# Coler v. Cleburne/Opinion of the Court

* Court Documents
* Case Syllabus
* Opinion of the Court
United States Supreme Court
131 U.S. 162
Coler v. Cleburne
Article 422 of the statute provides that the bonds shall be signed by the mayor. This clearly means that they shall be signed by the person who is mayor of the city when they are signed, and not by any other person. The legislature having declared who shall sign them, it was not open to the city council to provide that they should be signed by some other person. Article 423 of the statute provides that it shall be the duty of the mayor, whenever any bonds are issued, to forward them to the comptroller of public accounts of the state, for registry. They could not be issued until they were properly signed by a person who was the mayor at the time they were signed, and the comptroller could receive them lawfully for registry only from such mayor. So, also, by article 424, it is made the duty of the same mayor, and not that of any other person, at the time of forwarding the bonds to the comptroller for registration, to furnish him with the statement specified in that article. No other person than such mayor could furnish the comptroller with such statement.
The complete answer to the suggestion that the plea does not negative the idea that the bonds may have been signed by a person authorized by the defendant to sign them is that, in view of the statute, the defendant had no power to authorize any other person to sign them than the person who was mayor at the time they were signed. The answer to the suggestion that the plea does not negative the idea that they may have been signed by a person authorized by law to sign them is that, in view of the provisions of the statutes of Texas referred to, and of the allegations of the plea, it was for the plaintiff to aver or show, in reply to the plea, that the person who signed them, or some other person than the person who was mayor at the time they were signed, was authorized by law to sign them. It is contended for the plaintiff that, as Hodge, who signed the bonds as mayor, was the mayor on January 1, 1884, the date of the bonds, and the plaintiff was an innocent purchaser of them for value, he was not bound to look beyond the bonds themselves, and the enabling acts authorizing their issue, and that, if there was lawful authority to issue them, and the city appeared to have acted upon that authority, he was not obliged to inquire further, no matter what irregularity characterized the acts of the officers who issued them on behalf of the city; that the face of the bonds referred him to article 420 of the Statutes, and to the ordinance of September 13, 1883; that an examination of the statute and the ordinance would show authority to issue the bonds; that the records of the city would show that the persons who signed the bonds were the mayor and the secretary of the city on the 1st of January, 1884, the date of the bonds; that the indorsement on each bond would show that it had been registered by the comptroller; and that he had a right to presume that the bonds had been forwarded to the comptroller by the mayor, as provided by the statute, or otherwise the comptroller would not have registered them.
But we have always held that even bona fide purchasers of municipal bonds must take the risk of the official character of those who execute them. An examination of the records of the city in regard to the issuing of the bonds would have disclosed the fact that the bonds had not been signed and issued under h e ordinance of September 13, 1883, until July 3, 1884; that W. N. Hodge was not mayor on that day; and that the person who then signed the bonds as mayor was a private citizen. In Anthony v. County of Jasper, 101 U.S. 693, municipal bonds were signed and issued in October, 1872, on a subscription made in March, 1872, to the stock of a railroad company, and bore date the day of the subscription. The presiding justice who signed the bonds did not become such until October, 1872. Thus, the person who was in office when the bonds were actually signed, signed them, but they were antedated to a day when he was not in office. In the present case, the bonds were not signed by an officer who was in office when they were signed, but by a person who was in office on the antedated day on which they bore date. In the Jasper County Case there was a false date inserted in the bonds in order to avoid the effect of a registration act which took effect between the antedated date and the actual date of signing. In the present case there was a false signature. But the principle declared in the Jasper County Case is equally applicable to the present case. It was there said by Chief Justice WAITE, delivering the judgment of the court, (page 698:) 'The public can act only through its authorized agents, and it is not bound until all who are to participate in what is to be done have performed their respective duties. The authority of a public agent depends on the law as it is when he acts. He has only such powers as are specifically granted, and he cannot bind his principal under powers that have been taken away, by simply antedating his contracts. Under such circumstances, a false date is equivalent to a false signature; and the public, in the absence of any ratification of its own, is no more estopped by the one than it would be by the other. After the power of an agent of a private person has been revoked, he cannot bind his principal by simply dating back what he does. A retiring partner, after due notice of dissolution, cannot charge his firm for the payment of a negotiable promissory note, even in the hands of an innocent holder, by giving it a date within the period of the existence of the partnership. Antedating, under such circumstances, partakes of the character of a forgery, and is always open to inquiry, no matter who relies on it. The question is one of the authority of him who attempts to bind another. Every person who deals with or through an agent assumes all the risks of a lack of authority in the agent to do what he does. Negotiable paper is no more protected against this inquiry than any other. In Bayley v. Taber, 5 Mass. 286, it was held that when a statute provided that promissory notes of a certain kind, made or issued after a certain day, should be utterly void, evidence was admissible on behalf of the makers to prove that the notes were issued after that day, although they bore a previous date. * * * Purchasers of municipal securities must always take the risk of the genuineness of the official signatures of those who execute the paper they buy. This includes, not only the genuineness of the signature itself, but the official character of him who makes it.' This ruling has been since followed. In Bissell v. Spring Valley Tp., 110 U.S. 162, 3 Sup. Ct. Rep. 555, where bonds were issued by a township in payment of a subscription to railway stock, under a statute which made the signature of a particular officer essential, it was held that without the signature of that officer they were not the bonds of the township, and that the municipality was not estopped from disputing their validity by reason of recitals in the bond, setting forth the provisions of the statute, and a compliance with them. The same principle is recognized in Bank v. Porter Tp., 110 U.S. 608, 618, 619, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 254, and Bank v. Bergen Co., 115 U.S. 384, 390, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 88. The case of Weyauwega v. Ayling, 99 U.S. 112, is cited for the plaintiff. In that case the bonds of a town bore date June 1st, and were signed y A. as chairman of the board of supervisors, and by B. as town-clerk, and were delivered by A. to a railroad company. When sued on the coupons by a bona fide purchaser of the bonds for value before maturity, the town pleaded that the bonds were not in fact signed by B. until July 13th, at which date he had ceased to be town-clerk, and his successor was in office. It was held, Chief Justice WAITE delivering the opinion of the court, that the town was estopped from denying the date of the bonds, because, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, it must be assumed that the bonds were delivered to the company by A. with the assent of the then town-clerk. In Anthony v. County of Jasper the court distinguished that case from Weyauwega v. Ayling, and said that in the latter case it held that 'the town was estopped from proving that the bonds were actually signed by a former clerk after he went out of office, because the clerk in office adopted the signature as his own when he united with the chairman in delivering the bonds to the railroad company,' while in the former case the bonds were not complete in form when they were issued, and it was only by a false date that they were apparently so. In the present case it appears affirmatively by the bill of exceptions that the person who was mayor of the city at the time the bonds were signed took no part in signing, delivering, or issuing them; that they were not complete in form when they were issued, because they were not signed by the then mayor; and that it was only by a false date that they were then apparently complete in form. Hence, the present case is not like Weyauwega v. Ayling, but is like Anthony v. County of Jasper. This case is analogous to that of Amy v. City of Watertown, No. 1, 130 U.S. 301, ante, 530, where the statute required process to be served on the city by serving it on the mayor, and it was not so served, and it was held that there could be no substituted service, and no legal service without service on the mayor. Regarding these views as decisive of this case, we forbear discussing other questions on which it is maintained that the ruling of the circuit court was correct. Judgment affirmed.

## Notes

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