# The Lessons of the German Events/Chapter 2

II
COMRADE BRANDLER'S REPORT
How is the October defeat to be explained? The representative of the Executive has described how he came to Germany to the Chemnitz Conference on the 22nd and was faced with a fait accompli. It must be made quite clear what it was that created the situation the Executive Representative had described.
I came to Germany on October 8th: on the 12th the Saxon Government was already formed. I arrived when the negotiations for the formation of the Government were almost completed. Events moved with great rapidity. I had no time to consider the situation which faced me carefully and thoroughly. The participation in the Saxon Government was a result of the decision of the Executive. The Executive demanded by telegram that the comrades should enter the government although the necessary preparations had not been made. I was against the proposal ​made by Zinoviev in the telegram, and in favour of the amendment of Radek, for I believed that if the intention of entering the Saxon Government was in order to make it possible to arm, this could only follow after intensive preparation both in Saxony and in the rest of the Reich. The decision to enter the Government was precipitately carried into effect. The object of entering the Government was not a parliamentary manœuvre, but in order to procure arms, Since the entry into the Government took place practically without preparation, the necessary measures could not be taken. In order to procure arms one must know the bureaucratic machine and one must know the arms depots. For this purpose certain preparatory measures are necessary, of which not a single one was taken. The bureaucratic machine must be conquered and learned before we can use it. These may appear to petty and irrelevant details, but for us they were of the greatest importance. The Communist period of power lasted nine days in all. During these nine days nothing was done, except that attempts were made to procure weapons. The attempts failed owing to insufficient preparation.
I am still of the opinion that it was possible to make a better thing of the Saxon experiment than was actually the case. It is highly probable that in future things will develop quite differently and we shall never have a similar situation again. We must learn from the mistakes we have made.
Thälmann said that at bottom we did not believe in the revolution and that therefore when the moment became ripe for the fight, we were unable to make a sudden spring. This argument, stated with Thälmann's power of conviction, seems very plausible. Nevertheless it is false. I put the question thus: was the situation in October objectively ripe? Does the revolution depend upon the fact—although nobody more appreciates the subjective role of the Communist Party than I—that leaders of the Communist Party have no inner faith in the revolution? Does revolution come to a hilt on that account? Or are there other forces objectively at work preventing it from breaking out? If Thälmann is right then we have betrayed the revolution. The matter is then quite simple. The traitors must be removed and the 100 per cent. revolutionists put in their place.
Comrades, the March action in 1921 showed us that the whole class situation, the objective relations as a whole, had not ripened to such a degree that we could overthrow capitalism by a storm attack. Objective factors so brought it about that in the March action after a storm attack we were badly defeated. For this defeat, I personally was made just as responsible as for the October defeat, although the situations were entirely different. But that by the way. I have committed political errors, and so did other conrades. But I think it is my nature not to commit the same error twice. I assume full responsibility for the October retreat. I assert that if I had not intervened in the very critical situation ​after the Chemnitz conference, and entirely reversed matters, we should have entered upon a fight which would have brought us decisive retreat with the result that all question as to the possibility of a victory of the proletariat would have been impossible for many years to come. I personally assume all responsibility for the retreat. I go further: in a similar situation I would have behaved in exactly the same way. We consulted with the Executive. We believed that we could make Central Germany a marching off place, that from defence we could pass to attack, and thence to the fight for the dictatorship of the proletariat. The Executive in September gave its complete consent to this plan. The plan was correct, but in estimating the relation of forces, we—the Executive Committee of the Communist International and the Central Committee of the German Communist Party alike—made a mistake. We chose the easiest path for the victory of the revolution. The victory, however, is somewhat more difficult. What was the estimate of the relation of forces on the basis of which we chose this relatively easiest path? In order to make this clear, I must deal with the events which took place during the occupation of the Ruhr.
The Leipsic Party Congress coincided with the beginning of the Ruhr occupation. It was clear to us that the occupation of the Ruhr would be of decisive importance for the development of events in Germany and for the German revolution.
(Hesse and Mastov: But nothing was said about it.)
This question was clearly dealt with by us in the manifesto and by Comrade Zetkin in her report.
(R. Fischer: At the public meeting.)
The manifesto was adopted unanimously at the Party Congress. It was therefore not at the public meeting; it was the expression of opinion of the Party Congress, and in fact this point of view was documented at the ceremonial session.
