# Duns Scotus, Defender of the Immaculate Conception

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DUNS SCOTUS DEFENDER OF
THE IMMACULATE CONCEPTION
By BERARD VOGT, O.F.M.
DUNS SCOTUS DEFENDER OF THE IMMACULATE CONCEPTION
John Duns Scotus The Subtle Doctor
DUNS SCOTUS
DEFENDER OF
THE IMMACULATE CONCEPTION
A HISTORICAL-DOGMATIC STUDY
By
BERARD VOGT, O.F.M.
ST. ANTHONY GUILD PRESS
PATERSON, NEW JERSEY
Imprimi potest:
Celsus R. Wheeler, O.F.M.
Minister Provincial
Nihil obstat:
Bede Babo, O.S.B.
Censor librorum
Imprimatur:
† James A. McNulty
Bishop of Paterson
August 11, 1954
PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
DEDICATED to MARY OUR IMMACULATE MOTHER on the occasion of THE CENTENARY OF THE SOLEMN DECLARATION OF THE DOGMA of the IMMACULATE CONCEPTION
FOREWORD
JOHN Duns Scotus, or John Duns the Scot, was born in Scotland about 1266. His family name of Duns was taken from a place in the county of Berwick. Entering the Franciscan Order at an early age, he pursued his studies at Oxford, and was ordained a priest in 1291. He taught at Oxford and later at Paris with great distinction. In 1305 he received his doctorate in Theology from the University of Paris and continued to teach there until 1307, when he was called to Cologne, where he died suddenly on November 8, 1308. He was buried there in the Minorite Franciscan Church.
His most famous writings are the Opus Oxoniense, or Oxford Work, and the Reportata Parisiensia, or Paris Commentaries — two theological treatises in the form of commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard. The latter were the official textbooks of the theological schools of the Middle Ages.
Duns Scotus is the founder of the Later Franciscan School, which is more pronouncedly Aristotelian than the older Augustinian Franciscan branch led by St. Bonaventure. He possessed a subtle mind of uncommon force, hence his name the Subtle Doctor. He applied himself to the critical evaluation of the great problems of his day and of their solutions as offered by his great contemporaries. Thus his writings are a rich mine of information on contemporary philosophy and theology.
CONTENTS
Page
A Brief Review of Previous Theological Opinion, and an Analysis of the Nature of Original Justice and Original Sin, as Understood by Scotus
ST. AUGUSTINE has been called the Cor Ecclesiae.
The theology of the early ages is pre-eminently Augustinian. We shall be well advised, then, to begin our introductory survey of the views of theologians up to the time of Duns Scotus with this great Father of the Church. In his De Natura et Gratia, St. Augustine writes of the Blessed Virgin Mary: "When there is question of sin, I do not wish to include Mary, out of reverence for the Lord.” $^1$ In speaking thus of Our Lady, he had reference, however, primarily to personal sin, as is evident from his other writings.
Pope Leo the Great did not think otherwise. In his sermon on the Nativity, he says of our Lord: "Since He found no one free of guilt, He came to free all." $^2$
St. Anselm, who may rightly be considered the theological bridge between the early Fathers and the great scholastics, says of Mary in his Cur Deus Homo: "Mary was conceived in sin; the Virgin from whom Christ received His body was conceived in sin and born with original sin, because she sinned in Adam as we all have thus sinned." $^3$
Yet St. Anselm also paid this beautiful tribute to Mary: "Christ had such a mother as it was proper for Him to have, who was shining with so great purity that none greater can be imagined under God." $^4$
​From the middle of the twelfth century onward, theological sentiment in the academic circles of the medieval schools ranged itself solidly on the side of the denial of the privilege of the Immaculate Conception. It was influenced in this by the example of St. Bernard and by the unsolved difficulty of reconciling this prerogative of Mary with the Pauline doctrine of the universal guilt of mankind, and the consequent need of a Redeemer for all men. What is truly amazing is that St. Bernard, the fervent client of Mary, should have permitted himself the vehement stand against this privilege of Mary, as revealed in his letter of 1138 to the Canons of Lyon who had begun to celebrate the festival of Our Lady’s Conception, which was just then making its way into Gaul. He chides the Canons on the ground that the Feast of the Conception of Mary is a novelty entirely unjustified. "It is above all in liturgical matters," he writes, "that one has never seen the Church of Lyon give in to the lure of novelties, and that this Church, so full of judgment, has never dishonored itself by puerile absurdity.” He is astonished that there should be found among the Canons those who would tarnish this splendid record by the introduction of a feast which the Church ignores, which reason disavows, and of which tradition does not approve. He asks: "Are we more learned and more pious than the Fathers?" $^5$ While St. Bernard raised no objection to the Feast of Our Lady’s Nativity, because of the common belief that the Mother of God was sanctified before her birth, he protested against celebrating her Immaculate Conception.
​During the thirteenth century a similar negative attitude regarding the privilege of the Immaculate Conception continued to prevail in the schools. This was in no small measure due to Peter Lombard, the Magister Sententiarum. In his Libri Sententiarum, which became the official textbooks of the schools and as such the basis of the great theological commentaries of that century, Peter Lombard states $^6$ that the Blessed Virgin bore the taint of original sin, but was entirely cleansed before she became the Mother of Christ.
Alexander of Hales, the first Magister Regens of the newly founded Franciscan school at Paris, and one of the first Summists, shared the views of Peter Lombard concerning Mary’s sanctification after her conception. So did John of Rochelle and William of Melito. St. Bonaventure, the great pupil of Alexander of Hales, took a similar position because "It is the most commonly accepted view, the more reasonable, and the safer, being the most in conformity with the saints.’’ $^7$
The numerous disciples and successors of St. Bonaventure adopted the views of their master. Thus Matthew of Aquasparta, Richard of Middletown, Ubertin of Casale, Peter John Olivi.
