# History of Mexico (Bancroft)/Volume 4/Chapter 8

Contents
CHAPTER VIII.
PROGRESS OF THE REVOLUTION.
1810.
Calleja's Preparations — His Biography — Engagement at Querétaro — Calleja Joins Forces with Flon — Chavez Repulsed at Querétaro — Calleja's Movements — The Dispersion of the Insurgents at Aculco — Calleja Returns to Querétaro — Character of Torres — Defensive Measures of Abarca in Jalisco — Insurgent Operations in Jalisco — Engagement at La Barca — The Royalists Defeated at Zacoalco — Guadalajara Surrenders to Torres — Mercado Gains Possession of San Blas — Revolution in Zacatecas — Flight of the Europeans — An Unfortunate Intendente — Iriarte enters Zacatecas — The Commission of Doctor Cos — A Daring Scheme — San Luis Potosi Won by an Insurgent Friar — A Treacherous Visitor — San Luis Sacked.
While the events narrated in the two preceding chapters were taking place, Calleja in San Luis Potosi was making preparations, with extraordinary activity, to take the field; but at the same time with that avoidance of unprofitable haste which characterized all his movements. The comandante of San Luis was first apprised of the occurrences at Dolores on the 19th of September. He had a few days before received warning of Hidalgo's meditated insurrection, through information supplied to him by José Gabriel de Armijo, and conveyed through the subdelegado Pedro García. At that time he was at the hacienda de Bledos, a property belonging to his wife. While returning to San Luis he narrowly escaped capture by a troop of horsemen sent by Hidalgo to make him ​prisoner, the soldiers arriving at the hacienda only two hours after his departure. Without waiting for instructions from the viceroy, Calleja issued orders to place the two provincial dragoon regiments of San Luis and San Cárlos under arms, and to draw recruits from the different towns and haciendas of his district. This could not be very quickly done, scattered as the troops were in different localities; nor was it a matter of small difficulty to convert into an efficient force men drawn from their agricultural pursuits. Calleja, however, was ably seconded by the authorities and proprietors of estates, as he had their full confidence.
Felix María Calleja del Rey, the future viceroy of New Spain, was a native of Medina del Campo in old Castile, and a member of a distinguished family. He commenced his military career as an ensign in the disastrous expedition against Algiers conducted by the conde de O'Reily in the reign of Cárlos III. At a later date, he was appointed captain and instructor of one hundred cadets at the military school in the port of Santa María. In 1789 he came to New Spain with the viceroy Revilla Gigedo; and with the rank of lieutenant-colonel, served in the frontier states, successfully levying and organizing troops in Nuevo Santander and Nuevo Leon, the defence of which territories was intrusted to him by the viceroy Branciforte. When the government at Madrid adopted the system of dividing the provincial militia into ten brigades, the command of that of San Luis Potosi was bestowed by Viceroy Azanza upon Calleja, with the corresponding rank of brigadier. During his ​residence in that city he espoused Doña Francisca de la Gándara, daughter of the alférez real, who possessed considerable wealth. His personal influence over the country people was great, and his abilities and culture gained admiration; but he had an inordinate love of flattery, and was obstinate, hard-hearted, and remorselessly cruel.
In order to drill and place upon an efficient war footing the new levies, Calleja established a camp at the hacienda de la Pila, situated in the vicinity of San Luis; and so ably was he seconded by the authorities and leading men, that he soon had more recruits than he could furnish with arms and equipments. Various urban companies were raised for the protection of the city; officers were appointed; and the Europeans who were flying from Guanajuato to the coast were detained and pressed into the service. As the troops consisted principally of cavalry, a battalion of light infantry, six hundred strong, was organized; cannon were ordered to be cast; in the camp at la Pila a portrait of Fernando VII. was put up, and Calleja issued a proclamation to his troops, from whom the oath of allegiance was again exacted. Calleja's money was a great help to him, as he was enabled to meet preliminary expenses, as well as those of the ensuing campaign, for a considerable time. ​Venegas, before he was aware of the outbreak of Dolores, and without knowing the extent of the revolution, had by despatch of the 17th of September ordered Calleja to hasten to Querétaro for the purpose of preventing an uprising in that city. Calleja, however, replied that he had already discovered a concerted plot in San Luis, and that it would be impossible to leave until he had completed his arrangements; at the same time explaining to the viceroy his proposed plan to raise a considerable force and take the field against Hidalgo, after having put San Luis in a state of defence. Upon receiving this information, Venegas, perceiving the prudence with which Calleja was acting under the new aspect of affairs, permitted him to continue his operations, and instructed him to unite his forces when in readiness with those of Flon, now on his march to Querétaro.
No sooner had Flon arrived at Querétaro than an engagement took place between a detachment of his men and a body of three thousand insurgents in the vicinity of that city. When the enemy appeared in sight on the road from San Miguel, Flon sent out a force of six hundred under the command of Major Bernardo Tello, all of whom except one hundred and eighty, with the single officer, Captain Linares, hastily dispersed when they found the enemy to be much more numerous than they had supposed. Linares, however, made a resolute stand, and the division recovering itself, attacked and inflicted great slaughter upon the Indians with their artillery, the effect of which they were so ignorant of, that they attempted to protect themselves by putting their straw hats ​over the mouth of the cannon. The result was not long doubtful; the insurgents were dislodged from their favorable position with heavy loss, the royalists losing only one man.
