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# Ante-Nicene Fathers/Volume III/Anti-Marcion/Against Hermogenes/VII

Chapter VII.—Hermogenes Held to His Theory in Order that Its Absurdity May Be Exposed on His Own Principles.
When he contends that matter is less than God, and inferior to Him, and therefore diverse from Him, and for the same reason not a fit subject of comparison with Him, who is a greater and superior Being, I meet him with this prescription, that what is eternal and unborn is incapable of any diminution and inferiority, because it is simply this which makes even God to be as great as He is, inferior and subject to none—nay, greater and higher than all. For, just as all things which are born, or which come to an end, and are therefore not eternal, do, by reason of their exposure at once to an end and a beginning, admit of qualities which are repugnant to God—I mean diminution and inferiority, because they are born and made—so likewise God, for this very reason, is unsusceptible of these accidents, because He is absolutely unborn, and also unmade. And yet such also is the condition of Matter. Therefore, of the two Beings which are eternal, as being unborn and unmade—God and Matter—by reason of the identical mode of their common condition (both of them equally possessing that which admits neither of diminution nor subjection—that is, the attribute of eternity), we affirm that neither of them is less or greater than the other, neither of them is inferior or superior to the other; but that they both stand on a par in greatness, on a par in sublimity, and on the same level of that complete and perfect felicity of which eternity is reckoned to consist. Now we must not resemble the heathen in our opinions; for they, when constrained to acknowledge God, insist on having other deities below Him. The Divinity, however, has no degrees, because it is unique; and if it shall be found in Matter—as being equally unborn and unmade and eternal—it must be resident in both alike, because in no case can it be inferior to itself. In what way, then, will Hermogenes have the courage to draw distinctions; and thus to subject matter to God, an eternal to the Eternal, an unborn to the Unborn, an author to the Author? seeing that it dares to say, I also am the first; I too am before all things; and I am that from which all things proceed; equal we have been, together we have been—both alike without beginning, without end; both alike without an Author, without a God. What God, then, is He who subjects me to a contemporaneous, co-eternal power? If it be He who is called God, then I myself, too, have my own (divine) name. Either I am God, or He is Matter, because we both are that which neither of us is. Do you suppose, therefore, that he has not made Matter equal with God, although, forsooth, he pretends it to be inferior to Him?

## Footnotes

* ↑ Nec natus omnino.
* ↑ Of course, according to Hermogenes, whom Tertullian refutes with an argumentum ad hominem.
* ↑ Aderit utrobique.
* ↑ That is, having no God superior to themselves.
* ↑ Hermogenes.
# Ante-Nicene Fathers/Volume III/Anti-Marcion/Against Hermogenes/XIII

Chapter XIII.—Another Ground of Hermogenes that Matter Has Some Good in It. Its Absurdity.
Here the question will arise How creatures were made good out of it, which were formed without any change at all? How occurs the seed of what is good, nay, very good, in that which is evil, nay, very evil? Surely a good tree does not produce evil fruit, since there is no God who is not good; nor does an evil tree yield good fruit, since there is not Matter except what is very evil. Or if we were to grant him that there is some germ of good in it, then there will be no longer a uniform nature (pervading it), that is to say, one which is evil throughout; but instead thereof (we now encounter) a double nature, partly good and partly evil; and again the question will arise, whether, in a subject which is good and evil, there could possibly have been found a harmony for light and darkness, for sweet and bitter? So again, if qualities so utterly diverse as good and evil have been able to unite together, and have imparted to Matter a double nature, productive of both kinds of fruit, then no longer will absolutely good things be imputable to God, just as evil things are not ascribed to Him, but both qualities will appertain to Matter, since they are derived from the property of Matter. At this rate, we shall owe to God neither gratitude for good things, nor grudge for evil ones, because He has produced no work of His own proper character. From which circumstance will arise the clear proof that He has been subservient to Matter.

