# The Discovery of a World in the Moone/Chapter 3

Proposition 2.
Tis reported of Aristotle when hee saw the books of Moses he commended them for such a majesticke stile as might become a God, but withall hee censured that manner of writing to be very unfitting for a Philosopher because there was nothing proved in them, but matters were delivered as if they would rather command than perswade beliefe. And 'tis observed that hee sets down nothing himself, but he confirmes it by the strongest reasons that may be found, there being scarce an argument of force for any subject in Philosophy which may not bee picked out of ​his writings, and therefore 'tis likely if there were in reason a necessity of one onely world, that hee would have found out some such necessary proofe as might confirme it: Especially since hee labours for it so much in two whole Chapters. But now all the arguments which he himselfe urges in this subject, are very weake and farre enough from having in them any convincing power. Therefore 'tis likely that a plurality of worlds doth not contradict any principle of reason. However, I will set downe the two chiefe of his arguments from his owne works, and from them you may guesse the force of the other. The 1 is this, since every heavy body doth naturally tend downwards, and every light body upwards, what a hudling and confusion must there bee if there were two places for gravity and two places for lightneffe: for it ​is probable that the Earth of that other World would fall downe to this Center, and so mutually the aire and fire here ascend to those Regions in the other, which must needes much derogate from the providence of nature, and cause a great disorder in his workes. To this I answere, that if you will consider the nature of gravity, you will plainely see there is no ground to feare any such confusion, for heavinesse is nothing else but such a quality as causes a propension in its subject to tend downwards towards its owne Centre, so that for some of that earth to come hither would not bee said a fall but an ascension, since it moved from its owne place, and this would bee impossible (saith Ruvi) ) because against nature, and therefore no more to bee feared than the falling of the Heavens.
​Another Argument hee had from his master Plato, that there is but one World, because there is but one first mover, God.
But here I may deny the consequence, since a plurality of worlds doth not take away the unity of the first mover. Vt enim forma substantialis, sic primum efficiens apparentem solummodo multiplicitatem induit per signatam materiam (saith a Countreyman of ours.) As the substantiall forme, so the efficient cause hath onely an appearing multiplicity from its particular matter. You may see this point more largely handled, and these Arguments more fully answered by Plutarch in his Booke (why Oracles are silent) and Iacob Carpentarius in his comment on Alcinous.
But our opposites the Interpreters themselves, (who too often doe jurare in verba magistri) will grant that there is not any ​strength in these consequences, and certainely their such weake arguments could not convince that wise Philosopher, who in his other opinions was wont to bee swayed by the strength and power of reason: wherefore I should rather thinke that he had some by-respect, which made him first assent to this opinion, and afterwards strive to prove it. Perhaps it was because hee feared to displease his scholler Alexander, of whom ’tis related that he wept to heare a disputation of another world, since he had not then attained the Monarchy of this, his restlesse wide heart would have esteemed this Globe of Earth not big enough for him, if there had beene another, which made the Satyrist say of him,
Æstuat infœlix angusto limite mundi.
"That he did vexe himselfe and sweate in his desires, as being pend up in a narrow roome, ​when hee was confin’d but to one world." Before he thought to seate himselfe next the Gods, but now when hee had done his best, hee must be content with some equall, or perhaps superiour Kings.
It may be, that Aristotle was moved to this opinion, that hee might thereby take from Alexander the occasion of this feare and discontent, or else, perhaps, Aristotle himselfe was as loth to hold the possibility of a world which he could not discover, as Alexander was to heare of one which he could not conquer. Tis likely that some such by-respect moved him to this opinion, since the arguments he urges for it are confest by his zealous followers and commentators, to be very sleight and frivolous, and they themselves grant, what I am now to prove, that there is not any evidence in the light of naturall reason, which can ​sufficiently manifest that there is but one world.
But however some may object, would it not be inconvenient and dangerous to admit of such opinions that doe destroy those principles of Aristotle, which all the world hath so long followed?
This question is much controverted by the Romish Divines; Campanella hath writ a Treatise in defence of it, in whom you may see many things worth the reading and notice.
To it I answer, that this position in Philosophy, doth not bring any inconvenience to the rest, since tis not Aristotle, but truth that should be the rule of our opinions, and if they be not both found together, wee may say to him, as hee said to his Master Plato, ἀμφοῖν γὰρ ὄντοιν φίλοιν, ὅσιον προτιμᾶν τὴν ἀλήθειαν. Though "Plato were his friend, yet hee would rather adhere to truth than him."
​I must needs grant, that wee are all much beholden to the industry of the ancient Philosophers, and more especially to Aristotle, for the greater part of our learning, but yet tis not ingratitude to speake against him, when hee opposeth truth; for then many of the Fathers would be very guilty, especially Iustin, who hath writ a Treatise purposely against him.
