# Walbrun v. Babbitt/Opinion of the Court

* Court Documents
* Case Syllabus
* Opinion of the Court
United States Supreme Court
83 U.S. 577
Walbrun v. Babbitt
In the view we take of this case it is not necessary to notice the assignments of error upon the instructions to the jury by the court below. In some respects they may be technically inaccurate, and in others they were far too favorable to the defendants. But, in any event, they did not materially affect the merits of the action, and, as there were no disputed facts bearing on the real matter in controversy, the court could have properly told the jury to find, as they did, for the plaintiffs. Indeed, the verdict was so obviously right that the court would not set aside the judgment when the record shows that no other result could be obtained on a new trial.
That Mendelson intended to defraud his creditors in the course which he pursued is too plain for controversy; but the inquiry is, has he succeeded in diverting his property from the payment of his debts to the injury of his creditors?
The 35th section of the bankrupt law condemns fraudulent sales equally with fraudulent preferences, and declares that if such sales are not made in the usual and ordinary course of the business of the debtor that fact shall be prim a facie evidence of fraud. The usual and ordinary course of Mendelson's business was to sell at retail a miscellaneous stock of goods common to country stores in a small town in the interior of the State of Missouri. It was to conduct a business of this character that the goods were sold to him, and, as long as he pursued the course of a retailer, his creditors could not reach the property disposed of by him, even if his purpose at the time were to defraud them.
But it is wholly a different thing when he sells his entire stock to one or more persons. This is an unusual occurrence, out of the ordinary mode of transacting such a business, is prim a facie evidence of fraud, and throws the burden of proof on the purchaser to sustain the validity of his purchase.
Summerfield seeks to overthrow the legal presumption that Mendelson intended to commit a fraud on his creditors by showing that he paid full value for the goods in ignorance of the condition of Mendelson's affairs. But the law will not let him escape in this way. The question raised by the statute is not his actual belief, but what he had reasonable cause to believe. In purchasing in the way and under the circumstances he did, the law told him that a fraud of some kind was intended on the part of the seller, and he was put on inquiry to ascertain the true condition of Mendelson's business. This he did not do, nor did he make any attempt in that direction. Indeed, he contented himself with limiting his inquiries to the object Mendelson had in selling out, and to his future purposes. Something more was required than this information to repel the presumption of fraud which the law raised in the mere fact of a retail merchant selling out his entire stock of goods. If this sort of information could sustain the sale, the provision of the bankrupt law we are considering would be no protection to creditors, for any one in Mendelson's situation, and with the purpose he had in view, would be likely to give the party with whom he was dealing a plausible reason for his conduct.
The presumption of fraud arising from the unusual nature of the sale in this case can only be overcome by proof on the part of the buyer that he took the proper steps to find out the pecuniary condition of the seller. All reasonable means, pursued in good faith, must be used for this purpose. If Summerfield had employed any means at all directed to this end he would have discovered the actual insolvency of Mendelson.
In choosing to remain ignorant of what the necessities of his case required him to know, he took the risk of the impeachment of the transaction by the assignee in bankruptcy, in case Mendelson should, within the time limited in the statute, be declared a bankrupt.
The defendants are in no better condition than Summerfield would be if he had not transferred the stock to them, because they took his title with full knowledge of its infirmity, and must blame their own folly for the result. Ritter, the active agent of the firm in the transaction, was fully informed by Summerfield of the circumstances attending his purchase, and this information was confirmed on his arrival at Kingsville. He there found Mendelson in charge of the store, with some of the goods boxed up and some on the shelves, sure indications that the sale was recent and that there had been no actual change of possession. These things, in connection with the residence of Summerfield in St. Louis, and his occupation there, ought to have excited the fears of a reasonable man that the sale by Mendelson was not for an honest purpose, and prompted him to make inquiry upon the subject. Ritter, instead of doing this, treated the transaction as one of ordi ary occurrence and as not imposing on him the duty of ascertaining the pecuniary status of either the vendor or vendee. Without learning anything, or seeking to learn anything, beyond the facts that the goods suited him and Mendelson wanted to change his business, he completed the purchase and immediately transferred the stock to the store of the defendants in Chillicothe. If this sale can be upheld, the law which declared the title of Summerfield prim a facie fraudulent could be easily rendered of no benefit, for all that would be necessary for a person buying property out of the ordinary course of business of the seller, to place it out of the reach of creditors, would be, as soon as he had consummated his purchase, to sell to another, who would acquire a good title, no matter how presumptively invalid the title of his vendor might be. It needs no argument to prove that if the law against fraudulent sales could be evaded in this way, it would furnish no sort of protection to creditors. Ritter, when he purchased, knew the nature of Summerfield's title, because he knew, or ought to have known, that a retail dealer like Mendelson, in selling out his entire stock, was presumptively guilty of intending to defraud his creditors, if it should turn out that he had any. Of this the bankrupt law gave him distinct notice, and as he chose, like Summerfield, to remain ignorant of Mendelson's affairs, he took the hazard of Summerfield's inability to prove the fairness of his title. It follows that if the sale to Summerfield cannot be supported, neither can the sale by him to the defendants.
It is unnecessary to notice the exceptions taken to the admission or rejection of testimony, because our decision is based on the evidence which was received without objection, and about which there is no controversy.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
[See the next following case, and also Smith v. Buchanan, supra, p. 277.]

## Notes

* ↑ Bevans v. The United States, 13 Wallace, 56.
* ↑ Scammon, Assignee, v. Cole, 5 National Bankruptcy Register, 257; Graham v. Stark et al., 3 Id. 95; Kingsbury et al. v. Hale, Ib. 84; Driggs v. Moore, Ib. 149; Tuttle v. Truax, 1 Id. 169.
This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
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