# The Lessons of the German Events/Chapter 5

V
SPEECH BY COMRADE ZINOVIEV
Comrades, we must examine the situation in which this discussion commenced.
We are all agreed that we have suffered a severe defeat. I think it is an exaggeration to say that we have suffered disaster, but still, the reverse was serious. Our experience is that this is the best test for every revolutionary party and every party policy, and precisely during this defeat must we undergo this test. If we lose heart and paint everything in the darkest colours, then the Party may indeed break up. Now in the time of reverse, every German comrade must show of what he is capable. It is quite easy to be in a good mood during victory, but it is during this period of difficulty that we must show faith in the Party.
Just one word before going into the essentials of the subject. It has been said here that a split in the German Communist Party would mean the collapse of the German Revolution, or at least that the Revolution would be postponed for five years. This is absolutely true. For that reason I think that we must enter into the discussion determined that who ever, irrespective of persons, in the spirit of factionalism, even if out of conviction, threatens the unity of the Party at this particular stage, must be branded as committing a crime against the German working class. Situations arise in which we must be prepared to split, and we have had splits, but situations also arise when we must put up with anything to avoid a split. I assert that we have just such a situation now in Germany. Whoever at this moment is aiming at a split, even from conviction, is objectively aiding the Social-Democrats and the bourgeoisie, and not the German working class.
And now to the essentials of the discussion.
It is attempted to assert here: October was not a mistake, we have not under-estimated, but it was before that, in the beginning of the Ruhr crisis that the present situation arose.
Of course, had we begun to make preparations at the opening of the Ruhr crisis, we would have been much better prepared, and the earlier we would have made our preparations the better it would have been. But this kind of argument can be stretched quite a long way. It is a sophism to endeavour to conceal the error at the point where it was actually committed. We must be honest to ourselves, and if we are we shall discover the error.
The picture which Comrade Koenig described of the incident between the German women and the French soldiers, was interesting. Indeed, the Ruhr situation was the starting point of the whole business.
I have before me the instructions of the Executive to the Communist Delegation of the Frankfurt Conference of March 17, 1923. What did we say?
​"The Essen Conference was mainly a demonstration conference. The conference of March 17 must be a working conference."
In the circumstances under which the Essen Conference was held even a demonstration was a great political event. The more or less successful co-ordination of the activities of the French and German Communist Parties in connection with the occupation of the Ruhr must not be under-estimated. Merely to repeat the Essen affair at this moment, however, would mean a step backwards. The conference of March 17, and particularly the preliminary conference, have two tasks to perform.
(a) To draw up a real, common, clear, fixed, and concentrated programme of action for the important sections affected.
(b) To draw up and actually carry out a number of organisational and partially conspirative measures.
Then follows a whole chapter dealing with the tasks of the French Party.
Consequently, the Executive saw the tasks ahead, and pointed them out to the Conference. That these tasks. were badly fulfilled, in spite of the fact that the youth in France are now well trained, can, if you will, now be asserted. We have done this sufficiently, but we must not reduce this to a sophism; that because we did not at that time raise the question of armed revolt, therefore, the mistake was committed at that time.
No, the mistake in October was due to the German Party and partly also due to the Executive.
On the question of fixing a date, Comrade Trotsky wrote an article in which he raised the point of a time-table.
That was a mistake. I must say that Radek was opposed to this.
(Brandler: I, too.)
Brandler, too. We decided that the date should be fixed merely for our orientation, and that the question must be settled in Germany. Therefore the question of the date was not a mistake on the part of the Executive or on the part of the Russian Party. We decided in the proper way.
Let me quote to you another document, Our telegram of October 1, 1928, concerning Saxony:—
"As we have estimated that the decisive moment will arrive not later than four, five, or six weeks, we consider it necessary that every position that can bring immediate advantage be occupied. In view of the situation, the question of our entry into the Saxony Government must be raised practically. We must enter on the condition that the Zeigner people are really prepared to defend Saxony against Bavaria and the Fascists, the immediate arming of 50,000 to 60,000, and that General Muller be ignored. The same to apply to Thuringen."
This is a telegram that was decided on in the presence of Brandler. Was it correct, or not? It was absolutely correct, ​if the Zeigner people really desired to fight the Fascists and arm 50,000 to 60,000 workers.
(Varski: It was a great mistake.)
The representative of the German Party gave us this figure, 50,000 to 60,000. (Pieck: The Party was not informed of these conditions.)
This telegram was decided on in the presence of three German and three Russian comrades.
However, how did we present the situation to ourselves? As an episode in the civil war, and we informed you of this in the text.
I want, thirdly, to make another quotation on the question of our attitude to the Left Social-Democracy and towards the Social-Democracy as a whole. "In the presence of the German representatives, we resolved that we have to conduct the campaign, not only without the Left Social-Democracy, but even against it."
These documents are sufficient to recall to your minds what the Executive had decided.
These documents should also refresh your memories, and you will understand how the Executive was placed, and that the comrades had agreed to its position.
