# History of Mexico (Bancroft)/Volume 4/Chapter 19

Contents
CHAPTER XIX.
SUCCESS OF MORELOS.
1812-1813.
Morelos' Third Campaign — Chilapa Retaken — Reoccupation of the Country to Acapulco — Matamoros at Work in Izúcar — Nicolás Bravo's Victories — Viceregal Tribulations — Publication of Decrees of the Spanish Córtes — Death of Trujano — Morelos' Visit to Ozumba — He Attacks a Royalist Convoy — Takes Orizaba — Defeat on the Heights of Aculcingo — Captures Oajaca — Enormous Booty — Establishment of Government — Victor and Miguel Bravo's Campaign to Jamiltepec — Morelos' Plans — Venegas Superseded — Review of his Rule.
We will now return to Morelos and follow his operations subsequent to his remarkable escape from Cuautla in the early morning of May 2, 1812. It has been already stated that he went from the town of Ocuituco to Chautla where he tarried one month gathering the dispersed forces of Galeana and Bravo to the number of about 800. Of this small army Morelos took command and marched to retake Chilapa and Tixtla, which, during the time he was in Cuautla, had been reoccupied by the royalists. The commandants Añorve and Cerro resolved not to wait his coming, but to retreat to Ayutla. The insurgents under Galeana on the 4th of June encountered part of them and took a number prisoners besides 200 muskets. They finally succeeded in reaching Ayutla, timely reënforcement having been sent them by Páris who was stationed there. The royalist prisoners were. ​taken to Zacatula. Morelos entered Chilapa unresisted. The parish priest, Rodriguez Bello, a stanch royalist, for whose head a reward had been offered, had disappeared. The vicar came out to intercede for the inhabitants. Morelos received him affably, but deemed it necessary to punish the people who had taken so prominent a part in the imprisonment of the subdelegado Montezuma. He accordingly allowed his troops to sack the town, and caused the prisoners to be decimated, despatching the rest to Zacatula, among whom was the giant Martin Salmeron. Three months later he had the giant brought back and mustered into his guard of honor, and issued an order of general amnesty. This triumph of the revolutionists produced a deep impression in government circles, and gave renewed encouragement to the friends of independence. The secret clubs bestirred themselves. Calleja's friends charged the loss of the Chilapa region to the viceroy's failure to have Morelos pursued after his flight from Cuautla, which might have been done, they said, had there been a force at Tixtla or Chilapa.
Meanwhile the independents were planning for new expeditions. Victoriano Maldonado resolved to take Ometepec with the force he had on the Metlatonoc hill. It was not a difficult undertaking, as Caldelas had gone with his forces to the siege of Huajuapan. Páris, hearing of Maldonado's movement, left Ayutla, where he did not feel safe, and went to Ometepec before Maldonado approached the place. This change of base on Páris' part opened the way for Morelos to occupy that portion of the country to ​the very gates of Acapulco, which port was besieged by the independent leader Ávila from the Veladero hill. Notwithstanding these advantages of Morelos' forces in the south, Iguala, Tasco, and the whole country on the right of the Mescala River were held by the royalists. It is true that the latter were constantly assailed, but they had been victorious at every encounter. One of their most noted victories was won by Rionda on the Santa Rosa height, near Jamiltepec, in the Costa Chica, when attacked the 31st of October by Victoriano Maldonado, who was defeated with the loss of his artillery.
The timely victory of Morelos at Huajuapan, the subsequent capture by his forces of upper and lower Mizteca, and his refusal to march against Oajaca have been already related. With 3,600 men, including the garrison of Huajuapan, he started for Tehuacan, a most important position which he occupied on the 10th of August and made his general headquarters. Thence he could watch and send expeditions to Oajaca, Orizaba, and Vera Cruz, without losing sight of Mexico. He could also from this centre, well provided with food and ammunition, give an impulse to his cause throughout that region, whose inhabitants had repeatedly shown a disposition to throw off the Spanish yoke. In the event of a large force coming against him, or of defeat, he would have a way open to the interior.
The comandante at Oajaca, Antonio Gonzalez Saravia, fearing that Morelos' objective point would be the capital of that province, called on the viceroy to reenforce him, the troops he had with him, in their demoralized condition after the recent defeats, being ​inadequate for a successful defence. Venegas was un able to aid him, having all he could attend to at home. Indeed, Orizaba was in no less peril than Oajaca, its people expecting Morelos any moment. As to Puebla, and the road to Vera Cruz, these places were not much safer, it being in Morelos' power to employ detached parties in waylaying trains and cutting off communications, thus preventing the government from moving tobacco and other merchandise, its only means of raising money at this time. In order to keep the roads open a large force, much needed elsewhere, must be stationed there. Again for a time, while watching closely events throughout the country, Morelos busied himself in forming his men into regiments, battalions, and cavalry squadrons, and drilling them for active work. Matamoros did the same, first in the hacienda of Santa Clara, and then in Izúcar. It was here that the latter heard of Venegas' famous edict of June 25th, depriving priests serving in the insurrectionary forces of their ecclesiastical immunity. This raised yet higher his priestly wrath; and he formed a new body of dragoons, which he called San Pedro, the standard being black with a large red cross in the centre, and on which appeared the in scription "Morir por la inmunidad eclesiastica." Morelos followed the example, and thus many of the regiments came to have saints' names.
With the assistance of Mier y Teran, some excellent artillery was cast. Morelos was opposed to brigandage, and empowered Rosains to persecute all who were wont to prey upon rural property and small defenceless towns. The vigilance of the revolutionists along the Vera Cruz road prevented the royalists from gaining any intelligence from that quarter. Flour had ​become very scarce at the port, and as there was a large amount of mail matter collected there, Governor Dávila, in union with the merchants, despatched an expedition of 300 infantry of the Campeche regiment, 70 cavalry, and three mountain howitzers, under Juan Labaqui, captain of one of the volunteer companies of Vera Cruz, who had seen military service in Spain in 1793, against the French. Labaqui took the Orizaba road, and on his march several times encountered the independents, coming off victorious. He passed the heights of Aculcingo, and having reached the beautiful plain which stretches off to the south west, he halted to rest at the town of San Agustin del Palmar, nineteen leagues from Puebla. Morelos, by Sesma's suggestion, sent a force to attack him, under Nicolás Bravo, whom he had appointed general-in-chief of all forces operating in Vera Cruz. Bravo took 600 men, of whom 200 were coast negroes, left the guerrilla chief Arroyo with a small party in the cañada de Iztapa to prevent surprise from Orizaba, and came up with the enemy. After a long and fierce struggle, Labaqui was dislodged from two points, and had only one protection left, a building which he defended as his life. After forty-eight hours of fighting, the independents, led by Captain Palma, a negro of the coast, fell on the enemy at close quarters. Labaqui fell mortally wounded, and his men surrendered. This was on the 20th of August. Bravo sent the prisoners to the province of Vera Cruz, and went himself to Tehuacan. But five days later he routed near the puente del Rey a royalist force escorting a train to Jalapa, and took ninety prisoners. ​Naturally, from such a man as General Nicolás Bravo we should expect to hear much during these stirring times. Since his signal victory at San Agustin del Palmar his military prestige had increased. Civilians flocked to his standard; soldiers deserted from the enemy to serve under him. Spaniards, as well as Mexicans, came to regard him as less an enemy than a patriot; for his conduct, whether toward friend or foe, was always marked by that honesty, magnanimity, purity of sentiment, and austere virtue which were part of his nature.
