# Intelligence and Security Committee China report/Annex B

PART ONE: THREAT AND RESPONSE
A. China's national imperative is to ensure that the Chinese Communist Party remains in power. Everything else is subservient to that.
B. However, it is its ambition at a global level—to become a technological and economic superpower, on which other countries are reliant—that poses a national security threat to the UK.
C. China views the UK through the optic of the struggle between the United States and China. When combined with the UK's membership of significant international bodies, and the perception of the UK as an international opinion-former, these factors would appear to place the UK just below China's top priority targets.
D. China views the UK as being of use in its efforts to mute international criticism and to gain economically: this, in the short term at least, will temper China's targeting of the UK.
E. China is seeking both political influence and economic advantage in order to achieve its aims in relation to the UK. It seeks to acquire information and influence elites and decision-makers, and to acquire Intellectual Property using covert and overt methods to gain technological supremacy.
F. China almost certainly maintains the largest state intelligence apparatus in the world. The nature and scale of the Chinese Intelligence Services are—like many aspects of China's government—hard to grasp for the outsider, due to the size of the bureaucracy, the blurring of lines of accountability between party and state officials, a partially decentralised system, and a lack of verifiable information.
G. The Chinese Intelligence Services target the UK and its overseas interests prolifically and aggressively. While they seek to obtain classified information, they are willing to utilise intelligence officers and agents to collect open source information indiscriminately—given the vast resources at their disposal. In more ways than one, the broad remit of the Chinese Intelligence Services poses a significant challenge to Western attempts to counter their activity.
H. To compound the problem, it is not just the Chinese Intelligence Services: the Chinese Communist Party co-opts every state institution, company and citizen. This 'whole-of-state' approach means China can aggressively target the UK, yet the scale of the activity makes it more difficult to detect ***.
​I. In terms of espionage, China's human intelligence collection is prolific, using a vast network of individuals embedded in local society to access individuals of interest—often identified through social media. It is also clear from the evidence we have seen that China routinely targets current and former UK civil servants ***. While there is good awareness of the danger posed, it is vital that vigilance is maintained.
J. In relation to the cyber approach, whilst understanding has clearly improved in recent years, China has a highly capable cyber—and increasingly sophisticated cyberespionage—operation: however, this is an area where the 'known unknowns' are concerning. Work on continuing coverage of its general capabilities must be maintained alongside further work on Chinese offensive cyber and close-proximity technical operations.
K. In terms of interference, China oversteps the boundary and crosses the line from exerting influence—a legitimate course of action—into interference, in the pursuit of its interests and values at the expense of those of the UK.
L. Decision-makers—from serving politicians to former political figures, senior government officials and the military—are, inevitably, key targets. China employs a range of tactics, including seeking to recruit them into lucrative roles in Chinese companies—to the extent that we questioned whether there was a revolving door between the Government and certain Chinese companies, with those involved in awarding contracts being 'rewarded' with jobs.
M. The Cabinet Office must update the Advisory Committee on Business Appointments guidelines in relation to intelligence and security matters, including with particular reference to China, and ensure that their implementation is strictly enforced.
N. China is an economic power, and this cannot be ignored in formulating the UK's policy towards China. Balancing the tension between security and prosperity requires dexterity, and we understand that there are a number of difficult trade-offs involved.
O. The length of this Inquiry has allowed us to see the development of the China policy within Government and we are reassured that, belatedly, the security aspects are now being given prominence—notably more so after the pandemic.
P. It is nevertheless concerning that the security community, and the Government in general, were aware of many of these issues several years ago and yet we are only now beginning to see the introduction of measures taken to protect UK sovereign interests. The lack of action to protect our assets from a known threat was a serious failure, and one from which the UK may feel the consequences for years to come.
​Q. Even now, HMG is focusing on short-term or acute threats, and failing to think long term—unlike China—and China has historically been able to take advantage of this. The Government must adopt a longer-term planning cycle in regard to the future security of the UK if it is to face Chinese ambitions, which are not reset every political cycle. This will mean adopting policies that may well take years to stand up and require multi-year spending commitments—something that may well require Opposition support—but the danger posed by doing too little, too late, in this area is too significant to fall prey to party politics.
R. Tackling the threats posed by China requires the UK to have a clear strategy on China, which is forward thinking, joined up and utilises a 'whole-of-government' approach. Work to develop such a strategy may now be in train, but there is still a long way to go.
