# History of Mexico (Bancroft)/Volume 6/Chapter 9

Table of Contents
CHAPTER IX.
THE EMPIRE A FAILURE.
1865-1866.
Capitulation of Oajaco — Army Movements — Battles and Sieges — War Measures — Presidential Term — New Republican Plan of Campaign — Sympathy in the United States — Napoleon Recognizes his Failure — The United States Demand his Withdrawal — Maximilian Overwhelmed — Charlotte Visits Europe — She Pleads in Vain with Napoleon — Then Seeks Consolation at Rome — Her Sad Fate
The extensive provinces south of Puebla had in the middle of 1864 been abandoned to the indefatigable Diaz and his allies; but their wealth and proximity to the capital induced the imperialists to make in this direction an advance corresponding to that in the north. Extensive preparations were accordingly undertaken, and toward the close of the year General Courtois d'Hurbal entered by way of Yanhuitlan, other columns following from Orizaba and Mexico. Diaz had concentrated at Oajaca his forces, consisting of 3,000 regulars and an equal number of mountaineers, and converted the town and surrounding heights into fortified camps, the inhabitants taking refuge elsewhere. The importance of overcoming this last ​formidable army of the republican decided Bazaine to undertake the task in person, and with his usual caution he took every measure to insure success, regardless of cost. Indians were employed by the
| 1. Cathedral. | 5. El Instituto College. |
| 2. Santo Domingo Convent. | 6. Mint. |
| 3. Palace. | 7. Town Hall. |
| 4. Plaza. | 8. Monte Alban Ruins. |
​thousands to convey siege material and supplies, and to throw up works round the city, which from the middle of January was so closely invested that a reënforcement under Félix Diaz failed to gain entrance. The besieging force now numbered fully 7,000 men with twenty-six large pieces of artillery.
On the 4th of February, 1865, firing began in earnest, and an assault was ordered for the 9th. Diaz, who had remained comparatively inactive, owing to a panic which had seized his men on account of the prestige and strength of the French troops, found that this fear had led to wholesale desertion, and would render effective resistance vain. To save useless bloodshed, he accordingly listened to the final summons and surrendered unconditionally. Most of the men were set free or incorporated with the imperial troops, the rest being sent with Diaz and other officers to Puebla. On his return, Bazaine learned that Tehuantepec had also been added to the empire. Thus ended an important but also enormously costly expedition. ​General Mangin remained with some foreign and Mexican troops to follow up the advantage, calling back the inhabitants of Oajaca, installing local authorities, and organizing militia in Villa Alta and other districts. Félix Diaz' followers melted away after several ineffectual movements. Figueroa was driven from his retreat at Huehuetlan, and the independent mountaineers were either watched or won over. The French being called away, Austrians took their place, but ineffectually, for Figueroa achieved several triumphs, and other republicans rose in different parts
to contend, with varying success, for control in lower Puebla and Vera Cruz; while farther south the Juarist cause remained supreme, favored to a great extent by the renewed outbreak of race war in Yucatan, which distracted the small forces of General Galvez. ​After a close confinement at Puebla of over seven months, General Diaz escaped and gained Guerrero, where Alvarez readily granted the necessary assistance to form a new army. This province had been left to the republicans after the evacuation of Acapulco in the preceding autumn; but the designs of Santa Anna induced the imperialists to reoccupy it on the 11th of September, with the aid of French vessels. Beyond this, however, no advance was made, and the nearest allied forces eastward were stationed in the valley of Rio Mescala, so that the opportunity was not unfavorable for reviving the spirit of patriotism.
In the central provinces of Mexico, Querétaro, Guanajuato, and those adjoining, the patriotic fire was still kept alive, though feebly, and by scattered guerrillas, prepared to form the nuclei for larger uprisings at an opportune moment. In Jalisco the recent operations of Douay's forces, culminating with the defeat and death of the redoubtable Rojas, had restored comparative quiet, which the proximity of large French bodies, and those under Lozada of Tepic, served to insure. ​The necessity for following up the advantage gained by the occupation of Mazatlan caused the transfer, in January 1865, of Castagny with nearly 3,000 men
​from Durango to this port. Severe and determined in disposition, this general retaliated both on the life and property of republicans for their hostility, mainly, however, with a view of terrifying them into submission. General Corona and his followers did the same, and a regular war of extermination ensued. Favored by the nature of the country, the guerrillas generally managed to avoid serious encounters, while inflicting no little mischief and annoyance by their flying movements to the walls of Mazatlan. Lozada had to be summoned to assist in the pursuit, and in April he succeeded in routing the republican main body near Rosario. The reverses suffered by the republicans compelled Corona to take the rest of his army to the northern part of the state, whence he went into Durango, but was back in five months and opened a successful campaign against the French, defeating them in Palos Prietos, where he won a glorious victory.
The extolled mineral wealth of Sonora had long dazzled the eyes of Frenchmen, with such results as the Raousset de Boulbon expedition; and strong influence had been brought to bear in France for obtaining a cession of the province; but the objections of ​Maximilian and other circumstances made the project undesirable. Its abandonment, however, did not diminish the allurements of the region, and the Sinaloa successes enabling Castagny to turn his attention to the upper coast, his soldiers eagerly entered upon the expedition. A main object was to deprive Juarez of Guaymas, the only valuable port left to him. On March 29th the French squadron landed several hundred men under Colonel Garnier, Patoni retiring with the republican garrison, yet seeking to bar all communication with the interior, supported on the road to Hermosillo by the combined forces of Governor Pesqueira and Morales, numbering about 3,000 men. While unable to effect much in this direction for a time, Garnier sent troops by sea to Álamos, and managed to gain several adherents, notably anong the Yaquis, Mayos, and Opatas, Tauori, chief of the last named, joining at Guaymas with a large band. Thus reënforced, the colonel marched unmolested into Hermosillo on July 29th, and a fortnight later into Ures, Pesqueira falling back on Arizpe. This left the main part of the state in the hands of the imperialists.
The concentration of French forces at this time under Bazaine left this and the adjoining province of Sinaloa combined to the care of only one regiment; one battalion, under Colonel Cotteret, confining itself almost exclusively to Guaymas; Hermosillo, Alamos, and other points being intrusted to the Indian allies, with varying success. Such stanch auxiliaries ​existed in Sinaloa that Corona, who had meanwhile been laying his plans, now resumed the campaign with a vigor that soon reduced the French battalion in this state to the immediate neighborhood of Mazatlan.
