# History of Mexico (Bancroft)/Volume 4/Chapter 23

Contents
CHAPTER XXIII.
FALL OF MORELOS.
1813-1814.
Morelos Marches against Valladolid — Calleja's Counter-movement — Repulse at the Gate of Zapote — Brilliant Charge by Iturbide — Defeat and Death of Matamoros — The Congress Asserts Itself — Armijo Overruns Tecpan Province — Galeana Falls — Maleadministration in Oajaca — Álvarez's Triumphant Entry — The Enchanted Mountain — Speculations with Convoys — Quarrel and Misconduct of Rayon and Rosains — Expedition against Zacatlan and Flight of Rayon — Manhunting in the Central Provinces.
Valladolid, the capital of Michoacan, had ever proved an attractive spot to the insurgents, by reason of its wealth, its central position, and the revolutionary spirit of the surrounding population. Similar motives stimulated the royalists to strive for its possession, when every other point in the province was lost, and after defeating the Rayons, they made the city again their headquarters for energetic operations against the remaining leaders, wresting from them nearly all the northern districts, as far as Zitácuaro. Southward, however, the ranges offered a comparatively safe retreat for the insurgents, who could thence make their raids into the rich lowlands, and in case of need fall back into the Zacatula region, beyond which Morelos held absolute sway, as undisputed successor of Hidalgo.
So he undoubtedly regarded himself. Flushed with ​his successes in field and council-hall, he proposed to remedy the mistakes and avenge the humiliation of his predecessors and colleagues. Deliverance was to come from the south. A first and necessary step was to recover the much disputed Valladolid, there to install the new-born congress, and thus affirm its dignity, and further to make this city the starting point for future operations, which henceforth must be directed into the central provinces. While the place at this time was not strongly fortified, aid could easily reach it; and he proposed to insure his project by mustering all the forces possible. To this end he summoned Nicolás Bravo and Matamoros from Vera Cruz and Puebla, counting upon their well trained troops as the nucleus for his army, to which were to be added the guerrillas of Michoacan, including those of Ramon Rayon.
Morelos kept his object secret from all except a few intimate friends, and sought to delude the royalists by a movement which obliged Daoiz to fall back on Cuernavaca. He thereupon set out from Chilpancingo November 7, 1813, incorporating the forces of Matamoros and Bravo at Cutzamala, and further on those of Muñiz, Ortiz, Arias, and Navarrete, so that he was able to present himself before Valladolid on the 22d of December with an army variously estimated at from 6,000 to 20,000 men, with thirty cannon and large supplies. The city was in despair, for the garrison under Landázuri numbered only some 800 ​men; and Morelos sternly presented the dread alternative of surrender within three hours or bloody infliction.
But Calleja had not been deceived by the movements of the insurgents, and his plans had been so laid as to permit ready counter-movements in any direction. He ordered the concentration at Acámbaro of more than 2,000 men from Tula, Mexico, and Guanajuato, who, under the designation of the army of the north, were placed under command of Llano, the successor of Castillo at Toluca, Iturbide joining as second. Ramon Rayon sought to impede their advance, but was defeated; and after a forced march, the royalists came up on the 23d, guided by the cannonade which had already begun. The fighting was directed mainly against the Zapote gate, as most threatened by the expected reinforcements from Mexico. It had been taken by the select forces under Galeana and Bravo, retaken by Landázuri, and again captured by the former. At this moment Llano and Iturbide appeared from different directions, and fearing to be cut off, the insurgents fell back toward their camp, only to be driven into disorder and routed with great loss. The royal troops thereupon entered the city, amidst loud demonstration from the inhabitants.
It was a severe blow to Morelos, this check to his cherished plans, and the whole of the following ​forenoon was spent in determining what next should be done. He then placed the active management of his forces in the hands of Matamoros, who thereupon extended the infantry in a long line before the city, and the cavalry along the hill of Santa María, which held the encampment. Not knowing what the display was intended for, Llano sent out Iturbide with 360 horsemen to reconnoitre. This officer had not failed to observe the defective position of the insurgents, and could not resist the temptation to avail himself of it, and display before his old home the prowess for which he was becoming famous. With a rousing cheer he led his little band to the attack, broke through the line, threw into disorder a cavalry reënforcement, and warmed with success, charged up the hill to the camp of Morelos in the very face of its formidable battery. It was already dusk. The gathering gloom seemed to have entangled the skill and courage of the revolutionists. They were bewildered by the unexpected charge, and their broken columns scattered and spread panic on all sides. The alarm was given throughout the army, creating the impression that the enemy had fallen also on their flank and rear. Shot and shouts began to resound in every direction. Soon it became difficult to distinguish friend from foe, and a fight sprang up among the insurgents themselves, lasting far into the night, with deplorable effect.
Meanwhile, Iturbide had availed himself of the confusion to penetrate into the camp, regardless of the murderous volleys from battery and file. His men came upon Morelos himself, but did not . ​recognize him at the moment. As it was, his fate might have been sealed if Rosains and others had not come to the rescue. This led to a rally which served to break the charge; the advantage was not followed up, and Iturbide retired in good order with two banners and four cannon, entering the city amid tumultuous ovation.
The achievement might have been put down only as a display of bravery but for its effect. Added to the havoc suffered by the select forces of Galeana and Bravo, this charge and its attendant panic so demoralized the insurgents that they fled in all directions. The officers did their utmost to reassure the men; but finding this impossible, they spiked the guns and followed, seeking to collect the stragglers. A few still remained on the ill-omened hills of Santa María at daybreak, leading the royalists to suppose that their task was yet before them. They accordingly mustered in full strength for the assault, but soon divided into pursuing columns.
Learning that the main body of the revolutionists had gathered at Puruaran, forming with the remnant of Ramon Rayon's force a body of about 3,000 men, with twenty-three cannon, Llano marched against them, to cull the final laurels by a victory over disspirited troops. The latter awaited the assault, on the 5th of January, 1814, behind parapets of loose stones. In these, breaches were, made by a few well directed shots, and within half an hour the assailed were in full flight, this time intercepted by a detachment under Iturbide. The slaughter was very great. ​Along a line of two leagues lay stretched 600 dead, and 700 were captured, including a score of superior officers, among them Matamoros, who was directing the flight, while Morelos was striving to save from disaster what he could.
