# Southern Historical Society Papers/Volume 04/August/Letter from Gen. J. A. Early

Letter from Gen. J. A. Early.
Lynchburg, Va., March 12th, 1877.
——— ———: A copy of your letter to Mr. Jones, the Secretary of the Southern Historical Society, in which you express a desire to have my opinion upon certain propositions suggested by you in regard to the Pennsylvania campaign of 1863, and the battle of Gettysburg, has been forwarded to me, and I take pleasure in giving my views on the several mooted questions.
In the first place, I must say that you are mistaken in assuming that the Army of Northern Virginia was more powerful when it undertook the invasion of Pennsylvania than it had ever been before. I believe that you receive our publications entitled "Southern Historical Society Papers," and if so, by referring to the July number for 1876, you will find a paper by me in regard to the relative strength of the armies of Generals Lee and Grant, in which is embodied, on page 16, a table of returns of the forces in the Department of Northern Virginia at the end of each month from February, 1862, to February, 1865, inclusive, except for the months of June and August, 1862, April and June, 1863, and May and September, 1864. This table was made out by Mr. Swinton, author of the "History of the Army of the Potomac," from the Confederate returns in the Archive Office at Washington, and is indisputably correct, except where, in the absence of the official returns, Mr. Swinton has substituted his own estimates or conjectures for the months of June and August, 1862, and June, 1863. You will observe that, at the close of May, 1863, the whole force for duty in the Department of Northern Virginia consisted of 68,352 men and officers. The Department of Northern Virginia embraced all that portion of eastern Virginia and the Valley north of James river, ​and included all the troops within it. Of course, the movable army was less than the whole force in the department, as some troops had to be left guarding depots, &c. There were no accessions to the army after the returns showing 68,352 for duty, prior to the movement towards Pennsylvania, which begun on the 4th of June. Even some of the movable troops had to be left behind, and among them were two brigades of cavalry, Robertson's and Jones', as you will see from Gen. Lee's report in the same number of the Society Papers, pages 44-5. Those brigades arrived at Gettysburg on the 3d of July, too late to be of any service, except in guarding the trains on the retreat. The force with which Gen. Lee invaded Pennsylvania was really under 60,000 effectives, as I have stated in the address embodied in Mr. Jones' "Personal Reminiscences," a separate copy of which I now send you. Gen. Lee's force against McClellan, in June, 1862, was between 75,000 and 80,000—a fact I think I have demonstrated in a communication which you will find in the June number of the Society Papers for 1876, page 413. The table before referred to shows the force for duty in the Department of Northern Virginia, at the close of July, 1862, just before the commencement of hostilities against Pope, was 69,559, and the force for duty at the close of November, 1862, just before the battle of Fredericksburg, was 73,554. There is no return at the close of April, 1863, just before Chancellorsville, for the enemy had then begun his movement by crossing the river in our front, and the steps necessary to oppose him rendered it impracticable to make returns. The force present, however, was not as large as it was at the close of May following, for two divisions of Longstreet's corps were absent south of James river, though the army in the aggregate was larger than it was at the beginning of the movement into Pennsylvania, by reason of the loss at Chancellorsville and at Fredericksburg at the same time. No reliance whatever is to be placed in the conjectural estimate of our strength for June of that year made by Mr. Swinton, nor in the statements of any of the writers on the Federal side as to our strength at Gettysburg.
​You will perceive, therefore, that our army was numerically smaller at the time of the commencement of the Pennsylvania campaign than it had been at the commencement of any of the previous campaigns; though in one sense it may be said to have been more powerful than it had previously been, for it was elated with the victory over Hooker, and bouyant with the prospect of carrying the war into the enemy's country—in fact it had come to regard itself as invincible.
From your first proposition, that "it was a mistake to invade the Northern States at all," I entirely dissent. The Trans-Mississippi Department was then practically severed from the Confederacy by the investment of Vicksburg and Port Hudson. To have confined our efforts east of the Mississippi to an entirely defensive policy would have exposed us to a certain, though slow process of exhaustion. We would have had not only to defend our northern frontier, on a line from the Chesapeake bay, up the Rappahannock and Rapidan rivers, across the Upper Valley Of the Shenandoah, and through Western Virginia, Middle Tennessee, and Northern Alabama and Mississippi, but also the entire coasts of Chesapeake bay and the Atlantic, on the east, from the mouth of the Rappahannock, south, and of the Gulf of Mexico on the south, with the enemy firmly in possession of a number of ports and harbors on said coasts, as well as a line in the west, parallel to and east of the Mississippi, with the enemy in possession of or besieging all of the towns on that river. This in fact would have required us to defend a line extending entirely around the States east of the Mississippi, with very inadequate resources. If we had had troops and resources in money, provisions, and munitions of war enough to defend this entire line, we might have accomplished "the pecuniary exhaustion of the North," which you think should have been our policy; but our men, our resources, and, above all, our faith, would have been exhausted long before we could have accomplished the desired result.
