# Mexico in 1827/Volume 1/Chapter 7

SECTION III.
REVOLUTION FROM DEATH OF MORELOS TO 1820.
The most brilliant period of the Revolution terminated with the life of Morelos. He alone possessed influence enough to combine the operations of the different Insurgent chiefs into something like unity of plan;—to reconcile their jarring interests, and to prevent their jealousy of each other from breaking out into open discord. By his death this last tie seemed to be dissolved, and things relapsed into their former confusion. Each Province considered itself as isolated, and connected by no bond of union with the rest; and by this fatal want of combination, the Insurgent cause, though supported in many parts of the country by considerable military talent, and the most brilliant personal courage, sunk gradually into an almost hopeless state.
Morelos conceived that the Congress which he ​had assembled at Oaxaca, and for which he sacrificed his life, would prove a centre of union, to which his lieutenants might look, as they had previously done to himself; but few of his officers entertained similar feelings with regard to this body, which, however useful in theory, was, practically, a most inconvenient appendage to a camp. Don Nicolas Bravo succeeded, indeed, in escorting the Deputies in safety to Tĕhŭacān, where they were received, at first, with great respect by General Tĕrān: but disputes soon arose between the Civil and Military authorities, and these terminated by the dissolution of the Congress, to which measure Tĕrān had recourse on the 15th of December, 1815.
There is no act in the history of the Revolution that has been more severely blamed than this, and none, perhaps, that has been less fairly judged. It cannot be denied that, by dissolving the Congress, Teran injured the general cause, by depriving the Insurgents of a point de réunion, which might, afterwards, have been of essential use; but it has never been proved that it was possible for him to do otherwise, or that the district under his command could, in any way, have supported the additional charge, which the arrival of the Congress must have brought upon it. The fact is, that the members of that assembly, amongst the other articles of their Constitution, had assigned to themselves, as Deputies, a yearly salary of eight thousand dollars each; a ​resolution which Bustamante, (the historian of the Revolution, and himself a Deputy,) justifies, by saying that the salary was merely nominal, and that two thousand dollars were the utmost that any one hoped to receive. Be this as it may, it is certain that whatever could be construed into public property, either as taken from the enemy, or as the produce of fines paid by the different Haciendas, (in the nature of black mail,) became liable for the payment of these sums, whenever the Congress chose to determine that it should be so; and moreover, the assembly was so well aware of this fact, that it always endeavoured to get the management of the public purse out of the hands of the Military Commandants, in order to entrust it to Intendants of its own nomination. Unfortunately, the man selected for this office at Tehuacan, (Martinez) was particularly strict and unyielding, (Bustamante calls him cosquilloso, ticklish,) in every thing connected with his department; and contrived to involve himself, almost immediately, in a dispute with Tĕrān, by demanding possession of the money, and stores, which that general had, with infinite pains, succeeded in collecting. In this claim, Martinez was supported by the Congress, and Teran was thus reduced to become, de facto, a dependant upon the body, which had just thrown itself upon his protection, or to deny its authority altogether. He asserts, however, that he would have supported with patience, his share of the dead weight of the Congress, had any ​disposition been shown by the other Independent chiefs to contribute towards its support. But no offers of the kind were made; and although all blamed Teràn for dissolving the National Assembly, and all refused to acknowledge the Government which he attempted to establish in its place, none would receive the Deputies into their camp, or undertake the charge of protecting their sessions, which might, in that case, have been resumed, as Teràn had no more right to dissolve a Congress, than he had to create one himself, in the name of the people, had he been inclined to attempt it.
It must, however, be admitted, that the breaking up of the only Central Government that had ever been at all generally recognized by the Insurgents, was attended with the most disastrous effects. From that moment, universal disorder prevailed: Vĭctōriă, Gŭerrērŏ, Brāvŏ, Răyōn, and Tĕrān, confined themselves each to his separate circle, where each was crushed in turn, by the superiority of the common enemy. A multitude of inferior partizans shared the same fate. The arrival of fresh troops from the Peninsula, enabled the Viceroy to establish a regular chain of communication throughout the country, and to enforce obedience, even at the most distant points; and these discouraging circumstances, together with the facilities held out to all who had embarked in the Revolution, by the new Viceroy Apŏdācă, for reconciling themselves with the Government by accepting the indulto, (or ​pardon,) offered by the King, reduced the number of those actually in arms, during the years 1816, 1817, and 1818, to a very inconsiderable amount.
But the reverses sustained by the Creole leaders in the field were more than counterbalanced by the effect previously produced, by the introduction of the Spanish Constitution into Mexico; which, although its most important articles were suspended almost immediately, so far favoured the developement of a spirit of independence, that nothing could afterwards shake its hold upon the minds of the people. This Constitution was, as may be recollected, sanctioned by the Cortes of Cadiz, in 1812, and immediately applied, not only to Spain, but to the Transatlantic dominions of the Crown. In Mexico it took effect in the Autumn of the same year, (29th September, 1812,) under the Viceroyalty of Venegas, who was soon convinced that his authority, if submitted to the test of public opinion, could not be long retained. So many violent pamphlets against Spain, and Spanish dominion, were published during the two only months that the liberty of the press was tolerated, (it lasted exactly sixty-six days from the 5th of October, 1812,) that the tranquillity of the Capital was endangered, notwithstanding the presence of a numerous garrison, and the palace itself threatened by an infuriated mob. Vivas in favour of Morelos, and the Insurgents, were heard under the Viceroy's own windows, as well as cries of "Down with the bad Government!" and even ​of "Down with the King!" In short, (to use the words of the Audiencia, paragraph 136,) "the political writings of the day produced upon the natives the same effect that spirituous liquors cause amongst savages." A national feeling was created, and became every where predominant. Fortunately for Spain, the right of electing the Members of the Ayuntamiento and the Deputies to the Cortes, afforded a vent for passions, which must otherwise have led to some terrific explosion. Out of six hundred and fifty-two elective appointments, of more or less importance, which the Mexicans were entitled by the Constitution to make, not One was bestowed upon an European; and most were filled by men notoriously addicted to the Independent cause! Nor were the legal forms prescribed by the new system, for the prosecution of criminals, turned to less account. Suspicions were no longer admitted as sufficient ground for depriving an accused Creole of his liberty. Proofs were required by the Constitutional Alcaldes, whose jurisdiction replaced, in most cases, that of the Audiencia; and these proofs were most critically weighed, by men, who had, in general, been recommended, by their known predilection for the cause of the Revolution, to fill those offices, which entitled them to judge of the inclinations and loyalty, of others.
Thus, under the safeguard of the new institutions, disaffection became every day more prevalent; and, neither the successes of the Royal army in the field, ​nor the exertions of two Viceroys, who undoubtedly possessed very superior talents, could give to Spain any prospect of permanently suppressing the Revolution.
