# Intelligence and Security Committee China report/Case Study: Academia

PART TWO: CASE STUDIES
* CHINESE INTERFERENCE IN UK ACADEMIA................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................103
* Influence and interference................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................103
* Economic advantage................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................109
* THE GOVERNMENT RESPONSE................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................115
* Who: Taking responsibility for tackling influence and interference................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................115
* How: Taking action on influence and interference................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................116
* What: Understanding the threat from theft and subversion................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................116
* How: Taking action on economic advantage................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................117
As we have noted in Part One, the UK is a target for China in its efforts to build global support for its core interests, to mute international criticism and to gain economically. To achieve these aims, China seeks 'political influence' in the UK and 'economic advantage' over the UK. During this Inquiry, we have examined the influence and advantage China seeks through three areas: Academia, Industry and Technology, and Civil Nuclear energy. We explore the threat and response to these three key areas in the subsequent Case Studies, starting with Chinese interference in UK Academia.
* The UK's academic institutions provide a rich feeding ground for China to achieve both political influence and economic advantage by both:
** controlling the narrative of debate about China within UK universities by exerting influence over institutions, individual UK academics and Chinese students; and
** obtaining Intellectual Property (IP) by directing or stealing UK academic research in order to build, or short-cut to, Chinese expertise.
* These strands can often overlap, and the UK Intelligence Community assess that it is not always clear which is the driver: "it is difficult to know if interference is the priority or whether it is a by-product of trying to acquire sensitive material and expertise".
* What is clear from our Inquiry is that the academic sector has not received sufficient advice on, or protection from, either.
* The External Expert witnesses who gave evidence to the Committee were very clear that Chinese attempts to interfere and stifle debate amongst the academic community in the UK are a significant problem, and they provided us with numerous examples.
* By contrast, historically, the Intelligence Community considered that, while China had "***" to interfere in UK Academia, there was not a broad evidence base for this—although it is not clear whether this was because the evidence was not there or the Intelligence Community were not looking for it. In June 2019, we were told by the Deputy National Security Adviser (DNSA) that examining the threat from interference to Academia was a "work in progress" and that there was not a "comprehensive understanding of the picture". However, towards the latter stages of our Inquiry it was recognised that evidence of malign Chinese interference in UK Academia appeared to be growing.
* Pressure is primarily exerted on institutions, academics and students to prevent engagement with topics that harm the positive narrative presented by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). This is particularly acute when it involves the so-called 'Five Poisons' ​ (Taiwanese independence, Tibetan independence, Xinjiang separatists, the Chinese democracy movement and the Falun Gong).
UK universities: Funding from overseas student fees
UK universities are reliant on income from students in order to operate. A decade ago, university funding comprised 72% public funding, with student fees providing 23%, but this has since been reversed, with student fees now making up 73% of funding. (There are other sources of income available to UK universities such as residences, catering, investments and endowments—but fees are the most significant revenue stream.) In recent years, the number of 'home' students (who have their fees capped) has remained static whilst the number of overseas students has increased. Figures from February 2021 show that, in 2018/19, international (non-European Union) students accounted for 14% of UK university students, and their fees accounted for 14.4% of the total income of all UK universities.
* The fees paid by international students account for a large—and increasing—share of university income. The profit universities are able to make from teaching international students helps to fund loss-making activities, such as research. Chinese students make up the largest overseas contingent of students in UK universities. Although estimates vary, it is believed that, in 2019, there were more than 120,000 Chinese students—more in the UK than in the rest of Europe combined. China sends five times as many students to the UK as any other country does. To put it in perspective, reporting in 2020 showed that there were only 27,000 students from India, the next largest source of international students in the UK.
* In financial terms, it was estimated that, in 2017/18, Chinese students were responsible for generating almost £600m, which makes up a very significant proportion of universities' income. HMG evidence provided in September 2020 noted that the Department for Education (DfE) was working on "geographically diversifying" the recruitment of foreign students—presumably to counteract the current over-reliance on income from Chinese students.
