# An Introduction to Ethics, for Training Colleges/Chapter 10

CHAPTER X.
THE MOTIVES AND SANCTIONS OF CONDUCT
§ 1. Preliminary Remarks. Moral judgment, if it is to be valid, must, we have seen, be based on reason. Now, this important conclusion leads us on immediately to ask other questions. Merely to know that sound moral judgment must be rational does not, after all, take us very far. We need to know, in addition, what exactly are the rational principles that we apply in moral judgment. Accordingly, in this chapter we consider two very important questions which are frequently asked in ordinary life, and to which it is difficult, without some reflection, to give a satisfactory answer. It is often asked, "What makes an action right?" "Is it right because its motive is good or because its consequences are good?" Less frequently the even more fundamental question is asked, "Why should I be good?" "What is the use of living a good life?" In attempting to answer the former question, we must investigate the precise meaning and relation of "motive" and "consequence"; and the answer to the latter will involve a discussion of the "sanctions" of conduct.
​§2. Analysis of a Typical Moral Action. In order to make clear the relation between motive and consequence, let us examine a typical moral action. A certain school-girl is very jealous of a rival, and in an important examination cheats in order to obtain a coveted scholarship. Incidentally the winner of the scholarship is always required to recite a Latin ode. The girl's dishonesty is discovered, and she is expelled. If we analyse this action, we may distinguish several factors, (a) The girl has a certain feeling towards her rival: she is jealous of her. (b) She has a certain aim in cheating: she wants to secure the scholarship, and she acts in order to attain this end. (c) She foresees that the realisation of this end involves as an accompaniment or accessory the recitation of the Latin ode. She does not act as she does in order to recite the ode. She does not want to do that. But she recognises that she cannot have the scholarship without this accessory, (d) The actual result of her action is her expulsion from school.
So far, we have analysed the action completely without mentioning the words motive, intention, and consequence. But we must now ask, with reference to this concrete moral action, what these important ethical terms mean. The girl's motive for doing the action included her feeling of jealousy, and also the end which she wished to attain. Her intention in doing the action included the end which she purposed and the accompaniment which she foresaw. The total consequence of the action, as foreseen by her, was identical with the intention. The actual consequence, however, i.e. her expulsion from school, ​was quite different. We may express the results of this investigation in the form of equations.
M = F+E,
 I = E+A, C = E+A = I,
C$_1$ = ?  (C$_1$ = C) or (C$_1$≠C).
These equations are true of every action. Take, for instance, the action of General Joffre in commanding a general resumption of the offensive on the Marne on September 6th, 1914. His motive in doing this included the aim of driving back the Germans, and also his own complex feeling of love of his country (M = E+F). His intention included this aim, and also the accompaniment of it, e.g. the deaths of thousands of his own men. He did not act as he did in order that they might be killed. But he foresaw that their deaths were a necessary accompaniment of the end with a view to which he acted (I = E+A). The total consequences of his action, as he purposed them, were identical with his intention (C = E+A = I). And the actual consequences, which, when he gave the order, were unknown to him (C$_1$ =?), coincided to a considerable extent with the purposed consequences (C$_1$ = C).
§ 3. Is Motive or Consequence the Test of Right and Wrong? If we bear carefully in mind the meanings we have assigned to motive and consequence, it will ​readily be seen that there can be only one answer to this question. The rightness of an action depends upon the motive, the total motive, with which it is performed.
The controversy which has raged between those who believe that motive is the criterion, and those who are convinced that the only objective test is consequence, is very largely due to a failure to take the terms motive and consequence in the strict sense. It has sometimes been argued, for instance, that motive means (1) merely the feeling with which the action is performed, or (2) merely the end or aim which is purposed. Now, if motive be taken in either of these partial senses, it is clear that the rightness of an action cannot depend on the motive. This may be shown in detail in each of the two cases.
(1) If motive be taken in the former sense, it means the actual feeling, emotion, or desire, which impels the action or accompanies it during its performance. A man may be moved by compassion for a beggar, and this emotion may impel the action of giving him a coin. Or he may be carried away by intense anger, and be immediately impelled to action. But in every case in which a man acts in obedience solely to the impulsion of a feeling, his action is not really a completely moral action. Such actions are literally impulsive, for they have not been deliberated on. They are not purposeful: they have no definite aim in view.
