# United States – Vietnam Relations, 1945–1967: A Study Prepared by the Department of Defense/IV. A. 5. 4. U.S. Perceptions of the Insurgency, 1954–1960

U.S. PERCEPTIONS OF THE INSURGENCY, 1954-1960
TABLE OF CONTENTS and OUTLINE
| | | | | Page |
| Chart - Principal Personalities, 1954-1960 | Chart - Principal Personalities, 1954-1960 | Chart - Principal Personalities, 1954-1960 | Chart - Principal Personalities, 1954-1960 | ii |
| A. | U. S. Intelligence, 1954-1958 | U. S. Intelligence, 1954-1958 | U. S. Intelligence, 1954-1958 | 1 |
| | 1. | Pre-Geneva, 1950-1954 | Pre-Geneva, 1950-1954 | 1 |
| | 2. | Geneva, 1954 | Geneva, 1954 | 4 |
| | 3. | Sect Warfare, 1955-1957 | Sect Warfare, 1955-1957 | 7 |
| | 4. | Rise of the Viet Cong, 1957-1960 | Rise of the Viet Cong, 1957-1960 | 17 |
| B. | U.S. Policy and Programs, 1954-1960 | U.S. Policy and Programs, 1954-1960 | U.S. Policy and Programs, 1954-1960 | 26 |
| | 1. | NSC 5612/1 | NSC 5612/1 | 27 |
| | 2. | NSC 5809 | NSC 5809 | 28 |
| | 3. | Public Statements | Public Statements | 32 |
| | 4. | Program Data | Program Data | 37 |
| C. | Recognition of Crisis, 1960 | Recognition of Crisis, 1960 | Recognition of Crisis, 1960 | 43 |
| | 1. | Country Team Assessment, March, 1960 | Country Team Assessment, March, 1960 | 43 |
| | | a. | Viet Cong Activity | 43 |
| | | b. | ARVN Weaknesses | 45 |
| | | c. | Political Factors | 46 |
| | 2. | Special NIE, August, 1960 | Special NIE, August, 1960 | 48 |
| | 3. | Contrasting DOD and State Appreciations | Contrasting DOD and State Appreciations | 52 |
| | 4. | The Counterinsurgency Plan (CIP) | The Counterinsurgency Plan (CIP) | 80 |
| | | a. | General McGarr Replaces General Williams | 82 |
| | | b. | Content of the CIP | 86 |
| | | c. | Presidential Action on the CIP | 95 |
| | | d. | Implementing the CIP | 97 |
PRINCIPAL PERSONALITIES, 1954-1960
UNITED STATES
| OFFICE | TERM OF OFFICE | NAME |
| President | 20 Jan 1953 - 20 Jan 1961 | Dwight D. Eisenhower |
| Secretary of State | 21 Jan 1953 - 15 Apr 1959 | John Foster Dulles |
| Secretary„ | 16 Apr 1959 - 20 Jan 1961 | Christian A. Herter |
| Ambassador to GVN | 25 Jun 1952 - 20 Apr 1955 | Donald R. Heath |
| Ambassador„ | 20 Apr 1955 - 14 Mar 1957 | G. Frederick Reinhart |
| Ambassador„ | 14 Mar 1957 - 14 Mar 1961 | Elbridge Durbrow |
| Secretary of Defense | 28 Jan 1953 - 8 Oct 1957 | Charles E. Wilson |
| Secretary„ | 9 Oct 1957 - 2 Dec 1959 | Neil H. McElroy |
| Secretary„ | 3 Dec 1959 - 8 Jan 1961 | Thomas S. Gates, Jr. |
| Chairman, JCS | 14 Aug 1953 - 15 Aug 1957 | Admiral Arthur W. Radford, USN |
| Chairman„ | 15 Aug 1957 - 30 Sep 1960 | General Nathan F. Twining, USAF |
| Chairman„ | 1 Oct 1960 - 30 Sep 1962 | General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, USA |
| Chief of Staff, Army | 15 Aug 1953 - 30 Jun 1965 | General Matthew B. Ridgway |
| Chief of„ | 30 Jun 1955 - 30 Jun 1959 | General Maxwell D. Taylor |
| Chief of„ | 1 Jul 1959 - 30 Sep. 1960 | General Lyman L. Lemnitzer |
| Chief of„ | 1 Oct 1960- 30 Sep 1962 | General George H. Decker |
| Chief of Naval Operations | 16 Aug 1953 - 17 Aug 1955 | Admiral Robert B. Carney |
| Chief of„ | 17 Aug 1955 - 31 Jul 1961 | Admiral Arleigh A. Burke |
| Chief of Staff, Air Force | 30 Jun 1953 - 30 Jun 1957 | General Nathan F. Twining |
| Chief of„ | 1 Jul 1957 - 30 Jun 1961 | General Thomas D. White |
| Commandant, Marine Corps | 28 Jun 1952 - 31 Dec 1955 | General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr. |
| Commandant„ | 1 Jan 1956 - 31 Dec 1959 | General Randolph McC. Pate |
| Commandant„ | 1 Jan 1960 -31 Dec 1963 | General David M. Shoup |
| Chief, MAAG | 24 Oct 1955 - 31 Aug 1960 | Lt. Gen. Samuel T. Williams, USA |
| Chief, MAAG„ | 1 Sep 1960 - 5 Mar 1962 | Lt. Gen. Lionel C. McGarr, USA |
| GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM | |
| Head of State/President | Mar 1949 - 26 Oct 1955 | Emperor Bao Dai |
| Head of State„ | 26 Oct 1955 - 1 Nov 1963 | Ngo Dinh Diem |
| Prime Minister | 12 Jan 1954 - 16 Jun 1954 | Prince Buu Lac |
| Prime Minster„ | 7 Jul 1954 - 1 Nov 1963 | Ngo Dinh Diem |
| Minister of Foreign Affairs/ Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs | 17 Dec 1953 - 16 Jun 1954 | Nguyen Quoc Dinh |
| Minister of Foreign Affairs/ Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs | 5 Jul 1954 - May 1955 | Tran Van Do |
| Minister„ | Jul 1955 - 1 Nov 1963 | Vu Van Mau |
| Minister of Defense/Minister of National Defense | 25 Jun 1952 - 1954(?) | Ngiem Van Tri |
| Minister„ | 5 Jul 1954 - 1 Nov 1963 | Ngo Dinh Diem |
U.S. PERCEPTIONS OF THE INSURGENCY, 1954-1960
A. U.S. Intelligence; 1954-1959
In electing to support Ngo Dinh Diem in 1954 and 1955, and to assume responsibilities from France for providing economic and military assistance to South Vietnam in the years thereafter, the United States deliberately set out to establish in South Vietnam a political environment markedly different from that which Franch had foster ed in the period 1945-54. In 1960; however, there were still similarities to the French period , and these were perhaps more fundamental than were differences.
1. Pre-Geneva, 1950-1954
The pattern that was to confront the U.S. throughout the 1950's was noted in a National Intelligence Estimate of 29 December 1950 (NIE-5), which began: "The French position in Indochina is critically in danger by the Viet Minh, a communist movement that has exploited native nationalism." Under the circumstances prevailing, "there is only a slight chance that the French can maintain their military position long enough to build up an independent Vietnamese government and an effective national army which might win the support of non-communist nationalists, and, in conjunction with French forces, contain the Viet Minh." Despite French efforts to weaken the political, nationa listic base of the Viet Minh by supporting "a semi-autonomous pro-French government under native leadership, . . . concessions to nationalistic sentiment leading to full sovereignty for the Bao Dai government have been forthcoming so slowly and with such seeming reluctance on the part of the French, that the Bao Dai government has not in fact won a strong nationalistic following in any quarter. As a result the French so far have been unable to undermine the political strength of the Viet Minh."
Meamwhile, however, the Estimate noted that military pressure from the Viet Minh, assisted by the Chinese Communists, could eject the French from Tonkin, and ultimately from all of Vietnam ; without a strengthening of the French military position, defeat seemed inevitable, even if the French and the Bao Dai government should begin to transform the political situation. A political mutation was essential to victory, and had to be timely were a military defeat to be averted. The NIE concluded that if Chinese Communist aid ​were continued, and French strength and military resources were not substantially increased above those then programmed, "the Viet Minh probably can drive the French out of North Vietnam (Tonkin) within 6 to 9 months."
But half a year later, an NIE of 7 August 1951 (NIE-35, pp. 1-2), reported, "The present military situation in Indochina is one of stalemate." General de Lattre de Tassigny had repulsed the Viet Minh regime's drive to conquer Tonkin, this "success" resulting from a number of factors including French reinforcements, Viet Minh mistakes in their initial foray into large-scale conventional warfare, and "the timely arrival of U.S. military aid, including aircraft, napalm bombs, patrol and landing craft, and ground combat materiel, "which had helped de Lattre "to inflict heavy losses on the Viet Minh…" But, the Estimate noted, "Political developments … have been less favorable…"
In other words, the French and Bao Dai showed no intention of using the time thus purchased by averting military defeat to bring about political progress:
   " … Despite the gradual French transfer of certain responsibilities, the Vietnamese government has been slow to develop and has continued to suffer from a lack of strong leadership. It has had to contend with: (a) French reluctance to relinquish ultimate control of political and economic affairs; (b) lingering Vietnamese suspicion of any French-supported regime, combined with the apathetic and fence-sitting attitude of the bulk of the people, which has derived the government of broad-based popular support; (c) the difficulty common to all new and inexperienced governments, of training the necessary personnel and building an efficient administration; and (d) the failure of factional and sectional groups to unite in a concerted national effort.
   "In January 1951 the opportunity arose of forming a broad-based cabinet representing most non-Communist group in Vietnam; instead Premier Huu formed a cabinet composed primarily of members of his own pro-French faction. Although Huu has displayed some administrative skill and his government has gained slowly in effectiveness, the weakness of the Huu cabinet and its alleged 'French puppet' status have limited its appeal to Vietnamese nationalism and have alienated strong nationalist groups, including the powerful Dai Viet group in Tonkin. Communist control of much of the country and Viet Minh infiltration of large areas under nominal French control have also discouraged many people from openly allying themselves with the government."
political stature of the Vietnamese government and to ultimate· non-cormnunist solution in Indochina," but "progress in the formation of the Army is retarded by lack of capable officers at all levels of command, shortages of equipment, and the apathetic attitude of the populace." (Weaknesses in officers -- in large part the policy of officer recruitment and promotion -- have fatally weakened Vietnamese army operations ever Since.) In the end) the French neither built a genuinely Vietnamese army, nor allowed the native armed force any role or status which might have made it an effective adjunct of nationalism.
On the communist side, the estimate noted that:
   "The communist party role has been strengthened) with strict party liners coming more into the foreground … in the absence of further military victories) Viet Minh popular support appears unlikely to increase … while we are unable to determine whether the Viet Minh is actually losing any of its popular appeal) the regime apparently is dependent more and more on tightened communist controls … these tightened controls may prevent defections and facilitate the exploitation of people already under Viet Minh control."
Two years later) NIE-91 of 4 June 1953 continued to emphasize the critical problems. of lack of support for the Bao Dai regime and lack of Indochines e will and ability to resist the Viet Minh. Some political progress could be pointed to during the preceding year) including local elections in secure areas) and decisions in March 1953 to increase the size of the Vietnamese National Army; and, a note that reads familiarly nearly fifteen years later:
   "Another Vietnamese program) undertaken with U. S. economic assistance, which involves the relocation of scattered villages in the [Tonkin]. delta into centralized and defensible sites may be an important step toward the eventual 'pacification' of heavily infiltrated areas."
However,
   "Despite these advances) Vietnam still lacks the degree of political strength essential for the mobilization of the country's resources. Tam's 'action' program remains more shadow than substance. Elected local councils have no real power, promised land reform and other social and economic reforms which might generate popular support have not left
   the planning stage, and the Vietnamese government is handicapped by incompetent cabinet ministers and the lack of competent administrators . While Bao Dai refuses to assume active direction of the affairs of state, he remains hostile toward new leadership and democratic activities."
   "Of more basic importance in the failure of Vietnamese to rally to the Vietnamese government following the French grant of independence within the French Union in 1949 have been the following:
   a. Many Vietnamese doubt the ability of French Union forces to defeat the Viet Minh and prefer to remain apart from the struggle.
   b. The French Government had not dared to promise complete national independence at some future date, as demand ed by the Vietnamese , because of the fear that the French national assembly would then refuse to support a war in a 'lost' portion of the French Union.
   c. The Vietnamese, despite many evolutionary steps toward complete independence since 1949, are generally inclined to believe that the French intend to retain effective control over the affairs of Vietnam.
   d. The nationalist appeal and military prestige of the Viet Minh remains strong among significant numbers of the Vietnamese."
2. Geneva, 1954
The Geneva Agreements of 1954 brought to an end nine years of open warfare between the French and the Viet Minh. In 1950, the conflict had been transformed from a purely colonial into a quasi-civil war in which the Viet Minh found themselves pitted against a non-communist Vietnamese state with nominal independence, enjoying significant U.S. support. Nonetheless, the conflict was settled by the original protagonists: France and the DRV. As of the summer of 1954, U.S. assessments anticipated that a continuing French presence in Indochina would offset the Viet Minh menace in North Vietnam. The U. S. expected its own "political action"-- e.g., forming SEATO -- further to buttress "free Vietnam." Initially, at least , the U. S . looked on Diem as an unknoym quantity with uncertain chances of succeeding against two sorts of challenges: the political turbulence within South Vietnam on the one hand, and on the other organized, communist-led remnants of the Viet Minh apparatus operating in concert with the DRV . In the years through 1960, estimates of the relative urgency of these two challenges varied. U .S. intelligence est imates rarely expressed confidence that Diem could overcome both ​these threats, and usually the odds were judged to be against his surmounting either in the long run.
However, U.S. estimates in the bmnediate aftermath of Geneva held that a forceful direct communist challenge was unlikely through 1956. Diem was expected to enjoy a respite in which he could deal with other internal opposition, and shore up his government. Most estimates then concluded that the principal reason why the communists were unlikely to make an open challenge during that period was the very likelihood that Diem would prove unable to consolidate his power, and that South Vietnam would fall to the communists in the general elections scheduled for 1956, if not as a result of earlier internal turmoil. Thus, a National Intelligence Estimate of 3 August 1954 (NIE 63-5 -54, p. 1) stated:
   "We believe that the Communists will not give up their objective of securing control of all Indochina but will, without violating the armistice to the extent of launching an armed invasion to the south or west, pursue their objective by political, psychological, and paramilitary means."
   "Although it is possible that the French and Vietnamese, even with firm support from the U.S . and other powers, may be able to establish a strong regime in South Vietnam, we believe that the chances for this development are poor and, moreover, that the situation is more likely to continue to deteriorate progressively over the next year…"
In the light of the lessons of the first Indochinese War, the possibility of meeting the longer term challenge from the communists was seen as requiring not only the establishment of an efficient government in South Vietnam (thus circumventing the short-term tendencies toward chaos in the south), but a government under "strong Nationalist leadership," that could enlist the loyalty and active participation of the people in a united struggle against communist forces. This, in turn, at that time, Has seen to depend on swift, firm, French action to back such leadership. But such a change in French policy appeared unlikely. (Ibid., p. 6)
   "On the basis of the evidence we have at this early date, however, He b elieve that a favorable development of the situation in South Vietnam is unlikely. Unless Mendes-France is able to overcome the force of French traditional interests and emotions Hhich have in the past governed the implementation of policy in Indochina, He do not believe there Hill be the dramatic transfonnat ion in French policy necessary to win the active loyalty and support of the local population for a South Vietnam Government …"
Yet, as early as November, 1954, a National Estimate projected the likelihood that if -- contrary to expectations -- the communists should be denied a victory by political means on or before July 1956, they would turn to violent means, using their remaining apparatus in the south for terrorism and guerrilla action and reinforcing it by infiltration. According to NIE 63-7-54, 23 November 1954 (p. 9):
   "We believe that the Viet Minh will continue to gain in political strength and prestige and, with Chinese aid, to increase its military striking power in North Vietnam. The Viet Minh probably now feels that it can achieve control over all Vietnam without initiating large-scale warfare. Accordingly, we believe that the Communists will exert every effort to accomplish their objectives through means short of war…"
   "If, on the other hand, South Vietnam should appear to be gaining in strength or if elections were postponed over Communist objections, the Communists probably would step up their subversive and guerrilla activities in the South and if necessary would infiltrate additional armed forces in an effort to gain control over the area…"
As of late 1954, the Estimate stated the "present key to political power in South Vietnam" was still held by the French. "Under present circumstances, only the French can provide to the legitimate governing authority in Vietnam the power it now lacks, and force the coalescence of the various factions, groups, and individuals." (Ibid., p. 5) As for Diem himself: "Diem, the leading lay Catholic in Vietnam, is honest, austere, and widely respected for his integrity and nationalistic zeal… However, Diem is rigid, unwilling to compromise, and inexperienced in the rough and tumble of politics. He is acutely suspicious of his colleagues on the political scene and is inclined to seek advice among a small group of relatives and close friends who, for the most part, are incapable of proffering sound counsel … None of the groups opposing Diem has any broad-based popular support. It is the weakness of Diem rather than any genuine political strength of their owm that enables them to prolong the political crisis in Saigon…" (Ibid., p. 4) ​The Estimate noted that the French might decide that in order to preserve their relationship with the U. S., "it is essential to support an anti-Communist South Vietnam, postponing elections if necessary. The French would feel, however, that such a course would involve a substantially increased risk of renewed hostilities with the Viet Minh …" (Ibid., p. 8)
   "We believe that the French estimate that South Vietnam cannot be held over the long term, except at very high cost." (Ibid., p. 8)
The French were unlikely to provide Diem with the "full and positive support" -- despite a French-U.S. understanding of September 29, in which the French agreed "to support Diem in the establishment of a strong, anti-Communist regime in Vietnam " (ibid., p. 7). "Diem will probably not be able to reestablish the authority of the government throughout South Vietnam and to tackle effectively the multitude of pressing problems now facing the country." (Ibid., p. 8) Thus, the Estimate ended on a gloomy note: "We believe, on the basis of present trends, it is highly unlikely that South Vietnam will develop the strength necessary to counter growing Communist subversion within its border; it almost certainly would not be able to defeat the Communists in countrywide elections. Even before the elections scheduled for 1956, the probable growth of Communist influence in the South may result in strong pressures with in South Vietnam for coalition with the North."(Ibid., p. 9)
Subsequently, reassured by Diem's successes in subduing a variety of non-communist challenges to his leadership, the U.S. moved into the key role in support of Diem it had earlier hoped the French might undertake. Yet the question posed by the French appreciation of the situation remained hanging: Was it possible to hold South Vietnam "over the long term" without a "very high cost"?
3· Sect Warfare, 1955-1957
By the spring of 1955, Diem was engaged in a sharp confrontation with the Binh Xuyen gangsters and with the religious sects of the Hoa Hao and Cao Dai, and the possibility was recognized that he might (as in fact, he did) win victory and increase his prestige and authority. Nevertheless, an estimate of 26 April 1955 was still pessimistic about his longer-term prospects:
Meanwhile, it continued to appear likely that open communist pressure would be postponed until mid-1956, but only until then. An estimate of probable developments in North Vietnam to July 1956 concluded:
   …The resumption of widespread guerrilla activities appears unlikely prior to the election deadline, unless the DRV should come to the conclusion that South Vietnam can be won only by force. Such a conclusion would become more likely should the Diem government persist in refusing to enter the election discussions, should election discussions not proceed favorably for the DRV, or should the Diem government succeed, with US assistance, in consolidating its strength to the point of becoming a nationalist alternative to the Ho regime. Moreover, if during the period of this estimate little progress is made towards relaxing tensions, Peiping and Moscow might permit the DRV greater freedom of action. Should the DRV decide to use force short of open invasion, it would probably attempt to undermine the Saigon government by initiating a campaign of sabotage and terror, seeking the formation of a new government more amenable to demands for a national coalition. These tactics are likely to include the activation of DRV guerrilla units now in South Vietnam and their reinforcement by the infiltration in small units of regulars from the North." (NIE 63.1-55, 19 July 1955, p. 2)
By the fall of 1955, although Diem and his army were still struggling with Hoa Hao and Cao Dai (having scattered the Binh Xuyen), it seemed likely that they would prevail, and emerge with unchallenged authority, at least for a time:
   "Nevertheless, the success of Diem's efforts to establish a viable anti-Communist government in South Vietnam is still in doubt. Although Diem has established control over the apparatus of government, he has dealt only in part with such fundamental problems as: (a) the development of an effective administration, particularly on provincial and local levels; (b) the institution of a popularly-sanctioned constitutional basis for the regime; (c) the elimination of armed opposition and the extension of government authority throughout all areas of South Vietnam; (d) the suppression of Viet Minh military and political capabilities remaining in South Vietnam; and (e) the restoration of the economy." (NIE 63.1-3-55, 11 October 1955, p. 3)
   "Diem will almost certainly not agree to hold national elections for the unification of Vietnam by July 1956. Although Diem, under pressure from the Western Powers, might reluctantly agree to indirect consultations with the DRV concerning elections, he would insist on conditions which he felt certain the Communists would be unable to accept. Aware that such a position will probably cause the Viet Minh to increase their efforts to destroy his government, Diem will probably seek to bind the US more specifically to the defense of Vietnam."
