# The American Historical Review/Volume 6/Review: The Diplomatic Relations of the United States and Spanish America

This work is based upon a course of lectures delivered by the author at Johns Hopkins University in January, 1899. The title would seem to promise a more comprehensive treatment of the subject than is contained in the six chapters which make up the book. The writer states, however, that no attempt has been made to cover the whole field of our diplomatic relations with Spanish America, and that the present volume i s intended to serve as an introduction to the subject. An examination will also show that the negotiations discussed have been in the main with European countries regarding the affairs of Spanish America rather than with the Spanish Americans themselves.
The revolt of the Spanish colonies and the part played by the United States and England in founding the republics into which they were formed, are the subjects of the first two chapters. There is such lack of knowledge in this country regarding the other republics of the continent that so clear and concise a sketch of their origin as is here presented should be received with gratitude. The leading events of the war of independence, which resulted in the loss by Spain of all her colonies on the main land, are admirably compressed in a short space, and due justice is done to San Martin, Sucre and O'Higgins, for there is too general a disposition to regard Bolivar as the only remarkable man produced by the movement. None of these four great leaders of the revolution reaped the harvest of his labors. Bolivar died after witnessing the failure of all his plans. San Martin survived him almost twenty years an exile in Europe. Sucre was assassinated and O'Higgins retired from Chile, the scene of his exploits, to die in comparative obscurity in Peru. In the recognition of the independence of the republics, both the United States and Great Britain proceeded with the strictest regard for their obligations toward Spain. Although the insurrection broke out in 1810 and the issue of the conflict could be forecast as early as 1815, independence was not, despite the eloquence and influence of Clay, recognized by the United States until 1822, and by England until 1824. The formation of the Holy Alliance by Austria, France, Prussia and Russia, their intervention in Spain and their menacing attitude towards her revolting colonies, drew from President Monroe, at the suggestion of Canning, the celebrated declaration in his message of December 2, 1823, known as the Monroe Doctrine.
Chapter III. is devoted to "The Diplomacy of the United States in regard to Cuba." The attitude of this government towards the island until about the time of the Mexican war may be summed up in the words of Madison in 1810 "that the United States although they might be an inactive could not be a satisfied spectator at its falling under any European Government." After the Mexican war, the policy of the United ​States took a more positive turn as was shown, not only by the decided stand against European intervention in the affairs of the island, but also by efforts to acquire it by purchase. This tendency to the acquisition of Cuba reached its height during the somewhat stormy mission to Spain of Pierre Soulé of Louisiana, who, being a Frenchman by birth, might with advantage have taken note of Talleyrand's maxim regarding the danger of "trop de zèle" in diplomacy. The remarkable proclamation of Soulé, Mason and Buchanan known as the Ostend Manifesto went so far as to announce in hysteric terms that the United States would be justified "by every law, human and divine, in wresting the island from Spain," should that government be indisposed to accept the §120,000,000 suggested by these gentlemen as the maximum price. The Civil War brought to an end the agitation for the purchase of Cuba, which was mainly in the interest of the South and entangled with the slavery question. Since the war, the only Cuban problem, but a serious one, thrust upon the attention of the government has been the attitude to be adopted during the insurrections in the island, and the complications, such as the Virginius affair, resulting therefrom. The problem has been finally solved. The ultimate destiny of the island is dismissed by the writer as too problematical to fall within the scope of this volume.
In discussing the proposed Central American Canal, to which a chapter is devoted. Professor Latané reviews the negotiations with Nicaragua regarding a canal through that country, the conclusion of the treaty of 1S4S with New Granada by which the United States guaranteed the neutrality of the Isthmus of Panama, and gives as much attention as his space will allow to the history of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty—an attention which it well merits in view of the confusion existing in the minds of many honorable persons regarding the binding force of that treaty. Of the style and method of the negotiations conducted by Messrs. Blaine and Frelinghuysen in order to secure the abrogation of the treaty, anything but a high opinion is expressed. Mr. Blaine in his celebrated circular of July, 1881, to the American representatives abroad, outlining the policy of American control of an inter-oceanic canal, completely and inexplicably ignored the Clayton-Bulwer treaty and exposed himself to a summary reply from Lord Granville simply calling attention to its existence. Professor Latané justly maintains that the neutralization of the canal is the only proper method of effectively providing for its safety. Before the case of the Suez Canal should be cited as a precedent, as is done by the author, it would be well to have a somewhat clearer conception of just what the present attitude of the English government is towards the Constantinople Convention of 1883, providing for the neutralization of the canal, in view of the reservation regarding that convention made some years ago by Mr. Curzon in the House of Commons, when parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
The two remaining chapters of the work treat respectively of "French Intervention in Mexico" and the "Present Status of the Monroe Doctrine." In the former, the agreement between England, France and ​Spain for intervention in Mexico for the purpose of securing a settlement of their claims, the determination of Napoleon III to establish an empire in Mexico which caused the retirement of the other powers, the policy of the United States and the negotiations which resulted in the withdrawal of the French forces and the collapse of the government of Maximilian are told of in an interesting way. The greater part of the chapter on the Monroe Doctrine is taken up with a sketch of the Venezuelan question. In a summary of "the policy of the United States in reference to arbitration of American questions" the statement is made that "in disputes between American States it (the United States) insists that they be settled without calling in the aid of European powers." If this means, as it seems to mean, that it is the policy of this government not to allow a European power to arbitrate in a dispute between two American states, it would certainly be an extraordinary and arbitrary development of the Monroe Doctrine. No such view has been taken by the United States. For example, one of the most important questions which has arisen between two South American republics since the war between Chile and Peru, has been the frontier question between Chile and the Argentine Republic. Several times within the last fifteen years these two states have been on the verge of war. In 1897 a treaty was negotiated submitting the matter to Queen Victoria for arbitration. The arbitration was accepted and the question is now awaiting decision.