# Bibb v. Allen

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United States Supreme Court
149 U.S. 481
Bibb v. Allen
The defendants in error, citizens of the states of New York and Tennessee, and doing business in the city of New York as brokers, commission merchants, and cotton factors, under the firm name and style of Richard H. Allen & Co., brought this action of assumpsit in February, 1887, against the plaintiff in error and one Hopkins, citizens of Alabama, as partners under the name of B. S. Bibb & Co., to recover the sum of $20,023.50 with interest, which was claimed as commissions for services rendered, and money paid and advanced by them for and at the request of the defendants in selling, for their account, and as their agents, cotton for future delivery, according to the rules and regulations of the New York Cotton Exchange, in the city of New York.
The declaration or complaint was in the usual form, and contained but a single count for work and labor done, services rendered, and money paid out and expended by the plaintiffs during the month of December, 1886, at the instance and request of the defendants, to the amount of $20,023.50, which, with interest thereon, was averred to be past due and unpaid. The defendants answered separately. Neither of them denied the existence of a partnership between them, but both defended upon the merits. The answer of the defendant Hopkins consisted of two pleas: (1) Nonassumpsit; (2) that the plaintiffs did not do the work and labor or pay the money mentioned in the complaint at his instance or request. The defendant Bibb filed an answer containing five pleas, the first two of which were the same as those interposed by Hopkins. His third plea was a general denial of the allegations of the complaint, while the fourth and fifth averred that the work and labor performed by the plaintiffs, as set forth in their declaration, was the making of 11 wagers for him on the price of cotton, and that the money paid by the plaintiffs for him was in the settlement of the losses of those wagers, and in each of these pleas the statute of the state of New York against wagers, bets, and gambling transactions was set out.
After issue joined on the pleas, the defendant Bibb, by leave of the court, filed a sixth plea, setting up that on November 10, 1886, the plaintiffs, as special agents for him, sold 10,000 bales of cotton by various contracts, as a speculation, and for future delivery in New York, and averred that the plaintiffs, by their gross negligence and unskillfulness, made said contracts in such forms that all of said contracts, under the laws of the state of New York, were unlawful and void, and not binding on any one of the parties to said contracts, or either of them, in this: that in and by the statute law of New York in force at the time said contracts were made it is declared that 'every contract for the sale of any goods, chattels, or things in action, for the price of $50 or more, shall be void unless (1) a note or memorandum of such contract be made in writing, and be subscribed by the parties to be charged thereby; or (2) unless the buyer shall accept and receive a part of such goods, or the evidences, or some of them, of such things in action; or (3) unless the buyer shall at the time pay some part of the purchase money.' It was further averred that no note or memorandum of any of the contracts of sale made by plaintiffs for defendant was made in writing and signed by the parties to be charged thereby; that no part of said cotton was accepted by the buyer, and no part of the purchase money was paid therefor. The plea further alleged that on December 30, 1886, the plaintiffs, without the request of the defendants, but voluntarily, settled said void contracts, and paid to the buyers of the cotton under such contracts large sums of money, and concluded with the averment that, without this, the plaintiffs never did any work, or paid any money, for the defendant.
Upon the trial of the cause before the court and a jury, the court, after stating to the jury that there was no evidence in the case upon which a verdict for the defendant Bibb could rest, on the ground that the contract sued on was a gambling contract, and therefore void, further instructed them that 'the defendant Bibb did not in his testimony deny the correctness of the account sued on, but did say that the plaintiffs were liable to him for their failure to execute his subsequent orders to them to sell, for future delivery, some twenty-two thousand bales of cotton, as shown in the evidence in this cause; but, there being no claims by him in this suit against the plaintiffs on account of such failure to execute such orders, 'I charge you that, if you believe the evidence, you should find a verdict for the plaintiffs against the defendant Bibb for the amount of the account and interest." The court further charged the jury: 'This case is made out as to defendant B. S. Bibb, and it is your duty to find a verdict against him for the account sued on and interest.'
To the instruction that if they believed the evidence they should find a verdict for the plaintiffs against him for the account sued on and interest, the defendant Bibb excepted. The jury returned the following verdict: 'We, the jury, find for the plaintiffs against the defendant Bibb, and assess the damages at $22,476.38; and we find for the defendant T. H. Hopkins on the ground that we find he was not a partner of B. S. Bibb.' Upon a return of this verdict the defendant Bibb objected to a judgment being rendered against him thereon, for the reason that the complaint and pleadings and said verdict did not authorize a judgment against him. No other ground of objection was stated or interposed. The court overruled his objection, and entered judgment against him for the amount found by the jury, to which Bibb excepted. The present writ of error is prosecuted by him to reverse that judgment.
Geo. H. Craig and E. W. Pettus, for plaintiff in error.
A. A. Wiley, for defendants in error.
Mr. Justice JACKSON delivered the opinion of the court.

## Notes

This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
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