# History of the War between the United States and Mexico/Chapter 13

Contents
CHAPTER XIII.
EL MOLINO DEL REY.
The Armistice — Fruitless attempt at Negotiation — Bad faith of the Mexican authorities — Political dissensions — Violation and Rupture of the Truce — Correspondence between General Scott and Santa Anna — Reconnaissances — Assault of El Molino del Rey and Casa de Mala — Severity of the Action — The enemy driven from their Position.
With a victorious enemy knocking at the gates of the Capital, and the booming thunder of their artillery echoing through the valley, the Mexican government and people had cause for alarm and apprehension. Their last stronghold was at the mercy of the conqueror. They had been steadily driven from one defence to another,—and the final overwhelming defeat at Contreras and Churubusco, filled the city with consternation. In this season of tribulation there was no !ack of counsellors. Some, mindful of the heroism displayed by their gallant kinsmen at Saragossa, exhorted their countrymen to convert every house into a fortification, and, if summoned to surrender, to return, as their only answer, "War, to the knife!" Others appealed to the memories of Iturbide, Hidalgo, and Morelos, the. heroes of Mexican Independence, and entreated their descendants to imitate their bravery and daring. The enemies of Santa Anna attributed the disasters which had befallen the armies of the republic, to his incompetency as a commander; but this was no time for unavailing complaints. The peril was imminent,—the crisis immediate. There was but one alternative:— ​they must either abandon the indefensible position which they had hitherto occupied, — that of refusing to hear any proposition from the American government, — or prepare to meet her soldiers, foot to foot, for a last struggle, like the dauntless Guatemozin and his brave Aztecs, at their own firesides.
Santa Anna and his ministers instantly decided upon procuring a cessation of hostilities, — not so much with the hope of concluding a peace, unless it would leave him firmly seated in power, as for the purpose of gaining time to revive the spirits of his soldiers, and to strengthen the defences of the city. At his instigation, the British Consul, with other foreign residents, visited General Scott, on the night of the 20th of August, while the smoke of the conflict still lingered over the battle field, and admonished him not to be too precipitate, lest a spirit of national desperation should be aroused, and the war unnecessarily protracted. They also represented, that the Mexican President was disposed to enter into negotiations, but that the influence of his enemies was so great, and the popular prejudices were such, that he was unable to make the first advances. Remembering that his mission was to conquer, not the country, but a fair and honorable peace, General Scott had already determined to give the enemy time for reflection, and to sacrifice to patriotism, "the eclat that would have followed an entrance, sword in hand, into a great capital. Though nothing definite was decided on at this interview, his visitors parted from him with the assurance, that he would do nothing derogatory to the character he had exhibited throughout the campaign, — that of a magnanimous victor. ​While making his preparations at Coyoacan, on the morning of the 21st, to take up the necessary battering or assaulting positions, to authorize him to summon the city to surrender, General Scott was waited on by General Mora y Villamil, who came out to propose a truce. The terms which were suggested being unsatis- factory, the American commander dispatched his con- templated note to Santa Anna, omitting the summons to surrender, and signifying his willingness to consent to an armistice with a view to negotiation. On the same day a reply was received from Alcorta, the Mexi- can Minister of War, accepting the proposition, and stating that Generals Mora y Villamil and Quijano had been appointed Commissioners on the part of the Mexi- can government, to settle the terms of the armistice. Generals Quitman, P. F. Smith, and Pierce, were se- lected by General Scott to represent the American army; and on the 21th instant, the armistice, signed by the Commissioners, was duly ratified by the command- ers of the two armies. ​The convention thus agreed upon,—which was to remain in force while negotiations were in progress, or until formal notice should be given, by either commander, of its cessation, and for forty-eight hours thereafter,—provided, among other conditions, that neither army should be reinforced during its continuance; that nothing should be done to enlarge or strengthen any work of offence or defence, within thirty leagues of the city of Mexico; that no new work of that character should be commenced; that the passage of supplies from the country into the city, and from the city or the country into the American camp, should not be obstructed; and that trade should remain unmolested.
