# History of Mexico (Bancroft)/Volume 4/Chapter 26

Contents
CHAPTER XXVI.
LAST CAMPAIGNS UNDER CALLEJA.
1815-1816.
Effect of Morelos' Fall — Respective Strength of Insurgents and Royalists — Intrigues and Overthrow of Rosains — He Joins the Enemy — Teran Rises in Fame and Influence — Arrival of the Congress at Tehuacan — It is Forcibly Dissolved — The Goazacoalco Expedition — First Naval Victory for the Mexican Flag — The Mounted Raiders of Apam Plains — Osorno's Last Campaign — The Convoy Service in Vera Cruz — Miyares' Measures for its Protection — Operations under Victoria and his Associates — Bravo and Guerrero on the South Coast.
The termination of Morelos' career, which to the royalists appeared so great a blow, was after all the fall of only one among the leaders. The late generalissimo might have accomplished much good had he been allowed to raise his voice in the south, where none stood so high as he, or had he been sent to promote harmony along the gulf coast; but in Michoacan, under the thumb of the congress, his influence counted little. The disaster at Tezmalaca was hardly felt beyond the Zacatula. Teran controlled, in the region of Tehuacan, about 2,000 well armed and disciplined men, and had a certain influence in Mizteca, where Sesma and Guerrero also commanded perhaps 1,000 mountaineers. He was, moreover, recognized by some chiefs in Vera Cruz province, although here Victoria claimed to be the leading spirit, with nearly 2,000 men, most of them mounted rancheros, intent mainly on spoils and adventure. Osorno had a similar and more united force of about 1,000, with a few scattered bands ​northward in the Querétaro region, and in the lake ranges of Mexico. Torres led 800 in the Bajío of Guanajuato, with as many more to the north-eastward under Correa and others. Resales still held out in Zacatecas with 300, and Vargas claimed to control 700 men along the southern border of Nueva Galicia, including Chapala Lake. In Michoacan were the Rayon brothers, Carbajal, and Yarza, with from 500 to 800 each, besides unenrolled adherents, extending from Cóporo along the range westward to Zacapo Lake, and connected southward in Tecpan with Ávila, Pablo Galeana, and Montesdeoca, who controlled from 500 to 700 men in all. To these forces Morelos assigns from 7,000 to 8,000 muskets, 1,000 pairs of pistols, and 200 pieces of artillery, the greater part of the former either worn out or not generally used. The resources from farms under their control might be placed at a million pesos a year, to which has to be added tribute levied on convoys and traders, a little excise, and the yield from raiding expeditions. All this was insufficient to support more than a limited body; but the number could, when occasion demanded it, especially with the hope of booty, be raised to triple the figure representing the fire-arms.
The royalists, on the other hand, could boast of 30,000 men, half of them regular troops, and the remainder local militia. Of this force over 6,000 were distributed in Vera Cruz, over 8,000 in Puebla, 4,500 in and round the lake valley, 2,600 under Armijo in the south, nearly 4,000 in the army of the north under Iturbide, 1,600 in Querétaro and San Luis Potosí, besides 4,000 in the Provincias Internas de Oriente, ​3,400 in Nueva Galicia, and a somewhat larger force in the Occidente, to which must be added the armed citizens in towns, villages, and farms; so that the royalists could really command about 80,000 men, on the whole better armed and disciplined than the insurgent forces, and with increasing resources, as the latter were driven back, but also with proportionately heavier expenses than the more frugal and enduring patriots. Calleja's plan henceforth was to isolate the insurgent leaders as much as possible from each other, and press steadily upon them, reducing one stronghold after another.
The central point of war operations had changed to Puebla and Vera Cruz, as we have seen. The flight of Rayon gave a fresh impulse to Rosains' plans for asserting his authority over this region; and to this end he proposed first that Osorno should join him in surprising the forces of Marquez Donallo, who occupied the line between them. But Osorno was justly ​suspicious of the intrigues, and kept aloof. Meanwhile Donallo got wind of the project, and turned the tables by falling unexpectedly upon Rosains at Soltepec, near Huamantla, on January 22, 1815, and inflicting a crushing defeat. The disaster carried rejoicing to the others, and Osorno, Arroyo, and Calzada not only declared their independence, but joined in picking up stragglers from the defeated army, and in taking
possession of several of Rosains' towns. Sesma abandoned him and retired to Mizteca, and a number of chiefs in Vera Cruz withdrew their allegiance, ​choosing the successful Victoria for lieutenant-general, under the pretence of adhering to the congress.
Rosains gave vent to his rage by sending an agent to ravage and reduce to ashes the town of San Andres, simply because the otherwise well disposed population had been reduced by his rivals. Undaunted as ever, he thereupon collected all the force he could muster against the leaders in Vera Cruz. His men by no means relished a campaign against brethren in arms, and their chief having been repulsed on the Jamapa, they nearly all abandoned him. Teran, who had so far remained true, was now persuaded to arrest and remove him from command. This was effected August 20th, and after being tossed from one leader to another, it was resolved to send him in chains to the congress. On the way he escaped, accepted pardon from the viceroy, and repaid it with most injurious exposures of insurgent plans. And so disappeared a man who owed his rise to the partiality of Morelos rather than to ability as a leader, and who chose to sacrifice the cause of his country and the blood of his adherents to satisfy a selfish ambition and indulge a choleric temperament.
