# The Lessons of the German Events/Chapter 3

III
REPORT OF COMRADE REMMELE
What do the October events prove? They prove that a Workers' Government can be formed only if the revolutionary forces are so disposed that at the very next moment the Workers' Government gives place to the fight for the dictatorship.
(From the Left: The Leipsic Congress!)
Comrades, I say emphatically that this applies particularly to Germany. What the situation is in other countries I cannot judge. Perhaps under certain circumstances things might be quite different from Germany. But in the conditions existing in Germany there can be no question of a Workers' Government except at the moment of direct transition to the fight for power.
Comrades, the resolution of the Fourth Congress envisages other possibilities. It is an international decision. But I believe that in the problem we are now considering it must be definitely stated that if a similar combination of circumstances again occurs in Saxony, the experiment must only be attempted if the necessary conditions making the fight possible have been created; then only can it be undertaken.
These are the experiences we have learned from the October events.
I will now consider the problems arising out of the events which occurred in Germany. One of the most important was the problem of the relation of forces. Let me briefly describe the situation as it existed at that time. In January, when the fight in the Ruhr began, the International quite rightly foresaw that the fight in the Ruhr would produce similar results—if not on quite the same scale, nevertheless quite similar political results—in Germany, as the war has produced. Let me remind you here of the decisions which were taken in Essen in January and in Frankfort in March. In these resolutions it was already clearly recognised that the fight in the Ruhr must lead to an extraordinarily difficult economic and political crisis in Germany, and that it will lead us into quite serious fights. This view was very. soon confirmed. The fight in the Ruhr produced exactly similar situations in Germany as existed after or towards the end of the war—acts of desperation, great uprisings. There were not only large strikes, as has been repeatedly pointed out, but throughout large areas of Germany a chaotic state of affairs existed, in which locally and provincially the organisations of the workers to some extent had power in their hands. I must point out that very often in large strike areas, political power was in the hands of the workers, and the various State Governments were not able to carry out a policy of preventing the uprising of the workers. In other words, the movement has reached the pitch which we would very much have desired at the moment when the state of siege was decreed in the Reich. ​Let me point out that during the time of the Fascist Movement demonstrations were carried out in spite of the prohibition, not only in the Stuttgart but also in Central Germany, in the north, in the west, and the east of the Reich. We had then in Thuringia and in Central Germany in July and in August a situation in which the workers had the food supplies in their hands: they seized motor trucks and drove into the country to get supplies directly from the peasants, and nobody had the least doubt that we were on the eve of great events. Undoubtedly, the Cuno strike was the apex of the movement, but it is my profound conviction that it was also the turning point of the movement. When the Social-Democrats entered into the great coalition, the Social-Democratic workers were again filled with illusions.
In the middle of August, as a result of the entry of the Social-Democrats into the Government, a certain ebbing of the revolutionary flood set in. When we came to discuss with the Social-Democrats it appeared that they had set fresh hopes upon the entry of Hilferding into the Government. Social-Democrats who had spontaneously come into our camp, who had taken part in the Cuno strike, became filled with new illusions. The kernel of the problem is to win over the Social-Democratic majority.
Now as to what occurred within the Party. What was the attitude of the Party towards the situation? I remember that we held a session of the Central Committee in September to discuss what our attitude should be towards the situation. A member of the Central Committee expressed the point of view that if conditions were ripe in Saxony we should attack. This the Central Committee at that time rejected, on the ground that they were opposed to this Putschist outlook. On the next day arrived the resolution adopted by the Executive here. And so the whole policy of the Party was directed to that which they had rejected the day before. A plan of attack was adopted which made Central Germany the point of concentration. The Party and the whole Party machinery was then mobilised for the armed uprising. All other Party work, the mobilisation of the masses, the organisation of the Factory Councils, was neglected, since the whole Party machine and all the Party officials were employed exclusively on the problem of arming and organising the fight. And so it came about that all other bridges leading to the proletariat were neglected. In our opinion, one of the greatest errors, which must be attributed to the weakness of the Party, was that the problem moved upon us very rapidly and that we concentrated all the efforts of the Party upon the question of arming.
