# History of Mexico (Bancroft)/Volume 2/Chapter 6

Table of Contents
CHAPTER VI.
CORTÉS AND GARAY IN PÁNUCO.
1522-1523.
Rivalry for Pánuco — Cortés Hastens to Occupy It — Battle at Ayotochtitlan — Operations at Chila — Native Tactics — Founding of San Estévan del Puerto — A Shipwreck Incident — Disappointing Results — Campaign in Tututepec Mountains — Rejoicings on the Receipt of Cortés' Commission — Alluring Projects for Southern Conquests — Startling News — Garay Prepares to Descend on Pánuco — His Lack of Ability and Firmness — March from Las Pamas — Negotiations with Vallejo.
North of Villa Rica extended the fertile province of Pánuco, so called after the ruling chief, whose villages bordered the deep-flowing rivers that seek the sea at the present Tampico. It was skirted on the east by woody ranges from which a number of streams ran down the undulating slopes to a flat and sandy seaboard broken by a series of lagoons. While the shore-line was unhealthy and thinly inhabited, the interior was salubrious, and rumor placed there rich mines of gold. To And this gold had been the chief inducement for the expeditions of Garay, and the hostility of the natives, together with a few thousand pesos obtained by barter, had only served to confirm the rumor.
The revelation that others were intent on establishing an independent government so close to his own, had been a source of anxiety to Cortés ever since the encounter with Pineda in August 1519. He ​accordingly hastened to inform the king that the natives of Pánuco had already submitted to him; and he intimated afterward that it would be not only dangerous for a strange expedition to enter the country, but injurious to the royal interest there and in the settled districts to the south. The claim of submission was based on the allegiance tendered by some towns near Almería, which by way of diplomacy he made extend indefinitely beyond. The reverses at Mexico, and the subsequent siege, called attention away from outlying provinces, but after the subjugation of Anáhuac Cortés took up the matter, although he was prevented from prosecuting it by the arrival of Tapia.
Soon after came news from the Islands that a fresh expedition, promoted to some extent by the admiral of the Indies, was preparing to occupy Pánuco. This was confirmed by a letter from Garay himself, who announced that the sovereign had appointed him governor of that district, and that he would at once enter into possession. Cortés had already made extensive preparations to anticipate his rival, and was not to be held back from a prize now more alluring than ever, and that by the mere indication of cédulas which he had so well learned to circumvent.
The question here involved was similar to that of Narvaez and Tapia. The descent of an armed force so near to Mexico would encourage the natives to fresh revolts which might involve the loss of the entire country, and the slaughter of every Spaniard. His duty to sovereign and comrades demanded that he should prevent such disasters, and he was also bound to protect from other invaders a province which had already submitted to him. Indeed, ​the natives had sent to implore him for protection both against strangers and adjoining hostile tribes. An additional reason for occupying the province was the necessity for New Spain proper to control so excellent a country.
The importance of the project demanded that Cortés should undertake it in person, the more so since his leading captains were occupied elsewhere. He accordingly left Diego de Soto in charge at Mexico, with instructions for continuing the rebuilding, and set out with one hundred and twenty horse, three hundred foot-soldiers, a few field-pieces, and some forty thousand Indians from different quarters. A fair proportion of the latter were chosen Aztec warriors, whom he thought it prudent to keep under his own immediate control, rather than expose the capital to the danger of a fresh conspiracy. The quality of the allegiance accorded to the Huastecs, as the Pánuco ​people were properly called, was demonstrated immediately on approaching their territory. Demands for peaceful submission were met by jeers, and at Ayotochtitlan a large force of warriors came to the attack with heedless confidence. Unfortunately for them the ground was advantageous for the cavalry, which fell upon them with an irresistible sweep that scattered the host in confusion. Swamps and forests enabled them to rally, however, and warned by misfortune they presented themselves again in better order, so much so that the allied troops found it no easy matter to complete the rout. Several thousand warriors paid the penalty for resisting the appeal of the Christians, while the invaders lost three soldiers, several horses, and a large number of allies, without counting the wounded.
