# Smith v. United States (599 U.S. )

Note: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
SMITH v. UNITED STATES CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT No. 21–1576. Argued March 28, 2023—Decided June 15, 2023
Timothy Smith was indicted in the Northern District of Florida for theft of trade secrets from a website owned by StrikeLines. Before trial, Smith moved to dismiss the indictment for lack of venue, citing the Constitution’s Venue Clause, Art. III, §2, cl. 3, and its Vicinage Clause, Amdt. 6. Smith argued that trial in the Northern District of Florida was improper because he had accessed StrikeLines’ website from his home in Mobile (in the Southern District of Alabama) and the servers storing StrikeLines’ data were located in Orlando (in the Middle District of Florida). The District Court concluded that factual disputes related to venue should be resolved by the jury and denied Smith’s motion to dismiss without prejudice. The jury found Smith guilty, and Smith moved for a judgment of acquittal based on improper venue. See Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 29. The District Court denied the motion, reasoning that the effects of Smith’s crime were felt at StrikeLines’ headquarters, located in the Northern District of Florida. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit determined that venue was improper, but disagreed with Smith that a trial in an improper venue barred reprosecution. The Eleventh Circuit therefore vacated Smith’s conviction for theft of trade secrets.
Held: The Constitution permits the retrial of a defendant following a trial in an improper venue conducted before a jury drawn from the wrong district. Pp. 3–16.
(a) Except as prohibited by the Double Jeopardy Clause, it “has long been the rule that when a defendant obtains a reversal of a prior, unsatisfied conviction, he may be retried in the normal course of events.” United States v. Ewell, 383 U. S. 116, 121. In all circumstances outside of the Speedy Trial Clause, the strongest appropriate remedy for trial error is a new trial, not a judgment barring reprosecution. Pp. 3–4.
(1) Text and precedent provide no basis for concluding that violations of the Venue and Vicinage Clauses are exceptions to the retrial rule. The Venue Clause mandates that the “Trial of all Crimes … shall be held in the State where the … Crimes shall have been committed.” Art. III, §2, cl. 3. Nothing about this language suggests that a new trial in the proper venue is not an adequate remedy for its violation. Smith primarily argues that the Venue Clause aims to prevent the infliction of additional harm on a defendant who has already undergone the hardship of an initial trial in a distant and improper place. But the mere burden of a second trial has never justified an exemption from the retrial rule. See Ewell, 383 U. S., at 121. Indeed, while the most convenient trial venue for a defendant would presumably be where he lives, the Venue Clause is keyed to the location of the alleged crimes. The Clause does not allow “variation … for convenience of the … accused,” Johnston v. United States, 351 U. S. 215, 221, and this Court has repeatedly rejected objections based on the hardships created when a defendant is prosecuted far from home.
The Vicinage Clause—which guarantees “the right to … an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed,” Amdt. 6—similarly provides no support for Smith’s argument that retrial is barred here. The Vicinage Clause differs from the Venue Clause in two ways: it concerns jury composition, not the place where a trial may be held, and it concerns the district where the crime was committed, rather than the State. Nothing about these differences dictates a remedy that is broader than the one awarded when the Venue Clause is violated. The vicinage right is only one aspect of the jury-trial rights protected by the Sixth Amendment, and the Court has repeatedly acknowledged that retrials are the appropriate remedy for violations of other jury-trial rights. Most analogous to this case, the Court has held that retrial is the appropriate remedy when a defendant is tried by a jury that does not reflect a fair cross-section of the community. See Glasser v. United States, 315 U. S. 60, 85–87. There is no reason to conclude that trial before a jury drawn from the wrong geographic area demands a different remedy. Pp. 4–7.
By the time of the founding, compelling evidence supported the conclusion that pleas of prior acquittal or conviction could not be grounded on a verdict issued in or returned by a jury from the wrong vicinage. See Arundel’s Case, 6 Co. Rep. 14a, 77 Eng. Rep. 273. Judicial decisions and prominent treatises of the time and since reflect no common-law principle at the founding that precluded retrial following a trial in an improper venue or before an improper jury. Indeed, this Court embraced the retrial rule for a venue error in United States v. Jackalow, 1 Black 484, and this decision did not break new ground. The Court has found—and Smith points to—no decision barring retrial based on a successful venue or vicinage objection in either the centuries of common law predating the founding or in the early years of practice following ratification. This absence alone is considerable evidence that the clauses do not bar retrial of their own force. See, e.g., Gamble v. United States, 587 U. S.___, ___. Moreover, courts affirmatively allowed retrial following trials in an improper venue or before improperly constituted juries. This leaves no reason to doubt that the retrial rule applies here. Pp. 7–14.
22 F. 4th 1236, affirmed.
| | The current edition of this document derives from the electronic version of the "slip opinion" posted online by the Supreme Court of the United States the day the decision was handed down. It is not the final or most authoritative version. It is subject to further revision by the Court and should be replaced with the final edition when it is published in a print volume of the United States Reports. The Court's full disclaimer regarding slip opinions follows: |
| The "slip" opinion is the second version of an opinion. It is sent to the printer later in the day on which the "bench" opinion is released by the Court. Each slip opinion has the same elements as the bench opinion—majority or plurality opinion, concurrences or dissents, and a prefatory syllabus—but may contain corrections not appearing in the bench opinion. Caution: These electronic opinions may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations from the official printed slip opinion pamphlets. Moreover, a slip opinion is replaced within a few months by a paginated version of the case in the preliminary print, and—one year after the issuance of that print—by the final version of the case in a U. S. Reports bound volume. In case of discrepancies between the print and electronic versions of a slip opinion, the print version controls. In case of discrepancies between the slip opinion and any later official version of the opinion, the later version controls. (source: http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/slipopinions.aspx) ||
This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
Public domainPublic domainfalsefalse