# Ante-Nicene Fathers/Volume V/Hippolytus/The Extant Works and Fragments of Hippolytus/Dogmatical and Historical/Against Beron and Helix/Fragment III

Fragment III.
Now, with the view of explaining, by means of an illustration, what has been said concerning the Saviour, (I may say that) the power of thought which I have by nature is proper and suitable to me, as being possessed of a rational and intelligent soul; and to this soul there pertains, according to nature, a self-moved energy and first power, ever-moving, to wit, the thought that streams from it naturally. This thought I utter, when there is occasion, by fitting it to words, and expressing it rightly in signs, using the tongue as an organ, or artificial characters, showing that it is heard, though it comes into actuality by means of objects foreign to itself, and yet is not changed itself by those foreign objects. For my natural thought does not belong to the tongue or the letters, although I effect its utterance by means of these; but it belongs to me, who speak according to my nature, and by means of both these express it as my own, streaming as it does always from my intelligent soul according to its nature, and uttered by means of my bodily tongue organically, as I have said, when there is occasion. Now, to institute a comparison with that which is utterly beyond comparison, just as in us the power of thought that belongs by nature to the soul is brought to utterance by means of our bodily tongue without any change in itself, so, too, in the wondrous incarnation of God is the omnipotent and all-creating energy of the entire deity manifested without mutation in itself, by means of His perfectly holy flesh, and in the works which He wrought after a divine manner, (that energy of the deity) remaining in its essence free from all circumscription, although it shone through the flesh, which is itself essentially limited. For that which is in its nature unoriginated cannot be circumscribed by an originated nature, although this latter may have grown into one with it by a conception which circumscribes all understanding: nor can this be ever brought into the same nature and natural activity with that, so long as they remain each within its own proper and inconvertible nature. For it is only in objects of the same nature that there is the motion that works the same works, showing that the being whose power is natural is incapable in any manner of being or becoming the possession of a being of a different nature without mutation.

## Footnotes

* ↑ λόγος.
* ↑ The text is, διὰ τῶν ἀνομοίων μὲν ύπάρχοντα.  Anastasius reads μὴ for μέν.
* ↑ σωματώσεως.
* ↑ τῆς ὅλης θεότητος.
* ↑ συνέφυ.
* ↑ Κατὰ σύλληψιν πάντα περιγράφουσαν νοῦν.
* ↑ οὔτε μὴν εἰς τ᾽ αὐτὸν αὐτῷ φέρεσθαι φύσεώς ποτε καὶ φυσικῆς ἐνεργείας , ἕως ἂν ἑκάτερον τῆς ἰδίας ἐντὸς μένει φυσικῆς ἀτρεψίας. Το φέρεσθαι we supply again πέφυκε.
* ↑ οὐσίαν.
* ↑ The sense is extremely doubtful here. The text runs thus:  ὁμοφυῶν γὰρ μόνων ἡ ταυτουργός ἐστι κίνησις σημαίνουσα τὴν οὐσίαν, ἧς φυσικὴ καθέστηκε δύναμις, ἑτεροφυοῦς ἰδιότητος οὐσίας εἶναι κατ᾽ οὐδένα λόγον, ἢ γενέσθαι δίχα τροπῆς δυναμένην.  Anastasius renders it: Connaturalium enim tantum per se operans est motus, manifestans substantiam, cujus naturalem constat esse virtutem: diversæ naturæ proprietatis substantia nulla naturæ esse vel fieri sine convertibilitate valente.