# Select British Eloquence/Speech on addressing the King for his removal

This speech is a reconstruction (though there is reason to believe that the introductory part and the conclusion are very nearly in his own words) of one delivered by Sir Robert Walpole before the House of Commons, February, 1741, on a motion for an address to the King on Walpole's removal. It is included in Select British Eloquence by Chauncey A. Goodrich, D.D., published New York, 1865. Reconstruction, footnotes, editorial insertions, and the explanation of the aftermath are by Chauncey A. Goodrich, 1865.
It has been observed by several gentlemen, in vindication of this motion, that if it should be carried, nether my life, liberty, nor estate will be affected. But do the honorable gentlemen consider my character and reputation as of no moment? Is it no imputation to be arraigned before this House, in which I have sat forty years, and to have my name transmitted to posterity with disgrace and infamy? I will not conceal my sentiments, that to be named in Parliament as a subject of inquiry, is to me a matter of great concern. But I have the satisfaction, at the same time, to reflect, that the impression to be made depends upon the consistency of the charge and the motives of the prosecutors.
Had the charge been reduced to specific allegations, I should have felt myself called upon for a specific defense. Had I served a weak or wicked master, and implicitly obeyed his dictates, obedience to his commands must have been mu only justification. But as it has been my good fortune to serve a master who wants no bad ministers, and would have hearkened to none, my defense must rest on my own conduct. The consciousness of innocence is also a sufficient support against my present prosecutors. A further justification is derived from a consideration of the views and abilities of the prosecutors. Had I been guilty of great enormities, they want neither zeal and inclination to bring them forward, nor ability to place them in the most prominent point of view. But as I am conscious of no crime, my own experience convinces me that none can be justly imputed.
I must therefore ask the gentlemen, From whence does this attack proceed? From the passions and prejudices of the parties combined against me, who may be divided into three classes, the Boys, the riper Patriots, and the Tories. The Tories I can easily forgive. They have unwillingly come into the measure; and they do me honor in thinking it necessary to remove me, as their only obstacle. What, then, is the inference to be drawn from these premises? That demerit with my opponents ought to be considered as merit with others. But my great and principal crime is my long continuance in office; or, in other words, the long exclusion of those who now complain against me. This is the heinous offense which exceeds all others. I keep from them the possession of that power, those honors, and those emoluments, to which they so ardently and pertinaciously aspire. I will not attempt to deny the reasonableness and necessity of a party war; but in carrying on that war, all principles and rules of justice should not be departed from. The Tories must confess that the most obnoxious persons have felt few instances of extra-judicial power. Wherever they have been arraigned, a plain charge has been exhibited against them. They have had an impartial trial, and have been permitted to make their defense. And will they, who have experienced this fair and equitable mode of proceeding, act in direct opposition to every principle of justice, and establish this fatal precedent of parliamentary inquisition? Whom would they conciliate by a conduct so contrary to principle and precedent?
Can it be fitting in them [the Tories], who have divided the public opinion of the nation, to share it with those who now appear as their competitors? With the men of yesterday, the boys in politics, who would be absolutely contemptible did not their audacity render them detestable? With the mock patriots, whose practice and professions prove their selfishness and malignity; who threatened to pursue me to destruction, and who have never for a moment lost sight of their object? These men, under the name of Separatists, presume to call themselves exclusively the nation and the people, and under that character assume all power. In their estimation, the King, Lords, and Commons are a faction, and they are the government. Upon these principles they threaten the destruction of all authority, and think they have a right to judge, direct, and resist all legal magistrates. They withdraw from Parliament because they succeed in nothing; and then attribute their want of success, not to its true cause, their own want of integrity and importance, but to the effect of places, pensions, and corruption. May it not be asked on this point, Are the people on the court side more united than on the other? Are not the Tories, Jacobites, and Patriots equally determined? What makes this strict union? What cements this heterogeneous mass? Party engagements and personal attachments. However different their views and principles, they all agree in opposition. The Jacobites distress the government they would subvert; the Tories contend for party prevalence and power. The Patriots, from discontent and disappointment, would change the ministry, that themselves may exclusively succeed. They have labored this point twenty years unsuccessfully. They are impatient of longer delay. They clamor for change of measures, but mean only change of ministers.