If we take deliberate and purposeful actions such as Joffre's and the deceitful girl's, in which, as we have seen, there is both a definite end and a system of feelings, can we say that the rightness of the ​action depends solely on the feelings? Was Joffre's action right merely because he loved his country? Was the girl's deception wrong, simply because she felt jealous of her rival? It would be absurd to believe that. The rightness and wrongness of actions depends not on the feeling alone, but on the feeling plus the end that is purposed. And both of these are included in the motive.
(2) It follows that it is just as erroneous to take motive to include only the end that is purposed. If motive be understood only in that sense, then it must be maintained that the rightness and wrongness of actions have nothing to do with the emotional disposition of the person who performs them. But that is simply not true. If a man gives £50,000 to build an hospital, his act is not morally right unless he feels sympathy with the people whose sufferings his money is destined to alleviate. Here again we see that an action is morally right only if the motive is complete, i.e. comprehends both the end purposed and the emotions felt.
Again, those who maintain that consequences constitute the criterion of the rightness or wrongness of actions often do not make clear what precisely they mean by consequences. "Consequences," as we have seen, may mean either (1) the intention, i.e. the total results of the action as purposed and foreseen, or (2) the actual results of the action when it has been performed.
Now, in neither of these senses do the consequences of an action supply an adequate test of the rightness or wrongness of that action. With regard to the former case, in which "consequences" is taken to ​mean "intended consequences," it will be enough to point out that it shares the defect which we have just found to be inherent in the view that the criterion is motive regarded solely as end. It does not take into account the feeling-disposition of the agent. And that is a fatal shortcoming.
In the latter sense, where "consequences" means "actual consequences," the theory is, of course, exposed to precisely the same criticism. And it has, in addition, other defects of its own. It is monstrous to make the rightness of an action depend on the actual consequences, for these are often not in the power of the agent. When we judge that an action is right or wrong, we are always passing a judgment at the same time on the character of the agent, whose action it is. And it is absurd to base our judgment on him on consequences over which he had no control. Of course, he may be responsible for the consequences. The evil consequences of his action may be due to his own lack of foresight and reflection. But it very frequently happens that, through no fault of his own, the actual consequences of his action are very different from those which he purposed.
​Our conclusion, then, is that the rightness and wrongness of actions depends not on the intended consequences alone, nor on the actual consequences alone, nor on the feelings of the agent alone, but on the total motive, which includes both the feelings of the agent and the end for the sake of which the action is performed. Unless both are good, the action will not be right.
§ 4. Why should I be Good? Suppose, in a given situation, it is clear that a given action is right. There is no doubt that this action, and this alone, is right. And suppose I say, "This action is doubtless right. It is the action that a good man would perform. But why should I do it? Why should I be good?" In attempting to answer this question, we must consider what are known as the sanctions of conduct. The word sanction is derived from the Latin word sanctio, which means "the act of binding" or "that which serves to bind." The word came to have a specifically legal sense. The sanction of a legal enactment is the penalty which is incurred when the law is broken. A man is "bound over" to keep the peace, and it is stipulated that unless he keeps the peace, he will have to pay the penalty. The fear of punishment is thus, from the legal standpoint, the sanction of his good conduct. Various sanctions may be appealed to as reasons why right actions should be done, and wrong ones avoided, but perhaps the most common is the sanction of punishment. If you do this wrong action, it is said, you will be punished; and if you don't do that right action, you will be punished.
§5. The Sanction of Punishment. Suppose a ​mother sees her young son climb a neighbour's apple-tree, pick an unripe apple, and begin to eat it. She calls him to her and says, "Tommy, it is wrong to pick apples that don't belong to you." If Tommy be in a contentious mood, he may protest, "But why shouldn't I do what's wrong? Why should I be good?" Mother may reply, "Because you will be punished if you do wrong." And if mother is inclined to be expansive, she may describe some of the kinds of punishment that await boys who steal unripe apples. (1) Green apples make your stomach very sore. (2) The policeman will catch you. (3) Mother and father and grannie and cook won't like you. (4) Boys who steal apples may go to the bad place when they die.
