# Investigation into the Reedley Biolab/Chapter 1

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​I. Apparent Pathogens and Other Dangerous Substances Discovered at the Reedley Biolab
A. Local Officials Discover the Reedley Biolab
The Reedley Biolab was discovered in a warehouse located at 850 I Street in Reedley, California. It was across the street from a residential neighborhood, next to a railway line, and a short walk from the town’s high school, city hall, and water supply. Officials ultimately learned that Jiabei “Jesse” Zhu, under the false identity of David He, had set up a facility engaged in fraudulent sales of medical device kits and, other biological laboratory activity—the “Reedley Biolab.” Zhu did so after he and his associates had to hastily move from their previous location in Fresno, “an illegal laboratory similar to the Reedley site” due to a fire and threat of eviction. Zhu operated the Biolab through the corporation Universal Meditech Incorporated (UMI) and, later, Prestige Biotech Incorporated (Prestige Biotech).
Figure 1 - Aerial view of Reedley, with Reedley Biolab in blue, major landmarks in red, and residential areas in yellow. Source: Google Earth.
Officials first learned about the Reedley Biolab thanks to the work of Code Enforcement Officer Jesalyn Harper, who identified the aberrant garden hose building code violation outside the warehouse in December 2022. Upon being let ​inside, Officer Harper observed three women who identified themselves as PRC nationals, wearing white lab coats, glasses, masks, and latex gloves. The women appeared to be packaging items for shipment. Officer Harper identified numerous building code violations, including unlawful electrical rewiring. She also observed samples of potentially dangerous pathogens and biohazard signs. Further inside, she discovered what appeared to be approximately 1,000 white laboratory mice, which, according to the employees on site, “were being tested.”
Officer Harper referred the matter to Fresno County and to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Approximately two months later and according to local officials, the FBI informed her that it had closed its investigation because the Bureau believed that there were no weapons of mass destruction on the property. The FBI continued to engage with local officials. As detailed later in this report, Zhu was subsequently charged with federal offenses relating to fraud and false statements in an FDA-led investigation.
After consultation with California state and Fresno County officials, Officer Harper led a small group to the Reedley Biolab and again requested entry. Two individuals, one of whom refused to identify himself, were present but quickly left after authorities arrived. Upon entering, Officer Harper noticed that there were now padlocks barring entry to most of the facility.
​B. March 16, 2023 Inspection by Local Officials of the Reedley Biolab
Local officials then obtained an inspection warrant, which they executed on March 16, 2023. Inside the Reedley Biolab, officials “observed blood, tissue and other bodily fluid samples and serums; and thousands of vials of unlabeled fluids and suspected biological material,” raising the concern that they contained pathogens. Some of these vials were labeled with the names of pathogens in English or Mandarin. Many were unlabeled. Others were labeled in code. Officials never found the full key that would translate this code, meaning that the nature of these vials’ contents is unknown to this day.
Figure 2 - Contents of a fridge found in the Reedley Biolab, including sera and chemicals. Source: City of Reedley.
Officials also found laboratory equipment, including “a biological safety cabinet and centrifuge[,]” as well as “cold temperature storage units, which included 2 ultralow temperature freezer units (-80- and -60-degree C) and 29 refrigerators/freezers (-20 degrees C). The Reedley Biolab operators had locked the -80 C ultralow freezer. These ultralow temperature freezers increased local officials’ concerns that UMI was storing infectious agents on site.”
​The facility contained other storage containers labeled with biohazard signs and medical cabinets filled with what authorities later identified as highly flammable, explosive, and corrosive chemicals. They also found trace narcotics, laboratory equipment, and hundreds of boxes containing faulty medical devices subject to an FDA health embargo. The warehouse’s electrical system was jury-rigged to power over 30 of these freezers.
Figure 3 and 4 - Blood and fluids found in two of the thirty refrigerators and deep freezers of the Reedley Biolab. Source: City of Reedley.
Figures 5, 6, and 7 - Bags labelled "MDMA," “Coca,” and “Met” found in freezers in the Reedley Biolab. “Coca” and “Met” presumably mean “cocaine” and “methamphetamine,” respectively. Other bags found were labelled “THC” and “Amp” (likely meaning “amphetamine”). Source: City of Reedley.
