# The Gradual Acceptance of the Copernican Theory of the Universe/Part 2/Chapter 3

CHAPTER III.
The Opposition and Their Arguments.
THE Protestant leaders had rejected the Copernican doctrine as contrary to the Scriptures. The Roman Congregations had now condemned Galileo for upholding this doctrine after they had prohibited it for the same reasons. These objections are perhaps best summarized in that open letter Foscarini wrote to the general of his order, the Carmelities, at Naples in January, 1615,—the letter that was absolutely prohibited by the Index in March, 1616. He gave these arguments and answered them lest, as he said, "whilst otherwise the opinion is favored with much probability, it be found in reality to be extremely repugnant (as at first sight it seems) not only to physical reasons and common principles received on all hands (which cannot do so much harm), but also (which would be of far worse consequence) to many authorities of Sacred Scripture. Upon which account many at first looking into it explode it as the most fond paradox and monstrous [wikt:capriccio|capriccio]] that ever was heard of." "Yet many modern authors," he says further on, "are induced to follow it, but with much hesitancy and fear, in regard that it seemeth in their opinion so to contradict the Holy Scriptures that it cannot possibly be reconciled to them." Consequently Foscarini argued that the theory is either true or false; if false, it ought not to be divulged; if true, the authority of the Sacred Scriptures will not oppose it; neither does one truth contradict another. So he turned to the Bible.
He found that six groups of authorities seemed to oppose this doctrine. (1) Those stating that the earth stands fast, as Eccles. I:4. (2) Those stating, that the sun moves and revolves; as Psalm XIX, Isaiah XXXVIII, and the miracle in Josh. X:12-14. (3) Those speaking of the heaven above and the earth beneath, as in Joel II. Also Christ came down from Heaven. (4) Those ​authorities who place Hell at the center of the world, a "common opinion of divines," because it ought to be in the lowest part of the world, that is, at the center of the sphere. Then by the Copernican hypothesis, Hell must either be in the sun; or, if in the earth, if the earth should move about the sun, then Hell within the earth would be in Heaven, and nothing could be more absurd. (5) Those authorities opposing Heaven to earth and earth to Heaven, as in Gen. I, Mat. VI, etc. Since the two are always mutually opposed to each other, and Heaven undoubtedly refers to the circumference, earth must necessarily be at the center. (6) Those authorities ("rather of fathers and divines than of the Sacred Scriptures") who declare that after the Day of Judgment, the sun shall stand immovable in the east and the moon in west.
Foscarini then lays down in answer six maxims, the first of which is that things attributed to God must be expounded metaphorically according to our manner of understanding and of common speech. The other maxims are more metaphysical, as that everything in the universe, whether corruptible or incorruptible, obeys a fixed law of its nature; so, for example, Fortune is always fickle. In concluding his defense, he claims among other things, that the Copernician is a more admirable hypothesis than the Ptolemaic, and that it is an easy way into astronomy and philosophy. Then he adds that there may be an analogy between the seven-branched candle-stick of the Old Testament and the seven planets around the sun, and possibly the arrangement of the seeds in the "Indian Figg," in the pomegranate and in grapes is all divine evidence of the solar system. With such an amusing reversion to mediæval analogy his spirited letter ends.
