# Philosophical Works of the Late James Frederick Ferrier/Institutes of Metaphysic (1875)/Section 1/Proposition 13

The Institutes of Metaphysic, Philosophical Works of the Late James Frederick Ferrier (1875 ed., Vol. 1). (E. L. Lushington, & A. Grant, Eds.) Edinburgh: William Blackwood and Sons. pp. 310-320.
PROPOSITION XIII.
THE INDEPENDENT UNIVERSE IN THOUGHT.
DEMONSTRATION.
Objects plus a subject, or self, is the only universe which can be known (Props. I. and II.) The only universe which can be thought of is the universe which can be known (Prop. XI.) Therefore, objects plus a subject, or self, is the only universe which can be thought of. Consequently, whenever any mind or ego thinks of the universe as independent of itself, it must still think of it as made up of objects plus a subject. Therefore, the only independent universe which any mind or ego can think of is the universe in synthesis with some other mind or ego.
OBSERVATIONS AND EXPLANATIONS.
This prop. Speaks only of what can be conceived, no of what exists.1. This proposition, like all the others in this section of the science, abstains from affirming anything as to existence. It does not state what independent universe can alone exist, but merely what independent universe can alone be thought of. Whatever controversies may still continue to prevail as to the kind of independent universe which may exist, it is submitted that this institute settles, once and for ever, and beyond the possibility of a dispute, what the only kind of independent universe is which can be conceived to exist.
It answers the question—what independent universe can be thought of?2. It answers a question which the reader, who is interested in speculation, may perhaps by this time be disposed to ask, after finding himself apparently debarred from the conception of any independent universe—What universe, then, do the laws of thought permit us to cogitate as absolutely independent of ourselves? The answer is this proposition, which declares that the only universe independent of each of us, which each of us can think of is the universe in union with some other subject than himself. Each of us can unyoke the universe (so to speak) from himself; but he can do this only by yoking it on, in thought, to some other self. The laws of all thought, and of all reason, prevent us most stringently from construing to our minds any other ​universe than this; but this kind of independent universe they permit us to construe to our heart's content.
Why we do not think of things as amorphous when they are absent from us.3. Another point which this proposition clears up is this: The reader may ask, When I suppose myself removed from this sublunary scene, why do I not think of it as relapsing into that amorphous and nonsensical state in which it is declared to be when dissociated altogether from me? Why do I think of it as still orderly and subsistent? Why does it not drop instantly into the gulf of the contradictory? Simply because you do not think of it as dissociated from every me. You cannot perform the abstraction. Whenever you think of material things which are no longer before you, you will find that you are either thinking of them and yourself as these were formerly apprehended together, or that you are thinking of them in connection with some other self or subject. It is through the performance of the latter operation that each of us is enabled to think the universe as independent of himself. This is not a matter of choice,—a mode in which we choose to think: it is a matter of necessity,—a mode in which we cannot help thinking. It is an operation which is done for us, and in spite of us, and in obedience to our deeper genius, who laughs to see how, even while we are performing it, we imagine ourselves to be doing something very ​different —namely, to be thinking of the universe by itself, or out of synthesis with every intelligent subject. This latter operation cannot be performed. It is made impracticable by the law which declares that that alone can be thought of which can possibly be known. But although it cannot be performed, we can understand how its performance, if possible, would have the effect of reducing the universe to the predicament of a contradiction; because the abstraction of the "me" would empty it of the element which, by Proposition I., is essential to the constitution of all knowledge or presentation, and which, by Proposition XI., is essential to the constitution of all thought or representation.
An objection stated.4. An objection, which at first sight may look serious, seems to lie against this proposition. It may be alleged that, in cogitating material things, each of us can cogitate merely his own individual self, which was originally apprehended in the cognition of them. It may be supposed that, no other than each person's individual self having been known or represented to him in the first instance, no other than this can be conceived or represented by him in the second instance, according to the terms of Proposition XI.
5. This objection is very easily removed. It proceeds on a misapprehension, not unnatural, of ​Objection obviated. We have a single type—can suppose it repeated.Proposition XI.; which misapprehension, however, will be completely obviated if the reader will attend to the two restrictions of thought laid down among the observations on that proposition. Representation can, first, do anything except add to the data of cognition, an element of which no type or instance has been given, or can be given, in experience; and, secondly, it can do anything except leave out an element essential to the constitution of original cognition. But here thought is doing neither of these things. Having apprehended myself along with all that I apprehend, I am furnished with a pattern or instance, according to which I can cogitate another, or any number of other, selves doing the same; and having supplied in thought, by the supposed presence of another "me" to the universe, the element essential to its cognition, I am leaving out no ingredient essential to the formation of knowledge. And thus each individual ego, without running into a contradiction, obtains in thought a universe absolutely independent of its individual self. This kind of independent universe each of us can believe to subsist in his absence without harbouring a contradiction; but we cherish a contradiction the instant we attempt to believe in any other kind of independent universe as subsisting in our absence.
