# The Empire and the century/Imperialism in Canadian Politics

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IMPERIALISM IN CANADIAN POLITICS
By JOHN W. HILLS
Though Canada has produced a line of statesmen gifted with ideas and with the power of expressing them, it is perhaps more interesting to look at the forces which have governed her destiny rather than at the minds of the leaders who have directed her policy. Conscious action of statesmen has played a part, but there have^been other and stronger forces at work, and these forces are not the ones which might at first sight have been thought the most powerful. The actual ideals of both political parties on Imperial questions are identical, and can be described very shortly: both are unanimous in desiring preferential trade within the Empire, both hope that the future will bring closer union, and both think that Canada should carry more of the weight of the defence of the Empire. A General Election is not perhaps the best occasion for ascertaining the political ideals of a people, and in Canada last autumn the speeches of the ordinary candidate, as of candidates elsewhere, were filled mainly with local and personal questions. But still there were three great issues running throughout the controversy—the new Grand Trunk Pacific Railway, preferential trade, and defence. The last issue was unluckily obscured by a personal quarrel. The discussions on it were acrimonious and not very useful. But Canadians recognise that they do not do their fair share of the work of defence, and the question for the future is to find some ​acceptable form which their contribution can take. It certainly will not take the form of a cash subsidy of a size worth discussing. It probably will take the form of Canada increasing and improving her land forces, and possibly of her building and manning ships to form part of the British fleet. The last is clearly the line upon which every effort should be concentrated. The country is rich in raw material, and would gladly foster some, at any rate, of the highly-specialized industries upon which modern shipbuilding depends; and she would not require the fleet so built to dance attendance at Halifax or Esquimalt, but would realize that it might defend Canadian interests better if stationed in the North Sea or the Mediterranean. This is looking a little ahead, but preferential trade is a present issue, and on this the country is unanimous. Mr. Foster recently told the American Economic Association at Chicago: 'Public sentiment in Canada is overwhelmingly in favour of the preferential system. As a theory it was advocated by the leaders of both parties previous to 1896, and has been supported by both parties since its enactment in 1898. In the press and on the platform it receives general commendation and support.' That certainly is a moderate statement. So unanimous is the country that little argument is required, and consequently a much larger space in party controversy was occupied by the new Transcontinental Railway. On this it was possible to take sides, and the whole country from east to west proceeded to do so. But as a rule it was debated as a local question, and it required the constructive imagination of Sir Wilfrid Laurier to show the Imperial idea underlying it—to see the produce of the East pouring along it into Canada, and through Canada to Europe, and the goods of Canada and Europe flowing back through the same channel to the East.
And yet to anyone acquainted with Canadian economic history the project requires no pictorial illustration to bring it into relation with great Imperial ​questions. It is the result of the same forces which produced the preference of 1897, 1898, and 1900, and it is the latest step upon the road upon which Canada has been irresistibly driven since the repeal of the Acts of Trade and Navigation.
When Canada lost her preferential position in British markets she turned, angrily and unwillingly, to the United States. Reciprocity became essential to her, and, to quote Mr. Foster again, 'reciprocity has no meaning in Canada except in relation to the United States.' From 1854 till 1865 it existed under the Elgin Treaty; after the Civil War it was denounced by the States, and for many years after Canada was a humble suppliant for its renewal—at one time contemptuously repulsed, at another deluded by negotiations which led to nothing. 'From 1867 till 1904 no election has taken place for the Federal Parliament in which reciprocity in some form was not a dominant factor. In 1891 it was the sole issue, in the form of unrestricted exchange of commodities between Canada and the United States, and involving discrimination against the Mother Country.' The positions are now reversed, and it is for the States to sue, and for Canada to refuse. At present 'as a live issue it does not exist'
Federation came in 1867. In the seventies two events happened: Canada took a step towards protection, and the Canadian Pacific Railway was begun. These two events sprang from the same causes, and were complementary of each other: Canada, denied access to the markets of the States, started to manufacture for herself; since her exports could no longer go south, they had to come east. The results of the building of the line have often been described, but can hardly be exaggerated; it converted the country from a series of separate communities, divided by wide distances and by wider spaces of time, closely bound to and dependent on the States lying immediately south of them, into a homogeneous country from the Atlantic to the Pacific. Had reciprocity continued, and had the ​railway never been built, Canada's trade would have followed its natural direction of north to south; the building of the line forced it east and west, and made it follow a national instead of a geographical channel. The results to Canada and the Empire are very great: without it the middle west would have become a commercial dependency of Buffalo, Chicago, and Minneapolis; and we can believe that the position would have been insecure without going to the length of assuming that political union would have followed commercial connection.
