# The German Classics of the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries/Volume 10/Speeches of Prince Bismarck/Bismarck as the "Honest Broker"

BISMARCK AS THE "HONEST BROKER"
February 19, 1878
TRANSLATED BY EDMUND VON MACH, PH.D.
[The complete victory which Russia had won in the Turkish war had greatly disturbed the European powers, and in Germany much apprehension was felt for the safety of Austria. England, too, was much concerned, for she had been displeased at Bismarck's refusal to intervene in the war. German public opinion was aroused, and the representative von Bennigsen joined with four colleagues in the following interpellation, which they made in the Reichstag on February 8: "Is the Chancellor willing to inform the Reichstag of the political situation in the Orient, and of the position which the German empire has taken or intends to take in regard to it?" The interpellation was put on the calendar of February 19, and while Bismarck regarded it as ill timed he was ready to reply, lest his silence be misunderstood.]
FIRST ask the indulgence of the Reichstag if I should not be able to stand while I say everything I have to say. I am not so well as I look.
With regard to the question, I cannot deny that I was in doubt, when I first saw the interpellation, not whether I would answer it—for its form gives me the right to answer it with a "No"—but whether I should not have to say "No." Do not assume, gentlemen, as one generally does in such cases, that the reason was because I had to suppress a good deal which would compromise our policy or restrict it in an undesirable manner. On the contrary, I have hardly enough to say in addition to what is already generally known to induce me, of my own initiative, to make a statement to the representatives of the empire.
THE BERLIN CONGRESS
From the Painting by Anton von Werner
Regarding the present situation, I suspect that you already know everything I can say about it. You know from the press and the English parliamentary debates that at present one can say in the Orient, "The arms are idle, and the storms of war are hushed"—God grant, for a long while! The armistice which has been concluded grants the Russian army an unbroken position from the Danube to the sea of Marmora, with a base which it lacked formerly. I mean the fortresses near the Danube. This fact, which is nowhere denied, seems to me to be the most important of the whole armistice. There is excluded from the Russian occupation, if I begin in the north, a quadrangular piece, with Varna and Shumla, extending along the shore of the Black Sea to Battshila in the north, and not quite to the Bay of Burgas in the south, thence inland to about Rasgrad—a pretty exact quadrangle. Constantinople and the peninsula of Gallipoli are also excluded, the very two points on whose independence of Russia several interested powers are laying much stress.
Certain peace preliminaries preceded the armistice, which at the risk of telling you things you already know I shall nevertheless review because they will answer the question whether German interests are at stake in any one of them. There is, in the first place, the establishment of ​Bulgaria "within the limits determined by the majority of the Bulgarian population, and not smaller than indicated by the conference of Constantinople."
The difference between these two designations is not of sufficient importance, I believe, to constitute a reasonable danger to the peace of Europe. The ethnographical information which we possess is, it is true, not authentic nor without gaps, and the best we know has been supplied by Germans in the maps by Kiepert. According to this the national frontier—the frontier of the Bulgarian nationality—runs down in the west just beyond Salonica, along a line where the races are rather unmixed, and in the east with an increased admixture of Turkish elements in the direction of the Black Sea. The frontier of the conference, on the other hand, so far as it is possible to trace it, runs—beginning at the sea—considerably farther north than the national frontier, and two separate Bulgarian provinces are contemplated. In the west it reaches somewhat farther than the national frontier into the districts which have an admixture of Albanian races. The constitution of Bulgaria according to the preliminaries would be similar to that of Servia before the evacuation of Belgrade and other strongholds; for this first paragraph of the preliminaries closes with these words, "The Ottoman army will not remain there," and, in parenthesis, "barring a few places subject to mutual agreement."
It will, therefore, devolve upon the powers who signed the Paris treaty of 1856 to discuss and define those sentences which were left open and indefinite there, and to come to an agreement with Russia, if this is possible, as I hope it may be.
Then there follow "The Independence of Montenegro * * * also of Roumania and Servia;" and directions concerning Bosnia and Herzegovina, whose reforms "should be analogous."