* While the numbers are clearly significant, the question is whether, and if so how, China is actively using this 'buying power' as leverage. An article in The Times in 2019 reported that the intelligence Agencies were "concerned that a reliance on Chinese money and students, particularly postgraduates paying up to £50,000 a year in fees, makes some universities particularly vulnerable [to influence and interference by the Chinese government]". During this Inquiry, we were told that "China likely seeks to exert influence ​ over UK universities by threatening to withdraw scholarships or funding for Chinese nationals in the UK". ***.
* Indeed, in some cases, China does not even have to issue a threat. Professor Steve Tsang (Director of the China Institute at the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS))—who is known for being willing to challenge the CCP's narrative—told the Committee that institutions were actively avoiding taking action themselves for fear of upsetting the Chinese: he had been asked by *** the University of Nottingham not to accept any media requests during the visit of President Xi Jinping to the UK in 2015, for fear of causing offence to the Chinese.
* In terms of exerting control and influence, China does not just rely on the leverage that its student fees buy it; it also provides direct investment to academic institutions so that it can guarantee input into academic programmes, direct research (discussed later in this Case Study) and ensure that UK students are taught an interpretation of China that reflects the CCP's interests. The latter is primarily conducted through the Confucius Institutes in the UK.
* There are 29 Confucius Institutes in the UK, with more than 160,000 registered students (not all of whom will be Chinese). They carry out entirely legitimate activities, such as fostering cultural ties and providing language teaching. However, they have also been accused of stifling academic debate about sensitive issues, such as Tibet. Confucius Institutes are run, and part-funded, by the Hanban, an educational organisation that is ultimately controlled by the CCP's Central Propaganda Department—an association that means that comparisons with the British Council or the Institut Français are misleading at best. The Hanban's charter stipulates that Confucius Institutes must obey Chinese law.
* Confucius Institutes often occupy premises on university campuses free of charge, and some also provide funding to the university with which they are associated, meaning that the line between the institutions can become blurred. For example, it has previously been reported that the Nottingham University School of Contemporary Chinese Studies received money from the university's Confucius Institute to fund core academic activities—thereby giving it influence over who came to speak at the university on Chinese issues.
* The Intelligence Community assess that Confucius Institutes are utilised by the Chinese government in order to dissuade universities from engaging in debates that the CCP considers to be unsuitable topics. The Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) Chair told us in October 2020 that the operations of Confucius Institutes were primarily concerning for their role in intimidation: The Confucius Institutes, I would say, are more of an instrument for pursuing that and at one level, if one takes it as a purely cultural issue, one could equate it with the British Council, but of course nothing in China is that simple and they are undoubtedly following a government line.
* China not only seeks influence at an institutional level but will also target individual academics who focus on China, seeking to ensure that they act in the CCP's best interests either through professional inducements or, if that doesn't work, by intimidation.
* China appears prepared to use levers, such as research funding and travel opportunities, to cultivate relationships with academics, and to encourage them to change their research direction or course content in line with CCP objectives. We heard from the External Experts that this can be very direct—Professor Steve Tsang told us that, within six months of him taking up a new appointment at SOAS, a political counsellor from the Chinese embassy approached him, offering him anything he wanted in an attempt to curry favour: "It is as blatant as that."
* If positive incentives do not work, the Chinese government is willing to apply pressure in other ways. The JIC Chair told us that they were aware of: examples of intimidation, in different ways, sometimes with the Vice Chancellor getting a phone call, sometimes at student body level, to try to discourage universities from allowing speakers on issues like Tibet or Xinjiang. Lord Patten told the Foreign Affairs Committee that, when, in the early days of his tenure as Chancellor of the University of Oxford, the Dalai Lama was invited to speak by the university's Buddhist Society, "within 48 hours I had the then-Chinese ambassador on the phone saying, 'This is a disgraceful insult to the People's Republic of China', and so on". He refused to intervene. On a different occasion, the Vice Chancellor of the University of Oxford was asked by the Chinese embassy to prevent Lord Patten from visiting Hong Kong; she also refused.
