# Jones v. League

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United States Supreme Court
59 U.S. 76
Jones v. League
THIS case was brought up, by writ of error, from the district court of the United States for the district of Texas.
It was an action of trespass to try title brought by League against Jones and the other plaintiffs in error. League averred himself to be a citizen of Maryland, in his original petition, or declaration, and claimed title to a tract of land in the county of Refugio, on St. Joseph's Island, in the State of Texas.
League claimed under a deed made to him on the 11th of May, 1850, by one John Power, a citizen of Texas, acting for himself and Hewetson and the representatives of Walker. This deed contained the following trust, namely:--
That League would commence the necessary suits to try title; that if decided adversely, he would carry the cases to the supreme court of the United States; that when the litigation should be finally determined, he would convey two thirds of the lands recovered to the grantors; that League should pay one third of the expenses of litigation heretofore incurred, and all costs and expenses for the future; that League might make sales and divide the proceeds in the proportion of one third to himself and two thirds to the grantors, &c., &c.
The defendants pleaded four pleas in abatement to the jurisdiction of the court. The first plea set forth the substance of the above deed, and then alleged that Power was, at the time of the commencement of the suit, a citizen of Texas; that League was also a citizen of Texas, but went to Maryland for the purpose of setting up a pretence of being a citizen of that State, and after remaining less than four months in Maryland, he returned to Texas: that it was a fraudulent device to enable him to bring the suits which Power could not have brought, &c.
The second and third pleas need not be noticed, as no question arose upon them in this court. The fourth alleged that, at the time of the commencement of the suit, League was a citizen of the State of Texas.
With respect to the first plea, the plaintiff demurred to it, and the demurrer was sustained by the court. On the fourth plea, the plaintiff took issue upon it, and a trial was had, which resulted, under the instructions of the court, which will presently be mentioned, in a verdict of the jury for the plaintiff. In order to understand the instructions, it is necessary to say that it was admitted of record by the plaintiff, for the purposes of the trial, that he was a citizen of the Republic of Texas from 1838 up to the time of annexation of the United States; that he remained domiciled in the State of Texas; and that he was a citizen of the State of Texas, on the first day of July, A. D. 1850; and he waived the necessity of proving the above facts.
And thereupon the court instructed the jury, that it is incumbent on the defendants on the issue made to show that the said plaintiff was a citizen of the State of Texas at the time of filing the petition in this cause; that the admission made by the plaintiff as above stated was, in law, presumptive proof that, at the time of filing the petition, the said plaintiff was a citizen of the State of Texas; but that on the other hand the allegation in the petition, that the plaintiff was, at the time of filing the same, a citizen of the State of Maryland was prim a facie, or presumptive proof that he was, as alleged, a citizen of the said State of Maryland at that time: That these two contradictory presumptions, one arising from the plaintiff's admission, the other from the allegation in his petition, were equivalent in weight, and counterbalanced or destroyed each other: And that if there was no other testimony beside the admissions of the plaintiff adduced on the part of the defendants to show that the said plaintiff was, at the time of filing the petition, a citizen of the State of Texas, the jury would on this point find for the plaintiff; to each and every part of which charge (except the first and second clauses thereof, to wit: That the burden of proof was upon the defendants, and that the plaintiff's admissions was presumptive proof of his being a citizen of Texas at the date of filing the petition) the said defendants by their counsel excepted, and tender this their first bill of exceptions, which they pray may be signed, sealed, and made a part of the record in this cause, and the same is now done accordingly.
[SEAL.] JOHN C. WATROUS.
January 28, 1854.
Other exceptions were taken in the progress of the trial, but it is not necessary to notice them.
The case was argued by Mr. Hale, for the plaintiffs in error, and Mr. Hughes, for the defendant. All other points are omitted except the one relating to jurisdiction. This point was stated by Mr. Hale as follows:--
The judicial power vested by the constitution extends to controversies-not merely suits-between citizens of different States; and in determining the limits of this power, we are to look to things, not names. McNutt v. Bland, 2 How. 9. The true rule as to the matters presented by the plea, is well settled to be that, when a conveyance is made for a valuable consideration, by a citizen of one State to a citizen of another State, it is effective to give the right to sue, although the principal motive, which influenced both parties, may have been a desire to give jurisdiction to courts of the United States; Smith v. Kernochen, 7 How. 215-217; McDonald v. Smalley, 1 Pet. 623. But the converse is equally true, that when no valuable consideration passes, and the grantee receives the legal title for the avowed purpose of giving jurisdiction to courts of the United States, while the real party in interest remains a citizen of the same State as the defendants, then, the court will not permit such a fraud upon the laws and the policy of the government, but will look into the transaction, on a plea in abatement, and ascertain the real party to the suit, without regard to the form of the conveyance, or of the action. Maxfield's Lessee v. Levy, 2 Dall. 381; S.C.. 4 Dall. 330; Hurst's Lessee v. Neil, 1 Wash. C. C. R. 70-81; Smith v. Kernochen, 7 How. 215-217.
Mr. Hughes contended that the court had jurisdiction by the averments of the petition; and the plea made the deed part of the plea, by which deed it was shown that League took the estate for a valuable consideration; that the instruction of the court was correct, because as this court had established the rule in 14 How. 510, that the averment of citizenship in the petition in prim a facie evidence of the fact averred, which defendant must remove by proof, it necessarily followed that the two presumptions counteracted each other, and the jury were constrained to find that the plaintiff was a citizen of Maryland at the commencement of the action, 9 Wheat. 537.
Mr. Justice McLEAN delivered the opinion of the court.

## Notes

This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
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