OpenLLM-France/wikimedia huggingface dataset:
# PROTECT Our Children Act of 2008/Title III
## TITLE III--EFFECTIVE CHILD PORNOGRAPHY PROSECUTION
### SEC. 301. PROHIBIT THE BROADCAST OF LIVE IMAGES OF CHILD ABUSE.

Section 2251 of title 18, United States Code is amended--
       (1) in subsection (a), by--
          (A) inserting `or for the purpose of transmitting a live visual depiction of such conduct' after `for the purpose of producing any visual depiction of such conduct';
          (B) inserting `or transmitted' after `if such person knows or has reason to know that such visual depiction will be transported';
          (C) inserting `or transmitted' after `if that visual depiction was produced'; and
          (D) inserting `or transmitted' after `has actually been transported'; and
       (2) in subsection (b), by--
          (A) inserting `or for the purpose of transmitting a live visual depiction of such conduct' after `for the purpose of producing any visual depiction of such conduct';
          (B) inserting `or transmitted' after `person knows or has reason to know that such visual depiction will be transported';
          (C) inserting `or transmitted' after `if that visual depiction was produced'; and
          (D) inserting `or transmitted' after `has actually been transported'.

### SEC. 302. AMENDMENT TO SECTION 2256 OF TITLE 18, UNITED STATES CODE.

Section 2256(5) of title 18, United States Code is amended by--
       (1) striking `and' before `data';
       (2) after `visual image' by inserting `, and data which is capable of conversion into a visual image that has been transmitted by any means, whether or not stored in a permanent format'.

### SEC. 303. AMENDMENT TO SECTION 2260 OF TITLE 18, UNITED STATES CODE.

Section 2260(a) of title 18, United States Code, is amended by--
       (1) inserting `or for the purpose of transmitting a live visual depiction of such conduct' after `for the purpose of producing any visual depiction of such conduct'; and
       (2) inserting `or transmitted' after `imported'.

### SEC. 304. PROHIBITING THE ADAPTATION OR MODIFICATION OF AN IMAGE OF AN IDENTIFIABLE MINOR TO PRODUCE CHILD PORNOGRAPHY.

    (a) Offense- Subsection (a) of section 2252A of title 18, United States Code, is amended--
       (1) in paragraph (5), by striking `; or' at the end and inserting a semicolon;
       (2) in paragraph (6), by striking the period at the end and inserting `; or'; and
       (3) by inserting after paragraph (6) the following:
                `(7) knowingly produces with intent to distribute, or distributes, by any means, including a computer, in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, child pornography that is an adapted or modified depiction of an identifiable minor.'.
    (b) Punishment- Subsection (b) of section 2252A of title 18, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:
                `(3) Whoever violates, or attempts or conspires to violate, subsection (a)(7) shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 15 years, or both.'.
# PR Comments on the results of the Tribunal for ISN 312

* related portals: Guantanamo.
* sister projects: Wikipedia article, Wikidata item.
Wikified from page 107 of http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/detainees/csrt_arb/publicly_filed_CSRT_records_2015-2121.pdf on November 17th, 2007
Unclassified//FOUO
PR Comments on the results of the Tribunal for #312
I do not believe the Tribunal gave proper weigh to exhibit D-c. The purpose of D-c was not necessarily to prove that the detainee was not properly classified as an enemy combatant, rather is was to shed light on the veracity of the testimony of detainee . While the spreadsheet is not a comprehensive document, it does show that detainee has provided information on over 60 detainees, currently at . These detainee come form varying countries and backgrounds and were in widely separate areas of Afghanistan. In order for to know over 10% of the detainees by sight and name, he would have to have known almost a similar portion of non-detained Taliban and al Qaida personnel in Afghanistan. This though strains the imagination. Specifically regarding #312, detaine indicated that he saw him at training camp during his  on week of training in April 2001. All documentary evidence indicates that detainee was not in Afghanistan until July 2001 and therefore could not have seen him. I investigated file and prepared the spreadsheet (D-c). After identifying over 60 detainees, I realized that a comprehensive investigation regarding each identified detainee was not possible. However, there were a limited amount that the detainee identified at . I then reviewed the travels of each of the detainees that identified at . Based on the documents in our possession, not one of the detainees that identified at was in the country at the time that would have been able to identify them as being trained at this camp. Barring each of these detainees having elaborate cover stories that have not been compromised over the length of their detainment, the testimony of should not be relied upon.
This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
Public domainPublic domainfalsefalse
# Poems & poèmes