   "The Viet Minh, despite their relative quiescence, present the greatest potential threat to Diem. Should the Viet Minh elect openly to invade the south with regular forces, they are capable of defeating the VNA and any French forces (if committed) now present in South Vietnam. Moreover, with an estimated 10,000 military personnel in South Vietnam, the Viet Minh have the capability to undertake local sabotage and terrorist actions; and small-scale but widespread guerrilla warfare. The Viet Minh can reinforce these forces by infiltrating into South Vietnam. The Viet Minh apparently exerts political influence in many areas scattered throughout South Vietnam." (NIB 63.1-3-55, 11 October 1955, p. 1)
   "Should the Viet Minh initiate large-scale guerrilla operations supported by substantial infiltration from the north, the South Vietnamese government would be hard pressed to do more than maintain control in the Saigon-Cholon area and in a few other major urban centers. If the operation were prolonged, the government probably could not survive without military assistance from outside." (Ibid., p. 2)
   Diem's greatest assets in this struggle were:
   "… his reputation for honesty and unsullied nationalism, his control of the Vietnamese National Army, and the moral and financial support of the U.S . In addition, Diem has gained considerable popular following, especially in urban centers and in recently pacified areas and has the loyalty of the refugees from North Vietnam. However, should he lose army or US support, his regime would probably collapse." (Ibid., p. 3)
   " … His cabinet is composed primarily of loyal technicians who lack political stature. Most well known political figures of the pre-Diem period have been alienated by Diem's unwillingness to trust them and by his insistence that unquestioned acceptance of his leadership is the only basis for cooperation. Diem has depended heavily on his unpopular brothers for advice and entrusts them with positions of great responsibility. His tendency toward 'one man rule,' his dependence on his brothers for advice, and his rejection of Vietnamese leaders whom he does not trust, has denied his government many of the few trained administrators." (Ibid., pp. 3-4)
As for the public, when he took office in July 1954) the most significant political convictions of most South Vietnamese were "antipathy for the French combined with a personal regard for Ho Chi Minh as the symbol of Vietnamese Nationalism …" (Ibid., p. 2)
Diem's efforts to "galvanize mass popular support" concentrated initially on "exploiting popular antipathy for Bao Dai and the French" and subsequently on developing "strong anti-Communist sentiment" (Ibid., p. 4) Nevertheless, confronting a communist regime in North Vietnam "possessing a far stronger Army, a more experienced administration, greater cohesion of leadership and greater drive than the government of South Vietnam," and led by Ho Chi Minh, "Premier Diem will almost certainly not agree to a test of relative popular strength in national elections." (Ibid., p. 5)
Although no estimates in the 1955-1956 period assumed the communists would open guerrilla operations immediately upon the final frustration of their election hopes in July 1956, the estimates recognized increasing pressures upon the communists for recourse to violent methods of achieving their long-run objectives. The 19 October 1955 NIE held that:
However, a July 1956 NIE noted that if substantial infiltration from the DRV were deemed necessary, it possessed the resources:
   " … Ninety-five thousand men were evacuated from the south in the first few months following the Armistice. The DRV probably views this group as a possible instrument for subversive activity in South Vietnam and some may have been retrained, reindoctrinated, and perhaps even reinfiltrated." (NIE 63-56, 17 July 1956, p. 6)
By March 1956, Diem had reduced the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao groups to political impotence, and had won a substantial majority in South Vietnam's first national elections: "no openly anti-Diem Deputy was elected… due in part to government manipulation of the election campaign, and in part to a boycott of the elections by most of the opposition parties." (Ibid., p. 7)
The same NIE stated that it was likely that "organized non-communist resistance" would virtually disappear by 1957 and, indeed, that South Vietnam's military and security forces could maintain "the government in power against any potential armed opposition now located south of the 17th parallel," even against communist armed strength in the south estimated at "8,000 - 10,000, with approximately 5,000 organized in skeletal company and battalion sized units which could be expanded through recruitment." (Ibid., 10-11) However, longer-run prospects of the regime still depended on the decision of the North Vietnamese regime whether, and when, to activiate their apparatus in the south and infiltrate "regroupees" from the north.
   "In the event of large scale, concerted guerrilla warfare supported by infiltration of men and supplies from the north, relatively large areas of rural Vietnam probably would be lost to government control … " (Ibid., p. 10)
   " …if the Communists decide to exercise their capability for armed intimidation and terror they could quickly reassert political control or influence) at least in some rural areas where GVN authority is tenuous.
   "During the past year the Communists in South Vietnam have remained generally quiescent. They have passed by a number of opportunities to embarrass the Diem regime. Although some cadres and supplies are being infiltrated across the 17th parallel) the DRV probably has not sent any large scale reinforcement or supply to the south. Communist activity in the south appears to concentrate on protecting vital bases and supply caches ) developing clandestine paramilitary organizations) and implementing a broad program of infiltration and subversion. While seeking to maintain intact as much of their armed strength as possible) their main activity seems to be an effort to weaken the Diem government by subversive and political tactics. Communi st directives indicate that penetration and subversion of the GVN military and security forces is a major objective… " (Ibid., p. 11)
   But the communists' choices were narrowing all the time:
   "The DRV probably estimates that its chances for securing control of South Vietnam by means short of open attack or large scale guerrilla action supported from the north will gradually diminish with the passage of time .... The DRV probably also believes that its covert assets in South Vietnam will gradually decline if the Diem government is permitted to concentrate on internal security and economic problems free of external harassment." (Ibid., pp. 12-13)
Thus,
   "The only remaining course of action holding out some promise for the early achievement of Communist control in South Vietnam appears to be the development of large scale guerrilla warfare in the south. In recent weeks a number of reports from sources of untested reliability have indicated that the Communists may have started preparations in both South Vietnam and in the north to begin guerrilla action. DRV allegations of Vietnamese violations of the demilitarized zone along the 17th parallel and Communist claims of US-Diem plans to violate the Armistice could be propaganda cover for the initiation of guerrilla action against the south." (Ibid., p. 13)
   " … Diem's success in by-passing the July 1956 election date without evoking large scale Communist military reaction will reassure many Vietnamese and encourage them to cooperate with GVN programs to expose and root out Communists. Continued improvement in internal security will depend in some measure on the government's ability to deal with economic and social problems and on the effectiveness of the administrative apparatus.
   "If the Communists were to undertake large scale guerrilla action in South Vietnam, they probably would not be able to develop widespread popular support, especially if the VNA were to register some early military success. The GVN is being increasingly accepted as a nationalist alternative to Communist leadership. Public confidence in the GVN, combined with general war-weariness, may have already reached the point where any effort to upset the government by force would lead to a strong popular reaction against the guerrillas. (Ibid., p. 14)
This NIE came close to being a high-water mark in optimism concerning Diem's ability to meet his dual challenges, both short and long run. But political trends that could restore the vigor of his non-communist opposition were seen:
   " … The trend toward authoritarian rule through the political parties led by Diem's relatives and small circle of trusted associates will probably continue. Isolation and neutralization of government critics and men disliked or distrusted by Diem will also continue. Diem and his associates are likely to exert strong pressures against any opposition in the Assembly. Thus it is not likely that Diem or his government will meet any serious opposition in the National Assembly during the period of this estimate [through mid-1957]; however, over a longer period the accumulation of grievances among various groups and individuals may lead to development of a national opposition movement … " (Ibid., p. 14)
In January, 1957, MAAG Vietnam's semi-annual report to the Secretary of Defense (Country Statement on MDAP, Non-NATO Countries, date cited) noted hopefully that:
   "The internal security situation in Vietnam has improved during the last year in regards to the dissident sects. Viet Minh armed cadres total approximately 1,370 effectives, Hoa Hao ​dissidents total approximately 850. No effective resistance is anticipated from the few remaining Cao Dai and Binh Xuyen. Activity of Viet Minh cadres in Free Vietnam has accelerated. While primarily political in nature, it does pose a threat to internal security. These cadres are attempting to infiltrate and take over the dissident sects. Reports indicate that they have succeeded in these efforts with a fraction of the Hoa Hao. On the other hand, approximately 7,000 sect troops have indicated their loyalty by joining forces with the government and have recently been integrated as a part of the National Army."
   " … It appears that the Communist efforts are mainly in a passive stage of long-range subversion of the 'will to fight.' The Vietnamese Psychological Action Section is increasing its efforts to counter 'Red propaganda'. Improvement of social status, security, and living standards are essential elements in preventing susceptibility to Communist subversion which may detract from the effectiveness of military forces."
   "The Vietnamese Army is considered capable of establishing and maintaining internal security throughout the populous areas of Free Vietnam against dissident sects and other anti-government elements .... "
   "The Binh Xuyen have been destroyed as an effective anti-government military force and a major portion of the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao forces have been integrated into the National Army."
   "Intelligence reports indicate that despite heavy losses due to military operations and desertions, the Viet Minh organization in Free Vietnam remains a serious problem. Recent mergers of other dissident and rebel elements with the Viet Minh, have considerably strengthened the Viet Minh cause."
An NIE of May 1957 on "The Prospects for North Vietnam" (NIE 63.2-57), considered that the communist leaders in North Vietnam, despire "sporadic outbursts of violence," remained "in firm control largely because of the loyalty and effect iveness of the army." However, they were considered crucially dependent on the USSR and CPR, and were ​deemed unlikely to launch an attack on the South unless there were unforeseen serious disturbances there:
   "Not only are the DRV leaders bound to the Bloc by strong ideological ties, but the very existence of the Communist regime in North Vietnam is dependent on continued Bloc diplomatic, military, and economic support. The Chinese Communists seem to exercise somewhat greater influence than the USSR and have given the DRV greater economic and diplomatic support ....However, there is no evidence that Soviet and Chinese Communists are at odds over North Vietnam."
   "The Bloc has recently given less than full support to Vietnamese reunification, to the perceptible discomfort of the DRV. At the May 1956 meeting of the Geneva co-chairmen, the Soviet Union tacitly accepted the status quo in Vietnam for an indefinite period. In January 1957 the USSR further recognized the long term nature of the division of Vietnam when it proposed, as a countermove to Western proposals for the admission of South Vietnam and South Korea, that both North and South Vietnam and North and South Korea should be admitted to the United Nations. Nevertheless, the DRV will almost certainly continue to be guided in its external course of action by the general policy set down by Moscow and Peiping, although it will continue to advocate a stronger policy on reunification."
   "The DRV continues to maintain its apparatus for subversion within South Vietnam and has the capability to infiltrate fairly large numbers of military and political personnel into South Vietnam. Although the Communists in the South have been largely quiescent, some trained military personnel remain, loosely organized in small units that presumably could be reactivated for missions of assassination, sabotage, or limited guerrilla activity. South Vietnamese security forces intermittently discover cached Communist arms.
   "Because the country-wide elections envisaged by the Geneva Agreements have not been held and because military action has been prevented, the DRV has been frustrated in its hopes of gaining control of South Vietnam. This has caused some discontent among cadres evacuated from the South in the expectation that they would soon return. Unification of the country remains a principal objective of the DRV regime, end it continues to seek support for its pretentions to emerge as the government of the whole of Vietnam. Its 'liberalization' measures are designed to appeal to the population of the South as well as the North. The DRV has maintained its pose of adherence to the terms of the cease-fire agreement concluded at Geneva while accusing the Republic of ​Vietnam and the US of violations. It is seeking to enhance its international prestige and position, and to secure the broadest possible support for the political settlement envisaged at the Geneva Conference which it still insists must eventually be implemented."
By mid-1957, the security outlook in South Vietnam, according to MAAG's intelligence, was rosy indeed; the only dark clouds hovered over the Viet Cong (MAAG, "Country Statement … , 15 July 1957):
   "In the past six months Dissident Sect strengths have fallen off. Numerically the Hoa Hao Sect has remained about the same (estimated at 850-950 armed men) but its power has been greatly diminished due to continuous government military operations, the improvement of the Civil Guard and Self-Defense Corps, the capture of bases and equipment by government forces, and the resulting loss in morale. Cao Dai and Binh Xuyen military forces are negligible ....
   "The Viet Cong guerrillas and propagandists, however, are still waging a grim battle for survival. In addition to an accelerated propaganda campaign, the Communists have been forming 'front' organizations to influence at least portions of all anti-government minorities. Some of these organizations are militant, some political. An example of the former is the 'Vietnamese Peoples' Liberation Movement Forces,' a military unit composed of ex-Cao Dai, ex-Hoa Hao, ex-Binh Xuyen, escaped political prisoners, and Viet Cong cadres. An example of the latter is the 'Vietnam-Cambodian Buddhist Association', one of several organizations seeking to spread the theory of 'Peace and Co-existence.' The armed strength of Viet cong-controlled units in Free Vietnam is now estimated at approximately 1,500."
The Department of State sponsored an intelligence estimate for the U.S . SEATO Council Renresentatives dated 3 April 1958, entitled "Nature and Extent of the Communist Subversive Threat to the Protocol States of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos." This estimate held that the DRV continued to pose a basic threat to the GVN:
   "Although Communist tactics have shifted over the past few years, the real objective -- ultimate Communist control of all Vietnam -- has remained unchanged. Overt aggression, employed by the Communists prior to the Geneva Agreements and ceasefire, has been at least temporarily put aside in favor of demands for 'peaceful reunification,' more in accord with the general Soviet line of peaceful co-existence. The Communist peaceful pose however has not brought any relaxation in the build-up of DRV military strength or repressive Communist control over the population in North Vietnam. Moreover, support and assistance provided by the DRV for Communist subversive activities in South Vietnam (as well as in Laos and to a lesser extent Cambodia and Thailand) has not been reduced … "
   "… The continuation of the Communist program to infiltrate and support subversive cadres in South Vietnam is the clearest indication of the unchanged nature of their objective in Vietnam and the threat which this constitutes for the GVN. The strongly anti-Communist policy of the GVN has forced the Communists to operate underground rather than through legal parties or front groups. Little concrete information is available concerning the organization and leadership of the Communist subversive apparatus in South Vietnam. At the time of the armistice, a considerable number of armed and trained Communist military personnel were left behind in South Vietnam, organized into a basic structure of a hierarchy of Administrative and Resistance Committees. Effective security measures carried out by the Diem government have reduced these armed Communist cadres to an estimated 1100-1400. The remaining cadres probably retain a roughly similar organizational pattern, although they have reduced their unit size and reportedly have changed their structure at the lowest level to make it more difficult for the GVN to penetrate the network.
   "Alongside the guerrilla nucleus (and undoubtedly with some duplication of personnel), the Communists have maintained and sought to expand their political network in South Vietnam. The latter organization probably encompasses a considerably larger number than the armed cadres, which, operating underground, are more difficult to identify or assess …
   "Leadership and direction for Communist subversive activity in the GVN is provided from North Vietnam by the Communist Lao Dong Party. In the past, several South Vietnamese Communist leaders who went North at the time of the armistice have been identified as playing important roles in directing and coordinating Communist operations within the GVN. Most powerful of these is Le Duan, who has recently enjoyed a swift rise to top-ranking status in the DRV hierarchy .... "
   " ... The Communists are now believed to be actively cultivating the remnants of the Hoa Hao, Cao Dai, and Binh Xuyen dissident bands, dispersed by GVN security forces in 1955. As many as 1,500 armed non-Communist dissidents are believed still in hiding in bands of various size in the delta region south of Saigon, the Plaine des Joncs, along the Cambodian border and northwest of Saigon. Through the years, the weapons of these outlaw bands have deteriorated, and ammunition has run low. The Communists are believed providing many of these bands with both assistance and guidance, in return for support or at least lip service to DRV aims. The DRV has also included a few minor sect leaders in its "Fatherland Front" in hopes of attracting support from sect adherents in the South. In its propaganda, the DRV claims to pursue a policy of religious tolerance and denounces the GVN for alleged religious persecution.
   "A degree of success in the Communist efforts to subvert the sects and sect leaders was indicated by a recent raid on a French plantation about 50 miles north of Saigon. In addition to robbing and some wanton destruction, an estimated 3-700 bandits claiming to be 'religious men' harangued the workers concerning the benefits of life in the North and warned them not to cooperate with the 'American-controlled' Diem government. The Cao Dai Pope, living in exile in Phnom Penh, has published statements in line with Communist themes, and an organization combining various sect remnants has reportedly been formed with a Communist advisor."
The MAAG intelligence estimate included in its mid-1958 report ("Narrative Study," 24 August 1958) was, however, more directly focused on DRV conventional military strength, and displayed a somewhat different view of "Viet Cong" than had been evident in earlier MAAG reports:
"ENEMY THREAT & PROBABLE COURSE OF ACTION
"Viet Cong (North Vietnam Communists):
   "(1) Strength: It is estimated that the Viet Cong in North Vietnam, currently have available approximately 268,000 regular army troops organized into 14 Infantry Divisions, 1 Artillery Division, 1 Anti-aircraft Artillery Groupment, ​11 independent Infantry Regiments, 5 Security Regiments, plus comb at support and service support units. In addition, there are para-military forces estimated to number up to approximately 235,000 personnel, which are organized as two separate forces, the Provincial Forces and the Armed Militia …
   " (2) Capabilities: …Although it is highly probable a some advance indication or warning will be received, an attack on South Vietnam by Viet Cong forces could occur without warning at any time. With or without warning, it must be realized that the initiative, at least during the initial stages of a war, will rest with the Viet Cong. Accordingly, it must be assumed that the enemy will be able to provide for the necessary build-up of his forces, execute planned deployments and launch his attack at selected points at his own time and convenience .... In conjunction with the conduct of operations by military forces, the Viet Cong will employ to the maximum guerrilla forces and subversive, dissident elements already in place in South Vietnam. The strength of these elements is currently estimated at approximately 2000 personnel, a majority of whom are armed. It can be expected that the Viet Cong will make every effort to reinforce these elements prior to and during the initiation of hostilities in order to enhance their capability for the conduct of guerrilla warfare, create internal disorder, and execute sabotage and conduct attacks on pre-selected critical targets within South Vietnam for the primary purpose of impeding or interfering with operations being undertaken by South Vietnam armed forces …
   "(3) Possible Courses of Action:
   "(a) Continuation of Viet Cong attempts to gain control of South Vietnam through a combination of diplomatic, economic, political and subversive means.
Washington estimates were, however, beginning to reflect concern over Diem's political solvency. For example, an Operations Coordinating Board Progress Report on U.S. policy in mainland Southeast Asia, dated May 28, 1958, drew attention both to an increase in communist subversive and terrorist pressures against the Diem regime, and to aspects in Diem's political style that could limit the ability of his regime to cope with those pressures:
   "Political and Security Problems of the Diem Government. President Ngo Dinh Diem's policy of strict control in the political and economic fields has caused a certain amount of internal dissatisfaction. Should the President's exercise of personal authority develop too far there may be danger that the resultant frustration of government officials might preclude the united support for his regime which the situation requires. Otherwise, the President's stern police measures and his emphasis on internal security have led to some criticism of the government. This emphasis on internal security stems from the recent emergence of the country, the continuation of communist-inspired violence and subversion, and such phenomena as the assassination of local officials in rural areas of southern Viet-Nam."
Half a year later, on January 7, 1959, a similar OCB Progress Report asserted:
   "Internal Security. It has become increasingly clear that the communists, no longer expectant that Free Viet-Nam will fall to their control through peaceful methods, are executing a carefully planned campaign of violence aimed at undermining the stability of the Diem Government. Their concentration of activities in rural areas where communications and terrain make it difficult for the government to cope with them recalls the tactics used against the French during the Indochina War. Assassinations, particularly of officials in rural areas, continue at an alarming rate of about fifteen to thirty-five a month. Attacks on rubber plantations and reported communist plans to break up the land development, land reform and agricultural credit programs indicate deliberate efforts to interfere with Viet-Nam's economic programs."
The first National Intelligence Estimate to assess the new situation--and the first NIE or SNIE on South Vietnam since 1956--was issued in May, 1959 (NIE 63-59 , "Prospects for North and South Vietnam," 26 May 1959):
   "The prospect of reunification of Communist North Vietnam (DRV) and western-oriented South Vietnam (GVN) remains remote. In the DRV the full range of Communist techniques is used to control the population, socialize the economy, impose austerity and direct investment to economic rehabilitation and development. The DRV maintains large armed forces. In South Vietnam, despite the authoritarian nature of the regime, there is far more freedom. Local resources and US aid are devoted to developing the armed forces, maintaining internal security, and supporting a relatively high standard of living, with lesser emphasis on economic development …
   "In South Vietnam political stability depends heavily upon President Di em and his continued control of the instruments of ​power, including the army and police. Diem will almost certainly be President for many years. The regime will continue to repress potential opposition elements and depend increasingly upon the effectiveness of the Can Lao, the regime's political apparatus, which is run by Diem's brothers Nhu and Can …
   "The capabilities of the GVN armed forces will improve given continued US materiel support and training. Continuance of the present level of training is threatened by a recent finding of the International Control Commission (ICC) that the US Temporary Equipment Recovery Mission (TERM) should end its activities by mid-1959. In any event, GVN forces will remain incapable of withstanding more than temporarily the larger. DRV forces. The internal security forces will not be able to eradicate DRV supported guerrilla or subversive activity in the foreseeable future. Army units will probably have to be diverted to special internal security assignments …
   "The GVN is preoccupied with the threat to national security and the maintenance of large military and security forces. It will probably remain unwilling to devote a significantly greater share of resources and attention to longer range economic development. Assuming continued US aid at about present levels, mode st improvement in South Vietnam's economic position is likely. However, development will lag behind that in the North, and the GVN will continue to rely heavily upon US support to close the gap between its own resources and its requirements …
   "There is little prospect of a significant improvement in relations bet·ween South Vietnam and Cambodia so long as the present leaders of the two countries remain in power. Relations with Laos will probably remain generally friendly. Continued suspicion that the French are intriguing in the area to recapture a position of major influence will probably prevent an improvement of Franco-GVN relations …
   "Despite widespread popular discontent, the Government of the DRV is in full control of the country and no significant internal threat to the regime is likely. With large-scale Bloc aid, considerable progress has been made in rehabilitating and developing the economy with major emphasis on agriculture, raw materials and light industry. The regime will probably soon have laid the foundations for considerable economic expansion …
   "The DRV has no diplomatic relations with any country outside the Bloc and its foreign policy is subservient to the Bloc. We believe that it will continue its harassment of the GVN and of Laos, though a military invasion of either is unlikely …"
   ​"President Diem continues to be the undisputed ruler of South Vietnam; all important and many minor decisions are referred to him. Although he professes to believe in representative government and democracy, Diem is convinced that the Vietnamese are not ready for such a political system and that he must rule with a firm hand, at least so long as national security is threatened. He also believes that the country cannot afford a political opposition which could obstruct or dilute the government's efforts to establish a strong and secure state. Although respected for his courage, dedication, and integrity, Diem has remained a somewhat austere and remote figure to most Vietnamese and has not generated widespread popular enthusiasm.
