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# An Etymological Dictionary of the German Language/Platteise

| Expand abbreviations An Etymological Dictionary of the German Language/Annotated/Platteise | Random word Special:RandomInCategory/Kluge's Etymological Dictionary of the German Language |
​ Platteise, f., ‘plaice,’ formed from the equiv. Du. pladijs (platdijs), which is based on MidLat. platessa; comp. E. plaice.
# An Etymological Dictionary of the German Language/Pips

| Expand abbreviations An Etymological Dictionary of the German Language/Annotated/Pips | Random word Special:RandomInCategory/Kluge's Etymological Dictionary of the German Language |
​ Pips, m., ‘pip,’ a LG. and MidG. form for the earlier ModHG. Pfipfs, from MidHG. and OHG. pfiffī̆z pfiffī̆ȥ, pfipfī̆ȥ, m., ‘pip’ (horny pellicle on the tip of a fowl's tongue). Borrowed at the beginning of the OHG. period or earlier (perhaps contemporaneously with Flaum and Kissen?) from MidLat. pipita, whence also Ital. pipita, Fr. pépie; likewise Du. and E. pip. The ultimate source of all the cognates is Lat. pī̆tuîta, ‘slime, phlegm, pip.’ In Henneberg the equiv. Zipf originated in the same prim. word through the intermediate form *tipwita.
# An Etymological Dictionary of the German Language/Plinze

| Expand abbreviations An Etymological Dictionary of the German Language/Annotated/Plinze | Random word Special:RandomInCategory/Kluge's Etymological Dictionary of the German Language |
​ Plinze, f., ‘coiled fritter or pancake’; ModHG. only, an East MidG. word of Slav. origin; comp. Russ. blin, blince, ‘flat, round cake.’
# An Etymological Dictionary of the German Language/Pluderhose

| Expand abbreviations An Etymological Dictionary of the German Language/Annotated/Pluderhose | Random word Special:RandomInCategory/Kluge's Etymological Dictionary of the German Language |
​ Pluderhose, f., ‘wide breeches,’ first occurs in early ModHG.; origin uncertain.
# An Etymological Dictionary of the German Language/Plage

| Expand abbreviations An Etymological Dictionary of the German Language/Annotated/Plage | Random word Special:RandomInCategory/Kluge's Etymological Dictionary of the German Language |
​ Plage, f., ‘plague, calamity,’ from MidHG. plâge, OHG. plâga, f., ‘divine punishment’; adopted on the introduction of Christianity during the OHG. period (comp. Pein) from Lat. plâga, ‘blow, thrust.’ From the same source the Rom. cognates, Ital. piaga, Fr. plaie, ‘wound’ (E. plague), are derived.
# An Etymological Dictionary of the German Language/Plan

| Expand abbreviations An Etymological Dictionary of the German Language/Annotated/Plan | Random word Special:RandomInCategory/Kluge's Etymological Dictionary of the German Language |
​ Plan, m., ‘plain, plan, project,’ from MidHG. plân, m. and f., ‘open space, plain’; from the equiv. Fr. plan.
# An Etymological Dictionary of the German Language/Plunder

| Expand abbreviations An Etymological Dictionary of the German Language/Annotated/Plunder | Random word Special:RandomInCategory/Kluge's Etymological Dictionary of the German Language |
​ Plunder, m., ‘trash, lumber, plunder,’ from late MidHG. plunder, blunder, m., ‘household furniture, clothes, linen,’ which is probably a LG. loan-word (MidLG. plunde, ‘clothing’). Hence plündern, ‘to plunder,’ lit. ‘to take away the household furniture’ (also Du. plunderen, ‘to plunder’).
# An Essay on Crimes and Punishments/Chapter V

