# United States – Vietnam Relations, 1945–1967: A Study Prepared by the Department of Defense/IV. A. 5. 1. Failure of the Geneva Settlement

​ ​IV. A. 5.
Tab 1.
FAILURE OF THE GENEVA SETTLEMENT
TABLE OF CONTENTS AND OUTLINE
| | | | Page |
| TABLE: Major Provisions of the 1954 Geneva Accords | TABLE: Major Provisions of the 1954 Geneva Accords | TABLE: Major Provisions of the 1954 Geneva Accords | iii |
| A. | Introduction: The Flawed Peace | Introduction: The Flawed Peace | 1 |
| B. | The Partition of Vietnam | The Partition of Vietnam | 2 |
| | 1. | Provisions for Unifying Vietnam | 2 |
| | 2. | France Withdraws, 1954–1956 | 3 |
| | 3. | Diem Refuses Consultation, 1955 | 5 |
| | 4. | Divided Vietnam: Status Quo Accepted | 7 |
| | 5. | The Discontented | 7 |
| C. | Refugees: Disruption of Vietnam's Society | Refugees: Disruption of Vietnam's Society | 8 |
| | 1. | Provisions for Regroupment | 8 |
| | 2. | Exodus to South Vietnam | 9 |
| | 3. | Causes of the Exodus | 10 |
| | 4. | Exodus: Test of Geneva | 12 |
| | 5. | Impact of the Exodus: North | 14 |
| | 6. | Impact of the Exodus: South | 14 |
| | 7. | Southerners Regrouped North | 16 |
| | 8 | Viet Minh Motivations | 17 |
| D. | Arming of the North and the South | Arming of the North and the South | 18 |
| | 1. | Provisions for Arms Control | 18 |
| | 2. | PAVN Modernizes | 20 |
| | 3. | The French Arms | 23 ​ |
| | 4. | RVNAF Revitalized | 23 |
| | 5. | U.S. Aid: SEATO | 25 |
| | 6. | US. Aid: MAP | 26 |
| | 7. | Implications: U.S. Role | 28 |
| | 8. | Implications: DRV Protests | 29 |
| | 9. | Implications: ICC Impotence | 29 |
| E. | The Situation in 1956 | The Situation in 1956 | 30 |
Tab 1.
FAIURE OF THE GENEVA SETTLEMENT
A. Introduction: The Flawed Peace
The Geneva Conference of 1954 brought only transitory peace to Indochina. Nonetheless, except for the United States, the major powers were, at the time of the Conference, satisfied that with their handiwork: the truce averted a further U.S. military involvement on the Asian mainland, and dampened a heightening crisis between East and West which might readily have led to conflict outside Southeast Asia. So long as these conditions obtained neither France, the U.K., the U.S.S.R. nor Communist China were seriously disposed to disturb the modus vivendi in Vietnam. U.S. leaders publicly put the best face possible on the Geneva Settlement about all that might possibly have been obtained from a seriously disadvantaged negotiating position, and no serious impairment to freedom of United States action. But the U.S., within its inner councils immediately after Geneva, viewed the Settlement's provisions for Vietnam as "disaster," and determined to prevent, if it could, the further extension of communist government over the Vietnamese people and territory. U.S. policy adopted in 1954 to this end did not constitute an irrevocable nor "open-ended" commitment to the government of Ngo Dinh Diem. But it did entail a progressively deepening U.S. involvement in the snarl of violence and intrigue within Vietnam, and therefore a direct role in the ultimate breakdown of the Geneva Settlement.
The Settlement of Geneva, though it provided respite from years of political violence, bitterly disappointed Vietnamese of North and South alike who had looked toward a unified and independent Vietnam. For the Viet Minh, the Settlement was a series of disappointing compromises to which they had agreed at the urging of the Soviet Union and China, compromises beyond what hard won military advantage over the French had led them to expect. For the State of Vietnam in the South, granted independence by France while the Geneva Conference was in progress, the Settlement was an arrangement to which it had not been party, and to which it could not subscribe. The truce of 1954, in fact, embodied three serious deficiencies as a basis for stable peace among the Vietnamese:
* It relied upon France as its executor.
* It ignored the opposition of the State of Vietnam.
* It countenanced the disassociation of the United States.
These weaknesses turned partitioned Vietnam into two hostile states, and given the absence of a stabilizing international force and the impotence of the ICC, brought about an environment in which war was likely, if not inevitable. A nominally temporary "line of demarcation" ​between North and South at the 17th parallel was transformed into one of the more forbidding frontiers of the world. A mass displacement of nearly 5% of the population disrupted the polity and heightened tensions in both North and South. And both the Democratic Government of Vietnam (DRV) in the North, and the Government of Vietnam (GVN) in the South armed, with foreign aid, for what each perceived as a coming struggle over reunification. Same of the main roots of the present conflict run to these failures of Geneva.
    B. The Partition of Vietnam
       1. Provisions for Unifying Vietnam
The sole formal instrument of the Geneva Conference was the document signed by the military commanders of the two hostile forces termed "Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Viet-Nam," dealing largely with the disengagement and regroupment of military forces. Article 14 of the Agreement contained one brief—but fateful allusion—to a future political solution:
   "Article 14a. Pending the general elections which will bring about the unification of Vietnam, the conduct of civil administration in each regrouping zone shall be in the hands of the party those forces are to be regrouped there in virtue of the present agreement...."
A more general expression of the intent of the conferees was the unsigned "Final Declaration of the Geneva Conference," by which the Conference "takes note" of the aforementioned Agreement and several declarations by represented nations and:
   "...recognizes that the essential purpose of the agreement relating to Vietnam is to settle military questions with a view to ending hostilities and that the military demarcation line is provisional and should not in any way be interpreted as constituting a political or territorial boundary...declares that, so far as Vietnam is concerned, the settlement of political problems, effected on the basis of respect for the principles of independence, unity, and territorial integrity, shall permit the Vietnamese people to enjoy the fundamental freedoms, guaranteed by democratic institutions established as a result of free general elections by secret ballot. In order to insure that sufficient progress in the restoration of peace has been made, and that all the necessary conditions obtain for free expression of the national will, general elections shall be held in July, 1956, under the supervision of an international commission composed of representatives of the member States of the International Supervisory Commission, referred to in the agreement on the cessation of hostilities. Consultations will be held on this subject between the competent representative authorities of the two zones from 20 July 1955 onwards...."
The DRV approved the Final Declaration, and, having failed in its attempts to bring about immediate elections on unification, no doubt did so reluctantly. There has been some authoritative speculation that the Viet Minh accepted this aspect of the Settlement with deep cynicism; Pham Van Dong, the DRV delegate at Geneva is supposed to have expressed conviction that the elections "would never be held. But it seems more likely that the communist powers fully expected the nascent GVN, already badly shaken from internal stresses, to collapse, and unification to follow with elections or not. In any event, the public stance of the DRV stressed their expectations that the election would be held. Ho Chi Minh stated unequivocally on 22 July 1954 that: "North Central and South Vietnam are territories of ours. Our country will surely be unified, our entire people will surely be liberated."
The Saigon Government was no less assertive in calling for unification of Vietnam. In a note to the French of 17 July 1954, the GVN delegate at Geneva protested having been left until then "in complete ignorance" of French intentions regarding the division of the country, which he felt failed to "take any account of the unanimous will for national unity of the Vietnamese people"; he proposed, futilely, United Nations trusteeship of all Vietnam in preference to a nation "dismembered and condemned to slavery." At the final session of the Conference,’ when called upon to join in the Final Declaration, the GVN delegate announced that his government "reserves its full freedom of action in order to safeguard the sacred right of the Vietnamese people to its territorial unity, national independence and freedom." Thus the Geneva truce confronted from the outset the anomaly of two Sovereign Vietnamese states, each calling for unification, but only one, the DRV, committed to achieving it via the terms of the Settlement.
