# History of Mexico (Bancroft)/Volume 5/Chapter 5

Table of Contents
CHAPTER V.
CONSERVATIVE RULE.
1830-1832.
Despotic Measures — Codallos' Revolution — Yorkino Opposition — Politcal Blunders — Institutions Prostituted — Inclan's Affair — Impending Changes — Santa Anna's Pronunciamiento — His Defeat at Tolome — Siege of Vera Cruz — Its Failure — Revolutions in Tamaulipas — Teran's Suicide — Santa Anna's Reformed plan — It is Seconded Elsewhere — Battle of Los Carmelos — Fall of San Luis Potosí — Its Effects in Mexico — Acting President Muzquiz — Bustamante's Victory in Guanajuato — Santa Anna's Success — Bustamante's Defeats in Puebla — Armistice — Plans of Pacification — The Revolution Triumphant
The party which had labored so hard for nine years to gain control of the government was at last triumph ant. It was believed by many that the change would prove beneficial. Indeed, friends and foes alike trust ed that the pledges of the leading men would be faithfully carried out, and a constitutional policy with tolerance adopted. Unfortunately, the new rulers manifested no such intentions. Their first step was to draw from congress a vote to legalize the rev olution that had elevated them to power. Relying on the clergy and the army, they initiated a policy of persecution against the authorities, functionaries, and prominent men of the yorldno or popular party.
Freedom of the press soon ceased under the ​oppressive system of Minister Alaman. Only journals defending the government were allowed to exist.
The government was not long permitted to pursue its despotisms in peace. Revolutions broke out in southern Michoacan and other parts of the south, as well as in Mexico, San Luis Potosí, and Puebla, which caused much trouble; though, for want of popular support, they were quelled, and their promoters arbitrarily dealt with.
The military element, being now well looked after as to pay, emoluments, and honors, was daily gaining a preponderance in public affairs; and the government further increased the number of its supporters by winning over the chiefs who had favored the late revolution by means of an amnesty law, so called, but really a penal one against conspirators, afterward amended, allowing officers in the rebellion not only to submit, but to tender to the pardoning authority their services against their former comrades. They were received with the rank they held among the revolutionists, and even given promotion. The government was running from one blunder into another in its endeavors to sustain itself. In October it forced Gomez Pedraza, who had come back, to leave the ​country. This unjustifiable proceeding was sustained by the subservient ministerial majority in congress.
The national congress from 1829 to the end of 1830, taken as a whole, was undeserving of popular respect. During the first session both houses were subservient to the demands of all parties. Their bickerings and general discordance brought upon the country all the troubles resulting from the Jalapa plan. In 1830, the legislative body, with a few honorable exceptions among its members, went over to the support of the men who effected the overthrow of Guerrero's government, which explains the ease with which it was accomplished as well as the facility with which Bustamante's administration obtained a legal status. But the congress of 1831-2 conducted itself with still greater subserviency to the will of the ministers, passing special laws, establishing special courts to terrorize those discontented with the existing order of things, giving the government almost unlimited powers, decreeing proscriptions, and rewarding crime. It permitted the executive, without protest, to modify or construe the laws at will.
The judiciary was not free from the corruption that pervaded congress. The courts, from the lowest to the highest, lent themselves to subterfuge and chicanery to please the government, and became its abject tools, as was made evident in the proceedings against Alpuche, Zerecero, Gondra, and others, and in the admission of the inost absurd charges, preferred in most cases by notoriously disreputable men. The independence of the legislative and judicial powers no longer existed, and the people were actually at the ​mercy of the government and its myrmidons — a state of things which, it must be confessed, was made available for its purposes with ability and energy, without neglecting to gain the favor of the clergy by concessions that virtually restored their former influence.
The despotism of the military is illustrated by the violence shown in the arrest of a printer at Guadalajara by the comandante general, Inclan, which was of so outrageous a nature that the insulted state authorities and legislature deemed it proper to remove to Lagos. The government for a time, from motives of policy, took no action in the case. Facio tried to extenuate Inclan's fault without offending that and other legislatures, and did not recall that general till the 28th of December.
This affair precipitated events when the opposition to the government had not yet matured any plan to bring about a reaction. The moderate element in the several parties limited its efforts to checking the retrogressive policy of the administration, and trusted, for a radical change, to the renewal of the executive and congress at the end of 1832. But the large number who had suffered or were suffering at the hands of despotism would brook no further delay; the policy of the opposition was in their estimation too slow and altogether dependent on electoral eventualities to be waited on a whole year, during which those in power would use their large resources to keep it in their own hands. The probabilities were all in favor of the government, which counted on the coöperation of the ​authorities — its own creatures — in many states, and on the indifference of others. Jalisco and Zacatecas, however, occupied a position between those willing to wait for a legal change of ruler, and those who wanted to effect it by force of arms.
Without leaning to either extreme, they organized their militia and kept fanning the flame of discord in the press. Wealthy Guanajuato, under General Luis Cortazar's advice, was also prepared for a turn of events. Chihuahua, Nuevo Leon, Coalhuila, Tamaulipas, and Tabasco, being at a distance, were to be called into action in the event of a conflict with the central force. Meantime the parties were carrying on intrigues to win the elections. Three parties were playing for the stake, namely, the friends of the existing order of things, the moderates, and the radicals. Amidst the agitation the administration felt sure of victory, and would probably have gained it but for an unforeseen occurrence that dashed to the ground all its plans, and hurled it from power.
Bustamante on the 1st of January, 1832, congratulated the legislative body on the progress the republic had made under his rule, adding that the fury and animosity of political parties had almost disappeared. Flattering manifestations of confidence greeted him from the ministerial majority and his other supporters, when tidings arrived which contradicted his ​asseverations regarding the popular satisfaction with his policy. The garrison at Vera Cruz had, on the night of the 2d of January, issued a pronunciamiento demanding, among other things, the dismissal of the ministers.
