# Eagle Glass Mfg Company v. Rowe/Opinion of the Court

* Court Documents
* Case Syllabus
* Opinion of the Court
* Dissenting Opinion Brandeis
United States Supreme Court
245 U.S. 275
Eagle Glass Mfg Company v. Rowe
Argued: Dec. 18, 1916. --- Decided: Dec 10, 1917
This case is quite similar to Hitchman Coal & Coke Company v. Mitchell et al., No. 11, this day decided, 245 U.S. 229, 38 Sup. Ct. 65, 62 L. Ed. --, and was submitted at the time of the argument of that case. It was a suit in equity, commenced July 28, 1913, in the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia. This was after that court had rendered its final decree in the Hitchman Case (202 Fed. 512), and the decree awarding a temporary injunction herein was made before the reversal of the final decree in the Hitchman Case by the Circuit Court of Appeals (214 Fed. 685, 131 C. C. A. 425).
The plaintiff, Eagle Glass & Manufacturing Company, is a West Virginia corporation, having its principal office and its manufacturing plant in that state. The object of the bill was to restrain the defendants, officers and members of the American Flint Glass Workers' Union, a voluntary association having its principal office at Toledo, in the state of Ohio, form interfering with the relations existing between plaintiff and its employes for the purpose of compelling plaintiff to 'unionize' its factory. The original defendants, Thomas W. Rowe, Joseph Gillooly, and three others, were among the chief executive officers of the union, and were sued individually and as such officers. The federal jurisdiction was invoked on the ground of diversity of citizenship, it being alleged that all of the defendants were citizens of the state of Ohio.
Upon the filing of the bill, with numerous affidavits verifying its averments, and showing that plaintiff's factory was run as a non-union shop under individual agreements with its employes, each employe having signed a paper declaring that he was not a member of the American Flint Glass Workers' Union and would not become a member while an employe of the Eagle Company, that the company agreed that it would run non-union while he was in its employ, that if at any time while so employed he desired to become connected with the union he would withdraw from the employ of the company, and that while in its employ he would not make any effort amongst its employes to bring about the unionizing of the plant against the company's wish; that the defendants, with notice of this, were making efforts through Gillooly as organizer, and threating further efforts to induce some of plaintiff's employes to quit its employ, and to persuade others secretly to join the union and remain at work in plaintiff's factory contrary to the terms of their agreement until a sufficient number had joined so as to be able by threatening to quit in a body to compel the unionization of the shop; and that by the activities of defendants the plaintiff was threatened with irreparable injury; the District Court granted a restraining order.
Process requiring defendants to answer the bill was promptly issued, but was served upon Gillooly alone, together with the restraining order. At the request of an attorney, a general appearance was entered for the other defendants. Gillooly filed an answer, amounting to a plea to the jurisdiction of the court, based upon the allegation that he was a resident and citizen of the state of West Virginia, and not of the state of Ohio as alleged in the bill. Upon this answer and affidavits in support of it he moved to dissolve the restraining order and dismiss plaintiff's suit, and thereupon, on the ground that he was a citizen of West Virginia, an order was made dismissing the bill as to him, without prejudice, and retaining the suit as to the other defendants. Plaintiff moved for a temporary injunction against them, whereupon the attorney at whose request their appearance had been entered moved to strike it out on the ground that his request was due to inadvertence and in fact he had no authority to appear for them. His motion was granted; but in the meantime plaintiff obtained leave to file and did file an amended bill, adding as defendants Peter J. Glasstetter and seven other parties named, residents of Steubenville, Ohio, and citizens of that state, and averring that they were members of the American Flint Glass Workers' Union, had constituted the original defendants, including Gillooly, their agents and representatives, and had assisted and were supporting them in their efforts to unionize plaintiff's employes and to force plaintiff to recognize the union. Process to answer the amended bill was issued and was served upon the added defendants, the remaining original defendants being returned 'not found.' Afterwards, and upon proper notice to the served defendants, plaintiff renewed its motion for a temporary injunction, basing it upon the original bill, exhibits, and accompanying affidavits, the amended bill, and some additional affidavits. Meanwhile the served defendants, who may be called the Steubenville defendants, filed answers denying knowledge of the matters alleged in the bill, denying that they had constituted Gillooly and the other original defendants their agents or representatives, or had assisted or supported them in the effort to unionize plaintiff's employes and force plaintiff to recognize the American Flint Glass Workers' Union, admitting that they were members of a local union of glass workers at Steubenville which was affiliated with the principal union, and averring that except their relation as members of the local union they had no connection or relation with the other defendants, were not officers, agents, representatives, or organizers of the union, and even in their capacity as members of their local had not by act, word, or deed authorized, assisted, aided, or encouraged any of the other defendants in doing any of the things alleged in the bill or amended bill. These answers were supported by affidavits of the answering defendants which were not specifically rebutted by the plaintiff.
