# The History of Slavery and the Slave Trade/Chapter 29

Contents
CHAPTER XXIX.
Period from 1842 to 1849. — Annexation of Texas.
The project for the annexation of Texas had not been abandoned. The object to be attained by the acquisition is thus set forth in the report of a committee of the Mississippi legislature: ​"But we hasten to suggest the importance of the annexation of Texas to this republic, upon grounds somewhat local in their complexion, hut of an import infinitely grave and interesting to the people who inhabit the southern portion of this confederacy, where it is known that a species of domestic slavery is tolerated and protected by law, whose existence is prohibited by the legal regulations of other states of this confederacy; which system of slavery is held by all, who are familiarly acquainted with its practical effects, to be of highly beneficial influence to the country within whose limits it is permitted to exist.
"The committee feel authorized to say that this system is cherished by our constituents as the very palladium of their prosperity and happiness, and whatever Ignorant fanatics may elsewhere conjecture, the committee are fully assured, upon the most diligent observation and reflection on the subject, that the south does not possess within her limits a blessing with which the affections of her people are so closely entwined and so completely enfibered, and whose value is more highly appreciated, than that which we are now considering.
"It may not be improper here to remark, that during the last session of congress, when a senator from Mississippi proposed the acknowledgment of Texan independence, it was found, with a few exceptions, the members of that body were ready to take ground upon it, as upon the subject of slavery itself.
"With all these facts before us, we do not hesitate in believing that these feelings influenced the New England senators, but one voting in favor of the measure; and, indeed, Mr. Webster has been bold enough, in a public speech recently delivered in New York, to many thousand citizens, to declare that the reason that influenced his opposition was his abhorrence to slavery in the south, and that it might, in the event of its recognition, become a slaveholding state. He also spoke of the efforts making in favor of abolition; and that being predicated upon, and aided by the powerful influence of religious feeling, it would become irresistible and overwhelming.
"This language, coming from so distinguished an individual as Mr. Webster, so familiar with the feelings of the north, and entertaining so high a respect for public sentiment in New England, speaks so plainly the voice of the north as not to be misunderstood.
"We sincerely hope there is enough good sense and genuine love of country among our fellow-countrymen of the northern states, to secure us final justice on this subject; vet we cannot consider it safe or expedient for the people of the south to entirely disregard the efforts of the fanatics, and the opinions of such men as Webster, and others who countenance such dangerous doctrines.
"The northern states have no interests of their own which require any special safeguards for their defense, save only their domestic manufactures; and God knows they have already received protection from government on a most liberal scale; under which encouragement they have improved and flourished beyond example. The south has very peculiar interests to preserve — interests already violently assailed and boldly threatened.
"Your committee are fully persuaded that this protection to her best interests will be afforded by the annexation of Texas; an equipoise of influence in the halls of congress will be secured which will furnish us a permanent guarantee of protection."
The states of Alabama arid Tennessee had also adopted resolutions in favor of annexation. Hon. Henry A. Wise, in a speech in congress, Jan. 26, 1842, said:
"True, if Iowa be added on the one side, Florida will be added on the other. But there the equation must stop. Let one more northern state be admitted, and the equilibrium is gone — gone forever. The balance of interests is gone — the safeguard of ​American property — of the American constitution — of tho American Union, vanished into thin air. This must he the inevitable result, unless by a treaty with Mexico, the south can add more weight to her end of the lever! Let the south stop at the Sabine, (the eastern boundary of Texas J while the north may spread unchecked beyond the Rocky Mountains, and the southern scale must kick the beam!"
Mr. Gilmer, member of congress and formerly governor of Virginia, wrote to a friend in January, 1842:
"You ask if I have expressed the opinion that Texas would be annexed to the United States. I answer, yes; and this opinion has not been adopted without reflection, or without a careful observation of causes, which I believe are rapidly bringing about this result. I do not know how far these causes have made the same impression on others; but I am persuaded that the time is not distant when they will be felt in all their force. The excitement which you apprehend may arise; but it will be temporary, and, in the end, salutary.
"I am, as you know, a strict constructionist of the powers of our federal government; and I do not admit the force of mere precedent to establish authority under written constitutions. The power conferred by the constitution over our foreign relations, and the repeated acquisitions of territory under it, seem to me to leave this question open as one of expediency.
"But you anticipate objections with regard to the subject of slavery. This is indeed a subject of extreme delicacy, but it is one on which the annexation of Texas will have the most salutary influence. Some have thought that the proposition would endanger our Union. I am of a different opinion. I believe it will bring about a better understanding of our relative rights and obligations.
"Having acquired Louisiana and Florida, we have an interest and a frontier on the Gulf of Mexico, and along our interior to the Pacific, which will not permit us to close our eyes or fold our arms with indifference to the events which a few years may disclose in that quarter. We have already had one question of boundary with Texas; other questions must soon arise, under our revenue laws, and on other points of necessary intercourse, which it will be difficult to adjust. The institutions of Texas, and her relations with other governments, are yet in that condition which inclines he r people ("who are our countrymen) to unite their destinies with ours. This must be done soon or not at all."
Texas was also making movements for annexation; resolutions and a bill for the purpose were introduced into the legislature. A Texas paper announced that Mr. Upshur, our secretary of state, had proposed to Mr. Van Zandt, the Texas charge at Washington, to open a negotiation for annexing Texas to the Union. This proved to be true. A treaty was concluded at Washington on the 12th of April, 1844, by John C. Calhoun, secretary of state, on the part of the United States, and Isaac Van Zandt and J. Pinckney Henderson on the part of Texas. This treaty was communicated to the senate on the 22d, and ordered to be printed in confidence for the use of the senators. On the 27th of April, notwithstanding the injunctions of secrecy upon the action of the senate, the New York Post announced the couclusion of the treaty, and published the president's message and documents which accompanied it.
On the 8th of June, the question was taken in the senate on the ratification of the treaty, a majority of two-thirds being necessary to ratify. Only 16 ​senators voted in the affirmative, and 25 in the negative. Of the senators from the free states who voted for the treaty, were Messrs. Buchanan and Sturgeon, of Pennsylvania, Mr. Breese, of Illinois, and Mr. Woodbury, of New Hampshire. Of the democrats from the free states who voted against the treaty, were Mr. Fairfield, of Maine, Mr. Atherton, of New Hampshire, Mr. Niles, of Connecticut, Mr. Wright, of New York, Messrs. Allen and Tappan, of Ohio; also, Mr. Benton, of Missouri, a slave state.
The vote on the question of ratification does not, however, indicate the views of senators on the abstract question of annexation. One objection to the treaty was, that it would involve the United States in a war with Mexico. Another was, that Texas claimed disputed territory; and to receive Texas would compel our government to defend the claim against Mexico. It was also objected, that the annexation was unconstitutional.
In the debate in secret session on the ratification, a large number of senators took part; among whom were Messrs. Benton, Choate, Wright, Walker, and M'Duffie; the two last in favor of the treaty, the others in opposition.
Mr. Benton's great speech was. delivered on the 16th, 17th, and 20th of May, and was in support of resolutions offered by him on the 13th, declaring,
1st. That the ratification of the treaty would be the adoption of the Texan war with Mexico, and would devolve its conclusion upon the United States.
2d. That the treaty-making power does not extend to the power of making war, and that the president and senate have no right to make war, either by declaration or by adoption.
3d. That Texas ought to be reunited to the American union, as soon as it can be done with the consent of a majority of the people of the United States and of Texas, and when Mexico shall either consent to the same, or acknowledge the independence of Texas, or cease to prosecute the war against her, (the armistice having expired,) on a scale commensurate to the conquest of the country.
Mr. Benton contended that the treaty proposed to annex much more territory than originally belonged to Texas; and therefore the proposition for the "reännexation of Texas" was a fraud in words. It was not pretended, even by those who used that word, that the province of Texas, when it was ceded in 1819 to Spain, extended farther than the boundaries included between the Sabine and the Rio del Norte, and the Gulf of Mexico and the Red River, whilst the republic of Texas, as defined in the treaty, included the whole extent of the Rio del Norte, and embraced portions of the department of New Mexico, with its capital, being many hundred miles of a neighbor's dominion, with whom we had treaties of peace and friendship and commerce — a territory where no Texan force had ever penetrated, and including towns and villages and custom-houses now in the peaceful possession of Mexico.
