# Keith v. Clark/Dissent Harlan

* Court Documents
* Case Syllabus
* Opinion of the Court
* Dissenting Opinions Waite Bradley Harlan
United States Supreme Court
97 U.S. 454
Keith v. Clark
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN.
I dissent altogether from so much of the opinion of the court as declares that the State of Tennessee, as represented by its existing government, is bound to receive, in payment of taxes levied under its authority, the notes of the Bank of Tennessee, issued after May 6, 1861, and during the period when that State was dominated by a revolutionary organization which usurped the functions of the lawful State government.
It is claimed that the obligation of the existing government of Tennessee to receive these bank-notes for taxes arises out of the twelfth section of the bank's charter, granted in 1838, which provides 'that the bills or notes of the said corporation, originally made payable, or which shall have become payable, on demand, in gold or silver coin, shall be receivable at the treasury of this State, and by all tax-collectors and other public officers, in all payments for taxes and other moneys due to the State.'
The purposes for which the bank was organized, and the relations created between it and the State by its charter, are thus stated in Furman v. Nichol, 8 Wall. 44.
'The State of Tennessee, through its legislature, in 1838, thought proper to create a bank 'in its name and for its benefit.' It was essentially a State institution. The State owned the capital and received the profits, appointed its directors, and pledged its faith and credit for its support.'
It was because the State, though directors of its appointment, had the absolute control of the operations of the bank, owning its capital and enjoying its profits, that it made the agreement contained in the twelfth section of the charter. That agreement unquestionably constituted, as between the State and the holders of the bank's notes, a contract, the obligation of which the State was forbidden by the Federal Constitution to impair. Such was the decision of this court in Furman v. Nichol (supra), as to all bills issued by the bank prior to May 6, 1861. In that case, while expressly waiving any decision of the question as to the liability of the State for bills issued between May 6, 1861, and the date of the restoration of its lawful government, we held that the guaranty contained in the twelfth section of the charter 'was, until withdrawn by the State, a contract between the State and every note-holder of the bank,' obliging the State to receive for taxes any notes issued prior to May 6, 1861. But it is to be observed that the State which made this contract with note-holders was the State which was represented by the lawful government thereof. The notes which it agreed to receive for taxes were necessarily only those issued by the authority, or under the orders, of directors appointed by that lawful government. It was not an agreement to receive notes issued under the orders of usurping directors, or by directors appointed by, or exercising their functions under, any revolutionary government, which, by violence, should displace the lawful government of the State. Upon the temporary overthrow of the latter government, on the 6th of May, 1861, all the State institutions, including the Bank of Tennessee, were seized by the usurping government, and were thereafter, and until the legal authorities resumed, or were reinstated in the exercise of, their functions, controlled and managed by the usurping government for its own benefit and maintenance. The notes in question were issued under the orders of directors who repudiated all responsibility to the government which made the contract embodied in the twelfth section of the bank charter. If the issue of such notes imposed obligations upon any State government, it was upon the insurgent State government, whose official agents had directed them to be issued. In the very nature of things, and so long as the duty exists to discourage revolution, by maintaining lawfully constituted authority, no obligation could arise against the State government which had been wrongfully displaced, and whose right to control and manage the bank, by directors of its appointment, was not only denied and repudiated, but was forcibly, and for some time successfully, resisted. And this view does no injustice to citizens of Tennessee who received the notes of the bank in the ordinary course of business. They were aware of the fact that these notes were issued under revolutionary authority. They did not take them upon the credit of the lawful government, or upon any faith they had in its restoration. They took them upon the credit of the usurping State government, under whose authority and for whose benefit they were issued, and which government, at that time, was regarded by the mass of the people of Tennessee as established upon a firm and enduring foundation.
