# The Hussite Wars/Chapter 6

CHAPTER VI
It is a strong proof how great the desire for peace had already become in Bohemia, that during the last days of the eventful year 1427 a religious disputation should have taken place, as had been settled earlier in the year. The divines of both Churches met at Žebrak on December 29. Though Pope Martin, maintaining his unvaried standpoint, had forbidden this disputation, the Cardinal of Winchester had, before he had received notice of the papal prohibition, appointed as representatives of the Church of Rome two Catholic priests who had been recommended to him by the lords “sub una.” These men, Simon of Tišnov and Prokop of Kladrub, had for a time belonged to the Utraquist Church, and had lectured at the university of Prague. The choice was undoubtedly a good one; these priests were acquainted with the teaching of the university of Prague and were not inclined to confuse it with the ravings of fanatics and visionaries, as former representatives of Rome had done on previous occasions, either from ignorance or from ill will. Unfortunately the disputation remained resultless. A very futile discussion arose as to which party should open the debate. The English Hussite, Peter Payne, was one of the representatives of Tábor, and we may conjecture that he here also displayed that rancour which we so often find in exiles. The discussion appears not to have got beyond the preliminary question mentioned above, and the conference broke up without any result. The truce previously concluded was, however, confirmed, and the Bohemians were thus enabled to devote their attention to ​their foreign enemies exclusively. Prokop now extensively adopted that system of assuming the offensive which characterised the Bohemians during the last years of the war. Probably at the beginning of the year 1428 the united armies of the Praguers under John Tovačovský, the Táborites under Prokop the Great, and the Orphans under Prokupek (Prokop the Lesser), who now first became widely known, entered Moravia and then marched to Hungary. The Bohemians evidently followed the example of Žižka, who some time previously had attempted to subdue Sigismund by invading his own kingdom. We have very little information concerning this new Bohemian invasion of Hungary. Some writers, indeed, state that no battles or sieges occurred, and that Prokop’s principal purpose was to devastate Hungary, thus rendering an invasion of Bohemia from that direction more difficult. Marching by way of Skalice and Senice the Hussites reached the Danube at Pressburg; they occupied, the suburbs, but were unable to obtain possession of the strongly fortified town and citadel. For reasons not known to us they then retired to Moravia by way of Trnova (Tyrnau), after having burnt down the suburbs of Pressburg. They reached the Moravian frontier at Uherský Brod, from where they had started on their not very successful expedition into Hungary. After a short respite the Bohemians determined to invade Silesia. That country had from the beginning of the war been intensely hostile to the Bohemian national cause, and the incessant raids of the Silesians, which generally took place at the moment when the Bohemians were occupied in opposing the main armies of the Germans, greatly incensed the people. Prokop the Great again assumed command of the united ​Utraquist armies, and it is interesting to note that among those who joined his standards were the Polish prince, Frederick of Ostroh, who had been chamberlain of Prince Korybutovič during his residence in Prague, and the Polish nobleman Dobeslav Puchala. The Bohemians arrived at the frontier of the Silesian duchy of Troppau probably at the end of February 1428. It has already been noted that the longer the Hussite wars continued the greater the terror became which their approach caused in the neighbouring German lands. This again proved true on the occasion of this invasion of Silesia. As soon as the Bohemians had crossed the frontier Venceslas, eldest son of the Duke of Troppau, appeared in their camp. He came there to conclude an agreement with the Bohemians, according to which several towns in the duchy of Troppau, which had been entrusted to him by his father, should, on payment of a sum of money, remain unmolested. The prince himself proclaimed his neutrality. His father, the old duke, sought refuge in the city of Troppau, which successfully repulsed the attacks of the Hussites. It was their custom during their offensive campaigns not to allow themselves to be delayed by lengthy sieges, and they therefore soon abandoned their attempt to obtain possession of the capital of the duchy of Troppau. They continued their advance through Silesia, and after plundering several small cities arrived before the city of Ober-Glogau in the duchy of Oppeln. This was the first Silesian town which the Bohemians took by storm, but the resistance does not appear to have been very determined. This can perhaps be accounted for by the fact that the town of Ober-Glogau had been made over by the duke to his son Bolko. This prince is stated to have been educated at the Utraquist university of Prague, and it ​is certain that his sympathies were on the side of the Hussites. Immediately after the surrender of Ober-Glogau he proceeded to the Bohemian camp and concluded a separate treaty of peace with them. Though Bolko was the only Silesian prince who openly sided with the Hussites, whose armies he joined during the last campaigns of the war, it is certain that sympathy with the Hussites was widespread in Silesia. German writers have even attributed the fact that Martin Luther’s Reformation found early adherents in Silesia to the Utraquist traditions that still lingered among the people.
The Bohemians were, however, also to meet with bitter enemies in Silesia. They now invaded the lands of Bishop Conrad of Breslau, one of the most determined opponents of the heretics. It was mainly through his influence that the Silesians had undertaken their frequent incursions into the Bohemian district of Králové Hradec. They had on these occasions given proof of cruelty and ferocity which far surpassed that of the Bohemians, who were now seeking revenge. The nationalists, indeed, now plundered Silesia mercilessly, and destroyed many towns and villages in a fashion which the modern humanitarian would severely condemn. They, however, except on rare occasions, spared the lives of the women and children, and indeed often received soldiers as prisoners. The Silesian Romanists, on the other hand, deliberately massacred, and, as far as it was in their power, exterminated the whole Slavic population of the Bohemian frontier districts which they invaded. The Bishop of Breslau had proceeded to Neisse, one of the principal cities in his dominions, where he was joined by a large part of the Silesian nobility and by some of the dukes who ruled over the many duchies into which Silesia was then divided. The Silesians chose as their leader the Bohemian lord “sub una” Puta of Častolovice, captain of the county of Glatz, who, as an old antagonist of ​the Hussites, was supposed to have become acquainted with their new system of warfare. The Bishop of Breslau and his alles had assembled a vast force, and had pressed into their service a large number of peasants from the surrounding country. The extraordinary rapidity of the movements of the Bohemians here again assured their success. They arrived before Neisse quite unexpectedly, and immediately attacked the Germans, whose resistance was very slight. The peasants, who had been hurriedly armed, immediately fled, and the bishop only with difficulty found a refuge within the fortifications of Neisse. Following the Germans rapidly, the Bohemians penetrated into the suburbs of the city, which they burned down. Though the Germans had offered but little resistance, their loss in this battle amounted to about 2000 men. Neisse itself was not taken, in consequence of its brave defence by Puta of Častolovice, and, it may be added, because it was the habit of the Hussites not to delay their advance by prolonged sieges of fortified towns. From Neisse the Bohemians immediately marched on Brieg, after receiving the submission of several Silesian princes and cities. The town of Brieg, situated on the banks of the Oder, was then one of the most important cities of Silesia. It belonged to Duke Louis of Liegnitz-Brieg, who at first decided to resist the advance of the Bohemians, and assembled a large number of troops. When, however, the news of the defeat at Neisse reached Brieg, the duke, changing his plans, hastily crossed the Oder and with his knights retired to his other duchy of Liegnitz. The town of Brieg was then immediately occupied by the Bohemians, who met with no resistance. The spiritless abandonment of Brieg—then one of the strongest fortified cities in Silesia, and the largest which the Hussites captured in that country—caused great sensation, not only in Silesia, but also in the neighbouring countries. One of the first to receive the news was Ladislas, King of Poland. As has already been mentioned, his policy during the Hussite wars was a very ​inconstant one. The Germans had, indeed, on several occasions accused him of secretly favouring the projects of his nephew, Prince Korybutovič, who was a staunch Utraquist. The King of Poland was therefore doubtlessly not reluctant to address severe and well-deserved reproaches to the Germans. In a letter to one of the Silesian princes, Duke Henry Kantner of Oels, he expressed his surprise that the Silesians, though they had ample means of defence, should have offered so slight a resistance, and that they should have abandoned cities such as Ober-Glogau, flying from them without necessity.
From Brieg the Bohemian armies, following the course of the Oder, marched in the direction of Breslau. The rulers of the different small duchies into which Silesia was then divided attempted no resistance, but concluded treaties with the Bohemians according to which they agreed to pay subsidies to them and to observe in future strict neutrality between the contending parties. These treaties were naturally kept very secret, and, as Dr. Grünhagen writes, no copy of any one of them has been preserved. Though the Bohemian horsemen arrived within the distance of a mile from Breslau they made no attempt to attack the city, and shortly afterwards retired to the county of Glatz. It was not their wish ​to obtain permanent possession of foreign countries, as they well knew that such an attempt would weaken them when they were called on to repel the ever-recurring German invasions of Bohemia. They determined, however, to retain in their possession certain strongholds which would be useful to them for the purpose of securing their communications, should they again be obliged to invade Silesia. They therefore besieged the castle of Landfried, or, as it was called in Bohemia, Homola, which overlooks the small town of Reinerz. The castle was captured after a somewhat prolonged siege. It is, however, certain that in July it was already in the hands of the Bohemians, who left here a garrison under Peter Polak of Volfina. Part of the nationalist army then returned from Reinerz to their country by way of the neighbouring pass of Nachod, while other detachments continued to ravage Silesia. They failed in their attempt to obtain possession of the town of Glatz, which has a naturally strong position and was strongly fortified in accordance with the then general custom. They then marched to Reichenbach, and without meeting with any resistance occupied the neighbouring castle of Zobten, situated on a height and overlooking a vast expanse of country. The Bohemians here also left a garrison, which was commanded by Lord Kolda of Žampach. The castle was, however, retaken by the Germans later in the year, but Žampach and his soldiers were allowed to return to Bohemia.
It is beyond the purpose of this work to give a detailed account of the various marches and counter-marches of the Hussite armies in Silesia during the latter part of the year 1428 and during the following year. As the Silesians had, in the early part of the war, annually raided the border districts of Bohemia, so the Hussites now constantly invaded Silesia and obtained there ammunition, provisions, and other necessary articles. The frontiers of the neighbouring lands had so long ​been closed to the Bohemians—all intercourse with the Hussites had been forbidden under penalty of excommunication—that the country would have been thoroughly exhausted had it not obtained supplies from Silesia. That country also now became a great recruiting-ground for the Hussite armies. In consequence of the necessities of agriculture it was impossible to keep the whole peasantry constantly under arms. Their places were gradually taken by other, not always desirable, recruits. Many Poles and Lithuanians, attracted by the example of Prince Korybutovič, as well as Ruthenians, now began to flock to the Bohemian standards. Many of these men—particularly the Ruthenians, who belonged themselves to a Utraquist Church—were genuinely zealous for the cause of Utraquism, and most of them, no doubt, possessed the innate Slavic hatred of the Teuton. Yet many of the new recruits were influenced by other motives. In consequence of the almost incessant warfare on the borders of Poland, Lithuania, Russia, and the dominions of the Teutonic order, these lands swarmed with mercenaries, always ready to take part in any warlike enterprise. Such men were mainly attracted by the democratic character of the Hussite armies, in which the rich spoils were distributed with the strictest impartiality. It is certain that in consequence of the admission of these new elements the Bohemian armies deteriorated towards the end of the war.
When the advanced party among the Hussites determined to drive Prince Korybutovič from Bohemia they were certainly unaware of the fact that they were rendering the greatest service to King Sigismund. Korybutovič had undoubtedly been a very dangerous rival to the claimant to the Bohemian throne; he had accepted the articles of Prague, and he belonged to the Slavic race. After his departure some of those who were strongly attached to the monarchical principle began again to turn their attention to Sigismund. Fourteen years had elapsed ​since the tragedy of Constance. Žižka and many others who considered that Sigismund’s participation in the execution of Hus excluded him for ever from the Bohemian throne were dead. Though Sigismund was at heart a fervent and even bigoted adherent of the Roman Church his innate falseness made it easy for him to express occasionally opinions which could be interpreted in a very different sense. Even at the time of the Council of Basel he stated that he was strongly opposed to the celibacy of the clergy, and it will be remembered that during the siege of Prague the Germans suspected Sigismund of secretly favouring their enemies.
