# Hopkins v. Cohen/Dissent White

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* Case Syllabus
* Opinion of the Court
* Dissenting Opinion White
United States Supreme Court
390 U.S. 530
Hopkins v. Cohen
Argued: March 11 and 12, 1968. --- Decided: April 2, 1968
Mr. Justice WHITE, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and Mr. Justice BRENNAN join, dissenting.
As the Court recognizes, § 206(b)(1) entitles the attorney of a Social Security benefits claimant to a fee 'not in excess of 25 percent of the total of the past-due benefits to which the claimant is entitled by reason of such judgment * * *.' (Emphasis added.) The Court characterizes the normal and natural reading of this language as 'too technical a construction * * * which we need not adopt.' From the undisputed fact that benefits accruing to the dependents of a claimant inure to the benefit of the claimant as head of the family, the Court seems to conclude that it may read 'claimant' to mean 'claimant and his dependants.' Because I see no justification for this result, either in the language of the statute or its history, I dissent.
Section 206(b)(1) deals with the attorney's fees payable with respect to 'a claimant under this title who was represented before the court by an attorney * * *.' The attorney may receive no more than 25% of the benefits payable to such a claimant 'by reason of such judgment. * * *' Only plaintiffs can meet the § 206(b)(1) definition of a 'claimant.' Therefore, dependents who are not joined as parties in a suit for past-due benefits are not 'claimants,' for they are not before the court, are not represented in court, and do not receive a judgment. In this case only petitioner, and not his wife and children, was the plaintiff in the court below. As is true in most such cases, petitioner's wife and children were determined in separate administrative proceedings to be dependents eligible for secondary benefits under § 202. Their entitlement to § 202 benefits should petitioner be found entitled to benefits under § 223 was not disputed and was not an issue before the court below. Since petitioner was the sole claimant before the court, and the only party for whom his lawyer provided representation in that court, I cannot escape the conclusion that the lawyer was only entitled to a maximum of 25% of the past-due benefits payable to petitioner. The situation might well be different in a case where the dependents were active plaintiffs before the court and where the primary claimant's attorney provided effective representation for the secondary claimants as well.
As the Court makes clear, the purpose of § 206(b)(1) was to reduce contingent fee arrangements by limiting the maximum fees recoverable by attorneys. The Court somehow concludes that this clear legislative purpose militates for a construction of the statute which is against its clear wording and which has the result of once again permitting attorneys to obtain a very high percentage of the benefits payable to Social Security claimants. The legislative history, however, supports the plain language of the statute. Indeed, the Court fails to mention that this very case was generated initially by a claim made by petitioner's lawyer that a contingent fee contract signed by petitioner, which would have given his lawyer 40% of the award, should be given effect because entered into prior to the passage of § 206(b)(1). It was just such contingent fees that Congress meant to prohibit. By its present ruling the Court gives mere lip service to the legislative mandate while effectively undoing it in practice. For the foregoing reasons I respectfully dissent.

## Notes

This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
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