# Imperialism, the Last Stage of Capitalism/Chapter 3

CHAPTER III. Finance Capital and Financial Oligarchy
"An increasing proportion of industrial capital," says Hilferding, "does not belong to the industrialists who employ it. They obtain the use of it only through the goodwill of the bank, which as against them represents the owner of the capital. On the other hand, the bank is forced to place a more and more important part of its funds in business. Thus it is continually becoming more of an industrial capitalist: and this banker's capital, this money capital, turned into industrial capital, is what I call 'finance-capital'. . . . Financial capital is that capital which the banks dispose of and which industrialists employ."
This definition is incomplete in so far as it is silent about one of the most important facts: the increase of the concentration of production and of capital to such an extent that it leads to monopoly conditions. But Hilferding's whole exposition, and particularly in the two chapters which precede the one from whch our definition is taken, stresses the part played by capitalist monopolies.
The concentration of industry: the monopoly arising therefrom: the fusion of banking and industry: these are the steps in the rise of finance-capital and the notion contained in the term.
We now have to describe how the domination of capitalist monopolies inevitably becomes, in conditions of commodity production and private property, the domination of a financial oligarchy. It should be noticed that the representatives of ​German bourgeois learning—and not of German learning alone—such as Riesser, Schulze-Gaevernitz, Liefmann, etc.—are all apologists for imperialism and for finance-capital. Far from throwing light on the system which conditions the formation of oligarchies, their methods, their legal and illegal sources of income, and their relations with parliaments, they conscientiously obscure and camouflage these subjects. They dodge these awkward questions, in fact, by a few vague and pompous phrases: calling on "the sense of responsibility of bank directors," praising "the sense of duty" of Prussian officials, giving serious study to ridiculous little plans for "supervision" and "regulation" by law, playing with theories, like, for example, the following "scientific" definition, arrived at by Professor Liefmann. "Commerce is an industrial activity tending to the collection and conservation of goods which are then placed in use."
The conclusion is that primitive man, who knew nothing of exchange, understood "commerce," and that it is going to continue in a Socialist society!
But the facts concerning the monstrous rule of the financial oligarchy are so striking that in all capitalist countries, notably America, France and Germany, a whole literature has sprung up which gives a fairly accurate picture of it from a bourgeois point of view, and a criticism—petty bourgeois naturally.
First and foremost comes the system of "participation" of which we have already spoken above. The German economist, Heymann, who, perhaps, ​concerned himself earlier than all others with this question, describes it thus:
"The chief controls the parent company: the latter in its turn reigns over the subsidiary or 'daughter' companies which similarly control others. Thus it is possible wth a comparatively small capital to dominate immense spheres of production. As a matter of fact, if holding 50 per cent. of the capital is always sufficient to control a company through its shares, the chief needs only a million to control eight millions in the second subsidiaries. And if the method of organisation is extended, it is possible with one million to control sixteen, thirty-two or more."
Experience shows this it is sufficient to handle 40 per cent. of the shares in order to direct the affairs of a company, since a certain number of small shareholders find it impossible in practice to attend general meetings. The "democratisation" of the system of shares and debentures, from which the bourgeois sophists, opportunists, and social-democrats expect the "democratisation" of capital, the strengthening of the small manufacturer and much besides, is, in fact, one of the ways of increasing the power of the financial oligarchy. For this reason, among others, in the most advanced or most "experienced" capitalist countries, the law allows the issue of shares of very small value. In Germany, it is illegal to issue shares of less value than one thousand marks, and the magnates of German finance look with an envious eye on England, where it is legal to issue shares at one pound sterling. Siemens, one of the chief captains of industry and a "monarch" of German finance, told the Reichstag on the 7th June, 1900, that "the ​one pound share is the basis of British imperialism." This merchant has a much more deeply "Marxian" idea of imperialism than a certain queer writer, generally held to be one of the founders of Russian Marxism, who considers that imperialism is a fault peculiar to only one of the European nations.
