# Russia & The Struggle for Peace/Chapter 10

CHAPTER TEN
THE ARMY AND THE WAR
NOW let us see what happened to the army during the war. I am very sorry that I was not in Russia in the first eight days of the mobilisation and did not see the send-off of the Petrograd garrison, notably of the Imperial Guard, on their way to the front. I imagine that when they went the war spirit and patriotic upheaval of the people was at its highest. On my return to Russia I witnessed the endless march of troops from the provinces through Petrograd. And I must state that the absence of any patriotic enthusiasm or even of any excitement or high temper among the soldiers themselves struck me very forcibly at that time.
The troops as they were marching to the front looked as Russian soldiers always look; like "God's poor little grey cattle." The army was, as it has long been, a resigned, obedient, amorphous human mass put into motion by other people towards some unknown destination, moving in blind faith towards an unknown destiny and for an unknown purpose. There was no fighting spirit, no feeling of duty, nor indeed any feeling of spiritual exaltation whatsoever. There was, once more, obedience and nothing else.
But there was one thing during this early period of the war which made the mobilisation very remarkable, indeed almost historic. For the first time in history there seemed to be a real point of contact between the army and the people. For the first time, the Russian troops were really heartily welcomed and cheered by the people. Hitherto there was only pity for the individual soldier and fear and hatred of the army as a whole. Now, for the first time, fear and hatred were ​replaced by sympathy and love. The cheers of the people and the welcome they received must have been a revelation to the soldiers—must indeed have warmed their hearts with a sudden glow of unexpected happiness. They must have felt that all they had been taught in the barracks by the officers about the "internal enemy" was a lie. This sympathy of the people was in striking contradiction to the legend about the "internal enemy," and it opened the eyes of the soldiers. It is quite possible that from this time the fermentation in the army actually began. At any rate, the soldiers went to the front with this rare experience of popular sympathy and love fresh in their memory. Later on the soldiers were to receive many more tokens of the people's sympathies; their distrust of the officers, who always tried to alienate them from the people, must have grown rapidly.
I well remember the favourable impression produced in Russia by Kitchener's and King George's orders of the day to the British Expeditionary Forces when they left for France. The British were reminded in these orders that upon their behaviour in France, and upon their respect for French civilian life and property, the good name of Britain would depend. Russian progressives admired and envied the noble and dignified advice given to British soldiers. But they knew only too well that Russian fighting traditions and the mentality of the Russian military leaders and of the Government were of quite a different nature. They feared that Russian Generals would never consent to restrict the soldier where "those insignificant interests of the civil population" were concerned. And the fears of Russian progressive society were confirmed only too soon. Not only was the army not restricted; it was expressly allowed "full freedom of movement and action" during the campaign. In fact, full licence was given to the soldiers, not only in enemy countries, but even in the Western provinces of Russia, which the army had to cross on their way to the front. This free​dom of movement and action was considered a good tonic for the coming" battle.
I am telling this abominable and terrible chapter of Russian realities very reluctantly. But I ought not to pass it over in silence, for two reasons. Firstly, because I ought not, nor do I desire, to be silent about any unpleasant truths; and secondly, because I am deeply convinced that this licence which was given to the soldiers, and actually encouraged by the military authorities, had a very bad effect on the morale of the army and bore terrible fruit at a later stage.
The poisonous atmosphere which was created at the front by the Military Party, and which was known in Russia as the Nicholas-Yanushkevich régime, was chiefly responsible for the shaken morale of the people and of the army. It was here that the shaken morale of the army had its origin.
There is not the slightest doubt that never since 1861, when the liberation of the serfs by Alexander II. had for a short time created an atmosphere of reconciliation, had there been such a favourable moment in Russia's history as in this first month of the war. The definite break with reactionary Germany and the alliance of Russia with free and liberal England in defence of the same cause—all this made Russians feel and believe that a new epoch had arrived.
It was a proud and happy—but, alas—a very short period of Russian history. Nobody preached, nobody even talked of reconciliation. And yet the relations between the Government and the people, and between the many races, nationalities, classes and creeds of Russia, were never more cordial and friendly. The people fraternised with the soldiers; progressive newspapers and leaders of the political opposition parties praised and blessed the Government. Inveterate anti-Semites fraternised with the Jews, and Jews marched in procession, singing the Russian National Anthem and bearing Russian National flags. The "Novoie Vremia" praised the loyalty of the Finns, and the Finns ​fraternised with the Russian soldiers. I, myself, travelled from Sweden through Finland immediately the war broke out, and the impression was simply marvellous. I have known Finland and the cold and placid Finns for many years; and the change I saw seemed like something which could happen only in fairy tales.