The assiduity of Don Carlos Bustamante, whom I have had occasion to mention frequently as the historian of the Revolution, has rescued from oblivion two most interesting State papers, which were found in the archives of the Vice-royalty. The one, is a representation addressed by the Audiencia of Mexico to the Cortes, on the 18th of November, 1813; and the other, a confidential letter of the Viceroy Calleja, (who succeeded Venegas, on the 4th of March, 1813,) to the King, on His release from captivity, dated a year later, but referring to the same period, and passing in review nearly the same events. Of the genuineness of these documents no doubt can be entertained; and they present so striking a picture of the effect produced by a little relaxation of those bonds, by which the Colonies had been previously kept in subjection, that I must recommend them most particularly to my readers, who will find a translation of both, annexed to the Appendix. They are worthy of attention, not merely as disclosing the secret springs of the Revolution, but, as proving that, for many years before any intercourse with the Colonies, on the part of Foreign powers, was attempted, the ​confidential servants of the Crown of Spain felt the impossibility of maintaining its authority there, unless supported by an overwhelming force, and admitted, "that the whole population of the country was bent upon the attainment of an independent political existence" This fact is so strongly urged throughout Calleja's letter to the King, that it may be considered, (as he himself terms it,) the corner stone of his whole argument. He states, in one passage, "That notwithstanding the advantages which he had obtained in the field, but little had been done towards destroying the seeds of the Rebellion; the focus of which lies in the great towns, and, more particularly, in the Capital. In another, he says, "That the great majority of the natives is in favour of the Insurrection,"—that "the municipalities, the Provincial Deputations, and even the Spanish Cortes themselves, (as far as the provinces of Ultramar are concerned, are composed of nothing but Insurgentes, and those of the most decided and criminal character." In another: "That the Insurgents profess attachment to the Constitution, not, because they intend to adopt it, or ever to submit to the Mother country, but, because it affords them the means of attaining all that they desire without risk." In another: "That the Insurrection is so deeply impressed, and rooted, in the heart of every American, that nothing but the most energetic measures, supported by an imposing force, can ever eradicate it:"—that "the war strengthens, and propagates the ​love of Independence, by holding out a constant hope of the destruction of the old Spaniards, a longing desire for which is general amongst all classes!" and lastly, that "as six millions of inhabitants decided in the cause of Independence, have no need of previous consultation, or agreement, each one acts, according to his means and opportunities, in favour of the project, common to all: the judge, by concealing, or conniving at, crimes: the clergy, by advocating the justice of the cause in the confessional, and, even in the pulpit: the writers, by corrupting public opinion: the women, by employing their attractions, in order to seduce the Royal troops: the Government officer, by revealing, and thus paralizing the plans of his superiors: the youth, by taking arms: the old man, by giving intelligence, and forwarding correspondence, and the public Corporations, by giving an example of eternal differences with the Europeans, not one of whom they will admit as a colleague!"
What stronger arguments could the warmest advocates of the Revolution adduce, in order to prove the impossibility of ever permanently re-establishing the authority of Spain in the New World? Yet this language was held, thirteen years ago, by one of her most able, and most zealous defenders. It was confirmed, too, by the opinion of the whole ​Audiencia of Mexico; which admits, as unreservedly as the Viceroy himself, the unanimity of the natives in favour of the Independent cause { Vide paragraphs 12, 14, 18, 19, 26, 28, and 42), and sees no hope of checking this spirit, but by having recourse to measures amounting to little less than the establishment of martial law; since it recommends that all legal restrictions should be dispensed with.
These measures were resorted to, and were for a time successful. Backed by an imposing force, and relieved by the abolition of the Constitution (in 1814) from all legal trammels, the authority of the Viceroy was gradually re-established, and tranquillity, to a certain extent, restored. Seventeen thousand Insurgents are supposed to have accepted the Indulto during the Viceroyalty of Apŏdācă, who assumed the reins of government in 1816; and even the expedition of Mina failed in rekindling the flame of civil war. But nothing could be more deceitful than this calm. The principles which led to the Insurrection of 1810 were daily gaining ground; they were disseminated by the Indultados themselves amongst their friends and connexions; the Creole troops were their first proselytes: disaffection spread amongst them, until whole regiments were ripe for revolt; and when, in 1820, the re-establishment of the constitutional system ​in the Peninsula allowed again of a freedom of intercourse amongst the Creoles, they found, with surprise, that all differences of opinion had disappeared, and that the army was ready to co-operate with its old enemies, the Insurgents, for the attainment of those political rights, against which it had fought during the earlier stages of the Revolution. Before we arrive, however, at this National movement, in which Iturbide took the lead, it will be necessary to take a rapid view of the events, by which it was preceded.
After the death of Morelos, the country (as I have already stated) was divided into districts, in each of which one of his former lieutenants took the lead. Guerrero occupied the Western coast, where he maintained himself in the fastnesses of the Sierra Madre until the year 1821, when he joined Iturbide. Răyōn commanded in the vicinity of Hălpŭjāhuacă, where he successively occupied two fortified camps, one on the Cerro del Gallo, and the other on that of Cōpŏrŏ. Teràn held the district of Tĕhŭacān, in La Puebla. Bravo was a wanderer in different parts of the country. The Băxīŏ was tyrannized over by the Padre Tōrrĕs; while Guădĕlūpĕ Victoria occupied the important Province of Veracruz. The intervening spaces were overrun by insurgent partizans. Ălbīnŏ Gărcīă, el Păchōn, ​Ĕpĭtācĭŏ Sānchĕz, Ŏsōrnŏ, and Sĕrrānŏ, who sometimes acknowledged one of the principal Chiefs as their superior, and sometimes acted independently of all; as was the case with the famous, (or infamous) Vĭcēntĕ Gōmĕz, whose band long infested the mountains which separate Mexico from La Puebla, and often cut off all communication between them.
It is not my intention to follow in detail the events of this period. A short sketch of the career of the principal chiefs is all that my limits will allow of. Those who are desirous of a nearer acquaintance with their military exploits, will find them traced in the pages of Robinson, and Don Carlos Bustamante, with a minuteness which does not suit the character of my present work. Robinson, though deficient on many points, gives a spirited sketch of what he saw; and most of the facts stated by him may be depended upon.
After the dissolution of the Congress by Tĕrān, (22nd December, 1815), that general was engaged, for some months, in the sort of desultory warfare which was universal, at the time, throughout America. In this he was usually successful, but his efforts were cramped by the want of arms; and, with a view to obtain a supply of these, he ​determined to undertake a march to the Coast with a part of his force, with the intention of occupying the mouth of the river Guăsăcūalcŏ, where he was to be met by a vessel from the United States. This hazardous attempt was made in July 1816, and, (though unsuccessful) appears to have been conducted in a very masterly manner. Tĕrān set out with an escort of only 300 men. The rest of his corps he left in the fortress of Cērrŏ Cŏlŏrādŏ, (a mountain in the vicinity of Tĕhŭacān), which he had fortified with extraordinary care, and where he had established a cannon-foundery, and a manufactory of powder. Surprised by the rainy season, he projected, and executed in ten days, with the aid of the Indian population of Tūstĕpēc, a military road across the marsh leading to Ămĭstān, (seven leagues in extent), which is even now acknowledged by the most scientific men of the day to be a very extraordinary work. From Ămĭstān, he proceeded, on the 7th of September, to Plāyă Vĭcēntĕ, a depôt for the Veracruz merchants in their trade with Ŏăxācă; there he was overtaken by a Royalist force of eleven hundred men, under Colonel Tŏpētĕ, which he defeated on the 10th of September, having selected so favourable a position for the engagement, that it more than compensated for the inferiority of his own numbers. But finding that his plan for occupying Guăsăcūalcŏ was discovered, he returned to Tĕhŭacān, where a force of 4,000 men, under Colonel Brāchŏ, was detached against him by the Viceroy, ​by which he was besieged in Cērrŏ Cŏlŏrādŏ, and ultimately compelled to surrender that fortress, on the 21st of January, 1817.