But the "system of participation" is not merely useful for formidably increasing the power of the monopolists. Besides this, it makes possible the carrying through of all kinds of shady and dirty deals with impunity, all emptying the pockets of the public, since the parent company is not legally responsible for the subsidiary companies, which are considered "independent" and a means through which anything can be done. Here is an example taken from the German review, Die Bank, (Bulletin for May, 1914): "The Steel Spring Company of Cassel was quoted some years ago among the German concerns giving the best returns. Through bad management its dividends fell from 15 per cent. to nil. It was established that the board, without consulting the stockholders, had made a loan of six million marks to one of the subsidiary companies, the Hassia, which had a nominal capital of only some hundreds of thousands. There was no indication of this loan, amounting to nearly treble the capital of the parent company, in its balance sheets. As a matter of law, this silence was possible and could last for two complete years without infringing any provisions of company law. The president of the board of directors who as the responsible head signed the false balance sheets, was and is still the president of the Cassel Chamber of Commerce. ​The shareholders only heard of the subsidy to the Hassia long afterwards, when it was proved to be an "error" (a word the writer might well have put in inverted commas), after the shares of the company, which those in the know were beginning to get rid of, had lost nearly all their value."
"This typical example of falsified balance sheets, quite usual in joint stock companies, makes it clear why boards of directors are more willing to run the risk of shady transactions than are individuals. The most modern technicalities in connection with the drawing up of balance sheets not only make it possible to conceal doubtful undertakings from the average shareholder, but also allow the people most concerned to get out of their responsibility by selling their shares in time if things turn out badly, whereas the private man has to pay for all it does to his last farthing.
"The balance sheets of most joint stock companies put us in mind of those manuscripts of the Middle Ages, from which the visible inscription had first to be erased, in order to discover beneath, another inscription giving the real meaning of the document. The simplest and, therefore, most usual procedure for making balance sheets indecipherable is to divide a business into several parts by setting up subsidiary companies—or by adding the business of these companies to it. The advantage of this system for various objects—legal and illegal—is so evident that it is quite unusual to find an important company in which it is not actually in use."
The author quotes as an example one of the most important monopolist companies, employing this system widely, the A.E.G., the great ​German electrical trust, referred to below. In 1912, it was calculated that this company held shares in from 175 to 200 others, controlling them, of course, and giving a total capital of 1,500 million marks.
All regulating laws, such as the necessity to publish balance sheets and to draw them up on certain models, the supervision of financial houses; these things about which professors and officials with the best intentions—that is, with the best intention of defending capitalism—discourse to the public, can have no kind of importance here. For private property is sacred, and no one can be hindered in buying, selling, exchanging or mortgaging shares, etc.
An estimate may be formed of the extent of this system of participation in the big Russian banks from the figures given by E. Agahd, who was for fifteen years an official of the Russo-Chinese bank and published in May, 1914, a book called, loosely enough, Great Banks and the World Market.
The author divides the great Russian banks into two classes: (a) those which operate as subsidiaries; (b) independent banks (the independence of the latter being arbitrarily taken to mean independence of foreign banks). The author subdivides the first group into three sub-groups: German, British and French subsidiaries, having in view those houses in whose business the banks of the three great European countries participate. The author divides the capital of firms belonging to this group into (1) Productive capital engaged in industrial or commercial undertakings; (2) Speculative capital reserved for Stock Exchange transactions and financial operations. Holding to the ​petty bourgeois reformist viewpoint natural to him, E. Agahd thinks it is possible, while keeping the capitalist system, to distinguish these two kinds of investments and to do away with the latter.
Here are the figures he supplies:
Assets of the banks, according to the balance sheets of October and November, 1913, in millions of roubles.