## Footnotes

* ↑ Matter.
* ↑ i.e. in their nature, Matter being evil, and they good, on the hypothesis.
* ↑ Matt. vii. 18.
* ↑ Concurrisse.
* ↑ Ipsa.
* ↑ Invidiam.
* ↑ Ingenio.
# Ante-Nicene Fathers/Volume III/Anti-Marcion/Against Hermogenes/XI

Chapter XI.—Hermogenes Makes Great Efforts to Remove Evil from God to Matter. How He Fails to Do This Consistently with His Own Argument.
But, after all, by what proofs does Hermogenes persuade us that Matter is evil? For it will be impossible for him not to call that evil to which he imputes evil. Now we lay down this principle, that what is eternal cannot possibly admit of diminution and subjection, so as to be considered inferior to another co-eternal Being. So that we now affirm that evil is not even compatible with it, since it is incapable of subjection, from the fact that it cannot in any wise be subject to any, because it is eternal. But inasmuch as, on other grounds, it is evident what is eternal as God is the highest good, whereby also He alone is good—as being eternal, and therefore good—as being God, how can evil be inherent in Matter, which (since it is eternal) must needs be believed to be the highest good? Else if that which is eternal prove to be also capable of evil, this (evil) will be able to be also believed of God to His prejudice; so that it is without adequate reason that he has been so anxious to remove evil from God; since evil must be compatible with an eternal Being, even by being made compatible with Matter, as Hermogenes makes it. But, as the argument now stands, since what is eternal can be deemed evil, the evil must prove to be invincible and insuperable, as being eternal; and in that case it will be in vain that we labour “to put away evil from the midst of us;” in that case, moreover, God vainly gives us such a command and precept; nay more, in vain has God appointed any judgment at all, when He means, indeed, to inflict punishment with injustice. But if, on the other hand, there is to be an end of evil, when the chief thereof, the devil, shall “go away into the fire which God hath prepared for him and his angels”—having been first “cast into the bottomless pit;” when likewise “the manifestation of the children of God” shall have “delivered the creature” from evil, which had been “made subject to vanity;” when the cattle restored in the innocence and integrity of their nature shall be at peace with the beasts of the field, when also little children shall play with serpents; when the Father shall have put beneath the feet of His Son His enemies, as being the workers of evil,—if in this way an end is compatible with evil, it must follow of necessity that a beginning is also compatible with it; and Matter will turn out to have a beginning, by virtue of its having also an end. For whatever things are set to the account of evil, have a compatibility with the condition of evil.

## Footnotes

* ↑ Et tamen.
* ↑ Definimus.
* ↑ Competere illi.
* ↑ Alias.
* ↑ Et in Deum credi.
* ↑ Gestivit.
* ↑ Jam vero.
* ↑ Tum.
* ↑ 1 Cor. v. 13.
* ↑ Utique: with a touch of irony, in the argumentum ad hominem.
* ↑ Matt. xxv. 41.
* ↑ Rev. xx. 3.
* ↑ Rom. viii. 19.
* ↑ Rom. viii. 21.
* ↑ Rom. viii. 20.
* ↑ Conditionis: “creation.”
* ↑ Condixerint.
* ↑ Isa. xi. 6.
* ↑ Ps. cx. 1.
* ↑ Male deputantur.
# Ante-Nicene Fathers/Volume III/Anti-Marcion/Against Hermogenes/VIII

Chapter VIII.—On His Own Principles, Hermogenes Makes Matter, on the Whole, Superior to God.
Nay more, he even prefers Matter to God, and rather subjects God to it, when he will have it that God made all things out of Matter. For if He drew His resources from it for the creation of the world, Matter is already found to be the superior, inasmuch as it furnished Him with the means of effecting His works; and God is thereby clearly subjected to Matter, of which the substance was indispensable to Him. For there is no one but requires that which he makes use of; no one but is subject to the thing which he requires, for the very purpose of being able to make use of it. So, again, there is no one who, from using what belongs to another, is not inferior to him of whose property he makes use; and there is no one who imparts of his own for another’s use, who is not in this respect superior to him to whose use he lends his property. On this principle, Matter itself, no doubt, was not in want of God, but rather lent itself to God, who was in want of it—rich and abundant and liberal as it was—to one who was, I suppose, too small, and too weak, and too unskilful, to form what He willed out of nothing. A grand service, verily, did it confer on God in giving Him means at the present time whereby He might be known to be God, and be called Almighty—only that He is no longer Almighty, since He is not powerful enough for this, to produce all things out of nothing. To be sure, Matter bestowed somewhat on itself also—even to get its own self acknowledged with God as God’s co-equal, nay more, as His helper; only there is this drawback, that Hermogenes is the only man that has found out this fact, besides the philosophers—those patriarchs of all heresy. For the prophets knew nothing about it, nor the apostles thus far, nor, I suppose, even Christ.

