# Building Up Socialism/Chapter 6

Chapter VI.
TROTSKY, ZINOVIEV AND CO.
It would be most expedient to commence the review of the latter category of critics with comrade Trotsky, the more so that Trotsky's criticism is so importunate and clamorous that it is literally impossible to avoid it. Here it would be sufficient to refer to two passages frequently reproduced in literature in order to compare them with the criticism we have just examined. The following are two passages from the works of comrade Trotsky.
"In order to make its victory secure the proletarian vanguard must in the very first days of its domination make deep inroads, not only into feudal but also into bourgeois property. In doing so it will come into hostile conflict, not only with all the groups of the bourgeoisie but also with the wide masses of the peasantry, with whose aid it came into power. The contradictions in the position of the Workers' Government in a backward country, in which the peasantry represent the overwhelming majority of the population, can find a solution only on an international scale, in the arena of the world proletarian revolution. Compelled by historic forces to break down the bourgeois democratic limitations of the Russian Revolution, the victorious proletariat will be compelled to break down its national State limitations, i.e., it must strive consciously to make the Russian Revolution become the prologue ​to world revolution." (Introduction to "1905," Moscow, 1922.)
This is the first passage from the works of Trotsky written in 1922.
Here is the second passage:
"Without the direct State aid of the European proletariat, the working class of Russia cannot retain power and convert its temporary domination into prolonged Socialistic dictatorship. Of this there cannot be any doubt for a single moment."
If we take the trouble to compare what comrade Trotsky says here with what was said by the Social-Democrat, Otto Bauer, we cannot but observe the close similarity, if not coincidence, of the two points of view. Trotsky in 1922 did not deny the existence of the proletarian dictatorship in Russia, but the cunning Bauer also accepted that dictatorship as a fact. On the other hand, while the clever prelate of the Social-Democratic church cautiously introduces a slight modification, i.e., the dictatorship is proletarian, but very short-lived, and its existence depends directly upon the State aid of the Western proletariat—the tribune of the revolution, Trotsky, does not concede one iota to Bauer: he too (apparently out of fear of falling into the sin of national limitations) cannot conceive that the Russian proletariat can guarantee the transition of ​its temporary domination into prolonged Socialist dictatorship without direct State aid.
However much they may wriggle, and turn the similarity—speaking mildly—is positively striking. The position of Trotsky on the question of the possibility of constructing Socialism in our country (or, what amounts to the same thing, on the question of the character of our revolution) is nothing more or less than the Russian translation оf the Bauer Social-Democratic variation. That is why the fact became possible in the fight against the Leninist Central Committee of the Russian Bolsheviks, that Trotsky found himself in the same company with a man who recently acquired the deplorable reputation of renegade, Korsch and his friends. This honourable gentleman, who has been expiating his Communist sins by preaching a holy crusade against the Russian Revolution, has now also perceived, through the blessing of Kautsky, the bourgeois-peasant character of our revolution and is now announcing that the Russian Bolsheviks are cultivating the off-shoots of a new, American type of capitalism. What is there surprising about this? Since no proletarian State aid from the West is forthcoming, it is not surprising that the proletarian dictatorship is changing into something "far from proletarian"; it is not surprising that it is "running off" class rails, this is the elementary conclusion to be drawn from the Bauer-Trotsky premises. …
Having finished with Trotsky, we must examine the extremely peculiar variation of the "friendly" criticism of the Leninist point of, view of the character of our revolution: we have in mind the criticism of Lenin on the part of Zinoviev, Kamenev and others in the period of the October Revolution; the peculiarity of this criticism was evidenced in that ​the comrades mentioned opposed to Lenin not only their theoretical "line," but put forward "in a friendly manner" also their political counter-platform.
First of all, however, we must deal with the criticism of the Leninist point of view advanced by Kamenev at the Conference of April, 1917. This is absolutely necessary because the position occupied by Kamenev in April, 1917, which was revealed with particular distinctness in his speech in opposition to the Central Committee's report at the All-Russian Conference, is the intellectual source and the theoretical basis of the desertion from the October line of policy on the part of the comrades mentioned.
