# United Nations Security Council Meeting 3

THIRD MEETING
Held at Church House, Westminster, London, on Friday, 28 January 1946, at 3 p.m.
President: Mr. N. J. O. Makin (Australia).
Present: The representatives of the following countries: Australia, Brazil, China, Egypt, France, Mexico, Netherlands, Poland, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom
16. Provisional agenda
* Adoption of the agenda.
* Letter from the Head of the Iranian delegation to the Executive Secretary dated 19 January 1946.
* Letter from the Acting Head of the USSR delegation to the President of the Security Council dated 21 January 1946.
* Letter from the Head of the Ukrainian SSR delegation to the President of the Security Council dated 21 January 1946.Ibid., Supplement No. 1; Annex 4.</ref>
* Letter from the Head of the Yugoslav delegation to the Executive Secretary (undated).Ibid., Supplement No. 1; Annex 5.</ref>
17. Filming of proceedings
The President: The first matter that I would like to submit to members of the Security Council is the question as to the filming of the proceedings of this session. A request has been made that there might be a filming, not just of a part of the proceedings, but of the whole of the proceedings. This morning, when this matter was referred to me, I indicated that possibly the Council might feel willing to approve of from ten minutes to a quarter of an hour of its proceedings being filmed for documentary purposes, but it is quite evident that this does not suffice for the needs of those who are associated with the filming of the proceedings. I understand from the representations that the Press has made about the matter, that the Press feels that if there is to be a complete documentation of the proceedings of the Council, it is essential for the whole of the proceedings to be filmed.
I would like members of the Security Council to determine whether there is any condition of discomfort or distraction that is likely to arise by reason of this. I may say that the Press has indicated to me that it has sought to minimize the amount of lighting that has to be done for the filming of our proceedings so as to cause no more discomfort than is necessary to members of the Security ​Council in their deliberations. Has any member of the Council any observations to make about the question whether the whole of the proceedings should be filmed or whether there should be only part of the proceedings filmed?
Mr. Bevin (United Kingdom): We may be very handsome and everybody may want to see us, but it is very uncomfortable to have these lights. I should have thought that if they had a period in which they could film the proceedings for the sake of posterity, that would be enough and leave us a little comfort to discuss our problems.
Badawi Pasha (Egypt): I am of the same opinion. They could have ten or fifteen minutes, but not all the time. They could take the liberty of filming once or twice for a short period from time to time during the session.
The President: It has been suggested to me that it would not be possible to have the proceedings filmed from time to time; it either has to be just for a short period, or for the whole of the session. May I suggest that we might possibly permit the filming to proceed for fifteen minutes, and then determine whether it might be desirable to have it discontinued. Those who are making the film must realize that permission is given for only fifteen minutes; after that we shall consider whether there may be any further filming of this present session of the Security Council.
18. Adoption of the agenda
The President: The first item is the adoption of the agenda for this Security Council meeting. I should like to say that, since the documentation for item 2 was listed, another communication from the delegation of Iran has been received and distributed. Is it the Council's wish to add to the documentation already listed in item 2 the note of 26 January 1946 from the Head of the Iranian delegation to the President of the Security Council? If there are no objections, I take it that that proposition is adopted.
The proposal was adopted.
The President: The next thing, before we actually adopt item 1 of the agenda, is a communication that was received from the representative of Yugoslavia bringing to the notice of the Security Council an application by the country of Albania for membership of the United Nations. There has been some unfortunate misunderstanding regarding the way in which it was listed today upon the agenda. I will call upon the Executive Secretary to explain how that has happened.
The Executive Secretary: I must apologize, Mr. President, for a mistake for which I am ​responsible. You will see in the letter dated 26 January which I wrote on your behalf to members of the Council, that I raised this question, and suggested that it was your wish that the Council should discuss at the beginning of this meeting whether this item should be put on the agenda or not. It is apparent from the letter itself that item 5 should not have been put on the agenda, which was attached. It is for the draft to decide whether it should in fact go on the agenda.
The President: May I take it that it is the wish of the Council that the application of Albania shall be treated as an item of the agenda?
Mr. Stettinius (United States of America): You will recall that I referred briefly to this question the last time we met. In view of the position taken by the Executive Committee, and also by the Preparatory Commission, that new applications for membership would not be acted upon at the first part of the General Assembly session, I feel it would be best not to include this item at this session of the Council. The admission of new Members is a serious and important matter, requiring the most careful consideration of the Members of the United Nations. In the circumstances, it is apparent that the only reasonable and fair method of giving proper and adequate consideration to applications for new membership would be to defer all applications until some time prior to the next meeting of the General Assembly, when the Security Council would have had an opportunity to deal with the number of applications that have accrued at that time.
The President: You move that?
Mr. Stettinius (United States of America): That is the motion: that that item should not be included in the agenda of this meeting.
Mr. Modzelewski (Poland) (translated from French): I do not think we should be setting a bad example by postponing the question of the admission of Albania. The United Nations is concerned that all countries which qualify for membership should not be kept waiting too long, if they apply for admission. There is nothing to prevent us from considering the substance of the question, if not today, then at least at our next meeting.
Mr. de Freitas-Valle (Brazil): I think this is not a particular question concerning Albania. The point is that it would be far better to have all applications for new membership studied during the intervals between Assemblies, and to have the Security Council meeting just before the Assembly report on them. This is a question of principle regarding all such new applications.
​Mr. Bevin (United Kingdom): I support that view.
Mr. Vyshinsky (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): There is no necessity to link the question of admitting any one country to membership of the United Nations with other, or a series of other, questions of a similar nature. On the contrary, it would seem to me that consideration of all applications as and when they are submitted would be very convenient and necessary. Apart from this, as far as I recall, the Security Council at its last meeting decided to place the question of Albania's membership of the United Nations on the agenda for the following meeting. In my opinion, therefore, this item should be placed on the agenda and the substance of the matter should be discussed.
