# The Red Insurrection in Finland in 1918/Part 2/Chapter 3

3. THE RED ARMY.
In order to become incorporated in the Red Guard, the following things were required: Class feeling, a knowledge of the methods of the Social Democracy, and being a member of the Labour Party. The Guard was thus a pure class army. Every local labour association formed its own Red Guard. The result of this was small groups without number, a lot of "staffs," and a number of "commanders-in-chief." It was, of course, the intention that a homogeneous organisation should be formed—the statutes speak of brigades as well as divisions and army corps—but it never got so far. In the larger towns both companies and battalions were formed, but regiments are never mentioned. On the Russo-revolutionary model the men constituted the supreme authority. That is to say, that the orders issued by the officers were made subject to discussion at the meetings of the men, and could either be sanctioned or vetoed. In like manner, the meetings could remove unpopular chiefs and choose others instead. Any uniform or consistent system in this respect seems not, however, to have existed. At one time it is the officers, at another the men who make the decisions.
The original object of the Red Guard was plainly enough purely local operations. Each division was to take over and keep the power in its own part of the country. It was therefore an extremely unpleasant surprise when it proved that the White intended to occupy the whole northern part of the country, and that it became necessary to take the field in the middle of the winter. This would entail claims on the commissariat which it could not meet, and it also made greater demands on the men than had been intended. In spite of all the Russian help with arms and ammunition, the Red army were quite at a loss at the change of programme. ​Fortunately—for the White army, too, suffered from an extremely critical complaint: it went almost without anus to its gigantic task.
The important question of the conduct of war-operations on the part of the Red was most closely connected with the question of how the Russian troops would stand. Were they to observe neutrality, and leave the country as quickly as possible, or were they openly to side with the Red? The answer came quickly enough.
On the 30th January the Russian Post and Telegraph Minister pays a visit to the Red Government at Helsingfors, and there observes as follows:—
"The Russian Brother Government hope that the Finnish brethren will carry the struggle they have commenced to a happy ending, and promise their full aid in the war against the bourgeoisie, which belong to the international class of sweaters, and are in consequence the enemies of the people." This official utterance must undoubtedly be designated as a declaration of war from the Russian Government.
Already on the 28th January, however, the troops that were in Finland had issued their own declaration of war. These troops constituted the 42nd Russian Army Corps, whose staff was at Viborg. The staff had, however, been replaced by an Army Corps Commission, and it was this commission which on the above-mentioned day issued an order to all divisions, the first paragraph of which ran as follows: "From and with the 28th of this instant the troops of the 42nd Army Corps are regarded as being at war with the civic White Guard of Finland."
There was, however, yet another authority which was to have a word to say in the matter. This was the "Rayon Committee of the Army, Navy, and Russian Working-men in Finland," which on the 4th December had been appointed sole representative of the Russian ​Government in Finland by Lenin. The military section of this Committee regarded itself as the supreme Russian military authority in this country. It did not issue any declaration of war, but on the 28th January the section orders the 42nd Army Corps to commence decisive operations against the White Guard.
The leadership of the Red Guard Corps was, as it was inevitable, placed in Russian hands. For expert military knowledge on Finnish side there was none. Already on the 15th January the "Commander-in-Chief of West Finland's Army," Michael Stepanovitsh Svetshnikoff, speaks of the Red Guard Corps as auxiliary troops to the Russian corps, and the Finnish Red are all under the leadership of the Russian district chiefs. Svetshnikoff was later appointed commander-in-chief of the Finnish Red Guard Corps, so that these for all practical purposes were amalgamated with the Russia troops.
The supreme war command thus consisted of Russian officers. It was Russian troops that made war against the Protective Corps. And telegraphic reports of the war operations were regularly dispatched to the Russian Minister for War, the Russian Government, and the commandants of the fortresses of Kronstadt and Reval. From this it was very plainly seen that the Bolshevik Government of Russia intended, by the aid of the Red Guard Corps, to reconquer Finland. And this also compels one to think of this Government when one asks oneself where the real mainspring of the outbreak of the Finnish revolution is to be sought. And for the rest one cannot help comparing this outbreak with the simultaneous great strikes in Austria, and those which broke out some days later in Germany. Elaborate and highly-coloured accounts of them were given in the Finnish Labour Press.
