# Krulewitch v. United States/Concurrence Jackson

* Court Documents
* Case Syllabus
* Opinion of the Court
* Concurring Opinion Jackson
* Dissenting Opinion Burton
United States Supreme Court
336 U.S. 440
Krulewitch v. United States
Argued: Jan. 10, 1949. --- Decided: March 28, 1949
Mr. Justice JACKSON, concurring in the judgment and opinion of the Court.
This case illustrates a present drift in the federal law of conspiracy which warrants some further comment because it is characteristic of the long evolution of that elastic, sprawling and pervasive offense. Its history exemplifies the 'tendency of a principle to expand itself to the limit of its logic.' The unavailing protest of courts against the growing habit to indict for conspiracy in lieu of prosecuting for the substantive offense itself, or in addition thereto, suggests that loose practice as to this offense constitutes a serious threat to fairness in our administration of justice.
The modern crime of conspiracy is so vague that it almost defies definition. Despite certain elementary and essential elements, it also, chameleon-like, takes on a special coloration from each of the many independent offenses on which it may be overlaid. It is always 'predominantly mental in composition' because it consists primarily of a meeting of minds and an intent.
The crime comes down to us wrapped in vague but unpleasant connotations. It sounds historical undertones of treachery, secret plotting and violence on a scale that menaces social stability and the security of the state itself. 'Privy conspiracy' ranks with sedition and rebellion in the Litany's prayer for deliverance. Conspiratorial movements do indeed lie back of the political assassination, the coup d'etat, the putsch, the revolution, and seizures of power in modern times, as they have in all history.
But the conspiracy concept also is superimposed upon many concerted crimes having no political motivation. It is not intended to question that the basic conspiracy principle has some place in modern criminal law, because to unite, back of a criminal purpose, the strength, opportunities and resources of many is obviously more dangerous and more difficult to police than the efforts of a lone wrongdoer. It also may be trivialized, as here, where the conspiracy consists of the concert of a loathsome panderer and a prostitute to go from New York to Florida to ply their trade, see 2 Cir., 145 F.2d 76, 156 A.L.R. 337, for details, and it would appear that a simple Mann Act prosecution would vindicate the majesty of federal law. However, even when appropriately invoked, the looseness and pliability of the doctrine present inherent dangers which should be in the background of judicial thought wherever it is sought to extend the doctrine to meet the exigencies of a particular case.
Conspiracy in federal law aggravates the degree of crime over that of unconcerted offending. The act of confederating to commit a misdemeanor, followed by even an innocent overt act in its execution, is a felony and is such even if the misdemeanor is never consummated. The more radical proposition also is well-established that at common law and under some statutes a combination may be a criminal conspiracy even if it contemplates only acts which are not crimes at all when perpetrated by an individual or by many acting severally.
Thus the conspiracy doctrine will incriminate persons on the fringe of offending who would not be guilty of aiding and abetting or of becoming an accessory, for those charges only lie when an act which is a crime has actually been committed.
Attribution of criminality to a confederation which contemplates no act that would be criminal if carried out by any one of the conspirators is a practice peculiar to Anglo-American law. 'There can be little doubt that this wide definition of the crime of conspiracy originates in the criminal equity administered in the Star Chamber.' In fact, we are advised that 'The modern law of conspiracy is almost entirely the result of the manner in which conspiracy was treated by the Court of the Star Chamber. The doctrine does not commend itself to jurists of civil-law countries, despite universal recognition that an organized society must have legal weapons for combatting organized criminality. Most other countries have devised what they consider more discriminating principles upon which to prosecute criminal gangs, secret associations and subversive syndicates.
A recent tendency has appeared in this Court expand this elastic offense and to facilitate its proof. In Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 66 S.Ct. 1180, 90 L.Ed. 1489, it sustained a conviction of a substantive crime where there was no proof of participation in or knowledge of it, upon the novel and dubious theory that conspiracy is equivalent in law to aiding and abetting.
