OpenLLM-France/wikimedia huggingface dataset:
# Karadzole v. Artukovic/Opinion of the Court

* Court Documents
* Case Syllabus
* Opinion of the Court
United States Supreme Court
355 U.S. 393
Karadzole v. Artukovic
The petition for writ of certiorari is granted. The judgment is vacated and the case is remanded to the United States District Court for the Southern District of California for the discharge of the writ of habeas corpus and the remand of respondent to the custody of the United States Marshal in order that a hearing be held under 18 U.S.C. § 3184, 18 U.S.C.A. § 3184.
Mr. Justice BLACK and Mr. Justice DOUGLAS dissent.

## Notes

This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
Public domainPublic domainfalsefalse
# Kaplan v. Tod

* related portals: Supreme Court of the United States.
* sister projects: Wikidata item.
United States Supreme Court
267 U.S. 228
Kaplan v. Tod
Argued: Jan. 26, 1924. --- Decided: March 2, 1925
Messrs. James Marshall and Elijah N. Zoline, both of New York City, for appellant.
Mr. Asst. Atty. Gen. Donovan, for appellee.
Mr. Justice HOLMES delivered the opinion of the Court.

## Notes

This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
Public domainPublic domainfalsefalse
# Karachi Agreement

Text of the agreement signed between Pakistan and Azad Kashmir Governments in March 1949. The Agreement was signed by the following:
* Honourable Mushtaque Ahmed Gurmani, Minister without Portfolio, Government of Pakistan.
* Sardar Mohammed Ibrahim Khan, the president of Azad Kashmir .
* Choudhry Ghulam Abbas, Head of All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference.
This was the only Kashmiri political party on this side of the cease fire line at that time, and the Agreement it was persuaded to sign, very seriously limited the role of Azad Kashmir Government in the Kashmiri freedom struggle. Therefore it is no surprise that respective governments of Azad Kashmir have very little or no interest in the freedom of the State of Jammu and Kashmir.
Text
A. Matters within the purview of the Government of Pakistan.
* Defence (as modified under....).
* Foreign policy of Azad Kashmir.
* Negotiations with the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan.
* Publicity in foreign countries and in Pakistan.
* Co - ordination and arrangement of relief and rehabilitation of refugees.
* Co - ordination of publicity in connection with plebiscite.
* All activities within Pakistan regarding Kashmir such as procurement of food, civil supplies running of refugee camps and medical aid.
* All affairs of Gilgit - Ladakh under the control of Political Agent.
B. Matters within the purview of Azad Kashmir Government.
* Policy with regard to administration of AK territory.
* General supervision of administration in AK territory.
* Publicity with regard to the activities of the Azad Kashmir Government and administration.
* Advice to the honourable Minister without Portfolio with regard to negotiations with United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan.
* Development of economic resources of AK territory.
C. Matters within the purview of the Muslim Conference.
* Publicity with regard to plebiscite in the AK territory.
* Field work and publicity in the Indian occupied area of the State.
* Organisation of political activities in the AK territory and the Indian occupied area of the State.
* Preliminary arrangements in connection with the plebiscite.
* Organisation for contesting the plebiscite.
* Political work and publicity among the Kashmiri refugees in Pakistan.
* Advise the honourable minister without Portfolio with regard to the negotiations with the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan.
# Karadzole v. Artukovic

* related portals: Supreme Court of the United States.
* sister projects: Wikipedia article, Wikidata item.
United States Supreme Court
355 U.S. 393
Karadzole v. Artukovic
Messrs. Lawrence S. Lesser and George E. Danielson, for petitioners.
Solicitor General Rankin, for the United States.
Mr. Robert T. Reynolds, for respondent.
On petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
PER CURIAM.

## Notes

This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
Public domainPublic domainfalsefalse
# Kaplan v. Lehman Brothers

* related portals: Supreme Court of the United States.
* sister projects: Wikidata item.