NATALIE CLIFFORD BARNEY
POEMS & POÈMES
autres alliances
| EMILE-PAUL FRÈRES ÉDITEURS A PARIS | GEORGE H. DORAN Co ÉDITORS. NEW-YORK |
This work is in the public domain in the United States because it was published before January 1, 1929.
The longest-living author of this work died in 1972, so this work is in the public domain in countries and areas where the copyright term is the author's life plus 51 years or less. This work may be in the public domain in countries and areas with longer native copyright terms that apply the rule of the shorter term to foreign works.
Public domainPublic domainfalsefalse
# Parish v. United States (75 U.S. 489)/Opinion of the Court

* Court Documents
* Case Syllabus
* Opinion of the Court
United States Supreme Court
75 U.S. 489
Parish v. United States
Upon the facts found by the Court of Claims, it is difficult to perceive upon what ground the contractors can urge any claim for damages against the government. The contract with New Orleans erased, superseded all other proposed contracts. No other had any validity. The action of Magruder, until the approval of the Secretary of War, was merely initiatory to a contract. He could not bind the United States in any way.
If the claimants had any objections to the provisions of the contract they signed, they should have refused to make it. Having made it, and executed it, their mouths are closed against any denial that it superseded all previous arrangements.
The case of Gilbert & Secor v. United States, is one much stronger than this. There it was insisted that the act of Congress, under which the secretary acted in making a contract with Gilbert & Secor, was itself an acceptance of certain proposals presented by them, and that, taken in connection with the proposals, it constituted a contract binding on the government. The secretary made with the parties a contract requiring, in one particular, different kind of materials from those originally proposed; but this court held that the parties were bound by the contract signed, and could not claim any compensation for the difference in value between the materials used and those proposed.
But, independent of any consideration respecting the character of the contract, it nowhere appears that the claimants suffered any damages from the supposed injury alleged. They did not offer to deliver any ice at New Orleans, and it is not shown that they secured any for such delivery, or, if they secured any, that they were unable to part with it at prices as remunerative as those they might have obtained at New Orleans.
The appeal is frivolous, and the decree of the court below is
AFFIRMED.

## Notes

This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
Public domainPublic domainfalsefalse
# Parish v. United States (100 U.S. 500)

* related portals: Supreme Court of the United States.
* sister projects: Wikidata item.
United States Supreme Court
100 U.S. 500
Parish v. United States
APPEAL from the Court of Claims.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
Mr. John B. Sanborn and Mr. Ralph P. Lowe for the appellant.
The Solicitor-General, contra.
MR. JUSTICE MILLER delivered the opinion of the court.

## Notes

This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
Public domainPublic domainfalsefalse
# Parish v. United States (75 U.S. 489)

