# Public Service Commission of Utah v. Wycoff Company/Concurrence Reed

* Court Documents
* Case Syllabus
* Opinion of the Court
* Concurring Opinion Reed
* Dissenting Opinion Douglas
United States Supreme Court
344 U.S. 237
Public Service Commission of Utah v. Wycoff Company
Argued: Nov. 13, 1952. --- Decided: Dec 22, 1952
Mr. Justice REED, concurring.
The record, although uncertain and unsatisfactory, convinces me that a suit was filed in the state court by the Public Service Commission of Utah. This state suit evidently sought to prevent respondent from transporting motion picture film and newsreels between points and places within the State of Utah. This is the portion of transportation between out-of-state points and motion picture exhibitors within Utah that raises the question as to the authority of respondent to operate under the Interstate Commerce Commission certificate. The films are unloaded at Salt Lake City, where they are prepared for exhibition, and stored by the owners until ordered out to the exhibition points. They are then again loaded on respondent's trucks and delivered to the exhibitors. If this final part of the transportation continues the interstate commerce, respondent would be free to operate without further authority from the Utah Commission. If it is intrastate commerce, respondent would need further authority from Utah. It was apparently to determine this question that the Utah Commission filed its suit in the state court. No process was served. Thereafter respondent instituted this proceeding for a declaratory judgment.
The authority for this litigation is the Declaratory Judgment Act of 1934, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, 28 U.S.C.A. § 2201. This provides for a judgment declaring 'the rights and other legal relations of any interested parties' in cases 'of actual controversy'.
The Act was intended by Congress as a means for parties in such controversies as that between this interstate carrier and the Utah Commission to settle their legal responsibilities and powers without the necessity and risk of violation of the rights of one by the other. The controversy here is clear and definite. A decision would settle the issue that creates the uncertainty as to the parties' rights. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 57 S.Ct. 461, 81 L.Ed. 617. The Act intended operations to be conducted in the light of knowledge rather than the darkness of ignorance. S.Rep. No. 1005, 73d Cong., 2d Sess.
However, it was recognized that the Declaratory Judgment Act introduced a new method for determining rights into the body of existing law. Therefore the language of the Act was deliberately cast in terms of permissive, rather than mandatory, authority to the courts to take cognizance of petitions seeking this new relief. This enables federal courts to appraise the threatened injuries to complainant, the necessity and danger of his acting at his peril though incurring heavy damages, the adequacy of state or other remedies, particularly in controversies with administrative bodies. But even in respect to controversies with administrative bodies, the Declaratory Judgment Act exists as an instrument to protect the citizen against the dangers and damages that may result from his erroneous belief as to his rights under state or federal law. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S. 293, 300, 63 S.Ct. 1070, 1074, 87 L.Ed. 1407. Cf. Spector Motor Co. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101, 105, 65 S.Ct. 152, 154, 89 L.Ed. 101; Spector Motor Co. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602, 605, 71 S.Ct. 508, 95 L.Ed. 573. It is a matter of discretion with federal courts.
The use of this new method of settlement was illustrated a few years ago in an important case dealing with the jurisdiction of the National Railroad Adjustment Board. That case involved a disagreement between two divisions of the National Railroad Adjustment Board as to which division had jurisdiction of disputes involving yardmasters. We held that the settlement of such a jurisdictional dispute concerning an administrative agency was a proper subject for a declaratory judgment where the controversy resulted in a complete stalemate. Here, the record does not show any unusual danger of loss or damage to respondent, a suit had already been filed and the record shows no reason why its result would not settle this controversy. Because of these circumstances, I concur with the reversal of the judgment.
Mr. Justice DOUGLAS, dissenting.

## Notes

* ↑ H.R.Rep.No.1264, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., P. 2; Borchard, Declaratory Judgments (2d ed. 1941), 312; Brillhart v. Excess Insurance Co., 316 U.S. 491, 494, 62 S.Ct. 1173, 1175, 86 L.Ed. 1620.
* ↑ Order of Ry. Conductors v. Swan, 329 U.S. 520, 67 S.Ct. 405, 91 L.Ed. 471.
This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
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