# CHAPTER 13: ENCIRCLEMENT

The Soviets developed their encirclement technique to deal withopposing mechanized forces. If enemy soldiers abandoned their vehi-cles to escape the encirclement, the result was still the same—themechanized force was defeated. The Mujahideen were not mechanizedand they discovered that the Soviet encirclement was usually porousand that the Soviet/DRA force did not have enough dismountedinfantry to hold them in the pocket, particularly when it got dark.However, the Soviets and DRA routinely conducted large-scale encir-clements, as part of cordon and search operations, and occasionalsmaller tactical encirclements of marauding bands.

## VIGNETTE 1A TRIP TO THE "GOVERNOR'S HOUSE" GOES BAD

BY COMMANDER SARSHAR
The governor of Parwan Province had his residence in the city ofCharikar. It was located next to the Numan High School. There wasalso a security post in an enclosed house next to the governor's resi-dence and the high school. This post was called the Wali house andthere were normally 30 soldiers in it. Everyone called the security post"the Governor's House", although it was not. In January 1983, weplanned a raid on this security post (No map). I had about 200Mujahideen armed with a 76mm mountain gun, five 82mm mortars,two 82mm recoilless rifles, 20 RPG-7s, Goryunov heavy machine guns,PK medium machine guns and Kalashnikov rifles. This was a severewinter and we moved across the mountains at night in the bitter cold.We came to the village of Ofian-e Sharif where we spent the day andplanned our raid. I constituted a heavy weapons support team servingthe 76mm gun, the mortars and the recoilless rifles. I constituted twosecurity groups—one of which would secure the area to the northbehind the heavy weapons support team and one to the south whichwould secure the approaches to Numan High School. I constituted anassault team to seize the outpost. At night, we moved from Ofian-e Sharif onto the Ofian plain out-side another security post at Qal-e Maqbul, which is just north of thetarget in Charikar. I launched the attack at night, but right as theassault group was moving forward in the attack, the mortar and recoil-less rifle rounds landed in the middle of the assault group. I had 18KIA and WIA. I aborted the attack and began evacuating the dead andwounded. Coincidently, the enemy had planned a major cordon andsearch operation which began the next morning. Early the next morn-ing, the enemy moved through the area and cordoned it off with hun-dreds of tanks and APCs. They encircled hundreds of Mujahideen inthe Bagram, Kohistan and Charikar area. We were trapped in our position.
Commander Sarshar was a police officer in Parwan and worked clandestinely with theMujahideen: When his cover was about to be blown, he became a Mujahideen comman-der in Ghorband. He commanded a mobile grOup in the Ghorband front near Charikar.[Map sheet 2887].
1 There is no map for this vignette. This operation is describe in Chapter 10, Vignette 4,"Defending Against a Cordon and Search Operation in Parwan" by Commander Haji AbdulQader.
Chapter 13, Vignette 1 Page 357
As the enemy approached us, we were glad to have the 20RPGs. We joined the local Mujahideen in the fray. The battle went onfor 12 days and we killed 1.2 armored vehicles during that time. Wetried to break out of the encirclement. We moved through the villagesto Pul-e Matak at the mouth of the Ghorband Valley. There, we exfil-trated through gaps in the enemy lines to the Ghorband Valley. Wehad 18 killed and two wounded. We destroyed 12 armored vehicles andfour supply trucks. During the 12-15 days that the Soviets and DRAcordoned the area, they succeeded in entering many parts of the areaand clearing it. Many Mujahideen managed to escape, but the Sovietsand DRA arrested about 800 Mujahideen and civilians in the area. COMMENTARY: Coordination of fire and maneuver elements is a prob-lem for trained armies. It is a bigger problem for irregular forces. Inthis case, the Mujahideen fire support fell short of the target withdeadly results. Although Mujahideen gunners who conducted regularshelling attacks against fixed targets were able to register theirweapons over time, Mujahideen gunners supporting ground attacksseldom had the luxury of registering their weapons prior to the attack.This added greater risk to the assault force.
Page 358 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

