# The Philippine Islands, 1493–1898/Volume 8/Luzón menaced by Japanese

LUZON MENACED BY JAPANESE
PRECAUTIONS SUBMITTED TO THE WAR-OFFICIALS AND CERTAIN OF THE CABILDO OF THE CITY
That the citizens reserve their arms and food to as great an extent as possible, and, for possible contingencies, fowls and any other delicacies for the sick.
That the vessels coming from Xapon be examined carefully to see whether they bring in secret other articles than those which they announce publicly.
That twenty vessels—virocos and fragatas—well manned and equipped, be stationed in the river, below the artillery of the fort, in order to be used in carrying food, news, or messages to any point considered advisable; and that the other boats—champans, and all other vessels—not needed there, go up the river, where they can not be attacked by the enemy and used for making entrenchments by them, and in order that the seacoast may be kept clear for fighting and skirmishing.
That an immediate general review and muster be made of all the Spanish forces for the defense of this city; every one, not only of those who are paid, but of the old inhabitants, to be entered on the list, with his weapons.
That a proclamation be made throughout the ​coast of these islands that no viroco, banca, fragata, or other vessel leave the islands without permission; for, should they happen to meet the enemy, the latter would have news of affairs here.
Another proclamation that no citizen or anyone else may remove from this city gold, silver, property, wife, children, or household, or leave it without permission, under penalty of his life, and confiscation of the property thus removed, the latter to be applied to the expenses of war.
As we see our fears of the Xaponese enemy so confirmed in every direction, and that the German pirates are actually here and committing daily depredations along the coast, it seems that, in order to relieve ourselves from anxiety regarding so many Xaponese traders as are in the city, it would be advisable to assign them a settlement or location outside of the city, after first taking away all their weapons; and that they live there and sell their property. Likewise, the question of what shall be done with the Xaponese servants here should be considered, for there is a great number of them, and they have free entrance into our houses and this city; in this great danger they would be able to set fire to it, or cause other like damage.
Also, it will be advisable to send word throughout the coasts of Mindoro, Lunban, Valayan, Ylocos, and other districts that piratical enemies are about, so that they may be forewarned and that the natives may be protected.
That the coast be reconnoite red from Parañaque to Cavite, to ascertain whether the enemy have disembarked along it, and to discover what location and ​convenience there is for laying ambushes and keeping the enemy busy.
What is said here of our fears of Xapon should be understood as well of the Chinese, since we have so little confidence in them.
That word be sent to Gallinato to set a price on rice, and gather as much as possible, on the account of his Majesty's tributes there.
That four fragatas be fitted up and used for nothing else than to transport rice and food, putting each fragata under command of a thoroughly trustworthy master.
That the biscuit brought by the Chinese, should be taken, and also one-half the flour brought by this Xaponese ship, in order to give it a trial, at a moderate price; and if any well-preserved tunny-fish have been brought, they should be taken, although first it should be ascertained whether they have any yewtree or other poison in them.
Item: It appears advisable that two careful regidors of this city—in order that they may secure due respect, and act in the name of the city—should go to bring twelve or fourteen thousand fanégas of rice and one thousand five hundred jars of wine, from such district or districts as they may choose, for any necessities that might arise in general—namely, in city, monasteries, and hospitals; since all are sustained by alms, and, in such times, there is no possibility that these can be supplied or provided for them from any place. For this reason it would be advisable to levy an assessment among the citizens of this city; for, although there may be no necessity therefor, it can be sold, and paid to those who should have lent or furnished the said rice and wine, and ​up to the amount that shall have been lent—so that, in one way or another, having either consumed or sold it, each one shall receive satisfaction for his loan.
Item: It is advisable that, in case anyone of us, from myself and my son first, down even to the least, should be captured while fighting with the enemy, no one shall be ransomed, even though the enemy be willing to surrender him for a very small ransom; and that this be with no exceptions or with no equivocation, so that each one may fight with greater courage and resolution, preferring—though God grant that we come not to blows with the enemy—death rather than capture.
Item: whether it would be advisable that, in the tingues and mountainous districts near Manila, forts and strongholds be established, to which, if possible, there be a safe path from this city, and an entrance and exit therefrom to that place. Then, when occasion should arise, the women, children, old people, sick, and other non-combatants might be placed there; for, if they remained in the city, they would hinder us and cause us to starve, while there they will have more comfort and refreshment.
