# Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.

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Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968), is a United States Supreme Court case which held that Congress could regulate the sale of private property in order to prevent racial discrimination: "42 U.S.C. § 1982 bars all racial discrimination, private as well as public, in the sale or rental of property, and that the statute, thus construed, is a valid exercise of the power of Congress to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment." Warning: template has been deprecated.

## Concurring Opinion

    Douglas

## Dissenting Opinion

    Harlan
United States Supreme Court
392 U.S. 409
Jones et ux. v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. et al.
Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
No. 645. Argued: April 1-2, 1968. --- Decided: June 17, 1968.
Petitioners, alleging that respondents had refused to sell them a home for the sole reason that petitioner Joseph Lee Jones is a Negro, filed a complaint in the District Court, seeking injunctive and other relief. Petitioners relied in part upon 42 U.S.C. § 1982, which provides that all citizens "shall have the same right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property." The District Court dismissed the complaint and the Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that § 1982 applies only to state action and does not reach private refusals to sell.
Held:
    1. Congress' enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, containing in Title VIII detailed housing provisions applicable to a broad range of discriminatory practices and enforceable by a complete arsenal of federal authority, had no effect upon this litigation or upon § 1982, a general statute limited to racial discrimination in the sale and rental of property and enforceable only by private parties acting on their own initiative. Pp. 413-417.
    2. Section 1982 applies to all racial discrimination in the sale or rental of property. Pp. 417-437.
       (a) Section 1982 has previously been construed to do more than grant Negro citizens the general legal capacity to buy and rent property free of prohibitions that wholly disable them because of their race. Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24. Pp. 417-419.
       (b) The question whether purely private discrimination unaided by any governmental action violates § 1982 remains one of first impression in this Court. Hurd v. Hodge, supra; Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323, the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3; and Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, distinguished. Pp. 419-420.
       (c) On its face, the language of § 1982 appears to prohibit all discrimination against Negroes in the sale or rental of property. Pp. 420-422.
       (d) The legislative history of § 1982, which was part of § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, likewise shows that both Houses of Congress believed that they were enacting a comprehensive statute forbidding every form of racial discrimination affecting the basic civil rights enumerated therein—including the right to purchase or lease property—and thereby securing all such rights against interference from any source whatever, whether governmental or private. Pp. 422-436.
       (e) The scope of the 1866 Act was not altered when it was re-enacted in 1870, two years after ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. Pp. 436-437.
       (f) That § 1982 lay partially dormant for many years does not diminish its force today. P. 437.
    3. Congress has power under the Thirteenth Amendment to do what 42 U.S.C. § 1982 purports to do.
       (a) Because the Thirteenth Amendment "is not a mere prohibition of State laws establishing or upholding slavery, but an absolute declaration that slavery or involuntary servitude shall not exist in any part of the United States," Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20, it has never been doubted "that the power vested in Congress to enforce the article by appropriate legislation," ibid., includes the power to enact laws "operating upon the acts of individuals, whether sanctioned by State legislation or not." Id., at 23. See Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207. P. 438.
       (b) The Thirteenth Amendment authorized Congress to do more than merely dissolve the legal bond by which the Negro slave was held to his master; it gave Congress the power rationally to determine what are the badges and the incidents of slavery and the authority to translate that determination into effective legislation. Pp. 439-440.
       (c) Whatever else they may have encompassed, the badges and incidents of slavery that the Thirteenth Amendment empowered Congress to eliminate included restraints upon "those fundamental rights which are the essence of civil freedom, namely, the same right... to inherit, purchase, lease, sell and convey property, as is enjoyed by white citizens." Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 22. Insofar as Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1, suggests a contrary holding, it is overruled. Pp. 441-443.
379 F. 2d 33, reversed.
Samuel H. Liberman argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the brief were Arthur Allen Leff and Samuel A. Chaitovitz.
Israel Treiman argued the cause and filed a brief for respondents.
Attorney General Clark argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, urging reversal. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Pollak, Louis F. Claiborne, and Brian K. Landsberg.
Briefs of amici curiae, urging reversal, were filed by Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General, Charles A. O'Brien, Chief Deputy Attorney General, and Loren Miller, Jr., and Philip M. Rosten, Deputy Attorneys General, for the State of California; by Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, and Carl Levin, Assistant Attorney General, for the State of Michigan (Civil Rights Commission); by Norman H. Anderson, Attorney General, C.B. Burns, Jr., Special Assistant Attorney General, and Louis C. Defeo, Jr., and Deann Duff, Assistant Attorneys General, for the Missouri Commission on Human Rights; by Richard W. Mason, Jr., Ilus W. Davis, and Joseph H. McDowell for Kansas City, Missouri, and Kansas City, Kansas; by Leo Pfeffer and Melvin L. Wulf for the American Civil Liberties Union et al.; by Sol Rabkin, Robert L. Carter, Joseph B. Robison, Arnold Forster, Paul Hartman, and Beverly Coleman for the National Committee against Discrimination in Housing et al.; by John Ligtenberg and Andrew J. Leahy for the American Federation of Teachers et al.; by James I. Huston for the Path Association; by William B. Ball for the National Catholic Conference for Interracial Justice et al.; by Charles H. Tuttle and Robert Walston Chubb for the National Council of Churches of Christ in the United States et al.; by Edwin J. Lukas for the American Jewish Committee et al., and by Henry S. Reuss, pro se, and Phineas Indritz for Henry S. Reuss.
Brief of amici curiae, urging affirmance, was filed by George Washington Williams and Thomas F. Cadwalader for the Maryland Petition Committee, Inc., et al.

## Notes

This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
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