# The passing of Korea/Chapter 9

CHAPTER IX THE ASSASSINATION OF THE QUEEN
The King had taken oath to govern according to enlightened principles, and had exhorted his officials to adhere strictly to the reform programme, protesting that if he himself failed to do so it would be an offence against Heaven. The Taiwunkun had retired from public life, but as his son, the brother of the King, was Minister of the Household, and his grandson Yi Chunyong held a position near the King, there can be no doubt that in a private way the Taiwunkun exercised fully as much influence as he had done while in active office. It is necessary to bear in mind that the enmity of the Queen against the ex-regent extended to the sons of the latter, and, in spite of the terms of the King's oath, constant pressure was brought to bear upon the King from that direction. Whatever be the reason, we find that in January Yi Chun-yong was sent to Japan as Korean minister, an act that was really in favour of the anti-regent faction, since it temporarily removed one of the chief actors from the immediate stage.
As the King had sworn to pay personal attention to the details of government, it was deemed advisable to remove the cabinet meeting-place to the palace itself. Whether this was in accord with the spirit of the reforms may be doubted, for it worked directly for the complete centralisation of power, which later caused a reversal of the whole governmental policy.
​The progress of the so-called reforms went on apace. The outside, the integuments, were changed, whatever may or may not have happened in the inner mind. The long baggy sleeves which had distinguished the true yang-ban were done away, and the side-openings of the long coats were sewed up. The width of the hat brims was curtailed, and other minor changes were effected. A salutary change was made by putting power into the hands of the ministers of state to carry out the work of their respective offices, according to law, without referring everything to the central government, excepting in very important cases, where it affected other departments. The immemorial customs regarding the salutations of inferiors to superiors and vice versa were largely done away and more democratic rules formulated. The Home Minister undertook to correct many abuses in the country, to ferret out cases where cultivated land returned no revenue, because of the indirection of the ajuns, and by this means the revenue of the government was very largely augmented.
At this time a radical change was made in the manner of punishing criminals. The cruel forms of execution and of torture which had always prevailed were done away, and more humane methods instituted. Decapitation was done away, and strangulation substituted. This worked no relief for the criminal, but the horrible spectacle of public decapitation was relegated to the past.
BUDDHIST ABBOT
On February 13 Yun Chi-ho returned from many years' sojourn in America and China, where he had gained a genuine insight into truly enlightened government; and his return to Korea would have been a most happy augury had there been enough enlightened sentiment in the country to form a basis for genuine as distinguished from superficial reform.
Meanwhile the Japanese were carrying everything before them in Manchuria, and the end had now come. The Korean government therefore sent a special envoy to the Japanese headquarters on the field at Hai-cheng, congratulating them upon their brilliant successes. Soon after this the war terminated with the treaty of Shimonoseki, by the terms of which China ceded to Japan southern Manchuria, and the island of Formosa, abjured all interest in Korea, and paid an enormous indemnity. The result astonished the Koreans, but so strong was the feeling in favour of China that very many still clung to the idea that China would pay the money and then go to work preparing for a much greater struggle with the victorious Japanese.
Since the year 1456 Buddhist monks had been forbidden to enter Seoul. This was part of the general policy of this dynasty to give Buddhism no political foothold. Now the Japanese secured from the government a reinstatement of the Buddhists in their original position, and for the first time in four centuries and a half the mendicant monk with his wooden gong and rosary begged on the streets of Seoul.
In April a great misfortune overtook the house of the ex-regent. His grandson, Yi Chun-yong, nephew to the King, was arrested and charged with having connived with tonghaks and others to depose the King and assume the reins of power. It was not shown that Yi Chun-yong had been a main mover in the scheme or that he had even favoured the idea; but the very fact that his name had been used in such a connection was ​enough to send him into banishment on the island of Kyo-dong, off Kang-wha. Four other men connected with this affair were executed. This was a severe blow to the ex-regent, and did much to bring him to the point which made possible the terrible events of the following October.
The 6th of June witnessed a great celebration in Seoul, which has gone down in history as Independence Day. A fete was held in the "Old Palace" which exceeded in brilliancy any similar demonstration since the opening of Korea to foreign relations.