On the 24th of October, Calleja broke camp and proceeded to Dolores, where he had arranged with the conde de la Cadena to unite their forces on the 28th. This was accordingly done, the latter having left Querétaro on the 22d. After leaving an efficient garrison in San Luis, Calleja's force, nevertheless, mustered 3,000 cavalry and 600 infantry, with four cannon. These united with Flon's troops formed an army of about 7,000 men, with eight pieces of artillery, and which henceforth assumed the name of Ejército de operaciones sobre los insurgentes. As Flon passed through San Miguel el Grande, he had the satisfaction of permitting his soldiers to sack the houses of Colonel Canal, Allende, and Aldama, while a similar gratification was indulged in by Calleja in Dolores by the sacking of Hidalgo's house and the ill treatment of the inhabitants.
The project of Calleja had been to proceed to the capital by way of Celaya, Acámbaro, and Toluca, following, in fact, Hidalgo's line of march; but while at Dolores he received a despatch from the comandante of Querétaro, García Rebollo, stating that the city was threatened with the whole force of Hidalgo's ​army. Calleja accordingly marched to Querétaro, but found that an insignificant attack on the city by a band of ill-armed Indians had been all. One Miguel Sanchez had raised the cry of insurrection on the hacienda de San Nicolás, belonging to the augustinians of Michoacan, occupied Huichapan and the neighboring towns, and being joined by Julian Villagran, a captain of the militia of Huichapan, attempted in the absence of Flon to gain possession of Querétaro. Leading his rabble into the town, they broke and fled at the first cannon-shot, which killed a considerable number of them, while their opponents lost not a single man. This futile movement of Sanchez was attended, however, with most important results; for, as will be seen, it saved Querétaro from being occupied by Hidalgo, and was the indirect cause of the insurgent leader's later defeat.
Calleja arrived at Querétaro on the 1st of November, the engagement having taken place on the 30th of October, the same day on which was fought the battle of the monte de las Cruces. Finding himself obliged to approach Mexico by a different route, he now directed his course by way of Estancia, San Juan ​del Rio, and San Antonio, arriving at Arroyozarco on the 6th of November. Meanwhile Hidalgo, retreating by the same way by which he had approached the capital, arrived at Ixtlahuaco. Unaware of Calleja's last movement, and confident that Querétaro could now be taken possession of with little difficulty, he directed his march toward the city, and the two opposing commanders were thus approaching each other without either of them knowing it. Hidalgo's force was reduced to one half its previous number, thousands of his followers, who had been attracted by the prospect of sacking the capital, having returned to their homes. But what is more significant of the waning star of the first leaders of the revolution is the disagreement which existed among themselves, and the growing jealousy which Allende and his friends, the Aldamas, began to entertain for Hidalgo. Where there was so much fighting to be done, these military men did not like to be led by a priest; they were determined to submit to him no longer than was necessary.
On the 6th of November the advance guard of Calleja's army came in contact with a detachment of Hidalgo's forces at Arroyozarco, and after a sharp skirmish put the enemy to flight, killing some and taking others prisoners. From the captives, and from Colonel Empáran, whom Calleja at once sent forward with a strong force to reconnoitre, it was discovered that the insurgents were at the neighboring town of Aculco. Calleja at once made his arrangements for battle, taking up a military position two leagues distant from that of Hidalgo. The ​insurgents were drawn up in two lines on the summit rectangular hill which overlooked the town and was almost surrounded by barrancas and gullies. Within the lines numbers were drawn up in the form of an oblong, the artillery being stationed in the front and on the right flank, while the rear was occupied by disorderly crowds. The encounter which followed was not properly an engagement, but rather a feint on the part of the revolutionary leaders, who had
​decided not to give battle, but effect a retreat under cover of a show of resistance. Calleja, undeterred by the difficulties presented by the enemy's position, commenced the attack with three columns of infantry, on the morning of the 7th of November. For some twenty minutes the royalists pushed on, exposed to the sluggish fire of the insurgents, whose cannon-balls flew high above their heads. Unscathed they reached the foot of the steep on which the enemy was posted, but when the stormed columns had scaled the heights, the foe had fled. Meanwhile Calleja had marked the disorder in the revolutionary ranks, caused, as he supposed, by his well directed fire; and thereupon ordered the cavalry on his right flank to attack the enemy's left, which could only be done by a long detour.
Doubtless it would have pleased him—as he affirmed that he did— to commit great slaughter by his cavalrymen who pursued the enemy two and a half leagues over the hills and through the glen; but the truth is, they did not kill a hundred. He lost, however, only ​one man killed and one wounded, while he captured all of Hidalgo's cannon, ammunition, and baggage, a large number of cattle, sheep, and horses, and a quantity of merchandise, besides rescuing the captives García Conde, Rul, and Merino. Thus terminated the affair at Aculco, which, trivial as it was, regarded as a martial achievement, was important as effecting the dispersion of Hidalgo's forces and frustrating his design against Querétaro. Had the insurgents not abandoned their position, they would probably have gained a victory. But the leaders were at variance; the soldiers were disheartened; the Indians were disappointed at not having been led to the capital; and all were affected by the demoralizing consequences of a retreat. As it was, a great victory was celebrated by the royalists in the capital, and solemn thanksgiving offered to their divine general, our lady of los Remedios.
About the movements of the revolutionary chiefs during the ten days following their departure from Aculco, historians are strangely silent; but one fact is certain, namely, that they effected their retreat to Celaya with insignificant loss. Here Hidalgo and Allende formed new combinations, and it was decided that the latter should inarch with the forces to Guana juato, while the former, accompanied by a few fol lowers, should return to Valladolid, and there repair losses by the manufacture of arms and the levying of fresh troops.
