# Philosophical Works of the Late James Frederick Ferrier/Institutes of Metaphysic (1875)/Section 3/Proposition 11

The Institutes of Metaphysic, Philosophical Works of the Late James Frederick Ferrier (1875 ed., Vol. 1). (E. L. Lushington, & A. Grant, Eds.) Edinburgh: William Blackwood and Sons. pp. 522-544.
PROPOSITION XI.
WHAT ABSOLUTE EXISTENCE IS NECESSARY.
DEMONSTRATION.
To save the universe from presenting a contradiction to all reason, intelligence must be postulated in connection with it; because everything except the synthesis of subject and object is contradictory, is that of which there can be no knowledge (Props. I. II., Epistemology), and no ignorance (Prop. VIII., Agnoiology). But more than one intelligence does not require to be postulated; because the universe is rescued from contradiction as effectually by the supposition of one intelligence in connection with it, as by the supposition of ten million, and reason ​never postulates more than is necessary. Therefore all absolute existences are contingent except one; in other words, there is One, but only one, Absolute Existence which is strictly necessary; and that existence is a supreme, and infinite, and eternal Mind in synthesis with all things.
OBSERVATIONS AND EXPLANATIONS.
Distinction taken in this prop. Ontological proof of Deity.1. In this proposition a distinction is taken between contingent absolute existences (for example, human beings together with what they apprehend) and the One Absolute Existence which is necessary. All absolute existences except one are contingent. This is proved by the consideration that there was a time when the world was without man; and by the consideration that in other worlds there may be no intelligences at all. This is intelligible to reason. But in the judgment of reason there never can have been a time when the universe was without God. That is unintelligible to reason; because time is not time, but is nonsense, without a mind; space is not space, but is nonsense, without a mind; all objects are not objects, but are nonsense, without a mind; in short, the whole universe is neither anything nor nothing, but is the sheer contradictory, without a mind. And therefore, inasmuch as we cannot help thinking that there was a time before man existed, and that there was space before ​man existed, and that the universe was something or other before man existed; so neither can we help thinking that before man existed, a supreme and eternal intelligence existed, in synthesis with all things. In the estimation of natural thinking, the universe by itself is not the contradictory; in our ordinary moods we suppose it capable of subsisting by itself. Hence, in our ordinary moods, we see no necessity why a supreme intelligence should be postulated in connection with it. But speculation shows us that the universe, by itself, is the contradictory; that it is incapable of self-subsistency, that it can exist only cum alio, inasmuch as it can be known only cum alio, and can be ignored only cum alio; that all true and cogitable and noncontradictory existence is a synthesis of the subjective and the objective; and then we are compelled, by the most stringent necessity of thinking, to conceive a supreme intelligence as the round and essence of the Universal Whole. Thus the postulation of the Deity is not only permissible, it is unavoidable. Every mind thinks, and must think of God (however little conscious it may be of the operation which it is performing), whenever it thinks of anything as lying beyond all human observation, or as subsisting in the absence or annihilation of all finite intelligences.
2. To this conclusion, which is the crowning truth ​The system is forced to this conclusion.of the ontology, the research has been led, not by any purpose aforethought, but simply by the winding current of the speculative reason, to whose guidance it had implicitly surrendered itself. That current has carried the system, nolens volens, to the issue which it has reached. It started with no intention of establishing this conclusion, or any conclusion which was not forced upon it by the insuperable necessities of thought. It has found what it did not seek; and it is conceived that this theistic conclusion is all the more to be depended upon on that very account, inasmuch as the desire or intention to reach a particular inference is almost sure to warp in favour of that inference the reasoning by which it is supported. Here metaphysics stop; here ontology is merged in Theology. Philosophy has accomplished her final work; she has reached by strict demonstration the central law of all reason (the necessity, namely, of thinking an infinite and eternal Ego in synthesis with all things); and that law she lays down as the basis of all religion.
Eleventh Counter-proposition3. Eleventh Counter-proposition. "The universe by itself, or out of relation to all intelligence, is, or may be, a necessary existence." This counter-proposition, which is the ground of all atheism, is effectually subverted by the proposition which is the ground of all Theism; but the atheistic position ​could not have been demonstratively turned, had the universe by itself (objects per se) not been reduced to the predicament of the contradictory—hence the infinite importance of the dialectical operation by which that reduction is effected.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION.
