# The Proletarian Revolution in Russia/Part 6/Chapter 3

Published in Nashe Slovo, Paris, 1915–1916 and then revised into a pamphlet "The Program for Peace" in June 1917
III.
STATUS QUO ANTE BELLUM.
(Trotzky.)
Now the question is, can the proletariat under the present circumsances set up an independent peace program, i. e., solutions of the problems which caused the war of today or which have in the course of this war been brought to light. It has been intimated that the proletariat do not now command sufficient forces to bring about the realization of such a program. Utopian is the hope that the proletariat could carry out its own peace program as to the issue of the present war. What alternative is there save the struggle for the cessation of the war and for a peace without annexations, i. e., a return to the status quo ante bellum, to the state of affairs prior to the war? This we are told is by far the more realistic program. In what sense, however, may the term realistic be applied to the fight for the close of the war by means of a peace without annexation? Under what circumstances, we ask, can the end of the war be brought about? Theoretically, three typical possibilities may here be considered. (1) A decisive victory of one of the parties. (2) A general exhaustion of the opponents without decisive sway of one over the other. (3) The interference of the revolutionary proletariat, which interrupts by force the development of military events.
It is quite obvious that in the first case, if the war is ended by a decisive victory of one side it would be naive to dream of a peace free of annexations. If the Scheidemanns and Landsbergs, the staunch supporters of the work of their militarism, insist in parliament upon an "annexationless" peace, it is only with the firmest conviction that such protests can hinder no "useful" annexation. On the other hand, one of our former Czarist commanders-in-chief, General Alexieff, who dubbed the annexationless peace as "an Utopian phrase," thought quite correctly that the offensive is the chief thing, and that in case of successful war operations everything else would come of itself. In order to wrest annexations from the ​hands of the victorious party, which is armed to the teeth, the proletariat would naturally be in need of a revolutionary force, which it will have to be ready to use openly. In any case, it possesses no "economic" means to compel the victorious party to renounce the advantage of the victory gained.
The second possible issue of the war, on which those who seek to promote the narrow program "annexationless peace and nothing more" principally depend, presupposes that the war, exhausting as it does all the resources of the warring nations, will, without being interrupted by the third, the revolutionary, power, end in general exhaustion, without conquerors or conquered. To this very state, where militarism is too weak for effecting conquests, and the proletariat for making a revolution, the passive Internationalists of the Kautsky type adapted their abbreviated program of "annexationless peace," which they not seldom denote as a return to the status quo ante bellum. Here, however, the apparent realism lays bare its Achilles heel, for as a matter of fact an undecided issue of the war, as already shown, does not at all exclude annexations, but on the contrary presupposes them. That neither of the two powerful groups wins, does not mean that Serbia, Greece, Belgium, Poland, Persia, Syria, Armenia and others would be left uninjured. On the contrary, it is precisely for the account of these weakest that annexations will in this case be carried out. In order to prevent these reciprocal "compensations" the International Proletariat must needs set afoot a direct revolutionary uprising against the ruling classes. Newspaper articles, Congressional resolutions, Parliamentary protests and even public manifestations have never prevented the rulers from acquiring territories or from oppressing the weak peoples either by way of victory or by means of diplomatic agreements.
As regards the third possible issue of the war, it seems to be the clearest. It presupposes that while the war is still on, the international proletariat rises with a force sufficient to paralyze and finally to stop from the bottom up, the war. Obviously, in this most favorable case, the proletariat, having been powerful enough to stop the progress of the war, would not be likely to limit itself to that purely conservative program which goes no farther than the renunciation of annexations.
A powerful movement of the proletariat is thus a necessary prerequisite of the actual realization of an annexationless peace. But again, while presupposing such a movement, the foregoing program remains quite inadequate in that it acquiesces in the restora​tion of the order which prevailed prior to the war and out of which the war broke out. The European status quo ante bellum, a resultant of wars, robbery, violation, red tape, diplomatic stupidity and weakness of peoples, remains as the only positive content of the motto, "without annexations."
In its fight against Imperialism, the proletariat cannot set up as its political aim the return to the old European map: It must set up its own program of State and National relations, harmonizing with the fundamental tendency of economic development, with the revolutionary character of the age and with the Socialist interests of the proletariat.
The mere statement of the motto, "without annexations," gives above all no criterion for a political orientation in the several problems, brought forth during the course of the war. Assuming that France later on occupies Alsace-Lorraine, is the German Social Democracy together with Scheidemann bound to demand the return of this province to Germany? Shall we demand the restitution of the kingdom of Poland to Russia? Shall we insist upon Japan's giving Chio-Chau back to Germany? Or that Italy yields back to its owners that part of Trentino now occupied by her? That would be nonsense. We should be fanatics of legitimacy, i. e,, defenders of dynastic and "historic" rights in the sense of the most reactionary diplomacy. Besides, this program also demands a revolution for its fulfillment. In all these enumerated and in other similar cases we, confronted with the stern reality, shall naturally advance only one principle, viz., consultation of the peoples interested. This is certainly no absolute criterion. The French "Socialists" of the majority reduce the consultation of the population (of Alsace-Lorraine) to an unworthy mummy-show:—First occupying (that is, acquisition by force of arms) and then asking the population's consent to be annexed. It is quite clear that a real consultation, presupposes a state of revolution whereby the population can give their reply without being threatened by a revolver, be it German or French.
The only acceptable content of the motto "without annexations" is a protest against new violent acquisitions, which only amounts to the negation of the rights of nations to self-determination. But we have seen that this democratically unquestionable "right" will necessarily lead to the right of strong nations to make acquisitions and impose oppression, whereas for the weak nations it will result in feebleness of will or in "scraps of paper." Such will be the case as long as the political map of Europe forces nations and their ​fractions within the confines of States, separated by tariff barriers and continually impinging upon one another in their imperialistic fights.
It is possible to overcome this règime only by means of a proletarian revolution. Thus, the centre of gravity lies in the union of the peace-program of the proletariat with that of the Social Revolution.