Tĕrān lived in obscurity, and under the strictest surveillance, at La Puebla, (his life having been secured by the capitulation), until the second Revolution of 1821.
He has since been Minister of War, (in 1823), and was appointed by the President, Minister Plenipotentiary in England, in 1825. This choice was disapproved of by the Senate, some of the members of which body were induced, by feelings, (I fancy) of a personal nature, to establish what was generally regarded as a very dangerous precedent, by raking up old revolutionary stories, and urging against Teran the dissolution of the Congress, in 1815, as a disqualification for public employment, without reflecting how few men there are, at present, in Mexico, whose conduct, during that stormy period, could support a rigorous investigation.
During the last two years, Tĕrān has led a very retired life, occupied principally with scientific pursuits, and the mathematics, in which he has always excelled. As an engineer and military chief, few amongst the old Insurgents could be compared with him.
His division was always remarkable for its discipline, and yet, he is said to have possessed the art of inspiring his followers with the warmest attachment to his person. He is still young (about 34), ​and his talents must, sooner or later, lead him to distinction.
The early career of Răyōn we have seen in the beginning of this sketch. During the prosperity of Morelos, he acted as one of his lieutenants, but always retained a sort of independent command in the mountainous parts of the province of Văllădŏlīd, where he was supported by the affection of the natives, and by the natural strength of the country. His principal strong-hold was in the Cerro de Cōpŏrŏ, where he was besieged, in January 1815, by a formidable Royalist force, under Brigadier Llano, and Iturbide, which retired with loss, after an unsuccessful assault upon the works, on the 4th of March. From this moment Cōpŏrŏ became an object of particular attention to the Spanish Government. The country about it was laid waste, in order to deprive the garrison of supplies, and, during the absence of Don Ignacio Rayon, the fortress was again invested by Colonel Ăgūirrĕ, to whom it was surrendered on the 2nd of January 1817. Răyōn himself was soon afterwards taken prisoner by General Armijo, having been deserted by all his adherents, and confined in the Capital until 1821. He has since obtained the rank of General, and holds, at present, a high situation under Government in the Interior.
The fate of Don Nĭcŏlās Brāvŏ was similar to that of his former companions. After the dissolution of the Congress he wandered for some time ​over the country, at the head of a small division, without being able to make head against the superior forces by which he was surrounded. On Mina's landing he occupied the mountain of Coporo, which he endeavoured to fortify anew, during the summer of 1817; but he was driven from it by a Royalist division, and, ultimately, taken prisoner by Armijo, (in December 1817,) by whom he was transmitted to the Capital, where he was imprisoned until 1821. After aiding Iturbide to establish the Independence, he declared against him, when he dissolved the Congress, and took a leading part in the contest, by which the Ex-Emperor was deposed. He was afterwards one of the three Members of the Executive Power, and, ultimately, a candidate for the first Presidency with Victoria, under whom he has served as Vice-President during the last three years.
​with the country, (which is extremely mountainous and intricate,) and an unlimited influence over the minds of his followers, made up for all deficiencies in point of numbers, and rendered Victoria, very shortly, the terror of the Spanish troops.
It was his practice to keep but a small body of men about his person, and only to collect his force upon great occasions: a mode of warfare well suited to the wild habits of the natives, and, at the same time, calculated to baffle all pursuit. The instant a blow was struck, a general dispersion followed: in the event of a failure, a rendezvous was fixed for some distant point; and thus losses were often repaired, before it was known in the Capital that they had been sustained at all.
Nor were Victoria's exploits confined to this desultory warfare: in 1815 he detained a convoy of 6000 mules, escorted by 2000 men, under the command of Colonel Aguila, at Pūēntĕ dĕl Rēy, (a pass, the natural strength of which the Insurgents had increased by placing artillery upon the heights, by which it is commanded,) nor did it reach Veracruz for upwards of six months. The necessity of keeping the channel of communication with Europe open, induced Calleja, in December 1815, to intrust the chief command, both Civil and Military, of the Province of Veracruz, to Don Fernando Mĭyārĕs, (an officer of high rank, and distinguished attainments, recently arrived from Spain,) for the special purpose of establishing a chain of ​fortified posts, on the whole ascent to the Table-land, sufficiently strong to curb Victoria's incursions. The execution of this plan was preceded, and accompanied, by a series of actions between the Insurgents and Royalists, in the course of which Miyares gradually drove Victoria from his strong-holds at Puente del Key and Puente de San Juan; (September 1815,) and although the latter maintained the unequal struggle for upwards of two years, he never was able to obtain any decisive advantage over the reinforcements, which the Government was continually sending to the seat of war. Two thousand European troops landed with Mĭyārĕs, and one thousand more with Apŏdācă, (in 1816;) and notwithstanding the desperate efforts of Victoria's men, their courage was of no avail against the superior discipline, and arms, of their adversaries. In the course of the year 1816, most of his old soldiers fell: those by whom he replaced them had neither the same enthusiasm, nor the same attachment to his person. The zeal with which the inhabitants had engaged in the cause of the Revolution was worn out: with each reverse their discouragement increased, and, as the disastrous accounts from the Interior left them but little hope of bringing the contest to a favourable issue, the villages refused to furnish any farther supplies; the last remnant of Victoria's followers deserted him, and he was left absolutely alone. Still, his courage was unsubdued, and his resolution not to yield, on any ​terms, to the Spaniards, unshaken. He refused the rank and rewards which Apodaca proffered as the price of his submission, and determined to seek an asylum in the solitude of the forests, rather than accept the indulto, on the faith of which so many of the Insurgents yielded up their arms. This extraordinary project was carried into execution with a decision highly characteristic of the man. Unaccompanied by a single attendant, and provided only with a little linen, and a sword, Victoria threw himself into the mountainous district which occupies so large a portion of the Province of Veracruz, and disappeared to the eyes of his countrymen. His after-history is so extremely wild, that I should hardly venture to relate it here, did not the unanimous evidence of his countrymen confirm the story of his sufferings, as I have often heard it from his own mouth.
During the first few weeks, Victoria was supplied with provisions by the Indians, who all knew and respected his name; but Apodaca was so apprehensive that he would again emerge from his retreat, that a thousand men were ordered out, in small detachments, literally to hunt him down. Wherever it was discovered that a village had either received him, or relieved his wants, it was burnt without mercy; and this rigour struck the Indians with such terror, that they either fled at the sight of Victoria, or were the first to denounce the approach of a man, whose presence might prove so fatal to them. For ​upwards of six months, he was followed like a wild beast by his pursuers, who were often so near him, that he could hear their imprecations against himself, and Apodaca too, for having condemned them to so fruitless a search. On one occasion, he escaped a detachment, which he fell in with unexpectedly, by swimming a river, which they were unable to cross; and on several others, he concealed himself, when in the immediate vicinity of the Royal troops, beneath the thick shrubs, and creepers, with which the woods of Veracruz abound. At last a story was made up, to satisfy the Viceroy, of a body having been found, which had been recognized as that of Victoria. A minute description was given of his person, which was inserted officially in the Gazette of Mexico, and the troops were recalled to more pressing labours in the Interior.
