# Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization/Opinion of Justice Kavanaugh

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 19–1392
THOMAS E. DOBBS, STATE HEALTH OFFICER OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION, ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT [June 24, 2022]
Justice Kavanaugh, concurring.
I write separately to explain my additional views about why Roe was wrongly decided, why Roe should be overruled at this time, and the future implications of today’s decision.
I
Abortion is a profoundly difficult and contentious issue because it presents an irreconcilable conflict between the interests of a pregnant woman who seeks an abortion and the interests in protecting fetal life. The interests on both sides of the abortion issue are extraordinarily weighty.
On the one side, many pro-choice advocates forcefully argue that the ability to obtain an abortion is critically important for women’s personal and professional lives, and for women’s health. They contend that the widespread availability of abortion has been essential for women to advance in society and to achieve greater equality over the last 50 years. And they maintain that women must have the freedom to choose for themselves whether to have an abortion.
On the other side, many pro-life advocates forcefully argue that a fetus is a human life. They contend that all human life should be protected as a matter of human dignity ​and fundamental morality. And they stress that a significant percentage of Americans with pro-life views are women.
When it comes to abortion, one interest must prevail over the other at any given point in a pregnancy. Many Americans of good faith would prioritize the interests of the pregnant woman. Many other Americans of good faith instead would prioritize the interests in protecting fetal life—at least unless, for example, an abortion is necessary to save the life of the mother. Of course, many Americans are conflicted or have nuanced views that may vary depending on the particular time in pregnancy, or the particular circumstances of a pregnancy.
The issue before this Court, however, is not the policy or morality of abortion. The issue before this Court is what the Constitution says about abortion. The Constitution does not take sides on the issue of abortion. The text of the Constitution does not refer to or encompass abortion. To be sure, this Court has held that the Constitution protects unenumerated rights that are deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition, and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. But a right to abortion is not deeply rooted in American history and tradition, as the Court today thoroughly explains.
On the question of abortion, the Constitution is therefore neither pro-life nor pro-choice. The Constitution is neutral and leaves the issue for the people and their elected representatives to resolve through the democratic process in the ​States or Congress—like the numerous other difficult questions of American social and economic policy that the Constitution does not address.
Because the Constitution is neutral on the issue of abortion, this Court also must be scrupulously neutral. The nine unelected Members of this Court do not possess the constitutional authority to override the democratic process and to decree either a pro-life or a pro-choice abortion policy for all 330 million people in the United States.
Instead of adhering to the Constitution’s neutrality, the Court in Roe took sides on the issue and unilaterally decreed that abortion was legal throughout the United States up to the point of viability (about 24 weeks of pregnancy). The Court’s decision today properly returns the Court to a position of neutrality and restores the people’s authority to address the issue of abortion through the processes of democratic self-government established by the Constitution.
Some amicus briefs argue that the Court today should not only overrule Roe and return to a position of judicial neutrality on abortion, but should go further and hold that the Constitution outlaws abortion throughout the United States. No Justice of this Court has ever advanced that position. I respect those who advocate for that position, just as I respect those who argue that this Court should hold that the Constitution legalizes pre-viability abortion throughout the United States. But both positions are wrong as a constitutional matter, in my view. The Constitution neither outlaws abortion nor legalizes abortion.
To be clear, then, the Court’s decision today does not outlaw abortion throughout the United States. On the contrary, the Court’s decision properly leaves the question of abortion for the people and their elected representatives in the democratic process. Through that democratic process, the people and their representatives may decide to allow or limit abortion. As Justice Scalia stated, the “States may, if they wish, permit abortion on demand, but the Constitution ​does not require them to do so.” Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U. S. 833, 979 (1992) (opinion concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part).
Today’s decision therefore does not prevent the numerous States that readily allow abortion from continuing to readily allow abortion. That includes, if they choose, the amici States supporting the plaintiff in this Court: New York, California, Illinois, Maine, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Vermont, Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Michigan, Wisconsin, Minnesota, New Mexico, Colorado, Nevada, Oregon, Washington, and Hawaii. By contrast, other States may maintain laws that more strictly limit abortion. After today’s decision, all of the States may evaluate the competing interests and decide how to address this consequential issue.
