# Atchison Company v. Matthews/Opinion of the Court

* Court Documents
* Case Syllabus
* Opinion of the Court
* Dissenting Opinion Harlan
United States Supreme Court
174 U.S. 96
Atchison Company v. Matthews
In 1885 the legislature of Kansas passed the following act: 'An act relating to the liability of railroads for damages by fire.
'Section 1. Be it enacted by the legislature of the state of Kansas: That in all actions against any railway company organized or doing business in this state, for damages by fire, caused by the operating of said railroad, it shall be only necessary for the plaintiff in said action to establish the fact that said fire complained of was caused by the operating of said railroad, and the amount of his damages (which proof shall be prima facie evidence of negligence on the part of said railroad): provided, that in estimating the damages under this act, the contributory negligence of the plaintiff shall be taken into consideration.
'Sec. 2. In all actions commenced under this act, if the plaintiff shall recover, there shall be allowed him by the court a reasonable attorney's fee, which shall become a part of the judgment.' Sess. Laws 1885, p. 258, c. 155.
Under it an action was brought in the district court of Cloud county, which resulted in a judgment against the railroad company, plaintiff in error, for $2,094 damages and $225 attorney's fees. This judgment having been affirmed by the supreme court of the state, the company brought the case here on error.
All questions of fact are settled by the decision of the state courts (Hedrick v. Railroad Co., 167 U.S. 673, 677, 17 Sup. Ct. 922, and cases cited in the opinion), and the single matter for our consideration is the constitutionality of this statute. It is contended that it is in conflict with the fourteenth amendment to the federal constitution, and this contention was distinctly ruled upon by the supreme court of the state adversely to the railroad company. In support of this contention, great reliance is placed upon Railway Co. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 17 Sup. Ct. 255. In that case a statute of Texas allowing an attorney's fee to the plaintiffs in actions against railroad corporations on claims, not exceeding in amount $50, for personal services rendered or labor done, or for damages, or for overcharges on freight, or for stock killed or injured, was adjudged unconstitutional. It was held to be simply a statute imposing a penalty on railroad corporations for failing to pay certain debts, and not one to enforce compliance with any police regulations. It was so regarded by the supreme court of the state, and its construction was accepted in this court as correct. While the right to classify was conceded, it was said that such classification must be based upon some difference bearing a reasonable and just relation to the act in respect to which the classification is attempted; that no mere arbitrary selection can ever be justified by calling it classification. And there is no good reason why railroad corporations alone should be punished for not paying their debts. Compelling the payment of debts is not a police regulation. We see no reason to change the views then expressed, and, if the statute before us were the counterpart of that, we should be content to refer to that case as conclusive.
But while there is a similarity, yet there are important differences, and differences which, in our judgment, compel an opposite conclusion. The purpose of this statute is not to compel the payment of debts, but to secure the utmost care on the part of railroad companies to prevent the escape of fire from their moving trains. This is obvious from the fact that liability for damages by fire is not cast upon such corporations in all cases, but only in those in which the fire is 'caused by the operating' of the road. It is true that no special act of precaution was required of the railroad companies, failure to do which was to be visited with this penalty, so that it is not precisely like the statutes imposing double damages for stock killed where there has been a failure to fence. Railway Co. v. Humes, 115 U.S. 512, 6 Sup. Ct. 110. And yet its purpose is not different. Its monition to the railroads is not, 'Pay your debts without suit or you will, in addition, have o pay attorney's fees;' but rather, 'See to it that no fire escapes from your locomotives, for if it does you will be liable, not merely for the damage it causes, but also for the reasonable attorney's fees of the owner of the property injured or destroyed.' It has been frequently before the supreme court of Kansas, has always been so interpreted by that court, and its validity sustained on that ground. In Railway Co. v. Merrill, 40 Kan. 404, 408, 19 Pac. 795, it was said:
'The objection that this legislation is special and unequal cannot be sustained. The dangerous element employed, and the hazards to persons and property arising from the running of trains and the operation of railroads, justifies such a law; and the fact that all persons and corporations brought under its influence are subjected to the same duties and liabilities, under similar circumstances, disposes of the objections raised.'