But Victoria's trials did not cease with the pursuit: harassed, and worn-out, by the fatigues which he had undergone, his clothes torn to pieces, and his body lacerated by the thorny underwood of the Tropics, he was indeed allowed a little tranquillity, but his sufferings were still almost incredible: during the summer, he managed to subsist upon the fruits of which nature is so lavish in those climates; but in winter he was attenuated by hunger, and I have heard him repeatedly affirm, that no repast has afforded him so much pleasure since, as he experienced, after being long deprived of food, in gnawing the bones of horses, or other animals, that he happened ​to find dead in the woods. By degrees he accustomed himself to such abstinence, that he could remain four, and even five days, without tasting any thing but water, without experiencing any serious inconvenience; but whenever he was deprived of sustenance for a longer period, his sufferings were very acute. For thirty months he never tasted bread, nor saw a human being, nor thought, at times, ever to see one again. His clothes were reduced to a single wrapper of cotton, which he found one day, when driven by hunger he had approached nearer than usual to some Indian huts, and this he regarded as an inestimable treasure.
The mode in which Victoria, cut off, as he was, from all communication with the world, received intelligence of the Revolution of 1821, is hardly less extraordinary than the fact of his having been able to support existence amidst so many hardships, during the intervening period.
When in 1818 he was abandoned by all the rest of his men, he was asked by two Indians, who lingered with him to the last, and on whose fidelity he knew that he could rely, if any change took place, where he wished them to look for him? He pointed, in reply, to a mountain at some distance, and ​told them that, on that mountain, perhaps, they might find his bones. His only reason for selecting it, was its being particularly rugged, and inaccessible, and surrounded by forests of a vast extent.
The Indians treasured up this hint, and as soon as the first news of Iturbide's declaration reached them, they set out in quest of Victoria; they separated on arriving at the foot of the mountain, and employed six whole weeks in examining the woods with which it was covered; during this time, they lived principally by the chase; but finding their stock of maize exhausted, and all their efforts unavailing, they were about to give up the attempt, when one of them discovered, in crossing a ravine, which Victoria occasionally frequented, the print of a foot, which he immediately recognized to be that of an European. By European, I mean of European descent, and consequently accustomed to wear shoes, which always give a difference of shape to the foot, very perceptible to the eye of a native. The Indian waited two days upon the spot; but seeing nothing of Victoria, and finding his supply of provisions quite at an end, he suspended upon a tree, near the place, four Tortillas, or little maize cakes, which were all he had left, and set out for his village, in order to replenish his wallets, hoping that if Victoria should pass in the mean time, the Tortillas would attract his attention, and convince him that some friend was in search of him.
His little plan succeeded completely: Victoria, on ​crossing the ravine, two days afterwards, perceived the maize cakes, which the birds had fortunately not devoured. He had then been four whole days without eating, and upwards of two years without tasting bread; and he says, himself, that he devoured the tortillas before the cravings of his appetite would allow him to reflect upon the singularity of finding them on this solitary spot, where he had never before seen any trace of a human being. He was at a loss to determine whether they had been left there by friend, or foe; but feeling sure that whoever had left them intended to return, he concealed himself near the place, in order to observe his motions, and to take his own measures accordingly.
Within a short time the Indian returned; Victoria instantly recognized him, and abruptly started from his concealment, in order to welcome his faithful follower; but the man, terrified at seeing a phantom covered with hair, emaciated, and clothed only with an old cotton wrapper, advancing upon him with a sword in his hand, from amongst the bushes, took to flight; and it was only on hearing himself repeatedly called by his name, that he recovered his composure sufficiently to recognize his old general. He was affected beyond measure at the state in which he found him, and conducted him instantly to his village, where Victoria was received with the greatest enthusiasm. The report of his re-appearance spread, like lightning, through the Province, ​where it was not credited at first, so firmly was every one convinced of his death; but as soon as it was known that Guădĕlūpĕ Vĭctōriă was indeed in existence, all the old Insurgents rallied around him. In an incredibly short time, he induced the whole Province, with the exception of the fortified towns, to declare for Independence, and then set out to join Iturbide, who was, at that time, preparing for the siege of Mexico. He was received with great apparent cordiality; but his independent spirit was too little in unison with Iturbide's projects, for this good understanding to continue long. Victoria had fought for a liberal form of Government, and not merely for a change of masters; and Iturbide, unable to gain him over, drove him again into the woods during his short-lived reign, from whence he only returned to give the signal for a general rising against the too ambitious Emperor.
I have now brought the history of the Revolution up to the year 1817, which was distinguished by the expedition of Don Xavier Mina, the famous Spanish Guerilla chief, (nephew to Espoz y Mina, now in England,) who, driven from Spain by his unsuccessful attempt to create a rising in favour of the Cortes, at Pampeluna, after the dissolution of that assembly by the King, resolved to advocate the same cause in Mexico, and landed for that purpose on the coast, with a small body of foreigners, (principally Americans,) on the 15th of April 1817.
Nothing could be more unfortunate than the ​moment chosen by Mina for this attempt. All the leaders of any note in the first Insurrection had, (as we have seen) successively disappeared from the scene, and the cause of the Revolution had fallen into the hands of defenders, with whom it was a disgrace to be associated. Such was the infamous Padre Torres, who had established a sort of half-priestly, half-military despotism in the Băxīŏ, the whole of which he had parcelled out amongst his Military Commandants,—men, mostly, without principle or virtue, whose only recommendation was implicit obedience to the will of their Chief. From his fortress, on the top of the mountain of Los Rĕmēdĭŏs, Torres was the scourge of the whole country around; vindictive, sanguinary, and treacherous by nature, he spared none who had the misfortune to offend him, whether Creole or Spaniard, and did more towards devastating the most fertile portion of the Mexican territory, by his capricious mandates for the destruction of towns and villages, under pretence of cutting off the supplies of the enemy, than all those who had preceded him, whether Royalists or Insurgents, during the five first years of the war. Robinson mentions several instances of the most wanton barbarity on the part of this man, which are confirmed by the general detestation in which his name is held, to this day, by his countrymen: yet, under his auspices, existed the only shadow of a Government, that was still kept up by the Insurgents. It was termed the Junta of Jāūxīllă, from ​a little fort, in the centre of a marsh, in the Province of Valladolid, which was its usual residence; but it possessed little influence, and no authority, being composed entirely of creatures of the Padre Torres. The country was, however, still overrun by parties of Insurgent cavalry, and Torres was in possession of three fortified places; (Los Rĕmēdĭŏs, Jāūxīllă, and Sŏmbrērŏ,) but, with the exception of Guerrero's corps, with which, from the Eastern coast, no junction could possibly be effected, there was no force bearing a respectable character collected upon any one point. The armies of Hidalgo and Morelos were reduced to mere predatory bands; while the Royalist forces, increased by successive reinforcements from the Peninsula, were in possession of all the towns, and of most of the military stations calculated to maintain a communication between them.
Still there was a feeling in the country so decidedly in favour of the Independent cause,—a feeling so strong, so universal, (as was proved four years later,) that had Mina succeeded in awakening it, his success would have been almost certain; but he struck the wrong chord. He was a Spaniard, and, very naturally, did not forget the land of his birth, nor wish to deprive it of the most precious jewel in its Crown. Constitutional liberty therefore, or, in other words, such liberty as the Mexicans could hope to enjoy under the Constitution of 1812, without an absolute separation from the Mother-country, was ​what he sought to establish in Mexico. He did not indeed proclaim this, but he proclaimed nothing else; and the uncertainty of the Creoles with regard to his intentions, was increased by the confidence shown in them by many of his own countrymen, (particularly the merchants of Veracruz,) who wished for the re-establishment of the Constitutional system, but not, of course, for a separation between Mexico and Spain. The Creoles had, therefore, reason to suppose that the change to be effected by Mina, if successful, would be to them little more than a change of masters; and this apprehension, together with the smallness of Mina's force, which was so inconsiderable as to check the hopes even of his warmest partizans, rendered them passive spectators of the contest, upon which he was about to enter, with the armies of the King.
Nothing could be, apparently, more unequal than this contest. Mina, on landing, had with him only three hundred and fifty-nine men, including officers, of whom fifty-one deserted him, under the command of Colonel Perry, before he commenced his march into the interior of the country. One hundred more were left to garrison a little fort, which was erected, as a depot, at Sŏtŏ lă Mărīnă, (where Mina landed,) under the orders of Major Sarda; and with the remainder, reinforced by a few straggling Insurgents, Mina attempted to effect a junction with the Independent party in the Băxīŏ, (the very heart of Mexico,) in the face of several detachments of the ​Royal army infinitely superior to him in numbers. He left Soto la Marina on the 24th of May; and after suffering dreadfully from the want of provisions and water on his march through the Tierra Caliente from the coast, he reached the town of El Valle del Maiz, situated on the river Pănūcŏ, in the Intendancy of San Luis Pŏtŏsī, and near the confines of the Table-land, on the 8th of June 1817. Here he found a body of four hundred Royal cavalry, which he defeated; and this successful action enabled him to allow his troops two days' rest after their fatigues. On the 14th of June his little corps reached the Hacienda de Pĕŏtīllŏs, where it was destined to meet with the first serious opposition to its progress. Brigadier Ărmiñān, at the head of nine hundred and eighty European infantry, of the regiments of Estremadura and America, and eleven hundred of the Rio Verde (Creole) cavalry, occupied the road to the Interior, and an engagement in the field, or a siege in the Hacienda, became inevitable. Mina resolved upon the first, aware that delay would only bring reinforcements to the Royalist army, while he had none to expect. He therefore posted his whole force, consisting of one hundred and seventy-two men, (a small detachment was left in charge of the baggage and ammunition,) upon a little eminence, which commanded the surrounding plain, and there awaited Ărmiñān's approach. He was soon enveloped by the Royalist ​forces; but his men, rendered desperate by the apparent hopelessness of their situation, invited him to lead them down into the plain, where they made so furious a charge upon the Spanish line, that, notwithstanding their immense superiority in point of numbers, Armiñān's troops were put to the rout, and sought safety in a precipitate flight. It is said that the use of buckshot, in lieu of balls, by the soldiers of Mina, contributed not a little to the panic, with which their opponents were struck; many of his men loaded their muskets with eighteen of these shot, and reserved their fire until they were within a few paces of the Royal ranks. Be this as it may, the dispersion was general; and although there was no pursuit, Arminan and his staff did not stop in their flight for many leagues from the field of battle: the cavalry was not heard of for four days. But on his side, Mina sustained a serious loss; eleven officers, and nineteen men were killed, and twenty six wounded, some so severely as to be unable to follow the march of the army. Nor did circumstances admit of his delaying, for a single day, his advance towards the Baxīo, where alone he could hope to increase the number of his adherents. While unsupported by the Insurgents, another such victory as that of Pĕŏtīllŏs, would have proved fatal to him. The division, therefore, moved forward on the morning of the 16th June. On the 18th it reached Pinos, a small mining town in the Intendancy of ​Zăcătēcăs, which, though defended by three hundred Royalists, was carried by surprise, by a small detachment of Mina's troops during the night of the 19th. On the 22d, after three days of forced marches, during which they crossed a country desolated by the war, where neither provisions, nor houses, were to be found, Mina's advanced guard fell in with a party of the Insurgents of the Băxīŏ, under the command of Don Crĭstōvăl Nāvă, with whom he at last opened the long-desired communication.
Robinson's description of Mina's new allies is very correct, and very characteristic. He represents them as fine athletic men, admirably mounted, armed with lances and sabres, (in the use of which they all excel) with round jackets, decorated with a quantity of gold or silver-lace, velveteen breeches, (also embroidered,) deer-skin wrappers round the leg, gartered at the knee, shoes of the country, open on one side above the ankle,—immense iron spurs, inlaid with silver, with rowels four inches in diameter,—open shirt-collars, and hats of the country, with a very broad brim, and silver band, ornamented in front with a picture of the Virgin of Guădĕlūpĕ, (the patroness of the Insurgents) inclosed in a frame, and protected by a glass. Such was, and is, the costume of those men, by whom the first shock was given to the power of Spain in America. They compose the agricultural population of the country, and are known in the towns by the denomination ​of Rănchērŏs; a name, which always conveys to any one acquainted with the country the idea of great activity, strength, and excellent horsemanship, combined with all the peculiarities of dress which I have just been describing.
Nava conducted Mina to a large Rancho, in possession of the Insurgents, which he was allowed to reach, without any opposition, by a body of Royalists, seven hundred strong, under the command of Colonel Orrantia, who had been deputed by the Viceroy for the express purpose of preventing this junction, but was discouraged from attempting it by the recollection of the battle of Peotillos. After refreshing his men there, who were almost exhausted with a four-days' fast, the division proceeded to Sŏmbrērŏ, (one of the three strong-holds still in the possession of the Insurgents,) which it reached on the 24th of June, having, in thirty days, traversed a tract of country two hundred and twenty leagues in extent, and been three times engaged with an enemy of infinitely superior strength.
Mina only allowed his men four days of repose at Sombrero, after which he undertook an expedition, in conjunction with his new allies, Don Pedro Moreno, (the Commandant of the fort,) and the famous Insurgent partizan, Encărnācĭōn Ortīz, against San ​Jūān dĕ los Llānŏs, where a Royalist division of three hundred cavalry, and four hundred infantry, under the command of Don Felipe Căstăñōn, was stationed. Căstăñōn was one of the most enterprising of the Royalist officers, and, like Iturbide, had been almost uniformly successful in his expeditions: but his military achievements were tarnished by his sanguinary character, and by the cruelty with which, even under the mild Government of Apodaca, he uniformly sacrificed the prisoners, whom the event of an action had thrown into his hands. His success alone caused these enormities to be tolerated, but he was too valuable a partizan for his services to be dispensed with, and, at the time of Mina's arrival, the flying division, which he commanded, was the terror of the whole Baxio.
The forces with which Mina prepared to meet it, consisted of his own division, (about two hundred strong, including new recruits,) with a detachment of fifty Creole infantry, and eighty lancers, under Mŏrēnŏ, and Encarnacion Ortiz. On the morning of the action, (the 29th June,) he was joined by a few more Insurgents, who increased his numbers to four hundred, but of these new arrivals, few were armed for service in the field, being provided mostly with rusty muskets, all without bayonets, and many without flints.
The two parties met in the plains which divide the town of San Fĕlīpĕ from that of San Jūān, and in eight minutes the action was decided. Colonel ​Young, at the head of Mina's infantry, advanced close to the enemy, gave them one volley, and then charged with the bayonet, while the cavalry, under Major Maylefer, (a Swiss, who was killed in the action,) after breaking that of the enemy, turned upon the infantry, already in confusion, and actually cut them to pieces. Căstăñōn himself was killed, with three hundred and thirty-nine of his men: two hundred and twenty more were taken prisoners, and not above one hundred and fifty effected their escape. A more destructive engagement (considering the smallness of the numbers on both sides,) is not, perhaps, on record. Castañon's division was annihilated, and its fate was celebrated by the exultation of the whole Baxio, which had so long groaned under the inexorable tyranny of its chief.
Mina, after striking this blow, returned to Sombrero, from whence he again set out in a few days, on an expedition against the Hacienda of Jărāl, accompanied by a small detachment. This Hacienda, of which a more particular description will be found in another part of this work, belonged to Don Juan Mŏncādă, (Marques del Jărāl, and Conde de Săn Mătēŏ,) a Creole nobleman of immense wealth, but thought to be devoted to the Royal cause. His estate was fortified, and garrisoned by a Royalist detachment, which, in conjunction with the number of his own immediate dependants and retainers, had ​preserved him from the incursions of the Insurgents during the earlier stages of the Revolution: but the dread of Mina's name induced the Marquis to abandon all idea of resistance upon his approach. He quitted his house, and fled with his escort to San Luis Pŏtŏsī, while Mina occupied the Hacienda without opposition, and proceeded to take possession of its most valuable contents. The Marquis was known to have very large sums in specie, concealed about the house; and one of these secret hoards having been discovered, by the treachery of a servant, beneath the floor of a room adjoining the kitchen, one hundred and forty thousand dollars were dug out, and transferred to Mina's military chest. This is the estimate given by Mina's friends, but the Marquis himself made his loss amount to three hundred thousand dollars, and such he states it to have been, at the present day. But without entering into any controversy as to the amount, the fact of the private property of a Creole nobleman having been seized by Mina, as good and lawful booty, according to his ideas of the laws of war, was universally known, and certainly did not tend to increase the number of his adherents. Most of the great landed proprietors of the country had taken the same line as the Marquis of the Jaral, and not only kept upon terms with the Government, but assisted it by contributions, not voluntary indeed, but in proportion to the supposed means of each. If this compliance with the requisitions, of the Viceroy were ​construed into an act of positive hostility, there was no security for the property of any one, in the event of Mina's success. It was true, indeed, that the Marquis of the Jaral had accepted the rank of Colonel in the Spanish service, and that, out of the funds supplied by him, the Government had raised a regiment, which bore his name. Still he had taken no active part in the war, and consequently he was one of those, whom Mina professed to have come to defend: he was a Mexican born, and one, too, who held an enormous stake in the country; and, on all these accounts, the seizure of his property was very generally considered as an unwarrantable act.
The success of Mina in the interior of the country was counterbalanced by the loss of the fort which he had erected at Soto la Marina, upon the coast, and which was of importance to him, not only as containing his dêpot of arms, and military stores, but as the only medium of communication with the United States. He left there, as I have already stated, a garrison of one hundred and thirteen men, under Major Sarda. On the 11th of June the place was invested by a division of two thousand two hundred men, with nineteen pieces of artillery, under the orders of General Ărrĕdōūdŏ, the commander-in-chief of the Eastern Internal provinces. On the 14th, a constant fire was kept up, by which the few guns which defended the mud-walls of the fort were dismounted; and on the 15th three general assaults were made, all of which were repulsed ​with the utmost gallantry, by the garrison. Discouraged by these repeated checks, General Arredoudo proposed terms, which were acceded to by Major Sarda; and, after stipulating for the honours of war, liberty on parole for the officers, and the free departure of the men for their respective homes and countries, thirty-seven men and officers, (the little remnant of the garrison,) grounded their arms before fifteen hundred of the enemy. The Royalists lost three hundred men in the three assaults upon the fort, a circumstance which may explain, though it cannot excuse, their disgraceful violation of the capitulation. Instead of being treated as prisoners of war, and allowed to leave Mexico for the United States, Major Sarda and his men were transferred, in irons, by the most circuitous route, and amidst a thousand intentional aggravations of their sufferings, to the dungeons of the Castle of St. John, at Veracruz, where they were confined, with thirty others of Mina's men, taken afterwards in the Interior, until they were reduced to half their original number. The survivors were removed to Spain, where, by a special decree of the 11th of June 1818, they were condemned to the Presidios of Ceuta, Melilla, and Cadiz, where they all, I believe, have terminated their wretched existence, as convicts (Presidiarios) linked with the refuse of Spanish gaols, and reduced to the lowest state of degradation, of which human nature is susceptible.
Mina was greatly affected by this reverse, the ​news of which reached him at the time when his exertions to organize a respectable force, in the vicinity of Sombrero, were counteracted by the jealousy of the Padre Torres, who could not be induced to co-operate with a man, of whose superior abilities he was, at once, jealous, and afraid. The time which was lost by his procrastination, and bad faith, was turned by the Royalists to account. Apodaca gradually concentrated his forces, which he placed under the orders of the Mariscal de campo Don Pascual Liñan, who, about the middle of July, was known to be upon his route towards the Baxio, at the head of five thousand men. Mina's troops did not exceed five hundred in number, and these were diminished by an ill-judged attempt upon the town of Lĕōn, by the occupation of which he wished to anticipate Liñan's arrival. The place was garrisoned, unexpectedly, by an advanced corps of the Royal army, and when Mina attacked it, he was repulsed with the loss of one hundred men. He retired immediately to Sombrero, which was invested, soon afterwards, by Liñan, who appeared before it, on the 30th of July, with a force of three thousand five hundred and forty-one men.
The garrison, which, (including women and children,) amounted to nine hundred, was soon reduced to the greatest distress by the want of water, the fort having previously drawn its supplies from a barranca, (ravine,) at the foot of the mountain, all communication with which was cut off by one of the ​enemy's batteries. There was no well in the place, and, although in the midst of the rainy season, the clouds, which deluged the country around, passed over the rock, upon which this ill-fated fortress stood. At length, a few partial showers afforded some relief, and Mina seeing the spirits of his men revive, made an attempt on the entrenchments of the enemy, on the night of the 8th of August, in which he was unsuccessful. His good star seemed to have deserted him: eleven of the little band of foreigners, to whom he was indebted for his first successes, fell upon this occasion: some died upon the spot, and others were only wounded. The fate of the last was, perhaps, the most melancholy; for, on the following morning, they were carried to a spot immediately in sight of the walls of the fort, and there strangled in the sight of their old comrades.
