# Mallory v. Norfolk Southern/Opinion of the Court

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 21–1168
ROBERT MALLORY, PETITIONER v. NORFOLK SOUTHERN RAILWAY CO. ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA, EASTERN DISTRICT [June 27, 2023]
Justice Gorsuch announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I and III–B, and an opinion with respect to Parts II, III–A, and IV, in which Justice Thomas, Justice Sotomayor, and Justice Jackson join.
Imagine a lawsuit based on recent events. A few months ago, a Norfolk Southern train derailed in Ohio near the Pennsylvania border. Its cargo? Hazardous chemicals. Some poured into a nearby creek; some burst into flames. In the aftermath, many residents reported unusual symptoms. Suppose an Ohio resident sued the train conductor seeking compensation for an illness attributed to the accident. Suppose, too, that the plaintiff served his complaint on the conductor across the border in Pennsylvania. Everyone before us agrees a Pennsylvania court could hear that lawsuit consistent with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court could do so even if the conductor was a Virginia resident who just happened to be passing through Pennsylvania when the process server ​caught up with him.
Now, change the hypothetical slightly. Imagine the same Ohio resident brought the same suit in the same Pennsylvania state court, but this time against Norfolk Southern. Assume, too, the company has filed paperwork consenting to appear in Pennsylvania courts as a condition of registering to do business in the Commonwealth. Could a Pennsylvania court hear that case too? You might think so. But today, Norfolk Southern argues that the Due Process Clause entitles it to a more favorable rule, one shielding it from suits even its employees must answer. We reject the company’s argument. Nothing in the Due Process Clause requires such an incongruous result.
I
Robert Mallory worked for Norfolk Southern as a freight-car mechanic for nearly 20 years, first in Ohio, then in Virginia. During his time with the company, Mr. Mallory contends, he was responsible for spraying boxcar pipes with asbestos and handling chemicals in the railroad’s paint shop. He also demolished car interiors that, he alleges, contained carcinogens.
After Mr. Mallory left the company, he moved to Pennsylvania for a period before returning to Virginia. Along the way, he was diagnosed with cancer. Attributing his illness to his work for Norfolk Southern, Mr. Mallory hired Pennsylvania lawyers and sued his former employer in Pennsylvania state court under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, 35 Stat. 65, as amended, 45 U. S. C. §§51–60. That law creates a workers’ compensation scheme permitting railroad employees to recover damages for their employers’ negligence. See Norfolk Southern R. Co. v. Sorrell, 549 U. S. 158, 165–166 (2007).
Norfolk Southern resisted Mr. Mallory’s suit on constitutional grounds. By the time he filed his complaint, the ​company observed, Mr. Mallory resided in Virginia. His complaint alleged that he was exposed to carcinogens in Ohio and Virginia. Meanwhile, the company itself was incorporated in Virginia and had its headquarters there too. On these facts, Norfolk Southern submitted, any effort by a Pennsylvania court to exercise personal jurisdiction over it would offend the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Mr. Mallory saw things differently. He noted that Norfolk Southern manages over 2,000 miles of track, operates 11 rail yards, and runs 3 locomotive repair shops in Pennsylvania. He also pointed out that Norfolk Southern has registered to do business in Pennsylvania in light of its “ ‘regular, systematic, [and] extensive’ ” operations there. 266 A. 3d 542, 562 (Pa. 2021); see 15 Pa. Cons. Stat. §411(a) (2014). That is significant, Mr. Mallory argued, because Pennsylvania requires out-of-state companies that register to do business in the Commonwealth to agree to appear in its courts on “any cause of action” against them. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. §5301(a)(2)(i), (b) (2019); see 266 A. 3d, at 564. By complying with this statutory scheme, Mr. Mallory contended, Norfolk Southern had consented to suit in Pennsylvania on claims just like his.
Ultimately, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court sided with Norfolk Southern. Yes, Mr. Mallory correctly read Pennsylvania law. It requires an out-of-state firm to answer any suits against it in exchange for status as a registered foreign corporation and the benefits that entails. 266 A. 3d, at 561–563. But, no, the court held, Mr. Mallory could not invoke that law because it violates the Due Process Clause. Id., at 564–568. In reaching this conclusion, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court acknowledged its disagreement with the Georgia Supreme Court, which had recently rejected a ​similar due process argument from a corporate defendant. Id., at 560, n. 13 (citing Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. McCall, 312 Ga. 422, 863 S. E. 2d 81 (2021)).
In light of this split of authority, we agreed to hear this case and decide whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a State from requiring an out-of-state corporation to consent to personal jurisdiction to do business there. 596 U. S. ___ (2022).
II
The question before us is not a new one. In truth, it is a very old question—and one this Court resolved in Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. of Philadelphia v. Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co., 243 U. S. 93 (1917). There, the Court unanimously held that laws like Pennsylvania’s comport with the Due Process Clause. Some background helps explain why the Court reached the result it did.
