# A manual of moral theology for English-speaking countries/Book 2

BOOK II
ON CONSCIENCE
CHAPTER I
THE NOTION OF CONSCIENCE
I. THE voice of conscience is the authoritative guide of man's moral conduct. Not that the individual conscience is independent of all authority; if the individual conscience is right, it proclaims the duty of submitting to all properly constituted authority, and especially to the supreme and absolute authority of God. It is, as theologians are fond of saying, the herald or ambassador of God to each individual, making known to him and applying the eternal law of God to the conduct of life.
Although the term is also used with other meanings, here conscience signifies a dictate of the practical reason deciding that a particular action is right or wrong. The process by which we arrive at this judgement of the practical reason may be put in the form of a syllogism. The major premise will be some general law of conduct, the minor will be its application to the particular case, the conclusion will be the judgement, which is nothing else but conscience. Thus when a precept has been given by one who is in lawful possession of authority, the dictate of conscience is implicitly arrived at somewhat as follows: I must obey all who command me with lawful authority. A. B. commands me with lawful authority. Therefore I must obey him is the conclusion and the dictate of conscience.
2. Conscience is said to be certain, dubious, or probable, as the motive on which it is grounded is morally certain, doubtful, or only probable.
A right conscience is in accordance with the eternal law of morality; an erroneous conscience gives a false instead of a true judgement. If the mistake could and ought to have been avoided by the agent who has a false conscience, the conclusion is vincibly erroneous; otherwise it is invincibly erroneous.
A strict conscience is one which is apt to decide that there is an obligation when none exists, or a greater obligation than there really is; a lax conscience, on the contrary, is apt to ​deny an existing obligation or to make it less than it is in fact; a scrupulous conscience without sufficient reason apprehends sin where there is none.
A dictate of conscience which precedes the action, judging it to be right or wrong, is said to be antecedent; that which follows an action, approving it as rightly done, or condemning it as wrong and disturbing the inward peace of the soul, is consequent.
CHAPTER II
ON THE CERTAIN CONSCIENCE
I. CERTAINTY in general is a firm assent of the mind to something known, without the fear of mistake. In mathematics and in other branches of exact science we can often attain absolute certainty, which rests on the evident truth of the principles which are employed to arrive at it. For anyone who is capable of following the demonstration there can be no manner of doubt that the angles of a triangle are together equal to two right angles. In the science of morality we have frequently to be content with a lower degree of certainty than this; there is often some obscurity about the principles to be applied, and human acts are not the matter of necessary and unvarying law. We have to be content with what is called moral certainty; but this again is of various degrees. I am morally certain of the existence of Berlin, though I never saw the city. Any person who doubted of its existence would be thought to be insane. The grounds on which the judgement that Berlin exists are based are so many and so strong that they leave no room for prudent doubt in the matter. In such cases we have perfect moral certainty. In other cases I may be conscious that mistake is possible but not probable, as when a man has been condemned on evidence which has satisfied a jury of intelligent men. In such cases if there can be no prudent doubt about the justice of the verdict I have moral certainty of an imperfect but real kind. If I could not safely rely in guiding my conduct on such a degree of certainty, I should have to abstain from action altogether. Ordinarily greater certainty cannot be obtained in human affairs.
2. In order to act lawfully and rightly, I must have at least moral certainty of the imperfect kind that the proposed action is honest and right. This degree of certainty will be sufficient, for ordinarily no greater can be had, as we have just seen. It is also required for right action; for if I am not at least to this extent morally certain that my action is right, I am conscious that it may (be wrong. In |this case I am bound to pause, and satisfy myself that it is right before acting; for if I do not do so my will is ready to embrace what may be wrong ​I am ready to do the action whether it is in right order or not. But such a will is malicious; it is not firmly set on doing what is right; and sin is thereby committed.
A subjectively certain conscience then, which tells me without prudent doubt that the action is right, is required for lawful action; " All that is not of faith is sin," as St Paul says. It will be sufficient if we have imperfect moral certainty, as we have seen.
3. If I have this imperfect moral certainty that my action is right, I am justified in acting, and if with such certainty my conscience tells me that I am bound to act, I must do so, even though my conscience be erroneous. For my action is morally good if my will be good. My will is good when it tends to a good object as represented by my intellect, not as it is in itself. But if my will follows my conscience and determines on what it prescribes, my will then tends to a good object as represented by my intellect and is a good will. So that even though my conscience be erroneous, I am justified in following it, and I am bound to follow it when it prescribes any action to be performed.
