# Air and Liquid Systems Corp., et al. v. Roberta G. DeVries, Individually and as Administratrix of the Estate of John B. DeVries, Deceased, et al.

Note: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
AIR & LIQUID SYSTEMS CORP. ET AL. v. DEVRIES, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE OF DEVRIES, DECEASED, ET AL. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT No. 17–1104. Argued October 10, 2018–Decided March 19, 2019
Petitioners produced equipment for three Navy ships. The equipment required asbestos insulation or asbestos parts to function as intended, but the manufacturers did not always incorporate the asbestos into their products. Instead, the manufacturers delivered much of the equipment to the Navy without asbestos, and the Navy later added the asbestos to the equipment. Two Navy veterans, Kenneth McAfee and John DeVries, were exposed to asbestos on the ships and developed cancer. They and their wives sued the manufacturers, alleging that the asbestos exposure caused the cancer and contending that the manufacturers were negligent in failing to warn about the dangers of asbestos in the integrated products. Raising the “bare-metal defense,” the manufacturers argued that they should not be liable for harms caused by later-added third-party parts. The District Court granted summary judgment to the manufacturers, but the Third Circuit, adopting a foreseeability approach, vacated and remanded.
Held: In the maritime tort context, a product manufacturer has a duty to warn when its product requires incorporation of a part, the manufacturer knows or has reason to know that the integrated product is likely to be dangerous for its intended uses, and the manufacturer has no reason to believe that the product’s users will realize that danger. Pp. 4–11.
    (a) Tort law imposes a duty to exercise reasonable care on those whose conduct presents a risk of harm to others. That includes a duty to warn when the manufacturer “knows or has reason to know” that its product “is or is likely to be dangerous for the use for which it ​is supplied” and “has no reason to believe” that the product’s users will realize that danger. 2 Restatement (Second) of Torts §388. Three approaches have emerged on how to apply that “duty to warn” principle when a manufacturer’s product requires later incorporation of a dangerous part in order for the integrated product to function as intended. The first–the foreseeability rule–provides that a manufacturer may be liable when it was foreseeable that its product would be used with another product or part, even if the manufacturer’s product did not require use or incorporation of that other product or part. The second–the bare-metal defense–provides that if a manufacturer did not itself make, sell, or distribute the part or incorporate the part into the product, the manufacturer is not liable for harm caused by the integrated product–even if the product required incorporation of the part and the manufacturer knew that the integrated product was likely to be dangerous for its intended uses. A third approach, falling between those two, imposes on the manufacturer a duty to warn when its product requires incorporation of a part and the manufacturer knows or has reason to know that the integrated product is likely to be dangerous for its intended uses.
The third approach is most appropriate for this maritime context. The foreseeability rule would sweep too broadly, imposing a difficult and costly burden on manufacturers, while simultaneously overwarning users. The bare-metal defense ultimately goes too far in the other direction. After all, a manufacturer that supplies a product that is dangerous in and of itself and a manufacturer that supplies a product that requires incorporation of a part that the manufacturer knows or has reason to know is likely to make the integrated product dangerous for its intended uses both “kno[w] or ha[ve] reason to know” that the product “is or is likely to be dangerous for the use for which it is supplied.” And in the latter case, the product manufacturer will often be in a better position than the parts manufacturer to warn of the danger, because the product manufacturer knows the nature of the ultimate integrated product. Requiring a warning in these circumstances will not impose a significant burden on manufacturers, who already have a duty to warn of the dangers of their own products. Nor will it result in substantial uncertainty about when product manufacturers must provide warnings, because the rule requires a manufacturer to warn only when its product requires a part in order for the integrated product to function as intended. And this Court is unaware of any substantial overwarning problems in those jurisdictions that have adopted the approach taken here. Requiring the product manufacturer to warn when its product requires incorporation of a part that makes the integrated product dangerous for its intended uses is especially appropriate in the context of maritime law, ​which has always recognized a “ ‘special solicitude for the welfare’ ” of sailors. American Export Lines, Inc. v. Alvez, 446 U. S. 274, 285. Pp. 4–10.
    (b) The maritime tort rule adopted here encompasses all of the following circumstances, so long as the manufacturer knows or has reason to know that the integrated product is likely to be dangerous for its intended uses, and the manufacturer has no reason to believe that the product’s users will realize that danger: (i) a manufacturer directs that the part be incorporated; (ii) a manufacturer itself makes the product with a part that the manufacturer knows will require replacement with a similar part; or (iii) a product would be useless without the part. P. 10.
873 F. 3d 232, affirmed.
Kavanaugh, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ., joined. Gorsuch, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Thomas and Alito, JJ., joined
This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
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