# The War with Mexico/Volume 2/Notes On Chapter 28

XXVIII. MOLINO DEL REY, CHAPULTEPEC, MEXICO
1. Hardcastle's map (Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 312) and (as elsewhere) the author's observations. So. Qtrly. Rev., Oct., 1852. Negrete, Invasión, iv, app., 295-6. Balbontín, Invasión, 126. Grant, Mems., i, 149. 66J. L. Mason to J. L. Smith, Sept. 25. 66Stevens to Smith, Sept. 25. Semmes, Service, 436, 440. Apuntes, 290-1. Picayune, Aug. 8. Delta, Oct. 14. Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 355 (Scott), 373 (Sumner), 425-6 (Smith). Wise, Gringos (N. Y., 1849), 259. 269Molina, recolls.
The foundry was decreed in July, 1846 (76report on artillery, Nov., 1846; Memoria de . . . Guerra, Dec.). The building it occupied had been a powder mill. The principal entrance to El Molino was by an archway near the south end. Sept. 5 Scott heard that bells had been sent to El Molino to be cast into cannon (Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 355). Santa Anna did in fact call for gifts of bells, etc. to be used for military purposes (76Carrera, Sept. 6).
2. Sen. 52; 30, 1, pp. 381-2 (S. Anna to Scott, Sept. 6). 76To Herrera, Sept. 6. 100Guerra, circular, Sept. 11. Apuntes, 290-2. S. Anna, Mi Historia, 75. Id., Detall, 23. 76Acuerdo, Sept. 4. Giménez, Memorias, 266. 76Alvarez to S. Anna, Sept. 25. Negrete, Invasión, iv, app., 293. Balbontín, Invasión, 125-6. Grant, Mems., i, 151. Mason to Smith: note 1. 76Alvarez, Sept. 6. Sen. 1; 30, 1, app., 184-5 (Dunean). Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos, 424.
3. Ramírez, México, 299. 73Lozano, nos. 2, 8, res., 1847. 199Anon. MS. Kenly, Md. Vol., 346. 8S. Anna, Apelación, 49. Giménez, Memorias, 111. 358Williams to father, Oct. 1. Exposición dirigida. 179 Diario Esactísimo. Negrete, Invasión, iv, app., 295-6. 100Alcorta, circular, Sept. 11. 76Tornel, decree, Sept. 7.
4. Smith, Co. A, Corps of Engineers. 221Hill, diary. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 296. 260Henshaw, comments on map. 217Id. to wife, Sept. 13. 65Scott, gen. orders, Sept. 7. Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 354 (Scott), 361 (Worth), 425 (Smith). 178Davis, diary. Sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 298 (Scott). Mason to Smith: note 1. 66Foster to Smith, Sept.8. 66Beauregard to Smith, Sept. 20. 224Hitchcock, introd. to intercepted letters. So. Qtrly. Rev., Oct., 1852, 302. Semmes, Service, 431-4.
Under Scott's orders, Pillow with the Ninth and Fifteenth Infantry ​was at S. Borja and Riley's brigade (Twiggs's division) at Nalvarte on Sept. .7, evening (Ripley, War with Mexico, ii, 363). Late on Sept. 7 Quitman's division also was sent to the south front of Mexico. Reconnoitring was done there on rather an extensive scale during the night, and the Mexicans were thoroughly roused.
5. The battle of Sept. 8. Sen.1; 30,1, pp. 354, 375 (Scott), 361 (Worth), 368 (return), 373 (Sumner), 374 (Huger), 425 (Smith), 430 (Hitchcock); app., pp. 1384-165, 192 (officers). Ho. 1; 30, 2, p. 1287 (Perry). 179 Diario Esactísimo. Stevens, Stevens, 1, 204-7. Sedgwick, Corresp., i, 170. Semi-weekly N. Y. Courier and Enquirer, Mar. 1, 1848. Elderkin, Biog. Sketches. So. Qtrly. Rev., Oct., 1852, 298-315. Negrete, Invasión, iii, app., 463-9; iv, app., 295-9. S. Anna, Detall, 23-5. Balbontín, Invasión, 125-9. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 296-9, 303. Grant, Wems., i, 152-8. Ballentine, Eng. Sold., ii, 238, 240. 217Henshaw to wife, Sept. 18. 218Henshaw narrative. 61Letter from Mexico, Sept. 11. 69May to Harney, Nov. 17, 1848. 69Steele to Harney,——, 1848. 69Harney to Marcy, May 22, 1848. 66Mason to J. L. Smith, Sept. 25, 1847. 66Stevens to Id., Sept. 25. 66G. W. Smith to Stevens, Sept. 20. Claiborne, Quitman, 1, 352. Raleigh Star, Oct. 27. 221Hill, diary. 304Kirby to Mrs. E. K. Smith, Sept. 12. 60Andrews to Daniel, Dec. 10. Louisville Democrat, Dec. 17. 68Testimony at Bonneville court martial. London Times, Nov. 13. Semmes, Service, 436-449. Sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 503. Apuntes, 210, 294-304. 100Relaciones, circular, Sept. 8. 199 Anon. MS. Correo Nacional, Dec. 10. Gamboa, Impug., 52. 70 "Guerra," no. 155 (testimony of Garay). 70"Guerra", no. 274 (testimony at the trial of Andrade and Jáuregui). Picayune, Oct. 14; Nov. 3. 350Weber, recolls. Delta, Oct. 14, 26. Ramírez, México, 304-6. México á través, iv, 687-9. Davis, Autobiog., 271. Wash. Union, Nov. 3. Diario, Sept. 8. 364Worth to daughter, Sept. 28; to S., Dec. 27. Prieto, Memorias, ii, 238-9. 73Lozano, no. 7, 1847. Moore, Scott's Camp., 155-63. Steele, Amer. Camps., i, 117. Niles, Oct. 30, p. 137. Bartlett, Pierce, 153. Wise, Gringos (N. Y., 1849), 259. Giménez, Memorias, 112, 266. 205Graham, memo. book. 178Davis, diary. Diccionario Univ. (León). Sen. 19; 30, 2 (M. L. Smith, Nov. 30, 1848). Molina, El Asalto. 291Pierce to Hooker, Sept. 15. Stevens, Vindication. 328 Sweet, statement. 69Huger, Sept. 9. Lawton, Artill. Off., 311-4, 323, 326. Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos, 426-7, 437-9, 447-53. 76Herrera to Relaciones, Oct. 14. 76Ortega, Sept. 13. 76To comte gen. Mex., Oct. 29. 76M. Andrade, Sept. 9; Nov. 3. 76J. Y. Gutiérrez, proclem., Sept. 11. 76Noriega, Nov. 19. 76Alcorta, circular, Sept. 11. 76Comte gen. Oaxaca, Sept. 15. 76Id. of Querétaro, Sept. 14. Calderón, Rectificaciones
Remarks on the battle of Sept. 8. In forming an opinion of the battle as a military operation one must ignore the fact that the position gained was used later as a stepping-stone, for at this time Scott was not planning to capture Chapultepec. It appears surprising that Scott, knowing that heavy Mexican forces were on the spot, apparently desiring to fight there, should have thought that a place as valuable to the enemy as he deemed El Molino (Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 355) ought to be attacked at night, and could be taken easily (Sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 579) by men unacquainted with ground and buildings familiar to the enemy, and should have neglected to have more of his troops near at hand; but we do not know what details were included in the information upon which he so confidently relied, nor do we ​know the source of it (ibid., 298). Pillow reported, apparently during the evening of September 7, that the cannon and machinery had been removed (ibid., 298, 579); no smoke appeared to issue from the mill; no sound of boring could be heard (Semmes, Service, 431). It has been suggested that Scott felt over-eager to punish Santa Anna for disappointing his expectations of peace; but he doubtless had learned from Trist of Santa Anna's political difficulties. He was, however, angry on account of the violations of the armistice. The principal information: on which Scott acted was understood to have come through Trist; it had been correct; but Scott seems to have erred in overlooking the chance that conditions might change in two or three days. Rives (U. S. and Mexico, ii, 528) states that the attack was based on a "rumor." This is an error. On account of the apparent incorrectness of Scott's information and the massing of Mexican troops in and near El Molino, some Americans suspected that Santa Anna set a trap for him. But the fact that Santa Anna left this quarter and took away a considerable part of his troops early in the night of Sept. 7 — leaving behind, according to Roa Bárcena (Recuerdos, 427) 4000 infantry and artillery privates — disposes of that idea. It has been said that Scott might have stopped work at the foundry (had work been then proceeding) by cutting off the supply of water (i.e., power); but he wished to seize the finished cannon supposed to be there (Sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 298) and the large quantity of powder that he had heard was at Casa Mata.
