# Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant/Chapter L

Soon after midnight, May 3d–4th, the Army of the Potomac moved out from its position north Rapidan, to start upon that memorable campaign, destined to result in the capture of the Confederate capital and the army defending it. This was not to be accomplished, however, without as desperate fighting as the world has ever witnessed; not to be consummated in a day, a week, a month, single season. The losses inflicted, and endured, were destined to be severe; but the armies now confronting each other had already been in deadly conflict for a period of three years, with immense losses in killed, by death from sickness, captured and wounded; and neither had made any real progress accomplishing the final end. It is true the Confederates had, so far, held their capital, and they claimed this to be their sole object. But previously they had boldly proclaimed their intention to capture Philadelphia, New York, and the National Capital, and had made several attempts to do so, and once or twice had come fearfully near making their boast good—too near for complacent contemplation by the loyal North. They had also come near losing their own capital on at least one occasion. So here was a stand-off. The campaign now begun was destined to result in heavier losses, to both armies, in a given time, than any previously suffered; but the carnage was to be limited to a single year, and to accomplish all that had been anticipated or desired at the beginning in that time. We had to have hard fighting to achieve this. The two armies had been confronting each other so long, without any decisive result, that they hardly knew which could whip.
Ten days' rations, with a supply of forage and ammunition were taken in wagons. Beef cattle were driven with the trains, and butchered as wanted. Three days rations in addition, in haversacks, and fifty rounds of cartridges, were carried on the person of each soldier.
The country over which the army had to operate, from the Rapidan to the crossing of the James River, is rather flat, and is cut by numerous streams which make their way to the Chesapeake Bay. The crossings of these streams by the army were generally made not far above tide-water, and where they formed a considerable obstacle to the rapid advance of troops even when the enemy did not appear in opposition. The country roads were narrow and poor. Most of the country is covered with a dense forest, in places, like the Wilderness and along the Chickahominy, almost impenetrable even for infantry except along the roads. All bridges were naturally destroyed before the National troops came to them.
The Army of the Potomac was composed of three infantry and one cavalry corps, commanded respectively by Generals W. S. Hancock, G. K. Warren, John Sedgwick and P. H. Sheridan. The artillery was commanded by General Henry J. Hunt. This arm was in such abundance that the fourth of it could not be used to advantage in such a country as we were destined to pass through. The surplus was much in the way, taking up as it did so much of the narrow and bad roads, and consuming so much of the forage and other stores brought up by the trains.
The 5th corps, General Warren commanding, was in advance on the right, and marched directly for Germania Ford, preceded by one division of cavalry, under General J. H. Wilson. General Sedgwick followed Warren with the 6th corps. Germania Ford was nine or ten miles below the right of Lee′s line. Hancock, with the 2d corps, moved by another road, farther east, directly upon Ely′s Ford, six miles below Germania, preceded by Gregg′s division of cavalry, and followed by the artillery. Torbert′s division of cavalry was left north of the Rapidan, for the time, to picket the river and prevent the enemy from crossing and getting into our rear. The cavalry seized the two crossings before daylight, drove the enemy′s pickets guarding them away, and by six o'clock A.M. had the pontoons laid ready for the crossing of the infantry and artillery. This was undoubtedly a surprise to Lee. The fact that the movement was unopposed proves this.
Burnside, with the 9th corps, was left back at Warrenton, guarding the railroad from Bull Run forward to preserve control of it in case our crossing the Rapidan should be long delayed. He was instructed, however, to advance at once on receiving notice that the army had crossed; and a dispatch was sent to him a little after one P.M. giving the information that our crossing had been successful.
The country was heavily wooded at all the points of crossing, particularly on the south side of the river. The battle-field from the crossing of the Rapidan until the final movement from the Wilderness toward Spottsylvania was of the same character. There were some clearings and small farms within what might be termed the battle-field; but generally the country was covered with a dense forest. The roads were narrow and bad. All the conditions were favorable for defensive operations.
There are two roads, good for that part of Virginia, running from Orange Court House to the battle-field. The most southerly of these roads is known as the Orange Court House Plank Road, the northern one as the Orange Turnpike. There are also roads from east of the battle-field running to Spottsylvania Court House, one from Chancellorsville, branching at Aldrich′s; the western branch going by Piney Branch Church, Alsop′s, thence by the Brock Road to Spottsylvania; the east branch goes by Gates′s, thence to Spottsylvania. The Brock Road runs from Germania Ford through the battle-field and on to the Court House. As Spottsylvania is approached the country is cut up with numerous roads, some going to the town direct, and others crossing so as to connect the farms with roads going there.
