# History of Mexico (Bancroft)/Volume 4/Chapter 10

Contents
CHAPTER X.
SPREAD OF THE REVOLUTION AND BATTLE OF CALDERON.
1810-1811.
Hermosillo's Operations in Sinaloa — Successes at Rosario — His Defeat at San Ignacio — Spread of the Revolution in Nuevo Santander — Coahuila and Nuevo Leon Revolt — Villagran's Doings — Biography of Cruz — Plan of Calleja — Tumult in Valladolid — Cruz Enters Valladolid — He Reorganizes the Government — Engagement at Urepetiro — Allende Joins Hidalgo at Guadalajara — A Council of War — Hidalgo Takes up a Position at the Bridge of Calderon — Plan of Battle-field — Calleja's Dispositions — Flon's Impetuosity — The Revolutionists Nearly Triumphant — Their Final Defeat — Death of Flon — His Character.
On receiving intelligence of the occupation of Guanajuato by Calleja, Venegas regarded the suppression of the insurrection as almost accomplished, when in reality it was more widely spread than ever. We have seen how completely the provinces of Nueva Galicia, Zacatecas, and San Luis Potosí were now in the power of the independents; and it was not likely that they would relax their efforts at this juncture. An expedition into the provinces of Sinaloa and Sonora was planned by Gomez Portugal, and placed under the command of José María Gonzalez Hermosillo, accompanied by the dominican father, Francisco de la Parra, in the character of director and adviser. ​It set out with a force of about 2,500 men, and arrived at Tepic on the 11th of December, where it was still further augmented by volunteers.
On the 15th Hermosillo reached Acaponeta, the border town, distant 115 leagues from Guadalajara; and on the 18th engaged with Colonel Pedro Villaescusa, who was in command of the troops at the real del Rosario. The royalists were defeated, and the town remained in possession of the independents. Herrnosillo gave Villaescusa a letter of safe-conduct to rejoin his family, exacting from him an oath not to take up arms against the independents. Villaescusa, taking advantage of this clemency, retired from the town with more than seventy of his troops, and having recruited on his march all whom he could induce to join the royalist cause, reached San Ignacio de Piastla. He now sent information to the intendente of Sinaloa, Alejo García Conde, who resided at Arizpe, and who hastened to his aid with a company of Indians. Meanwhile Hermosillo entered San Sebastian on the 27th of December without opposition, having been previously joined by the garrison of Mazatlan. His army now numbered nearly 5,000 men, and on the 29th he took up a position on an eminence which commanded the town of San Ignacio de Piastla, a considerable river intervening. Misfortune here ​awaited the insurgent chief. On the 2d of January, 1811, Padre Parra, having discovered a ford, while crossing it in company with five soldiers was taken, prisoner. On the 8th Hermosillo, after fording the river, fell into the hands of 400 royalists secreted in the brush on either side of his line of march. So deadly was the fire opened upon him, that in less than ten minutes more than 300 of the insurgents were slain, and the rest fled panic-stricken. Hermosillo lost all his cannon, baggage, and munitions of war, and the expedition so successfully begun was thus suddenly ended.
But in another direction success attended the revolution. In the eastern provinces it spread with rapidity. After San Luis Potosi had thrown off the yoke, the neighboring district of Nuevo Santander was awakened by the spirit of independence. The governor, Lieutenant-colonel Manuel de Iturbe,was compelled to retreat to Altamira by the revolt of troops which he had raised under the same delusive expectation indulged in by Abarca and Rendon. The country was now overrun by revolutionists. Spaniards were dragged from their homes and cast into dungeons from which the vilest criminals had been released; their wealth was appropriated and their property destroyed. The mines were deserted and ​enterprises abandoned. Many sought escape to the seacoast, or a refuge in some principal town. Great numbers flocked to Saltillo from the mining district of Catorce and neighboring places. Colonel Antonio Cordero was at that time governor of Coahuila, and was organizing a body of troops for the purpose of marching against San Luis Potosí, according to the plan formed by Calleja. The arrival of so many Spaniards at a time so critical might have been turned to good account by an able and energetic commander; but Cordero was not such a man. He was unable to harmonize differences, or secure unity of action, and his attempt to organize them proved a failure.
Hidalgo now appointed his lieutenant-general, Jimenez, to the command of San Luis Potosí and the adjoining provinces. At the close of 1810, Jimenez, at the head of some 10,000 men, marched against Saltillo, and met Cordero on the 6th of January, 1811, on the field of Aguanueva at no great distance from Saltillo. Cordero's force, which was well organized and armed, numbered 2,000; and had his troops remained faithful, he would probably have dispersed the army of Jimenez; but they deserted as soon as they came in sight of the enemy, and Cordero, who sought safety in flight, was made prisoner on the following day. Jimenez next morning entered Saltillo without opposition, and like Hermosillo at Acaponeta, he treated the captive enemy with every consideration.
This bloodless acquisition of Coahuila was followed by the declaration of the governor of Nuevo Leon, ​Manuel Santa María, in favor of the revolution, and the whole of that province acquiesced in his action. In Texas, also, the royalist party for a time succumbed to the independents. On the 22d of January, Juan Bautista Casas made himself master of San Antonio de Bejar, the capital, capturing the governor, Manuel de Salcedo, the lieutenant-colonel, Simon Herrera, commander of the frontier militia, and a number of officers and Europeans. Thus without much bloodshed the whole of that portion of New Spain which extends from San Luis Potosí to the borders of United States declared for independence. The sufferings and indignities, however, to which the fallen Spaniards were subjected were in many cases very great, not even priests escaping by reason of their cloth.
