# The Man of Last Resort/The Governor's Machine/Chapter 9
#### IX

THE audience in the court-room arose and remained standing until the judge in his black silk robe had entered and taken his place on the bench. Then the audience resumed its seat, and the clerk began to read the proceedings for the previous day. The ceremony attendant upon the sitting of the Circuit Court of the United States carried with it an impressive sense of majestic, imperial authority, and an air of grave, judicial deliberation. It was the Government of the United States of America, the spirit of supreme order and law moving through its servant, and, next to the Great Ruler of Events, it was greatest. It had assumed for the good of men the right to sit in judgment, and to say wherein lay the justice of their complicated quarrels. Before it, every man's cause was of equal import, and every ​man was of equal stature; bond or free, one stood before it naked of influence, and with his shoulder made as high as the shoulder of his fellow.
This is the theory. If it fails, it is because the law at best is but a human device, and its servants, after all, are but men like the others.
The building in which the Federal Court held its session was a substantial, handsome structure, and maintained a strange contrast to the town in which it stood. The town was rough, miserable, uncouth; the temporary habitation of men, struggling ever with the relentless anankè of things; in equal contrast to the officers of this court was the audience in the great court-room. They were the pioneers of civilization; a motley crowd in which the best and worst of human society was mixed and intermixed. They were, for the most part, bronzed, bearded, fearless examples of the inexorable law of the survival of the fittest, but not all. Some were the reckless advance agents of those hardy vices that follow close in the wake of empire,—devils too villainous to be tolerated in the cities of the East, and too ​bold and too wary to be stamped out by the deliberate machinery of the law.
Against these the officers of the court bore some evidence of polish. They were exact, calculating men, bred to respect order, and obey and maintain the customs of law. The contrast was significant, and one recalled and understood the constant bitter conflict between the judicial tribunals of the State and the judicial tribunals of the Federal Government, bitterly waged and as yet undecided. From one standpoint, this was the calm tribunal of the supreme power of the land, providing the same rights and remedies on the very border of its jurisdiction that it provided at the capital itself, favoring no condition and acting as even-eyed as nature.
On the other hand, one understood how the remote Commonwealth held this court to be the tribunal of a far off imperial government, seeking to enforce laws and customs foreign and repugnant to the laws and customs of its people. To them the Federal judge was a king's governor, travelling with his retinue over a subjugated province, and enforcing his ​edict by virtue of foreign armies quartered convenient to his hand. And looking on from this point of view, one understood why the outpost State hated this court so bitterly, and whence arose the fierce clamor against it. One understood how the far West smarted under its injunctions, and denounced them as the royal mandates of an emperor's consul, and how the far South collided with this tribunal and cried out against it to the Congress of the United States in a memorial clanging like a bell.
So the conflict was easy to understand, and it was easy to appreciate how large the spectre of discord loomed, and most difficult indeed to force the problem to some happy end.
When the clerk had finished, the marshal called the jury, and struggled bravely, but at times unsuccessfully, with the marvellous tangle of names. Indeed, if the list of this panel had been placed before a student of philology, he would have required no further history of the civilization of the Southwest. When the marshal had ended, the judge directed that the jury should be dismissed ​until two o'clock, and when order was again restored, the judge turned and looked down gravely from the bench.
“This court,” he said, “is ready to pass upon the matter taken under advisement yesterday afternoon. It seems that one Hiram Martin, a citizen of and a resident in the State of New Mexico, brought an action in this court against Ambercrombie Hergan and others to recover the sum of fifty thousand dollars, money, as it is said, borrowed by the said Hergan. The declaration contained the common counts in assumpsit, with which was filed, in lieu of the bill of particulars, a promissory note, made by the said Hergan to the said plaintiff, calling for fifty thousand dollars, and endorsed by one Randal and another Culverson. This note, in addition to the matter usually had in such instruments, recited that it was given in accord with a certain agreement of even date therewith, made and entered into by the parties to the said note. The case coming on for trial, the defendants, by their attorney, appeared and filed their plea exhibiting the said agreement, maintaining that the ​said note was given for money loaned for the purpose of being used in a gambling venture, and was, therefore, void at law. An issue being had upon the said plea, the case was put to trial, and the said agreement having been admitted, the defendants, by their attorney, moved this court to exclude the evidence, and direct the jury to find for the defendants; which motion this court took time to consider.
