# Air and Liquid Systems Corp., et al. v. Roberta G. DeVries, Individually and as Administratrix of the Estate of John B. DeVries, Deceased, et al./Opinion of the Court

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 17–1104
AIR AND LIQUID SYSTEMS CORP., ET AL., PETITIONERS v. ROBERTA G. DEVRIES, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE OF JOHN B. DEVRIES, DECEASED, ET AL. ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT [March 19, 2019]
Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion of the Court.
In maritime tort cases, we act as a common-law court, subject to any controlling statutes enacted by Congress. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U. S. 471, 507–508 (2008). This maritime tort case raises a question about the scope of a manufacturer’s duty to warn. The manufacturers here produced equipment such as pumps, blowers, and turbines for three Navy ships. The equipment required asbestos insulation or asbestos parts in order to function as intended. When used on the ships, the equipment released asbestos fibers into the air. Two Navy veterans who were exposed to asbestos on the ships developed cancer and later died. The veterans’ families sued the equipment manufacturers, claiming that the manufacturers were negligent in failing to warn of the dangers of asbestos.
The plaintiffs contend that a manufacturer has a duty to warn when the manufacturer’s product requires ​incorporation of a part (here, asbestos) that the manufacturer knows is likely to make the integrated product dangerous for its intended uses. The manufacturers respond that they had no duty to warn because they did not themselves incorporate the asbestos into their equipment; rather, the Navy added the asbestos to the equipment after the equipment was already on board the ships.
We agree with the plaintiffs. In the maritime tort context, a product manufacturer has a duty to warn when (i) its product requires incorporation of a part, (ii) the manufacturer knows or has reason to know that the integrated product is likely to be dangerous for its intended uses, and (iii) the manufacturer has no reason to believe that the product’s users will realize that danger. The District Court did not apply that test when granting summary judgment to the defendant manufacturers. Although we do not agree with all of the reasoning of the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, we affirm its judgment requiring the District Court to reconsider its prior grants of summary judgment to the defendant manufacturers.
I
Kenneth McAfee served in the U. S. Navy for more than 20 years. As relevant here, McAfee worked on the U. S. S. Wanamassa from 1977 to 1980 and then on the U. S. S. Commodore from 1982 to 1986. John DeVries served in the U. S. Navy from 1957 to 1960. He worked on the U. S. S. Turner.
Those ships were outfitted with equipment such as pumps, blowers, and turbines. That equipment required asbestos insulation or asbestos parts in order to function as intended. When used as intended, that equipment can cause the release of asbestos fibers into the air. If inhaled or ingested, those fibers may cause various illnesses.
Five businesses–Air and Liquid Systems, CBS, Foster Wheeler, Ingersoll Rand, and General Electric–produced ​some of the equipment that was used on the ships. Although the equipment required asbestos insulation or asbestos parts in order to function as intended, those businesses did not always incorporate the asbestos into their products. Instead, the businesses delivered much of the equipment to the Navy without asbestos. The equipment was delivered in a condition known as “bare-metal.” In those situations, the Navy later added the asbestos to the equipment.
McAfee and DeVries allege that their exposure to the asbestos caused them to develop cancer. They and their wives sued the equipment manufacturers in Pennsylvania state court. (McAfee and DeVries later died during the course of the ongoing litigation.) The plaintiffs did not sue the Navy because they apparently believed the Navy was immune. See Feres v. United States, 340 U. S. 135 (1950). The plaintiffs also could not recover much from the manufacturers of the asbestos insulation and asbestos parts because those manufacturers had gone bankrupt. As to the manufacturers of the equipment–such as the pumps, blowers, and turbines–the plaintiffs claimed that those manufacturers negligently failed to warn them of the dangers of asbestos in the integrated products. If the manufacturers had provided warnings, the workers on the ships presumably could have worn respiratory masks and thereby avoided the danger.
Invoking federal maritime jurisdiction, the manufacturers removed the cases to federal court. The manufacturers then moved for summary judgment on the ground that manufacturers should not be liable for harms caused by later-added third-party parts. That defense is known as the “bare-metal defense.”
