# Shannon v. Wilson

In Shannon v. Wilson, 329 Ark. 143 (1997), the Arkansas Supreme Court modified its prior holding in Carr v. Turner, 238 Ark. 889 (1965), so that juries could thereafter "determine whether the violation of the criminal statute prohibiting the sale of alcohol to minors by a licensed vendor is the proximate cause of any subsequent alcohol-related injury to a minor or third party . . . ." 329 Ark. at 145 (headnote 8).
The Opinion for the Court was authored by Chief Justice W.H. "Dub" Arnold, infra p. 146, and Justice David Newbern wrote a dissenting opinion, infra p. 161.
Supreme Court of Arkansas
329 Ark. 143
Martan Dale SHANNON, Individually and as Administrator of the Estate of Charles Shannon, Deceased v. L.K. WILSON and Elizabeth Ashworth, Individually and as Partners of City Liquor, a Partnership
Appeal from Benton Circuit Court
No. 96-762.---Delivered: June 23, 1997.
* Court Documents
* Opinion of the Court
* Dissenting Opinion Newbern
* COURTS—JUDICIALLY CREATED RULES SHOULD BE MODIFIED WHEN OUTMODED OR UNJUST—COURT FREE TO AMEND COMMON LAW.—When a judicially created rule becomes outmoded or unjust in its application, it is appropriate for the judiciary to modify it; the field of common law is the primary concern of the supreme court; accordingly, the court, not the legislature, should extirpate those rules of decision that are admittedly unjust, for it is to the judiciary that the power of government is given to provide protection against individual hurt; thus, as a part of the state's common-law doctrine, the supreme court has a duty to change the common law when it is no longer reflective of the economic and social needs of society.
* INTOXICATING LIQUORS—STRICT NONLIABILITY RULE AGAINST ONE SELLING LIQUOR TO MINOR—EXISTING COMMON-LAW RULE TAKES AWAY BASIC JURY FUNCTION OF DETERMINING PROXIMATE CAUSE.—Under the existing common-law rule, no cause of action exists against one selling liquor because the drinking of liquor, not the remote sale of it, is considered to be the proximate cause of any injury; this strict nonliability rule keeps the issue of a vendor's illegal sale of alcohol to a minor from a jury and takes away the basic jury function of determining proximate cause; while questions of foreseeability and causation may be ones of fact, proximate causation is usually a question for the jury; like any other question of proximate causation, the question whether an act or condition is an intervening or concurrent cause is usually a question for the jury.
* NEGLIGENCE—PROXIMATE CAUSE IS EFFICIENT AND RESPONSIBLE CAUSE—INTERVENING CAUSES WILL NOT NECESSARILY RELIEVE ORIGINAL ACTOR OF LIABILITY.—Implicit in the common-law rule is that proximate cause must be the immediate cause; the supreme court, however, has held that proximate cause is the efficient and responsible cause but that it need not be the last or nearest ​one; the mere fact that other causes intervene between the original act of negligence and the injury for which recovery is sought is not sufficient to relieve the original actor of liability if the injury is the natural and probable consequence of the original negligent act or omission and is such as might reasonably have been foreseen as probable; the original act or omission is not eliminated as a proximate cause by an intervening cause unless the latter is of itself sufficient to stand as the cause of the injury; the intervening cause must be such that the injury would not have been suffered except for the act, conduct, or effect of the intervening agent totally independent of the acts or omission constituting the primary negligence.
* INTOXICATING LIQUORS—SELLING OF ALCOHOL MAY BE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF INJURIES ALONG WITH PROXIMATE CAUSE OF CONSUMPTION—INJURY-PRODUCING BEHAVIOR IS REASONABLY FORESEEABLE.—The selling of alcohol may be a proximate cause of injuries along with the proximate cause of the consumption; the two are not mutually exclusive; selling alcohol to minors can be a proximate cause because the consumption, resulting intoxication, and injury-producing behavior is reasonably foreseeable.
* NEGLIGENCE—PROOF REQUIRED FOR—DUTY DISCUSSED.—In order to prove negligence, there must be a failure to exercise proper care in the performance of a legal duty that the defendant owed the plaintiff under the surrounding circumstances; duty is a concept that arises out of the recognition that relations between individuals may impose upon one a legal obligation for the other.
