# America in the Struggle for Czechoslovak Independence/Woodrow Wilson and the Cause of Czechoslovak Independence

II
WOODROW WILSON AND THE CAUSE OF CZECHOSLOVAK INDEPENDENCE
The most important facts concerning the United States Government during the war and its relation to the problem of Czechoslovak independence in particular and that of Austria-Hungary in general, may not be known for many years, and certainly not until the various communications between the several legations and embassies and the State Department are given to the public. Yet there are certain facts available at the present time, or which should be made available to the student of history, and which are not generally known, or, at least, not generally appreciated. Some of these may appear insignificant, but apparently insignificant matters, needless to say, frequently do characterize eras and men, and are a help to understanding.
Toward the end of the war the charge was made more than once, particularly in the German press, that the Czechoslovaks were Woodrow Wilson’s special protégés, and more than once his ​attitude was attributed to the personal influence of the then Professor, now President Masaryk.The charge, current even today, shows not only a lack of understanding of historical forces, but is also unfair to Woodrow Wilson both as a statesman and scholar, and as an historian.
For the fact is that long before the war, and long before he commenced his political career, the War President exhibited a knowledge of Czech history and Czech aspirations which it is safe to say was not possessed by any other leading statesman of the Allied or Associated Powers.
Wilson’s work, The State, first appeared in 1889, and there he touches upon the Austro-Hungarian problem. In the edition copyrighted in 1898 (D. C. Heath & Co., Publishers) the discussion reappears. If we are correctly to judge the origins of Wilson's attitude toward the Czechoslovaks the matter is of some importance and justifies even an extended quotation. Long be fore the war, in a scientific work, the future President of the United States, and for a period a dominant world figure, had this to say concerning a realm in the downfall of which he was to play so fateful a part:
Bohemia was a Slavonic wedge thrust into the side of Germany. Compassed about by hostile ​powers, it was a prize to be fought for. Alternately conquered by several neighboring kingdoms, it finally fell into German hands and became an appanage of the empire. It was as such that the Hapsburgers seized it when its throne became vacant in consequence of the extinction of the Luxemburg line of princes. In 1526 their hold upon it became complete, and they were thenceforth able to keep it secure as an hereditary possession within their family.(Par. 732.)
Moravia also was and is Slavonic. Slavs early drove out its Teutonic possessors, and were prevented from joining the Slavs of the southeast in the formation of a vast Slavonic kingdom only by the intervention of the Magyars, the conquerors of Hungary. This dominant race in the tenth century thrust themselves in between the Slavs of the northwest and those of the southeast, and, driving back the Slavs of Moravia, reduced the once “Great Moravia” to the dimensions of the present province. Striven for by Hungary, by Poland, and by Bohemia, Moravia finally met her natural fate in incorporation with Slavonic Bohemia (1029), and passed, along with that kingdom, into Austrian hands, in 1526.(Par. 733.)
The present constitution of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy practically recognizes but two parties to the union, Austria and Hungary. Bohemia, for all she has so much individuality and boasts so fine a history of independence, is swallowed up in Austria: only the Magyars of Hungary among all the races of the heterogeneous realm of the Hapsburgers have obtained for the kingdom of their making a standing ​of equality alongside of dominant Austria.(Par. 738.)
The commanding difficulty of government through out the whole course of Austro -Hungarian politics has been the variety of races embraced within the domain of the monarchy. First and most prominent is the three- sided contrast between German, Slav and Magyar. Within this general classification, again, Slav differs from Slav by reason of many sharp divergencies of history, of speech and of religion; and outside this classification, there is added a miscellany of Italians, Croats, Serbs, Roumanians, Jews—men of almost every race and people of eastern Europe. This variety is emphasized by the fact that only the Czechs (Bohemians), among all these peoples, have a separate homeland in which they are in majority. In Bohemia and Moravia the Czechs constitute considerably more than half the population; whilst in Hungary the Magyars, though greatly outnumbering any other element of the population, are less than half the whole number of inhabitants; and in Austria, though men of German blood are very greatly in the majority in the central provinces which may be called Austria proper, they constitute in Austria taken as a whole very little more than one-third of the population. (Par. 739.)
