# All the Works of Epictetus, Which Are Now Extant/Book 2/Chapter 21

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CHAPTER XXI.
Of Inconsistency.
§. 1.There are some Things which Men confess, with Ease; others, with Difficulty. No one, for Instance, will confess himself a Fool or a Blockhead; but, on the contrary, you will hear every one say, "I wish my Fortune was equal to my Mind." But they easily confess themselves fearful; and say, "I am somewhat timorous, I confess: but in other respects you will not find me a Fool." No one will easily confess himself intemperate in his Desires; upon no Account dishonest, nor absolutely very envious, or meddling: but many confess themselves to have the Weakness of being compassionate. What is the Reason of all this? The principal is, an Inconsistency and Confusion in what relates to Good and Evil. But different People have different Inducements. In general, whatever they imagine to be base, they do not absolutely confess. Fear and Compassion, they imagine to belong to a well-meaning Disposition; but Stupidity, to a Slave. Offences against Society they do not own: but, in most Faults, they are brought to a Confession, chiefly from imagining, that there is something involuntary in them; as in Fear and Compassion. And, though a Person should in some measure confess himself intemperate in his Desires, he accuses his Passion, and expects Forgiveness, as for an involuntary Fault. But Dishonesty is not imagined to be, by any means, involuntary. In Jealousy too, there is something, they suppose, of involuntary; and this likewise, in some degree, they confess.
​§. 2. Conversing among such Men, therefore, thus confused, thus ignorant what they say, what are, or are not, their Evils, whence they have them, and how they may be delivered of them; it is worth while, I think, to ask one's self continually, "Am I too one of these? What do I imagine myself to be? How do I conduct myself? As a prudent, as a temperate Man? Do I, too, ever talk at this Rate, That I am sufficiently instructed for what may happen? Have I that Persuasion, That I know nothing, which becomes one who knows nothing? Do I go to a Master, as to an Oracle, prepared to obey; or do I, as well as others, like a stupid Driveller, enter the School, only to learn the History [of Philosophy], and understand Books, which I did not understand before; or, perhaps, to explain them to others?"You have been fighting at home, with your Servant, Sir: you have turned the House upside-down, and alarmed the Neighbourhood: and do you come to me, with a pompous Show of Wisdom, and sit and pass Judgment how I explain a Sentence? How I prate whatever comes into my Head? Do you come, envious and dejected, that nothing is brought you from home? And, in the midst of the Disputations, sit thinking on nothing, but how your Father or your Brother may behave to you? "What are they saying about me at home? Now they think I am improving and say, He will come back with universal Knowledge. I wish I could learn every thing before my Return: but this requires much Labour; and nobody sends me any thing. The ​Baths are very bad at Nicopolis; and Things go very ill both at home, and here."
§. 3. After all this, it is said, nobody is the better for the philosophic School. Why, who comes to the School? I mean, who comes to be reformed? Who, to submit his Principles to Correction? Who, with a Sense of his Wants? Why do you wonder then, that you bring back from the School, the very Thing you carried there. For you do not come to lay aside, or correct, or change, your Principles. How should you? Far from it. Rather consider this, therefore, whether you have not what you come for. You come to talk about Theorems. Well: and are not you more impertinently talkative than you were? Do not these paultry Theorems furnish you with Matter for Ostentation? Do not you solve convertible and hypothetical Syllogisms? Why then, are you still displeased, if you have the very Thing for which you came?——"Very true but, if my Child, or my Brother, should die; or if I must die, or be tortured myself, what Good will these Things do me?"——Why, did you come for this? Did you attend upon me for this? Was it upon any such Account, that you ever lighted your Lamp, or sat up at Night? Or did you, when you went into the Walk, propose any Appearance to your own Mind to be discussed, instead of a Syllogism? Did any of you ever go through such a Subject jointly? And, after all, you say, Theorems are useless. To whom? To such as apply them ill. For Medicines for the Eyes are not useless to those, who apply them when, and as, they ought. Fomentations are not useless: Poisers are not useless: but they are useless to some; and, on the contrary, useful to others. If you should ask me now, Are Syllogisms useful I answer, that they are useful: and, if you please, I will show you ​how.——"Will they be of Service to me, then?"——Why: did you ask, Man, whether they would be useful, to you, or in general? If any one in a Dysentery should ask me, whether Acids be useful; I answer, They are. "Are they useful for me, then?"——I say, No. First try to get the Flux stopt, and the Exulceration healed. Do you too first get your Ulcers healed; your Fluxes stopt. Quiet your Mind, and bring it free from Distraction, to the School; and then you will know what is the Force of Reasoning.
* ↑ Mr. Upton's Copy.
* ↑ We have no Expression exactly like that in the Greek. The Translation comes the nearest to it, of any I could think on.
* ↑ This seems to be spoken by Epictetus, to one of his Scholars.
* ↑ The Greek is pointed at αποδειξω; but the Sense requires the Stop, at πως.