# A Political History of Parthia/Chapter 8

CHAPTER VIII
THE CAMPAIGN OF CORBULO
THE emperor Claudius was poisoned in October, 54, and the youthful Nero ascended the throne. News of events in Armenia reached Rome by December, and preparations were immediately begun for war. The oriental legions were recruited to war strength and then moved in the direction of Armenia. Antiochus IV of Commagene and Agrippa II of Chalcis (Andjar) were to collect troops and hold them in readiness for an invasion of Parthia, and bridges were to be constructed across the Euphrates. Lesser Armenia was given to Aristobulus, a son of the former king Herod of Chalcis and first cousin of Agrippa II; Sophene was turned over to a Sohaemus, perhaps of the same family as the one who had just succeeded to the throne of Emesa. To take command of the forces gathered to "retain" Armenia, Cn. Corbulo was recalled from Germany. Corbulo was a seasoned veteran and a career man, and his appointment was undoubtedly a wise move. The X ​Fretensis and the XII Fulminata and some oriental auxiliaries were to remain in Syria with Ummidius Quadratus, governor of that province. An equal number of allies, the III Gallica, and the VI Ferrata were assigned to Corbulo, who was also to have the cohorts that were wintering in Cappadocia. The allied rulers had orders to obey these generals as the exigencies of war demanded. Corbulo hastened to Cilicia, where he met Quadratus, who was greatly afraid that his more personally attractive colleague would reap all the glory. The Roman commanders sent envoys to Vologases, who in order to avoid war surrendered some important members of his family as hostages. Undoubtedly Vologases was pleased to secure terms, for a little earlier his son, Vardanes, had revolted. Whether he ever succeeded in displacing his father or in making himself king is doubtful, for the revolt was apparently put down.
Corbulo was greatly hampered by the miserable ​condition of the eastern legions. Tacitus says that many of the veterans scarcely knew arms when they saw them, and in some instances troops were not even supplied with armor. Those who were too old or incapacitated were sent home, and the strength of the legions was increased by levies from Galatia and Cappadocia. To these was added the X Fretensis, which was relieved in Syria by the IV Scythica, brought from Moesia. Late in 57 Corbulo felt conditions sufficiently improved so that he could move forward into Armenia, where the winter of 57/58 was spent under canvas in the bitter cold. Many of the men suffered from frozen hands and feet; but Corbulo, whose tall and commanding figure was always conspicuous, strode among them bareheaded and kept up morale with words of encouragement. Under such conditions many deserted, but desertion was effectively discouraged by the infliction of the death penalty for the first offense instead of the third as was customary. Paccius Orfitus was given command of the auxiliaries, who were distributed in garrison posts at strategic points. In spite of strict orders to the contrary, Orfitus engaged the enemy and was badly defeated.
In the spring of 58, when weather conditions improved, the campaign was resumed. Tiridates, supported by his brother Vologases of Parthia, began to ​despoil the Roman adherents. His horsemen managed to evade the troops sent against them and continued their successful raids. Corbulo sought in vain to catch Tiridates and at last was forced to adopt the tactics of his opponent and divide his men into bands to pillage the country. At the same time he advised Antiochus of Commagene to advance across the Armenian frontier. Pharasmanes of Iberia also allied himself with the Roman cause, and the "Insochi," possibly the Moschi or the Heniochi, were actively harassing the Armenians. Vologases and most of his troops were occupied with a revolt in Hyrcania which ultimately resulted in the permanent loss of that territory to Parthia. The Hyrcanians sent an embassy to Rome for aid, which apparently was not forthcoming.
Corbulo was aware of this diversion of Parthian forces. Hence when Tiridates made tentative overtures and requested to know the cause of the invasion, the Roman commander did not hesitate to reply that Tiridates should address himself as a suppliant to Nero, from whom he might receive his kingdom again in a peaceful manner, rather than attempt to hold it through bloodshed. Extended negotiations followed, but attempted treachery and a feeling of uncertainty on both sides caused their eventual abandonment.
​Fighting now broke out in earnest. Corbulo retained command of one division of the Roman forces while Cornelius Flaccus, a legate, took charge of the second, and Insteius Capito, camp prefect, of the third. Volandum, the strongest of the forts, fell by assault on the first day. All the male citizens were put to the sword and the noncombatants sold to the victorious forces. Punitive expeditions which the Roman commander sent out had little trouble in re­ ducing other strongholds. Such easy success induced him to set out to Artaxata with the intention of laying siege to it also. Tiridates had insufficient forces to withstand an attack for any length of time and therefore attempted to induce the Romans to break their formations and thus lay themselves open to attack by his cavalry. Because of their discipline and training under Corbulo the ranks stood firm and the ruse failed. Tiridates, determined not to risk an open battle, fled in the night, probably to take refuge with Vologases. Artaxata surrendered without a struggle. The lives of the inhabitants were spared, but the walls were pulled down and the city burned. Rome celebrated the victory by erecting statues and triumphal arches and creating new holidays.