It was one of the greatest of the Bohemian territorial nobles, Lord Menhard of Jindřichův Hradec (in German, Neuhaus); who undertook the difficult task of mediating between King Sigismund and the Utraquists. Menhard’s career had been a somewhat chequered one. He was the son of John of Jindřichův Hradec, who had been one of the first Bohemian nobles to adopt the Utraquist teaching, but who had died in 1417, before the beginning of the war. Menhard had in 1421 taken up arms against Žižka, by whom he was made prisoner and detained for some time at the castle of Přibenic. After his liberation he again opposed the national party, but was defeated at Kamenic in 1425. Henceforth he joined the Utraquists, as whose ally he took part in the campaigns of Střibro and Tachov. He now appears for a time as a genuine defender of the articles of Prague, but he continued to be a strong monarchist, and also endeavoured to restore the power of the Bohemian nobility, which had greatly declined since the departure of Korybutovič. His well-known prudence and caution caused him to become the recognised leader of the Utraquist nobility. Menhard found a favourable occasion for his attempted mediation when Prokop the Great, leaving the castle of Bechin, undertook a new invasion of Austria. Menhard of Jindřichův Hradec, accompanied by other nobles ​of Bohemia and Moravia, met him on his march and suggested to him that he should, for the purpose of a general pacification, have an interview with King Sigismund, who was then residing at Pressburg in Hungary, not far from the frontiers of Moravia. It appears probable that peace negotiations had already begun some time previously, but we have little information on this subject.
It is certain that Prokop did not hesitate to accept the invitation as soon as his safety and that of his companions had been assured by means of hostages; for the treachery once committed against Hus was still in the minds of many. With him Menhard, several Bohemian nobles and knights, representatives of the cities of Prague, and a few divines—among whom was the English Hussite, Peter Payne—rode to Pressburg. They arrived there on April 4, 1429. Perhaps to overawe the Bohemian envoys, Sigismund had invited many German princes to Pressburg at this moment. Among those present were Sigismund’s son-in-law, Albrecht of Austria, William, Duke of Bavaria, several Silesian princes, and the principal nobles “sub una,” among whom it is sufficient to mention Ulrich of Rosenburg, Puta of Častolovice, and Hanuš of Kolowrat. A large number of ecclesiastical dignitaries had also been summoned to Pressburg. Bishop Conrad of Breslau, the “iron” Bishop John, formerly of Litomyšle, now of Olomouc, Hus’s bitterest enemy, and the Archbishop of Gran in Hungary were present. Representatives of several universities had also arrived at Pressburg—among them four theologians of the university of Paris. These had no doubt arrived on a special mission. During the whole period between the meeting of the Council of Constance to the dissolution of that of Basel ​the university of Paris had always insisted on the necessity of strengthening the authority of the ecumenical councils of the Church. The council held in Siena in 1424 had already determined that a new council should be held at Basel after the lapse of seven years. The university of Paris, however, in view of the disturbed condition of the Christian world, wished to advance the date of the new assembly. It was hoped that a general council of the Church would more easily come to terms with the Utraquists than the Pope. The Bohemian envoys were received by King Sigismund on the day of their arrival, but the first meeting had an entirely ceremonial character. On the following day the King assembled the princes, Bohemian nobles, and theologians, and consulted them as to the best manner in which negotiations with the Utraquists could be opened. They advised him to tell the Hussites in a conciliatory fashion that they had strayed from the path of true Christianity and that they had abandoned the doctrines in which their forefathers had believed, and which they themselves had formerly accepted. According to the contemporary chroniclers, Sigismund then transmitted these remarks to the Hussite delegates “with wise and kindly words.” It isa proof of Sigismund’s intense vanity that he believed that his conciliatory words—which contained no concession whatever—would induce the Hussites to abandon doctrines which they had successfully upheld against all Europe for nearly ten years. The Hussites answered that they wished to be granted a hearing by a general meeting of the Christian people, at which laymen also were to be present. According to Dr. Neubauer’s skilful conjecture, the Hussites had remarked that among the lower nobility and the townsmen beyond the borders of Bohemia their views had already found many friends. The germs of the ideas which brought out the German Reformation in the following century perhaps already existed in the border-lands of Bohemia. The brief exchange of views at Pressburg soon proved that the antagonistical parties were at least for ​the moment irreconcilable. On the advice of his councillors Sigismund replied that the Catholic Church had been founded by Jesus Christ, and that the teaching of the Hussites had already been condemned at Constance by the Pope and Council, and that discussions on a matter which had already been decided were useless; the Hussites could only expect a hearing and such instruction as was befitting for those who had erred; this, however, could be better given privately by ecclesiastical or temporal princes and by scholars than before a large assembly comprising many plain men who knew nothing of these matters. This categorical statement did not, as might have been expected, lead to an immediate conclusion of the negotiations. Sigismund again consulted his advisers. They declared that heresy in Bohemia could only be exterminated by the sword, but that it would be well, that being for the moment impossible, to propose an armistice which was to last up to the moment of the meeting of the new Council. The condition of the armistice was to be that the Hussites should attend the Council and submit to its decisions. This advice was undoubtedly astute if we consider the constitution of the Hussite armies. It was certain that during a prolonged truce the Utraquist nobles would retire to their estates with their followers; the peasants, freed from imminent peril, would return to their country homes, from which they had so long been absent; the mercenaries, whose number in the Hussite armies was increasing, accustomed to constant warfare, would, deprived of any immediate hope of obtaining booty, have sought service elsewhere. It can be considered as probable that the acceptance of Sigismund’s proposal would have deprived the national party of the powerful weapon which the Hussite army had now become, and would have left the country at the mercy of Sigismund and his allies. It need hardly be said that Prokop, whose military talent had kept the Hussite armies at that very high standard of efficiency to which Žižka had brought them, did not for a moment ​contemplate such a surrender. The Hussite envoys had received from the estates of Bohemia instructions according to which they were under no condition to accept a general armistice, but were to consent to a truce with Sigismund and his son-in-law, Albert of Austria, on condition that both these princes should surrender to the Utraquist party all the castles in Bohemia and Moravia which were still held by them. It seems probable that these propositions had been brought to the notice of Sigismund at the beginning of the negotiations at Pressburg, and that they had then already been rejected by him; the answer of the Hussites to Sigismund’s new proposal, therefore, entirely ignored the question of the proposed armistice. It was, however, on the whole more conciliatory than their first message had been. The belief in the authority of councils was then at its apogee, and even the Utraquists were not uninfluenced by it. It appeared to them a very different thing to obtain a hearing before the whole Christian Church than to receive an admonition from a number of priests chosen by their enemies. They therefore declared that they were ready to appear before a council of the universal Church, but that they would continue to uphold their views till a general Church reformation had been carried out. Seeing that the reply of the Hussites was evasive rather than negative, Sigismund now thought that he could obtain an armistice. This, indeed, appears to have been his principal reason for entering into these negotiations.
On April 8 the Hussites made a somewhat unexpected move. They informed the King that if he would consent to accept their creed they would gladly receive him as their sovereign—rather than any one else. Should he, however, decline their proposal they could only repeat what they had ​said before, that they had drawn their swords and would not sheath them till they had converted all men to their faith. On receiving this message Sigismund was seized by one of those attacks of semi-insane fury which sometimes overtook him. He beseeched all the princes who were at his court to assist him in exterminating heresy and in obtaining possession of the lands which he had inherited. He added that he would immediately organise a new military expedition against Bohemia. The German princes, whose previous experiences had not been satisfactory, received this statement silently and without enthusiasm. On April 8 Prokop and his companions again approached the King and inquired where the proposed Council was to meet. They also wished to know whether it was to be entirely under the direction of the Pope and the cardinals, or whether Sigismund and the other princes were also to exercise a certain control over it. In his reply Sigismund stated that he would have the same authority over the Council which the Roman emperors and kings had possessed on similar previous occasions. On the following day the Bohemian envoys left Pressburg and rejoined the Hussite army, which was encamped six (German) miles from the city. The Hussite envoys, whose instructions did not allow them to express an opinion on such vital questions as the conclusion of an armistice and the promise of attending the future council, declared, before leaving Pressburg, that a general meeting of the estates of Bohemia would give a definite reply. This assembly began its sittings on May 23, and continued them for a week. The representatives of King Sigismund, who had on this occasion appeared in Prague, demanded that the Bohemians should submit to the verdict of the Council of Constance, and agree to a truce for two years, or up to the beginning of the council, not only with the King and his Bohemian adherents, but also with the foreign princes who were allied with him. The diet in Prague, on the advice of some theologians and priests who were consulted, agreed to ​accept Sigismund’s proposals, but only under certain conditions. The diet demanded firstly that this assembly of the whole Christian world should include the Greeks, the Armenians, and the Patriarch of Constantinople, who all, like the Bohemians, received Communion in the two kinds; secondly, that the council should be held according to the law of God, and not according to rules established by the Pope, and that not only the Pope, but all Christianity should be permitted to express its views freely. Should such a council assemble, the Bohemians were ready to send to it wise, prudent and pious men, both priests and laymen, and to grant them full powers. The Bohemians added several other conditions of minor importance. They declared that those who had acceded to the law of God (i. e. the Utraquist Church) and then treacherously abandoned it, and those who had bound themselves by writing to accept the law of God and then failed to do so, should be excluded from the truce. In view of the vacillating attitude of some of the Bohemian nobles this affected some men of considerable importance in the country. The Bohemians further declared that they were ready to conclude a truce with King Sigismund and his son-in-law, but not with Meissen (Saxony) or Bavaria. Archduke Albert was to promise to preserve the rights and privileges of Moravia, and the King was to entrust the government of that land provisionally to one who belonged to the Bohemian or Slavic nation. The Bohemians finally made stipulations in favour of the Utraquist peasants who lived on estates of the lords “sub una,” and demanded guarantees for the safety of the Utraquist priests who resided in districts occupied by partisans of Sigismund. The Bohemians were naturally elated by their constant victories, and, having been so long isolated from other countries, they were imperfectly informed as to the public opinion in the rest of Europe. They seem to have considered it probable that Sigismund would accept their proposals, and indeed already began to discuss ​the possibility of his accession to the Bohemian throne. It has already been noted that some of the new leaders of the Utraquists no longer entertained the intense personal resentment against Sigismund which Žižka had felt, and which the Orphans—who all cherished memories of their dead leader—still preserved. Prokop was not disinclined to recognise Sigismund as king should he accept the articles of Prague. It was, however—as stated by the chronicler quoted below—decided that, in consequence of the resistance of the Orphans and the new town of Prague, the attempt to confer the Bohemian crown on Sigismund should be deferred to a later period. At the same time the diet decided to inform Sigismund of the conditions under which it would consent to a truce. For this purpose a new Bohemian embassy, again headed by Prokop the Great, started for Pressburg. The delegates arrived there probably at the end of June. Prokop informed Sigismund of the decision of the diet and questioned him as to the composition of the proposed council, at which, he said, the Hussites could only appear as one of the contending parties, not as contrite penitents. Sigismund had at the time of Prokop’s first visit already come to the conclusion that the negotiation would at that moment inevitably be resultless; he was, indeed, then already busily engaged in organising a new crusade against Bohemia. Yet both parties wished to avoid the odium of renewing the hostilities, and no immediate rupture ​took place. When King Sigismund demanded that the Hussites should abandon all sieges of castles belonging to nobles “sub una,” and that the truce should include all his subjects—an expression which could be applied to all German states, even those with whom the Bohemians had already refused to negotiate—the envoys stated that they had no instructions to discuss these matters, but would inform their countrymen of the King’s demands. They then left Pressburg and the negotiations were interrupted for a considerable period.
