# Williams v. Oliver (53 U.S. 111)/Opinion of the Court

* Court Documents
* Case Syllabus
* Opinion of the Court
United States Supreme Court
53 U.S. 111
Williams v. Oliver
This case is not distinguishable from the case decided at the last term of Gill v. Oliver's Executors, and which was dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
It is reported in 11 How., 529. That case involved the right to the share of Lyde Goodwin as a member of the 'Baltimore Mexican Company' in the fund that had been awarded to the members of that company by the commissioners under the convention of 1839 with Mexico. Gill claimed it as permanent trustee under the insolvent laws of Maryland, the benefit of which Goodwin had obtained in 1817, on the assignment of all his property for the use of his creditors.
The executors of Oliver claimed the right of Goodwin to this fund under an assignment made by himself 30th May, 1829.
The money awarded by the commissioners to this company under the treaty, had, by the agreement of all parties claiming an interest in the same, been deposited in the Mechanics' Bank of Baltimore, to be distributed according to the rights of the respective parties claiming it.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland decided against the right of Gill, as the permanent trustee of Goodwin, under the insolvent proceedings, and in favor of the right of the executors of Oliver.
The case was brought here by writ of error for review, and was dismissed as we have stated for want of jurisdiction.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland had decided against the right of Gill, on the ground that the contract made by the 'Baltimore Mexican Company' with General Mina, in 1816, by which means were furnished him to carry on a military expedition against the territories and dominions of the King of Spain, a foreign prince with whom the United States were at peace, was in violation of our Neutrality Act of 1794, and consequently illegal and void, and could not be the foundation of any right of property, or interest existing in Goodwin in 1817, the date of the insolvent proceedings, and hence, that no interest in the subject-matter passed to the permanent trustees, setting up a title under them.
After the revolutionary party in Mexico had achieved their independence, and about the year 1825 the public authorities, under the new government, recognized this claim of the Baltimore Company, as valid and binding upon it, and as such it was brought before the board of commissioners, under the convention of 1839, and allowed.
It was not denied on the argument, and, indeed, could not have been successfully, that the contract with General Mina in 1816, was illegal and void, having been made in express violation of law: and hence that no interest in, or right of property arising out of it, legal or equitable, could pass, in 1817, the date of the insolvent proceedings of Goodwin, to the trustee, for the benefit of his creditors. But, it was urged, that the subsequent recognition and adoption of the obligation by the new government, had relation back, so as to confirm and legalize the original transaction, and thereby give operation and effect to the title of the trustee at the date mentioned.
And upon this ground it was insisted that the decision of the court below, denying the right of Gill, the permanent trustee, was a decision against a right derived under the treaty and award of the commissioners, which therefore brought the case within the 25th section of the Judiciary Act.
Undoubtedly, upon this aspect of the case, and assuming that there was any well-founded ground to be found in the record for maintaining it, jurisdiction might have been very properly entertained; and the question as to the effect of the recognition of the obligation by Mexico, and award under the treaty in pursuance thereof, upon the right claimed by the trustee under the insolvent proceedings, examined and decided. The decision below, in this aspect of the case, must have involved the effect and operation of the treaty, and award of the commissioners under it.
But, a majority of the court were of opinion that no such question existed in the case, or was decided by the court below; and that the only one properly arising, or that was decided, was the one growing out of the contract with General Mina of 1816, and of the effect and operation to be given to it under the insolvent laws of Maryland.
The money awarded to the Mexican Company was a fund in court, and had been brought in by the consent of all parties concerned, for distribution according to their respective rights. The plaintiff in error claimed the share of Goodwin, under the insolvent proceedings of 1817, as trustee for the creditors through the contract with Mina-the defendants by virtue of an assignment from Goodwin himself in 1829, after Mexico had recognized and acknowledged the claim as valid. The money had been awarded to certain persons 'in trust for whom it may concern,' without undertaking to settle the rights of the several claimants. The court, in giving effect and operation to the insolvent laws of Maryland, as to the vesting of the property and estate of the insolvent in the hands of the trustee, for the benefit of the creditors, held, that no interest or right could be claimed under them through the contract of 1816, but that the right of Goodwin to the fund passed by his assignment in 1829 to the defendants.
