# The Philippine Islands, 1493–1898/Volume 8/Opinions of the religious communities

OPINIONS OF THE RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES UPON WAGING WAR WITH THE ZAMBALES
OPINION OF THE AUGUSTINIANS
Your Lordship orders us to give our judgment whether it be lawful to make war on the Zambales, in view of the many injuries that they have been and daily are inflicting upon our people; and, if so be that the war is lawful and righteous, what measures may be taken to attain the end proposed therein, security.
In reply to this we say that, according to all the authorities, divines as well as canonists and jurists, three conditions are required in a war to make it a righteous one; and on these we will rest the justification of the war at present under consideration.
The first condition is that he who begins the war shall have authority; the second, just cause for making war; and third, righteous intention.
The first requires that he who begins the war and by whose order it is waged be a public person, as St. Augustine declares, Contra Faustum Manichæum; cited by Gratian (23 qu. I. c. Quid culpatur): Ordo naturalis mortalium paci accommodatus hoc boscit, ut suscipiendi belli authoritas atque consilium penes principes sit. Whence it is clear, as St. Thomas says ​(2a 2æ, q. 40, art. 1), that a private person cannot lawfully make war; for, if he is aggrieved, he should resort to his superior for satisfaction; and it is as little within the right of a private individual to collect such a body of men as is requisite to carry on a war. The difficulty is to understand what is meant by "public person" or "prince;" for it is plain that it is not lawful for every prince or judge whatsoever to wage war. The solution of this difficulty, according to St. Thomas (ubi supra), and Cajetanus (ibi and in Summa, ch. Bellum), and Castro (De justa hæreticorum punitione lib. 2, c. 4), is that by "public person" in the present case is understood the one who in his government depends not on another; such are the kings of Spain and France, also some free commonwealths, as Venice, Florence, and Ferrara: these have authority, without recourse to another, to wage war. But those princes and states whose government is not sovereign may not levy war without authority from their superior; and so the lords of Castilla and the viceroys and governors appointed by our king Philippus may not without a warrant make war.
What is said applies not when war is waged for defense against enemies, but in other circumstances; for if it is for defense, such war is permitted to any governor or king, as the authors say, because vim vi repellere licet;" and thus the viceroys and governors of the Indias have authority to levy war against dis​turbers of the peace and quiet of the states of which they are in charge, without necessity of resorting to his Majesty for permission.
The second condition of righteous war is that the cause for which it is waged shall be a just one, as St. Thomas says: "Those upon whom war is waged deserve it for the offenses that they have committed, and the grievances that they have inflicted upon the one who makes war on them." Thus says St. Augustine (lib. 83. Quæstionum super Josue, 9. 10), and Gratian quotes him (23, q. 2, c. Dominus noster): Justa autem bella solent definiri que ulciscuntur injurias, si gens vel civitas plectenda est, quod vel vindicare neglexerit quod a suis improbe factum est, vel reddere quod per injuriam ablatum est. And as this injury and grievance may be of many kinds, so too, many and various are the just causes of war; but we will consider here only those which make for the matter in hand, confirmed by the authority of Scripture.
The first ground of a righteous war may exist when one is hindered from doing what he may by right do. This is matter of natural and divine law and on this ground Julius Cæsar, as Lucan represents him (lib. 1), made defense of his conduct in waging war against the Roman state—viz., that the state had blocked to him, a Roman citizen, the route to Rome; and so he said, arms in hand, Omnia dat qui justa negat. On this ground, as St. Augustine says (in Quaest. Num. q. 43), the children of Israel justly ​
made war on the kings of the Amorites (Ut legitimum, c. 21), for having withstood their passage through their country when they were on their way to the promised land, although the Israelites had given assurance that they would do no damage to the lands, the crops, or the vineyards of the Amorites. And so says St. Augustine (and he is quoted ubi supra, last chapter), Notandum est sane quemadmodum justa bella gerebantur a filiis Israel contra Amoritas: innoxius enim transitus denegabatur qui jure humana societatis aequissimo patere debebat. Upon which passage Joannes Andreas in his gloss well says: Licet enim transire per alienum agrum jus non sit, tamen quia necessarius et innoxius erat iste transitus illi prohibere non debuerunt; item quia via publica erat et nemo prohibetur via publica.
