# The Kaleidoscope; or, Literary and Scientific Mirror/Series 2/Volume 4/Number 199/The Political Economist

The Political Economist.
THE PERIODS OF APPRENTICESHIP TOO LONG.
TO THE EDITOR.
Sir,—You were kind enough to insert a short letter on the subject of the laws relative to apprentices, in your paper of the 19th instant. Allow me, then, to state a few of my reasons for inviting the attention of the public towards that question.
Every one is aware that there are some trades which a person cannot practise unless he has served the number of years required by the charter or bye-law which regulates such trades, and that there are others in which the term of apprenticeship depends entirely upon the master and the parents of the apprentice. In the former, always, and in the latter, generally, the term is prolonged to such a length as produces habits of idleness and inattention in the apprentices. Boys are generally bound before they are capable of judging for themsselves, the consequence of which is, that, in the course of a year or two, they either take a dislike to their master or the trade; and, seeing that it will be long before they can derive any solid advantage from their labour, they endeavour to do just as little as possible. Besides, the length of apprenticeships may be said to increase the expense of education; but, were parents to endeavour to keep their children a little longer at school, and masters to accept of a shorter term of apprenticeship, both, I am certain, would reap great benefit from it in the end. It is true, that, at first, parents would think it greatly to their disadvantage to keep their children at school after they were able to work; but the future, they must see, would be greatly in their favour; for it is the boast of a civilized society that it weighs the probable events of the future, whilst it is the characteristic of a state of barbarism that it is wholly engrossed with the concerns of the present.
The wages of the person, after he was loose, would be much lower than they are at present; yet, knowing that they must be increased, according to his industry, he would naturally endeavour to do whatever lay in his power: such, of course, is the case with workmen at present, but not so, generally, with apprentices.
Would it not, then, be much better for both parties to alter the present system entirely, since it is apparent to every one how much may be done by a willing mind, and how little where the inclination does not concur. To produce this concurrence there must be reciprocal advantages; but, in long apprenticeships, the advantage chiefly belongs to the master, since two or three years, at most, is sufficient to learn the generality of trades.
This, then, is a question which deeply affects not only the industry but the morality of apprentices.
“The institution of long apprenticeships,” says Dr. Adam Smith, “has no tendency to form young people to industry. A journeyman who works by the piece is likely to be industrious; because he derives a benefit from every exertion of his industry. An apprentice is likely to be idle, and almost always is so; because he has no immediate interest to be otherwise. In the inferior employments the sweets of labour consist altogether in the recompense of labour. They who are soonest in a condition to enjoy the sweets of it are likely soonest to conceive a relish for it, and to acquire the early habit of industry. A young man naturally conceives an aversion to labour, when, for a long time, he receives no benefit from it. The boys who are put out apprentices from public charities are generally bound for more than the usual number of years; and they generally turn out very idle and worthless.”
This work was published before January 1, 1929, and is in the public domain worldwide because the author died at least 100 years ago.
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