OpenLLM-France/wikimedia huggingface dataset:
# Gitanjali/41

41
Where dost thou stand behind them all, my lover, hiding thyself in the shadows? They push thee and pass thee by on the dusty road, taking thee for naught. I wait here weary hours spreading my offerings for thee, while passers by come and take my flowers, one by one, and my basket is nearly empty.
The morning time is past, and the noon. In the shade of evening my eyes are drowsy with sleep. Men going home glance at me and smile and fill me with shame. I sit like a beggar maid, drawing my skirt over my face, and when they ask me, what it is I want, I drop my eyes and answer them not.
​Oh, how, indeed, could I tell them that for thee I wait, and that thou hast promised to come. How could I utter for shame that I keep for my dowry this poverty. Ah, I hug this pride in the secret of my heart.
I sit on the grass and gaze upon the sky and dream of the sudden splendour of thy coming—all the lights ablaze, golden pennons flying over thy car, and they at the roadside standing agape, when they see thee come down from thy seat to raise me from the dust, and set at thy side this ragged beggar girl a-tremble with shame and pride, like a creeper in a summer breeze.
But time glides on and still no sound of the wheels of thy chariot. Many a procession passes by with noise and shouts and glamour of glory. Is it only thou who wouldst stand in the shadow silent and behind them all? And only I ​ who would wait and weep and wear out my heart in vain longing?
# Gitanjali/43

43
The day was when I did not keep myself in readiness for thee; and entering my heart unbidden even as one of the common crowd, unknown to me, my king, thou didst press the signet of eternity upon many a fleeting moment of my life.
And to-day when by chance I light upon them and see thy signature, I find they have lain scattered in the dust mixed with the memory of joys and sorrows of my trivial days forgotten.
Thou didst not turn in contempt from my childish play among dust, and the steps that I heard in my playroom are the same that are echoing from star to star.
# Gitanjali/38

38
That I want thee, only thee—let my heart repeat without end. All desires that distract me, day and night, are false and empty to the core.
​As the night keeps hidden in its gloom the petition for light, even thus in the depth of my unconsciousness rings the cry—I want thee, only thee.
As the storm still seeks its end in peace when it strikes against peace with all its might, even thus my rebellion strikes against thy love and still its cry is—I want thee, only thee.
# Gitanjali/42

42
Early in the day it was whispered that we should sail in a boat, only thou and I, and never a soul in the world would know of this our pilgrimage to no country and to no end.
In that shoreless ocean, at thy silently listening smile my songs would swell in melodies, free as waves, free from all bondage of words.
Is the time not come yet? Are there works still to do? Lo, the evening has come down upon the shore and in the fading light the seabirds come flying to their nests.
Who knows when the chains will be off, and the boat, like the last glimmer of sunset, vanish into the night?
# Grand Trunk Railway Company of Canada v. Cummings

* related portals: Supreme Court of the United States.
* sister projects: Wikidata item.
United States Supreme Court
106 U.S. 700
Grand Trunk Railway Company of Canada v. Cummings
John Rand, for plaintiff in error.
A. A. Strout and Geo. F. Holmes, for defendant in error.
WAITE, C. J.

## Notes

This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
Public domainPublic domainfalsefalse
# Grand Sale of Real Estate