Shortly after the grito de Dolores, Villagran, as the reader will recollect, established himself at Huichapan, and proved extremely troublesome to the royalists by interrupting their communication between the capital and Querétaro. With him two others later associated, ​Cayetano and Maríano Anaya. On one occasion Venegas despatched under a strong escort a quantity of stores to Querétaro, and with it travelled the newly appointed auditor de guerra, Ignacio Velez de la Campa. The insurgents, however, attacked it in the narrow defile of Calpulalpan, and killing the passengers and part of the escort, carried off the stores. A huge rock was rolled down upon the carriage of Velez, crushing his head, after which he was despatched. Venegas decided to send a force to Huichapan for the security of the highway. The brigadier José de la Cruz had just arrived from Spain, and to him the viceroy gave the command of the expedition, with Torcuato Trujillo, of Las Cruces renown, as his second.
José de la Cruz does not appear to have begun his military career before 1808, when owing to the invasion of Spain by the French, he like many others abandoned his university for the profession, of arms. His rise was rapid; and after two years' service under General Gregorio de la Cuesta he was made brigadier. His success in New Spain was no less conspicuous than it had been in the peninsula, but it must be attributed to accident rather than ability. He was truculent and cruel. His rapid promotion was owing to the jealousy with which the viceroy came to regard the successes of Calleja; and such was the influence of Venegas in Spain, that after his return thither and the accession of Calleja to the viceroyalty he maintained Cruz in the high position to which he had elevated him, in order to mortify one whom he could never pardon for having succeeded him in his rôle of vice-king.
On the 16th of November, Cruz marched out of Mexico, his force constisting of the infantry regiment ​of Toluca, 250 dragoons, and two pieces of artillery, afterward reënforced by the provincial infantry regiment of Puebla, and a battalion of marines commanded by Captain Porlier, of the frigate Atocha. Arriving at Nopala on the 20th, he proceeded on the following day to Huichapan, hoping to come in contact with the insurgents; but Villagran, timely informed of the danger, had retreated with all his followers to the sierra of the Real del Doctor and taken up a position on the inaccessible heights of Nasteje or the Muñeca. Cruz on arriving at the town recovered the merchandise and ammunition which had lately been taken by the insurgents in the Calpulalpan defile. His reception by those of the inhabitants who had not fled was joyful; but in order to prevent any further insurrectionary acts, he deprived them of every article of use that could be converted into a weapon, sparing neither the housewife's scissors, the laborer's implements, nor the artisan's tools. He gave imperative orders to the commander of a detachment which he sent out in quest of the Anayas, to put to death the inhabitants of every town or hacienda in which insurgents might be found, or where they had received shelter, reducing the places to ashes. Before his departure from Huichapan, Cruz amply avenged the death of Velez; pendent from the trees on the roadsides all through the defile where the deed was perpetrated swung the corpses of victims hanged in reprisal. On the 14th of December, in ​pursuance of the plan of military operations proposed by Calleja, he left Huichapan for Querétaro on his march for Valladolid, having been joined by the reenforcement above mentioned.
Calleja at this time was at Leon, and the plan he had formed for conducting the campaign was such as would, he hoped, confine the insurgents to the province of Nueva Galicia. Cruz was instructed to march to Valladolid, reducing to obedience the disaffected towns on his way, and so regulate his movements that he would arrive at the bridge of Tololotlan near Guadalajara on the 15th of January, on which date Calleja, approaching by way of Lagos, expected to reach the same important point. Meanwhile Cordero, the governor of Coahuila, who was supposed to be at Matehuala, was to advance against San Luis Potosí, restore order in that district, punish the towns of Dolores, San Luis de la Paz, and others, and remain in the neighborhood of Guanajuato and Querétaro; and lastly, Bonavia, the intendente of Durango, at this time in Sombrerete or Fresnillo, was to descend upon Zacatecas and Aguascalientes, and keep in subjection the districts extending southward as far as Leon and Silao. The design was well conceived, and would enable Calleja and Cruz with their united forces to assail Hidalgo at Guadalajara with a larger and better appointed army than had yet been sent into the field by the royalists; but, as the reader has already been informed, Cordero's troops joined the insurgents; the projected movement from Coahuila upon San Luis Potosí was reversed; and the cordon around Hidalgo was rendered incomplete.
​Having remained a few days at Querétaro, Cruz left on the 20th for Valladolid. His march was uneventful; for although a hostile force threatened to oppose his progress in the neighborhood of Acámbaro, it retreated to Valladolid as he approached. Pedro Celestino Negrete, a naval officer, was sent with a detachment in pursuit, but was unable to overtake the retreating enemy. I mention this apparently trivial circumstance because the name of Negrete, who afterward greatly signalized himself and contributed to the success of Cruz by his victories, appears for the first time in history on this occasion. On the 27th, passing through Indaparapeo, Cruz approached Valladolid and bivouacked for the night on the heights above the city.
As the royalists drew near, the revolutionary intendente, Ansorena, convinced that the forces which he had at his disposal would be unable to cope with those of Cruz, on the night of the 26th and 27th secretly left the city for Guadalajara, escorted by fifty chosen men; and on the following morning the officials appointed by Hidalgo also left, taking with them such treasures and archives as were under their charge.
