# Forsyth v. Hammond/Opinion of the Court

* Court Documents
* Case Syllabus
* Opinion of the Court
United States Supreme Court
166 U.S. 506
Forsyth v. Hammond
The first proposition of counsel for plaintiff is that the writ of certiorari was prematurely issued, and that this court could not at that time rightfully take jurisdiction of the case because there had been no final decree. The court of appeals simply reversed the decree of the circuit court and remanded the case for further proceedings. This contention involves two matters: First, the question of power; and, second, that of propriety. It may be that the question of propriety should be considered as foreclosed by the action of the court in awarding the writ of certiorari, but the question of power, being one of jurisdiction, is always open, and must whenever presented be considered and determined.
This question of power has, indeed, already been decided by this court in prior cases (American Const. Co. v. Jacksonville Ry. Co., 148 U.S. 372, 383, 13 Sup. Ct. 758; U.S. v. The Three Friends, 166 U.S. 1, 17 Sup. Ct. 495); but, as it has again been discussed by counsel, a brief reference to those cases and the reasons therein stated may not be inappropriate. Up to the time of the passage of the act of 1891, creating the circuit courts of appeal, the theory of federal jurisprudence had been a single appellate court, to wit, the supreme court of the United States, by which a final review of all cases of which the lower federal courts had jurisdiction was to be made. It is true there existed certain limitations upon the right of appeal and review, based on the amount in controversy and other considerations; but such limitations did not recognize or provide for the existence of another appellate court, and did not conflict with the thought that this court was to be the single tribunal for reviewing all cases and questions of a federal nature. The rapid growth of the country and the enormous amount of litigation involving questions of a federal character so added to the number of cases brought here for review that it was impossible for this court to keep even pace with the growing docket. The situation had become one of great peril, and many plans for relief were suggested and discussed.
The outcome was the act of March 3, 1891, the thought of which was the creation in beach of the nine circuits of an appellate tribunal composed of three judges, whose decision in certain classes of cases appealable thereto should be final. McLish v. Roff, 141 U.S. 661, 666, 12 Sup. Ct. 118. While this division of appellate power was the means adopted to reduce the accumulation of business in this court, it was foreseen that injurious results might follow if an absolute finality of determination was given to the courts of appeal. Nine separate appellate tribunals might by their differences of opinion, unless held in check by the reviewing power of this court, create an unfortunate confusion in respect to the rules of federal decision. As the courts of appeal would often be constituted of two circuit judges and one district judge, a division of opinion between the former might result in a final judgment where the opinions of two judges of equal rank were on each side of the questions involved. Cases of a class in which finality of decision was given to the circuit courts of appeal might involve questions of such public and national importance as to require that a consideration and determination thereof should be made by the supreme tribunal of the nation. It was obvious that all contingencies in which a decision by this tribunal was of importance could not be foreseen, and so there was placed in the act creating the courts of appeal, in addition to other provisions for review by this court, this enactment:
'And excepting also that in any such case as is hereinbefore made final in the circuit court of appeals it shall be competent for the supreme court to require, by certiorari or otherwise, any such case to be certified to the supreme court for its review and determination with the same power and authority in the case as if it had been carried by appeal or writ of error to the supreme court.'
The general language of this clause is noticeable. It applies to every case in which but for it the decision of the circuit court of appeals would be absolutely final, and authorizes this court to bring before it for review and determination the case so pending in the circuit court of appeals, and to exercise all the power and authority over it which this court would have in any case brought to it by appeal or writ of error. Unquestionably the generality of this provision was not a mere matter of accident. It expressed the thought of congress distinctly and clearly, and was intended to vest in this court a comprehensive and unlimited power. The power thus given is not affected by the condition of the case as it exists in the court of appeals. It may be exercised before or after any decision by that court, and irrespective of any ruling or determination therein. All that is essential is that there be a case pending in the circuit court of appeals, and of those classes of cases in which the decision of that court is declared a finality, and this court may, by virtue of this clause, reach out its writ of certiorari, and transfer the case here for review and determination. Obviously, a power so broad and comprehensive, if carelessly exercised, might defeat the very thought and purpose of the act creating the courts of appeal. So exercised it might burden the docket of this court with cases which it was the intent of congress to terminate in the courts of appeal, and which, brought here, would simply prevent that promptness of decision which in all judicial actions is one of the elements of justice.