(Brandler: I did not agree to the telegram.)
Comrades, I must admit that I and the other comrades bear most of the responsibility for the entry into the Saxony Government. Brandler somewhat hesitated on this, He said "I do not know whether the situation is ripe for it," but he agreed. I do not wish to shirk any responsibility. It was the general view, and decided upon with you after consultation with the French, with the Polish, and with the Czecho-Slovak Parties, we said, if it was really a question of weeks we must utilise this in the event of civil war.
Well, this was the general view.
Now, comrades, how was it carried out? That is the most important question. Take Saxony. Comrade Remmele said yesterday: "Is it so important to bring up now about the Ministers being too late? Is not this opportunism? What can we expect from Minister?"
What is right in this statement? Of course, the most important is what the masses do. But for us, it is a symptom of wrong tendencies in the Party. The main question is, of course, why the civil war did not come, and why the masses could not be mobilised. You must understand, however, why we place so much importance upon the speeches of the Communist ministers: because it was a Ssmptom of the wrong tendency in our Party. Who were the minister ? Our leading and best comrades. Brandler, Heckert, Boettcher. For us, their speeches were a symptom of decay.
(Thälmann: Quite true.)
Compare the ideas contained in our telegram with the style ​of the speeches of these ministers. Of course, the most important is, why the masses did not rise, but the conduct of the ministers implied something. It implied an incorrect orientation.
Comrade Fischer undoubtedly exaggerated yesterday when she said that Brandler was playing a deliberate game. One of the greatest defects of Comrade Fischer's otherwise good speeches, is that she exaggerates. Things are reduced to a caricature. This generally is the chief defect of the left wing, and we have frequently said this to our bolshevik left. It is impossible that Brandler should have acted so deliberately.
(Walcher: It was her only argument.)
But she put forward many good arguments with which we must agree. The reason why we pay so much attention to the speeches of the Communist ministers was that they were the reflection of an incorrect policy. That is why things were reduced to a banal hotch-potch with the Social-Democracy.
We wrongly estimated the situation. We could not arm sixty, let alone 60,000. It turned out that the situation had been over-estimated. But why were we obliged to come out like Social-Democrats? Why should we have talked about the constitutionalness of our position? Why was it made to appear that we alone were responsible for the Landtag? This is old-fashioned and, at best, a Bebelist position of the '90's. Bebel in his best period said this. At that time it was right. Now, however, we must appeal to the direct revolutionary forces of the workers, and must say that the Left Social-Democracy is the principal enemy; the Left goes with the Right, with Seckt, Seckt with Ludendorf. But we must never say we stand on the basis of the constitution.
Therefore, the carrying out of the tasks was extraordinarily bad, and threatened greater dangers for our Party than anybody imagined. That is why we unanimously decided to send the critical letter to the German Central Committee. This, too, must not be forgotten. I do not wish to shift the responsibility upon other comrades. I wrote the letter. But it was not my personal letter, as has been stated in Germany. Yes, it is one of the notorious letters. A commission was appointed which included both Comrades Kolarov and Zetkin, who made certain amendments, most of which I accepted.
(Zetkin: I beg to observe that the letters were written before we had received full information—before we received any information.)
Of course, we were not as well informed as we are now. I am prepared to say that in certain details my decision now is different to what it was before, but in the main we were right. If we can defend what has happened in Germany—in Saxony, we should join the Second International. We do not need elastic formulas, but we must express the facts. We have already expressed much in the theses of the present majority on the Central Committee.
The attitude towards the Social-Democracy as a whole. It ​was here decided that the principal enemy is the Left Social Democracy, and that we must fight apart, without and against the Social-Democracy. I must confess that I said in this article, when in Berlin in the middle of October, some of our comrades had sat a week with these rascals, and drew up a programme; and the next day they said postpone the meeting for two days, we will come with a new programme.
Now, comrades, comes the question of the united front. Speaking generally, are there differences of opinion on this question in the Communist International? Yes, we have shades and nuances. We have not fought them out. Now, however, they must be fought out to the end.
Where is my mistake in having said at the meeting of the Enlarged Executive, that the workers' government is a pseudonym for the dictatorship of the proletariat. I was attacked by a representative of the majority. It was said: "You are spoiling our agitation, we cannot put forward this motto." I conceded, because I agreed that in practical agitation there is no need to blab at all. Now, however, it is clear that the objection was not made out of consideration for practical agitation, but an error in principle. Absolutely, however, the workers' government is nothing else than a pseudonym for the proletarian dictatorship—or else it is a Social-Democratic opposition.
Radek will assert that, immediately after Leipsic, I said: "Here we have either a great deviation in style or a great political deviation." Soon, I believe a week after, the conference of the Czecho-Slovak Party took place. The same formulations of democracy. It was clear that Brandler had united with them.
My mistake lay in not having fought the matter out. I said to myself wait, the thing is new, perhaps it can be fought out in a friendly way.