​Meanwhile Calleja retraced his steps and marched toward Querétaro. As he repassed through San Juan de los Rios he made proclamation offering ten thousand pesos for the head of any one of the five leaders, Hidalgo, Allende, the two Aldamas, and Abasolo.
Though the revolution had apparently received a deadly blow at Aculco, and the royalists confidently expected its near termination, the end was not yet. Hidalgo's agents had not been idle. Though often disappointed, they were not wholly cast down. In the northern provinces, and in those bordering on the Pacific, the revolution had widely spread. At the time of the disaster at Aculco, the arms of the independents had triumphed in Nueva Galicia, Zacatecas, and San Luis Potosi, and those provinces were wholly in their power. In the south the star of Morelos, Hidalgo's worthy successor, was just rising above the horizon. At Huichapan a body of insurgents, headed by Julian Villagran, interrupted communication on the highway between the capital and Querétaro, capturing convoys, killing royalists, and when threatened with capture, escaping to the mountains. Thus it was that a movement, regarded by the government as an affair of two short months, now about ended, was indeed but begun, and was practically never to be extinguished. As the future operations of Hidalgo ​and Allende will be more particularly confined to the provinces of Nueva Galicia, Zacatecas, and San Luis Potosí, it will be necessary to give some account of the events there occurring during these same two months.
While Hidalgo was in Guanajuato, José Antonio Torres, who had joined the revolutionary standard with a few followers at Irapuato, asked for and obtained authority from Hidalgo to occupy Guadalajara, Torres was an honest, conscientious man, without education, being a peasant of San Pedro Piedragorda in Guanajuato; but he was not without talent, and ​possessed unbounded enthusiasm in the cause of independence. Energetic, intelligent, brave, and honorable, he was nevertheless modest and had good common sense. When he entered Guadalajara as victor he molested no one, and interfered with the administration of affairs no more than was necessary.
At this time Brigadier Roque Abarca governed in Guadalajara, holding the three-fold office of comandante, president of the audiencia, and intendente. As soon as he received intelligence of the grito de Dolores, he took measures to exclude revolution from his province; but not being well regarded by either the audiencia or the European commercial class, on account of his disapproval of Iturrigaray's deposal, he was fettered in his operations. Finally, instead of asserting his authority, he consented to the establishment of a junta composed of lawyers, ecclesiastics, and others, which styled itself the auxiliary of the government, though it seemed satisfied with little less than supreme power. By order of this junta a considerable military force was collected. The divisions from Tepic, Colima, and Colotlan were called in and the provincial militia got under arms, while two companies of volunteers were raised from the commercial class in the city. In a short time Abarca, by levying recruits, had no less than 12,000 men under arms; but being of weak resolution, and wanting in military ability as well as in courage, his action benefited the revolutionists rather than the royalists. In truth, ​all of his newly levied troops soon deserted to the enemy.
In the mean time Torres had raised in revolt the towns of Colima, Sayula, Zacoalco, and those of the districts of the tierra caliente, while other revolutionary chiefs, Gomez Portugal, Godinez, Alatorre, and Huidrobo, were no less active among the pueblos on the Rio Grande, so that by the end of October all the districts bordering upon Guanajuato and Michoacan were in insurrection. Though day by day the danger became more imminent, the want of harmony in the city of Guadalajara still prevailed. In vain Abarca, in view of the continued desertion of troops, represented to the Europeans that they should take arms and defend themselves. They would not listen to him, and would neither fight nor pay. Nor was the action of the junta auxiliar any more favorable to the success of the royalist cause in Jalisco. Regarding as traitors efficient officers in whom Abarca had confidence, the members of the junta appointed the oidor Recacho, and Villaseñor, a rich landed proprietor, commanders of two divisions to be sent against the insurgents. Guadalajara was by this time threatened on the south by Torres, who had occupied Zacoalco, and on the east by Huidrobo, Godinez, and Alatorre, who were at La Barca. Villaseñor commanded the division despatched against Torres, and Recacho that opposed to Huidrobo, each detachment being five hundred strong. Recacho, on arriving at La Barca, discovered that the enemy had abandoned the town, and on the 1st of November entered it without resistance. On the 3d, however, Huidrobo attacked the royalists with a large body of Indians, but was repulsed with some loss, Recacho having taken up a position in the plaza. On the following day the ​insurgents again assailed the royalist forces with great intrepidity, but with no better success. Recacho, however, having lost several of his best officers, deemed it prudent to retreat to Sula and wait for reënforcements. There he received orders to return to Guadalajara, and the expedition ended without any serious blow having been inflicted upon the insurgents.
Still more unsuccessful was Villaseñor in his operations at Zacoalco. Torres was a military man by instinct. It is stated that before the engagement he showed the Indians, with a stick on the ground, how to deploy, in order to surround the enemy. Be this as it may, his manœuvres were so successful that Villaseñor's division was shortly overthrown and almost destroyed, no less than 276 being slain. So great was the shower of stones discharged by the Indians that the enemy's muskets were badly battered. The flower of the youth of Guadalajara who formed the newly recruited volunteer companies, deficient in training and unaccustomed to hardship, perished. Villaseñor and the captains of two companies were made prisoners, and Gariburu, a lieutenant of the regiment of la Corona, was killed. ​After this tragical defeat, consternation prevailed in Guadalajara. There was no thought of further resistance. The bishop, in spite of his previous military ardor, ignominiously fled to the port of San Blas, followed by most of the Europeans, who carried with them what they could. The junta hastily dissolved, and the warlike Recacho, with the oidor Alva, hurried with all speed to the same port, not forgetting, however, to collect on their way the royal revenues. Abarca endeavored to reanimate the Europeans who remained, and induce them to take up arms in defence of the city. "We are not soldiers," they said, "and our only duty is to take care of ourselves." The only force left at his disposal was 110 raw recruits. In this hopeless condition he fell grievously ill, and while on his bed the ayuntamiento surrendered the city to Torres. The insurgent forces entered Guadalajara on the 11th of November. Torres kept faithfully the terms of the capitulation. Both the property and persons of the citizens were respected; the malefactors in the jails were not released, and to prevent violence he would not allow his troops to quarter themselves in the city.