Approximately 1,000 mice were kept in inhumane, overcrowded conditions. When local officials asked a worker who “appeared to be in control” of the mice, she replied that they were transgenic mice that simulate the human immune system that were “genetically engineered to catch and carry the COVID-19 virus.”
In subsequent interviews with individuals who were at the warehouse, local officials learned that workers were tasked with caring and cleaning for the mice and, on numerous occasions, the Reedley Biolab operators had held back their pay. One of the workers who tended to the mice told Officer Harper that he and his ​children had become sick close in time to when he was tending the mice. The worker stated that he was instructed to discard any dead mice that he found into a dumpster. The worker thereafter stopped communicating with officials. Local officials later confirmed that “UMI and Prestige Biotech were disposing of deceased laboratory mice, considered to be medical waste, without the use of a licensed medical waste hauler.”
Shortly thereafter, Prestige Biotech representative Xiuqin Yao emailed City of Reedley officials and asked about the mice. She stated that the mice were a “special purebred population that took six years to build up” and are “of special significance in the study of immunology and oncology.” Yao furthermore said that the transgenic mice were “biological assets” that were worth “hundreds of thousands or even one million” dollars. Yao said that she cannot go to the Reedley Biolab, as she is currently in the PRC and unable to enter the United States due to a visa backlog. Despite repeated requests, she “failed to provide any certifications or licenses from any state or federal agency for storage and experimentation on mice and other laboratory activities” at the Reedley Biolab. Moreover, the “[p]roperty, UMI and Prestige Biotech were not listed as a licensed laboratory” and were likewise “not registered with CDPH as a medical waste generator.”
Ultimately, while the City of Reedley tried to care for the transgenic mice, their condition continued to deteriorate. Reedley retained a veterinarian specializing in laboratory specimens that the California Department of Public Health (CDPH) recommended. On March 24, it had the veterinarian review the transgenic mice for risk of biohazards. She confirmed the earlier assessments of overcrowding and inhumane conditions. When on site, she found 773 living mice and another 172 mice carcasses. She saw evidence of cannibalism, including the devouring of newborn mice, severe fight wounds, and indications of high stress. As of the time of her review, the veterinarian did not identify any immediate risk to humans ​being near the mice. On April 12, upon recommendation from the veterinarian and pursuant to court order, City officials had the veterinarian euthanize the mice.
Figure 8 - At least ten dead mice, including at least nine decaying carcasses, were found in just one box at the Reedley Biolab. Source: City of Reedley.
Figure 9 - Evidence of wounds on seven mice found at the Reedley Biolab, indicating inhumane living conditions for the animals. Source: City of Reedley.
As part of their review, local officials uncovered marked and unmarked “fire danger and explosion hazards created by the corrosive, toxic, and highly flammable chemicals stored” in the Reedley Biolab. These materials were highly dangerous. Were a fire to occur, Fire Department officials assessed that the City of Reedley would need to evacuate at least one city block around the warehouse. The “proposed evacuation zone would include the City of Reedley Police Department, City Hall, the Kings Canyon Unified District main office, and approximately 12 residential homes.” The potential blast radius would increase significantly if the fire spread to the gas station located next door.
While the inspection process was ongoing, Jesse Zhu, using the false name “David He,” began communicating over the phone and via email with local officials. He said that he was a “special representative” of UMI. Zhu asked for local officials not to destroy the pathogen samples. Instead, he asked that they allow him to move them off-site using a company that is unlicensed for medical ​waste or pathogen transportation. Local officials did not permit Zhu to do so. Zhu also provided contact information for corporate officers, all of whom were in the PRC.
C. April 21 and May 1, 2023 Inspections by County and State Officials
Fresno County public health officials inspected the premises on April 21, confirming and expanding on the prior findings. “Fresno County Public Health staff observed biologicals stored and kept in hazardous and non-compliant conditions, the presence of multiple infectious agents (later confirmed by CDC) and pursuant to Title 17 California Code of Regulations Section 2500.” Fresno County public health staff also “observed the 32 refrigerators and freezers. A number of these refrigerators and freezers had either stopped functioning or were failing due to an inadequate power supply.”
