# City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc.

Supreme Court of the United States
514 U.S. 725
CITY OF EDMONDS v. OXFORD HOUSE, INC., ET AL.
Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
No. 94-23. Argued: Mar. 1, 1995 --- Decided: May 15, 1995

## Dissenting Opinion

    Thomas
Respondent Oxford House operates a group home in Edmonds, Washington, for 10 to 12 adults recovering from alcoholism and drug addiction in a neighborhood zoned for single-family residences. Petitioner City of Edmonds (City) issued citations to the owner and a resident of the house, charging violation of the City's zoning code. The code provides that the occupants of single-family dwelling units must compose a "family," and defines family as "persons [without regard to number] related by genetics, adoption, or marriage, or a group of five or fewer [unrelated] persons." Edmonds Community Development Code (ECDC) § 21.30.010. Oxford House asserted reliance on the Fair Housing Act (FHA), which prohibits discrimination in housing against, inter alios, persons with handicaps. Discrimination covered by the FHA includes "a refusal to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices or services, when such accommodations may be necessary to afford [handicapped] person[s] equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling." 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B). Edmonds subsequently sued Oxford House in federal court, seeking a declaration that the FHA does not constrain the City's zoning code family definition rule. Oxford House counterclaimed under the FHA, charging the City with failure to make a "reasonable accommodation" permitting the maintenance of the group home in a single-family zone. Respondent United States filed a separate action on the same FHA "reasonable accommodation" ground, and the cases were consolidated. The District Court held that the City's zoning code rule defining "family," ECDC § 21.30.010, is exempt from the FHA under 42 U.S.C. § 3607(b)(1) as a "reasonable . . . restrictio[n] regarding the maximum number of occupants permitted to occupy a dwelling." The Court of Appeals reversed, holding § 3607(b)(1)'s absolute exemption inapplicable.
Held: Edmonds' zoning code definition of the term "family" is not a maximum occupancy restriction exempt from the FHA under § 3607(b)(1). Pp. 731–738.
(a) Congress enacted § 3607(b)(1) against the backdrop of an evident distinction between municipal land-use restrictions and maximum occupancy restrictions. Land-use restrictions designate districts—e.g., [p726] commercial or single-family residential—in which only compatible uses are allowed and incompatible uses are excluded. Reserving land for single-family residences preserves the character of neighborhoods as family residential communities. To limit land use to single-family residences, a municipality must define the term "family"; thus family composition rules are an essential component of single-family use restrictions. Maximum occupancy restrictions, in contradistinction, cap the number of occupants per dwelling, typically on the basis of available floor space or rooms. Their purpose is to protect health and safety by preventing dwelling overcrowding. Section 3607(b)(1)'s language—"restrictions regarding the maximum number of occupants permitted to occupy a dwelling"—surely encompasses maximum occupancy restrictions, and does not fit family composition rules typically tied to land-use restrictions. Pp. 732–735.
(b) The zoning provisions Edmonds invoked against Oxford House, ECDC §§ 16.20.010 and 21.30.010, are classic examples of a use restriction and complementing family composition rule. These provisions do not cap the number of people who may live in a dwelling: So long as they are related by "genetics, adoption, or marriage," any number of people can live in a house. A separate ECDC provision—§ 19.10.000—caps the number of occupants a dwelling may house, based on floor area, and is thus a prototypical maximum occupancy restriction. In short, the City's family definition rule, ECDC § 21.30.010, describes family living, not living space per occupant. Defining family primarily by biological and legal relationships, the rule also accommodates another group association: Five or fewer unrelated people are allowed to live together as though they were family. But this accommodation cannot convert Edmonds' family values preserver into a maximum occupancy restriction. Edmonds' contention that subjecting single-family zoning to FHA scrutiny will overturn Euclidian zoning and destroy the effectiveness and purpose of single-family zoning both ignores the limited scope of the issue before this Court and exaggerates the force of the FHA's antidiscrimination provisions, which require only "reasonable" accommodations. Since only a threshold question is presented in this case, it remains for the lower courts to decide whether Edmonds' actions violate the FHA's prohibitions against discrimination. Pp. 735–738.
18 F.3d 802, affirmed.
Ginsburg, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C.J., and Stevens, O'Connor, Souter, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Thomas, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Scalia and Kennedy, JJ., joined, post, p. 738.
[p727] W. Scott Snyder argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioner.
William F. Sheehan argued the cause for private respondents. With him on the brief were Elizabeth M. Brown, David E. Jones, John P. Relman, Robert I. Heller, and Steven R. Shapiro.
Deputy Solicitor General Bender argued the cause for respondent United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Days, Assistant Attorney General Patrick, Cornelia T. L. Pillard, Jessica Dunsay Silver, and Gregory B. Friel.

## Notes

* ↑ Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the City of Lubbock by Jean E. Shotts, Jr.; for the City of Mountlake Terrace by Gregory G. Schrag; for the Township of Upper St. Clair by Robert N. Hackett; and for the International City/County Management Association et al. by Richard Ruda, Lee Fennell, and Michael J. Wahoske.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts et al. by Scott Harshbarger, Attorney General of Massachusetts, and Stanley J. Eichner, Donna L. Palermino, and Leo T. Sorokin, Assistant Attorneys General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective jurisdictions as follows: Grant Woods of Arizona, Winston Bryant of Arkansas, Alan G. Lance of Idaho, Thomas J. Miller of Iowa, Richard P. Ieyoub of Louisiana, Frankie Sue Del Papa of Nevada; Tom Udall of New Mexico, Charles W. Burson of Tennessee, Dan Morales of Texas, Jan Graham of Utah, Rosalie Simmonds Ballantine of the Virgin Islands, and Darrell V. McGraw, Jr., of West Virginia; for the American Association on Mental Retardation et al. by Lois G. Williams, Jerrold J. Ganzfried, Gregg A Hand, Leonard S. Rubenstein, and Ira A Burnim; for the American Association of Retired Persons by Steven S. Zaleznick, Michael Schuster, Bruce B. Vignery, and Deborah M. Zuckerman; for the American Planning Association by Brian W. Blaesser and Daniel M. Lauber; for the American Society of Addiction Medicine et al. by Paul M. Smith, Seth P. Stein, Robert L. Schonfeld, Richard Taranto, and Carolyn I. Polowy; for the American Train Dispatchers Division of Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers et al. by Lawrence M. Mann; and for the National Fair Housing Alliance by Timothy C. Hester, Robert A Long, Jr., and Christina T. Uhlrich.
Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the City of Fultondale by Palmer W. Norris and Fred Blanton, Jr.; and for the Pacific Legal Foundation by Ronald A. Zumbrun and Anthony T. Casa.
This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
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