At the April Conference, Lenin's report and Kamenev's opposition report dealt with the character of the revolution which was then commencing and with the classes which might be and were it driving forces. The conference, in determining the line of policy to be carried on by the Party for the period immediately ahead—and that was the period when the revolution was unfolding itself—could not avoid answering the question: "What kind of revolution was unfolding itself, merely bourgeois revolution or a revolution growing into a Socialist revolution?" Both the reporter, comrade Lenin and the counter-reporter, comrade Kamenev, raised this question and answered it. Lenin saw the task of the immediate future, of the next few months ahead, to be "to take the first concrete steps towards this transition," i.e., transition to lines of Socialist revolution. To Kamenev, however, to think as Lenin did, that "this revolution is not a bourgeois democratic revolution, that it is approaching towards a Socialist revolution," implied "falling into great error." Thus:
"If the bourgeois democratic revolution is finished then this bloc [between the working class and the petty bourgeoisie—N.B.] cannot exist and no definite tasks will confront them, the proletariat will carry on a revolutionary struggle against the petty bourgeois bloc. Joint work from that moment is absolutely impossible. However, we recognise the Soviets as the centres of the organisation of forces; consequently, we recognise that there are tasks which can be fulfilled by the alliance between the workers and peasants. Consequently, the bourgeois revolution is not finished, has not yet outlived itself, and 1 think that all of you must admit that if this revolution was completely finished, power would really pass into the hands of the proletariat. Then the moment would have arrived for a break in the alliance between the proletariat and the petty bourgeoisie and for the independent fulfilment of proletarian aims by the proletariat, itself. I think we must adopt one of two tactics: either the proletariat is confronted by tasks which can be fulfilled only by the proletariat and no other social group can aid it in that—and then we must break the alliance and proceed to the fulfilment of these ideas which must be fulfilled by the proletariat; or we consider that by virtue of the conditions of the moment the bloc is practical and has a future before it—then we take part in the bloc and formulate our tactics so that the alliance shall not be broken. Hence, I say that the proletarian Party must stand out separately in this bloc and clearly and precisely define its own purely Socialist international aims. We will march with the bloc and can still do several paces jointly with ​it. I hope the proletarian Party will really act in this manner."
Here, in passing, another question is raised (or more correctly another phase of the same problem), viz., the question of the role of the peasantry in the proletarian revolution, the question as to whether the peasantry can still be utilised as a force capable of helping the revolution. The point of view of Kamenev is quite clear on this also: there can be no talk of a proletarian dictatorship marching side by side with the peasantry; there can be no dictatorship of the working class under which the proletariat could construct Socialism in conjunction with the peasantry and guide the peasantry in this work. For Kamenev, on the contrary, the capture of power by the proletariat, the point at which the proletariat commences the work of constructing Socialism, is precisely the point at which the proletariat breaks with the peasantry. Not alliance with the peasantry, but irreconcilable antagonism and struggle with the peasantry, is what Kamenev dreamed of at the beginning of the revolution.
Of course, this theoretical analysis of our revolution, this estimation of its driving forces and of the relations between the working class and the peasantry, the assertion that a bloc between the working class and the peasantry is impossible under the proletarian dictatorship, etc., wholly and completely determined the position of Kamenev and his friends at the outbreak of the October ​revolution. In those October days, Kamenev found himself in opposition to Lenin and the majority of the Central Committee and, as a consistent man, he drew the practical conclusions from the theories he developed at the April conference in opposition to the theories of Lenin. Others who followed Kamenev, consistently or inconsistently, also did nothing else but take the consequences of the first "friendly" attempt at the theoretical revision of Leninism. Indeed, if the capture of power by the proletariat signifies inevitable conflict with, the peasantry, then it is impossible to participate in a government of the proletarian dictatorship; it is impossible to call upon the proletariat to revolt; for its defeat can be foretold with astronomical precision. From this follows also the letter published against calling the workers to revolt and from this follows also the resignations from the Central Committee and from the Council of People's Commissaries.
Observe the leitmotif that runs through all these documents which are supposed to "elucidate", and "explain" these disgusting desertions and resignations, this violation of Party discipline, this flight from the field of battle. The following, for example, is an extract from a document signed, among others, by comrade Shliapnikov:
"We hold the point of view, that it is necessary to establish a Socialist Government comprising all the Soviet Parties." (At that time the term 'Soviet Party' applied to all those parties which adopted the 'Soviet platform' and which were represented in the Soviets, i.e., the Bolsheviks, the Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries.—N.B.). "We are of the opinion that only the formation of such a ​government can secure for us the fruits of the heroic struggle of the working class and the revolutionary army in the October-November days. We believe that outside of this there is only one alternative: the preservation of a clearly Bolshevik Government by means of political terror. This alternative has been adopted by the Council of People's Commissaries. We cannot and do not desire to join this government. We foresee that this must lead to the removal of the proletarian mass organisations from the leadership of political life, the establishment of an irresponsible regime, and the suppression of the revolution in the country. We cannot accept responsibility for such a policy, and for that reason we submit to the Central Executive Committee our resignation as People's Commissaries."
Here is a short but eloquent extract from a long letter written by Zinoviev, Kamenev and others:
"We are resigning from the Central Committee at a moment of victory, at the moment when our Party has assumed power. We are resigning because we cannot look on calmly while the policy of the leading group of the Central Committee is leading to the loss of the fruits of victory of the workers' party and to the defeat of the proletariat." (Archives of the Revolution, 1917, p. 409.)