Bravo now determined upon a campaign against Jalapa, a point of the highest importance to the viceregal government, on account of its proximity to the chief seaport, and its fine climate, which was free from the deadly vómito of Vera Cruz. Accordingly he appeared before the town in good force on the 11th of November. The inhabitants, being stanch royalists, brave and well armed, prepared for defence. The comandante of the garrison was the major of the Vera Cruz regiment, named Antonio Fajardo. At this time there were in the place Brigadier Porlier, with his marines, and Colonel Francisco Hevia, with the Castilla regiment. Fajardo tendered the chief command to those officers as of higher rank, but both declined, promising him their best aid. In command of the independent troops besides Bravo was Maríano Rincon, who since his disaster at Coatepec had again organized an efficient force; also Utrera, Martinez, and the brave Veracruzan mulatto, Francisco Zuzúnaga, who occupied the avenues leading to the city, and the adjacent heights. At two o'clock in the ​morning they attacked with vigor on all sides. The garrison received the onslaught with cool and determined resistance. All assaults they repulsed; and the independents after eight hours of hard fighting retreated. Bravo then took up a position at San Juan Coscomatepec. Next to taking Jalapa he believed he could most advance his cause by occupying the puente del rey, later known as the puente nacional, a position deemed impregnable, and which gave him control of the road from Vera Cruz to the capital via Jalapa, then the route for passengers and merchandise between the coast and the interior. For damaging the enemy and securing spoils and supplies, no point could be better. He did not begin by seizing and appropriating all—a course which would soon have stopped traffic—but he contented himself by levying a tax on every bale passing to or from the coast. The cargoes being numerous, the tax yielded largely. In vain the viceroy forbade the merchants from holding any intercourse with rebels; the interests of commerce always found a way to attain their ends. Moreover, Bravo's integrity of character rendered such operations comparatively safe for the merchants.
It was a time of tribulation for the viceregal government. Morelos' daring and energetic efforts were being crowned with success, and the means to pay the royal troops, or even to keep them together, were wanting. No revenue entered the treasury from the ports; the silverware of private persons had been exhausted; the church had even contributed large sums; and the tax on urban rents was insufficient. Venegas must have money; $700,000 would do, but nothing less. He called a meeting of merchants and officials. The former proposed lowering expenses by reducing the salaries of the latter one third. To this, ​of course, these devoted servants of their country objected. At a second meeting a plan suggested by Crespo Gil and the consulado to place a tax on staples was tried and failed; whereupon the viceroy resorted to the old method of a forced loan.
Several decrees of the Spanish córtes were made public in Mexico about this time, one of which did away with the old feast of the perdon, which had been held every year on the 13th of August to commemorate the capture of the capital by Córtes.' This was done by way of conciliating the Mexicans. Another measure tending in the same direction was the substitution of the garrote for hanging, the latter being a "spectacle repugnant to humanity and to the generous character of the Spanish nation"—a refreshing sentiment, assuredly, considering the wholesale slaughter in which the Spanish nation was everywhere indulging! How comforting to the son of Leonardo Bravo that his father should be so humanely killed for devotion to his country! Another law allowed persons of African descent admission into the universities and religious organizations, as well as the privilege of ordination as priests.
On the whole, matters were improving somewhat in Spain and South America, but not in Mexico. The viceregal government, it is true, by its army of the centre, had recovered many places formerly occupied by the rebels, and put to death Torres and Albino García, the formidable chiefs of the central provinces; but on the other hand, the revolution had extended on the gulf coast, and Morelos, with greater prestige than ever as a military leader, and with an efficient army, held a central position threatening the points that the government had the greatest interest in defending. The revolution now possessed only one powerful leader, and only one army; but armed parties overran almost the whole country. Not a road but was intercepted by guerrillas, nor a district where some chief had not become notorious. One great ​difficulty the government had now to contend with was a lack of connection or coöperation between one insurgent leader and another, none of them recognizing any superior, and all deriding the junta suprema whenever it attempted to bring them under control. Had there been among them a central authority any conquest over which would have ended the rebellion, the probability is that with the victories already won the royalists could quickly have achieved such conquest. As matters stood, victories only served to multiply insurgent bands and extend the war over a still broader area. Revolution everywhere faced the viceroy. His troops were at times defeated, but were usually victorious. Still they could not be divided and conquer. Experience had, however, formed some officers fit for command, and Venegas himself directed army operations from Mexico, while watching enemies at home.
Morelos continued to annoy the enemy as best he was able. He sent Trujano with 300 men to remove from the haciendas that supplied Puebla and the royalist garrison of Tepeaca all the grain and live-stock, which he was to convey to Tehuacan for his own troops. On the 4th of October he reached the rancho de la Virgen, situated between Tlacotepec and Tepeaca, on the road from Tehuacan to Puebla, and established his headquarters there. Lieutenant-colonel Samaniego, who was at Tepeaca, determined to attempt his capture. Setting out at two o'clock in the morning of the 5th with 300 men of the vanguard division of the royalist army of the south, and having a small mountain howitzer, they silently approached and attacked the place. Trujano managed to keep his force together, and in the house of the rancho made a stout defence. Samaniego then set fire to the building, which drove out the inmates, and Trujano, his friend and most efficient officer Gil, and many of the men were slain. Samaniego having received a wound in his leg which lamed him for life, ​perceiving a large force of independents approaching, retreated toward Tepeaca. The band proved to be Galeana's, which had been hurriedly despatched to the Vírgen rancho by Morelos.