The court, having struck out the entry of appearance for the original defendants other than Gillooly, made a decree granting a temporary injunction to restrain the defendants in the cause from interfering with plaintiff's employes, the form of the injunction being modeled upon that ordered by the final decree made in Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell et al.
The answering defendants appealed to the Circuit Court of Appeals, and that court (219 Fed. 719, 135 C. C. A. 417) reversed the decree; holding that as the Steubenville defendants submitted affidavits that they were only members, not officers, of a local union, that the original defendants, who were the general officers of the union, were not authorized to represent them in the alleged illegal acts and that they knew nothing of the efforts to unionize plaintiff's factory, and as plaintiff had made no showing to the contrary, it was erroneous to issue a temporary injunction against the defendants (other than Gillooly) named in the bill and amended bill; that as Rowe and the other general officers were not served, no relief could be given against them unless it could be said that they were brought before the court by representation when the Steubenville defendants were brought in; and that as plaintiff had no case against the latter defendants for participation in the alleged torts, there was no such common or general interest as authorized a decree against the defendants not served by virtue of the service upon and appearance of the Steubenville defendants. Having said this to show error in the decree awarding a temporary injunction, the court concluded its opinion as follows:
'All the questions involved in the merits of the appeal were decided adversely to the appellee by this court in Mitchell v. Hitchman Coal & Coke Co., 214 Fed. 685 [131 C. C. A. 425].' Thereupon a decree was made reversing the decree of the District Court, and remanding the cause with directions not only to dissolve the injunction, but to 'dismiss the bill in accordance with the opinion of this court.' The mandate was stayed pending application to this court for a writ of certiorari. Afterwards an appeal was allowed by one of the Circuit Court judges, together with a supersedeas. The transcript on appeal having been filed in this court, an application for a writ of certiorari was afterwards presented, consideration of which was postponed to the hearing of the appeal.
Since it appears from the averments of the bill and amended bill that the federal jurisdiction was invoked solely upon the ground of diversity of citizenship, it is evident that, as in the Hitchman Case, the appeal must be dismissed. 241 U.S. 644, 36 Sup. Ct. 450, 60 L. Ed. 1218. But, as in that case, we grant the writ of certiorari, the record on appeal to stand as the return to the writ. And, as the case was submitted on the merits, we proceed to dispose of them.
So far as the decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals dissolved the temporary injunction upon the ground that the Steubenville defendants had denied, and plaintiff had not adduced sufficient evidence to sustain, the averment of the amended bill that they had constituted Gillooly and the other original defendants their agents and representatives and had assisted and supported them in their efforts to unionize plaintiff's employes and force plaintiff to recognize the American Flint Glass Workers' Union, we see no reason to disturb the decision.