This is true whenever I have a certain conscience that is, when I have no doubt or suspicion about the honesty of my action, even though my conscience be erroneous. If I were the wilful cause of my conscience being in error by not taking means to inform it correctly, then any objectively wrong action that I perform is voluntary in the cause, and so far imputable to me, but here and now I must follow my conscience.
I am said to be bound by my conscience because it compels me to follow it under pain of doing wrong, committing sin, and being exposed to the pangs of remorse. It binds me also in the name of God, whose will it makes known to me. It speaks, therefore, with the authority of God, it sternly bids me follow his behests, and it reproves me with the authority of a superior if I neglect to follow its promptings. As representing the will of God its authority is greater, as St Thomas teaches, than that of any merely earthly superior.
4. The question as to whether in any particular case a person acted with an erroneous conscience is a question of fact, which only he and God can decide. Still, following approved theologians, we may make use of certain presumptions drawn from the nature of things and from experience. It may be admitted that ignorant and dull people may have ​an invincibly erroneous conscience concerning the malice of merely internal sins committed in thought only; but we should except efficacious desires to do what is known to be wrong. A person can scarcely know that the external action is morally wrong and be ignorant of the malice of an effective desire to commit such an action.
Again, the first principles of morality, which are certain general axioms of conduct, such as, Do to others as you would be done by, can scarcely fail to be known by anyone who has the use of reason. Even the secondary principles of the moral law, or the precepts of the Decalogue, are usually known by those who have attained the use of reason among civilized men; if in any case there is ignorance of them, it is vincible ignorance, and so more or less culpable. Theologians readily admit the possibility of an invincibly erroneous conscience concerning the application of the general principles of morality to concrete cases. The theological disputes which they chronicle are proof of the fact.
CHAPTER III
ON A DOUBTFUL CONSCIENCE
i. WHEN we have some knowledge of a matter which does not amount to a certainty, various states of mind may be distinguished with respect to the mind's inclination to form a judgement about the matter in question. If no reasons are known for either affirming or denying a proposition, or if there are as weighty reasons for one as for the other, the mind suspends judgement, and is said to be in doubt. Doubt, then, is the suspending of judgement about a matter apprehended by the mind. A doubtful conscience, therefore, will be a suspension of judgement about the lawfulness of some action.
If some slight reason draws the mind in one direction, we have then a suspicion about the matter. If there be a good solid reason or reasons for forming a judgement in a particular sense though there is not sufficient ground for certainty, and it is felt that the opposite may be true, the mind then forms an opinion on the matter.
Theologians distinguish a negative from a positive doubt. There is negative doubt when the mind suspends judgement for want of reasons on one side or on the other; if there is an apparent equality of reasons on either side, the doubt is positive. In this chapter we confine our attention to negative doubt, the sense in which the term doubt is usually understood in theology. A speculative doubt has reference to some question in the abstract apart from present action, as when I doubt whether it is allowed to fish on Sundays, though I have no intention of actually fishing: a practical doubt has reference to the lawfulness of an action which there is question of performing here and now.
A doubt about law has reference to the law's existence or its interpretation; a doubt about fact has reference to fact.
2. It is not lawful to perform an action with a practically doubtful conscience as to whether the action is right or wrong. The reason is obvious; for, as we saw in the last chapter, we must have a certain conscience that the action is right before ​performing it, otherwise sin is committed, and one who has a doubtful conscience has not a certain conscience.
The sin which is committed by one who acts with a practically doubtful conscience as to whether the action is right takes its species and gravity from the doubtful conscience. If I eat meat with a practical doubt as to whether it is not forbidden on that day by the Church, I commit a sin of the same kind and malice as if I ate meat knowingly on a day of abstinence. The reason is obvious from what was said about a certain conscience. Trie species of a sin and its malice depend upon the mind and will of the agent, and when one acts with a doubtful conscience the will is prepared to commit a sin of the kind apprehended, and by that very act it commits the sin.
3. As long as the conscience is in a state of practical doubt, one may abstain from action altogether, or do what in any case would be licit. There is no danger of sin if, while doubting whether it is allowed to eat meat, one abstains from food altogether, or eats only what is allowed on days of abstinence. The axiom—In dubio pars tutior est sequenda—is to be taken in this sense. An effort may also be made to resolve the doubt by making inquiries of those who know, by consulting authorities, or by making use of certain principles of conduct which are approved by law and right reason. In this manner a certain conscience may frequently be formed.
