# The Lessons of the German Events/Chapter 4

IV
REPORT OF COMRADE RUTH FISCHER
The October defeat was no defeat, for there was no fight. It was rather a collapse, a complete rejection of the Party.
When one compares the three reports, one sees that the first report of the Central Executive and Brandler's report belong together. You can judge them as you like, they have a consistent line of policy, and this consistent theory is accompanied by a bad German practice.
What Remmele said amounts to an attempt on the part of certain very good people to depose of things, which they cannot otherwise explain, by regarding them as errors, as the results of a definite, and to them dangerous, policy. And consequently the fact that for a year and a half Remmele had been holding himself back, that he reacted during the Friesland and the Levi crises, and is now again reacting, is an indication that a reaction is setting in within the Party against a very typical liquidationism and revisionism. Comrades, if we oppose this revisionism so vigorously it is because in the development of our Party the Levi and the Friesland crises were the first severe liquidation crises we passed through. In those crises we learned to look behind the masks and formulas for causes and theoretical foundations which must lead to practical consequences.
What was here expressed by the Executive representative and by Brandler, denotes the beginning of a liquidation crisis, not only within the German Communist Party, but within the whole Communist International. There was such a crisis after the Third World Congress. It is to be explained by the backwash of the revolution in Europe, and in Germany particularly by the defeat in the March action.
The Third Congress met the backwash of the revolutionary wave with the slogan for the winning over and rallying of the masses for the seizure of power. And this correct change of position the liquidators of the German Party transformed into the revision of Communism, the rejection of the Communist Party as such; they derived from it such conclusions as that we must return to the methods of the Social-Democratic Party. And, comrades, they did return, and every Berlin worker who reads Vorwarts sees the signature "Ediot, Ernst Reuter," and thinks of the bitter experience we have passed through.
Comrades, the crisis in the Communist International was never completely overcome. It is true that we made certain expulsions, drove out Fossard, or perhaps he left of his own accord; we also expelled a few in Germany. But the theoretical analysis was never made which is essential if our workers are to understand that a breach of discipline is meant not in the sense of organisation but in the sense of policy. An attempt was made to formulate the matter a little more carefully in order to restrain the working class ​elements. And the result was that the poison was not driven out of the German Communist Party, nor, I fear, out of the Communist International.
The tactic of the united front was a consistent deduction from the slogan "To the Masses." This tactic had with us a very remarkable history, which I beg all foreign comrades to study carefully, for it is an illustration of how the attempt is made to transform the correct idea of the united front as a method of agitation into revisionism. Out of the open letter on the Rathenau campaign, out of the meeting of the Executives of the three Internationals, out of the thousand details develops the attempt to fuse the German Communist Party and the German Socialist Party organisationally. When, for instance, in the last few years our German comrades discovered that the finest thing about the Russian Revolution is the New Economic Policy, that it is the true meaning of Socialism, when they go further and declare that the New Economic Policy must come before the conquest of power, and that it is the one thing needful—this is a symptom of an attempt to carry the policy to the end.
The October situation began to evince itself with the beginning of the occupation of the Ruhr. But it now appears to be unanimously agreed that the course of the German revolution was rather interrupted by the occupation of the Ruhr, that the German bourgeoisie were disturbed in their attempts at consolidation and subjection to foreign capitalism and that an internal political crisis arose. But it is not by chance that the Leipsic Party Congress by a fractional vote refused to hear a report and speech on the Ruhr occupation. We all value Comrade Zetkin extremely, but a mere report by Comrade Zetkin and the adoption of a manifesto cannot be regarded as an examination of the Ruhr question.
It is most important to remember that regarding the theses of the Leipsic Party Congress, which were emphatically disavowed by the Executive, the Executive representative more than once declared that he had read through the majority theses, pencil in hand, and had not found the least trace of a false formulation. This is a part of the policy of a common platform which he, in competition with Brandler, to-day developed.
Comrades, the Leipsic Congress came very near to a split, and no purpose is served by concealing the fact. The factional warfare and mutual hatred of the two groups was so acute that it was only by the intervention of the Executive at the last minute that a split was prevented. We made practically no preparations for the Leipsic Congress. We were in the situation of people who have not even the right to oppose the old party leaders. Nevertheless, we obtained the votes of a quite considerable number of workers from the most important industrial areas, although the situation was far from being clear and definite.
Every single action which the party conducted in the period from the Leipsic Congress to October, had a double aspect. The ​rise of the revolutionary wave, the impulse forward of the workers, the mood of the workers on the one hand and of the Central Committee of the German Communist Party on the other. Every single action proved this. We attempted in each case to develop our own standpoint, to make it clear from February to October that the Ruhr fight was the introduction of a new period, and that the question of power was on the order of the day. At the Wasserkante District Congress Brandler called us idiots, because we failed to understand that the next stage in Germany was a Left Social-Democratic and trade union workers' government, and that there was time enough for bringing the question of power to the fore. In his opinion the latter ought to be avoided.
The Executive of Comintern realised that historically the possibility of the seizure of power was on the order of the day and that the bourgeoisie were attempting a decisive attack against the working class, and not against the November Republic.