The CDPH inspected the premises on May 1-2. In addition to the “32 refrigerators and freezers” containing apparent pathogens, “CDPH staff also observed several pieces of laboratory equipment, such as incubators and centrifuges.” Inside several freezers, CDPH “observed containers labeled as serum or plasma (of unknown origin) and/or with the name of an infectious agent. A substantial number of the containers were unlabeled and CDPH staff was unable to discern the contents of these containers.” “Many of the indecipherable containers appeared to contain blood, or a blood product, such as serum, or other bodily fluids.” CDPH did not inspect a -80C freezer and another freezer due to potentially dangerous biologicals stored within. CDPH also observed a biohazardous waste container “shrink wrapped” (but not properly sealed) and other forms of biohazards throughout the Reedley Biolab.
D. Abatement Action and Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) Response
Based on their initial observation in March 2023, local officials began to reach out to additional federal authorities for assistance. Local officials spent months repeatedly trying to obtain assistance from the CDC, both directly and through CDPH. According to local officials, the CDC refused to speak with them and, on a ​number of occasions, it was reported by local officials that the CDC hung up on them mid-conversation. Local officials were similarly unable to get any help from other federal agencies that may have concurrent authority to investigate and/or remediate the biohazardous substances found at the Reedley Biolab.
Ultimately, local officials contacted their local Member of Congress, Representative Jim Costa, asking him for help obtaining federal assistance. It was only then, following Congressman Costa’s advocacy on Reedley’s behalf, that the CDC responded to California state government and local official requests.
After significant effort, local officials were able to convince the CDC to inspect the Reedley Biolab. CDC arrived on site on May 2, 2023 and finished the onsite support on May 4. Upon reviewing the site, the CDC reported, based on existing labels, that the facility contained “at least 20 potentially infectious agents,” including HIV, Tuberculosis, and the deadliest known form of Malaria. The CDC specifically listed the following pathogens:
Potentially infectious bacterial agents present:
* Chlamydia trachomatis
* E. coli (recombinant strains)
* Helicobacter pylori
* Mycobacterium tuberculosis
* Mycoplasma pneumoniae and general Mycoplasma species
* Neisseria meningitidis
* Nostoc species
* Sphingobacterium heparinum
* Streptococcus pneumoniae and Streptococcus species
* Toxoplasma gondii
Potentially infectious viral agents:
* Hepatitis B virus
* Hepatitis C virus
* Dengue virus
* Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) 1 and 2
* Human Herpes virus 1 (Herpes simplex virus)
* Human Herpes virus 5 (Human Cytomegalovirus)
* Respiratory Syncytial virus
* Rubella virus
* Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2)
Potentially infectious parasites:
​The CDC noted that these potentially infectious agents fall into “risk group 2 and risk group 3.” Risk Group 2 agents “are associated with human disease which is rarely serious and for which preventive or therapeutic interventions are often available, [and] [t]hese agents represent a moderate risk to an individual but a low risk to the community. Risk Group 3 pathogens are “associated with serious or lethal human disease for which preventive or therapeutic interventions may be available. These agents represent a high risk to an individual but a low risk to the community.” The CDC also noted that American laboratories supplied many of these pathogens. There was also evidence that imported pathogens were present in the Reedley Biolab.
CDC officials confirmed that the CDC made this list of pathogens based solely on the labels that were placed on samples. The CDC did not test these samples to assess whether the listed labels were correct or otherwise in a cipher that the workers used for a more dangerous pathogen. It likewise did not test any of the apparent pathogen samples that were labeled in a code (i.e., a combination of partial Mandarin symbols or English letters with numbers) despite the fact that neither the CDC nor local officials ever found a key to decipher the code. The CDC did not even test the wholly unlabeled samples. It did not test the samples labeled “COVID,” even though both SARS-CoV and a chimeric version of the currently endemic COVID-19 are both Select Agents—biological agents that the ​U.S. government has determined “have the potential to pose a severe threat to public health and safety.”
