# Leiter Minerals v. United States/Dissent Douglas

* Court Documents
* Case Syllabus
* Opinion of the Court
* Dissenting Opinion Douglas
United States Supreme Court
352 U.S. 220
Leiter Minerals v. United States
Argued: Nov. 6 and 7, 1956. --- Decided: Jan 14, 1957
Mr. Justice DOUGLAS, dissenting in part.
I agree that the state action was properly enjoined; and so I concur in the opinion of the Court to that extent. But I dissent from the direction to the District Court to hold the case while the parties repair to the state court to get an interpretation of the Louisiana statute around which this litigation turns.
That procedure is an advisable one where private parties question the constitutionality of a state statute. An authoritative construction of the state law may avoid the constitutional issue or put it in new perspective. See Spector Motor Service v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101, 104-105, 65 S.Ct. 152, 154, 89 L.Ed. 101. In the Spector case, the plaintiff's claim was within the jurisdiction of the federal court solely because of the attack on the constitutionality of a state statute. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1331, the federal district court has jurisdiction where the matter in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional amount 'and arises under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States.' In litigation in the federal courts under that statute, the necessity of construing state law arises because of the federal court's duty to avoid if possible a federal constitutional question. Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 213 U.S. 175, 29 S.Ct. 451, 53 L.Ed. 753. In the Spector case, then, matters of state law were only ancillary to the primary responsibility of the federal court to resolve the constitutional issues.
But here, although potential constitutional questions may lurk in the background, this litigation primarily concerns not federal questions but title to land claimed by the United States. It is litigation which Congress by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1345, 1346, 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1345, 1346, has entrusted to the federal district court. Those sections allow civil litigation of the United States whether it involves federal or state law questions-to be conducted in the federal courts. In that situation it is the duty of the federal court to decide all issues in the case-those turning on state law as well as those turning on federal law. In Meredith v. City of Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 64 S.Ct. 7, 88 L.Ed. 9, a case in the federal courts by reason of diversity of citizenship, we refused to remit the parties to the state court for decision of difficult state law questions. We held that it was the duty of the federal court to decide all issues in the case-state or federal, difficult or easy. And see Propper v. Clark, 337 U.S. 472, 69 S.Ct. 1333, 93 L.Ed. 1480. There have been exceptions to this policy, notably in bankruptcy proceedings where trustees are sometimes sent into state courts to obtain adjudications on local law questions pertinent to the administration of the bankrupt's estate. See Thompson v. Magnolia Co., 309 U.S. 478, 60 S.Ct. 628, 84 L.Ed. 876. It is peculiarly inappropriate to follow that course here. Congress has decided that the United States should have the benefit of the protection of its own courts in this type of litigation. We properly hold that the District Court, not the state court, has jurisdiction of the controversy. But we beat the devil around the bush when, having taken the litigation out of the state court, we send the parties back to the state court for its construction of Louisiana law which is the most significant issue in the case. The problem is not only to construe the state statute but to construe it constitutionally. The federal court can make that construction as readily as the state court. That is the congressional scheme and we should not change it by judicial fiat.

## Notes

This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
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