PRECAUTIONS SUBMITTED TO THE RELIGIOUS
In all present and future affairs, the chief remedy is to invoke God, endeavoring to placate Him by sacrifice and prayer, and beseeching Him to protect us by His powerful right hand. This duty devolves by special right upon the religious. Our duty is to threaten and strive to correct him who offends God.
Admitting that we expect outside enemies—and we have them among us, because of our little assur​ance that the natives, if they see themselves safe, will not rise and attack us, on which point will be discussed, in its proper place, whether it will not be advisable to collect the arquebuses given them during the war with the Çambales—the immediate question is whether it would be advisable to take some security from them, such as, for instance, the gold that they wear, and of which they should be possessed, so that, if they did not prove an aid to us, they should not prove harmful. Also, whether this gold should be deposited with the fathers who instruct them, so that the natives would understand that this action is taken only for security, and with no other intent; and whether this gold should be brought to Manila by the said fathers of the doctrina, and deposited in the fortress—that being the most secure place. Also it should be considered whether this taking their gold seems a harsh measure, and whether others easier and milder offer themselves—as the exemption of certain chiefs from tribute, and otherwise making much of them. But this race is so barbarous and ungrateful that, if they understand our necessity, and discover any weakness or fear in us, the majority of them will rebel against us, and we shall be compelled rather to deal with them as with enemies. Therefore, whatever our exigency, we must deal with them with the same courage, superiority, and firmness as in our most prosperous time itself; and we must assure them that our orders and requests are solely for their good, and by no necessity of ours. It appears to be advisable to order them that each chief send one of his sons with his gold, in order to watch it, and to prove that the rightful owner accompanies it.
Likewise: whether it will be advisable to have a ​quantity of rice, swine, fowls, and other food stored in certain parts of the mountains and tingues; for were the places where these are chiefly produced near this city, or in places easy of access to the enemy—and since it is supposed that they would come in force—in such case, it would not be difficult for them to seize this food and appropriate it to their own use, or burn it, for we could not have sufficient forces to divide them, or withdraw them from the defense of this city. And in this connection it is observed that it would be advisable to have the cattle-pastures—which are the support of this state, and the first thing that the enemy look for—established inland (as there is sufficient pasturage in all parts), with some guard. And since, if the enemy came, and we were actually confronted with the danger, it would be necessary for the Indians who have their villages and houses on the seacoast, or along the rivers or estuaries, where the enemy could penetrate easily, to retire inland to live, it seems that it would be advisable for the fathers of the doctrinas to have the natives warned and persuaded immediately to move to more retired and secure places; and that they should commence their sowing, since there are many virgin and unoccupied lands. Should such an event [the coming of an enemy] occur, then this would be already done; and if not, then they would lose nothing in harvesting their rice; for it would be necessary to abandon their hamlets and comforts, if the enemy did come. Furthermore, as these Indians are traders, as is known, and trade in rice and other products with this community, since they bring it from Otton, Camarines, Ylocos, and other places, this trade and provision would, if the enemy came, have to cease; and ​if these Indians remained among us and near their present abodes, they would consume our food, and we both would starve. In order to supply food, there is no better remedy than to commence to sow in distant and secure places, so that the natives may be safe, prepared, and forewarned, and that there may be abundance of provisions; since, by withdrawing from each varangay ten men, or the number that may be deemed sufficient, these fields and new settlements may be commenced.
Likewise should be considered whether it would be advisable to store the property of all the Sangleys in the stone warehouses of this city, where the goods might be kept safe, while the Sangleys could go outside of the city to build their houses, because of the great danger, lest by some fire-contrivance they should burn that Parian and a great part of the city. This is to be understood as proposed only if occasion should arise for us to take such measures. Likewise, it will be advisable to have the houses or churches which now are thatched with straw or nipa roofed with tiles; or else they might be destroyed, because of the manifest danger of being set afire with great facility upon any occasion.
Whether the encomenderos, because of these common necessities, should be allowed to collect from each tributario the value of two reals in rice and one real in one laying hen, or two chicks (male or female), or one cock, and the rice at its value among them. Also whether the encomendero should not store it in the city, in the house that he is actually living in; and whether, since the hen is obtained from the Indian as the tribute for one real, neither the hen, the male or female chicks, nor the cock—whichever ​the Indian gives in tribute, the matter being left to his choice—can be valued, sold, or bought for more than one real.
