# McAllister v. Magnolia Petroleum Company/Dissent Whittaker

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* Case Syllabus
* Opinion of the Court
* Concurring Opinion Brennan
* Dissenting Opinion Whittaker
United States Supreme Court
357 U.S. 221
McAllister v. Magnolia Petroleum Company
Argued: April 1, 1958. --- Decided: June 23, 1958
Mr. Justice WHITTAKER, with whom Mr. Justice FRANKFURTER and Mr. Justice HARLAN join, dissenting.
With all respect, I feel compelled to express my disagreement with the Court's holding 'that where an action for unseaworthiness is combined with an action under the Jones Act a court cannot apply to the former a shorter period of limitations than Congress has prescribed for the latter.'
Although both are federal laws, each creates a separate and independent cause of action for conduct not covered or made redressable by the other, though both are designed for the one purpose of authorizing, within their respective terms, recovery of damages by a seaman for a bodily injury suffered in the course of his employment. Under the maritime law of unseaworthiness the owner warrants the vessel, its appliances and gear to be free of defects, and is liable to pay damages to a seaman for an injury occasioned by a breach of the warranty. This is so even though 'negligence of the officers of the vessel contributed to its unseaworthiness (for their negligence) is not sufficient to insulate the owner from liability for * * * failure to furnish seaworthy appliances * * *.' Mahnich v. Southern Steamship Co., 321 U.S. 96, 100-101, 64 S.Ct. 455, 458, 88 L.Ed. 561. (Emphasis supplied.) But 'before the Jones Act the owner was, in other respects, not responsible for injuries to a seaman caused by the negligence of officers or members of the crew.' Id., 321 U.S. at page 101, 64 S.Ct. at page 458.
To fill the gap in the owner's liability, by making him liable for the operating negligence of officers and members of the crew, Congress passed the Jones Act in 1920, which, in pertinent part, provides:
'Any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course of his employment may, at his election, maintain an action for damages at law, with the right of trial by jury, and in such action all statutes of the United States modifying or extending the common-law right or remedy in cases of personal injury to railway employees shall apply * * *.' 46 U.S.C. § 688, 46 U.S.C.A. § 688.
That Act, thus, incorporated the provisions of the Federal Employers' Liability Act, § 1 of which creates a liability upon the carrier for 'injury or death resulting in whole or in part from the negligence of any of the officers, agents, or employees of such carrier, or by reason of any defect or insufficiency, due to its negligence, in its * * * boats, wharves, or other equipment' (emphasis supplied), and § 6 provides, in pertinent part, that '(n)o action shall be maintained under this chapter unless commenced within three years from the day the cause of action accrued.' This makes clear that the maritime law of unseaworthiness imposes an unqualified liability upon the owner to pay damages to a seaman for injuries sustained through the owner's failure to keep the vessel, its appliances and gear in that safe and sound condition colloquially called 'ship-shape,' and that the Jones Act, on the other hand, supplements the maritime law of unseaworthiness by imposing a liability in tort upon the owner to pay damages to a seaman injured by negligence of the officers or members of the crew in the operation of the vessel, its appliances and gear.
By the Jones Act, then, Congress created a new cause of action, not then known to maritime law, for damages for a bodily injury to a seaman caused by 'the negligence of any of the officers, agents, or employees of such carrier,' and required any suit thereunder to be brought within three years. But Congress has fixed no limitation upon the time within which an action for damages for unseaworthiness must be commenced.
