# Lectures on the Proofs of the Existence of God/Amplification of the Ontological Proof 1831

In the sphere of revealed religion what we have first to consider is the abstract Notion or conception of God. This free, pure revealed Notion is what forms the basis. The manifestation of the Notion, its Being for an Other, is its existence, and the region in which this existence shows itself is the finite spirit. This is the second point—finite Spirit and finite consciousness are concrete. The chief thing in this religion is to attain to a knowledge of the process whereby God manifests Himself in the finite spirit, and is identical with Himself in it. The third point is the identity of the Notion and existence. Identity here is, strictly speaking, an awkward expression, for what we have in God is essentially life.
In the forms hitherto treated of we advanced from what was lower to what was higher, and took as the starting-point one definite form of existence regarded in its different aspects. Being was first taken in its most comprehensive aspect as contingent Being, in the Cosmological Proof. The truth of contingent Being is Being necessary in-and-for-itself. Existence was then further conceived of as involving relations of ends, and this supplied us with the Teleological Proof. Here there is an advance, a beginning from existence as actually given and present. These proofs consequently form part of the finite determination of God. The Notion of God is that of something boundless, not boundless in the bad sense, but rather as representing what has at the same ​time the most determinate character possible, pure self-determination. These first proofs belong to the domain of finite connection, of finite determination, since we start with what is given. Here, on the other hand, the starting-point is the free, pure Notion, and it is accordingly at this stage that we meet with the Ontological Proof of the existence of God. It constitutes the abstract metaphysical basis of this stage. It was first discovered in Christendom by Anselm of Canterbury. It was then further developed by all the later philosophers, by Descartes, Leibnitz, and Wolff, yet always along with the other proofs, though it alone is the true one. The Ontological Proof starts from the Notion. The Notion is considered to be something subjective, and is defined as something opposed to the object and to reality. Here it constitutes the starting-point, and what we have got to do is to show that Being, too, belongs to this Notion. The exact method of procedure is as follows. The Notion of God is first of all described, and it is shown that He cannot be conceived of unless as including Being in Himself. In so far as Being is separated from the Notion, God exists in a merely subjective way in our thought. As thus subjective He is imperfect, and imperfection belongs only to finite Spirit. It has to be shown that it is not only our notion which exists, but that He exists independent of our thinking. Anselm states the proof in the following simple form: God is what is most perfect, beyond which nothing can be thought of as existing; if God is merely an idea, then He is not what is most perfect. This, however, is in contradiction with the first statement; for we consider that as perfect which is not merely an idea, but which is also possessed of Being. If God is merely subjective, we could bring forward something higher which would be possessed of Being as well. This is further developed as follows. We begin with what is most perfect, and this is defined as the most real Essence, as the Substance ​of all realities. This has been termed possibility. The Notion as subjective, since it is distinguished from Being, is merely what is possible, or at all events it ought to be what is possible. According to the old Logic, possibility exists only where it can be shown that no contradiction exists. Realities are, in accordance with this idea, to be considered as existing in God only in their affirmative aspect, as limitless, and in such a way that negation is supposed to be eliminated. But it is easy to prove that in this case all that is left is the abstraction of something which is one with itself. For when we speak of realities we mean to imply that they represent different characteristics, such as wisdom, righteousness, almighty power, omniscience. These characteristics are attributes which may easily be shown to be in contradiction with each other. Goodness is not righteousness; absolute power is in contradiction with wisdom; for this latter presupposes final-ends. Power, on the other hand, means the limitlessness of negation and production. If, as is demanded, the Notion is not to contradict itself, all determinateness must be dropped, for every judgment or difference advances to the state of opposition. God is the Substance of all realities, it is said, and since one of these is Being, Being is consequently united with the Notion. This proof maintained itself until recent times, and we find it worked out particularly in Mendelssohn’s “Morning Hours.” Spinoza defines the Notion or conception of God by saying that it is that which cannot be conceived of apart from Being. The finite is something whose existence does not correspond to the Notion. The species is realised in existing individuals, but these are transitory; the species is the Universal for itself. In the case of the finite, existence does not correspond to the Notion. On the other hand, in the case of the Infinite, which is determined within itself, the reality must correspond to the Notion; this is the Idea, the unity of subject and object. Kant criticised ​this proof, and the objections he urged against it were as follows. If God is defined as the Substance of all realities, then Being does not belong to Him, for Being is no reality. It makes no difference to the Notion or conception whether it exists or does not exist, it remains the same. Already in Anselm’s day this objection was urged by a monk who said, “The fact of my forming an idea of anything does not therefore imply that the thing exists.” Kant maintains that a hundred thalers really remain the same whether I merely form an idea of them or actually possess them; consequently Being is not a reality, or real predicate, since nothing is added by it to the Notion. It may be granted that Being is not any determinate content; all the same, nothing certainly should be added to the Notion. (We may remark in passing that to speak of every wretched form of existence as a notion is to go on quite wrong lines.) On the contrary, it should be rid of the defect attaching to it in that it is merely something subjective, and is not the Idea. The Notion which is only something subjective, and is divorced from Being, is a nullity. In the form of the proof as given by Anselm, the infinitude consists in the very fact that it is not one-sided, something purely subjective to which Being does not attach. The Understanding keeps Being and the Notion strictly apart, and considers each as self-identical. But even according to the ordinary idea the Notion apart from Being is considered one-sided and untrue, and so, too, Being in which there is no Notion is looked on as notionless Being, Being which is inconceivable. This antithesis which is found in finitude cannot have any place in connection with the Infinite or God.
