# The Revolt in Arabia/The Shereefate of Mecca (Continued)

II
THE SHEREEFATE OF MECCA—Continued
IT was to these accidents of origin that the Shereefate of Mecca owed its peculiar standing. Its status was not a little enhanced by the unique significance of the city of Mecca for the Mohammedan world at large. From the tenth century, no one of the foremost Islam princes possessed the machinery to keep West Arabia under an administration even approximately orderly. On two points they were alike determined—first, to have their names introduced into the official prayers at the official ceremonies of Mecca, each desiring to take precedence of the others; second, that their deputies at the annual festivals should take rank ​in accordance with their pretensions. In the prayers, the name of the Caliph was given first place, without question, even after his power had become a phantom. The descendants of the Prophet, wielding authority at Mecca from about the year 1000 to 1200 A.D., managed the required homage with a certain impartiality. At their command, there were prayers, now for the official Caliph at Bagdad and again for the heretical opposition Caliph in Egypt, according to the puissance manifested or the bribes offered by the one or the other. The Shereef family, ruling at Mecca from about 1200 A.D. to the present time, were soon freed from the difficulty of choice when an end was made of the Fatimide Caliphate in Egypt and when the Mongol storm swept away that of Bagdad in 1258. In the centuries following these events, the Sultans alone were mentioned in the prayers. And it ​was thus, in the prayers, that there was the first formal expression of the relation between the Shereefate and the chief power of Islam.
Egypt long held an uncontested position so that it is correct to speak of a protectorate exercised by her Sultans over the territory of West Arabia from the thirteenth to the sixteenth centuries. The Hijaz (West Arabia) was dependent on the Nile-land for the importation of foodstuffs and other necessities. The Mameluke Sultans permitted the continuance of the Shereefate and did not interfere in the endless petty wars of succession fought by the claimants to the office. When it became necessary, it cost the Sultans little exertion to turn the scale in some of these contests with the help of a detachment of regular troops, and to enforce obedience. It was always an unequal strife between ​the trained soldiers of a great Moslem power and the Shereef's little force, consisting as it did, of a few hundred slaves, the same number of mercenaries, and the timely aid of a few Bedouin clans. Domestic dissension, moreover, always assured the punitory leader of the coöperation of one party within the disturbed territory.
When Egypt was conquered in 1517 by Sultan Selim, Turkey, automatically, took over the protectorate of the Holy Land. The Turkish Sultans styled themselves, with unassuming pride, "the servants" of both holy cities. At the same time, their garrison in Mecca was an outward and visible sign that they did not intend to share the service with anyone. From that epoch on, their names immediately preceded that of the Grand Shereef in the official prayers. Later, the significance of the honour was ​enhanced by the addition of the title of Caliph assumed by the Turkish Sultans as sign and seal of their unrivalled power in Islam.
The Osmans made as little effort to reform the hopelessly muddled administration of the holy cities as their predecessors in the Protectorate had done. By that date, the Shereefate had obtained for more than three centuries, and no Mohammedan thought of questioning either the legality or the desirability of the institution.
The administration methods of the Osmans were as little adapted for permanent centralization as those of the earlier Mohammedan empire had been. The provinces speedily assumed the character of feudal holdings, each possessing a large measure of independence. The Pashas of Cairo, of Damascus, of Bagdad, vied with each other for the first rank ​at Mecca. From this rivalry the Shereefate profited, just as the suzerains of the Holy Land had reaped advantage from the family disputes of the Shereefs. In the eighteenth century, the Shereefs were not troubled by the pressure of a heavy hand from without, but they were forced to depend on themselves, and their inadequate equipment was a source of danger to them when an unexpected opponent threatened to destroy their power.
The Wahhabis of Central Arabia, roused by a puritanic zeal to protest against what they declared was the dishonour of Islam, launched out on a campaign of reform. This "holy war," directed, primarily, against the Turkish domination, succeeded in exciting a religious fervour throughout a great part of Arabia, similar to that awakened by Mohammed twelve centuries earlier, and, at the turn of the eighteenth into the nineteenth ​centuries, these Wahhabis succeeded in obtaining the mastery of the Holy Cities and in forcing the Shereefs to recognise their authority. With infinite difficulty the Pasha of Egypt, Mohammed Ali, later the first Khedive, succeeded in fulfilling the mission entrusted to him by the Sultan of Turkey and in reconquering the Holy Land in his turn.
The then Shereef was punished for his inefficiency in repelling the Wahhabis from his realm, by banishment, together with several members of his family, while the head of another branch of his kinsfolk was appointed to his vacated post. At this crisis, too, there was no talk of abolition of the Shereefate.
With the expulsion of the Wahhabis from the Hijaz in 1813, begins the latest historical phase of the Shereefate. The Protectorate exercised by the first ​Khedive of Egypt down to 1840, partly in coöperation with, partly in opposition to, Turkish authority, was completely effective and so, as the Sultan was regularly represented in the Holy Land by a governor sent from Constantinople, the good old tumultuous times did not return for this free dynasty.