On the 27th, as soon as the flight of the intendente became public, the populace rose in tumult, and led by a blacksmith of Toluca, who was from the United States, raising the cry of death to the gachupines, broke into the college formerly belonging to the Jesuits, in which a number of Europeans were confined, and put three of them to death before they ​were restrained by the canon, the conde de Sierra Gorda, and other ecclesiastics, who, at the risk of their lives, quelled the tumult by elevating the host.
Cruz entered Valladolid on the morning of the 28th, having given orders to the officer in command of his advance guard to put all the male inhabitants to death, and set fire to the city if any further at tempt should be made to take the lives of Europeans. His entrance was signalized by the usual expression of welcome extended to either royalist or revolutionist when in power. The cathedral chapter, the ayuntamiento, and different corporations escorted him into the city, and in the cathedral te deum was chanted. The municipal and ecclesiastic cabildos vied with each other in representations of their past fidelity, and in the expression of their future zeal for the royalist cause. The conde de Sierra Gorda, who two months before had removed the excommunication fulminated against Hidalgo and his followers, now gracefully annulled his former action, explained the reason of his unorthodox proceeding, and ordered the validity of the excommunication to be proclaimed throughout the diocese. In order not to be behind hand in offering a sop to the royalists, the rector of the college of San Nicolás petitioned the bishop that Hidalgo's name might be struck off the books of that institution. Thus, as blew the political breeze, so turned like a weather-cock the civil and ecclesiastical authorities of Valladolid.
One of the first acts of Cruz after his entrance into ​the city was the extension of the general pardon, of which many availed themselves. In reorganizing the administration, he appointed Torcuato Trujillo comandante general of the province, whose associate, the brigadier García Dávila, presently arrived in company with the bishop elect, Abad y Queipo, Merino, the intendente ad interim, and other officials, who, as the reader will recollect, had fled from the city at the first approach of Hidalgo.
Calleja in his plan of operations had calculated that Cruz would be able to leave Valladolid on the 1st of January; he was however detained in that city until the 7th. This delay necessarily interfered with the carrying-out of Calleja's arrangements, but in addition to this, Hidalgo was forming plans for the purpose of preventing the union of Cruz's forces with those of Calleja, and had instructed Colonel Ruperto Mier, who was stationed at Zamora, to oppose the former's advance. Mier, therefore, at the head of 10,000 or 12,000 men, with twenty-seven pieces of artillery, took up an almost impregnable position on the heights commanding the mountain gorge of Urepetiro, about four leagues to the south-east of Zamora, and through which Cruz would necessarily have to pass.
On the 14th of January Cruz, whose force numbered 2,000, principally infantry, with eight pieces of artillery, approached the mountain pass, which he found occupied by the revolutionary army. He forth with ordered his advance guard to open attack by moving against the enemy's position along the banks of a stream flowing down the gorge. The insurgents' batteries, however, commanded the approach, and a well-sustained fire being opened upon the assailants, ​the officer in command, in view of the extreme difficulty of the ascent, retreated. Cruz now threw out detachments on his right and left, with the object of occupying commanding heights above the road, sending two cannon with the troops directed against the enemy's right, and planting his remaining six pieces in the most advantageous position at the foot of the gorge. In spite of the ruggedness of the ground, both movements were successful. Meanwhile Mier, regarding the retreat of the advance guard as a flight, unwisely made preparations to pursue, and exposing his left, one of his batteries was assaulted and taken by Negrete, and the insurgent force in that part of the field dispersed. While Negrete was thus engaged, a vigorous attack, supported by the two pieces on Cruz's left, was made upon the insurgents' centre and right, which resulted in the total rout of Mier's forces and the capture of his artillery and ammunition.
Although this attempt to arrest the advance of Cruz was unsuccessful, it contributed to the causes which prevented his taking part in the momentous battle fought on the 17th at the bridge of Calderon. At Zamora he was detained some time in repairing his gun-carriages; and when he arrived at the rio Grande de Lerma, although he met with no opposition, the transportation of his army was tediously slow, from the fact that at the crossing there was only one boat available for the purpose. When he arrived at the point of rendezvous the important battle had been fought and won.
Allende, after his flight from Guanajuato, hastened to Zacatecas, whither Iriarte had proceeded after his departure from San Luis. Although this city was occupied by a large body of insurgents, the command ​of which Allende could rightly assume in his position of captain-general, he perceived that the assertion of his superiority over Iriarte would in all probability provoke a mutiny. Of Iriarte's good faith he was more than doubtful; and his own prestige and popularity had seriously diminished, owing to his late discomfiture, as was indicated by the unsuppressed murmurings of the troops. He therefore decided to join Hidalgo at Guadalajara, and on the 12th of December arrived at the city. Hidalgo went out to meet him, with every demonstration of friendship.
That night a band of captive Spaniards was led out into the darkness, marched a few miles from the city to a lonely spot, and there butchered. And on other occasions the same ceremony was repeated.