The second ground, as I said, of a righteous war is the self-defense of the prince or of his subjects. This ground also is matter of both natural and divine right; for even as self-defense is a natural right, on which right is founded the rule of vim vi repellere, so too in the prince is the defense of his subjects—for the care which the prince has of his subjects is as essential on his part as is the care which each one of them has for himself; hence, if the subjects are ag​grieved by their enemies, the prince may justly in their defense make war, and vim vi repellere. This is much better than that the individual should himself avenge the wrong; for the individual can lawfully defend himself and his property only in continente, as Sylvester declares (Bellum, 2 § 3), but he may not avenge past wrongs, nec sua repetere save by recourse to his judge and superior. Whatever goes beyond that is contrary to law and good government and, as Cajetan says, is extra moderamen tutelæ, it being an essential condition of the right vim vi repellere that it be done cum moderamine. But the prince and the state have the same authority with respect to their enemies at whose hands they have suffered injury, which they have with regard to their own subjects; and hence not only may they defend themselves lest either they or their subjects suffer injury, but they may avenge injuries by inflicting punishment, exact satisfaction for damage done, and take the enemies' lives, if so the quiet and safety of their subjects require. Under this head come the many wars waged by King David against the Philistines, mentioned in the Scriptures; as also the war of the Machabee captains against the kings Antiochus and Demetrius.
The third cause and ground is rebellion and disobedience of subjects. This was the ground of David's war with Sheba, son of Bichri, who raised a revolt, as you may read in II Sam. 20; and this is ​
what St. Augustine says (Contra Faustum Manichaum, l. 22, c. 74): Adversus violentiam resistentium sive deo sive aliquo legitimo imperio jubente gerenda ipsa bella suscipiuntur a bonis ubi eos vel jubere tale aliquid vel in talibus obedire juste ordo ipse constringit (in c. Quid culpatur, ubi supra.)
The fourth cause and ground for a righteous war is when there is default of keeping faith or carrying out agreements; for in such case the party who has been wronged may lawfully make war on him who, by not keeping faith, has done him injury. This made Joran [Jehoram], king of Israel, wage war on Mesa [Mesha], king of Moab, for his having failed to keep the agreements and to pay the tribute which he had promised to pay to his suzerain, King Ahab; and that this war was just is clear, for that he was assisted therein by the holy and righteous Jehoshaphat, king of Judah, with the approval of the prophet Elisha—who in the name of the Lord urged them on to war, and promised them a sure victory—as is seen in II Sam. ch. 3. These four causes and grounds, or any one of them by itself, justify war; and there are other grounds also, but these are the most certain and the most applicable to the matter in hand. The third condition which, as we have said, must ​be fulfilled to make a war righteous is a right intention on the part of him who wages it; because, failing this, even when the other two conditions concur—to wit, authority and just cause—a faulty intention may render and does render the war unjust. This condition is also laid down by St. Augustine (Contra Faustum), and he is quoted by Gratian (in c. Quid culpatur); and as his words are of great weight and define wherein a bad intention consists, it is well to quote them: Quid culpatur in bello? an quid moriuntur quandoque morituri ut dominentur in pace victuri? Hoc reprehendisse timidorum est non religiosorum. Nocendi cupiditas, ulciscendi crudelitas, impacatus atque implacabilis animus, feritas rebellandi, libido dominandi et si quae sunt similia: haec sunt quae in bellis jure culpantur. And what must be the right intention of the prince in levying war the same Augustine declares in the book De Verbo Domini; and the passage is found in c. Apud, ubi supra: Apud veros dei cultores et ipsa bella peccata non sunt quae non cupiditate aut crudelitate sed pacis studio geruntur ut mali coerceantur et boni subleventur. Peace is the end that is to be sought in war, and so saith Aristotle (lib. 10 Ethicorum): Bellum gerimus ut in pace degamus. And Augus​tine says the same (Epist. ad Bonifacium): Non quaeritur pax ut bellum exerceatur, sed bellum geritur ut pax acquiratur.
But here it is to be noted that this right intention which is here required is a condition no more essential to a righteous war than to other good works, for in all these it is required, and without it no work is virtuous; and hence it is that if this right intention be wanting in the prince who levies war and in those who urge it, he would sin by wrong intention, but if the other two conditions be fulfilled, he, as Soto says, will not be held to make amends for the injuries that may be done in the war. So, too, if a judge orders a robber to be hanged, granted that ex odio suspendat, he will not be held to restitution, if on the testimony adduced the man deserved hanging.
Reply
Having ascertained the conditions required to make a war just, from them we shall be able clearly to decide whether such is the war against the Zambales at present under discussion. To this question we will answer affirmatively: that it is lawful without any scruple whatever, for in it the three conditions meet which are required for a just war, as we have already said.