Badawi Pasha (Egypt): The question depends rather on the prospects of the length of this part of the session. It would assist us if we could tell beforehand how long this part of the session would last. Naturally, as long as it is a question of time and a question of the necessary opportunity to discuss this question, unless we know something about the length of this part of the session of the General Assembly it is difficult for us to decide it.
Mr. Wellington Koo (China): This question of the application of Albania for membership of the United Nations really has two aspects; one of principle and one of procedure. I think that in principle, every peace-loving nation could apply for membership, and it is for the Security Council to decide. Therefore, so far as the insertion of this question in the agenda is concerned, personally I think that perhaps we might do that if there is no serious objection. There is also the question of procedure. This is the first application, and the Council is just organizing itself. I take it that the Council, in order to be in a position to consider not only this application but any other applications, naturally will want to formulate some procedure which should be suitable for all cases.
If this view is sound, I think the Council will be fully justified in considering when to take up that question, and whether it would not be useful first of all to have a small sub-committee to suggest some procedure for dealing with applications in general. In short, I look upon this question in two parts. One is a matter of principle which would seem to lead us to put the question on the agenda. On the other hand, the Council is its own master and can decide when to take up the discussion of a particular matter. Before taking up and considering any application, I think it is desirable, perhaps, to have some simple procedure which will be applicable not only to this one case, but also to other cases.
The President: May I suggest to the representative of the United States of America that ​even if this item is placed upon the agenda, it is within the province of the member to make such move as he may feel proper at that time with regard to the course he has suggested? The fact of it being included in the agenda at this stage does not determine the matter. That is a matter which will be considered at the stage when we reach that item on the agenda. It will then still be possible for the representative of the United States of America or any other member of the Council to make his suggestion.
The suggestion of the representative of the United States of America is that the placing of this item, the application of Albania for admission as a Member of the United Nations, on the agenda of this Security Council should be deferred until some time just before the second part of the first session of the General Assembly. Is that correct?
Mr. Stettinius (United States of America): I think the important point is that, as a result of the action of the Executive Committee and the Preparatory Commission, undoubtedly a number of peace-loving States which would like to join the United Nations refrained from making application during this period. My suggestion is not aimed, as the representative of Brazil has said, at Albania at all. The question of admitting Albania does not enter into the matter. It is merely a question of fairness and equity to all peace-loving States. I think it would be much better to adopt a procedure for deferring this whole question and dealing with it at the forthcoming meeting of the Assembly.
The President: I will now submit this matter to the vote of the Council. Those who are in favour of the submission by the representative of the United States of America that the matter be deferred, and not included at this stage upon the agenda of the Security Council, please indicate by raising the right hand.
Show of hands.
Against?
Show of hands.
Abstentions?
Show of hands.
The President: I am afraid some members have not quite understood the position.
Mr. Paul-Boncour (France) (translated from French): I abstained from voting, and I should like to give the reason for doing so. The representative of the United States of America asked that the question be postponed until the second part of the present Assembly. The Chinese representative suggested, and I fully approve, that we should first settle the procedure. But did he mean that we should settle it now and that the question of the admission of Albania could be considered during the present session or on the ​contrary, did his suggestion imply, as the United States representative asked, that the particular case of Albania should be placed on the agenda for the next session? I abstained from voting because I was not sure of the exact meaning of the proposal.
Badawi Pasha (Egypt): The application has been put on the agenda of the Council, on the immediate agenda. That conveyed the idea that it should be discussed in the course of this week or next week. The proposal of the representative of China amounted to a distinction between the actual agenda and a kind of permanent agenda for the Council on which he was willing that this application should be registered. If a distinction is admitted between an actual and immediate agenda and a general agenda kept of questions for the Council according to the dates of their arrival, there will not be the least objection to the inscription of this application on the general agenda. But, as I have already mentioned, the problem is that of not knowing exactly the time which would be required in this part of the session to discuss this question. Supposing that there is a discussion of the general principles, which would be applicable to other countries, I think that this discussion would require some time. Unless we know something certain about the length of time which this point would take, we are really unable to vote for immediate discussion of this problem.
Mr. Wellington Koo (China): Will you allow me to make an explanation? Perhaps in putting forward my views a little while ago I spoke a little too briefly.
I was impressed, on the one hand, by the question of principle. When a nation has applied for membership, that application is certainly admissible, and if it has been made in the proper manner, then it seems to me that it should go on the agenda. However, when and how to discuss it, and whether the qualifications of the particular applicant State meet or do not meet the requirements under the Charter are points for the Council to discuss. When is the Council to discuss them? That is entirely up to the Council to decide. Thus, the placing of an application on the agenda by no means binds the Council to discuss it today, tomorrow or next week.
On the other hand, I was very much impressed also by the practical point raised by the representative of the United States of America. In a matter of such importance, not with reference to any one particular applicant, but with reference to all applications, since this is the first case, the Council would want to consider the question from a more comprehensive viewpoint, perhaps studying, formulating and then eventually adopting some general procedure which would be applicable not to one case, but to all cases. It seems to me that that would be very desirable.
Therefore, in view of both aspects of the question, I suggest that we place the question on the agenda, leaving it entirely to the Security Council to decide when to discuss it. Personally, ​I would urge the Security Council not to take it up until some general procedure is worked out so that whatever procedure we follow in this particular case will also be followed in other cases. This will show the orderly way in which the Security Council seeks to deal with applications in general.