In party contests, why should not both sides be equally steady? Does not a Whig administration as well deserve the support of the Whigs, as the contrary? Why is not principle the cement in one as well as the other; especially when my opponents confess that all is leveled against one man? Why this one man? Because they think, vainly, nobody else could withstand them. All others are treated as tools and vassals. The one is the corrupter; the numbers corrupted. But whence this cry of corruption, and exclusive claim of honorable distinction? Compare the estates, characters, and fortunes of the Commons on one side with those on the other. Let the matter be fairly investigated. Survey and examine the individuals who usually support the measures of government, and those who are in opposition. Let us see to whose side the balance preponderates. Look round both Houses and see to which side the balance of virtue and talents preponderates! Are all these on one side, and not on the other? Or are all these to be counterbalanced by an affected claim to the exclusive title of patriotism? Gentlemen have talked a great deal of patriotism. A venerable word, when duly practiced. But I am sorry to say that of late it has been so much hackneyed about, that it is in danger of falling into disgrace. The very idea of true patriotism is lost, and the term has been prostituted to the very worst of purposes. A patriot, sir! Why, patriots spring up like mushrooms! I could raise fifty of them within the four-and-twenty hours. I have raised many of them in one night. It is but refusing to gratify an unreasonable or an insolent demand, and up starts a patriot. I have never been afraid of making patriots; but I disdain and despise all their efforts. This pretended virtue proceeds from personal malice and disappointed ambition. There is not a man among them whose particular aim I am not able to ascertain, and from what motive they have entered into the lists of opposition.
I shall now consider the articles of accusation which they have brought against me, and which they have not thought fit to reduce to specific charges; and I shall consider these in the same order as that in which they were placed by the honorable member who made the motion. First, in regard to foreign affairs; secondly, to domestic affairs; and, thirdly, to the conduct of the war.
I. As to foreign affairs, I must take notice of the uncandid manner in which the gentlemen on the other side have managed the question, by blending numerous treaties and complicated negotiations into one general mass.
To form a fair and candid judgment of the subject, it becomes necessary not to consider the treaties merely insulated; but to advert to the time in which they were made, to the circumstances and situation of Europe when they were made, to the peculiar situation in which I stand, and to the power which I possessed. I am called repeatedly and insidiously prime and sole minister. Admitting, however, for the sake of argument, that I am prime and solo minister in this country, am I, therefore, prime and sole minister of all Europe? Am I answerable for the conduct of other countries as well as for that of my own? Many words are not wanting to show, that the particular view of each court occasioned the dangers which affected the public tranquillity; yet the whole is charged to my account. Nor is this sufficient. Whatever was the conduct of England, I am equally arraigned. If we maintained ourselves in peace, and took no share in foreign transactions, we are reproached for lameness and pusillanimity. If, on the contrary, we interfered in these disputes, we are called Don Quixotes, and dupes to all the world. If we contracted guarantees, it was asked why is the nation wantonly burdened? If guarantees were declined, we were reproached with having no allies.
I have, however, sir, this advantage, that all the objections now alleged against the conduct of the administration to which I have the honor to belong, have already been answered to the satisfaction of a majority of both houses of Parliament, and I believe to the satisfaction of a majority of the better sort of people in the nation. I need, therefore, only repeat a few of these answers that have been made already, which I shall do in the order of time in which the several transactions happened; and consequently must begin with our refusing to accept of the sole mediation offered us by Spain, on the breach between that court and the court of France, occasioned by the dismission of the Infanta of Spain.
I hope it will not be said we had any reason to quarrel with France upon that account; and therefore, if our accepting of that mediation might have produced a rupture with France, it was not our duty to interfere unless we had something very beneficial to expect from the acceptance. A reconciliation between the courts of Vienna and Madrid, it is true, was desirable to all Europe as well as to us, provided it had been brought about without any design to disturb our tranquillity or the tranquillity of Europe. But both parties were then so high in their demands that we could hope for no success; and if the negotiation had ended without effect, we might have expected the common fate of arbitrators, the disobliging of both. Therefore, as it was our interest to keep well with both, I must still think it was the most prudent part we could act to refuse the offered mediation.
