# An Antidote Against Atheism/Appendix/Chapter XI

Chap. XI.
1. That Subtilty is not inconsistent with the strongest Truth. 2. That the subordinate serviceableness of things in the world is in the things themselves, not merely in our Phansy. 3. That the difficulty of obtaining such serviceable commodities is rather an Argument for Providence then against it. 4. That Beauty is no necessary Result from the mere Motion of the Matter. 5. That it is an intellectual Object, not taken notice of by Brutes. 6. That the preying of Animals one upon another is very well confident with the Goodness of the First Cause. 7. As also the Creation of offensive Animals, there being curbs & correctives to their increase. 8. That the immediate Matter of the Fœtus is homogental. 9. That the notion of the Archei or Seminal forms is no such intricate Speculation.
1. We have now gone through all the Objections against the First Book of our Antidote; whereat if the more coursely complexioned, that they may still seem to have something further to object, shall scoffingly cavil, as if we had used over-much subtilty in the management of our Arguments, I can onely advertise them of this. That Subtilty is as consistent with Truth as the most grosse Theories; as is manifest in manifold Mathematical Speculations, then which there is nothing more certain nor undeniable to the reason of Man. But that the coherence of Notions that are subtile in themselves should be as easily plain and conspicuous as the broad Objects of Sense, is a very incongruous conceit, and can be the expedation of none but those that are utterly unskilfull in the nature of such like contemplations.
But the defence of our Second Book will be not onely more short, but, lesse obscure, our Arguments therefor the most part being such that even the unlearned can judge of them, and few of them but so evidently convictive that there can be nothing materiall alledged against them. But such Objections as there are I shall briefly set down and answer.
2. And the first is made against our reasoning for Providence from the excellent Usefulness of Stones, Timber, Metalls, the Magnet, &c. For those long and subordinate concatenations of instrumental serviceableness of such things, say they, is but our fancy, no designe of any First Cause. And how easy a thing is it for the wit of Man to bring things together that are of a distant nature in themselves, and to imagine many Series of means and ends in matters that have do dependence one of another but what himself makes, But I answer, that the severall Usefull dependences of sundry matters of this kind we onely find them, not make them. For whether we think of it or no, it is for example manifest that Fewell is good to continue Fire, and Fire to melt Metalls, and Metalls to make ' ​instruments, to build ships or houses, and so on. Wherefore it being true that there is such a subordinate Usefulness in the things themselves that are made to our hand, it is but reason in as to impute it to such a Cause as was aware of the Usefulness and Serviceableness of its own works.
5. Nor are We to cavil because these Useful things, such as Stones, Metalls, Coals, and the like, are to be had with so much labour, whenas men were better released from all such drudgery, that they may have the more time to contemplate the World, and seek after God, and exercise those better Faculties of the humane Nature: For we see plainly that the lapsed condition of Man is such, that Idleness is no spur to Vertue or Piety, but rather a Nurse to all beastliness and Sensuality. Besides that few mens Minds are of so Speculative a temper that they can with any great pleasure attend such meditations as will prove worth their leaving of a more Pradicall and laborious life, which does not exclude men from being pious and honest, as certainly no Calling at all does. Wherefore that to the generality of men all Useful things come hardly, is indeed rather an Argument of Providence, and that that Cause that framed the Earth knew well aforehand what the disposition of the terrestriall Man would be.
4. The second Objection is against our Argument from the Beauty of Plants, which I contend to have its first original from an Intellectual Cause, Beauty it self being such an Intellectual Object. But to this are objected two things. First, that Beauty is a necessary result of the mere motion of the Matter. Secondly, that it is no intellectual Object, sith Women and Children seem to be more taken with it then Men, and Brutes as well as either.