None of these things, I am convinced, touches the interests of Germany to such an extent that we should be ​justified in jeopardizing for its sake our relations with our neighbors—our friends. We may accept one or the other definition without loss in our spheres of interest.
Then there follows, under paragraph five, a stipulation concerning the indemnity of war, which leaves the question open, whether "it should be pecuniary or territorial." This is a matter which concerns the belligerents in so far as it may be pecuniary, and the signers of the Paris treaty of peace in so far as it may be territorial, and will have to be settled by their consent.
Then there follows the provision concerning the Dardanelles. This, I believe, has given cause for much more anxiety in the world than is justified by the actual possibilities of any probable outcome. "His Majesty the Sultan declares his willingness to come to an agreement with His Majesty the Emperor of Kussia with a view of safeguarding the rights and interests of Russia in the straits of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles."
The question of the Dardanelles is freighted with importance when it means placing the control there—the key of the Bosphorus—in other hands than heretofore, and deciding whether Russia shall be able to close and to open the Dardanelles at will. All other stipulations can have reference only to times of peace, for in the more important times of war the question will always hinge on whether the possessor of the key to the Dardanelles is in alliance with or dependent on those living outside or inside the Dardanelles, on Russia or on the opponents of Russia. In case of war, I believe no stipulation which may be made will have the importance which people fear, provided the Dardanelles are in times of peace in the possession of people who are fully independent of Russia. It may be of interest for the people on the shores of the Mediterranean to know whether the Russian Black Sea fleet shall be permitted in times of peace to sail through the Dardanelles and to show itself on their shores. If, however, it shows itself there, I should infer peace, like good weather from the barometer; when ​it withdraws and carefully secludes itself, then it is time to suspect that clouds are gathering. The question, therefore, whether men-of-war shall be permitted to pass the Dardanelles in times of peace, although by no means unimportant, is to my way of thinking not sufficiently important to inflame Europe.
The question whether the possession of the Dardanelles shall be shifted to other owners is entirely different. It constitutes, however, a conjectural eventuality which the present situation does not contemplate, I believe, and on which I shall, therefore, express no opinion. My only concern at present is to give an approximate definition, as best I can, of those weighty interests which may lead to another war after the Russian-Turkish war has been actually concluded. For this reason I deem it important to affirm that the stipulations of peace concerning the Dardanelles mean less for the men-of-war than for the merchant marine. The preeminent German interest in the Orient demands that the waterways, the straits as well as the Danube from the Black Sea upward, shall continue as free and open to us as they have been until now. I rather infer that we shall surely obtain this, for as a matter of fact it has never even been questioned. An official communication on this point which I have received from St. Petersburg simply refers to the existing stipulations of the treaty of Paris. Nothing is jeopardized; our position can be no worse and no better than it has been.
The interest which we have in a better government of a Christian nation and in the safeguards against those acts of violence which have occurred at times, under Turkish rule, is taken care of by the agreements mentioned above. And this is the second interest which Germany has in this whole affair. It is less direct, but is dictated by humanity.
The rest of the preliminary stipulations consists—I will not say of phrases, for it is an official paper—but it has no bearing on our present discussion.
With these explanations I have answered to the best of ​my ability the first part of the interpellation concerning the present state of affairs in the Orient, and I fear, gentlemen, that I have said nothing new to any one of you.
The other parts of the question refer to the position which Germany has taken or intends to take in view of the now existing conditions and innovations.
As to the position which we have already taken I cannot now give you any information, for officially we have been in possession of the papers to which I have referred only a very short while, I may say literally only since this very morning. What we knew beforehand was in general agreement with these papers, but not of a nature to make official steps possible. It consisted of private communications for which we were indebted to the courtesy of other governments.
