# The Works of Nicholas Machiavel/Volume 4/The Art of War/Book 1

THE
ART OF WAR.
BOOK I.
THE CONTENTS.
Since it is allowable, I think, to speak well of any man after he is dead, because there can then be no longer any imputation or suspicion of flattery, I willingly take this opportunity of doing justice to the memory of my dear deceased friend Cosimo Rucellai, whose name I never remember without tears; as I knew him to be possessed of every quality that his friends and country could wish for in a worthy man and a good Citizen. For I am very certain he would chearfully have sacri​ficed all that he had in the world, and even life itself, for his friends; and that there was no enterprize how difficult and dangerous soever, which he would not have undertaken for the good of his country. And I must acknowledge, that amongst all the men I ever was acquainted with, I never met with any one whose heart was more disposed to great and generous actions. The only thing that he lamented at his death, was, that it should be his fate to die so young, and in his own house, without honour, or the satisfaction of having served any man in so effectual a manner as he passionately desired to have done; so that he was afraid (as he told his familiar acquaintance) nothing more could be said of him after he was dead, than that they had lost a good friend. But as his actions are sunk in oblivion, and scarce any of his acquaintance remaining, I think it proper to give this testimony of his virtues, and many amiable accomplishments. Time indeed has spared some small specimens of the sprightless of his Genius, consisting chiefly of love Sonnets, which (though he was not of an amorous turn) he composed at vacant hours in his youth, to avoid being altogether idle, and to entertain himself as well as others, till he should find it necessary to employ his thoughts upon subjects of a higher and more serious nature. But even from these little samples, it appears how happy he was in expressing his conceptions, and what a figure he might have made in Poetry, if he had thought it worth his while to give himself wholly up to it.
Since fortune therefore has deprived us of so valuable a friend, the only remedy we have left, is to console ourselves as well as we can with the remembrance of his company, and the recollection of such things, whether of a pleasant or serious cast, as we have often admired in him whilst he lived. And because the conversation that happened not long ago in his gardens, betwixt him and Fabrizio ​Colonna, concerning the Art of War (at which I and some other friends were present) is the freshest upon my memory, I will endeavour to recollect what I can of it, and commit it to writing for as Fabrizio laid open the mysteries of that art with great perspicuity on one side, and several pertinent questions were proposed, many objections started, and divers arguments supported with no less strength of reason by Cosimo on the other; a summary account of that conference may serve not only to revive the remembrance of his abilities in the minds of such friends as were then met together, but to make those that were absent regret they were not there, and to recapitulate to others the substance of various topics (no less useful in a civil than a military life) at that time handled in a very masterly manner, by a great and experienced man. But to our purpose.
Fabrizio Colonna returning from the wars in Lombardy, where he had commanded his Catholic Majesty's forces a considerable time with great reputation, took Florence in his way, with a design to repose himself a few days in that City, and to visit the Duke and some other Gentlemen there, with whom he was acquainted. Cosimo Rucellai therefore invited him to spend a day with him in his gardens; not merely to gratify his natural turn to hospitality and politeness, but in hopes likewise of being indulged in a long conversation with him concerning several things he wanted to know, and of which he thought he could not have a better opportunity of informing himself, than from the mouth of so great a man. The invitation being freely accepted by Fabrizio, he came to the Gardens at the time appointed, where he was received by Cosimo, and some of his most intimate friends, amongst whom were Zanobi Buondelmonti, Battista dalla Palla, and Luigi Alamanni, (all young men, very dear to him, of the same disposition, and ​engaged in the same studies) whose virtues and good qualities are so well known to every body, that it would be altogether unnecessary to say any thing here in praise of them.—To be as brief as I can, Fabrizio was regaled there with all possible demonstrations of honour and respect: but after the entertainment and usual formalities were over (which generally are few and short amongst men of sense, who are more desirous of gratifying the rational appetite) the days being long, and the weather intensely hot, Cosimo, under a pretence of avoiding the heat, took his guests into the most retired and shady part of the Gardens; and being all sat down, some upon the grass (which was very green and pleasant) and some upon seats placed under the trees; Fabrizio said it was a most delightful garden, and looking earnestly at some of the trees, seemed not to known the names of them; but Cosimo being aware of it, immediately said, perhaps you may not be acquainted with this sort of trees; and indeed I am not at all surprised at it, for they are very old ones, and were much more in vogue amongst our ancestors than they are at present. Having then told him the names of them, and that they were planted by his Grandfather Bernardo, who was fond of such amusements: I thought so, replied Fabrizio; and both the place and the trees put me in mind of some Princes in the Kingdom of Naples, who took much delight in planting groves and shady arbours, to shelter them from the heat.—Here he stopped short, and after he had paused a little while, proceeded in this manner.—If I was not afraid of giving offence (said he) I would tell you my opinion of these things: and yet I think none of you will be affronted at what is said amongst friends in free conversation; not with any design to vilify or depreciate such a taste, but for the sake of a little innocent argumentation. How much better then would those Princes have done ​(I speak it without intending to reflect upon their memories) if they had endeavoured to imitate the ancients in bearing hardships, instead of giving themselves up to ease and indolence, in doing such actions as are performed in the sunshine, and not in the shade; in following their example whilst they continued hardy and honest, and not when they became delicate and corrupt; for after that our country soon fell into ruin and distraction.—You have now introduced a subject, said Cosimo (but to avoid the frequent and tiresome repetition of "such a one said, such a one answered, and such a one replied," I shall hereafter only prefix the name of the several speakers, to what they said in the course of this conversation) you have now introduced a subject which I have long wished to hear thoroughly discussed, and therefore should take it as a particular favour, if you would speak your sentiments of it freely, and without reserve, or fear of offending any one here: for my own part, I will take the liberty of proposing some questions and doubts to you, in which I should be glad to be satisfied; but if I shall seem either to impeach or excuse any one's conduct in my questions or replies, it will not be for the sake of blaming or defending them, but for better information, if I should mistake in my judgment.
Fabrizio. It will be a great pleasure to me, I can assure you, on the other hand, to give you all the satisfaction I can in such questions as you shall think fit to propose to me; but I will not pretend to obtrude my opinions upon you as decisive and infallible; when you have heard them, I beg you will judge for yourself: perhaps I may now and then ask you a question too in my turn, and make no doubt but I shall receive as much satisfaction at least, in your answers, as you will do in mine: for it often happens that a pertinent question puts a man upon considering some things, and gives him ​light into many others, which otherwise he would never have thought of or known.