It was inevitable that, from the moment of his arrival in Korea, Pak Yong-hyo should be at swords' points with the Taiwunkun, for the returned refugee represented the radical wing of the reform party, which the ex-regent had always bitterly opposed; and, besides, the presence of such a strong man would necessarily subtract from the influence of the aged but autocratic prince. It is probable that the Japanese brought Pak Yong-hyo back to Korea under the impression that he would prove a willing instrument in their hands; but they soon discovered that he had ideas and opinions of his own, and that he was working rather for Korea than for Japan. He failed to fall in with some of the plans which would help the Japanese, but at the expense of Korea, and, in fine, he became something of an embarrassment to his former benefactors. Meanwhile the King and Queen were both attached to him, and this for several reasons. He was a near relative of the King, and would have no cause for desiring a change in the status of the reigning house; in the second place he was a determined enemy of the Taiwunkun, and, in the third place, he was sure to work against a too liberal policy toward the Japanese. This attitude of increasing friendliness between him and the royal family was a further cause of uneasiness to the Japanese, although Count Inouye himself had done much to win the good-will of the Queen. Finally, Pak Yong-hyo had won the lasting gratitude of the King and Queen by exposing the machinations of Yi Chun-yong.
A Picturesque Nook in the Old Palace
But progressive measures kept on apace, and during July the government issued new and important mining, quarantine and army regulations, and organised a domestic postal system. A valuable mining concession in the district of Un-san in the north was granted to an American syndicate, a transaction that has proved the most profitable, at least to the foreigner, of any attempt to open up the resources of Korea.
Near the end of the month Korea suffered the misfortune of seeing Count Inouye retire from the legation in Seoul and return to Japan. Never did the Japanese have such need of a ​strong and upright man in Seoul, and never had a Japanese minister in Seoul opportunity for greater distinction. There are those who believe that he despaired of accomplishing anything so long as the two opposing factions in Seoul were led by personalities so strong and so implacable in their mutual hatred as the Queen and the ex-regent. It is not unlikely that he felt that until one or other of these should be permanently removed from the field of action there could be no real opportunity for the renovation of Korea. This by no means implies that he desired such removal to be effected by forcible means, but it is not unnatural to suppose that he must have given expression to the conviction as to the futility of doing anything under existing conditions in the peninsula. There have been some who have believed that the Japanese authorities in Tokyo determined upon the removal of the obstacle in Seoul by any means in their power. Subsequent events gave some colour to this surmise, but we cannot and do not believe that the Japanese government was a party to the plot which ended in the tragedy of the following October, but that a fanatical and injudicious Japanese minister to Korea privately gave his sanction to an act which the Japanese government would have sternly forbidden had they been consulted.
On the first day of September Viscount Miura arrived from Japan to assume the duties of minister. Over a month had elapsed since the departure of Count Inouye. The viscount was an enthusiastic Buddhist, and evidently belonged to the old rather than the new Japan. He was, withal, a strenuous man, and is said to have considered the settlement of the Korean difficulties merely a matter of prompt and vigorous action. At the time of his arrival the ex-regent was living at his summer-house near the river, and from the very first he was in close relations with the new Japanese minister. It was quite evident that the latter had espoused the cause of the ex-regent as against the Queen, and that instead of trying to close the breach which was constantly widening between these two powerful personages he was preparing to make use of this estrangement to further what he ​posed to be the interests of Japan. Min Yong-whan, the most powerful of the Queen's friends, was sent to America as minister; and everything was ready for the coup which had undoubtedly been determined upon. From the mass of conflicting evidence, charge and counter-charge, it is difficult to escape the following conclusion. There were two different policies held by political parties in Japan as to the best way to handle the Korean question: one was what we may call the radical policy which advocated strong measures and the instant and complete overthrow of all opposition to the will of Japan in the peninsula; the other or conservative policy looked to the attainment of the same object by gradual and pacific means. It seems that the failure of Count Inouye to accomplish anything definite in the line of a settlement of internal dissensions at Seoul resulted in the appointment of Viscount Miura as an exponent of the extreme radical policy. He was supposed to do prompt work, but what that work would be, perhaps neither he nor his constituency saw clearly before his arrival on the scene. It would be going much too far to say that the assassination of the Queen was once thought of, and yet it is more than likely that those most conversant with conditions in Seoul felt that by some means, or other her enormous influence must be permanently checked, and that affairs must be so managed that she should have nothing more to do in the handling of questions of state. How this was to be accomplished neither Miura nor any of his advisers knew until he came and looked over the field.
