OpenLLM-France/wikimedia huggingface dataset:
# Getting Married/Impersonality is Not Promiscuity

There is, too, a really appalling prevalence of the superstition that the sexual instinct in men is utterly promiscuous, and that the least relaxation of law and custom must produce a wild outbreak of licentiousness. As far as our moralists can grasp the proposition that we should deal with the sexual relation as impersonal, it seems to them to mean that we should encourage it to be promiscuous: hence their recoil from it. But promiscuity and impersonality are not the same thing. No man ever fell in love with the entire female sex, nor any woman with the entire male sex. We often do not fall in love at all; and when we do we fall in love with one person and remain indifferent to thousands of others who pass before our eyes every day. Selection, carried even to such fastidiousness as to induce people to say quite commonly that there is only one man or woman in the world for them, is the rule in nature. If anyone doubts this, let him open a shop for the sale of picture postcards, and, when an enamoured lady customer demands a portrait of her favorite actor or a gentleman of his favorite actress, try to substitute some other portrait on the ground that since the sexual instinct is promiscuous, one portrait is as pleasing as another. I suppose no shopkeeper has ever been foolish enough to do such a thing; and yet all our shopkeepers, the moment a discussion arises on marriage, will passionately argue against all reform on the ground that nothing but the most severe coercion can save their wives and daughters from quite indiscriminate rapine.
# Getting Married/Large and Small Families

In most healthy families there is a revolt against this tendency. The exchanging of presents on birthdays and the like is barred by general consent, and the relations of the parties are placed by express treaty on an unsentimental footing.
Unfortunately this mitigation of family sentimentality is much more characteristic of large families than small ones. It used to be said that members of large families get on in the world; and it is certainly true that for purposes of social training a household of twenty surpasses a household of five as an Oxford College surpasses an eight-roomed house in a cheap street. Ten children, with the necessary adults, make a community in which an excess of sentimentality is impossible. Two children make a doll's house, in which both parents and children become morbid if they keep to themselves. What is more, when large families were the fashion, they were organized as tyrannies much more than as "atmospheres of love." Francis Place tells us that he kept out of his father's way because his father never passed a child within his reach without striking it; and though the case was an extreme one, it was an extreme that illustrated a tendency. Sir Walter Scott's father, when his son incautiously expressed some relish for his porridge, dashed a handful of salt into it with an instinctive sense that it was his duty as a father to prevent his son enjoying himself. Ruskin's mother gratified the sensual side of her maternal passion, not by cuddling her son, but by whipping him when he fell downstairs or was slack in learning the Bible off by heart; and this grotesque safety-valve for voluptuousness, mischievous as it was in many ways, had at least the advantage that the child did not enjoy it and was not debauched by it, as he would have been by transports of sentimentality.
But nowadays we cannot depend on these safeguards, such as they were. We no longer have large families: all the families are too small to give the children the necessary social training. The Roman father is out of fashion; and the whip and the cane are becoming discredited, not so much by the old arguments against corporal punishment (sound as these were) as by the gradual wearing away of the veil from the fact that flogging is a form of debauchery. The advocate of flogging as a punishment is now exposed to very disagreeable suspicions; and ever since Rousseau rose to the effort of making a certain very ridiculous confession on the subject, there has been a growing perception that child whipping, even for the children themselves, is not always the innocent and high-minded practice it professes to be. At all events there is no getting away from the facts that families are smaller than they used to be, and that passions which formerly took effect in tyranny have been largely diverted into sentimentality. And though a little sentimentality may be a very good thing, chronic sentimentality is a horror, more dangerous, because more possible, than the erotomania which we all condemn when we are not thoughtlessly glorifying it as the ideal married state.
# Getting Married/Economic Slavery Again the Root Difficulty

