OpenLLM-France/wikimedia huggingface dataset:
# The Strand Magazine/Volume 3/Issue 18

June, 1892. (transcription project)
Layout 4
​ Zodomirsky's Duel.
* Zodomirsky's Duel from the French of Alexandre Dumas. Illustrated by Paul Hardy.
* Illustrated Interviews. No. XII. Madame Adelina Patti, by Harry How. Illustrated by R. Jones.
* The Bride of Felix Armstrong by J. Harwood Panting. Illustrated by W. S. Stacey.
* How a Sculptor Works by Alfred T. Story. Illustrated by J. Frénzeny.
* The Conscientious Burglar by Grant Allen. Illustrated by A. Pearse.
* Portraits of Celebrities at Different Times of their Lives.
* Sir George Trevelyan, Bart.
* W. P. Frith
* B. W. Leader
* Lily Hanbury
* Henry Parkes
* Jacques Blumenthal
* Wilt Thou Understand? by G. M. G. and Jacques Blumenthal. Illustrated by A. Barraud.
* Sun-Dials written and illustrated by Warrington Hogg
* Adventures of Sherlock Holmes. Adventure XII. The Adventure of the Copper Beeches, by A. Conan Doyle. Illustrated by Sidney Paget.
* Instantaneous Photographs by Arthur Morrison.
* The Silver Penny from the Hungarian. Illustrated by H. R. Millar.
* The Queer Side of Things
** The End of War written and illustrated by J. F. Sullivan
** Silver-Plated by W. L. Alden.
** Two Views of Lord Palmerston by Samuel A. Walker
** Pal's Puzzle Page by Jean de Paléologue
** Miscellaneous
This work is in the public domain in the United States because it was published before January 1, 1929.
This work may be in the public domain in countries and areas with longer native copyright terms that apply the rule of the shorter term to foreign works.
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# The Philosophical Review/Volume 1/Summary: Merkel - Theoretische und experimentelle Begründung der Fehlermethoden

Phil. Stud. = Philosophische Studien
The article is, for the most part, a mathematical discussion of the method of right and wrong cases, and of the author's allied method of equal and unequal cases.
Taking Gauss’s theory of observation errors as a basis, M. finds formulae for the probable positive and negative errors and for the measure of accuracy for the m. of r. and w. cases where equal stimuli are used, as well as for the distribution of the ‘equal’ cases with stimuli of different intensities. Formulae are also found for the elimination of the constant errors of the method.
Distinguishing between the method of mean gradations with minimal changes when the object is to find a ‘middle’ between two given stimuli, and his own method of mean gradations when ‘middle’ judgments are avoided, the author shows that such ‘middle’ judgments as do occur are to be distributed according to the formulae of his method of equal and unequal cases. A similar plan of distribution is to be followed in case of judgments of ‘double’ in the author’s method of “doubled stimuli.” The relations of the threshold values in the several methods of r. and w. c., of equal and unequal c., and of minimal changes, are also mathematically deduced.
# The Philosophical Review/Volume 1/Summary: Mach - Facts and Mental Symbols

Our theories are abstractions, which, while they place in relief that which is important for certain fixed cases, neglect almost necessarily, or ​disguise, what is important for other cases. We should distinguish sharply between our theoretical conceptions of phenomena and that which we observe. The theoretical conceptions of physics light-waves, molecules, atoms, and energy must be regarded as mere helps or expedients to facilitate our viewing things. Even within the domain of physics the greatest care must be exercised in transferring theories from one department to another, and above all more instruction is not to be expected from a theory than from the facts themselves. Much greater confusion is produced by the direct transference of theories, methods, and inquiries that are legitimate in physics into the field of psychology. The entire theory of the psychological origin of the "external" world by the projection of sensations outwards is founded on a mistaken transference of a physically formulated inquiry into the province of psychology. The artificial and unnecessary dualism of feeling and motion has arisen by the improper formulation of the questions involved. Every physical notion is nothing more than a definite connection of sensory elements. In the sensory sphere of consciousness everything is at once physical and psychical. There is, therefore, no opposition of physical and psychical, no duality, but simply identity.
# The Philosophical Review/Volume 1/Summary: McTaggart - The Changes of Method in Hegel's Dialectic, Part 1