Therefore, when you put the question to the vote, to me it is a matter of principle that I voted for insertion on the agenda. But if you should take a vote in the second part, I understood in the sense I have just explained, that both vote for it also, because it seems to me that I would be very useful and very practical and would lead to consideration.
Let me add one more word. Inclusion in the agenda in no way commits the Council or any member as to the position each delegation may take; it simply puts the question on the agenda and leaves it to the Security Council to decide when to take it up and how to take it up.
Mr. Modzelewski (Poland) (translated from French): The question of procedure has been raised. With regard to this subject, I should like to remind all the members that the Security Council sits permanently. The fact of fixing the agenda of the Security Council today does not mean that we must exhaust the agenda today. The General Assembly will probably end in February, but the Security Council will continue to sit. It will therefore be able to continue dealing with the questions proposed during the present session of the Assembly. Besides, the Security Council will have a number of questions to settle between the two General Assemblies. That is why I voted against the proposal of the representative of the United States of America.
I voted in favor of discussing the Albanian application in order not to discourage other States not Members of the United Nations who may wish to make similar applications.
Mr. Vyshinsky (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): It seems to me that if we accept the proposal made by Mr. Stettinius, certain complications may arise in discussing the question of the admission of new Members to the United Nations.
This proposal is to the effect that we should not discuss single applications, but should wait until several have been made. On the one hand, it is not stated how many such applications would be deemed sufficient for the matter to receive consideration. How many should there be: two, three, or five? On the other hand, it is not certain that a sufficient number of these applications would be filed by the date fixed for discussion of the matter.
And again, in Article 4 of the Charter, which deals with the question of admission of new Members, there is nothing which precludes the consideration of single applications. There is nothing in the Charter to support Mr. Stettinius' proposal. I would even be inclined to think that ​it is to some extent contrary to the Charter, inasmuch as this procedure may not be conducive to the admission of new Members, but may on the contrary create certain complications. Therefore, this proposal is not based on the Charter.
Consequently, I suggest including the question of the admission of Albania in our agenda, while leaving the date, when it will be examined to be discussed at one of the later meetings of the Security Council.
Mr. van Kleffens (Netherlands): I think that the suggestion of Mr. Vyshinsky is a very wise one. I think that any State which applies for membership is entitled to have its application dealt with within a reasonable time. I do not think that it is at all unreasonable, especially when the Assembly is at present to consider what might call its constituent phase, to consider shaping things in such a way that the Assembly may be able to deal with the matter in the second half of its first session, and, I should say, irrespective of whether or not at that time there are any other applications for admission from other States.
Mr. Stettinius (United States of America): My objection to the placing of this item on the agenda applies to today’s meeting. I wish to make it clear to Mr. Vyshinsky that I am not talking in terms of quantity, but of timing, the time when the various applications of the peace-loving nations of the world should be considered. I am entirely in sympathy with the sentiments just expressed by the representative of the Netherlands.
The President: Do I take it that the representative of the United States of America agrees that this item be included in the agenda?
Mr. Stettinius (United States of America): Yes, as long as I understand that it is going on the continuing agenda and not on the specific agenda that is now before us.
The President: When this item is put on the agenda, then it is competent for the Council Members to take such view as they think proper. Do I take it, then, that this item is included in the agenda? I would remind you that there is only one agenda. Are there any objections?
Mr. Vyshinsky (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): I would like to be quite sure that I have understood the proposal correctly. When we place an item on the agenda, we do so in order to discuss it, not in order to evade discussion. Consequently, if we decide to include the question of admitting Albania to membership of the Organization at its presupposed that we shall discuss it, but that the Security Council will decide the exact date of discussion, and that it will take place during the present session of the Assembly.
Mr. Bevin (United Kingdom): I am willing for it to go on the agenda, but my attitude is ​that I am not ready to discuss the admission of new Members to the Organization during the Assembly now in session. I think it needs longer time to study, and it needs further opportunity for consideration. I have no objection to its going on the agenda, but I thought, if I understood the representative of China aright, that is what he wanted, too.
The President: May I emphasize to members of the Council that there is only one agenda. Therefore, if you include an item in the agenda, you include it in the agenda for the consideration of this Council in its order, as it is set down in that particular list. But you are to determine, when you arrive at that particular item, to determine whether the matter is one suitable for immediate discussion, or whether it should be deferred, or in what kind of treatment you should exercise the services of the Council in regard to that particular matter. It is a matter which you fully determine at the time when you arrive at that item for consideration.
Mr. Paul-Boncour (France) (translated from French): I should like to have a clear understanding of this question. I agree with the representative of China that, before deciding on the admission of a new Member, we must draw up rules of procedure that will enable us to determine whether the applicant fulfils the conditions for admission.
I regret, however, that we do not see our way to determine these rules of procedure during the present session, and that the admission of new Members whom we may invite or desire should be thus delayed. I share the view of the representative of China concerning the necessity, before coming to a final decision on a particular application, of establishing first the general rules of procedure which would enable us to see our way clearly in dealing with applications for admission and to ascertain whether the applying States fulfil the required conditions. I venture to express regret that we do not contemplate establishing these rules of procedure during the present session, and that we postpone to a later and hypothetical session the admission of new Members, which we ought, on the contrary, to encourage.
The President: That would be, I take it, a suitable matter actually to be determined at the time when we arrived at that item of the agenda, and when it came before the Council for discussion.
Now, are we ready to make a decision upon it? Are we all in favour of this item being placed on the agenda? If there are no objections, then it is adopted:
The agenda was adopted.
19. Filming of proceedings
The President: I would call the Council's attention to the fact that the lights have now been on for about an hour, and the filming has. ​been taking place during that period of time. That is considerably longer than I had first indicated. But I would like to know now, after the experience the Council has had of the matter, whether it wishes to continue.
