# Smith v. Mason

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United States Supreme Court
81 U.S. 419
Smith v. Mason
APPEAL from the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia; the case being this:
The Bankrupt Act enacts:
'SECTION 1. That the several District Courts of the United States be courts of bankruptcy, and they shall have original jurisdiction in their respective districts in all matters and proceedings in bankruptcy, and they are hereby authorized to hear and adjudicate upon the same according to the provisions of this act. . . .
'The said courts shall be always open for the transaction of business under this act, and the powers and jurisdiction hereby granted and conferred shall be exercised as well in vacation as in term time, and a judge sitting at chambers shall have the same powers and jurisdiction, including the power of keeping order and of punishing any contempt of his authority as when sitting in court.
'And the jurisdiction hereby conferred shall extend to all cases and controversies arising between the bankrupt and any creditor or creditors who shall claim any debt or demand under the bankruptcy; to the collection of all the assets of the bankrupt; to the ascertainment and liquidation of the liens and other specific claims thereon; to the adjustment of the various priorities and conflicting interests of all parties, and to the marshalling and disposition of the different funds and assets so as to secure the rights of all parties and due distribution of the assets among all the creditors; and to all acts, matters, and things to be done under and in virtue of the bankruptcy, until the final distribution and settlement of the estate of the bankrupt and the close of the proceedings in bankruptcy. The said courts shall have full authority to compel obedience to all orders and decrees passed by them in bankruptcy, by process of contempt and other remedial process, to the same extent that the Circuit Courts now have in any suit pending therein in equity.'
The second section, in its first clause, gives to the Circuit Courts 'a general superintendence and jurisdiction of all cases and questions arising under this act; and, except when special provision is otherwise made,' authorizes them, upon bill, petition, or other proper process of any party aggrieved, to hear and determine the case as in a court of equity.
By its third clause the act enacts thus:
'Said Circuit Courts shall also have concurrent jurisdiction with the District Courts of the same district of all suits at law or in equity which may or shall be brought by the assignee in bankruptcy against any person claiming an adverse interest, or by such person against such assignee, touching any property or rights of property of said bankrupt transferable to or vested in such assignee.'
The eighth section of the act gives appeals and writs of error from the District to the Circuit Courts, when the debt or damage claimed amounts to more than $500. The section proceeds:
'And any supposed creditor, whose claim is wholly or in part rejected, or an assignee who is dissatisfied with the allowance of a claim, may appeal from the decision of the District Court to the Circuit Court from the same district.'
The ninth section enacts:
'That in cases arising under this act no appeal on writ of error shall be allowed in any case from the Circuit Courts to the Supreme Court of the United States, unless the matter in dispute in such case shall exceed $2000.'The forty-ninth section enacts:
'That all the jurisdiction, power, and authority conferred upon and vested in the District Courts of the United States by this act in cases in bankruptcy are hereby conferred upon and vested in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia . . . when the bankrupt resides in the District of Columbia.'
So far as to provisions of what is called the Bankrupt Act.
The Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, referred to in the section last quoted, and from which court this appeal came, was reorganized by an act of March 3d, 1863. The act gives it a general jurisdiction in law and equity. It is made to consist of four judges. Any one of them may hold the District Court of the United States for the District of Columbia, in the same manner and with the same powers and jurisdiction possessed and exercised by other District Courts of the United States.
In this state of statutory law Frederick P. Sawyer, the bankrupt in this case, was the senior member of the firm of Sawyer, Risher & Hall, of Washington, D. C., who held a claim against the United States, which they had put in the hands of George Taylor, for collection. On the 20th January, 1867, and while the claim was pending, the firm assigned it to Biddle & Co., of New York, by an order on Taylor to pay the proceeds over to them collected, which order was accepted by Taylor. Biddle & Co. assigned the order in turn, on the next day, to one Smith. Taylor collected about $100 on the claim, which he remitted to Smith, according to the arrangement. Some time after this payment, and before any further collection was made, Sawyer went into bankruptcy (one Mason being appointed his assignee), and the firm of Sawyer, Risher & Hall was dissolved, Risher and Hall closing the business of the firm, as remaining partners. After this date Taylor, by consent of all parties, received a further sum of $4744.19, and there was an uncollected draft yet to be paid to him.
At the time of these collections the accounts between the bankrupt partner and the remaining ones were unsettled, and the partnership debts were unliquidated. The assignee, therefore, filed a bill for an account, but the remaining partners had not answered. At this stage of the proceedings Mason, the assignee of Sawyer, on the 13th of October, 1868, presented a petition to one of the judges of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, sitting in bankruptcy, setting forth that he had filed his bill against Risher & Hall, the partners, carrying on the business of Sawyer, Risher & Hall, for the settlement of the partnership accounts; that Taylor had collected the sum of $4744.19, above mentioned, and that other funds would come into his hands for Sawyer, Risher & Hall; that prior to the bankruptcy of Sawyer the firm made the assignment (already mentioned) to Biddle & Co., as collateral security for the payment of a debt to the said firm, which debt had been paid; and that Biddle & Co. had assigned its claim to Smith.