Immediately after the conclusion of the armistice, Generals Herrera and Nora y Villamil, and Señores Conto and Atristain, were appointed Commissioners by the Mexican authorities, to treat with Mr. Trist, the American Commissioner, who had accompanied General Scott from Puebla. The mission of the latter was solely a precautionary measure, adopted in consequence of the distance from the seat of war to the capital of the United States; and as the confidential agent of the Executive, with very little discretionary power, he took with him the projét, or outlines, of a treaty prepared at Washington. ​Several conferences were held between the Commissioners of the two governments, and on the 27th of August, Mr. Trist submitted a proposition, in accordance with his instructions, which provided, in substance, that there should be a ﬁrm and universal peace; that all forts, with their armaments, and all territories and possessions, captured by the American army, belonging to Mexico, under the terms of the treaty, should be restored to her; that the boundary line between the two republics should be the Rio Grande, to its intersection with the southern boundary of New Mexico, and thence to run along such boundary, and the western line of New Mexico, to the ﬁrst branch, or to some point nearest the first branch of the Rio Gila, and thence down the Rio Gila, the Rio Colorado, and the Gulf of California, to the Pacific ocean; and that, as a consideration for this extension of the boundaries of the United States, the latter should satisfy the claims of her citizens against the Mexican government, and, in addition thereto, pay to Mexico a certain sum of money, to be ﬁxed upon before signing the treaty.
It was well understood by the Commissioners of both countries, that Mexico was without the means to discharge the American claims, and indemnify the United States for the expenses of the war, except by the cession of some part of her territory. But the Mexican Commissioners were unwilling to adopt the Rio Grande as a boundary line, or to cede any thing, except an inconsiderable portion of California. Prevarication and delay characterized their proceedings, as they had ​formerly done those of other Mexican negotiators. At a conference held on the 2nd of September, Mr. Trist stated to the Mexican Commissioners, that if they would submit to him a proposition, — providing that the boundary line should follow the course of the Nueces to the Laguna de las Yuntas—thence running westward to the Rio Puerco — thence up that river to the parallel of latitude. six geographical miles north of the fort at El Pasa del Norte, on the Rio Grande — thence west along that parallel to the western boundary Of New Mexico — thence, following the line prescribed in his ﬁrst proposition, to the mouth of the Rio Gila—thence up or down that river to the thirty-third parallel of latitude—and thence along that parallel to the Pacific ocean; and that the territory between the Rio Grande and the Nueces should remain forever neutral, to be occupied by the citizens of neither republic, — he would transmit it to his government by express, and await its action.
The Mexican Commissioners were willing to submit this proposition, or rather they professed a willingness to submit it, but refused to grant the necessary time for ​Mr. Trist to communicate with his government. The insincerity of the professions of the Mexican authorities in relation to their desire to conclude a peace, was now made manifest; but, on the 6th of September, their Commissioners, aware that they must submit some formal proposition, in order to preserve appearances, presented to Mr. Trist a counter-projét, in which it was required that all forts, with their armaments, and all territories and possessions captured by the American army, and all the artillery taken outside such forts, should be restored; that the dividing line between the two republics should be the Nueces to its source,— thence to run, in a straight line, to the east-south-east frontier of New Mexico—thence along the boundary of New Mexico, on the east, north, and west, to the thirty-seventh degree of latitude—and thence along that parallel to the Pacific ocean—Mexico undertaking not to found any new settlements or colonies in the territory lying between the Nueces and the Rio Grande; that the United States should pay the American claims, and also make a pecuniary compensation to Mexico; and further, that the claims of Mexican citizens, for injuries sustained in the prosecution of the war by the American army, should be satisfied by the government of the United States.
Leaving out of view the other objectionable features of the counter-projét of the Mexican Commissioners,— the surrender of the artillery captured outside of the permanent fortifications of Mexico, and the indemnity to be paid to her citizens.— which could never have been submitted to with honor, the territory proposed to be ceded was of comparatively insignificant value. The boundaries specified by the Mexican Commissioners ​embraced only a small portion of California, including, it is true, the bay and harbor of San Francisco; but, without some portion, or all of New Mexico, the territory thus acquired would have been, in effect, isolated from the other American possessions. Mr. Trist therefore informed the Mexican Commissioners, on the 7th of September, that the terms proposed by them were wholly inadmissible, and the negotiations were here closed. Previous to this time, however, the armistice conceived and Concluded, on the part of Santa Anna, in bad faith, had been ﬁnally violated without excuse or justification.
The foreign residents of Mexico, and the wealthier citizens, whose property was liable to be injured by an assault or bombardment, were averse to a continuation of the war; but the political opponents of Santa Anna, Herrera and the leading federalists among the number, preferred hostilities, to the conclusion of a peace under his auspices; the followers of Paredes, aware of his return to Mexico, and influenced by similar motives, were also clamorous against peace: the friends of the ​Mexican President, as well as himself, saw that the parchment on which a treaty should be written, would not become dry, ere he would be hurled from power; and the clergy were obliged to favor the prolongation of the contest, through fear lest, if they refused, their churches would be plundered by the military demagogues, who could not forget their animosities, even when their country was in peril.
