# The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War/Chapter 3
## CHAPTER 3: SHELLING ATTACKS

Mujahideen shelling attacks on garrisons, outposts, airfields andcities were a daily event. The Mujahideen usually used mortars, rock-ets and recoilless rifles in these attacks. Sometimes they used moun-tain guns and howitzers. The objective was to harrass their foes anddestroy war material. Mujahideen gunners learned to construct mul-tiple firing sites and to fire and then quickly displace before DRA orSoviet artillery or aviation could respond effectively. When possible,Mujahideen would keep water near their firing sites to dampen theground behind the rocket or recoilless rifle. This would help curb theamount of tell tale dust raised by the backblast of the ordnance. TheSoviets and DRA tried to curb these attacks with counterbattery fires,rapid reaction forces and ambushes. Due to their routine nature, theMujahideen did not usually discuss these unless the interviewerprobed. The Mujahideen considered these as usually rather dullevents that did not bear retelling. The following attacks, however,were hardly dull events.
VIGNETTE 1: A SHELLING ATTACK TURNS BAD by Mawlawi Shukur Yasini In the spring of 1981, the Soviets and DRA were very active inour area. As a result, we dismantled our permanent bases andchanged them to mobile bases scattered throughout the area. Iintended to launch a major show of force against the Soviets usingmy mobile bases. I had two mortars—a 60mm and an 82mm. Theproblem with the 60mm mortar is that it only has a range of 1,400meters, so the gunner has to get close to the target to use it. I alsohad two DShK machine guns, and five RPG-7s. I kept these heavyweapons at my base at Gerdab. My men had small arms which theykept with them. On 17 April 1981, I launched a shelling attack against the Soviet66th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade in Samarkhel. I only took 42men with me since we were not very well equipped and we were notready for a major encounter with superior forces. Further, KamaDistrict is right across the river from the 66th Brigade garrison andthey kept the area under constant surveillance. I did not want tomove a large group of men through the area and alert them. Toavoid observation, we went north from Gerdab into the mountainsand then west across the mountains and into Mamakhel Village inthe Kama area (Map 3-1 - Dargo). We stayed for three nights inMamakhel and spent the days in the mountains at Dargo Chinaspring—some three kilometers away. From Mamakhel, we went to Mawlawi Shukur Yasini is a prominent religious leader in Nangrahar Province. He is fromthe village of Gerdab in Kama District northeast of Jalalabad. During the war, he was amajor commander of the Khalis group (HIK). Later, he joined NIFA. During the war, hetook television journalist Dan Rather to his base in Afghanistan. He also accompaniedCongressman Charles Wilson of Texas into Afghanistan several times. During most of thewar he was active in his own area, fighting the DRA in Jalalabad and the Soviet 66thSeparate Motorized Rifle Brigade at Samarkhel. He became a member of the Nangrahargoverning council after collapse of the communist regime—a position he held until theTaliban advance in September 1996. [Map sheet 3185].
One day, three Soviet soldiers from the 66th Brigade crossed the Kabul River for apicnic. They were drinking vodka and cooking shashlik around a campfire when MawlawiShukur captured them. One of the Soviets, named Naomov, converted to Islam and foughtwith the Mujahideen for three years. Author Ali Jalali interviewed Naomov during his visitto Washington,D.C. sponsored by the Freedom House. Naomov spoke Pushtu well by thattime. Naomov recommended that "the Mujahideen quit fighting one another and uniteagainst the enemy." Naomov settled in Canada.
Kama Village where some people were still living—although manypeople had already emigrated to Pakistan.
At Kama, I put my nephew Shahpur in charge and told him totake my two mortars and 38 men and to go shell the 66th's camp. Ikept four men with me. The shelling group left Kama at dusk. Theypositioned the 82mm mortar on the north side of the river at thehouse of Khan-e Mulla at Jamali Village—since it had the range.Then they crossed the river at Bela and approached the campthrough the village of Samarkhel. They occupied positions close to the entrance of the enemy camp. They had the guerrilla mortar(60mm) and the RPGs with them. They opened fire with the RPGsand the 60mm mortar from close range at 2200 hours. The 82mmmortar joined in long-range fires onto the sleeping camp. Theshelling attack created chaos. The shelling group fired at intervalsover a two-hour period and then broke contact and withdrew. I wasin Kama throughout the attack. My men had orders to join me in themountains at the Dargo China spring the next day. I went to therendezvous point. I arrived at dawn and they were already there.Two of my men were missing, since they had forgotten the 60mmmortar and a video camera and had gone back to retrieve them.