Both at the time of the founding and the Fourteenth Amendment’s adoption, the Anglo-American legal tradition recognized that a tribunal’s competence was generally constrained only by the “territorial limits” of the sovereign that created it. J. Story, Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws §539, pp. 450–451 (1834) (Story); see also United States v. Union Pacific R. Co., 98 U. S. 569, 602–603 (1879). That principle applied to all kinds of actions, but cashed out differently based on the object of the court’s attention. So, for example, an action in rem that claimed an interest in immovable property was usually treated as a “local” action that could be brought only in the jurisdiction where the property was located. 3 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on ​the Laws of England 117–118, 294 (1768). Meanwhile, an in personam suit against an individual “for injuries that might have happened any where” was generally considered a “transitory” action that followed the individual. Id., at 294. All of which meant that a suit could be maintained by anyone on any claim in any place the defendant could be found. Story §538, at 450.
American courts routinely followed these rules. Chief Justice Marshall, for one, was careful to distinguish between local and transitory actions in a case brought by a Virginia plaintiff against a Kentucky defendant based on a fraud perpetrated in Ohio. Massie v. Watts, 6 Cranch 148, 162–163 (1810). Because the action was a transitory one that followed the individual, he held, the suit could be maintained “wherever the [defendant] may be found.” Id., at 158, 161–163; see also, e.g., Livingston v. Jefferson, 15 F. Cas. 660, 663–664 (No. 8,411) (CC Va. 1811) (opinion of Marshall, C. J.); Peabody v. Hamilton, 106 Mass. 217, 220–221 (1870); Bissell v. Briggs, 9 Mass. 462, 468–470 (1813).
This rule governing transitory actions still applies to natural persons today. Some call it “tag” jurisdiction. And our leading case applying the rule is not so old. See Burnham v. Superior Court of Cal., County of Marin, 495 U. S. 604 (1990). The case began with Dennis Burnham’s business trip to California. Id., at 608 (plurality opinion). During his short visit, Mr. Burnham’s estranged wife served him with a summons to appear in California state court for divorce proceedings. Ibid. This Court unanimously approved the state court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over Mr. Burnham as consistent with the Due Process Clause—and did so even though the Burnhams had spent nearly all their married life in New Jersey and Mr. Burnham still resided there. See id., at 607–608, 616–619; id., at 628 (White, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); id., at 635–639 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment); id., at 640 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment).
​As the use of the corporate form proliferated in the 19th century, the question arose how to adapt the traditional rule about transitory actions for individuals to artificial persons created by law. Unsurprisingly, corporations did not relish the prospect of being haled into court for any claim anywhere they conducted business. “No one, after all, has ever liked greeting the process server.” Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 592 U. S. ___, ___ (2021) (Gorsuch, J., concurring in judgment) (slip op., at 7). Corporations chartered in one State sought the right to send their sales agents and products freely into other States. At the same time, when confronted with lawsuits in those other States, some firms sought to hide behind their foreign character and deny their presence to defeat the court’s jurisdiction. Ibid.; see Brief for Petitioner 13–15; see also R. Jackson, What Price “Due Process”?, 5 N. Y. L. Rev. 435, 438 (1927) (describing this as the asserted right to “both be and not be”).
Lawmakers across the country soon responded to these stratagems. Relevant here, both before and after the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification, they adopted statutes requiring out-of-state corporations to consent to in-state suits in exchange for the rights to exploit the local market and to receive the full range of benefits enjoyed by in-state corporations. These statutes varied. In some States, out-of-state corporate defendants were required to agree to answer suits brought by in-state plaintiffs. See, e.g., N. Y. Code Proc. §427 (1849); 1866 Wis. Laws ch. 1, §86.1; Md. Ann. Code, Art. 26, §211 (1868); N. C. Gen. Stat., ch. 17, §82 (1873). In other States, corporations were required to consent to suit if the plaintiff’s cause of action arose within the State, even if the plaintiff happened to reside elsewhere. See, e.g., Iowa Code, ch. 101, §1705 (1851); 1874 Tex. Gen. Laws p. 107; 1881 Mich. Pub. Acts p. 348. Still other States (and the federal government) omitted both of these limitations. They required all out-of-state corporations that registered to do ​business in the forum to agree to defend themselves there against any manner of suit. See, e.g., Act of Feb. 22, 1867, 14 Stat. 404; 1889 Nev. Stats. p. 47; S. C. Rev. Stat., Tit. 7, ch. 45, §1466 (1894); Conn. Gen. Stat. §3931 (1895). Yet another group of States applied this all-purpose-jurisdiction rule to a subset of corporate defendants, like railroads and insurance companies. See, e.g., 1827 Va. Acts ch. 74, p. 77; 1841 Pa. Laws p. 29; 1854 Ohio Laws p. 91; Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 112, §68 (1855); Ark. Stat., ch. 76, §3561 (1873); Mo. Rev. Stat., ch. 119, Art. 4, §6013 (1879). Mr. Mallory has collected an array of these statutes, enacted between 1835 and 1915, in his statutory appendix. See App. to Brief for Petitioner 1a–274a.
