# Royal Naval Biography/Forman, Walter

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WALTER FORMAN, Esq. [Commander.]
Commenced his gallant career in the royal navy on the 4th Feb. 1795; and served the whole of his time as midshipman, under the command of the present Admiral Sir Edward Thornbrough, G.C.B., in the Robust 74, Formidable 98, and Mars 74. On the 10th Oct. 1801, he was promoted into the Ville de Paris, first-rate, bearing the flag of Admiral the Hon. William Cornwallis; and in the beginning of 1802, he appears to have been removed into the Magnificent 74, Captain (now Vice-Admiral) John Giffard, under whom he assisted in quelling the mutiny of the 8th West India regiment, at Prince Rupert’s, in the island of Dominica. He subsequently joined the Rambler brig, of 14 guns; and was the only lieutenant on board that vessel for a period of three years, during nearly the whole of which time she was most actively employed, either in watching the Brest fleet, or in keeping up a communication between the commander-in-chief off Ushant and the blockading squadrons off Rochefort and Ferrol. In the course of the latter service, she was twice on the point of foundering, and obliged to throw overboard all her guns. The following are copies of letters written by the officer who commanded her at the commencement of the late war:
“H.M. sloop Rambler, Aug. 16th, 1804.
“Sir,– I have the honor to acquaint you, that, being between l’Isle Dieu and the Main, on the morning of the 7th instant, I observed nine sail close inshore, steering to the south-eastward. About 9, it fell calm. I then sent the boats, under the command of Lieutenant Forman and Mr. Cox, master’s-mate, to take possession of them; but, favored by a light air, they came to an anchor under the battery of St. Gillies, within musket-shot of the shore; notwithstanding which, two sloops were brought off, with great gallantry, under a smart fire from field-pieces and musketry. The others cut their cables, and ran aground, so near the pier-head that it was impossible to get them off. I have the honor to be, &c.
(Signed)“Thomas Innis.”
“To Sir Charles Cotton, Bart. &c. &c. &c.”
“Deal, October 11th, 1927.
“Dear Sir,– I have received your letter, and am extremely happy to have it in my power to hear testimony to your meritorious conduct during the time you served as lieutenant in H.M. sloop Rambler, when under my command, in 1803 and 1804, particularly the gallantry you displayed in cutting out two vessels belonging to a small convoy, which took shelter in the harbour of St. Gillies, under a heavy fire of field-pieces and musketry from the shore; and I remember the readiness with which you volunteered your services in all times of danger.
“Admiral Cornwallis mentioned to me your offer to join in an attempt to destroy the French fleet by fire-ships; for which purpose arrangements were made: but the removal of the fleet into the inner harbour prevented the admiral from putting his design into execution. I am, dear Sir, yours very sincerely,
(Signed)“Thomas Innis, Captain.”
“To Commander Walter Forman.”
In 1805, the Rambler, then commanded by the present Captain Henry E. P. Sturt Grindall, engaged three Frencn national vessels, each mounting fourteen guns, and drove them and the vessels under their protection into the harbour of Conquet. Her log will prove, that she was several other times engaged in skirmishes with coasting convoys, under the enemy’s batteries.
Lieutenant Forman’s next appointment was, shortly after the battle of Trafalgar, to the Queen 98, in which ship, successively bearing the flags of Lord Collingwood, the late Admiral John Child Purvis, and the present Sir George Martin, he served nearly two years, off Cadiz and in the Archipelago. In 1806, being then at Gibraltar, the boats of the Euryalus frigate were placed under his command, and sent to rescue an English gun-vessel which had drifted close to the shore, in the neighbourhood of St Roque:– although exposed to a heavy fire from the Spanish batteries, he succeeded in warping her clear of all danger, and that without losing a man. “His removal from the Queen,” says Lord Collingwopd, “was at his own request. He preferred a small ship; and I thought it proper to gratify an active and zealous officer with a situation which he considered was likely to afford him an opportunity of distinguishing himself. I accordingly appointed him first lieutenant of the Herald ​sloop of war.” On the 14th Nov. 1807, the commander of that ship made the following report to his lordship:
“My Lord, – In the execution of your orders, when off Otranto, with H.M. sloop under my command, on the 25th ultimo, I observed an armed trabaccolo under that fortress; and conceiving it practicable to cut her out, under cover of night, I despatched the boats, directed by Lieutenant Walter Forman, who executed the orders given to him with the greatest gallantry, under a heavy fire of great guns and musketry, both from the vessel aiHl the shore. She was shortly brought out, and proves to he le Caesar, French privateer, of four 6-pounders, belonging to Ancona, having on board a cargo of rice and flour, on account of the French Government^ bound to Corfu. The crew defended her until the boats were alongside, when all, excepting four men, escaped by a stem hawser. The Herald hay received some little injury both in the hull and rigging; but I am happy to say that my object was obtained with only one officer (Mr. James Wood, carpenter, dangerously) wounded in the boats, and three seamen in the ship. I have the honor to be, &c.
