# Intelligence and Security Committee China report/National Security Threat

PART ONE: THREAT AND RESPONSE
   I think the challenge of the rise of China absolutely raises huge questions for the future of the Western alliance … none of us can give a confident long-term answer to exactly how the balance of power plays out globally across the next few decades but it is clear for all of us that this is, I think, the central intelligence challenge for us across the next decade.
—Director General MI5, December 2020
* The Chinese state's prevailing aim is—very simply—to ensure that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) remains in power. Everything else is subservient to that. Professor Steve Tsang, Director of the China Institute at the School of Oriental and African Studies. (SOAS), explained, "[it is] the single most important driving factor for Chinese politics since the post-Mao period". The UK Intelligence Community similarly referred to China's principal concern as being "to ensure the continuing dominance and governance of the Chinese Communist Party. Anything which subtracts or threatens to undermine that will immediately run into what China perceives as its key national interests".
* This is familiar territory that has been covered in depth by others. However, the Intelligence Community added a second principal concern: China also seeks to become … a global power by the middle of the century. 2049 … will be the 100th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China and that is very much the timeframe in which China is looking at its global ambitions and its global activities.
* Unlike Russia, China is not assessed to be "fundamentally nihilistic" in its attempt to once again be viewed as a "great power"—it does not appear to intend to carry out a catastrophic attack. China wants to be a technological and economic superpower, with other countries reliant on its goodwill—that is its primary measure of sovereign success. MI5 observed: *** it is going after IP [Intellectual Property], it is building itself as a power, it is positioning China in the world at the top of the tree ***
* With these two overarching aims—remaining in power domestically and becoming a technological and economic superpower internationally—in mind, the UK Government considers China's supporting objectives as being:
** Economic stability: The CCP views economic prosperity as crucial to the legitimisation of the Party's rule. China's economic agenda focuses on ensuring the successful transition of its economy from a manufacturing base into an advanced high-tech economy that reflects and promotes modern China.
** Geopolitical influence: China seeks geopolitical influence in order to reshape international systems and values in line with its own interests and to be seen as a strong and dominant global power.
** Domestic control: The CCP looks to prevent internal dissent and ensure the survival of the Party. ​
** Foreign relations: China prioritises the protection of its core interests (state sovereignty, national security, territorial integrity, national reunification, the political system and economic development).
* China's actions can be understood best when viewed through the lens of these overarching aims and supporting objectives since its approach to the rest of the world flows directly from them. The Foreign Affairs Committee's report on China and the Rules-Based International System stated that: "China does not want a disrupted international order; it wants an international order that is more aligned with its interests and priorities." The Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) said that Beijing *** is opportunistically trying to transform parts of the rules-based international system, through resistance to United Nations (UN) interference in states, development without human rights conditions, the elevation of economic rights above political rights, and internet regulation by states. Where rules and norms constrain China, under President Xi Jinping it has become increasingly selective in its compliance.
* The UK Intelligence Community told the Committee that there is *** between China and Russia, based on shared interests that include seeking to erode the established world order, for strategic advantage. Although China and Russia will inevitably view each other as *** there is likely to be ***.
* Another shared interest that might result in material co-operation is around military capabilities. China is building global military capabilities to rival the US by 2049 and, as noted in our Russia Report, China and Russia have in recent years deepened defence and security co-operation, going so far as to conduct joint military exercises ***.
China's positioning: The Belt and Road Initiative
The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)—a 'belt' of overland connections to neighbouring countries (rail and road) and a maritime 'road' of shipping lanes to facilitate trade—is a clear example of President Xi Jinping's strategy to ensure that China is seen as a powerful force on the global stage, capable of shaping international norms and institutions for its own benefit.
Under the BRI, China is granting low-interest loans to countries in order to build infrastructure such as ports, roads and railways. By opening up numerous trade routes—more than 60 countries have signed up to the initiative—China seeks to develop new investment opportunities, cultivate export markets, and boost Chinese incomes and domestic consumption. ​However, there are concerns that China will be able to use its leverage, over countries which owe it money, to extract strategic concessions (such as supporting China's territorial ambitions at the expense of their own, or agreeing to long-term contracts that might not be in their national interest): a practice known as 'debt-trap diplomacy'.
The loans have, in some cases, included conditions such as a requirement to use Chinese contractors, which has inflated costs and reduced the benefit to the local economy. In other cases, there have been accusations that loans have been used to channel funds to companies owned by officials. In Sri Lanka, when the government asked to restructure repayments, China agreed—on the condition that it be given a 99-year lease on a strategically located port that it had funded. GCHQ told us that the BRI was allowing China to change the rules in numerous multilateral fora:
   So, the way in which China exerts its influence, we are seeing of course in Belt and Road, and that is a very physical thing but it is also a very virtual thing, it is the way in which technologies are being rolled out across the world … we are not nearly … fleet enough in thinking about how China is setting the standards for the world's technology … it is dominating the block-votes in some of the key standard-setting bodies; … [and] as part of its BRI diplomacy and its debt diplomacy, it is demanding the subservience of other countries to vote with them in these contexts. So they have a monopoly on a lot of the standard-setting bodies that we care about.
Professor Steve Tsang described the Chinese approach towards regional and international organisations as being "instrumentalist", adapting such organisations to better suit China's priorities. The Council on Foreign Relations describes China as undermining United Nations human rights mechanisms by downplaying individual rights and instead emphasising the importance of state-led development, national sovereignty and non-intervention. China has also been accused of trying to ensure that it received a favourable review of its human rights record from the Human Rights Council by threatening consequences for countries—and in particular BRI countries—that supported a negative view. While there is a question as to whether China's overseas lending constitutes a deliberate ploy to trap countries in unsustainable debt, in October 2020 the Joint Intelligence Committee noted that China can use loans and renegotiations as leverage to advance its policy objectives, and that developing countries have often been eager customers for Chinese lending, as China typically has competitive prices, can disburse loans quickly, can lend at a scale required for many large infrastructure projects and has been willing to fund prestige projects.
​In November 2021, the Chief of SIS highlighted the risk of Chinese debt traps in his speech to the International Institute for Strategic Studies: "we want other countries to be clear-eyed about the debt traps, data exposure and vulnerability to political coercion that arise from dependency on relationships where there is no recourse to an independent judiciary or free press".
We were also told that there had been several examples of the Chinese state-owned bank signing debt suspension agreements (***) and that China had also been taking advantage of gaps in international co-operation to expand its influence over international organisations such as the World Health Organization. Director GCHQ observed: "yes, they have been opportunistic, not just in the commercial space but in the rules-based international system space too".
In the summer of 2020, 60% of BRI projects were facing significant challenges as a result of the pandemic, including:
* restrictions on cross-border movement of workers and logistics;
* the worldwide economic downturn increasing the financial burden on China, and
* rising anti-China sentiment across the world.
As a result, China has taken the decision to move away from infrastructure projects and instead focus on its Health Silk Road and its Digital Silk Road.
The Health Silk Road has been epitomised by so-called 'vaccine diplomacy' and 'mask diplomacy', donations of both intended to show that China is the superpower most able to defeat the virus globally. China has been very keen to promote its role in 'health diplomacy'—sometimes exaggerating its work to counter the virus and to develop vaccines—whilst also encouraging the spread of disinformation favourable to Chinese narratives. Disinformation also appears to have been used to sow seeds of doubt about the origin of the virus, including through fake news and conspiracy theories, to deny any fault and sway its domestic audience in particular.
The Digital Silk Road has seen developing countries being given the opportunity to upgrade their digital infrastructure—vital when combating a pandemic by utilising rapid test results and contact tracing—through the donation or subsidisation of Chinese technology. The success of the Digital Silk Road has resulted in China accounting for almost a quarter of global data flows (at the beginning of 2021), twice the amount that the United States accounts for.
* The question for the UK is how China's global aims and ambitions affect the UK. The Intelligence Community have been clear that China's view of an ideal future—where it is a world power—would be antithetical to the UK's interests: If you think of UK interests as being in favour of good governance and transparency and good economic management, which I think is fair, we regard those as things which are good in their own right but also serve our national interest because it helps with trade, investment, prosperity and stability and so forth, then I think that China represents a risk on a pretty wide scale.
* The UK is unlikely to be the top priority for China when it comes to espionage and interference: the US, and perceived domestic threats to the CCP's rule (known as 'the Five Poisons'—Taiwanese independence, Tibetan independence, Xinjiang separatists, the Chinese democracy movement and the Falun Gong), are likely to receive the most attention from the Chinese Intelligence Services (ChIS). Nevertheless, the JIC Chair explained: China sees almost all of its global activity in the context of what it sees as the struggle between the United States and China, and therefore it sees the United Kingdom fundamentally through that optic. China aspires to split off from the United States countries which it thinks might be detachable, and they sometimes have a sunnily optimistic view about which countries might be susceptible to that treatment. I would say that that was their single biggest issue with the United Kingdom.
* In addition, the UK's membership of various international bodies of significance to China, and the perception of the UK as an international opinion-former, makes the UK of interest in the context of China's strategy to reshape international systems in its favour. The JIC Chair explained to the Committee: China sees the United Kingdom as an important bellwether, an important country in guiding opinion on Chinese affairs within the European Union. It sees us as a global player, not of course of the same stature as the United States but nevertheless a country still of considerable influence. GCHQ further observed: "We are really important to them … where we are performing that international leadership role."
* Linked to the UK's position as an opinion-former, the UK's unique historical role in China—particularly, but not exclusively, in relation to Hong Kong—is likely to make the UK a higher-profile target. In terms of Hong Kong, SIS recognised that: activism around Hong Kong and the way in which Hong Kong has become a more pressing issue means that we have probably gone up the stack in terms of their interest. ​ This has been demonstrated over the past few years, with the Chinese government proving extremely sensitive to UK Government comments on the Hong Kong protests in 2019—in a press conference in July 2019, the Chinese Ambassador to the UK said, "I tell [the UK Government]: hands off Hong Kong and show respect. This colonial mind-set is still haunting the minds of some officials or politicians"—and threatening curtailment of Chinese investment in the UK following HMG's announcement of the British National (Overseas) visa scheme. A number of our External Expert witnesses were clear that Hong Kong had become a personal project for President Xi and that he felt he had to be seen as victorious in the pursuit of his policy. Any move by the UK is viewed as interference in internal affairs and is responded to in an aggressive manner.
