# 1911 Encyclopædia Britannica/Sea-Power

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​SEA-POWER. This term is used to indicate two distinct, though cognate, things. The affinity of these two and the indiscriminate manner in which the term has been applied to each have tended to obscure its real significance. The obscurity has been deepened by the frequency with which the term has been confounded History of the term. with the old phrase, “Sovereignty of the sea,” and the still current expression, “Command of the sea” (vide Sea, Command of). A discussion—etymological, or even archaeological in character—of the term must be undertaken as an introduction to the explanation of its now generally accepted meaning. It is one of those compound words in which a Teutonic and a Latin (or Romance) element are combined, and which are easily formed and become widely current when the sea is concerned. Of such are “sea-coast,” “sea-forces” (the “land- and sea forces” used to be a common designation of what we now call the “Army and Navy”); “sea-service,” “sea-serpent” and “sea-officer” (now superseded by “naval officer”). The term in one form is as old as the 15th century. Edward III., in commemoration of the naval victory of Sluys, coined gold “ nobles ” which bore on one side his efligy “ crowned, standing in a large ship, holding in one hand a sword and in the other a shield.” An anonymous poet, who wrote in the reign of Henry VI., says of this coin:—
* “For four things our noble showeth to me,
* King, ship and sword, and power of the sea.”
Even in its present form the term is not of very recent date. Grote (Hist. of Greece, v. 67, published in 1849, but with preface dated 1848) speaks of “the conversion of Athens from a land-power into a sea-power.” In a lecture published in 1883, but probably delivered earlier, the late Sir J. R. Seeley says that “commerce was swept out of the Mediterranean by the besom of the Turkish sea-power” (Expansion of England, p. 89). The term also occurred in the 9th edition of this Encyclopaedia, vol. xviii. p. 574, in the article “Persia,” where we are told that Themistocles was “the founder of the Attic sea-power.” The sense in which the term is used differs in these extracts. In the first it means what we generally call a “naval power”—that is to say, a state having a considerable navy in contradistinction to a “military power,” a state with a considerable army but only a relatively small navy. In this sense there are many old uses of the phrase. In the last two extracts it means all the elements of the naval strength of the state referred to; and this is the meaning that is now generally, and is likely to be exclusively, attached to the term owing to the brilliant way in which it has been elucidated by Captain A. T. Mahan of the United States Navy.
The double use of the term is common in German, though in that language both parts of the compound now in use are Teutonic. One instance out of many may be cited from the historian Adolf Holm (Griechische Geschichte, Berlin, 1889). He says (ii. p. 37) that Athens, being in possession of a good naval port, could become “eine bedeutende Seemacht,” i.e. an important naval power. He also says (ii. p. 91) that Gelon of Syracuse, besides a large army (Heer), had “eine bedeutende Seernacht,” meaning a considerable navy. The term, in the first of the two senses, is old in German, as appears from the following, extracted from Zedler’s Grosses Universal Lexicon, vol. xxxvi. (Leipzig and Halle, 1743); “Seemachten, Seepotenzen; Latin, summae potestates mari potentes.” “Seepotenzen” is probably quite obsolete now. It is interesting as showing that German no more abhors Teuto-Latin or Teuto-Romance compounds than English. We may note, as a proof of the indeterminate meaning of the expression until his own epoch-marking works had appeared, that Mahan himself in his earliest book, Influence of Sea-power on History (1890), used it in both senses. He says (p. 35), “The Spanish Netherlands ceased to be a sea-power.” He alludes (p. 42) to the development of a nation as a “sea-power,” and (p. 43) to the inferiority of the Confederate States “as a sea-power.” Also (p. 225) he remarks of the war of the Spanish Succession that “before it England was one of the sea-powers, after it she was the sea-power without any second.”, In all these passages, as appears from the use of the indefinite article, what is meant is a “naval power, or a state in possession of a strong navy. The other meaning of the term forms the general subject of Mahan's' writings. In his earlier works Mahan, writes “sea power” as two words; but in a published letter of the 19th February 1897 he joins them with a hyphen, and defends this formation of the term and the sense in which he uses it. We may regard him as the virtual inventor of the term in its more diffused meaning, for—even if it had been employed by earlier writers in that sense—it is he beyond all question who has given it general currency. He has made it impossible for any one to treat of sea-power without frequent reference to his writings and conclusions.
There is something more than mere literary, interest in the fact that the term in another language was used more than two thousand years ago. Before Mahan no historian—not even one of those who specially devoted themselves to the narration of naval occurrences—had evinced a ore correct appreciation of the general principles of Appreciation of sea-power by the ancients. naval warfare than Thucydides. He alludes several times to the importance of getting command of the sea. Great Britain would have been saved some disasters and been less often in peril had British writers-taken as guides by the public possessed the same grasp of the true principles of defence as Thucydides exhibited. One passage in his history is worth quoting. Brief as it is, it shows that on the subject of sea-power he was a predecessor of Mahan. In a speech in favour of prosecuting the war, which he puts in the mouth of Pericles, these words occur: οἱ μὲν γὰρ οὐχ ἕξουσιν ἀλλην . . ., . . . . . τῆς θαλάσσης κράτοςς. The last part of this extract, though often translated “command of the sea,” or “dominion of the sea,” really has the wider meaning of sea-power, the “power of the sea” of the old English poet above quoted. This wider meaning should be attached to certain passages in Herodotus (iii. 122 in two places; v. 83), which have been generally interpreted “commanding the sea,” or by the mere titular and honorific “having the dominion of the sea.” One editor of Herodotus, Ch. F. Baehr, did, however, see exactly what was meant, for, with reference to the allusion to Polycrates, he says, classe maximum valuit. This is perhaps as exact a definition of sea-power as could be given in a sentence.
It is, however, impossible to give a definition which would be at the same time succinct and satisfactory. To say that “sea-power” means the sum total of the various elements that go to make up the naval strength of a state would be in reality to beg the question. Mahan lays down “principal conditions affecting the sea-power of nations,” but he does not attempt to give a concise definition of it. Yet no one who has studied his works will find it difficult to understand what it indicates. Our present task is, within the necessarily restricted limits of an article in an encyclopedia, to put readers in possession of the means of doing this. The ​ best, indeed—as Mahan has shown us—the only effective way of attaining this object is to treat the matter historically. Whatever date we may agree to assign to the formation of the term itself, the idea-as we have seen-is as old as history. It is not intended to give a condensed history of sea-power, but rather an analysis of the idea and what it contains, illustrating this analysis with examples from history ancient and modern. It is important to know that it is not something which originated in the middle of the 17th century, and having seriously affected history in the 18th, ceased to have weight till Captain Mahan appeared to comment on it in the last decade of the rgth. With a few masterly touches Mahan, in his brief allusion to the second Punic war, has illustrated its importance in the struggle between Rome and Carthage. What has to be shown is that the principles which he has laid down in that case, and in cases much more modern, are true and have been true always and everywhere. Until this is perceived there is much history which cannot be understood, and yet it is essential to the welfare of Great Britain as a maritime power that she should understand it thoroughly. Her failure to understand it has more than once brought her, if not to the verge of destruction, at any rate within a short distance of serious disaster.
The high antiquity of decisive naval campaigns is among the most interesting features of international conflicts. Notwithstanding the much greater frequency of land wars, the course of history has been profoundly changed more often by contests on the water. That this has not received the notice it deserved is true, and Mahan Early manifesta-tions of sea-power. tells us why. “Historians generally,” he says, “have been unfamiliar with the conditions of the sea, having as to it neither special interest nor special knowledge; and the profound determining influence of maritime strength on great issues has consequently been overlooked.” Moralizing on that which might have been is admittedly a sterile process; but it is sometimes necessary to point, if only by way of illustration, to a possible alternative. As in modern times the fate of India and the fate of North America were determined by sea-power, so also at a very remote epoch sea-power decided whether or not Hellenic colonization was to take root in, and Hellenic culture to dominate, central and northern Italy as it dominated southern Italy, where traces of it are extant to this day. A moment's consideration will enable us to see how different the history of the world would have been had a Hellenized city grown and prospered on the Seven Hills. Before the T arquins were driven out of Rome a Phocaean fleet was encountered (537 B.C.) off Corsica by a combined force of Etruscans and Phoenicians, and was so handled that the Pho caeans abandoned the island and settled on the coast of Lucania (Mommsen, Hist. Rome, English trans. i. p. 153). The enterprise of their navigators had built up for the Phoenician cities and their great off-shoot Carthage, a sea-power which enabled them to gain the practical sovereignty of the sea to the west of Sardinia and Sicily. The control of these waters was the object of prolonged and memorable struggles, for on it—as the result showed—depended the empire of the world. From very remote times the consolidation and expansion, from within outwards, of great continental states have had serious consequences for mankind when they were accompanied by the acquisition of a coast-line and the absorption of a maritime population. We shall find that the process loses none of its importance in recent years. “The ancient empires,” says the historian of Greece, Ernst Curtius, “as long as no foreign elements had intruded into them, had an invincible horror of the water.” When the condition, which Curtius notices in parentheses, arose the “horror” disappeared. There is something highly significant in the uniformity of the efforts of Assyria, Egypt, Babylon and Persia to get possession of the maritime resources of Phoenicia. Our own immediate posterity will perhaps have to reckon with the results of similar efforts in our own day. It is this which gives a living interest to even the very ancient history of sea-power, and makes the study of it of great practical importance to us now. We shall see, as we go on, how the phenomena connected with it reappear with striking regularity in successive periods. Looked at in this light the great conflicts of former ages are full of useful, indeed necessary, instruction.