III A
Unsurprisingly, some corporations challenged statutes like these on various grounds, due process included. And, ultimately, one of these disputes reached this Court in Pennsylvania Fire.
That case arose this way. Pennsylvania Fire was an insurance company incorporated under the laws of Pennsylvania. In 1909, the company executed a contract in Colorado to insure a smelter located near the town of Cripple Creek owned by the Gold Issue Mining & Milling Company, an Arizona corporation. Gold Issue Min. & Milling Co. v. Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. of Phila., 267 Mo. 524, 537, 184 S. W. 999, 1001 (1916). Less than a year later, lightning struck and a fire destroyed the insured facility. Ibid. When Gold Issue Mining sought to collect on its policy, Pennsylvania Fire refused to pay. So, Gold Issue Mining sued. But it did not sue where the contract was formed (Colorado), or in its home State (Arizona), or even in the insurer’s home State (Pennsylvania). Instead, Gold Issue Mining brought its claim in a Missouri state court. Id., at 534, 184 S. W., at 1000. Pennsylvania Fire objected to this choice of forum. It said the Due Process Clause spared it from having to answer in Missouri’s courts a suit with no connection to the State. Id., at 541, 184 S. W., at 1002.
The Missouri Supreme Court disagreed. It first observed that Missouri law required any out-of-state insurance company “desiring to transact any business” in the State to file paperwork agreeing to (1) appoint a state official to serve as the company’s agent for service of process, and (2) accept service on that official as valid in any suit. Id., at 543, 184 S. W., at 1003 (internal quotation marks omitted). For more than a decade, Pennsylvania Fire had complied with the law, as it had “desir[ed] to transact business” in Missouri “pursuant to the laws thereof.” Id., at 545, 184 S. W., at 1003. And Gold Issue Mining had served process on the ​appropriate state official, just as the law required. See id., at 535, 184 S. W., at 1000.
As to the law’s constitutionality, the Missouri Supreme Court carefully reviewed this Court’s precedents and found they “clearly” supported “sustain[ing] the proceeding.” Id., at 569, 576, 184 S. W., at 1010, 1013; see id., at 552–576, 601, 184 S. W., at 1005–1013, 1020–1021. The Missouri Supreme Court explained that its decision was also supported by “the origin, growth, and history of transitory actions in England, and their importation, adoption, and expansion” in America. Id., at 578–586, 184 S. W., at 1013–1016. It stressed, too, that the law had long permitted suits against individuals in any jurisdiction where they could be found, no matter where the underlying cause of action happened to arise. What sense would it make to treat a fictitious corporate person differently? See id., at 588–592, 600, 184 S. W., at 1016–1018, 1020. For all these reasons, the court concluded, Pennsylvania Fire “ha[d] due process of law, regardless of the place, state or nation where the cause of action arose.” Id., at 576, 184 S. W., at 1013.
Dissatisfied with this answer, Pennsylvania Fire turned here. Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Holmes had little trouble dispatching the company’s due process argument. Under this Court’s precedents, there was “no doubt” Pennsylvania Fire could be sued in Missouri by an out-of-state plaintiff on an out-of-state contract because it had agreed to accept service of process in Missouri on any suit as a condition of doing business there. Pennsylvania Fire, 243 U. S., at 95. Indeed, the Court thought the matter so settled by existing law that the case “hardly” presented an “open” question. Ibid. The Court acknowledged that the outcome might have been different if the corporation had never appointed an agent for service of process in Missouri, given this Court’s earlier decision in Old Wayne Mut. Life Assn. of Indianapolis v. McDonough, 204 U. S. 8 (1907). But the Court thought that Old Wayne had “left untouched” ​the principle that due process allows a corporation to be sued on any claim in a State where it has appointed an agent to receive whatever suits may come. 243 U. S., at 95–96. The Court found it unnecessary to say more because the company’s objections had been resolved “at length in the judgment of the court below.” Id., at 95.
That assessment was understandable. Not only had the Missouri Supreme Court issued a thoughtful opinion. Not only did a similar rule apply to transitory actions against individuals. Other leading judges, including Learned Hand and Benjamin Cardozo, had reached similar conclusions in similar cases in the years leading up to Pennsylvania Fire. See Smolik v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 222 F. 148, 150–151 (SDNY 1915) (Hand, J.); Bagdon v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 217 N. Y. 432, 436–437, 111 N. E. 1075, 1076–1077 (1916) (Cardozo, J.). In the years following Pennsylvania Fire, too, this Court reaffirmed its holding as often as the issue arose. See, e.g., Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Chatters, 279 U. S. 320, 325–326 (1929); Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U. S. 165, 175 (1939); see also Robert Mitchell Furniture Co. v. Selden Breck Constr. Co., 257 U. S. 213, 215–216 (1921); Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U. S. 13, 20 (1928).
