# History of Mexico (Bancroft)/Volume 4/Chapter 28

Contents
CHAPTER XXVIII.
MINA'S EXPEDITION.
1817.
A Famous Navarrese Guerrilla — Preparing for the Enterprise — The Landing at Soto la Marina — Alarm of the Royalists — The Victory at Peotillos — Penetrating the Interior — Traits of Mina — Overthrow of Ordoñez and Castañon — Liberation of Prisoners — Jealousy of Torres — Character of Mexican Guerrillas — Fall of Soto la Marina — Siege of Fort Sombrero — Ravages of Thirst and Sword — The Bulwark of Independence — Mina's Field Operations — Repulse at Guanajuato — Capture and Execution of Mina — Reflections on his Undertaking — Siege and Fall of Los Remedios — Bibliography.
Among those who in Spain resented the arbitrary measures of Fernando VII., when in 1814 he returned from ignominious captivity to overthrow the constitution and the córtes, were the Navarrese, a brave and sturdy race, of Basque Gothic blending, whose keen and passionate temperament clung to the chase and yielded to smuggling, without reproach to their otherwise upright and good-natured traits. With the prestige of former independence, and with liberal instinct, nurtured midst the ranges of the lofty Pyrenees, they objected to the king's infringement of popular rights. But the movement failed, and lay crushed for a time by the exile of the leaders, the famous General Espoz y Mina and his nephew, Francisco Javier Mina. The latter had been the first to shed lustre on the family name by daring and successful military operations. He was a student at the university of Zaragoza in 1808, when the French invasion roused his sympathies for the imperilled fatherland, and led to an exchange ​of books for the sword. Although a beardless youth of barely nineteen, he inaugurated the guerrilla war in his native province, at first at the head of a mere handful of followers. A born leader of men, and with great military talents, he achieved one success after another, and within two years he had become celebrated throughout Spain as its foremost guerrilla chief, with the official rank of comandante general of Navarre. Captivity placed a sudden check on his career, and later the failure in 1814 of his uprising against Fernando drove him a refugee to England. In company with other exiles, he soon evolved a plan for avenging outraged liberty, by lifting anew the standard of revolt in the colonies. Some Englishmen interested themselves in the scheme, partly from pecuniary motives, and provided a vessel, with arms and money, on which Mina embarked at Liverpool in May 1816, attended by over a dozen officers. ​New Spain appeared the most attractive country for the movement, and thither Mina proposed to sail direct, believing that able officers and arms were alone needed to give it impulse. At the last moment, however, came news of reverses in Vera Cruz, which induced him to change his course to the United States, There he bought or chartered three smaller vessels, prepared supplies, and enrolled, mainly at Baltimore, a number of recruits, including a large proportion of officers, with whom he sailed in September for Galveston, in Texas, by way of Port au Prince. Commodore Aury, a French freebooter who had received an insurgent commission as governor of Texas, and was preparing to invade it, gave him assistance; and after spending some time in refitting, he continued his course, in seven vessels, to Soto la Marina, in Tamaulipas, the only available landing place on the gulf coast. He disembarked in the middle of April, and took possession of the town, issuing proclamations in favor of independence under the title of General of the Relief Army of the Mexican Republic. ​Within a short time nearly two hundred of the active rancheros of the district joined his party, and with their aid was constructed an adobe fort on the eastern outskirts of the town, for the security of the stores with which a small force could not well burden itself on a flying trip.
The dismay created at Mexico by the news of his invasion, the precursor perhaps of others, was all the greater as it came upon the royalists at a time when they had succeeded in beating back the revolution with in very narrow limits. Warned by information already from the United States, Apodaca had taken prompt steps to guard the Vera Cruz coast as the most likely to be approached; and now reënforcements were hurried forward to Arredondo, of the Oriente provinces, Colonel Armiñan following with troops collected from the Tampico region, while a frigate and two armed tenders sailed in the middle of May from Vera Cruz, under Brigadier Berenger, to attack Mina's squadron. Aury had departed, leaving at the mouth of the river, manned by a small force, only three transport vessels, one of which had been beached and condemned. The lightest sailed away on beholding the Spanish squadron, and the other, being unable to follow, was abandoned. After a series of lively ​broadsides without response, the Spaniards ventured to approach and captured the sole occupant—a cat—whereupon they fired the vessel and hurriedly retreated. One effect of the blow was to increase the discouragement or discontent among several of the invaders, and to induce Colonel Perry, one of the leading officers, to depart with over fifty Americans. This unworthy conduct brought its own punishment, for he was overtaken by royalists in Texas and cut to pieces with all his men.
It was thought advisable not to weaken the expedition by unprofitable encounters with the enemy, but to join the insurgent centre, now understood to be in Guanajuato, and there revive the sinking cause, organize troops, and start a glorious campaign. Hence, when the report came that Arredondo was approaching with a large force, Mina left Major Sardá in charge of the fort at Soto la Marina with about a hundred men, and hastened away on May 24th, with the remaining three hundred, promising speedily to bring reënforcements. ​It was a daring attempt, in truth, for this handful to penetrate through an unknown and dangerous border-land into the midst of a hostile kingdom, braving victorious armies and hardships innumerable. But it was after all a sort of forlorn-hope party, for retreat was practically cut off by the loss of the vessels; and this added one more resemblance to Cortés' famed, expedition, with similar aims and hopes; if it counted more confidently on the internal discord sustained by white insurgents, while the Andalusian captain with his children of the sun had to conquer allies for himself, the chieftain of Navarre had more powerful opponents, and a smaller band, although from boreal climes. Whether right or not in dividing his forces, he undoubtedly suffered by delaying so long on the gulf coast. A prompt advance might have prevented the secession of Perry, and have gained for him decided advantages before the royalists could combine.
Avoiding the corps of observation under Garza, Mina hastened by a southern curve through Horcasitas to Valle del Maiz, where he rested for two days, after having driven back a royalist force under Villaseñor. This delay enabled Armiñan to approach, whereupon the party pushed onward, and reached on June 14th the Carmelite hacienda of Peotillos, fifteen leagues north-east of San Luis Potosí. Early on the following morning they were startled to find close upon them their pursuers, now swollen by reënforcements to about 1,700 men. Retreat before so large ​a body, composed mainly of cavalry, was out of the question, and a siege within the convent buildings equally forbidding; so Mina proposed an attack upon the foe before it should form. Encouraged by previous successful skirmishes with superior forces, the men responded eagerly. A part remained at the hacienda with the baggage, and the rest marched forth under their general and his second, Colonel Young, to the number of 172, to meet a body ten times stronger, a large proportion of which ranked as veterans used to victory. The royalist guerrillas opened the engagement, and then came the cavalry with a rush, that threatened to overwhelm the little band. Fortunately a few well directed volleys arrested the movement, but the rear had come up and the odds appearing so enormous Mina prepared to fall back toward the hacienda.
This stirred the Spaniards to fresh efforts, for which a galling fire prepared the way by creating havoc in the narrow ranks, while the cavalry wheeled round them, and the infantry moved forward en masse to closer quarters. At this critical moment, when the struggle seemed reduced to selling their lives as dearly as possible, Mina gave his men the order to charge. One blinding volley was delivered, and then with ringing hurrahs they leaped from out the smoke with gleaming bayonets. The startled infantry broke and fled, and the cavalry, partaking of the confusion, fell back to increase the confusion. On came the doughty band, a narrow-bounded cyclone, resistless in its sweep, with cheers that rolled before them, and bringing quick answers in shrieks of fear and pain. The disorder had swollen into a panic, lending wings to feet that halted not for leagues, the men meanwhile regardless of the sharp lances with which Armiñan at ​last turned on them to rally. Mina's horses were too tired to pursue very far, and consequently the royalists escaped with a loss of little over 100, while the three hours' battle cost their opponents the proportionately heavier casualty of fully 50.
Mina dared not at present face such another ordeal of dear-bought victory, but relieved himself of all cumbrous luggage and hastened away, reaching the flourishing mining town of Pinos late on the 18th. A few daring fellows scaled its walls during the night, and surprised the garrison; whereupon the place was sacked in retaliation for its neglect to surrender. Now followed a march of three days southward across the bare, silent plain, whose borders were desolate by the ravages of war, and during which hunger and hardships pressed sorely upon them, while in the distance a formidable corps of observation under the cruel Orrantia threatened at any moment to fall upon them. On the 24th, however, they arrived without further mishap at Fort Sombrero, or Comanja, five leagues east of Lagos, and one of the two strongholds remaining to the insurgents in Guanajuato. It was commanded by the mariscal Pedro Moreno, who with his small garrison gave them a greeting worthy of their heroic achievements. Their fame had preceded ​them, borne in every direction by defeated royalists, who to shield their own failure declared the followers of the lauded Navarrese leader to be demons, not men.
