# Life and select literary remains of Sam Houston of Texas/Chapter 8

CHAPTER VIII.
The declaration of Texan independence was denounced as an act of high-handed robbery, perpetrated by a band of bold outlaws, by a thousand newspapers in the United States; and a feeling of hostility was excited against the infant republic, without a parallel in the history of the world. But a wise Providence willed the declaration, and that it should be triumphantly sustained. The Convention which passed it, terminated the existence of the Provisional Government, with its offices of Governor, Lieutenant-Governor, Council, and Major-General. This last office, although he had been superseded by a hostile council. Gen. Houston held. But the emergency required that there should be a commander-in-chief. The Convention went into an election, and out of fifty-six votes, Houston, who was not present, received all but one vote. Gloom hung over the public mind. Texas had no organized forces. The few Georgians and Alabamians were detached beyond the Southern settlements, commanded by an officer who had contemptuously disobeyed the orders of the commander-in-chief. It was feared that Gen. Houston would decline the office tendered because of the treatment which he had received from the Council. The conviction was almost universal that, unless he would accept the command of the army, the cause of Texan Independence was lost. Apprehension and alarm agitated every mind. Stirred by the heroic spirit which ever animated him, sympathizing with the general feeling. Gen. Houston resolved to hazard everything and peril life itself upon the issue, and accepted the command. Letters had been received, a few days before the Declaration of Independence had been adopted, from Col. W. B. Travis, who was in command of the Alamo at San Antonio de Bexar, informing the people of Texas — for general anarchy at that time reigned — that he was invested by a numerous force, and calling earnestly for aid. This result had been, as it will be remembered, anticipated by Gen. Houston. The commanding officer had been ordered to abandon and blow up the Alamo. The orders were disobeyed by the officer, ​and treated with contempt by the General Council; who, promising to reinforce him, commanded the officer to defend the place to the last. The entire reinforcement sent to Travis' aid was only thirty men, making his whole effective force not more than one hundred and eighty-five men, without a month's provisions, seventy miles distant from all Texan settlements, and the whole intervening territory swept by Mexican cavalry. Some excuse may be offered for this disobedience and contempt of orders, from the fact that less than one year before, the Alamo had surrendered and San Antonio had been reduced, by the efforts of a Texan force under Milam, with less than two hundred men opposed to nearly twelve hundred men under Gen. Cos, But it was Santa Anna, now with seven times as many troops as Cos had, and no greater number of troops commanded by Travis, than Milam commanded. The result was foreseen by Gen. Houston; but the martyrdom that ensued was no less conspicuous, and the costly sacrifice which immortalized the victims, Travis, Crockett, Bowie, and their heroic comrades, was no less needed as a necessary factor in the final and grand consummation of Texan liberty and independence.
The last express that ever left the Alamo brought a letter to Washington on Sunday, March 6th, to the President of the Convention. No sooner was its intelligence made known, than terror pervaded the community. There was a general rush to the hall of the Convention. Without summons or signal, the members took their seats, and the President his chair. The President arose. He announced the reception of a document, "of the most important character ever received by any assembly of men." He then read a letter from Col. W. B. Travis most thrilling in its character. Breathing the language of despair, it was written in the fervor of lofty patriotism and devoted courage. The excitement ensuing was so great that even calm men could hardly command themselves, or say what the emergency required. Robert Potter, remarkable as a Member of Congress of the United States, and as a Cabinet officer of the Texan Republic for sad vices and a terrible end, moved that "the Convention do immediately adjourn, arm, and march to the relief of the Alamo." A proposition for fifty-six men, to march to the aid of one hundred and eighty-five men, against an investing force of over eight thousand! As he rose from his seat, all eyes were turned upon Gen. Houston. There was a death-like stillness. Feeling that the fate of Texas hung on the next movement of the Convention, he had resolved upon his own course, and what ought to be done by the Convention. He opposed the motion of Robert Potter as madness, and worse than treason to the people. He held that a declaration of independence, ​without an organization to sustain it, was null and void. A Government with organic forms must be inaugurated at once. Without it, they could not command the respect or sympathy of mankind, and would be regarded in no other light than