# French v. Barber Asphalt Paving Company/Opinion of the Court

* Court Documents
* Case Syllabus
* Opinion of the Court
* Dissenting Opinion Harlan
United States Supreme Court
181 U.S. 324
French v. Barber Asphalt Paving Company
Argued: February 25, 26, 27, 1901. --- Decided: April 29, 1901
In its opinion in this case the supreme court of Missouri said that 'the method adopted in the charter and ordinance of Kansas City, of charging the cost of paving Forest avenue against the adjoining lots according to their frontage, had been repeatedly authorized by the legislature of Missouri, and such laws had received the sanction of this court in many decisions. St. Louis use of Seibert v. Allen, 53 Mo. 44; St. Joseph v. Anthony, 30 Mo. 538; Neenon v. Smith, 50 Mo. 528; Kiley v. Cranor, 51 Mo. 541; Rutherford v. Hamilton, 97 Mo. 543, 11 S. W. 249; Moberly v. Hogan, 131 Mo. 19, 32 S. W. 1014; Farrar v. St. Louis, 80 Mo. 379.
'In the last-mentioned case Judge Norton for the court said:
"The liability of lots fronting on a street, the paving of which is authorized, to be charged with the cost of the work according to their frontage, having been thus so repeatedly asserted, the question is no longer an open one in this state, and we are relieved from the necessity of examining authorities cited by counsel for plaintiff condemning what is familiarly known as the 'foot-front rule."
'Learned counsel for defendant concede such was the state of the decided law of this state, and that the portion of the Kansas City charter known as the 9th article of the charter, which authorizes the cost of a pavement to be assessed against the lots fronting on the improvement according to their respective frontage, was framed after this court had fully considered and construed similar laws and sustained them against the charge of unconstitutionality, and the assessment now challenged was made under the construction given by this court.'
Accordingly, the supreme court of Missouri held that the assessment in question was valid, and the tax imposed collectable. And, in so far as the Constitution and laws of Missouri are concerned, this court is, of course, bound by that decision.
But that court also held, against the contention of the lotowners, that the provisions of the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States were not applicable in the case; and our jurisdiction enables us to inquire whether the supreme court of Missouri were in error in so holding.
The question thus raised has been so often and so carefully discussed, both in the decisions of this court and of the state courts, that we do not deem it necessary to again enter upon a consideration of the nature and extent of the taxing power, nor to attempt to discover and define the limitations upon that power that may be found in constitutional principles. It will be sufficient for our present purpose to collate our previous decisions, and to apply the conclusions reached therein to the present case.
It may prevent confusion and relieve from repetition if we point out that some of our cases arose under the provisions of the 5th, and others under those of the 14th, Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. While the language of those amendments is the same, yet, as they were ingrafted upon the Constitution at different times and in widely different circumstances of our national life, it may be that questions may arise in which different constructions and applications of their provisions may be proper. Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 77, 80, 21 L. ed. 394, 409.
Thus it was said, in Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97-103, 24 L. ed. 616-619:
'It is not a little remarkable that while this provision has been in the Constitution of the United States, as a restraint upon the authority of the Federal government, for nearly a century, and while, during all that time, the manner in which the powers of that government have been exercised has been watched with jealousy, and subjected to the most rigid criticism in all its branches, this special limitation upon its powers has rarely been invoked in the judicial forum or the more enlarged theater of public discussion. But while it has been a part of the Constitution, as a restraint upon the power of the states, only a very few years, the docket of this court is crowded with cases in which we are asked to hold that state courts and state legislatures have deprived their own citizens of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. There is here abundant evidence that there exists some strange misconception of the scope of this provision as found in the 14th Amendment. In fact, it would seem, from the character of many of the cases before us, and the arguments made in them, that the clause under consideration is looked upon as a means of bringing to the test of the decision of this court the abstract opinions of every unsuccessful litigant in a state court of the justice of the decision against him, and of the merits of the legislation on which such a decision may be founded.'
However, we shall not attempt to define what it is for a state to deprive a person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, in terms which would cover every exercisc of power thus forbidden to the state, and exclude those which are not, but shall proceed, in the present case, on the assumption that the legal import of the phrase 'due process of law' is the same in both amendments. Certainly, it cannot be supposed that by the 14th Amendment it was intended to impose on the states, when exercising their powers of taxation, any more rigid or stricter curb than that imposed on the Federal government, in a similar exercise of power, by the 5th Amendment.