In a message to the senate subsequent to that accompanying the treaty, the president has asserted the doctrine that the treaty signed by him was ratified from that moment; and, consequently, that part of Mexico above mentioned ​must be and remain "reännexed," until the acquisition should be rejected by the senate. In relation to this, Mr. Benton speaks thus:
"The president in his special message of Wednesday last informs us that we have acquired a title to the ceded territory by his signature to the treaty, wanting only the action of the senate to perfect it; and that, in the meantime, he will protect it from invasion, and for that purpose has detached all the disposable portions of the army and navy to the scene of action. This is a caper about equal to the mad freaks with which the unfortunate emperor Paul, of Russia, was accustomed to astonish Europe about forty years ago. By this declaration, the thirty thousand Mexicans in the left half of the valley of the Rio del Norte are our citizens, and standing, in the language of the president's message, in a hostile attitude towards us, and subject to be repelled as invaders. Taos, the seat of the custom-house, where our caravans enter their goods, is ours; governor Armijo is our governor, and subject to be tried for treason if he does not submit to us; twenty Mexican towns and villages are ours, and their peaceful inhabitants, cultivating their fields and tending their flocks, are suddenly converted, by a stroke of the president's pen, into American citizens, or American rebels. This is too bad: and, instead of making themselves party to its enormities, as the president invites them to do, I think rather that it is the duty of the senate to wash its hands of all this part of the transaction by a special disapprobation. The senate is the constitutional adviser of the president, and has the right, if not the duty, to give him advice when the occasion requires it. I therefore propose, as an additional resolution, applicable to the Rio del Norte boundary only — the one which I will read and send to the secretary's table — and on which, at the proper time, I shall ask the vote of the senate. This is the resolution:
'Resolved, That the incorporation of the left bank of the Rio del Norte into the American union, by virtue of a treaty with Texas, comprehending as the said incorporation would do, a part of the Mexican departments of New Mexico, Chihuahua, Coahuila, and Tamaulipas, would be an act of direct aggression on Mexico; for all the consequences of which the United States would stand responsible.'
Having shown the effect of the treaty on the Rio Grande frontier, Mr. B. took up the treaty itself, under all its aspects and in its whole extent, and assumed four positions in relation to it, namely:
1. That the ratification of the treaty would be, of itself, war between the United States and Mexico. 2. That it would be unjust war. 3. That it would be war unconstitutionally made. 4. That it would be war upon weak and groundless pretext."
Mr. M'Duffie, on the 23d of May, replied to Mr. Benton. The question as to boundary, he said, had been exhausted by the conclusive argument of Mr. Walker, of Mississippi, and he would not discuss it. It had been contended by senators that the ratification of the treaty would subject us to the charge of a violation of the public faith. In answer to this objection, Mr. M'Duffie ​referred to the case of France, in 1778. When the United States were waging an unequal war with Great Britain, she came to our aid recognized our independence, and formed with us a treaty of alliance, offensive and defensive. Had any historian mentioned this as a breach of national faith on the part of France? Had our government contracted such an alliance with Texas when Santa Anna was marching to meet a disgraceful defeat at San Jacinto, it would have violated no national faith, nor any dictate of international law. He contended that she had maintained her independence; we had recognized it: so had Great Britain, France, Holland, and Belgium. She possessed all the attributes of national sovereignty, and the elements of self-government, more so than Mexico herself. Texas, he said, had a right to enter into a treaty of annexation if she chose; and who would deny her that right? Could she not dispose of herself as she pleased? And did it not follow that the United States had a corresponding and an equal right to receive her? The right of property implied the right of the proprietor to sell, and the correlative right of every other person to purchase.
But it was said the ratification would involve us in a war with Mexico. So lie himself thought in 1836, when Texas was a "rebellious province;" but since the battle of San Jacinto, Mexico had not made a single military movement toward recovering her lost dominions. She had done nothing that deserved the name of war. Appealing to the gasconading proclamation of Mexico, the senator from Missouri had asked, "Is this peace?" The orders to the home squadron, and the army of observation sent to the Sabine, to watch the movements of Mexico, should any be made, and promptly report them to headquarters, that they might as promptly be reported to congress, the senator had pronounced an act of war. If to employ a corps of observation was to make war, then we were at war with the powers in the West Indies, on the Mediterranean, and on the coast of Africa; for we had squadrons in every sea to protect our commerce, and to make war on pirates. The proclamation of Mexico, and the counter proclamations and defiances of Texas, he did not consider war, as did the senators on the other side.
Mr. M'Duffie referred to the proposition to Mexico made by Mr. Clay, when secretary of state under Mr. Adams, in 1825, to purchase Texas, when the war between Spain and Mexico was still in existence. So in 1829, when Mexico was invaded by a large army, and her ports were blockaded, Mr. Van Buren, by order of Gen. Jackson, made to Mexico a proposition to purchase Texas.
Having advocated the right to receive Texas, he proceeded to show the duty of making the treaty. Great Britain should not be allowed to obtain the control of Texas by a treaty of guaranty stipulating for extensive commercial privileges. He had never till now realized the justice of Mr. Monroe's declaration, that no European power must ever be permitted to establish a colony on this continent. And he urged the danger to the slave property of the south, if Great Britain should get control of Texas. They had a right to demand from the government protection to their property. Annexation, too, would operate as a safety-valve to let off their superabundant slave population, which ​would render them more happy, and the whites more secure. And with regard to the time of annexation, he adopted the language of Gen. Jackson, "now or never."
Immediately after the treaty was rejected, Mr. Benton gave notice of a bill for the annexation of Texas, with the consent of Mexico. On the 10th of April, pursuant to notice, he brought in the bill, which authorized and advised the president to open negotiations with Mexico and Texas for adjusting boundaries and annexing Texas to the United States, on the following bases:
1st. The boundary to be in the desert prairie west of the Nueces, and along the highlands and mountain heights which divide the waters of the Mississippi from those of the Rio del Norte, and to latitude 42 degrees north.
2d. The people of Texas, by a legislative act or otherwise, to express their assent to annexation.
3d. A state to be called "Texas," with boundaries fixed by herself, and an extent not exceeding that of the largest state in the union, to be admitted into the union by virtue of this act, on an equal footing with the original states.
4th. The remainder of the territory, to be called "the Southwest Territory," and to be held and disposed of by the United States as one of their territories.
5th. Slavery to be forever prohibited in the northern half of the annexed territory.
6th. The assent of Mexico to such annexation and boundary to be obtained by treaty, or to be dispensed with when congress may deem such assent unnecessary.
7th. Other details to be adjusted by treaty so far as they may come within the scope of the treaty-making power.
On presenting his bill, Mr. Benton spoke nearly two hours. He said his was not a new burst of affection for the possession of the country, as his writings a quarter of a century ago would testify. He disapproved the course of the executive in not having first consulted congress. The rejection of the treaty having wiped out all cause of offense to Mexico, he thought it best to commence again, and at the right end — with the legislative branch, by which means we should proceed regularly and constitutionally. As to the boundary, he had followed the basis laid down by Jefferson, fixing, as the limit to be adopted in settling the boundary with Spain, all the territory watered by the tributaries to the Mississippi, and made it applicable to Mexico and Texas. He did not attach so much importance to the consent of Mexico as to make it an indispensable condition, yet he regarded it as something to be respectfully sought for. But if it were not obtained, it was left to the house to say when that consent became necessary. He wished to continue in amity with Mexico. Those who underrated the value of a good understanding with her, knew nothing of what they spoke. Mexico took the products of our farms, and returned the solid silver of her mines. Our trade with her was constantly increasing. In 1821, the year in which she became independent, we received from her $80,000; in 1835, $8,500,000. When we began to sympathize with Texas, ​this trade rapidly fell off, until it got down to one million and a half. As the earliest and most consistent friend of Texas, he desired peace with Mexico, in order to procure the ultimate annexation of Texas. If Mexico, blind to her interests, should refuse to let Texas take her natural position as a part of the valley of the Mississippi, let congress say in what case the consent of Mexico might cease to be necessary.
Mr. Benton severely censured that party, who, while an armistice was subsisting between Mexico and Texas, which bid fair to lead to peace, rushed in with a firebrand to disturb these relations of amity. For this act they must stand condemned in the eyes of Christendom. Every wise man must see that Texas and Mexico were not naturally parts of a common country. The settlements of Mexico had never taken the direction of Texas. In a northeastern direction, they had not extended much over the Rio Grande; they had come merely to the pastoral regions, but had never professed strength enough to subdue the sugar and cotton sections. He alluded to his own far back prophecies and writings concerning Texas. Messrs. Walker and Woodbury he termed "Texas neophytes," who had been so anxious to make great demonstrations of love for Texas. For himself, he had no such anxiety, because his sentiments had always been known. With him it was not a question "now or never," but Texas then, now, and always
Mr. Benton said he had provided against another Missouri agitation. For those who regarded slavery as a great moral evil, in which he, perhaps, did not differ much from them, there was a provision which would neutralize the slave influence. He would not join the fanatics on either side — those who were running a muck for or against slavery.
The senator from South Carolina, in his zeal to defend his friends, goes beyond the line of defense and attacks me; he supposes me to have made anti-annexation speeches; and certainly, if he limits the supposition to my speeches against the treaty, he is right. But that treaty, far from securing the annexation of Texas, only provides for the disunion of these states. The annexation of the whole country as a territory, and that upon the avowed ground of laying it all out into slave states, is an open preparation for a Missouri question and a dissolution of the union. I am against that; and for annexation in the mode pointed out in my bill. I am for Texas — for Texas with peace and honor, and with the union. Those who want annexation on these terms should support my bill; those who want it without peace, without honor, and without the union, should stick to the lifeless corpse of the defunct treaty."