We defined our attitude on this matter in the political report also. In this report I stated that we could not foresee whether we should remain long in the trough of the revolutionary wave in which we then were, or whether the occupation of the Ruhr would bring us on to a new rising revolutionary wave. There was not one among you then who was wiser than I, and who could have declared that we were certainly going to rise on a revolutionary wave. And in the theses, which were adopted by the majority, I declared that we must be prepared for both possibilities. The Party policy was carried on on the basis of this decision of the Leipsic Party Congress. What was this policy? It was that we could at first mobilise the masses against the Ruhr occupation only with difficulty. We could not get them to rise against the occupation. They were not moved by the broad national tumult; only the petty-bourgeoisie was to any extent nationalist and nationally aroused. We had, before attempting to create a movement, to grope for what would arouse the masses and make them ​fight. We issued ten rallying slogans, which were somewhat mixed and confused. Why? In order to orient ourselves as to on what grounds we could lead the proletariat into the fight and in order to get beyond mere propaganda. It was the period when the opposition was determined to have action at any price; when they issued the slogan for the occupation of the factories, which the French were also advocating, and which the Party had rejected. We brought the workers into action with the slogan for the Control Commissions and the formation of proletarian hundreds. We did not invent this slogan but arrived at it after testing the situation.
Such was the situation at the beginning of the Ruhr war. It ended very quickly, after the passive resistance of the German bourgeoisie had collapsed in May and all the costs and burdens not only of the first so-called fulfilment policy, but also so-called policy of sabotage, were placed upon the shoulders of the proletariat. There began for the first time that elemental struggle of the Ruhr population, which came without opposition under the leadership of the Communist Party. What the Social-Democrats before the war and during the war failed to obtain, and what we also failed to obtain after the war, namely, the determined leadership of a broad mass movement, we obtained for the first time after the collapse of the passive resistance of the German bourgeoisie.
Of course it is now easy to say that the characteristic of the Ruhr war was that it was the rising wave of the proletariat.
After the Ruhr strike came the strike in Upper Silesia, where we were again able, uncontested, to lead the proletariat into the fight. This proves that the influence of the united front, as we conducted it, was successful.
Comrades, I now come to the most important point of all. What was shown in these struggles in the Ruhr and in Upper Silesia was also shown in Saxony at the beginning of the Ruhr occupation. In Saxony, too, we succeeded in gaining the leadership not only of the non-party working-class masses, but also of the organised Social-Democratic masses; this was thanks to our whole Saxon policy, by which we prevented the coalition of the Social-Democrats with the bourgeoisie, and by which the Right opportunist leaders, under the pressure of the Social-Democratic workers, rejected compromise and a coalition Government with the bourgeoisie and, under the pressure of the Social-Democratic and other workers, declared themselves ready to co-operate with the Communists.
Thus at three points, in the Ruhr, in Upper Silesia and Saxony, and later in Central Germany, we held the leadership of the working class fairly securely in our hands.
But it is worth while examining why the workers entrusted themselves to our leadership in all the questions of their daily needs—in the Ruhr mainly on the question of wages; in Upper ​Silesia the same; only in Saxony did we go a shade further: there we were entrusted with the leadership of the political struggle on the question of taking advantage of the existing parliamentary situation.
Comrades, I do not want to deny any blame; I am an exponent of the policy of the Party since Leipsic and of the Saxon policy. But, comrades, it would be absurd, it would be entirely over-estimating my capacities, strength, and influence, to suggest that I was able to force a false political policy upon the whole Party. What is then in dispute? The quite definite circumstances under which we undertook the struggle. And what were these circumstances? In Saxony we forced the dissolution of the Landtag; we had a proletarian majority in the Landtag. Had we declared, as the opposition demanded, that the proletarian majority did not interest us in the least, that we would not attempt to make use of it, then I say, we should have become a sect not only in Saxony but also in the whole of Germany. We had to take up the struggle in the situation which then existed, with all its good sides and all its bad sides. Mistakes were made. The force of the attack and the impulse of the Party should have been stronger; greater advantages should have been obtained; but the decisive factor is not the great or small mistakes that we made, but the given conditions for the fight of which we had to make use. And what use had we to make of them? The slogans of the Third and Fourth Congresses. To the Masses. Make Use of the Questions of the Day. What resulted? Judged by our standards something quite worthless; a great deal, comparatively; freedom of movement for the formation of the Control Commissions, the Factory Councils, and the Proletarian Hundreds.
What was the result of exploiting the existing situation? Certainly, judged by the ultimate aims of Communism, nothing, something entirely worthless; but judged by the vital needs of the workers. something more: absolute confidence in the leadership of the German Communist Party.
This policy led to very dangerous illusions among the workers, who estimate too lightly the path laying before them. In our own Party circles illusions were created which perhaps might have been prevented by an intensive propaganda of principles. But the greatest danger was that they said to themselves: first a bourgeois coalition, then a Social-Democratic Government supported by the Communists, then a Government of Communists and Social-Democrats, and then a Government of the Communists—and all this without the necessity for severe and bloody fights. This frame of mind was a by-product of our policy, but that of course could not be avoided.