But it is the following circumstance which makes the proof unsatisfactory. That most perfect and most real existence is in fact a presupposition measured by which Being for itself and the Notion for itself are one-sided. Descartes and Spinoza defined God as the cause of Himself. Notion and existence form an identity; in other ​words, God as Notion cannot be conceived of without Being. What is unsatisfactory in this view is that we have here a presupposition, and this means that the Notion measured by this standard of hypothetical necessity must be something subjective.
The finite and subjective, however, is not finite only as measured by the standard supplied by that presupposition. It is finite in itself, and is consequently the antithesis of itself. It is the unsolved contradiction. Being is supposed to be distinct from the Notion. We may imagine we can regard this latter as strictly subjective, as finite; but the essential characteristic of Being is in the Notion itself. This finitude of subjectivity is done away with in the Notion itself, and the unity of Being and the Notion is not a presupposition relatively to the latter, and by which it is measured. Being in its immediacy is contingent, and we have seen that its truth is necessity. The Notion necessarily involves Being, and this is simple reference to self, the absence of mediation. If we consider the Notion, we find it to be that in which all difference is absorbed, and in which all determinations are merely ideal. This ideality is mediation or difference, which has been absorbed and removed, perfect clearness, pure transparency, being at home with self. The freedom of the Notion is just absolute reference to self, identity which is also immediacy, unity without mediation. The Notion thus has Being in itself potentially. Its very meaning is that it does away with its one-sidedness. The idea that Being can be separated from the Notion is a mere fancy. When Kant says that it is impossible to extract reality from the Notion, he is thinking of the Notion as something finite. But the finite is just what annuls itself; and if we were to think of the Notion in this way as divorced from Being, we should just have that very reference to self which Being essentially is.
The Notion, however, has not Being in itself potentially ​only. It is not seen to be there merely by us; but, on the contrary, the Notion is actual Being, Being for itself also. It abolishes its subjectivity, and objectifies itself. Man realises his ends; that is, what was, to begin with, merely ideal loses its one-sidedness, and is consequently made into something which has Being. The Notion shows itself eternally in that activity whereby Being is posited as identical with itself. In perception, feeling, &c., we have outward objects before us; but we take them up into ourselves, and thus the objects are ideal in us. The Notion is thus the continuous act whereby it abolishes its difference. When we regard closely the nature of the Notion, we see that this identity with Being is no longer a presupposition, but a result. The course of procedure is as follows: the Notion makes itself objective, turns itself into reality, and is thus the truth, the unity of subject and object. God is an immortal living Being, says Plato, whose body and soul are united in one. Those who separate the two sides do not get beyond what is finite and untrue.
The standpoint which we here occupy is the Christian one. We have here the Notion of God in its entire freedom. This Notion is identical with Being. Being is the poorest of all abstractions; but the Notion is not so poor as not to contain this determination in it. We have not to deal with Being in the poverty of abstraction, in immediacy in its bad form, but with Being as the Being of God, as absolutely concrete Being, distinguished from God. The consciousness of finite Spirit is concrete Being, the material for the realisation of the Notion of God. Here it is not a question of any addition of Being to the Notion, or merely of a unity of the Notion and Being—such expressions are awkward and misleading. The unity is rather to be conceived of as an absolute process, as the living movement of God, and this means that the two sides are distinguished from each other, while the process is thought of as that absolute, ​continuous act of eternal self-production. Here we have the concrete and popular idea of God as Spirit. The Notion of Spirit is the Notion which has Being in-and-for-itself, that is to say, knowledge. This infinite Notion is negative reference to self. When thus posited it is judgment, the act of distinguishing, self-differentiation. But what is thus differentiated, and which at first appears as something outward, devoid of Spirit, outside of God, is really identical with the Notion. The development of this Idea is the absolute truth. In the Christian religion it is known that God has revealed Himself, and it is the very nature of God to reveal Himself, and to reveal is to differentiate. What is revealed is just that God is the revealed God.
Religion must be something for all men; for those who have so purified their thought that they know what exists in the pure element of thought, and who have arrived at a philosophical knowledge of what God is, as well as for such as have not got beyond feeling and ordinary ideas.
Man is not merely pure thought. On the contrary, thought manifests itself as perception or picture-thought, or in the form of ordinary ideas. The absolute truth which is revealed to Man must therefore exist for him as a being who forms general ideas and sensuous images, who has feelings and sensations. This is the mark by which religion in general is distinguished from philosophy. Philosophy thinks what otherwise exists only for the ordinary idea and sensuous perception. Man who thus forms general ideas, is in his character as Man a thinking being also, and the substance of religion comes to him as a being who thinks. It is only a thinking being that can have a religion, and to think is also to form ideas, though the former act alone is the free form of truth. The Understanding thinks too, but it does not get beyond identity; for it the Notion is Notion, and Being is Being. These two one-sided categories always ​keep this one-sided form, so far as it is concerned. In their true nature, on the other hand, these finite forms are no longer held to be inherently identical on the ground that they are, but rather they are considered to be merely moments of a totality.
Those who find fault with philosophy for thinking religion, for stating religion in terms of thought, don’t know what they want. Hatred and vanity here come directly into play under the outward guise of humility. True humility consists in having the spirit absorbed in the truth, in losing ourselves in what is most inward, in having within us the object, and the object only. Thus anything subjective which may still be present in feeling, disappears. We have to consider the Idea from the purely speculative point of view, and to justify its claims as against the Understanding, and against it as being hostile to all content of religion whatsoever. This content is called a mystery, because it is something hidden from the Understanding; for the latter does not get the length of the process which this unity is, and thus it is that everything speculative, everything philosophical, is for the Understanding a mystery.