# The North Star (Rochester)/1848/01/14/Speech of John C. Calhoun, on the Mexican War

From the New York Herald. SPEECH OF JOHN C. CALHOUN, ON THE MEXICAN WAR.
Washington, Jan. 4,1848.
At twenty minutes to one o'clock, Mr. Calhoun's resolutions were taken up, on motion of Mr. Sevier.
Mr. Calhoun rose and said—In offering these resolutions, Senators, to your consideration, I have been governed by the same reasons which induced me to oppose the war—from the same considerations which have ever since guided me. In alluding to my opposition to the war, I do not intend to advert to the reasons which governed me on that occasion, further than is necessary to explain my object on the present. I opposed the war then, not only because I considered it unnecessary, and easily to be averted—not only because the President, without authority, ordered the United States troops to enter a disputed territory, at that time occupied by the Mexicans—not only because the declaration of Congress was unfounded in truth—but from higher considerations of policy: because I foresaw that it must lead to great and serious evils to the country, and greatly endanger its free institutions. The war was declared, and recognised as such, by the government, when it was too late to avert it. I then felt it to be my duty to shape my course so as to prevent, as far as possible, the danger which was threatening our free institutions. Such was my object in proposing the defensive line, at the last session—such is my object in now offering these resolutions; but I shall express my opinion at all times, boldly and independently, such as becomes a Senator who has nothing to ask or gain, and whose only object is to do what is good for his country. When I proposed, in the Senate of the United States, at the last session, a different line of policy, we had a large portion of country in our possession; we stood in a better position than at any other time since, to make it; for I hold it to be a fair principle, that we may receive indemnity, in the shape of unoccupied territory, from woods, but not from the cultivated homes of Mexicans. In offering, at the last session, peace resolutions, I did it because I thought it would be a great saving in men and money; but above all, because I saw it would save us from being involved to the extent we now are. The President took a different view; he recommended a vigorous prosecution of the war to Congress, to "conquer a peace;" that is, to compel the Mexicans to make us indemnity, and also to pay us the expenses of the war. I opposed it, because I thought there was great hazard if the war was continued. Congress thought differently; it voted men and money. At Buena Vista we were victorious; Vera Cruz fell; Cerro Gordo was conquered—brilliant victories, that do great honor to our army; and finally, the gates of the city of Mexico fell prostrate to our conquering arms.—Well, sir, have the avowed objects of the war been effected? Have we conquered a peace? Have we succeeded in effecting a treaty? Are we offered indemnity? No, sir, not a single object avowed by the President, has been accomplished. No, Mr. President, the object is farther off than ever. Now, sir, I ask what has caused the complete discomfiture of our measure?
We cannot charge the failure upon our troops. It is not charged to this; but to the fact, that the plan of the campaign was laid in error and founded on a mistake. We aimed at indemnity. If we wanted it, we should have enforced it when we had the power in our hands. We, however, endeavored to arrive at it by a treaty, which, had the Mexicans refused to sign, would have completely upset the arrangement.—They did refuse, and not withstanding all our brilliant victories, the war is still upon our hands. After an outlay of $40,000,000 we are worse off than ever. I am not looking at the conquest—I throw that aside. We have lost 7000 or 8000 men besides, and all this for nothing at all. But, Mr. President, it is said that a defensive line would have been as costly as the prosecution of the war. The President and the Secretary of War have said it; but I must say, to my mind, it is utterly impossible. The line which I proposed would have been covered with hostile Indians, and would have required only a single regiment and a ship of war to guard its coast. For seven years, Texas remained unconquered by Mexico, and that too, when the Mexican resources and power were greater and more powerful than they are now; and can any man believe it would cost us more to defend that line, than to carry on the present war? We now come, Mr. President, to the consideration of another campaign. Sir, the same measures are proposed as were at the last session. We are told it is not for conquest; that is explicitly disavowed. It is not an order to blot out the nationality of Mexico, for the President avows distinctly he wishes to retain its nationality. Now, sir, we come to the practical question:—Shall we carry on the war? I have enquired carefully into the matter, and I must say there are many reasons now existing against it, stronger than at the last session. A bill has been proposed authorising the President to raise an additional force of not less than twenty-five thousand men, making in all, not less than seventy thousand troops for the next campaign, and at an expense of fully $60,000,000. Now, what is the condition of the money market at present? Last year in consequence of the unfortunate famine in Europe, we have a large balance of trade in our favor and money plentiful. We are now encumbered with a large drain both ways. We have to send large sums, both to England and Mexico. If drafts are sent here they are cashed, and in the present state of the market the money goes to England. I see treasury notes quoted below par and stocks still lower. The end will be that the treasury notes will not go into the sub-treasury, and specie be given out—thus draining both. The end will be a great commercial crisis and the failures of our banks. There is danger now of all this, which did not exist at the beginning of the last session. Men you may get, but money you cannot. I have conversed with a gentleman well versed in commercial matters, and he has given it as his opinion, that treasury notes—and they are nothing more or less than loans, which must he repaid—would not bring more than 90 dollars, for every 100 dollars; which is rather more, I think, than 7 per cent. But, sir, these are not the only objections, formidable as they are against the war. I do not see the slightest chance of obtaining any thing by it, if we should be successful in our arms, which I don't believe; but if we should, the avowed objects would be defeated. But, sir, I take the other side. The more victories we gain, the greater will be our difficulty in arriving at a peace, as avowed. What is to be the effect it we proceed to repress all resistance in Mexico? We overthrow her civil government, and leave her without any power. Mr. President, if that is done, how are you to obtain a peace? One power can make war—it requires two to make peace. If you destroy the government of Mexico, where is your second party to a peace? You are defeated by your own success. But what do you accomplish by the very object you disown? The free republic you wish to see will be gone—blotted out—a mere mass of what she was, and her sovereignty, for the time, conveyed to her conquerors. The President has very much the same conviction of what is the vigorous prosecution of the war, as I have. He says, that the people of Mexico are divided into factions, governed by military rulers, and the only way to arrive at what we desire, is to put them all down.
