# Texas Pacific Railway Company v. Carlin/Opinion of the Court

* Court Documents
* Case Syllabus
* Opinion of the Court
United States Supreme Court
189 U.S. 354
Texas Pacific Railway Company v. Carlin
Argued: and submitted March 20, 1903. --- Decided: April 6, 1903
Two grounds have been urged upon the court for reversing this judgment and granting a new trial: One was that the negligence of the railway company, if any, was that of a fellow servant, for which it was not liable; and (2) that there was no evidence of the negligence of the foreman, in failing to discover the maul or hammer upon the bridge, sufficient to warrant the jury in finding a verdict for the plaintiff.
The right to maintain this action is founded upon a statute of Texas, the material sections of which read as follows:
'Art. 4560g. All persons engaged in the service of any person, receiver, or corporation controlling or operating a railroad or street railway, the lines of which shall be situated in whole or in part in this state, who are intrusted by such person, receiver, or corporation with the authority of superintendence, control, or command of other servants or employees of such person, receiver, or corporation, or with the authority to direct any other employee in the performance of any duty of such employee, are vice principals of such person, receiver, or corporation, and are not fellow servants with their coemployees.
'Art. 4560h. All persons who are engaged in the common service of such person, receiver, or corporation controlling or operating a railroad or street railway, and who while so employed are in the same grade of employment, and are doing the same character of work or service, and are working together at the same time and place and at the same piece of work and to a common purpose, are fellow servants with each other. Employees who do not come within the provisions of this article shall not be considered fellow servants.' Sayles's Civil Stat. (Tex.) 1897.
With reference to this statute, counsel for the defendant requested the court to charge the jury that—
'Although Welsh, the bridge foreman, may have been, in law, the representative of the company, yet, if they find that the act of examining the track, as the train might be approaching, for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not any obstruction was upon or near it, was a duty that may be expected to be performed by any one of the men, irrespective of his grade or rank; that is to say, by the foreman and men alike as occasion and circumstances may require,-then, in any such event, the act or duty of Welsh in this respect was one which existed between fellow servants, and defendant would not be liable for the negligent acts of Welsh in this respect, if any there were.' This charge was refused, and counsel for defendant excepted.
The court did charge that the foreman of the bridge gang was, under the evidence, the vice principal of the defendant company. This charge was duly excepted to by defendant's counsel.
Defendant contends that if the negligence which caused the accident was the failure of the foreman to see the maul or hammer upon the bridge and to remove it, it was not the failure to perform a duty peculiar to him, the foreman, and specially imposed upon him as such foreman within the meaning of article 4560g, because it was a duty resting equally upon all the members of the bridge gang. The testimony in regard to this question leaves no doubt as to the duty of the foreman, although it also appeared that when a man was using tools and got through with them he was supposed to put them out of the way where a train would not strike them, and it was his business to do so. The evidence showed, in addition, that it was the special business of the foreman to see that the track was unobstructed on the bridge when a train was about to cross, and that, although the men were supposed to see that the track was clear, it was the foreman's business to supervise them and see that the men left a clear track as the train came on. This was his duty as foreman, and not as fellow workman; and the duty of care on the part of the workmen under him to keep the tools off the track when the train came on the bridge in no degree lessened the duty of the foreman to see that the men under him did as they ought, and that a free and unobstructed track was left for the train. In other words, it was the special duty of the foreman, as such, to see that the men performed their duty.
The negligent act of the foreman did not arise in the performance of the duty of a mere servant, although each servant was under an obligation to be careful, but it was the negligent act of the vice principal in the performance of his duty as such. As it was the special duty of the foreman to see that the men performed their duty, his neglect so to do was the neglect of a duty which he owed, not as fellow servant, but as vice principal within the statute above cited.