(Signed)“G. M. Hony.”
“To the Right Hon. Lord Collingwood, &c. &c. &c.”
On a subsequent occasion, Lieutenant Forman, in the Herald’s gig, with only four men, captured a large coasting vessel, in a bay at the mouth of the Dardanelles, her crew, consisting of thirty Greek sailors and ten armed Turks, deserting her before he got alongside, leaving two long 4-pounders and a number of small arms already loaded and primed. A short time afterwards, in the same small boat, he got possession of a similar vessel, close to the rocks of Scio; but being exposed to a smart fire from the Turkish musketry on shore, and pelted by the Greek crew with heavy stones from the overhanging cliffs, he was obliged for a time to abandon her, with one of his men severely wounded in the face. On being joined by the Herald’s cutter and jolly-boat, he immediately landed, drove away the enemy, and brought off his prize in triumph. Another time, while successfully attacking some vessels at the island of Cephalonia, a man in the same boat with him was shot through the arm. He subsequently drove on shore and destroyed a large brig. Under a heavy fire of musketry, by which a man close to him, and two others, belonging to the Paulina sloop, were very ​severely wounded. We, next find him sent with the boats of the Herald alone, to board a large armed transport ship, which had been driven on shore, in the middle of the day, within musket-shot of a martello tower, about half-way between Brindisi and Otranto, where she was also protected by about forty Italian grenadiers, with a field-piece on the beach. This service was performed in the most gallant and masterly manner, under a very heavy fire of grape shot from the ship, the tower, and field-piece. After carrying the former, the launch, armed with a carronade, drove the soldiers out of the tower, the gun upon which was soon dismounted, by turning those of the prize against it. She proved to be laden with corn, and bound to the island of Corfu; but, unfortunately, she could not be warped out, and was consequently set on fire. In the performance of this brilliant exploit, one of the gallant party was shot through the body, by a musket-ball from the shore. A few days afterwards, Lieutenant Forman landed in the island of Santa Maura, under a heavy discharge of musketry, and succeeded in bringing off a brig, with a similar cargo, and likewise bound to Corfu, then strictly blockaded: his loss on this occasion consisted of one man killed, one mortally and two severely wounded.
On the 4th June, 1809, the following letter was addressed to Lord John Thynne, by the officer who had some time before succeeded Captain Hony in the command of the Herald:
“My Lord, – Though I have not the pleasure of your lordship’s acquaintance, yet, at the desire of my first lieutenant, Mr. Walter Forman, I am induced to address you, in order that his merits may not pass un-noticed.
“Understanding that your lordship is about to intercede with the Admiralty to get him promoted, may I beg to assure you that there cannot be a person more worthy than he is; that I have several times been an eye-witness of his gallantry and judgment as an officer, in very dashing affairs; and there is no one in the service, whom I am more desirous to see promoted than my worthy friend Mr. Forman. I have the honor to be, &c.
(Signed)“George Jackson.”
During the period that Lieutenant Forman served in the ​Herald, under Captains Hony and Jackson, he commanded the boats of that sloop in thirty close actions with the enemy; captured and destroyed more than forty vessels of different descriptions, including those already mentioned; and had between twenty and thirty of his subordinates killed and wounded. In 1810, he was, for a short time, first lieutenant of the Princess Charlotte frigate. Captain George Tobin, and present at the capture of two French privateers. In the beginning of 1811, he was ordered to India, on promotion; and proceeded thither in the Actaeon brig, Captain Bertie Cornelius Cator. On his arrival at Ceylon, he was appointed first of the Bucephalus frigate. Captain Drury, then at Java, and sent to join her in the Cornelia 32, Captain W. F. Owen, by whose directions he did duty as senior lieutenant during the whole of the passage; and from whom he subsequently received an order to act as commander of the Procris brig, in which vessel he accompanied the late Captain James Bowen, of the Phoenix frigate, on an expedition against Sambas, a piratical state on the western coast of Borneo.
Finding, on his arrival off the principal river, that frigates could not cross the bar. Captain Bowen then hoisted a broad pendant on board the Procris, and proceeded in her, accompanied by two other small vessels and the boats of the squadron, to the attack and capture of Palanibang, situated sixty miles from the sea. On his way thither, batteries containing altogether 101 pieces of cannon, were taken without resistance; as was likewise the Sultan’s palace, although 140 guns were mounted for its defence.
After commanding the Procris for five months, Lieutenant Forman was appointed first of the Malacca frigate. Captain Donald Hugh Mackay; and, finally, promoted to the rank of commander, Dec. 1st, 1813. Since that period he has never been employed, though, as appears by the following documents, he has repeatedly tendered his services.
“Admiralty, Dec. 13th, 1814.
“Sir,– Having laid before my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty your letter of the 12th instant, with its enclosure, requesting that you may be allowed to serve under Commodore Owen, as a volunteer, I have their ​Lordships’ commands to acquaint you, that your request cannot be complied with. I am, &c.