The president, having been foiled in his scheme of annexation by treaty, appealed to the house of representatives, in a message, dated the 10th of June, two days after the rejection of the treaty, accompanied by the rejected treaty with the correspondence and documents which had been submitted to the senate. The president says in the message, that he does not perceive the force of the objections of the senate to the ratification. Negotiations with Mexico, in advance of annexation, would not only prove abortive, but might be regarded as offensive to Mexico and insulting to Texas. We could not negotiate with ​Mexico for Texas, without admitting that our recognition of her independence was fraudulent, delusive, or void. Only after acquiring Texas, could the question of boundary arise between the United States and Mexico, a question purposely left open for negotiation with Mexico, as affording the best opportunity for the most friendly and pacific arrangements. He asserted that Texas no longer owed allegiance to Mexico; she was, and had been for eight years, independent of the confederation of Mexican republics. Nor could we be accused of violating treaty stipulations. Our treaty with Mexico was merely commercial, intended to define the rights and secure the interests of the citizens of each country. There was no bad faith in negotiating with an independent power upon any subject not violating the stipulations of such treaty.
In view of the importance of the subject, he invited the immediate attention of the representatives of the people to it; and for so doing he found a sufficient apology in the urgency of the matter, as annexation would encounter great hazard of defeat, if something were not now done to prevent it. He transmitted to the house a number of private letters on the subject from citizens of Texas entitled to confidence.
Much had occurred to confirm his confidence in the statements of General Jackson, and of his own statement in a previous message, that "instructions had already been given by the Texan government to propose to the government of Great Britain forthwith, on the failure of the treaty, to enter into a treaty of commerce, and an alliance offensive and defensive." He also referred the house to a letter from Mr. Everett from London, which he seemed to construe into an intention to interfere with the contemplated arrangement between the United States and Texas. Although he regarded annexation by treaty as the most suitable form in which it could be effected, should congress deem it proper to resort to any other expedient compatible with the constitution, and likely to accomplish the object, he was ready to yield his prompt and active coöperation. He says: "The question is not as to the manner in which it shall be done, but whether it shall be accomplished or not. The responsibility of deciding this question is now devolved upon you."
The message was communicated at too late a day for deliberation and action at this session. Congress adjourned on the 17th of June.
During the presidential campaign of 1844, the annexation of Texas constituted a leading issue between the two great political parties. Before the meeting of the nominating conventions, public sentiment had designated Clay and Van Buren as candidates for the presidency. Accordingly, letters were addressed to them to obtain an expression of their views upon the annexation of Texas.
The letters of Messrs. Clay and Van Buren, taking ground against annexation, without the consent of Mexico, as an act of bad faith and aggression, which would necessarily result in war, which appeared in the spring of 1844, make slight allusions to the slavery aspect of the case. In a later Letter, Mr. Clay declared that he did not oppose annexation on account of slavery, which he regarded as a temporary institution, which, therefore, ought not to stand in ​the way of a permanent acquisition. And, though Mr. Clay's last letter on the subject, prior to the election of 1844, reiterated and emphasized all his objections to annexation under the existing circumstances, he did not include the existence of slavery.
In his first letter Mr. Clay said, "there were those who favored and those who opposed the annexation of Texas, from its supposed effect upon the balance of political power between two great sections of the union. He discountenanced the motive of acquiring territory for the purpose of strengthening one part of the union against another. If to-day Texas should be obtained to strengthen the south, to-morrow Canada might be acquired to add strength to the north. In the progress of this spirit of universal dominion, the part of the union now the weakest, would find itself still weaker from the impossibility of securing new theaters for those peculiar institutions which it is charged with being desirous to extend. But he doubted whether Texas would really add strength to the south. From the information he had of that country, he thought it susceptible of a division into five states of convenient size and form; three of which he thought would be unfavorable to the employment of slave labor, and would be free states, while only two of them would be slave states. This might serve to diminish the zeal both of those who oppose and those who urge annexation"
In conclusion, he thus sums up his opinions: He "considers the annexation of Texas, at this time, without the assent of Mexico, as a measure compromising the national character, involving us certainly in war with Mexico, probably with other foreign powers, dangerous to the integrity of the union, inexpedient to the present financial condition of the country, and not called for by any general expression of public opinion."
The sentiments expressed in the following extracts from Mr. Van Buren's letter are worthy of observation: "We must look to this matter as it really stands. We shall act under the eye of an intelligent, observing world; and the affair cannot be made to wear a different aspect from what it deserves if even we had the disposition (which we have not) to throw over it disguises of any kind. We should consider whether there is any way in which the peace of the country can be preserved, should an immediate annexation take place, save one — and that is, according to present appearances, the improbable event that Mexico will be deterred from the farther prosecution of the war by the apprehension of our power. The question then recurs, if, as sensible men, we cannot avoid the conclusion that the immediate annexation of Texas would, in all human probability, draw after it a war with Mexico, can it be expedient to attempt it? Of the consequences of such a war, the character it might be made to assume, the entanglements with other nations which the position of a belligerent almost unavoidably draws after it, and the undoubted injuries which might be inflicted upon each — notwithstanding the great disparity of their respective forces, I will not say a word. God forbid that an American citizen should ever count the cost of any appeal to what is appropriately denominated the last resort of nations, whenever that resort becomes necessary either for ​the safety or to vindicate the honor of his country. There is, I trust, not one so base as not to regard himself and all he has to be forever and at all times subject to such a requisition. But would a war with Mexico, brought on under such circumstances, be a contest of that character? Could we hope to stand justified in the eyes of mankind for entering into it; more especially if its commencement is to be preceded by the appropriation to our own uses of the territory, the sovereignty of which is in dispute between two nations, one of which we are to join in the struggle? This, sir, is a matter of the gravest import, one in respect to which no American statesman or citizen can possibly be indifferent."
It was not long after this letter appeared, before it was apparent that Mr. Van Buren was to be abandoned. Movements were soon made in many places to prevent his nomination. Annexation was to southern democrats an object for which even Mr. Van Buren was not deemed too great a sacrifice. Meetings were held for the purpose of revoking the instructions which had been given to delegates to support Mr. Van Buren; and resolutions were passed recommending to them to cast their votes for men known and pledged to be in favor of annexation. In New York and other northern states, the "democracy" protested against these southern movements to defeat Mr. Van Buren.
Notwithstanding Mr. Clay's hostilty to the annexation of Texas, he was nominated unanimously in the whig convention. Mr. Van Buren did not fare so well in the democratic convention. He received a clear majority on the first ballot, but a rule of the convention required two-thirds. He was eventually sacrificed to make room for James K. Polk, who was in favor of the annexation.
Of course many of the northern democrats who had deprecated annexation, now became ardent advocates of the "great American measure," but there were some who still protested against it. The organ of this class was the New York Evening Post, whose editor, with six other gentlemen, issued a private circular to some of their friends in different parts of the state. The letter explains its object:
About this time the following official dispatch was addressed by Mr. Calhoun, Mr. Tyler's secretary of state, to the American Minister at Paris, the Hon. Wiliam R. King:
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| Washington, August 12, 1844. | $\scriptstyle {\left.{\begin{matrix}\ \\\ \end{matrix}}\right\}\,$ |
"Sir I have laid your dispatch, No. 1, before the president, who instructs me to make known to you that he has read it with much pleasure, especially the portion which relates to your cordial reception by the king, and his assurance of friendly feelings toward the United States. The president, in particular, highly appreciates the declaration of the king, that, in no event, would any steps be taken by his government in the slightest degree hostile, or which would give to the United States just cause of complaint. It was the more gratifying from the fact, that our previous information was calculated to make the impression that the government of France was prepared to unite with Great Britain in a joint protest against the annexation of Texas, and a joint effort to induce her government to withdraw the proposition to annex, on condition that Mexico should be made to acknowledge her independence. He is happy to infer from your dispatch that the information, so far as it relates to France, is, in all probability, without foundation. You did not go further than you ought, in assuring the king that the object of annexation would be pursued with unabated vigor, and in giving your opinion that a decided majority of the American people were in its favor, and that it would certainly be annexed at no distant day. I feel confident that your anticipation will be fully realized at no distant period.
"Every day will tend to weaken that combination of political causes which led to the opposition of the measure, and to strengthen. the conviction that it was not only expedient, but just and necessary.
"You were right in making the distinction between the interests of France and England in reference to Texas — or rather, I should say, the apparent interests of the two countries. France cannot possibly have any other than commercial interests in desiring to see her preserve her separate independence, while it is certain that England looks beyond, to political interests, to which she apparently attaches much importance. But, in our opinion, the interest of both against the measure is more apparent than real; and that neither France, England, nor even Mexico herself, has any in opposition to it, when the subject is fairly viewed and-considered in its whole extent, and in all its bearings. Thus viewed and considered, and assuming that peace, the extension of commerce, and security, are objects of primary policy with them, it may, as it seems to me, be readily shown that the policy on the part of those powers which would acquiesce in a measure so strongly desired by both the United States and Texas, for their mutual welfare and safety, as the annexation oi the latter to the former, would be far more promotive of these great object* than that which would attempt to resist it. ​"It is Impossible to cast a look at the map of the United States and Texas, and to note the long, artificial and inconvenient line which divides them, and to take into consideration the extraordinary increase of population and growth of the former, and the source from which the latter must derive its Inhabitants, institutions, and laws, without coming to the conclusion that it is their destiny to be united, and of course, that annexation is merely a question of time and mode. Thus regarded, the question to be decided would seem to be, whether it would not be better to permit it to be done now, with the mutual consent of both parties, and the acquiescence of these powers, than to attempt to resis* and defeat it.