For this reason it is easy to see how the ex-regent would be the first man in Korea with whom the Japanese minister would wish to consult, and it is certain that the Taiwunkun would have but one word to say as to the solution of the difficulty. His experience of twenty years had convinced him that there was only one way to accomplish the object which the minister had in view; and while Viscount Miura naturally shrunk from adopting that course it would seem he too was at last convinced that it was the only feasible plan. That he actually advised it in the ​first instance, we do not believe ; but that he fell in with the plan which others suggested and which they offered to carry through without his personal intervention there can be no doubt whatever. Nor can there be any question as to where the responsibility for the tragedy rests; not with the Japanese government, surely, except in so far as its appointment of such a man to the difficult post of minister to Seoul may reflect upon its wisdom.
It has sometimes been hinted that Count Inouye upon his return to Japan advocated some such policy as that which was carried out by Marquis Miura, but there is nothing to indicate that this is other than a libel, for the whole career of that able statesman gives the lie to such suspicions, and his despatches to his government show the very opposite spirit from that intimated in these slanderous reports. For instance, we have the extract from his reports, read in the Japanese parliament, in which he says: " On one occasion the Queen observed to me, ' It was a matter of extreme regret to me that the overtures made by me toward Japan were rejected. The Taiwunkun, on the other hand, who showed his unfriendliness toward Japan, was assisted by the Japanese minister to rise in power.' In reply to this I gave as far as I could an explanation of these things to the Queen, and after allaying her suspicions I further explained that it was the true and sincere desire of the Emperor and government of Japan to place the independence of Korea on a firm basis, and in the meantime to strengthen the royal house of Korea. In the event of any member of the royal family, or indeed any Korean, attempting treason against the royal house, I gave the assurance that the Japanese government would not fail to protect the royal house even by force of arms." This unequivocal promise of protection was made by Count Inouye just before his departure for Japan, and we do not and cannot believe that he expressed anything but his honest sentiments and those of the government that was back of him. It has been urged that the action of the Japanese government in ​acquitting Viscount Miura in the face of the evidence given proves the complicity of that government in the outrage and its previous knowledge that it was to be perpetrated, but this does not necessarily follow. That government was doubtless unwilling to stultify itself by acknowledging that its accredited minister to Korea was actually guilty of the crime indicated in the charge. This attempt to evade the responsibility was of course futile. There was no escape from the dilemma in which that government was placed, but the deduction that it was particcps criminis in the events of October 8 is unbelievable. It was the work of Viscount Miura and of his staff, and of them alone, as is shown by the decision of the Japanese Court of Preliminary Inquiry, which court sat in Hiroshima in January, 1896.
That court found, among other things, that Viscount Miura upon his arrival in Seoul soon became aware that the Korean court, and especially the Queen's faction, was placing every obstacle in the way of reform, and felt that an effective remedy should be applied. The Taiwunkun asked the Japanese for assistance in effecting a radical change, and it was decided to grant it. But first the ex-regent was asked to sign an agreement not to interfere unwarrantedly in political matters in the future. A plot was then formed to take the palace by force, murder the Queen, hold the person of the King, and thus control the situation. This plot was definitely sanctioned and urged by Viscount Miura and his secretary.
At three o'clock on the morning of October 8, a large party of Japanese, including a number of soshi, together with several Koreans, went to the residence of the Taiwunkun, near the river, and in company with him proceeded toward Seoul. When they were about to start, their leader exhorted them to deal with the "fox" as necessity might dictate, the obvious meaning being that the Queen should be killed. About dawn the whole party entered the palace by the Kwang-wha gate, and at once proceeded to the royal apartments.
At this point the recital of the facts abruptly stops, and the ​court goes on to state that, in spite of these proven facts, there is not sufficient evidence to prove that any of the Japanese actually committed the crime which had been contemplated, and all the accused are discharged.
It is very much to the credit of the Japanese authorities that they frankly published these incriminating facts, and did not attempt to suppress them. Their action discharging the accused was a candid statement that, in spite of the actual proof which they adduced, it would not be possible to punish the perpetrators of the outrage, for Miura had been sent as the accredited minister of Japan, and his acts, though unforeseen by his superiors, could not but partake of an official character, and therefore the onus of the affair must fall on the Japanese government. This is the effect that was produced in the public mind, and, while the Japanese government as such must be acquitted of any intention or desire to secure the assassination of the Queen, yet it can scarcely escape the charge of criminal carelessness, in according to the Korean court a representative who would so far forget the dignity of his position as to plan and encourage the perpetration of such a revolting crime.