Santa Anna had been living quietly for two years on his estate of Manga de Clavo. The administration had tendered him positions and he had refused them. All persons desiring to put a stop to the arbitrary acts of the government, and prevent the coming elections from being conducted under the influence of Bustamante's ministers, urged Santa Anna to place himself at the head of a movement to effect their removal. Santa Anna was convinced that only a resort to arms could remove the dangers of a wide-spread revolution that would lead to general anarchy. The dismissal of the ministers was thought to be the remedy for the evil, and this was the exclusive object of the pronunciamiento. It subsequently took another direction by the express will of the several states. The ministers and their friends attributed the movement to different motives, accusing Santa Anna of sinister views, and charging Colonel Landero, one of the chief promoters, with acts of a dishonorable character. Whatever the actual promptings may have been, the grievance complained against was the conduct of the ministry, as set forth by the complainants in their act, a synopsis of which I give below. Santa ​Anna accepted the position, and on the 4th of the same month addressed himself from Vera Cruz to Bustamante, detailing the occurrences at that city, and modestly tendering his good offices as a mediator to bring about the wished for result without breaking the peace or causing disturbance.
While Santa Anna and his followers awaited at Vera Cruz the government's decision, the ministry made preparation for resistance. The four ministers appeared before the chambers to inform them of these occurrences. After the official despatches had been read, Alaman read private letters from General Iberri, and explained from his standpoint the action of the revolutionists at Vera Cruz. That minister next proceeded to justify his own and his colleagues' conduct, and declared their intention to keep their post so long as the congress did not consider them open to the charges that had been preferred against them. However, on the 11th the four ministers laid their resignations, accompanied with an explanation of their motives, before the executive; but they were not accepted. Both houses of congress manifested their wish that the ministers should continue in office. This was tantamount to a resolution that the demand of the revolutionists at Vera Cruz should be ​disregarded as untenable and unconstitutional. Notwithstanding which the ministers remained in power much against their will, and after a while insisted that their resignations be accepted. Meantime, thousands of expressions favorable to the government came from its friends, which were looked upon as so many evidences that the movement at Vera Cruz was condemned by public opinion. The ministry thereupon resolved to employ all the resources at its disposal to crush the promoters. Minister Facio temporarily left his department on the 11th, and repaired to Jalapa to organize a strong division, which was placed in command of General José María Calderon. Peaceable means were, however, first tried, commissioners being sent to induce Santa Anna to abandon his hostile attitude. But they effected nothing, and no recourse was left but to appeal to arms. Facio had completed his preparations by the end of January, and General Calderon was to begin operations the next month. Thinking to obtain the surrender of Vera Cruz on the approach of his troops, Facio tried to bribe José María Flores, the commandant of San Juan de Ulúa, who returned dignified answers, rejecting the proposal. Hostilities consequently commenced. Santa Anna at first obtained some partial successes, but at Tolome he encountered the ​ministerial troops, 3,700 strong, on the 3d of March, and suffered a disastrous defeat, losing heavily in killed, wounded, and prisoners, besides a considerable quantity of ammunition and muskets. The ministerialists' loss was also severe. After this disaster Santa Anna hurriedly returned to Vera Cruz with the remnants of his force. He at once set to work to organize another army, and prepared the town for defence. Calderon by a little activity might now have made short work of the revolution, but by his dilatoriness, expecting that the town would easily fall into his hands, and also from motives of humanity to avert further bloodshed, he gave Santa Anna time to complete his preparations, and on arriving in front of the city found his adversary strongly fortified, with 112 heavy pieces of artillery on the ramparts, and 2,500 men. Calderon completed his preparations for the siege on the 12th of April; but all his efforts failed to reduce the place, while hundreds of his men were falling victims to the deadly climate. Finally, in view of occurrences in other states, and after losing upward of 1,000 men, Calderon raised the siege on the 13th of May, and retired to Jalapa, where we must leave him for the present to consider important events in other parts that eventually affected Vera Cruz and neighboring states.
Rumors had been for some time in circulation that several states intended to disregard the authority of the general administration. To ward off such blows, the government used all its means of persuasion, and made the most of Teran's influence in the eastern states, where he had the military command. Peace was preserved in that quarter till March, when the ​standard of revolt was raised in Tamaulipas by Francisco Vital Fernandez, who was supported by the comandante at Tampico, General Estévan Moctezuma. Teran prevailed on the legislature to set Fernandez aside, and restore the authority of the government, and after some conferences with Moctezuma, finding conciliatory action unavailing, he attacked him at Tampico on the 13th of May, and met with a disastrous repulse, which necessitated his retreat to Villerías, whereupon Moctezuma marched into the interior.
Teran afterward obtained some advantages over his adversaries; but the disaster at Tampico, the misfortunes of his country, and his dlespair of bringing about peace in the region under his command, together wvith family troubles, affected his mind, and drove him to commit suicide on the 3d of July, 1832, at Padilla, by thrusting his sword through his body.
Teran's death at this time was a serious loss to Mexico, as he had become the link between the moderate wings of the yorkino and escocés parties, and was their candidate for president of the republic.
The government's fears as to the effect of the occurrences at Tampico and elsewhere soon became realized. José Antonio Barragan revolted in San Luis Potosí, and soon after Zacatecas and Jalisco adopted a revolutionary plan differing somewhat from that of Santa Anna, in that it involved the removal of Bustamante from the executive, and proclaimed Gomez Pedraza as the legitimate president, regardless ​of the fact that he had voluntarily resigned his claim to the position. By right he could not be regarded as legitimate president without a new election; but the party of progress, formed by two strong sections of the yorkinos and escoceses, had no other man after General Teran's death in whom it could repose confidence, especially on the eve of the presidential election, which under the law could not be postponed.
