# Mexico, Aztec, Spanish and Republican/Volume 1/Book 3/Chapter 10

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CHAPTER X.
1847.
We return, from the theatre of these military operations on the shores of the Pacific, to the valley of the Rio Grande and the headquarters of General Taylor. The armistice at Monterey had ceased by the order of our government, and the commander of our forces, leaving Generals Worth and Butler at Monterey and Saltillo which had been seized, hastened with a sufficient body of troops to the gulf for the purpose of occupying Tampico, the capital of the state of Tamaulipas. But he did not advance further than Victoria, when he found that Tampico had surrendered to Commodore Conner on the 14th of November.
In the meanwhile the political aspect of Mexico was changed under the rule of Santa Anna who had returned to power, though he had not realized the hopes of our president by acceding to an honorable peace. A secret movement that was made by an agent sent into the country proved altogether unsuccessful, for the people were aroused against this union, and would listen, willingly, to no advances for accommodation. Santa Anna, cautiously noted the national feeling, and, being altogether unable to control or modify it,—although he studiously refrained from committing himself prior to his return to the capital,—he resolved to place himself at the head of the popular movement in defence of the northern frontier. Accordingly, in December, 1846, he had already assembled a large force, amounting to twenty thousand men, at San Luis Potosi, the capital of the state of that name south of Monterey, on the direct road to the heart of the internal provinces, and nearly midway between the gulf and the Pacific.
The news of this hostile gathering which was evidently designed ​to assail our Army of Occupation, soon reached the officers who had been left in command at our headquarters during Taylor's absence; and, in consequence of a despatch sent by express to General Wool at Parras for reinforcements, that officer immediately put his whole column in motion, and, after marching one hundred and twenty miles in four days, found himself at Agua Nueva, within twenty-one miles of Saltillo. Thus sustained, the officers in command, awaited with anxiety, the movements of the Mexican chief and the return of General Taylor.
But, in the meantime, the administration at home, seeing the inutility of continuing the attacks upon the more northern outposts of Mexico,—which it was, nevertheless, resolved to hold as indemnifying hostages, inasmuch as they were contiguous to our own soil and boundaries,—determined to strike a blow at the vitals of Mexico by seizing her principal eastern port and proceeding thence to the capital. For this purpose, General Scott, who had been set aside at the commencement of the war in consequence of a rupture between himself and the war department whilst arranging the details of the campaign,—was once more summoned into the field and appointed commander-in-chief of the American army in Mexico. Up to this period, November, 1846, large recruits of regulars and volunteers had flocked to the standard of Taylor and were stationed at various posts in the valley of the Rio Grande, under the command of Generals Butler, Worth, Patterson, Quitman and Pillow. But the project of a descent upon Vera Cruz, which was warmly advocated by General Scott, made it necessary to detach a considerable portion of these levies, and of their most efficient and best drilled members. Taylor and his subordinate commanders, were thus, placed in a mere defensive position, and that, too, at a moment when they were threatened in front by the best army that had been assembled for many a year in Mexico.
It is probable that the government of the United States, at the moment it planned this expedition to Vera Cruz and the capital, was not fully apprised of the able and efficient arrangements of Santa Anna, or imagined that he would immediately quit San Luis Potosi in order to defend the eastern access to the capital, inasmuch as it was not probable that Taylor would venture to penetrate the country with impaired forces, which, in a strictly military point of view, were not more than adequate for garrison service along an extended base of three hundred miles. But, as the sequel showed, they neither estimated properly the time that would be consumed in concentrating the forces and ​preparing the means for their transportation to Vera Cruz, nor judged correctly of the military skill of Santa Anna, who naturally preferred to crush the weak northern foe with his overwhelming force than to encounter the strong battalions of veterans who were to be led against him on the east by the most brilliant captain of our country.
