# Steinmetz v. Currie

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STEINMETZ et al. verʃus CURRIE.
T
M'KEAN, Chieƒ Juʃtice.– This is an action of very confiderable importance, not only as it affects the prefent parties, but as it affects every holder, drawer, or indorfor of a bill of exchange. The honor and juftice of the State are, indeed, likewife interefted, that the decifion fhould be conformably to the general mercantile law of rations, left a deviation fhould be impufed to our ignorance, or difrefpect, of what is right and proper. It fhould be remembered too, that the Defendant is a ftranger, and that the event of this fuit can be no further obligatory elfewhere, than as it correfponds with the univerfal and eftablifhed ufage of all countries ; for, upon the prefent queftion, that, and not the local regulations of Pennʃylvania, muft furnifh the rule of determination.
It appears, then, that one Whitelaw, on the 30th of October, 1775, drew a bill of exchange for Ł 339. 18. fterling, upon William Houʃton, matter, and Co. in Roƒrew, near Glaʃgow, in favor of James Witherʃpoon, or order, and payable on the 1ft day of Auguʃt, 1776. This bill, afterwards, but it is not certain at what period, Witherʃpoon indorfed to Currie the Defendant, who fometime in the year 1777 indorfed it to Melfrs. Archibald and John Blair, and thofe gentlemen, before the month of October, 1778, indorfed it to John Pringle, by whofe fubfequent indorfement, it became the property of Steinmetz and Bell, the Plaintiff in this caufe. It appears further, that Steinmetz and Bell on the 19th of October, 1778, indorfed the bill of exchange to Mr. Freeman, who is now dead, and by whom, in his lifetime, it was tranfmitted to William Cowpland of London. The bill feems to have been fpeedily and regularly indorfed after it came into the hands of the Plaintiffs; and Cowpland, having duly received it from Mr. Freeman, demanded payment of the perfons upon whom it was drawn on the 30th of December, 1778, when it was protefted on account of their refufal, for which they affigned ​
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reafons, that can have no effect or relation to the caufe. The notice of this proteft was received by Freeman's executor, William Sitpractus, on the 13th of April, 1780, and he gave notice to Meffrs. Steinmetz and Bell on the 28th of the fame month ; but thofe gentlemen did not until the 16th of October, 1782, giving any notice to Currie, the Defendant, who was arrefted the day following to anfwer in this action.
Thefe are the material facts ; and, on them, were are not to enquire, how it happened that the bill lay three years, from the time of drawing to the time of protefting it ; for, as between indorfor and indorfee, every indorfor is confidered as a new drawer. The defence, however, is on this fingle point, that the Plaintiffs had notice on the 28th of April, 1780, and yet gave none to the Defendant until the 17th of October, 1782, a period of two years and a half, except twelve days. Whether that was a reafonable time, will depend upon the circumftances of the cafe. It appears that the Plaintiff lived in Philadelphia, and the Defendant, when he fold the bill, lived at Fiʃhkill in the ftate of New-York, about 130 miles off. This, in point of diftance, is not fo great, but that he might have been found, or, at leaft, fome enquiry made after him, much fooner. We are, therefore, unanimoufly of opinion, that the delay has been unreafonable ; but if they have fatisfactorily account to the Jury for that delay ; their verdict will be in favor of the Plaintiffs. Were it, however, before us, on a fpecial verdict, we fhould certainly determine, that it is an unreafonable time.
It is alledged, that the difficulties of the war prevented the giving notice, and that the Plaintiffs could not bring their action, untill they were in poffeffion of the bill. But is that true? Could not notice be given, notwithftanding the war? They faw the bill and proteft in the hands of Sitgreaves, and they knew they became refponfible. It was, therefore, their duty to provide for their indemnification and to give immediate notice. Nor could there by any great difficulty in finding the Defendant, for he appears to have been a man of note, in extenfive bufinefs, and dealt, at that very time, with Pringle, another indorfor of the bill, who lived in Philadelphia, and from whom information might have been obtained. There is perhaps, and honeft and a reafonable ground for not giving notice untill after the 20th of May, 1780, left the money fhould be paid in depreciated paper. But two years more elapfed, when that danger was over, by the extingifhment of continental money.
It has been faid, likewife, that when the drawer has no effects in hands, no notice is neceffary ; but it has been determined otherwife, as between indorfor and indorfee, upon the cleareft principles. What is it to the indorfor and indorfee, upon the cleareft principles. What is it to the indorfee whether the drawer has effects or not? Every indorfor is in law a new drawer, and he may be compelled to pay a bill, even where the name of the drawer had been forged. Every day's experience fhews that bills are taken on the credit of the indorfor alone–fometimes when the drawer is totally unknown. Nor ​
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can it be alledged, that no injury has been fuftained, fince in the courfe of things, all the prior indorfors might have failed.
Upon the whole, we think the ftrength of the evidence is againft the Plaintiffs ; and if the Jury are of the fame opinion, they will find a verdict accordingly. But if, on the contrary, they are fatisfied with the reafons given for not making an earlier demand, they will find for them.
The opinion of the Court being fo unfavorable to the Plaintiffs, they voluntarily fuffered a nonfuit, when the Jury were at the bar ready to return their verdict.
In the courfe of the Trial, the Plaintiffs offered John Pringle, (their immediate preceeding indorfor) as a witnefs ; and, in order to do away his intereft in the action, they propofed ftriking his name off the firʃt and third bills of the fet ; which were the only bills in their poffeffion, the ʃecond, on which the proteft was made, being, as they alledged, loft in its paffage from England to America.
It was objected by the Defendant, that Pringle's nae would ftill remain upon the ʃecond bill (which, for any thing that appeared to the contrary, might be in the hands of a third perfon) and on the records of the notary, who made the proteft ; fo that he could not be effectually difcharged in the way propofed.
To this, the Plaintiffs counfel replied, that, where there are feveral fecurities for the fame thing, a difcharge of one is a difcharge of the whole; and they inftanced the cafe of a captain of a fhip, who ufually figns three bills of lading, of the fame tenor and date.
But, by the court : In that cafe, if the captain take a receipt, he would certainly be difcharged. In the inftance before us, however, the ʃecond bill may be in the poffeffion of a bona ƒide purchafer, who will be entitled to fue Pringle upon it, notwithftanding any act of the Plaintiffs on this occafion. We are of opinion, that Pringle is clearly interefted in the caufe, and, therefore, inadmiffible as a winefs.
It was fuggefted, that if the Plaintiffs executed releafe to Pringle, he might be made a witnefs ; but Ingerʃoll, doubting whether a releafe to one indorfor, would not be a releafe to all, did not chufe to adopt this meafure.
It was alfo ruled, in this caufe, that the cafe in Term Reports, being a determination upon general mercantile law, was of authority here ; and that it would have been fo, if it had been determined in France, Spain, or Holland, as well as in England.