# Royall v. State of Virginia

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United States Supreme Court
116 U.S. 572
Royall v. State of Virginia
Argued: February 1, 1886. ---
The plaintiff in error was convicted, in the hustings court of the city of Richmond, of the misdemeanor, under the laws of Virginia, of practicing law as a lawyer without having first obtained a license so to do from the commissioner of the revenue.
To the information the plaintiff in error filed the following plea: 'And for a plea in this behalf the said William L. Royall comes and says that he is an attorney at law, duly licensed and qualified to practice law in the courts of the state of Virginia, under the laws of said state, and that he has been such for more than five years; that on the first day of May 1884, he paid to Samuel C. Greenhow, who is the treasurer of the city of Richmond, Virginia, twenty-five dollars and seventy-five cents, and received from him and the commissioner of the revenue a revenue license as a lawyer for one year from that date; that he has not practiced his profession as a lawyer in the courts of said state between the first day of May, 1885, and the eleventh day of July, 1885; that on the eleventh day of July, 1885, he tendered to Seaton G. Tinsley, who is the deputy for Samuel C. Greenhow, one coupon for fifteen dollars, and ten dollars in United States treasury notes, in payment of his license tax as an attorney at law for the ensuing year, and seventy-five cents in silver coin for the fee of the commissioner of the revenue; that said coupon was cut from a bond issued by the state of Virginia under the provisions of an act of the general assembly approved March 30, 1871, entitled 'An act to provide for the funding and payment of the public debt;' that it was overdue and past maturity, and bore upon its face the contract of the state of Virginia that it should be received in payment of all taxes, debts, demanded of said due to the said state; that when he made said tender he demanded of said Greenhow a certificate in writing, stating that he had deposited with him said coupon and money, but the said Greenhow, by his said deputy, refused to receive said coupon and money for any purpose whatever, and refused to give him said certificate or any other certificate; that he refused to receive said coupon and money, because an act of the general assembly of the state of Virginia approved February 7, 1884, forbade him to receive said license tax in coupons, and because the 112th section of an act of the general assembly of said state approved March 15, 1884, provides that all license taxes shall be paid in current money of the United States, and not in coupons; that thereupon the defendant made the affidavit hereto attached, marked 'A,' and presented it to R. B. Munford, who is the commissioner of the revenue for the city of Richmond, and demanded of him a revenue license, as an attorney at law, and at the same time he presented to the said Munford the paper hereto attached, marked 'B,' and at the same time he offered to pay the said Munford any and all fees that he was entitled to receive before issuing said license, but the said Munford refused to issue to defendant a license as an attorney at law; that thereafter defendant accepted the employment of a client who was being prosecuted for a misdemeanor in this honorable court, and assisted in his defense, and thus practiced his profession as a lawyer without a revenue license, but said professional act was done after defendant had made the efforts hereinbefore described to obtain a revenue license, and this he is ready to verify.'
The affidavit referred to in the plea set forth the facts of the tender, and the paper marked 'B' was the usual form of an application for a revenue license. To this plea the commonwealth filed a general demurrer, which was sustained by the court, on the ground that the defendant had no right to practice his profession as an attorney at law after the tender of the coupons and money, as described in the plea, without first having obtained a license therefor. The defendant then pleaded not guilty, and a trial was had, resulting in a verdict finding the defendant guilty and assessing his fine at $30.
During the progress of the trial a bill of exceptions was duly taken, as follows: 'Be it remembered that on the trial of this cause the same was submitted to the jury upon the following agreed statement of facts, to-wit: 'It is admitted as evidence in the case of the Com. v. Royall, that said Royall did not practice his profession as attorney at law between May 1, 1885, and July 11, 1885, and that on the latter day he tendered to the treasurer of the city of Richmond a coupon issued by the state of Virginia under the provisions of the act of March 30, 1871, for the sum of $15, and $10.75 lawful money of the United States, in payment of his license tax for the ensuing year, and demanded his license of the proper officer; that said coupon was receivable in payment of all taxes, debts, and demands due said state; that said tender was refused; that thereupon the defendant practiced his profession as an attorney after said tender, but not before, without revenue license, but the said defendant has for more than five years been duly licensed to practice law under the laws of Virginia. It is further agreed that the license tax on the defendant as an attorney at law is twenty-five dollars, ($25.)' Thereupon the defendant moved the court to instruct the jury as follows: 'If the jury believe from the evidence that the defendant did not practice his profession of attorney at law between the first day of May, 1885, and the eleventh day of July, 1885, and that on the eleventh day of July, 1885, he tendered to the treasurer of the city of Richmond a coupon for $15, issued by the state of Virginia under the provisions of the act of assembly approved March 30, 1871, which coupon, by provisions of said act, was receivable for all taxes, debts, and demands due said state, and ten dollars and seventy-five cents in lawful money of the United States, in payment of his license tax, which said tax is $25, and 75 cents commissioner's fee, for the then ensuing year, and that said tender was refused by said treasurer, then they are instructed they must find the defendant not guilty.' Which instructions the court refused to give. To the court's action in refusing which instructions the defendant excepts, and tenders this, his first bill of exceptions, and prays that this his bill of exceptions be signed, sealed, and made a part of the record; which is accordingly done.'
Judgment was entered on the verdict for the payment of the fine, and execution awarded. The record contains the following: 'And, at the instance of the defendant, the court certifies that in the record and at the trial of this cause there was drawn in question the validity of section 86 of chapter 34 of the Code of Virginia of 1873, and an act of the general assembly of said state, approved February 7, 1884, entitled 'An act to regulate the granting of licenses for the exercise of any privilege,' and the 112th section of an act of the general assembly of said state approved March 15, 1884, entitled 'An act to provide for the assessment of taxes on persons, property, and incomes,' etc., upon the ground that, so far as they undertake to inflict punishment upon the defendant for practicing his profession as an attorney at law without license, after having tendered the state's tax-receivable coupons in payment of his license tax, they are repugnant to section ten of article one of the constitution of the United States. But the court, being of opinion that the defendant had no right to practice the profession of an attorney at law without a license after he had tendered payment of his license tax in coupons, decided and gave judgment that said section of said Code and said acts of the general assembly are not repugnant to section ten of article one of the constitution of the United States in that behalf, and it decided and gave judgment in favor of the validity of said section of said Code and said act of assembly.'
The supreme court of appeals denied a petition praying for an allowance of a writ of error, and to reverse that judgment this writ of error is prosecuted.
Wm. L. Royall and D. H. Chamberlain, for plaintiff in error.
F. S. Blair, R. A. Ayers, and W. R. Staples, for defendant in error.
MATTHEWS, J.

## Notes

This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
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