​The District Court granted the manufacturers’ motions for summary judgment. The U. S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit vacated and remanded. In re Asbestos Prods. Liability Litigation, 873 F. 3d 232, 241 (2017). The Third Circuit held that “a manufacturer of a bare-metal product may be held liable for a plaintiff ’s injuries suffered from later-added asbestos-containing materials” if the manufacturer could foresee that the product would be used with the later-added asbestos-containing materials. Id., at 240.
We granted certiorari to resolve a disagreement among the Courts of Appeals about the validity of the bare-metal defense under maritime law. 584 U. S. ___ (2018). Compare 873 F. 3d 232 (case below), with Lindstrom v. A-C Prod. Liability Trust, 424 F. 3d 488 (CA6 2005).
II
Article III of the Constitution grants the federal courts jurisdiction over maritime cases. Under 28 U. S. C. §1333, the federal courts have “original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States, of… [a]ny civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all cases all other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled.”
When a federal court decides a maritime case, it acts as a federal “common law court,” much as state courts do in state common-law cases. Exxon Shipping Co., 554 U. S., at 507. Subject to direction from Congress, the federal courts fashion federal maritime law. See id., at 508, n. 21; Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U. S. 19, 27 (1990); United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U. S. 397, 409 (1975); Detroit Trust Co. v. The Thomas Barlum, 293 U. S. 21, 42–44 (1934). In formulating federal maritime law, the federal courts may examine, among other sources, judicial opinions, legislation, treatises, and scholarly writings. See Exxon Co., U. S. A. v. Sofec, Inc., 517 U. S. 830, 839 (1996); East River S. S. Corp. v. Transamerica ​Delaval Inc., 476 U. S. 858, 864 (1986).
This is a maritime tort case. The plaintiffs allege that the defendant equipment manufacturers were negligent in failing to warn about the dangers of asbestos. “The general maritime law has recognized the tort of negligence for more than a century….” Norfolk Shipbuilding & Drydock Corp. v. Garris, 532 U. S. 811, 820 (2001); see also Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U. S. 625, 631–632 (1959). Maritime law has likewise recognized common-law principles of products liability for decades. See East River S. S. Corp., 476 U. S., at 865.
In this negligence case, we must decide whether a manufacturer has a duty to warn when the manufacturer’s product requires later incorporation of a dangerous part—here, asbestos—in order for the integrated product to function as intended.
We start with basic tort-law principles. Tort law imposes “a duty to exercise reasonable care” on those whose conduct presents a risk of harm to others. 1 Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm §7, p. 77 (2005). For the manufacturer of a product, the general duty of care includes a duty to warn when the manufacturer “knows or has reason to know” that its product “is or is likely to be dangerous for the use for which it is supplied” and the manufacturer “has no reason to believe” that the product’s users will realize that danger. 2 Restatement (Second) of Torts §388, p. 301 (1963–1964).
In tort cases, the federal and state courts have not reached consensus on how to apply that general tort-law “duty to warn” principle when the manufacturer’s product requires later incorporation of a dangerous part in order for the integrated product to function as intended. Three approaches have emerged.
The first approach is the more plaintiff-friendly foreseeability rule that the Third Circuit adopted in this case: A ​manufacturer may be liable when it was foreseeable that the manufacturer’s product would be used with another product or part, even if the manufacturer’s product did not require use or incorporation of that other product or part. See, e.g., 873 F. 3d, at 240; Kochera v. Foster Wheeler, LLC, 2015 WL 5584749, *4 (SD Ill., Sept. 23, 2015); Chicano v. General Elec. Co., 2004 WL 2250990, *9 (ED Pa., Oct. 5, 2004); McKenzie v. A. W. Chesterson Co., 277 Ore. App. 728, 749–750, 373 P. 3d 150, 162 (2016).
