# A Political History of Parthia/Chapter 5

CHAPTER V
THE STRUGGLE IN SYRIA
CRASSUS and Publius were dead, and the eagles of their legions decorated Parthian temples. But Roman armies had been destroyed before, and Rome still survived. The lesson may have made no immediate impression in popular thought and literature, but military men were cognizant of the danger.
M. Tullius Cicero was appointed proconsular governor of Cilicia and was assigned twelve thousand infantry and twelve hundred cavalry. Included in his instructions was a special charge to keep Cappadocia friendly, for the new king, Ariobarzanes III, was a doubtful quantity. From Brundisium Cicero wrote to Appius Claudius Pulcher, the governor of Cilicia whom he was to succeed, that the Senate had proposed raising troops in Italy for Cicero and Bibulus, the new governor of Syria, but that the consul Sulpicius had vetoed the measure. In a dispatch to the Senate Pulcher reported that he had dismissed many of his troops; but his legate privately contradicted the statement, and Cicero begged him not to reduce ​an already too small force. From Actium on June 14, 51 b.c., he wrote to Atticus that he hoped the Parthians would remain quiet. At Athens Cicero still had no news of their movements, but at Tralleis he heard that they were inactive. On July 31 the new governor reached Laodicea within his own territory. His earlier ideas with regard to the peacefulness of the "Persians" (Parthians) were soon to undergo rapid changes. He had scarcely begun his work when on August 9 reports reached him that some Roman cavalry had been cut up by the Parthians. His two legions were scattered and practically mutinous when he arrived at camp in Iconium. The troops were reunited, and Cicero was proceeding to whip them into shape, when on August 30 he received a dispatch from Antiochus I, king of Comma​gene, informing him that Pacorus (I), son of King Orodes of Parthia, had reached the Euphrates. Pacorus, at this time young and inexperienced, was supported in the command by Osaces, a more seasoned warrior. The troops under Pacorus consisted of a large detachment of Parthian cavalry and a considerable force of allies, some of whom may have been Arabs. Artavasdes, king of Armenia and brother-in-law of Pacorus, was reported to be contemplating an attack on Cappadocia. But Cicero, who did not quite trust Antiochus, the source of this information, decided to await further news before acting.
Since a Parthian thrust from Syria at Cilicia was expected to pass through Cappadocia, Cicero decided to advance with his legions to a point where he could be prepared to act no matter whence the attack came. On September 19, while on the march to Cilicia, Tarcondimotus, the chief Roman ally in the region beyond the Taurus, reported that Pacorus had crossed the Euphrates and camped at Tyba. A series up​rising had been started in Syria, probably by the pro-Parthian party. From Jamblichus, the son of the famous Sampsiceramus of Emesa (Homs), leader of the Arab allies, came the same news. Cicero went into camp at a point near Cybistra (Ereğli) at the foot of the Taurus. Thence he sent frantic appeals to the Senate for more troops, since the Roman forces in the province were scarcely sufficient to maintain order. The majority of the legions were held in Spain and Gaul near the persons of Pompey and Caesar, who were preparing for the coming struggle and were loath to part with their troops. Jamblichus, Tarcondimotus, and Deiotarus remained faithful to Rome, but only the forces of the last named could be depended upon with certainty. To make matters worse, the native population, suffering from the greed and oppression of former governors, was only too ready to welcome the Parthians.
Cicero remained in camp near Cybistra for five days, since from that point, which commanded the Cicilian Gates, he could both block a Parthian thrust through Cappadocia and act as a threat to the vacillating Artavasdes of Armenia. By September 20 ​Cicero had information that the Parthians had passed through Commagene and were in Cyrrhestica. Cassius with all of his troops was in Antioch, where he was shortly afterwards surrounded by the Parthians. At this time there was no news as to the whereabouts of M. Calpurnius Bibulus, governor of Syria, then on his way from Rome. Parthian patrols soon penetrated beyond the frontiers of Cilicia, and a considerable body of their cavalry was annihilated by some squadrons of Roman horse and a praetorian cohort stationed on garrison duty at Epiphanea. When it became apparent that the Parthian raid was directed not toward Cappadocia but into Cilicia, Cicero proceeded by forced marches through the Taurus by the Cilician Gates and arrived at Tarsus on October 5.
Both the Roman commanders and the Roman and Greek historians failed to understand the tactics employed by the Parthians. This expedition was a cavalry raid by a comparatively small force of swiftly moving horsemen whose object was not conquest, for which their numbers and equipment were inadequate, but booty and destruction of enemy property. This was the reason why they struck not at Cappadocia but at the rich area around Antioch. It was a comparatively easy matter to cross the Euphrates, avoid ​contact with the small garrisons in the cities, and descend upon the rich villas and suburbs of Antioch. Cassius shut himself up in the heavily walled portion of the city, where he remained until the Parthians had departed. Probably their withdrawal was occasioned by the completion of their plundering of the city lands rather than by any action of the Roman troops, as Cicero himself is free to say.
