# Germany's High Seas Fleet in the World War/Chapter 9
## Chapter 9 - Enterprises in the Hoofden, and Bombardment of Yarmouth and Lowestoft

ON March 5, the day after the return of the Moewe, the High Sea Fleet, under my command, carried out the first of its greater enterprises, partaking of the nature of a more extended advance. The idea prompting this move was to attack the enemy light forces that were constantly reported in the Hoofden, and thus attract support from the English harbours to the south, and if possible force them between the pincers formed by our advanced cruisers and the Main Fleet following in the rear. At daybreak the distance between the battleships arid the cruisers was approximately 30 nautical miles. The cruisers were then to advance from a position Terschelling Bank Lightship S.S.E. 15 nautical miles to the Hoofden, and push on to the northern boundary of the English minefield. The battleships were to follow the course of the cruisers up to 10 a.m., when they would have reached latitude 53" 30', pn> vided that in the meantime our action had not been checked by intervening circumstances. Squadron II (the older battleships) did not form part of this expedition, but was held ready, with a mine-sweeping division, to secure the safety of the Bight, in order to keep the return route open for the Fleet. Two flotillas accompanied the cruisers; the others were with the Main Fleet. To ensure the safety of the proceeding an airship was allotted to the Chief of Reconnaissance, while other airships were to reconnoitre early the following day in the sector north-west of Heligoland as far distant as 200 nautical miles, to protect the flank and rear of the Fleet. Should the weather the preceding night be favourable for airships, advantage was to be taken of it. This was carried out, and led to a very effective bombing of the important naval yards at Hull, on the Humber.
A graphic picture of the attack is given in the description by one of the airship commanders who took part, Captain Victor Schulze, on board the "L 11," but who has since died the death of a hero. He writes:
"Our orders were: 'March 5, in morning, "L 11," with "L 13" and "L 14," to attack England in the north.' At noon (on 4th) an ascent was made with the object of attacking the naval yard at Rosyth. In consequence, however, of an ever-increasing strong north-north-west wind, bringing heavy snow and hailstorms with it, it was decided on the way to seek out the munition factories at Middlesbrough instead of proceeding to Rosyth. The only shipping traffic noticeable was limited to a few fishing-boats off the Dogger Bank. Following the throwing out of benzine casks, the airship, towards 10 p.m., was fired at through a thin bank of clouds, but without success, and the incident was not worth noticing. At 10.45 P - M - the English coast was crossed between Flamborough Head and Spurn Head at Hornsea, which led to the belief that the north wind was stronger. The ship now steered northwards over the distinctly visible snow-clad coast. Wherever the landscape was not hidden from view by heavy snow-clouds visibility was good. The upper line of cloud was at a height of 2,000-3,000 m.; above, the sky was bright and starry. Violent hailstorms again came on, the ship became coated with ice, and although all water was discharged and the temperature of the air was 16 degrees, she could not rise above 2,000 m. Not until just before the attack, and after a further discharge of benzine, did she achieve a somewhat risky 2,300 m. The antennae and the ends of the metal props in gondola and corridor glistened through the snow and hail with balls of light - St. Elmo's fire. The gondola and platform were thickly covered with snow. When the weather cleared at 1 a.m., it appeared from the position of the ship that to steer further north would be fruitless with the velocity of the wind at 12 doms (doms - 2 metres per second).
