# Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Company/Opinion of the Court

* Court Documents
* Case Syllabus
* Opinion of the Court
* Concurring Opinion Blackmun
* Dissenting Opinion Rehnquist
[p165] MR. JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question before us, on writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Louisiana, concerns the right of dependent unacknowledged, illegitimate children to recover under Louisiana workmen's compensation laws benefits for the death of their natural father on an equal footing with his dependent legitimate children. We hold that Louisiana's denial of equal recovery rights to dependent unacknowledged illegitimates violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968); Glona v. American Guarantee & Liability Insurance Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968).
On June 22, 1967, Henry Clyde Stokes died in Louisiana of injuries received during the course of his employment the previous day. At the time of his death Stokes resided and maintained a household with one Willie Mae Weber, to whom he was not married. Living in the household were four legitimate minor children, born of the marriage between Stokes and Adlay Jones Stokes who was at the time committed to a mental hospital. Also living in the home was one unacknowledged illegitimate child born of the relationship between Stokes and Willie Mae Weber. A second illegitimate child of Stokes and Weber was born posthumously.
On June 29, 1967, Stokes' four legitimate children, through their maternal grandmother as guardian, filed a claim for their father's death under Louisiana's [p166] workmen's compensation law. The defendant employer and its insurer imploded Willie Mae Weber who appeared and claimed compensation benefits for the two illegitimate children.
Meanwhile, the four legitimate children had brought another suit for their father's death against a third-party tortfeasor, which was settled for an amount in excess of the maximum benefits allowable under workmen's compensation. The illegitimate children did not share in this settlement. Subsequently, the employer [p167] in the initial action requested the extinguishment of all parties' workmen's compensation claims by reason of the tort settlement.
The trial judge awarded the four legitimate children the maximum allowable amount of compensation and declared their entitlement had been satisfied from the tort suit settlement. Consequently, the four legitimate children dismissed their workmen's compensation claim. Judgment was also awarded to Stokes' two illegitimate offspring to the extent that maximum compensation benefits were not exhausted by the four legitimate children. Since such benefits had been entirely exhausted by the amount of the tort settlement, in which only the four dependent legitimate offspring participated, the two dependent illegitimate children received nothing.