Toronto Auction Mart.
GRAND SALE OF REAL ESTATE, ON MONDAY, The FIFTEENTH day of NOVEMBER next.
The Subscriber is instructed by JAMES M. STRACHAN, Esquire, to offer for Sale, at the above Rooms, if not previously disposed of by Private Sale, an number of TOWN LOTS,
Most advantageously situated in various parts of the City, of which Plans can be seen at the Office of the Subscriber, any day previous to the Sale.
Lots Nos. 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11, on the East side of Simcoe Street, and facing the Parliament Buildings, 26 feet front, by 90 feet in depth, and beautifully situated for Private Residences.
Lots Nos. 1, 2, 4, 6, 7, 10, 13, 14, 17, 18, 19, 20, on the North side of Carlton Street, (Yonge Street.)
Lots Nos. 24, 25, 28, 30, 31 and 32, on the South side of Carlton Street.
Lots Nos. 40, 41, 43, 46 and 47, on the South side of St. Anne Street.
Lots Nos.50, 51, 52 and 54, on the South side of M$^c$Gill Street.
These Lots will be put up at a certain Sum per Annum, payable as Rent half-yearly. The Leases to run for Ten Years, the Purchaser having the privilege, at any time during the said terms of Ten Years, of obtaining the Fee of the Land, by paying up the Principal Sum, of which the Rents stands as Interest.
Also: The following Lots in the Crookshank Block, viz.:
ACRE LOTS. Lots 6, 17, 18, 19, 21 and 22, on the West side of Strachan Street. These Lots will be put up at a certain Sum per Annum, payable as Rent half-yearly. The term, 999 years, with privilege of purchase. ALSO, WATER LOTS, No. 2, 3, 55, & 56. The two latter are improved, and the attention of Brewers, Distillers, and Warehousemen, is particularly requested to these Lots, which, for situation, are unsurpassed by any of the Water Lots in the City.
WILLIAM WAKEFIELD, A. & B.
This work is in the public domain in the United States because it was published before January 1, 1929.
This work may be in the public domain in countries and areas with longer native copyright terms that apply the rule of the shorter term to foreign works.
Public domainPublic domainfalsefalse
# Grand River Dam Authority v. Grand-Hydro/Dissent Douglas

* Court Documents
* Case Syllabus
* Opinion of the Court
* Dissenting Opinion Douglas
United States Supreme Court
335 U.S. 359
Grand River Dam Authority v. Grand-Hydro
Argued: Oct. 12, 13, 1948. --- Decided: Nov 22, 1948
Mr. Justice DOUGLAS, with whom Mr. Justice BLACK, Mr. Justice MURPHY and Mr. Justice RUTLEDGE join, dissenting.
The result of this decision, no matter how it is rationalized, is to give the water-power value of the current of a river to a private party who by reason of federal law neither has nor can acquire any lawful claim to it. The United States has asserted through the Federal Power Act its exclusive dominion and control over this water power. That Act specifies how one may acquire a license to exploit it, § 23(b), and the conditions under which the licensee must operate. See First Iowa Hydro-Electric Co-op. v. Federal Power Comm., 328 U.S. 152, 66 S.Ct. 906, 90 L.Ed. 1143.
Petitioner has such a license. Respondent has none and, for reasons unnecessary to relate here, concededly cannot obtain one. Respondent therefore has no claim to the water-power value which the law can recognize, if the policy of the Federal Power Act is to be respected. When respondent's claim is recognized, the effect is to make petitioner pay a private claimant for a privilege which only the United States can grant.
That is the bald result whether the condemnation takes place in a state or a federal court. Whatever the procedure, the conse quence is to give private parties an entrenched property interest in the public domain, which the Federal Power Act was designed to defeat.
The public burden is the same and the impairment of the policy of the federal act is identical whether the judgment is entered by a state or a federal court. Never before, I believe, has a federal right been allowed less protection in a state court than it is entitled to r ceive in the federal court.

## Notes

* ↑ The exclusive control which the United States has in the water power of a navigable stream (United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53, 69, 33 S.Ct. 667, 674, 57 L.Ed. 1063; United States v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 427, 428, 61 S.Ct. 291, 308, 309, 85 L.Ed. 243) extends to the water power of a non-navigable stream where private command over it is inconsistent with the federal program of control over navigation. United States v. Willow River Co., 324 U.S. 499, 509, 65 S.Ct. 761, 767, 89 L.Ed. 1101. Federal regulation and control has the same effect in each case. State of Oklahoma ex rel. Phillips v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508, 525, 61 S.Ct. 1050, 1059, 85 L.Ed. 1487.
* ↑ Article VI of the Constitution makes Acts of Congress 'the supreme Law of the Land' and directs that 'the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby'.
This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
Public domainPublic domainfalsefalse
# Grand Trunk Railroad Company v. Richardson

