# History of the Fenian raid on Fort Erie with an account of the Battle of Ridgeway/Chapter 5

CHAPTER V.
THE BATTLE Of RIDGEWAY.
We have already seen that Capt. Akers, acting upon the information received from the Customs officer as to the position of the Fenians, had decided that the best route from Port Colborne to Stevensville, was by rail to Ridgeway and from there to Stevensville by the road. The information was, that the Fenians were encamped at Frenchman's Creek at 6 p.m. But that was no proof where they would be at 7 a.m. next morning. Hereafter, in describing the Fenian line of march, it will be shewn that they were on the march to Ridgeway on Lieut.-Col. Booker's arrival there.
Lieut.-Col. Booker was, on this eventful morning, for the first time in his life, in command of a Brigade. He was an old volunteer officer, although still young in years. He had served in the Hamilton Field Battery for some time before the Volunteer force of 1855 was organized, and from that time to the present has been an enthusiastic and zealous officer. He was appointed commandant of the active force in Hamilton, in 1857, and a few years ago, while still holding that position, he organized the 13th Battalion of Volunteers in Hamilton. He always had the reputation of being a good officer, and was the first to obtain a first class certificate from the Board for examining Volunteer Officers. During his whole military career he had never commanded a Brigade of Infantry, even at a review, and was sent to the front merely as commanding his regiment, the 13th, and not in any other capacity. Chance threw him into the position of a Brigadier General on the morning of a battle, without any staff, without any mounted orderlies, without artillery, or cavalry, and without a mounted officer in the field but himself. Such was the position in which he found himself when forming up his command at the village of Ridgeway, after taking them off the cars.
​Finding that he could not procure vehicles to carry on his stores, he sent them back to Port Colborne in the train, left the great coats of the men at the station, and set off by the Ridge Road in the direction of Stevensville.
The Queen's Own, being the senior corps, took the lead, being under the command of Major Gilmor, an excellent officer, brave, active and energetic, one in whom the men had the utmost confidence, and one with whom they were all accustomed to serve. It will be remembered that Lieut.-Col. Dennis, who was sent in command, had left the regiment and had gone off on the Tug "Robb" along with Captain Akers. How it came to pass that Lieut.-Col Dennis, who belonged to another district, was sent in command of a Regiment which had its own officer to command it, one who had much more experience than he had, is difficult to conceive. It seems very unfair that the command should have been taken away from the officer who had all the trouble and hard work for months before in making his battalion efficient, and that the command of the best Volunteer Battalion in both provinces should be given to an officer who had never previously taken any interest in it or been connected in any way with it. The principle was bad for this reason:—If the Battalion covered itself with credit it would be due to the previous training and exertions of its own officer, and Lieut.-Col. Dennis would not be entitled to the credit, and if it did not act so well, Colonel Dennis could not be blamed for it, as he had never before been in command of it.
No. 5 company of the Queens Own, (Captain Edwards) being supplied with Spencer Rifles, were sent in advance as the advance guard; after the "Queen's Own" marched the York Rifles, then the 13th Battalion, and lastly the Caledonia Rifles, under command of Captain Jackson, forming the rear guard.
The force had proceeded in this way for about two miles when just before they had arrived to where the garrison road intersects the Ridge road the advance party signalled that the ​enemy were in sight. No 5 company immediately extended from the centre and No. 1 moved up and extended on their left and No. 2 on the right; No. 3 forming the centre support and Nos. 4 and 6 the left and right supports; after moving on in this way for some distance No. 7 company was sent out as a flanking party to the left supported by No. 8, the Trinity College company. The force was in this position on arriving at the garrison road. Before proceeding further with the movements it will be desirable to describe the nature of the ground and the position of the Fenians.
The Ridge road runs from Ridgeway in a direction northerly and easterly, following the course of the Lime Ridge from which the road takes its name; this ridge is about 30 or 40 feet in height, in some places steep, in others of a very gradual ascent; at the point where the battle was fought the ridge is about half a mile wide, of a very gradual rise, the road running along the ridge about half way up. The garrison road running from the west towards Fort Erie ascends the ridge crossing the Ridge road almost at right angles, about half a mile or perhaps a little farther there runs a road parallel with the garrison road which also leads to Fort Erie. It will thus be seen that in moving along the Ridge road from Ridgeway that the ground rises gradually for about a quarter of a mile on the right, and slopes downwards for about the same distance to the left; on both sides there are cultivated fields; on the right extending as far as the top of the ridge where the summit is covered with woods; on the left for half a mile, at which distance the view is shut out with a large hardwood bush. At the north west corner of the garrison road is a tavern called "The Smugglers Home," and on the south east corner of the next cross road there stands a brick farm house with an orchard around it, and a large orchard along the opposite side of the cross road to the right of the Ridge road.
It should also be mentioned that these fields on both sides are much cut up with orchards, and that a large number of ​beautiful shade trees are scattered about. These trees and the peculiar conformation of the ground renders it exceedingly difficult to get an extended view in any direction over the scene of the fight.