The lesson proved most effective, since the demand for submission with the promise of pardon and good treatment, extended through the captive caciques, was now promptly responded to, though the accompanying presents were so insignificant as to dampen the ardor of the gold-seekers. After a halt of three or four days the army proceeded to Chila, a large village on the Pánuco River, deserted and partly burned, five leagues from the sea, where Garay's force had suffered disaster. The usual demand, with offers of pardon for past offences, was sent to adjoining districts, but confident in the strength of their position on rivers and lagoons, the inhabitants scorned the appeal, and even killed the messengers, together with ​some foragers. During the fortnight required to obtain boats, build rafts, and make other preparations for a semi-naval attack, peaceful overtures were renewed in the hope that the gentle treatment so far observed might win the natives.
Everything being ready, advantage was taken of a dark night to cross the river. One hundred and fifty chosen soldiers, one third mounted, had already effected
the manœuvre when dawn revealed them to the Indians, who had all this time been massed to prevent the passage. They immediately attacked the invaders with a fierceness heretofore unsurpassed, says Cortés, killing two horses at the first onset, and inflicting other damage. The soldiers stood their ground, however, and, reënforced from the other bank, they took ​the offensive and quickly routed the natives, pursuing them with great slaughter. Three leagues from camp they reached a deserted village, in the temple of which were hung in ghastly array the dressed skins and apparel of Garay's slain men. Several could still be recognized by soldiers who had known them, and who now with deep emotion consigned the remains to sanctified graves.
The following day the party followed the banks of a lagoon, and near sunset reached a beautiful village, apparently deserted. On entering they were suddenly set upon by an ambuscaded force, though so prematurely as to enable them to form. This was most fortunate, since the natives attacked with great resolution, and fell back in good order after the repulse, throwing themselves into a compact circle bristling with pikes. When the soldiers charged in their turn, a blinding shower of arrows and darts came rattling against them, and though they broke the ring, the warriors formed anew, the front line kneeling. This was repeated three or four times. "And but for the stout armor of the soldiers, I believe that none of us would have escaped," says the general. Observing the unflinching resolution of the soldiers and the havoc repeatedly inflicted, the rear of the foe began to desert by swimming across a river which entered the lagoon just beyond the village. Cortes was too delighted to attempt interference, and sought rather to accelerate the movement into a general flight. The warriors gathered on the opposite bank, while the tired Spaniards retreated within the village and encamped under strong guard, feasting on the slain horses, for they had scarcely any supplies.
​Proceeding on their way, they passed through several deserted villages devoid even of food, though wine was found in the cellars and declared to be delicious. After three days, without seeing either natives or booty, they turned back to Chila, half starved. Instructed by certain natives, Cortés now sent a strong force by night in another direction, both by land and water, and surprised a large village, inflicting a terrific lesson. The wholly unexpected attack, the strength of the place, and the severity of the punishment, all combined to convince the natives that resistance was useless, and with almost one accord they came to submit, the whole province tendering allegiance within three weeks. In order to assure possession, Cortés founded the town of San Estévan del Puerto, a little below Chila, on a lagoon connected with Rio Pánuco, and established a municipality, with Pedro de Vallejo as his lieutenant. The force volunteering to remain consisted of one hundred and thirty men, with twenty-seven horses, and a number of allies, among whom the province was divided in repartimientos. Their comfort and security were further insured by the arrival of a small craft from Villa Rica with stores.
When the expedition set out from Mexico a larger vessel had been sent in advance with supplies; but she foundered at sea during a storm, and only three men managed to reach the shore, clinging to some spars. They found their place of refuge a sandy island, containing nothing but brackish water and a kind of fig. Fortunately it was frequented by manatees, which came to sleep on the sand, and were thus ​easily killed for food. Fire was obtained by the primitive method of rubbing together two pieces of wood. Finding no vessel at Pánuco, Cortés had sent instructions to Villa Rica to despatch the above craft in search of it, and so the three sailors were rescued. The vessel and a small boat were left with the settlers to maintain communication.