* related portals: Supreme Court of the United States.
* sister projects: Wikidata item.
United States Supreme Court
75 U.S. 489
Parish v. United States
APPEAL from the Court of Claims. The case was thus:
On the 4th of December, 1863, D. L. Magruder, the surgeon and medical purveyor of the military department of the West, acting under instructions of the Surgeon-General of the United States, gave notice that proposals would be received at his office in Louisville, Kentucky, until the 20th of that month, for furnishing ice to all the general hospitals of the United States at the West, including the division of the Mississippi and the Department of the Gulf, in such quantities as might be required, for the use of the sick and wounded, during the year 1864. Under this notice, Parish & Co., the claimants, submitted proposals which were accepted, and, on the 13th of the same month, a contract was prepared and signed by them and Magruder, by which they were to furnish ice for twenty different places, one of which was New Orleans. It was understood between the parties that this contract was not to be binding until it should receive the approval of the Surgeon-General, to whom it was forwarded. It received such approval, and was then despatched by mail to Magruder; but, before reaching him, the approval was reconsidered, and the contract, by order of the Secretary of War, was recalled, and the draft of another contract prepared in its place. After this draft had reached Magruder, he was directed by the secretary to erase from it the name of New Orleans, as one of the places to be supplied with ice, and have it executed in lieu of the contract originally proposed, and this was done. The claimants then executed the instrument, but, in doing so, they protested against the alteration, stating, however, that they would lay all the facts before the officials at Washington, and seek from them redress. But, notwithstanding this protest, they treated the contract thus made as the only one binding upon them, and carried out their obligations under it. They did not deliver, or offer to deliver, any ice at New Orleans.
Mr. A. L. Merriman, for the appellant; Mr. T. L. Dickey, Assistant Attorney-General, contra.
Mr. Justice FIELD, after stating the facts, delivered the opinion of the court, as follows:

## Notes

This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
Public domainPublic domainfalsefalse
# Parish v. United States

* Search for titles containing or beginning with: "Parish v. United States."
* sister projects: Wikidata item.
This is a disambiguation page. It lists works that share the same title. If an article link referred you here, please consider editing it to point directly to the intended page.
* Parish v. United States (75 U.S. 489)
* Parish v. United States (100 U.S. 500)
# Parisi v. Davidson

United States Supreme Court
396 U.S. 1233
Parisi v. Davidson
Mr. Justice DOUGLAS, Circuit Justice.

## Notes

This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
Public domainPublic domainfalsefalse
# Parisi v. Davidson/Opinion of the Court

* Court Documents
* Case Syllabus
* Opinion of the Court
* Wikipedia article
United States Supreme Court
396 U.S. 1233
Parisi v. Davidson
Applicant claims he is a conscientious objector entitled to classification as such. The Army did not approve that classification and his appeal is now pending before the Army Board for Correction of Military Records.
Meanwhile he applied to the District Court for the Northern District of California for a writ of habeas corpus, and for an order restraining respondents from transferring him out of the Northern District of California. The District Court denied that relief but it did restrain respondents from assigning applicant 'to any duties which require materially greater participation in combat activities or combat training than is required in his present duties.' The District Court retained jurisdiction of the case.
Applicant appealed to the Court of Appeals and asked for an order staying his deployment pending disposition of his appeal. That court denied his motion for a stay 'on condition that Respondents produce the Appellant in this district if the appeal results in his favor.' He now seeks a stay from me, as Circuit Justice; and he represents that he is under orders to report for deployment to Vietnam the day after tomorrow, December 31, 1969.
Applicant is at present assigned to duties of 'psychological counseling.' It would seem offhand from 'psychological counseling' in Vietnam would be no different than 'psychological counseling' in army posts here. He would, of course, be closer to the combat zones than he is at home; and he says that he could end up carrying combat weapons.
I heretofore granted like stays in cases involving deployment of alleged conscientious objectors to Vietnam. See Quinn v. Laird, 89 S.Ct. 1491, 23 L.Ed.2d 34. But this case is different because of the protective order issued by the District Court and the assurance given the Court of Appeals that the applicant will be delivered in the Northern District if he wins his habeas corpus case. Moreover, as the Solicitor General points out, the Secretary of the Army is a party to this action; hence the case will not become moot by the deployment.
If it were clear that applicant would win on the merits, a further protective order at this time would be appropriate. But the merits are in the hands of a competent tribunal and as yet unresolved. And I cannot assume that the Army will risk contempt by flouting the protective order of the District Court.
Application denied.

