# The New Europe (The Slav Standpoint)/Chapter 4

IV.—WAR TO THE END.
23. The Necessity of War to the End in the Interest of Permanent Peace.
THE PROBLEM OF THE WAR.
53. The democratic organisation of Europe on the basis of the self-determination of nations pre-supposes an integral victory of the Allies; unless defeated, Prussian Germany and Prussianised Austria-Hungary will not become democratic, will not permit the democratic organisation of Eastern Europe and will stem the longed-for development of all Europe. Austrian and Hungarian ministers declared plainly that they were opposed to the national principle; that is proved, too, by their manceuvres—they are interested in the maintenance of the dynasty and their robber state. Germany, to be sure, supports nationalities when she finds it of advantage to do so, but at home she rejects the self-determination of Alsace-Lorraine, of the Poles, Danes and others. The true character of Prussianism and Austrianism thus stands out very plainly.
In the interest of permanent peace it is therefore necessary to carry on the war till the end. That does not mean to accept Prussian militarism: we merely demand defence, an energetic and thorough defence.
Defence is psychologically and morally quite different from attack; the muscular activity is the same in both, but the motives, the entire mental attitude, are quite different. Every act is judged in ethics by its motives, and therefore the defensive war is morally admissible and necessary. Offensive, aggressive war is inadmissible, immoral. Tolstoy’s judgment of war is incorrect, in fact his doctrine of non-resistance is incorrect, unnatural, inhuman, under the aspect of humanity, because it prepares victims for men of violence. Truly human ethics demand resistance, everywhere, always, against all evil. Humanitarianism cannot condemn the defensive war, it only condemns the war of aggression.
This attitude, I believe, sufficiently refutes the charge of militarists that democracy in condemning aggressive war leads to passivism and weakening of energy.
The militarists object that it is impossible to decide correctly, when war is aggressive and when it is defensive; they claim that the historians have not settled that question even as to wars that were fought out long ago, to say nothing of the present war. Every war may be immoral, so the Prussian militarists will admit after the manner of Jesuits, and therefore one should not introduce questions of morality into it. All this is absolutely false: historians of Prussia, and of lands where there is no political freedom, cannot solve the controversy; that much is true; and it is true also that certain historians have not the ability for it. But free men of judgment, accustomed to scientific exactness, are able to settle the difference with due exactness. That is true of this war also. Every man sees the difference between defence and attack; all peoples in the world make the distinction between killing in self-defence and murder.
Many pacifists place a wrong valuation on the war. War is an evil, a great evil, but if we judge by the final effect and the loss of lives and health, it is not the greatest evil: alcoholism, for instance, is probably responsible for as many victims as wars; then there are the effects of syphilis, factory accidents, etc., which are equally harmful to individuals and to society; the immense number of suicides (in Europe about 100,000 annually) shows clearly that war is not the worst or the only evil, servile life is worse.
Then, of course, there are different ways of conducting war—a bashi-bazouk also makes war; but war in accordance with the Geneva convention is different. The Germans and Austrians have not adhered to this convention and have introduced inhumane methods of warfare; one cannot call them barbarian, because they are planned, the result of that ​theory of frightfulness which a German officer formulated when he said that he would kill ten thousand children in the enemy country if it would save a single soldier.
Militarism is the real evil which people have in mind, when they talk of the evils of war. Militarism is the mathematics of aggressiveness, the fighting spirit turned into a bureaucratic system—all state activities guided by military considerations, the officer becoming the standard of the citizen and of the world in general. Prussian militarism is universally recognised as the pattern and source of this social evil; the Prussian militarists themselves point out correctly that all life in Germany is militarized. Modern German theologians have made a corporal of Jesus and a drill-master of God.
This militarism is not necessary, as the war itself demonstrates. Not only France, but even England, stand successfully against Prussian militarism, although England was not at all militaristic; the armies of the Allies fight no less bravely than the Germans; and if we consider that Germany alone was prepared for the war, that German soldiers are military specialists, the achievements of the Allied armies are relatively higher than the German successes. Most assuredly this war has already sounded the deathknell for Prussian militarism—for militarism does not decide the value of men and nations.
A militia will be a sufficient system of defence for democracy, as is admitted even by anti-militarist socialists (Engels).
24. Who is Responsible for the War?
54a. From the democratic viewpoint the question who caused the war, who attacked and who only defended himself, the question, who is guilty, is of extreme importance. Democracy rests on morality, and for that very reason the question of guilt is so important.
We do not agree with those who dissociate politics, and consequently war, from morals, who exalt political acts, especially of the masses, as something great, something above the small, private happenings in ordinary life, which are subject to the usual moral standards. My experience teaches me, that men who do not obey the rules of morality in politics do not follow them in private life and vice versâ.