It was, however, impossible for the Russian leaders ​to carry through an organised, properly planned conduct of the war. The troops were too undisciplined for that. Besides, the army had been ordered to demobilise before the insurrection broke out. A great deal of the soldiers wanted to return to Russia, and were disinclined to go to war again. Demobilisation was, however, prevented in all sorts of ways, and the result was more often than not that those who had obtained leave stayed where they were, but now as "volunteers," and on higher pay. From Russia crowds came streaming in of the Russian Red armies raised there, and from documents and reports the presence of at least the following Russian formations in Finland may be established as a fact: the 42nd Army Corps, a Lettish army, volunteer divisions (consisting of men on leave), the National Socialistic Red Army, the Red Labour and Peasant Army, and finally the Anarchist Corps, consisting of 300 Marines. As, besides, the Finnish Red Guard received Russian volunteers, and all its special troops consisted of Russians, it will be understood how impossible it is to form an exact estimate of the number of Russian troops in Finland, and yet that the number was considerable.
The Finnish Red Guard, in spite of all, formed the nucleus of the revolutionary army; it could supply a lot of soldiers. Their arms and equipment the Russians had to provide. And they did their best. When the General Staff of the Red Guard on the 2nd February sanction the expenses of the Guard for the next two months, the estimate reads as follows:—
| | Marks. |
| Pay for 30,000 men at 600 marks | 36,000,000 |
| Pay„ for„ the Reserve | 6,000,000 |
| Pay„ for„ Sanitary Service | 3,000,000 |
| Pay„ for„ Widows | 2,000,000 |
| Marks | 47,000,000 |
​Here all expenses for clothes, food supplies, and arms are lacking. The clothes and food were procured by "seizures," i.e., the direct plundering of private and public stores, the arms it fell to Russians to provide. They were imported from St. Petersburg and Reval. Besides, command was issued to all the Russian troops that left Finland—on the 26th February it was decided that all Polish, Ukrainian, and Estnian soldiers were to go (they were not Bolsheviks, you see)—to hand over their arms to the Finnish Red Guard. Finally, the Russian Red Government on the 20th February took over all movables in Finland belonging to the Russian State. There were great quantities of weapons, ammunition, explosives, food supplies, and other things, which thus fell into the hands of the Red Guard. The supplies were, of course, to be paid for, and in the liquidation committees, appointed everywhere, the Russian Svetshnikoff was chief representative for Finland!
It was, however, necessary to have trained men for the service of the seven armoured trains, for the armoured motor-cars, the cannon and quick-firing machine guns on hand. Such were procured from Russia, and they were even advertised after in the papers—"no matter of what nationality." The artillery men received a monthly salary of 1,200 Finnish marks, the machine gunners got 900. But the shortage never seemed to be quite remedied—so large was the importation of arms. In illustration of the Red Finno-Russian co-operation, we shall here communicate a telegram sent out by Svetshnikoff and Vice Commissioner for the Interior, Taimi, together:—
"To the Special Staff at St. Petersburg.
"By order of the Finnish Government, we request you to hasten the despatch of volunteers to the General Staff of the Red Guard at Helsingfors: ten officers from ​the General Staff, twenty artillery officers, twenty machine gun officers, twenty sapper officeis and engineers. Besides, there is absolute need of 50,000 three-line rifles, two hundred machine guns (Maxim), fifty three-inch quick-firing guns, three million Japanese rifle-cartridges, ten million three-line rifle-cartridges, and one hundred thousand revolver-cartridges of all calibres."
It is funny to see how ten volunteers out of the officers of the General Staff are quite simply requisitioned.