The next step of our foreign conduct, exposed to reprehension, is the treaty of Hanover. Sir, if I were to give the true history of that treaty, which no gentleman can desire I should, I am sure I could fully justify my own conduct. But as I do not desire to justify my own without justifying his late Majesty's conduct, I must observe that his late Majesty had such information as convinced not only him, but those of his council, both at home and abroad, that some dangerous designs had been formed between the Emperor and Spain at the time of their concluding the treaty at Vienna, in May, 1725; designs, sir, which were dangerous not only to the liberties of this nation, but to the liberties of Europe. They were not only to wrest Gibraltar and Port Mahon from this nation, and force the Pretender upon us; but they were to have Don Carlos married to the Emperor's eldest daughter, who would thereby have had a probability of uniting in his person, or in the person of some of his successors, the crowns of France and Spain, with the imperial dignity and the Austrian dominions. It was therefore highly reasonable, both in France and us, to take the alarm at such designs, and to think betimes of preventing their being carried into execution. But with regard to us, it was more particularly our business to take the alarm, because we were to have been immediately attacked. I shall grant, sir, it would have been very difficult, if not impossible, for Spain and the Emperor joined together, to have invaded or made themselves masters of any of the British dominions. But will it be said they might not have invaded the King's dominions in Germany, in order to force him to a compliance with what they desired of him as King of Great Britain? And if those dominions had been ¡nvaded on account of a quarrel with this nation, should we not have been obliged, both in honor and interest, to defend them? When we were thus threatened, it was therefore absolutely necessary for us to make an alliance with France; and that we might not trust too much to their assistance, it was likewise necessary to form alliances with the northern powers, and with some of the princes in Germany, which we never did, nor ever could do, without granting them immediate subsidies. These measures were, therefore, I still think, not only prudent, but necessary; and by these measures we made it much more dangerous for the Emperor and Spain to attack us, than it would otherwise have been.
But still, sir, though by these alliances we put ourselves upon an equal footing with our enemies in case of an attack, yet, in order to preserve the tranquillity of Europe as well as our own, there was something else to be done. We knew that war could not be begun and carried on without money; we knew that the Emperor had no money for that purpose without receiving large remittances from Spain; and we knew that Spain could make no such remittances without receiving large returns of treasure from the West Indies. The only way, therefore, to render these two powers incapable of disturbing the tranquillity of Europe, was by sending a squadron to the West Indies to stop the return of the Spanish galleons; and this made it necessary, at the same time, to send a squadron to the Mediterranean for the security of our valuable possessions in that part of the world. By these measures the Emperor saw the impossibility of attacking us in any part of the world, because Spain could give him no assistance either in money or troops; and the attack made by the Spaniards upon Gibraltar was so feeble, that we had no occasion to call upon our allies for assistance. A small squadron of our own prevented their attacking it by sea, and from their attack by land we had nothing to fear. They might have knocked their brains out against inaccessible rocks to this very day, without bringing that fortress into any danger.
I do not pretend, sir, to be a great master of foreign affairs. In that post in which I have the honor to serve his Majesty, it is not my business to interfere; and as one of his Majesty's council, I have but one voice. But if I had been the sole adviser of the treaty of Hanover, and of all the measures which were taken in pursuance of it, from what I have said I hope it will appear that I do not deserve to be censured either as a weak or a wicked minister on that account.
The next measures which incurred censure were the guarantee of the Pragmatic Sanction by the second treaty of Vienna, and the refusal of the cabinet to assist the house of Austria, in conformity with the articles of that guarantee.
As to the guarantee of the Pragmatic Sanction, I am really surprised to find that measure objected to. It was so universally approved of, both within doors and without, that till this very day I think no fault was ever found with it, unless it was that of being too long delayed. If it was so necessary for supporting the balance of power in Europe, as has been insisted on in this debate, to preserve entire the dominions of the house of Austria, surely it was not our business to insist upon a partition of them in favor of any of the princes of the empire. But if we had, could we have expected that the house of Austria would have agreed to any such partition, even for the acquisition of our guarantee? The King of Prussia had, it is true, a claim upon some lordships in Silesia; but that claim was absolutely denied by the court of Vienna, and was not at that time so much insisted on by the late King of Prussia. Nay, if he had lived till this time, I believe it would not now have been insisted on; for he acceded to that guarantee without any reservation of that claim; therefore I must look upon this as an objection which has since arisen from an accident that could not then be foreseen or provided against.