Well, the cry about the "pseudonym," the Leipsic decisions, then the decisions of the Czecho-Slovak., Party Conference, all these were opportunist deviations. We must watch this carefully and correct it, otherwise we shall corrupt our Party.
What is the united front? In the theses brought in by the Politbureau of our Russian Party, we say: "The united front is a method of revolution and not of evolution, a method of agitating and of mobilising the masses in the present period against the Social-Democracy," and nothing more. He who believes that it implies more is giving a finger to the devil. It is not and cannot mean any more than this. He who believes otherwise, makes a concession to the counter-revolutionary Social-Democracy. This must be fought out to the end.
Well, comrades, we must fight this question out now not nationally but internationally. I stand absolutely on the position of the Fourth Congress. What did the Fourth Congress say? Not every Labour government is a proletarian government. Look at the situation as it is now. In a few days, we shall have the ​MacDonald government in England. This will be a Labour government.
(A Voice: No.)
It is, or else you are against the decisions of the Fourth Congress. At the Fourth Congress we even quoted the case of Australia. Compare Saxony with MacDonald. Saxony is a bagatelle in comparison. But on the eve of the proletarian revolution in Germany it is a great episode. Compare the two. What do we see? Either the workers' government is a pseudonym for the proletarian dictatorship, or it is what the MacDonald government will be, a translation into English of the Scheidemann government. What did we have in Saxony? It was said objectively that it was an attempt on the part of the Communists to march together with the Social-Democrats, and objectively it resulted in a banal hoteh-potch.
Comrade Fischer quite rightly reminded us yesterday that the news of the entry of the Communists into the Saxony Government came during the Fourth Congress.
(A Voice: It was rejected.)
Rejected in Germany. The authoritative representatives of the Party, about twenty comrades including Thalheimer, Meier, and others were in Moscow. It is a fact that they favoured entry. We spent a whole evening fighting them, and the Russian Party leaders, including Lenin and Trotsky, unanimously resolved that we could not permit this, it would be opportunism. Why? I was and am of the opinion that the moment we entered this government, we would lose the practical possibility of utilising this watchword for the purpose of agitation. We take the workers' government as a pseudonym for proletarian dictatorship, and the moment it is achieved, it will damage the possibility of utilising this word agitationally.
The position with regard to the united front was similar. You will remember at the time the united front was resolved on came the idea of the Executive of the Three Internationals. I was of the opinion that this should be delayed as long as possible, for immediately we came together it would weaken the forces of the united front agitation. Nothing would come of it. Either we would make concessions to the Social-Democrats or nothing would come of it, and the centre of attraction of the united front would be lost. For it is nothing more than a method of agitation.
We must understand to apply it under varying conditions. He who expects more than this, stands on the position of the Social-Democracy. Yesterday Comrade Brandler said something that to me was most interesting. He said: we must admit that as a result of the application of the united front tactics the psychology of the masses has produced something in the nature of an evolutionary theory—first comes the bourgeois coalition, then the Social-Democratic Government supported by the Communists, and perhaps something will come after. Is it true ​that this view has arisen among the masses? If it is, then it is a strong argument against your application of the united front tactics.
Hesse: "Brandler's article."
There is something more important than Brandler's article: not merely Brandler's fault or the fault of the Executive, but an important fact, which we must investigate.
Koenen: "There is no such opinion."
Thälmann: "There is, particularly in Saxony."
Brandler was the first to assert this. In his declaration he laid special emphasis on this, for he was the father of the united front tactic in Germany, which is no reflection on him. We did this altogether. When he now says: objectively the position is that the masses conceive it was one government gradually developing out of the other, then we must ponder very deeply over where the fundamental error lies. I think it lies not in the united front tactics as such, but in their application. This must not be overlooked. This is a matter that cannot be taken lightly. It is a more weighty question than any other.
This then, is the position with regard to the united front. I think there is no cause for revising it fundamentally, Fundamentally, it is correct and will remain so. It is similar to the question of revolutionary parliamentarism. We stand with both feet firmly on that ground. How did we fight that question? We said Bombacci is a fool: the parliamentary faction in Germany is weak, so it is in France. But this is not taking up a position on principle. We must understand how to fight for the proper carrying out of an idea. The tactics are determined by the fact that we are a minority in the working class, and that the Social-Democracy has the majority, and that in the main we are still on the defensive and not on the offensive—Capitalism is on the offensive. Consequently, these tactics must apply for several years, throughout the duration of this position of the Communist Labour Movement. But in order to appreciate this idea we must ruthlessly combat any incorrect application of it. Otherwise, conrades, the ordinary workers will indeed say: it cannot be much of an idea; it is carried out badly in France, and also in Czecho-Slovakia and Germany, where they have the best Communist Parties. The united front tactic apparently is not a good idea at all. But the united front cannot be a good idea without flesh and blood.
