OpenLLM-France/wikimedia huggingface dataset:
# Anatomy of the State/Index

Index page: Index:Anatomy_of_the_State.pdf
Index
* American Constitution, 31
* American Historical Review, 22
* Anticapitalist, 42
* Barnes, Harry Elmer, 23
* Beale, Howard K., 22
* Bill of Rights, 31
* Black, Charles, 31
* Boétie, Étienne de la, 19–20
* Bourne, Randolph, 45
* Buchanan, James, 41
* Burnham, James, 35
* Calhoun, John C., 37–41
* Chodorov, Frank, 53
* Collective security as maximizing extent of war, 48
* Dawson, Christopher, 55
* Disquisition (Calhoun), 37, 38, 41
* Dorfman, Joseph, 51
* Faith and Freedom (Schwarvtzman), 16
* Federal government, 33, 40
* Federal law, 39
   * anticapitalist, 42
   * coercion, 11, 47
   * conscription, 44
   * fallacy, 10, 44
   * fear of conquest and revolutionary overthrow, 44
      * method of control
      * appear inevitable, 18
      * appear legitimate, 30–36
      * church, 23
      * conspiracy, 26, 27
      * court “historians,” 23
      * depreciate individual and critical thinking, 25 ​
      * education, 54–55
      * fear of alternative systems, 20
      * ideology, 20
      * passive resignation, 18, 26
* Hayek, F.A., 21
* Henry VIII, 42
* Holy Writ, 34
* House of Hohenzollern, 21
* Hume, 19
* Huszar, George B. de, 21
* Inducing guilt, 27
* Intellectual “rewards,” 20
* International law
   * civilized war vs. total war, 49
   * limited inter-state destruction, 48
   * preserve private citizens of neutral and warring countries, 48
* Jacobs, Norman, 23, 26
* Jaszi, Oscar, 19
* Jouvenel, Bertrand de, 17, 21, 25, 30–31, 42–43
* Judicial branch, 31, 32, 34, 35, 54
* Lewis, 19
* Lewis, John D., 19
* Liberation, 22
* Material productive forces, 26
* Mencken, H.L., 26, 29, 46
* Mises, Ludwig von, 4, 9, 18–19
* Modern Age, 38
* Nazi, 10
* Needham, Joseph, 22
* Nef, John U., 49–51
* New Individualist Review, 12
* New York Times Sunday Review of Books, 22
* Nickerson, Hoffman, 50
* Nock, Albert J., 16, 53
* Oppenheimer, Franz, 14–16
* Owl, The, 21
* Pacific Historical Review, 22
* Power
   * at war with capitalist authorities, 43
   * race between man and nature, 53
* Raskin, Marcus, 22
* Read, Conyers, 22
* Ribs, Jeanne, 22
* Rothbard, Murray N., 12, 38 ​
* Schumpeter, Joseph A., 12, 21
* Schwartzman, Jack, 16
* Smith, J. Allen, 38–39
* Spencer, Herbert, 41
* Supreme Court
   * “something of a miracle,” 35
   * changed constitutional power of congress over national economy, 36
   * imparts legitimacy to state, 36
   * monopoly of ultimate interpreting power, 38
   * part of government, 34
   * violates basic juridical
   * principle, 34
* Territorial identification, 11, 47, 51
* Theft as economics, 14, 28
* Treaties, sanctity of, 51
* Tullock, Gordon, 41
* Veale, F.J.P, 49–50
* Vested economic interests
   * classic paradigm, 16
   * myth, 12
   * permanent opposition to genuinely private capital, 42
   * predatory, 15
   * self-preservation, 18
   * transcends limits transform concepts, 30
   * economic means, 14
   * political means, 14
* Wittfogel, Karl A., 21–23
* World War I, 45
# Anchor Oil Company v. Gray

* related portals: Supreme Court of the United States.
* sister projects: Wikidata item.
United States Supreme Court
256 U.S. 519
Anchor Oil Company v. Gray
Argued: and Submitted Jan. 27, 1921. --- Decided: June 1, 1921
Mr. John Devereux, of Tulsa, Okl., for appellant.
Mr. Preston C. West, of Tulsa, Okl., for appellees.
Mr. Justice PITNEY delivered the opinion of the Court.