Calleja considered this a good opportunity to seize upon Tehuacan, the centre of Rosains' district. The ​task was intrusted to Governor Alvarez of Oajaca, who on the way laid siege to Teotitlan. Teran came to the rescue and managed to surprise the royalists, inflicting so severe a chastisement that they retired whence they came. So notable a success could not fail to give fame and influence to this rising officer, then little over twenty; and it certainly came opportunely to assure his position as successor of Rosains in Tehuacan and the adjoining district in Mizteca. His youthfulness was overbalanced by strong will and energy, and by a certain reserve, which, if repelling intimacy, served to increase his self-reliance and attract a wholesome confidence and respect. Morelos pointed to him as the most promising of the leaders, partly from his knowledge of military science; and he justified the praise by placing the administration of his district on an excellent footing, and forming the best organized force among the insurgents, 800 strong, with which he began to plan movements destined to bring credit to himself as well as to the cause.
Such was his position when, on November 16th, the fugitive congress marched into Tehuacan with a dilapidated remnant of followers, escorted by Guerrero. Teran was by no means pleased, for he saw that this body expected not only a refuge, but obedience to its whims and sustenance for its respectable train of adherents. The latter feature appeared especially serious, owing to the limited extent of the district, and the neglect of other leaders to contribute for the maintenance of the assembly. Several arbitrary measures, and the injudicious election of deputies to fill ​vacancies, served to increase his annoyance, which developed into alarm as the financial administration was taken from his control and intrusted to a hostile and improper person, and as he found Corral, Sesma, and other opponents seeking to undermine his influence with the troops, and creating discontent generally.
Under the circumstances, he can hardly be blamed for taking steps to rid himself of a body which had long since sacrificed its influence by internal discord, impolitic conduct, and inefficient management, and was generally looked upon as a useless intruder. What role he really played is not clear, but he certainly countenanced the act of his leading officers, who placed him under arrest during the night of December 14th, while they secured the persons of the deputies, executive, and judges, together with Sesma and other supporters of the old regime. On the following morning it was decided to dissolve the congress as not sanctioned by popular election, and create a provisional executive commission, composed of Teran, together with the existing executive members, Alas and Cumplido, till a similar formal body could be chosen by the departments of Vera Cruz, Puebla, ​and North Mexico, to act till a regularly elected congress might be installed. Victoria and Osorno took no notice of the project, and so it was abandoned, nor did the dissolved assembly attempt to form anew. With it vanished the representative government started by Hidalgo's followers and reorganized by Morelos, leaving the insurgents adrift, at least for a while, and giving the royalists greater reason for treating them as rebels and bandits; yet this applied rather to the east, for in the home of the original junta rose another to influence the destinies of the cause.
Rid of the burdensome assembly, and with forces swelled to nearly fifteen hundred men from its late escort and other sources, Teran felt himself strong enough to take the offensive against the royalists, and so break in upon the plans forming against him. He succeeded, in fact, in giving so effectual a check to a column under Barradas, which was advancing against Tepeji, that it had to abandon the expedition. As a further measure, he sought to strengthen his ​position in Mizteca by constructing another stronghold on Mount Santa Gertrudis. and sending reënforcements under command of his brother Juan, who from his retreat at Tepeji did good service in obstructing the highway to Oajaca and harassing the detachments centring round Izúcar.
Teran's forces were not only the best organized among the insurgents, but with the aid of brothers and loyal officers he wielded a more absolute control within his district than other leaders in theirs, and could therefore claim at this time to be the most prominent among them. His position, however, was becoming more exposed, for the royalists had lately gained several successes to the north and west, and were ready to combine against him from different quarters. Teran saw the gathering storm, and in preparing to face it he found that more arms and ammunition were above all necessary, for his prestige would bring all the recruits he wanted. At this juncture appeared an American, named William Davis Robinson, lately dealing with Caracas, who offered to provide necessary funds. It was agreed that the delivery, including four thousand muskets, should take place at Goazacoalco River, which was unoccupied by royalists, and presented the only point accessible to Teran. The route was long and difficult, obstructed by forests and marshes, and threatened by the rainy season just beginning; but necessity overruled all. ​He set out with 400 men in the middle of July, by way of Tuxtepec, and after a toilsome march, reached, six weeks later, the southern tributary of the Papaloapan, which rises near Villa Alta. The delay had enabled the royalist troops to approach from Tlacotalpan and Oajaca, and the rivers being swollen by rain, it was thought imprudent to venture farther, to struggle with a threatening famine, and perhaps to be cut off by pursuers. During the retreat the royalist column from Tlacotalpan was bravely repulsed, and Juan Teran came in time to check two Oajaca expeditions which had been organized with the intent of attacking his brother in the rear. The latter reached Tehuacan September 22d.
Meanwhile the schooner Patriot had appeared off the Goazacoalco with the armament, as agreed, and managed to profit by the interval of hopeless waiting to capture an aggressive Spanish vessel, thus achieving for the Mexican flag, which it boldly hoisted, ​the glory of the first naval victory during the revolution.