While I was in Kama, informers told me that the enemy wouldlaunch a search and destroy mission in Kama District in five days. Idecided that they would now come sooner since we had shelled them. I decided that we had to leave the area. At sunrise, I instructed mymen to go deeper into the mountains. I was tired and had a cold, so I decided to go back home to Gerdab. However, as I set out, I saw twohelicopters lifting off from the airport and flying low over KamaDistrict. I hit the ground and hid. I was alone except for HajiShahbaz. Other helicopters followed the first two. At first I thoughtthat the helicopters were enroute to Kunar Province, but then theystarted landing troops from two helicopters at Mirji Gholi point onDerghi Ghar mountain—about a kilometer away.
They also landed troops north of Mamakhel on the plain and on Gedaro Ghunday hill.My men saw the helicopters landing and realized that they would beseen if they continued to climb into the mountains. So they turnedaround in the wide canyon and started back toward me. I was in aditch between Mirji Gholi and Dargo China and was hidden by theearly morning shadow from the mountain. As I raised my head, Icould make out some 25 Soviet soldiers along with several peoplewearing tsadar moving to the southeast from the high ground of MirjiGholi toward Gedaro Ghunday. I could also see Soviets setting upmortars on top of Gedaro Ghunday. I crawled about 50 meters in theditch. The Soviets were facing the sun and I was in the shadow, sothey couldn't see me. As I crawled, I got rid of heavy things that I hadin my pockets—such as pliers and wads of money. I headed northtoward the mountain ridge. At that point, Zafar and Noor, carryingthe missing 60mm mortar and video camera, walked into the Sovietgroup setting up at Gedaro Ghunday. They were immediately cap-tured. Noor was my cousin.
I climbed Derghi Ghar Mountain to try and see what was hap-pening. I saw that my men had split. Thirteen were now back inDargo China. These 13 men were commanded by Tajahul and therest, commanded by Shahpur, were going back into the mountains. Isaw that part of the Soviets were heading toward my 13 men. TheSoviets began firing flares at the group of 13 to mark their position.Helicopter gunships then attacked my men with machine gun fire.Other Soviets headed down from Derghi Ghar toward them. Afterthe air attack, the Soviets began attacking my 13-man group. I wasmidway between the attacking Soviets and my men—about 500meters away. I looked in my binoculars and saw that another groupof Soviets were down in the valley picking up the pliers, first aidpackets and money I had discarded. The group examining my thingslooked different than the others and I thought that they were officers.I decided that when the helicopters made their next strafing run, Iwould use the noise of their gunfire to hide my fire. When the heli-copters made their next gun run, I fired on the group in the valleyand hit one. I then took cover, raised my head, fired and got anotherone. This drew the Soviets attention and they opened up on me.Artillery started to fall all around. I ran from this position to anoth-er position about 100 meters away. I had a "20-shooter" [Czechoslo-vak M26 light machine gun] and some of my men had "20-shooters."As I ran to change positions, I heard firing from "20-shooters" in mygroup. They were involved in a heavy fire fight.
I then heard noise from the north and I thought that the Sovietswere coming from that direction as well. But then I saw Shapur andone of my other men. They were coming for me. Shapur reported thattanks were moving through Kama and had sealed the exits. Theenemy were arresting people throughout Kama. We decided to leaveto the north. Earlier, Shapur had sent a messenger to my group of 13telling them to move north. However, they were pinned down by heavyartillery fire and direct fire. They could not break contact and foughtto the last man. As we left the area, one of my Mujahideen fired anRPG at a helicopter. The helicopter caught fire and flew off and fell to the ground near Kama—where it exploded. I don't know whether theRPG hit the helicopter or whether other ground fire got it.
We moved to the village of Ghara Mamakhel, some four hours intothe mountains, where I met two more of my men. By morning, 12 ofmy people arrived there. I learned the fate of my group of 13. TheSoviets remained in Kama for two days. Then we returned to retrievethe bodies of my men. I found the bodies of my 13 men in a group, plusthose of Zafar and Noor and five more of my men. The Soviets hadbooby-trapped some of the bodies and had sprinkled chemicals on otherbodies which caused them to disintegrate. We couldn't evacuate thesebodies. So we built graves over them. Their bodies are still thereunder stones. I do not know what the Soviet casualties were, but I doknow that I shot two, we downed a helicopter and the Soviets lost threearmored vehicles to our mines during this action.