Concerning William of Ware, the teacher of Duns Scotus, there exists a controversy. Some maintain that Scotus received his views on the Immaculate Conception from this teacher; while others claim that William of Ware, in the earlier editions of his Commentary on the Sentences, followed the received Franciscan tradition. It was only after the brilliant defense of the Immaculate Conception by his gifted pupil that William of Ware ​abandoned his own earlier views and adopted those of Duns Scotus. Father Ephrem Longpre, O. F. M., the eminent Scotus scholar, relying on newly discovered testimony, inclines to this theory. $^8$
The famous words often attributed to Scotus: "Potuit, decuit, ergo fecit — Christ could preserve His Mother from original sin; it was becoming thus to honor her; therefore, we may presume that He did so” — are already found with William of Ware. $^9$
Similar maculist views were held by Giles of Rome, of the Hermits of St. Augustine, and by the secular teachers of the University of Paris. Thus Gerard of Abbeville and Godfrey of Fontaines attributed to Mary sanctification in her mother’s womb. And Henry of Ghent, in a respectful endeavor to reduce to a minimum the interval between Mary’s conception and her sanctification, maintained that the Blessed Virgin was subject to original sin "nonnisi in instanti et in transitu — only for a transient moment.” $^{10}$ Still, this admission of the actual presence of original sin, if only for a fleeting moment, in principle denies the privilege of the Immaculate Conception.
The Dominicans, under the leadership of Albert the Great and of St. Thomas, espoused the common teaching of the day. Perhaps we may best present their views by quoting the following passage from the Summa of St. Thomas: “If the soul of the Blessed Virgin had never been defiled by original sin, this would derogate from the dignity of Christ according to which He is the Redeemer of all mankind. It may be said, therefore, that under Christ, Who as the Universal Saviour needed not to be ​saved Himself, the Blessed Virgin enjoyed the highest measure of purity. For Christ in no wise contracted original sin, but was holy in His very conception.... The Blessed Virgin, however, did contract original sin, but was cleansed therefrom before birth.” $^{11}$
Thus, while popular Catholic tradition increasingly inclined toward belief in the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception, as is evident from the introduction of a special Feast of the Immaculate Conception, and from the gradual spread of this feast throughout Christendom, the theologians and the doctors of the Church continued to hesitate, because they found it impossible to solve certain inherent doctrinal difficulties, until Duns Scotus appeared upon the scene and offered his pre-redemption solution, which prepared the way for, and ultimately was incorporated in, the solemn dogmatic definition of the Immaculate Conception.
To appreciate properly the Subtle Doctor’s defense of the Immaculate Conception, it will prove helpful to recall his views on the nature of original justice and original sin. They are found principally in his Oxford commentary on the second book of the Sentences, distinction thirty-two.
When God in His goodness created man, He united in his being an animal body with a spiritual soul. By the rational powers of the soul man resembles God, in Whose image and likeness he is made. In endowing man with the gift of liberty, God made him a moral being responsible for his actions.
In addition, God freely bestowed upon Adam a supernatural gift, original justice, which raised him to the supernatural order and made him an adopted child of God ​with a right to heaven. Original justice, in its essence, signifies sanctifying grace. But as bestowed upon Adam, it included concomitant preternatural gifts binding man to God by inclining his will toward God and by serving as a check on the body, keeping it in subjection to the soul, thus establishing perfect harmony in his dual nature. In that happy state of original innocence the senses experienced only movements authorized by reason and the moral law.
Moreover, this gift of original justice and integrity was bestowed upon Adam not only as a personal gift, but also for his offspring. God willed that every descendant of Adam should receive this wonderful gift of original justice as a natural inheritance. However, God attached a divine condition to the transmission of the gift. He made the transmission dependent upon Adam’s obedience to a command given him in paradise. Unfortunately, Adam disobeyed God, and by his sin lost the gift of original justice both for himself and for his offspring.
Scotus calls this twofold will in God His antecedent and His consequent will. $^{12}$ By His antecedent will God destined every descendant of Adam to receive original justice. By His consequent will God does not bestow original justice upon mankind because of the sinful disobedience of Adam, whom He had constituted the head of the human race. In consequence, there is found in all descendants of Adam at the moment of their coming into being a lack or absence of that original justice which should be present in accordance with God’s original design and antecedent eternal decree. $^{13}$ In the words of Scotus, we now come into the world ’’debtors” of original ​justice. $^{14}$ It is precisely this absence or privation of the original justice due which constitutes original sin in us. $^{15}$ The lack of original justice due is its formal element. The obligation of possessing it constitutes the material element. $^{16}$
Adam’s sin severed the supernatural bond between God and man by depriving man of sanctifying grace. It likewise deprived him of the concomitant gift of integrity or primordial rectitude which had kept the lower appetites of the body under control of the will. Man is now inordinately drawn to the gratification of his lower nature and away from God. This deordination found in our nature as a consequence of original sin we call concupiscence. It is the tendency of the sentient appetite and the passions to go out to sensible good before and in spite of the judgment of reason.
Following St. Augustine, $^{17}$ many of the Fathers and scholastic doctors placed the nature of original sin in inherited concupiscence. According to them, the loss of original justice involved also a permanent corruption of our nature, an infected condition of sin-stained flesh. In proof they quoted the Apostle’s letter to the Romans: "I see another law in my members, warring against the law of my mind and making me prisoner to the law of sin that is in my members.” $^{18}$ Original sin is thus virtually found in the infected human body. It is communicated through the natural act of generation. At the moment of union of the body with the created soul the inherited taint is communicated to the soul by reason of the essential unity of their nature.