​In the spring of 59 Corbulo turned southward and, passing by the borders of the country of the Mardi and through that of the Tauraunites, drew near Tigranocerta. In the course of this march the army suffered more from hardships than from attacks by the Armenians, but two strongholds which resisted were reduced, one by storm, the other by siege. Ambassadors from Tigranocerta approached to present a gold crown to Corbulo and inform him that the city was prepared to surrender. But when the army arrived before the city the gates seem to have been closed. To discourage a lengthy defense Corbulo executed an Armenian noble whom he had captured and shot his head into the city. It fell into the midst of a council of war—a fact which hastened the surrender of the city without further resistance.
At a fort named Legerda Corbulo met with strong resistance, and it had to be taken by storm. Corbulo evidently wintered at Tigranocerta.
About this time the Hyrcanian ambassadors who ​had been in Rome were returning to their own country. They crossed the Euphrates, probably near Melitene, and had an interview with Corbulo. Apparently the ambassadors proceeded eastward to their own country.
The next year, 60, Tiridates made an attempt to recover his kingdom by an invasion from the direction of Media Atropatene. Corbulo sent Severus Verulanus, a legate, with auxiliaries, and followed as rapidly as possible himself. Tiridates was easily repulsed and forced to flee. Fire and sword soon reduced the country to submission.
Armenia was then entirely in the possession of the Romans, and Nero appointed Tigranes V, great-grandson of Archelaus, the last king of Cappadocia, as ruler. Parts of Armenia were intrusted to Pharasmanes of Iberia, Polemon of Pontus, Aristobulus of Lesser Armenia, and Antiochus of Commagene, in order to make the control of the newly subdued territory easier, for some people still favored the Parthians. Leaving a thousand legionaries with three or four thousand cavalry and infantry auxiliaries to support the new ruler, Corbulo returned to Syria, where he succeeded Quadratus, who had died.
Tigranes, as soon as he was established, proceeded in 61 to invade and ravage Adiabene. Either events ​in Hyrcania had now reached such a stage as to be utterly hopeless or Vologases considered that this invasion of Adiabene was of sufficient importance to warrant his departure from the Hyrcanian front. Murmurs in Parthia from discontented nobles were encouraged by Tiridates, deposed king of Armenia, who felt that his brother, Vologases of Parthia, had not assisted him sufficiently. Monobazus, ruler of invaded Adiabene, contemplated surrender to the Romans rather than capture by Tigranes. Vologases called a council of the nobles and reaffirmed his brother's rights to Armenia. His own cavalry he turned over to Monaeses, a Parthian noble, with orders to co-operate with Monobazus and the forces of Adiabene in driving Tigranes from Armenia, while he planned to abandon the contest with Hyrcania and to threaten Syria with the main Parthian force. Corbulo dispatched to Armenia under Severus Verulanus and Vettius Bolanus two legions, perhaps the IV Scythica and the XII Fulminata, and placed on the Euphrates the III Gallica, the VI Ferrata, and the X Fretensis, all of which he augmented by levies. All the crossings were defended, and water supplies carefully guarded. In view of the serious situation, Corbulo requested of Nero that an additional commander be sent to take charge of Armenia.
Tigranes anticipated trouble with the Parthians ​and therefore withdrew into Tigranocerta. Monaeses and his Parthian forces cut off convoys carrying food to the city and shortly thereafter appeared before its walls. An attempt to storm it proved unsuccessful, and siege was begun. When Corbulo heard of these events, he threatened Vologases with an invasion of Mesopotamia unless the siege was raised. Corbulo's messenger reached the Parthian king at Nisibis. Vologases was inclined to seek peace, since the Romans were so well prepared and the besieged city so strong, and since forage for the Parthian cavalry had been destroyed by a plague of locusts. For these reasons an agreement was reached, and it was announced that Vologases was sending ambassadors to Rome to request control of Armenia. Monaeses was ordered to abandon the siege of Tigranocerta, and the Parthian monarch returned to his own country. The Roman concessions were not immediately disclosed: Tigranes and the Roman legion. which supported him were likewise to withdraw from Armenia. The soldiers spent the winter of 61/62 in temporary quarters on the Cappadocian frontier.
