# United States v. Jonas/Opinion of the Court

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* Opinion of the Court
United States Supreme Court
86 U.S. 598
United States v. Jonas
It is quite apparent that the law will not compel the purchaser in this case to comply with the terms of sale and accept the deed offered, unless the Solicitor of the Treasury, who made the sale and executed the deed, has undoubted authority to do both these things. The officer was created by act of Congress of 29th of May, 1830, and among the duties assigned to him by the first section is the charge of property conveyed to the United States in payment of debts, with power to sell and dispose of the same. It may be that it was the intention of Congress that the important powers thus conferred should be exercised independently of the Secretary of the Treasury, although it is clearly the policy of the law to hold the head of the department responsible for the proper administration of the governmental functions which pertain to it. It is, however, not necessary to consider the point, because the act of the 3d of March, 1863, to 'prevent frauds on the revenue and provide for the certain and speedy collection of claims in favor of the United States,' has not only in terms placed the Solicitor of the Treasury in subordination to the secretary in the matter of selling the property of the United States taken in payment of debts, but has deprived him of the power of selling at private sale at all-a power liable to abuse, and which the interests of the government require should not be confided of any one. In the ninth section of this act the solicitor is authorized to sell, with the approval of the secretary, and not then except at public sale, on three months' notice of the time, place, and terms of sale, advertised in some newspaper published in the vicinity of the property. It is clear that this latter act was intended to qualify and limit the powers given by the act of 1830. It covers the whole subject of the disposition of lands acquired for debts due the government, and embraces new and salutary provisions in relation to their sale, and shows clearly that Congress, instead of conferring additional powers, intended to limit those already conferred.
Such being the case, the latter act must operate as a repeal pro tanto of the act of 1830.
It is urged that the two acts can be reconciled if the latter one is confined to unproductive property, but neither the letter nor spirit of this act would warrant any such interpretation. It is true the sale or lease for a limited period of unproductive lands is provided for, but the same provisions apply to other property obtained by the government in payment of debts due it. Indeed, no good reason can be assigned why the disposition of unproductive lands should be subject to the approval of the secretary, and other property, which, in this case, consisted of valuable real estate in the city of New Orleans, with buildings on it, be left to the sole lisposal of a subordinate officer. All property of whatever kind obtained in the way pointed out is embraced within the scope of the statute. If the Congress of 1830 intended that the Solicitor of the Treasury should be the sole judge of the propriety of selling the property of the United States taken in payment of debts, the Congress of 1863 thought proper to abandon that policy, and to declare that in no case should there be a sale without the approval of the Secretary of the Treasury. It went further and said that all sales should be at public auction, and gave the power to lease for a limited time, but whether the property were leased or sold, the secretary should be first consulted and his consent obtained, and all persons given a fair and equal opportunity of buying. The system thus inaugurated did away with the objections to private sales, and made the Secretary of the Treasury responsible, as he should be, for the proper administration of this branch of the public service.
The next point to be considered is, whether the defendant was obliged to comply with the terms of sale on tender of the deed. This deed was executed by E. C. Banfield, and recites that, acting in the capacity of Solicitor of the Treasury, under the ninth section of the act of 1863, he had caused the property to be exposed at public sale, but it does not contain any recital that the secretary authorized the sale, nor was any evidence offered to the defendant in connection with the deed that this authority had been obtained.
It is manifest, if any effect is to be given the act invoked by the solicitor as the basis of his authority, that he could not proceed at all without the approval of his superior. The legislation of Congress would be wholly ineffectual to prevent the evils which it was designed to remedy, if this approval should not be treated as a substantial requirement, a thing essential to give validity to the sale. The question is one of power, and the power is given to sell when the secretary thinks it advisable to do so. His approval is a condition precedent, without which the solicitor has no authority whatever to act.
It is said, however, if this be so, that the court will presume this approval, and that it is not necessary that it should appear either in the conveyance or in any other mode. It would defeat the obvious purpose of Congress, which is to be considered in the construction of a statute, to dispense with proof of this approval. One of the main objects of the statute was to subject the action of the solicitor to the control of the secretary in a matter of great public concern, in which he had heretofore acted without control. This change of the system contemplated a change in the mode of proceeding on the part of the solicitor. If this were not so, there would be no security that the solicitor would not continue to sell property as he had been accustomed to sell it. Indeed, the very sale in question is defended on the ground that the power conferred by the act of 1830 remains unimpaired by the act of 1863, and the action of the solicitor in this case furnishes a potent argument against the rule of presumption contended for. As the important power of selling the property of the United States acquired in payment of debts can only be exercised by the solicitor with the approval of the secretary, there would seem to be the best of reasons for requiring some written evidence of this approval, not only for the security of the purchaser, but for the protection of the government.
The defendant, therefore, is not in default, because there is nothing in the record to show that this consent of the secretary had been obtained.
If the authority to make the sale had been delegated to the solicitor alone, and its exercise confided to his discretion, his acts would carry with them prim a facie evidence that they were within the scope of his authority. But where the power is divided there must be joint action before any presumption can arise.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.

## Notes

This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
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