# United States Army Field Manual 7-93 Long-Range Surveillance Unit Operations/Appendix G

APPENDIX G INTELLIGENCE This Appendix provides information on intelligence preparation of the battlefield; mission folders; and conducting threat vehicle identification, order of battle, and intelligence training. G-1. INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD IPB is the cornerstone of intelligence operations and the commander's scheme of fire and maneuver. IPB predicts the allocation and employment of collection assets. It is the basis for situation and target development. It is also the basis for target value analysis, which identifies high-value targets for fire support targeting. The IPB process provides a graphic intelligence estimate for the commander. (For more information, see FM 34-130.)
a. The all-source production section of G2 considers the needs of the division combat and support elements to provide them with IPB products. IPB is a four-step process: define the battlefield environment, describe the battlefield's effects, evaluate the threat, and determine threat courses of action.
(1) Define the battlefield environment. The battlefield area is the geographical area on which the commander has responsibility and authority to conduct military operations. Based on METT-T and the commander's concept of operations, the G2 recommends to the commander the boundaries of the division area of interest.
(2) Describe the battlefield's effects. This step determines how the battlefield environment affects threat and friendly operations. This evaluation focuses on the general capabilities of each force until courses of action are developed in later steps of the IPB process. This step always includes an examination of terrain and weather, and their affects on friendly and threat operations.
(3) Evaluate the threat. During this step, a determination is made of threat force capabilities and the doctrinal principles and the tactics, techniques, and procedures that threat forces prefer to employ. This evaluation is portrayed in a threat model, which includes doctrinal templates that depict how the threat operates when unconstrained by the effects of the battlefield environment.
(4) Determine threat courses of action. This step integrates the results of the previous steps into a meaningful conclusion. Models are developed that depict the threat's available courses of action. These models are developed given the effects of the specific battlefield environment. As a minimum, the most likely and the most dangerous threat courses of action should be depicted.
b. The commander plans deep operations based on the factors of METT-T and IPB analyses. He begins planning the interdiction of enemy forces (primary area of operations for LRSU), while they are deep in the area of interest. He identifies and plans the attack well before the situation places the enemy force at the interdiction point. He projects how enemy second-echelon forces will react to friendly activities. He selects the time and place for attacks based on intelligence gathering.
(1) The LRS company and the LRS detachment perform several critical tasks in support of their parent unit commander's concept of the operation. How well the LRS unit performs its mission may decide the successor failure of the main force. Therefore, the LRS commander and team leader must know where they fit into the intelligence collection process. The LRSU's mission helps confirm or deny the commander's IPB in the unit area of interest.
(2) From the decision support template of the IPB cycle, the S2 and S3 prepare a detailed reconnaissance and surveillance plan. The reconnaissance and surveillance plan graphically depicts where and when reconnaissance and surveillance elements (for example, LRS elements) should look for the enemy. The reconnaissance and surveillance plan must direct specific tasks and priorities to LRS teams. Once near their objective, the LRS team confirms or denies the IPB. LRS teams confirm or deny the IPB by answering SIR to the commander's PIR. Critical information the LRS elements find during either reconnaissance or surveillance operations is relayed rapidly and accurately.
G-2. MISSION FOLDER PREPARATION The mission folder is based on mission responsibility of the individual unit. It is a stand-alone document consisting of who, what, where, when, and why to fill the needs of the commander. It contains detailed information of the mission to include maps, photographs sketches, climatology, area geography, and recent enemy activity. It also contains coordination, such as insertion and extraction means and corridors, made by the division staff and LRS headquarters to aid the mission. The mission folder for training should be prepared to reflect the unit's mission. These are unit METL dependent.
a. The folder should never tell the surveillance team leader how to execute his mission, but should contain all the information he needs to plan it. G2, G3, and LRS headquarters are responsible for completion of the mission folder.
b. The contents of the mission folder are as follows.
(1) Part 1--Mission identification data.
Target analysis. Composition and disposition of enemy forces. Radio direction finding capabilities of enemy. Rear area security ability and reaction time of enemy forces. (2) Part 2--Coordinating instructions.
Insertion and extraction. --Combat search and rescue procedures and evasion and escape corridors.
--Link-up procedures.
-Isolated Personnel Report, DD Form 1833.
-Friendly.
-Partisan.
-Contact point.
--Other than air.
--Departure and reentry of forward friendly unit.
--Fire support.
--Resupply: Cache and air resupply.
--Boundaries: To forward friendly unit and other assets.
