# Philosophical Works of the Late James Frederick Ferrier/Institutes of Metaphysic (1875)/Section 1/Proposition 9

The Institutes of Metaphysic, Philosophical Works of the Late James Frederick Ferrier (1875 ed., Vol. 1). (E. L. Lushington, & A. Grant, Eds.) Edinburgh: William Blackwood and Sons. pp. 241-256.
PROPOSITION IX.
THE EGO PER SE.
DEMONSTRATION.
The ego is the element common to all cognition—the universal constituent of knowledge, (Proposition VII.) But every cognition must contain a particular or peculiar, as well as a common or universal, part, and there can be no knowledge of either of ​these parts by itself, or prescinded from the other part (Proposition VI.) Therefore there can be no knowledge of the ego, or self, or mind, per se, or in a purely indeterminate state, or separated from all things, and divested of all thoughts. It can know itself only in some particular state, or in union with some non-ego; that is, with some element contradistinguished from itself.
OBSERVATIONS AND EXPLANATIONS.
Purport of this proposition in relation to Proposition I.1. Just as Proposition I. declares that the mind can be cognisant of something else only when it knows itself so this proposition affirms that it can know itself only when it is cognisant of something else. This statement may appear to give rise to several objections and difficulties which must be obviated and explained.
An objecti started2. First, In laying down the cognisance of something different from self as the condition of the mind's self-consciousness, does not this proposition appear to introduce a new primary condition of knowledge, in addition to that which was announced in Proposition I. as the one fundamental law? If the mind must know itself, as Proposition I. declares, in order to know anything else; and if, conversely, it must know something else in order to know itself (as this proposition imports), must not ​these two laws stand upon an equal footing, and consequently must there not be some mistake or confusion in the statement which declares that the one of them (that laid down in Proposition I.) is the more fundamental and essential of the two?
Objection obviated.3. There is no mistake; and the apparent confusion is easily cleared up. The law laid down in Prop. I. as the primary condition of knowledge has an undoubted title to precedence—for this reason, that it names the one thing (to wit, self) which must be known in order to bring about a cognisance of any other thing; whereas the proposition which announces (as Prop. IX. does) that something else must be known in order to bring about a cognisance of self, cannot name what that something else is. This cannot be named in any proposition, because, as has been said, the varieties of the particular element are contingent, indefinite, and inexhaustible. And therefore, although the truth set forth in Prop. IX. is equally certain with that stated in Prop. I., the law of knowledge announced in the latter proposition is entitled to the pre-eminence which has been assigned to it. If a man must know himself, as the condition of his knowing any one, or any number, of ten million things, surely that law would take rank before the converse law, which might declare with equal truth that he must know some (indefinite) one, or more, of these ten ​million things as the condition of his knowing himself. Besides, the first question of philosophy is, What is the one thing, or rather element which must be known in order that anything may be known,—what is the one thing known along with all other things? The answer, as we have seen, is—self. But had the question been, What is the one thing which must be known in order that self may be known—what is the other thing known along with self?—the question would have been aimless and unanswerable, because there is no one thing which can be mentioned, or conceived, which must be known in all knowing of oneself. These reasons may be sufficient to explain the relation which subsists between this proposition and Proposition I., and to show that the law stated in the latter has an undoubted right to the priority which has been accorded to it.
Another objection obviated.4. A second difficulty may be started. The ego must know itself whenever it knows anything material. Does the converse follow—must it know something material whenever it knows itself? No—that is by no means necessary. It must know something particular,—it must know itself in some determinate condition, whenever it has any sort of cognisance, but the particular element need not be material—the determinate state need not embrace any material thing. This objection was sufficiently ​guarded against under Proposition VII. (Obs. 2), to which reference is made in order to avoid repetition. The caveat there introduced is quite sufficient to obviate any charge of materialism which might be brought against this system, on the ground that it makes our cognisance of ourselves to depend on our cognisance of matter. The system steers completely clear of that objection, although it holds unequivocally that our cognisance of self is dependent on our cognisance of something particular, or of ourselves in some determinate state, and that this is a law binding on intelligence universally.