Mr. Lincoln had announced his purpose to "keep a-pegging" until the "rebellion" was suppressed, and General Grant ​subsequently announced the same policy in rather different language, to-wit: "To hammer continuously against the armed force of the enemy and his resources, until, by mere attrition, if by nothing else, there should be nothing left to him but an equal submission with the loyal section of our common country to the constitution and laws of the land." Under this pegging-hammer process, we must inevitably have succumbed, if we had remained on the defensive entirely, just as it is said the constant dropping of water will wear away the hardest stone.
Let us look at the condition of affairs at the close of May, 1863. The Federal forces held possession of Fortress Monroe, Yorktown and Norfolk in Virginia, with the control, by means of gunboats, of the Chesapeake, York river, and James river up to the mouth of the Appomattox—of the entire coast of North Carolina, except the mouth of Cape Fear river—of Port Royal and Beaufort island on the coast of South Carolina, with Charleston harbor blockaded and the city of Charleston besieged—of Fort Pulaski, at the mouth of the Savannah river, in Georgia—of the mouth of the St. John's river, Key West and Pensacola, in Florida—of the lower Mississippi, New Orleans, Baton Rouge, and Memphis, with Vicksburg and Port Hudson besieged, the fall of which latter towns was all that was necessary to give complete possession of the Mississippi river—of West Tennessee, the northern portion of Middle Tennessee, all of Kentucky, northwestern Virginia, including the Valley of the Kanawha, the lower Valley of Virginia, and all of eastern Virginia north of the Rappahannock. At the same time the entire coasts of the Atlantic and the Gulf of Mexico were so rigidly blockaded and patroled by war vessels, that it was a mere chance when the blockade was evaded.
The large army under Grant, besieging Vicksburg and Port Hudson, could very readily have been brought against one or the other of our armies in the field on the fall of the beleaguered towns, which was a mere question of time, as General Johnston was unable to concentrate a force large enough to relieve them. ​Our main Western army, under Bragg, was confronted in southern Tennessee by a much larger army under Rosecrantz, while the Army of Northern Virginia was confronted on the Rappahannock by one of nearly, if not quite double its numbers, under Hooker. In this condition of things, it was very apparent that unless we could break through the cordon that was gradually closing and tightening around us, we must infallibly be crushed as a victim in the coils of a boaconstrictor. To set down and content ourselves with a mere defensive policy, would be to await an inevitable collapse of our cause, sooner or later, by the gradual process of attrition and exhaustion. The only hope for us, then, was to strike such a blow as would alarm the North and shake its faith in the financial credit of the Federal government, and its ability to conduct the war to a successful issue.
Bragg's army was not in a condition to strike such a blow, and the issue of the Kentucky campaign of the previous year would not have warranted its employment for such a purpose, if other things had been favorable. The Army of Northern Virginia was the only one that could be relied on to undertake the difficult task, and its recent success at Chancellorsville had inspired the whole of that army with a spirit that gave promise of success.
There were but three plans that presented themselves for our adoption, if we were to take the aggressive. The first was to attack Hooker's army in position, and endeavor to destroy it; the second, to draw it out into the open field and defeat it, which could only be done by threatening Washington or the States north of the Potomac; and the third was to undertake an invasion of the latter States, pure and simple.
If we had awaited a renewal of the attacks of the Army of the Potomac, we might have repulsed it again and again; but from the nature of the ground occupied by the two armies respectively, with a wide, low plain on the south bank of the Rappahannock between the heights occupied by us and the river, while the commanding heights on the north bank were close upon the river, and ​crowned with an immense armament of heavy guns, it was always practicable for the Army of the Potomac to recross to its position of safety after a repulse. The result, therefore, must have been, as we always feared it would be, that that army, heavily reinforced under some new and more sagacious commander, would have been transported, by way of the Potomac, Chesapeake, and James river, to the position Grant was finally forced to take on the south of the James, when a siege of Richmond and Petersburg would have ensued, and the fall of those cities would have been only a question of time.