--Attachments: Topographical engineer team, fire support officer, air liaison officer, air defense artillery, joint air party, and so forth.
Special weapons and equipment. Communication data. (3) Part 3--Required maps and imagery.
Area orientation maps. --1:50,000 minimum for planning and operations.
--1:250,000 minimum for planning.
--Joint operations graphics minimum for planning.
Target oriented maps. --Detailed planning maps.
--Line-of-sight graphics or matrix.
-From proposed surveillance sites to target.
-From proposed target to surveillance sites.
-Within 500 meters of each proposed false insertion site.
Gazetteer oriented to terrain, grid coordinate, and geographical features. (Gazetteer is a map dictionary alphabetically listing every named feature in the country.) Gridded imagery of target specific. Gridded imagery of target area. (4) Part 4--Target area information.
Geographical data: Average slope, soil table, and trafficability. Meteorological data. --Effects of light and illumination on friendly forces, and enemy forces and their use of night observation devices.
--Weather: Current and historical.
--Effects of weather on friendly forces and enemy forces.
Hydrographic data. --Tidal and current.
--Drainage.
--Flooding.
Cultural features. --Language.
--Religion: Tolerance and dominance.
--Mores.
--Values.
--US support by indigenous personnel.
Infiltration and exfiltration planning factors. --Routes.
--Security.
--Medical.
--Assets available.
--Unit qualifications.
Survival, evasion, resistance, and escape planning factors. --Isolated Personnel Report, DD Form 1833.
--Area studies.
--Culture: Religion and morals.
--Blood chits.
--Food sources.
-Animals (poisonous, inedible).
-Plants (poisonous, nonpoisonous).
-Water--potable.
--Endemic diseases.
--Currency.
(5) Part 5--Target area activity. Recent activity.
Train-up or refit. Movement to combat. Rehearsals. (6) Part 6--References. Prior area intelligence.
Unconventional warfare forces. Pre-employed LRS teams. Line crossers. Refugees. c. An intelligence estimate and an intelligence annex are also useful to the team in planning their mission.
(1) Intelligence estimate. An intelligence estimate is a five-paragraph document containing the latest intelligence of the battlefield and enemy capabilities and limitations. It also contains any notable conclusions about the total effects of the area of operations on friendly and probable enemy courses of action, and the effects of enemy exploitable vulnerabilities.
(2) Intelligence annex. An intelligence annex is a formal but brief eight-paragraph tasking document containing necessary intelligence orders or guidance for the operation. It gives subordinate commanders instructions on specific collection and reporting requirements, PIR and IR, and associated SIR. It may accompany the operation plan or OPORD.
G-3. INTELLIGENCE TRAINING Specific training on vehicle identification, order of battle, and intelligence is critical to successful mission accomplishment for both the LRS headquarters personnel and team members. Training priorities are established in accordance with the unit METL.
a. The team leader prioritizes the most urgent training needs.
(1) Train teams for compatibility with G2.
(a) Develop briefing and debriefing skills.
(b) Aid in credibility of team reporting ability.
(c) Identify gaps between teams availability and capability and G2 taskings.
(d) Make available G2 assets to LRS units.
(2) Train teams on vehicle identification and table of organization and equipment key signature vehicles and equipment.
(3) Train teams on preparing for debriefing.
(4) Train teams on use and recognition of PIR, IR, SIR and how they are produced and used by G2.
(5) Train teams on making area studies--historical, sociological, economic, religious, medical, political, cultural, languages, geological, military (especially influences, for example, US, United Kingdom, Chinese, and any other country that provides equipment and training).
(6) Train teams on the order of battle--enemy warfighting doctrine and the integration of outside military influences on enemy doctrine, philosophies, and ideology. Additionally, key vehicles and equipment placement in organizations and formations.
(7) Train teams on the team's real-world mission when developing IPB. Planning for operations other than war is often overlooked and poorly trained, teams should evaluate and restructure to prepare for this contingency. IPB in operations other than war is slow to develop and has the potential to change rapidly. Preparation and use of mission folders for potential targets are essential.
(8) Train teams on the doctrine of enemy--
Offensive operations--major influences. Defensive operations--major influences. Rear area security. IPB--doctrine, history. b. The team leader plans the intelligence training schedule.
(1) For active duty soldiers, the recommended intelligence training is--
One hour per day per week training on vehicle identification. Thirty hours per month training on forces and equipment specific to units in real-world contingency areas; for example, Mideast and South America. Field training exercises or deployments should incorporate intelligence training by vehicle photo packets, as a minimum. (2) For Reserve Components and National Guard units, the recommended intelligence training schedule is as follows:
(a) Weekend drill.