(Signed)“John Barrow.”
“To Captain Forman, R.N.”
The next is a letter addressed by Captain Forman to Viscount Melville, just before the conclusion of the war with America.
“My Lord, – As I conceive it to be the duty of every Englishman to impart whatever observations may tend to promote the good of his country, I do not hesitate to address myself to your Lordship upon a subject which, if not the most important, at least affects the honour and national feelings of this country more, perhaps, than any other possibly could, – mean the ascendency which the American men-of-war seem to possess, individually, over the ships of His Majesty’s navy. If we may credit newspaper reports, the American corvette Wasp recently sustained an engagement with His Majesty’s brig Avon for nearly two hours; and then, after receiving two broadsides from the Castilian (another English man-of-war), sheered off, without apparently having received any material damage, while her opponent was left in a sinking state.
“This wonderful success, my Lord, on the part of the Americans, cannot be solely attributed to disparity of force. The difference of a few guns was not an object of calculation during the French war, and cannot possibly be the principal cause of the results which we now so often witness. Had the guns of His Majesty’s brig, in this encounter, produced the same effect in the Wasp, proportioned to their number and weight of metal, as the guns of the Wasp did in her, her opponent (the Wasp) would have been, very nearly, in as helpless a condition as herself, and might easily have been captured by the Castilian. Either these two vessels fought at some distance from each other, and the guns of the Wasp were plied with greater precision than those of the English brig, or, if they were close alongside of each other, there must have been some cause, independent of a trifling superiority of force, which gave the American corvette so great an advantage over her English antagonist. As I do nor happen to be acquainted with any of the officers that have been engaged with the Americans, I have no means of proving the justice of my opinion; but as it is clear that the ships of both nations are composed of the same materials, the same force ought to make the same impression on both sides, which does not appear to have been the case in some of our recent naval engagements with the Americans. It is therefore very natural to conclude, that the effect of our guns must either have been weakened by having been overloaded, or else (in compliance with an order which was once issued by the Admiralty respecting carronades) our ships’ carronades, when closely engaged with the enemy, have been loaded solely with grape and canister, which will not penetrate a ship’s side, while the Americans ​have made use of round shot only. Even supposing that the guns of our ships were loaded with round shot, together with grape and canister, and that the Americans used round shot only, the Americans even then might have reloaded their guns much oftener than we could, and their fire, at the same time, would have been more efficacious. As a proof of this, the Brunswick, in Lord Howe’s engagement, used, I believe, nothing but round shot, and sunk her opponent, the Vengeur; and, after the action, a great many of the Vengeur’s grape and double-headed shot were found sticking in the Brunswick’s sides. Be this, however, as it may, it would be worth while to ascertain how our guns (and, if possible, how the American guns) have been loaded in the late actions; and we might then determine, to an absolute certainty, which method should be adopted for the future.
“Again, my Lord, the American ships, from being much better manned than ours; have usually a greater number of small-arm men; and on this account, the commanders of our ships may, perhaps, be disposed to avoids coming in close contact with them; and, if so, they give the Americans the principal, if not the only advantage which they can derive from their superior numbers. The Americans, from being better manned, can manoeuvre their ships and fight their guns well at the same time, while we have not a sufficient number of men to do both together; and accordingly we find that, in every one of the recent engagements, in which our ships have been unsuccessful, the Americans have reaped great advantage from this very circumstance; for they have invariably crippled our ships, without being materially injured themselves. In short, my Lord, when a ship is constrained to engage another of superior force, her best chance of succeeding is to reduce the two forces as nearly as possible to the same level, and her only way to do this is to lay her adversary close on board; because, in that case, if her adversary should be ever so much longer, she can only bring the same number of guns to bear upon her; if she has more men to fire musketry, she has more men exposed to be shot and if the smaller ship should take the lee-side instead of the weather-side, the men stationed in the tops on board her opponent, will be precluded by the sails from taking aim. The little loss which was sustained by the Shannon in her close engagement with the Chesapeake, and the very severe losses which our other frigates sustained in their unsuccessful engagements with the enemy, afford pretty strong grounds to warrant such an assumption.
“Having now, my Lord, laid before your lordship my opinion respecting the principal causes of some of our recent defeats, I beg leave to renew my offers of service; and to request, that if you should approve of what I have written, you will afford me the opportunity of putting my schemes in practice, by appointing me to the command of one of His Majesty’s sloops. I am, &c.
(Signed)“Walter Forman.”
Some considerable time since, the author received a letter ​from Commander Forman, relative to a proposal of his to join the Greek service under the command of Lord Cochrane, now Earl Dundonald:– the following is a copy:
“My dear Sir,– In reply to your letter, of the 27th ult., in which you request me to forward to you whatever documents I may possess, relative to my naval services during late war, I have to observe, in the first place, that I should be well pleased to offer my name to remain (where it is at present) in oblivion, if I could be certain that, by passing it over without notice, you would not, indirectly, brand it with a stigma, which all who know me will say that I do not deserve.