Let us, then, inquire as briefly as possible what has been decided by this court as to the scope and effect of the phrase 'due process of law,' as applied to legislative power.
One of the earliest cases in which was examined the historical and legal meaning of those words is Den ex dem. Murray v. Hoboken Land & Improv. Co. 18 How. 272, 15 L. ed. 372. The question involved was the validity of a sale of real estate made under a distress warrant, authorized by a statute of the United States (3 Stat. at L. 592, chap. 107), against a defaulting collector of customs. It was contended that such a proceeding deprived the owner of property without due process of law, contrary to the 5th Amendment; that by 'process of law' was meant a charge, defense, judgment before and by a legally constituted court. The question was thus stated by Mr. Justice Curtis:
'That the warrant now in question is legal process is not denied. It was issued in conformity with an act of Congress. But is it 'due process of law?' The Constitution contains no description of those processes which it was intended to allow or forbid. It does not even declare what principles are to be applied to ascertain whether it be due process. It is manifest that it was not left to the legislative power to enact any process which might be devised. The article is a restraint on the legislative as well as on the executive and judicial powers of the government, and cannot be so construed as to leave Congress free to make any process 'due process of law' by its mere will. To what principles, then, are we to resort to ascertain whether this process, enacted by Congress, is due process? To this the answer must be twofold. We must examine the Constitution itself, to see whether this process be in conflict with any of its provisions. If not found to be so, we must look to those settled usages and modes of proceeding existing in the common and statute law of England, before the emigration of our ancestors, and which are shown not to have been unsuited to their civil and political condition by having been acted on by them after the settlement of this country.'
Pursuing the lines of inquiry thus indicated, the court reached the conclusions that, in ascertaining and enforcing payment of taxes and of balances due from receivers of the revenue in England, the methods have varied widely from the usual course of the common law on other subjects, and that, as respects such debts, the 'law of the land' authorized the employment of auditors, and an inquisition without notice, and a species of examination bearing a very close resemblance to the warrant of distress in the act of Congress in question; that this diversity in the law of the land between revenue defaulters and ordinary debtors was understood in this country, and entered into the legislation of the colonies and provinces, and more especially of the states after the Declaration of Independence and before the formation of the Constitution of the United States; that not only was the process of distress in nearly or quite universal use for the collection of taxes, but what was generally termed a warrant of distress, running against the body, goods, and chattles of defaulting receivers of public money, was issued to some public officer, to whom was committed the power to ascertain the amount of the default, and by such warrant proceed to collect it; and that, accordingly, the distress warrant in question was not inconsistent with that part of the Constitution which prohibits a citizen from being deprived of his property without due process of law.
In Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90, 23 L. ed. 678, there was presented the question whether the 14th Amendment availed to secure to a citizen of Louisiana a right of trial by jury as against an act of that state which provided that in certain circumstances a case enforcing penalties should be tried by the judge; and it was held that 'the states, so far as this amendment is concerned, are left to regulate trials in their own courts in their own way. A trial by jury in suits at common law pending in the state courts is not, therefore, a privilege or immunity of national citizenship which the states are forbidden by the 14th Amendment to abridge. A state cannot deprive a person of his property without due process of law, but this does not necessarily imply that all trials in the state courts affecting the property of persons must be by jury. This requirement of the Constitution is met if the trial is had according to the settled course of judicial proceedings. Den ex dem. Murray v. Hoboken Land & Improv. Co. 18 How. 280, 15 L. ed. 376. Due process of law is process due according to the law of the land. This process in the states is regulated by the law of the state. Our power over that law is only to determine whether it is in conflict with the supreme law of the land,-that is to say, with the Constitution and laws of the United States made in pursuance thereof,-or with any treaty made under the authority of the United States. . . . Here the state court has decided that the proceeding below was in accordance with the law of the state; and we do not find that to be contrary to the Constitution or any law on treaty of the United States.' McMillen v. Anderson, 95 U.S. 37, 41, 24 L. ed. 335, was a case wherein was involved the validity of a law of the state of Louisiana, whereby a tax collector was authorized to sieze property and sell it in order to enforce payment of a license tax, and which was alleged to be opposed to the provision of the 14th Amendment of the Constitution, which declares that no state shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; but it was said by this court:
