# Lewis v. National Labor Relations Board/Opinion of the Court

* Court Documents
* Case Syllabus
* Opinion of the Court
United States Supreme Court
357 U.S. 10
Lewis v. National Labor Relations Board
Argued: May 21, 1958. --- Decided: June 9, 1958
This is a companion case to National Labor Relations Board v. Duval Jewelry Co., 357 U.S. 1, 78 S.Ct. 1024. While the latter was a representation proceeding under the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 151 et seq., the present case is an unfair labor practice proceeding. It was commenced on the issuance of a complaint charging violations of § 8 of the Act, 61 Stat. 136, 140, 29 U.S.C. § 158, 29 U.S.C.A. § 158, both by petitioner-employer and by petitioner-union. Subpoenas duces tecum and ad testificandum were issued by the Regional Director under the seal of the Board and the facsimile signature of a member. On the day of the hearing petitioners all moved that the subpoenas be revoked. One ground was that they had not been properly issued. Another was that they were issued at the request of the General Counsel of the Board who, it was alleged, was not a 'party' to the proceeding within the meaning of the Act. The motions, which were addressed to the Board, were referred to the trial examiner over objection of petitioners. He denied them. Petitioners refused to appear in response to the subpoenas; and the hearing was continued until they could be enforced. Thereafter the present suit was instituted in the District Court for their enforcement. The District Court denied enforcement on the authority of National Labor Relations Board v. Pesante, D.C., 119 F.Supp. 444. The Court of Appeals reversed. 9 Cir., 249 F.2d 832. The case is here on a writ of certiorari. 355 U.S. 929, 78 S.Ct. 413, 2 L.Ed.2d 413.
1. Delegation of authority over the revocation of subpoenas. The express authority of the Board to revoke extends only to subpoenas 'requiring the production of any evidence,' not to subpoenas requiring the attendance and testimony of witnesses. So the argument that Congress has disallowed delegation extends only to the subpoenas duces tecum. What we have said in National Labor Relations Board v. Duval Jewelry Co., supra, disposes of the argument that the Board has no authority to delegate to a trial examiner the power to rule on motions to revoke those subpoenas reserving to itself the final decision in the matter. The provisions of those Rules being substantially the same in this type of case as in the representation cases, the results in the two cases should be the same. We therefore find it unnecessary to consider the argument pressed on us that § 7(b) of the Administrative Procedure Act, 60 Stat. 237, 241, 5 U.S.C. § 1006, 5 U.S.C.A. s 1006, grants a power withheld by the National Labor Relations Act. The power to make the revocation procedure applicable to subpoenas ad testificandum seems clear from the authority of the Board contained in § 6 of the Act 'to make * * * such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act.'
2. Issuance of subpoenas by the Regional Director.-The Act makes clear that the issuance of subpoenas is mandatory. 'The Board, or any member thereof, shall upon application of any party * * * forthwith issue * * * subpenas * * *.' The only function remaining is ministerial. Consequently the Board supplies blank subpoenas bearing its seal and the facsimile signature of a Board member to its regional offices and trial examiners. Upon application of a proper party the subordinate official automatically issues the subpoena to the applicant. There is here involved no delegation of any act entailing the exercise of discretion, as in Cudahy Packing Co. v. Holland, 315 U.S. 357, 62 S.Ct. 651, 86 L.Ed. 895. The agents issuing the subpoenas perform ministerial acts only. We cannot read the Act to mean that these burdensome details should be performed by Board members in faraway Washington, D.C. The command of the Act is to issue the subpoena 'forthwith' on 'application of any party.' Identification of the party hardly rises to the dignity of the discretionary act which is confided solely to the agency heads. This has been the consistent view of the law in the lower courts; and we think it is the correct one.
3. The General Counsel of the Board as a 'party.'-The Act does not define the term 'party'; but it does make clear that the role of the General Counsel is a major one. By § 3(d) of the Act he is given 'final authority' respecting the investigation of charges, the issuance of complaints, and the prosecution of complaints before the Board. The General Counsel is, indeed, indispensable to the prosecution of the case. He vindicates the public interest, performing functions previously performed by the Board itself. See National Licorice Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 309 U.S. 350, 352, 60 S.Ct. 569, 571, 84 L.Ed. 799. Plainly the issuance of subpoenas may often be essential to the performance of that role. To relegate him to a lesser role than that of a 'party' is to overlook the critical role he performs in enforcement of the Act.
Affirmed.

## Notes

* ↑ Section 11(1) of the Act provides:
* ↑ See § 11(1), supra, note 1.
* ↑ Section 102.31(b) of the Board's Rules and Regulations, 29 CFR, 1958 Cum. Pocket Supp., provides:
* ↑ Section 102.26 of the Rules provides:
* ↑ Section 7(b) provides:
* ↑ See § 11(1), supra, note 1.
* ↑ Section 11(1) was rewritten by the Taft-Hartley Act, 61 Stat. 136, 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq., 29 U.S.C.A. § 151 et seq. Senator Taft said concerning it, 93 Cong.Rec. 6445:
* ↑ See National Labor Relations Board v. John S. Barnes Corp., 7 Cir., 178 F.2d 156; Edwards v. National Labor Relations Board, 5 Cir., 189 F.2d 970; Jackson Packing Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 5 Cir., 204 F.2d 842; National Labor Relations Board v. Gunaca, D.C., 135 F.Supp. 790, affirmed 7 Cir., 230 F.2d 542.
* ↑ Section 3(d) reads as follows:
* ↑ Section 3(d) of the Act effected an important change over the earlier Wagner Act. It was designed to separate the prosecuting from the adjudicating function, to place the former in the General Counsel, and to make him an independent official appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate for a term of years. See H.R.Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 26; H.R.Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 37; statement of Senator Taft, 93 Cong.Rec. 6859.
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