“The facts herewith concerned are involved in no controversy, and the agreement being couched in plain terms, admits of no doubtful construction. It would seem that the defendant Hergan called at the gambling house of one Crawley, a resident of this State, and requested a private interview with the said Crawley and the plaintiff; that in this interview Hergan explained that he was considering what it pleased him to denominate 'a gambling venture in oil,' and solicited the two men to join him in the venture. This they declined to do, but suggested that they would advance to Hergan such money as he might need upon a promissory note with good security.
“It appears that some controversy arose as ​to the rate of interest to be paid; and a division of the profits was suggested in lieu of the larger per cent. This matter was finally concluded by the plaintiff and the said Crawley advancing the said sum, and taking therefor the note filed in this cause, and in addition thereto entering into this agreement in writing with the said Hergan, wherein it is set forth that the money loaned is to be used by the said Hergan for the express purpose of 'a gamble in oil,' and for no other purpose; and that if any profit should result from said gambling venture, the said plaintiff and the said Crawley were to receive one-eighth of said profits. It seems that the money was paid and presumably used by Hergan for the purpose as stated. Afterward the note was presented for payment, and being refused, was duly protested, and later sued upon in this court.
“It is maintained by the defendants that this transaction was contrary to public policy, and that the money, having been loaned for a known illegal purpose, cannot be recovered in a judicial tribunal, but falls within the purlieus of those matters which are par se ex ​turpe causa, and for which the law provides no remedy. On the contrary, it is urged by counsel for the plaintiff that the transaction as between the parties to this suit was entirely commercial and innocent; that the plaintiff is a mere lender of money in a bona fide transaction, and is in no wise a party to any illegal proceeding, and that the mere use to which the money was put is a matter of no moment.
“The law, being for the welfare and the protection of human society, refuses to recognize and enforce certain contracts had among its citizens, when those contracts are founded in moral turpitude or inconsistent with the good order or solid interests of society.
“'No people,' declares Chancellor Kent in his Commentaries, 'are bound or ought to enforce or hold valid in their courts of justice any contract which is injurious to the public rights or offends their morals or contravenes their policy or violates a public law.' Hence contracts having an illegal or immoral consideration, or tending to the violation of law or the debauching of public morals, are held to be contra bonas mores, and are void.
​“It is said that the object of all law is to suppress vice, and to promote the general welfare of society, and it does not give its assistance to persons to enforce a demand originating in their breach or violation of its principles and enactments. It is not necessary that the law expressly prohibit or enjoin an act. It may impliedly prohibit or enjoin it. In either case a contract in violation of its principles is void under the wholesome maxim ex turpi causa non oritur actio.
“It may happen, and, indeed, frequently does happen, that the individual suffers great hurt from this sweeping policy of the law, but it is held that the good of the commonwealth rises above the mere benefit of the individual citizen, and that where the welfare of the whole of society is involved, the law will not pause to consider the injury entailed upon the mere unit. Hence the policy of government in the exigencies of war, when protection must be had against violence, and the policy of government in the peaceful administration of the law, when protection must be had against vice.
“Thus gambling, wagering, and all gambling ​and wagering contracts and transactions are illegal as against public policy, since they are repugnant to the well-being of society, fraught with vice, pregnant with demoralization, and corrupting alike to the youth and to the aged, as they inspire a hope of reward without labor.
“It is significant that in matters of this nature human society has been progressive. Under the common law of England wagers were not unlawful or unenforceable, but the statute of 9th Anne followed and altered the common law, and the statutes of 8th and 9th Victoria altered it yet farther, and in the United States every separate Commonwealth has its respective statute striking at this vice.
“I think it will not at this day be denied that all transactions in stocks, by way of margin, settlement of differences, and payment of gains or losses, without intending to deliver the stocks, is a gambling or wagering operation which the law does not sanction, and will not carry into effect; and it has been held in the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Irwin vs. Williar, 'If under the guise of a contract to deliver goods at a future day ​the real intent be to speculate in the rise or fall of prices, and the goods are not to be delivered, but one party is to pay to the other the difference between the contract price and the market price of the goods at the date fixed for executing the contract, the whole transaction is nothing more than a wager, and is null and void.' And that 'Generally in this country wagering contracts are held to be illegal and void as against public policy.'