* These factors would appear to place the UK just below China's top priority targets, as it seeks to build support for its current 'core interests', to mute international criticism and to gain economically. In respect of the latter, China sees the UK as a home for Chinese investment. The JIC Chair told us: [China] sees us as an important financial and commercial centre. It is no accident that of course the United Kingdom has been the major destination for Chinese investment in Europe since 2000, indeed I think by most estimates, if you add together investments in France, Germany and Italy, the United Kingdom still outstrips them. So there is a very strong commercial element.
* China also values the UK in relation to both its technology industry and its education sector. Lord Patten, Chancellor of the University of Oxford, observed: I think they probably think we are not entirely reliable useful idiots … I think they do take us quite seriously, though not as seriously as once was the case, and I think they regard us as an economic opportunity and as an opportunity to, through elite capture, through the cultivation of useful idiots, through playing on things like the 'Golden Age' of British China relations, getting us by and large corralled into doing the sort of things they would like us to do. This approach can be seen in relation to Civil Nuclear energy: Chinese interest lies in gaining UK regulatory approval for its reactor designs as they assess that this will influence other countries to permit Chinese investment in their Civil Nuclear sectors. This is explored further in Part Two of this Report. ​ As a result, while China poses the main state security threat to British interests, at the same time China's targeting of the UK for strategic advantage will—in the short term at least—be tempered by its need to keep the diplomatic relationship afloat in order to retain economic ties with the UK and encourage wider UK support for China as a responsible global actor.
* However, as China's economic power develops, along with its capability to target foreign states covertly, China may be in a position to take a more aggressive stance against the UK. In addition, there is a realistic possibility that the UK's departure from the European Union (EU) will decrease the UK's attraction for China in terms of trade and investment, and that more assertive push-back from the UK and its Western allies may result in increasingly adverse retaliation from China. In July 2020, following the UK Government's decision to prohibit the use of Huawei equipment in the UK telecommunications network, China's Ambassador Liu Xiaoming told the broadcaster Andrew Marr that it was "a dark day for UK-China relations". There has been a definite cooling in the relationship, and it appears that the downwards trajectory is likely to continue. We were told: China has reduced ministerial engagement and its media has threatened boycotts against UK pharmaceutical, financial and automotive companies. *** Nevertheless, it is notable that the Huawei decision has not yet led to any direct action. Whilst we found that surprising, it may be because China still considers the decision to be reversible.
* We questioned the UK Intelligence Community about the concerns raised by the Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee that China may be targeting the Commonwealth, trying to undermine the alliance in order to gain the support of Commonwealth members who benefit from Chinese investment. The concerns were reported by The Times following the announcement that Barbados had taken the decision to remove the Queen as its Head of State - the article reported that Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) intelligence about Chinese activities in Barbados had been shared with the UK. However, the JIC Chair ***.
A. China's national imperative is to ensure that the Chinese Communist Party remains in power. Everything else is subservient to that.
B. However, it is its ambition at a global level to become a technological and economic superpower, on which other countries are reliant that poses a national security threat to the UK.
​C. China views the UK through the optic of the struggle between the United States and China. When combined with the UK's membership of significant international bodies, and the perception of the UK as an international opinion-former, these factors would appear to place the UK just below China's top priority targets.
D. China views the UK as being of use in its efforts to mute international criticism and to gain economically: this, in the short term at least, will temper China's targeting of the UK.
* As noted previously, China's broad aims in relation to the UK are to mute criticism and build support for China as a partner, and to gain economically. More specifically, China’s aims are:
** to encourage a divergence between US and UK policy goals on China;
** to shape the public narrative to mute criticism of the CCP and its actions (particularly in relation to Hong Kong, human rights, the South China Sea, Tibet, press freedom, Xinjiang etc.);
** to dissuade the UK from challenging any of China’s territorial claims;
** to encourage the UK to endorse China as a reliable partner (and thereby boost its reputation on the global stage); and
** to ensure China can benefit economically from the UK (in particular by seeking UK endorsement of Chinese national champions and through the purchase of UK technology companies).
* In order to achieve these aims, China is seeking both political influence and economic advantage in relation to "UK government departments, politicians, our academic institutions, non-government organisations, private companies with access to sensitive data and areas of emerging technology (e.g. artificial intelligence (AI), quantum, biotech)". This chapter provides an overview of the political influence and economic advantage that China is seeking: these are also expanded on in later chapters and Part Two of the Report.
* China is trying to create a world in which it is "going to be increasingly hard to … swim against the tide of what China wants to happen in … global, economic, political [and] military settings".To this end, China seeks to influence elites and decision-makers in different walks of life. HMG explained: Distinct from China’s legitimate lobbying and diplomacy efforts, China seeks to manipulate the perceptions of China and Chinese policy in line with [its] aims … We judge that China uses overt and covert methods in parallel in order to achieve its aims. Under President Xi, who is championing China's emergence as a global power, the appetite for using these methods is likely growing. ​
* China prioritises acquiring information on traditional targets of espionage - such as political decision-making and defence. In seeking to establish HMG's position, it casts its net widely. We were told that China hoovers up: very large amounts of mostly not very damaging information in isolation. There is a big thing here about the aggregation of vast amounts of small insights, but alongside that you cannot be blind to the possibility of small amounts of very deep insights. (China also uses its acquisition of large amounts of data to enable it to identify, and track, targets: this is covered in the Case Study on Industry and Technology in Part Two of the Report.)
* In recent years, it appears that there has been a general rise in attempts to penetrate the Government or the UK Intelligence Community ***. UK students studying in China can also be targeted. ***. *** both SIS and MI5 told us that the ChIS were most aggressive in ***. ***
* In terms of cultivating influence, HMG told us that the ChIS use the following methods: In terms of political parties, support groups, institutions, officials and the media, we consider these methods in more detail later, in the chapter on Interference. ​
** covert support for foreign political parties;
** covert funding and support of groups favourable to the CCP;
** using trade negotiations or investment activities as a platform to influence key decision-makers through bribery and corruption;
** co-opting academics, think-tank employees, former officials and former military figures;
** using cultural and friendship institutions to access key thinkers and decision-makers;
** obtaining and releasing materials to discredit individuals opposed to China's views;
** funding of universities, both to influence research direction towards Chinese priorities and to gain access to prominent individuals through philanthropy, and
** covert media manipulation to undermine support for policies and views deemed harmful to China.
* In terms of Academia, this is the subject of a specific Case Study in Part Two of the Report. At this point, however, we note that Academia provides China with a key means of exerting influence: Chinese attempts to interfere with, and stifle debate, amongst the academic community in the UK are a significant problem, made possible by China's academic 'buying power'. Chinese students make up the largest overseas (non-EU) contingent in UK universities and are responsible for generating almost £600m—a very significant proportion of universities' income. China is actively using this income as leverage to gain political influence and control and to direct the narrative.
* However, China does not simply exert control and influence through student fees, it also provides direct investment to academic institutions so that it can guarantee input into academic programmes, direct research and ensure that UK students are taught an interpretation of China that reflects the CCP's interests. In addition to seeking political influence at an institutional level, China also targets individual academics who study the country, seeking to ensure that they act in the CCP's best interests either through professional inducements or, if that doesn't work, by intimidation, including using Chinese visas as leverage. The threat of not allowing an academic to travel to China—when that is their area of expertise—is a very powerful threat. Our Case Study on Academia explores the scale of China's political influence in this area.
* In terms of the use of investment activities as a platform, this can clearly be seen from the political influence China gains from its very significant investment in the UK's Civil Nuclear sector—seeking to ensure that the UK is economically reliant on China. In a bid to become a global supplier, China is looking to capitalise on the UK's international leadership and seeks to use UK regulatory approval for Chinese technology in this sector to enable the export of Chinese technology to other Western markets—thereby increasing China's political influence. We explore China's influence in this sector in our Case Study on Civil Nuclear energy.
* China is engaged in a battle for technological supremacy with the West—one which it appears to be winning. China's 'Made in China 2025' strategy is an initiative designed to help China become a manufacturing superpower through investing in, and then leveraging, foreign industries and foreign industry expertise in order to help China master complex design and manufacturing processes more quickly. China targets other countries’ technology, Intellectual Property (IP) and data in order to "bypass costly and time-consuming research, development and training". This approach means it can exploit foreign expertise, gaining economic and technological advantages and thereby achieving prosperity and growth more quickly—and at the expense of others.
* Chinese dominance of technology has far-reaching consequences: a key issue in the 5G/Huawei decision was that there were few other options, such is the dominance of China ​ in the market. In July 2019, our predecessor Committee published a statement reporting on the first aspect of this Inquiry, Chinese involvement in the UK telecommunications sector—and more specifically the then current issue of whether Huawei should be able to supply equipment to be used in the UK 5G telecommunications network. As this Committee warned. in its 2019 statement, the problem is far bigger than the UK's 5G network: the West is over-reliant on Chinese technology generally and must act now to tackle China's technological dominance. The Committee warned that the Huawei decision was a geopolitical (rather than simply technological) issue and would require careful consideration. However, crucially, it also warned that action must be taken now to tackle the Chinese monopoly in technology generally: one of the lessons the UK Government must learn from the current debate over 5G is that with the technology sector now monopolised by such a few key players, we are over-reliant on Chinese technology and we are not alone in this, this is a global issue. We need to consider how we can create greater diversity in the market. This will require us to take a long-term view—but we need to start now. This issue is not unique to telecommunications and we return to it in the Case Studies on Industry and Technology, and Civil Nuclear energy.
* Chinese dominance of technology is driven and supported by the Chinese state. China uses regulation and state subsidies (***) to give its companies an advantage in the global marketplace, and uses its political weight to shape international standards to favour Chinese companies. China is aggressively acquiring technology and expertise through investment, and mergers and acquisitions, as well as by co-opting companies and Academia. Illicit acquisition of Intellectual Property also appears to be a major contributor to China's rapid progress. The JIC Chair confirmed that "[China] is likely to want to access our science and technology base by legitimate and illegitimate means".