In arguing for a constitutional right to abortion that would override the people’s choices in the democratic process, the plaintiff Jackson Women’s Health Organization and its amici emphasize that the Constitution does not freeze the American people’s rights as of 1791 or 1868. I fully agree. To begin, I agree that constitutional rights apply to situations that were unforeseen in 1791 or 1868—such as applying the First Amendment to the Internet or the Fourth Amendment to cars. Moreover, the Constitution authorizes the creation of new rights—state and federal, statutory and constitutional. But when it comes to creating new rights, the Constitution directs the people to the various processes of democratic self-government contemplated by the Constitution—state legislation, state constitutional amendments, federal legislation, and federal constitutional ​amendments. See generally Amdt. 9; Amdt. 10; Art. I, §8; Art. V; J. Sutton, 51 Imperfect Solutions: States and the Making of American Constitutional Law 7−21, 203−216 (2018); A. Amar, America’s Constitution: A Biography 285−291, 315−347 (2005).
The Constitution does not grant the nine unelected Members of this Court the unilateral authority to rewrite the Constitution to create new rights and liberties based on our own moral or policy views. As Justice Rehnquist stated, this Court has not “been granted a roving commission, either by the Founding Fathers or by the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment, to strike down laws that are based upon notions of policy or morality suddenly found unacceptable by a majority of this Court.” Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S. 238, 467 (1972) (dissenting opinion); see Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U. S. 702, 720–721 (1997); Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U. S. 261, 292–293 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring).
This Court therefore does not possess the authority either to declare a constitutional right to abortion or to declare a constitutional prohibition of abortion. See Casey, 505 U. S., at 953 (Rehnquist, C. J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part); id., at 980 (opinion of Scalia, J.); Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113, 177 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U. S. 179, 222 (1973) (White, J., dissenting).
In sum, the Constitution is neutral on the issue of abortion and allows the people and their elected representatives to address the issue through the democratic process. In my respectful view, the Court in Roe therefore erred by taking sides on the issue of abortion.
II
The more difficult question in this case is stare decisis—that is, whether to overrule the Roe decision.
The principle of stare decisis requires respect for the ​Court’s precedents and for the accumulated wisdom of the judges who have previously addressed the same issue. Stare decisis is rooted in Article III of the Constitution and is fundamental to the American judicial system and to the stability of American law.
Adherence to precedent is the norm, and stare decisis imposes a high bar before this Court may overrule a precedent. This Court’s history shows, however, that stare decisis is not absolute, and indeed cannot be absolute. Otherwise, as the Court today explains, many long-since-overruled cases such as Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537 (1896); Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45 (1905); Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U. S. 586 (1940); and Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U. S. 186 (1986), would never have been overruled and would still be the law.
In his canonical Burnet opinion in 1932, Justice Brandeis stated that in “cases involving the Federal Constitution, where correction through legislative action is practically impossible, this Court has often overruled its earlier decisions.” Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U. S. 393, 406−407 (1932) (dissenting opinion). That description of the Court’s practice remains accurate today. Every current Member of this Court has voted to overrule precedent. And over the last 100 years beginning with Chief Justice Taft’s appointment in 1921, every one of the 48 Justices appointed to this Court has voted to overrule precedent. Many of those Justices have voted to overrule a substantial number of very significant and longstanding precedents. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U. S. 644 (2015) (overruling Baker v. Nelson); Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483 (1954) (overruling Plessy v. Ferguson); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U. S. 379 (1937) (overruling Adkins v. Children’s Hospital of D. C. and in effect Lochner v. New York).
But that history alone does not answer the critical question: When precisely should the Court overrule an erroneous constitutional precedent? The history of stare decisis in ​this Court establishes that a constitutional precedent may be overruled only when (i) the prior decision is not just wrong, but is egregiously wrong, (ii) the prior decision has caused significant negative jurisprudential or real-world consequences, and (iii) overruling the prior decision would not unduly upset legitimate reliance interests. See Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 U. S. ___, ___−___ (2020) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part) (slip op., at 7−8).
Applying those factors, I agree with the Court today that Roe should be overruled. The Court in Roe erroneously assigned itself the authority to decide a critically important moral and policy issue that the Constitution does not grant this Court the authority to decide. As Justice Byron White succinctly explained, Roe was “an improvident and extravagant exercise of the power of judicial review” because “nothing in the language or history of the Constitution” supports a constitutional right to abortion. Bolton, 410 U. S., at 221−222 (dissenting opinion).