When the secret of the legitimists, as they were called from the project to bring the general government again to a legitimate status, leaked out, though it had been carefully kept by the authorities of Zacatecas and Jalisco, the administration at Mexico considered itself in imminent peril, inasmuch as the revolution in its new tendencies was assuming a different aspect. This condition of affairs evidently called for peremptory measures and extraordinary sacrifices. Alaman did not allow himself to be intimidated, and believing that with the presence of an able and influential general at the head of the army in the field the impending storm might be weathered, he recommended that the vice-president should assume the command of the government's forces in person, and on the 10th of May asked authorization therefor from the chamber of deputies. It was refused, and the enemies of the administration had the opportunity to say that the proceeding had been a farce with the ulterior view of recovering in that puerile manner its lost prestige. This false step was followed by another, which was an attempt to remove the foundations on which the revolutionists based their opposition. They had demanded the dismissal of the ministers, and on the acceptance of their resignation the executive thought that the question would terminate. ​They were therefore allowed to resign on the 17th of May. But the action, which four months previously might have been beneficial, produced no good effects now. The congress had expected much from the firmness of the cabinet, so often proclaimed as it had been in divers ways. It was thought that the ministers would not leave their posts till they had triumphed, or Santa Anna had been persuaded to tender his submission. Their present action was a disappointment, and the states were disgusted with the undignified course of the chambers.
When General Calderon abandoned the siege of Vera Cruz he left 800 men under Rincon on the puente nacional to keep Santa Anna in check; the latter, however, got the better of Rincon, cutting off his communications with the main body of the government army. Rincon having retreated to Los Órganos, Santa Anna went to the hacienda El Encero, and an armistice was agreed upon and signed at Corral Falso on the 13th of June, with the object of holding conferences on the puente nacional, to treat of peace, on the 6th of July. Nothing resulted therefrom, however, except a promise on Santa Anna's part to undertake no operation against the government troops during forty-eight hours reckoned from the morning of the 13th.
The failure of these, negotiations resulted from Santa Anna's refusal to accept any proposition from ​the government, because, whether at his own instigation or not, the garrison at Vera Cruz, urged by the authorities of Jalisco and Zacatecas, had on July 5th made a pronunciamiento in favor of restoring legitimacy to the government, or in other words, ignoring Bustamante and proclaiming Pedraza as the rightful president of the republic.
The despatches conveying the failure of the negotiations with Santa Anna reached Mexico at the same time with the news that Zacatecas, Jalisco, and Durango had adopted the plan of placing Pedraza in the presidential chair. Zacatecas placed 4,000 militiamen under arms ready for active service. In Durango General Urrea replaced Governor Elorriaga, who had been deposed in March 1830 by Bustanante's ministers, and in Jalisco the comandante general Cirilo Gomez Anaya was forced to leave Guadalajara.
On the other hand, San Luis Potosí, Michoacan, Chihuahua, Mexico, Puebla, and Tabasco favored Bustamante; but in Tamaulipas Colonel Mejía seized the port of Matamoros, where he obtained the necessary resources for his 600 men and a squadron of six vessels. He then proceeded to Tampico to unite his forces with those of Moctezuma, and not finding him there, joined Santa Anna at Vera Cruz.
Moctezuma made a rapid march toward San Luis Potosí, and at Pozo de los Carmelos defeated the government force under Colonel Otero on the 3d of ​August, which opened to him at once the gates of the state capital. The authorities created by a revolution on the 21st and 22d of July and the comandante general Zenon Fernandez took to flight, leaving as governor Felipe Manjarrez, a member of the city council. On the 5th of August the ayuntamiento accepted the situation, and six days later the legislative diputacion permanente met for the sole purpose of nullifying Bustamante's authority, and declaring Pedraza the rightful executive of the republic.
The occupation of San Luis by the revolutionists staggered the government. The chamber of deputies at once authorized the vice-president to take command of the army. In his absence the executive was intrusted, by special choice of the deputies voting by states on the 7th of August, to General Melchor Muzquiz, who on the 14th took possession of the office with the title of president ad interim. Bustamante retained his position as vice-president; but after a victory over his enemies he resigned it on the 19th of September.
His resignation was not accepted by congress, but the course of events made it effective.
General Melchor Muzquiz was born about 1790 in Santa Rosa, in the district of Monclova, Coahuila. In 1810 he left the college of San Ildefonso to join the revolution for independence. When a colonel he was captured by the royalists, and would have been shot at Puebla but for an opportune amnesty decree that included him. He supported the plan of Iguala, and in 1824 was governor of Mexico. From his ​action in concert with Facio to promote the plan de Jalapa, Muzquiz came to be looked upon as Bustamente's second and possible substitute.
Muzquiz was an honest man and a disinterested patriot, ready to do his duty and undergo any suffering for his country and his principles. At his death his family was left unprovided for, and his widow had to keep a school for support. Some time after Muzquiz's death, his name was given to the place of his birth.
Muzquiz appointed his cabinet on the 19th of August, with the following ministers: Francisco Fagoaga, of relations; Juan Ignacio Godoy, of justice and ecclesiastical affairs; Ignacio Alas, of the treasury; General José Ignacio Iberri, of war and marine.
No one had any doubt of Muzquiz's honesty of purpose, but his identification with the party, now thrown out of power by late events, rendered it impossible for his government to satisfy the leaders of the revolution, who were demanding a legitimate authority.
The first efforts of the new administration were directed to the preparations for Bustamante's campaign. Guanajuato and Michoacan were in peril of meeting with the same fate as San Luis Potosí, the forces of Zacatecas and Jalisco now coöperating with those under General Moctezuma.
