# Florida v. Georgia (58 U.S. 478)/Opinion of the Court

* Court Documents
* Case Syllabus
* Opinion of the Court
* Dissenting Opinions Curtis Campbell
United States Supreme Court
58 U.S. 478
Florida v. State of Georgia
IN 11 How. 293, it is reported that the State of Florida filed a bill in this court, in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, against the State of Georgia to establish a boundary between them. The State of Georgia answered, and other proceedings were had; but the case was not yet at issue, nor was all the testimony taken upon which the parties proposed to rely.
At the present term, the attorney-general appeared in court and filed the following information, moving at the same time for leave to intervene on behalf of the United States for the reasons stated in the information.
Now, on this 15th day of December, 1854, Caleb Cushing, attorney-general of the United States, in his proper person comes here into the court, and for the said United States gives the court to understand and be informed, that a certain bill of complaint is pending in said court, by or in behalf of the State of Florida, complainant, against the State of Georgia, defendant, wherein is in controversy a certain portion of the boundary line between said States, and of the lands contiguous thereto.
That by Mariano D. Papy, attorney-general of the State of Florida, formal notice in the name and behalf of said State has been given to the United States that the matter of said bill is of interest and concern to the said United States.
That, by inspection of said bill of complaint, it appears that the State of Florida alleges that the portion of boundary line in question should run, commencing at the junction of the Flint and Chattachoochee Rivers, and thence in a straight line to a point at or near a monument commonly called Ellicott's Mound, at the assumed head of the River St. Mary's, which line has been survyed by the surveyors of the United States, and is known as McNeil's line, or howsoever otherwise the same may be described or designated.
That in said bill of complaint the State of Florida further alleges, that the State of Georgia pretends that, commencing at the junction of the Flint and Chattahoochee Rivers, as aforesaid, the said line should run to a point called Lake Spalding, or a point called Lake Randolph.
It further appears that the said points of Lake Spalding and Lake Randolph are situated about thirty miles to the south of said Ellicott's Mound, and the effect will be, if the pretence of the State of Georgia be sustained, to transfer to said State of Georgia a tract of land in the shape of a triangle, having a base of some thirty miles, and equal sides each of the length of about one hundred and fifty miles, comprehending upwards of one million two hundred thousand acres of land, which have been considered and treated heretofore as public domain of the United States, and surveyed as such, and much of which has accordingly been sold and patented by the government as of the territory of East Florida acquired from Spain.
And for the information of the court herein, the attorney-general files, annexed to this motion:--
1. A certified copy of the (cautionary) traverse line so surveyed in 1825, by said McNeil.
2. A certified copy of the filed-notes of said traverse line so surveyed.
3. A certified copy of the map of the (cautionary) true line, plotted from traverse line, by said McNeil.
4. An official copy of diagram of surveyor-general of the United States for Florida, of surveys of public lands of United States in said State, to September 30, 1853.
Whereupon, and in consideration of the interest and concern of the United States manifestly apparent in said bill of complaint, the said attorney-general of the United States prays the consideration of the court here, and moves the court that he be permitted to appear in said case, and be heard in behalf of the United States, in such time and form as the court shall order.
This motion was opposed by the States, and was argued by the Attorney-General, in behalf of the United States; by Mr. Badger and Mr. Berrien, on behalf of the State of Georgia, and by Mr. Westcott and Mr. Johnson, on behalf of the State of Florida.
Upon a question of this character, where 'the file affords no precedent,' the reporter would be pleased if be could report the arguments of counsel in extenso; but want of room compels him to submit to the reader only the following condensed and imperfect sketch of the respective arguments.
Mr. Cushing began with a general view of the subject of intervention, how it was considered in other countries, Spain, France, and England, and particularly the latter; and how far the English doctrines had been recognized in the United States. He then passed from the subject of intervention between private persons to cases where the attorney-general interfered, both in England and this county. He then considered the effect of the act of congress, (1 Stats. at Large, 93,) establishing the office of attorney-general, and making it his duty 'to prosecute and conduct all suits in the supreme court in which the United States shall be concerned;' and contended that, if the government cannot be heard in this case by intervention, it cannot be heard at all.
His argument under the 15th and 16th heads is given entire.
15. If there were no precedents to justify the right claimed for the attorney-general, then the court should make one, in deference to the great principle of equity laid down by Lord Cottenham, in Taylor v. Salmon, that it is the duty of the court of chancery 'to adapt its practice and course of proceeding, as far as possible, to the existing state of society, and to apply its jurisdiction to all those new cases which, from the progress daily making in the affairs of men, must continually arise; and not, from too strict an adherence to forms and rules established under very different circumstances, decline to administer justice, and to enforce rights for which there is no other remedy.' Taylor v. Salmon, 4 Mylne and Craig, 141.