Meanwhile Calleja was rapidly approaching. The army which Hidalgo now had under his command was far superior to any force which the insurgents had hitherto brought into the field. It numbered no less than 80,000 men, 20,000 of whom were cavalry, with ninety-five pieces of artillery, many of them of heavy calibre. No exertion was spared by the revolutionary leaders to render this large force as effective as ​possible. The enthusiasm of the troops was stimulated by encouraging addresses; the necessity of discipline urgently pressed upon them; and drills and manœuvres were daily practised on the plains outside the city. Though their arms were far inferior to those of the royalists, they were better than on former occasions; most of them were still only the sling and bow, but for the former great quantities of small grenades had been manufactured missiles much more destructive than rough stones. A great improvement had also been effected in ridding the camp of hordes of unarmed hangers-on, who followed merely with a view to pillage.
With regard to the plan of operations, a diversity of opinion prevailed among the leaders. At a council of war Hidalgo expressed his conviction that the whole army ought to take up a position at the bridge of Tololotlan, and there engage Calleja, while Iriarte with his forces moving from Zacatecas should assail the royalists in the rear. Allende disapproved of this plan, and bearing in mind the disastrous results at Las Cruces and Guanajuato, expressed his want of confidence in directing their whole force against the enemy, arid exposing their fortunes to the hazard of a single battle. He proposed that several divisions should be formed out of the army, that Guadalajara should be evacuated, and that Calleja should be attacked by these corps d'armée consecutively, thus avoiding the risk of a general rout. The debate was long and warm, but eventually Hidalgo's plan was adopted.
On the 13th of January, Hidalgo was advised that Calleja was advancing by forced marches toward Guadalajara; and he immediately made preparations to occupy the bridge of Calderon, eleven or twelve leagues from the city. On the following day Hidalgo led out his host. As he compared his now ​comparatively well organized force with the rabble he had lately led, he felt confident of victory. At sunset he halted at the bridge of Tololotlan, six leagues from the city, and having received fresh information of Calleja's advance, he again convoked a council, at which the same questions were discussed with the same result. Proceeding on the following morning, he occupied the bridge of Calderon, and took up a strong position commanding the approach to Guadalajara. On a steep height on the left side of the river a battery of sixty-seven guns was planted. This position
was almost inaccessible in front, was protected in the rear by a deep barranca, and nearly surrounded the open ground on which Calleja would have to advance his troops. Flanking this main battery, minor ones ​were established on heights to the right and left of it, the latter one being on the other side of the river, the access to each being up steep and rocky ascents.
On the 16th the royalist army appeared in sight, and Calleja, finding this almost impregnable position occupied by the enemy, sent forward a reconnoitring detachment, which, becoming engaged with the outlying insurgent troops, succeeded in gaining possession of the bridge. Calleja thereupon ordered reënforcements to advance to its support in order to hold the point, and it being now nightfall, both armies encamped without farther movements on either side. As the small army of the royalists bivouacked on the ground, the vast number of their foes was made apparent by the fires on the opposite heights, which Hidalgo caused to be built along the whole extent of his line, three quarters of a league in length.
Calleja's force consisted of 6,000 men, one half of whom were cavalry; but although his army bore no numerical comparison with that of the revolutionists, it was perfectly equipped and disciplined. He had also ten pieces of artillery admirably served, and a magnificent supply of war material; while the insurgents had but few muskets, and many of their cannon were of no service, some being fastened to clumsy carts, and others being manufactured of no better material than wood bound with iron hoops.
Calleja decided to attack without waiting for Cruz. In the morning he formed his army into two divisions, one of which he placed under Flon, who was to assail the enemy's right, while he with the other attacked their left. The assaults were to be made simultaneously, in order that the two commands might fall at the same time on the insurgents' centre. A ford some little distance above the bridge had been found the night before, and Flon leading his force across it ​immediately began to ascend the heights. Such was his impetuosity that he would not wait for his artillery, which consisted of four field-pieces, and which owing to the extreme ruggedness of the ground had to be dragged up by hand. Perceiving that it could not be brought with the infantry, he led his men at once against the first insurgent battery, consisting of four guns, and guarded by a strong body of the enemy. Rash as was the deed, he was so ably supported by his troops that he drove the insurgents from their position and captured their guns. Pursuing his advantage, as soon as his artillery arrived, he succeeded in dislodging the revolutionists from the minor batteries on the right of their main position, compelling them to fall back upon their centre.
Meanwhile Calleja advanced with the rest of the army toward the bridge, supporting Flon's movements with the fire of his advance guns, and sending him a reënforcement of pioneers of the grenadiers of la Columna. When Calleja arrived near the bridge, and could survey the whole position of the enemy, he recognized the danger of attempting an assault by that direction, and, wheeling to the right, occupied with four cannon and a considerable portion of his troops a small eminence, from which he opened fire upon the enemy's nearest left battery. At the same time he sent forward on the old road, on the righthand side of the stream, Colonel Empáran with a squadron of dragoons of Spain and the cavalry regiment of San Cárlos, with the object of assailing the enemy in the rear. Colonel Jalon, moreover, was sent to assault a battery of seven guns situated lower down the stream.
While these movements were being made by Calleja, Flon, urged by his uncontrollable desire to win the glory of the day, exceeded his instructions, and ​without waiting until Calleja was prepared to act in concert with him, attacked the main battery of the insurgents with his division. The attempt was unsuccessful. The enemy was able to concentrate overwhelming numbers at the point assailed, and twice his troops were repulsed. His artillery ammunition at this crisis gave out; his men lost confidence, and began to retreat in great disorder.
