# CHAPTER 7: SIEGE WARFARE

The Mujahideen besieged several isolated DRA garrisons. If the besieging Mujahideen were local, then the siege went on indefinitely.If outside Mujahideen were involved, the siege usually failed since the Mujahideen could not maintain the supplies necessary for the siege or keep enough of the Mujahideen in place. Since the Mujahideen were unpaid volunteers who also had family responsibilities, they were seldom interested in staying around for uninteresting, lengthy sieges.
LEGEND ) INMAL SITUATION A A-1w° PHASE I--■•■■1: PHASE 2 Page 198 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

## VIGNETTE 1: FAILED SIEGE AT URGUN

by General Gulzarak Zadran
Urgun was the home of the DRA's 21st Mountain Regiment. It islocated near the Pakistan border and is close to the strategic posi-tions of Khost, Gardez, and Ghazni, as well as Waziristan, Pakistan.Once, after the Mujahideen formed their government in exile, theywanted to make Urgun the symbolic seat of their government.Despite the fact that Urgun is located in 'an isolated area, its politi-cal significance prompted the DRA and Soviet forces to keep it undercontrol at all costs. One of the major Mujahideen actions at Urguntook place in 1983. About 800 Mujahideen from the Wazir, Zadran,and Kharoti tribes took part. Major commanders at the seige includ-ed Mawlawi Jalaluddin Haqani, Mawlawi Arsalah, Matiullah,Mawlawi Ahmad Gul and Qauzi Kharoti. The military council for theseige included Captain Abdul Majid, Major Arsala Wazir, CaptainQayum, Captain Sardar, Amanullah, Mawlawi Abdul Ghafur and me.The regiment's main force was located in the old fortress at Urgunwhich is commonly called the Octagonal Fort (Hashtrakha Kala). Ithad one battalion based in another fort four kilometers south of theregiment at Nek Mohammad Kala. A reinforced company held theairfield to the west of the regimental headquarters. Another compa-ny protected the main road to Urgun at a post some 1.5 kilometers to the north. (Map 7-1 - Urgun) We planned to destroy the regiment in two phases. The first phasewould destroy the security around the main headquarters (the south-ern battalion plus the two outlying companies). The second phasewould destroy the regimental headquarters. The first phase began inAugust 1983. The Mujahideen based in the mountains east of UrgunValley encircled and besieged the battalion at Nek Mohammad Kala.This enemy battalion was deployed in a fort which had several towers.The fort was surrounded by minefields and heavy ZGU-1 machine
General Gulzarak Zadran was an officer in the Royal Afghan Army. He trained in theUnited States and attended the Afghan Army Higher Officers Training Institute, where theauthor, Ali Jalali, was his instructor. He joined the resistance and fought in Paktia Province.He fought in Zhawar one and two and at the Satakandow pass. He belonged to Abdul-RabRussul Sayyaf's Islamic Union of Afghanistan (IUA). After the fall of the DRA, he becamethe Deputy Minister of Defense in the interim government. Currently he lives nearPeshawar. [Map sheet 2882].
Page 200 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War
guns were positioned in the towers which made it impossible for theMujahideen to approach close to the fort. This prevented theMujahideen from tightening their seige on the fort.
A few days after the seige began, the religious Festival of Sacrifice(Eid-al-Adha) occured. It was customary for Mujahideen to go homeduring the festival and the enemy felt that few Mujahideen would stillbe around. This time, however, we did not let our people go home butkept them at their bases. Thinking that the Mujahideen were not athreat, the DRA took advantage of the holiday and sent three tanksand a few trucks from the main regimental base to resupply thebattalion. We put an ambush force of approximately 70 Mujahideen,commanded by Mawlawi Hasan, in a dry stream bed about halfwaybetween the two forts. Among their weapons were some RPG-7s.When the DRA column entered the kill zone, he sprang the ambush.The ambush destroyed one tank and damaged another. The ambush-ers killed some DRA soldiers and captured 25. Some others escaped.The DRA abandoned one intact tank, but the Mujahideen could notretrieve it due to heavy machine gun fire from the battalion's fort.The fire forced the Mujahideen force back into a side canyon. Whennight fell, Mawlawi Hasan and Khan Zamak led a group ofMujahideen back to the intact tank. The Mujahideen group includedsome former DRA tank crewmen. They drove the tank away to theirposition.
