OpenLLM-France/wikimedia huggingface dataset:
# Proclamation 4912

Delivered on 24 March 1982.
By the President of the United States of America A Proclamation
Among the blessings of this wonderful land are our free institutions. Americans are guaranteed freedom of speech, religion, and the press and the right to assemble and petition for the redress of grievances. Our citizens cherish their liberty and their right to be protected against the unwarranted intrusion of government. Our freedoms have been hard-won and will be preserved.
Other countries are not so fortunate. Time and time again, individuals, groups, and whole peoples have been subjected to tyrannies and deprivations. When thoughtful Americans witness the oppression, even terror, that is so prevalent in many other parts of the world, they cannot help but feel a deep and abiding appreciation for, and renewed loyalty to, our own Nation and its ideals.
Americans prize their diversity but are united in a shared allegiance to our Nation's tradition of justice and liberty for all. We have fought for these traditions in the past, and we will not permit their erosion in the future.
It is altogether fitting that we set aside a day for reflection on our stake in democracy and in its highest purpose-the advancement of the freedom and dignity of mankind.
By joint resolution approved July 18, 1958 (72 Stat. 369, 36 U.S.C. 162), Congress has designated May 1 of every year as Loyalty Day in order to encourage all Americans to reflect upon our national institutions, our heritage of freedom, and what it means to be an American.
Now, Therefore, I, Ronald Reagan, President of the United States of America, call upon all Americans and patriotic, civic, and educational organizations to observe Saturday, May 1, 1982, as Loyalty Day, with appropriate ceremonies.
I call upon all Government officials to display the flag of the United States on all Government buildings and grounds on that day.
In Witness Whereof, I have hereunto set my hand this 24th day of March, in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and eighty two, and of the Independence of the United States of America the two hundred and sixth.
RONALD REAGAN [Filed with the Office of the Federal Register, 11:33 a.m., March 25, 1982]
This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
Public domainPublic domainfalsefalse
# Proclamation 4919

Delivered on 2 April 1982.
By the President of the United States of America A Proclamation
This year marks the tenth anniversary of our country's commitment of major resources to the control of cancer through the National Cancer Program. While progress against this dread disease has been slow, each step forward can save thousands of lives since statistics show that one out of four Americans now living will become a victim of cancer.
Research has demonstrated that lifestyle and environment play a crucial role in the development of cancer. Reports issued by the Surgeon General increasingly link cigarette smoking with cancer of the lung and other parts of the body. We have developed greater understanding of the effects of exposure to carcinogens and radiation in the workplace and have also learned the importance of diet and nutrition as factors in the development and prevention of cancer. Advances in biochemistry, microbiology, and other basic research have improved our comprehension of the cellular events that lead to cancer formation, but researchers still seek a clearer understanding of the cause of cancer as they strive to halt the progress of this disease more effectively.
Improved surgical procedures, new discoveries in recombinant DNA and hybridoma technology, and developments on the frontiers of immunotherapy hold out the possibility not only of better treatment, but also of the significant breakthrough long prayed for. With continued advances, this ancient scourge may yet pass from mankind.
In 1938, the Congress of the United States passed a joint resolution requesting the President to issue an annual proclamation declaring April to be Cancer Control Month.
Now, Therefore, I, Ronald Reagan, President of the United States of America, do hereby proclaim the month of April, 1982, as Cancer Control Month. I invite the Governors of the fifty states and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and the appropriate officials of all other areas under the United States flag, to issue similar proclamations. I also ask the health care professions, the communications industry, and all other interested persons and groups to unite during this appointed time to reaffirm publicly our nation's continuing commitment to control cancer.
In Witness Whereof I have hereunto set my hand this 2nd day of April in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and eighty-two, and of the Independence of the United States of America the two hundred and sixth.
RONALD REAGAN [Filed with the Office of the Federal Register, 10:43 a.m., April 5, 1982]
This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
Public domainPublic domainfalsefalse
# Premonition

* Search for titles containing or beginning with: "Premonition."
* sister projects: Wikipedia article, Wikidata item.
This is a disambiguation page. It lists works that share the same title. If an article link referred you here, please consider editing it to point directly to the intended page.
* Premonition, a poem by Paul Laurence Dunbar.
* Premonition, poem by Wanda Petrunkevitch.
* Premonition, a poem by Robert W. Service.
# Prentice v. Northern Pacific Railroad Company