These are the four kinds of sanction which Bentham, the founder of the Utilitarian School of Ethics, considered most important in the moral life. By the Utilitarians the sanctions are called (1) the physical sanction, (2) the political sanction, (3) the social sanction, and (4) the religious sanction. These are precisely the sanctions that the mother has used in persuading her boy not to steal apples. A word or two must be said about each of them.
(1) The physical sanctions include the pains of body and mind that follow the disregard of natural laws, e.g. the headache which follows an evening's carouse. (2) The political sanction consists of the pains and penalties which are attached to the violation of the legal enactments of the State. The law of the land enjoins certain actions and prohibits others. It prohibits theft, libel, assault and battery, etc. It enjoins the paying of rates and taxes, the ​maintenance of children, and so on. To each of these prohibitions and injunctions legal penalties are attached. (3) The social sanction depends on public opinion. If you do certain things, you will be "sent to Coventry," "cut" by your friends, shunned by your "set," become ostracised by society, and "lose caste." These sanctions operate in every grade of society and at every age, and the punishment they inflict is often of the severest kind. (4) The religious sanction comprises the pains of Hell, and the penalties by which some churches maintain discipline.
So far, we have considered the sanctions only as pains and penalties. But the sanctions also offer rewards to those whose conduct conforms to their requirements. The man who does right will be rewarded.
§ 6. The Sanction of Success. Under each of the four typical classes of sanction some reward or some kind of success is offered to the man who does right. (1) According to the physical sanction, if you live a temperate life, you will be healthy. You will have the physical reward of your moral goodness. Health is almost essential to success. Hence, if you would be successful, live a good life. (2) If you conform to the laws of the land, says the political sanction, they will forward your success. The laws prevent your clerks embezzling your money, they protect the ships in which your merchandise is carried, and they preserve the integrity of your country. Therefore obey the laws, for by so doing you strengthen them and directly contribute to your own success. (3) The social sanction has even more obvious ​advantages to offer. If you are good, you will be well thought of by society. You will gain reputation, society will give you a "good character," and conformity to social convention will go far to advance your success. (4) Lastly, the religious sanction holds out, as an incentive to virtue, the reward of Heaven, and the prospect of eternal bliss.
The sanction of success is, in one respect, obviously higher than the sanction of punishment. The former encourages action, whereas the latter sets a premium on inaction. The ambition to attain success is a positive thing, whereas the anxiety to avoid punishment is negative. And, as we have seen, the positive life is better than the negative.
§ 7. Criticism of the Sanctions. But whether the sanctions be regarded from the positive or negative point of view, they are equally open to fatal criticism. (1) The sanctions are external to conduct. They import their reasons from outside, from facts which are foreign to conduct. If a man does an action, merely because some external sanction advises it, his action is not really moral at all. It has no moral motive. The reasons given by the sanctions why certain actions should be done and others avoided are not really moral at all. Now the justification of a moral act must always itself be moral. It will not do to attempt to justify a moral action by referring to some physical pain or pleasure, that will attend its avoidance or performance. Nor can moral actions be sanctioned by pointing to the legal, social, and religious consequences of them. These associations and consequences are all non-moral; they are all external to the action. A man who abstains from ​an evil action only because he fears the physical consequences of it, or the legal penalties which it involves, or the social unpopularity which it will reflect upon him, or the pains which religion attaches to it, is not really good. He has abstained from the wrong act, not because it is wrong, not because his character is good and abhors it, but solely because he fears the consequences of the action.
(2) Actions which are done in obedience to the external sanctions of morality, and in accordance with the rules which they imply, may be outwardly indistinguishable from right actions, but they are not right. If a suburban lady gives half-a-crown to a charitable institution simply because all the other ladies in the Terrace do so, she is acting in obedience to the external social sanction, and her action has no moral worth. Her action would be right only if the motive were good, i.e. only if she felt sympathy with the institution, and gave her half-crown in order that it might contribute to the realisation of that aim. Actions are not right because they conform to some moral rule. They are right only if they are the expressions of a good character and are prompted by good motives.