Lee′s headquarters were at Orange Court House. From there to Fredericksburg he had the use of the two roads above described running nearly parallel to the Wilderness. This gave him unusual facilities, for that country, for concentrating his forces to his right. These roads strike the road from Germania Ford in the Wilderness.
As soon as the crossing of the infantry was assured, the cavalry pushed forward, Wilson′s division by Wilderness Tavern to Parker′s store, on the Orange Plank Road; Gregg to the left towards Chancellorsville. Warren followed Wilson and reached the Wilderness Tavern by noon, took position there and intrenched. Sedgwick followed Warren. He was across the river and in camp on the south bank, on the right of Warren, by sundown. Hancock, with the 2d corps, moved parallel with Warren and camped about six miles east of him. Before night all the troops, and by the evening of the 5th the trains of more than four thousand wagons, were safely on the south side of the river.
There never was a corps better organized than was the quartermaster′s corps with the Army of the Potomac in 1864. With a wagon-train that would have extended from the Rapidan to Richmond, stretched along in single file and separated as the teams necessarily would be when moving, we could still carry only three days' forage and about ten to twelve days' rations, besides a supply of ammunition. To overcome all difficulties, the chief quartermaster, General Rufus Ingalls, had marked on each wagon the corps badge with the division color and the number of the brigade. At a glance, the particular brigade to which any wagon belonged could be told. The wagons were also marked to note the contents: if ammunition, whether for artillery or infantry; if forage, whether grain or hay; if rations, whether, bread, pork, beans, rice, sugar, coffee or whatever it might be. Empty wagons were never allowed to follow the army or stay in camp. As soon as a wagon was empty it would return to the base of supply for a load of precisely the same article that had been taken from it. Empty trains were obliged to leave the road free for loaded ones. Arriving near the army they would be parked in fields nearest to the brigades they belonged to. Issues, except of ammunition, were made at night in all cases. By this system the hauling of forage for the supply train was almost wholly dispensed with. They consumed theirs at the depots.
I left Culpeper Court House after all the troops had been put in motion, and passing rapidly to the front, crossed the Rapidan in advance of Sedgwick′s corps; and established headquarters for the afternoon and night in a deserted house near the river.
Orders had been given, long before this movement began, to cut down the baggage of officers and men to the lowest point possible. Notwithstanding this I saw scattered along the road from Culpeper to Germania Ford wagon-loads of new blankets and overcoats, thrown away by the troops to lighten their knapsacks; an improvidence I had never witnessed before.
Lee, while his pickets and signal corps must have discovered at a very early hour on the morning of the 4th of May, that the Army of the Potomac was moving, evidently did not learn until about one o'clock in the afternoon by what route we would confront his army. This I judge from the fact that at 1.15 P.M., an hour and a quarter after Warren had reached Old Wilderness Tavern, our officers took off rebel signals which, when translated, were seen to be an order to his troops to occupy their intrenchments at Mine Run.
Here at night dispatches were received announcing that Sherman, Butler and Crook had moved according to programme.
On discovering the advance of the Army of the Potomac, Lee ordered Hill, Ewell and Longstreet, each commanding corps, to move to the right to attack us, Hill on the Orange Plank Road, Longstreet to follow on the same road. Longstreet was at this time—middle of the afternoon—at Gordonsville, twenty or more miles away. Ewell was ordered by the Orange Pike. He was near by and arrived some four miles east of Mine Run before bivouacking for the night.
My orders were given through General Meade for an early advance on the morning of the 5th. Warren was to move to Parker′s store, and Wilson′s cavalry—then at Parker′s store—to move on to Craig′s meeting-house. Sedgwick followed Warren, closing in on his right. The Army of the Potomac was facing to the west, though our advance was made to the south, except when facing the enemy. Hancock was to move south-westward to join on the left of Warren, his left to reach to Shady Grove Church.
At six o'clock, before reaching Parker′s store, Warren discovered the enemy. He sent word back to this effect, and was ordered to halt and prepare to meet and attack him. Wright, with his division of Sedgwick′s corps, was ordered, by any road he could find, to join on to Warren′s right, and Getty with his division, also of Sedgwick′s corps, was ordered to move rapidly by Warren′s rear and get on his left. This was the speediest way to reinforce Warren who was confronting the enemy on both the Orange plank and turnpike roads.