Farther eastward, from Chihuahua to the gulf of Mexico, republican arms had met with a similarly varied fortune. The growing success of the federals in the United States created here a corresponding glow, with the hope that a portion of the surplus, or needless, northern armies would soon lend their aid to the sister cause. As a result, the victories of the imperialists in this region were less overwhelming among the Juarists, and the spring of 1865 saw a number of leaders in the field, some menacing the eastern line of Durango, and others organizing forces in Nuevo Leon and Tamaulipas. Negrete so far mustered the largest army, of about 2,000, with which he in March moved from the Rio Florido district into Coahuila, and took possession of Saltillo on April 9th, and three days later of Monterey.
From here he advanced against Matamoros, joined by Cortina, who thought the movement favorable for again changing sides and by Carbajal, who, assisted ​by a band of United States volunteers, and in conjunction with leaders like Naranjo, had captured all the towns along the Rio Grande, from Piedas Negras down. Finding defection among his troops, General Mejía, who still held the command in this region, retired within the walls of Matamoros, to await the aid promised by Bazaine. This coming by sea in the shape of a foreign legion, Negrete thought it best to turn back on May 2d, after a feeble demonstration for two days.
At the first news of the Juarist movements, the French commander-in-chief had despatched generals Brincourt and Neigre toward the Mapimí border, with a view to check the eastward movement of Negrete. Coming too late for this, he followed him, and at the same time Colonel Jeanningros advanced from San Luis Potosí, both moving on Saltillo. Negrete had reached the latter place in the middle of May, and occupied the adjoining pass of Angostura to stop their approach; but after a feeble skirmish he retired during the night of June 6th, taking, with ​2,500 of his men, the route to Monclova, while General Escobedo, governor of Nuevo Leon, proceeded eastward to Galeana, with the remaining 2,000. The French passed through Saltillo on the following day, in pursuit of the former, pressing him so closely that his forces disbanded in flight. Thus the republican main army was again dissipated, and with it confidence in Negrete, who separated from Juarez.
A better record is presented by the minor Juarist forces in along the gulf coast. Beginning in January with the needless destruction of Linares, Colonel Mendez had, after a series of rapid movements, captured Ciudad Victoria on April 23d, and Tula on June 4th, after which he kept in check the garrison of Tampico, cutting off all communication with San Luis Potosí. Farther up, the forces of Escobedo overran in several parties the region between Linares, Búrgos, and Matehuala, routing a large convoy under Tijerina at Paso de las Cabras on Rio San Juan, and capturing Catorce on August 21st. Matehuala and Cadereita were strongly garrisoned, but could afford little aid beyond their limits, so that flying bodies had to sally from Querétaro and San Luis Potosí to drive back the daring guerrillas. Cortina rendering the communication with Matamoros additionally dangerous, efforts were concentrated to maintain that with Tampico, but rains and fevers impeded operations. ​The rainy season over, Escobedo reunited his troops and laid siege to Matamoros in October, with 3,000 men and eleven cannon. On the 25th a spirited assault was made, but poorly sustained, and consequently repulsed. Owing to the fear of defection and the active sympathy of the adjoining United States forces, Mejía feared to take the offensive against Escobedo; but one of the French vessels penetrating up the river, and further aid approaching, the latter raised the siege on November 8th. Mejía and the French naval commander, Cloué,
protested against the aid given by United States men to the republicans in war material, supplies, and hospital care, and above all, in lending them soldiers; but the commandant at Clarksville replied curtly that
​the men who had joined the Juarists were no longer in the United States service. His manifest hostility continued, and early in January 1866 bands of negro soldiers, with Cortina's name on their caps, came over and sacked Bagdad, carrying off the garrison. This being a manifest infringement of neutrality, the United States government hastened to make amends by removing the commandant and arraigning the participants in the outrage.
Escobedo fell back on Monterey, taking possession of the town; but a part of the imperial garrison retired, after a sharp contest, into the citadel, and held out till Jeanningros came to the rescue on November 25th, after a flying expedition to Monclova, and compelled Escobedo to hurry away to Camargo, and there recruit for the next favorable opportunity. In the lower part of Tamaulipas Mendez remained supreme, notwithstanding a temporary advantage of Ornano, who took Victoria on the 17th of November, and held it for a month, after which it was finally evacuated.
The dispersion of Negrete's army having deprived Juarez of his last imposing support, Maximilian ​became more anxious than ever that the advantage should be followed up by driving the president from the territory, and before the meeting of the United States congress, in the belief that this might change the feeling of the northern republic toward the empire.
The manœuvre was a natural sequence to the preceding operations in the north; and the simultaneous activity of the French columns, east and west of Chihuahua province, rendered it more effective by ​occupying the republicans in different directions, and preventing their government from seeking refuge in Sonora or Coahuila.
Brincourt had returned to Parras in June, after the defeat of Negrete, and now continued his march north-westward into Chihuahua with 2,500 men, leaving fortified depots at Rio Florido, Allende, Parral, Santa Rosalía, and Santa Cruz de Rosales, to secure communication. The Juarist forces under Ruiz, Aguirre, Villagran, Ojinaga, and Carbajal retired in different directions without molesting the main body, although its march might have been harassed with advantage, impeded as it was by flooded rivers and bad roads. Brincourt entered Chihuahua city August 15th, reorganizing the administration, and urging on the several Indian movements in favor of the empire, prompted on the one side by discontent with republican exactions, and on the other by illusive promises from the sovereign.
Fearing a collision with United States troops, Bazaine had given the general strict orders to return to Durango within three weeks after reaching Chihuahua, and to let his forces penetrate only a day's march beyond this city. It was enough to drive Juarez out of the last state capital occupied by him. Brincourt saw that this would render fruitless the whole expedition, by restoring the province to the enemy, and giving him fresh confidence. He accordingly delayed his departure while awaiting a reply to his representation. "A thousand men," he said, "could hold the entire region and exclude the Juarists, to the ruin of their party." But his orders were repeated, and he left October 29th.
Juarez had meanwhile made Paso del Norte his capital; but hearing of the evacuation, he hastened ​back, reëntering on the 20th of November, amidst great demonstration. Shortly after, however, came news that Bazaine had yielded to Maximilian's instances to retain Chihuahua, and that 500 men were approaching under Billot. On December 9th, accordingly, two days before the entry of the French, he was again on the way back to his refuge on the border of the friendly sister republic; and with him fell also the hope of his officers for any effective achievement for some time to come. Not that they had been idle. Villagran, for instance, had surprised the French post left by Brincourt at Parral, and Ojinaga, lately made governor of the state, operated near Guerrero, where he fell.