This court has repeatedly decided that it has ample power to regulate chancery practice for the new and purely American question, of suits in equity between States; subject, of course, to the control of congress in this respect. Grayson v. State of Virginia, 3 Dal. 320; Huger v. State of South Corolina, 3 Ib. 371; State of New York v. State of Connecticut, 4 Ib. 1; State of New Jersey v. State of New York, 5 Pet. 283; State of Rhode Island v. State of Massachusetts, 12 Pet. 657.
It can as well provide rules in equity, according to the exigencies of the case, for this first example of the more complex contingency of the collateral interest of the United States in a suit between two States, as it could for the primary and simple contingency of the suit between two States of itself.
If there be no rule in the files applicable to the case, then it is the very time for the court to exercise the double equity power, (reversing the order in which Bacon describes it,) tam supplendi defectum legis quam subveniendi contra rigorem legis.
16. It will not answer to say that the United States may appear in the name of the State of Florida.
§ 1. If so, then the condition of the United States, in the premises, is precarious, depending on the discretion of the State of Florida, or of any other State which may stand in like circumstances.
Self-defence on the part of the government will no longer be its right, but a favor to be granted or withheld by any litigant State. The essence of a right is, that it may be exercised contentiously, adversely. Ubi jus ibi remedium. Right is a thing determinate, fixed, established. Rego, rectum, regula,-all belong to the same set of ideas.
§ 2. The proposed appearance for the United States is not a volunteer act; for the State of Florida demands of the general government to intervene. The attorney-general of that State officially notifies the attorney-general of the United States of their interest depending on this question with Georgia.
But a case might arise in which neither of two or more litigant States desired the presence of the United States.
The matter before the court is, therefore, of a legal principle to be determined, not of a privilege to be conceded, or of one enjoyed indirectly, under favor of a State.
§ 3. Nor is the possibility of distinct and separate rights, on the part of the United States, a suggestion or supposition merely.
The United States have granted certain lands, by patent, to individuals, or by statute cession, to Florida, which, according to the claims of Georgia, belonged to her, not to the United States. Here is responsibility of the latter to its grantees.
The warrantor comes in because of his responsibility to his grantee, but also in order to see that the case is fully and well tried, with all just defences fully before the court, either technical or of the merits.
§ 4. The rights of the United States might be prejudiced in a suit between two States through the forms of law.
The constitution provides (Art. 1, § 3) as follows:--
'3. New States may be admitted by the congress into this Union; but no new State shall be formed or erected within the jurisdiction of any other State; nor any State be formed by the junction of two or more States, or parts of States, without the consent of the legislatures of the States concerned, as well as of the congress.'
By the constitution, also, (Art. 1, § 10,) 'No State shall, without the consent of congress, . . . enter into any agreement or compact with another State.'
These two clauses of the constitution are in pari materia, and to be construed together; and they establish that two States cannot change their common boundary without consent of congress.
The United States have a general interest in the question of the boundaries of States, because of sundry political or legislative relations of the subject: as, for instance, apportionment of members of the house of representatives, collection districts, judicial districts, and many other things having reference to the boundaries of States.
Treaty rights may likewise be involved, as in the present case, where the line in dispute is defined by the treaty of 1783 between the United States and Great Britain, art. 2, (8 Stats. at Large 81,) and by the treaty of 1795 between the United States and Spain, art. 2, (8 Ib. 140.) These treaties are a part of that supreme law, which it is the peculiar duty of the United States, its officers, and its tribunals, to maintain and execute.
Special acts of congress may be in question, as here in the present case.
By the act of March 3, 1845, for admitting the State of Florida into the Union, (5 Stats. at Large, 743, ch. 63, § 5,) 'said State of Florida shall embrace the territories of East and West Florida, which, by the treaty of amity, settlement, and limits between the United States and Spain on the 22d day of February, 1819, were ceded to the United States.'
And by the 7th section of that act, the State of Florida was admitted into the Union upon the express condition that the State shall never interfere with the primary disposal of the public lands within the State, nor levy any tax on the same whilst remaining the property of the United States.
The attorney-general, in proposing to intervene here to protect the interests of the United States, desires to do so, not as a technical party; not as joining with the one or the other party; not in subordination to the mode of conducting the complaint or defence adopted by the one State or by the other, nor subject to the consequences of their acts, or of any possible mispleading, insufficient pleading, omission to plead, or admission or omission of fact by either or both; but free to co operate with, or to oppose both, or either, and to bring forth all the points of the case according to his own judgment, whether as to the law or to the facts; for ex facto oritur jus.
As the States of Florida and Georgia cannot, by any direct agreement or contract between them, without the consent of congress, change the boundary of Florida, as established by the said act of congress, it follows that they ought not to be permitted to alter that boundary in the suit pending, either by possible mispleading, mistake in pleading, omission of pleading, or direct confession, or by omission of evidence, by any of which means the true, faithful, and full view of all the facts pertinent to the question might be withheld from the view and judgment of the court.