“’I have little to say of any services that I have performed; but I can safely lay my hand upon my heart, and declare, in the presence of God, that I not only never willingly missed a fair opportunity of distinguishing myself in the service of my country, but have frequently tendered my I personal services, and proposed plans for distressing the enemy, which (whether justly or not is no matter) have been thought too hazardous to be put in execution; and therefore, if my name is to appear in your work, I must beg you to have the goodness to publish, at the same time, all the documents which I herewith transmit to you; and which, if called upon to do it, I am ready to authenticate by producing the originals. I am, my dear Sir, your very obedient servant,
(Signed)“Walter Forman.”
“To Lieutenant John Marshall, R.N.”
In justice to this gallant, zealous, and truly respectable officer, the author cannot decline complying with his request. The documents are worded as follow:
“4, Pierrepont Street, Bath, March 12th, 1825.”
“Sir,– If I should be informal in addressing you as the Chairman of the Greek Committee, I trust that you will impute it to my ignorance, and not to my intention. I cannot mean to offend where I wish to obtain a favor; and my anxiety to benefit a cause, in which you take so lively an interest, will, I dare say, be deemed a sufficient apology for the liberty which I am going to take.
“Not to be tedious, I think that I could suggest a very practicable scheme for destroying a great part, if not the whole of the Turkish fleet; and I address myself to you, Sir, in the hope that, if you should approve of the plan you will make use of your interest to procure for me an opportunity of sharing the danger, as well as the glory of the enterprise.
“I shall be in town in the early part of next month; and then, if you will favor me with an interview, I think that I shall be able to convince you, that if my plan should be adopted, nothing, in all human probability, will be wanting to insure success, beyond the courage and determination ​which the Greek sailors have so repeatedly displayed in their several contests last year. Indeed, for my own part, I am so sanguine, that although I am aware that my commission in His Majesty’s navy must be forfeited, I am quite ready to make the sacrifice, provided I can be sure of obtaining the command of one of the Greek fire-ships that would be employed upon this occasion.
“I have long had it in contemplation to go out and offer my services to the Greeks; but was apprehensive that the want of a recommendation, and being ignorant of the Greek language, might induce them to decline my overtures, and it was only to-day, on reading in the papers an account of the formidable preparations that the Turks are making for the ensuing campaign against the Greeks, that it occurred to me to apply to you for an introduction.
“I have now, Sir, only to add, that. if you should think it worth while to listen to my proposal, I shall be happy to wait upon you at any tine that you may think proper to appoint; but, unless the occasion should be urgent, it would be rather inconvenient to me to leave Bath before the 6th of next month. I am. Sir
(Signed)“Walter Forman, Commander, R.N.”
“To Joseph Hume, Esq. M.P.”
“London, 14th March, 1825.
“Sir,– I have received your letter of the 12th instant, and have to state, in answer to it, that if you will call (when you come to town) on Edward Ellice, Esq. M.P., Freeman’s Court, Cornhill, your proposals, in regard to Greece, will be attended to. I am, &c.
(Signed)“Joseph Hume.”
“To Captain Forman, R.N.”
“Mr. Ellice presents his compliments to Captain Forman, and encloses a letter of introduction to the Greek deputies, to whom Captain F. had better communicate his plan.
“Mr. Ellice has no other means of recommending the plan to the Greek Government, and no power to undertake any engagement on their behalf.”
Captain Forman’ s remarks on the above note.
“Mr. Hume’s letter to me certainly inferred that the Greek committee had, at least, the power to recommend, to the Greek Government, any suggestion that was likely to benefit this Greek cause, or why did he tell me that, if I would wait upon Mr. Ellice, ‘my proposals, with regard to Greece, would be attended to:’ and, moreover, if the Greek committee had no power to take my economical scheme, into consideration, how happened it that these very gentlemen ​(whether as a committee, or as private individuals, is of little consequence) could take upon themselves, about three months afterwards, to recommend the Greek deputies to enter into a very expensive, and, as it turned out, very useless arrangement, with Lord Cochrane?
“If Mr. Ellice had submitted my plan to the consideration of experienced naval officers, before he declined to interfere in its behalf, he would have exonerated both himself and the Greek committee, from the smallest imputation of lukewarmness for the cause which they professed to have so much at heart; but, by transferring the plan, as he did, to the consideration of the Greek deputies, he tacitly, and, I have no doubt, intentionally, gave them to understand that he did not approve of it.