This is the first part of a two-part article; the second part is Summary: McTaggart - The Changes of Method in Hegel's Dialectic, Part 2
The method by which Hegel proceeds from one category to another changes as we pass from the earlier categories to the later. These changes can be reduced to a law from which important deductions can be made regarding the nature and validity of the dialectic, (1) The further the dialectic goes from its starting-point, the less self-centred and independent do the categories appear; and the more permanent becomes the process, until, finally, it is seen to be the only real meaning of the categories. (2) In the categories of Being the thesis and antithesis are neither of them superior to the other. An advance is first made by both being included in the synthesis. In the categories of Essence and the Notion there is no longer an opposition produced by two terms, and mediated by a third; but each term is a direct advance on the one before it. (3) Instead of sudden variations of method as we pass from one great division of the dialectic to another, these seem rather to be evidences of continuous development. (4) This change in method has not destroyed the validity of the process. (5) From this follows the ​subordinate place of negation in the process. Hegel's logic does not rest on the violation of the law of contradiction, but rather on the necessity of finding for every contradiction a reconciliation in which it vanishes. (6) The finite categories are all contained as elements in the absolute, and the question arises in what relation they stand to each other as thus constituting its moments. It does not seem that this relation is the same in which they stood as finite categories in the process. For the truth which is at the bottom of the whole dialectic is the unreality of any finite category against its synthesis. The procession of the categories, with its advance through oppositions and reconciliations, does not present absolute truth, as Hegel supposed. For in the true process of thought, each category develops from the preceding by rendering explicit what was before implicit, and this is an ideal which from the very nature of dialectic can never be quite realized.
# The Philosophical Review/Volume 1/Summary: McTaggart - The Changes of Method in Hegel's Dialectic, Part 2

This is the second part of a two-part article; the first part is Summary: McTaggart - The Changes of Method in Hegel's Dialectic, Part 1
The conclusion reached in the first paper was that the dialectic cannot fully represent in any part of its movement the real and essential nature of pure thought, but obscures this under particulars which are not essential, and so may be regarded as in some degree subjective. The discrepancy arises from the fact that, whereas the true process — which follows the essence of the actual process in time, and which alone is preserved and summed up in the Absolute Idea — is a direct process from one term which exists only in the transition to another; the actual process, on the other hand, is one from contradictory to contradictory, each of which is conceived as possessing some stability and independence. Secondly, it is subjective, because it does not fully express its own meaning, the meaning of the process forwards. The dialectic advance has mixed up with it elements which do not belong to the true advance, but are due to our original ignorance about the latter, of which we only gradually get rid.
Nevertheless, this subjectivity of the dialectic does not lessen its significance or practical importance, for it is a method of arriving at truth. It is of importance that the end should be reached, that we should advance to the Absolute Idea; but the steps by which we reach this may contain mistakes. Again, the element of indirectness which is introduced by the movement from thesis to antithesis diminishes as the dialectic proceeds, and in the ideal type wholly dies away. Confirmation of this view is found by examining the all-including triad given by H. as Logic, Nature, and Spirit. Here we have all the characteristics of the Notion; the second term is to be regarded, not as in opposition to, but as the completion of the first. The transition can be stated in the form which is used of the lower categories, i.e. we may take as thesis pure thought, and for antithesis the element of Immediacy in experience. We see that when the whole ground of the dialectic process is covered in a single triad, either method may be used, which suggests that the two methods are approximate to the two ends of the series which are here ​united by a single step. The method which H. adopted is the more correct and convenient, yet its use alone, without the knowledge that it does not exclude the concurrent use of the latter as equally legitimate, has led to grave misconceptions of the system. For the method which H. did not adopt has the advantage of bringing out the fact that immediacy is as important and ultimate a factor in reality as Logic is, and one which is irreducible to it. The two terms are exactly on a level. The dialectic system, then, makes no attempt to eliminate the elements of immediacy in experience or to deduce existence from essence, but we learn from it that in the universe is realized the whole of reason and nothing but reason.
# The Philosophical Review/Volume 1/Summary: Marchesini - La dottrina metafisico-psicologica di Andrea Cesalpino

R. I. d. Fil. = Rivista Italiana di Filosofia
Andrea Cesalpino's philosophy is essentially obscure, because he would not allow himself to speak openly, being the body-physician of Clement VIII. Yet his love of freedom induces him to speak with sufficient clearness to enable us to understand his standpoint.
He was born 1519. Studied medicine. He took up Aristotle with a view to interpreting him correctly and thus to fight scholastic interpretations. Professed medical philosophy in the University of Pisa. From there was called to the Collegio di Sapienza in Rome by Clement VIII, who made him his body-physician. Died 1603.
Much of his work is valuable. He anticipated in a way Harvey's theory of the circulation of the blood, having described the "little circulation" of the lungs. Invented a botanical system based on the form of the flowers and the fruit. His book, De plantis which Cuvier calls "une œuvre de génie," shows traces of his studies in Aristotle. His fame among his contemporaries was extraordinary; Torelli, one of his most violent enemies, says of him: "Caesalpiniana dogmata majore apud nostros fuerunt in pretio, quam olim apud Graecas Apollinis oracula." His works are: Quaestionum peripateticarum libri quinque, Venice, 1571. Quaestiones medicae, Florence, 1569. De plantis. The argument of Quaestiones III is : The central force (il primo motore) is speculative, not active (attiva) intelligence. The object of this intelligence is truth, and it draws from things their forms. (Notice the inconsistency.) In Quaestiones VI he tries to prove that intelligence is one, viz. God. As he says that the knowledge which the divine intelligence has of itself amounts to a knowledge of all things, A. C.'s enemies were not wrong in calling him a pantheist. He felt this, and tried to refute the accusation by subtle counter-arguments. In Quaestiones VIII he tries to prove that the soul is immortal. The soul alone has an independent function. In spite of inconsistencies and obscurities, A. C. played an important part in the emancipation of Aristotelian thought from scholastic rules.
# The Philosophical Review/Volume 1/Summary: Marshall - The Field of Æsthetics Psychologically Considered

