# The rise and fall of the Emperor Maximilian/Chapter XXI

CHAPTER XXI.
Withdrawal of French Troops from the Capital—Position of the Rebels —Dissatisfaction of M. Larès at the passive Attitude of the French Army—Marshal Bazaine's vindicatory Letter—Maximilian's final Rupture with the French Authorities—Proposition as to the 'Cross of Guadeloupe'—Interference of Abbe Fischer—His Reproval by the French Authorities—Orders for immediate Embarcation—French Measures for the Protection of the Capital—Destruction of French Munitions of War—Maximilian's Mistrust and Visit to the Citadel— French Flag struck in the City of Mexico—Characters of Mejia and Miramon—General Castelnau's Return—Marshal Bazain's last Appeal to Maximilian—Its Failure—Marshal Bazaine fortifies Vera Cruz— Marshal Bazaine's Letter to the French Admiral—Final Departure from Vera Cruz of the French Troops—The Marshal's bad Reception in France—Its Cause and its Injustice.
AT the end of January, 1867, the bayonets of the French army, in full retreat, stretched out like a ribbon of steel along the dusty road from Mexico to Vera Cruz.
The Austro-Belgian corps went down to the sea, flanked by our troops, to embark the first, in virtue of the promise made to Maximilian. In a few days nothing but a rearguard would be left in the city of Mexico. The environs of the capital were, therefore, already invaded by the insurrection, which came on like the rising tide. The time for fighting was now over for our soldiers. The rebels took care to keep at a long distance off, and out of sight of our outposts, which were, however, well prepared to meet any attack. Could more be required from the Juarists? Ought we to have begun another campaign, to wrest from them ​the towns which the imperialists had given up without resistance? Such a proceeding as this would only have been an act of folly. For, not only would it have been incurring danger without any useful end, but it would have delayed the evacuation, and provoked reprisals against the inhabitants of these places, and, subsequently, would have made it worse for our own countrymen, whose position was already bad enough. Besides, the orders of the French government were expressly opposed to it; and wisely so. The president of the council, dissatisfied with the passive attitude of our troops, drew up a letter which was insulting to our good faith, and called for a complaint addressed to Maximilian himself; it also caused a rupture with the minister.
Mexico, January 28, 1867.
Sire,—I have the honour of sending to your majesty a copy of an extract of a letter, dated the 25th of this month, and forwarded to me by the president of the council of ministers.
He states in this letter:—'The marshal and General Castelnau, in their communication of the 7th of last November, declared that so long as the French troops were in Mexico they would protect as before the authorities and the inhabitants, and, in short, would maintain order in the districts which they occupy, but that they would not undertake any distant expedition.
'An attack has recently taken place at Texcoco.
'Your excellency has not deemed it expedient to give any assistance according to the request of the general of our second division. The government would be glad to know what attitude the French troops in the capital would assume if, before their withdrawal, they were besieged by the rebels, or if the enemy attacked them on any point, or made any other kind of aggression.'
I believe that I am still rendering a service to the emperor in trying to enlighten him on the tendencies and perfidious insinuations of a faction which meets with but very little sympathy, the leaders of which are misusing the ascendancy which they believe they possess and the confidence they are able to inspire, to prepare for your majesty and Mexico an era of sanguinary reprisals, of grievous catastrophes, of complete ruin and anarchy, and of humiliations without number.
I have the honour of informing your majesty that, more than ever desirous of preserving the esteem and friendship with which you have been pleased to favour me, I have acquainted the president of the council that, looking at the language of the aforesaid letter, I do not wish for the future to hold any direct communication with the administration of which he is the president.
I must add, sire, that the officers appointed by General Marquez are in daily communication with the commanders of the engineers and artillery of the French army in order to make themselves conversant with the state of the fortifications, defences, and the provision of stores, arms, and munitions in the city.
Your majesty having signified your desire to know beforehand the date at which I shall leave Mexico, I have the honour of informing you that my departure, with the last contingents of the expeditionary corps, will take place in the first half of the month of February.
This despatch was the last official communication addressed to the crown from our head-quarters.
To M. Larès, President of the Council of Ministers.