## Notes

This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
Public domainPublic domainfalsefalse
# Ante-Nicene Fathers/Volume VI/Arnobius/Adversus Gentes/Book II/Chapter XXXI

31. A certain neutral character, then, and undecided and doubtful nature of the soul, has made room for philosophy, and found out a reason for its being sought after: while, that is, that fellow is full of dread because of evil deeds of which he is guilty; another conceives great hopes if he shall do no evil, and pass his life in obedience to duty and justice. Thence it is that among learned men, and men endowed with excellent abilities, there is strife as to the nature of the soul, and some say that it is subject to death, and cannot take upon itself the divine substance; while others maintain that it is immortal, and cannot sink under the power of death. But this is brought about by the law ofthe soul’s neutral character: because, on the one hand, arguments present themselves to the one party by which it is found that the soul is capable of suffering, and perishable; and, on the other hand, are not wanting to their opponents, by which it is shown that the soul is divine and immortal.

## Footnotes

* ↑ i.e., the abandoned and dissolute immortal spoken of in last chapter.
* ↑ Lit., “with.”
* ↑ Lit., “degenerate into mortal nature.”
* ↑ Arnobius seems in this chapter to refer to the doctrine of the Stoics, that the soul must be material, because, unless body and soul were of one substance, there could be no common feeling or mutual affection (so Cleanthes in Nemes. de Nat. Hom., ii. p. 33); and to that held by some of them, that only the souls of the wise remained after death, and these only till the conflagration (Stob., Ecl. Phys., p. 372) which awaits the world, and ends the Stoic great year or cycle. Others, however, held that the souls of the wise became dæmons and demigods (Diog., Lært., vii. 157 and 151).
* ↑ Lit., “they”—eas.
# Ante-Nicene Fathers/Volume VI/Arnobius/Adversus Gentes/Book II/Chapter XXXIII

33. Seeing that the fear of death, that is, the ruin of our souls, menaces us, in what are we not acting, as we all are wont, from a sense of what will be to our advantage, in that we hold Him fast who assures us that He will be our deliverer from such danger, embrace Him, and entrust our souls to His care, if only that interchange is right? You rest the salvation of your souls on yourselves, and are assured that by your own exertions alone you become gods; but we, on the contrary hold out no hope to ourselves from our own weakness, for we see that our nature has no strength, and is overcome by its own passions in every strife for anything. You think that, as soon as you pass away, freed from the bonds of your fleshly members, you will find wings with which you may rise to heaven and soar to the stars. We shun such presumption. and do not think that it is in our power to reach the abodes above, since we have no certainty as to this even, whether we deserve to receive life and be freed from the law of death. You suppose that without the aid of others you will return to the master’s palace as if to your own home, no one hindering you; but we, on the contrary, neither have any expectation that this can be unless by the will of the Lord of all, nor think that so much power and licence are given to any man.

## Footnotes

* ↑ Lit., “is set before.”
* ↑ So the ms., first ed., Gelenius, Canterus, Hildebrand, reading ex commodi sensu, for which all the other edd., following Ursinus and Meursius, read ex communi—“from common sense,” i.e., wisely.
* ↑ Perhaps, as Orelli evidently understands it, “prefer Him to our own souls”—animis præponimus.
* ↑ So Oehler, reading ea for the ms. ut, omitted in all edd.
* ↑ Lit., “by your own and internal exertion.”
* ↑ Lit., “of things.”
* ↑ Lit., “wings will be at hand.”
* ↑ The ms. reads di-cimus, “say;” corrected du, as above.
* ↑ The first four edd. read res, “things above,” for which Stewechius reads, as above, sedes.
* ↑ Sponte.
# Ante-Nicene Fathers/Volume VI/Arnobius/Adversus Gentes/Book II/Chapter XXV