The McKinley tariff of 1890 was followed in 1896 by the definite adoption by Canada of Protection. For the same reason a market in Europe had become a necessity, and she naturally turned to Great Britain. Hence the preference granted in 1897 and 1898—a preference which was increased, it should be noticed, after the enactment of the Dingley tariff in 1897. In granting this preference Canadian statesmen were actuated by Imperial motives, but it is of the greatest importance to realize that it was also a necessary step in the country's economic development. Sir Wilfrid Laurier said in an election speech last year: 'We gave the British preference because we wanted British trade. Great Britain is our best market. This makes it our duty to develop our trade in that direction, and our exports are growing greatly. But to secure low freight rates on your products it is necessary that the ships carrying them should bring back cargoes of English goods; that is the vindication of our preference policy.'
And now we are to witness the last chapter of the story, Canada has been driven, unconsciously, perhaps, at first, to make herself independent of the States, and to seek commercial union with Great Britain. But her independence to-day is not complete. Fifty years ago, when the Grand Trunk Railway was built, reciprocity with the States existed, and it was thought perfectly natural that the Atlantic terminus of the line should be Portland, Maine. But thirty years later, when it became ​a question of continuing the Canadian Pacific from Montreal to the Atlantic, public opinion had chanced. It was felt that the Atlantic port must be on Canadian territory, and St John, New Brunswick, was chosen. This line, therefore, runs from a Canadian harbour on the Atlantic to a Canadian harbour on the Pacific; but to get there it goes for nearly two hundred miles through the State of Maine. There was opposition to this, opposition in which, it may be remarked. Sir Wilfrid Laurier took a part, but it was overruled. Now, this gap in the system is a weakness: the withdrawal of the bonding facilities granted by the States has been threatened, and might be enforced, and Canada cannot consider herself independent until she possesses a transcontinental railway running throughout on Canadian territory; for though it is true that a railway—the Intercolonial—does link Montreal with St. John and Halifax, and does run on Canadian territory, its course is so roundabout and inconvenient that it can be left out of account. Hence the building of the Grand Trunk Pacific, in defiance of geography and of classical economy. And upon the necessity of building it both parties are united; they differ only in details, chiefly whether it should be worked by Government or by a company. But upon the question of principle they are united, and an overwhelming majority of the people support them.
The direction of Canada's economic development has been little influenced by geography or by other natural forces of which economists make so much. Western Canada is divided geographically by the Rockies; on the other hand, it is for a great part of its area divided from the States by an imaginary line corresponding to no natural features whatever. And yet, did the Rockies not exist, British Columbia would not be more closely bound to Manitoba than it is at present; did they run east and west, Alberta and Saskatchewan would not be more completely separated from Montana and the Dakotas. The States, a country speaking the same language and inhabited by the same race, lie at Canada's ​door, and yet she is united in declining to trade with them, and in desiring to trade with communities many of which are thousands of miles away. The forces which have influenced her are not the natural forces of geography or contiguity, but the sentimental force of nationality and the artificial force of commercial arrangements—commercial arrangements, that is to say, in the widest sense of the word, either such as are imposed from without, like the old colonial system, or such as are entered into voluntarily, like the former reciprocity with the States and the existing one-sided preference with the United Kingdom, or tariff barriers erected by foreign countries, like the McKinley and Dingley tariffs.
The great merit of Canadian statesmanship lies in the recognition of the potency of these two forces, and of the importance of getting them to act together; a commercial treaty is rendered far more durable if it is based on a common nationality.