# Texas Railway Company v. Cox

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United States Supreme Court
145 U.S. 593
Texas Railway Company v. Cox
STATEMENT BY MR. CHIEF JUSTICE FULLER.
This was an action brought by Mrs. Ida May Cox, a citizen of Texas, in the United States circuit court for the eastern district of Texas, on the 3d of September, 1887, against John C. Brown and Lionel L. Sheldon, as receivers of the Texas & Pacific Railway Company, to recover damages for the death of her husband, Charles Cox, resulting from their negligence while operating that company's road. Judgment was rendered against Brown and Sheldon as such receivers, and Sheldon having resigned as receiver, and his resignation having been accepted by the court, Brown, as sole receiver, prosecuted this writ of error. While the writ was pending Brown was discharged as receiver, and the railway company was restored to the possession of its property, and this court, in November, 1889, with the consent of the parties, made an order substituting the Texas & Pacific Railway Company as plaintiff in error in lieu of Brown, receiver. This was done upon a stipulation 'that the said Texas and Pacific Railway Company may be substituted as plaintiff in error in the above-entitled cause now pending undetermined upon writ of error in this court: such substitution, however, not to affect any of the questions or controversies presented by the record herein, and the questions and controversies persented by the record are to stand for the decision of this court, the same as if such substitution had not been made.'
The petition stated that the railway company, its lines running through Texas and Louisiana, and all its properties, were put in the hands of receivers, December 16, 1885, by order of the circuit court for the eastern district of Louisiana; that Brown and Sheldon were appointed and qualified at once as receivers, and had been ever since and were now such; and that Brown resided in the county of Dallas, Tex., and Sheldon in the state of Louisiana; that Cox was in their comployment, January 6, 1887, as a freight conductor, and received the injury which resulted in his death on that day while attempting to make a coupling of cars, because of the defective condition of the cross ties and of the roadbed, through the negligence of the receivers. The injury was alleged to have been inflicted in the state of Louisiana, and it was claimed that the plaintiff was entitled to recover under the law of that state, which was set forth, as well as under that of the state of Texas, it being averred that they were substantially the same. These statutes are given, so far as necessary, in the margin.
The petition further stated that Cox left no child or children, nor descendant of a child, nor father or mother, him surviving, but only the petitioner, his wife and widow. It was also alleged that the deceased suffered severe mental and physical pain from the time he was injured until he died.
The defendants demurred, assigning as grounds that the petition 'does not show that this court has jurisdiction of the cause as between the plaintiff and the defendants; it does not show jurisdiction of the persons;' and that the petition 'does not set out a cause of action, because it shows that Chas. Cox, the husband of the plaintiff, was killed in Louisiana, and not in the state of Texas;' and also answered denying the allegations of the petition, and charging, contributory negligence. On the 16th of February, 1888, Mrs. Cox filed an amended petition, reciting that she, 'leave of the court being first had, files this, her amended petition, and amending her original petition.' This pleading expanded the allegations in reference to the appointment of the receivers by the United States circuit court for the eastern district of Louisiana, and stated the entry and confirmation of the order of appointment as receivers, under ancillary proceedings, in the circuit court for the eastern district of Texas, and averred that the court had jurisdiction of subject-matter and receivers under the laws of the United States. It was further averred that Cox, in coupling the cars, as it was his duty to do, on account of the drawhead and coupling pin not being suitable for the purpose for which they were to be used, he being ingnorant therof, and of the defective condition of the tracks, was injured. The defendant filed a general denial to the amended petition, and pleaded the statute of limitations.
The demurrer to the petition and demurrer or plea to the amended petition were overruled, and the case came on for trial before a jury upon the issues joined. Evidence was adduced on both sides, and it was, among other things, admitted that the defendants were appointed receivers of the Texas & Pacific Railway Company by the circuit court for the eastern district of Louisiana, and with the powers alleged by plaintiff; and that an ancillary bill was filed in the circuit court for the eastern district of Texas, by direction, in the same case, and orders entered giving that court ancillary jurisdiction over the cause.
A verdict was returned for $15,000, and the defendants moved for a new trial, which, on plaintiff having remitted the sum of $5,000, was overruled, and judgment entered for $10,000, a certified copy of which was directed to be forwarded to the clerk of the circuit court for the eastern district of Louisiana, and called to the attention of that court. A motion in arrest was also made and denied.
Fifteen errors were assigned, which question the action of the court: (1) In maintaining jurisdiction; (2) in disallowing the plea of the statute of limitations; (3) in holding the cause of action enforceable in Texas; (4) in refusing to direct the jury to find for the defendants; (5) in refusing to give to the jury on defendant's behalf several specific instructions requested, not material to be here set forth.
John F. Dillon and Winslow S. Pierce, for plaintiff in error.
[Argument of Counsel from pages 597-600 intentionally omitted]
W. Hallett Phillips, for defendant in error.
Mr. Chief Justice FULLER, after stating the facts in the foregoing language, delivered the opinion of the court.

## Notes

* ↑ Texas, (2 Sayles' Civil St. pp. 26, 27:)
'Art. 2899. An action for actual damages on account of injuries causing the death of any person may be brought in the following cases:
'(1) When the death of any person is caused by the negligence or carelessness of the proprietor, owner, charterer, or hirer of any railroad, steamboat, stagecoach, or other vehicle for the conveyance of goods or passengers, or by the unfitness, negligence, or carelessness of their servants or agents.
'(2) When the death of any person is caused by the wrongful act, negligence, unskillfulness, or default of another.'
'Art. 2903. The action shall be for the sole and exclusive benefit of the surviving husband, wife, children, and parents of the person whose death shall have been so caused, and the amount recovered therein shall not be liable for the debts of the deceased.
'Art. 2904. The action may be brought by all of the parties entitled thereto, or by any one or more of them for the benefit of all.'
Louisiana, (Voorhies' Civil Code, 1875, p. 427; Acts La. 1884, p. 94:)
'Art. 2315. Every act whatever of man that causes damage to another obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair it. The right of this action shall survive in case of death in favor of the surviving minor children or widow of the deceased, or either of them, and, in default of these, in favor of the surviving father and mother, or either of them, for the space of one year from the death. The survivors above mentioned may also recover the damages sustained by them by the death of the parents or dhild, or husband or wife, as the case may be.
'Art. 2316. Every person is responsible for the damage he occasions, not merely by his act, but by his negligence, his imprudence, or his want of skill.
'Art. 2317. We are responsible, not only for the damage occasioned by our own act, but for that which is caused by the act of persons for whom we are answerable, or of the things which we have in our custody.'
This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
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