Could I take it that we might have a vote without discussion of the matter? Those in favor of having the filming continue, kindly put up their hands.
I take it that it is the wish of the Council that the filming of the proceedings of the Security Council shall now be concluded. I would ask the operators kindly to switch off the lights that are being used for this purpose.
20. Letter from the head of the Iranian delegation to the Executive Secretary dated 19 January 1946
The President: We have now reached item 2 of the agenda. The Council at its last meeting decided to invite the delegation of Iran to be present when this item was discussed. I think it was the intention of the Council to act under Article 31 of the Charter. If the Council had not already decided to issue an invitation, it might have been necessary to consider at this stage, in view of the Iranian communication of 26 January, whether an invitation should be issued under Article 32. That matter need not concern us further at this meeting. I merely mention it so that our records will show that we have not been unmindful of it.
I ask the Council whether it wishes to ask the representative of Iran to take his seat now at the Council table in order that he may exercise the right to participate, without vote, in the discussion? I point out that the right is the same whether under Article 31 or Article 32 of the Charter. Are there any objections to the procedure of inviting Iran to take its seat at the table?
The procedure was adopted.
The President: I would ask the Iranian representative kindly to come to the table.
The representative of Iran took his seat at the table.
The President: This is the first occasion on which the Security Council has been called upon to act under Chapter VI of the Charter, which is entitled, "The Pacific Settlement of Disputes". Our proceedings are likely to serve as a precedent for the Council’s future action. Eventually, rules of procedure will no doubt be worked out on the basis of what the Council has actually done in this and similar matters; and each successive step will be clearly laid down.
At present our provisional rules do not deal with all these matters. Today, therefore, we shall be obliged to decide on our procedure ad hoc.
​The matter is before the Council itself to determine. Before I ask for observations, I shall venture to offer a suggestion which can serve as a basis for discussion. On the subject matter of this item, the Council has received certain written communications from the delegations of Iran and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, respectively. The world has the right to expect of this Security Council that it will deal with all such matters in a regular way, and in accordance with the principles of justice and fair play which are stated in the Charter. My suggestion, therefore, is first, that the Council should commence its consideration of this item by giving to the delegation for Iran, and then to the delegation for the USSR, an opportunity to make oral observations, either in explanation of or in supplementation of their written communications. In this way, the Council will be fully seized of the matter under consideration.
The adoption of some such practice, as a general procedure initiating the discussion of matters such as this, may be thought to establish best the impartiality and the objectivity of the Council’s consideration of the item.
Then, certainly, after these statements have been completed, the suggestion is that I should throw the subject open to discussion by the Council: It will then be the right of any member to move any relevant resolution within the powers conferred on the Council by the Charter. Does the Council wish to adopt this procedure that I have outlined?
Mr. Vyshinsky (Union of Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): I raise no objections to your suggestion regarding procedure, but one factor must be borne in mind. May I remind you that, in reply to the Iranian Government’s first statement, the Soviet Government pointed out that the question could be settled by bilateral negotiations? The Soviet Government does not and did not refuse this means of settlement. At the last Security Council meeting, we objected to any discussion of the substance of this question, but we agreed to the manner being placed on the agenda for today’s meeting. That is, we agreed to limit the discussion to the procedural aspect of the question. We raise no objection to the discussion solely of this aspect of the question.
The President: I take it, therefore, that the procedure that I proposed to the Council is agreed to.
The procedure was adopted.
The President: I now invite the representative of Iran to make such statement supplementary to or in clarification of the written communication that was addressed to the Council in regard to this particular matter.
Mr. Taqizadeh (Iran): I am handing in a ​memorandum setting forth the contentions of the Iranian Government in the dispute which has arisen between the Iranian Government and the Soviet Government. This dispute has been brought by the Iranian Government to the attention of the Security Council, under Article 35 of the Charter, in a note dated 19 January 1946 communicated to Mr. Gladwyn Jebb, Acting Secretary-General.
I would like to emphasize that the Iranian Government regrets no less than any other Member Government of the United Nations that the organization has been faced at the commencement of its work with a situation in Iran and should have to deal with a dispute between two of its Members. The Iranian Government sincerely deplores that it finds itself in dispute with a country with which it not only has a long-standing friendship, but which is also its ally under the Tri-Partite Treaty of Alliance of 29 January 1942. Iran helped in no small measure towards Soviet victory by placing her entire resources at the disposal of the Allies for the prosecution of the war. Very considerable quantities of war supplies reached the Soviet Union by way of Iran, which was then almost the only route open. Iranian railways, roads and all means of transport were utilized for this purpose, even at the cost of depriving the Iranian population of food supplies.
I would remind the Council of the fact that the assistance given by Iran in the prosecution of the war against the common enemy, particularly by facilitating the transportation of supplies from overseas to the Soviet Union, was officially recognized in the Tehran Declaration, signed on 1 December 1943, by Mr. Churchill, Marshal Stalin and President Roosevelt. Iran broke off diplomatic relations with the Axis Powers, Germany and Italy, in September 1941; it declared war on Germany on 9 September 1943 and on Japan towards the end of February 1945.
The memorandum which I am handing in presents the facts which are relevant to this most unfortunate dispute. It will be seen that the Iranian Government has sought a solution of this dispute by direct approach to the Soviet Government and, in accordance with Article 33 of the Charter, has sought to reach this solution by negotiation. As you will see from the appendices to the memorandum, the Iranian Government has addressed to the Soviet Government a number of notes setting forth the interventions on the part of Soviet authorities in internal affairs in breach of Iranian independence and sovereignty, and has requested the Soviet Government to discuss and remedy these matters.
