# Mexico in 1827/Volume 1/Chapter 6

SECTION II.
COMMENCEMENT OF REVOLUTION IN MEXICO, FROM 1810 TO THE DEATH OF MORELOS.
Many of the causes of disaffection which I have pointed out as existing generally throughout the Spanish Colonies, did not extend to Mexico by any means in the same degree as to the rest. Her superior population gave her importance, while her mineral treasures, and her vicinity to the Peninsula, ensured to her a constant supply of European manufactures. The very process too, by which these treasures were drawn from the bosom of the earth, gave value to the landed property of the Interior, from the intimate connexion that must always subsist between mining and agriculture; and this concurrence of favourable circumstances diffused a degree of prosperity throughout the country, which few Colonies have ever attained, none, certainly, exceeded.
This prosperity, however, was due to the natural resources of the country alone; the government could not check, but did little to encourage it: ​for all the abuses inherent in the Spanish system,—the monopoly of the Mother country, the preference given to Europeans for all public employments, and the corruption which prevailed, both in the administration of justice, and in the collection of the revenue,—existed to as great an extent as in any other part of South America; and were perhaps only felt the more, because Mexico had already acquired that consciousness of strength, which, sooner or later, must, under any circumstances, have proved fatal to the dominion of Spain in the New World. Humboldt describes the irritation which was occasioned amongst the higher classes of the Creoles in 1803, by the political insignificance to which they were condemned; and from what he says of "the sullen hatred with which they regarded the Mother country, and the contempt in which they held her once formidable resources," it seems evident that, even at that early period, the germ of all that has since taken place existed, and only required a favourable opportunity to call it into action. Still, in Mexico as elsewhere, these feelings were confined to a comparatively small circle; for the same intelligent observer adds, " that the great majority of the people were indifferent to political rights, and not at all likely to join in any effort to acquire them." I believe this picture to have been perfectly correct, although it is difficult to reconcile the apparent apathy of the people, with the energy which it displayed a few short years afterwards, in its ​struggle for those rights, which it was supposed to be incapable of appreciating; unless, indeed, we allow that there are, in nations as in individuals, particular periods, at which a general fermentation takes place throughout the system, rendering intolerable the pressure of some evil, which has been long, and patiently supported, and inspiring an irresistible longing for the attainment of some particular blessing, the importance of which has not been before so acutely felt.
Some great moral change of this description must have taken place in Mexico, at the commencement of 1810, to render so general that disposition to rise against the established order of things, which was displayed in every part of the country, the moment that the standard of insurrection was unfurled. Men unconnected with the capital, or with politics; landowners resident upon their estates in the most remote provinces; Curas, whose lives had been passed in the midst of their parishioners; and young men educated for the law, or the church, and just emerging from the university;—all flew to arms, and embarked at once in a contest, for which no one conceived them to be prepared. Nor were the feelings which led to this step, light, or evanescent, in their nature. The war was carried on for years under most unfavourable circumstances, by the Insurgents, with a spirit that set all attempts to reduce them at defiance; and we shall see one of the most distinguished supporters of the cause of Spain (the ​Viceroy Calleja) confess, in 1814, (at the very moment when his arms had given him a temporary ascendancy,) that this spirit remained unchanged, and could be restrained by nothing but an immense superiority of force. But a rapid outline of the Revolution itself, will best explain its character, and progress.
The government of Mexico, at the commencement of 1808, was entrusted to Don José Iturrigaray, whose authority as Viceroy, supported by a host of European officers, and settlers, whom the riches of the Colony attracted, appeared to be as firmly established as at any former period.
The country was flourishing, and tranquil; mines, and agriculture affording to the whole population, (which did not exceed seven millions,) occupation and wealth: nor did any thing announce the approach of that storm, by which the whole fabric of society was so soon to be overthrown.
The first symptoms of agitation, appeared upon the receipt of the disastrous tidings from the Peninsula, which announced the occupation of the capital by the French army, and the captivity of the King.
The Viceroy, uncertain as to the line which he ought to pursue, and doubtful (it is said) of the fidelity of many of the old Spaniards about him, communicated this intelligence in the Government Gazette, without a single comment to guide the feelings, which it was so well calculated to excite. A very few days, however, convinced him of his ​error, and he issued a second proclamation, soliciting the support of the people, and declaring his determination to preserve, to the last, his fidelity to his, and their, Sovereign.
This declaration was received with enthusiasm. It was the first time that the people of Mexico had been taught to consider their voice of any importance, and they availed themselves of the opportunity with an eagerness, which proved, that they felt the value of the right, which they were called upon to exercise.
The Ayuntamientos, every where, became the organs of the people, and addresses poured in from every quarter, in which provinces, towns, and even villages, expressed their devoted loyalty, and their resolution to support the authority of the representative of their captive Sovereign.
This interchange of congenial sentiments, created a kindly feeling between the Viceroy and the Creoles: and advantage was taken of his wish to conciliate then, in the Ayuntamiento of the Capital, composed of men of the first influence and respectability in the State, to propose the creation of a Junta, in imitation of the Mother country; and even the convocation of a National Mexican assembly, to be composed of deputies from the different provinces.
This suggestion was not unfavourably received by Iturrigaray, but was protested against by the Audiencia, as contrary to the privileges, both of the ​Crown and of the Europeans. Disputes ran high between the Municipality and this body, during the months of July and August, and the beginning of September (1808), when the Audiencia, finding that the Viceroy was inclined to side with their opponents, and to admit the Creoles to a share in the government, determined to arrest, and depose him, in order to cut short a project, which they regarded as fatal to their own authority. This resolution, the principal promoters of which, were the Oidores Aguirre and Bataller, was carried into execution on the night of the 15th of September, when Iturrigaray was surprised in bed, in his own palace, by a band of Europeans, (mostly merchants,) headed by Don Gabriel Yermo, a rich Spaniard, the proprietor of some of the finest sugar estates in the valley of Cuĕrnăvācă. No resistance was made by the guards, who would not fire upon their countrymen, and at midnight the Viceroy was conveyed to the prisons of the Inquisition, while his Wife and Family were confined in a neighbouring convent.
To the populace, a suspicion of heresy was assigned as the cause of this measure; while, to the better informed, the Audiencia attempted to justify it, by one of the laws of the Code of the Indies, ​by which it is provided, that in cases where the Viceroy exceeds his powers, the Audiencia has a right of interference, in order to preserve the tranquillity of the country. But all attempts at concealment were vain: the Creoles knew that the removal of Iturrigaray implied their exclusion from power, and they consequently regarded his cause as their own. These feelings were rather confirmed, than checked, by the pains which were taken by the Audiencia to repress them. Juntas of public security were formed by its orders, and armed bands of Spaniards organized, who, under the curious denomination of Patriots, exercised a most rigorous surveillance over all whose opinions were suspected of being favourable to the imprisoned Viceroy. Many persons of note were arrested, who had voted in favour of a Mexican Junta in the Ayuntamiento, of whom some were banished to the Philippine Islands, and others sent to Spain, to be there tried, or confined in the Castle of St. John of Ulloa. The Viceregal authority was confided, for the time, to the Archbishop Lizana, and an account of all that had taken place transmitted to Spain, for the approbation of the Central Junta.
But although the Mexicans submitted at the moment to these innovations, they were far from viewing them with indifference. The moral change which a few months had produced was extraordinary; they had learnt to think, and to act; their old respect for the King's Lieutenant was destroyed ​by the manner in which his authority had been thrown off, and his dignity profaned by his countrymen; and they felt that the question was now, not one between their Sovereign and themselves as subjects, but between themselves, and their fellow-subjects, the European Spaniards, as to which should possess the right of representing the absent King.
The insolent manner in which this right was claimed, as exclusively their own, by the Europeans, encreased not a little the general irritation. The Ayuntamiento of Mexico was told by the Audiencia, in reply to some remonstrance in favour of the Viceroy, "that it possessed no authority, except over the leperos (lazzaroni), of the capital;" and it was a favourite maxim with the Oidor Bataller, "that while a Manchego mule, or a Castilian cobler remained in the Peninsula, he had a right to govern the Americas."
These sentiments were re-echoed by all the Europeans, both in the Capital, and in the principal towns of the Interior: they every where formed Patriotic associations for the defence of what they termed their rights, and armed themselves against the Natives, whose spirit these very precautions contributed to arouse. The Archbishop, whose moderation and conciliatory policy accorded but little with these views, was allowed to retain the reins of government but a short time. He was replaced, in 1809, by the Audiencia, to whom the supreme authority was entrusted by the Central Junta; and ​by the violence and arrogance of this body matters were soon brought to a crisis. In every part of the country, a feeling of hostility towards the Europeans spread, and with it an impatient desire to shake off their yoke. In some places, (as at Valladolid,) attempts were made to concert insurrectionary movements, as early as May 1809, which were checked by the arrest of those principally concerned in the project. But nothing was gained by this; discontent had become too general to be repressed entirely, and to check it at one point, only gave it a tendency to break out, with additional violence, at another. The scene alone was changed from the province of Mīchŏăcān, to that of Guănăjūātŏ, where the famous Cura Hidalgo was destined first to rouse into action the excited feelings of his countrymen.
