# The Guilt of William Hohenzollern/Chapter 19
## CHAPTER XIX THE DECLARATION OF WAR ON BELGIUM
### THE BREACH OF FAITH A POLITICAL BLUNDER

There still remained a hard nut for the Imperial Chancellor to crack, the solution of the task set him by the military: namely, the justification of the invasion of Belgium. This invasion was, like the war against France, decided upon as soon as hostilities with Russia had broken out.
In 1871, Germany had annexed Alsace-Lorraine. This was not in order to liberate the inhabitants of this territory. On the contrary, they offered a desperate resistance to being torn from France. Bismarck demanded the annexation not for national but for strategic reasons, with a view to obtaining a better strategic frontier against France, in order to be nearer Paris in a future war and to be able to threaten it more quickly than had been the case at the outbreak of war in 1870.
For the sake of this military advantage Germany had immeasurably impaired her international political position, had raised an eternal feud between herself and France, driven the latter into the arms of Russia, roused the armament rivalry and the constant danger of war in Europe, and laid the seeds of the unfavourable position in which the German Empire entered the world war in 1914.
​All this was done to gain a strategic advantage which was soon to prove quite worthless. For in the age of modern science there is no natural strategic frontier the obstacles of which a wealthy and technically as well as economically developed State cannot overcome by artificial means.
The new Franco-German frontier was so formidably fortified there could be no question of a German army penetrating it quickly. And yet this appeared to be necessary for Germany in a war on two fronts, if she was to dispose of France as quickly as possible, in order to be able to turn with all her strength on Russia alone.
It did not seem possible to break through quickly on the Alsace front. The northern French frontier was therefore all the more tempting. Strangely enough, the French had only fortified the Alsace frontier very strongly. They felt themselves so secured by Belgium that they did not sufficiently fortify the northern frontier. And even in July, 1914, when the danger of war arose, and all the world was arming and concentrating troops, the French Army devoted its attention mainly to the east and not to the north.
The northern frontier was France's weak spot. If Germany made a surprise break-through at this point, she might hope to overcome all resistance in a few vigorous blows, occupy Paris, and not only Paris but also Calais, the sally-gate against England. From the purely military point of view, then, the break-through via Belgium was certainly the obvious thing to do. It is true that the example of Alsace-Lorraine might have shown how dangerous may be the effect of militarist opportunism gaining the upper hand over a far-seeing national policy, which not only considers ​the military but also the political and economic, and, above all, the moral strength and driving power of a nation.
German policy had set out to gain England's neutrality and Italy's co-operation in the decision by arms of the conflict of the Central Powers with Russia and France.
Both these ends were already questionable of attainment, but not yet decided when the war broke out. Sir Edward Grey had certainly warned Germany, but, on the other hand, he had not been able to hold out to France the absolutely certain prospect of his support, in spite of all his sympathies for the French case. He has been much blamed for this uncertainty, which some attribute to instability, and others to duplicity. His critics forget that he was a Minister in a parliamentary and democratic country, and was by no means sure of the approval of the people. Even if he found a majority in Parliament for a war against Germany, it would have been very doubtful if the mass of the working classes and of the bourgeois pacifists, who, it happens, are particularly numerous and influential in England, had not offered an energetic resistance to war. On the other hand, no one who knew the English to any extent could have the least doubt that the great majority of the nation would enthusiastically throw itself into the war as soon as Germany, with her powerful army and growing fleet, seized Belgium and thus directly threatened England.
Italy, however, was in the closest dependence on England. That she would take her place by the side of the Central Powers was no longer to be expected, at any rate, by the beginning of August.
On August 3rd Herr von Kleist, who had been sent ​on a special mission to Rome, sent the following telegram from thence to the "Kaiser's Majesty":
   "To-day, Monday, at 9 a.m., I delivered your Majesty's message to the King of Italy, in which immediate mobilization as well as the assistance provided for in the Treaty of Alliance was demanded.
   "The King replied that he personally was whole-heartedly with us, and up to some weeks ago had never for a moment doubted that in war Italy would faithfully help her allies. The tactlessness of Austria, incredible to Italian popular feeling, had, however, incited public opinion in the past few weeks against Austria in such a way that now active co-operation with Austria would let loose a storm. The Ministry would not risk a revolt. He, the King, had unfortunately no power, only influence. If he dismissed the present Ministry, no other would assume the responsibility of office. All this, mainly because Austria was not ready to give any definite promise for the future, by which a change might perhaps have been wrought by now in public opinion. Whether this was still possible was very doubtful.
   "As the people do not understand the distinction, Italy, as a result of Austria's tactlessness, would unfortunately fail Germany also, which gave him, the King, great pain. He will again exert his influence on the Ministry and report the result."