* related portals: Supreme Court of the United States, Northern Pacific Railway.
* sister projects: Wikidata item.
United States Supreme Court
154 U.S. 163
Prentice v. Northern Pacific Railroad Company
This was an action of ejectment by Frederick Prentice against the Northern Pacific Railroad Company, the St. Paul & Duluth Railroad Company, and Owen Fargusson. On trial without a jury the circuit court rendered judgment for defendants. Plaintiff brought error.
This action of ejectment was brought, September 7, 1883, to recover an undivided half of certain lands in the city of Duluth, county of St. Louis, Minn. Pursuant to a written stipulation of the parties, the case was tried without a jury, and upon the question of title alone, and resulted-Mr. Justice Miller and Judge Nelson concurring-in a judgment for the defendants. 43 Fed. 270.

## Notes

This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
Public domainPublic domainfalsefalse
# Prentice v. Pickersgill

* related portals: Supreme Court of the United States.
* sister projects: Wikidata item.
United States Supreme Court
73 U.S. 511
Prentice v. Pickersgill

## Notes

This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
Public domainPublic domainfalsefalse
# Prendergast v. New York Telephone Company

* related portals: Supreme Court of the United States.
* sister projects: Wikidata item.
United States Supreme Court
262 U.S. 43
Prendergast v. New York Telephone Company
Argued: Feb. 21, 1923. --- Decided: April 16, 1923
[Syllabus from pages 43-45 intentionally omitted]
Wilbur W. Chambers, of Albany, N. Y., and Simon Fleischmann, of Buffalo, N. Y., for appellants.
John W. Davis and Chas. T. Russell, both of New York City, for appellee.
Mr. Justice SANFORD delivered the opinion of the Court.

## Notes

This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
Public domainPublic domainfalsefalse
# Prelude—Wings

* "Prelude—Wings" in The Ascent of Man (1889)
* "Prelude: Wings" in Poetical works of Mathilde Blind (1900)
# Premier-Pabst Sales Company v. Grosscup

* related portals: Supreme Court of the United States.
* sister projects: Wikidata item.
United States Supreme Court
298 U.S. 226
Premier-Pabst Sales Company v. Grosscup
Argued: April 27, 1936. --- Decided: May 18, 1936
Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.
Messrs. M. J. Donnelly and C. J. Lynch, Jr., both of Cedar Rapids, Iowa, and J. Wesley McWilliams, of Philadelphia, Pa., for appellant.
Mr. Justice BRANDEIS delivered the opinion of the Court.

## Notes

This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
Public domainPublic domainfalsefalse
# Proslogium and Monologium/Monologium/Chapter29
### Chapter XXIX

His expression is identical with himself, and consubstantial with him, since there are not two spirits, but one.
But now, having considered these questions regarding the properties of the supreme Nature, which have occurred to me in following the guidance of reason to the present point, I think it reasonable to examine this Spirit's expression (locutio), through which all things were created.
For, though all that has been ascertained regarding this expression above has the inflexible strength of reason, I am especially compelled to a more careful discussion of this expression by the fact that it is proved to be identical with the supreme Spirit himself. For, if this Spirit created nothing except through himself, and whatever was created by him was created through that expression, how shall that expression be anything else than what the Spirit himself is?
Furthermore, the facts already discovered declare irrefutably that nothing at all ever could, or can, exist, except the creative Spirit and its creatures. But it is impossible that the expression of this Spirit is included among created beings; for every created being was created through that expression; but that expression could not be created through itself. For nothing can be created through itself, since every creature exists later than that through which it is created, and nothing exists later than itself.
The alternative remaining is, then, that this expression of the supreme Spirit, since it cannot be a creature, is no other than the supreme Spirit. Therefore, this expression itself can be conceived of as nothing else than the intelligence (intelligentia) of this Spirit, by which he conceives of (intelligit) all things. For, to him, what is expressing anything, according to this kind of expression, but conceiving of it? For he does not, like man, ever fail to express what he conceives.
If, then, the supremely simple Nature is nothing else than what its intelligence is, just as it is identical with its wisdom, necessarily, in the same way, it is nothing else than what its expression is. But, since it is already manifest that the supreme Spirit is one only, and altogether indivisible, this his expression must be so consubstantial with him, that they are not two spirits, but one.
# Proslogium and Monologium/Monologium/Chapter24
### Chapter XXIV

