# A Philosophical Essay on Probabilities/Chapter 18

CHAPTER XVIII.
HISTORICAL NOTICE CONCERNING THE CALCULUS OF PROBABILITIES.
Long ago were determined, in the simplest games, the ratios of the chances which are favorable or unfavorable to the players; the stakes and the bets were regulated according to these ratios. But no one before Pascal and Fermat had given the principles and the methods for submitting this subject to calculus, and no one had solved the rather complicated questions of this kind. It is, then, to these two great geometricians that we must refer the first elements of the science of probabilities, the discovery of which can be ranked among the remarkable things which have rendered illustrious the seventeenth century—the century which, has done the greatest honor to the human mind. The principal problem which they solved by different methods, consists, as we have seen, in distributing equitably the stake among the players, who are supposed to be equally skilful and who agree to stop the game before it is finished, the condition of play being that, in order to win the game, one must gain a given number of points different for each of the players. It ​is clear that the distribution should be made proportionally to the respective probabilities of the players of winning this game, the probabilities depending upon the numbers of points which are still lacking. The method of Pascal is very ingenious, and is at bottom only the equation of partial differences of this problem applied in determining the successive probabilities of the players, by going from the smallest numbers to the following ones. This method is limited to the case of two players; that of Fermat, based upon combinations, applies to any number of players. Pascal believed at first that it was, like his own, restricted to two players; this brought about between them a discussion, at the conclusion of which Pascal recognized the generality of the method of Fermat.
Huygens united the divers problems which had already been solved and added new ones in a little treatise, the first that has appeared on this subject and which has the title De Ratiociniis in ludo aleæ. Several geometricians have occupied themselves with the subject since: Hudde, the great pensionary, Witt in Holland, and Halley in England, applied calculus to the probabilities of human life, and Halley published in this field the first table of mortality. About the same time Jacques Bernoulli proposed to geometricians various problems of probability, of which he afterwards gave solutions. Finally he composed his beautiful work entitled Ars conjectandi, which appeared seven years after his death, which occurred in 1706. The science of probabilities is more profoundly investigated in this work than in that of Huygens. The author gives a general theory of combinations and series, and ​applies it to several difficult questions concerning hazards. This work is still remarkable on account of the justice and the cleverness of view, the employment of the formula of the binomial in this kind of questions, and by the demonstration of this theorem, namely, that in multiplying indefinitely the observations and the experiences, the ratio of the events of different natures approaches that of their respective probabilities in the limits whose interval becomes more and more narrow in proportion as they are multiplied, and become less than any assignable quantity. This theorem is very useful for obtaining by observations the laws and the causes of phenomena. Bernoulli attaches, with reason, a great importance to his demonstration, upon which he has said to have meditated for twenty years.
In the interval, from the death of Jacques Bernoulli to the publication of his work, Montmort and Moivre produced two treatises upon the calculus of probabilities. That of Montmort has the title Essai sur les Jeux de Hasard; it contains numerous applications of this calculus to various games. The author has added in the second edition some letters in which Nicolas Bernoulli gives the ingenious solutions of several difficult problems. The treatise of Moivre, later than that of Montmort, appeared at first in the Transactions philosophiques of the year 1711. Then the author published it separately, and he has improved it successively in three editions. This work is principally based upon the formula of the binomial and the problems which it contains have, like their solutions, a grand generality. But its distinguishing feature is the theory ​of recurrent series and their use in this subject. This theory is the integration of linear equations of finite differences with constant coefficients, which Moivre made in a very happy manner.
In his work, Moivre has taken up again the theory of Jacques Bernoulli in regard to the probability of results determined by a great number of observations. He does not content himself with showing, as Bernoulli does, that the ratio of the events which ought to occur approaches without ceasing that of their respective probabilities; but he gives besides an elegant and simple expression of the probability that the difference of these two ratios is contained within the given limits. For this purpose he determines the ratio of the greatest term of the development of a very high power of the binomial to the sum of all its terms, and the hyperbolic logarithm of the excess of this term above the terms adjacent to it.
The greatest term being then the product of a considerable number of factors, his numerical calculus becomes impracticable. In order to obtain it by a convergent approximation, Moivre makes use of a theorem of Stirling in regard to the mean term of the binomial raised to a high power, a remarkable theorem, especially in this, that it introduces the square root of the ratio of the circumference to the radius in an expression which seemingly ought to be irrelevant to this transcendent. Moreover, Moivre was greatly struck by this result, which Stirling had deduced from the expression of the circumference in infinite products; Wallis had arrived at this expression by a singlar ​analysis which contains the germ of the very curious and useful theory of definite intergrals.
