# God's glory in the heavens/The Eternity Of Matter

Gyroscope.
XIX. THE ETERNITY OF MATTER.
Robert Hall, in his Sermon on Infidelity, employs the following argument to meet the position of the infidel, that the world may have existed from eternity. It is an old scholastic argument, put in a somewhat striking point of view:—"Besides, an eternal succession of finite beings involves in it a contradiction, and is therefore plainly impossible. As the supposition is made to get quit of the idea of any one having ​existed from eternity, each of the beings in the succession must have begun in time, but the succession itself is eternal. We have then the succession of beings infinitely earlier than any being in the succession; or, in other words, a series of beings running on ad infinitum, before it reaches any particular beings, which is absurd." This appears plausible; but no one can read it without feeling that there is a fallacy somewhere. To shew that there is no weight in the argument, it is only necessary to state it in its most general terms. But before doing so, let it be remarked, that the present argument is quite distinct from that of design or causation, and that consequently the expression, "finite being," is used merely as a unit of time. The most general statement, then, of the argument is this—" An infinite series of finites involves in it a contradiction." So far from this involving a contradiction, it is the only intelligible definition of infinity that can be given. At any rate, when we attempt to form a conception of infinity either of time or space, we take a finite or unit and multiply it indefinitely. We conceive of eternity, for example, by conceiving of an infinite number of years. Let "years " be substituted in the above form of the argument, and the matter becomes still more palpable—" An infinite series of years involves in it a contradiction." The only answer to this is, that there is no contradiction here, unless there is a contradiction involved in the very idea of ​eternity itself. And, in fact, the argument goes to prove that nothing can be eternal—that eternity is an impossible fiction. It is strange that exception should be taken to an "infinity of finites," seeing that the most familiar processes of algebra furnish illustrations; for every diverging series presents the idea of infinity made up of finite terms. Dr Samuel Clarke, although he loved to tread on slippery ground, abandoned the above scholastic argument as absurd. The ground of his objection does not, however, appear quite correct. He says, the misconception arises from regarding finites as "aliquot parts of infinity, whereas they are disparate," or, as the geometrician would term them, incommensurable quantities—finite being the same to infinite, as a point to a solid, or a line to a surface. On the contrary, a unit of time and infinite duration are commensurable quantities, though the proportion is indeterminate, just as the finite terms of a series and the series itself are not disparate, although we cannot determine the sum of the series. It is not at all necessary to have recourse to such recondite reasoning. The argument, when stated in its most general terms, bears its own refutation in the face of it. It tacitly assumes a certain definition to be true, and then asserts that it is not true — that it involves a contradiction.
The following scholastic argument is similar to Hall's, but somewhat more complicated and startling. It is taken from Hick's Lectures on Theology:— ​"If matter has existed from eternity, it must have existed as we have seen in the same form which it at present sustains, for this is the consequence of its necessary existence. The earth on which we dwell and the heavens above us are eternal; and the same motions have been incessantly going on in the immense regions of space. The earth has been revolving on its own axis, and, as well as the other planets, has been performing its circuit around the sun. Its revolutions upon its axis have been infinite, and so have been its revolutions in its orbit, and so have been the revolutions of Saturn. Mark the consequence! We have here three infinites which are made up of unequal parts, an infinite made up of the revolutions of Saturn, the time of which is twenty-nine times less than the infinite made up of the annual revolutions of the earth, and many thousand times less than the infinite made up of the diurnal revolutions of the latter. Thus we are landed in a palpable absurdity, from which we can only escape by renouncing the untenable hypothesis of the eternity of the universe, and admitting the scriptural doctrine of its creation." The reductio ad absurdum consists in the conclusion that infinites may be unequal. Now, if this conclusion necessarily follows from the assumption that the revolutions of the planets have been infinite, or, in other words, from the conception of an infinite number of finites, we must admit that the argument is good. But the ​reductio ad ahsurdum is obtained by assuming an absurdity in the process of proof. The conception of unequal infinites is absurd, but so is that of equal infinites. Neither equality nor inequality can be predicated of infinites. But the author evidently thought that infinites must be equal, and it is by assuming this in the course of proof that he lands us in an absurdity. He proceeds on the axiom, that if equals be multiplied by unequals, the products must be unequal. The unequals are the respective units or periods of revolution, the equals are the infinites by which they are multiplied; and consequently the resulting infinites are unequal. Here he assumes that infinites must be equal; which is absurd, for equality can be predicated only of finite qualities. The remark, that the idea of matter may be entirely dropped from the formula without in the least affecting the argument, is applicable to both of the above arguments; so that, if the reasoning have any force, it tells equally against all existence, mind as well as matter.