David Hume outgoes this proposition.5. In his Treatise of Human Nature, book i. part iv. sec. vi., David Hume says: "For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other of heat, cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never catch myself at any time without a perception"—that is, unmodified in any way whatever. This is undoubtedly true. It is what Proposition IX. maintains. But Hume does not stop here; he goes on to say that he always catches his perceptions without any self. "I never can observe," says he, "anything but the perception"—in other words, I always observe that the perceptions are not mine, and do not belong to any one! This is perhaps the hardiest assertion ever hazarded in philosophy. Not content with saying that a man ​can never apprehend himself in a purely indeterminate condition, he affirms that a man can never apprehend himself at all. This is certainly carrying the doctrine of determinate states, mental modifications, or particular cognitions, to an extreme. Many philosophers, however, to whom the speculations of Hume were as wormwood, have taught the same doctrine, only in terms somewhat more dubious and inexplicit.
What this proposition contends for.6. All that this proposition contends for is, that intelligence can be cognisant of itself only when it knows itself in some determinate state, whatever that state may be, or by whatever means it may be brought about. This doctrine is a necessary truth of reason. To suppose that any intelligence can know itself in no particular state, is contradictory; for this would be equivalent to supposing that it could know itself in no state at all, which again would be equivalent to the supposition that it could know itself without knowing itself.
The mind must always know itself in, but not as, some determinate condition.7. When it is said, however, that the ego can know itself only in or along with some particular modification, this position must be carefully distinguished from the assertion that it can know itself as that particular modification. This assertion would be quite as contradictory as the other— ​quite as irrational as the supposition that it could know itself in no determinate state. Because if the ego could know itself as any one particular state, it could never know itself in any other particular state. It would be foreclosed against all variation of knowledge or of thought; and thus its intelligent nature would be annihilated. In fact, this opinion would be equivalent to the contradictory supposition that the particular could be known without the universal, the determinate state without the ego with whom the state was associated. Therefore the ego, although it can be cognisant of itself only in or along with some determinate modification, never knows, and never can know, itself as any, or as all of these modifications. It can only know itself as not any of them—in other words, as the universal which stands unchanged and unabsorbed amid all the fluctuating determinations or diversified particulars, whether things or thoughts, of which it may be cognisant. Through an inattention to this distinction between the knowledge of ourselves in some particular state, and the knowledge of ourselves as that particular state, Hume was led into the monstrous paradox noticed above; and other philosophers (especially Dr Brown) have run their systems aground, and have foundered on the rocks of ambiguity, if not of positive error, in consequence of the same inattention. The dominant doctrine in ​psychology is that the mind is cognisant only of the variable determinations of which it is the subject; and that it is cognisant of itself as these.
Ninth counter proposition.8. Ninth Counter-proposition.—"The ego per se is not absolutely, and necessarily, and universally unknowable. We, indeed, are unable, on account of the imperfection of our faculties, to know ourselves in a purely indeterminate state. We are ignorant of the essence of the mind; but other intelligences may not be subject to this restriction, but may be able to know themselves per se."
Its twofold error.9. The opinion expressed in this counter-proposition, if not an express article of ordinary thinking, has at any rate been formally adopted and largely insisted on by psychology. But here, again, as in the case of matter per se, psychology is in error in attributing our inability to know ourselves per se to a wrong cause. The psychological blunder is twofold. First, it overlooks a sovereign law binding upon all reason—viz., that no intelligence can apprehend itself in a state of pure indetermination; and, secondly, it refers our inability to perform this feat, not to that supreme and necessary law, but to some special limitation in our faculties of cognition. These may be imperfect enough. But the disability in question (if that be a disability which is one of the prime characteristics of intelligence considered ​simply as intelligence) is certainly not due to the cause to which psychology refers it. It is due to the law to which expression was given in Proposition VI., namely, that the universal ground or common constituent of all knowledge cannot be apprehended by itself, but only in synthesis with some particular. That law is a necessary truth of reason; and the law expressed in the present proposition is merely one of its inevitable corollaries.