The husband, then, is to be allowed to discard his wife when he is tired of her, and the wife the husband when another man strikes her fancy? One must reply unhesitatingly in the affirmative; for if we are to deny every proposition that can be stated in offensive terms by its opponents, we shall never be able to affirm anything at all. But the question reminds us that until the economic independence of women is achieved, we shall have to remain impaled on the other horn of the dilemma and maintain marriage as a slavery. And here let me ask the Government of the day (1910) a question with regard to the Labor Exchanges it has very wisely established throughout the country. What do these Exchanges do when a woman enters and states that her occupation is that of a wife and mother; that she is out of a job; and that she wants an employer? If the Exchanges refuse to entertain her application, they are clearly excluding nearly the whole female sex from the benefit of the Act. If not, they must become matrimonial agencies, unless, indeed, they are prepared to become something worse by putting the woman down as a housekeeper and introducing her to an employer without making marriage a condition of the hiring.
# Getting Married/Importance of Sentimental Grievance

Any tolerable western divorce law must put the sentimental grievances first, and should carefully avoid singling out any ground of divorce in such a way as to create a convention that persons having that ground are bound in honor to avail themselves of it. It is generally admitted that people should not be encouraged to petition for a divorce in a fit of petulance. What is not so clearly seen is that neither should they be encouraged to petition in a fit of jealousy, which is certainly the most detestable and mischievous of all the passions that enjoy public credit. Still less should people who are not jealous be urged to behave as if they were jealous, and to enter upon duels and divorce suits in which they have no desire to be successful. There should be no publication of the grounds on which a divorce is sought or granted; and as this would abolish the only means the public now has of ascertaining that every possible effort has been made to keep the couple united against their wills, such privacy will only be tolerated when we at last admit that the sole and sufficient reason why people should be granted a divorce is that they want one. Then there will be no more reports of divorce cases, no more letters read in court with an indelicacy that makes every sensitive person shudder and recoil as from a profanation, no more washing of household linen, dirty or clean, in public. We must learn in these matters to mind our own business and not impose our individual notions of propriety on one another, even if it carries us to the length of openly admitting what we are now compelled to assume silently, that every human being has a right to sexual experience, and that the law is concerned only with parentage, which is now a separate matter.
# Illinois v. Indiana (340 U.S. 869)

* related portals: Supreme Court of the United States.
* sister projects: Wikidata item.
United States Supreme Court
340 U.S. 869
Illinois v. Indiana (340 U.S. 869)

## Notes

This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
Public domainPublic domainfalsefalse
# Illinois v. Indiana (330 U.S. 799)

* related portals: Supreme Court of the United States.
* sister projects: Wikidata item.
United States Supreme Court
330 U.S. 799
State of Illinois v. State of Indiana

## Notes

This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
Public domainPublic domainfalsefalse
# Illinois v. Indiana (330 U.S. 799)/Opinion of the Court

* Court Documents
* Case Syllabus
* Opinion of the Court
United States Supreme Court
330 U.S. 799
State of Illinois v. State of Indiana
The Special Report of the Special Master as to Shell Oil Company, Incorporated, and The Texas Company is approved. The amended bill of complaint is dismissed as to Shell Oil Company, Incorporated, pursuant to the stipulation entered into by and between the State of Illinois and the State of Indiana, City of East Chicago, City of Hammond, and Shell Oil Company, Incorporated, and as to The Texas Company pursuant to the stipulation entered into by and among the State of Illinois and the State of Indiana, the City of East Chicago and The Texas Company. Costs against Shell Oil Company, Incorporated, and The Texas Company to be taxed hereafter in accordance with the recommendations of the Special Master.