4. There are various principles or axioms suitable for the purpose of forming one's conscience when in doubt. They are for the most part taken from canon law, but they are also used in questions belonging to the forum of conscience.
In dubio melior est conditio possidentis.—Possession is properly a physical fact, and consists in the corporal detention of a thing. In a wider sense rights are objects of possession, as a right of way, or the right to one's liberty; so that if one's liberty has hitherto been unrestricted, it is said to be in possession. The very fact of possession gives a right to continue in possession unless there is an adverse and stronger claim. There is also in the possessor a presumption of title to possess, for all men are jealous of their rights, and usually do not allow their property or rights to be held by others as owners. If, then, I am in possession of some object or right, and a doubt supervenes as to whether I am entitled to possession in the case or not, the question may be solved in the forum of conscience as it would be in a court of law, by applying the maxim—In dubio melior est conditio possidentis.
​If, then, a doubt arises as to whether I have said my breviary, I must say it, for the law is in possession; if on the contrary a doubt comes into my mind as to whether I have taken food after midnight, I may go to Holy Communion, because my right to receive is in possession.
5. In dubio standum est pro eo pro quo stat praesumptio. A presumption is a probable conjecture about an uncertain event. The conjecture is such as would be formed in the circumstances by a man of ordinarily sound judgement and prudence. This is called a praesumptio hominis to distinguish it from a praesumptio juris, which the law itself sanctions in certain circumstances. Thus, according to the old canon law, if the parents of a boy and girl promised them in marriage and they did not express dissent, there was a, praesumptio juris that they gave their consent, and they were reputed betrothed to each other. This praesumptio juris admits, indeed, of proof to the contrary; in cases where proof to the contrary is not admitted, there is praesumptio juris et dejure, as it is called.
When in doubt, I can frequently form my conscience by the aid of this axiom. If, for example, I am in the habit of saying my little hours after breakfast, and some evening a doubt occurs to me whether I said them on that day, I need not say them then, the presumption being that I said them in the morning as usual, and In dubio standum est pro eo pro quo stat praesumptio.
6. In dubio factum non praesumitur sed probari debet. Similarly, Nemo praesumitur mains donee probetur. These axioms are understood of some principal fact, the fact of baptism, for example, or the commission of a crime, which obviously should not be presumed. If on the contrary the principal fact is certain, and a doubt arises as to some accessory circumstance, then other axioms should be used to guide the conduct: as, In dubio omne factum praesumitur recte factum; or, In dubio praesumitur factum quod de jure faciendum erat; or, In dubio standum est pro valore actus. So that if I am certain that I baptized a child, but begin to doubt whether I anointed the head with chrism, according to the ritual, I am not bound to supply the ceremony afterwards.
CHAPTER IV
ON THE PROBABLE CONSCIENCE
I. A SUBJECTIVELY certain conscience that the proposed action is lawful is required before performing any action, as we have already seen. A great difficulty a difficulty which has to be faced by all moralists arises from this principle in consequence of the uncertainty as to whether many actions in the concrete are lawful. One need not consult the works of moralists to find out what difference of opinion there is among experts on many practical questions of morals; It will be sufficient to consult one's own experience. In the conflict of rights and duties, and in the obscurity which exists as to the application of moral principles to concrete cases, we are frequently at a loss as to what course duty prescribes. The cases which are constantly submitted to the decision of courts of law, but which also belong to morality, illustrate the familiar truth that opinion and not certainty is very often alone attainable in the field of conduct. But if this be the case, what is a conscientious man to do? He finds himself in a difficulty; what the right thing to do under the circumstances may be is not clear. A young man has promised to marry a girl somewhat his inferior in social position; they are both satisfied that the union would be a happy one for both, but the young man's parents will not hear of the thing, and strictly forbid him to see the girl again. Must he obey his parents, or may he follow his inclinations and keep his promise? He consults those whose knowledge and judgement he respects, and they give him contrary decisions. He goes to recognized authorities on morals, and finds the same difference of opinion.
This example is but a type of innumerable questions which constantly arise in everyday life. Is it possible to lay down any universal principle for the solution of such doubtful cases, so as to be able to act with a certain conscience?