Two hundred prisoners were offered in exchange for him, but this and other efforts in his behalf proved useless. He was shot February 3d at Valladolid, dying with the firmness to be expected of so valiant and brilliant a leader. Unimposing in appearance, but of strong character and magnetism, he had exerted a marked influence on the campaigns of ​Morelos, although leaving a record for brilliant feats rather than great achievements. The wide-spread grief for his loss was manifested by comrades in a terrible reprisal on royalist prisoners, of whom over 200 were executed, and by an admiring posterity in honors to his name, which is preserved notably in that of the gulf port. Morelos retired to the fastnesses in Tecpan with the remnant of his once imposing army, there to consider his crushing misfortunes.
Calleja's plans had been succeeding, and this last stroke practically opened to him the gates to the hitherto impenetrable south. It merited his substantial approval, and he hastened to take advantage of it by ordering a relentless pursuit of the dispersed bands, and the shooting of all who had heretofore failed to submit. Reënforcements were summoned to Mexico from the comparatively quiet Puebla, ready for any movement, and Lieutenant-colonel Armijo replaced Daoiz in the command of the Cuernavaca troops, with instructions to march on Chilpancingo. This energetic officer crossed the Mescala January 21st, despite the opposition of Guerrero, outflanked and defeated Victor Bravo, and thereupon proceeded unhindered toward the seat of the congress, assisted not a little by the consternation created by his sudden advance. ​The absence of Morelos had served to revive the contentious spirit of the members, and when the news came of his disaster, deferential praise of the generalissimo changed to condemnation of the cura, initiated by the lately humbled Rayon. They assumed of their own accord the executive power and took steps for directing affairs. Liceaga was sent to assure the occupation of Acapulco, and Rayon, whose ambition they feared, was consigned to a safer distance, with the commission to superintend the defence of the Oajaca province. In the midst of their dispositions came the news of Armijo's approach, and now was resumed the alternate wandering and flight that characterized the former body. Under the protection of Guerrero's force of 400 men, they hastened to Tlacotepec, where they reopened their sessions on January 29th, with only five members, and with hardly any means.
Here Morelos arrived not long after with over a thousand men, whereof Licentiate Rosains had been given the second command, with the title of lieutenant-general, amidst the undisguised and not unjust murmur of a host of older and well deserving officers of military training. Somewhat humbled by reverses, he readily surrendered the executive power, now vested in five members, whose places were filled by new appointees, the total number of deputies being fixed at sixteen, including Morelos. The latter was ​confirmed in his title of generalissimo, but he allowed the congress to distribute all his forces, save a mere handful, among men of their own choice; and henceforth a coldness sprang up between them. Three comandantes generales, Rayon, Cos, and Rosains, were assigned respectively to Tecpan and Oajaca, Michoacan and Guanajuato, and Puebla and Vera Cruz, to assist in reducing the importance of their late chief, but also in weakening the cause by a division of power and harmony.
The most urgent measure now demanded was to check the advance of Armijo, who had already passed
through Tixtla. To this end Galeana, Guerrero, and the Bravos took up a position at Chichihualco, on the 19th of February, contrary to the views of Rosains, ​the general in command. A few shots from the royalists sufficed to scatter the 1,500 insurgent recruits. Armijo followed by forced marches to Tlacotepec in the hope of surprising the congress; and indeed, so narrow was the escape of this body that.the archives, seal, and baggage were captured; and Morelos himself would have been taken but for the heroic self-sacrifice of Colonel Ramirez, who made a stand till he got safely away. The deputies passed onward into Michoacan, and Morelos with a small escort took refuge in Acapulco.
Armijo, now promoted to the rank of colonel, resolved to complete his task by sweeping the whole province. He set out from Chilpancingo in the beginning of April, with over a thousand men, and appeared before Acapulco on the 12th, only to find it in flames and abandoned, with immense loss to the inhabitants as well the merchants in Mexico. Thus was surrendered without a blow, and to smoke, the richest port on the northern Pacific, the capture of which had shortly before required a costly campaign of seven months. Without loss of time, Armijo hastened up the coast in pursuit of Morelos, who had left a track of bloody retaliation, notably at Tecpan and Zacatula, on his way to the fastnesses of Michoacan. But if the pursuit proved vain, royalist control was ​reëstablished in a great measure throughout this region, sustained by the local guards now formed.
The great achievement during this march was the capture of El Veladero, a series of forts on the mountain summits close to Acapulco, and occupied by Galeana with several hundred men. The strength of the position demanded a fortnight of extensive preparations, with close investment, after which, on the morning of May 6th, the main fort was captured by a daring assault, whereupon the revolutionists took advantage of the still prevailing darkness to escape. They united in Cacahuatepec to the number of nearly 200, and in combination with Guerrero, Galeana began to rouse anew the upper country, known as Costa Grande; but he was defeated on the 27th of June in an attack upon Aviles, the royalist commander of this region, stationed at Coyuca. In seeking to escape, Galeana was thrown stunned from his saddle by the branch of a tree and was then shot. The whole movement subsided.
Among the series of disasters involving the revolutionary cause, the loss of Galeana created less attention than that of Matamoros, whose fall was signalled by a crushing defeat. Nevertheless the death of so great a leader added decidedly to the depression; and ​Morelos on receiving the news exclaimed in a tone of despair, "Both my arms are gone; I am now nothing!" Galeana was a warrior by instinct, with a vast fund of resources, although illiterate, and withal of greater gentleness than the other commanders, a trait that commended him also to the royalists.
Another prominent leader had been taken shortly before, in the person of Miguel Bravo, mariscal de campo, surprised at Chila by La Madrid. This officer, commanding at Iztúcar, and Villasana in charge of the Mescala district, assisted greatly to suppress revolutionary operations, so that with the fall of Galeana the province of Tecpan, the cradle of revolutionary movements since the time of Hidalgo, might be regarded as practically subjugated, an achievement on which Armijo failed not to pride himself.
Equally great had been the royalist success in the adjoining province of Oajaca. Morelos had not fully appreciated the value of this acquisition, with its large wealth and natural strength, and had allowed unfit ad ministrators to misdirect or neglect its resources, there by fostering a reaction against the cause among an ​otherwise tractable people. His own act in taking away nearly all the mules and horses required for agriculture, the interruption of communications, the circulation of copper money which had been introduced, and the effects of the change on his occupation of the capital, had all assisted toward ruin. The appointment of Rayon to the command had been made partly in view to remedy the evil; but he was unknown in the province, and without influence or interest. He did not advance farther than Huajuapan, sending thence San Martin and other agents to organize forces, collect means at Oajaca, and correct abuses; measures which were nullified partly by partisans of Morelos, hostile to Rayon, but mainly by the sudden advance of the royalists.