Mexico, January 27, 1867.
I have received your letter of the 25 th instant. I might well confine myself to merely acknowledging the receipt of it, because I do not admit that you can address me at your will, and next because your letter treats of matters which have been already settled, both in writing and also by former conferences.
In my replies to you or to the various under-secretaries of state, your excellency will find the explanations you desire.
Private and confidential.
Mexico, February 1, 1867.
My dear General,—You are not ignorant that the line of conduct pursued during the last few days by Marshal Bazaine has had this final result—that his majesty has determined, much to his regret, to break off all intercourse with the marshal.
On account of this lamentable incident, I have thought it my duty to abstain from submitting for his majesty's approbation the list and proposition that you sent me the day before yesterday; for I consider that the only effect would be to increase the emperor's displeasure.
The respect which is due to you, and my high esteem for your merits, induce me to speak thus candidly.
Desirous, however, not to leave without its well-earned recompense the good services of the deserving body of soldiers comprised in this list, I now submit to your choice two methods which, in my opinion, would be likely to succeed. Either ask the emperor yourself, not in the marshal's name, but in your own; or send to me a private letter of the same import; in the latter case, I shall feel great satisfaction in promoting his majesty's approval of the same.Augustin Fischer,
Secretary to the emperor.
In 1867 the clergy played the last part in the French intervention, as in 1861 they had played the first. The head of the military cabinet was directed to reply to the abbe as follows:—
Mexico, February 2, 1867.
Monsieur l'Abbé,—H. E. Marshal Bazaine, to whom General Osmont has communicated your private and confidential letter of the 1st of February, has intrusted me with the honour of replying to it.
With regard to the incident which you appeal to, you cannot be ignorant who was the cause of it, and methodising the facts, you will perhaps perceive that a feeling that his honour was mistrusted and his feelings and dignity offended, have rendered necessary on the marshal's part this first rupture, the burden of which will be on the conscience of your political friends only.Receive, &c.,
The Colonel, Head of the Military Cabinet.
Our head-quarters' authorities must have rejoiced that, in spite of the tendencies of General Castelnau, they had not the least departed from their written instructions, for our government wrote to them on the 15th of January that the movement of concentration and withdrawal ought to have been terminated; that it was necessary they should at once assemble the troops, to be ready for embarkation, and that the Transatlantic Company's vessels were to anchor in the roadstead at Vera Cruz in the latter part of the month of February.
Only one thing was now thought of in Paris, and this was to leave as soon as possible this land of destroyed illusions and bitter sacrifices.
'. . . You have duties to fulfil;' they wrote to the marshal, 'the responsibility, whatever may happen, will rest upon you; but the responsibility should be a light one if you proceed, as you always do, straight to the end to which you have to attain,—the sending home of your troops without loss of time.' In this great shipwreck everything was swallowed up, the ​regeneration of the Latin race, as well as the hopes of the monarchy, the interests of our countrymen (which had been the pretext for the war), as well as the two French loans, which had only served to bring it to this disastrous conclusion. The only thing which swam safe upon the surface was the claim of Jecker, the Swiss, who had obtained his twelve millions.
In the early part of February our head-quarters were still at Mexico, and were employed in giving up the city to the Mexican authorities. Our commissaries offered to the imperial ministry our waggons, vehicles, and military clothing. Too poor to pay for all these things, the latter only purchased the clothing, to reattire their troops, which were almost naked. Mexico, which was formerly an almost unfortified town, was now protected by a wall all round it, armed with numerous pieces of artillery, each furnished with ammunition enough for three hundred shots. There were three magazines, containing a very considerable quantity of cartridges, and the arsenal was full of muskets in good condition. Fearing that the enemy might attack the town suddenly, the marshal, in order to protect it from any such surprise, had chevaux-de frise placed in front of all the embankments abutting on the gates. As is usually done in any fortified place which is given up, the field-pieces, brought in from a certain extent of country, were taken into the court of the citadel, counted, examined, and made over to the officers of the imperial artillery, who also received the keys of the warehouses, where the various equipments and tools were deposited. Official receipts, duly signed, were handed in exchange to our staff. This operation had a twofold object. In case of any sudden attack on the part of the Liberals, the guns of light calibre would have been easy to carry off; but in the court of the citadel ​they were in a place of safety. With regard to the siege-guns left on the ramparts, their great weight was a sufficient protection against any sudden removal.
