# United States v. Child Company/Opinion of the Court

* Court Documents
* Case Syllabus
* Opinion of the Court
* Dissenting Opinion Clifford
United States Supreme Court
79 U.S. 232
United States v. Child Company
3d. Because the acceptance by the appellees of the money awarded by the commission does not of itself furnish evidence that the appellees accepted payment of such sum as a compromise. There is not a single fact in this case which sustains such an assumption. A compromise as defined by Mr. Justice Bouvier in his valuable Law Dictionary, is 'an agreement between two or more persons who, to avoid a lawsuit, settle their differences on such terms as they can agree upon.'
The opinion of the Court of Claims, given in the official report of this case below, tells the circumstances under which the money paid on these contracts was received by the appellees. This opinion, though indeed no part of the findings or of the record, is of course founded on the evidence given in the case, and is to be entirely relied on. It shows that the court had in its mind, as a very important element of the case, a fact omitted to be found specifically in the technical 'finding;' but which, of course, they supposed would be obvious from the nature of the case.
Payment was accepted, because, from the outlays which Child & Company had made on behalf of the government, they were 'reduced then to the verge of bankruptcy.' The sums dealt in were very large. That house-indeed few houses-could long remain out of so vast a sum and not become bankrupt. The government cannot be subjected to the influences which oblige private debtors to pay their debts. It pays no interest for withholding even the greatest sums, though, by confession, justly due. Acceptance of payment from such debtors, in such an emergency as Child & Company were placed in by the non-payment, was payment accepted under duress. Formerly, indeed, it was held that illegal restraint of the person was necessary to constitute duress, and that a detention of papers or goods of the party would not be duress. That doctrine is now, by numerous cases, exploded. Indeed, in Astley v. Reynolds, so far back as the time of Strange, speaking of a payment of money made under prudential influences, the court says: 'We think also this a payment by compulsion. The plaintiff might have such an immediate want of his goods that an action of trover would not do his business. Where the rule volenti non fit injuria is applied, it must be where the party has his freedom of exercising his will.'
The defence made by the receipt of a part of the claim, is at best one of the most technical character, and by a proud government ought not to be allowed to defeat a claim, if it be a just one, for property advanced to it in a crisis where its very existence was in peril, and in a region where the claimants were the faithful few among the faithless.
Mr. Justice MILLER delivered the opinion of the court.
The claim of the appellees for the sum of $478,119.62 was examined by the special commission appointed by the President. It allowed the sum of $315,008.15 on the demand, and rejected the remainder of $163,111.47. The claimants accepted the sum so allowed by the commission, gave receipts in full of the accounts included in the demand, and have brought this suit to recover the amount rejected by the commission.
These facts are undisputed, and part of the findings of the Court of Claims in the case. If they stood alone they would bring it within the principles laid down by this court in the case of the United States against Adams. That case was twice argued before us and affirmed by a full bench, and as we are satisfied with the principles on which it was decided they must govern us in passing on subsequent cases, so far as they fall within its rulings.
But the claimants contend that other facts found by the Court of Claims take this case out of the propositions laid down for the government of that case, and entitle them to an affirmance of the judgment rendered in their favor by the Court of Claims. An important difference between the two is said to exist in the fact that Adams voluntarily submitted his claim to the commission we have mentioned, and the claimants in this case did not. And it is insisted that this submission constituted an important, if not a controlling element in the decision of the Adams case.
The court in discussing the question of the conclusiveness of a receipt which Adams had given in order to obtain possession of his vouchers, and which he asserted to have been obtained by duress, says: 'In the view we have taken of the case, the giving of the receipt is of no legal importance. The bar to any further legal demand against government does not rest upon this acquittance, but upon the voluntary submission of the claims to the board; the hearing and final decision thereon; the receipt of the vouchers containing the sum or account found due to the claimant, and the acceptance of the payment of that amount under the act of Congress providing therefor.'
Counsel for the claimants construing the phrase 'voluntary submission,' here used, to mean such a submission as would constitute the commissioners a board of arbitrators, or at all events, such a submission as would render their decision legally conclusive, deny that the parties in the present case ever made such a submission. As much importance seems to have been given to this question by both parties, an order was obtained from this court on motion of the appellants directing the Court of Claims to make a more specific finding of facts on that subject. Such a supplementary finding is in the present record, and that court says, among other things, that the claims of the claimants were never submitted to said commission. But they further say in this supplementary finding, that the claimants had, in some manner not shown to the court, presented or given notice of their claim against the United States to the said commission, but that they had not presented their original vouchers, or any proofs, to the said commission. They also find that the claimants appeared before said commission with witnesses, but what they testified to is not shown.
Taking these findings together, it seems to us that the Court of Claims meant to say that the claimants did not submit their claims to the commission as arbitrators, or with intent that their decision should be conclusive, but that they did present their claims and did appear to support them with witnesses. This view of their meaning is confirmed by reference to their original finding, in which it is said that 'claimants on their part never submitted their vouchers to the arbitration or decision of the commission.' No doubt these were the facts of the case; and as to this part of it they come fairly within the decision of the court in Adams's case.
