# Intelligence and Security Committee China report/Annex A

* On 12 January 2020, the World Health Organization (WHO) announced that a "2019 novel coronavirus" had been identified, originating in Wuhan, China, in late 2019. It noted that "most cases [of people contracting the virus at the time] worked at or were handlers and frequent visitors to the Huanan Seafood Wholesale Market" and that: "The [Chinese] Government reports that there is no clear evidence that the virus passes easily from person to person."
* The exact origin of Covid-19 remains unknown but heavily speculated upon. Some reports have suggested the virus may have been circulating globally in the latter quarter of 2019. In the absence of conclusive evidence, it is generally accepted that the first cases of the virus were detected in Wuhan, China, in December 2019. From there, it spread first through Asia—most notably Iran—before finding a centre in Europe, initially in Italy and Spain.
* By the end of January 2020, the WHO had acknowledged significant evidence of human-to-human transmission outside of China and declared a "Public Health Emergency of International Concern". On 11 March 2020, the WHO declared Covid-19 a pandemic.
* The first death from Covid-19 in the UK was, at the time, believed to have been on 5 March 2020, although it is now generally accepted that several deaths in February and January 2020 are plausibly earlier instances. The Government moved the UK into 'lockdown': a period of restrictions from March 2020 which limited social and professional interactions in a bid to contain the virus. Concurrently, the Government heavily pushed for the development of a vaccine—for many, seen as the best way to combat the pandemic. At this point, the worldwide figures stood at 270,000 cases and 11,000 deaths. By 2 April 2020, there were 1m cases of Covid-19 worldwide and, within a fortnight, that figure had doubled.
* On 8 December 2020, the UK became the first country in the world to begin the process of vaccinating its citizens with a fully clinically approved vaccine. Despite this, at the time of drafting, cases of coronavirus remained carefully monitored in the UK, and international travel remained restricted. At this time, over 6m global deaths have been officially reported, although studies based on excess mortality indicate the true figure could be double that. As of 25 March 2022, 186,094 deaths had been recorded in the UK where Covid-19 was mentioned on the death certificate.
* The broader consequences of the pandemic—from home-working, to medical development, to international co-operation—have had an impact on the substance and methodology of the work of the UK Intelligence Community. Additionally, the pandemic has awoken in the popular consciousness the nature of the UK’s relationship with China. ​  ​Disinformation ​
** China's behaviour since the start of the pandemic has also been under the microscope. Questions have been raised as to whether it may have accidentally or deliberately released the virus, and whether it may have exacerbated or exploited the situation for its own gain or to others' detriment.   Investigation of origin
** Wet markets—where SARS-CoV-2 (the virus which causes Covid-19) is thought to have originated—are found across East Asia and often feature a trade in wild animals including birds, rabbits, bats and snakes, alongside the sale of raw meat. They have long been known as a potential source for the emergence of respiratory diseases.
** There has been significant scientific consensus that this was a natural outbreak. For example, a group of researchers from the UK, United States (US) and Australia, in a letter to Nature Medicine in March 2020, noted that "our analyses clearly show that SARS-CoV-2 is not a laboratory construct or a purposefully manipulated virus". In February 2020, a group of public health scientists had written to the medical journal The Lancet to "condemn conspiracy theories that COVID-19 does not have a natural origin". (Subsequent releases of emails—as a result of a freedom of information request in the US and subsequent Congressional scrutiny—between a number of scientists revealed that one of those who had signed the letter to The Lancet had put the chance of Covid-19 being a leak from a laboratory at "70:30 or 60:40" two weeks prior, a figure he downgraded to 50:50 several days after his initial judgement. However, when questioned as to why he had signed the letter to The Lancet—which took a different stance—he said his view had changed in line with the evidence). In April 2020, US intelligence agencies released a public statement noting: "The Intelligence Community also concurs with the wide scientific consensus that the COVID-19 virus was not manmade or genetically modified."