The instructions of our minister-of-war had directed that all our artillery should be brought away.
The projectiles, both hollow and solid, which would have cost too much to convey to France were destroyed; they were absolutely useless to the Mexicans, whose smooth-bore cannon could not be loaded with the rifled shot.
As to the powder belonging to the expeditionary corps, General Castelnau ordered it to be thrown into the Sequia. Mexico was now in so complete a state of defence, and so thoroughly provided with stores and provisions, that it was in a position to stand a long siege by a force more powerful than its own garrison. In fact, the death of Maximilian was the real cause of the capitulation of the place.
At the moment when we were breaking up our projectiles, two Mexicans, dressed in civil costume, presented themselves at the gate of the citadel, which was still occupied by our soldiers; notwithstanding the opposition of the sentinel, who forbade the entry of these unknown intruders, they made their way in. These two strangers were the Emperor and General Marquez. This was the first visit during his whole reign which Maximilian had paid to the fortress, notwithstanding the repeated offers of the commander-in-chief. This mysterious visit (the marshal complained that he was not advised of it, for his proper place was by the side of the sovereign) was an act of mistrust.
On the morning of the 8th of February, the tricoloured flag, which floated over the head-quarters at Buena-Vista, was lowered, and Mexico city was now freed from the French occupation. The marshal, who ​knew by experience that the Mexicans would but badly discharge the executive duties of the place, left the city with his troops. To give time for the necessary organization he encamped on the road of La Piedad, about a cannon shot from the city, where he remained a day and a night. The marshal still entertained a hope that Maximilian would resolve to join him. However, he kept on his guard; for it was not impossible that the ministry, under the influence of irritation, would commit some act of hostility, in the hope of forcing our troops to return to the capital. The next day the sheen of the French bayonets disappeared on the horizon.
General Castelnau's mission was now over. The imperial aide-de-camp proceeded at once to Vera Cruz, to embark in the transatlantic steamer, sailing the 15th of February. He went down by diligence from Mexico as far as the Terres Chaudes. He went, doubtless, to give his sovereign an account of the events which he had witnessed, and of the state of the country generally. It is, however, difficult to understand how he could have been able to enlighten the court of the Tuileries to any useful purpose as to the real spirit of the people; for, excepting his short journey to Puebla, he had not once quitted the capital. General Castelnau is too clear-sighted not to have been struck, at the time he left Mexico, with the hostile feeling manifested by all parties, and especially by the clerical faction, who, impelled by the ministry, endeavoured to incite a demonstration against our flag; the advisers of the crown hoped by this means, either to induce their fellow-countrymen to forget their past alliance with the intervention, or to retard our withdrawal, which, in spite of all that had happened, they looked upon with sorrow; for they felt that the reign of reaction was drawing to its close. ​Larès and Marquez were even now urging Maximilian to leave for Queretaro, knowing well that the sovereign would be powerless away from the capital, where they reckoned upon becoming the sole 'masters of the situation,' after the probable downfall or death of Maximilian. Mejia, up to the time of his execution, certainly stands out as the grandest military personification during this period of Mexican history, in which he shone out by his immutable loyalty and devotion both to the clerical cause and to Maximilian; but the impartiality of history will never be able to ennoble Miramon's head with a similar martyr-like halo of glory. Our government is generally too well informed of all that goes on at Paris not to have known that the former president of the republic used often to say in certain salons, that he was only returning to Mexico to reascend the presidential chair, after the downfall of the monarchy. If he had been successful in his northern campaign, it is a matter of certainty that he would have turned his arms against his sovereign.
Considering all the untoward symptoms which, at the beginning of February 1867, were already beginning to show themselves, one cannot help feeling surprised at the placidity which prevails in the final despatch addressed by General Castelnau to the Emperor Napoleon, dated Vera Cruz, the 14th of February, and conveyed to the telegraph station at New Orleans by the Bouvet advice-boat of our squadron.