* Academia provides China with a means of doing both. While it is the illegitimate means (such as the theft of IP) that may attract the headlines, China is also adept at making the most of overt routes (such as Foreign Direct Investment and joint ventures). Working in plain sight, China directs, funds and collaborates on academic research for its own ends, in particular seeking to benefit the Chinese military through targeted research on dual-use techniques and to secure economic advantage over the West. The vast number of Chinese students—especially post-graduates—in academic institutions in the UK provides a further opportunity.
* China uses some students to operate as non-traditional collectors of IP particularly those involved in cutting-edge research and development ***. In some cases, these students obscure their military affiliations, including through the use of misleading historical names for their institutions or even the use of non-existent institutions. Once established in academic institutions in the UK, these students are in a position to identify and exfiltrate valuable IP and data. Once in China's hands, IP and data are used to build or short-cut ​ Chinese expertise, giving China an economic advantage. (China's use of Academia to gain economic advantage is covered in more detail in a Case Study in Part Two of the Report.)
* In terms of illicit acquisition, the Chinese target IP and data closely aligned with China's national strategies, including those industries identified as priorities in the 'Made in China 2025' strategy—such as IT, robotics, aerospace, ocean engineering equipment and ships, railways, energy-saving technology, vehicles, agriculture, new materials and medicine. (The last of these, medicine, has become particularly pertinent since the start of the Covid-19 pandemic.) HMG told us that the ChIS will have launched a systemic cyber effort, both increasing and diversifying its use of cyber attacks, to obtain IP, Personally Identifiable Information, ***. This latter point is covered in more detail in the Case Study on Industry and Technology.
* China has been accused of stealing IP and data from industries in the US, with the estimated cost of Chinese cyber-enabled theft alone thought to be around $320bn to the US economy in 2018. The danger posed by Chinese illicit acquisition of data and technology—and emerging technology in particular—is discussed further in the Case Study on Industry and Technology.
* In the Energy sector, the Chinese government has a strategic imperative to acquire technology—through covert acquisition of IP—that will enable it to improve and increase domestic energy production. With severe pollution and environmental damage posing a possible threat to the CCP's popular support in China, there is a threat of economic espionage in the area of 'green' energy. These issues are explored in greater detail in our Case Study on Civil Nuclear energy.
* China's attempts to achieve economic advantage pose a pervasive threat, but certain UK sectors would appear to be of particular interest: (We consider these sectors in more detail later in our Case Studies on Academia, Industry and Technology, and Civil Nuclear energy.) ​ I think in the past we have perhaps not had as rigorous a process at identifying across the board what needs to be protected based on our sovereign interest. We've had a very sophisticated process in some areas, so for example Critical National Infrastructure, which includes energy and so on. We've been weaker in other areas, for example emerging technology, potentially strategic suppliers and interdependences and data and telecoms infrastructure particularly. We consider this later in the part of the Report dealing with the Government's response. E. China is seeking both political influence and economic advantage in order to achieve its aims in relation to the UK. It seeks to acquire information and influence elites and decision-makers, and to acquire Intellectual Property using covert and overt methods to gain technological supremacy.  ​THE CHINESE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES   Scale ​ The Chinese Intelligence Services Ministry of State Security The main civilian intelligence service is answerable to the State Council and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Politburo Standing Committee, with a remit to operate both domestically and abroad. Unlike the UK intelligence Agencies, it has executive powers. SIS has told the Committee that it understands the strength of the Ministry of State Security (MSS) to be in the low hundreds of thousands. In June 2018, a White House report examining the Chinese threat to technology and Intellectual Property cited open source reporting stating that the MSS deployed around 40,000 intelligence officers abroad and more than 50,000 in mainland China. The vast majority of its work is spent on domestic security and the 'Five Poisons'. It divides its work along thematic lines, headed by individual bureaux. The People's Liberation Army The People's Liberation Army (PLA, China's armed forces) has a significant intelligence collection role and answers to the Central Military Commission, which is chaired by President Xi Jinping. The Strategic Support Force ***, set up in 2016, is China's SIGINT (Signals Intelligence) agency and has responsibility for the PLA's previously disparate cyber and SIGINT capabilities (e.g. defensive cyber operations, disruptive and destructive cyber effects, cyber espionage, SIGINT collection and technology research). It is a highly capable organisation: GCHQ cites China as being "alongside Russia, the most capable cyber adversary we face and they put significant effort into it ***." *** the human intelligence arm of the PLA, persistently and aggressively targets government, military and commercial interests across the world, deploying *** covert tradecraft. *** *** *** ​The Ministry of Public Security The Ministry of Public Security is responsible for domestic law enforcement, counter-terrorism, counter-espionage operations and maintaining 'social order'—including the forced repatriation of Chinese nationals—although since 2015 it has been able to carry out investigations overseas if necessary. It liaises with foreign national police services and maintains an active role in counter-narcotics and illegal immigration work. Other intelligence-gathering organisations The Political Work Department Liaison Bureau—part of the Central Military Commission—makes use of cover organisations to facilitate access to, and influence over, prominent figures overseas, with a particular focus on defence policy-makers. It conducts operations at home and overseas, using officers posted under various covers in China and in embassies and consulates. The United Front Work Department, one of the most important departments of the CCP, is tasked with building and maintaining support for the Party, both at home and overseas, and is therefore concerned with domestic influence and control, and influence and interference activities directed at the Chinese diaspora, from managing relations with prominent Chinese individuals and groups to co-ordinating support for Chinese positions or targeting dissident groups abroad. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the official diplomatic service, has access to important stakeholders within foreign governments ***. The International Liaison Department is responsible for cultivating relations with foreign political parties. Its overt functions include liaison with these parties and with pro-China friendship associations and 'peace movements' overseas. ***   A broad remit
** the Telecommunications sector (given that it provides access to information across other sectors);
** the Aerospace sector;
** key emerging technology sectors (e.g. artificial intelligence (AI), quantum and synthetic biology);
** traditional technology sectors (e.g. trains and ocean engineering);
** Nuclear, Civil Nuclear and the wider Energy sector; and
** the economy and Academia.
** However, when we asked which specific aspects HMG prioritises for protection from China, the picture was startling. In December 2020, the Deputy National Security Adviser admitted:
** It is clear that China employs a range of overt and covert methods to gain political influence and economic advantage over the UK and that China's ambition and reach extends into a wide range of sectors in the UK, including Academia, Industry and Technology, and Civil Nuclear energy (each explored in the Case Studies in Part Two of this Report). China's activity is made possible by the nature and scale of its intelligence apparatus, which is explored in detail in the next chapter.
** The nature and scale of the Chinese Intelligence Services (ChIS) are like many aspects of China's government—hard to grasp for the outsider, due to the size of the bureaucracy, the blurring of lines of accountability between party and state officials, a partially decentralised system, and a lack of verifiable information. ***
** President Xi's reform agenda has aimed to increase professionalisation of Chinese intelligence activities domestically and overseas. Expenditure on the internal security apparatus has outpaced even China's recent dramatic military modernisation: by some estimates, China now spends almost 20% more on domestic security than on external defence, and this appears to have led to an improvement in capability. MI5 told the Committee: ***
** According to UK Intelligence Community evidence, China almost certainly maintains the largest state intelligence apparatus in the world—in excess of personnel—which means that it is not necessarily straightforward to identify which parts of this enormous apparatus are targeted at the UK and our allies ***. ***
** The ChIS are highly active, but the scope and scale of their activities vary widely—for instance, it has been reported that the Ministry of State Security (MSS) has a wide network of regional and municipal offices that exist under a federated structure. This means that one area of domestic or foreign policy might be a priority for one office, but not for another; or alternatively, two offices will have the same priority but may not co-ordinate their efforts.
** With that said, the overarching priorities for the ChIS include ensuring that the CCP's message is delivered consistently and that subversive views are prevented from gaining traction amongst the population—thereby preserving the CCP's monopoly on power. According to open-source reporting, there are several CCP priorities supported by the ChIS's work: ​
*** suppressing threats to the CCP and its monopoly on state power—including international and domestic democracy advocates and minority groups, such as the Falun Gong and the Uighur Muslim population in Xinjiang;
*** sovereignty—particularly with regard to Taiwan, Hong Kong, Macau and Tibet; and
*** support to military operations-in addition to operations designed to ensure China's territorial integrity, this also includes monitoring US military movements in the Pacific and the military capabilities and capacity of adversaries. Spying on other countries' defence industries would also fall under this category.
** The UK Intelligence Community broadly concurs, reiterating that China's prevailing priority is maintaining the power of the CCP and the Chinese state—but that this does not mean that the ChIS have a purely domestic focus, as their remit includes both seeking to suppress the 'Five Poisons' (which are regarded as threats to China's national security) and advancing China's national interests by expanding its global reach and influence. There are public indications that, over the past decade, China has been placing greater emphasis on developing stronger foreign intelligence capabilities—for example, the establishment of the People's Liberation Army Strategy Support Force (PLASSF) in 2015. SIS said that, while China "are predominantly focused on internal threats", nevertheless "they have a potent external capability … they deploy globally".
** It appears that President Xi's authority over the ChIS has grown since 2016, and that Beijing is using the ChIS as an increasingly important tool. The ChIS target the UK and its interests prolifically and aggressively, with economic espionage a prominent motivation for the ChIS. We were told that there are up to *** ChIS officers usually stationed in the UK, as well as ***. SIS noted that: ***
** Like all intelligence services, the ChIS seek to obtain classified information regarding, for example, foreign powers' military operations, defence industries, national security decision-makers and government organisations. However, the ChIS are also known to have a considerable appetite for collecting unclassified information. In 2008, MI5 had explained to the Committee: ​ What the Chinese do is a bit like … bees going out from the hive; they just go out and they collect little bits of pollen from all over the place and they bring it back to their hive and they turn it into honey. *** What they have is a pretty indiscriminate system of masses of students, officials, businessmen, et cetera, *** all of whom bring back little bits, which actually is jolly difficult—it's the grains of sand problem. *** During this Inquiry, MI5 noted that the ChIS threat had moved on from that analogy: Chinese intelligence officers directly target sensitive information and deploy more sophisticated tradecraft alongside developing those networks that collect lower-level information.