Many scholars, among whom one ought to name Deparcieux, Kersseboom, Wargentin, Dupre de SaintMaure, Simpson, Sussmilch, Messene, Moheau, Price, Bailey, and Duvillard, have collected a great amount of precise data in regard to population, births, marriages, and mortality. They have given formulæ and tables relative to life annuities, tontines, assurances, etc. But in this short notice I can only indicate these useful works in order to adhere to original ideas. Of this number special mention is due to the mathematical and moral hopes and to the ingenious principle which Daniel Bernoulli has given for submitting the latter to analysis. Such is again the happy application which he has made of the calculus of probabilities to inoculation. One ought especially to include, in the number of these original ideas, direct consideration of the possibility of events drawn from events observed. Jacques Bernoulli and Moivre supposed these possibilities known, and they sought the probability that the result of future experiences will more and more nearly represent them. Bayes, in the Transactions philosophiques of the year 1763, sought directly the probability that the possibilities indicated by past experiences are comprised within given limits; and he has arrived at this in a refined and very ingenious manner, although a little perplexing. This subject is connected with the theory of the probability of causes and future events, concluded from events observed. Some years later I expounded the principles of this theory with a remark as to the influence of the inequalities which may exist ​among the chances which are supposed to be equal. Although it is not known which of the simple events these inequalities favor, nevertheless this ignorance itself often increases the probability of compound events.
In generalizing analysis and the problems concerning probabilities, I was led to the calculus of partial finite differences, which Lagrange has since treated by a very simple method, elegant applications of which he has used in this kind of problems. The theory of generative functions which I published about the same time includes these subjects among those it embraces, and is adapted of itself and with the greatest generality to the most difficult questions of probability. It determines again, by very convergent approximations, the values of the functions composed of a great number of terms and factors; and in showing that the square root of the ratio of the circumference to the radius enters most frequently into these values, it shows that an infinity of other transcendents may be introduced.
Testimonies, votes, and the decisions of electoral and deliberative assemblies, and the judgments of tribunals, have been submitted likewise to the calculus of probabilities. So many passions, divers interests, and circumstances complicate the questions relative to the subjects, that they are almost always insoluble. But the solution of very simple problems which have a great analogy with them, may often shed upon difficult and important questions great light, which the surety of calculus renders always preferable to the most specious reasonings.
One of the most interesting applications of the ​calculus of probabilities concerns the mean values which must be chosen among the results of observations. Many geometricians have studied the subject, and Lagrange has published in the Mémoires de Turin a beautiful method for determining these mean values when the law of the errors of the observations is known. I have given for the same purpose a method based upon a singular contrivance which may be employed with advantage in other questions of analysis; and this, by permitting indefinite extension in the whole course of a long calculation of the functions which ought to be limited by the nature of the problem, indicates the modifications which each term of the final result ought to receive by virtue of these limitations. It has already been seen that each observation furnishes an equation of condition of the first degree, which may always be disposed of in such a manner that all its terms be in the first member, the second being zero. The use of these equations is one of the principal causes of the great precision of our astronomical tables, because an immense number of excellent observations has thus been made to concur in determining their elements. When there is only one element to be determined Côtes prescribed that the equations of condition should be prepared in such a manner that the coefficient of the unknown element be positive in each of them; and that all these equations should be added in order to form a final equation, whence is derived the value of this element. The rule of Côtes was followed by all calculators, but since he failed to determine several elements, there was no fixed rule for combining the equations of condition in such a ​manner as to obtain the necessary final equations; but one chose for each element the observations most suitable to determine it. It was in order to obviate these gropings that Legendre and Gauss concluded to add the squares of the first members of the equations of condition, and to render the sum a minimum, by varying each unknown element; by this means is obtained directly as many final equations as there are elements. But do the values determined by these equations merit the preference over all those which may be obtained by other means? This question, the calculus of probabilities alone was able to answer. I applied it, then, to this subject, and obtained by a delicate analysis a rule which includes the preceding method, and which adds to the advantage of giving, by a regular process, the desired elements that of obtaining them with the greatest show of evidence from the totality of observations, and of determining the values which leave only the smallest possible errors to be feared.
However, we have only an imperfect knowledge of the results obtained, as long as the law of the errors of which they are susceptible is unknown; we must be able to assign the probability that these errors are contained within given limits, which amounts to determining that which I have called the weight of a result. Analysis leads to general and simple formulas for this purpose. I have applied this analysis to the results of geodetic observations. The general problem consists in determining the probabilities that the values of one or of several linear functions of the errors of a very great number of observations are contained within any limits.