   "Diem's regime reflects his ideas. A facade of representative government is maintained, but the government is in fact essentially authoritarian. The legislative powers of the National Assembly are strictly circumscribed; the judiciary is undeveloped and subordinate to the executive; and the members of the executive branch are little more than the personal a gents of Diem. No organized opposition, loyal or otherwise, is tolerated, and critics of the regime are often repressed. This highly centralized regime has provided resolute and stable direction to national affairs, but it has alienated many of the country's educated elite and has inhibited the growth of governmental and political institutions which could carry on in Diem's absence … "
   "Although the popular enthusiasm attendant on the achieving of independence and the end of colonial rule has subsided and some disillusion has arisen, particularly among the educated elite, there appears to be little identifiable public unrest. There is some dissatisfaction among military officers largely because of increasing Can Lao meddling in military affairs. The growth of dissatisfaction is inhibited by South Vietnam's continuing high standard of living relative to that of its neighbors, the paternalistic attitude of Diem's government towards the people and the lack of any feasible alternative to the present regime.
   "The Communist apparatus in South Vietnam is essentially an operating arm of the North Vietnamese Communist Party (Lao Dong), but there have been recent indications of Chinese Communist participation in its operations. It is estimated that there are about 2,000 active guerrillas. They are in small units scattered along the Cambodian border, the south coast, and in the remote plateau region of the north. There are probably several thousand others, now inactive, who have access ​to arms and would participate in guerrilla activities if so ordered. The guerrillas are able to marshall a force of several hundred men for major hit-and-run raids, as they demonstrated twice during 1958. They have recently stepped up their intimidation campaign, assassinating local officials in remote areas, terrorizing local populations and disrupting government operations. The dissident armed remnants of the religious sects are largely broken up. About 2,000 such dissidents surrendered to the government during 1958 and the few hundred remaining in the jungle are probably now absorbed or dominated by the Communists.
   "The government has been able to restrict but not eliminate the subversive and espionage activities of clandestine Communist agents. It is probable that Communists have penetrated some local army and security units, village councils, and local branches of the government. There is no evidence, however, that such penetration is sufficient to hamper government operations seriously or that it extends to the higher echelons of the government. There is probably a widespread Communist underground in the urban areas, especially Saigon, and Communist intelligence of GVN plans and activities is probably good. Communist agents are also stimulating unrest among the tribal minorities in the central highlands, a relatively inaccessible and sparsely populated area which the government is attempting to settle and develop, primarily for security reasons.
   "South Vietnam's 136,000-man army, supported by the Civil Guard, the Self-Defense Corps and the police services, is capable of maintaining effective internal security except in the most remote jungle and mountain areas. Until mid-1957, the army had the primary responsibility for internal security, and had considerable success. By that time major responsibility for internal security had been given to the provincial Civil Guard (48,000) and the village Self-Defense Corps (47,000). These organizations have proven to be inadequately trained and equipped for the job, and units from the armed forces have continued to be called in to meet special situations. The size and scattered distribution of the Civil Guard and Self-Defense Corps add to the problems of training and equipping them and of coordinating their activities. In some regions, they are infiltrated by Communists. The police services, which include the 7,500-man Vietnamese Bureau of Investigation and 10,500-man police force stationed in the main cities, have had considerable success in tracking down subversives and terrorists and are developing into efficient organizations.
   ​"South Vietnam has made only limited progress toward basic long-term economic development in the five years since independence … "
It was not until 1960 that U.S. intelligence estimates began to reflect conviction that Diem's political base had in fact been seriously eroded, and that the DRV-supported Viet Cong posed a vital threat. The intelligence of 1960 is treated in detail in Section C, below; suffice to say for the purposes of this summary, mounting rural violence validated the estimate of the 1959 NIE that a concerted and dangerous Viet Cong attack on the GVN was underway.
GVN Internal Security Indicators in NIE & SNIE, 1958-1961
| | 1958 | 1959 | 1960 |
| Assassinations of GVN Officials & Backers | 193 | 239 | 1400 |
| Kidnappings | 236 | 344 | 700 |
But the most remarkable index of the Viet Cong upsurge was their reported zooming strength:
VIET CONG STRENGTH
1954 - 1964
(Rounded to nearest thousand)
| Year | Main and Local Force (Regulars) | Guerrillas, Self-Defense Units, Secret Self-Defense Units (Irregulars) | Source |
| 1955* | 10,000 | NA | NSC Briefing, 16 March 1956. Open sources give 5-10,000. Weekly Intelligence Digest, 18 May 1956, suggests 10,000 number should be revised to 6-8000. |
| 1956* | 5,000-7,500 | NA | Weekly Intelligence Digest, 10 August 1956. |
| 1957* | 1,000-2,000 | 2,000 | Weekly Intelligence Digest, 30 May 1958; Weekly Intelligence Digest, 18 July 1958. |
| 1958* | April-2,000 | NA | Weekly Intelligence Digest, 19 December 1958. |
| 1959* | 2,000 | NA | NIE 63-59, 26 May 1959. |
| 1960 | April-4,000 Sept.-7,000 Dec.-10,000 | 3,000 (SNIE 63.1-60) | Weekly Intelligen ce Digest, 17 February ~ SNIE 63.1 -68, 3-5,000 regulars. |
| 1961* | June - 15,000 Sept. - 16,000 - 17,000 | NA | Weekly Intelligence Digest, 13 October 1961; Weekly Intel- ligenc e Digest, 20 October 1961. |
| 1962* | 23,000 | NA | Current Int elligence We ekly Summary, OCI 2 November 1962. |
| 1963** | June - 25,000 | NA | Southeast Asia Military Fact Book, DIA!J CS. |
| 1964** | June - 31,000 Dec - 34,000 | 72,000 | Based on MACV data. Data not retroactively adjusted. |
* Estimate of Viet Cong strength for this period is subject to great uncertainty. The numbers here should be treated as order of magnitude.
** Add approximately 40,000 in the Viet Cong "infrastructure". The infrastructure is defined as the PRP, PRP Central Committee, and the NLF. See MACV, Monthly Order of Battle Summaries, for a discussion. Also add 23-25,000 in Administrative Service, i.e., staff and technical service units subordinate to various headquarters.
​The statistical picture presented above of an insurgent force declining in numbers from 1954 through 1959, and then mushrooming rapidly in 1960 and thereafter, is obviously misleading. What U.S. intelligence focused on in the immediate aftermath of Genva were the remnants of the Viet Minh military force following the regroupment. These, whatever their strength, probably represented only a fraction of the numbers of former Viet Minh in active opposition to the GVN after 1956, and apparently did not reflect the total numbers of armed dissidents from 1957 onward, nor the locally recruited political and logistic apparatus which supported the Viet Cong "armed propaganda teams," or guerrilla bands. The phenomenal growth of the Viet Cong, given the low estimates on infiltration from North Vietnam (some 5,000 through 1960), means either than the DRV cadres were extraordinarily effective in organizing and motivating rural people among whom U.S. intelligence detected little unrest through mid-1960, or that U.S. estimates were low. The latter seems probable.
Much of what the United States knows now about the origins of the insurgency in South Vietnam rests on information it has acquired since 1963, approximately the span of time that an extensive and effective American intelligence apparatus had been functioning in Vietnam. Before then, our intelligence was drawn from a considerably more narrow and less reliable range of sources, chiefly Vietnamese, and could not have supported analysis in depth of insurgent organization and intentions. It is surprising, therefore, that from 1954 to 1960 U.S. intelligence estimates at the national level correctly· and consistently estimated that the threat to GVN internal security was greater than the danger from overt invasion. They pegged the Viet Cong general offensive as beginning in late 1959, with some preparations noted as early as 1957. In general, they were critical of Diem, consistently expressing skepticism that he could thread his way through recognized internal political difficulty. To be sure, the same estimates misjudged the numerical and political strength of the Viet Cong, the extent of popular disaffection, and miscalculated the ability of the GVN to cope with the Viet Cong. But as strategic intelligence, U.S. estimates were remarkably sound.
B. U.S. Policy and Programs, 1954-1960
   "The Diem Government's resistance to communist demands for all-Vietnam elections, under the Geneva Accords, and its success in achieving internal security increase the likelihood of enlarged communist subversive efforts. This underlines the necessity of assisting the Diem Government to develop further counter-measures with considerable emphasis on police and para-military forces and civic action … The Vietnamese are increasingly critical of the general orientation and specific procedures of our aid program. Their request for an increased emphasis on capital development with consequent dimunition of the flow of consumer goods entering the country will require careful review …
a. NSC 5612/1
   "Although Communist policy now emphasizes non-military methods, the danger of overt aggression will remain inherent so long as Communist China and North Viet Nam continue a basically hostile policy supported by substantial military forces. There is only a cease-fire in Viet Nam and sporadic hostilities continue in Laos … At present overt aggression and, except in the cases of Viet Nam and Laos, militant subversion are less likely than an intensified campaign of Communist political, economic and cultural penetration in the area."
NSC 5612/1 laid out the following objectives for Vietnam:
   "Assist Free Vietnam to develop a strong, stable and constitutional government to enable Free Viet Nam to assert an increasingly attractive contrast to conditions in the present Communist zone."
   "Work toward the weakening of the Communists in North and South Viet Nam in order to bring about the eventual peaceful reunification of a free and independent Viet Nam under anti-Communist leadership."
   "Support the position of the Government of Free Viet Nam that all-Viet Nam elections may take place only after it is satisfied that genuinely free elections can be held throughout both zones of Viet Nam."
   "Assist Free Viet Nam to build up indigenous armed forces, including independent logistical and administrative services, which will be capable of assuring internal security and of providing limited initial resistance to attack by the Viet Minh."
   "Encourage Vietnamese military planning for defense against external aggression along lines consistent with U.S. planning concepts based upon approved U.S. policy, and discreetly manifest in other ways U.S. interest in assisting Free Viet Nam, in accordance with the SEATO Treaty, to defend itself against external aggression."
   SUPPLEMENTARY STATEMENT OF POLICY
   on
   THE SPECIAL SITUATION IN NORTH VIETNAM
   "Treat the Viet Minh as not constituting a legitimate government, and discourage other non-Communist states from developing or maintaining relations with the Viet Minh regime."
   "Prevent the Viet Minh from expanding their political influence and territorial control in Free Viet Nam and Southeast Asia."
   "Deter the Viet Minh from attacking or subverting Free Viet Nam or Laos."
   "Probe weaknesses of the Viet Minh and exploit them internally and internationally whenever possible."
   "Exploit nationalist sentiment within North Viet Nam as a means of weakening and disrupting Sino-Soviet domination."
   "Assist the Government of Viet Nam to undertake programs of political, econonic and psychological warfare against Viet Minh Communists."
   "Apply, as necessary to achieve U.S. objectives, restrictions on U.S . exports and shipping and on foreign assets similar to those already in effect for Communist China and North Korea."
b. NSC 5809
In 1958, NSC 5612 was reviewed, and the portions on Vietnam reapproved without significant change. Proposed revisions, underlined below, indicated increased awareness of the GVN's deteriorating internal security:
Otherwise, however, the new policy paper (NSC 5809 of April 2, 1958) was identical to its 1956 predecessor.
In late May of 1958 the Operations Coordinating Board submitted a progress report on U.S. programs in Vietnam which held that "in general we are achieving U.S. objectives in Viet-Nam." Among major operating problems facing the U.S., the report cited Vietnam's continued dependence on foreign aid: "In spite of some evidence of greater economic stability, Viet-Nam continues to depend on foreign aid, the largest part of which goes to support the military establishment. U.S. aid still accounts for approximately 85 percent of imports in two-thirds of the budgetary revenues." Also cited were the "political and security problems of the Viet-Nam Government":
   "President Ngo Dinh Diem's policy of strict control in the political and economic fields has caused a certain amount of internal dissatisfaction. Should the President's exercise of personal authority develop too far there may be danger that the resultant frustration of government officials might weaken the united support for his regime which the situation requires. Otherwise, the President's stern police measures and his emphasis on internal security have led to some criticism of the government. This emphasis on internal security stems from the recent emergence of the country, continuation of communist-inspired violence and subversion, and such incidents as the assassination of local officials in rural areas of southern Vietnam … "
The OCB report took up the note that the U.S. should "encourage and assist elements of the Army of Vietnam to establish and utilize specific anti-subversive guerrilla formations and operations," but stated that anti-guerrilla operations interfered with the efficient training of the army:
   "Viet-Nam. While continuing reorganization and training along U.S. lines the Vietnamese Armed Forces ... are still conducting operations against fragments of dissident sects and Viet Cong guerrillas. These military operations have succeeded in practically eliminating the Binh Xuyen and Cao Dai forces. The Hoa Hao, operating along the Vietnamese-Cambodian border, even though small, still give the Vietnamese some embarrassment and required the employment of a small portion of the Vietnamese Army against their operations. The over-all success against these anti-government forces has facilitated the release of the majority of the Vietnamese units from pacification missions, thus increasing emphasis on unit training and the concomitant increased effectiveness of the armed forces. In addition, the activation of two corps headquarters within the army was completed last month and has resulted in a more satisfactory command structure which will materially increase the combat efficiency of the army.
In 1959 U.S. policy papers began to emphasize that GVN preoccupation with internal security interfered with its ability to prosecute other desired programs, and particularly that economic development lagged what was "politically necessary" to "compete" with the DRV. The following is from the OCB Progress Report of January 7, 1959:
   "A. SUMMARY EVALUATION
   "32. Developments related particularly to a U.S. course of action to assist Free Viet-Nam to develop a strong, stable and constitutional government which would work toward the weakening of the communists in both North and South Viet-Nam. President Diem remained firmly in control despite some political dissatisfaction with his government … The communists and dissidents continued their campaign of assassinations, especially of officials in rural areas and carried out attacks aimed at disrupting Viet-Nam's economic progress. Although the government gave increasing attention to development of the economy, such development continued to be inhibited by almost pre-emptive military requirements which utilized a substantial portion of Viet-Nam's total resources, including U.S. aid …
   "B. MAJOR OPERATING PROBLEMS FACING THE UNITED STATES
   "33. Diem's Internal Political Position. Diem increased his travels throughout the country for the purpose of popularizing his regime. Increasing accomplishments of the government in the economic and social field s should also have beneficial political results. Nevertheless, the failure of the government to fully rally certain elements of the middle class, the intellectuals and former officials to its support, the frustration and restlessness of some of the present officials, and some ​discontent in the army are sources of political weakness. This dissatisfaction is caused primarily by the authoritarian and pervasive political controls of the Ngo family and its associates.
   Status of U.S. Actions: The desirability of liberalizing political and administrative controls is brought to the attention of the Vietnamese Government, when considered appropriately by the U.S. Ambassador. Possible lines of U.S . action are greatly limited due to the extreme sensitivity of Vietnamese leaders on this subject.
The subsequent OCB Progress Report of August, 1959--by which time the insurgency was spreading rapidly--illustrates well the policy difficulties of the United States in responding to the situation within the constraints of the Geneva Settlement. The report noted that the GVN:
c. Public Statements
Despite the increasingly pessimistic intelligence, however, and despite the notations in NSC reports of formidable problems in Vietnam, the public statements of Administration spokesmen, through August 1959 presented a generally sanguine picture of U.S. programs there. For example, in November, 1957, Ambassador Durbrow and General Williams appeared before a subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Operations and reported that Diem's government "had made remarkable progress." However, they did report that "Communists and sect remnants have regrouped and stepped up their terrorist activities in the past, several onths, and the Communists are infiltrating down the sparsely inhabited Meking Valley and are becoming fairly active, particularly in the south. For this reason, [Diem] still has to use considerable number of his armed forces and a large number of his police force to carryon pacification work. Because of the terrorist activities in the fertile Delta area, the peasants, through fear or intimidation, cannot till their fields properly and thus produce more rice and other exports … " The Ambassador stressed that Diem was aware of the problem -- indeed, acutely aware -- but that he was impelled to defer all other considerations to the creation of an environment of security. The Ambassador quoted Diem as follows: "If we don’t have assurances on the security front, what good will it do to build up the economy only to have it destroyed by Communist terrorists?" The Ambassador described Diem as "a devoted, honest, hard-working, Nationalist with a fine understanding of the internal political situation as well as the international political picture, particularly in Asia; but in consideration of his preoccupation of [security] he moves slowly in these fields …
In March 1958 Admiral Felix B. Stump, USN, Commander in Chief, Pacific, appeared before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations to testify for the Mutual Security Act of 1958. Admiral stump invited one of his questioners on Vietnam to visit the country on the conviction that "he would be astonished at the improvement that has taken place. It has been beyond what would have been our wildest and most optimistic ​dreams three years ago to see what has happened in South Vietnam." The Admiral also reported that while the Hoa Hao were still presenting difficulties in some areas, the Binh Xuyen and the Cao Dai were "pretty well eliminated."
But U.S. policy in Vietnam did not again achieve the status of a national issue until the summer of 1959, when a Scripps-Howard newspaperman published a series of articles alleging that the U.S. aid program in Vietnam was ill-directed, encumbered by waste and delay, and administered by bumbling, plush-living bureaucrats. Both the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the House Committee on Foreign Affairs thereupon conducted hearings, and Ambassador Durbrow and General Williams were among the Administration officials called to testify. The picture presented in their testimony was so roseate that Senator Mansfield, for one, was inclined to look for an early termination of U.S. aid:
   "SENATOR MANSFIELD. It would be correct to say, would it not, that a principal purpose of U.S. policy in Vietnam has been to prevent Communist aggression from the north?
   "MR. DURBROW. That is one of our basic policies, sir.
   "SENATOR MANSFIELD. And in a general way, another principal purpose has been to foster internal political and economic stability in South Vietnam, is that correct?
   "MR. DURBROW. Correct.
   "SENATOR MANSFIELD. Still another would be to maintain friendly ties with the Vietnamese?
   "MR. DURBROW. Yes, sir.
   "SENATOR MANSFIELD. You have instructed the various missions along these lines, have you not?
   "MR. DURBROW. I have sir.
   "SENATOR MANSFIELD. Have you ever instructed them to the effect that one of our purposes was to encourage the development of conditions of economic self-support in Vietnam which would enable us to reduce and eventually eliminate grants of aid?
   "Before you answer that, I want to compliment General Williams for what he had to say relative to his contacts with
   the Vietnamese Government, because he has told them, if I remember his words correctly, that he was there to work himself out of a job.
   "Mr Ambassador?
   "MR. DURBROW. That is one of the principal jobs we are doing there. We work on this at all times, working out the projects and plans for aid needed, discussing them with the Vietnamese officials and trying to do all we can to build up a sound basic economic structure so that they will become economically independent.
   "I might add that this is the goal of all of these newly-developing countries and, particularly, Vietnam.
   "The President has said to all of us many times:
   "We are grateful for your aid, but we hope we can get on our feet as soon as possible," and that is one of the principal objectives we are trying to carry out.
   "SENATOR MANSFIELD. You are to be commended for it. That is a sound statement.
   "So far as the aid programs are concerned, we have sought to achieve our various objectives, have we not, primarily through support of the Vietnamese armed forces and by assistance in the rehabilitation of the Vietnamese economy."
   "SENATOR MANSFIELD. Now, Mr. Durbrow, in the opening statements at this hearing we have had a picture drawn of some very significant changes in the situation in Vietnam since 1955.
   "We know, for example, that in that year the survival of a free Vietnam and a free Vietnamese Government was still in grave doubt; was that a correct statement?
   "MR. DURBROW. Quite correct.
   "SENATOR MANSFIELD. The stability of the government was threatened by the Binh Xuyen, by dissident political-religious sects such as the Hoa Hao and the Cao Dai.
   "There was a very Substantial armed Communist Vietminh underground in the south; is that correct?
   "MR. DURBROW. Not only in the south, sir; they were concentrated down there, but they were allover the country, the Communists, in particular.
   "The sects were in the southwest basically, and in Saigon, but as far as the Binh Xuyen is concerned, they were primarily in the Saigon-Cholon area.
   "SENATOR MANSFIELD. Yes.
   "There was little real military strength to resist a Vietminh invasion from the north had it come about at that time?
   "MR. DURBROW. Very little, sir.
   "SENATOR MANSFIELD. South Vietnam was a war-prostrated area with very extensive devastation?
   "MR. DURBROW. Quite correct. There is still evidence of that, sir.
   "SENATOR MANSFIELD. There were hundreds of thousands of refugees from the north waiting to be resettled, the figure being somewhere between 600,000, the official figure, and 1 million?
   "MR. DURBROW. Correct.
   "SENATOR MANSFIELD. These conditions have changed in significant degree in the past 4 years, have they not?
   "MR. DURBROW. Very much so."
   "SENATOR MANSFIELD. And there is a far greater degree of internal stability and security in Vietnam than there was in 1955?
   "AMBASSADOR DURBROW. Very definitely.
   "SENATOR MANSFIELD. I should like to read into the record at this point a statement by Maj. Gen. Samuel L. Myers, former Deputy Chief of MAAG in Vietnam. General Myers stated on April 17 of this year, and I quote:
      'The Binh Xuyen group was completely eliminated as a menace. The Cao Dai group was pacified or reoriented through political means to a point where it ceased to be any considerable obstacle. The Roa Rao had been reduced to a handful of the diehards still holding out against the Government and still conducting extremely limited armed raids and assassinations. The Vietminh guerrillas, although constantly reinforced by men and weapons from outside South Vietnam, were gradually nibbled away until they ceased to be a major menace
      to the Government. In fact, estimates at the time of my departure indicated that there was a very limited number of hostile individuals under arms in the country. Two territorial regiments, reinforced occasionally by one or two regular army regiments, 'were able to cope with their depredations.'