At least two among these many races, moreover, are strenuously, restlessly, persistently devoted to independence. No lapse of time, no defeat of hopes, seems sufficient to reconcile the Czechs of Bohemia to incorporation with Austria. Pride of race and the memories of a notable and distinguished history keep ​them always at odds with the Germans within their gates and with the government set over their heads. They desire at least the same degree of autonomy that has been granted to Hungary.(Par. 740.)
These excerpts show clearly enough that in the case of Woodrow Wilson, Czech propagandists were spared the necessity of teaching him the history of their nationality and of convincing him of the heterogeneity of the Austro-Hungarian Empire; a task they were confronted with in the case of many another war-time statesman. Equally clearly, a recognition of Czech claims must have been a pleasant task for Woodrow Wilson once the Czechoslovak legions appeared in the field, and once proof was established that nothing short of independence would satisfy the nation.
As a matter of fact, one of the statements of Mr. Wilson, appearing above, furnished the Czechs of America with a slogan which they eagerly seized upon and never tired of using: “NO LAPSE OF TIME, NO DEFEAT OF HOPES, SEEMS SUFFICIENT TO RECONCILE THE CZECHS OF BOHEMIA TO INCORPORATION WITH AUSTRIA.” This crisp sentence was for the first time quoted by a Czech spokesman at a hearing before the committee on foreign affairs of the ​House of Representatives on February 25, 1916 (see Bohemia’s Claim to Independence, published by the Bohemian National Alliance in Chicago, 1916), and thereafter it was printed on the title page of The Bohemian, later The Czechoslovak Review, and served as a veritable battle-cry for the Czech inhabitants of the United States.
The Czech propaganda, while well organized in this country, was spontaneous. At times it seemed that every Czech living in the United States had constituted himself a committee of one for the purpose of convincing his fellow-citizens of other origins, and particularly the White House, of the justice of the Czech cause and the propriety of aiding it. At one time the White House was so deluged with telegrams from Czechs from all parts of the country that the situation so created was the subject of a special Washington dispatch by the Associated Press. That these expressions of hope for the liberation of their native land, and of faith in Woodrow Wilson, inevitably had at least the effect of very early focusing his attention upon the problem, needs no special evidence.
At no time did Mr. Wilson resent this activity, though he did insist upon loyalty to America in the first place. In any event, the Czechs in ​America were fortunate in that the struggle for Czechoslovak independence was perfectly consistent with what they considered to be American ideals and with American aims. The Czech press in this country frequently quoted Mr. Wilson’s address, delivered to newly naturalized citizens in Philadelphia on May 10, 1915, and in which the following passage occurs: “I certainly would not be the one even to suggest that a man cease to love the home of his birth and the nation of his origin—these things are very sacred and ought not to be put out of our hearts—but it is one thing to love this place where you were born and it is another thing to dedicate yourself to the place to which you go.” (Addresses and Messages of Woodrow Wilson, Boni & Liveright, edited by Albert Bushnell Hart.)
Direct contact with the President was of course sought, but there were formal difficulties not only during America’s period of neutrality, but also after she entered the war, since virtually all the Czech spokesmen in this country were American citizens, and also because no prudent statesman could in any way commit himself to the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary without assurance that such was the desire of at least a majority of the Austrian peoples, and without certain evidence ​of their capacity to govern themselves. The difficulty was solved at least temporarily and partially by presenting to Colonel House a memorandum addressed, however, to the President himself.
The memorandum in question was the work of one of the then vice-presidents of the Bohemian National Alliance; an Iowa attorney, and had the approval of both the Bohemian National Alliance and the Slovak League of America, and was delivered to Mr. House in his New York apartment by two officials of the Alliance in May, 1917. The document, after a historical survey, dealt mainly with the fact that the plans, occasionally broached, for federalizing Austria-Hungary, were not feasible, and that Austria-Hungary, preserved in any form, would be a constant menace to the peace of the world.