We planned to attack the battalion fort three days later, usingthe tank as the main weapon. We formed an 11-man tank protectiongroup and mounted them on the tank. They were armed with someRPGs and small arms. They would ride the tank during a nightadvance through the antipersonnel minefield that surrounded thefort. In case the tank got stuck, the tank protection group wouldprotect the tank and free it. A 65-man assault force would follow inthe tracks of the tank as it passed throught the minefield. The tankcrew would blow a hole in the wall of the fort using the main gunof the tank. The 11-man tank protection crew would then dismountand secure the hole opening and the 65-man assault team wouldenter the fort. Mujahideen communications personnel would alsohelp in the assault by interrupting the communications betweenthe battalion and regiment. When possible, the radio operatorswould misdirect the artillery.1
1 It was common practice for Mujahideen and DRA to enter each others radio nets fordeception, harassment or to pass messages. General Gulzarak would often talk to theother side and curse and insult them. Chapter 7, Vignette 1 Page 201
At 2100 hours, the attack started. The Mujahideen tank movedon its designated route with the tank protection crew mounted ontop. As it approached the fort and crossed the antipersonnel mine-field, a few antipersonnel mines exploded, but the tank protectioncrew was unscathed. The tank crew opened fire on the fort's towerswith their main gun. The main gun rounds knocked out the heavymachine guns However, the artillery located with the regimentalheadquarters began firing into the area. Our Mujahideen communi-cations personnel began screaming into the radio their fire wasshort and was falling on the battalion. The artillery command postbecame confused with their demands that the fire be shifted furtheraway. The artillery stopped firing. The Mujahideen tank crew thenfired at the wall of the fort. After several rounds, they knocked a holein the wall. The tank drove to within ten meters of the wall andthe tank protection crew signaled the assault gimp with a flashlight.The tank protection crew immediately dismounted and secured thebreach. The assault group followed in the tank's tracks and enteredthe fort. The enemy was surprised by the sudden breach and offeredno resistance. The Mujahideen captured 243 men plus all theweapons and ammunition in the fort. We let those DRA prisonerswho wanted to join us. We released the others. We were now fourkilometers closer to the main fort.
Pishiano Ghar (the mountain of the cats) overlooks the octagonalfortress. The regiment had a security post with mortars located onthe mountain. Our next move was to seize the security post so thatthe seige would become more effective. A few days later, 70 Mujahi-deen attacked the security post from the north and south in a nightattack. The Mujahideen attack was successful. Once we controlledPishiano Ghar, the regiment pulled back the company that protectedhighway 141 to the regimental base. We prepared for phase two. Theenemy was now completely beseiged and could not receive supplies byroad and had to get supplies by air. The beseiged DRA could only getto the airfield, located some 1.5 kilometers to the west of the fortress,by armored vehicles, since we could take out trucks and jeeps. Ourmachine guns on Pishiano Ghar prevented DRA resupply by day. Wecontinued to tighten the seige. Mujahideen from Zadran broughttheir tank to help out.
The DRA brought in an operations group from Kabul. Their jobwas to help the regiment plan its defense and a linkup with a Sovietunit which was coming from Ghazni to break the seige. DRA GeneralJamaluddin Omar was in charge of the group. He was my old tactics
Page 202 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War
instructor at the Royal Afghan Military Academy. The DRA spreadtheir 3rd battalion in the south of the city instead of in the fort. Theyhad two companies in the forward defensive line. To the southeast,natural ditches and ravines created barriers to our advance. Theairfield lay to the west. One approach to west of the airfield was inad-equately mined, so the DRA covered the gap with guards and patrols.