COMMUNICATION FROM THE GOVERNOR TO THE ECCLESIASTICS
Relation of the proposition made by Gomez Perez Dasmariñas, knight of the order of Santiago, and governor and captain-general in these islands, for the king, our sovereign, to the fathers provincial of the orders, and to other superiors, religious, and ecclesiastics at the meeting that he held with them; and the response of the said fathers.
Since my arrival in this kingdom, whose government and defense the king, our sovereign, was pleased to entrust to me—certainly a trust greatly disproportionate to my poor strength—I have ever watched over its conservation and perpetuation, as being a new land, in the midst of infidel and idolatrous enemies; and I have even peopled the greater part of it with them; and those so far away have a remedy and aid from their hardships and dangers. In this, God has willed, by His mercy, to plant His faith among and to enlighten those natives, by preaching to them, through His ministers, His holy law, with a zeal so fervid. And this is very different from other provinces in these regions, where there is likewise a Christian faith, and the name of church of the faithful; but their people are so remiss that they content themselves with furthering only their trading and commerce, caring only for their own individual aims and interests, and peradventure, to no ​little renunciation of the name of Christian, and causing it to be despised (as in Goa, Malaca, Macan, Maluco, and other parts)—who, satisfied with their own individual interests and business, do not, as here, regard the propagation of the holy gospel as their principal purpose. The maintenance of this is costing so many deaths of blessed fathers religious, who, in the planting of this vine in the Lord, completed so much toil and affliction with their lives, and who, in the conversion of souls, were laboring and overcoming all manner of danger and fatigue; so much blood and lives of so many honorable Spaniards, who have so happily ended their days in the furthering and building of this new church; and lastly, the vast amount of wealth and royal patrimony which his Majesty has expended, and is expending daily, in the prosecution of so glorious an object. This is none other than the exaltation of the Catholic faith, although it costs so much, as is known, that every year he expends money from his own house, while the temporal gain derived here is so small, and the expense and cost so great and excessive that, unless he lift up his eyes and behold the eternal reward which will result from this, he would have abandoned it already—and as, I believe, no other monarch whatever would have been so zealous for the honor of God, and the Catholic name, that he would not have abandoned it. Therefore we must consider prudently, and fear lest (may God preserve him to us for many years!) he might die, and be succeeded by one who, because of nearer cares and labors, will grow tired, and not take any care of the affairs of this state. Therefore, it is advisable that, should this happen, he [a successor] take and find it in such condition that, with the divine favor, it might, ​in its own strength, furnish its own defense from the injuries inflicted by weather and enemies; and, planning out its duty in the most secure manner, take courage, so far as it might, to construct a solid and durable fort. And although this care and vigilance have always been mine, and I have been especially attentive, from the time of my arrival, to look after the repair and fortification of this city, as being the head and court of this kingdom, and where, in whatever attack and emergency, the heart and principal strength of the defense of this kingdom must be located; and for this and for the conservation and perpetuation of this state, I am setting in force many activities and provisions that I have ordained and made in anticipation, which are to be seen and considered, conforming to and governing myself in this by the express orders given me by his Majesty—who for it points out to me, and advises me especially of certain hostile nations, with whom I must proceed carefully and cautiously: nevertheless, in the preparation and repairs of this city, the defense of the coasts and seas, in order to resist the enemies that might invade them, I would have displayed greater zeal and energy (both in these and in other provisions), had not the fathers, superiors of the orders, and other religious, in all or nearly all of them, opposed me by raising scruples, both in private conversations and in their pulpits and sermons, contradicting my authority and raising up obstacles. For indeed, in the building of the wall and fort of this city, the scruples that they have urged against me are well known—namely, that this country had no need of the defenses; that the Indian, to whom the country belongs, does not request them; and that the whole thing results in ​labor and oppression for the Indians. If galleys are built and equipped—even when by order of his Majesty, and for the defense of these seas and rivers, it has been said with accusations that for so poor a land this is a very heavy burden; and that these and other preparations cannot be made, except in a known extremity, and a manifest and evident danger. They have urged the same obstacle against me in equipping the galleys with seamen from among the Indians; and say that, in good conscience, this cannot be done; that although such natives otherwise may be the perpetual