The Parthian troops next moved onward to Antigonea (unidentified), where they attempted unsuccessfully to cut down the forests, which hampered their cavalry. Meanwhile Cassius had ventured forth to worry the wings and had undoubtedly reduced both the numbers and the morale of the enemy forces. He employed Parthian tactics when he set an ambush along the road which they were traveling from Antigonea, feigned a retreat with a small body of men, and then turned to surround the disorganized pursuers with his entire force. In the struggle which followed Osaces was mortally wounded; he died a few days later. This victory Cassius reported to the Senate in a dispatch dated October 7, 51 b.c. Short​ly thereafter Bibulus, recently arrived in Syria, entered Antioch.
Cicero, in camp on October 8 near Mopsuhestia in Cilicia, apparently felt much reassured. He wrote Appius Claudius Pulcher, who had been asking about the Parthians, that he really did not think there were any, just Arabs partially equipped as Parthians, and that he thought they had all gone home. He, Cicero, understood that there was not a single enemy in Syria. Evidently news of the Parthian defeat by his military rival Cassius had already arrived, and possibly Cicero wished to minimize the importance of the victory. Perhaps this also accounts for his onslaught on the towns of the Amanus, which began almost immediately afterward, on October 13.
The raiders under Pacorus at once withdrew and went into winter quarters in Cyrrhestica. Cicero left his brother Quintus in charge of Cilicia and of the winter camp established there and returned to Laodicea. Everyone realized that the situation was fraught with danger for the coming year. Suggestions were made that Caesar should go with his own army to face the Parthians in the next summer, or that Pom​pey should be sent to take command. When the latter course was decided upon, Caesar turned over to Pompey legions I and XV for the contemplated expedition. In February, 50 b.c., Deiotarus decided to join Cicero's forces with thirty cohorts of four hundred men each and two thousand cavalry. In his letter to Cicero he indicated that he would take over the campaign, and Cicero believed that Deiotarus could hold out until Pompey arrived. King Orodes himself was expected to command the Parthians. At Laodicea early in May Cicero was planning to leave on the 15th for Cilicia and was hoping that the trip would be peaceful, though he realized that a serious war was impending. At Tarsus on June 5 he heard talk of bad "robberies" in Cilicia and of Syria blazing with war. Cicero's rival, Bibulus, dared not venture out of Antioch.
Bibulus, governor of Syria, turned to diplomacy rather than arms in an attempt to stave off the invasion. After he had won the regard of Ornodapates, a satrap who was unfriendly to Orodes, Bibulus persuaded him to adopt a plan to place Pacorus upon the throne. The troops which had been used against the Romans were then to be employed against ​Orodes; but before the scheme could be carried out the latter apparently heard of the affair and recalled Pacorus. The threatened invasion of the summer of 50 b.c. therefore failed to materialize, and by the middle of July Cicero felt that danger from the Parthians was over and that he could safely leave for Rome. The garrisons placed in Apamea and elsewhere were withdrawn, an action which caused some criticism. Pacorus was allowed to live and was later even restored to the high command, where he proved himself one of the most capable generals Parthia ever possessed. For the next decade Parthia failed to make good her threat of serious invasion. The fact that no tetradrachms were struck from about 52 to 40/39 b.c. may indicate a transference of activity to the eastern part of the empire.
Naturally it was to the advantage of Orodes to further the civil war among the Romans. Pompey sent ​L. Hirrus and probably others as ambassadors to Orodes. The Parthian king offered an alliance, provided he should receive the province of Syria in return. This Pompey refused, perhaps because he thought the price too high, or because Hirrus, though of senatorial rank, had been imprisoned, or because of his relationship with Crassus and Publius, for Cornelia, Pompey's wife, had formerly been the wife of Publius. Notwithstanding this, after the Battle of Pharsalia Pompey entertained the notion of throwing himself into the hands of the Parthian ruler, in the hope of returning to the contest with a force furnished by him. He was persuaded by his friends to abandon the idea, partly because they considered Ptolemy a safer refuge and partly out of consideration for Cornelia.
Q. Cornificius, a later governor of Cilicia, wrote Cicero in 46 b.c. that Caesar had given him charge of Syria for the coming year and that he was fearful of a Parthian attack. Cornificius, however, never held the Syrian command; it was taken over in 45 b.c. by ​C. Antistius Vetus. The autumn of that year found one of the Pompeians, Q. Caecilius Bassus, supported by certain legions, shut up in Apamea by Vetus. Bassus appealed to the Parthians for aid, and Pacorus at the head of his squadrons forced the abandonment of the siege; but, because of the lateness of the season, the main body of Parthians did not remain long.