   "That would indicate a far greater degree of internal stability in Vietnam than that which existed 4 years ago; would it not?
   "MR. DURBROW. Yes, sir.
   "SENATOR MANSFIELD. I read further from Major General Myers' statement. Speaking of the Vietnamese armed forces, he says, and I quote:
      'They are now able to maintain internal security and have reached the point where that responsibility could be turned over to the civilian agencies. If there should be renewed aggression from the north on the part of the Vietminh, they can give a really good account of themselves. There are many Vietnamese who are even more optimistic than that statement implies and feel that they have the capability of counterattack.'
   "That statement would indicate, would it not, considerable reduction of the danger of invasion from the north as it existed 4 years ago, or at least a far greater capacity to cope with it; would it not?
   "MR. DURBROW. I would say the latter, sir.
   "SENATOR MANSFIELD. A far greater capacity to cope with it?
   "MR. DURBROW. Because there are still Communists around, the danger is always there, ever present. But the possibility of countering it is much greater than it was before …
   "SENATOR MANSFIELD: What is the nature and purpose of military aid in Vietnam at the present time?
   "GENERAL WILLIAMS (Chief, MAAG, Vietnam). I would answer that in this way: The purpose of military aid in Vietnam is to enable the Vietnamese armed forces to provide for the internal security of their country and act as a deterrent against outside aggression.
   "SENATOR MANSFIELD. Would that explanation hold for 1955 as well?
   "GENERAL WILLIAMS. Yes, sir …
   "SENATOR MANSFIELD. Assuming no drastic change in the general situation in Indochina, what do you see in the next 4 years as to the requirements of military aid in Vietnam? Are they likely to be substantially higher, are they likely to continue to be reduced in size or do you think they will remain just about the same? This calls for an estimate and an informed guess.
   "GENERAL WILLIAMS. I would like to caution that what I say now will be a guess, based, however, on past experience and considered judgment.
   "I would say that for 1960 the military budget should be practically the same as 1959. I should think beginning in 1961, I hope not later than 1961, it should start to decrease again."
4. Program Data.
U.S. aid programs in Vietnam through the Eisenhower Administration are summarized below:
U.S. AID FOR SOUTH VIETNAM (Millions of Dollars by Fiscal Year)
| FY Obligations | 1946- 1954 | 1955 | 1956 | 1957 | 1958 | 1959 | 1960 | 1961 | 1955- 1961 |
| Economic Grants | 825.6 | 322.4 | 185.0 | 257.2 | 187.6 | 187.9 | 170.6 | 137.3 | |
| Loans | --- | --- | 25.0 | 25.0 | 1.5 | 19.5 | 11.4 | 13.2 | |
| Sub-total | 825.6 | 322.4 | 210.0 | 282.2 | 189.1 | 207.4 | 182.0 | 150.5 | 1543.6 |
| Military Grants | 709.6 | --- | 167.3 | 110.5 | 53.2 | 41.9 | 70.9 | 65.0 | 508.8 |
| Total | 1535.2 | 322.4 | 377.3 | 392.7 | 242.3 | 249.3 | 252.9 | 215.5 | 2052.4 |
| FY Economic Aid Expenditures | 825.6 | 129.1 | 192.8 | 251.3 | 212.3 | 179.2 | 181.2 | 146.4 | 1292·3 |
This program was among the largest in the world, reflecting a U.S. commitment sufficiently deep to assert a high priority for Vietnam among the numerous claimants for U.S. aid. From FY 1946 through FY 1961, Vietnam was the third ranking non-NATO recipient of aid, and the seventh worldwide; in FY 1961, the last Eisenhower program, South Vietnam was the fifth ranking recipient overall (behind India, Korea) Brazil, and Turkey):
| | U.S. Economic and Military Aid, FY 1946-1961 ($ Millions) | U.S. Economic and Military Aid, FY 1946-1961 ($ Millions) |
| | Recipient | Total |
| | France | 9,394 |
| | U.K. | 8,639 |
| | Italy | 5,664 |
| | Germany | 4,999 |
| | Korea | 4,958 |
| Vietnam -- | China | 4,150 | -- 3,588 |
| Vietnam -- | Turkey | 3,484 | -- 3,588 |
| | Greece | 3,225 |
| | India | 3,115 |
| | Netherlands | 2,449 |
| U.S. Economic and Military Aid, FY 1961 ||
| | India | 669.8 |
| | Korea | 472.2 |
| | Brazil | 328.3 |
| | Turkey | 318.9 |
| | Vietnam | 215.5 |
| Source: Agency for International Development, U.S. Foreign Assistance, June 1, 1945 - June 30, 1961 (Revised March 21, 1962), 2-4. ||
In per-capita assistance, Vietnam also ranked high in comparison with its Asian neighbors.
U.S. Aid, 1960 :
| Recipient | Aid per Inhabitant |
| Laos | $17.00 |
| Vietnam | 13.70 |
| China | 12.50 |
| Korea | 8.60 |
| India | 1.90 |
| Thailand | 1.20 |
| Source: Scigliano, op. cit., 112. ||
A recent study of U.S. assistance establishes that of all U.S. economic aid programs for less developed countries, 1945 to 1965, Vietnam has been the fifth ranking recipient and the sixth ranking per capita. In the decade 1956 to 1965, Vietnam was the fourth ranking recipient and the fourth per capita.
​The relative importance of Vietnam in the U.S. world-view is further attested to by the fact that MAAG Vietnam, though limited in size out of regard for the Geneva Accords 1955-1960, was the only military aid mission commanded by a Lieutenant General. MAAG strength was held at 342 (plus 350 personnel in TERM), but the U.S. economic aid mission grew rapidly over the years, becoming by mid-1958, the largest in the world:
FOUR LARGEST U.S. ECONOMIC AID MISSIONS (As of 31 May 1958)
| | ICA Employees | Contract Employees | Total |
| Vietnam | 183 | 372 | 555 |
| Korea | 305 | 168 | 473 |
| Pakistan | 177 | 204 | 381 |
| Iran | 220 | 93 | 322 |
Source: Montgomery, op.cit., 177.
However, it has been argued that despite this largesse of treasure, technical help, and goods, the U.S. failed to provide for Vietnam's security precisely because its aid emphasized security, rather than ameliorating those economic and social problems which formed the basis for popular discontent. It is certainly true that the bulk of U.S. assistance was concentrated on security. Although from the table above Military Grants comprised only 25% of the total U.S. program 1955-1961, more than 75% of the economic aid the U.S. provided went into the GVN military budget. Out of every $10 of U.S. economic aid the U.S. obligated for Vietnam, about $8 were extended through an import-subsidization program. The U.S. would purchase goods with dollars outside Vietnam, sell them to Vietnamese importers for piasters, and then deposit this local currency in a drawing account for the GVN. This defense supporting assistance was very crucial to Diem, since in the period 1956-1960, some 43% of GVN public expenditures were allocated directly to the military for the armed forces and Self-Defense Corps (Scigliano, op.cit., 113).
U.S. DEFENSE SUPPORTING AID FOR GVN Calendar Year
| Local currency | 1955 | 1956 | 1957 | 1958 | 1959 | 1960 | Total |
| Deposits | 167.1 | 239.4 | 256.0 | 203.4 | 170.2 | 181.8 | 1218.4 |
| Withdrawals in Support of GVN Defense Budget | 97.1 | 202.5 | 204.5 | 152.9 | 176.0 | 166.6 | 999.6 |
Source: RAC-TP-232, op.cit., II, 20-21.
​As may be seen by comparing the totals above with the table on total U.S. aid, (ignoring the calendar year-fiscal year differences in accounting):
| A. | FY Economic Obligations 55-61 | 1543.6 |
| B. | FY 55-61 Economic Aid Expenditures | 1292.3 |
| C. | Local Currency Deposits | 1218.4 |
| D. | Withdrawals for Defense | 99.6 |
| C/B is 94%; D/B is 77%; C/A is 79%; and D/A is 65%. |||
Approximately 94% of all money expended on U.S. aid found its way into counterpart funds, and of these expenditures about 77% went into the GVN defense budget. Hence, the GVN spent more than two-fifths of its total revenues, including over three-quarters of the funds it obtained from the U.S., on security.
The 23% or so of remaining U.S. economic aid was allocated principally to "project aid",
U.S. ECONOMIC AID TO VIETNAM (Millions of Dollars)
| | 1955 | 1956 | 1957 | 1958 | 1959 | 1960 | 1961 |
| Total Economic FY Obligations | 322.4 | 210.0 | 282.2 | 189.1 | 207.4 | 182.0 | 150.5 |
| Total Project FY Obligations | 7.2 | 22.7 | 48.9 | 29.3 | 36.4 | 28.9 | 13.4 |
| %Project Aid | 2.2 | 10.8 | 17.3 | 15.5 | 17.6 | 16.0 | 8.9 |
| Source: | Montgomery, op.cit., 289. | Montgomery, op.cit., 289. | Montgomery, op.cit., 289. | Montgomery, op.cit., 289. | Montgomery, op.cit., 289. | Montgomery, op.cit., 289. |
The 1959 Project Aid program was, like that of the other years, broken down among the following major categories:
U.S. ECONOMIC AID TO VIETNAM, 1959 (Thousands of Dollars)
| | Amount | % of Project Aid |
| Food and Agriculture | 2,498 | 6.8 |
| Industry and Mining | 2,042 | 5.5 |
| Transportation | 21,355 | 58.5 |
| Labor | 7 | .2 |
| Health and Sanitation | 1,936 | 5.3 |
| Education | 1,443 | 3.9 |
| Public Administration and Safety | 3,983 | 10.8 |
| Community Development, Social Welfare, Housing | 0 | 0 |
| Technical Support | 2,704 | 7.4 |
| General and Miscellaneous | 486 | 1.3 |
| | 36,434 |
Source: Ibid
The predominance of aid to transportation in 1959 was typical of the other years:
TOTAL PROJECT AID, 1955-1961 (Thousands of Dollars)
| | Amount | % of Project Aid |
| Food and Agriculture | 16,622 | 8.9 |
| Industry and Mining | 15,520 | 8.3 |
| Transportation | 75,921 | 40.7 |
| Labor | 76 | --- |
| Health and Sanitation | 16,086 | 8.6 |
| Education | 9,296 | 5.0 |
| Public Administration and Safety | 26,437 | 14.2 |
| Community Development, Social Welfare, Housing | 8,641 | 4.6 |
| Technical Support | 12,260 | 6.6 |
| General and Miscellaneous | 6,045 | 3.2 |
| Total Project Aid | 186,904 |
Source: Ibid
Even these figures conceal a further concentration on security. The "public administration" funds (14% of total) went chiefly to the police and state security services. The "transportation" category supported mainly the road building program, and while roads aided the economy, the routes were chosen for "strategic, military" purposes. For example, General Williams opposed ​President Diem's plan to rebuild the coastal highway to Hue, and succeeded in asserting priority for a road into the Pleiku area of the Highlands. General Williams acceeded to only so much of the Saigon-Hue road (Highway No.1) as extended to Bien Hoa (some 20 miles north of Saigon) because "there is no road out of Saigon now that could take care of heavy military traffic and will not be until Bien Hoa Highway is completed."
The 20-mile stretch of highway to Bien Hoa cost more money than all project aid allocated for labor, community development, social welfare, health, and education in the years 1954-1961.
​C. Recognition of Crisis, 1960
1. Country Team Assessment, March, 1960
By January 1960 communist terrorism and guerrilla action moved in U.S. estimates from the status of a long run threat to the viability of the Diem regime to crisis status as the GVN's "number one problem." In a long "Special Report on Internal Security Situation in Vietnam" (Incl 1 to Despatch #278 from Saigon, 7 March 1960), the U.S . Mission in Saigon submitted an appreciation of the problem which highlighted so many characteristics of the difficulties confronting Diem. and U.S. policy that were to prove critical in subsequent years that it deserves extensive quotation and precis:
Internal security had once again become the primary problem of the GVN as a result of: (1) "intensification of Viet Cong guerrilla and terrorist activities"; (2) "weaknesses apparent in the GVN security forces"; and (3) "the growth of apathy and considerable dissatisfaction among the rural populace." "The situation has grown progressively more disturbing since shortly after the National Assembly elections at the end of August 1959, despite the fact that President Diem was claiming, to the end of December, that internal security was continuing to improve."
a. "Viet Cong Activity"
Government operations had intens ified during the spring of 1955 when it increased its forces engaged in internal security operations, added precautions taken by the GVN during the period prior to and immediately following the August 30 National Assembly elections further suppressed VC activity. The upswing in VC operations first showed up in a sharp increase in assassinations and kidnappings in the last half of September. Where the total for assassinations in 1958 had been 193, there were 119 assassinations in the last four months of 1959 (for a yearly total of 233); in January 1960, there were to be 96 civilians killed and in February, 122. Meanwhile, significant Viet Cong attacks on GVN military forces also began in September, revealing characteristics on both the Viet Cong and GVN sides that were to become dishearteningly familiar in the next five years:
It was incidents like this and "particularly an attack on an ARVN regimental post near Tay Ninh in January, that brought on "the full impact of the seriousness of the present situation":
   "The Viet Cong attack on the Vietnamese Army installation near Tay Ninh on January 26 is a dramatic illustration of the increasingly aggressive tactics of the Viet Cong and of the difficulty the GVN is having in controlling the internal security situation. The audacity of the Viet Cong in conducting the attack, the likelihood of VC infiltration into ARVN, the indications of secret support of the VC by some of the local populace, the successful planning and coordination in carrying out the attack as opposed to apparent failure of ARVN which had been told there might be an attack to be sufficiently alert for such an attack and effectively counter once the attack had been launched, are indications of many of the problems faced by the GVN and discussed in this report." (Ibid, p. 1)
Armed propaganda operations involving large numb ers of Viet Cong in daylight were a third category of Viet Cong activities.
   " … The fact that the VC can, and have on a number of occasions, entered fair sized communities, spent several hours or a day propagandizing the population and then retired without meeting GVN resistance would indicate that the VC have an effective 'intelligence system." (Ibid, p. 5)
Behind all this activity were verbal indications of DRV intent:
   "In May 1959, the Central Committee of the Lao Dong Party passed a resolution or statement stating that the struggle for reunification would have to be carried out by all 'appropriate measures'. British observers have taken this to mean measures other than peaceful.
   "'You must remember we will be in Saigon tomorrow, we will be in Saigon tomorrow', these words were spoken by Premier Pham van DONG in a conversation with French Consul Georges-Picot on September 12, 1959.
b. "ARVN Weaknesses"
   " … Numerous high-ranking GVN officials have very recently stressed the necessity of more anti-guerrilla training for the security forces. From a military point of view an outstanding deficiency in the GVN effort has been the government's inability, or lack of desire, to recognize the follovling factors:
   (1) It is actively engaged in an internal war and, therefore, must take the measures which this situation entails .
   (2) There is a great need for a strong central military cow~and with wide powers for the conduct of internal security operations in the unpacified areas.
   (3) There is a need for a capable, well-equipped, well-trained, centrally-controlled Civil Guard to take over from the Military in pacified areas.
(The splitting of responsibility for internal security between the Province Chief, who controlled Provincial forces, and the military chain of command controlling ARVN was a constant complaint by MACV during the later Diem period.)
c. "Political Factors"
   " … The VC reportedly estimate that 70% of the people in the rural areas of South Viet-Nam are either embittered by or indifferent toward the present government … " (Ibid., p. 8)
   "It is highly unlikely that any final solution can be found to the internal security situation in South Viet-Nam if the GVN does not enjoy the support and cooperation of the rural population. At the present time indications are that the rural population is generally apathetic towards the Diem Government and there are signs of considerable dissatisfaction and silent opposition. In part this attitude appears to result from wide-spread fear of the Viet Cong and a belief that the GVN is relatively helpless to protect the rural population from Viet Cong depredations. Unfortunately the longer serious insecurity continues to exist in the countryside despite GVN efforts to control it, the more serious is the effect on the GVN’s prestige. Another effect is a growing belief among the peasants that the Viet Cong will always be here as long as North Viet-Nam remains under Communist control and that they must adjust to live with them. (A realization of the long-range nature of the problem among officials responsible for dealing with it could be an advantage. In Malaya it has taken 11 years to reduce the security situation to the minimum, and it is even more difficult to deal with it in a divided country with long exposed frontiers).
   "There appear to be other reasons contributing to the difficulty experienced by the GVN in attempting to rally the rural population:
   (a) Until recently it was becoming more and more apparent that Diem was not being given accurate information on the internal security and political situation in rural areas. As late as the end of December, 1959, he was telling all callers how much better the internal security situation had become, despite many doubts raised by his listeners. Information was apparently being presented to him by local officials ​in such a manner as to reflect well upon the officials giving it. The President's trips to the provinces have appeared to be carefully 'laid on' by local officials. The President himself cannot be absolved entirely from the blame, however, since his system of personal rule which permits direct appeal from the individual provincial authorities to himself, in a sort of intra-executive check and balance system, serves to further weaken the administrative apparatus.
   "Recently, however, as indicated in the subsequent section on 'GVN Reactions', the Vice President and others who are not his usual informers on security matters have spoken frankly with him and he now seems well aware of the situation.
   (b) Provincial and district authorities exercise almost autonomous control in the areas under their jurisdiction. Too often the personnel holding these positions have been incompetent, having been chosen for reason of party loyalty. Moreover, some have tended to view their jobs as a means to personal advancement or financial gain often at the cost of the population under their control. Press editorials have attacked local officials for extorting money from peasants, using torture to wring false confessions from innocent people and conducting themselves in such a manner as to reflect adversely on the prestige of the national government. In addition rumors continue to circulate among the population concerning the alleged nefarious activities of and favoritism shown to members of the Can Lao party. While officials have be en largely unable to identify and put out of commission Viet Cong undercover cadres among the population, they have often arrested people on the basis of rumors or of denunciations by people who harbor only personal grudges. Police powers justified on the basis of the needs of internal security have reportedly been misused to extort money not only from the peasants but from land owners, merchants and professional people in the towns. This misuse of police powers and the kind of broad scale arrests on suspicion are weakening the support of the population for the regime. On the other hand, the application of swift, summary justice (such as the Special Military Tribunals were created to hand out) designed to protect the population against the Viet Cong threat, if carefully administered and 'advertised' as such, can do much to restore a feeling of security;
   (c) While the GVN has made an effort to meet the economic and social needs of the rural populations through community development, the construction of schools, hospitals, roads, etc., these projects appear to have enjoyed only a measure of success in creating support for the government and, in fact, in many instances have resulted in resentment. Basically, the problem appears to be that such projects have been imposed on the people without adequate ​psychological preparation in terms of the benefits to be gained. Since most of these projects call for sacrifice on the part of the population (in the form of allegedly 'volunteer' labor in the case of construction, time away from jobs or school in the case of rural youth groups, leaving homes and lands in the case of regrouping isolated peasants), they are bound to be opposed unless they represent a partnership effort for mutual benefit on the part of the population and the government. (See subsequent section on 'GVN Reactions' for indications of Diem's current awareness of this problem.)
2. Special National Intelligence Estimate, August 1960
The Country Team report on internal security concluded that Diem was now aware of the gravity of the problem and was taking some countermeasures. But the inadequacy of his response was recognized in a Special NIE of 23 August 1960 (SNIE 63.1-60). The VC terrorism had continued to intensify: in the first five months of 1960, 780 government officials and sympathizers were assassinated by insurgents. Since January armed attacking units had been operating over wider areas than at any time since 1954.
   " … Support from North Vietnam appears to have increased over the past several months. In particular, senior cadres and military supplies such as communications equipment are believed to be moving south through Laos and Cambodia and by junk along the eastern coastline." (SNIE 63.1-6-0, p. 3)
But along with this further increase in communist pressure came increasing threats to stability from non-communist quarters reminiscent of the 1954-55 period:
   " … At the same time, grievances against the government, which have long been accumulating, have become increasingly urgent and articulate."
Throughout this August estimate, dual threats from communist and domestic opposition were presented in parallel, with priority ​going to the non-communists. In its discussion of Diem's political, problems, this estimate followed closely the analysis of the Mission report of six months earlier. The problems were seen as not only continuing, but intensifying:
   "Discontent with the Diem government has been prevalent for some time among intellectuals and elite circles and) to a lesser extent) in labor and urban business groups. Criticism by these elements focuses on Ngo family rule, especially the roles of the President's brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, and Madame Nhu; the pervasive influence of the Can Lao, the semi-clandestine apparatus of the regime; Diem's virtual one-man rule; and the growing evidence of corruption in high places. In late April, 18 prominent Vietnamese publicly petitioned Diem to 'liberalize the regime) expand democracy, grant minimum civil rights, (and) recognize the opposition in order to let the people speak without fear.' This unprecedented public attack on Diem by a non-Communist group may embolden other urban elements to become more vocal.
   "A new and even more important element in the political situation is the growing criticism of Diem's leadership within government circles, including the official bureaucracy and military; this criticism has become more intense than at any time since 1956. Since the early part of this year, Vice President Tho, other members of the cabinet, and middle echelon officials have made known their serious concern over Diem's handling of the internal security problem and have privately criticized the power and influence exerted by Nhu and his entourage. In addition, there is considerable uneasiness concerning the operations and activities of the Can Lao organization.
   "Although most of the Vietnamese peasants are politically apathetic, they also have their grievances against the government. These include the ineptitude and arrogance of many local and provincial officials, the lack of effective protection from Viet Cong demands in many parts of the country, the harshness with which many peasants have been forced to contribute their labor to government programs) and the unsettling economic and social effects of the agroville (government-sponsored settlements) program. As a consequence, Diem's government is lacking in positive support among the people in the countryside." (Ibid., pp. 1-2)
Although the estimate confirmed that Diem had become concerned over the deteriorating internal security situation, he appeared still to underestimate the non-communist political threat:
After this discussion of the political situation, the estimate discussed the Viet Cong pressures as: "aggravating many of the government's problems." (Ibid., p. 2) (Underlining added) The earlier report on internal security had commented, lilt is not completely clear why the DRV has chosen this particular time to mount an intensified guerrilla campaign in South Vietnam," (Saigon 278, p. 2) and had advanced several hypotheses including Diem's view that it represented "a somewhat desperate attempt to disrupt the progress of South Vietnam," in the face of steady GVN progress and DRV failure to interfere successfully with the National Assembly elections in August. The list of hypotheses in March did not include the possibility that the communists might have judged that the political situation within SVN had significantly deteriorated (earlier foreseen as the likely occasion for an increase in overt communist activities), but the August estimate emphasized this possibility.
