# The Emancipation of South America/Chapter 41

CHAPTER XLI.
THE THIRD WAR IN VENEZUELA.
1815-1817.
In none of the colonies of Spanish America was the struggle for emancipation so stubborn, so heroic, and so tragical, as in Venezuela. In the North of the Continent she was the nucleus of the revolution, gave it both its military power and its political basis, and supplied to it the genius of Bolívar. Twice conquered, she yet arose a third time against her oppressors.
After the rout of Urica, and the catastrophe of Maturin, the remnants of the Republican army of the East were dispersed as guerillas along the banks and about the headwaters of the Orinoco, and on the plains of Barcelona, while the insurrection was still unquelled on the plains of Casanare. A fresh signal for a general revolt was given by the island of Margarita immediately after the departure of Morillo on his expedition against New Granada. The Royalist governor, Colonel Urreistieta, to assert his authority, ordered the arrest of Arismendi. Fifteen hundred of the islanders rose in arms. The governor ordered the troops to give no quarter to the insurgents, gave them permission to pillage as they chose, and burned two towns in accordance with instructions received from General Moxó. The insurgents accepted the challenge of war to the knife. Arismendi put himself at their head, and took possession of the northern half of the island, captured by assault the fort at the Villa del Norte, and put to death the whole of the garrison, who numbered 200 men. Then on ​the 15th November, 1815, he laid siege to the capital and shut up the governor in the castle of Santa Rosa. His army numbered 4,300 infantry and 200 cavalry, badly armed, but all resolute men.
On the plains of Casanare the scattered groups of guerillas were organized by Paez into an army. José Antonio Paez was a native of Barinas, and was at this time twenty-six years old. He had served bravely throughout the campaign of the reconquest, but had never attracted special notice; now he was to show his great talents as a leader. He was a genuine Creole, of Caucasian race, with some mixture of native blood; a man of herculean strength, a breaker-in of wild horses, and an untiring swimmer. Skilful in the use of lance and sword, in moments of danger he was ever in the front rank, and had great influence over his men, both by his personal and by his moral qualities. They were accustomed to call him "Uncle" when addressing him. If any soldier committed a crime or showed unwillingness to obey orders it was his custom to challenge him to single combat. Whether the challenge were accepted or not he was always the victor, either physically or morally. After the excitement of a battle his nervous system would frequently give way, and he would fall to the ground, apparently lifeless. His plans were always carefully thought out and rapidly executed. He at this time knew neither how to read nor write, and was in no sense a politician, but was of a kindly, generous nature, and of very superior intelligence. In times of peace he was easily led, but in times of danger he led every one. His usual dress was a blouse of blue cloth, with a cloak thrown over his shoulders; a slouched hat, the front rim turned up and decorated with the cockade of Venezuela; and the gaiters of a Llanero. He wore a Toledo sword, and invariably carried a long lance.
Paez was serving as a simple captain with a small corps of Patriots which held the town of Guadalito, when news was brought of the approach of the Spanish governor of Barinas, with 1,100 horse and 300 infantry. The officer ​in command proposed to retreat. Paez requested permission to remain with one squadron to defend the town. Most of the other officers present approved of the proposition, on which the commander said angrily,
"Then let Paez command you, and those who choose may follow me to Casanare."
Paez, left with 500 men, marched out to meet the enemy, whom he found on the 16th February, 1816, near to the sources of the Apure. Paez, advancing alone to reconnoitre the position, had his horse killed under him by a musket-ball. It was near nightfall; some advised him to wait for daylight.
"It is as dark for them as it is for us," said Paez, and shouted to his men, "Comrades, they have killed my horse. If you will not revenge his death I will revenge him alone, and will die in the enemy's ranks."
The men shouted back that they would go wherever he would lead them. He formed them in two lines and led them on under a heavy fire. Such was the fury of the charge that two-thirds of the Royalist cavalry were driven in confusion from the field. As he led an attack upon their second line his horse was wounded, and burst the girths of the saddle with his plunges. The attack was beaten off. Springing on to the first horse he could catch, Paez rallied his men and again charged at full speed upon the rest of the Royalist cavalry, and bore them down in the rush. While the Patriots pursued the broken cavalry the Spanish infantry retreated through the woods. Four hundred killed and two hundred prisoners were the trophies of the day. Paez treated his prisoners so well that they all voluntarily took service with him.