* Chinese visas are also used as leverage. Professor Tsang stated: "Research for academics entering China is weaponised. You say something that they don't like, they deny you a visa." As visas are essential to the academic research of many UK-based China scholars, this makes them a powerful lever that can be used to deter criticism of the CCP and its policies. In October 2020, the Chief of SIS told the Committee: If you are an academic and you are specialising in China, and your entire academic life is focused on China, the threat of not allowing you to travel to the country of your academic [focus] is a very powerful threat.
* China also seeks to monitor and control Chinese students' behaviour—primarily via the network of Chinese Students and Scholars Associations (CSSAs). There are reportedly more than 90 CSSAs in the UK, all based at universities, and they are actively supported—and at least partly financed—by the Chinese embassy. The CSSAS ostensibly exist to look after the interests of Chinese students in the UK, organising cultural activities for Chinese and non-Chinese students, and providing practical advice to Chinese students on living and studying in the host country. However, CSSAS are—along with Confucius Institutes—assessed to be used by the Chinese state to monitor Chinese students overseas and to exert influence over their behaviour. Professor Steve Tsang told the Committee: The student bodies are infiltrated … We know that … there are meetings that happen through the middle of the night and the following morning some Chinese students can get rung up by somebody at the cultural or education section of the embassy to ask them: why did you say that? Why did you do that?
* This would appear to be resulting in a culture of fear and suspicion among Chinese students in the UK. According to Professor Tsang, "we are seeing that … in the class where there is only one Chinese student, that Chinese student usually engages in discussions and debates much more openly than in a class that has quite a few Chinese, [where] they don't know who [if anyone] is going to report on them". The protests in Hong Kong, and subsequent demonstrations in support of the protesters by some ethnic Chinese students in the UK, have brought to the fore the pressure exerted on Chinese students in the UK by the Chinese embassy and CSSAS.
* Examples of such behaviour have been reported throughout the Western world over the past decade, but awareness of the issue has increased in recent years. The perception that the Chinese government is interfering with academic freedom across the world—including through surveillance of its own students overseas via Confucius Institutes, CSSAS and other means—is such that, in 2019, the non-governmental organisation (NGO) Human Rights Watch issued a Code of Conduct to help universities protect themselves against Chinese academic interference, the Code called for the rejection of Confucius Institutes and restrictions on CSSAS.
Pressures on Chinese students in the UK
* In November 2019, a Chinese student was photographed in Edinburgh with a sign supporting Hong Kong citizens' demands for free elections. The following day, he was secretly photographed at Edinburgh Airport while escorting his mother to her flight. Both pictures were circulated on Weibo, the Chinese social media site, by someone who believed he was returning to Chengdu, his hometown. The post—entitled 'Brothers from Chengdu, beat him to death'—contained the flight number and a call for him to be arrested by police or assaulted by citizens. It was shared 10,000 times.
* In November 2019, it was reported that the Glasgow CSSA— which acknowledges that "the Chinese embassy is one of the sponsors of our events"—had promoted 'flash mobs' to confront Hong Kong demonstrations. One Hong Kong student who had attended protests in Edinburgh said that "there is Chinese embassy involvement in these demonstrations … They surrounded us in a circle, waving Chinese flags, singing the national anthem and being threatening and hostile." A spokesman for the Chinese consulate in Edinburgh told The Times: "It is totally justifiable and understandable for Chinese students to express their indignation and opposition to words and actions that attempt to split the nation and smear China's image."
* A Hong Kong student at the University of Sheffield reported that he and his friends were surrounded by mainland Chinese students when they were handing out pro-democracy leaflets: "A glass was thrown at one of my friends and one of our flags was broken … We were terrified. In Sheffield there are nearly 4,000 Chinese students and only a few hundred Hong Kong students … It's the fear of what they might do that scares us. We are sure we will be on watch lists when we go home." On another occasion, a film screening by Hong Kong students at Aston University, in Birmingham, was interrupted by mainland Chinese students who attempted to video those attending.
* ↑ Written evidence—NSS, 31 January 2020.
* ↑ Written evidence—HMG, 31 May 2019.
* ↑ Oral evidence—NSS, *** July 2019.
* ↑ Higher Education funding in England', House of Commons Library, 19 November 2021.