The next day Herr von Kleist had nothing more consoling to report:
   "H.M. the King received me this morning and said: In spite of his repeated efforts yesterday, the Government still maintains its attitude on ​neutrality. At the present time the people would only regard active assistance to the allies as help for Austria's plans for expansion on the Balkans [Our war against France has nothing to do with this. It is, besides, our side and not Austria's, that she is to be fighting on.—W.], plans from which Austria has so far never once definitely pledged herself to refrain. The people will always confound Germany with Austria [If the Government does nothing to prevent this, of course they will; but it is stupid.—W.]; therefore the Government would be risking rebellion if they gave active assistance to Germany at the present time. [A deliberate lie!—W.] He, the King, must repeat that he is unfortunately powerless, as the view of the Government is shared by the majority of the Deputies. Even Giolitti, who is friendly to the Triple Alliance [??—W.], and has just returned, thinks that there would not be a casus fœderis, but that the country needs rest, and must remain neutral, as there is no liability to give active help. [The unmitigated scoundrel!—W.] The Government intends to be armed for all eventualities. To my answer, that, as the possibility of assistance had thus disappeared, they were evidently thinking of menacing Austria, there being no other eventuality before them, the King said: 'One never knows what the men in the Government will do.' [That is to say, he is dropping out entirely.—W.] For the moment the King thought that nothing would happen."
The description of Giolitti as "an unmitigated scoundrel" is almost surpassed by the description of ​the King himself, who, in a letter on August 3rd, informed the Kaiser that the Italian Government did not recognize a casus fcederis in the war which had just broken out. The letter was signed:
"Thy Brother and Allly, "Vittorio Emanuele."
To "Ally" William added "Impudence," and to the name of the King the small but very expressive word "Rascal." On August 3rd, then, even the most frivolous and ignorant of optimists could no longer reckon on Italy's active assistance. Victor Emanuel's concluding remarks even left it to be feared that Italy might take an active part against Austria and Germany. England's attitude was therefore bound to have the greatest influence on Italy, as she depended on her in so many things.
This was a further consideration which ought to induce them not to irritate England by the occupation of Belgium. There was, in addition, the consideration that by this occupation Germany's prestige must suffer enormously in the eyes of the whole world. For Belgium's neutrality was not of the usual kind, like, for example, that of Greece. It was solemnly documented, and Prussia was one of the Powers guaranteeing it. With her invasion of Belgium she was committing not only a breach of neutrality but also of faith.
The greater the confidence that has been placed in one who gives his word, the greater is the fury against him and the contempt for him if he breaks it. Up to August, 1914, the majority of Belgians trusted Germany and were friendly towards her. After the invasion they became her most furious foes.
But not only in Belgium was the deepest indignation ​aroused by the breach of faith which was followed by the slaughter of thousands of Belgians and the appalling devastation of the whole country; it aroused all civilized countries, and deprived Germany of the last friends she still had in them.

### THE JUSTIFICATION OF THE BREACH OF FAITH

The invasion of Belgium was not only as morally condemnable as it was intelligible from a military point of view; it was also a profound political blunder.
But the soldiers commanded and the civilian politicians had to obey. To them only fell the thankless task of justifying the breach of faith in the eyes of the world. They did not make too great mental efforts over it. On this occasion they were again content to follow the convenient example of Berchtold, which he had set when dealing with Francis Joseph i.e., pretending that one was forced to war by the hostile acts of others.
And in the case of Belgium, the Imperial Chancellor only held the noble office of a letter-carrier.
On July 29th the Foreign Office received a draft, drawn up by Moltke, the Chief of the General Staff himself, under the date July 26th, for a letter to the Belgian Government, which, after a few editorial alterations made by the Chancellor, Stumm and Zimmermann, was sent off the same day by Jagow, not to the Belgian Government, but to the German Ambassador in Brussels. It ran:
   "The Imperial Government has received reliable reports regarding the intended advance of French ​forces on the Meuse from Givet to Namur. They leave no doubt of France's intention (after combining with an English expeditionary force) to advance against Germany through Belgian territory. The Imperial Government cannot resist the fear lest Belgium, with the best intentions, will not be able to prevent without help a French (-English) advance with sufficient prospects of success for ample security to be given against the threat to Germany. The law of self-preservation demands that Germany should anticipate the enemy attack. It would therefore fill the German Government with the greatest regret if Belgium should see an act of hostility against her in the fact that the measures of her enemies force Germany, in her turn, to invade Belgian territory as a defensive measure. To prevent any misconception, the Imperial Government makes the following statement:
   "1. Germany intends no hostilities against Belgium. If Belgium is willing to adopt a benevolent neutrality towards Germany in the war which is imminent, the German Government will pledge itself, at the conclusion of peace, not only to guarantee the possessions and independence of the kingdom completely, but is even ready to meet in most benevolent fashion any claims by the kingdom for territorial compensation at the expense of France.