B
Pennsylvania Fire controls this case. Much like the Missouri law at issue there, the Pennsylvania law at issue here provides that an out-of-state corporation “may not do business in this Commonwealth until it registers with” the Department of State. 15 Pa. Cons. Stat. §411(a). As part of the registration process, a corporation must identify an “office” it will “continuously maintain” in the Commonwealth. §411(f); see also §412(a)(5). Upon completing these requirements, the corporation “shall enjoy the same rights and privileges as a domestic entity and shall be subject to the ​same liabilities, restrictions, duties and penalties … imposed on domestic entities.” §402(d). Among other things, Pennsylvania law is explicit that “qualification as a foreign corporation” shall permit state courts to “exercise general personal jurisdiction” over a registered foreign corporation, just as they can over domestic corporations. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. §5301(a)(2)(i).
Norfolk Southern has complied with this law for many years. In 1998, the company registered to do business in Pennsylvania. Acting through its Corporate Secretary as a “duly authorized officer,” the company completed an “Application for Certificate of Authority” from the Commonwealth “[i]n compliance with” state law. App. 1–2. As part of that process, the company named a “Commercial Registered Office Provider” in Philadelphia County, agreeing that this was where it “shall be deemed … located.” Ibid. The Secretary of the Commonwealth approved the application, conferring on Norfolk Southern both the benefits and burdens shared by domestic corporations—including amenability to suit in state court on any claim. Id., at 1. Since 1998, Norfolk Southern has regularly updated its information on file with the Secretary. In 2009, for example, the company advised that it had changed its Registered Office Provider and would now be deemed located in Dauphin County. Id., at 6; see 15 Pa. Cons. Stat. §4144(b) (1988). All told, then, Norfolk Southern has agreed to be found in Pennsylvania and answer any suit there for more than 20 years.
Pennsylvania Fire held that suits premised on these grounds do not deny a defendant due process of law. Even Norfolk Southern does not seriously dispute that much. It concedes that it registered to do business in Pennsylvania, that it established an office there to receive service of process, and that in doing so it understood it would be amenable to suit on any claim. Tr. of Oral Arg. 62; post, at 2 (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); ​../Opinion of Justice Jackson#2 (Jackson, J., concurring). Of course, Mr. Mallory no longer lives in Pennsylvania and his cause of action did not accrue there. But none of that makes any more difference than the fact that Gold Issue Mining was not from Missouri (but from Arizona) and its claim did not arise there (but in Colorado). See Pennsylvania Fire, 267 Mo., at 537, 184 S. W., at 1001. To decide this case, we need not speculate whether any other statutory scheme and set of facts would suffice to establish consent to suit. It is enough to acknowledge that the state law and facts before us fall squarely within Pennsylvania Fire’s rule. See post, at 2–4 (opinion of Alito, J.).
In the proceedings below, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court seemed to recognize that Pennsylvania Fire dictated an answer in Mr. Mallory’s favor. Still, it ruled for Norfolk Southern anyway. It did so because, in its view, intervening decisions from this Court had “implicitly overruled” Pennsylvania Fire. See 266 A. 3d, at 559, 567. But in following that course, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court clearly erred. As this Court has explained: “If a precedent of this Court has direct application in a case,” as Pennsylvania Fire does here, a lower court “should follow the case which directly controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions.” Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U. S. 477, 484 (1989). This is true even if the lower court thinks the precedent is in tension with “some other line of decisions.” Ibid.
IV
Now before us, Norfolk Southern candidly asks us to do what the Pennsylvania Supreme Court could not—overrule Pennsylvania Fire. Brief for Respondent 36–38. To smooth the way, Norfolk Southern suggests that this Court’s decision in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U. S. 310 (1945), has already done much of the hard work for us. That decision, the company insists, seriously undermined Pennsylvania Fire’s foundations. Brief for Respondent 34–36. We disagree. The two precedents sit comfortably side by side. See post, at 4 (opinion of Alito, J.).
A
Start with how Norfolk Southern sees things. On the company’s telling, echoed by the dissent, International Shoe held that the Due Process Clause tolerates two (and only two) types of personal jurisdiction over a corporate defendant. First, “specific jurisdiction” permits suits that “ ‘arise out of or relate to’ ” a corporate defendant’s activities in the forum State. Ford Motor Co., 592 U. S., at ___–___ (slip op., at 5–6). Second, “general jurisdiction” allows all kinds of suits against a corporation, but only in States where the corporation is incorporated or has its “principal place of business.” Id., at ___ (slip op., at 5). After International Shoe, Norfolk Southern insists, no other bases for personal jurisdiction over a corporate defendant are permissible. Brief for Respondent 13–15; see post, at 2–4 (Barrett, J., dissenting).