The only argument advanced in favor of a night attack seems to have been the danger of fire from Chapultepec. In reply it was said that (as had been seen at Cerro Gordo) a plunging fire did little harm. The distance of Chapultepec seems almost to nullify this reply; but as a matter of fact the cannon of Chapultepec appear to have done no execution in the battle. Worth's officers met him after dark, Sept. 7, and later one of them submitted his general plan of operations to Scott, who discussed it at considerable length and finally (virtually admitting that a night attack was not advisable) approved all of it except the following point. Worth strongly desired to effect a lodgement in the grove of Chapultepec, which he believed he could take at a cost of fifty men (364Worth to S., Dec. 27). (Indeed, he pushed some of his troops several hundred yards that way: Sen. 1; 30, 1, app., 188; Davis, Autobiog., 271). But Scott refused positively to have this done. Semmes (Service, 447) says that Worth desired to capture Chapultepec at this time because with his remarkable intuitive judgment he saw, as Scott saw later, that this was the true approach to the city; but Scott's later opinion was due to a study of the ground which neither he nor Worth had at this time been able to make and to Mexican fortifying not yet done. Even if Worth could have carried Chapultepec rather easily, the prudent maxim that one should not buy (because it can be got cheaply) what one does not want, appeared to apply with especial force after losses that could be so ill afforded had been suffered; and it was not certain that the castle could be taken without a struggle. One costly surprise was enough for one day. Engineer Stevens (Stevens, Stevens, i, 206) thought an attempt should have been made to reconnoitre the Mexican right with a view to turning the position; but to push a reconnoitring party between the Mexican right wing and the cavalry of Alvarez must have looked extremely hazardous.
Clarke's brigade consisted of the Fifth Sixth and Eighth Infantry, it will be recalled. Cadwalader had the Voltigeurs and Eleventh and ​Fourteenth Infantry. C. F. Smith being ill, his battalion was commanded by Captain E. K. Smith, who was mortally wounded. Semmes (Service, 445) says that Cadwalader's brigade and Drum's guns had been added at Worth's request, but Hitchcock (Fifty Years, 296) and Scott's general orders of Sept. 7 show that Scott originally intended to give Worth one of Pillow's brigades. Worth could no doubt have had more light guns, but it was said that projectiles for the heavy guns were so few that it was necessary-to husband them closely. Scott, however, stated (Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 377) that he had plenty of such ammunition. Ripley (op. cit., ii, 461) says that "the nature of the orders [given to Worth] forbade an attack by artillery"; but (1) there is no evidence to prove this; (2) artillery was used on Casa Mata, only not long enough; (8) it was used again later with success (Sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 527; Sen. 1; 30, 1, app., 136). See Stevens, Stevens, 206. Indeed, it seems to have been unnecessary to attack Casa Mata. It could not have held out long after the fall of El Molino. Ripley admits (p. 462) that the battle "was confused," but adds, "storming is always a work of confusion." Here he confounds occurrences with management. The former must involve noise and confusion in such an affair, but the latter should not.
Sumner had one troop of the First Dragoons, six troops of the Second, part of a troop of the Third, and a company of Mounted Rifles. Foster had ten pioneers. Drum had three guns, but one of them was sent out on the road to Mexico, and during the battle one of the others became disabled by the breaking of a priming wire. Semmes — determined, as usual, to defend Worth at all hazards — says that during McIntosh's charge Duncan's battery was called away to repel the Mexican cavalry; but Duncan's report (Sen. 1; 30, 1, app., 186) shows that his guns did not turn against the cavalry until masked by McIntosh's troops. The part of Cadwalader's brigade that moved to the left was the Voltigeurs. After the repulse of Clarke's brigade some of the Voltigeurs went into the ravine and moved toward the rear of Casa Mata. This perhaps helped to force the Mexicans out, and certainly resulted in the capture of many prisoners. Vigorous pursuit of the Mexicans was in general impracticable on account of the character of the ground and the fire from Chapultepec. Finding the engagement far more serious than he had expected, Scott summoned forces from the southern front of the city and from Mixcoac, but these could not arrive soon enough to give material assistance. Jackson's section of Magruder's battery came from Mixcoac in time to contribute a little to the final repulse of the Mexican cavalry. Worth blamed Scott for saying in his report that Pierce's brigade interposed between Garland and the Mexicans, and asserted that it did not arrive until] a considerable time after the battle ended (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1079); and it was felt by others, too, that Scott erred here. But from the 178diary of a man in the Ninth Infantry it seems clear that that regiment — a part of Pierce's brigade — did as Scott stated.
The number of Americans actually engaged was 3251 (Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 369). Our loss was 116 (including nine officers) killed, 665 (including forty-nine officers) wounded, and eighteen privates missing (ibid., 384). We captured 685, including 53 officers. One third of Clarke's brigade, including one half of the officers, were killed or wounded (Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 145). The Fifth Infantry seemed little more than a company after the battle (Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 297).
Santa Anna stated later (Mi Historia, 75) that Iturbe, a wealthy ​resident of Tacubaya, notified Tornel that Scott intended to enter the city during the night of Sept. 7 by the San Lázaro garita, on the eastern side of Mexico, and that for this reason he (Santa Anna) took troops away from El Molino; but Santa Anna always laid the blame for his mistakes upon some one. No doubt Scott's feint against the southern side of the city and his not attacking during the afternoon were enough to cause alarm, but Santa Anna blundered in going to the southeast corner of the city, for an American attack there must have developed slowly owing to the swamps, whereas an attack upon El Molino could be made quickly. He reached the scene of the battle at about half-past nine, and claimed that, but for his arrival, Chapultepec might have been lost (Apelación, app., 111). The government represented that he was in command during the battle (Apuntes, 304). By Scott's orders Casa Mata was blown up. The Mexicans believed that a shot of theirs exploded the magazine. Andrade was tried and acquitted. Had he been as much at fault as Alvarez alleged, the latter should have replaced him on the spot with another officer. About noon the Mexican cavalry (or at least Andrade's division) were ordered to charge, but on reaching the battlefield found the Americans had retired. It has been suggested (Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos, 448) that a part of the Mexican cavalry should have been dismounted and placed between El Molino and Casa Mata; but one may feel sure that Alvarez would not have consented to that arrangement. One hesitates to think what the results of the battle might have been, had not Santa Anna withdrawn previously with a considerable part of his troops; and of this movement Scott was not aware, though he may have hoped that his feint against the city would have an effect of that sort.