The so-called crusade of 1429 requires but very slight mention. Cardinal Beaufort was again to command it. He landed on the continent in July with an English army of 5,000 men. While marching through Belgium he was ordered to proceed to France because of the victories of Joan of Arc. The German princes considered this a sufficient reason for abandoning the proposed campaign. Some time previously—in March 1429—Joan of Arc addressed a menacing letter to the Bohemians, threatening to invade their country. On his return from Pressburg to Bohemia Prokop had, at the castle of Sovinec, near Olomouc, an interview with Prince Korybutovič, who had again appeared in the lands of the Bohemian crown. The Lithuanian prince had, on his return from Bohemia, been treated with great severity by the King of Poland, and even imprisoned for a short time. Ladislas maintained that Korybutovič had undertaken his second expedition to Bohemia against the King’s order. In view of the profound duplicity of the King of Poland it is perhaps impossible to judge how far this was true. While the failure was blamed, a success would probably have met with approval. Korybutovič very soon regained the King’s favour, and now made his third appearance on the turbulent Bohemian stage. He probably hoped that Prokop would act as a mediator ​between him and the citizens of Prague. From Olomouc, Prokop proceeded to Ústi nad Orlicí (in German, Wildenschwert), where the Hussite army was occupied in besieging the neighbouring castle of Lanšberk.
The question of the recognition of Sigismund as King of Bohemia, which had been discussed at the diet of Prague, had caused new troubles in that city. It has already been mentioned that, roughly speaking, the old town contained the more conservative, and the new one the more radical, citizens. The Utraquist nobles, who had always demanded the establishment of a monarchical and orderly government, endeavoured to secure the recognition of Sigismund as King, and the Táborites were not opposed to this on condition that the new King accepted the articles of Prague. On the other hand the Orphans and the citizens of the New Town of Prague were bitterly opposed to this plan. It is one of the strange vicissitudes which we meet so frequently during the Bohemian civil wars that the citizens of the Old Town of Prague—the stronghold of the Hussite High Church—should now have requested the aid of the leader of the Táborites. Though so strongly antagonistic as regards matters of theology, both parties at that moment seem to have contemplated a monarchical restoration. Prokop, who was still directing the siege of Lanšberk, hurried to Prague, but found there that the two cities had already concluded peace or rather a truce. We have little information about the causes of this sudden agreement, but it is probable that both parties had become aware of the fact that Sigismund would not accept the Bohemian crown on the conditions under which it had been offered to him.
The castle of Lanšberk capitulated shortly after Prokop’s departure, and though during the summer small detachments of Hussites raided parts of Silesia, it was only for the following winter that Prokop had planned an invasion of Germany on a large scale. It was not only to provision Bohemia—as has been stated by many popular German writers—that these ​expeditions were undertaken. Prokop believed that by frequent attacks on the border-lands he could employ sufficient pressure against them to force them to grant freedom to the Bohemian Church, and perhaps even—so his sanguine temperament led him sometimes to believe—to induce them to accept the articles of Prague. In the meantime Prokop, whose matchless energy at this moment it is impossible not to admire, devoted his attention to the never-ending theological controversies in Prague. The good sense of the townsmen had, indeed, for the moment averted an armed conflict, but the odium theologicum of the rival divines continued unabated. The priest John of Přibram, one of the protagonists of the Hussite High Church, had in his sermons strongly attacked some of Wycliffe’s views concerning the Sacrament of Communion. This should not have been considered as an attack on Hussitism, as Hus himself had often stated that he did not accept unconditionally all Wycliffe’s views. In this controversy Peter Payne, surnamed Engliš, strongly upheld the opinions of his master. Payne as well as Master Nicholas of Pelhřimov and the majority of the Táborite divines maintained that Christ was not present in the Sacrament essentially, but that in the Sacrament the bread and wine signified the body and blood of Christ, who had suffered for us on the cross. This theory, which Dr. Krummel calls the “Wycliflite-symbolic” interpretation, was not quite in accordance with ​the theories of Prokop, who now, in view of the ever-recurring foreign peril, attempted to mediate between the contending parties. Prokop on this question did not agree with Payne and Pelhřimov and the majority of the Táborite divines. He believed that Christ was really present in the Sacrament of Communion, and he held that Christians should kneel before it, a custom which some of the advanced Táborites abhorred. On the other hand Prokop’s views also differed widely from those of magister Přibram. Prokop believed in the remanence of the substance of bread, that is to say he believed that after the consecration, besides the body of Christ, the substance of bread also continued to exist. When at a meeting of theologians Přibram attempting to refute the theories of Prokop, quoted the father of the Church, Prokop was somewhat irritated, and in a letter written to Přibram shortly afterwards, advised him to cling to the words of Christ and His Apostles, and to ignore the words of the “doctores,” the fathers of the Church. It was probably the conciliatory attitude of Prokop, as well as the news that the German princes had now finally decided to engage in a new crusade, which induced the controversialists to discontinue their deputations, at least for a time.
In the autumn of 1429 Prokop left Prague and first proceeded to Kutna Hora, a city which he appears often to have visited when he was able to absent himself from the Utraquist armies. These armies were at that moment scattered over different parts of Bohemia, but were already preparing for the new ​campaign. It was decided that the troops should assemble at different points along the Saxon frontier. On December 3 Prokop returned to Prague at the request of the magistrates of that city. He was to assume command over the vast army, which, according to the most trustworthy authorities, consisted of 4,000 cavalry, 40,000 infantry, and 2,500 armoured wagons. Besides the Orphans and Táborites, the men both of the Old and New Towns of Prague, and the levies of many Bohemian cities, started for the frontier on December 4. The burgomaster and councillors entertained the generals at a banquet at the town-hall before their departure, “drinking to their health as they were taking leave.” On its march the army was joined by the troops of several Bohemian and Moravian nobles, and on the frontier by the Bohemian forces that were already encamped there. The whole large army then, after crossing the frontier, followed the course of the Elbe as far as Pirna and Dresden. They encamped for some time before the latter city, but faithful to the system they had adopted during their former invasions of Germany, they did not attempt the siege of the fortified town. Small detachments of Hussites raided some of the open Saxon towns, but the Germans remained behind their fortifications, not daring to meet the Bohemians in the open field. On the appeal of Frederick, Elector of Saxony, some of the German princes promised to march to his aid and to arrest the triumphant progress of the heretics. The ecclesiastical princes were naturally among the most zealous. The Archbishop of Magdeburg, the Bishops of Naumberg, Halberstadt, Merseburg, and Hildesheim with their troops joined the Saxon army, which, under the command of the Elector Frederick, had assembled at Leipzig. The Duke of Brunswick and the Landgrave of Thuringia also marched to the aid of the menaced elector. The German army, according to the most trustworthy ​accounts, numbering about 100,000 men, was now vastly superior in strength to the Bohemian forces. On hearing of the approach of the Germans the Hussites marched in a north-western direction, burning the towns of Oschatz and Wurzen on their way. They then determined to cross the Mulda stream. Believing that the German army was concentrated on the other bank of that stream they kept their forces closely, and overcrowded the wagons to such an extent that some of them were overturned and some men were drowned. When about half the force had crossed the stream the cry was raised that the Germans were attacking. Those warriors who had already reached the bank immediately formed in battle array, but it was soon found that the alarm was unfounded. A body of Thuringian nobles with their followers had indeed ridden to the ford where the Bohemians were crossing. Their attack was, however, speedily repulsed by the Hussites, and the knights retired with heavy losses; of their small force of 800 horsemen half were killed or made prisoners. On the day following the skirmish the Bohemians, who had now all crossed the stream, expected to be attacked by the entire German army. They received a menacing letter from the German commanders, telling them that they would on the following day all be killed as being heretics. No attack, however, took place. The Elector of Saxony appears to have been greatly impressed by the sudden flight of the Germans at Tachov and to have feared the renewal of such a catastrophe. He therefore suddenly changed his plans, ordered the tents of his troops to be burnt, and dismissed the troops of his allies, who returned to their homes. The elector himself first retreated to Leipzig, sharply pursued by the Hussite soldiers. He then continued his flight to Thuringia, after having ordered the suburbs of Leipzig to be burnt down to prevent their falling into the hands of the enemies. The Bohemians, now unopposed, divided their forces into different detachments, which ravaged a large part of Northern Germany. The inhabitants, terrified ​by the mere approach of the Hussites, forsook their dwellings and fled into the woods, where many perished of cold and privation. The Germans, whose practice it had been when they occupied Bohemian towns or villages to murder the whole population, were surprised that the Bohemian always spared the lives of women and children. The German chronicler Windecke writes that “wherever the Bohemians arrived the citizens and peasants fled into the woods, leaving their wives and children behind them”; they evidently soon knew that the Bohemians did not war against women and children.
It is beyond the purpose of this work to give an account of the different raids which the Bohemians undertook during this winter. Their principal army marched into Franconia. That part of Germany, comparatively distant from Bohemia, had hitherto taken little interest in the affairs of that country. The Bohemian invasion came as a complete surprise. The Hussites attacked the town of Hof, of which they easily obtained possession, but the castle was bravely defended by Kaspar of Waldenfels. That general appears, however, to have been one of the first Germans who realised the necessity of terminating the war with Bohemia. Through his mediation the Bohemian leaders entered into negotiations with the Elector Frederick of Brandenburg, who was also Burgrave of Nürnberg. I have already referred to the elector’s conciliatory tendencies, and he again gave proof of them on this occasion. He had just returned to Germany from Pressburg, where he had taken part in the fruitless negotiations which have already been mentioned. It is not likely that the elector returned from Sigismund’s court in a hopeful frame of mind, and seeing that his country was at that moment quite unable to resist the Bohemians he determined to negotiate with them. His foremost purpose was to free Germany from the presence of unwelcome visitors, but he may have also hoped to reconciliate the Utraquists with the Roman Church, and thus to ​effectuate a general pacification. After having received letters from the Hussite leaders inviting him to their camp and letters of safe conduct, the Elector crossed the Bohemian lines accompanied by ten Hussite horsemen as his bodyguard. An interview took place between him and the Hussite commanders at the castle of Zwernitz, not far from Bayreuth, on February 6, 1430. It was here agreed that on condition of the payment of a considerable sum by the Bishop of Bamberg and by the municipalities of Bamberg and Forchheim, the Hussites should undertake not to attack the territory of Bamberg. It is, however, certain that larger and more weighty questions were also discussed at Zwernitz. The Elector then proceeded to Nürnberg, no doubt to consult his allies with regard to the continuation of the negotiations. Having obtained their consent Frederick again met the Hussite generals at the castle of Böheimstein, near Nürnberg. It was here agreed that the Elector of Brandenburg, Duke John of Bavaria, and the city of Nürnberg should pay large sums to the Bohemians on condition that the latter should evacuate Germany. Prokop was not, however, satisfied by receiving ransom, rightly thinking that his victorious campaign would thus appear as a mere razzia. He again brought forward the question of the reconciliation of the Utraquists with the universal Church. On this point the elector made very considerable concessions, for which he was much blamed by the extreme partisans of the Church of Rome. For reasons which it is not difficult to understand the documents concerning the agreements of Zwernitz and Böheimstein were destroyed, but it has been possible to ascertain some facts from other sources, particularly from the drafts of some letters of the Elector Frederick, which have been published by Dr. V. Bezold. It was agreed between the elector and the Bohemians that on April 23 both Catholics and Hussites should send to Nürnberg “doctors and men of learning,” not for the purpose of religious disputations, but only to attempt a ​friendly understanding in view of a future pacification. The draft of the letter of safe conduct which the elector intended to give the Bohemian envoys proves that he was ready to permit a discussion on the four articles of Prague. There is no doubt that the Elector of Brandenburg’s attitude was to a certain extent favourable to the Bohemians. It had been hitherto thought necessary to start from the standpoint that heretics should submit unconditionally. An astute statesman such as was Frederick, however, well knew that such a submission was out of the question. He was, therefore, already prepared to accept the articles of Prague as the basis of the future negotiations. Frederick accompanied the Bohemian armies to the frontier of their country and acquired great popularity among the soldiers. He was at that time on very bad terms with the Emperor Sigismund. The first Elector of the house of Hohenzollern and the real founder of the greatness of Prussia, he seems almost to have foreseen the long antagonism of the Hohenzollerns and the Habsburgs, who were to succeed Sigismund—an antagonism that only ended on the battlefield of Sadova.