As the public domain and jurisdiction in East and West Florida, were acquired from Spain by the United States, and thereafter the territory so acquired by the United States was admitted into the Union with its boundaries so defined, and with the reservation to the United States of the disposal of the public lands, and that they be free of taxation by the State whilst they remain the property of the United States, the conclusion seems to be inevitable, (supposing this court to have original jurisdiction on the direct question of the primitive right of the boundaries,) that the attorney-general ought to be suffered to intervene fully and completely, to protect the interests of the United States, without being prejudiced by any acts or omissions of either of the litigant States, whether Florida or Georgia.
Otherwise, and without power to show the possible mistakes, errors, omissions, mispleadings, insufficient pleadings, and improper admissions or agreement of the two, or of the one or the other, the means of protecting the public interests would be wholly inadequate to the end; and two States might, by their own acts, by pleadings, or their agreement entered of record in the suit, change the true and lawfully established boundary between them to the direct prejudice of the interests, rights, and laws of the United States.
It is on this consideration, among others, that the whole doctrine of equity, as to the necessity of proper parties in court, stands. Each party interested is to defend his own rights, lawfully according to his view of their merits, without being prejudiced through the acts or omissions of any co-party. See Story's Equity Pleadings, ch. 4.
§ 5. If the United States are not present, no decree in the case can be made to the prejudice of the United States.
Mr. Badger and Mr. Berrien, on behalf of the State of Georgia, opposed the motion, upon the following grounds, namely:--
The object of the motion, as appearing on its face and as explained by the brief of the attorney-general, is: That he, on the part and as the representative of the United States, may be made a party to this suit in fact, but not in form; may exercise all the rights of a party without becoming a party; may be, without seeming to be, a party.
On the part of the State of Georgia, it is insisted that the motion cannot be granted, because,
1. Under the constitution, this court has not and cannot have any jurisdiction of this cause, but as a controversy between States of the Union; and the appearance of any other party therein would determine the jurisdiction and put the cause out of court.
2. To allow the United States to become in fact a party, without appearing on the record to be one, would be a mere evasion of the constitutional inhibition, involving all the guilt of a deliberate violation of that instrument, accompanied and enhanced by an artful contrivance to conceal it; a violation in substance though not in form, and therefore utterly unworthy of this high constitutional court.
3. If the motion should be granted, the United States would judicially appear on the record to be a party, though not made so by the process or in the manner usual in this court; and, therefore, the jurisdiction of the court would, at once, be gone.
4. There is no precedent or example of any such intervention as is here sought to be obtained.
We put aside all the references in the learned brief to proceedings under the civil law, as being utterly irrelevant to the question; for that law neither gives the rule of judgment nor regulates the practice of this court. This cause is one of equity jurisdiction, governed, as to the principles of decision, by the law of courts of equity, and by the statutes and treaties of the United States, and as to the course of proceeding by the practice of the court of chancery in England, in subordination to the paramount authority of the rules of this court. If, therefore, it could be demonstrated that what the attorney-general asks is, and always has been, allowed as of right or of grace in all the courts of France, the German States, and other countries of continental Europe, we should not be advanced one title towards showing the right or the propriety of allowing it to be done here.
In England, no intervention, whether voluntary or involuntary, if that term may be properly used in this connection, is known, except by the intervener becoming a party, and submitting his rights in the matters in dispute to the decision of the tribunal, so that its judgment shall conclude those rights. There, whatever may be the case in other European countries, no process has ever been applied or understood, in virtue of which one not a party to the record may interpose between two litigants, contest their rights or the rights of one of them, embarrass and obstruct their proceedings, direct or control their management of the controversy, and taking all the chances of obtaining a judgment against one of them, binding upon the rights of both, may retire at the conclusion of the contest with his own rights unaffected by a judgment adverse to his claims.
On the contrary, where third persons are found to have such an interest in the subject of litigation that they ought to be heard before a judgment, these persons are required to be made parties, to the intent that all persons in interest may be concluded by the final award of the tribunal. This is emphatically true in regard to equity proceedings in the court of chancery, and not less in regard to the crown than to private persons. This is abundantly evident from cases cited by the attorney-general in support of his motion. For example:--
(The counsel then cited and commented on the cases of Penn v. Baltimore, 1 Ves. Sen., 444; Hovenden v. Annesley, 2 Sch. and Lef. 607; Attorney-General v. Galway, 1 Molloy, which established that the king must be a party.)
5. The United States is not 'concerned' in the questions involved in this cause, within the meaning of the act of congress prescribing the duties of the attorney-general; that term means, concerned in interest, and is exactly equivalent to 'interested,' and cannot be used in any other meaning in reference to an impersonal sovereignty like the United States. The cases cited show what is the nature of that interest of the king which makes it necessary in England that he should be a party; for example, a contest between two of his grantees claiming at rents of different value, where it appears upon record that the success of him who holds at the smaller rent will be immediately and certainly prejudicial to the crown revenue, and like cases.