And first, in this war is found the first condition, namely, authority in the one who wages it, for he is persona publica, the governor of these isles; and also he has a superior who is our king. But since the cause is self-defense, as will later be proved, he has ​no need of other permission to defend his state against enemies who molest it, as we have proved.
In this war, the third condition, too—we shall speak of the second later—is fulfilled, namely, right intention; for its end is the peace and security of the subjects, disturbed by these their enemies. And this peace it has not been possible to secure by means of our benevolent efforts, although such means have been tried—as appears from our labors to that end last year in sending religious of our order, and persons known to the Zambales, to persuade them to desist from wrongdoing and be our friends, granting them a general pardon for the wrongs they had committed against us; and although the Zambales promised, and made oath in their fashion, they have defaulted utterly, committing since then many atrocious wrongs against our people, as appears from the reports on that matter which have been drawn up. And, forasmuch as nothing has been gained through kindness, comes now, as a last and drastic remedy, the resolution to win peace and security for the king's subjects by waging war on his enemies; and this is the right intention that is required according to Aristotle and St. Augustine, as before quoted. But even suppose this intention to be lacking, it is already said and proved above that this condition is not in such sort essential as to oblige to indemnification.
It remains that we look into the second condition of just warfare, to wit, that just cause exist for waging it. This condition, in which might be presented greatest difficulty, is the clearest and plainest part of the matter before us; for not only are some of the four causes and grounds pointed out by us, as being any one of them in itself sufficient, but all the just ​causes are here concurrent. The first condition is fulfilled in that these Zambales impede the general traffic by sea and land of those who go to Pangasin and Ylocos and Cagayan. And, albeit the traffic works damage neither to them nor to their lands, but uses a common highway, yet they sally out upon the highways and kill and rob passengers, as appears from the reports.
Concurs also the second cause; for, although these Zambales are not molested by our people, they assault and murder them, not only falling upon them in the highways, as already said, but also seeking them out in the settlements while they are laboring in the fields; so that neither in their fields nor their homes are our people safe—which also is shown in the reports.
Furthermore, after promising obedience to our king and to the governor on his behalf, they have rebelled and renounced obedience, as we have said; and this is the third of the reasons which, as we said, justify the war.
Finally, the war is justified by their failure to keep their word and their pledges of friendship; for, as is well known, they have again and again, in the time of previous governors, been reconciled and have promised friendship, and thus have obtained pardon for their acts. And in the year just past this was done with greater formality and more solemn assurances, as appears from the record; but notwithstanding this, breaking the compact of peace, they have since then inflicted other and graver injuries—sallying out as robbers into the public routes by land and by sea, making descents on our settlements and murdering everyone on whom they can lay hands, be they ​Indians or Spaniards, seculars or ecclesiastics. Indeed, it is well known that last year they murdered a religious of our order, and they were tracking our provincial and two others, his companions; but all these, thanks to their own watchfulness, escaped.
From what has been said it stands amply proved that the war to be waged against the Zambales is a just one, and, beyond all scruple, as well on the part of him who sets it on foot as of those who take part in it.
But it may be that some one will, in opposition to what has been said, cite to us certain law texts to the effect that when a number of persons or a town sins, even if all or most of them are guilty, yet they should be pardoned. In the Decretum (dist. 50, c. ut constitueretur) St. Augustine says, writing to Bonifacius: Ubi per graves dissentionum scissuras non hujus aut illius hominis periculum sed populorum plurimorum strages jacet, detrahendum est aliquid severitati ut majoribus sanandis malis charitas syncera subveniat. And (1 q. 7 c. Quoties) Pope Innocent, as cited by Gratian, says: Quoties a populis aut a turba peccatur, quia in omnes propter multitudinem vindicari non potest inultum solet transire.
Much to the same effect is what is said by Alexander III (c. Extra, De clerico excommunicato), and also by Honorius III (in the last chapter, De transact.). And the reason for this is that in a mul​titude or in a town are many innocent persons, and it were a grave injustice to require that they shall suffer the rigorous punishment awarded to the guilty; while it is certain that in a war one suffers as much as the other; and hence, lest the innocent be punished, the guilty should be pardoned. To the objection which cites these testimonies in proof that parcendum est multitudini Castro makes apt reply (lib. 2 De justa haereticorum punitione c. 14), that the proposition is true and applies when the multitude or town purposes amendment, and there is fair hope of the same; but if the case is otherwise, and they persist in their evil ways after being admonished, reason says they shall be punished rigorously. The opposite course would only give them occasion to go on and become more hardened in their sin and misdoing, and cause others, after the example of these, to do the same that appearing to them to be lawful, when they see that it is not punished. And such is the teaching of c. Qui vult, de Pœnitentia, 3. 6., attributed to St. Augustine: Cum enim tot sunt qui labuntur ut pristinam dignitatem ex authoritate defendant et quasi usum peccandi sibi faciant, rescindenda est spes ista. Then, as these Zambales have many times been warned, and have promised and sworn peace and amends, and have totally defaulted, as we have already said, and have taken occasion, from the lenity shown them, to do greater mischiefs with more boldness—mistaking for timidity the kindliness that we have used toward them—it follows that, numerous ​though they are, we ought no longer to dissemble with them, but must punish them sternly; for the more numerous they are, the more mischief they do.