On February 21 the victorious Hussite armies re-entered Prague, where they were, of course, received with the greatest enthusiasm. A contemporary chronicler writes: “The Bohemians had never before carried out so brilliant a campaign ​in Meissen (Saxony); nor is there any man who remembers anything similar before, neither is anything such recorded in the chronicles. They numbered, as was commonly said, 40,000 men. Had they striven for glory like their ancestors they could have marched as far as the Rhine and have subdued many countries; but having obtained rich spoils they returned to Bohemia.” This day marks the climax of the glory of the Táborite arms. The decline followed it very closely; the former rigid discipline gradually disappeared; greed for plunder took the place of the former religious fervour and enthusiasm.
The Elector of Brandenburg soon found it difficult, or rather impossible, to obtain the Pope’s sanction for the negotiations with the Utraquists which he had planned. It was only the great defeat at Domážlice in the following year which at last induced Pope Martin to abandon his previous point of view, according to which discussions of Hus’ tenets were inadmissible, as they had already been condemned by the Council of Constance. The German princes also declined to take any part in the negotiations suggested by the Elector of Brandenburg, and Sigismund again protested against all conferences with heretics, now that it seemed improbable that they would turn to his personal advantage. The Elector reluctantly broke off all negotiations with the Bohemians, but before doing so he sent to Domážlice the sums of money which he and his allies had promised to the Bohemians on condition of their evacuating Germany. Prokop’s great winter campaign of 1429–1430 did not, however, prove entirely fruitless. Though the conferences at Boheimstein had led to no immediate result, yet the foundation of a future agreement had been laid there. There is little doubt that the Council of Basel in some respects considered the deliberations at Böheimstein as a precedent.
The brilliant campaign of the Bohemians in 1430 again attracted the attention of all Europe to their country. The ​Bohemian question then for the first time became a European one. The panic caused by the exploits of Prokop and his followers continued in Germany, where a new Hussite invasion was constantly dreaded. As has been frequently stated, the annals of Bohemia during this short but glorious period of its history are very scanty. It seems, however, certain that Prokop the Great returned to his country greatly exhausted by the fatigues of a long and arduous campaign, and that he rested for a short period. On April 4 we read of his presence in Prague, and it is known that shortly afterwards he proceeded with some of his followers to Domážlice to take over the indemnity which the German princes had agreed to pay to Bohemia. As comparative internal quiet then prevailed, and as the preparations for a new crusade—which, as the Bohemians knew, was being planned—proceeded but slowly, Prokop employed this period of respite for the purpose of defending his faith with his pen. It had not escaped him that the Bohemians were tired of incessant warfare and ready for peace if their enemies would accept the articles of Prague. On the other hand, he knew that the blind hatred of the Bohemians as “heretics” was not as general as it had been at the beginning of the war. The comparative moderation of the Hussites during their raids, when they indeed levied heavy contributions, but spared the lives of women and children, and often even received warriors as prisoners, had greatly impressed the minds of the people. The democratic spirit of the Hussites was also beginning to attract attention. Men could not but wonder that a citizen of Prague of modest birth and fortune should negotiate with princes and great territorial nobles. The German rulers began to fear that even ancient racial hatred might not be sufficient to prevent the Germans from joining the Bohemian fighters for freedom. Great agitation spread among the people. They said that they had been misled by the priests and abandoned by the princes and nobles, who had been unable to oppose the Slavic enthusiasts. This ​movement was not limited to the parts of Germany that are nearest to Bohemia. In the districts near the Rhine the peasants formed armed bands, which carried before them a banner with the portrait of Our Saviour, and raided the neighbouring country in every direction. It appeared as if an appeal of the Hussites would be sufficient to induce the whole German people to rise in arms against their princes.
Though this is a matter on which it is impossible to express a positive opinion, it appears that at this moment the religious views of the Hussites, and particularly of the Táborites, were beginning to find favour even in countries very distant from Bohemia. Some traces of this popular current appear even at the beginning of the Hussite wars. Monstrelet states that at a village near Douay some persons suspected of Hussite heresy were arrested and burnt. It was stated that some villages in the Dauphiné had sent subsidies to the Bohemians, and that revolutionary bands who were supposed to have some connection with the Hussites had appeared in the county of Forez, and had been exterminated by the Bailiff of Macon. The longer the war lasted the more the danger increased, particularly as in consequence of the slowness of the communications the news of the great Hussite victories only ​spread gradually in Western Europe. In a letter addressed to the Council of Basel by the Bishop of Arras on March 30, 1432, he writes that Bohemian heresies were spreading rapidly in his diocese. The penalties of heresy were then so terrible, and even the suspicion of not being a firm Roman Catholic so greatly endangered the life of him on whom such a suspicion fell, that we have naturally but very scanty information concerning the spreading of the Hussite doctrine in Western Europe. It is, however, probable that the cases mentioned above were by no means isolated.
These considerations undoubtedly influenced Prokop when he published in his own name and in that of some of his companions a manifesto addressed to the whole Christian world. This document, entitled “Epistola Procopii et aliorum Hussitarum honorabilibus, providis, honestis dominis, consulibus et toti communitati, divitibus et pauperibus,” attempts to justify the Hussites and very skilfully strives to create distrust of the Catholic clergy, whom the Hussites considered their most dangerous enemies. This manifesto was first published in 1430—Martène and Durand’s version has no date—and again in 1431. The two documents are, however, nearly identical. Prokop began by stating that there had for a long time been discord between the Bohemians and the Church of Rome, and that the Bohemians had been frequently attacked by the Roman Catholics. Yet, he continued, the partisans of Rome had never granted them a hearing nor heard from the mouths of the Bohemians what their doctrine was. This Prokop attributed to the influence of the clergy, who, by granting indulgences, excited the people to exterminate the Hussites. ​Prokop then referred to the executions of Hus and Jerome, the authors and advisers of which await God’s punishment. He then again complains that the Hussites were not allowed to expound their views, while Jesus Christ had even allowed the devil to address Him. The letter then formulates in sixteen “articles” the grievances of the Utraquists against the Church of Rome. Many grievances are here alluded to which have already been frequently mentioned in these pages. Great stress is laid on the poverty of the clergy—a point on which even moderate Utraquists agreed with the Táborites. The writer then affirms that many priests enter the Church without vocation and from lower motives. He then treats of the prayers for the dead. It is here interesting to note that these prayers are not absolutely condemned, a circumstance which proves that. even the Táborist, the most advanced party in the Bohemian Church, approached far less closely to modern Protestantism than has often been stated. It is, however, also maintained that no payment should be taken for such services. The letter next deals with the vexed question of vestments and the dress of priests generally. Prokop himself, differing in this respect from the priests of the Hussite High Church, who dressed like other Catholic priests, officiated in the clothes which he habitually wore, “a coat of coarse thick cloth.” He accused the Catholic priests of vanity, and wrote with disapproval of their “long tabards and other garments.” The letter then referred to the well-worn subject of the immorality of the clergy, a matter constantly discussed by ​mediæval writers—even by those who were firm adherents of the Church of Rome. On this subject Prokop wrote with a strong bias; like many priests of the Utraquist Church, he was a married man. It was further stated that the priests, to ingratiate themselves with the people, told them many tales (i. e. legends) which are not contained in Holy Scripture. The letter finally demanded the recognition of the articles of Prague.
The universal desire for peace, which was constantly growing stronger both in Bohemia and in Germany, manifested itself in a somewhat striking fashion towards the end of the year 1430. All parties believed that the only means of obtaining peace could be found in the convocation of a ecumenical council, though there were differences of opinion with regard to its constitution. The principal obstacle was Pope Martin V, to whom even the word “council” was obnoxious. Some German princes imagined a somewhat singular way of intimating to the Pope that the Christian world demanded that the Council, which it was proposed to hold at Basel, should meet as soon as possible. On November 8, 1430, the surprised Romans found that a somewhat lengthy document had—according to the custom of the time—been affixed to the gates of the papal palace. The authors, who stated that they were two illustrious princes, declared that, considering that innumerable persons had since the Council of Constance seceded from the militant Church, they forwarded the following statements to the Christian princes, as all Christian laymen as well as priests had the duty to defend the Christian faith. The conclusions or “articles,” to use the language of the period, declared that the Hussite heresy should be eradicated by a Council, as had been done on several occasions in the early Church. It was, therefore, necessary that the Pope should convoke a general Council not later than in March of the following year. Should the Pope without valid reason refuse to attend the Council, the Council might, in accordance with the powers given it by ​God, depose the Pope. It is impossible to state what princes were the authors of this strange manifesto, which largely influenced the convocation of the Council of Basel, and therefore indirectly the termination of the Hussite wars. Some writers have ascribed this document to the Archduke Albert of Austria. His lands had suffered severely through the Hussite incursions, and he also had a future claim to the Bohemian crown, as heir of his father-in-law Sigismund. Yet this conjecture appears very improbable, for the Archduke Albert fully shared that feeling of intense devotion to the papal see, which, with few exceptions, has influenced all the princes of his house from the time of Rudolph of Habsburg. The manifesto, on the other hand, though it strongly condemns the Hussites, is obviously the work of a member of the moderate, not of the intransigent party within the Church of Rome. Some Romans at the time believed the manifesto to have been drawn up by the Elector Frederick of Brandenburg and by his ​son-in-law, Duke Louis of Brieg, and most modern writers agree with this supposition. It has been pointed out that the wording of the manifesto recalls the statements contained in the documents drawn up by the Elector during the negotiations at Böheimstein. The Elector Frederick of Brandenburg has already been frequently mentioned in these pages. Of Duke Louis of Brieg, a Silesian prince, little is known. During the great invasion of Silesia he was said to have been somewhat half-hearted when opposing the Hussite attacks. It is, however, impossible to state with certainty who were the authors of the document.
This manifesto greatly impressed Pope Martin V. He at last consented to the meeting of a ecumenical council, whose members were to assemble at Basel in March 1431. Still, however, preferring to subdue the Hussites by the strength of the sword, he endeavoured by all means to accelerate the new crusade against Bohemia. To accentuate his point of view the Pope, on January 1, 1431, appointed Cardinal Julian Cesarini papal legate for Germany and entrusted him with the negotiations to expedite the crusade. Only on February 12, when he had already left Rome, the cardinal was also appointed president of the future Council. Though the Pope had reluctantly consented to the meeting of the Council, it is not likely that his life-long aversion to these assemblies—founded on the proceedings of the Council of Constance, which in his ​opinion had greatly limited the papal power—had suddenly disappeared. It was specially displeasing to him that a Council should negotiate with heretics. A victory in the coming campaign would, therefore, appear to him as a victory not only over the Hussites, but also over the Council. Had the Hussites been subdued by the strength of the sword it would become unnecessary to negotiate with them, and it was only to obtain peace that the German princes demanded the convocation of a Council. If this necessity disappeared it would be easy to dissolve the Council.
