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# Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers: Series I/Volume IX/Homily on the Paralytic Let Down Through the Roof
## Contents

* Title Page
* Homily
# Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers: Series I/Volume IX/Homily on the Paralytic Let Down Through the Roof/Title Page

St. Chrysostom:
Homily
on the paralytic let down through the roof: and concerning the equality of the divine father and the son.
translated by
rev. w. r. w. stephens, m.a.,
prebendary of chichester cathedral, and rector of woolbeding, sussex.
# Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers: Series I/Volume IX/Homily on Matt. xxvi. 19/Title Page

St. Chrysostom:
Homily
on the passage (Matt. xxvi. 19), “father if it be possible let this cup pass from me,” etc., and against marcionists and manichæans.
translated by
rev. w. r. w. stephens, m.a.,
prebendary of chichester cathedral, and rector of woolbeding, sussex.
# Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers: Series I/Volume II/City of God/Book XIII/Chapter 8

Chapter 8.—That the Saints, by Suffering the First Death for the Truth’s Sake, are Freed from the Second.
For if we look at the matter a little more carefully, we shall see that even when a man dies faithfully and laudably for the truth’s sake, it is still death he is avoiding. For he submits to some part of death, for the very purpose of avoiding the whole, and the second and eternal death over and above. He submits to the separation of soul and body, lest the soul be separated both from God and from the body, and so the whole first death be completed, and the second death receive him everlastingly. Wherefore death is indeed, as I said, good to none while it is being actually suffered, and while it is subduing the dying to its power; but it is meritoriously endured for the sake of retaining or winning what is good. And regarding what happens after death, it is no absurdity to say that death is good to the good, and evil to the evil. For the disembodied spirits of the just are at rest; but those of the wicked suffer punishment till their bodies rise again,—those of the just to life everlasting, and of the others to death eternal, which is called the second death.
# Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers: Series I/Volume II/City of God/Book XIV

Book XIV.
Argument—Augustin again treats of the sin of the first man, and teaches that it is the cause of the carnal life and vicious affections of man. Especially he proves that the shame which accompanies lust is the just punishment of that disobedience, and inquires how man, if he had not sinned, would have been able without lust to propagate his kind.

## Contents

* Chapter 1
* Chapter 2
* Chapter 3
* Chapter 4
* Chapter 5
* Chapter 6
* Chapter 7
* Chapter 8
* Chapter 9
* Chapter 10
* Chapter 11
* Chapter 12
* Chapter 13
* Chapter 14
* Chapter 15
* Chapter 16
* Chapter 17
* Chapter 18
* Chapter 19
* Chapter 20
* Chapter 21
* Chapter 22
* Chapter 23
* Chapter 24
* Chapter 25
* Chapter 26
* Chapter 27
* Chapter 28

## Footnotes

* ↑ This book is referred to in another work of Augustin’s (contra Advers. Legis et Prophet, i. 18), which was written about the year 420.
# Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers: Series I/Volume II/City of God/Book XIV/Chapter 12

Chapter 12.—Of the Nature of Man’s First Sin.
If any one finds a difficulty in understanding why other sins do not alter human nature as it was altered by the transgression of those first human beings, so that on account of it this nature is subject to the great corruption
we feel and see, and to death, and is distracted and tossed with so many furious and contending emotions, and is certainly far different from what it was before sin, even though it were then lodged in an animal body,—if, I say, any one is moved by this, he ought not to think that that sin was a small and light one because it was committed about food, and that not bad nor noxious, except because it was forbidden; for in that spot of singular felicity God could not have created and planted any evil thing. But by the precept He gave, God commended obedience, which is, in a sort, the mother and guardian of all the virtues in the reasonable creature, which was so created that submission is advantageous to it, while the fulfillment of its own will in preference to the Creator’s is destruction. And as this commandment enjoining abstinence from one kind of food in the midst of great abundance of other kinds was so easy to keep,—so light a burden to the memory,—and, above all, found no resistance to its observance in lust, which only afterwards sprung up as the penal consequence of sin, the iniquity of violating it was all the greater in proportion to the ease with which it might have been kept.
# Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers: Series I/Volume II/City of God/Book XIII/Chapter 9