The conquest of Oajaca, as a complement of Armijo's operations, was intrusted to Colonel Melchor Álvarez, who set out from Tepeaca after the 10th of March, with over 1,000 men. Colonel Hevia accompanied him as far as Huajuapan, there to remain in observation, and to pursue the feeble force collected by Rayon and Rocha. Álvarez marched unmolested to Oajaca, which opened its gates with ovations ​March 29th. Assuming the government of the province, he began at once a series of reforms, by reinstalling former officials and appointing new incumbents, withdrawing the copper coinage, introducing the constitution of 1812, restoring alienated estates, and correcting other abuses. The revolutionists were, on the other hand, sharply pursued, and fines and other inflictions were imposed on the chapter and those who had countenanced their presence. The vicarios generales and agents San Martin and Velasco stooped low for pardon, only to return to the revolutionists at the first opportunity. Álvarez's efforts were nevertheless too spasmodic and circumscribed to produce any decided improvement. He was vain and pompous, and allowed personal interests to outweigh his duty and the public good.
The subjugation of the remaining part of the province did not occupy much time. Encouraged by the extensive withdrawal of troops by Morelos for the campaign in Michoacan, royalists from Vera Cruz had already in December occupied the eastern line, and penetrated as far as Villa Alta; while Dambrini avenged himself for the defeat inflicted by Matamoros by a fresh invasion from Guatemala into Tehuantepec, and by prompting Reguera to fresh activity on ​the adjoining Costa Chica, where he occupied Jamiltepee, Amusgos, and other places. The Mizteca region alone remained true to the revolutionists, who found succor in its valleys and shelter in its labyrinth of fastnesses. Against them Álvarez now exerted himself. His lieutenant, Obeso, penetrated to Tlajiaco toward the end of April, and defeated the leader Herrera; but reënforced by Sesma, the latter gathered his men again on an adjoining hill, and inflicted, mainly with the aid of stones and bowlders, so severe a check upon the royalists that the spot became celebrated as the Cerro Encantado. Eager to avenge the disaster, Álvarez marched against them in person with a large force, and laid siege to Silacayoapan at the close of July; but was effectually repulsed, notably through a brilliant charge by Teran, whereupon he retired to Teposcolula, to remain in observation and guard the route for convoys from Mexico.
The centre of revolutionary operations had now shifted to Puebla and Vera Cruz, attracted partly by the resources of the tierras templada and caliente, and the rich prizes held out by the traffic between the gulf port and the capital, and partly by the strategic positions offered by the east range of the Sierra Madre, which stretches along the border between the two provinces and sends its branches into the central ​plateau. The advantages of the region had been demonstrated by the failure to overcome Osorno. His presence sufficed to render the highway to Vera Cruz insecure and to necessitate strong escorts for the rare convoys, causing an immense increase in the prices of merchandise.
The train leaving Mexico in January 1814 consisted of eighty-seven coaches, with passengers, and 7,000 pack-mules, carrying five millions in precious metals, besides other effects. Among those departing were the oidores Bodega and Villaurrutia, Salcedo, later comandante general of the provincias internas, and several distinguished persons suspected of revolutionary tendencies, such as Doctor Alcalá, and promoter Cortazar. Later in the year went Conde de Castro Terreño and Olazábal, both with lessened glory. The convoy was harassed, especially after leaving Puebla, and at San Juan where a valuable part of it was cut off. The transit occupied more than a month, and the return cargo did not reach Mexico till the middle of April, owing to stoppages at different points.
The delays and excessive charges were due less to danger from attack than to the reprehensible greed of officials, from the lowest upward, who aside from the money to be gained in the escort service, made large sums by speculating in merchandise or accepting bribes and partnerships from traders interested in certain goods and districts, and so retarding or advancing convoys at their will, under plausible pretences. Iturbide was known to have engaged in such transactions with the silver consignments from Guanajuato, ​and the return cargoes of quicksilver and other effects; and Calleja, who bore no spotless reputation, was widely accused of having favored convoys from Tampico to the exclusion of Vera Cruz trains.
The most dangerous part of the route lay in Vera Cruz, which fairly swarmed with lusty bands, living partly by direct plunder, partly by the exemption tax obtained from traders, and unwilling to recognize any superior authority under which their profits might have to be shared or restricted. After the departure of Nicolás Bravo to join Morelos, their independence of spirit ripened into actual discord, and there was need for a guiding spirit to uphold the tottering cause. During the flight of the congress to Michoacan, Rosains ingratiated himself so far with the members as to be confirmed as comandante general of Puebla, Vera Cruz, and northern Mexico; but on reaching his new field he found that Rayon had already claimed the command, on the strength of his superior rank as captain-general and minister of Hidalgo, and of the appeal to him of several chiefs who objected to Rosains, notably Perez, intendente of Puebla.
Rayon would listen to no proposals from Rosains, who thereupon resolved to try his influence in the adjoining province of Vera Cruz, where Joaquin Aguilar, the congressional intendente, disputed for control with Rincon, the comandante general left in Morelos' name. Rincon had been humbled in a severe encounter with the royalists under Álvarez, while ​Aguilar had been rather successful in association with Martinez, generally known by his baptismal names of José Antonio, now the most famous among the several leaders and occupying the road between Jalapa and Vera Cruz. The latter had not only gained the advantage over two Spanish expeditions, but had amassed a large treasure by means of his fortunate raids, as, for example, on the February convoy from Mexico. These funds enabled him to command more men than other chiefs, and exert great influence. Such a personage had to be courted. Rosains began by proposing to arrange the difficulty between Aguilar and Rincon, offering the latter the command of northern Vera Cruz, and the other the districts to the south. This appeared satisfactory, but just as the outlook became promising a cloud rose to obscure it.
When the subjugation of Oajaca was undertaken Hevia had been instructed to pursue Rayon. The latter eluded him for a time, and reached Teotitlan with a valuable store of cochineal and other effects; but Hevia came again upon his tracks, defeated his lieutenants Roca and Anaya with considerable loss in men and supplies, and compelled Rayon to take refuge in the Orizaba region with a bare remnant, including Deputy Bustamante, the brothers Teran, and Crespo. Hevia also established here his headquarters as commander of the second division of the southern army, routed Rosains at Huatusco, and inflicted so severe a blow on Rayon at Omealca on May 15th that he sought refuge with Osorno at Zacatlan. These successes did not, however, avail against the ​numerous bands investing the highways mainly for plunder, for they prudently yielded before regular forces, to reappear at a safer distance. Martinez did not exactly belong to this cautious class, but the late reverses affected him less than Rosains, and he did not care to submit to this intruder. Rosains cut the matter short by enlisting the services of jealous leaders, with whose aid he took by surprise and killed the redoubtable chief. Anaya was rewarded for his coöperation with the position of the rebellious Aguilar, and Guadalupe Victoria, now rising into prominence as a colonel, received the second rank. Although several leaders had been awed into submission, others still held out for independent raids on the highway; and seeing little prospect of restoring harmony, Rosains resolved again to try his fortune in Puebla, where Rayon's influence had greatly declined.