Don Miguel Hĭdālgŏ y Cŏstīllă, was a man whom the Spaniards themselves allow to have possessed many superior acquirements. His reading was extensive, and in the little town of Dŏlōrĕs, of which he was Cura, he had given proofs of great activity and intelligence, by encouraging different ​manufactures amongst his parishioners, and introducing the cultivation of the silk-worm; in which, in the year 1810, they had made a very considerable progress. He had likewise planted vineyards to a great extent in the vicinity of the town; but this attempt to increase the resources of his curacy was rendered abortive, by a special order from the Capital, prohibiting the inhabitants from making wine, by which they were reduced to the greatest distress.
Thus, private motives for discontent were added to those which he shared in common with the rest of his countrymen; and this may account for the stern, inexorable spirit, with which he began the contest, and which, being met by a spirit equally stubborn, and unrelenting, on the part of the Spaniards, gave at once to the revolution that sanguinary character, by which it is distinguished throughout.
To form a party willing to join him in the enterprise which he meditated, was no difficult task, since the minds of his countrymen were so well prepared for it beforehand. Indeed, so little caution does he seem to have observed, that his projects were discovered before they had come to maturity, and orders issued for the arrest of himself and his associates, Ăllēndĕ, Ăldāmă, and Ăbāsŏlŏ, three Creole officers in garrison at Guanajuato, who were amongst the first converts to his opinions.
This premature disclosure might have discouraged a man of less determination than Hidalgo; ​but with him it produced no other effect than that of hastening the execution of his plan.
Having been joined by Ăllēndĕ, on the 13th of September, 1810, and secured the co-operation often of his own parishioners, on the morning of the 16th of September, just two years after the arrest of Ĭtŭrrĭgărāy, he gave the signal for revolt, by seizing and imprisoning seven Europeans, resident in the town of Dŏlōrĕs, whose property he immediately distributed amongst his followers. The rapidity of his progress after this first exploit seems quite incredible. The news of it spread in every direction, and was every where received with the same enthusiasm. Within twenty-four hours, Hĭdālgŏ 's force became so considerable, that, on the 17th of September, he was enabled to take possession of Săn Fĕlīpĕ, and, on the 18th, of Săn Migūel ĕl Grāndĕ, (towns each of 16,000 inhabitants,) in both of which places the confiscated property of the Europeans afforded him the means of increasing the number of his own partizans.
Guănăjūātŏ, the capital of the Province, and the emporium of the treasures of the Spaniards in that part of the country, was his next object; but, as he was aware of the activity, and decided character of the Intendant Rĭañōn, (a magistrate respected still ​in Mexico, for his integrity, and benevolent spirit,) he would not risk an attack upon a city containing, at that time, 75,000 inhabitants, until he was sure that his numbers were equal to the attempt. The Intendant had, at first, resolved to defend the whole town; but finding that he had not men enough to undertake it, and observing strong symptoms of disaffection amongst the lower classes, who were all inclined to make common cause with their countrymen, rather than to assist the Spaniards, he shut himself up, with all the Europeans, and the gold, silver, quicksilver, and other valuables contained in the Royal Treasury, in the Public Granary, (called la Ălhōndĭgă,) where he fortified himself, and made every preparation for an obstinate defence.
On the morning of the 28th September, Don Mărĭānŏ Ăbāsŏlŏ, in the uniform of Colonel of Hĭdālgŏ 's army, appeared before the town, with a letter from the Cura, announcing, "that having been elected "Captain general of America", by the unanimous choice of his followers, and recognized as such by the Ayuntamientos of the towns of Călāyă, and Săn Migūel, he had proclaimed the independence of Mexico: that, as the Europeans were the only obstacles to this, it was necessary to banish them from the kingdom and to confiscate their property; but that, if the Spaniards at Guănăjūātŏ would submit ​without opposition, their persons should be respected, and they should be conveyed to the coast uninjured."
The Intendant's answer was moderate, but firm; and as it afforded no prospect of any capitulation, Hidalgo's troops immediately marched to the attack.
The number of those who had flocked to his standard in the course of twelve days is estimated at 20,000; but they were principally indians, armed with slings, bows and clubs, lances, and măchētĕs; very few had muskets, and, on the whole, nothing could form a greater contrast than the appearance of this motley crew, when compared with that of the regiment of La Reina, which, together with a part of the infantry of Cĕlāyă, had joined Hĭdālgŏ, on his march to Guănăjūātŏ.
The Ălhōndĭgă was commanded by a number of little eminences, which were immediately occupied by swarms of slingers, who kept up such a constant shower of stones that the Europeans could hardly appear upon the fortifications. The musketry, however, from the fort did great execution, as every ball took effect amongst the crowds with which the streets were filled. But the whole population of the town having joined the Insurgents, such numbers pressed on to the attack, that they at last carried every thing before them. Their progress was checked for a moment by some shells, which the Intendant had invented by filling some of the iron flasks, in which the quicksilver is contained, with gunpowder, and boring a hole for a match; ​but confusion soon ensued amongst the besieged, and resistance was given up as hopeless, the great gate having been forced, and the Intendant himself killed by a ball, which struck him on the temple.
The number of Whites who perished in, and after, the action, is not exactly known. I use the term 'Whites', because several of the principal Creoles of Guánăjūātŏ, connected by marriage with the Spanish residents, and apprehensive, no doubt, that their property would not be respected in the general pillage, which was to be expected on Hidalgo's entry, determined to share the fate of the Europeans, and shut themselves up with them in the Ălhōndĭgă.
The slaughter is allowed to have been very considerable: indeed, I am acquainted with one family which lost seventeen of its members on that fatal day. Nothing could exceed the acharnement of the Indians, after the action was over; they put to death all the Europeans who fell into their hands, and seemed to seize with delight the opportunity, which was at length afforded them, of avenging the evils, which Spanish ambition had brought upon their ancestors and themselves. This ferocity was the more extraordinary, from having lain dormant so long. During three centuries, the Indian race had appeared to be in a state of the most abject submission to their conquerors; nor was it suspected, until the Revolution broke out, that they entertained so deeply rooted a feeling of former wrongs.
As all the Europeans had transported to the ​Fort their most valuable effects, the amount of the money, and other precious commodities, found in it was enormous: it is usually estimated at five millions of dollars, the possession of which entirely changed the aspect of Hidalgo's affairs, and induced the public to watch, with the most anxious interest, the progress of an insurrection, which many had at first considered as an ill-judged, and desperate attempt.
The property of the old Spaniards at Guănăjūātŏ was given up to Hidalgo's troops; and such was the diligence of the Indians upon this occasion, that, although the action did not terminate till five in the afternoon on Friday, not a single house belonging to an European was found standing on the Saturday morning. Indeed, the greatest excesses were committed during the whole time that the army remained in the town: Hidalgo had neither the power, nor perhaps the inclination, to restrain them. He was aware that the contest in which he had engaged was one of a deadly nature, and was not averse to seeing his followers so deeply committed as to render any hope of future reconciliation impossible. This appears to me the simplest mode of accounting for his never having attempted to introduce any thing like discipline amongst his troops, (the possibility of which Mŏrēlŏs afterwards proved); for it cannot be attributed to any want of intelligence, or activity;—qualities which he displayed, in all other respects, in no common degree. ​During his short stay at Guănăjūātŏ, he established a Mint there, with every thing necessary for coining money, and a foundery of cannon, in which he made use of the bells which had been found in the houses of the Europeans.
I have been more particular in detailing the occurrences which took place at Guănăjūātŏ, because it was to his successul attempt upon this town that Hĭdālgŏ owed his celebrity. His name spread instantly through the different Provinces, and with his name the nature of his enterprise. From every part of the country recruits flew to join him; and, as all concurred in recognizing him as their chief, he distributed commissions and powers, by which his principles were disseminated, and his partisans augmented, in every quarter.
The consternation, which the news of the fall of Guănăjūātŏ created amongst the Spaniards in the Capital was very great; but the new Viceroy, Don Francisco, Xavier, Vĕnēgăs, who had been installed but two days before the insurrection of Dolores broke out, displayed such firmness in all his measures, that the Creoles were compelled to conceal their exultation, and public tranquillity was not disturbed.
Vĕnēgăs, though at first misled by the representations of the Aŭdĭēnciă, and particularly of the Oidor Bătĕllēr, who assured him that the sound of a drum would alone be sufficient to terrify the Mexicans into submission, soon perceived the real ​ state of affair's. He ordered troops from La Pūēblă, Ŏrĭzāvă, and Tŏlūcă, to march upon the Capital, and, at the same time, by way of conciliating the Creoles, he intrusted the command of one of the finest regiments to the Conde de la Cădēnă Cadena, a Mexican born. The event proved his calculation to have been correct, for the Count, who had been supposed before, to be one of those most desirous of seeing Mexico independent, became, from that moment, a zealous adherent of Spain, and perished soon after in the defence of her cause.