In response to the request of Corbulo, L. Caesennius Paetus was appointed governor of Cappadocia. A division of troops was made; the IV Scythica, the XII Fulminata, the V Macedonica (which had recently been withdrawn from Moesia), and certain auxiliaries from Pontus, Galatia, and Cappadocia ​were placed at the command of Paetus, while the III Gallica, the VI Ferrata, and the X Fretensis were allotted to Corbulo. The troops were apparently paid in silver which had been specially struck at Caesarea in Cappadocia. Corbulo took up a position on the Euphrates, where he effectively discouraged any Parthian advance in that direction.
The ambassadors whom Vologases had dispatched to Rome returned, unsuccessful, and the Parthians prepared to resume hostilities. Paetus at once assumed the offensive. Planning to take Tigranocerta, he crossed the Euphrates, probably near Melitene (Malatya), with his two legions, the IV Scythica un­ der Funisulanus Vettonianus and the XII Fulminata under Calavius Sabinus. The V Macedonica was left in Pontus for the winter. After he had reduced some of the nearer fortresses, Paetus was forced by the approach of cold weather into winter quarters at Rhandeia on the Arsanias River, a tributary of the Euphrates. Now that the Romans had made the first move in the contest, Vologases took the field in ear​est. Paetus had greatly weakened his legions by granting leaves to all who applied for them. In addition his troops were not those who had been whipped into shape by Corbulo, and some of the best men were with the V Macedonica in Pontus. One cohort was dispatched to guard the wife and small son of Paetus, who were placed for safety in a fortress at Arsamosata.
Corbulo in the meantime had succeeded in bridging the Euphrates, perhaps at Zeugma, under heavy fire. He brought up ships of considerable size furnished with towers on which were placed ballistae and catapults which cleared the hills on the opposite side of the river. The bridge was thus completed and a camp established to protect the bridgehead. This success caused the Parthians to abandon their thoughts of a Syrian invasion and to turn all of their forces against the Romans in Armenia.
As soon as Paetus heard of the advance of Vologases, he at once proceeded against the Parthian. Vologases easily forced him to retire to his camp, but he failed to press home the advantage thus gained. To make matters worse, Paetus divided his forces and sent three thousand men to guard the near-by passes of the Taurus while he kept the remainder in the winter camp near Rhandeia. As an additional precaution he informed Corbulo of the seriousness of his position. Upon the receipt of this news a thousand men from each legion, eight hundred cavalry, and an ​equal number of auxiliaries were ordered to be prepared to march on short notice. Meanwhile the position of Paetus was becoming increasingly dangerous. The advance posts and isolated Roman detachments were quickly overcome by the enemy, and a regular siege of the camp was begun. Again messengers went to Corbulo, this time with a plea for immediate aid.
Then Corbulo began his march. Leaving a part of his forces to maintain the forts along the Euphrates, he moved by the shortest and best provisioned route through Commagene, Cappadocia, and then Armenia. To avoid such difficulties as Paetus had encountered in securing provisions, Corbulo carried wheat on camels which followed the army. Shortly he began to meet fugitives from the besieged Roman camp, and thenceforward he proceeded by forced marches with great rapidity. But Paetus was unable to await his arrival and entered into negotiations with the Parthians. Doubtless the latter were aware of the proximity of the relieving column and were glad to arrange a peace. The Roman commission was forced to negotiate with Vasaces, the Parthian cavalry commander. An agreement was reached on the second day, when Corbulo was but three days' march away. Monobazus of Adiabene acted as witness to the treaty thus concluded, the terms of which were naturally highly favorable to the Parthians.
​The siege of the camp was to be abandoned, and all Roman soldiers were to be withdrawn from the confines of Armenia. All forts, supplies, and provisions were to be turned over to the Parthians. When these conditions had been fulfilled, Vologases was to be free to send ambassadors to Nero to negotiate the Armenian question. In addition the Romans were forced to bridge the Arsanias River (Murat Su), which ran before their camp, as a visible symbol of their defeat. These stipulations were carried out faithfully, but not without further difficulties for the vanquished; for even before the Roman troops left the intrenchments, the Armenians entered and seized the arms and clothing of the legionaries, who dared not protest lest a general massacre ensue.
Paetus hastened to the Euphrates, abandoning his wounded along the way. There he met Corbulo, whom he attempted to persuade to return with him and resume the attack. This Corbulo sensibly refused to do. He returned directly to Syria, while Paetus spent the winter in Cappadocia.