While raising troops near San Andrés, and awaiting there a proposal from Rayon, he was surprised by the watchful Hevia, on July 2d, and narrowly escaped with a bare remnant to Tehuacan. Close to this town rose a hill known as Cerro Colorado, accessible only by one narrow approach, and used in aboriginal times as a fortress. Here Rosains intrenched himself, and bid defiance to the pursuing Hevia, who was not prepared for a prolonged siege. His flight, however, revived the spirit of the startled Rayon faction, and the captain-general, as well as his intendente Perez, came forth with circulars against him, ​to which he replied with similar denunciations. Such scandal could not pass unnoticed by the congress, and Brigadier Arroyave was sent to take command of the disputed territory, while two deputies should investigate and arrange the difficulty. Neither party chose to obey a distant and powerless assembly, and Rosains went so far as to shoot the troublesome Arroyave on finding that he sided with his opponent.
To such a state had fallen the sacred cause of independence, unfolded by Hidalgo and exalted by the victories of Morelos. Two of the leaders arrayed one against the other, the other two wandering or ignored, and the petty chiefs intent mainly on plunder, ready to draw their sword equally on foe and comrade; campaigns reduced to mere raids and pursuits, with victory steeped in bloody executions, often of guiltless participants.
While the congress vainly endeavored to settle the differences between the two claimants in Puebla, the royalists brought more radical means to bear. Osorno having become more daring in his raids and attacks, even threatening Tulancingo, another expedition appeared necessary, to intimidate him at least, for he generally managed to avoid dangerous encounters. A main object was to nip in the bud the projects which Rayon was supposed to be framing at Zacatlan. These were overestimated, however, for the resources were ​diminishing with which he hoped to utilize his present force of four hundred men, and Osorno was by no means disposed to exert himself in the interest of another. Indeed, the latter seems to have purposely kept Rayon in the dark concerning the royalist preparations, under the direction of Colonel Águila.
This officer succeeded in presenting himself wholly unawares before Zacatlan on September 25th, with a force far outnumbering the garrison. He intended to surprise the place by night, but the roads delayed the march, and at the last moment the heavy mist broke and revealed the danger in time to sound the alarm for defence. The first assault carried everything before it, however, and over 200 insurgents succumbed, leaving a large quantity of newly manufactured war material to the victors. Deputy Crespo was caught and shot, and Rayon had a narrow escape from the same fate, but succeeded after great hardship in reaching his brother Ramon in Michoacan. Nothing loath at being rid of his unwelcome guest, Osorno took possession of Zacatlan after the royalist departure, and resumed his operations with such success that Brigadier Jalon, successor of Águila in the command of Apam region, had to be replaced by the more energetic Major Barradas. The command of the army of the south, with headquarters at Puebla, passed about the same time to Brigadier Daoiz, Ortega returning to Spain. ​The trouble experienced by Rayon and Rosains in obtaining recognition as comandantes generales was also encountered by Doctor Cos in Michoacan and Guanajuato, although in less degree. Muñiz, who had lately held the command over all this region under Morelos, objected to any interference in the former province, and refused obedience, as did also several minor leaders. Most of them acted indeed as they pleased, while according a certain deference to the wandering congress which had sought refuge among them, and to Morelos, who had retired with a chosen hundred to the isolated hill of Atijo, there to manufacture war material and gather adherents till opportunity should offer for retrieving himself. Ramon Rayon was similarly occupied in the position, of equal strength, known as Mount Coporo, after having made a brilliant and advantageous sweep into Querétaro and northern Mexico, which added both to his fame and resources. A number of lesser chiefs now joined his standard, such as Benedicto Lopez of Zitácuaro, Polo, Cañas, Sanchez, and Enseña, who had been closely pursued by the detachments sent out by Llano under Aguirre and the cruel Andrade.
Iturbide coöperated on his side, and surprised later in the year the town of Puruándiro, killing forty-five of the garrison, including the dashing commander, Mariscal Villalongin. So zealously did he employ ​Orrantia and other lieutenants within his own province of Guanajuato and on the adjoining borders in the pursuit of revolutionists, that he claims to have despatched within less than two months nearly 900 men, including nineteen chiefs, among them the brigadier presbyter Saenz and one of the celebrated Pachones. The effect was undoubtedly to render the highways more secure and to restore comparative peace in the long-desolated settlements. To this contributed greatly the active enrolment of local guards in the different towns and villages which coöperated in the pursuit of such leaders as Torres, Rafael Rayon, and Tovar, who still hovered in the mountains of Guanajuato, and two scions of Villagran, who flitted as avengers in the Tula region. But this was no longer a campaign. It was a hunting-down of human beings, as blood-hounds hunt wild beasts; and it is to be noticed that the foremost hunter and persecutor was the personage who finally gave the decisive blow for independence, and rose to the summit of power in liberated Anáhuac. His able though merciless performance as a royalist, however, served rather to excite admiration than hatred among many of his opponents; and it is a tribute to their gallantry as well as fairness to note that the greatest outcry against Iturbide at this time was raised by his execution of a woman who lent her beauty to sustain the cause of independence.
* ↑ It was recovered in Sept. 1813, from Ramos and other leaders, who had there reëstablished powder factories. Gaz. Mex., 1813, iv. 1082-4. See for other minor operations, Id., 805-1350, passim; Hernandez y Davúlos, Col. Doc., v. 107 et seq.
* ↑ Leaving Miguel and Victor Bravo with over 1,000 men to protect the congress, ordering Rocha to Tehuacan, and intrusting Acapulco to Irrigaray. A proclamation was issued menacing all royalist sympathizers among Americans. Bustamante's outline of the march, Cuad. Hist., ii. 409 et seq., is contradictory.