"Meanwhile the course of the Humber was now distinguishable in the snowy landscape further south, offering a very favourable chance of attack. The town of Hull was well darkened, but from where 'L 11' was stationed we could easily make out the dropping of bombs from 'L 14'. Fresh snow-clouds then interfered with the view, but I had time to spare and remained at my post until the clouds cleared away in an hour's time. At 2 a.m. 'L 11' opened the attack and first dropped some bombs on Hull to induce the defence batteries and searchlights to disclose their position, for if that failed the ship could not have attacked against so strong a wind. The town remained quiet and dark, but at that moment the clouds cleared away and disclosed the following picture. The town and environs were white with the freshly-fallen snow. Although plunged in darkness the town lay sharply defined under the starlit sky with its streets, blocks of houses, quays and harbour basins just below the airship. A few lights moved in the streets. The ship, taking a northerly course and with all her engines at high pressure, was poised over her objective and stood by. For twenty minutes, following my instructions, bombs were dropped quite composedly on the harbour and docks and the effect of each bomb carefully watched. The first bomb hit the quay, knocking a great piece out of it; a second hit the middle of the dock-gate of a harbour basin. The bomb fell so accurately on the gate that it might have been taken for a shot deliberately aimed at it. Buildings fell down like so many houses built of cards. One bomb in particular had a tremendous effect. Near the spot where it exploded houses kept falling on each side until at last a huge black hole stood out on the snowy ground near the harbour. A similar large black spot in the neighbourhood was apparently caused by 'L 14'. People were seen through the telescope running hither and thither in the light of the flames. Ships that had been hit began moving about in the harbour. All counter-action at and round Hull was limited to a few weak searchlights that failed to find the ship, and to some isolated firing. While the bombs were being dropped, the airship ventured up to 2,700 m.
"When fully convinced of the excellent effect of the bombs dropped on Hull, I decided to drop the remainder on the fortifications at Immingham which, as I had already noticed, had been heavily bombed by 'L 14'. The airship made for Immingham with the last five explosive bombs and was received at once by four strong searchlights and very lively gun-fire. The searchlights tried in vain to find the ship through the light clouds just passing over, for although it was brightly lit up by them they always moved farther away. South of the searchlights on the bank the batteries were using much ammunition. From 40 to 50 fiery lights or fire-balls were scattered round the ship on all sides, above and below. The height these missiles reached was reckoned at 3,000 m. or more. The first explosive bomb that fell among the searchlights extinguished first one and then all the others. No other results were observed. Towards the end of the attack on Hull the fore engine was put permanently out of action by the stoppage of the water gauge and the consequent freezing of the oil and water pipes at a temperature of 19 degrees; at Immingham the aft engine was out of action for half an hour. The coast was crossed at 2.40 a.m. on the return journey. Again heavy snow and hailstorms accompanied by electric disturbances were encountered. In the space of three minutes a sudden squall carried the ship upwards from 2,400 to 3,200 m., 250 m. above our previous highest altitude. Coming down shortly afterwards the elevating gear got out of order, but the ship was worked by the crew as well as could be until the damage was repaired, though we were forced to rise again to 3,200 m. At 5 a.m. the rear engine gave way again and, owing to the freezing of oil and water, stopped altogether shortly before we landed. At 7 a.m. we met the First Scouting Division of Squadrons I and II 30 nautical miles north-north-west of the Terschelling-Bank Lightship. At 2 p.m. we landed safely at Nordholz. The ship was quite able to fly again."
The airship did the trip in 26 hours; it must be mentioned in this connection that the crew of a raider is so limited that all the men have to be on duty the whole time.
The Naval Corps in Flanders supported the Fleet's enterprise by stationing 12 U-boats off the English south-east coast. In spite of good visibility, there was no encounter with the enemy. The expedition, therefore, was only useful for the purpose of practising unity of command, and the handling of individual ships under circumstances likely to arise during an offensive engagement of any big unit. The return voyage was made an occasion for different exercises in manoeuvring the Fleet in fighting formation until we were compelled to withdraw, alarmed by the sighting of enemy submarines, for which the Fleet at Terschelling would have presented a good target. After our return all opportunity for further operations was put a stop to for a time owing to the bad weather, and to high east and north-east winds which our airships only just succeeded in escaping.