The former they will prove thus; That Colour, which is one part of Beauty, is the result of mere Matter, is, say they, plain from the Rain-bow, which is assuredly such a mere natural result: And for Symmetry, which is the other part of Beauty, and in Plants consists in their leaves and branches parallely answering one another, as also the several parts of the same leaf; there is, say they, a kind of Natural necessity that there should be such an uniform correspondency as this in these branches and leaves, because the nourishment must follow the tract of the Vessels of the Seed, which being regular in their first conformation, the branches and leaves which sprout out must also be regular. Now this regular con- formation of the Seed came from the uniform motion of particles in the Mother-plant; and lastly, the first Mother-plant of any kind from the regular motion of the Matter.
But I answer, That though the Positure as well as the Colours themselves of the Rain-bow be necessary results of the mere Matter, and are nothing but the Reflexion and Refraction of the light of the Sun in the round drops of a rorid cloud, as Cartesius has admirably demonstrated; and that there is nothing at all further required hereunto saving the position of our Eyes in a line drawn from the Sun, and continued to this rorid cloud spred out so that the coloured circle may have for its Radius either about forty two or fifty one degrees, for then this Effect will necessarily follow; and if this rorid cloud extend it self so far every way, that there ​will be at fifty one degrees distance from the aforesaid line, as well as at fourty two, this dewy temper of the Aire, there will necessarily appear two Rain-bows at once, as has been frequently seen, and so, I confess, some things being put, the Colours of Flowers will be a necessary result of the Matter in such a motion or posture: Yet for all this, the variety of the placing of these Colours of Flowers cannot but shew that it is a thing either fortuitous or arbitrarious; but being that they ever some way gratifie the beholder, it is a signe that it is not fortuitous, and therefore it must be arbitrarious, and from some Counsel that contriv'd them thus.
But that I insist upon most and contend to proceed from an Intellectual principle is their Symmetry, against which the Objection seems very invalid, the reason of it being thus, as you plainly see. That the regular Motion of the Matter made the first Plant of every kinde: for we demand. What regulated the Motion of it so as to guide it to form it self into such a state that at last it appears a very pleasant Intellectual spectacle, and exceeding hard (if not impossible) to be hit upon without some other Director distinct from the blinde Matter? As a man will easily believe, if he do not think so much upon the Trunks and Branches of Trees (whose shooting out of the ground, and then having arms again shooting out of the trunk and branching themselves into a many subdivisions, is not so difficult to conceive) as upon their Blossoms, Fruits, and Leaves. As in the Leaf of the Oak and of Holly, and abundance of leaves of Herbs & their Flowers, as in Monks-hood, Snap-dragon, sundry sorts of Flie- flowers, as the Flie-flower properly so called, the Butterflie-Satyrion, the Gnat-Satyrion, to which adde the Wasp-Orchis, the Bee-flower, and the like. The Matter could never have hit upon such hard and yet regular shapes, had it not been regulated by something besides it self; the concinnity of which figures gratifying us that are Rational, we ought in all reason to conclude that they came from a Principle Intellectual.
5. But it was objected in the second place, That Beauty is no Intellectual Object, because Women and Children are more taken with it then Men, and Beasts as well as either. To which I answer. That Children are not so much taken with the Symmetry as the gayness of colours in things that are counted beautiful, as Larks are mightily pleased at the shining of the Glass the Lark-catcher exposes to their view. But if they can also discover a want of Symmetry and correspondency, as supposing a Flower which has some leaves cropt off, that Spirit which is in them being Intellectual, it is not at all unreasonable it should exercise it self upon such easy Objects as these betimes. But that They or Women are taken more with outward beauty then Men, is because Men imploy their Intellectuals about harder tasks, and so cannot minde these smaller matters. Otherwise there is no question but if they could be idle from other imployments, they would be as devout admirers of beauty as Women themselves, and be as well pleased with theirs, if they have any, as they them-selves are with it.