In addition to the military crisis which for a moment threatened to ingulf him, Juarez had to contend with another among his own party. His term as president expired on November 30th. Under the present condition of affairs an election could not well be held, and according to the constitution his office should in such a case be assumed by the chief justice. But General Ortega, who held this position, had long been absent in the United States, so long, indeed, and without formal permission, that his position was now declared forfeited. Further, the assumption of the ​presidency by the chief justice was intended, according to Juarist interpretation, to be only temporary, till a speedy election could install the one chosen by the people. In view of the war, the tenure promised to become anything but brief, and this appearing contrary to the constitution, it was deemed a better procedure to prorogue the power of the actual president and his substitute, thus preserving the government from the danger attending a doubtful change. The president had for that matter been elected to govern, while the president of the supreme court had been elected for the administration of justice; and the people's choice having been repeatedly confirmed by congress, together with the bestowal of dictatorial power, Juarez did declare the functions of himself and his substitute prorogued till they could be surrendered to a new officer, duly elected.
Ortega had hastened to the Texan frontier as the critical time approached, and learning of the measures taken against him, he thence launched his protests; but finding the people too occupied with the war, and himself in little favor, he returned northward to plot against his rival. A somewhat similar course was adopted by Manuel Ruiz, the substitute chief justice, who saw fading, not only the hope faintly entertained ​of securing what Ortega had missed, but of retaining the leading position on the bench. Thoroughly disappointed, and with waning faith in the republic, he availed himself of the imperial decree to retire into private life at Mexico.
Sophistry is plentifully used in the arguments of all the candidates; and the Juarists undoubtedly stretched the interpretation of the article bearing on the case, for personal as well as national reasons. Ortega had certainly lost prestige, and was no longer a favorite, either with the people or their leaders. Actual generals, governors, and other officials owed their position mainly to Juarez, and in sustaining him they sustained themselves. The essential point, however, although probably secondary with many of them, was the superior fitness of Juarez for his position as compared with Ortega, or perhaps any candidate then available. Moreover, it would have been impolitic to increase existing complications by removing the head which had so well maintained the government and kept the party united for the one great object. A change was apt to cause dissolution. Juarez' success in asserting himself at this critical period attests both his influence and ability.
It was fortunate that such was the disposition of Juarez that he did not find it necessary for armies or escorts to guard himself. It was a remarkable repetition of the old-time story of the European hunting ​down the Indian to kill him for loving home and liberty; only in the present instance the Indian was arrayed in the garb of the same European civilization which the other thought himself better capable of administering. Unpretentious, and with the patience and tenacity of his race, Juarez was prepared to meet any hardships and seek any refuge, intent only on the cause he had undertaken and the object for which he had aimed. To meet the French in open field at present seemed indeed suicidal, and he proposed rather to save the issue by distracting the enemy with desultory and rapid movements in small parties, especially east and west of his own position. The withdrawal of Brincourt, and the retrograde concentration of other bodies in different regions, lent confirmation to the rumor of a speedy French evacuation, under pressure from the northern republic, and to a revival of republican operations in all parts, as we have seen, under men like Diaz, Escobedo, Corona, Régules, and Alvarez, who now figured respectively as commanders-in-chief of the eastern, northern, western, central, and southern armies, with Ignacio Mejía for minister of war.
Although disappointed in the long-expected coöperation from the United States, the republicans felt grateful for the sympathy there so widely extended. Many feared their too active interference in view of the late disastrous loss of territory, and preferred the diplomatic and pecuniary aid which had so long helped to maintain them, and which now was forcing their main foe to fall back. A loan of thirty millions had just been placed in New York, with a success that in ​itself proved inspiring Volunteers asserted their confidence in the cause by ready enlistment, and flattering contributions and recognitions flowed in from different quarters. Juarez had every reason, therefore, to look into the future with a hopefulness which brightened in proportion as the prospects of the empire grew darker.
The pronounced attitude assumed by the United States since the conclusion of their civil war had served, not alone to intimidate Napoleon, but to open his eyes to the illusive nature of this Mexican enterprise. The irresistible advance of his troops had for a long time blinded him to dangers and disadvantages. He now saw that, although defeated, the republicans were never crushed; springing up ever with renewed courage and in larger numbers, or abiding with firm and bitter purpose the moment favorable to their cause, confident also in ultimate aid from the sister republic. His triumphs were sterile, and the end seemed more remote the further he advanced. He had set out primarily to recover an indebtedness; but ​millions had been expended and lives sacrificed without insuring even the first claim. The whole nation took alarm at the gloomy prospects of an expedition which from the beginning had found many opponents, and had gradually encroached upon the patience of the majority.
At the opening of the chambers in January 1866, Napoleon accordingly announced that he had taken steps to arrange for a recall of the troops. It was by no means a pleasant course, this acknowledgment of failure in an undertaking so long vaunted as the most glorious of his reign, and into which he had deluded so many of his subjects. But the step was opportune in saving France from yet greater disasters and humiliation; for politics in the United States was assuming an aspect which required the government to pursue a more determined foreign policy than ever. In reply to a note asking for at least a strict neutrality in Mexican affairs, Seward, on February 12th, insisted that the withdrawal of the French army should be effected without any conditions; for the states would not prove untrue to the political principles they had so far practised, or depart from the line of conduct traced by Washington. Napoleon answered this imperious demand in the most amiable manner; and grasping at the vague promise of an adherence to the principles of the first president as 'sufficient guarantee,' he declared that the return of the troops would no longer be deferred. They would be withdrawn in three detachments, "the first to depart about November 1866, the second in March 1867, and the third in the following November." Encouraged ​by this ready compliance, Seward required, further, that the proposed reënforcements to fill gaps should not be sent, and Austria was at the same time requested to stop the enrolment of volunteers for Mexico. Both governments promptly acquiesced.
Unconscious of the impending blow, and recognizing only too well that to France alone must he look for safety, Maximilian made once more, in January 1866, an appeal for money and men wherewith to check the growing republican movements. In the same month Baron Saillard was sent to communicate the resolution of Napoleon for a speedy withdrawal, and arrange for a convention to replace that of Miramare, which Mexico had been unable to carry out. The emperor felt overwhelmed. Saillard could obtain no satisfactory proposals, and left the negotiations with Minister Dano; but the result had been achieved of shifting the responsibility upon Maximilian, and permitting the announcement of the time of evacuation. ​Something had to be done, however, if only to gain time. The French government was asked to postpone the departure of the army for three years, and to accept twenty-five million francs a year in payment of its claims on Mexico, as soon as the Mexican treasury could afford the sum. This proposition was forwarded by Almonte, who had also to replace Hidalgo as minister at Paris, the hope being entertained that his previous relations with Napoleon as conservative leader might have an effect. The request was refused, as might have been expected, involving as it did only fresh sacrifices without any definite prospect of paying the growing debt. It was, moreover, coupled with the demand for financial guarantees, including the assignment of one half of the custom-house receipts; otherwise France would regard herself as liberated from all engagements, and take immediate steps for withdrawing her troops.