Figures 10-14 - Examples of pathogen-labeled containers from the Reedley Biolab. From left to right, going clockwise: dengue fever, HIV, SARS-CoV-2, syphilis, and malaria. Source: City of Reedley.
CDC’s refusal to test left local officials unable to assess the danger to the City of Reedley community or inform the community about what steps, if any, it should take to protect public safety. Local officials informed the CDC about their concerns. The CDC continued to refuse to test any samples. According to local officials, they also asked if the CDC could at least test a random sample of the pathogens. The CDC still refused. Despite their limited local budget, local officials then offered to pay the CDC for the entirety of the cost of testing these samples. The CDC still did not and left the site.
The CDC summarized its findings in a three-page report, in which it stated that the Biolab contained “[t]housands of vials [with] unclear labeling, coded labeling, or no identifications.” Lab workers appeared to have labeled some items ​they “believe[d] to be dangerous.” Although some of the pathogens could have come from Nigeria or Canada (“[d]uring the move to the U.S., infectious material may have been imported”), “there were no import or shipping records available at the time of the visit” to establish “conclusive evidence of violations of 42 C.F.R. § 71.54 for the importation of infections agents.”
Despite the fact that the Reedley Biolab was an illegal enterprise, the CDC suggested that local authorities “request all records of importation for infectious agents” to see if the violation occurred. Among the CDC’s action items would be to send the company advisement letters on import requirements and federal requirements for Select Agents, and add the company to an importation watchlist.
Even though it had not tested any samples from the Reedley Lab, the CDC concluded that “[t]here was no evidence of select agents or toxins.” According to local officials, the CDC knew that absent testing, local officials would have to destroy all samples pursuant to a forthcoming abatement order. The CDC likewise instructed state officials not to test any remaining samples of transgenic mice based on concerns over the accuracy of potential testing.
In sworn statements, local and county officials expressed “grave concern about the storage of potentially infectious bacterial, viral, and parasitic agents present at the Property and the health and safety risk to the public by these infectious agents.”
​E. Local Officials Report Discovering a Refrigerator Labeled “Ebola” that Contains Biological Samples
Figure 15 - More than 40 trash can-sized containers of biohazardous waste were removed from the Reedley Biolab after its abatement. Source: City of Reedley.
Thereafter, local officials had to handle the abatement (“ending” or destruction) process for all pathogens and toxic materials with only minimal guidance from federal experts. They secured the facility and contracted with a hazardous waste removal firm to assist with the abatement action. On July 5-7, local officials and a private firm specializing in pathogenic remediation handled potential pathogenic threat abatement. On July 28, and pursuant to court order, local officials and contractors continued the abatement process pursuant to an additional court order. Ultimately, local officials had to dispose of approximately 103.73 tons of general waste (including laboratory equipment) and 448 gallons of medical and biological waste.
Up to the point at which they began the abatement process, local officials had not thoroughly investigated several of the freezers for fear of encountering a dangerous pathogen. During the abatement process, however, they had to review every freezer for evidence of potential pathogens that they needed to destroy. While doing so, local officials and contractors reported that they found a freezer labeled “Ebola” with silver sealed bags found inside consistent with how the Reedley Biolab operators stored sensitive biological and other materials.
​Local officials noted their concern to CDC officials in writing. In email correspondence, they informed CDC that, during the abatement process, they had uncovered a freezer labeled with the word “Ebola.” In the email, a local official asked the CDC, “[w]hen you are going through and looking for select agents, do the containers need to be labeled individually with what is in it to count as one? We are doing the abatement here in Reedley and a fridge [freezer] had a label on it and one of the words in English was Ebola,” while noting that the containers within were not expressly labeled “Ebola.” The CDC official responded by stating, “Yes, we would typically look for the vial to be labeled as Ebola” and noted that they did not recall seeing the Ebola label. He did not cite any CDC policy when making this pronouncement. The court-ordered abatement action required local officials to destroy the samples under a defined timeline. Local officials emailed CDC on the afternoon of July 6, 2023, and CDC responded the following morning. Local officials had already destroyed the samples.