Official steps, therefore, have not yet been taken, and would be premature in view of the conference, which I hope is at hand. All this information will then be available and we shall be in a position to exchange opinions concerning these matters. Any alterations, therefore, of the stipulations of 1856 will have to be sanctioned. If they should not be, the result would not necessarily be another war, but a condition of affairs which all the powers of Europe, I think, have good cause to avoid. I am almost tempted to call it making a morass of matters. Let us assume that no agreement about what has to be done can be reached in the conference, and that the powers who have a chief interest in opposing the Russian stipulations should say: "At the present moment it does not suit us to go to war about these questions, but we are not in accord with your agreements, and we reserve our decision"—would not that establish a condition of affairs which cannot be agreeable even to Russia? The Russian policy rightly says, "We are not desirous of exposing ourselves to the necessity of a Turkish campaign every ten or twenty years, for it is exhausting, strenuous, and expensive." But the Russian policy, on the other hand, cannot wish to substitute for this Turkish ​danger an English-Austrian entanglement recurring every ten or twenty years. It is, therefore, my opinion that Russia is equally interested with the other powers in reaching an agreement now, and in not deferring it to some future and perhaps less convenient time.
That Russia could possibly wish to force the other powers by war to sanction the changes which she deems necessary I consider to be beyond the realm of probability. If she could not obtain the sanction of the other signers of the clauses of 1856, she would, I suppose, be satisfied with the thought "Beati possidentes" (happy are the possessors). Then the question would arise whether those who are dissatisfied with the Russian agreements and have real and material interests at stake, would be ready to wage war in order to force Russia to diminish her demands or to give up some of them. If they should be successful in forcing Russia to give up more than she could bear, they would do so at the risk of leaving in Russia, when the troops come home, a feeling similar to that in Prussia after the treaties of 1815, a lingering feeling that matters really are not settled, and that another attempt will have to be made.
If this could be achieved by a war, one would have to regard, as the aim of this war, the expulsion of Russia from the Bulgarian strongholds which she is at present occupying, and from her position which no doubt is threatening Constantinople—although she has given no indication of a wish to occupy this city. Those who would have accomplished this by a victorious war, would then have to shoulder the responsibility of deciding what should be done with these countries of European Turkey. That they should be willing simply to reinstate the Turkish rule in its entirety after everything said and determined in the conference, is, I believe, very improbable. They would, therefore, be obliged to make some kind of a disposition, which could not differ very much in principle from what is being proposed now. It might differ in geographical extent and in the degree of independence, but I do not believe that ​Austria-Hungary, for instance, the nearest neighbor, would be ready to accept the entire heritage of the present Russian conquest, and be responsible for the future of these Slavic countries, either by incorporating them in the state of Hungary or establishing them as dependencies. I do not believe that this is an end which Austria can much desire in view of her own Slavic subjects. She cannot wish to be the editor of the future in the Balkan peninsula, as she would have to be if she won a victory.
I mention all these eventualities, in which I place no faith, for the sake of proving how slight the reasonable probability of a European war appears to be. It is not reasonably probable that the greater or lesser extent of a tributary State—unless conditions were altogether unbearable—should induce two neighboring and friendly powers to start a destructive European war in cold blood! The blood will be cooler, I assure you, when we have at last come together in a conference.
It was to meet these eventualities that the idea of a conference was first proposed by the government of Austria-Hungary. We were from the start ready to accept it, and we were almost the first to do so. Concerning the selection of a place where the conference should be held, difficulties arose which I consider out of proportion to the significance of the whole matter. But even in this direction we have raised no objections and declared ourselves satisfied with the places which have been mentioned. They were Vienna, Brussels, Baden-Baden, Wiesbaden, Wildbad, a place in Switzerland—I should, however, say Wildbad was mentioned by no one but itself. Stuttgart was also mentioned. Any of these places would have been agreeable to us. It now seems—if I am correctly informed, and the decision must be made in a few days—that the choice will fall on Baden-Baden. Our interest, which is shared by those pow-ers with whom we have corresponded, is the despatch of the conference irrespective of the choice of a place, which is for us of little consequence. As regards places in ​Germany I have expressed no opinion beyond this, that on German soil the presidency would have to be German. This view has nowhere been opposed. After the general acceptance of this principle it will depend on the men sent to attend this conference whether for reasons of expediency it must be adhered to. Personally I believe the conference is assured, and I expect that it will take place in the first half of next March. It would be desirable that the conference should take place sooner—and the uncertainty concerning it be ended. But before the powers join in a conference, they naturally desire an exchange of opinion the one with the other; and the connections with the seat of war are really very slow. The delay of the communications which reached us was, and still is, explained by the delay with which news comes from the seat of war. The suspicion which has for some time been felt in the press that this delay was intentional becomes unfounded when one realizes that the advance of the Russian army following January 30 was in consequence of the stipulations of the armistice, and did not constitute an advantage taken of an opportune moment. The boundaries within which the Russian army is stationed today are the lines of demarcation expressly mentioned in the armistice. I do not believe in any intentional delay from anywhere; on the contrary, I have confidence in the good intentions everywhere to send representatives to the conference speedily. We certainly shall do our part to the best of our ability.