       2. France Withdrawals, 1954-1956
France, as the third party in Vietnam, then became pivotal to any political settlement, its executor for the West. But France had agreed to full independence for the GVN on June 4, 1954, nearly six weeks before the end of the Geneva Conference. By the terms of that June agreement, the GVN assumed responsibility for international contracts previously made on its behalf by France; but, there having been no reference to subsequent contracts, it was technically free of the Geneva Agreements. It has been argued to the contrary that the GVN was bound by Geneva because it possessed at the time few of the attributes of full sovereignty, and especially because it was dependent on France for defense. But such debates turn on tenuous points of international law regarding the prerogatives of newly independent or partitioned states. It is fact that in the years 1954 to 1956, first the Communist Chinese and then the Soviets acknowledged the separate and sovereign identity of the GVN; and that the United States and ​Great Britain did likewise. It is also fact that France speedily divested itself of responsibilities for "civil administration" in South Vietnam. In February, 1956, the GVN requested France to withdraw its military forces, and on April 26, 1956, the French military command in Vietnam, the signatory of the Geneva Agreement, was dissolved. France, torn by domestic political turbulence in which past disappointments and continued frustrations in Vietnam figured prominently, and tested anew in Algeria, abandoned its position in Southeast Asia. No doubt, an increasingly acerbic relation between its representatives and those of the United States in South Vietnam hastened its departure, where American policy clashed with French over the arming and training of a national army for the GVN, over French military assistance for the religious sects, over French economic policy on repatriating investments, and over general French opposition to Diem. But more fundamentally, France felt itself shouldered aside in South-Vietnam by the United States over:
(1) Policy toward the DRV. The French averred initially that Ho was a potential Tito, and that they could through an accommodation with him preserve their economic and cultural interests in Vietnam—in their view, a "co-existence experiment" of worldwide significance in the Cold War. As of December, 1954, they were determined to carry out the Geneva elections. Eventually, however, they were obliged to choose between the U.S. and the DRV, so firmly did the U.S. foreclose any adjustment to the DRV’s objectives.
(2) Policy toward Diem. France opposed Diem not solely because he was a vocally Francophobe Annamite, but because he threatened directly their position in Vietnam. His nationalism, his strictures against "feudalists," his notions of moral regeneration all conjoined in an enmity against the French nearly as heated as that he harbored against the communists—but to greater effect, for it was far easier for him to muster his countrymen's opinion against the French than against the Viet Minh. By the spring of 1955, the Diem–France controversy acquired military dimensions when French supported sect forces took up arms against the GVN. At that time, while the U.S. construed its policy as aiding "Free Vietnam," the French saw Diem as playing Kerensky's role in Vietnam, with the People's Revolutionary Committee as the Bolsheviks, and Ho, the Viet Minh Lenin, waiting off stage.
(3) Military Policy. By the end of 1954, the French were persuaded that SEATO could never offer security for their citizens and other interests in Vietnam, and had despaired of receiving U.S. military aid for a French Expeditionary Corps of sufficient size to meet the threat. U.S. insistence that it should train RVNAF increased their insecurity. Within the combined U.S.–French headquarters in Saigon thereafter, officers of both nations worked side by side launching countervailing intrigues among the Vietnamese, and among each other. The relationship became intolerable with French involvement in support of sect forces in open rebellion against U.S. assisted GVN forces.
​In March of 1956, as France prepared to accede to the GVN request for withdrawal of its remaining military forces, Foreign Minister Pineau, in a Paris speech, took the U.K. and the U.S. to task for disrupting Western unity. While Pineau selected U.S. support of French-hating Diem for particular rancor, he did so in the context of decrying France's isolation in dealing with nationalist rebels in North Africa—and thus generally indicted two powers who had threatened the French empire since the U.K. intervened in Syria in 1941, and President Roosevelt assured the Sultan of Morocco that his sympathies lay with the colonial peoples struggling for independence.
Ultimately, France had to place preservation of its European position ahead of empire, and, hence, cooperation with the U.S. before opposition in Indochina. France's vacating Vietnam in 1956 eased U.S. problems there over the short run, and smoothed Diem's path. But the DRV’s hope for a national plebescite were thereby dashed. On January 1, 1955, as the waning of France's power in Vietnam became apparent, Pham Van Dong, DRV Premier, declared that as far as Hanoi was concerned: "...it was with you, the French, that we signed the Geneva Agreements, and it is up to you to see that they are respected." Some thirteen months later the Foreign Minister of France stated that:
   "We are not entirely masters of the situation. The Geneva Accords on the one hand and the pressure of our allies on the other creates a very complex juridical situation....The position in principle is clear: France is the guarantor of the Geneva Accords...But we do not have the means alone of making them respected."
But the GVN remained adamantly opposed to elections, and neither the U.S. nor any other western power was disposed to support France's fulfillment of its responsibility to the DRV.
3. Diem Refuses Consultation, 1955
Communist expectations that the Diem government would fall victim to the voracious political forces of South Vietnam were unfulfilled. Diem narrowly escaped such a fate, but with American support—albeit wavering, and accompanied by advice he often ignored—Diem within a year of the Geneva Conference succeeded in defeating the most powerful of his antagonists, the armed sects, and in removing from power Francophile elements within his government, including his disloyal military chiefs. He spoke from comparatively firm political ground when, on July 16, 1955, before the date set for consulting with the DRV on the plebescite, he announced in a radio broadcast that:
   "We did not sign the Geneva Agreements.
   "We are not bound in any way by these Agreements, signed against the will of the Vietnamese people...We shall not miss any opportunity which would permit the unification of our homeland in freedom, but it is out of the question for us to consider any proposal from the Viet Minh if proof is not given that they put the superior interests of the national community above those of communism."
Moreover, Diem spoke with some assurance of American backing, for the U.S. had never pressed for the elections envisaged by the Settlement. At the final session of Geneva, rather than joining with the Conference delegates in the Final Declaration, the U.S. "observer," Under Secretary of State Walter Bedell Smith, had linked U.S. policy vis-a-vis Vietnam to that for Korea, Taiwan and Germany in these terms:
   "In the case of nations now divided against their will, we shall continue to seek to achieve unity through free elections supervised by the United Nations to insure that they are conducted fairly."
Although the U.S. opposed elections in 1954 because Ho Chi Minh would have then won them handily, the records of the National Security Council and the Operations Coordinating Board of the summer of 1954 establishes that this government then nonetheless expected elections eventually to be held in Vietnam. But, two major misapprehensions were evident: (1) the U.S. planned through "political action" to ameliorate conditions in Southeast Asia to the point that elections would not jeopardize its objective of survival for a "free" vietnam; and (2) the U.S. estimated that France would usefully remain in Vietnam. By the spring of 1955, although U.S. diplomacy had brought the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization into being, and although Diem had with U.S. aid weathered a number of severe political storms, the U.S. was less sanguine that its "political action" would suffice, and that further French presence would be helpful. Accordingly, it began to look closely at the conditions under which elections might be held, and urged that Vietnamese do the same. One definition of terms acceptable to the U.S. was set forth in a State Department memorandum of 5 May 1955, approved by Secretary Dulles.
   "The U.S. believes that the conditions for free elections should be those which Sir Anthony Eden put forward and the three Western Powers supported at Berlin in connection with German reunification. The United States believes that the Free Vietnamese should insist that elections be held under conditions of genuine freedom; that safeguards be agreed to assure this freedom before, after, and during elections and that there be adequate guarantees for, among other things, freedom of movement, freedom of presentation of candidates, immunity of candidates, freedom from arbitrary arrest or victimization, freedom of association or political meetings, freedom of expression for all, freedom of the press, radio, and free circulation of newspapers, secrecy of the vote, and security of polling stations and ballot boxes."
       4. Divided Vietnam: Status Quo Accepted
The deadline for the consultations in July 1955, and the date set for elections in July 1956, passed without further international action to implement those provisions of the Geneva Settlement. The DRV communicated directly with the GVN in July, 1955, and again in May and June of 1956, proposing not only consultative conference to negotiate "free general elections by secret ballot," but to liberalize North–South relations in general. Each time the GVN replied with disdain, or with silence. The 17th parallel, with its demilitarized zone on either side, became de facto an international boundary, and—since Ngo Dinh Diem's rigid refusal to traffic with the North excluded all economic exchanges and even an interstate postal agreement—one of the most restricted boundaries in the world. The DRV appealed to the U.K. and the U.S.S.R. as co-chairmen of the Geneva Conference to no avail. In January, 1956, Communist China requested another Geneva Conference to deal with the situation, but the U.S.S.R. and the U.K. responded only by extending the functions of the International Control Commission beyond its 1956 expiration date. By early 1957 the partition of Vietnam was generally accepted throughout the international community. In January, 1957, the Soviet Union proposed the admission of both the GVN and the DRV to the United Nations, the U.S.S.R. delegate declaring that "in Vietnam two separate States existed, which differed from one another in political and economic structure...."
Professor Hans Morganthau, writing at the time, and following a visit to South Vietnam, described the political progress of the GVN as a "miracle," but stated that conditions for free elections obtained in neither the North nor the South. He concluded that:
   "Actually, the provision for free elections which would solve ultimately the problem of Vietnam was a device to hide the incompatibility of the Communist and Western positions, neither of which can admit the domination of all of Vietnam by the other side. It was a device to disguise the fact that the line of military demarcation was bound to be a line of political division as well...."
