# Spiegel's Estate v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (335 U.S. 632)/Concurrence Reed

* Court Documents
* Case Syllabus
* Opinion of the Court
* Concurring Opinions Jackson Reed
* Dissenting Opinion Burton
United States Supreme Court
335 U.S. 632
Spiegel's Estate v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
Mr. Justice REED, concurring in No. 3, Spiegel v. Commissioner, and dissenting in No. 5, Commissioner v. Church.
As these tax decisions may have an influence on subsequent decisions beyond the limited area of the issues decided, I have thought it advisable to state my position for whatever light it may throw. I agree with the judgment directed by the Court in Spiegel v. Commissioner and with so much of the opinion as rests solely upon the controlling effect of the possibility of reverter under the law of Illinois. As I disagree with Church v. Commissioner, decided today, I cannot accept so much of the opinion in the Spiegel case, 335 U.S. 701, 69 S.Ct. 301, as seems to put reliance upon the fact that the settlor as trustee retains any 'possession or enjoyment' of the trust, other than a possibility of reverter. I am opposed to the view expressed in the dissent written by Mr. Justice Burton that the settlor's intent rather than the effect of his acts is the touchstone to determine the taxability of his property for estate tax purposes.
So far as Commissioner v. Church is concerned, I do not believe that May v. Heiner, 281 U.S. 238, 50 S.Ct. 286, 74 L.Ed. 826, 67 A.L.R. 1244, should be overruled. The Joint Resolution of March 3, 1931, therefore, stands as the determinative factor in reaching a conclusion as to the taxability of the Church estate. Hassett v. Welch, 303 U.S. 303, 58 S.Ct. 559, 82 L.Ed. 858, decided that the Resolution was not retroactive. Consequently, the Church estate is not subject to an estate tax because of the reservation of a life estate.
We are asked to accept an overruling of May v. Heiner, supra, and also, I think, of Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co., 278 U.S. 339, 49 S.Ct. 123, 73 L.Ed. 410, 66 A.L.R. 397, not to mention the incidental fall of Hassett v. Welch, supra, on the one side, or, on the other hand, to limit the rul as to the possibility of reverter in Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 60 S.Ct. 444, 84 L.Ed. 604, 125 A.L.R. 1368, and the numerous cases that follow its teaching, to reverters expressly reserved in the documents. Legislation indicates a purpose to promote gifts as a desirable means for early distribution of property benefits. In reliance upon a long settled course of legislative and judicial construction, donors have made property arrangements that should not now be upset summarily with no stronger reasons for doing so than that former courts and the Congress did not interpret the legislation in the same way as this Court now does. Judicial efforts to mold tax policy by isolated decisions make a national tax system difficult to develop, administer or observe. For more than thirty years Congress has legislated upon this problem and this Court has interpreted the enactments so that now what seems to me a reasonably fair interpretation of tax liability under § 811(c) of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C.A. § 811(c), as now written, has been worked out. Relying upon the desirability of stare decisis under the decisions concerning § 811(c), I would leave such changes as may seem desirable to the Congress, where general authority for that purpose rests.
(1) A provision including in a decedent's estate the value at time of death of interest in any transfer by trust 'in contemplation of or intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after his death' has been in the federal estate tax law since the Income Tax Act of 1916. It will be noted that the phrase relating to a transfer 'in contemplation of or intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after his [settlor's] death' has not changed. It was construed by this Court, at first, to apply to those circumstances where something passed from the 'possession, enjoyment or control of the donor at his death.' Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co., 278 U.S. 339, 348, 49 S.Ct. 123, 126, 73 L.Ed. 410, 66 A.L.R. 397. 'Of course it was not argued that every vested interest that manifestly would take effect in actual enjoyment after the grantor's death was within the statute.' Shukert v. Allen, 273 U.S. 545, 547, 47 S.Ct. 461, 71 L.Ed. 764, 49 A.L.R. 855. When, after the execution of a trust, the settlor 'held no right in the trust estate which in any sense was the subject of testamentary disposition,' this Court was of the opinion that the gift was not intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at the donor's death. Helvering v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 296 U.S. 39, 43, 56 S.Ct. 74, 76, 80 L.Ed. 29, 100 A.L.R. 1239; Helvering v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 296 U.S. 85, 88, 56 S.Ct. 70, 72, 80 L.Ed. 62; Burnet v. Northern Trust Co., 283 U.S. 782, 51 S.Ct. 342, 75 L.Ed. 1412; Morsman v. Burnet, 283 U.S. 783, 51 S.Ct. 343, 75 L.Ed. 1412; McCormick v. Burnet, 283 U.S. 784, 51 S.Ct. 343, 75 L.Ed. 1413; May v. Heiner, 281 U.S. 238, 50 S.Ct. 286, 74 L.Ed. 826, 67 A.L.R. 1244. A reserved power of appointment or change is, in a sense, a testamentary power over the corpus. Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co., supra, 278 U.S. at page 345, 49 S.Ct. 123, 124, 73 L.Ed. 410, 66 A.L.R. 397; Porter v. Commissioner, 288 U.S. 436, 53 S.Ct. 451, 77 L.Ed. 880.
Klein v. United States, 283 U.S. 231, 51 S.Ct. 398, 399, 75 L.Ed. 996, brought doubt into the above conception of the meaning of the phrase in question. That trust was to A for life and on condition that A survive the donor to A in fee simple. It was the death of the donor that 'brought the larger estate into being * * * and effected its transmission from the dead to the living,' this Court said in upholding the tax on the trust property. This was construed by four members of the Court to mean that the donor's death 'operating upon his gift inter vivos not complete until his death, is the event which calls the statute into operation.' Mr. Justice Stone, dissenting in the later case of Helvering v. St. Louis Trust Co., supra, 296 U.S. at page 46, 56 S.Ct. at page 77, 80 L.Ed. 29, 100 A.L.R. 1239. The two positions, one that only power in the settlor at the time of death to cause the property to be transferred from him to another by will or by descent or to select beneficiaries through appointment brought the property formerly transferred within the reach of the words 'intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after his death,' the Reinecke concept, and the other than, in addition, every possibility of reversion of the transferred interest to the settlor must be barred by the trust instrument, the dissenter's ground in Helvering v. St. Louis Trust Co., supra, were fully discussed in the majority and dissenting opinions in Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 60 S.Ct. 444, 84 L.Ed. 604, 125 A.L.R. 1368. The latter position was accepted as the sound interpretation by us and I adhere to that view for the reasons stated in the Court's opinion in Helvering v. Hallock. Cf. Eisenstein, Estate Taxes and the Higher Learning of the Supreme Court, 3 Tax Law Rev. 395. That interpretation has gained strength from the fact that Congress has not repudidated it as inconsistent with the legislative purpose and by other judgments by this Court applying the principles of the Hallock case in accordance with this statement. Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co. v. Rothensies, 324 U.S. 108, 65 S.Ct. 508, 89 L.Ed. 783, 159 A.L.R. 227; Commissioner v. Field's Estate, 324 U.S. 113, 6 S.Ct. 511, 89 L.Ed. 786, 159 A.L.R. 230. Possession or enjoyment of property as heretofore applied has meant from the standpoint of the taxability of the transferor's estate, at least, that the death of the transferor perfects the right of the transferee and cuts off any possibility of reverter to the transferor left by the instruments of transfer. If the transferor reacquired the property by inheritance or by purchase, other factors would enter. Before the Joint Resolution even the reservation of a life estate was insufficient to preserve possession or enjoyment in the transferor as nothing passed at his death. When words such as 'possession or enjoyment' used in a section of a revenue statute with their many possible shades and ambiguities of meaning have been given definition through the course of legislation and litigation, a change by courts should be avoided. By the Resolution such a reservation or that of power of appointment was also made the source of an estate tax.
Prior cases have involved trust instruments where the settlor specifically reserved remainders, reverters or contingent powers of appointment. In these cases the value at death of the entire corpus of the trusts was taxed. This was because in each case there was a contingency through which completed gifts of the entire corpus to the beneficiaries might fail before the death of the settlor with the result that the settlor would again control the transfer of the corpus. In such circumstances, I take it as settled that the property is taxable on the event of the settlor's death under §§ 810 and 811(c). Cf. Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co. v. Rothensies, 324 U.S. at page 111, 65 S.Ct. at page 510, 89 L.Ed. 783, 159 A.L.R. 227.
The trust instruments in the present cases of the Spiegel and Church estates do not specifically provide for such possibility of reverter or for regaining control of the devolution of the property. The issue raised by these cases is whether a like possibility of reverter springing not from the instrument but by operation of law through the failure of all beneficiaries named in the trust instrument shall have the same effect. All named beneficiaries in these two trusts might die before the settlors without surviving issue. Thus, depending upon the controlling state law, the settlors might repossess the estates.
To lay bare the heart of the problem, it seems helpful to put aside certain phases of possible congressional intention and possible statutory meaning, as not involved or heretofore decided for sound reasons.