As to the alternatives presented, if we took the aggressive, it was impossible for us to have attacked the Army of the Potomac in its position on the north of the Rappahannock, except at great disadvantage. If you examine the map of that part of Virginia, and take into consideration the fact that the Rappahannock, between the two armies, and below, and for some distance above, could be crossed only on pontoon bridges; that from the nature of the ground we could not have forced the passage if we had the bridges, and that if we had undertaken to cross above, at some point where bridges were not necessary, we would have had to make a wide circuit and cross two rivers, the Rapidan and Rappahannock, you can understand the difficulties we would have had to encounter in making the attack. If you knew the exact topography of the country, you would perceive the difficulties more clearly.
Unless, therefore, we had made up our minds to perish by degrees, it was necessary to adopt one of the other alternatives. Of course, Hooker would not have undertaken another forward movement until his army was sufficiently recruited to supply the loss incurred at Chancellorsville, and the diminution from the expiration of the terms of service of a portion of his troops, which was rapidly approaching, and to draw him out from his position of safety before that happened, it was necessary for us to threaten Washington or the states north of the Potomac. To have moved directly on Washington would have been idle, for Hooker would ​have moved back into the defences of that city on the south, and if we could have entered them we would then have had to cross the Potomac, which would have been an impossibility.
To threaten Washington, therefore, it was necessary to pass through the lower valley and cross the Potomac into Maryland, which amounted to an invasion.
General Lee adopted a plan, which was a combination of the last two plans mentioned, as open to us, to-wit: to draw Hooker out from his position, and transfer the scene of hostilities north of the Potomac, as you will perceive from the succinct but very clear statement of his purposes contained in his report. Hooker hugged too closely the defences of Washington for us to attack him south of the Potomac, and hence we crossed that stream without fighting him.
If we could have gained a decided victory north of the Potomac, it would have done more to produce a financial crisis at the North and secure our independence than a succession of victories on the soil of Virginia. I have always been and still am firmly convinced that, if General Lee's plans and orders had been promptly and strictly carried out, we would have gained such a victory at Gettysburg. I am, therefore, of opinion that the invasion of Pennsylvania, when undertaken, was a wise and judicious movement, notwithstanding the fate that attended it. It is true that it may be looked upon as somewhat of the nature of a forlorn hope, but it was our best chance for success, and we should have taken it.
I also dissent from your second proposition, that "If the invasion was to be undertaken, only raiding parties should have been sent." My observation during the war led me to the conviction that raiding parties generally resulted in more damage to the raiders than to the opposite side. Such was undoubtedly the case with Stuart's famous raid around McClellan's army, through Maryland and Pennsylvania, in October, 1862. The Dutch farmers and housewives in Pennsylvania were probably very badly frightened, but the loss in disabled cavalry horses, which ​were left behind in exchange for useless Dutch farm horses, was not compensated by any damage to the enemy. So, Morgan's celebrated raid across the Ohio proved disastrous to his command, without the possibility of any compensating damage to the enemy. Most of the raids undertaken by the Federal cavalry proved disastrous to the commands engaged in them.
It is true that Stuart's raid around McClellan, when he was on the Chickahominy in 1862, resulted in obtaining valuable information for Gen. Lee, but it also served to convince McClellan of the necessity of a change of his base to James river, which for us was the most dangerous position for him to occupy. Some of Forrest's raids also in the west, were attended with valuable results in the destruction of stores and the interruption of the enemy's lines of communication; but, as a general thing, the raids, unless when undertaken with a specific object, as for the purpose of obtaining information or the destruction of some depot of stores, or the cutting of a line of communication, and then with a force adequate to the purpose, were mere annoyances to the opposite side without serious damage, while the raiders came out badly worsted, at least in horse flesh; which latter was a very important consideration on our side. When undertaken merely for the purpose of harrying a particular section of country, they were too apt to degenerate into mere marauding parties, and almost always came to grief. These remarks apply equally to the partisan corps employed on our side. They annoyed without weakening the enemy, just as a spiteful insect may worry and enrage a huge bull, without doing him any serious hurt. Really they did a vast deal more damage to our own cause, by the demoralization caused in the army from a desire upon the part of many to share in the captures, which the partisan corps appropriated to their own use, which induced quite a number to desert their colors for the sake of plunder. I have been struck with the force of a remark contained in Gen. Sheridan's report of his operations in the Valley of Virginia in 1864, where, in ​speaking of the partisan corps, which he calls "guerrilla bands," he says: "I had constantly refused to operate against these bands, believing them to be, substantially, a benefit to me, as they prevented straggling and kept my trains well closed up, and discharged such other duties as would have required a provost guard of at least two regiments of cavalry." He is here speaking of the principal corps of that kind that operated in Virginia. I am of opinion that mere raiding parties sent north of the Potomac would have done much to arouse and excite the population to a stronger support of the war, without any compensating damage to the enemy or benefit to us.