## Footnotes

* ↑ Atquin etiam.
* ↑ Ex illa usus est.
* ↑ De cujus utitur.
* ↑ Præstat.
* ↑ Itaque.
* ↑ Quidem.
* ↑ Revera.
* ↑ Sane.
* ↑ They are so deemed in the de Præscript. Hæret. c. vii.
# Ante-Nicene Fathers/Volume III/Anti-Marcion/Against Hermogenes/XII

Chapter XII.—The Mode of Controversy Changed. The Premisses of Hermogenes Accepted, in Order to Show into What Confusion They Lead Him.
Come now, let us suppose Matter to be evil, nay, very evil, by nature of course, just as we believe God to be good, even very good, in like manner by nature. Now nature must be regarded as sure and fixed, just as persistently fixed in evil in the case of Matter, as immoveable and unchangeable in good in the case of God. Because, as is evident, if nature admits of change from evil to good in Matter, it can be changed from good to evil in God. Here some man will say, Then will “children not be raised up to Abraham from the stones?” Will “generations of vipers not bring forth the fruit of repentance?” And “children of wrath” fail to become sons of peace, if nature be unchangeable? Your reference to such examples as these, my friend, is a thoughtless one. For things which owe their existence to birth such as stones and vipers and human beings—are not apposite to the case of Matter, which is unborn; since their nature, by possessing a beginning, may have also a termination. But bear in mind that Matter has once for all been determined to be eternal, as being unmade, unborn, and therefore supposably of an unchangeable and incorruptible nature; and this from the very opinion of Hermogenes himself, which he alleges against us when he denies that God was able to make (anything) of Himself, on the ground that what is eternal is incapable of change, because it would lose—so the opinion runs—what it once was, in becoming by the change that which it was not, if it were not eternal. But as for the Lord, who is also eternal, (he maintained) that He could not be anything else than what He always is. Well, then, I will adopt this definite opinion of his, and by means thereof refute him. I blame Matter with a like censure, because out of it, evil though it be—nay, very evil—good things have been created, nay, “very good” ones: “And God saw that they were good, and God blessed them”—because, of course, of their very great goodness; certainly not because they were evil, or very evil. Change is therefore admissible in Matter; and this being the case, it has lost its condition of eternity; in short, its beauty is decayed in death. Eternity, however, cannot be lost, because it cannot be eternity, except by reason of its immunity from loss. For the same reason also it is incapable of change, inasmuch as, since it is eternity, it can by no means be changed.

## Footnotes

* ↑ Scilicet.
* ↑ Matt. iii. 9.
* ↑ Verses 7, 8.
* ↑ O homo.
* ↑ Temere.
* ↑ Tene.
* ↑ Scilicet.
* ↑ Gen. i. 21, 22.
* ↑ Denique.
* ↑ That is, of course, by its own natural law.
# Ante-Nicene Fathers/Volume III/Anti-Marcion/Against Hermogenes/XIV

Chapter XIV.—Tertullian Pushes His Opponent into a Dilemma.
Now, if it be also argued, that although Matter may have afforded Him the opportunity, it was still His own will which led Him to the creation of good creatures, as having detected what was good in matter—although this, too, be a discreditable supposition—yet, at any rate, when He produces evil likewise out of the same (Matter), He is a servant to Matter, since, of course, it is not of His own accord that He produces this too, having nothing else that He can do than to effect creation out of an evil stock—unwillingly, no doubt, as being good; of necessity, too, as being unwilling; and as an act of servitude, because from necessity. Which, then, is the worthier thought, that He created evil things of necessity, or of His own accord? Because it was indeed of necessity that He created them, if out of Matter; of His own accord, if out of nothing. For you are now labouring in vain when you try to avoid making God the Author of evil things; because, since He made all things of Matter, they will have to be ascribed to Himself, who made them, just because He made them. Plainly the interest of the question, whence He made all things, identifies itself with (the question), whether He made all things out of nothing; and it matters not whence He made all things, so that He made all things thence, whence most glory accrued to Him. Now, more glory accrued to Him from a creation of His own will than from one of necessity; in other words, from a creation out of nothing, than from one out of Matter. It is more worthy to believe that God is free, even as the Author of evil, than that He is a slave. Power, whatever it be, is more suited to Him than infirmity. If we thus even admit that matter had nothing good in it, but that the Lord produced whatever good He did produce of His own power, then some other questions will with equal reason arise. First, since there was no good at all in Matter, it is clear that good was not made of Matter, on the express ground indeed that Matter did not possess it. Next, if good was not made of Matter, it must then have been made of God; if not of God, then it must have been made of nothing.—For this is the alternative, on Hermogenes’ own showing.