In view of the formulation which is now given to it, it is most important that the matter be honestly thought out to the very end. On behalf of my party and with the unanimous approval of the Politbureau, I submit the following:—
"The united front is nothing more than a method of agitating and mobilising the proletarian forces in the period in which we at present find ourselves, All else is Social-Democratic." But, comrades, we must have regard to shades and colours. It would ​not be difficult to find an elastic formula: we are all masters of this craft; "on the one hand," "not only," "but," &c. But we do not see this. When we are a minority on the Executive, we fight gradually to become a majority. We hope we will not become a minority. We must speak right out. A stage of so-called democracy in coalition with the Social-Democracy is out of the question. He who desires this already has one foot in the camp of the Social-Democracy, perhaps he has both feet there already. If so all the better. He who believes that an alliance is possible between the Communists and the Social-Democrats, holds the viewpoint of the Social-Democracy. Really he is a centrist.
Well, comrades, we have had some bad experiences in Germany. The only good thing will be if we can bring clarity into this matter.
I come now to the question of Social-Democracy in Germany and in connection with it to the questions of Fascism, who has won, &c.
Yesterday, comrade Radek rightly said that the first question a political leader asks himself is: who rules in the particular country? Who rules in Germany? But this question must not be put in too simple a form. He replies: the Fascists. I ask: Who share in the government of Germany? And I reply: the Social-Democracy.
(Brandler: Quite true.)
Oh, this is quite true, is it? We will soon see the logic of it.
Since 1918 a "bloc" rules in Germany. It is too simple to say the Fascists rule. A "bloc" rules. The bourgeois revolution came against the will of the Social-Democracy. Until the very last moment they stood for the monarchy. The bourgeois revolution took place in Germany in spite of the Social-Democracy. Germany described itself as a Socialist Republic. Now they wish to adopt the term November Republic. I ask the German comrades whether this term was really popular. I think we are interested in introducing the old Marxian terminology. When we speak of scientific definitions we should use Marxian terminology.
What have we in Germany? A bourgeois democracy. It is somewhat different from the French, American and Swiss Democracies, but the type is similar. During the five years of the existence of this bourgeois democracy the Social-Democrats have done everything they could gradually to transfer the whole of the power, or at any rate, the greater part of it, to the bourgeoisie. A "bloc" rules in Germany. In this "bloc" the relations of forces has somewhat changed recently. This is a fact. Somewhat changed. How easily you forget. You say the situation now is different, the Communist Party is prohibited now, whereas Noske did not prohibit the Communist Party.
(Walcher: It is much better now.)
Good. We must clearly scrutinise those who share power in Germany. The Social-Democracy. Is not Severing a minister? Severing is an accomplice.
​What does this imply? That even now we have a bloc. Ebert is president, but that is not so important. We know that thousands and tens of thousands of Social-Democrats are in government offices. They sit in their jobs, and have something to defend. To speak precisely, it is too simple to say that Fascism is in power, Social-Democracy shares power with it. It is a bloc. And that is why the formula that Fascism has conquered—the November Republic—falls to the ground. It is totally wrong. Immediately we try to examine it closely it disappears. First of all, is the term November Republic correct? If you are Marxists, you must say bourgeois democracy. In principle, is it any other system? No. Bourgeois democracy is in power and approximately it is the same as in France. Do you think that the generals do not rule in France? Secondly: the republic cannot be defeated without the working class being defeated. This is a literary flourish, or a piece of opportunism similar to that at Leipsic. It were better if it were merely a literary flourish.
Why is it politically harmful? Because from it follows an incorrect estimation of the Social-Democracy, which for us is the most important question; whether there will be any new deviations among us. If it is true that the Social-Democracy is defeated, it follows that there must be an approach to it on our part. Comrade Arvid in a letter writes with a naive gesture: "Why do we employ this formula? Because only by this formula can we explain why we now repudiate partial slogans and partial struggles." But, comrades, this is all topsy-turvy. In order to make the repudiation of partial demands convenient, we employ wrong terminology. No one can deny that if it is true that Social-Democracy has been defeated, an approach to the Social-Democracy follows from this. Marx in his "Communist Manifesto," taught us much that when it is a question of reaction or the petty-bourgeoisie, we must go with the latter. In Germany, however, the situation is different. Reaction rules, but it shares power with the Social-Democracy. We must fight both. From your terminology, however, quite a different conclusion follows.
This, then, is the position. We must change the tactics for Germany, for as it is perfectly clear now, the Social-Democracy has become a wing of Fascism. It is a Fascist Social-Democracy. Hence the necessity for modifying our tactics.
(Walcher: That is what we say.)
