# Westray v. United States/Opinion of the Court

* Court Documents
* Case Syllabus
* Opinion of the Court
United States Supreme Court
85 U.S. 322
Westray v. United States
The acts of Congress which regulate the collection of duties upon imported articles are imperative that, on the entry of any goods, wares, or merchandise, the decision of the collector of customs, at the port of importation and entry, as to the rate and amount of duties to be paid on such goods, wares, and merchandise, and the dutiable costs and charges thereon, shall be final and conclusive against all persons interested therein, unless the owner, importer, consignee, or agent of the merchandise shall, within ten days after the ascertainment and liquidation of the duties by the proper officers of the customs, as well in cases of merchandise entered in bond as for consumption, give notice in writing to the collector on each entry, if dissatisfied with his decision, setting forth therein distinctly and specifically the grounds of his objection thereto, and shall, within thirty days after the date of such ascertainment and liquidation, appeal therefrom to the Secretary of the Treasury.
This act expressly applies to liquidations made when imported articles are entered for warehousing, and to those made when they are entered for consumption. In neither case is there any provision for notice of the decisions or liquidations, and for the obvious reason that such a provision would be superfluous. The importer is instructed by the law at what time the collector or officers of the customs must liquidate the duties. The statute, and the treasury regulations established under it, require that the duties must be ascertained whenever an entry is made, whether it be for warehousing or for withdrawal. In practice, it is true, the liquidation at the time of entry for warehousing is little more than an approximate estimate, and it is mainly for the purpose of determining the amount of the bond to be given. It is made, and the bond is given, before the goods are sent to the warehouse, or even to the appraisers' stores, and before they are weighed, gauged, or measured. But the importer enters them and gives the bond, the amount of which is regulated by the estimated amount of duties. It is due to his inattention, therefore, if he does not know what that estimate is at the time when it is made. Equally true is it that he has ample means of knowledge of the second or corrected liquidation-that made at the time of the withdrawal entry. One of the conditions of his bond is that he pay the amount of duties to be ascertained under the laws then existing or thereafter enacted. He is thus informed that there is to be another liquidation, and that the law requires it to be made at the time when he shall make his withdrawal entry and when the duties are required to be paid. There is, then, no reason for requiring a notice to be given to him of the collector's decision. But, if this were not so, it is certain that the statute requires none; and it is not for us to rule that what Congress has declared to be conclusive shall not be so, unless something has been done more than the lawmakers required. It follows that the Circuit Court was not in error when it refused to receive evidence to show that the rice which the officers of the customs had decided was 'cleaned rice,' and subject to duty as such, was 'uncleaned,' and therefore subject to less duty. No notice of dissatisfaction with the duty assessed, or with the liquidation made, was given to the collector within the period defined by the statute; no appeal was made to the Secretary of the Treasury, and the decision of the collector was, therefore, by the express declaration of the act of Congress, final and conclusive upon the plaintiffs and upon all persons interested.
The same considerations lead to the conclusion that the Circuit Court correctly refused to rule that the ten days prescribed by the statute, within which notice of dissatisfaction is required to be given, did not begin to run until notice of the collector's liquidation was given to the plaintiffs in error, or until they had knowledge thereof. The limitation of the right to complain or to appeal commences with the date of the liquidation, whenever that is made. No notice is required, but the importer who makes the entries is under obligation to take notice of the collector's settlement of the amount of duties. The claim of the government upon the goods is in the nature of a proceeding in rem, of every step in which the claimant, owner, or importer is presumed to have notice, and since, as we have remarked, the liquidation of the duties is required by the law to be made when the entries are made, the presumption is not unreasonable. This disposes of the first four assignments of error.
The bond upon which the suit was brought was for the penal sum of $25,049.90, and its conditions were that it should be void if the obligors, or either of them, should, within one year, pay unto the collector of the customs the sum of $12,524.95 (half the penalty), or the amount of duties to be ascertained under the laws then existing, or thereafter to be enacted, due and owing on the imported goods described, or should, in the mode prescribed by law, on or before the expiration of three years from the date of importation, withdraw the goods from the bonded warehouse where they might be deposited, and actually export them, or within three years should, under the regulations of the Secretary of the Treasury, transport them to the Pacific coast. It was an ordinary warehouse bond, in the from prescribed by the regulations of the Treasury Department. Its purpose was to secure the payment of the duties which might be owing upon the goods, when they should be withdrawn from the warehouse for consumption, should they be so withdrawn. It was impossible to ascertain at the time when it was given what the amount of duties would be when the goods might be withdrawn. The defeasance was, therefore, in the alternative that the penalty might be avoided by payment of a sum mentioned within one year, or by the payment of whatever duties might be ascertained to be due and owing, that is, ascertained to be due and owing whenever the goods should become subject to duty by withdrawal for consumption. It was not, therefore, an ordinary pecuniary bond. Hence, when the defendants requested the Circuit Court to instruct the jury that it having been admitted $12,352.15 had been paid within one year, no verdict could be returned for any greater sum than the difference between the amount paid and $12,524.95 (the sum mentioned in the defeasance), with interest thereon, we think it was not error to refuse the instruction. At law the penalty was forfeited by the non-performance of any one of the conditions. The defendants' claim to relief was in equity alone, and though in the case of an ordinary pecuniary bond, with a simple pecuniary penalty, compliance with the condition to pay at a specified day is allowed even in a court of law to be compensated for by the payment of the sum mentioned in the condition, with interest thereon, the rule may well be otherwise in the case of such a bond as this. If it be admitted that the obligors might have selected the condition with which they would comply before a legal forfeiture had been commended, it must still be held that, considering the nature of the bond and the purpose for which it was given, such an option was not theirs after they had come into default. They can be relieved from the forfeiture only upon their doing complete equity, and that is nothing less than the payment of all the duties, to secure which they gave the bond.
It follows that the jury were properly directed to return a verdict for the plaintiffs for the amount of duties unpaid, as ascertained and liquidated by the collector, with interest thereon.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.

## Notes

* ↑ Act of June 80th, 1864, § 14, 13 Stat. at Large, 214.
* ↑ See Treasury Regulations, 1857, ch. 3, §§ 2, 3.
* ↑ Regulations, p. 221.
This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
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