# America in the Struggle for Czechoslovak Independence/The Czechoslovak Problem in the Department of State

IV
THE CZECHOSLOVAK PROBLEM IN THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
The work of any foreign office is necessarily confidential, and the general public can very seldom learn much of the method of approach adopted by the Department of Foreign Relations concerning important problems which this branch of the government is confronted with. Instructions of the United States Department of State, and reports of various diplomatic representatives to their superior officer, ultimately, after a lapse of years, appear in the official publication, Foreign Relations; but seldom, if ever, has the historian been given a glimpse of the consideration, and its nature, accorded any question by responsible officials on the ground in Washington, in the department itself.
Fortunately, as regards the problem of Austria-Hungary, the author is in possession of first-class evidence that from the very beginning of American belligerency the situation was given investigation and consideration so thorough-going that ​its very extensiveness and detailed nature will come as a surprise to many who are fond of rather ungenerous criticism of everything connected with the conduct of foreign relations. Certainly the material presented in this chapter should go far toward dispelling the charge, often enough made, that recognition of Czechoslovak independence was brought about by clever intrigue, or alleged personal friendship of particular officials.
When the United States entered the war, and throughout the conflict, as well as for a period thereafter, questions relating to Austria-Hungary came within the purview of the Near East Division of the Department of State of which the chief then was Dr. Albert Hutchinson Putney, formerly Dean of the Illinois College of Law in Chicago, and an author of a number of works on legal subjects, particularly on constitutional law. In his official capacity Dr. Putney prepared for the Secretary of State and the President a memorandum entitled The Slavs of Austria-Hungary. The document has already become one of first rate importance in Czechoslovak history, and this work would be but fragmentary indeed did it not devote considerable attention to its nature and very evident influence upon the formulation of ​the policies of the American government. For that reason extensive quotations are not only justified, but in fact necessary. However, the survey would constitute a work of no inconsiderable proportions, and manifestly only its most important parts, relevant to our topic, can be reproduced here. Also, something of its scope and nature can be gathered from the Table of Contents, which is as follows:
| Section 01. | Importance of the problem of the Slavs in the Austro -Hungarian Empire. |
| Section 02. | Outline of the evolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. |
| Section 03. | Slavs—the earliest known inhabitants of this region. |
| Section 04. | Classification of the Slavs in Austria-Hungary. |
| Section 05. | The Czecho-Slovaks. |
| Section 06. | Hapsburg treatment of the Czecho-Slovaks. |
| Section 07. | Rights of Bohemia to be considered as an independent and sovereign state merely united to Austria through the accident of having a common sovereign. |
| Section 08. | The Jugo -Slavs. |
| Section 09. | Hapsburg treatment of the Jugo-Slavs. |
| Section 10. | The Magyars and the Non-Magyar races. ​ |
| Section 11. | Other Slavs of Austria-Hungary. |
| Section 12. | Strategic importance of the Jugo-Slav territory from the economic and commercial standpoints. |
| Section 13. | The controversy between Serbs and Bulgarians. |
| Section 14. | The Italian Jugo-Slav controversy. |
| Section 15. | Dualism in Austria-Hungary and its relations to the Slavic problem in the Empire. |
| Section 16. | The question of the possibility of justice for the Slavs under the Austro-Hungarian Empire. |
| Section 17. | Arguments in favor of the United States giving support to the aspirations of the Slavs of Austria-Hungary. |
The first chapter, discussing the “Importance of the Problem of the Slavs of the Austro-Hungarian Empire,” among other things maintains:
There are some problems the solution of which is a matter of sentimental rather than practical importance, and there are national and racial ambitions the attainment of which would be of great value to some particular country or race, but which are matters of little importance to the United States or to the world at large. On the other hand, there are questions, the settlement of which will have a far-reaching effect upon the future peace of the world and the security ​of the United States. Among the most important of this latter class of questions, if indeed not the most important of all, is that of the disposition to be made of the Slavic inhabitants of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.
When the terms of peace, by which the war can be ended, are considered from the standpoint of the security which they will furnish for the future peace of the world, there is no more important question than that of the disposition to be made of the Slavic subjects of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.