I must therefore think, sir, that our guarantee of the Pragmatic Sanction, or our manner of doing it, can not now be objected to, nor any person censured by Parliament for advising that measure. In regard to the refusal of the cabinet to assist the house of Austria, though it was prudent and right in us to enter into that guarantee, we were not therefore obliged to enter into every broil the house of Austria might afterward lead themselves into. And therefore, we were not in honor obliged to take any share in the war which the Emperor brought upon himself in the year 1733; nor were we in interest obliged to take a share in that war as long as neither side attempted to push their conquests farther than was consistent with the balance of power in Europe, which was a case that did not happen. For the power of the house of Austria was not diminished by the event of that war, because they got Tuscany, Parma, and Placentia in lieu of Naples and Sicily; nor was the power of France much increased, because Lorraine was a province she had taken and kept possession of during every war in which she had been engaged.
As to the disputes with Spain, they had not then reached such a height as to make it necessary for us to come to an open rupture. We had then reason to hope, that all differences would be accommodated in an amicable manner; and while we have any such hopes, it can never be prudent for us to engage ourselves in war, especially with Spain, where we have always had a very beneficial commerce. These hopes, it is true, sir, at last proved abortive; but I never heard it was a crime to hope for the best. This sort of hope was the cause of the late Convention. If Spain had performed her part of that preliminary treaty, I am sure it would not have been wrong in us to have hoped for a friendly accommodation; and for that end to have waited nine or ten months longer, in which time the plenipotentiaries were, by the treaty, to have adjusted all the differences subsisting between the two nations. But the failure of Spain in performing what had been agreed to by this preliminary, put an end to all our hopes, and then, and not till then, it became prudent to enter into hostilities, which were commenced as soon as possible after the expiration of the term limited for the payment of the £95,000.
Strong and virulent censures have been cast on me for having commenced the war without a single ally; and this deficiency has been ascribed in the multifarious treaties in which I have bewildered myself. But although the authors of this imputation are well apprised, that all these treaties have been submitted to and approved by Parliament, yet they are now brought forward as crimes, without appealing to the judgment of Parliament, and without proving or declaring that all or any of them were advised by me. A supposed sole minister is to be condemned and punished as the author of all; and what adds to the enormity is, that an attempt was made to convict him uncharged and unheard, without taking into consideration the most arduous crisis which ever occurred in the annals of Europe. Sweden corrupted by France; Denmark tempted and wavering; the Landgrave of Hesse Cassel almost gained; the King of Prussia, the Emperor, and the Czarina, with whom alliances had been negotiating, dead; the Austrian dominions claimed by Spain and Bavaria; the Elector of Saxony hesitating whether he should accede to the general confederacy planned by France; the court of Vienna irresolute and indecisive. In this critical juncture, if France enters into engagements with Prussia, and if the Queen of Hungary hesitates and listens to France, are all or any of those events to be imputed to English counsels? And if to English counsels, why are they to be attributed to one man?
II. I now come, sir, to the second head, the conduct of domestic affairs. And here a most heinous charge is made, that the nation has been burdened with unnecessary expenses, for the sole purpose of preventing the discharge of our debts and the abolition of taxes. But this attack is more to the dishonor of the whole cabinet council than to me. If there is any ground for this imputation, it is a charge upon King, Lords, and Commons, as corrupted, or imposed upon. And they have no proof of these allegations, but affect to substantiate them by common fame and public notoriety!
No expense has been incurred but what has been approved of, and provided for, by Parliament. The public treasure has been duly applied to the uses to which it was appropriated by Parliament, and regular accounts have been annually laid before Parliament, of every article of expense. If by foreign accidents, by the disputes of foreign states among themselves, or by their designs against us, the nation has often been put to an extraordinary expense, that expense can not be said to have been unnecessary; because, if by saving it we had exposed the balance of power to danger, or ourselves to an attack, it would have cost, perhaps, a hundred times that sum before we could recover from that danger, or repel that attack.
