# The Collected Works of Theodore Parker/Volume 01/Book 1/Chapter 2

CHAPTER II.
OF THE SENTIMENT, IDEA, AND CONCEPTION OF GOD.
Now the existence of this religious element, our experience of this sense of dependence, this sentiment of something without bounds, is itself a proof by implication of the existence of its object,—something on which dependence rests. A belief in this relation between the feeling in us and its object independent of us, comes unavoidably from the laws of Man's nature; there is nothing of which we can be more certain. A natural want in Man's constitution implies satisfaction in some quarter, just as the faculty of seeing implies something to correspond to this faculty, namely, objects to be seen, and a medium of light to see by. As the tendency to love implies something lovely for its object, so the religious consciousness implies its object. If it is regarded as a sense of absolute dependence, it implies the Absolute on which this dependence rests, independent of ourselves.
Spiritual, like bodily faculties, act jointly and not one at a time, and when the occasion is given from without us, the Reason, spontaneously, independent of our forethought and volition, acting by its own laws, gives us by intuition an idea of that on which we depend. To this idea we give the name of God or Gods, as it is represented by one or several separate conceptions. Thus the existence of God is implied by the natural sense of dependence; implied in ​the religious element itself; it is expressed by the spontaneous intuition of Reason.
Now men come to this Idea early. It is the logical condition of all other ideas; without this as an element of our consciousness, or lying latent, as it were, and unrecognized in us, we could have no ideas at all. The senses reveal to us something external to the body, and independent thereof, on which it depends; they tell not what it is. Consciousness reveals something in like manner, not the human spirit, in me, but its absolute ground, on which the spirit depends. Outward circumstances furnish the occasion by which we approach and discover the Idea of God; but they do not furnish the Idea itself. That is a fact given by the nature of Man. Hence some philosophers have called it an innate idea; others, a reminiscence of what the spirit knew in a higher state of life before it took the body. Both opinions may be regarded as rhetorical statements of the truth that the Idea of God is a fact given by Man's nature, and not an invention or device of ours. The belief in God's existence therefore is natural, not against nature. It comes unavoidably from the legitimate action of the intellectual and the religious faculties, just as the belief in light comes from using the eyes, and belief in our existence from mere existing. The knowledge of God's existence, therefore, may be called in the language of Philosophy, an intuition of Reason; or in the mythological language of the elder Theology, a Revelation from God.
If the above statement be correct, then our belief in God's existence does not depend on the à posteriori argument, ​on considerations drawn from the order, fitness, and beauty discovered by observations made in the material world; nor yet on the à priori argument, on considerations drawn from the eternal nature of things, and observations made in the spiritual world. It depends primarily on no argument whatever; not on reasoning but Reason. The fact is given outright, as it were, and comes to the man, as soon and as naturally as the consciousness of his own existence, and is indeed logically inseparable from it, for we cannot be conscious of ourselves except as dependent beings.
This intuitive perception of God is afterwards fundamentally and logically established by the à priori argument, and beautifully confirmed by the à posteriori argument; but we are not left without the Idea of God till we become metaphysicians and naturalists, and so can discover it by much thinking. It comes spontaneously, by a law, of whose action we are, at first, not conscious. The belief always precedes the proof, intuition giving the thing to be reasoned about. Unless this intuitive function be performed, it is not possible to attain a knowledge of God. For all arguments to that end must be addressed to a faculty which cannot originate the Idea of God, but only confirm it when given from some other quarter. Any argument is vain when the logical condition of all argument has not been complied with. If the reasoner, as Dr. Clarke has done, presuppose that his opponent has “no transcendent idea of God,” all his reasoning could never produce it, howsoever capable of confirming and legitimating that idea if already existing in the consciousness. As we may speak of sights to the blind, and sounds to the deaf, and convince them that things called sights and sounds actually exist, ​but can furnish no Idea of those things when there is no corresponding sensation, so we may convince a man's understanding of the soundness of our argumentation, but yet give him no Idea of God unless he have previously an intuitive sense thereof. Without the intuitive perception, the metaphysical argument gives us only an idea of abstract Power and Wisdom; the argument from design gives only a limited and imperfect Cause for the limited and imperfect effects. Neither reveals to us the Infinite God.
The Idea of God then transcends all possible external experience, and is given by intuition, or natural revelation, which comes of the joint and spontaneous action of reason and the religious element. Now theoretically this Idea involves no contradiction and is perfect: that is, when the proper conditions are complied with, and nothing disturbs the free action of the spirit, we receive the Idea of a Being, infinite in Power, Wisdom, and Goodness; that is, infinite, or perfect, in all possible relations. But practically, in the majority of cases, these conditions are not observed; men attempt to form a complex and definite conception of God. The primitive Idea, eternal in Man, is lost sight of. The conception of God, as men express it in their language, is always imperfect; sometimes self-contradictory and impossible. Human actions, human thoughts, human feelings, yes, human passions and all the limitations of mortal men, are collected about the Idea of God. Its primitive simplicity and beauty are lost. It becomes self-destructive; and the conception of God, as many minds set it forth, like that of a Griffin, or Centaur, or “men whose heads do grow beneath their shoulders,” is self-contradictory; the notion of a being who, from the very nature of things, could not exist. They for the most part have been called Atheists who denied the popular conception of God, showed its inconsistency, and proved that such a being could not be. The ​early Christians and all the most distinguished and religious philosophers have borne that name, simply because they were too far before men for their sympathy, too far above them for their comprehension, and because, therefore, their Idea of God was sublimer and nearer the truth than that held by their opponents.