outlaws. He spoke for an hour with great eloquence and effect, begged the Convention to sit quietly and pursue their deliberations, and assured the members that he would instantly start for Gonzales, where he understood that a small corps of militia had rallied. He promised that, while they continued to sit in Convention, the Mexicans should never approach them, and if human aid could save the brave men then in the Alamo, that aid should be extended to them. Walking out of the Convention, in less than an hour he mounted his battle horse, and was on his way to the Alamo, accompanied by three or four companions. His action must have been regarded as desperate, else many others would have followed him. Col. Travis had stated in his letter that, so long as the Alamo could hold out against the invaders, signal guns would be fired at sunrise. For many days these signal guns were heard at a distance of over a hundred miles across the prairie. Late at night of the first day Houston reached a point where the expected signal could be heard, if made at all. At sunrise the coming day, putting his ear to the ground, he listened with an acuteness of sense not understood except by dwellers of the forest or by one " awaiting a signal of life or death from brave men." Not a murmur, even the faintest, came across the morning air. In vain he listened. The Alamo had fallen. And he learned afterward, that the Alamo had fired its last gun on the morning on which he left Washington, and indeed that the heroes of the Alamo were meeting their fate at the very hour he was speaking in the Convention. Assured of this terrible fact, he sought his companions, who were preparing to continue their march, and wrote a letter to the Convention urging members to adopt a resolution declaring Texas as a part of Louisiana under the treaty of 1803. The suggestion was not adopted. Had it been adopted, Mexico would at once have discontinued the conflict, as Texas would be a portion of an integral part of the United States. The question of recognition or annexation would not have been raised. The sympathies of nations, of peoples, and of legislatures would have been with Texas. Why Mexico made war upon Texas after her recognition as an independent republic by the Great Powers of the world, and why war was also waged with the United States after the annexation of Texas, may be known readily when the persistent, long-continued, and desperate hostility of thousands of persons of influence, and of a thousand newspapers, to the annexation of Texas are calmly considered. These journals and their ​supporters sympathized with Santa Anna, Bravo, Bustamente, Almonte, Herrera, and Paredes. The enemies of Texas in Mexico believed that they had the cordial sympathy of the enemies of Texas in the United States, and they hoped for success, because they believed their sympathizers in the United States all - powerful. Trustworthy and confidential agents with money to expend, were stationed in Boston, Philadelphia, and New York. Here these agents of bold and impudent tyrants fought battles and won victories for Mexican despotism. It was strange and sad to behold the descendants of the heroes of 1776 frowning scornfully upon the youthful form of Texan liberty. The braggart threats of Paredas were made without apprehension of any danger in being summoned to battle. What a change came over these Anglo-Saxon opponents of Texan liberty! Twelve years after the battle of San Jacinto, they appropriate ten millions of dollars and fifty thousand volunteers with enthusiasm to enforce the decree of annexation. With shouts of political fervor, they make the hero of Palo Alto, Resaca de la Palma, Monterey, and Buena Vista President of the United States. History reveals itself strangely.
Notwithstanding all opposition, Gen. Houston was ever true to his purposes and principles. Assured that the Alamo had fallen and its brave defenders had met their fate, he moved on to Gonzales, although not a man joined him on his way. When he set out from the Convention at Washington, he dispatched an express to Col. Fannin intending to secure from that officer a junction of his forces with his own on the Cibolo, a small river between Gonzales and San Antonio, and with forces united march to the relief of the Alamo. Reaching Gonzales on March 10, 1836, he found three hundred and seventy-four men, without suitable apparel, unarmed, without organization or supplies. They were immediately assembled, organized, and they elected their own officers. The scouts, who arrived about the time of Gen. Houston's arrival from the vicinity of San Antonio, were under the impression that the Alamo had fallen. This was confirmed by two Mexicans who came in from San Antonio, and whose families had resided among the American colonists. The statement was written down, as Gen. Houston believed it to be correct. The terrible fact was evident that, on the morning of the 6th of March, the Alamo had been assailed, and all human beings in it put to death, except a woman, her child, and a negro; and that the bodies had been dragged out, heaped with wood, into one pile, a vast hecatomb, and burned to ashes.