History of word "essence." Its meaning reversed by moderns.10. At this place it is proper to take some notice of those random skirmishes or stray shots—they can scarcely be called controversies or discussions—which occasionally show themselves in the history of speculation touching what is called the "essence" of the mind. And, first of all, it is important to remark the change of meaning which this word has undergone in its transmission from the ancient to the modern schools of philosophy. Formerly the word "essence" (οὐσία) meant that part or characteristic of anything which threw an intellectual illumination over all the rest of it. It was the point of light, the main peculiarity observable in whatever was presented to the mind. It signified the quality or feature of a thing which made it what it was, and enabled the thing or things in question to be distinguished from all other things. It was a synonym for the superlatively comprehensible, the superlatively cogitable. Nowadays it ​means exactly the reverse. It signifies that part of a thing which carries no light itself, and on which no light can be thrown. The "essence "is the point of darkness, the assumed element in all things which is inaccessible to thought or observation. It is a synonym for the superlatively incomprehensible, the superlatively incogitable. Other words, as shall be shown hereafter, have been tampered with in the same way.
Consequences of this reversal!—injustice to the old philosophers.11. No great mischief can ensue from the reversal of the meaning of a philosophical term, provided those who employ it in its modern signification are aware of the sense in which it was formerly used, and are careful to record the distinction between the two acceptations. No precaution of this kind has been observed in the case of the word "essence." The ancients are supposed by our psychologists to have understood the term in the sense in which they understand it; and hence the charge has gone forth against them that they prosecuted their inquiries into matters which are inaccessible to the faculties of man and hopelessly incomprehensible. Never was there a more unfounded accusation. They prosecuted their researches, we are told, into the essence of things; and this, we are assured by a wiser generation of thinkers, lies beyond the limits of human cognition. What you choose to call the essence of things may be of this character, ​but not what they called the essence of things. With the old philosophers the essence of things was precisely that part of them of which a clear conception could be formed: with you of the modern school it is precisely that part of them of which there can be no conception. Whether anything is gained by thus changing the meaning of words, is another question; but certainly it is rather hard treatment dealt out to the early speculators, first to have the meaning of their language reversed by modern psychology, and then to be knocked on the head for carrying on inquiries which are absurd under the new signification, but not at all absurd under the old one.
Confusion and error to which the reversal has led.12. Considered, however, even as a matter of nomenclature, the change is to be deprecated. The reversal has resulted in nothing but confusion, and the propagation of unsound metaphysical doctrine. The essence of the mind, and the mind per se, are nowadays held to be identical; and these terms are employed by psychology to express some occult basis or unknown condition of the mind. That the mind per se is absolutely inconceivable (although for a reason very different from that alleged by psychology) is undoubted. But the essence of the mind is, of all things, the most comprehensible. The essence of the mind is simply the knowledge which it has of itself, along with all that it is ​cognisant of. Whatever makes a thing to be what it is, is properly called its essence. Self-consciousness, therefore, is the essence of the mind, because it is in virtue of self-consciousness that the mind is the mind—that a man is himself. Deprive him of this characteristic, this fundamental attribute, and he ceases to be an intelligence. He loses his essence. Restore this, and his intelligent character returns. Perhaps these remarks may assist in restoring to the word "essence" its right signification, and in dissipating the psychological hallucination, that the essence of the mind is inconceivable.