What we have stated in enforcing our thesis affords us occasion for explaining here the mode of procedure in this war, and—assuming it to be a lawful war, as has been sufficiently proved—for inquiring what considerations may be urged by those who carry on the war. And, for the sake of brevity and clearness, we will resolve the matter into a few points, without any arguments, for these points are corollaries of a just war.
First: If, to attain what is purposed—to wit, to bring the said Zambales under control—it becomes necessary that we burn their crops, their houses, and their other properties, and even kill those who make resistance, even if the presumption be that among them are some who are guiltless—it is lawful to do all this during war, until the final victory is won which is purposed. We say "if necessary," for unless the purpose of all that is done in the war is the final victory, such deeds will be impious and tyrannical. And hence the matter should not be left to the arbitrary will of the soldiers, but should be directed by the order of him who governs them.
Second: Also, if during the war there be lack of subsistence, or of other supplies needed for its prosecution, these may be taken from what the enemy have, even though the owners be guiltless, and this without obligation to restitution—the reason being that cum licet bellum licet apponere media necessaria ad finem victoria. ​Third: Ex jure gentium, during the war, all movables taken from any one of the enemy belong to him who has them, and there is no obligation to restitution: Sylvester Presbyter (Bellum, 1 § 10), and Cajetan (in Summa). I say "during the war," because when it is ended non licet ultra praedari.
Fourth: After they are reduced to subjection, those who are most guilty may be condemned to death, as also such others as regard for the security and tranquillity of the land may determine. But it will not be lawful to kill those of them who are found to be guiltless, even though it be feared that they may be mischievous in the future; for no grievance has been suffered at their hands, and means can be found of holding them securely, as we will show presently. Those of the inhabitants of a state who are usually deemed guiltless are lads not yet old enough to bear arms; old men incapacitated by age, save in the case that heretofore they have been mischievous; and the women, unless it appear that they too have engaged in war. But it will not suffice to say with Soto that they supply provisions for their husbands during the war, for that is a natural right and obligation. All the rest are deemed guilty, failing proof to the contrary; here strict investigation is to be made, lest wrong be done.
Fifth: Ex jure gentium, those captured in a just war are held as slaves. Paludanus (in 4. d. 15, 9. 3) holds that this is not to be understood as applying to Christian captives; and such is the truth, and this provision is observed among Christian kings. But, as these Zambales are not Christians, they may be dealt with according to the jus gentium, and made ​slaves. Yet, inasmuch as they are a people of small mental capacity, and hence do not realize the seriousness of their crime, they ought not to be treated with the full vigor of law; and therefore it seems to us that it will be enough to make them slaves for a limited time, ten or fifteen years.
Sixth: The war ended, his Lordship the governor may exact from the Zambales all the costs of the war, and indemnification for all the losses suffered; and he may, by way of chastisement, levy from them some tribute: for all this is jus belli in the case of a just war, such as is this, as stands proved.
Seventh: Since it is not enough to punish past crime unless a remedy is applied for the future; and since a wide experience has shown that little confidence is to be reposed in the word and the character of this people; and since to leave them in their mountains would be to give them occasion and good opportunity for doing mischief and damage hereafter, as always in the past: it seems to us that inasmuch as these Zambales are few and have not in their villages or in their territory any cultivated fields or any fixed settlements, it will be advisable, as security against their returning to their old ways, to transplant them from the mountain region to peopled districts, depriving them of arms, and giving them a village site and lands upon which, with police control and under a government, they may live and cultivate their farms. This we deem the ultimate remedy, and as being necessary for the ends of peace and security at which we aim.