Monaeses was sent by Vologases to Corbulo with a request that the forts on the east side of the Euphrates be abandoned by the Romans. Negotiations were conducted on the bridge which Corbulo had built over the river, but only after the central portion had been destroyed. The Roman commander agreed to evacuate the forts if the Parthians would ​withdraw from Armenia, a condition to which they agreed.
The ambassadors sent by Vologases arrived in Rome in the spring of 63. They proposed that Tiridates should receive the crown of Armenia at Roman headquarters, explaining that only his duties as a Magus prevented him from coming to Rome for the investiture. Though the request was denied, the ambassadors were sent back with presents—an action from which they might infer that if Tiridates appeared in person at Rome the appeal would be granted.
Preparations were then made to continue the war. The administration of Syria was given to C. Cestius Gallus, and the military forces, augmented by the XV Apollinaris from Pannonia under Marius Celsus, were intrusted to Corbulo. Paetus having returned to Rome, the authority of Corbulo was now increased until it was such that Tacitus compared it with that of Pompey under the Manilian Law. The IV Scythica and the XII Fulminata, which had lost the best of their men and were low in morale, were sent to Syria. Picked troops were then gathered at Melitene, ready to cross the Euphrates. They consisted of the III Gallica and the VI Ferrata from Syria, the V Macedonica, which had remained in Pontus, and the recently arrived XV Apollinaris. Crack units ​from Illyria and Egypt, the latter probably part of the XXII Deiotariana, and auxiliaries from allied kings were also assembled there.
Corbulo as he advanced into Armenia over the route followed by Lucullus and Paetus destroyed citadels and spread terror throughout the countryside. Proposals of peace arrived from Tiridates and Vologases, and the Parthian ambassadors were accompanied on their return by some Roman centurions who carried messages of a conciliatory nature. Vologases craftily proposed that a meeting be arranged at Rhandeia, where Paetus had been forced to surrender. Tiberius Alexander and Annius Vinicianus, son-in-law of Corbulo, went to the camp of Tiridates as pledges against ambush. The leaders, each accompanied by twenty horsemen, met and agreed that Tiridates was to receive Armenia, but only from the hands of Nero. In a formal ceremony some days later the Armenian monarch removed the crown from his head before the assembled Roman and Parthian troops and laid it at the feet of a statue of Nero erected for that purpose.
This agreement was reached late in 63, but it was not until 66 that it was consummated. A part of ​this period was no doubt occupied by a long trip which Tiridates took to visit his mother and his brothers Pacorus, king of Atropatene, and Vologases, the Parthian monarch, who was at Ecbatana. In the interim the daughter of Tiridates and also his kingdom remained as hostages in Roman hands. The troops on the eastern frontier were kept ready for action, and there is evidence that the crossing near Melitene was used by troops which were pushed forward into Armenian territory.
While the war was in progress Nero had erected a triumphal arch in Rome; now that the struggle was concluded, he issued a series of coins to commemorate the closing of the Temple of Janus.
On the long journey to Rome Tiridates took care to observe the Zoroastrian regulations which were laid on him by his priestly office. The entire trip was made by land to avoid defiling the sea, and the large sums of money required to support the three thou​sand horsemen who accompanied the Armenian king were drawn from the Roman state treasury. Besides his own sons, Tiridates took with him those of his two brothers and of Monobazus. The queen also was a member of the party and rode beside her lord, wearing a helmet in lieu of the usual veil. The whole trip took some nine months. In Italy Tiridates traveled in a two-horse carriage sent by Nero which conveyed him by way of Pisenum to Neapolis, where he was met by the Emperor. Here Tiridates did obeisance and paid homage to Nero; but, like the warrior that he was, he refused to remove his dagger, preferring to fasten it to its sheath with nails.
A gladiatorial exhibition was given at the near-by city of Puteoli, after which the party proceeded to Rome. The Imperial City was decorated for the occasion, and great crowds gathered to watch the ceremony. Tiridates again humbled himself before Nero, who then declared him king of Armenia and placed the diadem upon his head. After a stay of some duration in Rome Tiridates returned home partly by land and partly by sea, for he crossed from Brundisium to Dyrrachium and then passed through Asia Minor. He brought back with him many costly gifts and numbers of artisans in order to rebuild the capital city of Artaxata.
​This trip of Tiridates affords us glimpses of Zoroastrianism which unite with other scraps of evidence to show that in the second half of the first century after Christ a wave of oriental reaction was taking place. On the coins of the contemporary Parthian king Vologases I the altar appears for the first time in the history of Arsacid numismatics, and the figure of a man making an offering before a similar object is frequent. Under this same ruler all of the scattered remains of the manuscript or oral traditions of the Avesta were ordered collected. For the first time Pahlavi appears on the coins in addition to the traditional Greek, which has by now become hopelessly corrupt.