Cosimo. Let us return then, if you please, to what you said of my Grandfather and some others, who you think would have done better to have imitated the example of the ancients in a hardy and active manner of living, than in making such provisions for ease and luxury. As for my Grandfather, I shall make some sort of apology for him; and leave the others to be dealt with as you please: for I do not believe there was any man of his time, who detested a soft and delicate way of life more than he did, or was a greater friend to toil and labour. Nevertheless, he found it impossible either for himself or his sons to practise what he most approved; for such was the corruption of the age he lived in, that if any one had spirit enough to deviate ever so little from the common customs and manner of living in those times, he would have been laughed at and ridiculed by every body. So that if a man should have exposed himself naked upon a sandy beach to the heat of a noon-day sun in the middle of summer, or rolled himself in snow in the depth of winter, as Diogenes did, he would have been looked upon as a madman: if any one had brought up his children, like the Spartans in cottages or farm-houses; if he had accustomed them to sleep in the open air, to go barehead and barefoot, to bathe in the coldest streams, in order not only to make them bear hardships the better, but to despise both life and death, he would have been accounted a beast rather than a man: if, lastly, he had lived upon pulse and roots and such sort of things, if he had made no account of money, like Frabricius of old, he might perhaps have been admired by some few, but he would have been followed by nobody. My Grandfather therefore was discouraged from imitating the example of the ancients, in those things, by the general practice ​of the times, and forced to content himself with doing it in others, which did not lay him so open to the charge of affecting singularity.
Fabrizio. You have made a very handsome apology for your Grandfather in that particular, Sir; and there is indeed much truth and reason in it. But in what I said of imitating the ancients in their manner of living, I did not mean to carry matters to such extremities as you seem to think, but to propose some other things of a gentler and more practicable nature, and such as would be more suitable to the present times; which I think might very well be established, if they were introduced and countenanced by some man of authority in the State. And if we consider the practice and institutions observed by the old Romans (whose example I am always fond of recommending) we shall find many things worthy of imitation, which may easily be transplanted into any other state, if it is not become totally corrupt.
Cosimo. Pray what things are those?
Fabrizio. To honour and reward virtue; not to despise poverty; to keep up good order and discipline in their armies; to oblige their Fellow-citizens and Subjects to love one another; to decline faction; to prefer the good of the public to any private interest; and other such things which would be compatible enough with these times, and may easily be introduced if due means were taken for that purpose: because they appear so reasonable in themselves, and the expediency of them is so obvious to common sense, that nobody could gainsay or oppose them; and he that takes this course, plants trees under the shade of which he may enjoy himself with equal pleasure, and perhaps more security, than we do here.
Cosimo. What you have said of this matter admits of no contradiction, and therefore I shall leave it to the consideration of those whom it ​most concerns; but should be glad to know, why you, who blame others for not imitating the ancients in weighty and important concerns, have not thought fit in any wise to copy them yourself in their military discipline, and the Art of War, which is your Profession, and in which you have gained so much reputation.
Fabrizio. You are now come to the point I expected: for what I said, must naturally lead you to ask such a question; and, for my own part, I shall most willingly give you what satisfaction I can. And though I could make a short and ready excuse for my conduct in this respect, yet since we have so much leisure, and so convenient a place for it, I shall discuss the matter at large; especially as it will give me great pleasure to inform you thoroughly of what you seem so desirous to know.—Men who have any great design in hand must first make all necessary preparations, that their plan, when a proper opportunity offers, may be ready to be put in execution. Now when these preparations are made with caution and privacy, they are not known or talked of; so that a man cannot be blamed for negligence or omission in that respect, except some accident happens which shews that he has either not made due preparations for the executions of his design, or never thought of it at all: and therefore, as I never yet had any such opportunity of shewing what preparations I have made to revive the military discipline of the ancients amongst us, nobody can reasonably blame me for not doing it. This might serve for a sufficient answer to your charge.
Cosimo. It might so indeed, if I was sure you never had such an opportunity.
Fabrizio. Since you seem to doubt of that, I will shew you at large (if you will have patience to hear me) what preparations are necessary for that purpose; what sort of opportunity is requisite; ​what impediments may obstruct the preparations, and prevent those opportunities from happening; and lastly, (which seems a contradiction in terms) that it is at the same time the easiest and most difficult thing in the word to accomplish such a purpose.
Cosimo. You cannot oblige us more: and if you are not tired with speaking, you may assure yourself we shall never be tired of hearing you. But as the subject is copious and much to be said upon it, I must beg leave to call in the assistance of these friends now and then: and both they and I hope you will not be offended if we should now and then happen to interrupt you with any question that may seem unnecessary or unreasonable.
Fabrizio. You are all heartily welcome to ask what questions you think fit; for I see the ardour and ingenuity of youth incline you to have a favourable opinion of my Profession, and to listen to what I have to say concerning the duties of it: but when men are grown grey-headed, and their blood is frozen in their veins, they generally either hate the very name of a soldier, or become so positive that they can never be argued out of their opinions. Ask freely then and without reserve: for that will give me an opportunity of breathing a little sometimes, as well as satisfaction of answering your questions in such a manner as may leave no doubt or scruple remaining upon your minds.—To begin then with what you said yourself, that in the Art of War (which is my Profession) I have not imitated the ancients in any respect whatsoever, I answer, that War being an occupation by which a man cannot support himself with honour at all times, ought not to be followed as a business by any but Princes or Governors of Commonwealths; and that if they are wise men they will not suffer any of their Subjects or Citizens to make that their only Profession. Indeed no good man ever did: for surely he cannot be called a good ​man, who exercises an employment that obliges him to be rapacious, fraudulent, and cruel at all times, in order to support himself; as all those must be of course (of what rank soever they are) who make a trade of war; because it will not maintain them in time of peace: upon which account, they are under a necessity either of endeavouring to prevent a peace, or of taking all means to make such provisions for themselves in time of war, that they may not want sustenance when it is over. But neither of these courses is consistent with common honesty: for whoever resolves to heap as much in time of war as will support him for ever after, must be guilty of robbery, murder, and many other acts of violence upon his friends as well as his enemies: and in endeavouring to prevent a peace, Commanders must have recourse to many pitiful tricks and artifices to deceive those that employ them. But if they fail in their designs, and find they cannot prevent a peace, as soon as their pay is stopped, and they can live no longer in the licentious manner they used to do, they set up for Soldiers of fortune, and having got a parcel of their disbanded men together, make no scruple of plundering a whole country without mercy or distinction. You must have heard that when the late wars were over in Italy and the country full of disbanded Soldiers, they formed themselves into several bands, and went about plundering some towns and laying others under contribution. You must likewise have read how the Carthaginian Soldiers (after the first war was ended in which they had been engaged with the Romans) assembled together under the banners of Matho and Spendius (two officers whom they had chosen in a tumultuary manner to command them) and made a more dangerous war upon their own country, than that ​which had been just concluded. In the days of our Ancestors, Francisco Sforza, in order to support himself in splendor and magnificence in time of peace, not only betrayed the Milanese who had employed him in their service, but deprived them of their liberties and made himself their Sovereign. All the rest of our Italian Soldiers, who made. War their only occupation, acted the same part in those times: and if they did not succeed in their villainies like Sforza, they were not less blameable; for if we consider their conduct, we shall find their designs were altogether as iniquitous as his. Sforza, the father of Francisco, obliged Jane, Queen of Naples, to throw herself into the arms of the King of Arragon, by suddenly quitting her service and leaving her disarmed, as it were, in the midst of her enemies, with an intention either to deprive her of her Kingdom, or at least to extort a great sum of money from her. Bracero da Montone endeavoured by the same arts to have made himself King of Naples; and if he had not been routed and killed at Aquila, he would certainly have accomplished his design. Such evils and others of the like nature, are owing to men who make war their only occupation; according to the proverb, "War makes thieves, and Peace hangs them:" for those that know not how to get their bread any other way, when they are disbanded, finding nobody that has occasion for their Service, and disdaining the thoughts of living in poverty and obscurity, are forced to have recourse to such ways of supporting themselves as generally bring them to the Gallows.