Well, sir, if we are to build up a republican form of government, from those citizens who are well disposed towards us, and who are desirous of a peace, Mr. President, I confess I am at a loss to understand how an independent republic can grow up under the protection and auspices of its conqueror. I can well see how an aristocratic or despotic government could be thus formed; but how a free government can, I cannot see. I had always understood such a government must spring from the hearts of the people; but, sir, I see these notions are antiquated, and we can now make free republics. The people of Mexico do not wish it. The great body of the intelligence and wealth is concentrated in the clergy, and they are disinclined to it. The other large body, the owners of the haciendas, in other words, the planters, might, perhaps, favor it; but they are scattered without the means of forming a firm government, and if put up, would tumble down in a day, the moment our troops should be withdrawn. The other course, then, would be to support and foster the existing government. But it is said that would be useless, and it would fall the moment our troops were withdrawn. Mr. President, I protest against building up any power in Mexico, for we shall thereby be obliged to support it again and again, until at last we would be compelled to take it ourselves. The conquering of Hindostan, which we have so long deprecated, come on in this very way. There was no intention at first to conquer it. That came on by degrees, till at last it appeared a matter of course. So it would be with Mexico, if that government should agree to make a treaty on such terms as we ask. The President himself agrees we shall take the very course I have forshadowed. He says, in so many words, if measures fail, we must enforce terms which the honor of the country demands. Is not this an acknowledgment, that if the factional government is not built up, we must conquer and occupy the country, thus enforcing terms, not upon the government, but upon the people. Well, the President is right. This will be the result. Every argument against taking a defensive line, will have a double force when we have spent sixty millions of dollars more, and occupy a still greater extent of territory. The men engaged in the war—the contractors, the several parties engaged, directly or indirectly—all this large body will be adverse to return; and their influence in favor of a continuation of the war, will be found too powerful to oppose. Well, sir, now that we have added sixty millions of dollars to the former amount expended, what will you get to indemnify it?—With the population, which you will have to sustain, and the army of forty or fifty thousand men, as the Secretary of War says, you will never get enough to pay it; and it will have to come out of the pockets of the people of the united States. This and the next generation, will have to bear this burden. We now come to the solemn considertion proposed by the resolution. I have shown the course proposed by the President. It is to blot out the nationality of Mexico and throw seven or eight millions of people on your hands, either as province or incorporated into our Union.—Shall we do either? No, Mr. President, neither; and for these reasons: First, It will be against the avowed object of the war. No message has been sent to Congress which has distinctly denied the object to be the extinction of the nationality of Mexico; and yet, sir, what we disavow will have been accomplished, and what we avowed will have been defeated. This, sir, at least, will be an impeachment of the ability of our government to manage its own affairs. I acknowledge the full amount of glory our army has acquired and shed on the country; but, Mr. President, I am afraid all our applause will be confined to our army. Every nation looks upon us as a hard-hearted people, who are more given to war than modern nations. However much we might rejoice at the courage, bravery and skill of our troops, and the astonishing victories they have achieved, he was yet sorry to confess that the government had lost that reputation for moderation and justice which had been its crowning attributes in its early days. If we shall attempt to hold Mexico as a province, or incorporate it into this Union, we shall find it utterly impracticable. We had never assimilated any of the Indian tribes with our people when incorporating ther territory into our Union. We have removed them farther away. We have never incorporated any people into this Union but the Caucasian race—the free white man; and shall we now corrupt this free white population by introducing into our confederation the Indians and the mixed races of Mexico? He protested most earnestly against such a policy. Our government is for the free white man.