The fall of the Alamo, and the cool-blooded barbarity exhibited by Santa Anna and his minions, stirred a spirit wherever known, destined to culminate in the overthrow of Mexican despotism, on ​the not far distant day of San Jacinto. On the nth of March, Gen. Houston sent another express to Fannin, informing him that the Alamo had fallen, "ordering him to evacuate Goliad, blow up the fortress, and fall back without delay upon Victoria and the Guadaloupe." It was Houston's opinion that the only means of saving Texas was the union of all the forces at that time in the field. Fannin's force had a fine supply of arms brought from the United States. This force, numbering over five hundred men, joined to Gen. Houston, would make the army at least nine hundred effective men.
Fannin did not attempt a retreat until he had been surrounded by the Mexicans several days. He held a council of war, and sent an express to the commander-in-chief, informing him that he had named the place Fort Defiance, had determined to defend it, and was willing to meet the consequences of disobeying orders. Fannin's fatal mistake, as the result proved, evinced the prophetic sagacity of Houston. About the 23d of March, in the midst of gloom and suspense, the terrible news reached the little army that Col. Fannin's regiment had all been massacred. Peter Kerr, a Mexican, brought the intelligence. A fearful panic took possession of the little army, which the fall of the Alamo had nearly dispersed. The consternation was redoubled when the terrible news came that five hundred courageous companions in a noble cause, men fully armed and equipped for the struggle, had all been massacred. The slaughtering army seemed to have swept away the last barrier in their way. The courage of Houston's men was sadly unnerved. The commander of a forlorn hope had a difficult task to perform immediately. This he did with marvellous sagacity. Calling for the sergeant of the guard, he declared that Kerr was an incendiary, sent as a spy into his camp to produce distraction, and, denouncing him, declared, in an apparently furious storm of anger, that he should be shot at 9 o'clock the next morning. Kerr was at once arrested and put under a strong guard. Addressing the soldiery, Houston gave numerous reasons to prove that the supposed spy's news could not be true. The excitement, which had reached a fearful height, was appeased by his apparent disbelief. Not until the soldiers in camp had retired to rest, would Houston see Kerr. He then repaired to the guard fire and heard the recital of that awful story, which proved that his worst forebodings were now veritable history. Orders were given to have the prisoner treated kindly, and he forgot the next morning to have him executed. With the dreams of the soldiers the excitement passed away. But as Houston would have subjected himself to the charge of collusion with the enemy, in turning loose a supposed spy sent by the people most ​odious to the army, he did not immediately release Kerr. However, on the eve of that day he struck his camp and marched toward the Brazos River. The next night the army reached San Felipe, marching about twenty-eight miles in less than twenty-four hours. The following brief extract from a dispatch develops the perplexities which crowded on the mind of the commander of the little army:
   "Camp West of Brazos, March 31, 1836.
   "My intention was to have attacked the enemy on the second night after the day Fannin's destruction was reported by Kerr Send me daily expresses, and let me know what to rely on. I must let the camp know something, and I want everything promised to be realized by them, and I can keep them together. I have thus far succeeded beyond my hopes. I will do the best I can; but be assured that the fame of Andrew Jackson could never compensate me for my anxiety and mental pain. Two nights since, when it was reported that the enemy was on this side of the Colorado, the citizens of San Felipe reduced it to ashes. There was no order from me for it."