It would have been childish to say that since these dangers and difficulties must arise we must not pursue this policy. We had to attempt to overcome them. And how did we overcome ​them? By taking the Social-Democratic workers by the scruff of the neck, by destroying their illusions with facts. Their hopes for an easy path were destroyed by practice and in the course of events.
A rising revolutionary wave began. We saw only one side of it—its good side. What was the Cuno strike? The Cuno strike was in Berlin nothing but a continuation of the revolutionary wages fights in the Ruhr, in Upper Silesia, and Saxony. But such a fight in Berlin has an entirely different political significance from a fight in the Ruhr, in Saxony, or in Upper Silesia. The strike took place during a Government crisis and precipitated the fall of the Cuno Government, But, comrades. it: was only a political strike in its effects and in the given situation. In the sense of a conscious revolutionary aim, the Cuno strike was not a political strike, it had no elemental force behind it.
Serious preparations for civil war were begun by the Party in many, in fact in nearly all places, only after the manifesto of July 11. This inadequate preparation was due to objective weaknesses, since the anti-Fascist Day, with its tremendous possibilities for agitation among the petty-bourgeoisie and the workers, created a situation in which it was almost universally believed that on the 29th the Communists would begin the attack.
There were signs of a rising revolutionary movement. We had temporarily the majority of the workers behind us, and in this situation believed that under favourable circumstances we could proceed immediately to attack. In my opinion we were mistaken. The unfortunate thing was that we over-estimated the fighting power of the majority in the Ruhr, in Saxony, and in Berlin, we could not organise it and consolidate it. As we grew stronger the Government retaliated, It retaliated by prohibiting the Factory Councils.
This situation, which was pregnant of any possibility, we as the Communist Party were unable to drive forward into a storm attack, as we have imagined. And I believe—I must say this quite plainly and bluntly—that had we, as Radek states, recognised this then, and had we in good time, as a Party and as an Executive, taken the necessary, measures, had we begun the decisive fight, then the final victory perhaps may not have come in October, but certainly we should not have suffered the defeat we did suffer during the retreat. When we undertook to take advantage of the favourable situation in Central Germany and Saxony for a storm attack against the bourgeoisie, we overlooked the fact that the enemy had already long had the initiative, and that we were unable when the enemy struck first and took the offensive to organise serious resistance.
If I had not wasted the time at my disposal for my report by a too lengthy introduction I should proceed to point out what made the attack of the enemy easy, and how we duped ourselves, ​how we saw the situation in a false light. The enemy was able by means of petty-bourgeois Fascism in Bavaria to draw off attention from their open and secret preparations for the seizure of power through Fascism in its heavy industrial and agrarian capitalist form—in the form of Seeckt. As in 1914, 1918, and in the Kapp Putsch, so here too, the victory of Fascism without a fight was possible only because it was covered by the Social-Democrats; Fascism, like the Noske military dictatorship and the November Republic in 1918, acted so to speak from behind the backs of the Social-Democrats. The preparations for the victory of Fascism were concealed by the Coalition Government, by the empowering laws, and by the consent of the Social-Democrats. The belief arose among the masses, not in the Communist Party, but among the elements influenced by the Social-Democrats, in the trade unions, and among the unorganised working-class masses, that the enemy was in Bavaria, and that all these preparations for the seizure of power by Fascism was not intended for a fight against the proletariat, as they really were, but for a fight against the petty-bourgeois Fascist clique, Hitler, Ludendorff, &c.
