# The Indian Mutiny of 1857/Chapter 8

CHAPTER VIII.
THE PROGRESS OF THE INSURRECTION IN THE NORTH-WEST IN MAY AND JUNE.
The news of the insurrection at Mírath reached the station of Fíruzpur on the 12th of May. Fíruzpur lies immediately south of the river Satlaj, on the direct road from Dehlí to Láhor. There were stationed the 61st Foot, the 45th and 57th Regiments N. I., the 10th Native Light Cavalry, and about 150 European artillerymen. The Brigadier, Colonel Innes, had only arrived the day before, and had had no opportunity of testing the temper of the native troops. But on receiving, on the morning of the 12th, news of the Mírath catastrophe, he ordered a brigade parade, that he might judge for himself. The impression made by the demeanour of the infantry was not satisfactory, but the commandants of the three regiments reported favourably regarding the disposition of their men.
That same afternoon information reached the Brigadier of the startling events at Dehlí. He at once directed arrangements for relieving the sipáhís of the 57th N. I. of the charge they had held of the magazine and arsenal. But his orders were either misunderstood or carelessly carried out, for the sipáhís, though relieved by a company of the 61st and some European gunners, were allowed to remain in the intrenched position in which the magazine was located. At five o'clock of the same day the Brigadier paraded the native troops, with the intention of marching ​them outside the cantonment. But as they approached the intrenchment they halted, despite the orders and entreaties of their officers, and endeavoured to escalade it. The sipáhís who had been allowed to remain within threw to them scaling ladders, and about 300 of them succeeded in effecting an entrance. The company of the 61st held them at bay until two other companies of that regiment arrived. The mutinied sipáhís made a last desperate effort, and on the failure of that fled in confusion. The Brigadier, instead of pursuing them, allowed them to roam about for a time unmolested. Gaining courage from the supineness of the authorities, the sipáhís then burned the church, the Roman Catholic chapel, the 61st mess-house, two vacated hospitals, and several bungalows. The Brigadier, in sheer panic, then caused the regimental magazines of the two mutinous regiments to be blown up. Hardly had this been accomplished when information reached him that the men of the 45th were about to start for Dehlí. Then, for the first time, he acted with vigour. With one party he disarmed the 57th N. I., whilst with another he pursued the 45th, caught and dispersed them. The greater number of them, however, and some of the 57th, found their way to the revolted city. Few affairs were worse managed during the rebellion than the affair of Fíruzpur. It almost matched the blundering at Mírath.
At Alígarh the four companies of the native regiment stationed there, the 9th N. I., considered one of the best regiments of the Bengal army, mutinied on the 20th of May. The circumstances were somewhat peculiar. Alígarh lies on the grand trunk road eighty-two miles to the south-east of Dehlí, Apparently the events of the 10th and 12th of May, at Mírath and Dehlí, had not shaken the loyalty of the sipáhís. They continued re​spectful in their demeanour and assiduous in the performance of their duties. But, on the 20th, a parade had been ordered to witness the infliction of the punishment of death on a man caught in the act of endeavouring to seduce the men from their allegiance. The man had been awarded this sentence by a court-martial composed entirely of native officers. It was carried out in the presence of the sipáhís, on that eventful morning, without a murmur or sign of disapproval from them. But as they were marching from the ground there arrived a detachment of men of their own regiment, one of whom, on seeing the dangling corpse, exclaimed, pointing to it, 'Behold a martyr to our religion.' These few words were sufficient to light a flame which had lain repressed in the bosoms of the sipáhís. They broke into open insurrection, and though they inflicted no injury on their officers, they plundered the treasury, released the prisoners from the gaol, and went off bodily to Dehlí.
The detachments of the same regiment at Bulandshahr, forty miles from Alígarh; at Itáwah, in the Agra Division, seventy-three miles from the city of that name; at Mainpurí, seventy-one miles from the same place, followed the example of their comrades at headquarters. The outbreak at Bulandshahr was unaccompanied by violence, though the men plundered the treasury; that at Mainpurí was chiefly remarkable for the courage, coolness, and presence of mind displayed by the officer second in command of the sipáhís, Lieutenant De Kantzow.
Information of the revolt of the 20th at Alígarh had reached Mainpurí on the evening of the 22d. The magistrate, Mr Power, at once held a consultation with Mr Arthur Cocks, the Commissioner, as to the course to be pursued. It was resolved to despatch the ladies and children into Agra, and to march the sipáhís to a village ​some miles from the station. Early the following morning the ladies and children were duly despatched on their journey, and reached Agra, unmolested, in due course.