These political views did not just drop from the skies; they quite consistently and "correctly" ​follow from the definite point of view held by these comrades concerning our revolution. Of course, if our revolution is a bourgeois revolution and far from being completed at that, if it is not merging into a Socialist revolution (because the proletariat is weak and the majority of the population of the country, the peasantry, cannot be utilised as a force to help the proletarian revolution), it follows that the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat under the given conditions is a task impossible of fulfilment, a dangerous and impracticable undertaking. The Party may be compelled blind-folded to rush into this adventure, but nothing will come of it, as nothing comes from any adventure: the Party will meet inevitable destruction, either immediately or some little time after it has taken power. There can be no other result, for even if it manages to consolidate its power it can hold on only by naked violence, by the bayonet of dictatorship; and to sit on a bayonet is uncomfortable and unstable. In such a position the Party will not be able to avoid its isolation from the proletariat, nor prevent the circle of the revolutionary forces being narrowed down to its own ranks; and, in spite of its own desires, it must reveal the absurdity and impracticability of its actions and surrender the revolution to the flood and destruction.
It will not be superfluous to observe here that among these first conclusions drawn from the theory of disbelief in the possibility of a Socialist revolution in Russia, the theory of lack of faith in the strength of our proletariat and under-estimation of the, peasantry, there was already heard the note which later was to be repeated again and again in every outbreak of opposition temper. "The proletariat is weak, we can expect no aid from anywhere—not even from the countryside! What is the ​use of dreaming about constructing Socialism? Attempts in this direction are doomed to failure; they must inevitably develop into their very opposite. Obstinacy in this direction will merely lead to the degeneration of the new regime into a regime of irresponsible bureaucracy, official pressure, political terror, isolation from the masses and finally to the decay of the Party itself. In a word nothing good will come of the Bolshevik attempt to construct Socialism 'in a single country,' but any amount of bad may result: perhaps it may even result in the 'Asiafication and ossification' mentioned by the German bourgeois, Scheimann, to whom we have already referred!"
Now it will not be out of place to draw certain conclusions.
First of all the comparison made between all the points of view examined above, of the European Social-Democrats, Bogdanov-Bazarov, the Russian Mensheviks, Trotsky and Kamenev-Zinoviev, reveals that in principle they completely coincide; on the question of the relation of the inherent forces of the Russian Revolution, on the question of the maturity of the economic structure of Russia from the point of view of the possibility of definite Socialist achievements, without the slightest exaggeration we may speak on the close similarity and identity in principle of all the positions enumerated. Of course, in pointing out the similarity in the position from which the various groups start out, we do not suggest that the conclusions which each of them draws from these positions are the same. On the contrary, the conclusions drawn vary; some of these groups became heroes of the revolution, others fought against the revolution, while others shamefully dragged at its tail. Fairness demands that it should be stated that ​conclusions did not coincide even within the limits of a single group, for example, Plekhanov abandoned his friends, and (as is now known) was opposed to the attempt to smash the proletarian revolution, the "premature," but for all that proletarian revolution. Conclusions differed in other groups also: Trotsky in the October days drew certain conclusions, taking his place in the front ranks of the fighters; Kamenev and Zinoviev drew other conclusions. Trotsky reasoned this way: although due to inherent causes doom is inevitable, perhaps the State aid of the Western proletariat will come to our aid after all. Therefore, "Forward!" Kamenev and Zinoviev argued in this way: Precisely because doom is inevitable, owing to the inherent combination of forces, it is useless to hurry forward so quickly: therefore, "Retire!"
The conclusions, we repeat, were different, but the theoretical underlying principle (the estimation of the driving forces of the revolution, the approach to the estimation of the worker and peasant bloc, the estimation of the question of a combination of forces and of the possibility of a numerically small working class leading the enormous ponderous mass of the peasantry, the solution of the question of the inevitable conflicts between these two forces, the solution of the question of the character of the Russian revolution, i.e., of the possibility of Socialism in our country)—the underlying principle of this theory was the same among them all. And this "underlying principle" is so far removed from the Leninist presentation of the question, that even if it recalls the latter, it does so as its opposite and not as something similar to it. The Leninist presentation of the question of the maturity of capitalism in Russia is not so crudely simple as many of the wise critics of Lenin pretend. ​Lenin never disputed the assertion that the material premises for the construction of Socialism in Russia were far, far fewer than those in Western Europe or in America. But on the other hand, he held the opinion that in no country was the position such that Socialism would arise in all its completeness immediately after the Communists captured power. In every country, even in the most developed, even in the United States, the situation will be that a fairly long historical stage will be passed before the organisation of economy will totally embrace the whole of the national-economic complex. However, Lenin held that in the backward economy of Russia there was an island which could serve as a base for Socialist operations. The more so that in the country we had a peculiar combination of "proletarian revolution and peasant wars," a combination which Marx regarded as a most favourable condition for the victory of the proletariat. The special condition of the rise of revolution out of the imperialist war, the peculiar combination of forces within the country, the existence of a certain material basis serving as a starting point for the movement, all these taken together create the ground for a systematic advance along the lines of Socialist revolution. It is only necessary to strengthen carefully the Socialist sector of economy, to convert it into a base for our operations and then, using this as a commanding height, systematically and without undue haste proceed to round-up the seething, unorganised economy under Socialist influence.
