# All the Works of Epictetus, Which Are Now Extant/Book 1/Chapter 28

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CHAPTER XXVIII.
That we are not to be angry with Mankind. What Things are little, what great, among Men.
§. 1.What is the Cause of Assent to any thing?
Its appearing to be true.
It is not possible, therefore, to assent to what appears to be not true.
Why?
Because it is the very Nature of the Understanding to agree to Truth; to be dissatisfied with ​Falshood; and to suspend its Belief, in doubtful Cases.
What is the Proof of this?
Persuade yourself, if you can, that it is now Night.
Impossible.
Unpersuade yourself that it is Day.
Impossible.
Persuade yourself, that the Stars are, or are not, even.
Impossible.
§. 2. When any one, then, assents to what is false, be assured, that he doth not wilfully assent to it, as false (for, as Plato affirms, the Soul is never voluntarily deprived of Truth): but what is false, appears to him to be true. Well, then: Have we, in Actions, any thing correspondent to True and False, in Propositions?
Duty, and contrary to Duty: Advantageous, and Disadvantageous: Suitable and Unable; and the like.
A Person then, cannot think a Thing advantageous to him, and not chuse it.
He cannot. But how says Medea?
"I know what Evils wait my dreadful Purpose; But vanquish'd Reason yields to powerful Rage."
Because she thought, that very Indulgence of her Rage, and the punishing her Husband, more advantageous than the Preservation of her Children.
Yes: but she is deceived.
Shew clearly to her, that she is deceived, and she will forbear: but, till you have shewn it, what is the to follow, but what appears to herself?
Nothing.
Why, then, are you angry with her, that the unhappy Woman is deceived, in the most important Points; and instead of a human Creature, becomes a Viper? Why do not you rather, as we pity the Blind and Lame, so likewise pity those who ​are blinded and lamed, in their superior Faculties? Whoever, therefore, duly remembers, that the Appearance of Things to the Mind is the Standard of every Action to Man: that this is either right or wrong: and, if right, he is without Fault; if wrong, he himself bears the Punishment: for that one Man cannot be the Person deceived, and another the Sufferer: will not be outrageous and angry at any one; will not revile, or reproach, or hate, quarrel with, any one.
§. 3. So then, Have all the great and dreadful Deeds, that have been done in the World, no other Original than Appearance?
Absolutely, no other. The Iliad consists of nothing but the Appearances [of Things to the Mind]; and the Use of those Appearances. It appeared [right] to Paris, to carry off the Wife of Menelaus. It appeared [right] to Helen, to follow him. If, then, it had appeared [right] to Menelaus, to persuade himself, that it was an Advantage to be robbed of such a Wife, what would have happened? Not only the Iliad had been loft, but the Odyssey too.
Do these great Events then, depend on so small a Cause?
What are these Events, which you call great?
Wars, and Seditions; the Destruction of Numbers of Men; and the Overthrow of Cities.
And what great Matter is there in all this? Nothing. What great Matter is there in the Death of Numbers of Oxen, Numbers of Sheep, or in the burning or pulling down Numbers of Nests of Storks or Swallows?
Are these like Cases, then?
Perfectly like. The Bodies of Men are destroyed, and the Bodies of Sheep and Oxen. The Houses of Men are burnt, and the Nests of Storks. What is there great or dreadful in all this? Pray, shew me what Difference there is between the House of a Man, and the Nest of a Stork, so far as it is a Ha​bitation, excepting that Houses are built with Beams, and Tiles, and Bricks; and Nests, with Sticks and Clay?
What, then, is a Stork and a Man a like Thing? What do you mean?
With regard to Body, extremely like.
Is there no Difference, then, between a Man and a Stork?
Yes, surely: but not in these Things.
In what then?
Enquire; and you will find, that the Difference consists in something else. See whether it be not, in acting with Discernment: whether it be not, in a social Disposition; in Fidelity, Honour, Steadiness, Judgment.
§ 4. Where then, is the great Good or Evil of Man?
Where his Difference is. If this is preserved, and remains well fortified, and neither Honour, Fidelity, or Judgment, is destroyed, then he himself is preserved likewise: but, when any of these is lost and demolished, he himself is lost also. In this do all great Events consist. Paris, they say, was undone, because the Greeks invaded Troy, and laid it waste; and his Family were slain in Battle. By no means: for no one is undone by an Action, not his own. All that was only laying waste the Nests of Storks. But his true Undoing was, when he lost the modest, the faithful, the hospitable, and the decent Character. When was Achilles undone? When Patroclus died? By no means. But when he gave himself up to Rage; when he wept over a Girl; when he forgot, that he came there, not to get Mistresses, but to fight. This is human Undoing; this is the Siege; this the Overthrow; when right Principles are ruined; when these are destroyed.
But, when Wives and Children are led away ​Captives, and the Men themselves killed, are not these, Evils?
Whence do you conclude them such? Pray inform me, in my Turn.
Nay: but whence do you affirm, that they are not Evils?
§. 5. Let us recur to the Rules. Produce the Preconceptions. One cannot sufficiently wonder at what happens, in this Respect. When we would judge of Light and Heavy, we do not judge by Guess: when of Strait and Crooked, not by Guess: and, in general, when it concerns us to know the Truth of any Particular, no one of us will do any thing, by Guess, But, where the first and principal Cause is concerned, of acting either right or wrong; of being prosperous or unprosperous, happy or unhappy; there only do we act rashly, and by Guess. No-where any thing like a Balance; no-where any thing like a Rule: but some Fancy strikes me, and I instantly act conformably to it. For am I better than Agamemnon or Achilles; that they, by following their Fancies, should do and suffer so many Things, and Fancy not suffice me? And what Tragedy hath any other Original? The Atreus of Euripides, what is it? Fancy. The Oedipus of Sophocles? Fancy. The Phœnix? The Hippolytus? All Fancy. To what Character, then, doth it belong, think you, to take no care of this Point? What are they called who follow every Fancy?
Madmen.
Do we, then, behave any otherwise?
* ↑ See Note a, c. 18. §. 1.
* ↑ The Order of the following Words is disturbed in the Original. The Translation follows Mr. Upton's Correction.