## VIGNETTE 2: THE BATTLE FOR MUSA OALEH

BY AKHUND ZADA QASEM
We started the resistance using very simple methods. We had fewantitank weapons and so our main defenses were antitank ditches andMolotov cocktails that we made in the villages. The people would waitin their antitank ditches with axes to sort it out. I remember one fightwhere I became so frustrated with our inability to stop armored vehi-cles that I set my turban on fire and threw it at the tank. However, weeventually received better weapons and set about regaining control ofour country. In the summer of 1980, we Mujahideen liberated MusaQaleh District and established our base there. (Map 13-1 - Qaleh)Musa Qaleh is in a heavily-populated green zone on the Musa QalehStream which empties into the Helmond River. The area around MusaQaleh is high desert plain.
In June 1983, the Soviets launched an offensive to control HelmondProvince. They began with an attack from Girishk moving northtoward Nawzad (which is to the west of Musa Qaleh). This columnattacked the Mujahideen of HIH at their base in the Farhad Mountain.The Mujahideen of Musa Qaleh sent their MRL to this fight to strikethe Soviets. After the Soviets reduced the HIH base, they sent twocolumns to attack Musa Qaleh. The column that had destroyed theHIH base turned east and moved against us while a second columnmoved from Girishk along the river roads and approached us from thesouthwest. The columns met and cordoned Musa Qaleh.
We had established a perimeter defense and we fought the Sovietsfor seven days in late June and early July 1983. We lost 472Mujahideen KIA. Civilian deaths were much higher. I was in chargeof the hospital at that time and it was overflowing. During the fight-ing, Soviet tanks arrived from the east and were just 300 meters south.
Akhund Zada Qasem was a commander with Harakat-e Ingilab-i Islami (HAR) of MawlawiNabi Mohammadi. He was also in charge of medical support to the Musa Qaleh Front inHelmond Province. This was a major Mujahideen stronghold under the late MawlawiNasim Akhund Zada. Akhund Zada was one of the major Mujahideen regional comman-ders. After his assassination in 1986, his brother Mawlawi Sediq Akhund Zada took over.This front was in control of much of Helmond Province during the war and was one of thefew major unified Mujahideen commands. The front was supported by and became richfrom the drug trade. Qasem was in charge of medical support and was a member of thecounsel of the command. [Map sheet 1981].
Page 360 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War
of my hospital. They began shelling the hospital and I had to evacuatethe wounded. We managed to move the hospital outside of the cor-doned area to the 'north at night. We carried the wounded on stretch-ers for about 500 meters where we were met by other Mujahideen fromthe Baghran front. The Baghran front sent trucks and moved ourwounded to safety on the trucks. After I evacuated the wounded, Ireturned to Musa Qaleh at about 2200 hours. The front council metand we decided to break out -of the encirclement. That night, theweather cooperated with the breakout. There was a heavy gusty windwhich blew sand around. The noise of the wind and the dust concealedus as we moved between the enemy tanks. There were manyMujahideen in that cordon. There were Mujahideen from two districtsand other areas as well. About 2,000 Mujahideen escaped into thenight. The dust and wind also helped the civilians exfiltrate and cov-ered their escape. When we got out, the wind died down. Later on,people said that this was the hand of God that got them out. TheMujahideen went to the surrounding mountains. I went to Kohe MusaQaleh, the small mountain just north of Musa Qaleh.
After this heavy defeat, we decided to keep a presence in MusaQaleh but to establish a mountain base where we would keep ourheavy weapons, ammunition stocks and supplies. We set up ourmountain base in Ghulmesh Ghar (mountain) about 30 kilometersnortheast of Kajaki dam. The base was in a narrow canyon leadinginto the mountain. The canyon opened up into a bowl in the mountain.The canyon was about 10 kilometers deep. We protected this base withZGU-ls and DShKs. We named the base Islamabad (built byMuslims).
The following year, in October 1984, the Soviets attackedIslamabad. They sent a major column from Girishk and again laidsiege to Musa Qaleh, while another moved further north and attackedIslamabad. There were few Mujahideen in the mountain base sincethe majority were in Musa Qaleh. The Soviets landed air assaulttroops on the high ground and attacked with the ground column to cap-ture the base after three day's fighting. They destroyed the base andleft it unusable due to all the mines that they left behind.
We then moved our base and stores to Khanjak Mazar south ofKalata-e .Baghni. We distributed our ammunition to different basesand districts so that the capture of our central base would not crippleus completely.
Chapter 13, Vignette 2 Page 361

### COMMENTARY:

The area around Musa Qaleh is open, flat tank country and the Soviets were able to move freely around the perimeter of thegreen zone. The Mujahideen field fortifications within the green zoneenabled them to hold on for seven days, but at a very high price. TheMujahideen wanted to control Musa Qaleh for its political value as adistrict capital. The political considerations overrode the military andthe front still kept the bulk of its force there once they had built astrong mountain base.

