# Russia & The Struggle for Peace/Chapter 18

CHAPTER EIGHTEEN
THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT
THE Manifesto of the 14th of March to the Peoples of the World made an enormous impression all over Russia. It was felt that a new epoch had begun; that the beginnings of freedom and justice, sanctified by the Russian Revolution, were permeating foreign policy as well. It was a day of great joy, a festival for the Russian democracy. But the more gloomy was the outlook of the propertied and ruling classes. It was as severe a blow for them as the monarchical principle had received a fortnight earlier. In general, the Revolution was visibly departing from their ideas. It was taking a wholly unexpected direction. The propertied classes saw that it was threatening to pass them by without fulfilling their cherished dreams. Under the old régime they, the economic chiefs of the country, the big landowners and representatives of trade and industry, had had to take a second place. The Court aristocracy and the higher ranks of the bureaucracy had usurped their position and set a limit to their power in the State. The Revolution having swept away the throne and dispersed the bureaucracy, the propertied classes thought that at last they would be able to enter the field as leaders of the country, and come into their own. They imagined the Revolution as making smooth the way for the flourishing of capitalism and the triumph of industrial enterprise. The Revolution was to release them from the heavy guardianship of the bureaucracy; the war was to satisfy their dream of new markets, the annexation of Constantinople and the Straits, Armenia, Galicia, and undisputed power in the Balkans. They ​dreamed a golden dream. It is easy to imagine their disappointment when they saw the new course which the Revolution began to take.
The ideals of the Revolution in the realm of foreign policy amazed and stupefied them more than anything else. The victory of the democracy in this respect would amount to a complete defeat of the propertied classes. On the other hand, the preservation of imperialistic principles in foreign policy would render all revolutionary reforms in the internal, social and political life of the country illusory. They decided to oppose the foreign policy of the democracy with all their might. Every means was used; they fought the democracy openly and undermined it secretly. In this struggle between the democracy and the propertied classes, the latter are generally represented as upholding, not imperialistic aims of conquest, but simply the most elementary national interests of Russia, and as struggling only against the disorganising and disintegrating influences of the democracy. This contention is absolutely untrue. Their attitude was not only imperialistic, but cynically and unashamedly so. It was a virtual mania of imperialism. If we look at the actual stages in the struggle, we have ample evidence, that the first blow the Russian democracy received in their struggle for a just peace was dealt by the propertied classes and by their true representative, Miliukov.
In its Manifesto the Democracy announced that it would "use all means to oppose the annexationist policy of its ruling classes." The Soviet, therefore, proceeded to demand that the Provisional Government should publicly announce their repudiation of annexations. There began a struggle behind the scenes. Miliukov definitely and decisively opposed any such declaration. The Government, with the exception of Kerenski, sympathised with Miliukov but were unwilling to oppose the democracy openly. They tried to compromise and shelve the question. But public ​opinion in all Russia was on the side of the Soviet. Numerous provincial Soviets, army congresses and conferences of political parties, and the whole of the democratic Press, expressed their approval of the Soviet's foreign policy with great enthusiasm. The Provisional Government could resist no longer. On the 27th of March, thirteen days after the issue of the Manifesto, the Provisional Government issued a declaration on the war to the citizens of Russia. In this document the Government declared that "the aim of free Russia is not to rule over other nations, not to deprive them of their national possessions, not to annex foreign territory by force of arms, but to found a lasting peace on the basis of self-determination of peoples. The Russian people does not endeavour to strengthen its external power at the expense of other peoples; it does not aim at the enslavement or humiliation of any people."
Democratic Russia was exultant. It was a victory: a solemn and mighty victory. The Government of one of the belligerent States—of that very State which had been the most aggressive and the most openly imperialistic of all—began to speak the language of the advanced democracy. Indeed, the dawn had come for Russia. There was some cause for enthusiasm.
But it was an illusory victory. A few weeks later the insincerity of the Provisional Government's declaration led to a terrible "split," to the first serious clash between the Democracy and the propertied classes of new Russia. After this conflict was over we learned from the candid revelations made by Miliukov himself (in a "private" meeting of Duma Members on May 4lh, and in the May Congress of the Cadet Party) how great the insincerity of the Government's conduct had been. It appears from these revelations that Miliukov had intentionally put the Government's declaration in the form of a manifesto to the citizens of Russia instead of giving it the form of a diplomatic act. In other words, Miliukov purposely gave to the declaration, which the masses of Russia interpreted as ​an international statement, a form which, as it were, made it non-existent as a diplomatic statement of Russia's policy.