​Scotus agrees that original sin is transmitted through natural propagation from Adam. He does not admit, however, following St. Anselm, $^{19}$ that there is involved in original sin a physical corruption of our nature which in turn becomes communicated as a real taint to the soul. The transmission of original sin is not due to any physical infection of human nature, but solely to the fact that we are children of Adam. Adam, having lost original justice, could no longer transmit it; and so now we come into existence with the moral deordination (not a physical quality) of the lack of original justice due according to the antecedent decree of God. It is this fact which constitutes original sin in us, and the reason why it is found in us is our natural descent from Adam. $^{20}$
Incidentally, says Scotus, we can see here why newborn children arrive in this world as '’debtors,” and why this is accounted a sin to them, punishable with privation of the Beatific Vision, unless the sin is removed by Baptism. Adam received original justice for himself and for human nature as such; therefore God justly demands this primordial justice of human nature in whomsoever found. $^{21}$
Scotus denies, then, that concupiscence constitutes original sin. The deordination of concupiscence, he holds, comes from sin and leads to sin; but it is not itself a sin. The Subtle Doctor gives us this detailed analysis of concupiscence: concupiscence may be taken to mean an actual stirring of the sentient appetite, or a habitual condition of the same, or merely a dormant instinctive proneness. None of these is formally a sin, because sin is not found in sentient nature as such. $^{22}$
​Again, concupiscence may signify a natural proneness found in our rational appetite, that is, a spontaneous tendency in the will to desire what is pleasurable to the senses. By reason of the intimate union of sentient nature and rational will in the unity of our being, the will is affected by the promptings of our senient nature and is prone to identify itself pleasurably with these. In these ways concupiscence is a material consequence of original sin, inasmuch as through the loss of original justice and integrity, and the absence of their moderating influence in curbing desire, we are now prone to covet inordinate pleasure, as a horse deprived of its bridle will tend to go astray, an event which the bridle would have prevented. $^{23}$
The example of the horse and bridle quoted by Scotus gives us an accurate picture of the nature of concupiscence as he understood it. There is no question of a deteriorated physical condition of our nature as a result of inherited concupiscence, but of changed circumstances under which our will now functions. The fundamental proneness of our lower appetites toward their own good was always there; it is a part of the psychological structure and functioning of normal human nature. What has changed is that the "bridle has been removed.” In other words, because of Adam’s sin we are now deprived of the moderating check of original integrity. In consequence, we now have a state of rebellion and moral struggle, whereas in paradise there existed a holy state of harmony.
To sum up: for Scotus, original sin is a moral defect found in the soul of man. Its cause is a moral demeriting cause. In a word, original sin consists in the absence of ​due original justice that should be there, because received by our first parent and culpably lost by him. $^{24}$
Original sin involved another problem for the scholastics. Owing to their mediate animation views, the school men placed an interval of time between active and passive generation, that is, between the natural generative act of the parents and the actual coming into being of the new human person at the moment God infuses the rational soul. St. Thomas $^{25}$ mentions forty days in the case of a male child, and eighty days in the case of the female child. He also postulates a succession of vital principles in man. When the formative power of the paternal semen has sufficiently disposed the materials provided by the mother, a vegetative soul is generated in this fundamentally organized matter. After further perfection of organization the vegetative soul is replaced by a sentient soul. Ultimately, when progressive organization has produced a sufficient human pattern, God infuses the spiritual soul, which takes over the functions of the preceding vegetative and sentient vital principles.
According to Scotus, all immanent life in the human embyro from the very beginning derives from the rational soul infused by God. $^{26}$ But we must not interpret this statement in terms of present-day notions of biology, which teaches that the embryonic life and development of the new human individual begins with the fertilized ovum, that is, with the moment of the fusion of two living organic cells derived from the living substance of both parents. It is, therefore, a vital process throughout. The medieval view, shared by Scotus in common with all the schoolmen, was that the seminal fluid had no life. The ​seed was regarded as a by-product of digestion, rather than as part of the living substance of the parent. $^{27}$
Since the schoolmen believed the seminal fluid to be without life, in their view the causality of the male principle in disposing the materials furnished by the mother to the organized pattern required for the induction and functioning of a vital principle, was not a vital but a physical compounding activity. There was no immanent life present in the human embryo prior to the induction of the soul. The body must first attain to proper organization before it could become a potential receptacle of the soul. $^{28}$ Such was their biological theory of mediate animation. Scotus, too, demanded a time interval.
When the medieval biological views we have just recalled are found conjoined, as in the case of the followers of St. Augustine, with theories of a physically corrupted human nature and a transmission of original sin through the instrumentality of its infected seed, a satisfactory explanation of preservation from original sin, as implied in the privilege of the Immaculate Conception, will offer special difficulties and demand postulates which Scotus does not have to face by reason of his purely moral deordination theory of original sin.
The Argument of the Subtle Doctor in Favor of the Immaculate Conception
THE Subtle Doctor’s defense of the Immaculate Conception is found in his Oxford and Paris commentaries on the third book of the Sentences of Peter Lombard. The problem is there posed: "Utrum Beata Virgo concepta fuerit in peccato originali? — Was the Blessed Virgin conceived in original sin?”
Scotus begins his answer to the question with a brief enumeration of authorities opposed to the Immaculate Conception, and a restatement of the main difficulty which had influenced the Fathers and doctors to deny the privilege to Mary. This central difficulty was the Pauline teaching found in the Epistle to the Romans, concerning the need of universal redemption: ’’Through one man sin entered into the world and through sin death, and thus death has passed unto all men because all have sinned.” $^{29}$
Two important contributions were made by Duns Scotus to the controversy. Admitting that Mary as a descendant of Adam stood in need of redemption because of the sin of Adam, he offered a novel solution to the subtle difficulties which had for so long baffled theologians, by introducing the idea of pre-redemption, and a distinction of order of nature and order of time into the solution of the problem of the Immaculate Conception.
Tradition within the Franciscan Order has preserved the memory of a famous debate held in Paris in the year 1307. In the presence of high Church dignitaries, ​the university authorities, respected doctors of the various accredited schools and religious orders, and a great concourse of university students, Duns Scotus successfully defended Mary’s privilege of the Immaculate Conception. Béraud de St. Maurice, in her recent book, Jean Duns Scot, $^{30}$ gives a graphic description of this public debate. She tells how learned doctor after learned doctor rose to cross argumentative swords with Scotus, and how the Subtle Doctor as sole defending knight against a united field took on all comers and emerged victorious. Although the historical truth of the event here narrated has been questioned by some historians, notably Father Denifle, O. P., $^{31}$ still, after careful study and consideration, competent Scotistic scholars, e. g ., Father Ephrem Longpré and Father Charles Balic, $^{32}$ maintain that in substance the tradition affirming the debate is based upon facts.
