OpenLLM-France/wikimedia huggingface dataset:
# United States v. Reidel
## Concurring Opinion

    Harlan

## Dissenting Opinion

    Marshall
United States Supreme Court
402 U.S. 351
United States v. Reidel
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California
No. 534. Argued: January 20, 1971. --- Decided: May 3, 1971
Appellee, who had advertised in the newspaper the sale to persons over 21 years of age of a booklet entitled The True Facts About Imported Pornography, was indicted for mailing copies of the booklet in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1461, which prohibits the knowing use of the mails for the delivery of obscene matter. Appellee moved to dismiss the indictment, contending that the statute was unconstitutional. Assuming, arguendo, that the booklets were obscene, the trial judge granted the motion to dismiss on the ground that appellee made a constitutionally protected delivery and that § 1461 was unconstitutional as applied to him.
Held: Section 1461 is not unconstitutional as applied to the distribution of obscene materials to willing recipients who state that they are adults. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476. The decision in Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, holding that a state's power to regulate obscenity does not extend to mere possession by an individual in the privacy of his own home, did not disturb Roth, supra. Pp. 353-356.
Reversed.
WHITE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and HARLAN, BRENNAN, STEWART, and BLACKMUN, JJ., joined. HARLAN, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 357. MARSHALL, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 360. BLACK, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which DOUGLAS, J., joined, post, p. 379.
Solicitor General Griswold argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Assistant Attorney General Wilson and Roger A. Pauley.
Sam Rosenwein argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief was Stanley Fleishman.

## Notes

This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
Public domainPublic domainfalsefalse
# United States v. Reilly

* related portals: Supreme Court of the United States.
* sister projects: Wikidata item.
United States Supreme Court
131 U.S. 58
United States v. Reilly
Sol. Gen. Jenks, for plaintiff.
Frank H. Hurd, Walter H. Smith, and Wm. M. Stewart, for defendant.
MILLER, J.

## Notes

This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
Public domainPublic domainfalsefalse
# United States v. Reily

* related portals: Supreme Court of the United States.
* sister projects: Wikidata item.
United States Supreme Court
290 U.S. 33
United States v. Reily
Argued: Oct. 18, 19, 1933. --- Decided: Nov 6, 1933
The Attorney General and Mr. George C. Sweeney, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the United States.
Mr. F. H. Reily, of Shawnee, Okl., for respondent.
Mr. Justice VAN DEVANTER delivered the opinion of the Court.

## Notes

This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
Public domainPublic domainfalsefalse
# Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Federal Maritime Commission/Concurrence Fortas

* Court Documents
* Case Syllabus
* Opinion of the Court
* Concurring Opinions Harlan Fortas
* Dissenting Opinion Douglas
United States Supreme Court
390 U.S. 261
Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Federal Maritime Commission
Argued: Nov. 13, 1967. --- Decided: March 6, 1968
Mr. Justice FORTAS, concurring in the judgment.
I agree with the judgment and with Part I of the opinion herein. I do not understand that the Court's opinion purports to determine the effect of §§ 16 and 17, and I believe that the Court certainly should not do so. I do not join Part II of the opinion dealing with these sections.
Mr. Justice DOUGLAS, dissenting in part.

## Notes

This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
Public domainPublic domainfalsefalse
# Volksmährchen der Deutschen

English-language translations of Volksmährchen der Deutschen include:
* Volume 1 (1782)
** "Die Bücher der Chronika der drey Schwestern" ('The Books of the Chronicles of the Three Sisters')
** "Richilde" ('Richilda')
** "Rolands Knappen" ('Roland's Squires')
* Volume 2 (1783)
** "Legenden von Rübezahl" ('Legends of Rübezahl')
** "Die Nymphe des Brunnens" ('The Nymph of the Spring')
* Volume 3 (1784)
** "Libussa" ('Libussa')
** "Der geraubte Schleier" ('The Stolen Veil')
** "Liebestreue" ('Love-Loyalty')
* Volume 4 (1786)
** "Stumme Liebe" ('Mute Love')
** "Ulrich mit dem Bühel" ('Ulrich with the Hump')
** "Dämon Amor" ('Demon Cupid')
* Volume 5 (1787)
** "Melechsala" ('Melechsala')
** "Der Schazgräber" ('The Treasure Seeker')
** "Die Entführung" ('The Elopement')
This work was published before January 1, 1929, and is in the public domain worldwide because the author died at least 100 years ago.
Public domainPublic domainfalsefalse
# Volodia

English-language translations of Володя include:
* Volodia, translated by Marian Fell
* Volodya, translated by Constance Garnett
# Wellens v. Dillon

* related portals: Supreme Court of the United States.
* sister projects: Wikidata item.
United States Supreme Court
371 U.S. 11
Wellens v. Dillon
Wellens, pro se.
Solicitor General Cox, Acting Assistant Attorney General Guilfoyle and Morton Hollander, for appellees.
PER CURIAM.