* ↑ According to the statement of Father Solana the total was 10,050, of whom Galeana commanded 1,200, Sesma 1,100, Bravo 1,300, and Muñiz 1,800, while Matamoros brought over 7,030. Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc., v. 250; vi. 251-2. But his sources for the statement need explanation. Bustamante gives to Matamoros only 2,000, and to Bravo 800. Morelos admits 5,700 men just before reaching Valladolid. Id., vi. 30. Landázuri claims that the force after this must have doubled. Gaz. de Mex., 1814, v. 79-81.
* ↑ A native of Lima, not from Spain as supposed. The inhabitants professed great loyalty, to judge by their document in Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc., v. 80-91, signed by the chapter.
* ↑ He also addressed a threatening letter to Bishop Abad, with regard to his strong upholding of the royalist cause. Gaz. de Mex., 1814, v. 84-8, 101-4.
* ↑ The forces are minutely enumerated in the Diario de Ixtlahuaca. Ordoñez was ordered back to Jilotepec. Mex. Virey, 7-8.
* ↑ Near Ucareo by Aguirre, Dec. 19th. He had then nearly 1,000 men, and might have rendered better service if Morelos had permitted him to occupy the pass of Medina, as he proposed, rather than to follow a parallel route with Llano for the sake of joining the generalissimo. Aguirre claims to have killed 200. Gaz. de Hex., 1813, iv. 1351. Ramon had received at Chilpancingo the appointment of mariscal de campo, with the command of Tlalpujahua district, Nov. 8th, and left at once to raise troops. Diario de, Rayon, 649-50. His brother Rafael was defeated by Iturbide about the same time at Santiaguito.
* ↑ Morelos making no movement to aid them, says Alaman; but royalists state that he sent 1,000 horse. Torrente, Rev., i. 440. Most of the prisoners now taken, over 200, were promptly shot as deserters from royalist armies, as Llano admits in his report.
* ↑ This was greatly due to the rivalry roused not alone by the near presence of Llano, but by the companionship of Aguirre, a Navarrean from Catorce, who commanded the Fieles de Potosí, famed for their bravery.
* ↑ Bustamante attributes the confusion greatly to the trick of the royalists in blackening their faces, in imitation of the insurgents, whom Morelos had ordered so to do, as a means to distinguish them from opponents; but it is believed the order was not carried out, for no authority alludes to what would have been a very striking feature. Liceaga, Adic. y Rectif., 248, has a less good suggestion for the cause. It has also been supposed that Navarrete's reënforcements were taken for foes and attacked by Morelos' men.
* ↑ There is much contradiction on this point. Rosains claims in his Rel. Hist., 3-4, to have killed two assistants. The half-drunken troops took Morelos at first for Llano, because he had a dress like his, and happened most unusually to be mounted on a horse with Spanish trappings. Cuad. Hist., ii. 418.
* ↑ A reënforcement sent by Llano came only to support the retreat. Alaman thinks that Valladolid should have received the name of Iturbide, not that of Morelos, who had no claim to such honor. Hist. Méj., iv. 7-8. Morelos' birthplace was a rancho near Apatzingan, not this city, as some believe, though he passed some of his younger days here. See Bustamante, Cuadro, ii. 407-8. Negrete upholds Morelos. Mex. Siglo XIX., vi. 181.
* ↑ Llano in his report places the killed at over 600, with the capture of 18 high officers, admitting for himself only a loss of 5 killed and 36 wounded. The capture included 23 guns, 150 loads of ammunition, and 1,200 muskets. Gaz. de Hex., 1814, v. 74-80. He gives the first loss of the insurgents before Valladolid at 1,000, including 217 prisoners, and assumes that the total loss at this place amounted to 1,500 men, 27 or 30 guns, and large supplies. Landázuri, who estimated the besieging force at over 11,000, places their first loss at 650 killed and 233 captured. The royalists lost 25 killed and 57 wounded. Id., 9-11, 79-84, 181-8; Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc., v. 276-81; vi. 30-1, 256-60. Bustamante allows for the first encounter under Galeana 1.800 men, with a loss of 700. The value of the abandoned artillery material he places at $800,000. He goes into paroxysms over the cold-blooded execution of prisoners, many of them half dead with wounds. Cuadro, ii. 419-28; Cavo, Tres Siglos, iv. 105-11. The losses at the first battle are attributed partly to Galeana's neglect from pique at the promotion of Matamoros. Mendíbil, Res., 192-5. Negrete doubts any such feeling; but his speculations on causes and effects are feeble. Zamacois assigns 3,000 men on this occasion to the revolutionists. Hist. Méj., ix. 333 et seq. Royalist accounts like Torrente's Rev. Hisp. Am., i. 445-6, ii. 89-90, naturally gloat over the victory. Escalera y Liana, Hex. Hist., 10-12. Morelos' Declaracion, 29-31, is brief and unsatisfactory, Rosains, Rel. Hist., 3 et seq., adds some interesting details, most of them used by Bustamante, Alaman, and others.
* ↑ Matamoros was captured in seeking to cross the river on a poor borrowed horse. A dragoon named J. E. Rodriguez overtook and surrendered him to a comrade without stopping for the usual plunder. He was rewarded with $200, and recommended for decoration. Gaz. de Mex., 1814, v. 707-8.
* ↑ Yet the royalists published a reputed confession and proclamation by him, wherein he denounces the insurrection as wrong, and urges his compatriots to submit with him to the king. Full text in Id., 169-80. None but royalists have received them as genuine. Alaman believes, nevertheless, that he signed the proclamation as well. Hist. Méj., iv. 15. His. handkerchief bathed in blood was preserved as a relic, and masses were secretly offered in Valladolid for his repose as he died. He was a small, thin man, with pock-marked face inclined to the left, and modest blue eyes, but with a stentorian voice that had assisted not a little to cheer his soldiers on to the victories for which he stood famed. He was a born soldier, writes Bustamante, and displayed both strategy and prudence, combined with great piety. 'Fué el brazo izquierdo de Morelos.' Cuadro, ii. 423. For detailed biography, see Gallo, Hombres Ilustres, iv. 227-49; Arroniz, Biog. Mex., 226-31; Dicc. Univ., art. 'Matamoros,' etc.
* ↑ Izúcar, not far from his early pastoral field, also adopted the name, and the congress inscribed his name among national heroes. Morelos, Declaracion, vii. 30, 61, admits ordering the shooting of 203 prisoners in reprisal. See also Rosa, in Pap. Far., xlii. pt viii. 31; Diario de Rayon, 651.