The object of the note was no doubt to force Maximilian to abdicate, and so facilitate the new course ​entered upon. Such might, indeed, have been the result but for the firm stand taken by the empress, who undertook to plead with Napoleon in person; for neither she nor her consort at this time regarded the attitude of the United States with the same fears as France. She took with her a letter from Maximilian, presenting an elaborate answer to the last peremptory note. It assumed that Napoleon stood compromised to found a strong government in Mexico. This could be done only after establishing the peace needful for creating resources. So far the loans and revenue had been absorbed mainly by the army, to the sacrifice of other interests and projects, proof enough that every possible effort had been made to fulfil the convention of Miramare. Maximilian could not be blamed for the state of the finances. They had always been in disorder, and the task of reform had all this time been intrusted to French officials. So far only a portion of the country had been brought under the empire by the French commander-in-chief. The very condition of placing all the imperial forces at his disposal implied an obligation for him, the representative of France, to effect the subjugation; instead of doing this, he had, by inaction and disregard for Maximilian's remonstrances, lost to a great extent the results achieved by costly campaigns. In short, both military and financial failures were charged to the French. ​In all this lay a great deal of truth. The French had encountered obstacles, but they were mainly connected with the nature of the undertaking, and not due to the Maximilian government. Deceived with regard to his expedition, Napoleon had deceived the archduke; and now discovering his mistake, he resolved to ignore the spirit of the compact, and disregard the various promises held forth. Fortunately for himself, he would save appearances to some extent by pointing to the letter of the Miramare convention, followed near enough by him for all essential purposes, while Mexico could give no hope of fulfilling her part. Maximilian was accordingly to be sacrificed-a victim to a sanguine and over-confiding nature.
Charlotte found Napoleon obdurate. Thereupon she proceeded to Rome in such a frame of mind that she became insane. ​
* ↑ By way of Cuernavaca and Teotitlan. Iglesias assumes the total force to be 7,000 French and 1,500 'traitors.' Revistas, iii. 99.
* ↑ The four chief convents formed a sort of bastions at the cardinal points, enclosing a vast square, while a double line of barricades and fortified houses represented the curtains. Cannon extended along the terraces, and apertures had been cut in every direction for loop-holes and communication. Outlying houses had been razed. A fort on La Soledad hill commanded the town, and intrenchments covered every adjoining height. Niox describes some of these. Expéd. du Mex., 447-8. In view of the extensive and determined preparations of the French, Diaz' policy has been questioned in thus passively awaiting them at this place and ruining it with comparatively useless works of defence, instead of harassing them along the diticult route and prolonging resistance by skirmishing operations. It is easy to criticise, however, after the occurrence.
* ↑ Arrangoiz assumes that the popular Brincourt, who formerly commanded the southern operations, had been removed through the jcalousy of Bazaine, 'no se quería dejar que aumentara su prestigio.' Méj., iii. 269. The apparent reason was a lack of success, due, however, to insufficiency of troops.
* ↑ Niox asserts that both Indians and well-to-do planters eagerly welcomed the French, tired of republican exactions. The laborers were paid. Ubi sup. Félix Diaz, commanding 700 cavalry, had left his brother shortly before on an expedition.
* ↑ Bazaine's men numbered 6,000. The rest were Mexicans. Diaz makes the number 16,000.
* ↑ With 4,000 men and 60 cannon, says Niox, while Diaz explains his misfortune by stating that the 3,000 with which he began the defence had diminished to 400. Biog., MS., 201, 209. He does not allude to the irregulars. Iglesias states that Diaz prepared to cut his way through; but while attempting personally to entertain Bazaine with pretended arrangements for surrender, he was detained as an escaped prisoner, having been captured when the French took Puebla. Revistas, ii. 401. But this Diaz does not admit. See also Rivera, Hist. Jal., v. 631-2; Manero, Rel., 1-2; Diaz, Datos Biog., 746.
* ↑ Diaz states that he had never given his parole, as some declare. Biog., MS., 210–11, 213. He regretted that so many of his companions did so. Vega, Docs, iii. 54-5.
* ↑ Du 1$^{er}$ juillet 1864 jusqu'an 1$^{er}$ mai 1865, on dépensa en transports pour les expéditions sur Oajaca, 1,866,000 francs.' Niox, Expéd. du Mex., 450. 'Au point de vue financier,' says Domenech, 'ce siége fut désastreux.' Hist. Mex., iii. 283. He enters into details on road-making, transport, etc., and asserts that Brincourt would have effected the subjugation of the whole region long before at little cost, had the jealous Bazaine not withdrawn troops from him. See also Payno, Cuentas, 619, etc. Arrangoiz takes a similar view. Loc. cit. Further details in Diario Imp., Dec. 14, 1864, and subsequent numbers; La Voz de Méj., id.
* ↑ The emperor sent a considerable sum to assist them.
* ↑ As near Vera Cruz city as Rio Blanco. Details in Diario Imp., Mar. 18, etc., 1865; La Voz de Méj., id.; La Estrella de Occid., id.; Iglesias, Revistas, iii. 455-7, 663-72. 'Hoy Oaxaca está casi bloqueado,' states a correspondent, in Pap. y Corr. Famil. Imp., 150-1; Rivera, Hist. Jal., v. 632, 651, etc.; Vega, Docs, pt 24.
* ↑ The Indians had been encouraged by the too friendly efforts of the commissioner, Ilarregui, 'que fuese desarmada la guardia móvil.' Iglesias, ii.
* ↑ On the night of Sept. 20tlı, by means of ropes. Diaz, Biog., MS., 222; Vega, Docs, ii. 524. Evidently with the aid of friendly hands, to judge from his own statement. 'Se generalizó la idea de que por órden superior se le habían facilitado los medios,' says Arrangoiz, Méj., iii. 269, but the term 'órden superior' is probably unwarranted.
* ↑ Four hundred Mexicans from Manzanillo, under Montenegro, forming the garrison. Vega, Ausiliares, MS.; Vega. Docs, pt 24. The inhabitants nearly all left the place. Niox mentions Aug. 11th as the date, and Gen. Oroñoz as commandant.
* ↑ Under Peña, who had succeeded Vicario.
* ↑ Fever proved another check to the imperialists at Acapulco, as it had to many of their expeditions on this lower coast. Iglesias, Revistas, iii. 677.
