# Debates in the Several State Conventions/Volume 5/Congress Feb. 1787

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Philadelphia: Lippincott, pages 94–97
Monday, February 19, 1787.
Mr. PINCKNEY, in support of his motion entered on the Journal for stopping the enlistment of troops, argued that he had reason to suppose the insurrection in Massachusetts, the real though not ostensible object of this measure, to be already crushed; that the requisition of five hundred thousand dollars for supporting the troops had been complied with by one state only, viz. Virginia, and that but in part; that it would be absurd to proceed in the raising of men who could neither be paid, clothed, nor fed, and that such a folly was the more to be shunned, as the consequences could not be foreseen, of imbodying and arming men under circumstances which would be more likely to render them the terror than the support of the government We had, he observed, been so lucky in one instance—meaning the disbanding of the army on the peace—as to get rid of an armed force without satisfying their just claims; but that it would not be prudent to hazard the repetition of the experiment.
Mr. KING made a moving appeal to the feelings of Congress, reminding them that the real object in voting the troops was, to countenance the exertions of the government of Massachusetts; that the silent coöperation of these military preparations under the orders of Congress had had a great and double effect in animating the government and awing the insurgents; that he hoped the late success of the former had given a deadly blow to the disturbances, yet that it would be premature, whilst a doubt could exist as to the critical fact, to withdraw the cooperating influence of the federal measures. He particularly and pathetically entreated Congress to consider that it was in agitation, and probably would be determined, by the legislature of Massachusetts, not only to bring to due punishment the more active and leading offenders, but to disarm and disfranchise, for a limited time, the great body of them; that for the policy of this measure he would not undertake to vouch, being sensible that there were great and illustrious examples against it; that his confidence, however, in the prudence of that government, would not permit him to call their determinations into question; that what the effect of these rigors might be it was impossible to foresee. He dwelt much on the sympathy which they probably would excite in behalf of the stigmatized party; scarce a man was without a father, a brother, a friend, in the mass of the people; adding that, as a precaution against contingencies, it was the purpose of the state to raise and station a small military force in the most suspected districts, and that forty thousand pounds, to be drawn from their impost on trade, had been appropriated accordingly; that under these circumstances a new crisis more solemn than the late one might be brought on, and therefore to stop the federal enlistments, and thereby withdraw the aid which had been held out, would give the greatest alarm imaginable to the government and its friends, as it would look like a disapprobation and desertion of them; and, if viewed in that light by the disaffected, might rekindle the insurrection. He took notice of the possibility to which every state in the Union was exposed of being visited with similar calamities; in which event they would all be suing for support in the same strain now used by the delegates from Massachusetts; that the indulgence now requested in behalf of that state might be granted without the least inconvenience to the United States, as their enlistments, without any countermanding orders, would not go on whilst those of the state were in competition; it being natural for men to prefer the latter service, in which they would stay at home, and be sure of their pay, to the former, in which they might, with little prospect of it, be sent to the Ohio to fight the Indians. He concluded with the most earnest entreaties, and the fullest confidence, that Congress would not, at so critical a moment, and without any ​necessity whatever, agree to the motion, assuring them that, in three or four weeks, possibly in less time, he might himself be a friend to it, and would promote it.
Mr. PINCKNEY, in reply, contended, that if the measures pursuing by Massachusetts were such as had been stated, he did not think the United States bound to give them countenance. He thought them impolitic, and not to be reconciled with the genius of free governments; and if fresh commotions should spring from them that the state of Massachusetts alone should be at the charge, and abide by the consequences of their own misconduct.
Mr. MADISON would not examine whether the original views of Congress, in the enlargement of their military force, were proper or not; nor whether it were so, to mask their views with an ostensible preparation against the Indians. He admitted, indeed, that it appeared rather difficult to reconcile an interference of Congress in the internal controversies of a state with the tenor of the Confederation, which does not authorize it expressly, and leaves to the states all powers not expressly delegated, or with the principles of republican governments, which, as they rest on the sense of the majority, necessarily suppose power and right always to be on the same side. He observed, however, that, in one point of view, military precautions on the part of Congress might have a different aspect. Whenever danger was apprehended from any foreign quarter, which of necessity extended itself to the federal concerns, Congress were bound to guard against it; and although there might be no particular evidence in this case of such a meditated interference, yet there was sufficient ground for a general suspicion of readiness in Great Britain to take advantage of events in this country, to warrant precautions against her. But, waiving the question as to the original propriety of the measure adopted, and attending merely to the question whether at this moment the measure ought, from a change of circumstances, to be rescinded, he was inclined to think it would be more advisable to suspend than to go instantly into the rescission. The considerations which led to this opinion were—
First That, though it appeared pretty certain that the main body of the insurgents had been dispersed, it was by no means certain that the spirit of insurrection was subdued. The leaders, too, of the insurgents had not been apprehended, and parties of them were still in arms in disaffected places.
Secondly. That great respect is due on such occasions to the wishes and representations of the suffering member of the federal body, both of which must be judged of by what comes from her representatives on the floor. These tell us that the measures taken by Congress have given great satisfaction and spirits to their constituents, and have coöperated much in baffling the views of their internal enemies; that they are pursuing very critical precautions at this moment for their future safety and tranquillity; and that the construction which will be put on the proposed resolution, if agreed to by Congress, cannot fail to make very unhappy impressions, and may have very serious consequences. The propriety of these precautions depends on so many circumstances better known to the government of Massachusetts than to Congress, that it would be premature in Congress to be governed by a disapprobation.