In the first and greatest of the contests waged by the nations of the East against Europe—the Persian wars—sea-power was the governing factor. Until Persia had expanded to the shores of the Levant the European Greeks had little to fear from the ambition of the great king. The giians conquest of Egypt by Cambyses had shown how Wars of the Greeks and Persians. formidable that ambition could be when supported by an efficient navy. With the aid of the naval forces of the Phoenician cities the Persian invasion of Greece was rendered comparatively easy. It was the naval contingents from Phoenicia which crushed the Ionian revolt. The expedition of Mardonius, and still more that of Datis and Artaphernes, had indicated the danger threatening Greece when the master of a great army was likewise the master of a great navy. Their defeat at Marathon was not likely to, and as a matter of fact did not, discourage the Persians from further attempts at aggression. As the advance of Cambyses into Egypt had been flanked by a fleet, so also was that of Xerxes into Greece. By the good fortune sometimes vouchsafed to a people, which, owing to its obstinate opposition to, or neglect of, a Wise policy, scarcely deserves it, there appeared at Athens an influential citizen who understood all that was meant by the term sea-power. Themistocles saw more clearly than any of his contemporaries that, to enable Athens to play a leading part in the Hellenic world, she needed above all things a strong navy. “He had already in his eye the battle-field of the future.” He felt sure that the Persians would come back, and come with such forces that resistance in the open field would be out of the question. One scene of action remained—the sea. Persuaded by him the Athenians increased their navy, so that of the 271 vessels comprising the Greek fleet at Artemisium, 147 had been provided by Athens, which also sent a large reinforcement after the first action. Though no one has ever surpassed Themistocles in the faculty of correctly estimating the importance of sea-power, it was understood by Xerxes as clearly as by him that the issue of the war depended upon naval operations. The arrangements made under the Persian monarch’s direction, and his very personal movements, show that this was his view. He felt, and probably expressed the feeling, exactly as—in the war of American Independence—Washington did in the words, “Whatever efforts are made by the land armies, the navy must have the casting vote in the present contest.” The decisive event was the naval action of Salamis. To have made certain of success, the Persians should have first obtained a command of the Aegean, as complete for all practical purposes as the French and English had of the sea generally in the war against Russia of 1854-56. The Persian sea-power. was not equal to the task. The fleet of the great king was numerically stronger than that of the Greek allies; but it has been proved many times that naval efficiency does not depend on numerical superiority alone. The choice sections of the Persian fleet were the contingents of the Ionians and Phoenicians. The former were half-hearted or disaffected; while the latter were, at best, not superior in skill, experience, and valour to the Greek sailors. At Salamis Greece was saved not only from the ambition a.nd vengeance of Xerxes, but also and for many centuries from oppression by an Oriental conqueror. Persia did not succeed against the Greeks, not because she had no sea-power, but because her sea-power, artificially built up, was inferior to that which was a natural element of the Vitality of her foes. Ionia was lost and Greece in the end enslaved, .because the quarrels of Greeks with Greeks led to the ruin of their naval states. .
The Peloponnesian was largely a naval war. The confidence of the Athenians in their sea-power had a great deal to do with its outbreak. The immediate occasion of the hostilities, which in time involved so many states, was the oppor- gzzgzn tunity offered by the conflict between Corinth and Wu-Corcyra of increasing the sea-power of Athens. Hitherto the Athenian naval predominance had been virtually conined to the Aegean Sea. The Corcyraean envoy, who pleaded for help at Athens, dwelt upon the advantage to be derived by the ​ Athenians from alliance with a naval state occupying an important situation “with respect to the western regions towards which the views of the Athenians had for some time been directed” (Thirlwall, Hist. Greece, iii. 96). It was the “weapon of her sea-power,” to adopt Mahan’s phrase, that enabled Athens to maintain the great conflict in which she was engaged. Repeated invasions of her territory, the ravages of disease among her people and the rising disaffection of her allies had been more than made up for by her predominance on the water. The scale of the subsequent Syracusan expedition showed how vigorous Athens still was down to the interruption of the war by the peace of Nicias. The great expedition just mentioned overtaxed her strength. Its failure brought about the ruin of the state. It was held by contemporaries, and has been held in our own day, that the Athenian defeat at Syracuse was due to the omission of the government at home to keep the force in Sicily' properly supplied and reinforced. This explanation of failure is given in all ages, and should always be suspected. The friends of unsuccessful generals and admirals always offer it, being sure of the support of the political opponents of the administration. After the despatch of the supporting expedition under Demosthenes and Eurymedon no further great reinforcement, as Nicias admitted, was possible. The weakness of Athens was in the character of the men who swayed the popular assemblies and held high commands. A people which remembered the administration of a Pericles, and yet allowed a Cleon or an Alcibiades to direct its naval and military policy, courted defeat. Nicias, notwithstanding the possession of high qualities, lacked the supreme virtue of a commander—firm resolution. He dared not face the obloquy consequent on withdrawal from an enterprise on which the popular hopes had been fixed; and therefore he allowed a reverse to be converted into an overwhelming disaster. “The complete ruin of Athens had appeared, both to her enemies and to herself, impending and irreparable. But so astonishing, so rapid and so energetic had been her rally, that (a year after Syracuse) she was found again carrying on a terrible struggle ” (Grote, Hist. Greece, v. p. 354). Nevertheless her sea-power had indeed been ruined at Syracuse. Now she could wage war only “ with impaired resources and on it purely defensive system.” Even before Arginusae, it was seen that “superiority of nautical skill had passed to the Peloponnesians and their allies” (ibid. p. 503).
The great, occasionally interrupted, and prolonged contest between Rome and Carthage was a sustained effort on the part of one to gain and of the other to keep the control of the western Mediterranean. So completely had that control been exercised by Carthage, that she had anticipated the Spanish commercial policy in America. Struggle between Rome and Carthage. The Romans were precluded by treaties from trading with the Carthaginian territories in Hispania, Africa and Sardinia. Rome, as Mommsen tells us, “was from the first a maritime city and, in the period of its vigour, never was so foolish or so untrue to its ancient traditions as wholly to neglect its war marine and to desire to be a mere continental power.” It may be that it was lust of wealth rather than lust of dominion that first promoted a trial of strength with Carthage. The vision of universal empire could hardly as yet have formed itself in the imagination of a single Roman. The area of Phoenician maritime commerce was vast enough both to excite jealousy and to offer vulnerable points to the cupidity of rivals. It is probable that the modern estimate of the sea-power of Carthage is much exaggerated. It was great by comparison, and of course overwhelmingly great when there were none but insignificant competitors to challenge it. Mommsen holds that, in the 4th and 5th centuries after the foundation of Rome, “the two main competitors for the dominion of the Western waters” were Carthage and Syracuse. “Carthage,” he says, “had the preponderance, and Syracuse sank more and more into a second-rate naval power. The maritime importance of the Etruscans was wholly gone. . . . Rome itself was not exempt from the same fate; its own waters were likewise commanded by foreign fleets.” The Romans were for a long time too much occupied at home to take much interest in Mediterranean matters. The position of the Carthaginians in the western basin of the Mediterranean was very like that of the Portuguese long afterwards in India. The latter kept within reach of the sea; “nor did their rule ever extend a day’s march from their ships” (R. S. Whiteway, Rise of the Portuguese Power in India. Westminster, 1889, p. 12). “The Carthaginians in Spain,” says Mommsen, “made no effort to acquire the interior from the warlike native nations; they were content with, the possession of the mines and of stations for traffic and for shell and rot her fisheries.” Allowance being made for the numbers of the classes engaged in administration, commerce and supervision, it is nearly 'certain that Carthage could not furnish the crews required by both a great war-navy and a great mercantile marine. No one is surprised on finding that the land-forces of Carthage were composed largely of alien mercenaries. We have several examples from which we can infer a parallel, if not an identical, condition of her maritime resources. How, then, was the great Carthaginian carrying-trade provided for? The experience of more than one country will enable us to answer this question. The ocean trade of those off-shoots or dependencies of the United Kingdom, viz. the United States, Australasia and India, is largely or chiefly conducted by shipping of the “old country.” So that of Carthage was largely conducted by old Phoenicians. These may have obtained a “Carthaginian Register,” or the contemporary equivalent; but they could not all have been purely Carthaginian or Liby-Phoenician. This must have been the case even more with the war-navy. British India for a considerable time possessed a real, and indeed highly efficient navy; but it was office red entirely and manned almost entirely by men from the old country. Moreover, it was small. The wealth of India would have sufficed to furnish a larger material element; but, as the country could not supply the personnel, it would have been absurd to speak of the sea-power of India apart from that of England. As soon as the Romans chose to make the most of their natural resources the maritime predominance of Carthage was doomed. The artificial basis of the latter’s sea-power would not enable it to hold out against serious and persistent assaults. Unless this is perceived, it is impossible to understand the story of the Punic Wars. Judged by every visible sign of strength, Carthage, the richer, the more enterprising, ethnically the more predominant among her neighbours, and apparently the more nautical, seemed sure to win in the great struggle with Rome Which, by the conditions of the case, was to be waged largely on the water. Yet those who had watched the struggles of the Punic city with the Sicilian Greeks, and especially that with Agathocles, must have seen reason to cherish doubts concerning her naval strength. It was an anticipation of the case of Spain in the age of Philip II. As the great Elizabethan seamen discerned the defects of the Spanish naval establishment, so men at Rome discerned those of the Carthaginian. Dates in connexion with this are of great significance. A comprehensive measure, with the object of “rescuing their marine from its condition of impotence” was taken by the Romans in the year 267 B.C. Four quaestores classici—in modern naval English we may perhaps call them port-admirals—were nominated, and one 'was stationed at each of four ports. The objects of the Roman Senate, so Mommsen tells us, were very obvious. They were “to recover their independence by sea, to cut off the maritime communications of Tarentum, to close the Adriatic against fleets coming from Epirus, and to emancipate themselves from Carthaginian supremacy.” Four years afterwards the first Punic War began. It was, and had to be, largely a naval contest. The Romans waged it with varying fortune, but in the end triumphed by means of their sea-power. The victory of Catulus over the Carthaginian fleet off the Aegadian Islandsdecided the war and left to the Romans the possession of Sicily and the power of possessing themselves of Sardinia and Corsica. It would be an interesting and perhaps not'barren investigation to inquire to what extent the decline of the mother states of Phoenicia, 'consequent on the campaigns of Alexander the Great, had helped to enfeeble the naval efficiency of the Carthaginian defences. One thing was certain. Carthage had ​ now met with a rival endowed with natural maritime resources greater than her own. That rival also contained citizens who understood the true importance of sea-power. “With a statesmanlike sagacity from which succeeding generations might have drawn a lesson, the leading men of the Roman Commonwealth perceived that all their coast fortifications and coast garrisons would prove inadequate unless the war-marine of the state were again placed on a footing that should command respect” (Mommsen, i. 427). It is a gloomy reflection that the leading men of the United Kingdom could not see this in 1860. A thorough comprehension of the events of the first Punic War enables us to solve what, until Mahan wrote, had been one of the standing enigmas of history, 'viz. Hannibal's invasion of Italy by land instead of by sea in the second Punic War. Mahan's masterly examination of this question has set at rest all doubts as to the reason of Hannibal's action (Influence on Hist. pp. 13-21). The naval predominance in the western basin of the Mediterranean acquired by Rome had never been lost. Though modern historians, even those belonging to a maritime country, may have failed to perceive it, the Carthaginians knew well enough that the Romans were too strong for them on the sea. Though other forces co-operated to bring about the defeat of Carthage in the second Punic War, the Roman navy, as Mahan demonstrates, was the most important. As a navy, he tells us in words like those already quoted, “acts on an element strange to most writers, as its members have been from time immemorial a strange race apart, without prophets of their own, neither themselves nor their calling understood, its immense determining influence on the history of that era, and consequently upon the history of the world, has been overlooked.”