The enterprise of General Scott was one of extraordinary magnitude and responsibility. With his usual foresight he determined that he would not advance until the expedition was perfectly complete in every essential of certain success. Nothing was permitted to disturb his equanimity or patient resolution in carrying out the scheme as he thought best. He weighed all the dangers and all the difficulties of the adventure, and placed no reliance upon the supposed weakness of the enemy. This was the true, soldier-like view of the splendid project; and if, at the time, men were found inconsiderate enough to blame him for procrastinating dalliance, the glorious result of his enterprise repaid him for all the petty sneers and misconceptions with which his discretion was undervalued by the carpet knights at home. There is but one point upon which we feel justified in disagreeing with his plan of campaign. He should not have weakened the command of General Taylor in the face of Santa Anna's army. It was almost an invitation to that chief for an attack upon the valley of the Rio Grande; and had the Army of Occupation been effectually destroyed at Buen Vista, scarcely an American would have remained, throughout the long line of Taylor's base, to tell the tale of cruelties perpetrated by the flushed and revengeful victors.
Whilst events were maturing and preparations making in the valley of the Rio Grande and the island of Lobos, we shall direct our attention again for a short time to the central regions of the north of Mexico in the neighborhood of Santa Fé.
A considerable force of Missourians had been organized under the command of Colonel Doniphan, and marched to New Mexico, whence it was designed to despatch him towards Chihuahua. Soon after General Kearney's departure from Santa Fe for California, Colonel Price, who was subsequently raised to the rank of general, reached that post with his western recruits and took command, whilst Doniphan was directed, by orders from Kearney, dated near La Joya, to advance with his regiment against the Navajo Indians, who had threatened with war the New Mexicans, now under our protection. He performed this service ​successfully; and, on the 22d of November, 1846, made a treaty with the chiefs, binding them to live in amity with the Spaniards and Americans. Reassembling all his troops at Val Verde, he commenced his march to the south, in the middle of December, and, after incredible difficulties and great sufferings from inadequate supplies and equipments he reached Chihuahua, fighting, on the march, two successful actions against the Mexicans at Bracito, and Sacramento. Having completely routed the enemy in the latter contest, Chihuahua fell into his power. Here he tarried, recruiting his toil-worn band, for six weeks, and, as the spring opened, pushed onwards to the south until he reached the headquarters of Taylor, whence he returned with his regiment to the United States. His army marched five thousand miles during the campaign, and its adventures form one of the most romantic episodes in the war with Mexico.
Whilst Doniphan was advancing southward, the command of Price was well nigh destroyed in New Mexico and the wild region intervening between its borders and the frontiers of the United States. A conspiracy had been secretly organized, among the Mexican and half-breed population, to rise against the Americans. On the 19th of January, 1847, massacres occurred, simultaneously, at Taos, Arroyo Hondo, Rio Colorado and Mora. At Taos, Governor Charles Bent, one of the oldest and most experienced residents in that region was cruelly slain, and a great deal of valuable property destroyed by the merciless foe. Price received intelligence of this onslaught on the 20th, and rapidly calling in his outposts, marched with a hastily gathered band of about three hundred and fifty men against the enemy, whom he met, attacked and overawed on the 24th, at Canada. Reinforced by Captain Burgwin from Alburquerque, he again advanced against the insurgents; and on the 28th, defeated a Mexican force estimated at fifteen hundred, at the pass of El Embudo. Passing, thence, over the Taos mountain, through deep snows, in midwinter, the resolute commander pursued his way unmolested through the deserted settlement which had been recently ravaged by the rebels, nor did he encounter another force until he came upon the enemy at Pueblo, when he stormed the fortified position, and gained the day but with the loss of the gallant Burgwin and other valuable officers. Mora was reduced again to subjection, early in February, by Captain Morin; and, in all these rapid but successful actions, it is estimated that near three hundred Mexicans paid the forfeit of their lives for the cruel conspiracy and its fatal results.