The personal qualities of Mina were well calculated to sustain the fame that had preceded him. There was a combined dash and dignity about him that commanded admiration as well as respect; the stamp of a born leader, exacting an involuntary deference, yet permeated with a generosity and frankness that inspired confidence and love. In manners and accomplishments a gentleman, he possessed also every sterling trait of the soldier. While foremost in a spirited charge, he remained calm throughout the danger, ready to seize the opportunity and direct his officers. Frugal and enduring as was required of the mountain guerrilla, he shared hardship and discomfort with the meanest, cheering the sufferer, and winning the hearts of opponents with his kind sympathy. His broad Spanish face, with its heavy lower chin, the dark bushy hair, and favorite whiskers of his race, gave the impression, primarily, of a man of firmness and action, and one somewhat beyond the twenty-seven years which he had just passed. In figure he was well formed and strongly built, though rather slight, and of scant medium height.
An opportunity soon presented itself to give his new comrades in arms an inspiring proof of his ability. While Armiñan held back under the lesson he had received, Comandante general Ordoñez of Guanajuato, in conjunction with Castañon, renowned both for his successes and cruelties, advanced with 700 men against Sombrero. Mina set out to meet them with about half that number, and brought them to a stand June ​29th at the hacienda of San Juan de los Llanos, near San Felipe. He at once charged, regardless of the sharp firing, and threw them into disorder. Within eight minutes the royalists were in full flight. The rest was but pursuit and slaughter. Over 300 are said to have been stretched along the route, including both commanders, while more than 200 were captured.
And here is told the story of a most politic act, which added lustre to the cause of the revolutionists.
​The foe had shortly before taken a favorite officer of Mina, who offered in exchange the numerous prisoners held by him. He was refused. Then he called his prisoners before him and said: "Behold the heartless indifference of your government. Your lives are doubly mine—mine by victory and retaliation; yet you are free! You may join my standard or peaceably depart, as you will." A policy so rare and generous won an almost unanimous adhesion to the insurgents, and the report of it spread abroad evoked an admiration that added not a little to the popularity of the general, even in the opposing ranks.
Greater achievements could not have been desired to inspire the confidence necessary for energetic coöperation among the insurgents. To promote this end, Mina now held a conference with Father Torres and two members from the junta of Jaujilla, besides other chiefs. Torres was an ignorant man of ferocious instincts, a gambler and profligate, who after figuring with little credit as a priest, joined the guerrilla Albino García. His sacerdotal character assisted him to rise, and at this time he was the most prominent leader, with the rank of lieutenant-general, whose will indeed was law, both to the council and to the bands sustaining the cause. While devoted enough to the cause, he loved above all the display of a power sustained greatly by fear of his cruelty, and was only too ready to look upon the Navarrese as an interloper, whose transoceanic fame and brilliant feats would surely eclipse his own. Hence also he felt predisposed to suspect, and spread the insinuation, ​that the new-comer was at heart as by birth a Spaniard, in sympathy with his countrymen, and aiming not at liberating New Spain, but merely to restore the constitution of 1812, with its meagre concessions. This belief unfortunately received support from the arguments which Mina employed somewhat too openly for winning Spanish soldiers and partisans. Torres nevertheless pretended great interest in Mina's projects, yielding to him the chief command, while intimating that he really was the superior, and boasting that he could place 6,000 men under his orders. "In that case," exclaimed the general eagerly, "I shall march direct on Mexico."
A rich treasure having at this time been somewhat unfairly captured at the hacienda of the marqués del Jaral, active steps were taken to obtain clothing and armament and to organize troops, Mina being invested with the rank of mariscal de campo by the junta. Soon, however, came disenchantment. He found that only an insignificant proportion of the promised men was sent, and these formed what he would call rabble rather than soldiers. Brave and loyal, but utterly devoid of discipline and sustained determination, and objecting to regulations and tactics as irksome restraint, the cavalry alone was valuable, and only for flying raids. One demoralizing source was the tribute ​system submitted to by the towns and favored by speculating commanders, which induced the insurgent bands to sacrifice their cause for personal gain and convenience. Another was the liberty accorded them, partly from necessity, of living at their homes, dressing as they pleased, and obeying the call to arms as they listed, or even the longing to turn back, which often manifested itself on the eve of threatening danger, when they were most needed. This laxity was sustained by the practice among the men to elect their officers, with rare exception, who consequently were as a rule untrained as well as numerous and subservient. The leaders kept only a small bodyguard with which to share the large revenue drawn from raids and tributes. Little of this reached the public coffer, as may be imagined, but it passed into individual pockets, and thence upon showy costumes glittering with gold and silver buttons, lace and embroidery, and upon superb horses richly caparisoned incongruous enough as a whole, and in striking contrast to the general poverty, and particularly to the absence of arms. Yet even with such men Mina might have achieved something if Torres had proved sincere and the royalists had granted a little time.
The defeat of Armiñan had created a wholesome dread at the viceregal court. The leanings of the masses were well understood; but an additional danger sprung up in the popularity of the invader among the troops, especially the Europeans with their masonic bent, who spoke loudly and proudly of Mina as their countryman, or even comrade. Mexico itself was regarded as in danger, and fresh troops were hurried forward to ward it off. The mariscal Liñan, ​sub-inspector of troops, and the highest military officer in the country, took command, with supreme control of the provinces embracing the field of action. A few months earlier such concentration of soldiers would have been impossible, and in that case Mina might have gained a speedy triumph by combining with Victoria, Teran, and Guerrero.
The royalists received about this time crumbs of comfort in the fall of Soto la Marina. Arredondo had presented himself before the adobe fort on June 10th, with about 1,600 men. Water was cut off, and soon the tottering walls began to crumble under the heavy firing. Death and desertion had made sad inroads on the garrison, yet Colonel Sardá remained resolute as ever, cheering the famished defenders, and supplying the deficiency of hands by distributing a large number of extra fire-arms with which he effectively repelled the approaches of the startled besiegers. Occasionally a brave woman would rush through the shower of bullets to the stream and bring a momentary relief to the parched lips which swore to die rather than surrender. Finally Sardá was persuaded to accept honorable terms; but imagine the mingled rage and wonder of Arredondo when he saw marching forth before his imposing army thirty-seven cadaverous, hunger-pinched men. He dared not, in view of his heavy losses, sustain the favorable offers made to this handful, and the viceroy, ignoring the capitulation, had them sent to the dungeons of San Juan de Ulúa, and subsequently to interior fortresses in Spain, to endure the most atrocious sufferings incident to a lingering death. ​Linan advanced through Querétaro into Guanajuato, incorporating all the troops possible, and encouraging them by placing a price on the heads of Mina and his followers. This leader had just met with a repulse—his first—in an attack on Leon, and had retired into Fort Sombrero with 650 men, to whom were added some 300 women, children, and laborers. Shortly after, on July 30th, Liñan appeared before it at the head of about 4,000 men, and a train of artillery, with which he at once invested Ihe place, maintaining a constant and wasteful fire upon it—wasteful because the natural features of the fort afforded protection. It stood on a cudgel-headed ​projection, with steep sides 1,000 feet high and connected by a narrow ridge, the only real approach, with the mother range, from which it could be commanded to some extent. A few rude walls added shelter; seventeen shaky guns blustered defiance, and all to cover a scanty commissariat and a decreasing water store.
With many and useless mouths it was not long before thirst began also its siege. Torres had been given money with which to bring supplies from his richer districts, but he criminally delayed doing so, and on approaching the place, when already besieged, he was routed. Mina attempted a sally to open communication with him, but not being well supported, he had to retire with a loss of eleven taken prisoners, who were promptly despatched in full view of the garrison. Stores must be had, however, and so the following night Mina and three others climbed down the steepest and least guarded declivity, and managed to slip through the lines, favored by the wind and darkness; but he sought in vain to improve on Torres' effort.
The situation was now becoming critical. Rations had dwindled to a mere nothing; and worse, the water was wholly gone. The rainy season was about to begin, and clouds sailed by, only to tantalize the besieged by bursting at a distance. Unable to restrain themselves, many staggered forth, regardless of booming cannon and whistling bullets, to pluck the succulent roots around, while women and children stole by night down the cañon to the brook, there to be captured by the sentinels. The suffering was so aggravated by the stench of dead animals and other causes, ​that Colonel Young, now in command, opened negotiations. But the terms offered being unconditional surrender, he proposed that they should cut their way through. This was opposed by one or two officers in a manner so insulting to his American pride that he swore to stay till the last. He inspired fresh determination among the besieged, so much so that when the royalists made their second assault on the fort, on August 15th, the women heartily joined in the fray with stones and rolling bowlders, and assisted to repulse the assailants with heavy loss. As Young stepped forward to watch the retreating foe, his head was taken clean off by a cannon-ball. He had kept his oath.
