# History of the Fenian raid on Fort Erie with an account of the Battle of Ridgeway/Chapter 6

CHAPTER VI.
THE MOVEMENTS OF COL. PEACOCK'S COLUMN.
Col. Peacock having ordered Lieut.-Col. Booker to meet him at Stevensville between 10 and 11 a.m., and having afterwards changed the time of meeting to about 11.30 p.m. set off from Chippawa at 7 a.m. In deciding upon his route to Stevensville, he had the map, Dewe's Post Office map, as has been before mentioned for his guidance, aided by the information he could obtain from the people of the neighbourhood. This map shows a direct road from Chippawa to Stevensville through Black Creek, making an almost imperceptible obtuse angle at Black Creek. Now the only road in fact, or at least the only travelled road to Black Creek is the river road which follows the windings of the river bank. At that place a road strikes back into the interior to New Germany, and from there due south to Stevensville. In addition to this, the bridge on the river road over the mouth of Usher's Creeks being broken made this road longer still, by rendering a detour necessary to avoid the obstruction.
There was another road from Chippawa direct to New Germany and Stevensville called the Sodom Road, this was mentioned to Col. Peacock by Mr. Kirkpatrick the Reeve, but the guides all representing that the river road was the best, and that the Sodom road was in so bad a state that artillery could not go over it, he allowed them to take him by the former road to Black Creek and thence to New Germany.
It was unfortunate that his column did not take the Sodom road. In moving up to join Col. Peacock with my command on the afternoon of the same day, I marched by that road, and found that it was quite suitable to move troops and artillery over, and by marching some seven miles my corps reached New Germany a point to arrive at which. Col. Peacock had marched about 10 miles.
​Strange to say, along this road we met scores of vehicles of every description belonging to people of the neighbourhood, who had by this time discovered that the Sodom road was the best way home, and were using it to get back from the camp, to which place they had followed the troops.
Whether the fear that the Fenians were coming up the river road to Chippawa, or the fear that they might move up while Col. Peacock was marching down the Sodom Road had any effect on the minds of the guides in deciding upon a route to take, it is of course impossible to say; but there is no doubt, that they all acted for the best, and Col. Peacock ought to feel grateful to the many inhabitants of the sections through which he marched, for the assistance they gave him, and for the readiness with which they devoted their time, night and day, to the service of the country.
Col. Peacock's column then marched on by the river road to Black Creek, and thence to New Germany. Saturday the 2nd June was the first really hot day of the season, there was hardly a breath of wind stirring and the heat of the sun was excessive. The men were all warmly clad, and it being the first hot day, they suffered far more seriously from it than if they had become inured to it by a succession of warm weather. After marching some miles the men began to fall out from fatigue and exhaustion caused by the heat, the regulars suffered more and fell out to a greater extent than the volunteers, on account of being heavily loaded with knapsacks, &c.
The column however still kept pushing on, arrived at Black Creek and moved on towards New Germany the men still falling out in great numbers, till at length, on arriving near Black Creek, Col. Peacock who was riding with the advanced files received a few words written by Lieut.-Col. Booker at 7.30 a.m. stating that he had been attacked in force by the enemy at a place three miles south of Stevensville. At the same time he received information that he had retired on Ridgeway. The receipt of this caused him (being anxious to reach Stevensville) to urge the column on faster. ​Immediately after he received word from the rear that the men were giving up with the heat, it being then about 11.30 am. and that great numbers were straggling. Just afterwards Lieut.-Col. Hoste sent him a message stating that his escort had so diminished that it would not be right to go on without having it increased. This decided Col. Peacock to halt for a time to rest, and accordingly after pushing on as far as New Germany so as to hold possession of the cross roads he camped in the fields about the village, and ordered the men to get dinner.
By this time he knew that Lieut.-Col. Booker was falling back and would be unable to meet him at Stevensville, and that he would have to depend upon his own column without the immediate assistance of the other.