** Despite this, there has been speculation about the origins of the virus—typically centring on the nearby laboratories in Wuhan that study bat coronaviruses (the Wuhan Institute of Virology, which is a level 4 biosecurity facility—the highest for biocontainment—and the level 2 Wuhan Centre for Disease Control). Senior US figures—including then-President Trump and former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo—have stated that there is "enormous evidence"that the virus came from a lab, in direct contradiction of their own intelligence agencies. More broadly, some have suggested possible Chinese complicity or negligence in the origins of the virus (including a former Chief of SIS). ​
** The Committee questioned whether there is any intelligence or intelligence assessment on the origins of the outbreak. What the Intelligence Community told us appeared to be not too dissimilar to the assessment made by the US Intelligence Community in 2020: that it is highly likely that SARS-CoV2 (the virus which causes Covid-19) is naturally occurring—as opposed to a laboratory-acquired infection or one manufactured as an offensive or defensive weapon, and it is likely that the first human infection originated from a natural human–animal interaction unconnected to a laboratory. They also told us that it does not appear that the virus was manufactured or intentionally spread by China. Having been tasked to look for intelligence on the origins of the virus, GCHQ told us that ***. The Intelligence Community said that: ***
** In response to global speculation—and perhaps in an effort to shape its global image—China has attempted to "sow seeds of doubt about the origins of the virus, to try and get its audiences in its own terms to believe that China was not at fault". Chinese diplomats and officials have, alongside state media, repeatedly reiterated that the virus may have originated outside China, and have claimed that the US is a more likely source. There are no credible sources that support this assertion, and the general consensus remains that the virus originated in Wuhan. We were told that, while it is difficult to determine the exact location of the first infection, it is unlikely that Covid-19 originated from a laboratory-acquired infection or accidental release from a laboratory. Even if it did, it is highly likely the original source was a natural pathogen. However, HMG noted that: *** ***
** It may be that neither the UK Intelligence Community nor our Five Eyes partners will ever be able to confirm the origin of Covid-19. While this is both expected and understandable, there nonetheless remain significant benefits in attempting to determine the origin of Covid-19, principally to inform our responses to future pandemics and develop preventative measures.
** China's deliberate obstruction of international efforts in this regard is inexcusable. In May 2020, it was reported that China would refuse access to investigators until the pandemic ​had ended and, in January 2021, a team of WHO investigators were refused entry to China. Instances such as these are a stark reminder of China's preponderance to favour its narrow ideological objectives over international co-operation, the implications of which will be felt for years to come.
** It may be the case that China has been obstructive because it has something it wishes to hide. However, ***.   China's initial response
** Accusations have also been levelled at China that its initial domestic response hindered later global containment efforts. However, there does not appear to be clear evidence that China deliberately released or allowed the release of the virus. What we have seen appears to echo reporting that suggested that, in the early days of the pandemic, the Chinese authorities appeared to emphasise information control at the expense of standard epidemic response measures. A reluctance to pass bad news up the chain hindered the response, as did widespread censorship of stories about the virus, and it appears that more decisive action only materialised when the issue reached higher levels of the Chinese government. The JIC Chair *** *** *** The response was characterised in evidence to us as part 'to be expected', and part 'typical Chinese aversion to bad news': I would characterise it in part as what would have been a challenge to any government dealing with a new virus, trying to work out what it was, trying to work out what measures should be taken and requiring a period of time as it flowed up through the system before it got to real decision-making level, but I would also say that they are handicapped by the Chinese system, because of a reluctance to share information, certainly a reluctance to allow information to become public and a reluctance to pass bad news up the chain.
** China has faced considerable public scrutiny for its role in containing the pandemic, playing down the potential impacts of the disease—including, crucially, its potential for human-to-human transmission, about which they are alleged to have delayed releasing information to the public for up to six days in January 2020. China's reporting of infections and deaths has also been widely criticised for introducing uncertainty into modelling by ​others when trying to ascertain the future spread and danger of the virus, and for providing a basis on which to downplay China’s role and responsibilities.
