# Cameron v. Johnson (390 U.S. 611)/Opinion of the Court

* Court Documents
* Case Syllabus
* Opinion of the Court
* Dissenting Opinion Fortas
United States Supreme Court
390 U.S. 611
Cameron v. Johnson
Argued: March 5 and 6, 1968. --- Decided: April 22, 1968
Appellants brought this action for declaratory and injunctive relief in the District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi. They sought a judgment declaring that the Mississippi Anti-Picketing Law is an overly broad and vague regulation of expression, and therefore void on its face. They also sought a permanent injunction restraining appellees-the Governor and other Mississippi officials-from enforcing the statute in pending or future criminal prosecutions or otherwise, alleging that the then pending prosecutions against them for violating the statute were part of a plan of selective enforcement engaged in by appellees with no expectation of securing convictions, but solely to discourage appellants from picketing to protect racial discrimination in voter registration and to encourage Negro citizens to attempt to register to vote.
A three-judge court initially considered the issues on the amended complaint and answers, and dismissed the complaint 'in the exercise of its sound judicial discretion' and 'in furtherance of the doctrine of abstention,' having concluded 'that such extraordinary relief is not due or suggested in this case. * * *' 244 F.Supp. 846, 849. We vacated the dismissal, 381 U.S. 741, 85 S.Ct. 1751, 14 L.Ed.2d 715, and remanded for reconsideration in light of our intervening decision in Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 85 S.Ct. 1116, 14 L.Ed.2d 22. On remand the three-judge court conducted an evidentiary hearing and again dismissed, this time with prejudice. 262 F.Supp. 873. We noted probable jurisdiction. 389 U.S. 809, 88 S.Ct. 127, 19 L.Ed.2d 63. We affirm.
The Mississippi Anti-Picketing Law was enacted by the Mississippi Legislature and signed by the Governor on April 8, 1964, and became effective immediately. The Forrest County voting registration office is housed in the county courthouse in Hattiesburg. The courthouse is set back a distance from the street and is reached by several paved walks surrounding grass plots and a monument. On January 22, 1964, civil rights organizations fostering increased voter registration of Negro citizens staged a large demonstration on the courthouse site. Thereafter they maintained a picket line on the grounds every day except Sunday from January 23 until May 18, 1964. To facilitate access to the courthouse the sheriff at the outset blocked off with barricades a small 'march route' area within the grounds to the right of the main entrance to the courthouse, where the pickets, usually few in number were allowed to picket until April 9. On April 9, the day following the enactment of the Anti-Picketing Law, the sheriff accompanied by other county officials, read the new law to the pickets at the 'march route' and directed them to disperse, which they did. The sheriff also removed the barricades marking the 'march route.' On the morning of April 10, the pickets, now increased to 35 or 40 persons, appeared at the courthouse and resumed picketing along the now unmarket 'march route.' The pickets were arrested and formally charged with violation of the Anti-Picketing statute. Others were arrested that afternoon. Seven more pickets were arrested and charged on the morning of April 11. The complaint in this action was filed April 13. Picketing nonetheless continued on the 'march route' every day until May 18, but no further arrests were made until May 18, when nine pickets were arrested and charged. All picketing stopped thereafter.
The District Court's response on the remand to reconsider the case in light of Dombrowski was first to render a declaratory judgment, cf. Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 88 S.Ct. 391, 19 L.Ed.2d 444, that the statute was not void on its face, rejecting appellants' contention that it is so broad, vague, indefinite, and lacking in definitely ascertainable standards as to be unconstitutional on its face. We agree with the District Court.
Appellants advance a two-pronged argument. First, they argue that the statute forbids picketing in terms 'so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application * * *.' Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391, 46 S.Ct. 126, 127, 70 L.Ed. 322. But the statute prohibits only 'picketing * * * in such a manner as to obstruct or unreasonably interfere with free ingress or egress to and from any * * * county * * * courthouses * * *.' The terms 'obstruct' and 'unreasonably interfere' plainly require no 'guess(ing) at (their) meaning.' Appellants focus on the word 'unreasonably.' It is a widely used and well understood word and clearly so when juxtaposed with 'obstruct' and 'interfere.' We conclude that the statute clearly and precisely delineates its reach in words of common understanding. It is 'a precise and narrowly drawn regulatory statute evincing a legislative judgment that certain specific conduct be * * * proscribed.' Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 236, 83 S.Ct. 680, 684, 9 L.Ed.2d 697.