'Looking at the Louisiana statute here assailed, . . . we feel bound to say that, if it is void on the ground assumed, the revenue laws of nearly all the states will be found void for the same reason. The mode of assessing taxes in the states, by the Federal government, and by all governments, is necessarily summary, that it may be speedy and effectual. By summary is not meant arbitrary or unequal or illegal. It must, under our Constitution, be lawfully done. But that does not mean, nor does the phrase 'due process of law' mean, by a judicial proceeding. The nation from whom we inherit the phrase 'due process of law' has never relied upon the courts of justice for the collection of her taxes, though she passed through a successful revolution in resistance to unlawful taxation. We need not here go into the literature of that constitutional provision, because in any view that can be taken of it the statute under consideration does not violate it. It enacts that when any person shall refuse or fail to pay his license tax, the collector shall give ten days' written or printed notice to the delinquent requiring its payment, and the manner of giving this notice is fully prescribed. If at the expiration of this time the license 'be not fully paid, the tax collector may, without judicial formality, proceed to seize and sell, after ten days' advertisement, the property' of the delinquent, or so much as may be necessary to pay the tax and costs. . . . Here is a notice that the party is assessed, by the proper officer, for a given sum as a tax of a certain kind, and ten days' time given him to pay it. Is not this a legal mode of proceeding? It seems to be supposed that it is essential to the validity of this tax that the party charged should have been present, or had an opportunity to be present, in some tribunal when he was assessed. But this is not, and never has been, considered necessary to the validity of a tax. And the fact that most of the states now have boards of revisers of tax assessments does not prove that taxes levied without them are void.'
Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 24 L. ed. 616, was a case wherein an assessment of certain real estate in New Orleans for draining the swamps of that city was resisted in the state courts, and was by writ of error brought to this court on the ground that the proceeding deprived the owner of his property without due process of law. The origin and history of this provision of the Constitution, as found in Magna Charta and in the 5th and 14th Amendments to the Constitution, were again considered; the cases of Den ex dem. Murray v. Hoboken Land & Improv. Co. 18 How. 272, 15 L. ed. 372, and McMillen v. Anderson, 95 U.S. 37, 24 L. ed. 335, were cited and approved; and it was held that 'neither the corporate agency by which the work is done, the excessive price which the statute allows therefor, nor the relative importance of the work to the value of the land assessed, nor the fact that the assessment is made before the work is done, nor that the assessment is unequal as regards the benefits conferred, nor that personal judgments are rendered for the amount assessed, are matters in which the state authorities are controlled by the Federal Constitution.'
In Springer v. United States, 102 U.S. 586, 26 L. ed. 253, was involved the validity of an act of Congress, June 30, 1864 (13 Stat. at L. 218, chap. 172), whereby lands of A were distrained and sold by reason of his refusal to pay a tax assessed against him; and it was contended that the sale of defendant's real estate, to satisfy the tax assessed upon him, in a summary manner, without first having obtained a judgment in a court of law, was a proceeding to deprive the defendant of his property without due process of law; that by 'due process of law' is meant law in its regular course of administration by the courts of justice, and not the execution of a power vested in ministerial officers. But this court, after citing Den ex dem. Murray v. Hoboken Land & Improv. Co. as holding that an act of Congress authorizing a warrant to issue, without oath, against a public debtor, for the seizure of his property, was valid, and that the proceeding was 'due process of law,' said:
'The prompt payment of taxes is always important to the public welfare. It may be vital to the existence of a government. The idea that every taxpayer is entitled to the delays of litigation is unreasonable. If the laws here in question involved any wrong or unnecessary harshness, it was for Congress, or the people who make congresses, to see that the evil was corrected. The remedy does not lie with the judicial branch of the government.'
In Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U.S. 22, sub nom. Bowman v. Lewis, 25 L. ed. 989, the 14th Amendment was invoked to invalidate legislation of the state of Missouri regulating the right of appeal and of writs of error, and whereby suitors in the courts of St. Louis and certain other named counties were denied the right of appeal to the supreme court of Missouri in cases where it gave that right to suitors in the courts of the other counties of the state. Speaking for the court Mr. Justice Bradley said:
'If this position is correct, the 14th Amendment has a much more far-reaching effect than has been supposed. It would render invalid all limitations of jurisdiction based on the amount or character of the demand. A party having a claim for only $5 could with equal propriety complain that he is deprived of a right enjoyed by other citizens, because he cannot prosecute it in the superior courts; and another might equally complain that he cannot bring a suit for real estate in a justice's court, where the expense is small and the proceedings are expeditious. There is no difference in principle between such discriminations as these in the jurisdictions of courts and that which the plaintiff in error complains of in the present case.
'If, however, we take into view the general objects and purposes of the 14th Amendment, we shall find no reasonable ground for giving it any such application. These are to extend United States citizenship to all natives and naturalized persons, and to prohibit the states from abridging their privileges or immunities, and from depriving any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, and from denying to any person within their jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. It contemplates persons and classes of persons. It has not respect to local and municipal regulations that do not injuriously affect or discriminate between persons or classes of persons within the places or municipalities for which such regulations are made. The amendment could never have been intended to prevent a state from arranging and parceling out the jurisdiction of its several courts at its discretion. . . . Each state has the right to make political subdivisions of its territory for municipal purpose, and to regulate their local government. . . . If every person residing or being in either portion of the state should be accorded the equal protection of the laws prevailing there, he could not justly complain of a violation of the clause referred to. For, as before said, it has respect to persons and classes of persons. It means that no person or class of persons shall be denied the same protection of the laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same place and under like circumstances. The 14th Amendment does not profess to secure to all persons in the United States the benefit of the same laws and the same remedies. Great diversities in these respects may exist in two states separated only by an imaginary line.'
In Mattingly v. District of Columbia, 97 U.S. 687, 692, 24 L. ed. 1098, 1100, there was called in question the validity of the act of Congress of June 19, 1878 (20 Stat. at L. 166, chap. 309), entitled 'An Act to Provide for the Revision and Correction of Assessments for Special improvements in the District of Columbia and for Other Purposes,' and it was said by this court, through Mr. Justice Strong: 'It may be that the burden laid upon the property of the complainants is onerous. Special assessments for special road or street improvements very often are oppressive. But that the legislative power may authorize them, and may direct them to be made in proportion to the frontage, area, or market value of the adjoining property, at its discretion, is, under the decisions, no longer an open question.'
In Kelly v. Pittsburgh, 104 U.S. 78, 26 L. ed. 658, it was urged that land which the owner has not laid off into town lots, but occupied for agricultural purposes, and through which no streets are run or used, cannot be, even by the legislature, subjected to the taxes of a city,-the water tax, the gas tax, the street tax, and others of similar character. The reason for this was said to be that such taxes are for the benefit of those in a city who own property within the limits of such improvements, and who use or might use them if they chose, while he reaps no such benefit. Cases were cited from the higher courts of Kentucky and Iowa where this principle was asserted, and where those courts have held that farm lands in the city are not subject to the ordinary city taxes. But this court said:
'It is no part of our duty to inquire into the grounds on which those courts have so decided. They are questions which arise between the citizens of those states and their own city authorities, and offord no rule for construing the Constitution of the United States. . . . The main argument for the plaintiff in error-the only one to which we can listen-is that the proceeding in regard to the taxes assessed on his land deprives him of his property without due process of law.