No, you did not say that. You abuse them, but you fail to understand yet how to explain this to the masses of the workers in a Marxian manner. It is easy to abuse and call them the accomplices of the bourgeoisie. The Social-Democracy has not been defeated. It is a part of the whole thing, and the whole of international Social-Democracy is developing along the same way. We can see this quite clearly. What is Pilsudsky, and the others? Fascist Social-Democrats. Were they this ten years ago? No. Of course, at that time they were potential Fascists, but it is ​precisely during this epoch of revolution, that they have become Fascists. What is the Italian Social-Democracy? It is a wing of the Fascists. Turati is a Fascist Social-Democrat. Could we have said this five years ago? No. Do you remember the group of academicians who gradually developed into a bourgeois force, the Italian Social-Democrats, now are a Fascist Social-Democracy. Take Turati, d’Arragona, or the present Bulgarian governmental Socialists. Ten years ago we had opportunists, but could we say then that they were Fascist Social-Democrats? No. It would have been absurd to say that them. Now, however, they are Fascists. They keep repeating: we are from the Second International, we are Social-Democrats. We must understand what is taking place. It is not enough to abuse the Social-Democrats. On the one hand we have MacDonald, chairman of the Second International. coming into power. The British bourgeoisie politely invite him to rule. Of course, it is evidence of the weakness of the bourgeoisie; the working class is growing; it became a factor, but it also shows what has become of the Social-Democrats. The British bourgeois places the president of the Second International in the saddle.
We can abuse MacDonald, we may call him traitor and accomplice of the bourgeoisie, but we must understand in what period we are living. The international Social-Democracy has now become a wing of Fascism. This we must explain to the German workers. But this is quite a different view. It will mark a new starting point in policy and agitation and throws a completely new light on the subject.
Here we must place a new construction on the subject. The first was incorrect. I could never defend it on the International. When the International takes up this work objectively and closely scrutinises it, its verdict will be: incorrect. It is a Radek article, and not a Party resolution.
I have written an article on Koltchak, which, to my mind, is far more correct than the Radek article which you have brought up for discussion.
What has the Editorial Board of your Executive Committee done? It published a commentary, which in fact is another Radek article. You have a perfect right to do this, but you have no right to ask where is the Right, where are the nuances? The Right are those who wrote the commentary.
However, it is in the minority. After the International has made its decision it will be in a still smaller minority. Take the Leipsic decision, the clamour over the pseudonym, the resolution of the National Committee, the policy in Saxony, and the Radek article, which you have printed as a commentary of the Editorial Board, it is sufficient to convince any political leader that the system is incorrect.
(Radek: It is a system then, even if incorrect?)
It is a Menshevist system. What is Menshevism? It is often ​said that Radek is a Menshevik, but he is not. Of course, he is a Bolshevik. But frequently he makes mistakes of a Menshevist character. If he were a Menshevik and I were a Bolshevik, our light would be conducted quite differently. That is the position, comrades, Radek says: Zinoviev would be right if the position in Germany was the same as it was in Russia. Well, comrades, you, as foreigners, are not obliged to recognise this policy, but Radek should be. It is not merely a question of the Mensheviks. There was also Purishkevitch. He was the Russian Hittler. It was a great movement, reactionary—Black Hundreds as they were then called. In fact it was a Russian Fascism with the large addition of social demagogy. The Black Hundreds were formed from this Party. It was a pillar of the monarchy. It had branches in every village and town, do you know that, Comrade Radek?
(Petnitsky: And workers belonged to it.)
House porters, working women and such like belonged to it in large numbers. They utilised religion to a certain extent. It was in some ways a popular, revolutionary movement, with strong propaganda against the Jews. It was a big movement which had a following of tens of thousands. It had the petty bourgeoisie and a following in the villages, in the towns and everywhere. Therefore, if you wish to make this comparison, you must not lose sight of this third tendency. And you have overlooked it.
(Radek: With regard to the petty bourgeoisie, I stand completely on the ground that Zinoviev has quoted.)
Radek is right. He has emphasised the importance of the petty bourgeoisie. We must help the petty bourgeoisie. In this we are obliged to Radek. It is indeed one of the most important tasks. Your dealings with these small business men was good, it shows that you really have contact with the people. Of course this task still confronts us, and we must understand how to win the petty bourgeoisie to our side. I have not heard that the Left are against this. When, however, a great distinction is made in the resolution of the National Committee between Wittelsbachern and Hohenzollern, we say this is opportunism. If we will construct the working-class policy on this, and regard this as a great factor in the revolution, it will be a great error.
What was the point of the controversy between Lenin and Martov? Not over taking advantage of the nuances, but over the fact that Martov, absorbed in seeking for these fine nuances, completely forgot the main point. The three divisions of the people: the bourgeoisie, the petty bourgeoisie, and the proletariat. He was a menshevik, and he should serve as a warning example. This must not be overlooked,
And then there is the position taken up by Radek: either a Communist agitation party or a fighting party; a pure agitational policy; sect or mass party. This is a very bad position to take up. I do not say that Radek's position is the same as that of Levi, but in the main the error is the same, the starting ​point is the same. The controversy is precisely over the question as to whether we shall be a good agitation party; the question as to whether we are a Communist or a Centrist agitation party. It is no use raising the sect bogey here. We know it too well. We in Russia are a mass party. The defect of our parties is that they do not understand how to conduct Communist agitation. Take the British, the French, the Czecho-Slovak, and the German Parties, they do not understand yet how to conduct Communist popular agitation. They do not yet regard themselves as tribune of the people. Why has the speeches of one of our best men, Heckert, annoyed us so? We all like Heckert as a good fellow, we know that he is loyal to the Communist International and would die with it. All the more reason therefore why we were annoyed that he did not look upon himself as a popular tribune.
