# Ethical Studies

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1911 anastatic reprint. New York: G. E. Stechert & Co.
* Preface
* v |||
| CONTENTS. ||||
| ESSAY I. ||||
| | | | page |
| | THE VULGAR NOTION OF RESPONSIBILITY IN CONNECTION WITH THE THEORIES OF FREE-WILL AND NECESSITY, | THE VULGAR NOTION OF RESPONSIBILITY IN CONNECTION WITH THE THEORIES OF FREE-WILL AND NECESSITY, | 1 |
| Object of the inquiry (1-3). The common notion of Responsibility (3-8); irreconcileable with ‘Freedom’ (8-12); and with rational prediction (13-17). Ground of the objection to rational prediction (17-22). Common opinion and Necessitarianism (22-24). Irreconcileable as to Punishment and Responsibility (24-30). Reason of this twofold (30-37). ||||
| | Note A. Compulsion and Responsibility (39). Note B. Character how far fixed (46). Note C. Freedom (50). | Note A. Compulsion and Responsibility (39). Note B. Character how far fixed (46). Note C. Freedom (50). | Note A. Compulsion and Responsibility (39). Note B. Character how far fixed (46). Note C. Freedom (50). |
| ESSAY II. ||||
| | WHY SHOULD I BE MORAL? | . . . | 53 |
| Question rests on a dogmatic preconception (53-56); which is opposed to the moral consciousness (56-57); and is unreasonable (58-59). The End is self-realization (59); as is shown from morality (60); and from psychological considerations (61-62). It means realizing self as a whole (63-67); and an infinite whole (67-74). ||||
| | Note to Essay II. (75). | Note to Essay II. (75). | Note to Essay II. (75). |
| ESSAY III. ||||
| | PLEASURE FOR PLEASURE’S SAKE, | . . . | 78 |
| Happiness a vague phrase (78-79). Common opinion on pleasure (79-80). Hedonism irreconcileable with morality (81-85). Illusory nature of the Hedonistic end (86-89). My pleasure as the end gives no rule of life (90-94). And the pleasure of all is illusory (94-95); opposed to morality (96); and gives no practical guidance (96-101); it is dogmatically postulated (101-103); and irreconcileable with Hedonistic psychology (103-105). Further modifications of Hedonism. Qualitative distinction of pleasures is, in both its forms, untenable (106-111). Further criticism on Mill’s view (111-112). Results (113-114). ||||
| | Note to Essay III. (118). | Note to Essay III. (118). | Note to Essay III. (118). |
| ESSAY IV. ||||
| | | | page |
| | DUTY FOR DUTY’S SAKE, | . . . | 128 |
| The end is the Good Will (128-129). This is the universal form (130-131). What ‘ought’ means (131-132). Principle of non-contradiction (133). This contradicts itself (134-136). Duty and duties (137-138). Psychological objection (138-139). Practical uselessness of non-contradiction (139-141). Collision of duties unavoidable (141-143). ||||
| ESSAY V. ||||
| | MY STATION AND ITS DUTIES, | . . . | 145 |
| Present result (145-146). Advance to a higher point of view (146-148). Individualism criticized (148-156). The end is realization as member of a community (157). The moral organism seems to be the solution of ethical problems (158-166). Satisfactoriness of this view (166-171). Relative and absolute morality (171-174). Intuitive character of moral judgments (174-180). Morality not a mere private matter (180-183). Criticism of the above view (183-186). ||||
| | Note. Rights and Duties (187). | Note. Rights and Duties (187). | Note. Rights and Duties (187). |
| ESSAY VI. ||||
| | IDEAL MORALITY, | . . . | 193 |
| No limit to the moral sphere (193-197). Content of the ideal self (198-203). Collisions of moral elements (203-206). Morality not simply equal to self-realization (206). What it is (206-212). Difficulties as to its nature (212-220). In what sense is it approximative? (220-225). ||||
| ESSAY VII. ||||
| | SELFISHNESS AND SELF-SACRIFICE, | . . . | 226 |
| Statement and refutation of the argument for general selfishness, which is founded on the confusion as to ‘motive’ (227-235). What is the idea of a pleasure? (236). Psychological genesis of the voluptuary (237-245). What selfishness is (245-247). General problem of the good and bad self (247-248). Hereditary theory insufficient (249). Content of good and bad selves (250). Genesis of the good self (251-261). Genesis of the bad self (261-265). Origin of morality proper (265-271). Nature of the morally good and bad selves (271-275). What self-sacrifice is (276). ||||
| | CONCLUDING REMARKS, | . . . | 279 |
This work is in the public domain in the United States because it was published before January 1, 1929.
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