The expedition was most disappointing, for hardly any spoils were secured to satisfy the inordinate hopes entertained, while the expenses amounted to quite a large sum, nails and horseshoes costing their weight in gold. Yet the outlay was not in vain, so far as Spanish interests in general were concerned, for a crew wrecked on that coast not long after escaped the slaughter to which they would undoubtedly have been exposed had the province not been subjugated, and later colonists were saved the cost and danger of conquering.
There seems to have been good reason for the claim that the influence of Cortés was necessary to maintain the conquests he had effected, and that his simple presence answered better than armies to control the natives. Of this an illustration was offered at this time. His absence in Pánuco gave rise to the report in some quarters that he had departed for Spain, and ​the troublesome mountaineers of Tututepec, a district between Cempoala and Pánuco, took advantage of his supposed absence, encouraged also by false information from Huasteca. Not alone did they rebel, but they made a raid on the adjoining peaceful territory, burning more than twenty villages. Cortés was on the way back from San Estévan, when messengers from the ravaged district came with their complaints. Both time and proximity favored them, and the general resolved to personally inflict a lesson that should be lasting. It was no easy task, however, for the march led mostly across rugged mountains, alternating with narrow defiles and dense forests, so much so that a number of horses died from exhaustion. The line was besides exposed to constant assaults on flank and rear by the unencumbered and agile foe, which on one occasion inflicted quite a serious blow on the carriers' train, and escaped with a large part of the baggage. Nevertheless the persevering Spaniards achieved their object, and captured the ruling lord, together with the general, who were promptly hanged for having a second time broken their oaths of allegiance. As a further warning to other provinces, the captured natives were enslaved and sold at auction to cover the cost of the horses lost during the campaign, or rather, a portion of the cost, for the proceeds of the sale were comparatively small. The lord's brother was installed as ruler, and the expedition turned homeward by way of Villa Rica.
Costly as had been the campaign, however, both men and leader were to receive a reward which should forever obliterate their late severe troubles. This came in the form of the commission appointing Cortés ​governor and captain-general. It had been intrusted by his agents in Spain to Rodrigo de Paz and Francisco de las Casas, two near relatives of the general, who hastened on their way in the fastest vessel they could secure. Nor did they fail to touch at Santiago de Cuba, and there flaunt in the face of Velazquez, with great fanfaronade, the decrees which crushed forever his aspirations and rendered powerless his sting. Their arrival was greeted throughout New Spain with wild demonstrations of joy, with processions, salvos, and prolonged festivities. And rightly so; for the cédulas implied the culmination of years of deferred hopes, of victory achieved after long and varied struggle for all that was worth possessing. The triumph alone was soothing to these adventurous spirits, and how much more when it dispelled the weighty cloud of royal displeasure, removed the brand of outlaws, and placed them before the world as acknowledged heroes, assured in the enjoyment of their lands, their slaves and treasures, and looking forward with confident exultation to fresh conquests, now more resplendent than ever with prospective gain and glory.
Their anticipations were not now based on flimsy rumor, but on one of the richest presents laid at the feet of Cortés since the fall of Mexico. It was brought by an imposing embassy of one hundred persons from Utatlan and Guatemala, the result of Alvarado's demonstrations along the southern sea the year before. Gold-ware, pearls, rare plumes, and choice fabrics were offered in token of the friendship tendered by ​the distant monarchs. The hearts of the soldiers warmed with delight as they beheld these specimens of wealth, magnified tenfold as they drank with covetous souls the stories of the attendant Spanish messengers of cities and palaces surpassing those of Mexico in size and beauty. The experiences in Pánuco had already divested the unknown north of its main allurement, and now it was wholly eclipsed. All attention turned toward the pearl-lined shores bathed by the southern sea, to the mysterious Quiché kingdom, and beyond to the coast of Hibueras, where gold was so abundant that fishermen used nuggets for sinkers. Cortés had additional reasons for his allurement in the absorbing hope of discovering the much sought strait, which might possibly be found even in the south among the numerous inlets which penetrated into the narrow strip of land. To gain this and other laurels for his wreath he must hasten, however, for already the Spaniards of Panamá were moving northward and might forestall him.