A surprise awaited Teran in the bid for alliance from the hitherto unapproachable Osorno, who had at last succumbed under the combined onslaught of royalists, and now sought aid to recover a part at least of his lost ground. His overthrow was greatly due to a persistent and almost exclusive use of cavalry with little or no discipline. This availed little even against light intrenchments, behind which royalist infantry could generally manage to retire; nor had his men shown any ability to resist a well sustained charge, or maintain one in turn. These horsemen of the plain were too independent to submit to discipline or follow irksome tactics. The latter were reduced to feints for drawing the enemy to open ground, where a quick though not determined charge might have full effect. Their chief ambition appears to have been a display of their fiery steeds; saddles inlaid with silver, and striking dresses with embroidery and a profusion of glittering ornaments; and to satisfy this vanity they did not hesitate at exactions, and even robberies, which naturally produced great irritation against their party. Osorno was powerless, and had to humor them in order to retain a semblance of authority.
At Tortolitas, not far from the famous battle-field of Otumba, his forces in August 1814 and April 1815 gained two triumphs over royalists, on the latter occasion by driving a number of loose horses upon the infantry and taking advantage of the disorder by a ​murderous charge. They thereupon spread over the lake valley to the neighborhood of the capital, plundering the towns, farms, and villas, and creating such alarm at Mexico that adjoining garrisons were called in to protect it and assist in constructing additional fortifications. Satisfied with this paltry result, they turned homeward to celebrate it, proclaiming Osorno lieutenant-general and allowing him to distribute honors and promotions, regardless of the congress, which they had, for that matter, formally ignored. Barradas, commandant of Apam, retaliated soon after by a temporary occupation of Zacatlan;but this had no effect in restraining insurgent raids on highways and border towns.
Encouraged by the withdrawal of Spanish troops for the pursuit of Morelos, Osorno and his lieutenants ventured to attack the neighborhood of Puebla, and to make a futile attempt to capture Apam. The result was to bring back the royalists in so strong force that his columns were severely repulsed in two different engagements. Concha, who had gained renown as the captor of Morelos, was now given the command on the Apam plains, and began to press closely round Osorno, assisted by Donallo on the line between Puebla and Perote, and by the garrisons at Zacapoaxtla, Tulancingo, and the district westward. One town after another was taken and held; one party or detachment after another was surprised and slaughtered, with relentless execution of all captives, and distilleries and other industries were closed in order to stay the flow of resources. Osorno retaliated with ​sword and torch on all who fell off, only to irritate the terrified people against himself. Finally, from April 21 to 23, 1816, his combined forces under Inclan, Espinosa, Serrano, and others, 1,600 strong, were so effectually routed in a series of actions, beginning at Venta de Cruz, that they lost heart and crowds presented themselves to accept the pardon held out; sometimes to the number of 500 in a day, headed by Serrano and other leaders. Only too many turned at once to assist the royalists in the pursuit of their late comrades, whom they stigmatized as rebels, while receiving for themselves the appellation 'Don' from the now obsequious royalists, and from the church blessings in lieu of late anathemas.
The districts of Tulancingo, Huauchinango, and Huasteca had followed the example of the others, after suffering severely at the hands of energetic royalist leaders like Piedras, Friar Villaverde, Güitian, and losing several prominent chiefs, notably Vicente Gomez and the last patriotic relatives of Villagran, Aguilar, the rival of Rincon in the Vera Cruz region, and the formidable Arroya. Farther south, the districts round San Martin Tezmelucan, now in charge of Hevia, were by June almost wholly cleared of insurgents, Colin and Brigadier Angulo being among their most prominent leaders who perished. Deserted by most of his followers, and now even pursued by them, Osorno found it impossible to maintain himself any longer in his old stamping-ground, and attended by ​Inclan, Manilla, and some other adherents, in August he sought the mountain regions south-eastward, in order to place himself in communication with Tehuacan. Apam and the districts beyond thereupon rapidly recovered from the depression created by the long campaign.
Osorno had still nearly 600 followers, and Teran believed that combined operations would serve to distract the royalists, permitting advantageous descents on the Vera Cruz highway and the pursuit of many other projects. Not choosing to burden his own district with a host of strangers, he persuaded the new ally to maintain himself near San Juan de los Llanos and wait for opportunities. One of these was to surprise in detail Concha and Moran, stationed in November at Huamantla and San Andres, respectively, with 400 men each. On November 7, 1816, accordingly, Teran and Osorno approached San Andres with a force of nearly 1,000, mainly cavalry; but Moran by a quick movement managed to secure the advantage of position, and repulsed the first column of horsemen so effectually that their disorderly flight created a panic among the rest and led to a general scamper. This was followed by another discouraging repulse of Teran's forces by Samaniego, in the region of Acatlan; and now the clouds grew darker still.