How it is better understood to exist always than at every time.
It is also evident that this supreme Substance is without beginning and without end; that it has neither past, nor future, nor the temporal, that is, transient present in which we live; since its age, or eternity, which is nothing else than itself, is immutable and without parts. Is not, therefore, the term which seems to mean all time more properly understood, when applied to this Substance, to signify eternity, which is never unlike itself, rather than a changing succession of times, which is ever in some sort unlike itself?
Hence, if this Being is said to exist always; since, for it, it is the same to exist and to live, no better sense can be attached to this statement, than that it exists or lives eternally, that is, it possesses interminable life, as a perfect whole at once. For its eternity apparently is an interminable life, existing at once as a perfect whole.
For, since it has already been shown that this Substance is nothing else than its own life and its own eternity, is in no wise terminable, and does not exist, except as at once and perfectly whole, what else is true eternity, which is consistent with the nature of that Substance alone, than an interminable life, existing as at once and perfectly whole?
For this truth is, at any rate, clearly perceived from the single fact that true eternity belongs only to that substance which alone, as we have proved, was not created, but is the creator, since true eternity is conceived to be free from the limitations of beginning and end; and this is proved to be consistent with the nature of no created being, from the very fact that all such have been created from nothing.
# Proslogium and Monologium/Monologium/Chapter26
### Chapter XXVI

How this Being is said to be substance: it transcends all substance and is individually whatever it is.
But, if what we have ascertained concerning the simplicity of this Nature is established, how is it substance? For, though every substance is susceptible of admixture of difference, or, at any rate, susceptible of mutation by accidents, the immutable purity of this Being is inaccessible to admixture or mutation, in any form.
How, then, shall it be maintained that it is a substance of any kind, except as it is called substance for being, and so transcends, as it is above, every substance? For, as great as is the difference between that Being, which is through itself whatever it is, and which creates every other being from nothing, and a being, which is made whatever it is through another, from nothing; so much does the supreme Substance differ from these beings, which are not what it is. And, since it alone, of all natures, derives from itself, without the help of another nature, whatever existence it has, is it not whatever it is individually and apart from association with its creatures?
Hence, if it ever shares any name with other beings, doubtless a very different signification of that name is to be understood in its case.
# Proslogium and Monologium/Monologium/Chapter27
### Chapter XXVII

It is not included among substances as commonly treated, yet it is a substance and an indivisible spirit.
It is, therefore, evident that in any ordinary treatment of substance, this Substance cannot be included, from sharing in whose essence every nature is excluded. Indeed, since every substance is treated either as universal, i. e., as essentially common to more than one substance, as being a man is common to individual men; or as individual, having a universal essence in common with others, as individual men have in common with individual men the fact that they are men; does any one conceive that, in the treatment of other substances, that supreme Nature is included, which neither divides itself into more substances than one, nor unites with any other, by virtue of a common essence?
Yet, seeing that it not only most certainly exists, but exists in the highest degree of all things; and since the essence of anything is usually called its substance, doubtless if any worthy name can be given it, there is no objection to our calling it substance.
And since no worthier essence than spirit and body is known, and of these, spirit is more worthy than body, it must certainly be maintained that this Being is spirit and not body. But, seeing that one spirit has not any parts, and there cannot be more spirits than one of this kind, it must, by all means, be an indivisible spirit. For since, as is shown above, it is neither compounded of parts, nor can be conceived of as mutable, through any differences or accidents, it is impossible that it is divisible by any form of division.
# Proslogium and Monologium/Monologium/Chapter23
### Chapter XXIII

How it is better conceived to exist everywhere than in every place.
But, since it is plain that this supreme Nature is not more truly in all places than in all existing things, not as if it were contained by them, but as containing all, by permeating all, why should it not be said to be everywhere, in this sense, that it may be understood rather to be in all existing things, than merely in all places, since this sense is supported by the truth of the fact, and is not forbidden by the proper signification of the word of place?
For we often quite properly apply terms of place to objects which are not places; as, when I say that the understanding is there in the soul, where rationality is. For, though there and where are adverbs of place, yet, by no local limitation, does the mind contain anything, nor is either rationality or understanding contained.
Hence, as regards the truth of the matter, the supreme Nature is more appropriately said to be everywhere, in this sense, that it is in all existing things, than in this sense, namely that it is merely in all places. And since, as the reasons set forth above show, it cannot exist otherwise, it must so be in all existing things, that it is one and the same perfect whole in every individual thing simultaneously.
# Proslogium and Monologium/Monologium/Chapter25
### Chapter XXV

