# The Theory of Mind of Roger Bacon/Introduction

Layout 2
INTRODUCTION.
In following the history of thought one comes soon to know those figures in the drama who pass as the men “beyond their time”; men whose minds are so endowed as to assimilate fairly well the learning inherited by their time, but especially gifted with an insight that carries them beyond their immediate age. It is with a mind of this type—a mind too far beyond its time—that we shall have to do in the pages that follow. For, that which is characteristic and original in Roger Bacon is not the system of his Philosophy, but rather his search for philosophic Method; and indeed a search in which appears an anticipation, now clear and again but vaguely suggested, of the trend of thought which in later centuries came to be called the Scientific Movement. His is not a mind that fits comfortably into the predominant tendencies of the thirteenth century, and it is therefore important that we should bear in mind throughout the type of mind with which we have to deal.
Living (1214-1294) in a century when the most varied determining factors were at work, his natural bent threw him into that development which might properly be called the Scientific Movement of his day. Dissatisfied with what seemed to him the unfruitful method of inquiry then prevailing, he bent his efforts rather to preliminary Method than to formulated System, to the foundations of knowledge rather than to the completed edifice. The world, he thought, was quite too full of vain attempts to systematize; overburdened with specimens of plebeian and trivial knowledge. “It is easy,” as he says, “for any man of learning to multiply without end truths that are paltry and commonplace, and to spin out and magnify what is of little value. But for the scholar this is an unworthy procedure, and the more so when the limits to his scholarly thought are fixed thereby.” And more than once he gives evidence of an intense disdain for the learning of the eminent scholars of his day. But his impatient dismissal of that learning ​is from no unworthy motive; it arises rather from a pure and whole-hearted love of Truth—indeed, the man is carried away with the fine enthusiasm of the devotee of Truth “writ large.” “I am after the treasures of the Sciences,” he continues, “the wonders of Truth whereof one excels a thousand of commonplace truths. I would diligently search out the dominion of the Sciences and of the Languages, and the other things needful to raise the edifice of Truth.” Bold words these are, but they well characterize the spirit and the labor of the man as we know it. And so it is not strange that the figure of Bacon has been drawn almost exclusively in these lines by the historians of Philosophy.
But while his mind was so full of this inquiry after method, one does wrong to suppose that it held nothing more; nothing more than a critical opposition to the conditions then prevailing in the scholarly world, and an attempt to sketch some plan for its regeneration. On the contrary, his works make it plain that he had pondered—and pondered deeply, shrewdly and seriously—the problems that engaged the thoughtful men about him; and that he had his own views, and very decided ones they were, concerning these problems. To be sure, that degree of system which characterizes the work of Thomas Aquinas we are not to expect; for only in Bacon’s Scriptum Principale could this have been furnished, and that great work, if ever consummated, does not exist for us now. But there is plain evidence of a system in the making, and it is our task to indicate some of its features, and to make clear his position with reference to certain of the problems which attracted the thinkers of his day.
Now in his work there is revealed a mind filled, out of all proportion to his time, with the conviction that the exactness of the mathematico-mechanical method alone could be fruitful in investigating the various departments of knowledge. And while there are ​many indications of this scientific character of our Author’s way of thinking, these lie for us too far afield. But there is one feature so salient, so vitally characteristic, and so important for his Philosophy of Mind, that we must devote our first efforts to a comprehensive study of it. And this is his theory of Species or Forms.
* ↑ Exact dates are not known. As late as 1220 is not impossible for birth (v. Br. 65), and he must have been living in 1292 (v. Br. Pref. iv., n. 2). Cf. Emile Charles, op. cit. pp. 4-6; 41, n. 2; 109, n. 4.
* ↑ See C. Bacumker: Die Europ. Philos. d. Mittelalt., in Kultur d. Gegenwart, T. I. abth. V. pp 327-331, Berlin 1909. Also M. de Wulf: Histoire de la Philos. med., secs. 116-119, prem ed. Paris 1905. The Bacumker-v, Hertling Series has served to make this plain. For indications in Bacon’s own works of the "scientific" movement under way, see e.g. I-116, cf. II-538 (cf. 134): Ep. 511; C. N. 9; Br. 42, 47, 113, 116, 317; II-202; Br. 359; 523-551, especially 533; 34; 41; 58, cf. 38; III: 33, 42.14, 70, 91, 229, 428, 469, 472; 434; 94.