Finally: It seems to us from the experience we have had in this matter, and from what we have seen, that the expeditions sent against these Zambales have ​been ineffective because this method was not employed. The plan should be carried out chiefly by means of the Indians of Pampanga and the Zambales of Pangasinan—people who know the country and its hiding-places and coverts; and who, as being more agile than Spaniards, bear more easily the toils of the march over the routes that have to be traversed, owing to the wildness of the region, which, as is well known, is very great. In payment of the costs to these Indians, the slaves captured in the war might be apportioned to them; and in virtue of this compact they will not commit the cruelties and murders to be apprehended from them. Besides, this will benefit the state; for, having more field-hands, they will plow and cultivate more land. Further, as regards the Panpangos, they will in this way obtain satisfaction for the many and serious wrongs that they have suffered from the Zambales in the way of both murders and robberies.
Such, with all respect for the better judgment of others, is our opinion regarding the matter proposed to us by your Lordship, with command to declare our views. This we do, recommending always moderation and Christian charity, which should ever be practiced, and especially in dealing with this people—who, as we have said, do not realize the gravity of their offense; and on whom, therefore, the penalties of the law ought not to be inflicted in all its rigor. And, to signify that this is our judgment, we confirm it with our names. Given at San Augustin de Manila, the nineteenth day of January, 1592.
Fray Joan de Valderrama, provincial Fray Alonzo de Castro, definitor Fray Lorenso de Leon, definitor
Signatures of Augustinian officials [From MS. in Archivo general de Indias, Sevilla]
Fray Joan de Tamayo, prior Fray Antonio Serrano, prior Fray Diego Gutierrez Fray Diego Muñoz Fray Diego Alvarez Fray Alonso de Montavalan, superior Fray Matthias Manrique Fray Alonso de Paz
[Endorsed: "Opinion of the Augustinian fathers regarding the Çambales." "Opinion of the Augustinian fathers upon waging war against the Zambales."]
OPINION OF THE DOMINICANS
Jesus
Admitting the information received against the Negrillos and certain Zambales, who commit assaults; and admitting (what is generally known) the murders committed daily, both past and present, and which have not been committed in their just defense or in just revenge for injuries—as is evident because indeed the Batanes, Panpangos, Pangasinanes, and Ylocos (and these last are the worst sufferers) were at peace with them, and, since that peace, neither the Panpangos nor the others have disturbed them in their villages or on the highways, but, on the contrary, have tried to preserve friendly relations; and admitting (likewise a well-known fact) the custom of this race from the earliest period of killing, whenever possible, Spaniards and Indians, without any distinction, and without having received any injuries, for the sole purpose of proving their courage by their ability to kill men, collecting heads and hanging them up in their houses, as such proof; item, admitting one other certain fundamental, that no incursion has been made into their lands for the sake of provoking them in their common habitation, but that they, on the other hand, invade, from their lands, the royal open highways and the settlements of the peaceful natives, in order to kill those who are living in peace with them, and with all: we render freely an exact opinion.
1. The Negrillos and mountain Zambales have not, because of their former wars, before the arrival of the Spaniards in this land, at present any just title to war against the settled and peaceful people of these islands. This is proved, for, although in those former ​times force ruled, and injustice held full sway, and meant different things to each individual, and no distinction was made—as, where two persons quarrel with words, and injure each other equally, there is no satisfaction other than to stop, and there is no distinction in the injury—now, after the pacification of the Indians in settlements, these wars ceased for many years; for which reason the old animosities do not furnish any just pretext for war to either Negrillos or Zambales against the Ilocos, Panpangos, etc. Item: Since those petty wars ceased, the Panpangos, etc., and all the others have not incited the Negrillos or Zambales to war; nor have they done them any injury, either personally or in their lands. Therefore the present action of the Negrillos and mountain Zanbales in committing assaults on the highways and killing as many as they have killed, has no just pretext of war from their neighbors.
2. Second, we assert that the Batanes, Panpangos, Pangasinanes, Ylocos, and other tribes living near the Negrillos and mountain Zambales, have a just pretext for war against the Negrillos and mountain Zanbales—a proof of which is admitted in the fact of the murders, robberies, attacks, and assaults on the highways, made without any just pretext, as we have said in the first conclusion. Therefore, on the contrary, the injured ones have a just pretext against them.
There appears to be no doubt regarding these two conclusions, for they are most certain according to natural reason and to all law. The whole difficulty is whether the injuries committed, the present harm, and that which with some reason is feared (which will be greater each day)—considering also the condition of the Negrillos, and the sort of country in ​which they live—whether all these together constitute sufficient pretext for an expedient so severe as war; and if fire and sword are necessary.