​But the Soviet Government has either not replied to these notes or has found itself unable to admit the protests of the Iranian Government. Furthermore, the Iranian Prime Minister offered in December 1945 to proceed to Moscow accompanied by the Iranian Foreign Minister in order to arrive at a settlement with the Soviet Government. This offer was ignored. In the light of the refusal of the Soviet Government either to discuss these matters or to cease these disturbances in Iran’s internal affairs, the only course for the Iranian Government was to bring the dispute to the attention of the Security Council as a situation which might lead to international friction.
The detailed circumstances which have given rise to this situation are set forth in the memorandum. It is therein shown that, in breach of international law and of the Tri-Partite Treaty of Alliance of 29 January 1942, between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Great Britain and Iran, also contrary to the Three-Power Declaration by the United States of America, Great Britain and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics concerning Iran which was made at the Tehran Conference in December 1943, and contrary to the principles embodied in the Preamble to the Charter of the United Nations, there have been a number of interventions in Iranian internal affairs by the Soviet authorities.
Although the Tri-Partite Treaty provides that the presence of the Allied forces on Iranian territory shall not constitute a military occupation and that it shall disturb as little as possible the administration and security forces of Iran, the economic life of the country, the normal movements of the population and the application of Iranian laws and regulations, nevertheless the Soviet authorities have disturbed the administration of Iran by interfering with it in the zone where Soviet troops are stationed. In Azerbaijan this policy has been carried so far that the Iranian Government has been prevented from exercising any power whatsoever in this part of Iran; the security forces of Iran have been prevented from exercising their proper functions of suppressing disorders; the Soviet authorities have disturbed the economic life of the country by setting up at the frontier of the so-called Soviet zone internal barriers which all merchandise and civilians have been allowed to pass only at the discretion of the Soviet authorities; no armed forces of the Iranian Government have been allowed to proceed beyond these limits. The Soviet authorities have prevented the Iranian authorities from applying Iranian laws and regulations in these areas, in some cases by applying their own ruling, in others by forbidding the local authorities to enforce the law of Iran.
While the Iranian Government to a certain extent tolerated these breaches of territory and international law during the war, it contends that, now that the war is over, this interference with Iran’s independence and sovereignty should certainly be ended. Since the end of the war, ​certain unruly elements in Azerbaijan sought to cause dissension and disturbances. It would have been an easy matter for the Iranian Government to carry out its duty of re-establishing order if it had been possible for the security forces to proceed to those affected areas. This access was denied, and Iranian troops were halted at the Russian barriers. This, in the submission of the Iranian Government, is clearly an interference in the internal affairs of Iran.
It will be seen from the memorandum that this is only one instance among many. The result has been that whole districts are no longer under the control of the central Government, which, owing to the action of the Soviet authorities, is not able to send troops or officials to these parts. As such action on the part of the Soviet authorities is in contravention of the Tri-Partite Treaty, the Iranian Government urges that the Security Council recommend that the terms of the Tri-Partite Treaty be strictly adhered to; that until the evacuation of Soviet troops from Iranian territory is duly completed, in accordance with their obligations, no action be taken by the Soviet authorities in Iran contrary to this treaty or to the Tehran Declaration, and that troops and officials be allowed to carry out their normal functions of government, and that the authority of the central Government be not interfered with in any way by the Soviet forces or officials in Iran. The Iranian Government also asks that the Security Council should recommend that withdrawal by the Soviet authorities of all moral and material support from the rebels in Azerbaijan or dissident elements elsewhere.
It will be within the recollection of two members of the Security Council, namely the United States of America and Great Britain, that each Government on being informed that Soviet troops had prevented Iranian security forces from proceeding to Azerbaijan, made representations to the Soviet Government that the Government of Iran should have full freedom to send its armed forces to any part of Iran in order to maintain order in its own territory. The representation of the United States was contained in a note dated 24 November 1945, delivered by the United States Ambassador in Moscow to the Soviet Government. This note, after invoking the Treaty of Alliance and the Declaration of Tehran, stated that the fulfillment of the assurances given at Tehran required that “the Government of Iran should have full freedom, without interference from Soviet, British or American military or civil authorities, to move its armed forces through Iran in such a manner as it may consider necessary in order to preserve its authority and to maintain internal security”.
​The representations of Great Britain, which were contained in a letter dated 27 November 1945 from the British Ambassador in Moscow to Mr. Molotov, the Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs, also referred to the Tehran Declaration and stated that it seemed reasonable to the British Government that the Iranian Government should wish to maintain order in its own territory and that it seemed legitimate that it should move its forces about its own country to do so. The British Government stated that it trusted that the Soviet Government would give instructions in this sense to its forces in Iran that they should not interfere with the Iranian Government in the exercise of its sovereign right of maintaining order in its own territory.
On 29 November 1945, the Soviet Government answered the United States Government note of 24 November. The Soviet Government maintained that the events that had taken place in northern Iran were not an armed uprising and were not directed against the Iranian Government, but had been caused by reactionary elements which have opposed the extension of national rights to the population of northern Iran.
As regards the Iranian security forces, the Soviet Government stated that it was not hindering the movement of forces which were already in the districts of northern Iran, but that it had opposed the dispatch of new Iranian troops to northern districts on the grounds that this would increase the disorders and the bloodshed and would further compel the Soviet Government to bring in more Soviet troops to preserve order and to assure the security of the Soviet garrison. As the Soviet Government considered the introduction of additional Soviet forces into Iran as undesirable, it considered that the introduction of new Iranian forces into the Northern Provinces would serve no useful purpose.