The dismissal of Grand Admiral von Tirpitz as Secretary of State of the Imperial Admiralty which was announced to the Fleet Command on March 18 aroused great sympathy, not only in view of his services in connection with the many-sided development of the Fleet through long years and in all branches of maritime service, but because, in these critical times for the country, much anxiety was aroused at the thought of being deprived of the services of a man who had shown himself to be a genial personality and of unwavering energy. This change in the conduct of the Naval Department, in particular, gave rise to grave fears as to the prompt carrying out of resolute and adequate U-boat warfare.
At the beginning of March the decision in this connection had again been postponed for four weeks. The Fleet was therefore bound all the more to aim at active action against the enemy, and every attention was given to that purpose by the new Fleet Command.
Meanwhile the English, by an unexpected attack, provided us with the opportunity of testing our preparations. The repeated air-raids, and particularly a very big and successful one on London on February i, roused them to make an effort to seek out and destroy these troublesome raiders in their own homes. The hangars at Tondern were the nearest. There had been no further attack on this group since the first unsuccessful one on Christmas Day, 1914. On March 25, in very unfavourable weather for flying - so much so that our own scouting machines did not go up owing to fog and snowstorms - an attack was made at 9.30 a.m. by some torpedo-boat destroyers on our outpost group at List. They sank two fishing steamers that could have reported the attack, but were themselves obliged to withdraw before our aeroplanes which had gone up from List, and which dropped bombs on the enemy, hitting the destroyer Medusa. She was abandoned later on in a sinking condition. The English report gave out that the loss of the Medusa was owing to a collision with the destroyer Laverock.
Various reports were made by our aeroplanes, from which we gathered that an aerial attack had started from two vessels carrying aeroplanes, which were supported by battle-cruisers, light cruisers and destroyers. We were not able at once to determine what the intention was - whether there was to be a simultaneous attack from the west on the hangars at Hage (south of Norderney), or whether we were to expect an encircling movement of the enemy against our forces sent northwards, in an effort to force them to come out. The counter-action of our aeroplanes and the bad weather compelled all the five English airmen to come down. Two of them were picked up by one of their own torpedo-boats; the other three were taken by our aeroplanes. They did not succeed in doing any damage.
The English attack caused great commotion among our outpost forces, as well as among all the other ships, which at once got ready to put to sea, until the further purpose of the enemy was revealed. Our cruisers and several flotillas went in pursuit of the retiring enemy, who evidently did not attach much importance to the rescue of the airmen; but the weather becoming still worse, we were unable to get near the ships. There was an encounter that night between our torpedo-boats and English light cruisers, when the English cruiser Cleopatra succeeded in ramming and sinking one of our torpedo-boats, "G 194," which had crossed her bows by mistake.
During these nocturnal proceedings another torpedo-boat, "S 22," Commander Karl Galster, struck a mine 55° 45" North Lat., and 5° 10" East Long. This boat broke in two at once; the fore-part sank quickly, the remainder floated for about five minutes and then suddenly went to the bottom. The hurrahs from the crew, led by the commander, proved that they stood firm at their posts to the very last. Torpedo-boat "S18" immediately tried to render assistance, but the wind and the high sea running made it impossible, and in spite of every effort only ten petty officers and seven of the crew were saved. We learned from the English report that the same night the Cleopatra was also run into by the English cruiser Undaunted, the latter receiving such heavy damage that she had to be towed into harbour. An English wireless intercepted during the night stated that a warship, together with destroyers, had tried to take a damaged English destroyer in tow, and it might be presumed that the ships would proceed northwards by night and return again at daybreak when there would be the possibility of encountering and capturing certain units of the enemy. Squadron II and Scouting Divisions I and IV were ordered to proceed to 55° 10' N. Lat. and 6° 0' E. Long., whither Squadrons I and II would follow; the flagship was with Squadron III. At 6.30 a.m. the cruisers reported that the sea was so rough that an engagement was impossible; the push was therefore given up as hopeless. We heard later that the same reason had induced the English to abandon the destroyer Medusa and return home very much battered by the storm.