Miliukov by no means stood alone in his fight against the democratic policy. On the very day when the Provisional Government decided to make its concession to the Democracy, the party of the Cadets held its first Congress since the Revolution. The deliberations of the Cadet Party are the more significant, in that they really represented the spirit of the Provisional Government, though the latter was of course not formally identified with the party. The speeches made at this Congress now appear simply fantastic. Reading over these speeches at the present time, one cannot help feeling that the party was suffering from a kind of imperialistic madness. All that is difficult to understand in the conduct of Miliukov as the first revolutionary Foreign Minister becomes comprehensible when we realise that he was at the same time the head of the Cadet Party. In the Cadet Congress F. Rodichev, a member of the Provisional Government, proposed the resolution on the question of the war. According to the newspaper reports he made his speech with an emphasis and power which only Rodichev could achieve. (Rodichev is one of the best orators in Russia. He is the author of the famous epigram about "Stolypin's tie.") He made an enormous impression: his speech was interrupted by unanimous outbursts of approval and acclamation. Rodichev began his speech by emphatically repudiating the suggestion that they were cherishing any annexationist aims. He went on to enumerate the various territorial changes in question. They were out for a free and united Poland. That was the reverse of annexation. …" Where, then, is our second annexation—the annexation of Galicia? I do not know who suggested this, but I know that the new conception of right will not tolerate the disposal of ​peoples against their will, and therefore there can be no question of any annexation of Galicia, unless it be a unison of free Galicia with free Russia. The Austrian Chauvinists tell us that we want to dismember their Empire. Yes, we do want to dismember this Empire, this Empire of violence and tortures, this Empire whose history throughout the nineteenth century is a history of violence, deceit, corruption, falsehood, perfidy and cruelty. … Citizens, we aim at the liberation of Armenia. The establishment of an autonomous Armenia: is that an annexation? We have a great sin on our souls, in our indifference to the fate of the Armenians at the time when the voice of free England called us out in defence of Armenia. And Constantinople? From whom are we going to annex it? From the Turks. Gentlemen, you know that Constantinople is least of all a Turkish city. You know that, if our memory does not deceive us, there are 140,000 Turks there and the remainder are Christians, Greeks and Jews. Citizens, in this war we have our duty to our Allies. … At the end of the war I want to look them straight in the face; I do not want to expect them to ask: What then, when we were sacrificing our children, our sons and brothers on the peninsula of Gallipoli in order to open up the way to Constantinople for you, was that merely your caprice? … It is our duty to raise our voice and cry: Russia is with you. Do not depart one iota from her legitimate demands, one iota from her life-interests; do not let yourselves be confused by the shouts that you may hear on your way; stand firm to the end we shall support you."
Rodichev's speech was received with tremendous ovations by the Cadet Congress, and made a deep impression on them. It was immediately proposed to close ​the sitting. "Nobody can say anything more after Rodichev." "Print his speech and distribute it in millions of copies at the front and among the people."
On the proposal for adjournment the representative of the Tartars, Maxudov, member of the Duma, voiced a strong warning that the thirty million Mahommedans in the country, loyal and affectionate subjects of Russia, did not desire the humiliation of Turkey. "If the party wants to count on their sympathy, let it delete from its programme the destruction of Turkey and the annexation of Constantinople." Maxudov's speech was received with hisses and murmurs of disapproval, and was answered by Kokoshkin, who pointed out that the conquest of Constantinople was a matter of cold calculation and not of feeling, a political and not a religious question.
In its Resolution the Congress expresses its complete confidence in the Provisional Government "in its foreign policy, which is based on faithfulness to established treaties." It further expresses its conviction that the Provisional Government "will unflinchingly stand by the war-aims of liberation of small nationalities to which our democratic Allies are pledged." After the Resolution was passed, Miliukov arrived at the Congress, and further emphasised its meaning in the following words: "I associate myself with your decision on the war. The whole world is interested in the attitude of our Party towards the war. The eyes of all the world are on us. They expected a wise decision from you, and you have made it."