Bustamante accordingly hurried to Querétaro. With his force of 4,000 men divided into three divisions, commanded respectively by generals Amador, Duran, and Arista, Bustamante marched to San Miguel el Grande, since named Allende, where the enemy occupied several important positions. He attempted no movement
​against the city, and occupied the town of Dolores Hidalgo. Moctezuma with superior numbers advanced, on the 17th of September, to the haciendas of El Rincon, evidently intending to seize the important position called Puerto del Gallinero; but Bustamante, detecting his purpose, occupied it early in the morning of the 18th. Five hours later Moctezuma came up and at once opened fire. In a short time the action became general. Moctezuma having first arranged his columns so as to assail the enemy on both flanks at the same time, the brunt of the attack was finally made on Bustamante's left line, after it was found impracticable to break his centre. By massing his whole force against that line, Moctezuma exposed his columns to the fire of the enemy's batteries as well as of some battalions stationed under cover on the slope of a hill. The result was that his troops were driven back by Bustamante's cavalry to where he had stationed his reserve. He tried to renew the attack, but soon found himself outflanked, and the rout became general and complete. His dispersed men were hotly pursued as far as the hacienda of Las Trancas, and cut down without mercy. The mortality on Bustamante's side was large, but that of Moctezuma's army was enormous.
​Bustamante now reoccupied San Luis Potosí on the 30th of September, reinstating the deposed authorities. He might easily have quelled the revolution in the other hostile states, but that news reached him of General Valencia's defection in the state of Mexico, which imperilled the national capital. He had only advanced as far as Peñon Blanco, where he obtained, in the latter part of October, a promise from Governor García of Zacatecas that he would cause the legislature of his state to revoke the act recognizing Pedraza. That promise was not fulfilled, owing, as alleged by Bustamante's partisans, to the influence of Luis de la Rosa and Gomez Farías over García.
Affairs in Vera Cruz were in the mean time assuming a most unfavorable aspect for the government. Facio, who since Calderon's retreat from Vera Cruz and his own resignation as minister of war had been in command of the government troops in that state, could not boast of much progress in his operations against Santa Anna. The latter had been active in recruiting and instructing his army, and on the 29th of September was in a condition to assume the offensive. With the view of raising the spirits of his men, some of whom had become downcast on hearing of Moctezuma's defeat, he resolved to engage with Facio, and if victorious march forthwith on Puebla. The latter, who was then crossing the heights of Maltrata, stationed one half of his troops in the town of San Agustin del Palmar and in the hacienda ​of La Trasquila under General Antonio Azcárate, while he with the other half occupied the Chaltepec hill. Santa Anna, making a feint on Facio with his cavalry, directed his real attack, under colonels Mejía and Jarero, against Azcárate. After a short but well contested action, in which Azcárate lost his life, the government troops were completely routed, with a loss in killed, besides the commander, of 12 officers and 353 rank and file. All the arms, ammunition, and 280 prisoners fell into Santa Anna's hands. Facio precipitately fled to the sierra, and the greater part of his remaining force became dispersed.
Santa Anna at once marched on Puebla, which after a short semblance of defence succumbed on the 4th of October, the garrison being allowed the honors of war with permission to go to Mexico. Santa Anna lost no time in advancing upon the capital, and a portion of his army reached Tacubaya on the 22d of October; the other divisions occupying the surrounding towns, the line of investment was soon established.
Meantime the greatly alarmed government had obtained from the congress a vote conferring on President Muzquiz unlimited power to act as circumstances might demand. An effort was made through commissioners to arrive at an amicable arrangement, but it failed because congress refused to sanction any adjustment based on the assumption by Pedraza of the executive authority.
The capital had been declared under martial law, and the command intrusted to General Quintanar, ​who answered Santa Anna's demand on the first of November for a surrender of the city with a dignified refusal. The latter did not see fit to open fire, the danger to which Puebla was exposed by Bustamante's approach demanding his attention. He accordingly raised the siege on the 6th, marched to meet the enemy, and on the 10th reached Huehuetoca, where he received despatches from Pedraza announcing his arrival at Vera Cruz, and his intention to proceed at once to Puebla. The states that had seconded the movement in Pedraza's favor immediately passed special laws ordering his decrees and orders as president of the republic to be obeyed.
The two hostile armies encountered each other in the hacienda of Casas Blancas, on or about the 12th of November, without a decisive result, but Bustamante had to retire to Tequisquiac, where Quintanar joined him with a division on the 16th. They then undertook to carry out a preconcerted plan of capturing Puebla while Santa Anna was at Zumpango de la Laguna, but the latter by his activity frustrated their intention. Bustamante then resolved to try the issue of a pitched battle, and advanced via San Pedro Apetatitlan to the suburbs of Puebla on the 5th of December. Santa Anna having taken up a position in the Posadas ranchería and town of Mexico, Bustamante at the head of the 6th regiment vigorously assailed him, but was repulsed with a heavy loss in ​killed and wounded, among the former being his sec retary, Lieutenant-colonel Bonilla, and many of his best officers. The number of casualties in both armies is said to have been no less than at El Gallinero. Santa Anna remained master of the field; the enemy retreated and took up positions at the San Juan hill, the ex-convent of San Javier, the Hospicio and garita de Tlascala, Quintanar occupying the Santo Domingo
| 1. Cathedral. | 10, 11. Theatres. |
| 2. Palace. | 12, 13. Bull-rings. |
| 3. Episcopal Palace. | 14. Barrack. |
| 4, 5, 6, 7. Hospitals and Asylums. | 15, 16. Parks. |
| 8. Academy of Fine Arts. | 17. Main Plaza. |
| 9. Presidio. |
mill. Other partial engagements followed, with dis astrous results to the government troops. Meantime Gomez Pedraza, who had defended Puebla against an attack in which the enemy had actually possessed himself of some houses of the suburbs, made prepara tions for future eventualities.