   " … The indications of increasing dissatisfaction with the Diem government have probably encouraged the Hanoi regime, supported and guided by the Chinese Communists, to take stronger action at this time … given '… a sizable and effective indigenous guerrilla apparatus responsive to Communist control'; and 'a government lacking in positive support from its people';" (SNIE 63.1 -60, p. 3)
The estimate concluded with the pregnant comment that:
   "In countering the Viet Cong challenge, Diem faces many of the same problems which confronted the French during the Indo-China War …
Some relevant portions of much earlier U.S. intelligence estimates might be recorded here:
   "Despite these advance s [which included 'the relocation of scattered villages in the Delta into centralized and defensible sites' as 'an important step toward the eventual "pacification" of heavily infiltrated areas' and increases in the size of the Vietnamese National Army] Vietnam still lacks the degree of ​political strength essential for the mobilization of the country's resources … elected local councils have no real power, promised land reform and other social and economic reforms which might generate popular support had not left the planning stage and the Vietnamese government is handicapped by incompetent cabinent ministers and the lack of competent administrators." (NIE 9 of 4 June 1953, p.3)
Seven years later, the estimate of August 1960 was pointing out:
   " … Viet Cong guerrilla units have succeeded in exploiting their natural advantages of surprise, mobility, and initiative. In many of their areas of operations, they have exploited the tendency of the largely passive population to accommodate to their presence and thereby avoid reprisals. In some areas of operations, however, they have obtained the active cooperation of the local population." (SNIE 63.1-60, p. 3)
   "In the absence of more effective government measures to protect the peasants and to win their positive cooperation, the prospect is for expansion of the areas of Viet Cong control in the countryside, particularly in the southwestern provinces.
   "Dissatisfaction and discontent with the government will probably continue to rise unless the security situation improves and unless Diem can be brought to reduce the corruption and excesses of his regime . . . "
The conclusions of the estimate were the most ominous since 1956:
   "Developments within South Vietnam over the past six months indicate a trend adverse to the stability and effectiveness of President Diem's government … "
The U.S. view of its policy in Vietnam could not yet be said to be "crisis management"; but a crisis was portended.
3. Contrasting DOD and State Appreciations
The August SNIE notwithstanding, however, subsequent analyses appearing in the Department of State and the Department of Defense disclosed differing views on the relative urgency of the threat to Diem from communist machination as opposed to simple rebellion. In general, Department of Defense papers tended to emphasize the threat from rural, communist-led insurgents, and to highlight relative military capabilities; Defense papers usually deprecated the significance or urgency of non-communist political dissent in South Vietnam. In contrast, analyses by the Department of State in Washington and Ambassador Durbrow in Saigon recognized, at least in principle, the importance of both the military threat posed by the VC, and the problems which stemmed from Diem's political insolvency. Department of Defense analyses, therefore, usually regarded proposals· by State or Saigon which aimed at pressuring Diem into a more enlightened domestic policy as being competitive with measures to improve internal security. The Pentagon and its field commands tended to regard military assistance to Diem as the key to the situation. Indeed, the Pentagon tended to oppose U.S. leverage on Diem because it might jeopardize his confidence in the U.S. and cooperation from him which was essential to improve his military posture.
The divergence in view sketched above emerges in several papers written not long after the 30 August 1960 SNIE. For example, alarmed by the ominous conclusion of the SNIE's Deputy Secretary of Defense Douglas asked ASD/ISA for comments and recommendations on how to remedy the "deteriorating situation in South Vietnam." As input for the reply, Brigadier General Edward G. Lansdale, OSO/OSD, one of Ngo Dinh Diem's earliest U.S. advisors, wrote a memorandum holding that:
To the end of meeting the threat from the Viet Cong, Lansdale suggested (among other items):
   " … The emphasis of the MAAG function should be shifted from purely training and organizational advice in preparation for defense against external aggression to include on-the-spot advice and assistance in the conduct of tactical operations against the Viet Cong." (Underlining added)
   " … Concomitantly, the MAAG should be staffed to a greater extent with officers skilled in the conduct of counter-guerrilla operations and who are capable of operating in the field. This might include Marines for amphibious instruction on Mekong River operations …"
   " … During the emergency, the Civil Guard should be temporarily put under the Ministry of Defense in order to integrate the activities of the ARVN and the Civil Guard. The Ambassador's concern that the Civil Guard will lose all identity as a civil police force, if this action is taken, is invalid, providing a strong US position to the contrary is announced and maintained." (Ibid., pp. 1-2)
(Subsequent development of the Regional Forces, which grew out of the Civil Guard after transfer to the Ministry of Defense in December 1960, showed this particular concern of the Ambassador to have been a valid one -- whatever the countervailing advantages of the move -- in that its role and capabilities as a police force atrophied almost entirely; no "strong U.S. position to the contrary" was, however, taken by MAAG, AID, or CAS.)
   " … Emphasis on civic action type activities by the ARVN should be encouraged and advisory and material assistance in this field furnished through MAP and ICA channels."
   " … Most importantly for the purpose of strengthening the morale of the Vietnamese, President Diem should be informed as soon as possible through appropriate channels of the gravity with which the US government views the internal security situation, of our intent to provide material assistance, and of our unswerving support to him in this time of crisis." (Underlining added) (Ibid., p. 2)
Meanwhile, Ambassador Durbrow in Saigon proceeded to elaborate upon the various political threats described in the August 30 SNIE. A week after the August 1960 SNIE was published, Ambassador Durbrow ​found it appropriate to send an assessment of the potentialities of various groups for coups and demonstrations in the short run. Among these were:
   "1. Peasants. Various factors discontent exist such as lack of adequate protection against communist attacks and pressures, low prices paddy, compulsory labor on agrovilles and other projects, and arbitrary methods of authorities. Diem has taken some steps to try alleviate sources of discontent (our G-79) but it is important he take others because peasantry represent key to success or failure communist guerrilla warfare in countryside and thus to gradual undermining of regime. However, any sudden demonstration or coup against GVN likely to center in Saigon and seems improbable that peasantry in view lack organization, transport problems, etc. would play significant role therein." (Saigon 538 to SecState, 5 September 1960, p. 1, Section 1 of 2)
(It is worth noting that this list of peasant grievances against the regime, like most such analyses by CIA or State, includes a number of separate factors, of which "lack of protection against communist attacks and pressures" is only one. This assessment of peasant attitudes toward the GVN was in some contrast to: (a) other analyses, particularly originating in the Department of Defense, but also from Diem himself, emphasizing lack of security as the single significant peasant grievance, or the overwhelmingly predominant one, or the basis of the others; and (b) effective U.S . advice and influence, which increaSingly centered upon the security problem.)
Urban groups, including labor and students (who were just beginning to show political ferment) were judged unlikely to begin a demonstration but increasingly likely to join one begun by other oppositionists either within or outside the government. Dissatisfaction with the regime existed even among Catholic refugees, some of this stemming "paradoxically … from what they feel is too heavily Catholic leadership of regime (with potential reaction to follow) … " (This worry appeared less paradoxical in the summer of 1963.)
As for the Army:
   " … Some discontent exists because of political promotions and favoritism throughout armed forces structure. Some disturbing indications of possible development spirit frustration and defeatism in fight against Viet Cong also received, such as statement allegedly made by General Duong Van Minh that for every Viet Cong killed by armed forces government creating ten in their rear; however indications are that generals remain imbued by non-political approach and that discontent is not of such
   proportions that any general is ready to take initiative in leading coup. We cannot of course exclude· emergence of a 'Kong Le' from ranks below general but key units in and around Saigon are commanded by officers believed to be close and loyal to Diem." (Saigon 538 to SecState, 5 September 1960, Section 2 of 2, p. 1)
Two months later, in November 1960, an abortive "Kong Le" coup came close to succeeding, led by LTC Nguyen Chanh Thi, one of those believed to have been most close and loyal to Diem.
The cable concluded that:
   " … Real possibility demonstrations in Saigon exist … any demonstration more likely to be initially loyal protests calling for changes in policies and personnel around Diem but could develop into anti-Diem riot … " (Ibid., p. 2)
Ten days later, Durbrow sent a long analysis of the threats confronting Diem, with recommendations for counter-measures, as a precursor to presenting Diem with strong U.S. representations on the need for changes. This discussion well expressed the complex problems in which Diem was enmeshed, all of which had to be met adequately if the regime was to survive; and it was an unusually explicit listing of the sort of "reforms," so often alluded to since the Eisenhower letter of October 1954, felt to be required if the Diem regime were to be politically viable.
   "As indicated our 495 and 538 Diem regime confronted by two separate but related dangers. Danger from demonstrations or coup attempt in Saigon could occur earlier; likely to be predominantly non-communistic in origin but communists can be expect ed to endeavor infiltrate and exploit any such attempt. Even more serious danger is gradual Viet Cong extension of control over countryside which, if current communist progress continues, would mean loss free Viet-Nam to communists. These two dangers are related because communist successes in rural areas embolden them to extend their activities to Saigon and because non-communist temptation to engage in demonstrations or coup is partly motivated by sincere desire prevent communist take-over in Viet-Nam.
   "Essentially two sets of measures required to meet these two dangers. For Saigon danger essentially political and psychological measures required. For countryside danger security measures as well as political, psychological and economic measure s needed. However both sets measures should be carried out simultaneously and to some extent individual steps will be aimed at both dangers." (Saigon 624 to SecState, Section 1 of 2, 16 September 1960, p. 1, underlining added)
and his political position."
   " … I realize some measures I am recommending are drastic and would be most unpolitic for an Ambassador to make under normal circumstances. But conditions here are by no means normal. Diem government is in quite serious danger. Therefore, in my opinion prompt and even drastic action is called for. I am well aware that Diem has in past demonstrated astute judgment and has survived other serious crises. possibly his judgment will prove superior to ours this time, but I believe nevertheless we have no alternative but to give him our best judgment of what we believe is required to preserve his government. While Diem obviously resented my frank talks earlier this year and will probably resent even more suggestions outlined below, he has apparently acted on some of our earlier suggestions and might act on at least some of the following … " (Ibid., p. 2)
Limiting his recommendations to the political and economic sphere, since other messages had dealt with security recommendations, Durbrow suggested measures, including:
   " … Rumors about Mr. and Mrs. Nhu are creating growing dissension within country and seriously damage political position of Diem Government. Whether rumors true or false, politically important fact is that more and more people believe them to be true. Therefore~ becoming increasingly clear that in interest Diem Government some action should be taken. In analagous situations in other countries as important, useful government personalities have had to be sacrificed for political reasons. I would suggest therefore that President might appoint Nhu to Ambassadorship abroad.
   " … Similarly Tran Kim Tuyen, Nhu's henchman and Head of Secret Intelligence Service, should be sent abroad in diplomatic capacity because of his growing identification in public mind with alleged secret police methods of repression and control." (Ibid., p. 3)
   " … One or two cabinet ministers from opposltion should be appointed to demonstrate Diem's desire to establish Government of National Union in fight against VC.
   " … Make public announcement of disbandment of Can Lao Party or at least its surfacing, with names and positions of all members made known publicly. Purpose this step would be to eliminate atmosphere of fear and suspicion and reduce public belief in favoritism and corruption, all of which party's semi-covert status has given rise to.
   " … Permit National Assembly wider legislative initiative and area of genuine debate and bestow on it authority to conduct) with appropriate publicity) public investigations of any department of government with right to question any official except President himself. This step would have three-fold purpose: (A) Find some mechanism for dispelling through public investigation constantly generated rumors about government and its personalities; (B) Provide people with avenue recourse against arbitrary actions by some government officials; (C) Assuage some of intellectual opposition to government.
   " … Require all government officials to declare publicly their property and financial holdings and give National Assembly authority to make public investigation of these declarations in effort dispel rumors of corruption."
   " … Adopt following measures for immediate enhancement of peasant support of government: (A) Establish mechanism for increasing price peasant will receive for paddy crop beginning to come on market in December) either by direct subsidization or establishment state purchasing mechanism; (B) Institute modest payment for all corvee labor; (C) Subsidize agroville families along same lines as land resettlement families until former on feet economically; (D) Increase compensation paid to youth corps. If Diem asks how these measures are to be financed I shall suggest through increased taxes or increased deficit financing) and shall note that under certain circumstances reasonable deficit financing becomes a politically necessary measure for governments. I should add that using revenues for these fundamental and worthy purposes would be more effective than spending larger and larger sums on security forces, which, while they are essential and some additional funds for existing security forces may be required, are not complete answer to current problems." (Saigon 624 to SecState, Section 2 of 2) 16 September 1960) pp. 1-2) underlining added)
Finally, in requesting State Department approval for an approach to Diem along these lines, Durbrow concluded with a recommendation on the nature of the political objectives the U.S. should set with respect to the GVN:
   "We believe U. S. should at this time support Diem as best available Vietnamese leader, but should recognize that overriding U.S. objective is strongly anti-communist Vietnamese government which can command loyal and enthusiastic support of widest possible segments of Vietnamese people, and is able to carry on effective fight against communist guerrillas. If Diem's position in country continues deteriorate as result failure adopt proper political, psychological, economic and security measures, it
   may become necessary for U.S. government to begin consideration alternative courses of action and leaders in order achieve our objective." (Ibid., p. 3, underlining added)
In its reply (Deptel 581 to Saigon, 7 Oct 60), the state Department concurred on the necessity of an approach to Diem on moves to increase his popular support. Among other comments, it was suggested that Durbrow state that after thorough study it was his " … carefully considered view GVN will face increasingly difficult internal political situation unless dramatic moves made to reverse present deteriorating trends. Small or gradual moves not repeat not adequate." On the question of Nhu and Tuyen, "since this important demarche would be most unpalatable," careful handling was stressed.
   " … Agree main point should be that whether rumors true or false we are convinced that if they ignored, regime likely lose support it needs in struggle against Communists and that in all governments, such decisions have to be made … convinced decision regarding Nhu and Tuyen would remove major cause of resentment against regime. It would, we believe, increase support of Diem within the GVN and among the educated classes. Support these groups is as necessary as support of peasants … " (Deptel 581 to Saigon, 7 Oct 60, underlining added)
Among other suggestions, the Department proposed that Diem fix and announce a date on which villages would be asked to elect at least some of their own officials. In connection with Diem’s program of agrovilles, the Department raised problems that were to recur repeatedly in the context of the later program in strategic hamlets.
   "Suggest inform Diem we agree agroville program good way meet security problem but are concerned re execution. Urge he announce corvee labor on agrovilles and elsewhere be paid and agroville families receive some aid (possibly rice) during period readjustment (could be less than in High Plateau since Delta peasants still produce rice their own fields.) If he asks how such measures to be paid for, concur suggested reply re higher taxes and deficit financing. Devaluation should also be emphasized. Diem might announce heavier taxes on rich for benefit peasants and agroville program. You might inquire whether training program for Vietnamese administrators and technicians should be increased to provide personnel needed for agrovilles and other ins ecure areas . Also might inquire re status information teams assigned to explain to peasants why they should leave homes and tombs ancestors to go to agrovilles." (Ibid., underlining added)
(From these implied criticisms of the execution of the agroville concept, it could be -- correctly inferred that many of the defects ​in "implementation" later associated with the strategic hamlet program were already discernible in the administration of the agrovilles by the Diem regime.)
One dissent by the Department from Durbrow's recommendations was on the Can Lao:
   "As to surfacing or abolishing Can Lao suggest that to ask for this and removal Nhus and Tuyen simultaneously would be too much … If considered necessary, question could be raised later." (Ibid.)
On 14 October} Ambassador Durbrow had his opportunity for frank discussion alone with Diem. He began by reading, in French, a 14-page paper containing the suggestions agreed to by the Department.
   " … Before reading text I stated that on October 13 I had been in Viet-Nam for three and one half years, had found my assignment edifying, interesting, and most worthwhile. I mentioned solid and worthwhile progress I had noted in country since 1957 and congratulated President on his many fine accomplishments. I then stated that since I admired his courage and determination I personally desired to do all I could to help him} particularly in these trying times. I added I personally, and other friends of his here as well as those in Washington, have been giving much thought about how we might be helpful to him. Results of our thinking led to conclusion that we could be most helpful if we should make several suggestions which I could put to him in a frank manner as a friend. I then read the paper.
   " … When I finished reading President stated that most of suggestions I had made conformed to his basic ideas, but added as much as he would like to put these into effect} stepped-up activities of the Viet Cong made it most difficult. He added that many people have been intimidated by Viet Cong and some had been won over so that it would be difficult to carry out some of steps regarding countryside. I replied while I realized difficulties I was firmly convinced after most careful consideration that it essential now to take many if not all of these suggested steps on a calculated risk basis in order to creat the psychological shock which I believed essential at this time. President made no further comment except to tell me that he would consider the. suggestions I had given him.
   "I then again begged his indulgence and asked if I could bring up a most sensitive and delicate matter which I felt in his interest and in interest of Viet-Nam I should discuss very frankly. From notes in French which I read but did not leave
   with him, (copy by pouch) I discussed growing criticism of his brother and Madam Nhu, as well as Dr. Tuyen and suggested that they should be assigned abroad. Diem did not interrupt me but assumed somewhat grim, and I detected, slightly hurt manner. His only comment was that these rumors about the Nhus were spread by communists. I replied that I was sure that communists were doing all they could to spread such rumors but I repeated that the unfortunate part about it is that more and more people are believing these reports - Vietnamese loyal to him, those who might be considered in the opposition, foreign civilians and foreign diplomats to say nothing of the press. I repeated, as I had previously, these reports were seriously damaging prestige of his regime.
   "After discussing the Nhus, I again apologized, first of all for bringing up this personal and sensitive subject, as well as the other suggestions I had made. I again asked his indulgence and forgiveness for speaking so frankly and added I hoped he would understand that I was talking as a sincere friend." (Saigon 802 to SecState, 15 October 1960, corrected copy)
The same day, September 16, 1960, as the Ambassador's recommendations for a political demarche to Diem, the JCS informed CINCPAC and the Chief of MAAG that they and the Deputy SecDef had approved a CINCPAC draft plan for counterinsurgency operations by the Government of South Vietnam. This had its origins in CINCPAC's staff study of April 26, 1960, subsequently endorsed by the JCS on June 6, 1960, with the recommendations:
   "a. That appropriate U.S. Government Departments and agencies encourage the Vietnamese and Laotian Governments to adopt a national emergency organization to integrate civil and military resources under centralized direction for the conduct of counter-insurgency operations.
   "b. That these U.S . departments and agencies encourage the Vietnamese and Laotian Governments to develop coordinated national plans for the progressive reduction of Communist influence.
   "c. That these U.S. Government departments and agencies be authorized and directed to support the training for and conduct of emergency operations … "
   "e. That the U.S . Government provide sufficient materiel and budgetary support to insure the successful accomplishment of these emergency campaigns.
   "The JCS also recommended that the Secretary of Defense initiate the action to obtain such U.S . Government support of counter-insurgency operations in Laos and Vietnam." (CINCPAC study and JCS memorandum 232-60, June 6, 1960, enclosed in letter, Rear Admiral E. J . O'Donnell, USN (Director, Far East Region, ISA, Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense), to J. Graham Parsons (Assistant Secretary of state for Far Eastern Affairs), September 16, 1960, secret (file 611.5lK); cited in Department of State, Division of Historical Policy Research, Research Project No. 630, January 1965, Recent American Policy and Diplomacy Concerning Vietnam, 1960-1963, pp. 10-11)
   "'encouraging the Government of South Vietnam to adopt a national course of action designed to reduce the growing threat of Communist insurgent actions' was vital to the continued freedom of that country and an important action 'to preclude the necessity for implementing U.S. or SEATO war plans.'" (Cited in Department of State Research Project No. 630, January 1965, "Recent American Policy … ," op. cit.)
The draft plan fonvarded to MAAG stressed organizational matters, including the formation of a National Emergency Council and a Director of Operations to integrate civil and military efforts and formulate the Vietnamese National Counter-Insurgency Plan, with sub-councils at regional, provincial and village levels, but concluded with a concept of operations:
   "(1) Politico/Military Operations. In order to provide protection which the people require, it is necessary to exercise more than an ordinary degree of control over the population. Among the more important operations required are those for exercising control in such manner as to isolate insurgents and sympathizers from the support of the populace. Such techniques as registration and identification, food control, and control of movement, should be implemented as offering the best prospects for success. Control measures instituted should require support by psychological warfare and information programs to gain and maintain popular confidence and support.
   "(2) Military Operations. An effective continuing defensive system should remain in place, with a capability for reinforcing the permanent local security establishment since it is not sufficient temporarily to defeat or suppress insurgents or to establish control in one area and then move the counter-insurgency forces to a new area thus allowing insurgents to
   re-establish themselves. The regular military establishment of South Vietnam has the capability to fight either guerrillas or external aggressors. Militia type home guards and civil guards should be trained and equipped. Accelerated efforts should be undertaken to develop the para-military and police forces. For the duration of the emergency campaign, operational control of all security activities should be under centralized direction. Border and Coastal Patrol operations, being fundamental to the campaign to prevent insurgents receiving support from areas outside of South Vietnam, should be closely coordinated with Vietnamese ground, air, and naval operations in the counter-insurgency campaign. These operations should also be coordinated with Cambodia and laos, as feasible." (Defense 982994 to CINCPAC, 162156z Sep 60)
The State Department, accepting the recommendations of the Department of Defense, sent a State-Defense message instructing the Ambassador of the country team to develop an overall plan
   " … for encouraging and supporting GVN in national emergency effort defeat insurgents and bring about order and stability in that country. Such action determined necessary in order check disruptive influences which could cause disintegration of the Government and the possible loss of South Viet-Nam to Communist Bloc." (Deptel 658 to Arrillnbassy Saigon, 19 October 1960)
Before making known such a plan to the GVN it would be reviewed in Washington and a U.S. position established. {{quote|After these somewhat differing analyses of the problem had been recorded, an abortive coup by troops which had been regarded as among the most loyal in ARVN, the airborne brigade, appeared to validate concerns (expressed by the State Department and the August 30 SNIE) over non-communist dissatisfactions with the Diem regime. Yet Washington interpretations of the coup and its aftermath were that it confirmed not only the Ambassador, but his critics within the DOD in their respective convictions.