       5. The Discontented
However, there were three governments, at least, for which the status quo of a Vietnam divided between communist and non-communist governments was unacceptable. The GVN, while remaining cool to the DRV, pursued an active propaganda campaign prophesying the overturning of communism in the North, and proclaiming its resolve ultimately to reunify the nation in freedom. The United States supported the GVN, having ​established as national policy in 1956, reaffirmed again in 1958, these guidelines:
   "Assist Free Viet Nam to develop a strong, stable and constitutional government to enable Free Viet Nam to assert an increasingly attractive contrast to conditions in the present Communist zone....Work toward the weakening of the Communists in North and South Viet Nam in order to bring about the eventual peaceful reunification of a free and independent Viet Nam under anti-Communist leadership....Support the position of the Government of Free Viet Nam that all Viet Nam elections may take place only after it is satisfied that genuinely free elections can be held throughout both zones of Viet Nam....Treat the Viet Minh as not constituting a legitimate government, and discourage other non-Communist states from developing or maintaining relations with the Viet Minh regime...."
And the Democratic Republic of Vietnam became increasingly vocal in its calls for "struggle" to end partition. In April, 1956, as the plebescite deadline neared, Ho Chi Minh declared ominously that:
   "While recognizing that in certain countries the road to socialism may be a peaceful one, we should be aware of this fact: In countries where the machinery of state, the armed forces, and the police of the bourgeois class are still strong, the proletarian class still has to prepare for armed struggle.
   "While recognizing the possibility of reunifying Vietnam by peaceful means, we should always remember that our people's principal enemies are the American imperialists and their agents who still occupy half our country and are preparing for war...."
In 1956, however, Ho Chi Minh and the DRV faced mounting internal difficulties, and were not yet in a position to translate the partition of Vietnam into casus belli.
    C. Refugees: Disruption of Vietnam's Society
       1. Provisions for Regroupment
Article 14 of the "Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Vietnam," which provided for separate political administrations north and south of the 17th parallel, also stated that:
   "14(d) From the date of entry into force of the present agreement until the movement of troops is completed, any civilians residing in a district controlled by oneparty who wish to go and live in the zone assigned to the other party shall be permitted and helped to do so by the authorities in that district."
It is probable that none of the conferees foresaw the ramifications of that one sentence, for it put in motion one million Vietnamese refugees, most of them destitute, who became at first heavy burdens on the DRV and the GVN, and ultimately political and military assets for both regimes. For the United States, the plight of these peoples lent humanitarian dimensions to its policy toward Vietnam, and new perspectives to its economic and military assistance.
       2. Exodus to South Vietnam
In accordance with Article 1 of the Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities, 190,000 troops of the French Expeditionary Corps were moved from North Vietnam to the South. In addition, some 900,000 civilians exercised their option under Article 14 (d) of the Armistice. While no wholly reliable statistics exist, there is agreement among several authorities that the figures presented by the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam (ICC), citing chiefly the Saigon Government as its source, are generally correct:
Figures of Movement of Population in Vietnam Under Article 14(d)) :
| North Zone to South Zone | North Zone to South Zone | Period Ending |
| (i) | Total arrivals (Figs. given by the State of Vietnam) | 19.5.55 | By air | 213,635 |
| (i) | Total arrivals (Figs. given by the State of Vietnam) | 19.5.55 | By sea | 550,824 |
| (i) | Total arrivals (Figs. given by the State of Vietnam) | 19.5.55 | Across provisional demarcation line | 12,344 |
| (i) | Total arrivals (Figs. given by the State of Vietnam) | 19.5.55 | By other means | 41,324 |
| (i) | Total arrivals (Figs. given by the State of Vietnam) | 19.5.55 | Total | 818,127 |
| (ii) | Estimate of arrivals not registered (Figs. given by the State of Vietnam in April) | | Total | 70 ,000. |
| (iii) | Figs. given by PAVN | 19.5.55 | | 4,479 |
| (iii) | Figs. given by PAVN | 20.7.55 | | |
| (iii) | Figs. given by PAVN | Up to 20.7.55 | Total | 892,876 |
The uncertainty of statistics concerning total numbers of refugees stems not only from DRV reluctance to report departures, but also the turbulent conditions which then obtained throughout Vietnam, where the French were in the process of turning over public administration ​to Vietnamese, and where Saigon's communications with refugee relief operations in the field were at best tenuous. U.S. Department of State analysis in 1957 estimated the following composition and disposition of the refugees:
Civilian Regroupees from the North, 1954-1955 :
| Category | | Number (Approximate) |
| 1. Registered with GVN for refugee benefits | | 640,000 Vietnamese |
| 1. Registered with GVN for refugee benefits | | 15,000 Nangs |
| 1. Registered with GVN for refugee benefits | | 5,000 Chinese |
| 2. French citizens resettled or repatriated by France | | 40,000 |
| 3. Chinese absorbed into Chinese community in South | | 45,000 |
| | Total | 745,000 |
| | (Remainder, 200,000 Vietnamese absorbed without aid, e.g., dependents of military, civil servants.) | (Remainder, 200,000 Vietnamese absorbed without aid, e.g., dependents of military, civil servants.) |
The GVN director of refugee programs reported that the refugees were composed, by trade, as follows:
| Farmers | 76% |
| Fishermen | 10% |
| Artisans, small businessmen, students, government employees, professionals | 14% |
But it was religious orientation which ultimately assumed the greatest importance in South Vietnam's political life: an estimated 65% of North Vietnam's Catholics moved to the South, more than 600,000 in all; these, with 2,000 northern Protestants, were settled in their own communities.
       3. Causes of the Exodus
The flight from North Vietnam reflected apprehension over the coming to power of the Viet Minh. Institutionally, the Viet Minh were further advanced in North Vietnam than the South, and had in areas of the North under their control already conducted several experiments in social revolution.
​In 1951, with the legalization of the Communist Party, an "economic leveling" program was launched, consisting of punitive taxes levied on the wealthy. In 1953, there was a short but sharp terror campaign, followed by a "Land Rent Reduction," which formed poor peasants into "land reform battalions" to administer "people's justice" to landlords and their families. These were only preliminaries, however, to the DRV's "Land Reform Campaign" of 1954 to 1956, which more systematically and terroristically struck at traditional wealth distribution. All of these undertakings were associated with the Viet Minh, and though mitigated by the victory over the French and the benign image of "Uncle Ho," they aroused rural resentment and fears.
But the flood of refugees also sprang from other sources. There were a few French, and 200,000 Vietnamese who had been French civil servants, or dependents of French soldiers, or retainers—these had every reason to anticipate hostility. There were the Nung tribal people, who had been allied with the French during the war, and would probably have clashed with the North Vietnamese government whatever its policies. The Chinese shadow over the Viet Minh deepened Nung fears, and strengthened tendencies within the Chinese community of Hanoi to split along Nationalist/Communist lines after the fashion of overseas Chinese throughout the Far East; many Chinese fled. Rich or landed Vietnamese could, with reason, be apprehensive over DRV policies toward the wealthy, and be drawn to the presumably more open South. A former ICC member was noted that there was a labor market in the South, and rumors of an impending corvee labor program in the labor surplus North—both incentives to migrate. Viet Minh propaganda painted grim pictures of life in South Vietnam, and savagely attacked the French and Americans who were aiding refugees. In turn, French and American propaganda promoted recourse to migration to escape the terrors and injustice of communism. Voice of America was active in rebutting the Viet Minh radio, and battery radios were reportedly distributed to extend the audience for Western programs. Colonel Lansdale described a U.S. instigated black propaganda campaign of pamphlets and announcements, ostensibly Viet Minh in origin, aimed at discrediting the DRV, depreciating its currency, and adding to popular fears of its new powers. One outcome was rampant rumor. For example, the ICC source cited above reported that some refugees believed that the U.S. would use atomic bombs on the Viet Minh. Dr. Tom Dooley found refugees with a Viet Minh pamphlet showing a Hanoi map with three concentric circles of nuclear destruction—conceivably, an example of Colonel Lansdale's handiwork.
Again, however the salient political aspect of the migration was that most of the refugees—two out of three—were Catholics. Many northern Catholics, with a long history of persecution at the hands of non-Catholic Tonkinese, would probably have left with their French protectors whatever the character of the successor. But Catholic opposition to the Viet Minh during the war invited retribution, and Ngo Dinh Diem's ascendancy in Saigon was no doubt attractive to his northern co-religionists. ​Moreover, almost as soon as the truce became effective, the Catholic bishops entered into a test of power with the Viet Minh, using their "self-defense forces" to balk DRV occupation. The response was predictably ruthless: Catholic villages were attacked by PAVN troops, and in two instances, inhabitants reportedly were massacred; churches were burned, Church property confiscated, priests tortured or jailed, and heavy taxes levied on Church lands and buildings. Among the consequences of that violence was a Catholic propaganda campaign against the Viet Minh—e.g, the-Virgin-had-gone-South theme—and mass migrations of whole parishes.