A. It was not the purpose of Congress at any time in dealing with the inclusion of transfers of property in trust to have the whole value, at the donor's death, of the total of all gifts made during life, included in the settlor's estate for estate tax purposes. The words of the statute show this. See note 1, supra. Gifts in trust are taxable only where an interest remains in the donor. Therefore a gift by A to a trust company to hold in trust for B during B's life and at B's death to C, his heirs, devisees or assigns is not taxable under § 811(c). Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co., supra, 278 U.S. at pages 347, 348, 49 S.Ct. at pages 125, 126, 73 L.Ed. 410, 66 A.L.R. 397. Before the amendment of 1931 the retention of an estate for life in the settlor did not subject the trust to estate tax where the remainder was taken by beneficiaries without regard to future action by the settlor.
B. The Joint Resolution of 1931 made no change in the language of the subsection of the estate tax relating to the inclusion in estates of interests in trusts intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after death. Neither the resolution nor the discussion on the floor of either house suggested a change in the words of the section to define what is meant by an interest intended to take effect after death. Congress aimed at the retention of life interests, not at this Court's determinations of the meaning of 'possession or enjoyment.' Those words were left untouched and an addition was made providing for the inclusion in the estate of interests where the settlor had retained the possession or enjoyment of the property or a right to income or the power to designate the beneficiaries. See note 1, supra. Therefore the words relating to intention, death, possession or enjoyment have the same meaning now as they did before the 1931 amendment was adopted. The doctrine of May v. Heiner that the state, as written when that case was handed down, did not cover reservations of life interests and powers of designation was legislatively changed by adding the words of the Joint Resolution. See in accord Helvering v. Hallock, supra. When Hallock there refers to the doctrine of May v. Heiner discarded by Congress, it is the doctrine of May v. Heiner that a settlor might reserve a life interest that was meant. Hallock did not say or imply, as I read it, that the May v. Heiner doctrine, which is supported by Reinecke and Shukert v. Allen, as to when 'possession or enjoyment' passes from a donor was changed by the Resolution. These cases had held that something must pass from the settlor. The only difference wrought by Hallock on this concept of possession and enjoyment was to apply the Klein rule that the enlargement of the remainder estate did effect a transmission from the dead to the living.
Assuming that Congress might have legislated so that the added words would apply to the estates of all who died after the passage of the Joint Resolution, Congress definitely manifested an intention that the amendments were not to apply to trusts created prior to the Resolution though the settlor might die subsequently thereto. This whole matter is discussed thoroughly and, I think, unanswerably in Hassett v. Welch, 303 U.S. 303, 58 S.Ct. 559, 82 L.Ed. 858, and I can add nothing to the argument. Attention, however, should be called to the statements on the floor of the House by members of the Committee on Ways and Means at the time of the passage of the Joint Resolution. Mr. Hawley, Chairman of the Committee, answering a question as to the nature of the Resolution said, 'It provides that hereafter no such method shall be used to evade the tax.'
'The Committee on Ways and Means this afternoon had a meeting and unanimously reported the resolution just passed. We did not make it retroactive for the reason that we were afraid that the Senate would not agree to it. But I do hope that when this matter is considered in the Seventy second Congress we may be able to pass a bill that will make it retroactive.'
And in answer to a question, he reiterated, 'I have strong hopes that the next Congress will make it retroactive.' Congress never took any subsequent action and this Court § interpretation of the meaning of 'intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment' remained the same. The addition to the section made by the Joint Resolution made certain future gifts inter vivos, which would theretofore have beer free of estate tax, subject to such a tax.
C. As a corollary to the foregoing section B, it is clear to me also that Congress by the Joint Resolution made no change in the statute for the purpose of bringing trusts into an estate merely because the actual use of the estate or its income by the cestui que trust was postponed until the death of the donor. Shukert v. Allen, supra.
D. It is impossible for me to look upon the Spiegel or Church trusts as closely akin to a will. The decisive difference is that a will may be changed at any time during life while these trusts obliterated any power in the settlors to change or modify the devolution. Only the chances of death, wholly beyond their control, might put the disposition again in their hands. Further, during life the settlors must handle the trusts for the benefit of all beneficiaries. They were not free to do as they pleased as would have been the case of a will. Of course, if the settlor had made similar provision for the objects of his bounty by will, in effect at death, the result to the takers would have been the same or, if in the Spiegel case, the father had annually given his children the same sums that the trust earned, their economic position would have been the same for that year but the children could not look forward with certainty to their annual income from the trust. Without the trust, the benficiaries' income would have been subject to the wish of the settlor. It needs no argument or illustration to show that a father's gift from his income is a very different thing from an irrevocable gift of principal to a child.
Returning to the issue in these present cases, the difference between them and Helvering v. Hallock and its progeny is that here the possibility of reverter arises by operation of law where as in them the possibility arises out of the terms of the trust. That difference I do not think is material as to taxability under § 810 and § 811(c). Granting that in early interpretations of the sections this Court might logically have determined that remote possibilities of reverter did not interfere with the beneficiaries' complete possession and enjoyment of the gift during the lifetime of the donor, the balance of experience and precedent, since Helvering v. Hallock, tips the scale the other way in my judgment. It is important, though not decisive, since we are not justified in pushing every rule to its logical extreme, that this conclusion is a logical outgrowth of the Hallock rule. Since we know it is the purpose of Congress to put an estate tax on gifts intended to take effect at or after death, the interpretation of those words should be broad enough to accomplish the purpose effectually. 'Intended to take effect,' in that view, has for me the meaning of an intention to abide by the legal result of the terms of the trust.
I recognize that this interpretation has possibilities of variation in result through the employment of technicalities of property law. The addition of a phrase may make the difference between a completed or an incompleted gift. To make the intention of the settlor the determinative factor creates equal difficulties. Nor am I unmindful of this Court's effort, in which I joined, in the Hallock case to find a harmonizing principle for the difficulties engendered by § 811(c). In that case the principle applied was that a tax lies against an estate when the death of the grantor brings a larger estate into being for the beneficiary. This does accomplish uniformity in the interpretation of the section of federal law. Hallock attempted nothing more. It leaves its application to particular trusts dependent upon state determination of when a settlor has divested himself of every possible interest in the res of a trust We are dealing with a statute and Congress is fully competent to correct any misunderstanding we may have of the congressional intention.
(2) The foregoing leads to the conclusion in the Spiegel case that this estate must pay a federal estate tax on the trust res unless that res, under the law of Illinois, would have passed to the heirs at law or the legatees of the last descendant of the settlor. If under Illinois law the estate returned to the settlor on his surviving all his descendants, the tax is due. The possibilities of this happening in this case are extremely remote but a trust might have been created by a young son for an aged mother to pay her the income for life and at the settlor's death to pay her the principal.
The Court of Appeals concluded Commissioner v. Spiegel's Estate, 2 Cir., 159 F.2d 257, at page 259, that 'If none of the beneficiaries survived the settlor, and that was a possibility, then the trust failed, and the trustees would hold the bare naked title to the corpus as resulting trustees for the settlor.' There is no Illinois case holding squarely on this point, and in the absence of such a determination by a state court we do not interfere with a reasonable decision of the circuit which embraces Illinois. Helvering v. Stuart, 317 U.S. 154, 164, 63 S.Ct. 140, 146, 87 L.Ed. 154; MacGregor v. State Mutual Life Assurance Co., 315 U.S. 280, 62 S.Ct. 607, 86 L.Ed.2d 864. The rule followed by the court of appeals accords with that generally accepted. Restatement, Trusts § 411; 3 Scott, Trusts § 411; 2 Bogert on Trusts and Trustees § 468; Harris Trust & Savings Bank v. Morse, 238 Ill.App. 232; Lill v. Brant, 6 Ill.App. 366, 376.
The taxpayer relies upon cases wherein the language of wills was construed in order to create vested remainders. These cases, however, do not overturn the firmly settled principle that where an express trust fails for lack of a beneficiary, a resulting trust in favor of the settlor arises by operation of law. To vest property under a will or deed is desirable. To vest property u der a trust may not be. It is more reasonable to return trust property to the settlor on failure of the trust than to have it go to the heirs of the beneficiary.
From a reading of the trust instrument involved in the instant case, it is manifest that the settlor did not intend to grant his children the power to dispose of their respective shares should they predecease the settlor without issue. The settlor specifically named as beneficiaries of the trust his children and grandchildren. That he intended to restrict the trust to these two classes of beneficiaries is evidenced by the provision of the instrument that in the event of the death of a child without issue that child's share was to be added to the shares of the settlor's surviving children. His retention of the trusteeship and failure to grant the power of disposition to his children in his lifetime negative any intention of the settlor to exclude the possibility of a reversion of the trust property to himself.
No error appears in the conclusion of the Court of Appeals on this point.
(3) Finally, the situation in the Church case must be dealt with. The trust was created in New York by a resident of New York who died a resident of New Jersey. Two of three trustees were at all times residents of New York where the stocks and accounts of the trust were kept. From what is before me, I would assume that the New York law would control as to the possibility of the retention of an interest by the settlor. This produces a variant from the Spiegel case. The determination of New York law will be made by a circuit that does not include that state. This, I think, is not significant in determining the course to be followed.
As the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, 161 F.2d 11, made its decision on the authority of the Dobson rule (Dobson v. Commissioner), 320 U.S. 489, 64 S.Ct. 239, 88 L.Ed. 248, it did not consider the effect of Hassett v. Welch, 303 U.S. 303, 58 S.Ct. 559, 82 L.Ed. 858. As May v. Heiner stands, in my opinion, trusts, like the Church trust, created prior to the passage of the Joint Resolution of March 3, 1931, are not includable in the gross estate of a settlor for federal estate tax purposes unless there is a possibility of reverter to the settlor by operation of the controlling state law. To determine this question, I would vacate the judgment of the Third Circuit and remand the case to the court to determine the state law.