Upon the second ground, we are of opinion that there was evidence sufficient to go to the jury upon the question of the negligence of the foreman in failing to discover the maul upon the bridge immediately prior to the passage of the train. The foreman himself swears that he did look along the track just prior to the coming of the train, and that he did not see any obstruction on the track, and did not see the spike maul in question. Whether he looked or not is, under the evidence, one of the material facts in the case. He says that he did, but we are of opinion that other facts proved in the case were of such a character as to make it proper to submit the question to the jury. The foreman's evidence was that of a somewhat interested witness. If the foreman did in fact neglect to perform his duty by looking over the track just prior to the coming of the train for the purpose of seeing that the bridge was clear of obstructions, it might be quite a serious matter for him in his future relations with the company. At any rate, no man is an absolutely disinterested witness where his testimony relates to the question of the performance or nonperformance of a duty which he owed on account of the position which he occupied. It was, therefore, a question for the jury as to what measure of credence should be given to his testimony. Of course, the mere absence of evidence that the foreman did his duty would not be equivalent to evidence, direct or circumstantial, that he did not, and it rested with the plaintiff to show negligence of the foreman for which the defendant would be liable.
But there are certain facts proved in this case which we think rendered it necessary to submit the question of negligence to the jury, notwithstanding the testimony of the foreman. We have here a bridge not more than 60 or 65 feet long,-an open top bridge, the surface of which was plain. The ties for the rails were the usual distance apart, and there was nothing on top of them except the rails themselves. The guard rails were 10 inches from the track and parallel with it, and they stood up about 4 inches above the ties. There was, therefore, nothing to obstruct or prevent the view of the length of the bridge by anyone at either end, and nothing to prevent the discovery of the maul if the glance of the individual were anything more than casual or formal. The maul could not have been hidden between the track and the guard rails so as not to be above the track, for if the maul were lower than the track, the train could not have hit it, as it is perfectly clear that anything lower than the surface of the track could not be struck by the train. So it would seem quite obvious that if anyone in the position of the foreman had looked, it would have been possible for him to have discovered this maul if it were there. Was it there? Workmen had been using the maul on the bridge during the morning and a few moments, not more than ten or fifteen minutes, prior to the crossing of the train. The maul was struck by it and hurled with great force, sufficient to break the handle, against the plaintiff, who was standing near the east end of the bridge. The man who was known to have used the maul a few minutes before the arrival of the train says himself that he has no recollection of what he did with it. Now, whether the maul were left exactly on the bridge, or just off the bridge, and so near the track as to be struck by the passing train, it is not necessary to determine, because if it had been left in a position just off the bridge, and yet so near the track as to be struck by the train, the failure of the foreman to see it and have it removed was the same as if it had been on the bridge. The maul being left so that it was struck by the train and hurled against the plaintiff, the failure of the foreman to see it might have been found by the jury to be a negligent failure, and, it being his duty to see that the track was kept clear for the passage of trains, that failure was a neglect which was the proximate cause of the injury. To be sure, it was regligence on the part of the servant who left the tool there in the first place, but after such negligence had occurred the duty of the foreman arose, and he had plenty of time in which to perform it, to overlook the bridge where the track was and see that there was no obstruction for the passing train, and his failure to look, or, looking, to discover the obstruction, thus became the immediate and proximate cause of the injury which followed.
There is no other cause assignable for this injury than the fact that the train did strike the maul, and that fact is proved from the fact that it was thrown in the direction in which the train was going. Counsel for the defendant admits that the evidence shows that fact, but he avers that it does not appear that the maul was in such a position as to convict the foreman of negligence in not discovering it, and as to that fact counsel insists that the negligence of the foreman is disproved by the uncontradicted testimony.
The facts already stated rendered it necessary, in our judgment, to submit the question to the jury as to the negligence of the foreman, even although he testified that he looked and did not discover any obstacle on the bridge.
These two are the propositions particularly argued before us. We do not see in them any ground for disturbing the verdict of the jury.
We have looked at the other exceptions taken in the course of the trial, and are of opinion that they do not show any error requiring a reversal of the judgment, and it is therefore affirmed.

## Notes

This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
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