# Oregon Historical Quarterly/Volume 19/The Federal Relations of Oregon

First of a multiple-part series. See Federal Relations of Oregon, Part II and Federal Relations of Oregon, Part III.
THE QUARTERLY
of the
Oregon Historical Society
Copyright 1918. by the Oregon Historical Society
The Quarterly disavows responsibility for the positions taken by contributors to its pages
THE FEDERAL RELATIONS OF OREGON.
By Lester Burrell Shippee, Ph. D.
CHAPTER I.
THE SITUATION IN 1819.
By the close of the year 1819 all the essential properties for setting of the stage of the "Oregon question" were prepared. With the exception of the slight difference, removed with little difficulty, with Russia as to the extent of claims upon the Northwest Coast of America, there were brought forward no new factors during the long diplomatic controversy which extended to 1846, although certain relatively unimportant but irritating residual questions persisting for many years after. The Spanish aspect of the matter as such no longer existed after 1819. With Great Britain the matter stood in June of 1846 on exactly the same footing as it had in October of 1818, despite the interchange of numerous diplomatic communications between that government arid the United States, despite more than one measure in Congress, a body which occupied weeks, even months, in debating the ever-resurgent "Oregon Question."
The interval between the ending, as between the United States and Spain, of the claim of the latter to the region north of 42∘ north latitude and west of the Rockies, and the admission of Oregon as a State of the Union in 1859, was one in which may be perceived the gradual development of interest ​in a far-off land. In 1819 few knew and fewer cared anything about the region on the Northwest Coast of America. By 1846 it had become an issue, national and international. The "Oregon Question" more than the Oregon Country was the touchstone of political sentiment in the West; that is, in the region along the Ohio and Mississippi, which was then looked upon by the greater part of the people of the United States as the outermost frontier of the land A prominent factor in the presidential campaign of 1844, one of the two uppermost topics for Congressional consideration after that campaign, it also presented itself as the foremost international issue confronting the United States and one over which a goodly portion of our people would have lightly entered upon a war.
It is important to glance summarily at the major events which brought about the situation of 1819, and to consider how much—or perhaps better, how little—the Oregon or Columbia River country figured in the public consciousness at the time.
Early discoveries and explorations which, during the period of the territorial controversy, entered so extensively into the discussions, seem to have begun, so far as the Northwest Coast is concerned, with those of Juan Rodriguez Cabrillo, who, under orders from Viceroy Mendoza, in 1542–3 sailed north along the western coast of America where Cabrillo's lieutenant, Bartholome Ferrelo, temporarily in command, observed land at 44° north latitude. The next European to venture into those parts was Sir Francis Drake, who, in the course of his long semi-piratical expedition beginning in 1577, touched the Northwest Coast at 43° N. L. (according to some accounts 48°) and claimed the land for his sovereign under the name of New Albion.
SPANISH EXPLORATIONS.
Sebastian Viscaino in 1603 reached and named Cape Sebastian in latitude 42° north. A branch of his expedition reached a point perhaps as far north as 43°. Juan Perez in 1774 saw land at about 54° N. L., arid shortly after landed at a bay in 50° 30′ called by him Port San Lorenzo, the same indentation being called Nootka Sound by the English a short time later. Bruno Heceta, with Juan Francisco de la Bodega y Quadra and Juan de Ayala in command of two vessels, started from Mexico in 1775. By Heceta and Bodega y Quadra Port Trinidad (41° 10′) was taken in the name of the Spanish sovereign. Land was next seen at 48 27′ N. L. A portion of the expedition had trouble with the Indians at 47 20', and the painful experience caused a cape and an island to receive the names of Punta de Martires and Isla de Dolores. The expedition separated, and Heceta went as far north as about 50° N. L.; returning south he had a landfall at 48°, although he did not perceive the entrance to the strait of Juan de Fuca. Off the coast at 46° 17′ there was a current strong enough to prevent his entering the inlet which he called Assumption Inlet (Enseñada de Asuncion). From this point he proceeded south to Monterey. Bodega y Quadra proceeded northward until land was seen at a point beyond 56° N. L., and a tall mountain seen there was called San Jacinto. Although this portion of the expedition did not reach 65°, which was the goal, it did get; as far as 58°. In 1779 an expedition under Ignacio Artega and Bodega went over much the same course as that followed by Cook in the following year, searching especially for a northwest passage through the Arctic Ocean. In 1788 owing to the activities of mariners of many lands the viceroy of Mexico sent out Martinez and Haro, who spent some three months in northern waters.
RUSSIAN EXPLORATIONS
Vitus Behring, a Dane in the employ of the Russian government, sailed along the coast of Asia as far as 67° 18′ N. L. in 1728, passing through the strait which separates the Asiatic ​from the American continent; he did not discover the land to the east of the strait, however. In 1732 Krupischef was diriven by storms upon the eastern shore opposite the easternmost point of Asia. In 1741 Behring again was sent out by the Russian government and reached the islands on the American side of the Pacific as far north as 60°, also discovering the Shumagin and Aleutian Islands. The expedition, which remained under the direct command of Behring, wintered at Behring's Island, and there the commander died. A second part of the expedition under Tchirikof discovered land at 56° N. L. In 1788 Synd went along the Kamtchatka shore to 66° and the next year landed, it is supposed, on the American coast. Krenitzin and Levaschef discovered Fox Island in 1768. In 1781-3 Gregory Schelikof and Ivan Gollikoff, with a group of fur traders explored the American coast from the extreme western point of Alaska to Prince Williams Sound, devoting especial attention to Kodiak Island. A Russian establishment was founded at Cook's River in 1787.
BRITISH EXPLORATIONS.
The British pursued exploratory attempts in the Northwest both overland from Canada and by sea, but not until long after the pioneer work of Drake. Samuel Hearne from 1769 to 1772 made explorations in the interior, having started from Canada and discovered Great Slave Lake and Copper Mine River, the first stream of the Northwest known to discharge into the western ocean. In 1776 Captain James Cook was commissioned for an extensive exploring expedition by the British Government. After his work in the South Seas, during which he discovered the Sandwich Islands, he reached the American coast at about 44° N. L., from which point he carefully explored the coast as far north as 70° 29′ on the American side of the Pacific and to 68° 56′ on the Asiatic side. He gave English names to many of the places which had been named by Heceta or Bodega y Quadra three years before. ​Portlock and Dixon made explorations about Cook's River, Nootka Sound, and Prince Williams' Sound for the King George's Sound Company in 1785-7. Dixon claimed to have discovered the region between 54° and 52° on the ground that it had not been seen by Cook, and he called the land he found Queen Charlotte's Island, although he did not prove the truth of his suspicions that this was not a portion of the mainland. Captain Meares wintered in 1786-7 at Prince William's Sound. Duncan and Colnett in 1787 explored about Queen Charlotte's Island and demonstrated the truth of Dixon's assumption. Berkley, as commander of the Austrian East India Company's vessel, discovered the Strait of San Juan de Fuca in 1787. In 1787-8 Captain Meares, in the employ of a Portuguese merchant, made his headquarters at Nootka, making expeditions from there, especially to try to find the great river said by the Spanish to be at about 46 N. L. He failed to do this and maintained that there was no such stream.
FRENCH EXPLORATIONS.
In 1786 La Perouse received elaborate instructions from the French government, by which he was commissioned, among other things, to explore the Northwest Coast of America. All he did, however, was to spend a short time in the neighborhood of Mt. Fairweather, whence he sailed for Monterey.
The year 1790 marks an important episode in the affairs of the Northwest Coast. By this time no nation and certainly no trader gave serious attention to the Spanish claim to exclusive rights along the entire litoral of the Pacific. English, American and Russian adventurers were drawn by the lucrative fur trade, and merchants of other nations were looking that way. Yet the Spanish government was unwilling to forego its pretensions; the Spanish commandant at the Island of Juan Fernandez was cashiered for allowing the American ship Columbia, Captain Kendrick, to leave after having put in for repairs ; the expedition of Martinez and Haro was sent particularly to ​94 LESTER BURRELL SHIPPEE investigate the activities of the Russians, and the protest of the Spanish to the Russian government appeared appeased by a statement that Russian subjects had been ordered not to make settlements in regions possessed by other nations. As noted above, Captain Meares, in the employ of a Portu- guese merchant, was at Nootka Sound in 1789, where he made some sort of bargain for a post with a native chief. The Portuguese merchant failed, and his interest and a vessel at Nootka were taken over by an agent of the English King George's Sound Company, who increased the establishment apparently with the intention of making it permanent. It was at this juncture that Martinez appeared at Nootka, when (May, 1789) only two vessels were in the bay, the Iphigenia, of the English company, and the Columbia. Upon the arrival of the second Spanish vessel under Captain Haro, the captain and one other from the Iphigenia were arrested by Martinez while the vessel with her papers and crew was seized. Subsequently arrangements were made to release the vessel and two other vessels belonging to the company were seized. The whole affair seems to have been based upon various assumptions and mis- understandings ; in the first place there was an avowed inten- tion on the part of the Englishmen to establish a permanent post at Nootka, an act sure to be officially condemned by the Spanish; then Martinez was evidently misled by the Portu- guese and British aspects of ownership of the vessels, as well as being possibly intentionally deceived by Meares, who, in making an arrangement for the release of the Iphigenia, might have taken advantage of Martinez' ignorance of English. The two vessels which had been seized after the release of the Iphigenia were taken to Mexico and finally set free on condi- tion that they should not be found anywhere upon Spanish coasts, although it was maintained that Martinez was sus- tained by Spanish law in his seizure of them. In London, however, the matter was not dropped, but be- came the subject of diplomatic interchanges leading to the ​agreement known as the Nootka Convention, a treaty figuring largely in later discussions between representatives of Great Britain and the United States. After providing that the buildings and tracts of land, of which British subjects had been dispossessed, should be restored, and that reparation would be made, the Convention (Art. III.) proceeded to state:
"And, in order to strengthen the Bonds of Friendship, and to preserve in future a perfect Harmony and good Understanding between the two Contracting Parties, it is agreed that their respective subjects shall not be disturbed or molested, either in navigating or carrying on their Fisheries in the Pacific Ocean, or in the South Seas, or in landing on the Coasts of those Seas, in places not already occupied, for the purpose of carrying on their commerce with the Natives of the Country, or of making Settlements there; the whole subject, nevertheless, to the Restrictions and Provisions specified in the three following Articles."