Preparations were accordingly made to carry out both aims by two directions, along the north and south seas, so as to render them quicker and surer of attainment, and to enable the expeditions not only to aid each other in their pacifications, but to present a stronger front to the approaching Spaniards from the south. The importance of the enterprise demanded the best military talent. The choice was easily made, however, for who could come before the often tried adherents, the redoubtable Alvarado, second only to the leader himself, the impressive Olid, and the admirable Sandoval, all able, brave, zealous, and evidently devoted? To Alvarado, who had already initiated the conquest in the direction of Guatemala, fell naturally its continuation, and Olid, as next in age and standing of the trio, had the best claim to the Hibueras command. The distance of this province, and the uncertainty of the land route, made it advisable that Olid ​should proceed by sea, while the other party advanced along the already disclosed path. By August 1523 both expeditions were ready, Alvarado's rendered imposing by a considerable force of cavalry, with four field-pieces* the more needful im view of reports of hostile movements in the border province of Soconusce. Olid was less thoroughly equipped, but funds had been sent to Cuba to secure the needed horses and stores, which he would there take on board.
Thus stood matters when a messenger from San Estévan appeared among the captains at Mexico with the startling intelligence that Adelantado Garay had arrived there with a large force to assert his claim as governor of the province. While this was most aggravating, Cortés congratulated himself on not having as yet despatched the expeditions. After expending so much money and labor in conquering Pánuco, and that in the face of royal orders, he had no intention of abandoning it, especially since he perceived behind the intruder the portly figure of Velazquez, and the meddling admiral of the Indies, with the prospect of never-ending intrigues, attended by encroachments and probably worse troubles. His fears and his ambition allowed him no rest; and broken in health as he was, and lame in one arm through a fall from the saddle, he resolved to lead all the prepared forces in person against the arrival.
Garay's expeditions to the north-western gulf ccasts had by no means been encouraging, what with comparatively meagre results from barter and loss of men In encounters with the natives. The gold obtained was nevertheless regarded as a specimen of riches which must be great, as the inhabitants were so eager ​to defend them. This belief was confirmed by the magnified treasures which Cortés had obtained on the adjoining coast, and despatched to the emperor. Garay had therefore hastened to ask for fresh cédulas, whereby he should be empowered to approach more closely to Anáhuac, the evident centre of wealth. With the aid of his patron, the admiral, and other friends, these were readily obtained from the regent Adrian, permitting him to colonize the province of Amichel, which embraced the much coveted Pánuco. The fate of Narvaez and Tapia had not failed to impress the adelantado with the danger of treading on the corns of the formidable Cortés, but if he entertained any serious fears, they were dissipated by the arguments of Colon and Velazquez, who were deeply interested in the success of an expedition which might pave the way for their own plans; sufficiently so to prompt even assistance.
Preparations were actively pursued, and about June 24, 1523, Garay set sail from his island domain of Jamaica with a fleet of eleven vessels, well provided with artillery and carrying nearly six hundred soldiers, one hundred and fifty of them mounted, and the rest largely composed of arquebusiers and archers. Stores appear to have been provided in a careless manner, or left to the discretion of different captains. Touching ​at Jagua in Cuba, he learned of Cortés' entry into Pánuco and his appointment of governor in New Spain. While notifying the men of prospective resistance, he pointed out their irresistible strength, and his own rights, and encouraged them with prospective rewards, whereof he gave a foretaste by appointing alcaldes and regidores of the Villa Garayana to be founded in the new region. The adelantado was a well-meaning man, but too pliable for the scheming adventurers who swarmed to the Indies. Of a good family, he sought to maintain his name and position by initiating some of the many enterprises which flitted through the brains of his companions, but he lacked both ability and character to direct them, and possessed no military experience with which to impose upon the swaggering horde. The more he heard of the wiles and exploits of Cortés, from the mouths of victims who hardly cared to mention their defeat, the less confident he grew in his project, though Velazquez did all he could to encourage him. He resolved to seek a compromise with his great rival, and directed himself to Licentiate Zuazo, an upright and highly respected judge, who had been sent to Cuba by the audiencia of Santo Domingo