Cosimo. I confess, I thought the Profession of a Soldier the most honourable of all others; but you have set it in such a light, that I am now so much out of conceit with it, that if you have not a great ​deal more to say in favour of it, you will leave a doubt upon my mind: for if what you have said be true, how comes it to pass that the memories of Julius Cæsar, Pompey, Scipio, Marcellus, and many other Roman Generals are immortalized?
Fabrizio. I have not yet finished what I proposed to say concerning the two points I mentioned a little while ago, viz. that a good man could not make war his only profession; and that no wise Prince or Governor of a Commonwealth ought to suffer any of their Subjects or Citizens to do it. As to the first, I have done with it; and will now proceed to the discussion of the second: in which I shall take an opportunity of answering your last question.—I say then, that Cæsar and Pompey, and almost all the Roman Generals who lived after the second Punic war, owed their reputation to their abilities, rather than their virtue: but those that lived before that time acquired their glory by being virtuous as well as able men: for the former made war their sole occupation, but the latter did Whilst the Roman Republic continued in corrupt, no Citizen, how powerful soever he might be, ever presumed to avail himself of that profession in time of peace, in such a manner as to trample upon the laws, to plunder Provinces, or to turn tyrant, and enslave his country: nor did any private Soldier dare to violate his oath, to enter into faction and cabals, to throw off his allegiance to the Senate, or to support any tyrannical attempt upon the liberties of the Commonwealth, in order to enable himself to live by the profession of arms at all times. The Commanders, on the contrary, contenting themselves with the honour of a Triumph, returned with eagerness to their former manner of living; and the private men laid down their arms when a war was over, with much more pleasure than they had taken them up, and resumed. The calling by which they had got their bread be​fore, without any hopes of advancing themselves by plunder and rapine. Of this we have a remarkable and evident proof in the example of Attilius Regulus, who being Commander in Chief of the Roman Armies in Africa, and having in a manner subdued the Carthaginians, sent to define leave of the Senate to return home, that he might put his little farm in order again, which had been neglected by his servants: whence it plainly appears, that if war had been his only occupation, and he had designed to have made his fortune by it, he would not have desired leave to return to the care of his little estate, when he had so many Provinces at his mercy, and might daily have gained more by plundering them than his whole patrimony was worth. But as good men who make not war their sole occupation, expect no other reward but glory and honour for their services; so when they have obtained that, they cheerfully return to their former way of life. As for the common Soldiers, we see that they likewise were of the same disposition: for though they entered voluntarily into the service when it was necessary, they were not less glad to return to their families when they were no longer wanted: the truth of which is manifest from many circumstances; particularly from the privilege which the Roman Citizens enjoyed, of not being forced into the army against their inclination. So that whilst that Republic continued well governed (which was till the time of the Gracchi) there never was any Soldier who made war alone his occupation: whence it came to pass that few of them were dissolute and licentious; and those that were so were severely punished. Every well governed Commonwealth therefore should take care that this Art of war should be practiced in time of peace only as an exercise; and in time of war, merely out of necessi​ty, and for the acquisition of glory; referring it (when considered as a constant business and employment) to be prosecuted by the Public alone: for if any Citizen has any other end or design in following this profession, he is not a good man: and if any Commonwealth acts otherwise it is ill governed.
Cosimo. I am thoroughly satisfied of the reasonableness of what you have hitherto said concerning this matter, and admit the conclusion you have drawn to be very just as far as it relates to a Commonwealth: but I cannot tell whether it will hold good with regard to Princes; for I think a Prince should have some such persons about him as make arms their only profession.
Fabrizio. A Kingdom that is well governed ought to be still more afraid of such persons than a Commonwealth; because they are the corruptors of Princes, and ministers of their Tyranny. It is vain to urge any Monarchy that now exists, as an instance to the contrary; for there is not one that is under good regulations. A Kingdom that is well constituted never gives the Sovereign power to its Prince in anything but the command of its armies; in which case alone it is absolutely necessary he Should have it; because sudden resolutions are often necessary, and such as cannot be carried into execution so speedily as they ought to be, except the supreme command is lodged in the hands of one man: in other matters, nothing ought to be done without his Council; and therefore his Counselors. should take particular care not to let such men be too near his person, as would be continually advising him to make war, whether it is necessary or not, because they cannot tell how to support themselves in time of peace. But I will enlarge a little further upon this subject, and not insist merely upon a Kingdom that is perfectly well governed and constituted, but content, myself (for argument's sake) with such as we see at this time. I say then that ​even in such Governments those persons are much to be feared who make war their only business; because the strength of all armies, without doubt, consists in their Infantry: so that if a Prince has not power enough over his Infantry to make them disband and return cheerfully to their former occupations when a war is over, he is in a fair way to be ruined. For no sort of Infantry can be so dangerous as that which is composed of people who make war their only calling: because a Prince must either keep them continually engaged in war, or in constant pay during the time of peace, or run the risque of being stripped of his kingdom: but it is impossible for any Prince, either to keep them continually engaged in war, or in constant pay when it is over; and therefore he must run no small risque of losing his Kingdom. Whilst the Romans continued wise and good they never suffered any of their Citizens to make war their only employment, (as I said before) though they were able to keep them in constant pay, because they were continually at war: but in order to avoid the inconveniencies which might have ensued from the toleration of such a custom, they changed their forces (as they could not alter the times) in such a manner, that at the end of every fifteen years, their Legions were filled with new men that were in the flower of their youth: for they took none but such as were betwixt eighteen and thirty-five years of age, in full health and vigour; and never kept them till they grew old and infirm, as the same people afterwards did in more corrupt times. For Augustus, and after him Tiberius, more careful to establish and increase their own power than to promote the public good, began to disarm the Roman people (in order to make them more passive under their tyranny) and kept the same armies continually on foot upon the confines of the Empire: but not thinking those sufficient to keep the Senate and people in due awe, ​they raised other forces, called the Pretorian Bands, which were always quartered either in the City or near it, and served not only as Guards to the Emperor's person, but to bridle the people. Afterwards, however, when the Emperors suffered the men who composed those Bands to lay aside all other occupations, and to make war their sole Profession, they soon became insolent and formidable, not only to the Senate, but to the Emperors themselves; many of whom they put to death, and then disposed of the Empire as they pleased, taking it from one, and giving it to another: nay it frequently happened that different Emperors were elected by different armies at the same time; which soon occasioned the division of that Empire, and at last the utter ruin of it. A Prince therefore who would reign in security, ought to make choice of such men alone for his Infantry, as will cheerfully serve him in war when it is necessary, and be as glad to come back to their own houses after it is over; which will always be the case with those that have other occupations and employments to live upon: for which purpose, when a peace is concluded, he should order his Generals and great officers to return to their respective charges and Governments; the Gentlemen to the care of their estates; and the private men to their particular callings: that so every one may be ready to enter into a war to procure a good peace, and no man perfume to disturb the peace, in order to stir up a war.