The contradiction between the fact that the Executive of Comintern somewhat differently from the German Communist Party understood the united front tactic as a method of winning the masses to Communism, and what we actually experienced in Germany, led to the fact that we had later to reproach ourselves for the collapse.
When the Party representatives returned from Moscow, one of them spoke in Berlin and declared that in three days we should have power in Saxony, and then we should march on Berlin.
Comrades, this characteristic distortion in practice of the decisions of the Communist International proved that the Party had not the strength to fight as a revolutionary party, let alone to fight for power. The characteristic feature of the policy of the German Communist Party, according to Brandler, was that it over-rated the revolutionary forces in October. The more the Reich fell asunder and the more the inflation crisis developed into economic disruption, the more it was declared that the relation of forces was against us. Yet so much was talked of civil war in August. When, however, we were obliged to fight, the Central Committee suddenly discovered that the forces at its disposal were not sufficient for a fight.
That is typical opportunism: when the time comes for attacking, it is discovered that forces are not sufficient. After the opportunity has passed the revolution is promised in three months. This is typical German trade union tactics.
Comrades, the October defeat culminated in two points—in Hamburg and in Saxony. The contrast between the Chemnitz Conference and the fight of the Hamburgers is so great that the Party was unable to pass it over. As regards Saxony, the situation was systematically and deliberately misrepresented to the Party and to the International. Comrades, I say that whoever thinks that Brandler did not know that weapons were not to be secured in Saxony, does not understand him. He consciously carried on ​his activities there so as to carry out the tactic of the united front from beginning to end, as he imagined.
I should like to take the example of the Chemnitz Conference. When a responsible politician sees that the Party is faced with an immediate armed struggle he must attempt to prepare the masses ideologically for it. The Party cannot be led into an armed conflict unless the masses are ideologically prepared for it.
At Chemnitz, however, it was intended to discuss economic industrial questions and not to call upon and mobilise the masses for the fight. When Graupe, at the moment of the civil war, declared that the masses could not be called upon to fight then but later, his method was the same as that employed by Brandler. At the decisive moment they declined because they cherished the theory of a constitutional transition from the Workers' Government to the paradise of Socialism.
The Hamburg fight is a proof that the Party, even as a minority, can win the masses for the fight, that it is not necessary to take up the ground of Social Democracy in order to secure an adequate relation of forces. I can hardly describe to you how the Hamburg fight affected the working class in Berlin. When the news reached Berlin that the Hamburg workers were fighting weapon in hand, the Berlin workers were moved, but they hardly reacted at all to the Saxon question. That shows that we shall win the workers for the struggle and be able to mobilise them if we have the courage as a Communist Party to enter the fight even without the Social-Democrats. This lesson of the Hamburg fight leads us back to the same problem of the German revolution, namely, that we must win over the masses.
There are two answers.
Shall we win the masses by wrapping ourselves in the cloak of Social Democracy by appearing to be constitutional? Or shall we win them by showing a clear Communist face, by acting as a Communist Party, and by displaying a clear Communist practice and theory.
Comrades, I say that only when we remember that we have made it easy for the Social-Democratic workers to remain in the Social-Democratic Party can we conceive what the present strength of the United Socialist Party of Germany is. The Left Social-Democratic workers who were beginning to understand that the Social-Democratic Party was a bad party, we have by our united front tactic, again united to their party.
I am of the opinion that the workers will be gradually driven towards Communism if our Party stands forth boldly and conscious of its aim, and by the strength of the International. If, however, we offer the Left Social-Democratic workers the outlet of the united front, then even the dissatisfied Social-Democratic workers will remain with the S.P.G. The talk about the split of the ​Social-Democratic Party is incorrect. The Social-Democratic Party will not split. The disruptive process was disturbed by the tactics of our Party and by the October collapse. I can prove by figures that the Left Social-Democrats are not in the majority. If they finally split off it will be in order to unite with the Right Communists, and then they will attempt to form a Centrist Party. Comrades, I have had letters distributed among you in which the same point of view is expressed by working-class circles.
(Laughter.)
I should like to ask the comrades of the Right to consider seriously the mood of the Leipsic comrades and how much confidence they still have in Böettcher and Brandler. You are playing with the mood of the workers. And indeed, it was only the existence of the Communist International which prevented large sections from passing over to the Communist Labour Party because of the attitude of the Party in October. If you continue to behave in this way you will disgust good workers and drive them out of the Party. Not Ruth Fischer: she is too clever to be caught in a breach of discipline.