* ↑ Jan. 28th, at Potrerillos. He fell, together with 60 of his men, and loss of 500 horses. Antonio Rojas left an unenviable record for cruelty, which in 1858 had caused him to be outlawed by his chief to save appearances.
* ↑ Echeagaray, for a time commander-in-chief of the central army, Rómulo del Valle, Solis, Neri, and other republicans now gave in their allegiance. 280, 393; Barrciro, Yuc., 60, etc. See also above journals. In June the imperialists had taken the adjoining town of Jonuta, in Tabasco, with the aid of a gunboat, but this was their only gain westward. Pap. Var., civ., pt v. 39, etc.; Niox, Expéd. du Mex., 510-1. Où pas un soldat français n'a paru,' writes Maximilian in 1869, in alluding to Guerrero, Tabasco, and Chiapas. Id., 558. Nevertheless, some movements took place at intervals, especially along the Sinaloa border. Son., Bol. Ofic, May 9, 1865; La Voz de Méj., July 13, Dec. 30, 1865; Diario Imp., May 8, Oct. 24, 1865; Gonzalez, Hist. Aguascal., 337 et seq.
* ↑ Imperialist writers acknowledge this severity, as instanced in burning towns and estates, and executing partisans and prisoners. See Zamacois, Hist. Méj., xvii. 775-8, 823-4; Arrangoiz, Méj., iii. 253; Niox, Expéd. du Mex., 463-4. If they condemned such acts, we may understand that republicans raised a cry of execration, as in Iglesias and La Estrella de Occid., so frequently quoted; Legacion Mex., Circul., ii. 285–8; Laurent, Guerre, 191 et seq.; and Vigil y Hijar, Ensayo Hist., 284, etc.; in which latter this northwest campaign is fully related. Castagny was roused during the march across the coast range by the severity inaugurated really by Corona, who after being driven from a stronghold at Espinazo del Diablo Jan. 1, 1965, surprised ten days later a garrison left at Veranos and executed all the French prisoners, placed by Iglesias at 50. Revistas, iii. 158. Marquez de Leon, Mem. Post., MS., 243, condemns the act severely. Castagny hastened back and burned the village. The numerous foreign traders at Mazatlan and elsewhere did not conceal their antipathy for the French, who had ruined a prosperous entrepôt and supply trade.
* ↑ His letters, serving to defend both them and himself against the charge of treason to the cause, are reproduced by Vigil and other authorities. Corona had a narrow escape from capture after his defeat. The republican governorship of the state had by Juarez' order been surrendered to Gen. Sanchez Ochoa, and subsequently to Rubí, by Rosales, who was promised other rewards for his activity; but he fell soon after at Álamos. Iglesias, Revistas, iii, 247, 531.
* ↑ Castagny accompanying only for the trip. The squadron consisted of the Lucifer, d'Assas, Cordelière, and Pallas.
* ↑ An attempt, May 22d, to surprise Pesqueira's blockading forces was only partially successful. Republicans seek to belittle the affair still more.
* ↑ The fruit of encroachments so long perpetrated by unscrupulous governors and colonists. Ex-governor Gándara is accused of using his influence with the tribes.
* ↑ 'Perdiéndose casi todo el Estado para la causa nacional,' laments Iglesias, Revistas, iii. 465.
* ↑ The 62d, which relieved the 51st. Niox, Expéd. du Mex., 531.
* ↑ In seeking to take Álamos in August, General Rosales was defeated and killed. A pronunciamiento at Hermosillo was suppressed and the city retaken by Prefect Campillo, assisted by three French companies. An attack by his son on Malape was repulsed by Gen. J. G. Morales, who now figures as republican governor.
* ↑ Full details concerning these operations are given in my History of the North Mexican States, ii., based on original documents, local reports, and journals, and the works of Vigil y Hijar, Escudero, and others.
* ↑ This prospect was widely held forth, although not alluded to in the proclamations of Juarez to his patriots, for which see Méx., Boletin Ley., 1863-7, ii. 131-4, 222-5.
* ↑ The city had been taken on March 29th, by Col Aguirre, but the imperialists Olvera and Lopez coming from Monterey to the rescue, he had to abandon it. The republican governorship had passed from Galindo to A. S. Viesca, who before Vidaurri's usurpation had held the office. Iglesias, Revistas, iii. 204, 244, 288-9.
* ↑ Abandoned by the imperialists. The republicans claim to have found here 62 pieces of artillery. Many deserters joined them. Period. Ofic., and La Estrella de Occid., May 19, 1865.
* ↑ It must be stated, however, that he had made the change unaided, April 1st, taking with him his command of 400 horsemen and 70 infantry, and securing a lot of ammunition buried at Matamoros before he gave allegiance to the empire. This he claims to have done by force, a portion of his men driving back, on April 1lth, the imperial garrison, while another bore it off. His report, and the thanks accorded him, may be found in Méx., Col. Leyes, 1863 7, ii. 235-8.
* ↑ This place had been taken April 23d, by Col Naranjo, the imperial garrison crossing the Rio Bravo to the confederates, who saved the greater number by opening fire on the pursuing Juarists. Iglesias, iii. 334.
* ↑ Negrete's forces are placed by Zamacois at 6,000, with 20 cannon, Hist. Méj., xvii. 986, while Niox credits Mejía with 3,000 men, assisted by 800 local volunteers; says a report in La Estrella de Occid., June 16, 1865, 1,800 infantry, 300 cavalry, and 1,000 volunteers.
* ↑ Of 500 men, under De Brian.
* ↑ Another probable reason for this lack of spirit was the failure of expected coöperation from the Texan side of the river. In his report, dated at Santa Rosalía on the same day, he declares that evidence was obtained of cooperation against him of confederates, who stood prepared to fall on his rear in case of an assault. Méx., Col. Leyes, 1863-7, ii. 243.
* ↑ General Aymard, commanding at Durango, taking personal command of the advance post at Rio de Nazas, so as to render assistance. Dupin's contra-guerriilas were ordered toward Matehuala to aid the column forming at San Luis Potosí, under Col Jeanningros. Niox, Expéd. du Mex., 469–70. Dupin, recalled for his cruelty, had been replaced by Captain Ney d'Elchingen.
* ↑ Not finding him at Mapimní, he turned to check a guerrilla inroad from Sinaloa, by way of Papasquiaro. This resulted in the repulse of Carbajal, who afterward came back in company with Patoni.
* ↑ Mejía had orders to coöperate from his side, but the federal authorities taking possession at this period of Brownsville, and manifesting hostility, he dared not leave Matamoros.
* ↑ His forces are placed at about 4,800 men. Jeanningros came up May 31st with about 1,500 men, and indulged merely in a skirmish while awaiting Brincourt. The approach of the latter caused Negrete to withdraw.