At a previous session of the Mexican Congress, a resolution had been passed, providing for the removal of that body to Queretaro when the capital should be in danger. Disregarding the spirit of this resolution, on the 215: of August, Santa Anna called a meeting of Congress, to be held in the city of Mexico, while the negotiations were in progress, in order that the members might be conveniently situated to act on any proposition, having reference to such negotiations, that might be submitted to them. This furnished a pretext for complaint, of which his enemies were prompt to avail themselves. On the 22nd of August, the deputies of Mexico, Jalisco, and Zacatecas, mainly federalists, or monarchists, like Paredes, signed a protest denouncing, in advance, any treaty, concluded or ratified under the guns of the enemy. The "Diario del Gobierno" insisted, on the following day, that the proposition of General Scott for an armistice, was acceded to, "without abatement of Mexican honor — — tried, yet not cast down by the most disastrous fortune;" — but the opponents of Santa Anna, though willing that he should continue the war until his military reputation was forever destroyed,
​were opposed to his concluding a peace with the enemy, and were powerful enough to prevent it. Seventy members of Congress retired to Toluca, declaring their unwillingness to deliberate in the capital; and on the 30th of August, the Congress of the State of Mexico, in session at Toluca, pronounced against peace. Similar sentiments were heard from the rabble in the streets, instigated by the clergy and the disaffected; the passage of supplies to the army of General Scott, was repeatedly obstructed by the populace, and soldiers in disguise; American traders, long residents of the city, were molested; and the Mexican authorities did not, or dare not, interfere to prevent those violations of the armistice.
Matters were thus unfavorably situated, when Mr. Trist invited the Mexican Commissioners to submit to him the proposition laid before them on the 2nd of September. This was regarded as his ultimatum on the subject of boundaries, and as soon as it had been considered in a council of ministers and others, before the Mexican Commissioners presented their counter-projét, and without notice to the American commander, Santa Anna, under cover of the darkness, and in violation of the armistice, actively recommenced strengthening the defences of the city, — alleging, subsequently, in a note to General Scott, that the works already constructed had been merely repaired, so as to place them in the same condition they were in on the conclusion of the armistice. Determined no longer to place any reliance on the Punic faith of the Mexican ​government, General Scott, who had removed his headquarters to Tacubaya, notified Santa Anna on the 6th of September, that, unless full satisfaction was given for the violation of the armistice, before twelve o'clock, meridian, On the following day, he should consider it at an end from and after that hour. The reply of the Mexican President, dated 0n the same day, but received on the morning of the 7th, was pronounced by General Scott to be "absolutely and notoriously false, both in recrimination and explanation."
So careful had General Scott been in regard to infringing the armistice, that the engineer officers had suspended their reconnaissances, while his troops remained quietly cantoned in Tacubaya, and the neighboring villages. The city and its fortifications had, therefore, yet to be reconnoitred, before any definite plan of attack could be laid down. The enemy being reported to be manœuvring on the San Antonio causeway, on the morning of the 7th of September, Captain Lee was dispatched to observe their movements, but found all quiet in that quarter, and on the Niño Perdido and Piedad causeways, intervening between the San Antonio, and Tacubaya, or Chapultepec, causeways. Two days previous, General Scott had been informed, that a number of church-bells had been sent out from the city to El Molino del Rey, where there ​was said to be a cannon foundry, to be cast into guns. It was also known, that there was a large deposit of powder in Casa de Mata, — that the ammunition was much needed by the enemy, — and that, without the manufacture of new pieces, they would be unable to arm all the works at the different gates.
In the forenoon of the 7th instant, Captain Mason made a reconnaissance of El Molino del Rey, — approaching near enough to the Mexican lines to converse with the officers, — and discovered a large body of troops in the vicinity. General Scott accordingly determined to leave the general plan of attack upon the city for full reconnaissances, and, as it was impossible to cut the communication with the mill, without first carrying the fortifications on the heights of Chapultepec, for which he was not yet quite prepared, to drive the enemy from Casa de Mata and El Molino, seize the powder, and destroy the foundry. The performance of this service, to be executed under the formidable guns of Chapultepec, was assigned to the veteran division of General Worth, then quartered at Tacubaya, reinforced by the brigade of General Cadwalader, from General Pillow's division; three squadrons of the 2nd dragoons, one troop of the 1st dragoons, part of a troop of the 3rd dragoons, and a company of mounted rifles, under Major Sumner; a small party of sappers under Lieutenant Foster, of the engineers; two twenty-four pounders from the siege train, with a. detachment of ordnance men, under Captain Huger, acting chief of ordnance; and three pieces of field artillery, under Captain Drum, with his company of ​the 4th artillery. The whole force, in the aggregate, numbered 3,447.
