# United States v. First National Bank of Detroit Minnesota/Opinion of the Court

* Court Documents
* Case Syllabus
* Opinion of the Court
United States Supreme Court
234 U.S. 245
United States v. First National Bank of Detroit Minnesota
Before the transfers here complained of, and while the lands were held in trust, subject to the provisions of the act of February 8, 1887, supra, the Clapp amendment was passed, having the purpose of removing the restrictions upon alienation in certain cases. This act provides:
'That all restrictions as to the sale, encumbrance, or taxation for allotments within the White Earth Reservation in the state of Minnesota, heretofore [amended March 1, 1907, the word 'heretofore' being substituted for the word 'now'] or hereafter held by adult mixed-blood Indians, are hereby removed, and the trust deeds heretofore or hereafter executed by the Department for such allotments are hereby declared to pass the title in fee simple, or such mixed bloods upon application shall be entitled to receive a patent in fee simple for such allotments; and as to full bloods, said restrictions shall be removed when the Secretary of the Interior is satisfied that said adult full-blood Indians are competent to handle their own affairs, and in such case the Secretary of the Interior shall issue to such Indian allottee a patent in fee simple upon application.' It is at once apparent from reading this act that it deals with two classes,-adult mixed-blood Indians, concerning whom all restrictions as to sale, encumbrance, or taxation are removed, and full-blood Indians, whose right to be free from restrictions shall rest with the Secretary of the Interior, who may remove the same upon being satisfied that such full-blood Indians are competent to handle their own affairs.
This case turns upon the construction of the words 'mixed-blood Indians.' It is the contention of the government that mixed blood means those of half white or more than half white blood, while the appellees insist, and this was the view adopted by the circuit court of appeals, that the term 'mixed blood' includes all who have an identifiable mixture of white blood. If the government's contention be correct, it follows that, for the purposes of this suit, all of less than half white blood must be regarded as full-blood Indians, all others as mixed bloods. Upon the appellees' contention the line is drawn between full bloods as one class, and all having an identifiable admixture of white blood as the other.
If we apply the general rule of statutory construction that words are to be given their usual and ordinary meaning, it would seem clear that the appellees' construction is right; for a full blood is obviously one of pure blood, thoroughbred, having no admixture of foreign blood. That this natural and usual signification of plain terms is to be adopted as the legislative meaning in the absence of clear showing that something else was meant is an elementary rule of construction frequently recognized and followed in this court. United States v. Fisher, 2 Cranch, 358, 399, 2 L. ed. 304, 317; Lake County v. Rollins, 130 U.S. 662, 670, 32 L. ed. 1060, 1063, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 651; Dewey v. United States, 178 U.S. 510, 521, 44 L. ed. 1170, 1174, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 981. Interpreted according to the plain import of the words, the persons intended to be reached by the clause are divided into two, and only two, well-defined classes,-full-blood Indians and mixed bloods. There is no suggestion of a third class, having more than half of white blood or any other proportion than is indicated in the term 'mixed blood,' as contrasted with full blood. If the government's contention is correct, the Indians of full blood must necessarily include half bloods, and mixed bloods must mean all having less than half white blood, and none others. Such construction is an obvious wresting of terms of plain import from their usual and well-understood signification.
But the government insists that to effect the legislative purpose the words must be interpreted as the Indians understood them, and cases from this court (Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1, 44 L. ed. 49, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1; Starr v. Long Jim, 227 U.S. 613, 57 L. ed. 670, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 358) are cited to the effect that Indian treaties and acts to which the Indians must give consent before they become operative must be interpreted so as to conform to the understanding of the Indians as to the meaning of the terms used. The justice and propriety of this method of interpretation are obvious and essential to the protection of an unlettered race, dealing with those of better education and skill, themselves framing contracts which the Indians are induced to sign. But the legislation here in question is not in the nature of contract, and contains no provision that makes it effectual only upon consent of the Indians whose rights and privileges are to be affected. Evidently this legislation contemplated in some measure the rights of others who might deal with the Indians, and obviously was intended to enlarge the right to acquire as well as to part with lands held in trust for the Indians.