Here no interest of the United States appears on the record. It is a question merely as to the boundary between two States. However resolved, the United States gains no right and suffers no loss, neither of the States holding under the United States as a tenant, or owing any payment or other duty to the United States, for or on account of her possession or jurisdiction. The only parties having any seeming interest in the question, besides the two States, are those having lands upon the disputed territory, whose titles may be, but are not necessarily, affected by a judgment against the plaintiff. The United States have no interest, real or apparent, and therefore are not a necessary or even a proper party to the controversy. The cases referred to by the attorney-general, in which the United States are represented by him officially in this court, are all consistent with the view here taken. Actions, for instance, brought in the name of heads of departments as such, are suits of the United States, as truly as an information in the name of the attorney-general, or the master of the crown office, is, in England, the king's suit, &c.
6. Supposing the United States to have some interest, indirect, consequential, and contingent, in the decision of the question in the cause, and supposing that in England such an interest of the crown might be represented by the attorney-general there, it doth not follow that the attorney-general here can assume, virtute officii, to represent such interest.
7. Even an act of congress could not enable him to intervene for the United States in this suit in this court. For, if made a party, either the court would proceed with a party, not a State before it, in which case, according to the constitution, this court cannot hold original congnizance, or dismiss the bill for want of jurisdiction; and thus a jurisdiction conferred by the constitution expressly and exclusively upon this court would be withdrawn from it by force of an act of congress, and in defiance of the constitution.
Upon the whole, it clearly appears that the court cannot grant the motion of the attorney-general.
What then remains to be done? If the United States have any consequential interest which ought to be represented, the court cannot, as did the lord chancellor in Reeve v. The Attorney-General, 2 Atkins, 223, dismiss the bill in order that proceedings might be taken in another court, for there is no such court; this court, and this only, having cognizance of the controversy between the two States; and the court cannot decline the exercise of its exclusive jurisdiction over the two principal parties, because of such incidental and subordinate interests.
We submit, as a necessary and inevitable consequence, that the court must proceed with the cause between the present parties, without intervention, formal or informal, of any third party whatever.
Mr. Westcott and Mr. Johnson, on behalf of the State of Florida, opposed the motion for the following reasons:--
1. That the jurisdiction of this court, in this case, is founded exclusively upon those clauses of the federal constitution which declare that 'the judicial power of the United States shall extend' 'to controversies between two or more States,' in connection with that clause which provides that 'in those cases (referring to the cases enumerated in the constitution, as being of federal judicial cognizance,) in which a State shall be a party, the supreme court shall have original jurisdiction.'
2. That the clauses of the federal constitution cited, extending the federal 'judicial power' 'to controversies between two or more States,' refer exclusively to cases in which States only are parties therein, and make such cases a distinct and separate class from all the other cases enumerated in the constitution; and they do not reach or apply to any case, whether at law or in equity, wherein there is a co-plaintiff or a co-defendant, other than a State, with a State or States; and if it be conceded that in a suit in equity, in this court, under any other of the constitutional provisions, a complainant hath a right to join the United States, or any corporation, or officer, or individual, interested in such suit, as a party complainant or defendant; or that the attorney-general of the United States hath authority to make the United States such party; or that this court possesses power to order the joinder as parties of all interested, as in an ordinary case in equity, in the English, or in our state chancery courts; it is nevertheless insisted by complainant, that in this 'controversy between two States,' such courses cannot be pursued; and this, though an act of congress allowing the same had been or should be passed.
3. That if the court should hold that the point secondly above stated is erroneous, and that the joinder of another party, not a State, with the State of Florida, as co-complainant, or with the State of Georgia, as co-defendant, would not affect the jurisdiction of this court over the present case, as invoked by the complainant in the bill filed, under the clauses of the federal constitution above cited, (and especially referred to in said bill,) then it is insisted that the complainant cannot, without an act of congress authorizing the same, make the United States a party to this bill; even if the consent of the attorney-general of the United States is given therefor; and that, without such law, this court doth not possess the power to order, (either ex mero motu, or upon the express application of said attorney-general, or at the instance of either or both of the litigant States,) such joinder of the United States as a party complainant or party defendant in this case.
4. That insomuch as the United States, in the admission, by act of congress, of the Floridas, as a sovereign and independent State into the federal union, yielded to that State all rights of sovereignty or 'eminent domain' they had within the boundaries of the States, as declared by the state constitution; and thereby became a mere proprietor of the unsold and ungranted lands included within said boundaries; they have not now any higher or other prerogatives, in reference to this 'controversy,' than a citizen or alien proprietor of land situate on the territory in dispute between the two litigant States, the titles of said proprietors of such lands being derived from the United States; and consequently, if the claim of the State of Georgia is sustained, will be destroyed; nor than the several thousand residents of said territory, who have, up to this time, been considered resident citizens of the State of Florida, and have exercised the rights, privileges, and immunities of such citizenship, and whose state allegiance will be changed by a decree of this court confirming the claim of the State of Georgia; and the complainant insists that the rights and interests of all said proprietors, (including the United States,) and of said residents, are, in this regard, entirely subordinate to those of the State of Florida, now in contest, and are subject to her action as their political sovereign in the premises.
