# All the Works of Epictetus, Which Are Now Extant/Book 1/Chapter 7

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CHAPTER VII.
Of the Use of convertible and hypothetical Propositions, and the like.
§. 1.It is a Secret to the Vulgar, that the Practice of convertible, and hypothetical, and interrogatory Arguments, and, in general, of all other logical Forms, hath any Relation to the Duties of Life. For, in every Subject of Action, the Question is, how a wise and good Man may find a Way of extricating himself, and a Method of Behaviour conformable to his Duty upon the Occasion. Let them say, therefore, either that the Man of Virtue will not engage in Questions and Answers; or that, if he doth, he will not think it worth his Care whether he behaves rashly and at hazard in questioning and answering: or if they allow neither of these; it is necessary to confess, that some Examination ought to be made of those ​Topics, in which the Affair of Question and Answer is principally concerned. For what is the Profession of Reasoning? To lay down true Positions; to reject false ones; and to suspend the Judgment in doubtful ones. Is it enough, then, to have learned merely this?——It is enough, say you.——Is it enough, then, for him who would not commit Mistake in the Use of Money, merely to have heard, that we are to receive the good Pieces, and reject the bad?——This is not enough:——What must be added besides?——That Faculty which tries and distinguishes what Pieces are good, what bad.——Therefore, in Reasoning too, what hath been already said is not enough; but it is necessary that we should be able to prove and distinguish between the true, and the false, and the doubtful.——It is necessary.
§. 2. And what farther is professed in Reasoning?——To admit the Consequence of what you have properly granted.——Well: and here, too, is the mere Knowing this enough?——It is not; but we must learn how such a Thing is the Consequence of such another; and when one Thing follows from one Thing, and when from many Things in common. Is it not moreover necessary, that he, who would behave skilfully in Reasoning, should both himself demonstrate whatever he delivers, and be able to comprehend the Demonstrations of others; and not be deceived by such as sophisticate, as if they were demonstrating. Hence, then, the Employment and Exercise of concluding Arguments and Figures arises; and appears to be necessary.
§. 3. But it may possibly happen, that from the Premises which we have properly granted, there arises some Consequence, which, though false, is nevertheless a Consequence. What then ought I to do? To admit a Falsehood?——And how is that possible?——Well or to say that my Con​cessions were not properly made?——But neither is this allowed——Or that the Consequence doth not arise from the Premises?——Nor is even this allowed.——What then is to be done in the Case?——Is it not this? As the having once borrowed Money, is not enough to make a a Person a Debtor, unless he still continues to owe Money, and hath not paid it: so the having granted the Premises, is not enough to make it necessary to grant the Inference, unless we continue our Concessions. If the Premises continue to the End, such as they were when the Concessions were made, it is absolutely necessary to continue the Concessions, and to admit what follows from them. But if the Premises do not continue such as they were when the Concession was made, it is absolutely necessary to depart from the Concession, and admit [rather the contrary: I mean] what doth not follow from the Argument itself. For this Inference is no Consequence of ours, nor belongs to us, when we have departed from the Concession of the Premises. We ought then to examine these Kinds of Premises, and their Changes and Conversions, on which any one, by laying hold, either in the Question itself, or in the Answer, or in the syllogistical Conclusion, or in any other thing of that sort, gives an Occasion to the Unthinking of being disconcerted, not foreseeing the Consequence.——Why so?——That in this Topic we may not behave contrary to our Duty, nor with Confusion.
§. 4. The same Thing is to be observed in Hypotheses and hypothetical Arguments. For it is ​sometimes necessary to require some Hypothesis to be granted, as a kind of Step to the rest of the Argument. Is every given Hypothesis then to be granted, or not every one; and if not every one, which? And is he who has granted an Hypothesis, for ever to abide by it? Or is he sometimes to depart from it, and admit only Consequences, but not to admit Contradictions?——Ay: but a Person may say, on your admitting the Hypothesis of a Possibility, I will drive you upon an Impossibility. With such a one as this, shall the Man of Prudence not engage; but avoid all Examination and Conversation with him?——And yet who, besides the Man of Prudence, is capable of treating an Argument, or who besides is sagacious in Questions and Answers, and incapable of being deceived and imposed on by Sophistry?——Or will he indeed engage, but without regarding whether he behaves rashly and at hazard in the Argument?——Yet how then can he be such a one as we are supposing him? But, without some such Exercise and Preparation, is it possible for him to preserve himself consistent? Let them shew this: and all these Theorems will be superfluous and absurd, and unconnected with our Idea of the virtuous Man. Why then are we still indolent, and slothful, and sluggish, seeking Pretences of avoiding Labour? Shall we not be watchful to render Reason itself accurate?——"But suppose, after all, I should make a Mistake in these Points: have I killed a Father?——Wretch! why, in this Case, where had you a Father to kill? What is it then that you have done? The only Fault that you could commit, in this Instance, you have committed. This very Thing I myself said to Rufus, when he reproved me, for not finding something that was omitted in some Syllogism. Why, said I, have I burnt the Capitol then? Wretch! answered he, was the Thing here omitted the Capitol? Or are ​there no other Faults, but burning the Capitol, or killing a Father? and is it no Fault to treat the Appearances presented to our Minds rashly, and vainly, and at hazard; not to comprehend a Reason, nor a Demonstration, nor a Sophism; nor, in short, to see what is for, or against one's self in a Question or Answer? Is nothing of all this any Fault?
* ↑ It is but fair to warn the Reader, that little Entertainment is to be expected from this Chapter, which is wholly logical.
* ↑ The Passage seems to require that ανακολουθον should be ακολουθον; We are to depart from the Concession, and admit what follows from the Argument itself. The Meaning I apprehend to be, that if, in the Course of an Argument, our Opponent sophistically alters the State of the Question on which our Concessions were founded, it is lawful to revoke those Concessions; and admit no Consequence but what is fairly drawn from the Argument itself.