I would affirm No. 3, Spiegel v. Commissioner; I would vacate No. 5, Commissioner v. Church.
By fitting together my agreement with portions of the dissenting concurrence and my disagreement with a part of the comprehensive dissenting opinions of my brother BURTON, I could indicate, substantially, my views of these cases. But such piecing together would make a Joseph's coat. Therefore, even at the risk of some repetition of what has been said by others, a self-contained statement on the basic issues of these cases will make for clarity. Particularly is this desirable where disharmony of views supports a common result-a result the upsetting of which by Congre § is almost invited.
I. In the Spiegel case, No. 3, the decedent made a settlement by the terms of which he reserved no interest for himself, and it is not suggested that the form of the settlement disguised an attempted evasion of the estate-tax law. The corpus of the decedent's estate is found to be subject to the estate tax on the basis of Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 60 S.Ct. 444, 84 L.Ed. 604, 125 A.L.R. 1368, as supplemented by Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co. v. Rothensies, 324 U.S. 108, 65 S.Ct. 508, 89 L.Ed. 783, 159 A.L.R. 227; Commissioner v. Field's Estate, 324 U.S. 113, 65 S.Ct. 511, 89 L.Ed. 786, 159 A.L.R. 230, and Goldstone v. United States, 325 U.S. 687, 65 S.Ct. 1323, 89 L.Ed. 1871, 159 A.L.R. 1330. On that basis it is now decided that if there is a possibility, due to the terms of the instrument or by operation of law, however remote, that settled property may return to the settlor, the entire trust property must be included in the gross estate for purposes of the federal estate tax. Thus, under the Court's decision tax liability may be incurred by the discovery of a gossamer thread of possession or enjoyment, which has no value. Nevertheless the entire trust corpus is included in the gross estate and taxed as if the settlor really had possession or enjoyment of the property. Such a result not only creates unanticipated hardship for taxpayers; it is also an unrealistic interpretation of § 811(c) of the Internal Revenue Code. Since such an unrealistic interpretation is not a judicial duty whereas its avoidance is, I am compelled to conclude that Spiegel did not transfer an interest in property 'intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after * * * death' within the meaning of § 811(c) and that the trust corpus settled by him in his lifetime was no part of his gross estate.
This case is brought under the decisions of Hallock and the three subsequent cases only by a disregard of the vital differences between the interest created by the Spiegel indenture and the arrangements before this Court in the four cases upon which reliance is placed.
1. In 1920, Spiegel transferred securities to himself and another person as co-trustees, the income to be paid equally to Spiegel's three named children during his lifetime. If any of the children died before the settlor, the share of that child was to go to his issue, if any, otherwise to the settlor's other children. The instrument provided further that upon the settlor's death the corpus, together with any accumulated income, should be divided 'equally among my said three (3) children; and if any of my said children shall have died, leaving any child or children surviving, then the child or children of such deceased child of mine shall receive the share' of the trust to which his or her parent would have been entitled. If any of the settlor's three children died without leaving surviving children, that share was to go to the two remaining children. When the trust was established Spiegel was 47 years old, and his three children were aged 25, 15, and 13. At his death twenty years later the children were still living and there were three grandchildren. Upon the assumption that there would have been a reverter to Spiegel by operation of Illinois law in the event that all his children predeceased him without leaving 'surviving children,' the value of this remote contingency was determined mathematically to be worth $4,000.
2. In the Helvering v. Hallock series, supra, each of the several donors created a trust giving an estate to another but providing that the property would revert to the donor if the donee predeceased him. The donor's death in each case was the operative fact which established final and complete dominion as between the donor and t e donee according to the terms of the instruments. Until the former's death the donor was, as it were, competing with the donee for the ultimate use and enjoyment of the property. We there held that the particular form of conveyancing words is immaterial if the net effect is that transferred property will revest in a donor who survives the donee. Except on a contingency of Illinois law so remote as to be nonexistent in the practical affairs of life, the property would never revert to Spiegel. His death no doubt would finally determine which children or grandchildren would have the ultimate enjoyment of the trust corpus settled upon his children, but in the real world the property could never come back to him as a windfall. His death did not determine contingencies from which he could benefit. His death merely definitively closed the class of beneficiaries and fixed the quantum of each child's share.
Contrary to the suggestion in the concurring opinion in this case-a suggestion accepted by the majority opinion-the Court of Appeals did not find that Spiegel retained an interest because he had not provided for all contingencies. It included the settled property in the gross estate on the theory that every trust carries as it were the seed of its own destruction through failure of the trust, thereby genrating a resulting trust. It said, 'If none of the beneficiaries survived the settlor, and that was a possibility, then the trust failed, and the trustees would hold the bare naked title to the corpus as resulting trustees for the settlor.' Commissioner v. Spiegel's Estate, 7 Cir., 159 F.2d 257, at page 259. But this mode of argument would have swept into the gross estate a conveyance in trust in fee to any of Spiegel's children in 1920 since the failure of the trust for any conceivable reason presumably would not turn the trust property into an outright gift to the trustees.
The trust indenture is a comprehensive arrangement for the children and their offspring to take care of the contingencies of mortality among the children and their offspring. Provisions such as were made in the Spiegel case are precisely the kind of arrangement made by an ancestor for his children and children's children by which he settles property upon them with a view to the contingencies of successive generations and reserves no interest in himself. Nothing was reserved in the settlor except what feudal notions about seisin may have reserved. But feudal notions of seisin are no more pertinent in tax cases when they lead to imposition of an estate tax than when they lead away from it. At the very basis of the decision of the Hallock case was the insistence that these 'unwitty diversities of the law of property derive[d] from medieval concepts as to the necessity of a continuous seisin. * * * are peculiarly irrelevant in the application of tax measures now so largely directed towards intangible wealth.' Helvering v. Hallock, supra, 309 U.S. at page 118, 60 S.Ct. at page 450, 84 L.Ed. 604, 125 A.L.R. 1368. The metaphysical remoteness of the present settlor's interest at the time the trust was created is clearly shown by the fact that it depended upon the highly unlikely event that all the children in existence at the time of the conveyance would die and would die childless. Even this remote possibility evaporated long before the settlor died. And certainly the only tenable construction of the statute is that not only must there have been a transfer of the sort designated in § 811(c) but the settlor's interest must also persist up to the time of his death. Cf. Estate of Miller, 40 B.T.A. 138; see Griswold, Cases and Materials on Federal Taxation 145 (1940).
3. The three later decisions invoked by the Court bear no resemblance to the situation presented by the Spiegel case and give no justification for the ruling now made. In Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co. v. Rothensies, supra, the settlement provided for a life estate in the settlor, life estates in the two daughters, and a eversion in the settlor unless the daughters had issue. See Brief for Respondent, p. 8, Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co. v. Rothensies, supra; Goldstone v. United States, 325 U.S. 687, 693, n. 3, 65 S.Ct. 1323, 1326, 89 L.Ed. 1871, 159 A.L.R. 1330. The birth of the grandchildren which cut off the settlor's interest did not occur until after the death of the settlor. Since, therefore, the taxability is to be determined at death, it followed that the value of the trust property was to be included in the gross estate. The sole controversy was whether deduction should be allowed for the mother's and daughters' life interests and for a contingent gift to unborn children. Likewise in the Estate of Field case it was conceded that the settlor retained until death a substantial interest-the right to reduce or cancel the interest of life tenants and a reversion of the corpus to himself if he survived these tenants. In the Estate of Field case too the controversy concerned the basis on which the estate was to be assessed-whether the value of the life tenancies was to be deducted from the corpus. The Goldstone case was in effect another Hallock case, the insurance being payable upon the donor's death to the wife but with a reserved right in the donor if she predeceased him.
The birth of grandchildren in Spiegel's lifetime destroys all resemblance between his case and the cases just discussed. On the least favorable reading of the trust instrument-whereby the grandchildren would have to survive not only their parents but also the settlor-the possibility that the settlor would regain the property was extremely tenuous. Reading the trust instrument in a customary and not in a hostile spirit, the grandchildren would merely have to survive their parents and not the settlor for their interest to become indefeasible. Thus the remote contingency of reacquisition by the settlor vanishes.
To be sure, in both the Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co. and the Estate of Field cases there is generality of language about indifference regarding the remoteness or uncertainty of the decedent's 'reversionary interest.' But in both cases as we have seen there was no question that the trust instrument itself purposely reserved in the settlor an interest which in its context was substantial. The talk of uncertainty and remoteness was merely a way of indicating that where the settlor himself had reserved an interest terminable only by his death, it was not for the law to make nice calculations as to the chance he was giving himself to regain the property. In these two cases the settlor thought the reserved interest had significance and of course the law gave that significance onetary value. Spiegel contrariwise designed to retain nothing and his estate should not be held to include property of which he divested himself many years before his death.