Cosimo. Indeed, Sir, I think there is much truth and reason in what you have said; but as the substance of it is so very different from the judgment I had formed to myself of these matters, I cannot say that I am altogether satisfied in some respects: for I know several Lords and Gentlemen who are supported by the profession of arms alone in time of peace; as yourself for instance, and some others of your rank and quality, who receive pensions from ​Princes and states: I see likewise many Soldiers, still kept in pay for the security of fortresses and other Cities; of that it appears to me that there is sufficient employment and occasion for them all in time of peace.
Fabrizio. Surely you cannot be of that opinion: for if there was no other reason to convince you of the contrary, the small number of men that is reserved to garrison those places might be a sufficient answer to your objection. What proportion is there betwixt a few regiments of Infantry that are necessary to defend some strong places in time of peace, and those that are to be kept in pay for the prosecution of a war? Are not many more wanted in time of war to reinforce those garrisons, besides the numbers that are to be employed in the field, which are always disbanded as soon as a peace is concluded? As to the common standing Guards that are requisite in any State (which need not be many) Pope Julius II. and your own Republic have sufficiently shewn the world how dangerous they thought those people who made war their only occupation, by dismissing them for their insolence, and hiring Swiss Guard in their room, who are not only born and brought up in strict obedience to Laws, but picked and chosen by the State in a proper and regular manner: your objection therefore that Soldiers of every kind are necessary, and may find sufficient employment in time of peace as well as war, must naturally fall to the ground. But why Horse and Gens d'Armes should be kept in pay in times of peace, perhaps may not appear so obvious: nevertheless, if we consider the matter thoroughly, it may easily be accounted for from the corruption of the times. For it is a bad custom introduced by men who make a trade of war, and would be attended with many dangerous consequences in a State, if any considerable number of them was kept in pay; but as there are seldom enow to make up an army ​of themselves, they can do no great mischief at present; though they have formerly, as I shewed before in the cases of Francisco Sforza, his father, and Braccio da Montone. It is a bad custom however, and such as I approve not.
Cosimo. Would you have none at all then? Or if you would have any, in what manner would you raise and employ them?
Fabrizio. As a Militia; not like the Gens d'Armes of France (who are as insolent and dangerous as our own) but after the manner of the Ancients, who always raised their Cavalry out of their own Subjects; and after a war was over, sent them home again to support themselves upon their respective occupations, as I shall shew more at large before I have done with this subject. So that if troops of horse are kept together, and receive pay, and live entirely upon it, even in times of peace, it is owing to corruption and bad government. And though indeed I myself and some other Commanders, whom I know, receive pensions and stipends in time of peace, I must confess I think it a very corrupt custom: for a wise and well governed Republic ought never to keep such Commanders in constant pay, but rather to employ its own Citizens in time of war, and afterwards to dismiss them to follow their former occupations. So likewise a Prince, if he would act wisely, should not allow a pension or stipend to anyone in time of peace, except by way of reward for some signal piece of service, or in order to avail himself of some able man in time of peace as well as war. And since you have pitched upon me as an example of this kind, I will take the charge to myself and make the best apology I can. I say then, that I never made war my sole business and occupation: my profession is to govern my subjects well, to defend and protect them: for which purpose, I study the arts both of peace and war; and if I am reward​ed and esteemed by the Prince whom I have the honour to serve, it is not so much for the experience I have in military affairs, as because he is pleased to retain me as one of his Counsellors in time of peace. A Prince therefore who would govern wisely should admit no other sort of persons into his Confidence: for if his Counsellors are too fond either of peace or war, they will lead him into errors and inconveniences. Thus much I thought myself obliged to say in consequence of what I proposed at first: and if it is not satisfactory, I make no doubt but you will be able to find others who can give you better information in the things you seemed so desirous of knowing. You begin however, I dare say, to be aware how difficult a matter it must be to revive the military discipline of the Ancients at present, what preparations are necessary for that purpose, and what occasions and opportunities are wanting to accomplish it. But if you are not already tired with what I have said, I could throw a little more light upon this subject, by comparing the particulars of our modern practice and institutions with the discipline of the Ancients.
Cosimo. If we were desirous at first to hear you enter into a discussion of these points, we can assure you that what you have already said has redoubled that desire: we thank you therefore most heartily for the satisfaction you have given us, and earnestly desire the favour of you to proceed.
Fabrizio. Since it is your pleasure then, I will deduce this matter from the fountain-head; that so I may be enabled to explain myself with more perspicuity, and you to understand me the better.—Whoever engages in a war must endeavor by all means to put himself in a condition to face his enemy in the field, and to beat him there if possible. For this purpose, it is necessary to form an army; and to form an army, he must not only raise men, but arm, discipline, and exercise them frequently, ​both in small and large bodies; he must teach them to encamp and decamp, and make the enemy familiar to them by degrees, sometimes by marching near them, and sometimes by taking post in a situation where they may have a full view of them. These preparations are absolutely necessary in a field war, which is the most effectual and honourable of all others: and a general who knows how to conduct such a war, to form and draw up an army, and to give an enemy battle in a proper and Soldier-like manner, cannot err much in other respects: but if he is deficient in this part of his profession (though he be ever so able a man in other points) he will never bring a war to a happy conclusion: besides, if he wins a battle, it cancels all other errors and miscarriages; but if he loses one, it effaces the memory of all his former merits and services. To form an army therefore, it is necessary in the first place to make choice of proper men for that purpose, which the Ancients termed delectus, but we call listing or levying. Those then who have prescribed rules in the Art of War, are unanimously of opinion that such men should be raised in temperate climates, that so they may be both brave and quick of apprehension; for it has been generally observed that hot countries produce men that are quick and sharp witted, but not courageous; and on the other hand, that the inhabitants of cold countries are for the most part hardy and brave, but of dull and heavy understandings. This rule indeed might be followed by a Prince who had the whole world at command, and could raise his men where he pleased. But to give a rule which may be observed by any State, I say that every Prince or Republic should raise their men in their own dominions, whether hot, cold, or temperate: for we see by ancient examples, that good discipline and exercise will make good Soldiers in any country, and that the defects of nature may be sup​supplied by art and industry; which in this case are more effectual than nature itself. Besides, the raising of men in any other country cannot properly be called delectus, or making a choice; because that term signifies to pick and cull the best men in a Province, and implies a power to chuse such as are unwilling, as well as those that are willing, to serve; which cannot be done in any country but your own: for in territories that are subject to another State, you must be content with such as are willing to serve you, and not expect to pick and chuse whom you please.