* ↑ Replacing Gen. Hinojosa, the former holder. J. M. Aguilar figured at the same time as prefect, and F. Lopez as comandante superior. La Estrella de Occid., March 17, May 19, July 7, 1865.
* ↑ This was effected mainly by Jeanningros, Brincourt having returned on the route to Parras to close this line against him.
* ↑ His orders being to call French attention from Chihuahua, he continued to struggle for a while in Nuevo Leon, with the remnant left him. Being called to account for funds intrusted to him, he turned to labor for the substitution of Ortega as president. Vega, Ausiliares, MS., pt 24, in Vega, Docs.
* ↑ After a siege of over a fortnight; the garrison agreeing to leave the territory. Iglesias places the siege at 19 days, ending April 23d. Revistas, iii. 333.
* ↑ The latter feat was performed by Gen. Vega, the former by Espinosa, in connection with Canales, Cerdo, and Naranjo, the convoy being estimated at 900 men. Niox credits the latter victory evidently to Cortina, and gives the loss at 250 men, the party being on the return march from Cadereita to Matamoros. Expéd. du Mex., 532.
* ↑ Chopin's African battalion and the foreign legion at Matamoros were brought to Tampico for the purpose, but fever reduced both rapidly, the lat ter losing half of its men. They were therefore sent back. On their way to Tampico, Mendez nearly succeeded, Sept. 9th, in overwhelming the convoy with its invalids.
* ↑ It was made in two columns by Hinojosa and Escobedo, both achieving decided advantages; but being made successively instead of simultaneously, Mejía could direct his whole strength against both. Hinojosa and his second in command, A. Garza, were wounded. Iglesias states that the French steamer Antonia came up the river and assailed them in the rear. Revistas, iii. 526. Mejía's sorties were repulsed. See also Arias, Reseña, 33-5.
* ↑ An act in accordance with the similar conduct of Bazaine, who some months previously had removed certain officers and restored war material in order to maintain harmonious relations with the commandant at Brownsville. Sheridan sustained Gen. Weitzel, the commandant at Clarksville. During the sacking of Bagdad, French vessels were fired upon by the invaders, and U.S. regulars came over to stop the excesses, only to continue the pillage in their turn, according to imperialist accounts. They remained at Bagdad till the 22d of Jan. Three days later an Austro-Mexican body retook the town. Alvensleben, With Max., 43-6, relates his personal observations on the spot. Niox, Expéd. du Mex., 534-S, reproduces a part of the sharp correspondence. Mejia's conduct under these trying circumstances brought a letter of thanks from Maximilian and the grand cross of the Aguila order. Arrangoiz, Méj., iv. 40, 60.
* ↑ La Hayrie, commandant at Saltillo, arrived earlier in the day with a small force, which managed to cut its way through Escobedo's lines and reach the citadel. Elton, With the French, 115-16, places his force at 110 men, and the republicans at 1,400. Iglesias speaks of 'la derrota de La Hayrie,' Revistas, iii. 530, in allusion to his later sortie from the citadel. Escobedo failed to collect the $200,000 levied on the city. Pap. y Corr. Famil. Imp., 165-7.
* ↑ For additional details on the north-east campaign, I refer to La Voz de Méj., Periód. Ofic., Diario Imp., Pájaro Verde, Mexicano, and other journals, throughout the year.
* ↑ Appointing T. Zuloaga prefect.
* ↑ 'Ce serait folie que de vouloir le suivre en ce moment dans tous les recoins où il voudra aller.'
* ↑ Leaving Chihuahua August Sth, he had established himself here on the 15th, as announced in circular of same date. Mex., Col. Leyes, 1863-7, ii. 251; Juarez, Biog., 31. 'Juarez habia sacado de Chihuahua mas de 400,000 pesos.' Rivera, Hist. Jal., v. 654.
* ↑ The actions and skirmishes in 1865 are estimated at 322, with 5,674 killed and 1,279 wounded. Juarez, Biog., 30.
* ↑ 'Si por cualquier motivo la eleccion de presidente no estuviere hecha y publicada para el 1° de Diciembre. . . cesará sin embargo el antiguo, y el supremo poder ejecutivo se depositará interinamente en el presidente de la Suprema Corte de Justicia.' Art. 82 of the constitution.
* ↑ In his defence, Ortega published a letter of Dec. 30, 1864, granting him permission to leave his post for an indefinite time, but with the understanding that, whether passing through foreign territory or not, he should in some unoccupied part of Mexican territory continue the war for independence. He had remained wholly in a foreign land, however, yet engaged, as he claimed, in actively aiding the cause, advising to this effect the president, who knew of his movements from journals. He received no reply to his letter, asking for authority to enroll volunteers, etc., and declared that a private suit at law was concocted to detain him as long as possible abroad. He also instanced previous futile attempts to obtain his removal from the post of chief justice, for having acted as governor of Zacatecas, and to injure his prestige as a military leader by placing him in critical positions with insufficient forces. His arguments are fully presented in Legac. Mex., Corresp., 3-210, passim, with special points at 35–90, and in Ortega, Protesta, 1-25. The suit against Ortega was by Col Allen, for $7,000. There is no doubt that the executive officers intrigued to invalidate his claims; but warned by the spirit manifested against him in 1864, he should not have afforded them the stronger grounds now raised by going away. He lived in reduced circumstances in the U. S., according to Cuevas, Vega, Ausiliares, MS., and he sought both funds and free travelling pass through the Mexican legation. Legac. Mex., Circ., 20-5. His protest was written in Texas. It was claimed by the Juarists that Ortega's letter concerning his movements was not official, and therefore not recognized. By his prolonged absence as chicf justice and general, in foreign parts, he had committed a grave fault, and by decree of Nov. 8, 1965, he was declared amenable for abandonment of his post, the government appointing another chief justice. Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Mex., ix. 719-21.
* ↑ Text of decree, followed by ministerial circular, arguing the case and giving instances. Id., 718-19, 721-6; Méx., Col. Leyes, 1863-67; ii. 276-9, 283-94.
* ↑ Although announcing in an official letter of Feb. 3, 1866, to Gov. Vega of Sinaloa that he would retain only the title of president of the supreme court, for he considered it improper to create discord under the present circumstances; "still, the country was not bound to recognize the acts of Juarez.' Vega, Doc., iii. 212-15.
* ↑ Letters of submission, etc., in Méx., Col. Leyes, 1863-7, ii. 302-6. This unpatriotic act relieved the government from replying to his protest, yet it was pointed out that both constitution and congressional decision opposed the claim of any accidental occupant of the chief justiceship to succeed as president. Argument, in Id., 306–10.