5. That by reason of the anomalous character of a suit at law or in equity 'between two or more (sovereign and independent) States,' involving their rights of sovereignty, as well as of property; instituted in virtue of a federative compact, before a judicial tribunal, by legal process, summoning a defendant State to the bar of the court to submit her claims, and abide by the arbitrament and decree of that tribunal, from which decision there is no appeal; most of the rules or procedure in ordinary cases before the courts of common law or of chancery in England, are inapplicable to such suit, ineffective as aids to counsel in its prosecution or defence, and useless to the court in its investigation of the 'controversy,' or in its arbitrament and decision; and, by consequence, additional, different, and extraordinary formula of procedure, must be prescribed by the court, and conformed to by the parties, in every 'controversy' before this court, 'between two or more States.'
6. That in the adoption of such necessary, additional, different, and extraordinary rules of procedure, 'in controversies between two or more States,' brought before this court, it is not restricted to guides furnished by the rules of procedure of the English common law or chancery tribunals, (wherein no like case is to be found;) nor, in the determination of such case, is this court limited to the consideration of the principles supplied by the English systems of jurisprudence, to which such case is unknown, and the principles controlling it are above the reach and beyond the scope of those systems: and, therefore, whensoever a departure from English rules and theories will facilitate and speed the settlement of the controversy, will aid in the better protection of all just rights and interests involved, whether of the States who are the 'parties,' or of others not 'parties,' this court may rightfully invoke systems of jurisprudence and rules of procedure, in the tribunals of other countries, and with especial propriety resort to the principles and rules of the 'civil law' of the continent of Europe, (the original source of much of the common law and most of the chancery law of England, but of more enlarged and liberal applicability;) or, this honorable court rightfully may, in a case so peculiarly and exclusively American, and its jurisdiction whereof is so entirely based on the constitutional compact between the States, devise, adopt, and enforce such original rules of procedure, appropriate to such case, as, in its judgment, may best tend to 'establish justice,' 'insure domestic tranquillity,' and promote the other declared objects of that compact; and this, though there cannot be cited any transatlantic precedent or example therefor.
7. That, as there are involved in this case not only the rights of sovereignty and of property, in controversy between the two litigant States, but also important rights and interests of others not parties in the record, founded on the identical facts and law to be submitted to the court, as the basis of its decree therein, all which rights and interests of those not parties will necessarily be affected if not conclusively determined by said decree; the complainant concedes the rightfulness and propriety of this court so devising the rules of procedure in this case, as to allow those immediately interested, though not parties, the privilege and opportunity of maintaining and defending their rights and interests, and of adducing proofs, and of being heard in argument before this court to that end; and that the same should be done in such liberal form and to such full extent as may be consistent with the progress of the cause, without embarrassment or prejudice to the parties, and as will not abridge or compromit the rights of the respective parties to the exclusive control and management of the mode and means of enforcing their own rights and interests; and the complainant also concedes, that insomuch as the title of the United States to some 1,200,000 acres of unsold and ungranted lands claimed to be what are usually designated as 'public lands of the United States,' of the estimated value of $1,200,000, and of which the United States are the constitutional trustees for the several States of the confederacy, and the people thereof; and, insomuch as the liability of the federal treasury to refund large amounts paid into it as purchase-money, by patentees of the United States, for lands heretofore sold by the United States to them, and also to pay large sums for improvements and for damages, will be affected and in some respects determined conclusively, if the claim made by Georgia (suggested in the bill of complaint) be established by this court, which amounts and sums will probably exceed $1,500,000; this complainant, whilst she denies any special prerogative appertaining to the United States as a government, or any special privilege of the attorney-general of the United States, virtute officii, to interfere in this case, except as aforesaid; yet, because of all said premises above set forth, and especially for the reason that the United States cannot be made a party complainant or defendant in this case, doth concede that the rules of procedure so adopted by this court may rightfully and properly be extended in this case, as aforesaid, to the United States, and that the attorney-general may be allowed to 'intervene,' as he hath applied to the court, under such restrictions as above suggested by complainant, or such others as may be deemed proper by this honorable court.
