# Hunt v. Rousmaniere/Opinion of the Court

* Court Documents
* Case Syllabus
* Opinion of the Court
This case was before this Court in the year 1823, and is reported in 8 Wheaton, 174, and was then argued at great length, by the counsel concerned in it. After full consideration, it was decided, that the power of attorney, given by Rousmaniere, the intestate, to the appellant, Hunt, authorizing him to make and execute a bill of sale of three-fourths of the Nereus and of the Industry, to himself, or to any other person, and in the event of their being lost, to collect the money which should become due under a policy upon them and their freight; was a naked power, not coupled with an interest, which, though irrevocable by Rousmaniere, in his lifetime, expired on his death.
That this species of security was agreed upon, and given under a misunderstanding, by the parties, of its legal character, was conceded, in the argument of the cause, by the bar and bench; and the second question, for the consideration of the Court, was, whether a Court of Equity could afford relief in such a case, by directing a new security, of a different character, to be given; or by decreeing that to be done, which the parties supposed would have been effected by the instrument agreed upon? After an examination of the cases, applicable to the general question, it was stated, by the Chief Justice, who delivered the opinion of the Court, that none of them asserted the naked principle, that relief could be granted, on the ground of ignorance of law, or decided, that a plain and acknowledged mistake, in law, was beyond the reach of a Court of Equity. The conclusion, to which he came, is expressed in the following terms:--
'We find no case, which we think precisely in point; and are unwilling, where the effect of the instrument is acknowledged to have been entirely misunderstood, by both parties, to say, that a Court of Equity is incapable of affording relief.' The decree was, accordingly, reversed; but the case being one in which creditors were concerned, the Court, instead of giving a final decree on the demurrer, in favour of the plaintiff, directed the cause to be remanded, that the Circuit Court might permit the defendants to withdraw their demurrer, and to answer the bill.
After the cause was returned to that Court, the demurrer was withdrawn, and an answer was filed, in which the defendants, after admitting the loans, mentioned in the bills, by the plaintiff to their intestate, and the notes, given for the same, by the latter, and their non-payment; assert their ignorance of any agreement, between the plaintiff and their intestate, that the former should have a specific security, other than the powers of attorney, to sell vessels and to collect the proceeds, or, the amount of the policies, in case they should be lost; but express their belief, that the powers of attorney were selected by the plaintiff, in preference to the other securities, which were offered by the intestate. The answer further states, that the estate of Rousmaniere is greatly insolvent, and had been so before his death; that the plaintiff had exhibited and proved his demand, as stated in his bill, before the Commissioners of term papersInsolvency, duly appointed, upon the estate of Rousmaniere; and that his dividend thereon declared, or to be declared, the defendants were, and would be ready, to pay, according to law.
The principal deposition, taken in the cause, is that of Benjamin Hazard, counsellor at law; who deposes, that he drew the powers of attorney, annexed to the original bill.-That on the day the first power was executed, Hunt and Rousmaniere came to his office, when the latter stated, that the former had loaned, or agreed to loan, to him, a sum of money, upon security to be given by him, on his interest in the brig Nereus, and that he was desirous the security should be as ample and available to Hunt, as it could be made. That he wished, and was ready, to give a bill of sale of the property, or a mortgage on it, or any other security, which Mr. Hunt might prefer. Both the parties declared that they had called upon the witness, to request him to draw the writings, and to obtain his opinion, as to the kind of instrument which would give the most perfect security to the lender. That the deponent then told the parties, that a bill of sale, or mortgage, would be good security, but that an irrevocable power of attorney, such as was afterwards executed, would be as effectual and good security, as either of the others; and would prevent the necessity of changing the vessel's papers, and of Hunt's taking possession of the vessel, upon her arrival from sea. That the parties then requested him to draw such an instrument, as, in his opinion, would most effectually and fully secure Mr. Hunt; and that the plaintiff frequently asked him, whilst he was drawing the power, and after he had finished, and read it to the parties, if he was quite certain that the power would be as safe and available to him, as a bill of sale, or mortgage, and that upon his assurances that it was, it was then executed. The witness then proceeds to express his opinion, from his knowledge of the parties, and from their declaration at the time, that Rousmaniere would readily have given an absolute bill of sale of the property, or any other security which could have been asked; and that Hunt would not have accepted the one which was afterwards executed, if he had not considered it to be as extensive and perfect a security, in all respects, as an absolute bill of sale; and he adds, more positively, that such was the understanding and agreement of both the parties.
It appears, by the testimony of this witness, that he drew the power of attorney, concerning the Industry, for securing the second loan made by the plaintiff to Rousmaniere, and that the circumstances attending that transaction, were essentially the same as those which have been stated, in respect to the first loan.
