# American Diplomacy in the Orient/Chapter XIII

Published in 1903
XIII
THE SPANISH WAR: ITS RESULTS
The foregoing pages constitute a narrative of the disinterested efforts of the United States to establish and maintain friendly relations and free commercial intercourse with the countries of the Orient. It has been seen that whenever the American representatives have approached the governments of China, Japan, Korea, and Siam, it was with the statement that their far-away people cherish no scheme of territorial aggrandizement in that region of the world, and that their only desire was to secure mutual benefit from the establishment of trade and to extend the influence of Christian civilization.
An event is now to be recorded which introduced a new factor in the relations of the United States with the Orient and which materially affected its political and commercial conditions and changed its foreign policy. From being a distant country concerned only in unselfish friendship and industrial development, it suddenly and unexpectedly became sovereign over a numerous Asiatic people and possessed of an extensive territorial domain in that quarter of the globe which was to be defended by an American army and navy.
The war with Spain in 1898 was entered upon by the government and people of the United States with no ​thought of territorial acquisition in the Pacific Ocean. The condition of the island of Cuba had been for three quarters of a century a source of embarrassment and concern to them, and the war was undertaken, in the language of President McKinley to Congress, "to relieve the intolerable condition of affairs which is at our doors." The joint resolution of Congress of April 20, 1898, which was virtually the declaration of war, announced the sole purpose to be the expulsion of Spain from Cuba and the establishment there of a free and independent government. But the victory of Admiral Dewey in Manila Bay modified all these plans. The dispatch of his squadron to the Philippines was made necessary by the exposure of American commerce in the Orient and of American cities and towns on the Pacific coast to the reprisals of the Spanish fleet. He fulfilled his orders when he destroyed that fleet. But there was not a single harbor in all the Asiatic waters where his squadron could remain in time of war. His only course was to continue in the harbor captured from the enemy till he received orders from his government.
The close of the war found the Americans in possession of Cuba, Porto Rico, and Manila Bay. The disposition of these conquests presented a serious problem to their government.
The year 1852 saw the end of the careers of the ​triumvirate of great statesmen of the middle period of American history, Calhoun, Clay, and Webster. Henry Clay, in the early period of his political life, was chiefly instrumental in precipitating war with England, in expectation of the conquest of Canada; and he devoted the later years of his public service to laying the foundation of the system of protection out of which has come in large measure the present power and prosperity of the nation. W. H. Seward, who realized more clearly than any other American the great destiny of his country in the Pacific Ocean, standing by the bier of Clay in the senate chamber, uttered these words, which to-day sound like the inspiration of the seer:—
"Certainly, Sir, the great lights of the Senate have set. … We are rising to another and a more sublime stage of national progress—that of expanding wealth and rapid territorial aggrandizement. Our institutions throw a broad shadow across the St. Lawrence, and stretching beyond the valley of Mexico, reaches even to the plains of Central America; while the Sandwich Islands and the shores of China recognize its renovating influence. Wherever that influence is felt, a desire for protection under these institutions is awakened. Expansion seems to be regulated, not by any difficulties of resistance, but from the moderation which results from our own internal constitution. No one knows how rapidly that restraint may give way. Who can tell how fast or how far it ought to yield? Commerce has brought the ancient continents near to us, and created necessities for new positions—perhaps connections or colonies there. … Even prudence will soon ​be required to decide whether distant regions, East or West, shall come under our protection, or be left to aggrandize a rapidly spreading and hostile domain of despotism. Sir, who among us is equal to these mighty questions? I fear there is no one."
These "mighty questions" confronted President McKinley at the close of the Spanish war. It was a comparatively easy matter to decide respecting Cuba and Porto Rico, but the disposition of the Philippines was a much more difficult problem. The country had already to some extent entered upon territorial acquisition in the Pacific. The right to the occupation of the island of Tutuila, in the Samoan group, with the commodious harbor of Pago Pago, had been acquired years before, and the Hawaiian Islands had been added to the American Union. But it was a long stretch across the Pacific to the southern shores of China and Siam. In his perplexity as to the course to be pursued, the President caused to be inserted in the protocol of August 12, 1898, which suspended hostilities and formed the basis for the treaty of peace, the following provision:—
"The United States will occupy and hold the city, bay and harbor of Manila, pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace, which shall determine the control, disposition and government of the Philippines."
While the protocol provided that Spain should relinquish its sovereignty over Cuba, and that it should cede to the United States Porto Rico and other islands in the West Indies, no allusion was made to a change of ​sovereignty in the Philippines. A careful examination of the diplomatic history of the period shows that the attitude of the government which resulted in the acquisition of those islands passed through three stages before the final consummation. In the first stage the President, who from the beginning to the conclusion guided the negotiations, was not in favor of demanding the sovereignty and possession of the islands. The language of the protocol sustains this view, and it is confirmed by the President's unofficial declarations.
A month after the protocol was signed, Messrs. W. R. Day, C. K. Davis, W. P. Frye, George Gray, and Whitelaw Reid were appointed commissioners to negotiate a treaty of peace; and three days afterwards they received their instructions. In this interval the President had changed his attitude. The instructions given the commissioners say: "Without any original thought of complete or even partial acquisition, the presence and success of our arms at Manila [which had been surrendered the day after the protocol was signed] impose upon us obligations which we cannot disregard. The march of events rules and overrules human action." The commissioners were directed to ask for the cession of the island of Luzon, and for reciprocal commercial privileges in the other islands of the Spanish group.
The American representatives arrived in Paris September 28, and held their first meeting with the Spanish ​commissioners October 1. During recess between conferences with the Spanish negotiators, and before the subject of the Philippines was reached, they examined a number of persons more or less informed as to these islands, including General Merritt, commander of the American army at Manila, who was ordered to Paris to advise with the commissioners. The trend of the information received by them was that the natives were strongly opposed to the restoration of Spanish authority; that its rule had been most oppressive and cruel; that the natives were not capable of sustaining an independent government; and that if American authority was withdrawn the islands would fall into hopeless anarchy and misrule. This testimony as taken was cabled to Washington. On October 25, Mr. Day (late Secretary of State) informed the President that there existed differences of opinion among the commission as to the course to be pursued, and asked for further instructions. He himself doubted the wisdom of extending American sovereignty over the Philippines, but would acquiesce in the occupation of Luzon as a commercial base and a naval station. Senator Gray opposed the taking of any part of the territory. The other three commissioners favored a demand for the cession of the entire Philippine group.