8. That if it be held by this honorable court, that the complainant is in error as to the points above presented; and that the United States may be made a party complainant or a party defendant in this case, either without an act of congress therefor, or by authority of an act that may be passed therefor; and that such joinder is necessary for the protection of the admitted important rights and interests of the United States involved therein as aforesaid; then, this complainant respectfully insists, that if no act of congress be requisite to enable them to be made such party, this honorable court ought not to dismiss the said bill of complaint, for that the complainant did not join them as such party in said bill, but should stay proceedings and the decision in the case till the same be done, under an order of this court therefor; and if such act of congress be deemed proper and necessary, that a suggestion thereof be made in this case by this honorable court, in an order to stay proceedings in the case, until the executive and legislative departments of the federal government may be enabled to adopt such course in that behalf, upon the application of this complainant, as they may respectively deem advisable to that end or otherwise in the premises.
Mr. Chief Justice TANEY delivered the opinion of the court.
The court proceed to dispose of the motion made by the attorney-general for leave to be heard on behalf of the United States, in the suit between the State of Florida and the State of Georgia.
It appears that the boundary line between these two States is in controversy, and a bill has been filed in this court by the State of Florida to ascertain and establish it.
The attorney-general has filed an information, stating that the United States are interested in the settlement of this line; that the territory in dispute contains upwards of one million two hundred thousand acres of land, and was ceded to the United States by Spain as a part of Florida; and that the United States have caused the whole of it to be surveyed as public land, and sold a large portion of it, and issued patents to the purchasers. And upon these grounds he asks leave to offer proofs to establish the boundary claimed by the United States, and to be heard, in their behalf, on the argument.
The motion is resisted on the part of the States, and the question has been fully argued by counsel for the respective parties. And as it is, in some degree, a new question, and concerns rights and interests of so much importance, we have taken time to consider it.
If the motion was merely to be heard at the argument, there would, we presume, have been no opposition to it on the part of the States. For it is the familiar practice of the court to hear the attorney-general in suits between individuals, when he suggests that the public interests are involved in the decision. And he is heard, not as counsel for one of the parties on the record, but on behalf of the United States, and as representing their interests. This was done in several instances at the last term, where the United States had sold lands as a part of the public domian, which were claimed by individuals under grants alleged to have been made by France or Spain previous to the cession to this country.
In these cases, however, they were argued by the attorney-general upon the evidence produced by the respective parties. No new evidence was offered on behalf of the United States. And the objection now made is, that he cannot be permitted to adduce evidence in the case, unless the United States are parties on the record; and that they cannot, under the provisions of the constitution, become parties in this court, in the legal sense of the term, to a suit between two States.
We proceed to consider this objection.
The constitution confers on this court original jurisdiction in all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, and those in which a State shall be a party. And it is settled, by repeated decisions, that a question of boundary between States is within the jurisdiction thus conferred.
But the constitution prescribes no particular mode of proceeding, nor is there any act of congress upon, the subject And at a very early period of the government a doubt arose whether the court could exercise its original jurisdiction without a previous act of congress regulating the process and mode of proceeding. But the court, upon much consideration, held, that although congress had undoubtedly the right to prescribe the process and mode of proceeding in such cases, as fully as in any other court, yet the omission to legislate on the subject could not deprive the court of the jurisdiction conferred; that it was a duty imposed upon the court; and in the absence of any legislation by congress, the court itself was authorized to prescribe its mode and form of proceeding, so as to accomplish the ends for which the jurisdiction was given.
There was no difficulty in exercising this power where individuals were parties; for the established forms and usages in courts of common law and equity would naturally be adopted. But these precedents could not govern a case where a sovereign State was a party defendant. Nor could the proceedings of the English chancery court, in a controversy about boundaries, between proprietary governments in this country, where the territory was subject to the authority of the English government, and the person of the proprietary subject to the authority of its courts, be adopted as a guide where sovereign States were litigation a question of boundary in a court of the United States. They furnished analogies, but nothing more. And it became, therefore, the duty of the court to mould its proceedings for itself, in a manner that would best attain the ends of justice, and enable it to exercise conveniently the power conferred. And in doing this, it was, without doubt, one of its first objects to disengage them from all unnecessary technicalities and niceties, and to conduct the proceedings in the simplest form in which the ends of justice could be attained.
It is upon this principle that the court appear to have acted in forming its proceedings where a State was a party defendant. The subject came before them in Grayson v. Virginia, 3 Dal. 320. And the court there said that they adopted, as a general rule, the custom and usage of courts of admiralty and equity, with a discretionary authority, however, to deviate from that rule where its application would be injurious or impracticable. And they at the same time passed an order directing process against a State to be served on the governor or chief magistrate, and the attorney-general of the State. This was in 1796. And the principle upon which its process was then framed, as well as the mode of service then prescribed, has been followed ever since, with this exception, that in subsequent cases the chancery practice, and not the admiralty, is regarded as furnishing the best analogy. But the power and propriety of deviating from the ordinary chancery practice, when the purposes of justice require it, have been constantly recognized; and were distinctly asserted in the case of Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 14 Pet. 247, and again in the same case, in 15 Pet. 273, and was recognized in the case of New Jersey v. New York, 5 Pet. 289.
