# Protestant Exiles from France/Volume 1 - Appendix 6

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VI.
THE EARL OF GALWAY’S TWO PAPERS FOR THE HOUSE OF LORDS, JANUARY 1711, N.S.
[Reprinted from the “Annals of Queen Anne.”]
(1). “The Earl of Galway’s Narrative, Read by the Clerk at the Table of the House of Lords, 9th January, 1711.
“In obedience to your Lordship’s commands, I present you with a short narrative in writing, containing the most material occurrences that happened in Portugal and Spain, during the time I had the honour to command the Queen’s troops there.
“In June 1704, being retired into the country, I received the Queen’s commands to attend her Majesty at Windsor, where she was pleased to order me to go and take upon me the command of her troops in Portugal. I desired to be excused from accepting an employment which I did not think myself equal to; but the Queen seeming fixed in her resolution, I obeyed.
“Upon my arrival at Lisbon, I found the two kings of Spain and Portugal already marching for Abeira, and joined upon their route. But the season was much advanced, and it being thought impracticable to attack the enemy there, it was soon resolved to retire into winter quarters.
“The troops being in quarters, I went to Lisbon, where I had certain advice that Gibraltar was besieged, and Marshal Tesse gone thither. Upon which, considering the importance of the place, I immediately sent the Prince of Hesse four of the best regiments of foot under my command, viz., the battalion of guards, my Lord Barrymore’s, Lord Donegal’s, and Lord Montjoy’s, together with a large supply of ammunition and provisions, which the garrison wanted extremely. This relief arrived in good time, and proved so successful, as not only to defend the place, but to hold out a siege that entirely ruined the enemy’s infantry, and prevented their being able to take the field the following spring in Alentejo.
“Being informed of their condition, as likewise that there was but a very small garrison in Badajoz, I endeavoured to persuade the Portuguese to attack that place, but could not then prevail; however they took Valencia de Alcantara by storm, and Albuquerque by capitulation under the command of the Conte des Galveas, and afterwards retired to quarters of refreshment, as is usual in the excessive heats of the summer.
“During this interval I went to Lisbon to confer with the Earl of Peterborow. I found the King of Spain designed to embark with him; and not doubting but the Earl was bound on some important expedition, though I had no orders to that purpose, and had now only one regiment of horse, two of dragoons, and five of foot left under my command in Portugal, I offered him whatever part of these troops he pleased to desire. The Earl accepted of my offer, and chose the royal regiment of dragoons, and Cunningham’s, taking likewise an order with him from me to the Governor of Gibraltar, for such regiments from thence as he should think fit to take on board, leaving only a sufficient garrison for the defence of the town, and accordingly his Lordship took from thence those four regiments which I had sent thither to the relief of the place.
“After the King of Spain and my Lord Peterborow had sailed, I with great difficulty prevailed upon the Portuguese to besiege Badajoz in autumn. But instead of taking the field, as we had agreed to do, in the beginning of September, it was the 2d of October before I could get them to invest the place, under the command of the Marquis das Minas. Our cannon had already begun to play with success, when an accident happened in a battery, which I went thither to repair; and being there to give the necessary orders for that purpose, I lost my arm by a cannon-shot from the town. But it is the general opinion, that if the disposition which I ​put in writing the very morning the misfortune happened to me, and proposed to a council of war, where the same was agreed to, had been duly executed, Marshal Tesse could never have relieved the place, which must necessarily have fallen into our hands in a very few days.
“Not long after the siege was raised, news came of the surrender of Barcelona to King Charles, and about a month after, that Marshal Tesse had marched with the best part of the forces quartered on the frontier of Portugal, in order to join the Duke of Anjou and besiege Barcelona again.
“Upon this I resolved to propose to the Portuguese to march to Madrid, concluding that either the Duke of Anjou would by this means be obliged to quit the siege of Barcelona, or else that we could meet with no opposition in our way. For this purpose I took a journey to Lisbon, even while my wound, upon the cutting off of my arm, was still open, and had such success with the King of Portugal, that his troops took the field the following spring by the 26th of March (n.s.) under the command of the Marquis das Minas, with intention to besiege Alcantara, and march that way to Madrid. Meantime the Duke of Berwick, who had been sent to command on the frontiers of Portugal in Marshal Tesse’s stead, had thrown ten regiments of foot into Badajoz, and marched with seven more, and a body of 4000 horse towards Alcantara, in order to reinforce that garrison, by the addition of those seven regiments, which he accordingly left there, and then came back to Brocas with his cavalry, where we surprised him, beat his rear-guard, pursued him a considerable way, and took possession of the castle of Brocas; in which place we left a garrison to cover our foragers, during the time we should lie before Alcantara.
