# Decisive Battles Since Waterloo/Chapter 5

CHAPTER V.
BATTLE OF STAOUELI AND FALL OF ALGIERS—1830.
In the year 454 of the Christian era, Genseric, the ruler of Northern Africa, sent an expedition that ravaged the coast of Sicily and Italy, captured Rome, which was given up to sack for fourteen days, and returned to Africa with sixty thousand prisoners. The fleet of Genseric was the precursor of the pirates and corsairs that ravaged the Mediterranean from that time to the present century, and the prisoners that were brought from Rome were the vanguard of that vast array of foreign slaves who toiled under Algerine and other barbaric masters until the French conquest of which we are about to speak.
Under the Turkish rulers of Algeria piracy became a well-organized system, and was regarded as legitimate a means of obtaining wealth as in our day we regard the manufacture of woollen or cotton goods, or the shipment of grain or other products to a profitable market. The Moslems considered it entirely proper to hold all Christians in their power as slaves, and they made no distinction between prisoners of war, the crews of captured merchant ships, or unhappy victims of their raids on the European coast and islands. Furthermore, whenever any European state attempted reprisals, it was the custom of the Dey of Algiers to send to the galleys the consul of that country, together with the crew of any merchant ship that might have ventured into his ports for purposes of trade.
very often partly in cannon, muskets, powder, shells, and other munitions of war. As late as 1771 France bought peace with Algiers, and one of the conditions was that she should send over some cannon-founders to instruct the pirates in their art. Spain, Holland, England, Austria, and the United States of America were among the tributary nations; as late as 1805, all these countries paid tribute to the dey as a condition of not being molested, a condition, it is needless to say, that was speedily violated.
During the Napoleonic wars, the Dey of Algiers supplied grain for the use of the French armies; it was bought by merchants of Marseilles, and there was a dispute about the matter which was unsettled as late as 1829. Several instalments had been paid; the dey demanded payment in full according to his own figures, while the French government, believing the demand excessive, required an investigation. In one of the numerous debates on the subject, Hussein Pasha, the reigning dey, became very angry, struck the consul with a fan, and ordered him out of the house. He refused all reparation for the insult, even on the formal demand of the French government, and consequently there was no alternative but war. It was known that the Algerines had replaced the fleet destroyed by Lord Exmouth, and repaired and greatly strengthened the fortifications of the harbor of Algiers. But their defences only looked towards an attack by water, and they had quite neglected the rear of the city, which was commanded by heights behind it. Therefore the French determined upon a land attack as the best mode of conquering the stronghold of the corsairs.
During the whole of April, the French government pursued its preparations at Toulon, Brest, Havre, and Cherbourg, and by the beginning of May all the fleet was assembled at Toulon and ready for sea. The land forces comprised 37,500 men, 3,000 horses, and 180 pieces of artillery, mostly heavy guns for the reduction of Algiers, in case a siege should be found necessary. The sea forces included 11 ships of the line, 23 frigates, 70 smaller vessels, 377 transports, and 230 boats for landing troops. General Bourmont, Minister of War, commanded the expedition, ​which appeared in front of Algiers on the 13th of June, 1830. Though somewhat alarmed at the spectacle of the vast fleet, Hussein Pasha thought he would be able to defeat his assailants with little difficulty should they ever attempt to land. He had previously asked for aid from the Sultan of Turkey, but that wily ruler had blankly refused. The beys of Tunis and Tripoli had also declined to meddle with the affair, and he had only his vassals, the beys of Oran, Constantine, and Tittery to fall back upon. They were entirely confident that a descent on the coast of Algiers was contemplated by the French, and stood ready to meet them in strong force.
Admiral Duperré, the commander of the fleet, carefully examined the coast and decided that the best place for landing was at Sidi-Ferruch, about sixteen miles to the west of Algiers, where there is a peninsula enclosed by two deep bays. On the 14th the landing was partially effected, rapidly and in excellent order. It was observed that the ground rose rather steeply in a series of natural terraces, covered with brushwood near the shore, and considerably more wooded farther inland. The French also perceived that every one of these terraces held a swarm of Turks and Arabs partially concealed in the bushes. They were not long in opening a lively fusillade against the French, who replied without attempting to advance. The Arabs mistook the deliberation of the French for fear, and concluded that it would be an easy matter to destroy the invaders at any desired moment.
Hussein's commander-in-chief was his son-in-law, the Aga Ibrahim, who had 40,000 to 50,000 men under his command. Ibrahim was a very skilful and daring horseman, but not much of a soldier. When the news came that the French were landing at Sidi-Ferruch, Ibrahim marched his army to the heights overlooking the bay, and encamped it on the table-land of Staoueli, which spreads out from the crest of the hills. His troops were mostly ​irregulars, having come there merely for the purpose of looting and with little stomach for battle. His horsemen could not be called cavalry in any close sense of the word. They were merely marks-men on horseback. Their mode of fighting was to ride up at a gallop, discharge their guns, and then wheel about and retire. Their numbers and the fury of their onset, together with their fine horsemanship, made them dangerous enemies.