The time the men rested was occupied in sending out scouts hunting up information and discovering where the enemy were and the direction they were moving, Here again he felt the want of Cavalry, here one single troop of Cavalry would have made a difference of two or three hours in gaining information, but the effects of the unfortunate feeling against Cavalry were not yet over, and the result was the Fenians had time to escape.
Had Col. Peacock had a force of cavalry with him at Chippawa, he could have moved his whole force from Chippawa to Black Creek, by rail, sending the cavalry spread across the country for two miles, on each side of the track, to see that all was clear. Fifty men could have done it, with perfect safety, and could have retired, and warned the train to retire, or to halt, in case they came upon the enemy. Cavalry, starting an hour before the train, could have searched the woods, and pushed on about five miles an hour, the train ​keeping about a mile behind, would have gone fully twice as fast as the force could have marched, and the men would have arrived at Black Creek quicker and fresher, and would only have had a few miles then to march to Stevensville. This would have precluded the necessity for a halt at New Germany, and the force could have pushed on to the Ridgeway battle ground, and thence to Fort Erie.
In the afternoon, about four o'clock. Col. Peacock received absolute information that the Fenians were falling back on Fort Erie, and he immediately made arrangements to move off in pursuit, hoping to reach them before night. It was particularly unfortunate that Col. Peacook had not decided to move on Fort Erie three hours or so sooner; had he marched direct to Ridgeway, he would at once have obtained positive information as to the Fenian retreat, and could have followed them direct to the river, and might have defeated them before dark. Had this delay not occurred, the Fenians in all probability would not have escaped, or at least not without loss. It was about half past five when he started from New Germany; and the columns had only just got in motion, when he was joined by the "Governor-General's Body Guard," under my command. On reporting to him, I was immediately ordered to push on to the front, and form the advance guard. This we did, at the gallop, being loudly cheered by the column while passing. The column moved on past Stevensville, and down the Lower Ferry Road, towards Fort Erie.
After marching about nine miles, it began to get dusk, just as the advance guard had arrived at a point on the road where the woods (after skirting it on both sides for nearly a mile, at the distance of about 600 or 700 yards) came close up on both sides, leaving only the road allowance clear through, for about a quarter of a mile.
The cavalry advanced files, on arriving within about 200 yards of where the woods came up to the road, noticed a body of men standing in the opening. They immediately ​halted, and signalled back, that men were in sight. I galloped on to the front, and, enquiring from my men, heard that a force was in front, and continually dropping into the woods on the right, and, on looking myself, saw that it was so. Col. Peacock, soon after, also galloped up, and, on learning the cause of the halt, requested me to send two men on to reconnoitre more closely. By this time, nearly all had gone into the woods on the right. I rode on with Cornet Denison and three men, and, detaching him with two to go down a side road, to the right, rode on myself, with the other, to where we saw, in the dusk, a vidette standing, where the others had been. He, also, moved into the woods, while we were yet some distance from him. We rode on about 150 yards through the woods, but, by this time, it had got so late that I could see nothing under the trees, it being much darker there than in the open road. They did not fire on us, consequently I could form no opinion of their position or probable numbers. I thereupon returned to Col. Peacock, and reported that I could see nothing, suggesting to him, that, as their outposts should properly have fired upon us to alarm their camp, their not having done so, was a sign their force were on the alert, and, the place being so suitable, it seemed to point to an ambuscade, and that I thought the wood should be searched.
Col. Peacock seemed to have had a somewhat similar opinion, as, in my absence, he had sent for two companies of the 16th to come up to search the bush, the main force being some distance to the rear. While we were speaking, the two companies came up, and I went on with Col. Peacock, who moved with them to direct their movements. They opened out to the right of the road, to skirmishing distance, and moved on to the front. It was so dark, by this time, that the men could not, its the woods, see from one to the other, and, there being a great deal of tangled brush and logs, and being very marshy and wet, the men could make no headway whatever. At this time, while I was sitting close beside Col. ​Peacock, a voice in the dark said, "You can't go down that way, sir!" On looking closely, we saw that it was a farmer, living about a quarter of a mile back, who had given us some information as we passed. Col. Peacock asked him, " Why not?" He answered, "The bridge is broken." The Colonel questioned him closely, and he adhered to it positively, that he could not get through. This information, together with the inability of the skirmishers to make their way through the woods, decided Col. Peacock to halt until daybreak.