The restrictions included (Art. IV.) a promise on the part of His Britannic Majesty to take effectual measures to prevent navigation and fishing by British subjects from becoming the pretext for illicit trade with Spanish settlements, with the express stipulation that British subjects should not go within ten sea leagues of the coasts already occupied by Spain. Furthermore, it was allowed that at Nootka and other parts of the Northwest Coast, north of the Spanish settlements, "wherever the subjects of either of the two powers shall have made settlements since the month of April, 1789, or shall hereafter make any, the subjects of the other shall have free access, and shall carry on their trade without any disturbance or molestation."
As to the coasts of South America (Art. VI.) no settlements were to be made, although "the said respective subjects shall retain the liberty of landing on the coasts and islands so situated for the purpose of their fishery, and erecting thereon huts ​96 LESTER BURRELL SHIPPEE and other temporary buildings serving only for these pur- poses." The fact of the collision between the Spanish and the Eng- lish is evidence of the value attached to the growing fur trade, a trade which consisted in obtaining various peltries from In- dians by barter, and then selling the same at high prices in China. Spanish and British alike had their interest in the Northwest increased by the Nootka affair, and both govern- ments renewed their exploring ardor, while citizens of other lands also sought those waters. Among the earliest American adventurers were Kendrick, captain of the Columbia, and Robert Gray of the Washington, who reached the Northwest coast late in 1788. In 1789 Gray explored the east coast of Queen Charlotte's Island and later entered the opening between 48 and 49, sailing therein for some distance. Subsequently Kendrick and Gray exchanged commands, the former remaining in Pacific waters, where he may have sailed quite through the Strait of Juan de Fuca, and Gray proceeding to China with furs and thence to Boston. Captain George Vancouver was appointed British commis- sioner to adjust the claims at Nootka. His instructions directed him to survey the coast between 35 and 60 N. L., and to seek a waterway between the Atlantic and Pacific, especially "to ex- amine the supposed Strait of Juan de Fuca, said to be situ- ated between the 48th and 49th degrees of north latitude, and to lead to an opening through which the sloop Washington is reported to have passed in 1789, and to have come out again to the northward of Nootka. "s Vancouver left England early in 1791 and reached the Northwest Coast in March, 1792. While the Vancouver expedition was preparing and during the time it was on the way to the Northern Pacific, both Span- ish and Russians renewed their explorations. The Spanish Captain Eliza, who replaced Martinez, sent a vessel under Lieutenant Quimper, who noted a number of islands and passages in the region about Nootka. Alexandra Malaspina ex- 5 Quoted by Greenhow (216) from the instructions to Vancouver. ​FEDERAL RELATIONS OF OREGON 97 plored farther north, up to about 60 N. L., especially seeking the supposed passage to the northwest denominated the Strait of Anian. In addition to these expeditions more information was ob- tained as a result of the zeal of several English and American traders, as well as by a French expedition which made some examination of the coasts southward from 56 in the summer of 1791. Among the American adventurers was Captain Rob- ert Gray again. He left Boston in September, 1791, again in command of the Columbia, which had been refitted by her owners for a further venture. Upon his arrival in northern Pacific waters Captain Gray explored some of the inlets be- tween 54 and 56 and wintered near Nootka Sound. In the spring of 1792 he resumed his cruising to the south, where he fell in with Vancouver, to whom he communicated the be- lief that a large river emptied into the ocean at 46 10' N. L., but Vancouver was convinced that Gray was mistaken. In May he was again off what he supposed to be the mouth of a river, and on the eleventh of the month ran through the break- ers into a large stream of fresh water. He sailed up the river some fifteen miles, and upon leaving it called it the Columbia after his vessel. Meanwhile Vancouver was employed in exploring the coasts and the adjacent islands. He encountered a Spanish expedi- tion under Galiano and Valdes, and for some time operated in conjunction with it. Both expeditions having demonstrated that a great island was cut off from the mainland by the Strait of Fuca, they agreed to call it the Island of Quadra and Van- couver. Leaving the Spaniards Vancouver returned to Nootka where he attempted to carry out his instructions relative to the treaty. Failing to come to a definite agreement with Quad- ra he dispatched a vessel to England for further instructions and resumed his explorations to the southward. As he had received from Quadra information and charts relative to the great river discovered by Gray, he resolved to look more closely at it. Accordingly one of his lieutenants, dispatched ​98 LESTER BURRELL SHIPPEE for the purpose, reached the river, arid in a small boat went some eighty miles inland to about where the Willamette enters the Columbia from the south. Further explorations on the coasts were carried on in the summer of 1793 from about 51 to some- what beyond 54 N. L. No definite carrying out of the terms of the Nootka Con- vention took place before there came the rupture between Great Britain and Spain in 1796, although apparently the Spanish abandoned the disputed area as not worth further contention. However, no other European nation attempted to continue the occupation, consequently Nootka and its con- vention remained to become a bone of contention between Great Britain and the United States many years later. From inland also the furs of the Pacific Northwest at- tracted attention. In 1784 there was formed the North- West Company of Montreal, primarily to protect a group of fur traders from the powerful Hudson's Bay Company. For this company Alexander Mackenzie, in 1789 and 1793, made two expeditions. He discovered and named Mackenzie River, and on the second venture reached the Pacific Ocean at 52 20', having for a distance descended the stream which later was called Fraser's River. From this time on contacts with the re- gion west of the Rocky Mountains by the overland route be- came more and more frequent. The interest of the government of the United States in the region between the Pacific and the Rockies cannot be said to have existed at all until the acquisition of Louisiana in 1803, and then that interest was by no means keen. Louisiana Ter​FEDERAL RELATIONS OF OREGON 99 ritory, purchased as it was under terms which were vague 6 as to its extent, was not thought to comprise anything beyond the "highlands west of the Mississippi." 7 Nevertheless, Lewis and Clark were instructed to push their explorations through to the Pacific Ocean if it should be found possible, with the object of discovering whether or not there existed a practicable water route across the continent, as well as of ascertaining the prospects for trading with the natives, especially in furs. Moreover, it appears that some Congressmen entertained the idea that there might be grounds for a possible claim beyond the Rockies, for, in the report of the House Committee on Commerce and Manufacture relative to the Lewis and Clark expedition, reference is made to the large additional territory which was believed to include all land west of the Mississippi and the mountains and "beyond that chain between the terri- tories claimed by Great Britain on the one side, and by Spain on the other, quite to the South Sea." 8 After the return of the explorers, however, no immediate interest was evinced in any shadow of a claim to the Pacific Northwest as a result of the expedition. Other matters occupied the attention of the Americans in the years following the return of Lewis and Clark, and scarcely a fugitive reference can be found to the region of their activi- 6 By Art. III. of the Treaty of 30 Apr., 1803, France agreed to "cede to the said United States, in the name of we French Republic, forever and in full sov- ereignty, the said territory with all its rights and appurtenances, as fully and in the same manner as they have been acquired by the French Republic in virtue of the above-mentioned treaty." This refers to the secret treaty of San Ildefonso, i Oct., 1800, where "His Catholic Majesty promises and engages on his part, to cede to the French Republic, six months after the full and entire execution of the conditions and stipulations herein relative to his royal highness the duke of Parma, the colony or province of Louisiana, with the same extent that it now has -in the hands of Spain, and that it had when France possessed it; and such as it should be after the treaties subsequently entered into between Spain and other States." Martens, Supplement an Recueil de prin. Traites, III, 467. No formal treaty ratified the cession of Louisiana to Spain by France in 1764. It was not mentioned in the treaty between Great Britain, France and Spain in 1763, at the close of the Seven Years' War, although the delimitation of th French and Englistt boundary is found in these words: "seront irrevocablement fixes par une Ligne tiree au Milieu du Fleuve Mississippi, depuis sa Naissance iusqu'a la Riviere d'Iberville, & de-la par une Ligne tiree au Milieu de cette Riviere, & des Lacs Maurepas & Ponchartrain, jusqura la Mer," "a L'exception de la Ville de la Nouvelle Orleans, & de 1'Isle dans laquelle elle eat situee, qui demeureront a la France." Martens, Recueil des prin. Traites. Ill, 38-9. 7 See Jefferson to J. C. Breckinridge, 12 Aug. 1803, Writings of Jefferson (Ford), Vni, 243; Jefferson to Dickinson, 9 Aug., 1803; Ibid. 261, for statements of Jefferson's views as to the western boundary of Louisiana. 8 Reported by S. L. Mitchell, Annals, 8th Cong, ist Ses. 1124-6. ​100 LESTER BURRELL SHIPPEE ties until the time of the negotiations for the treaty of Ghent. Once, in 1812, Samuel L. Mitchell, a Congressman from New York, in addressing the House upon the Naval Establishment, referred to the commercial activity of his countrymen : "Their activity," he said, "has really wrought wonders. While some are exploring the high latitudes of the Southern continent . . . . a fourth plants the seed of empire on the banks of the Northwestern Columbia.'