With the exception of San Blas, the whole province of Nueva Galicia was now in possession of the insurgents; and the ease with which that port fell into their power is somewhat remarkable. José María Mercado, the cura of Ahualulco, obtained from Torres a commission to go in pursuit of the fugitive Europeans; and raising forces in the villages on his way to the port, he entered Tepic without opposition, and was there joined by the garrison of the town. Mercado then hastened to lay siege to San Blas, and sent in to the comandante de la plaza, José de ​Lavallen, a formal summons to surrender, accompanied with a threat to burn the town in case of refusal. His whole force did not exceed three thousand Indians and a few hundred mounted lancers, while all of his artillery were six cannon brought from Tepic. The position of San Blas was such as to render it most difficult of assault. It was defended, as well as commanded, by a castle mounted with twelve 24-pound guns. In the harbor lay a frigate, two brigantines, a schooner, and two gunboats; the place was well supplied with provisions; there were forty mounted pieces of artillery and 800 able men in the place, and yet such was Mercado's cool impudence that Lavallen sent Agustin Bocalan, alférez de fragata of the royal navy, to capitulate. This was on the 29th of November, and Bocalan so reported the numbers and strength of the enemy on his return, that the comandante surrendered without further parley, and the royalists had no longer a foothold in the intendencia of Guadalajara.
In Zacatecas the news of the revolt at Dolores was known on the 21st of September, and the intendente Francisco Rendon at once took the same precautionary measures as those employed by Calleja and Abarca. He, moreover, applied for aid to those intendentes, but without success. From the governor of Colotlan, however, he obtained two companies of the militia dragoons, which he stationed at Aguascalientes, and shortly afterward the same governor ​arrived at Zacatecas with four additional companies. But Rendon's position was even worse than that of Abarca. The province was almost entirely without arms, and he had to provide with lances even the horsemen who arrived. His call, also, upon the different districts for recruits was almost unheeded. While in this strait he received some partial relief by the arrival of the conde de Santiago de la Laguna with 200 mounted men and some arms. These the count placed at the disposal of Rendon, and offered to use all his influence to maintain order among the populace. On the 6th of October the intendente received a despatch from Calleja informing him of the capture of Guanajuato by the insurgents, and of the immediate danger which threatened Zacatecas, probably the next place to be attacked. Rendon convoked a general junta, at which it was declared that the city was not defensible, surrounded as it was by command ing hills.
That same afternoon the Europeans, the members of the municipality, and the employes in the different government offices fled; and on the following morning the governor of Colotlan verbally informed the intendente that his troops had intimated to him that they had only followed him because he was a creole, but that they would take no action in the cause of the Europeans. Rendon allowed the governor to depart, but himself remained. The same day the populace rose in revolt, and only by the exertions of Laguna were they prevented from sacking stores and murdering objectionable residents. So violent were their demonstrations, that the cura implored Rendon to save ​himself. Laguna offered to escort him beyond reach of danger, and on the morning of the 8th the intendente and his family left Zacatecas for Guadalajara. On the following morning Laguna returned to Zacatecas, having been appointed, by a popularly elected ayuntamiento, intendente ad interim of the province, which office he deemed it his duty to accept in the hope of preventing excesses. He left an escort of twenty men for Rendon, who continued his journey. On the 29th, although reënforced by a troop of twenty-five lancers and four dragoons sent to his assistance by Abarca, Rendon and his family were captured by a body of insurgents, who after appropriating their clothes, conducted them to Guadalajara, where they arrived after thirty-three days, and were delivered to Hidalgo, who in the mean time had reached that city.
The revolt in Zacatecas was spontaneous, and not allied with the insurrection in other provinces. The latter were directed by the leaders either in person or by agents, to whom Hidalgo extended commissions of various grades. No such commissioner, however, had appeared in Zacatecas, and the outbreak was due to the excitement produced by news of the grito de Dolores. The people, after the first agitation, were moderate and tractable, and the conde Santiago de Laguna succeeded in suppressing pillage. About the middle of October, Rafael Iriarte, styling himself lieutenant-general, appeared at Aguascalientes at the ​head of a large body of insurgents, and having been joined by the dragoons stationed there, proceeded to take possession of Zacatecas, which he occupied with out opposition.
It was while Iriarte was at Aguascalientes that Laguna took action which brought his loyalty under suspicion. He convoked a junta for discussing the propriety of communicating with Iriarte. At that session it was decided to send José María Cos, cura of San Cosme, to inquire of the insurgent leader whether the war then waging was without prejudice to religion, king, and country; and whether any exceptions would be made in case they succeeded in expelling the Europeans; and if so, what. These questions were asked with a view to uniting the provinces under an alliance in peace or war. Laguna, in a letter dated the 26th of October, reported this to Manuel Acebedo, intendente of Durango, who forwarded it to Calleja. The mere fact that Laguna entertained doubts was enough for Calleja, and he cautioned Acebedo in his reply to avoid all expressions showing want of confidence which might drive Laguna to espouse the insurgent cause. Cos, who will appear prominently later, was received by Iriarte with marked demonstration, but greatly against his will was compelled to carry the insurgent standard on his entrance into the town. The explanation given by Iriarte of the object and plan of the revolution was equally unsatisfactory to Cos, and deeming himself compromised by the part he had been obliged to play, instead of returning to Zacatecas, he proceeded to San Luis and informed Calleja, who listened to his statement, and advised him to present himself before the viceroy. While on his way to the capital, Cos was arrested at Querétaro by the commander Rebollo and imprisoned in the convent of San Francisco.