(A Voice: Have you read his speeches?)
I have read all that was possible, and I think not less than Walcher. We have not made this judgment in a narrow-minded spirit. When we drew up the letter we were all unanimous, and we read a dozen reports.
(Walcher: Everybody said it was a good Communist speech.)
Perhaps in normal times it would have been a good speech. But it did not give the impression that it was a speech of one whom the revolutionary wave had carried to the head of the masses of the workers. No, it could not be, when the attitude was: I am responsible to the Landtag, I stand on the Constitution.
(A Voice: There was no wave.)
It is true there was no wave in Leipsic at that moment, but the wave was there in Germany in October. Remmele has related how the masses remained in the streets the whole night, how they confiscated luxurious automobiles, and what the temper of the women was. Comrades, this, for us, was far more important than the volumes of the theses we wrote. We must have this mass sense. The picture that Remmele described, that Koenig has given, and Thälmann has often drawn, that was the most important thing in Germany. On October 25 it was not in Leipsic, but it was in Germany. Were you the megaphone of this mood?
The masses were acting spontaneously, but Members of the Central Committee, like Heckert, were not acting spontaneously. If he is a leader, he must be able to sense what is in the masses. We saw nothing in these Ministers of what was reflected by Thälmann, Remmele, and Koenig, and this was the most terrifying symptom. I will not come forward here like a Shylock and say why did you not have the arms within five days? That could not be done. That is not the charge brought against you. But why did not you become the passionate tribune of the masses? This is what we do not understand—and it is a bad symptom.
​We agree that the retreat at the time of the Chemnitz Conference was unavoidable. It is not worth while now to argue about this. Apparently it was unavoidable in view of the situation then prevailing. But the attitude during the Saxony affair is evidence of the fact that semi-conscious right tendencies exist in the Party, and that hitherto there has not been a sufficiently well organised opposition in the Party. We have not opposed sufficiently, and we shall do so more in the future.
I come now to the situation in the Party. It has often been asked: do we require ten men like Remmele and Thälmann? That was the Central Committee which should have drawn fresh political and organisational forces to its aid. It was a Central Committee, it was the best and most valuable that we had in the Party. Of course I will not put forward the theory of Faust, but, comrades, it is the material we have. The greatest reproach that can be made against the Central Committee is that it did not know how to employ this, we may say, gold of the working class, but instead argued over theses and every Radek article was taken for discussion. You do not understand how to lend an ear to the working-class groups I referred to. This by no means implies that we can dispense with intellectuals—that would be demagogy. We need all our comrades from the intelligentsia, but we must once and for all adopt a firm basis.
What should be done now? A change in the leadership must be made now. What change? That the present majority on the Central Committee work with the Left wing of the Party, with the support and control of the Communist International: this is the advice we give you. The Poles say that on the German question we have sought a middle course. The Polish Party has never made any other proposal. They can always make their proposals. I do not think it becomes a party like the Polish Party to shed tears when we have suffered defeat.
(Walsky: We do not shed tears.)
You have decided on the letter to the Russian Communist Party without hearing us. You described this as a Solomon policy without making any proposals. It is to be hoped that you will make some proposal. All you propose in your letter is that people should not quarrel.
We hope that up till now we have acted correctly. You frequently say Muslov and Fischer are bad, Thälmann is good. Comrades, I have witnessed such things in our Party. But such methods are rarely successful. I know the worker not less well than you, and they resolutely protest against such attempts at splitting. There are shades of differences between Thälmann and Muslov, political and personal. That is clear. Thalmänn comes out of the very heart of the working class, Muslov comes from the intelligentsia.
(Walcher: Thälmann gave of his best on the Central Committee.)
​(Pieck: He tried to co-operate.)
But, comrades. if you think that we would so readily agree to a split, you are wrong. Muslov and Fischer have their failings, but we have always said we must have patience.
(Pieck: Until the Party is shattered.)
The Party is not going to be shattered. Radek runs around among the students meetings in Moscow where the discussions are taking place. At these meetings Radek says that the Executive, and I particularly, have corrupted the German Party. I do not fear this charge. It would be a very pretty German Party if it could be corrupted from Moscow.
(Radek: I have never said that. I said that you broke up the Central Committee.)
A nice Central Committee if it allows itself to be broken up.
(Radek: Yes, if it was a Russian Committee.)