Mr. Justice Grier, in delivering the opinion of the majority of the court, speaking of that decision, observes, that in deciding the question, the courts of Maryland have put no construction on the treaty or award asserted by one party to be the true one, and denied by the other. It was before them as a fact only, and not for the purpose of construction. Whether this money paid into the court under the award, and first acknowledged by Mexico as a debt in 1825, existed as a debt transferable by the Maryland insolvent laws in 1817, or whether it, for the first time, assumed the nature of a chose in action transferable by assignment after 1825, when acknowledged of record by Mexico, and passed by the assignment of Lyde Goodwin to Robert Oliver, was a question wholly dehors the treaty and award, and involving the construction of the laws of Maryland only, and not of any treaty, or statute, or commission, under the United States. And Mr. Justice Woodbury, who dissented on the question of jurisdiction, observes, that the claim, so far as it regards the enforcement of the treaty with Mexico, does not seem to have been overruled in terms by the state court. That court did not decide that the treaty was corrupt or illegal, or in any way a nullity, when they held that the original contract violated the laws of neutrality. So far, too, as regards the award made by the commissioners, that the Baltimore Mexican Company, and their legal representatives, had a just claim under the treaty for the amount awarded, it was not overruled at all.
Again, he observes, that all must concede, that the state court speaks in language against the Mina contract alone as illegal, and in terms do not impugn either the treaty or the award; and it is merely a matter of inference or argument that either of these was assailed, or any right properly claimed under them overruled. But it is true the court held that Oliver's executors, rather than the appellant, were entitled to the fund furnished by Mexico, and long subsequent to Mina's contract; but in coming to that conclusion, they seem to have been governed by their own views as to their own laws and the principles of general jurisprudence. The treaty or award contained nothing as to the point whether Gill or Oliver's executors had the better right to his share, but only that the Mexican Company and their legal representatives should receive the fund. This last the court did not question.
The decision of the court below, therefore, not involving the validity of the treaty, or award of the commissioner, or lawfulness or character of the fund, but simply the right and title to the respective shares claimed in it, after the fund had been paid over by the government, and brought into court for distribution according to the agreement of all concerned, and which distribution depended upon the laws of the state, a majority of the court, taking this view of the case, held, that there was a want of jurisdiction, and dismissed the writ of error; and that the decision, whether right or wrong, could not be the subject of review under the 25th section of the Judiciary Act, as it involved no question, either directly or by necessary intendment, arising upon the treaty or award, or connected with the validity of either; and if this court were right in the view thus taken of the case, there can be no doubt as to the correctness of the conclusion arrived at. A different view of the case might, of course, lead to a different conclusion.
Now, in the case before us, the plaintiff in error claims the share of John Gooding, one of the members of the Mexican Company, as permanent trustee under the insolvent laws of Maryland, having been appointed 29th January, 1842, Gooding having taken the benefit of these acts, and assigned his property for the benefit of the creditors as early as 1819.
George Winchester had been previously appointed provissional trustee on the 23d June, 1810, to whom all property had been assigned, and on the 2d May, 1823, had been appointed permanent trustee, and gave a bond for the faithful execution of his duties without surety, and on the 2d April, 1825, sold the interest of Gooding in this share to Robert Oliver, under an order of sale made by the Baltimore County Court, having jurisdiction in the matter, for the consideration of $2000. And in 1841 the Legislature of Maryland passed a law confirming this sale, a doubt having been suggested as to its validity, for want of a surety to the official bond of the trustee.
In this state of the case the Court of Appeals of Maryland held, that the interest of Gooding in the Mexican contract did not pass, under their insolvent laws, to the plaintiff in error as permanent trustee, for the reasons assigned in the previous case of Gill v. Oliver's Executors. And that if it did or could have passed under these laws, it passed to Winchester, the previous trustee, in connection with the confirming act of the legislature of 1841.