## Notes

This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
Public domainPublic domainfalsefalse
# Parisi v. Davidson (405 U.S. 34)

* related portals: Supreme Court of the United States.
* sister projects: Wikipedia article.

## Concurring Opinion

    Douglas
Supreme Court of the United States
405 U.S. 34
Parisi v. Davidson et al.
Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
No. 70-91 Argued: October 19-20, 1971 --- Decided: February 23, 1972
Petitioner, a member of the armed forces, applied unsuccessfully for discharge as a conscientious objector. After he had exhausted all his administrative remedies, he filed a habeas corpus petition in Federal District Court, claiming that the Army's denial of his application was without basis in fact. Thereafter court-martial charges were brought against him, and the District Court ordered consideration of the petition deferred until final determination of the court-martial proceedings. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
Held: The District Court should not have stayed its hand in this case. Pp. 37-45.
    (a) All alternative remedies have been exhausted by petitioner. Pp. 37-39.
    (b) Since the military judicial system in its processing of the court-martial charge could not provide the discharge sought by petitioner with promptness and certainty, the District Court should proceed to determine the habeas corpus claim despite the pendency of the court-martial proceedings. Pp. 39-45.
435 F. 2d 299, reversed.
STEWART, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and BRENNAN, WHITE, MARSHALL, and BLACKMUN, JJ., joined. DOUGLAS, J., filed an opinion concurring in the result, post, p. 46. POWELL and REHNQUIST, JJ., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
Richard L. Goff argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were George A. Blackstone and Stephen V. Bomse.
William Terry Bray argued the cause for respondents. On the brief were Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Mardian, William Bradford Reynolds, Robert L. Keuch, and Robert A. Crandall.
# Petticoat

* Search for titles containing or beginning with: "Petticoat."
* sister projects: Wikidata item.
This is a disambiguation page. It lists works that share the same title. If an article link referred you here, please consider editing it to point directly to the intended page.
* The Petticoat: an Heroi-comical Poem (1716), by John Durant Breval
* "Petticoat," in Encyclopædia Britannica (11th ed., 1911)
# Pettigrew v. United States

* related portals: Supreme Court of the United States.
* sister projects: Wikidata item.
United States Supreme Court
97 U.S. 385
PETTIGREW v. UNITED STATES.
ERROR to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District of Tennessee.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
Mr. W. Y. C. Humes for the plaintiff in error.
Mr. Assistant-Attorney-General Smith, contra.
MR. JUSTICE MILLER delivered the opinion of the court.

## Notes

This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
Public domainPublic domainfalsefalse
# Pettit v. Walshe

* related portals: Supreme Court of the United States.
* sister projects: Wikidata item.
United States Supreme Court
194 U.S. 205
Pettit v. Walshe
Argued: April 6, 1904. --- Decided: May 2, 1904
Mr. Charles Fox for appellant.
[Argument of Counsel from pages 205-208 intentionally omitted]
Messrs. Ferdinand Winter and Addison C. Harris for appellee.
[Argument of Counsel from Pages 208-210 intentionally omitted]
Mr. Justice Harlan delivered the opinion of the court:

## Notes

This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
Public domainPublic domainfalsefalse
# Patton v. Nicholson

* related portals: Supreme Court of the United States.
* sister projects: Wikidata item.
United States Supreme Court
16 U.S. 204
Patton v. Nicholson

## Notes

This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
Public domainPublic domainfalsefalse
# Patton v. Taylor

* related portals: Supreme Court of the United States.
* sister projects: Wikidata item.
United States Supreme Court
48 U.S. 132
Patton v. Taylor

## Notes

This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
Public domainPublic domainfalsefalse
# Patton v. United States