I have never broken up the Central Committee. It is true that a few days.after the departure of the representatives of the Communist International from Germany, the majority on the Central Committee found a correct and independent policy. How did I break it up? I can assert that I have not written a word either to Rammele or anyone else, although I had a right to do it. But it is true that the Central Committee, which was broken up from Moscow, found approximately the right policy without our having anything to do with it. What is the matter with the majority on the Central Committee ? Between ourselves, it is that it lacks determination, the will to power in the Party. It is necessary to have that in order to govern a Party. One must have the conviction that "I am right; I will lead the Party; I will convince it." The majority is somewhat anemic. It is still seeking words and formula that will suit Jacob Walcher. Of course we like Walcher. We will march with him, but the revolutionary policy of the Party is dearer to us than Jacob, and it would be good for him to understand that indefinite formulæ "on the one hand," "on the other hand," &c., are no use. The time for them has gone by.
Comrades, we have this majority on the Central Committee. In general we will march with it. A new attitude must be adopted towards the Left, different from that of Radek and Brandler. Radek's attitude towards the Left recently has been wrong. He has allowed his temperament to carry him away, and he is labouring under a false impression.
You say that the Left represents only a quarter, but you cannot lead the Party without this quarter. You speak of the bad people in Berlin, of the officials, &c. Comrades, I am at the head of the Leningrad organisation, and I know what it means to lead 25,000 to 35,000 men. This cannot be done mechanically, or by compulsion.
(Pieck: Muslov.)
However fallible Muslov may be, there are the tens of thousands ​of workers, I have been connected with the Leningrad workers for twenty years. But if I had attempted to apply compulsion do you think they would have carried out the great cause merely for the sake of our beautiful eyes? This is not an accident, one must know how to compromise. You have possession of the newspapers and the whole apparatus. Why have you not won in Berlin and Hamburg? Moreover, you over-estimate the role of individuals in history.
(Radek: Quite right.)
(Pieck: You are always relying on persons in Germany.)
Never. Certainly with regard to the policy in October, we believed that Brandler personified this best. We asked ourselves: Who will do this? And we said Brandler. We do not think that Brandler will never do anything any more. We believe that he will do much good. We know perfectly well that we must suffer twenty defeats before we achieve one victory. World history is so badly arranged. We say you have made great mistakes with us: we, too, have made mistakes.
(Brandler: I have made mistakes, but not those you refer to.)
What you said yesterday about the masses understanding the united front tactics as evolutionary tactics indicates your deviations.
(Brandler: Are there any tactics that have not their dangers and deviations?)
Do you know what Lenin once wrote? "The leader is responsible not for what he does, but what the masses do under his leadership." When, after two years, we come and say that the masses think in a certain way, it is proof that there is something rotten in the leadership.
The conclusion to be drawn is that we must have a change in the leadership. Under no circumstances do we wish to undertake a crusade against the so-called Right. To speak of the Kag spirit is an exaggeration. Exaggeration is the greatest enemy of Comrade Ruth Fischer. We must stand on the exact truth, and exaggeration is untrue. The Kag crisis, I must say, gives one to think. After having read all your letters, after having discussed the thing for days, these people come to you with petitions: "How can we on the Central Committee discuss the question of whether we can surrender the Party, or not?" That was the opinion also of Comrade Radek.
(Radek: Until to-day.)
But the Central Committee for weeks discussed the question of surrendering the Party. Until this very day, Radek has the impression that there are Right Wing tendencies in the Party. And now when I read to you the draft resolution of the Russian Party, you ask where are the Right tendencies? Is it Brandler, Pieck? Why do you mention these names? The tendencies do exist; it is a fact.
​But I do not speak of the Party as a whole, but of the Central Committee. The Party's attitude on the Kag crisis is better than that of the Central Committee. The latter discussed whether it should surrender the Party. This is a proof that all is not well. I believe that we have traces of Social-Democracy, not only in the German Party, but in the whole Communist International. That is because it has developed out of the Second International. Last year I said to Comrade Lenin: "In looking at the Communist International I cannot say with certainty whether we can establish a real Communist International without experiencing a crisis." One sometimes has the feeling that in our ranks we have considerable remnants of the Social-Democracy. Would we be the leaders of the Communist International if we did not see this weakness? The discussion in our Party has shown that we have remnants of the Social-Democracy in our ranks.
(Radek: Quite right.)
Not on our side, but on your side. We all love the Communist Party. I can quite understand Pieck and Walcher saying indignantly: "What! Our Party a Social-Democratic Party?" We Russians have never thought so. In spite of all you are one of the best sections of the Communist International.
(Radek: Not one of the best, but the best.)
But remnants of Social-Democracy are present. I will reveal another secret. Some of the younger element among you, Muslov, for example, have the advantages of not being burdened by Social-Democratic traditions. On the other hand, this is a weakness in that they have not grown up with the workers. Muslov himself recognises this quite well. It is a disadvantage in that you have not been so well grafted to the masses, but on the other hand, it is an advantage that you have not come with traces of Social-Democracy.
