# United States v. Lindsay/Dissent Reed

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* Opinion of the Court
* Dissenting Opinion Reed
United States Supreme Court
346 U.S. 568
United States v. Lindsay
Argued: Dec. 1, 2, 1953. ---
Mr. Justice REED, dissenting.
An emphasis by dissent upon the Court's departure from precedents of statutory construction will not be useless if it arouses the attention of statutory draftsmen to the necessity of more explicit language to protect government claims.
Prior to the passage of the Act in question, a Delaware corporation of the same name as the federal agency created by the Commodity Credit Corporation Charter Act of 1948 existed and operated. 15 U.S.C. (Supp. III) § 713, 15 U.S.C.A. § 713. It had claims and obligations which were unaffected by their transfer to the present corporation by the Charter Act. The earlier Delaware corporation was a wholly owned agency of the United States without statutory limitation, state or federal, on its right to sue upon its claims. United States v. Summerlin, 310 U.S. 414, 60 S.Ct. 1019, 84 L.Ed. 1283, and cases cited. Therefore, up to the time of the enactment of § 4(c), 15 U.S.C. (Supp. III) § 714b(c), 15 U.S.C.A. § 714b(c), there was no compelling reason, beyond the desire for prompt and proper administration, for the United States to file its suits.
As the corporation had played a major part since its organization in 1933 in the purchase, storage and financing of American agricultural products, large claims had accumulated in its favor and against it over the years. S.Rep. No. 1022, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. If the problem here presented was res integra, the existence of old claims, not then barred by limitation, would lead me to interpret the words, 'brought within six years after the right accrued', as prospective only to avoid imputing to Congress unreasonable and arbitrary destruction of valid claims for and against the corporation. This conclusion would follow from the principle that statutes of limitation 'must receive a strict construction in favor of the government.' E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Davis, 264 U.S. 456, 462, 44 S.Ct. 364, 366, 68 L.Ed. 788; Independent Coal & Coke Co. v. United States, 274 U.S. 640, 650, 47 S.Ct. 714, 718, 71 L.Ed. 1270.
Other principles, it seems to me, necessitate this conclusion. Senator Aiken, Chairman of the subcommittee in charge of the bill, its floor manager and the senior Senate conferee, recorded his view in a statement published after the Congress adjourned.
'With respect to claims by the Corporation, the 4-year period of limitations will not begin to run on claims of the Delaware Corporation transferred to the Federal Corporation until June 30, 1948, the effective date of the new charter.' 94 Cong.Rec. A4409.
The precedents in this Court on the interpretation of statutes establishing limitations by the definition of 'accrued' without exception give the word prospective meaning. See, e.g., United States v. St. Louis, S.F. & T.R. Co., 270 U.S. 1, 46 S.Ct. 182, 70 L.Ed. 435; Fullerton-Krueger Lumber Co. v. Northern Pacific R. Co., 266 U.S. 435, 45 S.Ct. 143, 69 L.Ed. 367; Sohn v. Waterson, 17 Wall. 596, 21 L.Ed. 737; Lewis, for Use of Longworth v. Lewis, 7 How. 776, 12 L.Ed. 909.
In the light of these purposes and precedents, viewed in the setting of damage to and pilferage of stored crops, the judgment of the Court of Appeals should be reversed.

## Notes

This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
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