Ambassador Durbrow described certain measures of reform promised by Diem after the coup but commented:
   "It is hoped that these reforms are not just reforms on surface with little or no substance. Despite these Signs, there is basically quite serious under-current malaise and skepticism whether effective reforms will be taken soon enough. This uneasy feeling not confined to intellectuals or opposition groups; but to sizeable number of others, i.e., cabinet
   Ministers, other loyal officials, deputies and some military. Nhu and Thuan have indicated that Diem, who not particularly interested fundamental political matters is resisting some suggested basic reforms." (From Saigon 1151, 4 December 1960)
The Ambassador reiterated the emphasis in his September analysis both upon the threat from non-communist quarters and the measures necessary to reduce it; however, it was apparent that one effect of the coup had been to make one of the most important measures, the transfer of Nhu, politically infeasible at the time.
   "Just below surface there is much talk about another coup unless Diem relaxes some controls, puts in effective reforms, takes more effective action to fight VC and give protection to population. There is still strong under-current of resentment against entourage but because any action he took this score would be under pressure and indicate weakness, and particularly his resentment of press stories about entourage, coupled with fact Diem feels he needs Nhu as loyal adviser, prospects Diem will transfer Nhu to other work or abroad not in sight, at least for some time. Despite this malaise and feeling about entourage, most critics still respect Diem as only leader at moment but this feeling could easily change unless he takes fairly drastic action to meet criticism and basic desires most strata population.
   "We believe also that Unless Diem takes early effective action on political front, coup has increased chances for development neutralism and for anti-Americanism among those critical of GVN. Despite our close identification with Diem and his regime critics have not to date bracketed us with government in expressing their dissatisfaction. Many have told us however that only we can induce Diem adopt changes which will save his regime, thus indicating they look to us to help them . If, after failure of clearly anti-Communist coup attempt to bring about changes we are not successful in inducing Diem to make peaceful changes, critics may we ll become frustrated, turn against U.S., seek other means bring about change and might even move toward neutralist position in middle. If Viet Cong guerrilla successes in countryside continue at rate registered during past year, this will also increase frustration of armed forces and population and could provide soil in which neutralism may grow." (Ibid., pp. 2-3)
Since Diem was assuring the mission he was working on reforms, the Ambassador concluded " … we should not at moment press too hard," but it was still necessary to take appropriate ​opportunities to urge Diem and others to adopt at least the most important suggestions of his demarche of October 14; moreover, the Ambassador now emphasized the necessity for leverage, as well as persuasion, in inducing him both to institute political reforms and to accept the basic principles of the MAAG Counter-Insurgency Plan:
   "Since it far from certain Diem will introduce sufficiently appealing and effective new programs and use his present security forces in most efficacious manner, we must find suitable means to bring pressure on him. As I outlined in Embtel 1105 as well as in memorandum this subject (letter to Parsons Nov 8,) I am convinced, even if we eventually should agree, that we should not now accord his request for 20,000 additional force or concur in his unilateral action to raise force level (Chief MAAG 1537 Dec 1 - copy JCS). To do so without his having relaxed controls, instituted effective reforms and having permitted efficient use present forces, would not save the day for Diem but might even induce him follow his instinct to rely primarily on use of force both to control population and fight VC. While I am not fully convinced need for extra 20,000 men, I would be willing to concur in such addition if careful study by all concerned concurred in this recommendation. (MAAG views on urgent need for 20,000 increase forwarded Parsons my letter Nov 30th) therefore, suggested this matter be carefully studied Washington and if final recommendation is favorable it be kept secret as ace in the hole to grant Diem provided he has taken other necessary steps which are to me much more fundamental, and provided he needs extra force after taking more essential steps. If, for instance, at the beginning next year he has taken effective steps along lines suggested above and it is still considered he needs increased force level we could so inform him then. But in meantime, in view his threat to raise force level unilaterally, I should be instructed soonest to taut suitable opportunity to state while force level increase is under consideration Washington cannot now see its way clear to grant such increase when other more important steps are essential at pres e nt in fight against VC and to make further progress Viet-Nam.
   "In summary, situation in Viet-Nam is highly dangerous to US interests. Communists are engaged in large-scale guerrilla effort to take over countryside and oust Diem's Government. Their activities have steadily increased. in intensity throughout this year. In addition Diem is faced with widespread popular dissatisfaction with his government's inability to stem the communist tide and its own heavy-handed methods of operation. It seems clear that if he is to remain in power he must meet
   these two challenges by improvements in his methods of conducting war against communists and in vigorous action to build greater popular support. We should help and encourage him to take effective action. Should he not do so, we may well be forced) in not too distant future, to undertake difficult task of identifying and supporting alternate leadership." (Saigon 1151 to SecState, 4 December 1960, Section 2 of 2, pp.2-3)
At the same time that Durbrow turned to an emphasis on pressure, his dispatch contained strong hints that U.S. ability to influence Diem and his immediate entourage without pressure might have declined, as an immediate result of the abortive coup and the perceived relation of the U.S. to it.
   "Nhu and Diem still deeply rankled particularly by critical American press stories about autocratic regime and entourage, and Diem made the ridiculous statement to Ladejinsky November 30th that he believes some Americans may have backed coup because one of coup leaders, Colonel Dong, 'told him so during negotiations.' This may represent rationalization blame others not selves … " both Nhu and Diem now expressing deep displeasure because Americans equated Diem regime with rebels because both anti-Communists and therefore we urged both sides negotiate. While under circumstances their attitude understandable, we have made point clear to them that we did all in our power to prevent that he should be given active role in any government established … " (Ibid., Section 1 of 2, p. 2)
At best, a state of affairs in which Diem believed we had been sympathetic to a rebellion against him could only be ominous for our relationship with him, and Durbrow implicitly acknowledged this in recommending a conciliatory gesture of reassurance, of a type that was to characterize our relations with the Diem regime in subsequent years:
   "Since Diem believes we do not understand seriousness of VC threat and he suspects we may have encouraged rebels, we should make arrangements immediately to ship six H-34 helicopters which are not only most urgently needed fight VC effectively but would reassure Diem we trying give effective help." (Ibid., Section 2 of 2, p. 2)
In the eyes of those who regarded Diem as the indispensable kingpin of effective anti-communist policy in Vietnam, and thus a mutual feeling of confidence and trust between Diem and the U.S. of paramount importance, such a gesture seemed pitifully inadequate -- and, indeed, Durbrow's continuing presence as Ambassador possibly counter-productive -- in the situation prevailing after the attempted coup. For example, another Lansdale memorandum:
​MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
From: BrigGen Lansdale, OSO/OSD .
Subj: Vietnam
As desired by you, I visited Vietnam 2-14 January 1961. After twelve days of intensive looking and listening over some old familiar ground, I have come to the following personal convictions:
a. 1961 promises to be a fateful year for Vietnam.
b. The Communist Viet Cong hope to win back Viett}am south of the 17th Parallel this year; if at an possible, and are much. further along towards accomplishing this objective than I had realized from reading the reports received in Washington.
c. The free Vietnamese, and their government, probably will be able to do no more than postpone eventual defeat - - unless they find a Vietnamese way of mobilizing their total resources and then utilizing them with spirit.
d. The U. S. team in Vietnam will be unable to help the Vietnamese with total effectiveness, unless the U. S. system of their operation is changed sufficiently to free these Americans to do the job that needs doing, and unless they do it with sensitive understanding and wisdom,
e. If Free Vietnam is won by the Communists, the remainder of Southeast Asia. will be easy pickings for our enemy, because the toughest local force on our side will be gone. A Communist victory also would be a major blow to U. S. prestige and influence, not only in Asia but throughout the world, since the world believes that Vietnam has remained free only through U. S. he]p. Such a victory would tell leaders of other governments that it doesn’t pay to be a friend of the U. S., and would be an even more marked lesson than Laos.
f. Vietnam can be kept free, but it will require a changed U. S. attitude. plenty of hard work and patience, and a new spirit by the Vietnamese, The Viet Cong have been pushing too hard militari1y to get their roots down firmly and can be defeated by an inspired and "determined effort.
​g. Ngo Dinh Diem is still the only Vietnamese with executive ability and the required determination to be an effective President. I believe there will be another attempt to :get ·rid of him soon, unless the U. S. makes it clear that we are backing him as the elected top man. If the 11 November coup had been successful. I believe that a number of highly selfish and mediocre people would be squabbling among themselves for power while the Communists took over. The Communists will be more alert to exploit the next coup attempt. At present, most Vietnamese oppositionists believe that the U. S. would look favorably upon a successful coup.
h. Vietnam has progressed faster in material things than it has spiritually. The people have more possessions but are starting to lose the will to protect their liberty. There is a big.1esson here to be learned about the U. S. aid program which needs some most serious study.
Recommendations
Before I left Saigon, I discussed my impressions with Ambassador Durbrow who was most gracious towards me during the visit. Included in these impressions was my feeling that many of the Americans in Saigon perhaps subconciously believed in defeat, probably had spent too much time and energy on the political situation in Saigon instead of on the very real Viet Cong menace, and were in need of some bolstering up by the Chief of Mission. In this feeling of defeat, would have to except the Chief of MAAG and the local CIA Chief who believe we can win. Ambassador Durbrow told me of the memo he had issued to all Americans in Saigon after the 11 November coup attempt. I said this was a good move, but much more than writing a paper was needed.
He asked me what suggestions I had. I said that I didn't have much immediately and would have to do a lot of thinking about it. The situation in Vietnam is not black and white. but a most complex one in all shade s of gray. Many Americans and Vietnamese expected me to come up with some sort of a miracle, to turn Ngo Dinh Diem into an Americanized modern version of the ancient Vietnamese leader Le Loi. However, the task requires more than a gimmick or some simple answer. It will take a lot of hard work and follow-through. In 12 days, all I could do was learn as much as I could and to "plant a seed or two" with Ngo Dinh Diem and other Vietnamese leaders who know that I speak out of deep affection for the free Vietnamese. ​Since leaving Vietnam, I have spent many hours thinking about the situation there. I am far from having a complete proposal to solve the situation. However, I do have some recommendations now for steps which should be taken to start remedying the downhill and dangerous trend in Vietnam. They are:
a. The U. S. should recognize that Vietnam is in a critical condition and should treat it as a combat area of the cold war, as an area requiring emergency treatment.
b. When there is an emergency, the wise thing to do is to pick the best people you have, people who are experienced in dealing with this precise type of emergency, and send them to the spot with orders to remedy the situation. When you get the people in position and free them to work, you should then back them up in every practical way you can. The real decisions will be made in little daily actions in Vietnam, not in Washington. That's why the best are needed on the spot.
c. Our U. S. team in Vietnam should have a hard core of experienced Americans who know and really like Asia and the Asians, dedicated people who are willing to risk their lives for the ideals of freedom, and who will try to influence and guide the Vietnamese toward s U. S. policy objectives with the alarm friendships and affection which our close alliance deserves. We should break the rules of personnel assignment, if necessary, to get such U. S. military and civilians to Vietnam.
d. Under emergency conditions, our aid to Vietnam should be treated as contingency business and be given expedited priority handling until we can afford to take a breathing spell.
e. Ambassador Durbrow should be transferred in the immediate future. He has been in the "forest tigers" which is Vietnam for nearly four years now and. I doubt that he himself realizes how tired he has become or how close he is to individual trees in this big woods. Correctly or not, the recognized government of Vietnam does not look upon him as a friend, believing that he sympathized strongly with the coup leaders of 11 November.
f. The new Ambassador should arrive as many weeks as possible before the April elections, for which the Communists are now actively preparing with their "political struggle" tactics almost unhindered. The nev Ambassador should be a person with marked leadership talents who can make the Country Team function harmoniously and spiritually, who ​can influence Asians through understanding them sympathetically, and who is alert to the power of the Mao Tse Tung tactics now being employed to capture Vietnam and who is dedicated to feasible and practical democratic means to defeat these Communist tactics.
g. Serious consideration should. be given to replacing USOM Chief Gardiner. A number of Vietnamese pointedly answered my questions about Gardiner by talking about his deputy, Coster, while admitting that "Gardiner seems to be a nice man who has fa1len asleep in our climate. "
h. U. S. military men in Vietnam should be freed to work in the combat areas. Our MAAG has a far greater potential than is now being utilized. U.S. military men are hardly in a position to be listened to when they are snug in rear areas and give advice to Vietnamese officers who have attended the same U. S. military schools and who are now in a combat in which few Americans are experienced. MAAG personnel from General McGarr on down expressed desire to get more into real field work; let's give them what they want as far as U. S. permission is concerned and let them earn their way into positions of greater influence with the Vietnamese military in the field.
i. A mature American, with much the same qualifications as those given above for the selection of the next Ambassador, should be assigned to Vietnam for political operations which will start creating a Vietnamese-style foundation for more democratic government without weakening the strong leadership required to bring about the defeat of the Communists. This must not be a "clever" type who is out to gain a reputation as a "manipulator" or a word-smith who is more concerned about the way his reports will look in Washington than in implementing U. S. policy in Vietnam.
j. We must support Ngo Dinh Diem until another strong executive can repiace him legally. President Diem feels that Americans have attacked him almost as viciously as the Communists, and he has withdrawn into a shell for self-protection. We have to show him by deeds, not words alone, that we are his friend. This will make our influence effective again.
K. We must do much, much more constructive work with the oppositionists. I suspect that the U.S. has taught them to be carping critics and disloyal citizens by our encouragement of these traits. They need to put together a constructive program which can save, ​Vietnam from, the Communists by building something worth a man's life to preserve. If it's a good program, we should encourage one strong political opposition to emerge, without endangering the national security. Here is where out political skill needs to be used. This political work is needed as a matter of grave urgency. Unless a constructive outlet is found quickly, the opposition in Saigon is going to explode in violence again and the Viet Cong are wide awake to exploit it this time.
The Communist Threat.
It was a shock to me to look over maps of the estimated situation with U.S. and Vietnamese intelligence personnel, as well as with president Diem who held similar grim views. The Communist Viet Cong now dominate much of the 1st and 5th Military Regions, as well as being active in spots in other regions, according to these estimates. The probable strength of the Communist armed forces in South Vietnam was given to me in various guesses from 3,000 to 15,000. My guess is that the strength is now closer to the latter figure and that only Hanoi knows accurately.
This strength estimate by itself isn't what shocked me. The shocking part was to realize that the thousands of disciplined and trained Communist graduates of "proletarian military science" had been able to infiltrate the most productive area of South Vietnam and to gain control of nearly all of it except for narrow corridors protected by military actions and for a few highly-localized spots where loyal paramilitary forces (Civil Guards and Self-Defnese Corps) have undertaken inspired counter-guerrilla actions or where villagers work closely with the military.
The Viet Cong have the initiative and most of the control over the region from the jungled foothills of the High Plateau north of Saigon all the way south down to the Gulf of Siam, excluding the big city area of Saigon-Cholon. This is Vietnam's "bread-basket" where most of its rice and rubber are grown.
Unlike the Philippines or Malaya, the Communists cannot be cordoned off at the country's borders and then dealt with as an internal security problem alone. The borders of Vietnam are long and include some of the most difficult terrain in the world to patro1. It is apparent that many of the Viet Cong infiltrate from Cambodia, particularly from Svayrieng Province. Also, southeastern Laos has a reported Communist ​build-up, with RLG forces committed elsewhere, and increasing infiltration into Vietnam is reported.
There is an intense psychological attack being waged against Free Vietnam by the Communists. This not only includes an almost constant barrage from powerful Radio Hanoi, which is reportedly relayed from Cambodia and is received as a loud 2nd clear signal in South Vietnam, but also a heavy campaign by on-the-spot agitprop agents. A part of the psychological attack is directed against Americans, particularly against U. S. MAAG personnel, along the lines of the Chinese Communist "hate America" campaign. I did not have the time or means to assess the effect of this psychological attack which has been going on for years.
The big city area of Saigon-Cholon undoubtedly is a target of Communist operations, although I was able to find out little about either the Communist organization or its operations in this city area. U. S. intelligence personnel believed that Vietnamese counter-intelligence organizations were so actively "hustling" so many suspects that the Communists have been unable to institute much of an organization. President Diem believed that the Communists were concentrating their work elsewhere, following the dictum: "first the mountains, then the countryside, and then the city." The attitude of Vietnamese and U. S. officials reminded me of the French and Vietnamese officials in Hanoi in 1953-54, who were so surprised later to discover that a complete, block-by-block clandestine Communist apparatus existed there. Or, of Filipinos and Americans who believed the Huks were in central Luzon in 1950 and were so surprised when an entire Communist politburo was captured in the city of Manila. I believe that the people in Saigon-Cholon have been the target of considerable subversive effort by the Commanists and that it takes an in-place organization, to carry this out.
Communist strength figures are difficult to determine due in part by the different categories of personnel. I was able to get no estimate of the number of Communist political-psychological operators, although the DRV reportedly have trained many for work in the south. Also. the Communist military personnel include regulars who have infiltrated from the north, plus territorial forces and guerrillas who apparently are recruited locally. Colonel Tranh Thien Khiem, who commands the 5th Military Region, broke his estimate of some 7,000 Viet Cong military in his region into 3,320 regulars, 1,170 territorials, and 2,590 guerrillas. When the Vietminh trcops were transferred to the north in 1954-55 under the Geneva Agreement many left families ​behind in the south, along with stay-behind organizations and arms, caches, Although the pacification campaigns of 1955-56 cleaned up what the Communists had left behind to, some extent, there were remnants remaining which the Viet Cong have since exploited and augmented greatly over the past 5 years.
President Ngo Dinh Diem
President Diem and I are friends. Also, he is a man who put other Vietnamese friends of mine in jail or exiled them. It is hardly a blind friendship.
Prior to my departure from Washington, Jeff Parsons asked if I would please size-up President Diem carefully to see if he had changed much from vhen I had worked with him so closely in 1954-56. In our first meeting, he was a bit cautious with me, I suspected that he was waiting for me to drop Washington's other shoe as a follow-up to the Ambassador's demands that he reform his ways. So, I reminisced on what we had been through together in the past and he joined in, adding the story of the 11 November coup as he saw it. Our meetings: from then on became more like the old days -- with plenty of give and take … but only after I convinced him that I still had affection for the Vietnamese people and was trying to understand their problems before sounding off.
He seems to have a better grasp of economic matters than formerly. Also, I believe he sincerely wants to pass some of his daily burden of work to others, He said that he had found this extremely hard to do, since too many others were soft in carrying out responsibilities or else were too vain to knuckle-down to hard work. This has forced him to over-burden Nguyen Dinh Thuan, Secretary of State for the Presidency, who doesn’t hesitate to make tough decisions when needed, who has had to act as hatchet-man when other s were too soft to get rid of incompetents, and who has been loyal to his boss (although he speaks right up for his ovm views), Vice President Tho is so soft-hearted that he really never takes corrective action against wrong doers. Vu Van Thai is a "blackmailer" by threatening to resign after convincing the Americans that he is the most brilliant Vietnamese in economic matters, although he is a poor executive whose work is in bad shape; if Diem accepted Thai's resignation, the Americans would feel that the Vietnamese Government was going to hell. (Unfortunately, there's some truth in these feelings of Diem's about Tho and Thai). ​I believe President Diem is more screened in by his "palace guard" than he realizes - - but then much the same could be said of other leaders elsewhere. I noted that he still. h3..5 a personal informant net and I managed to talk to some of them privately. The largest influence, but not the only one, is wielded by his brother Ngo Dinh Nhu. However, I found President Diem unusually well informed on the situation in Vietnam, including the bad aspects - - better informed than any other Vietnamese among the many with whom I talked.
In reflecting on Our conversations, I have concluded that most folks who ta1k to him have little empathy for, or sensitive understanding of, him. They fail to realize that Diem is human and doesn't like the idea of people trying to kill him out of hatred; the coup attempt of 11 November opened at 3 a. m. by bursts of heavy machine gun fire into his bedroom in an obvious try at liquidating him in his bed. On top of this, he has now had nearly 7 years of venomous attack by the Commnists who know that he is a major ohstacle which must be destroyed before they can win. This is a daily psychological attack on him in his own country, in his own language, and listened to by his own people. The only way he could shut this off today wou1d be to give up what he, and we, believe in. On top of this, he has criticism heaped on him by many who are simply being destructive, he has administrators who are disloyal or whose varnity is expressed in talking a better job of work than in doing it. And then, to cap the criticisms, he feels that many Americans have contempt for him - - that the U. S. which sould be Vietnam's staunchest friend is somehow taking the same psychological line with him as do the Communists, that somehow our nobly-expressed policies get carried out with much pettiness in actual practice.
If the next American official to talk to President Diem would have the good sense to see him as a human being who has been through a lot of hell for years -- and not as an opponrnt to be beaten to his knees -- we would start regaining our influence with him in a healthy way. Whatever else we might think of him, he has been unselfish in devoting his life to his country and has little in personal belongings to show for it. If we don’t like the heavy influence of Brother Nhu, then let's move someone of ours in clone. This someeone, however, must be able to look at problems with understanding, suggest better solutions than does Nhu, earn a position of influence.