​From this moment the tenure of our possessions in New Mexico was no longer considered secure. The troops in that district were not the best disciplined or most docile in the army, and, to the dangers of another sudden outbreak among the treacherous Mexicans, was added the fear of a sudden rising among the Indian tribes who were naturally anxious to find any pretext or chance for ridding the country of a foe whom they feared far more, as a permanent neighbor, than the comparatively feeble half-breeds and Mexicans.
In December of 1846, Lieutenant Richie, who bore despatches to Taylor apprising him of the meditated attack upon Vera Cruz, was seized and slain by the Mexicans whilst on his way to the headquarters, and, thus, Santa Anna became possessed of the plan of the proposed campaign. The Army of Occupation had been sadly impaired by the abstraction of its best material for future action on the southern line under the commander-in-chief. But General Taylor resolved at once to face the danger stoutly, and to manifest no symptom of unsoldierlike querulousness under the injustice he experienced from the government. Nevertheless, prudent in all things, and foreseeing the danger of his command, of the lower country, and of the morale of the whole army, in the event of his defeat,—he exposed the error of the war department in his despatches to the adjutant general and secretary, so that history, if not arms, might eventually do justice to his discretion and fortitude.
The note of preparation preceded, for some time, the actual advent of Santa Anna from San Luis Potosi, and all was bustle in the American encampments which were spread from Monterey to Agua Nueva beyond Saltillo, in order to give him the best possible reception under the circumstances. Wool was encamped with a force at Agua Nueva, in advance on the road from Saltillo to San Luis, about thirteen miles from the pass of Angostura, where the road lies through a mountain gorge, defended, on one side, by a small table land near the acclivities of the steep sierra and cut with the channels of rough barrancas or ravines worn by the waters as they descend from the summits, and, on the other by an extensive net work of deep and impassable gullies which drained the slopes of the western spurs.
This spot was decided upon, as the battle ground in the event of an attack, and the encampment at Agua Nueva, in front of it was kept up as an extreme outpost, whence the scouts might be sent forth to watch the approach of Santa Anna.
SIERRA MADRE PASS.
​On the 21st of February, the positive advance of that chief was announced. The camp was immediately broken up, and all our forces rapidly concentrated in the gorge of Angostura. Our troops did not amount to more than four thousand six hundred and ninety efficient men, while we had reason to believe that Santa Anna commanded nearly five times that number and was greatly superior to us in cavalry, a part of which, had been sent by secret paths through the mountains, to the rear of our position, so as to cut off our retreat, in the event of our failure in the battle.
The great object of Taylor in selecting his ground and forming his plan of battle, was to make his small army equal, as near as possible, to that of Santa Anna, by narrowing the front of attack, and thus concentrating his force upon any point through which the Mexicans might seek to break. In other words, it was his design to dam up the strait of Angostura with a living mass, and to leave no portion of the unbroken ground on the narrow table-land undefended by infantry and artillery. The battle ground that had been selected was admirably calculated for this purpose; and his foresight was justified by the result. It was not necessary for Taylor to capture, or annihilate his enemy, for he was victor, if with, but a single regiment, he kept the valley closed against the Mexicans. The centre of the American line was the main road, in which was placed a battery of eight pieces, reduced, during the action to five, supported by bodies of infantry. On the right of the stream, which swept along the edge of the western mountains, was a single regiment and some cavalry, with two guns, which it was supposed, would be sufficient, with the aid of the tangled gulleys to arrest the Mexicans in that quarter. On the left of the stream, where the ravines were fewer, and the plain between them wider, stood two regiments of infantry, suitably furnished with artillery, and extending from the central battery on the road, to the base of the eastern mountains, on whose skirts an adequate force of cavalry and riflemen was posted.
In order to break this array, Santa Anna divided his army into three attacking columns, each of which nearly doubled the whole of Taylor's force. One of these, was opposed to the battery of eight guns in order to force the road, and the other two were designed to outflank our position by penetrating or turning the squadrons stationed at the base of the mountains.
