# Philosophical Works of the Late James Frederick Ferrier/Institutes of Metaphysic (1875)/Section 1/Proposition 12

The Institutes of Metaphysic, Philosophical Works of the Late James Frederick Ferrier (1875 ed., Vol. 1). (E. L. Lushington, & A. Grant, Eds.) Edinburgh: William Blackwood and Sons. pp. 300-309.
PROPOSITION XII.
MATTER PER SE AGAIN.
DEMONSTRATION.
The material universe and its qualities per se cannot be known or presented to the mind—(Props. IV. and V.) But what cannot be known or presented to the mind, cannot be thought of or represented by the mind—(Prop. XI.) Therefore the material universe, and all its qualities per se, are absolutely unthinkable as well as absolutely unknowable.
OBSERVATIONS AND EXPLANATIONS.
1. The introduction of this proposition, and the preceding one on which it rests, will not appear ​Why this proposition is introduced.superfluous to those who are at all acquainted with the evasive procedure of psychology. This science frequently admits that matter per se is not to be known, but still holds in reserve the opinion that it may, in some way or other, be thought or conceived. Thus Kant, who surrenders all knowledge of things in themselves, makes a reservation in favour of some kind of conception of them. Matter per se is called by him a noumenon (τὸ νοόυμενον); that is to say, it is an object of thought—of pure intellectual contemplation; a position which, besides being erroneous and contradictory, is remarkable for the direct reversal of the Platonic doctrine which it involves. Matter per se (Kant's "ding an sich") is with Plato the absolutely unintelligible, the most alien from all conceivability: with Kant it is the object of an intellectual conception, and the approved nutriment of thought—so strange are the metamorphoses which philosophical opinions undergo in their transmission from ancient to modern thinkers. In Kant's hands Plato's transitory and phenomenal has been translated into veritable substance—the γιγνόμενον transmuted into the ὄντως ὂν. The present and preceding propositions have been introduced for the purpose of correcting this abuse, by showing that matter per se can be just as little, the object of thought as it can be the object of knowledge. Should the reader, however, be inclined to adopt the contrary opinion, he will find satisfaction in the eleventh and twelfth ​counter-propositions, which reduce to logical precision the vague and uncertain utterances of psychology on this subject, and which, if true, will be sufficient to uphold matter per se as thinkable, notwithstanding the demonstration of Proposition IV., by which it was proved to be absolutely unknowable.
On what condition matter per se might be thought of.2. In considering this proposition and its demonstration,—the first circumstance to be attended to is this—that matter and its qualities per se may very well be thought of, if some additional element be not essential to their original cognition. Thought can subtract whatever is not absolutely necessary to constitute knowledge in the first instance; but thought cannot do more than this. No power of abstraction can withdraw from representation any element indispensable to the composition of presentation. Every other element may be withdrawn, but an indispensable element way not be withdrawn. This point was sufficiently explained in the preceding proposition (Obs. 5), where the limitation of thought now referred to was called restriction by the way of subtraction.
3. The question therefore is, In attempting to cogitate matter and its qualities per se, is thought leaving out, or endeavouring to leave out, any element essential to the original cognition of matter ​In attempting to think it, we must leave out an element essential to its cognition, and therefore it cannot be thought of.and its qualities? And the answer is, that thought is unquestionably attempting to do this. It is attempting to leave out all conception of the ego, which was antecedently apprehended along with matter and its qualities,—and this it cannot do; for the ego required to be apprehended as the very ground (Proposition I.) and essential element (Proposition II.) of the original cognition. And therefore the thought of the antecedent ego must form part of the secondary representation, just as much as the knowledge of it formed part of the primary presentation. Consequently, all thought as well as all knowledge of matter per se is impossible.
How the imagination leads us astray.4. In the case of thought or representation, the imagination leads us into precisely the same inadvertency which we are led into by perception in the case of knowledge or presentation. When we perceive external objects, we usually pay so little attention to self that we seem to overlook altogether this most essential element of cognition: so when we think of, or represent, external objects, we think so little of the antecedent "me," formerly apprehended along with them, that we seem to be thinking of these objects themselves, without taking any notice of this, the necessary constituent in our original knowledge of them, and which is now a necessary constituent in our representation of them. The one oversight is the inevitable consequence of the other. ​We are, in the first instance (in presentation), so much more forcibly impressed by the presence to the mind of the things, than we are by the presence to the mind of itself, that, in the second instance (in representation), we are much more impressed by the presence to the mind of the images of the things than we are by the presence to the mind of the thought of the self, which was apprehended along with the things whose images we are now contemplating.
Illustration.5. For example; the man who may have made a tour, during last summer, through the Highlands of Scotland, was much more forcibly impressed by the charms of the scenery through which he passed than he was by the presence of himself whom, however, he apprehended (faintly it may be) at every turn, and in continual concomitance with all that he beheld:—so subsequently, when he recalls to mind his former tour, his imagination brings before him ideal pictures of these scenes without bringing before him, by any means, so forcibly—indeed, without appearing to bring before him at all, that former self, which was apprehended in constant and necessary association with every one of them.