** Nevertheless, a vast swathe of information collected by the ChIS would be considered to be 'open source': something they are able to do by virtue of the resources at their disposal—SIS explained that the ChIS are able to act in an opportunistic manner and gather everything they can without having to prioritise. Most Western intelligence services—usually due to resource constraints—focus primarily on the collection of classified information and much of the information collected by the ChIS would be considered anodyne or innocuous by Western standards. ChIS activities also therefore take them beyond what would be considered the remit of most Western intelligence services (for example, some of the efforts by the United Front Work Department to influence politicians and public perceptions of China could be regarded as traditional diplomacy). The broad remit means that the ChIS engage in activities ***, such as seemingly innocuous relationships with academics, think tanks or those in industry. For example, a US citizen with an affiliation to a Washington DC think tank was approached by the ChIS, who deemed his regular access to contacts in the US think-tank community to be valuable, as he would be able to report—based solely on unclassified information—on US-China relations.
** The sheer size of the ChIS also means that ChIS officers are able to try multiple routes to acquire all, or part of, the information they seek. For example, trying small- and medium-sized enterprises rather than just primary contractors, or using third-party countries. DI told the Committee: *** In more ways than one, the broad remit of the ChIS poses a significant challenge to Western attempts to counter their activity.  ​'Whole-of-state' approach F. China almost certainly maintains the largest state intelligence apparatus in the world. The nature and scale of the Chinese Intelligence Services are—like many aspects of China's government—hard to grasp for the outsider, due to the size of the bureaucracy, the blurring of lines of accountability between party and state officials, a partially decentralised system, and a lack of verifiable information. G. The Chinese Intelligence Services target the UK and its overseas interests prolifically and aggressively. While they seek to obtain classified information, they are willing to utilise intelligence officers and agents to collect open source information indiscriminately—given the vast resources at their disposal. In more ways than one, the broad remit of the Chinese Intelligence Services poses a significant challenge to Western attempts to counter their activity. H. To compound the problem, it is not just the Chinese Intelligence Services: the Chinese Communist Party co-opts every state institution, company and citizen. This 'whole-of-state' approach means China can aggressively target the UK, yet the scale of the activity makes it more difficult to detect ***.  ​ESPIONAGE Gathering human intelligence   Targeting of diplomats and officials abroad Case study: Targeting of British Embassy staff *** *** *** *** Due to limited extra-territorial provisions in the Official Secrets Act 1989, which extend only to UK nationals overseas, the UK Intelligence Community were unable to pursue a prosecution.   Using social media Case study: Former CIA officer convicted of spying for China Kevin Mallory, a former CIA and Defense Intelligence Agency officer, was found guilty of conspiracy to transmit national defence information to an agent of the Chinese Intelligence Services (ChIS) in May 2019. In February 2017, whilst heavily in debt, Mallory had responded to a LinkedIn message from a man purporting to be a researcher from a Chinese think tank, the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences. The discussion resulted in Kevin Mallory taking two trips to China, in March and April 2017. Following his return from China in April 2017, Mallory was subject to a Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) check. During the check, a CBP officer found that Mallory, despite declaring that he was not carrying over $10,000, had $16,500 in US dollars with him. He was allowed to amend his customs declaration. In May 2017, Mallory submitted to a voluntary interview with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). During that interview, he stated that he had been contacted by an ​individual via social media whom he believed to be a Chinese recruiter. He now believed the individuals whom he had met in China to be from the ChIS. According to Mallory, he had been tasked by the ChIS with producing two open source research papers on US policy matters. He had been paid $25,000 for the work and he expected to be paid a similar amount for work during a forthcoming trip to China in June 2017. He had also been encouraged to seek employment with the US Government. He had been given a covert communication device by the ChIS and was trained in how to use it. He agreed to supply the device to the FBI for investigation. When demonstrating how the device worked, Mallory showed the FBI interviewers messages that had been sent whilst in 'secure message' mode. Mallory was surprised, as he had understood that all of the secure messages were automatically deleted by the device. Upon further technical examination of the device, the FBI recovered further messages in which Mallory made reference to deleting top security classification markers on documents that he was sending on the device. The FBI established that four documents had been sent on the device, including one classified as TOP SECRET and two classified as SECRET. Kevin Mallory was sentenced to 20 years in prison, followed by 5 years of supervised release.   Seeding operations Case studies: British students targeted by ChIS officers *** In ***, MI5 became aware of a British student in China *** who had been cultivated by ChIS officers. As the relationship progressed, the student introduced the officers to a friend ***   Cyber operations I. In terms of espionage, China's human intelligence collection is prolific, using a vast network of individuals embedded in local society to access individuals of interest—often identified through social media. It is also clear from the evidence we have seen that China routinely targets current and former UK civil servants ***. While there is good awareness of the danger posed, it is vital that vigilance is maintained. J. In relation to the cyber approach, whilst understanding has clearly improved in recent years, China has a highly capable cyber—and increasingly sophisticated cyberespionage—operation: however, this is an area where the 'known unknowns' are concerning. Work on continuing coverage of its general capabilities must be maintained alongside further work on Chinese offensive cyber and close-proximity technical operations.  ​INTERFERENCE What constitutes interference? The boundary between influence and interference is hard to define, but can be broadly articulated as the difference between those diplomatic and soft power activities that are generally considered 'legitimate', and those that are considered 'illegitimate' (although of course legitimacy is subjective and some countries—not least China itself—are likely to set a lower threshold for which activities they consider to be interference in their affairs). The former Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull has described interference as "foreign influence activities that are in any way covert, coercive, or corrupt". There does not appear to have been a consistent definition within the UK Government of what constitutes interference until 2019, when the National Security Council was due to approve the following definition of foreign interference' (albeit it does not appear to have been discussed): Foreign interference involves deceptive, coercive, corruptive or threatening actions on behalf of, in collaboration with, or directed by a foreign principal. Interference activity can be overt and/or covert. Interference is a spectrum of activity that is unfavourable to UK national security and/or economic wellbeing; detrimental to or undermines political or democratic processes at the local or national level; undermines academic thought and freedom of expression; or undermines UK sovereignty. In May 2021, the consultation on Legislation to Counter State Threats (Hostile State Activity) gave the following definition: a wide range of activity through which states seek to further their aims by use of covert means or by obfuscation of intent and originator, including disinformation, ​bribery and coercion. This also includes attempts to interfere in our democracy or Government policy making, including through interference in national, regional or local elections and referenda, as well as attempts to undermine academic freedoms. A number of states conduct persistent activity which attempts to distort UK and international information environments through the use of information operations which often play on existing divisions.   Government   Senior officials   Military   Interference in elections   Media   The Chinese diaspora in the UK Case study: Interference against the Chinese diaspora It appears that, in 2019, a Chinese national studying for a PhD in a European country was coerced into travelling to a third country, where she was met by individuals who attempted to dissuade her from further engaging in activism activities. *** K. In terms of interference, China oversteps the boundary and crosses the line from exerting influence—a legitimate course of action—into interference, in the pursuit of its interests and values at the expense of those of the UK. ​L. Decision-makers—from serving politicians to former political figures, senior government officials and the military—are, inevitably, key targets. China employs a range of tactics, including seeking to recruit them into lucrative roles in Chinese companies—to the extent that we questioned whether there was a revolving door between the Government and certain Chinese companies, with those involved in awarding contracts being 'rewarded' with jobs. M. The Cabinet Office must update the Advisory Committee on Business Appointments guidelines in relation to intelligence and security matters, including with particular reference to China, and ensure that their implementation is strictly enforced.
*** To compound the problem, there is not just the ChIS to consider. The UK Intelligence Community assess that: "The Chinese government is agnostic about the means employed to achieve its objectives. It is willing to pull on whichever lever is most likely to succeed, often employing multiple levers at the same time."In practice, this means that Chinese state-owned and non-state-owned companies, as well as academic and cultural establishments and ordinary Chinese citizens, are liable to be (willingly or unwillingly) co-opted into espionage and interference operations overseas. SIS told the Committee: when you look at the kind of threat surface, it is very big and the people gathering information will not always be intelligence services. So every state institution in China is ultimately subsumed to the Chinese Communist Party and the state and their military interests. So a university, with no formal link to the intelligence services, could be being used to gather information on technologies which China deems critical to its future place in the world. So it is a very, very big subject.
*** This 'whole-of-state' approach will clearly be more difficult to detect ***. Nevertheless, the sharpest, or most challenging, elements of China's acquisition programme will always be placed in the hands of the ChIS. SIS warned that China has "a whole service effort geared to Chinese strategic advantage and will seek to penetrate and potentially disrupt … the UK to secure that advantage over time". This is the area that poses the greatest acquisition threat to the UK, whether via cyber intrusion, covert agents, penetration of HMG or collection of defence technology.
*** The Ministry of State Security (MSS) *** lead on China's human intelligence (HUMINT) collection through both covert and overt operations, run both overseas and in China. Intelligence officers (predominantly based in China) send individuals overseas as business executives, academics, students etc., who seek to establish themselves in positions of value, embed themselves in local society and qualify for host nationality status. Intelligence is then fed back to a controlling officer based in China via visits, social media or other electronic communications.
*** Commentators have noted the ChIS's sophisticated use of open source information to compile and catalogue lists of individuals and organisations that may be useful to China's aims, and how the ChIS embed themselves in positions to be able to direct information and knowledge back to China. The MSS also uses commercial, diplomatic and journalistic cover to access persons of interest and influence and conduct operations. They focus on gathering valuable open source information and cultivating contacts in government, business and local Chinese communities. These 'cultivees' are not necessarily agents (***) and, given that MSS officers are working under cover, they often are not aware they are talking to the MSS. MI5 explained: what the Chinese will do is sift what they can from many, many, many sources, many people, and to do that you don't really need for this British person or academic to kind of radically alter their view of the whole universe, you just need them to, sort of, give you some articles or some insights or a certain amount of influence that is useful to you, and the British person who is doing this in some cases may even remain genuinely unwitting as to what they have done, or more often, I suppose, they probably half know that they haven't done something wholly noble, but they never have to quite confront the fact that they are in some sense betraying the advantage of their nation. ***.