       4. Exodus: Test of Geneva
The movement of refugees from North Vietnam quickly became a central point of international controversy. Both parties to the Geneva Agreement accused the other of violations in impeding the free egress of would-be migrants, and both sides were undoubtedly at least partially justified in their charges. Aside from the propaganda campaign, France—with substantial American aid—helped refugees with food, medicine, and transportation. American and French ships moved whole villages southward, and American and French charities provided for their well-being during the journey and after their arrival in their new homeland. The U.S. Government, besides assigning a Task Force of the Seventh Fleet to refugee assistance, furnished the Saigon Government with $56,000,000 in 1955, and $37,000,000 in 1956 for refugee relief and resettlement considering the outflow from North Vietnam "a convincing tribute to the Free World and an indictment of the Communists." At the same time, both the GVN and the U.S. actively discouraged migration from the South—the GVN mainly by administrative obfuscation, the U.S. primarily through another propaganda campaign, targeted against Viet Minh in South Vietnam.
DRV behavior toward refugees during the year in which "regroupment" was authorized has served then and since as an indictment of its character, and proof that it could not be expected to permit free elections. Leo Cherne of Look, and Dr. Tom Dooley dramatized the misery and fearfulness of the refugees for American audiences. Ngo Dinh Diem utilized refugees systematically to mobilize opinion in South Vietnam against Geneva, the ICC, and the DRV as well. Since the issue has become central to the American policy debate on Vietnam, Frank N. Trager, for example, has stated that, after the DRV perceived that the numbers moving south by far exceeded those coming north, the DRV was impelled to:
   "...impose restrictions and brutal punishments on those who sought to go South. Summary arrests, denial of permits, intimidation by 'show trials' of those who served as leaders of the exodus, and executions served to inhibit the exercise of the option. Residual petitions affecting 95,000 persons in the North were presented to the International Control Commission. Nothing ever came of these. An unknown number were thus never allowed to leave the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. The refugee problem was one of the most far reaching issues at the time..."
This condemnation of the DRV was fairly well substantiated by U.S. intelligence. A U.S. Intelligence Advisory Committee report of 1955 quotes "usually reliable French intelligence reports" that after October 1954 three DRV regular infantry divisions, with local forces, were positioned to block refugee movement. These, with "voluminous reports from Catholic and other sources" indicated that the DRV, with armed forces, by barring refugees from local transport, and through economic penalties, was pursuing a deliberate policy to prevent departures. Article 14(d) of the Geneva Agreement obliged the DRV to assist the movement of would-be refugees, but GVN officials reported receiving only 15,000 refugees bearing official Viet Minh exit permits, including 8,300 who obtained their papers under direct ICC supervision. U.S. and French naval offices have attested that thousands of northerners literally escaped to their waiting ships.
Again, no entirely dependable record exists. The ICC was impeded in its observations and reporting by "narrow and complicated administrative procedures in the areas in the control of the PAVN...." Of 119 investigations conducted by ICC mobile teams during the period, 34 dealt with violations of Article 14(d) alleged by first parties. Beyond these, however, DRV authorities submitted to the ICC 320,000 petitions from friends and relations of regroupees alleging that the French had forced evacuation, and "thousands" of petitions were received from French sources claiming that the DRV was obstructing those who wished to move South. After a survey of 25,000 refugees in the South, the ICC teams reported that "there was no foundation for the allegation that thousands were victims of a systematic propaganda and many of them wished to go back to the PAVN zone and none of the persons contacted by the teams complained of forced evacuation or expressed a desire to return...." Investigations in the North, however, did disclose that observance of Article 14(d) by the DRV was not uniformly satisfactory. The ICC majority report notes that:
    "(ii) religious, social and local influences were used by both sides either to persuade persons to change their zone of residence or to dissuade them from exercising the freedom of choice regarding the zone in which they planted to live.
    "(iii) the demand for permits and facilities under Article 14(d) was the largest in the areas under the control of the PAVN and it was generally met except in the areas of Nghe An and Ha Tinh..."
The named areas were predominantly Catholic, and in the village of Luu My, in the province of Nghe An, the ICC team did report on a clash between the civil populace and troops of the DRV in which at least ​12 villagers were killed; in another locality, Ba Lang, other incidents of violence were reported which led to 200 arrests. It was the view of the Indian and Polish members of the ICC, however, that despite these incidents "by the 18th of May (1955) the bulk of the persons who wanted to change the zone of their residence had succeeded in doing so." The Canadian member dissented and submitted a minority report detailing other examples of forceful obstruction of refugees by DRV authorities or crowds, and concluded these were "deliberately planned." Moreover, the Canadians were convinced that the DRV had so effectively restricted ICC inspections that: "it's still not possible to say whether all persons wishing to move from one zone to the other have been able to do so." Estimates of the numbers of persons prevented from migrating from North Vietnam range from Asian scholar Ellen Hammer's "several fold" those who left, and Diem's estimate of twice the number who reached the South, to Robert Shaplen's "no more than 400,000," and B.S.N. Murti of the ICC, who thinks a number approaching 2,000 likely.
       5. Impact of the Exodus: North
Whatever the DRV's intentions concerning the exodus, the numbers of refugees who were permitted to depart speaks for itself: if the estimate of 900,000 is correct, the DRV witnessed the flight of 1 out of every 13 of its citizens at a time when, ostensibly, votes and labor were important to its future. It should be noted that the DRV capitalized upon the abandoned land and other property of the refugees in its initial wealth redistribution schemes, and thus had motive to encourage, rather than impede, departures. The timing of the uproar with the ICC over violations of Article 14(d) suggests an answer: the incidents observed by the ICC in the North, as well as manifestations in the South of discontent with Saigon's observance of the agreement, multiplied after October, 1954, and peaked toward May, 1955, indicating that the DRV pursued a progressively more ruthless policy on departures. In seeking to attenuate the outflow, the DRV undoubtedly resorted to stringent measures, at least in certain localities. Whether these measures approached the depravities depicted by Trager and others cannot be adjudicated with present evidence, but it is clear that refugees provided an early and severe test of the DRV's capability for humane and democratic action consistent with the Geneva Settlement—and in the eyes of many observers in South Vietnam and the West, the DRV failed abjectly, seriously damaging its position vis-a-vis the plebescite. Within North Vietnam, the refugee experience developed deep divisions between the DRV and rural Catholics which were to persist more than a year after the Geneva movement arrangement expired.
       6. Impact of the Exodus: South
For the GVN, the influx of 900,000 people presented problems of paralyzing proportions. Within a few months of Ngo Dinh Diem's taking office, Saigon was ringed with shabby encampments whose inhabitants were wholly dependent on the already overburdened government. Had ​it not been for U.S. aid, many of the refugees might never have reached the South, and without U.S. aid there, many might have perished. The U.S. Navy moved 310,848 persons in its "Operation Exodus." The $93 million the GVN received from the U.S. comprised 97% of the funds it dispensed for these purposes, nearly $100 per refugee in a country with a lower national income per capita. This official aid, plus substantial assistance from American charities, combined with a remarkably energetic and imaginative Vietnamese administration, succeeded by 1957 in providing decent habitation and livelihood for all but a few of the refugees—a genuinely laudable accomplishment, which must stand with the defeat of the sects among Diem's crowning achievements.
Because of the GVN's undertakings for the refugees, the Geneva "regroupment" turned out, at least initially, very much to its advantage: it gained nearly 1 million loyal citizens adamantly opposed to reunification were it to mean their return to DRV rule, whose recounted experiences with the Viet Minh buttressed the moral fiber of the South. Here were whole communities largely dependent on the GVN, untouched by the armed religious sects, and hostile to the Viet Minh, from which Diem could recruit reliable political and military cadres. Here were masses disposed to follow Diem uncritically, easily manipulated for political purposes by Diem or his family. Here, for aid-dispensing Americans, were Vietnamese whose needs were basic, and who proved capable of absorbing simple, quick-return, highly visible forms of assistance.
The GVN began to politicize the refugee communities almost immediately. For example, in July, 1955, when the DRV appealed to Diem to commence consultation towards the plebescite, an apparently well-directed mob of refugees attacked the hotel quarters of the ICC. Some 20,000 of the refugees were moved together to a sparsely settled tract in the Mekong Delta of 100,000 acres, which was cleared, plowed and irrigated with substantial American technical assistance and 100 tractors; this, the Cai San project, became a showcase of American aid for visitors. In a much smaller, yet perhaps more significant instance, the GVN formed small, black-pajamaed "civic action" cadres for the purpose of building communications between Saigon and the villages; although the original idea had been to use Saigon bureaucrats, these failed to volunteer, and the bulk of the teams were eventually manned by northern refugees. Later, refugee communities were transplanted to the frontiers to enhance both the local economy and security there. The GVN was not ungrateful, and eventually the preferred positions in the Army and the bureaucracy began to be filled with refugee Catholics and other northerners.