The main question is—How has the system redeemed its pledges?1. In proceeding to offer a short summary of these Institutes, with the view of aiding the impartial reader to form an estimate of their scope, character, and results, the main question for consideration is, how far have they redeemed the pledges held out at their commencement,—how far have they fulfilled the requirements by which they professed themselves bound,—how far have they executed the work which they took in hand? For it is but reasonable that a science should be tested only in reference to the end which it proposes, and to the means which it employs, and not in reference to the vague expectations or inconsiderate demands of its students. A man may desire to learn astronomy from the study of anatomy; but if he does so, he cannot fail to be disappointed. So, if a man expects to derive from metaphysics information which this science does not profess to impart, the mistake will lie with the man, and not with the science. This system, then, claims ​the privilege of being tried only by the standard which itself has set up, and of being called to an account only for the work which it undertook to execute.
It is submitted that the system is both reasoned and true.2. In the first place, it is submitted that these Institutes have complied with the two general requisitions set forth in the Introduction (§ 2), as obligatory on every system which lays claim to the title of philosophy. They are reasoned, and they are true. They are reasoned, inasmuch as their conclusions follow necessarily and inevitably from their initial principle; and they are true, inasmuch as their initial principle is a necessary truth or law of reason.
The chief consideration to be looked to in estimating the system.3. But in the second place, the point most particularly to be considered, as affecting the substance of the inquiry, is this—has the system done the work which it undertook to do? It undertook to correct the contradictory inadvertencies incident to popular opinion, and the deliberate errors prevalent in psychological science; and in the room of these inadvertencies and errors to substitute necessary ideas, or unquestionable truths of reason. This was declared to be the business, and the only business, of philosophy, (see Introduction, §§ 44, 45). How, then, has the system acquitted itself in respect to that engagement?
​Its negative character is to be attended to prinicapally.4. This question will be best answered if we take a survey of the system rather in its negative or polemical, than in its positive or constructive, character. The object of philosophy is twofold—to correct error, and to establish truth. Hence, either aim may be made the more prominent. In propounding the system, it was right to lay most stress on the positive establishment of truth, and to be more solicitous about building up the propositions than about overthrowing the counter-propositions. But now, in reviewing the system, it will be proper to reverse this order, and to attend more to the errors which the system corrects than to the truths which it substantiates. The counter-propositions shall now be made to take the lead,—those set forth in the epistemology being, of course, the first to be surveyed.
The first step which the system takes in its negative or polemical character.5. Looking at the system from this point of view, the reader will remark that the first step which the Institutes take, is the ascertainment of the subjects or topics in reference to which natural thinking and psychology are at fault These general topics are—first, Knowing and the Known; secondly, Ignorance; and, thirdly, Being. These themes are all-comprehensive: every truth and every error which any intellect can harbour, must find a place under one or other of these heads; and these, accordingly, are the departments into which ​philosophy is divided, inasmuch as these are the provinces where error has to be uprooted, and truth planted.
The next step which the system takes in its negative or polemical character. 6. These three heads having been laid down as the general topics in reference to which error and contradiction prevail, the system then proceeds to search out these errors and contradictions, and to deal with them separately and in detail—the first aim of the inquiry, when it descends to these specialties, being to bring to light the leading or capital contradiction out of which all the others proceed.
The capital contradiction which the epistemology brings to light and corrects. 7. The fundamental error of natural or ordinary thinking is found by the system to consist in an oversight of the primary law or condition of all knowledge. Natural thinking overlooks the necessity to which all intelligence is subject in the acquisition of knowledge—the necessity, namely, of apprehending itself along with whatever it apprehends. This oversight is equivalent to a denial, and, tested by the criterion of necessary truth, it amounts to a contradiction. It is tantamount to the assertion that a thing is not what it is—that "A is not A." Because, in asserting that knowledge can take place without its essential condition being complied with, it affirms that knowledge can be, without being knowledge (see Introduction, ​§ 28). This contradiction, which is largely countenanced, if not formally ratified, by psychology, is the parent, proximately or remotely, of all the other contradictions which are corrected in the course of the system. It is embodied in Counter-proposition I., and subverted by the corresponding proposition—the fundamental article of the Institutes. The subject must not only know, but must be known along with, all that comes before it. This single principle reforms the whole character of human thought. Its affirmation is the groundwork of all the truths which the system subsequently advances: its denial is the mother of all the errors which the system subsequently over-throws.
The second contradiction which it corrects.8. The contradictory inadvertency in regard to the primary law of knowledge leads directly to a contradictory inadvertency in regard to the object of knowledge. This latter contradiction obtains expression in the second counter-proposition, which asserts that objects can be known without a subject or self being known along with them. Proposition II., which is an immediate offshoot from Proposition I., corrects this error, and replaces it by a necessary truth of reason.
