# Atlantic Richfield Company v. USA Petroleum Company

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## Dissenting Opinion

    Stevens
United States Supreme Court
495 U.S. 328
Atlantic Richfield Company v. USA Petroleum Company
No. 88-1668 Argued: Dec. 5, 1989. --- Decided: May 14, 1990
Syllabus
Petitioner Atlantic Richfield Company (ARCO), an integrated oil company, increased its retail gasoline sales and market share by encouraging its dealers to match the prices of independents such as respondent USA Petroleum Company, which competes directly with the dealers at the retail level. When USA's sales dropped, it sued ARCO in the District Court, charging, inter alia, that the vertical, maximum-price-fixing scheme constituted a conspiracy in restraint of trade in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act. The court granted summary judgment to ARCO, holding that USA could not satisfy the "antitrust injury" requirement for purposes of a private damages suit under § 4 of the Clayton Act because it was unable to show that ARCO's prices were predatory. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that injuries resulting from vertical, nonpredatory, maximum-price-fixing agreements could constitute "antitrust injury." Reasoning that any form of price fixing contravenes Congress' intent that market forces alone determine what goods and services are offered, their prices, and whether particular sellers succeed or fail, the court concluded that USA had shown that its losses resulted from a disruption in the market caused by ARCO's price fixing.
Held:
1. Actionable "antitrust injury" is an injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that flows from that which makes defendants' acts unlawful. Injury, although causally related to an antitrust violation, will not qualify unless it is attributable to an anticompetitive aspect of the practice under scrutiny, since it is inimical to the antitrust laws to award damages for losses stemming from continued competition. Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 109-110, 107 S.Ct. 484, 488-489, 93 L.Ed.2d 427. P. 334.
2. A vertical, maximum-price-fixing conspiracy in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act must result in predatory pricing to cause a competitor antitrust injury. Pp. 335-341.
(a) As a competitor, USA has not suffered "antitrust injury," since its losses do not flow from the harmful effects on dealers and consumers that rendered vertical, maximum price fixing per se illegal in Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 88 S.Ct. 869, 19 L.Ed.2d 998. USA was benefited rather than harmed if ARCO's pricing policies restricted ARCO's sales to a few large dealers or prevented its dealers from offering services desired by consumers. Even if the maximum price agreement acquired all of the attributes of a minimum-price-fixing scheme, USA still would not have suffered antitrust injury, because higher ARCO prices would have worked to USA's advantage. Pp. 335-337.
(b) USA's argument that, even if it was not harmed by any of the Albrecht anticompetitive effects, its lost business caused by ARCO's agreement lowering prices to above predatory levels constitutes antitrust injury is rejected, since cutting prices to increase business is often the essence of competition. P. 337-338.
(c) It is not inappropriate to require a showing of predatory pricing before antitrust injury can be established in a case under § 1 of the Sherman Act. Although under § 1 the price agreement itself is illegal, all losses flowing from the agreement are not by definition antitrust injuries. Low prices benefit consumers regardless of how they are set. So long as they are above predatory levels, they do not threaten competition and, hence, cannot give rise to antitrust injury. Pp. 338-341.
3. A loss flowing from a per se violation of § 1 does not automatically satisfy the antitrust injury requirement, which is a distinct matter that must be shown independently. The purpose of per se analysis is to determine whether a particular restraint is unreasonable. Actions per se unlawful may nonetheless have some procompetitive effects, and private parties might suffer losses therefrom. The antitrust injury requirement, however, ensures that a plaintiff can recover only if the loss stems from a competition-reducing aspect or effect of the defendant's behavior. Pp. 341-345.
4. Providing competitors with a private cause of action to enforce the rule against vertical, maximum price fixing would not protect the rights of dealers and consumers-the class of persons whose self-interest would normally motivate them to vindicate Albrecht § anticompetitive consequences-under the antitrust laws. USA's injury is not inextricably intertwined with a dealer's antitrust injury, since a competitor has no incentive to vindicate the legitimate interests of a rival's dealer and will be injured and motivated to sue only when the arrangement has a procompetitive impact on the market. Pp. 345-346.
859 F.2d 687 (CA9 1988), reversed and remanded.
BRENNAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C.J., and MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, O'CONNOR, SCALIA, and KENNEDY, JJ., joined. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which WHITE, J., joined, post, p. 346.
Ronald C. Redcay, Los Angeles, Cal., for petitioner.
John G. Roberts, Jr., Washington, D.C., for the U.S. and Federal Trade Com'n as amici curiae, supporting petitioner, by special leave of Court.
Maxwell M. Blecher, Los Angeles, Cal., for respondent.
[Amicus Curiae Information from page 330 intentionally omitted]
Justice BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.

## Notes

This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
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