# All the Works of Epictetus, Which Are Now Extant/Book 1/Chapter 20

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CHAPTER XX.
In what manner Reason contemplates itself.
§. 1.Every Art, and every Faculty, contemplates some Things as its principal Objects. Whenever, therefore, it is of the same Nature with the Objects of its Contemplations, it necessarily contemplates itself too. But, where it is of a different Nature, it cannot contemplate itself. The Art of Shoemaking, for Instance, is exercised upon Leather; but is itself intirely distinct from the Materials it works upon: therefore it doth not contemplate itself. Again: Grammar is exercised on articulate Speech. Is the Art of Grammar itself, then, articulate Speech?
By no means.
Therefore it cannot contemplate itself. To what Purpose, then, is Reason appointed by Nature?
To a proper Use of the Appearances of Things.
And what is Reason?
A Composition of certain Appearances to the Mind: and, thus, by its Nature, it becomes contemplative of itself too. Again: what Subjects of Contemplation belong to Prudence?
Good and Evil, and Indifferent.
What, then, is Prudence itself?
Good.
What, Imprudence?
Evil.
You see, then, that it necessarily contemplates both itself and its contrary. Therefore, the first and greatest Work of a Philosopher is, to try and distinguish the Appearances; and to admit none untried. Even in Money, where our Interest seems to be concerned, you see what an Art we have in​vented; and how many Ways an Assayer uses to try its Value. By the Sight; the Touch; the Smell; and, lastly, the Hearing. He throws the Piece down, and attends to the Jingle; and is not contented with its Jingling only once; but, by frequent Attention to it, becomes quite musical. In the same manner, whenever we think it of Consequence, whether we are deceived or not, we use the utmost Attention to distinguish thole Things which may possibly deceive us. But, yawning and slumbering over the poor miserable ruling Faculty, we admit every Appearance that offers. For here the Mischief does not strike us. When you would know, then, how very languidly you are affected by Good and Evil, and how vehemently by Things indifferent; consider how you are affected with regard to being blinded; and how with regard to being deceived; and you will find, that you are far from being moved, as you ought, in relation to Good and Evil.
But much previous Qualification, and much Labour, and Learning, are wanted.
What, then? Do you expect the greatest of Arts is to be acquired by slight Endeavours? And yet the principal Doctrine of the Philosophers, of itself, is short. If you have a mind to know it, read Zeno, and you will see. For what ​ Prolixity is there in saying, Our End is to follow the Gods? And, The Essence of Good consists in the proper Use of the Appearances of Things. Indeed, if you say, What, then, is God? What is an Appearance? What is particular, what universal Nature? Here the Affair becomes prolix. And so, if Epicurus should come and say, that Good must be placed in Body; here, too, it will be prolix: and it will be necessary to hear, what is the principal, the substantial and essential Part in us. It is unlikely, that the Good of a Snail should be placed in the Shell: and, is it likely, that the Good of a Man should? You yourself, Epicurus, have something superior to this. What is That in you, which deliberates, which examines, which forms the Judgment, concerning Body itself, that it is the principal Part? And why do you light your Lamp, and labour for us, and write so many Books? That we may not be ignorant of the Truth? What are We? What are we to You? Thus the Doctrine becomes prolix.