* ↑ See Ep. 501.
* ↑ Thus, Br. 30 ff.; 325 ff.; C. N. 11 ff. Cf. Br. Pref. lvi. The Compendium Studii Theologise is promised, ed. H. Rashdall, for publication by the British Society of Franciscan Studies.
* ↑ See Ep. 503, cf. Br. 59, 42, 29ff.
* ↑ Cf. Ep. 501 with 498.
* ↑ Bacon stands pre-eminently for the restoration of learning, hence method is his first interest (Br. 60, cf. II—201), and conditions any systematic formulation (Ep. 501). The edifice to be raised he sketches in broad outline. Languages are the gateway to the wisdom of the past (Ep. 516); Mathematics is the foundation (I—103ff., cf. Br. 104ff.), as well as the gateway and key (I—97) of all the other Sciences. A universal hypothesis is found in his theory of Species (v. inf.). The field for urgent investigation, that of "Experimental Science" (II—167ff.). And the end of it all is Moral Philosophy and the regeneration of the world through the Church (Ep. 510, cf. 503; I—61, cf. 56. Not to be misunderstood; his conception is so broad as to be similar to that of the Positivists). But a project so grand required the assistance of a patron (Ep. 504, cf. I—300, 400) for its complete execution; and his Opus Majus, with its auxiliaries, the Opus Minus and Opus Tertium, pretended to be only a preamble (Ep. 498, 503, 507; II—298, 159; I—127; Br. 120). He was ready to produce the finished work under the proper conditions (Ep. 500, 501, cf. Br. 65), which he thought of as a Scriptum Principale.
* ↑ It is not probable that this projected work was ever actually completed. For its character see I—Introd. xliii. ff. Bacon often refers to it. Thus, e.g., Ep. 509; I—72, 305, 403; II—219, 377; Br. 56, 306; C. N. 10, 13, 105.
* ↑ For example: (a) His impatience with tke scholastic method ("more scholastico," Ep. 601), see above note 3. (b) His notion of Authority (e.g. I—3, 13ff., 15, 31; II—7, 12ff., 169). (c) The conception of a "Scientia Experimentalis" (II—167ff). (d) His expenditures for scientific work (Br. 59, cf. 65, 56). (e) Scientific spirit toward the writing of Geography (I—298ff., cf. 304, 338, 350, Br. 403). (h) His distinction between Astrology and Astronomy (I—238ff; Br. 268ff). (g) His insistence upon acquaintance with original sources, for biblical exegesis and for knowledge of Philosophy (I—66ff.; Br. 88ff., 330ff.).
* ↑ Bacon's conception of Law in the Universe is probably the most striking indication of his "scientific" penchant. His mind is firmly possessed with the thoroughgoing prevalence of Law, saving that his Universe remains one conserved by God and always subject to change by Him, and one in which man's soul is the object of central value. The reader who is interested may consult the following references: I—33, Br. 73, II—366, 385 (the unity of the University). II—503, 453, cf. 455 and 197 (Order). 1212, 214, 175, 43; I—216, 212; II—457 (ideological and mathematical conception). Br. 154; II—495, cf. 417, 436 (co-ordination of parts). II—215, cf. 1144, 127 (mechanical). I—122; 130; II—476; I—158; I—142; II—508 (special "laws"). I—137; II—37, 49 (laws of the propagation of Species. Cf. Aristotle, De Gen. et Corr., I—3, 318a, who fails to raise the generalization to the level of a law; cf. Bacumker, Prob. d. Mat. etc. 235, n. 3, and Zeller, D. Philos. d. Griech. 3te A., II—b. 391, n. 4). II—167-223 (the new field of Exp. Science, presupposes law throughout; for "autonomatice" cf. II—223, Ep. 510. Exp. Sc. and Mathematics and Optics are three of the four "Scientiae magnae," v. IzI222, cf. I—97; it proceeds by way of induction, v. II—173ff., cf. 201ff.). I—249ff. (attempt to put Astrology on an exact basis).