* ↑ Minister Iglesias, who later as chief justice claimed the presidency, argues warmly for his chief, and gives a list to show the immense preponderance of leading men supporting him, while a scanty few upheld Ortega, including generals Patoni and Huerta, and Guillermo Prieto. Revistas, iii. 650–3; also Quesada and Negrete. Vega, Ausiliares, MS.; Marquez de Leon, Fé Perdida, MS., 54-5. The latter wrote sharply to Juarez. Mem. Post, MS., 246. They were termed Orteguistas, the others calling themselves legalidad. The feeling in the U. S. favored Juarez. Legac. Mex., Circ., ii. 91-175, passim; Mex. Affairs, ii. 5, 63, 39th Cong. 1st Sess. Maximilian himself pays at this time tribute to the zeal and intelligence of his opponent in a letter to Baron de Pont. Arrangoiz, Méj., iv. 53-6.
* ↑ Appointed Dec. 25th. Méx., Col. Leyes, 1863-7, ii. 297. The governors of states were at this time Ignacio Pesqueira in Sonora; Domingo Rubí, Sinaloa; Antonio Pedrin, Lower California; Luis Terrazas, Chihuahua; Silvestre Aranda succeeding Pereyra in Durango; Miguel Auza, Zacatecas; Andrés S. Viesca, Coahuila; J. C. Doria acting for Escobedo in Nuevo Leon; Santiago Tapia succeeding Carvajal in Tamaulipas; Juan Bustamante, San Luis Potosí; Joaquin Martinez of second district in Mexico; Álvarez, Guerrero; Gregorio Mendez, Tabasco; J. Pantaleon Dominguez, Chiapas. In other states the office was vacant. All these men adhered to Juarez, says Iglesias. Revistas, iii. 651-2.
* ↑ It was arranged by J. M. Carbajal and Minister Romero with the house of Corlies & Co., for a term of 20 years from Oct. 1, 1863, at an interest of 7 per cent, and secured by the joint credit of the governments of the republic and the states of Tamaulipas and San Luis Potosí, 500,000 acres mineral lands being hypothecated, as well as the general revenue. The imperial minister Arroyo protested in the states against the loan. Legac. Mex., Circ., i. 77-8; Mex. et la Monarch., 50-6. 'Grant...se han apresurado á tomar bonos.' Iglesias, Revistas, iii. 498; Rivera, Hist. Jal., v. 603-4; Diario Ofic., Aug. 23, 1879.
* ↑ As instanced in Vega, Ausiliares, MS.; Vega, Doc., pt li.; La Voz de Méj., May 13, 1865 et seq.; S. F. Call, July 4, 1865, et seq.
* ↑ Notably republics to the south, as Guatemala, Colombia, Chile, and even from Holland. Méx., Col. Leyes, 1863-7, ii. 56–68, 142-9, 170-9, 233-65; Rivera, Hist. Jal., v. 632-77, passim; Legac. Mex., Circ., i. 57, 76, etc.; also journals already referred to.
* ↑ This he had expressed already on his first arrival at Paso del Norte, in a letter to his former secretary and minister Teran. The day was not long distant when the French would abandon the empire, either from recognizing the impossibility of subjugation or under pressure from the U.S. The very victories of the French would destroy them, wrote another observer. Domenech, Hist. Mex., iii. 337-41. Teran, holding friendly intercourse with Baron de Pont, a friend of Maximilian, the latter was kept informed of these views; but to the advice that he should withdraw, he replied by expressing the utmost confidence in his prospects. Arrangoiz wonders what he means, Méj., iv. 56-7, but preceding occurrences reveal that mere effect was intended.
* ↑ Domenech blames Montholon, the French minister at Washington, lately at Mexico, for exaggerating the war feeling in the U.S., to which he was bound by strong family ties, while the empire had never obtained his sympathy.
* ↑ 'Nous n'hésitons jamais à offrir à nos amis les explications qu'ils nous demandent. M. Seward nous donnant l'assurance que les Etats-Unis resteront fidèles à la règle de conduite que leur a tracée Washington, nous accueil lons cette assurance avec une pleine confiance, et nous y trouvons une garantie suffisante.' So runs this remarkable note, dated April 6, 1866. While certain Frenchmen, like Niox, admit the humiliation to France, some, like Detroyat, seek to avoid the subject, and others join Domenech in the futile effort to draw diplomatic victories for their country Instance: 'La forme dans laquelle l'empereur Napoléon annonça sa résolution lui [Seward] a enlevé ce triomphe' of acknowledging the effect of Seward's note. Hist. Mex., iii. 377; Doc. Hist. Mex., 1832-75, pt x. 86-90. It would have been more satisfactory to show that France merely carried out the convention of Miramare, in letter if not in spirit, by withdrawing the troops.
* ↑ The Austrian volunteers were ready to embark when the countermand was issued. This empire was at the time menaced by Prussia, and France began also to look to her frontiers. The respective protests of Motley and Bigelow were made in April and May 1866. For details concerning the relations of the U. S. with Mexico and her allies, see Mex. Affairs, i.-ii., 39th Cong. 1st Sess.; Congress. Globe, 1865-6, passim; U.S. H. Ex. Doc. 20, 31, 33, vii., 39th Cong. 1st Sess.; U.S. Sen. Doc. 6, 8, in Id.; U.S. Foreign Affairs, 206358, 39th Cong. 2d Sess.; Legac. Mex., Circ., i. 5-102, 169-87, passim. Imperialist consuls were not recognized. Iglesias, Interv., iii. 361, 602, et seq.; Domenech, Hist. Mex., iii. 339, etc.; Id., Le Mex., 297-348; Flint's Mex. under Max., 199–227; L'Interven. Française, 235, etc.; Kératry, Max., 103-14.
* ↑ If merely to replace the troops sent back to France. Toward the end of 1864 left: 'Outre la batterie de la garde... le ler et le 20 bataillons de chasseurs à pied; le 99% de ligne...el le 2e zouaves.' The last in March 1865. Niox, Expéd. du Mex., 484.
* ↑ The French minister at Mexico, Dano, was instructed to support the negotiations, to point out that France stood released from responsibillity, and that le plus dangereux pour un gouvernement qui se fonde est certainement celui [accusations de n'être soutenu que par des forces étrangères. Despatch of Jan. 15, 1866. Rather peculiar language from the foreign power that had forced the government upon the country.
* ↑ Returning to France within a fortnight after his arrival.