## Dissenting Opinion

    Warren
United States Supreme Court
389 U.S. 954
Kaplan v. Lehman Brothers
See 390 U.S. 912, 88 S.Ct. 813.
Anthony Bradley Eben and Peyton Ford, for petitioners.
Hammond E. Chaffetz, for respondents Lehman Brothers and others.
John T. Chadwell and Richard M. Keck, for respondent New York Stock Exchange.
Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.

## Notes

This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
Public domainPublic domainfalsefalse
# Keely v. Moore

* related portals: Supreme Court of the United States.
* sister projects: Wikidata item.
United States Supreme Court
196 U.S. 38
Keely v. Moore
Argued: November 8, 9, 1904. --- Decided: December 19, 1904
Messrs. C. C. Cole, Hugh T. Taggart, and Leo Simmons for plaintiff in error.
Messrs. D. W. Baker and Wilton J. Lambert for defendant in error.
Statement by Mr. Justice Brown:
This was an action of ejectment brought in the supreme court of the District by grantees of the heirs at law of William Thomson against Joseph H. Moore and the firm of Thomas J. Fisher & Company, agents of Mary Cecelia and Georgiana Hawkes Thomson, of the county of Kent, England, devisees under the will of William Thomson, to recover possession of an undivided ninety-one one hundredths of certain real estate in the city of Washington. Upon the trial it was admitted that William Thomson died in Southampton, England, in 1887, seised of the lot in question; that he was born in, and was a citizen of, the United States, leaving no issue or descendants. Plaintiffs had acquired the title of the heirs at alw, and the defendants were in possession of the lot as life tenants under his alleged will.
The validity of the will and the due execution thereof were contested by the plaintiffs for reasons hereinafter indicated in the opinion. The trial resulted in a verdict for the defendants, upon which judgment was entered, and affirmed by the court of appeals. 22 App. D. C. 9.
Mr. Justice Brown delivered the opinion of the court:

## Notes

This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
Public domainPublic domainfalsefalse
# Keely v. Ord

* related portals: Supreme Court of the United States.
* sister projects: Wikidata item.
1788.
KELLY verʃus ORD et al.
I
The Defendants gave in evidence, that a certain George Henry was two thirds owner of the cargo of which this Rum was a part ; and, in order to prove that the Rum was purchafed of George Henry, that he had made a charge in Henry's books, by the direction of Henry, of the fale of the Rum to the Defendants.
To this, it was objected, that the books of Henry fhould be produced to fhew the entry ; and that, otherwife, the evidence of the Clerk to the contents of the books ought not to be admitted.
And of this opinion was the court ; but, at the requeft of the counfel for the Defendants, they referved the point.
# Keely v. Sanders

* related portals: Supreme Court of the United States.
* sister projects: Wikidata item.
United States Supreme Court
99 U.S. 441
Keely v. Sanders
ERROR to the Supreme Court of the State of Tennessee.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
Mr. William M. Randolph for the plaintiff in error.
There was no opposing counsel.
MR. JUSTICE STRONG delivered the opinion of the court.

## Notes

This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
Public domainPublic domainfalsefalse
# Keen v. Keen/Opinion of the Court

* Court Documents
* Case Syllabus
* Opinion of the Court
United States Supreme Court
201 U.S. 319
Keen v. Keen
Argued: and submitted March 7, 8, 1906. --- Decided: April 2, 1906
The court deduced, as a conclusion of law from certain facts found, that no marriage at common-law had ever existed between Eli Keen and Phoebe, a former slave of Eli's father, and that the former died without leaving any child or children or other descendants capable of inheriting from him, and hence that plaintiff was entitled to recover possession of an undivided half of the lands as his wife. No ceremonial marriage was claimed.
It is difficult to see any facts upon which to found our jurisdiction of the case. No Federal question appears in the pleadings or in the testimony, a transcript of which is contained in the record. The first glimmer of one appears in the motion for a new trial in the circuit court, in which it is charged that the judgment deprived the defendant of his property without due process of law, and also denied him the equal protection of the laws, contrary to the 14th Amendment to the Constitution. But no allegation is made as to why the judgment had this effect. No notice was taken of the constitutional point in the opinion of the supreme court, although the writ of error from this court was allowed by the presiding judge. In the assignment of errors filed in this court the only error charged is that, although the court below found there was no common-law marriage between Eli Keen and Phoebe, yet, in its special findings, it found all the facts required to establish such common-law marriage between them, and that from the facts so found the law presumed a null and void marriage between said Eli Keen and Phoebe Keen, the issue of which was capable of inheriting, under the statutes of Missouri. Rev. Stat. § 2918. No reference is made to the Constitution of the United States in this connection. In addition to this, the question what facts constitute a common-law marriage is purely a local one. We have searched the record for a Federal question, but have found none. The writ of error is, therefore, dismissed.