It clearly appears from this note that the attitude of the Soviet Government is directly contrary to the Treaty of Alliance and to the Tehran Declaration. The Iranian Government, not the Soviet Government, is the judge of the strength and nature of the disturbances in Azerbaijan, since the Soviet Government is bound by treaty not to interfere with the internal affairs of Iran. Therefore, the Soviet Government, by its admission that it did not regard the introduction of new troops into Iran as necessary, acknowledged that it had committed a breach of the Treaty of Alliance, which provides that the stationing of Soviet troops is not a military occupation and that there should not be any interference in the internal affairs of Iran.
The Iranian Government had communicated directly with the Soviet Government on the subject of sending troops and officials to northern Iran. In a note to the Soviet Government of 17 November, the Iranian Government notified the Soviet Government that instructions had been ​issued that the Governor-General and Governors of Azerbaijan should be sent out to fill their posts. In addition, orders had been given for the dispatch of troops to restore order. The Iranian Government requested the Soviet Government to give the necessary immediate instructions to the Soviet military authorities to refrain from interfering with the freedom of action of the Iranian army and constabulary. The Iranian Government warned that if urgent attention was not paid to these matters the situation was such that disastrous consequences might ensue, and that if unfortunate incidents occurred owing to lack of freedom of movement of its armed forces, it would have the right to impute responsibility for this failure to the Soviet military authorities.
After the Iranian forces had been halted by the Soviet authorities on 21 November 1945, the Iranian Government addressed two notes, on 22 and 23 November 1945 respectively, requesting that telegraphic instructions be given to the Soviet authorities immediately to let these forces go through.
On 26 November, the Soviet Government answered the urgent requests of the Iranian Government by stating, as mentioned above, that if the Iranian Government sent troops to Azerbaijan this would cause disturbance and bloodshed and that it was therefore not considered advisable to allow reinforcements to proceed to Azerbaijan.
The rest of the note of the Soviet Government was a categorical denial of numerous incidents of interferences which the Iranian Government had cited in its note of 17 November. The submission of the Soviet Government, in its notes of 26 November to the Iranian Government and of 29 November to the United States Government, that it had prevented the dispatch of troops to Azerbaijan makes it unnecessary for me at this stage to deal with the other numerous acts of interference by the Soviet military and civil authorities in the internal affairs. These acts are fully set forth in the memorandum I am presenting today.
On 1 December, the Iranian Government addressed a reply to the Soviet Government in which satisfaction was expressed for the assurances implied in the Soviet note that these incidents would not be repeated, that the interference in the Northern Provinces would cease and that the security forces would be able to move about freely. The Iranian Government asked that it should be informed of the urgent steps which the Soviet Embassy would be taking to ensure freedom of movement for the Iranian military and civil authorities in the Northern Provinces. Exception was taken to the statement of the Soviet Government in its note that it could not be held ​responsible for the absence of officials in those provinces, since the presence of those officials would only be useful if Iranian security forces were placed at their disposal.
As explained in my letter of 26 January to the Security Council, the note of 1 December was in no sense a concluded negotiation. On the contrary, it maintained a request of the Iranian Government that the forces should be allowed to proceed to northern Iran.
On 15 December 1945, the eve of the conference of the three Foreign Ministers in Moscow, the Iranian Government addressed a note to Great Britain, the United States of America and the Soviet Union, asking for the complete and immediate evacuation of their territory by the Allied troops. Pending the fulfilment of this request, the Iranian Government asked that foreign military forces stationed in Iran should abstain from interfering with the free movement of Iranian security forces so that security might be re-established.
In the circumstances, the request of Iran, therefore, is that Soviet authorities should cease interfering in the internal affairs of Iran, and that Iranian forces and officials should not be prevented from proceeding freely in and through territory in which Soviet forces are stationed or from the full exercise of their duties, and more particularly that no hindrance should be put in the way of the Iranian security forces proceeding to Azerbaijan or to any part of Iran to restore law and order. In addition, the Iranian Government requests that the Soviet Government give the necessary instructions to effect complete withdrawal of all Soviet troops and officials by 2 March 1946.
I am confident that, in the spirit of justice which animates the new world organization, and in accordance with the principle laid down in Article 2, paragraph 4 of the Charter of the United Nations, the Security Council will grant Iran's request that pending the completion of the due withdrawal of the Soviet forces, Iran should have full freedom of action in its own territory.
I would like to add that, in presenting these facts, the Iranian delegation is animated by the desire for the maintenance of good relations with the Soviet Union. I have attempted to deal courteously and objectively with the facts of this unfortunate situation, which, it is the earnest hope of the Iranian delegation, will be clarified in the cause of lasting friendship between the Soviet Union and Iran through the recommendation of the Security Council.
The President: I invite the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to make such oral statements as might be wished in support of, or in clarification of, the written ​note which has already been communicated to this Council.
Mr. Vyshinsky (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian):
Note: The statement reproduced below is the translation of a text supplied by Mr. Vyshinsky after the meeting.
I think it necessary to make the following statement.
As I have already stated, I will leave aside the questions of substance raised by the Iranian delegation and I will deal only with the procedural aspect. I will endeavour to bring proofs to refute the facts put forward by that Iranian Government which is no longer in power and whose claims are entirely without foundation.
The questions raised by the Iranian Government are set forth in two Iranian statements, but since they do not meet the conditions specified in the Charter these questions cannot be discussed by the Security Council. I shall also, however, have to touch on some questions of fact which have been put in an incorrect and tendentious light by the Iranian delegation. It is necessary to decide immediately whether the Security Council should or should not deal with the question raised by the former Iranian Government of Hakimi, which obviously aimed at aggravating the relations existing between Iran and the Soviet Union.
