# Township of Pine Grove v. Talcott

* related portals: Supreme Court of the United States.
* sister projects: Wikidata item.
United States Supreme Court
86 U.S. 666
Township of Pine Grove v. Talcott
ERROR to the Circuit Court for the Western District of Michigan, in which court Talcott brought assumpsit against the township of Pine Grove, one of the municipalities of the State of Michigan, to recover the amount of certain bonds issued by that township to aid in the construction of a railroad running through the said township, from Kalamazoo to South Haven, both places being in Michigan.
The constitution of Michigan (adopted A.D. 1850) thus ordains:
'ARTICLE VI, § 32. No person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.
'ARTICLE XIV, § 6. The credit of the State shall not be granted to or in aid of any person, association, or corporation.
'§ 8. The State shall not subscribe to or be interested in the stock of any company, association, or corporation.
'§ 9. The State shall not be a party to or intersted in any work of internal improvement, nor engage in carrying on any such work, except in the expenditure of grants to the State of land or other property.
'§ 11. The legislature shall provide a uniform rule of taxation, except as to property paying specific taxes. Taxes shall be levied upon such property as shall be prescribed by law.
'ARTICLE XV, § 13. The legislature shall provide for the incorporation and organization of cities and villages, and shall restrict their powers of taxation, borrowing money, contracting debts, and loaning their credit.
'ARTICLE XVIII, § 2. When private property is taken for the use or benefit of the public, the necessity for using such property and the just compensation to be made therefor (except when to be made by the State) shall be ascertained by a jury of twelve freeholders, residing in the vicinity of such property, or by not less than three commissioners appointed by a court of record, as shall be prescribed by law.
'§ 14. The property of no person shall be taken for public use without just compensation therefor. Private roads may be opened in the manner to be prescribed by law; but in every case the necessities of the road and the amount of all damage to be sustained by the opening thereof shall be first determined by a jury of freeholders,' &c.
These provisions of the constitution being in force, the legislature of Michigan, on the 22d of March, 1869, passed an act entitled 'An act to enable any township, city, or village to pledge its aid, by loan or donation, to any railroad company now chartered or organized under and by virtue of the laws of the State of Michigan, in the construction of its road.'
The act enacted:
'That it shall be lawful for any township or city to pledge its aid to any railroad company now chartered, organized, or that may hereafter be organized, under and by virtue of the laws of the State of Michigan, in the construction of its road, by loan or donation, with or without conditions, for such sum or sums, not exceeding ten per centum of the assessed valuation then last made of the real and personal property in such township or city, as a majority of the electors of such township or city voting shall, at a meeting or meetings called for that purpose, determine.'
The manner in which the vote should be taken and the bonds executed was provided for in subsequent sections.
Under this act the bonds on which the suit was brought were issued. The bonds, and the coupons attached to them, were made 'payable to bearer.' It was not denied that the directions given in the act were carried out.
The declaration set forth in special counts the cause of action. The township demurred on the sole ground that the law in question was in conflict with the constitution of the State, and judgment being given against the township, it brought the case here.
The act under which the bonds were issued had been the subject of very full consideration by the Supreme Court of Michigan, in Bay City v. The State Treasurer, and an act of a similar character had been previously considered by the same court in The People v. Salem. Both acts were declared to be in conflict with the constitution, and void.
In the former case (Graves, J., dissenting, and delivering an opinion in dissent), the unconstitutionality of the law was placed upon several distinct grounds, some of which were more fully insisted on than others.
In the latter case it was held (Cooley, J., delivering on this occasion, as he had done on the former, the opinion of the court), that the statute was in conflict with Article VI, section thirty-two, already quoted, which provides that no person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law, and also with the provisions of Article XIV, sections eight and nine, also already quoted, which prohibit the State from being a party to or interested in any works of internal improvement.
The court observes that the State had, prior to 1850, when the constitution was established, been engaged in works of the description named and had owned some of the principal railroads in the State. It refers to the history of the times in which the constitution was adopted, and points out how previously to that time the people had been fraudulently led into the creation of debts for railroads of which they denied the moral obligation, and in consequence of which their public credit had been impaired; and how-interpreting these provisions as effectually guarding them against the like evils and dangers for the future-the people were induced more than by any other motive to adopt the constitution. The court says:
'All these provisions were incorporated by the people in the constitution as precautions against injudicious action by themselves, if in another time of inflation and excitement they should be tempted to incur the like burdensome taxation in order to accomplish public improvement in cases where they were not content to wait the result of private enterprise. The people meant to erect such effectual barriers that if the temptation should return, the means of inflicting the like injury upon the credit, reputation, and prosperity of the State should not be within the reach of the authorities. They believed these clauses of the constitution accomplished this purpose perfectly; and none of its provisions had more influence in recommending that instrument to the hearty good-will of the people.