Some or all of these scriptural arguments appear in most of the attacks on the doctrine even before its condemnation by the Index in 1616 was widely known. Besides these objections, Aristotle's and Ptolemy's statements were endlessly repeated with implicit faith in their accuracy. Even Sir Francis Bacon (1567-1631) with all his modernity of thought, failed in this instance to recognize the value of the new idea and, despite his ​interest in Galileo's discoveries, harked back to the time-honored objections. At first mild in his opposition, he later became emphatically opposed to it. In the Advancement of Learning (1604), he speaks of it as a possible explanation of the celestial phenomena according to astronomy but as contrary to natural philosophy. Some fifteen years later in the Novum Organon he asserts that the assumption of the earth's movement cannot be allowed; for, as he says in his Thema Coeli, at that time he considered the opinion that the earth is stationary the truer one. Finally, in his De Augmentis Scientiarum (1622-1623) he speaks of the old notions of the solidity of the heavens, etc., and adds, "It is the absurdity of these opinions that has driven men to the diurnal motion; which I am convinced is most false." He gives his reasons in the Descriptio Globi Intellectualis (ch. 5-6): "In favor of the earth [as the center of the world] we have the evidence of our sight, and an inveterate opinion; and most of all this, that as dense bodies are contracted into a narrow compass, and rare bodies are widely diffused (and the area of every circle is contracted to the center) it seems to follow almost of necessity that the narrow space about the middle of the world be set down as the proper and peculiar place for dense bodies." The sun's claims to such a situation are satisfied through having two satellites of its own, Venus and Mercury. Copernicus's scheme is inconvenient; it overloads the earth with a triple motion; it creates a difficulty by separating the sun from the number of the planets with which it has much in common; and the "introduction of so much immobility into nature … and making the moon revolve around the earth in an epicycle, and some other assumptions of his are the speculations of one who cares not what fictions he introduces into nature, provided his calculations answer." The total absence of all reference to the Scriptures is the unique and refreshing part of Bacon's thought.
All the more common arguments against the diurnal rotation of the earth are well stated in an interesting little letter (1619) ​by Thomas Feyens, or Fienus, a professor at the school of medicine in the University of Louvain. Thus Catholic, Protestant, and unbeliever, Feyens, Melancthon, Bacon and Bodin, all had recourse to the same arguments to oppose this seemingly absurd doctrine.
Froidmont, or Fromundus, the good friend and colleague of Feyens at Louvain, was also much interested in these matters, so much so that some thought he had formerly accepted the Copernican doctrine and "only fled back into the camp of Aristotle and Ptolemy through terror at the decree of the S. Congregation of Cardinals." His indignant denial of this imputation of turn-coat in 1634 is somewhat weakened by reference to his Saturnalitiæ Coenæ (1615) in which he suggests that, if the Copernican doctrine is admitted, then Hell may be in the sun at the center of the universe rather than in the earth, in order to be as far as possible from Paradise. He also refers in his De Cometa (1618) to the remark of Justus-Lipsius that this paradox was buried with Copernicus, saying "You are mistaken, O noble scholar: it lives, and it is full of vigor even now among many," thus apparently not seeing serious objection to it. M. Monchamp summarizes Froidmont's point of view as against Aristotle and Ptolemy, half for Copernicus and wholly for Tycho Brahe.
Froidmont's best known books are the two he wrote in answer to a defense of the Copernican position first by Philip Lansberg, then by his son. The Ant-Aristarchus sive Orbis Terræ Immobilis, Liber unicus in quo decretum S. Congregationis S. R. E. Cardinal. an. 1616, adversus Pythagorico-Copernicanous editum, defenditur, appeared in 1631 before Galileo's condemnation. The Jesuit Cavalieri wrote to Galileo in May about it thus: "I have run it through, and verily it states the Copernican theory and the arguments in its favor with so much skill and efficacy that he seems to have understood it very well indeed. But he refutes them with so little force that he seems ​rather to be of an opinion contrary to that expressed in the title of his book. I have given it to M. César. If you wish it, I will have it sent to you. The arguments he brings against Copernicus are those you have so masterfully stated and answered in your Dialogo." Nearly a year later, Galileo wrote to Gassendi and Diodati that he had received this book a month before and, although he had been unable to read much of it on account of his eye trouble, it seemed to him that of all the opponents of Copernicus whom he had seen, Fromundus was the most sensible and efficient. Again he wrote in January, 1633, regretting that he had not seen it till six months after he had published his dialogues, for he would have both praised it and commented upon certain points. "As for Fromundus (who however shows himself to be a man of great talent) I wish he had not fallen into what seems to me a truly serious error, although a rather common one, in order to refute the Copernican opinion, of beginning by poking scorn and ridicule at those who consider it true, and then (what seems to me still less becoming) of basing his attack chiefly on the authority of the Scriptures, and finally of deducing from this that in this respect it is an opinion little short of heretical. To argue in this way is clearly not praiseworthy;" for as Galileo goes on to show, if the Scriptures are the word of God, the heavens themselves are his handiwork. Why is the one less noble than the other?