The second approach is the more defendant-friendly bare-metal defense that the manufacturers urge here: If a manufacturer did not itself make, sell, or distribute the part or incorporate the part into the product, the manufacturer is not liable for harm caused by the integrated product—even if the product required incorporation of the part and the manufacturer knew that the integrated product was likely to be dangerous for its intended uses. See, e.g., Lindstrom, 424 F. 3d, at 492, 495–497; Evans v. CBS Corp., 230 F. Supp. 3d 397, 403–405 (Del. 2017); Cabasug v. Crane Co., 989 F. Supp. 2d 1027, 1041 (Haw. 2013).
The third approach falls between those two approaches. Under the third approach, foreseeability that the product may be used with another product or part that is likely to be dangerous is not enough to trigger a duty to warn. But a manufacturer does have a duty to warn when its product requires incorporation of a part and the manufacturer knows or has reason to know that the integrated product is likely to be dangerous for its intended uses. Under that approach, the manufacturer may be liable even when the manufacturer does not itself incorporate the required part into the product. See, e.g., Quirin v. Lorillard Tobacco Co., 17 F. Supp. 3d 760, 769–770 (ND Ill. 2014); In re New York City Asbestos Litigation, 27 N. Y. 3d 765, 793–794, 59 N. E. 3d 458, 474 (2016); May v. Air & Liquid Systems Corp., 446 Md. 1, 29, 129 A. 3d 984, 1000 (2015).
We conclude that the third approach is the most ​appropriate for this maritime tort context.
To begin, we agree with the manufacturers that a rule of mere foreseeability would sweep too broadly. See generally 1 Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm §7, Comment j, at 82; 2 Restatement (Second) of Torts §395, Comment j, at 330. Many products can foreseeably be used in numerous ways with numerous other products and parts. Requiring a product manufacturer to imagine and warn about all of those possible uses—with massive liability looming for failure to correctly predict how its product might be used with other products or parts—would impose a difficult and costly burden on manufacturers, while simultaneously overwarning users. In light of that uncertainty and unfairness, we reject the foreseeability approach for this maritime context.
That said, we agree with the plaintiffs that the bare-metal defense ultimately goes too far in the other direction. In urging the bare-metal defense, the manufacturers contend that a business generally has “no duty” to “control the conduct of a third person as to prevent him from causing physical harm to another.” Id., §315, at 122. That is true, but it is also beside the point here. After all, when a manufacturer’s product is dangerous in and of itself, the manufacturer “knows or has reason to know” that the product “is or is likely to be dangerous for the use for which it is supplied.” Id., §388, at 301. The same holds true, we conclude, when the manufacturer’s product requires incorporation of a part that the manufacturer knows or has reason to know is likely to make the integrated product dangerous for its intended uses. As a matter of maritime tort law, we find no persuasive reason to distinguish those two similar situations for purposes of a manufacturer’s duty to warn. See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability §2, Comment i, p. 30 (1997) (“[W]arnings also may be needed to inform users and ​consumers of nonobvious and not generally known risks that unavoidably inhere in using or consuming the product”).
Importantly, the product manufacturer will often be in a better position than the parts manufacturer to warn of the danger from the integrated product. See generally G. Calabresi, The Costs of Accidents 311–318 (1970). The product manufacturer knows the nature of the ultimate integrated product and is typically more aware of the risks associated with that integrated product. By contrast, a parts manufacturer may be aware only that its part could conceivably be used in any number of ways in any number of products. A parts manufacturer may not always be aware that its part will be used in a way that poses a risk of danger.
To be sure, as the manufacturers correctly point out, issuing a warning costs time and money. But the burden usually is not significant. Manufacturers already have a duty to warn of the dangers of their own products. That duty typically imposes a light burden on manufacturers. See, e.g., Davis v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 399 F. 2d 121, 131 (CA9 1968); Butler v. L. Sonneborn Sons, Inc., 296 F. 2d 623, 625–626 (CA2 1961); Ross Labs. v. Thies, 725 P. 2d 1076, 1079 (Alaska 1986); Moran v. Faberge, Inc., 273 Md. 538, 543–544, 332 A. 2d 11, 15 (1975). Requiring a manufacturer to also warn when the manufacturer knows or has reason to know that a required later-added part is likely to make the integrated product dangerous for its intended uses should not meaningfully add to that burden.