A PALACE-WOMAN IN FULL REGALIA
The body was wrapped in some sort of blanket, saturated with petroleum, and burned at the edge of a pine grove immediately to the east of the pond which lies in front of the royal quarters.
The royal family had been aware for two days of the danger which threatened. The guards at the palace had been reduced, the arms had been taken away, and the movements of Japanese troops were very suspicious. The King advised the Queen to go to a place of safety, and she said she would do so if the Queen Dowager would also go, but the latter refused. Chong Pyung-ha, who had been raised to high office through the patronage of the Queen, but who had struck hands with the Japanese, urged with great insistence that there was no danger to her Majesty's person, and it was the confidence expressed by this traitor that did the most to set at rest the apprehension of the King and the Queen.
During all the time leading up to these events the palace guard was in charge of General Dye, but his efforts to carry out the wishes of his Majesty were continually thwarted, and the guard was merely a nominal one. ​At about the time when the Queen was being killed, the Taiwunkun came into the presence of the King, and took the direction of affairs at the court. As might be supposed, both the King and the Crown Prince were in anything but an enviable frame of mind. They had been pushed about and insulted by low Japanese, and felt that their lives were momentarily in danger. Colonel Yi Kyung-jik, the Minister of the Household Department, had taken his stand at the door of the Queen's apartments, and had there been cut down by the Japanese or Koreans, but succeeded in making his way, desperately wounded, into the presence of the King. He was there stabbed to death by the Japanese before the eyes of his Majesty. This did not tend to reassure the King and the Crown Prince, but the coming of the Taiwunkun tended to quiet them somewhat. Of course they had no idea as yet that the Queen had been despatched.
Before dawn began to break the King learned that Japanese troops were pouring into the barracks in front of the palace, and, as some semblance of order had been restored in the immediate presence of his Majesty, a note was sent in haste to the Japanese minister, asking what all this meant. The messenger found Miura and Sugimura already up and dressed, and sedan chairs at the door. Miura told the messenger that he had heard that troops had been marched to the barracks, but did not know why. The minister and his secretary thereupon proceeded rapidly to the palace. Immediately upon their arrival all the disturbance suddenly quieted down, and the soshi dispersed and left the palace grounds. The Japanese minister and secretary immediately sought an audience with his Majesty, accompanied only by an interpreter and another Japanese who had led the soshi. The ex-regent was also present.
Three documents were prepared by those present and placed before his Majesty for signature, one of them guaranteeing that the Cabinet should thereafter manage the affairs of the country, the second appointing Yi Cha-myun, the King's brother, as Minister of the Household in place of Yi Kyung-jik, who had just ​been killed, and the third appointing a vice-Minister of the Household. These documents the King perforce signed. Thereupon all Japanese troops were removed from the palace, and only the Japanese-trained Korean troops were left as a palaceguard. Later in the day ministers of war and police were appointed in the persons of Cho Heui-yun and Kwun Yung-jin, both strong partisans of the Japanese, and doubtless privy to the attack upon the palace and the murder of the Queen. In other words, the King and court were surrounded by men every one of whom were in sympathy with the movement which had been planned by Viscount Miura.
Very early in the morning, while it was still scarcely daylight, Mr. Waeber, the Russian Charge d' Affaires, and Dr. Allen, the American Charge d' Affaires ad interim, came to the palace and sought audience with the King, but were told that the King was unwell and could not see them. They insisted, however, and succeeded in seeing his Majesty, who told them that he still had hopes that the Queen had escaped, and besought their friendly offices to prevent further trouble. Other foreign representatives were received later in the day.
It soon became evident that the Japanese authorities intended to deny any responsibility for the outrages committed. Miura stated in his despatches to his government that the origin of the emeute was a conflict between the Japanese-drilled Korean troops, who desired to lay a complaint before his Majesty, and the palace guards, who tried to prevent their entrance into the palace. Miura even sought to strengthen his disclaimer by obtaining from the newly appointed Minister of War a definite official statement that the rumours of his (Miura's) complicity in the affair were without foundation. The document that the Minister of War sent in reply proved altogether too much and defeated its own purpose, for it stated baldly that there was not a single Japanese in the palace on the night of the 8th of October when the Queen was murdered. As this minister was a creature of the Japanese, and as the presence of Japanese in ​the palace was clearly proved subsequently, it is evident that Miura, by this sort of trickery, only succeeded in further implicating himself.