But as for Brutes, I deny that they have any sense of so noble an ​Object as Beauty is, or take any notice of the chief requisite in it, which is Symmetrie and concinnity of parts, or of any order of colours, but only of the colours themselves. And it is no wonder that as the sight of red stockings will inflame the Spirits of a Turky-cock with anger, as also the sight of the blood of grapes or mulberries provoke the Elephant to fight; so other fresh colours of sundry sorts may please and exhilarate the spirits of several Animals, as Light does of most. And therefore if the Horse prance and carry himself proudly when he has gay and glittering furniture, it is from no other reason then what we have already declared. And if a Dog bark at a ragged Beggar more then at a handsomly-clad Gentleman, it is to be inquired into, whether a Beggar's Curre will not bark more at a Gentleman then at a Beggar, the sense of Beauty neither pleasing nor provoking this Animal, but the unusualness of the Object stirring up his choler. And that Birds prune their feathers, is not any delight in decency and comeliness, but to rid themselves of that more uncouth and harsh sense they feel in their skins by the incomposure of their ruffled plumes. So for the choice of their Mates in either Birds or Beasts for copulation, it is very hard to prove that they are guided so much by sight as scent; and then if by sight, whether it he not colour rather then exact symmetry of parts that moves them.
And lastly, if we should admit at any time that Brutes may be more pleased with a beautiful Object (taking Beauty in the entire Notion thereof) then with one less beautiful, it is but a confused delight, nor do they any more relish it as Intellectual, then Children (that are ordinarily well pleased to see Geometrical instruments that are made of Brass or Ivory or such like materials) do the exact cuttings and carvings of the characters and lines thereof as they are rational and Mathematical. And therefore we may very well conclude, that the Beauty of bodies is naturally intended no more for Brutes then such Mathematical instruments for Children: but all such objects are directed to Creatures Intellectual from that Eternal Intellectual Principle that made them.
6. The third Objection is against Animals preying one upon another, and Man upon them all. For this, say they, is inconsistent with that Eternal Goodness that we profess to have created and ordered all things. To which I answer, That it is not at all inconsistent: For the nature of that Absolute Universal and Eternal Goodness is not to dote upon any one particular, as we do (whose complexions haply may make us more then ordinarily compassionate (though most men have too little of that natural Benignity) and whose short sight plungeth us too much into the sense of what is present) but taking a full and free view of the capacities of Happiness in such kinde of Creatures, contriv'd their condition to be such as was best for the generality of them, though the necessity and incompossibility of things would be sure to load some particular Creatures with greater inconveniency then the rest.
And therefore that several kindes of terrestrial Creatures more exactly might be happy in their animal nature, this Soveraign Goodness was content to let it be so, that ever and anon something that by the Animal sense would be necessarily accounted Tragical and miserable should light upon ​some few; the Species of things in the meantime being still copiously enough preserved, and marching on safely in this Theatre of the World in their several successions.
Now it is evident that the main powers of the Animal life are natural craft, strength and activity of body, and that any purchace by these is far more pleasant to a living Creature then what easily comes without them. Wherefore what can be more grateful to a terrestrial Animal, then to hunt his prey and to obtain it? But all kindes of Creatures are not capable of this special happiness. Some therefore are made to feed on the fruits of the Earth, that they may thus not only enjoy themselves, but occasionally afford game and food to other Creatures. In which notwithstanding the Wisdome of God as well as his Goodness is manifest, in that while they are thus a sport and prey to others, yet they are abundantly preserved in their several generations. But I have so fully and methodically treated of all such scruples against Providence in my Enquiry into the Causes and Occasions of Atheism, that we will content our selves with this short intimation of an Answer in this place.
Onely we will adde, That if the Souls of Brutes prove immortal (which the best of Philosophers have not been averse from) the Tragedy is still lesse horrid: but yet that ought not to animate us causlesly and petulantly to dislodge them, because we know not how long it will be till they have an opportunity to frame to themselves other Bodies; and the intervall of time betwixt is as to them a perfect death, wherein they have not the sense nor injoyment of any thing. And for my own part, I think that he that slights the life or welfare of a brute Creature, is naturally sounjust, that if outward Laws did not restrain him, he would be as cruel to Man.