Burnside had moved promptly on the 4th, on receiving word that the Army of the Potomac had safely crossed the Rapidan. By making a night march, although some of his troops had to march forty miles to reach the river, he was crossing with the head of his column early on the morning of the 5th. Meade moved his headquarters on to Old Wilderness Tavern, four miles south of the river, as soon as it was light enough to see the road. I remained to hasten Burnside′s crossing and to put him in position. Burnside at this time was not under Meade′s command, and was his senior in rank. Getting information of the proximity of the enemy, I informed Meade, and without waiting to see Burnside, at once moved forward my headquarters to where Meade was.
It was my plan then, as it was on all other occasions, to take the initiative whenever the enemy could be drawn from his intrenchments if we were not intrenched ourselves. Warren had not yet reached the point where he was to halt, when he discovered the enemy near by. Neither party had any advantage of position. Warren was, therefore, ordered to attack as soon as he could prepare for it. At nine o'clock Hancock was ordered to come up to the support of Getty. He himself arrived at Getty′s front about noon, but his troops were yet far in the rear. Getty was directed to hold his position at all hazards until relieved. About this hour Warren was ready, and attacked with favorable though not decisive results. Getty was somewhat isolated from Warren and was in a precarious condition for a time. Wilson, with his division of cavalry, was farther south, and was cut off from the rest of the army. At two o'clock Hancock′s troops began to arrive, and immediately he was ordered to join Getty and attack the enemy. But the heavy timber and narrow roads prevented him from getting into position for attack as promptly as he generally did when receiving such orders. At four o'clock he again received his orders to attack, and General Getty received orders from Meade a few minutes later to attack whether Hancock was ready or not. He met the enemy under Heth within a few hundred yards.
Hancock immediately sent two divisions, commanded by Birney and Mott, and later two brigades, Carroll′s and Owen′s, to the support of Getty. This was timely and saved Getty. During the battle Getty and Carroll were wounded, but remained on the field. One of Birney′s most gallant brigade commanders—Alexander Hays—was killed.
I had been at West Point with Hays for three years, and had served with him through the Mexican war, a portion of the time in the same regiment. He was a most gallant officer, ready to lead his command wherever ordered. With him it was "Come, boys," not "Go."
Wadsworth′s division and Baxter′s brigade of the 2d division were sent to reinforce Hancock and Getty; but the density of the intervening forest was such that, there being no road to march upon, they did not get up with the head of column until night, and bivouacked where they were without getting into position.
During the afternoon Sheridan sent Gregg′s division of cavalry to Todd′s Tavern in search of Wilson. This was fortunate. He found Wilson engaged with a superior force under General Rosser, supported by infantry, and falling back before it. Together they were strong enough to turn the tables upon the enemy and themselves become aggressive. They soon drove the rebel cavalry back beyond Corbin′s Bridge.
Fighting between Hancock and Hill continued until night put a close to it. Neither side made any special progress.
After the close of the battle of the 5th of May my orders were given for the following morning. We knew Longstreet with 12,000 men was on his way to join Hill′s right, near the Brock Road, and might arrive during the night. I was anxious that the rebels should not take the initiative in the morning, and therefore ordered Hancock to make an assault at 4.30 o'clock. Meade asked to have the hour changed to six. Deferring to his wishes as far as I was willing, the order was modified and five was fixed as the hour to move.
Hancock had now fully one-half of the Army of the Potomac. Wadsworth with his division, which had arrived the night before, lay in a line perpendicular to that held by Hill, and to the right of Hancock. He was directed to move at the same time, and to attack Hill′s left.
Burnside, who was coming up with two divisions, was directed to get in between Warren and Wadsworth, and attack as soon as he could get in position to do so. Sedgwick and Warren were to make attacks in their front, to detain as many of the enemy as they could and to take advantage of any attempt to reinforce Hill from that quarter. Burnside was ordered if he should succeed in breaking the enemy′s centre, to swing around to the left and envelop the right of Lee′s army. Hancock was informed of all the movements ordered.
Burnside had three divisions, but one of them—a colored division—was sent to guard the wagon train, and he did not see it again until July.