^ This reference to John Jacob As- tor's unprofitable venture of 1811 brings us to another link in the chain of evidence which later statesmen used to demonstrate the claims of the United States to the disputed territory. Astor's attempt was a more pretentious scheme to capture some of the lucrative trade in furs than those which were un- dertaken by men financially less able to bear the burden of large outlay with little immediate return. The Missouri Fur Company, formed by a group of traders in 1808, was obliged to suspend its operations in 1810, the same year in which the Pacific Fur Company (Astor's company) was organized. The Pacific Fur Company was financially stronger than its only rival, the North- West Company of Montreal, from which op- position was anticipated, and the latter tendered to Astor a third interest in the Canadian company to secure his coopera- tion, an offer promptly rejected. The planting of a factory at the mouth of the Columbia River was carefully planned and adequate equipment made it possible for trading operations to be undertaken from the headquarters at Astoria in the summer of 1811. Operations had scarcely begun and not enough business had been done to cover the expense of inaugurating the enterprise when the War of 1812 broke out, and) as an incident in that contest the American company's possessions were transferred to the North- West Company so that Astoria, renamed Fort George, came under British control. Except for the form of the transfer it would be unnecessary in this preliminary sketch to pursue the point further, but the method raised an 9~Ibid, isth Cong, ist Ses., Pt I, 868. ​FEDERAL RELATIONS OF OREGON 101 issue which figured largely at a later date. When news of the existence of a state of war reached Astoria the post was tempo- rarily under the command of McDougall, once an employe of the North- West Company. McDougall immediately sold the whole establishment to a representative of the Canadian com- pany for $58,000, of which Astor eventually received about $40,000, although he claimed that the plant, furs, etc., were easily worth $200,000. McDougall became a partner in the purchasing company. After the sale had taken place ( 16 Oct- ber, 1813) H. M. Frigate Racoon arrived and took possession in the name of George III, formally changing the name of the post to Fort George. It appears that the officers of the Racoon were intensely incensed that the sale had taken place before their arrival because they had expcted to obtain a liberal reward from the rich prize. Astor, who had feared for his factory, had made application to Monroe, as Secretary of State, for a vessel of war to proceed to the North Pacific to protect Ameri- can interests there, but none had been available in time to be of any use. 10 Because Astoria was sold to the North- West Company be- fore capture by a national vessel it was urged later that it was not included as among "places" to be restored according to the treaty of Ghent, since there could be no restoration after a bona fide sale to a bona fide British Company. Therefore, ac- cording to the British view, no strength was added to the claims of the United States either by the words of the treaty or by the "restoration" of Astoria in 1818. In the negotiations for the treaty of peace following the War of 1812 the Northwest Coast did not assume an important place, although Secretary Monroe in his instructions cautioned the negotiators on the point. 12 John Quincy Adams notes 13 10 The correspondence relative to the transaction and Astor's letters with reference to it are given in Annals of Congress. i7th Cong. 2d Ss. 1210-21, having been brought before the House by a resolution of 19 Dec., 1822. 11 See Memorandum of H. U. Addington, 10 May, 1826, in Stapleton, Some official correspondence of George Canning, II, 110-5; also Canning to Liverpool, 7 ponde , _Jid., I 12. Am. State 'P'apers, For. Rel. t III, 731. 13 Memoirs of John Quincy Adams, III, 81-2, entry of i Dec, 1814. July, 1826, Ibid., II, 71- Papt ​102 LESTER BURRELL SHIPPER that Bayard insisted upon a simple statement to the effect that there should be a restoration to the state existing before the war, since this alone would prevent the recurrence of dis- putes over territory. Adams, commenting, says : "No reply was made to these remarks, which Mr. Bayard afterwards told me he made with particular reference to the settlement on Co- lumbia River." The negotiators were not in ignorance re- garding Astoria since a son-in-law of Astor had called upon them and, after trying to find out the state of affairs, said that Mr. Astor intended to renew the settlement before the Eng- lish had a chance to anticipate him and that he would take the necessary steps just as soon as peace should be made. '4 The contention of the Americans became a part of the Treaty of Ghent in these words : "Art I All territory, places, and possessions whatsoever, taken by either party from the other during the War, or which may be taken after the signing of this Treaty, excepting only the Islands hereinafter mentioned, shall be re- stored without delay . . ." IS In July, 1815, Monroe notified Baker, the British charge, that, since the post on the Columbia was included in the pro- vision for restitution, steps would immediately be taken to reoccupy the place. 16 Baker had had no communication from his government on the point, although he believed the place had been captured, a fact "of which the American government (did) not appear to have any certain information on which to ground the claim of restitution;" furthermore it was a ques- tion as to whether "any persons were left to retain possession of it." Although Baker made inquiries of the Governor Gen- eral of Canada for information the matter rested until late in 1817, when the Ontario was dispatched to receive the formal restitution of the post. This action, without any formal no- 14 Ibid., Ill, 90. The slight significance of the Oregon region as compared with other matters to be in the treaty is evidenced by the very small attention it receives in Adams' Memoirs, and in his correspondence at the time; see Writings, (Ford, ed.) Vol. V. 15 Hertslet, Map of Europe by Treaty, I, 48. The islands referred to are those in Passamaquoddy Bay which were to remain temporarily in the possession of the power holding them at the time of ratification of the treaty. 1 6 Correspondence in Am. S. P., For. Rel., IV, 352 and 852. ​FEDERAL RELATIONS OF OREGON 103 tice to the British minister of the intentions of the govern- ment of the United States, aroused some little feeling although the explanations of the Secretary of State smoothed the mat- ter over. 1 7 Orders were hastily issued by the British govern- ment so that a national vessel was at the mouth of the Co- lumbia in October of 1818. Captain Hickey formally surren- dered the post to J. B. Prevost, agent of the United States, but the North- West Company continued to conduct its trading op- erations as before. Keith, the chief factor, was assured by Prevost that the company might rely implicitly upon the jus- tice and equity of the government of the United States, and, al- though he was not authorized to make any promises, he could state without hesitation that the company would be treated with great liberality should the policy of his government ever extend to the point of exclusion. 18 The surrender of the post formed a part of Lord Castle- reagh's policy with respect to the whole question of the title to the Northwest Coast of America. 1 * As an issue among those remaining from the Revolution and the War of 1812 fisher- ies, boundaries in the Northeast and in the Lake-of-the- Woods region, impressment, commercial relations, indemnities, etc. it fell to Richard Rush, minister to Great Britain, and Albert Gallatin, special envoy, to deal with it in 1818. Since some, perhaps all, of these issues were far more pressing than that of the title to the Columbia River Valley, it is not surprising that both the American and British governments were willing to let the whole matter rest in statu quo. 20 The British gov- ernment, while acquiescing in the surrender of Astoria, would not admit the title of the United States to the soil upon which it stood. The United States, having in hand the negotiations with Spain over Florida and the western boundary was con- 17 Memoirs of J. Q. Adams, IV, 93. See also Rush to Secretary of State, 14 Feb., 1818, Am. S. P., For. Rel., IV, 853, for Castlereagh's attitude. i8>For this correspondence see Am. S. P., For. Rel. IV, 854; also girea in Annals, iyth Cong, ist Ses., II. 2140-2. 19 Castlereagh's policy in issuing the orders is indicated in a dispatch of 4 Feb. 1818, given l>y Schafer in Am. Hist. Rev., IOIO-H, 183-4. 120 Adams to Rush and Gallatin, 28 July, 1818, Am. S. P. For. Rel., IV, 377-8, ​104 LESTER BURRELL SHIPPEE tent to go slow and let the British government disclose its claims. On one point alone, beyond an absolute surrender of its title claim, was the United States insistent ; the question of respective titles should not be submitted to commissioners, al- though this expedient was to be used with certain of the other issues. Nor was the arbitration of a third power, especially if that be the Czar of Russia, to be considered as a means of de- termining the rights of the two parties. Castlereagh wished, however, to settle the whole question of boundary from the Lake-of -the- Woods to "the utmost contiguous extent of the two territories," a sentiment shared by the American gov- ernment, if a suitable adjustment could be reached. But when the envoys from the United States suggested that a reason- able division would be effected by continuing the line of 49 for the whole extent from the Lake-of-the- Woods to the Pa- cific, they found the British plenipotentiaries unwilling to take so decisive a step. As a counter proposal the latter sug- gested an agreement that the region west of the Rockies, be- tween 45 and 49 N. L., should be free and open to both parties, neither of which should exercise as against the other any territorial jurisdiction. At the outset, then, in the controversy as to the extent of the possessions of each, we find essentially the same issue which proved to be the stumbling block to the very end of the nego- tiations in 1846; while the United States admitted, for the greater part of the time, some sort of valid claim on the part of Great Britain to some portion of the Oregon Territory, the British government insisted that the real question was the weight of the respective claims south of the forty-ninth paral- lel. The disputed area from the point of view of the United States was the whole Oregon Territory ; from the British angle it was that portion which lay between 45 N. L., or the Colum- bia River in later negotiations when a better knowledge of the country had been obtained, and 49 N. L. For Great Britain the disputed area lay south of 49, for the United States it was north of that line. ​FEDERAL RELATIONS OF OREGON 105 Since there was no prospect of reaching an agreement the American plenipotentiaries were of the opinion of Adams, that "the minuteness of present interests" of both nations would allow the matter to lie over. Hence they were willing to ac- cept the British proposal of 13 October to the effect that the country lying west of the Rocky Mountains should be "free and open" to both parties, with the qualifying statement that the claims of neither country nor of any other power should be prejudiced thereby. Consequently the convention as signed at London, 20 October, 1818, after defining the boundary be- tween the territories of the United States and those of His Britannic Majesty as the 49th parallel of north latitude from the Lake-of -the- Woods (or from a point where a line drawn due north from the northwestern extremity of the lake should tersect 49) to the "Stony Mountains," contains these words : "Art. III. It is agreed that any country that may be claimed by either party on the northwest coast of America, westward of the Stony Mountains, shall, together with its harbors, bays, creeks, and the navigation of all rivers within the same, be free and open for the term of ten years from the date of the signa- ture of the present convention, to the vessels, citizens, and subjects of the two powers; it being well understood that this agreement is not to be construed to the prejudice of any claim which either of the two high contracting parties may have to any part of the said country, nor shall it be taken to affect the claims of any other power or state to any part of the said coun- try; the only object of the high contracting parties, in that re- spect, being to prevent disputes and differences among them- selves." 