“After this we continued our march to Alcantara, which surrendered to us in a very few days; we took ten good battalions prisoners of war there, and found about sixty pieces of cannon in the place, with great store of small arms and ammunition.
“After the surrender of Alcantara we crossed the Tagus there, and having taken some places of small note upon our march, and forced a pass at Massagona, where the enemy had entrenched themselves, we advanced as far as the bridge of Almaras.
“But here the Portuguese resolved unanimously to return home again, notwithstanding all the arguments the Generals of the allies could offer to the contrary, which happened very unfortunately. For had the army marched directly from thence to Madrid, in all probability we must have arrived there at the same time with the news of the Duke of Anjou’s being returned to France; the Duchess must have been obliged to escape alone; and the tribunals being still there, 'tis very likely the war would have been over.
“Some of the Portuguese were willing to go back and besiege Badajoz, which was entirely laying aside all thoughts of Madrid. But others were for attacking Ciudad Rodrigo, and, by joining with these, I engaged them, after the taking of that place, to go to Madrid. But the time which was lost on this occasion had given the Duke of Anjou an opportunity of returning from France to Madrid, from whence he withdrew the court and all the tribunals, before our army could reach that place. So upon our arrival there, we found Madrid an open village; and the troops having been extremely weakened by so long a march, were not above 4000 horse and 8 or 10,000 foot.
“The Portuguese Generals and those of the allies thought it highly necessary the King of Spain should come to Madrid as soon as possible. For besides the advantage his presence might have been to his own affairs, it was of the last importance to us to be immediately joined by the forces with the king and under the Earl of Peterborow’s command; not being strong enough without them to attack the Duke of Anjou, who had already received some succours from France, besides the 5500 horse and 8000 foot, of which the Duke of Berwick’s army consisted, after he had been joined by the Conde de las Torres.
“Being perfectly informed of the enemy’s strength and motions, and having great reasons to believe that if we were joined in time by all the forces with the King and the Earl of Peterborow, we might in this favourable conjuncture drive the Duke of Anjou entirely out of Spain, make ourselves absolute masters of that kingdom, and put an end to an expensive war — all the while we lay at Madrid and Guadalaxara I despatched every day one or more expresses, and the greatest part of them officers, with letters to the King of Spain and my Lord Peterborow, representing to them both the importance of our being joined forthwith, and earnestly desiring that no time might be lost in improving so critical a juncture.
“As the next best means to advise our friends of our arrival at Madrid, the first gazette day after we got thither, I caused it to be published in the gazette that we were there, and expected in a very few days to be joined by the King and the Earl of Peterborow, hoping that the natural curiosity of the Spaniards would give a printed newspaper a free passage.
“But notwithstanding all the diligence that was used in this manner on our part, near six weeks were elapsed at Madrid and Guadalaxara before we received any advice that the king was upon his march to join us; and in the meantime, the Duke of Anjou’s army was so much increased by daily reinforcements from several parts, that he was now become superior in number to us, even after we were joined by those forces which the king and my Lord Peterborow brought along with them.
“And I must say it is the general opinion, and I do verily believe, that as the Portuguese lost one fair opportunity of putting an end to the war by not marching directly from the bridge of Almaras to Madrid, so we lost another for want of being joined in time by the forces under the command of the King of Spain and the Earl of Peterborow.
​“And whereas that noble lord is pleased to aver that he never received any advice from me of my arrival at Madrid with the Portuguese, and (as an argument of my neglect of him on that subject) produces an instance of one officer that happened to pass through his quarters with letters from me to the king, and none to his lordship — I am obliged to observe that I gave this officer 100 pistoles, and ordered him to go directly to the King of Spain, who then lay at Saragossa, but he was accidentally forced to go out of his way to avoid one of the enemy’s parties, which was the true occasion of his passing through the Earl of Peterborow’s quarters at Valencia, contrary to his first intention. But several other officers who were despatched by me to the Earl assured me they had the honour to deliver him those letters which I wrote to his lordship from Madrid and Guadalaxara. And even taking the fact to be as the Earl of Peterborow is pleased to state it himself, it is plain his lordship had at least some verbal informations from that very officer that passed through his lordship’s quarters, and consequently could not be altogether ignorant either of the place where the Portuguese army lay, or of the necessity of joining them without loss of time.