## I

For purposes of recovery under workmen's compensation, Louisiana law defines children to include "only legitimate children, stepchildren, posthumous children, adopted children, and illegitimate children acknowledged under the provisions of Civil Code Articles 203, 204, and 205." Thus, legitimate children and acknowledged [p168] illegitimates may recover on an equal basis. Unacknowledged illegitimate children, however, are relegated to the lesser status of "other dependents" under § 1232 (8) of the workmen's compensation statute and may recover only if there are not enough surviving dependents in the preceding classifications to exhaust the maximum allowable benefits. Both the Louisiana Court of Appeal and a divided Louisiana Supreme Court sustained these statutes over petitioner's constitutional objections, holding that our decision in Levy, supra, was not controlling.
We disagree. In Levy, the Court held invalid as denying equal protection of the laws, a Louisiana statute which barred an illegitimate child from recovering for the wrongful death of its mother when such recoveries by legitimate children were authorized. The Court there decided that the fact of a child's birth out of wedlock bore no reasonable relation to the purpose of wrongful-death statutes which compensate children for the death of a mother. As the Court said in Levy:
   "Legitimacy or illegitimacy of birth has no relation to the nature of the wrong allegedly inflicted on the mother. These children, though illegitimate, were dependent on her; she cared for them and nurtured them; they were indeed hers in the biological and in the spiritual sense; in her death they suffered wrong in the sense that any dependent would." Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S., at 72.
[p169] The court below sought to distinguish Levy as involving a statute which absolutely excluded all illegitimates from recovery, whereas in the compensation statute in the instant case acknowledged illegitimates may recover equally with legitimate children and the unacknowledged legitimate child is not denied a right to recover compensation, he being merely relegated to a less favorable position as are other dependent relatives such as parents...." Stokes v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 257 La. 424, 433-434, 242 So. 2d 567, 570 (1970). The Louisiana Supreme Court likewise characterized Levy as a tort action where the tortfeasor escaped liability on the fortuity of the potential claimant's illegitimacy, whereas in the present action full compensation was rendered, and "no tort feasor goes free because of the law." Id., at 434, 242 So. 2d at 570.
We do not think Levy can be disposed of by such finely carved distinctions. The Court in Levy was not so much concerned with the tortfeasor going free as with the equality of treatment under the statutory recovery scheme. Here, as in Levy, there is impermissible discrimination. An unacknowledged illegitimate child may suffer as much from the loss of a parent as a child born within wedlock or an illegitimate later acknowledged. So far as this record shows, the dependency and natural affinity of the unacknowledged illegitimate children for their father were as great as those of the four legitimate children whom Louisiana law has allowed to recover. The legitimate children and the illegitimate children all lived in the home of the deceased and were [p170] equally dependent upon him for maintenance and support. It is inappropriate, therefore, for the court below to talk of relegating the unacknowledged illegitimates "to a less favorable position as are other dependent relatives such as parents." The unacknowledged illegitimates are not a parent or some "other dependent relative"; in this case they are dependent children, and as such as entitled to rights granted other dependent children.
Respondents contend that our recent ruling in Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971), controls this case. In Labine, the Court upheld, against constitutional objections, Louisiana intestacy laws which had barred an acknowledged illegitimate child from sharing equally with legitimate children in her father's estate. That decision reflected, in major part, the traditional deference to a State's prerogative to regulate the disposition at death of property within its borders. Id., at 538. The Court has long afforded broad scope to state discretion in this area. Yet the substantial state interest in providing for "the stability of... land titles and in the prompt and definitive determination of the valid ownership of property left by decedents," Labine v. Vincent, 229 So. 2d 449, 452 (La. App. 1969), is absent in the case in hand.
Moreover, in Labine the intestate, unlike deceased in the present action, might easily have modified his daughter's disfavored position. As the Court there remarked:
   "Ezra Vincent could have left one-third of his property to his illegitimate daughter had he bothered [p171] to follow the simple formalities of executing a will. He could, of course, have legitimated the child by marrying her mother in which case the child could have inherited his property either by intestate succession of by will as any other legitimate child." Labine, supra, at 539.
Such options, however, were not realistically open to Henry Stokes. Under Louisiana law he could not have acknowledged his illegitimate children even had he desired to do so. The burdens of illegitimacy, already weighty, become doubly so when neither parent nor child can legally lighten them.
Both the statute in Levy and the statute in the present case involve state-created compensation schemes, designed to provide close relatives and dependents of a deceased a means of recovery for his often abrupt and accidental death. Both wrongful-death statutes and workmen's compensation codes represent outgrowths and modifications of our basic tort law. The former alleviated the harsh common-law rule under which "no person could inherit the personal right of another to recover for [p172] tortious injuries to his body"; the latter removed difficult obstacles to recovery in work-related injuries by offering a more certain, though generally less remunerative, compensation. In the instant case, the recovery sought under the workmen's compensation statute was in lieu of an action under the identical death statute which was at issue in Levy. Given the two similarities in the origins and purposes of these two statutes, and the similarity of Louisiana's pattern of discrimination in recovery rights, it would require a disregard of precedent and the principles of stare decisis to hold that Levy did not control the facts of the case before us. It makes no difference that illegitimates are not so absolutely or broadly barred here as in Levy; the discrimination remains apparent.