He at once recalled the skirmishers, and, going back about 200 yards met the 47th Regiment, sent one company out, in skirmishing order, to the right of the road, and ordered the remainder of the regiment to form up in a line, about 200 yards behind the skirmishers. The 16th took up a similar position on the left of the road. The 10th "Royals" supported the 47th, in a line about 200 yards in the rear, the two right companies, wheeling to the right, and extending in skirmishing order, connecting with the skirmishers of the 47th, and circling round to the rear, as far as the road. The 19th Battalion, Lieut.-Col. Currie, took up a similar position on the left, in the rear of the 16th. The cavalry were in column on the road. The artillery in the rear of them, and the baggage waggons in the extreme rear. In this formation the men slept on their arms all night.
The disposition was admirable, as the force could show front to either flank by merely changing front on the centre of each regiment, and to the rear by countermarching, or quicker still by facing about.
I have entered very minutely into the circumstances that caused Col. Peacock to delay that night and to bivouac until day break, because there have appeared in the newspapers many strictures upon him for not pushing on at once, and because no account of the reasons which induced him to halt has ever been published. I was struck at the time with the pertinacity with which he endeavoured to push on, wondering ​myself how he would be able to execute a night attack upon a force of whose situation or position he was ignorant.
It should also be remembered that Col Peacock was under the impression, as was every one else, that these Fenians meant to fight, and that even if they did not he thought he had secured against their escape by means of the Tug "Robb" which he had sent round for that purpose.
The bivouac having been formed, no fires were allowed to be lighted, and the men laid down in their ranks and went supperless to sleep, with no covering but the sky. It was a novelty to them, that, and the hope of meeting the Fenians the next morning, kept up their cheerfulness, and with numberless jokes on the comparative merits of their beds and the warmth of the bed clothing, the mass of them went to sleep. The cavalry men laying on the dusty road with their arms through their horses bridles, while the horses either laid down to sleep along with their riders or nibbled at the grass on the roadside. The artillerymen slept on their waggons and under them. The officers generally were wakeful, being under the impression that the enemy were within a mile or two of them.
During the night, while the watchful ones were looking anxiously for the day to break, so that they could move on once more, Col. Peacock received some important information. He heard that a reinforcement had reached his old camp at New Germany, and that Col. Lowry with an additional force was on the way to join him. Before day he also received a telegram informing him that large reinforcements to the extent of some 2000 or 3000 had crossed over from Buffalo and joined the Fenians.
The news of the enemy being augmented to an extent that would have given them a great preponderance over his ​command, and the knowledge that reinforcements for himself were within two or three hours march of him caused him to decide to wait until these other forces came within supporting distance before he moved to the attack, and it being then breaking day he ordered rations to be distributed and the men to prepare their breakfasts; after they had made a rough meal, it being then about 5 o'clock, he decided to move on at once without waiting longer, thinking that his reinforcements would come up before the action (which the whole force expected was about to take place) had fairly commenced. The troops were preparing to fall in when Lieut.-Col. Cameron rode into camp and said he had heard the Fenians had gone. Col. Peacock about the same time requested me to ride on with my command and reconnoitre, sending him back all the information I could obtain.
I shall now leave Col. Peacock preparing to start and describe what took place on the Tug "Robb" and the proceedings of the force that left Port Colborne in it.
* ↑ This being absolutely necessary to enable him to decide in which direction to move his column. If he had moved to Fort Erie, and the enemy had marched to Port Colborne he would have left the column unsupported, while on the other hand, if he had marched towards Port Colborne while they had gone to Fort Erie, he gave them a good opportunity to escape, or to march to Chippawa and on to the bridge.
* ↑ It turned out afterwards that the force we had seen were the regular line of Fenian pickets, and that seeing us push on they had retreated into Fort Erie, reporting that they had been driven in by a detachment of the British cavalry. This statement of theirs was published very generally in the papers.