# Shelton v. Tucker/Dissent Frankfurter

* Court Documents
* Case Syllabus
* Opinion of the Court
* Dissenting Opinions Frankfurter Harlan
* Linked case(s):
* 231 Ark. 641 174 F. Supp. 351 364 U.S. 479
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting.
As one who has strong views against crude intrusions by the state into the atmosphere of creative freedom in which alone the spirit and mind of a teacher can fruitfully function, I may find displeasure with the Arkansas legislation now under review. But in maintaining the distinction between private views and constitutional restrictions, I am constrained to find that it does not exceed the permissible range of state action limited by the Fourteenth Amendment. By way of emphasis I therefore add a few words of the dissent of Mr. Justice Harlan, in which I concur.
It is essential, at the outset, to establish what is not involved in this litigation:
(1) As the Court recognizes, this is not a case where, as in N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, and Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, a State, asserting the power to compel disclosure of organizational affiliations, can show no rational relation between disclosure and a governmental interest justifying it. Those cases are relevant here only because of their recognition that an interest in privacy, in nondisclosure, may under appropriate circumstances claim constitutional protection. The question here is whether that interest is overborne by a countervailing public interest. To this concrete, limited question—whether the State's interest in knowing the nature [p492] of the organizational activities of teachers employed by it or by institutions which it supports, as a basis for appraising the fitness of those teachers for the positions which they hold, outweighs the interest recognized in N.A.A.C.P. and Bates—those earlier decisions themselves give no answer.
(2) The Court's holding that the Arkansas statute is unconstitutional does not, apparently, rest upon the threat that the information which it requires of teachers will be revealed to the public. In view of the opinion of the Supreme Court of Arkansas, decision here could not, I believe, turn on a claim that the teachers' affidavits will not remain confidential. That court has expressly said that "Inasmuch as the validity of the act depends upon its being construed as a bona fide legislative effort to provide school boards with needed information, it necessarily follows that the affidavits need not be opened to public inspection, for the permissible purpose of the statute is to enlighten the school board alone." 231 Ark. 641, 646, 331 S.W.2d 701, 704. If the validity of the statute depended on this matter, the pronouncement of the State's highest judicial organ would have to be read as establishing—the earlier view of the State Attorney General notwithstanding—that the statute does not authorize the making public of the affidavits. Even were the Arkansas court's language far more ambiguous than it is, it would be our duty so to understand its opinion, in accordance with the principle that "So far as statutes fairly may be construed in such a way as to avoid doubtful constitutional questions they should be so construed." Fox v. Washington, 236 U.S. 273, 277.
(3) This is not a case in which Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296; Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558; and Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, call for condemnation of the "breadth" of the statute. Those decisions struck down licensing laws [p493] which vested in administrative officials a power of censorship over communications not confined within standards designed to curb the dangers of arbitrary or discriminatory official action. The "breadth" with which the cases were concerned was the breadth of unrestricted discretion left to a censor, which permitted him to make his own subjective opinions the practically unreviewable measure of permissible speech. Nor is this a case of the nature of Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, and Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, involving penal statutes which the Court found impermissibly "broad" in quite another sense. Prohibiting, indiscriminately, activity within and without the sphere of the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of free expression, those statutes had the double vice of deterring the exercise of constitutional freedoms by making the uncertain line of the Amendment's application determinative of criminality and of prescribing indefinite standards of guilt, thereby allowing the potential vagaries and prejudices of juries, effectively insulated against control by reviewing courts, the power to intrude upon the protected sphere. The statute challenged in the present cases involves neither administrative discretion to censor nor vague, overreaching tests of criminal responsibility.
[p494] Where state assertions of authority are attacked as impermissibly restrictive upon thought, expression, or association, the existence vel non of other possible less restrictive means of achieving the object which the State seeks is, of course, a constitutionally relevant consideration. This is not because some novel, particular rule of law obtains in cases of this kind. Whenever the reasonableness and fairness of a measure are at issue—as they are in every case in which this Court must apply the standards of reason and fairness, with the appropriate scope to be given those concepts, in enforcing the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as a limitation upon state action—the availability or unavailability of alternative methods of proceeding is germane. Thus, a State may not prohibit the distribution of literature on its cities' streets as a means of preventing littering, when the same end might be achieved with only slightly greater inconvenience by applying the sanctions of the penal law not to the pamphleteer who distributes the paper but to the recipient who crumples it and throws it away. Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496; Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147; Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413. Nor may a State protect its population from the dangers and incitements of salacious books by restricting the reading matter of adults to that which would be harmless to the susceptible mind of a child. Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380. And see De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353; Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60. But the consideration [p495] of feasible alternative modes of regulation in these cases did not imply that the Court might substitute its own choice among alternatives for that of a state legislature, or that the States were to be restricted to the "narrowest" workable means of accomplishing an end. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 169–170. Consideration of alternatives may focus the precise exercise of state legislative authority which is tested in this Court by the standard of reasonableness, but it does not alter or displace that standard. The issue remains whether, in light of the particular kind of restriction upon individual liberty which a regulation entails, it is reasonable for a legislature to choose that form of regulation rather than others less restrictive. To that determination, the range of judgment easily open to a legislature in considering the relative degrees of efficiency of alternative means in achieving the end it seeks is pertinent.
