# History of Mexico (Bancroft)/Volume 4/Chapter 13

Contents
CHAPTER XIII.
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE JUNTA DE ZITACUARO.
1811.
Calleja's New System of Military Organization — Suppression of the Insurrection in Nuevo Santander — Pacification of San Luis Potosí — Defeat of Insurgents in Guanajuato — Porlier's Operations in Nueva Galicia — Torre's Activity and Severity — His Defeat at Zitácuaro, and Death — Rayon Fortifies Zitácuaro — Empáran Returns to Spain — Conspiracy to Seize the Viceroy — Proclamation of Calleja — Events in Michoacan — Condition of Guanajuato — Spread of the Revolution.
On the day of his entrance into Zacatecas, Calleja proclaimed the usual pardon, adding the customary threats in case of non-compliance. All stragglers and strangers were ordered to return to their homes within twenty-four hours, under pain of being treated as insurgents. Then, having purged the city by an appropriate slaughter of patriots, the royalist leader once more remodelled the government. For its future security he organized five companies of infantry, one of cavalry, and an artillery corps, and appointed Martin de Medina the governor of Colotlan, comandante and intendente of the province. On the 16th of May Calleja proceeded to Aguascalientes with an army greatly reduced in numbers. The separation of Empáran's division, and of another detachment under Miguel del Campo sent to operate against the insurgents in the Bajío of Guanajuato, had left him with little more than 1,000 men, while the revolutionists were again increasing in strength. This ​dismemberment of his famous army of the centre was a grievous trouble to Calleja, the more so because he could see that no durable results would be thereby attained. In the abilities of his captains he had little confidence; plan as he might, he foresaw under the present system only failure. While at Aguascalientes, he therefore submitted to the viceroy a plan of military organization which he thought might hasten peace. He would arm all the towns in the kingdom for their own defence, and thereby avoid the crippling effect of dividing and subdividing the standing army into sections. The troops would likewise be relieved from long and fatiguing marches from one point to another. By a judicious disposal of the regular troops in suitable localities, assistance could quickly arrive at any point attacked. Both Calleja and the viceroy recognized the risk incurred in placing arms in the hands of the people, and thus establishing a power which might turn against the government. Nevertheless, Calleja believed that such danger could be avoided, and the viceroy adopted the plan. Henceforth this system was pursued by the royalists to the close of the war.
The system was put into immediate practice as far as possible, and was methodically developed and extended as circumstances allowed. In each town, companies of infantry and cavalry and batteries of artillery were raised, the strength of which was proportionate to the number of inhabitants. All house holders were compelled to take service in these corps, which were placed under the direction of a comandante de armas, in whom were also vested, wherever practicable, the judicial functions. At each town from 100 to 150 of such troops were to be in constant service and daily drilled. Arms were at first supplied by collecting weapons in possession of the inhabitants. All persons not enrolled in these military corps were forbidden to keep any kind of arms. ​Only muleteers and others whose occupations so required it were allowed a hatchet, and knife without a point. In the country haciendas and ranches, moreover, armed squadrons were organized, composed of members varying from six or eight to fifty, according to the relative importance of the places. This system, afterward adopted with some modifications by Morelos and the other independent leaders, resulted in placing all Mexico on a war footing; but it did not accomplish at this time exactly what Calleja desired. Practically it arrayed the nation against itself. At the commencement of the strife the creole regulars even could not be relied upon, and in the first engagements great misgivings had been entertained by the viceroy in regard to them. Their conduct at Las Cruces, and the subsequent skilful management by Calleja of the troops under his command, had greatly relieved this anxiety, and now by enforcing armed resistance in the towns against the attacks of the insurgents, friends and brothers were sometimes brought face to face as enemies.
Well aware that Zacatecas was still far from secure, and that Guanajuato was exposed to invasion at any time by the insurgent forces in Michoacan, Calleja made such dispositions for the protection of those provinces as the circumstances of his position admitted. As the northern and eastern provinces, called the provincias internas, were now free from insurrectionary movements, the troops in those regions could be advantageously employed in securing Zacatecas and Guanajuato against hostile inroads, and at the same time protecting the frontier of Durango. Calleja accordingly addressed a letter to Governor Salcedo, urging him to instruct Lopez and Ochoa to occupy with their divisions the defiles of Colotlan, Tlaltenango, and Juchipila; at the same time he ​made arrangements with Cruz to send a portion of his forces in the same direction for the purpose of coöperating with Empáran, whom it was his intention to despatch to Lagos. Calleja's plan was to occupy with the main divisions of his army the district extending from Lagos to Querétaro, thus keeping in subjection the most important part of the country, and being in a position to hasten quickly to the assistance of the forces operating on the north and south of this line. The carrying-out of this plan was, however, frustrated to some extent by the development of events which necessitated the employment of the heavy divisions of Empáran and Linares at other points, the latter being despatched to the relief of Valladolid, as already related, and the former being sent to Zitácuaro. The departure of these forces from Guanajuato exposed that province, and even Querétaro, to imminent risk; and Calleja, ordering Diego García Conde to move to San Felipe with the division he commanded at San Luis Potosí, and Miguel de Campo to station him self at Salamanca, hastened to Leon, whence he proceeded to Guanajuato, entering the city on the 20th of June.
When Calleja returned to San Luis Potosí after his victory at Calderon, he found himself in a vortex of insurrection. No sooner had the army of the centre marched from Guanajuato for Guadalajara than a number of insurgent bands sprung into existence in various parts of the province. The most prominent among their leaders was Albino García, commonly called El Manco, who in the neighborhood of Salamanca and Santiago carried on hostilities with such daring and skill that he became one of the most celebrated guerrilla chiefs of the revolution. In the ​district between Huichapan and Querétaro, Villagran was still harassing convoys and interrupting communication with the capital. The hilly region of the Huasteca, the mountains of the Sierra Gorda, and the plains of Apam to the north of the Mexican capital swarmed with predatory hordes. Nuevo Santander was in open insurrection; portions of San Luis Potosí were still unpacified; while the forces left in Zacatecas and Aguascalientes were inadequate, as the reader is aware, for the security of those cities.