Ibrahim, assembled his men at Staoueli, in the belief that the most arrant cowardice kept the French in their camps, and that it would be an easy matter for him to make a rush and drive the army, horse and foot, into the Mediterranean. He did not observe the artillery that was rapidly being landed by the French, nor did he see the horses and ammunition wagons to move and supply the guns. He was at first inclined to make an attack when only a small part of the invaders had reached the shore, but finally concluded to let the entire body come to land, so that he would have but a single job of annihilation.
For five days the French continued their work of debarkation unmolested by the Algerines except by the desultory attacks of horsemen coming singly or in small groups to try conclusions with the pickets. A few stragglers and foraging parties were cut off, but on the whole the loss to the French during the five days of the landing was trifling. On the 19th General Bourmont was ready for the advance, and gave orders for breaking up the camp and moving in the direction of the enemy. There was great scarcity of water in the camp until the 16th, when a heavy rain flooded the country; after this rain the soldiers found plenty of water everywhere by digging a few feet into the sand.
Ibrahim had made his camp on the plain of Staoueli, drawing up his line in the form of a crescent, with his right resting on the valley of the Madiffa, a small river flowing from the Atlas Mountains, which here fill the ​southern horizon, A redoubt was thrown up, and strongly mounted, and behind the numerous knolls and hillocks of the table-land many thousands of soldiers were lying in wait. If Ibrahim had remained where he was, and calmly awaited the attack, he would have shown some understanding of the ways of warfare, since he must have been aware that his greatest strength always lay in acting on the defensive. But such was the arrogance of the Algerines that his muddled brain did not suggest any better plan than to let loose his hordes of horsemen, ride down the French infantry, and thus secure victory without delay.
As the French began their advance the Moslems came to meet them. The former had about thirty thousand men under arms, while the latter were thought to be not less than forty-five thousand—at least that was the estimate of the conquerors. Twenty thousand Moslems came rushing over the plain to attack General Berthezene's division, and fifteen thousand more, led by Ahmed, the Bey of Constantine, moved around Lovedo's division to attack it in the rear, a manœuvre which would have placed the French between two fires.
The plan was an excellent one, but neither Ibrahim nor Ahmed had the military genius to make it successful. A short fusillade ensued, and a troop of Arabs dashed into the French camp. A hand-to-hand fight followed, and very soon the ground was strewn with the dead and wounded. There was a time when the 21st regiment of the line seemed to be severely shaken. The soldiers' pouches were empty, and their ranks in too close order to make an effective use of the bayonet.
The rally was sounded. General Bourmont called up the reserves, and in a few minutes the tide of battle had turned. The general, observing the eager onslaught of his soldiers, and also the loose desultory system of the Algerian attack, now ordered the three divisions to ​advance at the double-quick upon the plateau of Staoueli. An eye-witness says: "The soldiers had been waiting for that order. Away now they dashed in three different routes to meet at the enemy's intrenchment. At once they carry the redoubt, cut down the gunners at the battery, and in their turn rush into the enemy's camps. The furious onslaught of the soldiers reels the Arabs over, they turn about as if in a whirlpool, give way, and are hurried out of all their positions. For an instant they try resistance, but too late; they take to flight and run, never halting till the sheltering walls of Algiers receive them."
The Algerines had made a fairly orderly retreat until the French entered their camp and captured the artillery. Orientals have a great respect for cannon; its possession is to them a proof of superiority, and its loss is almost certain to cause a panic among them. It was so in the present instance, and when their guns were in the hands of the French, their hope of victory was gone. And furthermore, the French guns, nearly one hundred in number, had been steadily pouring grape and canister in the Moslem ranks at short range and steady aim, with a destructive effect that no irregular troops are able to withstand. The Arab loss in killed and wounded was about three thousand, largely caused by the artillery fire of the invaders, while the French loss was less than five hundred. In little more than an hour the battle was over, and the Osmanlis were in full and disorderly retreat.
General Bourmont remained where he was for several days, strengthening his position and clearing out an old Roman road for the transportation of his heavy artillery to the rear of Algiers. On the day of the battle the debarkation of the heavy artillery had not been completed, and the work was continued until every piece was on shore. The French occupied and strengthened the former camp of the Osmanlis at Staoueli, and took every precaution against surprise. The Moslems recovered from their ​fright, and after a few skirmishes, in which their wonderful ability on horseback was admirably displayed, they made an attack (June 24th) on the French lines. Twenty thousand men, most of them mounted, advanced to the assault with loud shouts and riding close up to the French position. The divisions of Berthezene and Lovedo moved out to meet them in the same order as on the 19th, and with the same result. The artillery moved between the columns of infantry, and as the battle opened, the cannon mowed down the Arabs with fearful effect by means of grape and canister.