At the end of March, by way of reprisal for the attempt to injure our aerial fleet, our airships enjoyed a very successful series of expeditions which, aided by a combination of favourable weather and dark nights, resulted in five successive attacks. It is difficult for airships to bring back an exact statement of their successes owing to the great altitude at which they fly, and also to the darkness and their exposure to anti-aircraft defences. The reports issued by the English official censor were* therefore, the only means of ascertaining the extent of the damage done, which was often represented as being of little importance in order to calm the fears of the population. But it is certain that at the time the uninterruptedly recurring raids caused a great feeling of panic, as the destruction in London itself surpassed anything ever before known. On our side, for the first time, we had to deplore the loss of an airship, brought down by enemy anti-aircraft guns. "L15," Commander Breithaupt, was forced down on to the water at the mouth of the Thames after the airship's gondola had been repeatedly hit by shells. The crew, two officers and sixteen men, were rescued by English boats and taken prisoner; they did not, however, succeed in towing in the airship, the destruction of which had been provided for. It is worthy of note, that in the night of the 2nd-3rd the Firth of Forth was reached for the first time, and ships lying there and buildings along the Firth were attacked. Bad weather set in again on April 6 and put an end to this exceptionally successful period. "L11" took part more than once in the attacks and its commander has given the following description:
"Order: 'L 11,' together with 'L 14,' to attack England south or centre on morning of April 1st.' At 12 noon an ascent was made for the purpose of attacking England in the south, but owing to the wind soon veering round to north-west, the centre of the coast was made for. There was lively traffic among steam-trawlers off the Dogger Bank, and the English wireless was distinctly heard at work. In spite of throwing out two casks of benzine, the temperature of the air did not allow of the ship rising above 2,200 m.; at 10 P.M. the English coast was reached south of the Tyne. While trying to bomb the docks on the Tyne and cross the coast, the ship was greeted with violent firing, which came from the whole coastal area north and south of the river. To draw back and seek the required weather side for the attack would have occupied several hours with the prevailing wind (W.N.W., 5-7 doms.) I decided not to cross the batteries on account of not being very high in relation to the firing, and also because of slow progress against the wind and the absolutely clear atmosphere up above. I fixed, therefore, on the town of Sunderland, with its extensive docks and the blast furnaces north-west of the town. Keeping on the weather side, the airships dropped explosive bombs on some works where 6ne blast-furnace was blown up with a terrible detonation, sending out flames and smoke. The factories and dock buildings of Sunderland, now brightly illuminated, were then bombed with good results. The effect was grand; blocks of houses and rows of streets collapsed entirely; large fires broke out in places and a dense black cloud, from which bright sparks flew high, was caused by one bomb. A second explosive bomb was at once dropped at the same spot; judging from the situation, it may have been a railway station. While over Sunderland, the airship was caught by a powerful searchlight and was pelted with shrapnel and fire-balls, but to no purpose. The concussion from a shell burst- ing near the airship was felt as though she had been hit. After leaving the town, two other searchlights tried to get the ship, but only with partial success. Then followed slight firing, apparently with machine-guns. The last explosive bombs were dropped with good aim on two blast-furnace works in the neighbourhood of Middlesbrough. On returning, we again saw numbers of steam trawlers off the Dogger Bank. At 10 a.m., April 2nd, we landed at Nordholz."
The day following "L 11" again set out for a raid on England in company with "L 17," and reported as follows:
"Owing to the expected warm temperature of the air, only five mechanics and forty-five bombs were carried; the spare parts were limited; two machine-guns and a landing-rope were left behind, and the supply of benzine very sparingly measured out, as both going and coming back the wind was expected to be behind us. The ascent was made at 2.30 p.m. The flight was so rapid that the last bearings taken showed that the English coast would be reached near Sheringham at about 10.30 p.m. As the atmosphere was becoming still thicker, it was impossible to distinguish anything beyond a few dim lights. As the coast could not be made out at the expected time, I turned by degrees out of my previous course W. 1/2 S. to S.W. to S., presuming that the wind would have gone further south on land. Finally, however, the bearings, taken at 1.10 a.m. revealed the surprising fact that the slight W.S.W. wind blowing had risen to 8-10 doms. When, therefore, we found at 2.45 a.m. that the ship was over the land, a further advance towards London became purposeless. Moreover, on ascertaining the exact position, it was too late, and in view of the strength and direction of the wind, to turn off towards the mouth of the Humber. So long as the darkness lasted, I determined to try for some objective in the county of Norfolk. Norwich, which was in complete darkness, could not be made out.