The Fenian position was as follows: their main body, the reserves, were posted nearly quarter of a mile to the north of the further cross road, to the north of the brick house beyond the orchard; their position being behind a rail fence thickly grown up with shrubbery which almost hides it, some second growth shade trees being also thickly scattered along; their first line was posted along the south side of the road above the garrison road, where they had erected a barricade along the southerly fence with the assistance of the rails taken from the fence on the north side; this was done by laying the rails slanting outwards leaning against the top rail; this barricade was erected very hurriedly, not having taken them more than ten minutes to complete it. Their advanced skirmishers were posted along the rail fences about half way down to the garrison road, with a few files in the woods on the upper side of the ridge.
After moving on in the order before mentioned as far as the garrison road, a few of the Trinity College company moved down as far as the woods on the left, and the company was afterwards in skirmishing order on the extreme left for remainder of the fight. Nos. 1, 2, and 5, and Nos. 3, 4, and 6, who afterwards relieved them, moved on in the most gallant manner, driving in the enemy's skirmishers before them, pushing on from fence to fence. In this advance Ensign McEachren fell, mortally wounded. As soon as they had crossed the garrison road a short distance. Col. Booker again directed the Highland Company, Captain Gardner, to form a flanking party to the right, and to scour the woods on the top of the ridge. This service was performed by this company with ​great spirit, the Highlanders driving the Fenians before them in such haste that they left company rolls and papers of various kinds behind them on the ground, the Highlanders penetrated across a wheat field at least as far as the road along which the Fenian first line was posted; while there is very little doubt that the University company on their left had even crossed it and had advanced as far as a wood on the left of the Fenian line. The Trinity College company on the left and the University and Highland company on the right were not relieved during the fight.
About the time the these flank companies were sent off, or perhaps a little before, Major Gillmor reported the centre companies of his battalion short of ammunition, and Lieut.-Col. Booker ordered the 13th Battalion, Major Skinner, to move up and relieve skirmishers on the right of the road. The 13th Battalion, having only 6 companies, were only able to relieve that number, leaving the Highland Company and the University Rifles still out on the extreme right, and the Trinity College Company and No. 7 supporting them on the extreme left. For some reason, the company of the 13th, which was to have relieved No. 6 (Capt. Adam), moved up to the brick house where No. 6, after driving out the enemy with great gallantry, had established itself; and both companies remained in that position, fighting together; the left subdivision, with Lieut. Campbell and Ensign McLean, pushing across the road as far as a barn on the left side of the Ridge Road. No. 7 company was recalled from the left, and then soon after sent out on the right, in support, under Capt. McPherson; and the York Rifles, Capt. Davis, took their place on the left, in support of the Trinity College Corps.
The whole of the skirmishers pressed forward with the greatest gallantry, driving in the enemy's skirmishers on the first line and dislodging it from the strong position they had taken up behind the rail barricade. The whole of the Fenians were now concentrated on their main body, in the position already described, beyond the orchard, and our troops ​had moved on and taken up a position behind the rail barricade. No. 6 company of the Queen's Own and a company of the 13th holding the cross roads, the brick house, and stretching across the road to the barn on the left front; two companies of the 13th were on the right of the house, along the barricade; the Highlanders, who had cleared the woods, were in a wheat field in advance of them, to the right of the 13th, and the University Rifles between the right of the 13th and the Highland Company, in a wood, in advance of the cross road; and the Trinity College Company on the extreme left. The remaining companies of the Queen's Own were in reserve, in a close column, on the Ridge Road, about 400 yards in rear of the skirmishers. The other three companies of the 13th were in support of their skirmishers, except a small party with the colours in rear of the Queen's Own.
Our troops had been in this position for some time, when it seems that the Fenian leaders decided to charge again, to drive our men back from the line they had carried. In order to encourage their men onward, the officers rode out to the front, and two or three of them, mounted, led their men to the attack. As I have before stated, the windings of the road, the gentle undulations of the ground, and the orchards and shade trees prevent a clear view in any direction of more than about 100 or 200 yards. The skirmishers, seeing the mounted men coming towards them, thought a body of cavalry were going to charge; and, raising a cry that cavalry were coming, began to run back, calling out to the reserves to look out for cavalry. The reserves were on the road, and these mounted men were also seen upon it. Lieut.-Col. Booker, from his position in front of the reserves, could not possibly see for himself whether the report was true or false; but, on hearing it reiterated, he called out to Major Gillmor to "Look out for cavalry!" Major Gillmor thereupon ordered his battalion to form square. This was done; the bugler sounded the "prepare for cavalry," and the companies on the flanks ran in—some forming in rear of the square, ​others forming rallying squares in the fields, and afterwards falling back on the main body. These companies, coming in on the double, and being obliged to climb over the fences to get into the road where the square was situated, tumbling in from both sides in the confusion caused by the fences, endeavoured hastily to form in rear of the square. The front and side faces of the square were formed with the coolness of a parade movement, but by no possibility could the rear face be properly formed in the short time in which there was to do it. At this moment, while the men were endeavouring to form up, the Fenians came in range of the square; the bullets whistled fast and furiously among them, and the men were dropping wounded and dead on all sides. Seeing, by this time, that no cavalry were coming, Major Gillmor endeavoured to extend his regiment. He ordered No. 1 company (Capt. Brown) and No. 2 (Capt. Dixon) to advance and extend, in order to enable the square, under cover of their fire, to regain its formation. These companies advanced nobly, and endeavoured to extend, but the rear portion of the square, which had never been able to form, feeling the fire of the enemy, began gradually to dissolve, falling back to the rear. At the same time, the advanced skirmishers, running in along the road—being unable to go round the flanks for the fences—broke through the 1st and 2nd companies, who were advancing, and forced their way through the square. Seeing the impossibility of re-forming under so heavy a fire, the order was given to retire; and, the two regiments, retiring along the same road, became mingled together: some few running hurriedly to the rear, others retiring more slowly, while a large body of red coats and green, fighting gallantly, slowly and sullenly retired, covering the retreat, and holding the Fenians at bay. With this rear guard were most of the officers, who, throughout the entire day, fought nobly—encouraging their men and exposing themselves recklessly to the enemy's fire. Lieut. Campbell, No. 6, and Ensign Fahey, No. 1, "Queen's Own;" and Lieut, Routh, of the 13th, receiving serious wounds.