Meanwhile the President had made a visit through the States of the central West, attended several peace jubilees, and returned to Washington impressed with the popular sentiment apparently favorable to the acquisition of all the Philippine Islands; and on October 26 Secretary Hay cabled the commission that the President ​was convinced that, on political, commercial, and humanitarian grounds, the cession must be of the whole archipelago. He "is deeply sensible of the grave responsibilities it will impose," but he believes "this course will entail less trouble than any other, and besides will best subserve the interests of the people involved, for whose welfare we cannot escape responsibility."
Thus the third and last stage in the attitude of the government was reached, and a proposition was submitted to the Spanish commissioners for the cession of the Philippines, and the payment to Spain of twenty millions of dollars. The Spanish commissioners protested that the proposition was in violation of the peace protocol, but in order to avoid the horrors of war, they resigned themselves "to the painful strait of submitting to the law of the victor;" and the treaty of peace was signed which contained the cession of the entire Philippine group to the United States.
Three reasons were advanced for requiring the cession of the Philippines, based upon political, commercial, and moral grounds.
It was claimed that the United States had reached a stage in its history where it should no longer confine its influences to the western hemisphere. Modern means of communication had annihilated distance, so that the United States was nearer to the Philippines than it was to California when that territory was acquired from ​Mexico. The Pacific Ocean had become the area of interest to the civilized world, and it was not only proper, but essential to the future prosperity of the United States to secure a commanding and controlling station on the Asiatic side of the Pacific.
The argument for a complete cession from a commercial standpoint was that the recent enormous increase in productiveness of American industries and in the export trade required an extension of markets; that it was impossible to enter into competition with European countries without following their methods in securing a base for commercial operations; and that, although the policy of the United States was "the open door," this could not be maintained without asserting American political power, especially in the part of the world where the greatest markets were situated.
The moral grounds for the possession of the Philippines were that the colonial administration of Spain had been conducted with great cruelty, injustice, and in disregard of personal rights; that it would be inhuman and morally wrong to permit Spain to retain her sovereignty; that the weakened power of that government would be unable to tranquillize the disordered and lawless conditions existing in the islands, to protect life and property, and to perform the obligations incident to government; and that it was for the interest of the people of the Philippines in particular, and mankind in general, to extend to the archipelago the principles of civil liberty, equality, and self-government, which form the basis of American institutions, and that to do so was a duty to the world which the United States could not ​rightfully ignore. It is impossible to read the utterances of President McKinley during and following the negotiations, without being satisfied that these latter considerations exercised a controlling influence with him in determining the destiny of the islands.
There was a large party in the United States which combated all these reasons, and contended that the addition to the American domain of distant regions and races would lead to hurtful innovations in the system of government, to the oppression of an unwilling people, to a large increase in the standing army and the navy with heavy financial burdens, and to threatening foreign complications. But this opposition was no greater than had been manifested at the time of the addition to the American possessions of the Louisiana territory, Texas, California, and Hawaii. Since the beginning of its history, every step taken in the enlargement of the bounds of the Union had been popular with the masses of its citizens, had resulted in increased prosperity to the nation, and in benefit to the inhabitants of the annexed territory. Such, it was argued, would be the result as to the new possessions in the Orient.
Following soon after the acquisition of the Philippines, and while the government of the United States was actively engaged in restoring order and establishing a stable administration in its new possessions, the mutterings of a storm were heard in China which threatened to disorganize the government of that country, to paralyze its commerce, and to put in peril the lives and property of all foreign residents. In a few months the storm broke with a violence hitherto unknown ​in that land of riots and disorder. The civilized world was horrified by the massacre of foreigners,—men, women, and helpless children,—the destruction of foreign-built railways and property, and finally by the news that one foreign minister had been murdered in a street of the capital, and that all the other diplomatic representatives were besieged in their legations and their lives threatened by a bloodthirsty mob which had overawed or was controlling the imperial government. In answer to the urgent call which came from the beleaguered diplomats and foreigners resident at Peking, Tientsin, and other places, the United States, within a brief space was able from its forces in the Philippines to land upon Chinese soil a division of its army, supported by a squadron of its navy, and to take an important and honorable part in the rescue of its citizens and in the pacification and reorganization of the empire.
The so-called "Boxer" movement, which was the occasion of these troubles, suddenly dominated several of the most populous provinces and the imperial capital, and for a time threatened to carry the whole nation with it, in its cry for the expulsion of all foreigners from the country. Such a widespread and powerful movement, which imposed upon the United States and the other civilized powers the task of readjusting the foreign and domestic relations of the great empire, demands careful consideration.
China has been described as honeycombed with secret societies. The I Ho Tuan, or "Boxers," variously translated the "Sacred Harmony Fist," "Fists ​of Righteous Harmony," or "The Fist of Equality," had existed in the province of Shantung for many years, and so long ago as 1803 it had been prohibited by the government. It seems to have had as its object mutual benefit and support, mixed with patriotic and religious ideas and the practice of mysticism and magic. One of the best informed writers on Chinese affairs says the organization "remains and perhaps will continue to remain to a large extent a mystery to Occidentals." The events following the war with Japan gave to it increased activity, and, instigated and supported by the mandarins and literati, it rapidly spread through the province. With the cry of "Drive out the foreigners and uphold the dynasty," it entered upon its self-appointed work of the expulsion of all foreigners from China, which culminated in the siege of the legations and the occupation of Peking by the armies of the treaty powers.
The immediate cause of the "Boxer" uprising was the antipathy to foreigners and foreign ways, a feeling which prevails throughout the entire population of the empire, with very rare exceptions. The foreigners in China may be divided into three classes,—the missionaries, the merchants, and the public officials of other nations; and the lines of foreign activity are three,—missionary, commercial, and political.