4. But even the gossamer thread which binds the majority together in subjecting the Spiegel trust corpus to an estate tax is visible only to their mind's eye. The gossamer thread is the remote possibility that at the time of Spiegel's death there would be a reverter of the trust property to him. But that possibility depends entirely upon its recognition by the law of Illinois. It is at best a dubious assumption that such a reverter exists under Illinois law. My brother BURTON'S argument in disproof is not lightly to be dismissed. At best, however, this Court's guess that Illinois law would enforce such a reverter may be displaced the day after tomorrow by the Illinois Supreme Court's authoritative rejection of the guess. If tax liability is to hang by a gossamer thread, the Court ought to be sure that the thread is there. Since only the courts of Illinois can definitively inform us about this; it would seem to me common sense to secure an adjudication from them if some appropriate procedure of Illinois, like the Declaratory Judgment Act, is available. To justify at all the Court's theory, the rational mode of disposing of the case would be to remand it to the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in order to allow that court to decide whether in fact a procedure is available under Illinois law for a ruling upon the point of Illinois law which is made the basis of this Court's decision, since the correctness of this Court's assumption is at best doubtful. Cf. Thompson v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 309 U.S. 478, 483, 484, 60 S.Ct. 628, 630, 631, 84 L.Ed. 876; Spector Motor Service, Inc., v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101, 65 S.Ct. 152, 89 L.Ed. 101. A determination so made would conclusively fix the interests actually held by the parties to the instrument and at the same time leave to the federal courts the tax consequences of these interests. Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 5, 9-14, 57 S.Ct. 330, 331-334, 81 L.Ed. 465; Freuler v. Helvering, 291 U.S. 35, 54 S.Ct. 308, 78 L.Ed. 634.
II. The reach of the Church case, No. 5, extends far beyond the proper construction of the tax statute. It concerns the appropriate attitude of this Court toward a series of long-standing unanimous decisions by this Court. More than that, it involves the respect owed by this Court to the expressed intention of Congress.
The short of the matter is this. More than eighteen years ago this Court by a unanimous ruling found that Congress did not mean to subject a trust corpus transferred by a decedent in his lifetime to the estate tax imposed by the Revenue Act of 1918 merely because the settlor had reserved the income to himself for life. May v. Heiner, 281 U.S. 238, 50 S.Ct. 286, 74 L.Ed. 826, 67 A.L.R. 1244. At the earliest opportunity, in three cases having minor variations but presenting the same issue, the Treasury invited the Court's reconsideration of its decision. But the Court after having had the benefit of comprehensive briefs and arguments by counsel specially competent in fiscal matters, unanimously adhered to its ruling in May v. Heiner. Burnet v. Northern Trust Co., 283 U.S. 782, 51 S.Ct. 342, 75 L.Ed. 1412; Morsman v. Burnet, 283 U.S. 783, 51 S.Ct. 343, 75 L.Ed. 1412; McCormick v. Burnet, 283 U.S. 784, 51 S.Ct. 343, 75 L.Ed. 1413. These decisions, now cast aside, were shared in by judges of whom it must be said without invidiousness that they were most alert in recognizing the public interest and resourceful in protecting it. There were brave men before Agamemnon. If such a series of decisions, viewed in all their circumstances, as that which established the rule in May v. Heiner, is to have only contemporaneous value, the wisest decisions of the present Court are assured no greater permanence.
In fairness, attention should be called to the fact that in joining the Court's decisions laying down, and adhering to, the May v. Heiner ruling, Mr. Chief Justice Hughes, Mr. Justice Holmes, Mr. Justice Brandeis, and Mr. Justice Stone were not denied argument which the Government has now urged upon us. But it is also fair to the Government to point out that it has not of its own accord asked this Court to overrule the four decisions rendered eighteen years ago. It was only after the case was ordered for reargument and a series of questions was formulated by the Court which shed doubt upon the continued vitality of May v. Heiner, that the Government suggested that the decision be cast into limbo. No doubt stare decisis is not 'a universal, inexorable command.' Brandeis, J., dissenting in State of Washington v. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219, 238, 44 S.Ct. 302, 309, 68 L.Ed. 646. But neither is it a doctrine of the dead hand. In the very Hallock case relied upon so heavily in these cases the Court said, 'We recognize that stare decisis embodies an important social policy. It represents an element of continuity in law, and is rooted in the psychologic need to satisfy reasonable expectations.' 309 U.S. at page 119, 60 S.Ct. at page 451, 84 L.Ed. 604, 125 A.L.R. 1368. And one of the most recent reliances on stare decisis for decision was expressed with such firmness as to manifest allegiance to principle, not utilization of an ad hoc argument. We are not dealing here with a ruling which cramps the power of Government; we are not dealing with a constitutional adjudication which time and experience have proved a parochial instead of a spacious view of the Constitution and which thus calls for self-correction by the Court without waiting for the leadenfooted process of constitutional amendment. We are dealing with an exercise of this Court's duty to construe what Congress has enacted with ample powers on its part quickly and completely to correct misconstruction.
Those powe § were promptly invoked in this case. Because the Treasury was dissatisfied with the meaning given by this Court to the estate-tax provision, the very next day after the three decisions reaffirming May v. Heiner were handed down, the Treasury appealed to Congress for relief and Congress gave relief. The true significance of today's decision in the Church case is not to be found in the Court's failure to respect stare decisis. The extent to which judges should feel in duty bound not to innovate is a perennial problem, and the pull of the past is different among different judges as it is in the same judge about different aspects of the past. We are obligated, however, to enforce what is within the power of Congress to declare. Inevitable difficulties arise when Congress has not made clear its purpose, but when that purpose is made manifest in a manner that leaves no doubt according to the ordinary meaning of English speech, this Court in disregarding it is disregarding the limits of the judicial function which we all profess to observe.
The Treasury no doubt was deeply concerned over the emphatic reaffirmation of May v. Heiner. The relief sought from Congress was formulated by the fiscal and legal expert who had that very day failed in persuading this Court to overrule May v. Heiner. What relief did the Treasury seek from Congress? Did the Secretary of the Treasury ask Congress to rewrite § 302(c) of the Revenue Act of 1926, now § 811(c) of the Internal Revenue Code, so as to sterilize May v. Heiner? Certainly not. Not one word was altered of the language of the provision which this Court felt compelled to construe as it did in May v. Heiner. What the Treasury proposed and what Congress granted was a qualifying addition to the statute as construed in May v. Heiner, whereby trust settlements reserving a life interest in the settlor were to be included in a decedent's gross estate, but only in the case of settlements made after this qualification became operative, that is, after March 3, 1931. Such, in the light of the legislative history, was the inescapable meaning of what Congress did, and the only thing it did, to qualify the reading which this Court four times felt constrained to place upon the mandate of Congress in the imposition of the estate tax. The history is recounted in Hassett v. Welch, 303 U.S. 303, 58 S.Ct. 559, 82 L.Ed. 858, again without a dissenting voice. This history is so crucial to the exercise of the judicial process in this case, that it bears repetition.
When the Joint Resolution of March 3, 1931, was adopted, it was clear that it was to be only of prospective effect. Its sponsors specifically declared:
'Entirely apart from the refunds that may be expected to result, it is to be anticipated that many persons will proceed to execute trusts or other varieties of transfers under which they will be enabled to escape the estate tax upon their property. It is of the greatest importance therefore that this situation be corrected and that this obvious opportunity for tax avoidance be removed. It is for that purpose that the joint resolution is proposed.' 74 Cong.Rec. 7198 and 7078.
And there was good reason for not making it retroactive:
'We did not make it retroactive for the reason that we were afraid that the Senate would not agree to it. But I do hope that when this matter is considered in the Seventy-Second Congress we may be able to pass a bill that will make it retroactive.' 74 Cong.Rec. 7199.
These statements on the floor by those in charge of the Resolution are controlling, as much as though they had been submitted in a Committee Report, for they were the authoritative explanation of the Resolution's purpose and meaning. In fact, Representative Schafer of Wisconsin had stated that unless the sponsors explained the bill he would object, thus preventing its acceptance as a resolution. 74 Cong.Rev. 7198.
When the section was reenacted by the 72d Congress as § 803(a) of the Revenue Act of 1932, it remained n the pre-May v. Heiner language with the Joint Resolution of March 3, 1931, added in slightly different phrasing. 47 Stat. 279. This section was interpreted in 1938 by a unanimous Court as not applying to a reserved life estate created in 1924. Hassett v. Welch, 303 U.S. 303, 58 S.Ct. 559, 82 L.Ed. 858. The briefs filed by the Government in that case again contained much of the same data now found to demand a contrary result. On the same day this Court also decided Helvering v. Bullard, 303 U.S. 297, 58 S.Ct. 565, 82 L.Ed. 852, which held the Joint Resolution applicable to reserved life estates created after the passage of the Resolution. It quoted the same language from Matter of Keeney's Estate, 194 N.Y. 281, 287, 87 N.E. 428, now quoted by the majority, thus indicating that it appreciated the tax-avoidance problem and would have interpreted § 803(a) retroactively had Congress indicated that it intended to tax reserved life estates created before March 3, 1931. It is especially difficult to say that in Hassett v. Welch, supra, the Court considered only the language added by the Joint Resolution and not the section in its entirety, since it phrased the issue before it in this way:
'The petitioners ask us to hold that section 302(c) of the Revenue Act of 1926 as amended by the Joint Resolution of Congress of March 3, 1931, and section 803(a) of the Revenue Act of 1932, includes in the gross estate of a decedent, for estate tax, property which, before the adoption of the amendments, was irrevocably ransferred with reservation of a life estate to the transferor * * *.' 303 U.S. at page 304, 58 S.Ct. at page 560, 82 L.Ed. 858.