'It is not asserted that, in the methods by which the value of his land was ascertained for the purpose of this taxation, there was any departure from the usual modes of assessment, nor that the manner of apportioning and collecting the tax was unusual or materially different from that in force in all communities where land is subject to taxation. In these respects there is no charge that the method pursued is not due process of law. Taxes have not, as a general rule, in this country since its independence, nor in England before that time, been collected by regular judicial proceedings. The necessities of government, the nature of the duty to be performed, and the customary usages of the people, have established a different procedure, which, in regard to that matter, is and always has been due process of law. The tax in question was assessed and the proper officers were proceeding to collect it in this way. The distinct ground on which this provision of the Constitution of the United States is invoked is that as the land in question is, and always has been used as farm land, for agricultural use only, subjecting it to taxation for ordinary city purposes deprives the plaintiff in error of his property without due process of law. It is alleged, and probably with truth, that the estimate of the value of the land for taxation is very greatly in excess of its true value. Whether this be true or not we cannot here inquire. We have so often decided that we cannot review and correct the errors and mistakes of the state tribunals on that subject that it is only necessary to refer to those decisions, without a restatement of the argument on which they rest. State Railroad Tax Cases, 92 U.S. 575, sub nom. Taylor v. Secor, 23 L. ed. 663; Kennard v. Louisiana ex rel. Morgan, 92 U.S. 480, 23 L. ed. 478; Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 24 L. ed. 616; Kirtland v. Hotchkiss, 100 U.S. 491, 25 L. ed. 558; Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U.S. 22; sub nom. Bowman v. Lewis, 25 L. ed. 989; German Nat. Bank v. Kimball, 103 U.S. 732, 26 L. ed. 469.'
In Spencer v. Merchant, 125 U.S. 345, 31 L. ed. 763, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 921, a judgment of the court of appeals of the state of New York, upholding the validity of an assessment upon lands to cover the expense of a local improvement, was brought to this court for review upon the allegation that the state statute was unconstitutional. In the opinion of this court, delivered by Mr. Justice Gray, the following extract was given from the opinion of the court of appeals:
'The act of 1881 determines absolutely and conclusively the amount of tax to be raised, and the property to be assessed, and upon which it is to be apportioned. Each of these things was within the power of the legislature, whose action cannot be reviewed in the courts upon the ground that it acted unjustly or without appropriate and adequate reason. . . . The legislature may commit the ascertainment of the sum to be raised and of the benefited district to commissioners; but it is not bound to do so, and may settle both questions for itself; and when it does so, its action is necessarily conclusive and beyond review. Here an improvement has been ordered and made, the expense of which might justly have been imposed upon adjacent property benefited by the change. By the act of 1881 the legislature imposes the unpaid portion of the cost and expense, with the interest thereon, upon that portion of the property benefited which has thus far borne none of the burden. In so doing, it necessarily determines two things, viz., the amount to be realized, and the property especially benefited by the expenditure of that amount. The lands might have been benefited by the improvement, and so the legislative determination that they were, and to what amount or proportion of the cost, even if it may have been mistakenly unjust, is not open to our review. The question of special benefit and the property to which it extends is of necessity a question of fact, and when the legislature determines it in a case within its general power, its decision must of course be final. We can see in the determination reached possible sources of error, and perhaps even of injustice, but we are not at liberty to say that the tax on the property covered by the law of 1881 was imposed without reference to special benefits. The legislature practically determined that the lands described in that act were peculiarly benefited by the improvement to a certain specified amount which constituted a just proportion of the whole cost and expense; and while it may be that the process by which the result was reached was not the best attainable, and some other might have been more accurate and just, we cannot for that reason question an enactment within the general legislative power. . . . The precise wrong of which complaint is made appears to be that the land owners now assessed never had opportunity to be heard as to the original apportionment, and find themselves now practically bound by it as between their lots and those of the owners who paid. But that objection becomes a criticism upon the action of the legislature and the process by which it determined the amount to be raised and the property to be assessed. Unless by special permission, that is a hearing never granted in the process of taxation. The legislature determines expenditures and amounts to be raised for their payment, the whole discussion and all questions of prudence and propriety and justice being confided to its jurisdiction. It may err, but the courts cannot review its discretion. In this case it kept within its power when it fixed, first, the amount to be raised to discharge the improvement debt incurred by its direction; and, second, when it designated the lots and property, which in its judgment, by reason of special benefits, should bear the burden; and, having the power, we cannot criticise the reasons or manner of its action.'