I have purposely described the proceedings of this Congress fully and in detail, as they express very clearly the mentality of the propertied classes of Russia and of the Provisional Government at that time. The Foreign policy expressed by the Cadet Congress, and especially Rodichev's speech, aroused great indignation in the country. In the Allied countries it made the opposite impression, and was taken as the voice of Russia. The appeal of the Russian imperialists to the Allies "not to ​depart one iota" from Russia's imperialistic demands was taken by the Allies as the appeal of Russia.
The less notice did they take of the All-Russian Congress of Soviets, which was held at the same time, and expressed the views of the democracy on war and peace no less definitely. Its Resolution on War was ratified by numerous workers' organisations and army units, and by the Minsk Congress of the army at the front. It expressed the definite policy "to which the revolutionary democracy is pledged and from which it will not depart," and marks an important stage in the struggle for peace:
"In its proclamation of the 14th of March to the peoples of the world, the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Delegates announced the unalterable decision of the Russian democracy to realise in its foreign policy the same principles of freedom and justice which it had proclaimed for the internal life of Russia.
"Numerous assemblies of workers, soldiers and citizens throughout Russia have confirmed this decision and expressed the will of the people, which, having stood out for its own freedom, will not allow its revolutionary inspiration to be used for acts of violence against other peoples, or for open or covert aims of annexation and indemnities.
"The Executive Committee of the Soviet has entered into relations with the Provisional Government, pointing out the immediate necessity for free Russia to renounce all the aims of conquest of Tsarism.
"On March 27 the Provisional Government published its manifesto to the citizens of Russia. The Russian democracy attaches great significance to this act of the Provisional Government, and sees in it an important step towards the realisation of democratic principles in the realm of foreign politics. The Soviets will energetically support every step of the Provisional Government in this direction, and they summon all peoples, whether of the Allied countries or of those of war with Russia, to bring pressure to bear on their ​Governments for the repudiation of all aims of conquest. At the same time, every nation of both Alliances must insist on its Government obtaining from its Allies a common renouncement of annexations and indemnities. For its own part, the Executive Committee emphasises the necessity for negotiations of the Provisional Government with the Allies for the elaboration of a general agreement to that effect.
"The revolutionary people of Russia will continue its efforts to bring- about an early peace on the principles of brotherhood and equality of free nations. The official renouncement of annexationist programmes by all Governments is a powerful weapon for the conclusion of the war on such terms.
"Until these terms are realised, until the war is over, the Russian democracy recognises that the destruction of the army, the weakening of its strength and stability and fitness for active operations, would be the greatest blow for the cause of freedom and for the life-interests of the country. In order to defend revolutionary Russia most energetically from all external encroachments and to offer the most decisive resistance to all attempts to hinder the further success of the Revolution, the Soviet summons revolutionary Russia to mobilise all the living forces of the country in all branches of national life for the strengthening of the front and of the rear. This is the imperative demand of the moment; it is indispensable for the success of the great Revolution."
After this Congress the Soviet's policy, being endorsed by the provincial Soviets and by the democracy of all Russia, was firm and confident. They demanded immediate diplomatic steps towards a common repudiation of annexationist aims by Russia and the Allies. The Provisional Government began again the game of shelving and havering. At that time the disagreement between the democracy and the Provisional Government on almost all points of policy was beginning to crystallise. It became evident that the Provisional Government, which had undertaken to carry out the pro​gramme of the Revolution, was simply incapable of doing so. All the urgent economic and agrarian reforms were set aside. The most urgent business of a more democratic organisation of the Army was progressing very slowly, thanks to the hindrances put in its way by the War Office. Urgent and necessary changes in the military and civil service were not realised. The most deplorable thing was that the Government neglected to purge the diplomatic and consular services of all the reactionary elements. It was a paradox that revolutionary Russia continued to be represented by people who had grown up in the spirit of the corrupt and autocratic Tsarist diplomacy, and were imbued with that spirit. In short, in all the urgent questions raised by the Revolution, the disagreements between the democracy and the Government became more and more irreconcilable. Popular discontent was becoming stronger. The extreme Left got more and more material for their propaganda: "All power to the Soviets!" And yet the dominant mood of the democracy as a whole, including the army, was one of tolerance. At all costs they wanted to avoid a split, and were content to refrain from bringing matters to a head, pending the convocation of the Constituent Assembly. Guchkov's obstruction policy in the question of army reform aroused indignation in the army and was generally condemned and despised. A demand for his resignation would easily have removed him, but even in this case the democracy wanted to postpone the conflict. There was only one matter which could not be postponed, in which the democracy could not and would not compromise—namely, the need for an energetic and active foreign policy in accordance with the international manifesto of the Soviet. In this matter the democracy would not be arrested by any fear of a split. And a split was bound to come, because all the demands and protests of the democracy to the Government remained unheeded. Miliukov stood out in defence of imperialism. ​In his own words (at the May Congress of the Cadet Party), "To the last day on which I left the Ministry, I gave the Allies no pretext to speak of the renouncement of Constantinople and the Straits by Russia." In his imperialistic mania he violated the will of the people with remarkable simplicity and impudence.