“After the General had got King Charles proclaimed at Madrid, it was thought fit to advance to Guadalaxara, where we had at last advice that the king was coming to join us, and at the same time were informed that the Duke of Anjou was at Guadaraxa, to which place we marched to prevent the enemy from intercepting the king. Upon our approach the Duke of Anjou repassed the river, which little advantage we contented ourselves with, for it was not thought advisable to follow and attack him on the other side, being advantageously posted and stronger than we.
“We stayed here two days, and when we thought the king was out of danger, we again retired to Guadalaxara, where we were joined by his Majesty and my Lord Peterborough, with two regiments of Spanish dragoons, and part of Pearce’s, for his lordship had left behind him in several places thirteen battalions of English foot, with the remainder of Pearce’s and two other entire regiments of dragoons.
"So soon as the armies were joined (having upon my arrival at Madrid sent Captain Montague to give the Queen an account of our march, and to desire her Majesty’s leave to retire), I waited upon my Lord Peterborow, offering him the command of the English, and to receive his orders till I should have the Queen’s leave to go home. But because the Marquis das Minas would not do so too, my Lord Peterborow chose not to stay with the army, and within a few days after went away.
“The king resolved, by advice of the general officers, to go to Chincon, where all things necessary for the army were found in great plenty. But the season being far advanced, a council was held about taking winter quarters, where it was agreed to be by no means safe to canton on that side of the Tagus, for fear of losing all communication with the sea. Besides, the country was so open, the troops could not be divided without danger.
“For these reasons, after having stayed at Chincon about three weeks, though the army had forage and provisions for as many more, it was agreed forthwith to cross the Tagus, lest the approaching rains should render the fords impracticable. Nor was there a possibility of taking winter quarters so commodiously as in the kingdom of Valencia, where the situation of the country rendered us secure against any attempts from a superior army.
“This resolution was put in practice, and we made our retreat in good order, notwithstanding all the interruption the enemy were able to give us, and were obliged at Yniesta to cross the river in the sight of all their cavalry.
“Whilst the army was in quarters, my Lord Peterborow came back from Italy. And whereas it has been suggested that his lordship did then demand from me 5000 men for some expedition on the side of Catalonia, which were refused — I must declare I do not remember that the Earl ever applied himself to me in particular upon that subject. If he had, the answer must naturally have been, that that matter depended not upon me to grant or refuse, but upon the King of Spain under whose command I was.
“But I do remember the Earl proposed this at some general council, or council of war, held in the king’s presence about the operations of the ensuing campaign, and joined with those who were of opinion that it was by no means convenient to divide the troops, as may appear by a copy of that opinion signed by my Lord Tyrawley and by me, bearing date the 15th day of January 1706-7. But I must beg leave to observe that it was not the decisive council for the operations of the campaign, for many subsequent councils were held in the king’s presence more important than this. And though in them there might have been some variety of opinions as to the manner, yet almost all the generals and ministers that assisted at those councils agreed perfectly in the substance, which was, that we should join our troops and march to Madrid. Some indeed were for passing through the plains of the Mancha, and crossing the Tagus; but this opinion was overruled, because of the hazard in passing the river if the enemy opposed us, and of the scarcity of provisions in the Mancha, which had been exhausted by the enemy’s winter quarters. For which reasons it was, after many debates, agreed, that we should take the way of Valencia and Arragon, passing the Tagus at its head, to avoid all opposition. But lest the kingdom of Valencia might by this means be any ways exposed, it was likewise resolved, before we should begin our march, to destroy all the enemy’s magazines of provision and forage, in the country bordering upon the frontiers of Valencia, to prevent them from making incursions. And I do take upon me to aver, that nothing was ever transacted, during the time I had the honour to command the Queen’s troops, contrary to the ​positive resolutions of any general council or council of war, unless that resolution was afterwards repealed by some subsequent council.
“So sensible was every one of our being already too weak, it was resolved to desire my Lord Rivers (who was lately arrived at Lisbon) would join us with the troops that came under his command from England; which his lordship did, not long after.