## Footnotes

* ↑ Nactus.
* ↑ Turpe.
* ↑ Utique.
* ↑ Ex malo.
* ↑ Proinde quatenus.
* ↑ We subjoin the original of this sentence: “Plane sic interest unde fecerit ac si de nihilo fecisset, nec interest uned fecerit, ut inde fecerit unde eum magis decuit.”
* ↑ Pusillitas.
* ↑ Secundum Hermogenis dispositionem.
# Anne of Green Gables (1908)

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While Mark Twain in a letter to Francis Wilson praised it for "the dearest and most moving and delightful child since the immortal Alice;" some critics have commented on some striking parallels in the book to Rebecca of Sunnybrook Farm, (1903), a children's book by Kate Douglas Wiggin.
Layout 2
“‘THERE’S SOMETHING SO STYLISH ABOUT YOU, ANNE,’ SAID DIANA.” (See page 372.)
BOSTON ❦ L. C. PAGE & COMPANY ❦ MDCCCCVIII
Copyright, 1908 By L. C. Page & Company
(incorporated)
Entered at Stationers’ Hall, London
All rights reserved
First Impression, June, 1908
Second Impression, July, 1908
Third Impression, August, 1908
Fourth Impression, September, 1908
Fifth Impression, October, 1908
Sixth Impression, November, 1908
Seventh Impression, December, 1908
Eighth Impression, March, 1909
Ninth Impression, April, 1909
Tenth Impression, June, 1909
Eleventh Impression, August, 1909
COLONIAL PRESS Electrotyped and Printed by C. H. Simonds & Co. Boston, U.S.A.
TO THE MEMORY OF My Father and Mother
CONTENTS
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
This work is in the public domain in the United States because it was published before January 1, 1929.
The longest-living author of this work died in 1942, so this work is in the public domain in countries and areas where the copyright term is the author's life plus 81 years or less. This work may be in the public domain in countries and areas with longer native copyright terms that apply the rule of the shorter term to foreign works.
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# Ante-Nicene Fathers/Volume IV/Origen/Origen Against Celsus/Book II/Chapter XLIV

Chapter XLIV.
Celsus in the next place says, with indescribable silliness: “If, after inventing defences which are absurd, and by which ye were ridiculously deluded, ye imagine that you really make a good defence, what prevents you from regarding those other individuals who have been condemned, and have died a miserable death, as greater and more divine messengers of heaven (than Jesus)?” Now, that manifestly and clearly there is no similarity between Jesus, who suffered what is described, and those who have died a wretched death on account of their sorcery, or whatever else be the charge against them, is patent to every one. For no one can point to any acts of a sorcerer which turned away souls from the practice of the many sins which prevail among men, and from the flood of wickedness (in the world). But since this Jew of Celsus compares Him to robbers, and says that “any similarly shameless fellow might be able to say regarding even a robber and murderer whom punishment had overtaken, that such an one was not a robber, but a god, because he predicted to his fellow-robbers that he would suffer such punishment as he actually did suffer,” it might, in the first place, be answered, that it is not because He predicted that He would suffer such things that we entertain those opinions regarding Jesus which lead us to have confidence in Him, as one who has come down to us from God. And, in the second place, we assert that this very comparison has been somehow foretold in the Gospels; since God was numbered with the transgressors by wicked men, who desired rather a “murderer” (one who for sedition and murder had been cast into prison) to be released unto them, and Jesus to be crucified, and who crucified Him between two robbers.  Jesus, indeed, is ever crucified with robbers among His genuine disciples and witnesses to the truth, and suffers the same condemnation which they do among men. And we say, that if those persons have any resemblance to robbers, who on account of their piety towards God suffer all kinds of injury and death, that they may keep it pure and unstained, according to the teaching of Jesus, then it is clear also that Jesus, the author of such teaching, is with good reason compared by Celsus to the captain of a band of robbers. But neither was He who died for the common good of mankind, nor they who suffered because of their religion, and alone of all men were persecuted because of what appeared to them the right way of honouring God, put to death in accordance with justice, nor was Jesus persecuted without the charge of impiety being incurred by His persecutors.
* ↑ τῆς κατὰ τὴν κακίαν χύσεως.
* ↑ καὶ ταῦτα.
# Ante-Nicene Fathers/Volume IV/Origen/Origen Against Celsus/Book II/Chapter XVII

