# Barnes v. District of Columbia

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United States Supreme Court
91 U.S. 540
Barnes v. District of Columbia
ERROR to the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia.
This is an action to recover damages for a personal injury received by the plaintiff on the 14th of October, 1871, in consequence of the defective condition of one of the streets of the city of Washington. The accident occurred on K Street east, and arose from the construction of the Baltimore and Potomac Railroad through that street. The road was built by permission of the corporation, and authority was given to the company to change the grade of the streets according to a plan filed. In making this change, a deep pit or excavation was made, into which the plaintiff fell. The questions touching the plaintiff's injury, the defective condition of the street, and the negligence of those having it in charge, were submitted to the jury, and the issue upon each of them was found in favor of the plaintiff. The verdict of the jury, by which they awarded to him the sum of three thousand five hundred dollars as damages, besides his costs, and the judgment thereon, were set aside at the general term of the Supreme Court of the District, and judgment was ordered in favor of the defendant. From this judgment the present writ of error was brought.
Mr. Edwin L. Stanton for the defendant in error.
The charter of the old corporation having been repealed by the act of Feb. 21, 1817, its ordinance granting permission to the railroad company to construct its road was irrelevant in this case, as the District of Columbia is not responsible for the acts of that corporation. The right to pass along the streets having, independently of the municipal ordinance, been granted by Congress to the company, it was obliged to conform to the grade of the streets, unless Congress authorized a different level. The District had no power whatever to act in the matter.
Whether this action is maintainable against the District of Columbia depends upon the terms and conditions of its charter. Weightman v. Corporation of Washington, 1 Black, 50.
Prior to the passage of the act of Feb. 21, 1871, the corporation of the city of Washington had, under congressional enactments, full power and authority to open and keep in repair the streets, alleys, &c., agreeably to the plan of the city; but this act intrusts no control whatever over the streets and avenues to the new corporation, but vests it in a Federal commission authorized to make all regulations which it might deem necessary for keeping them in repair. The act prescribed the powers of the board of public works as distinctly as it did those of other officers, and made it independent of the legislative assembly in respect to the authority committed to it by Congress.
That this entire control of the streets and avenues, with power to make all regulations which it should deem necessary for keeping the same in repair, was committed to the board of public works, not as a department or subordinate agency of the municipality called the District of Columbia, but as a Federal commission, is clearly shown by the legislation of Congress. Its members were appointed by the President of the United States, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. The acts of May 8, 1872 (17 Stat. 74), and March 3, 1873 (id. 499, 500), and sect. 76 of the Revised Statutes relating to the District of Columbia, providing for the salaries of the members of the board of public works and other officers of the District, enact that no part of the sums thereby appropriated shall be paid to any member of such board 'who shall hold any other Federal office,' or 'who is paid a salary for the discharge of the duties of any other Federal office, under the government of the United States.'
The act of June 20, 1874 (18 Stat. 116), abolishing the office of governor, secretary, board of public works, delegate in Congress, and also the legislative assembly, distinguishes between the accounting officers, other officials, laborers, employes, and the indebtedness of the District, and those of the board of public works. This distinction is also made by the acts of Congress of June 10, 1872 (17 Stat. 350, 351), April 20, 1871 (id. 7), Jan. 8, 1873 (id. 405, 406), and June 23, 1874 (18 id. 210).
The conclusion is thus reached, that by the act of Feb. 21, 1871, the entire control ever the streets and avenues, which are the property of the United States, was given to a Federal commission, with exclusive power to make such regulations at it might deem necessary for keeping the same in repair.
Liability on the part of municipal corporation for the neglect or omission of a corporate duty springs from the particular nature of the duty enjoined, and from the means given for its performance, which must be ample. The duty must relate to the local interests of the municipality, and be imperative, and not discretionary or judicial. Weightman v. The Corporation of Washington, 1 Black, 50; Dill. on Munic. Corp., sect. 765.
Here the duty was not enjoined, nor were the means given. Therefore the liability for injury resulting from neglect of duty, if it exists at all, must appear, upon a fair review of the charter or statutes, to rest upon the municipal corporation an such, and not upon it as an agency of the State, nor upon its officers as independent public officers. Dill. on Munic. Corp., sects. 772, 789; Child v. City of Boston, 4 Allen, 41; Walcott v. Swampscott, 1 id. 101; Martin v. Mayor of Brooklyn, 1 Hill, 550; Detroit v. Blakely, 21 Mich. 84; 9 Am. Law Reg. 680, n.
Mr. W. D. Davidge and Mr. R. K. Elliot, contra.
MR. JUSTICE HUNT delivered the opinion of the court.

## Notes

This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
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