# The Election of Representatives, parliamentary and municipal

THE
ELECTION OF REPRESENTATIVES,
PARLIAMENTARY AND MUNICIPAL.
A Treatise.
By THOMAS HARE,
BARRISTER-AT-LAW.
FOURTH EDITION.
ADAPTING THE PROPOSED LAW TO THE BALLOT, WITH APPENDICES ON THE PREFERENTIAL AND CUMULATIVE VOTE.
LONDON:
LONGMANS, GREEN, READER, and DYER.
1873.
* Preface to the fourth edition
* Preface to the third edition
* Introduction to the first edition
* Clauses of the proposed electoral law
TABLE OF CONTENTS.
CHAPTER I.
THE REPRESENTATION OF MAJORITIES, MINORITIES, AND INDIVIDUALS.
Foundation of the power, page 1—and definition of majority, 2—Composition, 3—Burke, 1, 6— Guizot, 2, 7, 12—Calhoun, 3, 5, 19, 20—Conventional character, 3—Absolute government of numerical majority, 3— Its abuse, 6, 20—Suffrage insufficient to form constitutional government, 4 — Distinction of numerical from concurrent or constitutional majority, 5—Extinction in the representative body of the less popular parties by the detached action of local majorities, 7—Minorities in this country, 8—Supposed compensative representation, 9—Its injustice, impolicy, and danger, 10—Collection of the diversities of opinion of many, instead of the record of the preponderance of one of two or three opinions, 12—National loss in excluding the intelligence of all the minorities, 12—Three-cornered constituencies, or restricted vote, 12—Cumulative Vote, 13—Objections, 15—Ancient powers of knights and burgesses, and analogy of the jury, 16—Speeches of Mr. Bright, 17—Protection to Minorities and individuals in the power to form other new constituencies, 21—Free interchange of political force, 21, 22.
CHAPTER II.
CONSTITUENCIES BY VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATION AND UNANIMITY.
Association of individual electors of different constituencies, page 23—Its basis a community of sentiment, 24—Registrars, 24, 25—Relative magnitude of voluntary constituencies, 25—Average number of electors, 26—Mode of ascertaining the quota, 25, 26—Extent of the field for collecting kindred opinions, 27, 28—Facilities of intercourse, 27—Educational franchise, 28—Defects of the form suggested, 29—Unsuitableness of the ​geographical principle, 30—Increased scope for electoral action, 31—Representation of interest, 32—Inadequacy of the county representation, 33—The agricultural interest, 34—Manufactures, shipping, trade, 35—Absence of representation of the working classes, 36, 37—Contrast of the system of personal representation with its opposite, 30, 40.
CHAPTER III.
GEOGRAPHICAL, LOCAL, AND CORPORATE DIVISIONS OF ELECTORS.
Reform Act of 1832, page 41—Double process of giving representation to boroughs and creating boroughs for the purpose of representation, 41—Natural order in forming communities, 42—Artificial divisions, 43, 47, 48—Burke, 42, 48—Projected reform by grouping some boroughs and disfranchising others, 44—Disposition to voluntary association in guilds, fraternities, companies, &c., 46, 47—Its operation to be encouraged in forming electoral divisions, 47—The Crown the essential basis of legislative construction, 49—Provision for such reconstruction from time to time, 50—Immediate need of it, 52—Effect on the public spirit and emulation of majorities, 54—Guizot, 53—Early access to political life of men of talent, 56.
CHAPTER IV.
NUMERICAL DIVISIONS OF ELECTORS.
Duke of Richmond's plan in 1780, page 58—Reform Act of 1832, 59—Examples of Electoral districts, Ayr, Finsbury, Exeter, 59—Equality or permanency of geographical divisions impossible, 61—All involve the extinction of minorities, 62—Establishment of a self-acting scale, 62—Apportionment of representatives to the several states in America, 63—“Gerrymandering,” 64—Proportional system, 65—Geographical equality of this system, 65—Compared with that of contributory boroughs, 66—Efforts to pack the constituencies anticipated, 67—Majorities pronouncing on questions of peace or war, 68—Examples, 70—Comparison of classes likely to be represented in voluntary constituencies and in the smaller boroughs, 71, 73.
CHAPTER V.
THE SELECTION OF REPRESENTATIVES.
Vastness of political science, page 74—Traditional method of selecting legislators now unsuitable, 75—Legal and practical obstacles to candidates, 76—Contrast between the former and present mode of choice, 77—Traditional responsibility, 77—The Reform Bill and its necessity, 79— ​Change of leaders, 80—Montesquieu, 80—Principle of order to be sought and evolved, 81—State of Society, 81—Activity and combination of the vicious elements, and misleading of the rest, 83—Helplessness of the more upright and intelligent electors, 85—Demoralizing character of election contests, 87—National and individual deterioration under the new system, 88—Absence of volition and responsibility, 90, 92—The individual conscience must be aided and invoked, 92—Restoration of personal responsibility, 93—A corporate conscience non-existent, 94—Individuality needed, 94—Announcement of candidature and deposit, 95—Example of a gazetted list of candidates, 97—Expiring traditions to which the House is indebted, 96.
