# Union Telegraph Company v. Eyser/Opinion of the Court

* Court Documents
* Case Syllabus
* Opinion of the Court
* Dissenting Opinion Clifford
United States Supreme Court
86 U.S. 419
Union Telegraph Company v. Eyser
This is an application for a writ of supersedeas or an order, to the Supreme Court of Colorado Territory, and to the District Court of the first judicial district in and for the county of Arapaho, in that Territory, commanding that further proceedings upon the judgment in this case be stayed pending the writ of error whereby the judgment was brought into this court for review. The judgment was affirmed by the Supreme Court of the Territory on the 6th of September, 1873. On the 8th of October following the defendant sued out a writ of error returnable to this court. It was duly served and returned. On the day last mentioned a citation was served on the adverse party, and a supersedeas bond in the sum of $12,000, conditioned and approved according to law, was filed in the proper office. The plaintiffs in error represent in their petition that the defendant in error has applied to the Supreme Court of the Territory for an order that execution issue on the judgment, notwithstanding the writ of error and the supersedeas bond, and that they are apprehensive such an order will be made. Hence this application here.
The twenty-third section of the Judiciary Act of 1789 declares 'that a writ of error, as aforesaid, shall be supersedeas and stay of execution in cases only where the writ of error is served by a copy thereof being lodged for the adverse party in the clerk's office where the judgment remains, within ten days, Sundays exclusive, after rendering the judgment or passing the decree complained of.'
The second section of the act of 1803 makes appeals 'subject to the same rules, regulations, and restrictions as are prescribed in law in cases of writs of error.'
The twenty-second section of the act of 1789 requires 'that every justice or judge signing a citation on any writ of error as aforesaid, shall take good and sufficient security that the plaintiff in error shall prosecute his writ to effect, and answer all damages and costs if he fail to make his plea good.'
Where the judgment or decree is for money, not otherwise secured, the bond 'must be for the whole amount of the judgment or decree, including just damages for delay and costs and interest on the appeal.' And such bond must be approved and filed within the ten days prescribed for the service of the writ of error.
Such was originally the state of the law upon this subject. It frequently subjected parties to great inconvenience and sometimes to serious injury. If the writ were not served and the bond given within ten days from the rendition of the judgment or decree, the defendant, if it were for money, was liable to be compelled to pay, although he might ultimately be victor in the litigation. In such case he would lie out of the use of his money in the meantime, and finally be compelled to take the chance of getting it back, perhaps by further litigation. The facts and the law might be for him and yet the money be lost. If real estate were involved, he was liable to be turned out of possession and to lose all benefit from the property during the same period. It was frequently impossible to serve the writ and give the bond within the ten days, though both might readily have been done if more time were allowed.
The eleventh section of the act of June 1st, 1872, was intended to remedy these evils. That section is as follows:
'That any party or person, desiring to have any judgment, decree, or order of any District or Circuit Court reviewed on writ of error or appeal, and to stay proceedings thereon during the pendency of such writ of error or appeal, may give the security required by law therefor within sixty days after the rendition of such judgment, decree, or order, or afterward, with the permission of a justice or judge of the said appellate court.'
These provisions are remedial, and, therefore, to be construed liberally. So far as there is any conflict with the pre-existing rules, the latter must yield. The intention of the lawmaker constitutes the law. What is clearly implied in a statute is as effectual as what is expressed. It is expressly declared that the supersedeas bond may be executed within sixty days after the rendition of the judgment, and later, with the permission of the designated judge. It is not said when the writ of error shall be served. Its issuance must, of course, precede the execution of the bond; and, as the judge who signs the citation is still required to take the bond, we think it is sufficiently implied that it may be served at any time before, or simultaneously with, the filing of the bond. Indeed, the giving of the bond alone is made the condition of the stay. The section is silent as to the writ. A construction which requires the service to be still within ten days from the rendering of the judgment, is, we think, too narrow. It is sustained by no sufficient reason, and would largely defeat the salutary purposes of the statute. The execution, approval, and filing of the bond are substantial. The filing of the writ is matter of form. Form, under the circumstances, must not be allowed to defeat substance, where the consequences would be of so serious a character. The application of the plaintiffs in error is founded upon this section. As we construe it, their case is within it. The order asked for will be directed to issue, unless this opinion shall render that procedure unnecessary.
Mr. Justice CLIFFORD, with whom concurred Mr. Justice DAVIS, dissenting:

## Notes

* ↑ 29th Rule of this Court.
* ↑ Adams et al. v. Law, 16 Howard, 144; Hudgins v. Kemp, 18 Id. 533.
* ↑ United States v. Freeman, 3 Howard, 565.
* ↑ United States v. Babbit, 1 Black, 61.
This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
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