Comrades, if after the many years of war policy of the German Social-Democrats, if after five years of their post-war policy, it was possible for them to deceive and influence wide sections of the workers by such obvious manœuvres, and for the united front to be shattered by the facts which I have been unable to describe as well as I wished, then we were faced by a situation in which we as Communists had in spite of a shattered united front, either to take up the fight or reject it. That is the situation we were faced with. And I assert that had we, in October, after the manœuvres of the bourgeoisie with the aid of the Social-Democrats succeeded, taken up the fight we should have been forced on from a position of defence against the Reich Executive immediately to the decisive struggle for the proletarian dictatorship. The March action then would have been mere child's play, a poor jest in comparison with the defeat which we would have suffered in that situation. The Central Committee of the German Communist Party, but also the Executive, in drawing their fighting plans, considered only the Party and the proletariat. We overlooked the possibilities and chances and the capacity for manœuvring of the bourgeoisie. It is true that we one-sidedly concentrated our attention only upon Central Germany—the Executive was acquainted with our point of view and did not correct it. I assert that a decisive fight for power was in October and November possible only in Central Germany, and then only under favourable circumstances. These favourable circumstances did not present themselves, partly because of the errors of the Party committed during the decisive weeks, while we were in Moscow. The Party failed to undertake a rousing political campaign. Not sufficient use was made of the empowering law and the temporary prohibitions. But the plan was ​drawn up in conjunction with the Executive Committee. If we want to learn, we must criticise the false plan and its mistaken realisation. The great error which resulted in a depression of a part of the working class masses, we considered only one possible form of struggle, namely, the fight for the proletarian power; had only the dictatorship of the proletariat in mind and no other situation. Therefore we were unable to direct the retreat successfully, and could offer no resistance, as we did during the Cuno strike. Had we not staked all or nothing, we might have undertaken a defensive action, which, of course, would not have ended in victory but would certainly have saved us from decisive defeat. The representative of the Executive in his report stated that comrades during the defeat declared that it was undertaken without a fight. That is not true. From the very first we conducted retiring actions—demonstrations and strikes—and in the very first circulars and instructions. The Party did not act so rapidly. By its victory without a fight Fascism temporarily greatly affected the influence of the Communist Party over the masses. We were consequently not in a position to resist Fascism, to place the Party on an illegal basis, and to take up the struggle anew. It is for this and not a false tactic in the past we have to thank the defeat of October. In the circumstances which existed in 1921 during the March action, I declare that if the decision again lay with me I would pursue the same policy and tactics. No other policy was possible. What the comrades of the opposition desire will lead to the enfeeblement of the German revolution, in spite of their burning love for revolutionary fights, expressed by Thälmann. Speeches such as Thälmann made are easy, but if you are unable to rally the masses, you will be unable to carry out the tasks you set yourself. If we can bring the masses into the struggle, then in the struggle we shall overcome our weaknesses. By increasing our aims and intensifying the struggle we shall be able to secure victory. This time the necessary pre-requisites were lacking. In common with the Executive Committee, we over-estimated our strength and underestimated the strength of the enemy. We were therefore compelled to retreat.
In conclusion let me deal with the prospects for the future.
As far as they are concerned, there are no great differences between us and the opposition. Victory has placed State power completely into the hands of the Fascists. As far as it still tolerates the November Republic, Fascism may either embellish it or abolish it as it wishes. The Fascist dictatorship rests upon the alliance between industry and the agrarians. They can keep the proletariat under for some length of time, and give Fascism a breathing space only if they succeed: (1) in emerging from financial bankruptcy: (2) in winning over and subordinating petty-bourgeoisie Fascism by repressions and concessions: and (3) in splitting the working class by maintaining the appearance of democracy using the Social-Democrats as auxiliary troops, using repressive measures ​against the Communist Party, and by playing off the unemployed against the employed. The power of the State and militarism which Fascism has at its disposal, have enabled it to force the ten-hour day upon the proletariat with little resistance. Defensive fights of any importance began only in January. In spite of the reports of the resistance of the workers to the lengthening of the working day, it must be said that the proletariat is in such a state of depression that it accepted the ten-hour day without a fight. The attempts of the Communists to organise resistance against the ten-hour day have met with no great practical results.
What is the reason? In this present economic crisis the proletariat is split. The unemployed is in such a situation that they must fight or be crushed, and their fight will be a light of despair if the workers leave them in the lurch. There are over three million unemployed in Germany, and they are in such a situation that they must fight. Alone they have no chance of victory. What is the position of the other sections of the working class? There are three million short-time workers in Germany. Depression prevails among the full-time workers also for they are afraid of becoming unemployed or short-time workers. Among the full-time workers and the short-time workers there are sections who, if it were a question of at once entering upon a decisive struggle, weapon in hand, would be prepared for it, but who hesitate to undertake the necessary preliminary small fights, demonstrations, strikes, &c. This is a fact we have to face boldly. If the bourgeoisie succeeds in extending the breach between the unemployed and the full-time workers and short-time workers, it will gain for itself a longer breathing space. This, of course, depends upon the possibility of restoring a temporary economic balance.
Such are the prospects. Lamentations are useless. All the conditions exist to permit us shortly, if we are able, to rally the masses again and to fight. If the Party, as a result of the October defeat, and in the process of self-examination, reaches a crisis, if it is split, then we have lost five years of work. The October defeat was a severe defeat. It has disintegrated the Social-Democrats as never before. The Social-Democrats are faced with a split. This means that if we are not capable of assimilating this section of the working class, a new centrist party will arise. If we cannot assimilate it, if the new party manages to exist more than half-a-year, if we pursue a policy of phrases, as the opposition does, we shall become a sect. We shall then have a new centrist party which will grow not only from elements split off from the Social-Democrats, but also from losses from the Communist Party. This will mean the defeat of the German Revolution for many years, and what is more, the defeat of the world revolution. It is therefore a question of the greatest importance. In spite of the October defeat, there is no need for pessimism. Never before was the activity of the German party of such great importance as it is at the present moment.