If May v. Heiner, supra, had not been accepted as authoritative, it would have been pointless to decide that the amendment to § 302(c) of the revenue Act of 1926 did not operate retroactively. See Learned Hand, J., in Helvering v. Proctor, 2 Cir., 140 F.2d 87, 89, 155 A.L.R. 845.
Of course the Government did not attack May v. Heiner in Hassett v. Welch, supra. Having been rebuffed three times by this Court in its efforts to secure its overruling and having resorted to Congress to nullify its effect, the whole claim of the Government in Hassett v. Welch was that Congress had, as it were, overruled May v. Heiner by the Resolution of March 3, 1931, not only prospectively, but retrospectively. That construction of the Resolution of 1931 had to be rejected in the light of the legislative history of the Resolution. The unanimity of the Court's decision in Hassett v. Welch confirms the inevitability of the decision. A d the considerations that led the Government not to attack May v. Heiner in Hassett v. Welch, supra, likewise led the Government not to ask the Court to overrule May v. Heiner in this litigation until propelled to do so by this Court's order for reargument. These considerations were of the same nature, except reenforced by another decade's respect for May v. Heiner by the Treasury in the actual administration of the revenue law.
Congress has made no change in this section since 1932 and the identical language was carried over as § 811(c) of the Internal Revenue Code in 1939. There has been no amendment to this language in the Code. Although the sponsors of the Joint Resolution in the House expressed the hope that the next Congress would make the Resolution's provisions retroactive, nothing of the sort was done. See 74 Cong.Rec. 7199, partially quoted ante at p. 13. Nor did the Treasury remind any subsequent Congress of this unfinished business, despite the fact that it urged amendment of other provisions of the estate-tax law.
The Court during the past decade, in an impressive body of decisions, has given effect to legislative history under circumstances far less compelling than the story here summarized. See the massive body of cases collected in Appendix A. 69 S.Ct. 355. Moreover, in the face of the legislative history set out above, even an overruling of the five cases in which this precise issue was decided would not give this Court a free hand. For the subsequent actions of Congress make the meaning announced in May v. Heiner and reaffirmed four times as much a part of the wording of the statute as if it had been written in express terms. See Note, 59 Harv.L.Rev. 1277, 1285. An interpretation that 'came like a bombshell' certainly had the attention of the Congress. Its failure to alter the language indicates that it accepted that interpretation. See the cases collected in Appendix B. 69 S.Ct. 358. Due regard for this Court's function precludes it from ignoring explicit legislative intention even to 'yield results more consonant with fairness and reason.' Anderson v. Wilson, 289 U.S. 20, 27, 53 S.Ct. 417, 420, 77 L.Ed. 1004; see Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 14 (1921). What the Treasury could not induce the House to do because the Senate would not vote for it we should not now, eighteen years later, bring to pass simply because our action in this case does not depend upon that body's concurrence.
No comparable legislative history was flouted in Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 60 S.Ct. 444, 84 L.Ed. 604, 125 A.L.R. 1368. It is one thing to hold that Congress is not charged either with seeking out and reading decisions which reach conflicting views in the application of a sound principle or with taking steps to meet such decisions. This is the meaning of our holding in the Hallock case. It is quite a different thing to say that a statute does not acquire authoritative content when a decision interpreting it has been called to the attention of the public and of Congress and has engendered professional controversy, and when Congress, after full debate, has not merely refused to undo the effect of the decision but has seen fit to modify it only partially. Helvering v. Griffiths, 318 U.S. 371, 63 S.Ct. 636, 87 L.Ed. 843; United States v. South Buffalo R. Co., 333 U.S. 771, 773-785, 68 S.Ct. 868, 869-875; cf. Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 487-489, 60 S.Ct. 982, 988, 989, 84 L.Ed. 1311, 128 A.L.R. 1044. That is this case.
The opinion of the majority in the Hallock case did not, either explicitly or by implication, declare that May v. Heiner was no longer the accepted interpretation of the pre-1931 part of the language in § 811(c). When we spoke of what had been 'Congressionally discarded'-a reference, incidentally, made to answer the argument that Congress had legislatively recognized the distinction between the Klein and the St. Louis Trust cases-we meant just what Congress meant that where a settlor created a trust after May 3, 1931, in which he reserved a life estate, the property transferred would be included in the gross estate. It is significant that only one of the many circuit judges who have dealt with the Hallock opinion has thought that it overruled May v. Heiner or that the interpretation there announced was to be changed. Commissioner v. Hall's Estate, 2 Cir., 153 F.2d 172; Helvering v. Proctor, 2 Cir., 140 F.2d 87, 155 A.L.R. 845; Commissioner v. Church's Estate, 3 Cir., 161 F.2d 11; United States v. Brown, 9 Cir., 134 F.2d 372. The contention that the Hallock case overruled May v. Heiner was, one would have supposed, conclusively answered by Judge Learned Hand in Helvering v. Proctor, supra, 140 F.2d at pages 88, 89:
'The opinion of the majority in Helvering v. Hallock, supra, did not explicitly, or by inference from anything siad, declare that May v. Heiner, supra * * * was no longer law. We do not forget that in a note on page 120 of 309 U.S., page 452 of 60 S.Ct., 84 L.Ed. 604, 125 A.L.R. 1368. Frankfurter, J., spoke of the 'Congressionally discarded May v. Heiner doctrine; but it would be quite unwarranted from that to infer that the court meant to overrule that 'doctrine,' and the note was added for quite another purpose. * * * it cannot properly be interpreted as holding that the amendment was a legislative interpretation that May v. Heiner, supra, had been wrongly decided. Perhaps it was wrongly decided; perhaps the amendment is evidence that it was; but the Supreme Court did not say so, or indicate that it thought so. It is true that Roberts, J. in his dissent found no difference (309 U.S. at page 127, 60 S.Ct. at page 455 * * *) between that decision and Helvering v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., supra, 296 U.S. 39, 56 S.Ct. 74, 80 L.Ed. 29, 100 A.L.R. 1239, and apparently thought that consistently, May v. Heiner, supra, must also fall, but the majority did not share his opinion.
'Helvering v. Hallock, supra, 309 U.S. 106, 60 S.Ct. 444, 84 L.Ed. 604, 125 A.L.R. 1368, was concerned with quite another situation. The settlor had provided that, if he survived his wife who had a life estate-the remainder went to him; but if she survived him, the remainder went to her. All that was decided was that, when that was the intent, it made no difference what was the form of words used. It was enough that the settlor's death cut off an interest which he had reserved to himself upon a condition then determined; that made the remainder a part of his estate. * * * If therefore May v. Heiner, supra, 281 U.S. 238, 50 S.Ct. 286, 74 L.Ed. 826, 67 A.L.R. 1244, is to be overruled, we do not see how Helvering v. Hallock, supra, can be thought to contribute to that result; it must be overruled by a new and altogether independent lift of power, which is clearly not ours to exercise. Furthermore, if the Commissioner is right, Helvering v. Hallock, supra, 309 U.S. 106, 60 S.Ct. 444, 84 L.Ed. 604, 125 A.L.R. 1368 also overruled Hassett v. Welch, 303 U.S. 303, 58 S.Ct. 559, 82 L.Ed. 858, sub silentio. That decision had held that the amendment to § 302(c) did not operate retroactively; and it would not have been necessary to discuss that question, nor would the actual result have been the same, if May v. Heiner, supra, 281 U.S. 238, 50 S.Ct. 286, 74 L.Ed. 826, 67 A.L.R. 1244, had not been law.'
I would reverse Spiegel v. Commissioner, No. 3, and affirm Commissioner v. Estate of Church, No. 5.