General Castelnau to the Emperor Napoleon III.
The formal mission of the imperial aide-de-camp had not solved all the difficulties of the evacuation which fell upon the marshal.
The last French column went slowly down to Puebla, so as to be able to give a helping hand to Maximilian, if necessary. With this intention, the marshal remained five days in the latter town. To protect the entry of the Mexican detachments into the place, he sent out his cavalry towards Oajaca.
The Emperor of Mexico gave no sign of life. Just at this time the news of Miramon's disaster reached the bivouac. The commander-in-chief wrote immediately to Maximilian, beseeching him to return. He informed him also that General de Castagny would remain in the rear, in order to protect him. This final attempt failed; M. Dano had to make known the emperor's decision:—
M. Dano to the Marshal.
Mexico, February 16, 1867.
General de Castagny has written me that your excellency, still being in a position to give a helping-hand to the Emperor Maximilian to enable him to retire, would be glad to know the intentions of his Majesty after the check given to General Miramon. In a few days this chance will be out of the question.
The Mexican ministers assert that you have written in the same tenour to their sovereign.
The young emperor is less inclined than ever to accept this offer. I regret bitterly that he has decided to attempt any further hazards. It will be very grievous if any misfortune happen to him. But no one is able to check him, and we least of all.
As the French retired, they solidly strengthened the whole road which might serve as a line of retreat for the emperor if a moment of danger arrived. The town of Puebla (which, a month after, fell into Porfirio's power) was so well organised for defence that the 'general orders' of the 7th of April, addressed by the conqueror to his troops, ended thus:—
The marshal, on his arrival at Vera Cruz, in order to prepare and ensure a retreat for Maximilian, caused the fortifications of the port to be at once completed; he himself inspected the forts. At the request of M. Bureau, the imperial commissioner, he made over to the Mexicans a considerable store of cartridges, a hundred muskets, and thirty hundred-weights of powder taken from our fleet.
At one time there was an idea that the emperor had left the city of Mexico to come down to the sea. The marshal, who, in defiance of the vomito, had prolonged his stay at Vera Cruz, went up in great haste to La Soledad with some officers, intending to rely for ​protection on the rear-guard and the Egyptian battalion stationed in the Terres Chaudes. A report was spread among the guerillas that he was about to reopen the campaign, in order to clear the road. But he was compelled to retrace his steps to Vera Cruz without the emperor. Maximilian had already reached Queretaro.
The following note, emanating from the head of the French artillery, gives an exact idea of the means of defence left to the monarchy:—
The manufacture of cartridges and percussion caps under the care of the French artillery, and by the use of French powder, was continued, for the help of the Mexican government, up to the month of January, 1867, when the above government ceased, notwithstanding repeated demands, to furnish the funds necessary for the work.
At the request of the marshal commanding-in-chief, considerable quantities of cartridges and 20,000 kilograms of gunpowder had been sent out from France for the use of the Mexican army and people. From the official documents, provided with the written acknowledgment of the parties receiving them, it appears that the number of cartridges delivered was 3,228,226, and the quantity of gunpowder reached 21,437 kilograms.
In short, when the French army quitted the city of Mexico, it left it provided with 34,741 projectiles of all calibres with charges sufficient to fire 300 shot from each cannon, and a reserve of 500,000 cartridges (without reckoning those belonging to the Austro-Belgian legion). No kind of munitions of war belonging to Mexico were destroyed or taken away from the magazines, and Mexican officers, appointed for the purpose, gave an acknowledgment for them, and certified to their being duly handed over. The same formalities were observed in all the places in the interior occupied by the army, as they were evacuated.
Before embarking, the marshal entrusted to the care of M. Bureau, the imperial commissioner, a final message for the unhappy prince.
To the Admiral commanding the squadron.
Vera Cruz, March 7, 1867.
Monsieur l'Amiral,—I have handed over to the Mexican military authorities in the capital, at Puebla and at Orizaba, all the arsenals and the military establishments in a perfect state of repair, with the cannon and a full complement of ammunition; the fortifications also, and the detached works, all in the best possible state of defence, everything being understood to be the property of Mexico.