​The government also met with reverses in other parts of the country; and indeed, it may be said that its control of affairs was now at an end. I give briefly in a note the occurrences in the several states. General Muzquiz' government now was obeyed only by Oajaca and Chihuahua. Under the circumstances, Bustamante saw the uselessness of further attempts to capture Puebla, and opened negotiations with his opponents. General Cortazar accordingly sought an interview with Gomez Pedraza and Santa Anna in the morning of December 8th, at which it was agreed to enter first into an armistice, till both houses of congress should take action on the plan for peace proposed to Bustamante by Gomez Pedraza and Santa Anna. It was also stipulated that in the event of the congress rejecting the plan, Bustamante's army should take it into consideration. Meantime Bustamante's forces were to be quartered in Huejocingo and Santa Anna's in Puebla. I epitomize in a note the said plan of pacification.
​The armistice and plan being in due time laid before the houses of congress, both refused to sanction them, in view of which action Bustamante, pursuant to stipulation, resolved to act independently of the government. Whereupon he held a conference with Santa Anna, Gomez Pedraza, and other chief officers of both armies, at which it was concluded to appoint commissioners to draw up a treaty establishing peace, and stipulating other points of importance. The commissioners met accordingly at the hacienda of Zavaleta, and framed a treaty, embodying the terms of the plan de pacificacion and other points, to the satisfaction of the contracting parties, which was signed and ratified on the 23d of December. The sixth article of the convention recognized Gomez Pedraza as president till April 1, 1833, the date on which his term would expire according to his ​election in 1828. He took the oath of office in Puebla on the 26th of December, 1832.
Meantime in the city of Mexico the garrison, headed by General José Joaquin Herrera, pronounced on the 27th of December, recognizing President Gomez Pedraza. Acting President Muzquiz and his ministers thereupon returned to private life, without being able to observe the formality of resigning, congress having already dissolved itself.
* ↑ Several governors and others were deposed, a number of prominent citizens exiled, and the jails filled with political opponents, or persons denounced by paid spies. Rivera, Hist. Jalapa, ii. 590-1, 596-7; Mora, Obras Sueltas, ii. 426-9; Posadas, Alegato Def., 1-16; Atleta, 1830, ap. 20, 485.
* ↑ The Atleta was killed under the burden of fines. The press of the capital was finally reluced to El Sol and Registro Oficial, and later Bustamante's Voz de la Patria, together with a few loose sheets to circulate among the rabble. Zavala, Revol. Mex., ii. 312-13; Rivera, Hist. Jalapa, ii. 592, 596.
* ↑ Like that of Codallos, begun in December 1823, and crushed in the same month of 1830, whose chief and a few companions were taken prisoners and shot at Pátzcuaro. Zavala, Revol. Mex., ii. 283-6, 329-31; Bustamante, Voz de la Patria, iii. no. 23, 8, no. 17, 8; Id., MS., vi. 59-62; Mex., Proceso Instruct., 220-2. The parties concerned in such movements were either put to death, banished, or sentenced to long terms of imprisonment. Juan N. Rosains, of revolutionary fame, Col Francisco Victoria, a brother of the first president, Cristóbal Fernandez, Col José Marquez, his secretary Joaquin Gárate, and others in San Luis, and many in Michoacan, were shot. In some cases, as in Morelia, the claims of humanity were disregarded; in others, not even the form of a trial preceded. Suarez y Navarro, Hist. Méx., 220; Alaman, Hist. Méj., iv. 237; Id., Proceso, 19.3-219, 223-30; Bustamante, Voz de la Patria, iv. no. 16, 5 et seq., v. no. 31, 1-3; Rivera, Hist. Jalapa, ii. 603-4; Id., Gob. de Méx., ii. 153.
* ↑ March 11, 1831. Arrillaga, Recop., 1831, 218-21. The end of the government was to get rid of its enemies, under the garb of a pardon, to exile them. Suarez y Navarro, Hist. Méx., 220.
* ↑ The reason alleged was that Pedraza's presence would support the opposition to the government, and involve the country in still greater commotion. Quintana Roa, Acus., in Zavala, Revol. Mex., ii. 347-56; Alaman, Hist. Méj., v. 854; Rivera, Hist. Jalapa, ii. 605-6; Alvarez, Hist. Gen. Méx., v. 192-3.
* ↑ Senators' Pacheco Leal, Rejon, and Portugal; Deputies Quintana Roa and Cañedo. Rejon was beaten in the streets by instigation of the government. Bustamante, Voz de la Patria, MS., vii. 3-4.
* ↑ The death penalty was inflicted on many not taken with armıs in their hands, or in open revolt against the constituted authorities. Suarez y Navarro, Hist. Méx., 224.
* ↑ It is said that Bustamante, to further win their good will, visited the churches and prayed much, whereby indulgences were gained from the pope. This led to disagreements in the cabinet, too much preponderance being given to the clergy. Facio wanted the army to be all-powerful. Rivera, Gob. de Méx., ii. 154–5.
* ↑ Full particulars of the case in Alaman, Proceso, 32-7; Facio, Expos. á las Cám., 1-21; Rivera, Hist. Jalapa, iii. 20-1; Mora, Obras Sueltas, i. pp. xl, lxv.
* ↑ Alaman gives as the chief reason the probability of a movement at Guadalajara in favor of the central system of government, which would have been supported by the whole army. Hist. Méj., v. 854.
* ↑ On that date he surrendered his command to Col Cirilo Gomez Anaya. Jal., Espos. al Cong., 7, 14, 21.
* ↑ Mexico, Puebla, Vera Cruz, San Luis Potosí, Durango, Querétaro, Michoacan, and Oajaca were allies. Sonora and Sinaloa had their local bickerings to occupy them, and being far away from the centre, did not much feel the hand of the general government. Suarez y Navarro, Hist. Méx., 201.
* ↑ The administration party wanted a man as president who would secure them what had been gained under Bustamante's rule; the moderates desired a combination of the old ideas with the new; the third party was large and affected exaggerated ideas, favoring radical measures, such as abolition of fueros, confiscation of ecclesiastical property, reformation of the religious orders, and disbandment of the army so as to crush out militarism from the country.