Cosimo. But you may either take or refuse whom you think fit of those that are willing to serve you; and therefore that may be called delectus.
Fabrizio. You are right in one respect: but consider the defects to which such a choice is subject, and you will find that it is no choice at all. In the first place, those that are not your own Subjects, but yet are willing to enter into your pay, are so far from being the best men, that they are generally the worst: for if there be any scandalous, idle, incorrigible, irreligious wretches, any run-aways from their parents, any blasphemers, common cheats, or fellows that have been initiated into every kind of villany, those are the people that commonly list under your banners; and what sort of soldiers they are likely to make I leave every one to judge for himself. Now when they are more of these that offer their service than you want, you may indeed pick and chuse out of them; but you can never make a good choice, because they are all so bad. It often happens however, that there are not so many, even of these, as you have occasion for to fill up your Regiments: so that you must be obliged to take them all; and then surely you cannot so properly be said to make a delectus, a choice, as to raise ​men at any rate. Of such discorderly people our Italian armies and those of most other nations are composed at present, except in Germany; because our Princes have it not in their Power to make any man serve in their wars except he is willing. Consider with yourselves therefore whether is is possible to revive the discipline of the Ancients in armies which are raised in this manner.
Cosimo. What other method would you take then to raise them?
Fabrizio. That which I recommended before: a Prince should chuse them out of his own subjects, and exert his authority in such a choice.
Cosimo. Do you think any part of the ancient discipline might be revived in an army thus chosen?
Fabrizio. Without doubt it might, if such an army was commanded by the Sovereign of a Principality, or by one of the governing Citizens of a Commonwealth, who is appointed Commander in Chief during the time of his office; otherwise it would be a very difficult matter to do it.
Cosimo. Why so?
Fabrizio, I will explain that to you more at large hereafter: let it suffice at present to say, that no good can be done any other way.
Cosimo. Well then, since these Levies are to be made in your own dominions; is it better to draw the men out of the Country or out of Towns?
Fabrizio. All authors who have written upon this subject agree, that it is better to take them out of the Country; because such men are inured to hardships and fatigues, to endure all sorts of weather, to handle the mattock and spade, to throw up ditches, to carry heavy burdens, and are, generally speaking, more temperate and incorrupt than others. But as Horse as well as Foot are necessary in an army, I would advise that the Horse should be taken out of Towns, and the Foot out of the Country.
​Cosimo. Of what age would you have them?
Fabrizio. If I was to raise a new army, I would chuse them from seventeen to forty years of age: but, if I was only to recruit an old one, I would have none above seventeen.
Cosimo. I do not well understand the reason of this distinction.
Fabrizio. I will tell you the meaning of it then. If I was to raise an Army, or establish a Militia, in a State where there was none before, it would be necessary to take the best and most docible men I could find of all ages, (provided they were neither too young nor too old to carry arms) in order to discipline them in such a manner as I shall inform you of in its proper place: but if I was to raise men only to recruit on army that had been long on foot, I would take none above seventeen, because there would be men enow of riper age in such an army.
Cosimo. Then you would put your troops upon the same footing with those in our Country?
Fabrizio. Yes; but I would arm, and officer, and exercise, and discipline them, in a manner that I fancy is not known amongst yours.
Cosimo. You would have trained bands, I suppose?
Fabrizio. Why nor, Sir?
Cosimo. Because several wise and able men disapprove of them.
Fabrizio. That cannot well be surely. Some men perhaps may be accounted wise and able, though they really are not so.
Cosimo. The bad proof those bands have always made seems to countenance that opinion.
Fabrizio. Are you sure it is not owing to your own fault rather than any defect in them, that they have always made so bad proof? Perhaps I may convince you that it is, before we part.
Cosimo. We shall be much obliged to you for ​so doing. But in the first place I will tell you upon what accounts these troops are disapproved of, that so you may be the better enabled to refute the objections that are made to them. It is said then, that they are either of little or no service, and if a Prince or State confide in them they are sure to be ruined; or, if they are good Soldiers, the person that commands them may seize upon the Government himself by their assistance. To confirm this, the example of the Romans is cited, who lost their liberties by keeping up such forces: the case of the Venetians and the King of France is likewise instanced for the same purpose; the former of whom make use of foreign troops only, to prevent any of their own Citizens from seizing upon the Government; and the latter has disarmed all his subjects in order to rule them with more ease. But the unserviceableness of these troops is further urged for the following reasons: the first is, that they are raw and inexperienced; the second, that they are compelled to serve: for when people are grown up to years of maturity, they seldom learn any thing perfectly; and surely no material service can be expected from men who are forced into the army whether they will or not.