For that reason also we cannot adopt the attitude of those Marxists who even in this war appeal to historical (economic) materialism; “Comrades” Renner and others insist that war must be judged from the economic and not from the moral standpoint. Let us grant that: but then the economic standpoint is not valid for the Germans only, but also for the Czechs and other oppressed nations. Herr Renner, of course, thinks only of the Germans and their superior rights, and therefore through his materialism he has become a full-blooded Pangermanist; he thinks that “war selection,” the force creating the firmest organisation, will become the judge, the administrator and the law-giver of nations, Moltke completely absorbed Marx, naturally; materialism, whether we call it historical or any other kind, necessarily reaches the conclusion that might is right. Herr Renner even now claims to adhere to the Internacionale, but it is the Internacionale of the German Marxists, as Liebknecht’s minority clearly proves, having contracted its scope to meet the exigencies of German militarism and Pangermanism. Herr Renner defends Mittel-europa, and for that very reason he wants to reform Austria-Hungary: he wants to throw a bone to the dissatisfied nations so that they would so much the more effectively serve Berlin as its Eastern vanguard.
Russian Socialists speak often à la Dostojevsky of the guilt of all that fight. I might admit that all are guilty; but that does not dispose of the moral duty to investigate, who is the more guilty and who the less. It surely deserves some thought, why all the states before the war looked with connivance on Prussianism and its great strength—without that tacitus consensus the Pangerman march to the East would have been impossible.
​Quite numerous is a class of historians (principally Marxists) who pretend to be deep thinkers when they claim that in explaining the war one should not look at the causes lying on the surface, but to remote causes, the underlying, real, driving force. It is true that no thinking man is satisfied with secondary causes, with the last causes in point of time, yet not the decisive ones; everyone knows that scratching the match that fired the prepared powder was not the true cause and the decisive motive of the act; but on the other hand we will not be misled by that seeming wisdom, which by means of psychological “hocus pocus” such as “the driving force of driving forces,” reveals in fine only economic or similar interests.
A somewhat more modest philosophy of history is preached by those who point to the difficulty of giving a scientific explanation of the war; because of the excessive complication of this question it is not possible to determine the true cause of the war, and historians will not be able to decide that for a hundred years. Certainly the exact statement of all single facts is impossible, certain causes remain unknown, secret archives will reveal in the future many interesting details, but enough is known; on the contrary, such an event as the present world-war can be sufficiently explained by the entire development and state of Europe. To-day it is already determined with considerable accuracy that Austria and Germany are guilty of the war.
Among the various explanations of this war we find presumably that ultra-scientific positivism minimising and reducing the moral responsibility of individuals for the war; it accepts historical fatalism as determined by laws in the spirit of passive fatalism and it conceals under the guise of philosophy and history moral indifference and irresolution. Against this unnatural passivism and moral dilletantism, which in real life cringes before success, we join those to whom history is the judge of the world, of individuals and of nations, and who under the weight of world happenings do not lose their faith in moral responsibility and in the duty to help with increased energy in the fight for freedom of nations and humanity.
54b. The analysis of facts makes clear the guilt of Austria and Germany beyond all doubt; to-day it is already possible to refer to an extensive literature on this question; it is of some importance that in Germany voices are increasing that admit the guilt of Germany and Austria. The author of “J’Accuse” has now among the socialists a number of followers: Bernstein declared that he looks upon his vote for the first military credit, now that he realised the true state of things, as the most unfortunate act of his whole life. The report of Lichnowsky, the journal of Mihlon and other documents, leave no doubt of the guilt of Austria and Prussia; the socialist minority is now strengthened by non-socialist voices in Austria and Germany, that do not accept any longer, or at least doubt strongly, the official explanation of Berlin and Vienna, that the war is defensive. The language of facts is but too clear; Serbia in answer to Austria’s ultimatum conceded all that might be demanded of a sovereign state, and Russia placed no obstacles to it; England proposed a conference, and there is no reason why the proposal should not have been accepted—the crowned drones of the Central Powers have usually plenty of time for all kinds of solemn stupidities, why did not William, Francis Joseph and Nicholas meet with their chancellors for an oral conference before making such a far-reaching decision?
The spread of Pangermanism in accordance with which the war is not merely carried on, but which was being prepared for years and years, is sufficient proof that Germany and Austria wanted the war, for the Allied Powers were not prepared. The Russian Bolsheviks are siding strongly with the Germans, and yet Zinovjev in his pamphlet considers the German and Austrian preparedness as the strongest argument raised against Germany; the more decent Germans themselves admit the strength of this ​argument—Mr. Harden as early as November, 1914, made the candid and emphatic declaration: “We wished this war.”
In western literature all guilt, or at least the principal share of it, has been placed on the back of Germany, Austria remaining somehow in the background. This is not correct. Austria’s policy in recent years, both before and after the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, was highly aggressive against Serbia and Russia and thereby it brought on the war; Germany in its own interests supported this policy and abused it. The question which of the two is the more guilty need not be discussed in this brief sketch,—I merely emphasise here that Austria’s guilt is great, far greater than its adversaries admit.