Since temporizing measures would obviously never solve the Parthian problem, Caesar began plans for a great campaign against them. Elaborate preparations were made for handling the home government while the dictator was to be away and for the organization of the army. Octavius, Caesar's nephew, was sent to Apollonia, ostensibly to study philosophy, but in reality to learn military tactics in preparation for the coming campaign. Sixteen legions and ten thousand cavalry were made available for service. Six legions, together with many light-armed troops and cavalry, under the command of M. Acilius Caninus went to winter in Apollonia, while one legion was ​sent to Syria. Gold for payment of expenses was forwarded to Asia Minor, and large quantities of arms were prepared and gathered at Demetrias in Thessaly. The expedition was to proceed to Parthia by way of Lesser Armenia. These extensive preparations reflect far better than mere words the respect in which the Parthians were held by the Romans. The assassination of Caesar in March put an end to his plans and saved the Parthians from what would have been undoubtedly a very serious war with the Romans.
In the civil wars which followed, the Parthians played a small part. A certain number of mounted Parthian bowmen had come into the possession of Cassius after the defeat and surrender in 44 b.c. of Caecilius Bassus and his legions. When Cassius learned that Antony and Octavian were crossing the Adriatic, a move which forced him to abandon his plans for an Egyptian expedition, he sent back his Parthian troops with ambassadors who asked for a larger force of auxiliaries. Apparently these were supplied, and in 42 b.c. they fought a losing battle on ​the side of the republicans at Philippi in Macedonia against Octavian.
Antony, heir not only to the papers but also to the dreams of Caesar, considered an attack on Parthia as he passed through Asia Minor after the battle. In the late summer of 41 b.c. he was in Tarsus in Cilicia, where he had ordered Cleopatra to appear before him. From Tarsus Antony proceeded overland to Syria, where he appointed L. Decidius Saxa governor of that province. A body of Roman cavalry sought to raid Palmyra; but the people of that wealthy trading center were forewarned and fled to Parthian territory, where their influence was one cause for the Parthian invasion of Syria which was soon to take place. To these refugees were added the pro-Parthian tyrants who had gradually established themselves in Syrian cities during the period after the defeat of Crassus when Roman control was at an ebb. Such tyrants, removed by Antony, sought haven at the Parthian court.
From Syria Antony went southward to Alexandria. In 40 b.c., while he was still in Egypt with Cleopatra, the Parthians again took the field against the Romans, and this time they had the good fortune to have with them Quintus Labienus, one of the ambassadors whom Brutus and Cassius had sent to Parthia to ​secure reinforcements. When Labienus learned of the proscriptions which had followed the Battle of Philippi, he cast his lot with the Parthians. Under the joint command of Labienus and Pacorus the Parthian army crossed the Euphrates in the spring of 40 b.c. and invaded Syria. An attack on Apamea failed; but the small garrisons in the country round about were easily won over to their side, since they had served with Brutus and Cassius. Saxa, the governor, was defeated in a pitched battle through the superior numbers and ability of the Parthian cavalry, and his brother, his quaestor, lost most of his men through desertion to Labienus. This was brought about by means of pamphlets wrapped around arrows and shot into the Roman camp. At last Saxa fled in the dead of night to Antioch, but he lost most of his men as a result. Labienus took Apamea without resistance.
To cope with this new situation Labienus and Pacorus divided their forces, the Roman turning northward after Saxa, the Parthian southward into Syria and Palestine. Saxa was forced to abandon Antioch and fled into Cilicia, where he was seized and put to death. Labienus then continued into Asia Minor in a most successful campaign, during which he took almost all the cities of the mainland. Zeno of Laodicea ​and Hybreas of Mylasa both wished to oppose him, but others, who were without arms and inclined toward peace, yielded. Hybreas especially provoked Labienus, for when the latter struck coins with the legend IMPERATOR PARTHICUS Hybreas said: "Then I shall call myself 'Carian general.'" When Mylasa was taken the home of Hybreas was especially singled out for plunder, but the orator himself had sought safety in Rhodes. Alabanda also surrendered only after sharp fighting; Stratonicea of Caria, though it was besieged a long time, was never taken. A later rescript of Augustus praised Stratonicea for its resistance to the Parthian attack. L. Munatius Plancus, governor of Asia, fled to the islands for refuge. The forces of Labienus may even have penetrated as far as Lydia and Ionia. Naturally he did not neglect the opportunity thus created to collect funds from the captured territory.
Pacorus, proceeding along the coast, and Barzapharnes, one of his commanders, marching farther inland, met with equal success in the south. All Syria ​fell before them except Tyre, against which Pacorus was powerless without a fleet. In some places, such as Sidon and Ptolemais (Acre), he was favorably received.