The next-time we become "holier than thou", we might find it sobering to reflect on the DRV. Do the Soviets and the Chinese Communists give Ho Chi Minh a similar hard time, or do they aid and abet him? ​U. S. Political Efforts
The United States has been the main foreign political mentor for Free Vietnam since it became an independent nation. Of course other nations have had their influence. But we were the ones who have spoken with authority, who have held the purse-strings, who trained and advised the government personnel, and to whom most Vietnamese in political life have looked for guidance. It is only human to want to find someone else to blame for what has gone wrong. But. we won't be able to start doing effective political' work until we admit that our own action carry responsibilities with them. There are plenty of Aaron Burr's, a few Alexander Hamilton's and practically no George Washington's, Tom Jefferson’s or Tom Paine's in Saigon today. … largely as a result of our U. S. political influence. This certainly is not the U. S. policy we had hoped to implement.
Ambassador Durbrow seemed genuinely surprised when I told him that the Can Lao Party in Vietnam was originally promoted by the U.S. State Department and was largely the brain-child of a highly-respected, senior U. S. Foreign Service professional. Several weeks after this action was undertaken originally, I learned of it and warned that the benefits were extremely short-term and that great lasting harm could result by a favored party forcing older parties to go underground. However, the decision had been made, the Can Lao party had been started, and we had to start working from that reality. We cannot go back to living in the past and must keep moving ahead, but that doesn't mean that we have to pay forever for our mistakes.
However, the real point is that we don't seem to have very long memories or enough solid feeling of responsibility for out acts, Many U. S. Foreign Service officials leap into attacks on the Can Lao Party. I agree with their reasons. Any thinking American would. But I sure would feel better about it if they could only remember the consequences of their own actions for a few short years - and learn from that memory. I cannot truly sympathize with Americans who help, promote a fascistic state and then get angry when it doesn't act like a democracy.
So, what should we do about it? I have a concrete recommendation. We need an American in Saigon who can work with real skill, with great sensitivity to Vietnamese feelings, and with a fine sense of the dangerous limits of Vietnamese national security in a time of emergency. This unusual American should be given the task of creating ​an opposition party which would coalesce the majority of the opposition into one organization, of helping this new party adopt a platform which contains sound ideas for building national entities which the Vietnamese people would find worth defending against the Communists, and of strongly influencing it to play the role of loyal opposition while President Diem is in power and the nation is in such great danger.
This' work with the opposition is a matter of grave urgency. Unless the energies of the malcontents, the frustrated, the patriots on the outs are quickly channeled into constructive political works, they are going to explode into destructive political work. This opposition situation in Saigon-Cholon is at the bursting point, and there is no safety valve. When it next blows, and if Diem cannot cope with it, the Siagon political scene has all the makings of turning into anarchy. It can happen, and soon.
I saw a number of opposition people, officials of various parties, members of the National Assembly, and disgruntled members of President Diem's administration. They eagerly told me how they were criticizing Diem's actions more and more openly. I asked them what their own program was, other than to seize power for. themselves or to have me pat them on the head for being critics. Few of them had any sensible ideas. I told them they'd better get busy scratching for a better program themselves or else I could only assume that they were being disloyal or treasonous in a time of great national danger. I trust that other Americans talking to these oppositionists will do the same or we will be inviting disaster by listening to this and keeping mum when we should be working like beavers to turn it into constructive channels.
If we .can get most of the oppositionists meeting with each other to try to put together a platform they can all agree on, and can protect such work so that it can be done fairly openly, we will have an extremely useful political action in motion. It will absorb months of political energies which other·wise will go towards the solution of farmed overthrow. A major opposition party once it starts becoming a reality, will tend to make the several governmental groupings such as the Can Lao. MNR, and Nhu's labor organizations start coalescing into one stronger group. In this way, we can help promote a two-party system which can afford to be surfaced, end much of the present clandestine political structures, and give sound encouragement to the development of new political leaders. There are many fine younger patriots who need this sort of a healthy political atmosphere to develop ​Comments
Here are some additional thoughts:
a. President Diem said that Hit hadn't been for the dedicated anti-communism of about a million Catholics, Vietnam could never have kept going this long. Yet his brother, Archbishop Thuc, told me that the refugees from the north (inc1uding many Catholics) had been settled into such remunerative new lives in the south that they had gone soft, no longer wanted to fight, and criticized the government for wanting to continue the war. Also, the Saigon~Cholon area is seething with political discontent while the people are far better off in material possessions than ever before. The shops are full of goods for Tet and the people are buying heavily. Somehow, the U. S. has filled their bellies but has neglected their spirit.
b. Many of the Vietnamese in the cotmtryside who were right up against the Viet Cong terror were full of patriotic spirit. Thosc who seemed to be in the hardest circumstances, fighting barefoot and with makeshift weapons, had the highest morale. They still can lick the Viet Cong with a little help. There's a lesson here on our giving aid. Maybe we should learn that our funds cannot buy friends or a patriotic spirit by mere materialistic giving. Perhaps we should help those who help themselves; and not have a lot of strings on that help.
c. The Viet Cong crowded a lot of action into the year 1960. They infiltrated thousands of armed forces into South Vietnam, recruited local levies of military territorials and guerrillas, and undertook large scale guerrilla and terroristic operations. In so doing. they neglected doing sound political work at the grass roots level and broke one of Mao Tse Tung's cardinal rules. Many people in the south now under their thumb are unhappy about it, but too terrified to act against these new rulers. The Viet Cong apparently have been working hard recently to rectify this error, and now have political cadres in the field. We still have a chance of beating them if we can give the people some fighting chance of gaining security and some political basis of action. Since both of these actions will have to be carried out by Vietnamese forces in their Defense establishment, it is worthwhile to make U. S. help to the Vietnamese in the contested provinces along these sorely needed lines a priority mission of the U. S. military in Vietnam. The political actions should be the implementing of Vietnamese governmental policy by Vietmanese ​force commanders, aided by Vietnamese psychological warfare units. If the U. S. military doesn't ride herd on this, it is apt to be neglected and is too vital to keeping Vietnam free to be made a secondary work.
d. I am passing a copy of this to Admiral Felt at CINCPAC. Suggest that copies be passed also to selected persons In Defense, State, and CIA.
Edward G. LANSDALE
Brigadier General, U.S.A.F.
   " … Would prefer, for moment, put aside questions internal reforms GVN calculated primarily increase its efficiency (such as Internal Security Council) and focus on liberalization since any announcements GVN makes this subject will be matter great public interest … " (Underlining added)
   " … It Embassy's observation events November 11 and 12, whatever their cause, have led to increased atmosphere uneasiness and some doubt projected reforms ~ill be adequate (Embtel 1151). This adds emphasis to basic premise against which, we believe, program of liberalization should be tested: it should be genuine, if limited, liberalization on several fronts to be annoilllced simultaneously … if liberalization not clear cut and genuine and not made on several fronts, public will feel deceived and GVN will "lose rather than gain popular support … " (Deptel 898 to AmEmbassy Saigon, 15 December 1960, pp. 1-2)
The Department picked out several "liberalization" measures from the 14 October demarche, including the right of the National Assembly to investigate the GVN; greater freedom for domestic press; better relations with the foreign press; and several rural measures.
   Durbrow reported on the resulting conversation with Diem:
When the Ambassador told Diem of approval to give him eleven H-34 helicopters as soon as possible) "he made no comment." He rejected notions that the Assembly might investigate executive departments (dismissing Durbrow's comment that we have the same system in America) and then commented on the Department's earlier recommendations with respect to the agroville program:
   " … Although I had not mentioned corvee labor this time, Diem stated this only way collect equivalent of taxes from peasants and that this system is in Vietnamese tradition) but peasants in Cochin-China under French had not been asked to contribute labor. Therefore they now resent corvee labor and of course would not think of paying any monetary taxes. He pointed out peasants in central Viet-Nam willingly contribute free labor instead of taxes. I remarked one reason for discontent in south is arbitrary action of officials and the failure to explain needs to peasants before forcing them to work. Diem insisted peasants had been told of needs but they just lazy." (Ibid.) p. 3)
In view of Diem's expressed attitudes in this area) and the actual practice of his regime in implementing the agroville program) there was scarcely a basis for surprise when U.S. -urged provisions for paying peasants for their labor on the strategic hamlets went generally unfulfilled. In any event) Durbrow's report left little doubt that persuasion in pursuit of liberalizing reforms that Durbrow and State but not Diem) or) it would appear) MAAG or the DOD -- believed essential to counter the Viet Cong, had reached an impasse:
   "On few occasions he let me talk, I urged he adopt reforms soonest since it essential to win further support of the people if Viet Cong menace is to be overcome) but he gave me no indication of reforms he may adopt. Before leaving I again expressed hope that he would accept our suggestion that he announce all liberalizing programs at one time in order to make best impact. Diem replied he would think about this but made no commitment.
   "Comments. We have heard that Nhu, Thuan and others have been running into resistance when urging Diem to adopt worthwhile reforms. I also received impression he very reluctant to adopt reforms and is still basically thinking in terms of force to save the day, hence his insistence several times that
   we approve force level increase and his action raising civil guard ceiling by 10,000. While I still believe it absolutely essential he adopt more liberal programs, it is not certain from his attitude and remarks that he will take effective action in these matters, although I learned later he has agreed to engage the services of a public relations expert suggested by CAS to make a survey of GVN foreign public relations needs." (Ibid., pp. 3-4)
4. The Counterinsurgency Plan (CIP)
The expectations of the Department of Defense for the amelioration of Diem's security Situation, as well as those of State and the Embassy, were embodied in a Counterinsurgency Plan for Vietnam (CIP), prepared over the months April to December 1960, and forwarded to Washington for approval on 4 January 1961 (Saigon despatch 276, date cited). The CIP represented a considerable evolution in the U.S. concepts of how to cope with Vietnam's internal security. During 1959 and early 1960, Diem, recognizing the precariousness of his position, had begun to experiment with the structure of his security forces, seeking to find a mix of police, paramilitary, and regular military forces capable of countering the Viet Congo The U.S. MAAG, Vietnam, though constantly handicapped by personnel ceilings imposed out of respect for the Geneva Accords, had labored to build a modern national army, capable of both delaying invading forces from North Vietnam and of coping with internal threats; in the pre-1960 MAAG view, Diem was trifling with his army. In early 1960 the US decided, ​Geneva and the ICC notwithstanding, to amalgamate the Temporary Equipment Recovery Mission (TERM) with the MAAG; action was initiated to obtain ICC concurrence. Early in May the press learned of this plan, and a story was published that "the US is doubling its military training staff in South· Vietnam and stepping up the training of Vietnamese troops for guerrilla warfare against Communist terrorists:" The release stated that:
   "The decision reflects concern about the mounting strength and boldness of Communist bands which are raiding the villages and assassinating Vietnamese officials. However, US military and diplomatic officials said the Communist campaign is not a 'crisis' and in itself, is not likely to become a major threat to the government of President Ngo Dinh Diem. Guerrilla warfare specialists will be included among the 350 additional military trainee officers and men sent to Vietnam."
On 5 May 1960, the day this story was released, Senator Mansfield wrote, a letter to General Williams in Saigon quoting the press dispatch, and asking the General to explain:
   "I do not mind telling you that I was personally very impressed with that portion of your testimony which suggested to me that you were directing the military aid program in a fashion which was, wisely, aimed at working MAAG 'out of a job' and that you had about reached the point where the scaling down could begin. Therefore, it came as something of a surprise to me to learn … that we intend to double the training staff of MAAG in Vietnam by adding to it 350 men."
General Williams' reply (MAAG Saigon, telegram to OSD/ISA, MAGCH-CH691, of 200711Z, May 1960) informed the Senator of the MAAG-TERM merger, but went on to say:
   "It is my personal opinion MAAG should and can work itself 'out of job' with possible reduction approximately 15% in June 1961 and approximately 20% reduction yearly thereafter. Depending of course on readings taken at subsequent dates."
General Williams' ideas, however, were not integrated into the CIP. He left Saigon prior to the completion of the plan, and in any event the mounting intensity of the internal war precluded any further consideration of "phased withdrawal" before 1962.
​a. General McGarr Replaces General Williams
A study prepared at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, dated 10 June 1960, noted that:
   "From a loose conglomeration of combat battalions and various supporting units under French command in 1954, and under the aegis of, and with the impetus furnished by the U.S. MAAG, the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces have evolved into a balanced defense force. This force consists of 3 corps, with 7 infantry divisions (tailored to meet the existing situation in Vietnam, rather than 'mirroring' U.S. or other divisions) and supporting arms and services, together with small but appropriate naval and air forces … These total forces have the mission of (1) maintaining internal security (eventually to become the primary mission of the civil guard and other civil security forces when these organizations reach a satisfactory state of organization, training and equipment, at which time the armed forces will become the 'back-up' force), and (2) providing limited initial resistance to attack from Communist North Vietnam … The President [Diem] continues to organize military units outside the aegis, and contrary to the advice, of the U.S . MAAG. These non-U. S.-supported units are of questionable value and tend to drain the best people away from U.S.-supported units. Also, they may result in a requirement for U.S. support, not previously programmed."
The same study noted as a major deficiency the unwieldy high command of the RVNAF:
   "An example of complicated and duplicating channels of command is where a division commander receives orders from both the corps commander (who should be his undisputed boss) and the region commander in whose region his division is stationed. Another example is where the President, by means of his SCR-399 Radio Net (NCS in a radio van in the garden of the presidential office) sends operational orders to a regiment direct, bypassing the Department of National Defense, the General Staff, the field commander the corps, and the division. Still another example is where a chief of an arm gives orders to a unit of that arm, the unit being at the time assigned to a corps."
The study quoted above was produced at the behest of Major General Lionel C. McGarr, who was at the time the commandant at Leavenworth, ​but programmed to become Chief, MAAG, Vietnam, in September 1960 "General McGarr was informed by this study, and by his other preparations for his new assignment, of the increasing concern in Washington about the military situation in Vietnam.
On 24 March 1960, the Chief of Staff of the Army had called for urgent measures to improve the counterguerrilla capabilities of RVNAF. On 30 March 1960, the JCS advised CINCPAC (telegram JCS 974802, date cited) that:
   "The JCS agree that anti-guerrilla capability should be developed within organization of the regular armed forces by changing emphasis in training selected elements ARVN and other forces from conventional to anti-guerrilla warfare."
On 27 April 1960, CINCPAC submitted a study on counterinsurgency in South Vietnam to the JCS. On 6 June, JCS forwarded this study to the Secretary of Defense, recommending his acting to obtain U.S. Government support of counterinsurgency operations. The initial recommendation was followed by a proposed outline plan. The Secretary of Defense obtained the necessary concurrence in Washington, and on 20 October CINCPAC and Ambassador Durbrow were directed to develop the detailed plan and submit it to Washington (Joint State-DOD Message 192020Z October 1960).
In the meantime, Chief, MAAG, with the assistance of additional U.S. Army Special Forces, began in June a new training program for RVNAF designed to improve its counterguerrilla capabilities. Also, in September by SM-906-60 (15 September 1960), the Joint Chiefs of Staff had instructed subordinate commanders to take steps to improve guerrilla and counterguerrilla warfare training. In early 1961, the Director of the Joint Staff, Lt. General Earle G. Wheeler (WSM-158-61, 9 February 1961) circulated a paper prepared by General McGarr to improve that training in Vietnam. The paper, entitled "Information, Guidance and Instructions to MAAG Advisory Personnel by Lt. General Lionel C. McGarr, November 10, 1960," called for the training of RVNAF to produce the "anti-guerrilla guerrilla." General McGarr pointed out that the guerrilla derived his principal strength from conventional, opponents, and that he had to be defeated in his own chosen form of combat:
   "There is only one way he can survive--capitalize on the conventional concept by taking advantage of the inherent ​weakness of its built-in inflexibility and the longer reaction time required for its conventional type action -- and yes, even its conventional type thinking! Thinking which is too often geared to highly sophisticated weapons systems, complex logistics, stylized or rigid tactics, and vulnerable lines of communications … "
   "Thus, from the purely military point of view, the solution hinges on the capability of the armed forces to protect the very lives of the people - to include government functionaries, from mounting communist assassination and intimidation. In the far-flung villages, especially those isolated from governmental protective power in point of time, space and force, this is most difficult. The guerrilla, because of mobility and a battle-tested plan, together with the unique situation here, has been able to seize the initiative by taking the military offensive. This is because all of the elements of national power have not been adequately coordinated in the past. The government of the armed forces are literally blind due to a lack of information on VC guerrilla actions and intentions. As indicated previously, the military particularly must have adequate, evaluated, collated military intelligence if it is to be able to best apply its present force. To the military man - especially the commander of a small military group defending his country against the VC guerrillas in the swamps or jungles - timely, accurate, evaluated intelligence - not false rumor - spells the difference between success or defeat - life or death. With both the present military and political situation a matter for serious concern, it appears logical that the time has come when the armed forces must have the necessary force to give the population full and complete physical protection from the VC. Because of various reasons - some within and some beyond the immediate control of the Government of Vietnam - this cannot be done to the required degree at present …
   "Now, let us examine the broad objective of the MAAG in South Vietnam. As advisors, you must not only advise but follow through! Therefore, you must clearly understand that proper advising requires an instructor-pupil relationship with explanation, illustration and close personal supervision. It is not enough to tell your counterparts what to do and stop there. Your government prohibits your accompanying troops on wartime operations, but this does not lessen - only adds to - your advisory mission. Also, it is most important you understand that even as you cannot make a 'template type solution' of conventional concepts work on varied terrain, the same is true of solutions based on unconventional concepts … Objective, creative-type ​thinking is required here. Our thinking must be beamed towards evolving a new concept of action - a synthesis of the useable portions of history, the closely coordinated military and political concepts of our enemy, and the application of both conventional and unconventional warfare. All of these welded together by proper application of the principles - which will still remain valid - must be employed in the operations of our hunter-killer teams of 'antiguerrilla guerrillas.'
   For we must find a better way but only to counter the Viet Cong guerrilla in the swamps, the canal-gridded, inundated Mekong River delta, and the rugged mountains and jungles of both the high plateau and the entire land border region - but to crush him! …
   " … Militarily, our problem appears two-fold: First, reduce or eliminate VC intervention from outside. Second, prevent the growth and possible final complete military success of VC military action, while awaiting solution of the political 'causes'. This VC military success can happen here - it is our job to prevent it. At present, better use of military resources is Vietnam's only readily available solution - and it is at best a marginal one.
   "And finally, as a basis for your analysis, remember that the conventional organizations such as corps, divisions and regiments can be very adaptable to antiguerrilla operations …
   "I feel we should now reemphasize the basic actions and recommendations already implemented by this MAAG to assure a better RVNAF capability in fighting VC internal subversion by setting up the framework of a more responsive organization and command procedure. These actions included the following:
   a. MAAG recommended the transfer of the Civil Guard (CG) from the Department of Interior to the Department of Defense for equipping, training and operational control with command vested in RVNAF …
   b. MAAG recommended to the RVNAF and the GVN that the overall RVNAF command structure be modified to give clear lines of military control for all military type operations.
   c. MAAG recommended a rotation plan which would re-establish tactical unity and integrity of units, give military commanders responsibility for pacification of a permanently assigned area, and allow for rotation within division or even possibly regimental size units - as a minimum. ​d. MAAG recommended that the present unnecessary duplication of the high level personnel in Corps and Military Region Headquarters be eliminated or corrected.
   " … As explained previously, this concept envisions the organization and detailing of specialized ARVN units as 'anti-guerrilla guerrillas' employing improved guerrilla tactics against the VC guerrilla. They could well dress in guerrilla type clothing and would take the field in their assigned areas within the divisional zones for a period of one to six months, operating in the swamps, mountains and jungles as does their quarry - the guerrilla. These hunter-killer teams must be strongly disciplined, well indoctrinated, highly motivated, and imbued with the spirit of the offensive - and they must be offensively trained and led. They must have the will and determination to close with and destroy the VC.
General McGarr's impress was on the Counterinsurgency Plan (CIP), which reached Washington in January 1961, just before John F. Kennedy took office.
b. Content of the CIP
The CIP consisted of a basic directive and three annexes dealing with RVNAF force increases, concept of operations, and logistics, respectively. It incorporated one major point of difference between Ambassador Durbrow and General McGarr -- the RVNAF force increases (Despatch 276):
   Ambassador Durbrow:
   I maintain reservations concerning the proposal to increase the force level up to 20,000 additional RVNAF troops, purely to meet the threat in Viet-Nam and still believe more calculated risks should be taken by using more of the forces in being to meet the immediate and serious guerrilla terrorist threat. I recognize, however, that additional well-trained forces in being in this area are probably now justified from purely U.S. interest point of view in order to meet growing bloc threat SEA represented by Soviet airlift in Laos.
   MAAG Comments:
   The military requirement for this force increase to accomplish the current mission had been demonstrated in MAAG considered opinion as early as August 1960. This force increase was badly needed before the beginning of the Soviet airlift in Laos. The recent Viet Minh overt aggression against Laos merely reinforces this requirement.
   The four divisions in the North in I and II Corps Areas are committed in anti-guerrilla and static guard duty to the extent which not only cuts down on their ability to resist overt attack, and thus magnifies the risk to a militarily unacceptable degree, but also prohibits required training to adequately counter either external or internal aggression.
But otherwise, the CIP represented agreement on what the problem was in Vietnam, and what steps were necessary to solve it:
   "I. SITUATION. . .
   Developments in South Viet-Nam over the past year indicate a trend that is adverse to the stability and effectiveness of President Diem's government. Beginning in December 1959 and continuing to the present, there has been a mounting increase throughout South Vietnam of Viet Cong terrorist activities and guerrilla warfare. …
   Politically, discontent with the Diem Government has been prevalent for same time among intellectuals and elite circles and has been rising among the peasantry and, to some extent, labor and urban business groups. Criticism of these elements focuses on Ngo family rule, especially the roles of the President's brother Ngo Dinh Nhu. and Madame Nhu and the influence of the clandestine Can Lao political apparatus of the regime. An even more important element in the political situation is the criticism of the President's leadership within government circles, including the official bureaucracy and the military. In the past, such discontent and criticism had been centered on Diem's brothers, Ngo Dinh Nhu and Ngo Dinh Can, as directors of the allegedly corrupt Can Lao Party.