Comrades, the collapse is therefore not to be explained by technicalities, by small errors, We shall not abandon this platform and we will fight it through to the end, for it is the only means of saving the Party—which consists of good workers—from opportunism. The representative of the E.C.C.I. pursued a tactic in Germany which was very good for its own purposes, but which nevertheless was a political masquerade. Now he comes forward and declares that he has changed his point of view completely since October: one need not always say A, one may also say B. We have read an article of his written before October in which he says that Fascism must first triumph in Germany before the workers will fight. He has the same fiery perspective as Brandler, declaring in the midst of the defeat: "We need not fight now; it would he light-minded and inexcusable to suggest fighting now, for the situation improves for us every day." This is the prospect which the comrades dared to put forward after Chemnitz and Hamburg. Brandler, as a responsible person, declared that the situation would get better every day; he added that it would perhaps require only four weeks in order to undertake the fight for power. This produced a burst of indignation in the Central Committee; it must take place in ten days, it was declared. Brandler fixed four weeks as the minimum. The following is characteristic of all these accusations: when action was possible—as for instance when on the Anti-Fascist Day we demanded that we should demonstrate—it was not done, and Brandler, in order to make the demonstration impossible, declared that if we demonstrated the world would collapse as the result of armed collisions. And to avoid this, and to avoid the suppression of the Party, he forbade ​the demonstration. It is a characteristic method to roar oneself hoarse in order to make a thing impossible.
Consequently, it was decided not to demonstrate on the anti-Fascist day, in spite of the fact that the whole of Berlin was tensely expecting it and had prepared itself for it. At the lowest estimate 250,000 workers assembled at our meetings. That was the mood of the masses. And yet we were not to demonstrate, because Brandler demanded of me a guarantee that no armed collisions would take place. And since I could not, and would not, give such a guarantee, the demonstrations were forbidden. But in October, when the Party was in its most difficult crisis, when our workers were being restrained with difficulty from leaving the Party, the representative of the Executive Committee demanded an armed demonstration, merely on political grounds, so to speak. We carried through the demonstration and gave it armed protection; we carried through what the Executive had demanded, for that we shall always do.
I will now deal with the state of the Party and what is bound to take place. Many comrades think that it is an insult to the Communist Party to say it is not a good party. Comrades, it is nevertheless a fact that leadership is not understood in our Party. That illusion has collapsed in Germany.
A profound process is going on in the membership of the Party itself. Within the Party there are tendencies to go over to the Social Democrats. It would be folly not to recognise that this mood exists.
The crisis in the Party cannot be healed by a compromise, by swallowing all stupidities without a murmur. The crisis can be solved only by brutally declaring that there is revisionism in the Party. If we declare this, we may be able to cure the Party. If not, the Centre will form a coalition with the Social-Democrats and at the next Party congress there will be a split.
Our immediate duty is to rearrange and regroup the Party. Without such a regrouping, the Party will be incapable of action.
I should like to add to what the representative of the Executive said about Fascism, namely, that the Fascists had defeated the November Republic. Comrades, what did it mean to say that Fascism has defeated the November Republic? It was sheer demagogic declaration designed to turn the minds of the workers away from the defeat. That was the prime purpose. These theses naturally made the work of our people more difficult.
I must declare (1) that the Party was deceived about the defeat and (2) that the justification was based upon Democratic illusions. This policy can only be justified when one distinguishes between a Fascist, industrial, and a Social-Democratie government, and if one advances the theory that the democratic republic was a non-class structure.
I would like to recommend the comrades of the International to read the last volume of the German International. I have ​underlined ten quotations from Brandler's article. There you find the revisionist meaning of the theses on the victory of the Fascists over the November Republic. Comrades, the point of view there expressed serves as a theoretical explanation of the policy of our Party in October: it is the consequence of Radek's analysis.
As to the prospects of future struggles in Germany. When I opposed the three months' perspective, it was because the Party to-day is not in a position to lead great decisive Struggles, unless it consolidates itself internally. There will be fights, but they will be of a different nature from those which preceded October. The characteristic feature of the latter were that they were struggles that started over economic questions, but immediately assumed a political form; they became struggles for power. In the Cuno strike we said to Schlecht, one of our factory leaders: you must tell the people that we are in favour of economic assistance. He, however, stormily declared to the people: we want no economic assistance, we want to overthrow the government. This call to the masses was symbolic of the change which had overtaken the mass movement. We shall again have fights, conrades, but they will be fights in defence of economic interests and for economic demands. We shall have to make the centre of our activity the eight-hour day, which is now smashed, and every penny of wages. We shall have to take care that the breach between the unemployed and the employed does not become too great. We shall have to fight for the Factory Councils—not that they should become Soviets, but they should not be driven out of the factories because the employers are beginning to liquidate them.
Such will be the different nature of the coming conflicts. These conflicts may and will lead to a great union of the Party with the masses, although we must return to old positions. We have won ground, and thanks to the vagueness of our policy, lost it again. It will now be a question of again gaining ground among the masses; not of conducting a policy among the Social-Democrats which is tearing us to pieces, but of a policy which will consolidate us and will win the masses away from Social-Democracy. Then, perhaps, the conflicts will be transformed into struggles for power sooner than we expected. But without other political lines of policy, we shall conduct also these conflicts only with partial success and shall not be able to become a real revolutionary party. We demand that the Communist International should give a clear decision and that a Party congress should be held at which shall be discussed the question of how the Party is to be conducted. And we shall be on our guard against the oratory of certain comrades. Let us forget the past, a glad and glorious future lies before us. The past has not been in vain.