At this time in Judea the political power of the Hasmoneans was gone. Hyrcanus (I), the high priest, was but nominal ruler; and Antigonus, his nephew, had already failed in the attempt to wrest Jewish leadership from his uncle. The real power lay in the hands of Phasael and Herod, sons of Antipater the Idumean. To the advancing Parthians Antigonus offered one thousand talents and five hundred Jewish women, and because he was the head of a pro-Parthian group Pacorus decided to aid him. A special squadron of horsemen under the command of the cupbearer Pacorus, a man who bore the same name as the prince, was detailed to advance into Judea for this purpose. While these troops were raiding Carmel, a large number of Jews volunteered their services to Antigonus. Jews and Parthians together advanced to a grove of oak trees not far away, where they defeated the opposing forces, and then hastened on to Jerusalem.
​Within the city the writer of Enoch was moved by the coming of the Parthian hosts to express the pious hope that the city of righteousness would be a hindrance to their horses. In possible internal dissensions among the invaders he saw deliverance for the elect—a most reasonable hope in view of the past history of Parthia, but one not fulfilled in this case.
The combined Jewish and Parthian forces managed to enter the palace; but the struggle, eventually little more than an armed contest between two political factions, went on for some time within the walls. Finally the cupbearer Pacorus was admitted to the city with five hundred Parthian horsemen, ostensibly to act as mediator. Hyrcanus and the tetrarch Phasael were persuaded to go as ambassadors to the Parthian commander Barzapharnes. To allay suspicion Pacorus left with Herod two hundred horsemen and ten "Freemen," and the remainder of the cavalry acted as escort to the embassy. They were well received by Barzapharnes, and it was not until the Parthian commander had departed to rejoin Prince Pacorus and the ambassadors had reached Ecdippa (ez-Zīb) on the coast that they learned they were virtual prisoners.
In the meantime Pacorus the cupbearer was attempting to lure Herod outside the walls of Jerusalem in order to seize him. But Herod was suspicious, for ​he had heard of his brother's arrest; under cover of darkness he fled with most of his family, pursued by the Parthians. Herod and his supporters managed to hold both the Parthians and the hostile Jewish group at bay and eventually reached the stronghold of Masada (es-Sebbah) to the west of the Dead Sea. The Parthians pillaged Jerusalem and the surrounding country and laid waste the city of Mareshah or Marissa (Tell Sandaḥannah). Antigonus himself bit off the ears of Hyrcanus, so that his mutilated condition might prevent his ever again holding office. Phasael killed himself; Antigonus was made king in Jerusalem; and Hyrcanus was carried away to Parthia. By Parthian intervention a Jewish king again sat on the throne in the Holy City; the dream of re-establishing the kingdom had become a reality. The wide extent of Parthian influence, no doubt originally through trade relations and now through military strength, is demonstrated by the rapidity with which Malchus, king of the Nabataean Arabs, obeyed Parthian orders to expel Herod from his territory. This act later cost him a large sum of money. Practically all of the Asiatic possessions of Rome were now either ​in the hands of Parthia or were seriously threatened by her. Antony, though aware of the situation, took no decisive action during his voyage up the Syrian coast on his way to Greece, for war was on in Italy and his presence there was imperative.
In 39 b.c. Antony was sufficiently in control of the situation at home to begin a new campaign against the Parthians. He had sent Publius Ventidius Bassus in advance into Asia in 40 b.c., and this officer surprised Labienus with only a small body of local troops, for his Parthian allies were not present at that time. Labienus, unable to offer battle, was forced into Syria, where he was evidently cornered. Both the Romans and the troops of Labienus awaited reinforcements; for the former these were heavy-armed men, for the latter the Parthians. Both received the expected aid on the same day, but Ventidius wisely re​mained encamped on high ground where the Parthian horsemen could not operate effectively. Overconfident because of their previous success, the Parthians advanced without seeking to effect a junction with Labienus, and charged up the slope of the hill on which the Romans awaited them. The legions met them in a downrush that swept all before it. The Parthian survivors fled to Cilicia without attempting to join Labienus, who tried to escape at nightfall. His plans were betrayed by deserters; many of his troops were killed in ambush, and the remainder went over to the Romans. Again Labienus escaped, but soon afterward he was taken prisoner and put to death; thus ended the career of the man who chose to style himself "Imperator Parthicus."
Ventidius recovered Cilicia and then sent Pompaedius Silo with a troop of cavalry to secure the Amanus Gates, through which passed the road to Syria. This officer was unable to force the pass and ​was nearly destroyed by Pharnapates, the Parthian commander who was defending it. At the critical moment Ventidius came up with reinforcements and turned the tide in favor of the Romans. Pharnapates and most of his detachment were slain. Pacorus evidently then withdrew from Syria late in 39 b.c., and the country was occupied by Ventidius. Fighting continued sporadically in many quarters; Aradus offered prolonged resistance, and Ventidius encamped near Jerusalem for some time, though he did not attack the city. When he departed he left a detachment under Silo in the vicinity and turned northward to reduce those cities which still remained pro-Parthian.