Regardless of any doubt, however, concerning the occurrence of the debate, the milieu portrayed in the story reveals a reigning mental academic atmosphere. This is so true that even when Scotus defended the privilege of the Immaculate Conception within the cloistered walls of his monastery lecture hall, he was fully aware that he was doing so as practically a lone champion against the field of current theological opinion. It would seem to us that the method employed by Scotus in unfolding his thesis in favor of the Immaculate Conception, as recorded in the Oxford and Paris commentaries, reflects this keen awareness.
Realizing that the weight of traditional authority, both in number of defendants and in accumulated argument, ​was on the side of his opponents, Scotus chose a courteous polemical, rather than a direct didactical approach. He was intent upon fully answering the arguments of his opponents before establishing his own thesis in direct exposition. With a fine feeling for psychological procedure he cleared the ground by removing the arguments of his opponents, and only then offered his own solid and luminous appeal to the honor and merits of Christ and of His Blessed Mother, on behalf of her great prerogative of the Immaculate Conception.
Among the reasons appealed to by his opponents, the leading one was the dignity of Christ as Universal Redeemer and Mediator. This was irreconcilable, they asserted, with Mary’s exemption from original sin. Scotus restates the objection as follows: ’’One reason is the excellence of her Son, Who as Universal Redeemer opened the gate of heaven to all. But if the Blessed Virgin had not contracted original sin, she would not have needed a Redeemer. Nor would He have opened the gate to her, because it would not have been closed to her. For it is not closed except on account of sin, and more especially, original sin.” $^{33}$
The Paris commentary repeats the objection in these words: ’’The Son of God was the Universal Redeemer. He was, then, the Redeemer of everyone besides Himself. Therefore, the Blessed Virgin was in sin, since only a person who has been in sin can be redeemed. For else she would not have been redeemed. Ennobling the Mother in the way suggested, would imply dishonoring the Son. Again, Christ by His death opened the gate of heaven to all. But if the Blessed Virgin had not contracted original ​sin, the gate would never had been closed to her, and then Christ did not open it to her. But redemption has for its special purpose the taking away of original sin.” $^{34}$
Turning their attention to Mary, the opponents of Scotus objected: ’‘The Blessed Virgin was born according to common law and therefore her body was propagated and formed from infected seed. There was, then, the same reason for infection in her body as in the body of anyone else thus propagated. And since from an infected body the soul is infected, there was the same reason for infection in her soul as was found in the souls of others thus commonly propagated.” $^{35}$
“Moreover,” they continued, “Mary had the common sufferings of human nature, such as thirst, hunger, and those penalties which are inflicted upon us on account of original sin. These penalties were not voluntarily assumed by her, because she was not our Reparatrix or Redemptrix, for then her Son would not have been the Universal Redeemer of all. Therefore, they were inflicted upon her by God. Nor were they unjustly inflicted; consequently, they were inflicted on account of original sin. In other words, she was not innocent.” $^{36}$ Such was the maculist position.
Scotus declined to accept these reasons as conclusive. The argument that Mary’s privilege of the Immaculate Conception would derogate from the dignity of Christ as Universal Redeemer he rejected. On the contrary, he said that in defending Mary’s Immaculate Conception he was in fact attributing a more exalted and perfect role of Redeemer to Christ. In his own words: “The very opposite conclusion would seem to follow from the reasons ​as proposed; for from the fact that the Son of God was the Universal Redeemer, it follows that He was a most perfect Redeemer. As such, He employed the most perfect degree of mediation possible in regard to the person most esteemed by Him (respectu excellentissimae personae sub ipso — [His mother]). But the most perfect act of mediation preserves from all sin, inasmuch as no one intervenes perfectly on behalf of another unless he prevents offense if he is able. Now, if guilt were found at any time [in Mary], Christ as mediator would not have intervened as perfectly as would be the case had He prevented all offense. For he who prevents lest one offend, is a more perfect mediator than he who merely reconciles after the offense.” $^{37}$
Scotus tells us here that redeeming grace which preserves from original sin is greater than that which merely purifies from sin incurred, and therefore Christ was Mary’s Redeemer and Mediator more perfectly by preservative redemption. By preserving Mary from original sin, in view of the foreseen merits of his sacrifice on Calvary, Christ did not merely redeem her, He pre-redeemed her. This implies far greater grace and a far greater excellency of redemption.
The Subtle Doctor expresses this sentiment as follows: ’’Mary had the greatest need of Christ as Redeemer, for she would have contracted original sin by reason of her descent unless this had been prevented by the grace of a Mediator. As others needed Christ that through His merit sin already contracted might be remitted to them, she needed even more a Mediator preventing this, that she ​might not at any time be under debt of contracting it, and that she be preserved from actually contracting it.” $^{38}$
In this way did Scotus lay to rest the centuries-old objection derived from the Pauline doctrine concerning the need of universal redemption. Rightly understood, this doctrine will not offer any difficulty preventing Mary’s noble prerogative. The need of incurring original sin, and equally the need of universal redemption by Christ, was not denied by Scotus. Nor did he claim that Mary as a daughter of Adam escaped this universal law.
Mary was a daughter of Adam, he explained, before she became an adopted daughter of God. Therefore, she was subject to original sin and in need of redemption. As a child of Adam she would, in the ordinary course of events and according to the ordinary course of nature, have incurred Adam’s debt like the rest of mankind. But in the order of time God could give her sanctifying grace at the very moment of her conception. In this way Mary, though a child of Adam in the order of nature, would be made a child of God by the infusion of grace before original sin could take effect in her soul.