Chapter 9.—Whether We Should Say that The Moment of Death, in Which Sensation Ceases, Occurs in the Experience of the Dying or in that of the Dead.
The point of time in which the souls of the good and evil are separated from the body, are we to say it is after death, or in death rather? If it is after death, then it is not death which is good or evil, since death is done with and past, but it is the life which the soul has now entered on. Death was an evil when it was present, that is to say, when it was being suffered by the dying; for to them it brought with it a severe and grievous experience, which the good make a good use of. But when death is past, how can that which no longer is be either good or evil? Still further, if we examine the matter more closely, we shall see that even that sore and grievous pain which the dying experience is not death itself. For so long as they have any sensation, they are certainly still alive; and, if still alive, must rather be said to be in a state previous to death than in death. For when death actually comes, it robs us of all bodily sensation,
which, while death is only approaching is painful. And thus it is difficult to explain how we speak of those who are not yet dead, but are agonized in their last and mortal extremity, as being in the article of death. Yet what else can we call them than dying persons? for when death which was imminent shall have actually come, we can no longer call them dying but dead. No one, therefore, is dying unless living; since even he who is in the last extremity of life, and, as we say, giving up the ghost, yet lives. The same person is therefore at once dying and living, but drawing near to death, departing from life; yet in life, because his spirit yet abides in the body; not yet in death, because not yet has his spirit forsaken the body. But if, when it has forsaken it, the man is not even then in death, but after death, who shall say when he is in death? On the one hand, no one can be called dying, if a man cannot be dying and living at the same time; and as long as the soul is in the body, we cannot deny that he is living. On the other hand, if the man who is approaching death be rather called dying, I know not who is living.
# Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers: Series I/Volume II/City of God/Book XIV/Chapter 10

Chapter 10.—Whether It is to Be Believed that Our First Parents in Paradise, Before They Sinned, Were Free from All Perturbation.
But it is a fair question, whether our first parent or first parents (for there was a marriage of two), before they sinned, experienced in their animal body such emotions as we shall not experience in the spiritual body when sin has been purged and finally abolished. For if they did, then how were they blessed in that boasted place of bliss, Paradise? For who that is affected by fear or grief can be called absolutely blessed? And what could those persons fear or suffer in such affluence of blessings, where neither death nor ill-health was feared, and where nothing was wanting which a good will could desire, and nothing present which could interrupt man’s mental or bodily enjoyment? Their love to God was unclouded, and their mutual affection was that of faithful and sincere marriage; and from this love flowed a wonderful delight, because they always enjoyed what was loved. Their avoidance of sin was tranquil; and, so long as it was maintained, no other ill at all could invade them and bring sorrow. Or did they perhaps desire to touch and eat the forbidden fruit, yet feared to die; and thus both fear and desire already, even in that blissful place, preyed upon those first of mankind? Away with the thought that such could be the case where there was no sin! And, indeed, this is already sin, to desire those things which the law of God forbids, and to abstain from them through fear of punishment, not through love of righteousness.  Away, I say, with the thought, that before there was any sin, there should already have been committed regarding that fruit the very sin which our Lord warns us against regarding a woman:  “Whosoever looketh on a woman to lust after her, hath committed adultery with her already in his heart.” As happy, then, as were these our first parents, who were agitated by no mental perturbations, and annoyed by no bodily discomforts, so happy should the whole human race have been, had they not introduced that evil which they have transmitted to their posterity, and had none of their descendants committed iniquity worthy of damnation; but this original blessedness continuing until, in virtue of that benediction which said, “Increase and multiply,” the number of the predestined saints should have been completed, there would then have been bestowed that higher felicity which is enjoyed by the most blessed angels,—a blessedness in which there should have been a secure assurance that no one would sin, and no one die; and so should the saints have lived, after no taste of labor, pain, or death, as now they shall live in the resurrection, after they have endured all these things.

## Footnotes

* ↑ Matt. v. 28.
* ↑ Gen. i. 28.
# Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers: Series I/Volume II/City of God/Book XIV/Chapter 1

Chapter 1.—That the Disobedience of the First Man Would Have Plunged All Men into the Endless Misery of the Second Death, Had Not the Grace of God Rescued Many.
We have already stated in the preceding books that God, desiring not only that the human race might be able by their similarity of nature to associate with one another, but also that they might be bound together in harmony and peace by the ties of relationship, was pleased to derive all men from one individual, and created man with such a nature that the members of the race should not have died, had not the two first (of whom the one was created out of nothing, and the other out of him) merited this by their disobedience; for by them so great a sin was committed, that by it the human nature was altered for the worse, and was transmitted also to their posterity, liable to sin and subject to death. And the kingdom of death so reigned over men, that the deserved penalty of sin would have hurled all headlong even into the second death, of which there is no end, had not the undeserved grace of God saved some therefrom. And thus it has come to pass, that though there are very many and great nations all over the earth, whose rites and customs, speech, arms, and dress, are distinguished by marked differences, yet there are no more than two kinds of human society, which we may justly call two cities, according to the language of our Scriptures. The one consists of those who wish to live after the flesh, the other of those who wish to live after the spirit; and when they severally achieve what they wish, they live in peace, each after their kind.
# Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers: Series I/Volume II/City of God/Book XIV/Chapter 14