I must here admonish you not to confound my expedition into Maryland, and up to the fortifications of Washington, with what were merely raids. That expedition, though frequently called a raid, was not undertaken as such, but Gen. Lee's real purpose in sending me on it was to induce the withdrawal of troops from Grant's army, and eventually the abandonment of the siege of Richmond, which he saw was inevitable, and would result in the final capture of the city, unless a diversion was made. It was a forlorn hope, it is true, but I think it is unquestionable that it had a very considerable effect in prolonging the contest before Richmond by the detention in the Valley until the close of the year, not only of the troops that belonged to the Department of West Virginia, but also of two corps of infantry and two divisions of cavalry that had been sent from Grant's army.
My observation did not lead me to the conclusion, at which you seem to have arrived, that, on Northern soil, the Army of the Potomac "fought ten times better than in Virginia." I did not observe that the fighting at Gettysburg by that army was in any way superior to what I had seen it do before. You must make some allowance for the "poetic license" which writers and speakers on the Northern side have taken in describing the deeds of Meade's soldiers at Gettysburg, and in putting dramatic exclamations into their mouths. Those writers and speakers were not there to ​witness and hear what they have undertaken to record; and you can readily understand that, in the dreadful shock of battle, men have not the leisure or the calmness to frame pretty speeches, nor are they exactly in the condition to recollect what any of their comrades may have given utterance to. I am as incredulous about dramatic speeches and ejaculations in time of battle as about "real bayonet charges."
Our failure to carry the position at Gettysburg was not due so much to the superior fighting of Meade's army in position as to the failure to support, according to General Lee's instruction, the several attacks made on the 2d and 3d, and the delay in making those attacks. Meade did not select the position at Gettysburg; but that position was forced on him by the engagement which took place unexpectedly on the 1st. He had previously selected another position, behind Pipe creek, for his battle-ground, and even on the 2d, after his arrival at Gettysburg, deliberated about withdrawing to the former position, and was probably prevented from doing so by the attack on our part. See the testimony of himself and others before the Congressional Committee on the Conduct of the War, contained in the 1st vol. (2d series) of its report.
Your third proposition, that "the way in which the fights of the 2d of July were directed does not show the same co-ordination which ensured the success of the Southern arms at Gaines' Mill and Chancellorsville"—in which I understand you to mean by "co-ordination," co-operation and concert of action—has more of soundness in it. In the first place, it was intended by General Lee that the attack from his right flank on the enemy's left should commence at a very early hour on the morning of the 2d; that Hill should threaten the center with two of his divisions, and cooperate in Longstreet's attack with his right division; while Ewell was to make a demonstration upon the enemy's right, to be converted into a real attack should opportunity offer—that is, should success attend the attack on the enemy's left. That attack was not ​made until late in the afternoon, and, as a natural consequence, there could not be that co-operation that would have taken place had the attack been promptly made at the time expected. When Johnson, later in the day, attacked the enemy's right flank, and two of my brigades advanced to the crest of Cemetery Hill and got possession of the enemy's batteries, the divisions on my right that were to have co-operated did not move, and the enemy sent reinforcements from the part of the line against which those divisions ought to have advanced, which rendered it necessary for my brigades to retire. I have always thought that, if at the time Johnson's division and my two brigades became engaged the two divisions on my right had advanced promptly, we would have secured a lodgment on Cemetery Hill that would have ensured us the victory.
Again: On the 3d the attack from our right was to have been made at a very early hour by Pickett and the other two divisions of Longstreet's corps, while a simultaneous attack was to have been made from our left. Johnson, heavily reinforced for the purpose, begun the attack from our left at the proper time, but Longstreet again delayed until in the afternoon, and there was once more a failure of co-operation.
