# On Guerrilla Warfare (United States Marine Corps translation)/Introduction Chapter 4

IV SOME CONCLUSIONS
Historical experience is written in blood and iron. —Mao Tse-tung, 1937
THE FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCE between patriotic partisan resistance and revolutionary guerrilla movements is that the first usually lacks the ideological content that always distinguishes the second.
A resistance is characterized by the quality of spontaneity; it begins and then is organized. A revolutionary guerrilla movement is organized and then begins.
A resistance is rarely liquidated and terminates when the invader is ejected; a revolutionary movement terminates only when it has succeeded in displacing the incumbent government or is liquidated.
Historical experience suggests that there is very little hope of destroying a revolutionary guerrilla movement after it has survived the first phase and has acquired the sympathetic support of a significant segment of the population. The size of this "significant segment" will vary; a decisive figure might range from 15 to 25 per cent.
In addition to an appealing program and popular support, such factors as terrain; communications; the quality ​of the opposing leadership; the presence or absence of material help, technical aid, advisers, or "volunteers" from outside sources; the availability of a sanctuary; the relative military efficiency and the political flexibility of the incumbent government are naturally relevant to the ability of a movement to survive and expand.
In specific aspects, revolutionary guerrilla situations will of course differ, but if the Castro movement, for example, had been objectively analyzed in the light of the factors suggested during the latter period of its first phase, a rough "expectation of survival and growth" might have looked something like Figure I.
Had an impartial analyst applied such criteria to Vietnam six to eight months before the final debacle, he might have produced a chart somewhat like Figure II.
Here Determinants A, B, H, and I definitely favored the guerrillas, who also (unlike Castro) had an available sanctuary. Two others, C and F, might have been considered in balance. Although the Vietminh had demonstrated superior tactical ability in guerrilla situations, an experienced observer might have been justified in considering "military efficiency" equal; the French were learning.
While other determinants may no doubt be adduced, those used are, I believe, valid so far as they go, and the box scores indicative. These show that Castro's chances of success might have been estimated as approximately three to two, Ho Chi Minh's as approximately four to three.
Figure I. The Revolutionary Guerrilla Situation in Cuba
| Determinants* | Castro | Incumbent (Batista) | Remarks |
| A.Appeal of program | Progressive, plus (8) | Static, minus (3) | Batista government oppressive and reactionary |
| B.Popular support | Growing, active (7) | Diminishing, passive (3) | |
| C.Quality of leadership | Excellent, dedicated (8) | Mediocre to poor (4) | |
| D.Quality of troops | Good, improving to excellent (8) | Good, decreasing to fair (5) | |
| E.Military efficiency | Growing (6) | Mediocre to poor (4) | In guerrilla situations |
| F.Internal unity | Positive, strong (8) | Weak (3) | |
| G.Equipment | Poor, improving to good as taken (4) | Largely U.S., excellent (8) | Radios, transport, medical supplies, etc., available from incumbent |
| H.Base area terrain | Operationally favorable (10) | Unfavorable (3) | |
| I.Base area communications | Operationally favorable (10) | Unfavorable (3) | |
| J.Sanctuary | None (0) | Remainder of island (10) | Available for rest, retraining, equipment |
| AGGREGATE | 69 | 46 | |
Figure II. The Revolutionary Guerrilla Situation in Vietnam
| Determinants* | Ho Chi Minh | Incumbent (French) | Remarks |
| A.Appeal of program | Dynamic (7) | No program (0) | |
| B.Popular support | Growing (7) | Diminishing, slight (3) | |
| C.Quality of leadership | Good (7) | Good (7) | |
| D.Quality of troops | Good, improving (6) | Very good (7) | |
| E.Military efficiency | Very good (8) | Good (6) | In guerrilla situations |
| F.Internal unity | Excellent (8) | Excellent (8) | |
| G.Equipment | Fair but improving (7) | Generally well equipped (9) | Received from China and taken from French |
| H.Operational terrain | Favorable (10) | Unfavorable (5) | |
| I.Operational area communications | Favorable (10) | Unfavorable (5) | |
| J.Sanctuary | Available in China (8) | Remainder of Indochina (10) | Available for rest, retraining, equipment |
| AGGREGATE | 78 | 60 | |
At the present time, much attention is being devoted to the development of "gadgetry." A good example of this restricted approach to the problem was reported in Newsweek:*
PENTAGON—A new and fiendishly ingenious anti-guerrilla weapon is being tested by the Navy. It's a delayed-action liquid explosive, squirted From a flame-thrower-like gun, that seeps into foxholes and bunkers. Seconds later, fed by oxygen from the air, it blows up with terrific force.