After the battle the American troops reoccupied in general the positions held by them before it.
6. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 297-9, 303. 224Id., introd. to intercepted letters. 217Henshaw to wife, Sept. 13. 73Lozano, no. 7, 1847. Raleigh Star, Oct. 27. 22lHill, diary. Semmes, Service, 447-9. London Times, Nov. 13. 76Ortega, Sept. 13. 100Guerra, circular, Sept. 11. 76J. Y. Gutiérrez, proclam., Sept. 11. Apuntes, 303-4. 199Anon. MS. Picayune, Oct. 14. Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 361 (Worth), 430 (Hitchcock); app., 156 (Cadwalader). Sen. 19; 30, 2 (Smith to Abert, Nov. 30, 1848). 69Huger, Sept. 9, 1847. Ho. 24; 31, 1. Sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 145 (Lee). Negrete, Invasión, iii, app., 468. N. Y. Tribune, Dec. 17, 1882 (Mayne Reid). S. Anna, Detail, 24. 70"Guerra", no. 273 (trial of Bravo). Stevens, Stevens, i, 206.
7. Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 375 (Scott) and map. 73Lozano, no. 7, 1847. Semmes, Service, 430. So. Qtrly. Rev., Jan., 1853, 2-3. Niles, Oct. 9, p. 89. 92Piedad judge, Sept. 9. Diccionario Universal (México). Robertson, Visit, ii, 344.
8. Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 376 (Scott), 425-7 (Smith). Sen. 65; 30, 1, pp. 77 (Lee), 185 (Ripley), 579 (Pillow says he reported to Scott on Sept. 9 that the Mexican works opposite Piedad, where Pillow then was, could be carried easily). Davis, Autobiog., 223. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 298-300. So. Qtrly. Rev., Jan., 1853, pp. 4-5. 66Lee to J. L. Smith, Sept. 15. 66Beauregard to Id., Sept. 20. 111Id. to Id., Sept. 27. 218Henshaw narrative. 76To Olaguíbel, Sept. 11.
Ripley (op. cit., ii, 470) and Rives (op. cit., ii, 528) reflect upon Scott for having no reconnaissances made between Aug. 20 and Sept. 7. But to make them would have violated the meaning and spirit of the armistice, ​which prescribed an "absolute cessation of hostilities": (Sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 310), and it was highly important to show the strictest good faith during the delicate negotiations. Rives (ibid.) says "no preparation whatever had been made for the contingency of renewed hostilities." This statement results from a lack of information. Numberless things had been done to put the army and its equipment into fighting trim. Rives says also (ibid.) that the Mexicans, had they been enterprising, could easily have beaten our army in detail at this time. This seems to be a mistake (see Sen. 19; 30, 2, p. 8). A frontal attack upon Worth could certainly have been repulsed, and an attempt to strike Pillow, Twiggs or Quitman would have exposed their own flank and rear. Moreover it was clear that Santa Anna had no intention of assuming the offensive. Rives says himself he had none (op. cit., 466), attributing his decision to "well-justified distrust of his own army"; and since the decision was made (July) nothing had occurred to reassure him. Napoleon said, "A well-established maxim of war is, not to do anything which your enemy desires."
9. Sen. 65; 30, 1, pp. 77-8, 145 (Lee), 81 (Cadwalader), 112-3 (Beauregard), 123 (Trist), 169 (Hooker). Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 375 (Scott), 427 (Smith). Exposición dirigida, 6. So. Qtrly. Rev., Jan., 1853, pp. 6-15. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 300. 113Beauregard, remins. 66Id. to J. L. Smith, Sept. 20. 111Id. to Id., Sept. 27. 69Letter of Sept. 11 from Mexico. Semmes, Service, 480. (Gunners) 76Carrera, report, Dec., 1847. (Key) Apuntes, 304, 317. Wash. Union, Dec.9. 210Alvord to Hammond, Feb. 24, 1848. Rodríguez, Breve Reseña, 870. Stevens, Stevens, i, 207.
Ripley (op. cit., 11, 472) remarks that even after taking Chapultepec Scott was "yet at a distance of two miles from the city, with the positive certainty of running upon the citadel if the direct route were pursued." But two miles on a broad, good causeway signified little, it was unnecessary to take the direct route, and Scott had no intention of taking it. Ripley admits (p. 473) that Scott reasonably supposed that the defences at 8. Cosme were comparatively weak.
10. Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 428 (Smith). Sen. 65; 30, 1, pp. 77 (Lee), 112 (Beauregard), 169 (Hooker), 257 (Quitman). 113Beauregard, remins. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 300. Claiborne, Quitman, i, 353-5. The description of Lee is based principally upon a picture (seen at the Confederate Museum, Richmond) made soon after the Mexican war. The weather was still unusually favorable for military operations.
11. Negrete, Invasión, iv, app., 294-6. Evidence at the trial of Bravo (70"Guerra," no. 273). S. Anna, Detall, 22. 76To Monterde, May 24. 76Monterde, June 18, 21-2. 76To Lombardini, July 6, 23; Aug. 3. 76Tornel, Sept. 12. 76To Bravo, Sept. 10. 76Bravo, Sept. 14. 76 Liceaga to Lombardini, Aug. 22. 76Reports on Bravo's conduct, July 21, 24, 1848. Apuntes, 317. Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos, 459.
12. Sen. 1; 30, 1, map; pp. 400 (Pillow), 410 (Quitman). 76Bravo, Sept. 14. Negrete, Inv., iv, app., 294-6. Semmes, Service, 450-1. Tornel, Sept. 12. To Bravo, Sept. 10. Apuntes, 307-8. 357Wilcox, diary. 70Evidence at the trial of Bravo ("Guerra," no. 273). Ripley, War with Mexico, ii, 396-8. (Impreg.) 221Hill, diary. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 285, 302.
The southeastern corner of the rectangle was irregularly cut off. A bullet-proof wall, about fifteen feet high, protected the eastern end, and ran along the southern line of the rectangle with platforms or scaffolds for infantry on its inner side, while a stone aqueduct — its arches filled ​in here with heavy masonry extended (in the Anzures causeway) along the northern side of the rectangle, and continued via S. Cosme to the city. Cultivated fields, adjacent to El Molino, occupied about a third of the rectangle. On each side of the north-and-south drainage ditch there was an embankment. The next section perhaps one sixth of the rectangle was occupied by the swamps and cypresses, and then came the hill extremely steep except at the west, and steep there. A road or wide path led east through the grove to the foot of the hill. The opening in the south wall, covered by the exterior, unarmed redan (B), had a ditch outside of the redan for additional protection. The road that went up to the college was defended inside the main gateway with a 9-pounder (placed here Sept. 12). The circular (arc of a circle) redoubt (C) was at the glorieta (an open space furnished with seats, etc.). One or two other slight fortifications probably existed.