"If the former course be adopted, the certain fruits would be the preservation of peace, great extension of commerce by the rapid settlement and improvement of Texas, and increased security, especially to Mexico. The last, in reference to Mexico, may be doubted; but I hold it not less clear than the other two.
"It would be a great mistake to suppose that this government has any hostile feelings toward Mexico, or any disposition to aggrandize itself at her expense. The fact is the very reverse.
"It wishes her well, and desires to see her settled clown in peace and security; and is prepared, in the event of the annexation of Texas, if not forced into conflict with her, to propose to settle with her the question of boundary, and all others growing out of the annexation, on the most liberal terms. Nature herself has clearly marked the boundary between her and Texas by natural limits, too strong to be mistaken. There are few countries whose limits are so distinctly marked; and it would be our desire, if Texas should be united to us, to see them firmly established, as the most certain means of establishing permanent peace between the two countries, and strengthening and cementing their friendship. Such would be the certain consequence of permitting the annexation to take place now, with the acquiescence of Mexico; but very different would be the case if it should be attempted to resist and defeat it, whether the attempt should be successful for the present or not. Any attempt of the kind would not improbably lead to a conflict between us and Mexico, and involve consequences, in reference to her and the general peace, long to be deplored on both sides, and difficult to be repaired. But, should that not be the case, and the interference of another power defeat the annexation for the present, without the interruption of peace, it would but postpone the conflict, and render it more fierce and bloody when it might occur.
"Its defeat would be attributed to enmity and ambition on the part of that power by whose interference it was occasioned, and excite deep jealousy and resentment on the part of our people, who would be ready to seize the first favorable opportunity to effect by force what was prevented from being done peaceably by mutual consent. It is not difficult to see how greatly such a conflict, come when it might, would endanger the general peace, and how much Mexico might be the loser by it.
"In the mean time, the condition of Texas would be rendered uncertain, her ​settlement and prosperity in consequence retarded, and her commerce crippled; while the general peace would be rendered much more insecure. It could not but greatly affect us. If the annexation of Texas should be permitted to take place peaceably now, (as it would without the interference of other powers,) the energies of our people would, for a long time to come, be directed to the peaceable pursuits of redeeming and bringing within the pale of cultivation, improvement, and civilization, that large portion of the continent lying between Mexico on one side and the British possessions on the other, which is now, with little exception, a wilderness, with a sparse population, consisting, for the most part, of wandering Indian tribes.
"It is our destiny to occupy that vast region; to intersect it with roads and canals; to fill it with cities, towns, villages, and farms; to extend over it our religion, customs, constitution, and laws, and to present it as a peaceful and splendid addition to the domains of commerce and civilization. It is our policy to increase by growing and spreading out into unoccupied regions, assimilating all we incorporate: in a word, to increase by accretion, and not through conquest, by the addition of masses held together by the adhesion of force.
"No system can be more unsuited to the latter process, or better adapted to the former, than our admirable federal system. If it should not be resisted in its course, it will probably fulfill its destiny without disturbing our neighbors, or putting in jeopardy the general peace; but if it be opposed by foreign interference, a new direction would be given to our energy, much less favorable to harmony with our neighbors, and to the general peace of the world.
"The change would be undesirable to us, and much less iu accordance with what I have assumed to be primary objects of policy on the part of France, England, and Mexico.
"But, to descend to particulars: it is certain that while England, like France, desires the independence of Texas, with the view to commercial connections, it is not less so that one of the leading motives of England for desiring it is the hope that, through her diplomacy and influence, negro slavery may be abolished there, and ultimately, by consequence, in the United States and throughout the whole of this continent. That its ultimate abolition throughout the entire continent is an object ardently desired by her, we have decisive proofs in the declaration of the Earl of Aberdeen, delivered to this department, and of which you will find a copy among the documents transmit ted to congress with the Texan treaty. That she desires its abolition in Texas, and has used her influence and diplomacy to effect it there, the same document, with the correspondence of this department with Mr. Packenham, also to be found among the documents, furnishes proof not less conclusive. That one of the objects of abolishing it there is to facilitate its abolition in the United States, and throughout the continent, is manifest from the declaration of the abolition party and societies both in this country and in England. In fact, there is good reason to believe that the scheme of abolishing it in Texas, with a view to its abolition in the United States, and over the continent, originated with the prominent members of the party in the United States; and was first ​broached by them in the (so called) world's convention, held in London in the year 1840, and through its agency brought to the notice of the British government.
"Now, I hold, not only that France can have no interest in the consummation of this grand scheme, which England hopes to accomplish through Texas, if she can defeat the annexation, but that her interests, and those of all the continental powers of Europe, are directly and deeply opposed to it.
"It is too late in the day to contend that humanity or philanthropy is the great object of the policy of England in attempting to abolish African slavery on this continent. I do not question but humanity may have had a considerable influence in abolishing slavery in her West India possessions, aided, indeed, by the fallacious calculation that the labor of the negroes would be at least as profitable, if not more so, in consequence of the measure. She acted on the principle that tropical products can be produced cheaper by free African labor and East India labor, than by slave labor. She knew full well the value of such products to her commerce, navigation, navy, manufactures, revenue, and power. She was not ignorant that the support and maintenance of her political preponderance depended on her tropical possessions, and had no intention of diminishing their productiveness, nor any anticipation that such would be the effect, when the scheme of abolishing slavery in her colonial possessions was adopted. On the contrary, she calculated to combine philanthropy with profit and power, as is not unusual with fanaticism. Experience has convinced her of the fallacy of her calculations. She has failed in all her objects. The labor of her negroes has proved far less productive, without affording the consolation of having improved their condition.
"The experiment has turned out to be a costly one. She expended nearly one hundred million of dollars in indemnifying the owners of the emancipated slaves. It is estimated that the increased price paid since, by the people of Great Britain, for sugar and other tropical productions, in consequence of the measure, is equal to half that sum; and that twice that amount has been expended in the suppression of the slave-trade; making together two hundred and fifty millions of dollars as the cost of the experiment. Instead of realizing her hope, the result has been a sad disappointment. Her tropical products have fallen off to a vast amount. Instead of supplying her own wants, and those of nearly all Europe with them, as formerly, she has now, in some of the most important articles, scarcely enough to supply her own. What is worse, her own colonies are actually consuming sugar produced by slave-labor, brought direct to England, or refined in bond, and exported and sold in her colonies as cheap, or cheaper, than can be produced there; while the slavetrade, instead of diminishing, has been in fact carried on to a greater extent than ever. So disastrous has been the result, that her fixed capital invested in tropical possessions, estimated at the value of nearly five hundred millions of dollars, is said to stand on the brink of ruin.
"But this is not the worst; while this costly scheme has had such ruinous effects on the tropical productions of Great Britain, it has given a powerful ​stimulus, followed by a corresponding increase of products, to those countries which had had the good sense to shun her example. There has been vested, it has been estimated by them, in the production of tropical products, since 1808, in fixed capital, nearly $4,000,000,000, wholly dependent on slave-labor. In the same period, the value of their products has been estimated to have risen from about $72,000,000, annually, to nearly 220,000,000; while the whole of the fixed capital of Great Britain, vested in cultivating tropical products, both in the East and West Indies, is estimated at only about $830,000,000, and the value of the products annually at about $50,000,000. To present a still more striking view of three articles of tropical products (sugar, coffee, and cotton), the British possessions, including the East and West Indies, and Mauritius, produced in 1842, of sugar, only 3,995,771 pounds; while Cuba, Brazil, and the United States, excluding other countries having tropical possessions, produced 9,600,000 pounds; of coffee, the British possessions produced only 27,393,003 pounds, while Cuba and Brazil produced 201,590,125 pounds; and of cotton, the British possessions, including shipments to China, only 137,443,446 pounds, while the United States alone produced 790,479,275 pounds.
"The above facts and estimates have all been drawn from a British periodical of high standing and authority, and are believed to be entitled to credit.
"The vast increase of the capital and production on the part of those nations who have continued their former policy toward the negro race, compared with that of Great Britain, indicates a corresponding relative increase of the means of commerce, navigation, manufactures, wealth, and power. It is no longer a question of doubt, that the great source of wealth, prosperity, and power of more civilized nations of the temperate zone (especially Europe, where the arts have made the greatest advance), depends, in a great degree, on the exchange of their products with those of the tropical regions. So great has been the advance made in the arts, both chemical and mechanical, within the few last generations, that all the old civilized nations can, with but a small part of their labor and capital, supply their respective wants; which tends to limit within narrow bounds, the amount of the commerce between them, and forces them all to seek for markets in the tropical regions, and the more newly settled portions of the globe. Those who can best succeed in commanding those markets, have the best prospect of outstripping the others in the career of commerce, navigation, manufactures, wealth, and power.
