# Unlawful Marriage/Chapter 8

CHAPTER VIII.
The Levitical law a natural law.—Classification of the Statutes.—Marshall's objection.—His singular mistake.—Proofs of its being a natural law.—How made known.—Opinion of Jurists.—Summary of its prohibitions.—Chancellor Kent's definition.—The Puritan's objections answered.
In the preceding discussion it has been proved, that this law is neither ceremonial, nor civil or judicial, but ecclesiastical and moral; moral, because it forbids lewd acts of an incestuous character, and because it prescribes the limits of marriage.
These statutes constitute one law. The number of the prohibitions does not affect the unity of the law. The Decalogue has ten precepts; but they are one moral law. The human body has many members; yet they constitute one body.
So these statutes form but one law of incest. ​All are founded on the same basis of relationship by consanguinity or affinity; all have the same object, domestic purity and good morals in the community; all are enforced by the same spiritual penalty, excision from the Church.
But the classification of the prohibitions, from the sixth to the eighteenth verse inclusive, but excluding "those from nineteenth to the twenty-fourth," under the general prohibition contained in the sixth, is deemed arbitrary. Mr. Marshall, regarding the sixth verse as containing "the title or general principle" of all the statutes in this chapter, finds it to be unsuitable, and not in accordance with the accuracy of "European or American legislators;" and then goes on to apologize for the inaccuracy of the inspired lawgiver, by pleading the want of "exact classification or logical arrangement in discourse" in "the Asiatics." But to this he is driven by his own mistake. Had he carefully inspected the chapter, he would have found in the third and fourth verses a more general title or principle, than is contained in the sixth. "After the ​doings of the land of Egypt wherein ye dwelt, shall ye not do; and after the doings of the land of Canaan, whither I bring you, shall ye not do: neither shall ye walk in their ordinances. Ye shall do my judgments, and keep mine ordinances, to walk therein: I am the Lord your God." Here is a principle broad enough to comprehend all the prohibitions contained in this chapter. How came our brother to overlook it? Mr. Marshall needs an apology, not Moses.
The prohibitions are various. Let us glance at them. They are:
1. Against incest, in various specifications (v. 7–18); all contained in one general prohibition: v. 6.
2. Against unseasonable intercourse: v. 19.
3. Against adultery: v. 20.
4. Against idolatrous worship: v. 21.
5. Against sodomy: v. 22.
6. Against bestiality: v. 23.
All these prohibitions certainly range under the general principle expressed in the third and fourth verses. And is it not equally manifest, that the specifications in verses 7–18, come naturally under the general rule delivered in the ​sixth verse? They all refer to incestuous intercourse between persons nearly related by consanguinity or affinity. We repeat it, these prohibitions all rest upon the same common basis; they form one law of incest; or, if you prefer it, one section of the general law. Their basis, their object, their penalty, are one and the same.
This law is rightly denominated a natural law; for it is founded in nature. By this we mean, it is founded on the natural relation which subsists between us, dependent creatures, and God, our creator and preserver; and the relations which He has constituted between us and some of our fellow-creatures, as social beings. It may in part be discovered by the deductions of right reason, unaided by a written revelation; but it can be fully known only by the light of that written revelation which God has given to His Church.
The Puritan speaks of "the voice of nature,"—"the book of nature,"—"the law of nature,"—and of being "abhorrent to nature." But he has not explained his meaning. He has not told us how the voice of nature speaks to us, nor ​how we learn to know what in regard to marriage is abhorrent to nature.
At the commencement of the human race, it is certain the voice of nature did not forbid the marriage of brothers and sisters; nor did nature abhor such connexions. They were right, and approved by God; and in the circumstances in which the first children of Adam were placed, brothers and sisters felt no repugnance of nature to marry one another.
But, in subsequent times, when the human race had multiplied, so that wives could be found without the family circle, a different state of feeling was produced, and men regarded the marriage of brothers and sisters as unlawful, and contrary to the Divine will. There is now a repugnance to such connexions. They are felt to be incestuous, and are to be abhorred.
