# An Antidote Against Atheism/Appendix/Chapter VI

Chap. VI.
1. That the sense of his Argument from the idea of God in the first posture, is not simply That the Idea is true, and if God were, his Existence were necessary; but, That this Idea being true does exhibite to our Minde an absolute necessary Existence as belonging to Him. 2. That the Idea of the God of the Manichees does not include in it necessary existence. 3 . That to say that necessary Existence included in the Idea of a Being absolutely perfect is but conditional, is a Contradiction. 4. The second posture of his Argument made good, and that by virtue of the form thereof the Existence of the Manichean God is not concludible. 5. The invincible Evidence of the third posture of his Argument in the judgement of his Antagonist himself 6. That the force of his Argument in the fourth and last posture is not That we conceive the Idea of Matter without necessary Existence; but that, look as near as we can, we finde no necessary exiftence included therein, as we do in the idea of God. 7. That the Faculties of our Minde, to which he perpetually appeals are to be supposed, not proved to be true.
1. And now having thus clearly satisfied the Objection taken from the Idea of a Being absolutely Evil, it will be easie to turn back the edge of any Argument of the like nature, be it never so skilfully & cunningly directed against us. As that which I had from an ingenious hand, which because it seems very witty to me as well as invincible to the Objector, I shall propound it in his own words, the tenour whereof runs thus:
If a man may have a true Idea or Notion of that which is not, yea and of that which is not and yet would necessarily be if it were, then your Argument for the Existence of God, from necessary Existence being comprehended in his Idea or Notion, is unconcluding. How you can deny this Argument, I cannot possibly conceive, the substance of your first Argument from the Idea of God being contained therein in the first posture of it.
But a man may have a true Notion of that which is not, yea and of that which is not and yet would necessarily be if it were; as for instance, of the Evil God of the Manichees.
But I answer briefly to the Proposition thus, That it does not reach our Case: because we argue God does exist, not because the Idea of him is true, and if he did exist he would necessarily exist; for conditional necessary Existence,Antidote, Book 1. ch. 8. sect. 1, 2. as being less perfect then absolute necessary Existence, cannot belong to a Being absolutely Perfect: but because this true Idea, without any If or And, does suggest to our Natural Faculties, That necessary Existence being involved in his Idea alone, the like not happening in any other Idea beside, without any more a-do, he doth of himself absolutely and really Exist.
​To the Assumption I answer, That the Manichees God, if he could exist at all, would so do necessarily; and my reason is, because God would never create so foul a Monster.
2. But if you still urge that the Idea of this Evil God of the Manichees includes necessary Existence in it, it being the Notion of a God, and yet he is not existent; and that therefore the true God cannot be proved to exist, because necessary Existence is involved in his Idea: I further answer, That the Notion of the Manichees God does not naturally include necessary Existence in it, because it is not the Notion of a Being absolutely Perfect; and that the Notion of an Evil God is a mere forced or fortuitous Figment, and no better sense then a Wooden God, whose Idea implies not necessary Existence, but an impossibility thereof.
3. But the Objector proceeds, and we must attend his motions; onely before he comes to the second posture of our Argument, Antidote, Book 1. chap. 8. sect. 3.he takes notice of my charging of all those with self-contradiction that acknowledge that necessary Existence is contained in the Idea of God, or a Being absolutely Perfect, and that thereby is signified that necessary Existence belongs unto him, and yet unsay it again, by adding, If he do at all exist. But I answer, my charge is true: For to say, necessary Existence belongs to a Being, which we notwithstanding profess may not be for all that, is to admit a contradiction; for thus the same thing by our Faculties is acknowledged both necessary and contingent, that is, that it cannot but be, and yet that it may not be; which if it be not a Contradiction in this case, I know not what is: for no less then absolutely necessary Existence must be comprized in the Idea of a Being absolutely perfect.
4. Antidote, Book 1. chap. 8. sect. 4.But the Argument will still appear more plain in the second posture. For if there be any fraud or fallacy, it lies in this term, Necessary, which I have truly explain'd (and it is not denied) to signifie nothing else but an inseparable connexion betwixt the Subject and the Prædicate, Wherefore Existence having an inseparable connexion with God, it must needs follow that this Axiom, God does Exist, is eternally and immutably true. But here to reply, If he did exist, is to insinuate that for all this he may not exist, which is to say, that what is immutably true is not immutably true; which is a palpable contradiction.