Before referring to this, the last, crusade against the Bohemians, it is necessary to consider the internal condition of Bohemia at this moment, and also to refer to the renewed negotiations between Bohemia and Poland. The intense dislike and distrust of ecumenical councils which Pope Martin entertained inspired him—as he now no longer expected much help from Sigismund and Germany—with the idea of seeking aid against Hussitism from the Polish nation. He had, therefore, before consenting to the convocation of the Council of Basel, entered into negotiations with Ladislas, King of Poland, and his cousin Vitold, Grand Duke of Lithuania. In a letter addressed to them on October 1, 1430, he begged the princes to undertake the task of either converting the heretics or destroying them. He gave them permission to negotiate with those who had deserted the Church and to grant them pardon, and he was even ready to consent to any concessions the princes might make, unless they were contrary to the faith and the regulations of the Church; should the Hussites, however, refuse to be converted, the princes were to destroy them in any manner possible, and they were not to consider themselves as bound by any previous promise, even if it had been confirmed by oath; for it was within the power of the Church to annul all promises; and every one could neglect his natural duties, to his father, son, brother, or other relation, and even commit parricide if this was to the advantage of the Catholic ​Church. This message, which must of course be judged according to the spirit of that time, was given to a special envoy, Brother Andrew of the Dominican Order.
When the papal envoy arrived at the end of his long journey, Vitold was already dead, but King Ladislas for a time earnestly attempted to bring about a reconciliation between the Hussites and the Church of Rome. His now well-known duplicity, however, caused him to be distrusted by all parties. It is probable that Prince Korybutovič—whose personality contrasts somewhat favourably with those of the other Polish and Lithuanian dignitaries of his time—suggested that some Bohemian generals and divines should be invited to Poland and should there hold a disputation with some Roman Catholic theologians. When Prokop, who was then engaged in warfare in Silesia, was informed of this proposal he avoided giving a definite answer, but deferred the matter to the Bohemian estates. They met at Kutna Hora on February 11, 1431. A new attempt to establish a provisional government was now made. Prince Korybutovič had been obliged to leave Bohemia, and though he had begun to take part in the border warfare, which continued on the frontiers of Bohemia, Silesia and Poland during the whole period of the Hussite wars, his partisans in Bohemia were not numerous. The notorious duplicity of his uncle, King Ladislas, who had expressed sympathy with Bohemia at a moment when he was plotting the ruin of that country in league with King Sigismund and Pope Martin, had naturally, though unjustly, caused the Bohemians to distrust Korybutovič. King Sigismund, whom many Bohemians, even Utraquists, would now have been ready to recognise as King, still persisted in demanding an unconditional surrender to Rome. Even the most moderate Utraquist noble could not accept this as a possible result of ten years of victorious warfare. Under these circumstances the only alternative to complete anarchy appeared to be the ​establishment of another provisional government. It was, therefore, decided to appoint twenty regents, chosen among the nobles, knights, squires (“zemane”), Praguers, Táborites, and Orphans. Immediately afterwards it was agreed to send representatives to Poland, who were to take part in the disputations which had been proposed. The leader of this embassy was Prokop the Great, who, since his victories of Ústi and Tachov and his triumphant campaign in Germany, had for a time become practically, though not formally, Dictator of Bohemia. Other priests who formed part of the mission were Frederick of Strašnice and Peter Payne. Among the lay members of the embassy the chroniclers mention Lord Kostka of Postupie and several town-councillors of Prague. The delegates first proceeded to the castle of Sleiwitz in Silesia, where Prince Korybutovič was then residing. From there they sent messengers to King Ladislas to inquire when and where the proposed disputation should take place. The message found the King at Cracow, and he immediately decided that the deliberations should begin there on March 18. The Bohemians immediately started for Cracow, accompanied by Prince Korybutovič and the Polish nobleman, Dobeslav Puchala, who had lately been fighting in Silesia on the side of the Hussites. Contrary to the then general custom on the occasion of theological disputations, only the Bohemian and the Polish languages were used during the discussions which now began. The Bohemians, as on previous occasions, wished to discuss and defend the articles of Prague. King Ladislas and the Polish Church dignitaries, however, declared that the Bohemians should obey the orders of the Pope. The discussion, as was inevitable, therefore remained resultless. The priests Prokop, Frederick, and Peter entirely refused to recognise the papal decrees as absolutely decisive, and Prokop maintained that the Utraquists formed part of the universal Church. King Ladislas himself addressed the Bohemian envoys in a courteous fashion, and reminded them of the great ​misfortunes which had befallen their country because of heresy. He specially admonished the Bohemian nobles to return to the fold of the Church of Rome, and endeavoured to persuade them to act independently of the other national parties. On April 4 King Ladislas, on the advice of his councillors, suggested to the Bohemians that they should sign a document stating that they would attend a ecumenical council of the Holy Roman Church, whether held at Basel or elsewhere. The document also contained the promise that the Bohemians would accept and observe indissolubly all the decisions of the Council. The Bohemians immediately declined to sign this document, whose contents, indeed, amounted to an unconditional surrender. The Hussites had demanded to appear on terms of equality at a council in which the whole Christian world was to be represented, and hoped that, should they be able to prove the truth of their tenets, the Council would accept them. The King of Poland now suggested a Council of the Roman Church, which was to be entirely under the direction of the Pope, and he demanded that they should, as erring sons, submit themselves unconditionally to this papal assembly—as the Hussites considered it. The desire for peace was, however, at that moment already so strong that the refusal was couched in very courteous language. The Bohemians begged the King of Poland to intercede in their favour, that they might obtain letters of safe conduct which would enable them to attend the Council; they also suggested that the negotiations begun at Cracow might be continued in Prague at the coming meeting of the estates, to which they begged the King of Poland to send representatives.
Though the Bohemians showed great moderation on this occasion there is no doubt that they left Cracow greatly disappointed and somewhat indignant. It was not the first, nor by any means the last, time that the Bohemians wrongly placed their trust in the kindred Polish nation. An incident which occurred during the stay of the Bohemians in Cracow ​also caused great irritation among them. The very zealous, but somewhat tactless, Bishop Zbynev of Cracow had decreed that all religious services in the town were to cease during the presence of the Hussite heretics. When during Easter week the Polish royal family wished to assist at the religious functions, the Bohemian envoys were requested to take up their residence in the suburb of Kaziměř, situated outside the city boundaries. The bishop obstinately insisted on this measure, though many of the King of Poland’s councillors disapproved of it. The chivalrous Prince Korybutovič declared that the Bohemians, whom he considered his guests, had been insulted, and sent to the bishop a letter “declaring his enmity to him.”
During the period which begins with the return of the Bohemian armies from Germany in the spring of 1430 and ends with the march of these armies to the frontier to oppose the crusade of 1431, the warfare on the frontiers never entirely ceased, but it had little influence on the general course of events. Probably as early as in March 1430, a large Bohemian force, consisting of 10,000 infantry and 1,200 horsemen, again invaded Silesia. Prokop himself, who was retained at Prague by deliberations that were then taking place there, took no part in this raid, of which it is unnecessary to give a detailed account. The Bohemians were joined by Prince Korybutovič, and with their help he obtained possession of the small Silesian principality of Sleiwitz, which has already been mentioned. In April of the same year another Bohemian army invaded Hungary. This army consisted of the soldiers of the Orphans and the levies of the New Town of Prague. Commanded by Velek Koudelnik and the priest Prokupek (Prokop the Lesser), they marched on the city of Tyrnau, where Sigismund was then residing. He was on the point of starting for Germany, intent on holding another of his numerous imperial ​diets. The King was obliged to send a messenger to Nürnberg, where the German princes were to meet, informing them that he was detained in Hungary by the attack of the Orphans. It was necessary to meet the enemies in the open field; but Sigismund, never a keen soldier, entrusted the command of the Hungarian army to Stibor, Duke of Transylvania, and John Matik of Telovec, a Hungarian magnate. The first attack of Stibor was so spirited that his horsemen penetrated into the wagon-entrenchment of the Hussites. Velek Koudelnik fell while endeavouring to defend his camp. The arrival of Bohemian reinforcements, however, obliged the Hungarians to retreat, particularly as their second army, under Matik, wrongly believing that their comrades had been defeated, had already begun to retire. The battle was, considering the small number of soldiers who were engaged, very bloody. The Bohemians lost 2,000 men, and the losses of the Hungarians amounted to 6,000 dead and wounded. The Hussites, as was their custom when waging offensive warfare, did not attempt to retain permanent possessions in foreign lands. Shortly after their victory at Tyrnau they returned to Moravia. These raids of smaller or larger Hussite bands into the neighbouring country continued during the summer and autumn of the year 1430. On December 21 the Orphans started on another foreign expedition, invading Lusatia, which had hitherto suffered less than the other neighbouring countries.
Immediately after the departure of the Bohemian envoys King Ladislas, on April 7, 1431, addressed a letter to King Sigismund informing him of the results of the disputation at Cracow and of his intention to be represented at the diet of Prague. He also begged him to consult the German princes as to the best way in which he could obtain letters of safe conduct for the Hussite leaders who wished to attend the Council. Before this letter reached Sigismund, who had now arrived at Nürnberg, he had already received secret com​munications from some Bohemian nobles favourable to his cause. They had advised him also to send representatives to the diet of Prague. The King readily consented. He was above all things anxious to terminate the struggle with the Hussites. The Hussite wars have so great an importance in the world’s history that it is difficult to realise how largely Sigismund was, during this period, occupied with other matters, which even to the historian now appear unimportant. At this moment the King of Hungary was principally interested in the expedition to Italy which he had planned. He hoped to be there crowned as Emperor by the Pope, and he had already sent in advance some of his soldiers to Southern Germany along the road by which he intended to enter Italy. The fact that the Germans had recently frequently fled at the mere approach of the Hussites—and this applies not only to some of the larger battles, but also to many smaller engagements which it has not been possible to mention here—naturally rendered Sigismund reluctant to attempt a new crusade. He therefore gladly agreed to the suggestion of his adherents and appointed the Burgrave of the Karlštýn Zdislav of Buřenic and Nicholas Lobkowitz of Hasištýn his representatives at Prague. The regents chosen in the previous year had decreed that the diet should meet at Prague on May 1, 1431. They had also wisely settled that some time previously the Táborite divines and those representing the moderate Utraquists should meet for the purpose of exchanging their views, and if possible arriving at an understanding. The regents thoroughly understood that it would be necessary that all members of the Bohemian Church should formulate their tenets in an identical manner. They thought—rightly, as events proved—that any appearance of disunion among the Hussites would be very advantageous to their antagonists. Somewhat later than had been intended, on April 30, the Bohemian divines, representatives of the moderate Utraquists (the so-called “Praguers”), the Táborites, and Orphans met at the university college ​known as the Carolinum. Master John of Rokycan spoke first, in the name of the Praguers. Most of Rokycan’s grievances referred to matters which had already been frequently discussed. He said that the Táborites, who did not recognise the validity of some of the sacraments, reviled those who used them, that they did not pray for the souls of the dead and dissuaded others from doing so. He maintained that they did not sufficiently honour the holy hierarchy, the angels and saints, and the Virgin Mary, that they did not observe the fast-days which had been established at an early period of Christianity, and that they did not prevent the faithful from engaging in warfare not waged in defence of the law of God. Some of the Táborite priests, Rokycan continued, had exercised functions of secular government (“secularis dominii”), and the Táborites had entirely abandoned the use of vestments when celebrating mass; they had omitted to make the sign of the cross during mass, as well as to add water to the wine during mass, and they had been guilty of other irregularities.