We proceed to apply these principles to the case before us. It is manifest, if the facts stated in the suggestion of the attorney-general are supported by testimony, that the United States have a deep interest in the decision of this controversy. And if this case is decided adversely to their rights, they are without remedy, and there is no form of proceeding in which they could have that decision revised in this court or anywhere else. Justice, therefore, requires that they should be heard before their rights are concluded. And if this were a suit between individuals, in a court of equity, the ordinary practice of the court would require a person standing in the present position of the United States, to be made a party, and would not proceed to a final decree until he had an opportunity of being heard.
But it is said that they cannot, by the terms of the constitution, be made parties in an original proceeding in this court between States; that if they could, the attorney-general has no right to make them defendants without an act of congress to authorize it.
We do not, however, deem it necessary to examine or decide these questions. They presuppose that we are bound to follow the English chancery practice, and that the United States must be brought in as a party on the record, in the technical sense of the word, so that a judgment for or against them may be passed by the court. But, as we have already said, the court are not bound, in a case of this kind, to follow the rules and modes of proceeding in the English chancery, but will deviate from them where the purposes of justice require it, or the ends of justice can be more conveniently attained.
It is evident that this object can be more conveniently accomplished in the mode adopted by the attorney-general, than by following the English practice in cases where the government have an interest in the issue of the suit. In a case like the one now before us, there is no necessity for a judgment against the United States. For when the boundary in question shall be ascertained and determined by the judgment of the court, in the present suit, there is no possible mode by which that decision can be reviewed to re examined at the instance of the United States. They would therefore be as effectually concluded by the judgment as if they were parties on the record, and a judgment entered against them. The case, then, is this: Here is a suit between two States, in relation to the true position of the boundary line which divides them. But there are twenty-nine other States, who are also interested in the adjustment of this boundary, whose interests are represented by the United States. Justice certainly requires that they should be heard before their rights are concluded by the judgment of the court. For their interests may be different from those of either of the litigating States. And it would hardly become this tribunal, intrusted with jurisdiction where sovereignties are concerned, and with the power to prescribe its own mode of proceeding, to do injustice rather than depart from English precedents. A suit in a court of justice between such parties, and upon such a question, is without example in the jurisprudence of any other country. It is a new case, and requires new modes of proceeding. And if, as has been urged in argument, the United States cannot, under the constitution, become a party to this suit, in the legal sense of that term, and the English mode of proceeding in analogous cases is therefore impracticable, it furnishes a conclusive argument for adopting the mode proposed. For otherwise there must be a failure of justice.
Indeed, unless the United States can be heard in some form or other in this suit, one of the great safeguards of the Union, provided in the constitution, would in effect be annulled.
By the 10th section of the 1st article of the constitution, no State can enter into any agreement or compact with another State, without the consent of congress. Now, a question of boundary between States is, in its nature, a politica question, to be settled by compact made by the political departments of the government. And if Florida and Georgia had, by negotiation and agreement, proceeded to adjust this boundary, any compact between them would have been null and void, without the assent of congress. This provision is obviously intended to guard the rights and interests of the other States, and to prevent any compact or agreement between any two States, which might affect injuriously the interest of the others. And the right and the duty to protect these interests is vested in the general government.
But, under our government, a boundary between two States may become a judicial question, to be decided in this court. And, when it assumes that form, the assent or dissent of the United States cannot influence the decision. The question is to be decided upon the evidence adduced to the court; and that decision, when pronounced, is conclusive upon the United States, as well as upon the States that are parties to the suit. Now, as in a case of compact, it is, by the constitution, made the duty of the United States to examine into the subject, and to determine whether or not the boundary proposed to be fixed by the agreement is consistent with the interests of the other States of the Union; it would seem to be equally their duty to watch over these interests when they are in litigation in this court, and about to be finally decided. And, if such be their duty, it would seem to follow that there must be a corresponding right to adduce evidence and be heard, before the judgment is given. For this is the only mode in which they can guard the interests of the rest of the Union, when the boundary is to be adjusted by a suit in this court. For, if it be otherwise, the parties to the suit may, by admissions of facts and by agreements admitting or rejecting testimony, place a case before the court which would necessarily be decided according to their wishes, and the interest and rights of the rest of the Union excluded from the consideration of the court. The States might thus, in the form of an action, accomplish what the constitution prohibits them from doing directly by compact. Nor is this intervention of the United States derogatory to the dignity of the litigating States, or any impeachment of their good faith. It merely carries into effect a provision of the constitution, which was adopted by the States for their general safety; and, moreover, maintains that universal principle of justice and equity, which gives to every party, whose interest will be affected by the judgment, the right to be heard.