"Towards 3.55 a.m., after 'L 11' had crossed the coast close to the west of Yarmouth, violent gun-fire was observed through the mist in the rear. A turn was made, and altogether thirteen well-aimed bombs were dropped on the place where the firing came from. We had to give up the idea of staying longer on the coast as at the altitude of the airship day was already beginning to break. The return journey, as was anticipated, was favoured at a high altitude by a fresh W.S.W. wind. At 10 a.m. we landed at Nordholz."
On April 5, "L 11" with "L 13" and "16" again went up for a raid on the English Midlands. An account of this expedition will erve to give the reader some idea of the strain and exertions to which our airships' crews were exposed on such occasions.
"At 9.45 p.m. the airship crossed the distinctly visible coast south of Flamborough Head and took a course for Sheffield. When over Hull to the north the airship was found to be over several newly-erected batteries with four very strong searchlights, which caught up the ship easily in the very clear air; whereupon, from 10.10 to 10.30 an unusually heavy firing with shells and shrapnel was kept up. The aim was good; many shells burst quite close to the airship, causing the frame to shake violently. The next battery was at once attacked and silenced by explosive bombs. Being at the low altitude of 2,300 metres and in such clear air it was not considered advisable to continue to pass over the numerous other batteries, so we turned round intending to take a southerly course outside the coast in order to rise higher when the moon had gone down and to proceed inland. In setting off, the rear engine was put out of order through worn-out crank bearings. The commander decided, therefore, to put himself on the lee side of the north-north-east wind and look for Hartlepool. The line of the coast and the course of the rivers were just as plainly visible as on the map. North and south of Flamborough Head there was much shipping activity. Several neutral vessels were distinguishable by the bright lights above their neutrality marking.
"At 2 a.m., just off Hartlepool, the fore engine gave out. The attack on the town was abandoned, and it was decided on the way back to destroy a large iron factory at Whitby. Even from the high altitude of the airship, the factory appeared to be a very extensive establishment with many brightly illuminated blast furnaces and numerous buildings. It was situated on the shore and had steam extinguishing apparatus. The airship hovered sufficiently long over this factory to drop carefully aimed bombs. The distinctly visible result consisted not only in the utter destruction of the furnaces and buildings through fire and explosion, but there were also heavy explosions in the darker sections of the factory, which led to the conclusion that the entire establishment had been destroyed. At 10.30 a.m. the airship got into a dense fog on the return journey, and with a view to safer navigation went over land and made good her way at 50 m. altitude, landing at Nordholz at 3 p.m. in clear weather."
No ships were sent up by Captain Strasser, the Commander of Airships, on April 6. His estimate of the weather conditions proved quite correct, for in the course of the afternoon the slight north- easterly wind veered round to the east and when night came a regular storm was blowing. While the air raids of the previous night were proceeding several torpedo-boats started out from Horns Reef in a north-west and westerly direction and kept the outpost forces in constant activity. It led, however, to no engagement with the enemy.
From April 13 to April 19 the Fleet was kept in constant expectation of an English attack, news having been received that one was pending. But the enemy did not show himself.