It will be remembered that of the silver bars captured by Osorno at Pachuca, a portion had been allotted to Morelos, which, as Osorno never sent as promised,
Morelos resolved to go after them. Leaving Tehuacan on the 13th of October, he proceeded by the way of San Andrés Chalchicomula, and reached ​the hacienda of Ozumba, distant one and a half leagues from Nopalucan, where he received one hundred and sixteen bars of silver. The movement had been effected with the utmost secrecy, as was the custom of Morelos. It happened at this time that a convoy had been formed at Amozoc, just out of Puebla, under Lieutenant-colonel Mariano Rivas, to escort a mule train of ammunition, money, and other effects, and artillery detained in Perote, and also to set in motion the Zamora and Castilla regiments recently arrived from Spain, but which for want of those supplies had been unable to move from Jalapa. The artillery and troops were intended for laying siege to Morelos in Tehuacan. A large number of passengers and a quantity of private merchandise were also there to make avail of the military escort. Brigadier Porlier, who with the remainder of the marine battalion, now reduced to less than half its original force, had gone to Puebla on his way to Vera Cruz to embark for Spain, having in his charge official despatches, also joined the convoy, which on the 15th of October started from Amozoc. Llano, on hearing of Morelos' movement, sent the convoy back to Amozoc, and reënforced it with the Asturias battalion, ordering at the same time that Luis del Águila, should take command of the vanguard stationed at Tepeaca, and divert Morelos' attention in the direction of San Andrés, while the train could pass. On reaching Nopalucan it was learned that Morelos was in Ozumba preparing to attack the convoy. When the latter had passed the sanctuary of San José Chiapa, in the morning of the 18th, Morelos was in its rear marching against it in three columns. ​The Spanish forces, excepting one battalion detached to protect the train, occupied the road along which Morelos was coming. Galeana's column by a long detour made a diversion against and attacked the rear, but was repulsed. Meantime, the action had begun at the front. One of Morelos' columns made a vigorous charge, but was met by Otero and routed. The insurgents fled, leaving three pieces of artillery, one being loaded, which the royalists turned against the fugitives, killing the reverend Colonel Tapia. The convoy continued its march to Ojo de Agua. Morelos got together his force and went back to Tehuacan.
Upon the arrival of the convoy at Perote, Porlier went on to Jalapa to open communication with Vera Cruz. The supplies to be obtained at Perote were taken to Puebla by the Zamora infantry regiment, under Colonel Rafael Bracho. Águila, whose force was guarding the train on the left, approached San Andrés Chalchicomula to observe the enemy, and being falsely informed that Morelos had fled, rejoined the convoy at Ozumba. Meantime, Tepeaca, which had remained with a small garrison, was assailed by insurgents, but with timely relief under Colonel Echeagaray, sent by Llano, repulsed the assailants. Morelos now saw his opportunity—Oajaca being free from possible assaults, and Águila gone with the trains—to fall upon Orizaba, then defended by a small garrison, and whose inhabitants he believed to be friendly. On the 29th he appeared before the garita del Molino of the villa with 2,200 men, and occupied the Carnero hill, a commanding point. The garrison made a two hours' defence, during which many were slain. Colonel José Antonio Andrade, the commandant, then retreated to Cordoba, abandoning six guns and a quantity of other ​arms, being closely pursued till midday. Some of his men who were captured enlisted in the independent service.
Morelos had no intention of remaining at Orizaba; so after seizing the government tobacco, he took a portion for his own army, and returning to the planters such part as they claimed, he ordered the rest destroyed, and leaving there a small garrison under Rocha, took his departure. Soon after starting he saw the smoke rising from the burning tobacco. The loss to the government was considerable, but by no means so great as Morelos represented it in a letter to Rayon. As soon as the news reached Puebla of Morelos' expedition to Orizaba, Águila marched after him with 1,250 men, and three pieces of artillery. At the same time Llano sent Águila the Zamora regiment, 150 dragoons, and three guns, leaving Rivas at Tepeaca with 300 men to keep the way open. Águila by forced marches reached the cañada de Iztapa the 31st, on the same day Morelos had left Orizaba. Both parties continuing their march, neither knowing the position of the other, they came together on the 1st of November, Morelos being on the heights of Aculcingo in an advantageous position, with his men in two lines, his artillery enfilading the public road. He opened fire as soon as Águila was within reach. The latter, who was with the right column, ​without waiting for the left, ordered his cavalry, supported by the grenadiers, to charge. The left column soon came up, and the independents, abandoning their first line and the artillery there placed, retreated to the second. The fight here became very hot; the dragoons of Mexico were forced to give way, and their lieutenant-colonel, Moran, had his horse killed under him. Manuel Flon, a son of the conde de la Cadena, who commanded a squadron of Puebla cavalry, met with a like adventure. Whilst this was going on, mules, men, and women were all making their escape with as much tobacco as they could carry, all taking the side road toward Tehuacan. Morelos and his soldiers were finally forced to do likewise. The scattered revolutionists came together again by previous appointment at the town of Chapulco, on the way to Tehuacan. Galeana, whose horse was killed, escaped capture by hiding himself in the hollow trunk of an old cork tree. Águila reported him among the killed, and Morelos had also given him up as lost till he reappeared the next day.
Morelos remained in Tehuacan only seven days. With 2,500 men from Izúcar under Matamoros, 2,000 from the Mizteca under Miguel and Victor Bravo, and 500 collected at Chapulco, he had about 5,000 soldiers, with whom, and 40 pieces of artillery of various calibre, he started for Oajaca, making slow ​marches. He encountered little difficulty on the way, and on the 24th of November established his headquarters in an hacienda distant only three leagues from the city. In approaching the hacienda there was some skirmishing with royalists, who were easily driven within the city's defences. These had been built on a plan approved by the superior government. An intelligent Catalan had made thirty-six fine guns of various calibre, and a large quantity of shell and other missiles. Ammunition, much of it from Guatemala,
was abundant. The garrison was not under 2,000 men, made up of Spaniards residing in and about the ​place, Bergosa's sacred legion, and the remnants brought by Régules from Huajuapan and the Mizteca. The place, therefore, did not lack for means of defence, though the comandante general, Gonzalez Saravia, had, as I said, used his best efforts to get still more.
Bishop Bergosa, now archbishop elect of Mexico, on hearing of Morelos' approach, stole out of the city at night with his family and valuables, and started for the capital by way of Tehuantepec, Tabasco, and Vera Cruz. He had been virulent toward Morelos and the revolutionists, and deemed it prudent not to remain. His flight greatly disheartened the royalists. The frightened women sought refuge in the nunneries, and many hid their money and jewelry in the same sacred places. On the 25th Morelos demanded the surrender of the city within three hours, and receiving no answer, approached it and made preparations for the attack. He made of his army six divisions, two of which were to prevent the garrison's retreat by the road to Guatemala; to one was intrusted the duty of guarding the baggage and protecting the rear; of the remaining three divisions, the first, under Ramon Sesma, was to assail the fort in the church and convent of La Soledad commanding the town; the second, under Matamoros and Galeana, was directed to enter the city by Marquesado street; and the third Morelos retained under his immediate command as a reserve.