In the long run, however, Diem squandered the advantage the Geneva regroupment brought him. His policies kept the refugees an unassimilated, special interest group, which produced further distortions in an already stressed polity. They in turn projected in rural areas an unfavorable image of the GVN, which probably figured in its eventual rejection by most Cochinchinese and non-Catholic Annamites: a government ​whose protection and largess were extended preferentially to Catholics and northerners.
    7. Southerners Regrouped North
Whether or not at the time of Geneva the DRV leaders genuinely expected the plebescite of 1956, the Viet Minh of Annam and Cochinchina were apparently instructed through their Communist Party cadre that elections would be held. Thousands of Vietnamese left the South under the regroupment provisions of the Settlement. Upon cadre assurances of return, they staked family ties, ancestral lands, and fortunes.
Unfortunately, we know little still about the Southern regroupees in the North, and less about the Viet Minh who stayed behind when their comrades departed. The reports of the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam record the movement of only 4,269 civilians from the South to north of the 17th parallel. After April 1955, as reported by the ICC, refugees applied to the Saigon authorities, in such numbers that the GVN proved unable to meet demands for permits or transportation. Demonstrations occurred, and special arrangements by the ICC and the French were necessitated. Nonetheless, the total number thus formally involved in ICC reported moves was less than 5,000. The very sizable migration in 1954 of Viet Minh from the French controlled zone aboard Polish and Soviet ships to the North has not been reported authoritatively. An estimated 90,000 armed Viet Minh departed. An Indian member of the ICC published in 1964 the following figures, which correspond with the totals furnished by the French and the Poles, and which appear on present evidence to be as reliable as any:
Viet Minh Departures for DRV 1954–1955
Among the total, there If ere a significant number of Montagnards—Bernard Fall states 10,000—and children. A Viet Cong lieutenant colonel, captured in 1961, then one of the senior officers of the Viet Cong intelligence services, has confirmed that Highlanders and 10,000 children were among the regroupees, and that DRV was taking pains to educate both groups well.
​Concerning numbers of Viet Minh left behind, figures are even more vague. U.S. intelligence as of 1956 accepted 8,000 as its best estimate, of which 5,000 were armed and organized in skeletal military units; there were reports of strengths up to 10,000. A more recent U.S. intelligence appraisal states that:
   "While the number of hard-core Communists remaining in South Vietnam after 1954 cannot be confirmed, French and South Vietnamese estimates, based on observations of friendly military commanders in the field, placed the figure at 5,000 armed Viet Minh. However, this is clearly a conservative estimate since it does not include political agents or 'soft core' members or supporters...."
In summary, best current estimates indicate:
Disposition of Viet Minh in South 1954-55
Moved North
| By Polish and Soviet Ships | 90,000 Armed Viet Minh |
| By Polish and Soviet Ships | 40,000 Dependents |
| | 130,000 Including: 10,000 Highlanders 10,000 Children |
| By other transport | 4,269 |
| | 134,269 TOTAL |
Left Behind
* 5,000 Armed Viet Minh
* 3,000 Political Cadre
* Unknown dependents of Viet Minh
    8. Viet Minh Motivations
Interviews with captured or defected regroupees, and captured Viet Cong documents, establish that the DRV leadership told the Viet Minh in 1954 that the general elections and unification mentioned in Article 14 of the Geneva Agreement would occur in July 1956, as asserted in the Final Declaration of the Conference. Accordingly, unlike the refugees fleeing south, who evidently accepted permanent separation from their birthplace, most of the Viet Minh who were regrouped to the North expected to be separated from their homes and families only two years. There were a variety of motives or emotions involved, but whatever response the cadre evoked in their ​followers, it was clearly understood by all rank and file that the regroupment instructions were an order, and most responded as did one POW: "I did my duty as a soldier." Some were told to go; some to marry, then go; some to stay. After the initial regroupment in 1954, no further large-scale movement northward was encouraged by the DRV. The outburst of enthusiasm for regroupment which resulted in demonstrations in Saigon in April 1955, and DRV support for same, can be attributed to growing conviction that Diem might succeed in his drive for political control, and that he or the U.S. would not permit general elections, or to a tactical cover for the DRV's own difficulties with clamoring would-be refugees.
As of March 1967, a report was available on 23 Viet Minh who stayed behind in 1954. These men had been systematically interviewed, and while they comprise a slender sample, their replies give no evidence that violence or sabotage were included in the initial orders of any; rather, they received organizational and propaganda missions:
   "POW: We were given training about the Geneva treaty. We were instructed to work normally with the peasants, to earn a living and to explain to them the clauses of the treaty. We pointed out that general elections would be held in 1956."
Another distributed leaflets, hung posters and organized meetings to promote the plebescite. One had orders "to work as a core cadre exhorting the population to demand negotiations with North Vietnam for a general election." Still another distributed petitions demanding elections, trade relations with DRV, and peace.
However, this "political action" never promised much, since the GVN never seemed disposed toward holding the elections. When in July 1955, Ngo Dinh Diem dismissed with finality any prospect for consultations, the lines began to be drawn between the "stay-behind" cadre and the Saigon government. After 1956, the last illusions were dispelled, and the Viet Minh apparatus went wholly underground.
    D. Arming of the North and the South
       1. Provisions for Arms Control
The Geneva Conference intended to fix a ceiling on foreign military personnel, bases and arms in Vietnam corresponding to the levels of July 1954. Within months of the Conference, the DRV and the GVN were each led to believe that the other was contravening those arms control provisions of the Settlement. The DRV could claim, with justification, that the United States was introducing new arms and personnel, assuming an amplified military role in Vietnam, and acquiring bases. The GVN could accuse the DRV, again with justification, of ​a massive army, and modernizing it with Communist bloc aid. The ICC, discredited in its attempts to cope with observance of Article 14(d) of the "Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities..." regarding refugees, was further devalued as a stabilizing influence when forced to admit that it was impotent in inspecting compliance with Articles 16, 17, 18, and 19:
   "Article 16...the introduction into Viet-Nam of any troop reinforcements and additional military personnel is prohibited...
   "Article 17...the introduction into Viet-Nam of any reinforcement in the form of all types of arms, munitions, and other war material, such as combat aircraft, naval craft, pieces of ordnance, jet engines and armoured vehicles, is prohibited...
   "Article 18...the establishment of new military bases is prohibited throughout Viet-Nam territory.
   "Article 19...no military base under the control of a foreign State may be established in the regrouping zone of either party; the two parties shall ensure that the zones assigned to them do not adhere to any military alliance and are not used for the resumption of hostilities or to further an aggressive policy."
In June, 1958, the ICC issued the following statement concerning its inability to enforce the provisions of Articles 16 and 17:
   "The persistence of the Parties in not accepting the Commission's interpretation of the provisions of the Agreements and their failure to implement the recommendations made to them by the Commission have rendered it difficult for the Commission to supervise the implementation of the Articles concerned. The Commission will, as hitherto, continue to discharge its duties under the Geneva Agreements, but would like to emphasize that the lack of cooperation from the Parties seriously affects the effectiveness of its supervision and control. The Commission can, therefore, discharge its responsibilities only to the extent permitted by the Parties, and not as decided by the Commission in accordance with the Geneva Agreements. The Commission hopes that in the future a larger measure of cooperation will be forthcoming from the Parties and the difficulties which have persisted so far will cease to hinder its activities."
The test of the Geneva Agreement also allowed for the rotation of personnel, and the replacement of "destroyed, damaged, worn out or used up" material, arms, and munitions, provided that advance notice ​of movements be furnished the ICC, and specified points of entry and departure be employed. Neither the DRV nor the GVN cooperated with the ICC in all respects. The U.S., though it took steps to maintain the appearances of compliance through 1960, especially on personnel ceilings, and although it considered itself hampered by the Settlement, was able to provide in that time over $50,000,000 per annum worth of military assistance to the GVN. The failure of the Geneva Settlement to control the arming of Vietnam, with its concomitant heightened fears and potential for violence, no less than in the case of the plebescite and the refugees, was directly antecedent to the insurgency in South Vietnam.
       2. PAVN Modernizes
At the close of hostilities, the Viet Minh probably had some 300,000 to 400,000 men under arms—about 130,000 regulars of which all but about 70,000 were concentrated in North Vietnam and Laos. (See Map, ff.) The French had fielded 420,000 troops, including about 200,000 Vietnamese. Both sides received extensive aid from non-combatants, the French chiefly from the U.S., and the DRV chiefly from China. One recent estimate puts relative volumes of aid as follows:
COMPARISON OF TONNAGE OF U.S. AID TO FRANCE WITH CHINESE COMMUNIST AID TO VIET MINH
| | U.S. Aid | Chinese Aid |
| 1951 | 7,200 tons/month | 10 to 20 tons/month |
| 1953 | 10,000 tons/month | 500 to 600 tons/month |
| 1954 | n.a. | 4,000 tons/month (as of Dien Bien Phu) |
The differences between the two aid programs were, of course, significant beyond tonnages. The Chinese aid was largely infantry arms and ammunition, while U.S. shipments ranged across the whole costly and complicated inventory of the U.S. armed forces. More importantly, in contrast with the highly visible U.S. participation, Chinese aid was clandestine; neither the donor nor the recipient has owned to the aid program to this date, and in maintaining the flow without attribution the DRV developed procedures which stood it in good stead after Geneva.