In the present case the Court strikes down an Arkansas statute requiring that teachers disclose to school officials all of their organizational relationships, on the ground that "Many such relationships could have no possible bearing upon the teacher's occupational competence or fitness." Granted that a given teacher's membership in the First Street Congregation is, standing alone, of little relevance to what may rightly be expected of a teacher, is that membership equally irrelevant when it is discovered that the teacher is in fact a member of the First Street Congregation and the Second Street Congregation and the Third Street Congregation and the 4-H Club and the 3-H Club and half a dozen other groups? Presumably, a teacher may have so many divers associations, so many divers commitments, that they consume his time and energy and interest at the expense of his work or even of his professional dedication. Unlike wholly individual interests, organizational connections—because they involve obligations undertaken with relation to other per- [p495] sons—may become inescapably demanding and distracting. Surely, a school board is entitled to inquire whether any of its teachers has placed himself, or is placing himself, in a condition where his work may suffer. Of course, the State might ask: "To how many organizations do you belong?" or "How much time do you expend at organizational activity?" But the answer to such questions could reasonably be regarded by a state legislature as insufficient, both because the veracity of the answer is more difficult to test, in cases where doubts as to veracity may arise, than in the case of the answers required by the Arkansas statute, and because an estimate of time presently spent in organizational activity reveals nothing as to the quality and nature of that activity, upon the basis of which, necessarily, judgment or prophesy of the extent of future involvement must be based. A teacher's answers to the questions which Arkansas asks, moreover, may serve the purpose of making known to school authorities persons who come into contact with the teacher in all of the phases of his activity in the community, and who can be questioned, if need be, concerning the teacher's conduct in matters which this Court can certainly not now say are lacking in any pertinence to professional fitness. It is difficult to understand how these particular ends could be achieved by asking "certain of [the State's] teachers about all their organizational relationships," or "all of its teachers about certain of their associational ties," or all of its teachers how many associations currently involve them, or during how many hours; and difficult, therefore, to appreciate why the Court deems unreasonable and forbids what Arkansas does ask.
If I dissent from the Court's disposition in these cases, it is not that I put a low value on academic freedom. See Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 194 (concurring opinion); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 255 (concurring opinion). It is because that very freedom, [p496] in its most creative reaches, is dependent in no small part upon the careful and discriminating selection of teachers. This process of selection is an intricate affair, a matter of fine judgment, and if it is to be informed, it must be based upon a comprehensive range of information. I am unable to say, on the face of this statute, that Arkansas could not reasonably find that the information which the statute requires—and which may not be otherwise acquired than by asking the question which it asks—is germane to that selection. Nor, on this record, can I attribute to the State a purpose to employ the enactment as a device for the accomplishment of what is constitutionally forbidden. Of course, if the information gathered by the required affidavits is used to further a scheme of terminating the employment of teachers solely because of their membership in unpopular organizations, that use will run afoul of the Fourteenth Amendment. It will be time enough, if such use is made, to hold the application of the statute unconstitutional. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356. Because I do not find that the disclosure of teachers' associations to their school boards is, without more, such a restriction upon their liberty, or upon that of the community, as to overbalance the State's interest in asking the question, I would affirm the judgments below.
I am authorized to say that Mr. Justice Clark, Mr. Justice Harlan and Mr. Justice Whittaker agree with this opinion.
* ↑ See also Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496; Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (the Irvington ordinance); Largent v. Texas, 318 U.S. 418; Jones v. Opelika, 319 U.S. 103, vacating 316 U.S. 584 (the Opelika ordinance); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268; Joseph Burstyn, Inc., v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495; Gelling v. Texas, 343 U.S. 960; Superior Films, Inc. v. Department of Education, 346 U.S. 587; Staub v. Baxley, 355 U.S. 313; cf. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501; Tucker v. Texas, 326 U.S. 517. The common-law count in the Cantwell case involved considerations similar to those which were determinative of the decisions cited in text and note, at note 2, infra.
* ↑ See also Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359; Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507.
* ↑ Language characterizing state statutes as overly broad has sometimes been found in opinions where it was unnecessary to the result, and merely meant to express the idea that whatever state interest was there asserted as underlying a regulation was insufficient to justify the regulation's application to particular circumstances fairly within the Fourteenth Amendment's protection. Compare Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, with Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380. Compare Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, with Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622.