to take the residencia of the governor. Though unable to leave Cuba just then, ​the licentiate promised soon to undertake the mission. As an additional precaution, Garay took a special oath of allegiance from the men to uphold his cause, and then somewhat relieved he resumed the voyage. After being tossed by a storm, he entered Rio de las Palmas on St James' day, July 25th, and sent Gonzalo de Ocampo to explore. Their report was so unsatisfactory that the soldiers demanded vociferously to be led to Pánuco. Unable to resist the appeal, and not particularly captivated by the country, he landed the greater part of the force and proceeded southward, keeping close to the shore, while Juan de Grijalva conducted the fleet to Rio Pánuco. For two or three days they floundered through a swampy country, and crossing a wide stream in some shaky canoes, they reached a recently deserted village, wherein an abundance of provisions rewarded the toilers. Some Indians who had been at the Spanish settlements were brought in, and conciliated with presents to advance and reassure the natives. On reaching the next village, however, the soldiers began to pillage, regardless of appeals from the leader. Either intimidated or naturally mild, the natives remained to serve the army and to assist it onward. The route proved so bad that a number of horses ​perished, and the incapacity of the captains increased the danger. At one wide stream the horses, arms, and baggage were transferred and left almost unattended on one bank while the army camped on the other for the night. A few resolute warriors might have killed or carried off the whole train, and on other occasions the men were almost wholly at their mercy.
On approaching Pánuco, where rest and plenty had been looked for, Garay found the villages deserted and bare of food, due chiefly to alarm at the approaching host of starvelings. Informed by interpreters that the cause was Cortésian raids, he sought to win them back by promising to avenge their wrongs, and drive out the oppressors, as governor of that country. The announcement might have been left unsaid, for his famished soldiers were already spreading in different directions under impulse of hunger and greed. Little they found to appease the former, while for the latter nothing remained after the careful gleaning of the other party; and hearing from a deserter of the glories at Mexico, they felt prepared for any change that would take them nearer to the imperial city. If there had been any real meaning in the words of Garay, it did not take long to discover the difficulty of enforcing it in view of the growing insubordination. Now that the point of destination was reached, he had no definite idea what to do with the expedition fitted out at such trouble and expense; nor had he the resolution to carry out any effective plan. Why had he come?
Something must be done, however, and Ocampo was sent to confer with Vallejo, the lieutenant at San Estévan, and announce that Garay came provided with a commission to settle and govern the province, as adelantado. Vallejo received the envoy with great courtesy, and expressed delight at the prospect of ​having so esteemed a company for neighbors. He would willingly show them every attention, but as for recognizing any other ruler over Pánuco than Cortes, that was out of the question, since the latter had not only conquered it at great expense, but had received the appointment of governor. Nevertheless he would write to his chief at Mexico for instructions, and forward Garay's letter wherein he proposed a peaceable arrangement, to avoid losses to themselves and the sovereign. Meanwhile he agreed to let the newcomers quarter themselves in some of the villages near San Estevan, notably Taculula and Manalapan, with the injunction not to harass the natives. This order was not respected, chiefly because of scanty supplies; and finding that no military precautions were observed at the camps, the settlers at San Estévan one night pounced upon the most disorderly, and brought twoscore of them as prisoners to the fort. The feat was not dangerous, for the precaution had been taken to extort in payment for food nearly all the ammunition among the interlopers, and weapons and other effects were rapidly being absorbed. Garay protested; but emboldened by the change of aspect, Vallejo intimated that unless the soldiers were kept under control he should order him to leave the country.
Meanwhile the long-delayed fleet arrived, after having been exposed to heavy north gales, in which four out of the eleven vessels were lost. Their number was increased soon after by a caravel from Cuba, with a number of the retainers of Velazquez, who allured by a fancied scent of spoils came to seek a share. Learning the condition of affairs, Grijalva remained at anchor near the mouth of the river, despite the appeals of Vallejo, who objected to the hostility thereby implied, and even threatened him with the anger of his chief.
* ↑ 'Cuyo rey se llamaua Panuco.' Gomara, Hist. Mex., 67. The province was known to the Mexicans as Pantlan or Panotlan. Sahagun, Hist. Gen., iii. 132.