The assailants were repulsed with heavy loss, and pursued about six miles from the scene of the battle. The French loss was trifling, but the killed included Amadie de Bourmont, son of the commander-in-chief, who fell while leading his company of grenadiers.
The way to Algiers was now open to the French, though their advance was considerably impeded by the light troops of the enemy, who disputed every point where a stand could be made, and hovered so close on the flanks of the column, that every straggler was instantly cut off and slaughtered. The French advanced leisurely, and on the 30th of June took their position before, or rather behind, the city, in front of the Emperor's Fort, a quadrangular structure which occupied the ground where the Emperor Charles V., three centuries earlier, made a disastrous attack upon Algiers. It stands on the plateau above the city, and commands every part of it; the dey thought it would be able to resist the invaders, and even when they sat down before it his courage did not desert him.
The French brought up their heavy guns and began the attack, in which they were joined by the light artillery. The batteries were completed on the 3d of July, and fire was opened on the following day. Not since the bombardment by Lord Exmouth in 1816 had such a contest ​raged at Algiers. The French ships of the line approached the front of the city, and opened fire on the sea defences almost simultaneously with the bombardment of the fort. The French had one hundred guns in battery, while the Algerines had more than double that number in the fort, but all their artillery could not be brought to bear at once. The Algerines served their guns bravely, but their fire was greatly inferior to that of the French, and very soon the excellence of the artillery practice of the latter was manifest. One by one the defenders' guns were dismounted, the walls were breached, the gunners were either killed or wounded or driven from their batteries, and finally the survivors sought refuge in a huge tower in the middle of the fort. Shortly afterwards the tower blew up with an explosion that reduced it to a mass of ruins and killed nearly all those who had fled to it for protection. As soon as they could form, the French grenadiers assaulted and carried the fort, and the city of the deys was in the possession of a Christian power.
The dey hoisted the white flag and offered to surrender, for which purpose he sent an envoy to meet General Bourmont in the Emperor's Fort. Hussein Pasha hoped to the last moment to retain his country and its independence by making liberal concessions in the way of indemnity for the expenses of the war, and offered to liberate all Christian slaves in addition to paying them for their services and sufferings. The English consul tried to mediate on this basis, but his offers of mediation were politely declined; the French were determined on nothing short of complete conquest and the utter demolition of this nest of pirates, that had so long scourged the Mediterranean and the countries bordering on it. It was finally agreed that the dey should surrender Algiers with all its forts and military stores, and be permitted to retire wherever he chose with his wives, children, and personal belongings, but he was not to remain in the country under ​any circumstances. On the 5th of July the French entered Algiers in great pomp and took possession of the place; they respected private property, and in a proclamation General Bourmont offered amnesty to all who had opposed him, provided they laid down their arms at once.
The spoils of war were such as rarely fall to the lot of a conquering army, when its numbers and the circumstances of the campaign are considered. In the treasury was found a large room filled with gold and silver coins heaped together indiscriminately, the fruits of three centuries of piracy; they were the coins of all the nations that had suffered from the depredations of the Algerines, and the variety in the dates showed very clearly that the accumulation had been the work of two or three hundred years. How much money was contained in this vast pile is not known; certain it is that nearly fifty million francs, or two millions sterling, actually reached the French treasury, and it is not known that the French officers and soldiers added any thing to the original amount from their private purses.
On the walls and ships-of-war fifteen hundred and forty-two cannon were found, of which six hundred and seventy-were of bronze, and the entire value of the public property turned over to the French government was estimated at fifty-five million francs. The cost of the war was much more than covered by the captured property; in fact; the money alone that was found in the treasury was sufficient for that purpose. Many slaves were liberated, among them the crews of two French brigs that had been captured not long before. The total loss of the French in the campaign was six hundred killed and seventeen hundred wounded, while that of the Algerines was estimated at double those figures, the proportion of the killed being greater in consequence of the deadly fire of the French artillery.
The Algerine power was forever broken, and from that ​day Algeria has been a prosperous colony of France. Hussein Pasha embarked on the 10th of July with a suite of one hundred and ten persons, of whom fifty-five were women. He proceeded to Naples where he remained for a time, went afterwards to Leghorn, and finally to Egypt. On his arrival in that country Mohammed Ali Pasha received him with the consideration due to his high rank and misfortunes, and showed him marked favor. But one day, after a private audience with Mohammed Ali, Hussein retired to his apartments and died in convulsions, probably from a dose of poison administered by the hand of the slayer of the Mamelukes.
On a marble slab over the principal entrance of the new barrack at Sidi-Ferruch is the following inscription:
Ici
le 14 Juin, 1830, Par l'ordre du Roi Charles X.,
Sous le commandement du General de
Bourmont,
L'Armée Française
Vint arborer ses drapeaux,
Rendre la Liberté aux mers,
Donner l'Algérie à la France.