Colonel House asked the Czech representatives many questions and himself showed complete familiarity with the problem. He also stated that the President was well acquainted with, and very much interested in, the Czech cause.
That the matter was present in Mr. Wilson’s mind very soon after America’s declaration of war is well illustrated by his Flag Day address, delivered in Washington, June 14, 1917, from ​which the following passage is illustrative of the trend of the President’s thought:
Their plan (the Germans’) was to throw a broad belt of German military power and political control across the very centre of Europe and beyond the Mediterranean into the heart of Asia; and Austria-Hungary was to be as much their tool and pawn as Serbia or Bulgaria or Turkey or the ponderous states of the East. Austria-Hungary, indeed, was to become part of the central German Empire, absorbed and dominated by the same forces and influences that had originally cemented the German states themselves. The dream had its heart at Berlin. It could have had a heart nowhere else! It rejected the idea of solidarity of race entirely. The choice of peoples played no part in it at all. It contemplated binding together racial and political units which could be kept together only by force—Czechs, Magyars, Croats, Serbs, Roumanians, Turks, Armenians—the proud states of Bohemia and Hungary, the stout little commonwealths of the Balkans, the indomitable Turks, the subtle peoples of the East. These peoples did not wish to be united. They ardently desired to direct their own affairs, would be satisfied only by undisputed independence. They could be kept quiet only by the presence or the constant threat of armed men. They would live under a common power only by sheer compulsion and await the day of revolution. But the German military statesmen had reckoned with all that and were ready to deal with it in their own way. (Addresses and Messages of Woodrow ​Wilson , Boni & Liveright, edited by Albert Bushnell Hart. )
The reference I have italicized is significant, for Mr. Wilson could not speak fortuitously of a proud Bohemian state. Here was evidence that the American President not only was considering the Czech problem, but, also, that he was leaning toward the Czech claim, advanced frequently and included in the memorandums delivered to Colonel House, that legally the Czech (Bohemian) state had never ceased to exist.
This address was important for another reason. For the first time there was indication that Mr. Wilson had commenced to look upon the Austro-Hungarian problem in the light of contentions advanced by the French publicist, Mr. Andre Chéradame. (See especially this author’s Pan-Germany, the Disease and Cure, and The Pan-German Plot Unmasked, The Atlantic Monthly Press. ) In the first of these works the author holds that Bohemia dominates all Europe and that none of the subject nationalities can be really freed unless Bohemia is liberated. Evidence of Mr. Wilson’s virtual adoption of Chéradame’s views is even clearer in his speech to the American Federation of Labor Convention at Buffalo, November 12, 1917. (Addresses and Messages of Woodrow Wilson, Boni ​& Liveright, edited by Albert Bushnell Hart.)
But there were other indications that while Mr. Wilson was friendly, he was at that time not quite ready, after all, to come out for the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary. One of these was the address of the President to Congress in joint session, December 4, 1917, recommending that that body extend the state of war to include Austria-Hungary. In this speech the President said:
The peace we make . . . . must deliver the once fair lands and happy peoples of Belgium and northern France from the Prussian conquest and the Prussian menace, but it must also deliver the peoples of Austria-Hungary, the peoples of the Balkans, and the peoples of Turkey, alike in Europe and in Asia, from the impudent and alien dominion of the Prussian military and commercial autocracy.
But Mr. Wilson also declared:
We owe it, however, to ourselves to say that we do not wish in any way to impair or to rearrange the Austro-Hungarian Empire. It is no affair of ours what they do with their own life, either industrially or politically. We do not purpose or desire to dictate to them in any way. We only desire to see that their affairs are left in their own hands, in all matters, great or small. (Addresses and Messages of Woodrow Wilson, Boni & Liveright, edited by Albert Bushnell Hart.)