The DRV, from all U.S. intelligence has been able to discern, commenced the reorganization and refitting of its Peoples’ Army of Vietnam (PAVN) concurrently with occupation of Tonkin behind the withdrawing French. U.S. evidence indicated that shipments of military materiel from China and the Soviet significantly exceeded in kind and ​ Source: V.J. Croizat, trans., A Translation from the French: Lessons of the War in Indochina (Santa Monica: RAND Corp., RM-5271-PR, May 1967), 107.
Viet Minh deployment September 30, 1953
Trends in DRV Armed Strength (in thousands) :
| | PAVN | Navy | AF | Provincial Forces | Armed Public Security Force | Armed Militia | Total |
| 1954 | 144 | N.A. | N.A. | 77 | N.A. | N.A. | 221 |
| 1955 | 173 | N.A. | N.A. | 72 | N.A. | 75 | 320 |
| 1959 | 270 | 1.6 | 0.3 | 35.5 | 15 | 100 | 422 |
| 1963 | 240 | 2.5 | 0.5 | -- | 15 | 200 | 458 |
According to U.S. estimates, the period 1954–1956 was devoted to regrouping and reorganizing. New divisions were formed, incorporating Viet Minh from South Vietnam regrouped to the North per the Geneva Agreements. Overage and unfit personnel were weeded out, and intensive political indoctrination begun. Divisions were deployed into the countryside, with the new southern formations concentrated in areas of civil unrest. In 1957 and 1958 improvements in organization and control were inaugurated, PAVN taking on the structure and trappings of a Bloc-style professional army, with regularized pay scales, insignia, rank, and the like. During 1958 and 1959, to meet goals for manning collective farms, some divisions were reduced in personnel and converted to brigades. Conscription was introduced, the Armed Public Security Forces—frontier and internal security troops—formed, and the air and naval forces elevated in status. In 1960 and 1961 additional divisions were reduced to brigades, but since diversions to agriculture diminished, this was presumably to provide smaller, more manageable formations for the infiltration then underway into Laos, and in prospect for South Vietnam. In sum, with Bloc aid, the DRV more than doubled its effective infantry divisions from 6 in 1954 to 14 by 1962. U.S. intelligence credited the PAVN in 1954 with the capability, by concentrating all its resources on a single objective, of mounting an attack of limited duration using three divisions supported by direct artillery fire. By 1961, the U.S. rated the North Vietnam Army (NVA) as capable of a five division offensive backed by substantially greater logistic and combat support, including indirect artillery fires. The U.S. did not know ​with certainty much further concerning the quality or quantity of Bloc aid during this period. Reports of the presence in North Vietnam of Soviet-design small arms, artillery, tanks, and trucks were received regularly by U.S. intelligence, but the proportion of these which were supplied by the Chinese could not be established. U.S. estimates held that Soviet aid predominated up until about 1960, and that thereafter Hanoi looked increasingly to Peking for supply of such items, as well as for ammunition of all types. By 1964, except for some remaining stocks of French weapons, all NVA mortars and recoilless rifles were reported to be of Chinese manufacture. Similarly, small arms such as SKS 7.62 mm rifles and K-53 and K-54 7.62 mm machine guns, though of Russian design, were thought to have been supplied by China. For heavier, more complex items (e.g., armored vehicles, heavy artillery, antiaircraft systems, aircraft, and the like), the DRV remained dependent on the Soviets.
       3. The French Arms
In South Vietnam, the most significant military development in the immediate aftermath of Geneva was the withdrawal of the 200,000 men of the French Expeditionary Corps by 1956, apparently removing with them an estimated $200 million worth of undetermined kinds of military equipment from $1,308 million in MDAP materiel furnished them by the United States during the period 1950–1954. How precisely this draw-down affected the ceilings envisaged by Articles 16 and 17 of the Agreement was, of course, never established. The attention of the DRV and the ICC thereafter was fixed on the Republic of Vietnam's Armed Forces (RVNAF), and upon the United States military assistance program for RVNAF.
       4. RVNAF Revitalized
The French brought the Vietnamese Army into being in 1948, its strength in 1949 being reported as 25,000, led by French officers and noncommissioned officers. That strength rose eight-fold during the war, to 50,000 in 1950; 65,800 in 1951; 150,000 in 1953; and 200,000 in 1954, including 1500 navy and 3500 air force personnel. Dien Bien Phu and its aftermath resulted in widespread desertions, especially from Vietnamese units being moved from north to south during the regroupment. Thereafter, under urging from the U.S., French officers and noncommissioned leaders were withdrawn, and a combined U.S.-French training mission was established to develop the national army. New force structures for military and paramilitary forces evolved, with particular emphasis upon headquarters, staffs, and logistic limits. Strengths for the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF), for the same years given above for DRV armed forces, were as follows:
Trends in GVN Armed Strength :
| | Army | Navy | Mar Corps | AF | Provincial Forces | Coastal Forces | Militia | Total |
| 1954 | | | | | | | | 200 |
| 1955 | 170 | 2.2 | 1.5 | 3.5 | ... | ... | ... | 177 |
| 1959 | 136 | 4.3 | 2.0 | 4.6 | 49 | ... | 48 | 244 |
| 1963 | 192 | 6.7 | 5.2 | 6.4 | 76 | 3.3 | 94 | 384 |
A sampling of arms is represented below:
U.S. Army MAP Ordnance in Vietnam (Selected Items) :
| Item | Deliveries FY 50–54 | Inventory 1 Jan 58 | Inventory 30 Nov 63 | Deliveries FY 55–64 |
| Carbine, 30 cal | 73,889 | 48,051 | 303,635 | 321,884 |
| Rifle, 30 cal | 111,667 | 83,828 | 122,166 | 118,153 |
| Rifle, BAR | 13,145 | 11,839 | 21,800 | 22,770 |
| SMG | 77,342 | 63,099 | 55,743 | 61,961 |
| MG, 30 cal | 2,558 | 3,143 | 5,679 | 5,534 |
| RR, 57 mm | 1,121 | 470 | 648 | 539 |
| How, 105 mm | 329 | 170 | 188 | 234 |
| How, 155 mm | 36 | 28 | 66 | 35 |
| Mort, 60 mm | 1,393 | 1,732 | 2,922 | 2,470 |
| Mort, 81 mm | 921 | 868 | 1,106 | 891 |
| Mort, 4.2 in | - | 99 | 268 | 250 |
| Tank, light | 270 | 130 | 176 | 131 |
| Armored Car | 398 | 140 | 104 | 146 |
       5. U.S. Aid: SEATO
The role of the United States in the training and equipping of these forces mirrored the misapprehensions of other aspects of U.S. policy. In 1954 Secretary of State Dulles had drawn two principal lessons from the First Indochina War: (1) that it was impossible to support a belligerent in such a war unless he embodied the nationalistic aspirations of the people, and (2) collective action on behalf of that belligerent could not be drawn together amid the war. The first took the policy form of U.S. insistence upon a truly national army for South Vietnam, i.e., an army entirely free of French command. The second materialized as the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization. On 8 September 1954, the U.S., U.K. and France joined with Australia, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Thailand and agreed that:
Article IV
   "1. Each Party recognizes that aggression by means of armed attack in the treaty area against any of the parties or against any State or territory which the Parties by unanimous agreement may hereafter designate, would endanger its own peace and safety, and agrees that it will in that event act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes....
   "2. If, in the opinion of any of the Parties, the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the sovereignty or political independence of any Party in the treaty area or of any other State or territory to which the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article from time to time apply is threatened in any way other than armed attack or is affected or threatened by any fact or situation which might endanger the peace of the area, the Parties shall consult immediately in order to agree on the measures which should be taken for the common defense.
   "3. It is understood that no action on the territory of any State designated by unanimous agreement under paragraph 1 of this Article or on any territory so designated shall be taken except at the invitation or with the consent of the government concerned...."
By a Protocol to the SEATO Treaty, executed the same day, the Parties:
   "...unanimously designate for the purpose of Article IV of the Treaty the States of Cambodia and Laos and the free territory under the jurisdiction of the State of Vietnam...."
