# Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the case of Labed, Ahmed Bin Kadr (16 September 2005)

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Transcribed from pages 20-23 of http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/detainees/csrt_arb/ARB_Round_1_Factors_000595-000693.pdf
UNCLASSIFIED
* Department of Defense
* Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants
* at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba
| To: | Labed, Ahmed Bin Kadr |
| Subject: | Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the case of Labed, Ahmed Bin Kadr |
| 1. | An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary. |
| 2. | The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state or to a third state; (2) transfer you to your home state, or a third state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state, or the third state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control. |
| 3. | The following primary factors favor continued detention: |
| | a. Commitment The detainee admitted going door-to-door with the Jama'at Tablighi (JT) for three days in Hamburg attempting to discuss Islam with people. The Talbighi Jama'at is an Islamic missionary organization founded to spread Islam and recruit followers. Islamic extremists have been known to exploit the organization to enhance their ability to fight the perceived enemies of Islam. A member of JT traveled to Afghanistan while the detainee was there and asked the detainee to return to Germany with him in October 2001, but the detainee refused. Around March 2001, an acquaintance at the al Nur Mosque gave the detainee two videotapes of the mujahidin in Afghanistan and Chechnya. After watching the videotapes, the detainee contacted this facilitator and made arrangements for his travels to Afghanistan. Originally, the detainee stated he traveled to Affghanistan to fight jihad to make amends for the wrongs he committed. Later, the detainee stated that prior to viewing the videotapes, he had begun thinking of a scheme to travel to Afghanistan to purchase drugs and then smuggle them back to Germany to sell. He said he made plans to travel to Afghanistan under the guise of training for jihad. In June 2001, the detainee purchased a fraudulent Belgian passport, while his facilitator purchased round trip plane tickets for the detainee to travel from Germany to Afghanistan. On 3 September 2001, the detainee and Bahaji traveled from Hamburg via Istanbul, Turkey, to Karachi, Pakistan. They remained for three days before glying to Quetta, Pakistan. In Quetta, the Taliban provided a driver to take them to a Taliban safe house in Kandahar, Afghanistan. The detainee volunteered to fight for the Taliban against the Northern Alliance around Bagram under the command of Abdul Wakhil. In December 2001, the detainee retreated with the Taliban to Zormut, Afghanistan. They remained in Zormut during the month of Ramadan and then traveled to Banuu, Pakistan. The detainee met a senior al Qaida Lieutenant in December 2001 who was smuggling mujahidin into Pakistan. Durign Ramadan 2001, a senior al Qaida lieutenant convinced 20 of approximately 100 mujahidin to leave Afghanistan at the request of local Afghan leaders. About one week later, the group of 20 proceeded to Banuu, Pakistan. The 20 men were told al Qaida would contact them to continue their jihad as soon as the situation in Afghanistan had improved. Sometime in February 2002, al Qaida sent the group to Lahore, Pakistan, and then to Faisalabad, Pakistan. Traveling with this group was Jose Padilla (aka Abdallah al-Muhajir) and Fouad Zouaoui (aka Aalha al-Kini). Abdallah al-Muhajir and Talha al-Kini were planning to build a bomb using conventional explosive and radiological materials and then detonating it in the United States. The detainee remained in Lahore for approximately three and a half months, moving between several homes. He was then taken to Abu Zubaydah's safe house in Faisalabad, Pakistan. According to a senior al Qaida lieutenant, the Lashkar e Tayyiba as a Foreign Terrorist Organization . The Secretary of State has designated Lashkar e Tayyiba as a Terrorist Organization. Pakistanis moved the detainee to Faisalabad, Pakistan, but they mistakenly placed him in Abu Zubaydah's house. Since the detainee did not have any connection of relationship to Abu Zubaydah, he should have been placed in the Yemeni house. The detainee and others at Abu Zubaydah's house had a 15-minute period between the time they realized the Pakistani police had surrounded the house and the time entry was made to hide their fake passports and concoct stories to tell the police. b. Training The detainee served in the Algerian Army as a conscript for four years starting in January 1979. He served primarily as a physical training teacher and weapons guard, receiving training on the AK-47, Seminov and Dictaroff (a single-shot rifle). In September 2001, the detainee attended the al Farouq Training Camp and the surrounding mountain training area for approximately thirteen days. While in the mountains, he received training on the Kalashnikov rile, Rocket Propelled Grenade and physical training. The detainee also attended Camp Nine outside Kabul for approximately 25 days, receiving training in camouflage techniques, weapons, and physical fitness. c. Connections/Associations During Ramadan 2000, the detainee met Sa'id Bahaji at the al Trak mosque in Hamburg. Bahaji is a known al Qaida operative connected to the 11 September 2001 attacks. Bahaji allegedly facilitated the false identification papers, cash, visa and transportation for the hijackers of the 11 September 2001 attacks. He also networked with other al Qaida cells around the world to fine tune the attacks on 11 September 2001. An admitted al Qaida member identified the detainee as a friend of an explosives trainer. d. Other Relevant Data Betwee 1973 and 1982, the detainee was arrested at least seven times in Algeria for stealing, robbery, receiving sentences varying from one week to two years. In 1985, he was found guilty of statutory rape after he married a 17-year old without her father's permission. From 1990 to 1994, the detainee lived in Rome, Italy, where he dealt illegal drugs. He was arrested for stealing at least six times while in Italy. From 1994 to 2001, the detainee lived in Hamburg, Germany, where he was involved in numerous illegal activities and spent over two years total in prison. His crimes included possession of a shotgun; pick pocketing, credit card fraud, prison escape and possession of fraudullent identification. He continued to deal in illegal drugs while in Germany. |
| 4. | The following primary factors favor release or transfer: |
| | a. The detainee denied seeing American forces while serving with the Taliban fighting the Northern Alliance, and did not know they were even fighting until the bombinng began. b. The detainee has no ill feelings towards the United States. He is aware he has made mistakes in the past and is willing to pay for these mistakes. He has spent most of his life in jail or prison and is hoping this will be his last detention, as he no longer wants to live a life of crime and wants to settle down with his family. |
| 5. | You will be provided with a meaningful opportunity to be heard and present information to this Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter. |