   "2. Germany pledges herself, under the above condition, to evacuate the kingdom as soon as peace is concluded.
   "3. In the case of a friendly attitude on the part of Belgium, Germany is ready, by arrangement with the Royal Belgian authorities, to purchase for cash ​all things required for her troops, and make good all damage which might be done by German troops.
   "Should Belgium offer a hostile resistance to the German troops, in particular to impede their advance by the resistance of the Meuse fortresses or by destroying railways, roads, tunnels and other works, Germany, to her regret, will be forced to regard the kingdom as an enemy. In this case, Germany will not be able to assume any obligations to the kingdom, but would have to leave to the decision of arms the later arrangement of the relation of the two States to one another.
   "The Imperial Government confidently hope that this contingency will not arise, and that the Royal Belgian Government will know how to take measures to prevent the occurrence of events such as those mentioned. In this case the friendly tie that unites the two neighbouring States would be drawn more closely and permanently."
To this text was appended the following passage, drafted by Moltke:
   "An unequivocal answer to this communication must be made within twenty-four hours after delivery, otherwise hostilities will be opened immediately."
Jagow, however, considered this too rude. He deleted this sentence in the communication to the Belgian Government, and substituted the following instructions for the German Minister in Brussels:
   "Your Excellency will at once communicate this in strict confidence to the Belgian Government and ​request an unequivocal answer within twenty-four hours.
   "Your Excellency will at once inform me by telegraph of the reception accorded to your disclosures and of the definite reply of the Royal Belgian Government."
As already mentioned, Herr von Moltke's communication was immediately accepted by the Foreign Office and dispatched with few editorial alterations. These are of no consequence; only one is worthy of note. The Chief of the General Staff obviously held the view that England would enter the war simultaneously with France; he, therefore, spoke of information which, like all information of a similar kind, of course leaves no doubt as to the intention of a "Franco-English" advance through Belgian territory. But the Foreign Office considered this too risky. It still hoped for England's neutrality. Stumm, therefore, deleted the words placed in brackets in the above copy, and contented himself with the "indubitable" establishment of the intention of a French advance through Belgium. It is only a matter of a couple of words, but their manipulation is very instructive. It showed how the General Staff understood the art of fabricating for stock complaints of French or Franco-English acts of hostility which made the war or the breach of neutrality inevitable, before such acts were even possible; these complaints were then brought forward as soon as they were needed. This method was actually followed. The document composed on July 26th, edited and dispatched on the 29th, was not immediately submitted to the Brussels Government. At that time the world was not yet prepared for the Franco-German war.
​Jagow sent the document in a sealed envelope through a King's Messenger to Brussels to the German Minister, Herr von Below-Saleske, with the following covering letter:
   "I respectfully request Your Excellency to keep securely sealed the enclosure accompanying this order, and not to open it until you are instructed to do so by telegram from here. You will confirm by telegram the receipt of this order and the enclosure."
Thus the necessity which, according to Bethmann's pathetic assurance in his great war speech of August 4th, knows no law was already carefully and deliberately concocted on July 29th, and put away "securely sealed" on ice, so that it could be brought out when it was needed.
The need arose on August 2nd. Not until then did it become urgently necessary for the General Staff that Germany's security should be most dangerously threatened by the intended penetration of the French into Belgium. Then Jagow telegraphed to the Minister in Brussels:
   "Also, the answer is to be demanded, not within twenty-four hours, but within twelve hours i.e., ​by 8 a.m. to-morrow. Please assure the Belgian Government most emphatically that every doubt is precluded as to the correctness of our information concerning French plan, notwithstanding promises.
   "Belgian answer must be to hand here by 2 p.m. to-morrow, German time. Your Excellency will, therefore, instantly wire answer hither, and, in addition, transmit it immediately upon receipt to General von Emmich, Union Hotel, Aix-la-Chapelle, through a member of Imperial Legation, preferably the Military Attache, by automobile.
   "Belgian Government must receive impression as though entire instructions in this matter had reached you only to-day. Leave it to your discretion to suggest to Belgian Government that it may withdraw with troops to Antwerp, and that we, if there desired, could take over protection of Brussels against internal disturbances."
The history of the Ultimatum to Belgium clearly reveals the mechanism by means of which the reasons of the German declarations of war in the first days of August were prepared.
Anyone who follows its operations must "receive the impression" as though the "entire" facts established by the German Government in those days were the more deeply untrue the more they are confirmed by repeated asseverations that they were absolutely "reliable" and "indubitable."
It was a terrible tragedy of moral collapse that ushered in the war. But, at the same time, the satyr-play was not to be lacking.