In Vera Cruz the operations of the insurgents centred more than ever on the roads to Mexico, by ​way of Jalapa and Orizaba, along which several convoys of great value had to pass every year, as Vera Cruz harbor was practically the only outlet for the wealth of New Spain. The nature of the roads, with rivers, marshes, and undulations, rendered it exceedingly difficult to guard the trains, so much so that an official report declared 15,000 men insufficient to protect, in transit, against 1,000, the convoy of 6,000 mules which in the spring of 1815 lay besieged at Jalapa, unable to cover the short distance to the port. The hovering bands could always manage to cut off some part, enough to repay the risk. Tired of the delay, and of the attendant expenses for animals, servants, and guard, the traders continued to break the stringent rules against purchasing passes from insurgents, and thus provided the latter with a considerable revenue wherewith to sustain the war. The main convoy was finally brought to its destination in sections, the return cargoes reaching Mexico in June, eight months after its departure thence.
The merchants of Cádiz joined loudly in the clamor at this inefficiency of the convoy service; and finding that the king entertained seriously the appeal of Calleja for reënforcements, they advanced sufficient money to hasten the departure of 2,000 out of the proposed 8,000 men. This body arrived at Vera Cruz June 18, 1815, under command of Brigadier Miyares, a young, active, and really able man. He submitted a new plan for the convoy traffic, which consisted in opening a military road from Vera Cruz to Perote, the latter as central entrepôt, with strong forts at intervals, especially at the difficult points. The viceroy approved, and conferred on him to this end the ​command of the district. The task was not easy, for it required a constant campaign of six months to keep the insurgents at bay while the forts were constructed. One of the most imposing of these was formed at Puente del Rey, half-way between Jalapa and the port, to protect the fine bridge across the Antigua. December saw the plan carried out, so that trains could henceforth pass with comparative security.
A futile attempt was made during the same period to occupy Misantla and Boquilla de Piedras, through which the insurgents introduced war material.
The occupation of Spanish troops in the pursuit of Morelos, and in campaigns on the plateau, gave a respite which Victoria used to good advantage. Toward the end of 1816, however, the war was resumed with vigor. Donallo captured, November 7th, the fort of Monteblanco, from which the insurgents had been long dominating the Orizaba route, and shortly after ​fell Boquilla de Piedras, but Victoria opened for himself another outlet by taking Nautla.
Since the fall of Galeana operations on the southern coast had been of so small importance as to attract little attention. The chief command was held by Nicolás Bravo, under whom served Pablo Galeana, and Montesdeoca, with about 200 armed men each, moving near and below Acapulco. Northward, toward Zacatula, the Mariscal Ávila hovered with an irregular force, which could at times be raised to nearly 500 from among the poorly armed Indians. The main strength of the revolution in this quarter centred, however, in Mizteca, favored by its combination of rich valleys and numerous fastnesses, and allured by the passage through it of two rich highways, to Acapulco and Oajaca, with their numerous tributary roads. After Rayon abandoned his charge over Oajaca, Rosains claimed supremacy, and appointed as his lieutenant Ramon Sesma, son of the deputy, who soon obtained the control from Rayon's representative, Herrera. Not long after Morelos sent Vicente Guerrero to maintain here the revolution in his name. Sesma grew jealous, and the attitude of the two threatened to assume serious proportions; but Rosains came to reconcile them, and assigned to Guerrero a separate district, toward the Chilapa region, with the rank of colonel. ​This was merely a just and politic concession to an officer who had suddenly risen into fame by several unexpected advantages over the royalists, which also brought followers to his banner. He was a man much like Galeana, under whom he had earned his first distinctions; not proficient in book-learning, but of quick apprehension, and possessed of a gentleness and magnetism that inspired love as well as confidence among his adherents; while his swarthy face, resonant voice, and flashing eye made him an object of profound respect among his enemies. It was not long before he gained the supremacy in forces and influence, partly through the temporary departure for Tehuacan of Sesma, who there suffered in prestige and command. This influence he extended by fortunate expeditions as far down as Costa Chica, and appeared in June 1815 at the head of nearly a thousand men, half of them well armed.
Two attempts to capture Acatlan and Tlapa failed through the arrival of strong reënforcements to those places, but he held his ground well during the ​following year, till the opening of November, when he received a severe check in seeking to intercept a convoy from Oajaca. It was the forerunner of the storm which was now about to burst upon him, as well as on the other leaders.
* ↑ Morelos, Declaracion, 42, adds that Carbajal, who commanded Muñiz' former force, could generally obtain more than 1,000 men for any expedition, and Yarza, stationed at Zacapo, fully 1,600; while Rayon could, with the aid of Vargas and Atilano García, muster 600 musketeers, which implied a similar number of men with inferior arms. Nicolás Bravo commanded along the South Sea, Galeana and the others being his lieutenants. Slightly varying details are given on page 31. A report from Valladolid with earlier data indicates that arms were readily manufactured by more than one leader, Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc., vi. 241-5; but this is doubtful.
* ↑ This distribution applied rather to a few months later, and rests on the official table given in Torrente, Hist. Rev., ii. 288, which shows 39,430 men, including nearly 2,000 who arrived in June 1815 under Miyares, and 8,000 stationed in the Provincias Internas and California, the latter province having 3,665 assigned to it. This figure belongs to the Occidente, yet the mistake casts a doubt also on other parts of the list, as Tabasco; the summing up is also wrong. Of the 40,000, 12,000 were in regiments from Spain. For regulations governing them and official lists, see Fernando Vll. y Decretos, 25-73, passim, 109-55, 337-49; Arrillaga, Recop., 1836, 59-64; Noticioso Gen., Aug. Sept. 1815, passim; Estado May. Gen. Ejer., 1-2; Rivera, Hist. Jalapa, ii. 20; Mendíbil, Resúmen Hist., 288-9; Bonnycastle's Span.-Amer., 56.