S. The Intelligence Community will play a key role in the work of the new Investment Security Unit (ISU): the classified and other technical advice that the Intelligence Community provide should shape the decisions made by the ISU as it seeks to balance the need for national security against economic priorities. It is essential that there is effective scrutiny and oversight of the ISU—and that can be undertaken only by this Committee.
T. We commend the action now being taken by the Government to counter interference by China—it is encouraging that the Government has finally woken up to the grave threat this poses to our national security.
U. However, it is worrying that 'policy ownership' of this national security activity, rather than being gripped at the centre by the Cabinet Office, has instead been devolved across the Government—in many instances to departments with no security remit or expertise. We have not been kept informed of these developments and, despite numerous requests, are not permitted to scrutinise this activity.
V. Effective Parliamentary oversight is not some kind of 'optional extra'—it is a vital safeguard in any functioning Parliamentary democracy, and the ISC is the only body that can do that. Moving responsibility for security matters to bodies not named in the ISC's Memorandum of Understanding is not consistent with Parliament's intent in the Justice and Security Act 2013: the Government should not be giving departments a licence to operate in the name of national security and hiding it from view.
​W. The Telecommunications (Security) Act 2021 does not contain provision for effective oversight of the new measures being implemented. The Act provides that notification of a company or person being a 'high-risk vendor' of telecommunications equipment, and specification of the limits placed on the use of this equipment, be laid before Parliament unless provision of this information is deemed to be contrary to national security. In such circumstances it is logical—and in keeping with Parliament's intent in establishing the ISC—that this information should instead be provided to the ISC. This would ensure that Parliament could be duly notified without this information being made public and thereby endangering national security. However, this proposed amendment was rejected wholesale by the Government. This was particularly inappropriate—and, indeed, ironic—as it was the ISC that had originally raised concerns about the adoption of Huawei in the UK telecommunications network. It was our initiative that prompted the Government to introduce this legislation.
X. In December 2020, we asked how the policy outcomes against which SIS and GCHQ must deliver intelligence were being prioritised. We presume, for instance, that "***" is not considered to be of the same importance as "***"; however, we have not been provided with any information. Without any indication of prioritisation, it is difficult to judge the effectiveness of Agency efforts and it is therefore disappointing—and rather telling—that NSS has failed to provide such critical information in response to this major Inquiry.
Y. We were told in 2019 that the Agencies take a tri-Agency approach, but this does not cover DI. In October 2020—over 15 months later—we asked if there had yet been any movement towards formally adding DI to the prioritisation process. The Acting National Security Adviser told us: "DI are fully part of the IOP process … they are one of our main repositories of expertise on China." Director GCHQ noted that DI is a part of the National Cyber Force, and "when you get into the effects world … they are completely there in every aspect". If DI is supposedly now fully integrated with the Intelligence Outcomes Prioritisation process, we expect the next iteration of the tri‑Agency approach—when it is finally updated—to include DI.
Z. As at 2021, the Government had a plethora of plans that laid out its China policies. The interaction between these documents has required a great deal of unpicking, and we have been surprised at the fact that changes in one document do not always lead to consequent changes in others. The slow speed at which strategies, and policies, are developed and implemented also leaves a lot to be desired—at the time of writing we await to see what impact the National Security Adviser’s review of processes will have on the China policy area, but we would certainly hope it will become more coherent.
AA. The level of resource dedicated to tackling the threat posed by China's 'whole-of-state' approach has been completely inadequate. While a shortage of resources had been identified as early as 2012, effort was diverted onto the acute counter-terrorism threat arising from Syria. The increase in funding on the China mission in 2020 was therefore both necessary and welcome. But it was only for one year. HMG cannot think or plan strategically with such short-term planning.
​BB. HMG must explore the possibility of a multi-year Spending Review for the Agencies, in order to allow them to develop long-term, strategic programmes on China and respond to the enduring threat. The UK is severely handicapped by the short-termist approach currently being taken.
CC. MI5 is responsible for countering Hostile State Activity, and the Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure and the National Cyber Security Centre play a key role in engaging with those within and outside the Government to protect national security. There is a wide array of defensive tools, which are being used to good effect, but the Government has come late to the party and has a lot of catching up to do. Our closest allies identified the need to use such tools against China long ago and we must learn from their experience and knowledge.