The CDC did not note an Ebola label on the freezer in its report. When asked about the freezer labeled Ebola in a subsequent email, the CDC official noted that the CDC “would typically look for the vial to be labeled as Ebola,” that they “didn’t recall seeing a fridge labeled as Ebola,” and asked for a photograph of the freezer. A photograph was not available. The Select Committee has received written statements reporting the presence of the label. Ebola is a Select Agent.
F. The Investigation and Lack of Testing Leave Many Unknowns
The CDC’s refusal to test any potential pathogens with the understanding that local officials would otherwise have to destroy the samples through an abatement process makes it impossible for the Select Committee to fully assess the potential risks that this specific facility posed to the community. It is possible that there were other highly dangerous pathogens that were in the coded vials or otherwise unlabeled. Due to government failures, we simply cannot know.
In its refusal to test, the CDC likewise did not offer to connect local officials with any other federal agency or authorized lab that may be able to test the samples. Based on statements from local officials and briefings the Select Committee received from the CDC, the CDC did not contact the National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center, the government biodefense laboratory located in Fort Dietrich, Maryland that could potentially have provided greater assistance.
According to local official accounts, in a subsequent conversation with the CDC in early September 2023, local officials again pressed the CDC on why they refused to test any potential pathogens. A CDC official informed the local officials ​that it was illegal for the CDC to test any samples that were not expressly labeled as a Select Agent. City Manager Nicole Zieba expressed shock at this fact. She asked whether, if that were the case, the CDC had any authority to stop a terrorist in the United States who simply removed the label off a vial of a deadly virus. The CDC official said that the CDC had no authority to test the deadly virus in that hypothetical and that it was a noted gap in its authority. This characterization of the CDC’s authority appears to be false.
* ↑ In Re: Property Locate at 850 “I” Street, Reedley, California 93654, No. 23CECG00912, (Cal. Super. Ct. Jun. 15, 2023). The factual statements contained in these and other court filings and relied on in this report were “declare[d] under the penalty of perjury.” Id.
* ↑ Select Committee Interviews with Local Officials.
* ↑ Press Release, Department of Justice, Arrest Made in Central California Biolab Investigation, (Oct. 19, 2023); United States v. Jia Bei Zhu, No. 1:23-MJ-00123-SKO, (E.D. Cal. Oct. 18, 2023) (Criminal Complaint).
* ↑ In Re: Property Locate at 850 “I” Street, Reedley, California 93654, No. 23CECG00912, (Cal. Super. Ct. Jun. 15, 2023).
* ↑ Id.
* ↑ Id.
* ↑ Id.
* ↑ In Re: Property Locate at 850 “I” Street, Reedley, California 93654, No. 23CECG00912, (Cal. Super. Ct. Jun. 15, 2023).
* ↑ See generally In Re: Property Locate at 850 “I” Street, Reedley, California 93654, No. 23CECG00912, (Cal. Super. Ct. Jun. 15, 2023), Decl. of Jesalyn Harper in Support of Application for Abatement Warrant and Order Authorizing Entry on the Property to Abate Public Nuisance (Mar. 29, 2023) at Ex. B.
* ↑ Id. They furthermore learned that “UMI and Prestige Biotech have not employed the services of a licensed medical waste hauler during the course of the operation of the warehouse.” Id.
* ↑ Id.
* ↑ Id.
* ↑ Id.
* ↑ Id.
* ↑ Id.
* ↑ Id.
* ↑ Id. at Ex. B – Letter from Jerry Isaak, Chief of the City of Reedley Fire Department.
* ↑ Id. at Ex. F – Email Correspondence.
* ↑ Id.
* ↑ Id.
* ↑ Id.
* ↑ Id.
* ↑ Id.
* ↑ Id.
* ↑ Id.
* ↑ Id.
* ↑ Id.
* ↑ This section and subsequent sections draw on Select Committee interviews with local officials to provide information about the local and federal responses.
* ↑ Id. at Ex. D – CDC Letter.
* ↑ In Re: Property Locate at 850 “I” Street, Reedley, California 93654, No. 23CECG00912, (Cal. Super. Ct. Jun. 15, 2023) at Ex. D – CDC Letter. Based on their physical appearance, the CDC noted that it believed that the “Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) and Mycobacteriumtuberculosis (RG3 agents) appear . . . to be diagnostic specimens, not isolates or culture.” It did not test the substance or engage in further review to confirm this hypothesis.