So it has been that this court, while not doubting its power, has been chary of action in respect to certiorari. It has said: 'It is evidence that it is solely questions of gravity and importance that the circuit courts of appeal should certify to us for instruction; and that it is only when such questions are involved that the power of this court to require a case in which the judgment and decree of the court of appeals is made final to be certified can be properly invoked.' Lau Ow Bew, 141 U.S. 583, 587, 12 Sup Ct. 43; In re Woods, 143 U.S. 202, 12 Sup. Ct. 417; Lau Ow Bew v. U.S. 144 U.S. 47, 58, 12 Sup. Ct. 517; American Const. Co. v. Jacksonville Ry. Co., 148 U.S. 372, 383, 13 Sup Ct. 758.
We have declined to issue writs of certiorari in cases where, there being only a matter of private interest, there had been no final judgment in the court of appeals. Railway Co. v. Osborne, 146 U.S. 354, 13 Sup. Ct. 281. On the other hand, in U.S. v. The Three Friends (at the present term) 17 Sup. Ct. 495, we issued a writ of certiorari in a case appealed to the circuit court of appeals before any action had been taken by that court; but this was in view of the fact that the question involved was one affecting the relations of this country to foreign nations, and therefore one whose prompt decision by this court was of importance, not merely for the guidance of the executive department of the government, but also to disclose to each citizen the limits beyond which he might not go in interfering in the affairs of another nation without violating the laws of this.
We reaffirm in this case the propositions heretofore announced, to wit, that the power of this court in certiorari extends to every case pending in the circuit courts of appeal, and may be exercised at any time during such pendency, provided the case is one which but for this provision of the statute would be finally determined in that court. And, further, that while this power is co-extensive with all possible necessities and sufficient to secure to this court a final control over the litigation in all the courts of appeal, it is a power which will be sparingly exercised, and only when the circumstances of the case satisfy us that the importance of the question involved, the necessity of avoiding conflict between two or more courts of appeal, or between courts of appeal and the courts of a state, or some matter affecting the interests of this nation in its internal or external relations, demands such exercise.
Among the considerations thus suggested are those which indicate why in this case the court properly exercised its power and issued the writ of certiorari. There was a conflict between the decision of the circuit court of appeals for the Seventh circuit and the supreme court of the state of Indiana. The latter court had declared that the proceedings by which the contiguous territory was annexed to the city of Hammond were legal, and therefore that that territory was to be considered by all the officers of the state of Indiana as within the territorial limits of the city. The United States circuit court of appeals by its decision in this case had declared that such annexation proceedings were invalid, and that the property of this petitioner was not within the city limits. This tract of plaintiff's was not on the extreme limit of the lands sought to be incorporated into the city, and if the decision of the circuit court of appeals was enforced there would be a tract of a few hundred acres within the exterior boundaries of the city of Hammond, as defined by the judgment of the supreme court of the state, withdrawn from the city's jurisdiction, and in fact excepted from its territorial limits. All the unfortunate possibilities of conflict and collision which might arise from these adverse decisions were suggested when this application for certiorari was made, and, although no final decree had been entered, it seemed to us a duty to bring the case and the question here for examination at the earliest possible moment.
Coming, now, to the merits of the case, it appears that on the pivotal question of the validity of the annexation proceedings the decision of the supreme court of the state is one way and that of the court of appeals directly the reverse. It is insisted by the plaintiff that the determination of the boundaries of a municipal corporation in the first instance, and any subsequent change in its boundaries by annexation of outside territory, are matters solely of legislative cognizance, and not judicial in their nature; that such is the general rule obtaining in the several states of the Union, and up to the time of the decision of the supreme court of Indiana in this controversy, recognized in that state as elsewhere; that, therefore, the judicial proceedings in respect to this controversy in the courts of the state, culminating in the decision of its highest court, were beyond the jurisdiction of such courts, and not to be regarded as creating an adjudication binding upon other tribunals. Article 3 of the state constitution is referred to, which reads: 'The powers of the government are divided into three separate departments; the legislative, the executive including the administrative, and the judicial; and no person charged with official duties under one of these departments shall exercise any of the functions of another, except as in this constitution expressly provided.' It is not denied that questions of a judicial nature may grow out of proceedings to annex territory to a municipal corporation, but it is insisted that the annexation itself is a legislative function, and must be determined by direct action of the legislature or some subordinate body exercising legislative functions. The supreme court of Indiana in its opinion on the petition for rehearing (142 Ind. 516, 41 N. E. 950) said: 'It may be conceded that annexation of territory to a city is a legislative function. This function is exercised by the common council when it resolves to annex certain described lands to the city, and to present a petition therefor to the county board.' This suggestion is vigorously attacked by counsel for plaintiff, as lifting the ex parte action of one party to a controversy to the dignity of the exercise of a legislative function, and making it the equivalent of a legislative determination.