Of course, the fact that a precedent is wrong, even egregiously wrong, does not alone mean that the precedent should be overruled. But as the Court today explains, Roe has caused significant negative jurisprudential and real-world consequences. By taking sides on a difficult and contentious issue on which the Constitution is neutral, Roe overreached and exceeded this Court’s constitutional authority; gravely distorted the Nation’s understanding of this Court’s proper constitutional role; and caused significant harm to what Roe itself recognized as the State’s “important and legitimate interest” in protecting fetal life. 410 U. S., at 162. All of that explains why tens of millions of Americans—and the 26 States that explicitly ask the Court to overrule Roe—do not accept Roe even 49 years later. Under the Court’s longstanding stare decisis principles, Roe ​should be overruled.
But the stare decisis analysis here is somewhat more complicated because of Casey. In 1992, 19 years after Roe, Casey acknowledged the continuing dispute over Roe. The Court sought to find common ground that would resolve the abortion debate and end the national controversy. After careful and thoughtful consideration, the Casey plurality reaffirmed a right to abortion through viability (about 24 weeks), while also allowing somewhat more regulation of abortion than Roe had allowed.
I have deep and unyielding respect for the Justices who wrote the Casey plurality opinion. And I respect the Casey plurality’s good-faith effort to locate some middle ground or compromise that could resolve this controversy for America.
But as has become increasingly evident over time, Casey’s ​well-intentioned effort did not resolve the abortion debate. The national division has not ended. In recent years, a significant number of States have enacted abortion restrictions that directly conflict with Roe. Those laws cannot be dismissed as political stunts or as outlier laws. Those numerous state laws collectively represent the sincere and deeply held views of tens of millions of Americans who continue to fervently believe that allowing abortions up to 24 weeks is far too radical and far too extreme, and does not sufficiently account for what Roe itself recognized as the State’s “important and legitimate interest” in protecting fetal life. 410 U. S., at 162. In this case, moreover, a majority of the States—26 in all—ask the Court to overrule Roe and return the abortion issue to the States.
In short, Casey’s stare decisis analysis rested in part on a predictive judgment about the future development of state laws and of the people’s views on the abortion issue. But that predictive judgment has not borne out. As the Court today explains, the experience over the last 30 years conflicts with Casey’s predictive judgment and therefore undermines Casey’s precedential force.
In any event, although Casey is relevant to the stare decisis analysis, the question of whether to overrule Roe cannot be dictated by Casey alone. To illustrate that stare decisis point, consider an example. Suppose that in 1924 this Court had expressly reaffirmed Plessy v. Ferguson and upheld the States’ authority to segregate people on the basis of race. Would the Court in Brown some 30 years later in ​1954 have reaffirmed Plessy and upheld racially segregated schools simply because of that intervening 1924 precedent? Surely the answer is no.
In sum, I agree with the Court’s application today of the principles of stare decisis and its conclusion that Roe should be overruled.
III
After today’s decision, the nine Members of this Court will no longer decide the basic legality of pre-viability abortion for all 330 million Americans. That issue will be resolved by the people and their representatives in the democratic process in the States or Congress. But the parties’ arguments have raised other related questions, and I address some of them here.
First is the question of how this decision will affect other precedents involving issues such as contraception and marriage—in particular, the decisions in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479 (1965); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U. S. 438 (1972); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S. 1 (1967); and Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U. S. 644 (2015). I emphasize what the Court today states: Overruling Roe does not mean the overruling of those precedents, and does not threaten or cast doubt on those precedents.
Second, as I see it, some of the other abortion-related legal questions raised by today’s decision are not especially difficult as a constitutional matter. For example, may a State bar a resident of that State from traveling to another State to obtain an abortion? In my view, the answer is no based on the constitutional right to interstate travel. May a State retroactively impose liability or punishment for an abortion that occurred before today’s decision takes effect? In my view, the answer is no based on the Due Process Clause or the Ex Post Facto Clause. Cf. Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U. S. 347 (1964).