The attainment of all but universal dominion by Rome was now only a question of time. “The annihilation of the Carthaginian fleet had made the Romans masters of the sea” (Schmitz, Hist. Rome, p. 256). A lodgment had already been gained in Illyricum, and countries farther east were before long to be reduced to submission. Expansion of Roman dominion furthered by sea-power. A glance at the map will show that to effect this the command of the eastern basin of the Mediterranean, like that of the western, must be secured by the Romans. The old historic navies of the Greek and Phoenician states had declined. One considerable naval force there was which, though it could not have prevented, was strong enough to have delayed the Roman progress eastwards. This force belonged to Rhodes, which in the years immediately following the close of the second Punic War reached its highest point as a naval power (C. Torr, Rhodes in Ancient Times, p. 40). Far from trying to obstruct the advance of the Romans the Rhodian fleet helped it. Hannibal, in his exile, saw the necessity of being strong on the sea if the East was to be saved from the grasp of his hereditary foe; but the resources of Antiochus, even with the mighty cooperation of Hannibal, were insufficient. In a later and more often quoted struggle between East and West-that which was decided at Actium—sea-power was again seen to “have the casting vote.” When the whole of the Mediterranean coasts became part of a single state the importance of the navy was naturally diminished; but in the struggles within the declining empire it rose again at times. The contest of the Vandal Genseric with Majorian and the African expedition of Belisarius—not to mention others—were largely influenced by the naval operations (Gibbon, Decline and Fall, chaps. xxxvi., xli.).
A decisive event, the Mahommedan conquest of northern Africa from Egypt westwards, is unintelligible until it is seen how great a part sea-power played in effecting it. Purely land expeditions, or expeditions but slightly supported from the sea, had ended in failure. The emperor at Constantinople still had at his disposal Extension westward of Mahommedan conquest. a fleet capable of keeping open the communications with his African province. It took the Saracens half a century (A.D. 647-698) to win “their way along the coast of Africa as far as the Pillars of Hercules” (Hallam, Mid. Ages, chap. vi.); and, as Gibbon tells us, it was not till the Commander of the Faithful had prepared a great expedition, this time by sea as well as by land, that the Saracenic dominion was definitely established. It has been generally assumed that the Arabian conquerors who, within a few years of his death, spread the faith of Mahomet over vast regions, belonged to an essentially non-maritime race; and little or no stress has been laid on the extent to which they relied on naval support in prosecuting their conquests. In parts of Arabia, however, maritime enterprise was far from non-existent; and when the Mahommedan empire had extended outwards from Mecca and Medina till it embraced the coasts of various seas, the consequences to the neighbouring states were as serious as the rule above mentioned would lead us to expect that they would be. “With the conquest of Syria and Egypt a long stretch of sea-board had come into the Saracenic power; and the creation and maintenance of a navy for the protection of the maritime ports as well as for meeting the enemy became a matter of vital importance. Great attention was paid to the manning and equipment of the fleet ” (Amir Ali, Syed, Short Hist. Saracens, p. 442). At first the fleet was manned by sailors drawn from the Phoenician towns, Where nautical energy was not yet quite extinct; and later the crews were recruited from Syria, Egypt and the coasts of Asia Minor. Ships were built at most of the Syrian and Egyptian ports, and “ also at Obolla and Bushire on the Persian Gulf,” whilst the mercantile marine and maritime trade were fostered and encouraged. The sea-power thus created was largely artificial. It drooped—as in similar cases—when the special encouragement was withdrawn. “In the days of Arabian energy,” says Hallam, “ Constantinople was twice, in 668 and 716, attacked by great naval armaments.” The same authority believes that the abandonment of such maritime enterprises by the Saracens may be attributed to the removal of the capital from Damascus to Bagdad. The removal indicated a lessened interest in the affairs of the Mediterranean Sea, which was now left by the administration far behind. “The Greeks in their turn determined to dispute the command of the sea,” with the result that in the middle of the 10th century their empire was far more secure from its enemies than under the first successors of Heraclius.” Not only was the fall of the empire, by a rational reliance on sea-power, postponed for centuries, but also much that had been lost was regained. “At the close of the 10th century the emperors of Constantinople possessed the best, an d greatest part” of southern Italy, part of Sicily, the whole of what is now called the Balkan Peninsula, Asia Minor, with some parts of Syria and Armenia (Hallam, chap. vi.; Gibbon, chap; li.).
Neglect of sea-power by those who can be reached by sea brings its own punishment. Whether neglected or not, if it is an artificial creation it is nearly sure to disappoint those who wield it when it encounters a rival power of natural growth. How was it possible for the Crusaders, in their various expeditions, to achieve even the transient success that occasionally crowned their efforts? How did the Christian kingdom of Jerusalem contrive to exist for more than three-quarters of a century? Why did the Crusades more and more become maritime expeditions? The answer to these questions is to be found in the decline of the Mahommedan naval defences and the rising enterprise of the seafaring people of the West. Venetians, Pisans and Genoese transported crusading forces, kept open the communications of the places held by the Christians and hampered the operations of the infidels. Even the great Saladin failed to discern the important alteration of conditions. This is evident when we look at the efforts of the Christians to regain the lost kingdom. Saladin “ forgot that the safety of Phoenicia lay in immunity from naval incursions, and that no victory on land could ensure him against an influx from beyond the sea” (Amir Ali, Syed, pp. 359-360). Not only were the Crusaders helped by the fleets of the maritime republics of Italy, they also received reinforcements by sea from western Europe and England, on the “arrival of Malik Ankiltar [Richard Cœur de Lion] with twenty shiploads of fighting men and munitions of war.”
Participation in the Crusades was not a solitary proof of the ​ importance of the naval states of Italy. That they had been able to act effectively in the Levant, may have been in some measure due to the weakening of the Mohammedans by 5°""'°W°' the disintegration of the Seljukian power, the moveoflfalian
mpub"c, ments of the Moguls and the confusion consequent on the rise of the Ottomans. However that may have been, the naval strength of those Italian states was great absolutely as well as relatively. Sismondi, speaking of Venice, Pisa and Genoa, towards the end of the 11th century, says “ these three cities had more vessels on the Mediterranean than the whole of Christendom besides ” (Ilal. Republics, English ed. p. 29). Dealing with a period two centuries later, he declares it “ difficult to comprehend how two simple cities could put to sea such prodigious fleets as those of Pisa and Genoa.” The difficulty disappears when we have Mahan's explanation. The maritime republics of Italy-like Athens and Rhodes in ancient, Catalonia in medieval and England and the Netherlands in more modern times-were “peculiarity well fitted, by situation and resources, for the control of the sea by both war and commerce.” As far as the western Mediterranean was concerned, Genoa and Pisa had given early proofs of their maritime energy, and fixed themselves in succession to the Saracens, in the Balearic Isles, Sardinia and Corsica. Sea-power was the Themistorlean instrument with which they made a small state into a great one.
A fertile source of dispute between states is the acquisition of territory beyond sea. As others have done before and since, the maritime republics of Italy quarrelled over this. Seapower seemed, like Saturn, to devour its own children. In 1284, in a great sea-fight off Meloria, the Pisans were defeated by the Genoese with heavy loss, which, as Sismondi states, “ruined the maritime power ” of the former. From that time Genoa, transferring her activity to the Levant, became the rival of Venice. The fleets of the two cities in 1298 met near Cyprus in an encounter, said to be accidental, that began “ a terrible war which for seven years stained the Mediterranean with blood and consumed immense wealth.” In the next century the two republics, “ irritated by commercial quarrels ”-like the English and Dutch afterwards-were again at war in the Levant. Sometimes one side, sometimes the other was victorious; but the contest was exhausting to both, and especially to Venice. Within a quarter of a century they were at war again. Hostilities lasted till the Genoese met with the crushing defeat of Chioggia. “From this time, ” says Hallam, “ Genoa never commanded the ocean with such navies as before; her commerce gradually went into decay; and the 15th century, the most splendid in the annals of Venice, is till recent times the most ignominious in those of Genoa.” Venice seemed now to have no naval rival, and had no fear that any one could forbid the ceremony in which the Doge, standing in the bows of the Buceutaur, cast a ring into the Adriatic with the words, “Despousamus te, mare, in signum veri perpeluique daminii.” The result of the combats at Chioggia, though fatal to it in the long run, did not at once destroy the naval importance of Genoa. A remarkable characteristic of sea-power is the delusive manner in which it appears to revive after a great defeat. The Persian navy occasionally made a brave show afterwards; but in reality it had received at Salamis a mortal wound. Athens seemed strong enough on the sea after the catastrophe of Syracuse; but, as already stated, her naval power had been given there a check from which it never completely recovered. The navy of Carthage had had similar experience; and, in later ages, the power of the Turks was broken at Lepanto and that of Spain at Gravelines notwithstanding the deceptive appearances afterwards. Venice was soon confronted on the sea by a new rival. The Turkish naval historian, Haji Khalifeh (M arilirne wars of the Turks, Mitchel1's trans. p. 12), tells us that, “ After the taking of Constantinople, when they [the Ottomans] spread their conquests over land and sea, it became necessary to build ships and make armaments in order to subdue the fortresses and castles on the Rumelian and Anatolian shores, and in the islands of the Mediterranean.” Mahommed II. established a great naval arsenal at Constantinople. In 1470 the Turks, “for the first time, equipped a fleet, with which they drove that of the Venetians out of the Grecian seas ” (Sismondi, p. 256). The Turkish wars of Venice lasted a long time. In that which ended in 1503 the decline of the Venetian naval power was obvious. “The Mussulmans had made progress in naval discipline; The Venetian fleet could no longer cope with theirs. ” Henceforward it was as an allied contingent of other navies that that of Venice was regarded as important. Dyer (Hist. Europe, i. p. 85) quotes a striking passage from a letter of Aeneas Sylvius, afterwards Pope Pius II., in which the writer affirms that, “ if the Venetians are defeated, Christendom will not control the sea any longer; for neither the Catalans nor the Genoese without the Venetians are equal to the Turks.”