While the events narrated in the preceding chapter were occurring in Zacatecas and Michoacan, the insurrection in Nuevo Santander, under the leadership of Villerías, was successfully suppressed by Arredondo. Having been invited by that chief to espouse the independent cause, Arredondo caused the communication to be burned by the hangman, and on the 4th of May marched from Agayo against the in surgents. Villerías, having sustained several successive defeats, fled toward Matehuala, where he was overcome and slain by a royalist force sent against him by the junta de seguridad of Catorce, under the direction of the cura Semper, Padre Duque, and Nicanor Sanchez. The insurrection in Nuevo Santander was now confined to Tula and its vicinity. On the 21st Arredondo approached the town, and having routed the insurgents with considerable slaughter, entered Tula the following day with little opposition. All the leaders and principal men were hanged, and their bodies left suspended from trees. Although the insurrection in this province was thus thoroughly crushed, Venegas, fearing that assistance to the revolutionists might arrive from the United States, dare not reduce the number of troops, the efficiency of ​which he even increased by supplying them with a considerable train of artillery. Iturbe was transferred to the governorship of Colotlan and Arredondo appointed to that of Nuevo Santander, which was shortly afterward increased in territory by the addition of the Huasteca.
At this time, Matehuala again became the scene of an insurgent defeat. In June the unfortunate town was taken possession of by Bernardo Gomez de Lara, better known by the sobriquet of Huacal. Lara, by birth an Indian, was the most ferocious of the insurgent chiefs who infested portions of San Luis Potosí. Captain of a band of half-savage Indians, he directed his hostilities not only against Spaniards, but against all who were not of his race. At Matehuala and in the vicinity he put to death a number of victims, and by compelling the inhabitants to join his band, raised his force to more than a thousand men. On the 21st of June he was simultaneously attacked by a company of Arredondo's troops under Antonio Elosúa, and a force brought up by Semper, the cura of Catorce. Assailed on opposite sides, Huacal was routed with slaughter, between two and three hundred of his followers being slain and a large number taken prisoners. He himself, though wounded, effected his escape and retired to the Bajío of Guanajuato. Some what later he entered San Miguel el Grande; but the inhabitants recovering from their first panic, surprised and captured him, with a number of his principal followers. Huacal was put to death in his prison, and his body exposed on the gibbet. This occurred about the end of the year. By this success the northern ​portion of San Luis Potosí was reduced to obedience, and during August the operations of the royalists in the district of Rio Verde and the southern part of the province completed the pacification.
In Guanajuato and Michoacan the condition of affairs was far different, and the revolution was assuming alarming proportions. Calleja was fully alive to the grave difficulties of his position. In a letter addressed to Venegas from Guanajuato on the 20th of August, he describes to him in strong colors the inextinguishable vitality of the insurrection and its strong recuperative power; and again on the 26th of September he reports that the forces of his division occupying the district between Lagos and Querétaro were insufficient to keep under control the ubiquitous guerrilla bands. Meantime, however, García Conde and Miguel del Campo were rendering good service in their respective localities. José de la Luz Gutierrez, at the head of 4,000 men well provided with arms, was signally routed at San Luis de la Paz, and Albino García sustained a similar defeat in the valley of Santiago.
When Cruz returned to Guadalajara after his successful recovery of Tepic and San Blas, he applied himself with his natural activity to the suppression of the rebellion in other portions of the province. The principal districts disaffected were those represented by the important towns of Zacoalca, Sayula, and Zapotlan, and on the 26th of February, Cruz despatched Captain Porlier with the greater portion of the troops ​against that region, instructing him to execute most exemplary punishment upon the rebels. At Zacoalco and Sayula Porlier met with no opposition, the insurgents retreating before him in the direction of Zapotlan; but on the 3d of March he fought them at some little distance from that town and defeated them. No difficulty was experienced by him in reducing to subjection the other towns which had shown symptoms of revolt in that region. Porlier now intended to advance farther southward, and sent forward Manuel del Rio to Colima, but the hostile attitude of the Indians in the territory of Colotlan and Nayarit forced Cruz to recall the larger portion of the troops. Calleja had despatched from Zacatecas the cura of Matehuala, José Francisco Alvarez, with a division of the troops of the provincias internas, against the revolted district; but on the 27th of March the belligerent padre was repulsed near the town, being badly wounded, and effecting his retreat with difficulty. Negrete was therefore sent with a force from Nueva Galicia, and more successful than Alvarez, soon reduced all the towns in the region between Colotlan and Juchipila. Zapotlan, however, on the withdrawal of the royalist troops, again revolted, and Negrete proceeding thither inflicted a severe defeat upon the insurgents on the 6th of May. Nevertheless, the revolution in Nueva Galicia was not easily eradicated, and Cruz and his officers were kept in constant occupation in one part or other of the province. On the 25th of June, hoping to strike an effective blow at the ringleaders, he issued a proclamation offering ​rewards for the delivery of insurgent chiefs, dead or alive. These stringent measures, however, were not effectual. In order to correspond with Calleja's wishes, and coöperate with him in the protection of Zacatecas and Aguascalientes, Negrete and Colonel Manuel del Rio were despatched with considerable detachments against different bodies of the insurgents. These officers defeated the enemy in a number of engagements fought during the months of June to September, while two other divisions, respectively under the commands of Angel Linares and Colonel Pastor, did good service.