And in the opinion filed in the present case that court (49 Pac. 602) observed:
'Our statute is somewhat in the nature of a police regulation, designed to enforce care on the part of railroad companies to prevent the communication of fire and the destruction of property along railroad lines. It is not intended merely to impose a burden on railroad corporations that private persons are not required to bear, and the remedy offered is one the legislature has the right to give in such cases. This is the view heretofore held by this court, which we see no reason for changing. Railway Co. v. Snaveley, 47 Kan. 637, 28 Pac. 615; Same v. Curtis, 48 Kan. 179, 29 Pac. 146; Same v. McMullen, 48 Kan. 281, 29 Pac. 147; Railroad Co. v. Henning, 48 Kan. 465, 29 Pac. 597.'
It is true that the Ellis Case was one to recover damages for the killing of a colt by a passing train. And so it might be argued that the protection of the track from straying stock and the protection of stock from moving trains would, within the foregoing principles, uphold legislation imposing an attorney's fee in actions against railroad corporations. We were not insensible to this argument when that case was considered, but we accepted the interpretation of the statute and its purpose given by the supreme court of Texas, as appears from this extract from our opinion (page 153, 165 U.S., and page 256, 17 Sup. Ct.): 'The supreme court of the state considered this statute as a whole, and held it valid, and as such it is presented to us for consideration. Considered as such, it is simply a statute imposing a penalty upon railroad corporations for a failure to pay certain debts.' And again, referring specifically to this matter (page 158, 165 U.S., and page 258, 17 Sup. Ct.): 'While this action is for stock killed, the recovery of attorney's fees cannot be sustained upon the theory just suggested. There is no fence law in Texas. The legislature of the state has not deemed it necessary for the protection of life or property to require railroads to fence their tracks, and, as no duty is imposed, there can be no penalty for nonperformance. Indeed, the statute does not proceed upon any such theory; it is broader in its scope. Its object is to compel the payment of the several classes of debts named, and was so regarded by the supreme court of the state.' Indeed, the limit in amount ($50), found in that statute, made it clear that no police regulation was intended; for, if it were, the more stock found on the track the greater would be the danger and the more imperative the need of regulation and penalty.
So that, according to the interpretation placed upon the Texas statute by its supreme court, its purpose was generally to compel the payment of small debts, and the fact that among the debts so provided for was the liability for stock killed was not sufficient to justify us in separating the statute into fragments, and upholding one part on a theory inconsistent with the policy of the state, while, on the other hand, the purpose of this statute is, as declared by the supreme court of Kansas, pro ection against fire,-a matter in the nature of a police regulation.
It may be suggested that this line of argument leads to the conclusion that a statute of one state whose purpose is declared by its supreme court to be a matter of police regulation will be upheld by this court as not in conflict with the federal constitution, while a statute of another state, precisely similar in its terms, will be adjudged in conflict with that constitution if the supreme court of that state interprets its purpose and scope as entirely outside police regulation. But this by no means follows. This court is not concluded by the opinion of the supreme court of the state. Yick Wo. v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 366, 6 Sup. Ct. 1064. It forms its own independent judgment as to the scope and purpose of a statute, while, of course, leaning to any interpretation which has been placed upon it by the highest court of the state. We have referred to the interpretation placed upon the respective statutes of Texas and Kansas by their highest courts, not as conclusive, but as an interpretation towards which we ought to lean, and which, in fact, commends itself to our judgment.
That there is peculiar danger of fire from the running of railroad trains is obvious. The locomotives, passing, as they do, at great rates of speed, and often when the wind is blowing a gale, will, unless the utmost care is taken (and sometimes in spite of such care), scatter fire along the track. The danger to adjacent property is one which is especially felt in a prairie state like Kansas. It early attracted the attention of its legislature, and in 1860-long before any railroads were built in the state-this statute was passed (Laws 1860, c. 70, § 2; Comp. Laws, c. 101, § 2): 'If any person shall set on fire any woods, marshes or prairies, so as thereby to occasion any damage to any other person, such person shall make satisfaction for such damage to the party injured, to be recovered in an action.' As held in Emerson v. Gardiner, 8 Kan. 452, its effect was to change the rule of the common law, which gave redress only when the person setting the fire did so wantonly or through negligence, whereas by this statute the mere fact of setting fire to woods, marshes, or prairies gave a right to the party injured to recover damages. And in the years after the railroads began to be constructed, and prior to the passage of the act before us, the reports of the supreme court of that state show that nearly a score of actions had been brought to that court for consideration, in some of which great damage had been done by fire escaping from moving trains. Fire catching in the dry grass often runs for miles, destroying not merely crops, but houses and barns. Indeed, in one case (Railroad Co. v. Stanford, 12 Kan. 354), it appeared that the fire escaping had swept across the prairies for over four miles, and one ground of objection to the recovery was that the distance of the property destroyed from the railroad track was so great, and the fire had passed over so many intervening farms, that it could not rightfully be held that the proximate cause of the injury was the escape of fire from the locomotive. No other work done, or industry carried on, carries with it so much of danger from escaping fire.