How was this change in the views and feelings of men on this subject produced? Was a change wrought by the Creator's hand, in the nature of man, that gave rise to new feelings and new views? or did the great Lawgiver interpose, by an announcement of His will, that such marriages should no longer be contracted, ​and thus excite new views and new feelings? Which is the more probable? When we consider how frequently, and in what various ways, He has graciously condescended to reveal His will to the children of men, does not the latter mode appear the more probable?
We know inspired teachers were not wanting in the first ages of the world. Such were Adam, Enoch, and Noah; and probably others of whom we have not heard. Adam, our great progenitor, had, at his creation, a perfect knowledge of moral duty; for he was created in the image of God, in knowledge, righteousness, and true holiness. He had also a vast extent of intellect, as appears from his intuitive view of the nature of marriage, and from his ability to give appropriate names to all cattle, and fowls, and beasts, as they were brought before him by the Creator. Gen. 2:19, 20. His intellect was indeed darkened by his mournful apostasy (Gen. 3:10); yet we have reason to believe, he retained much of the knowledge imparted to him at his creation, and was competent to instruct his posterity on subjects of moral duty, as well as to preserve among them the great promise of a coming ​Deliverer, the expected seed of the woman, who was to bruise the serpent's head. Was not Adam acquainted with the law of incest? Did he not, in the course of his long life, extending over 930 years, inform his descendants, at a proper time, that it was the will of God that marriages between brothers and sisters should cease? By the inspired historian it is stated, that the improper marriages between "the sons of God," the professors and followers of the true religion, and "the daughters of men," apostates from the true religion, ungodly men, were displeasing to the LORD, and became a source of irreligion and wickedness. (Gen. 6:1–4.)
Enoch, the seventh from Adam, was a man of eminent piety. "He walked with God;" and as a reward of his singular piety, he was translated to heaven, and exempted from the pains and corruption of death. (Gen. 5:24. Heb. 11:5.) This pre-eminently pious man was a prophet, as we are informed by the apostle Jude; and he prophesied to the Antediluvians of the second coming of our Lord, with his holy angels, to execute judgment on all unrighteous and ungodly men. And while he warned them of the ​approaching judgment and coming wrath, by which they would be most justly punished for their sins, did he not state distinctly what were the sins of which they were guilty, and what were the commandments which they had violated? And was not the law of marriage then known, so far as to prohibit the union of brothers and sisters?
Noah, we are informed by Peter, (2 Pet. 2:5,) was "a preacher of righteousness;" and, during the one hundred and thirty years of God's forbearance, when He afforded space for repentance to that wicked generation of men who were destroyed by the flood, this godly man did not cease to warn them of their imminent danger, and urge them to flee from their sins. Was not this inspired man acquainted with the law of incest? Had not God as yet revealed His will on this interesting subject?
The Jews had a tradition about the seven precepts of Noah; among them was one relating to incest. It is highly probable that his descendants were instructed on the law of marriage, and the limits set to this intimate connexion. The religious information imparted by Noah, ​was retained, more or less, by the nations that sprung from him; and additional light in regard to religious subjects, was diffused among Gentile nations, by intercourse with the Jewish people, who lived in their own land, and those who were scattered abroad in different parts of the world, especially after the Babylonish captivity. Their sacred scriptures were translated into the Greek language, two hundred and fifty years before the Christian æra.
It is no unreasonable supposition, that the best laws and customs of the ancient heathen nations were derived from Divine revelation. Selden expresses his belief on this point, in the strongest terms. Referring to the received sentiments and institutions of Gentile nations, ancient and modern, in regard to incestuous marriages, on account of relationship, he says, in a parenthesis: "Quæ, procul-dubio, Legi Sacræ ejus que interpretamentis diversimode acceptis, originem suam inprimis debent." Uxor Ebraica Lib. I. chap. vi. This learned man had well studied the subject, and his opinion is probably correct.
The repeated revelations of the Divine will, ​given at various periods of the world, will justify the belief, that God has left none of his creatures to collect the knowledge of duty, merely from the contemplation of the nature of things; but has revealed and announced a law of moral duty and of marriage, corresponding with the nature of things established by Himself, and which of course He knows most perfectly. A portion of the light of His revelations has reached, more or less, all nations.
If this reasoning be or be not admitted as correct, one thing has, we think, been proved: God has revealed a law of incest, and authoritatively determined the limits of legitimate marriage; and this law is found in these Levitical statutes. The prohibition against the marriage of parents with children, and of brothers with sisters, is generally admitted to be founded in nature, and therefore to be a natural law.