The missionary movement in the interior of China ​did not really begin until after the signing of the treaties of 1858. Some work had been done previously by the Roman Catholics, but without security and protection, and by the Protestants in the vicinity of the treaty ports, but the country had been practically closed to Christianity since the earliest intercourse with Europeans. Francis Xavier, returning from his successful labors in Japan, landed on the coast of China in 1552 and found it hermetically sealed against him. His noble soul could not brook the restraint, and there he died, exclaiming, "Oh! rock, rock, when wilt thou open?" By the American and British treaties of 1858 religious liberty was for the first time guaranteed, and by the French treaty the missionaries were permitted to acquire land and erect buildings in all the provinces. Since that date Christianity has been extended throughout almost all parts of the empire. There are now in the field about eighteen hundred Catholic and twenty-eight hundred Protestant foreign missionaries, and the converts are variously estimated at from five hundred thousand to over one million.
The testimony of the best observers is that the Chinese are not inclined to religious persecution, and that their antipathy to the missionaries is not so much on account of their religion as because they are foreigners and their presence leads to the introduction of foreign methods. Nevertheless the propagation of Christianity has been attended by serious opposition and bloody riots. That of Tientsin in 1870 has already been noticed. The years 1883–84 and 1891 were marked by violent attacks upon the missions, and that ​of 1895, following the Japanese war, was one of the most serious and widespread, until all former ones were surpassed by the slaughter of 1900.
The natural hatred of foreigners was aggravated by stories emanating from the gentry and literati, circulated by word of mouth, by placard and pamphlet, charging the missionaries with the kidnapping of children, murder, magic, and vile deeds. Besides, the teaching of Christianity tended to the introduction of ideas hostile to the existing governmental order and struck at ancestor worship. The missionaries opposed such native customs as slavery, concubinage, support of heathen festivals, and foot-binding. In fact, in China, as elsewhere and in all ages, the influence of Christianity was revolutionary. Its Founder declared that he "came not to send peace, but a sword." Paul, the first missionary, when he declared "the Gospel is the power of God," used the Greek word which has been anglicized to designate the most powerful of all modern explosives, dynamite. If the introduction of Christianity into the little island of Britain was attended with bloodshed and disorder for four hundred years, it should not be regarded as strange that in the mighty empire of the East its propagation has been marked by civil commotion.
But the missionaries were not merely the preachers of a new religion. They were useful to the government and society in many ways. The service they have rendered in diplomacy has already been referred to. Everywhere they brought the benefits of education and medicine and established schools and hospitals. ​Minister Denby, who from his long official residence in China was the most competent judge, in a dispatch to the Department of State, said of the missionaries, "that their influence is beneficial to the natives; that the arts and sciences and civilization are greatly spread by their efforts; that many useful Western books are translated by them into Chinese; and that they are the leaders in all charitable work. … In the interest, therefore, of civilization, missionaries ought not only to be tolerated, but ought to receive protection." Their claim to protection and their useful service to China had been recognized by imperial edicts, but these could not, in the eyes of the people, change their character as odious foreigners.
Acareful examination will show that missions were far from being the chief cause of the disturbances of 1900. From the foregoing chapters it has been seen that the principal object of securing intercourse with the East by the Christian nations has been the introduction and extension of commerce. On its account China had time and again suffered war and great humiliation at the hands of powerful European nations. The unwelcome traffic in opium had spread its baleful effects throughout the whole land. The establishment of lines of steamships and the construction of railroads ​were throwing hundreds of thousands of Chinese out of employment. The growing importation of American and British cotton fabrics were making idle looms and untilled cotton fields. American kerosene was destroying the husbandry of vegetable oils. And in an infinity of other ways was Western commerce affecting the domestic industries, and this with a people who were intensely conservative, wedded to ancient customs, and inveterate enemies of foreign trade.
The construction of railroads was bitterly opposed by the masses of the people, not only for the reasons just stated, but because it disturbed their venerated ancestral worship. Chinese burial places are not segregated, but are found all over the face of the country. Their desecration is regarded as the most heinous of crimes. It is stated that the Germans, in constructing a line from their port of Kiaochau, a distance of forty-six miles, though using all the care possible to pass around the most thickly located burial places, had to remove no less than three thousand graves. It is not strange to learn that all lines of railway have to be guarded by soldiers.
After the Japanese war a new impetus was given to commercial enterprise. Foreign traders as well as missionaries visited the interior, and the Chinese saw their country being overrun by the hated people. A scramble for railroad and mining concessions followed, supported by the influence of the representatives of the foreign governments; grants were made to Russians, French, British, Americans, Belgians, and others; and the whole territory of the empire seemed destined to be ​ploughed over by the feared and hated locomotive, and the most profitable enterprises to be placed in the hands of the despised foreigners.
But the most potent cause of the Boxer movement was neither the missions nor commerce, but the political influences which were operating for the dismemberment and destruction of the empire. These influences were especially manifest during 1897 and 1898. The cession of Formosa to Japan in 1895 was not so offensive, as it was the result of a great war and some compensation to the victor in territory seemed natural. But the effect of the next aggression was quite different. Following the murder of two German Catholic priests by a mob in Shantung in November, 1897, the German government sent a strong naval force to the spacious harbor of Kiaochau, ejected the Chinese forces from the fortifications, and occupied the place with marines. This was soon followed by the demand of the German minister in Peking for an apology for the murder of the priests, a large indemnity, and a lease of the harbor and an adjoining strip of territory, with the privilege of building railroads and exploiting mines in the province of Shantung. The remonstrances of the Tsung-li Yamen against the summary method of procedure and the exorbitant demands were of no avail. The German seizure of Kiaochau was followed a month later by the occupation of Port Arthur by a Russian ​fleet, and in March, 1898, Russia secured a lease of that strong fortress and harbor, as well as the neighboring port of Talienwan, in the peninsula of Liaotung, with the privilege of connecting them by railroad, through Manchuria, with the Siberian trunk line. Only three years before, Russia, in conjunction with its ally France, and with Germany, had compelled Japan to give up the Liaotung peninsula, on the ground that a nation holding it might at any time threaten Peking. The action of Russia led Great Britain to demand and secure the lease of the fortress of Wei-hai-wei and a strip of adjoining territory on the opposite promontory. France, which had some years before taken the large suzerain territory of Annam and Tonquin, also secured in 1898 an enlargement of its possessions in that region at the expense of China.
