# The Mind and the Brain

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THE MIND AND THE BRAIN
BY
ALFRED BINET
Directeur du Laboratoire de Psychologie à la Sorbonne
BEING THE AUTHORISED TRANSLATION OF
L'ÂME ET LE CORPS
LONDON
KEGAN PAUL, TRENCH, TRÜBNER & CO. L$^{TD}$
DRYDEN HOUSE, GERRARD STREET, W.
1907
The rights of translation and of reproduction are reserved.
Printed by Ballantyne, Hanson & Co.
CONTENTS :
| BOOK I THE DEFINITION OF MATTER ||
| CHAPTER I Introduction ||
| | page |
| The distinction between mind and matter—Knowable not homogeneous—Criterion employed, enumeration not concepts | 3 |
| CHAPTER II Our Knowledge of External Objects only Sensation ||
| Modern theories of matter—Outer world only known to us by our sensations—Instances Mill's approval of proposition, and its defects—Nervous system only intermediary between self and outer world—The great X of Matter—Nervous system does not give us true image—Müller's law of specificity of the nerves—The nervous system itself a sensation—Relations of sensation with the unknowable the affair of metaphysics | 10 ​ |
| CHAPTER III The Mechanical Theories of Matter are only Symbols ||
| Physicists vainly endeavour to reduce the rôle of sensation—Mathematical, energetical, and mechanical theories of universe—Mechanical model formed from sensation—Instance of tuning-fork—No one sensation any right to hegemony over others | 27 |
| CHAPTER IV Answers to some Objections, and Summary ||
| Objections of spiritualists—Of German authors who contend that nervous system does give true image—Of metaphysicians—Common ground of objection that nervous system not intermediary—Answer to this—Summary of preceding chapters | 44 |
| BOOK II THE DEFINITION OF MIND ||
| CHAPTER I The Distinction Between Cognition and Its Object ||
| Necessity for inventory of mental phenomena—Objects of cognition and acts of cognition—Definition of consciousness | 55 |
| CHAPTER II Definition of Sensation ||
| Sensation defined by experimental psychology—A state of consciousness—Considered self-evident by Mill, Renouvier, and Hume—Psycho-physical according to Reid and Hamilton—Reasons in favour of last definition—Other opinions examined and refuted | 60 ​ |
| CHAPTER III Definition of the Image ||
| Perception and ideation cannot be separated—Perception constituted by addition of image to sensation—Hallucinations—Objections anticipated and answered | 76 |
| CHAPTER IV Definition of the Emotions ||
| Contrary opinions as to nature of emotions—Emotion a phenomenon sui generis—Intellectualist theory of emotion supported by Lange and James—Is emotion only a perception? Is effort?—Question left unanswered | 88 |
| CHAPTER V Definition of the Consciousness—The Relation Subject-Object ||
| Can thoughts be divided into subject and object?—This division cannot apply to the consciousness—Subject of cognition itself an object—James' opinion examined—Opinion that subject is spiritual substance and consciousness its faculty refuted | 96 |
| CHAPTER VI Definition of the Consciousness—Categories of the Understanding ||
| Principle of relativity doubted—Tables of categories: Aristotle, Kant, and Renouvier—Kantian idealism—Phenomenism of Berkeley examined and rejected—Argument of a priorists—The intelligence only an inactive consciousness—Huxley's epiphenomenal consciousness—Is the consciousness necessary?—Impossibility of answering this question | 103 ​ |
| CHAPTER VII Definition of the Consciousness—The Separability of the Consciousness from Its Object—Discussion of Idealism ||
| Can the consciousness be separated from its object?—Idealists consider the object a modality of the consciousness and thus inseparable from it—Futility of this doctrine—Object can exist without consciousness | 119 |
| CHAPTER VIII Definition of the Consciousness—The Separation of the Consciousness from Its Object—The Unconscious ||
| Can ideas exist without consciousness?—No consciousness without an object—Can the consciousness die?—Enfeeblement of consciousness how accounted for—Doubling of consciousness in hysterics—Relations of physiological phenomena to consciousness—Consciousness cannot become unconscious and yet exist | 126 |
| CHAPTER IX Definitions of Psychology ||
| Difficulty of defining psychology—Definition by substance—Psychology not the science of the soul—Definition by enumeration: its error—Definition by method contradicts idea of consciousness—Externospection and introspection sometimes confused—Definition by content—Facts cannot be divided into those of consciousness and of unconsciousness—Descartes' definition of psychology insufficient—"Within and without" simile unanalogous—Definition by point of view—Inconsistencies of Ebbinghaus' contention—W. James' teleological theory—Definition by the peculiar nature of mental laws only one possible: why? | 135 ​ |
| BOOK III THE UNION OF THE SOUL AND THE BODY ||
| CHAPTER I The Mind has an Incomplete Life ||
| Problem of union of mind and body stated—Axiom of heterogeneity must be rejected—Phenomena of consciousness incomplete—Aristotle's relatum and correlatum applied to the terms mind and matter | 179 |
| CHAPTER II Spiritualism and Idealism ||
| Spiritualist view that death cuts link between soul and body—Explanation of link fatal to system—Consciousness cannot exercise functions without objects of cognition—Idealism a kaleidoscopic system—Four affirmations of idealism: their inconsistency—Advantages of historical method | 191 |
| CHAPTER III Materialism and Parallelism ||
| Materialism oldest doctrine of all: many patristic authors lean towards it—Modern form of, receives impulse from advance of physical science—Karl Vogt's comparison of secretions of brain with that of kidneys—All materialist doctrines opposed to principle of heterogeneity—Modern materialism would make object generate consciousness—Materialists cannot demonstrate how molecular vibrations can be transformed into objects—Parallelism avoids issue by declaring mind to be function of brain—Parallelists declare physical and psychical life to be two parallel currents—Bain's support of this—Objections to: most important that it postulates consciousness as a complete whole | 201 ​ |
| CHAPTER IV Modern Theories ||
| Berkeley's idealism revived by Bergson, though with different standpoint—Admirable nature of Bergson's exposition—Fallacy of, part assigned to sensory nerves—Conscious sensations must be subsequent to excitement of sensory nerves and dependent on their integrity | 225 |
| CHAPTER V Conclusion ||
| Author's own theory only a hypothesis—Important conditions for solution of problem—Manifestations of consciousness conditioned by brain, but this last unconscious—Consciousness perceives only external object—Specificity of nerves not absolute—Why repeated excitements of nerve tend to become unconscious—Formation of habit and "instinct"—Resemblance to and distinction of this from parallelism—Advantages of new theory | 234 |
| CHAPTER VI Recapitulation ||
| Description of matter—Definition of mind—Objections to, answered—Incomplete existence of mind—Other theories—Nervous system must add its own effect to that of its excitant | 256 |
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