The second prong of appellants' argument is that the statute, even assuming that it is 'lacking neither clarity nor precision, is void for 'overbreadth,' that is, that it offends the constitutional principal that 'a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulation may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms." Zwickler v. Koota, supra, 389 U.S. at 250, 88 S.Ct. at 396. The argument centers on the fact that the proscription of the statute embraces picketing employed as a vehicle for constitutionally protected protest. But 'picketing and parading (are) subject to regulation even though intertwined with expression and association,' Cox v. State of Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 563, 85 S.Ct. 476, 480, 13 L.Ed.2d 487, and this statute does not prohibit picketing so intertwined unless engaged in in a manner which obstructs or unreasonably interferes with ingress or egress to or from the courthouse. Prohibition of conduct which has this effect does not abridge constitutional liberty 'since such activity bears no necessary relationship to the freedom to * * * distribute information or opinion.' Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161, 60 S.Ct. 146, 150, 84 L.Ed. 155. The statute is therefore 'a valid law dealing with conduct subject to regulation so as to vindicate important interests of society and * * * the fact that free speech is intermingled with such conduct does not bring with it constitutional protection.' Cox v. State of Louisiana, supra, 379 U.S. at 564, 85 S.Ct. at 481.
The District Court's further response on remand to reconsider the case in light of Dombrowski was to deny injunctive relief, after an evidentiary hearing, on findings that appellants failed to show sufficient irreparable injury to justify such relief. Appellants argue in this Court that the record discloses sufficient irreparable injury to entitle them to the injunction sought, even if the statute is constitutional on its face.
Dombrowski recognized, 380 U.S., at 483-485, 85 S.Ct., at 1119-1120, the continuing validity of the maxim that a federal district court should be slow to act 'where its powers are invoked to interfere by injunction with threatened criminal prosecutions in a state court.' Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 162, 63 S.Ct. 877, 880, 87 L.Ed. 1324; see Zwickler v. Koota, supra, 389 U.S., at 253, 88 S.Ct., at 398. Federal interference with a State's good-faith administration of its criminal laws 'is peculiarly inconsistent with our federal framework' and a showing of 'special circumstances' beyond the injury incidental to every proceeding brought lawfully and in good faith is requisite to a finding of irreparable injury sufficient to justify the extraordinary remedy of an injunction. 380 U.S., at 484, 85 S.Ct., at 1119, 1120. We found such 'special circumstances' in Dombrowski. The prosecutions there begun and threatened were not, as here, for violation of a statute narrowly regulating conduct which is intertwined with expression, but for alleged violations of various sections of excessively broad Louisiana statutes regulating expression itself-the Louisiana Subversive Activities and Communist Control Law and the Communist Propaganda Control Law. These statutes were challenged as overly broad and vague regulations of expression. Despite state court actions quashing arrest warrants and suppressing evidence purportedly seized in enforcing them, Louisiana officials continued to threaten prosecutions of Dombrowski and his co-appellants under them. In that context, we held that a case of 'the threat of irreparable injury required by traditional doctrines of equity' was made out. 380 U.S., at 490, 85 S.Ct., at 1123. We held further that the sections of the Subversive Activities and Communist Control Law (for alleged violations of which indictments had been obtained while the case was pending in the federal court) were patently unconstitutional on their face, and remanded with direction to frame an appropriate injunction restraining prosecution of the indictments.
In short, we viewed Dombrowski to be a case presenting a situation of the 'impropriety of (state officials) invoking the statute in bad faith to impose continuing harassment in order to discourage appellants' activities * * *.' 380 U.S., at 490, 85 S.Ct., at 1123. In contrast, the District Court expressly found in this case 'that there was no harassment, intimidation, or oppression of these complainants in their efforts to exercise their constitutional rights, but they were arrested and they are being prosecuted in good faith for their deliberate violation of that part of the statute which denounces interference with the orderly use of courthouse facilities by all citizens alike.' 262 F.Supp., at 876, see also 244 F.Supp., at 848-849. We cannot say from our independent examination of the record that the District Court erred in denying injunctive relief.