I will pass to the procedural aspect of the question. Here there are two main points. In the first place, it must be established whether or not negotiations took place between the Iranian and Soviet Governments. In the second place, the results of such negotiations must be considered. In its first declaration, made to the Security Council on 19 January, the Iranian delegation stated that the Iranian Government had repeatedly tried to open negotiations with the Soviet Government but had met with no success. At present and in its second document, the Iranian delegation admits that the Iranian Government not only endeavoured to negotiate with the Soviet Government but that such negotiations actually took place. The Iranian delegation itself thus refutes its first statement.
There remains the second question, namely: What were the results of these negotiations?
In its statement of 24 January addressed to the Security Council, the Soviet delegation pointed out that the Iranian Government, in its note of 1 December, expressed its satisfaction at the Soviet Government's statement contained in its note of 26 November. The Iranian delegation states that the translation of the Iranian note is inaccurate, and endeavours to present the whole matter as if it were disguised with the results of the exchange of notes between the Soviet Government and the Iranian Government in November of last year. I am not going to start a philological discussion, and in general I do not intend to argue the correctness or incorrectness of the translation of the particular ​words. referred to by the Iranian delegation. I will use the text of the Iranian Government's note of 1 December, which the Iranian delegation has sent to the members of the Security Council. This text shows, no matter how desirable it may be for the Iranian delegation to deny it, that the Iranian Government through its Ministry of Foreign Affairs pointed with satisfaction to the contents of the statement mentioned in the Soviet note of 26 November. In order to decide the nature of these statements, it is obviously necessary to refer to them, that is to the Soviet Government's note of 26 November. It is evident, on referring to this note, that the Soviet statement pointed out that the allegation of interference by Soviet employees in the internal affairs of Iran in the northern district was not in accordance with the facts and that, on the contrary, the Soviet note of 26 November contained no statement to the effect that "the incidents will not be repeated", as now asserted by the Iranian delegation. Indeed, head could the note of the Iranian Government, dated 1 December, express satisfaction at the statement of the Soviet Government that “the incidents will not be repeated” if the Soviet note with which the Iranian Government expressed its satisfaction did not state that “the incidents will not be repeated”? Moreover, there are other passages in the Iranian note of 1 December which prove that the Iranian Government was at that time satisfied.
I am quoting from the text submitted by Mr. Taqizadeh:
"Your assurance [that is, the assurance of the Soviet Government contained in the note of 26 November] that the officials of the Soviet Union fully respect the provisions of the Tri-Partite Treaty and of the Declaration signed in Tehran by the three great Powers (which are the Allies of Iran), is also a source of gratification."
Thus, it is quite evident that the Iranian Government was satisfied with the results of the negotiations of November 1945 between the Soviet and Iranian Governments, on the question which the Iranian Government is now endeavouring to bring before the Security Council for consideration.
I must also point out that at that time, that is in December 1945, the Iranian Government did not show any desire to continue the negotiations on this question. In proof of this, the following passage of the same note of the Iranian Government of 1 December may be quoted:
"In answer to the communication in which you reply that the charges made concerning the interference of Soviet officials in our internal affairs, in the Northern Provinces, are unfounded, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs does not wish at this time to give further explanations in this matter and to throw more light on the antecedents of the case."
​How can the Iranian delegation now contend that the attempts of the Iranian Government to start negotiations with the Soviet Government had no results?
From all that I have said, it is obvious that such results have been achieved. It will also be seen that the negotiations were not continued after 1 December because the Iranian Government did not desire it and obviously did not see the necessity for it. Indeed, in view of the facts referred to above, can it be said that the negotiations between the Soviet Government and the Iranian Government were unsuccessful? The Soviet Government answers: No, this cannot be said. As a matter of fact, results were achieved, and these results were such that the Iranian Government did not think it necessary to continue the negotiations.
The Iranian delegation also referred here to the notes bearing later dates in December, the 13th and 15th. These references of the Iranian delegation to the notes in question aim at showing that even after 1 December the Iranian Government approached the Soviet Government with similar claims which, allegedly, were not granted. But on referring to these notes, it would appear that they did not deal with the claims presented at an earlier date by the Iranian Government to the Soviet Government, but raised an entirely new question, that is, that the Moscow Conference of Three Ministers should discuss the wishes of the Iranian Government regarding the withdrawal of foreign troops from Iran, and that no decisions should be taken at the Moscow Conference without previous consultation with the Iranian Government. It may therefore be asserted that after 1 December the Iranian Government did not repeat its claims against the Soviet Union, and that the reference to the notes of 13 and 15 December has no relation whatever to the question presented by the Iranian Government to the Security Council. As to the substance of these December notes, in which the question of the withdrawal of foreign troops from Iran is discussed, this matter was covered in the Treaty of 1942, which, as is known, laid down a definite time limit for this purpose. It is also known that the Moscow Conference of three Ministers of Foreign Affairs did not discuss Iranian questions, and therefore the claim of Mr. Hakimi at this time in connexion with the fact that he was not invited to the Moscow Conference is quite unfounded.
I will summarize this part of my statement, I consider it to be proved that, in November 1945, negotiations on the claims presented by the Iranian Government did take place between the Soviet Government and the Iranian Government, and that these negotiations had satisfactory results. Now the Iranian delegation, acting on the instructions of the Iranian Government, which, as is known, has now been replaced by another Government, states that it does not consider these negotiations satisfactory. In this case, the Iranian delegation has every possibility of again addressing the Soviet Government in order to clarify the questions in which it is interested.
​In its statement to the Security Council, the Soviet delegation wrote that the Soviet Government could not fail to point out that there had been a recent increase in propaganda hostile to the Soviet Union in Iran, which was obviously connived at by the Government of Hakimi.