'In process of time, however, a majority in the legislature were found willing, against the solemn warning of the executive, to resort again to the power of taxation in aid of internal improvement. It was discovered that though 'the State' was expressly inhibited from giving such aid in any form, except in the disposition of grants made to it, the subdivisions of which the State was composed were not under the like ban. Decisions in other States were found which were supposed to sanction the doctrine that under such circumstances, the State might do indirectly through its subdivisions what directly it was forbidden to do. This a way was opened by which the whole purpose of the constitutional provisions quoted might be defeated. The State could not aid a private corporation with its credit, but it might require each of its townships, cities, and villages to do so. The State could not load down its people with taxes for the construction of a public improvement, but it might compel the municipal authorities, which were its mere creatures, and which held their whole authority and their whole life at its will, to enforce such taxes, one by one, until the whole people were bent to the burden.
'Now, whatever might be the just and proper construction of similar provisions in the constitutions of States whose history has not been the same with our own, the majority of this court thought, when the previous case was before us, and they still think, that these provisions in our constitution do preclude the State from loaning the public credit to private corporations, and from imposing taxation upon its citizens, or any portion thereof, in aid of the construction of railroads. So the people supposed when the constitution was adopted. Constitutions do not change with the varying tides of public opinion and desire; the will of the people therein recorded is the same inflexible law until changed by their own deliberate action; and it cannot be permissible to the courts that, in order to aid evasions and circumventions, they shall subject these instruments, which in the main only undertake to lay down broad general principles, to a literal and technical construction, as if they were great public enemies standing in the way of progress, and the duty of every good citizen was, to get around their provisions whenever practicable, and give them a damaging thrust whenever convenient. They must construe them as the people did in their adoption, if the means of arriving at that construction are within their power. In these cases we thought we could arrive at it from the public history of the times.'
Notwithstanding these decisions, the court below gave judgment against the township, and it, accordingly, brought the case here.
Mr. J. A. Garfield, for the plaintiff in error:
The only point in issue below was the meaning of the constitution of the State, and on such a question it was the duty of the court below to have taken as true the meaning put upon it by its highest judicial tribunal. If a contrary course of proceeding is permissible there is an end to the independence of the judiciary of the States, and the decisions of tribunals which are confessedly constitutional expositors of the local law, are reviewed and reversed by a tribunal possessing no authority to exercise such functions upon any theory of State and Federal jurisdiction hitherto recognized in our judicial history.
A long series of decisions in this court-of which Nesmith v. Sheldon is but one illustration of which there are infinite other ones from the first page of Dallas to the last of Wallace stand out to witness that the Federal tribunals have ever recognized and felt bound by the decisions of the State courts in matters of local law. Although pressed on many occasions to 'amplify the jurisdiction,' the rule has been steadily adhered to, unless the case was within some of the recognized exceptions. This case falls within none of the exceptions. Nor is it in that class of cases where it has been held that 'if a contract when made was valid under the laws and constitution of a State as they had been previously expounded by its judicial tribunals, and as they were understood at the time, no subsequent action by the legislature or the judiciary will be regarded by this court as establishing its invalidity.' Neither the act under consideration nor any like act had ever been held valid. No exposition had ever been made of the constitution of 1850, from which it could be concluded that such legislation would be sustained. There was no previous course of decision which held even by inference that the constitutional prohibitions above referred to would authorize municipal taxation in aid of works of internal improvement.
The case of Swan v. Williams, which might, at a hasty view, be taken as disproving what we say, was not a case arising under the present constitution. Indeed, it was a case which originated when an entirely different public policy prevailed, and under a constitution which permitted the legislature to make the public a party to such enterprises. What that case decides was this only, that a railroad was so far of public use as to justify the exercise of the power of eminent domain by allowing it to take private property upon payment of compensation.
Independently of all constitutional restraints, the bonds are void. The railroad was a private enterprise. It had no element of a public object, otherwise than as all manufactures, canals, steamboat lines, and other things open to persons generally to enjoy on payment of their money, are to be called public.
The present case, therefore, is that of a person buying bonds and running the risk of their being held valid.
Messrs. J. S. Black and C. A. Kent, with whom were Messrs. C. I. Walker and D. D. Hughes, contra.
Mr. Justice SWAYNE recapitulated the facts of the case, and delivered the opinion of the court.

## Notes

* ↑ 23 Michigan, 499, 504.
* ↑ 20 Id. 452.
* ↑ 7 Howard, 812.
* ↑ 2 Michigan, 427.
This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
Public domainPublic domainfalsefalse