Besides our two tanks, we had two 76mm mountain guns, one122mm D30 howitzer, one 107mm mountain mortar, other lightermortars, many RPGs, many DShK and ZGU heavy machine guns andother lighter machine guns. It was January and snow was on theground. We covered part of our tanks with white cloth to hide them.We recorded the sound of a moving tank. We received some l'oud-speakers from Peshawar and assigned people to use them on the east-ern flank to depict tanks coming from the east. We structured ourforces for the assault by creating several groups:
•A tank and tank protection group commanded by MawlawiShadam •Two assault groups—Northern and Southern •An evacuation group to carry away the spoils. •A family and dependents protection group to protect the fami-lies of DRA officers who were in the garrison •A truck transport group •A command and control group
We planned the attack. Following an artillery preparation, a tank wouldspearhead the assault from the north and the south to clear a paththrough the antipersonnel minefields. An assault group would follow inthe tank's tracks to hit the enemy from two sides simultaneously.
I was with the southern forces. At 2000 hours on a cold Januarynight, our Mujahideen were all in position. We started artillerypreparatory fire on the DRA positions. Ten minutes later, our tankmoved north toward the city. The tank fired on two city towers andknocked out the machine guns in them. Then we turned on the loud-speakers in the southeast to create tank noises there. The enemyfired at the noises as our tank changed direction and headed westwhere it could reach the unmined area. Fifteen Mujahideen, includ-ing Mawlawi Shadam, Ismail Turkistani and me were on the tank asit entered the city. As we passed through the mined area, we dis-mounted and moved to the rear of the 3d battalion. Assault groupsouth followed the tank's tracks into the city. They stormed 'through
Chapter 7, Vignette 1 Page 203
the city and the 3d battalion resistance collapsed. Battalion person-nnel either surrendered or retreated north. As the Mujahideencontinued to advance, we were stopped by the fire of a DShK machinegun some 50 meters to our north. It was now 0300 in morning. Weattacked the position and killed the gunner—a Soviet adviser. Therest of the DRA regiment had retreated into the fortress with GeneralJamaluddin Omar.
At this point, Mawlawi Shadam reported that his tank was out ofammunition. The tank driver, Lt Mohammad Gul Logari, was wound-ed in the arm and the gunner was killed. The enemy resolve wasstrengthening and showing renewed resistance. Other Mujahideen inthe assault group were running low on ammunition. We had failed toplan for ammunition resupply. We instructed Mawlawi Shadam totake the tank and go back to get all types of ammunition and thenreturn to resupply and support our combatants. As the tank movedback, the Mujahideen and the DRA heard it and thought that we werewithdrawing. It was cold, early in the morning and our command andcontrol was collapsing. Mujahideen began to fall back. The enemycounterattacked and pushed us out of the city. Daybreak came withthe disorganized Mujahideen milling around outside the city. Waveafter wave of enemy aircraft appeared and began bombing and straf-fing the Mujahideen caught in the open. They destroyed our tank. Weretreated into the mountains.
I later learned that the northern assault group had not moved thatnight since their tank was stuck in the sand and they could not free it.The entire assault was from the south. This cost us an almost certainvictory. We had no other choice but to withdraw into our mountainhideouts in the east. In the following days, as we were preparing toresume the seige, a Soviet regiment arrived in Urgun from Ghazni toresupply and reinforce the Urgun garrison.
COMMENTARY: Ammunition resupply was clearly a problem and thewithdrawal of the tank at a critical juncture turned the tide of battle.Communications was as big a problem. The Mujahideen had radios,but they were not able to accompany the assault forces. The northernand southern assault groups were unable to communicate with eachother and, presumably, with the command and control group. If bothattacks had occured, prevention of fratricide would have been a diffi-cult problem without radio communications. Further, members of themilitary council were forward with the assault forces rather thandirecting the battle.
Page 204 The. Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War
Mujahideen air defense planning was also limited. The natural airapproach into Urgun follows highway 141 in a north-south direction.The Mujahideen had heavy machine guns and control of the highground flanking the approach. Evidently, most of the machine gunswere used to fire on DRA ground forces and the air defense posture wasdegraded at the time of the Soviet air response.
Mine clearance was a continual problem for Mujahideen forces andthe use of tanks to clear lanes through antipersonnel minefields and tobreach a hole in the fortress walls deserves high marks. The use of atank protection group, mounted on the tank, was a tactical innovationthat worked well. This may not seem a tactical innovation to profes-sional officers who always keep infantry up with their tanks, but it wasnot a common practice when Mujahideen acquired armor. The pres-ence of professional officers, like General Zadran, was responsible forthe formation of the tank protection group.