The period of peace which followed the temporary settlement of the Armenian question is responsible for a dearth of information on Parthia. There is even considerable doubt as to the length of the reign of Vologases I; it probably extended to 79/80. Military preparations on a large scale were made by Rome in the years 66 and 67: a new legion, the I Italica, was created; and one of the crack legions, the XIV Gemina (Martia Victrix), was started on the journey to the eastern front. At the time of his ​death in 68 Nero was engaged in plans for a great expedition which had as its objective the Iron Gates of the Caucasus. Possibly its ultimate aim was the Alani, as has been suggested, or it might have been a feint to keep the Parthians occupied and thus prevent their sending aid to the Jews; but in any case hostilities with the Parthians could hardly have been avoided. The troublous times which followed Nero's death put a stop to all such preparations.
In 69 Vespasian declared himself emperor. Vologases, informed of the event, sent ambassadors to Alexandria the next year to offer him the use of forty thousand Parthian horse. The letter which they bore was addressed: "The King of Kings, Arsaces, to Flavius Vespasianus, greetings." Possibly this salutation had something to do with the polite refusal which followed, but more likely Vespasian felt he had the situation in hand. Sohaemus of Emesa and Antiochus of Commagene joined forces with Vespasian, and embassies were sent to the Parthians and Armenians so that peaceful relations might be established with them. In 71 Vologases sent his congratulations to Titus at Zeugma on the Roman victories over the Jews and presented him with a gold crown. ​The gift was accepted, and the messengers who brought it were feasted before their return.
An incident occurred in 72 which threatened to break the established peace. L. Caesennius Paetus, formerly with Corbulo and now governor of Syria, informed Vespasian of a projected alliance of Antiochus of Commagene and his son Epiphanes with Vologases against Rome. The union would have been dangerous, for Samosata, the capital of Commagene, lay on the Euphrates at one of the best crossings. The Parthians would thus have an excellent base for operations in Syria and Cilicia. Paetus was given authority to proceed against Antiochus, which he did with all possible speed. Moving forward with the X Fretensis and some auxiliaries furnished by Aristobulus of Chalcis and Sohaemus of Emesa, Paetus took Antiochus of Commagene by surprise. That king gathered his wife and children and retired before the Roman advance, which swept into Samosata without a struggle. Though Antiochus himself was not disposed to contest the matter by force of arms, his two sons, Epiphanes and Callinicus, with such troops as they could muster, barred the passage. An all-day battle resulted in a draw at nightfall, when the king ​left and continued his flight. This so disheartened the troops that they deserted to the Romans and the princes fled for refuge to Vologases with a guard of only ten men. Among the Parthians they were well treated, but they were later surrendered to Velius Rufus, who had been sent by Vespasian to secure them. Antiochus was placed under arrest by the Romans, but was allowed to live in Sparta, where he was furnished with sufficient money to maintain an estate such as befitted a king. Lesser Armenia and Commagene were then made into provinces and garrisoned accordingly. The absorption of these frontier kingdoms was in accord with the policy begun under Tiberius and now continued under Vespasian, who had become thoroughly acquainted with the eastern situation during his campaign in Judea.
The number of standing legions in the Near East was raised, as well as the number of high commands. Syria and Commagene, which was added to it, had the III Gallica, the IV Scythica, and the VI Ferrata; Judea retained the X Fretensis; and the V Macedonia, which had been utilized in the Jewish War, was sent back to Moesia via Alexandria early in 71. ​Cappadocia, Lesser Armenia, and Galatia were placed under one governor with military headquarters at Melitene. Apparently there were no legions in Cappadocia at the beginning of Vespasian's reign, and he was the first to station legions there. The legions for this district were the XII Fulminata and at least one other, probably the XVI Flavia.
The invasion of Parthian territory by the Alani, a nomadic tribe of the north, occurred about a.d. 72. They advanced from their territory near Lake Maeotis (the Sea of Azov), secured an alliance with the king of the now independent Hyrcania, and passed ​to the south through the Iron Gates of the Caucasus and thence into Media Atropatene. Pacorus, brother of Vologases I, installed in that country at the accession of Vologases to the Parthian throne, was driven into some remote spot. His harem fell into the hands of the Alani, but he succeeded in ransoming his wife and concubines. The hordes continued their march westward and defeated Tiridates, king of Armenia, within the confines of his own country, where they nearly captured him with a lasso. Satiated with booty, they returned eastward.