A second reconnaissance was made by Captain Mason, in company with Lieutenant Colonel Duncan, and Lieutenant Hardcastle, of the topographical engineers, in the afternoon of the 7th. Generals Scott and Worth also carefully reconnoitred the enemy's line of defences, and the necessary orders were then given for making the attack at daylight on the following morning. A night attack had been in contemplation, but this was abandoned, on account of the uncertain knowledge derived from the reconnaissances, daring as they were. The configuration of the ground, and the extent of the enemy's force, were ascertained, but a very imperfect idea could be formed 3f the nature of their defences, which were skilfully masked.
In the evening of the 7th, General Worth ordered one of Captain Drum's pieces, an eight-pounder, in charge of Lieutenant Benjamin, to be sent to the picket in front of Chapultepec. The enemy evidently anticipated a movement of some kind, and scouting parties were frequently sent out during the night. The advance guard of the American picket was once driven in, and several shots were fired; but, on seeing the port-fire lighted near Lieutenant Benjamin's gun, no further attempt at molestation was made, and every thing remained quiet till three o'clock in the morning of the 8th, when the troops were ordered under arms.
During the reconnaissances of the previous day, the enemy had presented an extended line of cavalry and infantry, with their right resting on Casa de Mata, and their left on El Molino del Rey. Midway between the two was a battery of four pieces of field artillery, supported by masses of infantry. In the course of the ​night the guns were removed to a position nearly in front of the mill, — — -thus making El Molino del Hey the strong point of the position, and the centre the weak one. About four hundred yards west of Casa de Mata, there was a deep ravine, impassable except near the enemy's line, extending some distance to the south, and flanking the broad plain in front. On the south side of the plain the ground rose into a ridge, falling away gradually as it approached Tacubaya, something more than a mile from El Molino, — which consisted of a long range of buildings facing the plain. Thirty 0r forty yards in advance of Casa de Mata and El Molino del Rey, both of which were slightly elevated above the plain, there was a dry ditch, with a breast-height for the protection of infantry, reaching, in a semicircle, from the mill to the ravine. Casa de Mata being upon a retired line, a column approaching over the plain would necessarily be subject to a severe converging, or flank fire, in addition to that in front; except that, as the road to Tacubaya formed the prolongation of the enemy's left, an attacking force moving forward upon that route would be less exposed, and possess the advantage of having an enfilading fire on that flank.
Quietly and orderly the American troops fell into their places, before daylight on the 8th of September; and when objects could be first discovered, in the gray of the morning, they Were seen drawn up in readiness for action, within six hundred yards of the Mexican line. Captain Drum, with the two six-pounders lost at Buena Vista, but recovered at Contreras, was posted on the road leading north from Tacubaya, past the western front of El Molino del Rey. Colonel Garland was ordered to support the battery, and in time assault ​the enemy's left, with his brigade. The 2nd artillery moved out under Captain Mackenzie; and the 3rd under Captain M. Burke, — Lieutenant Colonel Belton being temporarily absent on detached service, but arriving in time to lead his regiment near the close of the action. Three hundred yards west of the road, on the ridge, were the heavy battering guns of Captain Huger, supported by the light battalion of General Worth's division, under Captain E. Kirby Smith, of the 5th infantry, Lieutenant Colonel C. F. Smith being sick. A little to the left of Captain Huger's battery was an assaulting column of five hundred picked men, with twelve officers, taken from the different regiments of the division, commanded by Major Wright, of the 8th infantry, who was ordered to force the enemy's centre as soon as an impression had been made by the batteries. The second brigade, commanded by Colonel McIntosh, in consequence of the illness of Colonel Clarke, — Lieutenant Colonel Scott taking charge of the 5th infantry — was posted, with Duncan's battery, still higher up the ridge, opposite to the enemy's right, to make the attack on that flank, or sustain the other corps, as might be necessary. Major Sumner was ordered to envelope the extreme left with the cavalry, and be governed by circumstances; and General Cadwalader was held in reserve with his brigade, between the battering guns and the second brigade of the first division.
