# Students for Fair Admissions v. President and Fellows of Harvard College/Opinion of Justice Kavanaugh

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Nos. 20–1199 and 21–707
STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC., PETITIONER 20–1199v.20–1199 PRESIDENT AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC., PETITIONER 21–707v.21–707 UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA, ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT [June 29, 2023]
Justice Kavanaugh, concurring.
I join the Court’s opinion in full. I add this concurring opinion to further explain why the Court’s decision today is consistent with and follows from the Court’s equal protection precedents, including the Court’s precedents on race-based affirmative action in higher education.
Ratified in 1868 in the wake of the Civil War, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides: “No State shall … deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U. S. Const., Amdt. 14, §1. In accord with the Fourteenth Amendment’s text and history, this Court considers all racial classifications to be constitutionally suspect. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U. S. 306, 326 (2003); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U. S. 303, ​306–308 (1880). As a result, the Court has long held that racial classifications by the government, including race-based affirmative action programs, are subject to strict judicial scrutiny.
Under strict scrutiny, racial classifications are constitutionally prohibited unless they are narrowly tailored to further a compelling governmental interest. Grutter, 539 U. S., at 326–327. Narrow tailoring requires courts to examine, among other things, whether a racial classification is “necessary”—in other words, whether race-neutral alternatives could adequately achieve the governmental interest. Id., at 327, 339–340; Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U. S. 469, 507 (1989).
Importantly, even if a racial classification is otherwise narrowly tailored to further a compelling governmental interest, a “deviation from the norm of equal treatment of all racial and ethnic groups” must be “a temporary matter”—or stated otherwise, must be “limited in time.” Id., at 510 (plurality opinion of O’Connor, J.); Grutter, 539 U. S., at 342.
In 1978, five Members of this Court held that race-based affirmative action in higher education did not violate the Equal Protection Clause or Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, so long as universities used race only as a factor in admissions decisions and did not employ quotas. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265, 325–326 (1978) (joint opinion of Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ.); id., at 287, 315–320 (opinion of Powell, J.). One Member of the Court’s five-Justice majority, Justice Blackmun, added that race-based affirmative action should exist only as a temporary measure. He expressed hope that such programs would be “unnecessary” and a “relic of the past” by 1988—within 10 years “at the most,” in his words—although he doubted that the goal could be achieved by then. Id., at 403 (opinion of Blackmun, J.).
In 2003, 25 years after Bakke, five Members of this Court ​again held that race-based affirmative action in higher education did not violate the Equal Protection Clause or Title VI. Grutter, 539 U. S., at 343. This time, however, the Court also specifically indicated—despite the reservations of Justice Ginsburg and Justice Breyer—that race-based affirmative action in higher education would not be constitutionally justified after another 25 years, at least absent something not “expect[ed].” Ibid. And various Members of the Court wrote separate opinions explicitly referencing the Court’s 25-year limit.
* Justice O’Connor’s opinion for the Court stated: “We expect that 25 years from now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be necessary to further the interest approved today.” Ibid.
* Justice Thomas expressly concurred in “the Court’s holding that racial discrimination in higher education admissions will be illegal in 25 years.” Id., at 351 (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part).
* Justice Thomas, joined here by Justice Scalia, reiterated “the Court’s holding” that race-based affirmative action in higher education “will be unconstitutional in 25 years” and “that in 25 years the practices of the Law School will be illegal,” while also stating that “they are, for the reasons I have given, illegal now.” Id., at 375–376.
* Justice Kennedy referred to “the Court’s pronouncement that race-conscious admissions programs will be unnecessary 25 years from now.” Id., at 394 (dissenting opinion).
* Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice Breyer, acknowledged the Court’s 25-year limit but questioned it, writing that “one may hope, but not firmly forecast, that over the next generation’s span, progress toward nondiscrimination and genuinely ​equal opportunity will make it safe to sunset affirmative action.” Id., at 346 (concurring opinion).
In allowing race-based affirmative action in higher education for another generation—and only for another generation—the Court in Grutter took into account competing considerations. The Court recognized the barriers that some minority applicants to universities still faced as of 2003, notwithstanding the progress made since Bakke. See Grutter, 539 U. S., at 343. The Court stressed, however, that “there are serious problems of justice connected with the idea of preference itself.” Id., at 341 (internal quotation marks omitted). And the Court added that a “core purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to do away with all governmentally imposed discrimination based on race.” Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted).
The Grutter Court also emphasized the equal protection principle that racial classifications, even when otherwise permissible, must be a “ ‘temporary matter,’ ” and “must be limited in time.” Id., at 342 (quoting Croson, 488 U. S., at 510 (plurality opinion of O’Connor, J.)). The requirement of a time limit “reflects that racial classifications, however compelling their goals, are potentially so dangerous that they may be employed no more broadly than the interest demands. Enshrining a permanent justification for racial preferences would offend this fundamental equal protection principle.” Grutter, 539 U. S., at 342.
Importantly, the Grutter Court saw “no reason to exempt race-conscious admissions programs from the requirement that all governmental use of race must have a logical end point.” Ibid. The Court reasoned that the “requirement that all race-conscious admissions programs have a termination point assures all citizens that the deviation from the norm of equal treatment of all racial and ethnic groups is a temporary matter, a measure taken in the service of the goal of equality itself.” Ibid. (internal ​quotation marks and alteration omitted). The Court therefore concluded that race-based affirmative action programs in higher education, like other racial classifications, must be “limited in time.” Ibid.