The sanctions of morality, as we have seen, are attempts to answer the question, "Why should I be good?" And we have also seen that no sanction can give a satisfactory answer to this question. The only sound answer to the question, "Why should I be good?" is, "Because it is good to be good." Good conduct is its own sufficient justification. Morality contains in itself its own sanctions. To the man of good character, his own approval is the ​highest reward, and his own remorse the severest punishment. Goodness is an intrinsic thing, which depends on no external sanctions and extraneous associations.
§ 8. The Educational Value of External Sanctions. Yet these sanctions have a certain educational value. The child cannot understand the absoluteness of morality. "Be good simply because it is good" seems to him an intolerably vague precept. If he asks, "Why should I do this particular right action?" it conveys no information to him to be told, "Because it is right." He wants a definite and particular answer to a particular and definite question. It is just here that the sanctions have value.
(1) The sanctions give readily intelligible reasons for conduct. These reasons are definite and limited. If we revert to the case of the boy and the apples, it is clear that he will have no difficulty in understanding the nature of the sanctions to which his mother appeals. He knows what it is to have a sore stomach. He knows what a policeman is. He knows what it is to be regarded by the whole household as a "naughty boy." And he has been impressed with the awfulness of the "bad place." External sanctions are educationally valuable because they are easily understood, and make an immediate impression on the mind.
(2) External sanctions have great persuasive value. When the object is simply to get a child to do an action, they are often indispensable. The child may be very unwilling to perform an action which seems disagreeable to it. "Do this because it is ​right" will make no impression on it. But "If you do this, you will get a cake," or "If you don't do this, you will get a whipping," will quickly lead it to change its attitude, and do the disagreeable thing. If external sanctions be used in a prudent way to persuade children to courses of action for which at first they have no natural inclination, they may prove a very valuable educational instrument.
(3) Their value depends on the fact that it is important that children should learn to act rightly, or as a good person would act, even before they can be expected to know why they act rightly. The average man acts rightly all his life without reflecting why he does so. And though moral theory is important, moral practice is still more important. As we saw in an earlier chapter, we form good habits only by repeatedly doing right actions. Hence it is exceedingly important that the child should, as soon as possible, be encouraged to do habitually the right actions. In order to attain this result, there is no reason why the external sanctions should not be wisely and prudently used.
(4) But we must insist that these external sanctions should be employed only as a propaedeutic. They are a second-best, and should be used only as stepping stones over which the child may pass to a higher conception of morality. They may be used as a means to persuade the child to do the good and avoid the evil; but the child should never be led to believe that they supply the ultimate reasons why he should be good and do the right. It is impossible to give any particular reasons for doing right and being good that will be absolutely true, not because ​there are no reasons for being good, but because there is every possible reason.
For further reading: (for §§ 1-3) J. S. Mackenzie: Manual, bk. i. ch. ii.; J. H. Muirhead: Elements, §§21-25; J. Dewey and J. H. Tufts: Ethics, pp. 241-257; (for §§4-8) J. S. Mackenzie: Manual, bk. ii. ch. vi.; Leslie Stephen: Science of Ethics, pp. 396-404; J. M. Baldwin: Social and Ethical Interpretations, ch. ix. and x.
* ↑ M stands for motive, F for feeling, E for end, A for accessory, I for intention, C for consequences (foreseen, purposed, or intended), and C$_1$ for actual consequences. To the person who is performing a particular action, the actual consequences are unknown (C$_1$ =?). They may be the consequences which he intended. In that case C$_1$ = C. But they may be quite different. In that case C$_1$≠C.
* ↑ Other defects in this theory might be mentioned. It is often impossible to compute the consequences of an action, even after it has been done. They are often strictly incalculable, for they are capable of influencing generations yet unborn. Who could measure the total consequences of Luther's action, in burning the Pope's Bull, or the Kaisers (if the responsibility be his) in initiating the European War? Further, even if this test were valid, it would be of use only in assessing the rightness or wrongness of actions which had already been performed. We cannot pretend to know the results of actions which are merely purposed. Hence such a test as this would be of no use to a man who was in doubt as to which of two alternative courses of action he ought to pursue.