On the 29th of March the army encamped at Mill Creek, and reached their destination, opposite Groces, the following day. The steamboat Yellow Stone, lying at the landing, was immediately pressed into service, and a company of troops placed aboard to prevent the engineers from running the boat off. Until April nth, the army remained in the same position. While the spring rains kept the river in a swollen condition, it camped on an island of the Brazos, secure from the enemy. To maintain communication with the enemy's country, a narrow bridge was constructed, over which Texan scouts could pass, to gather news and keep an eye on the plans and manoeuvres of the Mexicans. It was Gen, Houston's design, before the waters had reached their greatest height, to march with all his force, as soon as the Mexicans should approach San Felipe, and supposing that their confidence in their numerical strength, discipline, and success would throw them entirely off their guard, and to surprise them at night, and thus make them an easy victory to Texan prowess. The freshet in the Brazos was, however, at its height when Gen. Houston heard of the arrival of the enemy at San Felipe; as, therefore, there were three creeks to ford on his march, the plan so boldly conceived was abandoned. The bold daring and sleepless vigilance of the heroic man, on which hung the fate of the young Republic, were thus displayed, although no fortunate result followed his designs. The first certainty of the approach was indicated by the noise of their cannon. The company left to guard San Felipe had retired to the east side of the river, where a partial fortification of timber was thrown up, discovering which, the enemy immediately opened their artillery on ​their breastworks. A company of eighty men, just arrived in camp from Eastern Texas, were detached with another body to give aid to Capt. Baker, while the commander-in-chief, through expresses, maintained communication with the troops at San Felipe and Fort Bend. The main body of the army at Groces, composing his entire force, did not amount to more than five hundred and twenty men. Five hundred men in addition had been expected from the red lands. They were already in the field, and had marched as far as the banks of the Trinity River. Rumors of Indian hostilities were raised by men more willing to ruin the country than fail in Houston's destruction, and thus reinforcements were prevented from joining him. A fine company, composed of Southern chivalry, under command of Gen. J. A. Quitman, of Natchez, were prevented in this way from participating in the triumphs of San Jacinto. Two days after the victory they arrived in camp. As Houston retreated and Santa Anna advanced, the country behind Houston was entirely depopulated, for the hero of San Jacinto never fell back until interposing the army between the enemy and the helpless, he secured the women and children from danger. The strength, position, and designs of the Mexicans had become apparent to him. In three divisions they were advancing on him,—Santa Anna, leading the centre, was to advance from San Antonio to Gonzales, Beasons, and San Felipe, or Washington and Robbin's Ferry, to Nacogdoches; Gen. Urrea was to march with the Second Division from Goliad, by way of Victoria, to Brazoria and Harrisburg; the Third Division was to advance by Bastrop to Texoxtitlan, on the Brazos, and thence to the Comanche, crossing the Trinity on to Nacogdoches. This plan of campaign displayed Santa Anna's superior ability, revealing to Houston the military skill of his opponent. This entire scheme had to be thwarted within thirty days; if not, Texas would be devastated, and the last hope of the Republic blotted out. How this was to be was discovered by no one but Houston. Suspense painfully possessed the little army. To their bold leader all eyes were anxiously turned. The salvation of Texas depended, under God, on the arm of Houston. The policy of Houston was soon mapped out. The advancing divisions were so much detached that he felt assured that they could be managed in detail, if the expected succors should reach him in time. The best position had been selected on the Brazos, enabling the commanding General to cover a larger extent of territory than any other location at command, and afforded good access to supplies. While encamped at this place he was constantly sending expresses to Eastern Texas, in which, while his true situation was communicated to the Committee of Vigilance and Safety, at ​Nacogdoches, he habitually endorsed the envelopes with postscripts, to show to all that his force did not exceed twenty-five hundred, believing that success would fail to come to his aid if his real situation were known. The report that he had a command of twenty-five hundred men had no other origin.
News came from Fort Bend, about the nth of April, that Santa Anna, with the centre division of Mexicans, had already crossed the river at that place. The vigilance enjoined was not maintained by the company stationed at that place, consequently a negro took the ferry-boat over to the western side of the river, which enabled the Mexicans at once to cross the river, which, as it was at high flood, they could not have crossed in a month. A month's delay in crossing would have enabled Houston to maintain his position until his army was reinforced, from the confidence inspired by safety. Circumstances fortunately conspired in favor of Houston and the Texans. Gaono, and the upper division of the Mexican army, had lost their way on the march, and ascended the Colorado, High waters delayed the southern division under Urrea, and the Brazos was not passed at all. That Harrisburg had become the seat of Government, after the Convention had adjourned, March 17th, was known to Santa Anna, and he was prepared to take advantage of the panic which the flying officers of the Republic had spread over the country. Such was the consternation with which the Convention broke up, that only seven of its members found their way to the army in the field. The disastrous consequences of terrible panic among leading men were only thoroughly conceived by those w^ho were on the ground. Owing to this cause more than to any other, Houston received no more reinforcements in this fearful and trying crisis. A government ad interim had been created by a constitutional act of the Convention. A President, Vice-President, Secretaries of War, Navy, and the Treasury, with all powers, except law-making, incident to a government, had been appointed, ad interim, and then the Convention adjourned to Harrisburg, a point not less than seventy miles from the scene of war. The flight of the wise and worthy men of the country from danger, tended to frighten the old, young, and helpless, furnish excuses to the timid, and " sanction the course of the cowardly." The general dismay following the adjournment of the Convention, induced many brave men, impelled irresistibly by natural impulses, to go to their abandoned, fugitive wives and children to render them protection. It has been often declared by Gen. Houston that of all the circumstances which befell him in the struggle for Texas, ​this was the most disheartening, and his dispatches confirm the statement.