* related portals: Supreme Court of the United States.
* sister projects: Wikidata item.
United States Supreme Court
91 U.S. 454
Grand Trunk Railroad Company v. Richardson

## Notes

This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
Public domainPublic domainfalsefalse
# Foreign Economic Espionage in Cyberspace

* related portals: National Counterintelligence and Security Center.
* sister projects: Wikipedia article, Wikidata item.

## ContentsContents

* Executive Summary • 1
* Scope Note • 2
* I. The Strategic Threat of Cyber Economic Espionage • 4
* II. Threats from Foreign Countries • 5
** China: Persistent Cyber Activities • 5
** Russia: A Sophisticated Adversary • 8
** Iran: An Increasing Cyber Threat • 9
** Targeted Technologies • 11
* III. Emerging Threats • 12
** Software Supply Chain Operations • 13
** Foreign Laws Could Enable Intellectual Property Theft • 13
** Foreign Technology Companies With Links to Host Governments • 14
* Annex – Decreasing the Prevalence of Economic or Industrial Espionage in Cyberspace • 15
This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
Public domainPublic domainfalsefalse
# Executive SummaryExecutive Summary

In the 2011 report to Congress on Foreign Spies Stealing U.S. Economic Secrets in Cyberspace, the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive provided a baseline assessment of the many dangers facing the U.S. research, development, and manufacturing sectors when operating in cyberspace, the pervasive threats posed by foreign intelligence services and other threat actors, and the industries and technologies most likely at risk of espionage. The 2018 report provides additional insight into the most pervasive nation-state threats, and it includes a detailed breakout of the industrial sectors and technologies judged to be of highest interest to threat actors. It also discusses several potentially disruptive threat trends that warrant close attention.

## This report focuses on the following issuesThis report focuses on the following issues

Foreign economic and industrial espionage against the United States continues to represent a significant threat to America’s prosperity, security, and competitive advantage. Cyberspace remains a preferred operational domain for a wide range of industrial espionage threat actors, from adversarial nation-states, to commercial enterprises operating under state influence, to sponsored activities conducted by proxy hacker groups. Next-generation technologies, such as Artificial Intelligence (AI) and the Internet-of-Things (IoT) will introduce new vulnerabilities to U.S. networks for which the cybersecurity community remains largely unprepared. Building an effective response will require understanding economic espionage as a worldwide, multi-vector threat to the integrity of the U.S. economy and global trade.
Foreign intelligence services—and threat actors working on their behalf—continue to represent the most persistent and pervasive cyber intelligence threat. China, Russia, and Iran stand out as three of the most capable and active cyber actors tied to economic espionage and the potential theft of U.S. trade secrets and proprietary information. Countries with closer ties to the United States also have conducted cyber espionage to obtain U.S. technology. Despite advances in cybersecurity, cyber espionage continues to offer threat actors a relatively low-cost, high-yield avenue of approach to a wide spectrum of intellectual property.
A range of potentially disruptive threat trends warrant attention. Software supply chain infiltration already threatens the critical infrastructure sector and is poised to threaten other sectors. Meanwhile, new foreign laws and increased risks posed by foreign technology companies due to their ties to host governments, may present U.S. companies with previously unforeseen threats.
Cyber economic espionage is but one facet of the much larger, global economic espionage challenge. We look forward to engaging in the larger public discourse on mitigating the national economic harm caused by these threats.
# Foreign Economic Espionage in Cyberspace/Foreign Technology Companies with Links to Host Governments
## Foreign Technology Companies with Links to Host GovernmentsForeign Technology Companies with Links to Host Governments