But if this account might seem a plausible summary of some of our International Shoe jurisprudence, it oversimplifies matters. Here is what really happened in International ​Shoe. The State of Washington sued a corporate defendant in state court for claims based on its in-state activities even though the defendant had not registered to do business in Washington and had not agreed to be present and accept service of process there. 326 U. S., at 312–313. Despite this, the Court held that the suit against the company comported with due process. In doing so, the Court reasoned that the Fourteenth Amendment “permit[s]” suits against a corporate defendant that has not agreed to be “presen[t] within the territorial jurisdiction of a court,” so long as “the quality and nature of the [company’s] activity” in the State “make it reasonable and just” to maintain suit there. Id., at 316, 319–320. Put simply, even without agreeing to be present, the out-of-state corporation was still amenable to suit in Washington consistent with “ ‘fair play and substantial justice’ ”—terms the Court borrowed from Justice Holmes, the author of Pennsylvania Fire. International Shoe, 326 U. S., at 316 (citing McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U. S. 90, 91–92 (1917)).
In reality, then, all International Shoe did was stake out an additional road to jurisdiction over out-of-state corporations. Pennsylvania Fire held that an out-of-state corporation that has consented to in-state suits in order to do business in the forum is susceptible to suit there. International Shoe held that an out-of-state corporation that has not consented to in-state suits may also be susceptible to claims in the forum State based on “the quality and nature of [its] activity” in the forum. 326 U. S., at 319. Consistent with all this, our precedents applying International Shoe have long spoken of the decision as asking whether a state court may exercise jurisdiction over a corporate defendant “ ‘that has not consented to suit in the forum.’ ” Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S. A. v. Brown, 564 U. S. 915, 927–928 (2011) (emphasis added); see also Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U. S. 117, 129 (2014). Our precedents have recognized, too, that “express or implied consent” can continue to ​ground personal jurisdiction—and consent may be manifested in various ways by word or deed. See, e.g., Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U. S. 694, 703 (1982); BNSF R. Co. v. Tyrrell, 581 U. S. 402, 415 (2017). See also post, at 4 (opinion of Alito, J.).
That Norfolk Southern overreads International Shoe finds confirmation in that decision’s emphasis on “ ‘fair play and substantial justice.’ ” 326 U. S., at 316. Sometimes, International Shoe said, the nature of a company’s in-state activities will support jurisdiction over a nonconsenting corporation when those activities “give rise to the liabilities sued on.” Id., at 317. Other times, it added, suits “on causes of action arising from dealings entirely distinct from [the company’s] activities” in the forum State may be appropriate. Id., at 318. These passages may have pointed the way to what (much) later cases would label “specific jurisdiction” over claims related to in-forum activities and “general jurisdiction” in places where a corporation is incorporated or headquartered. See, e.g., Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S. A. v. Hall, 466 U. S. 408, 414–415, and nn. 8–9 (1984). But the fact remains that International Shoe itself eschewed any “mechanical or quantitative” test and instead endorsed a flexible approach focused on “the fair and orderly administration of the laws which it was the purpose of the due process clause to insure.” 326 U. S., at 319. Unquestionably, too, International Shoe saw this flexible standard as expanding—not contracting—state court jurisdiction. See Daimler, 571 U. S., at 128, and n. 6. As we later put the point: “The immediate effect of [International Shoe] was to increase the ability of the state courts to obtain personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants.” Shaffer ​v. Heitner, 433 U. S. 186, 204 (1977).
Given all this, it is no wonder that we have already turned aside arguments very much like Norfolk Southern’s. In Burnham, the defendant contended that International Shoe implicitly overruled the traditional tag rule holding that individuals physically served in a State are subject to suit there for claims of any kind. 495 U. S., at 616 (plurality opinion). This Court rejected that submission. Instead, as Justice Scalia explained, International Shoe simply provided a “novel” way to secure personal jurisdiction that did nothing to displace other “traditional ones.” Id., at 619. What held true there must hold true here. Indeed, seven years after deciding International Shoe, the Court cited Pennsylvania Fire approvingly. Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U. S. 437, 446, n. 6 (1952).