These proceedings were followed by agreements or treaties between Russia and Great Britain, and between Germany and Great Britain, as to what are termed "spheres of influence" in China, without consulting the government of that country or taking its wishes or interests into account. At the demand of the same powers, several new ports were opened to foreign trade, with the usual concomitants of foreign territorial concessions and exterritorial jurisdiction; until now the extensive Chinese Empire is reduced to the anomalous condition of scarcely possessing a single harbor in all its long line of seacoast where it can concentrate its navy and establish a base of warlike operations, without the consent of the treaty powers. Not the least of the irritants which induced the Boxer movement was ​the foreign authority which was exercised in the treaty ports, and the abuse and contempt with which the natives were there treated.
The rulers of China understood full well the causes which had nerved their people to rise in their wrath and undertake the impossible task of the expulsion of the foreigners. In 1900, after the Boxer movement had been put down, Li Hung Chang, in giving the cause of the outbreak, stated that its chief impetus was to be found in the high-handed course of Germany, and it "was due to the deep-seated hatred of the Chinese people towards foreigners. China had been oppressed, trampled upon, coerced, cajoled, her territory taken, and her usages flouted." The empress dowager, in her famous proclamation issued when the Boxers were reaching their ascendancy, and just before the violent outburst of 1900, exclaimed: "The various powers cast upon us looks of tiger-like voracity, hustling each other in their endeavors to be the first to seize upon our inmost territory. They think that China, having neither money nor troops, would never venture to go to war with them. They fail to understand, however, at there are some things which this empire can never consent to, and that, if hard pressed, we have no alternative but to rely upon the justice of our cause, the knowledge of which in our breasts strengthens our ​resolve and steels us to present a united front against our aggressors."
Under the state of affairs thus briefly indicated, the Boxers soon overran Shantung, spread through the adjoining provinces, and were threatening the imperial capital. In 1898 the Yellow River overflowed its banks, causing widespread misery, and in 1899 famine prevailed in the near-by province of Kiangsu, and bands of robbers and lawless men added to the general disorder. The political confusion at Peking likewise contributed to the prevailing disorganization of the country. While the mass of the people, including the ruling classes, remained fixed in their conservative views, a considerable body of intelligent men had become convinced that China must follow the example of Japan, and align itself with the Western nations in its government and social institutions. The young emperor, who had studied English and read numerous translations of Western books, including the Bible, had gathered about him a number of liberal men, who realized the deplorable condition of the empire, and believed it could be overcome only by initiating reforms in the government. The emperor at once undertook the task, and over thirty edicts were issued in quick succession, providing for most radical reforms in the administrative, financial, and educational departments.
Li Hung Chang, a devoted adherent of the empress dowager, not being in accord with these measures, was relieved from his post in the Tsung-li Yamen. His rival, Chang Chih Tung, who from a bitter foreign hater had become a strong advocate of liberal ideas, ​had written a book urging radical reforms, and by an edict of the emperor this book was printed and scattered broadcast over the land. The emperor and his advisers were, however, moving too fast. The conservative members of the government appealed to the empress dowager, who had a few years before nominally withdrawn from participation in public affairs, and she resolutely seized again the reins of government, practically dethroned the emperor, and proceeded to behead, banish, or imprison his supporters, his chief adviser, Kang Yu Wei, however, having escaped and fled the country.
The reform movement of the emperor, which, if carried out, might have restrained foreign aggression, thus came to an end, and the government continued to endure the demands of the foreigners, and its conduct furnished additional incentive for the growth of the Boxers. Their attitude became so threatening that in November, 1898, the American and other ministers asked for guards to protect the legations. They were sent from the naval vessels at Tientsin, and remained through the winter, when they were withdrawn. The year 1899 was not marked by any serious outbreaks, though the Boxers continued to extend their organization and influence. But early in 1900 their movement assumed a more aggressive character. In May the foreign ministers addressed the Tsung-li Yamen asking ​for their suppression, but the same month the railway stations were attacked by them, and legation guards were again hastily dispatched from Tientsin. Scarcely had they arrived when the railway between that city and Peking was seized by the Boxers June 4, and soon thereafter all telegraphic communication with the capital ceased.
Events that startled the world followed swiftly. A column of naval troops were marched overland to open up communication with the legations, and military forces were hurried forward from the American army in the Philippines, and by the other treaty powers from the nearest foreign posts. The Taku forts were occupied by the allied forces after a few hours' bombardment,—the American admiral declining, however, to take part in it, as he held it to be an act of war, and his instructions were to use his forces only for the protection of American interests; but it proved to be a wise military precaution, as the Chinese government was then under the control of the Boxers, and its forces were coöperating with them against the foreigners. Tientsin was attacked by the Chinese troops in large numbers, and the foreign residents were saved from slaughter only by the timely arrival of the allied forces. News came from Peking of the murder of the German minister and the siege of the legations, succeeded by frightful rumors of the extermination of the diplomatic corps and all foreigners in the capital.
Then followed the repulse of the column sent to the relief of the legations, their long and heroic siege, the gathering of the allied army at Tientsin, its march to ​the capital, the deliverance of the besieged, and the occupation of Peking. It is not possible to give a detailed narrative these events, but it will illustrate the inveterate and all-embracing hostility of the Chinese to note the experience of two of the persons who underwent the dangers and privations of the siege. Dr. W. A. P. Martin, an American, and Sir Robert Hart, an Englishman, had each spent more than fifty years in China, the greater portion of this time in the service of the Chinese government. Martin was a scholar of rare attainments, who had translated various works on international law and kindred topics into Chinese, and for many years had presided over the Imperial University. He was pronounced by Minister Denby "the foremost American in China." Sir Robert Hart had taken charge of the Chinese customs service, brought order out of confusion, supplanted wholesale corruption with strict honesty and accountability; had from insignificant proportions made its resources largely support the government and pay its foreign indebtedness; and had been the trusted and able adviser of the cabinet and the most useful official in China. But when the storm broke upon the capital the angry mob of Boxers and soldiers, thirsting for the blood of the despised foreigner, assaulted, plundered, and burned to ashes the residences of those two public servants, Martin and Hart escaping only with their lives and the clothes on their backs to the legation quarters. All their services to the government counted as nothing with the infuriated demons.