​It is clear now, as was clear then to many, that the President intended to show that the peoples of Austria-Hungary must decide their own fate, and that no new form of government would, or could, be imposed from the outside. Also, one must admit the awful and solemn responsibility assumed by the chief of any state once he decides to declare, and does declare, for the dissolution of an Empire which, after all is said, had existed and functioned for centuries. However, to the Czech leaders in this country the speech brought home the fact that much still remained to be done, and that, in the last analysis, when the really critical moment came the fate of the Czechoslovak nation must be decided at home, by those living within its old historical boundaries, and that those active abroad, standing alone, could not bring about the realization of their great ideal. Nevertheless, the Czechoslovak public in this country demanded that their spokesmen do something, as the public always does demand in similar situations. But what to do and how to do it was a delicate question. Finally two measures were adopted.
The director of the Slav Press Bureau, in this capacity and as Vice-President of the Bohemian National Alliance, addressed a letter to the chief ​of the Near East Division of the State Department, Dr. A. H. Putney, within whose competence Czechoslovak matters came, asserting that no solution continuing Hapsburg sovereignty could be acceptable to the Czechoslovak people, and indicating that the war-ardor and sacrificial spirit among the Czechoslovaks should in no way be weakened by state papers not always clearly understood by the public and tending to create fears of a possible compromise with the Dual Monarchy. It is understood that this letter formed a part of a report to the President, prepared by the official referred to, and that thus it reached him.
On December 12, 1917, an interview by the Washington Post with the same spokesman, expounded the same view, and this interview was brought to the attention of the President by the Secretary of the Interior, Franklin K. Lane.
President Masaryk, coming from Russia, landed in Vancouver on April 29, 1918, and when he arrived in Chicago, a few days later, a welcome was accorded to him which in American history is probably without a parallel. At least one hundred thousand Czechs and Slovaks greeted him at the Northwestern Station in that city, thus proving the perfect functioning of the Czechoslovak organization and giving Dr. Masaryk prestige which ​otherwise would have been out of the question. Similar welcomes, though on not quite so large a scale, since Chicago’s Czech population is the largest in the country, were organized in New York, Cleveland, Pittsburgh and Baltimore.
As for propaganda and political activity, Dr. Masaryk continued along the lines already laid out by American Czechs and addressed numerous organizations of importance. Finally, in the first half of June, 1918, he was received by Mr. Wilson, an occurrence which in itself was politically significant, for until almost the last day there was some doubt as to the possibility of this reception because as yet the Czechoslovak movement had not been recognized officially by America, and Mr. Wilson was unwilling to commit himself definitely to territorial changes or rearrangements. It was understood that shortly before that he had refused to receive a delegation of Alsatians and Lorrainers.
This conference was the only one between Mr. Wilson and Dr. Masaryk held prior to the Armistice. When they next met, for the second and last time, Dr. Masaryk came to bid the American President good-bye, himself the President of the Czechoslovak Republic.
The next contact of a personal nature of Czech ​spokesmen with Mr. Wilson, came on July 4, 1918, when a pilgrimage was organized of citizens of foreign descent to the tomb of Washington on the presidential yacht, The Mayflower. Each nationality had a representative in the group which accompanied the President on his trip, and the Czech delegate was in a position to inform the President that the Czech deputies, at a meeting in Prague on May 16, 1918, had declared for a League of Nations, of which Mr. Wilson was even then an advocate. The diplomatic corps participated in this pilgrimage and there was some disappointment in Czech circles that an invitation was not extended to Dr. Masaryk. But at that time the Czechoslovak National Council had not been recognized by the United States, though it had received recognition by the French Government.
While in America, Dr. Masaryk prepared for the State Department and President Wilson certain memoranda. The first of these was a survey of the Czechoslovak problem, largely historical, and requires merely to be referred to, since Dr. Masaryk himself evidently did not attribute to it special diplomatic importance, the same document appearing textually in the Washington Post ​as an interview given to Gordon Gordon-Smith.