It is apparent, therefore, if the decision in the case of Gill v. Oliver's executors involved no question that gave to this court jurisdiction to revise it here, as has already been decided, none exists in the case before us; for, as it respects the question of jurisdiction, the two stand upon the same footing, and involve precisely the same principles.
The counsel for the plaintiff in error sought to distinguish this case from the previous one, and to maintain the jurisdiction of the court, upon the ground that the act of the Legislature of Maryland of 1841, confirming the authority of Winchester, the permanent trustee, was in contravention of a provision of the Constitution of the United States, as a 'law impairing the obligation of contracts.'
But, admitting this to be so, (which we do not,) still the admission would not affect the result. For the decision upon the previous branch of the case denied to the plaintiff any right to, or interest in, the fund in question, as claimed under the insolvent proceedings, as permanent trustee, and hence he was deemed disabled from maintaining any action founded upon that claim.
It was of no importance, therefore, as it respected the plaintiff in the distribution of the fund, whether it was rightfully or wrongfully awarded to Oliver's executors. He had no longer any interest in the question.
In order to give jurisdiction to this court to revise the judgment of a state court, under the 25th section of the Judiciary Act, a question must not only exist on the record, actually or by necessary intendment, as mentioned in that section and the decision of the court as there stated, but the decision must be controlling in the disposition of the case; or, in the language of some of the cases on the subject, 'the judgment of the state court would not have been what it is, if there had not been a misconstruction of some act of Congress, or a decision against the validity of the right, title, privilege, or exemption set up under it.' 3 Pet., 292, 302. Or, as stated by Mr. Justice Story, in Crowell v. Randell, (10 Pet., 392,) where he reviewed all the cases, it must appear 'from the facts stated by just and necessary inference, that the question was made, and that the court below must, in order to have arrived at the judgment pronounced by it, have come to the vary decision of that question as indispensable to that judgment.' And in a recent case, (5 How., 341,) following out the doctrine of the previous cases, 'It is not enough that the record shows that the plaintiff in error contended and claimed that the judgment of the court impaired the obligation of a contract, and violated the provisions of the Constitution of the United States, and that this claim was overruled by the court; but it must appear by clear and necessary intendment, that the question must have been raised, and must have been decided, in order to induce the judgment.'
It is not intended, nor to be understood, from these cases, that the question, thus material to the decision arrived at, must be confined exclusively and specially to the construction of the treaty, act of Congress, &c., on order to give the jurisdiction, as this would be too narrow a view of it. Points may arise growing out of, and connected with the general question, and so blended with it as not to be separated, and, therefore, falling equally within the decision contemplated by the 25th section. The cases of Smith v. the State of Maryland, 6 Cranch, 281, and Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat., 305, 355, afford illustrations of this principle.
Now, as the decision of the question involving the right and title of the plaintiff in error to Gooding's interest in this fund under the insolvent proceedings was against him in the court below, and was one which, in our judgment, involved only a question of state law, and, therefore, not the subject of revision here, and was conclusive upon his rights, and decisive of the case, it follows that we have no jurisdiction within the principle of the cases to which we have referred; for the determination of the court upon the validity of the act of the legislature of 1841 in no way controlled the judgment at which the court arrived, as respected the plaintiff. That turned upon the decision as to the right of the plaintiff to the fund under the insolvent proceedings, as permanent trustee of Gooding, and whatever might have been the opinion of the court upon the other question, the result of their judgment would have been the same.
For the reason, therefore, that this case falls directly within the decision of Gill v. Oliver's Executors, and is not distinguishable from it, the case must take the same direction, and be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record from the Court of Appeals of the state of Maryland for the Western Shore, and was argued by counsel. On consideration whereof, it is now here ordered and adjudged by this court, that this cause be, and the same is hereby, dismissed, for the want of jurisdiction.

## Notes

* ↑ QUOTED. Williams v. Gibbes, 17 How., 254.
This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
Public domainPublic domainfalsefalse