* ↑ See Hist Mex., i. 189, this series.
* ↑ Cartas, 56, 263-4.
* ↑ Bernal Diaz states that he did send some men to settle near Pánuco River so as to prevent Garay from taking possession, Hist. Verdad., 160, but this is doubtful.
* ↑ The cédula issued in 1521 is to be found in Navarrete, Col. de Viages, iii. 147. Instructions connected with it, such as the settling of a boundary, appear to have been brought by Bono de Quejo.
* ↑ Bernal Diaz confirms this, and adds that the greater part of the province had risen and killed the men sent by Cortés. Hist. Verdad., 161. He evidently confounds the time and men with previous occurrences, for Cortés would not have failed to use a slaughter of his own men as an argument. He states that the people of Panuco came to excuse themselves for killing Garay's men, and later the crew of a vessel, on the ground that they were not his adherents. Cartas, 281-2. The petition came probably from the Almeria region, which he chose to call Panuco, for on a previous page he writes somewhat contradictorily that the Panuco tribes who had formerly tendered allegiance were now warring on vassals of the crown. Id., 263.
* ↑ Mouia le tãbien desseo de vengar los Españoles de Francisco de Garay g alli matara,' adds Gomara. Hist. Mex., 222.
* ↑ Cartas, 282. One hundred and thirty horse, 250 foot, and 10,000 Indians. Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 161. He never allows more than a limited number of natives, desirous as he is to assume as much credit for Spaniards as he possibly can. A part of the force was recruited from Aillon's unfortunate expedition to Florida. Herrera reduces the horsemen to 80, but Gomara increases them to 150; and Ixtlilxochitl follows him as usual, though he assumes the auxiliaries to be composed wholly of Acolhuas and Mexicans. There must have been a large number of Tlascaltecs, Totonacs, and others. the town of Xochimilco claims to have furnished 500 warriors and large supplies. Those who survived this expedition perished under Alvarado in Guatemala. Carta, in Pacheco and Cárdenas, Col. Doc., xiii. 294. Zamacois, Hist. Méj., iv. 104, assumes that the incorporation of so large a force of Aztecs was a proof of growing confidence in them, but the truth is that the select warriors were taken away because they could not be trusted, especially after the recent conspiracy. Two years later the same precaution was observed, even so far as to take away on a long journey their princes, who actually proved a burden from the constant watching and care demanded by them.
* ↑ The Huastecs occupied a large stretch of territory, but afterwards their province was limited on the north-east by Tampico. See Native Races, i. 647.
* ↑ The present Coscatlan, says Lorenzana, 25 leagues from Pánuco port. Cortés, Hist. N. España, 342.
* ↑ Bernal Diaz has 3 soldiers, 4 horses, and 100 allies killed, with 30 Spaniards and 200 allies wounded. The Huastecs numbered 60,000. He calls the encounter two battles. Ixtlilxochitl increases the allied loss to 5,000 and the Huastec to 15,000. Herrera mentions only 50 Spaniards and several horses wounded, and a number of allies killed; and Cortés as usual refrains from disagreeable details.
* ↑ Accompanied by Father Olmedo, Marina, and Aguilar, says Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 161, but it is not likely that persons so valuable would be sent to doubtful foes. Those who had formerly submitted, by sending envoys to Mexico, now confirmed the allegiance, says Cortés.
* ↑ Bernal Diaz states that only half the army advanced, after a week's rest.
* ↑ The casualties according to Bernal Diaz were 2 soldiers, 3 horses, and many allies, with 30 Spaniards and 15 horses wounded. Chimalpain is much more moderate. Hist. Conq., ii. 93, while Ixtlilxochitl claims 10,000 wounded allies. Cortés involuntarily admits heavy losses so far by saying, 'con hasta treinta de caballo que me quedaron . . . seguí todavía mi camino.' Cartas, 284.
* ↑ Bernal Diaz, who assumes that the retiring foe was pursued, gives the loss at 2 horses and 3 men, with 4 times that number wounded. Cortés admits the wounding of nearly 20 horses.
