# The American Indian/Chapter 20

CHAPTER XX
THEORIES OF CULTURE ORIGIN
The familiar phenomenon of identity of traits among different groups of aborigines has always been treated as a serious problem. Our leading anthropologists have shown a tendency to seek the explanation for such identity in independent development rather than in diffusion, or borrowing, presumably because of the predisposition arising from experience with the highly organized military groups of Europe, where political unity is practically synonymous with cultural individuality. We have seen how this correlation also appeared among the more highly organized peoples of the New World, but was not found among the more primitive tribes where culture groups were far more inclusive than the political ones. But there is still another important factor favoring the independent origin theory: viz., Darwinism, the great influence of whose evolutionary ideas emphasized the development aspect of culture and thus gave the primitive social group an exaggerated importance.
According to the independent development theory, the unity of the human mind is sufficient to account for identities in culture wherever the environments are the same. Thus, according to this view, no matter what tribes moved into the country occupied by one of our culture centers, the environment would react on their minds in essentially the same way, suggesting the same ideas and so leading to the same inventions. One important objection to the wide application of this theory is that different peoples do not seem to arrive at the same solutions even when confronted with like conditions. Another difficulty is that similarities are found in such traits as mythological characters, social practices, etc., whose origin can not be successfully accounted for as reactions to the environment. Yet, a close view of the case shows that many ​times these objections can be fairly well met, so that a final conclusion as to the applicability of the theory is reached with difficulty. Further, it is clear that there is usually but a single solution for a problem so that if it is solved at all it will be solved in the same way and given time enough some one is by the law of accident sure to hit upon it. But the greatest difficulty with the theory of independent invention is found in the observed distribution, for this tends to be continuous over certain areas, instead of intermittent, as would be the case if due to accident, unless we assume a greater age for New World culture than other facts warrant. Also, we have historical examples of diffusion, as, for example, the Ghost Dance religion, the Peyote Cult, the Grass Dance ceremonies, the Spanish horse culture, etc., and scarcely one of the contrary kind. In these historic cases, the phenomena came under direct observation so that there can not be the least doubt as to diffusion, or borrowing by one social group from another. The most satisfactory conclusion, then, seems to be that while there is reason to believe that different social groups will ultimately solve many of their problems in the same way, they are far more likely to borrow the solutions of their neighbors, which arrangement gives the initial solution a very great advantage. Hence, when there is continuity of distribution we may posit a single origin, or locality, from which the trait has been diffused, until we can find evidence to the contrary.
The most modern advocate of the diffusion theory is Graebner, who is disposed to the extreme view that independent invention is practically impossible and that all similarities, however widely separated, are to be considered as having single origins. Such extreme views are always harmful, for they set up a mere formula according to which problems are solved deductively, whereas the true and safe method of science is to proceed empirically. The ideal method is to treat each case according to its own data and not to assume diffusion from a single locality until we have some good, specific reasons for so doing.
There is, however, still another theory to account for similarities in culture—an hypothesis first advocated by ​Ehrenreich, under the title of convergence. According to this view a definite culture complex, which appears to be the same among two or more social groups, may prove upon analysis to have been arrived at in quite different ways. The similarity is in this case merely an accident of development. As the reality of such convergence has been clearly established for certain instances, it must always be considered as a possible factor, and so complicates our problem. It has, however, one great virtue in that its applicability must be empirically determined for each case, and can not be deduced from a general presupposition. In fact, all these theories are of little use as formulæ of interpretation, for we must study carefully each trait-complex before a conclusion as to its origin can be reached. Their true functions are to define the different ways in which cultural similarities have been observed to come about.
The intensive analytic study of single trait-complexes has developed the pattern theory. The conception is that in certain phases of culture each social unit develops a style, or pattern, for its traits and that borrowed traits will be worked over to make them conform to this pattern. So far as we can now see such patterns hold only for organized traits like ceremonies and social systems of control. The very complete studies we now have for the cultures of a few tribes in the central part of North America suggest that in organized ceremonies each tribe has one main concept according to which all their ritualistic performances are adjusted. For example, we find that the Dakota have a conception that supernatural power comes by a vision or dream, in which an animal-like being designates a plant as containing the power sought, and this plant then becomes the important objective part of the ritual. The Menomini, on the other hand, consider that power is conveyed by a song and that the true supernatural experience is to be found only when a song is handed down. The rituals of each also have distinct forms or styles of composition by which they can be distinguished. Yet, so far as we have observed, these tribal pattern conceptions do not greatly interfere with the absorption of foreign rituals. For example, ​the hako pipe ritual of the Pawnee has been traced through a number of tribes without losing its important features. But where the pattern has most force is within the tribe itself. For example, in the Plains area we usually find a very large number of rituals projected on similar lines, indicating that they are the accumulative creations of many individuals in imitation of the rituals already established. This is particularly noticeable in the bundle rituals of the Blackfoot, Menomini, and Pawnee. Yet, these tribal patterns have not prevented the occasional borrowing of rituals from their neighbors. It is, perhaps, too soon to pass judgment upon the general applicability of the pattern theory, for until we have detailed analyses of several contiguous tribal complexes we can not form a satisfactory conception of just what ideas may have been worked over to form rituals not originally conforming to the tribal pattern; but as it now stands the theory of pattern phenomena applies rather to the original products of a tribe than to borrowed traits, and can not be considered as expressing an important principle of culture diffusion.