Catholic theologians answer this question in the affirmative, but they are not agreed as to what the principle is. A probabiliorist would tell the young man that he must obey his parents and break off the engagement unless the opinion that he may marry the girl in spite of the prohibition is distinctly ​more probable than the opposite. An equiprobabilist would say that he may marry the girl if the weight of opinion is fairly equal on either side. A probabilist would maintain that he may marry her if there is a solidly probable opinion which favours that course. The terms are technical, and their meaning should be carefully studied.
An opinion, as we have already gathered from St Thomas, is an adhesion of the mind to one proposition, but with a consciousness that the opposite may be true.
A probable opinion is one which rests on good and solid grounds, such as would incline a man of prudence and judgement to embrace it. If the intrinsic reasons of the opinion are the grounds for embracing it, we have an intrinsic probability; if authority is the ground, we have an extrinsic probability.
A more probable opinion is one which rests on weightier reasons than the opposite, but which leaves the opposite still probable.
A very probable opinion rests on such solid grounds that the opposite is not considered solidly probable.
A morally certain opinion excludes even slight probability in the opposite; it is an adhesion of the mind to a truth without any fear of mistake.
2. In this difficult question, the Catholic Church so far has been content to condemn extreme views, and allows her children to follow any of the moderate systems mentioned above. Alexander VIII condemned rigorism, which required direct moral certainty in all cases about the lawfulness of an action, and denied that it is ever lawful to follow' an opinion which is very probable among several. Laxism was condemned by Innocent XI, since it taught that one might lawfully act on a slight probability. The systems which are known as Probabiliorism, Equiprobabilism, and Probabilism all have their adherents; the Catholic moralist is free to follow whichever he wishes.
To us it seems that probabilism is the true system, and if it be rightly understood, as it is taught by its moderate supporters, and not as it is misinterpreted by its opponents, we are convinced that it will recommend itself to practical common sense.
Its maxim may be formulated thus: When there is only question of committing sin or not, it is lawful to follow a solidly probable opinion, even though the opposite may be more probable.
​The wording of the formula should be carefully weighed. The words " when there is only question of committing sin or not " limit the application of the principle to cases where the only question is whether by following such a course sin will be committed because a certain law, human or divine, will be broken. Probabilism, then, cannot be applied to cases where the validity of an act is in question, where some end must be obtained, or where there is question of the certain right of some other person which must be respected. In all these cases we are bound to safeguard the end by taking means that are sure and not merely probable. These are not so many exceptions to the use of probabilism; there is a certain obligation to use secure means to obtain the end in view in such cases, and so there can be no question as to whether probabilism is applicable or not. This will explain why Innocent XI condemned a proposition which asserted that it is not unlawful for a minister of the sacraments to follow a probable opinion about their validity when administering them; and another, which taught that a judge might use probabilism in giving sentence in a court of law; and a third, which excused an infidel who followed a probable opinion and remained in infidelity. In all these cases there is not merely question of sin, but the certain rights of others are at stake, or there is question of an end which cannot lawfully be exposed to risk.
Again, the words " it is lawful to follow a solidly probable opinion " should be noted. It is not a question as to what is more perfect, what the noble and generous thing to do may be. The rule merely asserts that there is no obligation under pain of sin to follow the more perfect course, if in the case there be one.
Finally, the words are added " even though the opposite may be more probable." For the greater probability of the other view does not make it certain, nor is the supposed greater probability a sure guarantee that the more probable view is the more true. It very frequently happens that an opinion which is considered more probable at one time is thought less probable or altogether improbable at another. Moreover, degrees of probability are very difficult to determine. What seems more probable to one theologian seems less so to another, or even to the same at a different time. And even if it be granted that one opinion is certainly and absolutely more probable, the opposite may for all that remain solidly prob​able. With these provisos the proof of the thesis is not very difficult.
3. Whenever there is a solidly probable opinion that a particular action is lawful, there is no certain law forbidding one to perform it. But it is lawful to do what no certain law forbids. Therefore when there is only question of committing sin or not, it is lawful to follow a solidly probable opinion even though the opposite may be more probable.
The major premise of this syllogism is obvious. No opinion can be probable which has a certain law against it. The certain law imposes a certain obligation. On the other hand, if an opinion is probable and acknowledged as such by five or six experts, good, prudent, and learned men, it is impossible that there should be a law contrary to the probable opinion. Or if there is such a law, the law cannot be sufficiently promulgated, or else it would be known to the experts. But a law which is not sufficiently promulgated does not bind; ignorance excuses from its transgression. The minor premise, too, is clear. We are at liberty to do what no certain law prohibits. If indeed I doubt whether an action is forbidden, I am bound to inquire and satisfy my conscience on the point. But whenever there is a probable opinion, this inquiry has been already made by experts, and with the result that no law forbidding the action can be discovered, otherwise the opinion will not be probable. The conclusion then is certain.