6. There cannot be a doubt that this illustration expresses correctly the state of the fact; but just as little can there be a doubt that, in thinking or ​Self must be represented just as much as it must be presented.representing what we formerly beheld, we are as much compelled by the necessary laws of reason to cogitate or represent ourself in its antecedent connection with these scenes, as we were in the first instance compelled by the necessary laws of reason to apprehend this self when the objects were actually before us. And we are thus compelled; because this apprehension of self was in the first instance essential to the constitution of the cognition, and therefore the thought of this antecedent apprehension of self is absolutely necessary to the constitution of the representation. If it were impossible to know one thing without knowing two things, it would be impossible to represent one thing without representing two things; because, unless this were so, less would be representable than could be known; in other words, that would be representable which could not be known. But this contradicts Proposition XI., and is therefore a false and contradictory supposition. And the conclusion is, that we cannot think or represent to the mind our antecedent knowledge or experience of material things without thinking or representing the "me" by which they were, in the first instance, apprehended, and which was itself necessarily apprehended along with them.
Twelfth counter-proposition.7. Twelfth Counter-proposition.—"Matter and its qualities per se are not absolutely incogitable; they admit of being conceived or represented in thought, ​although it may be true that they cannot be presented in knowledge."
Its character and downfall.8. This counter-proposition expresses the inadvertency of natural thinking, and also of psychological science which comes up in the place of Counter-propositions IV. and V., when these are subverted by their corresponding propositions. This counter-proposition would rest upon an assured basis if Counter-proposition XI. were sound; because, if less could be thought of than was essential to constitute cognition, there would be nothing to prevent matter per se from being conceived. But Counter-proposition XI. is false, and therefore Counter-proposition XII., which is founded upon it, is false also. The one goes down before Proposition XI., and the other before Proposition XIII, as contradicting the necessary truths of reason.
Matter per se has no chance of being thought of.9. The psychologist sometimes argues that, although matter and its qualities per se cannot be imagined, they may nevertheless be thought of in some loose and indeterminate kind of way. Imagination, he may admit, cannot represent to us the material universe emancipated from all subjective or sensational admixture; but he may contend that pure thinking is competent to perform what knowledge and imagination are unable to overtake. This proposition disposes of that inconsiderate and ​evasive mode of arguing. It deprives matter per se of every chance of being conceived or represented.
It cannot be reached by the way of inference.10. And let it not be supposed that matter per se can be reached by the way of inference. Whatever can be conceived inferentially, must be conceived as the object of possible, though not of actual cognition. But there is no potential knowledge, in any quarter, of matter per se, as has been already sufficiently established. It can be conceived only as the object of no possible knowledge; and therefore it cannot be conceived as an inference, except on the understanding that this inference is a finding of the contradictory, or of that which cannot be conceived on any terms by any intelligence.
Why the discussion respecting matter per se is important.11. It may be proper at this place to remark, parenthetically, that the discussion respecting matter per se is interesting and important, not so much on account of any conclusion as to the independent existence or non-existence of matter which the inquiry may lead to, as on account of the truths in regard to knowing and thinking which the research brings to light. Philosophers have been too apt to overlook this consideration, and to suppose that the main object of the research was to prove something either pro or con respecting material existence. That, however, is a point of very secondary ​importance, and one which, at the outset, ought not to be attended to at all. The inquiry should be gone into as if it were merely the smelting process, by which the most secret and essential laws of cognition and of thought are to be extricated from the dross of ordinary opinion, and submitted to the attention of mankind. Viewed in this light, the importance of the discussion cannot be too highly estimated. The agitation of no other question can make known to us the fundamental laws of all knowledge—the binding necessities of all reason. If any other topic will answer this purpose, let it be announced: philosophers will very readily proceed to its examination. Would people inquire directly into the laws of thought and of knowledge, by merely looking to knowledge or to thought itself, without attending to what is known, or to what is thought of? Psychology usually goes to work in this abstract fashion; but such a mode of procedure is hopeless,—as hopeless as the analogous instance by which the wits of old were wont to typify any particularly fruitless undertaking,—namely, the operation of milking a he-goat into a sieve. No milk comes in the first instance, and even that the sieve will not retain! There is a loss of nothing twice over. Like the man milking, the inquirer obtains no milk in the first place; and, in the second place, he loses it, like the man holding the sieve. Modern wit has not equalled that intolerable jest, which describes exactly the predicament ​of our psychologists, in their attempts to ascertain the laws of thinking and knowing, by merely looking to these, considered as mental operations. Our Scottish philosophy, in particular, has presented a spectacle of this description. Reid obtained no result, owing to the abstract nature of his inquiry, and the nothingness of his system has escaped through the sieves of all his successors. They drag for abstractions in nets composed of abstractions; and, consequently, they catch very few fish. If we would avoid this termination to our toils; if we would protect ourselves against the unpleasantness of losing no result twice over, we must go to work in a very different way. It is of no use inquiring into the laws of knowing and thinking, considered as abstract operations. We must study the contents, and not the mere form of knowledge; for the form without the contents,—the law without that which the law determines,—is elusory as the dream of a shadow. We must ask, and find out, what we know, and what we think;—in other words, we must inquire whether matter per se be what we know or think, or whether we have not, all along, been practising an imposition upon ourselves in imagining that this was what we knew, when, in truth, this was not what we knew. If any important conclusions are to be reached, the concrete, and not the abstract, must be the object of our investigation, and this is what these Institutes have endeavoured to keep constantly in view.