Froidmont replied in 1633 to Lansberg's reply with his second attack, Vesta, sive Ant-Aristarchi Vindex, in which he laid even more emphasis upon the theological and scriptural objections. Yet, in ignorance of Galileo's condemnation, he considers the charge of heresy too strong. "The partisans of this system do not after all disdain the authority of the Scriptures, although they appear to interpret it in a way rather in their favor." He also, and rightly, denies the existence at that time of any conclusive proof.
In spite of Froidmont's position, the University of Louvain was not cordial in its response to the papal nuncio's ​announcement in September, 1633, of Galileo's abjuration and sentence, in marked contrast to the reply sent by the neighboring university of Douay. The latter body, in a letter signed by Matthæus Kellison (Sept. 7, 1633), declared the condemned theory "should be discarded and hissed from the schools; and that in the English College there in Douay, this paradox never had been approved and never would be, but had always been opposed and always would be."
This opposition in the universities in Belgium continued throughout the century to be based not so much on scientific grounds as upon the Bible. This may be seen in the manuscript reports of lectures in physics and astronomy given at Liège in 1662, and at Louvain between 1650-1660, though one of these does not mention the decree of 1616. The general congregation of the Society of Jesus in 1650 drew up a list of the propositions proscribed in their teaching, though, according to M. Monchamp (himself a Catholic) not thereby implying a denial of any probability they might have. The 35th proposition ran: "Terra movetur motu diurno; planetae, tanquam viventia, moventur ab intrinseco. Firmamentum stat." The Jesuit astronomer Tacquet in his textbook (Antwerp, 1669) respected this decision, acknowledging that no scientific reason kept him from defending the theory, but solely his respect for the Christian faith.
One of the pupils of the Jesuits revolted however. Martin van Welden, appointed professor of mathematics at Louvain in 1683, debated a series of theses in January, 1691. The second read: "Indubitum est systhema Copernici de planetarum motu circa sole; inter quos merito terra censetur." His refusal to alter the wording except to change indubitum to certum brought on a stormy controversy within the faculty which eventually reached the Council of Brabant and the papal nuncio at Brussels. The professor finally submitted, though he was not forbidden to teach the Copernician system, nor did the faculty affirm its falsity, merely that it was contrary to the Roman ​decree. The professor re-opened the matter with a similar thesis in July, thereby arousing a second controversy that this time reached even the Privy Council. Once more he submitted, but solely with an apology for having caused a disagreement. His new theses in 1695 contained no explicit mention of the Copernician system; at least he had learned tact.
The absorption of the German states in the Thirty Years War may account for the apparent absence there of Copernican discussion until after the Peace of Westphalia. A certain Georgius Ludovicus Agricola gave a syllogistic refutation of the doctrine as his disputation at the university of Wittenberg in 1665. While he acknowledged its ingenuity, he preferred to it "the noblest, truest, and divinely inspired system" of Tycho Brahe. The four requirements of an acceptable astronomical hypothesis according to this student are: (1) That it suit all the observations of all the ages; (2) That as far as possible, it be simple and clear; (3) That it be not contrary to the principles of physics and optics; (4) That it be not contrary to the Holy Scriptures. As the Copernican theory does not meet all these tests, it is unsatisfactory. Incidentally, he considers it "ridiculous to include the earth among the planets, because then we would be living in Heaven, forsooth, since we would be in a star." He decides finally "that the decree of March, 1616, condemning the Copernican opinion was not unjust, nor was Galileo unfairly treated."