Apparently we are to assume that guerrillas will conveniently ensconce themselves in readily identifiable "foxholes and bunkers" awaiting the arrival of half a dozen admirals armed with "flame-thrower-like guns" to march up, squirt, and retire to the nearest officers' club. To anyone even remotely acquainted with the philosophy and doctrine of revolutionary guerrilla war, this sort of thing is not hilariously funny. There are no mechanical panaceas.
I do not mean to suggest that proper weapons and equipment will not play an important part in antiguerrilla operations, for of course they will. Constant efforts should be made to improve communication, food, medical, and surgical "packs." Weapons and ammunition must be drastically reduced in weight; there seems to be no technical reason why a sturdy, light, accurate automatic rifle weigh​ing a maximum of four to five pounds cannot be developed. And the search for new and effective weapons must continue. But we must realize that "flame-thrower-like guns" and bullets are only a very small part of the answer to a challenging and complex problem.
The position of active third parties in a revolutionary guerrilla war and die timing, nature, and scope of the assistance given to one side or the other has become of great importance. Basically, this is a political matter; responsibility for a decision to intervene would naturally devolve upon the head of state. Any assistance given should, however, stop short of participation in combat. The role of a third party should be restricted to advice, materials, and technical training.
The timing of aid is often critical. If extended to the incumbent government, aid must be given while it is still possible to isolate and eradicate the movement; if to the revolutionary side, aid must be made available during the same critical period, that is, when the movement is vulnerable and its existence quite literally a matter of life and death.
From a purely military point of view, antiguerrilla operations may be summed up in three words: location, isolation, and eradication. In the brief definitions of each term, it will be well to bear in mind that these activities are not rigidly compartmented.
Location of base area or areas requires careful terrain studies, photographic and physical reconnaissance, and possibly infiltration of the movement. Isolation involves sepa​ration of guerrillas from their sources of information and food. It may require movement and resettlement of entire communities. Eradication presupposes reliable information and demands extreme operational flexibility and a high degree of mobility. Parachutists and helicopter-borne commando-type troops are essential.
The tactics of guerrillas must be used against the guerrillas themselves. They must be constantly harried and constantly attacked. Every effort must be made to induce defections and take prisoners. The best source of information of the enemy is men who know the enemy situation.
Imaginative, intelligent, and bold leadership is absolutely essential. Commanders and leaders at every echelon must be selected with these specific qualities in mind. Officers and NCO's who are more than competent under normal conditions will frequently be hopelessly ineffective when confronted with the dynamic and totally different situations characteristic of guerrilla warfare.
Finally, there is the question of whether it is possible to create effective counterguerrilla forces. Can two shoals of fish, each intent on destruction of the other, flourish in the same medium? Mao is definite on this point; he is convinced they cannot, that "counterrevolutionary guerrilla war" is impossible. If the guerrilla experiences of the White Russians (which he cites) or of Mikhailovitch are valid criteria, he is correct. But, on the other hand, the history of the movement in Greece during the German occupation indicates that under certain circumstances, his thesis will not stand too close an examination. This sug​gests the need for a careful analysis of relevant political factors in each individual situation.
Mao Tse-tung contends that the phenomena we have considered are subject to their own peculiar laws, and are predictable. If he is correct (and I believe he is), it is possible to prevent such phenomena from appearing, or, if they do, to control and eradicate them. And if historical experience teaches us anything about revolutionary guerrilla war, it is that military measures alone will not suffice.