The success of the German plan for “Mitteleuropa” depends upon the continuance of the present alliance between Germany and Austria-Hungary; and the continuance of this alliance depends, in turn, upon the continuance of the control of the policies of the latter empire by the Austrian (German) and Magyar minority in the population thereof. The granting of full political rights to the Slavic majority in the empire would forever destroy the German control over Austria-Hungary. The various Slavic races of central and southeastern Europe have suffered the most, and have the most to fear from the German ambitions, and are the strongest natural enemies of all Germanic plans of aggrandisement. The Slavs of the Austro-Hungarian Empire should, and would if they were able, constitute the first line of defense against any German aggression towards the east and south; but under the present system of government in the Austro-Hungarian Empire these peoples have been compelled to assist in the carrying out of the designs from which they are the chief sufferers.
​Or, if the various dissatisfied and exploited races in the Austro-Hungarian Empire should be given their independence—if the Bohemians, Moravians and Slovaks should be united into an independent Czech state, if the Poles of Austria should be united with their brethren of Prussia and Russia in an independent Poland, if the Serbo-Croats and Slovenes of Austria should be united with Serbia and Montennegro in a strong Jugo-Slav state, if the Roumanians of Transylvania, Bukowina and the Banat should be united with Roumania, if the Ruthenians of Galicia should be united with their brethren in Russia, or if some other just solution should be found for the problem of this people, and if Italia Irredenta should be restored to Italy—the danger of a German-made “Mitteleuropa,” to be used as a stepping-stone to boundless Germanic conquests, would be effectively and forever crushed.
Extremely interesting, from an historical, political, as well as legal, point of view, is Chapter Seven (7) on the “Rights of Bohemia to be considered as an independent and sovereign state merely united to Austria through the accident of having a common sovereign.” After a careful examination of various historical, diplomatic and legal documents, commencing with the Golden Bull of 1356, Dr. Putney summarizes his views in the following words:
The union between Bohemia and Austria being ​merely dynastic it is evident that there was never any legal merger of the two countries, nor can Bohemia be held legally bound by any laws passed by any legislative assembly except a Bohemian assembly meeting in Bohemian territory. The situation was well stated by Charles Pergler, Vice-President of the Czechoslovak National Council, in a speech delivered at the State University of Minnesota, in which he said:
“For that matter, the fact cannot be over-emphasized that the Czechs were deprived of the national state then once had, by force. In demanding independence, Czechs can plant themselves not only upon the proposition that any nation has the right to self-government, but also upon laws and constitutions which have never been repealed or abrogated with the consent of the Bohemian people.
“Almost four centuries ago Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia (with the two Lusatias) constituted an independent kingdom, just as Hungary was then an independent kingdom. In 1526 Czechs called the Hapsburg dynasty to the Bohemian throne for practically the same reasons and on the same conditions as the Magyars. Together with the Pragmatic Sanction, the terms under which the Hapsburgs were called to the Hungarian throne formed what we might call the legal foundation of the Hungarian revolution in 1848. The Czech case, legally speaking, is every bit as strong, if not stronger, as was the Magyar case in 1848. The compact of 1526, together with the coronation oaths and a large number of historical documents, too numerous to be here mentioned, form ​the legal basis of the Czech revolution in 1915.
“De facto the Bohemians lost their independence, de jure they still have it, and are now demanding something of which they were illegally deprived. Just as no one can be legally deprived of his property by force and violence and without due process of law, just so the Czechs retain their legal title to independence.”
The soundness of the Bohemian claim is also proven by the agreement between Austria and Hungary as to the government of the latter country. The Magyars have asserted the right of Hungary to be considered as a country independent of Austria, and this view has been practically acquiesced in by Austria.
But Hungary and Bohemia came under Hapsburg rule at the same time and in the same manner, and there can be no legal difference between the relations between Austria and Bohemia, and those between Austria and Hungary. This has been recognized and admitted by the fair-minded and liberty-loving faction among the Magyars. In a letter to Mr. Helfi, editor of the Magyar paper Magyar Ujszag, dated November 8, 1871 , Louis Kossuth made the following statement:
“Between the legal titles which form the foundation of the right of the dynasty to the throne in Hungary and Bohemia there is not merely an analogy, but a complete identity. That is true of their origin and time, method, conditions and principles, as well as their literal wording. The Bohemian land is not ​a patrimonium, no so-called hereditary land, no mere appendage of Austria, but a land which may appeal to diplomatic negotiations and mutual agreements. It is a state, just like Hungary.”