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CHAP. V.
Of the Obscurity of Laws.
IF the power of interpreting laws be an evil, obscurity in them must be another, as the former is the consequence of the latter. This evil will be still greater, if the laws be written in a language unknown to the people; who, being ignorant of the consequences of their own actions, become necessarily dependent on a few, who are interpreters of the laws, which, instead of being public, and general, are thus rendered private, and particular. What must we think of mankind, when we reflect, that such is the established custom of the greatest part of our polished, and enlightened Europe? Crimes will be less frequent, in proportion as the code of laws is more universally read, and understood; for there is no doubt, but that the eloquence of the passions is greatly assisted by the ignorance, and uncertainty of punishments.
​Hence it follows, that without written laws, no society will ever acquire a fixed form of government, in which the power is vested in the whole, and not in any part of the society; and in which, the laws are not to be altered, but by the will of the whole, nor corrupted by the force of private interest. Experience and reason shews us, that the probability of human traditions diminishes in proportion as they are distant from their sources. How then can laws resist the inevitable force of time, if there be not a lasting monument of the social compact?
Hence, we see the use of printing, which alone makes the public, and not a few individuals, the guardians and defenders of the laws. It is this art, which, by diffusing literature, has gradually dissipated the gloomy spirit of cabal and intrigue. To this art it is owing, that the atrocious crimes of our ancestors, who were alternately slaves, and tyrants, are become less frequent. Those who are acquainted with the history of the two or ​three last centuries, may observe, how, from the lap of luxury and effeminacy, have sprung the most tender virtues, humanity, benevolence, and toleration of human errors. They may contemplate the effects of, what was so improperly called, ancient simplicity, and good faith; humanity groaning under implacable superstition; the avarice and ambition of a few, staining with human blood, the thrones and palaces of kings; secret treasons, and public massacres; every noble a tyrant over the people; and the ministers of the gospel of Christ, bathing their hands in blood, in the name of the God of all mercy. We may talk as we please of the corruption and degeneracy of the present age, but happily we see no such horrid examples of cruelty and oppression.
# An Essay on Crimes and Punishments

* information about this edition.
* sister projects: Wikidata item.
Anonymous 1767 English translation of Dei delitti e delle pene (1764). Foundational text of modern criminology. Famous for the Marquis Beccaria's arguments against torture and capital punishment. Warning: template has been deprecated.
AN
ESSAY
ON
CRIMES
AND
PUNISHMENTS,
TRANSLATED FROM THE ITALIAN;
WITH A
COMMENTARY,
ATTRIBUTED TO
Mons. De VOLTAIRE,
TRANSLATED FROM THE FRENCH.
THE FOURTH EDITION
Bacon.
LONDON.
Printed for F. Newbery, at the Corner of St. Paul's Church-Yard.
MDCCLXXV.
This work is a translation and has a separate copyright status to the applicable copyright protections of the original content.
# An Essay on Crimes and Punishments/Chapter I

Layout 2
AN
ESSAY
ON
CRIMES and PUNISHMENTS.
CHAPTER I.
Of the Origin of Punishments.
LAWS are the conditions, under which men, naturally independent, united themselves in society. Weary of living in a continual state of war, and of enjoying a liberty which became of little value, from the uncertainty of its duration, they sacrificed one part of it, to enjoy the rest in ​peace and security. The sum of all these portions of the liberty of each individual constituted the sovereignty of a nation and was deposited in the hands of the sovereign, as the lawful administrator. But it was not sufficient only to establish this deposite; it was also necessary to defend it from the usurpation of each individual, who will always endeavour to take away from the mass, not only his own portion, but to encroach on that of others. Some motives, therefore, that strike the senses, were necessary to prevent the despotism of each individual from plunging society into its former chaos. Such motives are the punishments established against the infractors of the laws. I say, that motives of this kind are necessary; because, experience shows, that the multitude adopt no established principle of conduct; and because, society is prevented from approaching to that dissolution, (to which, as well as all other parts of the physical and moral world, it naturally tends,) only by motives, that are the immediate objects of sense, and which being continually presented to the mind, are ​sufficient to counterbalance the effects of the passions of the individual, which oppose the general good. Neither the power of eloquence, nor the sublimest truths, are sufficient to restrain, for any length of time, those passions, which are excited by the lively impressions of present objects.
# An Essay on Crimes and Punishments/Chapter III