Any chilling effect on the picketing as a form of protest and expression that flows from good-faith enforcement of this valid statute would not, of course, constitute that enforcement an impermissible invasion of protected freedoms. Cox v. State of Louisiana, supra, 379 U.S. at 564, 85 S.Ct. at 480. Appellants' case that there are 'special circumstances' establishing irreparable injury sufficient to justify federal intervention must therefore come down to the proposition that the statute was enforced against them, not because the Mississippi officials in good faith regarded the picketing as violating the statute, but in bad faith as harassing appellants' exercise of protected expression with no intention of pressing the charges or with no expectation of obtaining convictions, knowing that appellants' conduct did not violate the statute. We agree with the District Court that the record does not establish the bad faith charged. This is therefore not a case in which '* * * a federal court of equity by withdrawing the determination of guilt from the state courts could rightly afford (appellants) any protection which they could not secure by prompt trial and appeal pursued to this Court.' Douglas v. City of Jeannette, supra, 319 U.S. at 164, 63 S.Ct. at 881. We have not hesitated on direct review to strike down applications of constitutional statutes which we have found to be unconstitutionally applied to suppress protected freedoms. See Cox v. State of Louisiana, supra; Wright v. State of Georgia, 373 U.S. 284, 83 S.Ct. 1240, 10 L.Ed.2d 349; Edwards v. State of South Carolina, supra.
Appellants argue that the adoption of the statute in the context of the picketing at the courthouse, and its immediate enforcement by the arrests on April 10 and 11, provide compelling evidence that the statute was conceived and enforced solely to bring a halt to the picketing. Appellants buttress their argument by characterizing as 'indefensible entrapment' the enforcement of the statute on April 10 against picketing conduct which county officials had permitted for almost three months along the 'march route' marked out by the officials themselves. This argument necessarily implies the suggestion that had the statute been law when the picketing started in January it would not have been enforced. There is no support whatever in the record for that proposition. The more reasonable inference is that the authorities believed that until enactment of the statute on April 8 they had no choice but to allow the picketing. In any event, upon the adoption of the law, it became the duty of the authorities in good faith to enforce it, and to prosecute for picketing that violated that law. Similarly, insofar as appellants argue that selective enforcement was shown by the failure to arrest those who were picketing from April 11 to May 18, the short answer is that it is at least as reasonable to infer from the record that the authorities did not regard their conduct in that period as violating the statute. Indeed, the fact that no arrests were made over that five-week period is itself some support for the District Court's rejection of appellants' primary contention that appellees used the statute in bad faith to discourage the pickets from picketing to foster increased voter registration of Negro citizens.
Nor are we persuaded by the argument that, because the evidence adduced at the hearing of the pickets' conduct throughout the period would not be sufficient, in the view of appellants, to sustain conviction on a criminal trial, it was demonstrated that the State had no expectation of securing valid convictions. Dombrowski v. Pfister, supra, 380 U.S. at 490, 85 S.Ct. at 1122. This argument mistakenly supposes that 'special circumstances' justifying injunctive relief appear if it is not shown that the statute was in fact violated. But the question for the District Court was not the guilt or innocence of the persons charged; the question was whether the statute was enforced against them with no expectation of convictions but only to discourage exercise of protected rights. The mere possibility of erroneous application of the statute does not amount 'to the irreparable injury necessary to justify a disruption of orderly state proceedings.' Dombrowski v. Pfister, supra, 380 U.S. at 485, 85 S.Ct. at 1120. The issue of guilt or innocence is for the state court at the criminal trial; the State was not required to prove appellants guilty in the federal proceeding to escape the finding that the State had no expectation of securing valid convictions. Appellants say that the picketing was nonobstructive, but the State claims quite the contrary, and the record is not totally devoid of support for the State's claim.
Appellants argue that selective enforcement was shown by the evidence that subsequent to the arrests of the pickets parades were held in Hattiesburg during which the streets of the downtown area, including the locale of the courthouse, were cordoned off during daytime business hours and the sidewalks were obstructed by crowds of spectators during the parades. But this statute is not aimed at obstructions resulting from parades on the city streets. All that it prohibits is the obstruction of or unreasonable interference with ingress and egress to and from public buildings, including courthouses, and with traffic on the streets or sidewalks adjacent to those buildings. There was no evidence of conduct of that nature at any other place which would have brought the statute into play, let alone evidence that the authorities allowed such conduct without enforcing the statute.
Affirmed.
Mr. Justice FORTAS, with whom Mr. Justice DOUGLAS joins, dissenting.

## Notes

* ↑ The statute as amended is codified as Miss.Code Ann. § 2318.5 (Supp.1966), and in pertinent part provides:
* ↑ All of the prosecutions were removed under 28 U.S.C. § 1443 to the federal courts. Following our opinion in City of Greenwood, Miss. v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808, 86 S.Ct. 1800, 16 L.Ed.2d 944, the cases were remanded to the state courts. Hartfield v. State of Mississippi, 5 Cir., 363 F.2d 869. They were subsequently stayed by the District Court and are presently stayed pending our decision on this appeal.