* ↑ Bustamante declares that he warned him against going further for conquests, instead of assuring his southern acquisitions. Cuadro, ii. 409, 417, 420-1; Id., Elogio, 20-1. See also Negrete, Mex. Siglo XIX., vi. 95 et seq.; Liceaga, Adic., 247-52.
* ↑ Brigadier Llano's services were proclaimed, and his soldiers and the garrison at Valladolid received a badge for the left arm, with the inscription 'Valor y fidelidad,' etc. Gaz. de Mex., 1814, v. 188. Iturbide having just been promoted could not expect further reward at the time, but his fame spread far and wide. Bishop Abad failed not, however, in praising him, to hint with prophetic spirit that so ambitious a person might become dangerous to the royalists!
* ↑ The mere fact of their having formed part of Morelos' army sufficed to condemn them. Id., 112.
* ↑ Who lost 95 prisoners out of a force of 500. Id., 148-50.
* ↑ Regarded as an extension of the junta de Zitácuaro, the congress had a right to assume the executive power which it was supposed to have conferred on Morelos. There are always charges enough which can be brought against a fallen ruler as a reason for still further humiliating him. The quorum rule was reduced to less than five members. Act Feb. 14th.
* ↑ Verdusco, Cos, Herrera, Quintana, and Liceaga; the first three priests. During the flight Crespo left for his home at Oajaca, while Bustamante followed Rayon. Orders were issued for their return. They pleaded that the congress was expected to move to Oajaca. Cuad. Hist., iii. 6. Verdusco also longed for a quiet retreat in his province, where he promised to use his influence for the cause, and Cos wished to go and reform the misrule of Salmeron in Guanajuato; but more members could not be spared from the sessions. Acts of Jan. 30th and Feb. 14th.
* ↑ The 10,000 and more pesos in copper held by the treasurer, Berazaluce, had to be abandoned on the road for lack of mules.
* ↑ President Liceaga, Vice-president Bustamante, Rayon, Verdusco, Morelos, Cos, Crespo, Herrera, Quintana, Alderete y Soria, Ortiz de Zárate, Sotero de Castañeda, José Ponce, José Argándara, Antonio de Sesma, and Josá San Martin. Ortiz and Castillo were secretaries. Act of March 1st. The above 16 deputies represented the following provinces, in the order named: Guanajuato, Mexico, Guadalajara, Michoacan, Nuevo Leon, Zacatecas, Oajaca, Tecpan, Yucatan, Querétaro, Tlascala, Durango, Sonora, San Luis Potosí, Puebla. San Martin had evidently no province assigned. Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc., v. 296-7.
* ↑ The list of intendentes reads now: for Oajaca, Murguía; Tecpan, Ig. Ayala; Mexico, José Maria Rayon, Ant. Perez; Vera Cruz, José Flores; Valladolid, Pablo Delgado; Guanajuato, José Pagola. San Martin became vicario general. The presidency and vice-presidency changed by lot every three months. Rosains pretends not to have aspired to other than diplomatic positions. Rel. Hist., 2, 7, etc.
* ↑ Galeana's obstinacy, caused by jealousy of Rosains, was the main reason for making the stand. Rosains, Rel. Hist., 6. Bustamante, on the contrary, allows Galeana to blame the other. Armijo estimates the insurgents at 1,500 or 2,000. Gaz de Mex., 1814, v. 237, 349-56. Another account in Alaman, Hist. Méj., iv. app. 3, allows Rosain to be outwitted by flank movements which caused him to divide his forces.
* ↑ This occurred Jan. 24th, at the rancho de las Ánimas, near Tlacotepec. The booty included Morelos' portrait in oil, his uniforms, and some trinkets. Out of the force of 60 soldiers and 300 unarmed men, 38 were captured and shot, including Secretary Castillo. Armijo had followed with 300 infantry and 150 dragoons. Gaz. de Mex., 1814, v. 269, 356-60; Morelos, Declaracion, vi. 31. Armijo is supposed to have secured a large prize for himself, the foundation for his later wealth. Bustamante, Cuadro, iii. 13-16; Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc., vi. 252 et seq.
* ↑ Who lost especially on the cacao there stored. See report in Gaz. de Mex., 1814, v. 595-9; Mex. Virey, 9; Torrente, Rev., ii. 96-8. Reports reproduced in Negrete, Mex. Siglo XIX., vii. 286-305.
* ↑ Morelos had left Juan Álvarez, in later times the undisputed lord of this province, to make a stand at the pass of Pié de la Cuesta, with 200 men and a few guns; but the approach of Armijo dispersed them. Miota continued the pursuit of Morelos, who was attended only by an escort, and readied Tecpan in time to prevent further retaliation. Advancing to Petatlan, he captured the intendente Ayala with a considerable booty, acquired by peculation and robbery, for which Morelos had suspended him. Details of above in Gaz. de Mex., 1814, v. 598-600, G 15-21, etc.
* ↑ San Cristóbal, the key to the position, was carried by Captain Ocampo. 'Este ha sido el no pensado y nunca esperado fin del decantado Veladero,' writes Armijo in his report. Id., 603, 621-6. Hunger assisted to intimidate the besieged. Bustamante, Cuad. Hist., iii. 73-7. Also reports in Negrete, Mex. Siglo XIX., vi. 288 et seq.; Liceaga, Adic. y Rectif., 252-3.
* ↑ Ávila surprised Petatlan, and Galeana the town of Asayac.
* ↑ The attack was boldly made with 500 not well armed men, partly contributed by Morelos, and commanded by Ávila, Mayo, and Montesdeoca. Struck by the branch, Galeana fell almost senseless, and was shot and decapitated by a soldier named Joaquin de Leon. The head was deferentially placed on the church door at Coyuca by the admiring Aviles, and then interred within the edifice.
* ↑ He was repeatedly approached with offers of pardon, but remained true to the cause. He was born at Tecpan about 1762, and passed most of his time on the hacienda of his cousin till called to fight for his beloved Morelos. If the latter slighted him of late, it was perhaps mainly due to his illiteracy. Bustamante calls him the right arm of Morelos, Matamoros being the left. Cuad. Hist., ii. 423; iii. 80-5; Mendíbil, Resúmen, 214.
* ↑ He was the second of his family to be executed for the cause. He was shot on April 15th, at Puebla, where a monument now records his services. Col Robles claims that Bravo surrendered only on condition of being granted his life, but Ortega ignored the promise. Bustamante, Cuadro, iii. 97-9. But this Alaman doubts. No allusion is made in Gaz. de Mex., 1814, v. 313-14, to any condition, yet the fact that Bravo was remitted to Puebla lends color to Robles' version.
