# Local Lodge No. 1424 v. National Labor Relations Board/Dissent Frankfurter

* Court Documents
* Case Syllabus
* Opinion of the Court
* Dissenting Opinions Frankfurter Whittaker
United States Supreme Court
362 U.S. 411
Local Lodge No. 1424 v. National Labor Relations Board
Argued: Jan. 11, 1960. --- Decided: April 25, 1960
Mr. Justice FRANKFURTER, dissenting.
While agreeing with my Brother WHITTAKER'S grounds for dissenting, I should like to add confirming considerations for his conclusion. At a time when the union did not represent a majority of employees, union and employer entered into a collective bargaining agreement, containing a 'union security' clause compelling all employees to become members of the union. Under principles accepted by the Court, this constituted an 'unfair labor practice,' for it tended 'to restrain or coerce employees' in the exercise of their right 'to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing.' Union and employer continued to carry out the terms of this illicit agreement. Specifically, the union purported to act as an authorized bargaining agent, union dues were collected through a 'check-off' by th employer, and employees were compelled to become members of the union within forty-five days. The Court's opinion recognizes that all this constituted continuing interference with the employees' free choice and was therefore a continuing unfair labor practice.
Ten months after the collective agreement was first entered into, but while its terms continued to be actively carried out, an unfair labor practice charge against the union and employer was filed with the Board. Plainly, the continuing unfair labor practice of maintaining the collective agreement illegally entered into did occur within six months of the filing of the charge. The Court accepts this as true. But the Court holds that a charge based upon that continuing unfair practice is time-barred.
The applicable statute of limitations provides: 'no complaint shall issue based upon any unfair labor practice occurring more than six months prior to the filing of the charge with the Board.' The Court relies on the fact that the active carrying out of the agreement, concededly an unfair practice occurring within six months, is revealed as unlawful only by reason of the unlawful character of the agreement at its inception, specifically, the fact that the union did not represent a majority of employees at that time. The Court concludes that the action is barred because the inception of the unlawful agreement was outside of the statutory period.
Such an interpretation, I respectfully submit, is not to enforce congressional legislation, which is our task, but is to fashion linguistic legislation and then apply it. Instead of barring only those complaints 'based upon any unfair labor practice occurring more than six months prior to the filing of the charge,' the statute is made to read 'based upon any unfair labor practice having had its inception more than six months prior to the filing of the charge.' Thus the complaint is held barred, even though an unfair practice did occur, with due regard to the thought conveyed by that word. That is, we have here not mere inert continuity of consequences through antecedent action; events were brought to pass through conscious human intervention within six months of the filing of the charge.
I see no justification for such rewriting of what Congress wrote. The legislative history recited by the Court makes no such demand. Congress no doubt wanted to put stale claims to rest, and it did so by a relatively short statute of limitations for permitting claims to be brought to litigation. If six months are allowed to pass by without a charge against an unfair labor practice being filed, Congress said that is an end of the matter, and a charge cannot be filed thereafter. But Congress did not say that if a charge is filed within six months of the occurrence of an unfair practice, that cannot be halted, that cannot be proceeded against, if such labor practice had its inception more than six months before. On the contrary, what I deem a controlling analogy leads me to apply the statute as I find it, and to bar complaints only when based upon active occurrences not falling within the six-month period. I find that analogy in the treatment of the same kind of problem in cases where a conspiracy is entered into before a statutory period but is actively kept alive within that period.
The essence of the unfair labor practice involved in this case is the making and maintaining of an illegal agreement between upon and employee. Suppose that Congress, having defined such an agreement to be an unfair labor practice, had subjected it not only to civil remedies but had also made it a misdemeanor. That is by no means a fanciful supposition. The federal antitrust statutes are a prominent instance of the use of the criminal law, and in particular the law of conspiracy, as part of a scheme of industrial regulation. Suppose a six-month statutory limitations period for the criminal charge, as we now have for the civil, and suppose the very facts of this case. Specifically, suppose it had been charged that during the prior six months, by maintaining their collective agreement, entered into when the union did not represent a majority of employees, the union and employer had conspired to deprive employees of their rights freely to choose bargaining representatives, and that during those six months overt acts had been committed in pursuance of the unlawful agreement.
To find a cognate statute of limitations to be a bar to such a case would be to ignore the applicable precedents. The rules set out by this Court for applying statutes of limitations to conspiracy cases are clearly otherwise. See United States v. Kissel, 218 U.S. 601, 31 S.Ct. 124, 54 L.Ed. 1168; Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 367-370, 32 S.Ct. 793, 802-803, 56 L.Ed. 1114; Brown v. Elliott, 225 U.S. 392, 400-401, 32 S.Ct. 812, 815, 56 L.Ed. 1136; Fiswick v. United States, 329 U.S. 211, 216, 67 S.Ct. 224, 227, 91 L.Ed. 196; Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 396-397, 77 S.Ct. 963, 969-970, 1 L.Ed.2d 931. 'The statute of limitations, unless suspended, runs from the last overt act during the existence of the conspiracy.' Fiswick v. United States, supra, 329 U.S. at page 216, 67 S.Ct. at page 227. And these cases show that this principle applies even when, as here, the overt acts within the statutory period derive their illegal significance only when interpreted in light of an illegal agreement which was initiated prior to the statutory period for bringing a charge. Certainly, the illegalities committed within the six-months period in this case, to the same degree as overt acts in pursuance of a conspiracy already formed, represent 'a renewed affirmation of the unlawful purpose,' expressed in an agreement which Congress has outlawed as an unfair labor practice. A conspiracy is kept alive by an overt act within the period of the statute of limitations not by reason of some dogmatic postulate relevant to conspiracies, but as a result of judicial reasoning in applying statutes of limitations. This reasoning is equally applicable to the matter in hand.
I am baffled to understand why the present case should be different from what it would be were it a prosecution for criminal conspiracy, rather than a civil proceeding based on an agreement giving rise to an unfair labor practice.

## Notes

This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
Public domainPublic domainfalsefalse