Chapter XVII.
Extremely foolish also is his remark, “What god, or spirit, or prudent man would not, on foreseeing that such events were to befall him, avoid them if he could; whereas he threw himself headlong into those things which he knew beforehand were to happen?” And yet Socrates knew that he would die after drinking the hemlock, and it was in his power, if he had allowed himself to be persuaded by Crito, by escaping from prison, to avoid these calamities; but nevertheless he decided, as it appeared to him consistent with right reason, that it was better for him to die as became a philosopher, than to retain his life in a manner unbecoming one. Leonidas also, the Lacedæmonian general, knowing that he was on the point of dying with his followers at Thermopylæ, did not make any effort to preserve his life by disgraceful means but said to his companions, “Let us go to breakfast, as we shall sup in Hades.”  And those who are interested in collecting stories of this kind will find numbers of them. Now, where is the wonder if Jesus, knowing all things that were to happen, did not avoid them, but encountered what He foreknew; when Paul, His own disciple, having heard what would befall him when he went up to Jerusalem, proceeded to face the danger, reproaching those who were weeping around him, and endeavouring to prevent him from going up to Jerusalem? Many also of our contemporaries, knowing well that if they made a confession of Christianity they would be put to death, but that if they denied it they would be liberated, and their property restored, despised life, and voluntarily selected death for the sake of their religion.
# Ante-Nicene Fathers/Volume IV/Origen/Origen Against Celsus/Book II/Chapter XLVII

Chapter XLVII.
He represents, moreover, a statement of his own as if it were an answer to one of his questions, in which he asks:  “By what train of argument were you led to regard him as the Son of God?” For he makes us answer that “we were won over to him, because we know that his punishment was undergone to bring about the destruction of the father of evil.” Now we were won over to His doctrine by innumerable other considerations, of which we have stated only the smallest part in the preceding pages; but, if God permit, we shall continue to enumerate them, not only while dealing with the so-called True Discourse of Celsus, but also on many other occasions. And, as if we said that we consider Him to be the Son of God because He suffered punishment, he asks: “What then? have not many others, too, been punished, and that not less disgracefully?” And here Celsus acts like the most contemptible enemies of the Gospel, and like those who imagine that it follows as a consequence from our history of the crucified Jesus, that we should worship those who have undergone crucifixion!
# Ante-Nicene Fathers/Volume IV/Origen/Origen Against Celsus/Book II/Chapter XV

Chapter XV.
Celsus continues: “The disciples of Jesus, having no undoubted fact on which to rely, devised the fiction that he foreknew everything before it happened;” not observing, or not wishing to observe, the love of truth which actuated the writers, who acknowledged that Jesus had told His disciples beforehand, “All ye shall be offended because of Me this night,”—a statement which was fulfilled by their all being offended; and that He predicted to Peter, “Before the cock crow, thou shalt deny Me thrice,” which was followed by Peter’s threefold denial. Now if they had not been lovers of truth, but, as Celsus supposes, inventors of fictions, they would not have represented Peter as denying, nor His disciples as being offended. For although these events actually happened, who could have proved that they turned out in that manner? And yet, according to all probability, these were matters which ought to have been passed over in silence by men who wished to teach the readers of the Gospels to despise death for the sake of confessing Christianity. But now, seeing that the word, by its power, will gain the mastery over men, they related those facts which they have done, and which, I know not how, were neither to do any harm to their readers, nor to afford any pretext for denial.