The same policy was recommended to Don Felix Mărīă Căllējá, who commanded a brigade of troops, at San Luis Pŏtŏsī, and was ordered to augment his division as much as possible and to march in pursuit of Hidalgo. Nor did the Viceroy neglect to turn to account the superstition of the people: some doubts having arisen, in the Capital, with respect to the justice of a sentence of excommunication pronounced against Hidalgo by his Diocesan, the Bishop of Valladolid, (as the Cura, though in arms against the King, had not committed any offence against the Catholic Religion,) Vĕnēgăs caused This sentence to be confirmed by the Archbishop Lĭzānă, and by the Inquisition, who pronounced, at the same time, the penalty of excommunication, ipso facto incorrenda, against any one who should presume to question its validity in future.
But the advantages, which the Spanish cause ​might have derived from these measures, were more than counterbalanced by the public distribution of honours and rewards amongst the Europeans who had been concerned in the deposition of Ĭtŭrrĭgărāy. It renewed all the feelings of irritation which the event itself had excited, both in the Provinces and in the Capital, and was continued to great account by the friends of the Independent cause.
Hidalgo remained in quiet possession of Guănăjūātŏ until the 10th of October, when he set out with his whole army for Văllădŏlīd, partly from a report that Căllējă was approaching, and partly to put a stop to the ravages, which a Licentious life, and an a host habitual state of drunkenness, were producing amongst his followers: Valladolid was abandoned by the Bishop, and most of the Spaniards, on his approach; and no resistance being attempted, he took quiet possession of the town on the 17th of October.
His army had increased so enormously on the march, and during his stay at Guănăjūātŏ, that it consisted of nearly fifty thousand men. Hĭdālgŏ made some valuable additions to this force at Văllădŏlīd, where he was joined by the regiment of Provincial militia, and the dragoons of Mīchŏăcān, both, armed, ​and well equipped: but a greater acquisition still was Don José Maria Mŏrēlŏs, Cura of Nŭcŭpētărŏ, an old college friend of Hidalgo, and one, of whose talents he was so well aware, that he immediately gave him a commission to command in chief on the whole South-Western line of coast. The confidence which Morelos showed in his own resources by accepting this commission, and setting out, accompanied only by five servants armed with old muskets, with a promise to take Acapulco within the year, is the more worthy of notice, as the event proved it to be well-founded. But as we shall have occasion hereafter to trace the progress of this extraordinary man, who proved one of the most distinguished characters of the Mexican Revolution, I must confine myself at present to Hidalgo.
On the 19th of October the army left Văllădŏlīd, and on the 28th, reached Tŏlūcă, a town within twelve leagues of the Capital.
Vĕnēgăs had found means to collect about 7000 men in, or near Mexico, whom he stationed, in the most advantageous manner, for the defence of the town, with the exception of a small corps of observation which he sent out, on the Tŏlūcă road, under the command of Colonel Trŭxīllŏ, assisted by Don Augustin Ĭtŭrbīdĕ, then a Lieutenant in the Spanish service. This corps was defeated by Hĭdālgŏ and Ăllēndĕ, on the 30th of October, at Lăs Crŭcēs, a pass in the chain of mountains which separates the valley of Mexico from that of Tŏlūcă, where ​Truxillo had taken up a position. The only remarkable circumstance that took place during the action was the fact of an insurgent officer, with a flag of truce, having been encouraged by Trŭxīllŏ to approach his lines until he came close to the ranks, when a general discharge was ordered, by which he was killed, with those who accompanied him. This act of treachery was boasted of by Truxillo in his official report of the engagement, and approved by the Viceroy, who thus gave his sanction to the principle, that none of the ordinary rules of war were to be observed with the Insurgents. Vĕnēgăs, however, was so much alarmed at their success and near approach, that he had again recourse to the superstition of the people, as the best method of preserving tranquillity. The image of the Virgin of los Rĕmēdĭŏs was brought in great pomp, from a little village where it was usually kept, to the Cathedral of the Capital, where Vĕnēgăs went in full uniform to pay his respects to it; and, after imploring the Virgin to take the Government into her own hands, terminated his pathetic appeal to her by laying at her feet his staff of command.
A flaming account was published, on the following day, of the action of Las Cruces, where Truxillo was said to have obtained a decided advantage, though circumstances had afterwards obliged him to retreat;—a term which was rendered but too intelligible by the melancholy condition, in which both he and his troops entered the capital. Every preparation ​was however made for defence, and the approach of the Insurgents was hourly expected: but Hidalgo, after advancing within sight of Mexico, retreated without risking an assault. His conduct has been attributed to cowardice by some, and by others, to a wish to spare the Capital the horrors of being taken by storm; but I conceive that neither of these reasons was the true one: Hidalgo had given too many proofs of a daring spirit, for any one to suspect him of want of courage; and as to the excesses which might have been committed had he succeeded in entering Mexico by assault, he would have considered them as unavoidable evils, but which could not, for an instant, be set against the advantages which the country would derive from the termination of the contest by so decisive a blow. The fact is, that he had not calculated upon the Viceroy's being able to assemble so considerable a force. His Indians were discouraged by the losses which they had sustained in the battle of Las Crŭcēs, where, from their total ignorance of the nature of artillery, they had charged Truxillo's guns, and tried to stop the mouths of them with their straw hats, until hundreds had perished by the discharge. He foresaw that they would never be brought to face the batteries, which Vĕnēgăs had erected: his whole army, too, had fallen into a state of greater confusion than ever, during the march; and, on examining his supplies of ammunition, he found that there was a very great scarcity both of ​powder and ball. In addition to these cogent reasons for not advancing, a courier was intercepted, with dispatches from Calleja, who had already reached Qŭerētărŏ on his way towards the Capital; so that there was every reason to suppose that he would push on by forced marches, and inclose the besiegers between his own force, and that of the Viceroy. To avoid this danger Hidalgo commenced his retreat, much to the dissatisfaction of Allende, his second in command; but his measures were so badly taken, that one might almost imagine him to have sought the peril from which he was endeavouring to escape. After a march of six days, his advanced guard, most unexpectedly, fell in with Calleja's outposts, who, on their side, were equally ignorant of the approach of the Insurgents. Calleja's troops were composed principally of Creole regiments. His cavalry was commanded by the Conde de la Cadena; and his army possessed all the advantages that superior discipline and arms could give; but it remained to be seen what effect the appearance of their countrymen, fighting for a cause, in which all Mexicans were equally interested, might produce upon their minds.
This great question was decided, on the 7th of November, 1810, in the plains of Ăcūlcŏ. Officers who were present at the action have assured me, that the troops were wavering when they went into the field; and that, if Hidalgo had prevented his men from beginning hostilities, it was more than ​questionable whether they would have been brought to fire. But the Insurgents, struck with terror at the appearance of a regular army going through its evolutions in perfect silence, and beginning to advance upon them in five separate columns, dispersed in the greatest confusion at their approach, and began firing at random upon all who came within their reach. This was an insult with which the Creole Regulars were so irritated, that they were even more eager than the Spaniards in the pursuit; and, from this moment, their line, throughout the early part of the Revolution, was decided. For many years, they were the chief support of the cause of Spain, and the most inveterate enemies of the Insurgents; nor was it until the declaration of Ĭtŭrbīdĕ, in 1821, that they espoused the cause of Mexican Independence. One cannot but admire the dexterity with which this feeling in favour of the Mother country, was created, and kept up. The very men who enabled Căllējă, to gain the battles of Ăcūlcŏ and Căldĕrōn, would, under less skilful management, have put an end to the contest at once, by siding with their countrymen. ​Ten thousand Indians are said to have perished at Ăcūlcŏ; but Hidalgo and most of his officers found means to escape, and, after collecting as many of the fugitives as they could, effected a hasty retreat to Văllădŏlīd. Ăllēndĕ, having separated from his companions, took the road to Guănăjūātŏ, with the intention of defending the town; but finding: that he had not forces sufficient again to meet Calleja, by whom he was pursued, he evacuated the place on his approach.
Much has been said of the atrocities committed by this general, on his entry into that unfortunate city. I am far from wishing to palliate them, but there was, undoubtedly, a circumstance, which furnished him with a plea for any severities that he chose to exercise. Two hundred and forty-nine Europeans, who had escaped from the massacre at Ălhōndĭgă, when Hĭdālgŏ took it, or were found afterwards concealed in the neighbourhood, were left there by him as prisoners. The populace, furious at seeing themselves deserted by Ăllēndĕ, in a paroxysm of rage flew to the fort, in which these unfortunate men were confined, and, in spite of the resistance made by several respectable Creoles, many of whom were wounded in attempting to oppose them, most inhumanly massacred all the prisoners. This horrible act was perpetrated on the very morning that Căllējă entered the town; and it was upon receiving intelligence of it, that his troops were ordered to give no quarter. This ​order too, by which the innocent were confounded with the guilty, was revoked before the troops had penetrated beyond the suburbs; and I do not find that the authors, who are most zealous in the cause of the Revolution, can prove the number of those who really suffered by the sentence of decimation, pronounced afterwards against a part of the population, to have been greater than that of the Europeans, who had fallen victims to their ferocity. Besides, it must not be forgotten that, at the commencement of a Revolution, however just its causes, all those who engage in open hostilities against the established government, do it at their own peril. They must expect to be treated as traitors, until success makes heroes of them. I do not blame the Spanish Authorities so much for having done, in the first instance, what most governments would have done in their place, as I do, for having persevered in their system of severity, when time had proved its inefficacy, and when they were intreated by the Insurgents themselves, to avoid such an unnecessary effusion of blood.