| | CAPITAL IN USE | CAPITAL IN USE | CAPITAL IN USE |
| Groups of Russian Banks | Productive | Speculative | Total |
| (a) 4 Banks: Siberian Commercial Bank, Russian Bank, International Bank, and Discount Bank. | 413.7 | 859.1 | 1,272.8 |
| (b) 2 Banks: Industrial and Commercial and Russo-British. | 239.3. | 169.1 | 408.4 |
| (c) 5 Banks: Russo-Asiatic, Petrograd Private, Azov-Don, Union, Moscow Russo-French Commercial. | 711.8 | 661.2 | 1,373.0 |
| Total (11 Banks) | 1,364.8 | 1,689.4 | 3,054.2 |
| (d) 8 Banks: Moscow Merchants, Volga-Kama, Junker and Co., Petrograd Commercial (formerly Wawelberg), Bank of Moscow (formerly Riabouchinski), Moscow Discount, Moscow Commercial, Private Bank of Moscow. | 504.2 | 391.1. | 895.2 |
| Total (19 Banks) | 1,869.0 | 2,080.5 | 3.949.4 |
According to these figures, of the four billions of roubles making up the active capital of the great Russian banks in 1913, more than three-quarters, more than three billions, come from banks which in reality are only subsidiary companies of foreign banks, and chiefly of the banks of Paris (the famous trio: Parisian Union, Paris ​et Pays-Bas and Société Génèrale) and of Berlin (Deutsche Bank and Disconto). Two of the most important Russian banks, the Russian Bank for Foreign Trade and the International Commercial of Petrograd, between 1906 and 1912 raised their capital from 44 to 98 million roubles, and their reserves from 15 to 39 millions, employing three-fourths German capital. The first belongs to the Deutsche Bank group, and the second to the Disconto. The worthy Agahd is indignant at the spectacle of the majority of the shares of these Russian financial houses in German hands, thus paralysing their Russian shareholders. And, naturally, the country which exports it funds reaps a splendid harvest. The Deutsche Bank, for instance, in putting the shares of the Siberian Commercial Bank on the Berlin market, kept them in its coffers for a whole year, and then sold them at 193 per cent. that is, at nearly twice their face value, making a profit of nearly 6 million roubles, which Hilferding calls "founders' profits."
Our author puts the total resources of the chief Petrograd banks at 8,235,000,000 roubles: from the point of view of the participation in them, or more exactly their control by foreign banks, he estimates it as follows: French banks, 55 per cent.; English, 10 per cent.; German, 35 per cent. Of this sum of 8,235,000,000 roubles of actual capital, 3,687,000,000 roubles, or over 40 per cent. falls upon the syndicates, Prodamet and Produgol—syndicates in the oil, metallurgical and cement industries. Thus the fusion of banking and industrial capital in Russia, corresponding to the formation of capitalist monopolies, has made great strides.
​Finance-capital, concentrated in a few hands and exercising a virtual monopoly, exacts enormous and ever-increasing profits from the floating of companies, issue of stock, State loans, etc., tightening up the grip of financial oligarchies and levying a tribute on the whole of society. Here is an instance, taken from a multitude, of the methods of constituting American trusts. We quote Hilferding: "In 1885, Mr. Havemeyer founded the Sugar Trust, by amalgamating fifteen small firms, whose total capital amounted to nearly 6,500,000 dollars. Suitably 'watered,' as the Americans say, the capital of the new trust was increased to 50,000,000 dollars. This 're-capitalisation' anticipated in advance the profits of the monopoly, in the same way as the American Steel Trust anticipates its profits, by buying up as many iron fields as possible. In fact, the sugar trust managed to impose its prices on the market, which secured it such profits that it could pay 10 per cent. dividends on the capital thus swollen, or about 70 per cent. on the capital actually invested at the time of the creation of the big enterprise. In 1909, the capital of the sugar trust was increased to 90,000,000 dollars. In twenty-two years, it had become more than ten times what it had been."
In France, the rule of the "financial oligarchy" (denounced by Lysis in a book which ran through five editions up to 1908), assumed a not very different form. Four of the most powerful banks enjoyed an "absolute monopoly" of the issue of new stock. In reality, this is a trust of the chief banks. And their monopoly ensures them monopolist profits from new issues. A country borrowing from France rarely gets more than 90 per cent. of the total of ​the loan, the remainder going to banks and agents. The bank rate at the time of the Russo-Chinese loan of 400,000,000 francs amounted to 8 per cent.: that of the Russian loan of 800,000,000 francs (1904), to 10 per cent., and of the Moroccan loan of 62,500,000 francs (1904) to 18.75 per cent. Capitalism, the development of which began with petty usury, ends in the gigantic usury of high finance. "The French," says Lysis, "are the moneylenders of Europe. Their whole economic life is profoundly modified by this transformation of capitalism. Without increase of population or development of industry, business, or sea-borne carrying trade, the country can grow rich by usury." Fifty persons representing a capital of 8,000,000 francs can control 2,000,000,000 deposited in four banks. The system of participation, with which we are already acquainted, leads to the same result. The Société Générale, for instance, issues 64,000 bonds of one of its subsidiary companies, the Egyptian Refineries. The bonds are issued at 150, the bank gaining straight away 50 centimes in the franc. The dividends of the new company are then found to be non-existent. The public lost from 90 to 100 million francs. One of the directors of the Société Générale belongs to the board of directors of the Egyptian Refineries. Hence it is not surprising if the author is driven to such conclusions as "the French Republic is a financial monarchy," "the financial oligarchy is the supreme power behind the press and the government."