All being ready, operations began. Sesma with the San Lorenzo regiment quickly dislodged the garrison in the Soledad fort, their commander Régules fleeing to hide himself in the Carmelite convent. This fort communicated with the city by a drawbridge, the defence of which had been given to Colonel Bonavía, who together with his officers fled, leaving a sergeant to prevent the bridge from being raised as long as possible. But Mier y Teran seized the bridge, and placing on it a gun swept the opposite street. Matamoros and Galeana simultaneously entered the city, ​the other columns advancing and meeting but little resistance. Mier y Teran advanced to the plaza, driving before them the fugitives who were still firing from behind the pillars. Galeana proceeded against the Santo Domingo convent, which was very strong and suited for a long defence. After a slight opposition, the place was surrendered with upward of 300 men
| 1. Cathedral. | 5. El Institute College. |
| 2. Santo Domingo Convent. | 6. Mint. |
| 3. Palace. | 7. Town Hall. |
| 4. Plaza. | 8. Monte Alban Ruins. |
​and three guns. Matamoros attacked the Cármen, which was soon taken, though hotly defended by the Spanish friars, particularly Friar Félix, one of the captains of Bishop Bergosa's ecclesiastical militia. Lieutenant-general Gonzalez Saravia sallied forth with the cavalry of European Spaniards to meet the independents that were coming in from all quarters, but his men quickly fled, leaving him alone, and he sought refuge in a house. The whole affair lasted but two hours.
The city being thus taken, pillage and punishment followed, the houses and shops of the Spaniards receiving the chief attention. The convents as well as the effects deposited in them were, however, respected; but Morelos afterward took out everything belonging to the Spaniards, and applied it to the uses of his army. He also issued an edict commanding the surrender of all effects that had been concealed by Spaniards. Next those were looked after who were to die. Five hundred prisoners came with the city's capture, two hundred of whom were fine old Spaniards. The notorious Régules Villasante was found in the Carmelite convent, hidden be hind some coffins. Among the royalist officers taken ​the first day were Colonel Bernardino Bonavía, and Captain Aristi. Lieutenant-general Gonzalez Saravia was captured three days afterward attempting to escape by the Guatemala road, disguised as a man of the lower class with a sheet round his person. On seeing that he was to be confined in a building generally used for common criminals, he asked Morelos to treat him as befitted his rank, and offered forty thousand dollars for his freedom and leave to embark for Spain, which proposition was declined. He was a man of mettle, generous, chivalrous, and when the auditor de guerra appointed by Morelos to try his case went to interrogate him, he called Morelos and his soldiers banditti, offered them amnesty, and refused to answer any questions. This hastened his doom, though perhaps only a few days. On the 2d of December, Saravia and Régules were shot in the plain of Las Canteras, the same spot where early in the revolution Lopez and Armenta, messengers of Hidalgo, had been executed. Bonavía and Aristi suffered death in the plaza de San Juan de Dios, where the royalists had wreaked their vengeance the previous year on Tinoco and Palacios for conspiracy in favor of independence. A young Guatemalan servant of Saravia was also put to death, because he tore from a wall and burned an edict of Morelos. The death of Régules was well deserved. The lives of the other prisoners were spared. But notwithstanding this and many other acts of kindness and magnanimity, Morelos, like Hidalgo, has been called cruel; but only by royalists and their sympathizers. This was a war without quarter, and with far greater strictness than the ​insurgents the royalists awarded death to every independent chief falling into their hands. We may be very sure if the situation at Oajaca had been reversed Morelos and all his officers would have been killed. The revolutionists made some little distinction in regard to the men they executed; the royalists made none whatever. Had Morelos refused entirely to execute notorious prisoners it would have laid him open to suspicion and perhaps have brought on mutiny. Undue magnanimity would hardly have been appreciated. When Mariano Jimenez became a prisoner, his kindness toward the governor of Coahuila and other Spaniards in the internal provinces was all forgotten. The Spanish authorities made no distinction between him and the infamous Marroquin, the butcher of the barrancas near Guadalajara.
Morelos despatched Father García Cano in pursuit of Bishop Bergosa, hoping that he might be overtaken in Tehuantepec. Cano's orders were to extend to him every kindness; but the bishop had already gone to sea. Cano's expedition was not fruitless, however, as he gathered on the road a large quantity of cochineal and other property that the Spanish merchants had sent out of Oajaca. Lieutenant-colonel Vicente Guerrero, who had begun his military service under Galeana in 1810, was directed to seize in the bights near Tehuantepec the tobacco and cacao landed from Acapulco.
To the remains of Tinoco, Palacios, and others sacrificed in Oajaca by the royalists, Morelos caused funeral honors to be paid. He released the revolutionary prisoners confined in the convent of ​Santo Domingo, placed them on horses, and caused them to ride through the streets with their long un kempt hair and beards and tattered garments, so that the people might see how they had been treated. Masses of thanksgiving to God and the virgin of Guadalupe were celebrated, at one of which the preacher was Canon San Martin, late commander of Bishop Bergosa's sacred legion. The ceremony of swearing obedience to the suprema junta as the representative of Fernando VII. was performed with great pomp, the ceremonial used at the acts of swearing allegiance to kings being followed. Morelos, who had been raised by the junta to the rank of captain-general, was in attendance with his new uniform, which had been presented him by Matamoros. A civil government was organized; a new ayuntamiento was formed, composed of natives of the country, well known by their honorable record, who were required to accept the positions they were called to. In every one of his acts Morelos gave evidence of his desire to establish peace and order. José María Murguía, a citizen of intelligence, administrative ability, and sterling character, was made intendente. With the money he obtained from the booty, a battalion of infantry called the Oajaca, and a regiment of cavalry named Los Valles, were organized and the artillery was put in order.