* ↑ 'Coronavirus: Financial impact on higher education', House of Commons Library, 8 February 2021.
* ↑ 'Coronavirus: Financial impact on higher education', House of Commons Library, 8 February 2021.
* ↑ 'Coronavirus: Financial impact on higher education', House of Commons Library, 8 February 2021.
* ↑ 'Number of international students at UK universities jumps', Financial Times, 16 January 2020.
* ↑ Written evidence—***, February 2019.
* ↑ Written evidenc—HMG, 14 September 2020.
* ↑ 'Security Services fear the march on universities of Beijing's spies', The Times, 27 October 2019.
* ↑ Written evidence—***, *** May 2019.
* ↑ Written evidence—***, *** May 2019.
* ↑ Oral evidence—Professor Steve Tsang (SOAS), 9 May 2019.
* ↑ Oral evidence—JIO, *** October 2020.
* ↑ Oral evidence—Professor Steve Tsang (SOAS), 9 May 2019.
* ↑ Oral evidence—JIO, *** October 2020.
* ↑ 'Security Services fear the march on universities of Beijing's spies', The Times, 27 October 2019.
* ↑ Charles Parton, 'China-UK Relations: Where to Draw the Border Between Influence and Interference', Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), 20 February 2019.
* ↑ Oral evidence—Professor Steve Tsang (SOAS), 9 May 2019. Professor Tsang has himself been denied a visa by China in the past.
* ↑ Oral evidence—SIS, *** October 2020.
* ↑ 'Authoritarian Advance: Responding to China's Growing Political Influence in Europe', Benner et al, Global Public Policy Institute, February 2018.
* ↑ Written evidence—***, *** May 2019.
* ↑ Oral evidence—Professor Steve Tsang (SOAS), 9 May 2019.
* ↑ Oral evidence—Professor Steve Tsang (SOAS), 9 May 2019.
* ↑ 'China: Government Threats to Academic Freedom Abroad', Human Rights Watch, 21 March 2019.
* ↑ 'Hong Kong crisis: Beat Edinburgh University student to death, Chinese students told', The Times, 26 November 2019.
* ↑ 'Beijing is backing attacks against us, say Hong Kong students in Scotland', The Times, 28 November 2019.
* ↑ 'Security Services fear the march on universities of Beijing's spies', The Times, 27 October 2019.
* ↑ 'Security Services fear the march on universities of Beijing's spies', The Times, 27 October 2019.
* ↑ We note that MI5 issued an espionage alert on an individual working in think tanks and Academia who was in regular contact with Chinese intelligence officers. ('Joint Address by MI5 and FBI Heads', www.mi5.gov.uk/news/speech-by-mi5-and-fbi, 6 July 2022.)
* ↑ Oral evidence—MI5, *** December 2019.
* ↑ Written evidence—***, *** May 2019.
* ↑ Oral evidence—Charles Parton (RUSI), 9 May 2019.
* ↑ Written evidence—***, February 2019.
* ↑ Oral evidence—NCSC, *** July 2019.
* ↑ US Presidential Proclamation 10043 of May 29, 2020.
* ↑ 'Suspension of Entry as Non-immigrants of Certain Students and Researchers From the People's Republic of China', Federal Register, 4 June 2020.
* ↑ 'Picking flowers, making honey—The Chinese military's collaboration with foreign universities', Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 26 October 2018.
* ↑ 'China: A New World Order—Episode 3: IP Theft', BBC, 12 September 2019.
* ↑ 'Picking flowers, making honey—The Chinese military's collaboration with foreign universities', Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 26 October 2018.
* ↑ 'Picking flowers, making honey—The Chinese military's collaboration with foreign universities', Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 26 October 2018.
* ↑ 'China hushes up scheme to recruit overseas scientists', Financial Times, 10 January 2019.
* ↑ 'The China Threat: Chinese Talent Plans Encourage Trade Secret Theft, Economic Espionage', FBI website, accessed 26 April 2023.
* ↑ 'Threats to the US Research Enterprise: China's Talent Recruitment Plans', US Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 18 November 2019.
* ↑ Written evidence—HMG, 18 April 2019.