Perhaps the most important contributions to this subject have been made by those who have exhaustively studied the diffusion of single traits. As a good example, we may cite Goldenweiser's study of totemism, in which the distributions of the several elements appearing in specific examples of totemism are followed out to their limits, exposing the workings of pattern and other formative factors. Of equal value is Lowie's research in Plains societies previously cited.
In the older literature, we find a number of studies of single traits, particularly in material culture, but as their investigators usually took their diffusion for granted, they gave their chief attention to the question of genetic relationships. Yet what we need in this connection is analytic studies, like the above, that reveal the manner of diffusion over a considerable area. Some recent studies of material culture have made attempts of this kind. One of the most suggestive is the study of horse culture in both North and South America, first developed by Lewis, but carried out in some detail by the author. Here it can be shown that the natives of the New ​World first in contact with the Spanish settlements, acquired the whole horse-complex of the invaders. They did not take over the cart, but as a matter of fact, the Spaniards drew carts and ploughs with oxen, using horses and mules only for packing and riding. Historical data show that the whole horse-complex acquired by the first tribes was passed on to their neighbors in rapid succession, far in advance of interior exploration. Practically nothing was lost. Nor was anything of moment added except the travois in North America and a few ritualistic observances which, so far as they have been studied, seem to have had a common origin. In this region of aboriginal dog-traction there still remains a very important problem as to how much of the older dog-culture was incorporated in the more recent horse-complex. The only good study of dog-culture is that for the Hidatsa by Wilson, which suggests that in the care and handling of dogs and horses we shall find some pattern phenomena. On the other hand, the tribes of the pampas in the South seem to have had no dog-traction. Unfortunately, we have no data as to the ceremonial accompaniments of the horse, but in its objective features the horse-complex agrees with the Spanish riding complex.
The author's studies of maize culture show that in this case the whole complex was carried along over the eastern maize area and, what is perhaps of more significance, almost the entire complex was taken over by the English colonists. In the Old World, where the seed alone was introduced, we do not find this complex but an adaptation of the prevailing cereal complex.
Additional examples of diffusion by whole complexes come readily into mind so that we can generalize by stating that in the New World the diffusion of material complexes has been by wholes. It was not merely a plant, a food, or an idea that was borrowed, but a complete method, with all of its associates. When, however, we turn to ceremonial practices and art, the case is less simple, for there seems to be a conflict between tribal patterns and the new trait.
DIFFUSION OF THE GRASS DANCE TRAIT-COMPLEX
Fig. 102. Distribution of Men's Societies among the Indians of the Plains. The tribes having age-grades are indicated by underlining. (The Blood and Piegan are allied with the Blackfoot.)
Thus, we may generalize by stating that when a trait-complex is confined to a single area, it may be regarded as an independent invention. As such, it can be hypothetically, if not actually, assigned to a single tribe from whom it was diffused outwardly. Yet, we have seen that not one, but many such inventions seem to center in one place, or area. What, therefore, shall we say of the causes contributing to this result?
CULTURE TRAIT ASSOCIATION
Such discussions as the preceding lead ultimately to an important theoretical problem: namely, the nature of trait association within what we call a tribal culture. So far, we have used the term culture to designate the sum total of trait-complexes manifested by a social group, or tribe. We have naïvely assumed that they formed a whole, because they pertained to a single group of people and we have characterized types of culture by enumerating the most conspicuous of these traits. Such a view would, in the end, commit us to the theory that the simultaneous appearance of two or more traits was a mere coincidence, or an accident. In other words, unless we can find some other basis for this association of traits in a culture, such traits have no functional or other necessary relations to each other.
If we recall the details of trait distribution so far discussed, there come to mind many instances of whole groups of associated traits so segregated as to suggest their diffusion as a whole. In this book we have preferred to use the term trait-complex because it more accurately expresses the character of the phenomenon. For example, we have frequently referred to the maize-complex. By this term, we designate all the practices that immediately accompany maize production. Upon analysis, we find these processes to fall into unit cycles such as planting, cultivating, gathering, preserving, storing, grinding, ​cooking, etc., each of which may be quite complex in itself, but all are dependent one upon the other. They thus form a kind of logical sequence, the ultimate aim of which is to provide a specific type of food. As another example, we may cite pottery: here we again see a complex in which are a number of unit cycles of processes, as making the paste, modeling, drying, decorating, baking, etc. Now it appears that there is a functional association of some kind between the unit processes within one of these complexes—they are at least knit into a logical whole. On the other hand, our previous discussions have shown a tendency for the whole pottery-complex to accompany the maize-complex. Yet it is not apparent that one of these is necessary to the other. Since the natives of California cooked acorn meal in baskets (page 212), it appears equally possible to cook maize meal in the same manner. The coincidence, then, between the distribution of the maize-complex and the pottery-complex can scarcely be due to any objective functional relation between the two complexes themselves.