Judging of Rokycan’s own views by the objections he raised to the teaching of the Táborites, it appears clear that these views were in many respects closely connected with the tenets of the Roman Catholic Church. Yet it must be remembered that Rokycan cannot be rightly considered a thorough member of the Hussite High Church. At the moment of the rising of the people of Prague against Korybutovič he had even been one of those who demanded the expulsion of Přibram, Mladenovič, and other High-Churchmen.
The Taborites immediately replied on all the points raised by Rokycan. They said that they recognised six sacraments. They denied that the sacrament of extreme unction had been established by Jesus Christ, but they raised no objection to the practice of administering extreme unction to sick or dying men if they desired it. As to the prayers for the dead the ​Táborites objected to them, as they found in Scripture no positive statement affirming the existence of purgatory nor any injunction to pray for the dead; they also stated that these prayers often caused simony to be committed. They disapproved of prayers to the saints, but declared that their memory should be honoured and respected. The Táborites did not disapprove of fasting, but said that every Christian should himself determine when to do so; he should, however, when doing this take into consideration the times mentioned in the Old and New Testaments as specially suitable for fasting. The answer of the Táborites to Rokycan’s rather unfair accusation of favouring bloodshed and warfare was appropriate and dignified. They declared that originally none of those whom the teaching of Master John Hus had converted had any intention to fight. “But,” they continued, “when our opponents began to use violent means against us, then our whole nation, which did not wish to abandon the good cause and turn away from the Catholic Church, out of necessity began to go to war, and all the priests and masters of Prague unanimously agreed to this.” The Táborites further stated that they could not condemn wars forced on them by necessity, and that such a necessity still existed. They were ready immediately to abandon warfare if the enemies would tread the path of truth and justice, and they had always preferred to employ spiritual warfare, that is, prayer and mild persuasion, for the purpose of leading the enemy to concord and agreement. They could not prevent many who had evil intentions from joining their armies, but they deeply regretted it, and had issued severe regulations to maintain order in their camps. With regard to Rokycan’s statement that Táborite priests had assumed the duties of secular government, the Táborites declared that they had decreed at their convocations that no priest or person who had received the higher orders should ​engage in temporal affairs; yet as there were improvident and careless laymen, they would not judge or condemn a priest who, inspired by the Divine Spirit, established peace and order among secular men, thus assuming functions which laymen had proved incapable of exercising. They were also sure that there were no priests among them who would not gladly renounce such functions if it were possible for them to do so. With regard to the use of vestments, the last point which Rokycan had raised, the Táborites maintained the views which they had previously held. They said that concerning mass and Communion, certain matters were essential, these were the necessary materials, bread and wine, the ritual words at the moment of consecration, and the presence of a lawfully ordained priest, who had the intention of celebrating mass; other matters—and this referred specially to the vestments of the priests—could be observed or neglected without incurring sin in either case. The priests of the Orphans then expounded their views, which were intermediate between those of the Praguers and those of the Táborites. Their statements, however, appear to have been considered unimportant, and are hardly mentioned by the contemporary writers. When reading the authentic statements expounding the views of the different Hussite parties, it is impossible not to be struck by the comparative moderation of the opinions expressed. It is certain that the Hussite parties, intending to appear jointly before the universal council of the Church, endeavoured to attenuate the differences which existed between them as to matters of ritual and doctrine. It is also certain that during the whole period of the Hussite wars there were many fanatics holding views that differed widely from those recorded above. Yet every Bohemian, to whatever branch of Christianity he ​may belong, is justified in objecting to the statements of those writers who—from political rather than from religious motives—describe lengthily the deeds and words of sometimes crazy fanatics, but ignore the teaching of what was for a long time the dominant Church in Bohemia.
The meeting of the Bohemian diet took place immediately after the disputations in the Carolinum. The King of Poland and King Sigismund had both sent representatives. The proceedings were of short duration, and turned principally on the question whether the Bohemians should accept the invitation of Sigismund, who had asked them to send representatives to Cheb, where the conditions of the coming Council were to be again discussed. The Bohemians were at this moment better disposed to Sigismund than to the King of Poland. The conflict between Pope Eugenius IV—Pope Martin had died on February 20—and the Council, which began to assemble at Basel in the spring of 1431, had an indirect but not inconsiderable influence on the course of events in Bohemia. Sigismund was at that moment considered an upholder of the authority of ecumenical councils, which moderate men even in Bohemia were inclined to recognise. The King of Poland then was, or pretended to be, an unconditional supporter of Pope Eugenius. Though there was some opposition on the part of the Orphans, who cherished their hatred of Sigismund as a legacy of their dead leader, the Bohemians decided to send representatives to Cheb. As had become customary, Utraquist nobles with representatives of the communities of Tábor and of the Orphans and delegates of the cities of Prague composed the new embassy. Prokop did not form part of it. He joined the Hussite army, that was then carrying on guerilla warfare in Silesia, and undoubtedly wished at this important moment to bring pressure on the enemies and convey to them that the negotiations had not yet advanced sufficiently to render the conclusion of an armistice possible.
The negotiations which began at Cheb on May 24 were ​similar in character to those at Pressburg and Cracow and equally resultless. The principal speaker on the national side was Lord Kostka of Postupic, who had already taken part in several similar discussions. The Bohemians again demanded that the Council in which they were to take part should be a truly ecumenical one, to which members of the Greek and the Oriental Churches should be admitted. Sigismund, who was present at Cheb accompanied by many German princes, rejected this proposal, which, indeed, he considered ridiculous The King then suggested that the Hussites should leave to the Council the final decision as to what was true Scriptural doctrine. The Hussites replied that they would die rather than submit unconditionally to the Council, and they also rejected Sigismund’s proposal that an armistice should be concluded which was to last during the time in which the Council continued its deliberations. This concluded the negotiations, and the Bohemian envoys hurriedly returned to Prague, where they cailed on their countrymen to be ready to resist an immediate German invasion.
Sigismund had in August 1430 returned to Germany after an absence of nearly eight years. It was now his duty to superintend the organisation of a new crusade. He did this reluctantly, remembering the failure of previous expeditions, yet it appears that from the time when he had received Prokop at Pressburg he had been planning a new invasion of Bohemia. In February 1431 the German princes began to assemble at Nürnberg, where the long-deferred imperial diet was to meet. The festivities on this occasion were very brilliant, and the German princes attended in large numbers. As soon, however, as the serious deliberation began great difficulties arose. The free so-called “imperial” cities possessed great ​privileges, and had formerly been favoured by Sigismund. Influenced probably by the Suabian nobles the King now took up an attitude very hostile to these miniature republics. When the question of the levies and financial grants which were required for the new crusade arose, these cities, therefore, proved more reluctant than on any previous occasion. While these discussions affecting the private interests of various German princes and cities were being carried on with great acrimony the papal legate, Cardinal Cesarini, arrived at Nürnberg on March 4. His religious enthusiasm greatly contrasted with the indifference and egoism of the German princes. He appeared before the diet and stated that he had been sent by the Pope to further the coming crusade by word and by deed. When shortly afterwards the proceedings at Nürnberg terminated and Sigismund proceeded to Cheb, as already mentioned, Cardinal Cesarini repaired to Germany and the Netherlands, calling on all faithful Christians to take part in the holy war. It is evident that at this moment the papal see was more intent on the result of the coming crusade than on the meeting of the Council. Though Cesarini had been appointed papal representative at the Council he avoided visiting Basel, skilfully explaining his absence by the fact that he had not yet received instructions from the new Pope, Eugenius IV. The papal see no doubt thought that should the new warlike enterprise prove successful Hussitism could be exterminated, and negotiations with the Hussites would become unnecessary; in that case it would be well to close the Council as soon as possible. The cardinal first visited Würzburg and Frankfort, and then visited several princes in the lands situated near the Rhine. He received promises of aid from the Elector Palatine, the Duke of Burgundy, the town of Köln, and the Bishop of Lièges, and then returned to Nürnberg, greatly pleased with the results of his mission. He was here, however, to meet with ​a great disappointment. The incessant bitter feuds among the German princes and free cities continued as usual during the year 1431, and even the princes who had just promised their aid to Cardinal Julian forgot Bohemia as soon as he had left them and again engaged in civil warfare. Thus the Duke of Burgundy took part in the contest for the succession to the duchy of Lorraine, and several other German princes aided each of the two rival claimants to the succession to the duchy. Internal warfare also began between two rival candidates to the archbishopric of Trier, anda feud broke out between the Archbishop of Magdeburg and the citizens of that town. These were the principal, though not the only, feuds raging in Germany during the year 1431. Though the diet had decreed that the crusaders should start on their march in spring, it was only on June 26 that King Sigismund appointed Frederick, Elector of Brandenburg, commander-in-chief. On July 1 Cardinal Cesarini issued a proclamation in which he called on all Germans to start immediately on the crusade. About this time numerous German soldiers began to march through Nürnberg on their way to the Bohemian frontier. Cesarini, who had no knowledge of military matters, believed them to be far more numerous than was actually the case. Feeling, therefore, very confident, he addressed a proclamation to the people of Bohemia and Moravia, calling on them to submit at last to the papal authority, and promising them peace and quiet should they do so. The cardinal then, as was so often done during the Hussite wars, appealed to the Bohemian nobles, calling on them not to submit to the arrogance of heretical townsmen and peasants. At the same time King Sigismund also published a proclamation throwing on the Hussites the full responsibility for the rupture of the recent negotiations at Cheb, and protesting against the accusation that he was invading Bohemia to burn the cities, ravage the country, and murder women and children. In answer to these proclamations the united Utraquists on July 21 pub​lished a manifesto addressed to the whole Christian world. It began by again enumerating the articles of Prague, and strongly maintained that the Utraquists had always been favourable to a peaceful agreement and had proved this by taking part in the negotiations at Pressburg, Cracow, and Cheb. They, however, strongly protested against the attempt of the Roman Church to assume in the place of Jesus Christ the position of supreme arbitrator on the question of true Christianity. They then drew a contrast, worded in very bitter words, between the life of the Apostles and that of the pontiffs of the period. The bitter hatred of the Roman priesthood and the striving for a return to the primitive Church, so characteristic of the Hussite movement, appear very clearly in this interesting document.
On July 7 Cardinal Cesarini left Nürnberg and proceeded as far as the town of Weiden, where part of the army had already assembled. The crusaders, from motives which it is difficult to fathom, remained near this town up to the end of July. New levies gradually joined them, but by no means to as great an extent as had been hoped. The long delay at Weiden, as was inevitable, slackened the discipline in the German army, and the usual discord arose among the princes. Some princes began to suggest that the campaign should be abandoned and that the Council, which had already begun its sittings at Basel, should be called on to negotiate a pacific agreement with the Bohemians. The enthusiastic Cardinal Cesarini violently opposed these proposals, and urgently demanded an immediate advance. Some German writers ​have recently, not quite unjustly, accused the cardinal of being the cause of one of the most disgraceful defeats which any German army ever suffered.