At this moment victory inclined to the insurgents. The detachment under Empáran on the right had also sustained two repulses, he himself was severely wounded in the head, his horse killed, and the regiment of San Cárlos was already in flight. Nothing but the ascendency of Calleja's presence, his coolness and military skill, saved the day. Jalon, who had successfully forded the river and captured the revolutionists' battery, hastened to the assistance of Empáran; and interposing his troops between him and the dense masses of the enemy in pursuit, restored this part of the field, resulting in great slaughter of the independents. To restore the left was more difficult, and required immediate attention. A strong column of infantry, supported by two squadrons of horse with two field-pieces, was sent over the bridge to the support of Flon. This movement had some effect in arresting the disorder, but it was obvious to the leader of the royalists that his left division held their ground in front of the great battery with difficulty, and that an extraordinary and decisive effort must be made in order to dislodge the enemy. He therefore marched with all the available troops of his division over the bridge, and deploying into line, as soon ​as the ground allowed his doing so, joined his forces with those of Flon. He then caused his ten pieces of artillery to be collected on one point, and directed against the main battery of the insurgents. While these were playing vigorously upon the enemy at half musket shot, a general charge along the royalist line was ordered.
And now occurred an accident which overruled the power of battle, and held back the cause of independence, it may be, for eleven tedious and bloody years. A bomb from the well directed artillery of the royalists struck an ammunition wagon of the enemy, and a terrific explosion occurred, scattering the dead and dying in all directions. But this was not all. The ground at that season of the year was covered with a thick matting of dry grass, and this taking fire a fearful conflagration ensued. The wind blew full in the face of the revolutionists, and the fire spreading with awful rapidity, they were soon enveloped in dense clouds of smoke and roaring flames. Before the fiery blast they could not stand. Some fell asphyxiated; others were horribly burned. Flight was inevitable. The disorder caused by this catastrophe and the firm advance of the royalists, who were now encouraged by the presence and intrepid bearing of Calleja, struck panic ​into the insurgents. All along the royalist lines the charging troops pressed upward with but little loss, and cavalry, infantry, and artillery at last gained the height together. But the enemy was in full flight, and their abandoned guns were found still loaded with grape-shot. A solitary battery of six heavy pieces, situated on the summit of an eminence on the in surgents' left, still maintained its fire. Thither had congregated great numbers of the dispersed army, but a detachment of the triumphant troops being sent against it, it was captured with little difficulty; and after a contest of six hours the royalist victory at the bridge of Calderon was complete.
Then followed the pursuit. Over the charred ground the horsemen urged their steeds after the flying bands. Foremost amongst the pursuers was Flon. Enraged at the unsuccessful part which he had played in the late battle, and eager for revenge, or determined not to survive his disgrace, he outstripped them all, and plunging among the insurgents, fell covered with wounds. At night his absence was noticed and a party was sent in search of him, but it was not until the following day that his mutilated body was found.
Of the military antecedents of Colonel Manuel de Flon, conde de la Cadena, little is known. His reputation as a public man was, however, well established in New Spain, and his character for honesty and integrity, as well as his ability in the performance of political and magisterial duties, universally recognized. ​His impetuosity and strong passions, it is true, not unfrequently led him into errors, causing him to overlook individual rights and disregard law. He held the same political opinions as his brother-in-law Riaño.
Flon was about sixty years of age when he met his death at Calderon. Pedraza, who witnessed his action in the alhóndiga, says that he "was of ordinary height, with broad and arched shoulders. His countenance was of a dark brown and wrinkled, the expression of it being frowning and severe; his eyes were sunken, penetrating, and fierce, and his look proud and disdainful, while his long, heavy, gray eyebrows gave to his features an imposing and unpleasing aspect." The portrait is not a pleasing one. His remains were temporarily deposited in the neighboring parish church of Zapotlanejo, whence they were transferred to the cathedral of Guadalajara and there interred with solemn obsequies.
Calleja on the following day rested his troops on the battle-field, and then pursued his march to Guadala jara, taking with him all the serviceable cannon of the insurgents, after having destroyed and buried the rest. The revolutionary leaders fled by different routes to Zacatecas, Rayon succeeding in carrying off the army funds, which amounted to $800,000.
The loss on the side of the insurgents, as on previous occasions, is unknown, but that it was very considerable may be inferred from the fact that in the part of the field alone where Jalon went to the support of Empáran more than 1,200 fell. That sustained by the royalists was 49 killed, 134 wounded, and ten ​missing. This insignificant loss in the achievement of so great a victory was due first of all to the accident, and secondly, to the superiority in arms and discipline of the royalists. Henceforth the royalist cause was for some time ascendent, but the principles of independence were too deeply rooted ever again to be wholly eradicated.
* ↑ In a letter to Calleja, dated Dec. 16, 1810, in reply to the brigadier's request that a medal might be presented to his soldiers, the viceroy, speaking of their toil, says: 'Contemplo próximo el fin y la coronacion do ellas, y en los pocos dias que probablemente se terminarán, se arreglarán con aquella detencion que hace apreciables los premios, los que deban concederse.' Bustamante, Quad. Hist., i. 118.
* ↑ Parra rendered the revolutionary cause great assistance. The charge of the printing-press was intrusted to him by Hidalgo, and its expenses were temporarily defrayed by him. Hidalgo appointed him as leader of the expedition, with the rank of brigadier, Hermosillo being nominally the commander, as Parra did not wish this appointment to be made public, it not being in conformity with his position as a friar. Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc., i. 379.