   "...In order to contribute to the security of the area pending the further development of national forces for this purpose, the representatives of France indicated that France is prepared to retain forces of its Expeditionary Corps, in agreement with the government concerned, within the limits permitted under the Geneva Agreements, and to an extent to be determined....The channel for French and United States economic aid, budgetary support, and other assistance to each of the Associated States will be direct to that state...."
On 23 October 1954, President Eisenhower, in a letter to Diem, offered "to assist the Government of Vietnam in developing and maintaining a strong, viable state, capable of resisting attempted subversion or aggression through military means." Direct U.S. military assistance to Diem began in early 1955. As mentioned above, by spring, 1956, the French military command had been dissolved, and the Expeditionary Corps withdrawn, so that the U.S. thereafter alone bore the principal burdens of assisting the GVN to build its defenses.
       6. U. S. Aid: MAP
U.S. policy on how RVNAF should develop vacillated accordingly. Initially, we considered that the French forces and the SEATO mantle would suffice for the purposes of shielding the GVN from external aggression, and that as Lt. General John W. ("Iron Mike") O'Daniel, Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group, put it in February, 1955:
   "The (Vietnamese) Army will be above all, according to American ideas on the subject, a police force capable of spotting Communist guerrillas and Communist efforts at infiltration."
The withdrawal of the French Expeditionary Corps, however, cast RVNAF in a new role, and demanded they be prepared for conventional combat, capable of staving off an attack from the North until U.S. and SEATO aid could be landed. In June, 1956, in the wake of the French withdrawal, General O'Daniel reported to the American Friends of Vietnam that:
   "The Vietnamese Army is now organized into regiments and divisions. In case of an armed attack by the Vietminh from the North, it is capable of effecting enough delay to allow for additional forces to be employed in time to save the country...."
To this threat MAAG turned its attention from 1955 to 1960, with such success that General O'Daniel's successor, Lt. General Samuel T. ("Hanging Sam") Williams could justifiably assert (on the occasion of his retirement ​in August, 1960, that:
   "In 1954 the Communist army of North Vietnam could have crossed the seventeenth parallel and walked into Saigon standing up. Today if they tried it, they would have one nasty fight on their hands."
The Army of Vietnam (ARVN) assumed American forms, with divisions, corps headquarters, and general staffs—an "upgrading" which appealed to the Vietnamese military, denied such pretensions under the French. Although the MAAG continued to recognize a requirement for assisting ARVN capabilities against guerrillas and infiltrators, the primary efforts of American and Vietnamese soldiers alike were directed toward improving conventional defense capability through 1960, and ARVN became mechanized, ponderous, road bound, and preoccupied with its supply and staffing functions. Indeed, MAAG viewed ARVN "pacification" duties as an obstruction to progress. The internal security of the nation devolved upon two paramilitary forces: the Self-Defense Corps, and the Civil Guard, U.S. aid for both of which comprised an unhappy chapter in the U.S.–GVN relationship. The Self-Defense Corps (SDC) was created in April, 1956, as a village militia, and received U.S. assistance from the MAAG in the form of funds and shoulder arms. Training of the SDC was left to ARVN. The Civil Guard (CG) was established in April 1955, as a paramilitary force which was to operate under the province chiefs. American aid to the CG was provided through a group from Michigan State University under contract to both the U.S. and the GVN. Its organization, equipment, and utilization became a point of controversy almost at once: the Public Administration Division of the Michigan State group conceived of the CG as a rural constabulary, recruited locally, trained and equipped for police operations; Diem preferred a more military organization, heavier in equipment, and organized for sustained combat. In terms of later U.S. concepts of "counterinsurgency," the early judgment of the MSU group was probably correct: a rural constabulary close to the people might have helped Diem meet the early challenges of the insurgency, especially in the field of intelligence. However, with HAAG support, Diem's ideas prevailed, and the CG became a force competitive to ARVN. In actuality both the SDC and the CG were quite ineffective in providing internal security. Their arms, equipment and training were rudimentary. ARVN used its training responsibilities for them as a dumping ground for inept officers. Through them, however, U.S. small arms were channeled into the countryside, there to augment the arsenals of dissidents. And the behavior of these ill-prepared levies probably did little to enhance GVN rapport with the farmers.
From the outset, the American aid program for South Vietnam was overwhelmingly military. There was doubtless, always a limit to how much economic and other non-military aid the GVN needed, wanted, or could efficiently absorb, but primary emphasis in U.S. aid programs from the outset was placed upon security—with Diem's agreement, as his 1956 letter (supra.) indicates. In the first few years, about 70% of all U.S. aid was for the security establishment. About 80% of ​non-military economic aid was furnished in the form of "commodity imports, "an arrangement in which the U.S. purchased imports for Vietnamese who paid for them in Vietnamese currency into a "counterpart fund." The counterpart funds, in turn, were made available for support of the GVN budget — in 1956, 51% of all GVN expenditures were for defense.
       7. Implications: U.S. Role
Much criticism leveled at U.S. assistance for the GVN has cited its military character as evidence that the U.S. deliberately undermined or ignored the Geneva Settlement. SEATO has been similarly suspect, its formation having drawn an immediate DRV protest to the ICC in September 1954, that the treaty violated Article 19 of the "Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities..." forbidding alliances. However, U.S. official records reveal that the nature and direction of U.S. aid programs, with their emphasis on security, were dictated by no conscious effort to contravene the Settlement, but by the desires of the GVN, and by a mutual adjustment to the circumstances of French withdrawal. In late 1954, J. Lawton Collins, the U.S. Special Representative in Vietnam, recommended an ARVN of 77,000 and reported the French willing to have NAAG expand slowly beyond the Settlement-fixed mid-1954 level of 342. The JCS initially (September, 1954) viewed the Settlement as too restrictive, and enjoined against MAAG's accepting the mission of training RVNAF. However, Defense eventually took the view that while State Department could have to rule on a possible increase in MAAG strength, its 342 personnel were probably "capable of furnishing training assistance to develop Army and Navy internal security forces...." The build-up of DRV forces was perceived, and the JCS view was that this threat entailed retention of at least four divisions of French forces in the South until they could be replaced by combat effective RVNAF divisions. There followed a period of about six months, December 1954 to May 1955, in which the U.S. government debated within its councils whether or not to throw its entire support behind Ngo Dinh Diem, or to seek alternatives. However, while this debate was in progress, the U.S. followed through in adopting direct aid to GVN, and in extending its advisory effort with ARVN to replace French advisors—steps explained as authorized by the Geneva Agreement in terms of rotation of personnel, and of implementing a 1950 pentalateral agreement for military aid among the U.S., France, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam. Ultimately, Ngo Dinh Diem's success in breaking the power of the sects, as well as the inability of Americans to identify other leaders for the GVN, won him unequivocal American political support and agreement to support an RVNAF of about 150,000. Thus buttressed, Diem refused to open consultations on the plebescite in July 1955, and in October held an election of his own in which Bao Dai was deposed, and himself installed as head of state of the GVN. Diem then felt confident in requesting the French to remove their forces from Vietnam. The French withdrawal came certainly before ARVN was ready to replace the Expeditionary Corps divisions, and created urgency for MAAG to help develop minimal conventional defense capabilities.
       8. Implications: DRV and GVN Protests
By the summer of 1955, the unfolding of U.S.–GVN policy prompted the DRV to appeal directly to the Co-chairmen of the Geneva Conference. In a letter of August 17, 1955, Pham Van Dong, DRV Prime Minister, insisted that "the political question in Vietnam should be settled according to the Geneva Agreements," and requested the U.S.S.R. and the U.K. to "take all necessary measures in order to guarantee observance...." This request was indorsed by the Chinese on October 31, 1955, and referred in November by the Co-chairmen to other members of the Geneva Conference for comment. The DRV promptly called for reconvening the Geneva Conference; the CPR quickly supported the demand. On February 18, 1956, the U.S.S.R. concurred, and proposed to the U.K. the summoning of a new Conference. The DRV call was based principally upon accusations that the GVN was frustrating execution of the political provisions of the Settlement, but a U.S.S.R. note to the U.K. added the charge that in South Vietnam, "foreign military bases are being set up and attempts are being made to include South Vietnam in a military bloc." The U.K. responses were cool to the idea that a reconvened Geneva Conference "would necessarily provide the quickest or most satisfactory means of reaching agreement," and on April 9, 1956, the U.K. made public a note to the U.S.S.R. rejecting its accusations concerning military bases and blocs, and countercharging "massive military expansion in the North," noting that while French troops had been withdrawn from the South, the army in North Vietnam had been increased from 7 to 20 (sic) divisions since 1954. The U.K. further took the position that the GVN was not bound by the Geneva Agreements. The outcome was a letter from the Co-chairmen to the DRV and the GVN enjoining cooperation to keep the peace, and asking notification when the recipients felt the time propitious for consultations preliminary to plebescite.