Æsthetic theory has gained little of fundamental importance from the discussions by philosophers in the past. This is not because æsthetic problems have been neglected by the best thinkers, but rather because they have looked upon them as secondary issues. Non-hedonistic æsthetic theories have, from a psychological point of view, resulted in failure. Hedonic the æsthetic psychosis certainly is. Whether this hedonic quality is of great moment, is a question to be determined. M. agrees that associations which are pleasurable are important elements in an æsthetic effect; but if the associationist means that æsthetic effect is determined altogether by pleasure-revivals, he cannot follow, for presentation pleasures certainly have much to do with the effects of beauty. If, on the other hand, the associationist means to identify hedonic phenomena and æsthetic phenomena, we are at once met with the objection that, while æsthetic states of mind are pleasurable, not all pleasurable states are allowed to pass for æsthetic. What are the bounds of the æsthetic within the hedonic field? Kant distinguishes the agreeable from the beautiful by the supposed presence of sense pleasure in the former, and the absence of the same in the latter. This distinction cannot be accepted. Eye and ear sensations are obvious exceptions; but if it be admitted that one set of senses can produce æsthetic effects, the whole contention fails, and a close examination shows clearly that the rest of the senses may act in the same manner in the make-up of æsthetic complexes. Pleasures of the typical emotions are also of great moment in æsthetics, but they do not stand alone, as some have held. 'Association' by itself can, of course, give no account of distinctively æsthetic effect. Recognized, as well as unrecognized, ​usefulness seems to be an element. The distinction between the 'higher' and the 'lower' pleasures is illusory. It is the man who has grown to be capable of appreciating new ethical standards, and who has lost his pleasure in the old, who makes a distinction between pleasures of higher and lower grade. This by no means shows that what was pleasurable in his undeveloped or uncultivated state was not æsthetic for him at that time. Nor does it show that ethical standards are unimportant for æsthetics. What is 'immoral' is painful. But the mass of æsthetic effects are made up of elements entirely unmoral.
# The Philosophical Review/Volume 1/Summary: Martius - Ueber den Einfluss der Intensitat der Reize auf die Reactionszeit der Klänge

Phil. Stud. = Philosophische Studien
Experiments undertaken, in the first instance, to test Stumpf’s assertion that high tones have an especial sensation value as regards intensity. The test was made by finding reaction-times for different intensities of the same tone. In light of the experiments, the author also reviews the opinion of Wundt, Exner, and others, that, in general, reaction-times decrease with the increase in intensity of stimuli. M. found that, with a proper amount of practice and training of the attention, the reaction-times for strong impressions of sound arising from a series of stimuli differing considerably in intensity were equal, but that for very weak impressions the reaction-times were longer, notwithstanding practice and training of the attention. The cause of the increase of the reaction-times with weak impressions lies in the difficulty of perceiving them, and in the slower co-ordination of impression and motion, and not to purely physiological processes of transmission.
# The Philosophical Review/Volume 1/Summary: Monrad - Ueber das Gebet