* ↑ Padre Parra relates that the alcabalero, a European, had made a final but unsuccessful stand with a piece of artillery and been slain, 'y para saciar mas los indios su corage, al Europeo artillero le cortan los genitales, quo pendientes de una cuerda los paseaban por toda la poblacion, lo que infundio tanto terror a aquellos habitantes, y a los soldados realistas, que en un momento quedaron las calles limpias de toda gente enemiga.' Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc., i. 380. Hidalgo promoted Hermosillo to the rank of colonel for this victory, and promised him a brigadiership if he captured Cosalá. Id., 24-28.
* ↑ 'Con refuerso de cuatrocientos indios Opatas de caballeria armados de fusil, lanza, rodela y pistolas, y un cañon de a seis.' Id., 382.
* ↑ 'Se contaron 4,125 infantes, 476 caballos, 900 fusiles, algunas escopetas y carabinas. 200 pares de pistolas y mucho numero de lanzas. . .se condugeron tambien los seis cañones que se le quitaron a Villaescusa.' Id. 381.
* ↑ One of the soldiers was killed, the other four escaped. Padre Parra went through great hardships. He was afterward sent to Durango and delivered to the asesor Pinilla Perez, who 'habia jurado no dejaren este suelo gota de sangre Americano.' Id., 383. Parra, knowing that he had little hope of life, contrived to escape, 'contrahaciendo en el pasaporte que fingio la firma de Bonavia.' Ib. Bonavia was the intendente of Durango.
* ↑ This account of the Sinaloa expedition is taken from the narrative of Parra, in Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc., i. 378-83, and given in brief by Bustamante, in Cuad. Hist., i. 176-81, and in Campañas de Calleja, 62-8. The original document belonged to Bustamante, and Hernandez y Dávalos is indebted for it to José María Andrade. Alaman is inclined to discredit Bustamante's account relative to the dishonorable action of Villaescusa. Hist. Mej., ii. 93. But the statements of Parra copied by Bustamante are corroborated by another document, a despatch written by José Lopez, an officer under Hermosillo, and who makes the same statements. Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc., i. 376-7. The total dispersion of Hermosillo's army may be gathered from Gaz. de Mex., 1811, ii. 173-4. Negrete omits all mention of Hermosillo's defeat. Mex. Sig. XIX., iii. 82-3.
* ↑ This officer married a sister of the historian Alaman. Hist. Mej., ii. 94.
* ↑ The instructions Calleja submitted to the approval of the viceroy relative to the movements of Cordero's troops were the following; 'Las tropas de Cordero que se hallan, segun las últimas noticias, en las inmediaciones de Matehuala, distantes 35 leguas de San Luis Potosí, deberán bajar á esta ciudad á restablecer el órden y castigar los pueblos de Dolores, San Luis de la Paz, Sichú, etc., y manteniéndose en las inmediaciones de San Miguel, Guanajuato y Querétaro.' Calleja, in Negrete, Mex. Sig. XIX., ii. 408. The date of Calleja's despatch is Dec. 16, 1810.
* ↑ Parte de Jimenez, in Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc., ii. 332-4; Alaman, Hist. Mej., ii. 94-6.
* ↑ Santa María was a native of Seville, but having arrived in New Spain when quite a child, was regarded as a Mexican. Id., 96.
* ↑ Gaz. de Mex., 1812, iii. 1087-8. Western Florida, the present state of Louisiana, had declared its independence on the 26th of Sept. previously, and Salcedo informed the viceroy of this event on the 21st of Nov., at the same time begging for reënforcements, since he feared to be invaded from the revolted province. Salcedo considered the movement at Baton Rouge, where the insurrection broke out as a sequence to the conspiracy of Burr, and the effect of French emissaries acting upon his suggestions, Burr having been in Paris during the previous year. Bustamante, Cuad. Hist., i. 121-4.
* ↑ Jimenez at Saltillo not only left the Spaniards at liberty, but extended to them letters of safe conduct. Many availed themselves of this opportunity to seek the protection of Calleja; contrary to promise, when near Cedral they were seized, beaten, and stripped. Amid the maledictions and curses of the populace they were then conducted to Cedral, where they were kept imprisoned for a month, whence they were eventually conveyed to San Luis Potosí, and confined, to the number of eleven, in the jail. By order of Herrera, they were put to death with one exception, in March 1811, Juan Villarguide only escaping, having been left for dead. Villarguide, in Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc., ii. 913-22.
* ↑ The cura of San Sebastian, José Mateo Braceras, a Franciscan friar, and a secular priest Francisco Fraga were submitted to every kind of ill treatment on their attempting to go from San Luis to Querétaro. They were sent back to San Luis, where they were imprisoned by Herrera, but were eventually released. Alaman, Hist. Mej., ii. 100-2. hist. mex., vol. iv 26
* ↑ According to Fray Tomás Blasco, however, he was in active military service against the French during the years 1793-5. Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc., iii. 246.
* ↑ As the sequel will show, Venegas appointed him comandante general of Nueva Galicia and president of that audiencia in fact, made him a second viceroy. Mora, Mej. y sus Rev., iv. 110-11, 231, 437, 440-2; Bustamante, Cuad. Hist., i. 133, and Campañas de Calleja, 58-9, 96, 107.