On July 20, 1918, Dr. Masaryk filed with the State Department a request for aid for the Czechoslovak Army in Siberia. This memorandum is not accessible to the writer, but its nature appears from another document, delivered to the Department of State and undoubtedly read by Mr. Wilson, a mimeographed copy of which is in the writer’s possession. (The Situation in Russia and the Military Help of the Allies and the United States.) This last paper is undated, but since it refers to an Allied declaration of August 3, 1918, with regard to the aid to be given to the Czechoslovak army, it of course followed that declaration and preceded the formal recognition of the Czechoslovak National Council by America. Its importance lies in the fact that it throws some light on the Russian situation of the period, and its pertinence here is due to the consideration that it was undoubtedly weighed by Mr. Wilson when he deliberated upon the Russian problem an whether or not to send troops to Siberia in aid of the Czechoslovak legions. The following passages have been selected from this document:
The relation to the Bolsheviks I always imagined as a so to say working relation: I am speaking from ​my own experience: I was in contact with them in Ukraine and Moscow): I know how to work with them, and I had a certain amount of influence over them. I never agreed with the whole of their program, and I utterly condemn their tactics. Mr. Hapgood not long ago quoted a statement of Lenin which said that out of a hundred Bolsheviks one is reasonable, the rest being fools and criminals—if Lenin really believes in this cynical criticism of Russia, then he is himself the greatest criminal of all. Their radical social reforms the few reasonable Bolsheviks can put into effect only through these fools and criminals, and such means and methods ultimately must always destroy the goal. Lenin is a Jesuit . . . . . an honorable and moral object cannot be achieved by dishonorable methods.
Bolshevism is clearly amateurism in all respects, and cannot administer Russia and bring about order there. But the misfortune of Russia lies in the fact that the anti-Bolshevist parties are also amateurish, for that is the curse of Tsarism, that it did not accustom Russians to administrative work. The Bolsheviks keep their power only through the weakness and incompetency of their opponents. I, and with me our army, did everything possible not to provoke the Bolsheviks: we wanted to work in Russia without obstacles. Only when the Bolsheviks showed themselves openly faithless, when they combined with the Germans, we were forced to take the defensive. With those 99 fools and criminals peaceful dealing is impossible; their aggression must be energetically repelled. This they understand, and this only.
​In the beginning of April I advised the Allies to recognize the Bolsheviks de facto (not de jure) so that they could peacefully work in Russia as soon as possible. At that time the Bolsheviks still kept their agreement with us. Five months elapsed since that time. When the Allies did not send to Russia economic and administrative assistance, the Germans and Austrians exploited this fact, told the Bolsheviks the Allies could not and would not help, and so gained the Bolsheviks. But the Bolsheviks, in the meantime, and the Germans are losing in Russia their prestige, because of their defeats in the West. Under these conditions action in Russia is again made easier.
Dr. Masaryk then discusses the degree of Allied help necessary in Russia and expresses the opinion that it will be necessary for the Japanese to send a larger contingent, probably two divisions. As for the military and political function of the Czechoslovak army, he says:
The military quality of our army is generally recognized: they are not only brave, but also intelligent (every individual knows what he is fighting for), and they maintained discipline throughout the terrible events in Russia not only after the revolution, but also under the old regime.
From the military point of view it must be the duty of the Allies to make the most effective use of such a military force. Naturally war against Austria-Hungary and Germany is the chief objective of ​our army not only in France and Italy, but also in Russia; with that object in view the army was organized. Right after the disappearance of the Eastern front after the treaty of Brest-Litovsk the Allies have decided and agreed to transport our army from Russia to France. That is still our military and political aim. The fact that our army was organized against Austria-Hungary and Germany has a great political and military significance. Austria-Hungary was considerably weakened by it, her population and army demoralized. Of that the voices and official proclamations of the Austro-Hungarian and German governments leave no doubt.
Austrians and Germans have therefore endeavored to prevent our army from coming from Russia to France; to that end they forced the Bolsheviks to break their own agreements and pledges, to that end they are organizing their war prisoners against us and the Allies.