In such circumstances it may with justice be asked what tasks were left over for the Finnish Commander-in-Chief and the Finnish General Staff. Of course, there were still a few trifles left even for them to do. But they were mostly for ornament. When Haapalainen was elected commander-in-chief he thankfully accepts the post, but at the same time emphasises the fact that he is devoid of all military knowledge. In the minutes of the General Staff a specially enlightening passage may also be found. The whole interior here depicted by the by deserves to be known. At the meeting on the 23rd February a Finnish "comrade" holds forth who has been on a visit to St. Petersburg. There, he says, complaint was made of the bad leadership of the Finnish Red Guard, and there was an uncertainty whether the sending of more weapons to Finland should be ventured. This communication was, of course, received with bitterness, and the lively discussion establishes the fact that "the aggressive activity of the Guard has continually been carried on without the knowledge of the General Staff!" A sharp reprimand must therefore be sent to Commander-in-Chief Haapalainen "with the remark that the General Staff will not undertake the responsibility of reverses in fighting carried on without the knowledge and decision of the General Staff!" In their solicitude the General Staff ​resolve to procure a commander-in-chief of the best quality, and a deputation is chosen which is to see the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian army, Krylenko, and the Russian Naval Minister, Dybenko, with the petition that one of them will, at least for a shorter period, take supreme command in Finland. This plan, however, is naturally relinquished, for, when later in the evening the meeting is continued after a pause, it is made known that Dybenko is expected at Helsingfors and so may eventually be persuaded. Now the General Staff have, however, collected all their energies and resolve that flying machines are to be procured, and that an army is to be raised at Archangelsk, as there are arms there as well as many working-men. This army is to fall into Finland from the North. Besides, a secret plan is to be formed for hunting out the weapons concealed by the citizens of Helsingfors. Every house throughout the city should be closely searched from cellar to attic. Then it is arranged how the next batch of arms from St. Petersburg is to be distributed, and, finally, as a reward for all the energy shown, a kind request is received from the greatest of all the Bolsheviks, from Lenin himself. The latter requests that a company of Finnish Red Guardsmen, "in the uniform of the Guard," may be placed at his disposal. The soldiers are to go to St. Petersburg without arms; they will be armed and supplied with food there. The General Staff, of course, agree to this, but are of opinion that the company should also be of use to its own army. Therefore, after the lapse of some time it is to return—this time provided with arms—and be replaced by a fresh company without arms. "The political aspect of the matter must be arranged by the Government," conclude the minutes.
Yet, the Russians sometimes make trouble. On the 19th February two different complaints are brought ​before the General Staff. At Viborg Russian soldiers have been enlisted, and these have just arrived. But now they have "taken" a whole hotel, and refuse to go to the front before they get new rifles and new clothes from head to heel. From the Björneborg front the further communication is received that a band of sailors that have arrived here have quite suddenly turned back, and have begun to rob the peaceful population of objects of gold and silver and other things. The reason was that they had heard there was some wine in a church. They had then broken into the church, drunk the communion wine, and gone out on an expedition of pillage. Neither their Russian nor their Finnish comrades dared hinder them—"as a great conflict might have arisen."
According to the budget of the 2nd February the Red Guard consisted of 30,000 men. If we assume that the Reserve received half-pay it amounted to 10,000. We have thus an army of 40,000 men. But, according to official documents from the Red, the Guard amounted to 75,000 in March. The augmentation must mainly be put down to the forced mobilisation which was carried out. Already earlier "moral pressure" of every kind had of course been brought to bear in order to get the working-men into the Guard, which does not seem to have been very popular. When the revolution broke out, the men were tempted with the particularly high salary, to which was further added free board and in part free clothing. But now even such working-men as had not volunteered were forced into the Guard. In the first place the municipal workmen and the unemployed were selected. Later the forced mobilisation of all men was ordered—they were taken in the street—but it was only in East Finland the proposal was properly carried through, so that, in fact, "bourgeois" in large numbers ​were put into the Red ranks at the front. In other places they were only arrested and locked up.
If we now look over the still extant documents of the Red Guard, we receive a fair idea of the peculiar order and discipline reigning throughout it. Some interiors may also in this respect serve as an illustration of the military and moral level of the Guard.