That a mere dynastic union creates no permanent binding union between two countries is conclusively proved by the examples which history furnishes us. If two countries united by the accident of a common sovereign desire a closer union, this requires an express agreement between the countries to this effect. Thus Poland and Lithuania, though united dynastically under the Jagellons, in 1386, were not merged under one government until the Union of Lublin in 1569; and England and Scotland, while both under the Stewart kings from 1603, were not otherwise united until the act of Union in 1707. There has never been at any time such an act of union between Bohemia and Austria, like those between Poland and Lithuania in 1569, and between England and Scotland in 1707.
Where countries are united by no other bonds than those of a common dynasty it has been constantly held that they might become separated either by the operation of different laws governing the succession in the two countries, or by the wish of either country. For example, within the past century Hanover be came separated from Great Britain in the former manner, and Norway from Sweden in the latter.
The relations recently existing between Norway and Sweden were substantially those now existing between Bohemia and Austria. In each case there are ​two formerly independent and distinct countries united together by the historical accident of a common sovereign. Norway, in 1905, desired to do what Bohemia desires to do today—namely, to terminate the dynastic union. After full consideration the powers of Europe decided to approve of the separation of the two countries.
From the historical evidence above stated I believe that Bohemia is legally an independent elective monarchy; that the illegal and tyrannical suppression of Bohemian rights by the Hapsburgs has not destroyed such rights; that Bohemia has the same legal right to terminate its dynastical relations with Austria that Norway had to terminate similar relations with Sweden; and that these rights of Bohemia should be recognized by the United States and the Entente. Above all I believe that it would be contrary to all American traditions for this country to make any treaty which would recognize as legal the destruction of Bohemian liberties by the Hapsburgs.
If, to some, Dr. Putney’s attitude may seem too strained and legalistic, let them consider what would have been the situation of the lands of the Bohemian crown if Austria-Hungary had not been dismembered and had there been no demand for Czech independence, but the Hapsburg dynasty had become extinct. It is obvious that in that case the Czech state certainly would have reverted to its original elective rights and that the ​Czechs would have exercised the right of choosing a new sovereign. This consideration demonstrates beyond the peradventure of a doubt that the various parts of Austria-Hungary were held together by a purely dynastic bond, legally speaking.
In his final chapter, Dr. Putney argues for a recognition of the aims of the Slavs of Austria-Hungary and for a declaration of sympathy with them. We can never completely understand the origin of certain declarations of the State Department unless we take into account Dr. Putney’s argument. This again calls for extensive quotations. Dr. Putney told those responsible for the country’s success in war and its foreign policy:
The Slavic leaders claim that an expression of sympathy with the nationalistic aspirations of the various western and southern Slavic races will assist the United States and the Entente in this war in the following ways:
1. It will encourage the formation of various Slavic Legions to fight on the “West Front” in Europe and elsewhere.
2. It will encourage the large number of Austrian Slavs who surrendered to Russia and then took up arts against Austria-Hungary to continue in the field against the Central Powers.
3. It will make of such prisoners active propa​gandists against the Central Powers. Their work among the Russians might accomplish important results.
4. It will encourage strikes and parliamentary opposition in Austria-Hungary.
5. To a much greater extent it will encourage passive resistance, refusals to participate in war loans, and attempts to disorganize in every possible way the military and economic plans of the Central Empires.
6. It will increase the activities in support of the war and of the administration among the two to three million Slavs in the United States.
While a declaration by the United States cannot fail to increase the activity of the western and southern Slavs against the Central Empires, in the absence of such a declaration the United States and the Entente run the risk in the near future of losing much of the assistance which they have been receiving from this source; although to the credit of these Slavs it must be said that there has as yet been no such result. The recent events in Russia, however, have left the Czechs, Jugoslavs, etc., in a most terrible plight. They can hardly be expected to keep up their efforts against the Central Empires unless they have encouragement, and especially, if possible, express assurance that their liberty will be a certain result of an Entente victory.
At the present time some are beginning to doubt whether an Entente victory will bring them their liberty. The Germans, Austrians, and Hungarians are endeavoring to persuade them that it will not, ​and that the Entente and the United States have abandoned them.
To sum up, every one of Germany’s many ambitions in the East depend for their success upon her breaking through and crushing the ring of western and southern Slavs which encircles her on the east and southeast. For this reason (even if we look at the question from a merely selfish standpoint) there is nothing which the United States should not do to aid these Slavic races; and if we look at the question from a humanitarian standpoint there are no races anywhere more deserving of the sympathy and support of the United States than the Czechoslovaks, the Jugoslavs and other Slavic races of Austria-Hungary.