Meanwhile, the two officers of the 9th N. I., Crawford and De Kantzow, were doing all they could to induce their men to march from the station. The sipáhís, however, steadily refused to budge one inch from the extreme end of the parade ground. Finally, they warned their officers that it was well for them to depart, and some of them even discharged their muskets. In the confusion that followed, the two officers got separated from one another. De Kantzow had dismounted, and Crawford, believing that he had been killed, rode back to warn the civilians of the mutiny of the men, and to announce his own intention to ride for Agra.
Crawford found assembled Mr Cocks, above referred to, the elder Power, Dr Watson, and a missionary named Kellner. The younger Power, just returned from escorting the ladies on their first stage, joined them. After a brief consultation, Cocks and Crawford decided to make for Agra. The two Powers, Watson, Kellner, three sergeants of the Road and Canal departments, Mitchell, Scott, and Montgomery, and a clerk, Mr Glone, determined to remain. The cousin of the Rájá of Mainpurí, Ráo Bhowání Singh, with a small following, expressed his intention of standing by them.
Meanwhile, De Kantzow, on foot, had been doing all he knew to stem the torrent of mutiny. He had, in turn, implored, upbraided, and menaced the turbulent sipáhís. In vain did they level at him their loaded muskets, threatening to kill him; still did he persevere. At length, casting off the last bonds of discipline, they rushed towards the treasury, carrying their officer with them. Just as they reached the building De Kantzow dashed forward ​to its iron gates, and appealed to the civil guard on duty there, consisting of thirty men, to be true to their salt, and repel the unauthorised invasion. The men of the guard responded; they rallied round him. The gaol officials joined them, and, by their united resistance, the torrent of the attack was stemmed.
More than that, it was stopped. Forbidding the men of the gaol guard to fire, De Kantzow drew them up facing the sipáhís, and for three hours kept them at bay. At the end of that period the Bhowání Singh, above referred to, arrived on the spot, and induced the mutineers to retire. The only condition made by the baffled men was that Bhowání Singh should accompany them. He complied.
At Itáwah the scene was more tragic and more bloody. The force at this station, which lies nearly midway between Agra and Kánhpur, though somewhat nearer to the latter, was a company of the 9th N. I. The chief civil officers were Mr Allan Hume and Mr Daniell. On hearing of the events at Mírath these gentlemen sent patrolling parties to watch the roads, and to intercept, if possible, any stray mutineers. On the night of the 16th of May one of the patrolling parties brought in as prisoners, though without depriving them of their arms, seven troopers of the 3d Native Cavalry, a regiment which had mutinied. The patrols brought the prisoners to the quarter-guard of the 9th N. I., in front of which was drawn up the company of that regiment, with its two officers at its head. Seeing the state of affairs, the seven troopers suddenly levelled their carabines and let fly at the two Englishmen. But ​the men of the 9th N. I. were staunch, and, replying vigorously, they killed five of the troopers. The two survivors escaped for the moment.
Three days later the patrols attempted to lay hands upon and to disarm a larger body of troopers of the same regiment well supplied with fighting material. But in the struggle the men of the patrol were worsted. The rebels, then, probably fearing an attack in force, took up a position in a small Hindu temple, strong in itself, and stronger still in the approaches, which rendered assault difficult and dangerous.
Information of this action having been brought to Messrs Hume and Daniell, they resolved, despite the fact that assault was almost impossible, and that the villagers had shown a disposition to aid the troopers, to venture on an attack with the men of their police. But in reply to the summons to follow them but one of that force obeyed. He was promptly killed; Daniell was shot through the face. Hume, who was then left alone, forthwith retired, supporting Daniell to his carriage, and returned with him to Itáwah. That night the troopers evacuated the temple. Four days later, the company of the 9th, which had remained quiet in the interval, suddenly mutinied, looted the treasury, released the prisoners from the gaol, and inaugurated a reign of terror. Fortunately timely warning had enabled the civilians to ensure the safety of the women and children. Two days later there was a change A regiment of the Gwáliár contingent, the 1st Grenadiers, which was to mutiny in its turn, arrived, and for the moment restored order.
But these isolated mutinies, however deplorable in themselves, counted for comparatively little so long as British authority remained supreme in the great station of Agra. Agra was a very important place. Not only was it the ​seat of the Government of the North-west Provinces, but, as a royal residence in the times of the early Mughals, it had great traditions, whilst its position, almost touching the territories of Gwáliár and of Rájpútána, made it a gate the possession of which by the rebels would constitute an enormous peril to British interests. A great deal, then, depended on the personnel of the officials, civil and military.
The Lieutenant-Governor was Mr John Colvin, a civilian trained in Bengal proper, but who had been private secretary to Lord Auckland during the troublous times of the first Afghán war. It is possible that in quiet times Mr Colvin might have gained a great reputation. He had a cultivated mind, and large intellectual faculties. But to guide the State vessel through a storm, to sway the minds of others in dangerous times, there was wanted a man with iron nerves, complete self-confidence, one who could impress his will alike on his friends and his foes. The Great Revolt of 1857 did bring to the front some men of that stamp — Havelock, Strathnairn, Nicholson, Hodgson, Roberts, Napier, and some others — but amongst them cannot be reckoned the amiable John Colvin.