* ↑ Our per curiam stated, 381 U.S. 741-742, 85 S.Ct. 1751 1752, 'On remand, the District Court should first consider whether 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1958 ed.) bars a federal injunction in this case, see 380 U.S., at 484, n. 2, 85 S.Ct. at 1119. If § 2283 is not a bar, the court should then determine whether relief is proper in light of the criteria set forth in Dombrowski.' The District Court held that § 2283 prohibited the court from enjoining or abating the criminal prosecutions initiated against the appellants prior to the filing of the suit on April 13, 1964, and further, that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 creates no exception to § 2283. 262 F.Supp. 873, 878. We find it unnecessary to resolve either question and intimate no view whatever upon the correctness of the holding of the District Court.
* ↑ The three-judge District Court which rendered the initial decision consisted of Circuit Judge Rives and District Court Judges Mize and Cox. Upon the death of Judge Mize, Circuit Judge Coleman was designated to serve in his stead. Circuit Judge Rives dissented from his colleagues on both occasions. See 244 F.Supp., at 856, 262 F.Supp., at 881.
* ↑ In the initial decision the District Court declined to pass on the statute's constitutionality, holding that the case was one for abstention. 244 F.Supp., at 855-856. In Zwickler we held that it was error in the absence of special circumstances to abstain and refuse to render a declaratory judgment and, further, said, 389 U.S. at 254, 88 S.Ct. at 399: 'a request for a declaratory judgment that a state statute is overbroad on its face must be considered independently of any request for injunctive relief against the enforcement of that statute. We hold that a federal district court has the duty to decide the appropriateness and the merits of the declaratory request irrespective of its conclusion as to the propriety of the issuance of the injunction.'
* ↑ See Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195, 200-201, 86 S.Ct. 1407, 1410, 16 L.Ed.2d 469.
* ↑ The appellants suggest that the amendment to the statute which twice inserts the word 'unreasonably' 'raises new questions of unconstitutional vagueness and overbreadth not before this Court on the original appeal.' The District Court rejected this argument, 262 F.Supp., at 879: 'Plaintiffs * * * argue that the addition of the word 'unreasonably' to the statute made it even more vague and indefinite, but we disagree. The word 'unreasonable' seems to have been well understood by the founders of the Republic when they used it in the Fourth Amendment, where it remains, and is enforced, as it should be, to this day.' Judge Rives, in dissent, 262 F.Supp., at 897, n. 58, found that the addition of the word to the statute did not alter its scope. 'On the contrary, the defendants argue that the statute should always have been interpreted as if this word were present and that the persons arrested did unreasonably block the Court House.'
* ↑ See Cameron v. Johnson, 381 U.S., at 749-750, 85 S.Ct. at 1755-1756 (dissenting opinion of BLACK, J.); id., at 757, 85 S.Ct. at 1759 (dissenting opinion of WHITE, J.).
* ↑ See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Flowers, 377 U.S. 288, 307, 84 S.Ct. 1302, 1313, 12 L.Ed.2d 325; see also Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 249-250, 88 S.Ct. 391, 396-397, 19 L.Ed.2d 444; Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 609, 87 S.Ct. 675, 687, 17 L.Ed.2d 629; Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 508-509, 84 S.Ct. 1659, 1664-1665, 12 L.Ed.2d 992; NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438, 83 S.Ct. 328, 340, 9 L.Ed.2d 405; Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488, 81 S.Ct. 247, 252, 5 L.Ed.2d 231; Cantwell v. State of Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304-307, 60 S.Ct. 900, 903-904, 84 L.Ed. 1213; Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161, 165, 60 S.Ct. 146, 150, 152, 84 L.Ed. 155.
* ↑ See Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161, 60 S.Ct. 146, 150, 84 L.Ed. 155; Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 499-500, 69 S.Ct. 684, 689, 93 L.Ed. 834; NAACP v. State of Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460-462, 78 S.Ct. 1163, 1170-1171, 2 L.Ed.2d 1488; NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438-439, 83 S.Ct. 328, 340-341, 9 L.Ed.2d 405.
* ↑ See 244 F.Supp., at 849: '(T)his Court indicates nothing as to the guilt or innocence of the plaintiffs * * *'; 262 F.Supp., at 876: 'We do not sit in this proceeding to determine the guilt or innocence of the plaintiffs * * *.'
This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
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