In regard to your fourth proposition, that General Lee, after the fight on the 2d, having found Meade's position very strong, ought to have attempted "to turn it by the south, which was its weakest place, by extending his right so as to endanger Meade's communications with Washington," I have this to say: It would have been an exceedingly hazardous movement at best, in which we would have been exposed to attack under great disadvantage, as we would have had to move by flank on, I believe, but one road in the narrow strip of country between South mountain and Meade's position; and there would have been great danger of the capture or destruction of a large part of our trains. Look at the map of the country, if you have one, and recollect that we were on the north and west of Meade's position, which was really between us and Washington. In order to get near enough to Meade's line of ​communications with Washington to threaten it, we would have had to make a wide circuit, while he had the inner and shorter line. If we had undertaken to get between him and Washington, he could have retired to Westminster, from whence there was a railroad to Baltimore, or to some point on the Northern Central railroad, and have run into Washington by rail before we could have gotten half way there, if he had desired to do so. Or, taking a bolder course, he might have moved down by the way of Emmettsburg to Frederick, Md., where he would have been joined by 10,000 men under French, taken possession of the passes of South mountain, and thus been on the line of our communications. If we had moved on Washington, we would have been followed on our heels, and while we had the strong fortifications of that city in our front, we would have had Meade's army in our rear. In any event, we would have been in a most hazardous position, with no prospect of escape in case of a defeat, for we could not have gotten near enough to Meade's line of communicatiens to endanger them without crossing the Monocacy and going at least as far as Taneytown, where we would have been out of reach of the passes of South mountain. This idea about our being able to threaten Meade's communications by extending our right on the Emmettsburg road, has grown out of an entire misapprehension of the topography of the country.
Your fifth proposition, that "The heroic but foolish attack of Pickett on the 3d, should never have been attempted," may now appear very plain in the light of what actually happened. We have in our country a homely saying of some backwoodsman, that, "If a man's foresight was as good as his hindsight he wouldn't so often go wrong," which has a vast deal of sound practical philosophy in it. You and I, with a full knowledge of the facts and circumstances attending any military movement, acquired by subsequent developments, may be able to perceive where mistakes were made; but how would it have been if we had been called on to direct that movement with only the knowledge possessed by him who did direct it?
​I was at Gettysburg and participated in the first day's action—in fact, it was the arrival of my division, at an opportune moment, that made the defeat of the enemy so signal. This fight was not anticipated by General Lee, who had ordered the concentration of his army at the eastern base of the South mountain. The fight was brought on by the movement of two of A. P. Hill's divisions towards Gettysburg, for the purpose of ascertaining the strength of the enemy's force reported to be there, which was supposed to consist entirely of cavalry. Hill's division having become engaged, Ewell went to his assistance with his two divisions that were in reach, and the result was a brilliant success for our arms.
General Lee reached the part of the field where Hill was about the close of the action. Upon ascertaining the facts, and seeing a brilliant and decisive victory within his grasp, as all of us thought, he determined to give battle at that point. To have withdrawn without fighting would have been exceedingly dispiriting to the troops that had been engaged; and I venture to affirm that not a man of the entire force present lay down that night with any other expectation than that the next day would witness a crushing defeat of Meade's army. It was General Lee's purpose to begin the battle at a very early hour next morning; but, by some untoward management on the part of the commander of the troops that were to open the attack, it did not begin until very late in the afternoon. It is very manifest to my mind, that if the attack from our right flank had been made at an early hour on the morning of the 2d, or, in fact, at any time in the forenoon of that day, we would have achieved the anticipated victory, for Meade's whole army had not then arrived, and the position on his left, which was assailed at 4 P. M., was not occupied by his troops until about 3 P. M. Nevertheless, we gained advantages which produced the conviction that, by concerted action next day, we could still win the victory, and General Lee determined to make the attempt. There was good reason at the time to anticipate success from the proposed attack, if made at the time and in the manner designed.
​You will observe from General Lee's report, already referred to, that the attack was to have been made by the whole of Longstreet's corps, and Ewell was to have assailed the enemy's right at the same time, for which latter purpose Johnson had been reinforced by two brigades from Rode's division and one from mine. Johnson did become engaged about daybreak, the time, Ewell says, that had been designated for the combined attack. Had Longstreet's three divisions moved to the attack at the same time, while Hill had his three divisions ready to support that attack, I verily believe that it would have been successful; but there was again a great delay on our right, and the attack there did not begin until after 2 P. M. In the meantime, Johnson had been compelled to retire from the attack made by him, on account of the accumulation of forces against him, which ought to have been employed by the attacking force from our right. When the attack was made by Pickett's division, and the division and two brigades from Hill's corps, the victory for some time hung in the balance, and our troops got into the enemy's lines, but were repulsed by reinforcements brought from the enemy's right, which could not have been spared if the attack had been simultaneous with that of Johnson. If this failure of co-operation had been anticipated, of course it would have been injudicious to order the attack; but there was no good reason at the time to expect any such failure. When any movement of any kind is attended with failure, it is a very easy thing to condemn it, and declare that it should never have been made; but in order to judge of the propriety of making the attacks on the 2d and 3d, we should consider the circumstances and conditions under which those attacks were ordered, and not merely their failure from other circumstances and conditions beyond the control of the Commander-in-Chief.