But the court went further, and directed a dismissal of the bill. Since the cause had not gone to final hearing in the District Court, the bill could not properly be dismissed upon appeal unless it appeared that the court was in possession of the materials necessary to enable it to do full and complete justice between the parties. Where by consent of parties the case has been submitted for a final determination of the merits, or upon the face of the bill there is no ground for equitable relief, the appellate court may finally dispose of the merits upon an appeal from an interlocutory order. Smith v. Vulcan Iron Works, 165 U.S. 518, 525, 17 Sup. Ct. 407, 41 L. Ed. 810; Mast, Foos & Co. v. Stover Mfg. Co., 177 U.S. 485, 494, 20 Sup. Ct. 708, 44 L. Ed. 856; Castner v. Coffman, 178 U.S. 168, 184, 20 Sup. Ct. 842, 44 L. Ed. 1021; Harriman v. Northern Securities Co., 197 U.S. 244, 287, 25 Sup. Ct. 493, 49 L. Ed. 739; U.S. Fidelity Co. v. Bray, 225 U.S. 205, 214, 32 Sup. Ct. 620, 56 L. Ed. 1055; Denver v. New York Trust Co., 229 U.S. 123, 136, 33 Sup. Ct. 657, 57 L. Ed. 1101. But in this case the application for a temporary injunction was submitted upon affidavits taken ex parte, without opportunity for cross-examination, and without any consent that the court proceed to final determination of the merits. Hence there was no basis for such a determination on appeal unless it appeared upon the face of the bill that there was no ground for equitable relief. That this was in effect the decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals is evident from the fact that it was rested upon the authority of Mitchell v. Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. In that case the same court had expressed the following opinion (214 Fed. 685, 714, 131 C. C. A. 425, 454):
'The court below also reached the conclusion that the defendants have caused and are attempting to cause the non-union members employed by the plaintiff to break a contract which it has with the nun-union operators. The contract in question is in the following language:
"I am employed by and work for the Hitchman Coal & Coke Company with the express understanding that I am not a member of the United Mine Workers of America, and will not become so while an employe of the Hitchman Coal & Coke Company; that the Hitchman Coal & Coke Company is run non-union and agrees with me that it will run non-union while I am in its employ. If at any time while I am employed by the Hitchman Coal & Coke Company I want to become connected with the United Mine Workers of America, or any affiliated organization, I agree* to withdraw from the employment of said company, and agree that while I am in the employ of that company that I will not make any efforts amongst its employes to bring about the unionizing of that mine against the company's wish. I have either read the above or heard the same read.'
'It will be observed that by the terms of the contract that either of the parties thereto may at will terminate the same, and while it is provided that so long as the employe continues to work for the plaintiff he shall not join this organization, nevertheless there is nothing in the contract which requires such employes to work for any fixed or definite period. If at any time after employment any of them should decide to join the defendant organization, the plaintiff could not under the contract recover damages for a breach of the same. In other words, the employes under this contract, if they deem proper, may at any moment join a labor union, and the only penalty provided therefor is that they cannot secure further employment from the plaintiff. Therefore, under this contract, if the nin-union men, or any of them, should see fit to join the United Mine Workers of America on account of lawful and persuasive methods on the part of the defendants, and as a result of such action on their part were to be discharged by the plaintiff, it could not maintain an action against them on account of such conduct on their part. Such being the case, it would be unreasonable to hold that the action of the defendants would render the United Mine Workers of America liable in damages to the plaintiff because they had employed lawful methods to induce the non-union miners to become members of their organization.
'Under these circumstances we fail to see how this contract can be taken as a basis for restraining the defendants from using lawful methods for the purpose of inducing the parties to the contract to join the organization.'
This reasoning, essential to the decision reached, is erroneous for several reasons, as we have now held in reversing the Hitchman decree, viz.: (a) Because plaintiff was entitled by law to be protected from interference with the good will of its employes, although they were at liberty to quit the employment at pleasure; (b) because the case involved no question of the rights of employes, and their right to quit the employment gave to defendants no right to instigate a strike; and (c) because the methods pursued by the defendants were not lawful methods.
The present case, according to the averments of the bill and amended bill, differs from the Hitchman Case principally in this: That it appeared that Gillooly, as organizer, had used money and had threatened to use dynamite to reinforce his other efforts to coerce plaintiff into agreeing to the unionization of its works. The system of employment at the Eagle Glass Company factory was precisely the same as that at the Hitchman mine. The written contract of employment inaugurated at the Eagle Glass Works more than a month prior to the filing of the bill in this case followed precisely the form established at the Hitchman mine shortly after the filing of the bill in that case. And the activities of Gillooly among the plaintiff's employes, and the motive and purpose behind those activities, as alleged in the bill, show the same elements of illegality to which we have called attention in our opinion in the Hitchman Case. Plaintiff is entitled to an opportunity, on final hearing, to prove these allegations as against those defendants who are within the jurisdiction of the court, and to connect them with the activities of Gillooly.
The decree of the Circuit Court of Appeals, so far as it directed that the temporary injunction be dissolved will be affirmed, but so far as it directed a dismissal of the bill it must be reversed, and the cause will be remanded to the District court for further proceedings in conformity to this opinion.
Decree reversed.
Mr. Justice BRANDEIS dissenting.

## Notes

This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
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