The enemy were by no means unprepared for the attack. Their long lines of infantry, tastefully arrayed in blue and White uniforms, filled the breastworks in front of the position, the roofs of Casa de Mata and El Molino del Rey, and the space between them. The artillery was placed at intervals, amongst the infantry, ​just to the left of the centre, and the lancers, under General Alvarez, with their gay ensigns and curveting steeds, their yellow cloaks and scarlet caps and jackets, hovered on the flanks and in rear of the infantry. General Perez occupied Casa de Mata with 1,500 regular troops, and General Leon was posted in El Molino del Rey, with several large battalions of the National Guard. Santa Anna remained further in the rear, between Mexico and Morales, with a heavy reserve.
At early dawn General Worth ordered Captain Huger to open his guns on El Molino del Rey, which was the signal for the action to commence. Having an oblique fire on. the enemy's battery and right wing, Captain Huger served his pieces with such rapidity and effect, that the Mexicans were obliged to abandon their guns, and portions of their infantry took shelter in the mill, whose walls trembled at every discharge from the twenty-four pounders. The assaulting column under Major Wright, headed by Captain Mason, Lieutenant Foster, and the sappers with their forcing tools, had gallantly dashed forward, in the direction of the Mexican battery, a.t the opening of the fire. Unshaken by the galling torrents of musketry and canister poured upon them, they reached the guns, drove back the artillerists and infantry who lingered near them, with their bayonets, and commenced trailing the pieces on the retreating masses of the enemy. Captain Huger's battery was now masked; and discovering the feebleness of the force that had daringly advanced under the very walls of El Molino, General Leon ordered the rally to be sounded, and bravely led his men to the rescue.
A most terrific fire of musketry was at once opened upon the assaulting party. Major Wright, Captain Mason, and Lieutenant Foster, were wounded, and ​eight of the remaining eleven officers attached to the command, were either killed or wounded. Non-commissioned officers and men were cut down in proportion. Staggered, but not yet beaten, the remnant under Captain Bomford, of the 8th infantry, manfully stood their ground. Leaving Lieutenant Elzye, of the 2nd artillery, to cover the heavy battery with his company, Captain E. K. Smith instantly advanced, in doublequick time, at the head of the light battalion; and in a few moments Lieutenant Colonel Graham, of General Cadwalader's brigade, was ordered to follow the movement with the 11th infantry.
Meanwhile the first brigade, under Colonel Garland, with the two pieces of artillery commanded by Captain Drum, had been moving forward on the Tacubaya road. A slight bend allowed them to approach within two hundred yards of the breastwork in front of El Molino, without being seen. Whilst unlimbering his guns, Captain Drum encountered a severe fire of grape from the enemy's battery, which disabled a number of his horses. The animals becoming frantic from their wounds, he cut the traces and worked his guns by hand, assisted by officers and men of different corps. Having fired once with round shot, he ran his guns forward to within one hundred yards of the breastwork, and opened on the enemy with canister. The light battalion, led by their intrepid officers, were the first to break through the Mexican lines, and gain an archway under the buildings of El Molino del Rey. Being joined by the first brigade, they sprang to the roofs of the adjoining sheds, and commenced a warm and animated contest for the possession of the mill. A foothold being gained, the Americans would not be driven back. The Mexican troops fought bravely, but they could not long ​withstand the fierce onset of soldiers whose spirits appeared to rise with the severity of the action.
Blackened with smoke and gunpowder, the assailants drove the enemy' from room to room. Aided by the ﬁre of Captain Drum's battery, Captain E. K. Smith headed a second charge on the enemy's guns, temporarily recaptured, in which he fell mortally wounded. and Captain Reeve, of the 8th infantry, took command of the light battalion. Lieutenant Colonel Graham also advanced upon the same point with the 11th infantry. This determined perseverance decided the contest on this flank. The guns were once more taken, and immediately manned by Lieutenant Peck, of the 2nd artillery, and Lieutenants Harley, McClelland, and Scott, of the 11th infantry. Captain Drum then fired a few rounds on a body of the enemy in the mill, when they exhibited a white flag, and surrendered themselves prisoners of war.