B
Norfolk Southern offers several replies, but none persuades. The company begins by pointing to this Court’s decision in Shaffer. There, as the company stresses, the Court indicated that “ ‘prior decisions … inconsistent with’ ” International Shoe “ ‘are overruled.’ ” Brief for Respondent 35 ​(quoting Shaffer, 433 U. S., at 212, n. 39); post, at 15 (opinion of Barrett, J.). True as that statement may be, however, it only poses the question whether Pennsylvania Fire is “inconsistent with” International Shoe. And, as we have seen, it is not. Instead, the latter decision expanded upon the traditional grounds of personal jurisdiction recognized by the former. This Court has previously cautioned litigants and lower courts against (mis)reading Shaffer as suggesting that International Shoe discarded every traditional method for securing personal jurisdiction that came before. See Burnham, 495 U. S., at 620–622 (plurality opinion); cf. Daimler, 571 U. S., at 126, 132–133. We find ourselves repeating the admonition today.
Next, Norfolk Southern appeals to the spirit of our age. After International Shoe, it says, the “primary concern” of the personal jurisdiction analysis is “[t]reating defendants fairly.” Brief for Respondent 19 (internal quotation marks omitted). And on the company’s telling, it would be “unfair” to allow Mr. Mallory’s suit to proceed in Pennsylvania because doing so would risk unleashing “ ‘local prejudice’ ” against a company that is “not ‘local’ in the eyes of the community.” Id., at 19–21.
But if fairness is what Norfolk Southern seeks, pause for a moment to measure this suit against that standard. When Mr. Mallory brought his claim in 2017, Norfolk Southern had registered to do business in Pennsylvania for ​many years. It had established an office for receiving service of process. It had done so pursuant to a statute that gave the company the right to do business in-state in return for agreeing to answer any suit against it. And the company had taken full advantage of its opportunity to do business in the Commonwealth, boasting of its presence this way:
All told, when Mr. Mallory sued, Norfolk Southern employed nearly 5,000 people in Pennsylvania. It maintained more than 2,400 miles of track across the Commonwealth. Its 70-acre locomotive shop there was the largest in North America. Contrary to what it says in its brief here, the company even proclaimed itself a proud part of “the Pennsylvania Community.” Ibid. By 2020, too, Norfolk Southern managed more miles of track in Pennsylvania than in any other State. Brief for Public Citizen as Amicus Curiae 21. And it employed more people in Pennsylvania than it did in Virginia, where its headquarters was located. Ibid. Nor are we conjuring these statistics out of thin air. The company itself highlighted its “intrastate activities” in the proceedings below. 266 A. 3d, at 560, 563 (discussing the firm’s “extensive operations in Pennsylvania,” including “2,278 miles of track,” “eleven rail yards,” and “three locomotive repair shops”). Given all this, on what plausible account could International Shoe’s concerns with “fair play and substantial justice” require a Pennsylvania court to turn aside Mr. Mallory’s suit? See post, at 4–5 (opinion of Alito, J.).
​Perhaps sensing its arguments from fairness meet a dead end, Norfolk Southern ultimately heads in another direction altogether. It suggests the Due Process Clause separately prohibits one State from infringing on the sovereignty of another State through exorbitant claims of personal jurisdiction. Brief for Respondent 16–19; see post, at 6–8 (opinion of Barrett, J.). And, in candor, the company is half right. Some of our personal jurisdiction cases have discussed the federalism implications of one State’s assertion of jurisdiction over the corporate residents of another. See, e.g., Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., San Francisco Cty., 582 U. S. 255, 263 (2017). But that neglects an important part of the story. To date, our personal jurisdiction cases have never found a Due Process Clause problem sounding in federalism when an out-of-state defendant submits to suit in the forum State. After all, personal jurisdiction is a personal defense that may be waived or forfeited. See Insurance Corp. of Ireland, 456 U. S., at 704–705; see also post, at 8 (opinion of Alito, J.); post, at 1–2 (opinion of Jackson, J.).
That leaves Norfolk Southern one final stand. It argues that it has not really submitted to proceedings in Pennsylvania. Brief for Respondent 11–13; see post, at 5–6, 8 (opinion of Barrett, J.). The company does not dispute that it has filed paperwork with Pennsylvania seeking the right to do business there. It does not dispute that it has established an office in the Commonwealth to receive service of process on any claim. It does not dispute that it appreciated the jurisdictional consequences attending these actions and proceeded anyway, presumably because it thought the benefits outweighed the costs. But, in the name of the Due Process Clause, Norfolk Southern insists we should dismiss all ​that as a raft of meaningless formalities.
Taken seriously, this argument would have us undo not just Pennsylvania Fire but a legion of precedents that attach jurisdictional consequences to what some might dismiss as mere formalities. Consider some examples we have already encountered. In a typical general jurisdiction case under International Shoe, a company is subject to suit on any claim in a forum State only because of its decision to file a piece of paper there (a certificate of incorporation). The firm is amenable to suit even if all of its operations are located elsewhere and even if its certificate only sits collecting dust on an office shelf for years thereafter. See, e.g., Goodyear, 564 U. S., at 924. Then there is the tag rule. The invisible state line might seem a trivial thing. But when an individual takes one step off a plane after flying from New Jersey to California, the jurisdictional consequences are immediate and serious. See Burnham, 495 U. S., at 619 (plurality opinion).