The last-named people, indeed, exemplified once more the rule that a military state expanding to the sea and absorbing older maritime populations becomes a serious menace to sempom its neighbours. Even in the 15th century Mahommed gud pm, II. had made an attack on Southern Italy; but his gre.” of sea-power was not equal to the undertaking. Suley- U” TWU man the Magnificent directed the Ottoman forces towards the west. With admirable strategic insight he conquered Rhodes, and thus freed himself from the danger of a hostile force on his flank. “ The centenary of the conquest of Constantinople was past, and the Turk had developed a great naval power besides annexing Egypt and Syria” (Seeley, British Policy, i. 143). The Turkish fleets, under such leaders as Khairad-din Barbarossa), Piale and Dragut, seemed to command the Mediterranean, including its western basin; but the repulse at Malta in 1 56 5 was a serious check, and the defeat at Lepanto in 1 571 virtually put an end to the prospect of Turkish maritime dominion. The predominance of Portugal in the Indian Ocean in the early part of the 16th century had seriously diminished the Ottoman resources. The wealth derived from the trade in that ocean, the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea had supplied the Mahommedans with the sinews of war, and had enabled them to contend with success against the Christians in Europe. "The main artery had been cut when the Portuguese took up the challenge of the Mahommedan merchants of Calicut, and swept their ships from the ocean ” (Whiteway, p. 2). The sea-power of Portugal wisely employed had exercised a great, though unperceived influence. Though enfeebled and diminishing, the Turkish navy was still able to act with some effect in the 17th century. Nevertheless, the sea-power of the Turks ceased to count as a factor of importance in the relations between great states.
In the meantime the state which had a leading share in winning the victory of Lepanto had been growing up in the West. Before the union of its crown with that of Castile and the Spam, formation of the Spanish monarchy, Aragon had been, e, ,., ,¢, W¢, - expanding till it reached the sea. It was united with Catalonia. Catalonia in the I2th century, and it conquered 'R-Valencia in the 13th. Its long line of coast opened the way to an extensive and flourishing commerce; and an enterprising navy indemnified the nation for the scantiness of its territory at home by the important foreign conquests of Sardinia, Sicily, Naples and the Balearic Isles. Among the maritime states of the Mediterranean Catalonia had been conspicuous. She was to the Iberian Peninsula much what Phoenicia had been to Syria. The Catalan navy had disputed the empire of the Mediterranean with the fleets of Pisa and Genoa. The incorporation of Catalonia. with Aragon added greatly to the strength of that kingdom. The Aragonese kings were wise enough to understand and liberal enough to foster the maritime interests of their new possessions (Prescott, Ferdinand and Isabella, Introd. sects. i., ii.). Their French and Italian neighbours were to feel, before long, the effect of this policy; and, when the Spanish monarchy had been consolidated, it was felt not only by them, but by others also. The more Spanish dominion was extended in Italy the more were the naval resources at the command of Spain augmented. Genoa became “ Spain's water-gate to Italy .... Henceforth the Spanish crown found in the Dorias its adrnirals; J I ​ their squadron was permanently hired to the kings of Spain.” Spanish supremacy at sea was established at the expense of France (G. W. Prothero, in M. Hume's Spain 1479-1788, p. 65). The acquisition of a vast domain in the New World had greatly developed the maritime activity of Castile, and Spain was as formidable on theocean as in the Mediterranean. After Portugal had been annexed the naval forces of that country were added to the Spanish, and the great port of Lisbon became available as a place of equipment and as an additional base of operations for oceanic campaigns. The fusion of Spain and Portugal, says Seeley, “produced a single State of unlimited maritime dominion .... Henceforth the whole New World belonged exclusively to Spain.” The story of the tremendous catastrophe-the defeatof the Armada-by which the decline of this dominion was heralded is well known. It is memorable, not only because of the harm it did to Spain, but also because it revealed the rise of another claimant to maritime pre-eminence -the English nation. The effects of the catastrophe werenot at once visible. Spain still continued to look like the greatest power in the world; and, though the English seamen were seen to be something better than adventurous pirates-a character suggested by some of their contemporary exploits-few could have comprehended that they were engaged in building up what was to be a sea-power greater than any known to history. They were carrying forward, not beginning, the building of this. “ England, ” says Sir ]. K. Laughton, “ had always Barb, believed in her naval power, had always claimed ”, s¢, ,. the sovereignty of the Narrow Seas; and more than tions of two hundred years before Elizabeth came to the iffggwer throne, Edward III. had testified to his sense of its importance by ordering a gold coinage bearing a device showing the armed strength and sovereignty of England based on the sea ” (Armada, Introd.). It is impossible to make intelligible the course of the many wars which the English waged with the French in the middle ages unless the true naval position of the former is rightly appreciated. Why were Crégy, Poitiers, Agincourt-not to mention other combats-fought, not on English, but on continental soil? Why, during the so-called “ Hundred Years' War, ” was England in reality the invader and not the invaded? We of the present generation are at last aware of the significance of naval defence, and know that, if properly utilized, it is the best security against invasion that a sea-surrounded state can enjoy. It is not, however, commonly remembered that the same condition of security existed and was properly valued in medieval times. The battle of Sluys in 1340 rendered invasion of England as impracticable as did that of La Hogue in 1692, that of Quibéron Bay in 1759 and that of Trafalgar in 1805; and it permitted, as did those battles, the transport of troops to the continent to support Great Britain's allies in wars which, had she not been strong at sea, would have been waged on the soil of her country. Her early continental wars, therefore, are proofs of the long-established efficiency of her naval defences. Notwithstanding the greater attention now paid to naval affairs, it is doubtful if Great Britain even yet recognizes the extent to which her security depends upon a good fleet as fully as her ancestors did seven centuries ago. The narrative of pre-Elizabethan campaigns is interesting merely as a story; and, when told-as, for instance, D. Hannay has told it in the introductory chapters of his Short History of the Royal N avy-it will be found instructive and worthy of careful study at the present day. Each of the principal events in England's early naval campaigns may be taken as an illustration of the idea conveyed by the term “ sea-power, ” and of the accuracy with which its meaning was apprehended at the time. To take a very early case, we may cite the defeat of Eustace the Monk (see Dovnnz Battle of) by Hubert de Burgh in IZ17. Reinforcements and supplies had been collected at Calais for conveyance to the army of Prince Louis of France and the rebel barons who had been defeated at Lincoln. The reinforcements tried to cross the Channel under the escort of a lieet commanded by Eustace. Hubert de Burgh, who had stoutly held Dover for King John, and was faithful to the young Henry III., heard of the enemy's movements. “ If these people land, ” said he, “ England is lost; let us therefore boldly meet them.” He reasoned in almost the same words as Raleigh about four centuries afterwards, and undoubtedly “ had grasped the true principles of the defence of England. ” He put to sea. and defeated his opponent. The fleet on which Prince Louis and the rebellious barons had counted was destroyed; and withgit their enterprise. “ No more admirably planned, no more fruitful battle has been fought by Englishmen on water ” (Hannay, p. 7). As introductory to a long series of naval operations undertaken with a like object it has deserved detailed mention here.
The 16th century was marked by a decided advance in both the development and the application of sea-power. Previously its operation had been confined to the Mediterranean Extend, ” or to coast waters outside it. Spanish or Basque sphere of seamen-by their proceedings in the English Channel- Sea had proved the practicability of, rather than been power engaged in, ocean warfare. The English, who withstood them, were accustomed to seas so rough, to seasons so uncertain and to weather so boisterous, that the ocean had few terrors for them. All that was wanting was a sufficient inducement to seek distant fields of action and a development of the naval art that would permit them to be reached. The discovery of the New World supplied the first; and consequently increased length of voyages and of absence from the coast led to the second. The world had been moving onwards in other things as well as in navigation. Intercommunication was becoming more and more frequent. What was done by one people was soon known to others. It is a mistake to suppose that, because the English had been behindhand in the exploration of remote regions, they were wanting in maritime enterprise. The career of the Cabots would of itself suliice to render such a supposition doubtful. The English had two good reasons for postponing voyages to and settlement in far-off lands. They had their hands full nearer home; and they thoroughly, and as it were by instinct, understood the conditions on which permanent expansion must rest. They wanted to make sure of the line of communications first. To effect this a sea-going marine of both war and commerce, and, for further expansion, stations on the way were essential. The chart of the world furnishes evidence of the wisdom and the thoroughness of their procedure. Taught by the experience of the Spaniards and the Portuguese, when unimpeded by the political circumstances of the time, and provided with suitable equipment, the English displayed their energy in distant seas. It now became simply a question of the efficiency of sea-power. If efficiency was not a quality of the English sea-power, then their efforts were bound to fail; and, more than this, the position of their country, challenging as it did what was believed to be the greatest of maritime states, would have been altogether precarious. The principal expeditions now undertaken were distinguished by a characteristic peculiar to the people, and not to be found in connexion with the exploring or colonizing activity of most other great nations even down to our own time. They were really unofficial speculations in which, if the government took part at all, it was for the sake of the profit expected, and almost, if not exactly, like any private adventurer. The participation of the government, nevertheless, had an aspect which it is worth while to note. It conveyed a hint-and quite consciously-to all whom it might concern that the speculations were “ under-written ” by the whole sea-power of England. The forces of more than one state had been used to protect its maritime trade from the assaults of enemies in the Mediterranean or in the Narrow Seas. They had been used to ward off invasion and to keep open communications across not very extensive areas of water. In the 16th century they were first relied upon to support distant commerce, whether carried on in a peaceful fashion or under aggressive forms. This, naturally enough, led to collisions. The contention waxed hot, and was virtually decided when the Armada shaped course to the northward after the fight off Gravelines.-The
expeditions against the Spanish Indies and, still more, those against Philip II.'s peninsular territory had helped to define ​ the limitations of sea-power. It became evident, and it was made still more evident in the next century, that for a great country to be strong it must not rely upon a navy alone. It must also have an adequate and properly Limitations of sea-power. organized mobile army. Notwithstanding the number of times that this lesson has been repeated Great Britain has been slow to learn it. It is doubtful if she has learned it even yet. English seamen in all ages seem to have mastered it fully; for they have always demanded—at any rate for upwards of three centuries—that expeditions against foreign territory oversea should be accompanied by a proper number of land-troops. On the other hand, the necessity of organizing the army of a maritime insular state and of training it with the object of rendering effective aid in operations of the kind in question, has rarely been perceived and acted upon by others. The result has been a long series of inglorious or disastrous affairs, like the West Indies voyage of 1595–1596, the Cadiz expedition of 1625 and that to the Île de Ré of 1627. Additions might be made to the list. The failures of joint expeditions have often been explained by alleging differences or quarrels between the naval and the military commanders. This way of explaining them, however, is nothing but the inveterate critical method of the streets by which cause is taken for effect and effect for cause. The differences and quarrels arose, no doubt; but they generally sprang out of the recriminations consequent on, not producing, the want of success. Another manifestation of the way in which sea-power works was first observed in the 17th century. It suggested the adoption of, and furnished the instrument for, carrying out a distinct maritime policy. What was practically a standing navy had come into existence. As regards Appearance of standing navies. England this phenomenon was now of respectable age. Long voyages and cruises of several ships in company had been frequent during the latter half of the 16th century and the early part of the 17th. Even the grandfathers of the men who sailed with Blake and Penn in 1652 could not have known a time when ships had never crossed the ocean, and squadrons kept together for months had never cruised. However imperfect it may have been, a system of provisioning ships and supplying them with stores, and of preserving discipline among their crews, had been developed, and had proved fairly satisfactory. The parliament and the Protector in turn found it necessary to keep a considerable number of ships in commission, and make them cruise and operate in company. It was not till well on in the reign of Queen Victoria that the man-of-war’s man was finally differentiated from the merchant seaman; but, two centuries before, some of the distinctive marks of the former had already begun to be noticeable. There were seamen in the time of the Commonwealth who rarely, perhaps some who never, served afloat except in a man-of-war. Some of the interesting naval families which were settled at Portsmouth and the eastern ports, and which—from father to son—helped to recruit the ranks of bluejackets till a date later than that of the launch of the first ironclad, could carry back their professional genealogy to at least the days of Charles II., when, in all probability, it did not first start. Though landsmen continued even after the Civil War to be given naval appointments, and though a permanent corps, through the ranks of which every one must pass, had not been formally established, a body of real naval officers—men who could handle their ships, supervise the working of the armament and exercise military command—had been formed. A navy, accordingly, was now a Sea-power and territorial expansion in the “New World.” weapon of undoubted keenness, capable of very effective use by any one who knew how to wield it. Having tasted the sweets of intercourse with the Indies, whether in the occupation of Portugal or of Spain, both English and Dutch were desirous of getting a larger share of them. English maritime commerce had increased and needed naval protection. If England was to maintain the international position to which, as no one denied, she was entitled, that commerce must be permitted to expand. The minds of men in western Europe, moreover, were set upon obtaining for their country territories in the New World, the amenities of which were now known. From the reign of James I. the Dutch had shown great jealousy of English maritime enterprise. Where it was possible, as in the East Indian Archipelago, they had destroyed it. Their naval resources were great enough to let them hold English shipping at their mercy, unless a grand effort were made to protect it. The Dutch conducted the carrying trade of most of the world, and the monopoly of this they were resolved to keep, while the English were resolved to share in it. The exclusion of the English from every trade-route, except such as ran by their own coast or crossed the Narrow Seas, seemed a by no means impossible contingency. There seemed also to be but one way of preventing it, viz. by war. The supposed unfriendliness of the Dutch, or at least of an important party amongst them, to the regicide government in England helped to force the conflict. The Navigation Act of 1651 was passed and regarded as a covert declaration of hostilities. So the first Dutch war began. It established England’s claim to compete for the position of a great maritime commercial power.