In July, 1959, the government of South Vietnam published a White Paper, summarizing the "violations of the Geneva Agreements by the Viet Minh communists." In it the "authorities of the North" were charged with a "policy of aggression and subversion," in that contrary to their 1954 pledges, they obstructed the movements of refugees, conducted widespread destruction and sabotage in South Vietnam, introduced large quantitites of arms and ammunition into North Vietnam, and with communist cadres in South Vietnam pursued a scheme to overthrow the Republic of Vietnam. The GVN claimed that between September, 1954, and June, 1959, a total of 3,561 caches of arms and ammunition had been discovered in South Vietnam, of which 303 had been reported to the ICC. Although the 303 "most important" caches so reported contained only 679 rifles, 142 machine guns, 182 mortars, 49 pistols, and assorted mines, grenades and other munitions, the government of South Vietnam construed these to convey "the intention of further attacks against the national government...in violation of the Agreements...." It noted that the United Kingdom had cited in 1956 an increase in the DRV armed forces from 7 to 20 divisions and evoked the 1958 denunciation of the French Minister of Foreign Affairs for the DRV’s increasing its military strength from a 1954 total of 200,000 to 550,000. The White Paper castigated Hanoi for "introducing 600 to 700 Chinese instructors" and noted that "the number of Russian and Chinese advisors amounts to several thousand in all echelons of the Army." Noting that the Geneva Accords had proscribed using one zone for conducting of aggression against ​the other, the GVN condemned what were termed "national movements, such as 'Patriotic Front,' 'United Front,' or 'Fatherland Front,' [which] were in reality of communist inspiration...simply and solely directing communist propaganda and subversive agencies in the zone controlled by the national government." It claimed that responsive to orders from Hanoi, these organizations were conducting a systematic campaign of terror and subversion. During the two and one half years from 1957 through July, 1959, 174 assassinations involving 10 servicemen, 20 civil guards, 65 village officials and 59 civilians were reported by the GVN to the ICC. The White Paper concluded on the note that:
   "Contrary to their official declarations, the Viet-Minh Communists have turned their back upon the interests of the Vietnamese people.
   "Is it a question of the reunification of the country? They have conceived of it as a simple subordination to Red Imperialism. In North Vietnam, democratic liberties are scoffed at, sacred human rights trampled under foot. How could the Vietnamese people express their real will under this reign of terror where liberty is nothing but a word?
   "Desirous to realize the reunification of the country through freedom and in freedom, the Government of the Republic of Vietnam has repeatedly, but in vain, summoned the Communists to re-establish and respect the fundamental liberties to which human beings are entitled. This appeal was made in order to create a favorable atmosphere for really free general elections.
   "Not only are the Viet-Minh Communists enemies of democracy and freedom, but they continue to mobilize their forces to sabotage peace in this part of the world.
   "The unceasing reinforcement of the Communist armed forces, the importation, in great numbers, of arms and munitions into North Vietnam, secret arm and ammunition dumps left in the territory of the Republic of Viet-Nam, subversive manoeuvres carried out by Communist cadres constitute tangible and irrefutable evidence of their deliberately aggressive intentions."
       9. Implications: ICC Impotence
In the meantime, the ICC tried to engage the Geneva Conference machinery to provide a substitute for France in Vietnam, with no better success than the DRV. Acting on an ICC report, the U.K. made representations to the GVN in December, 1955, on behalf of the ICC, but received no reply until April, 1956, in which the GVN promised to cooperate with the ICC, but again declined to accept responsibility for the Geneva Settlement. In May, 1956, the Co-chairmen asked the ICC to remain functioning beyond its contemplated termination in July, 1956, despite the informality of its relations with the GVN. The ICC agreed, on May 27, 1956, to "continue dealing with the parties concerned on the basis of 'status quo.'" "Status quo" by that time involved the ICC directly with the U.S. aid program. For example, in April, 1956, the GVN notified the ICC through the French that it had accepted a U.S. proposal to augment the U.S. MAAG in May 1956, with a 350-member group to be called the Temporary Equipment Recovery Mission (TERM), tasked to assist in the evacuation of U.S. military equipment and supplies left ​behind upon the French withdrawal. Despite an ICC request to delay deployment while the matter was under advisement, TERM personnel arrived on schedule, and without ICC sanction. In 1957 the ICC protested the circumstances of TERM's introduction, but was content with requesting a periodic report of its activities. The same 1957 report delivered an ICC opinion that SEATO was not a U.S.–GVN alliance prescribed by the Geneva Settlement, and a 1958 report put the ICC on record (the Polish member dissenting) that the GVN might be given "credit" for the war material withdrawn by the French prior to 30 June 1956 in accepting like equipment from the U.S. A 1959 report ruled that Bien Hoa was not a new military base, and authorized TERM to remain until 31 December 1960. In 1960 the ICC acceded to an increase in the MAAG from 342 to 685 personnel.
Nonetheless, it is clear on the record that U.S. and GVN cooperation with the ICC was little more than pro forma. Convinced that the ICC was impotent in inhibiting the behavior or restricting the arming of the DRV, both the U.S. and the GVN pursued their goals without serious regard for the fixed levels of arms envisaged at Geneva, or for attempts by the ICC to regulate arms. Both governments appreciated that the inability of the other Geneva Conference powers to concert action, well demonstrated in the spring of 1956, constituted international condonement of status quo in Vietnam, and while both apparently preferred to avoid controversy with the ICC, neither was disposed to consider the ICC or the Settlement it guarded as other than a secondary consideration to GVN security.
       E. The Situation in 1956
On June 1, 1956, a prestigious group of citizens assembled in Washington as the "American Friends of Vietnam." They heard Senator John F. Kennedy characterize Vietnam as:
   "(1)...the cornerstone of the Free World in Southeast Asia, the keystone in the arch, the finger in the dike...The fundamental tenets of this nation's foreign policy, in short, depend in considerable measure upon a strong and free Vietnamese nation.
   "(2)...Vietnam represents a proving ground of democracy in Asia...the alternative to Communist dictatorship. If this democratic experiment fails, if some one million refugees have fled the totalitarianism of the North only to find neither freedom nor security in the South, then weakness, not strength, will characterize the meaning of democracy in the minds of still more Asians....
   "(3)...Vietnam represents a test of American responsibility and determination in Asia. If we are not the parents of little Vietnam, then surely we are the godparents...If it falls victim to any of the perils that threaten its existence...our prestige in Asia will sink to a new low.
   "(4)...The key position of Vietnam in Southeast Asia...makes inevitable the involvement of this nation's security in any new outbreak of trouble."
Senator Kennedy was followed by Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, who declared that the U.S. sought:
   "To support a friendly non-Communist government in Vietnam and to help it diminish and eventually eradicate Communist subversion and influence.
   "To help the government of Vietnam establish the forces necessary for internal security.
   "To encourage support for Free Vietnam by the non-Communist world.
   "To aid in the rehabilitation and reconstruction of a country and people ravaged by eight ruinous years of civil and international war.
   "War efforts are directed first of all toward helping sustain the internal security forces consisting of a regular army of about 150,000 men, and mobile civil guard of some 45,000 and local defense units which are being formed to give protection against subversion on the village level...."
Dr. Tom Dooley described emotionally the plight of the refugees from North Vietnam, and sketched in graphic terms Viet Minh terrorism. Professor Hans Morganthau extolled the Geneva Settlement and status quo in Vietnam as a logical balancing of the interests of the powers concerned, and General O'Daniel described how the Vietnamese had been given the opportunity to select the type of military organization they like best, and had "followed the U.S. pattern."
But from Saigon, Ngo Dinh Diem addressed a sober, reflective letter to the American Friends of Vietnam on the note that "we have arrived at a critical point in our national life." He concluded with the assertion that: "It is indispensable that our army have the wherewithal to become increasingly capable of preserving the peace which we seek....Economic aid can be only effective once security is restored...."
From Hanoi to the peoples of Southeast Asia, a commentary on the 1 June conference in Washington was broadcast in Vietnamese headlines: ​"The American Colonialists Are the Most Dangerous Enemy of the People." The commentary castigated the American Friends of Vietnam for supporting Diem in "his sabotage of the Geneva Accords and opposition to the clauses relative to free general elections to unify the country. It is obvious that this association is an organization formed by the American imperialists to more cynically and bluntly intervene in the South.... " and called for solidarity against the American intrusion.
However, July 20, 1956, the date the Geneva Conference had indicated for the plebescite on reunification, passed without incident. Years later, 'Then controversy over the failure of the Geneva Settlement raged anew, the U. S. should point to the subsequent behavior of the DRV to demonstrate that its judgment was quite correct in arming the GVN, aiding the refugees, and insist ing with Diem that conditions permitting free elections did not exist in North Vietnam. But in that summer of 1956, most such arguments appeared to be settled to the satisfaction of all parties except Ho Chi Minh.