## Notes

This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
Public domainPublic domainfalsefalse
# Illinois v. Indiana (338 U.S. 856)

* related portals: Supreme Court of the United States.
* sister projects: Wikidata item.
United States Supreme Court
338 U.S. 856
Illinois v. Indiana (338 U.S. 856)

## Notes

This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
Public domainPublic domainfalsefalse
# Illinois v. Indiana (338 U.S. 856)/Opinion of the Court

* Court Documents
* Case Syllabus
* Opinion of the Court
United States Supreme Court
338 U.S. 856
Illinois v. Indiana (338 U.S. 856)
The Fourth Special Report of the Special Master is approved. The amended bill of complaint is dismissed as to (1) Cities Service Oil Company, pursuant to joint motion of complainant, State of Illinois, and the defendants, State of Indiana, City of East Chicago, and Cities Service Oil Company; (2) Cudahy Packing Company, pursuant to joint motion of complainant, State of Illinois, and the defendants, State of Indiana, City of East Chicago, and Cudahy Packing Company; (3) Inland Steel Company, pursuant to joint motion of complainant, State of Illinois, and the defendants, State of Indiana, City of East Chicago, and Inland Steel Company; (4) National Tube Company, pursuant to joint motion of complainant, State of Illinois, and the defendants, State of Indiana, City of Gary, Indiana, and National Tube Company; (5) Sinclair Refining Company, pursuant to joint motion of complainant, State of Illinois, and the defendants, State of Indiana, City of East Chicago, and Sinclair Refining Company; (6) and Socony-Vacuum Oil Company, Incorporated, pursuant to joint motion of complainant, State of Illinois, and the defendants, State of Indiana, City of East Chicago, and Socony-Vacuum Oil Company. Costs against these defendants are to be taxed in accordance with the recommendations of the Special Master.
The Fourth Interim Report of the Special Master dated September 7, 1949, is approved. The Court orders and directs the Special Master to continue the proceedings in accordance with the order of this Court dated February 17, 1947. The Court further orders that the recommendation of the Special Master as to the apportionment of costs be adopted and costs for the period from September 8, 1948, to September 7, 1949, inclusive, shall be taxed as recommended in the Fourth Interim Report.
An order is entered fixing the compensation and allowing the expenses of the Special Master as of September 7, 1949.

## Notes

This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
Public domainPublic domainfalsefalse
# Illinois v. Missouri

* related portals: Supreme Court of the United States.
* sister projects: Wikidata item.
United States Supreme Court
399 U.S. 146
ILLINOIS v. MISSOURI.

## Notes

This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
Public domainPublic domainfalsefalse
# I, Mary MacLane/Chapter 77

To-day
SO it is finished: and I have oddly Failed.
I have slyly Succeeded and oddly Failed in equal degree.
I have Failed because I am too cowardly and too weak and too dishonest to write certain bruised and self-accusing places in my Soul and in my Heart and in my Mind which rightly come in the scope of this: there are the Stern and Delicate Voices one closes one's ears against: there are the starry grimy Actualities one drops from one's hands: there are the Thoughts one Does Not Think. Yet and yet: they too are in it, hanging cobweb-ish on my wordings and colons.
It is not a strong tale, and that is very well. This book is less I-written than it is I-myself. And Just Beneath The Skin no person is strong: not Theodore Roosevelt, true fearless American: not Bonaparte, splendid tyrant: not Joan of Arc, titanic martyr. They are strong in their depths and strong on the outside. So are many others. So am I, I think. But just under the skin all who are human are roundly weak.
Roundly weak, every one.
And with that, in my case, False.
This primarily is the picture of one who is made-​False: False from her fingertips to her innermost concept.
It is belike because of that that this, as itself, oddly Fails.
It is as if I have made a portrait not of Me, but of a Room I have just quitted. My Gloves are left on a chair: my Hat is left on a couch: my taken-off Shoes are left on the floor: my faint-smelling Handkerchief is dropped by the door: my round ribboned Garter is hanging on the door-knob: my Breath is in the air: my Grief is on the walls clinging like smoke: my flat Despair is on the petunia-leaves in the window: my fragrant Horridness lingers in the curtains. I am not there! But I—I have just Quitted that Room!—
Therein I have slyly Succeeded.
My feeling at my book's-end is a prayer-feeling, both frantic and quiet: God have mercy on me! but not unless you want to.
And I feel barbarous and utterly solitary, solitary from here to Jericho, solitary from here to the cool stars.
There comes off the grim gray east hills a soft whelming taste of Sunset, bloody and full of human marrows.
And I feel a need of great Pain or great Sin to make and break me, Soul and bones.
# I, Mary MacLane/Chapter 9