I now come to the most difficult part—excuse me if I continue for the present seated—I come to the most difficult part of the task set me, an explanation, so far as this is possible, of the position which Germany is to take in the conference. In this connection you will not expect from me anything but general indications of our policy. Its programme Mr. von Bennigsen has developed before you clearly and comprehensively, almost more so than my strength at the present moment permits me to do.
When from many quarters the demand has been made ​upon us—to be sure from no government, but only from voices in the press and other well meaning advisers—that we should define our policy from the start and force it on the other governments in some form, I must say that this seems to me to be newspaper diplomacy rather than the diplomacy of a statesman.
Let me explain to you at once the difficulty and impossibility of such a course. If we did express a definite programme, which we should be obliged to follow when we had announced it officially and openly not only before you, but also before the whole of Europe, should we not then place a premium on the contentiousness of all those who considered our programme to be not favorable to themselves!
We should also render the part of mediation in the conference, which I deem very important, almost impossible for ourselves, because everybody with the menu of the German policy in his hand could say to us: "German mediation can go just so far; it can do this, and this it cannot do." It is quite possible that the free hand which Germany has preserved, and the uncertainty of Germany's decisions have not been without influence on the preservation of peace thus far. If you play the German card, laying it on the table, everybody knows how to adapt himself to it or how to avoid it. Such a course is impracticable if you wish to preserve peace. The adjustment of peace does not, I believe, consist in our playing the arbiter, saying: "It must be thus, and the weight of the German empire stands behind it." Peace is brought about, I think, more modestly. Without straining the simile which I am quoting from our everyday life, it partakes more of the behavior of the honest broker, who really wishes to bring about a bargain.
As long as we follow this policy we are in the position to save a power which has secret wishes from the embarrassment of meeting with a refusal or an unpleasant reply from its—let me say, congressional opponent. If we are equally friendly with both, we can first sound one and then say to the other: "Do not do that, try to arrange matters in this ​way." These are helps in business which should be highly esteemed. I have an experience of many years in such matters, and it has been brought home to me often, that when two are alone the thread drops more frequently and is not picked up because of false shame. The moment when it could be picked up passes, people separate in silence, and are annoyed. If, however, a third person is present, he can pick up the thread without much ado, and bring the two together again when they have parted. This is the function of which I am thinking and which corresponds to the amicable relations in which we are living with our friendly neighbors along our extensive borders. It is moreover in keeping with the union among the three imperial courts which has existed for five years, and the intimacy which we enjoy with England, another one of the powers chiefly concerned in this matter. As regards England we are in the fortunate position of not having any conflicting interests, except perhaps some trade rivalries or passing annoyances. These latter cannot be avoided, but there is absolutely nothing which could drive two industrious and peace-loving nations to war. I happily believe, therefore, that we may be the mediator between England and Russia, just as I know we are between Austria and Russia, if they should not be able to agree of their own accord.
The three-emperor-pact, if one wishes to call it such, while it is generally called a treaty, is not based on any written obligations, and no one of the three emperors can be voted down by the other two. It is based on the personal sympathy among the three rulers, on the personal confidence which they have in one another, and on the personal relations which for many years have existed among the leading ministers of all three empires.