Chapter 14.—Of the Pride in the Sin, Which Was Worse Than the Sin Itself.
But it is a worse and more damnable pride which casts about for the shelter of an excuse even in manifest sins, as these our first parents did, of whom the woman said, “The serpent beguiled me, and I did eat;” and the man said, “The woman whom Thou gavest to be with me, she gave me of the tree, and I did eat.” Here there is no word of begging pardon, no word of entreaty for healing. For though they do not, like Cain, deny that they have perpetrated the deed, yet their pride seeks to refer its wickedness to another,—the woman’s pride to the serpent, the man’s to the woman. But where there is a plain trangression of a divine commandment, this is rather to accuse than to excuse oneself. For the fact that the woman sinned on the serpent’s persuasion, and the man at the woman’s offer, did not make the transgression less, as if there were any one whom we ought rather to believe or yield to than God.

## Footnotes

* ↑ Gen. iii. 12, 13.
# Morgan v. Virginia

* related portals: Supreme Court of the United States.
* sister projects: Wikipedia article, Wikidata item.

## Dissenting Opinion

    Burton
United States Supreme Court
328 U.S. 373
Morgan v. Virginia
Argued: March 27, 1946. --- Decided: June 3, 1946
Appeal from the Supreme Court of Appeals of the State of virginia.
Messrs. William H. Hastie, of Washington, D.C., and Thurgood Marshall, of New York City, for appellant.
Mr. Abram P. Staples, of Richmond, Va., for appellee.
Mr. Justice REED delivered the opinion of the Court.

## Notes

This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
Public domainPublic domainfalsefalse
# Morico v. United States/Opinion of the Court

* Court Documents
* Case Syllabus
* Per Curiam Opinion of the Court
United States Supreme Court
399 U.S. 526
William Philip MORICO v. UNITED STATES.
Motions for leave to proceed in forma pauperis in Misc. Nos. 35, 88, and 738, granted. The petitions for writs of certiorari are granted, the judgments are vacated, and the cases are remanded for further consideration in light of Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 90 S.Ct. 1792, 26 L.Ed.2d 308.
THE CHIEF JUSTICE, Mr. Justice STEWART, Mr. Justice WHITE, and Mr. Justice BLACKMUN are of the opinion that certiorari should be denied.

## Notes

This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
Public domainPublic domainfalsefalse
# Morissette v. United States

Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952), is a U.S. Supreme Court case, relevant to the legal topic of criminal intent. Warning: template has been deprecated.

## Concurring Opinion

    Douglas
United States Supreme Court
342 U.S. 246
Morissette v. United States
Argued: Oct. 9-10, 1951. --- Decided: Jan 7, 1952
Mr. Andrew J. Transue, Flint, Mich., for petitioner.
Mr. Robert W. Ginnane, Washington, D.C., for respondent.
Mr. Justice JACKSON delivered the opinion of the Court.

## Notes

This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
Public domainPublic domainfalsefalse
# Morissette v. United States/Concurrence Douglas

* Court Documents
* Case Syllabus
* Opinion of the Court
* Concurring Opinion Douglas
* Wikipedia article
United States Supreme Court
342 U.S. 246
Morissette v. United States
Argued: Oct. 9-10, 1951. --- Decided: Jan 7, 1952
Mr. Justice DOUGLAS concurs in the result.
Mr. Justice MINTON took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

## Notes

This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
Public domainPublic domainfalsefalse
# Morgan v. United States (81 U.S. 531)/Opinion of the Court