* ↑ Risk Groups, Public Health Emergency (Nov. 13, 2015).
* ↑ Id.
* ↑ In Re: Property Locate at 850 “I” Street, Reedley, California 93654, No. 23CECG00912, (Cal. Super. Ct. Jun. 15, 2023) at Ex. F – Email Correspondence.
* ↑ The CDC report does note, however, that “representative[s] provided a limited key that was reported to contain proprietary or trade secret information.” Id. at Ex. D – CDC Letter.
* ↑ Select Agents and Toxins, CDC (Sept. 10, 2020). Select Agents are a specially regulated group of biological agents and toxins that have the potential to pose a severe threat to public health and safety.
* ↑ In addition to written and verbal statements from local officials, the Select Committee obtained an email from CDC officials who stated that they “don’t see an urgent need to test samples at the moment” because “most of the material [CDC was] able to identify were proteins, antibodies, or pathogens (e.g. E.coli, HAIV, SARS CoV-2, Hepatitis, Malaria, Mycoplasma, etc.) that would not be regulated under our authority (i.e. select agents) or considered a serious threat to public health” even though the samples included “‘unknowns,’ illegible, or [those] coded in a way that we could not interpret.” This email was in response to a Fresno County email offering to pay for the packaging and shipment of the samples to an appropriate testing facility.
* ↑ This conversation was summarized in the email described above.
* ↑ In Re: Property Locate at 850 “I” Street, Reedley, California 93654, No. 23CECG00912, (Cal. Super. Ct. Jun. 15, 2023) at Ex. D – CDC Letter.
* ↑ Id.
* ↑ Id.
* ↑ Id.
* ↑ Id. Specifically, the CDC stated that it would “[i]ssue an Import Permit advisement letter to Prestige Biotech to ensure they know the Import Permit Regulations for importing infectious substances into the U.S.” and “[i]ssue a Federal Select Agent Program advisement letter to Prestige Biotech informing them of the requirements for possession, use, and transfer of select agents and toxins if the entity decides to possess them.” Among other items, it also called for “add[ing] Prestige Biotech and associated entity names to the CDC Import Permit Program watch list, in case the entity attempts to apply for a CDC Import Permit. If submitted, the application will be reviewed carefully, considering previous observations, and the program will inspect the facility before issuing any permit.”
* ↑ Id. It also found “insufficient evidence at [that] time to conclude that there has been a violation of 42 CFR 71.54 or 42 CFR part 73.”
* ↑ As part of its investigation, the Select Committee reviewed an email on August 28, 2023 where a CDC official stated the opinion above.
* ↑ In Re: Property Locate at 850 “I” Street, Reedley, California 93654, No. 23CECG00912, (Cal. Super. Ct. Jun. 15, 2023)
* ↑ In Re: Property Locate at 850 “I” Street, Reedley, California 93654, No. 23CECG00912, (Cal. Super. Ct. Jun. 20, 2023).
* ↑ See In Re: Property Locate at 850 “I” Street, Reedley, California 93654, No. 23CECG00912, (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 16, 2023).
* ↑ Id.
* ↑ Ebola Disease, CDC (Mar. 23, 2023). Ebola “is a rare and often deadly” disease that results in hemorrhagic fevers, with a case fatality rate ranging from 25% to 90% in past outbreaks. Symptoms appear within 2-21 days of infection and are often severe. While Ebola’s rapid onset and high lethality make it unlikely to spread into a pandemic, it can cause many localized deaths. See also Ebola Disease, WHO.
* ↑ HHS and USDA Select Agents and Toxins, CDC (Aug. 1, 2023).
* ↑ The Select Committee was unable to find any emails or other communications where the CDC offered to make these connections to agencies with similar authorities. Local officials reported that the CDC did not do so.
* ↑ Information obtained through Select Committee conversation with local officials.
* ↑ See, e.g., John Lancaster and Susan Schmidt, When anthrax-laced letters terrorized Washington and New York (Oct. 24, 2018, 1:02 PM) (describing how CDC officials tested unlabeled suspected anthrax spores).