*** The ChIS routinely target foreign diplomats and embassy officials in China and its near abroad, and there has been greater scrutiny of HMG staff in China *** in recent years ***. China has been developing increasingly pervasive coverage, and technical and legal powers, and it has almost certainly been using these and other espionage levers ***. Although until recently the ChIS did not routinely engage in harassment, there has been increasing harassment of Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) staff based in and travelling to China ***. Recent examples of ChIS action *** include entering their accommodation, close surveillance and IT incidents ***. It is possible that this increase ​ in aggressive action is in response to actions taken by the UK, which China perceives to be aggressive: Royal Navy activity in the South China Sea *** and statements made by UK officials that challenge Chinese 'core interests'.
*** Social media is increasingly used to identify human targets overseas and to make initial introductions. Bulk online methodology—using multiple fake profiles on social media—can be used to identify thousands of potential targets, including HMG officials, with all-expenses-paid invitations to China following. Foreign business consultants based in China are increasingly used to help Chinese state targeting by advertising on Western websites for 'consultants' or 'associates' to provide assessments on various issues: good connections to Western governments are often a prerequisite.
*** Academics are often initially approached through invitations to a conference in China, during which the academic would "have a slightly strange encounter over coffee with someone who is not quite as presented". We questioned whether the methodology always focused on trips to China and were told that: *** once they get you back to China, if you have shown vulnerability to them, they will absolutely do all the usual gamut of blackmail, honey-trapping, where they try and catch you in a sexually compromising position. They will do all of that.
*** The following graphic *** is useful in showing a potential pathway through which online cultivation may take place, and where the approaches have led to further cultivation. ​ Bearing in mind that this would be just one department out of many, and just using one platform, it can be seen that China's use of social media to target individuals is prolific—and it is also global.
*** In December 2017, the German internal intelligence service (BfV) publicly accused the ChIS of using fake LinkedIn profiles to target German citizens—including politicians. The following is a recent case of a retired CIA officer who was convicted of spying for China, having been recruited via LinkedIn.
*** *** the widespread targeting of foreign students in China. ***
*** *** an attempt by the ChIS to seed someone into one of the UK Agencies as a recruit. ***
*** China has a large and highly effective cyber espionage capability, consisting of official elements of both the MSS and the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and a range of non-official ​ actors, including so-called 'patriotic hackers' (to whom the state turns a blind eye) and cyber criminals. GCHQ assesses that China focuses its UK cyber activity on *** rather than ***.
*** Chinese cyber operations have achieved considerable success in penetrating foreign government and private sector IT systems. They also support HUMINT targeting efforts, providing useful insights into vulnerabilities or potential motivations. Defending against them requires ***: GCHQ told us that it assesses that there are between *** and *** active Chinese cyber groups ***. Its effort is focused ***. GCHQ told the Committee that: ***
*** Increasingly, sophisticated cyber operations have become a prominent feature of China's approach, and the UK Government assesses that ChIS cyber and signals intelligence (SIGINT) actors ***. GCHQ judges that, while campaigns around cyber security (for instance, not clicking links or downloading attachments) have been successful in increasing user awareness, the substantial rise in home working means that there are now more opportunities to get into an organisation as people use different technologies to connect remotely to a network.
*** China's cyber expertise allows it to target a diverse range of organisations and datasets—and increasingly unusual ones. In 2015, the hacking of the US Federal Government's Office of Personnel Management (OPM) was attributed to a Chinese state-sponsored hacker group. The OPM held the data on background checks run by the US government on their employees, and the hackers obtained the personal details of around four million current and former federal employees. Such a dataset could be used to help the ChIS identify potential HUMINT targets within the US Federal Government. China's acquisition of large amounts of data to enable it to identify, and track, targets is covered in more detail in the Case Study on Industry and Technology.
*** A more recent example of this expertise is the hacking of Equifax, an international credit reference agency, which took place in 2017. In February 2020, the FBI filed an indictment alleging that a branch of the PLA was responsible for the theft of a huge quantity of data, including the names and dates of birth of 145 million Americans and at least 13 million UK citizens (amongst other nationalities). Of those UK citizens, 841,000 had additional information, such as driving licence details and phone numbers, stolen, and 14,961 UK citizens also had passwords, usernames or partial credit card records stolen. There has been no evidence of criminal use of the data—instead, the information could be used to identify people working in sensitive research fields, politics or intelligence. There are also concerns that, depending on the level of information stolen, it could be used as a basis for blackmail. ​
*** The UK Intelligence Community judge that their understanding of Chinese Computer Network Exploitation capability—for instance "how they use that to hack, to hack and leak, to manipulate, to manage their campaigns"—had *** since the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) was set up in 2016. Western governments have, on the whole, been reticent about publicly attributing cyber attacks to China. However, in December 2018, the UK and US governments publicly attributed a series of major cyber attacks to the MSS, ***
*** We question whether it is yet having a 'deterrent effect'. On 19 July 2021, the FCDO issued a press release that attributed another cyber attack to Chinese state-backed actors. The statement read: The UK is joining likeminded partners to confirm that Chinese state-backed actors were responsible for gaining access to computer networks around the world via Microsoft Exchange servers. The Foreign Secretary condemned China, commenting: "The cyber attack on Microsoft Exchange Server by Chinese state-backed groups was a reckless but familiar pattern of behaviour. The Chinese Government must end this systematic cyber sabotage and can expect to be held account if it does not."
*** We asked GCHQ whether it viewed China's offensive cyber capabilities as a similarly significant threat and were told that China has offensive cyber capabilities ***.
*** The ChIS also have the capability to deploy what are known as close-proximity technical operations ***. This is offensive technical activity that requires physical access or proximity to a target, whether to gain access to premises (e.g. alarm defeats) or to acquire intelligence (e.g. eavesdropping, physical surveillance, cable-tapping or digital forensics).*** ***
*** It appears that since 2018, under President Xi Jinping, China's appetite to expand and entrench its global influence has grown. Seeking to exert influence is a legitimate goal: however, China's activity does not stop there, as it increasingly seeks to interfere.
*** HMG told us that China likely dedicates substantial resource to its interference operations, with *** its most important targets. Nevertheless, this does not mean that the UK is immune from targeting by Chinese political interference operations, since China seeks to gain wider legitimacy by influencing UK opinion.
*** China's interference activities are as with all its activity—primarily driven by the CCP's twin imperatives of: "[ensuring] regime stability by defending against threats at home and overseas"; and "[promoting] its political and economic interests overseas in order to bolster its rise as a global power". HMG assesses that "China has increasingly deployed aggressive propaganda and disinformation techniques to shape the information landscape and propagate narratives which promote the CCP's approach whilst denigrating the West." However, the two are very much linked—unlike in the case of Russia. Charles Parton has previously explained that "unlike Moscow, Beijing's interference is not aimed at subverting the West, but represents a rigorous, ruthless advancement of China's interests and values at the expense of those of the West".
*** While the Chinese clearly do interfere overseas when it serves their perceived national interest, they nevertheless strongly resist accusations of interference—in part because they do not wish foreign powers to interfere in China's own affairs. Again, Charles Parton said, "their whole narrative is that they don't interfere in other countries, so you should not interfere in the way they run their Confucian society". This stems from the deeply held fear that civil society organisations and global movements (in particular, those supposedly 'created' or 'supported' by Western democracies) calling for democratic accountability in China would challenge the legitimacy of CCP rule. Professor Steve Tsang noted that "the Chinese saw from the 1990s onwards that colour revolutions ultimately would have China as the final ultimate goal, and they don't want that to happen ever".
*** China can be seen seeking to interfere with UK politicians, senior officials and military personnel, and they can be increasingly seen to interfere in the media, in Academia (covered in detail in the Case Study on Academia) and in relation to the Chinese diaspora.
*** The JIC Chair told us, "[the Chinese government] will certainly be seeking contact and to sustain relationships with elites … [and] decision-makers in different walks of life". Political decision-makers will therefore, inevitably, be targets of activity by the Chinese state—probably by the United Front Work Department (UFWD). ​
*** It appears that China has a high level of intent to interfere with the UK Government, targeting officials and bodies at a range of levels to influence UK political thinking and decision-making relevant to China ***. Examples of such actions include:
**** UK-based individuals associated with the UFWD and other CCP-linked groups have encouraged individuals, including those with Chinese heritage, whom they judge to have views that align with those of the CCP, to pursue political office.
**** UFWD-linked individuals received funds from overseas sources for onward donation to political parties, prospective Parliamentary candidates (PPCs) ***.
**** There have been attempts at a more generic political influence over a broader range of members of relevant legislatures (MRLs) who the UFWD perceive to be sympathetic to the Chinese world view and CCP priorities.
**** In ***, MI5 investigations of the activities of several Chinese intelligence officers working *** in the UK, identified one of the intelligence officers gaining access to at least one UK Parliamentarian ***.
*** Targets are not necessarily limited to serving politicians either. They can include former political figures, if they are sufficiently high profile. For example, it is possible that David Cameron's role as Vice President of a £1bn China-UK investment fund (itself an initiative of Lord Chadlington), and Sir Danny Alexander's February 2016 appointment as Vice President of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), were in some part engineered by the Chinese state to lend credibility to Chinese investment, as well as to the broader China brand ***.
*** Security briefings are provided to politicians, including those who are targeted, and MI5 is able to take action where an attempt at interference is made: In one case *** GCHQ observed that China frequently targeted Parliamentarians in their cyber operations ***.
*** The UK does not appear to have suffered from some of the more egregious examples of Chinese political interference publicly disclosed in, for example, Australia and New Zealand. We note, for example, the public case of an Australian investigation into Chinese government interference within the office of an Australian Parliamentarian. In October 2020, MI5 told the Committee: ​ *** because we are in close partnership with our Five Eyes counterparts, we can draw … learning *** and be alive to the possible vectors of influence that might be brought to bear within our own system. However, it appears that there are numerous instances of activity at the lower end of the influence/interference spectrum, and establishing whether approaches were legitimate lobbying on behalf of the Chinese embassy or whether there is the potential for an approach to develop into something inappropriate is not necessarily straightforward. By way of example, we were told that there had been cases of China offering to supply research staff to MPs.