The rise of the sea-power of the Dutch, and the magnitude which it attained in a short time, and in the most adverse circumstances, have no parallel in history. The case of Athens was different, because the Athenian power had not so much been unconsciously developed out of a great maritime trade, as based on a military marine Sea-power of the Dutch. deliberately and persistently fostered during many years. Thirlwall believes that it was Solon who “laid the foundations of the Attic navy” (Hist. Greece, ii. p. 52), century before Salamis. The great achievement of Themistocles was to convince his fellow-Citizens that their navy ought to be increased. Perhaps the nearest parallel with the power of the Dutch was presented by that of Rhodes, which rested largely on a carrying trade. The Rhodian undertakings, however, were by comparison small and restricted in extent. Motley declares of the Seven United Provinces that they “commanded the ocean” (United Netherlands, ii. 132), and that it would be difficult to exaggerate the naval power of the young Commonwealth. Even in the days of Spain’s greatness English seamen positively declined to admit that she was stronger than England on the sea; and the story of the Armada justified their view. The first two Dutch wars were, therefore, contests between the two foremost naval states of the World for what was primarily a maritime object. The identity of the cause of the first and of the second war will be discerned by any one who compares what has been said about the circumstances leading to the former, with Monk’s remark as to the latter. He said that the English wanted a larger share of the trade enjoyed by the Dutch. It was quite in accordance with the spirit of the age that the Dutch should try to prevent, by force, this want from being satisfied. Anything like free and open competition was repugnant to the general feeling. The highroad to both individual wealth and national prosperity was believed to lie in securing a monopoly. Merchants or manufacturers who called for the abolition of monopolies granted to particular courtiers and favourites, had not the smallest intention, on gaining their object, of throwing open to the enterprise of all what had been monopolized. It was to be kept for the exclusive benefit of some privileged or chartered company. It was the same in greater affairs. As Mahan says, “To secure to one’s own people a disproportionate share of the benefits of sea commerce every effort was made to exclude others, either by the peaceful legislative methods of monopoly or prohibitory regulations, or, when these failed, by direct violence.” The apparent wealth of Spain was believed to be due to the rigorous manner in which foreigners were excluded from trading with the Spanish oversea territories. The skill and enterprise of the Dutch having enabled them to force themselves into this trade, they were determined to keep it to themselves. The Dutch East India Company was a powerful body, and largely dictated the maritime policy of the country. We have thus come to an interesting point in the historical consideration of sea-power. The Elizabethan conflict with Spain had practically settled the question whether or not the ​ expanding nations were to be allowed to extend their activities to territories in the New World. The first two Dutch Wars Effect on ocean trade. were to settle the question whether or not the ocean trade of the world was to be open to any people qualified to engage in it. We can see how largely these were maritime questions, how much depended on the solution found for them, and how plain it was that they must be settled by naval means.
Mahan’s great survey of sea-power opens in 1660, midway between the first and second Dutch Wars. “The sailing-ship era, with its distinctive features,” he tells us, “had fairly begun.” The art of war by sea, in its more important details, had been settled by the first war. From the beginning of the second the general features of ship Mahan’s survey. design, the classification of ships, the armament of ships, and the handling of fleets, were to remain without essential alteration until the date of Navarino. Even the tactical methods, except where improved on occasions by individual genius, altered little. The great thing was to bring the whole broadside force to bear on an enemy. Whether this was to be impartially distributed throughout the hostile line or concentrated on one part of it depended on the character of particular admirals. It would have been strange if a period so long and so rich in incidents had afforded no materials for forming a judgment on the real significance of sea-power. The text, so to speak, chosen by Mahan is that, notwithstanding the changes wrought in naval matériel since about 1850, we can find in the history of the past instructive illustrations of the general principles of maritime war. These illustrations will prove of value not only “in those wider operations which embrace a whole theatre of war,” but also, if rightly applied, “in the tactical use of the ships and weapons” of our own day. By a remarkable coincidence the same doctrine was being preached at the same time and quite independently by Vice-Admiral Philip Colomb in his work on Naval Warfare. As a prelude to the second Dutch War we find a repetition of a process which had been adopted somewhat earlier. That was the permanent conquest of trans-oceanic territory. Until the 17th century had well begun, naval, or combined naval and military, operations against the distant possessions of an enemy had been practically restricted to raiding or plundering attacks on commercial centres. The Portuguese territory in South America having come under Spanish dominion in consequence of the annexation of Portugal to Spain, the Dutch—as the power of the latter country declined—attempted to reduce part of that territory into permanent possession. This improvement on the practice of Drake and others was soon seen to be a game at which more than one could play. An expedition sent by Cromwell to the West Indies seized the Spanish island of Jamaica, which has remained in the hands of its conquerors to this day. In 1664 an English force occupied the Dutch North American settlements on the Hudson. Though the dispossessed rulers were not quite in a position to throw stones at sinners, this was rather a raid than an operation recognized warfare, because it preceded the formal outbreak of hostilities. The conquered territory remained in English hands for more than a century, and thus testified to the efficacy of a sea-power which Europe had scarcely begun to recognize. Neither the second nor the third Dutch War can be counted amongst the occurrences to which Englishmen may look back with unalloyed satisfaction; but they, unquestionably, disclosed some interesting manifestations of sea-power. Much indignation has been expressed concerning the corruption and inefficiency of the English government of the day, and its failure to take proper measures for keeping up the navy as it should have been kept up. Some, perhaps a good deal, of this indignation was deserved, but it would have been nearly as well deserved by every other government of the day. Even in those homes of political virtue where the administrative machinery was worked by, or in the interest of speculating capitalists and privileged companies, the accumulating evidence of late years has proved that everything was not considered to be, and as a matter of fact was not, exactly as it ought to have been. Charles II. and his brother, the duke of York, 'have been held up to obloquy because they thought that the coast of England could be defended against a naval enemy better by fortifications than by a good fleet and, as Pepys noted, were “not ashamed of it.” The truth is that neither the king nor the duke believed in the power of a navy to ward off attack from an island. This may have been due to want of intellectual capacity; but it would be going a long way to put it down to personal wickedness. They have had many imitators, some in our own day. The huge forts which stud the coast of the United Kingdom, and have been erected within living memory, are monuments, likely to last for many years, of the inability of people, whom no one could accuse of being vicious, to rate seapower at its proper value. It is much more likely that it was owing to a reluctance to study questions of naval defence as industriously as they deserved, and to that moral timidity which so often tempts even men of proved physical courage to undertake the impossible task of making themselves absolutely safe against hostile efforts at every point.
Charles II. has also been charged with indifference to the interests of his country, or worse, because during a great naval war he adopted the plan of trying to weaken the enemy by destroying his commerce. The king “took a fatal resolution of laying up his great ships and keeping only a few frigates on the cruise.” It is expressly related that this Misap-plication. was not Charles’s own idea, but that it was urged upon him by advisers whose opinion probably seemed at the time as well worth listening to as that of others. Anyhow if the king erred, as he undoubtedly did, he erred in good company. Eighteen hundred years earlier the statesmen who conducted the great war against Carthage, and whose astuteness has been the theme of innumerable panegyrics since, took the same “fatal resolution.” In the midst of the great struggle they “did away with the fleet. At the most they encouraged privateering; and with that view placed the war-vessels of the state at the disposal of captains who were ready to undertake a corsair warfare on their own account” (Mommsen, 1894, ii. 191). In much later times this method has had many respectable defenders. Mahan’s works are, in a sense, a formal warning to his fellow-citizens not to adopt it. In France, Within the last years of the 19th century, it found, and appears still to find, adherents enough to form a school. The reappearance of belief in demonstrated impossibilities is a recognized incident in human history; but it is usually confined to the emotional or the vulgar. It is serious and filled with menaces of disaster when it is held by men thought fit to administer the affairs of a nation or advise concerning its defence. The third Dutch War may not have settled directly the position of England in the maritime world; but it helped to place that country above all other maritime states—in the position, in fact, which Great Britain, the United Kingdom, the British Empire, whichever name may be given it, has retained up to the present. It also manifested in a very striking form the efficacy of sea-power. The United Provinces, though attacked by two of the greatest monarchies in the world, France and England, were not destroyed. Indeed, they preserved much of their political importance in the state system of Europe. The Republic “owed this astonishing result partly to the skill of one or two men, but mainly to its sea-power.” The effort, however, had undermined its strength and helped forward its decline.