* ↑ 'En todo este tiempo entre todos no hubo cincuenta libras de pan.' Cortés, Cartas, 285. Messengers were again sent forth to summon the caciques, who replied that they were collecting gold and other presents and would bring them within a few days; but none came. Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 162.
* ↑ Including a part of the Acolhua warriors. Ixtlilxochitl, Hor. Crueldudes, 64
* ↑ Some of these ae are dated at San Estévan May 1, 1523. Casas, Carta, in Pacheco and Cárdenas, Col. Doc., vii. 308.
* ↑ 'Un barco y un chinchorro.' Cortés, Cartas, 286. Bernal Diaz adds that when Cortés was about to leave, a conspiracy was revealed among the three leading villages, to lead in a general revolt against the settlers as soon as the general should have left. The villages were burned as a warning. Hist. Verdad., 162. Gomara insinuates that this burning occurred during the campaign, it seems, in punishment for the attack on Garay's men. Hist. Mex., 222-3.
* ↑ 'Valian los clauos a peso de oro, de quinze quilates, y cada quatro herraduras, y cien clauos, costãua cincuenta y quatro Castellanos de buen oro,' and the horses cost 1,500 to 2,000 castellanos. Herrera, dec. iit. lib. ii. cap. xvii. 'The cost to me alone was 30,000 pesos de oro,' says Cortés, 'and as much more to my companions for outfits and supplies.' Cartas, 286. Bernal Diaz raises the amount to 70,000. When the general afterward claimed reimbursement from the crown, the treasury officials objected on the ground that he had incurred the expense merely to forestall the legally appointed governor. Hist. Verdad., 161, 163.
* ↑ This applies to Garay's expedition, and Cortés himself points out the gain to the emperor.
* ↑ Another Tututepec existed near the coast, west of Tehuantepec, and the name has also been applied by careless chroniclers to Tochtepec, or Tuxtepec, on Papaloapan River, creating much confusion.
* ↑ Herrera, dec. iii. lib. iii. cap. xviii., assumes that only 200 slaves were sold, while 20 horses perished. Cortés says 10 or 12 horses. Cartas, 279. 'Era compensacion religiosa y cristiana, hombres por caballos!' observes Bustamante. Chimalpain, Hist. Conq., ii. 95.
* ↑ Remesal leaves the impression that this had called Cortés to Villa Rica, on the way from Tututepec to Mexico. Hist. Chyapa, 3.
* ↑ In May 1523, says Gomara.
* ↑ The usual reward to bearers of good tidings was this time distributed with princely liberality. Paz was made chief mayordomo of his great kinsman; Casas received a captaincy, to which was soon added the large encomienda of Anguitlan, and the office of alcalde mayor, an office for which his ability fitted him. Both men figure quite prominently during the following years. Their voyage companions were also remembered, and the captain who had brought them across, says Bernal Diaz, received a new vessel, so that he returned quite rich. Hist. Verdad., 187.
* ↑ See Hist. Cent. Am., i. 624 et seq., this series.
* ↑ Cortés enumerates his force as 30 horse and 200 foot. Cartas, 289-90.
* ↑ The purchases were intrusted to Alonso de Contreras. Oviedo, iii. 459; Gomara, Hist. Mex., 229, 243.
* ↑ He was bedridden. Cortés, Cartas, 291. 'Vu Braço, que se le quebrò en un regozijo, por el nes de Setiembre.' Herrera, dec. iii. Lib. v. cap. v. The fall must have occurred earlier than September.
* ↑ See Hist. Mex., i. 189, this series.
* ↑ The cédula is dated at Búrgos, 1521, and signed by the cardinal and admiral. Navarrete, Col. de Viages, ii. 147-53. It contains the usual instructions for good government and extension of the faith, and stipulates that 'repartimientos of Indians shall under no consideration be made,' as this has been the cause of all the evil in Española and other parts. Should his reports prevail on the crown to extend the privilege to him, after the condition of the country is known, he must strictly conform to regulations for such repartimientos. Instructions like these amounted to nothing, for they were always evaded with more or less assurance, and by this time the Panuco people had been enslaved.