In 75 Vologases appealed to Rome for aid against the Alani, but Vespasian did not send either Titus or Domitian as the Parthian monarch had requested. There was a Roman force in at least one of the passes of the Caucasus, and Vespasian aided Mithradates of Iberia to fortify his capital, Metskheta. While these precautions were ostensibly for the purpose of curbing the Alani, they might also have been directed ​against the Parthians. In 76 M. Ulpius Trajan, father of the future emperor, received triumphal insignia for some diplomatic victory over the Parthians. The work of Valerius Flaccus, a part of which must have been composed about this time, clearly mirrors Roman interest in the Alani and in the Caucasus region.
* ↑ Tac. Ann. xiii. 6; Nero was seventeen years old on the sixteenth of December, 54.
* ↑ Tac. Ann. xiii. 7; Josephus Ant. xx. 158 and Bell. ii. 252; Dessau 8958. Emesa and Sophene are too far apart to make the identity of these two men likely; see PW, art. "Sohaemus," No. 4.
* ↑ On the legions see PW, art. "Legio," both the general section and those on the individual units, also "Domitius (Corbulo)" in Suppl. III. Frontinus Strat. iv. 2.3 apparently refers to the beginning of the campaign. Cf. also the mention of Arrius Varus, who was successful in Armenia, by Tac. Ann. xiii. 9 and Hist. iii. 6 (perhaps different men of that name are meant).
* ↑ See CAH, X, 879, for a discussion and bibliography on this pretender to the throne. The relationship here accepted depends on an emendation of Tac. Ann. xiii. 7. 2.
* ↑ Wroth, Parthia, p. lii, n. 2, points out that the appearance of "Vol." on some of the drachms of Vologases is suggestive of the fact that he was confronted with a rival. For a similar instance in the cuneiform literature see pp. 50–52.
* ↑ On the statement of Tac. Ann. xiii. 35 that it came "ex Germania," see PW, art. "Legio (IIII Scythica)," cols. 1558 f.
* ↑ See discussion and bibliography in CAH, X, 880, n. 5.
* ↑ Tac. Ann. xiii. 37. 6, xiv. 25. 2, xv. 1. 1; Wroth, Parthia, p. liii. Hyrcania may have supported the revolt of Vologases' son.
* ↑ Dio Cass. lxii. 19–20; Tac. Ann. xiii. 39–41.
* ↑ Tac. Ann. xiii. 41. 3. This was probably the end of the campaign season, and, as suggested by Furneaux in his ed. of the Annals, II, 114, n. 2, the city may not have been destroyed until after the army had wintered there. Such compression of chronology would be typical of Tacitus' account of eastern affairs.
* ↑ PW, art. "Tigranokerta." On the eclipse of 59 see Pliny Hist. nat. ii. 180.
* ↑ Frontinus Strat. ii. 9. 5; cf. Tac. Ann. xiv. 24. 6. For army discipline during this campaign see Frontinus Strat. iv. I. 21 and 28. The coins (McDowell, Coins from Seleucia, pp. 228 f.) strongly suggest that Seleucia was in revolt from 59/60–61/62.
* ↑ This is the Elugia of Tiglathpileser III, as Lehmann-Haupt points out in Zeitschr. für Ethnologie, XXXII (1900), 438, n. 4; see also Olmstead, "Shalmaneser III and the Establishment of the Assyrian Power," JAOS, XLI (1921), 359 f., n. 31.
* ↑ Tac. Ann. xiv. 24–25.
* ↑ The text of Tac. Ann. xiv. 25, "maris rubri," must be corrupt. The emendation "maris sui," which has been suggested, seems reasonable.
* ↑ Tac. Ann. xiv. 26; Josephus Ant. xviii. 140 and Bell. ii. 222; PW, art. "Tigranes," No. 6.
* ↑ Tac. Ann. xv. 2; Dio Cass. lxii. 20.
* ↑ Statius Silvae v. 2. 32 ff. mentions the activities of Bolanus.
* ↑ Tac. Ann. xv. 5 f.; cf. Dio Cass. lxii. 20.
* ↑ Tac. Hist. iii. 24 and Ann. xiii. 8 and xv. 6. 5; see also Victor Chapot, La frontière de l'Euphrate de Pompée à la conquête arabe (Paris, 1907), p. 79. See also CIL, XIV, No. 3608 = Dessau 986.
* ↑ Mattingly and Sydenham, Rom. Imp. Coin., I, 15, n. 4, and p. 147, coins Nos. 37 ff. The reverse {ibid., PL X, No. 159) bears the legend ARMENIAC and a Victory holding a palm and a wreath.