21 It was obvious to all that the whole question was merely de- ferred, although there is little evidence that many persons out- side governmental circles bestowed even passing attention upon the whole topic. Not only did other features of the convention seem much nearer the everyday interests of the average man, 21 Among other places the Convention is given in Am. S. P., For. R*l. t VI. 642-3. ​106 LESTER BURRELL SHIPPEE but most people were more occupied in the economic questions coming from the financial crisis developing from the War of 1812 than they were with anything connected with a far-off wilderness. 22 In referring to the negotiations of 1818 Presi- dent Monroe in his annual Message to Congress passed the matter over with a general statement, and in December, 1819, when commenting upon the completed treaty, did not notice the Northwest Coast. Nor was Congress curious about the matter, a fact testified to by absence of comment in its debates. However, one of the plenipotentiaries who negotiated the convention, Richard Rush, deemed the subject of sufficient im- port to comment upon it in his Memoirs in this fashion : "I cannot leave this part of the negotiation without remark- ing, that the important question of the rights which it involves between the two nations, is still an open one ; and I do not fear to record the prediction that it will be found a question full of difficulty, under whatever administration either of Great Brit- ain or the United States, it may hereafter be approached. It is not in the genius of either nation readily to yield what it be- lieves itself entitled to ; and however strong our convictions of the just foundations of the whole of our claim on that coast and its interior, the conviction of Great Britain in the stable nature of her right, that interferes so materially with ours, is not less decided and unequivocal. Nor will she push it with less zeal; not more on the general ground of her maritime and commercial enterprise which are only stopped by the limits of the globe, than on her special desire to foster the growing interests of her colonial settlements all over this continent, and those trading companies that issue from them." 2 ^ While Gallatin and Rush were adjusting, temporarily to be sure, one phase of the Northwest question, John Quincy Adams was engaged in settling definitely this issue so far as it con- cerned the United States and Spain. The negotiations of 1818- 22 The National Intelligencer (quoted in Nile's Register of 17 July, 1819), contains a news item about the approaching return of Judge Prevost from the mouth of the Columbia, and expresses the hope that he will give a full account of the region. 23 Rush, Memoirs, (editon of 1833) 374. ​FEDERAL RELATIONS OF OREGON 107 19 had in view not only the quieting of the Spanish title to the Floridas but of fixing the boundary, still in dispute, between the Mexican possessions of His Catholic Majesty and the whole Louisiana Territory so far as the two regions were contigu- ous. It was, indeed, this western boundary, and particularly that portion which should determine the northern bounds of Mexico, upon which the negotiations threatened to break. 2 * It was a case of a wily Spaniard using all the tricks which the diplomacy of the time approved struggling with an un- yielding New England Yankee. 25 After the announcement by Senor Onis that his government at his earnest solicitation had agreed to a line running from the Missouri to the mouth of the Columbia, Adams protested that the United States could never accept this line, although the proposition would be considered if reduced to writing. For a month after this offer the matter swung in the balance : Senor Onis, part of the time acting through Monsieur De Neuville, the French minister, protested vehemently that Spain would never grant all that the United States demanded. Little by little, however, he receded, first to the South Branch of the Columbia, and from there to a line which would follow the Red River to 100 West Long., thence north to the Arkansas River, and up that stream to its source, from which point the line would run due west to the Multnomah River and along the river to 43 N. Lat, thence due west to the sea. This line the President was inclined to accept, but the Secretary of State opined that if Onis yielded so much and intended to conclude the treaty at all, better terms could be obtained, and, as a feeler, drafted an article suggesting a line between 101 and 102 West Long, and along 41 N. Lat. Thereupon Onis proposed the Arkansas to its source, thence to 42 N. Lat., and west to the Multnomah, down the river to 43 and west to the ocean. Again President Monroe was for taking up with this offer, but again the Secretary was adamant, insisting more- over that the west bank of rivers rather than the middle of river beds should be the boundary. "After a long and violent 25 In addition to the diplomatic correspondence to be found in Am. S. P., a much more intimate and personal relation is contained in Adams' Memoirs. See especially IV., 219, 221, 237, 239, 244, 246, 250, 255. ​108 LESTER BURRELL SHIPPEE struggle" with de Neuville as go-between Onis agreed to the line as laid down by the treaty which he signed on the 22nd of February, 1819, having agreed not only to 42 as the north- ern boundary of Mexico, but also to the proposition that the west bank of all streams should be taken as the boundary of the United States. 26 Furthermore, the article contained a renunciation of all rights and pretensions as affecting the Northwest Territory in these words : "... The two high contracting parties agree to cede and renounce all their rights, claims, and pretensions, to the territories described by the said line; that is to say: The United States hereby cede to his Catholic Majestey, and re- nounce forever, all their rights, claims, and pretensions, to the territories lying west and south of the above described line; and, in like manner, his Catholic Majesty cedes to the United States hereby cede to his Catholic Majesty, and re- tories east and north of the said line, and for himself, his heirs, and successors, renounces all claim to the said territories for- ever." With the conclusion and ratification of this treaty there was formed a new basis of claim on the part of the United States to the Oregon Territory, for, according to the arguments brought forward in all subsequent negotiations with Great Brtain, whatever claims Spain had possessed now belonged to the United States. It was obvious also that no American statesman or diplomat would minimize the importance of the work of early Spanish explorers, however slightly it might have been estimated by Adams for the benefit of Senor Onis. Of the possible claimants to the territory lying west of the Stony or Rocky Mountains upon the Pacific Ocean and north 26 Statt Papers, No. 103, 7, i6th Cong, ad Ses., Art. Ill contains this descrip- tion of the boundary: "On the Gulf of Mexico, at the mouth of the river Sabine, in the sea, continuing north, along the western bank of that river, to the 3 ad degree of latitude; thence bv a line due north, to the degree of latitude where it strikes the Rio Roxo of Natchitoches, or Red River; then, following the course of the Rio Roxo westward, to the degree of longitude 100 west from Lon- don, and 23 from Washington; then crossing the said Red River, and running thence, following the course of the southern bank of the Arkansas to its source, in latitude 42 north; and thence, by that parallel of latitude to the South Sea." ​FEDERAL RELATIONS OF OREGON 109 of 42 N. Lat. three only remained ; the United States, Great Britain and Russia. Up to this time, 1819, the position of Russia as a possible contestant for the region claimed by the United Sattes and by Great Britain, or by either of them, remained a matter of doubt. The activities of Russian explorers and adventurers in the North Pacific had been noted, and the undisputed claim of the Muscovite to the northwestern extremity of North America was little doubted. No indication, however, of the extent of this claim to the south along the coast had been adduced. Judge Prevost 2 ? as a result of his visit to the mouth of the Columbia was disturbed by the evident activities of the Russian American Company, and wrote Adams that up to 1816 there had been no Russian settlements on the American coast south of 55, and those which they had north of this point were inconsiderable. It appeared, however, that Hum- boldt's description of the region had aroused their ambition and since 1816 they had established a post not only at Atooi, in the Sandwich Islands, but one a few miles from San Fran- cisco Bay. After the Spanish treaty had been completed Adams let the Russian minister, de Poletica, examine it confidentially and take a copy for his government. This is the comment Adams makes in his diary : 28 "In allowing him to take a copy of the treaty I have shown him an unusual mark of confidence, with a view to its effect upon the Emperor. It is only a slight anticipation, for, whether ratified by Spain or not, the treaty must be published here, at least upon the next meeting of Congress. As the Emperor has evidently taken considerable interest in the late events of our relations wtih Spain, and wished that they might be amicably settled, it is important to satisfy him as early as pos- sible of the fairness and justice of our proceedings, and that if Spain now refuses the ratifications of the treaty it will be in her own wrong."