   Ftlrther aggravating many of the govermuent's problems is the active and partly successful campaign of the Viet Cong to discredit President Diem and weaken the government's authority through political subversion, as well as through military action. Among other factors making this possible is
   the void between the GVN and its people which stems from the failure of the GVN to communicate understandably with the poulation [sic] and, in reverse, the lack of an effective mechanism whereby the people can in their terms communicate with the GVN. Taking advantage of this lack of effective communication and the GVN's inability to protect the people the Viet Cong has had considerable success in sowing disaffection and disrupting effective administration of the government among the population. This is especially true in the Capital; 1st and 5th Military Regions. Viet Cong successes in these regions are due to the large number among the population who, whether out of terror or sympathy, give support to the Viet Congo Aided by this Situation, the Viet Cong is striving to establish a political apparatus parallel to the GVN. Below province level in the 5th Military Region, no effective GVN control exists in many areas. The Viet Cong are increasing the void by taxation, terroristic acts, attacks on Self Defense posts, assassination of village and provincial officials, and simultaneously a systematic development of the Viet Cong political apparatus to fill the void. In view of the above conditions the principal task facing the GVN is restoration of individual security.
   Military force, in the form of increased communist insurgency, is clearly the major immediate threat to the stability of Viet-Nam tOday. South Viet-Nam is unique in that it is the only country in the world which is forced to defend itself against a communist internal subversion action, while at the same time being subject to the militarily supportable threat of a conventional external attack from communist North Viet-Nam. The RVNAF force basis is inadequate to meet both these threats.
   "The problem is twofold, although at present the counter-insurgency phase is the more dangerous and immediate. In this counterinsurgency fight RVNAF is on the defensive. Approximately 75% of ARVN is committed to pacification missions, about half of these being committed to static guard and security roles. The military chain of command has usually been violated at the expense of unity of effort and command. No adequate operations control or overall planning system presently exists, although significant progress has been made in the development of military plans. The President has exercised arbitrary control of operations, by-passing command channels of the JGS and often Corps and Division staff. Resources have been fragmented to provincial control. The above practices appear to have been designed to divide responsibility in order to guard against the possibility of a military coup through placing too much power in the hands of a single subordinate. The guerrilla
   problem has become much more serious than the Civil Guard can manage, thereby requiring a disproportionately large RVNAF commitment, which has further resulted in a serious weakening of the RVNAF capability for defense against internal/external [sic] or overt attack in force. Rotation within RVNAF and Civil Guard cannot be accomplished regularly. Many units have been on operations for a year or more without relief, because RVNAF strength is insufficient to permit an adequate rotation policy and to conduct adequate border and coastal surveillance. Many troops are battle weary, in a state of low morale, and in need of recuperation and training. Notwithstanding the above deficiencies, GVN plans have recently been developed for the RVNAF Command Control and Logistic structure which upon implementation, possibly in the near future, should correct major deficiencies if adequate military strength is provided.
   "The complete divorce of command control from logistics support in the field has resulted in a lethargic and cumbersome requi sitioning and supply system….
   "The current military intelligence capability of the RVNAF is inadequate to support the critical intelligence requirements of all echelons of the armed forces …
   The economic health of the' country, though not robust, has been improving rapidly. In the future, if current economic trends continue and the economy is not further disrupted by adverse security developments the economy will be able, insofar a s physical wealth is concern~d, to provide for the consumption needs of a growing population and at the same time to finance a steadily increasing proportion of local military costs and could under favorable conditions meet essentially all these costs …
   Assumptions:
   (1) That the greatest immediate threat to the continued existence of the Republic of Viet-Nam is posed by the steady expansion of guerrilla warfare by the Vietnamese Communists, with the Mekong Delta as a political and military base.
   (2) That North Vi et -Nam has the capability of supporting guerrilla operations in SVN by infiltrating regular forces and cadre s to strengthen locally recruited eleme nts. (Guerrilla forces have increased from 3,500 to an ARVN estimate of 9,800 during 1960.)
   (3) That at the present time the Diem Government offers the best hope for defeating the Viet Cong threat.
   (4) That the Government of Viet-Nam has the basic potential to cope with the Viet Cong guerrilla threat if necessary corrective measures are taken and adequate forces are provided.
   (5) That the gravity of this threat will continue until a maximum offensive and coordinated retailatory [sic] effort is made by civil and military authorities.
   (6) That the most vital consideration of US policy in Viet-Nam is to create governmental stability by the eradication of insurgency in the Republic of Viet-Nam and to that end the activities of all US agencies will be coordinated.
   (7) That the Viet Cong, in coordination with the communist parties of Laos and Cambodia, will continue to build up a maximum effort against the Republic of Viet-Nam. The April '61 elections constitute particularly critical period.
   (8) That the DRV has a current continuing military capability for external aggression against SVN.
   "2. MISSION. Defeat Communist insurgency efforts in SVN.
   "3. EXECUTION:
   a. Objectives:
   (1) GVN must take immediate and extraordinary action to:
   (a) Suppress and defeat disruptive Communist activities in South Viet-Nam and concurrently maintain a capability to meet overt aggression.
   (b) Establish and maintain political and economic control and stability .
   (c) Interdict aid flowing to insurgents across Vietnamese borders, to include both police and military action in coordination with the adjacent nations of Laos and Cambodia.
   (2) Country Team:
   (a) Induce the GVN to adopt and vigorously prosecute Country Team Plans designed to defeat Communist insurgency.
   b. Tasks:
   (1) Political:
   (a) [Ambassador's reports cited above] … In addition to tasks relating to the GVN administration itself, further steps are required in the field of development of independent and quasi-independent political institutions and organizations, such as labor unions, youth movements and political parties. Possible steps in this field are under study by the Country Team.
   (2) Security:
   (a) Establish an Emergency Operations Control System to include:
   1. A national emergency council (GVN established an Internal-Security Council 7 October 1960).
   2. A director of operations (Permanent secretary for National Defense so designated 7 October 1960) with responsive regional, provincial, district, and village internal security councils.
   (b) Implement fully planning aspects of the national planning, programming, and budgeting system.
   (c) Develop and employ to optimum RVNAF capabilities to support emergency and related internal security operations on a fully coordinated schedule.
   (d) Take extraordinary action starting at highest levels of government and extending to the lowest political sub-division (the village) to establish and maintain internal security.
   (e) Assign high priority to the development of intelligence /counterintelligence staff and operational procedure to provide not only timely and accurate knowledge of Viet Cong activities and organization within Viet-Nam, but also provide information to enable the GVN to correct sociological and economic problems which the communists are exploiting.
   (f) Develop an adequate bvrder/coastal patrol system.
   (g) Develop an adequate commun ication capability within GVN; agencies to support emergency and related internal security operations.
   (h) Employ full use of psychological and civil affairs programs in support of internal security actions.
   (i) Establish concurrently means for assuring continued security.
   (j) Retain the Civil Guard under the temporary control of the Department of Defense for the duration of the emergency.
   (k) To develop the force basis for the. RVNAF to cope with the insurgency now threatening the GVN and to build capaCity for resistance to external aggression.
   (3) Economic: to be forwarded in supplemental submission to this basic plan.
   (4) Psychological:
   (a) Improve communications between the Government of Viet-Nam and its people.
   (b) Attract the loyalty of the population to the GVN and to the Diem regime.
   (c) Acquaint the people with the aims and actions of the GVN, and persuade them that the GVN is acting in their interests.
   (d) Counteract among the people and in the military sense within the RVNAF VC propaganda denigrating the Diem regime and painting it as opposed to the reunification of North and South Viet-Nam.
   (e) Foster a spirit of national unity and purpose among all elements of the Vietnamese society.
   (f) strengthen the people's confidence in and respect for the RVNAF as a security force vis-a-vis the VC.
   (g) Raise South Viet-Nam's prestige among the peoples of other countries especially in Asia and Africa as a means of enhancing the GVN's national security and stability.
   c. Concept of Operations:
   (1) General:
   (a) Political Operations. Refer to Embassy communications listed in political section under "Tasks" above.
   (b) Politico/Military Operations. In order to provide protection- which the people require, it is necessary to exercise more than an ordinary degree of control over the population. Among the more important operations required are those for exercising control in such manner as to isolate insurgents and sympathizers from the support of the populace. Such techniques as registration and identification, food control and control of movement will be implemented as appropriate.
   (c) Military Operations:
   1. There are immediate actions, civil and military, which the GVN can and must take to halt or slow down the current and extremely serious adverse security trend until such time as the necessary increased offensive capability can be brought to bear. These actions include, of course, extraordinary action by the GVN to:
   a. Further develop a national emergency operations control system.
   b. Implement the National Planning System.
   c. Implement the plan for a national intelligence organization and system with particular emphasis on obtaining information at the village level, and integrating effort at the national level.
   d. Fully employ military capabilities to include strengthening and reorganizing military command and control channels.
   e. Establish a border/coastal surveillance system.
   f. Improve the civil and military communications system:
   g. Reduce attrition rate of armed forces and utilize the trained manpower pool."
In the field of political tasks to achieve its stated objectives, the CIP cited the Embassy and other Department reports relating to the demarche by DurbrmT and the later discussions in December. A covering cable presented a discussion by Ambassador Durbrow of the Country Team proposals, presenting these in three categories:
​(1) Measures that Diem had, in fact, requested, and that required U.S . action, principally the proposed 20,000-man increase in ARVN.
(2) Measures which the GVN currently had "under study" or which would shortly be presented to the GVN, but on which foot-dragging and some resistance could be expected; such as implementation of a firm military chain of command (in particular, willingness by Diem to cease by-passing his military staff and commanders in dealing with province chiefs and subordinate commanders); establishment of a military operational command for counterinsurgency operations; and development of a national plan for counterinsurgency.
(3) Recommendations "considered by the Country Team to be indispensable and in the GVN's own best interests," but which would "probably not be particularly palatable to the GVN"; this situation pertained particularly to certain political actions and concepts of the military-civilian relationship. (For example, strengthening the role of the National Assembly, and including respected oppositionists in the Cabinet.)
​A considerable part of the rationale within the CIP -- including one long annex -- was devoted to justifying the enlarged force level for RVNAF, emphasizing that action must be taken to implement the increase as quickly as possible, since from one to two years would be required to fill the new units. It could be foreseen that those who saw the Viet Cong threat as most important (which was the basic tone of the CIP, and subsequently of the DOD), and who regarded military measures against this threat as most urgent, including measures that would require increased acceptance and cooperation by Diem, would be impatient with "pressure tactics" when they involved delays on "vital" military matters in the hope of winning concessions from Diem in political areas that seemed peripheral or trivial in the context of the communist insurgency.
A factor tipping the scales toward what might be called the Diem/MAAG/DOD priorities in each instance was the coincident, and increasing, need to "reassure" Diem of U.S. support for Vietnam and for him personally, in the light of events that had shaken that assurance (and hence, Diem's willingness to cooperate on less controversial measures) such as, in Diem's eyes, U.S. involvement In the abortive November 1960 coup, U.S. pressures via Durbrow for Political reforms, and, above all, U.S. policy with respect to Laos. This need to reassure Diem was at cross purposes with the use of pressure tactics to influence him and in part conflicted with the U.S. desire to have Diem adopt moves (such as delegating authority to a single military commander, or include oppositionists in his cabinet) that he regarded as directly threatening continuation of his rule.
c. Presidential Action on the CIP
Ten days after President Kennedy's inauguration, on 30 January 1961, a memo from the President to the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense noted that as a result of a meeting on 28 January he had authorized:
   " … an increase of expenditure of $28.4 million to expand the Viet-Nam force level by 20,000; and an increase In expenditure of $12.7 million for a program to improve the quality of the Viet-Nam civil guard."
These figures represented the dollar costs of the increases recommended in the CIP. In passing on this authorization from the President in a Joint State-Defense-ICA message, the Department pointed out:
   " … U. S. would as Plan provides expect GVN absorb local currency costs these increases and does not contemplate further US-? dollar grants to generate additional local currency for this purpose." (Joint State-Defense-ICA Message, Deptel 1054 to Saigon, 3 February 1961, p. 1)
The Department suggested that the Ambassador and the Chief, MAAG, prepare an abridged version of the plan to present to Diem and emphasized:
   " … immediate purpose Plan is to enable GVN defeat insurgency, but Plan also envisages that GVN must move on political front towards liberalization to retain necessary popular cooperation; that various economic steps be taken; and that there be adequate cooperation with RKG on frontier control. It considered US view that success requires implementation entire plan."
   " … Future funding will require Congressional approval. Views Congress likely be influenced by developments in political as well as security situation. FY 61 component represents large increase in US support Viet-Nam.' If GVN willing to accept the obligations involved in its implementation, the US is ready give full and immediate support in carrying it out." (Ibid., pp. 1-2)
In a passage suggesting some naivete on the part of the Department as to actual working procedures and the rhythm of negotiations in Saigon, the Department suggested:
   " … proposing to Diem that members US Missions ready confer with GVN opposite numbers work out agreed version Plan within, say two week time limit … " (Ibid., p. 2)
The guidance concluded:
   "If Ambassador considers GVN does not provide necessary cooperation, he should inform Washington with recommendations which may include suspension US contribution." (Ibid., p. 3)
On 2 February 1961 Walt W. Rostow showed the new President the memorandum on Vietnam' written by General Lansdale (reproduced above). The President read it in Rostow's presence, and said, "This is the worst yet … You know Ike never briefed me about Vietnam … " It has been reported that shortly thereafter Lansdale was summoned unexpectedly to the White House, and was ushered into a meeting of principle Cabinet and National Security Council ​members. At this meeting, the President discussed Lansdale's report, and apparently indicated that Lansdale would be sent to Vietnam in "a high capacity." If the appointment of Lansdale to replace Durbrow was under active consideration there is no record so indicating. In March, Frederick E. Nolting was appointed to replace Ambassador Durbrow. (Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, op cit., 320; Shaplen, "The Lost Revolution," op. cit. 148-149)
d. Implementing the CIP
In the meantime, the Ambassador and the Chief, MAAG, carried out their instructions from Washington, obtaining an interview with Diem and Thuan, Secretary of State for the Presidency, on February 13, 1961. Both Diem and Thuan expressed concern as to how they could finance the local currency costs for the . additional 20,000 men. The Ambassador expressed his firm conviction that by taking "extraordinary measures" the Vietnamese government could raise sufficient piasters. When Thuan asked what the U.S. position would be if the Vietnamese could not see their way to finance the plan as a whole, the Ambassador replied that the plan was a "comprehensive document" and therefore all facets should "basically be carried out." The Ambassador reported that he was "not very sanguine" that an agreed plan could be worked out by the end of February. (From Saigon Deptel 1367, 13 February 1961, summarized in State Department Research Project No. 630, op. cit., p. 15)
A month later, Ambassador Durbrow discussed the status of GVN acceptance of the CIP with Thuan. On the political measures:
   " … He repeated question of bringing opposition members into cabinet would depend on whether such persons would agree with government policy. I replied I felt certain GVN would find loyal oppositionists who would be in basic agreement with policy and therefore urged this step be taken. Thuan expressed skepticism. He repeated legislative investigation of executive only practiced in US, therefore GVN would not accept this suggestion." (Saigon 1454 to SecState, 11 March 1961, p. 1)
   "(1) We believe it important to attain further national unity that Diem make reasonable offer take one or two non-commie oppositionists into cabinet.
   "(2) I stated we still receiving allegations and rumors about Can lao Party secret activities which, whether true or not, are harmful to GVN. I again urged that party come out in open or dissolve itself and suggested might be worthwhile pass law or issue decree stating against law have any secret parties Viet-Nam, pointing out this would help give legal basis act against various secret parties even covert communist-front organizations.
   "Diem interrupted me at this point to describe what he called favorable evolution among non-communist oppositionists which now taking place. He stated many of those who took part in coup see errors their ways and now realize if they had won they would have only assisted communist take-over. According Diem most oppositionists, whether those arrested because of coup or others, now in process changing their attitude and realize it in national interests they try to work more closely with GVN. For this reason too soon to make offer cabinet posts to oppositionists but, without making firm promise, he stated that if some non-commies could agree basic policy GVN he might take them into government after election.
   "He did not directly reply to my Can Lao suggestion but stated that more and more oppositionists and public in general coming to realize allegations and rumors re party are not true. I interjected these developments all more reason why Can Lao Party should come into open or dissolve and why he should seriously make r e asonable offers non-communists enter govt. Diem made no promises." (Saigon Deptel 1466 to SecState, 16 March 1961, Section 1 of 2, p. 2)
In connection with the proposed Central Intelligence organization, Diem stated he had finally chosen an officer to run this; on the issue of better relations with the Cambodian Government, to the end of working out border control arrangements, Diem was, as al.rays, very negative on the possibilities. Raising once more the issue of dealings with the peasants in connection with agrovilles:
   "I again urged he make mod e st payments to peasants called upon furnish labor, particularly those for instance who work on agrovilles but would not live there and would thus get no benefit from their labor. Diem replied peasants everywhere except those in Cochin-China are a gladly contributed to
   community development. He added if he tried to tax them it would cause more disgruntlement. He argued even those who did not get into agrovilles received considerable benefits from establishment nearby markets, schools, hospitals and maternity wards. I stated that while this undoubtedly true, corvee labor was one of principal things used by communists to cause disgruntlement Delta." (Ibid., Section 2 of 2, pp. 2-3)
   The Ambassador concluded with the following:
   "Comments: Diem was most affable, exuded confidence and for first time expressed some gratitude our CIP efforts which he promised implement as best he could. Again before giving full green light believe we should await outcome detail discussion by GVN-US officials. In meantime MAAG quietly ordering some equipment for 20,000 increase (Embtel 1444)." (Ibid., Section 2 of 2, p. 4)
With the approval of the Counterinsurgency Plan for Vietnam and with the appointment of Ambassador Nolting, the Kennedy Administration launched its efforts to stem the Viet Cong tide in South Vietnam.
* ↑ In this and all following citations) italics are added, unless otherwise noted.
* ↑ From letter, Rand Corporation, L-1498Z (attachment 1, 8-11-67). Data in table are SECRET.
* ↑ Proposed by CIA and evidently adopted, although this is not altogether clear in DOD files. A further CIA revision, not adopted, would have added: "In this effort priority should be given to areas of greatest dissidence, particularly in the extreme south."
* ↑ A CIA proposed amendment, evidently not approved, would have added: "Also encourage and assist elements of the Army of Viet Nam to establish and utilize specific anti-subversive guerrilla formations and operations. In the anti-guerrilla campaign encourage the government of Viet Nam to use the Vietnamese Army in a way which will help win the favor of the local populace in order to obtain its support for their campaigns, particularly for intelligence purposes."
* ↑ U.S. Congress, House, Foreign Aid Construction Projects, Committee on Government Operations, 85th Congress, Second Session, (Washington: GPO, 1958), 864-866.
* ↑ U.S. Congress, Senate, Mutual Security Act of 1958, Committee on Foreign Relations, 85th Congress, Second Session (Washington: GPO, 1958), 120-121.
* ↑ U.S. Congress, Senate, Situation in Vietnam, Committee on Foreign Relations, 86th Congress, First Session (Washington: GPO, 1959), 168 -171, 198-199 ; House, Current Situation in the Far East, Committee on Foreign Affairs, 86th Congress , First Session (Washington : GPO, 1959), 34 ff., 45 ff.
* ↑ Source: Montgomery, op.cit., 284.
* ↑ Total aid program for the Associated States of Indo-China, including deobligations and adjustments, 1954-1961.
* ↑ Total grants and loans, 1946-1961: 3587.6
* ↑ Kenneth M. Kauffman and Helena Stalson, "U.S. Assistance to Less Developed Countries, 1956-65," Foreign Affairs, Volume 45, No. 4, July 1967, 715 ff.
* ↑ MAAG, Vietnam had a TD authorization of 342 spaces; TERM, 350; the 1960 authorization for MAAG’s amalgamation with TERM was 685.
* ↑ Senate, Situation in Vietnam, op.cit., 287-288.
* ↑ Scigliano, op.cit., 115.
* ↑ The MAAG "Country Statements" for the period 1956-1960 record a concentration on developing the staff and logistiC superstructure of ARVN, and on U.S. Army-type training programs; throughout, it is clear that the MAAG looked increasingly to the Self Defense Corps, the Civil Guard, and the National Police to meet the "Viet Minh" internal threat in order to free ARVN for conventional combat training. See especially U.S. Military Assistance AdviSOry Group, Vietnam, "Country Statement on MDAP, Non-NATO COUl1tries," paragraphs I, 5, 6, and Section C, of the reports 15 January 1956, 20 July 1956, 21 January 1957, 15 July 1957; also, same headquarters, "Narrative Study," dated 24 August 1958, and "Narrative Statement," dated 25 November 1958 with changes dated 10 May 1959, 9 August 1959, and 8 November 1959· Cf., Shaplen, Ope cit., 117-119, 137; Warner, op. cit., 129-136; Scigliano, op. cit., 162-167; Nighswonger, op. cit., 43-48; David Halberstam, The Making of a Quagmire (New York: Random House, 1965), 60-66.
* ↑ "Study on Amry Aspects of the Military Assistance Program in Vietnam (U)," 10 June 1960.
* ↑ U. S. Army, Office Chief of Military History, "United States Policy Toward Vietnam Since 1945," Choronology.
* ↑ CINCPAC, Command History for 1960, 143-144.
* ↑ The author, Benjamin Bock of the State Department Study: Recent American Policy and Diplomacy Concerning Vietnam 1960-1963, Research Project #630, January 1965, notes that Chalmers V. Wood, the Vietnamese desk officer in the 1961 period, had told him in June 1963 that President Kennedy had personally approved the counterinsurgency Plan.