# Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the case of Noori, Mullah Norullah (31 January 2006)

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Transcribed from pages 11-13 of http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/detainees/csrt_arb/ARB_Round_2_Factors_1-99.pdf#11
UNCLASSIFIED
* Department of Defense
* Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants
* at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba
31 January 2006
| To: | Noori, Mullah Norullah |
| Subject: | Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the case of Noori, Mullah Norullah |
| 1. | An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary. |
| 2. | The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state or to a third state; (2) transfer you to your home state, or a third state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state, or the third state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control. |
| 3. | The following primary factors favor continued detention: |
| | a. Commitment In September 1995 the detainee fought alongside al Qaida as a Taliban military general against the Northern Alliance. The detainee was responsible for the line near Murghab in the vicinity of Herta, Afghanistan. The detainee claimed he joined the Taliban in 1999. He worked for the governor of Jalalabad, Afghanistan until December 1999. In February 2000 the detainee arrived in Mazar-e-Sharif , Afghanistan. The detainee began working for the Taliban government as one of eight assistants to the governor of Mazar-e-Sharif . The detainee eventually became the governor of Balkh Province, Afghanistan, as he was one of very tribal members who could read and write. The detainee held this position for about eight to ten months. He received the title of Mullah due to his education and political position. The detianee was fighting on the front lines at Mazar-e-Sharif as a Taliban fighter. As the front lines in Mazar-e-Sharif fell he moved with a majority of the remaining fighters to Kunduz, Afghanistan to reestablish the front lines. While traveling from Mazar-e-Sharif to Zabol Province, Afghanistan, the detainee agreed to negotiate with Dostum's forces regarding the surrender of Taliban forces. b. Training The detainee's job required him to stand guard duty, armed with a Kalishnikov , at buildings. He denied ever receiving any training for this position. The detainee stated that he never learned how to take the weapon apart, but he knew how to use it. c. Connections/Associations The detainee was identified as the Taliban leader in charge of Mazar Bal. The detainee's name appears on a list of key Taliban personalities. The detainee is a close associate of a high-ranking Taliban leader. The detainee hosted al Qaida commanders. The detainee held a meeting with the head of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, who discussed jihad in Uzbekistan. While serving as the governor of Balkh Province in Mazar-e-Sharif the detainee met a subordinate of Usama Bin Laden to pass a message from the Taliban supreme leader. As of late July 2003 Taliban leaders close to the detainee were leading efforts in Zabol Province to destablilize the Afghan Transitional Administration. As of early November 2003, while he was the Taliban Northern Zone Chief, the detainee provided assistance to a friend who was using profits from the salde of narcotics to provide material support to the Taliban and al Qaida. The detainee had given him money and provided him with a money exchange shop. d. Other Relevant Data The detainee was in charge of about 150 combat troops and one helicopter. A group of individuals, including a Taliban member, continue to work to support the detainee. |
| 4. | The following primary factors favor release or transfer: |
| | a. The detainee does not consider himself an enemy of the United States. He has never believed that the United States is an enemy of Afghanistan. He reiterated that he never fought with or shot a gun at anyone. b. The detainee advised that he did not know much about Usama Bin Laden and had only heard of him on the radio. He has never seen Usama Bin Laden. c. The detainee said that he is not against the United States in any way. If he were allowed to return home, he would attempt to obtain a position in the new government with the hope of being able to provide for his family. The detainee would hold nothing against the United States and would not give support to anyone who was against the United States. |
| 5. | You will be provided with a meaningful opportunity to be heard and present information to this Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter. |

## See also

* This is my speech (ISN 006)
* Summarized Administrative Review Board Detainee Statement (2005)
* Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the case of Noori, Mullah Norullah (2005)