“These gentlemen, at all events, must have understood Mr. Ellice’s transfer in that light; and, accordingly, they over-whelmed me with compliments, promised to transmit it to the Greek Government, took my address, but gave me no reason to hope, from any thing that dropped from themselves, that it would be backed by their recommendation. They certainly praised the scheme, even far beyond its merits; but (sapiently) intimated, at the same time, that they were afraid that it never could be put in execution, because, forsooth, the Turkish officers were so intimidated by their recent defeats, that they never would suffer the Greeks to catch them at an anchor any more; and the object that I had, in view, was to make the attack when they were at anchor upon a lee shore, and could not possibly escape. It was in vain for me to urge, that these Turkish ships must occasionally go into their own ports to refit, if they did not attempt to land troops on the Greek coasts; that, after all, their adoption of the plan would be attended with no expense until it should be put in execution, and even then, the total amount of the expense would amount to no more than the purchase of a few old ships, that might possibly be fit for nothing else but to make fire-ships of. All I could say was of no avail. They did not think that the Turks would ever furnish the Greeks with such a favorable opportunity of ​attacking them; and yet, within, I believe, one month of their having made this sage declaration, the fleet of Ibrahim Pacha anchored at Modon, and, for nearly two years afterwards (either at Modon or Navarin), actually did furnish the Greeks with abundant opportunities of attacking them in the very manner which I proposed.
“The following plan of the proposed expedition was submitted to the inspection of Mr. Ellice, and transferred, as before stated, to the Greek deputies.
“In all cases, hitherto, where fire-ships have been employed for the purpose of destroying an enemy’s fleet, the attack has either been made in the night-time, when the enemy’s ships were at anchor, or in the day-time, under cover of a protecting force, when they were under weigh in the open sea.
“Both these plans are necessarily subject to many great inconveniences; and my object is, with several additions of my own, to combine the good parts of both of them, and leave out all that is bad; or, in plain English, I propose to make the attack in the day-time, instead of the night, when the Turkish fleet shall be at anchor upon a lee shore.
“In a night attack, fire-ships, owing to the darkness, almost invariably miss the objects they are intended to destroy; they are generally fired too soon; and if by accident one, out of a dozen, should fall on board an enemy’s ship, it must necessarily have so much way (i.e. velocity), in consequence of not shortening sail, that it is hardly possible for its grapplings to hold. Thus, for instance, in Lord Cochrane’s celebrated night attack upon the French squadron in the road of l’Isle d’Aix, not one of these ships was injured by a fire-vessel; and, if the captains of these ships had had the presence of mind to remain quietly at anchor, they might have laughed at our impotent attempt to destroy them.
“In a day attack by fire-vessels, in the open sea, the chances of success are not much increased. The ships that are attacked see the danger approaching, and, most generally, have the means of escaping: and, moreover, whenever any of them happen to be set on fire in this way, the mischief ends there; because, in the open sea, it is not likely that they can drift upon other ships that are under weigh, and, of course, in a condition to avoid the contact. The English and French have long since given up this mode of warfare, because it is long since they have discovered the inutility of it. The Greeks, owing to alarm and want of coolness on the part of the Turks, have certainly reaped considerable advantage from it; but, after all, with the loss of nearly one hundred fire-ships, they have done little more than intimidate the Turks, without materially crippling their resources.
“What I propose, then, is to wait the opportunity of catching a Turkish ​fleet at anchor, in such a situation as would render it impossible for any one of them to escape, except by running on shore, and to make the attack in the day time, when, with the arrangements which, I am going to recommend, the Greek fire-vessels cannot possibly miss their objects; and as the weather-ships will be fired first of all, these will necessarily, drift down upon those that are to leeward, and will become fire-ships in their turn.
“In the Mediterranean and Levant seas, the wind, as is well known, most generally, in the summer season, blows directly into all harbours during the afternoon and early part of the night; so that, if the Greek fire-ships should make their attack in the early part of the evening, they would at once see the object of attack, and be sure of having a leading wind in, which in all probability would not fail them before they completely effected the object in contemplation.
“In order to make the attack as effective as possible, I proposed, in the first place, to have the fire-ships filled with empty casks, and would have them carry very little, if any ballast, and then they may he hulled repeatedly by the batteries without being in danger of sinking; and, if any of them should happen to be dismasted, they would still drift in before the wind, and create confusion, if they did no further mischief. This misfortune, however, is not much to be apprehended. Not one of Sir Johh Duckworth's squadron was dismasted in passing through the Dardanelles in the day-time; and not one of Lord Nelson’s ships was dismasted at the battle of Copenhagen, till long after every one of them had taken her proper position. It is morally impossible, therefore, that more than two out of a dozen of the Greek fire-vessels could be dismasted, or materially crippled, by the Turkish batteries, in passing, with a fair wind, into any harbour, before they had run the enemy’s ships on board.
“In the second place, I propose that the fire-ships shall make the attack in couples, connected by a cablet, or chain, fastened to their quarters; by which means, if properly conducted, they will be sure to enclose the objects of their attack, and must necessarily remain in contact, even if the grapplings should not retain their hold. It can hardly be necessary to point out the advantage which this mode of attack would possess over every other. A single fire-ship, with no one at the helm, is very likely to pass wide of the object of attack; or her grapplings may not retain their hold, even if she should get alongside, when she is going with equal rapidity through the water; but it is not likely that the object of attack should escape, when she is enclosed by two fire-ships, which are ​coupled in the manner which I have represented in the accompanying figure. In Lord Cochrane’s attack on the French squadron, with single fire-vessels, there was but one out of the whole that ran on board an enemy’s ship; and her grapplings did not keep their hold, so that she passed by without doing any further mischief than merely tearing away some of the rigging.