During this period the rebellion developed to a great extent in the province of Mexico, and the proximity of the insurgent bands which soon infested it not only caused the viceroy increased anxiety, but exposed the weakness of the government in being unable to suppress hostilities carried on almost in sight of the capital. Although Hidalgo had been unsuccessful in rousing much enthusiasm during his brief inroad into Mexico, he had sowed well the seeds of revolution. His departure did not allay the agitation in the towns of the Toluca Valley, and it spread rapidly to those of Temascaltepec, Sultepec, and Zitácuaro. Although authority was quickly reëstablished in the city of Toluca, the country was soon overrun by guerrilla bands. Haciendas and the smaller towns were attacked and pillaged, communication between the outlying cities and the capital was almost closed, travel on the highways was impossible without strong escorts, and sentinels were lassoed at the very gates of the city. The viceroy at first attempted the ​organization of volunteer troops of horse supported by subscription; but this force proved a failure. He then appointed Juan Bautista de la Torre, a captain of the regiment of Tres Villas, military commander of Toluca, and assigned to him a strong body of regulars.
To describe all the operations of Torre would be entering into monotonous details of similar events. He proceeded against the rebels early in January, and during that and the three succeeding months gained a number of victories, by which he reduced the valleys of Toluca and Temascaltepec. About the beginning of April, however, the inhabitants of Jocotitlan again rose in revolt. The viceroy ordered Torre to chastise them and clear the highway to Valladolid of guerrilla bands. On the 15th., after two hours and a half of incessant firing, Torre entered Jocotitlan, "having had the particular pleasure of leaving four hundred dead upon the field," which he believed would act as a restraint upon "the enemies of God, the king, and the country."
Zitácuaro, in Michoacan, still remained in the power of the insurgents under Benedicto Lopez, who had sustained various defeats at the hands of Torre. The town, surrounded by lofty hills on all sides, can only be approached by three deep and narrow canons, namely, those of San Mateo, Tuxpan, and los Laureles; and Lopez, driven from place to place in the less rugged valley of Toluca, had taken refuge ​in the mountain wilds of Zitácuaro. Torre, having advanced during the night up the San Mateo canon, at daylight on the 22d of April attacked the town, his force consisting of 700 men provided with artillery. At the opening of the engagement the infantry led by Ventura Mora, second in command, gained some advantage. By a gallant charge they made themselves masters of the hill of the Calvario, which commanded the town; but though they captured the enemy's guns, they were unable to hold their position against the immense numbers by which they were in turn assailed. Mora and Captain Piñera were slain, and the soldiers broke and ran to the artillery for refuge. Pursuers and pursued, however, were so intermingled that the artillerymen could not fire without inflicting heavy loss upon their own men; and the crowd rushing in among the ranks of the main body threw it into confusion. Finding it impossible to arrest the panic, Torre tried a retreat by the way he had come. When he had reached the narrow entrance to the canon, however, he found that a breastwork of loose stones had been thrown up, behind which a host had collected to cut him off. His destruction was now certain. The soldiers lost all hope. A few only escaped to tell the tale. Torre prepared for death. He confessed to Padre Arévalo, the cura of Tlalpujahua, who accompanied him, and then under his guidance endeavored to escape from the trap he had entered. Accompanied by a few horsemen, he succeeded in extricating himself, and on the following day even passed Tuxpan without harm. On arriving at the hacienda of Xaripéo, however, he was captured with his companions by Benedicto Lopez and taken back to Tuxpan. As they crossed the bridge of that town Torre was killed by the natives, who showered stones upon him until his dead body was covered. The fruits of this victory were the ​capture of all the enemy's arms, ammunition, guns, and baggage, and more than 300 prisoners.
Rayon was at this time at Tusantla; and on receipt of the important news hastened to Zitácuaro, where he assumed command. With considerable skill he proceeded to put the town in a state of defence, recognizing the importance of its position as a central point of operation. A ditch was cut round it five varas wide and a league in circumference, which could be converted at will into a moat by inundating it from an extensive dam with which Zitácuaro was provided. Behind the ditch a concentric barricade three varas in width was erected, all the assailable portions of it being covered with cannon, the number of which was increased as rapidly as guns could be turned out of the foundry which Rayon had established. The roads also leading into the town were closed against hostile approach by ditches and breastworks of timber.
The defeat of Torre and destruction of his division almost neutralized the previous advantages gained by him. Communication between Valladolid and the capital was entirely closed, and the valley of Toluca left open to the insurgents. Venegas, in this extremity, being unable to detach any more forces from those retained in the capital, had recourse to those under the command of Empáran, who, contrary to the orders of Calleja, had approached toward Valladolid. That commander was, therefore, instructed to unite his division with the forces under the lieutenant-colonel José Castro, then at Tultenango, and proceed with all possible despatch against Zitácuaro. This separation of Empáran's important division from the army of the centre caused Calleja great annoyance, and from this time date the differences which arose between him and the viceroy, and which afterward developed into personal enmity. Empáran, who estimated more correctly than the viceroy the difficulty of the undertaking, was not inclined to engage ​in it without having first made every reasonable preparation. With this object he occupied himself for some time at Maravatio in putting in good order his artillery trains and arms, in collecting supplies of provisions, by informing himself through spies of the strength and position of the enemy, and making himself acquainted with the topography of the district. This prudent delay gave umbrage to Venegas, who, in face of Torre's late disaster, blindly regarded the capture of Zitácuaro as presenting little difficulty; and in his communications with Calleja he expressed his dissatisfaction at Empáran's dilatoriness, wrongly attributing it to want of energy and inclination.
Although Venegas was anxious to place the expedition under some other leader, circumstances prevented his doing so, and he ordered Empáran to advance against Zitácuaro without further delay. Empáran accordingly, though suffering in health, led out his division, composed of 2,000 of the best troops of Calleja's army, and by forced marches under drenching rains arrived on the 19th of June within six leagues of the town. Entering by the same canon as that followed by Torre, for two days the royalist army with great difficulty pursued its march up the narrow and rugged bed, continually impeded by obstructions thrown in the way by the insurgents. Emerging from the gloomy ravine on to the more open ground of the glen in which Zitdcuaro was situated, Empáran took up a position on the 21st, in front of the gently rising elevation of Los Manzanillos near the ​town. On the following day the royalists took possession of the hill without difficulty, and also routed a strong body of insurgents, estimated at 10,000 or 12,000, which assailed their rear; but all attempts to take the town were prevented by the ditch, which was filled with water and defended by well trained infantry under cover of the barricade. After nine hours' fighting, during which the troops suffered heavy loss, Empáran withdrew to Los Manzanillos, where his soldiers bivouacked, comfortless and disspirited.