In all such cases there will be a variety of opinions. I happened to be one of those who thought all these expenses necessary, and I had the good fortune to have the majority of both houses of Parliament on my side. But this, it seems, proceeded from bribery and corruption. Sir, if any one instance had been mentioned, if it had been shown that I ever offered a reward to any member of either House, or ever threatened to deprive any member of his office or employment, in order to influence his vote in Parliament, there might have been some ground for this charge. But when it is so generally laid, I do not know what I can say to it, unless it be to deny it as generally and as positively as it has been asserted. And, thank God! till some proof be offered, I have the laws of the land, as well as the laws of charity, in my favor.
Some members of both Houses have, it is true, been removed from their employments under the Crown; but were they ever told, either by me, or by any other of his Majesty's servants, that it was for opposing the measures of the administration in Parliament? They were removed because his Majesty did not think fit to continue them longer in his service. His Majesty had a right so to do; and I know no one that has a right to ask him, "What doest thou?" If his Majesty had a mind that the favors of the Crown should circulate, would not this of itself be a good reason for removing any of his servants? Would not this reason be approved of by the whole nation, except those who happen to be the present possessors? I can not, therefore, see how this can be imputed as a crime, or how any of the King's ministers can he blamed for his doing what the public has no concern in; for if the public be well and faithfully served, it has no business to ask by whom.
As to the particular charge urged against me, I mean that of the army debentures, I am surprised, sir, to hear any thing relating to this affair charged upon me. Whatever blame may attach to this affair, it must be placed to the account of those that were in power when I was, as they call it, the country gentleman. It was by them this affair was introduced and conducted, and I came in only to pay off those public securities, which their management had reduced to a great discount; and consequently to redeem our public credit from that reproach which they had brought upon it. The discount at which these army debentures were negotiated, was a strong and prevalent reason with Parliament to apply the sinking fund first to the payment of those debentures; but the sinking fund could not be applied to that purpose till it began to produce something considerable, which was not till the year 1727. That the sinking fund was then to receive а great addition, was a fact publicly known in 1726; and if some people were sufficiently quick-sighted to foresee that the Parliament would probably make this use of it, and cunning enough to make the most of their own foresight, could I help it, or could they be blamed for doing so? But I defy my most inveterate enemy to prove that I had any hand in bringing these debentures to a discount, or that I had any share in the profits by buying them up.
In reply to those who confidently assert that the national debt is not decreased since 1727, and that the sinking fund has not been applied to the discharge of the public burdens, I can with truth declare, that a part of the debt has been paid off; and the landed interest has been very much eased with respect to that most unequal and grievous burden, the land tax. I say so, sir, because upon examination it will appear, that within these sixteen or seventeen years, no less than £8,000,000 of our debt has been actually discharged, by the due application of the sinking fund; and at least £7,000,000 has been taken from that fund, and applied to the ease of the land tax. For if it had not been applied to the current service, we must have supplied that service by increasing the land tax; and as the sinking fund was originally designed for paying off our debts, and easing us of our taxes, the application of it in ease of the land tax, was certainly as proper and necessary a use as could be made. And I little thought that giving relief to landed gentlemen, would have been brought against me as a crime.
III. I shall now advert to the third topic of accusation: the conduct of the war. I have already stated in what manner, and under what circumstances, hostilities commenced; and as I am neither general nor admiral—as I have nothing to do either with our navy or army—I am sure I am not answerable for the prosecution of it. But were I to answer for every thing, no fault could, I think, be found with my conduct in the prosecution of the war. It has from the beginning been carried on with as much vigor, and as great care of our trade, as was consistent with our safety at home, and with the circumstances we were in at the beginning of the war. If our attacks upon the enemy were too long delayed, or if they have not been so vigorous or so frequent as they ought to have been, those only are to blame who have for many years been haranguing against standing armies; for, without a sufficient number of regular troops in proportion to the numbers kept up by our neighbors, I am sure we can neither defend ourselves nor offend our enemies. On the supposed miscarriages of the war, so unfairly stated, and so unjustly imputed to me, I could, with great ease, frame an incontrovertible defense. But as I have trespassed so long on the time of the House, I shall not weaken the effect of that forcible exculpation, so generously and disinterestedly advanced by the right honorable gentleman who so meritoriously presides at the Admiralty.