The troops stationed at Agra consisted of the 3d European Regiment, a battery of artillery (D'Oyley's), and the 44th and 67th Regiments N. I. The officer commanding the brigade was Brigadier Polwhele. The station was very straggling. The troops were cantoned in the open ground between the fort and the civil lines. The fort is a handsome quadrangle of red sandstone, built by the illustrious Akbar. It was used as a magazine and general emporium.
To the indications of ill-feeling and discontent given by the 19th and 34th N. I. in Bengal Mr Colvin had been as blind as the Government of India. Nor had the circulation of the chapátís, which had taken place ​about the same time in Bundelkhand and elsewhere, caused him any serious apprehension. Amongst minds of a certain order there always is the conviction that, however disturbed the surface may be, matters, if only one remains quiet, will settle down of their own accord. That feeling strongly prevailed at Agra during the early months of 1857.
The news of the mutiny at Mírath, on the night of the 10th of May, followed by that of the easy occupation of Dehlí, came to give the first shock to those notions. Never had men received a greater surprise. Nor was the surprise unmingled with apprehension. Dehlí is but 115 miles from Agra, and the first impression, based on information actually received, was to the effect that the rebels, after sacking Dehlí, would march on Agra. Under the influence of this impression, it was resolved, at a meeting of the notables of the station summoned by Mr Colvin, to secure the fortress by a detachment of the 3d Europeans, to raise volunteers, horse and foot, and to hold a brigade parade the following morning, when the Lieutenant-Governor would address the troops.
The parade was held on the morning of the 14th, and Mr Colvin did address the troops, English and natives. He told the former not to distrust their native comrades, but added: 'The rascals have killed a clergyman's daughter, and if you meet them in the field you will not forget this.' His address to the sipáhís might have been spoken by any of Lord Canning's councillors. It breathed the same tone; it expressed the confidence which was not felt. He told them that he trusted them. The demeanour of the sipáhís was eminently suggestive. 'Prompted by their officers to cheer,' wrote Judge Raikes, who was present, 'the sipáhís set up a yell; they looked, however with a devilish scowl at us all.'
​Wisdom dictated the disarming then and there of the two sipáhí regiments, but, alike at Calcutta and at Agra, 'wisdom was crying in the streets.' In both places this policy was urged upon the Government by those who did not wield authority. In both places the Government, to the detriment of the country, and to the sacrifice of many valuable lives, preferred to act the farce of feigning a confidence which they did not feel. Noting the demeanour of the sipáhís on that 14th of May, the Chief Engineer of the Agra Division, Colonel Hugh Fraser, advised Mr Colvin to recognise the emergency, to distrust the native soldiery, and to move into the fort. But Mr Colvin had not at all realised the nature of the crisis. He believed he would be able to maintain order, and he reported to this effect to the Government in Calcutta.
Far more astute was the native prince whose capital lay but sixty-six miles from Agra, I have said that the city of Agra almost touched the plains of the territory known as the dominions of Sindhiá. The actual representative of that family, Máhárájá Jaiájí Ráo, possessed a vigorous intellect, and a thorough knowledge of his countrymen. He had read much, conversed much, and thought much, and the conclusion at which he had arrived had satisfied him with the position which, as a protected prince, supreme in his own territories, he held under the overlordship of the British. Between him and them no discordant clash had arisen. During his career he never ceased to remember that it was to the statesmanlike moderation of a Governor-General of India, Lord Ellenborough, that he was indebted for the complete inheritance of his immediate predecessor. During the visit to Calcutta, of which I have written in a previous chapter, this sagacious prince had noticed, with an accuracy never at fault, the signs of the times. He had observed the strong undercurrent of native ​feeling working against the British. The impressions conceived in Calcutta were more than confirmed after his return to Gwáliár, and he had informed the Governor-General's Agent at his Court that, in his opinion, the situation was extremely perilous. The news of the events at Mírath and Dehlí had driven fast into his mind these convictions, and he was satisfied that a very evil time was approaching for his overlord.