28 Memoirt, V, 376-7, under date of 28 May, 1819. ​110 LESTER BURRELL SHIPPEE While undoubtedly one of the main reasons for this act was the feeling that it might help in securing the compliance of Spain, it is not going so far into the realm of speculation to surmise that Adams was also willing to ascertain what effect the agreement, as touching the. west coast of America, would have in Russia. Certain it is that about two years later came the edict of the Czar announcing that Russia's claims extended to 51 N. Lat., and declaring the North Pacific a closed sea. 29 Thus, when the end of the year 1819 was reached, all the essential features entering into the Oregon Question as a national matter were present. The decisive explorations had been made; from a terra incognita of the time of the Revolu- tion Oregon had come to be a region about which considerable information was available. While the settlements were con- fined to the posts of fur traders it may still be said that a be- ginning had been made in opening the country to civilization. Henceforth, so far as the United States was concerned, the Oregon Territory was to be a diplomatic issue, briefly and with- out serious portent with Russia, long, and toward the end, acrimonious with Great Britain. As a legislative, executive and administrative problem it entered upon its course in 1819 and continued to be a vexed issue until the admission of a portion of its area as the State of Oregon in 1859. 29 Am. S. P., For. Rel., IV, 857-61. ​CHAPTER II. CONGRESS AND OREGON, 1819-1829. With the first session of the Sixteenth Congress begins the period of ten years during which the Oregon Question af- forded a fruitful source of debate as well as a medium at times for some of the pointed, if not bitter, personal attacks which abounded in that troubled area of our national politics. Con- temporaneous as it was with the important diplomatic negotia- tions with Russia and with Great Britain, the whole topic brought into the open all of the essential factors which were to figure again at a later day. At each session of Congress during this time there was some agitation in one or both houses in the form of bill or resolution to keep alive the matter of the claims of the United States to the Northwest Coast of Amer- ica, and at one time the action went so far as the passage by the House of Representatives of a bill authorizing the Execu- tive to take formal possession of the region in dispute. It is difficult to agree wholly with William I. Marshall 1 that the real object of this agitation was keeping "the subject before the public" and for disseminating information "as to the merits of the case in anticipation of the time when either the expiration of the convention of 1818, or the negotiation of a new treaty in advance of that date should give us the right to occupy the Columbia River country." Certainly those who were most active in Congress give no indication that such was the motive behind their endeavors, and the conviction that the real purpose of this group was legislative action of a defi- nite character grows with a study of the times. John Quincy Adams, who, as Secretary of State in the earlier part of the i Acquisition of Oregon, I, 157, 8. This work was written to disprove the "Whitman saved Oregon" legend, and Principal Marshall delved into nearly every available source. ​112 LESTER BURRELL SHIPPEE period and President of the United States from 1825 to 1829, more than any other individual determined the course of the United States on the Oregon Question during the period, was in a position to know most public men of his day, and he en- tertained no such view so far as can be judged by his writings which have been preserved to us. Nevertheless, one is forced to believe that, although a small number actually desired decisive action, they were thwarted by two facts ; the mass of men in places of authority believed that the time was not ripe for pressing the matter that the United States stood to gain more by a policy of waiting than by forcing the issue; and the public at large refused to be- come excited over Oregon, in fact, ignored the whole affair and so failed to bring to bear that popular pressure which was manifest in 1845-6. There is positive evidence to bear out the first statement, and both positive and negative testimony on the second. The precipitancy with which the question sank into practical oblivion at the beginning of Jackson's first ad- ministration, not to emerge for nearly ten years, is merely cor- roborative evidence. During the period under consideration in this chapter Dr. John Floyd, a member of Congress from Virginia and later governor of that State, occupied the leading position in the advocacy of settling the Oregon Question. In all cases one is interested to discover, if possible, the motives actuating a man when he rides a particular legislative hobby for a series of years, when he comes to be looked upon as the especial cham- pion of a cause. In the case of Dr. Floyd there seems to be left no direct personal evidence other than found in his speeches in Congress; these, however, afford no real information, em- phasizing as they do the customary zeal for securing for Amer- ican citizens then and in times to follow their rightful her- itage. Thomas Benton ascribes the beginning of Floyd's ac- tivity to a meeting with Ramsay Crooks and Russell Farnham in Washington. These men had been members of Astor's party and they recounted their experiences on the Northwest Coast ​FEDERAL RELATIONS OF OREGON 113 while staying at Brown's Hotel where both Benton and Floyd lived. Benton says: "It (the proposition to occupy and settle the region of the Columbia River) was made by Dr. Floyd, representative from Virginia, an ardent man, of great ability, and decision of char- acter, and, from an early residence in Kentucky, strongly im- bued with western feelings. He took up the subject with the energy which belonged to him, and it required not only energy, but courage, to embrace a subject which, at the time seemed more likely to bring ridicule than credit to its advocate. I had written and published essays on the subject the year before, which he had read." 2 Taking Benton's testimony, then, three factors actuated Floyd; his general attitude as a westerner, the immediate in- centive from Crooks and Farnham, and Benton's own interest in Oregon and his writings thereon. But Floyd had been brought in contact with the findings of the Lewis and Clark Ex- pedition at an earlier date, for his cousin, Charles Floyd, was a sergeant in that expedition ; moreover Dr. Floyd was an early friend and great admirer of George Rogers Clark, whom he had known in Kentucky. 3 Looking to another contemporary we receive a different im- pression as to why Dr. Floyd so long led the futile fight for occupying Oregon. Commenting upon Floyd's report (of January, 1821) Adams, then Secretary of State, says that Floyd was party to a systematic attack upon Calhoun by the supporters of Crawford, De Witt Clinton and Clay; furthermore, about half the members of Congress were seeking some government position, a portion being the cringing can- vass and the rest the "flouting canvass ;" "this Dr. Floyd is one 2 Thirty Years' View, I, 13. It is interesting, in connection with this moJ cst remark, to read in Marshall, Acquisition of Oregon, I, 175-6: It is doubtful if any other politician of our history ever succeeded in acquiring so widespread a reputation as a chief factor in accomplishing a great national work, upon which his real influence was never decisive, as Benton acquired in connection with the Oregon acquisition, by merely writing newspaper articles and incessantly making speeches about it, though of the. real constructive work which secured us Oregon ot only did absolutely nothing, but bitterly opposed what such statesmen as ison, Monroe, J. Q. Adams, Albert Gallatin, Richard Rush and Henry Clay do, which secured us Oregon without war and without expense." 3 Bourne, Aspects of Oregon History before 1840, Quar. Ore. Soc., VI, 262-3. ​114 LESTER BURRELL SHIPPEE of the flouters."4 And then, "the Presidents told me he had been informed that the Columbia River settlement project was for the benefit of a brother-in-law of Dr. Floyd's, who as Treas- urer of the State of Virginia, and about a year since was de- tected in the embezzlement of the funds of the State to the amount of many thousands of dollars. This had so disgraced him in reputation that a retreat to the Columbia River was thought expedient for him by his friends, and, as his near rela- tions shared something of the ignominy which had attached to him, Dr. Floyd probably intended to be of the Columbia River party too." With Adams as well as with Benton some allowance must be made for the personal factor, and it will appear later that one phase of the Oregon agitation was the occasion of an interchange between Adams and Floyd. Apparently there were mingled motives arising from a desire to see that the United States was not checkmated by Great Britain combined with those of personal ambition stimulated by a great amount of the pioneer spirit. When Congress assembled in December of 1819, President Monroe, in his Annual Message, expressed his regret that no commercial agreement had been reached with Great Britain as a result of the negotiations of 1818, but he made no direct reference to the joint occupancy of the Columbia region which had resulted from the same discussions. During the session a resolution was adopted by the Senate 6 calling upon the Secretary of War to present to present to Congress a project of the system considered by him best calculated to protect the frontier of the United States, especially that portion watered by the tributaries of the Missouri River. The result was a Report on Trade with the Indians laid before Congress at its next session.7 In this Calhoun recommends the formation, by authority of a Federal charter, of a stock company with 4 Memoirs, V, 237-8. 5 Monroe was a Virginian and in, close touch with Virginia politics. 6 Introduced by Johnson of Kentucky, Annals, I, 1819-20. 7 Ibid., II, 2462-6. ​FEDERAL RELATIONS OF OREGON 115 furthermore, about half the members of Congress were seeking monopoly privileges for trading with the Indians "who occupy the vast region extending west to the Pacific Ocean." Such a monopoly would not be subject to the objections obtaining against similar organizations in settled communities and only by some such scheme could American citizens hope to com- pete with the British North- West Company and push their trade to the Pacific, aided by the natural geographic ad- vantages of the western territories. Nothing came of the report, and it is only interesting as throwing light on Calhoun's views of the western situation. The same session, however, saw the real beginning of Dr. Floyd's long campaign on Oregon in the introduction (19 December, 1820) of a resolution calling for a special com- mittee to inquire into the "situation of the settlements upon the Pacific Ocean, and the expediency of occupying the Co- lumbia." 8 Floyd was made chairman of the committee which was authorized, and for it reported to the House on the 25th of January, 1821. This report contained a long and detailed account of the claims of the United States, placing especial emphasis upon those so recently derived from the treaty with Spain, and adducing the Louisiana Purchase to support Amer- ican discoveries and settlements.^ The report concluded that the most modest pretensions of the United States would carry the title to 53 N. Lat. The value of the fur trade, which the North- West Company was monopolizing, was emphasized while other natural resources in timber, fish and a fertile soil were pictured in attractive terms. Accomipanying the report was a bill dealing with two matters, occupation of the Columbia and trade with the Indians. For the first the President was to be authorized and required to occupy the territory of the United States "on the waters 8 Hist, of Cong., i6th Cong, ad Ses., 679. 