9. The next contradiction which the system corrects is the supposition that the unit or minimum ​ The third contradiction which the epistemology corrects.of cognition can, in any case, consist of less than an objective part and a subjective part. Psychology holds that the objective part of a cognition can be known by itself, and that the subjective part of a cognition can be known by itself; or that each of these parts is a possible, if not actual, unit or minimum of knowledge. Proposition III. corrects this contradiction (which is merely a more explicit form of Counter-proposition II.), by showing that the two parts, objective and subjective together, are required to make up the unit or minimum of cognition, and that each factor by itself is necessarily less than can be known by any intelligence.
The fourth and fifth contradictions which the epistemology corrects.10. Counter-propositions IV. and V. express contradictions which are merely more special examples of those which have gone before. Natural thinking advocates our knowledge of material things per se, and psychology, if it abandons this position, contends, at any rate, for our knowledge of certain material qualities per se. This contradiction is one which it is of the utmost importance to point out and correct, inasmuch as it is the basis of materialism—a system which, if it could be substantiated, and an independent existence accorded to material things, would extinguish all the brightest hopes and loftiest aspirations of our nature. The counter-propositions, however, in which these errors are embodied, are effectually subverted by ​Propositions IV. and V., by which matter per se and the material qualities per se are reduced to the contradictory or absurd.
The propositions and counter-propositions fall into groups.11. At this place it is proper to remark that, although a close connection subsists among all the propositions on the one hand, and all the counter-propositions on the other hand, still there is a stricter affinity among some of them than among others. They fall naturally into groups; and the system has periodical resting-places where it pauses for a moment, and from whence it again flows forward with an accession of strength. One of these pauses occurs at the end of Proposition V. The first five propositions, and their corresponding counter-propositions, are to be regarded as forming a group or family which, although closely related to those which follow, are still more closely related to each other. The groups into which the subsequent propositions and counter-propositions fall shall be indicated as we proceed.
The sixth contradiction which the epistemology corrects.12. The error brought to light in Counter-proposition VI. is the supposition that the knowledge of particular things can precede the knowledge of universals, or rather of a universal (the me). If this counter-proposition were true, the refutation of the preceding counter-propositions would, of course, go for nothing, and materialism would be triumphant. ​The corrective proposition, however, proves that there must be a universal or common, as well as a particular or peculiar, ingredient in every cognition; and that, consequently, we can have no knowledge of the particular prior to our knowledge of the universal. This proposition is very important, on account of the historical notices connected with it, and the psychological fallacies (Realism, Conceptualism, and Nominalism) which it demolishes.
The seventh contradiction which it corrects.13. The next contradiction involved in natural thinking, and countenanced by psychology, is the notion that the ego, or oneself is, or may be a special or particular object of cognition, just as material things are supposed to be special or particular objects of cognition. Proposition VII. corrects this error by showing that the ego can be known only as the common or universal element in every cognition, just as matter is known as the particular or peculiar element of some cognitions.
The eighth contradiction which it corrects.14. Counter-proposition VIII. declares that the ego, or mind, may possibly be known to be material. This affirmation is proved to be contradictory by the corresponding proposition, which derives its data of proof from Propositions VI. and VII. These three Propositions (VI. VII. VIII.) form ​even out of their relation to the system, as affording the only argument by which the materiality of the mind can be disproved, and its immateriality put upon a right and intelligible footing.
The ninth contradiction which it corrects.15. The ninth contradiction which the system corrects is found in the assertion that the ego or mind is knowable per se, or in a state of pure indetermination. Proposition IX. gives expression to the true doctrine on this point
The tenth contradiction which it corrects.16. The contradiction embodied in Counter-proposition X. is one which called for correction, more imperatively, perhaps, than any other error which these Institutes have brought to light and refuted. The doctrine that the senses by themselves are, to some extent, faculties of cognition, and not mere capacities of nonsense, has operated more fatally on the cause of speculative truth, and has retarded the progress of philosophy more effectually, than any other blunder presented in the manifold aberrations of psychology. This doctrine is proved to be contradictory by Proposition X., and expunged, it is to be hoped, for ever from the pages of metaphysical science.
17. At Proposition XI. the system takes a fresh start,—puts forth a new articulation. Hitherto the system has controverted the contradictions incident ​ The eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth contradictions which it corrects.to popular knowledge; now it controverts the contradictions incident to popular thinking, laying down the distinction between knowing and thinking, presentation and representation, which is described in the Epistem., Prop. XI., Obs. 2. The three contradictions embodied in Counter-propositions XI. XII. XIII., and corrected by the corresponding propositions, are introduced lest the student should suppose that thought is competent to perform what knowledge is inadequate to overtake. This opinion is loosely entertained by ordinary thinking, and formally adopted by psychology; and therefore it was necessary to controvert it expressly. This refutation is effected by Propositions XI. XII. XIII., which form one group or family.
