OpenLLM-France/wikimedia huggingface dataset:
# Ante-Nicene Fathers/Volume V/Hippolytus/The Extant Works and Fragments of Hippolytus/Dogmatical and Historical/Against Beron and Helix/Fragment IV

Fragment IV.
For, in the view of apostles and prophets and teachers, the mystery of the divine incarnation has been distinguished as having two points of contemplation natural to it, distinct in all things, inasmuch as on the one hand it is the subsistence of perfect deity, and on the other is demonstrative of full humanity. As long, therefore, as the Word is acknowledged to be in substance one, of one energy, there shall never in any way be known a movement in the two. For while God, who is essentially ever-existent, became by His infinite power, according to His will, sinless man, He is what He was, in all wherein God is known; and what He became, He is in all wherein man is known and can be recognised. In both aspects of Himself He never falls out of Himself, in His divine activities and in His human alike, preserving in both relations His own essentially unchangeable perfection.

## Footnotes

* ↑ διττὴν καὶ διαφορὰν ἔχον διέγνωσται τὴν ἐν πᾶσι φυσικὴν θεωρίαν.
* ↑ The text goes, ἕως ἂν οὐχ, which is adopted by Combefisius. But Capperonnier and Migne read οὖν for οὐχ, as we have rendered it.
* ↑ Change, κίνησις.
* ↑ μένει ἀνέκπτωτος.
# Ante-Nicene Fathers/Volume V/Hippolytus/The Extant Works and Fragments of Hippolytus/Dogmatical and Historical/Against Beron and Helix/Fragment VII

Fragment VII.
But if it (the flesh) did not become of like nature with that (the deity), neither shall it ever become of like natural energy with that; that He may not be shown to have His energy unequal with His nature, and heterogeneous, and, through all that pertains to Himself, to have entered on an existence outside of His natural equality and identity, which is an impious supposition.

## Footnotes

* ↑ φυσικῆς ἔξω γεγονὼς ἰσότητος καὶ ταυτόητος.
# Arthur v. Davies/Opinion of the Court

* Court Documents
* Case Syllabus
* Opinion of the Court
United States Supreme Court
96 U.S. 135
Arthur v. Davies
The twenty-second section of the act of March 2, 1861 (12 Stat. 191), imposed a duty of thirty per cent on 'braces, suspenders, webbing, or other fabrics, composed wholly or in part of india-rubber, not otherwise provided for.'
The eighth section of the act of July 14, 1862 (id. 552), imposes the following duty: 'On manufactures of india-rubber and silk, or of india-rubber and silk and other materials, fifty per cent ad valorem.'
The thirteenth section imposes: 'In addition to the duties heretofore imposed by law on braces, suspenders, webbing, or other fabrics, composed wholly or in part of india-rubber, not otherwise provided for, five per cent ad valorem.' Id. 555, 556.
In Schedule C of the act of July 30, 1846 (9 id. 44), the same provision is made, in these words: 'Thirty per cent ad valorem on braces, suspenders, webbing, or other fabrics, composed wholly or in part of india-rubber, not otherwise provided for.'
The same designation and the same duty are found in the seventh subdivision of sect. 5 of the act of Aug. 30, 1842, where they do not exceed two dollars per dozen in value. 5 id. 555.
It thus appears that for thirty years prior to this importation, and in four different statutes, braces and suspenders, composed wholly or in part of india-rubber, had been a subject of duty, eo nomine; and in the same statute where a duty of fifty per cent is imposed on other manufactures of which rubber is a component material, which it is now sought to apply to braces and suspenders, braces and suspenders containing that material are, by name, charged with an additional duty of five per cent.
It is not material that in one kind of suspenders cotton was the component of chief value, and that each contained some proportion of silk. If they are technically and commercially braces and suspenders composed in part of india-rubber, they take their dutiable character from that source, and not from the fact that they would otherwise fall under the general designation applicable to other subjects.
Under the principles of the cases already decided, it is clear that excessive duties were exacted, and that the rulings of the judge on the trial were correct.
Judgment affirmed.