We have always avoided forming a majority of two against one when there was a difference of opinion between Austria and Russia, and we have never definitely taken the part of one of them, even if our own desires drew us more strongly in that direction. We have refrained ​from this for fear that the tie might not be sufficiently strong after all. It surely cannot be so strong that it could induce one of these great powers to disregard its own incontestably national interests for the sake of being obliging. That is a sacrifice which no great power makes pour les beaux yeux of another. Such a sacrifice it makes only when arguments are replaced by hints of strength. Then it may happen that the great power will say: "I hate to make this concession, but I hate even worse to go to war with so strong a power as Germany. Still I will remember this and make a note of it." That is about the way in which such things are received. And this leads me to the necessity of vigorously opposing all exaggerated demands made on Germany's mediation. Let me declare that they are out of the question so long as I have the honor of being the adviser of His Majesty.
I know that in saying this I am disappointing a great many expectations raised in connection with today's disclosures, but I am not of the opinion that we should go the road of Napoleon and try to be, if not the arbiter, at least the schoolmaster of Europe.
I have here a clipping given me today from the Allgemeine Zeitung, which contains a noteworthy article entitled "The Policy of Germany in the Decisive Hour." This article demands as necessary the admission of a third power to the alliance of England and Austria. That means, we shall take part with England and Austria and deprive Russia of the credit of voluntarily making the concessions which she may be willing to grant in the interest of European peace. I do not doubt that Russia will sacrifice for the sake of peace in Europe whatever her sense of nationality and her own interests and those of eighty million Russians permit. It is really superfluous to say this. And now please assume that we took the advice of the gentlemen who think that we should play the part of an arbiter—I have here another article from a Berlin paper, called "Germany's Part as Arbiter"—and that we declared to Russia in some polite ​and amicable way: "We have been friends, it is true, for hundreds of years, Russia has ever been true-blue to us when we were in difficulties, but now things are different. In the interest of Europe, as the policemen of Europe, as a kind of a justice of the peace, we must do as we are requested, we can no longer resist the demands of Europe * * *," what would be the result?
There are considerable numbers of Russians who do not love Germany, and who fortunately are not at the helm now, but who would not be unhappy if they were called there. What would they say to their compatriots, they and perhaps other statesmen who at present are not yet avowedly hostile to us? They would say: "With what sacrifices of blood and men and money have we not won the position which for centuries has been the ideal of Russian ambition! We could have maintained it against those opponents who may have a real interest in combating it. It was not Austria, with whom we have lived on moderately intimate terms for some time, it was not England, who possesses openly acknowledged counter-interests to ours—no, it was our intimate friend Germany who drew, behind our back, not her sword but a dagger, although we might have expected from her services in return for services rendered, and although she has no interests in the Orient."
Those approximately would be the phrases, and this the theme which we should hear in Russia. This picture which I have drawn in exaggerated lines—but the Russian orators also exaggerate—corresponds with the truth. We, however, shall never assume the responsibility of sacrificing the certain friendship of a great nation, tested through generations, to the momentary temptation of playing the judge in Europe.
To jeopardize the friendship which fortunately binds us to most European states and at the present moment to all,—for the parties to whom it is an eyesore are not in power,—to jeopardize, I say, this friendship with one friend in order to oblige another, when we as Germans have ​no direct interests, and to buy the peace of others at the cost of our own, or, to speak with college boys, to substitute at a duel—such things one may do when one risks only one's own life, but I cannot do them when I have to counsel His Majesty the Emperor as regards the policy of a great State of forty million people in the heart of Europe. From this tribune I therefore take the liberty of saying a very definite "No" to all such imputations and suggestions. I shall under no condition do anything of the kind; and no government, none of those primarily interested, has made any such demands. Germany, as the last speaker remarked, has grown to new responsibilities as it has grown stronger. But even if we are able to throw a large armed force into the scales of European policies, I do not consider anybody justified in advising the emperor and the princes (who would have to discuss the matter in the Bundesrat if we wished to wage an offensive war) to make an appeal to the proven readiness of the nation to offer blood and money for a war. The only war which I am ready to counsel to the emperor is one to protect our independence abroad and our union at home, or to defend those of our interests which are so clear that we are supported, if we insist on them, not only by the unanimous vote of the Bundesrat, which is necessary, but also by the undivided enthusiasm of the whole German nation.