The Soviet delegation wrote that this propaganda was in no way different from the fascist propaganda that formerly took place against the Soviet Union under Riza Shah. This statement continued:
"The anti-democratic and pogrom activity, hostile to the Soviet Union, on the part of the reactionary forces in Iran which are supported by certain influential Iranian groups drawn from the ruling circles and the police authorities, creates for the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic a danger of organized hostile actions, diversions and so forth… The Soviet Government considers, however, that questions of this kind, which affect the relations between two neighbouring States, the USSR and Iran, can and should be settled by means of bilateral negotiations between the Soviet Government and the Iranian Government. The Soviet Government did not and does not refuse to accept this method of settling such questions arising between Allied Governments."
I now ask the Security Council if there is any foundation for consideration by the Security Council of the question brought before it by the Iranian Government of Hakimi and the Iranian delegation? I answer: No. There is no such foundation.
This is the actual state of affairs. I should like, however, to consider to what extent the Iranian statement to the Security Council is justified from the legal point of view, from the point of view of the conformity of this statement with the Iranian delegation with the Charter of the United Nations.
I must analyse the circumstances of this question in connection with Articles 33, 34, 36 and 37 of the Charter, Article 33 says:
"The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry etc."
Consequently, the Charter of the United Nations requires the Members of the Organization to attempt to settle disputes by means of negotiation, et cetera, and it is even stated in the second part of this Article that the Council may call upon the parties to settle their dispute by the means indicated in Article 33.
On comparing the contents of Article 33 with all the circumstances mentioned here by the Iranian delegation, it will become quite obvious that, in the present case, the Security Council cannot call upon the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to take any steps provided for by Article 33.
​The next Article pertaining to this question, Article 34, says:
"The Security Council may investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security."
It suffices to compare the circumstances mentioned here by the Iranian delegation with Article 34 in order to eliminate any doubt that this Article is absolutely inapplicable to the question under consideration; since it relates to a dispute or situation of quite a different order. I shall further quote Article 36, paragraph 1 of the Charter:
"The Security Council may, at any stage of a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 or of a situation of like nature, recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment."
This Article is inapplicable in this case since this is not the place for such recommendations, the Soviet Government having expressly stated that it considers the only acceptable means of settling such questions between neighboring countries to be by bilateral negotiation.
Finally Article 37, paragraph 1:
"Should the parties to a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 fail to settle it by the means indicated in that Article, they shall refer it to the Security Council."
This Article envisages a situation in which the parties have found themselves unable to come to an agreement. It is quite obvious that, at present, such a situation does not exist in the relations between the USSR and Iran, and consequently, there is no foundation for the application of Article 37 of the Charter.
The analysis of the above-mentioned Articles of the Charter undoubtedly proves that the Security Council has no grounds for considering the substance of the Iranian delegation’s statement. The Soviet delegation suggests that the Soviet Union and Iran should be given the opportunity to settle this matter,
In submitting this proposal, the Soviet delegation has in view the interest of good-neighborly relations among Members of the Organization, the interest of strengthening international confidence and mutual goodwill, and an endeavour to strengthen unity and friendship within the Organization of the United Nations.
The President: Does the Iranian representative desire to speak at this stage? I was going to propose that this might be a suitable moment for an adjournment of the debate until the next meeting of the Security Council. If the Iranian representative feels it imperative for him to speak, I shall have to ask the Council.
Very well; do I take it, then, that it is desired that we shall adjourn the proceedings of the debate until the next meeting?
​Mr. Vyshinsky (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): I should like to suggest that the completion of this discussion should not be carried over to the next meeting, because it would not be expedient to divide this question into two parts.
The President: Does any other representative wish to speak regarding the question of the adjournment of the proceedings at this stage? Then I will ask the Council to vote. All in favour of the proceedings in this discussion being adjourned until the meeting of the Council at 3 p.m. on Wednesday indicate by raising the right hand.
Show of hands.
…Against?
Show of hands.
The President: As seven representatives have voted in favour of the adjournment, I declare that it has been carried.
May I indicate at this stage to the representative of the USSR delegation that, in view of the statement which has been made to the Council and the text of the written statement as well as the oral statement made by the Iranian representative today, there is a question whether a dispute exists. If the Council should accept the view that there is a dispute, then under the terms of paragraph 3 of Article 27, since the Soviet Union is named as the other party to this dispute, it will not be possible for the representative from the Soviet Union to exercise a vote during the consideration of this particular debate, in any of the decisions referred to in that paragraph. This does not apply, of course, to decisions on procedure or matters under paragraph 2 of Article 27.
The Council stands adjourned until 3 p.m. on Wednesday afternoon.
The meeting rose at 6.08 p.m.
* ↑ See Official Records of the Security Council, First Year, First Series, Supplement No. 1; Annex 2A.
* ↑ Ibid., Supplement No. 1; Annex 3.
* ↑ See Official Records of the Security Council, First Year, First Series, Supplement No. 1; Annex 2A.
* ↑ Ibid., Supplement No. 1; Annex 5.
* ↑ See Official Records of the Security Council, First Year, First Series, Supplement No. 1; Annex 5.
* ↑ See pages 20 and 21.
* ↑ See Official Records of the Security Council, First Year, First Series, Supplement No. 1, Annex 2A.
* ↑ See Official Records of the Security Council, First Year, First Series, Supplement No. 1; Annex 2B.
* ↑ Ibid., Supplement No. 1; Annex 2A.
* ↑ Ibid., Supplement No. 1; Annex 2B, appendix A.
* ↑ For texts of the Government notes referred to in this statement, see Official Records of the Security Council, first year, First Series, Supplement No. 1, Annex 28, Appendix A.
* ↑ See Official Records of the Security Council, First Year, First Series, Supplement No. 1, pages 58 and 59.
* ↑ Ibid., page 59.
* ↑ See Official Records of the Security Council, First Year, First Series, Supplement No. 1; Annex 2A, pages 18 and 19.
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