The extraordinarily high rate of profit from the issue of securities, which is one of the chief functions of finance-capital, plays a large part in the ​development and stabilisation of the financial oligarchy. "There is not in the whole country a single business bringing in profits like the issue of foreign loans," says the German journal Die Bank."
"No banking operation brings in profits to be compared with those from new issues." According to the German Economist, the average profits made on the issue of industrial securities from 1895 to 1900 were as follows:
| 1895 | ... | ... | ... | 38.6 per cent. |
| 1896 | ... | ... | ... | 36.1 per„ cent.„ |
| 1897 | ... | ... | ... | 66.7 per„ cent.„ |
| 1898 | ... | ... | ... | 67.7 per„ cent.„ |
| 1899 | ... | ... | ... | 66.9 per„ cent.„ |
| 1900 | ... | ... | ... | 55.2 per„ cent.„ |
"In the ten years from 1891 to 1900, German financial houses 'earned' more than a thousand million marks on the issue of industrial securities."
If, during periods of industrial boom, the profits of finance-capital are disproportionately large, so during periods of depression small businesses, and those not in an assured position, go out of existence, while the great banks profit by buying up their shares for next to nothing, or through advantageous 'reconstructions.' In the reconstruction of imperilled undertakings, the share capital is decreased in face value, that is, profits are distributed on smaller capital and for the future are calculated on this basis. If the income falls to zero, new capital is called in which, in conjunction with the old, saves the situation. All these reorganisations and reconstructions, says Hilferding, ​have a double meaning for the banks: first, as profitable transactions; and secondly as splendid opportunities for getting control of the companies in difficulties.
Here is an instance. The Union Mining Company of Dortmund, founded in 1872, with a capital of about 40,000,000 marks, saw the market price of its shares rise to 170 after it paid in its first year a 12 per cent. dividend. Finance-capital received a "trifle" of something like 28,000,000 marks. At the foundation of this bank the chief part was played by that same Disconto Bank which attained a capital of 300 million marks. But the dividends of the Union fell to nothing: the shareholders had to consent to a reduction of capital, that is, to losing some of it in order not to lose it all. By a series of reconstructions, more than 73,000,000 marks disappeared in thirty years from the funds of the Union. "At present, the original shareholders of this company have only got 5 per cent. of the nominal value of their shares. But the bank kept on doing well from each reconstruction."
Speculation in land situated in the suburbs of towns making rapid progress is also a very profitable operation for finance capital. The monopoly of the banks here coincides with that of the means of communication, since the increase in value of the land and the possibility of selling it profitably in allotments is mostly dependent on good means of communication with the centre of the town; and these means of communication are in the hands of large companies connected, by the participation system and by the distribution of positions on the directorate, with the interested banks. ​What happens is what the German writer, Eschwege, a contributor to Die Bank, who has made a special study of real estate business and the transactions connected with it, calls the formation of a "bog." Frantic speculation in land in the suburbs of large towns; collapse of building undertakings (like that of the Berlin firm of Boswau and Knauer, who had actually made 100,000,000 marks with the help of the Deutsche Bank, "the most secure and strongest of the German banks"—the latter acting, of course, discreetly behind the scenes through the participation system and only losing 12,000,000 marks)—the ruin of small holders and of workers deluded by the firms doing building work on a large scale, criminal agreements with the 'honest' Berlin police and the Berlin officials with the aim of getting the right of issuing information about the land, building licences, etc.
"American methods," strongly condemned by European professors and well-intentioned bourgeois have become in the age of finance-capital, those of every great town, no matter what country it is in.
At the beginning of 1914, there was talk in Berlin of a transport trust to combine three Berlin transport undertakings: Metropolitan, Tramway Company and Omnibus Company. "We know," wrote Die Bank, "that this plan has come to a head since the majority of the shares in the bus company has been acquired by the other two transport companies. We can believe those who, in following this course, hope by a re-organisation of the transport services to secure enough economies to allow the public to benefit in the end. But the question is complicated by the fact that behind the trust being formed are the banks, who, if they ​desire, can subordinate the means of communication, which they have monopolised, to the interests of their real estate business. To be convinced of the reasonableness of such a conjecture, we need only recall that the Metropolitan Company was founded with the help of one of the great banks. This company's interests are associated with those of the financial house in its land transactions. Its Eastern line, in fact, was going to open up lands belonging to the bank, who sold them, of course, later on, when the completion of the railway was a certainty, making fabulous profits on its own account and enriching certain private members."