slaves of their chiefs, while here they are seamen for but three years, at the end of which they are freed, this is not sufficient to justify it, as the work is different, greater, and against natural right. They have even said that, if there is no other means to have galleys, there should be none, or that the king find the method, since, by virtue of the tribute that he levies, the defense of the land belongs to him. If order is given to gather the rice and other foods—so necessary a preparation in case of any adverse event—or that tackle, lines, and other supplies be made (for which the Indians are well paid for their work thereon), neither can this be done, because the Indians are deprived of food, and it is a great affliction. In short, there is contradiction and opposition to everything, and moreover, called by a name so serious as charge of conscience and salvation or condemnation of the soul. This, at the very least, however necessary may be the things ordained, renders lukewarm and greatly disheartens him who ordains them, and continues to warn him; so that it has happened to me that, by finding myself confused and with my hands almost tied by so many outcries in the pulpits, ​so many declarations, and so many acclamations and persuasions, I have been temporizing. And, little by little, this has increased, with that which the troubles and dangers were demanding in the procuring of repairs and remedies, until now when it is evident—by reason of the information that I have received of Xaponese enemies, which can have only a sure and certain foundation—that there will be no need of announcing to them, in the manifest danger that threatens, the arousing and quickening of the great and ardent desire that I have always had, that I might succeed in seeing this state in some condition of perfection, and in such repair and defense that it may await, with courage and confidence (after the protection of God), any attack whatever from surrounding enemies, who are known here—until, with the lapse of time, and God opening His hand more generously, and the city growing stronger with its power and forts, it may, not contenting itself with only conserving that conquered in the name of God and of its king, extend and enlarge itself, ever acquiring greater dominion and authority. For this purpose, there is no surer means than by repairs and preparations to have foreseen the danger and extremity to which we might come, before such danger comes to let fall its blow—since, if we await it until that time, the enemy will give us no opportunity to take counsel or protect ourselves, much less to make and prepare things, that, necessarily, to be of use, should have been made and prepared much beforehand; for the sword is worn many days in the belt, to but one that it proves its worth by its aid. It would not suffice for me then, when the enemy tried to kill me in the fort, to have my sword at home. Nor is it a dis​creet state which, when expecting enemies, waits until they are actually seen, before providing a fort, walls, artillery, galleys, arms, and other preparations [aparatos], which for that very reason are called preparations: because they have to be made ready beforehand [aparejados] many days, and even years. Accordingly, not only should the arms be ready, but the soldiers experienced in and accustomed to them; the galley not only finished, but the rower skilful at the oar; the food collected; and even the money, which is the sinew of war, ready and assigned for the expenses of war—in order that the enemy, who spies on all our actions, may see how well prepared and equipped we are, and be restrained and intimidated. For many times battles are fought as much by means of reputation as with forces, and since the future danger, when it is assured, must be held as present, in order to anticipate it and prepare for it, let us take counsel on the danger expected as if we had it already at the doors of our houses. And with the same diligence, let us set ourselves to the preparation, as if we actually saw the enemy on that sea. I would wish to be judged as too forearmed and assured, than, by negligence, over-confidence, and lack of diligence to lose one palmo of land, or one iota of reputation. This proposition, then, Fathers and Sirs, I have petitioned and prayed from your Paternities and Graces, that we might assemble here, since we all have equal share in the common safety, to discuss it; and so that, in the provisions and preparations that must be made, I may take action in everything with an easy conscience, which is the part pertaining to your Paternities; so that, with light and clearness on this point, I may prepare in time for the imminent ​danger that threatens. For if we waited until the extreme point of necessity was reached, innumerable difficulties would ensue, since what gradually, and in space of time, can be done easily, and with few people, who are well paid, must then be done at one stroke, with an infinite number of conscripted and unpaid people, and with intolerable confusion and hardship, besides many other annoyances, which are a great hindrance and obstacle to both soul and body, and to defense from the enemy, but which are avoided, if preparation be made beforehand.
[Endorsed on the front leaf: "For the religious."]
* ↑ The writer apparently confuses the Dutch with Germans.
* ↑ The reply here mentioned is not preserved with this document.
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