This is seen and felt by British statesmen, and has opened their eyes to the errors which they have committed. The question now with them is, how shall it be counteracted? What has been done cannot be undone. The question is, by what means can Great Britain regain and keep a superiority in tropical cultivation, commerce, and influence? Or, shall that be abandoned, and other nations be suffered to acquire the supremacy, even to the extent of supplying British markets, to the destruction of the capital already vested in their ​production? Those are the questions which now profoundly occupy the attention of her statesmen, and have the greatest Influence over her councils.
"In order to regain her superiority, she not only seeks to revive and increase her own capacity to produce tropical productions, but to diminish and destroy the capacity of those who have so far outstripped her in consequence of her error. In pursuit of the former, she has cast her eyes to her East India possessions — to Central and Eastern Africa — with the view of establishing colonies there, and even to restore, substantially, the slave-trade itself, under the specious name of transporting her free laborers from Africa to her West India possessions, in order, if possible, to compete successfully with those who have refused to follow her suicidal policy. But these all afford but uncertain and distant hopes of recovering her lost superiority. Her main reliance is on the other alternative — to cripple or destroy the productions of her successful rivals. There is but one way by which it can be done, and that is by abolishing African slavery throughout this continent; and that she openly avows to be the constant object of her policy and exertions. It matters not how, or from what motive, it may be done — whether it be by diplomacy, influence, or force; by secret or open means; and whether the motive be humane or selfish, without regard to manner, means, or motive. The thing itself, should it be accomplished, would put down all rivalry, and give her the undisputed supremacy in supplying her own wants, and those of the rest of the world; and thereby more than fully retrieve what she lost by her errors. It would give her the monopoly of tropical productions, which I shall next proceed to show.
"What would be the consequence if this object of her unceasing solicitude and exertions should be effected by the abolition of negro slavery throughout this continent, some idea may be formed from the immense diminution of productions, as has been shown, which has followed abolition in her West India possessions. But, as great as that has been, it is nothing compared with what would be the effect, if she should succeed in abolishing slavery in the United States, Cuba, and Brazil, and throughout this continent. The experiment in her own colonies was made under the most favorable circumstances. It was brought about gradually and peaceably by the steady and firm operation of the parent country, armed with complete power to prevent or crush at once all insurrectionary movements on the part of the negroes, and able and disposed to maintain to the full, the political and social ascendency of the former masters over their former slaves. It is not at all wonderful that the change of the relation of master and slave took place, under such circumstances, without violence and bloodshed, and that order and peace should have been since preserved. Very different would be the result of abolition should it be effected by her influence and exertions in the possessions of other countries on this continent — and especially in the United States, Cuba, and Brazil, the great cultivators of the principal tropical products of America. To form a correct conception of what would be the result with them, we must look, not to Jamaica, but to St. Domingo, for example. The change would be followed by unforgiving hate between the two races, and end in a bloody and deadly struggle between them ​for the superiority. One or the other would have to be subjugated, extirpated, or expelled; and desolation would overspread their territories, as in St. Domingo, from which it would take centuries to recover. The end would be, that the superiority in cultivating the great tropical staples would be transferred from them to the British tropical possessions.
"They are of vast extent, and those beyond the Cape of Good Hope, possessed of an unlimited amount of labor, standing ready, by the aid of British capital, to supply the deficit which would be occasioned by destroying the tropical productions of the United States, Cuba, Brazil, and other countries cultivated by slave-labor on this continent, as soon as the increased prices, in consequence, would yield a profit. It is the successful competition of that labor which keeps the prices of the great tropical staples so low as to prevent their cultivation with profit in the possessions of Great Britain, by what she is pleased to call free-labor.
"If she can destroy its competition, she would have a monopoly of these productions. She has all the means of furnishing an unlimited supply — vast and fertile possessions in both Indies, boundless command of capital and labor, and ample power to suppress disturbances and preserve order throughout her wide domain.
"It is unquestionable that she regards the abolition of slavery in Texas as a most important step toward this great object of policy, so much the aim of her solicitude and exertions; and the defeat of the annexation of Texas to our Union as indispensable to the abolition of slavery there. She is too sagacious not to see what a fatal blow it would give to slavery in the United States, and how certainly its abolition with us will abolish it over the whole continent, and thereby give her a monopoly in the productions of the great tropical staples, and the command of the commerce, navigation, and manufactures of the world, with an established naval ascendency and political preponderance. To this continent, the blow would be calamitous beyond description. It would destroy, in a great measure, the cultivation and productions of the great tropical staples, amounting annually in value to nearly $300,000,000, the fund which stimulates and upholds almost every other branch of its industry, commerce, navigation, and manufactures. The whole, by their joint influence, are rapidly spreading population, wealth, improvement and civilization over the whole continent, and vivifying, by their overflow, the industry of Europe, thereby increasing its population, wealth, and advancement in the arts, in power, and in civilization.
"Such must be the result, should Great Britain succeed in accomplishing the constant object of her desire and exertions — the abolition of negro slavery over this continent — and toward the effecting of which she regards the defeat of the annexation of Texas to our Union so important.
"Can it be possible that governments so enlightened and sagacious as those of France and the other great continental powers, can be so blinded by the plea of philanthropy as not to see what must inevitably follow, be her motive what it may, should she succeed in her object? It is little short of mockery to talk of philanthropy, with the example before us of the effects of abolishing ​negro slavery in her own colonies, in St. Domingo, and in the northern states of our Union, where statistical facts, not to be shaken, prove that the free negro, after the experience of sixty years, is in a far worse condition than in the other states, where he has been left in his former condition. No: the effect of what is called abolition, where the number is few, is not to raise the inferior race to the condition of freemen, but to deprive the negro of the guardian care of his owner, subject to all the depression and oppression belonging to his inferior condition. But, on the other hand, where the number is great, and bears a large proportion to the whole population, it would be still worse. It would be to substitute for the existing relation a deadly strife between the two races, to end in the subjection, expulsion, or extirpation of one or the other; and such would be the case over the greater part of this continent where negro slavery exists. It would not end there; but would, in all probability, extend, by its example, the war of races over all South America, including Mexico, and extending to the Indian as well as the African race, and make the whole one scene of blood and devastation.
"Dismissing, then, the stale and unfounded plea of philanthropy, can it be that France and the other great continental powers — seeing what must be the result of the policy, for the accomplishment of which England is constantly exerting herself, and that the defeat of the annexation of Texas is so important towards its consummation — are prepared to back or countenance her in her efforts to produce either? What possible motives can they have to favor her cherished policy? Is it not better for them that they should be supplied with tropical products in exchange for their labor from the United States, Brazil, Cuba, and this continent generally, than to be dependent on one great monopolizing power for their supply? Is it not better that they should receive them at the low prices which competition, cheaper means of production, and nearness of market, would furnish them by the former, than to give the high prices which monopoly, dear labor, and great distance from market would impose? Is it not better that their labor should be exchanged with a new continent, rapidly increasing in population and capacity for consuming, and which would furnish, in the course of a few generations, a market nearer to them, and almost of unlimited extent, for the products of their industry and arts, than with old and distant regions, whose population has long since reached its growth?
"The above contains those enlarged views of policy which, it seems to me, an enlightened European statesman ought to take, in making up bis opinion on the subject of the annexation of Texas, and the grounds, as it may be inferred, on which England vainly opposes it. They certainly involve considerations of the deepest importance, and demanding the greatest attention. Viewed in connection with them, the question of annexation becomes one of the first magnitude, not only to Texas and the United States, but to this continent and Europe. They are presented that you may use them on all suitable occasions where you think they may be with effect, in your correspondence, where it can be done with propriety, or otherwise. The president relies with confidence on ​your sagacity, prudence, and zeal. Your mission is one of the first magnitude at all times, but especially now; and he feels assured that nothing will be left undone on your part to do justice to the country and the government in reference to this measure.
"I have said nothing as to our right of treaty with Texas, without consulting Mexico. You so fully understand the grounds on which we rest our right, and are so familiar with all the facts necessary to maintain them, that it was thought unnecessary to add anything in reference to it.
"I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant, :
| "William R. King, Esq., &c., &c., | J. C. Calhoun." |
The presidential contest of 1844 resulted in the election of Jas. K. Polk. The second session of the 28th congress commenced Dec. 2d, to terminate with the close of Mr. Tyler's presidential term. On the 19th of December, Mr. John B. Weller, of Ohio, introduced a joint resolution providing for the annexation of Texas to the United States, which he moved to the committee of the whole. Mr. Hamlin, of Ohio, moved its reference to a committee of one from each state, with instructions to report to the house,
"2d. Whether annexation of Texas would not extend and perpetuate slavery in the slave states, and also the internal slave-trade; and whether the United States government has any constitutional power over slavery in the states, either to perpetuate it there, or to do it away.