“For the better execution of what had been resolved for our march through Valencia and Arragon, proper commissaries and officers were despatched to provide bread and forage sufficient for the troops, in all places where it was designed the army should pass. I went with the Marquis das Minas to the frontiers towards the latter end of March, and we took the field the beginning of April. We ruined part of the country bordering upon the frontiers of Valencia before the enemy could join their troops, particularly Yecla, where they had their largest magazines. Judging it necessary to take in the Castle of Villena, to prevent their army from being masters of one of the most considerable inlets into the kingdom of Valencia, we sat down before that place. But it proved stronger than was expected; and after we had spent some days there, we had notice that the enemy had assembled their troops at Almanza.
“Upon this advice a council of war was held, where it was unanimously resolved to fight the enemy, which we were the rather induced to, because it was judged impossible to subsist upon the defensive in the kingdom of Valencia. The country had already been so much exhausted by our winter quarters, that there was not two days’ provisions to be found for the army; and we could not have been able to have subsisted there so long as we did, but for the supply we found in the enemy’s magazines at Yecla. Nor did we think it proper to pursue the once-intended march through that kingdom and Arragon, lest provisions should be wanting, leaving the enemy so near and in a condition to follow us. For though commissaries had been employed, there was reason to apprehend that the towns we were to pass through would shut their gates against us, whilst we were closely followed by the enemy, and persecuted by the peasants of the country, who, grown desperate by seeing themselves abandoned, would naturally be up in arms in the mountains. Besides, we had certain advice that there was already a body of French troops, consisting of 8000 men, in Spain, and upon their march to reinforce the enemy. Thus, as the army must inevitably have perished without fighting, it was thought reasonable to run the hazard of a battle, wherein we had an equal chance to come off victors, which was accordingly done two days after, on the 25th of April 1707, N. S., but with ill success.
“The cavalry of the allies, with some small part of the foot that had escaped the ill fate of the day, joined again at Alcira, from whence they retired to Tortosa, and finding the enemy had crossed the Ebro, endeavoured, by opposing their passage over the Chinca, to amuse them till the latter end of the campaign. Meantime, with great expedition, I gathered the broken remains of the foot (out of which I formed five battalions) and raised four more of Catalans, with which we made a stand against a victorious enemy, and preserved the principality of Catalonia entire, except Lerida. After the taking of Lerida, the enemy thought fit to retire into winter quarters, and we did the same.
“In February following, the Marquis das Minas, with most of the Portuguese generals, embarked for Lisbon; and having the Queen’s leave to do so too, I visited the several quarters where the troops in her Majesty’s pay were lodged; and having left the necessary orders with Majors-General Carpenter and Wills for the government in my absence, took the same opportunity of going thither.
“Upon my arrival in Portugal, I found the Queen’s orders there to take upon me the characters of ambassador extraordinary, plenipotentiary, and general of her forces, which charges I accepted in obedience to her Majesty; though I had nothing so much at heart as the pleasure of returning to that retirement, from whence only the Queen’s positive commands could have drawn me.”
(2.) The Earl of Galway’s Reply, or Observations upon the Earl of Peterborow’s Answers to the five questions proposed to his Lordship by the Lords.
“Your lordships having been pleased to allow me a copy of all such papers as have been produced to prove the truth of the Earl of Peterborow’s answers to the five questions that were proposed to him by this honourable house, together with a copy of those questions and answers, with leave to answer to any such part thereof as I might conceive myself concerned in, and have not already sufficiently explained in my narrative, I do take the liberty of observing to your lordships, that
“The Earl of Peterborow, to the first question, is pleased to say, ‘The management of the war in Spain, when under the conduct of other generals, was not only supported with great numbers of men and vast sums of money, but also with notorious falsehoods published in their favour, to excuse repeated disgraces.’ Whereas his lordship cannot but remember, that when he sailed from Portugal with the King of Spain to Barcelona, he left only one regiment of horse and five of foot under my command in that country, I having voluntarily ​offered him, and he as freely accepted of, two regiments of dragoons from Portugal, and four battalions of foot from Gibraltar, which I had sent to the defence of that place.
“I declare I never traduced the said Earl’s conduct either by letters or otherwise, though it seems the Queen had been fully informed thereof, particularly in regard to the misunderstanding between his lordship and the King of Spain, to which his Catholic Majesty has attributed his delays in marching to his capital, as may appear by Count Gallas’s memorial, a copy whereof lies on your Lordships’ table. ’Tis well known, the first ‘disgrace’ that ever happened to us in Spain was occasioned by his lordship’s not joining us in time at Madrid; and all the misfortunes that attended us afterwards were owing to that neglect.