### Bombardment of Yarmouth and Lowestoft

On April 24, Easter Monday, the Fleet put out on an important enterprise which, like that in the beginning of March, was directed towards the Hoofden, but was to be extended farther so as to force the enemy out of port. I expected to achieve this by bombarding coastal towns and carrying out air raids on England the night the Fleet went out. Both these actions would probably result in counter measures being taken by the enemy that would give our forces an opportunity to attack. On the occasion of the advance of March 5 - 6 the enemy preferred withdrawing all his forces into port, as we learnt afterwards from intercepted wireless messages, as soon as he had news of our advance, either through agents or from submarines in the North Sea.
The news we obtained from the enemy had repeatedly announced strong enemy forces in the northern section of the North Sea under the Norwegian coast; forces had also been sighted in the Hoofden and harbours on the south-east coast of England so that an opportunity would probably occur for our Fleet to push in between those two divisions of the enemy Fleet and attack with equal strength that section which should first present itself. It was, therefore, obvious that the most suitable direction for attack would be towards the south-east counties of England. If the enemy then wished to cut off our return he would have to move into the neighbourhood of Terschelling Bank, where the waters were favourable for offering battle. With luck we might even succeed in attacking the enemy advancing from the Hoofden on both sides; on the south with the forces told off to bombard the coast and on the north with the Main Fleet.
Lowestoft and Yarmouth were the only coastal towns it was intended to bombard. Both were fortified and were important military points of support for the enemy - Lowestoft for mine-laying and sweeping; Yarmouth as a base for the submarines whence they started on their expeditions to the Bight. The destruction, therefore, of the harbours and other military establishments of both these coastal towns was a matter of great military importance, apart from the object of the bombardment in calling out the enemy. Simultaneous air-raids on southern England would offer the advantages of mutual support for the airships and the sea forces. The airships would reconnoitre for the forces afloat on their way to and fro, while the latter would be able to rescue the airships should they meet disaster. It was also hoped there might be an opportunity for trade-war under prize conditions.
All the available High Sea forces were assembled, including Squadron II, and the Chief Command of the Naval Corps in Flanders was enjoined to keep his available U-boats in readiness. The Naval Corps also offered to station two U-boats east of Lowestoft to facilitate the advance; they did excellent service in assisting the bombardment. The U-boats at the disposal of the High Sea Command were placed in a position to attack the Firth of Forth and the southern egress from the Firth was closed by a U-minelayer.
Eight of the newer airships were selected for the raid and three older ones were ordered to hold themselves in readiness on the second day in the rear of the fleet for reconnoitring. If at all possible, the bombardment was to take the towns by surprise at daybreak, in order to prevent counter-measures by the enemy, such as calling up submarines from Yarmouth to protect the coast. The forces intended to accompany the cruisers had to endeavour to keep, not actually in the Hoofden, but in the open waters west and north of Terschelling Bank in case it should come to a fight, as that was the only position where liberty of action in all eventual developments could be ensured. The bombardment of both the coastal towns was entrusted to the battle-cruisers. They were supported by Scouting Division II and two fast torpedo-boat flotillas (VI and IX). The Main Fleet, consisting of Squadrons I, II and III, Scouting Division IV, and the remainder of the torpedo flotillas was to accompany the battle-cruisers to the Hoofden until the bombardment was over, in order, if necessary, to protect them against superior enemy forces.
At noon on the 24th all the forces, including the airships, started. The course led first through the south opening in the barrier at Norderney and then north, round a minefield laid down by the English out of sight of the Dutch coast, and into the Hoofden where the bombardment was to open at daybreak and last for about thirty minutes. At 4 p.m. the movement received an unwelcome set-back owing to a message from Rear-Admiral Bodicker, leader of the reconnaissance ships, that his flagship, the battle-cruiser Seydlitz had struck a mine and her forward torpedo compartment was damaged. The ship was thus debarred from taking part in the expedition; she was still able to do 15 knots and returned to harbour under her own steam. The leader was, therefore, obliged to hoist his flag in another cruiser. The route on which the ship had struck the mine had been searched and swept last on the night of the 22nd and 23rd and had been constantly used by light forces on their night patrols.