A monopoly, once it is formed, and when it once controls thousands of millions, penetrates inevitably into every part of public life, quite apart from political circumstances and all other considerations. The economic literature of Germany usually praises the integrity of the Prussian bureaucracy, while alluding to the scandals usual in France and to American corruption. But the fact is that the bourgeois literature of Germany devoted to banking matters constantly has to go beyond the field of purely banking operations, and to speak, for instance, of "the attraction exercised by financial houses" in reference to the more and more frequent passing of officials into the employ of the banks. "How can one vouch for the integrity of a State official who is aspiring in his inmost heart, to a modest position in the Bernstrasse"? (the street in Berlin in which is situated the head office of the Deutsche Bank). The director of Die Bank, Alfred Lansburg, wrote in 1909 an article on the Economic Meaning of Byzantinism, chiefly devoted to William II.'s ​tours in Palestine, and to "the immediate result of this journey," the construction of the Bagdad railway, that fatal "great German enterprise," which "is more responsible for 'encircling' than all our political blunders taken together." (It will be remembered that the encircling policy of Edward VII. tended to isolate Germany by surrounding her with hostile imperialist alliances). The contributor already referred to, M. Eschwege, published in 1912 an article called Plutocracy and Bureaucracy, which contains some instructive examples. A German official named Felker, who was a member of the Commission on Trusts, and conspicuous by his activities, quickly got a well-paid position on the staff of the biggest trust of all, the Steel Syndicate.
Similar cases, not in the least the result of chance, forced this bourgeois author to admit that "the economic liberty guaranteed by the German Constitution is at present, in many departments of economic life, only a meaningless phrase" and that under the rule of the plutocrats, "the widest political liberty does not alter the fact that we are not free."
As for Russia, we will be content with one example. All the papers spoke, some years ago, of the entry of the director of the Banking Department, Davydov, into the employment of a great bank who paid him so highly that in a few years his total salary must have been more than a million roubles. The Banking Department is charged with the duty of "co-ordinating the activities of all the establishments giving credits in the State," and gives subsidies to banks in the capital of 800 to 1,000 million roubles.
​In general, it is characteristic of capitalism that it separates the ownership of capital from its application to production, financial capital from industrial or productive capital, the investor who lives only on his income from the entrepreneur, and all those who, in fact, share in the management of capital. Imperialism or the rule of finance-capital, is that highest stage of capitalism in which this separation reaches vast proportions. The supremacy of finance-capital over all other forms of capital means the rule of the investor and of financial oligarchy, or the crystallisation of a small number of financially powerful States out of the general body. To what extent? This may be judged from the statistics of the issue of securities. In the Bulletin of the International Statistical Bureau, M. A. Neymarck has published very complete figures covering the issue of securities all over the world. These figures have been partially quoted many times in economic literature. The following are the totals he gives for four ten-year periods:
Total issues in milliards of francs. :
| 1871-1880 | ... | ... | ... | 76.1 |
| 1881-1890 | ... | ... | ... | 64.5 |
| 1891-1900 | ... | ... | ... | 100.4 |
| 1901-1910 | ... | ... | ... | 197.8 |
Between 1870 and 1880, the total amount of issues for the whole world was high, through loans resulting from the Franco-German war and the phase of development on which Germany then entered. In general, the increase is not very rapid during the three last decades of the 19th century, ​but the first ten years of the 20th century are noteworthy for an enormous increase, almost of 100 per cent. Thus the beginning of the 19th century marks a sudden change not only in connection with the extension of monopolies (cartels, syndicates, trusts), of which we have already spoken, but also with reference to the development of finance-capital.