This brilliant affair attracted the attention of the Llaneros, who were weary of the brutal rule of Boves and Morales, and won them over to the cause of independence.
Paez became at once the first general of cavalry in America. He was the bond of union between the Llaneros and the Patriots. He was proclaimed the chieftain of the plains, and from the recruits who poured in to join his ​standard he organized the famous Army of the Apure, On taking command he told his men that he would do his best to merit the confidence they had placed in him, but exhorted them above all to put faith in Divine Providence. In September, 1816, he invaded the Province of Barinas.
While the Army of the Apure was thus gathering itself together, the parties of guerillas, scattered along the banks of the Upper Orinoco, and on the eastern plains, also collected, forming divisions of as many as 1,500 men, under Monagas, Saraza and Cedeño. The Governor of Guayana sent a strong column against Cedeño, which was completely routed by him on the 8th March, 1816. A second expedition of 1,500 men, sent in boats up the Orinoco, had no better fortune, and was forced to retire to Angostura, the capital of Guayana.
While Bolívar, in exile at Kingston, Jamaica, was turning over in his mind many plans for renewing the War of Independence, he had a narrow escape from assassination. A slave of his who had followed his fortunes went one night into his room when all was dark, and seeing a man asleep in his hammock, gave him two stabs with a poniard, killing him on the spot. The dead man was found to be a poor emigrant named Amestoy, who, knowing that Bolívar would not sleep at home that night, occupied his room. The slave was caught, and confessed that it was his intention to kill Bolívar, but said not a word about accomplices. He was hung, but it was generally believed that an emissary of General Moxó had paid him to do the deed.
From Jamaica Bolívar crossed to the island of Santo Domingo, hearing on his way of the fall of Cartagena, where, too late, he had been offered the command. The famous mulatto, Alexander Petión, was at that time President of Haiti. He was an ardent partisan of the emancipation of Spanish America, and not only supplied Bolivar with arms for another expedition, but opened a credit for him for the necessary expenses with the house of a wealthy English merchant named Robert Sutherland. Bolívar also met here a Dutch shipbuilder named Luis ​Brion, who, becoming deeply interested both in him and in his designs, placed seven armed schooners at his orders, with 3,500 muskets, and offered his life and fortune in the same cause.
Bolívar commenced his preparations early in 1816, at the port of Cayos de San Luis, which has given its name to this famous expedition. There the refugees from Cartagena, and many officers from New Granada and Venezuela had collected. Among them were Piar, Mariño, Bermudez, Montilla, Soublette, the English Colonel MacGregor, who had served with Miranda, Doucoudray-Holstein, and Francisco Zea. There was anarchy among them; many of them refused to recognise the authority of Bolívar. Petion interposed his influence, and Brion declared that he would entrust his ships and armament to no one but to the Liberator. He was at length accepted as leader of the expedition, from which Montilla, who had challenged Bolívar, and Bermudez, who had led the opposition, were excluded.
Brion, with the title of Admiral of Venezuela, took command of the squadron, which sailed from Cayos on the 16th March, 1816. The expedition consisted of 300 men, whom Bolívar afterwards compared to the 300 Spartans of Leonidas, as he compared his reconquest of Venezuela to the redemption of Jerusalem by the Crusaders. They reached the island of Margarita early in May, finding there the Spanish brig Intrepido and the schooner Rita, which Brion boarded and captured, after a desperate resistance in which three-fourths of their crews were killed. The expedition then disembarked at the port of Juan Griego, the Royalists concentrating their forces at Pampatar and Porlamar.
Bolívar and Arismendi then conjointly convened a meeting of the officers of the Patriot army, and of the principal inhabitants, in the church at La Villa del Norte, in order to name the supreme ruler of the Republic they were about to restore. In accordance with his custom, Bolívar immediately renounced all pretensions to so ​important a post, which, as he had already arranged the matter with Arismendi, was merely one way of securing his own appointment. On the 7th May he was named "Supreme Chief," with power to do whatever he might find necessary for the salvation of the country. Mariño was named second in command.
