# Secrets of Crewe House/Chapter 1

CHAPTER I
PROPAGANDA: ITS USES AND ABUSES
Definition and Axioms: Why German Propaganda Failed: Ludendorff's Lament and Tribute.
Propaganda in war is a comparatively modern activity. Certainly, in the stage of development to which it attained in the closing phases of the Great War, it is a new weapon of warfare and a powerful weapon. Therefore it requires skilful and careful handling. Otherwise it destroys rather than creates, and alienates whom it should conciliate.
What is propaganda? It is the presentation of a case in such a way that others may be influenced. In so far as its use against an enemy is concerned, the subject matter employed must not be self-evidently propagandist. Except in special circumstances, its origin should be completely concealed. As a general rule, too, it is desirable to hide the channels of communication.
​Creation of a favourable "atmosphere" is the first object of propaganda. Until this psychological effect is produced (as the result of military events, of propagandist activity or of internal political disaffection) the mentality of enemy troops and civil population—and both are equally important in modern warfare—will be naturally unsympathetic and unresponsive to influence. In order to produce this "atmosphere" of receptivity and susceptibility, continuity of propaganda policy is indispensable. This presupposes definition of sound policy, based upon comprehensive knowledge of the facts and of the developments of the political, military, and economic situation, and also of the enemy psychology.
When a line of policy has been laid down, actual propaganda operations may be begun, but not before. First of all axioms of propaganda is that only truthful statements be made. Secondly, there must be no conflicting arguments, and this can only be ensured by close co-operation of all propagandists and by strict adherence to the policy defined. A false step may possibly be irretrievable.
Owing to inattention to these cardinal principles of propaganda against an ​enemy—inattention due to lack of appreciation of their importance—the Germans' very energetic propaganda effort miscarried. Wrongly assuming that the war would be of short duration, they made use of untruths and half-truths, mis-statements and over-statements. These produced a temporary effect, but the protraction of the war brought its own refutation of their misrepresentation, and, instead of operating to the good of the Central Empires, the campaign wrought harm to their cause.
Moreover, as they afterwards realised, the Germans did not agree among themselves in their misrepresentations. There was, as a well-known British authority on German propaganda has pointed out, a chaotic exuberance of different points of view. And they were incapable of understanding other nations. Dr. Karl Lamprecht, the distinguished German professor, deplored this in the course of a lecture at the end of 1914, when the Germans regarded their victory as assured. "When the war came," he said, "everyone who could write obtained the largest possible goose quill and wrote to all his foreign friends, telling them that they did not realise what splendid fellows the Germans were, and not infrequently adding that in ​many cases their conduct required some excuse. The effect was stupendous." "I can speak with the most open heart on the subject," he added, "for amongst the whole crowd it was the professors who were most erratic. The consequences were gruesome. Probably much more harm came to our cause in this way than from all the efforts of the enemy. None the less, it was done with the best intentions. The self-confidence was superb, but the knowledge was lacking. People thought that they could explain the German cause without preparation. What was wanted was organisation."
Before coming to Allied methods and matter, it will be interesting to examine the scope of German propaganda. In the early stages of the war, Germany loudly proclaimed that she was winning. As the progress of events belied such words, she changed her theme. The Allies could not win, she averred, and the longer they took to realise this the greater would be their suffering and losses. She continually endeavoured to sow discord between the Allies. Great Britain was not taking her fair share of the Allied burden; Great Britain intended to retain Belgium and the northern part of France; Great Britain was using France and Russia for her ​own selfish ends; the interests of the Balkan Powers could not be reconciled. These were some of the foolish falsehoods in which she indulged. They were ineffective, as were her many attempts to stir up disaffection within Allied countries. Ireland, South Africa, India, Egypt and Mohammedan countries were examples in the case of Great Britain, and Algeria in that of France. She spared no effort to encourage Pacifism among the Allied peoples.
Their lack of success became evident even to the Germans themselves. Government agencies and Press became more reticent as the war went on and the propaganda was found to be doing more harm than good. The military leaders became apprehensive of the effectiveness and superiority of British propaganda. Soldiers and writers made bitter complaints of the lack of any German organisation to maintain an adequate counter-campaign.
General Ludendorff ("My War Memories," pp. 360 et seq.) is pathetic in his laments at the non-success of German efforts. "The German propaganda," he writes, "was only kept going with difficulty. In spite of all our efforts, its achievements, in comparison to the magnitude of the task, were inadequate. We ​produced no real effect on the enemy peoples." He admits failure, too, in propaganda efforts on the fighting fronts. In the East, he says, the Russians were the authors of their own collapse. In the West, "the fronts of our enemies had not been made susceptible by the state of public opinion in their home countries, and the propaganda we gradually introduced had no success." He records his efforts to induce the Imperial Chancellor to create a great organisation, as it had become "undeniably essential to establish an Imperial Ministry of Propaganda," and he was convinced that no adequate counter-campaign to Allied propaganda could be organised except by an Imperial department possessing special powers. "At last a feeble step in this direction was taken in August, 1918. A totally inadequate organisation was set up; besides, it was then too late. In these circumstances it was quite impossible to achieve uniformity in propaganda work between Germany and Austria-Hungary, as was conspicuously the case with our enemies. The Army found no ally in a strong propaganda directed from home. While her Army was victorious on the field of battle, Germany failed in the fight against the moral of the enemy peoples."
​Ludendorff's apologia shows that he understood the principles which should govern a propaganda campaign; but he did not understand that the German case was bad. He has the doubtful consolation of knowing he was right in his theories; for they coincided in large degree with the principles upon which Viscount Northcliffe based his famous intensive campaign from Crewe House. No other German has exhibited such a grasp of the fundamentals of propaganda as Ludendorff, and he had excellent opportunity of judging the efficacy of the action into which these theoretical principles were translated. His verdict is an unqualified tribute, as the extracts from his writings quoted in another chapter show.
How this success was attained it is the purpose of this book to reveal.