On the American left the conflict had been still more bloody and severe. At the commencement of the action, Lieutenant Colonel Duncan opened a vigorous fire from his battery, on the Mexican right, which was kept up for a short time, when Colonel McIntosh was ordered to assault Casa de Mata with the second brigade. Lieutenant Colonel Duncan continued to play with his guns, over the heads of the advancing column, until they were completely masked. He then moved his pieces to the extreme left, supported by the voltigeurs under Colonel Andrews, to check a large force of cavalry and infantry, moving rapidly down the slopes west of the ravine, to reinforce the enemy's right. Major Sumner also dashed to the front, changed direction in an instant, and crossed the ravine within range of Casa de Mata, under an appalling fire which, in a very few ​seconds, killed or wounded between forty and fifty of his officers and men, and over one hundred horses Successive charges were made by General Alvarez with his lancers; but they were always checked by the fire of Duncan's battery and the voltigeurs, from the other bank of the ravine, and of one of the twenty-four pounders, turned in this direction, and actively served by Lieutenant Hagner, of the ordnance; and by the prompt and skilful evolutions of Major Sumner, who remained on this flank with the cavalry until the close of the engagement.
Instead of an ordinary field intrenchment, as was supposed, Casa de Mata proved to be a strong stone citadel, recently repaired and enlarged, with bastions and impassable ditches. With a step as blithe and free as if moving on parade, the column under Colonel McIntosh advanced against the position. Dense masses of Mexican infantry crowded the roof and adjacent breastworks. Closer and Closer the Americans, now deployed in line, pressed upon them. Within one hundred yards they encountered a destructive fire. Promptly returning it, they rushed forward with charged bayonets. The enemy fell back from their first line, at the breastwork, and rallied on the second. Exposed to a murderous discharge of musketry from Casa de Mata, and to a raking fire from El Molino, the assailing troops continued their advance until they reached the ditch and breast-height, within thirty yards of the Mexican position. Here the carnage was terrible. Partly sheltered by the stone wall, the Americans calmly loaded their guns, and picked off their men. At length many of their pieces became foul, their ammunition was nearly -expended, and their ranks fearfully thinned. A scathing ​torrent of flame rolled down upon them, through which It pas impossible to pass with life.
Colonel McIntosh fell mortally wounded; Lieutenant Colonel Scott was killed while urging his men to cross the ditch; and Major Waite, commanding the 8th infantry, was also severely wounded. The 5th infantry was nearly deprived of officers, and Assistant Surgeon Roberts received a mortal wound while acting, as a volunteer, in that capacity. The 6th infantry suffered in like manner; three color bearers of the 8th were killed, and the fourth badly wounded. One-third of the brigade, including one half the officers, were killed or wounded. Confusion became unavoidable; and the column retired to the left of Duncan's battery, leaving behind them several wounded officers and men, who, though helpless and unresisting, were cruelly butchered by the enemy. Having assisted in driving away the lancers on the left, Lieutenant Colonel Duncan now turned his guns on the masses of Mexican infantry crowding in and around Casa de Mata, and rained upon them a constant shower of cannon balls.
At the same time, Lieutenant Colonel Graham, after the enemy's centre had been forced. directed Major Hunter to enter El Molino with a portion of the 11th infantry, and advanced against Casa de Mata with the remainder of his command. Already twice wounded, ​he urged forward his men, till he was struck from his horse by two additional and mortal wounds; exclaiming as he fell — "Forward, my men! — my word is always, forward!" — The enemy did not wait to encounter men led by such officers, but abandoned the position in haste, followed, at full speed, by the light battery of Lieutenant Colonel Duncan, who did not cease playing upon them until they were out of reach.
The brave stand maintained by General Worth and his men, their daring and sustained efforts, though encountering obstacles which they had never anticipated, decided the fate of the day. The enemy's whole line, which had been repeatedly reinforced from the reserve, was broken; but, in a few minutes, they attempted to rally on the left, under the guns of Chapultepec, to recover possession of El Molino del Rey. The 6th and 8th infantry, commanded respectively, by Captain Hoffman and Major Montgomery, were ordered, under Major Bonneville, to move to that flank, — — the 5th infantry, now commanded by Captain Chapman, remaining behind, to mourn the loss of the best and bravest of their officers and men. Lieutenant Stone, of the ordnance, also advanced in the same direction with the remaining twenty-four pounder, and placed his gun in position near the southern end of the mill, where he aided Captain Drum, with one of his pieces, in driving back a large force of the enemy advancing from Chapultepec, and in silencing a battery of one gun in the road leading to the castle, whose fire had seriously annoyed the American infantry in El Molino. The captured guns were planted in the road north of the mill, and supported by the 4th, 6th, and 8th infantry. A brief engagement took place at this point; but the enemy soon abandoned their attempts to regain the ​ground which they had lost, and retired towards Chapultepec, closely pursued by the Americans for several hundred yards.