On the 8th May Bolívar published a proclamation to the people of Venezuela, announcing that the National Congress would be reinstalled, and authorising the free towns to elect deputies, who should have the same sovereign powers as in the former epoch.
The expedition, reinforced by four ships from the island, then went on to Carupano, on the coast of Paria, capturing two armed vessels of the enemy and the fort, which was abandoned by the garrison. Here Bolívar established his head-quarters on the 1st June.
Rumour had greatly exaggerated the strength of the force he brought with him, but Bolívar made small use of the stupor into which the Royalists were thrown. He detached Piar to Maturin and Mariño to Güiria, but remained himself at Carupano, issuing pompous bulletins, in which he renounced his former system of a war of extermination, as a mistake. Also, in fulfilment of a promise to Petión, he published a decree giving liberty to all slaves, and called the people to arms, but no one joined him. He then convened an assembly of the townsfolk, who at his suggestion decreed the centralization of the powers of government. The federal system was abolished in Venezuela.
But a month of precious time was thus lost. Twenty days after the disembarkation, his advanced posts were driven in, and he was besieged by a division of 1,300 men, while a Spanish squadron threatened his communications by sea. Mariño sent him a strong reinforcement, but Brion refused to risk his ships in an unequal fight with the Spanish squadron. Meantime the guerilla leaders of the East proclaimed him general-in-chief, and desired his presence.
​Rejecting the advice of Piar to occupy Guayana as a base of operations, he re-embarked his small force, and again landed on the 5th July at Ocumare, between Caracas and Puerto Cabello. This step can only be explained by his anxiety to rescue his native city from the Royalists, a preoccupation which was to cost him the loss of three campaigns. Again rejecting the advice of his officers, who wished to effect a junction with the guerillas and so form an army, he detached Soublette with the bulk of his men to occupy the pass of Cabrera, and a smaller force along the coast in search of recruits, while he landed a printing press and issued more bulletins, and Brion went off on a cruise leaving him one armed brig and two small schooners.
On the same day on which Bolívar landed at Ocumare, Morales reached Valencia, with the division detached by Morillo after the surrender of Cartagena. In the face of such a superior force, Soublette was compelled to retire to a strong position on the heights of Ocumare. Bolívar went to his assistance with 150 recruits, but the combined force was completely routed by Morales on the 13th July.
MacGregor was then sent off with a detachment southwards to Choroni, while Soublette protected the retreat of Bolívar with the artillery to Ocumare, where he intended to re-embark. While engaged at night in this operation, he received word that the enemy were entering the town. It was a false alarm, Soublette still held his ground, but his men were panic-struck, and Bolívar without inquiring into the truth of the report, abandoned his sick and wounded, and fled on board the brig where his stores of war material were already in safety. He sailed at once and reached the island of Bonaire on the 16th July. Here he was joined by Brion, and sailed with him for Choroni, where he learned that Soublette and MacGregor had marched inland and had taken refuge in the valleys of Aragua. Returning to Bonaire he there met Bermudez, and with him sailed off to join Mariño at Güiria.
Soublette and MacGregor had joined forces at Choroni, ​the latter taking the command. Two days he waited for news of Bolívar and then marched off for the plains with 600 infantry and 30 horse. Dispersing a Royalist detachment which attempted to bar the passage of the hills, he occupied Victoria and routed another detachment under Rosete. On the 1st August he was met by a squadron of Saraza's guerillas, who were in search of him, and on the 2nd August routed another division of 1,200 Royalists at Quebrada-Honda. The next day he was joined by Saraza and Monagas with their divisions of guerillas, and was master of the plains of Barcelona, while Cedeño held his ground on the Upper Orinoco. So was formed the army which was afterwards known as "the Army of the Centre," which, in conjunction with that of the Apure, decided the destinies of Venezuela. Of this army MacGregor was recognised as general-in-chief.
At Güiria Bolívar met with but a sorry reception, the troops of Mariño refused to obey him, and the island of Margarita declined to recognise his authority. Bermudez charged him with cowardice for deserting his soldiers when in danger. Amid threats and jeers he was forced to re-embark and returned to Haiti, where he was coldly received by Petion. The people were incensed against him and had lost all faith in him. Nevertheless, Bolívar was the man not only for the revolution in Columbia, but for the emancipation of South America. None so well as he could rise superior to adverse fortune, none had such power as he over the petty chieftains, none but he could organize the discordant elements of the revolution into the strength of a warlike nation. Spite of his ignorance of military tactics and of his puerile vanity, he was the genius of the revolution in the North of the Continent. The sacred fire of liberty and of patriotism burned within him and inspired him. As he himself said, he would yet merit the title of Liberator. History owes to him this justice as she turns this disgraceful page.