* ↑ In a letter to Calleja, dated Huichapan, 23d of Nov., he says: 'Los cuchillos de la mesa, las tijeras y todo cuanto pueda ser ofensivo recojo; instrumentos de herreros, cerrajeros, etc., estoy encajonando.' Alaman, Hist. Mej., ii. ap. 17. Negrete states that this letter, as well as the one mentioned in the following note, was addressed to the viceroy. Mex. Sig. XIX., ii. 250.
* ↑ Alaman, Hist. Mej., ii. ap. 18. The date of this letter is the 29th of Nov. On the previous day the Anayas had killed seven Europeans, and Cruz suspects that his correspondence had been intercepted, as he had received no despatches from Mexico for four days, whereas he expected daily communication. The expression he uses, 'Supongo que me han interceptado la correspondencia, pues que hace cuatro dias que no tengo pliegos de Mexico, que debia recibir todos los dias,' and the tone of the letters, lead me to agree with Alaman that they were addressed to Calleja, and not to the viceroy.
* ↑ Alaman, who saw the bodies hanging in Dec., does not mention the number, but they were scattered at intervals from the hacienda de la Goleta to the pueblo of San Miguelito, and one of them was that of the Indian governor. San Miguelito was burned. Hist. Mej., ii. 71. Bustamante says: 'Cruz marcó muy luego sus pasos con torrentes de sangre, el rastro de esta y los cadáveres que dejaba á su tránsito senñlaban al viagero la ruta que llevaba.' Cuad. Hist., i. 137.
* ↑ Calleja submitted his plan to the viceroy by despatch dated Leon, Dec. 10, 1810, and it was approved. A copy of the plan is supplied by Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc., ii. 304-5.
* ↑ The insurgents numbered 3,000 or 4,000 horse and foot, and had six cannon. Gaz., de Mex., 1811, ii. 17-19.
* ↑ Ansorena, Defensa, 16.
* ↑ Described by the viceregal government as an ‘anglo-americano de nacion,' Gaz. de Mex., 1811, ii. 19; and by Ansorena as 'un toluqueño, á quien llamaban el anglo-americano.' Defensa, 16.
* ↑ After the massacres at the Bateas and cerro del Molcajete the remaining Spanish captives, to the number of 170, were distributed at the intercession of ecclesiastics in the convents and colleges. Gaz. de Mex., 1811, ii. 19. Ansorena's son, however, makes a different statement. His version is that on the 25th of Dec. the intendente convoked a junta, and stating that the forces in the city were inadequate to oppose Cruz, declared his intention of retiring to Guadalajara. He then proposed for the safe custody of the prisoners that they should be removed to the convents and clerical college. This proposal was carried out, though strongly opposed by the military officers. Ansorena, Defensa, 15.
* ↑ 'Si la infame plebe intentase de nuevo quitar la vida á los europeos, entre V. en la ciudad, pase á cuchillo á todas sus habitantes, exceptuando solo las mugeres y niños, y pegándole fuego por todas partes.' Such are his instructions, a copv of which he forwarded to Calleja. Bustamante, Campañas de Calleja, 59.
* ↑ See the alcalde Ramon de Huarte's proclamation to the inhabitants, and the address of the cathedral chapter to the viceroy, dated respectively Dec. 30, 1810, and Jan. 2, 1811. Gaz. de Mex., 1811, ii. 28, 31-3.
* ↑ A copy of his circular is given in Id., 20-8.
* ↑ Trujillo had accompanied Cruz from Mexico as far as Huichapan, whence he returned to the capital and rejoined Cruz at Valladolid Jan. 2, 1811. The viceroy associated with him in his command the aged brigadier García Dávila, 'para que contuviera su juvenil ardor.' Bustamante, Campañas de Calleja, 59. Calleja described Trujillo as a madman with a sword. Alaman, Hist. Mej., ii. 78.
* ↑ The insurgents lost 600 men, while the royalists had only two killed and one wounded. For a full account of this engagement, see the reports of Cruz in Gaz. de Mex., 1811, ii. 53, 81-8.
* ↑ Marroquin, in his testimony at the trial of Hidalgo, states that he assisted at one, and one only, of these massacres, on which occasion 48 victims, more or less, were put to death. Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc., i. 41. Abad y Queipo in his pastoral of September 26, 1812, says: 'Luego que se entronizó en Guadalajara comenzó á degollar en la misma forma, esto es, en partidas diarias de 60, 80 y 100, los muchos europeos y algunos criollos.' Id., 839. Says José María Chico: 'Mandó varios asesinatos, y lo mismo es público y notorio que mandó en Guadalajara, sin embargo de haberlo hecho con tal reserva.' Id., 41. These are the instructions Hidalgo gives to Hermosillo Jan. 3, 1811: 'Deponga U. todo cuidado á cerca de los indultos y libertad de europeos, recogiendo U. todos los que alla (sic) por esa parte para quedar seguro, y al que fuere inquieto, perturbador y seductor, ó se conosca otras disposiciones, los sepultará en el olvido dándoles muerte con las precauciones necesarias en partes ocultas y solitarias para que nadie lo entienda.' Id., 24. In his own declaration he says: 'Se, ejecutaban en el campo á horas deshusadas y lugares solitarios.' Id., 14.
* ↑ This is the number given by José María Zabalza in a letter dated Jan. 18, 1811, and addressed to Mercado. Id., i. 386. Calleja, followed by Alaman, states that the insurgent army numbered 100,000, an estimate which I consider less reliable. Id., ii. 338, 342, 355; Id., iv. 180. Calvillo raises the num ber to 103,000. Sermon, 138.