Fabrizio. All these objections seem to be made by very short-sighted people, as I shall shew presently. For as to the unserviceableness of these Bands. I say that no troops can be more serviceable than such as are chosen out of one's own subjects; nor can those subjects be raised in a better or more proper manner. And since this will not admit of dispute, I shall not throw away any more time in endeavoring to prove it, especially as there is sufficient evidence of it in the histories of all nations. What has been said concerning inexperience and compulsion, I allow to be just and reasonable: for inexperience is the mother of cowardice, and compulsion makes men mutinous and discontented: but both ​experience and courage are to be acquired by arming, exercising, and disciplining them in a proper manner, as I shall plainly demonstrate to you. As to the matter of compulsion, I answer, that such men as are to be raised by the command of their Prince, should neither be altogether volunteers, nor yet forcibly compelled into the service: for if they were to be altogether volunteers, the mischief's would ensue which I just now mentioned, it could not properly be called a delectus, and few would be willing to serve. Compulsion, on the other hand, would be attended with no less inconveniences; and therefore a middle course ought to be taken, and without either treating men with downright violence, or depending entirely upon their own voluntary offers, they should be moved by the obedience they think due to their Governors, to expose themselves to a little present hardship, rather than incur their displeasure: and by these means (their own will seeming to co-operate with a gentle sort of compulsion) you will easily prevent thofe evils which might otherwise result from a spirit of licentiousness or discontent. I will not venture however to affirm, that an army composed of such men is invincible; for even the Roman Legions were often routed, and Hannibal himself was at last conquered: so that it is impossible to model any army in such a manner as to prevent it from being ever defeated. The wise and able men therefore of whom you speak, should not be so peremptory in pronouncing such forces altogether unserviceable, because they have sometimes loft a battle; for though they may happen to be defeated once or twice, they may be victorious afterwards, when they have discovered the causes that contributed to their defeat, and provided remedies against them; especially as their disgrace (when the causes of it come to be looked into) may probably be owing rather to bad conduct in the Commanders than any defect in the ​institution itself: your acquaintance therefore instead of condemning one, should endeavour to correct the other; and how that is to be done I will shew you as we proceed. In the mean time I shall convince you how little foundation there is for the objection which you urge, that such bands, under the command of an aspiring Subject or Citizen, may deprive a Prince or Republic of their authority and dominions: for it is certain that no Subjects or Citizens, when legally armed and kept in due order by their masters, ever did the least mischief to any state on the contrary, they have always been of the highest service to all Governments, and have kept them free and incorrupt longer than they would have been without them. Rome continued free four hundred years, and Sparta eight hundred, though their Citizens were armed all that while: but many other States which have been disarmed have lost their liberties in less than forty years. No State therefore can support itself without an army, and if it has no Soldiers of its own, it must be forced to hire foreign troops, which will be much more dangerous: because they are more liable to be corrupted, and become subservient to the ambition of some powerful Citizen, who may easily avail himself of their assistance to overturn the established Government, when he was nobody to deal with but an unarmed and defenseless multitude. Besides, every State must naturally be more afraid of two enemies than one; and that which takes foreign troops into its pay, will be apprehensive of them, as well as of its own forces: for which indeed you will see there is sufficient reason, if you remember what I said just now concerning Francisco Sforza: whereas a State which employs no troops but such as are composed of its own Subjects has only one enemy to fear. But to omit all other proofs which might be adduced to support this point, I shall only lay it down as a certain truth, that no man ever yet ​founded a Monarchy or a Republic but he was well assured the Subjects, if armed, would always be ready and willing to defend it: and if the Venetians had acted as wisely in this respect as in others, they might have erected a new Monarchy in the world: for the neglect of which, they are the mere inexcusable, as they had arms put into their hands by their first Legislators: but not being possessed of much territory by land they employed their strength chiefly at sea, where they carried on their wars with great spirit, and made considerable acquisitions. At last, however, when they were obliged to engage in a land war for the relief of Vicenza, instead of trusting some Citizen of their own with the command of their forces, they took the Marquis of Mantua into their pay. Now if this false step, which clipped the wings of their ambition, and put a stop to their further aggrandizement, was owing to an opinion, that though they knew how to make war at Sea, they did not at land, it was a simple and ill-founded diffidence: for a Sea-commander who has been used to fight the winds and waves, as well as the enemy, will sooner make a good Land-officer where he has nothing to deal with but men, than a Land-officer will make a good Sea-commander. The Romans, who were most expert in Land-wars, but knew little of naval affairs, being engaged in a quarrel with the Carthaginians, who were very powerful at Sea, did not take either Grecian or Spanish forces into their Service, though they were the best Seamen in the world at that time; but left the command of that expedition to their own Land-officers, who made a descent upon the enemy's coast, and subdued the whole Country. But if the Venetians acted in the above manner out of apprehension that if they did otherwise, some one of their own Citizens might seize upon the Government, it was an unreasonable jealousy: for (not to repeat what has been already said) if none of their ​Sea-commanders ever made themselves masters of any town upon their coasts; much less occasion had they to fear that any of their Citizens who commanded their armies should make use of them for such a purpose. If they had considered this, they would have been convinced that tyranny and usurpation are not owing to the Citizens being armed, but to a weak Government; and that whilst a State is well conducted, it has nothing to fear from the arms of its Subjects: the resolution therefore which they took upon that occasion was a very imprudent one, and brought great disgrace and many misfortunes upon them. As to the error which the King of France is guilty of in disarming his Subjects, instead of keeping them well disciplined and ready for war, (an instance which you urge against me) every impartial man must own that it is a great default in judgment, and has much weakened that Kingdom. But I have made too long a digression, and may seem perhaps to have forgotten my Subject: yet I was in some measure obliged to do it, in answer to your objections, and to shew you that a State ought by no means to depend upon any troops but such as are composed of its own Subjects; that those Subjects cannot be raised in any manner so well as by way of trained bands: and that there can be no better method devised to form an army, or militia, or to introduce good order and discipline amongst the Soldiers. If you ever read the institutions established by the first Kings of Rome, particularly by Servius Tullus, you mist remember that the Classes which he formed, were a sort of trained bands, or bodies of men fit to bear arms, out of which, an army might presently be railed upon any sudden emergency for the defence of the State.—But to return to your Levies, I say again that if I was to recruit an old army, I would take men of about seventeen years of age; but if I was to raise a new one, and to make it fit for service in a ​short time, I would take them of all ages betwixt Seventeen and forty.
Cosimo. Would you have any regard to their respective trades or occupations?
Fabrizio. Some Authors who have written upon this Subject, will not admit of fowlers, fishermen, cooks, pimps, or any other sort of people who make an occupation of pleasure or sporting; but prefer plowmen, smiths, farriers, carpenters, butchers, hunters, and such like: but, for my own part, should not so much consider the nature of their profession as the goodness of the men, and which of them would be the most serviceable. For this reason I should sooner make choice of husbandmen, and such as have been accustomed to labour in the fields, as more useful in an army than any other kind of people: next to these, I would take smiths, carpenters, farriers, and stone-cutters, of whom it is necessary to have many; because they are very often wanted, and it is a good thing to have Soldiers that can turn their hands to more services than one.
Cosimo. But how may one distinguish those that are fit for war from those that are not?