Decisions During the Past Decade in Which Legislative History Was Decisive of Construction of a Particular Statutory Provision
United States v. Durkee Famous Foods, Inc., 306 U.S. 68, 59 S.Ct. 456, 83 L.Ed. 492; United States v. Towery, 306 U.S. 324, 59 S.Ct. 522, 83 L.Ed. 678; Kessler v. Strecher, 307 U.S. 22, 59 S.Ct. 694, 83 L.Ed. 1082; United States v. Maher, 307 U.S. 148, 59 S.Ct. 768, 83 L.Ed. 1162; United States v. One 1936 Model Ford, 307 U.S. 219, 59 S.Ct. 861, 83 L.Ed. 1249; Sanford's Estate v. Commissioner, 308 U.S. 39, 60 S.Ct. 51, 84 L.Ed. 20; Palmer v. Massachusetts, 308 U.S. 79, 60 S.Ct. 34, 84 L.Ed. 93; Valvoline Oil Co. v. United States, 308 U.S. 141, 60 S.Ct. 160, 84 L.Ed. 151; Haggar Co. v. Helvering, 308 U.S. 389, 60 S.Ct. 337, 84 L.Ed. 340; American Federation of Labor v. National Labor Relations Board, 308 U.S. 401, 60 S.Ct. 300, 84 L.Ed. 347; Kalb v. Feuerstein, 308 U.S. 433, 60 S.Ct. 343, 84 L.Ed. 370; Morgan v. Commissioner, 309 U.S. 78, 626, 60 S.Ct. 424, 84 L.Ed. 585, 1035; South Chicago Coal & Dock Co. v. Bassett, 309 U.S. 251, 60 S.Ct. 544, 84 L.Ed. 732; Amalgamated Utility Workers v. Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, 309 U.S. 261, 60 S.Ct. 261, 84 L.Ed. 738; Germantown Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 309 U.S. 304, 60 S.Ct. 566, 84 L.Ed. 770; Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 309 U.S. 390, 60 S.Ct. 681, 84 L.Ed. 825; United States v. City and County of San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16, 60 S.Ct. 749, 84 L.Ed. 1050; Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 60 S.Ct. 907, 84 L.Ed. 1263; United States v. American Trucking Ass'n, 310 U.S. 534, 60 S.Ct. 1059, 84 L.Ed. 1345; United States v. Dickerson, 310 U.S. 554, 60 S.Ct. 1034, 84 L.Ed. 1356; Helvering v. Northwest Steel Rolling Mills, Inc., 311 U.S. 46, 61 S.Ct. 109, 85 L.Ed. 29; Neuberger v. Commissioner, 311 U.S. 83, 61 S.Ct. 97, 85 L.Ed. 58; Milk Wagon Drivers' Union, Local No. 753 v. Lake Valley Farm Products, 311 U.S. 91, 61 S.Ct. 122, 85 L.Ed. 63; Helvering v. Janney, 311 U.S. 189, 61 S.Ct. 241, 85 L.Ed. 118, 131 A.L.R. 980; Taft v. Helvering, 311 U.S. 195, 61 S.Ct. 244, 85 L.Ed. 122; Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 61 S.Ct. 399, 85 L.Ed. 581; United States v. Gilliland, 312 U.S. 86, 61 S.Ct. 518, 85 L.Ed. 598; Palmer v. Webster & Atlas National Bank of Boston, 312 U.S. 156, 61 S.Ct. 542, 85 L.Ed. 642; United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600, 61 S.Ct. 742, 85 L.Ed. 1071; Helvering v. Enright's Estate, 312 U.S. 636, 61 S.Ct. 777, 85 L.Ed. 1093; Maguire v. Commissioner, 313 U.S. 1, 61 S.C . 789, 85 L.Ed. 1149; Helvering v. Campbell, 313 U.S. 15, 61 S.Ct. 798, 85 L.Ed. 1159; Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 61 S.Ct. 868, 85 L.Ed. 1214; Phelps Dodge Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 313 U.S. 177, 61 S.Ct. 845, 85 L.Ed. 1271, 133 A.L.R. 1217; Helvering v. William Flaccus Oak Leather Co., 313 U.S. 247, 61 S.Ct. 878, 85 L.Ed. 1310; Benitez Sampayo v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 313 U.S. 270, 61 S.Ct. 953, 85 L.Ed. 1324; Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Kepner, 314 U.S. 44, 62 S.Ct. 6, 86 L.Ed. 28, 136 A.L.R. 1222; Parker v. Motor Boat Sales Inc., 314 U.S. 244, 62 S.Ct. 221, 86 L.Ed. 184; Textile Mills Securities Corp. v. Commissioner, 314 U.S. 326, 62 S.Ct. 272, 86 L.Ed. 249; Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402, 62 S.Ct. 326, 86 L.Ed. 301; District of Columbia v. Murphy, 314 U.S. 441, 62 S.Ct. 303, 86 L.Ed. 329; Illinois Natural Gas Co. v. Central Illinois Public Service, 314 U.S. 498, 510, 62 S.Ct. 384, 389, 86 L.Ed. 371; Duncan v. Thompson, 315 U.S. 1, 62 S.Ct. 422, 86 L.Ed. 575; Cudahy Packing Co. v. Holland, 315 U.S. 357, 788, 62 S.Ct. 651, 86 L.Ed. 895; United States v. Local 807 of International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 315 U.S. 521, 62 S.Ct. 642, 86 L.Ed. 1004; Stonite Product Co. v. Melvin Lloyd Co., 315 U.S. 561, 62 S.Ct. 780, 86 L.Ed. 1026; National Labor Relations Board v. Electric Vacuum Cleaner Co., 315 U.S. 685, 62 S.Ct. 846, 86 L.Ed. 1120; Miles v. Illinois Central R. Co., 315 U.S. 698, 62 S.Ct. 827, 86 L.Ed. 1129, 146 A.L.R. 1104; United States, to Use of Noland Co. v. Irwin, 316 U.S. 23, 62 S.Ct. 899, 86 L.Ed. 1241; Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Manufacturing Co. v. S. S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203, 62 S.Ct. 1022, 86 L.Ed. 1381; Kirschbaum v. Walling, 316 U.S. 517, 62 S.Ct. 1116, 86 L.Ed. 1638; Helvering v. Cement Investors, Inc., 316 U.S. 527, 62 S.Ct. 1125, 86 L.Ed. 1649; Marine Harbor Properties, Inc., v. Manufacturers' Trust Co., 17 U.S. 78, 63 S.Ct. 93, 87 L.Ed. 64; Braverman v. United States, 317 U.S. 49, 63 S.Ct. 99, 87 L.Ed. 23; Riggs v. Del Drago, 317 U.S. 95, 63 S.Ct. 109, 87 L.Ed. 106, 142 A.L.R. 1131; Ex parte Kumezo Kawato, 317 U.S. 69, 63 S.Ct. 115, 87 L.Ed. 58; State Bank of Hardinsburg v. Brown, 317 U.S. 135, 63 S.Ct. 128, 87 L.Ed. 140; Pfister v. Northern Illinois Finance Corp., 317 U.S. 144, 63 S.Ct. 133, 87 L.Ed. 146; United States v. Wayne Pump Co., 317 U.S. 200, 63 S.Ct. 191, 87 L.Ed. 184; Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 63 S.Ct. 307, 87 L.Ed. 315; Walling v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 317 U.S. 564, 63 S.Ct. 332, 87 L.Ed. 460; Harrison v. Northern Trust Co., 317 U.S. 476, 63 S.Ct. 361, 87 L.Ed. 407; United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 63 S.Ct. 379, 87 L.Ed. 443; United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424, 63 S.Ct. 409, 87 L.Ed. 376; Ziffrin, Inc., v. United States, 318 U.S. 73, 63 S.Ct. 465, 87 L.Ed. 621; Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 63 S.Ct. 477, 87 L.Ed. 645, 144 A.L.R. 719; Overstreet v. North Shore Corp., 318 U.S. 125, 63 S.Ct. 494, 87 L.Ed. 656; Robinette v. Helvering, 318 U.S. 184, 63 S.Ct. 540, 87 L.Ed. 700; Smith v. Shaughnessy, 318 U.S. 176, 63 S.Ct. 545, 87 L.Ed. 690; Helvering v. Sabine Transp. Co., 318 U.S. 306, 63 S.Ct. 569, 87 L.Ed. 773; Federal Security Adm'r v. Quaker Oats Co., 318 U.S. 218, 63 S.Ct. 589, 87 L.Ed. 724, 158 A.L.R. 832; United States v. Swift & Co., 318 U.S. 442, 63 S.Ct. 684, 87 L.Ed. 889; Ecker v. Western Pac. R. R. Corp., 318 U.S. 448, 63 S.Ct. 692, 87 L.Ed. 892; Fred Fisher Music Co. v. M. Witmark & Sons, 318 U.S. 643, 63 S.Ct. 773, 87 L.Ed. 1055; Jersey Central Power & Light Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 319 U.S. 61, 63 S.Ct. 953, 87 L.Ed. 1258; National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 63 S.Ct. 997, 87 L.Ed. 1344; Boone v. Lightner, 319 U.S. 561, 63 S.Ct. 1223, 87 L.Ed. 1587; Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 63 S.Ct. 1333, 87 L.Ed. 1796; Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 63 S.Ct. 1375, 87 L.Ed. 1774; Roberts v. United States, 320 U.S. 264, 64 S.Ct. 113, 88 L.Ed. 41; United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 64 S.Ct. 134, 88 L.Ed. 48; Crescent Express Lines v. U ited States, 320 U.S. 401, 64 S.Ct. 167, 88 L.Ed. 127; Colgate-Palmolive-Peet Co. v. United States, 320 U.S. 422, 64 S.Ct. 227, 88 L.Ed. 143; United States v. Laudani, 320 U.S. 543, 64 S.Ct. 315, 88 L.Ed. 300, 149 A.L.R. 492; United States v. Myers, 320 U.S. 561, 64 S.Ct. 337, 88 L.Ed. 312; McLean Trucking Co. v. United States, 321 U.S. 67, 64 S.Ct. 370, 88 L.Ed. 544; Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, Enterprise Lodge, No. 27 