Lieutenant Bradburn now took command, and resolved to break through the lines. The attempt was made on the night of the 19th. A distressing fare well was-said to the ill and wounded, who with anguished looks and piteous appeals saw themselves abandoned to relentless butchery. Stealthily all who could walk pressed down the slope and were already gaining the level ground, when some timid females, who had unaccountably been allowed to precede the others, roused the attention of the enemy. A hellish scene ensued. The royalists rushed like blood-hounds on their victims, caring nothing whether their bullets struck women or their lances impaled children. The shrieks of the despairing mother, and the cries of the little ones whom she sought to shield, were drowned in the fierce shouts of the combatants. In their ​frenzy numbers climbed back upon the rock only to fall a living prey; others leaped into the gulch to hide in the underbrush, while many ran blindly through the lines to the plain, soon to be hunted down by horsemen. Only fifty escaped from all that number, including Bradburn and Moreno. At dawn the fortress was entered, after a slight resistance from crouching fugitives. Then followed another carnage: and this time in cold blood, for Liñan must have his turn at the slaughter. The male prisoners, over two hundred in number, were brought forth in batches and shot, the sick being supported and the maimed propped up to suit the marksmen.
Sixty miles south of Sombrero, in the midst of the fertile plains of Pénjamo, rises a straggling range known as San Gregorio, and near its centre a broken circle of peaks covered with bastions and breastworks, and enclosing an area 5,000 feet in circumference, to which had been applied the name of Los Remedios. This was the retreat of Torres, forming one of the strongest fortresses in the country; for it was protected on nearly every side by abrupt ravines, leaving only one easy approach, which had been covered by heavy works. Within, were inexhaustible springs. It was called the bulwark of Mexican independence. The defences had of late been improved with the aid of Mina's officers, and an immense supply of provisions introduced, sufficient to sustain ​for months not only the garrison, now swelled to 1,500 men, but an equal number of laborers, refugees, women, and children. Torres looked, therefore, with comparative indifference on the approach of Liñan, who appeared before the place on August 27th, and distributed his force, now numbering over 4,000, along the opposite sides of the ravines, and erected batteries, one upon a peak, the Bellaco, hitherto regarded as inaccessible, from which he could inflict no little damage on the surprised garrison. A large body,
mainly of cavalry, was also in the field to keep open communications and drive back insurgents.
It had been arranged that Mina should, with all the available horsemen, harass the besiegers, and cut off supplies by ravaging the country around and at tacking the convoys. In accepting this task, he allowed Torres, singularly enough, to retain most of the surviving members of his own band, who would have ​proved of immense value to drill and lead the undisciplined and capricious field force. Less than three score now remained of that doughty handful. As the leader reflected on their sad fate, tears sprung to his eyes, and for once he yielded to the clamor for revenge by shooting a number of prisoners, although not over forty in all. He soon regretted the act, however, and the more so as day after day revealed how little he could count upon the firmness of his present followers, fine dashing fellows who attacked splendidly, but generally turned before the first resolute resistance with volleys or bayonets, when one minute more of sustained bravery might have overcome it and won the day. Thus the capture of San Luis de la Paz, in the beginning of September, took him four days, when it could easily have been carried in one assault if the men had followed the officers. The delay contributed to defeat the attacks next made upon San Miguel el Grande, and the hacienda de la Zanja, by allowing reënforcements to come up.
Mina retired somewhat disheartened to Valle de Santiago, the centre of a strongly revolutionary population, there to seek the coöperation of Comandante Flores for a descent on Guanajuato, which promised, besides rich gains, to cripple the enemy severely, and even to compel the abandonment of the siege of Remedios. Torres for some reason failed to take this view, and insisted that the only way to relieve the fortress, as his main duty, was to attack the besiegers. Mina remonstrated that the relative strength, character, and position of the contending forces forbade such a movement; whereupon the other went so far as to forbid his subordinates from joining with their best troops in any enterprise beyond the one indicated. One result of this injudicious deterioration ​of Mina's forces was to enable Orrantia, who had been sent to operate against him with about 900 men, to gain a comparatively easy victory in the open field at La Caja over his somewhat larger army, and to greatly dissipate the awe inspired by his former achievements.
Leaving orders for his men to reunite at the same place, Mina proceeded to confer with the council of Jaujilla. They also objected to an attack on Guanajuato, and recommended that he should summon the remnant of his original band, and seek the south western districts of Michoacan, where he would have both means and leisure to organize troops for an effective campaign. Mina insisted, however, that he was bound to relieve Los Remedios. He went back to La Caja, and thence at the head of 1,400 men marched on Guanajuato. So sudden and quiet had been his advance, that he penetrated far into the town toward midnight on October 24th, before the garrison was apprised. The latter, commanded by the determined Linares, then opened a galling fire on the intruders, with the usual effect of causing the foremost to fall back and throw the rest into disorder. Mina flew from street to street to rally them; but example, exhortation, and threats were alike in vain. He found himself surrounded by military mobs paying no attention to his orders. One or two flank movements, supported by a determined sally, enabled the garrison to drive them from the town. "Had you ​done your duty," exclaimed the exasperated general to his officers, "the men would have done theirs, and Guanajuato would have been ours." He thereupon dismissed them with a censure to their respective districts, on guerrilla duty, and rode away with about a hundred followers.
He required rest and consultation before deciding on future movements, and withdrew to the rancho del Venadito, belonging to a devoted revolutionist and friend named Maríano Herrera, Pursuers were believed to be far away, and so Mina for once, after a long interval, abandoned himself to repose within the house, instead of staying as usual with his men. It so happened that this very day the watchful Orrantia came by accident to Silao, twenty miles off, seeking for traces of the general, and there received the desired information. Tired as he was, Orrantia pushed onward during the night, and with the first streaks of light on the morning of October 27th he rushed upon the farm. The startled sentries gave one shout of alarm and turned in flight, and the rest hurried after them as best they could, many being overtaken and killed, including Moreno, lately commandant of Sombrero. The noise roused Mina, who rushed out half ​dressed and unarmed, only to find himself deserted. The next moment a dragoon had seized him.
The news spread rapidly, and from Mexico orders were sent throughout the country to celebrate the occurrence with ringing of bells, volleys, masses, and other demonstrations, in manifestation of delight. Orrantia was rewarded with a colonelcy in the regular army; the captor received money as well as promotion, and the king testified his delight by dubbing Apodaca conde del Venadito, after the place where Mina was captured, a title which soon became to him an annoying nickname among the Mexicans.
Mina was conducted in triumph to the camp of Liñan, where the officers endeavored by their attentions to compensate for the indignities he had so far suffered among them. For there had been the imposition of shackles, in allusion to which Mina said: "I shudder more to observe so barbarous a custom than to submit to it." With praiseworthy spirit he declined to make any revelations. The viceroy ​repeated the order for his execution, and with a view to make an impression on the garrison of Los Remedios, the commanding hill of Bellaco was selected for the scene. As he was led forth on the afternoon of November 11th, a hush fell upon the battle, and the combatants turned to gaze in mute sympathy, one side upon a champion and martyr, the other upon an heroic countryman. "Do not let me suffer," said Mina, with resigned tranquillity, as he turned his back to receive the whizzing bullets.
And so closed a brief though brilliant career. Mina's genius is reflected in the daring nature of his undertaking, with its victories over the armies led by Armiñan, Ordoñez, and Castañon, and in nobility of mind he shines conspicuously by the side of men like Nicolás Bravo, to relieve with bright humanity a blood-stained period. With a few more followers such as he brought, the invasion might have achieved success, by a prompt advance against the yet scattered royalists, and by threatening Mexico itself; thus giving time for a more effective coöperation, perhaps for a wide uprising. He certainly came at an unfortunate moment, when the overthrow of Teran, Victoria, and other leaders had dampened the ardor of revolutionists, confined their struggle to narrow limits, closing the gates against foreign communication, and left royalist armies at liberty to combine in large force. Unacquainted with the country and the people, and ​without plans, Mina had moreover to struggle with the diffidence growing out of a comparison between his small party and the imposing armies of a rich government.
He also suffered from lack of discipline among the Mexicans, and from being subjected to a jealousy and distrust, due greatly to his character as a Spaniard. The revolutionists were divided with regard to his true intention; but there is no doubt that, while he may secretly have desired to maintain the connection between the mother country and the colonies, he worked faithfully for the independence. Whether the time was ripe or not, Mina evidently failed to strike the key-note; yet his efforts were by no means in vain, for they served to expose the weakness of the government, and demonstrate what a band of determined men might accomplish. They served also to sustain the revolutionary spirit, and pave the way for emancipation.