When the dull morning came with its leaden, rain-charged sky, the royalist leader recognized the hopelessness of any further attempt against Zitácuaro. The ground on which they had fought on the preceding day was inundated and was, indeed, an impassable swamp. Lacking means of crossing the moat, and without provisions or ammunition, Empáran cursed in his heart the viceroy who had forced him forward against his better judgment. Retreat was the only course left; and mustering into line, he retired through the canon to Toluca, his force reduced one half. Here, prostrated by fatigue and exposure, the wound received on his head at the battle of Calderon ​breaking out again, Empáran lay at the point of death. His condition did not, however, prevent Venegas from venting his wrath upon the unfortunate chief. The fault was altogether his own, but he, being ruler, must have someone to throw the blame upon. He sent the conde de Alcaraz to Toluca to investigate. Disgusted at the treatment, as soon as his health permitted, Empáran asked permission to return to Spain, although the result of the investigation left him without prejudice. His request was granted. On his arrival in the peninsula he retired from military service, and died shortly afterward. Thus ended the career of one of the few royalist chiefs who, while no less brave than competent, was able to temper success with mercy.
While these reverses—which were the more pronounced by reason of the coincident successes of Morelos in the south, and the aggressive operations of the insurgents at Valladolid—were causing Venegas great anxiety, an unforeseen peril was threatening him in the capital. As early as April a plot was formed to seize the person of the viceroy, and force him to give orders for the release of Hidalgo and his fellow-captives. The prime mover was Doña Maríana Rodriguez de Lazarin, a woman of great daring and devotion to the cause, and with such energy and tact did she manage the matter that the plans of the conspirators were already arranged and the day appointed. On the evening before this day, however, one of them, José María Gallardo, mindful that he might lose his life in the coming adventure, bethought him to provide for the saving of his soul by confessing. to Padre Camargo of la Merced, divulging therein the particulars of the conspiracy. Camargo immediately informed the viceroy, and Gallardo, who was ​apprehended without loss of time, in abject terror disclosed the names of all concerned. A number were arrested that night; and as further information was gained, a great many persons of high position were found to be implicated. Doña Maríana and her husband were confined in a dungeon till December 1820, when they were liberated by the exertions of Zerecero. Although it does not appear that any executions followed the discovery of this plot, many of those arrested languished for a long time in prison.
The failure of this conspiracy did not, however, deter others. Plots thickened in the capital, and when the failure of Empáran's attack upon Zitácuaro became known, the bolder conspirators, hoping to deal a finishing blow at royalist power in New Spain, again formed a plot to seize the viceroy. Their plan was to attack his escort on the 3d of August, while he was taking his customary evening ride, in the paseo de la Viga, and having secured his person, to conduct him to Zitácuaro, and deliver him into the power of Rayon. There he would be coerced to issue orders consigning the government of the kingdom to Rayon. But again a traitor marred the plot on the eve of its accomplishment. On the night of the 2d, one Cristobal Morante, who had attended the last meeting of the conspirators when their plans were finally arranged, denounced the proceedings to Venegas, who immediately gave orders for necessary precautions to be taken. On the following morning the principal conspirators were arrested, and in order to allay the agitation caused by the discovery and the military measures taken, the viceroy on the same day issued a proclamation informing the public of what had occurred. ​Proceedings were at once brought against the prisoners, and their trials conducted with the utmost haste. Six of them were condemned to death, and executed on the 29th of the same month.
Among those arrested were three Augustinian friars, Juan Nepomuceno de Castro, Vicente Negreiros, and Manuel Rosendi. Castro was degraded by the ecclesiastical court, and handed over to the secular power; the other two were deposed from their religious dignities, and sentenced to confinement in the convents of their order in Manila. The criminal court, however, demanded the surrender of all three. This gave rise to disputes between the two jurisdictions, and the viceroy, deeming it impolitic to exhibit the spectacle of an ecclesiastic's execution in Mexico, finally sent them all to Habana, to be there confined. Castro, however, died on his way thither in the castle of Ulúa, where so many others under similar circumstances had been released from durance by death. ​Notwithstanding the triumphs obtained by the independents at Zitácuaro, and the successful progress of Morelos in the south, Rayon recognized the want of coöperation among the revolutionary leaders. By a union only could permanent advantage be gained over an enemy who could concentrate an overpowering force at any point and destroy them in detail. With a view of centralizing authority, Rayon formed the plan of a national junta, under some show of popular election, and he corresponded with Morelos, who indorsed his views. Then he convoked an assembly of as many of the principal inhabitants of Zitácuaro and land owners in the district as could be collected, and laid the matter before them. This meeting was held on the 19th of August, and an act was passed, establishing a supreme national junta consisting of three members, to be increased to five as occasion might require, and nominating for election Rayon, José María Liceaga, and José Sixto Verdusco, the cura of Tusantla.For the installation of this junta, and the election of the members, the principal chiefs were convoked the same day to give their votes on the matter. The act of the general junta was confirmed by them; the nominees were elected by a large majority, and took oath to maintain the rights of the church and the king, and shed the last drop of blood for liberty. The electors then swore to obey the decrees and enactments of the newly created ​council, which was styled the Suprema Junta Nacional, and a circular copy of the proceedings was sent to the different chiefs, calling upon them to take the oath of allegiance and exact the same from the troops and inhabitants in their respective districts.