* ↑ All the war material was to be purchased from the army on its departure. The manner of pursuing the hostile bands roaming the country had to be agreed upon. Maximilian alone should communicate orders to the Mexican army, into which French officers would be admitted with an advance of one or two grades. Two French naval stations to be formed; in the Atlantic and Pacific. Influence should be brought to bear with the U. S. to recognize the empire.
* ↑ The latter was blamed for having produced a false impression in France. Arrangoiz accuses Maximilian of ingratitude and calumny. Méj., iv. 83. •Almonte eagerly accepted the mission to escape the humiliating neglect into which he and his party had fallen. He never returned. His death took place at Paris, March 21, 1869, con 'remordimientos de la conciencia... lleno de angustias.' Rivera, Gob. Mex., ii. 643; Monitor, April 30, 1869.
* ↑ Her expedition to Mexico had been undertaken merely to secure guarantees for her claims. This required the formation of a government for maintaining order. France could not impose such a government. Elements existed for erecting it, and Maximilian undertook the task. Napoleon merely offered the necessarily limited assistance defined by the convention of Miramare, measuring 'à l'importance des intérêts français engagés dans cette entreprise l'étendue du concours qu'il lui était permis de lui offrir.' France had largely fulfilled the treaty; not so Mexico, who had on the contrary given preference to English claims, and allowed her officials to systematically oppose the interests of France. Despatch of May 31st. The peremptory nature of the note might have assumed an even more decided tone had Almonte carried out his instruction, 'de pedir que las tropas francesas evacuasen immediatamente el territorio del imperio,' unless Maximilian's proposal was accepted. Almonte's letter, in Lefêvrs, Doc. Maximiliano, ii. 311.
* ↑ Saillard had declared, on his return, that an empire under Maximilian was impossible.
* ↑ L'abdication devait avoir lieu le 7 juillet,' writes Détroyat, L'Interven., 246. 'Am 7 Juli ergriff er in der That die Feder, um den Fall der Monarchie zu unterzeichnen,'adds another witness. Kaiser, Max., 146; and so Arrangoiz; but among the officials were those who believed differently. They bethought themselves of his obstinacy, which would be affirmed by the prospect of increasing the trouble for France. Niox, Expéd du Mex., 584. Kératry declares that Maximilian spoke to his friends of a formal agreement with Napoleon for retaining the French troops till the end of 1868, without which he would never have accepted the throne; but he must have depended on rumor, and reveals weakness in his own statements.
* ↑ The moment for abdication seemed unfavorable for Maximilian's hopes in Europe, for the result of the 'seven days' war' was not yet known in Mexico. Had a cable existed at the time to bring the news, he might have hastened home to take advantage of the blow at his brother's popularity.
* ↑ He had not expected the subjugation to cover only a part of the try, nor the transport charges alone to rise to several millions. Bazaine had been charged to organize a national army, but neglected to do so, casting obstacles also in the way of Thun when he undertook the task; lately the subsidy needed for effecting it had been withdrawn. Maximilian had been accused of favoring too much liberal principles and men; but he followed the line drawn by the French.
* ↑ Instance only the utterances of Rouher at the issue of the last loan, and the order then issued to Bazaine to retain all needed forces. Charlotte brought copies of two letters of March 1864, which she regarded as guarantees of union between the emperors. L'Interven. Française, 262.
* ↑ At first he declined to receive her, pleading illness. Finally on the 24th of Aug. she received her answer. So low was the treasury at Mexico that her travelling money had to be taken from the drainage fund. She embarked July 13th, taking the mail-steamer for St Nazaire, yet refused to be conveyed on board by the French naval boat. Domenech, Hist. Mex., iii. 393-4. Castillo, minister of foreign affairs, was one of her companions. Although not offcially advised, Almonte went to receive her. She stayed at Paris from Aug. 9th to the 29th, Enpress Eugénie calling upon her. Le Saint, Guerre, 172-3; Lefêvre, Doc. Maximiliano, ii. 336, etc. See also Masseras, Essai, 66 et seq.; Revue Deux Mondes, Feb. 1, Sept. 15, 1866; Méx. Emp., 1-13; Diario Imp., July 7 et seq.; Nacional, id.; Elizaga, Ensayos, 145, etc.
* ↑ She remained for a few days at Miramare, and left for Rome Sept. 18th. At Boetzen her mental condition suddenly became manifest. She believed herself henceforth surrounded by hirelings of Napoleon engaged to poison her, and frequently refused the food set before her, preferring the water, chestnuts, or other articles which she sometimes bought. The pontiff received her and gave her his sympathy, though he had to listen mainly to this now fixed topic. After a stay of three weeks her brother took her away to Miramare. Thence she was conducted to the palace of Tervueren, near Brussels, one of the most picturesque localities in that country, which henceforth became her home. The loss of her husband tended to increase her malady. Reports concerning her continually clouded mental condition are given in Constit., Feb. 6, Mar. 13, 1868; Jonit. Rep., Oct. 17, 1872; Diario Ofic., and La Voz de Méj., Mar. 14, 1880, and in 1885. The rumor is current among certain classes in Mexico that she was poisoned with juice from the dreaded palo-de-leche tree, and by the orders of Napoleon or Bazaine. Alluding to this subject, Hall writes: 'Her physicians have lately attributed her insanity to the effect of poison. In the fall of 1866 his majesty Maximilian received an anonymous letter, stating that the empress had been poisoned in Cuernavaca.' Her insanity, as emanating from such a source, had been talked about in Mexico before the news of its actual occurrence.' Life Max., 56-7. What object Napoleon might have in poisoning her is not mentioned. Others state that she was sun-struck while promenading with a crown on her head. Velazquez de Leon spoke of peculiarities during the trip to France. Masseras, Essai, 79-80. Arrangoiz publishes extracts from notes made at Rome, showing the extreme form taken by her fancies. Méj., iv. 130-5, 157-9, 220. The emperor was moved to tears or learning the truth, as Basch minutely relates. Erinnerungen, i. 45–51, 71. This occurred Oct. 18th. Before this news had come of her leaving Paris indisposed. The public manifested for her great sympathy, and public prayers were offered by request. See Diario Imp., Oct. 18, 1866, et seq.; La Voz de Méj., id., also Feb. 18, 1876. The truth is, that while Charlotte was yet a girl, it was understood that she was precocious, having had a joyless childhood, in which may have been sown the seeds of her disease. The death of her father, the murder of the envoys from the new king, the irritating attitude of Napoleon, and the beginning of military reverses, all shocked her sensitive mind, and inclined it toward disease, fostered also by distrusting self-restraint and reserve. Before her appearance at Paris there were fancies and acts which struck many as peculiar, and have since been recalled as clear symptoms, especially those manifested during the trip to Vera Cruz and across the ocean.