9 In all the discussions from this time the claims of th United States were based upon (i) Gray's discovery of the Columbia; (2) the Louisiana Purchase; (3) Lewis and Clark Expedition; (4) Astoria establishment; and (5) the Spanish treaty of 1819. ​116 LESTER BURRELL SHIPPEE of the Columbia River," extinguish the Indian title to a portion of the soil, establish regulations for the government of the territory and for the administration of justice therein, and open a port of entry at which the customs of the United States should be in force as soon as should be deemed ex- pedient. The bill further provided that a grant of land should be made to settlers. The portion of the project relating to Indian affairs would establish an entirely new system of dealing with aborigines wherein licensed traders responsible to a Superintendent of Indian affairs were to be leaders in civilizing the natives. No action was taken by the House and the bill expired with the Sixteenth Congress. Before submitting his report to the House Dr. Floyd had given it to the President with the request that the latter suggest such alterations as seemed desirable. Monroe in turn handed it to Adams who, after reading it, thus freely ex- pressed himself: 10 "... I returned the paper this morning to the President who asked me what I thought of it. I told him I could rec- ommend no alteration. The paper was a tissue of errors in fact and abortive reasoning, of invidious reflections and rude invectives. There was nothing could purify it but the fire." While Floyd's project made little headway in the House it did succeed in arousing some comment in Washington." Jonathan Eaton, a Senator from Tennessee, sent to the editors of the National Intelligencer a letter from W. D. Robinson wherein was set forth the need for the United States to send an exploring expedition to the Pacific Coast particularly on account of the encroachments of the Russians. 12 To prevent dissemination of the impression that Mr. Robinson was the originator of this proposition, Commodore Porter caused the publication of a letter which he had written President Madison in October, 1815, and which he maintained was the basis of 10 Mtmoirs, V, 237, entry of 18 January. 11 Ibid., 260. 12 26 January, 1821. ​FEDERAL RELATIONS OF OREGON 117 Robinson's letter. The Intelligencer, looked upon as an ad- ministration paper, commented, 13 "Doubts are entertained by intelligent citizens, with whom we have conversed!, of the policy and propriety of a disclosure, at this time, of the advantages which may probably result to the U. States from the possession of an extent of coast on the Pacific." The Secretary of State, who had just been engaged with a lively altercation with the British minister, Stratford Canning, over the Oregon discussion in Congress, concluded that the latter would think this hint came from official sources as a result of their conversation. 14 Even if this was the editorial opinion of the Intelligencer it did not prevent, a short time after, the statement that "everybody must approve Mr. Floyd's bill to the close of the 4th article; so far it is confined to the occupation of the territory bordering the Columbia." 1 * When the Seventeenth Congress assembled in December, 1822, unofficial information of the Ukase of the Emperor Alexander of September, 1821, had reached the United States. A virtual claim to the American coast as far south as 51 and a declaration that the North Pacific was closed to all but Russians served to give impetus to the activities of those who were interested in the passage of Floyd's Oregon bill and even served to arouse some interest in those who were opposed to the measure. A hint of the situation was contained in the Annual Message where the President said that it had been thought necessary to maintain a naval force in the Pacific for the protection of interests of American citizens. This portion of the message was referred to a special com- mittee in the House. Dr. Floyd opened his campaign by requesting another com- mittee to inquire into the expediency of occupying the Co- lumbia. 16 The committee brought in the bill of 1821 accom- panied by another report asserting the claim of the United 13 30 January, 1821. 14 Memoirs, V, 260. See Chapter III, below. 15 3 Feb. 1821; further notices as found 10 Feb. and 20 Mar. 1 6 10 Dec., Ibid., 529. The committee reported 17 and 18 Jan. ​118 LESTER BURRELL SHIPPEE States as far as 5 1 . 17 Although other matters prevented a consideration of the bill itself the Oregon Question arose in other connections. Since, however, the bill was carried on into the next session, for continuity's sake it may be traced here. The second session found the bill under consideration at an early date, when, in Committee of the Whole House, Floyd supported the measure in a long speech, taking the arguments of his report for his text. With a minor amendment or two the bill was reported to the House, where it came up in the middle of January. Although an amendment defining the Oregon Territory as "all that portion of the territory of the United States, lying on the Pacific Ocean, north of the 42nd degree of north latitude, and west of the Rocky Moun- tains/' was adopted, 18 the measure as a whole was laid upon the table on the 25th of January, and by a vote of 100 to 61 the House refused to take it from the table. In addition to the fact that interest did not run high in relation to the project itself Floyd's bill was delayed during the first session of the Seventeenth Congress (1821-2) by the Russian Ukase. In December, Floyd had secured the adoption of a resolution calling upon the Secretary of the Navy for information relative to the probable cost of an examination of the harbors on the Pacific and of transport- ing artillery to the mouth of the Columbia. 19 In February he brought forward another resolution calling upon the President to inform the House whether any foreign government laid claim to any territory upon the Pacific Coast north of 42 and to what extent; what regulations touching that coast had been made by foreign powers, and how far these affected the interests of the United States; also whether any com- munication had been made to the government by any foreign government touching the contemplated occupation of the Co- 17 H. Rep. No. 1 8, i?th Cong, ist Ses. j 8 The apathy of the House on the topic had been complained of by Wright, Ibid., 413. 19 Annals, I, 553; a response indicated that it would cost $25,000 to send 150 tons of artillery to the Columbia. The reply was referred to Floyd's select committee. ​FEDERAL RELATIONS OF OREGON 119 lumbia. This resolution called before the House the corre- spondence which had taken place between Adams and de Poletica when the former had received the official Russian announcement of policy in the Pacific. 20 One further episode in the House during this Congress casts a ray of light upon the presidential campaign already under way in anticipation of the elections of 1824. In addi- tion to the Secretary of State, who was an avowed candidate to succeed Monroe in accordance with the practice of several years, there were several other aspirants being groomed for the contest. In January, 1822, Floyd brought about the passage of a resolution calling upon the President for copies of all correspondence which had led to the Treaty of Ghent with the alleged purpose of getting more light on the subject of his Columbia River project. When the papers were com- municated it appeared that the particular paper sought by Floyd was not forthcoming, and there resulted more resolu- tions and! finally a correspondence in the newspapers. Niles, commenting editorially in the Register upon the whole episode, concluded that the whole thing instead of having to do with the ostensible subject of the Columbia River country, was really an electioneering device, and rebuked the legislature for being too much occupied with president-making. 21 The Secretary of State, if not actually the object of attack in the whole affair, certainly believed himself to be, and opened his soul to his Diary upon the question: 22 ". . . Floyd is a man having in the main, honest inten- tions, but with an intellect somewhat obfuscated, violent pas- sions, suspecting dishonesty and corruption in all but himself, rashly charging it upon others; eager for distinction, and forming gigantic projects upon crude and half-digested in- formation. He has a plan for establishing a Territorial Gov- ernment at the mouth of the Columbia River, and, being leagued with Clay and Benton of Missouri, made his bill for 20 Annals, II, Appen., 2129-60. 21 25 May, 1822. 22 Memoirs, VI, 57. See also letter in Niles Register, Sept. 7, 1822. ​120 LESTER BURRELL SHIPPEE that purpose the pretext of moving the call for the Ghent papers, and then for Russell's letters. Clay, who is at the bottom of it all, has been working like a mole to undermine me in the West, by representing me as an enemy to the Western interests, and by misrepresenting the transactions at Ghent in a way to suit that purpose." In the second session of the Seventeenth Congress (19 De- cember, 1822), a resolution by Johnston of Louisiana produced the correspondence which described the transfer of Astoria to the North-West Company. All this fitted in with the plans of Floyd who was eager to have brought forward any- thing which would serve to stir Congress into action, and whatever pointed toward apparent British aggression upon American rights was calculated to rouse interest. While the House had before it the Oregon matter in its various aspects the Senate, during the life of the Seventeenth Congress, ignored the whole question, except in two instances. Late in April, 1822, when the Indian trade was under dis- cussion, Benton took occasion to point out the value of the fur trade of the Columbia region and the claims of the United States to that valuable country. It may not be out of place to call attention to the fact that this marks the beginning of Senator Benton's long legislative connection with the Ore- gon Question; never thereafter when the topic arose was the gentleman from Missouri found reticent in expressing his views. The second time the Senate's attention was di- rected to Oregon was also at the instance of Benton who, in February, 1823, introduced a resolution calling upon the Committee on Military Affairs to inquire into the expediency of making an appropriation to enable the President "to take and retain possession of the territories of the United States on the Northwest Coast of America." This resolution, which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations, ap- parently had two purposes : it served to bring formally before the Senate a matter which the House had under considera- tion ; and it allowed Senator Benton to make one of his many ​FEDERAL RELATIONS OF OREGON 121 long speeches on the topic. He reviewed the diplomatic aspects of the subject to date and considered that the prospects for an ultimately favorable outcome for the United States were not promising; he considered that the whole diplomatic treatment as not worthy the best traditions of the American executive. It is to be noticed that Benton did not commit him- self so far as to define the boundary to which the United States ought to push its claims. He succeeded no better than in the previous session in stirring the Senate into action or even to words. The pioneer work of the Seventeenth Congress was actively followed up by its successor. The not too-discouraging re- sults of Floyd's efforts in 1822-3 were the prelude of a more determined assault in the winter of 1823-4, followed in turn by a campaign in 1824-5 which resulted in the passage of his bill by the House. The vigorous message of President Monroe of December, 1823, with its direct reference to the Russian Ukase and the policy of the United States enunciated as a result of it, gave good grounds for agitation of the Oregon Question. Floyd began his work with another resolu- tion for a committee, which, a few weeks later, reported a bill. This measure did not get beyond a reference to the Committee of the Whole in the course of this session. Shortly after the report of his special committee Floyd introduced another resolution calling upon the President to lay before the House information as to the expense of transferring two hundred of the troops then at Council Bluffs to the mouth of the Columbia. While these steps concluded the legislative activities of the session Dr. Floyd was busy laying his plans for vigorous action later. To the Secretary of War, Calhoun, he wrote, as chairman of the special committee, asking for "any facts or views which may be in the possession of the War Department, relative to the proposed occupation of the River in a military point of view," respecting the ease with which troops might be marched! to that point, and their importance in checking ​122 LESTER BURRELL SHIPPEE foreign encroachments and in controlling the Indians. 