Early in the spring of 38 b.c. Pacorus gathered his army together and again invaded Syria while the legions of Ventidius were yet in winter quarters beyond the Taurus in Cappadocia. The situation was none too free from danger of general uprising, for many of the Roman governors had mistreated the sub​ject peoples, while the Parthian administration under Pacorus was evidently popular. Confronted with such a situation, Ventidius had to act with caution. Knowing that Pharnaeus of Cyrrhestica, one of his allies, was secretly in league with the Parthians, he determined to use him to advantage. Ventidius treated him as though he had his entire confidence, but pretended to fear those very things which he most desired to bring about. In this way he caused Pharnaeus to give Pacorus an entirely false idea of the situation. Pacorus was told that the Romans hoped he would advance via Zeugma, along the ordinary and shortest route, for then they could avoid the Parthian archers in the hills; should the Parthians cross the Euphrates farther down, Ventidius was fearful of disaster. Pacorus, acting on this false information, led his troops by the long route through Cyrrhestica and spent forty days gathering material and building a bridge over the river, which at the chosen point was quite wide.
In the time thus gained Ventidius collected his troops and was ready for action three days before ​the arrival of the Parthians. Since he had not opposed the passage of the Euphrates, the Parthians supposed his forces to be inadequate and attempted an attack on his camp, which was located on high ground near Gindarus (Tell Jindaris), a little west of the ʿAfrīn River. The attacking force, composed of cavalry, was driven down the hill in confusion and slaughtered at the bottom by the heavy-armed men and slingers. In the midst of the mêlée Pacorus was slain, and with his death the Parthian forces melted away. A slightly different version is given by Justin, according to whom a part of the legions of Ventidius charged the Parthians, defeated, and pursued them. Pacorus, when he saw the Roman camp apparently defenseless, threw himself with the remainder of his troops upon it. The Roman reserves then advanced and cut to pieces the last of the Parthians, and Pacorus perished in this last struggle. Of the remaining Parthians, some were cut off and killed in an attempt to recross the bridge over the Euphrates, and some fled for refuge to Antiochus of Commagene, father-in-law of Orodes, who was now openly pro-Parthian. The head of Pacorus was displayed in the revolting ​cities of Syria, which are reported to have been thus induced to surrender.
Pacorus was evidently a man of great energy and unusual military genius, for his death was regarded by the Romans as a severe blow to Parthia and one which went far to redeem the disgrace of Carrhae. Under this prince Ctesiphon is said to have been enlarged by the immigration of many new citizens, fortified with walls, and given a Greek name.
Ventidius completed the subjugation of Syria, and the last chance of Parthian success for the time being at least was gone. Once rid of active opposition, Ventidius turned to punish those who had aided the Parthians. Antiochus of Commagene was besieged in Samosata until he offered to do the bidding of the Romans and to pay one thousand talents. But Antony, who by midsummer of 38 b.c. had nearly reached the scene of action, was filled with a desire to reap some of the glory for himself, refused the offer, and relieved Ventidius of the command. The faithful Herod hastened from Judea with reinforcements of infantry and cavalry; some of these were delayed by the Parthians, who controlled the road, but they fought their way through and arrived just be​fore the close of the siege. Unfortunately Antony was even less successful than his able lieutenant before the walls of Samosata, and he was at last constrained to accept three hundred talents in lieu of the original offer of a thousand.
Ventidius returned to Rome. Gaius Sosius was to take charge of Syria, and Publius Canidius Crassus was expected to subdue Armenia and then proceed northward to the Caucasus. In November, 38 b.c., Ventidius celebrated his triumph in Rome. Antony also was granted one, but did not live to enjoy it. Jerusalem fell in 37 b.c.; Antigonus was put to death, and Herod became king of the Jews.
The loss of his son Pacorus proved a great shock to the aged King Orodes and may have unbalanced his mind to some extent. With thirty sons to choose from, Orodes found it difficult to make up his mind. His selection of Phraates, the eldest of his eligible children, was most unfortunate, as the events which followed proved.
* ↑ Horace Epist. i. 18. 56–57 and Od. iv. 15. 6–8.
* ↑ Plut. Cicero 36. 1. On Cicero's governorship see also G. d'Hugues, Une province romaine sous la république (Paris, 1876).
* ↑ Cicero Ep. ad fam. iii. 3.
* ↑ Translations of dates of this period from the old Roman calendar are of dubious accuracy, as the calendar is known to have been seriously incorrect at this time.
* ↑ Cicero Ep. ad Att. v. 9. 1.
* ↑ Ibid. v. 11. 4.
* ↑ Ibid. v. 14. 1.
* ↑ Cicero De domo sua 60. Cf. the much later writer Boethius, who remarks (De consolatione philosophiae ii. 7. 30–34) that in the time of Cicero the Parthians feared Rome.
* ↑ Cicero Ep. ad Att. v. 16. 4.
* ↑ Cicero Ep. ad fam. xv. 4. 2.
* ↑ Cf. Ep. ad fam. xv. 3. 1, written to Cato on August 30, 51 b.c., with xv. 4. 3, also to Cato but written four months afterward.