7. The fourth Objection is against our Argument for Divine Providence drawn from the consideration of that happy Mitigation of the trouble and offensiveness of some Animals by others that bear an enmity to them, and feed upon them as their prey, as the Cat for example does on the Mouse. Now, say they, it were a more exact sign of Providence if there were no such offensive Creatures in the world to trouble us, then to bring on the trouble by making these Animals, and then to take it off again by making others to correct the mischief that would follow.
But no man would argue thus if it were not that he had over-carelesly taken up this false Principle, That the World was made for Man alone, whenas assuredly the Blessed and Benigne Maker of all things intended that other living Creatures should enjoy themselves as well as Men, which they could not if they had no Existence: Therefore Providence is more exact, in that she can thus spread out her Goodness further, even to the injoyments of the more inferiour ranks of Creatures, without any considerable inconvenience to the more noble and superior.
Besides, all these Creatures that are thus a prey to others are their sport and sustenance, and so pleasure others by their death, as well as enjoy themselves while they are yet in life and free from their enemy. To say nothing how they are both in some sort or other useful to man himself, and therefore sometimes would be missed if they were wanting.
​8. The fifth and last Objection is against our concluding a Substance distinct from Body, from the Homogeneity of that immediate Crystalline Matter out of which the Fœtus is efformed, suppose in an Egge, the same being also observable in other generations. To avoid the force of which Argument, it is denied that there is any such Homogeneity of parts, but that there are several Heterogeneal particles, though to us invisible which being put upon Motion by the heat of the Hen or some equivalent warmth, like particles will be driven to their like, and so the Chicken will be efformed: But that to acknowledge any other Archeus, brings inextricable difficulties along with it. For where, say they, were all the Archei which shap'd the Wasps out of an Horse's Carcase? Are they parts of the Horse's Soul, or new intruding guests upon the old ones being ejected? If the former, then the Soul of an Horse is divisible, and consequently material, or, if you will, truly Matter: If the latter, where were those little Intruders before? Or be they so many sprigs or branches of the common Soul of the world? But if so, why have they not one common sense of pain and pleasure amongst them all? But to all these I answer in order.
And to the first part of this Objection I say, That it cannot but be a very strong presumption, that Nature intends an utter Homogeneity of Matter before she fall upon her work of efformation, she so constantly bringing it to as perfect Homogeneity as we can possibly discern with our Senses. And there being no conceivable convenience at all in the Heterogeneity of parts, I think the conclusion is not rash, if we averre that the immediate matter of efformation of the Fœtus is either accurately Homogeneal, or if there be any Heterogeneity of parts in it, that it is onely by accident; and that it makes no more to the first work of efformation or organization of the Matter, then those Atomes of dust that light on the limners colours make to the better drawing of the picture. For to say that those sundry sorts of particles put upon motion by external warmth do gather together by virtue of similitude one with another, is to avouch a thing without any ground at all, against all grounds of Reason.
For what can this Similitude of Parts consist in, if not either in the likeness of figure, or in the equality of agitation or magnitude? Now Bodies of the like figure being put upon motion, will not direst their courses one towards another any thing the more for being alike in shape. Indeed Bodies of like figure of equal agitation and magnitude in a confused agitation may very likely goe together, as we see done (where yet we cannot promise our selves so exact similitude of the particles in their figure) in the thinner Spirits of distilled liquors, that all mount upward; in the Tartarous parts of wine, that are driven outward to the sides of the vessel, in the feculency of urine, that sinks to the bottom of the glass; in the subsidency of this dreggish part of the world, the Earth, if it may so properly be said to subside and be at the bottom, as in the midst of the more refined and subtile Elements. And so in like manner the Fermentation of the matter which precedes the efformation of Creatures may haply arrive to some such rude effect as is seen in the forenamed instances: but it can never amount to such an artificial contrivance of Organs as are in living Creatures.