The Provisional Government tried to reconcile the democracy with Miliukov. They gave promises and assurances, saying that conversations were going on and so forth. The democracy demanded an open note to the Allies, but the Government avoided all open courses. The situation became uneasy, and the Government were evidently veering to Miliukov's side and not intending to send a note. On April 14 they published in the papers the following démenti: "Statements have appeared in the Press to the effect that the Provivisional Government is preparing a note on the aims and purposes of the war, with the purpose of approaching the Allied Governments in the next few days. The Provisional Government begs to announce that these statements are not in accordance with the facts." This démenti, which violated all the promises of the Government and definitely compromised the position of the democracy in its foreign policy, aroused a storm of indignation. The Soviet thereupon adopted extreme measures. On April 16 a general meeting of the Soviet was announced, with the object of settling the attitude of the democracy to the "Liberty Loan." The Executive Committee chose this as an opportune subject on which to bring the conflict with the Government on the question of foreign policy to a head. It proposed a postponement of the consideration of this question for three days, informing the Government that the democracy would decide its attitude to the loan in accordance with the Government's attitude on the question of a note to the Allied Powers. This amounted to a virtual ultimatum, expressed in a very tactful form. The Provisional Government began to reconsider the question. Miliukov stood firm; Kerenski ​threatened to resign if the note was not sent immediately. The Government decided to send it. Next day was April 18—the first of May in the European style—and the workers celebrated the first May-day since the Revolution. It was the greatest and the most glorious May-day ever celebrated. The international significance of this holiday was enhanced by the fact that the Government was known to have consented to send a note. On that morning I saw Kerenski, and he told me of this new victory of the democracy with the greatest elation and hope.
This "new victory," which was nothing but a new mean falsification by Miliukov, very nearly became a source of civil war. This is how Miliukov himself described his proceeding to the May Congress of the Cadets: "When the representative of the democracy began to insist that the Act of March 27 must be converted into a diplomatic document, I decided on a new compromise. I decided not to send a note, but to despatch the original document itself (the declaration to the citizens of Russia of March 27) with a covering letter which would safeguard the Foreign Office from any inaccurate interpretation or misrepresentation of the compromise."
This note (the "covering letter" referred to in his speech) simply annulled all the ideas which were expressed in the declaration of March 27. It was simply an appeal for a fight to a finish and a reaffirmation of the imperialistic policy of old Russia in its entirety. It was a challenge to the Russian democracy, to the whole of the Russian people. The sequel will be remembered. There was a spontaneous outburst of indignation; the crisis came to a head. The indecision of the Government and the Machiavellian tactics of Miliukov had to be done away with. But the indecision of the Government was met by a correspondong indecision and wavering on the part of the democracy. The great clash led only to a miserable compromise. Miliukov was compelled to send a new note to the Allies to undo ​the effects of his previous one, but the new note was indefinite and only helped to increase the confusion. The crisis was settled by Miliukov's and Guchkov's resignations, and the Coalition Government was formed.
The struggle for peace entered a new phase. But by this time the adverse attitude of the Allies was beginning to take effect.
* ↑ I quote from the account in the Petrograd Den of March 28th.
* ↑ The non-Cadet Press criticised Rodichev's speech very strongly. The Den remarked: "Constantinople being inhabited by Turks, Greeks, and Jews, it is only right that it should therefore belong to Russia!"
* ↑ Miliukov afterwards boasted he did not leave the Government but was turned out.