Marching up within two miles of the stream, and almost in sight of the ruins, they prepared to cross Buffalo Bayou, which was between them and the scene of the Mexican's desolation. Swimming across the stream with several companions, the gallant Karnes and Deaf Smith, in a short time brought back across the Bayou two couriers, who furnished most important intelligence. Dispatches from Felisola to Santa Anna were found on the person of the courier—who proved to be a Mexican officer,—so recently written, that the party reading them out aloud for Gen. Houston, remarked, "The ink, sir, is hardly dry." Assurance most positive was now forced on the Texan commander that Santa Anna had the command in person of the advance of the enemy. The second express was composed of mail from the City of Mexico, filled with letters of congratulation from the capitol, acknowledging Santa Anna as Emperor of Mexico.
Gen. Houston and Gen. Rusk, the Secretary of War, retired immediately for a private conference. They exchanged but few words; serious and all-engrossing facts were before them. There could be but one conclusion: "We need not talk," said Houston to Rusk, "you think we ought to fight and I think so too." It was ​decided that the fate of Texas should be settled in battle as soon as the enemy could be found, and Gen. Houston was informed not long after this conference, by Col. Hockley, that he had overheard an officer in command of a regiment, saying to the soldiers around him, with whom he supposed that he possessed great influence, "Boys, Houston don't intend to fight; follow me and you shall have enough of it." Houston said at once to Hockley, "I'll cure this mischief directly." The two Colonels were summoned into his presence. "Gentlemen," said he, " have you rations of beef in camp for three days? " " Yes, sir." " You will then see that each man is supplied with three days' cooked rations, and hold the camp in readiness to march. We will see if we can find Santa Anna; good-morning, gentlemen." Houston remarked, as he turned off with Hockley, "There is no excuse for sedition now if they wish to fight." Orders were immediately given to prepare for crossing Buffalo Bayou, so that the march upon the enemy might be commenced the next morning. But when morning came, no preparations had been made for the march. No attention had been paid to the orders of the commanding General,—no soldier had prepared his rations. No time was to be lost. Not taking his usual morning rest, the General in person issued his orders to the men, and soon the signs of preparation were evident throughout the camp. It was, however, nine o'clock before the column could be gotten under arms. Arriving at the bayou, two miles from the encampment, the boat was found to be nearly filled with water. Dismounting at once. Gen. Houston called for an axe, and went to hewing oars out of rails. Difficult and perilous as was the passage, yet Houston was resolved that it should be made that morning. The stream was about fifty yards wide, and more than twenty feet deep. An accident occurred, damaging the boat, while the pioneers, a small company, were going aboard. The General at once leaped aboard. His faithful horse, left pawing on the bank, plunged in after him, and swam to the opposite shore. A rope of horse-hair, called in Spanish cabriestos, was soon constructed with raw twigs, and fastened to both banks of the bayou, enabling the boat to make trips more rapidly, and keep it from floating down stream. With great rapidity the passage was now made. But the commander and his faithful and intelligent councillor. Gen. Rusk, Secretary of War, spent an hour of intense anxiety. On opposite banks they stood and watched the dangerous movement of their little army, in whose brave hearts were now gathered all the hopes of Texas. The enemy's column might appear in sight at any moment, and coming up while the deep stream divided the army of Texas, the hopes of Anglo-Saxon civilization would have been blasted on Texas soil for ​an indefinite period. The moment of deepest peril now intervened. After half the army had crossed, the boat commenced giving away, occupying four strong men in continually bailing out the water. The cavalry had now to cross. Goaded to plunge into the deep stream, they immediately disappeared, and rising again in full strength they swam to the steep, opposite bank, and made a successful passage. The last passage of the boat carried over Gen. Rusk. These two brave men grasped each other's hands, and involuntarily the same exclamation escaped from each other's lips, " Thank God, at last we are safely over." The following letter, written in pencil, on a scrap of paper drawn from the General's pocket, will attest the animus and intention of the hour after the passage of Buffalo Bayou:
   "Camp at Harrisburg, April 19, 1836.