Hidalgo arrived at Valladolid on the 14th of November, from whence, after allowing three days for his followers to recruit after their late losses, he proceeded, without delay, to Guădălaxāră, which town had been occupied by one of his lieutenants, on the very day, that the battle of Ăcūlcŏ was lost by himself. During this short stay at Valladolid, he was joined by another man, who, afterwards, ​took a very active part in the Revolution, the advocate (el lĭcĕncĭādŏ) Don Ignācĭŏ Lōpĕz Răyōn, whom Hidalgo immediately appointed his confidential secretary: Răyōn is one of those who did most towards reducing the Insurrection to a regularly organized system; he established the Junta of Zitācŭarŏ, which was the first step taken towards creating an independent government, and gave to the Patriot cause a character of respectability, which it had not before possessed.
On the 24th of November, Hidalgo made a triumphal entry into Guădălaxāră, where he was received with the greatest pomp, and, apparently, with the greatest enthusiasm. Although the excommunication originally pronounced against him had not been taken off, he assisted at a grand Te Deum, in the Cathedral, from whence he was conducted to the palace, where all the great Corporations came to place themselves at his orders. Soon after his arrival he was joined by Ăllēndĕ, in conjunction with whom, though a great degree of irritation had existed between them since the retreat from Mexico, he proceeded, with his usual activity, to take measures for increasing his forces, and replacing the artillery which he had lost. This he effected, by bringing a number of cannon from Săn Blās, (the great dock-yard and arsenal of the Spaniards, on the Western coast;) some of which, though of a very large size, (24-pounders) were conveyed, by the Indians, over a mountainous ​district, across which no communication had ever before been thought practicable. It would have been well for Hidalgo's reputation, if these cares alone had occupied him; but, during his stay in Guădălaxāră, he was guilty of an action, which leaves a foul blot upon his name. I have already remarked his inexorable spirit, and his bitter enmity towards every thing Spanish. All the Europeans in the town were thrown into confinement, upon his arrival: their number was so great, that it was necessary to distribute them amongst the different convents; and it is not improbable that they may not have been as guarded in their conversation there, as circumstances required. But, without any other crime being alleged against them than this,—on some vague rumours of a conspiracy amongst the prisoners, Hidalgo determined to make away with them all. This cruel resolution was carried into effect with a cold-bloodedness which is really horrible.
No form of trial, no previous examination even, was thought necessary; but the prisoners were brought out, by twenty and thirty at a time, and conducted, under the veil of night, by some of Hĭdālgŏ's creatures, to retired parts of the mountains in the vicinity of the city, where they were butchered in secret, the use of fire-arms being prohibited, for fear of creating any alarm. This detestable system of midnight executions commenced at Valladolid, where Hidalgo ordered eighty Europeans to be ​beheaded on the Cerro de la Bătēă, during the three days which he passed in the town; but, in Guădălajāră, the number of victims was between seven and eight hundred. There is every reason to believe too, that he intended to pursue the same line of conduct in future, and to establish it as a general rule amongst his adherents; for a letter was produced on his trial, written by him to one of his lieutenants, in which, after recommending him to go on seizing the persons of as many Spaniards as possible, he adds, "and if you should have any reason to suspect your prisoners of entertaining restless, or seditious, ideas, or discover amongst them, any dangerous intentions, bury them in oblivion at once, by putting such persons to death, with all necessary precautions, in some secret and solitary place, where their fate may remain for ever unknown."
Nothing can be more horrible than the idea of thus reducing assassination to a system; and, even setting humanity and morality entirely aside, nothing could be more ill judged. It drove the Spaniards to despair, and furnished them, at the same time, with an excuse for any atrocities which they chose to commit. It discredited the cause of the Revolution, and prevented a number of respectable Creoles from espousing it. Allende himself, is said to have been so disgusted with the cruelty of his chief, that nothing but the approach of Calleja prevented him from abandoning him.
The cannon which the Insurgents had found at ​San Blas, were so numerous, that Hidalgo, though there were only 1,200 muskets in the whole army, imagined that, with the assistance of his batteries, he should be able to repulse Calleja's forces. Allende foresaw that the want of discipline amongst the troops, would produce the same effect as at Aculco, and wished not to try another action; but being out-voted, in a council of war, he was forced to submit. The bridge of Căldĕrōn, (about sixteen leagues from Guădălajāră,) was fortified, and the Mexicans awaited there the approach of the Royalist army.
Calleja, after having passed nearly six weeks in Guănăjūātŏ, began his march towards the North; and on the l6th of January, 1811, the two armies were, once more, in sight. On the 17th, a general action took place, the event of which completely justified Allende's predictions. After some partial successes, on the part of the Mexicans, who repulsed two or three attacks, in one of which the Conde de la Cadena (Calleja's second in command) was killed; the explosion of an ammunition-wagon threw the whole army into confusion; but, as they had fought better, so they lost fewer men than at Aculco. Hidalgo and Allende effected an orderly retreat, in the direction of the Provincias Internas. Răyōn returned to Guădălajāră, to carry off the military chest, which contained 300,000 dollars. This he effected, as Calleja, satisfied with his victory, did not attempt to pursue the Insurgents, or even to enter ​Guadalaxara, until four days after the battle. It is from the bridge of Căldĕrōn, where this action was fought, that he takes the title of Conde de Căldĕrōn; under which, in the year 1820, in Spain, he was surprised and made prisoner by Riego, in the midst of the army which he was destined to lead to Mexico, in order to terminate the work, which he had commenced ten years before.
The Insurgent Chiefs arrived in safety at Săltīllŏ, with about 4000 men. There it was determined that Rayon should be left in command of the troops, while Hĭdālgŏ, Ăllēndĕ, Ăldāmă, and Ăbāsŏlŏ, pushed on, with an escort, for the frontiers of the United States, where they intended to purchase arms and military stores, with a part of the treasure which they had saved. They were surprised, on the road, by the treachery of a former associate, Don Ignacio Ĕlĭzōndŏ, who, having declared, at first, for the Revolution, was anxious to make his peace with the Government, by so valuable a capture. They were made prisoners on the 21st of March, 1811, and conveyed to Chĭhūāhuă, where, such was the anxiety of the Government to draw from them some information as to the ramifications of the Insurrection, in the different provinces, that their trial was protracted until the end of July; when Hidalgo, having been previously degraded, was shot. His companions shared the same fate: they all appear to have met death with great firmness; at least, I have heard even Spaniards allow that the accounts ​published at the time, of their confessions, and alleged penitence, were fabrications.
It is not my intention to follow the history of the Revolution, after Hidalgo's death, through all the mazes of a Guerrilla war. Throughout the whole territory of Mexico, from Veracruz to the Provincias Internas of the North, Insurgent parties were organized, and the Royalist troops employed in their pursuit. But there was no concert amongst their leaders, many of whom were barbarous and illiterate men, while each considered himself as independent in his own particular district. Răyōn assumed the command of the remains of Hidalgo's forces at Saltillo, and retreated with them upon Zăcătēcăs; but his authority was acknowledged by none but his own men. The Baxio was laid under contribution by the parties of Muñiz, and the Padre Nāvărrētĕ: Sĕrrānŏ and Ŏsōrnŏ commanded in the Provinces of La Puebla, and Veracruz; and even the valley of Mexico swarmed to such a degree with partizans, that all communication between the Capital and the Interior was cut off, while sentinels were lassoed at the very gates of the town. But still the authority of the Viceroy was acknowledged in all the principal cities, and the Creoles were unable to assemble ​any force that could meet the army of Calleja in the field. Little, therefore, was done towards bringing the contest to a close, although the country was devastated, and hardly a day passed without some partial action being fought.
Răyōn seems to have been the first to perceive that nothing but a general coalition could enable his countrymen to contend with an enemy, who had the power of directing an overwhelming force upon any particular point, and thus destroying its opponents in detail. To effect this, he conceived the idea of a National Junta, to be created by some sort of popular election, and acknowledged by all the Insurgent chiefs; and he selected the town of Zitācŭarŏ, in the State of Valladolid, as the best residence for such an assembly; public opinion having pronounced itself more decidedly in favour of the Insurgents in that Province, than in any other.
With this view he occupied Zitācŭarŏ, about the end of May, (1811,) and having repulsed an attack made upon it, on the 22nd of June, by Brigadier Ĕmpărān, at the head of 2000 men, he proceeded in the execution of his favourite plan, in which he was so far successful, that, on the 10th of September 1811, a Junta, or Central Government, was installed, composed of five members, elected by as large an assembly of the most respectable farmers, and landed proprietors of the district, as could be collected for the occasion, in conjunction with the Ayuntamiento, and inhabitants of the town. ​The principles laid down by the New Junta, in its first declarations, seem to have formed the basis of those adopted by Iturbide, ten years later, in his famous plan of Iguālă: both, at least, agree in acknowledging; Ferdinand VII. as Sovereign of Mexico, provided he would quit his European dominions, and occupy the throne in person, and both profess to desire a most intimate union with Spain. But there can have been but little sincerity in this, on the part of the Junta, for Mŏrēlŏs, with whom, at that time, Rayon had held but little communication, but whose name was, soon afterwards, added to those of the other members of the Government, openly blamed his colleagues for consenting to recognize a Spanish Monarch on any terms; while Rayon only defended the measure on the score of expediency, "because the name of King still possessed such influence over the lower classes, that it was highly desirable to afford them the means of continuing in a state of insurrection, without shocking, in any way, their notions of what their duty to their Sovereign required."