If my whole administration is to be scrutinized and arraigned, why are the most favorable parts to be omitted? If facts are to be accumulated on one side, why not on the other? And why may not I be permitted to speak in my own favor? Was I not called by the voice of the King and the nation to remedy the fatal effects of the South Sea project, and to support declining credit? Was I not placed at the head of the treasury when the revenues were in the greatest confusion? Is credit revived, and does it now flourish? Is it not at an incredible height, and if so, to whom must that circumstance be attributed? Has not tranquillity been preserved both at home and abroad, notwithstanding a most unreasonable and violent opposition? Has the true interest of the nation been pursued, or has trade flourished? Have gentlemen produced one instance of this exorbitant power; of the influence which I extend to all parts of the nation; of the tyranny with which I oppress those who oppose, and the liberality with which I reward those who support me? But having first invested me with a kind of mock dignity, and styled me a prime minister, they impute to me an unpardonable abuse of that chimerical authority which they only have created and conferred. If they are really persuaded that the army is annually established by me, that I have the sole disposal of posts and honors, that I employ this power in the destruction of liberty and the diminution of commerce, let me awaken them from their delusion. Let me expose to their view the real condition of the public weal. Let me show them that the Crown has made no encroachments, that all supplies have been granted by Parliament, that all questions have been debated with the same freedom as before the fatal period in which my counsels are said to have gained the ascendency; an ascendency from which they deduce the loss of trade, the approach of slavery, the preponderance of prerogative, and the extension of influence. But I am far from believing that they feel those apprehensions which they so earnestly labor to communicate to others; and I have too high an opinion of their sagacity not to conclude that, even in their own judgment, they are complaining of grievances that they do not suffer, and promoting rather their private interest than that of the public.
What is this unbounded sole power which is imputed to me? How has it discovered itself, or how has it been proved?
What have been the effects of the corruption, ambition, and avarice with which I am so abundantly charged?
Have I ever been suspected of being corrupted? A strange phenomenon, a corrupter himself not corrupt! Is ambition imputed to me? Why then do I still continue a commoner? I, who refused a white staff and a peerage. I had, indeed, like to have forgotten the little ornament about my shoulders [the garter], which gentlemen have so repeatedly mentioned in terms of sarcastic obloquy. But surely, though this may be regarded with envy or indignation in another place, it can not be supposed to raise any resentment in this House, where many may be pleased to see those honors which their ancestors have worn, restored again to the Commons.
Have I given any symptoms of an avaricious disposition? Have I obtained any grants from the Crown, since I have been placed at the head of the treasury? Has my conduct been different from that which others in the same station would have followed? Have I acted wrong in giving the place of auditor to my son, and in providing for my own family? I trust that their advancement will not be imputed to me as a crime, unless it shall be proved that I placed them in offices of trust and responsibility for which they were unfit.
But while I unequivocally deny that I am sole and prime minister, and that to my influence and direction all the measures of the government must be attributed, yet I will not shrink from the responsibility which attaches to the post I have the honor to hold; and should, during the long period in which I have sat upon this bench, any one step taken by government be proved to be either disgraceful or disadvantageous to the nation, I am ready to hold myself accountable.
To conclude, sir, though I shall always be proud of the honor of any trust or confidence from his Majesty, yet I shall always be ready to remove from his councils and presence when he thinks fit; and therefore I should think myself very little concerned in the event of the present question, if it were not for the encroachment that will thereby be made upon the prerogatives of the Crown. But I must think that an address to his Majesty to remove one of his servants, without so much as alleging any particular crime against him, is one of the greatest encroachments that was ever made upon the prerogatives of the Crown. And therefore, for the sake of my master, without any regard for my own, I hope all those that have a due regard for our constitution, and for the rights and prerogatives of the Crown, without which our constitution can not be preserved, will be against this motion.
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## Aftermath

This speech had a great effect. The motion for an address was negatived by a large majority.
But the advantage thus gained was only temporary. A spirit of disaffection had spread throughout the kingdom; and the next elections, which took place a few months after, showed that the power and influence of Walpole were on the decline. Still he clung to office with a more desperate grasp than ever. He used some of the most extraordinary expedients ever adopted by a minister, to divide the Opposition and retain his power. He even opened a negotiation with the Pretender at Rome, to obtain the support of the Jacobites. But his efforts were in vain. He lost his majority in the House; he was compelled to inform the King that he could no longer administer the government; he was created Earl of Orford with a pension of £4000 a year, and resigned all his offices on the 11th of February, 1742.