Fabrizio. I will first inform you of the method I would take for raising levies to form a new army; because I shall have an opportunity of mentioning several things at the same time, that are necessary in the choice of men to recruit an old one.—I say then, we must judge whether a man is fit for service, either from the experience we have had of his former behaviour, or from probable conjecture: but in such as are altogether raw men, and never served before, (of whom we must suppose all new levies chiefly, if not wholly, to consist) we can have no experience of their fitness: upon which account, we must have recourse to such conjectures as we may be able to form from their age, their occupation, and appearance. Of the two first ​we have already spoken; it only remains therefore to say something of the last. Some, like Pyrrhus, would have their Soldiers tall and large of stature; others, like Julius Cæsar, prefer such as are active and vigorous: of which they form a conjecture from the symmetry of their limbs, and the vivacity of their aspect. Some that have treated of this subject, accordingly recommend those that have quick and lively eyes, muscular necks, wide chests, brawny arms, long fingers, small bellies, round sides, spare legs, and little feet, which are for the most part signs of strength and agility; two qualities that are principally necessary in a Soldier. But above all, we ought to have strict regard to their morals and behaviour: otherwise we shall make choice of such as having neither modesty nor honesty, will be a scandal to an army, and not only become mutinous and ungovernable themselves, but sow the seeds of corruption amongst others: for it is not to be expected that any virtue or commendable quality can be found in such men. Here perhaps it may not appear impertinent (nay indeed it seems absolutely necessary) to put you in mind of the method taken by the Roman Consuls, as soon as they entered upon their office, to raise the forces that were wanted for the service of that year; that so you may be more fully convinced of the importance of such a choice. Upon these occasions then, (as their Republic was almost continually engaged in war) being obliged to make choice of some that had served before, and others that were altogether raw men, they had an opportunity in one case of pitching upon such as they knew by experience were fit for their purpose, and were forced in the other to make use of those that seemed to be so from probable conjecture. It should likewise be observed that such Levies are made either for present service, or to be disciplined in order to be employed when occasion shall require. But as I have hitherto spoken of ​those only that are to be raised and disciplined for future service, in countries where there was no army before, and consequently no proper choice can be made from any experience of much men as are fit for Soldiers, I shall continue that subject: because it is an easy matter either to raise good recruits or form armies for immediate service, in places where a military force has been once established; especially, if the rulers of the State have sufficient authority to enforce it, as the Romans did of old, and the Swiss do at this day: for though there must of course be many new men, yet there will also be so many veterans, in this sort of Levies, that both together will soon make a very good army. The Roman Emperors, however, when they began to keep up garrisons and standing armies upon the confines of the Empire, thought fit to appoint certain Masters or Instructors to teach and discipline their Tirones (or new raised men) in warlike arts and exercises, as we may see in the life of the Emperor Maximus: an institution observed at home only whilst Rome continued free; but in such a manner, that the young Romans who had been trained up, and inured to this sort of discipline, made excellent Soldiers when a delectus was necessary, and they were called out into the service of their Country: but afterwards, when this custom of training up the youth at home was left off by the Emperors, they were forced to make use of the method I just now mentioned—But to return to the method observed by the Romans in making their Levies. As soon as the Consuls (who always conducted their wars) had entered upon their office, they began to raise forces, each Consul having two legions alloted him, which consisted of Roman Citizens only, and were the main strength and flower of their armies. For this purpose, they first appointed twenty-four military Tribunes, six to each legion; whose office resembled that of our Lieutenant-Colonels, or Commanders of a battalion. This ​done, they called all the people together that were able to bear arms, and placed the Tribunes of each legion apart: after which, those Officers cast lots out of which Tribe or Class they should begin their choice; and upon which Tribe soever the lot fell, they took four of the best men out of it, one of whom was made choice of by the Tribunes of the first legion, another by those of the second, another by those of the third, and the last fell to the share of the fourth. After this, they picked out four more, out of whom, the first was chosen by the Tribunes of the second legion, the second by those of the third, the third by those of the fourth, and the fourth by those of the first. When this were thus disposed of, four others were drawn out: the first of whom was taken by the third Legion, the second by the fourth, the third by the first, and the fourth by the second; thus varying the turns of their choice out of all the Tribes, till the four legions were all equal and complete. Now these levies might be employed in immediate service, as I said before: and since they consisted of men, many of whom had been tried, and the rest well exercised and disciplined at home, such a choice might be made partly from experience, and partly from conjecture: but where the men are altogether raw and untried, and must be exercised and disciplined from the beginning to make them fit for future service, the choice must be made by conjecture alone, founded upon their age and appearance.
Cosimo. What you have said appears to be very just: but before you proceed any further, I could wish you would gratify my curiosity in one point, which you have put me in mind of by saying, that where the levies that are to be made have not been used to military service before, they must be chosen by conjecture: for I have heard great fault found with our Militia in many respects, especially with regard to their number; some being of opinion that ​if they were fewer, they might be better chosen; that it would not be so troublesome and inconvenient to the country, nor to the men themselves; and that they might have larger pay, which would make them more content and ready to obey your commands. I should be glad to know therefore whether you would have a large or small number of such people, and how you would proceed in the choice of them in either case.
Fabrizio. Without doubt is it much better to have a large number than a final one; for where there is not a great number, it is impossible ever to have a good Militia: as to the objections which you say some others have made to it, I shall presently shew you the futility of them.—I say then, in the first place, that the smallness of the number does not make them the better soldiers, especially in a country where there is plenty of men, as in Tuscany; for if you are to chuse them from experience, you will find very few there that have had any trial, as not many have been in the field; and of those few, there are hardly any that have given the least mark of worth, or deserve to be preferred to others; so that whoever wants to raise men in this country can have no assistance from experience, but must depend wholly upon conjecture. Since this is the case, I should be glad to know what I am to do, and by what rules I must make my choice of a certain number, if twenty well-looking young fellows should be brought before me. Surely every body must allow, that it would be the best way to arm and exercise them all (since it will be impossible to judge at first sight which of them will make the best proof) and defer your choice till they have all had the same exercise and instruction: for then you will easily perceive which of them are most spirited and active, and likely to be the most serviceable. Upon the whole therefore, the maxim of chusing but few, that they may be so much the better, is ​simple and ill grounded. As to a large number being troublesome and inconvenient, both to the country and the men themselves, I answer that no number of such men, whether small or great can be troublesome or inconvenient to any one; for no body is hindered by being a Militia-man from pursuing his usual occupation, or following his necessary affairs; since they are only obliged to meet together, and to be exercised on holidays, which can be of no prejudice either to the country or themselves; on the contrary, it would be a great recreation to both: for young men instead of being idle at those times, or perhaps spending their leisure in something worse than idleness, would go to these exercises with pleasure, and others would not be a little entertained with such a spectacle. In answer to the objection, that a small number may be better paid, and consequently will be better satisfied and more obedient to command, let it be considered that no number of Militia (how small soever) can be kept in continual pay in such a manner as to be always satisfied with it. Let us suppose (for example) a Militia to consist of five thousand men, whose, pay (if they are to be paid to their satisfaction) will amount to at least ten thousand ducats per month. But in the first place, five thousand foot are not sufficient to make up an army; and in the next, a monthly payment of ten thousand ducats would be an insupportable burden upon most States, and yet not enough to keep their Soldiers in content and obedience: so that though the expence would be extravagant, your army would be so inconsiderable that it would not be able to defend your own dominions, much less to act offensively upon occasion. If you increase their pay or their number, it will still be more difficult to pay them: and if you diminish either, they will become dissatisfied and unserviceable. Those who talk of raising a Militia therefore, and of paying them when they have no​thing for them to do, talk of things that are either impossible, or will answer no end: but it is highly necessary, I own, to pay them, and well too, when they are called out to serve their country. If such an Establishment however should happen to occasion any little inconvenience to the Community in time of peace, (which yet can hardly be) surely that must be much over balanced by the conveniences and advantages which result from it: for without a regular and well-ordered Militia there is no living in security. I conclude then, that those who are for keeping up but a small Militia, that so they may be able to pay them the better, or for any other of the reasons you have alleged, are greatly mistaken: for (which makes still more for my opinion) any number, be it ever so considerable, will be continually diminishing upon your hands through many unavoidable accidents; and therefore a small one would soon dwindle away to nothing. Besides, when your Militia is numerous, you may employ a considerable force at once, if you see occasion; which must always have a greater effect than a small one, and be much more for your reputation. I might add, that if you raise but a small number of Militia in a large country, and design to have them well exercised, they must of course be at such a distance from each other, that they cannot all be got together upon the days and at the places appointed for that purpose, without great trouble and inconvenience: and if they ate not duly exercised they will be good for nothing at all, as I shall shew in its proper place.