Two years later appeared a text-book at Nürnberg, by a Jesuit father, based on the twelfth century Sacrobosco treatise and without a single reference so far as I could find, to Copernicus! Another publication of the same year was a good deal more up to date. This was a kind of catechism in German by Johann-Henrich Voight explaining for the common people various scientific and mathematical problems in a hundred questions and answers. He himself, a Royal Swedish astronomer, obviously preferred the Tychonic system, but he left his reader ​free to choose between that and the Copernican one, both of which he carefully explained. He made an interesting summary in parallel columns of the arguments for and against the earth's motion which it seems worth while to repeat as an instance of what the common people were taught:
​Another writer preferring the Tychonic scheme was Longomontanus, whose Astronomica Danica (Amsterdam, 1640) upheld this theory because it "obviates the absurdities of the Copernican hypothesis and most aptly corresponds to celestial appearances," and also because it is "midway between that and the Ptolemaic one." Even though he speaks of the "apparent motion of the sun," he attributed diurnal motion to the heavens, and believed the earth was at the center of the universe because (1), from the account of the Creation, the heaven and the earth were first created, and what could be more likely than that the heavens should fill the space between the center (the earth) and the circumference? (2) and because of the incredibly enormous interval between the sphere of the fixed stars and the earth necessitated by Copernican doctrine.
The high-water mark of opposition after Galileo's condemnation was reached in the Almagestum Novum (Bologna, 1651) by Father Riccioli of the Society of Jesus. It was the authoritative answer of that order, the leaders of the Church in matters of education, to the challenges of the literary world for a justification of the condemnation of the Copernican doctrine and of Galileo for upholding it. Father Riccioli had been professor of philosophy and of mathematics for six years and of theology for ten when by order of his superiors, he was released from his lectureship to prepare a book containing all the material he could gather together on this great controversy of the age. He wrote it as he himself said, as "an apologia for the Sacred Congregation of the Cardinals who officially pronounced these condemnations, not so much because I thought such great height and eminence needed this at my hands but especially in behalf of Catholics; also out of the love of truth to which every non-Catholic, even, should be persuaded; and from a certain notable zeal and eagerness for the preservation of the Sacred Scriptures intact and unimpaired; and lastly because of that reverence and devotion which I owe ​from my particular position toward the Holy, Catholic and Apostolic Church."
This monumental work, the most important literary production of the Society in the 17th century, is abundant witness to Riccioli's remarkable erudition and industry. Nearly one-fifth of the total bulk of the two huge volumes is devoted to a statement of the Copernican controversy. This is prefaced by a brief account of his own theory of the universe—the invention of which is another proof of the ability of the man—for his scientific training prevented his acceptance of the Aristotelian-Ptolemaic theory in the light of Galileo's discoveries; his position as a Jesuit and a faithful son of the Church precluded him from adopting the system condemned by its representatives; and Tycho Brahe's scheme was not wholly to his liking. Therefor he proposed an adaptation of the last-named, more in accordance, as he thought, with the facts. Where Tycho had all the planets except the earth and the moon encircle the sun, and that in turn, together with the moon and the sphere of the fixed stars, sweep around the earth as the center of the universe, Riccioli made only Mars, Mercury and Venus encircle the sun,—Mars with an orbit the radius of which included the earth within its sweep, the other two planets with orbital radii shorter than that of the sun, and so excluding the earth. This he did, (1) because both Jupiter and Saturn have their own kingdoms in the heavens, and Mars, Mercury and Venus are but satellites of the sun; (2) because there are greater varieties of eccentricity among these three than the other two; (3) because Saturn and Jupiter are the greatest planets and with the sphere of the fixed stars move more slowly; (4) Mars belongs with the sun because of their related movements; and (5) because it is likely that one of the planets would have much in common both with Saturn and Jupiter and with Mercury and Venus also.