The intelligence of the installation of the Junta of Zitācŭarŏ was received, with great enthusiasm, by the Creoles throughout New Spain; but the flattering hopes which this event excited, were, unfortunately, never realized. There was not, ​indeed, any want of good intentions, on the part of the Junta; but the supremacy of its members was not, at first, generally acknowledged; and when, by the accession of Morelos, they acquired additional influence, the destruction of their residence by Căllējă, and the preparations for the Congress of Chilpănzīngŏ, in which the Junta, itself, was, finally, merged, prevented any decisive measures from being taken. It left, however, some lasting memorials of its existence. I know few papers drawn up with greater moderation, or better calculated to produce a good, practical effect, than the Manifesto, with the proposals for Peace, or War, which was transmitted, in the name of the Junta, to the Viceroy, in the month of March, 1812.
After an eloquent picture of the state, to which fifteen months of civil war had reduced the country, and an appeal to the Viceroy, respecting the manner in which the miseries inseparable from any state of warfare, had been augmented by the wanton sacrifice of the prisoners. Dr. Cos (by whom this manifesto was drawn up) proceeds to point out to Venegas his critical position; the little dependence which he could place upon the Creole troops, who, sooner or later, must make common cause with their countrymen; the rapid progress of the Revolution, and the total inefficacy of all the measures of severity, by which he had endeavoured to check it. He then assumes, as undeniable principles, the ​natural equality of America and Spain; the right of America to assemble her Cortes, as the Spaniards had done theirs; and the nullity of the claims of any body of men in the Peninsula, to exercise the supreme authority in Mexico, during the captivity of the Sovereign: and finally, he proposes, on the part of the Junta, that, "if the Europeans will consent to give up the offices which they hold, and to allow a General Congress to be assembled, their persons and properties shall be religiously respected; their salaries paid; and the same privileges granted to them, as to the native Mexicans; who, on their side, will acknowledge Ferdinand as their Sovereign; assist the Peninsula with their treasures; and regard all Spaniards as their fellow-subjects, and citizens of the same great empire."
Such was the plan of Peace. The plan of War was confined, principally, to an endeavour to obtain some abatement of severity in the treatment of prisoners, so as to avoid unnecessary effusion of blood; and to establish the severest penalties for all such, on either side, as should sack or burn villages, where no resistance was made; or authorize indiscriminate massacres, on entering the smaller towns.
The introduction of the name of religion, in a quarrel where religion was in no way concerned, is, likewise, reprobated in very strong terms; but, in the whole course of the manifesto, there is not one offensive or insulting expression; an instance of ​moderation which is the more remarkable, as, at that time, the cause of the Revolution appeared to be every where triumphant.
These proposals Venegas ordered to be burnt by the public executioner, in the Plaza Mayor of Mexico! He could not, however, prevent them from producing a great effect upon the public mind, enforced, as they were, by the example and success of Morelos, whose career it will now be my duty to trace, as furnishing one of the most interesting episodes in the Mexican Revolution.
We left Morelos, in October, 1810, setting out from Valladolid, with a commission from Hidalgo to act as Captain-general of the provinces on the South-Western coast, without any other retinue than a few servants, from his own curacy, armed with six muskets, and some old lances. The first addition which he received to this force, on arriving on the coast, was a numerous band of slaves from Pĕtătlāñ, and other towns, eager to purchase their liberty on the field of battle: arms were, however, so scarce, that twenty muskets, which were discovered in Pĕtătlāñ, were considered as a most invaluable acquisition. The brothers, Don José, and Don Antonio, Gălĕānă, who had already declared for the cause of Independence, joined him, soon afterwards, with their adherents, (November, 1810,) and increased his numbers to about a thousand men. With this force Morelos advanced upon Acapulco. He was met by the Commandant ​of the district, Don Francisco Paris, at the head of a numerous and well-appointed body of troops. Notwithstanding his superiority, Morelos, aware of the necessity of commencing his operations by a coup-d'éclat, determined to attack the camp of the Royalists by night. The attempt was crowned with complete success. On the 25th of January, 1811, the enemy was surprised, and thrown into such confusion at the first onset, that they thought of nothing but a rapid flight. Eight hundred muskets, five pieces of artillery, a quantity of ammunition, and a considerable sum of money, fell into the hands of Mŏrēlŏs, who thus saw all his wants supplied at once. Seven hundred prisoners were taken at the same time, all of whom were treated with the greatest humanity. This successful enterprize was, as Mŏrēlŏs himself frequently said, the corner-stone of all his later triumphs. The rapidity of his progress, from this moment, was astonishing; and the skill with which he baffled the efforts of the divisions successively detached against him by Venegas, under the Brigadiers Llānŏ and Fūēntĕs, rendered him, in a very short time, the terror of the Spaniards, and the admiration of his own countrymen. His celebrity brought men of talent, from every quarter, to his standard. Those in whom he placed most confidence were, Don Ermenegildo Gălĕānă, the Cura Mătămōrŏs, (whom he appointed his first lieutenant,) and the Brāvŏs, whose whole family joined him, soon after the defeat ​of Paris. The father, Don Lĕŏnārdŏ, and one of his brothers, perished in the course of the Revolution; but Don Nicolas Brāvŏ (the son) survived it, and has been placed, by the unanimous voice of his countrymen, with Vĭctōriă, at the head of the present government.
The whole of the year 1811 was occupied by a series of petty engagements, (the details of which can only be interesting to Mexicans,) and by the strenuous efforts of Morelos to introduce something like discipline amongst the Blacks, who had enlisted in considerable numbers in his army. Their ferocity was of use in the field of battle, but it was only by frequent examples that it could be prevented from showing itself on other occasions; and it required all the firmness of Morelos to keep it within any bounds.
In the mean time, the scene of action had been, gradually, brought nearer to the Capital; and, in January 1812, the Insurgents advanced so far, that Tasco, a town famous for its mines, and only twenty-five leagues from Mexico, was taken by Gălĕānă and Brāvŏ, after an obstinate resistance.
Various actions took place in January, and the beginning of February, 1812, in all of which Mŏrēlŏs was victorious; so that, at last, his advanced guard, under Bravo, pushed on to Chalco, with outposts at Săn Aŭgŭstīn de las Cūēvăs, within three leagues of the gates of Mexico. But the alarm which this movement excited drew upon Morelos a ​more formidable opponent. Calleja was summoned to defend the Capital, with the army which had triumphed over the first Insurgents at Ăcūlcŏ, and the bridge of Căldĕrōn; but, though flushed with new successes, Morelos determined to wait its approach. Cūāūtlă Āmīlpăs, (about twenty-two leagues from Mexico,) was the place which he selected to make his stand. It was an entirely open town, nor did he attempt to supply the want of exterior fortifications, though he was indefatigable in his endeavours to render the interior as strong as possible, by cutting trenches in the streets, walling up the doors, and lower windows of the houses, and breaking a communication within, so as to give his men every possible advantage. In this he was seconded by the activity of his Lieutenants, Brāvŏ, Gălĕānă, and the Cura Mătămōrŏs; and such was the confidence with which they inspired their troops, that the approach of the Royal army was impatiently expected.
As Calleja, whom we left in the North of the country, did not march from thence to Cūāūtlă, without adding to the number of his successes over the Insurgents, it will be necessary, in order to avoid confusion, to trace his progress, before I give any account of the siege.
From the moment of its establishment, the Junta of Zitācŭarŏ was considered by the Spaniards as their most formidable enemy; and Venegas, in December 1811, sent positive orders to Calleja, then at ​Ăcāmbarŏ, in the province of Mīchŏăcān, to march, with all his forces, against the town. Calleja obeyed; and his army sustained such hardships, and overcame such difficulties on the way, in crossing a country where roads were unknown, and where, at times, they were forced to cut their way through forests so thick, that it required the labour of twenty-four hours to enable them to advance a single league, that even their enemies speak of the undertaking with admiration.
On the 1st of January, 1812, Căllējă arrived before Zitācŭarŏ; and on the 2nd, he attacked, and carried the town by assault, which must have been badly defended, as, from the strength of its situation, it was capable of making considerable resistance. The Junta escaped to Sūltĕpec, where it established a new seat of Government; but the honour of having been selected for its first residence proved fatal to Zitācŭarŏ. Calleja, after having passed a fortnight there, which he employed principally in examining Rayon's papers, decimated the inhabitants, ordered the walls to be rased, and burnt the town on his departure, sparing only the churches and convents.