The news of the establishment of a government was received with great joy by the revolutionists, and they now indulged in the most sanguine hopes of the accomplishment of their high aspirations. The result, however, fell far short of their expectations. The suprema junta failed to receive general recognition; many of the military leaders refused obedience to it; others only acknowledged its authority when convenient, while the Villagranes even placed themselves in hostility to it. But what contributed most to its inefficiency was disagreement among its members. Some said it had no title to obedience, not having been convened by the nation. Morelos and some others did not like the idea of still holding on to the skirts of royalty; they thought it a species of deception ruling in the name of Fernando, when pure independence alone would satisfy them. The members of the junta tried to soothe his scruples, and in a letter dated the 4th of September, defended their action on the ground of expediency. Although they aspired to independence with no less ardor than their colleagues, they found it advantageous to the cause to proclaim Fernando, inasmuch as many Europeans as well as wavering Spanish Americans had thereby been induced to join them. But Morelos could not countenance a measure which he foresaw would lead to complications, and although he was appointed the ​fourth member of the junta of Zitácuaro, he held aloof.
The establishment of this junta, however, caused Venegas considerable alarm. He could not close his eyes to the fact that even the mere semblance of a government would give impulse to the revolution, and afford a dangerous opportunity to the insurgent leaders of uniting under the direction of rulers who were no more illegitimately constituted than had been the junta of Seville. Its destruction, therefore, was of the first importance; and Calleja, who had already been ordered to proceed against Zitácuaro after Empáran's repulse, was again urged to use all possible despatch. In order to counteract the effect from the use of the name of Fernando VII. by the newly organized junta, Calleja proclaimed in Guanajuato on the 28th of September that no junta was here recognized except the national congress of the córtes in Spain, nor any authority as legitimate except that of the viceroy. He moreover placed a price of $10,000 on the head of Rayon and those of his principal associates.
While Calleja was making his preparations to assault Zitácuaro with that unhurried leisurely system always pursued by him, and which in this case detained him till the end of the year, a variety of events occurred. The danger to which Valladolid had been exposed during July caused Venegas, as soon as Empáran's troops had recovered from their fatigue, to despatch Colonel Joaquin Castillo y Bustamante with his battalion to the assistance of Trujillo. This officer, having joined Linares in Valladolid, ​proceeded on the 6th of September against Muñiz, who was posted at Acuitzio with 8,000 men and thirteen pieces of artillery; and on the following day defeated him and captured his guns and ammunition. He then marched to Pátzcuaro, which was occupied by Torres, who, however, did not await his attack, but retired to Zacapo, and uniting his forces with those of Navarrete, took up a position on the hills near Zipiméo, where he gave battle to the royalists. Torres was as unsuccessful as Muñiz; he was routed with great slaughter and the loss of twenty-one cannon. Extreme severity was exercised by Castillo after these victories; at Zipimeo more than 300 prisoners were put to death. And Castillo seemed to regard other kinds of butchery with favor, as he commended to the favorable notice of Trujillo a dragoon who, in the pursuit at Acuitzio, slew with his own hand a brother, saying, as the latter pleaded for his life, that he knew no brother who was a rebel.
On the departure of Castillo from Toluca with a considerable portion of the troops stationed there, Rayon determined to extend his operations into the province of Mexico, and sent detachments in the direction of Ixtlahuaca and Tenango. These made inroads to the gates of Toluca, and Venegas despatched Captain Porlier, who had returned to Mexico, to take command of the force in that city. On the 16th of September Porlier marched from Toluca against the insurgents, and on the 21st made an unsuccessful attempt to dislodge them from a strong position on the hill of Tenango. The loss of the royalists was considerable, and Toluca being threatened, Porlier retraced his steps thither. Before his arrival, on the 10th of October, the city had been assaulted by the enemy, and was cannonaded for the five following days. Meanwhile the viceroy had despatched a force ​of 500 men from the capital to the assistance of the besieged. Porlier, on the arrival of this detachment, assumed the offensive, and drove the insurgents from their positions with the loss of their artillery, arms, and ammunition. Of 100 Indians taken prisoners all were drawn up in file and shot, except one who was dismissed to bear the tidings to his countrymen.
The viceroy now peremptorily ordered Calleja to march against Zitácuaro. Calleja, aware of the peril in which Guanajuato would be placed by his departure, was nevertheless compelled to obey these instructions, and unwillingly left that city on the 11th of November, having been frustrated in his attempts to provide for the safety of the province by arrangements with Arredondo and Cruz, who, indeed, were fully occupied in protecting their own territories. Thus abandoned to its own resources of defence, the city of Guanajuato lay exposed to the attack of numerous bands of guerrillas who gathered round as soon as Calleja was out of sight. On the 26th that indefatigable chief Albino García occupied the hill of San Miguel with some 12,000 men, and opened fire on the city. An attempt made by a party of royalists to capture the enemy's cannon by assailing their rear failed, nearly every man being killed; and the insurgents, taking advantage of their success, pushed forward into the town, and attacked the plaza. Here, however, they lost a cannon which they had placed in the plazuela of San Diego, and Albino García, aware that reinforcements were approaching from Leon and Silao to the relief of the besieged, hurriedly with drew to the hacienda of Cuevas, where a great number of his followers dispersed. But although the insurgents failed in their attempts against the capital ​and the principal towns, which were attacked in turn, the province was overrun by fierce bands of guerrillas and subjected throughout its length and breadth to the scourge of predatory warfare. In the neighboring province of Michoacan the aspect of affairs underwent no material change. Although the capital was relieved from immediate danger, it was the only place held absolutely in possession by the royalists. During the last three months of the year, various expeditions were sent into the districts of Pátzcuaro, Tacámbaro, Ario, and Uruapan, but though the government forces succeeded in driving Muñiz and other chiefs from place to place, destroying the founderies which they established and burning their camps, they made no permanent progress. In Nueva Galicia, Cruz was more successful. On the principle of Calleja's new system, military companies were organized in most of the towns, and by their coöperation in resisting the predatory attacks of the revolutionists, the province was gradually reduced to tranquillity.