​Although Calleja took every possible precaution before his departure from San Luis Potosí to insure the preservation of that province, his efforts were unavailing. When Hidalgo at the opening of his career passed through Celaya, he was joined by Luis de Herrera, a lay friar of the order of San Juan de Dios of the province of Mexico. For some time this man followed the army in the capacity of chief surgeon; but being compelled to go to San Luis on private business, he was arrested as a suspicious person, and imprisoned in the jail, it not being known that he was a friar. Heavily fettered and with no prospect of release, he disclosed himself in order to escape from durance, and was removed to the Carmelite convent, in which Calleja had imprisoned suspected persons. Erelong Herrera prevailed on the comandante, Cortina, to allow him to retire to the convent of his order in San Luis, the prior and other conventuals becoming his sureties. Having thus secured comparative freedom, he conceived, in conjunction with Juan Villarias, a lay brother of the same convent, the daring scheme of getting possession of the city during a single night. With this intent they instigated Joaquin Sevilla y Olmedo, an officer of the San Cárlos lancers, to place at their disposal a few troops, and some arms which he had in his house. Sevilla entered into their designs, and on the night of the 10th of November, meeting a patrol of his own corps and another of the cavalry, he called on them to assist him in the execution of an order of the commander. With this small force he proceeded to the convent of San Juan de Dios, where he was joined by the two friars. The revolutionists then went to the Carmelite convent, and ringing the night-bell, requested that a priest might be sent with them to confess a prominent citizen who was dying. The door-keeper opened the gate, ​and the insurgents rushing in seized and disarmed the guard. They then released the prisoners, many of whom daily expected death, and supplying them with the weapons thus obtained, proceeded with the utmost caution to the city jail, having first secured the Carmelite friars, all of whom were Spaniards. With equal success they surprised the guard at the jail, and their numbers being now greatly increased by the prisoners whom they liberated, they directed their course to the artillery barracks. Here they met their first mishap. Opposite the barracks stood the house of the comandante, Cortina; and the guard, more vigilant than those hitherto encountered, fired on them, killing four. Undeterred, they rushed forward and quickly made themselves masters of the barracks. Ten cannon were immediately brought out and planted at the entrances of the plaza, one being trained upon Cortina's house.
The desperate design of Herrera was now all but accomplished. The remaining barracks of the city were soon in the power of the insurgents, and Cortina alone continued to offer resistance. Being wounded at last in the jaw, he was made prisoner by his own guard, who had hitherto kept up a vigorous fire, killing sixteen of the assailants and wounding many more. After the insurgents had thus gained possession of the comandante's house, it was delivered over to pillage; likewise his store and storerooms; but this appears to have been the only excess committed. By seven o'clock in the morning the affair was over. The usual arrest of Europeans — to the number of forty — followed their triumph, but order and tranquillity were maintained. Miguel Flores, one of the principal citizens of San Luis, was ​appointed political chief and intendente, and the absence of popular commotion is sufficient evidence of the prudence which guided the revolutionists.
But the spirit of discord was at hand. Iriarte, who was at this time in possession of Zacatecas, and had been apprised of the successful coup d'armes at San Luis, despatched a courier to Herrera, proposing to recruit his forces at San Luis on his march to Guanajuato to join Allende. No objection to the reception of a brother-in-arms could be made, and Iriarte, with a disorderly rabble of several thousand Indians, armed, as usual, with clubs, slings, and bows and arrows, entered San Luis. The arrival was hailed with demonstrations of joy. The bells were rung and cannon fired. Festivities and balls for three days celebrated the meeting between these champions of the cause of independence.
In return for all this kindness, Iriarte deemed it his duty to give an entertainment, and do honor to those who had done honor to him. So he invited Herrera, Villarias, and Sevilla to a great ball, and when the merriment was at its highest a troop of soldiers rushed in and arrested them. Villarias managed to escape, and with fifty men fled to Guanajuato to inform Allende of the treachery. Herrera and Sevilla were thrown into prison; the barracks were taken by surprise; the artillery was seized, and Iriarte was master of the town. At dawn the cry was raised, "Death to the San Luis traitors!" Sack and pillage were proclaimed. The public treasury was ransacked, and the houses and stores of private persons were broken open and emptied.
One more turn of the wheel comes with the celebration of the occasion by a banquet to which Iriarte invites his captives. At first he gave them to understand that they were to die; even now they were going to execution. After thus amusing himself for a while, he embraced the victims of his sport, and seating them at the table, informed them that their imprisonment had ​been effected only for the purpose of insuring their safety, as they would have proved an impediment to his intention of sacking the city. He then appointed Herrera field-marshal, and raised Sevilla to the rank of colonel. During his occupation of San Luis the wife of Calleja fell into his power, and Iriarte, the treachery of whose future action makes it reasonable to suppose that he entertained no serious intention of aiding Allende, after loitering till it was too late to do so, returned to Zacatecas.
* ↑ Abad y Queipo, in his report to Fernando VII. in 1815, says of Calleja: 'Siempre obro con lentitud, dando mucho lugar á los enemigos para aumentar sus reuniones y defensas.' Informe, in Zamacois, Hist. Mej., ix. 871.