## Notes

This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
Public domainPublic domainfalsefalse
# Welles declaration

The declaration was issued on July 23, 1940, by Sumner Welles, then under-Secretary of the US State Department. It established the policy of the U.S. non-recognition of the annexation of the Baltic States by the Soviet Union during World War II. Source:US National Archives (foto copy from Hiden, John; Vahur Made, David J. Smith (2008) as reprinted in The Baltic question during the Cold War. Routledge. pp. 209 ) and the website of the US Embassy in Estonia, where it is described as a US Department of State bulletin
During these past few days the devious process whereunder the political independence and territorial integrity of the three small Baltic Republics – Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania – were to be deliberately annihilated by one of their more powerful neighbors, have been rapidly drawing to their conclusion.
From the day when the peoples of these Republics first gained their independent and democratic form of government the people of the United States have watched their admirable progress in self-government with deep and sympathetic interest.
The policy of this Government is universally known. The people of the United States are opposed to predatory activities no matter whether they are carried on by the use of force or by the threat of force. They are likewise opposed to any form of intervention on the part of one State, however powerful, in the domestic concerns of any other sovereign state, however weak.
These principles constitute the very foundations upon which the existing relationship between the 21 sovereign republics of the New World rests.
The United States will continue to stand by these principles, be of the conviction of the American people that unless the doctrine in which these principles are inherent once again governs the relations between nations, the rule of reason, of justice and of law – in other words, the basis of modern civilization itself – cannot be preserved.
# Wellington's letter to Blücher, 2 July 1815

* related portals: Hundred Days.
* sister projects: Wikidata item.
Source:
Gonesse, 2nd July, 1815.
Sir,
I requested General Müffling to write to your Highness yesterday, upon the subject of the propositions which had been made to me by the French Commissioners for a suspension of hostilities, upon which I have not yet had a positive answer from your Highness.
It appears to me that, with the force which you and I have under our command at present, the attack of Paris is a matter of great risk. I am convinced it cannot be made on this side with any hope of success.
The army under my command must then cross the Seine twice, and get into the Bois de Boulogne before the attack can be made; and even then if we should succeed the loss would be very severe.
We must incur a severe loss, if it is necessary, in any case. But in this case it is not necessary. By the delay of a few days we shall have here the army under Marshal Prince Wrede, and the Allied Sovereigns with it, who will decide upon the measures to be adopted, and success will then be certain with a comparatively trifling loss; or, if we choose it, we can settle all our matters now by agreeing to the proposed armistice.
The terms on which I think this armistice can be made, and on which alone I will consent to make it, are these:
    First; that we shall remain in the positions we now occupy.
    Secondly; that the French army shall retire from Paris across the Loire.
    Thirdly; that Paris shall be given over to the care of the national guard till the King shall order otherwise.
    Fourthly; the time to be fixed for notice to break off this armistice.
By adopting this measure, we provide for the quiet restoration of His Majesty to his throne; which is that result of the war which the Sovereigns of all of us have always considered the most beneficial for us all, and the most likely to lead to permanent peace in Europe.
It is true we shall not have the vain triumph of entering Paris at the head of our victorious troops; but, as I have already explained to your Highness, I doubt our having the means at present of succeeding in an attack upon Paris; and, if we are to wait till the arrival of Marshal Prince Wrede to make the attack, I think we shall find the Sovereigns disposed, as they were last year, to spare the capital of their ally, and either not to enter the town at all, or enter it under an armistice, such as it is in your power and mine to sign this day.
I earnestly urge your Highness, then, to consider the reasoning which I have submitted to you on this occasion; and to let me have your decision whether you will agree to any armistice or not; and, if you will, I beg you to name a person to treat in your name with the French Commissioners. If you will not, my conduct will be guided by your decision.
I have the honour to be, &c.
    Wellington
# Wellens v. Dillon/Opinion of the Court

* Court Documents
* Case Syllabus
* Opinion of the Court
United States Supreme Court
371 U.S. 11
Wellens v. Dillon
The appeal is dismissed. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari is denied.
Mr. Justice GOLDBERG took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

## Notes

This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
Public domainPublic domainfalsefalse
# Weller v. New York

* related portals: Supreme Court of the United States.
* sister projects: Wikidata item.
United States Supreme Court
268 U.S. 319
Weller v. New York
Argued: April 28, 29, 1925. --- Decided: May 25, 1925
Mr. Louis Marshall, of New York City, for plaintiff in error.
[Argument of Counsel from pages 319-321 intentionally omitted]
Messrs. Robert D. Petty and Felix C. Benvenga, Asst. Dist. Atty., both of New York City, for the People of the State of New York.
Mr. Justice McREYNOLDS delivered the opinion of the Court.