​In the massacres and plundering which attended the uprising of 1900 it was manifest that the movement was not against the Christians, or any other special class, but against all foreigners and foreign things. Missionaries, railroad constructors, merchants, teachers, and diplomats were alike the victims, and foreign property and foreign-made goods in the hands and shops of Chinese were destroyed.
The evidence is also overwhelming that the empress dowager and the government—as reconstructed after the displacement of the emperor in 1898—were in sympathy with the Boxers, and that the government finally coalesced with them, and became responsible for the attack upon Tientsin and the siege of the legations. There is reason, however, to believe, that the emperor did not approve of these acts, and there were instances of heroic devotion to duty and the true interests of the country on the part of some members of the Tsung-li Yamen and other public men. The native Christians also, as a rule, proved true to their new faith, and courageously supported their foreign friends in their hour of trial.
The dispatch of a division of the American army, composed of all arms of the service and fully equipped for a campaign, was one of the most extreme acts of executive authority in the history of the United States. It has been seen that when the Secretary of State was requested by the representatives of Great Britain and ​France in 1857 to cooperate with them in an expedition to Tientsin, he replied that, although the objects sought to be gained by the United States were the same as those entertained by the allies, the executive branch of the government was not the war-making power, and that military expeditions into Chinese territory could not be undertaken without the authority of Congress. Doubtless that body would have been consulted by the President had it been in session when the crisis came in 1900; but the emergency was great, and if the government of the United States was to participate in the relief of its minister and citizens besieged at Peking, no time was to be lost. Duty, interest, and convenience called for the immediate transfer to China of a portion of the army then in the Philippines. The President acted with commendable promptness, and the American forces were enabled to bear an honorable part in the campaign. The circumstances which called for the action of 1900 were quite different from those attending the expedition of 1857. In the latter case it was a deliberate act of war against the Chinese government. In 1900 the American forces were sent to China to protect American citizens and their interests in extreme peril, at a time when the authority of the Chinese government was suspended and unable to afford them protection. There are many such precedents in American history, though none calling for such a display of military force. The approval which the President received from the people was an evidence that the situation justified his conduct.
​The main object of the military operations of the allies had been attained by the deliverance of the legations; but it was manifest that the work of the powers would not be complete until the causes which had brought about the unparalleled outrage against the comity of nations should be removed, and the necessary precautions taken to prevent a recurrence of similar violations in the future. The first step to that end had been taken by the American Secretary of State, Mr. Hay, soon after the gravity and extent of the offense against international law and comity became known. On July 3, 1900, Mr. Hay, through a circular note, communicated to the allied powers the views and intentions of the United States, so far as the circumstances at that date would permit. It was declared to be the purpose of its government to act concurrently with the other powers in the rescue of the American officials and citizens then in peril, and in the protection of American life and property everywhere in China, and, finally, to take measures to prevent a recurrence of such disasters. In attaining this last result it would be the policy of the United States to seek a solution which might bring about permanent safety and peace to China, preserve its territorial and administrative entity, protect all rights guaranteed by treaty and international law, and safeguard for the world the principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire.
Although this policy was not in harmony with the recent conduct of some of the European powers in their relations with China, it was so fully consonant with the ​principles of international justice that it met with the approval of the intelligent public sentiment of the world. Through the long and tedious negotiations which followed, this policy was consistently adhered to by the American representatives.
For several weeks no communication could be had with the American minister, Mr. Conger, and it was doubtful whether he would escape with his life; the Russian and Japanese forces were pouring into China in large numbers; and the situation with respect to the allies and their attitude towards China was uncertain. In this critical period the President felt the need of a representative in the midst of the scene of operations, possessed of his views and in direct communication with Washington. He therefore appointed as a special commissioner Mr. W. W. Rockhill, formerly secretary of legation in China and lately assistant Secretary of State. On his arrival at Shanghai the allied army was in occupation of Peking, Mr. Conger had resumed his duties, and was in free communication with his government. After conferring with the viceroys of the Yang-tse-Kiang provinces, Mr. Rockhill went to Peking and was made counselor of the legation, while Mr. Conger was in charge of the negotiations.
Before the siege of the legations had been raised, notice was given that Li Hung Chang had been appointed a plenipotentiary to negotiate a peace, and soon after the occupation of the capital by the allies, Prince Ching informed the representatives of the powers that "their majesties the empress dowager and emperor having gone westward on a tour," he had been nominated with Li ​Hung Chang "to open negotiations in a harmonious way at an early date to the interest and gratification of all concerned." Li, however, was slow in arriving at Peking, and it was not until October 26 that the plenipotentiaries of the powers and of China met and the formal negotiations were begun.
Meanwhile four important declarations had been made which had done much to bring the powers into cordial relations, removing suspicion and anxiety as to the possible action of any one power. Of these, first in date and importance was the circular note of Secretary Hay of July 3. The next in order was the announcement, August 28, of Russia, that it had "no designs of territorial acquisitions in China," and that, since the Chinese government had left Peking, there was no need for its representative to remain, that its troops would be withdrawn, and that when the Chinese government was reestablished Russia would appoint a representative to negotiate with it. To this announcement, which was in the shape of a proposal, the United States replied that it did not deem it wise for the troops to be withdrawn until there was a general agreement by the powers.
The third was the proposal made, September 18, by Germany, that, as a preliminary to peace, China should surrender to the allies for punishment the leaders of the anti-foreign movement who should be designated by the foreign ministers. The reply of the United States was that it would be far more effective for the future if the Chinese government would punish the guilty, that it was but just to give China in the first instance this ​opportunity to exhibit her justice and intentions, and that the subject could be included in the negotiations if afterwards found necessary. It may be remarked, in this connection, that the United States took no part in the punitive expeditions by the forces of some of the European powers conducted soon after the capture of Peking.
Fourthly, one other important event was announced in the agreement of Great Britain and Germany, of October 16, (1) to preserve "the open door" in trade, and (2) to take no advantage of the existing conditions to acquire territory; but (3) reserving the right to take another course if any other power attempted to violate the first two policies. Secretary Hay, when requested to signify his acceptance of these principles, replied that his government, in the note of July 3, had already announced the adoption of the first two, and that as the third related to a reciprocal arrangement between the two contracting parties, the United States did not regard itself as called upon to express an opinion upon it.