We find another deposition in the record, which deserves to be noticed, as it consists of declarations, made by the plaintiff, after the powers of attorney were executed, and may serve, in some measure, to explain the more positive testimony given by Mr. Hazard. This witness, William Merchant, deposes, that, after the decease of Rousmaniere, the plaintiff stated to him, and to a Mr. Rhodes, that in consequence of his declining to engage in an enterprise in one of the vessels of Rousmaniere, to which he had at one time consented, and of the complaints of Rousmaniere, on that account, he was induced to offer to Rousmaniere a loan of money. That an agreement was accordingly made, by which he, Hunt, was to let Rousmaniere have a certain sum on loan, and Rousmaniere was to give him a bill of sale of a certain vessel; but that afterwards, Hunt, reflecting, that if he took that security, he would have to take out papers at the custom-house, in his own name, be subject to give bonds for the vessel, and perhaps be made liable for breaches of law committed by others, he consulted with Mr. Hazard upon the subject; who told him that he could, or would, draw an irrevocable power of attorney, to sell which, would do as well, and which was accordingly done.
The cause coming on to be heard, in the Court below, and that Court being of opinion, that the plaintiff had then no lien, or specific security upon these vessels, and no equity to have such lien or security created against the general creditors of Rousmaniere, dismissed the bill; from which decree, the cause has been brought, by appeal, to this Court.
It must be admitted, that the case, as it is now presented to the Court, is not materially variant from that which we formerly had to consider; except in relation to the rights of the general creditors, against the insolvent estate of a deceased debtor, in opposition to the equity which a particular creditor seeks, by this bill, to set up. The allegations of the bills, filed in this cause, which were, on the former occasion, admitted by the demurrer to be true, are now fully proved, by the testimony taken in the cause.
Before proceeding to state the general question, to which the facts in this case give rise, or the principles of equity, which apply to it, it will be necessary, distinctly, to ascertain, what was the real agreement concluded upon between the plaintiff and the intestate, the performance of which, on the part of the latter, was intended to be secured by the powers of attorney? Was it that Rousmaniere should, in addition to his notes for the money agreed to be loaned to him by the plaintiff, give a specific and available security on the Nereus and the Industry, or, was the particular kind of security selected by the parties, and did it constitute a part of the agreement? It is most obvious, from the plaintiff's own statement, in his amended bill, as well as from the depositions appearing in the record, that the agreement was not closed, until the interview between the parties to it, with Mr. Hazard, had taken place. The amended bill states, that the specific security which Rousmaniere offered to give, was a mortgage of the two vessels, for which irrevocable powers of attorney were substituted, by the advice of Mr. Hazard, and for reasons, which it would seem, were approved of and acted upon, by the plaintiff. From the testimony of Mr. Merchant, it would appear, that the security proposed by Rousmaniere, was a bill of sale of the vessels, which the plaintiff declined accepting, for reasons of his own, uninfluenced by any suggestions of Mr. Hazard, who merely proposed the powers of attorney as a substitute for the other forms of security which had been offered by Rousmaniere. The difference between these statements is not very material, since it is apparent from both of them, that the proposed security, by irrevocable powers of attorney, was selected by the plaintiff, and incorporated into the agreement, by the assent of both the parties. The powers of attorney do not contain, nor do they profess to contain, the agreement of the parties; but was a mere execution of that agreement, so far as it stipulated to give to the plaintiff a specific security on the two vessels, in the mode selected and approved of by the parties, to which extent, it was a complete consummation of the agreement. Such was the opinion of this Court upon the former discussion of this cause in the year 1823, and such is its present opinion. Upon this state of the case, the general question to be decided, is the same now that it formerly was, and is that which has already been stated.
