# United States – Vietnam Relations, 1945–1967: A Study Prepared by the Department of Defense/III. C. Notes

| 1. | CIA Study 0017/66, "Asian Communist Employment of Negotiations as a Political Tactic" (S), p. 42. |
| 2. | CIA Study 0017/66 (S), p. 43. |
| 3. | U.S. VerbMin/2, pp. 58 ff. |
| 4. | Ibid., pp. 65–66. |
| 5. | After Dien Bien Phu and the withdrawal of most French forces to the Tonkin Delta, Viet Minh strength in and around the Delta was reported as 94 infantry battalions, 1 artillery division, 110 district companies, and from 40,000 to 50,000 militia. French–Vietnamese strength stood at 109 battalions (of which some 60 percent was VNA) and about 80,000 auxiliary troops and militia. Despite this manpower advantage for the French Union forces, an intelligence estimate for the period said they faced possible defections on a mounting scale which could become very large if the Viet Minh scored major victories or if the French were believed about to abandon Hanoi and portions of the Delta. See NIE-63-4-54, "Probable Military and Political Developments in Indochina over the Next 30 Days (15 June–15 July)," June 15, 1954 (SECRET). In General Valluy's report to the five-power military staff conference on June 4, moreover, he stated, there were no southern Vietnamese who could oppose northern Vietnamese once the Tonkin Delta was lost and defense of the South became necessary. See Dulles' tel. TEDUL 171 to the American Consul – Geneva, June 7, 1954 (TOP SECRET). |
| 6. | U.S. VerbMin/1, pp. 15–16. |
| 7. | IC Restricted/1 (C), p. 8. |
| 8. | CIA Study 0017/66 (S), p. 43. |
| 9. | U.S. VerbMin/5, p. 198. |
| 10. | U.S. VerbMin/5, pp. 216–228; U.S. VerbMin/7, pp. 333–342. |
| 11. | CIA Study 0017/66 (S), p. 44. |
| 12. | IC Restricted/14 (c), pp. 18-19. |
| 13. | IC Restricted/14 (C), p. 9; CIA Study 0017/66 (S), p. 45. |
| 14. | IC Restricted/15 (C), p. 16. |
| 15. | IC Restricted/6 (C), p. 7- |
| 16. | DULTE 187, Geneva to SecState, 16 June 1954 (TOP SECRET) ​ |
| 17. | SECTO 489, translation of aide memoire, Bonnet to State, 28 June 1954 (TOP SECRET). |
| 18. | SECTO 557, Geneva to State, 3 July 1954 (TOP SECRET). |
| 19. | SECTO 560, Geneva to State, 6 July 1954 (TOP SECRET). |
| 20. | Lacouture and Devillers, La fin d'une guerre, p. 268. |
| 21. | Fall, Viet-Nam Witness, p. 135. |
| 22. | Lacouture and Devillers, p. 284. |
| 23. | Kahin and Lewis, The United. States in Vietnam, pp. 47–48. |
| 24. | Bator, Vietnam — A Diplomatic Tragedy, p. 17. |
| 25. | CIA Study 0017/66 (S), p. 49. |
| 1. | J. M. Mackintosh, Strategy and Tactics of Soviet Foreign Policy (New York: Oxford, 1963), pp. 83–84. |
| 2. | In a talk with Nong Kimny, Cambodian Foreign Minister, July 14; in Johnson tel. SECTO 616 from Geneva, July 15, 1954 (SECRET). |
| 3. | In a talk with Mendes-France, June 24; in Dillon tel. from Paris priority No. 5035, June 24, 1954 (TOP SECRET). |
| 4. | Ibid. and Johnson priority tel. SECTO 517, June 24, 1954, from Geneva (SECRET), reporting Mendes-France's conversation with Chou in Berne. Chou qualified this somewhat by urging that the resistance elements in the two countries be provided suitable means of re-integration into their respective societies. |
| 5. | Dillon tel. from Paris priority No. 5035, June 24, 1954 (TOP SECRET). |