DD. It is also clear that this defensive effort requires a cross-government approach. However, this transfer of responsibility will need to be a well-thought-out, gradual process with adequate support provided to the departments and some degree of control retained at the centre. HMG needs to ensure that those departments not traditionally associated with security are properly resourced with security expertise, properly supported and properly scrutinised.
EE. Chinese law now requires its citizens to provide assistance to the Chinese Intelligence Services (ChIS) and to protect state secrets. It is highly likely that the ChIS will use such legislation to compel the Chinese staff of UK companies to co‑operate with them. It is also likely that China's Personal Information Protection Law will lead to the Chinese government forcing Chinese and other companies to turn over their data held on Chinese citizens. As compartmentalisation of Chinese citizens' data will be difficult, this is likely to mean that, in practice, China will obtain access to data held on non-Chinese citizens as well.
FF. The UK Intelligence Community have been open with the Committee about the challenges of detecting Chinese interference operations. ***
GG. It is incumbent on the Government to report on how national security decision-making powers are being dispersed across the Government. It should annually update this Committee on the number of personnel cleared to see Top Secret material in each of the departments with new national security decision-making powers, together with the facilities provided to them (secure IT terminals and telephones etc.).
HH. Failure to get this transition right from the outset could lead to decisions that fail to withstand external challenge. Furthermore, as there is an adjustment in national security responsibility, so too must there be an adjustment to ensure there is effective Parliamentary oversight of all aspects.
II. It is clear that there has been progress in terms of 'offensive' work since we started our Inquiry—for instance, an increase in 'effects' work. However, given what appears to be the extremely low starting point, this is not cause for celebration ***. Both SIS and GCHQ say that working on China "is a slow burn, slow-return effort" ***.
​JJ. GCHQ and SIS tasking is set by the Government and, rightly, they cannot work outside the Government's priorities. Nevertheless, the fact that China was such a relatively low priority in 2018—the same year in which China approved the removal of term limits on the Presidency, allowing President Xi Jinping to remain in office as long as he wished—is concerning. Work must continue to be prioritised now to make up for this slow start and there must be clear measurement and evaluation of effort.
KK. It is clear that both GCHQ and SIS face a formidable challenge in relation to China. What we were unable to assess—without the specific requirements set for the Agencies or any idea of the prioritisation of the 'outcomes' within the Intelligence Outcomes Prioritisation Plan—is how effective either Agency is at tackling that challenge. As a result of pressures placed on civil servants during the Covid-19 pandemic—including fewer people in offices with access to the necessary IT systems—the Cabinet Office has not measured the Agencies' success against its requirements, and so neither the Government nor Parliament has any assurance about their effectiveness.
LL. We have seen efforts grow over the duration of this Inquiry. We expect to see those efforts continue to increase as coverage leads to an increased programme of 'effects'. However, given the importance of the work, it is vital that the Cabinet Office carries out an evaluation on whether SIS and GCHQ are meeting their targets in relation to China. That evaluation must be shared with this Committee.
MM. ***. Increased surveillance, both in the physical and virtual world, poses significant challenges to long-term intelligence-generating capabilities ***. This problem is only going to get more difficult. SIS and GCHQ should prioritise work on this *** ***.
NN. Although we have stated this earlier in this Report, it bears repeating specifically in relation to legislation: the length of time it has taken to reform the Official Secrets Acts is unconscionable. Our predecessors were told that the Acts required updating as a matter of urgency in January 2019. Over three years later, we have yet to see the introduction of a Bill. National security legislation ought to be a priority for any UK Government—it is certainly not a matter to be kicked into the long grass by successive Governments.
OO. We recommend that HMG ensure that a Counter-State Threats Bill is enacted as a matter of urgency.
PP. The UK's academic institutions provide a rich feeding ground for China to achieve political influence in the UK and economic advantage over the UK. China exerts influence over institutions, individual UK academics and Chinese students in order to control the narrative of debate about China—including through the use of Confucius Institutes in the UK—and it directs or steals UK academic research to obtain Intellectual Property in order to build, or short-cut to, Chinese expertise. However, the academic sector has not received sufficient advice on, or protection from, either.
QQ. In seeking political influence, there are obvious and repeated examples of Chinese attempts to interfere and stifle debate amongst the academic community in the UK. Universities are reliant on student fees, and the vast number of Chinese students in the UK—it is striking that there are more than five times the number than for any other country—provides China with significant leverage, which it is not afraid to exert. Yet the Government had shown very little interest in warnings from Academia: at the time of drafting, there was no point of contact in the Government for those in the sector to seek advice on these issues.