   "To Colonel Rusk, in the field:
   "This morning' we are in preparation to meet Santa Anna. It is the only chance of saving Texas. From time to time I have look.ed for reinforcements in vain. The Convention's adjourning to Harrisburg struck terror through the country. Texas could have started at least four thousand men. We will be only about seven hundred to march, besides the camp guard. But we go to conquest. It is wisdom growing out of necessity to meet and fight the enemy now. Every consideration enforces it. The troops are in fine spirits, and now is the time for action. We will use our best efforts to fight the enemy to such advantage as will insure victory, though the odds are greatly against us. I leave the result in the hands of an all-wise God, and I rely confidently upon His providence. My country will do justice to those who serve her. The right for which we fight will be secured, and Texas shall be free.
   "Sam Houston, Commander-in-Chief."
   (Certified copy from the Department of War of the Republic of Texas.)
After the passage of Buffalo Bayou the companies of the army were formed into line, and then Gen. Houston rode up and addressed the soldiers. His address was said by those who heard it to be the most eloquent and impassioned to which they ever listened. He gave them as the battle cry. Remember the Alamo. The words were taken up by every man in the army, and one unanimous shout pierced the sky, " Remember the Alamo! Remember the Alamo! " and the green islands of prairie trees echoed and repeated that shout, " Remember the Alamo." Gen. Rusk, Secretary of War, also spoke in the most stirring, impassioned, and appropriate language. Inspired with the spirit of chivalry, the men were impatient to hear the order to "march." The column soon received the order to march. Under a brilliant sun, shining full and clear after a long cold rain, that army marched without bugle ​blast, floating banners, thrilling fife, or pealing drum. Seven hundred men, resolute on freedom without pomp or circumstance of glorious war, evinced their determined purpose by heavy tramp, strained muscle, and compressed lip. To avoid being seen on the open prairie, the army halted till sundown, in a narrow woodland not far from the stream. Once more in motion, the column made a forced march to a position distant not more than four or five miles from the ground where the serious and main struggle was expected to be made. Off from the line of march the weary men took shelter under the covert of a grove, and lying down on their rifles, slept for an hour. Gen. Houston rose from the ground at daylight. He had rested on a coil of rope used in dragging the artillery, and with his well-known three taps of the drum roused the camp. From the day he assumed command a reveille or tattoo had never been beaten. In every direction pickets were advanced. The scouts sent out returned very soon with information which assured Gen. Houston that Santa Anna with his column was not far distant. A small party well mounted had been met with, and although chase was given, they escaped. The army halted to take refreshment; when the scouting party returned, rousing fires were kindled to cook the beeves already dressed. About seven o'clock that same morning, before much progress had been made, it was reported that the enemy was marching up from New Washington to cross the San Jacinto, effecting which, Santa Anna would have been enabled to have carried desolation to the Sabine. The order was given immediately by Gen. Houston to take up the line of march for crossing the San Jacinto at Lynchburg. On cutting off Santa Anna's retreat hinged the issue of the entire struggle, and the whole army at once saw it. With alacrity abandoning their half-cooked meat, the men flew to their arms as one man, and hitching the horses to the artillery as soon as possible, began the march, nor did they halt until they had reached the ferry at the junction of Buffalo Bayou and San Jacinto, where, to the great joy of the Texans, they learned that Santa Anna had not yet come up. Santa Anna had forced some Americans to construct a new boat; of this Houston took possession, and caused it to be rowed up the stream opposite the first grove on the bayou. Arriving first, he had the opportunity of choosing his position. In a beautiful copse of trees growing on a bend in the stream, semicircular in form on the margin of the prairie, he posted his army. On the bank of the river his forces were concealed by the trees and their undergrowth, ​and his artillery was planted on the brow of the copse. The Texans were now ready for battle at a moment's warning, but as Santa Anna's forces had not yet come up, they relighted their