Lee was evidently very anxious that there should be no battle on his right until Longstreet got up. This is evident from the fact that notwithstanding the early hour at which I had ordered the assault, both for the purpose of being the attacking party and to strike before Longstreet got up, Lee was ahead in his assault on our right. His purpose was evident, but he failed.
Hancock was ready to advance by the hour named, but learning in time that Longstreet was moving a part of his corps by the Catharpin Road, thus threatening his left flank, sent a division of infantry, commanded by General Barlow, with all his artillery, to cover the approaches by which Longstreet was expected. This disposition was made in time to attack as ordered. Hancock moved by the left of the Orange Plank Road, and Wadsworth by the right of it. The fighting was desperate for about an hour, when the enemy began to break up in great confusion.
I believed then, and see no reason to change that opinion now, that if the country had been such that Hancock and his command could have seen the confusion and panic in the lines of the enemy, it would have been taken advantage of so effectually that Lee would not have made another stand outside of his Richmond defences.
Gibbon commanded Hancock′s left, and was ordered to attack, but was not able to accomplish much.
On the morning of the 6th Sheridan was sent to connect with Hancock′s left and attack the enemy′s cavalry who were trying to get on our left and rear. He met them at the intersection of the Furnace and Brock roads and at Todd′s Tavern, and defeated them at both places. Later he was attacked, and again the enemy was repulsed.
Hancock heard the firing between Sheridan and Stuart, and thinking the enemy coming by that road, still further reinforced his position guarding the entrance to the Brock Road. Another incident happened during the day to further induce Hancock to weaken his attacking column. Word reached him that troops were seen moving towards him from the direction of Todd′s Tavern, and Brooke′s brigade was detached to meet this new enemy; but the troops approaching proved to be several hundred convalescents coming from Chancellorsville, by the road Hancock had advanced upon, to join their respective commands. At 6.50 o'clock A.M., Burnside, who had passed Wilderness Tavern at six o'clock, was ordered to send a division to the support of Hancock, but to continue with the remainder of his command in the execution of his previous order. The difficulty of making a way through the dense forests prevented Burnside from getting up in time to be of any service on the forenoon of the sixth.
Hancock followed Hill′s retreating forces, in the morning, a mile or more. He maintained this position until, along in the afternoon, Longstreet came upon him. The retreating column of Hill meeting reinforcements that had not yet been engaged, became encouraged and returned with them. They were enabled, from the density of the forest, to approach within a few hundred yards of our advance before being discovered. Falling upon a brigade of Hancock′s corps thrown to the advance, they swept it away almost instantly. The enemy followed up his advantage and soon came upon Mott′s division, which fell back in great confusion. Hancock made dispositions to hold his advanced position, but after holding it for a time, fell back into the position that he had held in the morning, which was strongly intrenched. In this engagement the intrepid Wadsworth while trying to rally his men was mortally wounded and fell into the hands of the enemy. The enemy followed up, but made no immediate attack.
The Confederate General Jenkins was killed and Longstreet seriously wounded in this engagement. Longstreet had to leave the field, not to resume command for many weeks. His loss was a severe one to Lee, and compensated in a great measure for the mishap, or misapprehensions, which had fallen to our lot during the day.
After Longstreet′s removal from the field Lee took command of his right in person. He was not able, however, to rally his men to attack Hancock′s position, and withdrew from our front for the purpose of reforming. Hancock sent a brigade to clear his front of all remnants that might be left of Longstreet′s or Hill′s commands. This brigade having been formed at right angles to the intrenchments held by Hancock′s command, swept down the whole length of them from left to right. A brigade of the enemy was encountered in this move; but it broke and disappeared without a contest.
Firing was continued after this, but with less fury. Burnside had not yet been able to get up to render any assistance. But it was now only about nine in the morning, and he was getting into position on Hancock′s right.
At 4.15 in the afternoon Lee attacked our left. His line moved up to within a hundred yards of ours and opened a heavy fire. This status was maintained for about half an hour. Then a part of Mott′s division and Ward′s brigade of Birney′s division gave way and retired in disorder. The enemy under R. H. Anderson took advantage of this and pushed through our line, planting their flags on a part of the intrenchments not on fire. But owing to the efforts of Hancock, their success was but temporary. Carroll, of Gibbon′s division, moved at a double quick with his brigade and drove back the enemy, inflicting great loss. Fighting had continued from five in the morning sometimes along the whole line, at other times only in places. The ground fought over had varied in width, but averaged three-quarters of a mile. The killed, and many of the severely wounded, of both armies, lay within this belt where it was impossible to reach them. The woods were set on fire by the bursting shells, and the conflagration raged. The wounded who had not strength to move themselves were either suffocated or burned to death. Finally the fire communicated with our breastworks, in places. Being constructed of wood, they burned with great fury. But the battle still raged, our men firing through the flames until it became too hot to remain longer.
