# Railway Employes' Department v. Hanson/Opinion of the Court

* Court Documents
* Case Syllabus
* Opinion of the Court
* Concurring Opinion Frankfurter
United States Supreme Court
351 U.S. 225
Railway Employes' Department v. Hanson
Argued: May 2, 1956. --- Decided: May 21, 1956
This is a suit brought in the Nebraska courts by employees of the Union Pacific Railroad Co. against that company and labor organizations representing various groups of employees of the railroad to enjoin the application and enforcement of a union shop agreement entered into between the railroad company and the labor organizations. Plaintiffs are not members of any of the defendant labor organizations and desire not to join. Under the terms of the union shop agreement all employees of the railroad, as a condition of their continued employment, must become members of the specified union within 60 days and thereafter maintain that membership. It is alleged that failure on their part to join the union will mean the loss of their employment together with seniority, retirement, pension, and other rights.
The employees claim that the union shop agreement violates the 'right to work' provision of the Nebraska Constitution, Art. XV, § 13, which provides:
'No person shall be denied employment because of membership in or affiliation with, or resignation or expulsion from a labor organization or because of refusal to join or affiliate with a labor organization; nor shall any individual or corporation or association of any kind enter into any contract, written or oral, to exclude persons from employment because of membership in or nonmembership in a labor organization.'
They ask for an injunction restraining the railroad company from enforcing and applying the union shop agreement.
The answers deny that the Nebraska Constitution and laws control and allege that the union shop agreement is authorized by § 2, Eleventh of the Railway Labor Act, as amended, 64 Stat. 1238, 45 U.S.C. § 152, Eleventh, 45 U.S.C.A. § 152, subd. 11, which provides that, notwithstanding the law of 'any State,' a carrier and a labor organization may make an agreement requiring all employees within a stated time to become a member of the labor organization, provided there is no discrimination against any employee and provided that membership is not denied nor terminated 'for any reason other than the failure of the employee to tender the periodic dues, initiation fees, and assessments (not including fines and penalties) uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership.'
The Nebraska trial court issued an injunction. The Supreme Court of Nebraska affirmed. It held that the union shop agreement violates the First Amendment in that it deprives the employees of their freedom of association and violates the Fifth Amendment in that it requires the members to pay for many things besides the cost of collective bargaining. The Nebraska Supreme Court, therefore, held that there is no valid federal law to supersede the 'right to work' provision of the Nebraska Constitution. 160 Neb. 669, 71 N.W.2d 526. The case is here by appeal. 28 U.S.C. § 1257(1) and (2), 28 U.S.C.A. § 1257(1, 2). We noted probable jurisdiction. 350 U.S. 910, 76 S.Ct. 195.
The union shop provision of the Railway Labor Act was written into the law in 1951. Prior to that date the Railway Labor Act prohibited union shop agreements. 48 Stat. 1186, 45 U.S.C. § 152, Fourth and Fifth, 45 U.S.C.A. § 152, subds. 4, 5; 40 Op.Atty.Gen. 254. Those provisions were enacted in 1934 when the union shop was being used by employers to establish and maintain company unions, 'thus effectively depriving a substantial number of employees of their right to bargain collectively.' S.Rep.No. 2262, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., p. 3. By 1950, company unions in this field had practically disappeared. Id. Between 75 and 80% of railroad employees were members of labor organizations. H.R.Rep.No.2811, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., p. 4. While nonunion members got the benefits of the collective bargaining of the unions, they bore 'no share of the cost of obtaining such benefits.' Id., at p. 4. As Senator Hill, who managed the bill on the floor of the Senate, said, 'The question in this instance is whether those who enjoy the fruits and the benefits of the unions should make a fair contribution to the support of the unions.' 96 Cong.Rec., Pt. 12, p. 16279.
The union shop provision of the Railway Labor Act is only permissive. Congress has not compelled nor required carriers and employees to enter into union shop agreements. The Supreme Court of Nebraska nevertheless took the view that justiciable questions under the First and Fifth Amendments were presented since Congress, by the union shop provision of the Railway Labor Act, sought to strike down inconsistent laws in 17 States. Cf. Hudson v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 242 N.C. 650, 89 S.E.2d 441; Otten v. Baltimore & O.R. Co., 2 Cir., 205 F.2d 58. The Supreme Court of Nebraska said, 'Such action on the part of Congress is a necessary part of every union shop contract entered into on the railroads as far as these 17 states are concerned for without it such contracts could not be enforced therein.' 160 Neb. at page 698, 71 N.W.2d at page 547. We agree with that view. If private rights are being invaded, it is by force of an agreement made pursuant to federal law which expressly declares that state law is superseded. Cf. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 663, 64 S.Ct. 757, 764, 88 L.Ed. 987. In other words, the federal statute is the source of the power and authority by which any private rights are lost or sacrificed. Cf. Steele v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 198-199, 204, 65 S.Ct. 226, 230, 232, 89 L.Ed. 173; Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U.S. 768, 72 S.Ct. 1022, 96 L.Ed. 1283; Public Utilities Commission of District of Columbia v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 462, 72 S.Ct. 813, 820, 96 L.Ed. 1068. The enactment of the federal statute authorizing union shop agreements is the governmental action on which the Constitution operates, though it takes a private agreement to invoke the federal sanction.