Foreign information and communications technology companies are often subject to foreign state influence. This presents a risk to U.S. trade secrets and intellectual property. These companies provide valuable services that often require access to the physical and logical control points of the computers and networks they support. These unique accesses also present an opportunity for foreign countries to obtain sensitive proprietary information. Recent events underscore the potential risks posed by technology companies that have links to foreign governments with high threat intelligence services:
* Recent Chinese laws—including laws on national security and cybersecurity—provide Beijing a legal basis to compel technology companies operating in China to cooperate with Chinese security services.
* In September 2017, the Department of Homeland Security issued a directive to Federal departments and agencies to remove Kaspersky Lab products and services based on the information security risks posed by the company and its links to Russia.
* In December 2017, the Department of Justice made public an agreement with Netcracker Technology Corp. that resulted in the company agreeing that it would not store sensitive information and data from its U.S.-based technology clients in overseas locations, including most notably Russia.
# I. The Strategic Threat of Cyber Economic EspionageI. The Strategic Threat of Cyber Economic Espionage

Foreign economic and industrial espionage against the United States continues to represent a significant threat to America’s prosperity, security, and competitive advantage. Cyberspace remains a preferred operational domain for a wide range of industrial espionage threat actors, from adversarial nation-states, to commercial enterprises operating under state influence, to sponsored activities conducted by proxy hacker groups. Next-generation technologies such as Artificial Intelligence (AI) and the Internet-of-Things (IoT) will introduce new vulnerabilities to U.S. networks for which the cybersecurity community remains largely unprepared. Building an effective response demands understanding economic espionage as a worldwide, multi-vector threat to the integrity of the U.S. economy and global trade.
The United States remains a global center for research, development, and innovation across multiple high-technology sectors. Federal research institutions, universities, and corporations are regularly targeted by online actors seeking all manner of proprietary information and the overall long-term trend remains worrisome.
While next generation technologies will introduce a range of qualitative advances in data storage, analytics, and computational capacity, they also present potential vulnerabilities for which the cybersecurity community remains largely unprepared. The solidification of cloud computing over the past decade as a global information industry standard, coupled with the deployment of technologies such as AI and IoT, will introduce unforeseen vulnerabilities to U.S. networks.
* Cloud networks and IoT infrastructure are rapidly expanding the global online operational space. Threat actors have already demonstrated how cloud can be used as a platform for cyber exploitation. As IoT and AI applications expand to empower everything from “smart homes” to “smart cities”, billions of potentially unsecured network nodes will create an incalculably larger exploitation space for cyber threat actors.
* Lack of industry standardization during this pivotal first-generation deployment period will likely hamper the development of comprehensive security solutions in the near-term.
* Building an effective response demands understanding economic espionage as a worldwide, multi-vector threat to the integrity of both the U.S. economy and global trade. Whereas cyberspace is a preferred operational domain for economic espionage, it is but one of many. Sophisticated threat actors, such as adversarial nation-states, combine cyber exploitation with supply chain operations, human recruitment, and the acquisition of knowledge by foreign students in U.S. universities, as part of a strategic technology acquisition program.
# Foreign Economic Espionage in Cyberspace/Foreign Laws Could Enable Intellectual Property Theft
## Foreign Laws Could Enable Intellectual Property TheftForeign Laws Could Enable Intellectual Property Theft