Then he takes up the attack upon the Copernican doctrine. M. Delambre summarizes and comments upon 57 of his arguments ​against it, and Riccioli himself claims to have stated "40 new arguments in behalf of Copernicus and 77 against him." But these sound somewhat familiar to the reader of anti-Copernican literature: as, for instance, "which is more natural, straight or circular movement?" Or, the Copernican argument that movement is easier if the object moved is smaller involves a matter of Faith since it implies a question of God's power; for to God all is alike, there is no hard nor easy. Although diurnal movement is useful to the earth alone and so, according to the Copernicans, the earth should have the labor of it, Riccioli argues that everything was created for man; let the stars revolve around him. The sun may be nobler than the earth, but man is nobler than the sun. If the earth's movement were admitted, Ptolemy's defense would be broken down through the elimination of the epicycles of the superior planets: here, if ever, the Copernicans appear to score, as Riccioli himself admits, but he calls to his aid Tycho Brahe and the Bible. "To invoke such aids is to avow his defeat" is M. Delambre's comment at this point. There are many more arguments, of which the foregoing are but instances chosen more or less at random; but no one of them is of especial weight or novelty.
To strengthen his case, Riccioli listed the supporters of the heliocentric doctrine throughout the ages, with those of the opposite view. If a man's fame adds to the weight of his opinion, the modern reader will be inclined to think the Copernicans have the best of it, for omitting the ancients, most of those opposing it are obscure men.
Riccioli nevertheless viewed the Copernican system with much sympathy. After a full statement of it, he comments; "We have not yet exhausted the full profundities of the Copernican hypothesis, for the deeper one digs into it, the more ingenious and valuable subtilties may one unearth." Then he adds that "the greatness of Copernicus has never been sufficiently appreciated nor will it be,—that man who accomplished what no astronomer before him had scarcely been able even to suggest without an insane machinery of spheres, for by a ​triple motion of the earth he abolished epicycles and eccentrics. What before so many Atlases could not support, this one Hercules has dared to carry. Would that he had kept himself within the limits of his hypothesis!"
His conclusions seem to show that only his position as a Jesuit restrained him from being a Copernican himself. "I. If the celestial phenomena alone are considered, they are equally well explained by the two hypotheses [Ptolemaic and Copernican]. II. The physical evidence as explained in the two systems with exception of percussion and the speed of bodies driven north or south, and east or west, is all for immobility. III. One might waver indifferently between the two hypotheses aside from the witness of the Scriptures, which settles the question. IV. There are in addition plenty of other motives besides Scriptural ones for rejecting this system."(!) But with the Scriptural evidence he adduces the decree of the Index under Paul V against the doctrine, and the sentence of Galileo, so that "the sole possible conclusion is that the earth stands by nature immobile in the center of the universe, and the sun moves around it with both a diurnal and an annual motion."
Even this great book was as insufficient to stop the criticism of the action of the Congregations, as it was to stop the spread of the doctrine. So once again the father took up the cudgels in defense of the Church. The full title of his Apologia runs: "An Apologia in behalf of an argument from physical mathematics against the Copernican system, directed against that system by a new argument from the reflex motion of falling weights." (Venice, 1669). He states in this that his Almagestum Novum had received the approbation of professors of mathematics at Bologna, of one at Pisa, and of another at Padua, and he quotes the conclusion from Nicetas Orthodoxus ("a diatribe by Julius Turrinus, doctor of mathematics, philosophy, medicine, law, and Greek letters"): "That the sun is revolved by diurnal and by annual motion, and that the earth is at rest I firmly hold, infallibly believe, and openly confess, not because of mathematical reasons, ​but solely at the command of faith, by the authority of the Scriptures, and the nod of approval (nutu) of the Roman See, whose rules laid down at the dictation of the spirit of truth, may I, as befits everyone, uphold as law."