* ↑ In reply to a letter announcing the projected expedition to the gulf coast, Cortés had congratulated him and tendered his services, but this was not supposed to be sincere. Indeed, it was intimated that the wily conqueror rather sought to induce Garay to come, so that he might win over his men, and seize, or buy for a trifle, the outfit. Lucas, in Cortés, Residencia,. 275-6. This was an idle rumor, no doubt, but it illustrates the opinion entertained of Cortés and his wiles.
* ↑ 'Dia de San Johan,' writes Oviedo. June 26th, says Herrera.
* ↑ Garay declares 11 vessels 'navios,' though the phrase is peculiar, and may be interpreted as 12. The word navíos may exclude smaller craft. His officers declare 'about 600 men.' Provision, in Pacheco and Cárdenas, Col. Doc., xxvi. 97-103. Lucas, who shared in the expedition, mentions 11 vessels, 150 horse, and 400 foot. Cortés, Residencia, i. 275. Cortés writes 120 horse and 400 foot and several cannon. Cartas, 290. This is supposed to be the number which arrived in Pánuco, reduced by losses. Gomara specifies 9 larger vessels and 2 brigantines, 850 Spaniards, with 144 horses, 200 arquebuses, 300 crossbows, a few Jamaican natives, and an abundance of stores and merchandise. Hist. Mex., 224. An exaggeration, no doubt, though the men are increased by the crews. Not to be outdone, Bernal Diaz enumerates 11 larger vessels, 2 brigantines, 136 cavalry, 840 infantry, chiefly arquebusiers and archers. Hist. Verdad., 168. A royal cédula based on a report from the audiencia of Española mentions 16 large and small vessels, 600 men and 150 horses. Pacheco and Cárdenas, Col, Doc., xiii. 497-8.
* ↑ Where, is not said. It was probably left for events to determine. Provision, in Pacheco and Cárdenas, Col. Doc., xxvi. 115-16. Gomara places this incident already at Jamaica, saying derisively, 'Hizo un pueblo en ayre que llamo Garay.' The alcaldes were Alonso de Mendosa and Fernando de Figueroa, and the regidores Gonzalo de Ovaile, Diego de Cifuentes, and one Villagran. Hist. Mex., 224.
* ↑ Herrera, dec. iii. lib. v. cap. v. A letter from Bono de Quejo, instigated no doubt by Cortés, assisted not a little to frighten the adelantado.
* ↑ The present Rio la Marina, or Santander. On the map of Fernando Colon, 1527, Las Palmas; Ribero, 1529, R. de Palmas; Munich Atlas, 1535, palmas; Agnese, 1540, palmas; Vaz Dourado, 1571, Ro de Palmas; Hood, 1592, R. de Palmas; Ogilby, 1671, R. Escondido, marked near the head waters, Culias Vachus Gracos S Iohn Enda; Laet, 1633, R. de Palmas, and south, R. de Montanhas; Jefferys, 1776, Rio de las Palmas, at the mouth Esmotes L., tributary Rio de las Nasas; Kiepert, 1852, Rio Rapido, or Iglesias. Cartog. Pac. Coast, MS., i. 602-3. It must not be confounded with Rio de la Palma in southern Vera Cruz, as a careless writer appears to do in Soc. Mex. Geog., Boletin, 2da ép., i. 474.
* ↑ A relative, says Gomara.
* ↑ A declaration in Provision, ubi sup., 103, states that several persons wished him to settle there, but he refused. There is no doubt that the soldiers objected to remain in a region devoid both of gold and superior culture, so that Garay had to yield. Bernal Diaz places here the creation of a municipality, and the renewal of allegiance.
* ↑ Named Montalto from its source in the high mountains five leagues off. Gomara, Hist. Mex., 225, This is evidently the Montanhas of Laet's map.
* ↑ The natives were urged to support Garay in driving away the retainers of Cortés. Provision, ubi sup., 125 et seq.
* ↑ Including their captain, Alvarado. Gomara, Hist. Mex., 225.
* ↑ Garay's declaration, in Provision, ubi sup., 97. Yet the sentence may be understood to say that one of the four was lost in the river. Bernal Diaz allows only two to be wrecked.