## VIGNETTE 2: DEHRAWUD OFFENSIVE

In the spring and summer of 1984, the Soviet forces stepped uptheir attacks on Mujahideen hideouts and mobile bases in the threeadjoining provinces of Kandahar, Helmand and Unizgan. The Sovietsalso intensified their efforts to intercept Mujahideen supply' convoyscoming through the mountains from Pakistan. In the fall, a number ofmajor Mujahideen commanders in these provinces decided to set up aregional supply base in the Uruzgan Mountains that could supportMujahideen units deployed in the area. Dehrawud District, located inUruzgan Province, seemed to be a suitable place for the supply base.It is an oasis in the mountains in the upper Helmand Valley. It is easyto defend and it is conveniently located between the three provinces(Map 7-2 - Dehrawud).
The Dehrawud District capital of Dehrawud was garrisoned bysome 500 government militia who manned security outposts aroundthe town. They were supplied by air since the town was blockaded bythe local Mujahideen who controlled all the roads leading into thetown. The Mujahideen council decided to attack the governmentenclave, dislodge the militia and consolidate control over the entirevalley. To do this, however, they first had to negotiate a truce betweenrival groups in the region to ensure their full cooperation during theupcoming operation. Two months before the action, Mujahideen dele-gations from Kandahar and Helmand mediated such a truce.
In October, Mujahideen forces from Kandahar under MullaMalang, Faizullah and other leaders joined a contingent of HelmandMujahideen commanded by the late Nasim Akhund Zada, the leadingresistance figure in Helmand Province. Haji Assadullah and someMujahideen fighters from Uruzgan and Baghran areas joined theattacking force. This force eventually numbered over 1,000 men. TheMujahideen force moved along different approaches to Dehrawud andsurrounded the government positions in the area. A 300-man detach-ment sealed off the main approach to Dehrawud from the south alongthe Helmand River. Another 100-man detachment deployed to thesoutheast to cover the Kotal-e Murcha (the Murcha pass) and mine its Sources for this vignette include Commander Mulla Malang, Akhund Zada Qasem, sever-al Mujahideen from Uruzgan, Kandahar and Helmand Provinces and Mr. Jalali's personalnotes and papers.
DURSHAHAK DURSHAHAK GHA1/ \ ,/ ‘ / VBARIKI /..e ..1.4., \I V / i i . . 0/ / / //3).1 • • • 1 ...• 0 r<4 // / / // \ip,r. DEHRAWUD,'4‘i / u4t./ .I / ■srY1Y / ■• . ,".1.— ..■ KURKAK / s„, BARIKAY\ 'KAKRAK (GHARBI) KAKRAK ■ M‘1,/ 3), .14■ TARAK /FORD■\ no YATadIAK O CEGHAK I CE6rAKj DEZAK d*7 V 123 KM
Page 206 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War Chapter 7, Vignette 2 Page 207
road. About 500 fighters deployed around the district center, while therest were engaged in fulltime logistic support. The siege lasted 45 days while the Mujahideen gradually tightenedthe noose around the militia positions. The Mujahideen kept only onethird of the fighters on the front line at any one time. The rest wereeither in reserve or involved in logistic service. The front line fighterswere relieved every 24 hours.
The Soviets and DRA supported the Dehrawud garrison with dailyair strikes on Mujahideen positions to check their advance. Theywould run two or three attack missions daily using fighter bombersand helicopter gunships. In the meantime, the Soviet/DRA commandassembled ground forces from Kandahar and Shindand to relieve theembattled militia at Dehrawud. However, it took the enemy weeksbefore he was ready to move large columns of infantry and tanks to themountainous battlefield.
One day, a Mujahideen gun crew on a ZGU-1 anti-aircraft heavymachine gun shot down one of a pair of Soviet fighter-bombers flyingover Dehrawud. The plane burst into flames and fell in the HelmandRiver. The pilot, said to be a high ranking officer,2 bailed out and land-ed five to six kilometers from the nearest Mujahideen position. Theother fighter circled the area and flew away apparently after pinpoint-ing the crash site of the fallen plane. A seven-man Mujahideen teamunder Mulla Juma Khan went to capture the pilot. By the time theMujahideen reached the pilot, he had moved to a position from whichhe could fire his AK-74 at the advancing resistance fighters.