Doctrines of conspiracy are not only invoked for criminal prosecution, but also in civil proceedings for damages or for injunction, and in administrative proceedings to apply regulatory statutes. They have been resorted to by military commissions and on at least one notable occasion when civil courts were open at the time and place to punish the offense. This conspiracy concept was employed to prosecute laborers for combining to raise their wages and formed the basis for abuse of the labor injunction. The National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 151 et seq., found it necessary to provide that concerted labor activities otherwise lawful were not rendered unlawful by mere concert. But in other fields concert may still be a crime though it contemplates only acts which each could do lawfully on his own.
The interchangeable use of conspiracy doctrine in civil as well as penal proceedings opens it to the danger, absent in the case of many crimes, that a court having in mind only the civil sanctions will approve lax practices which later are imported into criminal proceedings. In civil proceedings this Court frankly has made the end a test of the means, saying, 'To require a greater showing would cripple the Act,' United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 68 S.Ct. 941, in dispensing with the necessity for specific intent to produce a result violative of the statute. Further, the Court has dispensed with even the necessity to infer any definite agreement, although that is the gist of the offense. 'It is elementary that an unlawful conspiracy may be and often is formed without simultaneous action or agreement on the part of the conspirators. * * *' United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 275, 62 S.Ct. 1070, 1076, 86 L.Ed. 1461. One might go on from the reports of this and lower courts and put together their decisions condoning absence of proof to demonstrate that the minimum of proof required to establish conspiracy is extremely low, and we may expect our pronouncements in civil cases to be followed in criminal ones also.
Of course, it is for prosecutors rather than courts to determine when to use a scatter gun to bring down the defendant, but there are procedural advantages from using it which add to the danger of unguarded extension of the concept.
An accused, under the Sixth Amendment, has the right to trial 'by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed.' The leverage of a conspiracy charge lifts this limitation from the prosecution and reduces its protection to a phantom, for the crime is considered so vagrant as to have been committed in any district where any one of the conspirators did any one of the acts, however innocent, intended to accomplish its object. The Government may, and often does, compel one to defend at a great distance from any place he ever did any act because some accused confederate did some trivial and by itself innocent act in the chosen district. Circumstances may even enable the prosecution to fix the place of trial in Washington, D.C., where a defendant may lawfully be put to trial before a jury partly or even wholly made up of employees of the Government that accuses him. Cf. Frazier v. United States, 335 U.S. 497, 69 S.Ct. 201.
When the trial starts, the accused feels the full impact of the conspiracy strategy. Strictly, the prosecution should first establish prima facie the conspiracy and identify the co spirators, after which evidence of acts and declarations of each in the course of its execution are admissible against all. But the order of proof of so sprawling a charge is difficult for a judge to control. As a practical matter, the accused often is confronted with a hodgepodge of acts and statements by others which he may never have authorized or intended or even known about, but which help to persuade the jury of existence of the conspiracy itself. In other words, a conspiracy often is proved by evidence that is admissible only upon assumption that conspiracy existed. The naive assumption that prejudicial effects can be overcome by instructions to the jury, cf. Blumenthal v. United States, 332 U.S. 539, 559, 68 S.Ct. 248, 257, all practicing lawyers know to be unmitigated fiction. See Skidmore v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 2 Cir., 167 F.2d 54.
The trial of a conspiracy charge doubtless imposes a heavy burden on the prosecution, but it is an especially difficult situation for the defendant. The hazard from loose application of rules of evidence is aggravated where the Government institutes mass trials. Moreover, in federal practice there is no rule preventing conviction on uncorroborated testimony of accomplices, as there are in many jurisdictions, and the most comfort a defendant can expect is that the court can be induced to follow the 'better practice' and caution the jury against 'too much reliance upon the testimony of accomplices.' Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 495, 37 S.Ct. 192, 198, 61 L.Ed. 442, L.R.A.1917A, 502, Ann.Cas.1917B, 1168.
A co-defendant in a conspiracy trial occupies an uneasy seat. There generally will be evidence of wrongdoing by somebody. It is difficult for the individual to make his own case stand on its own merits in the minds of jurors who are ready to believe that birds of a feather are flocked together. If he is silent, he is taken to admit it and if, as often happens, co-defendants can be prodded into accusing or contradicting each other, they convict each other. There are many practical diffidulties in defending against a charge of conspiracy which I will not enumerate.