This feature was the secret of its stability. The Spanish republics on this continent had failed, because they had mainly attempted to place the colored race on an equality with the whites, in assuming that by nature all men were equally adapted to free government; yet it was proposed to annex the Mexican states as territories, and place them on an equality with the rest of the states. He utterly protested against the adoption of any such policy in any form. He adverted to the proofs of history to show that the colored races could not be blended in the same government, and in the same terms with the white races; that the colored races are always degraded, and that the whites, even in a savage state, maintain some of the elements of free institutions. He came next to consider the two points in one; that the holding of Mexico in subjection would, in the end, be subversive of our free institutions, and that no such line of policy ought to be adopted. It would be a waste of time to argue that the incorporation of Mexico would be dangerous to our free institutions. He who understood the American constitution; he who had studied its character; he who had profited from the examples of history, and had marked the consequences, where large conquests have been held by a hostile nation, as territorial possessions, would need no other proof to convince him that to hold the republic of Mexico, either as a province or as territories, must lead to the subversion of our free institutions. In all the examples in which such incorporations of territories of foreign people, bearing anything near the proportions which Mexico bears to the United States, the end had been the downfall of the conquering party. With us, Mexico would add so much to the powers of the general government, that it would absorb all the powers of the states; it would become imperial; it would usurp the powers of the legislative department; all the powers of the government would fall into the hands of the executive, and with the prevailing rule of party proscription, and the increasing patronage of the executive, our institutions would not be able to combat the Presidential elections,—they could not resist the chock. Mr. Calhoun admonished gentlemen not to flatter themselves with the delusive idea, that we, as well as Great Britain, could hold great empires under subjection, and hold them in safety. Of all the governments that ever existed, England is possessed of the greatest power of expansion, without reducing her people to anarchy, or her officials to corruption. This was, in part, because the executive branch of the government, and the conservative, the House of Lords, were hereditary. Rome never had such a capacity for expansion. When the Roman empire extended east and west beyond the barriers of Italy, the central power began to weaken, and soon it became corrupt, and anarchy and violence were the order of the day. Yet, England had been going on in the extension of her dominions, without any visible symptoms of decay. Yet she could not long escape. She is even now paying the penalty; she is paying a penalty for her two hundred millions of dependants; which, like disproportionate superincumbent weight, threatens to crush the foundations of the superstructure. Yes, sir, instead of indemnity from her conquests, they are a burden to her; and even neighboring Ireland has taxed her resources for its support, and rim labor of her people, almost beyond their power to bear. Shall we go on and follow this example for territorial indemnities for the expense of our wars? Let us now consider the incorporation of Mexico into this Union. There are twenty states in Mexico; these we should have first to initiate as territories. The governors, the magistrates, the justices, would all have to be appointed by the Executive, as in our own territories, made up of our own people, or from the same foreign stock as ourselves. We have, in this first formation of a government to take care of them, and they are glad of it; but when they reach the age of twenty-one; when they come to years of maturity, they come in among us our equals, and in all respects the same. Not so with Mexico. You may call it annexation; but it will be a forced annexation. You will be compelled, whatever form of government you may establish, to hold it as a province, and it will be but a provincial government at last.