The south wall of the terre-plein had a parapet except near the southeast corner. Along the base of the west wall ran a fosse about twelve feet wide and ten deep. Rather extensive mines (to be fired by powder-trains laid on or just under the surface of the ground) lay below the fosse; and beyond them about half-way down the slope stood a redan (E) for some fifty men, which seems to have been about 125 feet from the wall. This west wall was a priest-cap: i.e., it was indented like a shallow V, so that its two halves could afford support to each other. In the central portion of the terre-plein stood the masonry edifice of the military college with an open terrace at its eastern end and some stone buildings with flat, parapeted roofs, at its western end. A half-round bastion on each of the long sides afforded room for a heavy gun commanding in each case a semicircle. (The one in the southern bastion seems to have been disabled on Sept. 8.) East of the southern bastion, in a smaller projection stood a lighter gun looking toward the lower gateway; behind the somewhat zigzag parapet westward two or three smaller pieces covering the road and the southwest approach; on the terre-plein commanding the upper gateway a couple of light howitzers; and at the western end, specially screened with timber and sand-bags, two heavy pieces, which swept the approach from El Molino. (One of the pieces was a 68-pound howitzer. Ripley is precise in his account of the size and the placing of the guns, but the evidence is against him. He says there were eleven. There seem to have been thirteen; but one of them was not mounted, and two were now disabled.) Timbering, proof against bullets, covered much of the lower story, the parapeted azotea of the main edifice and some other parts of the buildings; and sand-bags afforded further, though inadequate, protection at a number of peculiarly exposed points.
13. Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 377 (Scott), 397 (Twiggs), 399 (Riley), 400 (Pillow), 410 (Quitman), 422 (Huger); app., 197 (Pierce), 201 (Cadwalader), 230 (Porter). Sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 185 (Ripley). 260Henshaw, comments on map. 217Id. to wife, Sept. 13. 66Lee to J. L. Smith, Sept. 15. 66 McClellan to Smith, Sept. 20. 66Beauregard to Smith, Sept. 20. 111Id. to Id., Sept. 27. 304Andrews to Lovell, Sept. 19. 304Hunt to Id., Sept. 15. 304Steptoe to Id., Sept. 16. 304Porter to Id., Sept. 16. 304Wilcox, diary. Ramsey, Other Side, 457. 327Sutherland to father, Aug.——. 178Davis, diary. Negrete, Invasión, iii, app., 426. 76Carrera, Sept. 1.
14. Negrete Invasión, iv, app., 299-300. 6lLetter from Mex., Sept. 11. Apuntes, 305-6, 309-10, 314. Ramírez, México, 307-8. Diario, Sept. 11. 73Lozano, no. 7, 1847. S. Anna, Apelación, 57. Id., Detail, ​25. 76To Bravo, Sept. 10. 76Bravo, Sept. 11. 76Tornel to Carrera, Sept. 9. 92Ayunt. to S. Anna, Sept. 11. 92Letter from Piedad, Sept. 11. 199Anon. MS.
15. 76Bravo, Sept. 14. Negrete, Invasión, iii, app., 427; iv, app., 299-300. 179Diario Esactísimo. London Times, Nov. 13. S. Anna, Detall, 26. 76To comtes. gen. Querétaro and Guanajuato, Sept. 12. Arco Iris, Nov. 30. Apuntes, 310-2. 70Trial of Bravo ("Guerra," no. 273). 70Trial of Terrés ("Guerra," no. 155). Molina, Asalto. 269Id., recolls. Prieto, Memorias, li, 241-3. Rangel, Parte (with notes).
16. Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 377 (Scott), 410-2 (Quitman); app., 231 (Mackenzie). Sen. 65; 30, 1, pp. 143 (Lee), 193, 200-1 (Worth), 259 (Quitman). Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 301-2. Henshaw narrative. 376Nicholson, recolls. 221Hill, diary.
17. The battle of Chapultepec. Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 375, 391-425; app., 169-231 (reports of Scott and officers). Sen. 65; 30, 1, pp. 119 (Tilton), 146 (Lee), 155-6, 158 (Bennett), 170, 172 (Hooker), 204-9 (Rains), 217-8 (Drum), 219 (Bates), 220-1 (Johnston), 222 — 4 (Loeser), 270-5 (Howard). Stevens, Stevens, i, 208-10. Niles, Oct. 30, p. 137. Cong. Globe, 34, 1, pp. 105-7. Sen. Report 32; 34, 1. Brown, Ninth Inf., 70. Henderson, Science of War, 97 ("The issue of battle"). So. Qtrly. Rev., Jan., 1853, pp. 15-42. 76Bravo, Sept. 14. Negrete, Invasión, ii, app., 428-9; iv, app., 300-4. Balbontín, Invasión, 131. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 302-3. Ballentine, Eng. Sold., ii, 242-7. Davis, Autobiog., 231-2. Henshaw narrative. 180Pillow to wife, Oct. 18. Weekly N. Y. Courier and Enquirer, Mar. 2, 1848. 61Seymour, Oct. 31, 1847. 69H. V. Johnson et al. to Polk, Apr. 6, 1848. 376Nicholson, recolls. 183Drum, recolls. 223Hirschorn, recolls. 66G. W. Smith to Stevens, Sept. 20. 66Tower to J. L. Smith, Sept. 23. Claiborne, Quitman, i, 361-2, 380-6. Raleigh Star, Oct. 27. 221Hill, diary. 200Reid to Gladden, May 27, 1849. S. Anna, Detall, 16, 26-9, 38-42. 151Numerous reports and letters regarding Quitman's operations. 113Beauregard, remins. (based on diary and notes). 151Wilcox, diary. 303Quitman papers. National, Nov. 14. 179Diario Esactísimo. 60Riley to Westcott, Nov. 30, 1847. 60Loring to P. F. Smith, Sept. 27. 68Testimony at Bonneville court martial. 60Miller to sister, undated. 60Id. to mother, Mar. 24, 1848. London Times, Nov. 13, 1847. 335Reynolds to Trist, Sept. 27. Oswandel, Notes, 426. Semmes, Service, 453-5. Arco Iris, Nov. 30. Apuntes, 311, 314-6. 199Anon. MS. Rangel, Parte (with notes). Eco del Comercio, May 1, 1848. Sen. 11; 31, 1 (M. L. Smith, Nov. 30, 1848). Gamboa, Impug., 55. 70"Guerra," no. 1044 (trial of Alemán). 70"Guerra," no. 273 (trial of Bravo). Monitor, Apr. 27, 1848. 70"Guerra," no. 155 (trial of Terrés). Statue of Bravo at Puebla. Delta, Oct. 14, 26; Nov. 3, 20. México á través, iv, 690-5. 76Bravo, Dec. 27. Dunovant, Battles, 5-10. Wash. Union, Nov. 3. Monitor Repub., Oct. 24; Dec. 16 (S. Anna). Nashville Repub. Banner, Oct. 28, 1857. 292Pillow to wife, Oct. 18. Spirit of the Age, Feb. 10; July 29, 1848. Pacheco, Exposíción. Wise, Gringos (N. Y., 1849), 257-9. Calderón, Rectificaciones, 47. Vedette, iv, nos. 3, 8, 12. 327Sutherland to father. Aug.——. 178Davis, diary. Flag of Freedom, Nov. 27. Molina, El Asalto. 269Id., recolls. 291Pierce to Appleton, Sept. 26. 51Marine off., Oct. 20. Reynolds, Exculpation. 131Brindle, statement. Ripley, War with Mexico, ii, 396-402. Encarnacion Prisoners, 84. Hist. Teacheer's Mag., Apr., 1912 (Vieregg). ​Remarks on the battle of Chapultepec. Chapultepec had been a protected summer palace, not a fortress. At this time the upper stories that one sees now did not exist. There were perhaps three times as many large trees in the grove as at present. For military reasons the small trees had recently been cleared away. Scott had a small map of the city, apparently purchased from the British courier (Sen. 34; 34, 3, p. 25). The Twelfth Infantry guarded the stores at Mixcoac, and Sept. 10 Harney was sent there with a body of dragoons. Sumner was then placed in command of all the dragoons at Tacubaya (Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 421). P. F. Smith's brigade remained at Mixcoac until the morning of Sept. 13. Lee, Beauregard, Stevens and Tower reconnoitred the southern front. Scott was there nearly all day Sept. 9, and on the morning of the eleventh. The purposes in view were to study the Mexican preparations, ascertain the nature of the ground, and find places for batteries. In general the ground, even where covered with water, appeared to be firm enough for infantry, and suitable places for batteries were found.