* ↑ Great as was the pressure on the country, with increased excise and other taxes, while mining and many other industries had declined, yet the pay of civil and military employes was seldom delayed, the old high rates being generally maintained. It had not been thought prudent to impose taxes on Indians in lieu of the abolished tribute. The sale of tobacco, which yielded so large a revenue, was in the remote provinces granted to contractors. Forced contributions by commandants were forbidden, and surplus funds in one province were ordered sent direct to the troops and officials in an adjoining needy one. Decree in Gaz. de Mex., 1816, vii. 162-6; Bonnycastle’s Span.-Amer., 55-6; Torrente, Rev., ii. 193-4.
* ↑ Of these were in Mizteca: Silacayoapan, Jonacatlan, Ostocingo, and Cerro del Alumbre; in Michoacan: Zacapo, Artijo, and Cóporo; in Nueva Galicia: Mescala Island; in Guanajuato: Cerro San Gregorio and Cerro del Sombrero; in Tehuacan District: Cerro Colorado, Tepeji, and Teotitlan; and in Vera Cruz: Monteblanco and Palmillas, besides a number of temporary strongholds, Robinson expresses some views respecting the value of the troops on both sides, Mem. Rev., 182-3.
* ↑ The royalists numbered about 1,000, and claimed that the insurgents lost 200 in killed on the battle-field alone, out of a force of 1,300. Gaz. de Mex., 1815, vi. 123-9, 99-100. Bustamante, Cuad. Hist., iii. 300-2, and Rosains, Rel. Hist., 13-14, belittle the affair; but Teran speaks more plainly. For Lobera's share in the victory, see Barrera, Elogio Lobera, 1-12.
* ↑ Rosains' agents, Velasco and Joaquin Perez, were arrested. Foremost among the rebellious leaders were Corral, who had so warmly upheld Rosains, and Montiel, the cobbler of Orizaba, leader of one of the finest cavalry bands there.
* ↑ Details of the outrage in Negrete, Mex. Siglo XIX., vii. 21-7. He also attempted to shoot the intendente Perez, and he escaping the guards suffered in his place.
* ↑ He rashly insisted on charging the intrenched camp of Corral and Montiel, at the close of July. By this time his disaffected force had dwindled from 700 to 200. Details in Teran, Manifest., 13-22; Orizava, Ocurrenc., 103-4.
* ↑ The text is reproduced among others by Zamacois, Hist. Méj., ix. 843-53. For pardon and character, see Noticioso Gen., Oct. 23, 1815; Bustamante, Notic., 22-4. He claims in his Rel. Hist, to have aided the insurgents with information, although taking no active part in the war, and Victoria certainly rewarded him with a pension after 1823. He became in 1824 senator for Puebla, where he had been residing with his family all this time. In 1830 he conspired with Victoria's brother against General Bustamante and was shot at Puebla Sept. 27th. Bustamante, Voz Patria, v. no. 31, p. 3.
* ↑ For 'no sabe mandar ni obedecer,' says Teran, Manifesto, 31, who also intimates that he came on the battle-field merely to turn his back.
* ↑ This occurred on Oct. 12th. The place was defended by Teran's brother Joaquin, with 130 men. Teran brought 200 men, according to Bustamante, who places the royalists at 700. Cuadro, iii. 305-6. General Daoiz reduces the latter to 405, with one cannon. At the same time Sesma gained an advantage at Yolomecatl on the Mizteca border. Alvarez was a drunkard and a despot, says Carriedo, Estud. Oaj., ii. 36. He was threatened with removal.
* ↑ Manuel de Mier y Teran had joined Rayon's forces in 1811, bringing the reputation from Mexico of a talented student. Later he fought under Matamoros, and after remaining in the south till 1814, vainly urging Rayon to defend Oajaca, he came to Puebla province, gaining here the rank of colonel.
* ↑ Ignacio Alas had on the way been chosen associate of Cumplido, to fill the place of Morelos in the executive, and Ponce de Leon figured as chief justice, leaving only four deputies, President Potero Castañeda, Ruiz de Castañeda, Sesma the elder, and Gonzalez. Three suplentes were now chosen, the presbyter Gutierrez de Teran, Benito Rocha, former commandant at Oajaca, and Juan José de Corral, the late opponent of Teran on the Jamapa battle field. Cárlos Bustarnante and Nicolás Bravo were chosen supreme judges truly a wise act, to withdraw in the latter an able and much needed officer from the field. In the beginning of Dec. the assembly withdrew for more undisturbed session to San Francisco hacienda, four leagues distant, after having decreed, against Teran 's opinion, the expulsion of Carmelite friars from Tehuacan.
* ↑ Sesma uttered mysterious threats, Corral threatened to arraign Teran for his treatment of Rosains, and the troops escorting the congress began to quarrel with Teran's men. Sesma challenged Teran, and the latter was placed under arrest by the deputies, but the clamor of his soldiers obtained his release.