* ↑ Tac. Ann. xv. 7; Dio Cass. lxii. 20.
* ↑ Tac. Ann. xv. 9.
* ↑ Dio Cass. lxii. 21; B. W. Henderson, "Rhandeia and the River Arsanias," Journ. of Philology, XXVIII (1903), 271 ff.
* ↑ Whether or not Tacitus attempts to cover up deliberate negligence on the part of Corbulo in not hastening to the relief need not be discussed here.
* ↑ Tac. Ann. xv. 14; Dio Cass. lxii. 21; cf. also Suet. Nero 39. 1.
* ↑ Tac. Ann. xv. 25; CIL III, Nos. 6741–42a = Dessau 232; J. G. C. Anderson in Class. Rev., XLV (1931), 190.
* ↑ An inscription from Bithynia honors Sulpicius Scaptia Asper of the VI Ferrata and refers to the legion's wintering in Cappadocia; see F. W. Hasluck, "Inscriptions from the Cyzicus District, 1906," JHS, XXVII (1907), p. 64, No. 5; A. von Domaszewski, "Kleine Beitrage zur Kaisergeschichte," Philologus, LXVII (1908), 5–8. This is the Asper of Tac. Ann. xv. 49 ff.
* ↑ Tac. Ann. xv. 24–31; cf. Josephus Bell. ii. 379, speech of Agrippa in 66; Mommsen, Prov. Rom. Emp., II, 64; CAH, X, 770–73.
* ↑ The III Gallica under Titus Aurelius Fulvus was stationed at Ziata (Harput), where it apparently built a fortress at the command of Corbulo; see CIL, III, Nos. 6741–42a = Dessau 232.
* ↑ 31 Tac. Ann. xv. 18. 1. The arch is probably represented on coins; see Mattingly and Sydenham, Rom. Imp. Coin, I, 155, n. 1, and coins Nos. 147 ff.
* ↑ Mattingly and Sydenham, Rom. Imp. Coin., I, 156, n. 1, and coins Nos. 159 ff.
* ↑ Pliny Hist. nat. xxx. 16 f.; Tac. Ann. xv. 24.
* ↑ Pliny loc. cit.; The Zend-Avesta. I. The Vendidad, tr. by James Darmesteter ("The Sacred Books of the East," ed. F. Max Müller, IV [2d ed.; Oxford, 1895]), pp. lxxv–lxxvii.
* ↑ Dio Cass. lxii (lxiii. 1. 2—6. 1); Suet. Nero 13.
* ↑ For an interpretation of this trip of Tiridates see F. Cumont, "L'iniziazione di Nerone da parte di Tiridate d'Armenia," Rivista di filologia, LXI (1933), 145–54.
* ↑ Wroth, Parthia, Pl. XXIX 11 f.
* ↑ Ibid., Pl. XXIX 8–10.
* ↑ Zend-Avesta. I. Vendidad, tr. by Darmesteter, pp. xxxviii–xli.
* ↑ Wroth, Parthia, pp. 182 f.
* ↑ Ibid., pp. xlix f.; McDowell, Coins from Seleucia, p. 192.
* ↑ Suet. Nero 19; Dio Cass. lv. 24. 2.
* ↑ Tac. Hist. ii. 11, 27, 66; W. Schur, Die Orientpolitik des Kaisers Nero (Klio, Beiheft XV [1923]), pp. 107 ff.
* ↑ Tac. Hist. i. 6; Suet. Nero 19; Dio Cass. lxii (lxiii. 8. 1); Pliny Hist. nat. vi. 40; CAH, X, 773–78. See also E. M. Sanford, "Nero and the East," Harvard Studies in Classical Philology, XLVIII (1937), 75–103.
* ↑ Mommsen, Prov. Rom. Emp., II, 65 f. and n. 3.
* ↑ Suet. Vespasian 6 ; Tac. Hist. iv. 51. On a revolt in Seleucia in 69/70 see McDowell, Coins from Seleucia, pp. 228 f.
* ↑ Dio Cass. lxv (lxvi. 11. 3).
* ↑ Tac. Hist. ii. 81 f.; v. 1.
* ↑ Josephus Bell. vii. 105 f.
* ↑ C. E. S. Gsell, Essai sur le règne de l'empereur Domitien (Paris, 1893), pp. 232–34. H. C. Newton, The Epigraphical Evidence for the Reigns of Vespasian and Titus ("Cornell Studies in Classical Philology," XVI [New York, 1901]), pp. 19 f. and No. 254, does not date the consulship of Paetus; but cf. PW, art. "Syria," col. 1629.