After the departure of Bolívar, Mariño was named general of the army at Güiria, with Bermudez as his ​second in command, but his authority did not extend beyond the peninsula of Paria.
After occupying the plains of Barcelona, MacGregor marched upon the city. A Royalist force, which, under the command of Colonel Lopez, occupied the town of Aragua, sallied out to meet him. The action was hotly contested, but was decided by desperate charges of the Llanero horse led by Saraza and Monagas, and by a bayonet charge led by MacGregor in person. The Royalists lost 500 killed, 300 prisoners, and one gun.
Barcelona was evacuated by the Royalists on the 12th September, after they had murdered many of the townsfolk and plundered many of the houses, but MacGregor was now threatened by Morales, who had advanced to Aragua with 3,000 men. He sent to Arismendi, Mariño, and Piar for assistance. Piar, who was then besieging Cumana, came at once with all his troops and took the command. On the 27th September the two armies met at the Playon del Juncal, near to Barcelona. MacGregor, supported by the fire of Piar's artillery, led a bayonet charge which decided the day. The Royalists were totally routed, with a loss of 300 killed and 400 prisoners. After this victory MacGregor, worn out with fatigue and unwilling to brook the domineering ways of Piar, withdrew to Margarita.
Paez, by skilful manœuvres, forced his old opponent, Colonel Lopez, to retreat to the line of the Apure in October. The town of San Fernando on this river was the key of the plains; he resolved to seize it, but had no boats in which to cross the river. The Royalists had a flotilla of four "flecheras" and seven long-boats, manned by 400 men. An officer named Peña had committed some fault. Paez ordered him as a punishment to get himself killed by the enemy. He crossed the river in a canoe with eight men, at midday, and threw the Royalist camp into ​confusion. In the skirmishes which followed, Colonel Lopez was killed and the Patriots seized seven boats. Paez then crossed the river, and in December laid siege to San Fernando. There he received news that La Torre and Morillo were on the march from New Granada to the plains watered by the Arauca and Apure.
Mariño and Bermudez were engaged in the siege of Cumaná, aided by the flotilla from Margarita. The Spanish garrison was about to evacuate the city, when the Royalist force on the island abandoned it and came to their assistance. The Patriots were forced to raise the siege.
At the close of the year 1816 the Patriot armies had gained many advantages, but they felt the need of a head to give cohesion to their efforts. With the army of the centre were many of the partisans of Bolívar. Backed by Arismendi they induced the army to demand his recall. Assisted by Petion and by Brion he organized another expedition, sailed from Haiti on the 21st December, and reached Barcelona at the same time as Arismendi, who brought a strong reinforcement from the island of Margarita.
But the Army of the Centre was no longer there. Piar had seen from the beginning that descents on the coasts and incursions on to the plains would lead to no satisfactory result, that the Orinoco was the true line of action, and that Guayana was the true base of operations. Bolívar, without any plan, had hovered round Caracas like a moth round a candle, and had burned his wings. Even Cedeño, the rude guerilla, had seen more clearly, as was shown by his success on the Upper Orinoco. Morillo himself had seen the same thing, and ere leaving New Granada had written to the Home Government, impressing upon them the importance of preserving the line of the Orinoco. Piar, after the victory of Juncal, found himself in command of an army, and at once proceeded to carry out his idea, thus saving the Patriot cause by forcing Bolívar to give up his pursuit of a phantom at Caracas. He left a small garrison ​at Barcelona, left the guerillas to defend the plains, and marched for Guayana.
The Royalists had a powerful flotilla on the Orinoco, and had fortified Angostura, which was the capital of Guayana. Piar cut down trees in the woods and made small boats, captured two boats from the enemy, and forced the passage of the Cauca in front of the Royalist camp. The guerillas, under Cedeño, swam the river on horseback, fighting with the crews of the Royalist gunboats as they passed, and on reaching the opposite shore charged upon the encampment, driving out the enemy before them.