But suppose this opinion were false, yet ’tis not against the faith, and so it may serve for the better confirmation of that which is true; the sparkes of errour, being forc’d out by opposition, as the sparkes of fire, by the striking of the flint and steele. But suppose too that it were hereticall, and against the faith, yet may it be admitted with the same priviledge as Aristotle, from whom many more dangerous opinions have proceeded: as that the world is ​eternall, that God cannot have while to looke after these inferiour things, that after death there is no reward or punishment, and such like blasphemies, which strike directly at the fundamentalls of our Religion.
So that it is justly to be wondred why some should be so superstitious in these daies, as to sticke closer unto him, than unto Scripture, as if his Philosophy were the onely foundation of all divine truths.
Upon these grounds both St. Vincentius and Senafinus de firmo (as I have seene them quoted) thinke that Aristotle was the viol of Gods wrath, which was powred out upon the waters of Wisedome by the third Angel; But for my part, I thinke the world is much beholden to Aristotle for all it sciences. But yet twere a shame for these later ages to rest our selves meerely upon the labours of our Fore-fathers, ​as if they had informed us of all things to be knowne, and when wee are set upon their shoulders, not to see further then they themselves did. 'Twere a superstitious, a lazie opinion to thinke Aristotles workes the bounds and limits of all humane invention, beyond which there could be no possibility of reaching. Certainly there are yet many things left to discovery, and it cannot be any inconvenience for us, to maintaine a new truth, or rectifie an ancient errour.
But the position (say some) is directly against Scripture, for
1. Moses tells us but of one world, and his History of the creation had beene very imperfect if God had made another.
2. Saint John speaking of Gods workes, saies he made the world, in the singular number, and therefore there is but one: 'tis the argument of Aquinas, and he thinks that none will oppose it, but such ​who with Democritus esteeme some blinde chance, and not any wise providence to be the framer of all things.
3. The opinion of more worlds has in ancient time beene accounted a heresie, and Baronius affirmes that for this very reason, Virgilius was cast out of his Bishopricke, and excommunicated from the Church.
4. A fourth argument there is urged by Aquinas, if there be more worlds than one, then they must either be of the same, or of a diverse nature, but they are not of the same kinde, for this were needlesse, and would argue an improvidence, since one would have no more perfection than the other; not of divers kinds, for then one of them could not be called the world or universe, since it did not containe universall perfection, I have cited this argument, because it is so much stood upon by Iulius Cæsar la Galla, one that has ​purposely writ a Treatise against this opinion which I now deliver, but the Dilemma is so blunt, that it cannot cut on either side, and the consequences so weake, that I dare trust them without an answer; And (by the way) you may see this Author in that place, where he endeavours to prove a necessity of one world, doth leave the chiefe matter in hand, and take much needlesse paines to dispute against Democritus, who thought that the world was made by the casuall concourse of atoms in a great vacuum. It should seeme, that either his cause, or his skill was weake, or else he would have ventured upon a stronger adversary. These arguments which I have set downe, are the chiefest which I have met with against this subject, and yet the best of these hath not force enough to endanger the truth that I have delivered.
Unto the two first it may be ​answered, that the negative authority of Scripture is not prevalent in those things which are not the fundamentalls of Religion.
But you’le reply, though it doe not necessarily conclude, yet 'tis probable if there had beene another world, wee should have had some notice of it in Scripture.
I answer, 'tis as probable that the Scripture should have informed us of the Planets they being very remarkable parts of the Creation, and yet neither Moses nor Job, nor the Psalmes (the places most frequent in Astronomicall observations) mention any of them but the Sunne and Moone, and moreover, you must know, that 'tis besides the scope of the Holy Ghost either in the new Testament or in the old, to reveale any thing unto us concerning the secrets of Philosophy; 'tis not his intent in the new Testament, since ​we cannot conceive how it might any way belong either to the Historicall exegeticall or propheticall parts of it: nor is it his intent in the old Testament, as is well observed by our Countrey-man Master Wright. Non Moses aut Prophetarum institutum fuisse videtur Mathematicas aliquas aut Physicas subtilitates promulgare, sed ad vulgi captum & loquendi morem quemadmodum nutrices infantulis solent sese accommodare. "’Tis not the endeavour of Moses or the Prophets to discover any Mathematicall or Philosophicall subtilties, but rather to accomodate themselves to vulgar capacities, and ordinary speech, as nurses are wont to use their infants." True indeede, Moses is there to handle the history of the Creation, but 'tis observed that he does not any where meddle with such matters as were very hard to be apprehended, for being to informe the common people as well ​as others, he does it after a vulgar way, as it is commonly noted, declaring the originall chiefely of those things which were obvious to the sense, and being silent of other things, which then could not well be apprehended. And therefore Aquinas observes, that Moses writes nothing of the aire, because that being invisible, the people knew not whether there were any such body or no. And for this very reason Saint Austin also thinkes that there is nothing exprest concerning the creation of Angels which notwithstanding are as remarkable parts of the creatures, and as fit to be knowne as another world. And therefore the Holy Ghost too uses such vulgar expressions which set things forth rather as they appeare, then as they are, as when he calls the Moone one of the greater lights המארת הגדלים whereas ’tis the least, but one that wee can see in the whole heavens. ​So afterwards speaking of the great raine which drowned the world, he saies, the windowes of heaven were opened, because it seemed to come with that violence, as if it were, poured out from windows in the Firmament. So that the phrases which the Holy Ghost uses concerning these things are not to be understood in a literall sense; but rather as vulgar expressions, and this rule is set downe by Saint Austin, where speaking concerning that in the Psalme, who stretched the earth upon the waters, hee notes, that when the words of Scripture shall seeme to contradict common sense or experience, there are they to be understood in a qualified sense, and not according to the letter. And 'tis observed that for want of this rule, some of the ancients have fastened strange absurdities upon the words of the Scripture. So Saint Ambrose esteemed it a heresie, to thinke, that the Sunne ​and starres were not very hot, as being against the words of Scripture, Psalm. 19. 6. where the Psalmist sayes that there is nothing that is hid from the heate of the Sunne. So others there are that would prove the heavens not to be round, out of that place, Psal. 104. 2. Hee stretcheth out the heavens like a curtaine. So Procopius also was of opinion, that the earth was founded upon the waters, nay, he made it part of his faith, proving it out of Psal. 24. 2. Hee hath founded the earth upon the seas, and established it upon the flouds. These and such like absurdities have followed, when men looke for the grounds of Philosophie in the words of Scripture. So that from what hath beene said, I may conclude that the silence of Scripture concerning any other world is not sufficient argument to prove that there is none. Thus for the two first arguments.