Before the first formal meeting was held, France submitted as a basis of negotiations six propositions, which were substantially agreed upon by the powers, and briefly stated were as follows: Punishment of the principal guilty parties; prohibition of the importation of firearms; indemnity for losses; permanent legation guards; dismantling of the Taku forts; and establishment of foreign military posts between Peking and the sea.
These declarations and papers had made the task of ​concurrence in the general principles by the representatives of the powers a comparatively easy one, and within less than one month they reached an agreement on the essential provisions to be embodied in a treaty, but some delay occurred in reconciling minor differences and consulting the home governments. A question arose as to the form in which the demands agreed upon should be submitted to the Chinese plenipotentiaries, whether in separate identic notes, or in a joint note signed by the representatives of all the powers. Although the United States does not ordinarily favor joint action with European powers, Mr. Conger advocated a joint note on the ground that the question was world-wide, that the demands should be strengthened by unanimity, and that it would hasten final settlement by being more effective than identic notes; and that course was pursued, and the note, signed by all the representatives, was delivered to the Chinese plenipotentiaries December 24, and by them forwarded to the court with their recommendation of the acceptance of its terms.
The note contained twelve demands, which may be divided into the four heads: (1) punishment of the guilty; (2) preventive measures for the future; (3) indemnification; and (4) improvement of official and commercial relations. On January 16, in obedience to an imperial edict, the Chinese plenipotentiaries gave notice of their acceptance of the twelve demands, but accompanied it with a series of questions and suggestions looking to some modifications of the details.
Mr. Conger had conducted the negotiations on the part of the United States to a successful conclusion on ​all the essential questions involved, and as the discussion of the details bid fair to occupy much time, he was granted by the government a leave of absence from his post to visit the United States. He had well earned a season of rest. He had conducted himself during the trying ordeal of the siege with great fortitude and discretion, and in the negotiations he had labored indefatigably and with a good degree of success to impress upon his colleagues the liberal and reasonable attitude of his government. During his stay in the United States he received such marks of favor as indicated that his services were highly appreciated by his countrymen.
By appointment of the President, Mr. Rockhill succeeded to the conduct of the negotiations on the part of the United States. The two most important points yet remaining for adjustment were the punishments to be inflicted upon the leaders in the anti-foreign movement, and the amount and manner of payment of the indemnities. While the negotiations were in progress the Chinese government, under the urgent representations of the foreign ministers, had condemned a number of high officials, some of whom had been permitted to commit suicide, and others had been banished or degraded. But the ministers were not satisfied with the sufficiency of this action, and they prepared a list of ten other officials whose execution was to be demanded, and about one hundred more to be otherwise punished. The Russian minister objected to the list, and Mr. Rockhill strongly seconded him, declaring that the effusion of blood should cease, after the chief culprits ​had been punished, and that no more death penalties should be exacted. Through their influence, and that of the Japanese minister, the death penalties were confined to four others, and lesser punishments applied to about fifty.
The question of indemnity was even more difficult of settlement than that of punishments, for in it a measure of cupidity was added to the natural feelings of vengeance. From the beginning the United States had favored a lump sum, in place of filing itemized individual and governmental claims, as the latter would enormously increase the aggregate amount. It was with difficulty and after much delay that this point was gained; and then the amount of this lump sum was a still more debated question. Sir Robert Hart, who was advising both the Chinese and the allies, stated that China could not pay more than $250,000,000 to $300,000,000. Mr. Rockhill proposed that the lump sum should not exceed China's ability to pay, and that the powers would scale down their claims to that amount; that it should be divided equitably among the powers; and that if they could not agree among themselves to an apportionment, that question should be submitted to the Hague Tribunal. These propositions did not meet with approval, Russia and Japan only agreeing to the reference to The Hague, and Japan alone supporting the scaling down of the claims. This action was the more significant in view of the fact that of the five powers principally involved, the claim of the United States was the lowest, and that of Japan next.
The amount of the indemnity to be paid by China ​was finally fixed at 450,000,000 taels, payable in gold at the rate of exchange fixed in the protocol, with interest at four per centum, in annual payments covering thirty-nine years.
The negotiations on the details had dragged along through weary months and the protocol or peace agreement was not signed by the representatives of the powers and the Chinese plenipotentiaries till September 7, 1901. In addition to the subject of the punishments and indemnity above noticed, the following were its most important provisions: A special embassy to be sent to Germany to convey to the emperor the regret of the Chinese government for the death of Baron von Ketteler, the German minister, and a monument with appropriate inscription to be erected by China on the spot of his assassination; similar action respecting the assassination of the chancellor of the Japanese legation; the suspension of official examinations for five ​years in all the cities where foreigners were massacred or cruelly treated; the erection by China of expiatory monuments in all foreign cemeteries which had been desecrated; prohibition of the importation of firearms for two years; a quarter of Peking set aside for the legations, with the right to maintain foreign guards; the Taku forts to be razed; certain points, named, between the capital and the sea to be occupied by foreign troops; the death penalty to be inflicted on all who become members of anti-foreign societies; viceroys and all subordinate officials to be dismissed where anti-foreign riots occur and the authors are not punished; new treaties of commerce to be negotiated, and the river navigation to Tientsin and Shanghai to be improved; the Tsung-li-Yamen abolished and succeeded by a new board, the Wai-wu Pu, which should take precedence over the other ministries; and a court ceremonial agreed upon in conformity with Western usage.
The influence of the United States was plainly noticeable throughout the negotiations, especially in restraining radical measures and in modifying the action respecting the indemnities. While it supported the efforts to punish the really guilty leaders, and was firm in demanding measures which would guarantee the protection of American citizens and interests for the future, ​it manifested anxiety that nothing should be done to cripple or impede the ability of China in the maintenance of a stable government and its territorial integrity. Hence it was necessary to continue in the concert of the powers and as far as possible control their action to that end.
Its success in bringing about an agreement for a lump sum for indemnities, to be apportioned among the nations, was of vast importance. If each power had acted separately respecting the indemnities, the one possible method other than a loan, which would have imposed foreign management of the revenues, would have been the occupation of sections of territory by the powers, each one utilizing its own sphere as a source of revenue in payment of claims. This condition once inaugurated would have been difficult to change.