In Petrograd the people sang the Russian National Anthem and cheered the Government and the Tsar with no less enthusiasm than the Germans in Berlin sang "Die Wacht am Rhein" and shouted "Hoch!" for the Kaiser. In fact, a more favourable atmosphere for the successful prosecution of the war could not be imagined. But it was destroyed only too soon by the rude and overbearing behaviour of the ambitious Military Party. The Military Party went to war, not only to conquer the enemy, but to conquer Russia itself. Even victory over Germany was, for them, only a means of establishing more firmly their own power in Russia. The Military Party, the Grand Dukes, the War Office, the General Staff, and the Court camarilla refused to accept the change which had come over Russia. Their mentality prevented them from understanding the people's loyalty and from believing in it. They could only believe in loyalty achieved by military means; they could only trust enforced loyalty.
The Finns are loyal. Splendid! But a few more divisions stationed in Finland will strengthen the loyalty of the Finns. The Jews are proclaiming their patriotism. A very pleasant sign! But that is no reason why the military authorities should alter their long-established conviction that in the event of a war with Germany the Russian Jews will sympathise with the enemy more than with Russia. Therefore, loyalty or no loyalty, the Jews in the provinces behind the front must be treated as potential spies or at least as secret allies of the enemy.
Such was the poisonous mentality of the Military Party. Within a fortnight the golden opportunity ​for reconciliation had passed by, and a few weeks later the public and political life of Russia was once more permeated with mutual hatred and mistrust. But it was in the army that the influence of this policy of the Military Party was most deplorable. The morale of the army was shaken even before it met the enemy.
It is, of course, easy to understand why the Press in this country and in France persisted in denying that the Russian army committed any atrocities. It certainly is more convenient for them to represent the "army of the Tsar" as a well-disciplined model army which chivalrously and gallantly fought the enemy, whereas the army of the Revolution degenerated into an undisciplined mob, looting and destroying everything that came its way. But whether we like it or no, it is a terrible fact that the army of the Tsar, or rather of the Grand Duke Nicholas, committed atrocities both in enemy lands and in Russia itself. The most abominable atrocities were committed by the High Command. It terrorised the people behind the front, arrested and banished the populations of whole villages, took hostages, and encouraged the soldiers to look upon the civilian population as spies and secret agents of the enemy. In the invaded provinces of Galicia and the Bukovina it violated all institutions of public life, shutting down the Ruthenian (Ukrainian) schools, sup-pressing the Ruthenian newspapers and religious societies, and arresting and banishing the Ruthenian priests. It replaced the free or half-free forms of political and social life by the most rotten institutions, the worst products of Russian political ingenuity.
The short régime of Count Bobrinski, who was appointed Military Governor of Galicia, was a terrible object lesson to the peoples of Austria, and indeed of Europe in general. Bobrinski brought over the very worst elements from Russia, the political blackguards recommended by the "Black Hundred." He made Lemberg into a kind of experimental laboratory of the ​worst possible "Black Hundred" methods. The soldiers, encouraged by the High Command, looked upon the unfortunate population of Western and Southwestern Russia and of the occupied territory of Austria as legitimate booty; they looted the shops and violated the people. The facts shocked Russia. Russian society was disgusted and filled with shame. All the high ideals which Russian progressives had associated with the war were brutally violated. They had gone to war to free the peoples of Austria from the Hapsburg yoke, only to put them under the regime of the "Black Hundred"; and on the way the war with the Huns was being transformed into a continuous pogrom by the soldiers in the Western provinces of Russia. Thus there was no limit to the depression and humiliation of thoughtful Russians. But apart from their humiliation, they were alarmed above all on account of the inevitable influence of this state of affairs on the morale of the soldiers. It was poisoning the soul of the Russian soldiers; it was dangerously affecting the simple mind of the peasant soldier.
​Every effort was made to stop this rot. Several influential public bodies—notably an unofficial Commission of the Duma, the Society of Journalists in Petrograd, and others—investigated the facts! at the front. The immense material collected testified with unfailing clearness to the criminal origin of this policy and to its terrible influence upon the army. The Russian Press was powerless, being forbidden to report the facts. But there was a widespread hope that if the facts could be brought to the notice of the Western Allied Powers, they would use their influence with the Russian Government to bring about a change for the better. The most difficult question was how to get the material over the frontier. However, this was successfully done, and yet all efforts to induce the Press in the Allied countries to make a protest were in vain. The silence of the British Press at that time was the first blow to the great admiration of Russian progressive society for Great Britain and for its free Press. The belief of Russian progressive society that England was "our ally" was destroyed; they saw that in reality England was "their ally"—the ally of the Tsarist Government, on which the English Press continued to lavish its praise and flattery.