But the Objector here flyes for aid to the God of the Manichees, desiring me to put the Manichean God in stead of the God whose Existence I would prove, whereby I may discern my own Sophisme. Well, if it be not Idolatry, let us place him there; but how shrimpish he is and unfit to fill this place, you may understand out of what I said before. That the Manichean God does no more imply in the Notion thereof necessary Existence then a Wooden God does, nay it rather implyes impossibility of Existence. For the Notion of God is the same, that is, of a Being absolutely Perfect, which must involve in it the most absolute Goodnesse that may be. Now bring the Manichean God into sight, and let us view his inscription: He is an evil absolutely good, which, as I said before, is far worse sense in my conceit then a Wooden God, and therefore Impossibility, and not Necessity of Existence, is contained in his Idea.
5. Antidote, Book 1. ch. 8. sect. 5.The third posture of my Argument is formidable even to the ​Objector himself: for whereas I urge, That either Impossibility, Contingency or Necessity of Actual Existence belongs to a Being absolutely Perfect, he confesses here, that the Manichean God will succour him no longer; but as a man lest in distress he complains, that it is an hard case, that we must be put to prove the Existence of God impossible, or else we must be forced to admit that he is. But afterwards being better advised, he takes notice that if he be not, it is impossible for him to be; and therefore, say I, it is but just that we expect of him that will deny that he is, to prove his Being impossible, especially the force of our Argument so necessarily casting him upon it. But in my conceit he had better save his pains, then venture upon so frustraneous an undertaking: for he may remember that the Idea, of this Being absolutely Perfect is so fram'd, that in the judgement of any man that has the use of his Faculties, there is no inconsistency nor incompossibility therein, nor the least shadow for suspicion or shyness. And besides, since impossibility of existing is the most imperfect χέσις that any Being can bear to Existence, it must needs be an outragious incongruity to attribute it to a Being absolutely Perfect, it so naturally and undeniably belonging to a Being absolutely Imperfect, chap. 5. sect. 2.as hath been noted before.
Wherefore if either the doubting or obdurate Atheist will say the Existence of God is impossible, that will not argue any weakness or vanity in my Argument, but rash boldness and blind impudency in him that shall return so irrational an Answer.
6. Antidote, Book 1. chap. 8. sect. 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11.But the Objector has arrived now to the fourth and last posture of our Argumentation, of which he conceives this is the utmost summe, That either there is a God, or Matter is of it self; but Matter is not of it self, because necessary Existence is not included in the Idea thereof. Against which he alledges, that as thousands have the Idea of a Triangle, and yet have not any knowledge of that property of having the three Angles equal to two right ones, so a man may have the Idea of Matter, and yet know nothing of the necessity of its Existence, though it have that property in it.
But I answer. This does not reach the force of our Argument; for look as curiously and skilfully as you will into the Idea of Matter, and you can discover no such property as necessity of Existence therein. And then again, the weight of my reasoning lieth mainly in this, That necessity of Self-existence being so plainly and unavoidably discoverable in the Idea of a Being absolutely Perfect, but not at all discernible in the Idea of Matter; that we doe manifest violence to our Faculties while we acknowledge Self-existence in Matter, no Faculty informing us so, and deny it in God, the Idea of God so conspicuously informing us that necessary Self-existence belongs unto him. So that all that I contend for is this, That he that denies a God, runs counter to the light of his Natural Faculties, to which I perpetually appeal.
7. But if you will still say. It may be our Faculties are false; I say so too, that it might be so if there were no God by whom we were made; for then we were such as we finde our selves, and could seek no further, nor assure our selves but that we might be of that nature, as to be then ​mistaken most when we think we are most sure, and have used the greatest caution and circumspection we could to avoid errour. But it is sufficient for us that we ask no more then what is granted to them that pretend to the most undeniable Methods of Demonstration, and which Geometry her self cannot prove, but supposes; to wit. That our Faculties are true.