To-morrow
MY Two Dresses tell me the scope of my present Mary-Mac-Lane-ness.
Every day they tell me things about myself.
They tell me I'm living in a prison of self, invisible and ascetic and somberly just.
They tell me I'm living an outer life narrow and broodingly companionless and that if I were not self-reliant by long habit a leprous morbidness would rot me in body and spirit.
They tell me because of outer solitude an inner fever of emotion and egotism and a fervid analytic light are on all my phases of self: mental, physical, psychical and sexual.
They tell me my way of thought is at once meditative and cave-womanish.
They tell me I'm all ways the Unmarried Woman and profoundly loverless.
They tell me I'm like a child and like a sequestered savage.
They tell me I am having no restful unrealities of social life with chattering women and no monotonous casually bloodthirsty flirtations with men.
They tell me I walk daily to the edges of myself and stare into horrible-sweet egotistic abysses.
They tell me I'm grave-eyed and coldly melancholy.
​They tell me there's a bereftness in the curves of my breasts and an unfulfillment in my loose-girt loins.
They tell me I am barren of sensation and fertile in feeling.
They tell me God has taken away the beer and also the skittles and left me only pieces of bread and drinks of water.
# In re Citigroup Inc. Shareholder Derivative Litigation

* Court Documents
* Opinion of the Court
COURT OF CHANCERY OF DELAWARE
964 A.2d 106
IN RE CITIGROUP INC. SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE LITIGATION
No. 3338-CC Argued: January 28, 2009 --- Decided: February 24, 2009
Pamela S. Tikellis, Meghan A. Adams, and Tiffany J. Cramer, of CHIMICLES & TIKELLIS LLP, Wilmington, Delaware; OF COUNSEL: Marvin A. Miller, of MILLER LAW LLC, Chicago, Illinois; Daniel W. Krasner, Peter C. Harrar, and Matthew M. Guiney, of WOLF HALDENSTEIN ADLER FREEMAN & HERZ LLP, New York, New York, Attorneys for Plaintiffs.
Gregory P. Williams and John D. Hendershot, of RICHARDS, LAYTON & FINGER, P.A., Wilmington, Delaware, Attorneys for Defendants and Nominal Defendant Citigroup Inc.
Brad S. Karp, Richard A. Rosen, and Susanna M. Buergel, of PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND, WHARTON & GARRISON LLP, New York, New York, Attorneys for Defendants Charles Prince, Winfried Bischoff, Robert E. Rubin, David C. Bushnell, John C. Gerspach, Lewis B. Kaden, Sallie L. Krawcheck, and Gary Crittenden.
Robert D. Joffe and Richard W. Clary , of CRAVATH, SWAINE & MOORE LLP, New York, New York, Attorneys for Defendants C. Michael Armstrong, Alain J.P. Belda, George David, Kenneth T. Derr, John M. Deutch, Roberto Hernandez Ramirez, Andrew N. Liveris, Anne M. Mulcahy, Richard D. Parsons, Judith Rodin, Robert L. Ryan, Franklin A. Thomas, Ann Dibble Jordan, Klaus Kleinfeld, and Dudley C. Mecum.
Lawrence B. Pedowitz, George T. Conway III , Jonathan M. Moses , and John F. Lynch , of WACHTELL, LIPTON, ROSEN & KATZ, New York, New York, Attorneys for Nominal Defendant Citigroup Inc.
This work is in the public domain in the U.S. because it is an edict of a government, local or foreign. See § 313.6(C)(2) of the Compendium II: Copyright Office Practices. Such documents include "legislative enactments, judicial decisions, administrative rulings, public ordinances, or similar types of official legal materials" as well as "any translation prepared by a government employee acting within the course of his or her official duties."
These do not include works of the Organization of American States, United Nations, or any of the UN specialized agencies. See Compendium III § 313.6(C)(2) and 17 U.S.C. 104(b)(5).
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Public domainPublic domainfalsefalse
# In re Chicago, Rock Island, & Pacific Railway Company

