# Clancy v. United States/Opinion of the Court

* Court Documents
* Case Syllabus
* Opinion of the Court
* Dissenting Opinion Clark
United States Supreme Court
365 U.S. 312
Clancy v. United States
Argued: Jan. 10, 1961. --- Decided: Feb 27, 1961
This case presents an important question under 71 Stat. 595, 18 U.S.C. § 3500, 18 U.S.C.A. § 3500, the statute sometimes referred to as the Jencks Act, as it deals with the problems presented in our decision by that name. Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 77 S.Ct. 1007, 1 L.Ed.2d 1103. Petitioners were charged with making false statements (18 U.S.C. § 1001, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1001), with attempting to evade the wagering excise tax (26 U.S.C. § 7201, 26 U.S.C.A. § 7201), and with conspiring to defraud the United States of internal revenue taxes (18 U.S.C. § 371, 18 U.S.C.A. § 371). They were found guilty and the judgments of conviction were affirmed. 7 Cir., 276 F.2d 617. The case is here on a writ of certiorari. 363 U.S. 836, 80 S.Ct. 1611, 4 L.Ed.2d 1723.
At the trial Minton, a government agent, testified concerning an interview with petitioner, Kastner, at which he was present. Minton testified 'I did not take any notes at the time, but afterwards I returned to the office and made a memorandum of the interview.' Counsel for Kastner asked the court for the production of that memorandum pursuant to the Jencks Act.
Other government witnesses testified to conversations they had had with Clancy, Kastner, and a third partner in petitioners' wagering business. One of the witnesses, Agent Buescher, testified he had taken no notes during these interviews, but had 'compiled a memorandum' from notes taken at the time of the interview by the second witness, Agent Mochel. Both Buescher and Mochel testified that they had signed the later memoranda of the conversations. Counsel for petitioners requested production of the memoranda, and the requests were refused.
The trial court, though directing delivery to the defense of notes made by the witnesses at the time of the interviews, refused the requests for the memoranda, saying that written statements were not covered by the Jencks Act unless they were made 'contemporaneously' with the interview. The Government now concedes that this was an erroneous ruling, as indeed it was. Each of these statements related 'to the subject matter as to which the witness has testified.' Each was a 'statement' as that word is defined in the Act. The requirement that it be contemporaneous applies only to 'a substantially verbatim recital of an oral statement' made to a government agent. By the terms of the Act, 'a written statement made by said witness and signed or otherwise adopted or approved by him' is also included. These statements fell in that category and should have been produced. Campbell v. United States, 365 U.S. 85, 81 S.Ct. 421, 5 L.Ed.2d 428. And see United States v. Sheer, 7 Cir., 278 F.2d 65, 67-68. As the Senate Report on the bill that became the Jencks Act states:
'The committee believes that legislation would clearly be unconstitutional if it sought to restrict due process. On the contrary, the proposed legislation, as reported, reaffirms the decision of the Supreme Court in its holding that a defendant on trial in a criminal prosecution is entitled to reports and statements in possession of the Government touching the events and activities as to which a Government witness has testified at the trial.
'The purpose of the proposed legislation is to establish a procedural device that will provide such a defendant with authenticated statements and reports of Government witnesses which relate directly upon his testimony.'
The Government, however, contends that as to Agent Minton the error was harmless. It also asserts-though the record is silent and counsel for petitioners deny it-that verbatim carbon copies of the reports of Agents Bueschner and Mochel were delivered to the defense at the trial. But since its version of what transpired is contested, the Government urges that the most we do is to remand the case to the District Court to determine whether verbatim copies of the reports were delivered to the defense at the trial. If they were so delivered, the Government argues, the court's denial of their production was harmless error.
We do not follow that suggestion. We deal with the record as we find it, which gives no support to the Government's assertion that verbatim reports were delivered to the defense. Moreover, the Government's assertion is not a positive statement of the prosecution. Those who present the case here say with candor that they speak only 'according to our information,' which admittedly falls short of a assertion that the copies were delivered to the defense at the trial. Since the defense earnestly denies the statement, we can only conclude that on the record before us petitioners were denied an inspection of the documents to which they were entitled.
We put to one side Rosenberg v. United States, 360 U.S. 367, 79 S.Ct. 1231, 3 L.Ed.2d 1304, where a failure to produce a document was considered to be harmless error under the particular circumstances of that case. We do not reach the harmless error point because, if applicable, it is relevant only to the report of one of the agents, not to those of the other two. Since the production of at least some of the statements withheld was a right of the defense, it is not for us to speculate whether they could have been utilized effectively. As we said in Jencks v. United States, supra, 353 U.S. 667, 77 S.Ct. 1013:
'Flat contradiction between the witness' testimony and the version of the events given in his report is not the only test of inconsistency. The omission from the reports of facts related at the trial, or a contrast in emphasis upon the same facts, even a different order of treatment, are also relevant to the cross-examining process of testing the credibility of a witness' trial testimony.'
Accordingly we conclude that at least as respects some of these statements reversible error was committed and that petitioners are entitled to a new trial. There are other questions raised that we do not reach, as we have no way of knowing whether they will arise on a new trial.
Reversed.
Mr. Justice CLARK, with whom Mr. Justice FRANKFURTER and Mr. Justice HARLAN join, dissenting.

## Notes

* ↑ 18 U.S.C. 3500, 18 U.S.C.A. § 3500, provides in relevant part:
* ↑ 18 U.S.C. § 3500(b), 18 U.S.C.A. § 3500 (b), supra, note 1.
* ↑ 18 U.S.C. § 3500(e), 18 U.S.C.A. § 3500 (e), supra, note 1.
* ↑ 18 U.S.C. § 3500(e)(2), 18 U.S.C.A. § 3500(e)(2), supra, note 1.
* ↑ 18 U.S.C. § 3500(e)(1), 18 U.S.C.A. § 3500(e)(1), supra, note 1.
* ↑ S. Rep. No. 569, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 2.
This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
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