** In the early stages of the pandemic, open source reporting alleged that China closed internal flights in January 2020 while leaving international flights open until March 2020. If true, this may indicate culpability for the global reach of the virus—whether through negligence, or a deliberate effort to spread the virus beyond China's borders. The Committee therefore questioned whether there was any intelligence on, or intelligence assessment of, the issue. The UK Intelligence Community told us their assessment is as follows: At the end of January, China initiated the highest levels of public emergency in all provinces, restricting almost all forms of travel for ordinary citizens. Foreign consular services were required to arrange chartered flights to assist their citizens’ return to home countries. During the strictest period of lockdown, approximately 23 January to mid-March, although China did not formally close its borders, the number of total domestic and international flights departing dropped from about 15,000 per day, to 1,800-2,000. Approximately 75% of these flights were domestic. In addition to the epicentre, in the most restricted cities (Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou), which account for the top three busiest airports for international and domestic travel, the number of weekly flights dropped to less than 100, and some weeks less than ten. On 28 March China banned foreign citizens entering China, and sought to dissuade Chinese citizens from returning. This marked a change in China epidemic control strategy. After it had officially declared the epidemic under control domestically, having brought the number of cases down to single digits, and declared most provinces virus free, it focused on preventing imported cases entering the country and causing a second wave. ***.
** It is not clear from this reply what the proportions were of international and domestic flights which were stopped. ***.
** Furthermore the JIO has since advised that, from updated open source data, this "statistic [of 75%] is no longer the most accurate" and that "the flight numbers provided ought to be treated with caution given that in some cases flights included were subsequently found to have been cancelled or the layover in Wuhan aborted whilst others could have been empty return flights or chartered flights evacuating foreign nationals from Wuhan". There is therefore no evidence base on which to assess the validity of the allegations made in the open source reporting.
** Alongside the Covid-19 pandemic, various commentators have discussed the 'pandemic of disinformation',or an 'infodemic'. The WHO characterises the latter term as an abundance of information, including false information, which causes confusion, undermines confidence in public health responses, and can intensify or lengthen outbreaks. This presents clear challenges to governments as they attempt to develop and implement public health responses.
** The origins of misinformation and disinformation are complicated and reflect the underlying purposes of their promulgators. Russian disinformation throughout the pandemic has been frequently alleged. When we speak of threats to the UK, we often talk of 'Russia and China' in the same breath. While each stands in opposition to Western liberal democratic values, the two present very different challenges and engage with the UK in very different ways. In our predecessor Committee's 2020 Russia Report, we discussed efforts to discredit and undermine the democratic process in the UK, including during the 2014 Scottish independence and 2016 EU membership referenda, through disinformation.
** With disinformation reported so readily in the media throughout the Covid-19 pandemic, we asked the JIC Chair for his assessment of comparisons which could be drawn between Russian and Chinese efforts. The JIC Chair noted that disinformation campaigns by Russia and China seek to fulfil their respective political objectives: while Russia seeks actively to undermine trust in Western democratic institutions and values, China remains focused on controlling the narrative around its position in the world and its domestic challenges. As a result, we heard from Director General MI5 that the "other audience that China is seeking to influence is its own diaspora communities". Although this is concerning, we were told that the scale of the effort expended by China in the UK media is not "as vigorous" as that from Russia, and that targeting of social media, while engaged in extensively by China, is predominantly in Chinese languages rather than English.
** As we noted when discussing the role of China in Academia, disinformation can be used as a means to shape the narrative on, or shut down discussion of, the domestic challenges that China considers as presenting the greatest risk to its international reputation or its internal suppression of dissent. Director General MI5 noted that: if that is their objective in respect of the UK media over the last year, they probably regard themselves as not having done a brilliant job, because, if you look at the balance of stories appearing in the UK media over the last year, there has been a lot of discussion around things like Huawei, Hong Kong, Xinjiang … the tide of public opinion and the opinion polling shows … that the UK public are more conscious of China as presenting threats and challenges to the UK than was the case two or three, four years ago.
* As well as using disinformation to limit damage to its own image, China is also accused of spreading disinformation and discord abroad in a bid to damage democracies by suggesting that autocracies have managed to contain the virus whereas democracies have failed to protect their populations. GCHQ told us China has been very keen to promote its role in health diplomacy, to show where it is helping other nations, to amplify, over exaggerate in some ways its work to counter the virus and to develop vaccines, and so on, but it has equally, at the same time, been putting out disinformation to try and sow seeds of doubt about the origins of the virus, to try and get its audiences in its own terms to believe that China was not at fault with this and to promulgate fake news and conspiracy theories.