There are certain principles of equity, applicable to this question, which, as general principles, we hold to be incontrovertible. The first is, that where an instrument is drawn and executed, which professes, or is intended, to carry into execution, an agreement, whether in writing or by parol, previously entered into, but which, by mistake of the draftsman, either as to fact or law, does not fulfil, or which violates the manifest intention of the parties to the agreement, equity will correct the mistake, so as to produce a conformity of the instrument to the agreement. The reason is obvious-The execution of agreements, fairly and legally entered into, is one of the peculiar branches of equity jurisdiction; and if the instrument which is intended to execute the agreement, be, from any cause, insufficient for that purpose, the agreement remains as much unexecuted, as if one of the parties had refused, altogether, to comply with his engagement; and a Court of Equity will, in the exercise of its acknowledged jurisdiction, afford relief in the one case, as well as in the other, by compelling the delinquent party fully to perform his agreement, according to the terms of it, and to the manifest intention of the parties. So, if the mistake exist, not in the instrument, which is intended to give effect to the agreement, but in the agreement itself, and is clearly proved to have been the result of ignorance of some material fact, a Court of Equity will, in general, grant relief, according to the nature of the particular case in which it is sought. Whether these principles, or either of them, apply to the present case, must, of course, depend upon the real character of the agreement under consideration. If it has been correctly stated, it follows, that the instrument, by means of which the specific security was to be given, was selected by the parties to the agreement, or rather by the plaintiff; Rousmaniere having proposed to give a mortgage, or bill of sale of the vessels, which the plaintiff, after consideration, and advice of counsel, thought proper to reject, for reasons which were entirely satisfactory to himself. That the form of the instrument, so chosen by the plaintiff, and prepared by the person who drew it, conforms, in every respect, to the one agreed upon, is not even asserted in the bill, or in the argument of counsel. The avowed object of the plaintiff was, to obtain a valid security, but in such a manner, as that the legal interest in the property should remain with Rousmaniere, so that the plaintiff might be under no necessity to take out papers at the custom-house, in his own name, and might not be subject to give bonds for the vessels, or to liabilities for breaches of law, committed by those who were intrusted with the management of them. That the general intention of the parties was, to provide a security, as effectual as a mortgage of the vessels would be, can admit of no doubt; and if such had been their agreement, the insufficiency of the instruments, to effect that object, which were afterwards prepared, would have furnished a ground for the interposition of a Court of Equity, which the representatives of Rousmaniere could not easily have resisted. But the plaintiff was not satisfied to leave the kind of security which he was willing to receive, undetermined; having finally made up his mind, by the advice of his counsel, not to accept of a mortgage, or bill of sale, in nature of a mortgage. He thought it safest, therefore, to designate the instrument; and, having deliberately done so, it met the view of both parties, and was as completely incorporated into their agreement, as were the notes of hand for the sum intended to be secured. In coming to this determination, it is not pretended that the plaintiff was misled by ignorance of any fact, connected with the agreement which he was about to conclude. If, then, the agreement was not founded in a mistake of any material fact, and if it was executed in strict conformity with itself; we think it would be unprecedented, for a Court of Equity to decree another security to be given, not only different from that which had been agreed upon, but one which had been deliberately considered and rejected by the party now asking for relief; or to treat the case, as if such other security had in fact been agreed upon and executed. Had Rousmaniere, after receiving the money agreed to be loaned to him, refused to give an irrevocable power of attorney, but offered to execute a mortgage of the vessels, no Court of Equity could have compelled the plaintiff to accept the security so offered. Or, if he had totally refused to execute the agreement, and the plaintiff had filed his bill, praying that the defendant might be compelled to execute a mortgage instead of an irrevocable power of attorney; could that Court have granted the relief specifically asked for? We think not. Equity may compel parties to perform their agreements, when fairly entered into, according to their terms; but it has no power to make agreements for parties, and then compel them to execute the same. The former is a legitimate branch of its jurisdiction, and in its exercise, is highly beneficial to society. The latter is without its authority, and the exercise of it would be not only an usurpation of power, but would be highly mischievous in its consequences.
If the Court could not have compelled the plaintiff to accept, or Rousmaniere to execute, any other instrument, than the one which had been agreed upon between them, the case is in no respect altered by the death of the latter, and the consequent inefficiency of the particular security which had been selected; the objection to the relief asked for, being in both cases the same, namely, that the Court can only enforce the performance of an agreement according to its terms, and to the intention of the parties; and cannot force upon them a different agreement. That the intention of the parties, to this agreement, was frustrated, by the happening of an event, not thought of, probably, by them, or by the counsel who was consulted upon the occasion, is manifest. The kind of security which was chosen, would have been equally effectual, for the purpose intended, with a mortgage, had Rousmaniere lived until the power had been executed; and it may therefore admit of some doubt, at least, whether the loss of the intended security is to be attributed to a want of foresight, in the parties, of to a mistake of the counsel, in respect to a matter of law. The case will, however, be considered in the latter point of view.
The question, then, is, ought the Court to grant the relief which is asked for, upon the ground of mistake arising from any ignorance of law? We hold the general rule to be, that a mistake of this character is not a ground for reforming a deed founded on such mistake; and whatever exceptions there may be to this rule, they are not only few in number, but they will be found to have something peculiar in their characters.
