# International Longshoremen's Association, Local 1291 v. Philadelphia Marine Trade Association/Concurrence Douglas

* Court Documents
* Case Syllabus
* Opinion of the Court
* Concurring Opinions Brennan Douglas
United States Supreme Court
389 U.S. 64
International Longshoremen's Association, Local 1291 v. Philadelphia Marine Trade Association
Mr. Justice DOUGLAS, concurring in part and dissenting part.
I would reverse in No. 78 and in No 34 remand the case to the District Court for further proceedings.
If the order of the District Court is an 'injunction' within the meaning of Rule 65(d), then I fail to see why it is not an 'injunction' within the meaning of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. Legal minds possess an inventive genius as great as that of those who work in the physical sciences. Perhaps a form of words could be worked out which would emply the science of semantics to distinguish the Norris-LaGuardia Act problem from the present one. I for one see no distinction; and since I feel strongly that Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, 82 S.Ct. 1328, 8 L.Ed.2d 440, caused a severe dislocation in the federal scheme of arbitration of labor disputes, I think we should not set our feet on a path that may well lead to the eventual reaffirmation of the principles of that case. My Brother STEWART expressly reserves the question whether the present order is an injunction prohibited by the Norris-LaGuardia Act. Despite this qualification, once we have held that the order constitues an 'injunction,' the District Court on remand would likely consider Sinclair, which is not overruled, controlling and apply it to preclude the issuance of another order.
We held in Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 77 S.Ct. 912, 1 L.Ed.2d 972, that a failure to arbitrate was not part and parcel of the abuses against which the Norris-LaGuardia Act was aimed. We noted that Congress, in fashioning § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, was seeking to encourage collective bargaining agreements in which the parties agree to refrain from unilateral disruptive action, such as a strike, with respect to disputes arbitrable by the agreement. Hence, if unions could break such agreements with impunity, the congressional purpose might well be frustrated. Although § 301 does not in terms address itself to the question of remedies, it commands the District Court to hold the parties to their contractual scheme for arbitration-the 'favored process for settlement,' as my Brother BRENNAN said in dissent in Sinclair, 370 U.S., at 216, 82 S.Ct., at 1340. I agree with his opinion that there must be an accommodation between the Norris-LaGuardia Act and all the other legislation on the books dealing with labor relations. We have had such an accommodiation in the case of railroad disputes. See Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Chicago R. & I.R. Co., 353 U.S. 30, 77 S.Ct. 635, 1 L.Ed.2d 622. With respect to § 301, 'Accommodation requires only that the anti-injunction policy of Norris-LaGuardia not intrude into areas, not vital to its ends, where injunctive relief is vital to a purpose of § 301; it does not require unconditional surrender.' 370 U.S., at 225, 82 S.Ct., at 1344.
It would be possible, of course, to distinguish Sinclair from the instant cases. In these cases, the relief sought was a mandate against repetition of strikes over causes covered by the arbitrator's award. The complaint below alleged that the union's 'refusal to comply with the terms of the Arbitrator's Award constitutes a breach of the applicable provisions of the current Collective Bargaining Agreement * * *.' Respondent asked that the court 'enter an order enforcing the Arbitrator's Award and that plaintiff may have such other and further relief as may be justified.' We do not review here, as in Sinclair, a refusal to enter an order prohibiting unilateral disruptive action on the part of a union before that union has submitted its grievances to the arbitration procedure provided by the collective bargaining agreement. Rather, the union in fact submitted to the arbitration procedure established by the collective bargaining agreement but, if the allegations are believed, totally frustrated the process by refusing to abide by the arbitrator's decision. Such a 'heads I win, tails you lose,' attitude plays fast and loose with the desire of Congress to encourage the peaceful and orderly settlement of labor disputes.
The union, of course, may have acted in good faith, for the new dispute may one which precipitated the award. Whether or not it was, we do not know. To make the accommodation which the Textile Workers case visualizes as necessary between the policy of encouraging arbitration on the one hand and the Norris-LaGuardia restrictions on the other, the basic case must go back for further and more precise findings and the contempt case must obviously be reversed. See Sinclair, 370 U.S., at 228-229, 82 S.Ct., at 1346 (dissenting opinion).

## Notes

This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
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