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CHAPTER III.
Consequences of the foregoing Principles.
THE laws only can determine the punishment of crimes; and the authority of making penal laws can only reside with the legislator, who represents the whole society, united by the social compact. No magistrate then (as he is one of the society) can, with justice, inflict on any other member of the same society, punishment that is not ordained by the laws. But as a punishment, increased beyond the degree fixed by the law, is the just punishment, with the addition of another; it follows, that no magistrate, even under a pretence of zeal, or the public good, should increase the punishment already determined by the laws. ​If every individual be bound to society, society is equally bound to him, by a contract, which from its nature, equally binds both parties. This obligation, which descends from the throne to the cottage, and equally binds the highest and lowest of mankind, signifies nothing more, than that it is the interest of all, that conventions, which are useful to the greatest number, should be punctually observed. The violation of this compact by any individual, is an introduction to anarchy.
The sovereign, who represents the society itself, can only make general laws to bind the members; but it belongs not to him to judge whether any individual has violated the social compact, or incurred the punishment in consequence. For in this case, there are two parties, one represented by the sovereign, who insists upon the violation of the contract, and the other is the person accused, who denies it. It is necessary then that there should be a third person to decide this contest; that is to say, a judge, or magistrate, from whose ​determination there should be no appeal; and this determination should consist of a simple affirmation, or negation of fact.
If it can only be proved, that the severity of punishments, though not immediately contrary to the public good, or to the end for which they were intended, viz. to prevent crimes, be useless; then such severity would be contrary to those beneficent virtues, which are the consequence of enlightened reason, which instructs the sovereign to wish rather to govern men in a state of freedom and happiness, than of slavery. It would also be contrary to justice, and the social compact.
# An Essay of Dramatic Poesy/Reader

TO THE READER.
The drift of the ensuing discourse was chiefly to vindicate the honour of our English writers, from the censure of those who unjustly prefer the French before them. This I intimate, lest any should think me so exceeding vain, as to teach others an art which they understand much better than myself. But if this incorrect Essay, written in the country without the help of books or advice of friends, shall find any acceptance in the world, I promise to myself a better success of the Second Part, wherein I shall more fully treat of the virtues and faults of the English poets, who have written either in this, the epick, or the lyrick way.
* ↑ A om. I shall more fully treat of.
* ↑ Epique, A.
* ↑ Lyrique, A.
* ↑ A has, 'will be more fully treated of, and their several styles impartially imitated.'
This work was published before January 1, 1929, and is in the public domain worldwide because the author died at least 100 years ago.
Public domainPublic domainfalsefalse
# An Essay on Crimes and Punishments/Chapter II

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CHAP. II.
Of the Right to punish.
EVERY punishment, which does not arise from absolute necessity, says the great Montesquieu, is tyrannical. A proposition which may be made more general, thus. Every act of authority of one man over another, for which there is not an absolute necessity, is tyrannical. It is upon this then, that the sovereign's right to punish crimes is founded; that is, upon the necessity of defending the public liberty, entrusted to his care, from the usurpation of individuals; and punishments are just in proportion, as the liberty, preserved by the sovereign, is sacred and valuable.
​Let us consult the human heart, and there we shall find the foundation of the sovereign’s right to punish; for no advantage in moral policy can be lasting, which is not founded on the indeliable sentiments of the heart of man. Whatever law deviates from this principle will always meet with a resistance, which will destroy it in the end; for the smallest force, continually applied, will overcome the most violent motion communicated to bodies.
No man ever gave up his liberty, merely for the good of the public. Such a chimera exists only in romances. Every individual wishes, if possible, to be exempt from the compacts, that bind the rest of mankind.
The multiplication of mankind, though slow, being too great for the means, which the earth, in its natural state, offered to satisfy necessities, which every day became more numerous, obliged men to separate again, and form new societies. These naturally opposed the first, and a state of ​war was transferred from individuals to nations.
Thus it was necessity that forced men to give up a part of their liberty; it is certain, then, that every individual would chuse to put into the public stock the smallest portion possible; as much only as was sufficient to engage others to defend it. The aggregate of these, the smallest portions possible, forms the right of punishing: all that extends beyond this is abuse, not justice.
Observe, that by justice I understand nothing more than that bond, which is necessary to keep the interest of individuals united; without which, men would return to their original state of barbarity. All punishments, which exceed the necessity of preserving this bond, are in their nature unjust. We should be cautious how we associate with the word justice, an idea of anything real, such as a physical power, or a being that actually exists. I do not, by any means, speak of the justice of God, ​which is of another kind, and refers immediately to rewards and punishments in a life to come.
# Ante-Nicene Fathers/Volume III/Anti-Marcion/The Five Books Against Marcion/Book I/II