​The Highland Company and the University Rifles being, as we have seen, so far advanced on the right, did not know of the squares being formed, until they heard the retire sounded. The whole force were falling back at this time, and the two companies had to cross, diagonally, the full fire of the enemy, in order to reach the road. Had the Fenians advanced promptly, they would, in all probability, have cut off the retreat of both. A portion of the Highland Company retreated across the fields, along with the University Rifles, while the remainder fell back through the woods, and rejoined the main column by the Garrison Road. It was through this retreat across the front of the Fenians, that the University Rifles suffered so much loss.
After retiring some distance. Col. Booker endeavoured to rally his command at the edge of a wood, which came up to the road. In this he was ably seconded by many of the officers, all of whom behaved well. Major Gillmor, Major Skinner, and Captain Hennery (13th), and Captains Brown, Dixon, Whitney, Adam, Gardner, and Sherwood; Adjutant Otter, and Lieut. Arthurs, of the "Queen's Own," and Captain Davis, of the York Rifles, did their utmost, assisted by their officers, to restore order. Captain Sherwood succeeded in forming part of his company at Ridgeway, so, also, to a greater extent, did Captain Adam; and there, also, one or two companies of the 13th were rallied by their officers, but, not being properly supported, they were obliged to resume the retreat, which was continued to Port Colborne.
Before leaving this subject, it will be desirable to consider the circumstances which led to the retreat of the volunteer force, on this occasion. Lieut.-Col. Booker, being without a mounted staff, was acting at a great disadvantage, which, of course, must have had an ill effect on the whole of the movements. The broken nature of the ground, and the impossibility of thoroughly understanding the enemy's position, was another great difficulty.
​The substantial cause of the retreat, however, was, without doubt, the fact of the reserves being in close column, and in square, so close to the skirmishers as to be under fire.
The most difficult thing that soldiers can be called upon to perform, is to deploy or execute any movement from close or quarter distance column, while exposed to the fire of the enemy. The best disciplined veterans in the world will often be thrown into confusion, if endeavoring to deploy from column under fire. The Old Guard of Napoleon, the victors of a hundred fights, the men who never failed to retrieve the fortunes of their Emperor, wherever he trusted to their efforts, failed him at his last great battle, at the battle that was to decide his fortunes forever. They did not fail him for want of bravery, from want of enthusiasm, or from want of endurance, but solely because they were thrown upon the English line in immense columns, in a formation in which they could neither fight, manoeuvre, or retreat in order.
If these veterans could not deploy from column under fire, how could our lads, who, for the first time in their lives, were seeing shots fired in anger? If the French columns at Albuera were cut to pieces by Cole's Fusilier Brigade, and the Russian column at Alma driven off the field by Lacy Yea and his regiment, by reason of their using this heavy formation, how could we hope for more from the inexperienced volunteers at Ridgeway? This was the great mistake: had the reserves been a few hundred yards farther back, they could have deployed or extended, and, perhaps, have retrieved the day. Under any circumstances, the fences on the flanks should have been at once levelled, when they took up their position, because, where they stood, being cooped up between fences, they could not execute any manoeuvre without getting into confusion.
The Fenians only followed them as far as Ridgeway and about a quarter of a mile beyond it.
There was no doubt that the men and officers behaved well; they fought with the greatest gallantry, and, had it ​not been for the unfortunate cry of "Cavalry!" and the mistakes I have mentioned, would have won a brilliant victory. Where all did so well, we cannot make invidious distinctions. Reflections have been made, in some of the public prints, on the conduct of the 13th Battalion. After thoroughly enquiring into the whole matter, I am strongly of opinion that there was no difference between them. Both fought nobly. They were mingled in the retreat, some in front, some in the centre, and some behind, fighting bravely, covering the remainder. In all these different positions, each battalion was represented.