But beyond this, jurists and legislators seem unwilling to extend the limits of unlawful marriages. Sir William Scott, however, (afterwards Lord Stowell,) who is styled, we repeat it, by Chancellor Kent, "a great master of public and municipal law," has recently adjudged a ​marriage between an uncle and a niece to be incestuous; "a nuisance extremely offensive to the laws and manners of society, and tending to endless confusion, and the pollution of the sanctity of private life."
Jurists see the first part of the Levitical law to be founded in nature. For this they are able to assign sufficient reasons to satisfy their minds on the point; but in regard to the rest of these statutes, they cannot assign the same reasons for the prohibitions: and, therefore, they chose to denominate these positive law. Is this reasonable? The law, we have seen, is one law. All its prohibitions rest on the same basis; all have the same object in view; and all are enforced by the same spiritual punishment. Why then should a part of this one and the same law be regarded as founded in nature, and another part be considered as only positive? The inability of jurists to discover by the deductions of their own reason the whole extent of the law of nature, is no sufficient reason for not admitting the whole of this Levitical law to be a natural law, ​founded in nature. The ignorance of uncultivated minds, unable to determine what is the law of nature, and what is not, cannot affect the character of the natural law, acknowledged to be such by the common consent of jurists and legislators. And why should the weakness of the human mind to discover the whole extent of a natural law, affect the natural character of this one Levitical law of marriage; when it is evident, from an inspection of it, that the whole rests on the same basis, the natural relations which rational creatures sustain to their Creator and to one another? Can not His omniscient eye see farther than the human eye? Does not the Maker of all things, the Architect of nature, know perfectly that nature which He created, and all the relations which He has constituted between his rational creatures?
Let us for a moment look at the particulars in this law. It prohibits marriage between
1. Parents and children: vs. 7, 8.
2. Brothers and sisters: v. 9.
3. A man and his grand-daughter: v. 10.
4. A man and his father's wife's daughter: v. 11.
​5. A man and his aunt, either his father's or his mother's sister: vs. 12, 13.
6. A man and his uncle's wife: v. 14.
7. A man and his daughter-in-law: v. 15.
8. A man and his brother's wife: v. 16.
9. A man and his wife's daughter: v. 17.
10. A man and his wife's son's daughter, or her daughter's daughter: v. 17.
11. A man and his sister-in-law: v. 18.
Why should the prohibition of any of these marriages be regarded as not belonging to natural law? Let the question be again proposed, What is meant by the law of nature? Chancellor Kent has well answered this question. In his adjudication of the case of Whitman vs. Whitman, he says, "By the law of nature I understand those fit and just rules of conduct, which the Creator has prescribed to a man, as a dependent and social being; and which are to be ascertained from the deductions of right reason, though they may be more precisely known and more explicitly declared by Divine revelation."
​This definition is just. It involves the following points:—1. The law of nature is the Creator's law;—2. It is founded on relations;—3. Human reason is incompetent to discover it in its full extent;—4. Divine revelation alone can make it fully known.
The law of nature is indeed the Creator's law; and rules derived from the consideration of the nature of things, have no binding authority on the conscience, except so far as they indicate the Divine will. They bind the conscience anterior to human legislation. God has not left the law of incest to be collected from the deductions of fallible reason. He himself has promulgated it at different periods, so that heathen nations have learned something of it by tradition; and by his servant Moses, He vouchsafed, in writing, to his chosen people, a full revelation of His will on this interesting subject. Why, then, should any reject the light He has shed on a part of moral duty, so important to be known? We needed the light of revelation to ascertain our duty fully. God has given this heavenly light. Let us thankfully receive the gift, and walk in the light.
​Is it reasonable to deny any part of this law to be founded in nature, when every part so manifestly rests upon the same basis, relationship by consanguinity and affinity? Why assert a part, and not the whole, to be binding on us? Why denominate it a revelation to the Hebrew commonwealth, and not to the Church? Why call it a municipal, and not an ecclesiastical law?
The Puritan has assailed particularly that part of this law which prohibits the marrying of a brother's widow. This he will have to belong to the Jewish civil law, and to have been repealed. He however has offered no arguments in favor of his position. It is merely assumption.