* ↑ Branciforte, Instruc., MS., 31, in Linares, Instruc., MS.
* ↑ Consult Hist. Mex., iii. 415, this series.
* ↑ Id., 491. Calleja's military services were such as to gain for him the recommendation of the six viceroys who preceded Venegas, one of whom says: 'Calleja era uno de los pocos oficiales de graduacion, de quienes podria valerse, con seguridad, por las ocasiones dificiles que presentasen, por su inteligencia, actividad y conocimiento.' Prov. Intern., Real Orden, in Mayer MS., no. 7. In 1794 he was selected by the viceroy for important work. N. Esp. Acuerdos, MS., 185. hist. mex., vol. 13
* ↑ Conspicuous among those who rendered him aid was Juan Moncada, marqués del Jaral de Berrio, who armed and took command as colonel of a considerable body. According to Alaman, Allende had reported to Hidalgo that Moncada was disposed to support the revolution. Hist. Mej., i. 453.
* ↑ Many afterward became distinguished leaders, among them Meneso, Armijo, Orrantia, Aguirre, Barragan, the Beistiguis, and Bustamante. Id., 454.
* ↑ Known by the name of los Tamarindos, from the color of their uniform, which was similar to that of the tamarind fruit. Id., 455. They were commanded by Juan Nepomuceno Oviedo. Id., ap. 78.
* ↑ The proclamation, which is given in full by Bustamante, Camp. Calleja 13-15, is an exhortation to allegiance; it attributes the revolutionary movement to the machinations of Napoleon. It is dated the 2d of Oct.
* ↑ A Carmelite friar with a crucifix in his hand administered the oath to each soldier. Of the influence which these religious exercised over the soldiery, Bustamante remarks: 'Prevalido del ascendiente que gozan alli estos religiosos sobre el bajo pueblo, logró entusiasmarlos de tal manera, que cuando marchó con sus tropas creian estas que iban á medírselas con hereges y á defender la religion de Jesucristo.' Cuad. Hist., i. 48.
* ↑ The intendente of San Luis Potosi placed at his disposition 382,000 pesos from the royal coffers. Besides this, as soon as he heard of the uprising he ordered a conducta of silver which had been detained at Santa María del Rio by the subdelegado García, to be sent to San Luis. This consisted of an ingot of gold and 315 bars of silver. In addition to this, he received as a loan from wealthy mining speculators of Zacatecas 225,000 pesos en reales, 94 bars of plata quintada, and 2,800 marks of plata pasta, Id., 56-7; Alaman, Hist. Mej., i. 450.
* ↑ Alaman remarks: 'Este hecho apenas creible, me ha sido asegurado por todos los que han tenido conocimiento del suceso.' Hist. Mej., i. 459.
* ↑ According to Tello's version, 200 Indians were killed; the royalist slain met his death by accident while passing in front of a cannon. Gaz. de Mex., 1810, i. 850. Tello does not say anything about his own hurried departure from the field. The most reliable particulars are those given in the text, being the statements of Linares in a representation setting forth his services, and addressed to Viceroy Apodaca. Alaman obtained a copy of this document. Hist. Mej., i. 459.
* ↑ Before leaving Querétaro Flon addressed a proclamation to the inhabitants, describing to them in sanguinary terms the manner in which he intended to suppress the insurrection, and concluding by threatening to make the streets of Querétaro flow with blood if, during his absence, they acted disloyally. Id., 469; Negrete, Hist. Mil. Sig. XIX., i. 292; Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc., ii. 173-4.
* ↑ This consisted of 350 foot, 110 horse, and three companies of the urban troops. Bustamante, Cuad. Hist., i. 55.
* ↑ Calleja's report in Gaz. de Mex. (1810), i. 965.
* ↑ By some this defeat of Sanchez was considered one of the reasons for Hidalgo's retreat. 'Se tuvo por cierto entonces que habia recibido la noticia de la derrota del general Sanchez en Querétaro.' Insurrec. N. Esp. Res. Hist., 10. Bustamante's account of this affair, deemed improbable by Alaman, is as follows: Brigadier Sanchez, after raising the standard of revolt, marched to San Juan del Rio, where he captured the oidor Juan Collado, who, having concluded his commission, was returning to Mexico. He also made prisoner Antonio Acuña, 'Teniente de corte de la sala del crímen,' who beguiled Sanchez into believing that if he would allow him to return to Querétaro he could by his influence succeed in winning over the garrison for him, the signal to be the firing of a cannon from the fort de la Cruz. Sanchez consented, but Acuña disclosed the plot, so that the city might be put in defence. The signal was given, nevertheless, and the credulous Sanchez entered the city with the result narrated in the text. The same author states that their whole force was only 500 men, who had only 14 muskets amongst them, and that 31 were killed on the spot, without counting the wounded and others killed in the pursuit. Cuad. Hist., i. 88-9. The version of Comandante Rebollo is, however, very different. He states in his report to the viceroy that there were 4,000 or 5,000 of the insurgents; that the engagement lasted from half-past nine in the morning till half-past seven in the evening, and that 300 of the enemy were killed and as many more taken prisoners. Gaz. de Mex. (1810), i. 929-30.
* ↑ The captive García Conde afterward stated to the viceroy that although Hidalgo's loss after the battle of las Cruces amounted to 40,000 in killed, wounded, and deserters, there still remained to him 40,000 followers. Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc., ii. 274. Guerra, Hist. Rev. N. Esp., i. 339, thinks this an exaggeration although confirmed by Calleja. Gaz. de Mex. (1810), i. 967-8.