To answer this doubt, we must admit that, with the diversities and natural features of countries, and with the characteristics of the peoples therein, is entwined most intimately the jus gentium, as we call it. Accordingly, in some lands some things are regarded as established, and classed with the jus gentium, but not in others; and some things lawful in certain lands are not so in others. On the contrary, things that would be wrong for some would be lawful and jus gentium for others; while things wrong for others would be lawful and honorable to the first, because of the diversity of countries, customs, and race, whence arises this jus gentium. Therefore we say that, if in Castilla, where neither the land nor people of these islands are known, this case were to be judged on only the things written and proved, nothing more than that these people were assaulters would be decided; and an order would be issued to proceed against them as against assaulters. If these things should happen in Sierramorena, no orders would be given to destroy the towns near by; or, if in the Pyrenees, for that reason war would not be declared upon the Gascons or Navarrese. For this would be esteemed a personal offense, and not one committed by the community. But here, where we know the land, the people, and their abominable and long-standing customs, we must esteem it, not a personal, but a communal offense; nor must we presume amendment where ferocity springs from custom, now rendered almost natural instinct, and from the land being unconquerable. Therefore it must be presumed that, ​if they are not punished by force superior to their own, they will grow worse each day; for they consider cruelty honorable, and esteem him most who kills most. Therefore, with people of this nature, we apply the saying of Aristo—namely, that it is lawful to make war on and kill like wild beasts, those people who live unsettled and wandering like wild beasts. It is quite evident that Aristo means people harmful to others; for, even when they live like wild beasts, but are not harmful, war is not on that account lawful. And inasmuch as these arguments extend to the Negrillos and Zambales, it is our opinion that the war must be judged as just or unjust rather by the condition of the land and people, the injuries that will be inflicted, and the little relief obtained by employing other methods, than by the severity of the injuries received. It is no remedy to guard the roads, as is quite evident, because they do more harm in one night than the soldiers in a week. Likewise it is no remedy to guard the villages, for the people are obliged to go to the fields, etc. Consequently we say:
That, it is justifiable—by methods which will not cause greater annoyance to the regions adjoining the Negrillos and Zambales—to make war upon the Negrillos and Zambales, even with fire and sword, whenever the above reasons are evident. We prove this by the above statements, for ferocity is a quality among them now almost a natural instinct; and they place all their honor in killing, without caring for any other object. Again, these ills cannot be obviated and prevented, except by destroying them, if it be possible. Item: because there is no hope that they will make peace and settle down; for their happiness consists in living a nomadic life, without any re​straint, and they are a race who never keep any promise.
Item: We say that, because the method of warfare as employed by the Castilians is not by means of rough ground, forests, and dense thickets—as witness the war of Granada, in which Hespaña lost so many men because the rising was in places unknown to the Spaniards but known to the Moors. It has been seen here many times that the Spaniard needs ten or twenty servants to take care of his person, furniture, food, and clothing, alone—from which results more loss than that which the Negrillos and Zambales can inflict in a lifetime. We think, in the absence of better judgment, that, for a specified time, those cap- tured alive should be handed over to the neighboring districts as captives, or remanded to the galleys. Whoever is put to death, let it be by order of the captains, and at the time and place appointed. We render this opinion, as long as this measure does not appear more harmful [i.e., than the harm caused by the Negrillos and Zambales]. If any measure whatever is more harmful, then we shall consider it unlawful, although we are assured that a most justifiable right exists for making war, and for destroying with all the harm possible to them, and less harm to the surrounding people, than is done or can be done by the Negrillos and Zambales. Item: We declare that, as the losses of war are accidental, and depend on artifice, seasons, and innumerable other circumstances, it might well happen that what is advanced one time as justifiable may, given a change of conditions at the time of execution, become unjustifiable; for with the change of conditions the argument of justice or injustice is altered.
Signatures of Dominican officials [From MS. in Archivo general de Indias, Sevilla]
​Item: Because the term "Zambales," in general, comprehends many people to whom the above arguments do not apply, we say that, under the terms Zambales and Negrillos, we understand only those who are nomadic, as above stated. As to whom these may be, we refer to the investigations in detail; it is not for us to judge the information given, but to credit it. This we advance as our opinion, and as such we sign it. Given in the convent of Santo Domingo at Manila, January 1, 92.