* ↑ The former destroyed the fortifications at San Juan del Rio, organized defence movements in the villages, and executed a number of petty leaders. Villasana took Zimatepec, and occupied a strong central position at Teloloapan. Details in Gaz. de Mex., 1814, v. 227-8, 302 et seq., 304-8.
* ↑ In his report of May 25th, already he wrote: 'Ya está cumplida enteramente la conquista del sur,' and this in 52 days, with 1,000 men. Id., 604. Armijo now established his headquarters in the more temperate region of Tixtla, leaving sufficient forces at Acapulco and other points, and keeping open communication with Mexico.
* ↑ The canons Moreno and Bazo having shown strong royalist proclivities, Morelos sent Velasco to exile them. They went to enlighten the viceroy on the true condition of affairs. Velasco remained with the Mariscal Anaya, to create disorder by their shameless and pompous conduct. Brigadier Montezuma, left in charge by Commander Rocha, showed himself a dissipated gambler. Bustamante had vainly urged the congress to make Oajaca its seat and capital, as more secure, open to foreign intercourse, etc. Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc., v. 50. He even proceeded to it in January, thinking that the deputies would follow. Not. Biog., 10-19.
* ↑ Murguía in framing this report, sent in by Alvarez in April 1814, admits that the insurgents had not otherwise been exacting with levies and contributions. Gaz. de Mex., 1814, v. 555-60; Bustamante, Cuad. Hist., iii. 16-19.
* ↑ Morelos disliked the appointment, and Rosains proclaimed against it in his Justa Repulsa. See also Diario de Rayon, 650; Teran, Manif., 5. Rocha recognized Rayon.
* ↑ Velasco was arrested after some trouble, but escaped to join the royalists and publish a rabid denunciation of his late comrades. Text in Gaz. de Mex., 1814, v. 472-6. Vicario-general San Martin was sent to represent him, and Teran to organize troops. See the different instructions in Diario de Rayon, 651-3; and Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc., v. 299-301.
* ↑ Subordinate to Brigadier Diaz de Ortega of Puebla. See proclamation in Gaz. de Mex., 1814, v. 289-90, 408.
* ↑ Yet the colonel halted before it to issue a pompous and threatening proclamation. The last revolutionary adherents had departed shortly before, attended by insults from the populace, who now turned to raise arches for Alvarez. Carriedo, Estud. Oaj., ii. 29; Torrente, Rev., ii. 95-6.
* ↑ Both were afterward caught and tried. Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc., vi. 313, 316-440. Velasco sought to merit his pardon by bitter denunciation of the cause. Bustamante writes that Murguía was confirmed as intendente by Alvarez, but had soon to leave for Madrid to seek absolution. Cuad., iii. 37-8. Carriedo states that he was at once removed and sent to Mexico, Estud. Oaj., ii. 29, which is more likely. Pap. Var., clxxi. pt xviii. 5-14. Rosains assailed Rayon in his Justa Repulsa for so readily losing the rich province intrusted to him, and Rayon came forth to explain that Morelos' adherents had prevented the execution of his orders, and withheld arms and money, and had furthermore created a reaction against the revolutionary cause by their outrages. It was moreover too late to save the province when he took the task. Both documents are given in Revolucion, Verd. Orígen, pt ii. 62-6.
* ↑ By order of Topete, stationed at Tlacotalpan. Tuxtepec was captured with a loss of over 80 insurgents. The entry into Villa Alta was a mere raid. Reports in Gaz. de Mex., 1814, v. 277-84, 415-19.
* ↑ Carriedo assumes that Reguera had 500 men before the occupation of Amusgos. Estud. Oaj., ii. 30. Dambrini's force included 100 Omoa negroes. Bustamante dwells on his cruelty springing from a revengeful spirit. His negroes were taken by Álvarez for a guard. Cuad. Hist., iii. 38-9. Reguera figures as commander of the fifth division of south coast militia, assisted by Captain Arrazola and Cura Herrera of Jamiltepec.
* ↑ Enchanted hill. This action took place April 29th, with a loss to the assailants of 19 dead and over 200 wounded. Bustamante states that Sesma came up to aid the Americans. Cuad., iii. 287-9. Royalist accounts allude only to the previous victory, at Cerro del Coyote close to Tlajiaco, over 500 men, of whom they killed 93 and captured 13. Gaz. de Mex., 1814, v. 538-9. Carriedo, Estud. Oaj., ii. 30-1, reduces Herrera's force to 100.
* ↑ Who captured part of his artillery. Bustamante, Cuad., iii. 289-91. After the fight at Cerro Encantado, Sesma, who had been appointed by Rosains, arrested Herrera, who claimed authority under Rayon. Teran now came up and reconciled and joined them. Mier y Teran, Manif., 8-9. He was made a colonel for his achievement. Álvarez abandoned the siege August 19th. Negrete, Mex. Sigh XIX., vi. 433-7.
* ↑ Coaches were taxed $600 each, and other things in proportion.
* ↑ Both sent by force as deputies for Guanajuato. Alaman, who joined the party, adds many details. Hist. Méj., iv. 36-9. Finding the road toward Puebla unmolested, several went on in advance of the slow convoy, only to be cut down by lurking bands.
* ↑ Martinez effected the capture. Oidor Bodega alone lost 1,000 ounces in gold, and the jewels of his wife, worth $40,000, which fell into the hands of Intendente Aguilar. For details, see Rivera, Hist. Jal., i. 472-3; Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc., v. 292 etc.; Orizava, Ocurrencias, 42-3, 85-6. Also Rosains' account in Revol. Verd. Origen, 63-4; Arrangoiz, Méj., i. 240-1, 261; Gaz. de Mex., 1814, v. 361-3.
* ↑ Arechederreta gives some interesting revelations to this effect in his Apuntes Hist. Also Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc., v. 325, 335-44, 731, etc.
* ↑ Bustamante adds Oajaca, but Rosains does not claim it in his Justa Repulsa, 63-4.
* ↑ See Rayon's reply to Rosains in Revol. Verdad. Origen, 65-6. Alaman assumes that he had also obtained a commission similar to that of Rosains. To bind Perez, Rayon made him also brigadier and comandante of Puebla. Diario Rayon, 654.
* ↑ Aguilar was a late tobacco official, who had promised to capture Vera Cruz, and bring to the treasury half a million within six months. Rosains sought to cut the difficulty by appointing a new comandante in Colonel Aldana, a protégé of Rayon, but Aldana ignored him.