RR. In its quest for economic advantage, China often acts in plain sight—directing, funding and collaborating on academic research for its own ends. In particular, it seeks to benefit the Chinese military through research on dual-use technologies, which is often unclassified in its early stages. There is a question as to whether academic institutions are alive to the threat posed by such collaboration, particularly given that they often accept transfer of Information Data and Intellectual Property as a condition of funding. While some have expressed concern, others seem to be turning a blind eye, happy simply to take the money.
SS. The UK Government must ensure that transparency around the source of foreign donations to Higher Education institutions is improved: a public register of donations must be created by the Department for Education and monitored by the State Threats Unit in the Home Office.
TT. Academia is also an 'easy option' when it comes to the theft of Intellectual Property, by taking advantage of collaborative projects to steal information which is less protected than it might be in the private sector or the Ministry of Defence, for example. The vast number of Chinese students—particularly post-graduates—in academic institutions in the UK that are involved in cutting-edge research must therefore raise concerns, given the access and opportunities they are afforded.
UU. At present, HMG still seems to be trying to understand the threat from Chinese students stealing Intellectual Property from UK Academia, or the Chinese subverting UK research to its own ends, at the most basic level—i.e. what it is they are trying to steal. There is still no comprehensive list of the areas of sensitive UK research that need protecting from China. Identifying these key areas of research must be a priority, and they must be communicated to Academia as a matter of urgency so that protective action can be taken. Unless and until this is done, then the UK is handing China a clear economic advantage over the UK, and indeed the rest of the world.
​VV. Unlike other countries, such as the United States (US), the UK has taken no preventative action. This is particularly concerning, as US restrictions on Chinese students will make UK institutions more attractive to those seeking to gain Intellectual Property and expertise. The Research Collaboration Advice Team should submit a quarterly report on the progress and outcomes of its work to the State Threats Unit in the Home Office to ensure there is cross-government awareness of the scale of the issue.
WW. It is clear that the Academic Technology Approval Scheme (ATAS) is an effective tool. Once the Government has identified the sensitive areas of research that need protecting from China, consideration should be given to ensuring that ATAS certificates are required for foreign nationals undertaking post-graduate study in UK institutions in those areas. Furthermore, we recommend that ATAS be expanded to cover postgraduate doctoral study.
XX. Tackling the threat in relation to Academia could have been an example of the Fusion Doctrine working seamlessly—with each policy department clearly contributing to an overall goal. But, as in so many areas, the devolution of responsibility for security to policy departments means that the ball is being dropped on security. Policy departments still do not have the understanding needed and have no plan to tackle it.
YY. This must change: there must be an effective cross-government approach to Academia, with clear responsibility and accountability for countering this multifaceted threat. In the meantime, China is on hand to collect—and exploit—all that the UK's best and brightest achieve as the UK knowingly lets it fall between the cracks.
ZZ. China is seeking technological dominance over the West and is targeting the acquisition of Intellectual Property and data in ten key industrial sectors in which the Chinese Communist Party intends China to become a world leader—many of which are fields where the UK has particular expertise.
AAA. As this Committee has previously warned, the West is over-reliant on Chinese technology. As the role of technology in everyday life increases exponentially, so therefore the UK will be at an increasing disadvantage compared to China—with all the attendant risks for our security and our prosperity. British technology and innovation is therefore critical and must be robustly protected.
BBB. China's joined-up approach can be clearly seen from its use of all possible legitimate routes to acquire UK technology, Intellectual Property and data—from buy‑in at the 'front end' via Academia, to actual buying-in through licensing agreements and Foreign Direct Investment, to the exertion of control over inward investments and standards-setting bodies. Each represents an individual threat, but it is the cumulative threat that can now be clearly seen.
CCC. Overt acquisition routes have been welcomed by HMG for economic reasons, regardless of risks to national security. The threat to future prosperity and independence was discounted in favour of current investment. This was short-sighted, and allowed China to develop significant stakes in various UK industries and Critical National Infrastructure.
​DDD. Without swift and decisive action, we are on a trajectory for the nightmare scenario where China steals blueprints, sets standards and builds products, exerting political and economic influence at every step. Such prevalence in every part of the supply chain will mean that, in the export of its goods or services, China will have a pliable vehicle through which it can also export its values. This presents a serious commercial challenge, but also has the potential to pose an existential threat to liberal democratic systems.