25. What say you, O men, who assign to yourselves too much of an excellence not your own? Is this the learned soul which you describe, immortal, perfect, divine, holding the fourth place under God the Lord of the universe, and under the kindred spirits, and proceeding from the fountains of life? This is that precious being man, endowed with the loftiest powers of reason, who is said to be a microcosm, and to be made and formed after the fashion of the whole universe, superior, as has been seen, to no brute, more senseless than stock or stone; for he is unacquainted with men, and always lives, loiters idly in the still deserts although he were rich, lived years without number, and never escaped from the bonds of the body. But when he goes to school, you say, and is instructed by the teaching of masters, he is made wise, learned, and lays aside the ignorance which till now clung to him. And an ass, and an ox as well, if compelled by constant practice, learn to plough and grind; a horse, to submit to the yoke, and obey the reins in running; a camel, to kneel down when being either loaded or unloaded; a dove, when set free, to fly back to its master’s house; a dog, on finding game, to check and repress its barking; a parrot, too, to articulate words; and a crow to utter names.

## Footnotes

* ↑ Founded on Plato’s words (Phædrus, st. p. 247), τῷ δ᾽ (i.e., Zeus) ἕπεται στρατιὰ θεῶν τε καὶ δαιμόνων, the doctrine became prevalent that under the supreme God were lesser gods made by Him, beneath whom again were dæmons, while men stood next. To this Orelli supposes that Arnobius here refers.
* ↑ The vessels in which according to Plato (Timæus, st. p. 41), the Supreme Being mixed the vital essence of all being. Cf. c. 52.
* ↑ Lit., “and endowed.”
* ↑ The text and meaning are both rather doubtful, and the edd. vary exceedingly. The reading of Orelli, demoretur iners, valeat in ære quamvis, has been translated as most akin to the ms., with which, according to Oehler, it agrees, although Orelli himself gives the ms. reading as ær-io.
* ↑ Lit., “acknowledge turnings in the course.”
# Ante-Nicene Fathers/Volume VI/Arnobius/Adversus Gentes/Book II/Chapter XXVI

26. But when I hear the soul spoken of as something extraordinary, as akin and very nigh to God, and as coming hither knowing all about past times, I would have it teach, not learn; and not go back to the rudiments, as the saying is, after being advanced in knowledge, but hold fast the truths it has learned when it enters its earthly body. For unless it were so, how could it be discerned whether the soul recalls to memory or learns for the first time that which it hears; seeing that it is much easier to believe that it learns what it is unacquainted with, than that it has forgot what it knew but a little before, and that its power of recalling former things is lost through the interposition of the body? And what becomes of the doctrine that souls, being bodiless, do not have substance? For that which is not connected with any bodily form is not hampered by the opposition of another, nor can anything be led to destroy that which cannot be touched by what is set against it. For as a proportion established in bodies remains unaffected and secure, though it be lost to sight in a thousand cases; so must souls, if they are not material, as is asserted, retain their knowledge of the past, however thoroughly they may have been enclosed in bodies. Moreover, the same reasoning not only shows that they are not incorporeal, but deprives them of all immortality even, and refers them to the limits within which life is usually closed. For whatever is led by some inducement to change and alter itself, so that it cannot retain its natural state, must of necessity be considered essentially passive. But that which is liable and exposed to suffering, is declared to be corruptible by that very capacity of suffering.

## Footnotes

* ↑ Lit., “but retaining its own things, bind itself in earthly bodies.”
* ↑ Lit., “of.”
* ↑ So the ms. and edd., reading sua-de-ri, for which Oehler reads very neatly sua de vi—“can anything of its own power destroy,” etc.
* ↑ Lit., “not suffer forgetfulness.”
* ↑ Lit., “however the most solid unions of bodies may have bound them round.”
* ↑ So the edd. reading privat immortalitate has omni, for which, according to Hildebrand, the ms. reads -tatem has omnis—“all these of immortality.”
# Ante-Nicene Fathers/Volume VI/Arnobius/Adversus Gentes/Book II/Chapter XXXII

32. Since these things are so, and we have been taught by the greatest teacher that souls are set not far from the gaping jaws of death; that they can, nevertheless, have their lives prolonged by the favour and kindness of the Supreme Ruler if only they try and study to know Him,—for the knowledge of Him is a kind of vital leaven and cement to bind together that which would otherwise fly apart,—let them, then, laying aside their savage and barbarous nature, return to gentler ways, that they may be able to be ready for that which shall be given. What reason is there that we should be considered by you brutish, as it were, and stupid, if we have yielded and given ourselves up to God our deliverer, because of these fears? We often seek out remedies for wounds and the poisoned bites of serpents, and defend ourselves by means of thin plates sold by Psylli or Marsi, and other hucksters and impostors; and that we may not be inconvenienced by cold or intense heat, we provide with anxious and careful diligence coverings in houses and clothing.