From Zitācŭarŏ, he proceeded, by forced marches, to Mexico, where Venegas most anxiously expected him, in order to check the progress of Morelos. The army made a triumphal entry into the Capital, on ​the 6th of February, 1812; they were received with salutes, and a grand Te Deum in the cathedral, and a general promotion took place. But this important point was no sooner arranged, than Venegas became as impatient for the departure of his guests, as he had been for their arrival. He had always been jealous of Calleja; but now, when brought into contact, the misunderstanding rose to such a height, that they would have kept no terms, had the stay of the army been prolonged. Fortunately, the vicinity of Morelos afforded a pretext for a speedy separation; and on the 14th of February, 1812, Calleja began his march towards Cūāūtlă Amilpas, which he threatened with the fate of Zitacuaro.
Morelos, on the approach of the Royalists, (February 18th,) went out, with a small escort, to reconnoitre them, and had the imprudence to advance so far, that he was charged by a party of cavalry, lost several of his men, and would, probably, have been made prisoner himself, had not Gălĕānă, who was afraid of his exposing himself too much, kept a party in readiness, with which he sallied out in person to his rescue. It was upon this occasion that Don José Maria Fĕrnāndĕz, now General Victoria, first distinguished himself: his father was a considerable landholder in the Provincias Internas, and Victoria, at the age of twenty-two, had just completed his studies for the bar, in the Capital, when the Revolution broke out. From the first, his ​resolution to espouse the cause of his country was taken, but it was not until he saw a man of acknowledged merit at the head of the Insurgents, that he determined to place himself under his orders. The instant Morelos's character was known, he left the Capital, and joined him as a volunteer.
In the present skirmish, which was a very sharp one, he received a severe wound, by which, however, he was the means of saving Galeana's life. Morelos was brought off with difficulty; but he had the pleasure of seeing that his men, far from being intimidated by the idea of having to contend with troops, who advanced with the character of invincible, had never behaved better than in this affair.
Early in the morning of the 19th, Calleja made a general attack upon the town. His army advanced in four columns, with the artillery in the centre, and, animated by the recollection of the late success at Zitācŭarŏ, which was infinitely superior to Cūāūtlă in point of strength, the troops came on like men resolved to carry every thing before them. The Mexicans allowed them to approach within one hundred yards of their entrenchments, in the Plaza of San Diego; but there they opened so tremendous a fire, that the column was forced to retreat precipitately. Galeana, who commanded in the Plaza, seeing a Spanish colonel at some distance from his troops, and endeavouring to bring them up to the charge again, sallied out upon him alone, engaged him hand to hand, and killed him on the ​spot; an action, which contributed, not a little, to raise the spirits of his own men. Indeed, nothing could exceed the enthusiasm with which Morelos had inspired both his troops, and the inhabitants of the town. The Indians, who were stationed upon the flat roofs of the houses, did great execution with their slings, and assisted in preventing the enemy, when once thrown into disorder, from forming again. Morelos himself was equally successful with Galeana in repulsing the column which attacked the Plaza de St$^o$. Domingo, where he commanded in person. The action lasted from seven in the morning till three in the afternoon; when Calleja, after a fruitless attempt to decoy the Mexicans from their entrenchments, by pretending to abandon his artillery, drew off his men, (leaving five hundred dead upon the spot,) and retired, in good order, to a little village, about a league from the town, where he established his head-quarters.
The event of the day had so completely discouraged him, that he did not think of risking another assault, but determined to lay siege to Cūāūtlă in form, and wrote to Venegas for supplies of artillery, ammunition, and men. Venegas immediately sent him all that the magazines of the Capital contained; and ordered Brigadier Llano, who had before been opposed to Morelos, to join the army of the Centre with his whole division. The courier charged with the Viceroy's dispatches having fallen into the hands of an Insurgent party, Morelos was perfectly aware ​of the increase of force, which Calleja was about to receive; but he felt, likewise, that the eyes of all Mexico were turned upon the contest at Cūāūtlă, and that a retreat would defeat the hopes, which the repulse of the Royalists, in their first attack, had excited. He determined, therefore, to defend himself to the last, in a place where, according to the rules of war, defence was impossible; and this resolution was most gallantly carried into effect.
Llano was, at this time, engaged in an attack upon Īzūcăr, which was successfully defended by Don Vicente Gŭerrērŏ, who had, at that time, begun his long and perilous career. In the course of the Revolution, this general had received upwards of fifty wounds, and has had almost as many miraculous escapes: one of the most extraordinary, perhaps, was at Īzūcăr, where, while he was asleep, exhausted with fatigue, a small shell came through the roof, and rolled under his bed, where it exploded, and killed, or wounded, every person in the room, but himself.
On the receipt of the Viceroy's orders, Llano quitted Īzūcăr, and joined Căllējă on the 1st of March. On the 4th, Calleja on one side, and Llano on the other, began to cannonade, and bombard the town, after having erected batteries and breastworks in the course of a single night.
The first shells alarmed the inhabitants excessively; but, within twenty-four hours, they grew so accustomed to them, that the very children were ​employed in collecting them, as well as the cannon, and musket-balls which were strewed about the streets; for which Morelos, whose stock of ammunition was not very copious, paid them so much a dozen.
Hostilities were not, however, confined to this distant warfare: during the month of March, an attempt was made to surprise Calleja, by an insurgent division not in Cuautla, under the orders of one of the Bravos, and Larios, which failed completely. The want of water, too, constantly brought the troops, on both sides, to close quarters. Cuautla was supplied by a stream, which, at a point not very far from the town, there was a possibility of turning into another channel. This Calleja effected; and, though his works were destroyed by a sally from the town, he had made some progress in reestablishing them, when Galeana, aware of the necessity of securing this important spot, undertook, on the night of the 25th of March, to dislodge the enemy, and to raise a fort close to the spring. This enterprise was conducted with such activity and judgment, that it was crowned with complete success. In the course of twenty-four hours, a fort, with three pieces of artillery, was completed, with a covered way, which extended to the town. Galeana himself took charge of the new fortification, and defended it against a desperate attack, which the Royalists made upon it the following night, and in which their loss was considerable, as ​Galeana would not allow his men to fire, until the enemy was within pistol-shot of the entrenchments.
An attempt to enter Cuautla, by establishing a correspondence with some of the inhabitants, likewise failed. Calleja had managed to induce a Captain Manso, to promise to deliver up a battery entrusted to his charge, but his treachery was discovered by Galeana, and turned against the Royalists, who, on seeing the signals agreed upon, advanced, by night, and were introduced by Galeana himself into the trenches, where they were received with so general, and so well-directed a discharge, that they left one hundred men dead upon the spot.
Calleja's own reports do ample justice to the gallantry of the defence made by the Insurgents. He acknowledges, (March 25th) in his correspondence with the Viceroy, that, so far from having shown any symptoms of discouragement, they had supported both the firing and the bombardment, "with a firmness worthy of a better cause;" and that they continued to harass his troops by frequent sallies, which kept them constantly upon the alert. He calls Morelos, "a second Mahomet;" and though he terms fanaticism the enthusiasm with which he had inspired his followers, he confesses that it had produced the most extraordinary effects. At a much earlier period, he had applied for a train of heavy artillery from Pĕrōtĕ; but though Venegas instantly despatched the necessary ​orders, the troops appointed to convoy it to Mexico were so often attacked upon the road by the La Puebla, and Vera Cruz Insurgents, that their progress was extremely slow. In these Provinces the Spaniards possessed little more than the great towns; all the open country was in the hands of the Insurgents; and they mustered in such formidable numbers about Nŏpălūcă, that Ŏlăzabăl, who commanded the convoy of the artillery, was detained there, in a state of siege by Ŏsŏrnŏ, on the 23d of March, and was only released by the arrival of a strong detachment sent from La Pūēblă to his assistance.
The great object of Mŏrēlŏs was to prolong the siege until the commencement of the rainy season, when he knew that the Royalists would be forced to raise it, as Cuautla is situated in Tierra Caliente, and is a most unhealthy spot. Calleja was aware of this, and felt the ignominy with which a retreat would be attended; yet not even this could induce him to risk another general attack. All his efforts had been hitherto unavailing; and, at the end of April, he could not boast of having gained one single advantage. Unfortunately for the Mexicans, he had but too powerful an ally within the walls of the town. Cuautla had never been properly supplied with provisions, as Morelos had not expected to be besieged there in form, and famine now prevailed to a horrible extent; maize was almost the only sustenance of the troops; a cat sold for six dollars; a lizard for two; and rats or other vermin for one. ​An ox, which was seen, one day, feeding between the Spanish camp and the town, nearly brought on a general action; for the troops, unable to resist the temptation, rushed out in crowds to seize the prey, and were attacked, while bringing it off, by so strong a party of the enemy, that Morelos was forced to draw out nearly his whole remaining force, in order to save them from destruction. Disease, too, began to show itself in its most frightful shape, and nearly 300 sick were lodged in the hospital of San Diego alone. Such, however, was the influence of Morelos over his men, that they endured all their sufferings with undaunted resolution, as long as there was a hope of supplies being received from without; but Mătămōrŏs having been defeated in an attempt to introduce provisions, Mŏrēlŏs was forced to decide between making: a general attack upon the camp of Calleja, and evacuating the town without delay. Had his men been in full health and vigour, it is probable that he would have attempted the first; but considering the wretched state to which they were reduced, he thought he should not be justified in risking the fate of the nation upon the issue of so hazardous an enterprize. An attack made upon Llano's great battery a short time before, convinced him of the impossibility of preserving order amongst his men, in case of a first success, and of the fatal consequences with which their confusion might be attended. The Insurgents had advanced with such ​intrepidity, that they carried the whole battery at the first assault; but finding there a considerable stock of salt meat and segars, (luxuries of which they had long been deprived,) they seized upon them with such avidity, that not all the exertions of their chiefs could induce them to turn the advantage which they had gained to account; the guns were neither carried off, nor even spiked; and so much precious time was wasted, that a large reinforcement arrived from Calleja's camp, and drove them out of the battery again with considerable loss.