"Every natural child of Adam,” writes Scotus, "is a debtor of original justice, and is deprived of it through the sin of Adam. Therefore, everyone has that in him whence he should contract original sin. But if grace were given to anyone in the first instant of the creation of the soul, that person would never lack original justice. Still this would not be of oneself, but by the merits of another (if one does receive grace on account of the merits of another). Hence, as far as one depends upon oneself, ​everyone would have original sin unless someone by his merits prevents it.” $^{39}$
Pursuing the argument further, the Subtle Doctor continues: "One may argue that she [Mary] was by priority of nature a daughter of Adam before she had grace, since she was a person before she could receive grace. In that prior state she was a debtor to original justice as a natural daughter of Adam, and did not have this justice, and therefore in this prior state she contracted original sin.” $^{40}$
Inasmuch as generation precedes sanctification, concedes Scotus, Mary was a daughter of Adam before she became an adopted daughter of God; therefore she must have been in need of redemption, because subject to original sin. But though under the aspect of time our thoughts may dwell thus on Mary — conceived first as a daughter of Adam and then sanctified as a daughter of God — this does not imply a priority of time which would demand in the soul of Mary two successive states, one of sin and the other of grace. There is only in her at the first moment of her existence a twofold relation: that of a daughter of Adam, for which she is indebted to her human generation, subject to the common law and establishing the debt of sin; and that of a daughter of God, which she owes to the privileged sanctification which has protected her from the consequences of the common law and extinguished in her the debt of sin by a special application of the foreseen merits of the Saviour.
"It may be said,” writes Scotus, "that all children of Adam are subject to original sin if nature be left to itself. But this will not hinder divine power from effecting the opposite in the soul of Mary. The Son of God is not in ​this way a debtor to original justice like Mary, because He is not a natural son of Adam. Though in Mary there is found sufficient cause for original sin, God nevertheless could hinder this effect from taking place, even as He can prevent fire from consuming combustible fuel. Therefore, to be a natural child of Adam does not necessarily imply that original sin is found in a person; otherwise a person would have original sin even after Baptism, since he remains a natural child of Adam after Baptism. After Baptism, then, these two things are simultaneously found in the same person: he is a natural child of Adam, and yet does not have original sin. Now, inasmuch as there is no greater repugnance in the first instant than in any other, it follows that a person may be cleansed in the first instant as well as in any other, from sin which would be found in him if nature had been left to itself.” $^{41}$
Scotus continues: "Mary, then, needed redemption more than anyone else. She needed redemption so much the more, the greater the good conferred upon her. Since perfect innocence is a greater good than remission of sin after a fall, a greater good was conferred upon her by preserving her from original sin than if she had been purified afterward. Nor was it necessary that Christ should have first suffered, because Abraham was purified from original sin which was in his person, by virtue of the foreseen passion of Christ. Thus could original sin have been prevented in Mary, which would otherwise have been in her.” $^{42}$
Turning to the arguments of the opponents referring peculiarly to Mary, Scotus refutes these in turn. As to the argument concerning the opening of the gate of ​heaven, Scotus replies: "It is evident that the gate was opened to her through the merit of the passion of Christ, foreseen and specially accepted with regard to this person [Mary]. So that on account of this passion, sin would never be found in her, and thus nothing on account of which the gate would be closed; although, because of her birth and origin, the gate would be closed to her as to others.’’ $^{43}$
Again, his adversaries claimed that a stainless conception was in flagrant contradiction with the human nature of Mary. How could it be that her soul was not soiled by its contact and union with a sinful flesh? Such was the objection. It must have seemed unanswerable to those theologians of the period who did not plainly distinguish original sin from concupiscence, and who looked upon the latter as a defective quality tarnishing primarily the flesh and through it reaching the soul.
The Subtle Doctor first clears the ground of these false ideas. Appealing to the authority of St. Anselm and to sound reason, he denies that concupiscence is a real infection of the flesh, or a positive vice. He explains that original sin does not consist in any corruption or infection of our human nature, but in the privation of original justice due. Moreover, he insists, inasmuch as sin is a moral deordination, the flesh cannot serve as a physical cause in the transmission of original sin. The argument taken from the common descent does not, then, conclude against Mary’s Immaculate Conception: "The conclusion from the infection of the flesh on account of her descent does not hold, according to St. Anselm’s explanation of the nature of original sin.’’ $^{44}$
​A final objection remained. If the Blessed Virgin did not contract original sin, why did she incur its penalties? Why did she have to suffer? There were some of these penalties which might have been advantageous to Mary, and others which could not have been, replied Scotus. What purpose would there have been in the stain of original sin? It is quite another thing with the afflictions and sufferings of this life, as they are sources of merit. Christ could, therefore, fulfill His office of Redeemer in Mary’s regard and yet leave her these kinds of penalties. We have here a pregnant thought of Scotus if we correlate the idea with the role of Mary as "Socia Christi Redemptoris,” or "Co-Redemptrix,” so much stressed by theologians today. As the new Eve, Mary had to be close to Jesus, the new Adam, to share His atoning destiny.
In Scotus’ own words: "The argument taken from the sufferings of Mary is inconclusive, because a mediator can reconcile someone in such a way that the penalties which are not useful to him are taken away, but the useful punishments are left. Now original guilt would not have been useful to Mary, whereas the temporal sufferings were useful because she merited by them.” $^{45}$
Having thus removed the objections brought forward by his opponents against the Immaculate Conception, and firmly established the possibility of this noble privilege of Mary, Scotus sums up his own position in this modest and reserved form: "To the question proposed I answer: God could have arranged that Mary was never in original sin; He could also have allowed her to be in sin for a single moment; and He could have permitted her to be in sin for a while and purified her ultimately.” $^{46}$
​’’Which of these three possibilities actually took place, God knows. But if it be not against the authority of the Church and of Holy Scripture, it would seem probable to attribute to Mary that which is more perfect.” $^{47}$
In this restrained concluding statement are we dealing with literary modesty, with prudence, or with complete and absolute honesty admitting personal uncertainty regarding the true answer? There are authors who affirm the latter. Others find it difficult to subscribe to this view on account of the whole preceding course of argument and tenor and tendency of the defense as offered respectfully by Duns Scotus.