It has already been stated that the Bohemian envoys, on returning from their fruitless mission to Cheb, had informed their countrymen that they must expect an immediate new attack of the Germans. With a rapidity and energy that contrast strangely with the attitude of the Germans, who had for two years been deliberating on the plan of this campaign, Prokop immediately gave the necessary orders to concentrate his troops and move them in the direction of the menaced frontier. All the troops in Silesia marched to Prague, leaving only small garrisons in some Silesian cities. In a letter addressed to the nobles of Moravia, Prokop and the other Táborite captains called on them to march to the district of Plzeň with as large force as they could muster, “as the King of Hungary had assembled many foreigners to fight against God’s truth and for the destruction of the inhabitants of Bohemia and Moravia who believed in God’s truth. The Moravians readily responded to the call; we find among those who hurriedly marched into Bohemia the names of two of the greatest Moravian nobles, Lord John of Tovačovský and Lord Lacek of Sternberg. The Utraquist nobles of Bohemia did not at this moment show as great a zeal for the Utraquist cause as on former occasions. The strong distrust, soon amounting to hatred, of the advanced parties which the Bohemian nobles felt, and which finally caused the downfall of Bohemia, was already very evident. Though a considerable number of Bohemian nobles sent their retainers to join the Táborite ​forces, only Lord Hanuš of Kolowrat is mentioned as having, somewhat reluctantly, taken a personal part in this campaign. The Táborite army was, however, joined by large forces sent by the cities of Prague and many other Bohemian towns, and a large Polish contingent led by Prince Korybutovič also came to the aid of the Bohemians in this moment of peril. The forces of the Hussites in this their last battle against a foreign foe were greater than on any previous occasion. The Bohemian army first marched to Plzeň, and after an unsuccessful attempt to obtain possession of that stronghold continued its march to the Bavarian frontier ready to give battle immediately. The crusaders, however, remained at Weiden on the Bavarian frontier without attempting to cross the hills of the Šumava (Bohemian forest). The districts of Western Bohemia had during the last ten years been the scene of almost incessant warfare, and had been thoroughly devastated. The Hussites soon found it impossible to provision a large army in these regions. Prokop the Great, anxious to prove the conciliatory attitude of his party, made another attempt to negotiate with the King of Hungary, which, however, again failed. The Hussite leaders then immediately decided to evacuate for the moment this exhausted district and to retire into the interior of their country. The crusaders, as usually, entirely uninformed of the doings in the enemies’ camp, concluded that the Bohemians had given up all hope of offering resistance in the open field. On August 1 they at last crossed the Bohemian frontier and marched on the small town of Tachov, which had played a considerable part in a previous campaign. The Elector of Brandenburg, who was commander-in-chief, was accompanied by Cardinal Cesarini, the Archbishop of Köln, the Duke of Bavaria, and the Count Palatine Stephen. Though some of the promised reinforcements were not forthcoming a considerable number of new crusaders joined the invading army about the time at which it crossed the frontier. According to the most reliable calculations the whole ​force—including the numerous camp-followers—amounted to about 100,000 men. Instead of advancing immediately the vast army remained for some time close to the Bavarian frontier. The terror then inspired by the Bohemian name was so great that the crusaders probably thought it more prudent to await the results of the movements of the Archduke of Austria and the Silesian princes, who were to create diversions by attacking Bohemia from their territories. Contrary to the judicious advice of Cardinal Julian, a week was spent in besieging the town of Tachov. The attempt to capture Tachov failed, and on August 8 the army continued its march, following at first the direct road to Plzeň, and then turning southward in the direction of Domážlice. Both on this march and during the siege of Tachov the crusaders plundered and devastated the surrounding country to an extent unrivalled even in the bloody annals of the Hussite wars. The entire population was murdered, irrespective of their religious creed. The crusaders were undoubtedly determined to extirpate entirely the Slavic-Bohemian race.
The Hussites, who had only retired from the frontier because of the difficulty of provisioning their large army in an exhausted country, had meanwhile rallied their forces near the Karlštýn fortress, and, probably well aware of the indiscipline and licence which prevailed among the crusaders, now immediately marched on Domážlice. When the Elector Frederick was, on the morning of August 14, informed of the approach of the Bohemian armies, he immediately determined to await their attack in a defensive position and also to prepare for a retreat which, he thought, might possibly be necessary. He therefore gave orders that all the transport-wagons and impedimenta generally should be immediately conveyed to the rear. This measure, though undoubtedly justified by the circumstances, ​yet caused great alarm among the Germans, who had on previous occasions distrusted the Elector’s conduct. He had issued this order without informing either the cardinal or the German princes of it. When, at about three o’clock in the afternoon, the cardinal, accompanied by the Elector of Saxony and several other German princes, rode up to the summit of a hill which overlooked the road by which the Bohemians were advancing, he was naturally astounded at seeing the long columns of provision-wagons that were being hurriedly driven off in the opposite direction, that of the German frontier. Though the Hussites were not yet even in sight, many wagons had already thrown off their loads to hasten their retreat. Matters, of course, became much worse when the advancing Bohemian columns were seen and the war-song “All ye warriors of God,” which the nationalists intoned, reached the ears of the crusaders. No resistance was even attempted, and before a single shot had been fired the whole German army, seized by a sudden panic, fled in the greatest disorder in the direction of the mountain passes which divide Bohemia from Bavaria. All discipline soon ceased, and in the narrow roads that lead to the frontier fierce struggles took place among the crusaders and particularly the wagon-drivers, each of whom tried to outstrip the others. A small number of crusaders, among whom were some Italian troopers who formed the body-guard of the cardinal, attempted to arrest the advance of the Bohemians, who, this time well provided with cavalry, sharply pursued the flying Germans. Cardinal Cesarini, who at first attempted to remonstrate with the flyers, was soon obliged to take part in the general flight. The German soldiers, most of whom had very reluctantly taken part in the campaign, were infuriated against the foreign priest as the cause of this disaster, and they threatened his life. He was at last obliged to fly in disguise, not from the Hussites, but from the crusaders. During the retreat through the mountain-passes the losses of ​the Germans were enormous, and almost all their artillery and baggage were captured by the Hussites.
* ↑ He must, of course, not be confounded with Prokop the Great, or Prokop the Lesser.
* ↑ Bartošek of Drahonic writes (p. 598 of Professor Goll’s edition: “[The Hussites] civitatem Prespurk suburbium excremaverunt, deinde ante Wiennam processerunt, sed illuc per Danubium venire non valentes ex ista parte in Austria per voraginem ignis magnum monumentum fecerunt.” It may be considered as certain that this statement, corroborated by no other contemporary writer, is untrue.
* ↑ Or rather Ruthenian; the chroniclers of the fifteenth century took little notice of these distinctions that have become so important in the present day.
* ↑ Very valuable information concerning this invasion of Silesia is contained in the so-called “Strehlener Fragment” (published in Grünhagen’s Geschichtsquellen, etc., pp. 155–158).
* ↑ Up to the time of Frederick the Great the county of Glatz formed an immediate part of the kingdom of Bohemia, and did not form part of Silesia.
* ↑ “Porro vero admiramur vehementer de hominibus vestris et presertim nobilibus quos fama bellicos et ad bella doctos et audaces ubique in orbe terrarum perstrepuit, qualiter circa defensionem dominorum suorum et fame sue dilatationem ampliorem tam desides et leves se ostenderunt et ubi resistere potuerunt, cur fuerunt negligentes? Habentes enim loca, castra et civitates tam munita et fortia, potuerunt hostes a se repellere, sed in ipsis nec minima resistentia est reperta. Ecce quomodo Glogoviam [Ober-Glogau] quomodo Bregam civitates ubi populum habuerunt numerosum se juvantem absque necessitate et gravi offensa hostibus reliquerunt et soli se in fugam converterunt. Adhuc muri et castrorum presidia construuntur ut hostibus resistatur ex eisdem et periculis et incommodis non parcatur. Nam bona et virilis nobilium conditio sub sepibus defendere se consuevit et castra sepe mulierum vetularum fragilitate defensa audivimus. Si enim cum ipsis campum belli portare grave fuisset saltem furit circa flumina et castra resistendum. Re vera qua talis concussit pusillanimitas ut suorum dominorum et principum defensioni non intenderunt et tot dampna fieri permiserunt non absque pudore reputemus.” (This interesting letter is published by Grünhagen, Geschichtsquellen der Hussitenkriege, pp. 60–61.)
* ↑ Die Hussitenkämpfe der Schlesier, p. 140.
* ↑ Reinerz has now become a small but fashionable watering-place.
* ↑ Palacký, Geschichte von Böhmen, Vol. II. ii. p. 473 of German edition.
* ↑ “Anno eodem videlicet MCCCCXXIX presbyter Procopius et secta Taboriensium commisso castro Bechina Johanni dicto Bleh se cum comitatu suo versus et in Austriam transsumpsit et equitavit, ibique Dominus Menhart de Nova domo [Neuhaus, Jindřichův Hradec] cum aliis baronibus Boemiæ et Moraviæ se interposuerunt et ipsum presbyterum Procopium cum serenissimo domino Sigismundo . . . ad terminum et tractatus conduxit, qui in civitatem Prespurk . . . convenerunt” (Bartošek of Drahonic, p. 599).
* ↑ “Quod Gratia Vestra una cum filio Vestro, duce Austrie disponeret quod castra que in Bohemia et Moravia tenetis, se nobiscum unirent et ad veritates Dei accederent et quod super illo vellemus nos cum Gratia Vestra et filio Vestro pacificare ad certum tempus.” (Deutsche Zeitschrift fur Geschichtswissenschaft, Vol. V. p. 370, quoted by Dr. Neubauer.)
* ↑ Or language. The word “jazyk” has both significations in Bohemian.
* ↑ The ancient chroniclers write: “This year [1429] there was a great assembly of the Bohemian nation in Prague (of) lords, knights, gentry [“zemane”], Taborites, Orphans, and citizens. They met in the house of the masters of the great college [the Carolinum] and debated as to how they could come to an agreement with King Sigismund of Hungary, and receive him as their Lord and the hereditary sovereign of the land. All agreed to this except Valek Koudelnik, captain of the Orphans. He and the citizens of the New Town [of Prague] would not consent to it, and opposed it” (“Scriptores rerum Bohemicarum,” Vol. III. p. 76).
* ↑ Professor Goll writes: “Prakop had no objection to the accession of Sigismund, should he conform to the teaching of the Hussite Church. . . . It appeared clearly that he had not preserved that implacable hatred of Sigismund which we find in Žižka, and which the Orphans preserved as his inheritance.” Cěchy a Prusy (Bohemia and Prussia), p. 179.
* ↑ I have printed part of this letter in my Bohemia, a Historical Sketch, p. 152 n. 1.
* ↑ I may perhaps be allowed to quote here my own words—contained in Master John Hus, p. 21—“Hus himself frequently protested against the suggestion that he was responsible for all the statements made by Wycliffe, and shortly after the death of the Bohemian Church-reformer, a controversy on this subject arose. . . . John of Přibram, an intimate friend of Hus, wrote: ‘It is well known to many that when preaching Master John Hus said that he would not defend any error of Wycliffe, or of anyone else. He also preached: “If Wycliffe is in heaven, may he pray to God for us; if he is in purgatory, may God help him; if he is in hell the Lord be blessed.” Also in Constance before his death Hus said openly before all: “Why do you blame me because of Wycliffe? What concern is it of mine? For neither was Wycliffe a Bohemian, nor was he my father; he was an Englishman; therefore if he wrote errors, let the English answer for them.”’”
* ↑ “Die Wycliffitisch-symbolische Auffassung” (Hussiten und Taboriten, p. 85).
* ↑ This letter is so characteristic of Prokop that I will quote part of it. He wrote: “Mane in sententia Salvatoris et ejus Apostoli (scilicet panem materialem remanere asseverantium) et statim erit pax inter nos et te, et alias non. Et noli attendere verba vel sensus eorum de quibus propheta loquitur: Narraverunt iniqui fabulationes, sed non ut lex tua. Sin autem illud nolueris facere, scito quod contra te intendo pro posse clamare et omnibus modis licitis insurgere. Et videbis quod veritas Domini vincet te una cum doctoribus. Jam enim eos judicat in illis quæ pertinaciter contra ipsam dixerunt vel scripserunt. Et væ illis si non pœnituerint. Et ideo doctores nolo habere pro (ut tu scribis) Dei legis judices, sed opto ut lex judicet doctores” (Cochlæus, Hist. Hussit. p. 226).
