# Aircraft in Warfare (1916)/Chapter 1

AIRCRAFT IN WARFARE
THE DAWN OF THE FOURTH ARM
CHAPTER I.
(September 4th, 1914).
AIRCRAFT AS CONSTITUTING A NEW OR FOURTH "ARM." THE PRIMARY AND THE SECONDARY FUNCTIONS OF THE AERONAUTICAL ARM.
§ 1 Introductory. All authorities may to-day be said to agree on the broad fact of the utility and importance of the flying-machine or aeroplane—or, more broadly, aircraft—in warfare; but at present the air service as a fourth Arm of the military organisation, either of this country or of any of the other great military Powers, can only be regarded as of a tentative and experimental character. It is, unfortunately, not yet possible to draw conclusions of a lasting nature from the actual usage of aircraft in the present war, mainly for two reasons. Firstly, the machines at present available (with possibly a few exceptions) are entirely without armour or defence of any kind, and, dirigibles apart, are, generally speaking, without guns or other offensive armament of an effective character. Secondly, the machines are numerically so weak that, as an Arm of the Service, the aeronautical forces are a negligible factor. The question of sufficiency in numbers is evidently dependent upon the point of view ​taken. On the one hand, if we regard the flying corps as merely the successor to the pre-existing balloon corps, the numbers, as they at present stand, may be regarded as sufficient; indeed, perhaps, even liberal. On the other hand, if we would recognise in the advent of the aeroplane the dawn of a fourth Arm (this being the point of view adopted by the author), the present strength, which in no case represents numerically one-twentieth part of 1 per cent, of the number of bayonets, is a truly negligible quantity. In order to get a fair perspective of the position, it is sufficient to institute a comparison with the cavalry, to which Arm, from its function, the aeronautical Arm is most closely akin; here the accepted numerical proportion in a modern army is about 6 per cent. Now there are many otherwise competent authorities who would deny to the aeroplane (or to aircraft generally) the potential importance which the author hopes satisfactorily to demonstrate is its due; let us put the matter to the test. We hear frequent reports of the work done by German aircraft, and particularly the effective tactical reconnaissance of the German aeroplanes, which appear to be continuously employed during the course of every engagement for locating our gun positions, directing gun-fire, following up bodies of troops in retreat, etc. We also hear reports of their wider field of operations, presumably reconnoitring the strategic distribution of the forces of the Allies at points remote from the enemy's lines. We may presume that the Belgian. French, and British aircraft are employed with equal success; but here, in the nature of things, the information which appears in our Press is meagre. As already pointed out, the total number of machines engaged is microscopic; the Germans are reputed to have possessed at the outbreak of hostilities some 500 machines in all. If the German cavalry had been limited to 500 mounted ​men, would it have proved of any real utility? Answer is unnecessary. It may be reasonably argued that the capital value of an aeroplane, with pilot and observer, being so much greater than that of a cavalryman, the above comparison is unfair; granting this objection, the position is not seriously altered, the equivalent force would be quite unperceived and be of no tangible service to the German army of to-day.
If, then, instead of the present moment being that of the introduction of the aeroplane (and dirigible), it had chanced to be the moment when mounted men were put on trial for the first time as a fighting force, and presuming the initial trial to have been made on a similarly modest scale, the mounted men would, relatively speaking, have proved a failure, and no one, not possessed of exceptional intuition or foresight, would have had the least conception of the possibilities of cavalry when numerically sufficient, boldly handled in masses and with appropriate supports.
The foregoing does not constitute a demonstration that the air service is in the future destined to become as important an auxiliary to an army in the field as the cavalry of to-day, although this is in effect the belief of the present author. Clearly, if we may judge from the scale of preparation which obtains, it is far from being the accepted view, in this country at least. The difficulty in connection with the present subject is that in order to get the future into true perspective, it is necessary to be able to look forward along two parallel lines of development—i.e., to visualise the improvement of aircraft possible in the near future as a matter of engineering development, and simultaneously to form a live conception of what this improvement and evolution will open up in the potentialities of the machine as an instrument of war. The author does not wish it to be supposed that he is ​endeavouring to lay down complete axioms as to the military future of aircraft of a positive character, or that he pretends to be in a position to formulate a cut-and-dried constructive programme; his intention is rather ta give something in the nature of a lead in the direction in which it appears development may be logically anticipated.
Plate I.
R.A.F. TYPE B.E.2. As flown at the International Competition in August, 1912. The forerunner of the B.E.2. Types. Speed: Max. 70 m/h.; not inherently stable.
​reconnaissance by cavalry has become far too slow to keep pace with the conditions of modern war.
So far as the author is aware, there has, up to the present, been no serious attempt to work out in complete detail the duties which can be undertaken by aircraft, or to define in specification form by any process of logic the types of machine which will be necessary at the outset to deal with the various duties so postulated. It is necessary to say at the outset, in view of the fact that if to-day we had a perfect organisation based on existing conditions, the first great Power to be similarly equipped would require to be answered in the form of a further equipment especially directed to his destruction, and so (as in the evolution of the Navy) we may in due time have aerial destroyers and "super" destroyers, and again still faster and more heavily-armed machines for the destruction of these.
The primary function of, and basic justification for, any Arm is the execution of its duties in relation to other than its own kind; thus, although it is admittedly one of the first and most important duties of cavalry to drive the enemy's cavalry out of the field, and establish ascendency, this is actually the secondary function of the cavalry Arm; its primary function is the observation and harrying of the other Arms of the Service. Again, the primary function of a fleet is neither to hold nor defeat a hostile fleet, although this, its secondary function, is universally admitted to be its first and most important objective. Ultimately, in every case, there must be some primary purpose which gives rise to the need for any kind of fighting machine, apart from its power of offence or defence against its own kind; it is this primary purpose that imparts the initial impulse and direction to its development.
It is proposed forthwith to define the primary ​function of the aeronautical Arm as comprised by its duties and actions relating to the three pre-existing Arms of the Service—viz., the infantry, cavalry, and artillery. Its secondary function is defined as comprised by its duties in the attack on and defence from its like Arm—i.e., the destruction or countering of hostile aircraft.
It is necessary to be perfectly clear as to the above definitions. In considering, in the first instance, the comparative merits of the aeronautical and the older Arms of the Service for any particular duty, as it is needful to do in order to justify, or otherwise, any particular type or usage, it is futile to import into the initial discussion the action or possible counter-manoeuvres of the enemy's aircraft; this latter may, or may not, eventually prove an important factor, but its influence, when taken into account, must be studied not only as touching the air service in contemplation, but also at the same time as affecting the other Arms of the Service (more particularly the cavalry) in its corresponding usage. In brief, as a matter of logic, in discussing the functions and duties of the aeronautical Arm, and the type-specifications of machines by which its objects are to be secured, the primary function alone has to be considered. Subsequently, when a provisional scheme and specifications have been formulated, it is time to take count of the secondary function, and to endeavour by careful prevision to forestall the enemy.
* ↑ Not to mention entanglements of barbed wire.
* ↑ Also the Navy and merchant marine where naval warfare is in question.