Chapter II.—Marcion, Aided by Cerdon, Teaches a Duality of Gods; How He Constructed This Heresy of an Evil and a Good God.
The heretic of Pontus introduces two Gods, like the twin Symplegades of his own shipwreck: One whom it was impossible to deny, i.e. our Creator; and one whom he will never be able to prove, i.e. his own god. The unhappy man gained the first idea of his conceit from the simple passage of our Lord’s saying, which has reference to human beings and not divine ones, wherein He disposes of those examples of a good tree and a corrupt one; how that “the good tree bringeth not forth corrupt fruit, neither the corrupt tree good fruit.” Which means, that an honest mind and good faith cannot produce evil deeds, any more than an evil disposition can produce good deeds. Now (like many other persons now-a-days, especially those who have an heretical proclivity), while morbidly brooding over the question of the origin of evil, his perception became blunted by the very irregularity of his researches; and when he found the Creator declaring, “I am He that createth evil,” inasmuch as he had already concluded from other arguments, which are satisfactory to every perverted mind, that God is the author of evil, so he now applied to the Creator the figure of the corrupt tree bringing forth evil fruit, that is, moral evil, and then presumed that there ought to be another god, after the analogy of the good tree producing its good fruit. Accordingly, finding in Christ a different disposition, as it were—one of a simple and pure benevolence—differing from the Creator, he readily argued that in his Christ had been revealed a new and strange divinity; and then with a little leaven he leavened the whole lump of the faith, flavouring it with the acidity of his own heresy.
He had, moreover, in one Cerdon an abettor of this blasphemy,—a circumstance which made them the more readily think that they saw most clearly their two gods, blind though they were; for, in truth, they had not seen the one God with soundness of faith. To men of diseased vision even one lamp looks like many. One of his gods, therefore, whom he was obliged to acknowledge, he destroyed by defaming his attributes in the matter of evil; the other, whom he laboured so hard to devise, he constructed, laying his foundation in the principle of good. In what articles he arranged these natures, we show by our own refutations of them.

## Footnotes

* ↑ Passus.
* ↑ Instinctum.
* ↑ St. Luke vi. 43 sq.
* ↑ Languens.
* ↑ Isa. xlv. 7.
* ↑ Mala.
* ↑ [This purely good or goodish divinity is an idea of the Stoics. De Præscript. chap. 7.]
* ↑ Hospitam.
* ↑ Quendam. [See Irenæus, Vol. I. p. 352, this Series.]
* ↑ Integre.
* ↑ Præstruendo.
* ↑ Or sections.
# Ante-Nicene Fathers/Volume III/Anti-Marcion/The Five Books Against Marcion/Book I/VIII

Chapter VIII.—Specific Points. The Novelty of Marcion’s God Fatal to His Pretensions. God is from Everlasting, He Cannot Be in Any Wise New.
In the first place, how arrogantly do the Marcionites build up their stupid system, bringing forward a new god, as if we were ashamed of the old one! So schoolboys are proud of their new shoes, but their old master beats their strutting vanity out of them. Now when I hear of a new god, who, in the old world and in the old time and under the old god was unknown and unheard of; whom, (accounted as no one through such long centuries back, and ancient in men’s very ignorance of him), a certain “Jesus Christ,” and none else revealed; whom Christ revealed, they say—Christ himself new, according to them, even, in ancient names—I feel grateful for this conceit of theirs. For by its help I shall at once be able to prove the heresy of their tenet of a new deity. It will turn out to be such a novelty as has made gods even for the heathen by some new and yet again and ever new title for each several deification. What new god is there, except a false one? Not even Saturn will be proved to be a god by all his ancient fame, because it was a novel pretence which some time or other produced even him, when it first gave him godship. On the contrary, living and perfect Deity has its origin neither in novelty nor in antiquity, but in its own true nature. Eternity has no time. It is itself all time. It acts; it cannot then suffer. It cannot be born, therefore it lacks age. God, if old, forfeits the eternity that is to come; if new, the eternity which is past. The newness bears witness to a beginning; the oldness threatens an end. God, moreover, is as independent of beginning and end as He is of time, which is only the arbiter and measurer of a beginning and an end.