* ↑ The states were all represented as having considerable surplus funds. The minister of the treasury could dispose of large amounts at Vera Cruz and Tampico, and had provided for the payment of six months' interest on the foreign debts. Bustamante, Voz de la Patria, MS., vii. 1. It must be confessed that the administration had much improved the financial and industrial condition of the country.
* ↑ It was hoped that by his mediation the object could be accomplished. Suarez y Nararro, Hist. Méx., 263.
* ↑ Santa Anna wanted to be president. Landero had embezzled $18,000 of his regiment's funds. Bustamante, Voz de la Patria, MS., vii. 4-6; Alaman, Hist. Méj., v. 855.
* ↑ The field and other officers of the garrisons of the town and fortress, by invitation of Ciriaco Vasquez, comandante general, assembled at the house of Col Pedro Landero, and after considering the situation, arrived at the conclusion that the country was threatened with revolution and probably with anarchy. The cause of this general discontent was attributed to the arbitrary acts of the ministers, which had made them hateful to the people, and had been practised in spite of the vice-president's remonstrances. The latter was represented as a firm supporter of the federal system, but his action was trammelled by the ministry. Accompanying the long preamble, the following resolutions were adopted: 1. The garrison renews the obligations assumed in the plan of Jalapa to faithfully observe the federal constitution and laws; 2. Asks the vice-president to dismiss the ministers whom public opinion charges with upholding centralism and tolerating abuses against civil liberty and personal rights; 3. It appoints a committee of two officers to lay these proceedings before Santa Anna, and invite him to repair to Vera Cruz and take command of the forces; 4. The garrison, in the event of Santa Anna's acceptation of the invitation, abstains from addressing the supreme government. The general will send this act and such other remarks as he may deem expedient to the vice-president and the authorities of the federation and states, adopting such measures, besides, as may conduce to the accomplishment of the desired object. Suarez y Navarro, Hist. Méx., 253-7; Bustamante, Voz de la Patria, MS., vii. 9-10; Id., Hist. Santa Anna, 275; Id., Hist. Iturbide, 211; Rivera, Hist. Jalapa, iii. 46-94; Becher, Mex., 39-41, 48, 53-4.
* ↑ He had first got possession of $279,000 from the federal treasury, against the protest of Treasurer Lebrijar. Bustamante, Voz de la Patria, MS., vii. 11.
* ↑ He mentioned as causes of the revolution that the troops had been led to believe that General Gomez Pedraza had been called back to the republic, and that to support his landing, a military camp had been founded under Calderon, and troops would be stationed in Vera Cruz.
* ↑ 'Till the chambers should hold them to accountability,' 'si es que hubieran dado motivo á las inculpaciones que se les hacian.' Suarez y Navarro, Hist. Mex., 266-7.
* ↑ On the 20th of January the legislature of Zacatecas petitioned the vice-president not to keep these men in power against their will, as there was no law authorizing it.
* ↑ The vice-president had been showing them some coldness. Bustamante, Voz de la Patria, MS., vii. 15.
* ↑ The commissioners were the vice-governor of Vera Cruz, M. M. Perez, Senator Bernardo Couto, and a treasury official named Vicente Segura. Suarez y Navarro, Hist. Méx., 269.
* ↑ The report of the commissioners to the governor of Vera Cruz, and Alaman's to the chamber of deputies, are given in Suarez y Navarro, Hist. Méx., 270-3; Bustamante, Voz de la Patria, MS., vii. 21-3.
* ↑ Facio offered Flores the rank of full colonel and $25,000 if he would make a counter-pronunciamiento in the castle. His and Calderon's letters, both dated Jan. 25, 1832, appeared in El Censor of Vera Cruz, Jan. 30th, and El Fénix de la Libertad, no. 18, and were used at Facio's impeachment in 1833. Mex. Proceso Instruct., 54-3. Facio also tried to win over officers and men with offers of promotion and reward. Rivera, Gob. de Méx., ii. 156.
* ↑ A small village of palm huts, having narrow paths leading to a bridge which was the passage-way for the miserable place. Suarez y Navarro, Hist. Méx., 270-7; Rivera, Hist. Jalapa, iii. 63.
* ↑ Among the killed were colonels Landero and Andonaegui, both of whom had done good service against the Spanish invaders under Barradas. The prisoners were 32 officers and about 460 rank and file.
* ↑ Congress on the 25th of April passed a law granting Santa Anna and his officers a humiliating pardon, which they indignantly rejected. Suarez y Navarro, Hist. Méx., 287.
* ↑ Moctezuma was an old royalist soldier during the war of independence, and afterward served under Iturbide. He had been out of service when Pres. Bustamante, at the request of his old friend Col. Martin y Aguirre, brought him again into the army, giving him the brevet of a general of brigade, and appointing him to the command at Tampico. Bustamante, Voz de la Patria, MS., vii. 66-7.
* ↑ Rivera, Hist. Jalapa, iii. 90-1; Niles' Reg., xlii. 455. Teran was one of the few Mexicans of general scientific attainments, a man of high character, and a profound thinker. Tornel, Breve Reseña Hist., 27, 269; Atleta, 1830, Jan. 9, 83; Bustamante, Cuad. Hist., MS., viii. 235, 238; Id., Voz de la Patria, ii. no. 23, 3. Teran was interred in the same tomb with Iturbide. Alaman, Hist. Méj., v. 856; Rivera, Hist. Jalapa, ii. 91.
* ↑ The plan of calling Pedraza to the presidency was the work of Gomez Farías and Gov. García of Zacatecas. Mora, Obras Sueltas, i. p. lxxv.
* ↑ Art. 112 of the constitution prescribed it. Alaman's exposé of the situation was a long and able one, maintaining that the executive at the head of the army would be better able to cause the constitution and rights of the nation to be respected. Suarez y Navarro, Hist. Méx., 290-1.