EEE. We welcome the Government's attribution of attacks to the Chinese hacking group APT10. Public condemnation of such groups explicitly linked to the Chinese government is an essential tool in tackling the increasing cyber threat from China. The Government should continue to work with allies to highlight and condemn hostile Chinese government activity.
FFF. The threat posed by Chinese targeting of experts in UK Industry is of concern. While the expulsion of intelligence officers and the disruption of Chinese efforts are to be commended, the lack of prosecutions is worrying. We note that the Government is intending to introduce new legislation that will make it easier to prosecute such behaviour. Convictions under such new legislation would act as a strong deterrent to those contemplating engaging in such relationships.
GGG. The scale of investments by the China General Nuclear Power Group in the UK Civil Nuclear sector—and its willingness to undergo expensive and lengthy regulatory approval processes—demonstrates China's determination to become a permanent and significant player in the UK Civil Nuclear sector, as a stepping stone in its bid to become a global supplier. Involvement will provide China with an opportunity to develop its expertise and gain both experience and credibility as a partner.
HHH. The question is to what extent the Government is prepared to let China invest in such a sensitive sector, for the sake of investment, and whether the security risks have been clearly communicated to Ministers—and understood. The Government would be naïve to assume that allowing Chinese companies to exert influence over the UK's Civil Nuclear and Energy sectors is not ceding control to the Chinese Communist Party.
III. Using the fact that Hinkley Point C will be operated by a French company as justification for allowing Chinese involvement was obfuscatory: the Government clearly knew that that decision would lead to it allowing the use of Chinese technology and Chinese operational control at Bradwell B. It is astonishing that the investment security process for Hinkley Point C did not therefore take Bradwell B into account. It is unacceptable for the Government still to be considering Chinese involvement in the UK's Critical National Infrastructure (CNI) at a granular level, taking each case individually and without regard for the wider security risk. It is imperative that linked investments are considered in the round and that Ministers are consulted on the cumulative security risk brought by linked Chinese investments. Effective Ministerial oversight in this area is still lacking, more than eight years on from the Committee's Report on the national security implications of foreign involvement in the UK's CNI.
​JJJ. We have serious concerns about the incentive and opportunity for espionage that Chinese involvement in the UK's Civil Nuclear sector provides. Investment in Hinkley Point C opened the door, but for the UK to allow the China General Nuclear Power Group to build and operate Bradwell B would be opening a direct channel from the UK nuclear enterprise to the Chinese state.
KKK. While we accept that the risk posed by physical access to Civil Nuclear sites is overshadowed by the vulnerabilities exposed by Chinese investment and operational control, it would be wrong to dismiss the former outright. The Government recognises the risk that a digital back door into the UK’s Critical National Infrastructure might create, but the risk posed by the literal back door of human actors with access to sensitive sites should not be dismissed.
LLL. We are reassured that the Intelligence Community have recognised the *** vulnerability that potentially lies in the supply chains: effort to protect against cyber attacks must include the supply chains.
MMM. While we recognise that the threat of disruption is less likely, the threat of leverage is very real: the fact that China will be able to exert some control over the UK's Critical National Infrastructure will complicate the Government’s calculations in its broader approach to China. In other words, it may not be possible to separate the Civil Nuclear sector from wider geopolitical and diplomatic considerations.
NNN. Unlike the Civil Nuclear sector, the Energy sector appears to provide China with less potential for leverage, as it does not have the same long-term reliance issues that we see in the Civil Nuclear sector. Nevertheless, there are concerns in relation to the threat to the Energy sector from economic espionage (particularly in the area of new 'green' energy) and disruption.
OOO. We reiterate that foreign investment cases cannot be looked at in isolation and on their own merits. It is absurd that the (then) Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS) considered that foreign investment in the Civil Nuclear sector did not need to be looked at in the round: we question how any department can consider that a foreign country single-handedly running our nuclear power stations shouldn't give pause for thought. This clearly demonstrates that BEIS does not have the expertise to be responsible for such sensitive security matters.
PPP. Previous investments in the sector, or the potential for there to be 'legitimate expectation' that an investment in one area ought to facilitate a linked investment, must be taken into account. If the Investment Security Unit fails to do so, then it will be unable to counteract the 'whole-of-state' approach so effectively utilised by China (amongst others).
