# An Antidote Against Atheism/Appendix/Chapter V

Chap. V.
1. That there is a vast difference betwixt arguing from forced Figments or fancies, and from the natural Ideas of our own Minds. 2. That the Idea of a Being absolutely Evil does not imply necessary Existence, whether it signifie a Being absolutely Imperfect, 3. Or absolutely Wicked, 4. Or absolutely Miserable, 5. Or absolutely Mischievous. 6. That if by a Being absolutely Mischievous were meant onely the Infinite power of doing hurt, this is God, whose absolute Goodness prevents the execution thereof. 7. That the right Method of using our Reason is to proceed from what is plain and unsuspected to what is more obscure and suspicable. 8. That according to this Method, being assured first of the Existence of a Being absolutely Perfect from his Idea, we are therewithall inabled to return answer, that Impossibility of Existence belongs to a Being either absolutely Miserable or absolutely Mischievous. 9. That the Phænomena of the World further prove the impossibility of the Existence of a Being absolutely Mischievous. 10. And that the Counsels and Works of God are not to be measured by the vain Opinions of Men.
1. As for those that admit necessary Existence to be included in the Idea of a Being absolutely Perfect, but would shew that our Inference from thence, viz. That this perfect Being doth Exist, is false and sophistical, because necessary Existence is contained in the Idea of a Being absolutely Evil, which notwithstanding we will not admit to Exist (for, say they, that which is absolutely Evil is immutably and ever unavoidably such, and cannot but be so, and therefore it cannot but Exist, and ever has Existed:) To these we answer, That we shall easily discover the grand difference betwixt such arbitrarious and forced Figments and fancies as these, and the naturall and consistent Ideas of our own Mind, if we look more carefully and curiously into the Nature of what these Objectors have ventured to utter, and sift out what either themselves mean, or what must necessarily be understood by this Idea of a Being absolutely Evil; which they have thus forged.
2. By the Idea of a Being absolutely Evil must be meant either the Idea of a Being absolutely Imperfect, or absolutely Wicked, or absolutely Miserable, or absolutely Mischievous.
Now the Idea of what is absolutely Imperfect removes from it ​whatever sounds Perfection; as if all Perfectness were 1000, then this Idea removes from this absolute imperfect every unite of these 1000, allowing not so much as an unite or fraction of an unite, no not the possibility of them, to what is thus absolutely imperfect. So that what is absolutely imperfect is impossible to Exist. But necessary Existence is a Term of Perfection, as was plainly demonstrated before.
3. The Idea of a Being absolutely Wicked removes from it all manner of Goodness, Equity, Decorum, Righteousness; and implies a firm and immutable aversation of the Will from all these, and a settled and unchangeable purpose of doing things wickedly: but intimates nothing either of the Necessity or Contingency of the Existence of the Substance of this Being; that being neither here nor there to the moral deformity thereof, as is evidently plain at first sight.
4. The idea of a Being absolutely Miserable is the Idea of a Being that sustains the fullest and compleatest torments that are conceiveable; and this must be in a knowing, passive, and reflexive Subject. Now, I say, this torture arising partly from the sense of present smart, and partly out of reflexion of what it has suffered, and a full belief that it shall suffer thus eternally; this miserable Being, though but a Creature, is as perfectly tormented as it could possibly be if it necessarily existed of it self. For if it were always, though but contingently and dependently of another, the torture is equally perfect; and therefore necessary Existence is not included in the Idea thereof.
Again, the Objector is to prove that a Being wholly Immaterial can suffer any torture: which till he do, it seeming more reasonable that it cannot, I shall flatly deny that it can; and therefore do assert, that a torturable Being is a Spirit incorporate; and affirm also, as a thing most rational, that this Spirit, if very great pain was upon it, such as that it were better for him not to be at all then to be in it, that anguish by continuance would be so increased, (pain infinitely overpowering the vital vigour, and overpoising the contents of life and sense) that it would die to the Body in which it is thus tormented. But if it be not in so ill a plight as to change its state of conjunction, but that the torture proves tolerable; then necessary Existence would not be its misery, but some part of happiness: so that there can be no such thing as a Being absolutely Miserable in the world. For Misery rack'd up to the highest would make the thing cease to be. As a man cannot say an absolute big Triangle; for a Circle will be always bigger: or rather no Figure can be absolutely big because the nature of it is to be limited.
Thirdly, The Idea of a Being absolutely Perfect is compos'd of Notions of the same denomination, all of them of themselves sounding absolute Perfection; but the Idea of a Being absolutely Miserable is not compiled of Notions that found absolute Misery of themselves. For what Misery, but rather good, is there in necessary Existence? Wherefore if we should contend that an inference from the Idea of a thing to its necessary Existence is onely warrantable there where the Idea consists of Notions of one denomination, the Objector is to take off the distinction.
Or, to speak more plainly, absolutely necessary Existence and ' ​Self-existence is one and the same Notion: But Self-existence is the most high and perfect mode of Existence that is conceivable, and therefore proper to what is most absolutely Perfect. Wherefore to transplant Self-existence to so pitiful an Idea as the Idea of a Being absolutely Miserable, is as absonous and prodigious as to clap the head of a Lion to the body of a Snail. Nay, indeed, it seems more contradictious, that being but the misplacing of Body and Figure, but this the implantation of an inward Property into a wrong Subject; nay infinitely contrary properties in the same Subject.