​But if by Likenesse of Parts they mean onely fitnesse of Parts for figure and motion, they both being so framed and moderated, that upon external warmth their agitation will necessarily cast them to lock one with another, and to be linked into this admirable and useful frame of the body of an Animal; that Artifice would be so particularly nice and curious, that it is utterly unconceiveable but that it must imply either the attendance, or at least first contrivance, of a Knowing Principle, that put the Matter into so wonderful an order, as to be able by such precise laws of Figure and Motion to exhibite so noble Objects to our Sense and Understandings: And thus our Adversaries will gain nothing by this supposal.
But though this may seem barely possible, yet I conceive it is very improbable that such an infinite number of particles that must concur to make up a Fœtus, should have such a particular figuring and law of Motion impress'd upon each of them, as to enable it to take its right station or posture in the structure of a living Creature. ** See my Treatise of the Immortality of the Soul, Book 3. Ch. 12, and 13. For methinks this is going about the bush, whenas the more compendious way would be to make some Immaterial Substance, such as are conceived to be the Seminal Forms of Plants and Animals, or the Archei, as others call them. For this Form or Archeus is a thing more simple and plain, and requires a more simple and plain qualification of the subject it works upon, to wit, that it be onely homogeneal, and ductile, or yielding to the tender assaults of that Substantial power of life that resides in it.
9. Nor is this opinion of the Archei or Seminal Formes intangled in any such difficulties, but may be easily answered.
For as for those many pretended intricacies in the instance of the efformation of Wasps out of the Carcase of a Horse, I say, the Archei that framed them are no parts of the Horse's Soul that is dead, but several distinct Archei that do as naturally joyn with the Matter of his body so putrefied and prepared, as the Crowes come to eat his flesh.
But you demand where these Archei were before. To which I answer, Can there want room for so small pieces of Spirituality in so vast a compass as the comprehension of the Universe? I shall rather reply, Where were they not? the World of life being excluded out of no place, and the sundry sorts of Souls being as plentiful and as obvious there, as those Magnetick particles are in this corporeal world; and you can scarce place your Loadstone and Iron any where, but you will finde their presence by the sensible effects of them: Or if you will have a grosser comparison, they are as cheap and common as dust flying in the Aire in a dry and windy Summer.
To the last puzzle propounded, whether these Archei be so many sprigs of the common Soul of the world, or particular subsistences of themselves; there is no great inconvenience in acknowledging that it may be either way. For it does not follow that if they be so many branches or distinct ** This is the usual phrase of the Ancients, but how farre justifiable, see Immortal. Book 3. ch. 16. sect. 8. rayes of the great Soul of the world, that therefore they are that very Soul it self; and if they be not, they may have their pleasures and pains apart distinct from one another: And what is pleasure and pain to them, may haply be neither to their Original, moving her no more then the chirping of a Cricket does those that are attentive to a full ​Consort of loud Musick, or the biting of a Flea does a man tortured on a Rack.
But suppose we say,They are so many Substances as independent on the Soul of the world as the Matter it self is (though all depend on God) there is no difficulty at all nor inconvenience in that position; nor need we trouble our selves where they are, or what becomes of them then, either before they actuate this or that part of the Matter, or after they have done actuating the same, no more then of the parts of the Matter actuated by them. For as every particle of the Matter is safely kept within the compass of the corporeall world, whether it be acted upon by any Soul or Archeus or not; so every Archeus or Soul is as safe in the World of life, and as secure from being exterminated out of the comprehension of Immaterial Beings, whether it act upon any part of the material world or no. For Substance, be it of what nature it will, it cannot perish without a Miracle. And why God should annihilate that which in succession of Time may again have opportunity to act its part, and prove serviceable to the world, no man, I think, can excogitate any Reason.