Bravo was appointed to the command of Chapultepec on August 27. Sept. 9 Alvarez was ordered to take the cavalry to Guadalupe. According to 76Bravo, Sept. 14, the garrison of Chapultepec on the morning of Sept. 12, aside from gunners and engineers, was the Tenth Line Infantry. (250), Mina battalion (277), Unión battalion (121), Querétaro battalion (115), Toluca battalion (27), Patria battalion (42). These 832 men were disposed as follows: defending the road to Tacubaya, 160; redoubt on south side of hill (apparently at B), 215; glorieta redoubt (C), 92; entrenchment at the right of the glorieta (D), 42; north side of the hill, 80; buildings at summit, 248 (76Bravo, report, Sept. 14). The buildings near the gateway batteries were defended principally by the Matamoros de Morelia battalion.
At the conference of Sept. 11 Engineers Smith, Lee, Stevens and Tower favored attacking San Antonio, and Quitman, Shields, Cadwalader and Pierce took that view. Pillow did the same. Riley and Twiggs sided with Scott though not for positive reasons. Hitchcock and Trist do not seem to have expressed opinions. Worth and P. F. Smith were engaged elsewhere. Scott's attacking Chapultepec against the advice of Lee illustrated the fact that his success in Mexico was not due to that officer, as the value of Lee's services and his later fame have led some to imagine.
Gen. U.S. Grant regarded the battles of Sept. 8 and 13 as wholly unnecessary (Mems., i, 154). But here, as elsewhere in referring to the Mexican War, he seems to have been merely recording youthful impressions. He says that, had Scott gone round those positions, the Mexicans would have evacuated them; but Scott did not wish the Mexicans to evacuate El Molino and Casa Mata, taking with them their gunpowder and (supposed) foundry material: i. e., Grant failed to understand the question. With regard to Chapultepec also it is an issue between a lieutenant and the major general commanding. Scott did not overlook the idea of going round (Worth: Sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 199); and hence, as he understood the case far better than Grant did at the time or when he wrote his Memoirs, one concludes that his judgment was correct. He stated (Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 377) that [Grant's] plan would have required too wide and hazardous a circuit. The following other objections against it may be suggested. Grant's plan would have required the army to abandon the roads for difficult fields and marshes, limited the practicability of defending the rear in case of attack, weakened greatly the effective ​feinting upon which Scott counted (ibid., 376), produced a bad moral effect — especially in view of the recent battle — by suggesting that he dared not attack Chapultepec, exposed our assaulting troops to a cannonade from the rear, and left behind them a menace of other uncertain but alarming possibilities. The capture of Chapultepec, on the other hand, worked morally as well as physically in our favor, and was thought by Scott likely to have an even greater effect than it had (Sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 169); and it was stated by our engineers that mortars planted there would command a large part of the city. It has been said that our batteries were too far from the target; but it was not known what guns Chapultepec had, and no doubt our engineers and artillery officers ventured as far as appeared expedient. Clearly, however, too much was expected of our batteries.
Battery No. 1, to play on the south side of the fort, was laid out by Lee; No. 2, opposite the southwest angle of the fort, by Huger. The batteries did not fire accurately at first (179Diario Esactísimo). This seems to have been due to a lack of platforms for the guns. Quitman's division supported No. 1, which was particularly exposed, and in the afternoon he made a bold reconnaissance of the road, discovering artillery and a ditch in his front (Claiborne, Quitman, 11, app., 308). The Mexicans made advances toward No. 1 on Sept. 12, but canister repelled them. To hinder reinforcements from reaching Chapultepec, Quitman by Scott's order placed fifty men well forward on the road in the night of Sept. 12-13, and some skirmishing occurred. A 9-pounder protected with sand-bags was planted just in front of No. 1. The intention had been to establish an advanced battery, but the Mexicans prevented this. Two New York companies supported No. 2. Battery No. 3 had a brass 16-pounder. This, becoming unserviceable, was replaced with an iron 24-pounder. Batteries 1, 2 and 3 commanded the south and west fronts of Chapultepec fort, and No. 4 commanded its interior. No. 1 stood about 1000 yards from the south front of the fort; No. 2 about 1400 yards from its southwestern angle; No. 3 about 1140 yards from its west front; and No 4 a little nearer than No. 3 (Hardcastle's map in Sen. 1; 30, 1).
Pillow reoccupied El Molino early Sept. 12 and his division slept there the following night. Early Sept. 13 Twiggs resumed operations at La Piedad, and the Mexicans endeavored to draw him on. Steptoe had two 12-pounders and two 24-pound howitzers. The weakness and gradual discontinuance of his fire and the fact that Twiggs did not expose his infantry rendered this feint ineffective. Scott states that Taylor's battery also was at La Piedad, but it does not seem to have been used at this time. Perhaps, as the Mexicans were likely to attack, it was held in reserve.
The storming parties were composed of volunteers. In some and possibly in all cases some slight reward was offered. In a number of regiments so many volunteered that it became necessary to draw lots. Scott thought Pillow would need one brigade; but Pillow sent for Worth's whole division and received one (Clarke's) brigade of it. Ripley (op. cit., ii, 420) states that Pillow asked for only one of Worth's brigades, but against him is the testimony of Scott, of Worth and of Semmes, who bore Pillow's message. Some of Clarke's men arrived in time to fight. After the battle Pillow admitted that not over 1000 of his men took part in the assault (Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 408). He had too many. They were in one another's way. Pillow stated that the garrison was 6000, thus probably reckoning almost every Mexican soldier within a mile of the hill. Pillow wrote (1800ct. 18): I led "to the very Cannon's mouth, where I was cut ​down — Then my men picked me up and carried me forward under my orders and with a shout of exultation and triumph, scaled the ditches and wall." In fact he seems to have received a painful wound on the ankle from a glancing grapeshot at the foot of the hill (Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 378), and was not carried to the summit until serious fighting had ended (Sen. 65; 30, 1, pp. 156, 172, 204, 217, 222, 224). Cadwalader succeeded him in command. Lt. Col. Hébert with the Eleventh Infantry, assisted by Sumner's dragoons and in effect by Trousdale and Jackson, kept off a strong force of lancers that menaced the American rear from the direction of Los Morales.
Sept. 13 when Santa Anna finally sent the San Blas battalion (perhaps 400) toward the summit, the approach of the Americans forced it to halt — apparently at the entrenchment (D) near the glorieta. The Third Ligero was ordered to reinforce this battalion, but the college fell before it arrived, and it retired. Other troops were sent to the lower parts of the hill. Some perished, some retreated, some were captured. The Hidalgo battalion fought on the Tacubaya road. Reserves of 2 — 5000 were on the Belén causeway near Chapultepec.
-A Mexican lieutenant of engineers named Alemán had charge of firing the mines, and he was ordered to do his work. At his trial he said that he found his way blocked by Mexican troops, and that before he could reach his post the Americans were there. Some, if not all, of the canvas pipes containing the trains had already been found and cut by our troops. The Americans got over the fosse by laying ladders across it. The man who first reached the Mexican flagstaff appears to have been Capt. Kimball, a Vermonter but born in New Hampshire. He stood on guard there till Seymour, who commanded his regiment after Ransom's fall, arrived. Sept. 13 the Americans took revenge for the atrocities perpetrated upon our wounded on the eighth.