The effect of this policy of deliberate mistrust on the morale of the army was terrible. Indeed, imagine the state of mind of the poor uneducated Russian soldier, who is taught to believe that the population in the rear is permeated with spies and hidden enemies. This terrible legend must naturally have excited and terrorised the army. The more so, as it began to dawn on the soldiers that all their greatest heroism and sacrifices ultimately led to disaster, and that for some reason or other disaster always coincided with grave cases of treason in the army itself. But even the facts about treason in the army, real and serious as they were, would not have had such a terrible effect on the psychology and the morale of the army if it had not been prepared to believe that treason was everywhere. The grave and ​repeated cases of treason in the army, added to the atmosphere of mistrust against the civilian population which had deliberately been fostered by the High Command, were enough to upset the confidence of any fighting force. After the dreadful disaster in East Prussia and after the Miassoiedov affair, when many officers were shot for high treason, the army was tremendously excited. The soldiers became very suspicious, and began to explain every misfortune by treason. The lack of munitions, the absence of reinforcements, in fact any sign of disorganisation in the army—everything was explained in whispers as being due ta high treason. There was indeed treason enough in many places, but the soldiers began to see it everywhere. Each man suspected his neighbour. The army was overwrought. It lived, as it were, in a nightmare from which there was no escape. While the advance was still going on this did not matter so much, but after the great and disastrous retreat from Galicia in 1915, the army began to fall to pieces.
I made up my mind to avoid in my account of the war and of the Revolution any reference to the psychology of the Russian people. Explanation by reference to the national psychology is always a very dubious and hazardous process. But perhaps I may be allowed the one exception of pointing out the extraordinary impulsiveness of the Russian people. It is not merely my private opinion; it is a generally recognised fact. The Russian character lacks the tenacity and stubbornness of the British race. Misfortune will always make the British soldier more obstinate and more stubborn. With the Russian it is not so. Success will increase his energy and efforts tenfold, but failure inevitably leads him to weariness and despair.
The light and frivolous treatment of the great Russian retreat by the Allied Press is fresh in our memories. The Grand Duke was the favourite of the Press, and was praised as the greatest strategist and tactician. The Russian newspaper experts also ​attempted to conceal the extent of the catastrophe, but the people of Russia were not deceived. They knew only too well that the retreat from Galicia, the loss of Poland and the fall of the western fortresses were the greatest military disasters ever sustained by Russia.
The High Command made an attempt to mislead the Russian public and the Allies by explaining this disaster as a crisis in munitions and organisation. But it was a much larger and more serious crisis than that. It was a veritable revolution in the mentality of the Russian soldier. For the first time in his life, he began to think, to criticise and to judge for himself.
And the result was that the whole structure of the Russian army was shaken. The very foundations of discipline were lost. In the course of the war, the Russian soldier had more and more begun to distrust his officers; now he ceased to fear them. The Government could indeed replace the guns and munitions which were lost during the retreat. But never again was it able to inspire in the soldiers the confidence in their officers which they had lost. Frightfulness was tried again and again, but with results the reverse of those anticipated. The disintegration of the army had begun; nothing could arrest it.
There were many terrible checks after this crisis; there were many splendid victories. But the morale of the army was broken.
* ↑ "Among the heaviest criminals of the old regime, it appears that we have hitherto forgotten one more gang of political marauders—those who, under the leadership of Count Bobrinslci and Bishop Eulogiy, flocked to Galicia after our victorious army, robbing and oppressing the population who gave the Russian army a friendly welcome and who, thanks to their crimes, followed the retreating army with altogether different feelings. Every honest Russian has blushed with shame in reading of even that minute part of the exploits of that gang, which has found its way to the press through the obstacles of censorship."—"Den," March 21, 1917.
* ↑ "… But the front is not a homogeneous domain. If the best youthful forces of the people are concentrated there there are also entrenched the noxious breed of the old order, and it is hard to say whose part has been more fatal in the last three years; that of the outcasts of reaction in the rear or that of the outcasts of reaction at the front. "For it is just at the front that a wild bacchanalia of pogroms and banishments, of wholesale slaughter and murder of peaceful and innocent inhabitants, took place. Acting from here, the high command filled the history of the last three years with the horrors of St. Bartholomew's Eve, of the inquisition and the crusades, which struck millions of Russian citizens dumb with horror."—"Den," Petrograd, March 15, 1917.