TheMujahideen tried to capture the pilot alive. While they were prepar-ing to try and capture him, a swarm of transport helicopters and heli-copter gunships flew over the Kotal-e Murcha pass from Kandahar andbegan gun runs against the Mujahideen positions. Two helicoptershovered over the crash site. One hovered about 50 meters from theground and lowered a ladder. The Soviet pilot jumped up from his hideout and started climbing up the ladder. Seeing that the Soviet pilot was escaping, the Mujahideen opened fire and killed the pilot and damaged the helicopter. The helicopter tried to escape but crashedabout three kilometers away.
This incident triggered increased Soviet air activity as they tried tosoften up the area for the upcoming attack by ground forces moving ontwo axes to Dehrawud. One column was approaching along theHelmand River from Kajaki dam and the other from Khakrez acrossthe Kotal-e Murcha pass. For three days, Soviet air strikes continued
Mulla Malang states that he was a general officer.
Page 208 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War
uninterrupted from dawn to dusk. However, the Mujahideen sufferedfewer casualties than the militiamen, who sustained losses from bothcollateral damage and "friendly fire."
Following three days of heavy bombardment, a column of enemyinfantry and tanks arrived from the Kajaki side. Although theMujahideen groups assigned to cover this approach had left earlier, theterrain did not support tank movement. A Soviet Movement SupportDetachnient (MSD) used road construction machines and demolitionsto open a way through the rocky approaches to Dehrawud for the tanksand APCs. The Soviets conducted airmobile insertions of soldiers onthe heights overlooking the movement route to provide flank security.
By this time, the Mujahideen were too widely dispersed for effec-tive control. The contingents from Kandahar and Helmand were onopposite sides of the Helmand River and could not cross it. Theirheavy weapons, such as the ZGU-1, DShK and surface-to-surface rock-ets were also positioned on both sides of the river. Their fires could notbe coordinated. Five days after they killed the Soviet pilot on theHelmand River, the Mujahideen realized that they had lost commandand control over the scattered detachments and could not deal with thetwo-pronged enemy advance. Therefore, the Mujahideen groups with-drew to their separate provincial bases by mountain paths.
The Soviet column from Kajaki reached Dehrawud and recov-ered the body of the dead pilot. The Mujahideen had removedhis documents earlier. As the Mujahideen pulled out, the columnfrom Kandahar stopped at Khakrez and did not proceed toDehrawud. It conducted a number of search and destroy actionsin the area and returned. During the entire 45-day battle, theDRA militia incurred the heaviest losses. Mujahideen casualtieswere negligible. Mulah Malang states that the Mujahideen shotdown a jet fighter and 10 helicopters.

### COMMENTARY:

This Mujahideen seige was a conventional battle by aguerrilla force. It ended in a tactical setback. Had the Mujahideenestablished an operational command system in the region, it wouldhave been easier for them to coordinate their action in terms of timeand space: Lack of such an arrangement left a sizeable Mujahideenforce without operational support by other local groups, especially inblocking the movement of Soviet/DRA reinforcements.
Guerrilla forces are best employed for actions of short duration.Long, extended operations, such as this seige, asks a lot of unpaidvolunteers. The Mujahideen did assign detachments to cover the approaches to Dehrawud from the south, but, as the seige continued,many of the fighters found more pressing business to attend tothen sitting idly on a mountain. They departed one after another andleft the approaches open. Both the Kajaki axis and the Kotal-eMurcha axis were very easy to block with a small detachment ofdetermined fighters. If the Mujahideen had held their positions,they could have stopped the large columns of their enemy and cele-brated a Mujahideen victory in Dehrawud. But, once again, theMujahideen experience demonstrated their tactical and logisticallimitations in maintaining control over large forces for an extendedperiod of time. Most of the Mujahideen were not fighting on theirhome territory and, therefore, were less enthusiastic about remain-ing in stationary positions for an extended period of time while theSoviet Air Force attacked them.
Air power, while seldom decisive in guerrilla war, played a majorrole in breaking this seige. Once the Mujahideen assumed static posi-tions, the Soviet Air Force was able to delay the Mujahideen assaultand gain the time needed for the ground forces to reach the battlefield.