Now the conception we form of God, under the most perfect circumstances, must, from the nature of things, fall short of the reality. The Finite can form no adequate conception or imagination of the Infinite. All the conceptions of the human mind are conceived under the limitation of Time and Space; of dependence on a cause exterior to itself; ​while the Infinite is necessarily free from these limitations. A man can comprehend no form of being but his own finite form, which answers to the Supreme Being even less than a grain of dust to the world itself. There is no conceivable ratio between Finite and Infinite. Our human personality gives a false modification to all our conceptions of the Infinite. But if, not resting in a merely sentimental consciousness of God, which is vague, and alone leads rather to pantheistic mysticism than to a reasonable faith, we take the fact given in our nature—the primitive Idea of God, as a Being of infinite Power, Wisdom, and Goodness, involves no contradiction. This is, perhaps, the most faithful expression of the Idea that words can convey. This language does not define the nature of God, but distinguishes our Idea of him from all other ideas and conceptions whatever. Some great religious souls have been content with this native Idea; have found it satisfactory both to Faith and Reason, and confessed with the ancients, that no man by searching could perfectly find out God. Others project their own limitations upon their conception of God, making him to appear such an one as themselves; thus they reverse the saying of Scripture, and creating a phantom in their own image, call it God. Thus, while the Idea of God, as a fact given in man's nature, and affording a consistent representation of its Object, is permanent and alike in all; while a merely sentimental consciousness or feeling of God, though vague and mysterious, is always the same in itself; the popular Conception of God is of the most various and evanescent character, and is not the same in any two ages or men. The Idea is the substance; the ​conception is a transient phenomenon, which at best only imperfectly represents the substance. To possess the Idea of God, though latent in us, is unavoidable; to feel its comfort is natural; to dwell in the Sentiment of God is delightful; but to frame an adequate Conception of Deity and set this forth in words, is not only above human capability but impossible in the nature of things. The abyss of God is not to be fathomed save by Him who is All-in-all.
* ↑ The truth of the human faculties must be assumed in all arguments, and if this be admitted we have then the same evidence for spiritual facts as for the maxims or the demonstrations of Geometry. On this point see some good remarks in Cudworth's Intellectual System, Andover, 1838, 2 vols. 8vo, Vol. II. p. 135, et seq. If any one denies the trustworthiness of the human faculties there can be no argument with him; the axioms of morals and of mathematics are alike nonsense to such a reasoner. Demonstration presupposes something so certain it requires no demonstrating. So Reasoning presupposes the trustworthiness of Reason.
* ↑ I use the word Spirit to denote all the faculties not material—as distinguished from Body.
* ↑ English writers have rarely attempted to account philosophically for the origin of the Idea of God. They have usually assumed this, and then defended it by the various arguments. See Locke's Essay on the Human Understanding, Book I. ch. IV.; and Cousin's Psychology, Henry's Translation, Hartford, 1834, p. 46, et seq., and 181, et seq. See some valuable remarks in Cudworth's Intellectual System, &c., Vol. II. p. 143, et seq. See the Christian Examiner for January, 1840, p. 309, et seq., and the works there cited. See also the article of President Hopkins in American Quarterly Observer, No. II., Boston, 1833; and Ripley's Philosophical Miscellanies, Vol. I. p. 40, et seq., and 203, et seq. Some valuable thoughts on this subject may also be found in De Wette, Das Wesen des Christlichen Glaubens, vom Standpunkte des Glaubens dargestellt, Basel, 1846, § 4, et ant. See too Wirth, die speculative Idee Gottes, Stuttgart, 1845; and Sengler, die Idee Gottes, Heidelberg, 1845.
* ↑ This doctrine seems to be implied in the writings of the Alexandrian fathers.
* ↑ Kant has abundantly shown the insufficiency of all the philosophical arguments for the existence of God, the physico-theological, the cosmological, and the ontological. See the Kritik der reinen Vernunft, 7th edition, p. 444, et seq. But the fact of the Idea given in man's nature cannot be got rid of. It is not a little curious that none of the Christian writers seem to have attempted an ontological proof of the existence of God till the eleventh century, when Anselm led the way. See Bouchitté Histoire des Preuves de l'Existence de Dieu dépuis les Temps les plus reculés jusqu'au Monologium d'Anselme, in the Mem. de l'Acad. des Sciences Morales, &c., Tom. I. Savants Etrangères, Paris, 1841, p. 395, et seq., and his second Mémoire, p. 461, et seq., which brings the history down to that time. Tom. II. p. 59, et seq., 77, et seq.
