# Jones v. Van Doren

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United States Supreme Court
130 U.S. 684
Jones v. Van Doren
This was a bill in equity, filed May 18, 1883, by Sarah M. Jones, a citizen of Pennsylvania, against Matilda A. Van Doren, a citizen of Indiana, and Samuel J. Jones and Samuel J. Glover, citizens of Illinois. The original bill alleged that Robert H. Jones died intestate in April, 1863, leaving the plaintiff, his widow, and the defendant Jones, his son and only heir at law, and seised in fee of one-fourth undivided part of certain land described, in Minnesota; that the plaintiff became entitled to a dower interest therein, which by the laws of Minnesota was a life-estate in one-third part, and the son became vested with the title in fee, subject to her dower interest; that she, being informed that the estate was involved in litigation, and having little or no knowledge of business, and at his request, for no consideration, and merely for the purpose of facilitating the conduct of the litigation, made a quitclaim deed of her interest to him; and that he accepted the deed upon the express understanding and agreement to receive it for that purpose only. The bill further set forth, as the result of the litigation, that certain described parcels of the land were set off to him in severalty, and alleged that he, conspiring and confederating with the defendant Matilda A. Van Doren (who was fully advised of all the facts above alleged) to defraud the plaintiff of her dower estate, made a mortgage by a conveyance in trust to the defendant Glover, on July 25, 1871, of all the land so set off, including the plaintiff's interest therein, to secure a sum of $10,000 lent to him by Mrs. Van Doren; that, as part of the conspiracy, a suit for foreclosure was begun in the name of Glover on August 26, 1876, and a decree obtained therein, under which all the land was sold, and (except a small portion purchased by one Galusha) bought by Mrs. Van Doren for the sum of $8,745.14, and a final decree, vesting title in the purchasers, was entered on May 22, 1880; that the plaintiff was ignorant of the mortgage and of the foreclosure suit until long after the final decree therein; that on December 16, 1876, in order to protect her dower right, she paid $1,808.48 in discharge of taxes on the land, of which payment the defendants availed themselves; and that Mrs. Van Doren, in 1881, sold a portion of the land to one Marshall, a bona fide purchaser, for the sum of $10,000, which she received and applied to her own use, and still held the rest of the land. The plaintiff further alleged that before filing her bill she demanded an account of Mrs. Van Doren, and offered to pay her all moneys paid or expended by her on or about the land, with interest, in redemption of the mortgage, and demanded a reconveyance, but she refused; and that the plaintiff was ready and willing to pay to her all sums of money, and to do all other acts that might be adjudged by the court necessary to redeem the land from the mortgage and foreclosure. The bill prayed for an account, and that the plaintiff, on paying to Mrs. Van Doren such sums as the court might direct to enable her to redeem the mortgage, should be adjudged to be entitled to redemption, and Mrs. Van Doren might be ordered to reconvey the land still held by her, and for such other or different relief as the nature of the case might require and as might be agreeable to equity. A demurrer to that bill was sustained, and the bill dismissed, on the ground that the plaintiff, having conveyed her interest by a deed absolute on its face, the statute of frauds would not permit her to set up an oral trust, and, as no fraud, accident, or mistake in making that deed was alleged, no trust arose by implication of law. 18 Fed. Rep. 619. The bill was then amended by substituting, for the allegations concerning the plaintiff's conveyance to the defendant Jones, allegations that he, with intent to defraud her, prepared an instrument which he represented to be a power of attorney to enable him to act for the plaintiff in regard to certain anticipated litigation and other business, and thereby induced her to sign it; that the instrument was in fact, as he knew, a quitclaim deed of all her right of dower; that she did not read the instrument, or know its true character or effect, but relied on his representations, and, had she re d it, was then so ignorant of business that she would not have understood its legal purport, and that she always, until within six months before the filing of this bill, believed that the instrument was a mere power of attorney.
The defendant Van Doren demurred to the amended bill, and afterwards moved to have it stricken from the files for the reason that it stated a new and different cause of action, the original bill being based upon an express trust, and the amended bill upon a resulting trust arising by implication of law. The court overruled the motion, but sustained the demurrer, on the ground that the plaintiff was not entitled to the specific relief prayed for, as shown by its opinion sent up with the record and printed in the margin. A final decree was entered, dismissing the bill, and the plaintiff appealed to this court.
C. E. Flandrau and Jeremiah Leaming, for appellant
C. K. Davis and J. M. Gilman, for appellees.
[Argument of Counsel from pages 688-690 intentionally omitted]
Mr. Justice GRAY, after stating the facts as above, delivered the opinion of the court.

## Notes

* ↑ NELSON, J. The demurrer is sustained, for the reasons: (1) If the allegations of the bill of complaint are true, the right of the complainant to bring her action to recover dower exists, unless the statute of limitations of the state of Minnesota has barred such recovery. Of course, if she has lost all right of action by laches, the bill must fail, for the relief claimed is based upon an interest in the property as dowress. (2) If not barred by the statute of her action to recover dower, the fraud alleged, which creates an impediment to a recovery at law, can be removed by a suit in equity and her dower obtained. Equity furnishes the most adequate and complete remedy, and dower is highly favored in that forum. (3) The complainant is not entitled by the fraud alleged, if true, to anything more than dower. She is not entitled to the whole property. If, by a fraud perpetrated upon her, which the defendants were cognizant of and participated in, as alleged, she has been prevented from asserting her right to dower by a suit at law, she is not thereby deprived of all remedy to recover it. The relief prayed for in this bill, as amended, does not necessarily follow from the facts alleged therein and admitted by the demurrer. The demurrer goes to the relief prayed, and, not being entitled to the relief, the bill must fail. In the original bill, the relief claimed was based upon the admitted allegation that the quitclaim deed was voluntarily given, and accompanying it was a parol trust for the benefit of the grantor, known to the defendants at the time the property was mortgaged. This bill was held bad on demurrer, for the reason that such a trust as alleged could not be created and recognized, it being in violation of the laws governing uses and trusts, which were special y defined by the statutes of Minnesota. The amendments have changed the features of the bill, and it is doubtful whether they are proper; but I have overruled a motion to strike them from the files, and decided the demurrer upon the bill as amended. Demurrer sustained.
This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
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