Against this inadequately sketched background, I think the decision of this case in the court below introduced an ominous expansion of the accepted law of conspiracy. The prosecution was allowed to incriminate the defendant by means of the prostitute's recital of a conversation with defendant's alleged co-conspirator, who was not on trial. The conversation was said to have taken place after the substantive offense was accomplished, after the defendant, the co-conspirator and the witness had all been arrested, and after the witness and the other two had a falling out. The Court of Appeals sustained its admission upon grounds stated as follows: '* * * We think that implicit in a conspiracy to violate the law is an agreement among the conspirators to conceal the violation after as well as before the illegal plan is consummated. Thus the conspiracy continue , at least for purposes of concealment, even after its primary aims have been accomplished. The statements of the co-conspirator here were made in an effort to protect the appellant by concealing his role in the conspiracy. Consequently, they fell within the implied agreement to conceal and were admissible as evidence against the appellant. Cf. United States v. Goldstein, 2 Cir., 135 F.2d 359; Murray v. United States, 7 Cir., 10 F.2d 409, certiorari denied, 271 U.S. 673, 46 S.Ct. 486, 70 L.Ed. 1144. While Bryan v. United States, 5 Cir., 17 F.2d 741, is by implication directly to the contrary, we decline to follow it.'
I suppose no person planning a crime would accept as a collaborator one on whom he thought he could not rely for help if he were caught, but I doubt that this fact warrants an inference of conspiracy for that purpose. Of course, if an understanding for continuous aid had been proven, it would be embraced in the conspiracy by evidence and there would be no need to imply such an agreement. Only where there is no convincing evidence of such an understanding is there need for one to be implied.
It is difficult to see any logical limit to the 'implied conspiracy,' either as to duration or means, nor does it appear that one could overcome the implication by express and credible evidence that no such understanding existed, nor any way in which an accused against whom the presumption is once raised can terminate the imputed agency of his associates to incriminate him. Conspirators, long after the contemplated offense is complete, after perhaps they have fallen out and become enemies, may still incriminate each other by deliberately harmful, but unsworn declarations, or unintentionally by casual conversations out of court. On the theory that the law will impute to the confederates a continuing conspiracy to defeat justice, one conceivably could be bound by another's unauthorized and unknown commission of perjury, bribery of a juror or witness, or even putting an incorrigible witness with damaging information out of the way.
Moreover, the assumption of an indefinitely continuing offense would result in an indeterminate extension of the statute of limitations. If the law implies an agreement to cooperate in defeating prosecution, it must imply that it continues as long as prosecution is a possibility, and prosecution is a possibility as long as the conspiracy to defeat it is implied to continue.
I do not see the slightest warrant for judicially introducing a doctrine of implied crimes or constructive conspiracies. It either adds a new crime or extends an old one. True, the modern law of conspiracy was largely evolved by the judges. But it is well and wisely settled that there can be no judge-made offenses against the United States and that every federal prosecution must be sustained by statutory authority. No statute authorizes federal judges to imply, presume or construct a conspiracy except as one may be found from evidence. To do so seems to approximate creation of a new offense and one that I would think of doubtful constitutionality even if it were created by Congress. And, at all events, it is one fundamentally and irreconcilably at war with our presumption of innocence.
There is, of course, strong temptation to relax rigid standards when it seems the only way to sustain convictions of evildoers. But statutes authorize prosecution for substantive crimes for most evildoing without the dangers to the liberty of the indivudal and the integrity of the j dicial process that are inherent in conspiracy charges. We should disapprove the doctrine of emplied or constructive crime in its entirety and in every manifestation. And I think there should be no straining to uphold any conspiracy conviction where prosecution for the substantive offense is adequate and the purpose served by adding the conspiracy charge seems chiefly to get prodecural advantages to ease the way to conviction.