* ↑ Pacorus apparently struck coins in his own name, although there is no numismatic evidence for a joint rule with his father; see p. 104, n. 43.
* ↑ Dio Cass. xl. 28; Cicero Ep. ad Att. v. 20. 3.
* ↑ Cicero Ep. ad fam. xv. 4. 7.
* ↑ Ibid. xv. 3. 1.
* ↑ Ibid. xv. 1. 1–2.
* ↑ Ibid. xv. 1. 2. The date is mistranslated by W. G. Williams in the Loeb edition.
* ↑ See PW s.v.
* ↑ Possibly ʿAin Dēbā, PW, art. "Syria," col. 1624.
* ↑ Cicero Ep. ad fam. xv. 1. 3–5 and Caelius ibid. viii. 5. 1.
* ↑ Cicero Ep. ad fam. xv. 1. 2 and 6 and Ep. ad Att. v. 18. 1–2. At a later date Deiotarus received the praise of the Senate; see Lucan De bell. civ. v. 54 f., and cf. Cicero Pro rege Deiotaro 1. 2.
* ↑ Dio Cass. xl. 28; Cicero Ep. ad fam. xv. 1 and 2. 3.
* ↑ Cicero Ep. ad fam. xv. 2. 1–2.
* ↑ Cicero Ep. ad Att. v. 18. 1. On the passage through Commagene see Caelius in Cicero Ep. ad fam. viii. 10. 1.
* ↑ Dio Cass. xl. 29; Cicero Ep. ad Att. v. 20. 3.
* ↑ Cicero Ep. ad fam. xv. 4. 7; PW, art. "Epiphaneia," No. 2.
* ↑ Cicero Ep. ad Att. v. 20. 2.
* ↑ Ibid. v. 21. 2.
* ↑ Malalas viii, p. 201; Strabo xvi. 2. 4; PW, art. "Antigoneia," No. 1. Not Tell Shaikh Ḥasan; see R. J. Braidwood, Mounds in the Plain of Antioch … (OIP XLVIII [Chicago, 1937]) 38, n. 2.
* ↑ Cicero Ep. ad Att. v. 20. 3–4. Cf. Dio Cass. xl. 29, who states that he was killed in the fighting. On this victory see also Frontinus Strat.
* ↑ Cicero Ep. ad Att. v. 21. 2.
* ↑ Cicero Ep. ad fam. xv. 4. 7 and Ep. ad Att. v. 21. 2; Dio Cass. xl. 30.
* ↑ Cicero Ep. ad fam. iii. 8. 10.
* ↑ Ibid. xv. 4. 8; cf. Ep. ad Att. v. 20. 5.
* ↑ Cicero Ep. ad Att. v. 21. 2.
* ↑ Ibid. v. 21. 2 and vi. 2. 6; Caelius in Cicero Ep. ad fam. viii. 7. 1.
* ↑ Caelius in Cicero Ep. ad fam. viii. 10. 2; Cicero Ep. ad Att. vi. 1. 3.
* ↑ Caesar Bell. Gall. viii. 54 f.; Plut. Pompey 56. 3 and Antony 35. 4; Lucan De bell. civ. ii. 474 f.
* ↑ Cicero Ep. ad Att. vi. 1. 14; vi. 4 f.; vi. 8. Caesar Bell. civ. iii. 31 says of the Parthians: "Bibulum in obsidione habuerant." Cf. also Livy Epit. cviii, which may refer to events as late as 50 b.c.
* ↑ Dio Cass. xl. 30. There is nothing in this account which directly implicates Pacorus. Cicero's failure to mention the incident is not strange, since his account closes at about this point. Cf. Tarn, "Tiridates II and the Young Phraates," Mélanges Gustave Glotz (Paris, 1932), II, 834 f.
* ↑ Justin xlii. 4. 5.
* ↑ Cicero Ep. ad fam. ii. 17. 3. His later references to the Parthians are few: Ep. ad Att. vi. 6; vii. 2 and 26; viii. 11.
* ↑ On the possibility of numismatic evidence for joint rule with Orodes see Wroth, Parthia, p. 88, No. 173 and n. 1, and p. 97, Nos. 1 f. and n. 1; cf. Gardner, Parthian Coinage, pp. 41 f. Tarn, loc. cit. would assign these coins to the young Phraates instead and date them about 26 b.c. On the absence of tetradrachms see McDowell, Coins from Seleucia, pp. 184 and 221.
* ↑ Caesar Bell. civ. iii. 82; Dio Cass. xli. 55; cf. also Lucan De bell. civ. ii. 633 and 637 f.
* ↑ Dio Cass. xlii. 2.