Fray Juan de Castro Fray Alonso Ximenes Fray Juan de Castro Fray Juan de San Pedro Martir Fray Juan Cobos Fray Thomas Castellar Fray Juan Garcia
OPINION OF THE JESUITS
Jesus
In regard to our right to make war upon the Zambales, the following is our opinion. Granting as true the reports of robberies and murders committed by them, past and present, on both Castilians and the pacified Indians (who are our allies, and Christians), then it must be ascertained how these crimes have been committed—whether by all their land in common, or one portion of their province, so that by common consent those of one or many villages or the whole province conspire, and the bravest and strongest go forth to rob and kill; whether its head or chief is of one or of many villages or of the entire province, by whose order certain men go out to com​mit these depredations; or whether it is not really by common consent, or by the authority of the chiefs, but by crowds of ruffians from one or several villages who commit the said injuries.
If this people have a leader, and any go out from the villages or from the province to commit assaults, then this is sufficient cause for war. The same is true, even if they do not go at his order, but if the chiefs allow them to go, and do not punish them; since they have authority and power therefor. If there are no chiefs, then it must be ascertained whether they go out by common consent, to commit assaults, even if all do not go, but only a few. For, if they go by common consent, then war may be made on them all. But war may not be made if they went out as a single band of plunderers, even when they have friends and relatives in the villages, who protect them and supply them with food. It can not be determined that the latter are accomplices; neither can they be punished, nor be dissuaded from doing it, nor even prohibited from giving them food, etc., because of their being, as is usually the case, women and children, while the former are barbarous and cruel men. In such a case, then, it could only be allowable to seek to apprehend the guilty, as well as one might, and to punish them in conformity with their crimes. But nothing may be done to the others.
Signature of Antonio Sedeño, S.J. [From MS. in Archivo general de Indias, Sevilla]
​part in the depredation, or against all the province, or the guilty part; but it must be with the moderation with which our Catholic king has ordered, in so Christian-like a manner, war to be made, with the least bloodshed and injury possible. Those captured shall not be killed, except those who shall have committed individual crimes, who consequently merit death; and the others shall not be reduced to perpetual bondage, but for a limited period only.
However, because of the great danger from this tribe, in order to be sure of peace and to render secure our allies who dwell near the Zambales, whom we are bound to protect, all the children and women and the others may be taken from their land and divided in various parts in small bands, even when their crimes were perpetrated by but a few ruffians. By this method we receive much benefit and security, and they no harm, but on the contrary much benefit, both spiritual and corporal. But in no case do we think that they may have their ears cut off or be crippled so that they can not take flight—neither women, nor children, nor those who do not commit any individual crime which may merit such punishment; for this is great cruelty and will engender in all a deadly hatred of our nation and law. Besides, other and gentler means can be used to prevent them from becoming fugitives—such as dispersing them throughout many widely-separated districts, and providing some one to watch over them.
Antonio Sedeño
OPINION OF THE FRANCISCANS
Jesus
Signature of Pedro Baptista, O.S.F. [From MS. in Archivo general de Indias, Sevilla]
​the first condition to be established, observing faithfully in all things the spirit of uprightness and Christian moderation—which is justice, charity, and freedom for the innocent, according to the saints, particularly St. Augustine and St. Thomas, and other doctors of the church—seeking the common weal. Since the cause for just war is the injury received, war against them would be unjust, if they are innocent of the charges against them. This is my opinion, in view of the aforesaid report, in the absence of better judgment. Issued from this convent of San Francisco at Manila, January twentieth, 1592.
Fray Pedro Baptista
* ↑ The quotation from St. Augustine is cited in Gratian's "Decretum," in Corpus juris canonici; it reads thus, in English: "The natural order, fitted to promote peace among mortals, demands that the power to wage war, and the direction of it, rest in the sovereign." The other citation is from St. Thomas Aquinas's Summa theologica, part ii, div. ii, qu. 40, art. i.—Joseph Fitzgerald.
* ↑ "One may repel force with force."
* ↑ "Just wars are defined to be those which avenge wrongs; if a nation or a state is to be punished either for neglect to punish the evil deeds of their people, or to make restitution of what has been taken wrongfully."
* ↑ "He concedes all who refuses what is just."
* ↑ This reference is to St. Augustine's "Questions on (the book of) Numbers." The citation Ut legitimum is to a chapter in Gratian's Decretum, of which these are the opening words.—Joseph Fitzgerald.
* ↑ "It is to be observed in what manner just wars were waged by the children of Israel against the Amorites; for inoffensive transit was denied to them, although by the most equitable laws of human fellowship it should be open."
* ↑ "Though it be not lawful to cross over the lands of others, still, as this transit was necessary and harmless, they [the Amorites] ought not to have forbidden it-and, further, because it was a public route, and no one is forbidden to use a public route."