“His lordship is pleased to say further, in his answer to the same question, ‘That to excuse the fatal battle of Almanza a king was to be used at that rate as to have it, in an account printed by authority, declared that he took numbers, amounting to 4000 or 5000 men, from a battle to be fought for his crown, the very regiments of horse and foot mentioned by name. Whereas it is notoriously known to the whole world that he took only about 200 miserable Spanish dragoons; and that of the regiments mentioned to be taken away from the English general in Valencia, some were never in being, others were regiments of trained bands in Barcelona, and none of them within 250 miles of that place.’ Whereupon I beg leave to observe, that notwithstanding the Earl’s reflection on that paper published by authority, the account therein printed is so far from having been exaggerated, that there were actually some battalions of regular troops absent in Catalonia besides those mentioned in the Gazette, June 1707; and several officers who were at Almanza can depose that there was not one Spanish corps, either horse, foot, or dragoons, on our side at that battle.
“If part of the king’s forces were at 250 miles’ distance, that may be a reason why they could not be at the battle; but none can be given for their being at that distance, except in the case of some few garrisons, which might indeed have been necessary, but could not require above six or seven battalions whilst the army was then in the field. Whereas his Catholic Majesty had at that time in his own pay in Spain above 6000 men, besides the Dutch and English that were in Arragon and Catalonia. And those regiments which the Earl is pleased to call ‘trained bands,’ because they bore the name of some particular town or province that raised or subsisted them, are no more so than the regiments of Picardy and Burgundy in France, though newly raised.
“In his lordship’s answer to the second question, he is pleased to aver, ‘That from the time the Earl of Galway came first into Spain as far as Almaras, and thence returned back to Portugal, the Earl of Peterborow had no advices from the Earl of Galway, no account of the motives of that retreat, or any hopes given him of the return of the Portuguese into Spain.’ What his lordship says upon this occasion is very true, for whilst he was at so great a distance besieged in Barcelona, and the Duke of Berwick with a considerable body of horse between him and us, it was to no purpose to think of sending despatches by land. Neither was it necessary to inform the enemy that way, that the Portuguese were resolved (notwithstanding the repeated instances of the foreign generals to the contrary) to return back again to their own country, after their army had advanced as far as the bridge of Almaras. But when we got to Madrid, I immediately sent so many expresses with letters both to the Earl of Peterborow and the King of Spain, that it was morally impossible his lordship could have been ignorant above eight days of our arrival there. And I have been since assured by the inhabitants of Barcelona, that they were all informed of it by that time; from whence I must conclude that his lordship’s delays in joining us were voluntary, and not occasioned by want of intelligence. I have asserted in the narrative which I delivered in to this most honourable house, that I do verily believe, if the Portuguese army had been joined in time after their arrival at Madrid by the forces with the King of Spain and under the command of the Earl of Peterborow, we might have been able to have driven the Duke of Anjou out of Spain, and have put an end to an expensive war; nor was this my opinion only, but that of all the world at that time. And I find his lordship thinks it so far imports him to be clear of this imputation, that he is resolved to be rid of it at any rate. For certainly nothing less than an apprehension of this nature could have made him aver a fact so improbable as that where, in his farther answer to the same question he says, ‘That he received no letter, no message from the Earl of Galway after his second entrance into Spain, nor had the least notice of his situation, circumstances, or designs, till he saw his troops retreating from the enemy to take the strong camp of Guadalaxara.’
“Now what could be the design of his lordship’s marching to Guadalaxara, with so small a body of troops as is mentioned in my Narrative, unless he knew he was to meet us there? Besides, his lordship forgets that he came not to Guadalaxara till some days after the Portuguese had been actually encamped there, as I can make appear by the oath of several officers; and consequently it was impossible for him to have seen us retreating thither.
“I believe it may be necessary upon this occasion to repeat, that when his lordship did ​join us, he brought no more English troops with him than one regiment of dragoons and a detachment of another, though he had actually at that time under his command in Spain 13 English battalions and 4 regiments of dragoons. As, likewise, that the officer who (his lordship says) passed through his quarters with letters for the King of Spain and none for him, was never designed to have gone within several leagues of his lordship, unless he had been obliged to it by a party of the enemy (as I have already explained more largely in my Narrative). And I cannot help observing, ’tis very improbable that officer should have had occasion to apply to the Earl’s secretary for money, because I gave him 100 pistoles at the time I dispatched him.