Comrades, once we were compelled to take part in the formation of the Government, the definite moment for the attack could not be delayed. When the instructions of the Executive arrived to the effect that we should enter the Saxon Government, the comrades at first hesitated to carry this decision into effect. ​Even before the Communists were in the Government, the Reich Government threatened the Saxon Social Democratic Government that the Reich Executive would take proceedings against it. Our comrades therefore hesitated to carry the resolution into effect. Negotiations were carried on with them; they were obliged to enter the Government, and they did enter the Government.
As events developed the Saxon question of necessity occupied the chief role in the whole International. In my opinion the Saxon problem was not at all faced correctly. We shall very sharply criticise the Saxon Ministers for what they neglected to do. The belief that the Ministers could do a great deal was based upon illusions. The decision that our comrades should participate in the Saxon Government was taken on the basis of reports and representations which were without foundation. The decision was taken in the belief that the arming and mobilisation of the Party and the masses had reached such a stage that this move could be attempted. It was presumed that the defeat of the enemy had gone much further than was actually the case.
Thus we arrived in the position in which the enemy took the offensive and dictated the time of attack. The enemy struck, and we were obliged to say, either there will be a White Dictatorship or we must set up the Dictatorship of the Proletariat. In the first moment of deliberation it was decided to attack and to carry out the plan adopted.
Just previous to October 20 movements which were already in action were checked, so that forces might be preserved in order to be brought into play at the moment decided upon.
Consequently, everything was concentrated upon the armed attack, and only the decisive attack for the decisive fight came into question.
After the fight in Hamburg and after the failure of the Saxon Experiment, the Party could once more rally itself. Very shortly after the session of the Central Committee took place, which attempted to perform a given task, to give a foundation for, or to crystallise the point of view upon which we were at the moment setting. The Central Committee neglected to make a retrospect, to examine what was wrong and what was right. This, of course, led to considerable differences of opinion within the Central Committee and in the districts. Confusion and differences arose because the problem was not clarified by the Central Committee, and this found expression at the sessions of the Central Committee. Since what had already occurred was not explained and clarified, a clear policy could not be thought out.
These differences later, when the Executive sent its letter, gave rise to the attempt to secure clarity on the basis of this letter. The discussion showed that within the Central Committee there were in the main three points of view represented: that of the left—comrades Fischer and Thälmann—that represented ​by Brandler and Thalheimer, and that represented by Koennen and myself.
Comrades, the point of view represented by us was expressed in the examination of what had occurred roughly as follows: was it true that in the stage in which we then were, we could arm ourselves for a decisive struggle? This we denied. On the grounds of the particular structure of Germany and the particular class relationships and class forces in Germany, we declared that we had not yet reached the stage when we could fix the period for the decisive struggle. We declared that before the decisive struggles would come about, we should have first to pass through a period of numerous and powerful armed partial struggles. We should have to pass through a stage in which the relations of forces in Germany would vary extremely. And therefore we declared that we should have foreseen what had still not occurred before the October days, and to the recognition of which we came only because of the October days, namely, that, as Brandler has already declared, we should have to pass through a period of armed demonstrations and armed individual actions before we reached the decisive struggle.
Therefore, comrades, we represent the point of view that the method or the theory pursued in October, namely, that in the practical circumstances as they would arise in Germany, to jump out of a period of agitation and propagandist activity immediately into an armed uprising, was false. And this was one of the essential reasons why we were opposed to the preparations for the October action.
I now come to the problems of future developments in Germany and what our main task must be. Here again, the breaking up of the counter-revolutionary bloc within the working class occupies the front place. Only when it is broken up will the way remain clear for the possibility of the armed decisive struggle.
I affirm that the bloc will be best broken up during the course of the struggle; but that should not prevent us from clearly envisaging what has to be done as long as the fight cannot be started and still does not exist. We believe that the defeat of the counter-revolutionary bloc, that appendix of social democracy within the working class, is a most urgent and important matter and one which has still be to accomplished in Germany. It must be done, while bearing in mind the actual possibilities as they exist in Germany. It has been frequently repeated here that one of the most important problems of our revolutionary ideology is to create, to mobilise, and to make use of the Factory Councils. This is absolutely true, but the question must be put thus: What are the Factory Councils, and what possibilities do they represent?