The second in command in Casey's party was Capt. Paul, but Capt. B. S. Roberts, whose company stood at the head of it, led the successful charge. Gen. Rangel reported that by this time the Mexican muskets had become useless and the one cannon that directly enfiladed the road had been accidentally disabled. It is quite clear, particularly in the light of Mexican evidence, that the fort on the summit was carried before the gateway batteries. Quitman rendered no essential service in the capture of Chapultepec, though he kept many Mexicans occupied. His troops that went up the hill were not needed. (Even Clarke's brigade was a greater reinforcement than the situation called for.) Shields states that the three regiments turned off to the left because the Mexicans in Quitman's front were found too strong, and if these could not be beaten before those three regiments were detached, evidently the remainder of Quitman's command was not strong enough to beat them. When Roberts led the successful charge, Worth (whom Clarke rejoined), Trousdale and Jackson had appeared at the northeast of Chapultepec and menaced the rear of the gateway batteries. Except thirty to fifty under Capt. Terrett the Marines did not distinguish themselves. Their commander, however, said that their ammunition failed, and other officers stated that Quitman ordered the corps to halt. This was their first battle.
P. F. Smith had the Mounted Rifles (minus two companies detached), First Artillery and Third Infantry (minus two companies detached). It was hoped that he could strike the Belén aqueduct, break through, and take the Mexican flank and rear. Smith's brigade not being strong ​enough — under the difficulties of the ground and in view of Quitman's halt — to attack Santa Anna's reserves, veered toward the causeway, and under the partial shelter of maguey opened fire. His right companies took part in the final charge against the gateway batteries. Had Quitman given Smith the pioneer party with planks, etc., for bridging the ditches, and a storming party, and supported him with two of the regiments that went up the hill, Smith could have struck the Mexicans effectively on the Belén route, while Quitman himself was doing what he could on the Tacubaya road with the rest of his command. A great number of prisoners could probably have been captured in this way (Stevens, Stevens, i, 214-5). Gen. Rangel reported that the corps which defended the work on the Tacubaya causeway lost one third, and that almost every member of his staff was wounded Sept. 8 or 13. The serious fighting inside the fort lasted only four or five minutes. When the final assault occurred, the effective defenders, all told, probably did not number more than 275. Bravo's sword was returned to him. He was charged by Santa Anna with bad conduct, but when tried was fully exonerated. In reference to Chapultepec the author was kindly assisted by Señor D. Ignacio Molina, head of the cartography section of the Mexican government, who was a student at the military college in Sept., 1847, and, being an engineer by profession, could be relied upon.
18. Pillow estimated the Mexican killed, wounded and captured at Chapultepec at about 1800 (Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 408), and mentioned that the prisoners included Gens. Bravo, Noriega, Monterde [Dosamantes, Saldaña], three colonels, seven lieut. colonels and 40 captains. The actual number of Mexicans captured in the operations of Sept. 13-14 was 125 officers, 698 men besides about forty students (Hitchcock in Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 430). As to their killed, wounded and missing, one can only guess. The American loss on Sept. 12-14 was: killed, 10 officers, 128 rank and file; wounded, 60 officers, 613 rank and file (Ho. 24; 31, 1). What part of this loss was incurred at Chapultepec cannot be stated. (Black) McSherry (M'Sherry), El Puchero, 108.
19. The Belén operations. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 1019, 1021-5. Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 381-3 (Scott), 398 (Twiggs), 414-6 (Quitman), 423 (Huger); app., 180 (Bonneville), 184 (Smith), 191 (Beauregard), 215 (Seymour), 223 (Smith), 225 (Shields), 230 (Porter). Sen.65; 30, 1, pp. 188 (Ripley). 633 (Pillow). Carreño, Jefes, 166. Niles, Oct. 30, pp. 1387-8. Sen. Report 32; 34, 1. Brown, Ninth Inf., 62. Haskin, First Artill., 115. So. Qtrly. Rev., Jan., 1853, pp. 43-4. Negrete, Invasión, iii, app., 133, 145-9; iv, app., 304-8. Balbontin, Invasión, 132. Davis, Autobiog., 209-10, 232-4, 262-3. 376Nicholson, recolls. 218Henshaw narrative. 69Dimick to Woodbury, Dec. 1, 1848. 69Childs to Dimick, Dec. 2, 1848. Claiborne, Quitman, i, 347, 364, 367-9, 372, 385-6. 151Reports and letters. City of Charleston, S. C., Year Book, 1883, p. 523. Rowland, Miss. Register, 418. 113Beauregard, remins. 357Wilcox, diary. 303Reports. 60Loring to P. F. Smith, Sept. 27. 60Dimick to Id., Sept. 20. 60Id. et al. to P. F. Smith, Oct. 19, 1848. 60Id. to adj. gen., Nov. 30, 1848. 69Williams to Porter, Apr. 11, 1857. 65Adj. gen., orders 7, Feb. 20, 1847. Rodriguez, Breve Reseña, 870. Gamboa, Impug., 56. 70"Guerra," no. 155 (trial of Terrés). Picayune, Nov. 20. Delta, Oct. 14, 26, 1847; Jan. 11, 1848. México á través, iv, 695. Dunovant, Battles, 11-17. Wash. Union, Sept. 11. Monitor Repub., Nov. 3; Dec. 16. South. Mag., July, 1874, p. 78. 364Worth to daughter, Sept. 28. ​Ramsey, Other Side, 249, note. Prieto, Memorias, ii, 246. 270Moore, diary. 335Statement re Quitman by Trist. 80Relac. to Olaguíbel, Sept. 14. Statements to the author from Quitman's daughters. 327 Sutherland to father, Aug.——. 178Davis, diary. 269Molina, recolls. Reynolds, Exculpation. Stevens, Vindication. S. Anna, Detall, 21, 29-32. Raleigh Star, Nov. 3. 76Tornel to Carrera, Sept. 9. Apuntes, 309, 317-22. Diccionario Universal (México). 68Bonneville court martial. Semmes, Service, 457. Monitor Repub., Nov. 3 (Terrés). Stevens, Stevens, i, 210-1. Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos, 492-3.
Remarks on the Belén operations. The Mexicans retiring by this road were commanded by Gen. Lombardini. The principal corps was the Activo regiment of Morelia. The ditch across the Tacubaya causeway at the gateway batteries was promptly filled in by the Americans to permit passage. A part of the men who captured the gateway batteries pursued the fleeing Mexicans, but not far. A part of the Sixth Infantry, having gone astray, joined Quitman. It has been suggested that Scott made a mistake in not giving orders, before the attack upon Chapultepec, for subsequent operations, and thus left the troops to their own devices; but it was impossible for him to calculate in advance what the situation would be, and he went as soon as possible to the summit of the hill, which was the proper place for surveying the field and issuing suitable commands.