In 1887 the legislature of the state of Missouri felt constrained to pass an act making every railroad corporation responsible in damages for all property destroyed by fire communicated, directly or indirectly, from its engines, and giving the corporation an insurable interest in the property along its road. This statute was, after a full examination of all the authorities, held by this court a valid exercise of the legislative power. Railway Co. v. Mathews, 165 U.S. 1, 17 Sup. Ct. 243. So, when the legislature of Kansas made a classification, and included in one class all corporations engaged in this business of peculiar hazard, it did so upon a difference having a reasonable relation to the object sought to be accomplished, to wit, the securing of protection of property from damage or destruction by fire.
While, as heretofore noticed, no special act of precaution was required, no statutory duty imposed upon railroad corporations, in respect to protection against escaping fire, and a similar omission in the legislation of Texas was referred to in the opinion in the Ellis Case as strengthening the argument that no police regulation was intended, yet we are of opinion that such omission is not conclusive upon the question of the validity of the statute. We have no right to consider the wisdom of such legislation. Our inquiry runs only to the matter of legislative power. If, in order to accomplish a given beneficial result,-a resuit which depends on the action of a corporation,-the legislature has the power to prescribe a specific duty and punish a failure to comply therewith by a penalty, either double damages or attorney's fees, has it not equal power to prescribe the same penalty for failing to accomplish the same result, leaving to the corporation the selection of the means it deems best therefor? Does the power of the legislature depend on the method it pursues to accomplish the result? As individuals, we may think it better that the legislature prescribe the specific duties which the corporations must perform. We may think it better that the legislation should be like that of Missouri, prescribing an absolute liability, instead of that of Kansas, making the fact of fire prima facie evidence of negligence. But clearly, as a court, we may not interpose our personal views as to the wisdom or policy of either form of legislation. It cannot be too often said that forms are matters of legislative consideration; results and power only are to be considered by the courts.
Many cases have been before this court involving the power of state legislatures to impose special duties or liabilities upon individuals and corporations, or classes of them, and while the principles of separation betweem those cases which have been adjudged to be within the power of the legislature and those beyond its power are not difficult of comprehension or statement, yet their application often becomes very troublesome, especially when a case is near to the dividing line. It is easy to distinguish between the full light of day and the darkness of midnight, but often very difficult to determine whether a given moment in the twilight hour is before or after that in which the light predominates over the darkness. The equal protection of the laws which is guarantied by the fourteenth amendment does not forbid classification. That has been asserted in the strongest language. Barbier v. Connolly, 113, U.S. 27, 5 Sup. Ct. 357. In that case, after, in general terms, declaring that the fourteenth amendment was designed to secure the equal protection of the laws, the court added (pages 31, 32, 113 U.S., and page 359, 5 Sup. Ct.):
'But neither the amendment,-broad and comprehensive as it is, nor any other amendment, was designed to interfere with the power of the state, sometimes termed its 'police power,' to prescribe regulations to promote the health, peace, morals, education, and good order of the people, and to legislate so as to increase the industries of the state, develop its resources, and add to its wealth and prosperity. From the very necessities of society, legislation of a special character, having these objects in view, must often be had in certain districts, such as for draining marshes and irrigating arid plains. Special burdens are often necessary for general benefits,-for supplying water, preventing fires, lighting districts, cleaning streets, opening parks, and many other objects. Regulations for these purposes may press with more or less weight upon one than upon another, but they are designed, not to impose unequal or unnecessary restrictions upon any one, but to promote, with as little inconvenience as possible, the general good. Though, in many respects, necessarily special in their character, they o not furnish just ground of complaint if they operate alike upon all persons and property, under the same circumstances and conditions. Class legislation, discriminating against some and favoring others, is prohibited; but legislation which, in carrying out a public purpose, is limited in its application, if within the sphere of its operation it affects alike all persons similarly situated, is not within the amendment.'