“In the next place, I recommend that no other combustibles should be taken on board the fire-ships than what are absolutely necessary to cause them to take fire readily; and then, as there will be no fear of an explosion, there will be no necessity for the Greeks to quit their fire-vessels, until it will be impossible for them to miss the shipping which they intend to fire. Some wetted straw, and damp powder formed into devils, might be ignited, on entering the harbour, which, by producing a great deal of smoke, might occasion alarm, and prevent the enemy’s boats from approaching the fire-ships, in order to tow them into another direction.
“With these preparations, if the attack should be made, in a pretty strong sea-breeze, a little before the close of day, the Greek seamen will at once be able to see the object of attack, and will pass too rapidly by the batteries to be materially injured by them in going in. In which case, if they should possess sufficient resolution to remain on board their own ships till they are on the point of grappling with the enemy, they will not only succeed in their enterprise, but may be morally certain that the Turkish boats will be too much occupied in taking care of their own people to think of pursuing them on their return. And if the Greek.Government will intrust me with the command of one of their fire-ships, I will pledge all that is sacred in man, to be the first to advance, and the last to retire.”
“This plan was presented, and the offer of my personal services made, to the Greek deputies, in the early part of April, 1825, before Ibrahim Pacha had landed in the Morea; and a similar plan, together with an offer of my personal services, was presented to Lord Cochrane, on his accepting the chief command of the Greek navy, in the following August; who, by the way, wanted the politeness to make me any reply. It is now submitted to the criticism of my brother officers of all grades; and I shall leave it to them to make their own comments, after merely stating, that, as Sir Edward Codrington, at the battle of Navarin, carried a leading wind into the harbour, in the day-time. Lord ​Cochrane might have done so with his fire-ships; and, had he been so disposed, might possibly anticipated that gallant admiral’s intentions, and have claimed the victory for himself.”
4, Pierrepont Street, Bath, Aug. 22d, 1825.
“My Lord,– I have just seen it stated in the papers, that your lordship has accepted the command of the Greek navy; and presuming that you will not be offended at an intrusion which is meant to benefit a cause in which your lordship takes so lively an interest, I take the liberty of recommending to your notice the enclosed rough sketch of what is, in my opinion, a more effectual plan for destroying the Turkish fleets than has yet been adopted by the Greeks. It is offered, however, merely as a hint for your lordship to improve upon; and, if it should meet your approbation, I trust that you will permit me to share in the glory of the enterprise. Indeed, under any circumstances, I should be most happy to serve under your lordship, in so good a cause, with a fair prospect of having an opportunity of distinguishing myself, though I must make a sacrifice of all I have in the world by so doing. By the Foreign Enlistment Bill, I am liable to be deprived of my rank, as a commander in His Majesty’s navy, with the half-pay attached to it, if I accept any appointment in the service of the Greeks: and these I would willingly sacrifice, in exchange for the glory of sharing (not to say commanding) in such an expedition as I am suggesting to your lordship.
“Your lordship, I am sure, will appreciate the feelings of an officer, who is most anxious to rescue the Greeks from their horrible thraldom; but, at the same time, would not wish to risk the loss of his commission unnecessarily. Perhaps it might he contrived to let me go out without having any ostensible appointment in the Greek service, until an opportunity offered of putting my plan in execution, and then I shall be quite ready to risk the consequences. I remain, my Lord, with great respect, your lordship’s most obedient and devoted servant,
(Signed)“Walter Forman, Commander, R.N.”
“To the Right Hon. Lord Cochrane.”
“Sir,– As it appears, by the concurrent testimony of all the papers, that Lord Cochrane has certainly sailed on his expedition to Greece, I have ventured to take the liberty of forwarding to you the copies of a letter and a plan for the destruction of the Turkish fleets, which I addressed to bis Lordship immediately after it was announced that he had accepted a chief command in the Greek navy; in order that, if my plan should be adopted by his Lordship, you may be enabled to bear me witness, that I was the proposer of it; and if it should not, that you may judge between us, whether the Greek cause will have derived any benefit by his neglecting it.