* ↑ Including Intendente Martinez and Lobato. Sesma might have been shot but for Teran's interference. So far the members of congress had been accorded all the pomp which they so dearly loved. Bustamante proposed a restoration of affairs, with the concession of the war office under Teran to direct campaigns; but this was considered impracticable.
* ↑ The new triumvirate was to be called convencion departamental, and its three members comisarios. They were to reside alternately in the three districts electing them. The plan was dated at Tehuacan Jan. 16, 1816. The district of Tehuacan elected in Feb. the cura Montezuma Cortés, but Victoria paid no attention to the project, nor did Osorno, although he had sent in his usual meaningless consent. The argument against the existing congress was its illegality, as self-elected, and its unwise elections and other acts. The deputies and other prisoners were released and departed, chiefly for Vera Cruz, where Victoria figured as passive sympathizer. Alas and Cumplido soon returned to Michoacan. About this time Liceaga set out to join the congress. Informed of what had happened, he turned back, but he was overtaken by royalists in Mexico Valley, and lost all his baggage, having a narrow escape with his life. Gaz. de Mex., 1816, vii. 191.
* ↑ For details concerning the affair, see the account of Bustamante, who participated. Cuadro, iii. 308-34. He is naturally somewhat offended with Teran, and prefers to let the report of a royalist spy and the documents issued on the occasion speak for themselves in quoted form. Mendíbil reproduces also the proclamations, Res., 259-61, 404-11, one of them the effusion of a royalist intriguer. Negrete, Mex. Siglo XIX., vii. 400-36. Royalist versions, in Torrente, Hist. Rev., ii. 198-200, 202-3, implicate Teran as main actor, 'á amenazar con la muerte a varios de sus compañeros. ' Ward, Mex., i. 212-14, and Robinson, Mex. Rev., i. 72-3, 213-15, while not blaming Teran for his conduct, ascribe to the dissolution of the common bond the downfall of the revolution. Teran naturally maintains a garb of innocence. Segunda Manifest., 26; Zavala, Rev. Mex., ii. 74-116, 194-5.
* ↑ This triumph was gained at Rosario Dec. 27, 1815, with 500 men. Barradas admitted the loss of two officers and nine men; but not a defeat.
* ↑ Under him was placed Lieut-col Fiallo, a royalist deserter, who began to intrigue among the troops with a view to seduce them for Victoria, or even for royalists, it is said. The intrigue was attended by lack of discipline, which called the attention of the strict Teran. He arrested both his brother and Fiallo, and the guilt of the latter appearing, he was shot. Bustamante assisted in the case. Cuad. Hist., iii. 345-7. Teran, Segunda Manifest., 49 et seq. Rosains, Rel. Hist., 17, makes a severe charge of this act. La Madrid speaks highly of the bravery and discipline of Teran's troops. Gaz. de Mex., 1816, vii. 209.
* ↑ His supply from Puebla had been cut off, and the lead mines at Zapotitlan yielded him little.
* ↑ Robinson had landed at Boquilla de Piedras, but Victoria demanded an exorbitant price for transmitting the arms from there. The price of the muskets was $20 each. Guerrero was invited to join, but objected to entering a territory claimed by Victoria, whose district was supposed to extend to Yucatan.
* ↑ Attended voluntarily by Wm Robinson, and also the doctor, John Robinson, who came with Arrayá from the United States. Juan Rodriguez commanded half the force, as Teran's second.
* ↑ Teran did cross the river in a small boat with a few men to Playa Vicente, a new entrepôt for trade between Oajaca and Vera Cruz, but was surprised and narrowly escaped capture. Most of his companions were either drowned or captured; among the latter, Wm Robinson. Gaz.de Mex., 1816, vii. 997-8. After 2 years' imprisonment at Ulúa, Robinson was sent to Cádiz, whence he escaped, although under parole, and wrote the history which will be noticed in a later chapter. The other Robinson returned from Tehuacan to the United States soon after the expedition arrived home.
* ↑ The march from Tuxtepec back having been accomplished in 9 days. The Tlacotalpan column under Topete is placed by Teran at 800 men, and its loss at 80 killed, 17 prisoners, 90 muskets, etc. Four days later, on Sept. 15th, Juan Teran dislodged Castro from Coscatlan with 300 men, and the latter in retreating took with him the corps under Lopez, intended to harass Teran's expedition. Castro, who appears to have had 160 horsemen, claims that he routed Teran! Id., 1002-4. Topete retrieved himself by taking Ojitlan, with its garrison of 100 men under Miranda, left to cover Teran's retreat. Miranda was well treated, contrary to custom. Details concerning the expedition in Teran, Segunda Manifest., 6 et seq.; Bustamante, Cuad. Hist., iii. 365-79; Robinson's Mex. Rev., i. pp. xxx-li. 216-31. He claims that Topete lost 120 killed during the first repulse. Carriedo, Estud. Oaj., ii. 34-5.