The city, of Querétaro, well fortified and garrisoned, was secured against attack, but the surrounding territory was no more exempt from civil strife than the neighboring provinces, and the comandante Rebollo sent frequent expeditions against the rebels, who interrupted the communication between the capital and Querétaro to such an extent that only immense convoys strongly escorted could pass through the infested district. In communication with the insurgent ​leaders in Querétaro were those operating in the Huasteca and Mexico. The progress made by the revolution in the eastern part of the latter province was rapid and alarming. During August and the succeeding months of 1811, the insurrection spread southward
​through the plains of Apam and extended across Puebla to the confines of Oajaca. Toward the close of the year the territory of Tlascala was invaded, the city attacked, and many of its towns and their districts devastated. The highway between the capital and Orizaba was almost closed to the royalists, and communication with Vera Cruz interrupted.
The first impulse to the revolutionary movement in the plains of Apam was given by José Francisco Osorno, a highwayman by profession, and so illiterate that he only succeeded in learning to scrawl his name when he became prominent as a leader. Having collected a band of 600 or 700 men, he entered Zacatlan on the 30th of August without opposition. Here he was presently joined by Mariano Aldama a relative of the Aldamas who had been the associates of Hidalgo with the rank of major-general; and their rapid progress soon caused inconvenience in the capital by the stoppage of supplies from the haciendas situated in the plains. Venegas accordingly despatched an expedition against Zacatlan under the command of a naval captain named Ciriaco del Llano. This officer gained a series of successes over the insurgents, but his sanguinary and oppressive proceedings, instead of extinguishing the insurrectionary spirit, only served to inflame it. Thus Osorno, though repeatedly defeated and his followers dispersed, ever reappeared at ​some point distant from the scene of his late reverse at the head of his reunited men, and his name became as celebrated in the plains of Apam as that of Albino García in the Bajío of Guanajuato.
* ↑ Gaz de Mex., 1811, ii. 425-31.
* ↑ See copy of the plan, dated June 8, 1811, in Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc., iii. 289-90.
* ↑ In May 1811 the provincias internas were divided into two comandancias generales, subject to the viceroy's authority, by an order of the Spanish government, which was confirmed by the regency in July 1812. Prov. Inter. Carta del Ministro, and Id., Real orden Mayor, MS., nos. 6 y 7.
* ↑ See Calleja's despatch of July 31, 1811, in Gaz de Mex., 1811, ii. 747-8.
* ↑ García was a native of Salamanca, a town situated in the southern part of the province. He derived this sobriquet of Manco from being crippled in one arm by a fall from his horse. Alaman, Hist. Mej., ii. 249.
* ↑ Gaz. de Mex., 1811, ii. 493-7, 509-10. Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna, a cadet of the Santa Cruz regiment, was commended by Arredondo for his gallant conduct in one of the engagements alluded to in the text. Id., 496. This is the first time that Santa Anna's name appears in print.
* ↑ Id., 507-8. Arredondo tells the viceroy that at the mission of Ola shortly before his arrival an unfortunate prisoner was slowly roasted alive, from the feet upwards, by the Indians, and eaten! hist. mex., vol iv 21
* ↑ 'Hasta la Sierra Gorda, confinando con el Mezquital y los llanos de Apan y las costas de Tuxpan en el seno mejicano.' Alaman, Hist. Mej., ii. 282.
* ↑ The combined attack was unpremeditated, as the royalist leaders were not aware of each other's movements. This nearly led to a disaster, as the soldiers of Elosúa fired upon those of Semper before they discovered that they were friends. Gaz. de Max., 1811, ii. 1235-6.
* ↑ Id., 1811, ii. 744-6, 1234-6; Iturribarría, Mem., in Soc. Mex. Geog., vii. 291-2.
* ↑ Bustamante, Cuad. Hist., i. 292; Liceaga, Adic. y Rect., 196.
* ↑ 'La insurreccion está todavia muy léjos de calmar; ella retoña como la hidra, á proporcion que se cortan sus cabezas.' Bustamante, Campañas de Calleja, 127.
* ↑ The action took place on the 11th of July. Francisco Guizarnótegui, the officer in command of the royalists, received Calleja's highest commendation on this occasion. Gaz. de Mex., 1811, ii. 750. In subsequent operations several leading insurgent chiefs were captured and shot. Among them was Luz Gutierrez.
* ↑ On the 26th of June. García lost five cannon, and was prevented by this defeat from approaching Salamanca, where he had great influence. Gaz. de Mex., 1811, ii. 749.
* ↑ Cruz in his instructions to Porlier says: 'No deve perdonarse la vida á ningun revelde sea de la clase, condicion, y edad que fuere.' Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc., iii. 224.
* ↑ See his correspondence with Cruz during Feb. and March of this year. Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc., iii. 224-35, 249-07.
* ↑ Gaz. de Mex., 1811, ii. 411; Parte de Negrete, in Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc., iii. 270-2.
* ↑ Gaz. de Mex., 1811, ii. 467-8. The leader of the insurgents was the 'infame lego Gallaga,' who retired with a few followers to Tomatlan. About the end of August he was there taken prisoner and shot. Alaman, Hist. Mej., ii. 299-30.
* ↑ The rewards offered were proportionate to the military grades, the leaders being rated at $500 a head, their colonels at $300, sub-officers at $100, and an ordinary individual at $50. Cruz in the same proclamation enacted that in every town which had lapsed into revolt after the extension of the indulto to it, all the rebellious inhabitants should be put to death. Gaz. de Mex., 1811, ii. 715-18.
* ↑ Id., ii. 759, 763-6, 811-14, 836-8, 967-70; Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc., iii. 287-9, 295-6, 324-5, 328-9, 330-1, 338-9, 368, 370-1.
* ↑ Ward, Mex. in 1827, i. 180.
* ↑ The name of guerrilla volante was given to this force. According to Mora, the outrages committed by it were worse than those of the insurgents. Mej. y sus Rev., iv. 182.
* ↑ Torre was a native of Spain, being born in the mountains of Santander.