## II

Having determined that Levy is the applicable precedent, we briefly reaffirm here the reasoning which produced that result. The tests to determine the validity of state statutes under the Equal Protection Clause have been variously expressed, but this Court requires, at a minimum, that a statutory classification bear some rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose. Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe R. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150 (1897); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). Though the latitude given state economic and social regulation is necessarily broad, when state statutory classifications approach sensitive and fundamental personal rights, this Court exercises a stricter scrutiny, Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 [p173] (1966). The essential inquiry in all the foregoing cases is, however, inevitably a dual one: What legitimate state interest does the classification promote? What fundamental personal rights might the classification endanger?
The Louisiana Supreme Court emphasized strongly the State's interest in protecting "legitimate family relationships," 257 La., at 433, 242 So. 2d, at 570, and the regulation and protection of the family unit have indeed been a venerable state concern. We do not question the importance of that interest; what we do question is how the challenged statute will promote it. As was said in Glona:
   "[W]e see no possible rational basis... for assuming that if the natural mother is allowed recovery for the wrongful death of her illegitimate child, the cause of illegitimacy will be served. It would, indeed, be farfetched to assume that women have illegitimate children so they can be compensated in damages for their death." Glenn v. American Guarantee & Liability Insurance Co., supra, at 75.
Nor can it be thought here that persons will shun illicit relations because the offspring may not one day reap the benefits of workmen's compensation.
It may perhaps be said that statutory distinctions between the legitimate and illegitimate reflect closer family relationships in that the illegitimate is more often not under care in the home of the father nor even supported by him. The illegitimate, so this argument runs, may thus be made less eligible for the statutory recoveries and inheritances reserved for those more likely to be within the ambit of familial care and affection. Whatever the merits elsewhere of this contention, it is not compelling in a statutory compensation scheme where dependency on the deceased is a prerequisite to anyone's recovery, [p174] and where the acknowledgment so necessary to equal recovery rights may be unlikely to occur or legally impossible to effectuate even where the illegitimate child may be nourished and loved.
Finally, we are mindful that States have frequently drawn arbitrary lines in workmen's compensation and wrongful-death statutes to facilitate potentially difficult problems of proof. Nothing in our decision would impose on state court systems a greater burden in this regard. By limiting recovery to dependents of the deceased, Louisiana substantially lessens the possible problems of locating illegitimate children and of determining uncertain claims of parenthood. Our decision fully [p175] respects Louisiana's choice on this matter. It will not expand claimants for workmen's compensation beyond those in a direct blood and dependency relationship with the deceased and it avoids altogether diffuse questions of affection and affinity which pose difficult probative problems. Our ruling requires equality of treatment between two classes of persons the genuineness of whose claims the State might in any event be required to determine.
The status of illegitimacy has expressed through the ages society's condemnation of irresponsible liaisons beyond the bonds of marriage. But visiting this condemnation on the head of an infant is illogical and unjust. Moreover, imposing disabilities on the illegitimate child is contrary to the basic concept of our system that legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibility or wrongdoing. Obviously, no child is responsible for his birth and penalizing the illegitimate child is an ineffectual—as well as an unjust—way of deterring the parent. Courts are powerless to prevent [p176] the social opprobrium suffered by these hapless children, but the Equal Protection Clause does enable us to strike down discriminatory laws relating to status of birth where—as in this case—the classification is justified by no legitimate state interest, compelling or otherwise.
Reversed and remanded.