With the view of making himself master of all this rich province, and of that portion of the intendencia of Puebla bordering on it then extending to the Pacific ​Ocean, Morelos took steps to destroy the small royalist garrisons under Páris, Reguera, Añorve, Rionda, and Cerro, whose chief point of support was Jamiltepec. Miguel and Victor Bravo, who had shown much gallantry and judgment at the capture of Oajaca, were the officers chosen for the purpose. Moving forward with activity, they soon drove Páris and Reguera into Acapulco, while Rionda retired to Mexico, and Cerro to the other side of the Mescala. This, however, did not seem to affect in the least the royalist proclivities of the inhabitants which Reguera encouraged from La Palisada. Águila, who had entered Tehuacan on the 21st of November, when he heard that Morelos had gone to Oajaca, started after him and even advised Régules that he was marching to his relief; but on learning of the fall of the city, and that Morelos had possession of the passes, returned to Tehuacan. Morelos had now no armed foes on the southern coast, except the few concentrated in Acapulco.
All these advantages gained were the result of Morelos’ plan in having made Tehuacan the central point of operations. On the other hand, we cannot but observe the series of blunders of the viceroy and his officers in Puebla and Oajaca. The royalist leaders certainly displayed ignorance and inability in leaving uncovered so many points of easy defence between Tehuacan and Oajaca, and concentrating in the latter place most of their available forces, thus inviting defeat with the abundant resources at their command.
About this time there came to visit Morelos two members of the ayuntamiento of Tlascala with a ​petition that caused him to despatch Montaño to occupy that city, not being able to go himself till the whole southern coast was secured. He had the idea that by holding Tlascala he could beyond a doubt possess himself of Puebla, and even of Mexico. To accomplish this, he invited Rayon, and through him the other members of the junta, to draw the attention of the viceregal commanders in the direction of Toluca, so that they might not bring their whole strength upon him as was the case when he held Cuautla. If this should prove too difficult, he would direct his operations against Orizaba and Córdoba. Both of these plans were bold, for neither were his troops adequate for such undertakings, nor could he promise himself the coöperation of the president and his colleagues. Further than this, he placed but little reliance on the accounts of victories their chiefs reported to have won. Before he had fully decided he thought of another plan, which was to conduct in person the siege of Acapulco. It was not altogether a good idea. It must be a slow, tedious undertaking, and of doubtful success; but even allowing that everything should turn out as he desired, it could aid but little, if at all, his great aims; the acquisition of that port would not compensate him for the time he must spend in securing it and which his enemies would employ in regaining strength and in preparing better plans for the next campaign. It was clear that the viceroy was making his arrangements, though he did not choose the best instrument to carry them out, for he intrusted the command of his army of the south to Brigadier Olazábal.
Let us again look in at the capital. I have elsewhere mentioned the bitter feeling existing between ​Viceroy Venegas and General Calleja. The latter, since his surrender of the command, of the central army, lived in retirement, having declined the position tendered him of comandante general of the provincias internas de oriente. That ill feeling was well known, and had been the subject of many public comments, Calleja being charged with fomenting by his remarks a spirit of hostility on the part of the royalists toward the viceroy. Nevertheless, on the 29th of December, without any antecedent to explain his change of feeling, Venegas appointed Calleja military governor of Mexico, conferring on him at the same time the commission of lieutenant-colonel of the royalist or patriot military organization bearing the name of Fernando VII. A few days later, on the 7th of January, 1813, having suppressed the junta de seguridad and created in its stead, at each provincial capital, a military commission for the trial of persons arraigned for treason, he gave the presidency of the commission at Mexico to Calleja. It was one of the duties of the military governor of Mexico to receive every day at the palace the parole and countersign. On the 28th of February, the last time that he performed this duty, he had already received his commission as viceroy of New Spain, and Venegas, going to the outer reception-room to meet him, tendered him his congratulations.
The removal of Venegas from his high position resulted from the representations made by the merchants of Cádiz, whose influence with the government was very great, to the effect that the continuance of the insurrection was mainly owing to the viceroy's inefficient measures. His was the fate of many ​another occupying high responsible place in a time of great peril, when complete success only can save him from obloquy. Venegas, at the time he assumed the viceregal office together with the chief command of the forces, was hailed by the Spaniards as their liberator; there can be no doubt that his timely arrival and prompt measures saved New Spain to the crown in 1810; later he became an object of censure to the different parties, as their passions or interests prompted. The insurgents hated him because he prevented the consummation of their purpose, calling him cruel and blood-thirsty—and it must be confessed that these accusations were borne out by facts. The clergy hated him for attacking their privileges. The royalists, on the other hand, found fault with what they called his excessive benevolence to the rebels, to which as well as to the absence of a well conceived plan of military operations they attributed the recent advantages obtained by the revolutionists. Venegas thus found himself without the good opinion of either party, who, if they did not actually feel pleased at his removal from office, certainly looked upon it with indifference. At this distance of time it is easier to judge the man with impartiality. Justice demands of us to say that his character for honesty was irreproachable; even his bitterest enemies concede him that. He never resorted to reprehensible means to enrich himself, and even went beyond ordinary honesty in refusing to receive presents which a long-established custom had authorized the acceptance of. He went back poor to Spain; and out for a loan of $25,000 from his personal friend, the conde de Casa de Agreda, he would have found himself without money for his journey. His constant attention to the duties of his office ​allowed him no leisure except for a ride occasionally in the afternoon. An able financier and ruler, he had generally managed to procure resources to meet the enormous expenses of the war, and to organize armies to oppose the insurgents wherever they appeared in force.
His resolution to enter the struggle with so many odds against him was certainly that of a man possessed of undaunted courage; and when he made preparations to resist Hidalgo and his host of 80,000 men, with a handful of soldiers in whom he could not then have much confidence, the most he might expect was an honorable death. Even certain weaknesses in his relations with the other sex, attributed to him, he made use of for the benefit of his cause—the insurgents of Mexico were always of the opinion that to female gossip he owed the discovery of the August conspiracy. The war allowed Venegas but little opportunity to attend to the duties of the viceregal office proper, but he did not neglect them entirely. It may be truthfully asserted that if peace had reigned during his incumbency he would have been one of the best viceroys New Spain ever had. On his return to the mother country he was given the title of Marqués de la Reunion de Nueva España, and was also treated with the utmost consideration in other respects. ​When Fernando recovered his throne he showed his esteem for Venegas by conferring on him the high est offices of honor.
* ↑ Páris' report from Ometepec of July 11, 1812, in Gaz. de Mex., 1812, iii. 901-4; Mendíbil, Resúmen Hist., 120-8.
* ↑ Salmeron was born near Chilapa in April 1774. When 22 years of age he was presented to the viceroy, and at that time, according to the Gaz. de Mex. of Nov. 11, 1796, his weight was 270 Ibs., and his height 'dos varas y tres cuartas y dos pulgadas,' equal to 7 ft 7 ½ in. Humboldt saw Salmeron and says that his true height was 2.224 metres, or 7 ft 3½ in. Essai Pol., i. 88. After serving some time in Morelos' guard, he was taken ill, and returned to his birthplace, Chilapa, where he died in 1813. Nicolás Bravo's letter of Feb. 21, 1850, in Alaman, Hist. Méj., iii. 248, app. no. 5, 27; Negrete, Méj. Siglo XIX., v. 287-90.