The understanding between the Shereefs and their protectors at Stamboul were, however, never cordial; the aspirations and interests of the two parties were too far asunder for that. The Sultans of Turkey considered the Shereefate as a necessary evil that prevented them from making the Hijaz into an ordinary wilayet or province. They stationed there military and civil officials similar to those in other wilayets, but the functions of these subordinates were hampered by the unrestricted power of the Shereef. After the Wahhabi war, this ruler was selected ​by the suzerain and the rival kinsmen could no longer oust an incumbent of the hereditary office by force of arms. They were obliged to resort to the weapons of intrigue with the Sultan and the Sublime Porte. Still, even with this appearance of stable administration, it was not until 1880 that the Shereef finally relinquished as fruitless all armed resistance to the Sultan's deputies. The theory had been that the Sultan was to be obeyed, but that his servants in the Hijaz were unfaithful and could not be accepted. At Constantinople, meanwhile, certain members of the Shereef's family were kept in a kind of honourable captivity, partly as hostages for the good faith of the reigning Shereef, partly to relieve him from the burden of having rivals in his vicinity, and also it was a convenience to have those rivals in readiness in case the Shereef proved untrustworthy.
​The Turkish governors of the Hijaz had no easy task. An energetic Shereef would always be on the alert to reduce the governor's authority to the smallest measure. A weak Shereef might be submissive, but then he was powerless to control the ill-disposed elements in his family and make them innocuous, and often he would be sacrificed to the wiles of the opposition. Coöperation between the two authorities for the maintenance of peace was not dreamed of. The roads from Mecca to Medina, to Jidda, to Taʾif, were in a chronic state of insecurity, and it was not seldom that the rapacious Bedouins rejoiced in the secret support of the Shereef.
The Shereef Aun, incumbent of the dignity from 1882 to 1905, was of the energetic type, but he was, at the same time, an avaricious tyrant, whose actions suggest Cæsar's mad ambition. One ​governor after another had to yield, and had to sit in his shadow. Ahmed Ratab alone succeeded in holding on from 1892 to Aun's death in 1905, by shutting his eyes to the Shereef's ill deeds and contenting himself with a share in the profits that accrued from the malfeasance in office. Aun's brother, Abdullah, then living in Constantinople, was appointed his successor but died before he began his journey to his native land. Then the Sultan appointed Shereef Ali, a nephew of Aun, as "Amir of Mecca." Such was the title given to these princes by the Turkish chancery, out of respect for a possible sensitiveness on the subject.
Both Shereef Ali and the governor, Ahmed Ratib, succumbed when the great Turkish Revolution broke out in 1908. Ratib had to submit to financial extortions and to exile, while the deposed Shereef settled down in Cairo. His cousin ​Husein, son of Aun's brother Ali, took his place as Shereef. It soon became apparent that this Husein intended to profit by the turn of events to retrieve the reputation and status of the Shereefate.
It is well known that Arabia has contributed her share to the many difficulties with which the Young-Turk Government has had to battle from its inception. Thus the latter found it advisable to let the Shereef, appointed as he was by the new régime, to go his own gait and Husein made ample use of his freedom.
During the Turco-Italian War, Turkish occupation was in a disturbed condition, especially in the southern part of Arabia and the Turkish Government asked Shereef Husein for help in relieving the besieged Turkish garrison of Obha in the rebellious Asir territory. With an old-time Shereef-army, composed of slaves, mercenaries, and Bedouins, Husein ​undertook a campaign which did, possibly, help secure the safe retreat of the beleaguered Turkish garrison of Obha, but which also, undoubtedly, tempered the Shereef's sense of dependence on Turkish authority.
The same National Turkish News Agency (Milli Agency) contradicted by Reuter in regard to the revolt in Arabia, which it had reported as "a quickly suppressed uprising of roving robber bands in the pay of England"—telegraphed later that Shereef Husein was deposed and that Shereef Ali, appointed in his stead, had already set out for Mecca. Here the natural queries arise whether, by the "roving robber leader" of the first Milli report, was meant Shereef Husein himself, and whether the proposed journey of Shereef Ali will pass without incident. Whether the newly ​appointed Shereef, that is the man with whose aid the Turkish Government is to try to suppress, once for all, "robber raiding," is the same who was replaced by Husein, some time ago, is not made clear in the Milli-despatch, but it is very probable that it is. In that case, Shereef Ali must have left Cairo before the war and betaken himself to Constantinople.
Here we have a repetition of the old game of playing off one Shereef against another, just as it was played in the past. And the outcome will depend on which of the two can gather the greater force of "robber raiders" under his standard: Ali, supported by the Turks and their friends, or Husein, aided by their opponents.
Assuredly either alternative proves the significance that a serious revolt against Turkish authority would have under present circumstances.