*** Political interference has also been seen to include a degree of coercion. For example, in 2014 the Chinese state made it clear that it would refuse Members of the Foreign Affairs Committee entry to Hong Kong because it considered the Committee's Inquiry into Hong Kong to be an unacceptable interference in its affairs. The visit was cancelled, and the incident sparked a (somewhat muted) diplomatic protest from the UK Government. In March 2021, the Chinese state sanctioned five MPs and two Members of the House of Lords in response to their work publicising the human rights abuses of the Uighur population in Xinjiang. It appears that the Chinese approach to countering the *** (***).
*** However, distinguishing overt lobbying from covert or malign activity, and identifying relationships between UK-based actors and CCP-associated agencies or officials upstream ***
*** There have been a number of high-profile examples of former UK officials being recruited by Chinese companies. The case that received the most scrutiny is that of John Suffolk, formerly the Government Chief Information Officer (2006–2011) and later, at the time of writing, Huawei's Global Head of Cyber Security.
*** In January 2011, as the then Government Chief Information Officer, Mr Suffolk travelled to China with GCHQ and BT to brief Huawei on serious security issues that GCHQ had discovered with Huawei's equipment. Mr Suffolk's participation in the visit demonstrates the importance of his role in managing the risk associated with Huawei. Just one month later, Mr Suffolk applied for permission to join Huawei as their first Global Head of Cyber Security. (It is unclear whether Mr Suffolk had been offered the role prior to the January 2011 trip, and if so, whether the Government knew about it.) ​
*** In July 2011, the (then) Prime Minister, David Cameron, approved the appointment, on the advice of the Advisory Committee on Business Appointments (ACOBA). However, media reporting at the time suggested that the intelligence Agencies had concerns about the appointment, and that Mr Suffolk was interviewed by the Cabinet Office to discuss these concerns. Indeed, the conditions imposed on his appointment included a requirement for him to "seek advice from the appropriate security authorities … about any risks to the confidentiality of communications resulting from his new appointment which might be of concern to those authorities".
*** During this Inquiry our predecessor Committee specifically asked the Cabinet Office to provide any assessment or information they hold on whether the Chinese government or ChIS specifically targeted Mr Suffolk for recruitment to Huawei. Our request was refused, on the grounds that "we do not comment on individuals": the response is telling, given that it is not employed as routinely as it might suggest.
*** Other examples include Sir Andrew Cahn, a former senior civil servant and head of UK Trade and Investment (2006–2011), who in March 2015 was appointed as a Non-Executive Director of Huawei's UK subsidiary, having been Chairman of the Huawei UK Advisory Board from 2011 to 2014. At the same time, Lord Browne of Madingley, former Chief Executive Officer of BP and Lead Non-Executive Director at the Cabinet Office(2010–2015), was appointed as an independent Non-Executive Chairman of Huawei UK.
*** In October 2020, we asked the Acting National Security Adviser whether the ACOBA rules were fit for purpose, given what appeared to be a revolving door between the Government and Huawei, with officials involved in awarding the company contracts being apparently 'rewarded' with jobs. He told us that, across Government, the challenge presented by China meant that structures and processes were being kept under review and that included the ACOBA guidelines. However, he noted that those subject to the guidelines were "often working with companies that we have welcomed to this country and whose investment we have welcomed and that are acting entirely legally here".
*** In 2019, HMG noted that China was almost certainly seeking to court retired "elites". It would appear that the (state-run) China Association for International Friendly Contact (CAIFC) is one mechanism by which pro-China narratives might be being encouraged amongst this demographic, including amongst former senior military personnel. ***. ​
*** The Sanya Initiative provided a key opportunity to do so. It was a military-to-military discussion forum organised by the CAIFC, often cited as a front organisation for the Political Work Department Liaison Bureau, an intelligence and political interference bureau of the Central Military Commission. Meetings took place between the US and China from 2008 to 2010, and between the UK and China from 2011 to 2013. ***.
*** The Sanya Initiative would appear to have been an influence operation run by the ChIS, focused on targeting and co-opting senior officials and military personnel to support Chinese aims ***. *** they serve as an example of China’s willingness to blend overt and covert activity in an attempt to influence and interfere.
*** There are also concerns that China is recruiting former UK military personnel. The motivation appears to be to gain operational advantage (as opposed to employing them for the explicit purpose of interference). However, the possibility remains that former UK Armed Forces personnel could be utilised as part of a wider interference operation. We questioned DI about this threat, and the Chief of Defence Intelligence (CDI) told us: I am very concerned in the defence space about particularly former military personnel being employed by China. So there’s been an active campaign by the Chinese to recruit pilots ***
*** Former UK military personnel are attractive to the Chinese as a way to improve their understanding of how Western planes and pilots operate. We were told that, although China had made advanced technological equipment available to their military, the lack of Chinese experience in the field (i.e. engaged in operations) meant that they did not have the experience of using it: because they haven't been in combat, [that] means that they haven't learnt many of the lessons that the West has learnt and other nations over recent military operations. So therefore they're trying to not only short-circuit their R&D [research and development] through stealing secrets, but they're also trying to short-circuit their … operational development by attracting Western personnel. When we questioned what could be done, we were told: we're looking at options that we have ***
*** In recent years, there has been significant coverage of state actors attempting to interfere in Western democratic elections. In the previous Committee's Russia Report, it was noted that the UK is "clearly a target for Russian disinformation campaigns and ​ political influence operations". On 16 July 2020, the Foreign Secretary announced that HMG was "almost certain that Russian actors sought to interfere in the 2019 general election through the online amplification of illicitly acquired and leaked Government documents".
*** The reputational risks of interfering in the democratic processes of others are significant. The UK Intelligence Community believe that these risks ***. ***. *** there is precedent for China seeking to influence democratic processes overseas and ***. Work to map foreign interference from Russia and China is ***.
*** Chinese interference in UK media has many facets—from the use of the UK media for the publication of Chinese content, to the expansion in the number of Chinese media outlets and journalists in the UK. (The use of journalist cover by ChIS officers for espionage operations is dealt with later in this Report.)
*** The Chinese government looks to use the UK’s own media to its advantage. The Telegraph was reportedly paid £750,000 p.a. to carry the China Daily newspaper supplement (effectively a CCP mouthpiece), and it has been noted that since 2016 The Telegraph has carried twice the number of signed articles by the Chinese ambassador to the UK than the Daily Mail, The Guardian and the Financial Times put together. In April 2020, content from the China Daily disappeared from The Telegraph website: when Buzzfeed and The Guardian asked The Telegraph to comment on its removal, The Telegraph refused to do so. When we asked the JIC Chair whether he was concerned that the China Daily supplement was widely available in the UK, he told us that he was not convinced that it posed a significant threat: The Chinese state, and individuals within it, are under quite a lot of pressure to show that they are doing things to advance the historical inevitability of the rise of China, and it is important that they can do things and report them, and they will report them as a great success. They will say that Daily Telegraph readers, a newspaper which is read by influential people in the United Kingdom, is now getting Chinese input. We might see it as being rather different but I am sure that is how they will be reporting it to Beijing and Beijing may well consider it money well spent. ​
*** As well as seeking to influence the narrative through UK media outlets, China has also been seeking to expand its own media presence in the UK—another lever that can be used to promote values and standards at odds with those upheld by the UK. For example, China Global Television Network (CGTN), which was previously available in the UK on Sky and Freesat, created a new European headquarters in London in 2019. However, in 2021, CGTN had its licence to broadcast in the UK suspended as the result of an Ofcom inquiry into its ownership, after it was found to have its editorial content directed by the CCP (a breach of Ofcom rules, which state that bodies wholly or mainly of a political nature, or those who are controlled by such bodies, are prohibited from holding a broadcasting licence).
*** Ofcom has also upheld complaints against CGTN on the broadcasting of forced confessions by Chinese detainees and political prisoners, and in relation to the impartiality of its reporting on Hong Kong. However, CGTN can still broadcast its UK content via its website, a YouTube Channel and internet TV platforms, such as Apple TV, Roku and Amazon Fire TV (which do not require a broadcast licence). CGTN is also seeking a broadcast licence in France where politically controlled broadcasters are permitted, and this would allow them to broadcast in the UK (under a convention to which the UK is a signatory, French TV channels can be broadcast in the UK with any content complaints going to the French regulator rather than Ofcom).
*** Chinese journalists operating in the UK have notably displayed behaviours not typically acceptable in the UK media. For example, in September 2018, a CGTN journalist was arrested at the Conservative Party conference after slapping a delegate in the course of an argument about Hong Kong (the journalist had disrupted an event being run by the UK- based NGO Hong Kong Watch and shouted, "You guys are trying to separate China"). In a public statement following the arrest (released on the Chinese embassy's website), the television station said, "any attempt or action to divide China is futile and against the trend of history", and "we urge the UK side to take concrete steps to protect our journalist's legitimate rights and avoid such absurd incidents from happening again." The Chinese embassy also raised the matter with the FCDO at a working level, and again later when the case came to court; the FCDO firmly refuted any suggestion that it could influence the investigation. The journalist was later convicted of assault.
*** The case fits a pattern of the Chinese government robustly supporting Chinese nationals who 'stand up' for the perceived Chinese national interest, even when they break the law or ​ risk damaging bilateral relations in the process. Chinese intelligence officers have been known to use journalistic cover ***.
*** Finally, in terms of the media, the Chinese authorities have demonstrated a willingness to put pressure on British journalists who are perceived to be acting against China's core interests. For example, in 2018, Victor Mallet, the Asia Editor of the Financial Times, was denied a visa to remain in Hong Kong after meeting with a pro-Hong Kong independence figure.
