# Vinson v. Washington Gas Light Company/Dissent Douglas

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* Dissenting Opinion O. Douglas
United States Supreme Court
321 U.S. 489
Vinson v. Washington Gas Light Company
Argued: Feb. 11-14, 1944. --- Decided: March 27, 1944
Mr. Justice DOUGLAS, with whom Mr. Justice BLACK and Mr. Justice MURPHY concur, dissenting.
This case goes hand in hand with Davies Warehouse Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 144, 64 S.Ct. 474. That decision expanded the 'public utility' exemption in the Emergency Price Control Act to include a wide variety of enterprises. The present decision illustrates the value of that preferred treatment.
The Stabilization Act prohibits any 'utility' from making 'any general increase in its rates or charges which were in effect on September 15, 1942' without giving the President's agent the right to intervene in the proceedings. The present decision goes far towards making that provision ineffective. It allows the commission so to shape the issues of the rate proceeding as to exclude the data most relevant to a determination of whether any rate increase should be allowed. The power of a commission to shape the issues as it desires and to restrict the Director of Economic Stabilization to those issues is not a power which is apt to be neglected. The Director may of course proclaim against rate increases. But he does not need the right to intervene to prove that rate increases are inflationary. That is self-evident. The right to intervene, if it is not a right to introduce relevant data bearing on the true earnings and returns of the utility, is an empty right indeed.
I agree that Congress did not transfer rate-making powers from the commissions to the Director. I agree that Congress must have contemplated that some rate increases might take place or else it would have treated the whole problem quite differently. But I find not the slightest indication that the Director was to be denied a full hearing. And I do not see how a full hearing could be accorded unless he was given the opportunity to establish, if he could, that the case under consideration showed no real hardship, that wartime demands were not causing the company to suffer, that its financial integrity and its ability to render service remained unimpaired, that its property was not being confiscated, that it was not being treated unfairly as compared with other companies.
We are told that this company has an inflated rate base of some $1,000,000. We are told that its excessive charges for depreciation expense were over $225,000 a year as compared with the rate increase of about $200,000 a year. We are told that a full hearing would have disclosed that the company was in fact earning more than 6 1/2%. I do not know what the evidence would show. But an offer of proof in a rate case could not be more relevant.
I believe, moreover, that when Congress halted general rate increases and gave the Director a right to intervene, it did not sanction rate increases regardless of need and regardless of inflationary effect. I think it meant to make utility commissions at least partial participants in the war against inflation and gave them a sector of the front to control. Though it did not remove the established standards for rate-making I do not think it intended utility commissions to proceed in disregard of the requirements of emergency price control and unmindful of the dangers of general rate increases. To the contrary, I think Congress intended that there should be as great an accommodation as possible between the old standards and the new wartime necessities. The failure of the commission to make that accommodation is best illustrated perhaps by its treatment of taxes. The commission allowed the company to deduct as operating expenses all income taxes up to and including 31%. That this amount includes wartime taxes is evident from the fact that the highest corporate tax rate which prevailed from 1936 to 1939 was 19%. We all know that the extraordinary expenditures incurred for the defense of the nation started with the Revenue Act of 1940, 26 U.S.C.A.Int.Rev.Acts. It has been accepted practice to deduct income taxes as well as other taxes from operating expenses in determining rates for public utilities. Galveston Electric Co. v. Galveston, 258 U.S. 388, 399, 42 S.ct. 351, 356, 66 L.Ed. 678. But this is war, not business-as-usual. When income taxes are passed on to consumers, the inflationary effect is obvious. And it is self-evident that the ability to pass present wartime income taxes on to others is a remarkable privilege indeed.

## Notes

This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
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