## Notes

This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
Public domainPublic domainfalsefalse
# Arthur v. Herman/Opinion of the Court

* Court Documents
* Case Syllabus
* Opinion of the Court
United States Supreme Court
96 U.S. 141
Arthur v. Herman
The last paragraph of sect. 6 of the act of 1864 is as follows, viz.: 'On cotton braids, insertings, lace trimming, or bobbinet, and all other manufactures of cotton not otherwise provided for, thirty-five per cent ad valorem.'
The goods in question were manufactured from two materials, of which cotton was one, and may, therefore, in general terms, be said to be manufactured of cotton, and they are not provided for by any specific enumeration in the act of 1864. They fall under the general clause of this act, just quoted.
Impliedly admitting the application of this provision to their goods, the importers, by their protest, insist 'that the merchandise aforesaid is only liable under existing laws to a duty of ninety per cent of thirty-five per cent ad valorem, under the second section of the act of June 6, 1872, as being merchandise composed of animal hair and cotton.'
On turning to the act of 1872, we find that the ninety per cent provision is made applicable to 'all manufactures of cotton, of which cotton is the component part of chief value.' The article in question is dutiable as a manufacture of cotton, that material being one of its components. But the record expressly states that cotton is not the component part of chief value. It is plain that this case does not fall within the terms of the clause.
The argument of the importers, if we appreciate it, is this: The similitude clause of the act of Aug. 30, 1842 (5 Stat. 565, sect. 20), provides that there shall be collected on every nonenumerated article, . . . manufactured from two or more materials, the highest duty assessable upon any of its component parts. The article in question is manufactured from cow hair and cotton; of these the cotton is assessed at a higher rate of duty than the hair, and, therefore, the article is assessed as a manufacture of cotton, and hence it is insisted, under the act of 1872, as a manufacture of cotton it is entitled to the deduction claimed.
The defect in this argument is apparent. The article in question does not fall within the terms of either part of the clause of the act of 1872, 'all manufactures of cotton, of which cotton is the component part of chief value.' The first part gives the deduction to manufactures of cotton, which might be understood to mean those which are wholly of cotton. If it also includes a manufacture of which cotton is one of the components only, the cotton must be the component of chief value. It certainly was not intended to embrace a composite article of which cotton was the chief component, and a composite article of which it was not the chief component. In any aspect, it does not embrace the goods in question.
We think the judge erred in ruling in favor of the importer, and that there must be a new trial.
Judgment reversed and new trial ordered.

## Notes

This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
Public domainPublic domainfalsefalse
# Arthur v. Fox

* related portals: Supreme Court of the United States.
* sister projects: Wikidata item.
United States Supreme Court
108 U.S. 125
Arthur v. Fox
Sol. Gen. Phillips, for plaintiff in error.
E. B. Smith and S. G. Clarke, for defendants in error.
WAITE, C. J.

## Notes

This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
Public domainPublic domainfalsefalse
# Arthur v. Goddard

* related portals: Supreme Court of the United States.
* sister projects: Wikidata item.
United States Supreme Court
96 U.S. 145
Arthur v. Goddard
ERROR to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York.
In 1874, Goddard & Brother imported certain goods, of which the invoice, after giving the details of weight, &c., was as follows, viz.:--
Bought Fr's 8,670.25
Discount for cash on gross amount, two per cent, 8,766.00 175.30
Fr's 8,494.95
Terms cash. If not paid, interest to be added at the rate of six per cent.
The importers entered the goods at the net price stated in the invoice,-francs, 8,494.95,-and declared on the entry as follows: 'Cash not paid on these goods, but are passed to our account, and are subject to interest at six per cent per annum.'
The case finds, as matter of fact, that 8,494.95 francs was the actual market value of the goods at the time of their exportation, in the principal market of the country from which they were exported, and that the purchase by the importers was at the figures named.
The appraisers disallowed the discount of two per cent, on the ground that the importers stated in the entry that the cash was not paid. The collector thereupon fixed the value of the goods at 8,670.25 francs; and the duty charged upon that valuation having been paid under protest, the importers brought suit to recover the excess.
Judgment was rendered in their favor, and the collector brought the case here.
Mr. Assistant-Attorney-General Smith for the plaintiff in error.
Mr. William G. Choate, contra.
MR. JUSTICE HUNT delivered the opinion of the court.

## Notes

This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
Public domainPublic domainfalsefalse
# Arthur v. Herman

* related portals: Supreme Court of the United States.
* sister projects: Wikidata item.
United States Supreme Court
96 U.S. 141
Arthur v. Herman
ERROR to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York.
In the year 1872, Herman & Co., the plaintiffs, imported from England certain cheap goods, the warp of which was made of cotton, and the filling or woof of cattle hair. These were the only component parts of the goods.
The collector imposed a duty of thirty-five per cent on the goods, under the act of June 30, 1864. The importers protested against this charge as excessive, insisting that, under the second section of the act of June 6, 1872 (17 Stat. 231), but ninety per cent of thirty-five per cent could be legally exacted as the duty. Judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiffs, and the defendant brought the case here.
The Solicitor-General for the plaintiff in error
Mr. Stephen G. Clarke, contra.
MR. JUSTICE HUNT delivered the opinion of the court.