​The "assembling" of French troops on the Belgian frontier was intended to impress the naive Germans, whose senses were already befogged by the war-intoxication of the August days. But it was also desired to convince England that they were forced to invade Belgium. For this, stronger arguments were needed. And what straws were not snatched at then! The legendary airmen had again to come to the rescue. We have already communicated the text of the German declaration of war on France. In this it is remarkable that it emphasizes the statement that several of the airmen had notoriously violated Belgian neutrality by flying over Belgian territory.
It was, however, not to be expected that these intangible airmen would make any particular impression in England. Efforts had to be made to reach firm ground. Perhaps the automobile would succeed where the aeroplane failed.
On August 2nd the President of the Local Government in Düsseldorf telegraphed to the Imperial Chancellor:
   "The Landrat of Geldern telegraphed yesterday local Battalion reports that early this morning eighty French officers in Prussian officers' uniform vainly attempted to cross the frontier near Walbeck with twelve automobiles. On inquiry, Landrat further states Adjutant of local Battalion subsequently reports that report respecting eighty French officers has been, in the main, confirmed. Cars remained behind on Dutch territory. One officer who had advanced retreated before armed opposition."
Let us assume for a moment that the report was, ​"in the main," correct, and not the product of the heated imagination of a few excited frontier guards.
Then the case in question was, primarily, a violation not of Belgian but of Dutch neutrality.
But, further, what, according to the report, had the frontier guards seen? Twelve automobiles with eighty occupants in Prussian officers' uniform. One of them who got out and stepped across the frontier was received, strange to say, not, like the Captain of Kopenick, with respect, in view of his uniform, but with armed opposition. At the same time, the guards at once observed that the eighty men in the cars had no right to wear their uniform. But they also knew, without further investigation, that the disguised men were not, say, Dutchmen, but Frenchmen—nay, French officers, who had driven through Belgium to Holland, and then to the German frontier. To get through Belgium and Holland without attracting notice, these gentlemen, instead of travelling in mufti, had obviously preferred to don Prussian uniform!
The whole story was just as senseless as that of the French doctor (reported on the same day), who, with two other Frenchmen, was caught at Metz in the act of poisoning wells with cholera bacilli. Later on, they no longer dared to make use of this story, but on August 2nd Jagow managed not only to take it seriously but even to make it the subject of diplomatic action. He telegraphed the story of the cholera bacilli to Rome with the order to circulate it in the local press. And to the Ambassador in London and the Ministers in Brussels and the Hague he sent the following telegram:
   "Please inform Government there that eighty French officers in Prussian officers' uniform, with ​twelve autos, this morning attempted to cross the German frontier near Walbeck, west of Geldern. This means the gravest conceivable violation of neutrality by France."
The German Foreign Office must have lost its head completely, to make itself thus ridiculous in the eyes of foreign countries.
Geldern, moreover, is situated near Wesel, where the French airmen were supposed to have been brought down. The military in that frontier district appear to have been particularly nervous and apt to see ghosts.
But General Emmich went still farther than Jagow. He gave the reason for the invasion of Belgium in a proclamation which ran:
   "Our troops acted under the compulsion of an unavoidable necessity, Belgian neutrality having been violated by French officers who, in disguise, entered Belgian territory in automobiles, in order to reach Germany." (Quoted by Dr. E. J. Gumbel in his pamphlet, " Vier Jahre Luge " (" Four Years of Lies "), page 9.)
In his war speech of August 4th Bethmann-Hollweg was not ashamed to make use of this silly pretext for the invasion of Belgium. He acknowledged that the attack on Belgium "contravenes the dictates of International Law," as also that the French Government had declared in Brussels that it was willing to respect Belgium's neutrality so long as their opponent respected it. He forgot to remark that Jagow had declined to make the same declaration. He continued:
   "We knew, however, that France was ready for the invasion,"
​Yes, indeed, we knew already on July 2gth that France was ready for the invasion on August 1st!
   "France could wait, but we could not, and a French attack on our flank on the Lower Rhine might have proved disastrous. We were therefore forced to disregard the protests of the Luxemburg and Belgian Governments."
Here there is no more talk of Belgium's neutrality having been already violated. The fundamental reason given for the invasion is now only this: "We could not wait," and that, indeed, was the sole reason.
With lying and perfidy the way was paved for war in the beginning of July, with lying and perfidy in the first days of August the war was begun. The sequel was the inevitable consequence of the introduction. And thus again was proved the truth of that curse which clings to wrongdoing—that evil propagates itself by begetting more evil. Government and Army Command were never rid of the lie in which they had once involved themselves, and had to pile up the edifice of falsehood ever higher and higher, until on November 9th, 1918, it fell in with a crash.
* ↑ Referring to the epilogue in lighter vein which followed a trilogy in the great tragic drama. (Translator's note.)