* Court Documents
* Case Syllabus
* Opinion of the Court
* Wikipedia article
United States Supreme Court
81 U.S. 531
Morgan v. United States
These claimants cannot recover, on the ground that the injuries to their vessel were occasioned by the tortious act of the quartermaster at Brazos in compelling their master, against his better judgment, to proceed to sea; nor would their condition be improved if the vessel had been actually impressed into the service of the United States, for in neither case would the Court of Claims have jurisdiction. Congress has wisely reserved to itself the right to give or withhold relief where the claim is founded on the wrongful proceedings of an officer of the government.
The case, therefore, rests wholly on the contract of affreightment, and the inquiry is, which of the parties to it must bear the loss caused by the stranding of the claimants' vessel on the bar at the mouth of the harbor of Brazos.
The stipulations in the contract applicable to this subject leave no room for doubt how the question should be answered. The United States, being in a state of war, found it necessary to hire the injured vessel for the purpose of transporting troops and munitions of war to different ports and places, and entered into a contract with her owners to carry this purpose into effect. The vessel was to be officered and manned by the owners, who agreed at all times to keep her in repair and fit for the service in which she was engaged. In no sense were the United States the owners of the vessel, for they had nothing to do with her management, and only reserved to themselves the right to say how she should be loaded and where she should go. In the condition of things then existing it became necessary to make provision for two classes of perils. This was done; the United States assuming the war risk, while the owners of the boat agreed to bear the marine risk. If, therefore, the stranding of the boat in going over the bar was owing to a peril of the sea, her owners, and not the government, must bear the loss. That the high wind and low stage of water were the efficient agents in producing this disaster are too plain for controversy. They were the proximate causes of it, and in obedience to the rule causa proxima non remota spectatur we cannot proceed further in order to find out whether the fact of war did not create the exigency which compelled the employment of the vessel. If it did, it was known to the owners when the charter-party was formed, who, with this knowledge, became their own insurers against the usual sea risks, and must abide the consequences of their stipulation.
There is a certain degree of hardship in this case growing out of the peremptory order of the quartermaster to proceed to sea, but this is outside of the contract, and, if worthy of being considered at all, must be addressed to another department of the government.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.

## Notes

This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
Public domainPublic domainfalsefalse
# Morimura Arai Company v. Taback

* related portals: Supreme Court of the United States.
* sister projects: Wikidata item.
United States Supreme Court
279 U.S. 24
Morimura Arai Company v. Taback
Argued: Oct. 9, 1928. --- Decided: Feb 18, 1929
Mr. James D. Carpenter, Jr., of Jersey City, N. J., for petitioner.
Mr. Frederic M. P. Pearse, of Newark, N. J., for respondents.
Mr. Justice SANFORD delivered the opinion of the Court.

## Notes

This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
Public domainPublic domainfalsefalse
# Morico v. United States

* related portals: Supreme Court of the United States.
* sister projects: Wikidata item.
United States Supreme Court
399 U.S. 526
William Philip MORICO v. UNITED STATES.
On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
PER CURIAM.

## Notes

This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
Public domainPublic domainfalsefalse
# Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers: Series I/Volume V/On the Merits and Forgiveness of Sins, and on the Baptism of Infants/Book III/Chapter 2

Chapter 2 [II.]—Pelagius’ Objection; Infants Reckoned Among the Number of Believers and the Faithful.
In these terms, then, the argument is stated:—“But they who deny the transmission of sin endeavour to impugn it thus: If (say they) Adam’s sin injured even those who do not sin, therefore Christ’s righteousness also profits even those who do not believe; because ‘In like manner, nay, much more,’ he says, ‘are men saved by one, than they had previously perished by one.’” Now to this argument, I repeat, I advanced no reply in the two books which I previously addressed to you; nor, indeed, had I proposed to myself such a task. But now I beg you first of all to observe, when they say, “If Adam’s sin injures even those who do not sin, then Christ’s righteousness also profits even those who do not believe,” how absurd and false they judge it to be, that the righteousness of Christ should profit even those who do not believe; and that thence they think to put together such an argument as this: That no more could the first man’s sin possibly do injury to infants who commit no sin, than the righteousness of Christ can benefit any who do not believe. Let them therefore tell us what is the benefit of Christ’s righteousness to baptized infants; let them by all means tell us what they mean. For of course, since they do not forget that they are Christians themselves, they have no doubt that there is some benefit. But whatever be this benefit, it is incapable (as they themselves assert) of benefiting those who do not believe. Whence they are compelled to class baptized infants in the number of believers, and to assent to the authority of the Holy Universal Church, which does not account those unworthy of the name of believers, to whom the righteousness of Christ could be, according to them, of no use except as believers. As, therefore, by the answer of those, through whose agency they are born again, the Spirit of righteousness transfers to them that faith which, of their own will, they could not yet have; so the sinful flesh of those, through whose agency they are born, transfers to them that injury, which they have not yet contracted in their own life. And even as the Spirit of life regenerates them in Christ as believers, so also the body of death had generated them in Adam as sinners. The one generation is carnal, the other Spiritual; the one makes children of the flesh, the other children of the Spirit; the one children of death, the other children of the resurrection; the one the children of the world, the other the children of God; the one children of wrath, the other children of mercy; and thus the one binds them under original sin, the other liberates them from the bond of every sin.