Therefore in cases where there is a probable opinion, or a positively doubtful conscience, I may arrive at a certain conscience required for lawful action by reasoning implicitly somewhat as follows: The opinion is probable that this action which I am contemplating is lawful for example, marrying according to my promise a good and suitable person in spite of the prohibition of my parents which indeed does not seem to be reasonable. But if this is so, there is no law forbidding me to do it; I violate no obligation in marrying her. Therefore I may marry her.
4. The proof of probabilism from what we must call at least the toleration of the Church for some centuries will perhaps appeal still more strongly to Catholic minds.
The guardianship of faith and morals has been committed to the Church by her divine Founder. He has promised that she shall not fail in the task committed to her even to the end of time. But if a false doctrine is widely held and publicly taught for some centuries in the Church, and she does not condemn it, does not protest against it, the promise of Christ ​fails to be effective, which is impossible. So that probabilism, which has been widely held and publicly taught for some centuries as a theory of morals without being condemned by the Church, cannot be a false system. A third argument may be drawn from the approbation of the works of St Alphonsus Liguori by the Holy See. The decree of May 18, 1803, on the revision and approbation of the works of St Alphonsus with a view to his beatification, gives a list of his works and expressly states that after careful examination nothing reprehensible was found in them. Among the works mentioned is a dissertation on the moderate use of a probable opinion when it conflicts with a more probable opinion on the other side, published in 1755. In this dissertation St Alphonsus clearly and ably defends and proves probabilism; he never withdrew or corrected this dissertation, though to save his Congregation and the doctrine he afterwards modified the statement of his views. He followed probabilism in his choice of opinions while writing his great work on moral theology which subsequently, though he admitted corrections in details, remained substantially the same.
5. It has been already pointed out that, although we may lawfully adopt and follow a probable opinion, there is no obligation of doing so, and it will frequently be more perfect to follow an opposite opinion. It is not intended to propose probabilism as the ideal of Christian conduct; we go to ascetical writers and elsewhere for that. Probabilism is especially an instrument of moral theology, to be wisely and prudently used by the confessor in the confessional, as the doctor uses his medicines in the sick room.
6. Theologians warn us that only experts can judge of the intrinsic probability of an opinion. Others must be content to be able to discover extrinsic probable opinions. They can do this by consulting approved authors. If they find that an opinion is held as probable by five or six authors of repute, and it has not become obsolete by new legislation, by decrees of the Holy See, or by the progress of theological opinion, they may act upon it as solidly probable. The Sacred Penitentiary, July 5, 1831, declared that a professor of theology or a confessor might follow in practice the opinions of St Alphonsus. In thus adopting extrinsically probable opinions with regard to conduct, the priest or the layman only does what anyone ​not skilled in law would do in a difficult legal case he would consult an expert whom he could trust.
7. A limitation to the use of probabilism is mentioned by theologians. When one has decided on any course of conduct, he must loyally adhere to the consequences which the decision involves. He must not use a probable opinion to gain an advantage, and then in the same matter adopt the contrary opinion in order to shake off a burden. And so when a probable opinion has been adopted in favour of the validity of a will in my behalf, I cannot also adopt a contrary opinion that the will is invalid and refuse to pay the legacies.
CHAPTER V
ON THE SCRUPULOUS CONSCIENCE
I. A SCRUPLE is a groundless fear that there is sin where there is none. Hence a scrupulous conscience (the term is ordinarily used of the habit, not of the single act) is one which from some frivolous reason judges that a harmless action is sinful. A person, moreover, is not said to be scrupulous because of a scrupulous conscience in a single instance; the term is used of one who, either in some matter or in all his actions, is apt to be disturbed with unfounded scruples.
2. An upright, straightforward, and well-balanced conscience is what it is desirable to have, and so a scrupulous conscience is in itself a bad habit. A scrupulous conscience may indeed be useful for a time to purify the conscience, and to make it more delicate and sensitive to even the appearance of evil; it is sometimes permitted by God for this and other reasons. But if it continues for a long time it causes great trouble of mind, injures the health of body and soul, and sometimes drives its poor victim to desperation, so that he gives up all attempt to be good, or even loses his senses.