## Footnotes

* ↑ Lit., “from the gapings and,” etc.
* ↑ There may be here some echo of the words (John xvii. 3), “This is eternal life, that they may know Thee, the only true God,” etc.; but there is certainly not sufficient similarity to found a direct reference on, as has been done by Orelli and others.
* ↑ i.e., souls.
* ↑ This passage presents no difficulty in itself, its sense being obviously that, as by God’s grace life is given to those who serve Him, we must strive to fit ourselves to receive His blessing. The last words, however, have seemed to some fraught with mystery, and have been explained by Heraldus at some length as a veiled or confused reference to the Lord’s Supper, as following upon baptism and baptismal regeneration, which, he supposes, are referred to in the preceding words, “laying aside,” etc. [It is not, however, the language of a mere catechumen.]
* ↑ These “thin plates,” laminæ, Orelli has suggested, were amulets worn as a charm against serpents.
* ↑ ms. Phyllis.
* ↑ So the edd., reading instit-oribusfor the ms. instit-ut-oribus, “makers.”
* ↑ Lit., “that colds and violent suns may not,” etc.
* ↑ Lit., “of.”
# Ante-Nicene Fathers/Volume VI/Arnobius/Adversus Gentes/Book II/Chapter XXVII

27. So then, if souls lose all their knowledge on being fettered with the body, they must experience something of such a nature that it makes them become blindly forgetful. For they cannot, without becoming subject to anything whatever, either lay aside their knowledge while they maintain their natural state, or without change in themselves pass into a different state. Nay, we rather think that what is one, immortal, simple, in whatever it may be, must always retain its own nature, and that it neither should nor could be subject to anything, if indeed it purposes to endure and abide within the limits of true immortality. For all suffering is a passage for death and destruction, a way leading to the grave, and bringing an end of life which may not be escaped from; and if souls are liable to it, and yield to its influence and assaults, they indeed have life given to them only for present use, not as a secured possession, although some come to other conclusions, and put faith in their own arguments with regard to so important a matter.

## Footnotes

* ↑ Lit., “put on the blindness of oblivion.”
* ↑ Cf. Lucretius, iii. 969, where life is thus spoken of.
# Ante-Nicene Fathers/Volume VI/Arnobius/Adversus Gentes/Book II/Chapter XXXIV

34. Since this is the case, what, pray, is so unfair as that we should be looked on by you as silly in that readiness of belief at which you scoff, while we see that you both have like beliefs, and entertain the same hopes? If we are thought deserving of ridicule because we hold out to ourselves such a hope, the same ridicule awaits you too, who claim for yourselves the hope of immortality. If you hold and follow a rational course, grant to us also a share in it. If Plato in the Phædrus, or another of this band of philosophers, had promised these joys to us—that is, a way to escape death, or were able to provide it and bring us to the end which he had promised, it would have been fitting that we should seek to honour him from whom we look for so great a gift and favour. Now, since Christ has not only promised it, but also shown by His virtues, which were so great, that it can be made good, what strange thing do we do, and on what grounds are we charged with folly, if we bow down and worship His name and majesty from whom we expect to receive both these blessings, that we may at once escape a death of suffering, and be enriched with eternal life?