This definition of legislative power was approved by this court, and the judgment of the court of appeals was affirmed. The following extract is from the opinion of this court:
'In the absence of any more specific constitutional restriction than the general prohibition against taking property without due process of law, the legislature of the state having the power to fix the sum necessary to be levied for the expense of a public improvement, and to order it to be assessed, either, like other taxes, upon property generally, or only upon the lands benefited by the improvement, is authorized to determine both the amount of the whole tax and the class of lands which will receive the benefit and should therefore bear the burden, although it may, if it sees fit, commit the ascertainment of either or both of these facts to the judgment of commissioners. When the determination of the lands to be benefited is intrusted to commissioners, the owners may be entitled to notice and hearing upon the question whether their lands are benefited and how much. But the legislature has the power to determine by the statute imposing the tax, what lands which might be benefited by the improvement are in fact benefited; and if it does so, its determination is conclusive upon the owners and the courts, and the owners have no right to be heard upon the question whether their lands are benefited or not, but only upon the validity of the assessment and its apportionment among the different parcels of the class which the legislature has conclusively determined to be benefited. In determining what lands are benefited by the improvement, the legislature may avail itself of such information as it deems sufficient, either through investigations by its committees or by adopting as its own the estimates or conclusions of others, whether those estimates or conclusions previously had or had not any legal sanction.'
In Paulsen v. Portland, 149 U.S. 30, 40, 37 L. ed. 637, 641, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 750, where the validity of a city ordinance, providing that the cost of a sewer should be distributed upon the property within the sewer district, and appointing viewers to estimate the proportionate share which each piece of property should bear, was questioned, because the ordinance contained no provision for notice, it was held by the supreme court of Oregon, and by this court on error, that notice by publication is a sufficient notice in proceedings of this nature, and that as the viewers, upon their appointment, gave notice by publication in the official paper of the city of the time and place of their first meeting, such notice was sufficient to bring the proceedings within 'due process of law.'
In Fallbrook Irrig. Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 41 L. ed. 369, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 56, was involved the validity of the irrigation act enacted by the legislature of the state of California. One of the objections urged against the act was that it permitted the whole cost to be levied by a board of directors of the district upon all of the real estate of the district according to value, with no reference to the degree of benefit conferred. As to this it was said by this court, through Mr. Justice Peckham:
'Assuming for the purpose of this objection that the owner of these lands had by the provisions of the act, and before the lands were finally included in the district, an opportunity to be heard before a proper tribunal upon the question of benefits, we are of opinion that the decisions of such a tribunal, in the absence of actual fraud and bad faith, would be, so far as this court is concerned, conclusive upon that question. It cannot be that upon a question of fact of such a nature this court has the power to review the decision of the state tribunal which has been pronounced under a statute providing for a hearing upon notice. The erroneous decision of such a question of fact violates no constitutional provision.' Citing Spencer v. Merchant, 125 U.S. 345, 31 L. ed. 763, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 921.
Another objection to the validity of the act was the total want of an opportunity to be heard on the question of the expediency of forming the district, on the questions of cost and of benefits received. In respect to this it was said:
'The provision for a hearing in the irrigation act is similar, and the condition therein, that lands which in the judgment of the board are not benefited shall not be included, renders the determination of the board, including them after a hearing, a judgment that such lands will be benefited by the proposed plan of irrigation.
'The publication of a notice of the proposed presentation of the petition is a sufficient notification to those interested in the question, and gives them an opportunity to be heard before the board. Hagar v. Reclamation Dist. No. 108, 111 U.S. 701, 28 L. ed. 569, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 663; Lent v. Tillson, 140 U.S. 316, 35 L. ed. 419, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 625; Paulsen v. Portland, 149 U.S. 30, 37 L. ed. 637, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 750.'
'It has been held in this court that the legislature has power to fix such a district for itself, without any hearing as to benefits, for the purpose of assessing upon the lands within the district the cost of a local, public improvement. The legislature, when it fixes the district itself, is supposed to have made proper inquiry, and to have finally and conclusively determined the fact of benefits to the land included in the district; and the citizen has no constitutional right to any other or further hearing upon that question. The right which he thereafter has is to a hearing upon the question of what is termed the apportionment of the tax, i. e., the amount of the tax which he is to pay. Paulsen v. Portland, 149 U.S. 30, 41, 37 L. ed. 637, 641, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 750. But when, as in this case, the determination of the question of what lands shall be included in the district is only to be decided after a decision as to what lands described in the petition will be benefited, and the decision of that question is submitted to some tribunal (the board of supervisors in this case), the parties whose lands are thus included in the petition are entitled to a hearing upon the question of benefits, and to have the lands excluded if the judgment of the board be against their being benefited.