New and enhanced cyber, national security, and import laws in effect in foreign countries are posing an increasing risk to U.S. technology and propriety information. For example, in 2017, China and Russia aggressively enforced laws that bolstered their domestic companies at the expense of U.S. companies and also might allow their companies access to U.S. intellectual property and proprietary information.
In 2017, China put into effect a new cyber security law that restricts sales of foreign information and communication technology (ICT) and mandates that foreign companies submit ICT for government-administered national security reviews. The law also requires that firms operating in China store their data in China, and it requires government approval prior to transferring data outside China. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce has gone on record to explain that if a foreign company is forced to localize a valuable set of data or information in China, whether for research and development purposes or simply to conduct its business, it will have to assume a significant amount of risk. Its data or information may be misappropriated or misused, especially given the environment in China, where companies face significant legal and other uncertainties when they try to protect their data and information.
* Pass National Security Reviews for Technology and Services
* Store All Data in China
* Form Joint Venture to Open Data Center
* Obtain Government Approval for Data Transfers
* Buy Government-Approved Encryption and Virtual Private Networks (VPNs)
    ► China has Access to U.S. Intellectual Property and Proprietary Information
​Similarly, in recent years Russia has dramatically increased its demand for source code reviews for foreign technology being sold inside the country. Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB), associated with economic espionage missions in the past, serves as the authority charged with directing these source code reviews and approving the sale of technology products and services sold inside Russia. High intelligence threat countries, such as China and Russia, could exploit these laws to significantly improve their access to the intellectual property of foreign companies operating in their countries and subsequently share this sensitive information with domestic firms.
# Annex – Decreasing the Prevalence of Economic or Industrial Espionage in CyberspaceAnnex – Decreasing the Prevalence of Economic orIndustrial Espionage in Cyberspace

The U.S. Government (USG) continues to undertake numerous actions to counter economic espionage in cyberspace. Perhaps most evident are current USG efforts to protect critical infrastructure and other sensitive computer networks from malicious cyber activities. The USG also continues to work with the private sector to address science and technology gaps through cyber research and development as a way of mitigating the malicious activities of threat actors in cyberspace. The USG will continue to improve its efforts to disrupt, deny, exploit, or increase the costs of foreign cyber operations that are targeting the nation’s most critical economic assets.
Examples of USG actions include the following:
* Sharing information about cyber threats, vulnerabilities, and other risks;
* Promoting best practices, risk assessments, and capability development;
* Improving our responses to cyber incidents;
* Building and driving the market towards a more secure cyber ecosystem; and
* Partnering with allies to address cyber issues.
The USG has the capability to impose costs on adversaries who engage in economic cyber espionage through various actions, including diplomatic, informational, military, law enforcement, and economic response. The details of many of these actions are too sensitive to discuss in this publication; however, we have provided a few general examples that illustrate the USG's response, such as:
* Public statements and attribution;
* Diplomatic demarches;
* Economic sanctions; and
* Law enforcement actions.
# Scope NoteScope Note

This report is submitted in compliance with the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015, Section 1637, which requires that the President annually submit to Congress a report on foreign economic espionage and industrial espionage in cyberspace during the 12-month period preceding the submission of the report.

## Definitions of Key TermsDefinitions of Key Terms

For the purpose of this report, key terms were defined according to definitions provided in Section 1637 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015.
Economic or Industrial Espionage means (a) stealing a trade secret or proprietary information or appropriating, taking, carrying away, or concealing, or by fraud, artifice, or deception obtaining, a trade secret or proprietary information without the authorization of the owner of the trade secret or proprietary information; (b) copying, duplicating, downloading, uploading, destroying, transmitting, delivering, sending, communicating, or conveying a trade secret or proprietary information without the authorization of the owner of the trade secret or proprietary information; or (c) knowingly receiving, buying, or possessing a trade secret or proprietary information that has been stolen or appropriated, obtained, or converted without the authorization of the owner of the trade secret or proprietary information.
Cyberspace means (a) the interdependent network of information technology infrastructures; and (b) includes the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers.

## ContributorsContributors

The National Counterintelligence and Security Center (NCSC) compiled this report, with close support from the Cyber Threat Intelligence Integration Center (CTIIC), and with input and coordination from many U.S. Government organizations, including the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Defense Cyber Crime Center (DC3), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Defense Security Service (DSS), Department of Energy (DoE), Department of Defense (DoD), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Department of State (DoS), Department of Treasury (Treasury), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), National Cyber Investigative Joint Task Force (NCIJTF), National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), National Security Agency (NSA), and Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI).