# The Unexpurgated Case Against Woman Suffrage/Ulterior Ends which the Woman's Suffrage Movement has in View

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ULTERIOR ENDS WHICH THE WOMAN'S SUFFRAGE MOVEMENT HAS IN VIEW
We have now sufficiently considered the suffragist's humanitarian schemes, and we may lead up to the consideration of her further projects by contrasting woman's suffrage as it presents itself under colonial conditions—i. e. woman's suffrage without the female legislative reformer and the feminist—with the woman suffrage which is being agitated for in England—i. e. woman suffrage with the female legislative reformer and the feminist.
In the colonies and undeveloped countries generally where women are in a minority, and where owing to the fact that practically all have an opportunity of marrying, there are not for woman any difficult economic and physiological conditions, there is no woman's ​question; and by consequence no female legislative reformer or feminist. The woman voter follows, as the opportunist politicians who enfranchised her intended, the lead of her menfolk—serving only a pawn in the game of politics. Under such conditions woman's suffrage leaves things as they are, except only that it undermines the logical foundations of the law, and still further debases the standard of public efficiency and public morality.
In countries, such as England, where an excess female population has made economic difficulties for woman, and where the severe sexual restrictions, which here obtains, have bred in her sex-hostility, the suffrage movement has as its avowed ulterior object the abrogation of all distinctions which depend upon sex; and the achievement of the economic independence of woman.
To secure this economic independence every post, occupation, and Government service is to ​be thrown open to woman; she is to receive everywhere the same wages as man; male and female are to work side by side; and they are indiscriminately to be put in command the one over the other. Furthermore, legal rights are to be secured to the wife over her husband's property and earnings. The programme is, in fact, to give to woman an economic independence out of the earnings and taxes of man.
Nor does feminist ambition stop short here. It demands that women shall be included in every advisory committee, every governing board, every jury, every judicial bench, every electorate, every parliament, and every ministerial cabinet; further, that every masculine foundation, university, school of learning, academy, trade union, professional corporation and scientific society shall be converted into an epicene institution—until we shall have everywhere one vast cock-and-hen show.
The proposal to bring man and woman together everywhere into extremely intimate ​relationships raises very grave questions. It brings up, first, the question of sexual complications; secondly, the question as to whether the tradition of modesty and reticence between the sexes is to be definitely sacrificed; and, most important of all, the question as to whether epicene conditions would place obstacles in the way of intellectual work.
Of these issues the feminist puts the first two quite out of account. I have already elsewhere said my say upon these matters. With regard to the third, the feminist either fails to realise that purely intellectual intercourse—as distinguished from an intercommunion of mental images—with woman is to a large section of men repugnant; or else, perceiving this, she makes up her mind that, this notwithstanding, she will get her way by denouncing the man who does not welcome her as selfish; and by insisting that under feminism (the quotation is from Mill, the italics which question his sincerity are mine) "the mass of mental ​faculties available for the higher service of mankind would be doubled."
The matter cannot so lightly be disposed of. It will be necessary for us to find out whether really intimate association with woman on the purely intellectual plane is realisable. And if it is, in fact, unrealisable, it will be necessary to consider whether it is the exclusion of women from masculine corporations; or the perpetual attempt of women to force their way into these, which would deserve to be characterised as selfish.
In connexion with the former of these issues, we have to consider here not whether that form of intellectual co-operation in which the man plays the game, and the woman moves the pawns under his orders, is possible. That form of co-operation is of course possible, and it has, doubtless, certain utilities.
Nor yet have we to consider whether quite intimate and purely intellectual association on an equal footing between a particular man and a selected woman may or may not be possible. ​It will suffice to note that the feminist alleges that this also is possible; but everybody knows that the woman very often marries the man.
What we have to ask is whether—even if we leave out of regard the whole system of attractions or, as the case may be, repulsions which come into operation when the sexes are thrown together—purely intellectual intercourse between man and the typical unselected woman is not barred by the intellectual immoralities and limitations which appear to be secondary sexual characters of woman.
With regard to this issue, there would seem to be very little real difference of opinion among men. But there are great differences in the matter of candour. There are men who speak out, and who enunciate like Nietzsche that "man and woman are alien—never yet has any one conceived how alien."
There are men who, from motives of delicacy or policy, do not speak out—averse to saying anything that might be unflattering to woman.
And there are men who are by their ​profession of the feminist faith debarred from speaking out, but who upon occasion give themselves away.
Of such is the man who in the House of Commons champions the cause of woman's suffrage, impassionately appealing to Justice; and then betrays himself by announcing that he would shake off from his feet the dust of its purlieus if ever women were admitted as members—i e. if ever women were forced upon him as close intellectual associates.
Wherever we look we find aversion to compulsory intellectual co-operation with woman. We see it in the sullen attitude which the ordinary male student takes up towards the presence of women students in his classes. We see it in the fact that the older English universities, which have conceded everything else to women, have made a strong stand against making them actual members of the university; for this would impose them on men as intellectual associates. Again we see the aversion in the opposition to the admission of women to ​the bar. But we need not look so far afield. Practically every man feels that there is in woman—patent, or hidden away—an element of unreason which, when you come upon it, summarily puts an end to purely intellectual intercourse. One may reflect, for example, upon the way the woman's suffrage controversy has been conducted.
Proceeding now on the assumption that these things are so, and that man feels that he and woman belong to different intellectual castes, we come now to the question as to whether it is man who is selfish when he excludes women from his institutions, or woman when she unceasingly importunes for admittance. And we may define as selfish all such conduct as pursues the advantage of the agent at the cost of the happiness and welfare of the general body of mankind.