Other abortion-related legal questions may emerge in the ​future. But this Court will no longer decide the fundamental question of whether abortion must be allowed throughout the United States through 6 weeks, or 12 weeks, or 15 weeks, or 24 weeks, or some other line. The Court will no longer decide how to evaluate the interests of the pregnant woman and the interests in protecting fetal life throughout pregnancy. Instead, those difficult moral and policy questions will be decided, as the Constitution dictates, by the people and their elected representatives through the constitutional processes of democratic self-government. *** The Roe Court took sides on a consequential moral and policy issue that this Court had no constitutional authority to decide. By taking sides, the Roe Court distorted the Nation’s understanding of this Court’s proper role in the American constitutional system and thereby damaged the Court as an institution. As Justice Scalia explained, Roe “destroyed the compromises of the past, rendered compromise impossible for the future, and required the entire issue to be resolved uniformly, at the national level.” Casey, 505 U. S., at 995 (opinion concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part).
The Court’s decision today properly returns the Court to a position of judicial neutrality on the issue of abortion, and properly restores the people’s authority to resolve the issue of abortion through the processes of democratic self=government established by the Constitution.
To be sure, many Americans will disagree with the Court’s decision today. That would be true no matter how the Court decided this case. Both sides on the abortion issue believe sincerely and passionately in the rightness of their cause. Especially in those difficult and fraught circumstances, the Court must scrupulously adhere to the Constitution’s neutral position on the issue of abortion.
Since 1973, more than 20 Justices of this Court have now ​grappled with the divisive issue of abortion. I greatly respect all of the Justices, past and present, who have done so. Amidst extraordinary controversy and challenges, all of them have addressed the abortion issue in good faith after careful deliberation, and based on their sincere understandings of the Constitution and of precedent. I have endeavored to do the same.
In my judgment, on the issue of abortion, the Constitution is neither pro-life nor pro-choice. The Constitution is neutral, and this Court likewise must be scrupulously neutral. The Court today properly heeds the constitutional principle of judicial neutrality and returns the issue of abortion to the people and their elected representatives in the democratic process.
* ↑ The Court’s opinion today also recounts the pre-constitutional common-law history in England. That English history supplies background information on the issue of abortion. As I see it, the dispositive point in analyzing American history and tradition for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment inquiry is that abortion was largely prohibited in most American States as of 1868 when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, and that abortion remained largely prohibited in most American States until Roe was decided in 1973.
* ↑ In his dissent in Roe, Justice Rehnquist indicated that an exception to a State’s restriction on abortion would be constitutionally required when an abortion is necessary to save the life of the mother. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113, 173 (1973). Abortion statutes traditionally and currently provide for an exception when an abortion is necessary to protect the life of the mother. Some statutes also provide other exceptions.
* ↑ I also agree with the Court’s conclusion today with respect to reliance. Broad notions of societal reliance have been invoked in support of Roe, but the Court has not analyzed reliance in that way in the past. For example, American businesses and workers relied on Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45 (1905), and Adkins v. Children’s Hospital of D. C., 261 U. S. 525 (1923), to construct a laissez-faire economy that was free of substantial regulation. In West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U. S. 379 (1937), the Court nonetheless overruled Adkins and in effect Lochner. An entire region of the country relied on Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537 (1896), to enforce a system of racial segregation. In Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483 (1954), the Court overruled Plessy. Much of American society was built around the traditional view of marriage that was upheld in Baker v. Nelson, 409 U. S. 810 (1972), and that was reflected in laws ranging from tax laws to estate laws to family laws. In Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U. S. 644 (2015), the Court nonetheless overruled Baker.
* ↑ As the Court today notes, Casey’s approach to stare decisis pointed in two directions. Casey reaffirmed Roe’s viability line, but it expressly overruled the Roe trimester framework and also expressly overruled two landmark post-Roe abortion cases—Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U. S. 416 (1983), and Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U. S. 747 (1986). See Casey, 505 U. S., at 870, 872−873, 878−879, 882. Casey itself thus directly contradicts any notion of absolute stare decisis in abortion cases.
* ↑ To be clear, public opposition to a prior decision is not a basis for overruling (or reaffirming) that decision. Rather, the question of whether to overrule a precedent must be analyzed under this Court’s traditional stare decisis factors. The only point here is that Casey adopted a special stare decisis principle with respect to Roe based on the idea of resolving the national controversy and ending the national division over abortion. The continued and significant opposition to Roe, as reflected in the laws and positions of numerous States, is relevant to assessing Casey on its own terms.