But it is said that this court has frequently deciced that the ordinary acts and transactions of the Confederate State governments, which had no direct connection with the support of the insurrection against the authority of the Union, were to be deemed as valid as if they had been the acts and transactions of legitimate legislatures. The argument upon this branch of the case necessarily rests upon the assumption that the notes of the bank issued, under usurping authority, after May 6, 1861, were not issued, or do not appear to have been issued, for the purpose of aiding the insurrection or in hostility to the Union. This assumption, however, cannot be successfully maintained without excluding from consideration well-known historical facts. The government of the Confederate States of America had its origin in the purpose to dissolve the Union formed by the Federal Constitution, and to overthrow the national authority in the States declared to be in insurrection. The revolutionary governments of the insurrectionary States had their origin in, and were formed for, a like purpose. The existence of the former depended upon the existence of the latter. All moneys, therefore, raised by the revolutionary State government, for its support and maintenance, may be deemed, in every substantial legal sense, as having been raised for the support and maintenance of the Confederate government in its efforts to overturn the government of the United States. But in the view which I take of this case, and of the principles which must govern its decision, it is immaterial whether the notes were or were not issued in direct aid of the rebellion. They were the obligations of an institution controlled and managed by a revolutionary usurping government, in its name, for its benefit, and to prevent the restoration of the lawful State government. It was that revolutionary government which undertook to withdraw the State of Tennessee from its allegiance to the Federal government and make it one of the Confederate States. When, therefore, the people of Tennessee, who recognized the authority of the United States, assembled by their delegates in convention, in January, 1865, it was quite natural, and, in my judgment, not in violation of the Federal Constitution, that they should declare, by an amendment of the State Constitution, that 'all laws, ordinances, and resolutions of the usurped State governments passed on or after the 6th May, 1861, providing for the issuance of State bonds, also all notes of the Bank of Tennessee, or any of its branches, issued on or after the 6th May, 1861, and all debts created or contracted in the name of the State by said authority, are unconstitutional, null, and void; and no legislature shall hereafter have power to pass any act authorizing the payment of said bonds or debts, or providing for the redemption of said notes.' And this amendment of the State Constitution was duly ratified by a popular vote in that State on 22d February, 1865.
After carefully examining the former decisions of this court, and regarding the special facts and circumstances of each case heretofore decided, I do not perceive that any thing declared by us is at all inconsistent with the position that it was competent for the lawful government of Tennessee, when restored to the exercise of its just authority, to refuse to meet the obligations of the usurping State government, or to recognize the notes which had been illegally issued in the name of a State banking institution by the directions, and for the benefit, of the revolutionary organization which had violently displaced the regular and lawful State government. There may be some difficulty in defining precisely what acts of the usurping State government the restored State government should have recognized as valid and binding. It may be true that there were some of them which should, upon grounds of public policy, have been recognized by the lawful government as valid and binding. It may be that, in the absence of any declaration to the contrary by the latter, the courts should recognize certain acts of the revolutionary government as prima facie valid. But I am unwilling to give my assent to the doctrine that the Constitution of the United States imposed upon the lawful government of Tennessee an obligation, which this court must enforce, to cripple its own revenue, by receiving for its taxes bank-notes issued and used, under the authority of the usurping government, for the double purpose of maintaining itself and of defeating the restoration of that lawful government to its proper relations in the Union. Lawful government should not be required to pay the expenses incurred in effecting and maintaining its overthrow. Tennessee, as one of the United States, cannot be under a constitutional duty to recognize the governmental obligations of those who, by revolution, and in violation of the Federal Constitution, overthrew the legitimate State government, not because of its administration of the internal affairs of that State, but solely because of its adherence to the Federal Union, and its refusal to acknowledge the authority of the Confederate government. If the insurrectionary State government had, during the recent war, urged the people in insurrection to take the notes of the Bank of Tennessee at par, upon the ground that the lawful State government, if restored, would be required by the courts of the United States, whose government they were endeavoring to overturn, to receive them in payment of taxes, and if the insurgents had believed such to be the law of the land, the treasury of the Confederate State government would have had more money than it did have to carry on the work of revolution.
Upon these grounds, which I will not further elaborate, I feel obliged to dissent from the conclusions reached by the court.
This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
Public domainPublic domainfalsefalse