## Notes

This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
Public domainPublic domainfalsefalse
# Arthur v. Dodge

* related portals: Supreme Court of the United States.
* sister projects: Wikidata item.
United States Supreme Court
101 U.S. 34
Arthur v. Dodge
ERROR to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York.
Between Aug. 28 and Oct. 18, 1874, Dodge and his partners, constituting the firm of Phelps, Dodge, & Co., imported into the port of New York sundry invoices of 'tin in plates,' 'terne plates,' and 'tagger's tin,' whereon Arthur, the then collector, imposed a duty of fifteen per cent ad valorem, which the firm paid under protest. The following is a copy of one of their protests, the others being substantially like it:--
'SIR,-We do hereby protest against the payment of fifteen per cent charged on sixteen hundred and fifty (1650) boxes tin plates of the dutiable value of $14,422, gold, contained in our entry made on the twenty-third day of September, 1874, per S. S. 'Algeria,' from Liverpool, England, in cases marked P. D. & Co., and various other marks, claiming that under existing laws said goods are only liable to a duty of ninety per cent of fifteen per cent or thirteen and one-half per cent, because title 33, sect. 2503, of the codification of the revenue laws provides certain rates of duty on articles which are mentioned in Schedule E of sect. 2504, with the provisions that all articles mentioned in 2503 shall have the benefit of ten per cent reduction-one of the provisions-on all metals not herein otherwise provided for, and on all manufactures of, &c., &c., includes tin plate, and pay the amount exacted in order to get possession of the goods, and look to you for refund of the same.'
The Secretary of the Treasury having, on appeal, affirmed the decision of the collector, the firm brought this suit to recover the difference between the amount paid and ninety per cent thereof.
There was a judgment for the plaintiffs. Arthur then sued out this writ of error.
The Solicitor-General for the plaintiffs in error.
Mr. John E. Parsons, contra.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WAITE delivered the opinion of the court.

## Notes

This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
Public domainPublic domainfalsefalse
# Avery v. United States

* related portals: Supreme Court of the United States.
* sister projects: Wikidata item.
United States Supreme Court
79 U.S. 304
Avery v. United States
ERROR to the Circuit Court for the District of West Tennessee.
Avery owning a warehouse in Memphis, Tennessee, had become surety for the postmaster there appointed before the rebellion. During the war and after the government troops had driven the insurgents from Memphis, and were themselves in military occupation of the place, the treasury agents of the United States taking possession of the house (under the act of Congress, as was stated in the brief of Avery's counsel, relating to captured and abandoned property), leased it to one Ford, who occupied it from September, 1862, till the same month in 1865, paying a monthly rent which amounted in all to about $7000. The rebellion being suppressed, and Avery having returned to Memphis, the United States sued him in the court below as surety on the postmaster's bond, and in March, 1867, got judgment against him for $5023, and issued execution.
In this state of facts, which for the purposes of this case, seemed to be conceded on both sides, Avery now, May, 1869, filed a petition in the same court in which the judgment had been got, setting forth the fact of the judgment and execution, the previous occupation of this property by the United States, and the receipt by rental agents of the United States, and payment into the Federal treasury of rent for it amounting to the sum of $7000, and praying the court to stay proceedings on the execution and to have the judgment declared satisfied. The ground of his petition, of course, was the alleged fact that the government had received rents from his warehouse, for a sum larger than the amount of their judgment, a fact in proof of which he annexed to his petition copies of the rental agent's receipts. As a reason why he had not presented his demand by way of set-off on the trial of the suit against him as the postmaster's surety, he alleged that he did not know at that time that the money was in the treasury of the United States, nor did he receive knowledge of that fact or evidence on which to found his demand until shortly before presenting his petition. When filing his petition he moved also for a writ of audit a querel a; asking for it on the facts and statements contained in his petition.
The court below, without any formal pleadings, denied the prayer of the petition, and also refused to grant the writ. To this, its action, the present writ of error was taken.
Messrs. Albert Pike and R. W. Johnson, for the plaintiff in error; Mr. B. H. Bristow and C. H. Hill, contra.
Mr. Justice DAVIS delivered the opinion of the court.