Consider, too, just a few other examples. A defendant who appears “specially” to contest jurisdiction preserves his defense, but one who forgets can lose his. See York v. Texas, 137 U. S. 15, 19–21 (1890). Failing to comply with certain ​pre-trial court orders, signing a contract with a forum selection clause, accepting an in-state benefit with jurisdictional strings attached—all these actions as well can carry with them profound consequences for personal jurisdiction. See Insurance Corp. of Ireland, 456 U. S., at 703–706 (collecting cases); see also post, at 2 (opinion of Jackson, J.).
The truth is, under our precedents a variety of “actions of the defendant” that may seem like technicalities nonetheless can “amount to a legal submission to the jurisdiction of a court.” Insurance Corp. of Ireland, 456 U. S., at 704–705; see also Brief for Stephen E. Sachs as Amicus Curiae 10. That was so before International Shoe, and it remains so today. Should we overrule them all? Taking Norfolk Southern’s argument seriously would require just that. But, tellingly, the company does not follow where its argument leads or even acknowledge its implications. Instead, Norfolk Southern asks us to pluck out and overrule just one longstanding precedent that it happens to dislike. We decline the invitation. Post, at 4 (opinion of Alito, J.). There is no fair play or substantial justice in that. * Not every case poses a new question. This case poses a very old question indeed—one this Court resolved more ​than a century ago in Pennsylvania Fire. Because that decision remains the law, the judgment of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania is vacated, and the case is remanded.
It is so ordered.
* ↑ See U. S. Environmental Protection Agency, East Palestine, Ohio Train Derailment (June 21, 2023), https://www.epa.gov/east-palestine-oh-train-derailment.
* ↑ After Mr. Mallory commenced this suit, Norfolk Southern relocated its headquarters to Georgia. See Brief for Respondent 5.
* ↑ The Pennsylvania Supreme Court did not address Norfolk Southern’s alternative argument that Pennsylvania’s statutory scheme as applied here violates this Court’s dormant Commerce Clause doctrine. See 266 A. 3d, at 559–560, nn. 9, 11. Nor did we grant review to consider that question. Accordingly, any argument along those lines remains for consideration on remand.
* ↑ Norfolk Southern and the dissent observe that some state courts applied these laws narrowly. Brief for Respondent 43–44; post, at 11–12, and n. 4 (Barrett, J., dissenting). But, as we will see in a moment, others did not. Part III, infra. Even state courts that adopted narrowing constructions of their laws did so by invoking statutory interpretation principles and discretionary doctrines. Notably, neither Norfolk Southern nor the dissent has identified a single case (or any other source) from this period holding that all-purpose jurisdiction premised on a consent statute violates the Due Process Clause. Indeed, some of the decisions they cite presumed just the opposite. See, e.g., Camden Rolling Mill Co. v. Swede Iron Co., 32 N. J. L. 15, 17–18 (1866) (a law like Pennsylvania’s “could be judicially adopted” consistent with due process if clearly expressed); Sawyer v. North Am. Life Ins. Co., 46 Vt. 697, 706–707 (1874) (similar). Nothing in this body of case law, then, comes close to satisfying Norfolk Southern’s burden of establishing that consent statutes like Pennsylvania’s “ ‘offen[d] some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked’ ” among those secured by the Due Process Clause. Medina v. California, 505 U. S. 437, 445–448 (1992). In saying this much, we hardly suggest, as the dissent supposes, that the practice of States or their courts is irrelevant. Post, at 11, n. 3. Our point is simply that Norfolk Southern has not met its burden of showing that original and historic understandings of due process foreclose consent statutes.
* ↑ The dissent stresses that Pennsylvania’s statute does not use the word “consent” in describing the jurisdictional consequences of registration. When the dissent finally comes around to addressing Pennsylvania Fire at the end of its opinion, it fleetingly seeks to distinguish the decision along the same lines—stressing that words like “agent” and “jurisdiction” do not appear “in Norfolk Southern’s registration paperwork.” Post, at 5, 17, and n. 8. But, as the dissent itself elsewhere acknowledges, “ ‘[a] variety of legal arrangements have been taken to represent express or implied consent to’ ” personal jurisdiction consistent with due process. Post, at 4. And neither Pennsylvania Fire, nor our later decisions applying it, nor our precedents approving other forms of consent to personal jurisdiction have ever imposed some sort of “magic words” requirement. See infra, at 22–23; Pennsylvania Fire, 243 U. S., at 95; Neirbo Co., 308 U. S., at 175.
* ↑ Because International Shoe allowed a suit against a corporation that had not registered to do business in the forum State, if it disturbed anything it was only this Court’s decision in Old Wayne, not Pennsylvania Fire. See supra, at 9–10; Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U. S. 437, 443–444 (1952).