But back of any criticism of the reasoning of the supreme court in its two opinions lies the fact of its decision. And here these things appear: The city of Hammond sought to bring within its limits, among other territory, the lands of plaintiff. After action by the city council, the city instituted proceedings before the county commissioners, which proceedings were subsequently taken by appeal, as prescribed by statute, to the circuit court, a court of general jurisdiction, and in that court a decree was entered annexing plaintiff's lands to the city of Hammond. Were or were not these proceedings valid, and was or was not such decree a binding adjudication which neither the city nor the plaintiff could elsewhere dispute? That question certainly is one of a judicial nature. Now, it is no less a judicial function to consider whether those proceedings and that decree were valid and effective, and determine that territory to the city, than to enter upon a like consideration, and determine that they were invalid and ineffective to make such annexation. The decision of the supreme court of Indiana was in favor of the validity, that of the court of appeals against their validity, and, if it is judicial to hear and determine one way, it is likewise judicial to hear and determine the other. If action by the state tribunals stopped with the decree of the trial court, in might to said that the plaintiff did not voluntarily seek that forum. She was brought in by appropriate process, and compelled to there litigate the question. But after an adverse decree she insisted that it was not only erroneous but void, and voluntarily commenced an action in the supreme court of the state to have that claim established. She invoked the jurisdiction of that court. She summoned the city of Ahmmond into that forum, and there challenged the decree of the circuit court,-challenged it for error, and also for lack of jurisdiction. The questions both of error and of jurisdiction were certainly judicial in their nature, and questions within the undoubted cognizance of the supreme court. She voluntarily sought its judgment. Can she, after its decision, be heard in any other tribunal to collaterally deny the validity thereof? Does not the principle of res judicata apply in all its force? Having litigated a question in one competent tribunal and been defeated, can she litigate the same question in another tribunal acting independently and having no appellate jurisdiction? The question is not whether the judgment of the supreme court would be conclusive as to the question involved in another action between other parties, but whether it is not binding between the same parties in that or any other forum. The principles controlling the doctrine of res judicata have been so often announced, and are so universally recognized, that the citation of authorities is scarcely necessary. Though the form and causes of action be different, a decision by a court of competent jurisdiction in respect to any essential fact or question in the one action is conclusive between the parties in all subsequent actions. Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351; Lumber Co. v. Buchtel, 101 U.S. 638; Stout v. Lye, 103 U.S. 66; Nesbit v. Independent Dist., 144 U.S. 610, 12 Sup. Ct. 746; Railway Co. v. Wharton, 152 U.S. 252, 14 Sup. Ct. 608; Last-Chance Min. Co. v. Tyler Min. Co., 157 U.S. 683, 15 Sup. Ct. 733.
But there is another aspect of this case. The matter in controversy is one peculiarly within the domain of state control. Kelly v. Pittsburg, 104 U.S. 708. It is for the state to determine its political subdivisions, the number and size of its municipal corporations, and their territorial extent. These are matters of a local nature, in which the nation, as a whole, is not interested, and in which, by the very nature of things, the determination of the state authorities should be accepted as authoritative and controlling. We do not mean to hold that in the creation or change of municipal boundaries there may not be action taken by the state which involves a trespass upon rights secured by the federal constitution, or that in proceedings looking to such change no questions can arise which are of a federal nature, and in respect to which the judgment of the courts of the nation must be controlling. All that we mean to decide it that the matter of the territorial boundaries of a municipal corporation is local in its nature, and, as a rule, to be finally and absolutely determined by the authorities of the state. The opinion of the court of appeals in this case is devoted to questions arising under the state constitution and statutes; and the amended bill filed in the cirsuit court rests the jurisdiction of that court, not upon the existence of any right claimed under the federal constitution, but simply on adverse citizenship.