* ↑ The cargo was in charge of Juan Galvan. Bustamante gives the vessel 3 guns, and calls the captured Numantina a corvette, taken after 'accion reñida.' It afterward put to flight another bergantine of 18 guns and 150 men. After waiting for 3 months the Patriot proceeded to Galveston, and gave part of the cargo to Mina. Cuad. Hist., iii. 378-9. A statement of Victoria identifies this vessel with the General Jackson, despatched, like a preceding one, by A. L. Duncan from New Orleans. See Duncan's claims in Miller, Reflexiones, 1-8; Pap. Var., Ixxiii. pt xv. Rivera assumes that the Mexican flag hoisted occasionally by interested pirates and others was red, white, and yellow, the latter afterward replaced by green. Hist. Jalapa, i. 509.
* ↑ A royalist commander reports that in one of Osorno's columns defeated by him was a regiment of richly dressed men, with fine hats and broad white ribbons, all mounted on thrush-colored horses. Gaz. de Mex., 1815, vi. 1357. They were the poorest fighters. Bustamante incurred wide-spread indignation by his remonstrances against such laxity. Cuad. Hist., iii. 255.
* ↑ On the former occasion over Herrera; in April 1815 over Barradas, the new commandant for Apam. Gaz. de Mex., 1815, vi. 375, 423-8; Arechederreta, Apuntes, Aug. 28, 1814.
* ↑ By a council at Chinahuapan. Among other appointments was an intendente for Tlascala. Negrete, Mex. Siglo XIX.,vii. 152-6.
* ↑ Barradas was soon after removed for arbitrary conduct and replaced by Ayala, and he falling ill Monduy took charge till Concha came. A fray on Sept. 9th, near Teotihuacan, remained undecided. Bustamante, Cuad. Hist., iii. 257-60.
* ↑ At Ocotepec and Tortolitas, Dec. 5th and 6th. Royalists place the insurgent forces as high as 2,000, with a loss of 150 for each action. Gaz. de Mex., 1815, vi. 1355-67. The attack which startled Puebla was made by Vicente Gomez and Colin, who destroyed the garrison of Cholula, over 100 strong.
* ↑ For details, campaign, and acceptance of pardon, see Id., vii. 1816. Feb. to Aug. numbers, passim, especially April and May. Bustamante, Cuad. Hist., iii. 248-64, 350-1; Mendíbil, Res., 238-41, 269-81, passim; Noticioso Gen., 1816, March-July, passim; Torrente, Hist. Rev., ii. 200-4, 277-80, etc.; Dicc. Univ., x. 529, 631.
* ↑ The last three were killed in quarrels among themselves, Arroya being assassinated by his lieutenant, Calzada, who wanted his command and his wife. Maríano Guerrero, the last noted chief in Huauchinango, caused the surrender, Aug. 12th, of the last effective stronghold there, the Cerro Verde, with 8 guns and 143 men. Capt. Luvian of Tututepec remained in control and granted pardon to 4,800 persons within a few weeks. The friar Villaverde was aided by troops from Rio Verde and Huichapan to recover Sierra Gorda and the regions along the Tula and Montezuma. Gütian had in Jan. taken Tlascalantongo, where Aguilar and his confederates held forth. For de tails, see the authorities in preceding note.
* ↑ Concha was promoted to colonel of the San Luis Potosí dragoons, and Anastacio Bustamante to lieut-col. His pursuit of the fleeing Osorno is reported in Gaz. de Max., 1816, vii. 885-7.
* ↑ The royalists claimed to have with 300 men defeated 1,040, killing from 80 to 100, and capturing over threescore. Gaz. de Mex., 1816, vii. 1093-4, 1133-40, 1169-70. Teran admits a total force of 800. Segunda Manifest., 59. Vicente Gomez, known as the capador, for his unseemly mutilation of prisoners, and one of Osorno's best lieutenants, soon after accepted pardon and continued his campaigning as a royalist. Bustamante., Cuad. Hist., iii. 389. One reason for Teran's confidence in his plan was a successful out manœuvring of Donallo's forces two weeks previously. Id., 385-6.
* ↑ On November 25th, Samaniego was on his way to Huajuapan with 260 men. Teran had 500, but he incautiously divided them. Id., 389-91.
* ↑ Gaz. de Mex., 1815, vi. 343.
* ↑ For details concerning the operations for bringing the convoy from Jalapa to Vera Cruz, see Gaz. de Mex., vi., January to May, 1816.
* ↑ Part of the 10,500 men for Caracas were promised, and also a regiment from Habana, but none of these came.
* ↑ Son of the late captain-general of Caracas. The troops numbered somewhat over 1,700.
* ↑ This is one of the finest public works in New Spain, 260 varas in length, 12 in breadth, and 18 in height, with 7 arches, besides one to serve for floods. The central one is 25 varas in diameter. It had occupied the builders from Feb. 1803 till Dec. 1811. Since the beginning of the war it had been one of the most bitterly contested points. Miyares occupied it finally on Dec. 8, 1815, Victoria's lieutenant having abandoned it during the night after a brave defence, and the royalists henceforth kept possession, with a fort and a battery on the respective banks, the former named Fernando and the other Concepcion. Eleven other bridges exist on the road to Perote. For operations from June till Dec. 1815, see Gaz. de Mex., vi., during this period; Bustamante, Cuad. Hist,, iii. 197 et seq.; Negrete, Mex. Siglo XIX., vii. 444-70. A history of the bridge is given in Dicc. Univ., vi. 493-6.