“I am afraid, Sir, that being a stranger, you will think I am guilty of an ​unpardonable liberty in thus attempting to make you tbe umpire between us; but if you will put yourself, for a moment, in my situation, I am sure, that, as a well-wisher to the Greeks, you will find a sufficient excuse in your own feelings; for this seeming ebullition of mine. Though I have not been so fortunate as his Lordship, I have never intentionally missed an opportunity of distinguishing myself in the service of my Country; and whatever may be the distance between us, my rank, as a commander in His Majesty’s navy, entitles me to the privilege of being treated like a gentleman. My plan may possibly be a very silly one, or at least his Lordship may think so; but my offer to serve under him, in a cause which he professes to have so much at heart, deserved at least to be treated with that politeness, which, in all civilized society, is supposed to be due from one gentleman to another. Man, Sir, is but a man, whatever may be his rank and condition in life; and if his Lordship’s plan of operations should turn out to be no better than mine, the honor of having even Lord Cochrane to command them will hardly make amends to the Greeks, for a delay of nearly twelve months, during which time they have constantly been losing ground. Fifteen months ago, (quite time enough to have prevented all the disasters that have befallen the Greeks since the landing of Ibrahim Pacha in the Morea) I presented this plan to the Greek committee, and offered, at the imminent risk of losing my commission in His Majesty’s service, to go, at once, without further preparation, to put it in execution; and that without putting the Greek Government to any further expence than that of furnishing me with a conveyance to the scene of action: his Lordship, on the contrary, required very nearly twelve months to prepare for his expedition, during which time the Greek cause has been all but annihilated; and then sails with an overwhelming force, (that has been collected at a very great expence) which would ensure to any seaman the command of those seas, let his talents be what they may. If my offer had been accepted, the Egyptian fleet might have been destroyed at Modon, and Ibrahim Pasha cut off from all supplies, without robbing the treasury of more than £2,000 or £3,000 at the utmost. My offer, however, was declined by the Greek committee, on the plea that they had no power to treat with me, though it appears that, only three months afterwards, they possessed full powers to appoint, or, at all events, to recommend, Lord Cochrane to a chief command on his own terms, which amounted, by the way, to an expensive preparation, accompanied with a tedious delay, which, under existing circumstances, was tantamount to a defeat: and, if report speak true, the ample compensation for the sacrifice he has made of his interest in the service of the Emperor of Brazil.
​“In the month of March, 1825, I addressed o letter to Mr. Hume, as Chairman of the Greek committee, to inform him that I had a plan to communicate to him, which I had no doubt would materially benefit the Greek cause, if he should think proper to recommend it. Mr. Hume, in a very polite note, referred me to Mr. Ellice, to whom, as that gentleman was not at home when I called, I forwarded nearly the same plan which was afterwards sent to Lord Cochrane, accompanied with a written offer, either to take the command of the expedition myself, or (to prevent Jealousy on the part of the Greek officers) to serve in it under the command of a Greek admiral. Mr. Ellice, in reply, told me that the Greek committee had no power to treat with me on this subject, but at the same time gave me a letter of introduction to the Greek deputies, and advised me to present my plan to them. To these gentlemen I then made my application, and begged them (in writing) to inform the Greek Government that I was willing either to take the command myself, or to serve under the command of any one of their officers; and promised, if they would give me the opportunity, that I would be the first to go in, and the last to return. These gentlemen, who, like the Greek committee, had no power to treat with me themselves, promised to forward my application to the Greek Government; but I was convinced, by the reception they gave me, that they were determined to throw cold water on my proposal. Out of politeness, of course, they professed to believe that, of all the numerous plans that had been submitted to them, mine was by far the best; but told me, at the same time, that the Turks were now so completely dispirited by repeated defeats, that they never would be found at an anchor, or suffer themselves to be found in such a situation as my plan seemed to require. This point they insisted upon to the last; and I could not, by any means, make them understand that Turkish ships, as well as those of all other nations, could not be always at sea, but must occasionally go into harbour to refit and take in supplies; and it was at those times, if my plan should be adopted, that they would have it in their power to destroy, not only a few out of the great many of their shipping, as they have hitherto done, but a great part, if not the whole, of all the ships that would be collected in the same port. They still persisted that the Turks never would afford the Greeks an opportunity of putting my plan into execution; but their prophecy was very speedily falsified. A very short time afterwards, the Egyptian fleet, under the command of Ibrahim Pacha, anchored in the harbour of Modon. The Greek admiral had the opportunity, and did make a night, (instead of a day ​attack, as I proposed, upon the fleet; which, as usual, did some damage, but not sufficient to prevent the same fleet from sailing in a few days, and bringing back a considerable reinforcement.
“There are four different methods of making an attack on an enemy’s fleet by fire-ships: at anchor, and at sea, in the night-time, and in day-light. At sea, an enemy’s ship, if it sails equally well, has the opportunity of running away from a fire-ship; and, in the night-time, from not being able to see the objects, the fire-ships are very apt to miss their aim. It was for this reason that not one of the French ships in Aix Roads was injured by the fire-ships that were sent in to attack them under the command of Lord Cochrane; and, for the same reason, but little damage was done to the Egyptian fleet in the harbour of Modon; but if, as I proposed, the attack had been made in the day-time, and the fire-ships coupled as I have represented them in the plan, they could not possibly have missed their aim, and the Egyptian ships could not possibly have escaped: the weathermost ships would have been set fire to by the Greeks, and these, as they parted their cables, would have become fire-ships in their turns, and have destroyed those that were to leeward, as they drifted down upon them. By this means, a very great part of Ibrahim’s fleet must inevitably have been destroyed, his supplies would have been cut off, and he would not have had it in his power to march his army against the town of Missolonghi; and even if this opportunity had been lost, the Capitan Pacha’s fleet before Missolonghi might have been destroyed in the same way, and then supplies could have been thrown into the town.