* ↑ According to García Conde, when speaking of Hidalgo, they used to call him 'el bribon del cura,' that knave of a priest. Alaman, Hist. Mej, i. ap. 66.
* ↑   A Line of battle of the royalist army. B Park of artillery in position. 1 Cavalry on the left. 2 Cavalry on the right. 3 Body of cavalry covering the flank of the infantry. 4 Bodies of infantry. 5 Reserve of cavalry. 6, 6 Cavalry on left and right in column. 7 Company of volunteers. 8 Cavalry on left flank of infantry columns. 9 Reserve cavalry of same columns. 10 Columns of infantry. 11 Park of artillery in second position. 12, 12 Park of artillery opening fire. 13 Columns of infantry mounting the hill to attack. 14 Cavalry in reserve. 15, 15 Position of the insurgent army. 16 Insurgent artillery. 17 Equipage, ammunition, and carriages. 18 Companies of patriots of San Luis doing service as light troops.
* ↑ Hidalgo published at Celaya on the 13th of Nov. a circular giving an account of the affair, assigning as a reason for his not engaging the enemy his want of ammunition. He says: 'Solo se entretubo un fuego lento y a mucha distancia, entro tanto se daba lugar a que se retirara la gente sin experimentar quebranto, como lo verifico.' Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc. ii. 221. A quantity of cannon-balls and grape-shot and 120 cans of powder were left on the field. Bustamante, Campañas de Calleja, 22. Zerecero regards the sudden flight of the insurgents as a skilfully executed retreat, which the leaders considered necessary in the present condition of their troops, and to effect which they were willing to sacrifice their artillery. Mem. Rev. Mex., 114, 117.
* ↑ Calleja boasts of the coolness and precision displayed by his well drilled troops. Gaz. de Mex. (1810), i. 968. At the same time Zerecero was informed by his uncle, José Azpeitia, an officer in the regiment of la Corona, that those troops, and a part of the second battalion of la Columna, were wavering in their allegiance when the order was given to advance. Mem. Rev. Mex., 115. Bustamante inclines to this opinion. 'He hablado,' he says, 'con persona presencial de este suceso, la cual me ha asegurado que los cuerpos principales del ejercito real estuvieron vacilantes y á punto de pasarse.' Cuad. Hist., i. 91-2.
* ↑ García Conde timed the duration of the firing, and states: 'En veinte y dos minutos sesó el fuego.' Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc. Indep., ii. 275.
* ↑ Calleja estimated the entire loss to the insurgents in killed, wounded, and prisoners at 10,000. 'Pasa de cinco mil,' he says, 'el número de los tendidos en el campo.' And he adds this pious reflection: 'Dexando el campo lleno de cadáveres, y el espectáculo horrible que presentaba, y de que son responsables ante Dios y los hombres, los traidores Hidalgo, Allende y sus sequaces.' Gaz. de Mex. (1810), i. 909.
* ↑ Manuel Perfecto Chavez, the justice of Aculco, in an official despatch of the 15th, reports to Calleja that the killed at Aculco, together with those slain in the skirmish of the day before, were 85—'y nada mas;' and that of 53 wounded, ten died subsequently. Bustamante, Campañas de Calleja, 23.
* ↑ Twelve, including the two abandoned by Trujillo at las Cruces. Id., 22.
* ↑ 'Equipages, ropa, papeles, y. . .ocho muchachas bien parecidas (que Calleja llama el serrallo de los insurgentes).' Ib.
* ↑ Salvador, Accion de Gracias, 1-8. The accounts of the battle of Aculco, as it is called, are extremely contradictory; but I have no hesitation in accepting the version of it given by Negrete, Hist. Mil. Sig. XIX., i. 375-8, as correct, and, in the main, I have followed it in the text.
* ↑ Hidalgo, in his circular dated Celaya, Nov. 13th, states that his forces had been reunited, and that he had more than 40 pieces of artillery already mounted, and was well provided with ammunition. Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc., ii. 221.
* ↑ The offer was ratified by the viceroy. Calleja on previously passing through San Juan de los Rios, which had been held for a time by Sanchez, demanded all arms to be delivered up within six hours, extending on those conditions a pardon to those who had aided the insurgents, adding that in case of further disobedience the inhabitants 'serán tratados sin conmiseracion alguna, pasados á cuchillo, y el pueblo reducido a cenizas.' The viceroy approved of the edicts of Calleja, and extended the indulto to all towns in New Spain, promising that if one of the leaders would deliver up the rest he should benefit by the pardon. Dispos. Varias, ii. f. 8; Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc., ii. 206, 219-21.
* ↑ This movement was initiated, as before stated, by Miguel Sanchez. Villagran, who was of a ferocious character and addicted to drunkenness and all other vices, murdered Sanchez for some slight offence soon after his repulse at Querétaro. His son Francisco, known by the name of Chito, and as notorious for his crimes as his father, was also one of these insurgents. Bustamante, Cuad. Hist., 135-C.
* ↑ Carta de Abarca; Bustamanle Campañas de Calleja, 97-8.
* ↑ 'Junta Superior auxiliar de Gobierno, seguridad y defensa.' See Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc. Indep., iii. 693-4, where will be found the names of the members who composed it.
* ↑ The bishop, Juan Cruz Ruiz Cabañas, in his zeal against the heretical insurgents, raised a regiment composed of both the secular and regular clergy, and any others who might wish to join. The name given to this extraordinary body was La Cruzada, and each member wore a red cross on his breast. Morning and evening this band of church militants issued from the episcopal palace on horseback, sword in hand, and, as they paraded through, the streets, the staring rabble raised the cry, Viva la Fé catolica! Bustamante calls the regiment 'una piadosa compañía de asesinos.' Cuad. Hist., i. 138-9.