In the opinion of the court then delivered, it is held that this board had no authority to compel parties to submit their claims to it, and that its decisions were not conclusive when they did submit them. The court, referring to the various ways open to claimants to obtain satisfaction of their demands, and after speaking of an application to Congress, a suit in the Court of Claims, and a submission to this special commission, adds: 'This tribunal afforded an additional advantage over others, namely, that if, after the hearing and adjustment of the claims, the claimants were not satisfied, they were free to dissent and look for redress to the only legal tribunals provided in such cases.' And to the application of Adams to remand the case to the court below, founded on the allegation that the Court of Claims had made a mistake in finding that he had submitted his claim to the board, this court responds: 'Though it is true that the appellee did not present his claim to the board, as stated in the finding in the record on appeal, it cannot, in view of the original record of the evidence before the Court of Claims, be denied that he made himself a party to the proceedings and took the benefit of the adjustment of his accounts by them, which brings the case within the principle decided in 7th Wallace.'
But though the claimants might have refused to abide by the decision of the board and sought relief from the Court of Claims or from Congress, they did not do so.
We lay out of view in this case, as in the Adams case, the receipts which they gave, under protest, in order to regain possession of their vouchers. But we cannot disregard the finding of the Court of Claims that, after Congress had appropriated money to pay the sums found due by the commissioners, the claimants received the amount so allowed, and signed upon each voucher a receipt whereby they acknowledged having received said reduced amount 'in full of the above account.' And that at the time of receiving this payment they made no formal objection or protest, but were required to and did sign the receipt above described.
Although it is found by the court that these receipts were not under seal and were without consideration, the latter statement must have some meaning not apparent to us, in view of the other fact found also, that over $315,000 was paid to the claimants on those accounts at the time they gave the receipts.
To avoid the legal effect of these facts it is argued that not only in giving the receipts above mentioned, but also in accepting the money for which they were given, the complainants acted under duress.
We can hardly conceive of a definition of duress that would bring this case within its terms. Authorities are cited to show that where, under peculiar circumstances, property is withheld from the owner and he is forced to pay some unjust demand to obtain possession of it, he can afterwards maintain a suit for the money so paid. But no case can be found, we apprehend, where a party who, without force or intimidation and with a full knowledge of all the facts of the case, accepts on account of an unliquidated and controverted demand, a sum less than what he claims and believes to be due him, and agrees to accept that sum in full satisfaction, has been permitted to avoid his act on the ground that this is duress. If the principle contended for here be sound, no party can safely pay by way of compromise any sum less than what is claimed of him, for the compromise will be void as obtained by duress. The common and generally praiseworthy procedure by which business men every day sacrifice part of claims which they believe to be just to secure payment of the remainder would always be duress, and the compromise void.
But it is argued that the government should be held to a different rule than that which applies to private parties. It is said that the amount in dispute here was so large that the claimants were compelled to accept what was offered, to avoid bankruptcy.
No fact found by the Court of Claims, or otherwise presented by the record, justifies us in supposing that the claimants were threatened with insolvency, and the circumstance that the claim which was the subject of the compromise was a very large one can hardly be accepted in a court of law of equity as a reason for setting it aside. If indeed there was any such pressing motive in the minds of the as influenced them strongly to of their private affairs as infiuenced them strongly to accept the offer of the government, it cannot, in the absence of fraud or constraint on its part, invalidate the settlement.
It seems to us that this case, under the ordinary principles of law applicable to its class, is free from embarrassment.
If there had been no reference to, and no finding by, the commission, it would still remain true, that here was a claim, the justice of which had been denied and the amount that was due on it had been in dispute for nearly two years. The government finally says to the claimants: 'We will pay you a certain sum on this disputed claim provided you will take it in full satisfaction of the whole;' when, without intimidation, without fraud or concealment on the part of the government, without protest or objection on their part, the claimants accept the money offered and sign a receipt acknowledging it to be in full of the whole claim. Is not this a legal and binding compromise of the disputed demand? Is it not a voluntary adjustment of the matter in dispute between the parties? And we think that it is a strong additional argument in favor of the validity of this settlement, when it is called in question in court, that the sum so agreed upon was found to be a balance justly due on the claim by a commission of three capable and honest men, appointed by the government to ascertain what was due, and that before this commission the other party presented his claim and produced his witnesses, and was allowed a full and fair hearing to any extent that he desired.
In this view of the case it is of no avail to urge that the Court of Claims has found that the whole claim was just and ought to be paid. After the compromise that question was no longer open to inquiry. It is of the very essence of such adjustments of disputed rights that the contest shall be closed; and whatever consideration might be given the finding of the Court of Claims on that subject in another department of the government, this department, which sits to administer the law, must be governed by its recognized principles.
JUDGMENT REVERSED and the case remanded to the Court of Claims, with directions to render judgment
IN FAVOR OF THE UNITED STATES.
Mr. Justice CLIFFORD, with whom concurred the CHIEF JUSTICE, dissenting:

## Notes

* ↑ White v. Heylman, 10 Casey, 142; Ripley v. Gelston, 9 Johnson, 201; Wheeler v. Smith, 9 Howard, 55; Elliott v. Swartwout, 10 Peters, 137; Hearsey v. Pruyn, 7 Johnson, 179; Ashmole v. Wainwright, 2 Queen's Bench, 837; Wakefield v. Newbon, 6 Ib. 281; Parker v. The Great Western R. R. Co., 7 Manning & Granger, 253; Harmony v. Bingham, 1 Duer, 229; Shaw v. Woodcock, 7 Barnewall & Cresswell, 73; Atlee v. Backhouse, 3 Meeson & Welsby, 633.
* ↑ 2 Strange, 916; and see Collins v. Westbury, 2 Bay, 214.
* ↑ 9 Wallace, 554.
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