5. Fourthly and lastly, As for a Being absolutely Mischievous, it seems indeed to include necessary and unavoidable Existence as well as Omnipotency and Omnisciency, or else this Soveraign Mischief is not so full and absolute as our apprehension can conceive. These added to a peremptory and immutable desire or will of doing all mischief possible for Mischief sake, do fully complete the Notion of this absolute Mischievous Being.
But how spurious and unnatural this Idea is, is evident in that it does again forcedly tie together Notions of a quite contrary nature, the greatest Imperfection with the highest Perfections, joyning the incommunicable Attributes of God with that which is haply worse then we can demonstrate to be in any Devil; nay such as seem a contradiction in any Subject whatsoever.
Wherefore, as I intimated before, if any man pretend our Argument to be a Sophism, and in imitating it would discover the fallacy in some other Matter, he is exactly to observe the Laws thereof in his imitation, and constitute an idea of Notions that agree with the same Title, as they exquisitely do in the Idea of a Being absolutely Perfect; for there is no notion there but what founds highest Perfection.
But in this idea of a Being absolutely Mischievous there is nothing that of its own nature signifies mischief, but that wicked and malicious desire of doing mischief merely for mischiefs sake. Which is a degree of Imperfection sunk into the borders of Inconsistency and Contradiction. But yet to be able accurately to destroy all good whatsoever, implies again an Omnipotency in Power, and an Omnisciency. But what is omnipotently and absolutely mischievous, must also destroy it self, as an infinitely-big Triangle implies no Triangle at all. So that this idea is not free from the intanglement of multifarious Contradictions in the conception thereof.
6. But if by a Being absolutely Mischievous were meant, a Being that has the power and skill of doing all mischief imaginable, and indeed far above all the Imagination and Conceit of man, and that so effectually and universally that nothing possibly can prevent him; this is indeed the Eternal God, who is necessarily of himself, and prevents all things, and can be limited in his actions by none but by himself: but he being that absolute and immutable Good, and full and pure Perfection, he cannot but include in his Idea that precious Attribute of Benignity; and therefore acting according to his entire Nature, he is not onely Good himself, but, by the prerogative of his own Being, keeps out such mischievous ​Soveraignties as have been here pleaded for, from ever having any Existence in the world.
7. Wherefore to bring our Answer to a head, I say, we are to use that natural method in this Speculation that men that know the use of their Faculties observe in all others, viz. to assent to what is most simple, easie and plain first, and of which there can be no doubt but that the Notion is congruous and consistent; and such is the Idea of a Being absolutely Perfect, no arbitrarious or fortuitous figment, or forced compilement of Notions that jarre one with another, or may be justly suspected, if not demonstrated, to be incoherent and repugnant; such as for example would be a walking Tree, or or an intelligent Stone, or the like: but such as wherein the Notions naturally and necessarily come together to compleat the conception of some one single Title, as being homogeneal and essential thereunto.
8. And then what I contend for is this. That attending to this Natural Idea of God, or a Being absolutely Perfect, we unavoidably discover the necessity of actual Existence, as inseparable from him, it being necessarily included in this Idea of absolute Perfection: which is still more undeniably set on in the last push of my Argument, where I urge that either Impossibility, Contingency, or Necessity of actual Existence must needs belong to a Being absolutely Perfect; but not Impossibility nor Contingency, therefore Necessity of actual Existence.
And therefore being so well secured of this Truth, I require the Objector to bring up his Argument to this last and clearest frame, and let him also urge that either Impossibility, Contingency, or Necessity of actual Existence, belongs either to a Being absolutely Miserable or absolutely Mischievous; and I shall confidently answer, Impossibility of Existence, and give him a further reason, besides what I intimated before of the incongruity of the Notions themselves, that it is also repugnant with the Existence of God, whom, without any rub or scruple, attending to the natural and undistorted suggestions of our own Faculties, we have already demonstrated to exist.
9. And still to make our Answer more certain concerning a Being absolutely Mischievous, it is most evident He is not, and therefore sith he must be of himself if he be at all, it is impossible he should be: And that he is not, is plain, because things would then be infinitely worse then they are, or not at all; whenas I dare say they are now as well as it is fit or possible for them to be, if we had but the wisdome to conceive or comprehend the whole counsel and purpose of Providence, and knew clearly and particularly what is past and what is to come.
10. But if we take up, out of our own blindness or rashness, Principles concerning the Providence of God that are inconsistent with his Idea (such as the Ptolemaical Systeme of the Heavens, which (as some say) Alphonso looked upon (though others tell the story of the misplacement of certain Mountains on the Earth) as so perplex'd a Bungle, that transported with zeal against that fond Hypothesis, he did scoffingly and audaciously profess, that if he had stood by whilst God made the World, he could have directed the Frame of it better) we shall indeed then have occasion to ​quarrell, but not with either the Counsels or Works of God, but rather with the Opinions of ignorant and mistaken men.