Owing to this occurrence the battle-cruisers behind the Seydlitz stopped and turned according to agreement, awaiting further orders in case they, too, should come across mines. As the Seydlitz turned to follow them in order to transfer the admiral to the Lutzow, two of the ships simultaneously reported the track of a torpedo and submarines. With that danger so near it would not have been advisable to attempt to stop the ship and transfer the admiral to another; and as the cruiser was already badly damaged, it would have been dangerous to expose her to still further injury. The Seydlitz continued, therefore, on her westerly course and the Chief of Reconnaissance on board a torpedo-boat reached the Lutzow later and there resumed his duties. The Seydlitz was escorted on her homeward way by two torpedo-boats and "L 7" and reached the harbour without further misadventure.
In consequence of this incident, the Fleet Command thought fit to alter the intended course, and the only alternative was to take the route along the coast of East Friesland. The weather being so very clear, it would have to be borne in mind that in following that route the ships could be observed from the islands of Rottum and Schiermonnikoog and the news probably dispatched farther. Unfortunately this lessened the chance of carrying out a surprise bombardment of Lowestoft and Yarmouth, but there was no reason on that account to give it up altogether. Relying on aerial reconnaissance, further developments might be expected and the enterprise was continued.
Towards 8 p.m. a wireless message from the Naval Staff confirmed what the Naval Corps in Flanders had already reported at noon, that since 6 a.m. numerous enemy forces had been assembled off the Belgian coast, at the mouth of the Scheldt; it was not possible to divine their intention, but very probably it was connected with a bombardment of the coast of Flanders. It was welcome news for our Fleet to hear of the assemblage of enemy forces there. Another wireless announced that on the morning of the 23rd large squadrons of English warships of all types had been sighted off Lindesnaes, the south-west point of Norway. I could count, therefore, on my presumption that the English Fleet was divided into two sections being correct.
At 9.30 p.m. a message was sent us from Bruges that according to an intercepted English wireless all patrol boats had been ordered back to port. This showed that the meeting of our battle-cruisers with English submarines during the afternoon had resulted in their sending news of our movements.
Shortly before daybreak reports were received from the airships of the results of their attack. They were obliged to fight against unfavourable wind conditions, and bad visibility over the land; they also met with strong counter-action. The six air-ships taking part had raided Norwich, Lincoln, Harwich and Ipswich and had been engaged with outpost ships. None had been damaged and they were then in the act of returning home. At 5 a.m. our large cruisers approached the coast off Lowestoft. Good support was afforded them by the U-boats placed in position by the Naval Corps. The light cruiser Rostock, which formed the flank cover for the battle-cruisers, reported enemy ships and destroyers in a west-south-west direction. But as the light was not good enough to open fire, Admiral Bodicker proceeded to bombard the towns. This was carried out at a distance of from 100 - 130 hm. Excellent results were observed in the harbour and the answering fire was weak. A north-west course was then taken to proceed with the bombardment of Great Yarmouth and to engage the ships reported by the Rostock.
Meanwhile the Rostock, supported by the light cruiser Elbing, had kept in touch with the enemy forces in the endeavour to bring them nearer to the battle-cruisers. The ships in question were four modern light cruisers and about twelve destroyers. As soon, however, as they caught sight of our battle-cruisers they turned at full speed southwards. We opened fire on them at a distance of 130 hm. until they were beyond our range. Many hits were observed, and on one of the cruisers a big fire was plainly visible. The high speed kept up by the enemy made pursuit useless. The cruisers then shaped their course in the direction of our Main Fleet and reported that their task was accomplished.
During the bombardment of the two coastal towns, the light cruiser Frankfurt sank an armed patrol steamer by gunfire. A second one was sunk by the leader of Torpedo-boat Flotilla VI, "G41," the crew of which were rescued. From what the latter stated she was the King Stephen, of evil repute, which had allowed the crew of the airship "L 19" to perish. These men certainly denied most emphatically that they were on the trawler then, and laid the blame on a former crew. They contradicted them- selves so constantly, however, that the captain and the engineer grew very suspicious, and as the steamer had been used for war service the crew were made prisoners.
