# Public Service Commission of Utah v. Wycoff Company/Dissent Douglas

* Court Documents
* Case Syllabus
* Opinion of the Court
* Concurring Opinion Reed
* Dissenting Opinion Douglas
United States Supreme Court
344 U.S. 237
Public Service Commission of Utah v. Wycoff Company
Argued: Nov. 13, 1952. --- Decided: Dec 22, 1952
Mr. Justice DOUGLAS, dissenting.
Respondents hold a certificate of public convenience and necessity from the Interstate Commerce Commission for the transportation of motion picture films and news reels from Salt Lake City, Utah, to points in Utah, Idaho, and Montana. Their transportation to Utah points is interstate commerce according to the Court of Appeals; and with that conclusion I agree since the movement in Utah is part of a continuing interstate stream. The threat of interference with that interstate activity by the Utah Public Service Commission is clear and immediate. First. The Utah Commission brought suit to enjoin those interstate activities and that suit is now pending in the Utah court. Second. The Commission's answer in the District Court denied that it was interfering with interstate commerce, not because it did not intend to prevent respondent from operating, but on the ground that the operations were deemed to be intrastate commerce and therefore subject to its regulation. Similarly, the District Court's finding that there was no interference with interstate commerce was based on an acceptance of the Commission's contentions as to the nature of respondent's business. Third. In their brief here petitioners assert that the Utah Commission 'will prevent the respondent from conducting' this business 'unless and until he is authorized to do so by appropriate administrative order' of the Utah Commission, since in the Commission's view the transportation is in intrastate commerce.
That for me is threat enough. Moreover, Utah is not attempting to regulate a phase of interstate business that is within the reach of a State's police power. She is endeavoring to make respondent obtain a permit to do an interstate business for which the respondent already holds a federal permit, under threat that unless he obtains a Utah permit, Utah will stop him from conducting the interstate business. That is an attempt to regulate in a field pre-empted by the Congress under the Motor Carrier Act, 49 U.S.C. § 301 et seq., 49 U.S.C.A. § 301 et seq. That kind of regulation is precluded by our decision in Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U.S. 307, 45 S.Ct. 324, 69 L.Ed. 623.
Thus the controversy is definite and concrete and involves legal interests of adverse parties. The test laid down for declaratory judgments by Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 57 S.Ct. 461, 81 L.Ed. 617, is thus satisfied. I have said enough to show that the judges who heard this case below knew that they were dealing with a live, active contest that theatened serious consequences to respondent, not with a hypothetical question that might have practical repercussions only in the remote future.
The fact that the Utah court can adjudicate the controversy in the pending state case is no reason why the federal court should stay its hand. There is no federal policy indicating that this is a field in which federal courts should be reluctant to intervene. That was the case in Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S. 293, 63 S.Ct. 1070, 87 L.Ed. 1407, where we held that declaratory relief that a state tax was unconstitutional should be denied by the federal court. The basis of our ruling was that since Congress had prohibited the federal courts from enjoining state taxes where an adequate remedy was available in the state courts, cf. Township of Hillsborough, Somerset County, N.J. v. Cromwell, 326 U.S. 620, 623, 66 S.Ct. 445, 448, 90 L.Ed. 358, declaratory relief should also be withheld. Congress here has given no indication that the integrity of permits granted interstate carriers by the Interstate Commerce Commission should be protected in the state rather than in the federal courts. All the presumptions are contrary. The basis of the jurisdiction of the District Court created by Congress is clear. The case 'arises under the Constitution' and 'laws' of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1331, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1331. It is proper that the federal court, absent such special circumstances as the Huffman case presented, exercise that jurisdiction and protect the federal right.
The failure to do it here relegates the declaratory judgment to a low estate.

## Notes

This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
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