In 1899, just before the Boxer outbreak, Secretary Hay, fearing the effects which might result to American commerce from the apparent intention of certain European powers to appropriate Chinese territory at will, or to extend over it their "spheres of influence," addressed the governments of Great Britain, Germany, Russia, France, Italy, and Japan, urging that it was to the interest of the world's commerce that the government of China should be strengthened and its integrity maintained, and submitting for their assent certain principles which should be respected in that territory, whereby that populous empire should remain an open market for the world. These principles were accepted by all the governments named, and the American Secretary received deserved credit among all nations for his ​firm and timely action. Doubtless he foresaw during the negotiations that unless the powers could be held to joint action in accepting the lump sum in settlement of their indemnity claims, his policy of the "open door" would have been placed in peril.
Since the protocol was signed, the United States has had another opportunity of showing its consideration for China in her humiliation and financial distress. During the year 1902 the first installment on the indemnities was to be paid. But since the basis of settlement was agreed upon, silver, which is the currency of China, has greatly fallen in value, making it much more onerous to meet the obligation. China appealed to the powers to allow the installment to be paid at the rate of exchange when the settlement was made, and the United States is the only power which has manifested a willingness to grant the appeal.
The conditions imposed upon China in the peace protocol would seem to be adequate to prevent any widespread anti-foreign uprisings in the future. But the hatred of the stranger still prevails throughout the empire, and the extortionate spirit of the powers has placed in the protocol a provision which is likely to prove a continued source of irritation and to feed the flames of discontent. Against the remonstrance of the United States and of those best informed as to the financial ability of China, a burden of indemnity has been placed upon the government which it will be very difficult for it to carry. To meet this obligation additional taxes must be laid upon the people, and the knowledge ​that this imposition is for the benefit of the despised foreigner may lead to disorder and repudiation; and repudiation will raise again the question of Chinese autonomy.
So long as race hatred controls the Chinese people the peace of the world will be in danger, as the destiny of that country is intimately connected with the interests of all the great powers of the earth; and, since the acquisition of the Philippines, not less with the United States than the most interested of other nations. The "yellow peril" has been much discussed by writers and statesmen who have studied the problems of the Far East. Since the Japanese war and the recent easy march of the allied forces to Peking, the tendency has been to decry and scout the danger. But it is scarcely an exaggeration, in presence of its history and attainments, to assert that no nation or race of ancient or modern times has stronger claim than the Chinese to be called a great people. The fact that the United States has been compelled to violate its early traditions and much vaunted principles in the exclusion of the Chinese from competition with its own people is a high testimony to their race capacity and endurance.
Wensiang, the wisest and most farseeing Chinese statesman of modern times, was accustomed to say to foreign diplomats and others who urged speedy reforms: "You are all too anxious to awake us and start us on a new road, and you will do it; but you will all regret it, for, once awaking and started, we shall go fast and far,—farther than you think, much faster than you want." Sir Robert Hart, who has made a ​study of Chinese character and capacity for a half century, believes that their hatred of foreigners is a real menace to the world, not in this generation, perhaps, but in the early future as the lifetime of nations is measured. Four hundred millions, sturdy and passionately devoted to their ancient customs, might in time, under the influence of an all-prevailing race hatred, be changed from a peace-loving community into a warlike people, bent upon avenging their wrongs. Sir Robert suggests only two remedies for this impending danger. The first is partition of the empire among the great powers, which he regards as full of difficulties; the second, a miraculous spread of Christianity, "a not impossible, but scarcely to be hoped for, religious triumph … which would convert China into the friendliest of friendly powers."
But the review in this volume of the diplomatic relations of the Orient has shown that another local power is to be reckoned with in considering the Asiatic question. Japan's wonderful development in industrial affairs is even more remarkable than its display of military power. Marquis Ito in a late publication, after arraying the statistics as to his country's great increase in its mercantile marine, its manufactures, and its foreign commerce, justly claims that Japan has attained a secure position commercially, and that "she appreciates the achievements of peace as thoroughly as achievements by force of arms." The fact that it has within the last few years advanced to the second place in the trade with China evinces its commercial activity. The ​estimate of Japanese statesmen of the part their country is to play in world politics may be seen from the utterance of Count Okuma, former prime minister, anticipating the revision of the treaties and the triumph over China,—"We should become one of the chief powers of the world, and no power could engage in any movement [in Asia] without first consulting us." Such language hardly appears exaggerated, in view of the late treaty of alliance between Great Britain and Japan.
The power most greatly feared by China and Japan, and the one whose vast territorial possessions in Asia entitle it to the first consideration in the affairs of that continent, is Russia. Its system of government is the antipodes of that of the United States and its repression of missions is out of harmony with the hopes of a large majority of the American people, but in their political relations the two governments have always maintained a cordial friendship, and if the principle of the "open door" is respected, there does not appear to be any reason why in Asiatic affairs they should not so continue.
The other great power in the Pacific whose policy is of concern to the United States is Great Britain. There has been occasion in these pages to animadvert upon the conduct of its government, but it is due to it to say that, however dictatorial and aggressive has been its course towards the Eastern countries, it has reserved to itself no selfish or exclusive privileges, but ​has extended to all other nations the right of trade and residence gained for its own subjects. Wherever in the Orient its authority has gone there has been introduced impartial administration of justice and honest taxation, conditions unknown under native government; and the influence of its administration is to elevate the intellectual condition and the morals of the people. With a similarity of institutions, a common origin and language, and a community of trade interest in the East, the two governments are naturally inclined to coöperation. Neither do the Americans forget that when the other European powers were indifferent or unfriendly during the war that transferred the Philippines to the United States, Great Britain alone was outspoken in its sympathy, and looked with complacency upon the enlargement of Anglo-Saxon influence in that quarter of the globe. A political alliance of the two nations in Asiatic affairs is not probable, but they are likely to be found working together to maintain that which is of vital importance to the United States, free markets in those countries.