It is therefore in the military and political interest of the Allies and of America that our army gets from Russia to France. The more of our soldiers will get to the western front, the less America will have to send there. Of course, the transportation task is much greater; but the difference is only in transportation to America; American soldiers have to be transported to France also. The political and military value of our army, however, outweighs the expenses and the difficulties of transportation. (Financially our army is much less expensive than the American or British army—the pay of our troops ​is much lower and all equipment much less costly, our men being used to simpler forms of life.)
Our army will have a special and very important part to play on the western front at the moment of decisive victory: it will have to attempt an invasion of Austria-Hungary.
I admit that our army can be used with advantage in Russia. Our men know Russia and Russian: but it would be a distinct loss to use our forces for a more police than military duty, more so, that they would not like it themselves. That of course depends on the further development of the Russian situation and on the plans of the Allies in Russia. Meanwhile, the army will stay in Russia and co-operate with the Allies.
I therefore propose that after Siberia is put into order, and that should be accomplished before winter, half of our army be transported to France; the other half could in the meantime remain in Russia.
It is not without interest to register what Dr. Masaryk said relative to the Russian policy of the Allies:
I abstain from criticizing the action in Siberia; I am not informed about the size of the military help and I do not know what political and administrative plans the Allies are pursuing. Judging from the reports I receive, and from the news I read in the papers, I am obliged to say that is seems to me that the Allies must send a considerably greater force, and that their policy towards the various Russian parties and governments (a rather dreary symptom of ​the Russian disorganization and lack of political maturity) should be clearer and more energetic. A precise political (and administrative) plan is also necessary for the success of the military operations.
Mr. Wilson finally decided to send a contingent of American troops to Siberia, but only for the express purpose of protecting the Czechoslovaks in their march to the Pacific. This contingent numbered seven thousand men and was commanded by General Graves. It never proceeded beyond Vladivostok.
The appearance of the Czechoslovak legions in Siberia, in independent formations, required that this army be given a political head also in the legal sense, and this led to a recognition of the Czechoslovak National Council as а de facto government, not only by the Allied powers, but by the American Government as well. The latter’s recognition was accorded on September 3, 1918, and Dr. Masaryk, as President-Designate of the new Republic, sailed from New York on November 19th, after having appointed the writer as the first Czechoslovak diplomatic representative in the United States with the title of Commissioner. This appointment in itself was something of a curiosity. The appointee was an American citizen, though of Czech birth, and the ​title of Commissioner was selected to prevent an undesirable diplomatic precedent from arising.
The future commissioner was received by Mr. Wilson at the White House on September 9, 1918, and in discussing the then recent recognition of the Council as a de facto government. Mr. Wilson declared: “By your conduct throughout the war, especially by your armies, you have demonstrated that you insist upon complete independence. We have merely recognized an accomplished fact.”
Thus was again demonstrated the profound truth of a famous statement of Cavour: “Diplomacy cannot change the status of nations. It can merely legalize accomplished facts.” (Thayer’s Life of Cavour.)
When Austria-Hungary claimed acceptance of the fourteen points as a basis of peace negotiations, she was informed by the Department of State that, in so far as autonomy for the nationalities of Austria-Hungary was concerned, the fourteen points had undergone a modification, and that she must deal with the Czechoslovaks directly. On October 27, 1918, the Austro-Hungarian minister of foreign affairs, Count Andrassy, in reply to this attitude of President Wilson and his government, admitted the right of the Czecho​slovaks to self-determination. On October 28, 1918, the Republic was proclaimed in Prague.
Woodrow Wilson, who so emphasized the importance of the army, without which Czechoslovak independence would have remained but a dream, was afforded an opportunity to review a contingent of these men passing through the United States in July, 1919. The review was to take place from a stand erected before the White House especially for the purpose. Owing to a heavy rain the reviewing party assembled and watched the parade from the White House portico. One of the group was Adolph J. Sabath, Representative from Illinois, himself born in Bohemia. When Mr. Wilson concluded his remarks (see Appendix) he invited Mr. Sabath to address the troops in their native language. Probably this is the only time an address in a foreign tongue was delivered from the White House portico. As to the occasion itself, this was certainly unique, and, it is easy to predict, will never be repeated.