* ↑ Norfolk Southern and the dissent observe that, today, few States continue to employ consent statutes like Pennsylvania’s. Brief for Respondent 22; post, at 9–10, 15, n. 6. Surely, too, some States may see strong policy reasons for proceeding differently than Pennsylvania has. See, e.g., State ex rel. Am. Central Life Ins. Co. v. Landwehr, 300 S. W. 294, 297 (1927) (abandoning construction of Missouri law at issue in Pennsylvania Fire based on “the legislative policy in th[e] state”); cf. Cooper Tire, 312 Ga., at 437, 863 S. E. 2d, at 92 (Bethel, J., concurring) (suggesting Georgia’s consent scheme “creates a disincentive for foreign corporations to” do business in-state and conflicts with the State’s claim to be “ ‘business-friendly’ ”). But the meaning of the Due Process Clause is not measured by the latest popularity poll, nor does it come with some desuetude rule against a traditional practice like consent-based jurisdiction long held consistent with its demands. See Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U. S. 94, 110–111 (1921).
* ↑ Taking up the Shaffer baton from the company, the dissent insists that International Shoe “ ‘cast … aside’ ” consent statutes in favor of a minimum contacts analysis. Post, at 13–14. But, as we have seen, nothing in International Shoe purported to address, let alone condemn, consent statutes. Even the dissent ultimately acknowledges, as it must, that “ ‘a variety of legal arrangements’ ” can signal consent to jurisdiction after International Shoe, and these arrangements can include state laws requiring consent to suit in exchange “for access to [a State’s] markets.” Post, at 4, 6; see also Neirbo Co., 308 U. S., at 175 (calling this form of consent “real consent” (emphasis added)).
* ↑ The dissent does not dispute the company’s extensive in-state contacts but replies that counsel for Mr. Mallory abandoned any reliance on them at oral argument. Post, at 17–18, and n. 9. In support of its claim, however, the dissent shears from context two sentences counsel uttered in response to a question about “why [Mr. Mallory] sue[d] in Philadelphia.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 48. In reply, counsel explained that Mr. Mallory “used to live … in Pennsylvania” and “his lawyers are from there.” Id., at 48–49. Counsel then agreed that “[t]hose contacts” would not establish jurisdiction and pointed this Court to Norfolk Southern’s “consent” to suit in Pennsylvania. Id., at 49 (emphasis added). All in all, it was a prosaic response to a simple question about why Mr. Mallory filed suit where he did. Nor, contrary to the dissent’s suggestion, are we alone in discussing the company’s in-state contacts; the lower court, the company, and the dissent all point to them too. See 266 A. 3d, at 547; Brief for Respondent 16–21; post, at 3–4.
* ↑ While the dissent joins Norfolk Southern in this argument, it wavers. At points, the dissent seems to insist that laws like Pennsylvania’s “mak[e] no sense.” Post, at 5–6. But the closest the dissent comes to identifying authority for the notion that laws like these are impermissible are two cases that did not involve personal jurisdiction or purport to interpret the Due Process Clause. Post, at 8 (citing Home Ins. Co. v. Morse, 20 Wall. 445 (1874); Barron v. Burnside, 121 U. S. 186 (1887)). The dissent’s observation that one of those cases in turn cited Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 18 How. 404 (1856), hardly helps—that decision approved a consent-to-suit regime for out-of-state corporations under the Full Faith and Credit Clause. Id., at 405–407. At other points, however, and as we have seen, the dissent rightly acknowledges that a “ ‘variety of legal arrangements [may] represent express or implied consent’ ” to personal jurisdiction consistent with due process, and these arrangements can include requiring at least some companies to consent to suit in exchange “for access to [a State’s] markets.” Post, at 4, 6.
* ↑ While various separate writings accompany this opinion, it should be apparent a majority of the Court today agrees that: Norfolk Southern consented to suit in Pennsylvania. Supra, at 10–11; post, at 2 (opinion of Alito, J.). Pennsylvania Fire therefore controls this case. Supra, at 11–12; post, at 2–4 (opinion of Alito, J.). Pennsylvania Fire’s rule for consent-based jurisdiction has not been overruled. Supra, at 13–14; post, at 4 (opinion of Alito, J.). International Shoe governs where a defendant has not consented to exercise of jurisdiction. Supra, at 14–15; post, at 4 (opinion of Alito, J.). Exercising jurisdiction here is hardly unfair. Supra, at 17–20; post, at 4–5 (opinion of Alito, J.). The federalism concerns in our due process cases have applied only when a defendant has not consented. Supra, at 21; post, at 7–8 (opinion of Alito, J.). Nor will this Court now overrule Pennsylvania Fire. Supra, at 21–23; post, at 4 (opinion of Alito, J.).