## Notes

This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
Public domainPublic domainfalsefalse
# Aviation Accident Report: 1934 Braniff Airways crash

STATEMENT OF PROBABLE CAUSE CONCERNING AN AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED TO PLANE OF BRANIFF AIRWAYS, INCORPORATED, ON DECEMBER 8, 1934, NEAR COLUMBIA, MISSOURI
To the Secretary of Commerce:
On December 8, 1934 at about 5:20 a.m. near Columbia, Missouri, an airplane, being operated in scheduled flight carrying mail and express, crashed with resultant death to the pilot, the complete destruction of the aircraft and the loss of considerable mail.
The pilot, Lewis L. Bowen, held a Department of Commerce transport pilot's license and had a scheduled air transport rating. The airplane, owned and operated by Braniff Airways, Incorporated, was a Lockheed Vega, model 5-C, and bore Department of Commerce license number NC-106W. This was a mail and express schedule and passengers were not permitted to be carried.
Pilot Bowen departed from Kansas City at approximately 4:37 a.m. Weather along the regular route was not good. However, the pilot elected to take an alternate route over which weather reports indicated favorable weather. About five minutes before the accident, a special weather broadcast announced a change in weather over the alternate route which indicated icing conditions.
Observers on the ground heard the plane pass ever the field headed east and, from the sound, the engine was functioning normally. The wreckage was found at a point about four and one-half miles east of the airport and indicated that the pilot had turned back, probably to effect a landing. The plane had flown into a road embankment with the engine full on and the force of impact had practically disintegrated the plane. No one witnessed the accident and apparently no flares were released.
From available facts and the path of flight, it appears that the pilot, after unexpectedly encountering icing conditions, had decided to land at Columbia. He crossed the airport flying east and turned with the probable intention of landing toward the west. Enough ice had collected on the plane to make it difficult if not impossible to maintain altitude. Crashing so far from the airport and with full engine suggests that the pilot had experienced this difficulty and was utilizing full engine power in an effort to keep the plane from diving into the ground nose first. It is also probable that both windshield and instruments were iced up, making it practically impossible for the pilot to judge his proximity to the ground. There was nothing to indicate either mechanical or structural failure.
It is the opinion of the Accident Board that the probable cause of this accident was unexpected icing conditions which made proper handling of the aircraft impossible.
Respectfully submitted,
Eugene L. Vidal, Director of Air Commerce.
This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
Public domainPublic domainfalsefalse
# Aviation Accident Report: 1935 Petrol Oil Corporation crash

for the Bureau of Air Commerce
​FOR IMMEDIATE USE
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
BUREAU OF AIR COMMERCE
Washington
STATEMENT OF PROBABLE CAUSE
CONCERNING AN AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT
WHICH OCCURRED TO A COMMERCIALLY OWNED PLANE
ON MAY 7, 1935, NEAR FILLMORE, CALIFORNIA
To the Secretary of Commerce
On May 7, 1935 at about 10 30 a.m. near Fillmore, California, a commercially owned airplane, carrying three passengers and the pilot, collided with a mountain with resultant serious injury to one passenger, minor injuries to two passengers and the pilot and the complete destruction of the aircraft.
The airplane, a Bellanca Skyrocket, model CH-400, was owned by the Petrol Oil Corporation of Los Angeles and bore Department of Commerce license number NC-547V. The pilot, Leland F. Williams, held a Department of Commerce transport pilot's license.
The ceiling at Los Angeles at the time of take-off was 600 feet with a visibility of three miles. A fog over this area was estimated about 1200 feet in thickness. This was a local condition, however, because at a point six miles out of Los Angeles, the ceiling was approximately 1500 feet with a visibility of seven miles and about sixty miles out the weather was clear and unlimited.
The pilot should have been able to clear the mountains under the clouds had he been sufficiently familiar with the terrain to have followed an exact course out of Saugus, California, under the existing poor visibility. However, he attempted to get through at a point about ten miles west of this course. In flying up a canyon and just under the clouds at an altitude of about 2300 feet, he flew into a heavy fog. In attempting to turn to get out of the fog the plane collided with the side of a mountain.
It is the opinion of the Accident Board that the probable cause of this accident was poor judgment on the part of the pilot for attempting this flight under weather conditions which existed at the time and for continuing flight up a canyon until engulfed in fog which could have been avoided and for attempting a turn in a canyon so narrow that there was not a reasonable expectancy of being able to complete the turn.
Respectfully submitted,
Eugene L. Vidal
Director of Air Commerce
This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
Public domainPublic domainfalsefalse