The strongest case which was cited and relied upon by the appellant's counsel, was that of Landsdown vs. Landsdown, reported in Mosely. Admitting, for the present, the authority of this case, it is most apparent, from the face of it, that the decision of the Court might well be supported upon a principle not involved in the question we are examining. The subject which the Court had to decide, arose out of a dispute between an heir at law, and a younger member of the family, who was entitled to an estate descended; and this question, the parties agreed to submit to arbitration. The award being against the heir at law, he executed a deed in compliance with it, but was relieved against it on the rinciple that he was ignorant of his title.
If the decision of the Court proceeded upon the ground that the plaintiff was ignorant of the fact that he was the eldest son, it was clearly a case proper for relief, upon a principle which has already been considered.
If the mistake was of his legal rights, as heir at law, it is not going too far to presume, that the opinion of the Court, may have been founded upon the belief, that the heir at law was imposed upon by some unfair representations of his better informed opponent; or that his ignorance of a legal principle, so universally understood by all, where the right of primogeniture forms a part of the law of descents, demonstrated a degree of mental imbecility, which might well entitle him to relief. He acted, besides, under the pressure of an award, which was manifestly repugnant to law, and for aught that is stated in this case, this may have appeared upon the face of it.
But if this case must be considered as an exception from the general rule which has been mentioned; the circumstances attending it, do not entitle it, were it otherwise unobjectionable, to be respected as an authority, but in cases which it closely resembles. There is a class of cases which it has been supposed forms an exception from this general rule, but which will be found, upon examination, to come within the one which was first stated. The cases alluded to, are those in which equity has afforded relief against the representatives of a deceased obligor, in a joint bond, given for money, lent to both the obligors, although such representatives were discharged at law. The principle upon which these cases manifestly proceed, is, that the money being lent to both, the law raises a promise in both to pay, and equity considers the security of the bond as being intended, by the parties, to be co-extensive with this implied contract by both to pay the debt. To effect this intention, the bond should have been made joint and several; and the mistake in the form, by which it is made joint, is not in the agreement of the parties, but in the execution of it by the draftsman. The cases in which the general rule has been adhered to, are, many of them, of a character which strongly test the principle upon which the rule itself is founded. Two or three only need be referred to. If the obligee, in a joint bond, by two or more, agree with one of the obligors, to relieve him from his obligation, and does accordingly execute a release, by which all the obligors are discharged at law, equity will not afford relief against this legal consequence, although the release was given under a manifest misapprehension of the legal effect of it, in relation to the other obligors. So, in the case of Worral vs. Jacob, 3 Merv. 271, where a person having a power of appointment and revocation, and, under a mistaken supposition, that a deed might be altered or revoked, although no power of revocation had been reserved, executed the power of appointment without reserving a power of revocation; the Court refused to relieve against the mistake.
The case of Lord Irnham vs. Child, 1 Bro. C. C. 92, is a very strong one in support of the general rule, and closely resembles the present, in most of the material circumstances attending it. The object of the suit was to set up a clause containing a power of redemption, in a deed granting an annuity, which, it was said, had been agreed upon by the parties, but which, after deliberation, was excluded by consent, from a mistaken opinion, that it would render the contracts usurious. The Court, notwithstanding the omission manifestly proceeded upon a misapprehension of the parties as to the law, refused to relieve by establishing the rejected clause. It is not the intention of the Court, in the case now under consideration, to lay it down, that there may not be cases in which a Court of Equity will relieve against a plain mistake, arising from ignorance of law. But we mean to say, that where the parties, upon deliberation and advice, reject one species of security, and agree to select another, under a misapprehension of the law as to the nature of the security so selected, a Court of Equity will not, on the ground of such misapprehension, and the insufficiency of such security, in consequence of a subsequent event, not foreseen, perhaps, or thought of, direct a new security, of a different character, to be given, or decree that to be done which the parties supposed would have been effected, by the instrument which was finally agreed upon.
If the Court would not interfere in such a case, generally, much less would it do so in favour of one creditor, against the general creditors of an insolvent estate, whose equity is, at least, equal to that of the party seeking to obtain a preference, and who, in point of law, stand upon the same ground with himself. This is not a bill asking for a specific performance of an agreement to execute a valid deed for securing a debt; in which case, the party asking relief, would be entitled to a specific lien; and the Court would consider the debtor as a trustee, for the creditor of the property on which the security was agreed to be given. The agreement has been fully executed, and the only complaint is, that the agreement itself was founded upon a misapprehension of the law, and the prayer is to be relieved against the consequences of such mistake. If all other difficulties were out of the way, the equity of the general creditors to be paid their debts equally with the plaintiff, would, we think, be sufficient to induce the Court to leave the parties where the law has placed them.
The decree is to be affirmed, with costs.

## Notes

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