* ↑ In his Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God.
* ↑ The Idea of God, like that of Liberty and Immortality, may be called a judgment à priori, and from the necessity of the case, transcends all objective experience, as it is logically anterior to it.
* ↑ See Cudworth's Intellectual System, Chap. IV. § 8–10, Vol. I. p. 213, et seq.
* ↑ The best men have often been branded as Atheists. The following benefactors of the world have borne that stigma: Thales, Anaxagoras, Pythagoras, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Xenophanes, and both the Zenos, Cicero, Seneca, Abelard, Galileo, Kepler, Des Cartes, Leibnitz, Wolf, Locke, Cudworth, Samuel Clarke, Jacob Böhme; Kant, and Fichte, and Scbelling, and Hegel, are still under the ban. See some curious details of this subject in Reimmann's Historia Atheismi, &c. 1725, a dull book but profitable. See also a Dissertation by Buchwaldius, De Controversiis recentioribus do Atheismo, Viteb. 1716, 1 vol. quarto, and “Historical Sketch of Atheism,” by Dr Pond, in American Biblical Repository, for Oct. 1839, p. 320, et seq. Possevin, in his Bibliotheca, puts Luther and Melancthon among the Atheists. Mersenne (in his Comment, in Geneseos) says, that in 1622 there were 50,000 Atheists in Paris alone, often a dozen in a single house. Biographie Universelle, Tom. XXVIII. p. 390. See some curious details respecting the literary treatment of the subject in J.G. Walch's Philosophisches Lexicon, 2d ed., Leip. 1733, pp. 134–146. Dr Woods, in his translation of Knapp's Theology (New York, 1831, 2 vols. 8vo), in a note borrowed from Hahn's Lehrbuch des Christ. Glaubens, p. 175, et seq., places Dr Priestley among the modern Atheists, where also he puts De La Mettrie, Von Holbach (or La-Grange), Helvetius, Diderot, and d'Alembert. Such catalogues are instructive. But see Clarke's Classification of Atheists at the beginning of the discourse, in his Works, Vol. II. p. 521, et seq. The charge of impiety is always brought against such as differ from the public faith, especially if they rise above it. Thus Hicks declared Tillotson “the gravest Atheist that ever was.” Discourse on Tillotson and Burnet in Lechler, Gesch. Englischen Deismus, Stuttgart, 1841, p. 150, et seq. In 1697, Peter Browne, for a similar abuse of Toland, was rewarded with the office of a Bishop.—Ib. p. 195. A curious old writer says, “among the Grecians of old, those, Secretaries of Nature, which first made a tender of the natural causes of lightnings and tempests to the rude ears of men, were blasted with the reproach of Atheists, and fell under the hatred of the untutored rabble, because they did not, like them, receive every extraordinary in nature as an immediate expression of the power and displeasure of the Deity.” Spencer, Preface to his Discourse concerning Prodigies, London, 1665. Diodorus Siculus, Lib. 1, p. 75 (ed. Rhodoman), relates an instructive case. A Roman soldier, in Egypt, accidentally killed a cat—killed a god, for the cat was a popular object of worship. The people rose upon him, and nothing could save him from a violent death at the hands of the mob. All religious persecutions, if it be allowed to compare the little with the great, may be reduced to this one denomination. The heretic, actually or by implication, killed a consecrated cat, and the Orthodox would fain kill him. But as the same thing is not sacred in all countries (for even asses have their worshippers), the cat-killer, though an abomination in Egypt, would be a great saint in some lands where dogs are worshipped.
* ↑ M. Cousin thinks God is comprehensible by the human spirit, and even attempts to construct the "intellectual existence" of God. Creation he makes the easiest thing in the world to conceive of! See his Introduction to the History of Philosophy, Linberg's Translation, pp. 132–143. See also Ripley, l. c. Vol. I. p. 271, et seq. One would naturally think human presumption could go no further; but this pleasing illusion is dispelled by the perusal of some of his opponents.
* ↑ Zenophanes saw further into the secret than some others, when he said, that if Horses or Lions had hands and were to represent each his Deity, it would be a Horse or a Lion, for these animals would impose their limitations on the Godhead just as man has done. Sec the passage in Eusebius, Præp. Ev. XIII. 13, and Clemens Alex. Strom. V. 14. The late excellent Dr Arnold goes to the other extreme, and says, "It is only of God in Christ that I can, in my present state of being, conceive anything at all." (!) Life, &c., New York, 1845, Chap. VII. Letter 61, p. 212.
* ↑ See Parker's Sermons of Theism, Atheism, and the Popular Theology, Boston, 1853, Serm. I.