v. Toledo, P. & W. R. R., 321 U.S. 50, 64 S.Ct. 413, 88 L.Ed. 534, 150 A.L.R. 810; B. F. Goodrich Co. v. United States, 321 U.S. 126, 64 S.Ct. 471, 88 L.Ed. 602; Davies Warehouse Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 144, 64 S.Ct. 474, 88 L.Ed. 635; Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 64 S.Ct. 587, 88 L.Ed. 754; Cornell Steamboat Co. v. United States, 321 U.S. 634, 64 S.Ct. 768, 88 L.Ed. 978; National Labor Relations Board v. Hearst Publication, 322 U.S. 111, 64 S.Ct. 851, 88 L.Ed. 1170; Carolene Product Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 18, 65 S.Ct. 1, 89 L.Ed. 15, 155 A.L.R. 1371; Smith v. Davis, 323 U.S. 111, 65 S.Ct. 157, 89 L.Ed. 107; United States v. Rosenwasser, 323 U.S. 360, 65 S.Ct. 295, 89 L.Ed. 301; Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Lenroot, 323 U.S. 490, 65 S.Ct. 335, 89 L.Ed. 414; Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 65 S.Ct. 373, 89 L.Ed. 322; Central States Electric Co. v. City of Muscatine, 324 U.S. 138, 65 S.Ct. 565, 89 L.Ed. 801; Gemsco, Inc., v. Walling, 324 U.S. 244, 65 S.Ct. 605, 89 L.Ed. 921; Canadian Aviator v. United States, 324 U.S. 215, 65 S.Ct. 639, 89 L.Ed. 901; Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 324 U.S. 515, 65 S.Ct. 749, 89 L.Ed. 1150; A. H. Phillips, Inc., v. Walling, 324 U.S. 490, 65 S.Ct. 807, 89 L.Ed. 1095, 157 A.L.R. 876; Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 65 S.Ct. 895, 89 L.Ed. 1296; Federal Trade Commission v. A. E. Staley Mfg. Co., 324 U.S. 746, 65 S.Ct. 971, 89 L.Ed. 1338; Jewell Ridge Coal Corp. v. Local No. 6167, United Mine Workers of America, 325 U.S. 161, 65 S.Ct. 1063, 89 L.Ed. 1534; Elgin, J. & E. R. Co. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 65 S.Ct. 1282, 89 L.Ed. 1886; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Parker, 326 U.S. 60, 65 S.Ct. 1490, 89 L.Ed. 2051; Markham v. Cabell, 326 U.S. 404, 66 S.Ct. 193, 90 L.Ed. 165; John Kelley Co. v. Commissioner, 326 U.S. 521, 66 S.Ct. 299, 90 L.Ed. 278; Roland Electrical Co. v. Walling, 326 U.S. 657, 66 S.Ct. 413, 90 L.Ed. 383; Mabee v. White Plains Pub. Co., 327 U.S. 178, 66 S.Ct. 511, 90 L.Ed. 607; Duggan v. Sansberry, 327 U.S. 499, 66 S.Ct. 657, 90 L.Ed. 809; United States v. Carbone, 327 U.S. 633, 66 S.Ct. 734, 90 L.Ed. 904; Williams v. United States, 327 U.S. 711, 66 S.Ct. 778, 90 L.Ed. 962; Federal Trade Commission v. A. P. W. Paper Co., 328 U.S. 193, 66 S.Ct. 932, 90 L.Ed. 1165; Hust v. Moore-McCormack, 328 U.S. 707, 66 S.Ct. 1218, 90 L.Ed. 1534; United States v. Sheridan, 329 U.S. 379, 67 S.Ct. 332, 91 L.Ed. 359; Oklahoma v. United States Civil Service Commission, 330 U.S. 127, 67 S.Ct. 544, 91 L.Ed. 794; United States v. United Mine Workers of America, 330 U.S. 258, 67 S.Ct. 677, 91 L.Ed. 884; United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America v. United States, 330 U.S. 395, 67 S.Ct. 775, 91 L.Ed. 973; American Stevedores Inc. v. Porello, 330 U.S. 446, 67 S.Ct. 847, 91 L.Ed. 1011; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Mechling, 330 U.S. 567, 67 S.Ct. 894, 91 L.Ed. 1102; United States v. Ogilvie Hardware Co., 330 U.S. 709, 67 S.Ct. 997, 91 L.Ed. 1192; McCullough v. Kammerer Corp., 331 U.S. 96, 67 S.Ct. 1165, 91 L.Ed. 1365; Ayrshire Collieries Corp. v. United States, 331 U.S. 132, 67 S.Ct. 1168, 91 L.Ed. 1391; Williams v. Austrian, 331 U.S. 642, 67 S.Ct. 1443, 91 L.Ed. 1718; Jones v. Liberty Glass Co., 332 U.S. 524, 68 S.Ct. 229; Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 68 S.Ct. 374; Hilton v. Sullivan, 334 U.S. 323, 68 S.Ct. 1020; United States v. National City Lines, 334 U.S. 573, 68 S.Ct. 1169; United States v. Zazove, 334 U.S. 602, 68 S.Ct. 1284; United States v. Congress of Industrial Organizations, 335 U.S. 106, 68 S.Ct. 1349; Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 68 S.Ct. 375; Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188, 68 S.Ct. 1443.
Opinions During the Past Decade Resting Upon the Rule That the Reenactment of a Statute Carries Gloss of Construction Placed Upon It by This Court
Electric Storage Battery Co. v. Shimadzu, 307 U.S. 5, 14, 613, 616, 59 S.Ct. 675, 681, 83 L.Ed. 1071; Rasquin v. Humphreys, 308 U.S. 54, 60 S.Ct. 60, 84 L.Ed. 77; Apex Hosiery Co., v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 60 S.Ct. 982, 84 L.Ed. 1311, 128 A.L.R. 1044; Brooks v. Dewar, 313 U.S. 354, 61 S.Ct. 979, 85 L.Ed. 1399; Helvering v. Griffiths, 318 U.S. 371, 63 S.Ct. 636, 87 L.Ed. 843; Walling v. Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co., 331 U.S. 17, 67 S.Ct. 1056, 91 L.Ed. 1312; Commissioner v. Munter, 331 U.S. 210, 67 S.Ct. 1175, 91 L.Ed. 1441; Francis v. Southern Packing Co., 333 U.S. 445, 68 S.Ct. 611; United States v. South Buffalo R. Co., 333 U.S. 771, 68 S.Ct. 868; cf. Federal Communications Comm. v. Columbia Broadcasting System of California, 311 U.S. 132, 133, 61 S.Ct. 152, 85 L.Ed. 87, see Mr. Justice Black dissenting in Washingtonian Publishing Co. v. Drew Pearson, 306 U.S. 30, 42, 59 S.Ct. 397, 403, 83 L.Ed. 470; See Mr. Chief Justice Stone dissenting in Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61, 70, 66 S.Ct. 826, 830, 90 L.Ed. 1084.
Mr. Justice BURTON, dissenting.

## Notes

* ↑ This provision first appeared in § 202(b) of the Revenue Act of 1916, 39 Stat. 756, 777, 778, and read as follows:
* ↑ Whether the taxable event is the 'trnasfer inter vivos,' as we suggested in Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 111, 60 S.Ct. 444, 447, see Shukert v. Allen, 273 U.S. 545, 546, 47 S.Ct. 461, 71 L.Ed. 764, 49 A.L.R. 855, and Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co. v. Rothensies, 324 U.S. 108, 110, 111, 65 S.Ct. 508, 509, 510, 89 L.Ed. 783, 159 A.L.R. 227, or the transfer at death, as now seems to me more precise, seems immaterial. See Int.Rev. Code § 810, 26 U.S.C.A. § 810; dissent in Helvering v. St. Louis Trust Co., 296 U.S. 39, 46, 47, 56 S.Ct. 74, 77, 80 L.Ed. 29, 100 A.L.R. 1239; Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co., 278 U.S. 339, 347, 49 S.Ct. 123, 125, 73 L.Ed. 410, 66 A.L.R. 397.
* ↑ National Safe Deposit Co. v. Stead, 232 U.S. 58, 67, 34 S.Ct. 209, 211, 58 L.Ed. 504.
* ↑ Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 60 S.Ct. 444, 84 L.Ed. 604, 125 A.L.R. 1368; Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co. v. Rothensies, 324 U.S. 108, 65 S.Ct. 508, 89 L.Ed. 783, 159 A.L.R. 227; Commissioner v. Field's Estate, 324 U.S. 113, 65 S.Ct. 511, 89 L.Ed. 786, 159 A L.R. 230; Goldstone v. United States, 325 U.S. 687, 65 S.Ct. 1323, 89 L.Ed. 1871, 159 A.L.R. 1330.
* ↑ Since the state law defines and creates rights and interests in property and the federal taxing statutes only say which of these rights and interests created by state law shall be taxed, the law of Illinois controls the construction of this trust. Helvering v. Stuart, 317 U.S. 154, 161-163, 63 S.Ct. 140, 144, 145, 87 L.Ed. 154; Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 5, 9, 10, 57 S.Ct. 330, 331, 332, 81 L.Ed. 465.
* ↑ This statement does not refer to the items of deduction or exemption covered by Int. Rev. Code § 812, 26 U.S.C.A. § 812, but to the value of gifts not covered by § 812 that also are not covered by § 811.
* ↑ 46 Stat. 1516.
* ↑ May v. Heiner, 281 U.S. 238, 50 S.Ct. 286, 74 L.Ed. 826, 67 A.L.R. 1244; Burn t v. Northern Trust Co., 283 U.S. 782, 51 S.Ct. 342, 75 L.Ed. 1412; Morsman v. Burnet, 283 U.S. 783, 51 S.Ct. 343, 75 L.Ed. 1412; McCormick v. Burnet, 283 U.S. 784, 51 S.Ct. 343, 75 L.Ed. 1413.