* ↑ The conqueror of Oajaca, Jan. 20th, at Jamapa. As a result, his fortifications and factories at Huatusco were destroyed. Gaz. de Mex., 1814, v. 152, 167-8. Bustamante claims that Álvarez was disfigured and nearly killed in a previous encounter with Calzada, the lieutenant of Arroyo. Cuadro, iii. 22.
* ↑ Lately employed on the hacienda of a Biscayan trader named Arrillaga, who headed the liberal party at Vera Cruz.
* ↑ One of 300 men in Dec. 1813, under Ulloa, sent in his pursuit, and another of nearly 300 men under Major Fajardo. Gaz. de Mex., 1814, v. 272-6, 287-9.
* ↑ Details in Orizava, Ocurrencias, 53-71, 41, etc. Bustamante, who followed Rayon, gives many interesting points, Cuad. Hist., iii. 43-9, as does Mier y Teran in his Manifest., 6, etc. Hevia's reports appear in Gaz. de Mex., 1814, v. 470, 540, 553-5, etc. The Teran brothers now crossed to the more promising Mizteca region, to which Rosains also sent Sesma.
* ↑ 'Asesinado,' is Teran's view. Manifest., 8. Rosains began by a raid on Martinez' treasure cache. He then sought to intimidate him during an interview, attacking him afterward with Rincon in ambush. Thus much he confesses in his Rel. Hist., 7, etc.
* ↑ He proposed an exemption tax to the traders at Vera Cruz, which they gladly accepted, notwithstanding the injunctions of the authorities; but other leaders insisting also in levying tribute on the convoys, the plan failed. The effort to rout the latter resulted in a repulse for the Spaniards. Gaz. de Méj., 1814, v. 978-80.
* ↑ The royalists took about 100 muskets and 49 prisoners. Although the latter had just been enrolled by force, and were kept under lock, Hevia had them all shot. Bustamante, Cuad. Hist., iii. 53-4; Gaz. de Mex., 1814, v. 735; Orizava Ocurrencias, 81-2.
* ↑ See Mier y Teran, Segunda Manif., 86, etc.
* ↑ Both sides reproduced by Martiñena in Verdad. Origen, no. ii. 62, et seq. Rosains also quarrelled with Arroyo and sent a force against him, which was defeated.
* ↑ Partly on the assumption that he was a Spaniard, which was wrong. Águila Mex., pt 315. Bustamante, Not. Biog., 22, as a friend of Arroyave, had to flee. The proceedings against Arroyave are given in Hernandez y Duvolos, Col. Doc., v. 757-70.
* ↑ It is interesting to read the introductory declamation of Rosains in his Rel. Hist., protesting against such iniquity! See Bustamante, Cuad. Hist., iii. 18, and passim, and the more honorable Teran, Manifest., 7 et seq.; also the documents in Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc., v. 318-19, 588-94, 074-5; Pap. Var., xxxvi., pt lxviii. 62-6, etc., and observations in Torrente, Rev., ii. 90-1.
* ↑ On Feb. 26th, with 2,500 men, of which only 500 were soldiers. The commandant, Col Piedras, repulsed him with, a loss of 20. His lieut. had rashly attacked Osorno on the 25th and lost 41. Gaz. de Mex., 1814, v. 261-7.
* ↑ An agent at Puebla had embezzled the small stock of cochineal left him, and his efforts to create sympathy in Oajaca had failed.
* ↑ Together with 50 others; Colonel Peredo, the envoy to the U. S., had a narrow escape. Twelve guns and 200 muskets were taken. Although claiming over 200 dead foes, Aguila admits only one fallen royalist. Gaz. de Mex., 1814, v. 1089-96. Bustamante escaped with his wife. He gives Aguila 1,200 men. The later president Anastasio Bustamante distinguished himself in leading a detachment to the assault. Cuad. Hist., iii. 58-60. Crespo was offered pardon on the condition of turning against the insurgents, but refused. He had been college professor, and later parish priest of Riohondo, Oajaca. Carriedo, Estud. Oaj., ii. 115-16.
* ↑ Who distinguished himself in November by a valiant defence of Apam. Jalon came to his relief and routed the insurgents, killing among others Brigadier Ramirez, commander of Huamantla district. Gaz. de Mex., 1814, v. 1241-4. Jalon was removed in March 1815, with a narrow escape from being subjected to court-martial.
* ↑ Stories are told of ancient subterranean passages in the hill, where he confined those who incurred his anger, starving them on scant rations. Morelos' testimony in Morelos, Declaracion.
* ↑ Bearing the additional name of San Pedro, from the day he began to fortify it. Previous to this he had been manufacturing arms in a beautiful cavern near Zitácuaro, whence he was driven forth by Llano's lieutenant Aguirre in March. Report in Gaz. de Mex., 1814, v. 319-20. 378-81. Muñiz had previously taken away most of his men.
* ↑ Assisted by Sanchez and Atilano, he took vengeance at the hacienda de la Barranca for the death of a friend, and then surprised Huehuetoca, after luring Ordoñez to Jilotepec. Bustamante, Cuad. Hist., iii. 113-17.
* ↑ Notably under Colonel Andrade, who swept the whole northern section and managed to end the career of Arias at Pátzcuaro July 8th. Gaz. de Mex., 1814, v. 485-8, 797-800, 993, et seq.
* ↑ Famed for the daring rescue of his condemned wife at Valladolid in Dec. 1811. The surprise was effected on the morning of Nov. 2d by Castañon, the insurgents being less watchful, owing to the festivities of the preceding todos santos day. Id., 1401-8.
* ↑ And this with a loss of only three of his own men. He mentions the execution of Captain Omelas, Rodriguez, commander of Cerro Gordo, Colonel Borja, commandant of the Curadero. There is a boastful tone throughout these reports of Iturbide when speaking of the butcheries. Gaz. de Mex., 1815, vi. 37-40.
* ↑ Ordoñez' campaign here is reported in Id., 1814, v. 650-1, etc.; Bustamante, Cuad. Hist., iii. 196-204.
* ↑ Her name was María Tomasa Estevez, 'comisionada para seducir la tropa.' Iturbide's report in Id., 1084. Negrete, Mex. Siglo XIX., vi. 455-6, and Liceaga, Adic. y Rectif., 254-5, join in condemning the act. See also allusions to cruelties in Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc., v. 328, et seq., 282, etc. It has been observed that Rayon and other leaders had frequently to take severe measures against unprincipled chiefs who injured the cause by their outrages and afforded royalists just motives for severity.