On the afternoon of the 22d of February, the attack began by a skirmishing attempt to pass to the rear of our left wing; but as the Mexicans climbed the mountain, in their endeavor to outflank us ​in that quarter, they were opposed by our infantry and riflemen, who disputed successfully every inch of ground, until night closed and obliged the Mexicans to retire. General Taylor, fearing an attack from the cavalry upon Saltillo, immediately departed with a suitable escort to provide for its safety, and left General Wool to command during his absence.
After day dawn, on the 23d, Santa Anna again commenced the battle, by an attack upon the left wing, and, for a while, was withstood, until a portion of our forces, after a brave defence, mistaking an order to retire, for an order to retreat, became suddenly panicstruck, and fled from the field. At this moment, Taylor returned from Saltillo, and found the whole left of our position broken, whilst the enemy was pouring his masses of infantry and cavalry along the base of the eastern mountains towards our rear.
Meanwhile the battery in the road had repulsed the Mexican column sent against it, and spared three of its guns for service on the upper plain. The regiment, on the right of the stream, had been brought over to the left bank with its cannons, and was now, in position with two other regiments, facing the mountains, between which and this force, was a gap, through whose opening, the Mexicans steadily advanced under a dreadful fire. Nearly all the artillery had been concentrated at the same place, while, in other parts of the field and nearer to the hacienda of Buena Vista, in the American rear, were bodies of our cavalry, engaged in conflict with the advancing foe.
As Taylor approached this disastrous scene, he met the fugitives, and speedily made his dispositions to stop the carnage. With a regiment from Mississippi, he restrained a charge of Mexican cavalry, and ordered all the artillery, save four guns, to the rear to drive back the exulting Mexicans. This manoeuvre was perfectly successful, and, so dreadfully was the enemy cut up by the new attack, that Santa Anna, availed himself of a ruse, by a flag of truce, in order to suspend the action, whilst he withdrew his men.
The transfer of so large a portion of Taylor's most efficient troops to the rear of his original line, had greatly weakened his front, in the best positions, where the inequalities of ground sustained his feeble numbers. Santa Anna was not unmindful of the advantage he had gained by these untoward events, and prepared all his best reserves, which were now brought for the first time into action, for another attack. Taylor had with him three regiments and four pieces of artillery. His front was rather towards the mountain than the open pass, while his back was towards the road ​along the stream. On his right was the whole Mexican army; on his left, far off in the rear, were the troops that had repulsed and cut up the Mexican column; and the great effort, upon whose success all depended, was to bring these dispersed squadrons again into action, whilst he maintained the position against the assault of the fresh reserves. As Santa Anna advanced with his inspirited columns, he was met by regiments of infantry, which stood firm, until, overwhelmed by numbers and driven into a ravine, they were cruelly slaughtered. After the American infantry had been overcome, the last hope was in the artillery, and, with this, the Mexican advance was effectually stopped and the battle won.
The whole day had been spent in fighting, and when night came, the field was covered with dead. It was an anxious season for our battered troops, and whilst all were solicitous for the event of a contest, which it was supposed would be renewed on the morrow, the greatest efforts were not only made to inspirit the troops who had borne the brunt of two days' battle, but to bring up reinforcements of artillery and cavalry that had been stationed between Saltillo and Monterey. At day dawn, however, on the 24th, the enemy was found to have retreated.
This wonderful battle saved the north of Mexico and the valley of the Rio Grande; for Minon and Urrea were already in our rear with regular troops and bands of rancheros, ready to cut up our flying army, and descend upon our slender garrisons. Urrea captured a valuable wagon train at Ramos, in the neighborhood of Monterey. From the 22d to the 26th of February, he continually threatened our weakened outposts, and from that period until the 7th of March inflicted severe injuries upon our trains and convoys from the gulf. In the meantime Santa Anna retreated to San Luis Potosi with the fragments of his fine army, and not long after, General Taylor retired from a field of service, in which he was no longer permitted to advance, or required except for garrison duty.
In the months of October and November, 1846, Tobasco and Tampico had yielded to our navy; the former after a severe attack conducted by Commodore Matthew C. Perry, and the latter without bloodshed.