* ↑ In continente, "on the spot;" that is, at the actual time of the assault or other wrong. Nec sua repetere, "nor recover his own" (by force or violence is implied). Silvester is cited in the Theologia moralis of Alphonso Maria de Liguori.—Joseph FitzGerald.
* ↑ "Beyond the due limits of [lawful self-] defense."
* ↑ The Spanish writer cites "II Kings." But the books desig--
* ↑ "Whether at command of God or that of some legitimate ruler, wars are undertaken even by good men, to be waged against the violence of rebels, when civil order itself justly constrains them either to command such action or to obey [i.e., to serve in the army]." Quid culpatur is the opening of a chapter in Gratian's Decretum, a section of the canon law, and serves as the title of the chapter.—Joseph FitzGerald.
* ↑ "What is condemned in war? Is it that men who at some time must die, die in war? It is for cowards to fault this, not religious men. The desire to do injury, the cruelty of revenge, unappeased and implacable hate, the wild passions of rebellion, lust of power and the like—such are the things which are justly condemned in wars."
* ↑ " With God's true worshipers even wars are not sinful if they are waged, not through greed or with cruelty, but for the sake of peace, that the wicked may be repressed and the good sustained."
* ↑ "We wage war that we may live in peace."
* ↑ "Peace is not sought that war may be waged, but war is waged that peace may be won."
* ↑ "He hangs him out of hatred."
* ↑ "When from dissensions and factions results, not peril to this one or that, but slaughter of whole populations, then severity must be relaxed somewhat, that sweet charity may intervene for the healing of those greater ills."
* ↑ "Whenever evil is done by whole populations or by a multitude, then, because it is not possible to punish them all, on account of their great number, the matter usually passes by unpunished."
* ↑ "The multitude should be spared."
* ↑ "For when there are so many who fall that they defend their former iniquity by authority, and who make, as it were, a business of sinning, that hope itself must be cut off."
* ↑ "As war is lawful, it is lawful to use the means needful to attain the end, which is victory."
* ↑ "Plunder is no longer allowable."
* ↑ Juan de Valderrama was the head of the Augustinian missionaries sent to the Philippines in 1582. He had much executive ability, and, besides conducting one or more churches in the villages near Manila, held successively important posts in his order (prior provincial, from 1590). He died in 1618. Alonso de Castro came to the islands in 1577, and was missionary in several villages, both Tagalo and Bisayan, as he had mastered both languages. Gifted as a theologian and orator, he was designated by Felipe II as bishop of Nueva Cáceres, but died (1597) before he could exercise that office. Lorenso de León came in 1582, and held many high positions in his order there. In 1606 he returned to Mexico, where he died in 1623. Juan Vega Tamayo who arrived in the same year, remained until his death (in 1603), most of his time being occupied in official duties at Manila. Of Antonio Serrano it is only known that he occupied various official positions in the Manila convent from 1590 to 1596. Diego Gutierrez was a missionary in Luzón from 1578 until his death in 1613. Diego Muñoz came in 1578, and was professor of theology in the Manila convent, missionary to the Chinese at Tondo in 1581, the first commissary of the Inquisition in the islands (see his instructions, vol. v, pp. 256-273), and prior provincial from 1587. He died at Manila in 1594. Diego Álvarez was in the islands from 1578 until his death (1601) mainly engaged in official duties. Alonso de Montalban came in 1590, and died in 1604. Matías Manrique came in 1586, and died in 1593. Alonso Paz is known to have been in Luzón during 1591-93. The above information is obtained from Pérez's Catálogo.
* ↑ This was doubtless St. Pedro Bautista Blazquez y Blazquez Villacastin, born June 29, 1542, of a noble Spanish family. He made his religious profession in the Franciscan order, in 1567. After some time spent in Mexico, he came to the Philippines, where his first task was the instruction of Tagals in music. In 1586 he was chosen as custodian of the Franciscan communities there, which office he held until 1591; he was then appointed guardian of the Manila convent. He was very active in mission work in the islands, and founded several convents and villages. In 1593 he was sent by Governor Dasmariñas as ambassador to Japan; was afterward placed in charge of the Franciscan missions in Japan; and founded a hospital for lepers and a convent in the city of Miaco. On February 5, 1597, Father Bautista with five of his brethren, and a number of Japanese converts, were martyred at Nagasaki. He was beatified in 1627, and canonized by Pius IX in 1862. See Gomez Platero's Catálogo biográfico (Manila, 1880); and Santa Inés's Crónica, i, pp. 452-466.
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