All this time the siege of Fort Los Remedios continued without interruption, varied alone by two brilliant ​sallies and disastrous assaults. Mina had so effectually harassed the royalists as to reduce them to great stress both for food and ammunition, but after his capture reënforcements as well as supplies came flowing in, and the batteries soon made sad havoc with the exterior works of the fortress, raking also a vast extent of ground. All this, however, would not have availed much against a place so well manned and provisioned, at least for some time longer, had not the ammunition begun to fail. The object of the last sally had been to supply the deficiency, and this failing, it was resolved to evacuate the stronghold on the night of January 1, 1818, by the difficult pathway from the Panzacola, but the least guarded and therefore the only available exit. As at Sombrero, the men chivalrously encumbered themselves with the women and children, who would probably meet with no worse fate than lenient imprisonment if they remained behind, but the sick and wounded were abandoned to the well known mercies of a ruthless foe.
Unfortunately, the mistake had been made to stop the usual call of the sentinels, and this intended precaution served only to apprise the royalists that flight was intended. Hence, before half the garrison had passed the gate the movement was discovered, and in a twinkling, the signal being given, beacons blazed up along the passes and hilltops, illuminating the whole route. And now were repeated the terrible scenes presented at Sombrero, of scattering fugitives seeking the dark recesses of the woods and gulches; of a panicstricken throng at the ravine pass, struggling in different directions, some to escape the onslaught of the ​soldiers, gathering with sword and pike and musket; others to avoid being pushed headlong over the precipice, already red with gore, and resounding with the groans of the bruised and dying. Large numbers grasped at temporary relief within the fortress, only to find it entered from the rear, while flames burst forth in every direction, enfolding also the hospital, and roasting alive the inmates, a few crawling forth to meet a speedier death on royalist bayonets. And so the slaughter and the hunt continued throughout the night, till morning came to add fresh zest. Torres escaped with only a handful, his track marked by bodies of the slain, which by this time had swollen to about 500. Over 400 prisoners had been taken, besides as many women and a host of children; but in this instance the example set by Mina succeeded in exempting at least the rank and file from the death awarded to the chiefs. They were consigned to Mescala presidio; the women were sent home, with heads ignominiously shaven, to nurse with the growing locks a deep thirst for vengeance. The bulwark of the independence was razed. ​ ​
* ↑ As Marshal Suchet testifies in his Mem., i. cap. iii.
* ↑ He was born Dec. 3, 1789, at Otan, near Monreal, the eldest son of a well-to-do land owner. After studying at Pampalona and Zaragoza, he became a volunteer, carried despatches across the French frontier, and then began the guerrilla war in Navarre, with the object of harassing convoys for French armies, and cutting off their communications. The biography in Robinson, Mem. Mex. Rev., i. 81-2, credits him with having inaugurated the guerrilla war in the peninsula. The regency rewarded his successes by making him a colonel, and finally comandante general also of Upper Arragon. In 1811 he was captured and sent to France, leaving his uncle, Espoz, who added to his own the now famous name of Mina, and was recognized as his successor, to add fresh glory to the family, which he did finally as one of the foremost generals of Spain. Mina, Breve Extracto de la Vida, 1-107, published at London in 1825, where this man was then an exile. Javier profited by his imprisonment at Vincennes to study military science, and on returning home, after an absence of three years, he was offered a prominent command in New Spain, but preferred to join his uncle in the vain revolt for the constitution. England recognized the services of the refugee by granting a pension. Portraits in Bustamante, Cuadro Hist., iv. 306; Alaman, Hist. Méj., iv. 547, 728; Frost's Pict. Hist. Mex., 160, etc.
* ↑ Six Spaniards, a few Italians, two Englishmen, and one American, to whom commissions were given, two of them above the rank of captain. The party included Doctor S. T. de Mier, a Mexican priest of distinguished descent, who had suffered persecution for his liberal ideas, and lived a poor exile in London. He joined as confessor. In his Declaracion, 800, he gives the names of some of the officers, and says that they embarked May 5th, on board the 'fragata Caledonia.' Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc., vi. no. 952. He adds that the English government provided him and other Spanish patriots with assistance, as it had Mina, by pension. England certainly favored Spanish liberals to a certain extent. The biographers also point out that Gen. Scott of the U. S. met Mina in London. Alaman adopts a misprint in the Spanish translation of Robinson concerning the number of followers.
* ↑ The Spanish minister was informed by deserters of the project and sought to stay the departure, but clearance papers were taken for the Antilles, and 200 men embarked quietly near Ft McHenry under Colonel Count de Ruuth, at the close of August. Mina followed Sept. 27th. Storms and desertion played some havoc among his men, and subsequently yellow fever; but the president of Hayti gave him aid, and French sailors filled the gaps. Rivera, Hist. Jalapa, ii. 67, and Zamacois, Hist. Méj., x., point at the indifference of the U. S. to Spanish remonstrances.
* ↑ A despatch boat sent with letters to Victoria had found all the ports in Vera Cruz occupied by royalists. Arrangoiz, Méj., i. 348, even declares that Mina secretly visited Vera Cruz, but this is doubtful. Although Aury aided the expedition with vessels and supplies, he at one time threatened to attack it because his subordinate, Col Perry, chose to transfer himself and 100 Americans to Mina's party. Aury had received his commission, including the rank of general, from the congress envoy Herrera. Toledo, who had formerly invaded Texas, sought also to assert his claims to the command, and a Spaniard named Correa is said, in Robinson, i. 121-5, to have tried to seduce the men; but this is doubtful. Meanwhile Mina had gone to New Orleans for additional aid, and was there tempted with a project to seize Pensacola; but it savored too much of a freebooter scheme for his taste. He left Galveston March 27th, and after watering at the Rio Bravo, landed on April 15th at the mouth of the Rio Santander, or Marina, the former site of the town of Soto la Marina, now situated 18 leagues above on the left bank of the river. This landing was suggested by Hinojosa, who knew this region. Mier, Vida, 34.
* ↑ A proclamation to the Spaniards had been issued already at Galveston and sent to New Spain for distribution; and now were issued others to royalist soldiers, and to his own men, together with six octaves of patriotic doggerel with the following refrain: 'Acabad Mexicanos De romper las cadenas, Con que infames tiranos Redoblan vuestras penas.' It was composed by Doctor Infante, who managed the printing-press of the expedition. The text of the different proclamations may be consulted in Bustamante, Cuad. Hist., iv. 317-23, 323-33, etc.; Alaman, Hist. Méj., iv. ap. 52 et seq.; Zamacois, Hist. Méj., x. ap. 9-21. In Ilust. Mex., ii. 388-91, iv. 264-8; Abispa de Chilpancingo, 77-8, 223-35, is also reproduced a letter to Arredondo of May 21st, urging him to join the cause, and arguing that Spain like England would gain more from liberated colonies by fresh impulse to trade and friendship. In conversation with the Spaniards he thought it prudent to leave the impression that he would, as in Spain, aim at the restoration of the constitution of 1812 rather than at independence. He counted also on the Masonic spirit among Spanish officers.
* ↑ Including Lieut-col Valentin Rubio and his brother, Lieut Antonio.
* ↑ 'Un peligro, tanto mas terrible cuanto menos esperado,' says Torrente, Hist. Rev., ii. 368. But the royalists had had ample warning. 'Apodaca tembló,' observes Bustamante, Cuad. Hist., iv. 338.
* ↑ Frightened by the sight of a few tents from approaching the shore, says the diary in Robinson, i. 155. There appears to have been a small battery close to them, however. Bustamante, Cuad. Hist., iv. 340, grows eloquent over the cat prisoner. Berenger's report in Gaz. de Mex., 1817, viii. 615-18, is headed, 'Destruction of the squadron of the traitor Mina.' Extra pay, badges of honor, and other rewards were granted to the men engaged.
* ↑ In the middle of June, near Matagorda. By this time they had become reduced to 40. They bravely refused the fair terms offered. Fourteen fell captive, 12 mortally wounded. Perry shot himself rather than yield. Gaz. de Mex., 1817, viii. 787-9. According to Mier, Declaracion, 811, Perry had become dissatisfied with the lack of confidence bestowed upon him. Before leaving he received extra arms, and agreed to skirmish in Texas and distract royalist attention. He had served with credit at New Orleans in 1815, and in Texas under Toledo. Major Stirling took his place as commander of Mina's union regiment. Colonel Ruuth had left with Aury, and was replaced by a Swiss captain, named Maylefer. During the foraging a successful encounter took place with the overwhelming forces of Garza.