The Belén garita presented a hard problem because, having been more threatened than the San Cosme garita, it seemed likely to be more strongly guarded, because, being nearer to the forces protecting the southern front, it could be more quickly and effectively reinforced, and because it was supported by the citadel, which could only be approached over open ground. Scott, therefore determined to make only a feint at Belén (Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 382). Quitman, however, owing to the abortive Alvarado expedition, had not figured at Cerro Gordo. Aug. 20 and Sept. 8 his duty had been to guard the rear. Hence he had won no éclat under Scott, and, feeling that Scott was unfriendly to him, he apparently resolved at this time to take the bit in his teeth (Davis, Autobiog., 232). During his operations against the city Scott repeatedly signified his disapproval of them, but Quitman refused to retire without a positive order (Claiborne, Quitman, i, 386), and, since Quitman had committed him, Scott, although extremely annoyed (Davis, Autobiog., 234-5), wisely refrained from giving this. Gen. U.S. Grant said, 'It is always, however, in order to follow a retreating foe, unless stopped or otherwise directed'? (Mems., i, 152). This principle authorized Quitman's moving toward the city but not the later part of his operations. At the expense of his men, therefore, Quitman was guilty of virtual insubordination — though not of positive disobedience — for personal reasons. This fact it is necessary to make clear. But his men were no doubt as willing as he to risk their lives, and it was only natural that Quitman should seek to distinguish himself. That motive had to be recognized, for without it probably few volunteer officers would have been in the field. Ripley (op. cit., ii, 549) says that according to Scott's report orders were repeatedly sent to Quitman to prevent his too rapid advance, but Quitman did not receive them and could not find the staff officer who had borne them. What Scott said (Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 382) was that he repeatedly communicated his "views" to Quitman, and Davis (Autobiog., 234-5) supports this statement. The purpose of Ripley's remark apparently was to hint that Scott's statement was untrue.
The intermediate battery (at what was called the Bridge of the ​Insurgents) seems to have been built for four guns but to have had only one, two, three guns in place, or perhaps none. The accounts disagree. Quitman and Smith, both of them volunteer officers, appear distinctly to have colored their reports in favor of the Palmetto regiment, which was second to none in gallantry, but was not enabled by circumstances to do all it would gladly have done here. The First Artillery, on the other hand, did not receive the credit it deserved. It was merely a question of precedence, not of courage, but vigorous protests against their reports were the consequence. Perhaps, however, the real explanation of their inaccuracies is that the reports represent orders of which circumstances (unknown or forgotten by them) prevented the execution.
Sept. 9, believing Scott would attack the southern side, Santa Anna had two guns removed from the Belén garita. The "citadel" had originally been a tobacco factory. Terrés was treated by Santa Anna with the utmost contempt and even subjected to personal violence, but a court martial exonerated him, and he was regarded by Scott with marked respect (Delta, Jan. 11, 1848).
20. The S. Cosme operations. Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 381-2 (Scott), 391-3 (Worth), 421 (Sumner), 424 (Huger), 428-9 (J. L. Smith); app., 166 (Huger), etc. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 1072-3, 1077, 1079. Journ. Milit. Serv. Instit., v, 46; xxxiii, 444. Wilson, Grant, 63-7. Stevens, Stevens, i, 211-2, 215. So. Qtrly. Rev., Jan., 1853, p. 44. Negrete, Invasión, iii, app., 430-41, 450; iv, app., 305-8. Grant, Mems., i, 150, 155-9. Ballentine, Eng. Sold., ii, 249. 66Lee to J. L. Smith, Sept. 15. 66McClellan to G. W. Smith, Sept. 14. 66Stevens to J. L. Smith, Sept. 25. Claiborne, Quitman, i, 379. 113Beauregard, remins. 60Paul to Lovell, Sept. 20. Semmes, Service, 457-61. Apuntes, 316-22. Rangel, Parte (with notes). 70"Guerra," no. 273 (trial of Bravo). Delia, Oct. 14. S. Anna, Detall, 30-2. México á través, iv, 695. Monitor Repub., Dec. 16 (S. Anna). 76Mora to Lombardini, Aug. 9; to Guerra, July 22. 76Lombardini, Aug. 22. Jackson, Mems., 43. 80Relac. to Olaguíbel, Sept. 14. G. W. Smith, Co. A, Corps of Engins. 51Letter from Marine officer, Oct. 20. 51Terrett, undated. 51Henderson to sec. navy, May 12, 1848. Stevens, Vindication. Raleigh Star, Oct. 27. Arnold, Jackson, 130, 177. Dabney, Jackson, 47-9. Murphy, Remins., 69. Roa Bádrcena, Recuerdos, 496-502.
Remarks on the San Cosme operations. The Mexicans retreating by this route were commanded by Gen. Rangel, assisted by Gen. Peña y Barragán and Lt. Col. Echeagaray. It is impossible to be as precise as would be desirable in describing the first part of Worth's advance, for the reports are both vague and inconsistent. This is mainly, no doubt, because the officers wrote from memory and without the aid of a map. Ripley observes (op. cit., ii, 484) that Worth's movement "had the great element of success, celerity." In reality, it was very slow, but unofficial accounts and the Mexican reports contain evidence that the resistance was not only vigorous but more than once temporarily triumphant. The one-gun redoubt seems to have been abandoned when the hill yielded. Ripley observes also (op. cit., ii, 485) that Worth did not need to advance rapidly: "Time was not immediately pressing." But this is a mistake, for substantially all the Mexican preparations at the S. Cosme garita were made after Worth's advance began. The fortification (unarmed) near the English cemetery was at the bridge of Santo Tomás. The Mexican infantry was withdrawn from this position because the Americans could ​have struck the S. Cosme highway (by a cross-road) between it and the city; but a large body of cavalry under Torrejón remained and charged in order to gain time for Rangel to make preparations at the garita.
While Quitman was struggling with the intermediate battery, Duncan of Worth's command sent a gun from La Verónica causeway into a road that extended some distance toward the right, and fired at the Mexicans. He and Worth believed they gave Quitman material assistance, but this -does not appear to have been the fact, for the distance was found to be much greater than they supposed (113Beauregard). The better way to aid Quitman would have been to press forward without loss of time, and threaten the rear of the Mexicans opposing Quitman. Later some of Worth's guns did aid Quitman by firing at the garita.
With remarkable daring Capt. Terrett of the Marines, Lieuts. Gore and U. S. Grant of the Fourth Infantry, a few other officers and a small party of men captured the unarmed work near the junction of La Verónica and San Cosme roads by moving to the left round the English cemetery, and took the parapet on the San Cosme highway. From the latter Worth recalled them because the American guns behind them were about to open. Cadwalader, sent to Worth by Scott, was placed by the former at the English cemetery to guard Worth's left and rear. Sumner, after pursuing the Mexicans for some time, was detached to protect Tacubaya. Scott joined Worth near the English cemetery and directed him to carry the garita (Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 392), but he soon returned to the base of Chapultepec so as to be within easy reach of all his scattered forces (ibid., 382). By Scott's order Huger sent to Worth four siege guns and a mortar, but on account of the nature of the ground none of these pieces was used against the garita (ibid., 424). Santa Anna brought four guns to the garita, but only three of them were available. The stampede from the garita seems to have been due in part to a cornet signal for retreat, meant for a single corps. The cavalry under Alvarez entered the city during the afternoon of Sept. 12. Grant was assisted by Lieut. Lendrum of the Third Artillery in handling the mountain howitzer.