Five hours of intelligence training. Three hours of vehicle identification. Priority: Area of operation; former Soviet; former Soviet alliance; and Third World, nonaligned. Two hours of order of battle. Priority: Unit organization; offensive, defensive, and rear area operations; and IPB--doctrine, history. (b) Annual training.
Fifteen hours of intelligence training: Briefing and debriefing and imagery interpretation by imagery interpreters (96D). Twelve hours of vehicle identification, priority as above. Three hours of order of battle, priority as above. G-4. INTELLIGENCE RESOURCES The LRS element is a direct asset of the corps and division commander through the G2 with a vast amount of resources available to them. The assets are as follows.
a. G2.
(1) Air liaison for Air Force.
(2) Staff weather officer: Light and weather data and historical weather data.
(3) Security: OPSEC and counterintelligence.
(4) Intelligence updates on the unit's contingency area.
(5) G2 and LRS interface.
(6) Liaison officer training for (at a minimum):
Commander and executive officer. Operations sergeant. Intelligence sergeant and analyst. Team leader. (7) Topographical data:
Line-of-sight graphics. Defense mapping agency. Obstacle overlays. Terrain analysis. (8) Imagery support: Interpretation and training by imagery interpreters (96D).
(9) Integrated training with other intelligence-gathering assets to develop a greater understanding of the intelligence battlefield operating systems.
(10) Planning procedures: Intelligence updates and current changes.
b. Additional Resource Assets.
(1) Computers (integrated video disc, point of contact is Company D, LRS Leader's Course, 4th Ranger Training Brigade, Fort Benning, Georgia 31905).
(2) Manuals.
(3) Janes publications and similar products.
(4) Vehicle and order of battle slides and photographs (G2).
(5) PCQT (computer floppy disc; point of contact is US Army Foreign Science and Technology Center, Fort Meade, Maryland).
(6) Video or movie footage.
(7) Visualization:
Overhead projector. Intelligence School, Fort Huachuca, Arizona. Foreign Science and Technology Center, Fort Meade, Maryland. (8) Quizzes:
Flashcards. Slides or photographs. List of features for vehicle identification. (9) Posttesting to determine the effectiveness of overall training.
(10) Models--1:100 scale models available with use of spotter scopes from 50 to 75 meters is hands-on training that is expeditious and excellent for detection and identification training. (Military Training Equipment, 357 UXbridge Road, Rickmansworth, Hertfordshire, WD3 2DT, United Kingdom.
c. Military Resources.
Directorate of Threat and Security
US Army Infantry Center Fort Benning, Georgia 31905-5000 (706) 545-1561 DSN: 835-1561 Long-Range Surveillance Leaders Course
Fort Benning, Georgia 31905 DSN: 784-6831/6212 Advanced Imagery Interpretation Course
Scherstien Compound Germany 497 RTG/INIOET APO New York, New York 09633 Student handout is a catalog of key vehicles and equipment with table of organization and equipment breakdown. NATO Identification Course
RAF Alcanbury, UK, England Student handout for vehicle identification. Foreign Materials Handling and Exploitation
201st MI Battalion, Fort Meade, Maryland Course available through Red Train; see Red Train catalog. US Army Intelligence Center and School
Non-Warsaw Pact and Third World Countries correspondence courses: Commander, US Army Ordnance Center and School, ATTN: ATSC-TD-RCO Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland 21005 Red Thrust Star, c/o S2, 177th Armored Bde
Fort Irwin, California 92310-5031 DSN: 470-5239/5207 Department of the Army, US Army, Element,
International LRRP School, APO New York 09035 Bundespost 0751-44033 Ext 168 Bundespost 0751-51817 d. Civilian Resources.
Janes Defense Weekly Circulation Manager
1340 Braddock Place, Suite 300 PO Box 1436 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-2036 (703) 683-3700 FAX (703) 836-0029 Janes Yearbook (Vehicle Identification)
4th Floor 115 5th Avenue New York, New York 10003 (212) 254-9097 TLX 272562 International Defense Review
c/o Publications Expediting, Inc. 200 Meacham Avenue Elmont, New York 11003 (516) 352-7300 Military Training Equipment
(lead and rubber model 1:100 scale) USA Representative: Fairey Engineering 526 King Street, Suite 201 Alexandria, Virginia 22314 (703) 543-3397 Local library.