'Unless the legislature decide the question of benefits itself, the land owner has the right to be heard upon that question before his property can be taken. This, in substance, was determined by the decisions of this court in Spencer v. Merchant, 125 U.S. 356, 31 L. ed. 767, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 921; and Walston v. Nevin, 128 U.S. 578, 32 L. ed. 544, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 192.'
In Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548, 42 L. ed. 270, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 966, on appeal from the court of appeals of the District of Columbia, it was held that Congress may direct that, when part of a parcel of land is appropriated to the public use for a highway in the District of Columbia, the tribunal vested by law with the duty of assessing the compensation or damages due to the owner, whether for the value of the part taken or for any injury to the rest, shall take into consideration, by way of lessening the whole or either part of the sum due him, any special and direct benefits, capable of present estimate and reasonable computation, caused by the establishment of the highway to the part not taken; that the estimate of the just compensation for property taken for the public use, under the right of eminent domain, is not required to be made by a jury, but may be intrusted to commissioners appointed by a court, or to an inquest consisting of more or fewer men than an ordinary jury; that Congress, in the exercise of the right of taxation in the District of Columbia, may direct that half of the amount of the compensation or damages awarded to the owners of lands appropriated to the public use for a highway shall be assessed and charged upon the District of Columbia, and the other half upon the lands benefited thereby within the District, in proportion to the benefit; and may commit the ascertainment of the lands to be assessed, and the apportionment of the benefits among them, to the same tribunal which assesses the compensation or damages; that if the legislature, in taxing lands benefited by a highway or other public improvement, makes provision for notice, by publication or otherwise, to each owner of land, and for hearing him, at some stage of the proceedings, upon the question what proportion of the tax shall be assessed upon his land, his property is not taken without due process of law.
In the opinion of the court in that case, delivered by Mr. Justice Gray, it was said that the provisions of the statute under consideration, which regulated the assessment of damages, are to be referred, not to the right of eminent domain, but to the right of taxation; and that the legislature, in the exercise of the right of taxation, has the authority to direct the whole, or such part as it may prescribe, of the expense of a public improvement, such as the establishing, the widening, the grading, or the repair of a street, to be assessed upon the owners of lands benefited thereby; and that such authority has been repeatedly exercised in the District of Columbia by Congress, with the sanction of this court,-citing Willard v. Presbury, 14 Wall. 676, 20 L. ed. 719; Mattingly v. District of Columbia, 97 U.S. 687, 24 L. ed. 1098; Shoemaker v. United States, 147 U.S. 282, 302, 37 L. ed. 170, 186, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 361. It was also said that the class of lands to be assessed for the purpose may be either determined by the legislature itself, by defining a territorial district, or by other designation; or it may be left by the legislature to the determination of commissioners, and be made to consist of such lands, and such only, as the commissioners shall decide to be benefited; that the rule of apportionment among the parcels of land benefited also rests within the discretion of the legislature, and may be directed to be in proportion to the position, the frontage, the area, or the market value of the lands, or in proportion to the benefits as estimated by commissioners.
This subject has been recently considered by this court in the case of Parsons v. District of Columbia, 170 U.S. 45, 42 L. ed. 943, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 521, and where it was held, after a review of the authorities, that the enactment by Congress that assessments levied for laying water mains in the District of Columbia should be at the rate of $1.25 per linear foot front against all lots or land abutting on the street, road, or alley in which a water main shall be laid,-was constitutional, and was conclusive alike of the necessity of the work and of its benefit as against abutting property.
We do not deem it necessary to extend this opinion by referring to the many cases in the state courts in which the principles of the foregoing cases have been approved and applied. It will be sufficient to state the conclusions reached, after a review of the state decisions, by two text writers of high authority for learning and accuracy:
'The major part of the cost of a local work is sometimes collected by general tax, while a smaller portion is levied upon the estates specially benefited.
'The major part is sometimes assessed on estates benefited, while the general public is taxed a smaller portion in consideration of a smaller participation in the benefits.
'The whole cost in other cases is levied on lands in the immediate vicinity of the work.