* ↑ After improving the fortifications at Vera Cruz, Miyares retired in April 1816 to Spain, partly from disgust with the jealousy shown by the viceroy and other officials, and partly to recuperate from an injury to his chest inflicted during the campaign. This carried him off soon after. He had shown a marked leniency toward the captured insurgents. A train with 8 millions in treasure reached Vera Cruz in Feb., followed a few weeks later by one for passengers alone, in 75 coaches and on horseback.
* ↑ The task was intrusted to Llorente, and he captured Misantla on July 5th; but reënforcement being held back by the bad roads, he had to retire to Nautla with considerable loss. This success enabled Victoria in Oct. to receive a large supply of arms from Toledo, who had lately figured in Texas.
* ↑ The garrison numbered about 300, under Muzquiz and Mauri. After a brief siege with over 1,200 men, Donallo effected a breach in the walls which resulted in a capitulation with guaranties of life only. Gaz. de Mex., 1816, vii. 1101-4, 1141-50; Orizaba, Ocurrencias, 124-5. The later famous Santa Anna gained his captaincy by cooperating in the district northward. Rivera, Hist. Jalapa, ii. 27-8.
* ↑ On Nov. 24th, taken by José Rincon, who had been despatched by José Davila, commandant at Vera Cruz. Id., 2025-8 (which should be 1225-8). The resistance was brief, and the 50 claimed to have been killed fell during the flight. The 350 insurgents had been assisted by 80 men from a freebooter vessel, which now departed. Llorente, commandant of Tuxpan, and Luvian of Huauchinango, had been coöperating to clear the district lying between them. Id., September till December 1816, passim; Noticioso Gen., Aug. 1815 et seq. Comments on the effect upon the province in Perez y Comoto, Repres., 12-31.
* ↑ Captured from insurgents at the close of 1814. Gaz. de Mex., 1814, v. 1425-31.
* ↑ Sesma at first appeared friendly, and sent Guerrero on a Bellerophonic errand to Rosains. The latter discovered the trick on the way, and began to act independently, whereupon the two parties became hostile. Bustamante, Cuad. Hist., iii. 204-6; Rosains, Rel. Hist., 12-13.
* ↑ He surprised the forces from Chilapa and Tlapa on two different occasions, besides obtaining other advantages. Bustamante, Cuad. Hist., iii. 204 et seq. This author places the Chilapa force as high as 700 men. Rosains was preparing to attack Guerrero and force compliance, when he yielded.
* ↑ He was among the tirst to enlist under Morelos, rose to the rank of captain in 1811, and signalized himself as commandant at Izúcar by assisting materially in defeating Llano in Feb. 1812, His biography will be given when he rises to the presidency in the next volume.
* ↑ Where his lieutenant, Carmen, a negro, gathered both recruits and booty round Ometepec and beyond. Meanwhile, Guerrero had manufactured artillery and ammunition at his fort of Tlamajalcingo.
* ↑ Commandant Flon of Acatlan was relieved in July by Samaniego, stationed at Huajuapan, and this same officer brought succor to Tlapa. Guerrero was already gone, although he had on October 28th inflicted so severe a chastisement on Armijo as to compel him to fall back. This is partly admitted in Gaz. de Mex., 1815, vi. 872-80, 1347-50; also 402-6, 643-4, 840-2, 1251-2; 1816, vii. 51-9. Bustamante assumes that Armijo lost fully 100 men. His account of Guerrero's operations are indistinct and partial. It is one series of successes from the time he enters Mizteca. He repulses La Madrid at Chiquihuite and Xonacatlan; routs Combé; captures an Oajaca convoy from Samaniego, near Acatlan, and repulses the latter, when in conjunction with La Madrid he seeks to retaliate for his loss; his lieutenant Ochoa repulses Armijo near Culuac, and he inflicts further lessons on La Madrid. His relations with Teran are meanwhile not cordial, for he refuses to recognize the government substituted by him for the dissolved congress, and declines to join in the expedition to Goazacoalco, as infringing on Victoria's ground. See details in Cuad. Hist., iii. 264-77; Torrente, Hist, Rev., ii. 274, etc.; ' Noticioso Gen., July 28th, August and October passim, Nov. 6th, 13th, Dec. 2, 1815; Jan. 22, Mar. 4, 8, May 10, 24, 1816; Mendíbil, Res., 242-8, 254-8; Carriedo, Estud. Oaj., ii. 32-3. Alaman, Hist. Méj., iv. 191-4, 256-9, gives less attention to him than to Teran and other chiefs. A rich convoy from Acapulco reached Mexico in safety in Dec., after three months' passage, a delay caused partly by prudent regard for insurgents, partly by bad roads.
* ↑ In the cañada de los Naranjos, Samaniego actually captured Guerrero's silver table-service. Guerrero owed his life to Pablo de la Rosa. On the return of the train, a fortnight later, Guerrero again attacked it with better success; but as the royalists now combined in larger force, he retired toward Tlajiaco.