In the meantime the work of demolition had been going on. Casa de Mata was blown up, and the useless captured ammunition was destroyed. Lieutenant Colonel Hébert entered El Molino with a battalion of the 14th infantry, and, under his orders, four moulds for casting cannon, eight platforms for heavy guns, and a number of muskets, were broken in pieces; and the combustible parts of the mill, and adjacent buildings, were set on fire. The main action had continued a little over two hours, but the enemy continued to keep up a straggling fire while the works were being destroyed.
General Scott had anxiously watched the changing scenes of the contest, though not interfering with the plans of General Worth; but when the enemy were discovered to be repeatedly reinforcing their line, anticipating a general engagement, he had ordered up General Pillow, from a distance of three miles, with the brigade of General Pierce, and, shortly after, Colone] Riley's brigade of General Twiggs' division. The battle was won, however, just as General Pierce reached the ground, and interposed his troops between the division of General Worth, and the discomfited enemy. Having removed their dead and wounded, the Americans retired to their lines, leaving the walls of El Molino scarred and blackened, and Casa de Mata in ruins.
The battle of El Molino del Rey was the hardest fought, and the bloodiest engagement of the war. In no action was the heroic ardor of the American soldiers more conspicuous; in none was their desperate valor submitted to a severer ordeal, or more signally ​triumphant. The plain in front of the enemy's position was deluged with their blood, poured out freely, like water. General Worth lost one-fourth of his division, and the other corps sustained a severe loss. Less than 3,500 men, including officers, engaged between twelve and fourteen thousand, either in action, or immediately in reserve, and accomplished their object, with the loss, however, of 784 officers and men.
It need not be disguised, that the Americans were deceived as to the importance of the enemy's position, and the foundry in El Molino; and as to the strength of their defences; — yet, it is not the least that may be said in their commendation, that they were able to sustain themselves, and finally to triumph, against such odds. Three of the enemy's guns were captured, and the fourth was spiked. Large quantities of small-arms and ammunition, and grain and flour were also taken, and 685 prisoners, including 53 commissioned officers. Over two thousand Mexicans were killed or wounded, and about the same number deserted after the rent. General Leon, and Colonels Balderas, Huerta, and Gelati, were among the killed. But, what was more important than all, the infantry arm of the Mexican service, so essential to the protection and support of ​their artillery, was nearly paralyzed by the result of this action. The 11th and 12th regular regiments, under General Perez, were almost annihilated; and, from that time forward, as we shall see, their infantry dared not stand before the destructive fire of the American artillery, or meet the charge of the American bayonet.
* ↑ Official report of General Scott to the Secretary of War, August 28th, 1847.
* ↑ The note written by General Scott was as follows: "Head Quarters, Army U. S. America. Coyoacan, August 21. 1847.   “To his Excellency. the President and General in Chief of the Republic of Mexico. “Sir:—Too much blood has already been shed in this unnatural war between the two great Republics of this Continent. It is time that the differences between them should be amicably and honorably settled; and it is known to your Excellency, that a Commissioner on the part of the United States, clothed with full powers to that end. is with this army. To enable the two Republics to enter on negotiation, I am willing to sign, on reasonable terms, a short armistice. “I shall wait. with impatience until to—morrow morning for a direct answer to this communication; but shall, in the meantime, seize and occupy such positions outside of the capital, as I may deem necessary to the shelter and comfort of this army. “I have the honor to remain, with high consideration and respect, your Excellency’s most obedient servant.
* ↑ Senate Exec. Doc. 1. (p. 355,) 1st session, 30th Congress.
* ↑ Herrera, at ﬁrst, declined the appointment, upon the ground that he had been ostracized, on a former occasion, for expressing a willingness to hear the propositions of Mr. Slidell. Though ready enough to connive at the fraud about to be practised on the American army, he did not care to, be. an active participator in the transaction. Subsequently. however, he was persuaded to accept,—influenced, probably, by the fact, that under the full instructions prepared by Santa Anna and his cabinet, who assumed all the responsibility, the Commissioners were the mere passive agents of the Executive—Senate Exec. Doc. 1, (p. 41,)
* ↑ Letter of Mr. Buchanan to Mr. Trist, July 13th, 1847.
* ↑ Senate Exec. Doc. 20, (p. 4,) 1st session, 30th Congress.— By an act of Congress, passed at the session of 1846-7, the sum of three millions of dollars was placed at the disposal of the President of the United States, to be employed, if necessary, in the negotiation of a peace.