* ↑ Plut. Pompey 76. 4; Quintilian iii. 8. 33; Appian Bell. civ. ii. 83; Dio Cass. xlii. 2. 5; Vell. Pat. ii. 53. 1; Florus ii. 13. 51; cf. also Lucan De bell. civ. vii. 427 ff. and viii. 396 ff. On the proposed mission (probably imaginary) of Deiotarus to rouse the east for Pompey see Lucan De bell. civ. viii. 209 ff. and 331 ff.
* ↑ Cicero Ep. ad fam. xii. 19. 1 f.; PW, art. "Cornificius," No. 8.
* ↑ Cicero Ep. ad Att. xiv. 19. For further details see Adcock in CAH, IX, 714.
* ↑ Dio Cass. xlvii. 27; Appian Bell. civ. iv. 58 f.
* ↑ Dio Cass. xliii. 51.
* ↑ Suet. Augustus 8; Appian Bell. civ. iii. 9; Cicero Ep. ad Att. xiii. 27 and 31; Dio Cass. xlv. 3; Florus ii. 13. 94; Plut. Brutus 22. 2, Cicero 43, and Antony 16; Vell. Pat. ii. 59; Livy Epit. cxvii.
* ↑ Appian Bell. civ. ii. 110.
* ↑ Nic. Dam. De Caes. 16; Clayton M. Hall, Nicolaus of Damascus' Life of Augustus, p. 81, § 16, n. 3.
* ↑ Appian Bell. civ. iii. 24; Dio Cass. xlv. 9.
* ↑ Appian Bell. civ. iv. 58.
* ↑ Nic. Dam. De Caes. 18.
* ↑ Plut. Brutus 25.
* ↑ Suet. Julius 44; cf. Plut. Caesar 58.
* ↑ See Dio Cass. xliv. 15; Appian Bell. civ. ii. no; Plut. Caesar 60; Cicero De div. ii. 110; Suet. Julius 79. 3; all of whom cite the report that the Sibyl said the Parthians could be defeated only by a king. This was propaganda, of course, but it showed the Roman feeling toward the Parthians.
* ↑ Appian Bell. civ. iv. 63, 88, 99; cf. Justin xlii. 4. 7.
* ↑ Plut. Antony 25. 1.
* ↑ Dio Cass. xlviii. 24. 3.
* ↑ Appian Bell. civ. v. 9 f.
* ↑ Florus ii. 19; Dio Cass. xlviii. 24. 4; Vell. Pat. ii. 78; Livy Epit. cxxvii; Ruf. Fest. 18.
* ↑ Justin xlii. 4. 7; Dio Cass. xlviii. 25; Plut. Antony 28.
* ↑ G. F. Hill, Historical Roman Coins (London, 1909), pp. 128–31 and Pl. XIII 80. These coins bore on the obverse the head of Labienus and on the reverse a saddled and bridled horse. The assumption of such a title should mean a victory over the Parthians, but the Parthians were the allies of Labienus! It was evidently as difficult for contemporaries to understand this action as for us.
* ↑ Strabo xiv. 2. 24.
* ↑ Dio Cass. xlviii. 25–26.
* ↑ Tac. Ann. iii. 62.
* ↑ Plut. Antony 30.
* ↑ Strabo xii. 8. 9.
* ↑ Dio Cass. xlviii. 26; Josephus Ant. xiv. 330 ff., xx. 245, and Bell. i. 248 ff.
* ↑ Dio Cass. xlviii. 26 confuses Antigonus with Aristobulus, as xlviii. 41 and xlix. 22 of his own work, as well as the accounts of Josephus, prove.
* ↑ Cf. Strabo xvi. 2. 28; PW, art. "Drymos," No. 4. This may be a place name.
* ↑ Enoch 56:5–8; cf. also chap. 57. See Olmstead, "Intertestamental Studies," JAOS, LVI (1936), 255 f., for the dating.
* ↑ Cf. Lev. 21:16–23.
* ↑ Josephus Bell. i. 273 and 284 and Ant. xiv. 379 and 384 f.; Euseb. Hist. i. 6. 7; CSCO Syr., 3. ser., t. IV, Versio (1903–5), p. 83, lines 17–19. Cf. Edwyn Robert Bevan, Jerusalem under the High Priests (London, 1924), pp. 145 f.; James Darmesteter, "Les Parthes à Jérusalem," JA, 9. sér., IV (1894), 43–54.
* ↑ Josephus Bell. i. 276.
* ↑ Dio Cass. xlviii. 41.
* ↑ Dio Cass. xlviii. 27; Plut. Antony 30.