On the 9th of August, Mina, finding that the reinforcements and supplies promised by the Padre Torres, did not appear, quitted the fortress, accompanied only by three companions, in order to concert measures with the Insurgents without, for collecting a force sufficient to raise the siege. In this he completely failed: the cause of the Insurrection was in much too low a state to admit of the organization of a body numerous enough to contend with Liñan's force, and Mina, as a last resource, was compelled to send orders to Colonel Young, to evacuate the place by night.
Before these orders were received, that officer ​had perished. He died in repulsing an assault made by the enemy, on the 18th of August, which he effected, although the previous sufferings of the garrison had reduced his numbers to one hundred and fifty effective men. Upon his death, the command devolved upon Lieutenant-colonel Bradburn, who attempted to abandon the fort on the night of the 19th of August. But, amidst such a multitude of women and children, to preserve order was impossible; their screams and cries alarmed the enemy, whose whole force was immediately put under arms: many of the fugitives were shot down, before they could cross the ravine: the rest, who, from their ignorance of the country, were wandering about the mountains in small parties of six and seven each, were cut off by the cavalry, which was detached for the purpose, on the following morning. Out of Mina's whole corps not fifty escaped. No quarter was given in the field, and the unfortunate wretches who had been left in the hospital wounded, were, by Liñan's orders, carried, or dragged along the ground, from their beds to the square, where they were stripped, and shot.
The result of the siege of Sombrero was fatal to all Mina's hopes. With his foreign officers, of whom only eleven ever rejoined him, he lost the means of disciplining his Creole recruits, and the men were all tried soldiers, on whom he could reckon in the hour of need. They were not to be replaced by numbers, and Mina attempted in vain, with his ​Mexican allies, enterprizes, in which, with his original forces, (inconsiderable as they were) he would have been almost certain of success. It was not that the Creoles were deficient in personal courage: on the contrary, they possessed both that, and all the other elements of excellent soldiers; but, in a contest with disciplined troops, nothing could compensate the want of discipline, no sort of attention to which had been paid by the Padre Torres, or any of his subordinate chiefs. They indulged their men in all the licentiousness, in which they habitually indulged themselves; and thus, though individually formidable, they were totally inefficient when called upon to act in a body. Such were the tools with which Mina was compelled to work. At an interview with the Padre Torres, it was determined that, in the event of the fort of Los Remedios being besieged by Liñan, (as it was shortly afterwards,) Mina should take the field with a body of nine hundred Insurgent cavalry, and endeavour to harass the besieging army by cutting off its supplies, while the Padre, with the remnant of Mina's officers, conducted the defence of the place. This was conceived to be an easy task, as the fort was, in fact, a natural fortification, being one of a lofty chain of mountains which rise out of the plains of the Băxīŏ, between Sĭlāŏ and Pēnjămŏ, separated by precipices, and immensely-deep barrancas, from the rest. On one point alone it was vulnerable; but there, a wall three feet in thickness was erected, ​and the approach enfiladed by three batteries, which rose in succession one above the other. So large a space was inclosed by the ravines, that the fort contained six hundred head of cattle, two thousand sheep or goats, and three hundred large hogs, with twenty thousand fanegas of Indian corn, ten thousand of wheat, and a large provision of flour. It was likewise well supplied with water and ammunition; so that the garrison, which consisted of fifteen hundred men, conceived that they might bid defiance to any force that could be brought by the Royalists against them.
On the approach of Liñan's army, which appeared before Los Remedios on the 27th of August, Mina quitted it, in order to take the field, and the place was immediately invested in due form. On the 30th, he was joined by Don Encarnacion Ortiz at the head of his cavalry, and with him he found nineteen of his old followers, of whom six were officers: these, with thirty more who had previously reached Los Remedios, and whom Mina left there to assist in the defence of the place, were the only survivors of the three hundred and fifty-nine men who landed with him at Sŏtŏ lă Mărīnă in the preceding April: all the rest had perished; and but few of those who remained were destined to escape the fate of their comrades.
On the 31st of August, the siege of Los Remedios began, and with it, a desultory Guerrilla war, which was carried on, with but little success on Mina's side, ​against a division of eight hundred men, under the command of Colonel Orrantia, which was detached to watch his motions, and to protect the supplies of the army. After passing nearly the whole month of September in this manner, Mina, convinced both of the impossibility of attacking Liñan's intrenchments with the troops under his command, and of the necessity of striking a blow of sufficient importance elsewhere, to induce the Royalists to raise the siege, resolved to attempt to surprise Guănăjūātŏ, where, it is said, that he had received assurances of a disposition to assist him being entertained by several of the principal inhabitants. Not only his friends, but the members of the Junta of Jāūxīllă, whom he consulted upon this occasion, remonstrated strongly against this enterprize, but in vain: Mina's mind was bent upon it, and, on the 24th of October, he succeeded, by secret and well-combined marches, in concentrating his whole force at a little mine called La Mina de la Luz, in the very midst of the mountains, and only four leagues from the town, without the Spanish Authorities being in the least aware of his approach. At nightfall, he attacked the gates, which were carried almost without opposition, and his troops penetrated into the very centre of the town; but there, their subordination and courage failed them at once. The men refused to advance; time was given for the garrison to be put under arms, and no sooner were a few shots exchanged, than Mina's whole division took to flight, ​and that with such precipitation, that only five of the whole number were killed. A general dispersion ensued, by Mina's own order, who appears to have been too thoroughly disgusted with his new associates, to hope ever to effect any thing with their assistance; nor is it known what line he intended to take, had time been allowed him for deliberation. This, however, was not the case. On quitting Guanajuato, accompanied only by a very small escort, he took the road to the Rancho del Vĕnădītŏ, in the direction of the Hacienda of La Tlăchĭjēră, which belonged to Don Mariano Herrera, a friend whom he probably wished to consult with regard to his future plans. He arrived at the Rancho on the 26th, and resolved to pass the night there, conceiving it impossible that Orrantia should have received intelligence of his route, as he had purposely avoided all beaten roads. His intentions, however, were discovered by a friar, whom he met at a little Indian village through which he passed, and who instantly conveyed the news to Orrantia, who detached, on receiving it, a party of five hundred horse, which invested the house at day-break on the 27th, and, after dispersing Mina's escort, seized the General himself, in the act of rushing out of the house, unarmed, and almost undressed, in order to ascertain the cause of the confusion without. Don Pedro Mŏrēnŏ, the Commandant of Sŏmbrērŏ, was taken at the same time, and immediately shot.
Mina was conveyed pinioned to Ĭrăpŭătŏ, where ​he was presented to Orrantia, who had the meanness not only to revile his fallen enemy in the most opprobrious terms, but actually to strike him repeatedly with the flat of his sword. Mina's rebuke was dignified and striking: "I regret to have become a prisoner, but to have fallen into the hands of a man, regardless alike of the character of a Spaniard and a soldier, renders my misfortune doubly keen."