Riccioli further on proceeds to answer his objecters, declaring that "the Church did not decide ex cathedra that the Scripture concerning movement should be interpreted literally; that the censure was laid by qualified theologians and approved by eminent cardinals, and was not merely provisional, nor for the time being absolute, since the contrary could never be demonstrated; and that while it was the primary intent of the Inquisitors to condemn the opinion as heretical and directly contrary to the Scriptures.… they added that it was absurd and false also in philosophy, in order, not to avert any objections which could be on the side of philosophy or astronomy, but only lest any one should say that Scripture is opposed to philosophy." These answers are indicative of the type of criticism with which the Church had to cope even at that time.
* ↑ In Salisbury: Math. Coll.; I, 471-503.
* ↑ Bk. II; sec. 8, §1.
* ↑ Bk. II, ch. 46.
* ↑ Phil. Works: 705.
* ↑ Bk. III.
* ↑ Phil. Works: 684-685.
* ↑ translated in Appendix C. For criticism, see Monchamp: 58-64.
* ↑ Fromundus; Vesta; Ad Lectorem.
* ↑ Monchamp: 41.
* ↑ Justus-Lipsius: IV, 947.
* ↑ Monchamp: 48.
* ↑ Ibid: 94.
* ↑ Galileo: Opere: XV, 25.
* ↑ Ibid: XIV, 340-341.
* ↑ Monchamp: 107-108.
* ↑ Doc. in Favaro: 120-121, 132, 133.
* ↑ Monchamp: 125, 143.
* ↑ Ibid: 148-149.
* ↑ Ibid: 152-153.
* ↑ Ibid: 182-234.
* ↑ Monchamp: 321.
* ↑ Agricola: Disputatio.
* ↑ Schotto: Organum Mathematicum (1667).
* ↑ Voight: Der Kunstgunstigen Einfalt Mathematicher Raritäten Erstes Hundert. (Hamburg, 1667).
* ↑ Voight: op. cit.: 28.
* ↑ Ibid: 30-31.
* ↑ Longomontanus: Op. cit.: 162.
* ↑ Longomontanus: Op. cit.: 158.
* ↑ Riccioli: Alm. Nov.; Præfatio, I, xviii.
* ↑ Riccioli: Alm. Nov.: II, 496.
* ↑ Cath. Ency.; "Riccioli," and Walsh: Catholic Churchmen in Science: 200. (2nd series, 1909.)
* ↑ Riccioli: Alm. Nov.: II, 288-289; see frontispiece.
* ↑ Delambre: Astr. Mod.: I, 674-680.
* ↑ Riccioli: Apologia: 2.
* ↑ Riccioli: Aim. Nov.: II, 313, 315.
* ↑ Riccioli: Aim. Nov.: II, 330-351.
* ↑ Ibid: II, 339-340.
* ↑ Delambre: Op. cit.: I, 677.
* ↑ Ibid: I. 673.
* ↑ Riccioli: Aim. Nov.: II, 290.
* ↑ Riccioli: Op. cit.: II, 304, 309.
* ↑ Delambre: Astr. Mod.: I, 680.
* ↑ Riccioli: Op. cit.: II, 478 (condensed), 500.
* ↑ Riccioli: Apologia: 4.
* ↑ Ibid: 103.
* ↑ One bit of contemporary opinion on Riccioli and his work has come down to us. A canon at Liège, Réné-François Sluse, wrote asking a friend (about 1670) to sound Wallis, the English mathematician, as to his opinion of the Almagestum Novum, and of this argument based on the acceleration of movement in falling bodies. Wallis himself replied that he thought the argument devoid of all value. The canon at once wrote. "I do not understand how a man as intelligent as Riccioli should think he could bring to a close a matter so difficult [the refutation] by a proof as futile as this." Monchamp: 165-166.  For a full, annotated list of books published against the Copernican system between 1631-1688, see Martin: Galilée: 386-388.