6. The reason why the universe per se is absolutely unthinkable, is because neither we nor any ​Why we cannot cogitate matter per se—no single type.intelligence has, or can have, any type or model whereby to construct it in thought. Had we been furnished with any single instance of such a type, we could multiply in thought that type as often as we pleased, and represent to ourselves a world, or a plurality of worlds, per se. There is no transgression of the laws of thought involved in the supposition that what has once been known may be repeated—and repeated in a great variety of fashions. But we have not, and cannot have, a single type given us whereby to cogitate matter per se at all. We are not supplied even with an example of a grain of sand per se. Proposition I. settles that point. And, therefore no model whatever of matter per se being presentable to us in knowledge, the material universe per se must for ever remain absolutely irrepresentable by us in thought
We have a single type of objects+subject—can conceive other cases of this.7. But the case is totally different in regard to the universe mecum. In thinking of objects plus another subject, we are restrained by no such incapacity as that which paralyses us when we would cogitate the universe plus no subject at all. Each of us has had an instance of this synthesis given to him in his own knowledge or experience. Each man apprehends the universe (or parts of it) with the addition of himself; and therefore there is nothing whatever to prevent him from conceiving the same process to take place in an unlimited ​number of other instances. He can think of the universe plus another self ad libitum; because, so soon as the conception of any one case is obtained, the conception of a plurality of analogous cases is also compassed. The conception of one necessarily brings along with it the conception of many.
Further explanation of how one self can conceive another self.8. These Institutes will scarcely be charged with loose argumentation, or with a disposition to flinch from any consequence to which their premises may lead. All that they are concerned about is, that their deductions should be correctly drawn—not that they should be approved of when drawn: that issue must be as fortune may determine. The plea, therefore, which would limit each individual to the cogitation of his own individual self is rejected, not because it is unpalatable, but because it is illogical. We are as much inclined to deal strictly with this point as any of our readers can be. The system, then, admits that each man can be cognisant, or have experience, only of his own individual self, and only of the universe which is presented to that individual self. The question, therefore, may be asked, How can he conceive any other self than this individual, or any other universe than that which this individual is in contact with? Here it is that the distinction between the simply inconceivable by us, and the absolutely inconceivable in itself, comes to our assistance, ​The simply inconceivable by us falls (see Introd. § 68) under the category of the conceivable. We can conceive it as that which is conceivable from involving no contradiction. Hence, although another self is not knowable by me (in the sense of being experienced), and is, moreover, not conceivable by me (in the sense of being conceived as that of which I have had experience), still I can conceive another self as conceivable—that is to say, as non-contradictory. I can do this, because I know and conceive my individual self, and the things by which I am surrounded. But what I can think of as taking place in one instance, I can think of as taking place in an infinitude of instances; or, what is the same thing, I can think of that one case as not the only case of the kind which is possible—in other words, as not exhausting the capabilities of nature in that particular direction. What has happened once, may be conceived to happen again and again. What is possible at all is possible to any extent. My consciousness is both possible and actual, and therefore other consciousnesses are possible; and, by a very easy and reasonable determination of the mind, I can admit them to be actual. With their actual existence, however, I have at present nothing to do. What I am undertaking to show is, not that other me's besides me exist, but only that I can form a conception of other me's besides me, and ​that this is what each of us (supposing that there is more than one of us) can do. It is, moreover, to be borne particularly in mind, that the other egos or subjects which are conceived by us, are always conceived as the universal part of all their cognitions, just as one's own me is always known and conceived as the universal part of one's own cognitions. Each of us having the type or pattern, can construct the conception ad libitum.
A word on Belief.9. One word on the subject of Belief. Belief is the determination of the mind to accept as actual fact, or as actual existence, on grounds of probable evidence, whatever the compulsory reason has declared to be possible—that is, has shown to be non-contradictory. But, according to psychology, and more especially according to our Scottish philosophy of common sense, belief is the determination of the mind to accept as actual fact, or as actual existence, on the evidence of ordinary thinking, that which the compulsory reason has proved to be impossible and contradictory.
Another difficulty obviated.10. Another difficulty has been started. Proposition I. affirms that, along with whatever a man is cognisant of, he must be cognisant of himself. In thinking, therefore, of the independent universe as a synthesis of objects plus another subject, must he not take himself into account as well, and must not ​the total synthesis of thought, in that case, be objects plus another me plus me? It is true that the synthesis which each of us cogitates is of this character. But the explanation is this: Propositions I. and II. lay down the essential constituents of all cognition, and, consequently, of all conception. These elements are not necessarily more than objects plus one self. This is all that is necessary to constitute a case of knowledge or of thought. These propositions enunciate that universal truth. Therefore, although I cannot cogitate things plus another self without taking my own self into account as well, yet I can perfectly well understand how such a case (to wit, a case of objects plus another subject) should take place without my having anything to do with it. There is no necessity whatever for me to take into account any other self, when I am cognisant of things plus my individual me; and, therefore, there is no necessity for another self to take me into account, when he is cognisant of himself and the things by which he is surrounded. All this I can understand perfectly well. And, therefore, although it is true that I must cogitate myself whenever I think of another self in union with things, still I can conceive that other self, and the things he is cognisant of, to subsist, although I were entirely withdrawn, or had never been called into existence. But I cannot conceive things to subsist without any "me" in my supposed annihilation. For to ​conceive this would be to conceive a contradiction—something from which the grounds of all conceivability had been removed. If the reader will consider that the general thesis laid down in Propositions I. and II. is simply this, that things and some one self are necessary to constitute the unit or minimum of all possible knowledge, and, consequently, of all possible conception, he will very readily surmount the difficulty which is here noticed, and will perceive that there is nothing in the present proposition which is at all at variance with anything that has gone before.
Thirteenth counter-proposition.11. The counter-proposition only remains to be appended. After what has been said, it will be unnecessary to offer any remarks in refutation of this contradictory product of ordinary thinking, which psychology has taken under her protection. Thirteenth counter-proposition: "The independent universe which each of us thinks of is the universe, out of synthesis or connection with every mind, subject, or self."