The construction by the courts of a state of its constitution and statutes is, as a general rule, binding on the federal courts. We may think that the supreme court of a state has* misconstrued its constitution or its statutes, but we are not at liberty to therefore set aside its judgments. That court is the final arbiter as to such questions. In Claiborne Co. v. Brooks, 111 U.S. 400, 410, 4 Sup. Ct. 489, it was said: 'It is undoubtedly a question of local policy with each state what shall be the extent and character of the powers which its various political and municipal organizations shall possess, and the settled decisions of its highest courts on this subject will be regarded as authoritative by the courts of the United States, for it is a question that relates to the internal constitution of the body politic of the state.' See, also, Burgess v. Seligman, 107 U.S. 20, 33, 2 Sup. Ct. 10; Bucher v. Railroad Co., 125 U.S. 555, 8 Sup. Ct. 974; Detroit v. Osborne, 135 U.S. 492, 10 Sup. Ct. 1012; Lumber Co. v. Ott, 142 U.S. 622, 12 Sup. Ct. 318; Kaukauna Water-Power Co. v. Green Bay & M. Canal Co., 142 U.S. 254, 12 Sup. Ct. 173; McElvaine v. Brush, 142 U.S. 155, 12 Sup. Ct. 156; Stutsman Co. v. Wallace, 142 U.S. 293, 12 Sup. Ct. 227, quoting Norton v. Shelby Co., 118 U.S. 425, 6 Sup. Ct. 1121, and Gormley v. Clark, 134 U.S. 338, 10 Sup. Ct. 554; Morley v. Railroad Co., 146 U.S. 162, 13 Sup. Ct. 54; Bauserman v. Blunt, 147 U.S. 647, 13 Sup. Ct. 466; May v. Tenney, 148 U.S. 60, 13 Sup. Ct. 491; Railroad Co. v. Baugh, 149 U.S. 368, 373, 13 Sup. Ct. 914; Lewis v. Monson, 151 U.S. 545, 14 Sup. Ct. 424; Balkam v. Iron Co., 154 U.S. 177, 14 Sup. Ct. 1010, quoting Leffingwell v. Warren, 2 Black, 599, 603.
It may be true that the general rule is that the determination of the territorial boundaries of a municipal corporation is purely a legislative function, but there is nothing in the federal constitution to prevent the people of a state from giving, if they see fit, full jurisdiction over such matters to the courts and taking it entirely away from the legislature. The preservation of legislative control in such matters is not one of the essential elements of a republican form of government which, under section 4 of article 4 of the constitution, the United States are bound to guaranty to every state in this Union; and, whenever the supreme court of a state holds that under the true construction of its constitution and statutes the courts of that state have jurisdiction over such matters, the federal courts can neither deny the correctness of this construction nor repudiate its binding force as presenting anything in conflict with the federal constitution.
It is conceded that the judgment of the supreme court of Indiana in this controversy could not be reviewed by this court on writ of error; that the questions involved and decided by that court are not of a federal nature, or such as to vest any appellate jurisdiction in this court. But, if this court cannot set aside such judgment on the ground of error of law, it would seem to follow that no subordinate federal court has the power on the same ground to strike it down. What the highest court of the United States cannot do directly would seem to be beyond the reach of a subordinate court in collateral attack. The case of Burgess v. Seligman, supra, is largely relied upon in the opinion of the court of appeals, but there are several reasons why that authority does not justify its action. In the first place, the decision of the supreme court of the state was rendered before the filing of this bill in the circuit court of the United States, and not, as in the Burgess Case, after the judgment in the circuit court. In the second place, the decision was upon a question of a local nature, involving the internal policy of the state, and therefore is such a decision as should be, generally speaking, recognized and followed by the federal courts. And, thirdly, it was a final adjudication between the same parties, and should have been respected as binding and conclusive, upon the principle of res judicata.
For these reasons we think that the decision of the court of appeals was erroneous. Its decree will be reversed, and the case remanded to the circuit court of the United States for the district of Indiana, with instructions to sustain the demurrer to the bill and dismiss the suit.

## Notes

This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
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