Throughout the war, I faced the Soviets like this during sevensweeps. I moved the families of the martyrs to refugee camps inPeshawar, Pakistan, since we couldn't support them in the Kama area.I later learned that the Soviets were looking for me personally. Theyarrested someone who looked like me (the narrator has a prominentnose) while he was harvesting clover. At that time, my beard wasshorter. They took him to Jalalabad and paraded him around—"We'vecaught the son of a b----" they said. Someone finally recognized him,and said that he wasn't me and so he was released. Around that sametime, the DRA governor of Kama District was in the Merzakhel Village.The Soviets arrested him and put him into forced labor since they did-n't recognize him. They had him carrying water to their soldiers on thehigh ground. The Soviets were very careless of Afghan lives. Theykilled several villagers indiscriminately. They also killed one of mymen who was unarmed. I am glad we drove the Soviets out, but thesubsequent actions of the Mujahideen tarnish their record of victory. Ihave written many poems of protest against their current activities.
COMMENTARY: The Mujahideen were able to fire on the garrisonover a two-hour period since they periodically shifted firing positionsto avoid return fire. The Soviets did not push out any night patrolsto find the firing positions but only replied with artillery fire. Theartillery fire did no good. Apparently, the garrison commander hadnot surveyed potential and actual Mujahideen firing positions tocounter them.
The Mujahideen rendezvous point was located in one of threeescape routes into the mountains from Kama District. Further, it isadjacent to a likely blocking position which the Soviets used duringtheir periodic block and sweep operations. The Mujahideen werecaught downhill from the Soviet blocking force and could not escape.As usual, the Mujahideen were severely hampered by the lack ofportable, short-range radios which would have allowed them tocoordinate their actions.
VIGNETTE 2 A NEW YEARS PRESENT FOR THE SOVIETSby Mawlawi Shukur Yasini The Soviets invaded Afghanistan on 27 December 1979. I decidedthat we should give them a combination anniversary and New Yearspresent on 29 December 1983. The present would be a shelling attackon the 66th Separate. Motorized Rifle Brigade at Samarkhel. I assem-bled 150 Mujahideen with two 82mm mortars, two RPG-7s, one recoil-less rifle, and five or six antitank mines We had 250 mortar roundsfor the attack. I placed my nephew Shapur in command. He formedfour groups: a mortar group commanded by Awozubellah; a mortargroup commanded by my son Abdul Basir; an observation post/fireadjustment group commanded by Shapur; and a light group. We start-ed moving the ammunition and supplies on donkeys and mules twodays before the attack. We had to move all of it across the Kabul Riverand stockpile it in the village of Gerdi Kats. From there we had to move it. to Khwaja Hanafi Baba Ghar Mountain overlooking Samarkhel (Map 3-2 - New Year). We moved all the ammunition and supplies to the mountain areaundetected during the two days. We set up the mortars behind themountain and set up the observation post on top.. The light group hadthe recoilless rifle, RPGs and antitank mines. They crossed the riverat Bela at night and went through Samarkhel to the west. LocalMujahideen met them, guided them to the objective and helped themplant the mines They planted the mines in the road near the maingate of the compound near a mosque. Our plan was to start with aquick strike by the light group and then follow on with the mortarattack. The 66th Brigade was garrisoned in barracks and tents, so wehoped that our mortar fire would be effective against them. It was arainy night with lots of lightning. The light group launched the attackat 2200 by firing the recoilless rifle and RPGs at the main gate of theenemy compound. The enemy reacted with tanks and APCs whichcame roaring out of the gate. Two of them were destroyed or damagedby the antitank mines The light group withdrew. At the same time,the mortars went into action. They sent all 250 rounds of hot steel intothe enemy compound as our New Year's present to the 66th Brigade.The 66th Brigade responded with BM-21s, artillery and mortars. Mawlawi Shukur Yasini is the narrator of the previous vignette. [Map sheet 3185]. Page 114 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War Round after round of enemy fire slammed into the mountains, whilethe Mujahideen mortars continued to fire from the valley between themountains. With the Soviet fire, the Mujahideen mortars and thelightning, the night was practically turned into day. It was a spectac-ular fireworks display. I had stayed at Gerdab and had a cow killed and