* ↑ The force as definitely formed soon after consisted of general and staff, 11; guard of honor, composed of officers under Col Young, second in command, 31; regiment of the union, under Major Stirling, 56; 1st regiment of the line, Capt. Travino, 64; cavalry, under Maj. Maylefer, 124; artillerists, 5; servants, etc., 17; total, 308. Robinson, i. 101. Mier, who roughly estimates the force at 400, states that 30 of the garrison were local recruits, and as many more were soon enrolled. Declaracion, 811. The men were well uniformed from the abundant and varied stock on hand. See Robinson, i. 145. Rivera, Hist. Jalapa, ii. 68, who follows royalist sources, adds 200 recruits to Mina's party.
* ↑ Who came too late to occupy a pass in advance of Mina. His force is placed in Bustamante, Cuad. Hist., iv. 343, at 150, in Robinson, i. 107-8, 205, at nearly 400, and his loss at 6 prisoners, several killed, and 4 cannon. The prisoners were nobly set free, yet the royalists afterward shot a wounded hussar who fell into their hands. No pillage or disorder was permitted at the Valle, but a small contribution was levied, which, added to the horses and booty obtained on the way in fair capture, helped to cheer the party.
* ↑ Whereof 680 infantry of European regiments, and 1,100 of Rio Verde and Sierra Gorda cavalry, with a rear guard of 300. Robinson, i. 180. This is adopted in Bustamante and Alaman, and fairly confirmed in the less definite royalist reports, Gaz. de Mex., 1817, viii. 735-6, wherein the invaders are placed at 500-600, although Arredondo admits that their entire force, including the detachment at Soto la Marina, 'no excede de 400 á 500.' Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc., vi. 892; Torrente, Hist. Rev., ii. 376-7, seeks to equalize the forces.
* ↑ A mere feint, he afterward declared.
* ↑ Whereof 30 killed and 26 wounded, List in Robinson, i. 180, 11 of the wounded and 11 of the slain being officers. Royalist account places the dead opponents alone at 95 and allow for themselves only 116 killed and wounded. Torrente, Hist. Rev., ii. 378. For details, see Armiñan's report in Gaz. de Mex., 1817, viii. 733-44, wherein he casts the blame for the 'retirada,' as he calls it, on the Rio Verde cavalry. Mina's departure in the afternoon he attributes to an acknowledgment of fear, and his own subsequent advance to occupy the deserted hacienda he claims as a triumph, for which the viceroy indeed gave thanks, with rewards for the wounded. Mina cared for the royalist wounded, and sent a message to Armiñan to do the same for his, which was complied with. The writer in Robinson, i. 178, blames Col Noboa for not joining the fighters to swell the victory, and for prohibiting Maylefer to do so. Bustamante testifies, Cuad. Hist.,iv. 355-6, to the dismay created by the defeat at Mexico, Vera Cruz, etc., and thinks that he could have achieved a great advantage by marching on terrified San Luis Potosí, and there recruiting men for marching on Mexico. See also Mendíbil, Resúmen Hist., 328, etc. The use of buckshot is said to have promoted the panic.
* ↑ A valuable booty of money and rich clothing was obtained, besides 4 guns and other effects. Two guns were taken along. The garrison numbered 300.
* ↑ Their number had now diminished to 269, whereof 25 wounded, 39 having been killed and lost. Robinson, i. 205. For other rosters made about this time, see Soc. Mex. Geog., Bol., ép. 2, iii. 145-54.
* ↑ About 5 feet 7 inches.
* ↑ He took about 200 of his own, Moreno joined with 130, and some ragged infantry fell in on the way, forming nearly 400 in all. Robinson, i. 254. Alaman misinterprets the translation by adding 400 rabble on the way.
* ↑ In Robinson, i. 257-8, the prisoners are placed at 220, the slain at 339, and those who escaped at 150. Two guns and 500 muskets were taken. It is related that the royalists fired silver dollars; and Bustamante confirms the story by saying that one of the gunners could not find the necessary shot at the proper moment, and so threw in a handful of dollars. Cuad. Hist., iv. 377. It is agreed that Col Young and Maj. Maylefer led the victorious charge, yet a commentator in Soc. Mex. Geog., Bol., ép. 2, iii. 105-7, seeks patriotically to replace Young with Moreno. The insurgents crowned the victory every where with loud demonstrations.
* ↑ Doctor San Martin and Cumplido.
* ↑ The writer, in Robinson, i. 237-42, 277, etc., paints him in black colors as cruel, avaricious, vindictive, ready for wine, women, and gambling; a man who sustained himself by distributing subordinate commands among uneducated men, and who held tyrannic sway over the country people. His loyalty is admitted, however, and it is related that when two of his younger brothers wrote to him, under compulsion, from a royalist prison that their lives depended on his abandoning the cause, he replied that if they escaped he would shoot them for daring to propose terms so dishonorable. Id., 239. Even Bustamante condemns him. 'Torres no era capaz de hacer una accion buena, era un indecente.' Cuad. Hist., iv. 387, 538-9.
* ↑ And from the insignia on his despatches of four fasces enclosing a square with a lion in the centre. Bustamante, Cuad. Hist., iv. 386, 402, and Alaman, Hist. Méj., iv. 602, point out this indiscreet talk and its sad effect on the insurgents. Col Noboa assisted to spread this feeling by siding with and instigating Torres, for Mina had offended his haughty spirit by a reprimand. Moreno, Ortiz, Borja, and others remained faithful, however.
* ↑ On July 7th, the marquis fled with his 300 men, and servants pointed out a cache from which $140,000 was secured, besides other valuables. The owner subsequently claimed a loss of $183,000 in money and over $100,000 in other effects. Although this was no doubt exaggerated, Mina's men may have secured privately sums beyond the $140,000 from which they also filched. Robinson, i. 269-74. Bustamante regrets that Mina should have stooped to such robbery; he should at least have left a promise for later repayment. Cuad. Hist., iv. 385. The arbitrary seizure alarmed many creoles and created distrust.
* ↑ Young was made inspector of the Bajío troops; Noboa went with Torres to Fort Remedios to organize; the administration was remodelled, and a certain amount of pay was distributed. For Mina's appointment, see fac simile letter in Soc. Mex. Geog., Boletin, ép. 2, iii. 136.
* ↑ The towns paid tribute, under a passport sytem, which procured supplies and furnished in return clothing, ammunition, and other effects, and so the parties maintained one another.
* ↑ It was not uncommon for a colonel to command merely 50 men. Robinson, ii. 55. Mina's attempt to enforce order had little effect, and created ill-will.
* ↑ It was said of Pascual Liñan that he had suddenly been raised from a private soldier to mariscal, by the king, in return for his fidelity as servant; and he was declared illiterate, untrained, and coarse. Robinson, ii. 34-5. Bustamante, Cuad. Hist., 378-9, confirms the statement that he rose purely by favor, and adds, 'No tenia este gefe nombradia de valiente;' but others admit his bravery. Daoiz, now mariscal, replaced him as sub-inspector for the time.
* ↑ The verbal capitulation, before numerous witnesses, admitted them on June 15th as prisoners of war, with the promise of free dismissal to their homes, Americans to be sent to the U. S. Robinson, i. 304. A decree of the córtes of April 10, 1813, had set a bad precedent by declaring it derogatory to confirm a capitulation with insurgents. Bustamante, who was at the time a prisoner at Ulúa, testifies to the maltreatment of these men, and to Spanish breach of honor. Cuad. Hist., iv. 362-7; also in his Abispa de Chilpancingo, i. See feeling in U. S. thereat, Niles' Reg., xiv. 135, xvi. 237, xix. 396-7. Mier, who figured as apostolic prothonotary, was whisked off to the inquisition cells at Mexico, but suffered no great injury. He escaped three years later, became a deputy, and died in 1827, age 64. Payno has given his biography. Mier, Vida, Mex. 1865, 1-112, etc., full of adventures. His writings I have referred to under page 451, this volume. Arredondo was reproved by the viceroy for not shooting the prisoners, but leaving the responsibility to him. Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc., vi. 894-5, 856-7; Mendíbil, Resúmen Hist., 325-7; Atleta, Feb. 4, 1830, 185-6. Mier, Declaracion, 811-13, etc., describes the miserable fort at Soto la Marina. A few of the men, withdrawn to a battery at the mouth of the river, were included as prisoners, but a foraging party was shot down. The party numbered at one time 135 fighters. Mier assumes that the capitulation was subject to viceregal approval. Arredondo claims, in Gaz. de Mex., 1817, viii. 715-16, 695-6, that 300 persons were taken. This included the villagers and their families. Bustamanto maintains that Arredondo must have lost 300 in killed alone. Pap. Var., clix. pt xxxvi. Sardá escaped from Ceuta and became a general under Bolívar, Revista Cien., ii. 166.