As already noted, the 1951 amendment, permitting the negotiation of union shop agreements, expressly allows those agreements notwithstanding any law 'of any State.' § 2, Eleventh. A union agreement made pursuant to the Railway Labor Act has, therefore, the imprimatur of the federal law upon it and, by force of the Supremacy Clause of Article VI of the Constitution, could not be made illegal nor vitiated by any provision of the laws of a State.
We come then to the merits.
In the absence of conflicting federal legislation, there can be no doubt that it is within the police power of a State to prohibit the union or the closed shop. We so held in Lincoln Federal Labor Union No. 19129, A.F. of L. v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525, 69 S.Ct. 251, 93 L.Ed. 212, and in American Federation of Labor v. American Sash & Door Co., 335 U.S. 538, 69 S.Ct. 258, 93 L.Ed. 222, against the challenge that local 'right to work' laws, including Nebraska's, violated the requirements of due process. But the power of Congress to regulate labor relations in interstate industries is likewise well-established. Congress has authority to adopt all appropriate measures to 'facilitate the amicable settlement of disputes which threaten the service of the necessary agencies of interstate transportation.' Texas & N.O.R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Railway & S.S.C.lerks, 281 U.S. 548, 570, 50 S.Ct. 427, 433, 74 L.Ed. 1034. These measures include provisions that will encourage the settlement of disputes 'by inducing collective bargaining with the true representative of the employees and by preventing such bargaining with any who do not represent them', Virginian Ry. Co. v. System Federation No. 40, 300 U.S. 515, 548, 57 S.Ct. 592, 600, 81 L.Ed. 789, and that will protect the employees against discrimination or coercion which would interfere with the free exercise of their right to self-organization and representation. National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 33, 57 S.Ct. 615, 622, 81 L.Ed. 893. Industrial peace along the arteries of commerce is a legitimate objective; and Congress has great latitude in choosing the methods by which it is to be obtained.
The choice by the Congress of the union shop as a stabilizing force seems to us to be an allowable one. Much might be said pro and con if the policy issue were before us. Powerful arguments have been made here that the longrun interests of labor would be better served by the development of democratic traditions in trade unionism without the coercive element of the union or the closed shop. Mr. Justice Brandeis, who had wide experience in labor-management relations prior to his appointment to the Court, wrote forcefully against the closed shop. He feared that the closed shop would swing the pendulum in the opposite extreme and substitute 'tyranny of the employee' for 'tyranny of the employer.' But the question is one of policy with which the judiciary has no concern, as Mr. Justice Brandeis would have been the first to concede. Congress, acting within its constitutional powers, has the final say on policy issues. If it acts unwisely, the electorate can make a change. The task of the judiciary ends once it appears that the legislative measure adopted is relevant or appropriate to the constitutional power which Congress exercises. The ingredients of industrial peace and stabilized labor-management relations are numerous and complex. They may well vary from age to age and from industry to industry. What would be needful one decade might be anathema the next. The decision rests with the policy makers, not with the judiciary.
It is said that the right to work, which the Court has frequently included in the concept of 'liberty' within the meaning of the Due Process Clauses (see Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 36 S.Ct. 7, 60 L.Ed. 131; Takahashi v. Fish & Game Commission, 334 U.S. 410, 68 S.Ct. 1138, 92 L.Ed. 1478), may not be denied by the Congress. The question remains, however, whether the long-range interests of workers would be better served by one type of union agreement or another. That question is germane to the exercise of power under the Commerce Clause-a power that often has the quality of police regulations. See Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14, 19, 67 S.Ct. 13, 15, 91 L.Ed. 12. One would have to be blind to history to assert that trade unionism did not enhance and strengthen the right to work. See Webb, History of Trade Unionism; Gregory, Labor and the Law. To require, rather than to induce, the beneficiaries of trade unionism to contribute to its costs may not be the wisest course. But Congress might well believe that it would help insure the right to work in and along the arteries of interstate commerce. No more has been attempted here. The only conditions to union membership authorized by § 2, Eleventh of the Railway Labor Act are the payment of 'periodic dues, initiation fees, and assessments.' The assessments that may be lawfully imposed do not include 'fines and penalties.' The financial support required relates, therefore, to the work of the union in the realm of collective bargaining. No more precise allocation of union overhead to individual members seems to us to be necessary. The prohibition of 'fines and penalties' precludes the imposition of financial burdens for disciplinary purposes. If 'assessments' are in fact imposed for purposes not germane to collective bargaining, a different problem would be presented.