Mr. Seward's prophecy of the growing importance of the Pacific and of America's expansion to those distant regions has become history much sooner than he or any American statesman foresaw. It has brought with it much governmental embarrassment and great responsibilities. But the hopeful citizen must believe that the system of government and the wisdom of its public men will be equal to the emergency and the responsibilities. It is a matter of pride and of confidence for the future to be assured that the conduct ​and policy of the government, from the beginning of its history, in its relations with the Orient have been marked by a spirit of justice, forbearance, and magnanimity. Its early and its later intercourse with China, Japan, and Korea has been that of a friend interested for their welfare, ready to aid them in their efforts to attain an honorable place among the nations, and willing to recognize the embarrassments which attended those efforts.
With the acquisition of the Philippines, whether wisely or unwisely done, the United States has assumed towards those countries the new and additional relation of a neighbor. The enormous development of the resources of the United States and the increased necessity for foreign markets have strengthened the reasons which have controlled its policy in the past, and the proximity of its new possessions, with their millions of inhabitants, has brought it nearer than ever in sympathy to these peoples and their governments. The American Union has become an Asiatic power. It has new duties to discharge and enlarged interests to protect. But its record of a hundred years of honorable intercourse with that region will be a safe guide for the conduct of affairs. Its task will be well done if it shall aid in giving to the world a freer market, and to the inhabitants of the Orient the blessings of Christian civilization.
* ↑ During the time the admiral remained in Manila Bay he added to his brilliant achievement of arms by wise conduct in his relations with the commanders of foreign squadrons in sympathy with the defeated foe, thus showing himself worthy to be ranked with Perry and Schufeldt in diplomatic service in the Orient.
* ↑ Obituary Addresses on the Death of Henry Clay, Washington, 1852, p. 49.
* ↑ On January, 1899, President McKinley stated to Dr. Schurman that he did not want the Philippine Islands. He said: "In the protocol to the treaty I left myself free not to take them; but in the end there was no alternative." Philippine Affairs, An Address by J. G. Schurman, New York, 1902, p. 2.
* ↑ Peace Protocol, S. Doc. No. 62, Pt. i. 55th Cong. 3d Sess. 282; Instructions to Peace Commissioners, S. Doc. 148, 56th Cong. 2d Sess. 3; Negotiations, Docs. Nos. 62 and 148 (cited); Treaty of Peace, Doc. No. 62 (cited), 5.
* ↑ The Boxer Rising, Shanghai Mercury, Shanghai, 1900; 1 China in Convulsion, by Rev. A. H. Smith, New York, 1901, chaps, x–xiii.; The Siege of Peking, by Dr. W. A. P. Martin, New York, 1900, chap. iv.; China and the Powers, by H. C. Thompson, London, 1902, chaps, i. and xiii.; U. S. For. Rel. 1898, China; S. Ex. Doc. 67, 57th Cong. 1st Sess. 75.
* ↑ U. S. For. Rel. 1880–1897, China; Williams's Hist. China, 420–437; Martin's Cathay, Pt. ii. chap. xv.; Thompson's China, chaps, xv. and xvi.; 1 Smith's China, etc., chaps, iii.–vi.; China, her History, Diplomacy, and Commerce, by E. H. Parker, London, 1901, chap. xv.; Missionary Principles and Practice, by Robt. Speer, New York, 1902, p. 173; Report on China Missions, by Rev. A. J. Brown, New York, 1901, pp. 16–23; U. S. For. Rel. 1895, p. 197; 1899, pp. 154–178.
* ↑ The Problem in China, by A. R. Colquhoun, London, 1900; 1 Smith's China, etc. chap. vii.; Douglass's China, 447; The Story of the Chinese Crisis, by A. Krausse, London, 1900, p. 135; China and the Powers, by A. Ireland, Boston, 1902; Dr. Brown's Report, 9–13; Gen. Wilson's China, 394; Speer's Missionary, etc. 157, 161.
* ↑ U. S. For. Rel. 1898, pp. 182–91; 1900, p. 85; 1 Smith's China, etc. chap. viii.; The Break-Up of China, by Lord Charles Beresford, New York, 1899, chap. xxx.; Krausse's Chinese Crisis, 143, 147; China in Transformation, by A. R. Colquhoun, London, 1898, chap. xiv.; Essays on the Chinese Question, by Sir R. Hart, London, 1901, chap. v.; World Politics, by P. S. Reinsch, New York, 1900, pts. iii. and v.
* ↑ Martin's Siege, chaps, ii. and iii.; China from Within, by S. P. Smith, London, 1901, chaps, ii. and iii.; 1 Smith's China, etc. chap. ix.; Thompson's China, 215; China's Only Hope, by Chang Chih-Tung, New York, 1900; U. S. For. Rel. 1898, pp. 219–221.
* ↑ For military operations, Report of U. S. Secretary of Navy for 1900, pp. 3, 1148; Lieutenant-General Commanding the Army of U. S. 1900, pt. vii.; ib. for 1901, pt. iv. p. 433; U. S. For. Rel. 1900, "China"; General Wilson's China, chaps, xxii.–xxiv. Most of the works already cited in this chapter contain narratives of the Boxer operations and the siege of Peking.
* ↑ Supra, p. 232.
* ↑ The claims of the various governments were as follows:— Country. Taels. Germany 90,070,515 Austria-Hungary 4,003,920 Belgium 8,484,345 Spain 135,315 United States 32,939,055 France 70,878,240 Portugal 92,250 Great Britain 50,712,795 Italy 26,617,005 Japan 34,793,100 Netherlands 782,100 Russia 130,371,120 International (Sweden and Norway, $62,820) 212,490 450,000,000
* ↑ For negotiations, U. S. For. Rel. 1900, pp. 285–382; Rockhill's Report, S. Ex. Doc. 67, 57th Cong. 1st Sess., published also as appendix to For. Rel. 1901; Secretary Hay's note, July 3, 1900, Rockhill's Report, 12; Russia's announcement, Aug. 28, ib. 19; German note, Sept. 18, ib. 23; British-German agreement, Oct. 16, ib. 31; French basis of negotiations, Oct. 4, ib. 26; joint note of powers, Dec. 22, ib. 59; statement of indemnities, ib. 225; final protocol, ib. 312.
* ↑ H. Ex. Doc. 547, 56th Cong. 1st Sess.
* ↑ Sir Robert Hart's Essays, 64–65.
* ↑ The Commercial Future of Japan, by Marquis Ito, N. Y. Independent, February 20, 1902; Norman's Far East, 392.
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