* ↑ On his $500; on theirs $100. Not a very munificent offer.
* ↑ He attacked it with 500 men during the night of July 27th, but the garrison, just reënforced, obtained warning, and he was obliged to retire with a loss of 100 men, including 21 prisoners, who were shot. Mina nevertheless liberated those taken by his force. Robinson, ii. 6, etc.
* ↑ The official statement reproduced in Robinson, ii. 7-8, indicates 3,541 and 12 guns, but Solorzano claims that there were 5,000 with 20 guns, which may include later reënforcements. Torrente, Hist. Rev., ii. 381, admits 3,500, but Liñan's report in Gaz. de Mex., 1817, viii. 967-8, lessens the number. Bustamante, Cuad. Hist., iv. 396. The nature and distribution of the forces are given on adjoining pages. There were four main divisions; one under Brigadier Loaces, who occupied a position on the range commanding the entrance, and with him the headquarters of Liñan; another under Negrete, with troops reluctantly supported by Cruz of Nueva Galicia, was extended along the south; a third, under Ruiz, guarded the east and the approaches to the brook; while the fourth body, under Rafols, maintained communications with Guanajuato. Querétaro had been strengthened with new fortifications.
* ↑ The place took its name from a conic hill resembling a hat, which rose on the 1,500-foot-long plateau of the promontory.
* ↑ 'Strangled,' says Robinson, ii. 18; others say shot. During parleys held, Mina told the royalists that he came merely to restore the constitution of 1812. This was heard by his followers and left a bad impression. The sally took place early on August 8th.
* ↑ The misery was attributed partly to Mina's haste in ordering a dirty reservoir to be emptied and cleaned, for the rains were expected. Bustamante, Cuad. Hist,, iv. 398-9.
* ↑ Among those who objected were Moreno, and an Italian named Mauro; yet the former had favored negotiations. See also documents in Dicc. Univ., ii. 460. Robinson, i. 286, ii. 23-4, charges him with secreting supplies for himself and holding out in order to make money by low speculation. Bustamante, 373-4, praises him as one of the greatest patriots, who sacrificed his patrimony for the cause, who possessed natural ability, valor, and generosity. His name was inscribed among patriot heroes by the nation. Liñan's report shows that Moreno had plenty of water stored for himself in his house. Gaz. de Mex., 1817, viii. 975.
* ↑ They admitted about 200 in killed and wounded. A shower fell during the battle.
* ↑ He had been a lieut-col of the 29th regiment of U. S. infantry, and was greatly admired for his noble qualities.
* ↑ The women and children were spared. Impressed somewhat by Mina's example, the viceroy issued on the 24th an order to shoot only the leaders and invaders, consigning the rest to the presidio at Mescala; but it came too late. Liñan, obeying previous instructions, wrote: 'Los prisioneros fusilados segun las órdenes de V. E.' Gaz. de Mex., 1817, viii. 939. Details in Id., 967-78. Bustamante asserts that the royalists lost during the assault on the 15th alone 35 officers and over 400 men. Cuad. Hist., iv. 411; Mendíbil, Resúmen Hist., 334-42; Soc. Mex. Geog., Bol., vi. 306. Torrente reduces this figure to 312 killed, while placing the killed revolutionists at 619 natives and 71 foreigners. Hist. Rev., ii. 384.
* ↑ Besides reservoirs and an accessible brook. On its highest point rose the fort Tepeyac, and at the other lower extremity the Panzacola, from which led a narrow passage. The easy approach, covered by the works of Santa Rosalia, was to the right of the ridge connecting with Tepeyac.
* ↑ The supply embraced 30,000 fanegas of corn and wheat, and 3,000 head of food animals; with much material for making ammunition. Robinson, ii. 44.
* ↑ Thirty-one men captured with the hacienda Bizcocho, soon after the fall of Sombrero, and two officers, taken at S. Luis de la Paz.
* ↑ The former was attacked Sept. 10th, with from 1,200 to 1,500 men, it is claimed by royalists. Gaz. de Mex., 1817, viii. 1035-7; the latter on the 16th, with a loss of 20 killed. Id., 1073-4.
* ↑ This battle took place at the hacienda de la Caja, three leagues from Irapuato, on Oct. 11th. The main cause for the defeat is ascribed to an attack by a royalist detachment on the hacienda, where the women who usually encumber Mexican armies were abiding. Their shrieks and disorder created a panic which led to a general flight. Mina cut his way through Orrantia's lines with only 250 men, the latter not daring to pursue. He places his force at 1,000 horsemen and his loss at 35, allowing the enemy 900 men. Bustamante, Cuad. Hist., iv. 430-3. In Torrente, Hist. Rev., ii. 386, the numbers are given at 1,500 and 836 respectively, following Orrantia's report in Gaz. de Mex., 1817, viii. 1171-4.
* ↑ Liceaga, Adic. y Rectific., 297 et seq., adds some interesting details from his own experiences on that occasion, to supplement the accounts in Robinson and others. Liceaga, who was shot in the arm, received a colonelcy for his energy.
* ↑ A man who had suffered greatly at royalist hands for his cause, in ravaged lands, burned buildings, extorted ransoms, etc. He now lived in assumed poverty on his rancho.
* ↑ From the cura, says Robinson, but ever zealous in behalf of the cloth. Bustamante, Cuad. Hist., iv. 533-4, explains that a ranchero named Chagoya gave the information.
* ↑ Orrantia estimates the party at a round 200, of which nearly half were killed, 25 being captured and shot. Gaz. de Mex., 1817, viii. 1241-4. Herrera was also taken, but escaped execution by feigning madness, a deception maintained till 1821, when he joined the victorious republicans. According to Robinson, Mina brought only about 70 men, yet they might have made a stand had they chosen. The captor did not recognize his prize till he announced himself. It is related that Orrantia spoke insolently, calling him a traitor, etc., and Mina replying in no complimentary terms about the king, he struck him with the flat of his sword. 'It is sad to be a prisoner, but sadder still to be in the hands of one who fails to respect himself as a soldier and a Spaniard,' said Mina. Alaman, Hist. Méj., v. ap. 102-3, afterward corrects this story at the request of Orrantia, who declares that he struck him simply because he continued to abuse the king after being warned. He said nothing on being struck. Zamacois, Hist. Méj., x. 370-2. Orrantia also denies that Moreno's head was carried in triumph on a pike.
* ↑ The dragoon, José Miguel Cervantes of Nuevo Santander, received the prize money of $500, a special badge, and a corporalcy. The other soldiers obtained a general badge. Gaz. de Mex., 1818, ix. 134.
* ↑ And gave additional impulse to his request for a change, which was not granted. Bustamante, Cuad. Hist., iv. 443. For first news of the capture, with odes, etc., see Gaz. de Mex., 1817, viii. 1191, 1210-12.
* ↑ 'Sin haber querido hacer clase alguna de revelacion,'says Torrente, Hist. Rev., ii. 394, although Bustamante intimates that he answered certain questions. He made it a habit to destroy letters, keeping the information in cipher. Yet he is said to have written a letter to Liñan, declaring that if sometimes he seemed a less true Spaniard, it was an error, that the existence of the republican party meant ruin to the country, and offering, if his life were prolonged, to give advice for the speedy pacification of the provinces. Copy in Mendíbil, Resúmen Hist., 423, differs. Robinson, ii. 119-20, refuses to believe it authentic, and declares that he wrote about this time a letter to his comrade Erdozain, at Los Remedios, exhorting him to pursue a course marked by honor and consistency. Bustamante, Cuad. Hist., iv. 445-6, insists, however, that he has seen the autograph letter, and adds, that acting upon it Liñan wrote to the viceroy for instructions whether to spare Mina or not. Apodaca declared the offer of advice valueless, and ordered his execution. Mina certainly was somewhat disgusted with the revolutionists as he had found them, and Spanish pride was strong; so argues Ward, Mex., i. 255, among others. Yet we know that the authorities made it a rule to issue declarations over the name of almost every prominent captive, many of which are admitted to be doubtful or spurious; and we have royalist testimony to the fact that Mina refused to make any revelations. A number of men at Los Remedios offered to attempt a rescue, but Torres objected to it as a waste of life. Robinson, ii. 133; Revista Cien., ii. 164.
* ↑ After examination by numerous witnesses to place the deed beyond dispute, the body was buried in the field near by. For testimony, see Gaz. de Mex., 1817, viii. 1364-6. Later it was placed by the side of Hidalgo and other heroes, in the pantheon at Mexico. Bustamante describes the ceremonies. Cuad. Hist., iv. 457-60. By decree of July 19, 1823, Mina and Moreno were declared beneméritos with Hidalgo, etc. Mex., Col. Dec. y Ord., ii. 150.