UUU. Now is not the time to try to reach conclusions about Chinese intent or actions over the origins and development of the pandemic—it is still too soon, as it is likely that more information will come to light about Covid-19 as investigations continue. Initial work *** does appear to support public statements made by the World Health Organization and the Intelligence Community in the United States that the virus was not man-made and China did not deliberately let it spread—beyond cultural issues around failure.
VVV. However, those cultural issues—a failure to share information due to a reluctance to pass bad news up the chain, and a tendency to censor press and social media reports considered to present a negative impression—were in themselves extremely damaging to efforts to contain and, later, counter the disease. Attempts by China to suggest that the pandemic originated elsewhere show an unwillingness to change its approach—a concern, given the possibility of future pandemics.
* The work which has led to the development of several effective Covid-19 vaccines built on the response to SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome) in 2002 and MERS (Middle Eastern Respiratory Syndrome) in 2012. Chinese research was instrumental in sequencing the virus's full genome and sharing it globally on 11 January 2020. From that point, several teams around the world were able to work independently on potential vaccines, and several had received regulatory approval by early 2021. Further efforts to promote equitable distribution saw the establishment of Covid-19 Vaccines Global Access (or 'COVAX'), which laid the foundation for ongoing vaccine rollout in lower-income countries.
* The development of an effective vaccine to combat Covid-19 was considered to be the most crucial aspect in managing the pandemic over the long term. There was a race to be the first to develop a vaccine and therefore work on a vaccine was judged to be highly likely to be targeted by hostile states. At the outset of the pandemic, MI5 judged that "COVID-related intelligence would almost certainly be a high priority. We considered it almost certain they would target global healthcare organisations, especially those engaged in ​ vaccine discovery and manufacture, and organisations involved in the vaccine supply chain."
* The National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) has publicly identified Russian efforts to target UK vaccine work (and indeed Russian disinformation around the vaccine, with the aim of undermining public confidence in it, appeared to be the primary hostile state threat in this area ***), but there have also been allegations in the press that China has used information supplied to the WHO in order to guide its targeting of companies and institutions working on coronavirus vaccines. The JIO told us ***.
* While China would seemingly gain no clear advantage in sabotaging efforts to create a vaccine – given the benefits it would likely reap—it is nevertheless very interested in the UK's vaccine development. MI5 told us that: ***
* Furthermore, China stands to gain clear benefits from medical espionage while there remain exploitable commercial opportunities in connection with the pandemic. Both Russia and China appear to have used 'medical diplomacy' in the context of Covid-19 to further their own positions: offers of personal protective equipment or medical support may appear to be generous on the surface, but may have conditions attached. CDI told us that the ***.
* The UK Intelligence Community should be commended for the proactive measures they have taken to defend the UK’s medical infrastructure and capabilities from possible interference. NCSC increased its support to the UK Government Vaccine Taskforce, which makes decisions on research funding and purchase of vaccines, and to universities involved in the research and development of a vaccine.The Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure is helping to secure Covid-19 testing, treatment and vaccine research and development, and ***.
* Indeed, the pandemic has raised an important issue: namely that sectors that are not traditionally considered 'critical' became hugely significant in co-ordinating and facilitating the UK's response. As a consequence, support was rapidly required from Government to counter the interest shown in them by—and threat from—a wide range of actors, including hostile states. GCHQ noted: These are companies that are generally not classed as Critical National Infrastructure but became essential to the UK's response to the Covid-19 crisis including: supermarkets, haulage companies to ventilator manufacturers, healthcare suppliers and charities. No priority list of these existed, we had to work with a range of ​organisations—from central Government departments to trade associations—to ensure that our efforts were appropriately targeted. We produced 17 new pieces of guidance and a range of material to support the ESPs [Essential Service Providers] and advise on how to reduce their cyber risk.
* NCSC noted that *** and that the pandemic also caused it to work much more closely with the UK's Health Critical National Infrastructure given the greater interest shown in it as a result of Covid-19. This has included working with the Department of Health and Social Care to tackle the range of cyber threats that have emerged, and NCSC notes that ***.