Lee was now in distress. His men were in confusion, and his personal efforts failed to restore order. These facts, however, were learned subsequently, or we would have taken advantage of his condition and no doubt gained a decisive success. His troops were withdrawn now, but I revoked the order, which I had given previously to this assault, for Hancock to attack, because his troops had exhausted their ammunition and did not have time to replenish from the train, which was at some distance.
Burnside, Sedgwick, and Warren had all kept up an assault during all this time; but their efforts had no other effect than to prevent the enemy from reinforcing his right from the troops in their front.
I had, on the 5th, ordered all the bridges over the Rapidan to be taken up except one at Germania Ford.
The troops on Sedgwick′s right had been sent to enforce our left. This left our right in danger of being turned, and us of being cut off from all present base of supplies. Sedgwick had refused his right and intrenched it for protection against attack. But late in the afternoon of the 6th Early came out from his lines in considerable force and got in upon Sedgwick′s right, notwithstanding the precautions taken, and created considerable confusion. Early captured several hundred prisoners, among them two general officers. The defence, however, was vigorous; and night coming on, the enemy was thrown into as much confusion as our troops, engaged, were. Early says in his Memoirs that if we had discovered the confusion in his lines we might have brought fresh troops to his great discomfort. Many officers, who had not been attacked by Early, continued coming to my headquarters even after Sedgwick had rectified his lines a little farther to the rear, with news of the disaster, fully impressed with the idea that the enemy was pushing on and would soon be upon me.
During the night all of Lee′s army withdrew within their intrenchments. On the morning of the 7th General Custer drove the enemy′s cavalry from Catharpin Furnace to Todd′s Tavern. Pickets and skirmishers were sent along our entire front to find the position of the enemy. Some went as far as a mile and a half before finding him. But Lee showed no disposition to come out of his Works. There was no battle during the day, and but little firing except in Warren′s front; he being directed about noon to make a reconnoissance in force. This drew some sharp firing, but there was no attempt on the part of Lee to drive him back. This ended the Battle of the Wilderness.

## Footnotes

* ↑ UNION ARMY ON THE RAPIDAN, MAY 5, 1864. [COMPILED.] LIEUTENANT-GENERAL U. S. GRANT, Commander-in-Chief. MAJOR-GENERAL GEORGE G. MEADE, Commanding Army of the Potomac. MAJ.-GEN. W. S. HANCOCK, commanding Second Army Corps. First Division, Brig.-Gen. Francis C. Barlow. First Brigade, Col. Nelson A. Miles. Second Brigade, Col. Thomas A. Smyth. Third Brigade, Col. Paul Frank. Fourth Brigade, Col. John R. Brooke. Second Division, Brig.-Gen. John Gibbon. First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Alex. S. Webb. Second Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Joshua T. Owen. Third Brigade, Col. Samuel S. Carroll. Third Division, Maj.-Gen. David B. Birney. First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. J. H. H. Ward. Second Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Alexander Hays. Fourth Division, Brig.-Gen. Gershom Mott. First Brigade, Col. Robert McAllister. Second Brigade, Col. Wm. R. Brewster. Artillery Brigade, Col. John C. Tidball. MAJ.-GEN. G. K. WARREN, commanding Fifth Army Corps. First Division, Brig.-Gen. Charles Griffin. First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Romeyn B. Ayres. Second Brigade, Col. Jacob B. Sweitzer. Third Brigade, Brig.