* ↑ The official despatch calls Maldonado ‘el indio Victoriano de Metlatonoc, coronel de insurgentes.' He is reported to have lost many men, seven cannon, all his muskets, powder, etc. Gaz. de Méj., 1812, iii. 1233-4.
* ↑ Mendíbil, Resúmen Hist., 129-30; Alaman, Hist. Méj., iii. 252-4; Carriedo, Estud. Hist., ii. 20; Negrete, Méj. Siglo XIX., v. 207-8. A Spaniard wrote a letter which was published in the Redactor General of Cádiz, Feb. 13, 1813, that Morelos destroyed an immense quantity of tobacco and took 500 prisoners. Guerra, Hist. Revol. N. Esp., ii. 465.
* ↑ They proved to be good fighters. Bustamante, Cuad. Hist., ii. 149; Mendíbil, Resúmen Hist., 129-38; Negrete, Méj. Siglo XIX., v. 309-10.
* ↑ His orders were very severe. Any soldier convicted of stealing to the value of one peso was to be shot. If a party committed depredations, the men were to bo decimated; the rest, and also thieves stealing the value of half a peso, were to be sent to the chain-gang. Negrete, Méj. Siglo XIX., v. 322.
* ↑ The royalists had 48 killed and many wounded. There were captured 300 prisoners, 60 horses, 3 pieces of artillery, 300 muskets, some ammunition, and the whole mail from Spain. Bustamante, Cuad. Hist., ii. 176-9; Id., Elog. Morelos, 13; Mendíbil, Resúmen Hist. . 144-5; Ward's Mex., i. 203-4. Guerra, Hist. Revol. N. Esp., ii. 465-6, on the authority of a Spaniard who wrote a letter Nov. 19th, published in the Redactor General of Cádiz of Feb. 14, 1813, places Labaqui's arrival in San Agustin del Palmar on the 19th of Sept. with 350 men and three pieces of artillery, and says he was attacked by 4,000 rebels, losing 150 men in killed and 200 prisoners.
* ↑ Bustamante and Mora speak of prisoners shot by order of Morelos; but Bravo's letter to Alaman, before quoted, makes no mention of such executions. Bravo was certainly opposed to killing prisoners.
* ↑ Detailed royalist accounts of events at Jalapa for the period from Oct. 1811 to June 1812 may be seen in Gaz. de Mex., 1812, iii. 1271-8. Further on Bravo in Mendíbil, Resúmen Hist., 135-6; Torrente, Hist. Rev. N. Esp., ii. 402.
* ↑ From 1780 to 1810 Jalapa had been the place of residence of the wealthy merchants of Vera Cruz, and a fair was held there on the arrival of the fleets from Spain. The town lost its importance after the independence, and declined still more after the railroad was made from Vera Cruz to Mexico.
* ↑ The bridge is a fine piece of architecture, built by José Rincon, at the cost of the consulado of Vera Cruz, on the river emptying at La Antigua.
* ↑ Galeana carried the bodies of Trujano and Gil to Tehuacan, where Morelos had them interred with military honors. Trujano was a mulatto, and before the revolution had been an arriero, or muleteer in Tepecacuilco his birthplace. Alaman, Hist. Méj., iii. 304-6. Llano transmitted from Puebla on the 6th of October Samaniego's verbal report, which says that this officer received two balls in one of his legs, and that Trujano and 80 more were killed. Gaz. de Mex., 1812, iii. 1079-81; Bustamante, Cuad. Hist., ii. 180-4.
* ↑ Gaz. de Mex., 1812, iii. 1135-42. Alaman in describing Morelos' operations relies a great deal on that chief's own statements at his subsequent trial. But as they are not quite so minute as it would be desirable, other sources must be consulted. Hist. Méj., iii. 300-10.
* ↑ The train consisted of 1,500 laden mules, nine coaches, and five litters; it was placed on a hill of easy descent, close by the road, by the side of which was a cornfield, and the mules were protected from a cavalry attack by an Indian fig field; the whole was guarded by the Union battalion.
* ↑ The independent loss was light, though Águila reported 600 slain. Morelos passed the night in Ozumba, where Tapia was buried. Bustamante, Cuad. Hist., ii. 184-6; Id., Elogio Morelos, 13-14; Negrete, Mex. Siglo XIX., v. 323-4.
* ↑ Llano's report of Oct. 25th. Gaz. de Mex., 1812, iii. 1141-2.
* ↑ The officers taken were shot; among them was young Santa María, a native of Vera Cruz, and brother to Miguel Santa María, who in after years was Mexican minister to Spain, and with the Spanish minister of state, Calatrava, signed the treaty by which Mexico's independence was formally recognized. The young man had been one of the San Agustin del Palmar prisoners, and to escape death pretended to be a partisan of Morelos, being employed by him to instruct his troops, but at the first chance escaped and rejoined the royalists. Being now recaptured, a young woman to whom Santa María was betrothed presented a petition on his behalf to Morelos, who coolly wrote upon it, 'Let her choose a more decent swain.' The clergy and chief citizens interceded for the prisoners. Morelos gave an evasive answer, and during the mass, himself being in attendance, the prisoners were shot in the adjoining plaza. Bustamante, Cuad. Hist., ii. 190-3; Alaman* Hist. Méj., iii. 310-12; Gaz de Mex., 1812, iii. 1184-6; Guerra, Revol. N. Esp., ii. 469; Mendíbil, Resúmen Hist., 151; Mora, Revol. Mex., iv. 388; Negrete, Méj. Siglo XIX., v. 324-6.
* ↑ He said that by the burning of fourteen million cigars the government had been deprived of resources to carry on seven years of war.
* ↑ Aguila's report of Nov. 5th from Orizaba, in Gaz. de Mex., 1812, iii. 1186, 1211-15. This account, Alaman says, was corroborated later by Benigno Bustamante, who in this action was Águila's aid. Hist. Méj., iii. 312-16. According to Morelos' declaration at his trial, he then had only 800 men, and lost 40 of them, together with four or five cannon, besides some ammunition, a few muskets, etc. Bustamante, Cuad. Hist., ii. 184-6; Id., Elogio Morelos, 13-15; Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc., vi. 26. The royalist force was much larger, and had seven killed and 25 wounded. Águila said Morelos was completely routed; and it was even rumored that he had been wounded and Arroyo killed. But the result was really unimportant; Morelos got together the next day 500 of his scattered men and returned to Tehuacan in good order, having saved nearly all his muskets, a matter of no small importance to him. Águila went to Orizaba, whence he sent some assistance to Andrade, who was greatly beset by the insurgents at Córdoba.