## Notes

This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
Public domainPublic domainfalsefalse
# Wellford v. Snyder

* related portals: Supreme Court of the United States.
* sister projects: Wikidata item.
United States Supreme Court
137 U.S. 521
Wellford v. Snyder
[Statement of Case from pages 521-524 intentionally omitted]
Leigh Robinson, for appellants.
Wm. Pinkney Whyte and Henry Wise Garnett, for appellee.
Mr. Justice GRAY, after stating the case as above, delivered the opinion of the court.

## Notes

This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
Public domainPublic domainfalsefalse
# White Paper on Indian States (1950)/Part 11/Reorganisation of Judiciary following Integration

Reorganisation of Judiciary following Integration
235. The integration of States rendered it possible to reorganise judiciary in the States and to make available to the people, law courts organised on the lines of the judiciary in the Provinces. In the changed set-up the provincially-merged States have become subject to the jurisdiction of the Provincial High Courts and considerable progress has been made in the direction of the reorganisation of the lower courts. In the case of States constituted into Centrally administered areas, Courts of Judicial Commissioners have been constituted. So far as the Unions of States are concerned, Union High Courts have been constituted on the lines of the corresponding Courts in the Provinces.
# White Paper on Indian States (1950)/Part 11/The Position of Junagadh State

The Position of Junagadh State
223. The position of Junagadh and certain other adjoining States in Kathiawar may also be briefly stated here. After the Nawab of Junagadh had left the State for Pakistan, the administration of this State was taken ​over by the Government of India on November 9, 1947, at the request of the Nawab's Council. Obviously, the action taken by the Government of India had the fullest approval of the people of Junagadh in that the results of the referendum held in Junagadh and the adjoining smaller States in February 1948, showed that voting in favour of accession to India was virtually unanimous. During the period the Government of India held charge of the State, an Administrator appointed by the Government of India assisted by three popular representatives conducted the administration of the State. In December 1948, the elected representatives of the people of Junagadh resolved that the administration of the State be made over to the Government of Saurashtra and that the representatives of Junagadh be enabled to participate in the Constituent Assembly of Saurashtra State with a view to framing a common Constitution for Saurashtra and the Junagadh State. Similar resolutions were adopted by the representatives of Manavadar, Mangrol, Bantwa, Babariawad and Sardargarh. Accordingly, a Supplementary Covenant (Appendix XXXVI) was executed by the Rulers of Kathiawar States with a view to giving effect to the aforementioned resolutions. The administration of Junagadh was taken over by the Saurashtra Government on January 20, 1949, and of the other States sometime calling. Accordingly the Constitution treats Junagadh and these States as part of Saurashtra.
# White Paper on Indian States (1950)/Part 11/Position under the Act of 1935

Position under the Act of 1935
232. The scheme embodied in the Act of 1935 made little advance in the direction of the unification of the judicial systems of States. The jurisdiction which the Act conferred on the Federal Court in respect of ​States was extremely limited. The original jurisdiction at this Court extended only to disputes between any two or more of the following parties; that is to say, the Federation, any of the Provinces or any of the Acceding States, if the dispute involved any question on which "the existence or extent of a legal right" depended. In respect of a dispute to which a State was a party the jurisdiction of the Court could be invoked only if the dispute concerned the interpretation of the Act, the Instrument of Accession and like matters arising out of the constitutional relationship between the Federation and the State. Judgments in such cases were to be merely declaratory; "in other words they need not involve any consequential relief". The appellate jurisdiction of the Federal Court was likewise limited to questions of law concerning the intepretation of the Act and the Instruments or Agreements governing the constitutional relationship between the States and the Federation.
233. Even in this limited field, an appeal to the Federal Court was to be by way of a special case to be stated for the opinion of the Federal Court by the High Court of the State. If the Federal Court wanted to move the judicial machinery of the State, the Court was required to send letters of request to the Ruler of the State and the Ruler was to cause such communication to be made to the High Court or to any other judicial or civil authority as the circumstances required. Thus, even in the limited field of the jurisdiction of the Federal Court in and over the States the writ of the Court could not run in the States in the normal way.
234. Nor did the Constitution define, or empower the federal authority to do so, the constitution of the High Courts of the States. Section 215 of the Government of India Act, 1935, which enabled the Federal Legislature to confer "ancillary powers" upon the Federal Court did not enable the legislature to enlarge the powers of the Federal Court in respect of the States as they were not required to accept the corresponding entry in the Federal Legislative List, i.e., entry 53. Even if they accepted it, the powers conferred were to be only supplemental and not inconsistent with the provisions of the Act. The only authority which the Act gave to the federal authority in respect of the Courts in the Acceding States was that contained in Section 217 which empowered the Governor General to declare, in consultation with the Ruler concerned, the High Court of an Acceding State to be a High Court for the purposes of any provisions of the Act. It was inconceivable that this provision could be invoked in the case of the High Courts of all the Acceding States. The Act was silent as to what would happen to the rest.
# White Paper on Indian States (1950)/Part 11/The Judiciary of States under the New Constitution