Numerous decisions of this Court have established that, in a suit to enforce a federally created right which is silent on the matter of limitations, the applicable period of limitations is that prescribed by the law of the State in which the action is brought. Cope v. Anderson, 331 U.S. 461, 463, 67 S.Ct. 1340, 1341, 91 L.Ed. 1602; Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 395, 66 S.Ct. 582, 584, 90 L.Ed. 743; Rawlings v. Ray, 312 U.S. 96, 97, 61 S.Ct. 473, 85 L.Ed. 605; Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. City of Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390, 397, 27 S.Ct. 65, 66, 51 L.Ed. 241; McClaine v. Rankin, 197 U.S. 154, 158, 25 S.Ct. 410, 411, 49 L.Ed. 702, and Brady v. Daly, 175 U.S. 148, 158, 20 S.Ct. 62, 66, 44 L.Ed. 109. The Court's opinion, holding that, where an action for unseaworthiness is combined with an action under the Jones Act, a court cannot apply to the former 'a shorter period of limitations' than Congress has prescribed for the latter, recognizes this rule but permits it to be applied only to an unseaworthiness action which is not conjoined with a count for negligence under the Jones Act, or to an unseaworthiness action which is conjoined with a count for negligence under the Jones Act if brought in a State whose laws provide an equal or longer period than Congress has provided for the commencement of a negligence action under the Jones Act. This seems quite inconsistent. We know that many States provide a longer period, and others a shorter period, for the commencement of a suit for unseaworthiness than is provided by Congress for the commencement of an action for damages for negligence under the Jones Act. I cannot escape the conviction that the long-established rule, expressive of the meaning of the silence of Congress in fixing a statute of limitations, should be enforced in all unseaworthiness cases or in none. I am therefore unable to see why, as the Court argues, 'a time limitation on the unseaworthiness claim effects in substance a similar limitation on the right of action under the Jones Act' or, transposing-as I think more proper-the names of the laws as used in the Court's argument, why 'a time limitation on the (Jones Act) claim effects in substance a similar limitation on the right of action (for unseaworthiness),' i.e., extends it to three years when, as here, the applicable state statute prescribes a limitation of two years.
It is quite true, as the Court points out, that Baltimore Steamship Co. v. Phillips, 274 U.S. 316, 47 S.Ct. 600, 71 L.Ed. 1069, holds that an action for damages for unseaworthiness and an action for damages for negligence under the Jones Act must be conjoined in the same suit inasmuch as they both look to redress of the same bodily injury, and that otherwise a final judgment on the one would bar an action on the other under principles of res judicata. But I think this is not to say, as the Court argues, that a time limitation upon the one 'effects in substance a similar limitation' upon the other. Surely a seaman may not, in such a suit, maintain a count for unseaworthiness which is barred by the applicable limitations of the State, any more than he may maintain a count for damages for negligence under the Jones Act which is barred by the applicable three-year federal statute. It would seem just as clear that he may maintain both counts in the same suit only if neither is barred by limitations as it is that he could not maintain an action on either count if both were so barred.
I, therefore, believe that the Court is in error in holding that 'where an action for unseaworthiness is combined with an action under the Jones Act a court cannot apply to the former a shorter period of limitations than Congress has prescribed for the latter' (emphasis supplied), for, as observed, a state court, in an unseaworthiness action, is bound to apply the period of limitations prescribed by the law of the State in which it sits, not only in instances where that period is equal to or longer, but also where it is shorter, than the three-year period prescribed by Congress for commencing a negligence action under the Jones Act which Act, I think, is quite immaterial to the question. However desirable coterminous and uniformly applicable periods of limitations may be in these two coordinate federal laws, accomplishment of that change in the law is not properly for us, but for Congress.
Here petitioner joined in his suit, brought in a Texas court, a count for unseaworthiness with a count for negligence under the Jones Act, but he did not bring the suit within the two-year period of limitations applicable to unseaworthiness actions as prescribed by the law of that State. Therefore, I think the Texas Court of Civil Appeals was correct in holding his unseaworthiness count to be barred for that reason, and I would affirm its judgment.

## Notes

* ↑ 45 U.S.C. § 51 et seq., 45 U.S.C.A. § 51 et seq.
* ↑ 45 U.S.C. § 51, 45 U.S.C.A. § 51.
* ↑ 45 U.S.C. § 56, 45 U.S.C.A. § 56.
This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
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