* ↑ He kept the utmost secrecy respecting his destination. There were various surmises, and he aided to keep up the doubt with a letter of Nov. 1st from Cuicatlan to the cura Sanchez, left in Tehuacan with a small number of men, saying that the great heat and scarcity of provisions compelled him to go back to Tehuacan, whence he would march against Puebla. This letter was found in Tehuacan by Águila when he entered the place on the 21st, Sanchez having made a timely exit. Izúcar was also retaken by the royalists. Llano attributed the abandonment of the two places to the royalist victory on Aculcingo heights; but he was mistaken, though it is not likely that the independents could have held them long. Gaz. de Mex., 1812, iii. 1231-3, 1260-1. Morelos promoted Matamoros and Galeana to mariscal de campo, making the for mer his second in command, as the latter could not read or write. The chief had at this time no little trouble with Martinez, the visitador sent by Rayon; nor was his disgust less with other insurgent chiefs for their bad conduct and inordinate pretensions. All appears in his correspondence with Rayon. Alaman, Hist. Méj., iii. 329-3G: Negrete, Méj. Siglo XIX., v. 331; Mora, Revol. Mex., iv. 373-4.
* ↑ The main facts relating to the attack and capture of Oajaca have been taken from Morelos' own declarations at his trial. According to his statement, ‘se apoderaron de la ciudad despues de solo dos horas de fuego, en tales términos que á las dos de la tarde ya el declarante estaba en la Plaza Mayor, y á las tres comiendo en la Casa de un Europeo apellidado Gutierrez.' Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc., v. 630; vi. 26-7. A minute account of the affair, and one that he obtained on the spot soon after its occurrence, is given by Bustamante, Cuad. Hist., ii. 206-26; Id., Elogio Morelos, 15-16; Mora, Rev. Mex., iv. 396-400; Alaman, Hist. Méj., iii. 320-4, 329; Ward's Mex., i. 201-2. Among the independents in the attack figured Manuel Félix Fernandez, who in after years gave up his name, assuming that of Guadalupe Victoria. He had thrown himself, full of enthusiasm, into a moat, intending to swim across it. Mier y Teran saw him floundering in the mire, but offered no assistance. When in later years he told Mier his intention of changing his name, the latter jocosely approved it, proposing that of Américo Triunfo, which made the other very angry, and brought ill feeling between them which afterward caused their country much misery. Alaman says he obtained this information from Mier himself. Hist. Méj., iii, 323; Mayer's Mex. Aztec., 291-2.
* ↑ Besides sixty pieces of artillery, 2,000 muskets, and a large quantity of ammunition.
* ↑ Canon Moreno, who had been Morelos' teacher of Latin grammar, and other members of the clergy, together with the families of the prisoners, interceded for the Spaniards. Upward of 200 were released on bonds; 31 of whom he was distrustful were despatched to the prison at Zacatula. Among the prisoners were 300 native Mexicans, of whom he mustered the able-bodied and efficient into his own force.
* ↑ One of those referred to uses these words: 'No era posible que Morelos dejara de llevarse de sus feroces instintos.' Arrangoiz, Méj., i. 196. Cancelada, Tel. Mex, 274-5, 281-2, in speaking of the capture also charges Morelos with cruelty.
* ↑ It is said that afterward, better informed, Morelos acknowledged the shooting of Saravia to have been an error, and regretted it till his death. Bustamante, Cuad. Hist., ii. 217.
* ↑ Morelos wrote Rayon on the 15th of Jan. 1813, that Guerrero 'limpió los bajíos de Tehuantepec, Puerto Escondido y el de Santa Cruz.' The quantity of cochineal that fell into Morelos' hands was 800 bales, the value of which, added to that of the tobacco, cacao, jewelry, silver plate, etc., formed a total of about three million dollars, with which he resolved to give the greatest impulse to the revolution. Alaman, Hist. Méj., iii. 328.
* ↑ This historic uniform, which was magnificently embroidered with gold, is said to be kept in the museum of the artillery department at Madrid.
* ↑ When the royalists recovered the city Murguía was pardoned; and later became a deputy to the Spanish córtes of 1820-1821. He was the author of an excellent work on the statistics of Oajaca, in several folio volumes. Morelos' decree naming the ayuntamiento is of Dec. 5, 1812. The acts of the first sittings set forth the oath the members took ‘to uphold the mystery of the immaculate conception of our lady; the catholic religion; and to recognize, respect, and obey his majesty the suprema junta gubernativa de América en representacion de nuestro augusto soberano el Sr D. Fernando VII. (Q. D. G.).' Id., 329.
* ↑ See map on page 435. This expedition was beset with difficulties ably surmounted by the Bravos, though their modest report of it made it appear a mere excursion. They granted pardon to all who took the oath of allegiance, which was soon broken. Bustamante, Cuad. Hist., ii. 230-4; Mendíbil, Resúmen Hist., 161.
* ↑ He well understood the value of his acquisition. Dec. 16, 1812, he wrote Rayon that the royalist array 'esta bobeando en Tehuacan é Izúcar, caraqueando avances de á medio real, por millones que ha perdido.' Again, Jan. 31, 1813, he says: 'We have in Oajaca a province worth a kingdom.' Alaman, Hist. Méj., iii. 332.
* ↑ According to his own letter of Jan. 21, 1813, to Rayon. Id., iii. 338.
* ↑ He acknowledged himself advised of the progress claimed to have been made by the president and the others. As for himself, he said, 'Por acá voy poco á poco, porque así larga la gallina el moco.' Id., iii. 338.
* ↑ Padre Ramos, 'no me contesta á los oficios, pero si me cuenta sus aveuturas ó hazañas de D. Quijote.' Ib.
* ↑ It consisted of three battalions of infantry, two squadrons of cavalry, and one battery of artillery; the viceroy being ex officio its colonel.
* ↑ The new court consisted of seven officers of high military rank, with whom was associated an ecclesiastical judge nominated by the respective ordinary, who was to exercise jurisdiction in cases of ecclesiastics brought for trial biefore the military court. This was a modification of the famous decree of June 25, 1812. Id., iii. 375-6.
* ↑ The despatch announcing his relief, and the appointment of Calleja as his successor, bears date at Cádiz, Sept. 16, 1812; and the reason alleged for that action was that his military services were needed in Spain. Gaz. de Mex., 1813, iv. 242.