Piar then marched upon Angostura, but was repulsed in every attempt to take the city by assault. Desisting for a time, he passed behind the city to the mission station at Coroní, where supplies were plentiful. One of his officers cut the throats of twenty-two friars who were given into his custody, and received no reprimand for his barbarity. In fact this cruel deed greatly increased the popularity of the Patriots in the country round about, as these friars were hated by their Indian neophytes.
At Coroní Piar established a regular administration, which was of great service to the Patriot cause, as the armies were by it afterwards regularly supplied with cattle and corn. By these successes Piar acquired great fame, which for a time eclipsed even that of Bolívar himself.
All the Patriot leaders had now done something except Bolívar, but when he assumed the command for the second time he was another man: more grave and more thoughtful than he had been. But he was not yet a true soldier; he still took audacity for inspiration, and launched forth on enterprises without first of all adapting the means to the end desired. Immediately on landing at Barcelona he issued a proclamation that he was about to liberate the Province of Caracas, and in twenty hours set forth on his expedition with a force of 600 men. A Royalist detachment lay in his way in an entrenched position on the river Unare. Without any reconnaissance Bolívar rushed at it. ​Forty horse fell upon his rear, threw his attacking column into confusion and totally destroyed it.
The Liberator was lost again. He was now in a worse plight than when he fled from Carúpano. He wrote to Piar and Cedeño to abandon their attempt on Guayana, and to Paez, Monagas, and Saraza that they should come to the protection of Barcelona. All this was utter folly, for Morillo, with 4,000 men, already covered the approach to Caracas, and La Torre, with Calzada, occupied the higher plains. Meantime he fortified himself in Barcelona, and mustered 600 more recruits. He turned the Franciscan convent into a regular citadel and sent for Mariño. Mariño, forgetting his jealousy, marched from Cumaná and joined him with 1,200 men. Bolívar then left 700 men in Barcelona, and naming Aragua as the point of concentration for the scattered forces of the Patriots, he went off to Guayana to persuade Piar to join him in an invasion of Caracas.
On the 7th April, 1817, Barcelona was attacked and taken by the Royalists, who cut the throats of the whole of the garrison, and in addition killed 300 old men, women, and sick. Mariño retreated to the peninsula of Paria and again declared himself independent, while Bermudez and other leaders got together 500 men and awaited orders from Bolívar on the plains.
The Liberator, attended by fifteen officers, met Piar near Angostura and found that he was already in possession of all the open country. The behaviour of the negro general was noble and patriotic. He showed no jealousy of his superior, who had come to seize the laurels which he had won in spite of him, and set to work to show him that Guayana must be the base of a successful campaign. The veil fell from the eyes of Bolívar; for the first time he saw before him the true theatre of the war. Leaving Monagas to hold the plains of Barcelona with his guerillas, he summoned Bermudez, Arismendi, and Saraza to join him, and the revolution was saved, thanks to Piar.
The Royalists held the coastline from Coro to Cumaná with the army of Caracas, 5,000 strong. The divisions of ​La Torre and Calzada, 4,000 picked troops, with 1,500 Llanero horse, had concentrated at Guadalito on the Apure, and in January had forced Paez to raise the siege of San Fernando. Paez sent a small force against them to draw them on. La Torre, who had no idea of his force, fell into the trap, and advanced with all his army on to a wide plain covered with dry reeds. Here the fugitives were joined by the main body, and facing about, charged furiously upon the Royalist cavalry, dispersed them completely, and then by repeated charges forced the infantry to form square. Then Paez, with fifty men whom he had detailed for the purpose set fire to the reeds all round them. Fortunately for them they found a marsh, into which they plunged, with the mud up to their waists, until the fire burned itself out, when they hurriedly retreated, leaving Paez in possession of the whole country round.