* ↑ True, he yielded for a moment at Bizcocho to clamoring followers and deep sorrow; and the seizure of property at Jaral was regrettable, in the manner rather than the act.
* ↑ Robinson, ii. 128, 143, thinks that with 1,000 foreigners he might have done as he pleased; or had Torres proved loyal, all might have gone well. Alaman admits that 2,000 invaders could have achieved their aim. American merchants gave far less aid than the English. The delay at Soto la Marina was unwise, and some think Mina should have taken all his forces along.
* ↑ His utterances to Spanish soldiers in favor of the constitution of 1812 can be counted only as efforts to promote the cause. When offered the military command in New Spain, before his flight from Spain, he is said to have refused it partly on the ground that it was impossible and inadvisable to subjugate the country, as Mendíbil, Resúmen Hist., 316-17, also points out. His different proclamations are clearly enough for independence, and he lands under the title of a general of the Mexican republic. Liceaga, Adic. y Rectific., 300-2, is ready to accept him, with Alaman, Hist. Méj., iv. 628, as a champion of independence; Torrente, Hist. Rev., ii. 368, 394-5, stamps him as a republican who seeks to 'arrebatar de las manos de su Soberano i Señor los dominios,' etc., and Baz so receives him, Gallo Hombres Ilustres., iv. 283-295; and Robinson never questions his motives. Yet Bustamante assumes him to be a Spaniard at heart, intent only on reëstablishing the constitution of 1812, and is therefore glad that he failed. 'Yo tengo para mí que fué una extraordinaria providencia del cielo que no lograra su empresa.' Cuad. Hist., iv. 455. Ward, Mex., i. 236-7, sides rather with Bustamante. Americans would no doubt accept the enrolment of troops, mainly in the United States, as an argument that Mina aimed at a separate republic. He firmly rejected the tempting offer to begin with freebooter schemes at Pensacola.
* ↑ Despite his prejudices, Bustamante accords glowing tribute to Mina, as rivalling Napoleon in glory. Abispa, i. 77. Alaman, Hist. Méj., iv. 628, refers to this episode as the 'mas brillante' of the revolution; 'as full of lustre as any of the same duration,' adds Robinson, Mem. Mex. Rev., ii. 126-7. If some condemn the undertaking as rash, they must consider that Mina started it while Teran, Victoria, and others still flourished. When he heard of their downfall, it was too late to recede. Torrente, Hist. Rev., ii. 395, estimates the cost of the expedition at over $2,000,000, expended on 14.000 uniforms, 12,000 fire-arms, 30 cannon, etc., but the figures are very doubtful.
* ↑ The former early in Oct. and at close of Dec., against the Tigre battery, which had opened a breach in the breastworks of Santa Rosalia. On the first occasion captains Crocker and Ramsay carried the battery with 250 men, and destroyed it, the defenders believing that Mina was upon them. The second sally was only partially successful, for the battery had been strongly reconstructed. The assaults in the middle of Sept. and Nov. were repulsed with heavy loss, especially on the latter occasion, when nearly 400 royalists were killed or wounded.
* ↑ Attempts had also been made to undermine the chief bastion, but so un skilfully as to be of no avail.
* ↑ Among the executed captives were Col Noboa and Lieut-gen. Muñiz, known as the gunner, from his predilection for unwieldy artillery. He had lately accepted pardon, but was lured by Mina's fame to join the cause again. Arroyo was bayoneted. Liñan gives a list of 15 guns taken, and some material for ammunition, and makes no allusion to the sentinel call. The garrison proper had dwindled to about 1,000 men. Details in Gaz. de Mex., 1818, ix. 162-86. See also preceding parts for reports on the progress of the siege. Torrente, Hist. Rev., ii. 393-4, places the total royalist loss at 171 killed and about 350 wounded, and Liñan seeks to cover it by praising the valor of the garrison, and dwelling on the strength of Los Remedios. The besieging force appears to have swelled to fully 6,000 men. Bustamante, Cuad. Hist., iv. 502, states that 273 men were sent to Mescala. Robinson, ii. 166, who denies that any ammunition was left, intimates that the women were outraged. A large number of decorations and promotions were given to the victors, with badges to all the men. See also Noticioso Gen., Oct. 1817 to Jan. 1818, passim. The earliest and most complete account of Mina's expedition was issued in 1820 by an American merchant, William Davis Robinson. He rushed into print mainly to ventilate his ill-feeling against the Spanish government for financial wrongs and imprisonment inflicted upon him. The former came from mercantile operations with South America since 1799, the latter from joining in the expedition to Goazacoalco in 1816, under Teran, to whom he sold a lot of arms. For this transaction he was carried to Spain a prisoner, but escaped in the spring of 1819, while under parole, on hearing that he was about to be transported to the dungeons of Ceuta. He modestly consigns his own adventures and affairs to an introduction and an appendix, devoting the text mainly to Mina's expedition, for its interest and the apt illustration it affords to expose Spanish misrule and weakness. The story is preceded by a review of the colonial régime and an outline of operations prior to 1817, and followed by a special chapter on Spanish cruelty, and another on the problem of interoceanic communication, with observations 011 trade prospects, the whole pleasingly interspersed with sketches and reflections on customs and institutions in New Spain, as a rule favorable to the Creoles, although abusive against peninsular connections. The account is woven from different material, the story of Mina being drawn from the journal of J. A. Brush, who accompanied the hero from England, and served a while as commissary-general. Robinson's knowledge of the field adds value to his work. The fresh interest roused by Iturbide's revolution extended also to this work, issued at Philadelphia in 1820, 396 pp., and in the following year it was reprinted at London in two volumes, with a portrait of Mina. Three years later appeared a Spanish translation, somewhat faulty, and with suppression of many facts as disagreeable and needless. Bustamante makes it a task to combat and correct many of Robinson's statements, while praising his ability and claiming to have furnished most of his information—see Cuad. Hist., iii. 377, iv. 306-7—and he certainly adds many new points from different sources, toning his narrative somewhat to suit his conception of Mina as a Spaniard intent mainly on restoring the constitution of 1812. Briefer forms of his versions are given in Cavo, Tres Siglos, iv. 138-66, and Mendíbil, Resúmen Hist., 314-53. I have been able to throw additional light with aid of such recent collections as Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc., vi. 647-948 passim, containing among other papers the testimony of Doctor Mier before the inquisition, Declaracion, somewhat vague and distorted by fear, yet valuable; and I have found interesting details in Mier, Vida; Mina, Breve, Extracto de la Vida, Lóndres 1825; in scattered documents in Soc. Mex. Geog., dp. 