"3d. Whether the United States, having acknowledged the independence of Texas, Mexico is thereby deprived of her right to reconquer that province.
"4th. That they report whether Texas is owing any debts or not; and if she is, what is the amount, and to whom payable; and whether, if she should be annexed to the United States, the United States government would be bound to pay them all.
The question was first taken on Mr. Weller's motion, and carried. Yeas, 109, democrats; nays, 61, whigs; whereupon it was held that Hamlin's amendment was defeated, and the original proposition alone committed.
On the 10th of January, 1845, John P. Hale, of New Hampshire, proposed the following as an amendment to any act or resolve contemplating the annexation of Texas to the Union: t
"And provided further, that this provision shall he considered as a compact between the people of the United States and the people of the said territory, and forever remain unalterable, unless by the consent of three-fourths of the states of the Union."
Mr. Hale asked for a suspension of the rules to enable him to offer it now, and have it printed and committed. Refused by a vote of yens 92, not twothirds; nays, 81. All the whigs and most of the democrats from the free states voted aye; all the members from slave states except three, and 17 democrats from free states, voted nay. On the 12th of January, Mr. Ingersoll, of Pa., from the committee on foreign affairs, reported a joint resolution for the annexation of Texas, which was discussed in committee of the whole, and on the 25th reported to the house in the following form; that portion relating to slavery having been added in committee, on motion of Milton Brown, of Tennessee:
"Resolved by the senate and house of representatives in congress assembled, That congress doth consent that the territory properly included within, and rightfully belonging to, the republic of Texas, may be erected into a new state, to be called the state of Texas, with a republican form of government, to be adopted by the people of said republic, by deputies in convention assembled, with the consent of the existing government, in order that the same may be admitted as one of the states of this Union.
"2. And be it further resolved, That the foregoing consent of congress is given upon the following conditions and with the following guaranties, to wit:
"First. Said state to be formed, subject to the adjustment by this government of all questions of boundary that may arise with other governments; and the constitution thereof, with the proper evidence of its adoption by the people of said republic of Texas, shall be transmitted to the President of the United States, to be laid befere congress for its final action, on or before the 1st day of January, 1846.
"Second. Said state, when admitted into the Union, after ceding to the United States all public edifices, fortifications, barracks, ports, and harbors, navy and navy-yards, docks, magazines, arms, armaments, and all other property and means pertaining to the public defense, belonging to the said republic of Texas, shall retain all the public funds, debts, taxes, and dues of every kind which may belong to, or be due or owing said republic; and shall also retain all the vacant and unappropriated lands lying within its limits, to be applied to the payment of the debts and liabilities of said republic of Texas; and the residue of said lands, after discharging said debts and liabilities, to be disposed of as said state may direct; but in no event are said debts and liabilities to become a charge upon the United States.
"Third. New states of convenient size, not exceeding four in number, in addition to said state of Texas, and having sufficient population, may hereafter, by the consent of said state, be formed out of the territory thereof, which shall be entitled to admission under the provisions of the federal constitution. And such states as may be formed out of that portion of said territory lying south of thirty-six degrees thirty minutes north latitude, commonly known as the Missouri compromise line, shall be admitted into the Union, with or without slavery, as the people of each state asking admission may desire; and in such state or states as shall be formed out of said territory north of said Missouri compromise line, slavery or involuntary servitude (except for crime) shall be prohibited."
The following is the joint resolution for the annexation of Texas:
"Resolved by the senate and house of representatives of the United States in congress assembled, That congress doth consent that the territory properly included within, and rightfully. belonging to, the republic of Texas, maybe erected into a new state, to be called the state of Texas, with a republican form of government, to be adopted by the people of said republic, by deputies in convention assembled, with the consent of the existing government, in order that the same may be admitted as one of the states of this Union.
"Sec. 2. And be it further rseolved, That the foregoing consent of congress is given upon the following conditions, and with the following guaranties, to wit:
"First. Said state to be formed, subject to the adjustment by this government of all questions of boundary that may arise with other governments; and the constitution thereof, with the proper evidence of its adoption by the people of said republic of Texas, shall be transmitted to the President of the United States, to be laid before congress for its final action, on or before the first day of January, one thousand eight hundred and forty-six.
"Second. Said state, when admitted into the Union, after ceding to the United States all public edifices, fortifications, barracks, ports, and harbors, navy and navy-yards, docks, magazines, arms, armaments, and all other property and means pertaining to the public defense, belonging to the said republic of Texas, shall retain all the public funds, debts, taxes, and dues of every kind which may belong to, or be due or owing said republic; and shall also retain all the vacant or unappropriated lands lying within its limits, to be applied to the payment of the debts and liabilities of said republic of Texas; and the residue of said lands, after discharging said debts and liabilities, to be disposed of as said state may direct; but in no event are said debts and liabilities to become a charge upon the United States. ​"Third. New states of convenient size, not exceeding four in number, in addition to the said state of Texas, and having sufficient population, may hereafter, by the consent of said state, be formed out of the territory thereof, which shall be entitled to admission under the provisions of the federal constitution; and such states as may be formed out of that portion of said territory lying south of thirty-six degrees thirty minutes north latitude, commonly known as the Missouri compromise line, shall be admitted into the Union with or without slavery, as the people of each state asking admission may desire; and in such state or states as shall be formed out of said territory north of said Missouri compromise line, slavery or involuntary servitude, (except for crime,) shall be prohibited.
"And be it further resolved, That if the President of the United States shall, in his judgment and discretion, deem it most advisable, instead of proceeding to submit the foregoing resolution to the republic of Texas, as an overture on the part of the United States, for admission, to negotiate with that republic; then,
"Be it resolved, That a state to be formed out of the present republic of Texas, with suitable extent and boundaries, and with two representatives in congress, until the next apportionment of representation, shall be admitted into the Union by virtue of this act, on an equal footing with the existing states, as soon as the terms and conditions of such admission, and the cession of the remaining Texan territory to the United States, shall be agreed upon by the governments of Texas and the United States.
"And be it further enacted, That the sum of one hundred thousand dollars be, and the same is hereby appropriated to defray the expenses of missions and negotiations, to agree upon the terms of said admission and cession, either by treaty to be submitted to the senate, or by articles to be submitted to the two houses of congress, as the president may direct.
"Approved March 2, 1845."
Texas having been annexed in pursuance of the foregoing joint resolution of the two houses of congress, a portion of the United States army, under Gen. Taylor, was, early in the spring of 1846, moved down to the east bank of the Rio Grande del Norte, claimed by Texas as her western boundary, but not so regarded by Mexico. A hostile collision ensued, resulting in war between the United States and Mexico.
This proviso was carried in committee by a vote of 84 to 63. The bill was then reported to the house, and the previous question moved on its engrossment, which was carried, and the bill sent to the senate. Mr. Lewis, senator from Alabama, moved that the proviso be struck out, on which debate arose, and Mr. John Davis, of Mass., was speaking, when twelve o'clock, August 10th, arrived, the time fixed for adjournment, and both houses adjourned without day.
The 30th congress assembled Dec. 6, 1847. On the 28th February, Mr. Putnam, of New York, moved the following resolution:
"And whereas, Congress, in the organization of a territorial government, at an early period of our political history, established a principle worthy of imitation in all future time, forbidding the existence of slavery in free territory; therefore,
The resolution was ordered to lie on the table by a vote of 105 to 93. This terminated all direct action on the Wilmot proviso for that session.
A bill for the establishment of a territorial government for Oregon was reported in the senate early in the session, and the question of slavery furnished matter for a protracted debate. The power of congress to legislate on the subject of slavery in the territories was discussed in the senate by Mr. Dix, of New York, who maintained the affirmative, and Mr. Calhoun the negative.
Mr. Dix stated certain positions which he thought constituted a proper basis for the settlement of the question; positions, the correctness of which a majority of the friends of free territory, it is believed, do not concede. They are these: 1. All external interference with slavery in the states is a violation of the compromises of the constitution, and dangerous to the harmony and perpetuity of the federal union. 2. Territory acquired by the United States should, in respect to slavery, be received as it is found. If slavery exists therein at the time of the acquisition, it should be left to remain undisturbed by congress. If it does not exist therein at the time of the acquisition, its introduction ought to be prohibited while the territory continues to be governed as such. 3. All legislation by congress in respect to slavery in the territory, ceases to be operative when the inhabitants are permitted to form a state government; and the admission of a state into the Union carries with it, by force of the sovereignty such admission confers, the right to dispose of the whole question of slavery at its discretion, without external interference. ​Mr. Calhoun denied the existence of the power of congress to exclude the south from a free admission into the territories with its slaves. He denied what had been by many assumed, that congress had an absolute right to govern the territories. The clause of the constitution which gives "power to dispose of and make all needful rides and regulations respecting the territory and other property belonging to the United States," did not, he said, convey such a right: "it conferred no governmental power whatever; no, not a particle." It only referred to territory as public lands — as property — and gave to congress the right to dispose of it as such, but not to exercise over it the power of government. Mr. Calhoun thought the best method of settling the slavery question was by non-action — by leaving the territories free and open to the emigration of all the world, and when they became states, to permit them to adopt whatever constitution they pleased.
