# Comstock v. Crawford/Opinion of the Court

* Court Documents
* Case Syllabus
* Opinion of the Court
United States Supreme Court
70 U.S. 396
Comstock v. Crawford
It is only necessary to examine the objections taken to the appointment of the first administrator, and the subsequent acceptance of his resignation, so far as they affect the jurisdiction of the Probate Court. It is well settled that when the jurisdiction of a court of limited and special authority appears upon the face of its proceedings, its action cannot be collaterally attacked for mere error or irregularity. The jurisdiction appearing, the same pre-umption of law arises that it was rightly exercised as prevails with reference to the action of a court of superior and general authority.
By the statute of Wisconsin, under which the administrator was appointed, the only facts necessary to give the Probate Court jurisdiction were the death of the non-resident intestate and the possession by him, at the time, of personal property within the Territory. Both of these facts are recited in the record of the proceedings produced by the defendant, which sets forth the letters of administration at large. These recitals are prima facie evidence of the facts recited. They show the jurisdiction of the court over the subject. What followed was done in the exercise of its judicial authority, and could only be questioned on appeal, the mode provided by the law of the Territory for review of the determinations of the court. Whether there was a widow of the deceased, or any next of kin, or creditor, who was a proper person to receive letters, if he had applied for them, or whether there was any public administrator in office authorized or fit to take charge of the estate, or to which of these several parties it was meet that the administration should be intrusted, were matters for the consideration and determination of the court; and its action respecting them, however irregular, cannot be impeached collaterally.
The same observations are applicable to the acceptance of the resignation of the first administrator, and the appointment of Ripley in his place. If the second appointment was irregularly made, the irregularity should have been corrected on appeal.
But, independent of this consideration, there is nothing in the objection. The power to accept the resignation and make the second appointment, under the circumstances of this case, were necessary incidents of the power to grant letters of administration in the first instance. It does not appear that the first administrator ever took possession of the property of the intestate, or attempted to exercise any control over it; and his inability to act left the estate in fact without any administrator. The duty of the court therefore to provide for its proper administration could not otherwise have been discharged than by a new appointment.
But the principal reliance of the plaintiffs is placed upon the objections taken to the action of the Probate Court of Grant County in ordering the sale. With reference to these objections, as with reference to the objections taken to the original appointment of the administrator, it is only necessary to consider them so far as they affect the jurisdiction of the court.
The proceeding for the sale of the real property of an intestate, though had in the general course of administration, is a distinct and independent proceeding authorized by statute only in certain specially-designated cases. But when by the presentation of a case within the statute the jurisdiction of the court has once attached, the regularity or irregularity of subsequent steps can only be questioned in some direct mode prescribed by law. They are not matters for which the decrees of the court can be collaterally assailed.
The statute of the Territory provided that the real estate of a decedent might be sold to satisfy the just debts which he owed, when the personal property of the estate was insufficient to pay the same. And it authorized the Probate Court of the county where the deceased last dwelt, or in which the real estate was situated, to license the administrator to make the sale upon representation of this insufficiency, and 'the same being made to appear' to the court. It also required the court, previous to passing upon the representation, to order notice to be given to all parties concerned, or their guardians, who did not signify their assent to the sale, to show cause why the license should not be granted.
As thus seen, the representation of the insufficiency of the personal property of the deceased to pay his just debts, was the only act required to call into exercise the power of the court. The truth of the representation was a matter for subsequent inquiry. How this should be made to appear the statute did not designate, but from the notice required of the hearing upon the representation, it is clear that the necessity and propriety of the sale solicited were matters to be then considered. A license following such hearing necessarily involved an adjudication upon these points. The jurisdiction to hear was conferred by the representation; the authority to license followed from the fact which the court was required to ascertain and settle by its decision. In such case the decision of the court is conclusive.
The record of the Probate Court, produced by the defendant, states the fact that a written application for the sale was made. It sets forth the application at length, representing that the personal property of the deceased was insufficient to pay his just debts by the sum of about eight thousand dollars; it gives the order directing publication of notice of the application; it recites that due notice was given; it contains a certificate of the probate justice of Illinois that the personal property of the deceased had been exhausted in payment of his debts, and that there remained debts unpaid to the amount named, and it states, by way of further recital, that it had been made to appear to the court that the sale was necessary and proper to pay such debts of the existence and amount of which due proof had been given.
To this record it is further objected: 1st. That the representation, which was the preliminary step in the proceeding for the sale, did not give the amount and description of the personal property of the deceased, or a statement of the just debts which he owed; and 2d. That the order for the sale did not show that the personal property of the estate was insufficient to pay the debts, unless resort was had to the certificate of the probate justice of Illinois.
The answer to the first objection is found in the fact that the statute did not require any such particularity of statement with reference to the property of the deceased, or to the debts which he owed. It only required a representation of the general fact. The particularity desired to guide the court was to be obtained at the hearing of the application.
The answer to the second objection is, that the sufficiency of the proof upon which the court took its action is not a matter open to consideration in a collateral manner. It does not touch the question of jurisdiction.
Similar questions were presented for the consideration of this court, in Grignon's Lessee v. Astor. That case turned upon the validity of proceedings for the sale of real property of an intestate under a statute almost identical in its provisions with the one under which the sale in the present case was made. And it was there held that the representation was sufficient to bring the power of the court into action; that it was enough that there was something of record which showed the subject before the court, and that the granting of the license was an adjudication upon all the facts necessary to give jurisdiction. That decision disposes of the particular objections stated to the sale in this case.
The record of the subsequent license to the administrator to sell the same property, and its second purchase by the defendant, was properly excluded. It did not show, or tend to show, fraud in the first sale or any collusion between the administrator and the purchaser. The proceeding may have originated in a desire to remove doubts suggested as to the regularity of the original sale, but whether this was so or not, the first sale not being set aside, its validity could not be impaired by the second.
There is no force in the objection that the proceeds of sales made by the administrator of lands of the intestate amounted to over ten thousand dollars instead of eight thousand, the amount of his alleged debts remaining unpaid. The title of the purchaser could not be affected by the excess. That was a matter solely for the consideration of the court on the return of the sales by the administrator.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.

## Notes

* ↑ Barber v. Winslow, 12 Wendell, 102; Porter v. Merchants' Bank, 28 New York, 641.
* ↑ Van Steenbergh v. Bigelow, 3 Wendell, 42; Jackson v. Robinson, 4 Id. 437; Jackson v. Crawfords, 12 Id. 534; Atkins v. Kinnan, 20 Id. 242; Porter v. Purdy, 29 New York, 106; Betts v. Bagley, 12 Pickering, 572.
* ↑ 2 Howard, 319; see also Florentine v. Barton, 2 Wallace, 210.
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