WWW. During the pandemic, sectors not traditionally considered 'critical'—such as organisations working on a vaccine, supermarkets, logistics, haulage and medical equipment supply companies—became essential to the UK's response. The support of the Intelligence Community was key to protect the vaccine supply chain and to counter the interest shown in these 'critical' areas by hostile foreign actors
* The Secretary General of NATO (the North Atlantic Treaty Organization), Jens Stoltenberg, and Sir John Sawers, former Chief of SIS, amongst others, have raised concerns about China buying strategic assets and critical infrastructure cheaply as a result of the crisis. MI5 told us that, at the time, it and the Joint State Threats Assessment Team (JSTAT) recognised this risk, and assessed that: ***
* The UK Intelligence Community judged that China had used the opportunities presented by Covid-19 in the commercial space and also to increase its influence in global organisations, such as the WHO. We were warned *** that, overall, the threat from China had increased and that it was likely to emerge from the pandemic "stronger and more aggressive than before".
XXX. The key issue for the future is the extent to which China will now capitalise on the pandemic as other countries suffer its effects and how the UK Intelligence Community and their allies will stop this growing threat.
* One of the broader consequences of the pandemic domestically was the large increase in the number of people in the UK who worked principally, or partly, from home. This included the staff of the Agencies. The (then) Deputy National Security Adviser told us that this had several implications for HMG's effort on China: China is a cross-Government effort and any work on China needs to be done in a secure way. For these organisations, they are very used to communicating at very high levels of security. One thing Covid did show us earlier this year was that when much of the Civil Service went to working from home, most departments ***. ***
* MI5 told us that the pandemic had caused it to rapidly alter its processes to equip staff for low-side working, and noted that this approach had seen productive outcomes: ***
YYY. In terms of the work of the Intelligence Community generally, while it may have been reasonable for staff to work partially from home during the pandemic, it would obviously not be feasible for organisations that rely on secret material to carry out all their work over less secure systems. Yet even now, with the country having fully reopened, we continue to see the Intelligence Community working partially from home (some more than others). It appears that the response to our requests for information has slowed dramatically as a result: the 'new normal' for some organisations means deadlines have been missed or responses have been sanitised to enable them to be sent from home. This has had—and continues to have—an impact on the Committee's ability to scrutinise security and intelligence issues properly and in a timely fashion.
ZZZ. The pandemic had a notable impact in terms of staff across the Intelligence Community working from home, without continual access to classified systems—other than for those working on the most critical priorities. In this respect we take the opportunity to pay tribute to the Committee's own staff, who have continued to work from the office full time (a rarity in the Civil Service) so as to ensure that the Committee was able to function efficiently and effectively.
* ↑ 'Novel Coronavirus—China', World Health Organization, 12 January 2020.
* ↑ The virus is known as Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 or SARS-CoV-2.
* ↑ 'Timeline of WHO’s response to COVID-19', World Health Organization, 29 June 2020.
* ↑ 'World Health Organization (Covid-19) Dashboard', World Health Organization, 25 March 2022.
* ↑ 'Coronavirus Dashboard', HMG, 25 March 2022.
* ↑ 'Wet markets—a continuing source of severe acute respiratory syndrome and influenza?', Webster, R. G., The Lancet, 2004; 363(9404): 234–236.
* ↑ 'The proximal origin of SARS-CoV-2', Nature Medicine, 17 March 2020.
* ↑ 'Statement in support of the scientist, public health professionals, and medical professionals of China combatting COVID-19', The Lancet, 2020; 395(10226): 42–43.
* ↑ 'Top SAGE adviser admitted lab leak theory was "most likely" origin of COVID in February 2020 but debate was shut down because it could "cause harm to China", bombshell emails reveal', MailOnline, 12 January 2022.
* ↑ 'Intelligence Community Statement on Origins of COVID-19', Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 30 April 2020.
* ↑ 'Pompeo Ties Coronavirus to China Lab Despite Spy Agencies' Uncertainty', New York Times, 7 May 2020.
* ↑ 'Coronavirus: Former MI6 boss says theory COVID-19 came from Wuhan lab must not be dismissed as conspiracy', Sky News, 6 July 2020.