It cannot suffer change by any accidents [Accidents, as Anselm uses the term, are facts external to the essence of a being, which may yet be conceived to produce changes in a mutable being.]
But does not this Being, which has been shown to exist as in every way substantially identical with itself, sometimes exist as different from itself, at any rate accidentally? But how is it supremely immutable, if it can, I will not say, be, but, be conceived of, as variable by virtue of accidents? And, on the other hand, does it not partake of accident, since even this very fact that it is greater than all other natures and that it is unlike them seems to be an accident in its case (illi accidere)? But what is the inconsistency between susceptibility to certain facts, called accidents, and natural immutability, if from the undergoing of these accidents the substance undergoes no change?
For, of all the facts, called accidents, some are understood not to be present or absent without some variation in the subject of the accident -- all colors, for instance -- while others are known not to effect any change in a thing either by occurring or not occurring -- certain relations, for instance. For it is certain that I am neither older nor younger than a man who is not yet born, nor equal to him, nor like him. But I shall be able to sustain and to lose all these relations toward him, as soon as he shall have been born, according as he shall grow, or undergo change through divers qualities.
It is made clear, then, that of all those facts, called accidents, a part bring some degree of mutability in their train, while a part do not impair at all the immutability of that in whose case they occur. Hence, although the supreme Nature in its simplicity has never undergone such accidents as cause mutation, yet it does not disdain occasional expression in terms of those accidents which are in no wise inconsistent with supreme immutability; and yet there is no accident respecting its essence, whence it would be conceived of, as itself variable.
Whence this conclusion, also, may be reached, that it is susceptible of no accident; since, just as those accidents, which effect some change by their occurrence or non-occurrence, are by virtue of this very effect of theirs regarded as being true accidents, so those facts, which lack a like effect, are found to be improperly called accidents. Therefore, this Essence is always, in every way, substantially identical with itself; and it is never in any way different from itself, even accidentally. But, however it may be as to the proper signification of the term accident, this is undoubtedly true, that of the supremely immutable Nature no statement can be made, whence it shall be conceived of as mutable.
# Proslogium and Monologium/Monologium/Chapter30
### Chapter XXX

This expression does not consist of more words than one, but is one Word.
Why, then, should I have any further doubt regarding that question which I dismissed above as doubtful, namely, whether this expression consists of more words than one, or of one? For, if it is so consubstantial with the supreme Nature that they are not two spirits, but one; assuredly, just as the latter is supremely simple, so is the former. It therefore does not consist of more words than one, but is one Word, through which all things were created.
# Protestant Exiles from France/Volume 2 - Book Third - Chapter 27 - Comarque

Layout 2
Comarque.
This refugee family, which sometimes spelt its name De Comarque or De Comarc, can be traced backwards to France by the help of Quick’s “Synodicon.” French names were not spelt by Quick with literal accuracy, but often with alterations, so as to give Englishmen an idea of the French pronunciation. In a list of ministers of the Reformed Church of France in 1637, he gives “John Comarc,” pasteur of Verteuill, Russet, and Castel-Renaud in the Colloquy of Angoumois. At the National Synod, which met at Alengon on 27th May 1637, one of the clerical deputies from the Provincial Synod of Xaintonge, was “John Commarc, pastor of the church of Verteuil.” Opposite his name Mr. Quick, writing in 1692, gives a marginal note, There be two of his sons ministers and exiles here in England. Here, however, I must leave a blank, and come to grandsons. Nichols informs us that there were two brothers (probably sons of one of the refugee ministers). He thus describes them:—
(1.) Rev. David Comarque, educated at Canterbury, entered Bene’t College, Cambridge, in 1717; B.A., 1720; M.A, 1726; Rector of West Halton, Lincolnshire, married, 23rd January 1723, a daughter of the late Peter Reneu, Esq. (See under Wandsworth in this chapter).
(2.) Reynald Comarque, student of physic at Cambridge, M.B. and M.D., 1728. (He is twice named among the subscribers to Laval’s History in 1737 as “Dr. De Comarc,” and “Mr. Comarques, M.D.,” and is evidently the same person as the Director of the French Protestant Hospital, “René de Comarque, M.D.,” elected on 5th April 1738).