-Gen. J. J. Bartlett. Second Division, Brig.-Gen. John C. Robinson. First Brigade, Col. Samuel H. Leonard. Second Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Henry Baxter. Third Brigade, Col. Andrew W. Denison. Third Division, Brig.-Gen. Samuel W. Crawford. First Brigade, Col. Wm McCandless. Third Brigade, Col. Joseph W. Fisher. Fourth Division, Brig.-Gen. James S. Wadsworth. First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Lysander Cutler. Second Brigade Brig.-Gen. James C. Rice. Third Brigade, Col. Roy Stone. Artillery Brigade, Col. S. S. Wainwright. MAJ.-GEN. JOHN SEDGWICK, commanding Sixth Army Corps. First Division, Brig.-Gen. H. G. Wright. First Brigade, Col. Henry W. Brown. Second Brigade, Col. Emory Upton. Third Brigade, Brig.-Gen. D. A. Russell. Fourth Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Alexander Shaler. Second Division, Brig.-Gen. George W. Getty. First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Frank Wheaton. Second Brigade, Col. Lewis A. Grant. Third Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Thos. H. Neill. Fourth Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Henry L. Eustis. Third Division, Brig.-Gen. James Ricketts. First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Wm. H. Morris. Second Brigade, Brig.-Gen. T. Seymour. Artillery Brigade, Col. C. H. Tompkins MAJ.-GEN. P. H. SHERIDAN, commanding Cavalry Corps. First Division, Brig.-Gen. A. T. A. Torbert. First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. G. A. Custer. Second Brigade, Col. Thos. C. Devin. Reserve Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Wesley Merritt Second Division, Brig.-Gen. D. McM. Gregg. First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Henry E. Davies, Jr. Second Brigade, Col. J. Irvin Gregg. Third Division, Brig.-Gen. J. H. Wilson. First Brigade, Col. T. M. Bryan, Jr. Second Brigade, Col. Geo. H. Chapman. MAJ.-GEN. A. E. BURNSIDE, commanding Ninth Army Corps. First Division, Brig.-Gen. T. G. Stevenson. First Brigade, Col. Sumner Carruth. Second Brigade, Col. Daniel Leasure. Second Division, Brig.-Gen. Robert B. Potter. First Brigade, Col. Zenas R. Bliss. Second Brigade, Col. Simon G. Griffin. Third Division, Brig.-Gen. Orlando Willcox. First Brigade, Col. John F. Hartranft. Second Brigade, Col. Benj. C. Christ. Fourth Division, Brig.-Gen. Edward Ferrero. First Brigade, Col. Joshua K. Sigfried. Second Brigade, Col. Henry G. Thomas. Provisional Brigade, Col. Elisha G. Marshall. BRIG.-GEN. HENRY J. HUNT, commanding Artillery. Reserve, Col. H. S. Burton. First Brigade, Col. J. H. Kitching. Second Brigade, Maj. J. A. Tompkins. First Brig. Horse Art., Capt. J. M. Robertson. Second Brigade, Horse Art., Capt. D. R. Ransom. Third Brigade, Maj. R. H. Fitzhugh. GENERAL HEADQUARTERS....... Provost Guard, Brig.-Gen. M. R. Patrick. Volunteer Engineers, Brig.-Gen. H. W. Benham. CONFEDERATE ARMY. Organization of the Army of Northern Virginia, Commanded by GENERAL ROBERT E. LEE, August 31st, 1864. First Army Corps: LIEUT.-GEN. R. H. ANDERSON, Commanding. MAJ.-GEN. GEO. E. PICKETT′S Division. Brig.-Gen. Seth M. Barton′s Brigade. (a) Brig.-Gen. M. D. Corse′s " " Eppa Hunton′s " " Wm. R. Terry′s " MAJ.-GEN. C. W. FIELD′S Division. (b) Brig.-Gen. G. T. Anderson′s Brigade " E. M. Law′s (c) " " John Bratton′s " MAJ.-GEN. J. B. KERSHAW′S Division. (d) Brig.-Gen. W. T. Wofford′s Brigade " B. G. Humphreys' " " Goode Bryan′s " " Kershaw′s (Old) " Second Army Corps: MAJOR-GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY, Commanding MAJ.-GEN. JOHN B. GORDON′S Division. Brig.