We shall be in a better position to pronounce judgment on this question of ethics when we have considered the following series of analogies:
​When a group of earnest and devout believers meet together for special intercession and worship, we do not tax them with selfishness if they exclude unbelievers.
Nor do we call people who are really devoted to music selfish if, coming together for this, they make a special point of excluding the unmusical.
Nor again would the imputation of selfishness lie against members of a club for blackballing a candidate who would, they feel, be uncongenial.
Nor should we regard it as an act of selfishness if the members of a family circle, or of the same nation, or of any social circle, desired to come together quite by themselves.
Nor yet would the term selfish apply to an East End music hall audience when they eject any one who belongs to a different social class to themselves and wears good clothes.
And the like would hold true of servants resenting their employers intruding upon them in their hours of leisure or entertainments.
​If we do not characterise such exclusions as selfish, but rather respect and sympathise with them, it is because we recognise that the whole object and raison d'être of association would in each case be nullified by the weak-minded admission of the incompatible intruder.
We recognise that if any charge of selfishness would lie, it would lie against that intruder.
Now if this holds in the case where the interests of religious worship or music, or family, national, or social life, or recreation and relaxation after labour are in question, it will hold true even more emphatically where the interests of intellectual work are involved.
But the feminist will want to argue. She will—taking it as always for granted that woman has a right to all that men's hands or brains have fashioned—argue that it is very important for the intellectual development of woman that she should have exactly the same opportunities as man. And she will, scouting the idea of any differences between the ​intelligences of man and woman, discourse to you of their intimate affinity.
It will, perhaps, be well to clear up these points.
The importance of the higher development of woman is unquestionable.
But after all it is the intellect of man which really comes into account in connexion with "the mass of mental faculties available for the higher service of mankind."
The maintenance of the conditions which allow of man's doing his best intellectual work is therefore an interest which is superior to that of the intellectual development of woman. And woman might quite properly be referred for her intellectual development to instructional institutions which should be special to herself.
Coming to the question of the intimate resemblances between the masculine and the feminine intelligence, no man would be venturesome enough to dispute these, but he may ​be pardoned if he thinks—one would hope in no spirit of exaltation—also of the differences.
We have an instructive analogy in connexion with the learned societies.
It is uncontrovertible that every candidate for election into such a society will have, and will feel that he has, affinities with the members of that association. And he is invited to set these forth in his application. But there may also be differences of which he is not sensible. On that question the electors are the judges; and they are the final court of appeal.
There would seem to be here a moral which the feminist would do well to lay to heart. There is also another lesson which she might very profitably consider. A quite small difference will often constitute as effective a bar to a useful and congenial co-operation as a more fundamental difference.
In the case of a body of intellectual workers one might at first sight suppose that so small a distinction as that of belonging to a different ​nationality—sex, of course, is an infinitely profounder difference—would not be a bar to unrestricted intellectual co-operation.
But in point of fact it is in every country, in every learned society, a uniform rule that when foreign scientists or scholars are admitted they are placed not on the ordinary list of working members, but on a special list.
One discerns that there is justification for this in the fact that a foreigner would in certain eventualities be an incompatible person.
One may think of the eventuality of the learned society deciding to recognise a national service, or to take part in a national movement. And one is not sure that a foreigner might not be an incompatible person in the eventuality of a scientist or scholar belonging to a nationality with which the foreigner's country was at feud being brought forward for election. And he would, of course, be an impossible person in a society if he were, in a spirit of chauvinism, to press for a larger representation of his own fellow-countrymen.
​Now this is precisely the kind of way man feels about woman. He recognises that she is by virtue of her sex for certain purposes an incompatible person; and that, quite apart from this, her secondary sexual characters might in certain eventualities make her an impossible person.
We may note, before passing on, that these considerations would seem to prescribe that woman should be admitted to masculine institutions only when real humanitarian grounds demand it; that she should—following here the analogy of what is done in the learned societies with respect to foreigners—be invited to co-operate with men only when she is quite specially eminent, or beyond all question useful for the particular purpose in hand; and lastly, that when co-opted into any musculine institution woman should always be placed upon a special list, to show that it was proposed to confine her co-operation within certain specified limits.
From these general questions, which affect ​only the woman with intellectual aspirations, we pass to consider what would be the effect of feminism upon the rank and file of women if it made of these co-partners with man in work. They would suffer not only because woman's physiological disabilities and the restrictions which arise out of her sex place her at a great disadvantage when she has to enter into competition with man, but also because under feminism man would be less and less disposed to take off woman's shoulders a part of her burden.
And there can be no dispute that the most valuable financial asset of the ordinary woman is the possibility that a man may be willing — and may, if only woman is disposed to fulfil her part of the bargain, be not only willing but anxious—to support her and to secure for her, if he can, a measure of that freedom which comes from the possession of money.
In view of this every one who has a real fellow-feeling for woman, and who is concerned for her material welfare, as a father is ​concerned for his daughter's, will above everything else desire to nurture and encourage in man the sentiment of chivalry, and in woman that disposition of mind that makes chivalry possible.
And the woman workers who have to fight the battle of life for themselves would indirectly profit from this fostering of chivalry; for those women who are supported by men do not compete in the limited labour market which is open to the woman worker.
From every point of view, therefore, except perhaps that of the exceptional woman who would be able to hold her own against masculine competition—and men always issue informal letters of naturalisation to such an exceptional woman—the woman suffrage which leads up to feminism would be a social disaster.
* ↑ In England and Wales there are, in a population of 8,000,000 women between the ages of twenty and fifty, 3,000,000 unmarried women.
* ↑ Vide Appendix, pp. 169-173.