Although a reversal after trials is, of course, regrettable, I cannot overlook the error as a harmless one. But I should concur in reversal even if less sure that prejudice resulted, for it is better that the crime go unwhipped of justice than that this theory of implied continuance of conspiracy find lodgment in our law, either by affirmance or by tolerance. Few instruments of injustice can equal that of implied or presumed or constructive crimes. The most odious of all oppressions are those which mask as justice.
Mr. Justice FRANKFURTER and Mr. Justice MURPHY join in this opinion.
Mr. Justice BURTON, dissenting.

## Notes

* ↑ The phrase is Judge Cardozo's-The Nature of the Judicial Process, p. 51.
* ↑ The Conference of Senior Circuit Judges, presided over by Chief Justice Taft, in 1925 reported:
* ↑ Harno, Intent in Criminal Conspiracy, 89 U. of Pa.L.Rev. 624: 'In the long category of crimes there is none, not excepting criminal attempt, more difficult to confine within the boundaries of definitive statement than conspiracy.'
* ↑ Justice Holmes supplied an oversimplified working definition in United States v. Kissel, 218 U.S. 601, 608, 31 S.Ct. 124, 126, 54 L.Ed. 1168: 'A conspiracy is a partnership in criminal purposes.' This was recently restated 'A conspiracy is a partnership in crime.' Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 644, 66 S.Ct. 1180, 1182, 90 L.Ed. 1489. The latter is inaccurate, since concert in criminal purposes, rather than concert in crime establishes the conspiracy.
* ↑ See, for example: 8 U.S.C. § 47, 8 U.S.C.A. § 47 Conspiracy to interfere with civil rights: (1) Preventing officer from performing duties; (2) Obstructing justice, intimidating party, witness, or juror; (3) Depriving persons of rights or privileges. 10 U.S.C. § 1566, 10 U.S.C.A. § 1566, Conspiracy by persons in military service to defraud the U.S. 12 U.S.C. § 1138d(f), 12 U.S.C.A. § 1138d(f), Conspiracy involving Farm Credit Banks, Administration, etc. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-3, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-3, Conspiracy in restraint of trade; § 8, 15 U.S.C.A. § 8, Conspiracy in restraint of import trade. 18 U.S.C. § 6, 18 U.S.C.A. § 6, Seditious conspiracy; § 11, Conspiracy to impair loyalty of armed forces or advocate overthrow of U.S. Government by force; § 51, Conspiracy to injure person in exercise of civil rights; § 54, Conspiracy to prevent officer from performing duties; § 83, Conspiracy to defraud the government by obtaining payment of a false claim; § 88, Conspiracy to defraud the U.S.; § 242, Conspiracy to obstruct justice; § 252, Conspiracy to cause riots at Federal penal institutions; § 408c, Conspiracy to transport kidnapped person in interstate commerce; § 418a, Conspiracy to transport stolen property and counterfeiting instruments in interstate commerce; § 420a(d), Conspiracy to violate Anti-Racketeering Act; § 483, Conspiracy to incite mutiny on shipboard; § 487, Conspiracy to cast away vessel. 22 U.S.C. § 234, 22 U.S.C.A. § 234, Conspiracy to injure property of foreign government. 31 U.S.C. § 231, 31 U.S.C.A. § 231, Conspiracy to obtain payment of false claims. 34 U.S.C. § 749a, 34 U.S.C.A. § 749a, Conspiracy to bid collusively on construction of naval aircraft. 38 U.S.C. § 715, 38 U.S.C.A. § 715, Conspiracy to falsify pension claims. 50 U.S.C. § 34, 50 U.S.C.A. § 34, Conspiracy to disclose national defense information or commit espionage. 50 App.U.S.C. § 311, 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, § 311, Conspiracy to violate Selective Service Act.
* ↑ Harno, Intent in Criminal Conspiracy, 89 U. of Pa.L.Rev. 624, 632.
* ↑ See Senturia, Conspiracy-Political, IV Encyc. Soc. Sci. 238 (1937).
* ↑ 8 Holdsworth, History of English Law, 383. Miller, Criminal Law, p. 110.