This famous deed of arms confirmed the authority of Paez over the Llaneros, and put him into a position to overrun the Province of Barinas. He concluded his glorious campaign by placing himself voluntarily at the orders of Bolívar, on condition that he might still protect the province he had conquered. Morillo, who was well aware of the importance of the Province of Guayana, detached La Torre with a strong force to drive out the Patriots, while he marched with 3,000 men to reduce the island of Margarita. La Torre embarked his force at San Fernando and descended the Apure and the Orinoco to Angostura, without meeting any resistance, and manoeuvred to draw Piar from the Missions of Coroní, hoping then to capture them by crossing the river at Angostura. But Piar divined his intentions, and leaving a reserve of horses on the right bank, he marched by the left bank to the vicinity of Angostura, then, after nightfall, leaving his camp-fires burning, he rapidly countermarched to his former position.
La Torre crossed the river as he had proposed, but was met by Piar at San Felix on the 11th April, 1817. The Spanish infantry, advancing in three columns with cavalry on the flanks, were received by volleys of musketry and ​showers of arrows. The Patriots, among whom were 1,200 Indians from the Missions, armed with bows and pikes, then charged, and a furious hand to hand fight ensued, in which the Spaniards were totally routed. La Torre escaped with seventeen men, but all the rest of his Spanish troops were killed. Piar spared the lives of all the Creoles among the Royalists who would join his ranks.
Bolívar, on his return from an expedition to the plains, where he had a narrow escape from falling in with Morillo, then on the march for Margarita, found himself at the head of a respectable army. All the Patriot leaders now recognised his authority except Mariño, who summoned a Congress at Cariaco, of which Zea and Admiral Brion were members. This Congress appointed an executive Junta, of which Bolívar was named one, and gave Mariño the title of general-in-chief.
Morillo soon put an end to this farce; he overran the peninsula of Paria, sank the Patriot flotilla, and dispersed Mariño's army, shooting all prisoners taken. Those who escaped, headed by Urdaneta and Colonel Sucre, a name soon to become famous, went to join Bolívar in Guayana, while Mariño, with a few followers, fled to Maturin.
Until the Patriots had the dominion of the Orinoco their tenure of Guayana was insecure. Bolívar armed and organized a flotilla of flecheras, but what was more to the purpose, Brion again came to assist him with five brigs, some schooners and more flecheras from Margarita. These vessels were commanded by a mulatto named Diaz.
One part of the Royalist flotilla was engaged in the defence of Angostura and Guayana Vieja, which still held out; the other guarded the mouth of the Orinoco under the protection of the forts. Diaz being sent by Brion to explore the position of this latter detachment, was attacked by sixteen Royalist flecheras, and lost two of his boats. With three flecheras which remained to him, he then attacked the Royalists, recovered his two boats, captured two of theirs, sank five, and compelled the rest to retreat in confusion. Brion then entered the river under full sail.
​At the approach of Brion, La Torre evacuated Angostura and was soon afterwards obliged by hunger to abandon Guayana Vieja, the last position held by the Royalists in Guayana. The remnant of his army, which now numbered only 600 men, he embarked on 32 vessels and gained the open sea in safety.
Piar, though he had recognized the authority of Bolívar, was in his heart disaffected and entered into a conspiracy with Mariño to restrict his authority by the appointment of a Junta of War; he also gained over Arismendi to his views. Bolívar prudently quelled this attempt at sedition by counsels and threats conveyed privately to the conspirators. Piar, in alarm, asked leave to withdraw from the army on pretext of illness, and retired to Upata, where he continued his intrigues till Bolívar wrote a friendly letter to him asking him to desist. He then fled to Maturin and concerted with Mariño a plan of independent action.
The position of Bolívar was now one of great danger; the troops of the army of Guayana were for the most part men of colour, Piar was very popular with them, and was accused of an intention to produce among them a mutiny of race. Bolívar gave orders to Cedeño to arrest Piar. The negro chieftain made no resistance, and was brought to Angostura for trial by a court-martial, under the presidency of Brion. He was sentenced to death for disobedience, sedition, and desertion.
Bolívar confirmed the sentence and he was shot in the great square of Angostura on the 16th October, 1817, dying as bravely as he had lived. If not an act of justice, this execution was warranted by necessity. It was the only means of preventing a civil war, which would have ended in the destruction of the army.
Mariño was still in arms at Cumaná with 400 men. Bolívar sent Bermudez with his corps to arrest him. Bermudez being an old friend of Mariño's, procured his banishment. Bolívar was now rid of opposition, but still his power was far from being well consolidated.