'In a constitutional point of view either of these methods is admissible, and one may be sometimes just, and another at other times. In other cases it may be deemed reasonable to make the whole cost a general charge, and levy no special assessment whatever. The question is legislative, and, like all legislative questions, may be decided erroneously; but it is reasonable to expect that, with such latitude of choice, the tax will be more just and equal than it would be were the legislature required to levy it by one inflexible and arbitrary rule.' Cooley, Taxn. 447.
'The courts are very generally agreed that the authority to require the property specially benefited to bear the expense of local improvements is a branch of the taxing power, or included within it. . . . Whether the expense of making such improvements shall be paid out of the general treasury, or be assessed upon the abutting property or other property specially benefited, and, if in the latter mode, whether the assessment shall be upon all property found to be benefited, or alone upon the abutters, according to frontage or according to the area of their lots, is, according to the present weight of authority, considered to be a question of legislative expediency.' 2 Dill. Mun. Corp. § 752, 4th ed.
This array of authority was confronted, in the courts below, with the decision of this court in the case of Norwood v. Baker, 172 U.S. 269, 43 L. ed. 443, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 187, which was claimed to overrule our previous cases, and to establish the principle that the cost of a local improvement cannot be assessed against abutting property according to frontage, unless the law under which the improvement is made provides for a preliminary hearing as to the benefits to be derived by the property to be assessed.
But we agree with the supreme court of Missouri in its view that such is not the necessary legal import of the decision in Norwood v. Baker. That was a case where, by a village ordinance apparently aimed at a single person a portion of whose property was condemned for a street, the entire cost of opening the street, including not only the full amount paid for the strip condemned, but the cost and expenses of the condemnation proceedings, was thrown upon the abutting property of the person whose land was condemned. This appeared, both to the court below and to a majority of the judges of this court, to be an abuse of the law, an act of confiscation, and not a valid exercise of the taxing power. This court, however, did not affirm the decree of the trial court awarding a perpetual injunction against the making and collection of any special assessments upon Mrs. Baker's property, but said:
'It should be observed that the decree did not relieve the abutting property from liability for such amount as could be properly assessed against it. Its legal effect, as we now adjudge, was only to prevent the enforcement of the particular assessment in question. It left the village, in its discretion, to take such steps as were within its power to take, either under existing statutes or under any authority that might thereafter be conferred upon it, to make a new assessment upon the plaintiff's abutting property for so much of the expense of opening of the street as was found upon due and proper inquiry to be equal to the special benefits accruing to the property. By the decree rendered the court avoided the performance of functions appertaining to an assessing tribunal or body, and left the subject under the control of the local authorities designated by the state.'
That this decision did not go to the extent claimed by the plaintiff in error in this case is evident, because in the opinion of the majority it is expressly said that the decision was not inconsistent with our decisions in Parsons v. District of Columbia, 170 U.S. 45, 56, 42 L. ed. 943, 947, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 521; and in Spencer v. Merchant, 125 U.S. 345, 357, 31 L. ed. 763, 768, 8 Sup Ct. Rep. 921.
It may be conceded that courts of equity are always open to afford a remedy where there is an attempt, under the guise of legal proceedings, to deprive a person of his life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. And such, in the opinion of a majority of the judges of this court, was the nature and affect of the proceedings in the case of Norwood v. Baker.
But there is no such a state of facts in the present case. Those facts are thus stated by the court of Missouri:
'The work done consisted of paving with asphaltum the roadway of Forest avenue in the said [Kansas] City, 36 feet in width, from Independence avenue to Twelfth street, a distance of 1/2 mile. Forest avenue is one of the oldest and best-improved residence streets in Kansas City, and all of the lots abutting thereon front the street and extend back therefrom uniformly to the depth of an ordinary city lot to an alley. The lots are all improved and used for residence purposes, and all of the lots are substantially on the grade of the street as improved, and are similarly situated with respect to the asphalt pavement. The structure of the pavement along its entire extent is uniform in character and quality. There is no showing that there is any difference in the value of any of the lots abutting upon the improvement.' What was complained of was an orderly procedure under a scheme of local improvements prescribed by the legislature and approved by the courts of the state as consistent with constitutional principles.
The judgment of the Supreme Court of Missouri is affirmed.

## Notes

This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
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