​The law of the possibility of the errors of observations introduces into the expressions of these probabilities a constant, whose value seems to require the knowledge of this law, which is almost always unknown. Happily this constant can be determined from the observations.
In the investigation of astronomical elements it is given by the sum of the squares of the differences between each observation and the calculated one. The errors equally probable being proportional to the square root of this sum, one can, by the comparison of these squares, appreciate the relative exactitude of the different tables of the same star. In geodetic operations these squares are replaced by the squares of the errors of the sums observed of the three angles of each triangle. The comparison of the squares of these errors will enable us to judge of the relative precision of the instruments with which the angles have been measured. By this comparison is seen the advantage of the repeating circle over the instruments which it has replaced in geodesy.
There often exists in the observations many sources of errors: thus the positions of the stars being determined by means of the meridian telescope and of the circle, both susceptible of errors whose law of probability ought not to be supposed the same, the elements that are deduced from these positions are affected by these errors. The equations of condition, which are made to obtain these elements, contain the errors of each instrument and they have various coefficients. The most advantageous system of factors by which these equations ought to be multiplied respectively, in ​order to obtain, by the union of the products, as many final equations as there are elements to be determined, is no longer that of the coefficients of the elements in each equation of condition. The analysis which I have used leads easily, whatever the number of the sources of error may be, to the system of factors which gives the most advantageous results, or those in which the same error is less probable than in any other system. The same analysis determines the laws of probability of the errors of these results. These formulæ contain as many unknown constants as there are sources of error, and they depend upon the laws of probability of these errors. It has been seen that, in the case of a single source, this constant can be determined, by forming the sum of the squares of the residuals of each equation of condition, when the values found for these elements have been substituted. A similar process generally gives values of these constants, whatever their number may be, which completes the application of the calculus of probabilities to the results of observations.
I ought to make here an important remark. The small uncertainty that the observations, when they are not numerous, leave in regard to the values of the constants of which I have just spoken, renders a little uncertain the probabilities determined by analysis. But it almost always suffices to know if the probability, that the errors of the results obtained are comprised within narrow limits, approaches closely to unity; and when it is not, it suffices to know up to what point the observations should be multiplied, in order to obtain a probability such that no reasonable doubt remains in ​regard to the correctness of the results. The analytic formulæ of probabilities satisfy perfectly this requirement; and in this connection they may be viewed as the necessary complement of the sciences, based upon a totality of observations susceptible of error. They are likewise indispensable in solving a great number of problems in the natural and moral sciences. The regular causes of phenomena are most frequently either unknown, or too complicated to be submitted to calculus; again, their action is often disturbed by accidental and irregular causes; but its impression always remains in the events produced by all these causes, and it leads to modifications which only a long series of observations can determine. The analysis of probabilities develops these modifications; it assigns the probability of their causes and it indicates the means of continually increasing this probability. Thus in the midst of the irregular causes which disturb the atmosphere, the periodic changes of solar heat, from day to night, and from winter to summer, produce in the pressure of this great fluid mass and in the corresponding height of the barometer, the diurnal and annual oscillations; and numerous barometric observations have revealed the former with a probability at least equal to that of the facts which we regard as certain. Thus it is again that the series of historical events shows us the constant action of the great principles of ethics in the midst of the passions and the various interests which disturb societies in every way. It is remarkable that a science, which commenced with the consideration of games of chance, should be elevated to the rank of the most important subjects of human knowlegdge.
​I have collected all these methods in my Théorie analytique des Probabilités, in which I have proposed to expound in the most general manner the principles and the analysis of the calculus of probabilities, likewise the solutions of the most interesting and most difficult problems which calculus presents.
It is seen in this essay that the theory of probabilities is at bottom only common sense reduced to calculus; it makes us appreciate with exactitude that which exact minds feel by a sort of instinct without being able ofttimes to give a reason for it. It leaves no arbitrariness in the choice of opinions and sides to be taken; and by its use can always be determined the most advantageous choice. Thereby it supplements most happily the ignorance and the weakness of the human mind. If we consider the analytical methods to which this theory has given birth; the truth of the principles which serve as a basis; the fine and delicate logic which their employment in the solution of problems requires; the establishments of public utility which rest upon it; the extension which it has received and which it can still receive by its application to the most important questions of natural philosophy and the moral science; if we consider again that, even in the things which cannot be submitted to calculus, it gives the surest hints which can guide us in our judgments, and that it teaches us to avoid the illusions which ofttimes confuse us, then we shall see that there is no science more worthy of our meditations, and that no more useful one could be incorporated in the system of public instruction.