* ↑ Bartošek of Drahonic, p. 600, and “Scriptores rerum Bohemicarum,” Vol. III. p. 79.
* ↑ “Wir haben auch unter einander [the Elector and the Hussites] Rede gehabt von eines gütlichen unverbundenen Tages wegen gegen Nürnberg zu kommen auf St. Georgs Tag [April 23], dazu man aus den sechs [Church] Provinzen dieser Lande doctores und gelehrte Leute bringen soll, nicht von dem Glauben zu disputiren, sondern unverbindlich und gütlich mit davon zu reden . . . möchte aber dass nicht sein dass man gedächte nach Rathe etlich andere Wege zu erdenken und fürzunehmen, damit solche Sachen zu ganzem Ende kämen.” (Letter of Frederick to the other Electors. Bezold, König Sigismund und die Reichskriege gegen die Hussiten, Vol. III. pp. 169–171). I have somewhat modernised the difficult German of the original.
* ↑ . . . Treugamus et assecuramus . . . ut possitis libere et secure ad nos versus Nurbergensem civitatem venire et in eadem demorari, ibique in concilio articulos quatuor, per quorum claritate instatis oretenus aut in scriptis offere aut propallare, scripturis sacris beatorumque doctorum verbis et sentenciis eos declarare, astruere et persuadere” (Bězold, as above, Vol. III. pp 171–174).
* ↑ “Scriptores rerum Bohemicarum,” Vol. III p. 79.
* ↑ Professor Droysen has very eloquently described the condition of Germany at this period; the passage is unfortunately too long to be quoted in its entirety: “Schon begann,” he writes, “die wilde Gährung die die Massen in so vielen Städten ergriffen auch beim Landvolk einzureissen: sie seien von den Pfaffen betrogen, von ihren Herrschaften preisgegeben. Und nicht bloss in den zunächst an Böhmen gelegenen Gegenden; am Rheine traten die armen Leute zu ‘Bauernschaften’ zusammen unter gewählten Hauptleuten, und eigenem Banner mit dem Bilde des gekreuzigten Heilandes, begannen nach Hussitenart umherzuziehen, wagten sich selbst an Worms, forderten die Auslieferung der Pfaffen und Juden. . . . War es noch möglich sich über die unermessliche Gefahr in der Deutschland stand zu täuschen? Nur eines Aufrufes daherziehender Hussitenhaufen schien es zu bedürfen um die Masse des deutschen Volkes zu entfesseln” (Geschichte der preussischen Politik, Vol. I. p. 382. Leipzig, 1868).
* ↑ “Et d’austre part furent trouvez en l’an dessudit [1420] plusieurs hommes et femmes tenans ladicte hérésie [Hussitism] et faisant leur concile ensemble, en un village près Douay nommé Sains, dedans lequel ilz furent trouvez et menez prisonniers à la court de l’evesque d’Arras” (Monstrelet, Vol. IV. chap. cclix).
* ↑ Noël Valois, Le Pape et le concile (1418–1450), Vol. I. p. 154.
* ↑ “Pullulant in dies in dyocesi ista hæreses et zizania Bohemorum, quibus nisi viriliter restitissem cum coadjutoribus, et modo jugiter vigilias gregis custodirem, in agro Domini non frumentum veritatis, sed infelix lolium doctrine erronee germinasset” (Quoted by Noël Valois, as above, Vol. I. p. 158).
* ↑ “De hoc miramur valde quod vos papæ et omni suo sacerdotio tantum confiditis et creditis qui vobis dant venenosum cœtum, alias dant intelligibile consulamen in eo, quod episcopi vobis dicunt, remissionem omnium vestrorum peccatorum. Contribuunt propter hoc ut vos debellare debeatis contra nos et nos depopulare” (Martène et Durand, “Veterum Scriptorum et monumentorum amplissima,’’ Coll. VIII. p. 19.)
* ↑ “Christus tamen audivit diabolum ut habetur Matth. cap. 10. Et ipsi [the Roman Catholic priests] non sunt meliores Christo, nec nos pejores diabolo” (Martène et Durand, as above, VIII. pp. 19–20).
* ↑ “Propter vitam otiosam et bene comedere et bibere et ut honorentur et venerentur super terram” (Marténe et Durand, as above, VIII. p. 20).
* ↑ “Quia si vellent orare pro mortuis et animarum missas legere . . . tamen nullum munus propter hoc capere debent, neque magnum, neque parvum” (Martène et Durand, as above, VIII. p. 20.)
* ↑ The contents of this strange proclamation are contained in a letter addressed to the chancellor of the Duke of Burgundy by a Roman correspondent. It is entitled “Conclusiones positæ in valvis palatii principis apostolorum Mercurii, VIII Novembris MCCCCXXX. I. Prima conclusio. Fides catholica adeo est privilegiata quod est omni homini præferenda . . . II. Secunda conclusio. Nedum ecclesiastici verum et sæculares, et maxime principes . . . adstricti sunt fidem Christianam defensare, aliter alieni a fide censendi sunt. III. Tertia conclusio. Sicut hæreses Novatiani, Arii, Sabelli, Macedonii, Nestorii et aliorum hæreticorum per generalia concilia exsufflatæ fuerunt: ita necesse est pro eradicatione hæresis Hussitarum concilium de mense proximo Martii inevitabiliter celebrare. IV. Quarta conclusio. Cum celebratio concilii generalis sit medium necessarium extirpandi dictam hæresin quisquis Christianus. . . . obnoxius est promovere . . . celebrationem concilii generalis fiendam dicto tempore. V. Ubi papa vel cardinales desistant promovere aut velint impedire celebrationem concilii generalis dicto tempore fautores hæresis sunt censendi. VI. Sixta conclusio. Ubi papa in proximo mense Martii concilium generale . . . non incipiat quod præsentas tunc in concilio jure divino sicut sunt obnoxii ei primo obedientiam nomine totius Christianitatis subtrahere, et omnes Christicolæ tenentur præsentibus in concilio generali parere. VII. Si appareat papam et cardinales nolle promovere concilium . . . ex potestate concilio data a Deo, concilium contra non promoventes tenebitur procedere ad illius vel illorum privationem et depositionem . . . et alias pœnas a jure statutas contra fautores hæresis.—Marténe et Durand, as above, VIII. pp. 48–49.
* ↑ By Dr. v. Bezold, König Sigmund und die Reichskriege, etc., Vol. III. p. 86.
* ↑ He was accused of having surrendered the town of Brieg to the Hussites without resistance, and even of having a secret agreement with them (Grünhagen, Hussitenkämpfe, etc., pp. 137–139).
* ↑ At a period when accusations against unworthy priests play so large a part in history, it is well to note the truly saintly nature of Cesarini. Dr. Pastor (Geschichte der Päbste, Vol. I. pp. 203–204) writes: “Von seiner [Cesarini’s] Sittenreinheit und Frömmigkeit kann Vespasiano da Bisticci kaum genug Lobenswerthes erzählen. Der Cardinal . . . schlief stets in einem härenen Busshemde, fastete jeden Freitag bei Wasser und Brod. . . . Nie kam mehr als ein Gericht auf seinen Tisch, der Wein den er trank war gefärbtes Wasser. . . . ‘Ich habe sehr viele heiligmässige Männer kennen gelernt,’ ruft der ehrliche Vespasiano da Bisticci aus, ‘aber unter ihnen keinen der dem Cardinal Cesarini gleiche; seit fünfhundert Jahren hat die Kirche keinen solchen Mann gesehen.’”
* ↑ Tomek, History of the Town of Prague, Vol. IV. p. 476.
* ↑ See Professor Goll, Cěchy a Prusy (Bohemia and Prussia), p. 220.
* ↑ This in the language of chivalry signified a challenge to single combat; there was nothing unusual in such a challenge at a period when bishops were warriors as well as dignitaries of the Church.
* ↑ This is noteworthy, as many German Lutheran writers have stated that the Táborites recognised only two sacraments.
* ↑ This is, of course, to be understood in the Hussite sense of the word; they always maintained that they belonged to the Catholic Church.
* ↑ I have founded my account of these discussions on the “Chronicon Taboritarum” (Höfler, Geschichtsschreiber, etc., Vol. II. pp. 475–480).
* ↑ “The Orphans on some points agreed with the masters of Prague, on others opposed them in union with the Táborites” (“Scriptores rerum Bohemicarum,” Vol. III. p. 80).
* ↑ “Subjunxerunt etiam [the Hussites] quod in hujusmodi concilio totius Christianitatis etiam Indi, Græci, Armeni, schismatici et breviter omnes Christum confitentes interesse deberent et plura alia quæ ad scribendum magis ridiculosa quam utilia forent” (Palacký, Urkundliche Beiträge, Vol. II. pp. 209–214.)
* ↑ The lengthy deliberations of the diet of Nürnberg are well described in Dr. v. Bezold’s König Sigmund und die Reichskriege, etc., Vol. III.
* ↑ “. . . sensate, attendite, obsecramus universi et singuli Christifideles, si isti episcopi sedes Apostolorum juste ac digne occupant, qui illis vita et moribus totaliter adversantur. Illi quippe per orbem terrarum pannosi et contempti a populo migrantes, veritates dominicas cunctis populis tribubus et linguis fideliter nunciarunt, easdem propria morte firmantes; isti purpura vestiti ac bisso, gloriosi in populo, canes muti effecti in castris et urbibus tranquille resident et easdem veritates eciam aspernantur audire, ac propter earum observanciam fidelem fideles spoliant fama, vita et rebus non per se quia cubant cum scortis, sed per cruente crucis ereccionem, seculare brachium in occisionem fidelium fallaciter concitantes” (Palacký, Urkundliche Beiträge, etc., Vol. II. pp. 228–231).
* ↑ Letter published by Palacký, Urkundliche Beiträge, etc., Vol. II. p. 215.
* ↑ It is interesting to note that Bishop Stubbs, though he did not devote much study to Bohemian history, saw this point more clearly than most historians have done. “It may be questioned,” he writes, “whether in the long run Bohemia could not have rejected the yoke of Rome and the rule of the Luxemburg family, had not the national party itself been divided and the Hussites—the Táborites are meant—as the weaker gone to the wall” (Germany in the later Middle Ages, p. 173).
* ↑ Even Æneas Sylvius writes: “Cardinalis numerosum exercitum ductans multas hæreticorum villas incendit, oppidaque diripuit, in quibus non avaritia tantum, verum crudelitas etiam militum grassata est qui mares cum fœminis obvios senes puerosque passim necavere (Historia Bohemica, chap. xIviii).
* ↑ See my History of Bohemian Literature, p. 151.
* ↑ Lawrence of Březova, author of a history of the early part of the Hussite wars which has often been quoted in these pages, wrote a quaint and very interesting Latin ballad on the rout at Domážlice. It is here only possible to quote a few lines. Březova writes of the flight—   “O quam turpe diffugium Tam strenuarum gencium: Non viso hoste fugere Totque cara relinquere Suis in fructum hostibus Duris atque crudelibus.” Somewhat later Cardinal Cesarini thus addresses the Pope— “Tandem illi scismatici Gentis Boemie rustici Congesserunt exercitum Paucum inermem frivolum. Mira tunc res peragitur Nec ei par conspicitur In tota sacra pagina. .... Cum nobis appropinquaret .... Ile malignus populus .... Spes fugit et consilium. Terra tremente tremimus, Nil nisi fugam querimus, Agente hoc dyabolo Certe ipsorum domino.” (Published in “Fontes rerum Bohemicarum,” Vol. V, pp. 545–563.)