# The Unpopular History of the United States by Uncle Sam Himself/Chapter 20

XX
ADVANCE, HALT, AND GENTLEMEN CHANGE
Despite these dazzling American successes at the North the Mexicans refused to sue for peace, so General Scott was ordered to capture the City of Mexico itself—with fewer than 12,000 men. Vera Cruz surrendered to him on the 29th of March, 1847. On the 8th of April he began his march into the interior. On the 18th at Cerro Gordo, he attacked and overthrew the Mexican army, capturing ​3,000 prisoners and 43 pieces of artillery. So complete was their annihilation that Mexico no longer had an army and the road to the Capital lay open. But the American general had to stop, solely and simply because of an error committed under the dome of our Capitol at Washington. Here he was, commanding a handful of men, in the heart of a hostile country, with troops that were enlisted, not "for the war," but with the option "to serve twelve months" or "to the end of the war."
There was absolutely no excuse for this; it could have been prevented if a solitary member of Congress, familiar with the military history of his country, had moved to strike out the loophole option. But there it was, left in the law by the ignorance and the haste of legislators. National enthusiasm would have supplied men for the war, as bountifully as for twelve months. The term of Scott's twelve months men was about to expire. They wanted to go home, and had the unquestioned legal right. So on the 4th ​of May, almost immediately after his triumph at Cerro Gordo, he was compelled to part with seven out of his eleven regiments of volunteers, numbering in the aggregate 4,000 men.
Which left him confronting a precarious situation: Scott was now at Puebla, within two days' march of Mexico City, his army being reduced to 5,820 effective men. He must sit tight and if possible cling to what he had conquered, while the enemy, profiting by our numskullery and delay, reorganized an army of five times his number. Abandoning Jalapa, cut off from his base of supplies, Scott's marvelous victories were about to go for nothing, and his campaign seemed on the verge of collapse.
Army officers to-day insist that if General Scott's small force of regulars had then been captured, 100,000 recruits and inexperienced officers would not have been sufficient to retrieve the disaster.
Scott's little army lay at Puebla for more than two months, while regiments were being ​raised in the United States to take the places of those who had returned home. Three and one-half months after the battle of Cerro Gordo reënforcements raised his total to 10,276 men, of whom nearly one-fourth were sick. On August 6th other reënforcements brought their numbers up to nearly 14,000, of whom 3,000 were sick or in the hospitals. Compelled still further to weaken himself by guarding his line of communications, Scott resumed the offensive, against an army estimated by the Mexicans themselves at 36,000 men, with 100 pieces of cannon. But General Scott had exceeding confidence in the character of his troops and fearlessly led them to a succession of brilliant victories. Beginning on the 20th of August our largest force engaged was 8,479 men, of whom he lost, in the series of battles, 2,703. So that on September 14th, he entered the City of Mexico with fewer than 6,000 men.
But — and here is a great big but, — but for a defect in legislation at Washington we would have captured the City of Mexico ​without resistance, directly after the battle of Cerro Gordo, saving thousands of heroic lives and enormous expenditures of money. This particular exhibition of inefficiency is wholly chargeable to Congress. Yet, even now, when an army officer goes before that body and asks for essential betterments, he may be met with the insinuation of selfish lobbying for personal advancement.
However, we won't cry over spilt milk. But you and I, and the folks back home, must see that such blunders do not occur in the future.