* ↑ 18 U.S.C.A. § 371. Until recently, the punishment for such a felony could have been far in excess of that provided for the substantive offense. However, the Act of June 25, 1948, c. 645, 62 Stat. 683, 701, provides that in such a case the punishment for the conspiracy shall not exceed the maximum provided for such misdemeanor.
* ↑ This is the federal law applicable to antitrust prosecutions. For the history of this conception and its perversion, particularly in labor cases, see Sayre; Criminal Conspiracy, 35 Harv.L.Rev. 393. On the abuse of conspiracy see O'Brian, Loyalty Tests and Guilt by Association, 61 Harv.L.Rev. 592, and Note, The Conspiracy Dilemma; Prosecution of Group Crime or Protection of Individual Defendants, 62 Harv.L.Rev. 276.
* ↑ This statement, of course, leaves out of account the subject of attempts with which conspiracy is said to be allied. 8 Holdsworth, History of English Law, 382.
* ↑ Id., 382.
* ↑ Id., 379.
* ↑ 'It is utterly unknown to the Roman law: it is not found in modern Continental codes; few Continental lawyers ever heard of it. It is a fortunate circumstance that it is not encrusted so deep in our jurisprudence by past decisions of our courts that we are unable to slough it off altogether. It is a doctrine which has proved it is the evil genius of our law wherever it has touched it.' Sayre, Criminal Conspiracy, 35 Harv.L.Rev. 393, 427.
* ↑ Counsel representing the United States, the United Kingdom, the French Republic, and the Soviet Union, and German defendants, indulged in some comparisons of the relevant laws of several nations before the International Military Tribunal at Nu rnberg in connection with organizations there accused as criminal. 8 Trial of Major War Criminals (GPO 1947), pp. 353, et seq.; 2 Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression (GPO 1946), p. 1; Jackson, The Nu rnberg Case, p. 95.
* ↑ The Assassination of President Lincoln and the Trial of the Conspirators, New York, 1865. See, however, Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2, 18 L.Ed. 281.
* ↑ See Sayre, Criminal Conspiracy, 35 Harv.L.Rev. 393, 403.
* ↑ International Union, U.A.W. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 336 U.S. 245, 69 S.Ct. 516.
* ↑ Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 32 S.Ct. 793, 56 L.Ed. 1114, Ann.Cas. 1914A, 614. Mr. Justice Holmes, on behalf of himself and Justices Hughes, Lurton and Lamar, wrote a vigorous protest which did not hesitate to brand the doctrine as oppressive and as 'one of the wrongs that our forefathers meant to prevent.' 225 U.S. 347, 387, 32 S.Ct. 793, 809.
* ↑ An example is afforded by Allen v. United States, 7 Cir., 4 F.2d 688. At the height of the prohibition frenzy, seventy-five defendants were tried on charges of conspiracy. A newspaper reporter testified to going to a drinking place where he talked with a woman, behind the bar, whose name he could not give. There was not the slightest identification of her nor showing that she knew or was known by any defendant. But it was held that being back of the bar showed her to be a co-conspirator and, hence, her statements were admissible against all. He was allowed to relate incriminating statements made by her.
* ↑ For courtroom technique employed in the trial of conspiracy cases by both prosecution and defense, see O'Dougherty, Prosecution and Defense under Conspiracy Indictments, 9 Brooklyn L.Rev. 263. His survey, which accords with our observation, will hardly convince one that a trial of this kind is the highest exemplification of the working of the judicial process.
* ↑ United States v. Hudson, 7 Cranch 32, 3 L.Ed. 259; United States v. Worrall, 2 Dall. 384, 1 L.Ed. 426; United States v. Coolidge, 1 Wheat. 415, 4 L.Ed. 124; United States v. Eaton, 144 U.S. 677, 687, 12 S.Ct. 764, 767, 36 L.Ed. 591; United States v. Bathgate, 246 U.S. 220, 225, 38 S.Ct. 269, 270, 62 L.Ed. 676. See, however, Warren, History of Federal Judiciary Act, 1937, Harv.L.Rev. 49, 73.
* ↑ Cf. Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 63 S.Ct. 1241, 87 L.Ed. 1519.
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