* ↑ Thus it was charged against him in the sentence of death pronounced on the 12th of May, 1812. Id., 144.
* ↑ Known as the Rio de Santiago de Lerma.
* ↑ Carta de Abarca; Bustamanle Campañas de Calleja, 99-100.
* ↑ Recacho, in his report to the viceroy, says that the enemy marched up to the cannon's mouth, and when fired upon with grape and canister closed their ranks and boldly charged again, 'avanzando con una temeridad increible.' Gaz. de Mex. (1811), ii. 159.
* ↑ 'El destacamento de la Barca volvió lleno de terror.' Carta de Abarca, ut sup., 100. Mora's account of this engagement is incorrect. He states that Torres was commander of the insurgents, and that Recacho was completely beaten. Mej. y sus Rev., iv. 92.
* ↑ Bustamante, Cuad. Hist., i. 142.
* ↑ Of these, 100 were Europeans, the remainder Creoles pressed in the service. Oficio de Torres, Alaman, Hist. Mej., ii. ap. 59-60. In an account of this engagement, obtained by J. Hernandez in January 1867 from three natives who were present at the action, the number of killed is stated to have been 257. Torres instructed the Indians to throw themselves upon the ground at each discharge of the artillery, and then keep closing in as quickly as possible. These tactics were so successful that the insurgents lost only two killed and thirteen wounded. Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc., ii. 202-3.
* ↑ During the action, which took place on the same day that Calleja dispersed the insurgents at Aculco, the militia of Colima passed over to the enemy. Bustamante relates that before the battle, Torres proposed to Villaseñor that the Americans should retire and leave the Europeans to engage with him if they wished. Villaseñor's reply was that if he had Torres in his power he would hang him, 'que era un indecente mulato.' Cuad. Hist., i. 142, 145.
* ↑ Carta de Abarca, in Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc., in. 401.
* ↑ The ayuntamiento petitioned the insurgent chiefs to grant Abarca release from confinement in consideration of his ill health and advanced age. Id., ii. 228-9.
* ↑ Respuesta al Papel, 19. The property of Spaniards was, however, embargoed, and commissioners were appointed to attend to the matter. Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc., ii. 229-30.
* ↑ 'Por tanto,' he says in his ultimatum to the comandante, 'esta es la última intimacion, y la falta de respuesta a ella sera la señal segura del rompimiento; pero en la inteligencia de que cuando peleen de esa parte los niños y las mugeres, les tocarán diez soldados á cado uno; pero diez soldados decididos a vencer y á avanzar hasta la misma boca de los cañones.' Bustamante. Cuad. Hist., 150.
* ↑ The military bishop, Recacho, Alva, and the Europeans went on board the brigantine San Cárlos, and steered for Acapulco.
* ↑ Lavallen, Bocalan, and other officers who signed the capitulation were afterward tried for treasonable surrender. After a tedious trial they were acquitted. An almost complete copy of the proceedings as well as other documents is supplied by Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc., i. 236-427.
* ↑ 'Las demás cabeceras de partido,' he says in his report to the viceroy of the 27th of Jan. 1811, 'no me remitieron un solo liombre, y hasta el 6 de octubre solo me llegaron 21 de á caballo, á quienes armé con otros (sic) tantas lanzas.' Exposic. Rendon, Bustamante, Campañas de Calleja, 46.
* ↑ The conde Santiago de la Laguna was the most opulent hacendado of the province, and much respected by the lower orders, over whom he had great control. After the death of Hidalgo, Laguna, who had been accused of treason, owing to his action during the events about to be related, was allowed the benefit of the indulto. Zamacois, Hist. Mej., vii. 10, 253. hist. mex. Vol. iv. 14
* ↑ Rendon escaped the massacre of Europeans at Guadalajara in December following; and when Calleja entered that city after the battle of Calderon, he appointed him intendente del ejército del centro. Alaman, Hist. Mej., ii. 138.
* ↑ Of Iriarte's antecedents but little is known. According to Mora, he had previously at different times been known by the names of Martinez and Laiton. Mej. y sus Rev. iv. 96. Zerecero and Liceaga state that in San Luis he went by the name of Cabo Leyton, and had been a scrivener in the secretary's office of the comandancia. Mem. Rev. Mex., 385; Adic. y Rectific., 151. His first commission as an insurgent officer, from evidence given later by Pedro de Aranda at his own trial, was to arrest and appropriate the property of the Europeans in the villa of Leon, situated between Guanajuato and Aguascalientes. In the execution of this commission he acted with great cruelty, 'prendia á los europeos de aquella villa, devoraba sus bienes y dejaba á perecer sus familias.' Alaman, Hist. Mej., ii. app. 60.
* ↑ Bustamante supplies copies of the correspondence on this matter in Compañas de Calleja, 51-7.
* ↑ In every convent was a door-bell called the campana de misericordia, which was rung by those who, during the night, sought the assistance of confessors for persons dangerously ill.
* ↑ Cortina was one of the principal merchants in San Luis.
* ↑ The only violence occurred on the night of the 12th, when a patrol guard was fired on from the house of a European named Gerónimo Berdiez. This so incensed the officer in command that he forcibly entered the house and mortally wounded Berdiez with his sword. Bustamante, Cuad. Hist., i. 97.
* ↑ The above account of the revolution in San Luis Potosí is derived from Bustamante, Cuad. Hist., i. 95-9. That author's information was supplied to him by a report of the affair obtained in the city. Alaman states that he was careful to verify the facts. Hist. Mej., ii. 23.