# Ker v. California/Concurrence Harlan

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Mr. Justice HARLAN (concurring in the result).
Heretofore there has been a well-established line of demarcation between the constitutional principles governing the standards for state searches and seizures and those controlling federal activity of this kind. Federal searches and seizures have been subject to the requirement of 'reasonableness' contained in the Fourth Amendment, as that requirement has been elaborated over the years in federal litigation. State searches and seizures, on the other hand, have been judged, and in my view properly so, by the more flexible concept of 'fundamental' fairness, of rights 'basic to a free society,' embraced in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27, 69 S.Ct. 1359, 1361, 93 L.Ed. 1782; cf. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 72 S.Ct. 205, 96 L.Ed. 183; Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 58 S.Ct .149, 82 L.Ed. 288. Today this distinction in constitutional principle is abandoned. Henceforth state searches and seizures are to be judged by the same constitutional standards as apply in the federal system.
In my opinion this further extension of federal power over state criminal cases, cf. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 83 S.Ct. 822, 9 L.Ed.2d 837; Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 83 S.Ct. 814, 9 L.Ed.2d 811; Draper v. Washington, 372 U .S. 487, 83 S.Ct. 774, 9 L.Ed.2d 899-all decided only a few weeks ago, is quite uncalled for and unwise. It is uncalled for because the States generally, and more particularly California, are increasingly evidencing concern about improving their own criminal procedures, as this Court itself has recently observed on more than one occasion (see Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 345, 83 S.Ct. 792, 797, 9 L.Ed.2d 799; ante, p. 31), and because the Fourteenth Amendment's requirements of fundamental fairness stand as a bulwark against serious local shortcomings in this field. The rule is unwise because the States, with their differing law enforcement problems, should not be put in a constitutional straitjacket, and also because the States, more likely than not, will be placed in an atmosphere of uncertainty since this Court's decisions in the realm of search and seizure are hardly notable for their predictability. Cf. Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 175 181, 67 S.Ct. 1098, 1121-1128, 91 L.Ed. 1399 (Appendix to dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter). (The latter point is indeed forcefully illustrated by the fact that in the first application of its new constitutional rule the majority finds itself equally divided.) And if the Court is prepared to relax Fourth Amendment standards in order to avoid unduly fettering the States, this would be in derogation of law enforcement standards in the federal system unless the Fourth Amendment is to mean one thing for the States and something else for the Federal Government.
I can see no good coming from this constitutional adventure. In judging state searches and seizures I would continue to adhere to established Fourteenth Amendment concepts of fundamental fairness. So judging this case, I concur in the result.
This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
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