2 * This letter Calhoun gave to the President who showed it to Adams, stating to him that he thought this was going beyond the duties of the Secretary of War. 2 * He, the President, thought of sending a message recommending the establishment of a military post on the Pacific and renewing the proposition of the projected Yellowstone post. Adams considered such an exposition of the President's views quite proper, but he ques- tioned the wisdom of expressing them ; in connection with the inquiries of Floyd and Calhoun they were as likely to be construed' in the light of an attempt to defeat the proposed establishment on the Columbia. So important was the matter considered that it was made the occasion of a cabinet dis- cussion. To Adams, Calhoun and Southard Monroe read the draft of a message in which he recommended the es- tablishment of a post high up on the Missouri River and one on the Pacific, either at the mouth of the Columbia or on the Straits of Fuca. This recommendation was accompanied by a strong argument against any territorial settlement on the Pacific and the expression of a decided opinion that the region was destined soon to be separated from the United States. All three cabinet members argued against sending such, an expression of opinion to the House; Adams and Calhoun thought there would be no separation and that the United States would make settlements on the Pacific Coast. In the face of such unanimity of opinion the President de- cided not to send his projected message. As a result of all the discussion, Calhoun replied to Floyd's letter in general terms respecting the utility of troops in the Columbia country, adding, 2 * ". . . but it is believed that so long as the traders of the British Fur Company have free access to the region of the Rocky Mountains from the various posts, which they hold on our Northern Boundaries, they will in great measure 23 Calhoun to Floyd, 10 Apr., 1824. Correspondence of Calhoun, 217-8. 24 Memotrs of J. Q. Adams, VI, 249. 25 Ibid., 428, o. Noted by Adams, 10 Nov., 1824. The negotiations at St. Petersburg and at London the previous winter and spring enabled the administra- tion to have a better perspective than most members of Congress; see below, Chapter III. ​FEDERAL RELATIONS OF OREGON 123 monopolize the Fur trade West of the Mississippi, to the almost entire exclusion in the next few years of our trade." In administrative circles, then, the whole question of the Columbia country was the occasional topic of consideration before the assembling of Congress in December of 1824. 25 Richard Rush, at the time conducting new negotiations with the British government on this Oregon topic among others, had advised sending a frigate to the mouth of the Columbia, but the suggestion did not meet with cabinet approval. Craw- ford thought the establishment of a military post was suffi- cient as well as proper although he disapproved of Floyd's plan of erecting a territorial government. In fact he had so told Floyd, and the latter, on his advice, said he would change his plan from a territory to a military post. Monroe apparently clung to his idea that the Pacific North- west was bound to separate in time from the United States, but he did not let it appear in his Annual Message of 1824. He advocated the establishment of a military post at the mouth of the Columbia "or at some other point in that quarter within our known limits," and took some pains to explain how such an establishment would protect every American interest, especially if it were backed by the stationing of a frigate in the northern waters of the Pacific. He made no direct reference to a territorial organization but it could not have been hard for members of Congress to perceive his lack of sympathy with the notion. He did, however, advise an appropriation for exploring the region, more potency being added to the recommendation by the fact that in the same message he could point to the treaty just concluded with Russia which he was about to lay before the Senate. Neither the President's message nor Crawford's advice made any modification in Floyd's views, and his bill, in the hands of the Committee of the Whole House, came up for early consideration. It contained essentially the same provisions as those of the 1821 measure, omitting the portion which would remodel the whole policy of governmental action with the ​124 LESTER BURRELL SHIPPEE Indians: it would establish a military post, allow a port of entry at the discretion of the President, grant bounty lands to settlers and provide for the erection of territorial organiza- tion by the President. In a lengthy speech (20 Dec. 1824) Floyd supported the measure on the grounds of the value of the trade, the strategic position of the Columbia, and the fear that if the United States did not act the country would be occupied by Spain, England or Russia. 26 As in his report he assumed that the title of the United States was clear from 42 to 53. Very little opposition was offered in the Committee of the Whole; Poinsett, of South Carolina, would leave to the President to determine what place in the region should be occupied by the post, while Cook of Illinois opposed the portion relative to a civil government as well as the grant of lands to settlers, a move, he said, to delude the people. The bill was reported to the House without amendment. Here some of the teeth were drawn. The section directing the President to erect a civil government was stricken out, not so much on account of possible international complications as because it would put out of the power of Congress a high legislative matter. Smyth of Virginia did, indeed, refer incidentally to the claims of other nations in his speech in general opposition to the bill, but that aspect seemed to cause little concern. The provision for bounty lands was also removed, so that the measure in its amended form as it passed the House became practically the recommendations of the President. No call for a record division was made at any stage of the passage of the bill, consequently it is not possible to see from what parts of the Union came the 113 votes for the bill or the 57 against it. Nor does the discussion, such as it was, throw much light on this point. While Floyd's measure went through the House in its emasculated form with surprising ease it met with difficulties in the Senate where from the outset there was apparently 26 The discussion is reported in Debates, I, 13-59, and took place on three days, 21-23 December. ​FEDERAL RELATIONS OF OREGON 125 no intention of passing it. 2 ? In the meager discussion, while Benton was the chief proponent, Barbour of Virginia spoke in its favor since the measure had been referred to his com- mittee, that on Military Affairs, although, as he said!, he had no particular interest in it. The only active opposition came from Dickerson of New Jersey who believed it improper for Congress to act before the expiration of the Convention of 1818 since Great Britain had done nothing to contravene that agreement. Furthermore, thought he, the region was so far off that it would never become a member of the Union, and the cost of the whole proposition would be out of proportion to the benefits which might be obtained. 28 Senator Benton, when the matter was up again at the very close of the session, thought that the measure had been un- fairly treated by the policy of neglect, and took occasion to go at length into the reasons why the United States had a valid claim to Oregon. He seemed to support the claim as advanced by Floyd's committee; that is, to 53, although he made no definite assertion on the point. Perhaps the most interesting point in the Senate's relation to the matter is Senator Benton's view of the future of the territory; he believed the bill would serve to "plant the germ of a powerful and independent Power beyond the Rockies," for those moun- tains would be the boundary between the east and the west. Although this feeling was by no means that entertained alone by Benton, it was one he departed from later on and con- sequently he did not emphasize it in his Thirty Years' View. The whole matter in the Senate was ended for this Congress by tabling the bill on a vote of 25 to 14, with no roll call. In his first annual message, in 1825, President Adams was able to continue the policy which he had urged previously as Secretary of State by renewing the recommendations of his predecessor in regard to the Northwest. 2 * While much fre- 27 The bill was before the Senate on 25 and 26 Feb., and i Mar. Debates, I, 684, 687-95, 698-713. 28 Harbour's attitude does not seem as indicated in Bancroft, Oregon, I, 364. 29 His Inaugural touched the same note. Richardson, Messages, ft, 298, 305, ​126 LESTER BURRELL SHIPPEE quented by commercial navigators, said he, that region had been "barely touched by our public ships," although the prin- cipal river had been discovered and named by an American; consequently, "with the establishment of a military post there, or at some other point on that coast, recommended by my pre- decessor, I would suggest the expediency of connecting the equipment of a public vessel for the exploration of the whole Northwest coast of this continent." This portion of the mes- sage drew from Baylies of Massachusetts a resolution inquir- ing into the expediency and cost of sending the Boston to ex- plore the Pacific Coast of North America from 42 to 49, "and also (inquiring) whether it would be practicable to trans- mit more cannon and more of the munitions of war in such vessel, than would be necessary for the use of the vessel." 30 After an unsuccessful attempt by Sawyer (North Carolina) to widen the scope of the proposed exploration, by directing the Boston to try to find the Northeast Passage to Hudson's Bay, the resolution was adopted by the House. Sawyer also at- tempted and failed to secure a resolution authorizing an over- land expedition to the Pacific, along the forty-ninth degree, thence down the coast to the forty-second degree and then along the Spanish boundary to the Mississippi, "or any other more eligible route across our unexplored territory to any place on that or the Ohio River ; with a view to geological and other examination which might be considered useful or inter- esting." Further exploratory zeal was manifested in Trim- ble's call for Jefferson's confidential message of January, 1803, in which was recommended an expedition into the Northwest, a document which was transmitted, though still under the "veil of confidence." The most interesting episode in the Oregon narrative which occurred in this Congress was the report of Baylies' select committee, to which had] been referred the portion of the Pres- 30 Debates, II, 813-5. Sawyer's modified resolution, Ibid., 819-21. The Sen- ate took no official notice of the President's recommendations, although Benton personally "professed to be much pleased with the plan." Memoirs of J. Q. Adams VII, 75. ​FEDERAL RELATIONS OF OREGON 127 ident's message relating to the Pacific Coast. 