In Germany there are 370,000 factories employing over twenty workers, which the law obliges to elect factory councils. In spite of all measures we have taken in this sphere—we have sent special secretaries to the various districts to organise these factory ​councils, we have carried on a tremendous propaganda on behalf of the factory councils and have issued a newspaper—in spite of all this work, we have so far succeeded in mobilising only 5,000 Factory Councils in the 370,000 factories that exist. Yes, comrades, when one hears such figures one cannot help asking: is it indeed possible to seize as many as 370,000? It appears to me that the essential thing is to seize the heavy industries. It is certain that if the factory councils become a true revolutionary element striving forward, the whole working masses will stand behind them. To-day the working masses no longer stand entirely behind the factory councils. But if we succeed in winning almost the whole of the factory councils, in the elections, at least in the heavy industries, then we shall also have the working masses on the side of the revolutionary struggle.
(Warski: And how many of the 2,000 heavy industries have we in our hands?)
That I cannot say exactly, but I believe that we have at least in every factory council one or two comrades on our side who are working with us.
Well, comrades, the question is not that we can perform all our tasks through the factory councils alone or, as Comrade Fischer erroneously stated recently, that the strike in Ludwigshaven was carried on by the factory councils. No. Even the wildest strikes are led by the trade union representatives in the factories concerned. Only large strikes covering considerable areas are led by the factory councils, but the isolated strikes are led by the trade union representatives of the workers.
It is, of course, essential that we should have a perfectly clear policy with regard to the trade union workers.
Comrades, to me it is perfectly clear that the situation as it now stands must lead to a great catastrophe. In October the bourgeoisie had still an extraordinarily powerful force on their side, the official class, which hitherto has been the strongest support of its power. Meanwhile, however, attempts have been made to consolidate the capitalist system at the expense of the officials. We have now a much broader foundation than in August and October.
I represent the point of view that in the next three months there will be many conflicts between the proletariat and the ruling class. The party must be prepared and arm for this. The armed preparation, the armed partial actions as a method of the class struggle must be added to our previous work. It is only in the course of these struggles that the moment for the decisive blow will be determined. Of course, no one can deny that it is possible that bourgeois society will be able to extricate itself from the present situation. It may happen that in the next three months temporary situations such as now exist will arise which will enable the bourgeoisie to extricate themselves from the noose which now hangs about their necks. This possibility ​exists, but we cannot bank upon two possibilities. The Party must be so directed as to make it possible during this period to do what has to be done, so that the possibility of a fight should not arise while we have a party which is not capable of action and which has a leadership that must itself be led. The subjective forces of the movement will then grow of themselves. For this it is necessary to have a strong hand at the head of the Party, capable of taking advantage of the existing situation, and to lead it into a victorious fight. For this a brief discussion of the differences is necessary, and of the situation as it is and as it should be. Then the strength of the Party must be directed outwards. As long as we dissipate our forces in struggles within the Party, we shall have no strength to fight and to exert influence outside.
The comrades who have developed themselves in the course of the struggle should work together in co-operation, and the leadership should not be left to a single individual. There are many comrades amongst our leaders who have been in the Party for many years, but have only just, in the course of the struggle, found themselves fighting by each other's side.
The Russian comrades say that it is the tradition of the old Bolsheviks that keeps them together, but we cannot speak of an old tradition within the Communist Party in Germany. We can, however, speak of an old tradition of the opposition in the Social-Democratic Party who have been working together for many years. That the bond between these comrades is closer than the bond between them and the comrades who have just come over to us is, of course, only natural.
We have come to the point of view that Brandler, in leading the Party, often acted too independently, so that many things occurred which the comrades did not desire. We have expressed the opinion that it is desirable, if Brandler is to lead the Party, that there should be strong collective action in the leadership of the Party. As to the situation within the Party and as to the Left, I repeat what I said yesterday. The opposition must come into the Central Committee, since Thälmann represents an opposition which arises from a proletarian feeling, from a good proletarian tradition, which Thälmann himself possesses. But the opposition represented by Ruth Fischer and Maslov is not an opposition which has grown out of real situations, but which was born out of theories. That is the criticism which I have to direct against this opposition; they do not represent reality, they believe that the world is created out of their own heads.
I think it is essential that this dispute should now come to an end, that it is our duty to return from Moscow with a strong hand and a strong leadership for the forthcoming struggles. This is essential above all in the period of illegality. If in such a period we have not the absolute confidence in one another, nothing can be done.