* ↑ Why 'possession or enjoyment of * * * the property' was put in the amendment to the section I do not know. It reads as if Congress intended to make it clear that the possession or enjoyment of the property was a basis for taxation. Such result would have followed from the original language. That is probably why no cases have been called to our attention that have turned on the use of these words in the amendment.
* ↑ 74 Cong.Rec. 7198-99.
* ↑ Helvering v. Stuart, 317 U.S. 154, 161, 162, 63 S.Ct. 140, 144, 87 L.Ed. 154:
* ↑ The Illinois Annotations to the Restatement of the Law of Trusts, § 411, says that the rule of the Restatement 'states the law,' but no case has been found where the trustee holds the corpus upon a resulting trust for the settlor because of the failure of the inter vivos trust. See Restatement, Trusts, Ill. Anno. § 411, comment (b).
* ↑ In Chater v. Carter, 238 U.S. 572, 35 S.Ct. 859, 862, 59 L.Ed. 1462, this Court considered the following language whereby an inter vivos trust was created. 'The trust for Lottie Lee is to cause the dividends to be paid to her during the three years from January 1st next and if she shall then be living to transfer the shares to her'. The cestui que trust died before the expiration of the three-year period and the question arose as to whether the heir of the cestui que trust or the estate of the settlor was to receive the corpus. The Supreme Court considered it unnecessary 'to strain the meaning of words, as is sometimes done to avoid intestacy when wills are to be construed.' It concluded that the trust having failed, the trustee must redeliver the corpus 'to him from whom it came. In other words, there is a resulting trust for the donor.'
* ↑ The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit did not determine whether a grandchild who survived his parent also had to survive the settlor-decedent to have the right to his share of the principal go to his estate.
* ↑ The grant of certiorari was 'limited to the question of whether the entire value of the corpus of the trust at the time of decedent's death should have been included in the decedent's gross estate.' Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co. v. Rothensies, 324 U.S. 108, 110, 65 S.Ct. 508, 509, 89 L.Ed. 783, 159 A.L.R. 227. The same is true in Commissioner v. Field's Estate, 324 U.S. 113, 114, 65 S.Ct. 511, 89 L.Ed. 786, 159 A.L.R. 230.
* ↑ In No. 5, Commissioner v. Church, it is even clearer that events subsequent to the creation of the trust removed whatever possibility of reverter had previously existed even if one assumes that when the trust was created the settlor would regain the property if children or his brothers and sisters did not survive him. The trust indenture provided that the corpus was to go to the issue of deceased brothers and sisters if he survived his brothers and sisters, but there was no requirement that the children survive anyone to take. Unless we are going to import notions of tortious conveyances into modern trust arrangements, the subsequent birth of the children of his brothers and sisters removed any possibility that the property would come back to the settlor. Since I do not reject May v. Heiner, I do not regard the retention of the life estate as causing the estate to be taxed.
* ↑ See Smith-Hurd, Ill.Stat.Ann., Title 110, § 181.1. Added May 16, 1945.
* ↑ The portion of § 811(c) with which we are now concerned has been continuously on the statute books since 1916, when the first federal estate-tax law was enacted. Revenue Act of 1916, § 202(b), 39 Stat. 777; Revenue Act of 1918, § 402(c), 40 Stat. 1097; Revenue Act of 1921, § 402(c), 42 Stat. 278; Revenue Act of 1924, § 302(c), 43 Stat. 304; Revenue Act of 1926, § 302(c), 44 Stat. 70, amended by Joint Resolution of March 3, 1931, 46 Stat. 1516; Revenue Act of 1932, § 803(a), 47 Stat. 278; Int. Rev. Code § 811(c).
* ↑ See Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 112, 113, 65 S.Ct. 1031, 1040, 89 L.Ed. 1495, 162 A.L.R. 1330. 'But beyond that is the problem of stare decisis. The construction given § 20 [now 18 U.S.C.A. § 242] in the Classic case [United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 61 S.Ct. 1031, 85 L.Ed. 1368] formulated a rule of law which has become the basis of federal enforcement in this important field. The rule adopted in that case was formulated after mature consideration. It should be good for more than one day only. We do not have here a situation comparable to Mahnich v. Southern S. S.C.o., 321 U.S. 96, 64 S.Ct. 455, 88 L.Ed. 561, where we overruled a decision demonstrated to be a sport in the law and inconsistent with what preceded and what followed. The Classic case was not the product of hasty action or inadvertence. It was not out of line with the cases which preceded. It was designed to fashion the governing rule of law in this important field. We are not dealing with constitutional interpretations which throughout the history of the Court have wisely remained flexible and subject to frequent re-examination. The meaning which the Classic case gave to the phrase 'under color of any law' involved only a construction of the statute. Hence if it states a rule undesirable in its consequences, Congress can change it. We add only to the instability and uncertainty of the law if we revise the meaning of § 20 to meet the exigencies of each case coming before us.'
* ↑ See Brief for Petitioner, pp. 20 et seq., in Hassett v. Welch, 303 U.S. 303, 58 S.Ct. 559, 82 L.Ed. 858.
* ↑ The Court made it clear in May v. Heiner, supra, and the three cases following it that it was resolving a statutory, rather than a constitutional, question. May v. Heiner, 281 U.S. 238, 244, 245, 50 S.Ct. 286, 287, 288, 74 L.Ed. 826, 67 A.L.R. 1244; Burnet v. Northern Trust Co., 283 U.S. 782, 783, 51 S.Ct. 342, 75 L.Ed. 1412; Morsman v. Burnet, 283 U.S. 783, 784, 51 S.Ct. 343, 75 L.Ed. 1412; McCormick v. Burnet, 283 U.S. 784, 785, 51 S.Ct. 343, 75 L.Ed. 1413. Nor was Congress left in doubt that the Court had merely construed the statute which Congress was then being asked to qualify. In the House, Mr. Black of New York asked, 'Was the Supreme Court decision based on a constitutional question, or a discussion of the statute?' To which a sponsor of the legislation, Mr. Garner of Texas, replied, 'It was on the statute itself, and was not constitutional. 74 Cong.Rec. 7199. Indeed it is diffcult to assume that the Court was affected by notions of constitutionality in view of the fact that when the courts of the State of New York held similar words to apply to a reserved life estate, this Court rejected the contention that the law offended the due progress clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Keeney v. Comptroller of State of New York, 222 U.S. 525, 32 S.Ct. 105, 56 L.Ed. 299, 38 L.R.A., N.S., 1139.
* ↑ See, e. g., Hearings before Committee on Ways and Means on Revenue Revision, 1932, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 7, 42-43; Hearings before Committee on Finance on the Revenue Act of 1932, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 33, 51; 75 Cong.Rec. 5787; Hearings before Committee on Ways and Means on the Revenue Act, 1936, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 624; Hearings before the Committee on Ways and Means on Revision of Revenue Laws, 1938, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 108; Hearings before the Finance Committee on the Revenue Act of 1938, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 692-93; Hearings before the Committee on Ways and Means, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 74-75; Hearings before the Finance Committee on the Revenue Act of 1941, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 37; Data on Proposed Revenue Bill of 1942 Submitted to the Committee on Ways and Means by the Treasury Department and the Staff of the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue 363-65 (1942), and Hearings before the Committee on Ways and Means, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 7, 91-92, 94; Revised Hearings before the Committee on Ways and Means on Revenue Revision of 1943, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 7; Revised Hearings before the Finance Committee on the Revenue Act of 1943, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 46; Federal Estate and Gift Taxes, A Proposal for Integration and for Correlation with the Income Tax, A Joint Study prepared by an Advisory Committee to the Treasury Department and by the Office of the Tax Legislative Counsel, with the cooperation of the Division of Tax Research and the Bureau of Internal Revenue (1948); Letter from the Under Secretary of the Treasury to the Chairman, Committee on Ways and Means, February 26, 1948, pp. 3, 5, 8 (mimeographed copy furnished by the Department of the Treasury).
* ↑ The entire text of the Hallock opinion insofar as here relevant makes clear why the situation in the Hallock case is not at all similar to that involved in the Church case.
* ↑ Bearing of legislation subsequent to Helvering v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 296 U.S. 39, 56 S.Ct. 74, 80 L.Ed. 29, 100 A.L.R. 1239, compared with that in response to May v Heiner, 281 U.S. 238, 50 S.Ct. 286, 74 L.Ed. 826, 67 A.L.R. 1244.
* ↑ Klein v. United States, 283 U.S. 231, 51 S.Ct. 398, 75 L.Ed. 996.
* ↑ Helvering v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 296 U.S. 39, 56 S.Ct. 74, 80 L.Ed. 29, 100 A.L.R. 1239; Becker v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 296 U.S. 48, 56 S.Ct. 78, 80 L.Ed. 35.
* ↑ And even the judge who found May v. Heiner inconsistent with the Hallock case suggested that the Tax Court determine whether the grantor failed to relinquish his life estate in reliance on May v. Heiner. See Frank, J., dissenting in Commissioner v. Hall's Estate, 2 Cir., 153 F.2d 172, 174, 175. The Government at the bar of this Court suggested that hardships could be alleviated by a regulation relieving of a tax those estates which could show such reliance. The very suggestion involves a confession that the decision urged upon the Court would be unfair.
This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
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