CHAPTER VI.
THE OBSTACLES WHICH DIMINISH THE NUMBER OF CANDIDATES.
Necessity and right of electors to the most extensive range of choice, page 99—Principle of the Commons' resolution of 1769, relating to Wilkes, 100—Impediments to candidates, 100.
I. Expense of elections, 101—Educated classes not necessarily wealthy, 101—National disposition for public labours, 102—Contemporaneous labours in Parliament and in professions, 102—Wealth not a security for character, ability, or conscientious action, 103—Its demagogism, 104—Burke, 104—The selection of the worthiest the interest of all, 105—Limit of necessary expense, 106—Bribery, 106—Causes of its prevalence, 107—Hardship of exposing to it the poorer voters, 108—Reduced to its minimum, 109—Voluntary and disinterested support, 111.
II. Introduction to constituents, 112—Canvassing, 112—Its demoralizing character, 113—A concurrence of sympathies contrasted, 113.
III. Incapabilities created by law, official persons, 114—Debate on the Indian Council, 114—Exceptional exclusions only justified by necessity, 115—Persons in holy orders, 116—The injustice and mischief of their exclusion, 117—Returning officers, 119—Presumptuous legislation on matters of individual judgment, 119.
CHAPTER VII.
THE ACT OF VOTING.
Documentary voting substituted for oral, page 121—Option of voting for one, or contingently for one of several candidates, 121—No single vote for more than one representative, 123—Voting paper, 124—The act necessarily deliberate, 126—Grote, 126—Burke, 126—Nature and sources of knowledge of candidates by electors, 128—Personal and public information, 129—Encouragement to inquiry, 130—Manifestation and recognition of superiorities, 132—Nurture of love of country, 134—Contact of ​intelligences, 135—Attraction of sympathy, 137—The ballot compared with this system, 139—Practical difficulty of effectual concealment without falsehood, 143—Necessity of faith or trust, 146—Christian principle of individuality, 148—Special consecration of the national act of electing representatives, 149.
CHAPTER VIII.
DUTIES AND POWERS OF RETURNING OFFICERS.
General duties, page 152—Number and distribution of polling-places, 153—Residential registration, 153—Poll-clerks and polling-places, 154—Tendering, receiving, and entering votes, 155—Tabular book of the poll-clerk, 156—and of the Registrars, 156—Appropriation of votes, 159—Where a candidate has more than the quota, 160—One candidate for several constituencies, 163—Certificate and transmission to the registrars of the unappropriated voting papers, 164—Example in a supposed Aberdeen case, 164—Ashburton, 166—Return of candidates having local majorities, 167—Computation of local majorities, 168—Supposed Norwich case, 169—Appropriation of votes from other constituencies, 170—to other constituencies, 172—Subsequent disposition of unappropriated votes, 173.
CHAPTER IX.
THE DUTIES OF THE REGISTRARS.
General functions, page 175—Registrars' fund, 176—Officers and clerks of registrars, 177—Appropriation of votes polled for the same candidates in different constituencies, 180—Preservation of family, territorial and traditional connection, 182—Process when no more quotas can be made up, 183—by eliminating the candidates having the smallest number of first and contingent votes, 185—or on unappropriated votes only, 185—or those having votes of less relative value computed by their position, 186—or by selecting comparative majorities, 187—Method of selection adopted, 188—Suggested alternative of transfer, 189—no candidate having a quota and no local majority, 192—Mr. Morrison's Bill, 193, 196—Quota applicable to a system rigidly local, 197, 200—Occasional vacancies, 200.
CHAPTER X.
THE DESIGNATION OF MEMBERS AND CONSTITUENCIES.
Several constituencies represented by one member, page 201—Multiple return of titular member for any number of constituencies 203—Operation of such law, 204—Distribution of members to constituencies, 204— ​Personal representation independent of the extent of the suffrage, 204—Tests of electoral capacity, 204—Guizot, 205—Capacity Independent of place, 206—Town and country inhabitants, 206—Difficulties in asserting the rights of the latter, 207—Burke, 207—Conduct of proprietary classes, 208—Mr. Bright, 207, 208—Imaginary antagonism, 208—Importance of a just county representation, 209—Metropolitan constituencies, 210—Their failure in representation, 213 — Remedy, 214—Effect of individual electoral independence, 215—Defective judgment drawn off, 215—Scotch, Irish, county, and local preferences of some voters in metropolitan and other constituencies, 218—Individual independence consistent with local and territorial interests, but not è converso, 217—Distinct action of localities preserved, 218—Examples of Liverpool and North Cheshire, 219.