Another interesting example of such association has been noted among the tribes intermediate to the North American Plains center of culture. These tribes lived in tipis at all times except when engaged in the production of maize, during which period they occupied permanent houses of a different type. Now, if the tipi sufficed as a residence in one case, it could do so equally well in the other. The most satisfactory explanation for this peculiarity is that the tribes from whom the art of maize culture was borrowed, used a shelter of that kind. In the same way, we could assume that pottery vessels and maize were diffused. Such explanations for trait-complex associations are classed as historical interpretations. The tacit assumption is that if two complexes once happen to get associated there is small chance of diffusing one without the other.
We have taken our illustrations from material life, but they could be duplicated in about every aspect of culture. The distinguished English anthropologist, Tylor, once discussed such associations between social trait-complexes under the name 'adhesions,' which, in a way, rather closely characterizes the ​relation. In our discussions of relationship systems, we found certain methods of estimating kinship to follow certain forms of marriage; but, in such cases we are dealing with a single complex. On the other hand, we have not found that specific kinship complexes were always associated with specific ceremonial or other complexes. In short, nothing so far connects specific forms of ceremony with a single form of social organization.
The general net result of this inquiry, therefore, has been negative and we are left with a presumption that there are no direct functional relations between the several trait-complexes constituting a culture. The safest assumption seems to be that they are found together because historical causes operated to bring them into juxtaposition within the life of the group. Now, we are facing one of the very fundamental assumptions of anthropology: viz., the historical conception of culture, a subject for further consideration.
THE HISTORICAL CONCEPTION OF CULTURE
While the full exposition of the historical conception of culture is not permissible here, some general statements may be attempted. Each individual usually brings to this subject strong sociological biases which distort his comprehension of the idea. Thus, our particular ideas of race values and our opinions as to heredity make the assumption of a fair attitude toward even the facts of culture, extremely difficult. The zoological sciences have for their own the conception of evolution which is the heart and soul of the whole subject. Man as a mammal, or even as a primate, falls under this conception and we have seen how fruitful was its application in the discussion of New World racial affiliations with the Old. Taking this as the point of departure, sociology and anthropology have sought to interpret culture as the mere expression of organic evolution; but such interpretations could not be made consistent with the data. Heredity did not appear to perpetuate the different forms of culture found in the world, nor could it in any way account for the cultural associations formed by the historical nations. A good illustration of this difficulty is ​found in language; every one knows that a language is not inherited, for if such were the case a person would speak French, Algonquian, or Chinese according to his parentage, and not according to his first associates. Neither are shooting with bows or kindling fire with firedrills inherited. Yet, such are the elements that constitute culture-complexes. It appears, then, that the form and direction the development of culture takes is something of another sort from that followed by organic evolution, because the perpetuating mechanism is not the same. Further, the knowledge we now possess of culture prohibits any fundamental distinctions in this respect between, say, the Eskimo and the English, for in neither case is the particular form of culture perpetuated by direct inheritance. The phenomenon of English culture is made the subject matter of English history, but it is a fair assumption that the causes that operate in it are of the same general type as those that operate in Eskimoan culture. Hence, in dealing with problems of culture, we must take our points of regard from the historian, because he deals with the phenomena where the approaches are most complete and direct. We assume, therefore, that the culture complex of the Eskimo grew up in the same type manner as that of England and is, in other words, a historical fact. Both are conceived of as perpetuated and evolved by social mechanisms. On the other hand, the straight black hair of the New World native and the more specific cephalic character of the Eskimo are not facts of the same series and are perpetuated by a mechanism we call inheritance.
It seems strange that these two series of facts should be continually confused to the extent of reading the interpretations arising from one directly into the structure of the other. In so far, then, as anthropology deals with culture, which is, after all, the only distinctly human phenomenon in the objective sense, it conceives of it as historical phenomena and this conception is in so far the soul of its method. But anthropology is something more than the study of culture; it is essentially a coördinating and synthetizing science. It seeks to bring to bear upon the problem of man the full joint force of geology, zoology, and history. To do this is a no mean task, a task ​which offers the greatest possible scientific opportunity of the age.
* ↑ Mooney, 1896. I.
* ↑ Radin, 1914. II.
* ↑ Wissler, 1916. I.
* ↑ Wissler, 1914. I.
* ↑ Graebner, 1911. I.
* ↑ Ehrenreich, 1903. I.
* ↑ Goldenweiser, 1913. I; Lowie, 1912. I.
* ↑ Goldenweiser, 1913. I; Lowie, 1912. I.
* ↑ Fletcher, 1904. I.
* ↑ Goldenweiser, 1910. I.
* ↑ Lowie, 1916. II.
* ↑ Mason, 1895. I.
* ↑ Wissler, 1914. I.
* ↑ Wilson, G. L., 1917. I.
* ↑ Wissler, 1916. II.
* ↑ Wissler, 1916. I.
* ↑ Tylor, 1889. I; Czekanowski, 1911. I.