## Footnotes

* ↑ Stuporem suum.
* ↑ [Cap. xix. infra.]
* ↑ The original of this obscure passage is: “Novum igitur audiens deum, in vetere mundo et in vetere ævo et sub vetere deo inauditum quem tantis retro seculis neminem, et ipsa ignorantia antiquum, quidam Jesus Christus, et ille in veteribus nominibus novus, revelaverit, nec alius antehac.” The harsh expression, “quidam Jesus Christus,” bears, of course, a sarcastic reference to the capricious and inconsistent novelty which Marcion broached in his heresy about Christ. [By some slight chance in punctuation and arrangement, I have endeavoured to make it a little clearer.]
* ↑ Gloriæ. [Qu. boast?]
* ↑ Hæc erit novitas quæ.
* ↑ Novo semper ac novo titulo.
* ↑ Consecravit.
* ↑ Germana.
* ↑ Censetur. A frequent meaning in Tertullian. See Apol. 7 and 12.
* ↑ We cannot preserve the terseness of the Latin: Deus, si est vetus, non erit; si est novus, non fuit.
# Ante-Nicene Fathers/Volume III/Anti-Marcion/The Five Books Against Marcion/Book I/V

Chapter V.—The Dual Principle Falls to the Ground; Plurality of Gods, of Whatever Number, More Consistent. Absurdity and Injury to Piety Resulting from Marcion’s Duality.
But on what principle did Marcion confine his supreme powers to two? I would first ask, If there be two, why not more? Because if number be compatible with the substance of Deity, the richer you make it in number the better. Valentinus was more consistent and more liberal; for he, having once imagined two deities, Bythos and Sige, poured forth a swarm of divine essences, a brood of no less than thirty Æons, like the sow of Æneas. Now, whatever principle refuses to admit several supreme beings, the same must reject even two, for there is plurality in the very lowest number after one. After unity, number commences. So, again, the same principle which could admit two could admit more. After two, multitude begins, now that one is exceeded. In short, we feel that reason herself expressly forbids the belief in more gods than one, because the self-same rule lays down one God and not two, which declares that God must be a Being to which, as the great Supreme, nothing is equal; and that Being to which nothing is equal must, moreover, be unique. But further, what can be the use or advantage in supposing two supreme beings, two co-ordinate powers? What numerical difference could there be when two equals differ not from one? For that thing which is the same in two is one. Even if there were several equals, all would be just as much one, because, as equals, they would not differ one from another. So, if of two beings neither differs from the other, since both of them are on the supposition supreme, both being gods, neither of them is more excellent than the other; and so, having no pre-eminence, their numerical distinction has no reason in it. Number, moreover, in the Deity ought to be consistent with the highest reason, or else His worship would be brought into doubt. For consider now, if, when I saw two Gods before me (who, being both Supreme Beings, were equal to each other), I were to worship them both, what should I be doing? I should be much afraid that the abundance of my homage would be deemed superstition rather than piety. Because, as both of them are so equal and are both included in either of the two, I might serve them both acceptably in only one; and by this very means I should attest their equality and unity, provided that I worshipped them mutually the one in the other, because in the one both are present to me. If I were to worship one of the two, I should be equally conscious of seeming to pour contempt on the uselessness of a numerical distinction, which was superfluous, because it indicated no difference; in other words, I should think it the safer course to worship neither of these two Gods than one of them with some scruple of conscience, or both of them to none effect.

## Footnotes

* ↑ Depth and silence.
* ↑ See Virgil, Æneid, viii. 43, etc.
* ↑ Ipso termino.
* ↑ Paria.
* ↑ Jam.
* ↑ Numeri sui.
* ↑ Ecce.