With such reasons for avoiding an action, one cannot but approve of the resolution taken by Morelos to evacuate Cuautla; which was executed with equal talent, and success. On the night of the 2d of May, between eleven and twelve o'clock, the troops were formed in the Plaza of San Diego; Galeana took the command of the advanced guard, Morelos of the centre, and the Bravos of the rear. Such was the silence observed by the whole column, that they passed between the enemy's batteries without being perceived; nor was it until they reached a deep barranca, (or ravine,) over which they were obliged to construct a bridge, with hurdles carried by the Indians for that purpose, that the alarm was given by a sentry, who fired his musket before Galeana had time to cut him down. The barranca was hardly crossed, when the column was attacked, on opposite sides, by the troops of Llano and ​Callejas. Morelos instantly gave the word for a general dispersion, as had been agreed upon, with orders to rendezvous at Izucar; and such was the promptitude with which this was effected, that the Spanish troops, finding no enemy between them as they advanced, began firing upon each other, and lost a number of men before the mistake was discovered.
Morelos reached Īzūcăr, which was in possession of Don Miguel Bravo, in two days, and had the pleasure to find, when his different divisions arrived, that of the soldiers of Cuautla only seventeen were missing. Amongst these, unfortunately, was Don Leonardo Bravo, who had fallen into the hands of the enemy, and whose loss was universally regretted.
Calleja did not enter Cuautla until some hours after Morelos had quitted it, and even then, his troops advanced with the greatest precaution; so apprehensive were they of some new stratagem. The cruelties which he exercised upon the unfortunate inhabitants of the town, will leave, for ever, a stain upon his reputation. I have heard officers, who were present at the siege, speak of them, after a lapse of ten years, with horror. On the l6th of May, the army returned to the Capital; where its reception was very different from that which it had experienced three months before. In spite of the pompous account of its success, published in the Gazette, and the number of deaths with which ​Calleja had swelled his reports, every body knew that he had been repulsed, and outwitted at last, by Morelos; and, as for the army, its appearance spoke for itself. A comedy was acted a few nights afterwards, in which a soldier was introduced, who, on his return from battle, presents his general with a turban, and tells him in a very pompous manner, "Here is the turban of the Moor, whom I took prisoner!" "And the Moor himself?" "O! he unfortunately escaped!" The passage was received with bursts of laughter, and the application instantly made by all the spectators.
Such was the event of the siege of Cūāūtlă Āmīlpăs, which I have given in some detail, because it may fairly be considered as the most important military occurrence in the whole Revolution. The resources displayed by Morelos, in the course of it, gave him a degree of celebrity, and influence, which none of the Insurgent chiefs attained after him. His authority was recognised every where; and continued to be respected until his death, in spite of the singular change of fortune, which marked the latter part of his career.
Mŏrēlŏs was detained some time at Īzūcăr, by an injury which he received, by a fall from his horse, on the retreat from Cuautla. On his recovery, he put himself again at the head of his troops, whom Matamoros had brought into admirable order, and soon convinced Vĕnēgăs, that "the monster of the South," as he was termed in the Gazette of Mexico, ​far from "seeking a hiding-place in caves and forests," was about to carry on the contest with all his usual activity. After defeating three Spanish divisions, Morelos made a triumphal entry into Tĕhŭacān, (in La Puebla,) on the l6th of September, 1812. From thence he undertook a successful expedition against the town of Ŏrĭzāvă, where he found nine pieces of artillery, and an immense booty in money and tobacco. Obliged to evacuate the place, by the approach of a superior force, he returned to Tĕhŭacān, and, after refreshing his troops there, commenced, in the beginning of November, his famous expedition against Ŏăxācă. After sustaining incredible hardships upon the march, the army at last arrived before the town, situated in the finest part of one of the most lovely provinces of Mexico. It was garrisoned by the Royalists, under Brigadier Regules, who attempted to defend the town; but nothing could withstand the impetuosity of the Insurgent troops. Their artillery, under the command of Don Manuel Mier y Tĕrān, having silenced that of their opponents, Regules made a last stand on the edge of a deep moat, which surrounds Oaxaca, and over which there was no passage but by a single drawbridge, which was drawn up, and the approach to it defended by the Royalist infantry. The Insurgents paused on perceiving this new obstacle; but their deliberation lasted but an instant; Guadelupe Victoria, who was in the front rank, threw himself into the moat, sword in hand, and ​swam across; the enemies were so surprised at his temerity, that they allowed him to land, and even to cut the ropes, by which the drawbridge was suspended, without receiving a single wound: the troops of Morelos rushed across it, and soon made themselves masters of the town.
After releasing all those who were in confinement for political opinions, and replacing the Spanish authorities by Mexicans, Morelos proceeded to execute his darling scheme of forming a National Congress. In order to give to this idea all the extension which he wished, the conquest of the rest of the province was indispensable. A very short time enabled him to effect this, with the exception of Acapulco, to which he laid siege on the 15th of February, 1813. This enterprise, the most important, as well as the most hazardous, that had ever been undertaken by the Insurgent armies, detained him several months: in the course of it, Morelos, whose great fault as a general was being too fond of exposing his person, had several very narrow escapes; nor was it until the 20th of August, 1813, that his object was attained.
As soon as the Mexican flag had taken the place of the Spanish colours on the fortress of San Diego, Morelos returned to Ŏăxācă, where he found every thing prepared, by Matamoros, for the meeting of the Congress, which was composed of the original members of the Junta of Zitācŭarŏ, the deputies elected by the Province of Oaxaca, and others, again, ​selected by them as representatives for the Provinces in the possession of the Royal troops. Such was the Assembly, which opened its sessions on the 13th of September, 1813, in the town of Chilpănzīngŏ. Its most remarkable act was the declaration of the absolute Independence of Mexico, which it published upon the 13th of November, 1813. It is difficult to say what impression this declaration might have produced upon the country, had Morelos continued his career of success; but his fortune was upon the wane, before it became at all generally known, and the influence of the Congress diminished, of course, in proportion to the decline in the reputation of its protector. The period of its installation was, undoubtedly, the most brilliant moment of Morelos's political existence. Up to that time, he had not only been successful wherever he commanded in person, but seemed to communicate a portion of his good fortune to all who served under his orders. The years 1812, and 1813, were distinguished by the victories gained by Don Nicolas Bravo, and Matamoros, at the Pălmār, and by the defence of the mountain of Cŏscŏmātĕpĕc. In the first of these actions. Bravo defeated Don Juan Lăbăquī, the Commandant of the regiment of the Patriots of Veracruz, at the head of a strong detachment. The engagement lasted three days, when the village, in which the Spaniards had taken refuge, was carried by storm, (20th August, 1812.) Three hundred prisoners, taken, upon this ​occasion, were placed by Morelos, at the disposal of Bravo, who offered them to the Viceroy Venegas, in exchange for his father, Don Leonardo Bravo, who was then under sentence of death in the prisons of the Capital. The offer was rejected, and the sentence against Don Leonardo ordered to be carried into immediate execution. His son, in lieu of making reprisals by the massacre of his prisoners, instantly set them all at liberty, "wishing," (as he said,)" to put it out of his own power to avenge on them the death of his parent, lest, in the first moment of grief, the temptation should prove irresistible!" So noble a trait requires no comment!
From this time. Bravo had the command of a separate division, with which he carried on hostilities in the province of Veracruz, where he fortified the Cerro of Cŏscŏmātĕpĕc, and defended it for two months, (September and October, 1813,) against a force of three thousand men, under the orders of Colonel Aguila. Forced at last, by want of provisions, to evacuate the place, he retired in the night without the loss of a single man, and rejoined Morelos in Oaxaca, with his whole division. But the most serious check received by the Spaniards, during the whole war, was that sustained by them in the second Battle of the Pălmār, on the 18th of October, 1813, where the regiment of Asturias, composed entirely of European troops, was cut off by Matamoros, after a severe action, which lasted eight hours. This regiment (which had been at the ​battle of Baylen,) came out from Spain with the proud title of "the invincible victors of the victors of Austerlitz;" and its loss was regarded by all the Spaniards as fatal to the prestige which had before attached to the European troops. The Insurgents, however, derived but little advantage from this victory. The time was come, at which it seemed decreed that their affairs should take an unfavourable turn, nor did fortune once smile upon them afterwards. The division of Mătămōrŏs shortly rejoined Morelos in Oaxaca, who was then concentrating his whole force at Chilpănzīngŏ, in order to prepare for an expedition against the province of Valladolid, the possession of which would have brought him into more immediate contact with the Insurgents of the Interior, and enabled him, with their co-operation, to strike a decisive blow against the Capital itself.