* ↑ This is, very nearly, the southern boundary of New Mexico; consequently, the proposed line Would have embraced almost the whole of that province.
* ↑ Senate Exec. Doc. 20, (p. 8,) 1st session, 30th Congress—The invitation of Mr. Trist to the Mexican Commissioners, to submit this proposition, was unauthorized by the President of the United States, and was promptly disapproved—Special Message of President Polk, February 2, 1848. Had not this novel idea, — of a boundary, to consist of a neutral strip of land, — been countenanced by many eminent states— men, it Would have very little to recommend it to favor. No government, and, least of all, one whose highest aim it ought to he, to avoid all causes of contention, should desire to be bounded by neutral territory, which must necessarily become, in spite of laws and regulations, the refuge and hiding—place of outlaws and bandits,— and the theatre of incessant broil; and strifes, in which, sooner or later, the contiguous governments would be involved.
* ↑ Senate Exec. Doc. 20, (p. 12,) 1st session, 30th Congress.
* ↑ Senate Exec. Doc. 20, (p. 14,) 1st session, 30th Congress.
* ↑ Among the papers found in the National Palace of Mexico, after the capture of the city by the American army, was a letter addressed by Santa Anna, on the 3lst of August, 1847, to Rejon, then at Queretaro, in which he assures his friend, that he assented to the application of General Scott for an armistice, because it would "give his troops rest, re-establish their morale," and afford him "an opportunity to collect the dispersed," and enable bin "to adept other measures to insure a reaction." It is possible, however, that Santa Anna may have really desired peace, provided he could maintain himself in power; and hence, probably, with a hope of preserving his own influence at home, rather than for any other purpose, the conditions and instructions prepared by him and his cabinet, for the government of the Commissioners, Upon which their counter-projét was based, assumed that Mexico was the triumphant party to the war.
* ↑ Paredes returned from his exile at Havana, and was landed at Vera Cruz, in violation of the blockade, on the 15th of August, 1817, from the British steamer Teviot, one of the vessels of the Royal Mail Steam Packet Company. In justice to the company it must be added, that upon a representation of the facts, the board of directors promptly dismissed the captain of the steamer from their service.
* ↑ Official Report of General Scott to the Secretary of War, September 11th, 1847. — Reply of Santa Anna to General Scott, September 6th, 1847. — At the council convoked by Santa Anna, it was determined that hostilities should be recommenced on the 9th instant.
* ↑ Senate Exec. Doc. 1, (pp. 355 359, 353,) 1st session, 30th Congress. Santa Anna charged the American army, in his reply to General Scott, with plundering the Mexican churches, and offering violence to their women. Nothing could have been more false or groundless. No disrespect was ever shown to the religion of the Mexican people, or to their places of worship, which went unpunished, if brought to the knowledge of the American officers; and at Vera Cruz, a soldier was hung for committing an outrage upon a Mexican woman, — General Scott firmly refusing to pardon the offence.
* ↑ There were two batteries in Mexico, during the war, served by ordnance men, with several officers.
* ↑ The death of no officer was more deeply deplored than that of Lientenant Colonel Scott. He had advanced to the breast-height, and, desirous of encouraging his men by his example, refused to shelter himself behind it. A brother officer near him entreated that he would not expose himself unnecessarily. His reply was characteristic: — "Martin Scott," said he, "has never yet stooped!" The next moment a ball entered his heart. He fell upon his back, deliberately placed his cap on his breast, and died. Commanded by officers like him, it is not to be wondered, that the American soldiers should dare. any peril.
* ↑ The Americans lost 125 killed, 649 wounded, many of them mortally, and there were 10 missing. Among the number killed and wounded were 58 officers, 17 of whom died on the field, or shortly after the battle. The officers who fell in this engagement were, Lieutenants Shaekelford, Armstrong, and Daniels, of the 2nd artillery; Captain Ayres, and Lieutenant Farry, 3rd artillery; Colonel McIntosh, Lieutenant — Colonel Scott, Captains Merrill and E. Kirby Smith, Assistant Surgeon Roberts, and Lieutenants Burwell and Strong, 5th infantry; Lieutenant Ernst, 5th infantry; Lieutenants Burbank and Morris, 8th infantry; and Lieutenant Colonel Graham, and Lieutenant Johnson, of the 11th infantry. The total number of officers present in this action was 196; consequently nearly one-third were either killed or wounded.