The manufacturers also contend that requiring a warning even when they have not themselves incorporated the part into the product will lead to uncertainty about when product manufacturers must provide warnings. But the ​manufacturers have not pointed to any substantial confusion in those jurisdictions that have adopted this approach. And the rule that we adopt here is tightly cabined. The rule does not require that manufacturers warn in cases of mere foreseeability. The rule requires that manufacturers warn only when their product requires a part in order for the integrated product to function as intended.
The manufacturers further assert that requiring a warning in these circumstances will lead to excessive warning of consumers. Again, however, we are not aware of substantial overwarning problems in those jurisdictions that have adopted this approach. And because the rule we adopt here applies only in certain narrow circumstances, it will not require a plethora of new warnings.
Requiring the product manufacturer to warn when its product requires incorporation of a part that makes the integrated product dangerous for its intended uses–and not just when the manufacturer itself incorporates the part into the product–is especially appropriate in the maritime context. Maritime law has always recognized a “special solicitude for the welfare” of those who undertake to “venture upon hazardous and unpredictable sea voyages.” American Export Lines, Inc. v. Alvez, 446 U. S. 274, 285 (1980) (internal quotation marks omitted). The plaintiffs in this case are the families of veterans who served in the U. S. Navy. Maritime law’s longstanding solicitude for sailors reinforces our decision to require a warning in these circumstances. See Yamaha Motor Corp., U. S. A. v. Calhoun, 516 U. S. 199, 213 (1996); Miles, 498 U. S., at 36; Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U. S. 375, 387 (1970).
For those reasons, we conclude as follows: In the maritime tort context, a product manufacturer has a duty to warn when (i) its product requires incorporation of a part, (ii) the manufacturer knows or has reason to know that the integrated product is likely to be dangerous for its ​intended uses, and (iii) the manufacturer has no reason to believe that the product’s users will realize that danger. We do not purport to define the proper tort rule outside of the maritime context.
One final point for clarity: Courts have determined that this rule applies in certain related situations, including when: (i) a manufacturer directs that the part be incorporated, see, e.g., Bell v. Foster Wheeler Energy Corp., 2016 WL 5780104, *6–*7 (ED La., Oct. 4, 2016); (ii) a manufacturer itself makes the product with a part that the manufacturer knows will require replacement with a similar part, see, e.g., Chesher v. 3M Co., 234 F. Supp. 3d 693, 713–714 (S. C. 2017); Quirin, 17 F. Supp. 3d, at 769–770; May, 446 Md., at 29, 129 A. 3d, at 1000; or (iii) a product would be useless without the part, see, e.g., In re New York City Asbestos Litigation, 27 N. Y. 3d, at 793–794, 59 N. E. 3d, at 474. In all of those situations, courts have said that the product in effect requires the part in order for the integrated product to function as intended. We agree. The maritime tort rule we adopt today therefore encompasses those situations, so long as the manufacturer knows or has reason to know that the integrated product is likely to be dangerous for its intended uses, and the manufacturer has no reason to believe that the product’s users will realize that danger. *** In the maritime tort context, we hold that a product manufacturer has a duty to warn when (i) its product requires incorporation of a part, (ii) the manufacturer knows or has reason to know that the integrated product is likely to be dangerous for its intended uses, and (iii) the manufacturer has no reason to believe that the product’s users will realize that danger. The District Court should evaluate the evidence under that rule. Although we do not agree with all of the reasoning of the Third Circuit, we ​affirm its judgment requiring the District Court to reconsider its prior grants of summary judgment to the defendant manufacturers.
It is so ordered.
* ↑ Sometimes, the equipment manufacturers themselves added the asbestos to the equipment. Even in those situations, however, the Navy later replaced the asbestos parts with third-party asbestos parts.
* ↑ We do not rule out the possibility that, in certain circumstances, the parts manufacturer may also have a duty to warn.