In an order of the 26th February the Russian soldiers are admonished not to sell their rifles to the enemy.—1,079 parcels of food have been seized on the 13th March at Raumo. They belong to the Russian Red Cross, but the commissariat of the Red Guard decide that the Guard are to have them to eat, "although it may be contrary to international agreements."—The Red Guard Cashier at Helsingfors requests that the militia will work out a list of how many thieves and other professional criminals are found in the ranks of the Red Guard.
On the 7th April, when the German troops had already landed and were marching towards Helsingfors, the Supreme Command of the Red Guard—then a committee of three—together with the General Staff issue the following order to the Staff at Helsingfors: "You will have observed an aeroplane above the city with black crosses on the wings. Try and find out what it is. Place zenith guns in suitable places, and bring it down if it is an enemy." It must well be observed that aeroplanes with the not unfamiliar iron cross under the wings had at that time for weeks past been a not uncommon spectacle to the population of the city.—On the 27th March the Commander-in-Chief on the East Front sends a communication to all the troops under him with the request that it be made known to every man. Both as regards its tenor and style it is very characteristic, and, literally translated, runs as follows: "Whereas among the men in the parts of Kavantsaari such an ​opinion has arisen that whether they may get leave or they may not they take it of their own accord, and yet they know very well that if they leave the front the butchers will get free access to conquer perhaps the whole of Finland, murder the working-men, and drown the revolution in blood." Then follows an urgent exhortation to stay at the front.—On the 9th March a committee is appointed at Helsingfors to investigate where all the troops from the capital had gone, as it was only known that they were dispersed along the front and entirely lacked officers. The committee departed, but a member reports that already on the way out a quarrel arose, and it dissolved.—The Commander-in-Chief on the West Front is subjected to an examination on the 1st March, because he is seldom sober, and has therefore led the troops astray.—On the 5th April the order is issued that the staff at the front in Syvälahti are to have 50 litres of brandy "for a special purpose."—A troop starts for the front, but discovers on the way that it has two "Commanders-in-Chief." In order to settle the question about the supreme command, the two field marshals take hold each of one end of a rope, and pull with all their might each in his own direction. The victor becomes the real commander-in-chief.—The commanders and the men were often of different opinions. There is a swarm of protests and complaints. As an example, the following extract from the minutes of a meeting held by the men of the motor-car department may be communicated: The demand of the commander-in-chief, Salminen, that the chief of the motor-car department, K. Siintola, should be removed, if the worst came to the worst by force of arms, was brought under discussion. Many opinions were expressed, and it was unanimously agreed to administer a severe reproof to the commander-in-chief for his shameful conduct to ​the chief of the motor-car department."—The Red Guard had a lot of women in its service. They were employed partly as common soldiers, for many woman battalions had been formed, partly as nurses, partly as God only knows what. But there was this curious circumstance that the wives of the Red Guardsmen were not allowed to serve in the Red Guard. In part at least the reason for this was no doubt that ladies with more extensive connections were more heartily welcomed in those circles. So much is suggested by a written communication from the municipal employment office at Helsingfors, which informs the Red Guard that there is great unemployment among the women of the city. "This is in part due to the fact," says the office with polite good fellowship, "that the Red Guard to a certain extent follow the so-called system of favouritism in the appointment of women, and therefore there are women in the service of the Guard who, on account of their moral conduct, are not adapted for work."—A cashier in the Guard sends in a written complaint of the frauds committed by his staff.—The chief of the general staff is taken into custody in the street, together with a Russian colonel, on account of intoxication.—On the 26th March the staff at Helsingfors resolve that the majors are to pledge themselves to go with their men to the front!
What has here been stated will no doubt be sufficient. These examples will not exactly give you any high opinion of the value of the Red army as a fighting power. And yet it was able to offer decent resistance. This—apart from the great lot of artillery, etc.—was due to the fact that the civil war in many ways had an "old-fashioned stamp," and that the innumerable skirmishes, surprises, and actions required more personal courage than discipline and control. In general there was no lack of such personal courage.