On the pth, the day after the cmeute, a full Cabinet was appointed, composed entirely of Japanese sympathisers, but, with one or two exceptions, they were not privy to the assassination of the Queen, though they were willing to profit by that crime in accepting office at the hands of the perpetrators.
One would have supposed that the enemies of the Queen would have been satisfied by her death, but not so. On the nth, three days after her assassination, an edict, .purporting to have originated with his Majesty and signed by the full Cabinet, appeared in the " Court Gazette." In it the Queen is charged with having interfered in public matters, disturbed the government and put the dynasty in peril. It is stated that she has disappeared, and that her guilt is excessive; therefore she is deposed from her rank as Queen and reduced to the level of the lowest class.
There can be no doubt that this edict is fraudulent. The King never gave his consent to it, and several of the members of the Cabinet knew nothing about it, notably Sim Sang-hun, who had already thrown up his position and run away, and Pak Chong-yang, who denounced the nefarious business and resigned. It was put through by a few of the Cabinet who were thoroughly subservient to the Japanese. The Japanese minister, in reply to the announcement of the Queen's degradation, affected to sympathise with the Korean government, but thought it was done for the good of the state. The United States representative refused to recognise the decree as coming from his Majesty, and in this he was seconded by all the other foreign representatives except one.
Meanwhile the Japanese government began to learn something of the truth in regard to the Queen's death, and felt called upon to defend itself from the charge of complicity in the outrage through its accredited minister. Consequently it recalled ​Miura and Sugimura, and upon their arrival in Japan they were arrested and charged with instigating the outrage. The fact of their arrest and trial was a distinct disclaimer on the part of the Japanese government that it was accessory to the crime; and, in spite of the utter inadequacy of the trial and its almost ludicrous termination, we hold to the theory that the Japanese government was not a party to the crime, excepting in so far as the appointment of such a man as .Miura can be called complicity.
But the vigorous action of Japan in arresting Miura and putting him on trial had a strong influence upon the course of events in Korea. The Korean public and all the foreign representatives were demanding that the occurrences of the 8th of October should be investigated, and the responsibility for the murder of the Queen placed where it rightly belonged. This itself bore strongly upon the Cabinet, but when, in addition to this, the Japanese government itself seemed to be weakening, and it appeared that Miura's acts would prove to have been unauthorised, things began to look rather black for the men who were enjoying office solely through Miura's influence, and, although the fiction was still maintained that the Queen was not dead but in hiding somewhere, the situation became more and more strained, until at last it became evident even to the Cabinet that something must be done to relieve the situation. Accordingly, on the 26th of November, the foreign representatives and several other foreigners were invited to the palace, and it was announced in the presence of his Majesty that Cho Heui-yun, the Minister of War, and Kwun Yung-jin, the Chief of Police, were dismissed, that the edict degrading the Queen was rescinded, and that the facts connected with the attack on the palace would be investigated by the Department of Justice and all guilty persons tried and punished. At the same time the death of her Majesty was formally announced.
The position of his Majesty during the months succeeding the attack was anything but comfortable. He had no voice in ​the direction of affairs, and he considered himself practically a prisoner in the hands of the Cabinet. He even feared for his life, and for weeks ate no food except what was brought to him in a locked box from friends outside the palace. He had requested that two or three foreigners should come to the palace each night and be at hand in case of trouble, feeling that their presence would exert a deterrent influence upon any who might plot inju:y to his person.
The half-way measures adopted on the 26th of November by no means satisfied those who wished to see his Majesty freed from practical durance at the hands of men thoroughly obnoxious to him, and a scheme was evolved by a number of Koreans to effect his release by forcible means. The purpose of these men was a laudable one, but the execution of it was ill-managed. On the night of the 28th, upwards of a thousand Koreans demanded entrance into the palace. They had arranged with one of the members of the palace guard, inside, to open the gate to them, but at the last moment he failed them, and they found themselves balked. The palace was in some confusion ; the King had called in to his presence the three foreigners who, at his request, were on duty that night, but in spite of their assurances that his person would be protected it was only natural that excitement should run high. The crowd without were shouting wildly and attempting to scale the high wall, and the members of the Cabinet, before the King, did not know at what moment the guard might betray them to the assailants, and they knew that once betrayed they would be torn to pieces without mercy. They tried, therefore, to induce the King to remove to a distant part of the palace, where he could hide for a long time before he could be found, even though the crowd should effect an entrance. The night was bitterly cold, and the King was but lightly clad ; and as the King's person was safe in any event, the foreigners who were with him opposed the move strongly, and at last were compelled to use physical force to prevent the change, which would certainly have endangered the King's life. The purpose of the Cabinet was ​thus thwarted, but as the hours passed it became evident that the men outside would not be able to effect an entrance. The shouts gradually died away, and at last the crowd dispersed, leaving in the hands of the palace guard three or four men who had scaled the wall but had not been followed by their confrères.