| 6. | Ibid. See also Johnson priority tel. SECTO 517, June 24, 1954, from Geneva (SECRET). |
| 7. | These views were presented, e.g., to Seymour Topping by Huang Hua at a meeting described by Topping as deadly serious and devoid of propagandistic remarks. "When Huang spoke of possibility American bases in Indochina or anti-communist pact in Southeast Asia, he became very agitated, his hands shook, and his usually excellent English broke down, forcing him to work through interpreter." See Smith's tel. SECTO 661 from Geneva, July 19, 1954 (TOP SECRET). See also Johnson priority tel. SECTO 517 from Geneva, June 24, 1954 (SECRET); Smith priority tel. SECTO 463 from Geneva, June 17, 1954 (SECRET); and Smith tel. SECTO 636 from Geneva, July 17, 1954 (SECRET). |
| 8. | Smith tel. SECTO 635 from Geneva, July 17, 1954 (SECRET). Interestingly, at this same conference, Chou indicated it would be acceptable for the Cambodians to have French or British military instructors, but not Americans. |
| 9. | Central Intelligence Agency, Memorandum: Asian Communist Employment of Negotiations as a Political Tactic, RSS No. 0017/66, p. 40 (SECRET/No Foreign Dis/Controlled Dis.). |
| 10. | U.S. VerbMin/Indochina Restricted 1, pp. 4–5 (CONFIDENTIAL). |
| 11. | In Smith tel. SECTO 267 from Geneva, May 20, 1954 (SECRET). |
| 12. | CIA Memorandum RS 0017/66 (cited previously), p. 39 (SECRET/No Foreign Dis/Controlled Dis.). |
| 13. | Ibid., p. 41. ​ |
| 14. | Lacouture and Devillers, pp. 238–39. |
| 15. | Ibid., pp. 239–40. |
| 16. | CIA Memo: "Asian Communist Employment of Negotiations as a Political Tactic" (SECRET), RSS 0017/66. |
| 17. | Lacouture and Devillers, pp. 257–58. |
| 18. | Smith from Geneva tel. SECTO 632, July 17, 1954 (SECRET). |
| 19. | Lacouture and Devillers, p. 268. |
| 20. | Smith from Geneva priority tel. SECTO 638, July 18, 1954 (SECRET). |
| 21. | Smith from Geneva tel. SECTO 632, July 17, 1954 (SECRET). |
| 22. | Ibid. |
| 23. | Smith from Geneva tel. SECTO 645, July 18, 1954 (SECRET). |
| 24. | Lacouture and Devillers, p. 268. |
| 25. | See, e.g., Lacouture and Devillers, p. 213. |
| 26. | Ibid., p. 215. |
| 27. | This was the demand made by the Viet Minh in secret talks with the French. Reported in Smith's priority tel. from Geneva DULTE 187, June 16, 1954 (TOP SECRET). |
| 28. | Smith from Geneva tel. DULTE 193, June 17, 1954 (TOP SECRET). |
| 29. | Smith tel. DULTE 193 from Geneva, June 17, 1954 (TOP SECRET). See also Lacouture and Devillers, pp. 217 and 219. |
| 30. | In a talk with Smith June 19, Molotov discussed the Laos and Cambodia resistance movements and said he saw the possibility of agreement so long as neither side (i.e., the French or the Viet Minh) "adopted one-sided views or put forward extreme pretensions." Molotov said about 50 percent of Laotian territory was not controlled by the royal government (a curious way of putting it), with a much smaller movement in Cambodia. The tone of Smith's report on this conversation suggests that Molotov saw no obstacles to Viet Minh withdrawal of its "volunteers." Smith tel. DULTE 202 from Geneva, June 19, 1954 (TOP SECRET). |
| 31. | Johnson from Geneva tel. SECTO 514, June 23, 1954 (SECRET). |
| 32. | See e.g., Smith from Geneva priority tel. SECTO 637, July 17, 1954 (SECRET). |
| 33. | Smith from Geneva priority tel. SECTO 638, July 18, 1954 (SECRET). |