* ↑ 'Venegas no robó un peso: ojalá que pudiera aparecer á los ojos del mundo tan piadoso, como fué limpio de manos!' Bustamante, Cuad. Hist., ii. 251.
* ↑ Bustamante, who shows little charity to Venegas' military record, uses this language, however, 'Creo que si le hubieran cavido tiempos pacificos, habria gobernado bien, pues amaba las ciencias.' Suplem., in Cavo, Tres Siglos, iv. 55. The same writer accuser the late viceroy of having 'un genio áspero,' and of being given to the use of profane language when angered, relating that upon one occasion on learning of a scanty supply of ammunition when he expected to find an abundance, ‘votó y juró como el mas renegado carromatero (segun tenia de costumbre y era su lenguage).' He also charges him with haughtiness toward the poor clerks who had to approach him, whom he would hardly look in the face. This is probably an exaggeration. Cuad. Hist., ii. 46-7. Venegas once slipped and fell on the steep staircase leading to his private apartments, for which reason he had it removed and a more suitable one erected. There were not wanting some to attribute the fall to drunkenness, which was unfounded, for he was noted for his sobriety. Alaman, Hist. Méj., iii. 380.
* ↑ Zamacois, Hist. Méj., ix. 37. Alaman has it 'Marqués de la Concordia de Nueva España.' Hist. Méj., iii. 380. Bustamante says: 'Conde de la Union,' adding that it was 'burlezco é insultante.' Supl., in Cavo, Tres Siglos, iv. 55.
* ↑ In the preparation of this and the preceding four chapters, the following authorities have been consulted: Córtes, Diario, 1810-11, i. ii. 273, 316-17, 346-50; Id., 1811, iii. 387; Id., 1811, iv. 36, 64, 170-1, 192, 272; Id., 1811, v. 12; Id., 1811, vi. 16; Id., 1811, vii. 471; Id., 1811, ix. 7-8, 354, 358; Id., 1811, x. 89; Id., 1811-12, xi. 114; Id., 1812, xii. 72, 122, 213; Id., 1812, xiv. 333; Id., xv. 254-6; Id., 1813, xvii. 151; Id., 1813, xix. 66, 330; Id., 1813, xx. 14-16; Córtes, Act. Ord., 1814, i. 518; Córtes, Col. Doc., ii. 25, 44-5, 158-64, 217-20, 224-6; Id., iii. 6, 56, 106-30; Córtes, Diar. Exta., viii. 1822-3, 7-8; Córtes, Diario Ofic., iii. 105; Bustamante, Cuad. Hist., i. 323-8, 384-406; Id., ii. 46-7, 99-106, 122-48, 158-62, 176-80, 202-34, 233-9, 251, 299-301, 307-15; Id., iv. 148-57; Bustamante, Campañas de Calleja, 158-9; Id., Notic. Biog., 12-13; Id., Elogio Morelos, 13-16; Alaman, Hist. Méj., ii. 443-5, 469-70, 534-7, 549; Id., iii. 67-71, 87-97, 104-32, 137-69, 176-204, 204-38, 245-68, 272-6, 316-53, 378-80, 581-2, app. 30-6, 45-9; Id., iv. 724, app. 3-5; Cancelada, Tel. Amer., 1-8; Id., Tel. Mex., 274-5, 281-2; Gaz. de Mex., iii. passim; Id., iv. 242; Dicc. Univ. Hist. Geog., iv. 180-2; Id., vi. 844-81; Id., ix. 219-22, 581; Id., x. 87-8, 114-16, 132, 640-1, app. i. 58-9; Carriedo, Estudios Hist., ii. 16-26; Cavo, Tres Slglos, 24-44, 46-50, 334-44; Cedidario, i. fol. 97; Hernan y Dáv., i. 342, 846-55, 864-8; Id., iv. 899-901; Id., v. 188-96, 298, 615-84, 909-11, 921; Id., vi. 26-7, 32-3, 41, 100-22, 245-6, 251-2, 1036-8; Liceaga, Adic. y Rectific. 227-42; Torrente, Rev. Hispan.-Amer., 310-42; Arróniz, Biog. Mex., 214-17; Arrangoiz, Mex., i. 155-98; Id., app. 100; Museo Mex., ii. 163-76; Mosaico Mex., ii. 118, 196, 198, 232; Mora, Rev. Hex., iv. 201-14, 366-412, 417-36, 445-8; Mex. Bosquejo Revol, 15-16; Mex. Col. Leyes Fund., 34-91; Mendlbil, Resúmen Hit., 86-7, 94-7, 120-45, 151, 154-5, 161-2; app. ii. 375-83, iii. 384-5, iv. 385, v. 385-6; Mayer, Mex. Aztecs, i. 289-93; Niles' Register, ii. 71, 238, 365; Id., iii. 64, 144, 272; Perez, Dicc. Geog. Estad., i. 115-16; Quart. Rev., xvii. 542-3; Pinart, Print, i. no. 7; Id., no. 9; Mex. El Virey de N. Esp., 1-8; Spain, Constit. Polít., Madrid, 1820, passim; Cor. Fed. Mex., Sept. 24, 1827. 2-3; Spain, Constit. Polít., Cadiz, 1812, reprint Mex. 1820, passim; S. Amer. and Mex. 157-66; Rev. in Span.-Amer., 312-44; Guerra, Hist. Rev. N. Españ., i. ii., passim; Rivera, Hist. Jalapa, i. 349-50, 363-4, 373-5, 405, 409; Robinson, Mex. Rev., i. 49-69; Id., ii. 321-8; Rockwell, Spain and Mex. Law, 398; Ahrens, Mex. and Mex. Zurt., 7; Constit. Polít. Monarquía Españ., Cadiz, 1812, passim; Gallo, Hombres Ilustres, iv. 7-171; Diar. de Avisos, 26 April, 1859, passim; Kewen's Wm. Walker, MS., 23-7; Kottenkamp, Unabhängigkeitskampf, 155-71, 175-6; La Ilustr. Mex., i. 99-100, 437-9; Lemprière, Notes in Mex., 424; Orizava, Ocur., 4-15, 165; Ward's Mex., i. 183-5, 202-26; Walton, Exposé, 392-6; Young, Hist. Mex.; 89-911 Zamacois, Hist. Mex., viii. passim; Id., ix. 5-9, 125, 225-31, 503-5, 568, 609-20, 779-96; Id., x. 276-7; Id., xi. 649, 843; Id., app. 789-91; Zerecero, Rev. Mex., 133-5, 185-90.