* Search for titles containing or beginning with: "Patton v. United States."
* sister projects: Wikidata item.
This is a disambiguation page. It lists works that share the same title. If an article link referred you here, please consider editing it to point directly to the intended page.
* Patton v. United States (159 U.S. 500)
* Patton v. United States (281 U.S. 276)
# Patton v. Texas Pacific Railway Company

* related portals: Supreme Court of the United States.
* sister projects: Wikidata item.
United States Supreme Court
179 U.S. 658
Patton v. Texas Pacific Railway Company
Argued: December 6, 7, 1900. --- Decided: January 7, 1901
Plaintiff in error, plaintiff below, brought his action against the defendant to recover for injuries sustained while in its employ as fireman. A judgment in his favor was reversed on April 10, 1894, by the circuit court of appeals. 9 C. C. A. 487, 23 U.S. App. 319, 61 Fed. Rep. 259. On a second trial in the circuit court the judge directed a verdict for the defendant, upon which judgment was rendered. This judgment was affirmed by the circuit court of appeals (37 C. C. A. 56, 95 Fed. Rep. 244), and thereupon the case was brought here on error.
The facts were that plaintiff was a fireman on a passenger train of the defendant, running from El Paso to Toyah and return. Some three or four hours after one of those trips had been made, and while the engine of which he was fireman was being moved in the railroad yards at El Paso, plaintiff attempted to step off the engine, and in doing so the step turned, and he fell so far under the engine that the wheels passed over his right foot, crushing it so that amputation became necessary. Plaintiff alleged that the step turned because the nut which held it was not securely fastened; that the omission to have it so fastened was negligence on the part of the company, for which it was liable.
Messrs. Frank W. Hackett and Millard Patterson for plaintiff in error.
Messrs. John F. Dillon, Winslow S. Pierce, and David D. Duncan for defendant in error.
Mr. Justice Brewer delivered the opinion of the court:

## Notes

This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
Public domainPublic domainfalsefalse
# Patterson v. Warden/Opinion of the Court

* Court Documents
* Case Syllabus
* Opinion of the Court
United States Supreme Court
372 U.S. 776
Patterson v. Warden
The motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and the petition for writ of certiorari are granted. The judgment is vacated and the case is remanded for further consideration in light of Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792.

## Notes

This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
Public domainPublic domainfalsefalse
# Patton v. Caldwell

* related portals: Supreme Court of the United States.
* sister projects: Wikidata item.
PATTON verʃus CALDWELE.
T
M‘KEAN, Chieƒ Juʃtice.– The objection turns upon this principle, that the Defendant had no opportunity of crofs-examining upon the former trial; and the anfwer is, that he, with the reft of the underwriters, had agreed to be bound by one verdict; which is certainly the only ground for offering the evidence propofed by the Plaintiff's counfel. ​
1789.
Whether this agreement was made in perfon, or by a Broker, mutually employed, it is equally binding on the parties ; and, under the agreement,all the underwriters were fully entitled to interfere upon the former trial, and to crofs-examine the witneffes then produced. Although, therefore, we fhould not have allowed the fpecial verdict to be read without full proof of the agreement; yet, on receiving that fatisfaction, we think it would be unfair to fupprefs it ; and, for the future, we defire, that all fuch agreements may be entered on the records of the Court.
The admiffion of this evidence, however, cannot be conclufive ; as it is manifeft, that teftimony has been given on the prefent occafion, different from what was given on the former ; and, confequently , a very different verdict may with great juftice and propriety take place.
# Patton v. Mississippi

* related portals: Supreme Court of the United States.
* sister projects: Wikidata item.
United States Supreme Court
332 U.S. 463
Patton v. Mississippi
Argued: Nov. 21-24, 1947. --- Decided: Dec 8, 1947
See 33 So.2d 456.
Mr. Thurgood Marshall, of New York City, for petitioner.
Mr. George H. Ethridge, of Jackson, Miss., for respondent.
Mr. Justice BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court.

## Notes

This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
Public domainPublic domainfalsefalse