“In his lordship’s answer to the third question, he is pleased to say, ‘That the Earl of Galway continued about 40 days at Madrid without making any endeavours to augment his troops, or provide any means for the subsistence of his army; that meeting the enemy unexpectedly and retreating to the camp of Guadalaxara, the troops were without provisions and in the greatest disorder.’ In reply to this paragraph I do affirm, that the Portuguese staid no longer time at Madrid than was necessary co get the king proclaimed there, which did not exceed ten days, — then advanced as far as Guadalaxara, and afterwards to Guadaraxa, about 60 miles beyond Madrid, where we obliged part of the Duke of Anjou’s troops to repass the river, — but were not willing to engage them, at a time when we had reason to expect we should have been joined in a few days by the forces with the King of Spain and Earl of Peterborow, which was the only secure method left us to augment our troops. For it would have been very imprudent to have attempted to have formed corps of the Castilians, who were entirely devoted to the Duke of Anjou’s interest. But all the officers of the army know, we were so far from wanting provisions ourselves, that we sent a convoy of 8000 loaves to meet the king and the Earl of Peterborow, which (by their delay in not advancing fast enough) grew mouldy, and was afterwards pillaged by the peasants. His lordship’s information of our want of intelligence of the enemy’s motions and of our disorder upon the retreat, are as great mistakes as the former. For the occasion of our advancing to Guadaraxa was purely to post ourselves in such a manner as to prevent the enemy from marching or sending detachments to intercept the King of Spain; and when we had reason to believe him out of danger, we returned to Guadalaxara, there to be joined by the King and the Earl of Peterborow. Nor was it possible for his lordship to have seen our disorder, if there had been any, because (as I have already observed) he came not to Guadalaxara himself till some days after we had been encamped there.
“Notwithstanding, the Earl of Peterborow is pleased to say, ‘That we lost 5000 men in the retreat to Valencia without a blow, and entirely ruined our whole cavalry.’ ’Tis certain our loss upon that occasion was very inconsiderable, if any, and the retreat made in so good order, that the enemy (superior as they were in number) never durst venture to attack us after the warm reception 22 of their squadrons met with from two battalions under the command of Colonel Wade, in the town of Villa Nova, notwithstanding we were obliged to cross plains and rivers in their view.
“And though his lordship avers in his answer to this question, ‘That this retreat was made against the king’s opinion, and that of all his officers and ministers’ — it is certain, the retreat was concerted and agreed upon at a council of war. ’Tis true some persons about the King seemed, at first, inclinable to have taken quarters in Castile, but that was soon after found impracticable; for none of those Spaniards who were best acquainted with the country could make a disposition of quarters where the troops could be secure. Therefore it was resolved immediately to cross the Tagus, before the approaching rains should have rendered the fords impracticable; which being done, our next design was to have lodged ourselves behind the river Xucar. But neither could this be done without taking a small town with a castle upon that river, that commanded a bridge, where the enemy had a garrison. And therefore a disposition was made for attacking this town; but by the delay of the king’s generals the execution of this matter was so long deferred, that the enemy had already reinforced their garrison, and were advanced so near us with a superior force, that it was not thought advisable to attempt the place. Thus the only resource left us was the kingdom of Valencia, whither we were absolutely obliged to retreat, that we might preserve our communication with the seas, and canton with security.
“Nor is it to be wondered at that Count Noyelles, in his letter to the Earl of Peterborow, should seem dissatisfied with the measures that were then taken; since ’tis well known that General used underhand to ridicule those very opinions of councils of war to which he had given his own assent. For, being disappointed of the command of the army (which was what he expected at his first arrival), he seemed resolved that no other general should have an army to command. ’Tis very notorious that a Dutch and Spanish battalion, with a detachment of English and Portuguese, amounting to above 3000 men, were sent to Cuenca, and thrown away there (after it had been resolved to retreat to Valencia), purely to satisfy his importunity; for I always foresaw it would be impossible to protect a garrison at that distance from our quarters. But what is still more extraordinary, the sending of the king’s troops into Arragon ​with part of the Dutch who might otherwise have been at the battle of Almanza, was another fatal effect of following Count de Noyelles’ advice.