* ↑ CIL, III, No. 14387 i = Dessau 9198; also Dessau 9200.
* ↑ Josephus Bell. vii. 219–43.
* ↑ Franz Cumont, "L'Annexion du Pont Polémoniaque et de la Petite Arménie," Anatolian Studies Presented to Sir William Mitchell Ramsay (Manchester, 1923), p. 114 and notes; Theodore Reinach, "Le mari de Salomé et les monnaies de Nicopolis d'Arménie," Revue des études anciennes, XVI (1914), 133–58.
* ↑ Suet. Vespasian 8. 4; Tac. Hist. ii. 81; S. E. Stout, "L. Antistius Rusticus," Class. Philol., XXI (1926), 49. PW, art. "Legio" (pub. 192425), contains nearly all of the evidence available on the subject.
* ↑ Josephus Bell. vii. 244–51 and Ant. xviii. 97; Suet. Domitian 2. 2; Dio Cass, lxv (lxvi. 15. 3); perhaps Lucan De bell. civ. viii. 223. Suggested dates for the invasion run from 72 to 74; see B. Niese, "Zur Chronologie des Josephus," Hermes, XXVIII (1893), 209–11, a.d. 73; Emil Schürer, Geschichte des jüdischen Volkes im Zeitalter Jesu Christi, I (Leipzig, 1901), 639, n. 139, a.d. 72; E. Täubler, "Zur Geschichte der Alanen," Klio, IX (1909), 18, a.d. 72 or 73; Rostovtzeff, Iranians and Greeks in S. Russia, p. 118, a.d. 73–74; R. P. Longden, "Notes on the Parthian Campaigns of Trajan," JRS, XXI (1931), 23, and Josef Markwart, "Iberer und Hyrkanier," Caucasica, VIII (1931), 80, a.d. 72.
* ↑ There have been numerous attempts to emend the text of Josephus, especially on the basis of early translations of the Chinese sources; see Täubler, op. cit., pp. 18 ff. More recent work on these same sources makes it probable that Josephus was correct, as Gutschmid, Geschichte Irans, p. 133, recognized; see Hirth, "Story of Chang K'ién," JAOS, XXXVII (1917), 96. J. Saint-Martin, "Discours sur l'origine et l'histoire des Arsacides," JA, I (1822), 65–77, believed the original Parthian invasion was similar in character to that of such peoples as the Alani.
* ↑ Josephus Bell. vii. 245.
* ↑ There were Roman troops stationed here at one time, but possibly this was later, in 75; see Statius Silvae iv. 4. 61 ff.
* ↑ Suet. Domitian 2. 2; Dio Cass. lxv (lxvi. 15. 3).
* ↑ CIL, III, No. 6052, plus a minor correction by A. Aminraschwili quoted in Philol. Wochenschr., XLVIII (1928), col. 838. See also JA, 6. sér., XIII (1869), 93–103; C. de la Berge, Essai sur le règne de Trajan ("Bibliothèque de l'École des hautes études," XXXII [Paris, 1877]), p. 163; Newton, Vesp. and Tit., pp. 19 f. The fact that almost every Roman campaign in Mesopotamia began with an expedition into Armenia disproves the belief of D. Magie, "Roman Policy in Armenia and Transcaucasia and Its Significance," Amer. Hist. Assoc., Annual Report for 1919, I (Washington, D.C., 1923), 300–303, that Roman interest in these regions was not military but commercial.
* ↑ W. H. Waddington, Fastes des provinces asiatiques (Paris, 1872), No. 100; Pliny Panegyricus 14. That no serious fighting took place is shown by Tac. Hist. i. 2; Victor Epit. 9. 12 and De Caes. 9. 10.
* ↑ Valerius Flaccus iii. 493 f.; v. 558–60 and 600 f.; vi. 65 f., 106 f., 114–35, 203 f., 507 f., 690–92. To about this same time may belong the Pahlavi document Avroman III. It is dated 321 (a.e.?), i.e., a.d. 74, or, if it is dated in the Seleucid era, a.d. 10. See A. Cowley, "The Pahlavi Document from Avroman," JRAS, 1919, pp. 147–54; A. H. Sayce, "Two Notes on Hellenic Asia. I. The Aramaic Parchment from Avroman," JHS, XXXIX (1919), 202–4; J. M. Unvala, "On the Three Parchments from Avroman in Kurdistan," Bull. School of Or. Studies, I 4 (1920), 125–44; H. S. Nyberg, "The Pahlavi Documents from Avroman," Le monde oriental, XVII (1923), 182–230.