We have proved, we believe, this whole Levitical law to be an ecclesiastical, moral, and natural law, unrepealed, and binding on all Christians.
One objection remains to be noticed. On p. 9, 2d par., the Puritan says, "Since ever after the race was fully constituted for multiplication, it was against the law of nature for brothers and sisters to marry, and God himself could not either allow or command it."
​It has been already remarked, that our brother speaks of "the law of nature," without explaining his meaning. But what is this law of nature but the law of God, the Author of nature? Distinct from the Creator's law there is no law of nature. Some parts of the laws of God are mutable, and others immutable. The Decalogue is a moral and natural law; natural, because it is founded in the natural relations that subsist between us and the Creator, and between us and our fellow-creatures. This law requires us to love God; and we cannot conceive this obligation should ever cease, or that the contrary should ever "be allowed or commanded." We are required to love our neighbor, not excepting our enemies; and this precept involves the duty of praying for them: but we are not permitted to pray for the wicked when dead; we must leave them in the hands of their Judge, who will do them no act of injustice. Before death the obligation to pray for a sinner may cease: "If any man see his brother sin a sin which is not unto death, he shall ask, and he shall give him life for them that sin not unto death." "But," adds the inspired writer, "There is a sin unto ​death: I do not say that he shall pray for it." 1 John 5:16.
So it is with the law of marriage. We cannot conceive of a case in which it could be lawful for a parent to marry his daughter. But we know that, at the commencement of the human race, it was lawful for brothers and sisters to marry. And since the multiplication of the human race, affirms our brother, "God could not either allow or command it." We dislike this language; it savors of irreverence. Suppose Noah and his wife alone had been saved from the destructive deluge, and they had begotten children after the flood, would it not have been again lawful for brothers and sisters to marry? Or suppose Noah, during the three hundred and fifty years he lived after the deluge, had begotten children, would not marriages between uncles and nieces have been allowed?
The Puritan goes on, in the same paragraph to affirm: "And we repeat, that if it were a moral wrong for one to marry his brother's widow, God could not have commanded it as he ​did." What is a moral wrong? Is it not sin? And what is sin? An inspired writer has answered the question: "Sin is a trangression of the law." Did not the Israelites, when, in opposition to a Divine command, they refused to march forward and take possession of the promised land, and when they threatened to stone Joshua and Caleb who exhorted them to go forward, sin? Did they not commit a "moral wrong?" And when God, to punish them for their disobedience, reversed his command, and swore they should perish in the wilderness, did they not sin again—again commit a "moral wrong," by attempting to march forward in opposition to His will? See Num. xiii. and xiv.
The Puritan has failed in his attempt to prove, the prohibition to "uncover the nakedness of a brother's wife," does not involve a prohibition to marry a brother's widow. We have shown that the Levitical law relates to marriage, as well as to single incestuous acts; and it follows, that in all cases, except one, if a Jew married the widow of his brother, he ​, he committed a "moral wrong;" because he violated a command of God. There is now, under the Christian dispensation, no exception to this prohibition. This ecclesiastical law of marriage, of permanent obligation, prohibits every one who hears it, marrying his brother's widow; and whoever does form such a connexion sins, he commits "a moral wrong."
Our brother, holding fast to his error, and confident of being right, boldly affirms, in the fifth paragraph, "So that, after all the objections that have been urged, the argument remains in all its force, that the marriage of a brother's widow is not an immorality per se; for if it had been, God could not, in any case, have commanded it." By "an immorality per se," our brother means an act which, in no possible circumstances, it would become a holy God to allow. We cordially agree with him that the marriage of a brother's widow is not such an act. Nor is the marriage of brothers and sisters such an act; for this plain reason, there have been circumstances in which God did permit and require such marriages. Still, however, as it is now unlawful for brothers and sisters, in ​any case, to marry, so it is now unlawful for a man, in any case, to marry his brother's widow. Both are forbidden by the law of God, given to His Church, which law is really a moral and a natural law.
* ↑ Marshall, pp. 86–88.
* ↑ Kent's Com., vol. ii. p. 82.
* ↑ Conflict of Laws, p. 105, a note, 4 Johns. Ch. R. p. 343.