The remaining contraditions which it corrects.18. The contradictions which prevail on the subject of "the phenomenal and the substantial in cognition," "the relative and the absolute in cognition"—errors which originate wholly, although remotely, in the fundamental contradiction expressed in Counter-proposition I., and which enjoy the special advocacy of psychology—are corrected in Propositions XIV. XV. XVI. XVII. XVIII. XIX. XX. XXI. And Proposition XXII., with which the epistemology concludes, has for its object the separation of the necessary laws (to which expression is given in the twenty-one preceding propositions) from the contingent laws of cognition. The main purpose of ​Proposition XXII. is to show that the Absolute in our cognition is not, of necessity, the Absolute in all cognition, except in so far as its essentials are concerned; that is to say, except to this extent, that it (the absolute, namely, and substantial in all cognition) must consist of these two elements—whatever their nature may be—a subject and an object together. So much, then, in regard to the contradictions affecting "Knowing and the Known," which the epistemology subverts, and in regard to the truths which it substitutes in their room. The popular and psychological errors in respect to ignorance have next to be passed under review.
The leading contradiction which the agnoiology corrects.19. The leading contradiction which the agnoiology corrects consists in the affirmation, express or implied, that there can be an ignorance of that of which there can be no knowledge. When tested by the criterion of necessary truth, the contradictory character of this assertion is obvious. It amounts to a denial that ignorance is ignorance. Because ignorance is a defect; but no defect is involved in not knowing what is not to be known on any terms by any intelligence. And therefore to affirm that a nescience of the absolutely unknowable is ignorance, is to affirm that ignorance is no defect; in other words, is to affirm that ignorance is not ignorance,—is not what it is. This error is embodied in Counter-proposition III. of the agnoiology, and ​refuted in the corresponding proposition, which is the feeding truth of this section of the science.
The derivative contraditions which it corrects.20. The capital contradiction which the agnoiology exposes, yields as its progeny the following swarm of contradictions: First, that there can be an ignorance of objects without a subject, (Counter-proposition IV.); secondly, that there can be ignorance of material things per se, (Counter-proposition V.); thirdly, that there can be an ignorance of the universal without the particular, and of the particular without the universal, (Counter-proposition VI.); and, fourthly, that there can be an ignorance of the ego per se, or of the subject without any object, (Counter-proposition VII.) Each of these errors is articulately refuted by its appropriate proposition on the general ground that there can be no ignorance of that which is absolutely unknowable.
The concluding contradiction which it corrects.21. The concluding contradiction which the agnoiology despatches, consists in the denial that object plus a subject is the only possible object of ignorance. This denial is expressed in Counter-proposition VIII.; and in opposition to it, the corrective proposition proves that this synthesis is the only thing of which there can be any ignorance, inasmuch as it is the only thing of which there can be any knowledge. It shows that nothing but this synthesis can be ignored, because nothing but ​this synthesis can be known. The contradictions corrected in the ontology have now to be considered.
The opinions entertained by natural thinking and to some extent by psychology on the subject of "Being."22. Natural thinking has an ontology of its own. It asserts the absolute existence of material things per se, if not, also, the absolute existence of immaterial minds per se. Psychology is less consistent. At times it makes common cause with ordinary thinking, and adopts and confirms "the science of Being," which it receives at the hand; and on the authority, of popular belief. It contends for the absolute existence of matter by itself, and of mind by itself. Then again it vacillates, and declares that there can be no science of that which absolutely exists—grounding its denial on our alleged ignorance of "Being in itself?'
How the ontology goes to work in exposing the contradictions involved in these opinions.23. To correct the contradictions contained in these opinions, whether natural or psychological, the first step which this section of the science takes is to determine exhaustively the characters of absolute existence, (Prop. I., Ontol.) The next step which it takes is to eliminate or clear off one of the alternatives; and the conclusion reached is, that Absolute Existence is either that which we know, or that which we are ignorant of. This operation occupies the ontology from Proposition II. to Proposition V. inclusive.