From the hands of this unworthy foe, he was removed to Liñan's head quarters, where he received the treatment due to a soldier, and a gentleman, though every precaution was taken to prevent the possibility of an escape.
On the 10th of November, the courier, whom Liñan had sent to the Capital, to take Apŏdācă's commands with regard to his prisoner's fate, returned with orders for his immediate execution; and, on the 11th, this sentence was carried into effect, in the presence of all the surgeons of the army, and the captains of each company, who were directed to certify the fact of his death.
Mina is said to have met his fate with great firmness. He appears, however, to have entertained, latterly, some doubts with regard to the cause which he had espoused, and an anxious wish to clear his memory, with his own countrymen, from the imputation of having wished to separate Mexico from Spain. With this view, I presume, he wrote a ​letter to General Liñan, on the 3d of November, the authenticity of which, though denied by Robinson, has been established by the discovery of the original in Mina's hand, by Don Carlos Bustamante, in which he assures him, that "if he had ever ceased to be a good Spaniard, it was erroneously, and not intentionally, that he had done so:" and adds, "that he is convinced that the Independent party can never succeed in Mexico, and must occasion the ruin of the country." That such should have been Mina's sentiments, after the experience which he had of the men, by whom the Insurgent cause was then supported, is perfectly natural. He knew not how deeply the love of Independence was implanted in every Creole's heart, and, as I have already observed, he was precluded by his position as a Spaniard from ever awakening those feelings in the mass of the people, which alone could have ensured him success.
They watched his career with interest, and would gladly have availed themselves of his success; but the re-establishment of a Constitution, from which no one expected to derive any good, was not calculated to awaken enthusiasm, or inspire confidence. Independence, as a Spaniard, he could not, and did not proclaim.
Mina died in his twenty-eighth year. He was shot on a rock in sight of Los Remedios, and his fate contributed, not a little, to strike the garrison with ​discouragement. The siege was, however, protracted until the end of December, (a general assault made on the 16th of November having been successfully repulsed,) when, from the total want of ammunition, the evacuation of the fort was resolved upon. The 1st of January, 1818, was fixed for the attempt, which was attended with much the same results as that of Sombrero. Indeed, it proved more generally fatal; for the Spaniards, taught by experience, had raised immense piles of wood in every direction, which were fired on the first alarm, and enabled the Royalist soldiers to follow their flying enemies through all the intricacies of the ravines around. With the exception of Padre Torres, and twelve of Mina's division, few or none of the fugitives escaped. The fate of the women, of whom there were great numbers in the fort, was too horrible to be mentioned. The wounded were not excepted from the general proscription: the hospital in which they lay was fired at all the four corners at once, and those who attempted to escape the flames, were bayoneted as soon as they reached the square without: the few prisoners to whom the soldiers had given quarter in the first instance, were compelled to demolish the works of the fort, and then all shot. Amongst them was Colonel Nŏbōă, Mina's second in command, and two other officers, who had been in all his actions.
The fort of Jāūxīllă had been invested before the fall of Los Rĕmēdĭŏs, (15th December, 1817,) by a ​detachment of Liñan's army, commanded by Colonel Ăgūirrĕ. The defence, conducted principally by two of Mina's officers, Lawrence Christie and James Dewers, was maintained with spirit until the first week in March, 1818, when the two Americans were treacherously seized by the Creole Commandant, Lopez de Lara, and delivered over bound, as a peace offering, to Aguirre. To his honour, be it said, that he was so disgusted with the perfidy of Lāră, that he exerted his whole influence with the Viceroy, in order to obtain the pardon of the Americans, and succeeded. Of all those who fell into the hands of the Spaniards, they alone were spared.
The fortress surrendered on the 6th of March 1818, and with it the Insurgents lost their last strong-hold in the centre of the country. The members of the Government escaped, before the place was fully invested, and sought a refuge in Guerrero's camp, in the Tierra Caliente of Valladolid. This was soon the only place in which even a shadow of resistance was kept up. The tyranny of Torres, which seemed to increase with his misfortunes, soon became intolerable to his associates in the Baxio, and urged by their remonstrances, the Government deprived him of his commission, as General-in-chief, with which they invested Colonel Ărāgŏ, who, in conjunction with Don Andres Dĕlgādŏ, (better known under the name of Ĕl Gīrŏ,) endeavoured to compel Torres to submission.
The contest between them would not have been ​decided without an appeal to arms, had not the approach of a Royalist Division terminated the dispute; Torres's friends soon afterwards gave in their submission to Arago, and the Padre himself, after leading a fugitive life for some months in the mountains of Pēnjămŏ, was run through the body with a lance by one of his own captains, Don Juan Zămōră, whom he had attempted to deprive of a favourite horse. Ĕl Gīrŏ was surprised, about the same time, (July, 1819,) by some soldiers of the Royalist Colonel, Bustamante, and killed, after a gallant defence, in which he slew three of his adversaries with his own hand. Don Jose Mărīă Lĭcĕāgă, one of the oldest Insurgent chiefs, and the colleague of Rayon in the Junta of Zitācŭarŏ, was killed at the commencement of the year by an Insurgent officer, belonging to the district of Guanajuato; so that of all those, who had taken any lead in the Revolution, not one remained in July, 1819, when the Insurgent cause may be said to have reached its lowest ebb. Gŭerrērŏ, indeed, maintained himself on the right bank of the river Zăcātūlă, (near Cōlĭmă, on the Pacific,) but he was cut off from all communication with the Interior, and had little hope of assistance from without; so that, notwithstanding his military talents, his little force was not formidable to the Royalists, who were in undisturbed possession of almost all the interior of the country, with the whole of the Eastern coast.
​So confident, indeed, was the Viceroy, that the Revolution was at an end, that he wrote to Madrid, to state that he would answer for the safety of Mexico without a single additional soldier being sent out; the kingdom being again tranquil, and perfectly submissive to the Royal authority.
* ↑ Vide Appendix, B and C Letters.
* ↑ Vide Calleja's letter to the Minister of War, Appendix, (Letter C.) from which all the preceding passages are literal translations.
* ↑ Vide Paragraphs, 249, 251, and 253, Appendix Letter B.
* ↑ It is from the Cerro del Gallo that the large view of Hălpŭjāhuacă is taken, which is now engraving.
* ↑ Memoirs of the Mexican Revolution, and of General Mina," by W. D. Robinson.
* ↑ "Cuadro Historico de la Revolucion de la America, Mexicana." Su autor Don Carlos Maria Bustamante.
* ↑ When first I knew General Victoria, at Veracruz, in 1823, he was unable to eat above once in twenty-four, or even thirty-six hours; and even now, though he conforms with the usual hours of his countrymen, with regard to meals, he is one of the most abstemious of men.
* ↑ The Mexican Rănchērŏ is equivalent to the Gaucho of the Pampas, (with whose character, and mode of life. Captain Head's delightful work has rendered every one so familiar,) but rather in a higher stage of civilization.
* ↑ Vide Personal Narrative, Book V.