This proposition reduces the ego per se to a contradiction.13. It is obvious that this proposition reduces the ego per se to a contradiction—a thing not to be known on any terms by any intelligence—just as Proposition IV. reduced matter per se to the condition of a contradiction. But there is this difference between the two contradictories, that the ego carries within itself the power by which the contradiction may be overcome, and itself redeemed into the region of the cogitable, out of the region of the Contradictory. It has a power of self-determination, which is no other than the Will. Matter per se, on the other hand, has to look to the ego for the elimination of the contradiction by which it is spell bound. This is a momentous difference, and gives the contradictory ego per se an infinite superiority over the contradictory material universe per se ​The importance of reducing the ego per se to a contradiction, will be apparent in the ontology.
Why the word ego is used in these discussions.14. The words "ego," "me," or "self," have been repeatedly used in the course of these discussions, because, awkward and barbarous though they be, they are of a less hypothetical character than any other terms which can be employed to express what is intended. Whatever else a man may be, he is, at any rate—himself. He understands what he means when he utters the word "I," and, therefore, when such terms as "mind," or "subject," or "intelligence," are employed in these pages, they are to be regarded as strictly synonymous with this less ambiguous though egotistical monosyllable.
The individual or monad.15. The synthesis of the ego (which is the universal element of all cognition), and the things whatever they may be, or the mental states whatever they may be (which are the particular element of all cognition), is properly called "the individual." This is what Leibnitz expresses by the word "monad"—that is, the combination of the singular and the universal, or the soul and its presentations wrapt up together, and constituting the independent totality known by each individual intelligence,—the intelligence being a surd without something of which it is intelligent, and this something being a surd without the intelligence which ​apprehends it. In other words, the individual, or monad, is the universe constituted by oneself with the addition of the things or thoughts with which oneself is associated.
An objection obviated.16. Finally, lest any dissatisfaction should be felt on the two following points, a word of explanation may be appended. First, It may be alleged that the demonstration of Proposition VIII. merely proves that the ego must be known as the non-material element of cognition, but does not prove that it is known as a completed and non-material existence; and that this conclusion, therefore, does not appear to be altogether satisfactory. The answer is, that the ego having been proved to be the universal or non-material element of all cognition, and matter having been proved to be that which (although it is frequently the other element) does not, of necessity, enter into the composition of cognition at all, the conclusion is that the ego may, at any time, exist in combination with such peculiar elements of cognition (different from the material) as Providence may be pleased to associate it with, or as its own inherent powers may be competent to develop. The ego can never be known as a completed non-material existence, because it can be known only as the universal element of all cognition; but this universal element by itself—that is, dissociated from every particular element​—is absolutely unknowable; and, therefore, if the reader expects a proof of the existence of himself as a completed immaterial entity, irrespective of his association with all particular things, and all determinate states, he must for ever be disappointed: at least he can obtain no redress on this point at the hands of speculation; nor does any redress appear to be at all needed.
Another objection obviated.17. Secondly, It may be said that the doctrine of the absolute unknowableness of the ego per se, and its reduction to a contradiction when in this predicament, may have the effect of depriving the mind of its fundamental substantiality; and that, according to this view, it must be little better than a nonentity when in a state of absolute indetermination. The answer is, Who cares although the doctrine has this effect? Who cares to exist, if he does not exist in some particular way, or in some determinate condition, or in association with something or other? To find the value of an existence of which there is, and can be, no cognisance, is a problem in metaphysical arithmetic which may be left to the psychologists to solve. In the opinion of speculation, such an existence is of no value at all. It seems quite sufficient for every reasonable wish, that a man's substantial existence should always consist of himself in some determinate condition, or of himself along with something else. All ​uneasiness as to the existence of the mind, in so far as it is absolutely unknown, or in so far as it is without thoughts or things present to it, is very much out of place. These reflections may, perhaps, have the effect of correcting this prevalent, but misdirected, solicitude. This system, assuredly, opens up a much brighter vista for the futurity of the mind than any which psychology can disclose; and places its imperishable nature on a much surer basis than any which psychology can establish.