* ↑ Appian Bell. civ. v. 65, 75, 132 f.; Gellius Noct. Att. xv. 4; Victor De vir. ill. 85; Dio Cass. xlviii. 39–41 and xlix. 19–22; Eutrop. Brev. vii. 5; Florus ii. 19 f.; Frontinus Strat. i. 1. 6 and ii. 5. 36 f.; Tac. Germ. 37; Josephus Ant. xiv. 392–95 and 420 and Bell. i. 284–92; Justin xlii. 4. 7–11; Juvenal Sat. vii. 199; Livy Epit. cxxvii; Orosius vi. 18. 23; Pliny Hist. nat. vii. 135 (44); Plut. Antony 33 f.; Ruf. Fest. 18; Strabo xii. 2. 11, xiv. 2. 24, xvi. 2. 8; Val. Max. vi. 9. 9; Veil. Pat. ii. 78; Zonaras x. 18 and 22 f. Plutarch drew his information on Antony's movements from the accounts of Quintus Dellius, one of his officers; see Plut. Antony 59. Cf. also ibid. 25; Strabo xi. 13. 3; Horace Od. ii. 3; and the discussion in J, II D, pp. 623–25. It is doubtful whether Dellius covered the campaign of Ventidius; see O. Hirschfeld, "Dellius ou Sallustius," Mélanges Boissier (Paris, 1903), pp. 293–95.
* ↑ Appian Bell. civ. v. 65.
* ↑ Dio Cass. xlviii. 26 and 39–40; Strabo xiv. 2. 24. Rhosus (Arsus) seems to have begun a new era on its coinage with these victories of Ventidius in 39 b.c.; see George Macdonald, "A New Syrian Era," Journal international d'archéologie et numismatique, VI (1903), 47 f.
* ↑ Or Poppaedius; see notes in Boissevain's ed. of Dio Cass. at xlviii. 41.
* ↑ Dio Cass. xlviii. 41; Earnest Cary, ad loc., n. 1, states that the Cilician Gates are meant. That is obviously an error, since the Cilician Gates are located in the Taurus Mountains, whereas Dio clearly refers to a pass in the Amanus on the border between Cilicia and Syria. Rawlinson, Sixth Mon., p. 190 and n. 2, suggests the Syrian Gates, on the basis of Strabo xvi. 2. 8; the reference in n. 2 is incorrect, for Strabo xv. 2. 8 refers to the Caspian Gates, hundreds of miles to the east. The Amanus Gates, just north of Epiphanea in Cilicia, are the most probable.
* ↑ Cf. Frontinus Strat. ii. 5. 37, who was probably drawing from Livy. Frontinus' account does not correspond with the others and may not refer to the same engagement or commander, whose name he gives as Pharnastanes; Dio Cass. xlviii. 41, Phranapates; Strabo xvi. 2. 8, Phranicates; Plut. Antony 33, Phar- or Phranapates.
* ↑ Dio Cass. xlviii. 41; Plut. Antony 33. The "tablelike hill" in Strabo xvi. 2. 8 may have been a tell.
* ↑ Josephus Bell. i. 288 f.
* ↑ Ibid. i. 291.
* ↑ Dio Cass. xlix. 19.
* ↑ Frontinus Strat. i. 1. 6.
* ↑ Dio Cass. xlviii. 24.
* ↑ Ibid. xlix 20; cf. also the tenacity with which Aradus supported the Parthians.
* ↑ Frontinus Strat. i. 1. 6; Dio Cass. xlix. 19 gives Χανναῖον. Frontinus is equally reliable and at least a full century closer to the events recorded. The form Pharnaeus is more probable, since it contains the Iranian element Phar.
* ↑ Strabo xvi. 2. 8.
* ↑ Frontinus Strat. i. 1. 6.
* ↑ Dio Cass. xlix. 20, followed by Rawlinson, Sixth Mon., pp. 191 f., who did not know of the details in Frontinus; Josephus Bell. i. 317 and Ant. xiv. 434; Tac. Hist. v. 9. Florus ii. 19. 6 mentions a Parthian force of 20,000, possibly this one. See also Vell. Pat. ii. 78. 1 and Moses Chor. ii. 19.
* ↑ Justin xlii. 4. 7–10.
* ↑ Dio Cass. xlix. 23.
* ↑ Dio Cass. xlix. 20; Florus ii. 19; Plut. Antony 34; Strabo xvi. 2. 8. Cf. Eutrop. Brev. vii. 5, who says the battle was fought on the same day as Carrhae, that is about May 6.
* ↑ Tac. Germ. 37; cf. also Horace Od. iii. 6. 9 ff.
* ↑ Amm. Marcel. xxiii. 23.
* ↑ Plut. Antony 34; Josephus Ant. xiv. 439–47 and Bell. i. 321 f.; Dio Cass. xlix. 20 f. Can this be the treaty mentioned in Florus ii. 20. 1?
* ↑ The speech in which he proclaimed his victories was borrowed from C. Sallustius, according to Fronto Epist. ii. 1. 5 (Loeb, II, p. 137). On Ventidius see Suetonius in Gellius Noct. Att. xv. 4. On the triumph see Fasti triumphales populi Romani, ed. E. Pais (Rome, 1920), F. Tr. 715/39; CIL, I 1, p. 461, a.u.c. 716; Vell. Pat. ii. 65.
* ↑ Justin xliii. 4. 11–16; Dio Cass. xlix. 23.