3. The confessor, then, should know how to recognize a scrupulous person, what the causes of scruples are, and what are the suitable remedies in particular cases.
The prudent confessor will not at once believe a penitent to be scrupulous merely because he says that he is. Some people who are anything but pious think that it is a fine trait of character to be scrupulous, or they honestly think that they are scrupulous for want of self-knowledge, and tell the confessor so. He would obviously make a great mistake if he applied the rules for scruples to such cases. Nor can the confessor safely conclude that a penitent is scrupulous because he mentions in confession minute faults which common penitents hardly trouble themselves about. He may have before him a soul of great purity of conscience and great sanctity, who is in no sense scrupulous. Until he has heard a penitent's confession more than once the confessor will usually suspend his judgement. When the penitent keeps confessing things which are not sinful, when he says that he is troubled with doubts and ​anxieties about his actions, when he is not satisfied with his confessions but keeps coming back, or running from one confessor to another; when he will not follow the advice the confessor gives him, but remains obstinately attached to his own will, the confessor may usually conclude that his penitent is really scrupulous.
4. If he can find out how the scruples arose, the confessor will sometimes be able to apply a suitable remedy at once. They may arise from a variety of causes: from reading ascetical or theological books which are too rigorous or which are not suited to the person's state of conscience; from associating with scrupulous people and contracting their malady; from a naturally weak judgement or from bad health; from immoderate and indiscreet fervour and spiritual pride; from the temptation of the devil, who wishes to ruin his victim, and from the permission of God, who for his own wise ends permits the evil for a time.
5. The confessor will then seek to apply a proper remedy. He may ask the scrupulous penitent whether he is prepared to follow his advice and direction. If the penitent will not do this, but goes from one confessor to another, the confessor will be able to do no good with him, and had better tell him to find someone whose directions he will follow. With one who trusts him and tries to follow his advice, the confessor should be kind and patient; he should give short, clear rules to the penitent, without going into further explanations; he should tell him to despise his scruples and to go against them, boldly to do what he groundlessly imagines to be sinful; as of course he is justified in doing, for he knows that his fear of sin in the matter is an idle scruple. The confessor should tell him not to mention his scruples in confession, and when great harm seems to threaten the penitent from his scruples he may tell him not to say anything about them, even if on occasions he has really committed sins; for scruples may be a valid reason for not making a full confession. The confessor will exhort him to keep body and soul fully occupied in interesting work and never to be idle; an idle brain is the devil's workshop.
Scruples commonly have reference either to past confessions, suggesting that they were not properly made, and were bad, or to temptations against some virtue, as faith or purity; or to one's actions in general, insinuating that they are sinful because not done with a proper motive, or for some other reason. With regard to the first class, the confessor will ask ​the penitent whether he is certain that he left out of his confession some grave matter, or that it was sacrilegious. Unless he can say that he is certain, he will tell him not to think of the past, to leave it with our good God, but to direct his thoughts to the present and future. Even if he says that he is certain that something serious was left out, or that he had not proper sorrow for his sins, the confessor after once or twice hearing him will forbid him to mention the past again.
One tempted against faith, purity, charity, or any other virtue, should be told that temptation is not sin, that sin is in the free consent of the will to evil, and that the best way to conquer such temptations is to despise them, to think as little as possible about them, and not to mention them in confession.
The confessor should tell a penitent who through scruples thinks he commits sin in every action to act boldly and fearlessly, that he may do whatever is not obviously forbidden, and that it is impossible for one who wishes to serve God to commit sin, especially grave sin, without being well aware of it.
* ↑ Rom. xiv 23.
* ↑ St Thomas, 2-2, q. 70, a. 2.
* ↑ St Thomas, 1-2, q. 19, a. 5.
* ↑ De Verit., q. 17, a. 5.
* ↑ St Thomas, 1-2, q. 94, aa. 4, 6.
* ↑ St Thomas, 2-2, q. 2, a. i.
* ↑ Cf. Irish Eccles. Record, Sept. 1899.
* ↑ Cap. un., de despon. impub. in Sexto.
* ↑ Prop. 3, condemned December 7, 1690.
* ↑ Prop. 3, condemned March 2, 1679.
* ↑ Decree March a, 1679, props. I, a, 4
* ↑ St Alphonsus, Dissertation, anno 1755, n. 10.
* ↑ Cf. Rodriguez, On the Practice of Christian and Religious Perfection, i, c. 8.
* ↑ Reuter, Neo-Confessarius, n. 262.