# McQuay v. Guntharp

Supreme Court of Arkansas
331 Ark. 466
Cathy McQUAY ET AL. v. Randall GUNTHARP, M.D., and Northeast Arkansas Internal Medicine Clinic, d/b/a Pocahontas Family Clinic
Appeal from Randolph Circuit Court
No. 96-1523.---Opinion delivered: February 19, 1998. Supplemental opinion denying rehearing delivered: April 16, 1998.
* Court Documents
* Opinion of the Court
* Dissenting Opinion Newbern
* CIVIL PROCEDURE – WHEN MOTION TO DISMISS TREATED AS ONE FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. – Ordinarily, when matters outside the pleadings are presented and not excluded by the trial court in connection with a motion to dismiss under Ark. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the appellate court treats the motion as one for summary judgment under Ark. R. Civ. P. 56.
* JUDGMENT – SUMMARY JUDGMENT – MATTERS CONSIDERED. – The matters to be considered in summary-judgment proceedings are limited to affidavits, depositions, admissions, and answers to interrogatories.
* PLEADING – COURT MUST LOOK TO COMPLAINT TO DETERMINE WHETHER PARTICULAR CAUSE OF ACTION STATED. – In determining whether the trial court erred in characterizing appellants' claim as a battery as opposed to outrage and thus ruling that the action was barred by the one-year statute of limitations pertaining to battery, the supreme court was obliged to look to the complaint itself.
* LIMITATION OF ACTIONS – STATUTE WITH LONGEST LIMITATIONS APPLIES. – Where two or more statutes of limitations apply to a cause of action, the supreme court generally applies the statute with the longest limitations.
* PLEADING – ARKANSAS RECOGNIZES ONLY "FACTS PLEADINGS." – Although appellants' complaint stated that their action was one for outrage, the supreme court was required to look to the facts alleged because Arkansas does not recognize "notice pleadings," but only "facts pleadings"; the court looks to the gist of the action in making such a determination.
* TORTS – OUTRAGE – NECESSARY ELEMENTS. – To establish an outrage claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate the following elements: (1) the actor intended to inflict emotional distress or knew or ​should have known that emotional distress was the likely result of his conduct; (2) the conduct was "extreme and outrageous," was "beyond all possible bounds of decency," and was "utterly intolerable in a civilized community"; (3) the actions of the defendant were the cause of the plaintiffs distress; and (4) the emotional distress sustained by the plaintiff was so severe that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it.
* TORTS – OUTRAGE – DETERMINED ON CASE-BY-CASE BASIS. – The type of conduct that meets the standard for outrage must be determined on a case-by-case basis.
* TORTS – OUTRAGE – CLEAR-CUT PROOF REQUIRED. – The supreme court gives a narrow view to the tort of outrage and requires clear-cut proof to establish the elements in outrage cases; merely describing the conduct as outrageous does not make it so; clear-cut proof, however, does not mean proof greater than a preponderance of the evidence.
* APPEAL & ERROR – ISSUE NOT RULED UPON BY TRIAL COURT NOT ADDRESSED ON APPEAL. – Although appellees raised the issue of the applicability of the statute of limitations pertaining to medical injury in their motion to dismiss, the record did not reflect that the trial court ever ruled on the issue, and, accordingly, the supreme court did not address the argument on appeal.
* TORTS – OUTRAGE – COMPLAINT DEMONSTRATED SUFFICIENT FACTS TO SUPPORT CLAIM FOR – TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CHARACTERIZING ACTION AS BATTERY. – Appellants' complaint demonstrated sufficient facts to support a claim for outrage separate and apart from a claim for battery where, among other things, appellants were patients of appellee-physician, who, during their physical examinations, improperly touched, examined, and fondled their breasts; where appellants specifically pleaded that the trauma of having a doctor, whom each had trusted, fondle their breasts in a sexually suggestive manner had caused them to be less trusting of physicians in general; and where two appellant-husbands asserted that they had suffered a loss of consortium of their wives as a result of appellee-physician's actions; the trial court erred in characterizing the cause of action as constituting the tort of battery.
* TORTS – OUTRAGE – NATURE OF PHYSICIAN-PATIENT RELATIONSHIP MADE OUTRAGE SUIT APPROPRIATE. – The nature of the physician-patient relationship and the nature of the allegations presented by appellants made appropriate a suit for the tort of outrage; a patient entrusts his or her body and sense of dignity to a physician; looking to the facts alleged in the complaint, it was ​apparent that appellants were most vulnerable in presenting their bodies to a physician whom they trusted to exercise professionalism in his treatment, only to be taken advantage of by a doctor seeking his own personal gratification.
* LIMITATION OF ACTIONS – TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING COMPLAINT – THREE-YEAR OUTRAGE LIMITATIONS APPLIED – REVERSED AND REMANDED. – The supreme court, concluding that the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint because sufficient facts were alleged to state a cause of action for the tort of outrage, which is governed by the three-year statute of limitations found in Ark. Code Ann. § 16-56-105 (1987), reversed the dismissal of the complaint and remanded the matter to the trial court.
SUPPLEMENTAL OPINION ON DENIAL OF REHEARING:
* APPEAL & ERROR – ISSUE RAISED BELOW – MATTER NOT RULED ON BY TRIAL COURT BARRED FROM REVIEW. – Appellees' assertion that the supreme court erred as a matter of law in failing to apply the two-year statute of limitations applicable to medical injuries was not reached; although appellees had raised the issue below, the trial court did not rule on it; the supreme court was precluded from reviewing the issue on appeal.
* APPEAL & ERROR – REHEARING DENIED – SUPPLEMENTAL OPINION ISSUED. – The supreme court denied rehearing of the case and issued a supplemental opinion for the purpose of clarifying that on remand to the trial court, appellees were not precluded from defending against appellants' claims by arguing that they are barred by the two-year statute of limitations applicable to medical injuries, as provided in Ark. Code Ann. § 16-114-203 (Supp. 1997).
​ Appeal from Randolph Circuit Court; Harold S. Erwin, Judge; reversed and remanded.
Boswell, Tucker, Brewster & Hicks, by: George R. Wise, Jr., for appellants.
Womack, Landis, Phelps, McNeill & McDaniel, by: Lucinda McDaniel, for appellees.
[Opinion of the court by Justice DONALD L. CORBIN. Special Justice CHARLES A. BANKS joins the Court's opinion. Dissenting opinion by Justice DAVID NEWBERN, joined by Justice ANNABELLE CLINTON IMBER. Justice TOM GLAZE not participating. Supplemental opinion denying rehearing by Justice CORBIN. Post, p. 479-A.]
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