* ↑ Consult Gaz. de Mex., 1811, ii. 43, 212-10, 221-7, 232-8, 265-75.
* ↑ Torre displayed a strange mixture of merciless severity and religious faith in a merciful saviour. He persecuted the insurgents, not only as rebels, but as wretches cast outside the pale of the church by excommunication. His cruelty and fanatical piety are well illustrated in a proclamation which he addressed to the inhabitants of Temascaltepec on the 11th of March. While offering them the choice of the indulto or death, he concludes by wishing them, with the lord's grace, all happiness. Id., 1811, ii. 238.
* ↑ Bustamante, Campañas de Calleja, 137. See map previously given.
* ↑ 'Siendo indudable,' he writes Calleja, 'que la reunion de Zitácuaro es despreciable, y que el suceso desgraciado,' that is, of Torre, 'fué efecto de haberse dirigido mal.' Bustamante, Campañas de Calleja, 123-4.
* ↑ Calleja had already forwarded complaints to the viceroy injurious to Empáran. Venegas thus influenced was not sparing of him, and told Calleja that it would be necessary for him to come and take charge of the expedition. Calleja, however, explained to the viceroy how impossible it would be for him to do so at the present time, and suggested that the command be given to Trujillo. Id., 123-5. As the reader is aware, Trujillo's position at this time precluded the possibility of his leaving Valladolid.
* ↑ Bustamante says that Empáran sent out two detachments to forage, one in the direction of San Mateo, and the other toward the town of San Francisco, and that the first was entirely destroyed by the Indians, while the other only saved itself by flight. Cuad. Hist., i. 224. Mora also follows this account. Mej. y sus Rev., iv. 186. Empáran, in his report to the viceroy, makes no mention of these reverses. Gaz. de Hex., 1811, ii. 598; nor does Alaman.
* ↑ Among the infantry were 200 soldiers of the regiment of Tres Villas and 100 deserters from the garrison at Valladolid. Alaman, Hist. Mej., ii. 365.
* ↑ Bustamante states that during the night great alarm was caused by a stratagem of Rayon's, who fastened paper lanterns to droves of donkeys, which were then driven toward the royalist camp. Cuad. Hist., i. 225. Mora enlarges upon this story, and says that Empáran's soldiers were thus thrown into panic. Mej. y sus Rev., iv. 188. Empáran, in his report, however, affirms, 'en la noche no se advirtiò cosa que mereciera atencion.' Gaz. de Mez., 1811, ii. 601.
* ↑ Bustamante, Cuad. Hist., i. 225. 'Logró por fin llegar a Toluca con poco menos de quinientos hombres, como consta de la revista que por órden del virey le pasó en esta ciudad el conde de Alcaraz.' Mora, Mej. y sus Rev., iv. 188. The accounts given by Alaman and Bustamante of this disaster differ considerably. The former follows in the main the report of Calleja given in Gaz. de Mex., 1811, ii. 597-694.
* ↑ When the ranks of the independent party were in despair at the news of the capture of Hidalgo, Doña Maríana at a meeting in her house proposed to seize the viceroy, and obtain the release of the captives or hang him. Zerecero, Mem. Rev. Mex., 359. This was the origin of the April conspiracy.
* ↑ Among them Padre Belaunzaran, afterward bishop of Monterey, the marquis of Rayas, the counts of Santiago, Regla, and Medina, and several high officials in the service of the government.
* ↑ Consult Bustamante, Martirol., pp. 51; and Mex. Refut. Artic. Fondo, 12. Zerecero was the author of the work quoted in note 33.
* ↑ Gaz de Mex., 1811, ii. 780.
* ↑ Bustamante erroneously states that it was a woman who divulged the plot. Cuad. Hist., i. 299.
* ↑ These were the licenciado Antonio Ferrer, Ignacio Cataño and José Maríano Ayala, subalterns of the commercial regiment, Antonio Rodriguez Dongo, in whose house the conspirators held their meetings, and Felix Pineda and José Maríano Gonzalez. The execution of Ferrer was little less than murder. The only evidence against him was the denunciation of one Manuel Teran, an official of the secretaría de cámara de vireinato, who stated that Ferrer on the morning of the 3d of August had invited him to go armed and on horseback that afternoon to the paseo de la Viga, and made him acquainted with the plans formed for the execution of the design. No other witness appeared against him, and he strenuously denied Teran's assertions, maintaining in his declaration that he knew nothing of the plot before that morning. So weak was the charge that the fiscal, José Ramon Oses, only ventured to propose the punishment of six years imprisonment. The Spanish party, however, were loud in their demands for his death. Ferrer was a lawyer, and too many of that class were attached to the cause of independence. The viceroy was importuned so urgently that he declared if the criminal court did not impose capital punishment upon Ferrer he would do so himself. The president of that court, the oidor Bataller, a Spaniard, wished to save his life, but the two alcaldes, Yañez and Torres Torija, both Americans, pronounced the sentence of death, and Bataller unwillingly signed the death-warrant. When Ferrer heard the sentence read to him, he fell senseless in the court, overwhelmed with the injustice to which he was victim. Alaman, Hist. Mej., ii. 370, 372-3; Zerecero, Mem. Rev. Mex., 424-8; Bustamante, Cuad. Hist., i. 300. A declaration asserted to be written by him 'sin sugestion ni seduccion de nadie,' before his death and recognizing the justice of his sentence, was published in the official gazette two days after his execution. Gaz. de Mex., 1811, ii. 784-5.
* ↑ Besides Alaman, Bustamante, and Zerecero, already quoted, consult Rivera, Hist. Jal., i. 338-9; Mex. Cabildo Metrop., pp. 14, in Doc. Ecles. Mex., MS., ii. no. 4; and Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc., iii. 435-6.
* ↑ Bando, in Hernando y Dávalos, Col. Doc., iii. 340.