Cosimo. You have fully refuted the objections I started upon this head, I must confess: but I have another doubt within myself which I should be glad to have solved. The persons I mentioned before seem to think, that a great number of armed men must naturally occasion much confusion and disorder, and frequently tumults in any country.
​Fabrizio. This notion is altogether as ill grounded as those which have been already discussed, as I hope I shall be able to convince you. For if a Militia can occasion any disorders, it must either be amongst themselves or others; which may easily be prevented, if such an Establishment is not so badly constituted and regulated as to defeat the end of its institution. For if it is properly conducted, it naturally suppresses all disturbances amongst its own constituents, instead of fomenting them; because they are under the command of superiors: and if the inhabitants of the country where you raise a Militia are either so little used to war that they are in a manner unarmed, or so united amongst themselves, that they have no factions, it will secure them against the fear of foreign enemies, but cannot in any wise contribute to divide them. For men who are well disciplined will always be as tender of violating the laws when they have arms in their hands, as when they have not; and will continue so if they are not corrupted by their Commanders; which it will be no difficult matter to prevent, as I shall shew you presently. But if the people are warlike and yet given to faction, such an establishment is most likely to re-unite them: because, though they may have arms and Chiefs of their own; yet their arms are such as will be of no service to their country, and their Chiefs only serve to foment divisions and animosities, instead of promoting union and tranquility: whereas this institution furnishes them with arms that will be serviceable to their country, and Chiefs to suppress their differences. For when any man thinks himself injured or offended in a divided country, he immediately applies to the Head of his faction, who, in order to keep up his own interest and reputation, is obliged to assist him in taking revenge, instead of discouraging violence. But a Chief appointed by public authority acts in a quite different manner: so that by establishing a good and well ordered Militia, divi​sions are extinguished, peace restored, those people that were unarmed and dispirited, but united, continue in union and become warlike and courageous; others that were brave and had arms in their hands, but given to faction and discord before, become united, and turn those arms and that courage upon the enemies of their country, which they formerly used to exert against each other. But to prevent a Militia from injuring others, or overturning the laws and liberties of their country (which yet cannot be effected but by the power and iniquity of the Commanders) it is necessary to take care that the Commanders do not acquire too great an authority over the private men. Now authority of this kind is either natural or accidental: to guard against the one, it should be provided that an Officer should not have any command over the men that were raised in the district where he was born: but over such only as were drawn out of other places where he has no natural interest or connections: as to the other, it may in a great measure be prevented by changing the Officers, and sending them to command in different parts every year: for a long continuation of command over the same people is apt to create too strict an union betwixt them, which may easily be converted to the prejudice of the Government. How serviceable this method has been to those that have followed it, and how fatal the neglect of it to others, plainly appears from the Histories of the Assyrian and Roman Empires where we find that the former continued above a thousand years without any sedition or civil war; which was entirely owing to the custom which the Government observed of changing the Commanders of their armies every year, and sending them into different Provinces. On the contrary, the omission of this custom in the Roman Empire, (from the time of Julius Cæsar) was the occasion of all the civil wars betwixt the Commanders of ​different armies, and of all the conspiracies which those Commanders afterwards formed against the Emperors. But if any of the first Emperors (especially of those that were esteemed the best, as Adrian, Marcus Aurelius, Severus, or some others like them) had been provident enough to have changed their Generals at certain times, that Empire would have enjoyed more tranquility and existed longer: for then those Commanders could not have had an opportunity of rebelling, the Emperors would have lived in greater security, and the Senate (when the throne became vacant) would have had more authority, and consequently have acted with more judgment in the choice of a Successor. But (whether it proceeds from ignorance, or inattention, or indolence in mankind, I know not) it is certain that bad customs are seldom changed, let who will be at the helm, or what example soever may be brought either to discredit them, or recommend an opposite measure.
Cosimo. I am afraid I have broke in upon the order you proposed to yourself, and led you away from your subject, by asking impertinent questions; for behold from talking of Levies we are got to another topic: so that if I had not desired you would excuse my freedom when we began this conversation, I should have thought myself obliged to ask your pardon for it.
Fabrizio. You need not make any apology for that, Sir, since what has been said is nothing more than was necessary to shew the nature of a Militia: an institution which (as it is condemned by many) I have taken upon me to defend and explain; and therefore it behoved me to point out the best manner of raising one. But before I descend to other particulars, I should say something concerning the choice of Cavalry. These troops were anciently chosen from amongst the richest Citizens (with due regard, however, to their age and other qualifica​tions) and there were but three hundred of them in a legion: so that the Romans never had above six hundred horse in a Consular army.
Cosimo. Would you have these troops likewise trained up and disciplined at home, in order to employ them upon occasion?
Fabrizio. Most certainly; and it is absolutely necessary to do so, if you would have Cavalry of your own, and not be obliged to take up with those that make a trade of hiring themselves out to any body that wants them.
Cosimo. In what manner would you chuse them?
Fabrizio. As the Romans did. I would take them out of the richest of the people; I would officer them as others are officered at present: I would have them well-armed, well-exercised, and disciplined.
Cosimo. Would it be proper to allow them any pay?
Fabrizio. To be sure: but as much only as would be sufficient to keep their horses: for if you gave them any more, it would be so burdensome to your Subjects that they would murmur at it.
Cosimo. What number would you have; and how would you arm them?
Fabrizio. That is another matter: but I will answer your question after I have told you how the Infantry ought to be armed and prepared for the field.
THE END OF THE FIRST BOOK.
* ↑ See the History of Florence, passim.
* ↑ See Polit. Disc. book III. chap. xxii.
* ↑ See the History of Florence, book 1. Towards the end.
* ↑ See Politic. Disc. book III. chap. xxv.
* ↑ See the Prince, Chap. xii. xiii. xiv. and Pol. Disc. Book I. Chap. xxi.