Mr. Calhoun considered the interference on the subject dangerous to the Union. If the Union and our system of government were ever doomed to perish, the historian who should record the events ending in so calamitous a result, would devote his first chapter to the ordinance of 1787; his next to the Missouri compromise; and the next to the present agitation. Whether there would be another beyond, he knew not. He reviewed and controverted the doctrines of the declaration of independence. The proposition that "all men are created free and equal," he called a "hypothetical truism." Literally, there was not a word of truth in it. This assertion he supported with the singular argument, that "Men are not born free. Infants are born. They grow to be men. They were not born free. "While infants, they are incapable of freedom; they are subject to their parents." Nor was it less false that they are born "equal." But in the declaration of independence the word "free" did not occur. Still the expression was erroneous. "All men are not created. Only two, a man and a woman, were created, and one of these was pronounced subordinate to the other. All others have come into the world by being born, and in no sense, as I have shown, either free or equal." This expression, Mr. C. said, had been inserted in the declaration without any necessity. It made no necessary part of our justification in separating ourselves from the parent country. Nor had it any weight in constructing the governments which were to be substituted in the place of the colonial. They were formed from the old materials, and on practical and well established principles, borrowed, for the most part, from our own experience, and that of the country from which we sprang.
Mr. Calhoun argued, that, instead of liberty and equality being born with men, and instead of all men and all classes being entitled to them, they were high prizes to be won; they were rewards bestowed on mental and moral development. The error which he was combating had done more to retard the cause of liberty and civilization, and was doing more at present, than all other causes combined. It was the leading cause which had placed Europe in its present state of anarchy, and which stood in the way of reconstructing good governments. He concluded as follows: ​"Nor are we exempt from its disorganizing effects. "We now begin to experience the danger of admitting so great an error to have a place in the declaration of our independence. For a long time it lay dormant; but in process of time it began to germinate, and produce its poisonous fruits. It had strong hold on the mind of Jefferson, the author of that document, which caused him to take an utterly false view of the subordinate relation of the black to the white race in the south; and to hold, in consequence, that the latter, though utterly unqualified to possess liberty, were as fully entitled to both liberty and equality as the former; and that to deprive them of it was unjust and immoral. To this error, his proposition to exclude slavery from the territory northwest of the Ohio may be traced, and to that the ordinance of 1781, and through it the deep and dangerous agitation which now threatens to engulf, and will certainly engulf, if not speedily settled, our political institutions, and involve the country in countless woes."
The house bill providing a government for Oregon was passed by that body on the second of August, 129 to 71. It contained a provision for extending the ordinance of 1787 over the territory. The bill passed the senate on the 13th August — the session closing the next day.
The following letter from Gen. Cass to A. 0. P. Nicholson, appeared during the winter of 1847-8. It is regarded as the first well considered enunciation of squatter sovereignty:
Washington, December 24, 1847.
Dear Sir: I have received your letter, and shall answer it as frankly as it is written.
You ask me whether I am in favor of the acquisition of Mexican territory, and what are my sentiments with regard to the Wilmot proviso.
I have so often and so explicitly stated my views of the first question, in the senate, that it seems almost unnecessary to repeat them here. As you request it, however, I shall briefly give them.
I think, then, that no peace should be granted to Mexico, till a reasonable indemnity is obtained for the injuries which she has done us. The territorial extent of this indemnity is, in the first instance, a subject of executive consideration. There the constitution has placed it, and there I am willing to leave it: not only because I have full confidence in its judicious exercise, but because, in the ever-varying circumstances of a war, it would be indiscreet, by a public declaration, to commit the country to any line of indemnity, which might otherwise be enlarged, as the obstinate injustice of the enemy prolongs the contest, with its loss of blood and treasure.
It appears to me, that the kind of metaphysical magnanimity which would reject all indemnity at the close of a bloody and expensive war, brought on by a direct attack upon our troops by the enemy, and preceded by a succession of unjust acts for a series of years, is as unworthy of the age in which we live, as it is revolting to the common sense and practice of mankind. It would conduce but little to our future security, or, indeed, to our present reputation, to declare that we repudiate all expectation of compensation from the Mexican ​government, and are fighting, not for any practical result, but for sonic vague, perhaps philanthropic object, which escapes ray penetration, and must be defined by those who assume this new principle of national intercommunication. All wars are to be deprecated, as well by the statesman as by the philanthropist. They are great evils; but there are greater evils than these, and submission to injustice is among them. The nation which should refuse to defend its rights and its honor, when assailed, would soon have neither to defend; and, when driven to war, it is not by professions of disinterestedness and declarations of magnanimity that its rational objects can be best obtained, or other nations taught a lesson of forbearance — the strongest security for a permanent peace. We are at war with Mexico, and its vigorous prosecution is the surest means of its speedy termination, and ample indemnity the surest guaranty against the recurrence of such injustice as provoked it.
The Wilmot proviso has been before the country for some time. It has been repeatedly discussed in congress, and by the public press. I am strongly impressed with the opinion, that a great change has been going on in the public mind upon this subject, in my own as well as others; and that doubts arc resolving themselves into convictions, that the principle it involves should be kept out of the national legislature, and left to the people of the confederacy in their respective local governments.
The whole subject is a comprehensive one, and fruitful of important consequences. It would be ill-timed to discuss it here. I shall not assume that responsible task, but shall confine myself to such general views as are necessary to the fair exhibition of my opinions.
We may well regret the existence of slavery in the southern states, and wish they had been saved from its introduction. But there it is, not by the act of the present generation; and we must deal with it as a great practical question, involving the most momentous consequences. We have neither the right nor the power to touch it where it exists; and if we had both, their exercise, by any means heretofore suggested, might lead to results which no wise man would willingly encounter, and which no good man could contemplate without anxiety.
The theory of our government presupposes that its various members have reserved to themselves the regulation of all subjects relating to what may be termed their internal police. They are sovereign within their boundaries, except in those cases where they have surrendered to the general government a portion of their rights, in order to give effect to the objects of the Union, whether these concern foreign nations or the several states themselves. Local institutions, if I may so speak, whether they have reference to slavery or to any other relations, domestic or public, are left to local authority, either original or derivative. Congress has no right to say that there shall be slavery in New York, or that there shall be no slavery in Georgia; nor is there any other human power, but the people of those states, respectively, which can change the relations existing therein; and they can say, if they will, 'we will have slavery in the former, and we will abolish it in the latter.'
In various respects, the territories differ from the states. Some of their ​rights are inchoate, and they do not possess the peculiar attributes of sovereignty. Their relation to the general government is very imperfectly defined by the constitution; and it will be found, upon examination, that in that instrument the only grant of power concerning them is conveyed in the phrase, "congress shall have the power to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory and other property belonging to the United States." Certainly this phraseology is very loose, if it were designed to include in the grant the whole power of legislation over persons, as well as things. The expression, the "territory and other property," fairly construed, relates to the public lands, as such; to arsenals, dockyards, forts, ships, and all the various kinds of property which the United States may and must possess.
But surely the simple authority to dispose of and regulate these does not extend to the unlimited power of legislation; to the passage of all laws, in the most general acceptation of the word; which, by-the-by, is carefully excluded from the sentence. And, indeed, if this were so, it would render unnecessary another provision of the constitution, which grants to Congress the power to legislate, with the consent of the states, respectively, over all places purchased for the "erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dock-yards," etc. These being the property of the United States, if the power to make "needful rules and regulations concerning "them includes the general power of legislation, then the grant of authority to regulate "the territory and other property of the United States" is unlimited, wherever subjects are found for its operation, and its exercise needed no auxiliary provision. If, on the other hand, it does not include-such power of legislation over the "other property" of the United States, then it does not include it over their "territory;" for the same terms which grant the one, grant the other. "Territory" is here classed with property, and treated as such; and the object was evidently to enable the general government, as a property-holder — which, from necessity it must be — to manage, preserve and "dispose of" such property as it might possess, and which authority is essential almost to its being. But the lives and persons of our citizens, with the vast variety of objects connected with them, cannot be controlled by an authority which is merely called into existence for the purpose of making rules and regulations for the disposition and management of properly.