*** The Chinese authorities take a strong interest in the political views and activities of the Chinese diaspora overseas. According to Professor Steve Tsang, the CCP uses its influence to make "Chinese communities feel that, if they don't support the Chinese government, they are being unpatriotic. The [Chinese Communist] Party is making the people of Chinese ethnicity great". The UK has a relatively small ethnic Chinese population. According to 2011 census data, the ethnic Chinese population was approximately 430,000—about 0.7% of the total UK population. (By contrast, in 2016 Australia had an ethnic Chinese population of approximately 1.3m, equating to 5.6% of its 23.4m total population.)
*** Notwithstanding the size of the Chinese population, the JIC Chair told us: "China will be seeking in some cases no doubt to coerce [the Chinese diaspora in the UK], but certainly to encourage [it] to follow a line which is consistent with China's interests." Family ties are often used as leverage in this context. With specific reference to academics, but in a broadly applicable observation, Charles Parton told the Committee: "[The CCP] can put real pressure on people who still have strong ties [to China] because they have relatives [there], or may even return."
*** Nevertheless, at the time of taking evidence, China's influence over its diaspora had not translated directly into any serious influence on electoral politics in the UK. Charles Parton told the Committee that in his view the UK is less susceptible to widespread CCP ​ interference in elections than Australia or New Zealand because the ethnic Chinese population, particularly from the People's Republic of China (as opposed to Taiwan or Hong Kong), is relatively small.
*** There is, however, a harder edge to China's interest in its citizens overseas. The UK's tradition of political tolerance has meant that many foreign dissidents have made their homes here over the years and this has often prompted the hostile interest of foreign intelligence services. This is particularly true also in the case of China, given its focus on muting criticism of the CCP and dissuading challenge to China's territorial claims.
*** The Chinese Ministry of Public Security (MPS) plays a key role in pursuing what China calls 'economic fugitives' (who are in fact more likely to be high-profile opposition figures) across the world, including in the UK. This global campaign to track down and repatriate individuals accused of corruption is known as Operation FOXHUNT. China is known to have repatriated Chinese nationals allegedly involved in corruption from the UK and conducted coerced repatriations of economic fugitives from the UK and kidnapping of dual nationals overseas. ***.
*** The MPS and other official bodies involved in FOXHUNT will typically 'persuade' the fugitive to return either by telephone calls or by visiting their place of residence abroad. The MPS also indirectly coerces fugitives by applying pressure on friends and family in China, for instance by suspending people from their jobs, withholding pension payments, physical threats and imprisonment, and by coercing them into visiting the fugitive abroad. ***.
*** The Home Office has been seeking to understand and respond to the threat posed by FOXHUNT. During our Russia Inquiry, we were assured that all figures at risk—Russian or otherwise—received protection according to the level of risk, which is police-led. We investigated the provisions in place to respond to such action from the ChIS as part of this Inquiry. ***. In evidence to the Committee, MI5 noted that ***.
*** When we asked why ***, we were told that: ***
* ↑ Oral evidence—Professor Steve Tsang (SOAS), 9 May 2019.
* ↑ Oral evidence—MI5, *** July 2019.
* ↑ Oral evidence—JIO, *** July 2019.
* ↑ Russia, HC 632, 21 July 2020.
* ↑ Oral evidence—MI5, *** October 2020.
* ↑ Oral evidence—MI5, *** October 2020.
* ↑ Written evidence—HMG, 18 April 2019.
* ↑ House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, China and the Rules-Based International System, HC 612, 26 March 2019.
* ↑ Written evidence—JIO, 18 March 2019.
* ↑ Written evidence—HMG, 18 April 2019.
* ↑ Written evidence—HMG, 18 April 2019.
* ↑ Written evidence—JIO, 21 June 2019.
* ↑ 'What is China's Belt and Road Initiative?', The Guardian, 30 July 2018; 'China's Massive Belt and Road Initiative', Council on Foreign Relations, 21 May 2019.
* ↑ China signs 99-year lease on Sri Lanka's Hambantota port', Financial Times, 11 December 2017.
* ↑ Oral evidence—GCHQ, *** July 2019.
* ↑ Oral evidence—Professor Steve Tsang (SOAS), 9 May 2019.
* ↑ 'Is China undermining Human Rights at the UN?', Council on Foreign Relations, 9 July 2019.
* ↑ Written evidence—JIO, October 2020.
* ↑ Chief of SIS, speech to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 30 November 2021.
* ↑ Oral evidence—GCHQ, *** October 2020.
* ↑ 'Coronavirus hasn't killed Belt and Road', Foreign Policy, January 2021; 'The Belt and Road Initiative after COVID: The Rise of the Health and Digital Silk Roads', Asian Institute for Policy Studies Issue Brief, March 2021.
* ↑ Oral evidence—JIO, *** October 2020.
* ↑ Oral evidence—JIO, *** July 2019.
* ↑ Oral evidence—JIO, *** July 2019.
* ↑ Oral evidence—GCHQ, *** July 2019.
* ↑ Oral evidence—SIS, *** October 2020.
* ↑ A Chinese foreign ministry spokesman also said: "The UK considers itself as a guardian [of Hong Kong] which is nothing but a delusion." The Ambassador was summoned to the Foreign Office following these remarks. ('Britain summons Chinese Ambassador as he accuses Government of taking "wrong side" on Hong Kong', The Telegraph, 3 July 2019.)
* ↑ Under this scheme, an estimated 2.9m British National (Overseas) status holders were eligible to move to the UK with a further estimated 2.3m eligible dependants. (Hong Kong BN(O) visa: UK government to honour historic commitment', www.gov.uk/government/news/hong-kong-bno-visa-uk-government-to-honour-historic-commitment, 29 January 2021.)
* ↑ 'China-UK relations grow more strained over Huawei and Hong Kong', China Brief Jamestown, 31 August 2020.
* ↑ Oral evidence—External Experts, 9 May 2019.
* ↑ Oral evidence—JIO, *** July 2019.
* ↑ Oral evidence—JIO, *** October 2020.
* ↑ Oral evidence—Lord Patten (University of Oxford), 9 May 2019.
* ↑ Written evidence—JIO, 21 June 2019.
* ↑ Written evidence—HMG, April 2019.
* ↑ Written evidence—HMG, April 2019.
* ↑ 'China-UK relations grow more strained over Huawei and Hong Kong', China Brief Jamestown, 31 August 2020.
* ↑ Written evidence—JIO, 5 November 2020.
* ↑ 'China blamed for Barbados ditching Queen', The Times, 23 September 2020.
* ↑ Oral evidence—JIO, *** October 2020.
* ↑ Oral evidence—HMG, *** October 2020; Written evidence—HMG, April 2019; Written evidence—JIO, 5 November 2020.
* ↑ Written evidence—HMG, 18 April 2019.
* ↑ Oral evidence—MI5, *** July 2019. We also note that President Xi Jinping's speech to the CCP summit in October 2022 claimed: "China's international influence, appeal and power to shape the world has significantly increased."
* ↑ Oral evidence—JIO, *** July 2019.
* ↑ Written evidence—HMG, 18 April 2019.
* ↑ Oral evidence—MI5, *** July 2019.
* ↑ Written evidence—HMG, 18 April 2019.
* ↑ Oral evidence—SIS, *** July 2019.
* ↑ Oral evidence—SIS, MI5, *** July 2019.
* ↑ Written evidence - HMG, 18 April 2019.
* ↑ Given the decline in EU applicants since 2019, the Chinese contingent has become even more important to UK universities. ('Chinese students now biggest foreign market for UK universities—but there's a reason why some experts are worried', Daily Telegraph, 14 July 2022.)
* ↑ The latter is primarily conducted through Confucius Institutes in the UK. This is explored in more detail in our Case Study on Academia.
* ↑ Written evidence—HMG, 1 May 2019.
* ↑ 'ISC Statement on 5G suppliers', Intelligence and Security Committee website, 19 July 2019.
* ↑ Oral evidence—JIO, *** July 2019.
* ↑ 'Picking flowers, making honey—The Chinese military's collaboration with foreign universities', Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 26 October 2018.
* ↑ Written evidence—***, *** September 2020; 'UK and allies hold Chinese state responsible for a pervasive pattern of hacking', www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-and-allies-hold-chinese-state-responsible-for-a-pervasive-pattern-of-hacking, 19 July 2021.
* ↑ Oral evidence—MI5, *** December 2020.
* ↑ Oral evidence—HMG, *** October 2020.
* ↑ Oral evidence—HMG, *** October 2020.
* ↑ Oral evidence—NSS, *** December 2020.
* ↑ The Chief of SIS stated in July 2022 that the ChIS "are extraordinarily well-resourced, I mean there are hundreds of thousands of civil intelligence officers, let alone their military capability". (Fireside Chat with Richard Moore, Aspen Institute, 21 July 2022.)
* ↑ Oral evidence—SIS, *** July 2019.
* ↑ Written evidence—HMG, 18 April 2019.
* ↑ 'China Spends More on Domestic Security as Xi's Powers Grow', Wall Street Journal, 6 March 2018; 'China's Domestic Security Spending: An Analysis of Available Data', The Jamestown Foundation, 12 March 2018.
* ↑ Oral evidence—MI5, *** July 2019.
* ↑ Oral evidence—HMG, *** July 2019.
* ↑ Oral evidence—MI5, *** July 2019.
* ↑ For example, 'Everything We Know About China's Secretive State Security Bureau', National Interest, 9 July 2017.
* ↑ Written evidence—HMG, 18 April 2019. In 2019, the Committee was told ***. In 2022, the Committee was subsequently told that ***.
* ↑ Hearing on China's Intelligence Services and Espionage Operations, US China Economic and Security Review Commission, 9 June 2016.
* ↑ For instance, ***.
* ↑ Taiwanese independence, Tibetan independence, Xinjiang separatists, the Falun Gong and the Chinese democracy movement.
* ↑ Written evidence—HMG, 18 April 2019.
* ↑ Oral evidence—SIS, *** July 2019.
* ↑ Written evidence—***, *** December 2019.
* ↑ Written evidence—***, *** December 2019.
* ↑ Oral evidence—SIS, *** July 2019.