* ↑ Besides 44 brought from San Blas, a large number had been cast in Guadalajara, many of them very inferior.
* ↑ Bustamante, Cuad. Hist., i. 185; Alaman, Hist. Mej., ii. 114; Negrete, Mex. Sig. XIX., ii. 413.
* ↑ 'Repitió muchas veces que iba a almorzar en el puente de Calderon, a comer en Queretaro, y a cenar en Mexico.' Cavillo Sermon, 136. Negrete in making mention of this boast remarks: 'Creo que esto no pasa de una vulgaridad.' Mex. Sig. XIX., iii. 4. See also Calleja, in Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc., ii. 300. This bridge is over a small affluent of the rio Grande de Lerma, about five leagues to the north-east of the bridge of Tololotlan.
* ↑ This plan is taken from the work of Torrente, who copied it from a draft which was in the war department at Madrid. Bustamante reproduced it in his Cuad. Hist., i. 188-9. Alaman, Hist. Mej., ii. 584.
* ↑ Verdia, Apunt. Biog., in Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc., iv. 180. Calvillo, however, says: 'Nuestro pequeño exército. . .no pasó de quatro mil y quinientos hombres.' Sermon, 135.
* ↑ Calleja, in Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc., ii. 356-7.
* ↑ ’Parece que Flon traspaso las ordenes de Calleja, para llevarse él solo la gloria de la batalla.' Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc., ii. 342. 'El resultado de la accion. . . habria sido mas feliz, si el Sr Conde de la Cadena, llevado de su ardiente espíritu, no se hubiese apartado del plan que me propuse y le fijé.' Calleja, in Id., ii. 339.
* ↑ Owing, according to Calleja's report, to the want of courage of the colonel, Ramon Cevallos, 'siendo causa de que su regimiento retrocediese por dos veccs, y empezase á huir siguiendo el ejemplo de su coronel y poniendo en desórden á los demas.' Bustamante, Cuad. Hist., i. 160.
* ↑ 'Me asegura,' says Calleja, 'su comandante no haber bayoneta alguna en todo el primer batallon que no esté teñida en sangre de insurgentes.' Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc., ii. 358. Jalon's report is found in Id., 361.
* ↑ Calleja makes no mention of this conflagration so favorable to his move ments; and Alaman —Hist. Mej., ii. 132-3—generally partial to the royalists, receives the statement with such expressions of doubt as to leave the impression on the reader's mind that he did not wish to believe in it. He does not even accept the testimony of Colonel Villamil, who was sent with two field-pieces to the assistance of Flon, and who says: 'Se empesó el fuego con los dos cañones que llevaba hasta que este cesó por haberse incendiado el campo.' Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc., ii. 361. But this royalist testimony is strongly corroborative of statements more particularized. In the Bosquejo de la Batalla de Calderon, I find this account: 'Una granada del calibre de á 4 tirada contra la orden de que no se hiciese fuego, pego en su carro de municiones de los enemigos, lo inflamo y se observo una grande explosion.' And further on: 'Se encontró con muchos cadaveres asi por el fuego de los ataques de Flon como por el de la esplosion del carro y de los cajones de polbora que abia disperses en varios puntos.' Id., ii. 342. Verdia, in Id., iv. 180-1, attributes in a great measure the disaster of the day on the side of the independents to the explosion of some ammunition wagons, caused by a grenade discharged by the royalists and the spread of fire thereby through the camp. Bustamante and Negrete take the view given in the text. Mora attributes the fire in the camp to the simultaneous discharge of the 67 guns by order of Allende. Max. y sus Rev., iv. 135.
* ↑ 'Siendo obra de pocos minutos el acometer la batería y apoderarse de ella, no obstante el inmenso número de insurgentes que la defendian y la resistencia que opusieron sosteniéndose hasta el término de que las tres armas llegaron á un tiempo, y la artillería misma á tiro de pistola.' Calleja, in Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc., ii. 358.
* ↑ 'Parece se fue á buscar la muerte entre enemigos para no sobrebir (sic) á aquella desgracia.' Id., ii. 342.
* ↑ Alaman states that a soldier of the provincial regiment of Valladolid slew him, remarking, as evidence in a foot-note, that this soldier produced in Guadalajara a pocket-book belonging to Flon, which he had taken from his dead body. Hist. Mej., ii. 130. But the condition of the corpse, covered with wounds and contusions inflicted by every kind of weapon, is sufficient evidence that he was overpowered by numbers, and that he did not fall by the hand of a single man.
* ↑ Celebridad Independ., 2; Mora, Mej. y sus Rev., iv. 45-6.
* ↑ 'Con los huesos de los españoles degollados en las barrancas cercanas á la ciudad.' This occurred on the 11th of Feb. following. Alaman, Hist. Mej., ii. 130.
* ↑ Zabalza, in Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc., i. 386. Alaman says about 300,000 pesos. Hist. Mej., ii. 127.
* ↑ Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc., ii. 361. According to a letter addressed by Navarro to Mercado, 4,000 were calculated to have fallen, 'aunque sobre esto no hay dato cierto.' Id., i. 390. hist. mex. vol. iv. 17
* ↑ Id., ii. 364. Calleja says 50 killed and 125 wounded. Id., 359. Alaman erroneously gives the numbers as 41 killed and 71 wounded. Hist. Mej., ii. 129-30. Those given in the text are taken from the official returns.