The war, which was ended by the Peace of Ryswick in 1697, presents two features of exceptional interest: one was the havoc wrought on English commerce by the enemy; the other was Torrington’s conduct at and after the engagement off Beachy Head. Mahan discusses the former with his usual lucidity. At no time has war against commerce been conducted on a larger scale and with greater results than during this period. England suffered “infinitely more than in any former war.” Many of her merchants were ruined; and it is affirmed that the English shipping was reduced to the necessity of sailing under the Swedish and Danish flags. The explanation is that Louis XIV. made great efforts to keep up powerful fleets. The English navy was so fully occupied in watching these that no ships could be spared to protect England’s maritime trade. This is only ​ another way of saying that her commerce had increased so largely that the navy was not strong enough to look after it as well as oppose the enemy's main force. Notwithstanding her losses she was on the winning side in the conflict. Much misery and ruin had been caused, but not enough to affect the issue of the war. V
Torrington's proceedings in July 1690 were at the time the subject of much angry discussion. The debate, still meriting the epithet angry, has been renewed within the last In bemgy few years. The matter has to be noticed here, because it involves the consideration of a question of naval strategy which must be understood by those who wish to know the real meaning of the term sea-power, and who ought to learn that it is not a thing to be idly risked or thrown away at the bidding of the ignorant and the irresponsible. Arthur Herbert, earl of Torrington-the later peerage is a viscountcy held by the Byng family-was in command of the allied English and Dutch fleet in the English Channel. “ The disparity of force, ” says Mahan, “ was still in favour of France in 1690, but it was not so great as the year before. ” We can measure the ability of the then English government for conducting a great war, when we know that, in its wisdom, it had still further weakened the fleet by dividing it. Vice-Admiral Killigrew had been sent to the Mediterranean with a squadron, and had neglected, and indeed refused when urged, to take the necessary steps to repair this error. The government having omitted, as governments sometimes do, to gain any trustworthy intelligence of the strength or movements of the enemy, Torrington suddenly found himself confronted by a considerably superior French fleet under Tourville, one of the greatest of French sea-officers. Since then the intentions of the French have been questioned; but it is beyond dispute that, in England at the time, Tourville's movements were believed to be preliminary to invasion. Whether Tourville deliberately meant his movement to cover an invasion or not, invasion would almost certainly have followed complete success on his part; otherwise, his victory would have been without any valuable result. Torrington saw that as long as he could keep his own fleet intact, he could, though much weaker than his opponent, prevent him from doing serious harm. Though personally not a believer in the imminence of invasion, the English admiral knew that “ most men were in fear that the French would invade.” His own view was “ that whilst we had a fleet in being they would not dare to make an attempt.” Of late years controversy has raged round this phrase, “ a fleet in being, ” and the strategic principle which it expresses. Most seamen were at the time, have been since, and still are in agreement with Torrington. This might be supposed enough to settle the question. It has not been allowed, however, to remain one of purely naval strategy. It was made at the time a matter of party politics. This is why it is so necessary that in a notice of sea-power it should be discussed. Both as a strategist and as a tactician Torrington was immeasurably ahead of his contemporaries. The only English admirals who can be placed above him are Hawke and Nelson. He paid the penalty of his preeminence: he could not make ignorant men and dull men see the meaning or the advantages of his proceedings. Mahan, who is specially qualified to do him full justice, does not devote much space in his work to a consideration of Torrington's case, evidently because he had not sufficient materials before him on which to form a judgment. The admiral's character had been taken away already by Macaulay, who did have ample evidence before him; William III., with all his fine qualities, did not possess a military genius quite equal to that of Napoleon; and Napoleon, in naval strategy, was often wrong. William III. understood that subject even less than the French emperor did; and his favourites were still less capable of understanding it. Consequently Torrington's action has been put down to jealousy of the Dutch. There have been people who accused Nelson of being jealous of the naval reputation of Caracciolo! The explanation of Torrington's conduct is this: He had a fleet so much weaker than Tourville's that he could not fight a general action with the latter without a practical certainty of a crushing defeat. The “Fleet
Such a result would have laid the kingdom open: a defeat of the allied fleet, says Mahan, “ if sufficiently severe, 'might involve the fall of William's throne in England.” Given certain movements of the French fleet, Torrington might have manoeuvred to slip past it to the westward and join his force with that under Killigrew, which would make him strong enough to hazard a battle. This proved impracticable. There was then one course left-to retire before the French, but not to keep far from them. He knew that, though not strong enough to engage their whole otherwise unemployed fleet with any hope of success, he would be quite strong enough to fight and most likely beat it, when a part of it was trying either to deal with our ships to the westward or to cover the disembarkation of an invading army. He, therefore, proposed to keep his “ fleet in being ” in order to fall on the enemy when the latter would have two affairs at the same time on his hands. Vice-Admiral Colomb rose to a greater height than was usual even with him in his criticism of this campaign. What Torrington did was merely to reproduce on the sea what has been noticed dozens of times on shore, viz. the menace of the flanking enemy. In land warfare this is held to give exceptional opportunities for the display of good generalship, but, to quote Mahan over again, a navy “ acts on an element strange to most writers, its members have been from time immemorial a strange race apart, without prophets of their own, neither themselves nor their calling understood.” Whilst Torrington has had the support of the seamen, his opponents have been landsmen. For the crime of being a good strategist he was brought before a court-martial, but acquitted. His sovereign, who had been given the crowns of three kingdoms to defend our laws, showed his respect for them by fiouting a legally constituted tribunal and disregarding its solemn finding. The admiral who had saved his country was dismissed from the service. Still, the principle of the “ fleet in being ” lies at the bottom of all sound strategy.
Admiral Colomb has pointed out a great change of plan in the later naval campaigns of the 17th century. Improvements in naval architecture, in the methods of preserving food and in the arrangements for keeping the crews healthy, ', ,, ,, ,, , permitted fleets to be employed at a distance from operation. their home ports for long continuous periods. The Dutch, as allies of the Spaniards, kept a fleet in the Mediterranean for many months. The great de Ruyter was mortally wounded in one of the battles there fought. In the War of the Spanish Succession the Anglo-Dutch fleet found its principal scene of action eastward of Gibraltar. This, as it were, set the fashion for future wars. It became a kind of tacitly accepted rule that the operation of British sea-power was to be felt in the enemy's, rather than in British waters. The hostile coast was regarded strategically as the British frontier, and the sea was looked upon as territory which the enemy must be prevented from intl/ading. Acceptance of this principle led in time to the so-called “ blockades ” of Brest and Toulon. The name was misleading. As Nelson took care to explain, there was no desire to keep the enemy's fleet in; what was desired was to be near enough to attack it if it came out. The wisdom of the plan is undoubted. The hostile navy could be more easily watched and more easily followed if it put to sea. To carry out this plan a navy stronger in number of ships or in general efficiency than that of the enemy was necessary. With the exception of that of American Independence, which will, therefore, require special notice, England's subsequent great wars were conducted in accordance with the rule.
In the early part of the 18th century there was a remarkable manifestation of sea-power in the Baltic. Peter the Great, having created an efficient army, drove the Swedes Rise of from the coast provinces south of the Gulf of Finland. R, , s, ,, », Like the earlier monarchies of which we have spoken, sea-power. Russia, in the Baltic at least, now became a naval state. A large fleet was built, and, indeed, a considerable navy established. It was a purely artificial creation, and showed the merits and defects of its character. At first, and when under the eye of its creator, it was strong; when Peter was no more if Change In ​ dwindled away and, when needed again, had to be created afresh. It enabled Peter the Great'to conquer the neighbouring portion of Finland, to secure his coast territories and to dominate the Baltic. In this he was assisted by the exhaustion of Sweden consequent on her endeavours to retain, what was no longer possible, the position of a quasi-great power which she had held since the days of Gustavus Adolphus. Sweden ha.d been further weakened, especially as a naval state, by almost incessant wars with Denmark, which prevented all hope of Scandinavian predominance in the Baltic, the control of which sea has in these days passed into the hands of another state possessing a quickly created navy-the modern German empire.
The War of the Spanish Succession left Great Britain a Mediterranean power, a position which, in spite of twice losing Minorca, she still holds. In the War of the Austrian Succession, ix, “ France was forced to give up her conquests for want wan of a navy, and England saved her position by her sea-power, though she had failed to use it to the best advantage ” (Mahan, Injiuence on Hist. p. 280). This shows, as we shall find that a later war showed more plainly, that even the government of a thoroughly maritime country is not always sure of conducting its naval affairs wisely. The Seven Years War included some brilliant displays of the efficacy of sea-power. It was this which put the British in possession of Canada, decided which European race was to rule in India, and led to a British occupation of Havana in one hemisphere and of Manila in the other. In the same war Great Britain learnt how, by a feeble use of sea-power, a valuable possession like Minorca may be lost. At the same time, the maritime trade and the' general prosperity of the kingdom increased enormously. The result of the conflict made plain to all the paramount importance of having in the principal posts in the government men capable of understanding what war is and how it ought to be conducted. This lesson, as the sequel demonstrated, had not been learned when Great Britain became involved in a war with the insurgent colonies in North America. Mahan's comment is 52%, striking: “ The magnificence of sea-power and its wan value had perhaps been more clearly shown by the uncontrolled sway and consequent exaltation of one belligerent; but the lesson thus given, if more striking, is less vividly interesting than the spectacle of that sea-power meeting a foe worthy of its steel, and excited to exertion by a strife which endangered not only its most valuable colonies, but even its own shores ” (ligluence on Hist. p. 338). Great Britain was, in fact, drawing too largely on the prestige acquired during the Seven Years' War, and was governed by men who did not understand the first principles of naval warfare, and would not listen to those who did. They quite ignored the teaching of the then comparatively recent wars which has been alluded to already-that the enemy's coast should be looked upon as the frontier. A century and a half earlier the Dutchman Grotius had written“ Quae meta Britannia
Litora sunt aliis."