Le Bachelet, in the Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique, $^{48}$ recalling the hostile atmosphere of the Paris University circles, suggests that the young Franciscan Magister Regens, only recently admitted to their august Academic Senate, deliberately chose this prudent way of stating his final conclusion.
As a matter of fact, in a later passage of the same Oxford commentary, Scotus explicitly says of Mary that she was never in original sin: "Numquam fuit inimica actualiter ratione peccati actualis, nec ratione originalis; fuisset tamen nisi fuisset praeservata.” $^{49}$
The public lecture course in Sacred Theology given by Scotus at the Paris University, beginning in 1304 and lasting four years, is recorded for us in the Reportata Parisiensia. The Subtle Doctor here resumes the earlier Oxford course, retouching it in places. The question concerning the Immaculate Conception came up toward the end of 1307 or early in 1308, when Scotus again lectured on the Third Book of the Sentences. His doctrine is the same as ​at Oxford. And his conclusion is expressed in similar restrained prudent terms. However, in the corresponding passage found in distinction eighteen of the Paris commentary, Scotus modifies the earlier text by the insertion of "forte” ("perhaps”), so that it now reads: "And perhaps Mary was never in original sin.”
Are we dealing with an interpolation, or must we accept this hypothetical pronouncement as the final opinion of the Subtle Doctor, who died in November of 1308? Perhaps we might best leave the answer to qualified scholars and to further historical research.
What cannot be doubted, however, is the enduring powerful influence of Duns Scotus on the development and eventual dogmatic proclamation of the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception. By his historic defense, with its luminous distinctions and definitions that had been previously unrecognized, e. g., his pre-redemption theory, and his suggestion of a distinction between the order of nature and the order of time, the Subtle Doctor cleared the dogmatic ground and greatly contributed to a final victorious solution.
Cardinal Merry del Vai, in a letter dated July 4, 1904, and addressed to Father P. Pauwels, O. F. M., says of Scotus that he carried the torch of Mary’s nonforfeiture of grace as on the crest of a wave to its ultimate triumph. And in his Maria die Unheflekt Empfangene, Father Koesters pays this tribute to Scotus: "It is the enduring achievement of the great Franciscan John Duns Scotus that he dispelled the hard frost of theological misgivings and (thus brought it about that the bud of the doctrine of the ​Immaculate Conception, which was even then perfectly formed, should open up and disclose its wondrous beauty.”
POSTSCRIPT
The Place of Mary in the Divine Plan of Creation
THEOLOGIANS generally hold that though Mary was actually exempt from original sin, she incurred the need or debt of contracting it, because otherwise her Immaculate Conception would not be the effect of atonement. We may distinguish a twofold debt, proximate and remote. The remote debt merely signifies membership in the human race, based on the ordinary mode of human propagation. The proximate debt involves inclusion in the willful act by which Adam, as representative of the human race, rejected the grace of God and implicated human nature in sin. The dogma of the Immaculate Conception is sufficiently safeguarded by admitting that Mary was subject to the remote debt. Some Scotist Friars, e. g., John of Bassolis (d. 1347), and Angelus Volpi (d. 1646), hold that Mary did not even incur this remote debt, since they believe her to be included in the primacy of Christ’s predestination.
Duns Scotus, as is well known, defends the primacy of the predestination of Christ; in other words, the view that our Lord would have become man even if Adam had not sinned. According to the Subtle Doctor, Christ, the God-Man, was predestined first and absolutely in the divine plan of creation. To say that he had no other purpose in becoming man than the redemption of the human race would be equivalent to making the divine predestination of Christ the Son of God to glory, dependent upon Adam and his foreseen fall into sin. Such an assumption ​would not be in accord with recognized theological principles, according to which the worthier objective must be considered as primary in the intentions of God.
The Subtle Doctor did not express himself on the predestination of Mary, according to Father Balic, the eminent Scotist (”La Predestination de la Très Ste. Virge dans la Doctrine de Jean Duns Scot,’’ in La France Franciscainer Tom. XIV, 1936). It was the followers of Scotus, especially John of Bassolis and Angelus Volpi, who worked out a complete Marian predestination synthesis. This synthesis implies that the primacy of Christ’s predestination includes that of his Mother, since she would have been the predestined Mother of God even if Adam had not sinned. Hence she was simply predestined in the divine plan of creation to her primacy place of glory. This includes her Immaculate Conception, since in principle it precedes Adam’s fall.
In an article entitled "De Debito Peccati Originalis in Virgine Maria” in the Antonianum (Rome, 1941), Father Balic sums up these views as follows: "Whether we affirm or deny that Scotus taught that the Mother of God was subject to the need of original sin, our views will be in conformity with the teaching of the Bull Ineffabilis Deus, as long as we state the doctrine of Scotus in these words: ’Mary would have contracted original sin by reason of her natural descent from Adam had she not been preserved in the first instant of her conception in view of the merits of the passion of Christ.’ ”
NOTES
1. Migne, P. L., 44, 267.
2. Ibid., 54, 191.
3. Ibid., 158, 416.
4. Ibid., 158, 451.
5. Ibid., 182, 335.
6. Lib. III, dist. 3; Ad Claras Aquas, 1916, II, 559.
7. Lib. III, Sent., dist. 3, n. 1. Ad Claras Aquas, 1885, III, 67b.
8. Ephrem Longpré, O. F. M., La Vierge Immaculée, Montreal, 1939, p. 13.
9. Cf. L. Siekaniec, O. F. M., "William of Ware," in The Scotist, III, 1941, 39.
10. Xavier Marie Le Bachelet, Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique, Paris, 1922, VII, col. 1054.
11. III, Qu. 27, art. 2, ad. 2.
12. Opus Oxoniense, Lib. II, dist. 32, nn. 9-10, Vives, XIII, 313.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
15. Dico igitur, quod peccatum originale, quod est carentia justitiae originalis, non est nisi carentia justitiae debitae (Oxon., L. II, dist. 32, n. 7, Vives, XIII, 310-311).