The question which should first be decided by the United States at this time is not what terms can probably be secured, but what terms would secure justice and a peace that can endure. It is at least possible for the United States to set for itself an ideal that will do justice to the races whose fate depends upon the result of this war, and then to secure an actual peace which will conform as closely as possible to the ideal which we have set for ourselves. For a century and a half; after the question might have been settled, the situation in the Turkish Empire has remained a world scandal and a constant menace to the peace of Europe, because the European powers never had the courage to bring about a final solution of the problem. Austria-Hungary will become another constant menace to the peace—not only ​of Europe but also of the whole world, unless the United States and the Entente Powers possess the wisdom, courage and ability to solve the problem which this Empire presents, by giving freedom to its subject Slav and Latin races. A peace which will leave between twenty-five and thirty millions of the most highly advanced branches of the Slavic race to continue to suffer under Hapsburg and Magyar misrule, and which eventually will render a new war in the Near East inevitable, is a peace to which this country should not consent, until and unless it has been proved that it is beyond the power of the United States to secure a more just and lasting peace. As to the possibility of securing a peace which will give liberty to the Slavs of Austria-Hungary, it should be borne in mind that in all probability the Germans will not consent to any just peace—to any terms of peace which the United States and the Entente can possibly accept—until Germany has reached the position where she will be obliged to accept any terms of peace which her opponents insist upon. It might furthermore be said that as long as these millions of Slavs remain under Hapsburg rule, the world is not safe for democracy, and such a peace can hardly be called a victorious peace—for the United States or its allies.
Dr. Putney’s survey was completed and delivered to the Secretary of State on May 9, 1918. On May 29, 1918, the State Department made public the following declaration:
The Secretary of State desires to announce that the proceedings of the Congress of Oppressed Races of Austria-Hungary, which was held in Rome in April, have been followed with great interest by the Government of the United States, and that the nationalistic aspirations of the Czechoslovaks and Jugoslavs for freedom have the earnest sympathy of this government.
Anyone carefully comparing the announcement with Dr. Putney’s survey will readily notice not only similarity, but identity of terminology (nationalistic aspirations); but today it is possible to go a step further than a mere surmise of this kind and authentically to declare that A. H. Putney was entrusted with the formulation of the declaration, in fact did write it and that it was given to the public as drafted by him.
Naturally, the full purport of the announcement, and its vital importance, cannot be grasped unless we know something of the Rome congress and of the aspirations there voiced. This congress was one called by a committee formed for the liberation of the oppressed nationalities of Austria-Hungary and was held in Rome on April 8, 9 and 10, 1918. The peoples represented were Italians, Czechoslovaks, Roumanians, Poles, Jugoslavs. The following resolutions were unanimously adopted:
​The representatives of the nationalities wholly or partly subject to the domination of Austria-Hungary—Italians, Poles, Roumanians, Czechoslovaks, Jugoslavs—have united in affirming as follows the principles by which their common action shall be guided:
1. Each of these peoples proclaims its right to establish its own nationality and state unity, to complete this unity, and to attain full political and economic independence.
2. Each of these peoples recognizes in the Austro-Hungarian monarchy the instrument of Germanic domination and the fundamental obstacle to the realization of its aspirations and its rights.
3. The assembly recognizes the necessity for a common struggle against the common oppressors, and in order that each people may attain its complete liberation and national unity as a single free state.
In view of the objectives fixed by the congress, the pronouncement of the Secretary of State was certainly clear and far -reaching enough. Nevertheless, certain pro-German and pro-Austrian elements, and even some Italian newspapers, claimed that the aims so expressed were not incompatible with the preservation of the Hapsburg monarchy, and for this reason a supplementary declaration, also from the pen of Dr. Putney, was published, this time on June 28, 1918, and worded as follows:
Since the issuance by this government on May 29th of the statement regarding the nationalistic ​aspirations for freedom of the Czechoslovaks and Jugoslavs, German and Austrian officials and sympathizers have sought to misinterpret and distort its manifest interpretation. In order that there may be no misunderstanding concerning the meaning of the statement, the Secretary of State has further announced the position of the United States to be that all the branches of the Slav race should be completely freed from German and Austrian rule.
The declaration of September 3, 1918, recognizing the Czechoslovak National Council as a de facto government, was but a logical culmination of the gradual steps described in this chapter, and it became not only possible, but inevitable, with a definite organization of the Czechoslovak armies in Russia and elsewhere.