After what has been stated above, it will not be superfluous to raise the question as to what would have been the logical conclusion of the application of the point of view of disbelief in the possibility of constructing Socialism under the conditions ​prevailing in Russia, the point of view of general and European Social-Democracy, plus Bogdanov-Bazarov plus Trotsky plus Kamenev-Zinoviev. We have already dealt with this in passing, but now it is necessary to emphasise it more strongly. It turns out that if consistently applied, this point of view would lead to one of the following two possible situations: if no victorious international working class revolution takes place, then the Bolsheviks are doomed, either because they will be overthrown, or as a result of their own degeneration. There is no other alternative, because if no objective premises for the Socialist revolution exist, if the proletarian dictatorship, as a proletarian dictatorship, cannot exist for any length of time, it may at best preserve its form by changing its content, i.e. the proletarian State must become something "far from a proletarian State." If in the social class sphere the peasantry overwhelmingly predominate and if conflict with the peasantry is inevitable, then equally inevitably must our State degenerate (if we "preserve ourselves") because, owing to the increasing pressure of the peasantry led by the wealthy peasants, it must make more and more concessions to the peasantry. In this manner the degeneration of our State willl develop in a concrete form: it will become a "kulak State." In other words, the opportunistic premises laid down already in the summer of 1917 wholly contain the ideology of the present-day opposition which, starting out from the fact that we exist, argues about the tendencies of our degeneration. The structure of the theory of the opposition inevitably leads to such conclusions. It is true that the Social-Democrats drew these conclusions before the ​opposition Communists; in this connection the words of Kautsky may be termed the "vade mecum" for the All-Russian Communist opposition. This circumstance, however, merely emphasised the ideological deviation of our opposition from Leninism. Our opposition speaks about the Soviet State becoming a "kulak State," but Otto Bauer said that long before them. He even now says that there are many elements of Socialism in our economy: he even now considers that our Party is not quite a workers' party; he "only" assumes that we are beginning to breathe the peasant spirit and that such, apparently, is our inevitable fate. Paul Levi, in a preface to an anti-Leninist pamphlet written by Rosa Luxemburg (which Levi published against the will of the deceased revolutionary), writes the same thing. Dalin, in the book we have already quoted, says that "subjectively" our revolution is a proletarian revolution, but that objectively it is nothing more or less than a bourgeois revolution, for it is inevitably a peasant revolution, etc. As for the other theoretical stream—Bogdanov and Bazarov—is not the theory of our inevitable bureaucratic degeneration the theory now held by the combined opposition? While the Social-Democrats place most emphasis upon the peasant aspect, Bogdanov lays more emphasis upon the second half of the process of our "degeneration," namely bureaucratic degeneration (the technico-intellectual bureaucracy, the "organising" caste). In the speeches of several of the opposition delivered in the Communist Academy, reference was made to "Cavaignacs." But even this piece of stupidity is not original: it was long ago "discovered" by Parvus, Kautsky and other gentlemen, for this company does not believe in the possibility of victorious revolution in Russia: and as these "confounded Bolsheviks" will not ​leave the stage, only one possibility is left, only one bright star of hope, namely, degeneration, Bonapartism, Tsarism and other "Thermidors." The theory of degeneration stands entirely upon the shoulders of Social-Democratic, Bogdanovist, Trotskyist, Kamenev-Zinoviev-Octobrist premises.
* ↑ L. Trotsky: "Our Revolution," quoted from Bukharin's book, "The Question of Trotskyism," State Publishing Department, 1925, p. 114.
* ↑ Speech by Kamenev at the Petrograd and All-Russian Conference of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party (Bolshevik Section) 9th April, 1917, State Publishing Department, 1925, p. 52.
* ↑ Archives of the Revolution, 1917. The October Revolution, Facts and Documents. Complied by Popov, edited by Roshkov. Leningrad, 1918, "Novaya Epokha," p. 408.
* ↑ Kulak—wealthy peasant, "gentleman farmer."