* ↑ www.gov.uk/guidance/controls-on-dual-use-goods
* ↑ Written evidence—HMG, 18 April 2019.
* ↑ Written evidence—HMG, 10 December 2019.
* ↑ Written evidence—HMG, 10 December 2019.
* ↑ 'Graphene partnership could deliver next generation of aircraft', press release by the University of Manchester, 7 December 2015.
* ↑ 'Inadvertently arming China? The Chinese military complex and its potential exploitation of scientific research at UK universities', Civitas, February 2021.
* ↑ 'Chances of hypersonic travel heat up with new materials discovery', press release by the University of Manchester, 6 July 2017.
* ↑ Written evidence—HMG, 18 April 2019.
* ↑ 'How the West's research aids China's military', Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 30 October 2018.
* ↑ Written evidence—GCHQ, 31 July 2019.
* ↑ Written evidence—HMG, 18 April 2019.
* ↑ Oral evidence—JIO, *** October 2020.
* ↑ Written evidence—HMG, 18 April 2019.
* ↑ 'UK Universities to stick with Huawei despite Oxford University's decision to suspend funding', CityAM.com, 18 January 2019.
* ↑ 'A cautious embrace: defending democracy in an age of autocracies: Government Response to the Committee's Second Report of Session 2019, First Special Report of Session 2019-21', House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, 17 February 2020.
* ↑ Oral evidence—NSS, *** July 2019.
* ↑ Oral evidence—NSS, *** December 2020.
* ↑ Now the Business and Trade Committee, as of 26 April 2023.
* ↑ The Government's Fusion Doctrine aims "to deploy security, economic and influence capabilities to protect, promote and project our national security, economic and influence goals". (HMG, National Security Capability Review, March 2018.)
* ↑ Written evidence—HMG, 14 September 2020.
* ↑ 'Universities to comply with free speech duties or face sanction', Department for Education, Office for Students, 12 May 2021.
* ↑ Oral evidence—NCSC, *** July 2019.
* ↑ Oral evidence—HMG, *** October 2020.
* ↑ Oral evidence—GCHQ, *** October 2020.
* ↑ Oral evidence—GCHQ, *** July 2019.
* ↑ Oral evidence—NCSC, *** July 2019.
* ↑ Dedicated government team to protect researchers' work from hostile activity', GOV.UK, 25 May 2021, [https://www.gov.uk/government/news/dedicated-government-team-to-protect-researchers-work-from-hostile-activity www.gov.uk/government/news/dedicated-government-team-to-protect-researchers-work-from-hostile-activity]
* ↑ Oral evidence, NSS—*** December 2020.
* ↑ In some instances in this Report, we have substituted an ISC-specific code word where it has been necessary to refer to the name of an operation or project, in order to protect classified information. No significance is intended by, nor should be inferred from, the matching of code words to real operation names. The ISC code words have no operational significance.
* ↑ 'Managing Risks in Internationalisation: Security Related Issues', Universities UK, 15 October 2020, [https://www.universitiesuk.ac.uk/policy-and-analysis/reports/Documents/2020/managing-risks-in-internationalisation.pdf www.universitiesuk.ac.uk/policy-and-analysis/reports/Documents/2020/managing-risks-in-internationalisation.pdf
* ↑ Written evidence—***, CPNI and NCSC.
* ↑ Oral evidence—NCSC, *** July 2019.
* ↑ Oral evidence—NSS, *** December 2020.
* ↑ Written evidence—HMG, 18 April 2019.
* ↑ Written evidence—DI, 31 July 2019.
* ↑ Oral evidence—DI, *** October 2020; GOV.UK guidance on the Academic Technology Approval Scheme (accessed 20 October 2020).
* ↑ 'Student Vetting: The UK’s Academic Technology Approval Scheme', Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, February 2015.
* ↑ 'Guidance on how to apply for an ATAS certificate', Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, 14 May 2021.
* ↑ Written evidence—HMG, 2 February 2021.
* ↑ 'Chinese students face ban amid security fears', The Times, 1 October 2020.
* ↑ Oral evidence—DI, *** December 2020.
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