At 5.30 a.m. "L 9," reported being chased by aeroplanes in a south-westerly direction. When the fleet was sighted the airmen departed, probably to announce the approach of our ships, which at that time were steaming on a south-westerly course to meet the cruisers. At the same moment "L 11" and "L 23" came in sight; they had not been able to discover the enemy. At 6 a.m., therefore, when the cruisers had reported the conclusion of the bombardment, Terschelling Bank was made for according to plan. Towards 7.30 a.m. the Naval Corps in Flanders reported that the English ships assembled there had been ordered by wireless, which was intercepted, to return. The English destroyers were to finish coaling and then move on to Dunkirk.
An approach, therefore, on the part of the enemy was not to be looked for from that quarter. The only hope now left was that enemy forces might be encountered off Terschelling. As we drew near to that zone, the Fleet was constantly obliged to evade submarine attacks, but no other enemy forces were met.
The return trip passed without further incident. Two neutral steamers, as well as some smaller vessels were stopped and searched for contraband goods. The enemy, hearing of the advance of our forces, withdrew all his ships from the Belgian coast and made no effort to locate us. It appears from subsequent English statements that the English Fleet had put to sea the day before for one of the usual North Sea expeditions, and it would be interesting to find out whether it could have had an opportunity of crossing our path in the Bight.
When the Seydlitz was docked a hole of 90 sq. m. was found in her, through which about 1,400 tons of water had poured into the ship. Eleven of the men had been killed at their post in the torpedo chamber. In spite of the considerable quantity of ammunition stored there, no further explosion occurred or the disaster would have been far greater.
Early in May the weather conditions were such as to allow of a resumption of the air raids on England. But this favourable phase in the weather was not of so long duration as in the preceding month, which was quite exceptional. Two raids were carried out in which eight airships took part. "L 20" was lost in the second raid as a strong south-westerly wind had arisen, and the airship, owing to engine trouble, was unable to reach the home coast. The captain, Commander Stabbert, made, therefore, for the Norwegian coast, where he came down with his damaged airship in the neighbourhood of Jaderen, where the crew alighted and were interned. Then ensued a period of short nights which caused a cessation in the airships' raiding activities as the hours of darkness were not enough to afford them sufficient protection, and it was also obvious that latterly the defensive measures had become much more effectual. But the Fleet made good use of the airships for all reconnoitring purposes in connection with important enterprises, which gained in value through co-operation with the U-boats and on which all the more energy had to be expended since the trade-war by the U-boats had been stopped since the end of April.
Just as we were proceeding to Lowestoft a wireless message was received from the Chief of the Naval Staff, to the effect that trade-war by U-boats was only to be carried out now in accordance with prize regulations. This was the result of the American protest in the case of the Sussex disaster. As I could not expect the U-boats to carry on a war of that description owing to the heavy casualties that might be expected, I had called back by wireless all the boats engaged in the trade-war, and subsequently received approval of this action in high quarters. It was left to me until further notice to employ the U-boats in purely military enterprises. This helped still further to protect the German Bight, as definite areas could now be continuously occupied and we could expect early reports of enemy movements; we also hoped to find opportunities to attack the enemy submarines employed as guard-ships. The experiences of our U-boats confirmed the danger caused by the enemy submarines, which, appearing unexpectedly, had come to be very unpleasant adversaries, and we intended, therefore, to make use of our boats for defence purposes.
* ↑ To ascertain its position wireless signals are sent out from the airship, picked up at two different stations, and registered on the map. The position fixed is then transmitted to the airship by wireless. The whole proceeding occupies the shortest space of time, but when several airships are on an expedition together the wireless must be worked most carefully to avoid mutual misunderstandings and mistakes.