## Footnotes

* ↑ Here, as in c. 7, p. 436, n. 3, the edd. read Phædone, with the exception of the first ed., LB., Hildebrand, and Oehler, who follow the ms. as above.
* ↑ Lit., “to the end of promising.”
* ↑ Meursius suggests numini, “deity,” on which it may be well to remark once for all, that nomen and numen are in innumerable places interchanged in one or other of the edd. The change, however, is usually of so little moment, that no further notice will be taken of it.
* ↑ So the ms., according to Rigaltius and Hildebrand, reading vitæ æternitate, while Crusius asserts that the ms. gives vita et—“with life and eternity.”
# Ante-Nicene Fathers/Volume IV/Origen/Origen Against Celsus/Book IV/Chapter LXII

Chapter LXII.
After these matters, then, he thinks that he can make us acquainted in a few words with the questions regarding the nature of evil, which have been variously discussed in many important treatises, and which have received very opposite explanations.  His words are: “There neither were formerly, nor are there now, nor will there be again, more or fewer evils in the world (than have always been). For the nature of all things is one and the same, and the generation of evils is always the same.” He seems to have paraphrased these words from the discussions in the Theætetus, where Plato makes Socrates say: “It is neither possible for evils to disappear from among men, nor for them to become established among the gods,” and so on. But he appears to me not to have understood Plato correctly, although professing to include all truth in this one treatise, and giving to his own book against us the title of A True Discourse. For the language in the Timæus, where it is said, “When the gods purify the earth with water,” shows that the earth, when purified with water, contains less evil than it did before its purification. And this assertion, that there at one time were fewer evils in the world, is one which we make, in harmony with the opinion of Plato, because of the language in the Theætetus, where he says that “evils cannot disappear from among men.”
* ↑ ὁ τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐκπεριλαμβάνων.
* ↑ [Cf. Plato, Theætetus, xxv. p. 176. S.]
# Ante-Nicene Fathers/Volume IV/Origen/Origen Against Celsus/Book IV/Chapter LXVII

Chapter LXVII.
I do not understand how Celsus should deem it of advantage, in writing a treatise against us, to adopt an opinion which requires at least much plausible reasoning to make it appear, as far as he can do so, that “the course of mortal things is the same from beginning to end, and that the same things must always, according to the appointed cycles, recur in the past, present, and future.” Now, if this be true, our free-will is annihilated. For if, in the revolution of mortal things, the same events must perpetually occur in the past, present, and future, according to the appointed cycles, it is clear that, of necessity, Socrates will always be a philosopher, and be condemned for introducing strange gods and for corrupting the youth. And Anytus and Melitus must always be his accusers, and the council of the Areopagus must ever condemn him to death by hemlock. And in the same way, according to the appointed cycles, Phalaris must always play the tyrant, and Alexander of Pheræ commit the same acts of cruelty, and those condemned to the bull of Phalaris continually pour forth their wailings from it. But if these things be granted, I do not see how our free-will can be preserved, or how praise or blame can be administered with propriety. We may say further to Celsus, in answer to such a view, that “if the course of moral things be always the same from beginning to end, and if, according to the appointed cycles, the same events must always occur in the past, present, and future,” then, according to the appointed cycles, Moses must again come forth from Egypt with the Jewish people, and Jesus again come to dwell in human life, and perform the same actions which (according to this view) he has done not once, but countless times, as the periods have revolved. Nay, Christians too will be the same in the appointed cycles; and Celsus will again write this treatise of his, which he has done innumerable times before.
# Ante-Nicene Fathers/Volume IV/Origen/Origen Against Celsus/Book IV/Chapter LXVIII

Chapter LXVIII.
Celsus, however, says that it is only “the course of mortal things which, according to the appointed cycles, must always be the same in the past, present, and future;” whereas the majority of the Stoics maintain that this is the case not only with the course of mortal, but also with that of immortal things, and of those whom they regard as gods. For after the conflagration of the world, which has taken place countless times in the past, and will happen countless times in the future, there has been, and will be, the same arrangement of all things from the beginning to the end. The Stoics, indeed, in endeavouring to parry, I don’t know how, the objections raised to their views, allege that as cycle after cycle returns, all men will be altogether unchanged from those who lived in former cycles; so that Socrates will not live again, but one altogether like to Socrates, who will marry a wife exactly like Xanthippe, and will be accused by men exactly like Anytus and Melitus. I do not understand, however, how the world is to be always the same, and one individual not different from another, and yet the things in it not the same, though exactly alike. But the main argument in answer to the statements of Celsus and of the Stoics will be more appropriately investigated elsewhere, since on the present occasion it is not consistent with the purpose we have in view to expatiate on these points.
* ↑ τοῦ παντός.
* ↑ ἀπαραλλάκτους.