Upon the whole, we think the attorney-general may intervene in the manner he has adopted, and may file in the case the testimony referred to in the information, without making the United States a party, in the technical sense of the term; but he will have no right to interfere in the pleading, or evidence, or admissions of the States, or of either of them. And, when the case is ready for argument, the court will hear the attorney-general, as well as the counsel for the respective States; and, in deciding upon the true boundary line, will take into consideration all the evidence which may be offered by the United States, or either of the States. But the court do not regard the United States, in this mode of proceeding, as either plaintiff or defendant; and they are, therefore, not liable to a judgment against them, nor entitled to a judgment in their favor. We consider the attorney-general as the proper officer to represent the United States in this court; and that the general government, in bringing before us for consideration the rights and interest of the Union in the question to be decided, does nothing more than perform a duty imposed upon it by the constitution. And, as the mode in which that duty is to be performed here is not regulated by law, but must depend upon the rules and regulations prescribed by the court, we shall not embarrass the proceedings by endeavoring to conform them strictly to English precedents and pleadings, and regard the mode in which the information on behalf of the United States has been presented, to be the simplest and best manner of bringing their interest before the court, and of enabling it to do justice to all parties whose rights are involved in the decision.
Mr. Justice McLEAN, Mr. Justice DANIEL, Mr. Justice CURTIS, and Mr. Justice CAMPBELL, dissented.
Ordered, that the attorney-general have leave to adduce evidence, either written or parol, and to examine witnesses and file their depositions, in order to establish the boundary claimed by the United States.
After the motion of the Attorney-General for leave to intervene in this suit had been decided, Mr. Westcott and Mr. Johnson, on behalf of the State of Florida, moved for leave to take out commissions to examine witnesses in the case, and for sundry orders to expedite the case and prepare it for trial.
Among the orders moved for was the following:--
'That (the consent of the State of Florida being hereby given thereto) the attorney-general of the United States may, in behalf of the United States, use the name of said complainant whenever he may deem it advisable that the United States should sue out any commission, to take any testimony or procure any proofs in said cause; he giving notice thereof to the solicitors or counsel for said parties, as aforesaid.'
This part of the motion was opposed by the counsel for the State of Georgia; and, in behalf of that State, a motion was made to appoint a commissioner and surveyor to survey the premises in dispute, and take testimony and report to the court; the motion stating particularly how the duty was to be performed. This motion was opposed by the counsel for the State of Florida.
The questions were argued by Mr. Westcott, for the omplaintant, and Mr. Badger, for the defendant.
Mr. Chief Justice TANEY delivered the opinion of the court.
The court have considered the above motions.
The motion to authorize the attorney-general of the United States to take testimony, and to conduct the proceedings on behalf of Florida, with the assent of the State, is refused. Each State must conduct its proceedings for itself. Whatever the attorney-general does in the case must be for the United States, and in the name of the United States, and with reference to their interest or duty in this controversy.
The motion on behalf of the State of Georgia, to appoint one or more persons to make the necessary surveys and to report their opinion to the court, is also overruled. Each party is at liberty to cause surveys to be made, and maps prepared and filed, by such person as the State may select, or, if they can agree, they may jointly appoint one. And these surveys and maps, and the proofs applicable to them, will be examined and considered by the court at the hearing, with the other testimony. But the court do not deem it advisable to appoint one or more persons to make these surveys and examinations, as officers of the court; and think the case will be better brought before them by leaving each State to act for itself.
The court, therefore, overrule the motions; and, for the purpose of preparing the case for hearing, make the following order:--
On consideration of the several motions filed yesterday by the complainant's counsel, and of the arguments of counsel thereupon had, as well in support of as against the same, it is ordered by the court that the said motions be and they are hereby overruled. And it is further now here ordered by the court, that the said parties in said cause be allowed until the first Monday of December, 1855, to obtain, take, and file the testimony and proofs, by said parties respectively to be adduced and given in evidence, on the hearing of said cause; and that, to enable said parties respectively so to do, commissions, in the usual form, be issued by the clerk, to examine witnesses, upon application of either party, accompanied by interrogatories, a copy whereof has been served upon the adverse party, or its solicitor or counsel, twenty days previous to such application, in order that cross-interrogatories may be filed within said twenty days by such adverse party; and that the commissioner or commissioners in each instance, if not agreed upon by the counsel of the respective parties, be named by the chief justice or one of the associate justices of this court; and that, forthwith, on the return of any commission executed, the clerk do open and file the same, and cause the same to be printed for the use of said parties.
And also, that any exceptions to testimony may be taken at the final hearing; and, if exceptions be then taken to the competency of testimony, which the opposite party can remove by further proof, the court will reserve the decision, and give time to the party to produce it.
And also, that said cause be set for final hearing on the bill, answer, replication, exhibits, testimony, and proofs, so adduced, filed, and admitted, on the second Monday of January, 1856, unless cause be then shown to the court for the continuance thereof.

## Notes

This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
Public domainPublic domainfalsefalse