How long will you have to bold it in subjection, before it is reduced to obedience; before it is in truth and in character a part of this confederacy? It will take a long time. England has held Ireland for some several hundred years past, and still they are a hostile people. Canada has been in the possession of the British government for one hundred years past, and still the Canadians are a hostile people. Never will the time come, from all examples, when Mexico will agree to be blended with the laws and people of this Union. The nucleus of her ruling population are from the old stock; equal in every sense to the original Anglo-Saxon, and superior to it in that unconquerable attachment to their soil and their own institutions. But let us admit that all these difficulties are removed, how will it affect us to introduce some twenty foreign States into the Union, with a basis of one or two millions of pure blood, and all the rest,—some seven or eight millions,—Indians or mixed races, inferior in every respect to our Choctaws or Cherokees? We are under a great mistake, if we suppose all this population are ready for our peculiar institutions. I heard a gentleman of high character say, but the other day, that he believed it was our appointed mission to extend our institutions of civil and religious freedom over the benighted of this continent. This is a great mistake. Our institutions are only adapted to a people advanced in intelligence and civilization; and it was remarkable that in all the revolution of nations, the people had been more indebted for any advantages they had secured in their forms of government, more to accident, or a combination of circumstances, than to any foretaste or previous decision of the human mind. We are indebted for our constitution more to a conjunction of circumstances, than to the superior wisdom and intelligence of our forefathers; and herein lies our danger—that a conjunction of circumstances to which we may be indifferent for the time, may overthrow our institutions. We seem to have no fear of their stability; the preservation of our liberty is now lost in the glory of our arms. Nobody talks now of the blessings of liberty. In our early history the great anxiety was to retain our liberty. Now, the great anxiety is to convince the world of our military power. The motto used to be, that the power was always stealing from the many to the few, and that the price of liberty was perpetual vigilance. Now, we seem to remember these maxims not at all; but the opinion appears to be, that we hold our liberty by a divine right. I fear that if we do not be vigilant, we shall find this to be the greatest mistake of all; and it is a great mistake to suppose that it is our divine mission to carry the principles of our liberty, by force of arms, over this continent, and that nothing can affect our security. If we persist in this delusion, the day of retribution will come, and it will bring with it destructive consequences, as sure as I am now addressing this American Senate. I am, therefore, opposed to the policy of holding Mexico by right of conquest, and of annexing it, either as a province, or territories, or states of this government. But what are we to do? After speaking of his efforts to arrest the war and its consequences, Mr. Calhoun said, he saw not the smallest chance of disentangling ourselves, save in the defensive line; by taking, in this way, the decision and indemnity into our own hands. Had time been allowed, when the President sent in his message declaring a state of war, Mr. Calhoun said he should have vindicated a plan to be pursued. He would have relieved Gen. Taylor; he would have had a committee to inquire and report on the relations between us and Mexico, showing that as yet there was no actual state of war. Had that failed of inducing negotiations, he would have held the territories on this side of the Rio Grande, and maintained his position on the boundary which it might have been deemed proper to claim, which would embrace lands of some value to us, and of no use to Mexico. But he had been overrated. Where the defensive line should now be, he had no opinion now to give. He was not now prepared to say where we could designate the best line; but he would say, that we should evacuate the central provinces.
Mr. Reverdy Johnson.—What's that, Mr. Calhoun, we should evacuate?
Mr. Calhoun.—We should evacuate the central parts of the states now occupied, and call back the troops to a defined boundary, receiving sufficient territory for all proper indemnities, the final decision to be subject to negociation, as well as the expenses of the war. It may take years to secure a peace, even upon this plan; but one great point shall he gained—we shall disentangle ourselves. We are now tied to a dead corpse, sad we should disentangle ourselves from it as soon as possible. If we should only be kept quiet, and pursue our true international policy with masterly inactivity, and wait the day for our destiny, we shall do better than to gain ten thousand victories in battle. Mr. Calhoun said, he was an old man; he was almost among strangers; and that, if he had urged anything that was strange or peculiar upon the Senate, they must attribute it to the impressions of thirty-five years ago. This was not the first time he had opposed the policy of war. In the case of the proposed reprisal upon France, he had stood almost alone in the Senate to resist it. He was utterly opposed to it. England was utterly opposed to it. England had interfered, and no war took place. He admonished his friends of the administration that there might be some contingencies to come, which they did not see—something in the vigorous central prosecution of this war, from year to year, which would seal the death-warrant of our beloved institutions; and yet the party appeared to be reversing the order of their doctrines; they were opposed to the national debt; and the prosecution of this war was hourly adding to the national debt. The expenses of this campaign would be found equal to the expenses of the revolution. They were opposed to an increase of the patronage of the executive government; yet what could so rapidly increase it as the policy now pursued? They were in favor of a pure metallic currency, yet did we not all know, that our treasury notes and paper dock were becoming more and more the staple of our country? They were in favor of free trade, yet the war thus sought to be prosecuted has already rendered it impossible to make any progress in free trade for many years to come.
The alternative is pressing. It is magnanimous to retrace your steps when you are in error; it is an act of reason to sacrifice your mere pride for the good of the country. In saying that there is no alternative between this defensive line of policy and that of the President, I say so, because public opinion is made up, and there can be no peace with Mexico, short of an acquisition of territory. Mr. Calhoun only spoke to his friends on the whig side of the House, and bore testimony that though they had voted for the war, which he had opposed, they had done it under promise, and for the relief of Gen. Taylor; but they had voted to get territory at the last session; and at this session, when the public sentiment was made up, the only way for safety now was, the defensive, and it must be adopted at this session, or we shall have to go on and meet the hazard of entire occupation, for better or for worse. He would propose nothing now; but if he found that he should be supported in these views, he should yet, perhaps, move for a committee to confer with the distinguished generals now in town, on the proper and best line to be adopted. It may not be this year; it may not be for many years; but we shall secure a peace; we shall secure the great object of disentangling ourselves.
Mr. Calhoun having concluded, on motion of Mr. Sevier, the resolutions were then laid on the table, to be taken up again after the bill to increase the army has been disposed of.