CHAPTER XI.
THE HOUSE OF COMMONS AND THE IMPERIAL GOVERNMENT.
Relation of constitution to government, page 221—Calhoun, 222—Pascal, 222—Guizot, 223—Burke, 223—Inevitable abuse of a sole depository of power, 224—Despotism of a multitude, 226—Concurrent consent, 228—British constitution, 228—Appeal to conscience and necessity, 229—Constitutional principle as opposed to mere physical power, 231—Concurrent interests and opinions in representative constitution, 232—Party government, 235—Means of perpetuating it, 237—Result, 238—Public opinion, 239—Its imperfect, false, or delusive declaration, 241—Public meetings, 241—Illustration in April, 1848, 242—The press, 244—Its function in forming public opinion or expressing it, 248—The House of Commons its proper exponent, 250—Ancient democratic law to ascertain public opinion, 251—Importance of decision, 253—Oratory less effectual than reading, 253—Stability of the position of individual statesmen, and of the general government, 254—Operation in political life of an enlarged range of causes, 256—Frequent elections with convenience and safety, 257.
CHAPTER XII.
THE SUFFRAGE.
Personal representation a subject apart from the suffrage, page 258— Qualification dependent on locality is unjust, 258—Principle of Mr. Locke King's Bill, 258—Equality of county and borough suffrage necessary, 259—Natural rights, 260—Burke, 260—Tests of electoral capacity, 263—Manhood; its legal, physiological, and statistical definitions, 263—Other qualifications or tests, 265—Proper conditions of such tests, 266—Accessibility, universality, and practicability of application, 266—Indirect ​election, 267, 270—Suffrage to be treated as a valuable right, 271—Amendment of the registration system, 272—Removal of disfranchisements in respect of office, 273—Special facilities for voting by deposit of voting papers in special cases, 274— Voting by seamen, travellers, &., 274—by British subjects in the colonies, 275—Women’s suffrage, 275.
CHAPTER XIII.
LOCAL GOVERNMENT.
Reasons for increasing the functions and powers of local governing bodies 277, 279—Defects of the Municipal Corporation Act, 279—Arbitrary restriction of voters to particular wards, 279—“Gerrymandering,” 279—Impolicy of arbitrary qualifications of candidates, 280–282—Elections of a third every third year, 282—Absence of direct representation of property, 283–285—Form of proprietary voting-paper, 285—Indirect election of the Board of Works, 286—A metropolitan corporation, 286–289—Conclusion, 290.
APPENDIX A.
Switzerland: Association Réformiste, Geneva. MM. Ernest Naville, Roget, and Morin, 292—Classification of Systèmes Empiriques, 293—and Systèmes rationnels, 294—La liste libre, 295.
APPENDIX B.
Method proposed in 1863 in Frankfort, page 298.
APPENDIX C.
Valuation of first and contingent votes, formerly proposed, but subsequently withdrawn (see p. 186), page 301.
APPENDIX D.
Report of Mr. Lytton of the application of the system in Denmark, page 302.
APPENDIX E.
APPENDIX F.
Parliament of New South Wales—Report of the Committee of the Legislative Council on the Bill for the election of the Upper House, page 307—Debate on the Bill in the Council, 310—in the Legislative Assembly, 317.
APPENDIX G.
Parliament of Victoria—Debate on cumulative voting when more than two members, page 323.
APPENDIX H.
Discussions in Frankfort in 1861, 1863, 1864, page 328.
APPENDIX I.
France—M. Louis Blanc, page 340.
APPENDIX K.
Holland and Belgium—International Social Science Congress, Amsterdam—M. Robin-Jacquemyns, page 344.
APPENDIX L.
United States of America, page 347—Senate report, 349—Illinois constitution, 349—Mr. Sterne, 350—New York Charter, 350.
APPENDIX M.
The preferential and proportional vote, page 351—Experiment in the Technological Institute, Boston, 351—in the nomination of Overseers of Harvard College, 355.
APPENDIX N.
Memorandum of the history, working, and results of the cumulative vote, page 359—Birmingham School Board Election, 363—Marylebone, Lambeth, and Sheffield, 364.
APPENDIX O.
Progress of the study of the representative principle, page 372—Italy 374–5—Experience in Illiois, 375—Practical contrast of majority representation, in the Upper, and proportional, in the Lower House, 376-379.
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This work was published before January 1, 1929, and is in the public domain worldwide because the author died at least 100 years ago.
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