“Indeed the courts of the land have gone to the extremity of denouncing in no uncertain terms the dangerous character of these illegal ventures. Judge Blauford, in the case of Cunningham vs. The National Bank of Augusta, in speaking of these transactions termed 'futures,' declares: 'If this is not a speculation on chances—a wagering and betting between the parties, then we are unable to understand the transaction. A betting on a game of faro or poker cannot be more hazardous, dangerous, or uncertain. Indeed it may be said that these animals are tame, gentle, and submissive compared to this monster. The law has caged them and driven them to ​the den. They have been outlawed; while this ferocious beast has been allowed to stalk about in open mid-day with gilded signs and flaming advertisements to lure the unhappy victim to its embrace of death and destruction. What are some of the consequences of these speculations in 'futures'? The faithful chroniclers of the day have informed us, as growing directly out of these nefarious practices, that there have been bankruptcies, defalcations of public officers, embezzlements, forgeries, larcenies, and deaths. Certainly no one will contend for a moment that a transaction fraught with such evil consequences is not immoral, illegal, and contrary to public policy.'
“In so far as this doctrine is concerned with the case at bar, it is certain that the parties understood and intended that the money loaned should be used for the purpose of engaging in an illegal speculation in oil,—'a gamble in oil,' as it is termed in the agreement, and that such gambling transactions are against public policy and the law of the land. But it is contended by learned counsel that all this can have no bearing upon the case at bar ​for the reason that in the cases heretofore cited announcing these conclusions of law, the litigants were the parties who dealt with or for each other, and were the immediate parties engaged in an unlawful gambling venture, and the ones to gain or lose directly by the venture, and not a mere stranger who loaned money to another to engage in such transactions, and having but an undetermined interest in the result; and that the law will not lend its aid to a further wrong. The defendant having committed one wrong cannot be permitted to use his first wrongful act as an instrument whereby to effect a second wrongful act.
“The objection is ingenious, but I judge fully met by the declaration of Lord Mansfield in Holman's case: 'The objection,' said the learned judge, 'that a contract is immoral or illegal as between plaintiff and defendant, sounds at all times very ill in the mouth of the defendant. It is not for his sake, however, that the objection is allowed, but it is founded on the general principle of policy which the defendant has the advantage of, contrary to the real justice as between himself and ​and plaintiff, by accident, if I may so say. The principle of public policy is this: ex dolo malo non oritur actio No court will lend its aid to a man who founds his cause of action upon an immoral or illegal act. If from the plaintiff's own statement or otherwise the cause of action appear to arise ex turpi causa, or the transgression of a positive law of this country, then the court says he has no right to be assisted. It is upon that ground the court goes, not for the sake of the defendant, but because it will not lend its aid to such a plaintiff.'
“This claim of the plaintiff to this action is unsound for the further reason that any promise, contract, or undertaking the performance of which would tend to promote, advance, or carry into effect an object or purpose which is unlawful, is itself void and will not maintain an action. The law which prohibits the end, will not lend its aid in promoting the means assigned to carry it into effect. Nor is it possible for an act contrary to law to be made the basis of a contract enforceable in courts of law. Hence when one lends money to another for the express purpose of enabling him to commit ​a specific unlawful act, and such act be afterwards committed by means of the aid so received, the lender is a particeps criminis, and the law will not aid him to recover money advanced for such a purpose, and much less would it assist him, if, as in this case he retained an interest in the result of the venture.”
It was very unusual for counsel to interrupt the judge in the delivery of his opinion, but at this point the attorney for Martin arose.
“If your honor please,” he said, “this court is taking away the remedy of the plaintiff, and permitting the wrong to stand. Does this court reverse the ancient doctrine upon which the theory of human justice has its eternal basis, the ancient doctrine that the law will always provide a remedy for a wrong?”
The faintest shadow of a smile flitted over the judicial face.
“That sage maxim: 'lex semper dabit remédium,'” answered the judge, “is a gigantic error couched in very good law Latin. The motion to exclude the evidence is sustained, and the jury will find a verdict for the defendants.”