* ↑ Oral evidence—GCHQ, *** October 2020.
* ↑ Written evidence—HMG, 18 November 2020.
* ↑ HMG subsequently advised the Committee that the evidence provided was inaccurate and that the penultimate sentence should read ***.
* ↑ Oral evidence—GCHQ, *** October 2020.
* ↑ '"American Coronavirus": China pushes propaganda casting doubt on virus origin', The Guardian, 13 March 2020.
* ↑ JIO assessments are measured on 'confidence' and 'probability'. The 'probability yardstick' states how likely something is: up to 5% (i.e. a 1 in 20 chance) is a 'remote' chance; 10–20% (between 1 in 10 and 1 in 20) is 'highly unlikely'; 25–35% (1 in 4 to 1 in 3) is 'unlikely'; 40–50% (2 in 5 to 1 in 2) is a 'realistic possibility'; 55–75% (5 in 9 to 3 in 4) is 'likely or probable'; 80–90% (4 in 5 or 9 in 10) is 'highly likely'; and 95–100% (19 in 20) is 'almost certain'. 'Low' confidence means that reports are based on fragmentary, ambiguous and/or contradictory source material; 'medium' or 'moderate' confidence reports will have elements of corroboration, based on quality material but have key gaps, concerns or weaknesses; and 'high' confidence means that reports are based on a range of good-quality sources, potentially with some corroboration.
* ↑ Written evidence—HMG, 7 June 2021.
* ↑ 'China refuses international probe on Covid-19 source until "final victory" over disease', France 24, 6 May 2020.
* ↑ 'Covid-19: WHO investigators are still blocked from entering China as two cities lock down', Owen Dyer, British Medical Journal, 8 January 2021.
* ↑ Oral evidence—GCHQ, *** October 2020.
* ↑ Written evidence—JIO, 22 May 2022.
* ↑ Oral evidence—JIO, *** October 2020.
* ↑ Oral evidence—JIO, *** October 2020.
* ↑ 'Taiwanese official reveals China suspected "human to human" transmission by January 13', The Telegraph, 6 May 2020.
* ↑ 'C.I.A. Hunts for Authentic Virus Totals in China, Dismissing Government Tallies', New York Times, 2 April 2020.
* ↑ 'How China locked down internally for COVID-19, but pushed foreign travel', Economic Times, 30 April 2020.
* ↑ Written evidence—JIO, 18 November 2020
* ↑ Written evidence—JIO, 24 February 2022.
* ↑ The "Pandemic" of Disinformation in COVID-19, Fabio Tagliabue et al, 1 August 2020.
* ↑ 'Infodemic', World Health Organization, 11 June 2021.
* ↑ Russia, HC 632, 21 July 2020.
* ↑ Oral evidence—JIO, *** October 2020.
* ↑ Oral evidence—MI5, *** October 2020.
* ↑ Oral evidence—JIO, *** October 2020.
* ↑ Oral evidence—MI5, *** October 2020.
* ↑ 'How China amped Up Disinformation Efforts During the Pandemic', Council on Foreign Relations, 10 September 2020.
* ↑ Oral evidence—GCHQ, *** October 2020.
* ↑ Written evidence—MI5, 24 September 2020.
* ↑ 'Russian Disinformation Campaign Aims to Undermine Confidence in Pfizer, Other Covid-19 Vaccines, US Officials Say', Wall Street Journal, 7 March 2021.
* ↑ Written evidence—JIO, 18 November 2020.
* ↑ Oral evidence—MI5, *** October 2020.
* ↑ Oral evidence—DI, *** October 2020.
* ↑ Written evidence—GCHQ, 31 July 2020.
* ↑ Written evidence—MI5, 31 July 2020.
* ↑ Written evidence—GCHQ, 31 July 2020
* ↑ Oral evidence—NCSC, *** October 2020.
* ↑ Oral evidence—JIO, *** October 2020.
* ↑ Written evidence – MI5, 24 September 2020.
* ↑ Oral evidence—HMG, *** October 2020.
* ↑ Oral evidence—HMG, *** October 2020
* ↑ Oral evidence—NSS, *** October 2020.
* ↑ Written evidence—MI5, 31 July 2021.
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