## Notes

* ↑ Stokes v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 257 La. 424, 242 So. 2d 567 (1970).
* ↑ La. Rev. Stat. § 23:1232 (1967) establishes the schedule of payment of workmen's compensation benefits to various classifications of dependents as follows: "Payment to dependents shall be computed and divided among them on the following basis: "(1) If the widow or widower alone, thirty-two and one-half per centum of wages. "(2) If the widow or widower and one child, forty-six and one-quarter per centum of wages. "(3) If the widow or widower and two or more children, sixty-five per centum of wages. "(4) If one child alone, thirty-two and one-half per centum of wages of deceased. "(5) If two children, forty-six and one-quarter per centum of wages. "(6) If three or more children, sixty-five per centum of wages. "(7) If there are neither widow, widower, nor child, then to the father or mother, thirty-two and one-half per centum of wages of the deceased. If there are both father and mother, sixty-five per centum of wages. "(8) If there are neither widow, widower, nor child, nor dependent parent entitled to compensation, then to one brother or sister, thirty-two and one-half per centum of wages with eleven per centum additional for each brother or sister in excess of one. If other dependents than those enumerated, thirty-two and one-half per centum of wages for one, and eleven per centum additional for each such dependent in excess of one, subject to a maximum of sixty-five per centum of wages for all, regardless of the number of dependents."
* ↑ La. Rev. Stat. § 23:1021 (3). The relevant provisions for acknowledgement of an illegitimate child are as follows: "La. Civ. Code. Art. 202 (1967): "Illegitimate children who have been acknowledged by their father, are called natural children; those who have not been acknowledged by their father, or whose father and mother were incapable of contracting marriage at the time of conception, or whose father is unknown, are contradistinguished by the appellation of bastards." La. Civ. Code, Art. 203: "The acknowledgement of an illegitimate child shall be made by a declaration executed before a notary public, in presence of two witnesses, by the father and mother or either of them, whenever it shall not have been made in the registering of the birth or baptism of such child." La. Civ. Code, Art. 204: "Such acknowledgement shall not be made in favor of children whose parents were incapable of contracting marriage at the time of conception; however, such acknowledgement may be made if the parents should contract a legal marriage with each other."
* ↑ See n. 2, supra.
* ↑ 232 So. 2d 328 (La. App. 1969).
* ↑ Stokes v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., see n. 1, supra.
* ↑ The affinity and dependency on the father of the posthumously born illegitimate child are, of course, not comparable to those of offspring living at the time of their father's death. This fact, however, does not alter our view of the case. We think a posthumously born illegitimate child should be treated the same as a posthumously born legitimate child, which the Louisiana statutes fail to do.
* ↑ The Court over a century ago voiced strong support for state powers over inheritance: "Now the law in question is nothing more than an exercise of the power which every state and sovereignty possesses, of regulating the manner and term upon which property real or personal within its dominion may be transmitted by last will and testament, or by inheritance; and of prescribing who shall and who shall not be capable of taking it." Mager v. Grima, 8 How. 490, 493 (1850). See Lyeth v. Hoey, 305 U.S. 188, 193 (1938).
* ↑ La. Civ. Code, Art. 204, see n. 3, supra, prohibits acknowledgement of children whose parents were incapable of contracting marriage at the time of conception. Acknowledgement may only be made if the parents could contract a legal marriage with each other. Decedent in the instant case remained married to his first wife—the mother of his four legitimate children—until his death. Thus, at all times he was legally barred from marrying Willie Mae Weber, the mother of the two illegitimate children. It therefore was impossible for him to acknowledge legally his illegitimate children and thereby qualify him for protection under the Louisiana's Workmen's Compensation Act. See also Williams v. American Emp. Ins. Co., 237 La. 101, 110 So. 2d 541 (1959), where the Louisiana Supreme Court held that a posthumously born illegitimate child cannot be classified as a child entitled to workmen's compensation benefits, as defined under La. Rev. Stat. § 23:1021 (3).
* ↑ See 391 U.S. 73, 76 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting in Glona v. American Guarantee & Liability Insurance Co., and Levy v. Louisiana).
* ↑ La. Civ. Code, Art. 2315.
* ↑ The most relevant sections of the Louisiana statutes defining dependency for purposes of workmen's compensation recovery read as follows: La. Rev. Stat. § 23:1231: "For injury causing death within two years after the accident there shall be paid to the legal dependent of the employee, actually and wholly dependent upon his earnings for support at the time of the accident and death, a weekly sum as hereinafter provided, for a period of four hundred weeks...." La. Rev. Stat. § 23:1251: "The following persons shall be conclusively presumed to be wholly and actually dependent upon the deceased employee: ... "(3) A child under the age of eighteen years... upon the parent with whom he is living at the time of the injury of the parent." The above section thus qualifies the illegitimate children in this case as dependents. La. Rev. Stat. § 23:1252: "In all other cases, the question of legal and actual dependency in whole or in part, shall be determined in accordance with the facts as they may be at the time of the accident and death...." Naturally, the variations of dependency claims coming to Louisiana courts under these sections are many, but Louisiana has consistently required valid evidence of dependency for recovery. See, e.g., Sandidge v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 29 So. 2d 522 (La. App. 1947), where children, living with their mother who was separated from the father, in order to receive the maximum compensation for the father's death, must establish that they were wholly dependent upon the father for their support.
* ↑ See, e.g., Gray & Rudovsky, The Court Acknowledges the Illegitimate: Levy v. Louisiana and Glona v. American Guarantee & Liability Insurance Co., 118 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1 (1969). A comprehensive study of the legal status of illegitimacy and the effects thereof is H. Krause, Illegitimacy: Law and Social Policy (1971); reviewed by Wadlington, 58 Va. L. Rev. 188 (1972).
* ↑ See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 91971); Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969); Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); and see also Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943).