M. Neymarck estimates at about 815 milliards of francs the total sum of issued securities current in 1910. With the intention of deducting from this sum amounts which might have figured more than once, he decreases the total to 575-600 milliards, which amount is divided as follows among various countries:
Financial Securities Current in 1910 (milliards of francs). :
| Great Britain | ... | ... | ... | 142 | $\scriptstyle {\left.{\begin{matrix}\ \\\\\ \\\ \\\ \\\ \ \end{matrix}}\right\}\,$ | |
| United States | ... | ... | ... | 132 | $\scriptstyle {\left.{\begin{matrix}\ \\\\\ \\\ \\\ \\\ \ \end{matrix}}\right\}\,$ | 479 |
| France ... | ... | ... | ... | 110 | $\scriptstyle {\left.{\begin{matrix}\ \\\\\ \\\ \\\ \\\ \ \end{matrix}}\right\}\,$ | 479 |
| Germany | ... | ... | ... | 95 | $\scriptstyle {\left.{\begin{matrix}\ \\\\\ \\\ \\\ \\\ \ \end{matrix}}\right\}\,$ | |
| Russia ... | ... | ... | ... | 31 | | |
| Austria-Hungary | ... | ... | ... | 24 | | |
| Italy ... | ... | ... | ... | 14 | | |
| Japan ... | ... | ... | ... | 12 | | |
| Holland ... | ... | ... | ... | 12.5 | | |
| Belgium... | ... | ... | ... | 7.5 | | |
| Spain ... | ... | ... | ... | 7.5 | | |
| Switzerland | ... | ... | ... | 6.25 | | |
| Denmark | ... | ... | ... | 3.75 | | |
| Sweden, Norway, Roumania etc. ......... | Sweden, Norway, Roumania etc. ......... | Sweden, Norway, Roumania etc. ......... | ​ ... | ​ 2.5 | | |
| | | Total | ... | 600 | | |
​It will be seen at once from these figures what a privileged position is held by four of the largest capitalist countries, each controlling from 100 to 150 milliard francs in securities. Two of these countries are the oldest capitalist countries and as we shall see, possess the most colonies: England and France; the other two are in the front rank as regards rapidity of development, and the degree of extension of capitalist monopolies in industrial affairs: the United States and Germany. Together, these four countries own 479 milliards of francs, that is, nearly 80 per cent. of the world's finance-capital. Thus, by this means or otherwise, the whole world is more or less the debtor and vassal of these four international banker-countries, on which world finance-capital rests.
It is now necessary to elaborate the part played by the export of capital in the creation of an international network of dependence and connections of finance-capital.
* ↑ 41.—Hilferding: "Finance Capital," 1912, p. 339.
* ↑ 42.—R. Liefmann, op. cit., p. 476.
* ↑ 43.—Heymann, op. cit., p. 269.
* ↑ 44.—Liefmann: "Beteiligungs, etc." p. 258 (1st ed.).
* ↑ 45.—Schulze-Gaevernitz, in "Grundriss der Sozialökonomik," v. 2, p. 111.
* ↑ 46.—L. Eschwege: "Tochtergesellschaften," Die Bank, 1914, i. p. 545.
* ↑ 47-48.—Kurt Heinig: "Der Weg des Elektrotrust," Neue Zeit, 28th June, 1912, pp. 2, 484.
* ↑ 49.—E. Agahd: "Grossbanken und Weltmarkt," Berlin, 1914.
* ↑ 50.—Lysis: "Contre l'oligarchie financière en France," 5th ed., Paris, 1908, pp. 11, 12, 26, 39, 40, 48.
* ↑ 51.—Die Bank, 1912, No. 7, p. 630.
* ↑ 52.—Stillich, op. cit., p. 143; W. Sombart: "Die deutsche Volkswirtschaft im 19 Jahrhundert," 2nd. ed., 1909, p. 526.
* ↑ 53.—"Finance Capital," p. 172.
* ↑ 54.—Stillich, p. 138; Liefmann, p. 54.
* ↑ 55.—Die Bank, 1913, i., p. 952; Eschwege: "Der Sumpf," idem, 1912, i., p. 223.
* ↑ 56.—Verkehrstrust," Die Bank, 1914, i., p. 89.
* ↑ 57.—"Der Zug zur Bank," idem, 1909, i., p. 79.
* ↑ 58.—Idem, p. 301.
* ↑ 59.—E. Agahd, p. 202.
* ↑ 60.—"Bulletin of the International Institute of Statistics," vol. xix., book ii., The Hague, 1912. The data for the small States, in the second column, are those of 1902 increased by 20 per cent.
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