​Unto the third, I may answer, that this very example is quoted by others, to shew the ignorance of those primative times, who did sometimes condemne what they did not understand, and have often censur’d the lawfull & undoubted parts of Mathematiques for hereticall, because they themselves could not perceive a reason of it, and therefore their practise in this particular, is no sufficient testimony against us.
But lastly I answer to all the above named objections, that the terme World, may be taken in a double sense, more generally for the whole Universe, as it implies in it the elementary and æthereall bodies, the starres and the earth. Secondly, more particularly for an inferiour World consisting of elements. Now the maine drift of all these arguments, is to confute a plurality of worlds in the first sense, and if there were any such, it might, perhaps, seeme strange, ​that Moses, or S$^t$. John should either not know, or not mention its creation. And Virgilius was condemned for this opinion, because he held, quòd sit alius mundus sub terrâ, aliusque Sol & Luna, (as Baronius) that within our globe of earth, there was another world, another Sunne and Moone, and so he might seeme to exclude this from the number of the other creatures.
But now there is no such danger in this opinion, which is here delivered, since this world said to be in the Moone, whose creation is particularly exprest.
So that in the first sense I yeeld, that there is but one world, which is all that the arguments do prove, but understand it in the second sense, and so I affirme there may be more nor doe any of the above named objections prove the cõtrary.
Neither can this opinion derogate from the divine Wisdome (as Aquinas thinkes) but rather ​advance it, shewing a compendium of providence, that could make the same body a world, and a Moone; a world for habitation, and a Moone for the use of others, and the ornament of the whole frame of Nature. For as the members of the body serve not onely for the preservation of themselves, but for the use and conveniency of the whole, as the hand protects the head as well as saves it selfe, so is it in the parts of the Universe, where each one may serve as well for the conservation of that which is within it, as the helpe of others without it.
I have now in some measure, shewed that a plurality of worlds does not contradict any principle of reason or place of Scripture, and so cleared the first part of that supposition which is applied in the opinion.
It may next be enquired; whether ’tis possible there may be a globe of elements in that which ​we call the æthereall parts of the Universe; for if this (as it is according to the common opinion) be priviledged from any change or corruption, it will be in vaine then to imagine any element there, and if we will have another world, we must then seeke out some other place for its situation. The third Proposition therefore shall be this.
* ↑ De Cælo l. 1. c. 8. 9.
* ↑ Ibid.
* ↑ De cælo l. i. c. 9. q. 1.
* ↑ Metaphys. l. 12. c. 8
* ↑ Diog. Laert. lib. 3
* ↑ Nic. Hill. de Philosop. Epic partic. 379.
* ↑ Plutarch. de tranq. anim.
* ↑ Iuvenal.
* ↑ Apologia pro Galilæo.
* ↑ Ethic. l. 1. c. 6.
* ↑ Rev. 16. 4.
* ↑ Part 1. Q. 47. Art. 3.
* ↑ Annal. Eccl. A.D. 748.
* ↑ Ibid.
* ↑ De Phænom. in orbe lunæ.
* ↑ In Epist. ad Gilbert.
* ↑ Part 1. Q. 68. Art. 3.
* ↑ Gen. 1. 16
* ↑ Gen. II.
* ↑ Sr. W. Rawly c. 7. §. 6.
* ↑ l. 2. in Gen.
* ↑ Psal. 136. 6.
* ↑ Wisd. 2. 4. 17. 5.
* ↑ Ecclus. 43. 3. 4.
* ↑ Com. in c. 1. Gen.
* ↑ Cusanus de doct. ignor. l. 2. c. 12.