* related portals: Supreme Court of the United States.
* sister projects: Wikidata item.
United States Supreme Court
255 U.S. 273
In re Chicago, Rock Island, & Pacific Railway Company
Argued: Dec. 13, 1920. --- Decided: Feb 28, 1921
Messrs. Lawrence Maxwell and William L. Day, both of Cleveland, Ohio, for petitioner.
Messrs. George D. Welles, of Toledo, Ohio, and Thurlow M. Gordon, of New York City, for respondent.
Mr. Justice BRANDEIS delivered the opinion of the Court.

## Notes

This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
Public domainPublic domainfalsefalse
# In re Christensen Engineering Company

* related portals: Supreme Court of the United States.
* sister projects: Wikidata item.
United States Supreme Court
194 U.S. 458
In re Christensen Engineering Company
Argued: April 25, 1904. --- Decided: May 31, 1904
This is a petition for a writ of mandamus commanding the circuit court of appeals for the second circuit to reinstate and take jurisdiction of a writ of error filed by the petitioner in that court, by which it sought to have reviewed an order of the circuit court for the southern district of New York, adjudging the petitioner guilty of contempt. The facts are, that on August 13, 1900, the Westinghouse Airbrake Company filed in the circuit court its bill of complaint, alleging the ownership of certain letters patent, an infringement by this petitioner, and praying an injunction restraining such infringement, and an accounting of profits and damages. A preliminary injunction was ordered on October 18, 1901. On February 21, 1903, the petitioner was adjudged guilty of contempt in disobeying that injunction, and ordered to pay a fine of $1,000; one half to the United States and the other half to the complainant. On March 23, 1903, a writ of error to revise this order was allowed by the circuit court, and a full transcript of the proceedings in that court duly certified to the circuit court of appeals. On March 18, 1903, the circuit court entered a decree sustaining the validity of the patent, directing a permanent injunction, and an accounting of profits and damages. On April 16, 1903, an appeal was taken from this decree. A hearing on the writ of error was had before the circuit court of appeals, and, on February 13, 1904, that court dismissed the writ of error.
Mr. William A. Jenner for petitioner.
Mr. Frederic H. Betts for respondent.
Statement by Mr. Chief Justice Fuller:
Mr. Chief Justice Fuller delivered the opinion of the court:

## Notes

This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
Public domainPublic domainfalsefalse
# In re City of Louisville Kentucky

* related portals: Supreme Court of the United States.
* sister projects: Wikidata item.
United States Supreme Court
231 U.S. 639
In re City of Louisville Kentucky
Argued: November 10, 1913. --- Decided: January 5, 1914
Messrs. Pendleton Beckley, J. W. S.C.lements, and Stuart Chevalier for petitioner.
[Argument of Counsel from pages 639-641 intentionally omitted]
Messrs. Alexander Pope Humphrey, William L. Granbery, and Hunt Chipley for respondent.
Mr. Justice McKenna delivered the opinion of the court:

## Notes

This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
Public domainPublic domainfalsefalse
# Interstate Commerce Commission v. New York New Haven and Hartford Railroad Company Sea-Land Service Inc

* related portals: Supreme Court of the United States.
* sister projects: Wikidata item.
United States Supreme Court
372 U.S. 744
Interstate Commerce Commission v. New York New Haven and Hartford Railroad Company Sea-Land Service Inc
Argued: Feb. 28, 1963. --- Decided: April 22, 1963
[Syllabus from pages 744-745 intentionally omitted]
Robert W. Ginnane, Warren Price, Jr., and Ralph S. Spritzer, Washington, D.C., for appellants.
Carl Helmetag, Jr., Philadelphia, Pa., for appellees. [Amicus Curiae intentionally omitted]
Mr. Justice HARLAN delivered the opinion of the Court.

## Notes

This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
Public domainPublic domainfalsefalse