Though ordinary prudence would have suggested ample preparation, British ministers allowed their country to remain unprepared. Instead of concentrating their efforts on the main objective, they frittered away force in attempts to relieve two beleaguered garrisons under the pretext of yielding to popular pressure, which is the official term for acting on the advice of irresponsible and uninstructed busybodies. “ Depuis le début de la crise, " says Captain Chevalier, “les ministries de la Grande-Bretagne s'éta.ient montrés inférieurs at leur tache." An impressive result of this was the repeated appearance of powerful and indeed numerically superior hostile fleets in the English Channel. The war-notwithstanding that land operations constituted an important part of it, and in the end settled the issue-was essentially oceanic. Captain Mahan says it was “ purely maritime.” It may be true that, whatever the belligerent result, the political result, as regards the status of the insurgent colonies, would have been the same. It is in the highest degree probable, indeed it closely approaches to certainty, that a proper use of the British sea-power would have prevented independence from being conquered, as i were, at the point of the bayonet. There can be no surprise in store for the student acquainted with the vagaries of strategists who are influenced in war by political in preference to military requirements. Still, it is difficult to repress an emotion of astonishment on finding that a British government intentionally permitted de Grasse'; fleet and the French army in its convoy to cross the Atlantic unmolested, for fear of postponing for a time the re victualling of the garrison beleaguered at Gibraltar. Washington's opinion as to the importance of the naval factor has been quoted already; and Mahan does not put the case too strongly when he declares that the success of the Americans was due to “sea-power being in the hands of the French and its improper distribution by the English authorities.” England's navy, misdirected as it was, made a good light of it, never allowed itself to be decisively beaten in a considerable battle, and won at least one great victory. At the point of contact with the enemy, however, it was not in general so conspicuously successful as it was in the Seven Years' War, or as it was to be in the great conflict with the French republic and empire. The truth is that its opponent, the French navy, was never so thoroughly a sea-going force as it was in the War of American Independence; and never so closely approached the British in sea experience as it did during that period. Great Britain met antagonists who were very nearly, but fortunately not quite, as familiar with the sea as she was; and she never found it so hard to beat them, or even to avoid being beaten by them. An Englishman would, naturally enough, start at the conclusion confronting him, if he were to speculate as to the result of more than one battle had the great Suffren's captains and crews been quite up to the level of those commanded by stout old Sir Edward Hughes. Suffren, it should be said, before going to the East Indies, had “ thirty-eight years of almost uninterrupted sea-service ” (Laughton, Studies, in N twat Hist. p. IO3). A glance at a chart of the world, with the scenes of the general actions of the war dotted on it, will show how notably oceanic the campaigns were. The hostile fleets met over and over again on the far side of the Atlantic and in distant Indian seas. The French navy had penetrated into the ocean as readily and as far as the British could do. Besides this, it should be remembered that it was not until the 12th of April 1782, when Rodney in one hemisphere and Suffren in the other showed them the way, that British officers were able to escape from the fetters imposed on them by the Fighting Instructions-a fact worth remembering in days in which it is sometimes proposed, by establishing schools of naval tactics on shore, to revive the pedantry which made a decisive success in battle nearly impossible.
The mighty conflict which raged between Great Britain on one side and France and her allies on the other, with little intermission, for more than twenty years, presents a
W I
different aspect from that of the war last mentioned. ¢;, :r;, -:, ,, ;, The victories which the British lleet was to gain were Revolution generally to be overwhelming; if not, they were looked Ezinre upon as almost defeats. Whether the fleet opposed to the British was or was not the more numerous, the result was generally the same-the enemy was beaten. That there was a discoverable reason for this is certain. A great deal has been made of the disorganization in the French navy consequent on the confusion of the Revolution. That there was disorganisation is undoubted; that it did impair discipline and, consequently, general eliiciency will not be disputed; but that it was considerable enough to account by itself for the French naval defeats is altogether inadmissible. Revolutionary disorder had invaded the land-forces to a greater degree than it had invaded the sea-forces. The super session, flight or guillotining of army officers had been beyond measure more frequent than was the case with the naval officers. In spite of all this the French armies were on the whole-even in the early days of the Revolution—extraordinarily successful. In 1792 “ the most formidable
invasion that ever threatened France, ” as Alison calls it, was repelled, though the invaders were the highly disciplined and veteran armies of Prussia and Austria. It was nearly two years ​ later that the French and British fleets came into serious conflict. The first great battl ., “ The Glorious First of June, ” though a tactical victory fo Great Britain, was a strategical defeat. Villaret Joyeuse rranoeuvred so as to cover the arrival in France of a fleet of merchant vessels carrying sorely needed supplies of food, and in this he was completely successful. His plan involved the probability, almost the necessity of ughting a general action which he was not at all sure of winning. He was beaten, it is true; but the French made so good a fight of it that their defeat was not nearly so disastrous as the later defeats of the Nile or Trafalgar, and-at the most-not more disastrous than that of Dominica. Yet no one even alleges that there was disorder or disorganization in the French fleet at the date of any one of those affairs. Indeed, if the French navy was really disorganized in 1794, it would have been better for Francejudging from the events of 1798 and 1805~if the disorganization had been allowed to continue. In pointof organization the British navy was inferior, and in point of discipline not much superior to the French at the earliest date; at the later dates, and especially at the latest, owing to the all-pervading energy of Napoleon, the British was far behind its rival in organization, in “ science, ” and in every branch of training that can be imparted without going to sea. Great Britain had the immense advantage of counting among her officers some very able men. Nelson, of course, stands so high that he holds a place entirely by himself. The other British chiefs, good as they were, were not conspicuously superior to the Hawkes and Rodneys of an earlier day. Howe was a great commander, but he did little more than just appear on the scene in the Revolutionary War. Almost the same may be said of Hood, of whom Nelson wrote, “ He is the greatest sea-officer I ever knew ” (Laughton, N elson's Lett. and Desp: p. 71). There mu t have-been something, therefore, beyond the meritorious qualities of the principal British officers which helped the navy so consistently to victory. The many triumphs won could not have been due in every case to or captain to
well as good
the individual superiority of the British admiral his opponent. There must have been bad as
among the hundreds on the lists; and we cannot suppose that Providence had so arranged it that in every action in which a mponuce British officer of inferior ability commanded, a still of sea more inferior French commander was opposed to him. “Perl” The explanation of the nearly unbroken success is, °"°°' that the British was a thoroughly sea-going navy, and became more and more so every month; while the French, since the close of the American War, had lost to a great extent its sea-going character and, because it had been shut up in its ports, became less and less sea-going as hostilities continued. The war had been for the British, in the words of Theodore Roosevelt, “ a continuous course of victory won mainly by seamanship.” The British navy, as regards sea experience, especially of the officers, was immensely superior to the French. This enabled the British government to carry into execution sound strategic plans, in accordance with which the coasts of France and its allied countries were regarded as the British frontier to be watched or patrolled by British fleets.
Before the long European war had been brought to a formal ending we received some rude rebuiis from another opponent of unsuspected vigour. In the quarrel with the A United States, the so-called “ War of 181 Q, ” the merlcan . . .
Wm great sea-power of the British in the end asserted its influence, and the Americans suffered much more severely, even absolutely, than their enemy. At the same time the British might have learned, for the Americans did their best to teach it, that over-confidence in numerical strength and narrow professional self-satisfaction are nearly sure to lead to reverses in war, and not unlikely to end in grave disasters. The British had now to meet the élile of one of the finest communities of seamen ever known. Even in 1776 the Americans had a great maritime commerce, which, as Mahan says, “ had come to be the wonder of the statesmen of the mother country.”, In the sixand-thirty years which had elapsed since then this commerce had further increased. There was no finer nursery of seamen Second
than the then states of the American Union. Roosevelt says that “there was no better seaman in the world” than the American, who “had been bred in his work from infancy.” A large proportion of the population “ was engaged in sea-going pursuits of a nature strongly tending to develop a resolute and hardy character in the men that followed them ” (Naval War of 1812, 3rd ed., pp. 29, 3o). Having little or no naval protection, th e American Seaman had to defend himself in many circumstances, and was compelled to familiarize himself with the use of arms. The men who passed through this practical, and therefore supremely excellent, training school were numerous. Very many had been trained in English men-of-war, and some in French ships. The state navy which they were called on to man was small; and therefore its personnel, though without any regular or avowed selection, was virtually and in the highest sense a picked body. The lesson of the War of 1812 should be learned by Englishmen of the present day, when a long naval peace has generated a confidence in numerical superiority fin the mere possession of heavier malériel, and in the merits of a rigidly uniform system of training, such conudence, as experience has shown, being often the forerunner of misfortune. It is neither patriotic nor intelligent to minimize the American successes. Certainly they have been exaggerated by Americans and even by the British. To take the frigate actions alone, as being those which properly attracted most attention, the captures in action amounted to three on each side, the proportionate loss to the Americans, considering the smallness of their fleet, being immensely greater than to the British. We also see that no British frigate was taken after the first seven months of a war which lasted two and a half years. Attempts have been made to spread a belief that British reverses were due to=nothing but the greater size and heavier guns of the enemy's ships. It is now established that the superiority in these details, which the Americans certainly enjoyed, was not great, and not of itself enough to account for their victories. Of course, if superiority in mere matériel, beyond a certain well-understood amount, is possessed by one of two combatants, his antagonist can hardly escape defeat; but it was never alleged that size of ship or calibre of guns-greater within reasonable limits than the British had-necessarily led to the defeat of British ships by the French or Spaniards. In the words of Admiral Iurien de la Graviére: “ The ships of the United States constantly fought with the chances in their favour.” All this is indisputable. Nevertheless in any future war British sea-power, great as it may be, should not receive shocks like those that it unquestionably did suEer in 1812.