* INTOXICATING LIQUORS—SELLER'S DUTY TO ACT WITH CARE WHEN SELLING LIQUOR TO PATRONS FOUND IN AFFIRMATIVE REQUIREMENTS OF STATUTES—PUBIC POLICY OF STATE TO PROTECT MINORS FROM ADVERSE CONSEQUENCES OF ALCOHOL CONSUMPTION.—The legislature's determination that it is the public policy of the State of Arkansas to protect minors as a special class of citizens from the adverse consequences of alcohol consumption is clear from the affirmative requirements of the statutes enacted by it; the statutes establish an affirmative duty for alcoholic-beverage license holders to safeguard against minors purchasing alcohol; these statutes serve to regulate the liquor industry and to promote the safety of the citizenry as a whole; the statutes establishing affirmative obligations upon license holders authorized to sell alcohol and the statute classifying as a felony the criminal act of selling or furnishing alcohol to minors for monetary gain create a duty for licensees to exercise a high standard of care for the protection of minors; a breach of this duty can lead to a suit for negligence. ​
* NEGLIGENCE—VIOLATION OF STATUTE IS EVIDENCE OF NEGLIGENCE—LICENSED VENDOR'S VIOLATION OF STATUTE PROHIBITING SALE OF ALCOHOL TO MINORS IS EVIDENCE OF NEGLIGENCE TO BE SUBMITTED TO JURY.—The violation of a statute is evidence of negligence; on the issue of proximate cause, it is often enough to point out that the act could not have occurred if the law had been obeyed; a licensed vendor's violation of the statute prohibiting the sale of alcohol to minors is evidence of negligence to be submitted to a jury.
* INTOXICATING LIQUORS—COMMON-LAW CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST VENDOR WHO KNOWINGLY SELLS ALCOHOL TO MINOR RECOGNIZED—JURIES ALLOWED TO DETERMINE WHETHER VIOLATION OF CRIMINAL STATUTE PROHIBITING SALE OF ALCOHOL TO MINORS IS PROXIMATE CAUSE OF SUBSEQUENT ALCOHOL-RELATED INJURY TO MINOR OR THIRD PARTY.—On the basis of past cases decided by the supreme court regarding its obligation to adapt the common law to an ever-changing society and as a matter of policy, the supreme court recognized a common-law cause of action against a vendor of liquor who knowingly sells alcohol to a minor; therefore, the holding in Carr v. Turner, 238 Ark. 889, 385 S.W. 2d 656 (1965), was modified to allow juries to determine whether the violation of the criminal statute prohibiting the sale of alcohol to minors by a licensed vendor is the proximate cause of any subsequent alcohol-related injury to a minor or third party; a licensed vendor who violates the regulatory policy and the criminal statutes of the state by selling alcohol to minors should be held accountable for any consequences of that action if a jury determines that the results were foreseeable; therefore, violations of the statute prohibiting the sale of alcohol to minors by licensed vendors can be presented to a jury as evidence of negligence, with the jury to determine whether such was the proximate cause of any harm.
* INTOXICATING LIQUORS—RULE OF LIABILITY PROSPECTIVE—RULE GIVEN IMMEDIATE EFFECT ON CLAIM AT ISSUE—MATTER REVERSED AND REMANDED.—The supreme court declared that the rule of vendor liability adopted in this case should be prospectively applied; there shall be liability for acts of negligence of a vendor selling to a minor pursuant to the application of this holding commencing with trials held on or after the date that the court's opinion becomes final; with respect to the claim at issue, the supreme court's decision was given immediate effect so that the efforts of a litigant to bring about needed changes in the law would ​not go unrewarded, because without such inducements changes might not occur; the matter was reversed and remanded.
Appeal from Benton Circuit Court; Tom J. Keith, Judge; reversed and remanded.
The Mulkey Attorneys Group, P.A., by: Bruce L. Mulkey and Ramona G. Stein, for appellants.
Ball & Mourton, Ltd., by: Kenneth R. Mourton and Rayburn W. Green, for appellees.
Everett, Shemin, Mars & Stills, by: David D. Stills, for Amici Curiae.
[Opinion of the court by Chief Justice W.H. "DUB" ARNOLD. Dissenting opinion by Justice DAVID NEWBERN.]
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