* ↑ The portfolios remained in charge of the chief clerks excepting that of the treasury, of which Mangino continued in charge till the 19th of August, after a new ministry had been organized. Mex. Mem. Hacienda, 1870, 1030-1. Mangino was really no political entity. Suarez y Navarro, Hist. Méx., 292.
* ↑ The puente del rey was so called after the independence.
* ↑ Santa Anna's commissioners were Col. Arago and José M. Vidal; for Calderon, Col. Félix Merino and Adjutant José García Conde. Terms of the armistice in Suarez y Navarro, Hist. Méx., 296-7.
* ↑ The commissioners who acted in the government's name were Ex-pres. Guadalupe Victoria, and Governor Sebastian Camacho of Vera Cruz.
* ↑ Bustamante has it that they revealed 'la iniquidad de Santa Anna, y de las hordes que le seguian,' as also the lack of stability and honor of the government. Voz de la Patria, MS., vii. 127.
* ↑ The acta sets forth the grounds of action, and directs Santa Anna to accede at the conferences to nothing incompatible with its two articles. Suarez y Navarro, Hist. Méx., 303-10; Bustamante, Voz de la Patria, MS., vii. 124-5; Rivera, Hist. Jalapa, iii. 97.
* ↑ Zacatecas made the declaration July 10th, Durango soon after, Jalisco on the 15th of July. Suarez y Navarro, Hist. Méx., 312, 314; Bustamante, Voz de la Patria, MS., vii. 157-8; Álvarez, J., Manif., 119; Pinart, Col. Doc., 5, 246-7.
* ↑ The legislature empowered Gov. Reyes to raise troops, and to borrow $100,000 to meet expenses.
* ↑ Moctezuma, after undoing all that Teran had done at Ciudad Victoria, and replacing Vital Fernandez in the governor's chair, had marched into the interior.
* ↑ The battle lasted three hours. Otero was slain, many officers were wounded, and the rest, with a few disperscd soldiers, reached the city three hours later. Bustamante, Voz de la Patria, MS., vii. 162-6; Suarez y Navarro, Hist. Méx., 317-8.
* ↑ This is said to have been a free, spontaneous act, without military coercion. S. L. Potosí, Diput. Perman., 2-5, in Pinart, Col. Doc.
* ↑ He had 15 votes out of 17. Gen. Bravo received one, and Juan Ignacio Godoy the other. Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Méx., ii. 445–6, 451; Arrillaga, Recop., 1832-3, 140-9.
* ↑ He stated that he did so of his free will, as a citizen and as a soldier who had never given way to force. Suarez y Navarro, Hist. Méx., 330.
* ↑ Pres. Victoria made him a general of brigade. Bustamante among his last acts placed his nomination for general of division before the senate, but Muzquiz, on assuming the executive office, recalled it.
* ↑ July 31, 1845, the congress declared Muzquiz benemérito de la patria.' Amigo del Pueblo, 12 Agosto, 1845, 86; Bustamante, Mem. Hist. Mex., MS., i. 215-8, ii. 192.
* ↑ Fagoaga had been since 1821 in favor of a foreign monarch. Iberri was objectionable to the revolutionists. The other two ministers were measurably respected by their opponents, being advocates of popular representative government.
* ↑ Suarez y Navarro accuses Bustamante of having led the pursuit in person, mercilessly slaying the fugitives. Hist. Méx., 329. The parish priest of Dolores Hidalgo, Rev. Ignacio Moctezuma, on the 23d of September, reported that he had buried 924 in the battle-field, and 45, who died of their wounds, in the parish cemetery. That total of 969 did by no means include all the victims, as the priest had not, owing to great distances, reached all the slain. According to Bustamante, Voz de la Patria, MS., vii. 169-82, who gives a detailed account of the campaign, the number of killed in the battle was 2,128. The prisoners were 604, including 169 wounded. Zamacois says that he investigated that point, and was assured by truthful persons from San Miguel el Grande that the number of killed exceeded 1,500. Hist. Méj., xi. 908-9. Suarez y Navarro, Juan, Historia de México y del General Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna. Mex., 1850. Large 8vo, pp. vi. 457, with Santa Anna's portrait. This work covers the period from 1821 to the beginning of 1833 — not to 1848 as indicated on its title-page. Of the events in the years 1821-1827 it gives little more than a résumé; but of those which occurred between 1828 and 1832 a full account is given, particularly of the last year. The author purports to furnish a true and honest detail of those events, refuting at the same time a number of accusations that had been preferred against General Santa Anna. He presents his opinions and proofs with good judgment and moderation, without ever allowing himself to use passionate language when criticising those charges. His narrative and comments are clear, and his arguments often well grounded. They are mostly the result of his own personal observation; but he makes occasional quotations from standard authorities. An appendix is attached to the work containing corrections and additional notes; the latter regarding the ex-emperor Iturbide's return from Europe in 1824, and Mexican relations with Guatemala.
* ↑ His portrait placed in the legislative chamber was afterward thrown out by the populace. Bustamante, Voz de la Patria, MS., vii. 190; Suarez y Navarro, Hist. Méx., 330-1. The revolutionary authorities and legislature found hospitality in Zacatecas. S. L. Potosí, Diput. Perman., 2-6.
* ↑ Andrade, governor and comandante general of Puebla, shared in Facio's defeat, as he had advanced to Tepeaca, and on the countermarch to Puebla lost two thirds of his men, who joined Santa Anna. Suarez y Navarro, Hist. Méx., 324.
* ↑ Andrade reached the capital on the 25th day of October, with very few men; the rest joined Santa Anna at San Martin Tesmelucan. Bustamante, Voz de la Patria, MS., vii. 219-27, gives a detailed account of the capture, with his lying, malignant addenda.
* ↑ October 16th. Dispos. Var., ii. 86; Rivera, Hist. Jalapa, iii. 115.
* ↑ The president's military orders appear in Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Mex., ii. 453; Dispos. Var., ii. 82-5.