“In the Earl of Peterborow’s answer to the fourth question, he is pleased to say, ‘That several councils of war were held in the month of January in Valencia, about the time that intelligence was brought that the forces under the Earl Rivers were entered into the Mediterranean, in order to adjust the measures for the ensuing campaign. That the matters therein debated were principally whether the army should march towards Madrid or seek the enemy. In the debates the Earl of Peterborow positively affirms that the Earl of Galway, Mr. Stanhope, and the Lord Tyrawley, supported those measures with the Portuguese general; and that the King, the Count de Noyelles, the Spanish generals and ministers, with himself, argued strongly against those measures as highly dangerous and impracticable; and this in repeated councils of war. Till at last the Earl of Peterborow, solicited by the king to renew the debate, desired the king that he would order all called to the council to bring their opinions in writing, that everybody’s opinion, and reasons for that opinion, might appear and be known to the world; which, according to the king’s commands, were put in writing and delivered at the council.’
“In reply to this assertion I would beg leave to appeal to your lordships’ memories, whether upon the first mention of these resolutions to your most honourable house, the Earl did not as positively affirm, ‘That the conclusive council for the operations of the ensuing campaign was held on the 15th of January, and whether he did not offer to depose on oath that in that very council no person whatever was of opinion for making an offensive war, and against dividing the troops, but the Lord Tyrawley, Mr. Stanhope, and I?’ Soon after, indeed, upon farther recollection, he was pleased to add the Marquis das Minas to our number; and I observe he has since given himself a much larger latitude, both as to the time of holding that council, and as to the persons who voted for an offensive war. His Lordship is now so far from confining himself to a day that he takes in the whole month, and by accusing us more modestly for having opposed only the King, Count Noyelles, himself, and the Spanish generals and ministers, leaves half the council on our side. For, supposing all the Spanish generals and ministers to have assisted at that council, there could only have been twelve persons there, viz., Prince Lichtenstein, Count Oropeza, Count Corsana, Count Cardona, Count Noyelles, my Lord Peterborow, the Marquis das Minas, Count d’Assumar, my Lord Tyrawley, Mr. Stanhope, Monsieur Friesheim, and I. The last six his lordship has plainly left on our side; but my Lord Tyrawley positively affirms Count Corsana was of the same opinion, and believes Count Oropeza was so too. Thus taking the matter as the Earl of Peterborow is pleased to state it, we had an equality, and, as my Lord Tyrawley remembers, the greater number, — of our party.
“Perhaps when my Lord Peterborow contended so positively to prove that council of the 15th of January conclusive, he was led into that error by the mistake in my Lord Sunderland’s letter in answer to one of Mr. Stanhope’s of January 15th. But he has since been pleased to allow that the council of the 15th was not conclusive, and that many more subsequent councils were held, which determined the operations of the ensuing campaign, wherein he voted himself for marching to Madrid by the way of Arragon — which (I should have imagined) had left no farther room to mention our opinions of the 25th. But because he is still resolved to make good his charges against my Lord Tyrawley, Mr. Stanhope, and me, he affirms to your Lordships, ‘That the occasion of that change in the subsequent council was, because the opinion of the majority had been overruled by a minister of her Majesty, assuring that the Queen had given him order to declare in her name, that her positive orders were that they should seek the enemy, march to Madrid, and not divide the troops upon any account whatsoever.’ I must confess I do not conceive that it imports me much to reply to this part of the Earl’s answer, nor shall I attempt to make an imperfect defence of an absent man; for if Mr. Stanhope was here, I doubt not but he would be able sufficiently to justify his own conduct in this affair. Yet I cannot help saying, that even malice has never yet suggested that my Lord Tyrawley, Mr. Stanhope, and I, did not act on that occasion with great integrity according to the best of our understandings. Nor (with great submission to this most honourable house) shall I ever be ashamed to own an opinion which was then not only the common sense of the army, but agreeeble to the desires and interest of the whole kingdom of England.
“In the Earl of Peterborow’s farther question he is pleased to say — ‘That notwithstanding this, the Earl of Galway brought the army into the plains of Valencia, the direct contrary route to that of Arragon, and into all those dangers, which he was to avoid by marching by the head of the Tagus.’ In reply to this answer I shall only observe, that I had not the command of that army (which consisted of three separate bodies, English, Portuguese, and Dutch), but the Marquis das Minas, from whom I always received orders. And the battle of Almanza was fought by the unanimous approbation of a council of war; nor could the resolutions of that council have ever been executed, had there been the least difference of opinion; because ​each commander of a separate corps might have refused to march. For the occasion of our moving towards Almanza, I must beg leave to refer to my Narrative, where I have mentioned more at large, that in order to execute the resolutions of those councils of war, where it was agreed we should march to Madrid by the way of Arragon, but first destroy the enemy’s magazines on the frontiers of Valencia, I went with the Marquis das Minas in the beginning of April to Yecla, where the enemy’s chief magazines lay, and from thence to Villena, where we had advice of their troops being assembled at Almanza, upon which that council was held wherein the battle was unanimously resolved on.