-Gen. H. T. Hays' Brigade. (e) " John Pegram ′s " (f) " Gordon′s " (g) Brig.-Gen. R. F. Hoke′s " MAJ.-GEN. EDWARD JOHNSON′S Division. Stonewall Brig. (Brig.-Gen. J. A. Walker). (h) Brig.-Gen. J M Jones' Brigade. (h) " Geo H. Stewart′s " (h) " L. A. Stafford′s " (e) MAJ.-GEN. R. E. RODES' Division. Brig.-Gen. J. Daniel′s Brigade. (i) " Geo. Dole′s " (k) " S. D. Ramseur′s Brigade. " C. A. Battle′s " " R. D. Johnston′s " (f) Third Army Corps: LIEUT.-GEN. A. P. HILL, Commanding. MAJ.-GEN. WM. MAHONE′S Division. (l) Brig.-Gen. J. C. C. Sanders' Brigade. Mahone′s " Brig.-Gen. N. H. Harris′s " (m) " A. R. Wright′s " " Joseph Finegan′s " MAJ.-GEN. C. M. WILCOX′S Division. Brig.-Gen. E. L. Thomas′s Brigade (n) " James H. Lane′s " " Sam'l McCowan′s " " Alfred M. Scale′s " MAJ.-GEN. H. HETH′S Division. (o) Brig.-Gen. J. R. Davis′s Brigade. " John R. Cooke′s " " D. McRae′s " " J. J. Archer′s " " H. H. Walker′s " _unattached_: 5th Alabama Battalion. Cavalry Corps: LIEUTENANT-GENERAL WADE HAMPTON, Commanding.(p) MAJ.-GEN. FITZHUGH LEE′S Division Brig.-Gen. W. C. Wickham′s Brigade " L. L. Lomax′s " MAJ.-GEN. M. C. BUTLER′S Division. Brig.-Gen. John Dunovant′s Brigade. " P. M. B. Young′s " " Thomas L. Rosser′s " MAJ.-GEN. W. H. F. LEE′S Division. Brig.-Gen. Rufus Barringer′s Brigade. " J. R. Chambliss′s " Artillery Reserve: BRIG.-GEN. W. N. PENDLETON, Commanding. BRIG.-GEN. E. P. ALEXANDER′S DIVISION.* Cabell′s Battalion. Manly′s Battery. 1st Co. Richmond Howitzers. Carleton′s Battery. Calloway′s Battery. Haskell′s Battalion. Branch′s Battery. Nelson′s " Garden′s " Rowan " Huger′s Battalion. Smith′s Battery. Moody " Woolfolk " Parker′s " Taylor′s " Fickling′s " Martin′s " Gibb′s Battalion. Davidson′s Battery. Dickenson′s " Otey′s " BRIG.-GEN. A. L. LONG′S DIVISION. Braxton′s Battalion. Lee Battery. 1st Md. Artillery. Stafford " Alleghany " Cutshaw′s Battalion. Charlotteville Artillery. Staunton " Courtney " Carter′s Battalion. Morris Artillery. Orange " King William Artillery. Jeff Davis " Nelson′s Battalion. Amherst Artillery. Milledge " Fluvauna " Brown′s Battalion. Powhatan Artillery. 2d Richmond Howitzers. 3d " " Rockbridge Artillery. Salem Flying Artillery. COL R. L.WALKER′S DIVISION. Cutt′s Battalion. Ross′s Battery. Patterson′s Battery. Irwin Artillery. Richardson′s Battalion. Lewis Artillery. Donaldsonville Artillery. Norfolk Light " Huger " Mclntosh ′s Battalion. Johnson′s Battery. Hardaway Artillery. Danville " 2d Rockbridge Artillery. Pegram′s Battalion. Peedee Artillery. Fredericksburg Artillery. Letcher " Purcell Battery. Crenshaw′s Battery. Poague′s Battalion. Madison Artillery. Albemarle " Brooke " Charlotte " NOTE. (a) COL. W. R. Aylett was in command Aug. 29th, and probably at above date. (b) Inspection report of this division shows that it also contained Benning′s and Gregg′s Brigades. (c) Commanded by Colonel P. D. Bowles. (d) Only two brigadier-generals reported for duty; names not indicated. Organization of the Army of the Valley District. (e) Constituting York′s Brigade. (f) In Ramseur′s Division. (g) Evan′s Brigade, Colonel E. N. Atkinson commanding, and containing 12th Georgia Battalion. (h) The Virginia regiments constituted Terry′s Brigade, Gordon′s Division. (i) Grimes' Brigade. (k) Cook′s " (l) Returns report but one general officer present for duty; name not indicated. (m) Colonel Joseph M. Jayne, commanding. (n) Colonel Thomas J. Simmons, commanding. (o) Four brigadier-generals reported present for duty; names not indicated. (p) On face of returns appears to have consisted of Hampton′s, Fitz-Lee′s, and W. H. F. Lee′s division, and Dearing′s Brigade. *But one general officer reported present for duty in the artillery, and Alexander′s name not on the original.