## VIGNETTE 3: ESCAPE FROM THE ARGHANDAY ENCIRCLEMENT

BY COMMANDER HAJI MOHAMMAD SEDDIQ
In July 1986, I took a detachment of 13 Mujahideen to abduct a DRA officer from his house in the western Kot-e Sangi section of Kabul.For several days, we gathered information about the officer—his timeof arrival and departure from his house and the road he took to and from his residence. We gathered the information with the help of a contact at. the Kot-e Sangi gas station. We discovered that the officer did not stay at his residence overnight, but spent a few hours in the evening at home and then returned to his unit. We decided to abduct him during those hours he was at his house.
We spent the night in the nearby Deh-Bori section of Kabul. The next day, at dusk, we met with our gas station contact who reported that the officer was at his residence. I took three men who were dressed in army uniform with me. I had on traditional clothing. We went to the officer's home which was located between Qala-e Shadasecurity outpost and the Kot-e Sangi Police station. When we reached the house, the uniformed Mujahideen knocked on the door. The officer's daughter answered the door. One of the Mujahideen told her that there was an urgent message for the officer from his unit. A few min-utes later, the officer came to the door. As he stepped out, I stepped around from behind the corner and told him to follow us and make no attempt to escape because we would shoot him on the spot. The officer and I knew each other and he recognized me. He was nervous but made no attempt to escape. We escorted him through the streets to Qala-e Shada and from there to the Mujahideen base at Arghanday. At Arghanday, we turned the officer over to a Paghman commander named Zahed. The officer supposedly had killed several Mujahideen from Zahed's group.
Haji Mohammad Seddiq is from No-Burja Village in Logar Province. The village is in the Tangi-Wardak area which connects the Saydabad District of Wardak Province to the Baraki Barak District in the Logar Province. Commander Seddiq's village is located on the border between the two provinces. Therefore, his command fought in both provinces in coordination with other Mujahideen. Commander Haji Mohammad Seddiq was affiliated with Hekmatyar's HIH. [ Map sheet 2785]. Page 364 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War
We spent the night at the residence/base of Shafeh, a local com-mander. Early the next morning, at about 0400 hours, we woke up to the noise, of tanks approaching the village (Map 13-2 - Arghanday). At first, we thought that the noise was from normal military traffic resupplying the security outposts along the Kabul-Ghazni highway. Then Shafeh's father climbed to the roof top and saw that the village was surrounded by tanks and other vehicles. Soviet soldiers and DRA militia men from Rashid Dostum's Militia group occupied the surrounding hills. We were trapped. Shafeh took us to a hideout near the house.It was a cave that they had dug to hide the Mujahideen during the enemy's cordon and search operations. After a while, we heard movement and noticed that the Soviet/DRA search party had posted a guard at the entrance of the cave. The guard called out and asked if there was some one inside. Then he asked for anyone inside to come out.Next, he stooped over to check out the cave. At that point, Mam Gul(who we nicknamed the Uzbek—because he looked like an Uzbek) shot the soldier. The soldier's body fell into the cave. We pulled his body aside and rushed out of the cave. As we came out, we encountered soldiers in the streets. We fought our way to a natural ditch at theedge of the village. We jumped in the ditch and faced in both directions. We all hadAK-47s plus one RPG-7. We fought from this position until 1300 hours.At that time, some Mujahideen units at Kot-e Ashro, about 10 kilo-meters to the southwest, started shelling the area with BM-12 fire.The rockets' explosions forced the enemy away from the south side of the village. We took advantage of this and slipped out of the encirclement through the southern gap and fled to Kot-e Ashro through themountains. One of my Mujahideen was wounded.

### CHAPTER COMMENTARY

The porous nature of the Soviet and DRA encirclement allowed the Mujahideen to exfiltrate. It helped to have other distracters such as incoming artillery, sand storms and nightfall to escape. The Mujahideen were skilled exfiltrators and often small groups of Soviets or DRA guarding the cordon would allow the Mujahideen to escape rather than risk a fire fight at uneven odds. The Soviets resorted to scatterable mines, ground sensors, parachute flares and other technology to prevent escapes, but Mujahideen groups would exfiltrate singly,or in small groups, and regroup outside the encirclement.