cooked. Iplanned to welcome my returning heroes with a feast. They weresupposed to return at dawn and so all the arrangements for the feastwere ready as the eastern sky lightened. But, my men did not returnat dawn. They were pinned down by the heavy Soviet return fire. Atdaybreak, Soviet helicopters and aircraft began flying over the areaand firing everywhere. I despaired that anyone would survive. Ipromised Allah that I would donate a large sum of money to charityif even half of my men would return. At 0800, my body guard, JumaKhan, and I left Gerdab and climbed the mountain overlookingGerdab. I was using my binoculars, I saw a shepherd running towardme. Everything was now calm. The aircraft had returned to theairfield and the artillery had quit firing. I climbed down to meet theshepherd. He brought me the good news that my Mujahideen hadsurvived and had returned to Gerdab. None of my Mujahideen wereeven hurt! We had a very good feast. Due to the heavy Soviet shelling, many other Mujahideen lefttheir areas. Our contacts in the Soviet camp later reported that heli-copters evacuated wounded and dead from Samarkhel to Jalalabadairport. The helicopters made 12 trips. Our contacts told me thatthere were at least 200 killed and wounded. This attack increasedSoviet activity and Soviet helicopters were out flying every day look-ing for Mujahideen.
COMMENTARY: A lot of Mujahideen mortar firing was observed firefrom the forward slopes of a mountain with the gunner making firingadjustments. The mortar crews in this attack would not have survivedthe Soviet return fire if they had tried firing from the forward slopes.Their reverse slope firing positions in the valley made it difficult forSoviet artillery to reach the firing positions. The use of forwardobservers to adjust fire is a mark of sophistication among Mujahideenforces. However, the Soviet mortar battery commanders should havesurveyed these likely firing sites and had them plotted long before theMujahideen attack. Apparently, they did not. This is a step that firesupport commanders should take whenever their forces stop. This was a permanent garrison, so such planning should have been done years before. The figure of 200 dead and wounded seems high, but it was awell-planned and executed attack.
DRA and Soviet intelligence efforts in the Kama area seem inade-quate. Commanders, like the narrator, operated from the same areathroughout the war and moved freely through populated areas, yet theDRA seemed unable to react in time. The Soviets and DRA knew whothe narrator was, what he looked like and where he was from, but theywere never able to kill or capture him.

### CHAPTER COMMENTARY

The Mujahideen fired from fixed, surveyed sites and from mobilefiring bases. The mobile fire base deployed in two phases. During theday, the firing survey party would move into the area, determineweapons positions, map locations, headings, intended positions for theaiming stakes and firing data. At night, the firing party would arrivein a jeep, meet with the survey party, set up their weapons, conduct aquick firing raid and depart. The Mujahideen also employed unmanned firing bases. Unmannedfiring bases were used against targets which were devoid of cover andconcealment. The Mujahideen would survey these points in daylightand set up rockets on makeshift or disposable launchers. They wouldconnect these rockets to time-delay firing devices. The Mujahideenwould be well away from the area when the Soviet or DRA forces wouldlaunch a search for them.
Shelling attacks had mixed results. When launched against mili-tary airfields and garrisons, they occasionally destroyed militarytargets of value. Further, they prevented the DRA or Soviet forcesfrom sleeping and depressed morale. When launched against cities,they frequently killed innocent civilians. This cost the Mujahideenpotential supporters. As some civilians expressed it, "the government oppress us during the day and the Mujahideen oppress us at night."
* ↑ The 66th and 70th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigades were forces created for counterin-surgency. They had three motorized rifle battalions, an air assault battalion, an artilleryhowitzer battalion, a MRL battalion, a reconnaissance battalion, a tank battalion andsupport troops. The 70th was located in Kandahar. The 2nd battalion of the 66th waslocated in Asadabad. ' Each of its motorized rifle companies had four motorized rifleplatoons instead of the usual three.
* ↑ The video camera was an important accessory of this war. Mujahideen used videocameras to record their actions so that they could prove that they expended weapons,ammunition and supplies and achieved results. The video tapes justified the issue of moresupplies to the faction.