The antinomies of Kant involve the same fallacy. He assumes one definition in the thesis, and adopts another in the antithesis. The essence of the fallacy lies in tacitly assuming that infinity is a definite whole, of which equality and inequality may be predicated. For example, he proves the contradiction involved in a past eternity in this manner. If we reckon the past eternity from to-day, we have the following ​equation: "an infinite number of years = infinity;" but if we reckon from to-morrow we have the equation, " an infinite number of years + one day = infinity." If we subtract the one equation from the other we arrive at the result, "one day = nothing."
But how do we arrive at this absurd conclusion? Simply by assuming, in subtracting one infinite front the other, that infinities must be equal; but such an assumption is opposed to the fundamental definition of infinity, which admits neither of equality nor inequality being predicated of it. This question is altogether distinct from the metaphysical one in reference to our power of conceiving or cogitating the infinite. It may be admitted that human thought is so limited that we cannot picture infinity to our minds. The question is, simply, can we not so define the idea of infinity, that it may be validly employed in any process of reasoning? We have seen that the attempts to prove contradictions in the very conception of infinity, are based on the fallacy of using two distinct and contradictory definitions of the term. The correct definition recognises infinites as incapable of comparison; the erroneous and tacitly-assumed definition involves the idea that infinites must be equal. In metaphysics, as well as mathematics, we shall meet with no antinomies if we use the word "infinity" in a correct and consistent manner. In his a priori argument, Dr Clarke does not think it necessary to prove the non-eternity of matter. He ​holds that the chain is complete without this forming a link in it. All that is necessary for his purpose is to prove that matter is not self-existent; so that his argument would be equally strong though the opinion of the ancient philosophers were admitted, that matter is an eternal effect of an eternal cause.
With regard to the a posteriori argument, the attempt to prove a beginning is limited to the collocations of matter. It is satisfied with the proof of a plastic creation, leaving the question of an absolute creation untouched. Paley, for example, deals only with the watch. He abandons the stone (representing unformed matter) as beyond his province. Dr Chalmers narrows still further the sphere of Natural Theology. He throws aside altogether the argument of design as an independent argument. He holds that we are not warranted from design to infer a designer. He denies that this is an ultimate principle in our nature, and falls back on Dr Thomas Brown's doctrine of sequence. According to this doctrine, we, by the constitution of our nature, necessarily infer the antecedent from the consequent, and vice versa. In the case in question the consequent is the design, the antecedent is the designing mind. But he holds, following the views of Dr Crombie, that the design must be proved to be a consequent before we can infer the antecedent designer—that the world must be proved to be an effect before the design which it manifests can lead us to the First ​Cause. In short, proof must be obtained that the present order of things had a beginning; and to obtain this proof he appeals to the revelations of geology. But geology serves his purpose only in as far as it discountenances the doctrines of transmutation and spontaneous generation; so that his whole argument rests upon the truth or falsity of these doctrines. Now, it is undoubtedly the case that the vast preponderance of scientific evidence is in favour of successive creative acts, in opposition to transmutation or spontaneous generation; still, we deplore the attempt to base the whole superstructure of Natural Theology on this the obscurest of natural sciences—to substitute a faint glimmering light from the darkest recesses of nature for the bright sunshine of design reflected from all God's works. According to this view, the argument of design per se is of no use whatever in proving the being of a God. Its bearing is felt only after the being of a God is virtually proved by establishing a beginning to the collocations of matter.
It is obvious from the line of argument pursued both by Paley and Chalmers, that they looked upon the non-eternity of matter as a purely scriptural truth beyond the reach of human reason. But if we admit the argument of design, if we admit that collocation implies a beginning, may we not legitimately push the argument somewhat further, and hold that matter itself must have had a beginning? We observe marks ​of design in the collocation of parts, and at once infer a beginning to the collocation; but may not the same argument apply to the parts themselves? Does not the adaptation of the parts to form the collocation evince design, and imply a beginning? For example, the solar system manifests design, and had, therefore, a beginning; but the matter out of which the system was formed must have been wisely adapted for such a cosmical combination; and are we not entitled to infer that this chaotic matter had a beginning also, or that matter is not eternal?