​Exposure and refutation of these contradictions.24. The successful performance of this operation makes everything safe. It renders the system impregnable in defence, and irresistible in attack. It brings to light, and at the same time refutes, the contradictions entertained by natural thinking in regard to Absolute Existence. Natural thinking holds that material things per se have an absolute existence, (Counter-proposition VI.); that particular things have an absolute existence, (Counter-proposition VII.); that minds per se have an absolute existence, (Counter-proposition VIII.) These assertions are annihilated by their antagonist Propositions, VI. VII. VIII., by means of the consideration that what absolutely exists must be either that which we know, or that which we are ignorant of. But matter per se, the particular per se, the ego per se, are what we neither know nor are ignorant of (as has been demonstrated in the course of the epistemology and the agnoiology); and these, therefore, are not things which absolutely exist, or of which true and substantial Being can be predicated without giving utterance to a contradiction.
The ninth contradiction which the ontology corrects.25. The ninth counter-proposition expresses the common, and to a large extent the psychological, opinion in regard to the origin of knowledge. It declares that matter is the cause of our perceptive cognitions. But this opinion is contradictory, ​because matter cannot be the cause of our cognitions, inasmuch as it is a mere part of our cognitions, as stated in the demonstration of the corrective proposition.
The tenth contradiction which the ontology corrects.26. The tenth counter-proposition is a mere repetition of counter-propositions VI. VII. VIII. It is introduced because it is the antagonist proposition to Proposition X., which overthrows it, and demonstrates what, and what alone, absolutely exists. It is conceived that the conclusion established by this proposition (a conclusion which is equally infallible, whether absolute existence be that which we know, or that which we are ignorant of)—namely, that minds together with what they apprehend are the only veritable existences, and that minds without any apprehensions, and apprehensions without any mind, are mere absurdities—is so far from being an obnoxious or extravagant conclusion, that it is, on the contrary, in the highest degree consonant with the dictates of an enlightened common-sense, and gratifying to feelings at once sober and exalted.
The eleventh contradiction which the ontology corrects.27. And lastly, the eleventh counter-proposition gives expression to the atheistic conclusion into which ordinary thinking and psychology inevitably fall, after performing their descent through the whole preceding series of contradictions. The counter-propositions hang organically together, and ​form a coherent chain no less than the propositions; and this, the last link in the series, traces its genealogy in a long but unbroken line up to the cardinal contradiction set forth in the first counter-proposition of the epistemology—just as the proposition by which it is overthrown, and the truth of theism established, owes its whole strength to the first proposition of that section of the science. The crowning contradiction, which the system corrects by means of Proposition XI., is the supposition that the material universe by itself is non-contradictory, and accordingly is, or may be, self-subsistent and eternal.
By the correction of these contradictions, the system has redeemed its pledge.28. Such then are the cardinal contradictions incident to natural thinking, and confirmed by psychological science; and such, in brief, is the manner in which they have been pointed out and corrected by these Institutes. Accordingly, it is submitted that the system has executed the work which it undertook, and has redeemed the principal pledge which it held out at the commencement.
The utility of philosophical study.29. By the foregoing summary, in which the system has been exhibited mainly in its polemical character as corrective of the contradictions incident to popular opinion, the utility of the science of metaphysics is placed in a conspicuous light. If philosophy were a science which aimed merely at ​the positive establishment of certain truths of its own, without having for its vocation to challenge and put right the fundamental verdicts of man's natural judgment, the study of it might, not unreasonably, be declined on the ground that, by the exercise of our ordinary faculties, we were already in possession of as much truth as we wanted, or as was good for us. If truth comes to us spontaneously, why should we not be satisfied with it; why should we fatigue ourselves in the pursuit of any other truth than that which comes to us from nature? Why, indeed? But what if no truth, what if nothing but error comes to us from nature; what if the ordinary operation of our faculties involves us in interminable contradictions, and lands us in atheism at last? In that case, it is conceived that the usefulness of philosophy, as corrective of these spontaneous fallacies, and as emendatory of the inherent infirmities of the human intellect, cannot be too highly estimated, or its study too earnestly recommended.
As a discipline of necessary and demonstrated truth.30. Its importance is greatly enhanced by the consideration that, when rightly cultivated, it deals only with necessary and demonstrated truths. Its conclusions are not optional opinions to be embraced or not as people please: they are insuperable necessities of thinking, to understand which is to assent to them. Truth grounded on mere ​probable evidence is ever obnoxious to vicissitude; its acceptance or rejection is determined by the humours or idiosyncrasies of individual minds; it comes home to us more forcibly at one time than at another. It varies with the variation of our feelings and our partialities. But the demonstrated truths of philosophy stand exempt from all these disturbing influences. They enlist in their favour neither wishes nor desires. They appeal not to the feelings of men, but simply to their catholic reason. The mind may fall away from them; but they can never fall away. Human passion cannot obscure them; human weakness cannot infect them; but, when once established, they enjoy for ever an immunity from all those mutations to which the truths of mere contingency are exposed.