16. Ad istud peccatum concurrunt duo, carentia justitiae scilicet ut formale, et debitum habendi earn ut materiale (Oxon., L. II, dist. 32, n. 15, Vives, XIII, 318).
17. A. Michel, in Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique, Vol. VIII, col. 2031-2033.
18. Romans 7:23.
19. A. Michel, op. cit., col. 2033-2034.
20. "Habet enim quilibet sic propagatus carentiam justitiae originalis, patet ex effectibus illius justitiae prius dictis, est debitor istius justitiae, quia accepit in primo parente, per cujus parentis actum amisit earn; ergo secundum descriptionem quilibet sic propagatus habet peccatum originale” (Oxon., L. II, dist. 32, n. 8, Vives, XIII, 312-313).
21. "Adam accepit justitiam pro se et pro tota natura, quae tunc erat in eo, et ideo juste Deus exigit a tota natura, in quocumque est, illam justitiam quam dedit naturae” (Oxon., L. II, dist. 32, n. 8, Vives XIII, 313).
22. "Concupiscentia potest accipi vel prout est actus vel habitus, vel pronitas in appetitu sensitivo; et nullum istorum est formaliter peccatum, quia non est peccatum in parte sensitiva” (Oxon., L. II, dist. 32, n. 7, Vives, XIII, 311).
​23. "Vel potest accipi prout est pronitas in appetitu rationali, id est, in voluntate ad concupiscendum delectabilia immoderate, quae nata est condelectari appetitui sensitivo, cui conjungitur et hoc modo concupiscentia est materiale peccati originalis, quia per carentiam justitiae originalis quae erat sicut fraenum cohibens ipsum ab immoderata dilectione ipsa, non positive, sed per privationem fit prona ad concupiscendum immoderate delectabilia sicut exemplificat de navi fracto gubernaculo, et equo fracto fraeno, qui dimittitur sibi, et ex hoc sequitur motum inordinatum, quem cohiberet illud fraenum” (Oxon., L. II, dist. 32, n. 7, Vives, XIII, 311).
24. ’’Peccatum originale est formaliter carentia justitiae originalis, et non qualitercumque debitae, quia acceptae in primo parente, et in ipso amissae” (Oxon., L. II, dist. 32, n. 7, Vives, XIII, 311).
25. Contra Gentiles, Book II, Ch. 89.
26. "Sensitiva autem et vegetativa in homine eadem anima est cum intellectiva” (Oxon., L. IV, dist. 45, Qu. I, n. 4, Vives, XX, col. 164).
27. ’'Semen est superfluum digestionis et nunquam potest esse aliquid de veritate humanae naturae illius, cujus est; nec praefuit, quia nunquam fuit animatum” (Rep., L. II, dist. 33, Qu. I, XXIII, 160).
28. "Anima non perficit nisi corpus dispositum et proportionatum ei” (Oxon., L. III, dist. 16, Qu. II, n. 11, Vives, XIV, 641).
29. Romans 5:12.
30. Jean Duns Scot, Paris, 1953.
31. Father Heinrich Seuse Denifle, O. P., Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis, 1891, T. II, pars. I, 118.
32. Father Charles Balic, O. F. M., Theologiae Marianae Elementa, Sibenici, 1933, Prolegomena XCVII. Father Balic in this work publishes a critical edition of the Oxford and Paris commentaries on the Immaculate Conception, which is being exclusively used in this paper. For convenience’ sake, the Vives (Paris) edition of Scotus will also be cited.
33. "... unum est excellentia Filii sui Ipse enim ut Redemptor universalis omnibus ianuam aperuit; sed si beata Virgo non contraxisset originale, non indiguisset redemptore, nec ipse sibi ianuam aperuisset, quia non fuisset sibi clausa; non enim clauditur nisi propter peccatum, et maxime originale” (Balic, 21, 5; Oxon., L. III, dist. 3, Qu. I, n. 3, XIV, 160).
34. "Similiter, probatur per hoc quod Filius Dei fuit redemptor universalis; ergo fuit redemptor cuiuslibet alterius a se; ergo beata Virgo praefuit in peccato, quia redemptio est praeexistentis in peccato. Aliter enim non fuisset redempta; ergo sic nobilitare matrem, esset ignobilitare filium. Item, Christus per mortem suam omnibus aperuit ianuam; sed si beata Virgo non praefuisset in originali, numquam sibi fuisset ianua clausa; ergo sibi numquam aperuit. Etiam redemptio proprie purgat peccatum originale” (Balic, 47, 10; Rep., L. III, dist. 3, Qu. I, n. 4, XXIII. 262).
35. "Ipsa enim fuit propagata communi lege, et per consequens corpus eius fuit propagatum et formatum de semine infecto, et ita eadem ​ratio infectionis erat in corpore eius, quae et in corpore alterius originaliter propagati. Et cum ex corpore infecto inficiatur anima, eadem ratio infectionis erat in anima eius, quae et in animabus aliorum communiter propagatorum” (Balic, 21, 10; Oxon. , L. III, dist. 3, Qu. I, n. 3, XIV, 160).
36. ’’Similiter ipsa habuit poenas communes naturae humanae, ut sitim famen et huiusmodi, quae infliguntur nobis propter peccatum originale; et istae non erant voluntarie assumptae, quia non erat redemptrix vel reparatrix nostra, quia tunc filius eius non fuisset redempt or omnium generalis; igitur erant sibi inflictae a Deo; et non iniuste: ergo propter peccatum; et ita ipsa non erat innocens” (Balic, 22, 5; Oxon., L. III, dist. 3, Qu. I, n. 3, XIV, 160).