Judiciary of States under the new Constitution
236. The original draft of the Constitution differentiated between the States and the Provinces as regards the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and did not define the Constitution of the High Courts of the States. The Constitution as finally adopted removes this disparity and integrates the judicial systems of the Provinces and States into one co-ordinated system.
The framers of the new Constitution have taken particular care to ensure the independence of the judiciary. Appointment of judges of the Supreme Court as also of the High Courts of States, are to be made by the President in consultation with the Chief Justice of India. The High Courts of States in Part B are to be governed by the same provisions as apply to the High Courts of the States in Part A in the matter of their constitution, jurisdiction, etc. The only distinction which the Constitution recognises in this field is that unlike the salaries of the judges of the High Courts in States specified in Part A, the salaries of judges in Part B States will be such as the President may, in consultation with the Rajpramukh, prescribe. This is a provision of s transitory nature and has been made to meet the immediate needs of the High Courts of States.
237. The Constitution vests in the Supreme Court wide jurisdiction in respect of matters constitutional; civil and criminal. Parliament will have power to enlarge the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in respect of matters in the Union List as also to confer "ancillary powers" on it. The law declared by the Supreme Court will be binding on all Courts within the territory of India. All decrees and orders of the Supreme Court will be enforceable throughout the territory of India in such manner as may be prescribed by Parliament by law. All authorities, civil and judicial, in the territory of India are under a statutory obligation to act in aid of the ​Supreme Court. The Supreme Court will be the final tribunal for the States in Part B, not as a matter of courtesy as it were, as was the case under the Act of 1935; its authority and jurisdiction will directly extend to States as well as Provinces. It will truly be the guardian of the Constitution and the coping-stone of the entire judicial structure of India, covering the Provinces and the States alike.
# White Paper on Indian States (1950)/Part 11/The Position of the Rajpramukh

​(2) The position of the Rajpramukh.
Articles 155, 156 and 157 which govern the appointment of the Provincial Governors, terms of their office and their qualifications, do not apply to the Rajpramukhs. However, the term "Rajpramukh" which is to be substituted for the term "Governor" in so far as the provisions of Part VI are to be applied to States specified in Part B, has been defined as follows:—
The position therefore is that, while the Governor of a Province is to be appointed by the President, so too the Rajpramukh has been defined to be the person for the time being recognised by the President as such. It follows that, while a Governor could be removed for violating the Constitution or for misconduct in the event of the Rajpramukh acting in such irresponsible manner, the President may be trusted to withdraw his original recognition and to recognise a suitable successor.
In Part A States the salary and allowances of the Governor are charged on the revenues and do not require to be voted each year. Similarly, it has ​been provided that the allowances of the Rajpramukh of a Part B State shall be charged on the State revenues. There is, however, a difference as to the authority for determining the amount to be charged in the two cases. In the case of Governors, the amount is to be determined by the Parliament by law and until provision is made in that behalf it is to be the figure prescribed in the Second Schedule to the Constitution. It has not been considered necessary to make a similar provision in the case of Rajpramukhs. The allowances of some of the Rajpramukhs of Unions of States are prescribed in the Covenants and the Government of India have guaranteed the provisions of these Covenants. The power to fix the salary and allowances of the Rajpramukh now vests in the President. In fixing the amount to be charged the President will no doubt consider the terms of the Covenant in the case of Unions of States and in the case of single States, where there is no Covenant, he will doubtless take into consideration the views of the Government and the Legislature of the State.
# White Paper on Indian States (1950)/Part 11/Recognition of Rulers

​(3) Recognition of Rulers.
The Rulers of the merged and integrated States have been guaranteed succession according to law and custom. In the Covenants and some of the Agreements of Merger, provision has been made for the procedure to be observed for the settlement of the cases of disputed succession. In the case of the Rulers of States forming Unions, every question of disputed succession is to be decided by the Council of Rulers after referring to the High Court of the Union and in accordance with the opinion of that Court. Article 366 (22) of the Constitution defines the term 'Ruler' as follows:—
It is expected that in according recognition to Rulers, the President will show due regard to the provisions of the Covenants and Agreements of Merger in respect of the cases to which these provisions apply.
# Weintraub v. United States

* related portals: Supreme Court of the United States.
* sister projects: Wikidata item.

## Dissenting Opinion

    Douglas
United States Supreme Court
400 U.S. 1014
Weintraub v. United States
On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
No. 5961. Argued: N/A --- Decided: January 18, 1971
Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 429 F. 2d 658.

## Notes

This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
Public domainPublic domainfalsefalse