We have now come to the end of the days of the naval wars of old time. The subsequent period has been illustrated repeatedly by manifestations of sea-power, often of great interest and importance, though rarely understood or even discerned by the nations whom they more particularly concerned. The British sea-power, notwithstanding the first year of the War of 1812, had come out of the great European conflict unshaken and indeed more pre-eminent than ever. The words usedfhalf a century before by a writer in the great French Encyclopédie seemed more exact than when first written. “L'Empire des mars, ” he says, is “le plus avantageux de tous les empires; les Phoeniciens le possédoient autre fois et c'est aux Anglois que cette gloire appartient aujourd'hui sur toutes les puissances maritime ” (Encydopédie, 7th January 1765, art. “Tha1assarchie ”). Vast outlying territories had been acquired or were more firmly held, and the communications of all the oversea. dominions of the British crown were secured against all possibility of serious menace for many years to come. Her sea-power was so ubiquitous and all-pervading that, like the atmosphere, Great Britain rarely thought of it and rarely' remembered its necessity or its existence. It was not till a late date that- the greater part of the nation-for there still are some exception sf perceived that it was the medium apart from which the British empire could no more live than it could have grown up. Forty years-after the fall of Napoleon she found herself again. at war with a great power. She had as her ally the owner of the greatest ​which the British Islands occupy to the European
navy in the world except her own. Her foe, as regards naval forces, came the next in order. Yet so overwhelming was the strength of Great Britain and France on the sea that wsu" Russia never attempted to employ her navy against 1854-56. them. Not to mention other expeditions, considerable enough in themselves, military operations on the largest scale were undertaken, carried on for many months, and brought to a successful termination on a scene so remote that it was two thousand miles from the country of one, and three thousand from that of the other partner in the alliance. U The stream of supplies and reinforcements, which in terms of modern war is called ' communications, ' ” was kept free from even the threat of molestation, not by visible measures, but by the undisputed efficacy of a real, though imperceptible seapower. At the close of the Russian War there were, even in influential positions, men who, undismayed by the consequences of mimicking in free England the cast-iron methods of Frederick the Great, began to measure British requirements by standards borrowed from abroad and altogether inapplicable to British conditions. Because other countries wisely abstained 'from relying on that which they did not possess, or had only imperfectly and with elaborate art created, the mistress of the seas was led to proclaim her disbelief in the very force that had made and kept her dominion, and was urged to defend herself with fortifications by advisers who, like Charles II. and the duke of York two centuries before, were “ not ashamed of it.” It was long before the peril into which this brought the empire was perceived, but at last, and in no small degree owing to the teachings of Mahan, the people themselves took the matter in hand and insisted that a great maritime empire should have adequate means of defending all that made its existence possible.
In forms differing in appearance, but identical in essentials, the efficacy of sea-power was proved again in the American Civil War. If ever there were hostilities in which, L t r
mzsitesu- to the unobservant or short-sighted, naval operations “W” °' might at first seem destined to count for little they ua-power.
were these. The sequel, however, made it clear that they constituted one of the leading factors of the success of the victorious side. The belligerents, the Northern or Federal states and the Southern or Confederate states, had a common land frontier of great length. -The capital of each section was within easy distance of this frontier, and the two were not far apart. In wealth, population and resources the Federals Were enormously superior. They alone possessed a navy, though at first it was a small one. The one advantage on the Confederate side was the large proportion of military officers which belonged to it and their rare excellence as soldiers. In physique as well as in moral the army of one side differed little from that of the other; perhaps the Federal army was slightly superior in the first, and the Confederate, as being recruited from a dominant white race, in the second. Outnumbered, less well equipped, and more scantily supplied, the Confederates nevertheless kept up the war, with many brilliant successes on land, for four years. Had they been able to maintain their trade with neutral states they could have carried on the war longer, and-not improbably-have succeeded in the end. The Federal navy, which was largely increased, took away all chance of this. It established effective blockades of the Confederate ports, and severed their communications with the outside world. Indispensable articles of equipment could not be obtained, and the armies, consequently, became less and less able to cope with their abundantly furnished antagonists. By dominating the rivers the Federals cut the Confederacy asunder; and, by the power they possessed of moving troops by sea at will, perplexed and harassed the defence, and facilitated the occupation of important points. Meanwhile the Confederates could make no reply on the water except by capturing merchant vessels, by which the contest was embittered, but the course of the war remained absolutely unaffected. The great numbers of men under arms on shore, the terrific slaughter in many battles of a war in which tactical ability, even in a moderate degree, was curiously uncommon on both sides, and the varying fortunes of the belligerents, made the land campaigns far more interesting to the ordinary observer than the naval. It is not surprising, therefore, that peace had been re-established for several years before the American people could be made to see the great part taken by the navy in the restoration of the Union; and what the Americans had not seen was hidden from the sight of other nations.
In several momentous wars in Europe waged since France and Great Britain made peace with Russia sea-power manifested itself but little. In the Russo-Turkish War the naval R -
superiority of the Turks 1n the Black Sea, where the Tgjjigh Russians at the time had no fleet, governed the plans, War. 78 1877- .
if not the course, of the campaign. The water being denied to them, the Russians were compelled to execute their plan of invading Turkey by land. An advance to the Bosporus through the northern part of Asia Minor was impracticable without help from a navy on the right flank.. Consequently the only route was a land one across the Danube and the Balkans. The advantages, though not fully utilized, which the enforcement of this line of advance put into the hands of the Turks, and the difficulties and losses which it caused the Russians exhibited in a striking manner what sea-power can effect even when its operation is scarcely observable., This was more conspicuous in a later series of hostilities. The civil war in Chile between Congressists and Balmacedists was specially interesting, because it threw into sharp relief the predominant influence, when a non-maritime g"f'°"" enemy was to be attacked, of a navy followed up Wg, ,895 by an adequate land-force. At the beginning of the dispute the Balmacedists, or President's party, had practically all the army, and the Congressists, or Opposition party, nearly all the Chilean navy. Unable to remain in the principal province of the republic, and expelled from the waters of Valparaiso by the Balmacedist garrisons of the forts-the only and doubtful service which those works rendered to their own side+the Congressists went off with the ships to the northern provinces, where they counted many adherents. There they formed an army, and having money at command, and open sea communications, they were able to import equipment from abroad, and eventually to transport their land-force, secured from molestation on the voyage by the sea-power at their disposal, to the neighbourhood of Valparaiso, where it was landed and triurnphantly Y
ended the campaign.
It will have been noticed that, in its main outlines, this story repeated that of many earlier struggles. It was itself repeated, as regards its general features, by the story of the war Wu between China and japan in 1894-95. Every aspect betwggg of the war, says Colomb, is interesting to Great Britain, Chin! and “ as Japan is to China in a position similar to that $35 continent ” (Naval Warfare, 3rd ed. p. 436). It was additionally interesting because the sea-power of Japan was a novelty. Though a novelty, it was well known by British naval men to be superior in all essentials to that of China, a novelty itself. As is the rule when two belligerents are contending for something beyond a purely maritime object, the final decision was to be on land. Korea was the principal theatre of the land war; and., as far as access to it by sea was concerned, the chief bases of the-two sides were about the same distance from it. It was possible for the Chinese to' march there by land(The japanese, coming from an island state, were obliged to cross the water. It will be seen at once that not only the success of the Japanese in the struggle, but also the possibility of its being carried on by them at all, depended on sea-power. The Japanese proved themselves decisively superior at sea. Their navy effectually cleared the way for one army which was landed in Korea, and for another which was landed in the Chinese province of Shantung. The Chinese land-forces were defeated. The navy of japan being superior on the sea, was able to keep its sister service supplied or reinforced as required. It was not, however, the navy, but the army, which finally frustrated the Chinese efforts at defence, and really terminated the war. What the navy did ​was what, in accordance with the limitations of sea-power, may be expected of a navy. It made the transport of the army across the sea possible, and enabled it to do what of itself the army could not have done, viz. overcome the last resistance of the enemy.
The issue of the Spanish-American War, at least as regards the defeat of Spain, was a foregone conclusion. That Spain, Spanish-American War, 1898.even without a serious insurrection on her hands, was unequal to the task of meeting so powerful an antagonist as the United States must have been evident even to Spaniards. However that may be, an early collapse of the Spanish defence was not anticipated, and however one-sided the war may have been seen to be, it furnished examples illustrating rules as old as naval warfare. Mahan says of it that, “ while possessing, as every war does, characteristics of its own differentiating it from others, nevertheless in its broad analogies it falls into line with its predecessors, evidencing that unity of teaching which pervades the art from its beginnings unto this day ” (Lessons of the War with Spain, p. 16). The Spaniards were defeated by the superiority of the American sea-power. “ A million of the best soldiers,” says Mahan, “ would have been powerless in face of hostile control of the sea.” That control was obtained and kept by the United States navy, thus permitting the unobstructed despatch of troops-and their subsequent reinforcement and supply-to Spanish territory, which was finally conquered, not by the navy, but by the army on shore. That it was the navy which made this final conquest possible happened, in this case, to be made specially evident by the action of the United States government, which stopped a military expedition on the point of starting for Cuba until the sea was cleared of all Spanish naval force worth attention.
It is unnecessary here to, dwell on the results of sea-power in the war between Great Britain and the Boers, in which troops had to be transported by sea from England to South Africa, or in that between Russia and Japan, in which the culminating blow given by Japan was the defeat of the Russian fleet at the battle of Tsushima.
The events of the long period which we have been considering will have shown how sea-power operates, and what it effects. What it involves will have appeared from this narrative more clearly than would have been possible from any mere definition. Like many other things, sea-power is composed of several elements. To reach the highest degree of efficacy it should be based upon a population naturally maritime, and on an ocean commerce naturally developed rather than artificially enticed to extend itself. Its outward and visible sign is a navy, strong in the discipline, skill and courage of a numerous personnel habituated to the sea, in the number and quality of its ships, in the excellence of its matériel, and in the efficiency, scale, security and geographical position of its arsenals and bases. History has demonstrated that sea-power thus conditioned can gain any purely maritime object, can protect the trade and the communications of a widely extended empire, and while so doing can ward off from its shores a formidable invader. There are, however, limitations to be noted. Left to itself its operation is confined to the water, or at any rate to the inner edge of a narrow zone of coast. It prepares the way for the advance of an army, the work of which it is not intended and is unable to perform. Behind it, in the territory of which it guards the shores, there must be a land-force adjusted in organization, equipment and numbers to the circumstances of the country. The possession of a navy does not permit a sea-surrounded state to dispense with all fixed defences or fortification; but it does render it unnecessary and indeed absurd that they should be abundant or gigantic. The danger which always impends over the sea-power of any country is that, after being long unused, it may lose touch of the sea. The revolution in the constructive arts during the latter half of the 19th century, which has also been a period of but little-interrupted naval peace, and the universal adoption of mechanical appliances, both for ship propulsion and for many minor services-mere materiel being thereby raised in the general estimation far above really more important matters-make the danger mentioned more menacing in the present age than it has ever been before.
The classic works on Sea-power are those of Captain A. T. Mahan: Influence of Sea-power on History (1890); Influence of Sea-power on the French Revolution and Empire (1892); Nelson: the Embodiment of the Sea-power of Great Britain (1897), &c. See also the bibliography of the article Navy. (C. A. G. B.)