37. "Ex prima ratione magis videtur sequi oppositum quam propositum, quia ex hoc quod Filius Dei fuit redemptor universalis, sequitur quod fuit perfectissimus mediator; ergo habuit perfectissimum modum mediandi, quem potuit habere respectu excellentissimae personae sub ipso. Sed actus perfectissimus praeservat ab omni peccato, quia nullus perfecte placat pro aliquo nisi praeveniat offensam, si posset; sed si culpa aliquando inesset, non ita perfecte placasset Christus, sicut si praevenisset offensam, quia perfectius placat ille, si praeveniat ne alius umquam offendat, quam si post offensam faciat quod alius remittat” (Balic, 48, 15; Rep., L. III, dist. 3, Qu. I, n. 5, XXIII, 263).
38. "Per idem patet ad rationes factas pro prima opinione, quia Maria maxime indiguisset Christo ut redemptore; ipsa enim contraxisset originale peccatum ex ratione propagations communis, nisi fuisset praeventa per gratiam mediatoris; et sicut alii indiguerunt Christo, ut per eius meritum remitteretur eis peccatum iam contractum, ita illia magis indiguit mediatore praeveniente peccatum, ne esset aliquando ab ipsa contrahendum et ne ipsa contraheret" (Balic, 35, 10; Oxon., L. III, dist. 3, n. 14, XIV, 171).
39. "Quilibet filius Adae naturalis est debitor iustitiae originalis et ex demerito Adae caret ea, et ideo omnis talis habet, unde contrahat peccatum originale. Sed si alicui in primo instand creationis animae detur gratia, ille numquam careret iustitia originali. Hoc tarnen non est ex sese ex merito alterius, si propter meritum alterius confertur sibi gratia: ergo quantum est ex se quilibet haberet peccatum originale, nisi alius praeveniret mediando” (Balic, 34, 10; Oxon., L. III, dist. 3, Qu. I, n. 14, XIV, 171).
40. "Et si arguatur contra hoc quod ipsa naturaliter prius fuit filia Adae quam habuit gratiam, quia prius fuit persona quam habuit gratiam; in illo igitur priori tenebatur ad iustitiam originalem quia naturalis filia Adae, et non habuit eam; ergo in illo priori contraxit originale" (Balic, 36, 5; Oxon., L. III, dist. 3; Qu. I, n. 15, XIV, 171).
41. "Potest dici... quod omnes filii Adam habent causam sufficientem originalis peccati, si natura sibi dimittatur; sed illa causa non praevenit virtutem divinam causantem contrarium in anima Mariae; et isto modo ​non est Filius Dei debitor iustitiae originalis, sicut Maria, quia ipse non est filius naturalis Adae. Et sic licet Maria habeat causam sufficientem peccati originalis, tamen Deus potest praevenire effectum, sicut praeveniendo ne ignis comburat combustibile approximatum. Unde esse filium Adae naturalem, non est causa necessaria quod peccatum originale insit, quia tunc, cum post baptismum, sit naturalis filius Adae, haberet peccatum originale post baptismum. Ergo cum in instand stent simul, quod sit filius naturalis Adae et quod non habeat peccatum originale, cum non sit maior repugnantia in primo instand quam in quocumque alio; ita bene potest purgari in primo instanti ab eo quod sibi inesset, si natura esset sibi dimissa, sicut in quocumque alio instanti” (Balic, 49, 25; Rep., L. III, dist. 3, Qu. I, n. 7, XXIII, 264).
42. "Magis ergo indiguit Maria redemptione quam quisque alius, quia tanto magis indiguit redemptione, quanto maius bonum sibi conferebatur post redemptionem; cum ergo maius bonum sit innocentia perfecta quam post lapsum culpa remissa, maius bonum sibi conferebatur praeservando ipsam ab originali, quam si postea fuisset purgata. Nec propter hoc oportuit quod Christus prius fuisset passus, quia Abraham fuit purgatus ab originali, quod sibi infuit, virtute passionis Christi praevisae; sic potuit peccatum originale praeveniri, quod fuisset in Maria aliter” (Balic, 50, 15; Rep., L. III, dist. 3; Qu. I, n. 8, XXIII, 264).
43. 'Patet quod ianua fuit sibi aperta per meritum passionis Christi praevisae et acceptatae specialiter in ordine ad hanc personem, ut propter illam passionem numquam huic personae inesset peccatum, et ita nec aliquid propter quod ianua clauderetur, cum tamen sibi ex origine competeret unde ianua sibi clauderetur sicut aliis” (Balic, 41, 5; Oxon., L. III, dist. 3, Qu. I, n. 8, XIV, 173).
44. ’’Quod enim arguitur primo de infectione carnis propter seminationem non arguit secundum viam Anselmi de peccato originali” (Balic, 27, 10; Oxon., L. III, dist. 3, Qu. I, n. 5, XIV, 164).
45. ’’Aliud de passionibus Mariae non concludit. Potest enim mediator reconciliare aliquem, ut auferantur ab eo poenae sibi inutiles et relinquatur in poenis sibi utilibus; culpa originalis non fuisset utilis Mariae; poenae temporales fuerunt utiles, quia in eis meruit” (Balic, 28, 5; Oxon., L. III, dist. 3, Qu. I, n. 8, XIV, 162).
46. "Ad questionem dico, quod Deus potuit facere, ut ipsa numquam fuisset in peccato originali; potuit etiam fecisse ut tantum in uno instanti fuisset in peccato; potuit etiam fecisse, ut per tempus aliquod esset in peccato et in ultimo instanti illius temporis purgaretur” (Balic, 28, 12; Oxon., L. III, dist. 3, Qu. I, n. 9, XIV, 164).
47. "Quod autem horum trium, quae ostensa sunt possibilia esse, factum sit, Deus novit; si auctoritati ecclesiae vel auctoritati scripturae non repugnet, videtur probabile, quod excellentius est attribuere Mariae” (Balic, 31, 5; Oxon., L. III, dist. 3, Qu. I., n. 10, XIV, 165).
48. Paris, 1922, VII, col. 1076.
49. L . III, dist. 28, Qu. I, n. 13, XIV, 684.
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