* ↑ Bustamante had reached Querétaro, and marching rapidly by way of San Cristóbal, San Juan Teotihuacan, and Otumba, might capture Puebla before relief could arrive.
* ↑ He had declined Santa Anna's first invitation to return. But a second commission, composed of Anastasio Zerecero and Lieut-col. Soto, which met him at Bedford Springs in Pennsylvania, after explaining what he was actually wanted for, was successful. The correspondence is given in Suarez y Navarro, Hist. Méx., 341-3; Zamacois, Hist. Méx., xi. 916-19; Rivera, Hist. Jalapa, iii. 116; Pedraza arrived at Vera Cruz November 5th. Bustamante, Voz de la Patria, MS., vii. 258-9.
* ↑ Bustamante's letter of Nov. 13th, to Col Condelle at San Luis Potosí, in Suarez y Navarro, Hist. Méx., 345. Bustamante describes the action. Voz de la Patria, MS., vii. 261-3.
* ↑ He not only succeeded in that, but in saving a valuable convoy, by a rapid march of 63 miles in less than 30 hours.
* ↑ Details of the Posadas battle in Suarez y Navarro, Hist. Méx., 346.
* ↑ Ciudad Victoria in Tamaulipas, Colima, Toluca, the whole south, San Luis Potosí, Querétaro, Durango, Sonora and Sinaloa, followed one another in acknowledging willingly or under coercion that Gomez Pedraza was the rightful president. Suarez, y Navarro, Hist. Méx., 332, 349-54; Zamacois, Hist. Méj., xi. 923-5; Pinart, Col. Doc., no. 255. In Campeche, Yucatan, on the 16th of Sept. the people shook off the yoke under which for the last three years they had been held by Carbajal. Tabasco and Chiapas also pronounced against their authorities and concluded to disregard Bustamante's administration. Bustamante, Voz de la Patria, MS., vii. 191-3, 243-50. In the south generals Bravo and Álvarez had made an arrangement to hold their respective comandancias, discontinuing hostilities and acting in concert for the general welfare. Id., 267-9.
* ↑ It was signed Dec. 11th, the commissioners being Gen. Gaona and Gen. Arista, for Bustamante, and Gen. Anaya and Col. Jarero for the other parties. Arrillaja, Recop., 1832-3, 258-61; Suarez y Navarro, Hist. Méx., 358-9; Bustamante, Voz de la Patria, MS., vii. 273-8; Zamacois, Hist. Méj., xi. 927-8.
* ↑ The preamble expressly says the object of the plan is to reëstablish a truly national and federal government. 1st. Absolute cessation of hostilities. 2d. All elections of members to general congress, state legislatures, and territorial diputaciones from Sept. 1, 1828, to date, to hold good. No more to be said about legitimacy or the reverse. 3d. New elections to be held at once for members of congress, legislatures, etc., to bring about an entire renovation so that the republic may return to the federal régime. 4th. New legislatures to be installed on or before Feb. 15, 1833; for this time, each shall, on the 1st of March, 1833, choose two senators, and vote for the president and vice-president of the republic. The actas, senators, and deputies of congress must be at the national capital on the 20th of March. 5th. Congress shall be installed March 23th, and the next day declare who have been duly elected president and vice-president. 6th. During elections no comandante general shall reside, nor troops in the pay of the national treasury shall be quartered, in any state or territorial capital. 7th. The decree of Oct. 7th on extraordinary powers, and the dire law of Sept. 27, 1823, to be revoked. 8th. Gomez Pedraza shall be recognized and obeyed as the rightful president till the 1st of April, 1833. 9th. A general and full amnesty shall be decreed by the future congress for all political offences from and after Feb. 1, 1828. 10th. Santa Anna, as commander of the forces seceded from the government, and Gomez Pedraza formally propose this plan. Dated on the puente de México, Dec. 9, 1832. Suarez y Navarro, Hist. Méx., 359–60; Zamacois, Hist. Méj., xi. 928-31.
* ↑ On the plea of unconstitutionality, Mex. Manif. Diput., 20-3, the congress declined to reconsider Pedraza's resignation in 1828, alleging that it could not revise the act of the congress of 1829. Dispos. Var., ii. 87; Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Mex., ii. 470-4.
* ↑ Zamacois blames him for his disobedience to constituted authority; highly commending the action of congress he adds, though attributing to Bustamante the humane purpose of averting further bloodshed, that he hereby stained his brilliant record. Hist. Méj., xi. 933.
* ↑ Antonio Gaona, Mariano Arista, and Lino Alcorta represented Bustamante; Juan Pablo Anaya, Gabriel Valencia, and Ignacio Basadre acted for Santa Anna.
* ↑ Since then it has been known as the Plan or Convenio de Zavaleta, from the hacienda where it was made, and embraces 13 articles. The whole document may be found in Registro Oficial, 1832, Dec. 31, ix. no. 122; Arrillaga, Recop., 1833, April-May, 214-27; Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Mex., ii. 522-6. The validity of that arrangement has been impugned as unconstitutional. It was carried out nevertheless. Peña y Peña, Voto Fund., 6-36; Santa María, Expos.-Protext., in Pap. Var., cxlvi. pt 8; Bustamante, Voz de la Patria, MS., vii. 278-82, ends saying, 'Tal es la carta de esclavitud que firmó D. Anastasio Bustamante de una Nacion que le habia colmado de honores.'
* ↑ The bishop received him under the pallium. The government council, presided over by the governor of Puebla, acted in lieu of the national representatives. La Cruz, v. 635; Rivera, Hist. Jalapa, iii. 123–7; Suarez y Navarro, Hist. Méx., 365.
* ↑ Congress decreed its dissolution on the 28th. It had on the 21st issued a manifesto congratulatory of its own course, which it had concluded to carry out to the end. Suarez y Navarro, Hist. Méx., 366-7; Bustamante, Voz de la Patria, MS., vii. 299-302.