We must bear in mind that the Party is in a difficult situation, and the factional spirit must cease. In order to achieve victory, we must have a united leadership, otherwise we shall fail. We must see the position as it is. When we fight for the revolution, and desire to save the Party, then we must abandon the spirit of passivity, factionalism, &c. We must investigate a number of questions like the trade-union question, the organisation question, and objectively decide them, And no doubt we shall have to decide the question of calling a Party conference. I say here quite frankly: we, the Executive and the Russian Communist Party, cannot now undertake the responsibility to establish a new combination in the leadership of the German Communist Party. Sometimes this can be done, but at the present moment the situation is too involved. The Party must reveal its true character and show what leadership it desires. The Communist International may intervene later, but the Party must speak. When the moment arrives we must deal with it from the standpoint of the interests ​of the Party. We would desire that the matter be settled without a factional fight. We believe that the political preparations for the Party congress are already being made in Moscow. I believe that if co-operation is achieved between the present majority on the Central Committee and the Left, upon a definite political policy, they will have ninety-nine per cent. in the Party behind them.
(Pieck: You have not yet heard the majority masses of the Party.)
But you represent them. I admit that one can easily fall into error on the question of the relation of forces in the Party.
There are three tendencies on the Central Committee; the majority, who have brought their theses here and which is somewhat weakly represented by Remmele and Koenen; we have a Left, which you know, and we have a minority which you have heard.
(Brandler: Where are Pieck and Walcher?)
(Zetkin: And where do you include me?)
Please do not be angry with me. The case of comrade Zetkin is very difficult. There is no need for me to say that we stand by her personally. You know that she signed the letter of the Executive. If she stands on this position, then I cherish and respect her. But what can I do when she stands for the other policy? I hope that Comrade Zetkin will be with the majority.
Comrades, the Central Committee has adopted a draft with which you are acquainted. We sat down with the majority of the delegation and attempted to draw up a draft. The comrades revised and improved my draft; in the main the spirit is the same. The work in this small commission—Comrade Pieck, Koenen and Remmele were present—showed that we can march 99 per cent. of the road together with Pieck. He was not present on the Central Committee when the voting took place. Something new happened there, and within a short time there were fresh events. Pieck was here at that time, and the work, which in the last few days we have carried out with him, has shown that we can come to an understanding. When however,, difficulties between him and the Left arise, Pieck, who is as passionate as we all are, permits himself to do things in the fight against the Berliners of which I cannot approve.
I think our task here is not to employ strategy and to conduct manœuvres inside our own Party, but to say this is a mistake. When you ask: is the Russian Party with the Berliners? I say, No. It is of the opinion that the installation of the new majority in the main is right. It must bring about honest co-operation with the Left. The "civil war" must cease. The comrades must abandon the factional spirit if it desires to save the Party. Good (to the Left), you have made serious mistakes. You know that. Sometimes it is said that the majority represents the backward section of the workers, and that the Left represents the impatient ​section of the workers. But can we bring about the revolution entirely without the backward section of the workers? And the right say: impatience. The time comes, however, when impatience is the most important thing we require. Take Thälmann. Speaking quite frankly, all the comrades say that when they hear him speak, they get the conviction that the German revolution will come one day. Therefore, comrades, we must have this. The two are complementary and we must unite them on the policy which we propose to you.
What will the minority do? Many say, they will form a new faction. Brandler perhaps will not form a new faction, but will wait a while. Every one of us knows how to appreciate comrade Brandler personally. He will yet do important work in the Party. To come and say now, turn them out, slaughter them, we think it is frivolous, it is not right.
I want to point out one or two other prospects. I believe, however, that we are almost agreed, we do not know how things will go further. In the first draft, we said, we must have both possibilities in mind on the question of the tempo, we erred. There is some consolation in that Lenin and Trotsky sometimes erred on this point. But our estimation remains correct. Then it is said everything will come within three months, I say wait and see, I am not so sceptical. But everything depends upon the driving power of the Party. We say that, as the Communist International, we are prepared to stake everything in order to hasten the development. Further preparations, further illegal organisations, further instructions to our brother sections, the French, &c. We have drawn up a letter to the French Party. Comrade Zetkin, who was a member of the commission, was convineed that the prospects in the German question were the old prospects, i.e., a new revolution. We will say the same thing to the other sections, and here, in Russia, also prepare for a speedy decision. But as leaders of the Party, we must see now that there is a danger of the process being slower. We must see this after the experiences we have had. Only eighteen months after 1905 were we able to see clearly whither things were leading. Three times Lenin fixed the revolt for 1906, then in the spring, then in the late summer after the peasants had gathered in the harvest, &c. The Mensheviks laughed at him, but there was nothing to laugh about. We erred in our estimation of the rapidity of development. After eighteen months, we saw that things will move more slowly. Our duty is now to see the thing as it now is; for the spring, for the summer—we shall see, for a short time perhaps.
If we agree on this point, then the heated struggle will not have been in vain. We have thrown off many illusions and gained much realist understanding.