“With the Greek Deputies I left my address, and almost a petition to their Government to be allowed to rescue their country from impending destruction, but have not been favored with any answer. The moment I heard that Lord Cochrane had determined to join the Greeks, I sent a parcel, containing the letter and plan, to his Lordship, the copies of which are here enclosed, and directed it to be forwarded to him by the Greek Committee. After waiting some time without receiving any answer, I wrote to Mr. Ellice, to beg him, as a member of the Greek Committee, to inform his Lordship, that I was desirous of serving under his command, and wished to know whether he had received my communication. Mr. Ellice, who was out of town, informed me that there was no Greek Committee in existence, and recommended me to apply to his Lordship’s brother. Colonel Cochrane, who was then in town, to make inquiry about this parcel. Not having been favored with any answer from the Colonel, I at length traced the parcel from the coach office to his Lordship’s hotel, near Berkeley ​Square, and left a second letter for him in the Landlord’s hands, who promised to deliver it to him the moment he returned from Scotland. It is impossible, Sir, that all these letters could have miscarried, and though his Lordship is undoubtedly a great man, and a successful commander, I am sure that you will agree with me, that neither great talents nor good fortune will justify the neglect of those common rules of good breeding which are generally understood to characterise the gentleman. I have now, Sir, only to request that you will pardon the great liberty I have taken in troubling you with my affairs, and believe me to be, with great respect, &c. &c.
(Signed)“Walter Forman.”
“To Colonel the Hon. Leicester Stanhope.”
“Stable Yard, St. James’s, Saturday.
“Dear Sir,– I have the pleasure to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, together with its enclosure.
“The services of able naval officers are much required in Greece, and I regret that yours have not been attended to as they seem to have deserved.
“I concur with you in considering that the exertion should have been made earlier, and that had the loan been properly expended, the cause of Greece would have been advancing instead of retrograding. The fault lies with the subscribers to the loan, and the contractors. The money should have been placed in the hands of some strong-minded, active and firm commissioners, instead of being placed in those of Greek Deputies and the Greek Government. Twenty times in * * * I predicted the fate of this loan and of Greece, if the money was to be placed at the disposal of feeble men.
“With respect to your fire-ships, the plan seems to me, as an unlearned man, as admirable. One decisive success, and the Turkish fleets would fly and huddle into their harbours; and thus would the resources of the invader be cut off.
“You are in error in supposing that Mr. Hume is the perpetual chairman of the Greek Committee; and again in supposing that they have any thing to do with the second Greek loan, or the present armament under Lord Cochrane.
“The Greek Committee have acted well, but their influence has for twelve months past been altogether suspended.
“I took the liberty to mention your name to Mr. Urquhart, Lord Cochrane’s secretary. At present I am in no way concerned with the affairs of Greece, or should, as far as my influence went, be desirous of promoting your views towards the liberation of that struggling country. I am, dear Sir, your most humble servant,
(Signed)“Leicester Stanhope.”
“To Captain Forman, R.N.”
“As this letter, though a private one, relates solely to ​public affairs, and contains no intimation of a desire to have it kept secret. Colonel Stanhope can, of course, have no objection to the publication of it.
W. F.
Commander Forman is the author of “An Essay on the Laws of Gravity, and the Distances of the Planets; with Observations on the Tides, the Figure of the Earth, and the Precession of the Equinoxes:” published by Longman and Co. in 1824.
* ↑ See Vol. I. Part I. p. 169 et seq.
* ↑ See Vol. II. Part II. p. 750 et seq.
* ↑ If they had been filled with empty cask, and the interstices between the casks filled up with water, they would have been in good sailing trim; and then, in the event of being hulled by the batteries there would have been no room for more water.
* ↑ In the plan which was presented to Lord Cochrane, all allusion to the Basque Roads expedition was carefully suppressed.
* ↑ By a statement, which has been copied from the Etoile, French newspaper, it appears that Lord Cochrane received £37,000 as an equivalent for what he gave up by quitting the Brazilian service; and that £123,000 were laid out, in England, for the purchase and equipment of six steam-vessels; to which must be added more than £100,000 which was laid out in America for the purchase of two large frigates, of which only one was forwarded to Greece. In one word. Lord Cochrane’s plans and appointment cost upwards of £300,000, while mine, which must, at least, have been equally effective, would not have cost more they the hundredth part of that sum.
* ↑ As Sir Edward Codrington’s squadron did carry a leading wind into the harbour of Navarin in the day-time, the Greek fire-ships might have done so also; and here it is evident that there could have been nothing to prevent the execution of my plan, but apprehension of the result.