## Notes

This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
Public domainPublic domainfalsefalse
# Keels v. Central Railroad Company of South Carolina/Opinion of the Court

* Court Documents
* Case Syllabus
* Opinion of the Court
United States Supreme Court
147 U.S. 374
Keels v. Central Railroad Company of South Carolina
As the facts of this case are substantially the same as the one just decided, (13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 348,) the decision must be the same.
The decree of the court below will therefore be reversed, and the case remanded, with directions to dismiss the bill.
Samuel Lord and Ira B. Jones, for appellants.
J. T. Barron and Henry A. M. Smith, for appellee.
Mr. Justice BROWN.

## Notes

This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
Public domainPublic domainfalsefalse
# Keen v. Keen

* related portals: Supreme Court of the United States.
* sister projects: Wikidata item.
United States Supreme Court
201 U.S. 319
Keen v. Keen
Argued: and submitted March 7, 8, 1906. --- Decided: April 2, 1906
This was an action of ejectment begun by Sophronia K. Keen in the circuit court of St. Charles county against Ellis Keen, to recover a tract of land in that county to which plaintiff averred she was lawfully entitled. The petition was in the usual form of a declaration in ejectment, and the answer a general denial.
Eli Keen was the common source of title, plaintiff claiming one half of the land, subject to the payment of debts, under § 2939 of the Revised Statutes of Missouri, upon the ground that she was the widow of Eli Keen, who died in 1901, leaving, as plaintiff alleged, no children capable of inheriting.
Defendant claimed to be the legitimate child of an alleged common-law marriage between Eli Keen, a white man, and Phoebe, a negro woman.
There was judgment below for the plaintiff, which was affirmed by the supreme court. 184 Mo. 358, 83 S. W. 526.
Mr. David P. Dyer for plaintiff in error.
Messrs. Charles W. Bates, John F. McGinnis, and C. W. Wilson for defendant in error.
Statement by Mr. Justice Brown:
Mr. Justice Brown delivered the opinion of the court:

## Notes

This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
Public domainPublic domainfalsefalse
# Keenan v. Burke

* related portals: Supreme Court of the United States.
* sister projects: Wikidata item.
United States Supreme Court
342 U.S. 881
Keenan v. Burke
Argued: and submitted Nov. 5, 1951. ---
On Writs of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
Mr. Archibald Cox, Cambridge, Mass., for petitioners.
Messrs. James W. Tracey, Jr., John H. Maurer, Philadelphia, Pa., for respondent.
PER CURIAM.

## Notes

This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
Public domainPublic domainfalsefalse
# Keenan v. Burke/Opinion of the Court