Thirdly. That every state ought to bear in mind the consequences of popular commotions, if not thoroughly subdued, on the tranquillity of the Union, and the possibility of being itself the scene of them. Every state ought, therefore, to submit with cheerfulness to such indulgences to others as itself may, in a little time, be in need of. He had been a witness of the temper of his own state (Virginia) on this occasion. It was understood by the legislature that the real object of the military preparations on foot was the disturbances in Massachusetts, and that very consideration inspired the ardor which voted, towards their quota, a tax on tobacco, which would not have been granted for scarce any other purpose whatever, being a tax operating very partially, in the opinion of the people of that state who cultivate that article; yet this class of the legislature were almost unanimous in making the sacrifice, because the fund was considered as the most certain that could be provided.
Fourthly. That it was probable the enlistments, for the reasons given, would be suspended without an order from Congress; in which case, the inconvenience suggested would be saved to the United States, and the wishes of Massachusetts satisfied, at the same time.
Fifthly. That as no bounty was given for the troops, and they could be dismissed at any time, the objections drawn from the consideration of expense would have but little force.
​Sixthly. That it was contended for a continuance of the apparent aid of Congress for only three or four weeks, the members from Massachusetts themselves considering that as a sufficient time.
After the rejection of the motion, as stated on the Journal, a dispute arose whether the vote should be entered among the secret or public proceedings. Mr. PINCKNEY insisted that, in the former case, his view, which was to justify himself to his constituents, would be frustrated. Most of those who voted with him were opposed to an immediate publication. The expedient of a temporary concealment was proposed as answering all purposes.
Tuesday, February 20.
Nothing of consequence was done.
Wednesday, February 21.
The report of the convention at Annapolis, in September, 1786, had been long under the consideration of a committee of Congress for the last year, and was referred over to a grand committee of the present year. The latter committee, after considerable difficulty and discussion, agreed on a report, by a majority of one only, (see the Journal,) which was made a few days ago to Congress, and set down as the order for this day. The report coincided with the opinion, held at Annapolis, that the Confederation needed amendments, and that the proposed convention was the most eligible means of effecting them. The objections which seemed to prevail against the recommendation of the convention by Congress were, with some, that it tended to weaken the federal authority by lending its sanction to an extra-constitutional mode of proceeding; with others, that the interposition of Congress would be considered by the jealous as betraying an ambitious wish to get power into their hands by any plan whatever that might present itself. Subsequent to the report, the delegates from New York received instructions from its legislature to move in Congress for a recommendation of a convention; and those from Massachusetts had, it appeared, received information which led them to suppose it was becoming the disposition of the legislature of that state to send deputies to the proposed convention, in case Congress should give their sanction to it There was reason to believe, however, from the language of the instruction from New York, that her object was to obtain a new convention, under the sanction of Congress, rather than to accede to the one on root; or, perhaps, by dividing the plans of the states in their appointments, to frustrate all of them. The latter suspicion is in some degree countenanced by their refusal of the impost a few days before the instruction passed, and by their other marks of an unfederal disposition. The delegates from New York, in consequence of their instructions, made the motion on the Journal to postpone the report of the committee, in order to substitute their own proposition. Those who voted against it considered it as liable to the objection above mentioned. Some who voted for it, particularly Mr. MADISON, considered it susceptible of amendment when brought before Congress; and that if Congress interposed in the matter at all, it would be well for them to do it at the instance of a state, rather than spontaneously. This motion being lost, Mr. DANE, from Massachusetts, who was at bottom unfriendly to the plan of a convention, and had dissuaded his state from coming into it, brought forward a proposition, in a different form, but liable to the same objection with that from New York. After some little discussion, it was agreed on all sides, except by Connecticut, who opposed the measure in every form, that the resolution should pass as it stands on the Journal, sanctioning the proceedings and appointments already made by the states, as well as recommending further appointments from other states, but in such terms as do not point directly to the former appointments.
It appeared from the debates, and still more from the conversation among the members, that many of them considered this resolution as a deadly blow to the existing Confederation. Dr. JOHNSON, who voted against it, particularly declared himself to that effect. Others viewed it in the same light, but were pleased with it as the harbinger of a better Confederation.
The reserve of many of the members made it difficult to decide their real wishes and expectations from the present crisis of our affairs. All agreed and owned that the federal government, in its existing shape, was inefficient, and could not last long. The members from the Southern and Middle States seemed generally anxious for some republican organization of the system which would preserve the Union, and give due energy to the government of it. Mr. BINGHAM alone avowed his wishes ​that the Confederacy might be divided into several distinct confederacies, its great extent and various interests being incompatible with a single government. The eastern members were suspected by some of leaning towards some anti-republican establishment, (the effect of their late confusions,) or of being less desirous or hopeful of preserving the unity of the empire. For the first time, the idea of separate confederacies had got into the newspapers. It appeared to-day under the Boston head. Whatever the views of the leading men in the Eastern States may be, it would seem that the great body of the people, particularly in Connecticut, are equally indisposed either to dissolve or divide the Confederacy, or to submit to any anti-republican innovations.