21. The night of Sept. 13-14. Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 383 (Scott), 393 (Worth), 416 (Quitman), 424 (Huger), 429 (J. L. Smith); app., 168, ete. (officers). Ho. 60: 30, 1, pp. 1077-9 (Worth), 1079 (Scott). 179Diario Esactísimo. Stevens, Stevens, i, 213,215. Sen. Rep. 32; 34,1. Negrete, Invasión, iii, app., 129, 450; iv, 108, 116-22; app., 309-10. So. Qtrly. Rev., Jan., 1853, p. 49. Davis, Autobiog., 235-7, 287-90. 217Henshaw to wife, Sept. 18 [partly later]. 218Henshaw narrative. 61Gates, Oct. 6. 376Nicholson, recolls. 151Steptoe to Lovell, Sept. 16. London Times, Nov. 13. 92S. Anna to Mex. ayunt., Sept. 15. 80Ferndndez to gov. Michoacán, Sept. 138. 80Relac. to Olaguíbel, Sept. 14. S. Anna, Mi Historia, 83. Gamboa, Impug., 57-8. 70"Guerra," no. 954 (trial of Bonilla). 366Ayunt. poster, Sept. 25. Monitor Repub., Sept. 27 (Pacheco); Oct. 2 (S. Anna). S. Anna, Contestación. Lawton, Artill. Off., 315. 73Lozano, nos. 4 and 8, res., 1847. Ramírez, México, 318. 92Mex. ayunt. to Scott, Sept. 13, 11 p.m. S. Anna, Apelación, 58-9. Calderón, Rectificaciones, 48. Giménez, Memorias, 114. Stevens, Vindication. Raleigh Star, Oct. 27. 112Beauregard to Quitman, Sept. 17. 113Id., remins. Rangel, Parte (with notes). Claiborne, Quitman, i, 370. 221Hill, diary. Semmes, Service, 463. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 304. S. Anna, Detall, 32-3. Apuntes, 334-5. Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos, 503-4. ​Quitman sent to Scott for heavy cannon and ammunition, and the latter, though offended by Quitman's course, had them supplied. During the night, under Beauregard's direction, two batteries inside the Belén garita (for a 24-pounder, an 18-pounder and a 24-pound howitzer) and a breastwork on the right for infantry were made ready. Steptoe, sent here by Scott, was on hand to superintend the firing. To assault the citadel across about 300 yards of open ground, even with the aid of these pieces, would have been a very serious affair, and it was most fortunate for Quitman that Worth's entering the town where no citadel existed made it unnecessary.
It has been supposed that Huger's brief bombardment caused Santa Anna to evacuate the city (Semmes, Service, 463); but Santa Anna knew, without being shown again, what the American artillery could do, and he seems to have decided upon his policy before this firing occurred. Santa Anna's chief published reasons for the evacuation were that he wished to save the city from bombardment, assault and sack, and save the army, arms and cannon for future operations. Gamboa complained that no provision was made before the evacuation for the security of the people, the archives, etc. But Scott's previous conduct was an adequate pledge, and the council relied upon his regard for international law. Considering Santa Anna's known love of money, the vast Mexican interests now imperilled, and his summary manner of deciding the question of evacuation, one cannot help suspecting that inducements were offered him. The council was probably held merely to divide the responsibility for what he had resolved to do.
It was charged that Santa Anna let the criminals out of jail expressly to attack the Americans, and to bring odium upon us by committing outrages that could be attributed to our troops. One cannot be sure about this matter; but it is noticeable that Gamboa, in piling up all possible charges against the President, only accused him of failing to prevent the criminals from getting free. Santa Anna must have been completely exhausted, but it seems to be true, as was stated by the British minister (Bankhead, no. 86, 1847), that some one in authority let about 2000 men out of confinement. Very likely it was hoped that the Americans would be guilty of disorder; but the palace at least was sacked before they entered it. Some of the Mexican soldiers acted like brigands, it was reported — even robbing the British consul. No preparations to evacuate the town had been made. Some one might and should have had sentinels posted at the public buildings and offices ready to surrender them in a proper manner. See chap. xxix, note 2.
On account of illness Pierce had no part in the battles of Sept. 8 and 18. Probably in order to occupy a place in the reports he appeared at the Belén garita at about four a.m., Sept. 14 (though he belonged to Pillow's division) on the ground that the Ninth Infantry was then serving under Quitman. Although Scott refused to grant a capitulation or sign any pledge, he seems to have indicated quite definitely to the commission how the capital would be treated (Negrete, Invasión, iv, 122), and in particular that in consideration of being protected it would have to pay $150,000 for necessaries and comforts to be given our troops. The ayuntamiento attempted to force Scott to make pledges by saying that otherwise it could offer no security to his army or its property. This was ingenious, and so was its solemn Protest (Negrete, Invasión, iv, 108) that it had no intention of submitting voluntarily to any foreign authority. ​Scott's report offended Worth by saying that he did not pass the garita until Sept. 14 (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1077). This was technically an error, and Scott so acknowledged in writing (ibid., 1079). But one cannot suppose he intended (though Worth imagined he did) to belittle Worth, for his plan had been to give that officer the glory of capturing the city, and he was displeased to find that Quitman had taken precedence of Worth (Claiborne, Quitman, i, 377). Moreover, Scott stated expressly in his report that Worth, had he not halted in obedience to orders, might have anticipated Quitman (Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 383). Scott seems, indeed, to have intended, in giving Worth the command on Sept. 8 and destining him to take possession of the city, to close the breach between that officer and himself, but Worth contrived, by taking needless offence on both occasions, to widen it. Another complaint was that Scott ordered Worth to stop at the Alameda, and thus enabled Quitman to reach the palace first (Semmes, Service, 464); but apparently this was because Scott intended to join Worth there (Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 417), for when Scott proceeded from Tacubaya to the city on the morning of Sept. 14 he took the long route via San Cosme, not knowing what Quitman had done.
Semmes (Service, 469) states that S. Anna left 40 pieces of artillery behind when he evacuated the city. Gamboa asserted that at the end of the fighting, Sept. 13, there were still 9000 Mexican soldiers besides 4000 National Guards (Impug., 59). The Spanish chargé reported that when the fighting ended Santa Anna had 12,000 troops. As the minister of relations was his guest at the time this would seem almost equivalent to an official estimate (73Lozano, no. 7, Sept. 16). Mounted and unmounted, the Americans found twenty-two cannon at the citadel (304Geary to Quitman, Sept. 14). In spite of Santa Anna's efforts to prevent the capture of the city, many still believed that he was in league with the Americans (Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos, 419).
22. Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 383 (Scott), 393 (Worth), 398 (Twiggs), 417 (Quitman). Niles, Oct. 30, p. 137. Sen. Rep. 32; 34, 1. Scott, Mems., il, 5385. Davis, Autobiog., 237. 376Nicholson, recolls. 224Introd. to intercepted letters. 66Beauregard to Quitman, Sept. 17. 304Watson to Shields, Sept. 16. Claiborne, Quitman, 1, 362, note, 376. 113Beauregard, remins. 151Roberts to Union, July 12, 1848. 357Wilcox, diary. Arroniz, Manual, i, 411. 65Scott, gen. orders 286. Semmes, Service, 464. Apuntes, 326. London Chronicle, Nov. 12. 307Roberts, diary. 187Thomas to Eddy, Oct. 26. Wise, Gringos (N. Y., 1849), 255. Norton, Life, 172. 327Sutherland to father, Aug. — . Lowell (Mass.) Journal, Sept. 14, 1852. Verse by Grace Greenwood (in Stevenson, Poems).
Epitomizing his operations in the Valley, Scott said his army had beaten thirty-odd thousand men, posted behind defences at chosen positions, killed or wounded more than 7000, taken 3730 (one seventh officers), including thirteen generals, and captured more than twenty colors and standards, 75 pieces of ordnance, 57 wall-pieces, 20,000 small arms, and an immense quantity of munitions (Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 384-5). The total American losses on Sept. 12, 13 and 14: note 18.