So much for the capital and the places situated on my line of retreat.
My intention was to act in the same way at Vera Cruz, and to make no additions to the resources of the garrison. Nevertheless, as H.E. the minister of France has concluded a new arrangement with the Mexican government, modifying the convention of July 30th, 1866, by which the Mexican government engages to pay monthly to France a sum of 50,000 piastres (250,000 francs), I have been obliged to look to securing for the longest possible time the payment of this sum, which cannot be a matter of indifference to the French treasury ; and, in fact, represents the interest of a considerable portion of the Mexican loans.
For this reason I have thought it right to give to M. Bureau, the imperial commissioner, everything that I had at my disposal in the way of arms, munition of war, harness, articles for encamping, &c. &c. It is, in fact, to our interest to enable this official to hold the city after the departure of the expeditionary corps.
Another reason, also, has prompted this resolution; this is the propriety, in my opinion, of ensuring to H.M. the Emperor Maximilian, without in any way binding the policy of our ​country, a place of refuge where he may find an asylum and the means of embarkation, should circumstances reduce him to it. In order to increase the strength of the place and to give the garrison greater confidence, I have wished to increase their resources in munitions of war, and especially in powder. I also think that it would be well to place at the disposal of the Mexican authority a small steamer which could protect the city from the attempts of armed bands from the neighbouring rebel population.
Following out the ideas explained above, I beg you, monsieur l'amiral, to let me know if you could spare 40 to 50 hundred-weights of powder from the stores of the fleet; and if, among the gun-boats now in the roadstead, one might not be found which could be made over to the Mexican government by the use of certain formalities, which would have the effect of doing away with any interpretation compromising to our policy. The gun-boat might, for instance, be denationalised and sold as unfit for service, and as not being worth sending back to France.
The gun-boat La Tourmente has been pointed out to me as one fulfilling these conditions.
I again repeat that I see in these measures a means of ensuring to our country the payment of an important sum; next, of protecting our countrymen for a more prolonged period, and strengthening the position and influence of our consul; and, finally, of enabling the young emperor, who is, at this time, running all the hazards of a conflict which may probably go against him, to find a point strong enough to cover his retreat and embarkation.
On the 11th of March, 1867, at eight o'clock in the morning, the French commandant at Vera Cruz handed over the place, as well as the Mexican artillery and stores, to General Perez Gomez, who assumed the charge of both in the name of his emperor. ​This general had just directed the abandonment of the towns of Cordova and Orizaba, in order to concentrate his forces at Vera Cruz. A few days after, the last French regiments crowded on board our ships, and bade adieu to the shores of Mexico and to their brave comrades who lay buried in that distant land.
Six weeks after, the 'Souverain' anchored in the roadstead of Toulon. Immediately on its arrival, the maritime prefect and the commandant of the subdivision proceeded on board the vessel which conveyed Marshal Bazaine. They announced to him, in the names of their respective ministers, that an order had been given not to pay him the accustomed honours. The inhabitants, already informed of these arrangements by the Gazette du Midi, which had not been contradicted by the authorities, crowded upon the quay; his reception was a hostile one. The marshal had to make his way through the crowd, carrying his head high, but with a wounded heart; when he set his foot on his native soil he had the consciousness of having thoroughly done his duty as a French soldier.
Our government, usually so jealous of the honour of the meanest of its functionaries, knows well how to restrain the press, and to prohibit the admission of foreign newspapers, when they deviate from certain principles. Three months before the commander-in-chief returned to Europe, pamphlets of American origin, and others of a similar character, were allowed to inundate our country, thus holding up to common shame the name of a marshal of France, and, in fact, misleading public opinion. It was soon forgotten that a marshal was bound to silence by his sense of military discipline, and that the government, being the guardian of the honour of its high dignitaries as well as of its own, alone had the right to speak. But this right is ​also an indefeasible duty, which allows of no reserve whatever, and dictates that, after public inquiry, the general who has violated his positive orders, and has failed in delicacy and honour, should be degraded; or else it should be publicly declared, after having been strict to all, that he has deserved well of his country. Our army, France, and Europe are now anxiously awaiting this final verdict!