General Longstreet's long delay on the 3d seems to have been based mainly on the idea that his right flank was in danger from a body of troops on the enemy's extreme left. By examining the testimony of General Pleasanton before the Committee on the ​Conduct of the War, pages 359-60, same volume of the report already referred to, you will find that the troops threatening Longstreet's right were really only two brigades of cavalry, which were posted there to prevent Meade's left from being turned. Two divisions of infantry were used to keep off that force, when one brigade ought to have been amply sufficient.
From some communications made to Mr. Swinton by General Longstreet after the war, and contained in the book of the former, you will find that General Longstreet was strongly opposed to the attack on the enemy's position at Gettysburg, and foreboded the worst results from it. He did not, therefore, enter into those attacks with that spirit of confidence so necessary to success.
I have discussed the causes of our failure to achieve a victory at Gettysburg at length in a controversy that arose last year between General Longstreet and myself, which was produced by an article published by him. I think I have pointed out in my replies to him the real causes of our failure, and will not now repeat the arguments used, but send you copies of my two articles. I regret that I have not also copies of his articles to send you, but the quotations I give from them will fully indicate the points at issue between us. You will observe that in my articles there is some causticity of expression, which was provoked by the character of the articles I was replying to. I now sincerely regret the necessity which called for the personal strictures contained in my replies, and would be glad if they could be eliminated. The facts, however, on which I rely are historic, and the arguments based on them are legitimate. I send you also a manuscript copy of a letter from General A. L. Long, who was on General Lee's staff at Gettysburg, received subsequently to the controversy between Longstreet and myself. The facts stated by General Long tend very strongly to sustain my positions.
I must here take occasion to declare that I have never had, and do not now have any suspicion of a want of fidelity on the part of ​General Longstreet to the cause of the Confederacy at Gettysburg or at any other period of the war. I am willing to accord to him great merit as a fighter, but I think his efficiency on such an occasion as that at Gettysburg was materially impaired by a constitutional inertia, mental and physical, that very often delayed his readiness to fight. When once ready, and in the fight, he always fought well, sometimes most brilliantly.
You may ask, if I am right in my view of the causes of our failure at Gettysburg, why it was that General Lee did not speak out and place the responsibility where it properly belonged? My reply would be, that it is difficult for one who did not know him personally to understand the wonderful magnanimity of character which induced General Lee often to take the chances of incurring censure himself rather than run the risk of doing possible injustice to another. Hence it was that he preferred to let the entire responsibility for the battle of Gettysburg and its failure rest on his shoulders, rather than attempt to screen himself by casting it upon one or more subordinates, for whose soldierly qualities he had respect, notwithstanding their short-comings on that occasion.
In connection with the battle of Gettysburg, I send you, besides the address and articles before mentioned, the official reports of Generals Longstreet and Ewell, as well as my own, in regard to that battle.
In conclusion, I must say that I do not regard the campaign in Pennsylvania as having resulted in such disastrous consequences to our arms as you seem to think attended them. It is true that we failed to win a great battle on the soil of Pennsylvania, but all the enemy's plans for the campaign in Virginia for that year were thwarted, and our army retired across the Potomac self-relying and defiant. When it confronted Meade for several days, near Hagerstown, Maryland, on the retreat, he dared not attack it.
In the following autumn General Lee was able to detach one corps from the army, two divisions of which were sent to the ​assistance of Bragg's army in the southwest, and contributed materially to the victory of Chickamauga.
In the ensuing spring the Army of Northern Virginia was able to meet and cope with an army under Grant, originally of nearly if not quite thrice its numbers, which was also constantly receiving heavy reinforcements during a campaign of unsurpassed length and brilliancy. It finally succumbed, solely from exhaustion, resulting from the mere process of attrition, caused by constant contact with overwhelming numbers.
But for the simultaneous disasters in the southwest, the campaign in Pennsylvania would not have materially impaired the chances for success of the Confederacy.
I have the honor to be, very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
J. A. Early.