fires to complete their cooking operations which had been so suddenly broken up a few hours before. Their arms had been scarcely laid aside and fires kindled before the scouts of Houston came flying into camp with the important news that at last the Mexicans were in sight—intelligence soon confirmed by Santa Anna's bugles, sounding over the prairie the charge of the Mexican army. Santa Anna knew perfectly well, whatever had been said to the contrary, the position of the Texan General. He intended to surprise the Texan army himself, instead of being surprised by a discharge from the Texan artillery. Intending to sustain his artillery by his infantry and cavalry, he opened his "brass twelve-pounder" upon the Texan position. The Mexican infantry column was driven back by a well-directed fire of grape-shot and canister from Houston's two six-pounders, and within rifle-shot of the Texan army took shelter in a piece of timber. The Mexican field-piece kept up its fire, resulting only in disabling from service Col. Neill, the gallant officer of the artillery, by a grape-shot received in his thigh. About ten o'clock of the morning of the 20th of April these events occurred. Permission was given Col. Sydney Sherman, of the 2d regiment, at his own request, to drive with a detachment the infantry from their covert. Although the place and time for action had been decided upon by Houston, he consented to Col. Sherman's proposition, enjoining him to take two companies of his regiment with positive orders not to advance beyond the piece of timber, or endanger the safety of his detachment. The charge was made on horseback, and only resulted in a repulse of the Texans. It is apparent from the records left concerning the movements of this eventful campaign, that Gen. Houston had determined to select his own time for the conflict, and by superior advantage of position and military skill to compensate for disparity in numbers. The skirmishing of the day concluded with the retirement of Santa Anna and his army to a swell in the prairie, with timber and water in his rear. About three-quarters of a mile from the Texan camp, near the bank of the Bay of San Jacinto, he took his position, and commenced a fortification. The Texan commander was well satisfied with the day's work, and declared to a confidential officer that evening that if he had pursued the enemy victory would have been certain, yet it would have been attended with a heavy loss of men. "While to-morrow," said Gen. Houston, "I will conquer, slaughter, and put to flight the entire Mexican army, and it shall not cost me a dozen of my brave men." The military sagacity of ​Gen. Houston displayed itself every day after he took the command of the army at Gonzales. In the afternoon of the 20th Col. Sherman was allowed to go out with the cavalry, and reconnoitre the enemy's position and forces, the artillery and infantry battalion remaining concealed behind an island of timber, to be in readiness to meet and check the advances of the enemy if Sherman's command should be attacked. Hardly had the reconnoitering party disappeared before the sound of firing was heard in their direction. Gen. Houston mounted his horse and rode to the scene of action, and met the cavalry coming in. A general engagement had not, fortunately, been brought on, but one soldier had been killed, and another wounded. The truth of history demands that the state ment of Gen. H. S. Foote (vol. ii., p. 301) should be placed on record, confirmed by the endorsement of Gen. Houston himself. Gen. Foote's statement is that the last action of the 20th " was a bold and well-conceived ruse to delude the commander-in-chief into a conflict in spite of the monitions of his cooler judgment."
Houston was satisfied that his plan of giving battle the next day would succeed, and he was reluctant to peril unnecessarily the life of a single man. Retiring to their camp at the close of the 20th, the Texan army refreshed themselves for the first time in two days. The position of the Mexican army maintained till the charge made upon it the next day, may be learned from Gen. Houston's official report. "The enemy in the meantime extended the right flank of their infantry, so as to occupy the extreme point of a skirt of timber on the bank of the San Jacinto, and secured their left by a fortification about five feet high, constructed of packs and baggage, leaving an opening in the centre of their breastwork, in which their artillery was placed—the cavalry upon the left wing."
* ↑ Hon. David G. Burnet, President; Hon. L. G. Zavalla, Vice-President
* ↑ There was one drum and fife, which few heard, which gave the air of "Come to the Bower," the only air of the struggling Republic.