* ↑ The names of those assembled were: Ignacio Rayon, minister of the nation; Lieutenant-general José María Liceaga; José Sixto Verdusco, as representative of General Morelos; the mariscales de campo Ignacio Martinez and Benedicto Lopez; Brigadiers José María Vargas and Juan Albarran; Remijio Yarza, as representative of General José Antonio Torres; Colonel Miguel Serrano, as representative of General Toribio Huidrobo; Captain Manuel Manzo, for the commissioner Mariano Ortiz; the commissioner Tomás Ortiz; the quartermaster Ignacio Ponce de Leon; and sub-inspector Vicente Izaguirre. Id., iii. 403.
* ↑ Rayon naturally had great preponderance in this assembly, which at most was only a partial representation of the independent leaders. A few other persons present gained votes to the number of four, and two; and one was cast for Morelos! Ib. Alaman says of Rayon's intentions, 'siendo su plan que la autoridad recayese en él mismo.' Hist. Mej., ii. 397.
* ↑ Even now they were not able to act wholly independent of royalty.
* ↑ Albino García, remarked, 'No hay mas rey que Dios, ni mas alteza que un cerro, ni mas junta que la de dos rios.' Bustamante, Cuad. Hist., i. 298.
* ↑ 'No era razon,' says Morelos at his trial, 'engañar á las gentes haciendo una cosa y siendo otra, es decir, pelear por la independencia y suponer que se hacia por Fernando VII.' Alaman, Hist. Mej., ii. 381.
* ↑ Gaz. de Mex., 1812, iii. 489. This letter fell into the possession of Calleja, at the capture of Cuautla in May 1812, together with others papers of Morelos. Guerra maintains that this document was a fabrication of the royalists. Rev. N. Esp., ii. 420-1.
* ↑ Consult Zerecero, Rev. Mex., 399-403; Bustamante, Cuad. Hist., I 293-6; Mora, Mej. y sus Rev., iv. 308-10; Guerra, Rev. N. Esp., ii. 402-10. Morelos, in a letter to Rayon dated August 13, 1811, had previously sanctioned the proposed establishment of a supreme junta, and appointed Verdusco as his representative. Zamacois, Hist. Mej., vii. 559-02, supplies a copy of it.
* ↑ The proclamations and enactments of the junta bore this heading: El Sr Don Fernando Septimo y en su Real Nombre la Suprema Junta Nacional Americana, etc. Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc., in. 392.
* ↑ Porlier had passed through Guanajuato in August on his way from Guadalajara to Vera Cruz, and conducted to the capital a convoy of 1422 bars of silver placed under his charge by Calleja. Alaman, Hist. Mej., ii. 310; Bustamante, Campañas de Calleja, 129. hist. mex., vol. iv. 22
* ↑ Gaz. de Mex., 1811, ii. 957-60, 977-80, 1006-10; Alaman, Hist. Mej., ii. 392.
* ↑ The despatch of Venegas was concluded in such terms as to cause Calleja additional offence. Bustamante, Campañas de Calleja, 132-3.
* ↑ Id., Cuad. Hist., i. 424-7; Hernandez y Dávalos, Col Doc., iii. 447-9. Cruz had, moreover, instructed Captain Angel Linares, then at Lagos, to hold himself in readiness to assist Guanajuato. Id., iii. 429-30.
* ↑ These expeditions were generally commanded by Fernando Romero Martinez and Ildefonso de la Torre, both European Spaniards, and whose ferocity gained for them an infamous notoriety. The former indulged his bloodthirstiness by putting bound captives to death with his own hand, and the latter respected neither sex nor age in the butcheries which he perpetrated. Alaman, Hist. Mej., ii. 405-6. Particulars of the engagements in Querétaro will be found in Gaz. de Mex., 1811, ii. 149-51, 381-4, 594-6, 69D-702, 707-11, 719-21, 760-1, 1022-4, 1192-3, 1195-6; Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc., iii. 336-7.
* ↑ On the 14th of November a convoy consisting of 2,000 pack mules, under the conduct of Colonel Andrade, entered Mexico. Besides 600 bars of silver, it conveyed a great quantity of articles of consumption, and its safe arrival was a matter of rejoicing to the inhabitants of the capital. Andrade left Mexico some days later with a return convoy six leagues in length, escorted by a body of troops 400 strong. On the 23d he was attacked by the Villagranes, Anayas, and Correa, the cura of Nopala, who had declared for the revolution and had been made brigadier by the junta of Zitácuaro, and appointed comandante of Huichapan and Jilotepec. Although the insurgents were repulsed, they succeeded in driving off some pack mules, and the action was so brisk that the bishop of Guadalajara, who was returning to his diocese, was in danger of being captured. Alaman, Hist. Mej., ii. 407-8; Gaz. de Mex., 1811, ii. 1108-11.
* ↑ Such is the statement of Calleja in his manifiesto supplied by Martiñena in his Verdadero Origen de la Rev. en N. Esp., 16-7. Osorno was convicted in Puebla for robbery about the year 1790. He attained to the rank of major general and lieutenant general in the revolutionary service. Bustamante glosses over the criminal antecedent of this leader. Cuad. Hist., i. 358.
* ↑ At the beginning of the revolution the governor of Habana had sent to Mexico a number of naval officers who wished to take service in the royalist army. Id., i. 359.
* ↑ An order which he issued to the effect that no one except a public character might ride on horseback caused great and general discontent, and many joined Osorno in order to save their horses, which were regarded with affection, from being taken for military work. Still more oppressive was Llano's system of burning the homes of the country people on the ranches scattered through the plains, in order to compel the inhabitants to congregate in the larger towns and oppose the insurgents. Id., i. 360-1; Gaz. de Mex., 1811. ii. 932.
* ↑ Aldama had been treacherously murdered by one José María Casalla, who received him into his house under the guise of friendship and assassinated him while asleep. Bustamante, Cuad. Hist., i. 363. By his death Osorno succeeded to the chief command.
* ↑ Details of the royalist operations in the plains of Apam will be found in Gaz. de Mex., 1811, ii. 871-8, 931-6, 987-91, 1056-8.