[Here I omit Lord Galway’s opinion concerning the Toulon question, as I have quoted it in Book II. Chapter III., Section 16.]
“What his Lordship says concerning a project that was formed for the taking of Origuela before the opening of the campaign is very true; but that project being afterwards found impracticable for want of provisions, and the campaign drawing near, the Earl Rivers’ troops, which after their landing at Alicant, had been quartered in the nearest and most commodious towns for their reception, were ordered to remove to Oya de Castalla (two short days’ march from the places where they lay before) that the enemy might not get between them and the rest of our quarters to surprise us.
“In the Earl’s answer to the fifth question, he says — ‘The King of Spain, when the troops were marching into Murcia towards the enemy, assembled a council of war to no other purpose, but to send by the hands of his secretary a protest with the reasons why he would not march with the army, but go to protect his subjects in Catalonia; the contents of which protest the Earl very well remembers, having had a copy of it by the king’s order.’ His lordship’s memory, as positive as he is, must have failed him extremely in this matter. For the army never did march into Murcia, nor any part of it, except a detachment of the troops under his lordship’s command: which returned from thence with very ill success. And whatever he may aver to have been the reason of the King of Spain’s leaving the army and going to Catalonia, ’tis certain his journey thither was fixed long before the army assembled, for no other reason that I ever yet heard of, but because he had a mind to redress some disorders there. And His Majesty always promised to be back again by the time our army should be ready to take the field. And it is notoriously known that the reasons for that journey were thought so insufficient, that not only all the foreign generals and ministers, but even the city and kingdom of Valencia, by their deputies, protested against it.
“As to what the Earl of Peterborow is pleased to say concerning those instruments which he has to produce as proofs of the King of Spain’s having been over-ruled on many occasions in what he proposed for the public service. I can only reply, that I do not remember to have seen any of those proofs — except a letter of the King of Spain to his lordship, where His Majesty observes that the English, Portuguese, and Dutch Generals had refused him men to send to Majorca, in councils of war held on the 17th and 19th of January (from whence I hope I may reasonably infer the great probability of these generals being of opinion, but two days before, against dividing the troops). And I must say, my behaviour to the King of Spain, while I had the honour to serve under him, was such, that he never had occasion to complain against me by his ministers to the Queen, as he did most strenuously by the Count of Gallas against the Earl of Peterborow.
“Gallway.”
* ↑ First Question: “The Earl of Peterborow be desired to acquaint the Committee how he was supported with men and money during the time he commanded in Spain, and what applications he made for either, and to whom?”
* ↑ [This was an old name for yeomanry regiments or militia.]
* ↑ Second Question: “The Earl of Peterborow may acquaint the house of what he knows of the Earl of Galway’s proceedings during his stay with the army at Madrid, his march to Guadalaxara, and his retreat to Valencia, and if he knows anything of the opposition made by the King of Spain, the Count De Noyelles, and the Spanish ministers and generals to those measures.”
* ↑ Third Question: “That the Earl of Peterborow acquaint the House, what advice his lordship received from the Karl of Galway at Madrid in order to concert any public measures, and what his lordship knows of the reasons that induced the King of Spain to go by Arragon towards Madrid, and not by Valencia?”
* ↑ Fourth Question: “If his lordship pleases to give an account of the councils of war in Valencia about the 15th of January 1707, upon the notice of the Earl Rivers sailing into the Straits — and upon the projects of that campaign — and what numbers the king took from the army, and an account of his manifesto upon so doing?” Lord Peterborough having touched on the latter portion of this question in his answer to question first, did not return to the subject.]
* ↑ Fifth Question. “What the motives were of the King of Spain’s leaving the army when it was resolved to march towards Madrid and towards the enemy? — and whether there were any orders pretended from England for those measures? [Lord Peterborough took no notice of the latter part of this question, having attacked Mr. Stanhope in his answer to Question Fourth.]