​QQQ. The regulation of the Civil Nuclear sector (through the Office of Nuclear Regulation (ONR)) is robust. However, we have not been able to evaluate the effectiveness of the ONR in countering Hostile State Activity—indeed, when we tried to ascertain whether the powers held by the ONR were sufficient to protect national security, witnesses from the Agencies and the Cabinet Office were unable to answer. Given the significant Chinese investment in this sector, we recommend that a review of the ONR's ability to counter Hostile State Activity is undertaken.
RRR. Should the Government allow China General Nuclear Power Group (CGN) to build and operate the proposed Hualong One reactor at Bradwell (or any other UK nuclear power station), we recommend that the Government set up a 'cell'—a 'nuclear' version of the Huawei Cyber Security Evaluation Centre—in order to monitor the technology and its operation and address any perceived risks arising from the involvement of CGN in the UK’s Civil Nuclear sector.
SSS. While it is understandable that *** —given that Hinkley Point C is still under construction, and the remainder had not been approved at the time of writing—the finished projects must be subject to detailed (and continuing) scrutiny by the Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure and the Intelligence Community. We expect to be kept informed of the advice provided by the Agencies and key decision timelines.
TTT. Although Chinese involvement in, and control over, UK nuclear power stations is deeply concerning, it offers only a small snapshot of the attempt to gain control over a range of sectors, and technologies, by an increasingly assertive China. The Government should commission an urgent review to examine and report on the extent to which Chinese involvement in the sector should be minimised, if not excluded.
UUU. Now is not the time to try to reach conclusions about Chinese intent or actions over the origins and development of the pandemic—it is still too soon, as it is likely that more information will come to light about Covid-19 as investigations continue. Initial work *** does appear to support public statements made by the World Health Organization and the Intelligence Community in the United States that the virus was not man-made and China did not deliberately let it spread—beyond cultural issues around failure.
VVV. However, those cultural issues—a failure to share information due to a reluctance to pass bad news up the chain, and a tendency to censor press and social media reports considered to present a negative impression—were in themselves extremely damaging to efforts to contain and, later, counter the disease. Attempts by China to suggest that the pandemic originated elsewhere show an unwillingness to change its approach—a concern, given the possibility of future pandemics.
WWW. During the pandemic, sectors not traditionally considered 'critical'—such as organisations working on a vaccine, supermarkets, logistics, haulage and medical equipment supply companies—became essential to the UK's response. The support of the Intelligence Community was key to protect the vaccine supply chain and to counter the interest shown in these 'critical' areas by hostile foreign actors.
​XXX. The key issue for the future is the extent to which China will now capitalise on the pandemic as other countries suffer its effects and how the UK Intelligence Community and their allies will stop this growing threat.
YYY. In terms of the work of the Intelligence Community generally, while it may have been reasonable for staff to work partially from home during the pandemic, it would obviously not be feasible for organisations that rely on secret material to carry out all their work over less secure systems. Yet even now, with the country having fully reopened, we continue to see the Intelligence Community working partially from home (some more than others). It appears that the response to our requests for information has slowed dramatically as a result: the 'new normal' for some organisations means deadlines have been missed or responses have been sanitised to enable them to be sent from home. This has had—and continues to have—an impact on the Committee's ability to scrutinise security and intelligence issues properly and in a timely fashion.
ZZZ. The pandemic had a notable impact in terms of staff across the Intelligence Community working from home, without continual access to classified systems—other than for those working on the most critical priorities. In this respect we take the opportunity to pay tribute to the Committee's own staff, who have continued to work from the office full time (a rarity in the Civil Service) so as to ensure that the Committee was able to function efficiently and effectively.
* ↑ Foreign involvement in the Critical National Infrastructure, Cm 8629, 6 June 2013.
* ↑ Oral evidence—GCHQ, *** October 2020.
* ↑ Written evidence—GCHQ, 12 June 2019.
* ↑ As previously noted, as part of the restructure of several government departments in February 2023, the Investment Security Unit (ISU) has returned from BEIS to the Cabinet Office. The Committee has not been in a position during this Inquiry to scrutinise the effectiveness of this transfer, or the reasons behind it. In principle, we would have welcomed the move to return the ISU to the Cabinet Office, where the relevant security expertise, capabilities and infrastructure are more likely to be in place. However, as outlined earlier, unfortunately, effective oversight has not been put in place.
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