Wide-ranged problems are tendered under the First Amendment. It is argued that the union shop agreement forces men into idelogical and political associations which violate their right to freedom of conscience, freedom of association, and freedom of thought protected by the Bill of Rights. It is said that once a man becomes a member of these unions he is subject to vast disciplinary control and that by force of the federal Act unions now can make him conform to their ideology.
On the present record, there is no more an infringement or impairment of First Amendment rights than there would be in the case of a lawyer who by state law is required to be a member of an integrated bar. It is argued that compulsory membership will be used to impair freedom of expression. But that problem is not presented by this record. Congress endeavored to safeguard against that possibility by making explicit that no conditions to membership may be imposed except as respects 'periodic dues, initiation fees, and assessments.' If other conditions are in fact imposed, or if the exaction of dues, initiation fees, or assessments is used as a cover for forcing ideological conformity or other action in contravention of the First Amendment, this judgment will not prejudice the decision in that case. For we pass narrowly on § 2, Eleventh of the Railway Labor Act. We only hold that the requirement for financial support of the collective-bargaining agency by all who receive the benefits of its work is within the power of Congress under the Commerce Clause and does not violate either the First or the Fifth Amendments. We express no opinion on the use of other conditions to secure or maintain membership in a labor organization operating under a union or closed shop agreement.
Reversed.

## Notes

* ↑ This constitutional provision is implemented by Neb.Rev.Stat.1943, § 48-217, which provides:
* ↑ Section 2, Eleventh reads as follows:
* ↑ The union shop is a variant of the closed shop, since union membership is required of every employee after the 60-day period designated in the Act.
* ↑ Once courts enforce the agreement the sanction of government is, of course, put behind them. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 68 S.Ct. 836, 92 L.Ed. 1161; Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 68 S.Ct. 847, 92 L.Ed. 1187; Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 73 S.Ct. 1031, 97 L.Ed. 1586.
* ↑ The parallel provision in § 14(b) of the Taft-Hartley Act, 61 Stat. 151, 29 U.S.C. § 164(b), 29 U.S.C.A. § 164(b), makes the union shop agreement give way before a state law prohibiting it.
* ↑ See Mason, Brandeis, A Free Man's Life (1946), pp. 303 304, which quotes a letter of February 26, 1912, from Brandeis to Lincoln Steffens:
* ↑ A number of appellant unions have broad powers to levy assessments for unspecified purposes. For example, the bylaws of the Railroad Yardmasters of America authorize the Executive Board to 'levy assessments upon all the members affected when in its opinion such assessments are necessary.' § 26. And § 27 provides: 'Local lodges may levy such assessments upon their respective memberships as may be found necessary * * *.' The General Committee of a Subordinate Division of the Order of Railroad Telegraphers is authorized 'to levy such assessments upon the members employed upon the transportation company over which it has jurisdiction as may be necessary to carry on its work.' Subordinate Division Statutes, § 42(H). And see Constitution of the Brotherhood of Railroad Signalmen of America, Art. I, § 6; Constitution of the American Railway Supervisors Association, Art. XVI, § 7.
* ↑ The constitutions and bylaws of several appellant unions place restrictions on the individual members.
* ↑ See Summers, Disciplinary Powers of Unions (1950), 3 Ind. & Lab.Rel.Rev. 483; Summers, Disciplinary Procedures of Unions (1950), 4 Ind. & Lab.Rel.Rev. 15; Summers, Legal Limitations on Union Discipline (1951), 64 Harv.L.Rev. 1049; Aaron & Komaroff, Statutory Regulation of Internal Union Affairs (1949), 44 Ill.L.Rev. 425, 631; Wirtz, Government by Private Groups (1953), 13 La.L.Rev. 440; Williams, The Political Liberties of Labor Union Members (1954), 32 Tex.L.Rev. 826.
This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
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