The government refers, in support of its contention, to reports of congressional committees, showing after effects of this legislation, which was followed, as the reports tend to show, by improvident sales and encumbrances of Indian lands and wasteful extravagance in the disposition of the proceeds of sales, resulting in suffering to the former proprietors of the lands sold and mortgaged. But these after effects can have little weight in determining the meaning of the legislation, and certainly cannot overcome the meaning of plain words used in legislative enactments. If the effect of the legislation has been disastrous to the Indians, that fact will not justify the courts in departing from the terms of the act as written. If the true construction has been followed with harsh consequences, it cannot influence the courts in administering the law. The responsibility for the justice or wisdom of legislation rests with the Congress, and it is the province of the courts to enforce, not to make, the laws. St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Taylor, 210 U.S. 281, 294, 52 L. ed. 1061, 1067, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 616, 21 Am. Neg. Rep. 464; United States ex rel. Texas Portland Cement Co. v. McCord, 233 U.S. 157, 163, 58 L. ed. --, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 550.
The government further insists that its interpretation of the act is consistent with its policy to make competency the test of the right to alienate, and that the legislation in question proceeds upon the theory that those of half or more white blood are more likely to be able to take care of themselves in making contracts and disposing of their lands than those of lesser admixture of such blood. But the policy of the government in passing legislation is often an uncertain thing, as to which varying opinions may be formed, and may, as is the fact in this case, afford an unstable ground of statutory interpretation. Hadden v. The Collector (Hadden v. Barney), 5 Wall. 107, 111, 18 L. ed. 518, 519. And again, Congress has in other legislation not hesitated to place full-blood Indians in one class and all others in another. Marchie Tiger v. Western Invest. Co. 221 U.S. 286, 55 L. ed. 738, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 578. In that case this court had occasion to deal with certain sections of the act of April 26, 1906 (34 Stat. at L. 137, chap. 1876), providing that no full-blood Indian of certain tribes should have power to alienate or encumber allotted lands for a period of twenty-five years, unless restrictions were removed by act of Congress. By § 22 of the act all adult heirs of deceased Indians were given the right to convey their lands, but for the last sentence of the section, which kept fullblood Indians to their right to convey under the supervision of the Secretary of the Interior. Therefore all adult heirs of any deceased Indian other than a full blood might convey, but the full blood only with the approval of the Secretary of the Interior. In this important provision the restrictions were removed as to all classes of Indians other than full bloods. In other words, there as here, the Indians were divided into two classes,-full bloods in one class and all others in the second class.
Furthermore, the appellees' construction accords with the departmental construction, as shown by the facts stipulated. Such was the construction given by the Indian Commissioner to the treaty of September 30, 1854, 10 Stat. at L. 1109, wherein provision was made for mixed-blood Indians among the Chippewas, and the Indian agent at Detroit, Michigan, was instructed by the Indian Commissioner that the term 'mixed blood' had been construed to mean all who are identified as having a mixture of Indian and white blood. Such was the interpretation of the Department of Interior, in the first place, at least, in administering the matter under the Clapp amendment. It is true that the government representatives at Detroit, Minnesota, were of the opposite opinion, for the reasons we have stated above, and that the Second Assistant Commissioner, in his reply, while reaching the conclusion we have, stated that he would confer with the Department of Justice.
While departmental construction of the Clapp amendment does not have the weight which such constructions sometimes have in long-continued observance, nevertheless it is entitled to consideration,-the early administration of that amendment showing the interpretation placed upon it by competent men having to do with its enforcement. The conviction is very strong that if Congress intended to remove restrictions only from those who had half white blood or more, it would have inserted in the act the words necessary to make that intention clear; that is, we deem this a case for the application of the often expressed consideration, aiding interpretation, that if a given construction was intended, it would have been easy for the legislative body to have expressed it in apt terms. Farrington v. Tennessee, 95 U.S. 679, 689, 24 L. ed. 558, 561; Union Nat. Bank v. Matthews, 98 U.S. 621, 627, 25 L. ed. 188, 189; Tompkins v. Little Rock, & H. S. R. Co. 125 U.S. 109, 127, 31 L. ed. 615, 624, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 762; United States v. Lexington Mill & Elevator Co., 232 U.S. 399, 410, 58 L. ed. --, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 337.
Congress was very familiar with the situation, the subject having been before it in many debates and discussions concerning Indian affairs. This was a reservation inhabited by Indians of full blood and others of all degrees of mixed blood, some with a preponderance of white blood, others with less, and many with very little. If Congress, having competency in mind, and that alone, had intended to emancipate from the prevailing restriction on alienation only those who were half white or more, by a few simple words it could have effected that purpose. We cannot believe that such was the congressional intent, and we are clearly of opinion that the courts may not supply the words which Congress omitted. Nor can such course be induced by any consideration of public policy or the desire to promote justice, if such would be its effect, in dealing with dependent people.
We reach the conclusion that the Circuit Court of Appeals rightly construed this statute, and its decrees are affirmed.

## Notes

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