# Life and select literary remains of Sam Houston of Texas/Chapter 16

CHAPTER XVI.
But it required other negotiations and much correspondence before the question of annexation was settled at the ballot box. The following secret message was transmitted to the Congress of the Republic:
   "To THE Honorable the Senate and House of Representatives:
   "Connected with our present condition our foreign relations are becoming daily more and more interesting, and it seems to me that the representatives of the people should anticipate the events which may in all probability occur.
   "To suppose that both branches of the Honorable Congress were not aware of the important and absorbing questions which it is believed will agitate the Congress of the United States connected with the fate of this country, would be to doubt their intelligence. The Executive, therefore, relies upon the deliberative wisdom and decision of the representatives of the people to give him all the aid in their power to conduct the affairs of Texas to such an issue as will be promotive of its interests as a community, and at the same time gratifying to the people. Heretofore he has carefully abstained during his present administration from the expression of any opinion in reference to the subject of annexation to the United States. And in submitting this communication he does not think it becoming in him now to express any preference. It will be perceived by the Honorable Congress that if any effort were made on the part of this Government to effect the object of annexation, which is so desirable, and it should fail in meeting responsive and corresponding action on the part of the United States, it might have a seriously prejudicial influence upon the course which England and France might otherwise be disposed to take in our favor. And a failure on our part after a decided expression could not but be mortifying to us, and to a great extent diminish our claims to the confidence of other nations. It would create distrust on their part toward us, because the opponents of our interests would allege there was no stability in our purposes, and therefore unsafe in other nations to cultivate very intimate relations with us, or even to maintain those which now so fortunately exist. They might apprehend that after the lapse of a few more years, Texas having acquired increased importance from their friendly aid and good offices, would be induced again by the agitation of the same question in the United States to apply for admission into the Union, and that by possibility it might be effected. Hence the utmost caution and secrecy on our part as to the true motives of our policy should be carefully observed.
   ​"Were the interest now manifested, both in the United States and Texas, in relation to annexation, to pass off without producing any material change in our national attitude, another object of but secondary importance might be achieved. It appears to the Executive, that the relations which the United States bear to this country, and its important position in the gulf, would not disincline them to a treaty of alliance with us, defensive, if not also offensive. If nothing else were effected than a treaty for defense, it would secure to Texas a position that would forever bid defiance to our Mexican enemy. It would be as important to us, in fact, as the recognition of our independence by Mexico.
   "These measures seem to the judgment of the Executive to be vitally connected with the glory, the well-being, and stability of the nation, and had he under this conviction not communicated the same to Congress, he should have felt himself delinquent in the discharge of an important duty. If they are favorably received by the honorable Congress, and their effectuation desired, it may be necessary for this purpose, if circumstances daily arising should justify the course, to dispatch an additional agent to the Government of the United States, to co-operate with our agent now there; and in that event an appropriation of five thousand dollars would be requisite to meet the necessary expenses. This recommendation does not arise from any distrust of the ability and capacity of Mr. Van Zandt, our present Chargé d'Affaires. His industry, zeal, and capacity are evinced by his correspondence with this Government; but the additional weight a coadjutor would give to our character at that court, and the multiplication of facilities for success by the aid which they could mutually render each other, from increased opportunities for intelligence, and in collecting and comparing information, would doubtless be of the highest importance.
   "If the honorable Congress should think well of these suggestions, they will be aware of the propriety of immediate action upon the subject. The Congress of the United States has now been in session some time, and there can be but little doubt that, if they have not already done so, they will soon indicate their disposition and course of policy toward this country.
   "Believing, as the Executive did at the commencement of the present session, that the subject of annexation was in the best position in which Texas could place it, he did not allude to it in his general message, apprehending that any public action, taken either by the Executive or the Congress, would only have a tendency to embarrass the subject. Action must now be taken by the United States, and we must now watch and meet their disposition toward us. If we evince too much anxiety it will be regarded as importunity, and the voice of supplication seldom commands, in such cases, great respect.
   "The Executive hopes that these injunctions, under which this communication is made, may be so regarded by the Congress, as to prevent the possibility of its publication, until the measures sought may be accomplished, or the negotiations terminated.
   "Sam Houston."
The effect of this message was salutary. Another minister, in the person of Hon. J. Pinckney Henderson (afterward the first Governor of the State of Texas), was commissioned to go to Washington. Anxiety for annexation, which the people voted for in 1836, almost unanimously, was declining, with the certain ​evidence that England (if not France also) would throw over Texas the broad æegis of its protection. Desire for annexation was increasing in the United States. The Cabinet at Washington manifested an anxiety to renew negotiations. Gen. Houston instructed his minister, Hon. Mr. Van Zandt, to meet the United States half way, and to inform him of any disposition on their part to come to the terms which they had rejected. The chapters containing correspondence will furnish the principal points touching the reasons for annexation.