Perhaps the objection will be made that Austria acted under the pressure of Berlin—in England, France and America many people see it that way, and Austria supports and strengthens this legend through its agents. This is known in Berlin, but it is not objected to; quite the contrary. It is true that Austria is under the influence and pressure of Berlin, but that does not mean that she does not exert any influence on Berlin. In monarchical states mutual personal influences (of sovereigns and their councillors) have considerable weight and in the given case Berlin after 1866 (just as previously) for tactical reasons treated with tenderness the person of Emperor Francis Joseph and complied with his inclinations as much as possible, Austria sometimes having different views. There is a certain tension between the courts of Berlin and Vienna, but both dynasties and their offensive imperialism pointed to the same East, and the bad conscience of militaristic aggressiveness unites the rivals.
The participation of Austria-Hungary, not merely in the provocation of the war, but also in the manner in which it was conducted, is considerable in any case; it is claimed, for instance, quite categorically that not Tirpitz, but Burián made the decision for the unrestricted submarine warfare, hoping ​to save thereby tottering Austria. This is entirely in harmony with the policy of terror through which Vienna hoped to save the internal situation.
The responsibility of Germany and Austria for the war is so much greater, because Germany in the very year 1914, before the war broke out, reached a very favourably agreement with England, France and the other Powers as to controversial questions in Asia and Africa.
* ↑ In The New Europe, 30 November 1916, I wrote [[../../Volume 1/Austria under Francis Joseph|a lengthy article]] on the then existing state of affairs.
* ↑ A member of the Reichstag, the historian Gothein, as early as November 17th, 1914, in the Berliner Tagblatt, tried to answer the question whether the Germans wished the war, and he was forced to the following admission: “It cannot be denied that certain irresponsible circles played with the thought.” Are General von Bernhardi (now one of the most prominent commanders on the Eastern front) and similar writers mere “irresponsible” personages? Herr Friedrich Naumann (Die Hilfe, August, 1917) explains why the German people no longer believe the war to be defensive. “People can no longer rightly believe that the present battles are inevitable battles of defence. They have rather the gloomy suspicion that a policy of conquest, over and above what is necessary, is being pursued. And here a positively disastrous effect is produced by certain publications in which powerful societies and private individuals give expression to the lust of conquest. Only general ideas of their contents reach the great mass of the people; but to the best of our belief their existence is well known in every barrack, in every workshop, and in every village inn. The consequence of this literature of conquest is the disappearance of simple faith in the defensive war.”
* ↑ The guilt of Austrian politics shortly before the declaration of war was well brought out by the Berlin Vorwärts, when it wrote, July 25th, 1914: “We condemn the agitation of the Great-Serbian Nationalists, but the frivolous provocation of the war by the Austro-Hungarian Government calls for our liveliest protest. For the demands of this Government are more brutal than any that have ever been addressed, in the whole course of history, to an independent State, and they can only be intended to provoke war forthwith. The conscious proletarist of Germany, in the name of humanity and culture, raises its burning protest against this criminal agitation . . . . Not a single drop of blood of a German soldier is to be sacrificed to the desire for power and to the imperialistic greed of the Austrian despots.”The rest of the German Socialist newspapers wrote in a manner similar to that of Vorwärts; they are cited in an American publication of the German adherents of Liebknecht, “Die Krise der deutschen Sozialdemokratie.” Dr. Victor Adler, the leader of the Social Democrats of Austria, admitted in careful but clear words that Austria caused the war when she refused to follow Serbia’s concessions with further diplomatic negotiations.Before him Kjellén, the strongly Germanophile Swedish Austrian, confesses (“Die politischen Probleme des Weltkrieges, 1916”) that Austria-Hungary could have solved the Serbian question in a peaceful way, and that the war was not necessary.Oven, the Orthodox David of the Scheidemann majority, accused the Berlin Government of giving carte blanche to Vienna.
* ↑ It is worth mentioning that in the various diplomatic blue books of Vienna and Berlin not a word is published about the negotiations of the two Allies from the Sarajevo murders to the Serbian ultimatum. But we see from official statements that both emperors looked from a purely personal standpoint upon the act committed on Austrian territory by an Austrian subject: Austria talked of a punitive expedition to Serbia, and William at the beginning of the war in his frequent speeches plays the rôle of an avenging Justice.
* ↑ Rohrbach (Das Grössere Deutschland, August 15th, 1915) says: “Now that everything has changed, we can openly say that the Treaties with England concerning the frontiers of our overseas spheres in Asia and Africa had already been concluded and signed, and that nothing remained but to make them public. We were frankly astonished at the concessions made to us in Africa by England’s policy.” In Turkey, he adds, Germany was given concessions in the matter of the Bagdad railway, of Mesopotamian petroleum wells and Tigris navigation beyond all expectations (“ueberraschend”): and altogether, England was quite willing to recognise Germany as her equal both in Africa and in Asia.