* ↑ Oral evidence—SIS, *** October 2020. ***
* ↑ 'How China's Economic Aggression Threatens the Technologies and Intellectual Property of the United States and the World', White House Office of Trade and Manufacturing Policy, June 2018.
* ↑ Written evidence—HMG, 18 April 2019.
* ↑ Oral evidence—GCHQ, *** July 2019.
* ↑ Written evidence—HMG, 18 April 2019.
* ↑ Written evidence—HMG, 18 April 2019.
* ↑ Written evidence—HMG, 18 April 2019.
* ↑ Written evidence—HMG, 18 April 2019.
* ↑ Written evidence—HMG, 31 May 2019.
* ↑ Written evidence—HMG, 18 April 2019.
* ↑ Written evidence—HMG, 31 May 2019; Charles Parton, 'China-UK Relations: Where to Draw the Border Between Influence and Interference', Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), 20 February 2019.
* ↑ Written evidence—HMG, 31 May 2019.
* ↑ Written evidence—HMG, 31 May 2019.
* ↑ Written evidence—HMG, April 2019.
* ↑ Oral evidence—MI5, *** January 2008.
* ↑ Oral evidence—SIS, *** October 2020.
* ↑ US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, '2016 Annual Report to Congress', November 2016.
* ↑ Oral evidence—DI, *** December 2020.
* ↑ Written evidence—HMG, 18 April 2019.
* ↑ Oral evidence—SIS, *** July 2019.
* ↑ Written evidence—HMG, 18 April 2019.
* ↑ Oral evidence—SIS, *** July 2019.
* ↑ Written evidence—HMG, 18 April 2019.
* ↑ Oral evidence—MI5, *** October 2020.
* ↑ Written evidence—HMG, 18 April 2019.
* ↑ Written evidence—HMG, 18 April 2019.
* ↑ Written evidence—HMG, 18 April 2019.
* ↑ Written evidence—HMG, 18 April 2019.
* ↑ Written evidence—HMG, 18 April 2019.
* ↑ We note the Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure's public Think Before You Link campaign. ('Think Before You Link (TBYL)', www.cpni.gov.uk/security-campaigns/think-you-link-tby1-0, 30 September 2021.)
* ↑ Written evidence—HMG, 18 April 2019.
* ↑ Written evidence—HMG, 18 April 2019.
* ↑ Oral evidence—MI5, *** July 2019.
* ↑ Oral evidence—SIS, *** October 2020.
* ↑ 'German spy agency warns of Chinese LinkedIn espionage', BBC News, 10 December 2017.
* ↑ Written evidence—MI5, 24 September 2020.
* ↑ Written evidence—HMG, 18 April 2019.
* ↑ Written evidence—MI5, 12 June 2019.
* ↑ Written evidence—MI5, January 2021.
* ↑ Oral evidence—GCHQ, *** December 2020.
* ↑ Oral evidence—GCHQ, *** October 2020.
* ↑ Oral evidence—GCHQ, *** October 2020.
* ↑ Written evidence—HMG, 14 September 2020.
* ↑ Written evidence—***, 24 September 2020.
* ↑ Oral evidence—GCHQ, *** December 2020.
* ↑ 'Millions of US government workers hit by data breach', BBC News, 5 June 2015.
* ↑ 'Chinese army's elite hackers steal Equifax data on 13 m Britons', Sunday Times, 16 February 2020.
* ↑ Oral evidence—HMG, *** October 2020.
* ↑ 'UK and allies reveal global scale of Chinese cyber campaign', www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-and-allies-reveal-global-scale-of-chinese-cyber-campaign, 20 December 2018.
* ↑ Written evidence—HMG, 18 April 2019.
* ↑ 'UK and allies hold Chinese state responsible for a pervasive pattern of hacking', FCDO press release, 19 July 2021.
* ↑ Oral evidence—GCHQ, *** December 2020.
* ↑ Written evidence—HMG, 18 April 2019.
* ↑ Oral evidence—MI5, *** October 2020.
* ↑ Written evidence—HMG, 31 May 2019.
* ↑ Charles Parton, 'China-UK Relations: Where to Draw the Border Between Influence and Interference', Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), 20 February 2019.
* ↑ 'Charles Parton, China-UK Relations: Where to Draw the Border Between Influence and Interference', Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), 20 February 2019.
* ↑ Written evidence—JSTAT, 31 May 2019.
* ↑ 'Consultation document: legislation to counter state threats (accessible version)', GOV.UK, updated 22 November 2021.
* ↑ Written evidence—JSTAT, 31 May 2019.
* ↑ Written evidence—HMG, 14 September 2020.
* ↑ Charles Parton, 'China-UK Relations: Where to Draw the Border Between Influence and Interference', Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), 20 February 2019.
* ↑ Oral evidence—Charles Parton (RUSI), 9 May 2019.
* ↑ Oral evidence—Professor Steve Tsang (SOAS), 9 May 2019.
* ↑ Oral evidence—JIO, *** July 2019.
* ↑ Written evidence—MI5, 16 November 2020.
* ↑ Written evidence—***, 31 May 2019.
* ↑ Written evidence—MI5, 16 November 2020.
* ↑ Oral evidence—GCHQ, *** October 2020.
* ↑ We also note that MI5 issued an Interference Alert for Christine Lee in January 2022 (after the Committee had completed taking evidence for this Inquiry).
* ↑ Oral evidence—MI5, *** October 2020.
* ↑ House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, 'The UK's relations with Hong Kong: 30 years after the Joint Declaration', 3 March 2015.
* ↑ Written evidence—***, 31 May 2019
* ↑ Written evidence—MI5, 24 September 2020
* ↑ Foreign involvement in the Critical National Infrastructure, Cm 8629, 6 June 2013
* ↑ 'Following approval from the UK Government John Suffolk to join Huawei as their Global Head of Cyber Security reporting to the Group CEO', johnsuffolk.typepad.com, 29 July 2011.
* ↑ 'Following approval from the UK Government John Suffolk to join Huawei as their Global Head of Cyber Security reporting to the Group CEO’, johnsuffolk.typepad.com, 29 July 2011.
* ↑ 'Government's former IT boss in MI6 grilling after taking job with Chinese mobile giant’, Daily Mail, 7 August 2011; 'Former UK.gov CIO takes top security job at Huawei', The Register, 1 August 2011.
* ↑ ACOBA, 'Thirteenth Annual Report 2011–2012', December 2012.
* ↑ Written evidence—HMG, 31 January 2020.
* ↑ Lord Browne resigned as Chairman in July 2019, in advance of the announcement of HMG's Huawei decision.
* ↑ Oral evidence—NSS, *** October 2020
* ↑ Written evidence—HMG, 31 May 2019.
* ↑ Open source reporting indicates that the US–China meetings have resumed in recent years.
* ↑ Written evidence—HMG, 21 January 2020; 12 February 2020.
* ↑ We note that the UK issued an intelligence alert to warn UK Armed Forces pilots against working for the Chinese military, in October 2022 (after evidence-taking had concluded for this Inquiry).
* ↑ Oral evidence—DI, *** December 2020.
* ↑ Oral evidence—DI, *** December 2020.
* ↑ Oral evidence—DI, *** December 2020
* ↑ Russia, HC 632, 21 July 2020
* ↑ HC Deb, 16 July 2020, HCWS384.
* ↑ Written evidence—JSTAT, 31 May 2019.
* ↑ Written evidence—JIO, 21 March 2021.
* ↑ We note, for instance, the allegations of Chinese interference in US and Canadian elections. ('Directors Remarks to Business Leaders in London', www.fbi.gov, 6 July 2022; 'Trudeau accuses China of 'aggressive' election interference', BBC News, 8 November 2022.)
* ↑ Written evidence—HMG, 21 January 2020.
* ↑ Written evidence—HMG, 21 January 2020.
* ↑ Charles Parton, 'China–UK Relations: Where to Draw the Border Between Influence and Interference', Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), 20 February 2019.
* ↑ 'A British Newspaper has given Chinese coronavirus propaganda a direct line to the UK', Buzzfeed, 1 April 2020; 'Daily Telegraph stops publishing section paid for by China', The Guardian, 14 April 2020.
* ↑ Oral evidence—JIO, *** October 2020.
* ↑ Written evidence—JSTAT, 31 May 2019.
* ↑ 'Ofcom revokes CGTN's licence to broadcast in the UK', Ofcom press notice, 4 February 2021.
* ↑ Broadcast and On Demand Bulletin, Issues 403 (26 May 2020) and 406 (6 July 2020).
* ↑ 'War of the airwaves', Index on Censorship, Vol. 50, Issue 1, April 2021.
* ↑ Oral evidence—*** October 2020.
* ↑ 'Chinese TV journalist guilty of slapping Tory delegate', The Guardian, 29 November 2019.
* ↑ 'Chinese reporter who allegedly slapped Tory conference delegate released by police', The Guardian, 2 October 2018.
* ↑ Written evidence—HMG, 31 January 2020.
* ↑ ‘Chinese TV journalist guilty of slapping Tory delegate', The Guardian, 29 November 2019.
* ↑ 'UK expelled Chinese journalists "working as spies"', BBC News, 5 January 2021.
* ↑ Written evidence—JSTAT, 31 May 2019.
* ↑ Oral evidence—Professor Steve Tsang (SOAS), 9 May 2019.
* ↑ Oral evidence—JIO, *** July 2019.
* ↑ Oral evidence—Charles Parton (RUSI), 9 May 2019.
* ↑ "Damned if you do, damned if you don't?" I won't', Angela Gui, published on Medium, 13 February 2019.
* ↑ Written evidence—HMG, 31 May 2019.
* ↑ We note that MI5 issued an Interference Alert for Christine Lee in January 2022 (after the Committee had completed taking evidence for this Inquiry).
* ↑ Oral evidence—Charles Parton (RUSI), 9 May 2019
* ↑ Written evidence—JIO, 17 November 2016; 30 November 2016
* ↑ Written evidence—HMG, 18 April 2019.
* ↑ Written evidence—HMG, 18 April 2019.
* ↑ Oral evidence—HMG, *** July 2019
* ↑ Oral evidence—HMG, *** July 2019.
* ↑ Written evidence—MI5, 24 September 2020.
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