Such, it appears to me, would be the construction put upon this provision of the constitution, were this question now first presented for consideration, and not controlled by imperious circumstances. The original ordinance of the congress of the confederation, passed in 1787, and which was the only act upon this subject in force at the adoption of the constitution, provided a complete frame of government for the country north of the Ohio, while in a territorial, condition, and for its eventual admission in separate states into the Union. And the persuasion that this ordinance contained within itself all the necessary means of execution, probably prevented any direct reference to the subject in the constitution, further than vesting in congress the right to admit the states formed under it into the Union. However, circumstances arose which required ​legislation, as well over the territory north of the Ohio as over other territory, both within and without the original Union, ceded to the general government, and, at various times, a more enlarged power has been exercised over the territories — meaning thereby the different territorial governments — than is conveyed by the limited grant referred to. How far an existing necessity may have operated in producing this legislation, and thus extending, by rather a violent implication, powers not directly given, I know not. But certain it is that the principle of interference should not be carried beyond the necessary implication which produces it. It should be limited to the creation of proper governments for new countries, acquired or settled, and to the necessary provision for their eventual admission into the Union; leaving, in the meantime, the people inhabiting them, to regulate their internal concerns in their own way. They are just as capable of doing so as the people of the states; and they can do so, at any rate as soon as their political independence is recognized by admission into the Union. During this temporary condition, it is hardly expedient to call into exercise a doubtful and invidious authority, which questions the intelligence of a respectable portion of our citizens, and whose limitation, whatever it may be, will be rapidly approaching its termination — an authority which would give to congress despotic power, uncontrolled by the constitution, over most important sections of our common country. For, if the relation of master and servant may be regulated or annihilated by its legislation, so may the regulation of husband and wife, of parent and child, and of any other condition which our institutions and the habits of our society recognize. What would be thought if congress should undertake to prescribe the terms of marriage in New York, or to regulate the authority of parents over their children in Pennsylvania? It would be vain to seek an argument justifying the interference of the national legislature in the cases referred to in the original states of the Union. I speak here of the inherent power of congress, and do not touch the question of such contracts as may be formed with new states when admitted into the confederacy.
Of all the questions that can agitate us, those which are merely sectional in their character are the most dangerous, and the most to be deprecated. The warning voice of him who from his character and services and virtue had the best right to warn us, proclaimed to his countrymen, in his farewell address, that monument of wisdom for him, as I hope it will be of safety for them, how much we had to apprehend from measures peculiarly affecting geographical sections of our country. The grave circumstances in which we are now placed make these words words of safety; for I am satisfied, from all I have seen and heard here, that a successful attempt to engraft the principles of the Wilmot proviso upon the legislation of this government, and to apply them to new territory, should new territory be acquired, would seriously affect our tranquility. I do not suffer myself to foresee or to foretell the consequences that would ensue; for I trust and believe there is good sense and good feeling enough in the country to avoid them, by avoiding all occasions which might lead to them.
Briefly, then, I am opposed to the exercise of any jurisdiction by congress ​over this matter; and I am in favor of leaving to the people of any territory, which may be hereafter acquired, the right to regulate it for themselves, under the general principles of the constitution. Because —
1. I do not sec in the constitution any grant of the requisite power to congress; and I am not disposed to extend a doubtful precedent beyond its necessity the establishment of territorial governments when needed — leaving to the inhabitants all the rights compatible with the relations they bear to the confederation.
2. Because I believe this measure, if adopted, would weaken, if not impair, the union of the states; and would sow the seeds of future discord, which would grow up and ripen into an abundant harvest of calamity.
3. Because I believe a general conviction that such a proposition would succeed, would lead to an immediate witholding of the supplies, and thus to a dishonorable termination of the war. I think no dispassionate observer at the seat of government can doubt this result.
4. If, however, in this I am under a misapprehension, I am under none in the practical operation in this restriction, if adopted by congress, upon a treaty of peace, making any acquisition of Mexican territory. Such a treaty would be rejected as certainly as presented to the senate. More than one-third of that body would vote against it, viewing such a principle as an exclusion of the citizens of the slaveholding states from a participation in the benefits acquired by the treasure and exertions of all, and which should be common to all. I am repeating — neither advancing nor defending these views. That branch of the subject does not lie in my way, and I shall not turn aside to seek it.
In this aspect of the matter, the people of the United States must choose between this restriction and the extension of their territorial limits. They cannot have both; and which they will surrender must depend upon their representatives first, and then, if these fail them, upon themselves.
5. But after all, it seems to be generally conceded that this restriction, if carried into effect, could not operate upon any state to be formed from newly-acquired territory. The well-known attributes of sovereignty, recognized by us as belonging to the state governments, would sweep before them any such barrier, and would leave the people to express and exert their will at pleasure. Is the object, then, of temporary exclusion for so short a period as the duration of the territorial governments, worth the price at which it would be purchased? — worth the discord it would engender, the trial to which it would expose our union, and the evils that would be the certain consequence, let the trial result as it might? As to the course, which has been intimated, rather than proposed, of engrafting such a restriction upon any treaty of acquisition, I persuade myself it would find but little favor in any portion of this country. Such an arrangement would render Mexico a party, having a right to interfere in our internal institutions in questions left by the constitution to the state governments, and would inflict a serious blow upon our fundamental principles. Few, indeed, I trust, there are among us who would thus grant to a foreign ​power the right to inquire into the constitution and conduct of the sovereign states of this union; and if there are any, I am not among them, nor never shall be. To the people of this country, under God, now and hereafter, aro its destinies committed; and we want no foreign power to interrogate as, treaty in hand, and to say, "why have you done this, or why have you left that undone?" Our own dignity and the principles of national independence unite to repel such a proposition.
But there is another important consideration, which ought not to be lost sight of, in the investigation of this subject. The question that presents itself is not a question of the increase, but of the diffusion of slavery. Whether its sphere be stationary or progressive, its amount will be the same. The rejection of this restriction will not add one to the class of servitude, nor will its adoption give freedom to a single being who is now placed therein. The same numbers will be spread over greater territory; and, so far as compression, with less abundance of the necessaries of life, is an evil, so far will that evil be mitigated by transporting slaves to a new country, and giving them a larger space to occupy.
I say this in the event of the extension of slavery over any new acquisition. But can it go there? This may well be doubted. All the descriptions which reach us of the condition of the Californias and of New-Mexico, to the acquisition of which our efforts seem at present directed, unite in representing those countries as agricultural regions, similar in their products to our middle states, and generally unfit for the production of the great staples which can alone render slave labor valuable. If we are not grossly deceived — and it is difficult to conceive how we can be — the inhabitants of those regions, whether they depend upon their plows or their herds, cannot be slaveholders. Involuntary labor, requiring the investment of large capital, can only be profitable when employed in the production of a few favored articles confined by nature to special districts, and paying larger returns than the usual agricultural products spread over more considerable portions of the earth.
In the able letter of Mr. Buchanan upon this subject, not long since given to the public, he presents similar considerations with great force. "Neither," says the distinguished writer, "the soil, the climate, nor the productions of California south of 36° 30', nor indeed of any portion of it, north or south, is adapted to slave labor; aud beside, every facility would be there afforded for the slave to escape from his master. Such property would be entirely insecure in any part of California. It is morally impossible, therefore, that a majority of the emigrants to that portion of the territory south of 36° 30', which will be chiefly composed of our citizens, will ever reestablish slavery within its limits.
"In regard to New Mexico, east of the Rio Grande, the question has already been settled by the admission of Texas into the Union.
"Should we acquire the territory beyond the Rio Grande and east of the Rocky Mountains, it is still more impossible that a majority of the people would consent to reëstablish slavery. They are themselves a colored ​population, and among them the negro does not belong socially to a degraded race." With this last remark, Mr. Walker fully coincides in his letter written in 1844, upon the annexation of Texas, and which everywhere produced so favorable an impression upon the public mind, as to have conduced very materially to the accomplishment, of that great measure. "Beyond the Del Norte," says Mr. Walker, "slavery will not pass; not only because it is forbidden by law, but because the colored race there preponderates in the ratio of ten to one over the whites; and holding, as they do, the government and most of the offices in their possession, they will not permit the enslavement of any portion of the colored race, which makes and executes the laws of the country."
The question, it will be therefore seen on examination, does not regard the exclusion of slavery from a region where it now exists, but a prohibition against its introduction where it does not exist, and where, from the feelings of the inhabitants and the laws of nature, "it is morally impossible," as Mr. Buchanan says, that it can ever reëstablish itself.
It augurs well for the permanency of our confederation, that during more than half a century, which has elapsed since the establishment of this government, many serious questions, and some of the highest importance, have agitated the public mind, and more than once threatened the gravest consequences; but that they have all in succession passed away, leaving our institutions unscathed, and our country advancing in numbers, power and wealth, and in all the other elements of national prosperity, with a rapidity unknown in ancient or in modern days. In times of political excitement, when difficult and delicate questions present themselves for solution, there is one ark of safety for us; and that is, an honest appeal to the fundamental principles of our Union, and a stern determination to abide their dictates. This course of proceeding has carried us in safety through many a trouble, and I trust will carry us safely through many more, should many more be destined to assail us. The Wilmot proviso seeks to take from its legitimate tribunal a question of domestic policy, having no relation to the Union, as such, and to transfer it to another, created by the people for a special purpose, and foreign to the subject matter involved in this issue. By going back to our true principles, we go back to the road of peace and safety. Leave to the people, who will be affected by this question, to adjust it upon their own responsibility, and in their own manner, and we shall render another tribute to the original principles of our government, and furnish another guaranty for its permanence and prosperity. I am, dear sir, respectfully, your obedient servant, Lewis Cass.
A. 0. P. Nicholson, Esq., Nashville, Tenn.