31 This commit- tee had had the benefit of some portion of the diplomatic cor- respondence of 1823-4 between Great Britain and the United States which had been transmitted to the House as a result of a resolution in January. The report went over the various claims to title and came to the conclusion that the possession of the mouth of the Columbia was a matter of vital importance, and that "the indifference of America stimulates the cupidity of Great Britain. Our neglect daily weakens our own claim, and strengthens hers; and the day will soon arrive when her title to this Territory will be better than ours, unless ours is earnestly and speedily enforced" It was the spirit of this re- port which Gallatin declared was one of the causes of his fail- ure to settle the boundary question in 1826-7. The President, whose influence had been powerful in whatever had been done with this question, saw in the report another of the numerous attacks upon himself in order to weaken him with the western- ers. Writing to Gallatin in March of 1827 he said : M " . . . . The origin, rise and progress of this Oregon Territory Committee, of which Mr. Balies became at last the chairman, is perhaps not known even to you ; but you remem- ber it was the engine by means of which Mr. Jonathan Rus- sell's famous duplicate letter was brought before the House of Representatives and nation, and) that incident will give you a clue to the real purpose for which that committee was raised, and the spirit manifested in the report of Mr. Balies." This reference to the earlier controversy with Floyd in which the western vote was appealed to, and the charge that forces were at work to undermine the President's chances for re-election, give a hint that already the Oregon Question was coming to be looked upon in some slight measure as a dis- tinctly western issue. Adams, it appeared, would be shown to have been neglectful of the interests of the West if it could 31 H. Rep. No. 213, igth Cong, ist Ses. A preliminary report bad appeared earlier, No. 35 H. Rep. Com. Vol. I. 32 Writings of Gallatin, II, 367. ​128 LESTER BURRELL SHIPPEE be proved that all possible claims of the United States to the Pacific Coast had not been sufficiently urged. The Nineteenth Congress in its second* session was even more neglectful of the Oregon question ; it ignored the matter entirely unless a fleeting resolution relative to a route across the Isthmus of Panama may be construed as a sort of recog- nition of the Northwest issue. The Twentieth Congress was informed by President Adams that the Joint Occupancy agreement with Great Britain had been renewed, but at the moment this did not produce any response. A casual reference to Oregon came up in the first session by the introduction of a bill for "the punishment of contraventions of the 5th Article of the treaty between the United States and Russia," i. e., that portion dealing with the prohibition of the sale of fire-arms and liquor to the na- tives. While the measure did not become a law, or even arouse any particular attention, it raised the question of the relation of the courts of the United States to the disputed region.33 A resolution for exploration in the "Pacific and South Sea" passed the House. The second session of this Congress produced the first really serious discussion of the question of occupying the Oregon Territory, and the first debate which called for any notice wor- thy the name since the passage of Floyd's bill by the House in 1825. At the same time this was the last Congressional no- tice of any moment for nearly ten years. Dr. Floyd was once more chairman of the Oregon Territory Committee for which he brought before the House a new bill into which had been incorporated some of the features of his previous measures. 34 It authorized the President to erect forts upon the coast be- tween 42 and 54 40' and garrison the same; the country should be explored, and the criminal laws of the United States were to be extended therein. In the course of the discussion of the measure, taking place upon seven different days, the 33 Debates TV, Pt a, 2560-3. 34 The debate took place in the latter part of December, 1828, and the first of January. 1829. Debates, V, 125-53; 168-91; 192. The vote on the third read- ing occurred January pth. ​FEDERAL RELATIONS OF OREGON 129 original bill was amended so as to confine the application of the laws to citizens of the United States only, thus making it con- form with the Act of Parliament of 1821 which provided for the extension of British law over British subjects in the dis- puted area. The debate was somewhat widely shared and all the cur- rent arguments for andi against the measure were aired. Those who favored the bill urged the good title of the United States, the value of the trade and the necessity of protecting citizens of the United States seeking to profit by that trade from the too-active competition of the British company. They argued that the petitions being received from different portions of the Union showed that the public demanded action, while no more favorable time could be found, for, if ten years were al- lowed to pass by with nothing done, the United States would be considered to have surrendered its claim. Through all the discussion there ran the note that the real reason for action was the fact that the region belonged to the United States, it was bound to be taken some time, and consequently it might as well be done immediately. The opposition to immediate action was based upon more widely diverse grounds; to some, action, irrespective of the merits of the case, was premature; others thought the whole thing impracticable on account of the distance of the country from the settled! regions of the United States; some pointed out that the title was in dispute and, at any event, notice of ab- rogation of the convention of Joint Occupation should precede legislative action; others said that the title of the United States was so good that no act was needed to affirm it. Some wished no action for fear of offending Great Britain, and others believed that Great Britain had scrupulously lived up to her agreement and so no pressing need of any action existed. To some the Oregon Territory had been presented as a sterile region, not worth the trouble or expense it would) bring upon the country, and others would do nothing to drain off the pop​130 LESTER BURRELL SHIPPEE ulation, needed in the older States and in the States and Ter- ritories upon the existing frontier. Very little of that long and extremely tedious discussion, so characteristic of Oregon debates of later days, of the bases of the title of the United States, is to be found in the record of the debate of 1828-9. For the most part it appears that those who approved the bill agreed to the principle that it should) apply to the region between 42 and 54 40', al- though Everett called attention to the fact that the United States had offered 49 during the late negotiations with Eng- land. It is further interesting to note that James K. Polk was one of those who opposed the bill because, as he stated, he believed the provision for military occupation was sure to provoke a collision with Great Britain. He thought no decisive step should be taken until further negotiations had settled the issue as between the two countries. One of the interesting aspects of this episode is the sectional distribution of support and opposition to the measure. The sectional issue was scarcely developed; this is shown both by the record of votes and by the discussion. The bill was strongly supported by Floyd of Virginia, Everett and Richardson of Massachusetts, Drayton of South Carolina, Gurley of Louisi- ana and Ingersoll of Connecticut. Among those who worked against it were Bates of Missouri, Mitchell of Tennessee, Storrs of New York, Weems of Maryland and Gorham of Massachusetts. Moreover, it was not a mere dissatisfaction with the particular bill which produced the opposition of such westerners as Mitchell and Bates. The former said that it was inexpedient to take possession in any manner whatsoever; for no possible good and innumerable evils would result; Bates wished that the Rocky Mountains were a deep sea bordering the United States so that there could be no temptations to ex- pand further in that direction. As there was no sectional division on the measure so there was no strictly party issue made of the vote, if one can call ​FEDERAL RELATIONS OF OREGON 131 those inchoate political aggregations of the time parties. 35 The Oregon issue had not entered into the presidential cam- paign of 1828 and it did not figure as a party matter at this time when the election was over and General Jackson had been "vindicated." In the course of the discussion in the House three separate requests for grants of land had been presented and supported by the Congressmen most interested. The notion of granting anything like monopoly privileges was not kindly entertained by the House, and proposed amendments which would modify the bill in that direction were not adopted. The vote of 99 to 75 by which the ordering of the bill to the third reading was lost settled the matter for this Congress and for some years to come. After this there was a period dur- ing which other matters occupied the attention of the legisla- tors to the exclusion of the distant Columbia River country. Outside ofi Congress during this period of Oregon agitation there was some interest in the question, but it has to be borne in mind that as compared with all the other matters which oc- cupied public attention Oregon commanded but a place of minor importance. This is evidenced by the small amount of newspaper space devoted to it as well as by direct testimony from other sources. At the beginning of this period, 1819-29, something of the popular sentiment is mirrored in an editorial paragraph in the National Intelligencer. 36 "A bill was reported in the House of Representatives yes- terday, the title of which is 'a bill to authorize the occupation of the Columbia River/ Yes, reader, you may believe it, for it is true, that a bill is before Congress, and for aught we know ought to pass, for establishing a Colony now, to be hereafter a Territory, at the mouth of the Columbia, about forty degrees 35 The vote, on ordering to a third reading, was by sections as follows: For the bll Against the bill New England ....15 19 North i.... 20 33 South 26 30 West 19 17 The "North" includes New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey and Delaware; the "West" includes Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Kentucky, Tennessee and Missouri. 36 19 Jan., 1822. ​132 LESTER BURRELL SHIPPEE of longitude west from Washington, and by water distant, how far we know not, but at least 10,000 miles. The Terri- tory, however, belongs to the United States, and we under- stand that our Eastern brethren resort there for timber which they transport to the Southern Provinces of America, where that article is scarce. It will soon become necessary, if it be not now, to establish a port there; and it may be well to an- ticipate those who may else undertake to establish one for us, seeing their attention is already turned in that direction." Toward the end of the same year the Intelligencer stated that the debate on Floyd's bill had been, if not convincing as to the measure, at least interesting and instructive upon some points "in their bearing upon the future policy of this coun- try, but which are yet seldom discussed." 3 ? One anxious in- quirer demonstrated that his curiosity had been aroused when he had inserted in the public press a query as to whether the government possessed "any tolerably authentic or credible topo- graphical description" of the country. The diverse accounts given by Congressmen evidently kd him to think that no one had any too much information on the point. Another inter- ested follower of Congressional discussions advocated making the region about the mouth of the Columbia a penal colony. 38 Fugitive news items mostly dealing with some recently-re- turned' fur traders' expedition appear from time to time in the public prints and show that certain editors at least were of the opinion that some of their readers might like to scan a paragraph about the Oregon country. 3 * In 1822 the North American Review contained an article giving a picture of the trade of the Northwest Coast and showing that at the same time some fourteen vessels under American registry were en- gaged in trafficking with the natives of the mainland as well as with those of the Sandwich Islands. It is not improbable that the view of Hesikiak Niles, written 37 IQ Dec., 1822. The Intelligencer noted in reference to the 1825-25 bill merely that it had passed the House and had been tabled by the Senate. 38 N. Y. Gazette, quoted by Nat. Intelligencer, 30 Mar., 1822. 39 Niles gathered many of them for his Register, while the Rchmcnd Enquirer, and the Washington and New York papers did the same. ​toward the end of 1825, expresses the opinion of the bulk of men who were at all acquainted with the whole question. Said he,
"The project of establishing a chain of military posts to the Pacific, and of building a colony at some point near the mouth of the Columbia river, is again spoken of in the newspapers. We hope that it will be postponed yet a little while it is not the interest of either the old Atlantic or the new states of the west, that a current of population should now be forced beyond the settled boundaries of the republic."
Although here and there were groups of men willing to be the recipients of land-grants located thousands of miles away and in an unknown region, most people were of the view of Niles, that the project should be "postponed yet a little while."
* ↑ Greenhow, History of Oregon and California, (1844) gives the story of early discoveries. The various works of H. H. Bancroft are based upon much original material and together form the most comprehensive study of the whole subject.
* ↑ A recent study of Russian exploration in this region is found in Golden, Russian expansion on the Pacific, 1641-1850, Cleveland, 1914.
* ↑ The truth of Greenhow's assertion that the accounts of Meares are not to be relied upon has been upheld by other and more recent investigators.
* ↑ Martens, Recueil des prin. Traites … depuis 1761. III, 185-01. Signed at the Escurial Oct. 28, 1790.
* ↑ Register, 35 Nov. 1825.