In view of the attitude of the Tokyo government, the Japanese in Seoul were now entirely quiescent, and the government was standing on its own base. The Cabinet held its own by virtue of the palace guard, which was composed of the soldiers trained by the Japanese. This Cabinet and guard held together from necessity, for both knew that should their power fail they would be denounced as traitors, and under the circumstances could expect little help from the Japanese. The Cabinet had to make a show of investigating the attack of the 5th of October, and someone must be killed for having murdered the Queen. At the same time punishment was to be meted out to the principals in the attempt on the palace on the 28th of November.
Three men were arrested and charged with being directly implicated in the crime of regicide. Of these one was certainly innocent, and while the second was probably privy to the crime, being a lieutenant of the Japanese-trained troops, there was no evidence adduced to prove his actual participation in the act of assassination. As a fact, the court did not know and never discovered who the actual perpetrators were. The three men were executed before the end of the year.
Though only three men were arrested in connection with the assassination of the Queen, thirty-three men were arrested in connection with the comparatively trivial affair of the 28th of November. Their trial proceeded simultaneously with that of the other three. Two of them were condemned to death, four to exile for life, and four to three years' imprisonment. To show the kind of evidence on which these convictions were based, we will cite the case of Prince Yi Cha-sun, who was proved to have gotten hold of some compromising documents and to have shown them ​to the King only, instead of to the proper authorities, namely, of course, the Cabinet. On these grounds he was sentenced to three years' imprisonment.
December and January saw matters move to an inevitable climax. The Cabinet forced upon the people the edict ordering the cutting off of the top-knot, the distinctive mark of Korean citizenship. The whole country was in a ferment, and the people, almost to a man, were gnashing their teeth at the Cabinet. The finding of the Hiroshima court claimed to have freed Miura and his fellows from blame, and it was rumoured that several of them were to return to Korea to take office under the government. It was perfectly evident, therefore, that the grip of the Japanese upon the King through the Gaoler Cabinet was tightening, and that there was no escape from it except through heroic measures. These measures the King was prepared to adopt rather than longer endure the humiliating position to which he seemed condemned.
He determined to find asylum in the Russian legation. C. Waeber was the Russian minister, a pronounced friend of the dead Queen and a man of great ability. Just how he was approached and his consent gained to the King's scheme is not generally known ; but in view of subsequent events, and the part that Russia intended to play in Korea, it is easy to see how the Russian representative would welcome an opportunity to do the King such a signal service, and one which was of such a personal character as to render it certain that it would never be forgotten.
The plan was carried out successfully in every detail. Women's chairs were caused to be sent in and out the palace gates at frequent intervals by day and night, until the guards had become quite accustomed to them. Then on the night of the nth of February the King and the Crown Prince without escort slipped by the guards in common women's chairs, and were taken directly to the Russian legation, where they were courteously received and given the best portion of the legation ​building. This act was, of course, a grievous lapse from the dignity that befits a king, but under the circumstances there is much to say by way of excuse. On the whole, it must be considered a mistake so far as the country at large is concerned, for it set in motion a new set of factors which probably did more harm than the temporary enforced seclusion of the King could have done. It acted as a potent factor in embittering the Japanese against Russia, and opened the door for Russian intrigue, which finally hastened if it did not actually cause the Russo-Japanese war. Had Japan been able to preserve the predominance which she held in Korea just after the China-Japan war, she might have looked with more or less complacency upon the Russian aggression in Manchuria, but when Korea itself became disputed ground the war was inevitable.
At seven o'clock on the morning of the 11th of February the King and the Crown Prince entered the Russian legation. Several hours elapsed before the Cabinet in the palace became aware of the fact. During that interval active operations were going on at the Russian legation. The organisation of a new Cabinet was hastened by summoning from various parts of the city such officials as the King could trust. Pak Chong-yang was made prime minister. No time was lost in putting out a royal edict deprecating the necessity of taking refuge in a foreign legation, promising to punish the real authors of the Queen's assassination, rescinding the order for cutting the top-knots. This was posted on the gates of the legation and at various points throughout the city.