Could his great predecessor, Mádhájí Ráo, have risen from his grave, it is possible that, holding these convictions, he might have used all the resources at his disposal to drive home the blow which had been dealt at Dehlí. But Jaiájí Ráo had had far more personal experience of the British than had been granted to the greatest representative of his house. He knew, from his own dealings with them, that they were to be trusted implicitly. Under their suzerainty he enjoyed all the internal authority his ancestors had wielded, whilst his suzerain bound himself to assure him against aggression from without. For what compensating advantage was he to renounce this position? To place himself and the resources of his State at the disposal of mutinous soldiers or a puppet king? Who, too, was that puppet king? He was no other than the descendant of the Mughal sovereigns who had in vain tried to subdue the Maráthás, and whom the Maráthás had instead subdued. No; there was no temptation to turn against those whom he had proved to support others whom he despised. Not for a moment did he hesitate. From the hour he heard of the events at Dehlí he threw himself heart and soul into the cause of the British.
Sindhiá had in this very month warned the British Agent at his Court not only that the sipáhí army was undermined to the core, but that the men of his own regiments, officered by British officers were not more to be ​depended upon. When, therefore, after the famous parade at Agra, described in a previous page, Mr Colvin, believing that the mutiny was a Muhammadan movement, in the repression of which those not imbued with the faith of Islám would aid, applied to the Mahárájá Sindhiá and to the Bhartpur regency for material assistance, that assistance was indeed immediately afforded by the despatch of native troops, alike from Gwáliár and Bhartpur. But, whilst responding to the call, Sindhiá expressed to the British Agent his grave doubts as to the consequence of his compliance.
The parade at Agra had been held on the morning of the 14th of May. On the 21st Mr Colvin heard of the mutiny at Alígarh, and two days later of the events at Bulandshahr, at Mainpurí, and at Itáwah. They were serious events for Agra, as they severed direct communications with the North-west, but they brought to the mind of the Lieutenant-Governor no solid conviction as to the cause of the general uprising.
Still mistaking the signs of the times, still beating the air, still hoping that an appeal to the reasoning powers of the sipáhís might induce them to reflect, Mr Colvin, at this period, issued a proclamation which, though well meant, was, to say the least, injudicious. The proclamation was based upon the possibility that the majority of the sipáhís had been, and were being, misled by turbulent ringleaders. It therefore offered a frank and free pardon to all sipáhís, irrespective of their offences. Naturally enough the proclamation produced no effect whatever, that is, it did not bring back a single penitent into the fold. But it had the result of convincing the sipáhís and their leaders that they might continue their treasonable work with impunity.
It is due to Lord Canning and his colleagues to add ​that they disapproved of Mr Colvin's proclamation, and substituted another for it of their own composition. This, though dealing largely with offers of mercy, made exceptions against men whose hands had been imbrued in blood. But this proclamation was as ineffective as that which it was intended to supersede.
Mr Colvin's proclamation was issued on the 25th of May. Five days later three companies of sipáhís, constituting the garrison of Mathurá, thirty miles to the north-west of Agra, mutinied, shot down one of their officers, wounded another, plundered the treasury, fired the houses of the English, released the prisoners from the gaol, and started off for Dehlí. Their example was followed by the bulk of the troops sent to the aid of Mr Colvin from Bhartpur.
This outrage, known the same evening at Agra, roused Mr Colvin to striking point. He directed the Brigadier to hold a parade the following morning to disarm the native troops. The parade was held (May 31), and in the presence of a battery of European artillery and the 3d European regiment, the sipáhís of the 44th and 67th N. I. were directed to pile their arms. There was a moment of hesitation followed by sullen obedience. On examining the muskets afterwards many were found loaded with ball. The disarming of these regiments was followed by a resolution, promptly carried out, to raise volunteers, horse and foot, from the planters, clerks, traders, merchants, and others in the district.
Still the situation, though less immediately dangerous, did not improve. The risings in the vicinity had left Agra isolated. The power of taking an initiative had passed from Mr Colvin. It was for him now to await the action of the rebels. This, too, when he was to a great extent ignorant of the events passing around him. Nor was this all. The reports from Major Charters Macpherson, the ​British Agent at Sindhiá's Court, left no doubt upon his mind that the sipáhís of the Gwáliár contingent might break out at any moment. Any insurrection in that quarter must be full of danger for Agra.
The Gwáliár contingent was composed of four field-batteries — one of which, under Captain Pearson, had been sent to Agra — a small siege-train, two regiments of cavalry, and seven of infantry, aggregating 8318 men. Some of these were absent on command, but the bulk was at Gwáliár.
On the night of the 14th of June the whole of these men broke out into insurrection. They rushed from their lines in tumultuous disorder, murdering every European they met. Seven British officers, one lady, wife of one of the officers, an English nurse, the wife of a warrant officer, three children, and six sergeants and pensioners, fell victims to their fury. The remainder escaped to Agra. They reached that place in driblets, and were kindly received. Mr Colvin, however, still maintained his position in the plains; nor was it until quite the end of the month that the pressure of circumstances compelled him to give the order to take refuge within the fort. There we must leave him whilst we turn to notice the action of the Commander-in-Chief.