The Grutter Court’s conclusion that race-based affirmative action in higher education must be limited in time followed not only from fundamental equal protection principles, but also from this Court’s equal protection precedents applying those principles. Under those precedents, racial classifications may not continue indefinitely. For example, in the elementary and secondary school context after Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483 (1954), the Court authorized race-based student assignments for several decades—but not indefinitely into the future. See, e.g., Board of Ed. of Oklahoma City Public Schools v. Dowell, 498 U. S. 237, 247–248 (1991); Pasadena City Bd. of Ed. v. Spangler, 427 U. S. 424, 433–434, 436 (1976); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Ed., 402 U. S. 1, 31–32 (1971); cf. McDaniel v. Barresi, 402 U. S. 39, 41 (1971).
In those decisions, this Court ruled that the race-based “injunctions entered in school desegregation cases” could not “operate in perpetuity.” Dowell, 498 U. S., at 248. Consistent with those decisions, the Grutter Court ruled that race-based affirmative action in higher education likewise could not operate in perpetuity.
As of 2003, when Grutter was decided, many race-based affirmative action programs in higher education had been operating for about 25 to 35 years. Pointing to the Court’s precedents requiring that racial classifications be “temporary,” Croson, 488 U. S., at 510 (plurality opinion of O’Connor, J.), the petitioner in Grutter, joined by the United States, argued that race-based affirmative action in higher education could continue no longer. See Brief for Petitioner 21–22, 30–31, 33, 42, Brief for United States 26–27, in Grutter v. Bollinger, O. T. 2002, No. 02–241.
​The Grutter Court rejected those arguments for ending race-based affirmative action in higher education in 2003. But in doing so, the Court struck a careful balance. The Court ruled that narrowly tailored race-based affirmative action in higher education could continue for another generation. But the Court also explicitly rejected any “permanent justification for racial preferences,” and therefore ruled that race-based affirmative action in higher education could continue only for another generation. 539 U. S., at 342–343.
Harvard and North Carolina would prefer that the Court now ignore or discard Grutter’s 25-year limit on race-based affirmative action in higher education, or treat it as a mere aspiration. But the 25-year limit constituted an important part of Justice O’Connor’s nuanced opinion for the Court in Grutter. Indeed, four of the separate opinions in Grutter discussed the majority opinion’s 25-year limit, which belies any suggestion that the Court’s reference to it was insignificant or not carefully considered.
In short, the Court in Grutter expressly recognized the serious issues raised by racial classifications—particularly permanent or long-term racial classifications. And the Court “assure[d] all citizens” throughout America that “the deviation from the norm of equal treatment” in higher education could continue for another generation, and only for another generation. Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted).
A generation has now passed since Grutter, and about 50 years have gone by since the era of Bakke and DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U. S. 312 (1974), when race-based affirmative action programs in higher education largely began. In light of the Constitution’s text, history, and precedent, the Court’s decision today appropriately respects and abides by Grutter’s explicit temporal limit on the use of race-based affirmative action in higher ​education.
Justice Sotomayor, Justice Kagan, and Justice Jackson disagree with the Court’s decision. I respect their views. They thoroughly recount the horrific history of slavery and Jim Crow in America, cf. Bakke, 438 U. S., at 395–402 (opinion of Marshall, J.), as well as the continuing effects of that history on African Americans today. And they are of course correct that for the last five decades, Bakke and Grutter have allowed narrowly tailored race-based affirmative action in higher education.
But I respectfully part ways with my dissenting colleagues on the question of whether, under this Court’s precedents, race-based affirmative action in higher education may extend indefinitely into the future. The dissents suggest that the answer is yes. But this Court’s precedents make clear that the answer is no. See Grutter, 539 U. S., at 342–343; Dowell, 498 U. S., at 247–248; Croson, 488 U. S., at 510 (plurality opinion of O’Connor, J.).
To reiterate: For about 50 years, many institutions of higher education have employed race-based affirmative action programs. In the abstract, it might have been debatable how long those race-based admissions programs could continue under the “temporary matter”/“limited in time” equal protection principle recognized and applied by this Court. Grutter, 539 U. S., at 342 (internal quotation marks omitted); cf. Dowell, 498 U. S., at 247–248. But in 2003, the Grutter Court applied that temporal equal ​protection principle and resolved the debate: The Court declared that race-based affirmative action in higher education could continue for another generation, and only for another generation, at least absent something unexpected. Grutter, 539 U. S., at 343. As I have explained, the Court’s pronouncement of a 25-year period—as both an extension of and an outer limit to race-based affirmative action in higher education—formed an important part of the carefully constructed Grutter decision. I would abide by that temporal limit rather than discarding it, as today’s dissents would do.
To be clear, although progress has been made since Bakke and Grutter, racial discrimination still occurs and the effects of past racial discrimination still persist. Federal and state civil rights laws serve to deter and provide remedies for current acts of racial discrimination. And governments and universities still “can, of course, act to undo the effects of past discrimination in many permissible ways that do not involve classification by race.” Croson, 488 U. S., at 526 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (internal quotation marks omitted); see id., at 509 (plurality opinion of O’Connor, J.) (“the city has at its disposal a whole array of race-neutral devices to increase the accessibility of city contracting opportunities to small entrepreneurs of all races”); ante, at 39–40; Brief for Petitioner 80–86; Reply Brief in No. 20–1199, pp. 25–26; Reply Brief in No. 21–707, pp. 23–26.
In sum, the Court’s opinion today is consistent with and follows from the Court’s equal protection precedents, and I join the Court’s opinion in full.