This declaration has, in various language, been often repeated, and the power of classification upheld, whenever such classification proceeds upon any difference which has a reasonable relation to the object sought to be accomplished. It is also clear that the legislature (which has power in advance to determine what rights, privileges, and duties it will give to, and impose upon, a corporation which it is creating) has, under the generally reserved right to alter, amend, or repeal the charter, power to impose new duties and new liabilities upon such artificial entities of its creation. Railway Co. v. Paul, 173 U.S. 404, 19 Sup. Ct. 419. It is also a maxim of constitutional law that a legislature is presumed to have acted within constitutional limits, upon full knowledge of the facts, and with the purpose of promoting the interests of the people as a whole, and courts will not lightly hold that an act duly passed by the legislature was one in the enactment of which it has transcended its power. On the other hand, it is also true that the equal protection guarantied by the constitution forbids the legislature to select a person, natural or artificial, and impose upon him or it burdens and liabilities which are not cast upon others similarly situated. It cannot pick out one individual, or one corporation, and enact that whenever he or it is sued the judgment shall be for double damages, or subject to an attorney's fee in favor of the plaintiff, when no other individual or corporation is subjected to the same rule. Neither can it make a classification of individuals or corporations which is purely arbitrary, and impose upon such class special burdens and liabilities. Even where the selection is not obviously unreasonable and arbitrary, if the discrimination is based upon matters which have no relation to the object sought to be accomplished, the same conclusion of unconstitutionality is affirmed. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, supra, forcibly illustrates this. In that case a municipal ordinance of San Francisco, designed to prevent the Chinese from carrying on the laundry business, was adjudged void. This court looked beyond the mere letter of the ordinance to the condition of things as they existed in San Francisco, and saw that, under the guise of regulation, an arbitrary classification was intended and accomplished.
While cases on either side and far away from the dividing line are easy of disposition, the difficulty arises as the statute in question comes near the line of separation. Is the classification or discrimination prescribed thereby purely arbitrary, or has it some basis in that which has a reasonable relation to the object sought to be accomplished? It is not at all to be wondered at that as these doubtful cases come before this court the justices have often divided in opinion. To some the statute presented seemed a mere arbitrary selection; to others it appeared that there was some reasonable basis of classification. Without attempting to cite all the cases, it may not be amiss to notice, in addition to those already cited, the following: Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U.S. 22; Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 7 Sup. Ct. 350; Duncan v. Missouri, 152 U.S. 377, 382, 14 Sup. Ct. 570; Marchant v. Railroad Co., 153 U.S. 380, 389, 14 Sup. Ct. 894; Railroad Co. v. Pontius, 157 U.S. 209, 15 Sup. Ct. 585; Lowe v. Kansas, 163 U.S. 81, 88, 16 Sup. Ct. 1031; Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 16 Sup. Ct. 1138; Turnpike Co. v. Sandford, 164 U.S. 578, 597, 17 Sup. Ct. 198; Jones v. Brim, 165 U.S. 180, 17 Sup. Ct. 282; W. U. Tel. Co. v. Indiana, 165 U.S. 304, 17 § p. Ct. 345; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 257, 17 Sup. Ct. 581; Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 18 Sup. Ct. 383; Savings & Loan Soc. v. Multnomah Co., 169 U.S. 421, 18 Sup. Ct. 392; Magoun v. Bank, 170 U.S. 283, 300, 18 Sup. Ct. 594; Tinsley v. Anderson, 171 U.S. 101, 18 Sup. Ct. 805. In some of them the court was unanimous; in others, it was divided; but the division in all of them was not upon the principle or rule of separation, but upon the location of the particular case one side or the other of the dividing line.
It is the essence of a classification that upon the class are cast duties and burdens different from those resting upon the general public. Thus, when the legislature imposes on railroad corporations a double liability for stock killed by passing trains, it says, in effect, that if suit be brought against a railroad company for stock killed by one of its trains, it must enter into the courts under conditions different from those resting on ordinary suitors. If it is beaten in the suit, it must pay, not only the damage which it has done, but twice that amount. If it succeeds, it recovers nothing. On the other hand, if it should sue an individual for destruction of its live stock, it could, under no circumstances, recover any more than the value of that stock. So that it may be said that in matter of liability, in case of litigation, it is not placed on an equality with other corporations and individuals; yet this court has unanimously said that this differentiation of liability, this inequality of right in the courts, is of no significance upon the question of constitutionality. Indeed, the very idea of classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of constitutionality.
Our conclusion in respect to this statute is that, for the reasons above stated, giving full force to its purpose as declared by the supreme court of Kansas, to the presumption which attaches to the action of a legislature that it has full knowledge of the conditions within the state, and intends no arbitrary selection or punishment, but simply seeks to subserve the general interest of the public, it must be sustained, and the judgment of the supreme court of Kansas is affirmed.

## Notes

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