2, iii. 136, 145-69; Pap. Var., xlii. pt viii., cxlix. pt vi., etc., and I have made a close examination of royalist reports in Gaz. de Mex., 1817-18, and other sources. Alaman's very acceptable version, Hist. Méj., iv. 547 et seq., rests on Robinson, Bustamante, and the Gazetas, and he is closely followed by Zamacois, Hist. Méj., x. 243 et seq., with a few corrections, and still closer by Arrangoiz, Méj., i. 343-63, who nevertheless adds a point or two. The article in Dicc. Univ., v. 381-493, is by Alaman. Liceaga, Adic. y Rectific., 275-307, contributes a personal story of the raid on Guanajuato. On Robinson rest mainly the accounts in Ward's Mex., i. 236-59; Young's Hist. Mex., 129-69; Kennedy's Texas, 291-300, relating mainly to the stay at Galveston; Gregory's Hist. Mex, 42, etc.; Mayer's Mex. Aztec., i. 295-7. In Zavala, Rev. Mex., 68-73; Revista Cien., ii. 15970;Beltrami, Mex., i. 82-161, 351-73, are some observations, the latter showing little regard for facts, however. Rivera, Hist. Jalapa, ii. 65 et seq., bases his account mainly on royalist reports, while favoring the republic. Vigneaux, Souv. Mex., 436, compares Mina to Raousset Boulbon, of later Sonora fame. In Gallo, Hombres Ilustres, iv. 283-95, is a eulogy on Mina; Olavarria y Ferrari, Conde del Venadito, 1-160, is mainly devoted to him, and his story has been specially elaborated for youths in Mina, Biog., Paris, 1872, 1-175. For additional authorities on this and four preceding chapters, see Córtes, Diario, 1813, xviii. 433; 1813, xxi. 151; 1820, ix. 15; 1821, ii. 2; 1821, xiii. 16; Córtes, Diario Congreso, i. 105; Córtes, Act. Ord., 1814, i. 453, 457, 463-4, 489-90; ii. 14, 19, 24, 95, 160, 187, 260, 202, 331, 345, 349, 353; Cedulario, MS., iv. 34, 38; Gaz. de Mex., 1813, iv. 865-9, 961-3, 1082-4, 1088, 1090-1, 1099-1102, 1350-1; 1814, v. passim; 1815, vi. passim; 1810, vii. passim; 1817, viii. passim; 1818, ix. 59-64, 134, 257-61; Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc., i. 777-814, v. 45-91, 126-30, 167-75, 238-50, 273-83, 292-335, 375-613, 650, 662-775, 810, 918, vi. 29-100, 215-74, 313-444, 460-514, 529-802, 925-48, 1042-49; Alaman, Hist. Méj., iii. 425-7, 580, 583, iv. 1-309, 328-509, 539638, 724-8, ap. 11-17, 27-40, 45-7, 52-8, 100-7, v. 958, 900; Bustamante, Cuad. Hist., i. 49-51, 103, 119, 325-7, ii. 119, 249-58, 274, 288-95, 407-28, iii. 3-87, 97-399, 422-4, iv. 23-4, 160-7, 171-502, 533-4, 541-7, v. 4, 21-31, 45-53; Id., Elogio Morelos, 8, 20-8; Id., Campañas de Calleja. 9-13, 18, 21, 96, 166, 178, supl. 1-18; Id., Notic. Biog., 18-19, 22-4; Id., Martirologio, 19-20; Id., Mem. Hist. Mex., MS., iii. 41-3; Alegre, Hist. Comp. Jesus, iii. 306-8; Liceaga, Adic. y Rectific., 251-307; Rivera, Hist. Jalapa, i. 406-73, 501-31, 41-2, 548-51, 5-136; Cavo, Tres Stiglos, iv. 111-66; Torrente, Revol. Hisp. Am., i. 431-2, 445-6, ii. 87-110, 186-204, 273-94, 368, 372-93; Mendibil, Resúmen Hist., 191-360, 397-423; Carriedo, Etud. Oaj., 14-15, 25-6, 29-36, 115-16; Robinson's Mex. Rev.,i. 69, 110-17, 140-320, ii. 5-72, 77-92, 96-124, 131-6, 155-62; Ward's Mex., i. 173-4, 188, 191-2, 199, 205-7; 212-14, 217, 220, 222-5, 234-61, app. 509-25; Negrete, Observ. Carta, 10; Niles' S. Am. and Mex., 144-53; Niles' Reg., v. 436, viiii. 436, ix. passim, x. 286, 386, 415-16, xi. passim, xii. passim, xiii. passim, xiv. passim, xvi. 237, 366, xix. 396-7; Noticioso Gen., 1815-18, passim; Abispa de Chil., 77-8, 223-35; Ahrens, Mex. Zustände, 8-10; Alerta á los Méj.; Perez, Past, del Obispo, 1-47; Bodega y Mollinedo, Man. de la Repres., 1-12; Calend. Man. ó Guia, 1814, 49-78, 100-71, 172-207; Am. State Pap., iv. 1, 422-626; Const. Apatz., l-SS; Aranjo y San Roman, Impugn., i.-vi. 59-66; Arizpe, Idea Gen., 4-10; Arrillaga, Recop., Jan.-June, 1836, 59-64, 290-2; Atleta, Feb. 4, 1830, 185-6; Barrera, Elogio Lobera, passim; Bib. Amer., 409-10; Beltrami, Mex., i. 82-8, 116-18, 159-61, 341-78; Blasco, Discurso Civ., 6-9; Bonnycastle's Span. Am., 47-9, 55-6, 62-3, 88-158; Chynoweth's Max., 12-14; Conder's Mex. and Guat., 115, 117, 124-6; Domenech, Hist. Mex., ii. 21-30; Bustamante, Muerte Morelos, MS., 1-4; Diario Deb., 10 Cong., ii. 530-3; Dergeho, Inter. Mex., 3d pt, 470-93; Dublan y Lozano, Leg. Mex., i. 427-8, 433-51; Dispos. Var., ii. 18-19, 35; Est. May. Gral. Ejec., 1-2; Escalera y Llana, Méj. hist.-descrip., 10-12; Ferry, Révol. Méx., 47-93, 97-125; Fernando VII., Decretos, passim; Fernando VII., Doc., 312-14, 337-49; Fossey, Le Mexique, 502-3; Frost's Pict. Hist. Mex., 160; Gachupines, Eterna Mem., 1-4; Gallo, Homb. Ilust., iii. 597-8, iv. 221-95; Gregory's Hist. Mex., 42-3; Gonzalez, Hist. Aguascal., 83-5; Hassel, Mex. und Guat., 135; Jesuitas en Mex., 4; llustrac. Mex., ii. 388-91, iv. 213-18; Iturbide, Breve Diseño, 1-10; Jalisco, Notic., 2, 59, 72; Kennedy's Tex., i. 272-5, 291-300; Ker's Travels, 209-98; Kollenkamp, Unabhaengigketiskampf, 177, 320-9; Lancaster Jones, Or. Cív., 5; Ledo, Alocucion, 1-8; Lempriere, Notes Mex., 424-5; Loreto, Mission Rec., MS., 59; Méjico, Bosquejo Liger., 22-39; Mex., Decreto Constit., 1814, 1-68; Mex., Bosquejo Revol., 38; Mex. Col. Dec. y Ord., 116; Soc. Mex. Geog. Bolet., 2$^a$ ép., iii. 1441/2-69; Mex., El Virey de N. Ep., 2-14, 18; Miery Teran, Segunda Manifest., 1-127; Mier, Vida, 3-112; Modelo de los Crist., 1-128; Mex. and Guat., 116-26; Mora, Rev. Mex., iv. 323-4, 439, 443-4; Museo Mex., ii. 121-31; Olavarria y Ferrari, El Conde de Venadito, 1-160; Orizava, Ocurrencias, 41-127; Quixano, Discurso sobre la Insurrecion, 1-35; Peña, Arenga Cív., 21-3; Pedraza, Oracion, 8; Mendizábal, Carta Edific.; Torres, Desengaño á los Reb., 705-18; Pap. Far., 1xvi. ptii.; Columbini, Canto Endecas, 1-40; Vindicac. Escritores, 2-6; Exposic. á las Córtes, 8; Bergosa y Jordan, Carta Pastoral, 1-20; Pizarro, Reflexiones, 1-11; Apuntes para Hist., 4-8; Pap. Var., clviii. pt 1vi.; Gutierrez, Doc., 5-14; Pedraza, Biog. Caudillos, 20-32; Perez, Dicc. Geog., i. 524-40, iii. 665-74, iv. 179-88; Perez y Comoto, Represent., 12-15, 18-20, 29-31; Polynesian, v. 45; Quart. Review, xvii. 548-53; Id., xxx. 177-9; Rivero, Mex., 1842, 151; Rivas, Carta Past.; Rev. Sp. Am., 331-42; Revista Cient. Lit. Méj., ii. 159-70; Rockwell's Span, and Mex. Law, 398-404; San Salvador, Suscrip., 1-22; Soc. Mex. Geog., 2$^a$ ép., iii. 136-7, 145-9, 151, 157-8, 163-5, vi. 306; Sosa, Episc. Mex., 214-15, 239-40; Suarez y Navarro, Hist. Méj., 6; Thompson's Recoil. Mex., app. 277-9; Vidaurre, Votos; Vigneaux, Souv. Mex., 436; Young's Hist. Mex., 108-10, 114-17, 129-67; Rosa (L. de la), Discurso, 15-16, 31; El Liberal á los Bajos Escritores, 67-8; Miller, Reflexiones, 1-8; Yuc., Compend. Hist.; Manifesto á Todas las Naciones, pt i. 1-66, pt ii. 62-6; Zerecero, Rev. Mex., 116-23, 161-4, 212, 223, 244-57, 260-71, 295-6, 398; Zavala, Rev. Mex., 57, 68-73, 74-116, 194-5, 312-17; Dice. Univ. Hist. Geog., i. 744-5, ii. 129-30, 456-62, v. 381-403, viii. 685, ix. 26-9, 318, 741, 759-80, 847, x. passim, ap. i. 220-32, 274, 426-7; Zamncois, Hist. Mex., ii. 723, vii.-x. passim, xi. 311, 360-1; Guerra, Rev. N. Esp., i. 281-5, 337-8, 352-4, 491-2; Mayer's Mex. as It Was, 335; Mayer's Mex. Azt., i. 291-300; Interf. Brit. Govt., 7-14; Mayer's MSS.; Arroniz, Biog. Mex., 226-31,244-9; Arrangoiz, Méj., i. 237-334, 343-68.