Phil. Mon. = Philosophische Monatshefte
I presuppose only religion, i.e. practical belief in God, without which there can scarcely be any question of prayer. I set out, also, from the fact that at least naive praying is always originally combined with belief ​in a possible answer; the one who prays hopes — whether with or without reason is to be investigated hereafter — that his prayer will bring him a longed-for good.
How, then, in this sense is answer to prayer at all possible under the reign of universal law?
In so far as the prayer is a real religious prayer, a real elevation of the self to God, in so far will the subject be purified by the very act of prayer from egoistic desires, in so far his wishes and views will coincide with the universal objective ends, and he may expect an answer. He who prays aright raises himself above his abstract finite subjectivity into unity with the universal, objective, divine order.
The objective course of things, as merely objective, is an abstraction; in its real significance it is that for which the subject takes it. As the subject submits himself to the laws of the objective, and makes them his own, the freedom and power of the subject over the objective increase. When we pray for earthly goods, or to be freed from earthly evils, it is not these external things themselves that we want, but an expected enjoyment from their use, or a freedom from fear or pain. By the direct effect of the prayer on the subject, that which was looked upon as an evil may be converted into a good. In that the prayer elevates the subject above its limited individuality, and harmonizes it with the objective and necessary, it frees it from the painful impressions of their external necessity. But further, it can scarcely be denied that prayer, by means of the change which it effects first and immediately in the subject, can thereby produce changes in the external relations. Spirit is ultimately lord of nature. The spirit of man exercises a control over the external objective world in so far as he apparently submits himself to the laws of nature, or, to speak more properly, falls in with the universal divine reason permeating the objective, and makes its laws his own. Every human subject is a co-determining factor in that which we call the objective world-relation, and every change that occurs in each human consciousness produces a change in the world at large, in the constellation of spirits on which at last even the external events depend. This influence of individual subjects will be all the greater, of course, the nearer and more intimately they are united with the true centre of the universal spiritual life, the spirit of spirits, about which the universe gravitates, whether with or without the conscious will of the individual.
# The Philosophical Review/Volume 1/Summary: Morgan - Mental Evolution

M. confines his speculations within the field of mental evolution in animals. If so highly intelligent an animal as the dog sprang from the amœba, the latter cannot be an insentient automaton. If it is, where did consciousness creep in? To say that it is potentially present in the germ is an ambiguity. Nor is consciousness either a product of brain-tissue or a mode of energy, but something sui generis. The phrase that consciousness is called into existence by physical processes is also unintelligible. M. adopts the hypothesis of scientific monism, according to which consciousness and brain-energy are respectively the subjective and objective aspects of the same occurrences. From the simpler modes of energy in the simpler organic substance of the ovum the more complex modes of energy have been evolved. Similarly, the complex and orderly states of consciousness have emerged from something simpler than consciousness, but of the same order of existence, which answers subjectively to the simpler organic energy of the fertilized ovum. As the complex molecular vibrations of the brain are to the simpler molecular vibrations of the ovum, so are the complex states of consciousness associated with the former, to the simple states of infra-consciousness associated with the latter. All organic modes of energy are associated with conscious or infra-conscious states. Thus molecular vibrations in the brain are sometimes attended by consciousness, sometimes not, there being unconscious cerebration. If there are such infra-conscious states in the cerebral hemispheres, why should there not be associated with every molecular thrill of the living body yet lower states of infra-consciousness? We go a step further and say that all modes of energy, whether organic or inorganic, have their conscious or infra-conscious aspect. This doctrine is necessarily implied in the phrase "mental evolution" for all thinkers who have grasped the distinction between consciousness and energy.
# The Philosophical Review/Volume 1/Summary: Morgan - The Law of Psychogenesis

It is common to assume that in social, as in organic, evolution natural selection is the all-important factor; but the elimination of failures, which is the method of natural selection, is just what is prevented in civilized society. Natural selection has guided the mental symbolism to certain developments by eliminating those in whom the developments were absent. Selective mating is a product of the mental symbolism so developed. It is itself a product of psychogenesis. What is the law of psychogenesis? Since the present investigation is psychological, not metaphysical, we must keep strictly to the psychic plane, and leave out of account the question whether, and if so how, our experience stands related to a noumenal existence. It will also be well to start with the abstract region of concepts, and work down to the more practical level of percepts. What is "the law of truth"? I accept as true only what is in accordance with my own views and theories. This seems arbitrary, but observe that my views can and do change. They develop by the selection of the congruous, the rejection of the incongruous. In æsthetic and ethical matters the same general law holds; things are for me beautiful or ugly, good or bad, according as they are congruous or incongrous to my present aesthetic or moral nature. It is a mistake to hold that there is only one self-consistent ethical system. There are several such. But the ideal system must be not only congruous within itself, but in touch with the actualities of life and conduct. The ultimate appeal is to perceptual experience. From percepts have concepts arisen by analysis and abstract thought; to percepts must they conform in order to satisfy the final test of congruity. The constant demand of science for practical perceptual verification is justified by the essential unity of consciousness, the solidarity of mental symbolism, and the continuity of its development. On the perceptual plane the congruity, not of percept with object (in the sense of "occasion"), but of percept with percept is the rule. Here, and through the whole range of mental development, the guidance of pleasure and pain is of great importance. Our nature ​is sensitive as well as intellectual, aesthetic, and moral. The painful is avoided as incongruous to our nature as sensitive. Only in this sense can it be said that all our actions are determined by pleasure and pain. While the law of psychogenesis is thus held to be a law of development by elimination of the incongruous, no attempt is made to account for the origin of the congruous. It is a theory of survival, not of origin.