* Court Documents
* Case Syllabus
* Opinion of the Court
United States Supreme Court
342 U.S. 881
Keenan v. Burke
Argued: and submitted Nov. 5, 1951. ---
The judgments are reversed. Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 68 S.Ct. 1252, 92 L.Ed. 1690.
Memorandum by Mr. Justice MINTON, dissenting.
These cases only illuminate the error of this Court in Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 68 S.Ct. 1252, 92 L.Ed. 1690. I would not compound the error. I would overrule Townsend rather than send these petitioners back to be proceeded against nicely. Their guilt is not questioned. They say, 'If we had only had a lawyer, maybe we would not have received such long sentences.' Yet, the sentencing judge gave two of the petitioners much shorter terms than the maximum provided by statute. They complain not so much of the sentences they received but the manner in which they received them.
Admit the sentencing judge was facetious, even that he bulldozed the petitioners-he sentenced them all within the limits authorized by law. Maybe the judge's conduct called for a curtain lecture. At most, that was a matter for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, and that court did not see even an error of state law in the judge's conduct, let alone a federal constitutional question. We sit only to determine federal constitutional questions, not to scold state trial judges. It is utterly incomprehensible to me how a judge can commit a denial of federal due process by being facetious in the sentencing of defendants where the sentences he imposes are within the limits prescribed by statute. I would affirm.

## Notes

This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
Public domainPublic domainfalsefalse
# Love v. Griffith

* related portals: Supreme Court of the United States.
* sister projects: Wikidata item.
United States Supreme Court
266 U.S. 32
Love v. Griffith
Argued: Oct. 6, 1924. --- Decided: Oct 20, 1924
Mr. R. D. Evans, of Waco, Tex., for plaintiffs in error.
Mr. Justice HOLMES delivered the opinion of the Court.

## Notes

This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
Public domainPublic domainfalsefalse
# Love v. Griffith/Opinion of the Court

* Court Documents
* Case Syllabus
* Opinion of the Court
United States Supreme Court
266 U.S. 32
Love v. Griffith
Argued: Oct. 6, 1924. --- Decided: Oct 20, 1924
This is a bill in equity alleging that the plaintiffs are qualified electors residing in Houston, Texas, and of the Democratic political faith; that on January 27, 1921, the City Democratic Executive Committee of Houston made and published a rule that negroes would not be allowed to vote in the Democratic City Primary Election to be held on February 9, 1921; that the Committee and Judges of Election threatened to enforce the rule, contrary to the Constitution of the United States; and praying an injunction to restrain the Committee and Judges of Election from carrying out their threats. The bill was filed on February 3, 1921. On February 5, 1921, it was demurred to generally, the demurrer maintaining that the rule did not infringe the Fifteenth Amendment. On February 7, 1921, the demurrer was sustained and the bill was dismissed with costs. The plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals, but that Court held that at the date of its decision, months after the election, the cause of action had ceased to exist and that the appeal would not be entertained on the question of costs alone. It therefore dismissed the appeal with costs. Error is assigned here on the ground that the Fifteenth Amendment prohibits the discrimination which was made the basis of the complaint, and that the decision denied the plaintiffs their constitutional rights.
When as here there is a plain assertion of federal rights in the lower court, local rules as to how far it shall be reviewed on appeal do not necessarily prevail. Davis v. Wechsler, 263 U.S. 22, 24, 44 S.C.t. 13, 68 L. Ed. 143. Whether the right was denied or not given due recognition by the Court of Civil Appeals is a question as to which the plaintiffs are entitled to invoke our judgment. Ward v. Love County, 253 U.S. 17, 22, 40 S.C.t. 419, 64 L. Ed. 751. If the case stood here as it stood before the court of first instance it would present a grave question of constitutional law and we should be astute to avoid hindrances in the way of taking it up. But that is not the situation. The rule promulgated by the Democratic Executive Committee was for a single election only that had taken place long before the decision of the Appellate Court. No constitutional rights of the plaintiffs in error were infringed by holding that the cause of action had ceased to exist. The bill was for an injunction that could not be granted at that time. There was no constitutional obligation to extend the remedy beyond what was prayed.
Decree affirmed.

## Notes

This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
Public domainPublic domainfalsefalse
# Love v. Pullman Co.