Mason accordingly prayed an injunction on Taylor against his payment of the money pending his suit against Sawyer, Risher & Hall. This application for an injunction was in truth apparently made at Taylor's instance, in order that in any payments which he made of money that he received, he might act under an order of court. He did not appear, and the injunction was granted. Mason then, on the 7th of April, 1869, filed a petition against Smith, asking for an order on him to show cause why the money should not be decreed to him, Mason, as assignee. Smith appeared and set up his claim to the money.
On the 10th of April, 1869, Risher & Hall, the remaining partners, now intervened, and also claimed the money, on the ground that the order on Taylor was a mere hypothecation of the claim, and that Biddle & Co. had been fully paid.
The court thereupon went into an examination of the accounts between Sawyer, Risher & Hall, and Biddle & Co., and (Biddle & Co. not being present, and having had no notice or order served upon them) decided that the debt originally due to Biddle & Co. had been satisfied; and that the funds in the hands of Taylor should be paid over to Mason, the assignee of Sawyer.
From this decree an appeal was taken by Smith. The court in banc reversed the decision of the court in bankruptcy, dissolved the injunction, and ordered the money to be paid over to Risher & Hall, the solvent and surviving partners, thus deciding the right of Biddle & Co. and Smith without notice to Biddle & Co., and in favor of the surviving partners.
From this decree Smith took the present appeal. Counsel for the appellee appeared generally. The record, which was not a very full one, did not perhaps show very well notice of the appeal, but it showed clearly enough that the appeal had been duly claimed, and that the appellant filed his appeal bond in open court, and that it was duly approved by the chief justice of the Supreme Court of the District, who presided at the hearing when the final decree was entered in the case.
Messrs. Moore and Bright, for the appellant:
If any jurisdiction existed under the first section of the Bankrupt Act, and in a summary way, all parties to be affected should certainly have had notice. The court, without notice to Biddle & Co., and in their absence, went into the examination of their accounts and decided that their claim had been paid and discharged, and that they were bound to return the order on and acceptance of Taylor to the firm of Sawyer, Risher & Hall.
But the case was not one for summary jurisdiction under the first section at all. The case was plainly one for a proceeding in equity under the third clause of the second section, when all parties in interest would have been regularly brought in and accounts could have been regularly taken.
Mr. G. W. Paschall, contra:
No appeal lies in a case from the general term of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia to this court in a strictly bankrupt proceeding. If it be conceded that the ninth section of the Bankrupt Act, by a negative pregnant, allows appeals from the Circuit Court to this court in all cases where the matter in controversy exceeds $1000, it does not follow that such appeal lies from the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, much less that such power has been exercised in a manner to give this court jurisdiction.
There is, in fact, no appeal order by the court; there is no appeal bond, such as is required by the statute; there is no notice of appeal, and no evidence that the appeal was taken in term, or ever, in fact, taken at all. These are all jurisdictional facts.
But conceding the jurisdiction, we insist that, under the first and second sections of the Bankrupt Act, and the broad principles of Ex parte Christy, the court, in the exercise of the powers given, had the right to do precisely what was done in this case; that is, to determine the right of the claimants to a fund in which the bankrupt estate had an interest. The suit was brought originally by the assignee against the partners of the bankrupt for account. This fund was in the District, in the hands of the attorney of this firm, and the assignee brought the suit to enjoin the payment, either to the non-accounting partners or to Smith, who was understood to have set up some claim to the fund. Smith was properly cited to assert his claim to the fund. At this point the surviving partners intervened and set up their rights. The bankrupt court, in the exercise of its legitimate powers, acquired a summary equitable jurisdiction over the subject-matter and the parties; and, having become thus possessed of the cause, it might fully proceed to adjudicate the right.
Smith, as also Risher and Hall, were claiming an interest in the bankrupt's assets, and no disposition could be made of this fund until the rights of these claimants should be settled. The jurisdiction of the District Court expressly extends 'to the collection of all assets of the bankrupt;' 'to the marshalling and disposition of the different funds and assets among all the creditors; and to all acts, matters, and things to be done under and in virtue of the bankruptcy, until the final distribution and settlement of the bankrupt's estate, and the close of the proceedings in bankruptcy.' The Circuit and District Courts have given an enlarged interpretation to this section.
Mr. Justice CLIFFORD delivered the opinion of the court.

## Notes

* ↑ 14 Stat. at Large, 517.
* ↑ 12 Stat. at Large, 762.
* ↑ 3 Howard, 321.
* ↑ See 2 Brightly's Digest, p. 74, notes a, b, c.
This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
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