# Lynde v. County of Winnebago/Dissent Field

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* Opinion of the Court
* Dissenting Opinion Field
United States Supreme Court
83 U.S. 6
Lynde v. County of Winnebago
Mr. Justice FIELD (with whose views and dissent concurred the CHIEF JUSTICE and Mr. Justice MILLER), dissenting.
I am compelled to dissent from the judgment of the majority of the court in this case, upon the following grounds:
1st. The county judge had no power to issue bonds binding upon the county, without previous authority conferred by a vote of the people. Such is the construction given to the statutes of Iowa, which are supposed to confer such power, by the Supreme Court of that State, and that construction is obligatory upon us. Here the only question ever submitted to the voters of the county was whether a tax of seven mills on the dollar should be levied for the purpose of building a court-house; and the only power conferred was to levy such a tax. I cannot find in this vote any authority in the county judge to issue bonds of the county for constructing a court-house, payable at different periods, and then to take up the bonds by issuing new bonds drawing a larger interest than the first, and differing in amount and time of payment, and providing that a failure to pay the interest as it matures shall cause the entire principal to become due.
2d. As the bonds were issued without the authorization of a vote of the people, the county is not estopped to deny their validity by reason of any recitals they contain. The county judge was only an agent of the county, acting under a special and limited authority, the exercise of which was supposed to be carefully guarded, and he could not enlarge that authority by any representation that he possessed what was never conferred. The statutes of the State never intended to make the liabilities of its counties dependent upon the mere statements of any of its officers. The law of agency is not different when applied to the acts of agents of municipal bodies, in a matter so serious and delicate as the contracting of a public debt, and when applied to the acts of agents of private individuals. They must both keep strictly within the limits of their power of attorney or their acts will be invalid. They cannot cure any inherent defect in their action arising from want of power by any extent of recitals that they had the requisite authority. With great deference to the opinions of my associates, this seems to me to be a legal truism.
3d. When the bonds in suit were executed and issued the county judge was in the city of New York, and by express provision of the statutes of Iowa his authority and functions ceased when he was without the State. At the time he put his signature to these instruments another person was acting as judge in his place and was invested with his authority, and as such officer issued county warrants, held a term of the County Court, and discharged other duties devolved by law upon the county judge.
It seems to me that the ruling of the majority of the court in this case, holding that the bonds, issued under circumstances attending the issue of these, are valid obligations, binding upon the county, goes further than any previous adjudication towards breaking down the barriers which State legislatures have erected against the creation of debts, and consequent increase of taxation, by careless, ignorant, or unscrupulous public officers.
This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
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