* related portals: Supreme Court of the United States.
* sister projects: Wikipedia article, Wikidata item.
United States Supreme Court
404 U.S. 522
Love v. Pullman Co.
Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
No. 70-5033 Argued: November 16, 1971 --- Decided: January 17, 1972
Procedure whereby the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), after having received a written charge from a complainant of discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, orally referred it to the appropriate state agency, waited until that agency had terminated its jurisdiction, and then formally filed the charge on behalf of the complainant without having obtained an additional written charge within 30 days of the termination of the state proceedings held to satisfy the requirements of §§ 706 (b) and (d) of the Act, which have the purpose of affording state agencies prior opportunity to consider discrimination complaints and ensuring their prompt filing and disposition by the EEOC on exhaustion of the state remedy. Pp. 523-527.
430 F. 2d 49, reversed.
STEWART, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all members joined except POWELL and REHNQUIST, JJ., who took no part in the consideration or decision of the cases.
Hugh J. McClearn argued the cause for petitioner in No. 70-5033. With him on the brief was Gail L. Ireland. Deputy Solicitor General Wallace argued the cause for the United States et al. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Griswold, Acting Assistant Attorney General Norman, David L. Rose, Stanley Hebert, and Julia P. Cooper.
Edward C. Eppich argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent in both cases.
Nathaniel R. Jones filed a brief for the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People as amicus curiae urging reversal in No. 70-5033.

## Notes

* ↑ Together with No. 70-37, United States et al. v. Pullman Co., also on certiorari to the same court.
This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
Public domainPublic domainfalsefalse
# Love v. Flahive (206 U.S. 356)

* related portals: Supreme Court of the United States.
* sister projects: Wikidata item.
United States Supreme Court
206 U.S. 356
Love v. Flahive
Argued: April 29, 1907. --- Decided: May 27, 1907
Messrs. C. B. Nolan and C. E. Pew in support of petition.
Mr. Justice Brewer delivered the opinion of the court:

## Notes

This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
Public domainPublic domainfalsefalse
# Love v. Flahive (206 U.S. 356)/Opinion of the Court

* Court Documents
* Case Syllabus
* Opinion of the Court
United States Supreme Court
206 U.S. 356
Love v. Flahive
Argued: April 29, 1907. --- Decided: May 27, 1907
A petition for rehearing calls our attention to a misstatement in the opinion. We said that 'it appears from the complaint and exhibits that during the time that these proceedings were pending in the Land Department, Love made a sale to James Rundell,' etc. The facts are that in May, 1882, Love settled upon and occupied the tract in controversy with the purpose of entering it as a homestead; that the land was then unsurveyed public land; that it was not surveyed until 1888, and that on January 2, 1889, plaintiff for the first time filed in the land office an application for an entry. It further appears that the sale to Rundell was made in September, 1883, after the original settlement by the plaintiff, while the land was unsurveyed, and before the application to enter. Hence it is not strictly true that while 'proceedings were pending in the Land Department Love made a sale,' for there was nothing of record or on file in that Department until after the entry.
Now the plaintiff contends that, conceding that there was a sale, and that thereby the plaintiff relinquished the right of entry which he had acquired by his settlement, yet thereafter, without having abandoned the possession, he filed his application in the land office; that that application must be considered as an entirely new proceeding, initiated by one in actual possession, desiring to take the land as a homestead, and that it is error, and error of law, to adjudge it vitiated or affected by the prior sale.
Conceding that the effect of a sale prior to the application projects into the case a question of law, we are still of opinion that the decision of the Secretary was right, and that the award of the patent to Mrs. Flahive must be sustained. A sale made by a party who is in possession of a tract of public land with an intent thereafter to enter it as a homestead is equivalent to a relinquishment of his right to enter, and the Department may properly treat him as having no further claims upon the land. He may not sell, and still have the rights of one who has not sold. He does not, by merely continuing in possession, create a new right of entry as against the party in whose favor he has relinquished his right.
We are of opinion, therefore, that the sale in 1883 was rightfully held by the Department to estop the plaintiff from subsequent entry of the land; at least, as against one who was a purchaser from his vendee.
The petition for rehearing is denied.

## Notes

This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
Public domainPublic domainfalsefalse