## Footnotes

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* 1 2 By the Boys he means Pitt, Lyttleton, &c., who were recently from college, with an ardent love of liberty, and much under the influence of Pulteney and others of more mature age, who were the "riper Patriots."
* 1 2 This refers to a secession from the House headed by Wyndham, after the debate on the Spanish convention in 1739. It placed those who withdrew in a very awkward and even ridiculous position, from which they were glad to escape with consistency some months after, when the war was declared against Spain.
* 1 2 The Infanta of Spain was betrothed to Louis XV., king of France, when four years old, and was sent to Paris to be educated there. At the end of two years, Louis broke off the engagement and sent her back to Madrid. This indignity awakened the keenest resentment at the Spanish court, which sought to involve England in the quarrel by offering to make her sole mediator in respect to existing differences between Spain and the Emperor of Germany, thus throwing Spain entirely into the hands of England. The English government, for the reasons here assigned by Walpole, wisely rejected the mediation, and this was now imputed to him as a crime.
* 1 2 Spain now turned her resentment against England, and settled her differences with the Emperor of Germany on terms so favorable to the latter, as to awaken suspicions (which were confirmed by secret intelligence) that some hidden compact had been made, for conjointly attacking the dominions of England. To counteract this, England, in 1725, united with France, Prussia, Denmark, and Holland, in an opposing league, by a compact called the treaty of Hanover, from the place where it was made. The evidence of these facts could not then be brought forward to defend the ministry; and hence the treaty of Hanover, and the consequent expenditures on the Continent, were extremely unpopular in England. But subsequent disclosures have made it nearly or quite certain, that every thing here alleged by Walpole was strictly true.
* 1 2 Charles VI., emperor of Germany, having no male issue, made an instrument called a Pragmatic Sanction, by which all his hereditary estates were to devolve on his female descendants. To give this instrument greater force, he induced nearly all the powers of Europe (and England among the rest, for reasons assigned by Walpole) to unite in a guarantee for carrying it into effect. But this, although designed to secure Austria against a partition between various claimants, in case of his death, was certainly not intended to pledge England or any other power to interfere in all the quarrels in which the Emperor might engage. When he became involved in war with France, therefore, in 1733, by supporting Augustus for the vacant throne of Poland, against the remonstrances of Walpole, the latter was under no obligation to afford him aid.
* 1 2 This is the only point on which Walpole is tame and weak. It is exactly the point where, if he had acted a manly part eighteen months before, his defense would have been most triumphant. He knew there was no ground for a war with Spain; and be ought to have held to the truth on that point, even at the sacrifice of his office.
* 1 2 This "critical juncture" wns occasioned by the recent death of the Emperor Charles VI. Under the Pragmatic Sanction, his Austrian possessions fell to his daughter Maria Theresa, queen of Hungary; but were claimed in part by Spain, though chiefly by the Elector of Bavaria, supported by France. Frederick of Prussia, afterward called the Great, who had just succeeded his father, was fluctuating between France and the Queen; but offered to support the latter if she would cede to him Silesia. Walpole, who wished to defeat the plans of France, advised her to yield to this demand, though unjust, and thus prevent a general war. Her ministers were weak and irresolute, and the affairs of Europe were in utter confusion. The proud spirit of the Queen soon decided the question. She refused the surrender of Silesia, was attacked by Frederick and the French, and was on the brink of ruin; when she made, seven months after this speech was delivered, her celebrated appeal for support to the Diet of Hungary, by which, in the words of Johnson, "The Queen, the Beauty, set the world in arms."
* 1 2 One who held himself bound to neither party.
* 1 2 Here Walpole dexterously avoids the main point of the difficulty. In 1717, it was provided by law that all the surplus income of the government should be converted into what was called the Sinking Fund, which was to be used for paying off the public debt. This principle was strictly adhered to down to 1729, when more than a million of this fund was used for current expenses, instead of laying taxes to meet them. The same thing was done in six other instances, under Walpole's administration. Now it is true, as Walpole says, that by thus applying the fund, he lessened the land tax. Still, it was a perversion of the fund from its original design; and if the taxes had been uniformly laid for all current expenses, and the fund been faithfully applied to its original purpose, the debt (small as it then was) might perhaps have wholly been extinguished.