# Final Report of the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol/Chapter 3/Section 3.3

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​3.3 THE CAMPAIGN LEGAL TEAM BOWS OUT, AND GIULIANI STEPS IN
Not everyone on the campaign was eager to pursue the fake elector plan. On December 11th, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected a high-profile lawsuit filed by the State of Texas challenging the election results in Pennsylvania,
(Photo by Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images)
(Photo by Drew Angerer/Getty Images)
any of the States he contested. Justin Clark, who oversaw the Trump Campaign's general counsel's office, said that he basically conveyed, "I'm out," and encouraged his colleagues on the legal team to do the same. Findlay told the Select Committee that "we backed out of this thing," and Morgan, his boss, said he had Findlay pass off responsibility for the electors as "my way of taking that responsibility to zero."
Clark told the Select Committee that "it never sat right with me that there was no…contingency whereby these votes would count." "I had real problems with the process," Clark said, because "it morphed into something I didn't agree with." In his view, the fake electors were "not necessarily duly nominated electors" despite being presented as such. He said he believed he warned his colleagues that "unless we have litigation pending like in these States, like I don't think this is appropriate or, you know, this isn't the right thing to do."
Morgan told the Select Committee that he saw no value in pushing slates of purported electors if they were not authorized by a State government's certificate of ascertainment. As he put it, "[M]y view was, as long as you didn't have a certificate of ascertainment, then the electors were, for ​lack of a better way of saying it, no good or not—not valid." Findlay confirmed that Morgan told him after the Supreme Court ruling on December 11th that "there's not really anything left for us to do on this project" and that "it doesn't seem like a good idea for us to be involved in it."
Campaign lawyers were not the only ones who doubted the legality of the fake elector plan. The Office of White House Counsel appears to have expressed concerns about it as well. In his testimony to the Select Committee, White House Counsel Pat Cipollone acknowledged his view that by mid-December, the electoral process was "done." Cipollone told the Select Committee that the White House Counsel's office "probably" had discussions about the electors plan and that his Deputy, Pat Philbin, would have been involved in evaluating the electors issue. In an informal Committee interview, Philbin described the fake elector scheme as one of the "bad theories" that were like "Whac-A-Mole" in the White House during this period. Mr. Cipollone agreed with this characterization.
In her testimony, Cassidy Hutchinson testified that she heard at least one member of the White House Counsel's Office say that the plan was not legal:
   Committee Staff: . . . to be clear, did you hear the White House Counsel's Office say that this plan to have alternate electors meet and cast votes for Donald Trump in States that he had lost was not legally sound?
   Hutchinson: Yes, sir.
She also recalled a meeting that took place in or before mid-December during which this view was relayed to Giuliani and members of his team by lawyers in the White House Counsel's Office.
By December 11th, Findlay emailed his main points of contact in six battleground States to say "[t]hank you for your work on the presidential elector project" and, in order to pass off his responsibilities, let them know that "Rudy's team has designated Kenneth Chesebro as the point person for the legal documents" going forward.
While the campaign's core legal team stepped back from the fake elector effort on December 11th, it nonetheless went forward because "Rudy was in charge of [it]" and "[t]his is what he wanted to do," according to Findlay. When Findlay was asked if this decision to let the effort proceed under Giuliani's direction "was coming from your client, the President," Findlay responded: "Yes, I believe so. I mean, he had made it clear that Rudy was in charge of this and that Rudy was executing what he wanted." Findlay also recalled being told that Chesebro's elector memos had become "the justification for why Rudy and Ken were going to keep going forward ​with this stuff." He explained that Giuliani "really bought into Ken's theory on this," and that the two of them "were kind of the main ones driving this" from that point forward. Clark told the Select Committee that ". . . my understanding of who was driving the process . . . was Mayor Giuliani and his team." On December 10th, when Kenneth Chesebro emailed one of the State party officials involved in organizing the fake elector effort in Nevada, he reported that "I spoke this evening with Mayor Guiliani [sic], who is focused on doing everything possible to ensure that that [sic] all the Trump-Pence electors vote on Dec. 14."
In the days that followed this handoff, Chesebro would draft and distribute documents intended for use in the Trump team's fake elector ceremonies that were then shared with key contacts in Arizona, Georgia, Michigan, Nevada, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin. He also gave some of the groups step-by-step logistical guidance, such as when and where they should convene, how many copies each person would need to sign, and to send their fake votes to Congress via registered mail. "Pretty Simple!" he commented in some of these emails.
A campaign operative named Michael Roman was also tapped for a major operational role in the fake elector effort. When Findlay sent his email handing off certain responsibilities for the initiative, he also wrote that Giuliani's team had designated Roman "as the lead for executing the voting on Monday" December 14th. Roman was the Trump Campaign's Director of Election Day Operations (EDO), with team members who specialized in political outreach and mobilization in battleground States where the Trump team now urgently needed the fake electors to meet on December 14th.
With help from his EDO staff, as well as Giuliani's team and RNC staffers working alongside the Campaign as part of the Trump Victory Committee, Roman ran an improvised "Electors Whip Operation." For example, Roman sent an email on December 12th directing an aide to create "a tracker for the electors" with tabs for Arizona, Georgia, Michigan, Nevada, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin, listing contact information, whether they had been contacted, whether they agreed to attend on December 14th, and names of "[s]ubstitute electors" to replace any reticent or unavailable participants as needed. Roman referred to others on this email as the "WHIP TEAM" and directed them to fill out the spreadsheet, to update him on "what you have and what you need," and to plan on a call that evening.
In the days that followed, this group focused on tracking which Republicans previously named as President Trump's nominees to the electoral college would be willing to show up for fake elector ceremonies, finding ​adequate substitutes for those who refused to attend, and actually coordinating the unrecognized elector signing ceremonies in seven States on December 14th. In all seven States, these efforts to mobilize fake electors benefitted from support from the RNC, as well as the State Republican parties. However, it was the Trump team who drove the process from start to finish, as one of the fake electors and later co-chair of the Michigan Republican party, Meshawn Maddock, told an audience in January 2022: "We fought to seat the electors. The Trump campaign asked us to do that."