With these hopes Morelos collected seven thousand men, and a large train of artillery, with which force he left Chilpănzīngŏ, on the 8th of November, 1813. After sustaining incredible fatigues and privations, in marching across one hundred leagues of country, which no one had ever traversed before, he arrived before Valladolid on the 23d of December, where he found a formidable force under Brigadier Llano, and Iturbide, (who had then attained the rank of Colonel,) prepared to receive him. Rendered too confident by the success which had constantly attended his arms, without allowing his troops time ​to repose, he advanced immediately against the town, and was repulsed by the Royalists with loss. On the following morning, Matamoros, (ignorant, probably, of the real strength of the garrison,) had the imprudence to order a general review of the army, within half a mile of the walls. In the midst of it, Iturbide, by a sudden sally, threw the Mexicans into confusion. They rallied, however, by degrees, and had succeeded in repulsing the Spaniards, when an Insurgent party under Nāvărrētĕ and el Păchōn, (two partizans of the Independent cause in the Băxīŏ,) arrived on the field of battle in order to assist Morelos, with a large body of cavalry. Not having agreed upon any general signals, they were not recognized as friends, and were fired upon by the Mexicans on their approach. They immediately made a furious charge upon the flank, and Iturbide taking advantage of an error so fortunate for him, succeeded in putting the whole army to the rout, with the loss of its best regiments, and all the artillery.
Morelos retreated to Pŭrŭărān, where Ĭtŭrbīdĕ attacked him again, on the 6th of January, 1814, and again obtained a complete victory. Mătămōrŏs was taken prisoner in the general dispersion. Morelos endeavoured to save his life by offering, in exchange for him, a number of Spanish prisoners, (principally of the regiment of Asturias,) taken at the Palmar, and confined at Acapulco; but Căllējă, who had, at that time, replaced Vĕnēgăs as Viceroy, ​refused to listen to any proposal of the kind. Matamoros was shot, and the Insurgents, by way of reprisals, immediately ordered all their prisoners to be put to death.
This was the beginning of a series of reverses, which only terminated with the life of Morelos. While he himself endeavoured to recruit his forces on his old scene of action, the Southern coast, he despatched Don Manuel Mier y Tĕrān to take the command of the district of Tĕhŭacān, (in La Puebla,) and Victoria, who had distinguished himself greatly in the unfortunate affair before Valladolid, to act as Captain-general in the Province of Veracruz. But although Morelos displayed as much resolution and activity as ever, in struggling against the tide of adversity, all his efforts to retrieve his sinking fortune were ineffectual. He lost action after action; Oaxaca was retaken by a Royalist division under Brigadier Ălvărēz, (28th March, 1814,) Don Miguel Bravo was made prisoner, and died upon the scaffold, at La Puebla; Gălĕānă perished on the field of battle, (27th June, 1814,) the Congress of Chilpănzīngŏ was driven from that town, and forced to take refuge in the woods of Apătzīngăn, where, however, it continued its labours, and sanctioned, on the 22nd of October, 1814, the Constitution known by that name. Here it was very nearly surprised by Iturbide, (in 1815,) who, by a rapid and masterly march across the mountains of Mīchŏăcān, came upon the Deputies almost before ​they were apprized of his approach. It was in consequence of this attempt, and with a view of placing the Congress in safety, that Morelos determined to undertake his expedition to Tĕhŭacān, in the Province of La Puebla, where Tĕrān had already assembled a considerable force. With only five hundred men he attempted a march of sixty leagues, across a part of the country occupied by several divisions of Royalists. He hoped, indeed, to be joined by Tĕrān and Gŭerrērŏ, but his couriers were intercepted, and neither of these generals was aware of his situation.
The Spaniards conceiving the forces of Morelos to be much more considerable than they really were, did not venture to attack him until he had penetrated as far as Tĕsmălācă, where the Indians, though they received him with great apparent hospitality, conveyed intelligence, both of the real number of his followers, and of their wretched state, to Don Manuel Cōnchă, the nearest Spanish Commandant, who determined to attack the convoy the next day. Morelos, who fancied himself in security, as he was now beyond the enemy's line, was surprised on the following morning, (5th of November, 1815,) by two parties of Royalists, who came upon him unperceived, in a mountainous part of the road. He immediately ordered Don Nicolas Bravo to continue his march with the main body, as an escort to the Congress, while he himself with a few men endeavoured to check the advance of the Spaniards. ​"My life," he said, "is of little consequence, provided the Congress be saved. My race was run from the moment that I saw an Independent Government established."
His orders were obeyed, and Morelos remained with about fifty men, most of whom abandoned him when the firing became hot. He succeeded, however, in gaining time, which was his great object, nor did the Royalists venture to advance upon him, until only one man was left by his side. He was then taken prisoner, for he had sought death in vain during the action. There can be little doubt that his late reverses had inspired him with a disgust for life, and that he wished to end his days by a proof of devotion to his country worthy of the most brilliant part of his former career.
Morelos was treated with the greatest brutality by the Spanish soldiers into whose hands he first fell. They stripped him, and conducted him, loaded with chains, to Tĕsmălācă. But Concha, (to his honour be it said,) on his prisoner being presented to him, received him with all the marks of respect due to a fallen enemy, and treated him with unwonted humanity and attention. He was transferred, with as little delay as possible, to the capital, and the whole population of Mexico flocked out to San Agustin de las Cuevas, to see, (and some to insult) the man, whose name had so long been their terror. But Morelos, both on his way to prison, and while in confinement, is said to have shown ​a coolness which he preserved to the last. Indeed, the only thing that seemed to affect him at all was his degradation; a ceremony humiliating in itself, but rendered doubly so, in his case, by the publicity which was given to it. His examination, which was conducted by the Oidor Bătăllēr, (whose insolent assertion of the natural superiority of the Spaniards to the Creoles, is said first to have roused Morelos into action,) was not of long duration. On the 22d of December, 1815, Concha was charged to remove him from the prisons of the Inquisition, to the hospital of San Christoval, behind which the sentence pronounced against him was to be carried into execution. On arriving there, he dined in company with Concha, whom he afterwards embraced, and thanked for all his kindness. He then confessed himself, and afterwards walked, with the most perfect serenity, to the place of execution. The short prayer which he pronounced there, deserves to be recorded for its affecting simplicity. "Lord, if I have done well, thou knowest it; if ill, to thy infinite mercy I commend my soul!"
After this appeal to the Supreme Judge, he fastened with his own hands a handkerchief about his eyes, gave the signal to the soldiers to fire, and met death with as much composure as he had ever shown when facing it on the field of battle.
* ↑ Seg. 36. titº. 15. lib. 2. which says, "Que excediendo los Vireyes de las facultades que tienen, las Audiencias les hagan los requerimientos que conforme al negocio pareciere, sin publicidad; y si no bastase, y no se causase inquietud en la tierra, se cumpla lo proveído por los Vireyes, ó Presidentes y avisen al Rey."
* ↑ Vide Appendix, 37th paragraph of the Representation of the Audiencia to the Cortes, in which Hidalgo, although designated as a "man without honour, or religious principle," is admitted to have possessed sufficient acuteness, and knowledge of mankind, to calculate, not only upon the assistance of the troops, whom he had seduced, but upon the powerful aid of the ambition, the vices, and the ignorance of his countrymen.
* ↑ "The flame which Hildago lighted at the little town of Dolores, spread through the country with the rapidity of atmospheric plague."—Vide Appendix, 42nd paragraph of Representation.
* ↑ The Ălhōndĭgă is the large square building which rises above the rest in the annexed Plate of the Cañada de Marfil, or Ravine which forms the entrance to Guănăjūātŏ.
* ↑ It must not be forgotten that the Mexicans considered the cause of Iturrigaray as identified with their own. That the Audiencia thought so likewise, may be seen by the "Representation," paragraphs 20 to 34.—Vide Appendix.
* ↑ Michoacan is the Indian name for the Province (now State) of Valladolid.
* ↑ Vide Representation of Audiencia, paragraph 38, in which Căllējă is termed "a General, whose consummate skill converted into invincible soldiers, men who, under any other direction, would have turned against their General, and their Country;" that is, (in dispassionate language,) men, who, if left to themselves, would have joined Hidalgo instead of Calleja, and fought for the Independence of Mexico, instead of against it.
* ↑ The lasso, respecting which the works of Captain Hall, and Captain Head, contain so many amusing particulars, is as generally used in Mexico, as in Chile, or the Pampas, and that, not merely in catching horses, or cattle, but as an offensive weapon.
* ↑ Vide Original Letters, since published by Bustamante, in his Cuadro, and Representation of Audiencia, Appendix.
* ↑ I saw this unfortunate town in 1826. The situation is lovely, but the place is still in ruins.