# A History of the Military Transactions of the British Nation in Indostan/Volume 2/Book 12

B00K XII.
THE two armies in the Carnatic continued, during the first days of January, in their encampments near Arcot, equally cautious of risquing any attempt of consequence, because both were, waiting the result of their negotiations to bring Innis Khan with his Morattoes to their assistance. Both offered 60,000 rupees; but, whilst the English were proposing conditional bills, the French sent ready money, which determined his preference. He arrived on the 8th in the French camp, with 3000 mounted, and a greater number of foot plunderers, who are called Pandarums, and always troop with the horse, as we have described when Bajinrow joined Clive in the fight near Arni. The next day, the French army filed off from their encampment which extended from the suburbs of Arcot along the south side of the Paliar, and took the road towards Trivatore; and, as they were going off, Mr. Lally, with a large body of Morattoes, some of the European horse, and two field-pieces, crossed the river, and advanced to Trimuddi, an out-post, three miles in front of the English camp at Chinasimundrum. A cannonade ensued, but more guns and troops coming up, Mr. Lally retired, and recrossed the river: during which, a body of 200 Morattoes, with whom Colonel Coote had treated, came over from the enemy's, and joined his camp. In the evening, Colonel Coote proceeded across the river, with an escort of horse, and reconnoitred the enemy's line of march, and suspecting, that they might intend against Vandiwash, took his measures accordingly. Orders were dispatched to Captain Sherlock, who commanded ​in the forf, to defend it to extremity, and to the two companies of Sepoys at Trivatore, to repair thither immediately. The baggage of the army was sent off that night to Covrepauk; and in the morning the whole army moved from Chinasimundrum, where they had lain eighteen days, and in the evening pitched anew on the bank of the Paliar, five miles lower down than the ground which the French had occupied on the other side. A strong post of horse and foot was advanced at some distance towards Arcot, and another on the left, with orders to keep up continual patroles. The next day passed without any alarm from the enemy, or intelligence of consequence concerning them, who nevertheless were not idle.
Mr. Lally had formed another project besides that which Colonel Coote suspected; and, to accomplish it, had not suffered his army to advance with half the expedition they might. They were on the 11th, the third day after they quitted their encampment, no farther than Papantanguel, six miles on this side of Trivatore, and halted there the greatest part of the day. Towards the evening, all were under arms, and the stores and baggage loaded; but, instead of marching on he displayed them on the plain, facing to the Paliar, and then exercised them as if for practice, in large evolutions, which were calculated to fling the whole line to the eastward, with all the horse, Morattoes, as well as Europeans, on the right, of whom the outermost, when the exercise ended, were six miles from Papantanguel. Having thus whiled away the time until the close of the evening, he continued all on the ground they stood until it was dark; and then separated the army into two divisions. The horse, excepting some which rejoined the second, filed off, followed by 300 Sepoys, who had formed next to them, and marched on as fast as they could, keeping together; the rest of the army, which consisted of all the European infantry, with the baggage and artillery, were ordered to follow, but without strain. Mr.Lally led the first division himself. After a march of 15 miles, in which they had crossed the Paliar, they arrived at eight in the morning at Conjeveram; expecting to find in the town the magazines of rice which supplied the English army; but they had no such store, ​living on the purchase of the day; nor had the inhabitants more than the common provision of their houses; but in the pagoda was the hospital, and a stock of military stores, under the guard of two companies of Sepoys, commanded by Lieutenant Chilsholm, of which the capture would have been distressing; but Mr. Lally having brought no cannon made no attempt on the pagoda, and employed his troops in collecting plunder, and setting fire to the houses of the town; during which, the Sepoys, and all the sick in the pagoda, who could move, came out, and being well acquainted with the streets and covers, continually attacked their smaller parties and stragglers, and whenever likely to be overpowered, disappeared. In the evening the enemy retreated, driving off 2000 bullocks, the most valuable part of their booty, loaded with the trumpery they had collected. By this time the other division of the army had arrived at Jangolam, a village on the bank of the Paliar, three miles from Conjeveram, from whence both united, immediately proceeded, and the next day reached Trivatore.
The nearest ground of the French line, whilst marching on this exploit, was eight miles from the advanced post of the English camp, whose black horse, awed by the number of the Morattoes, were afraid to venture, and could not be trusted so far abroad; and the European horse, being only one hundred, were not even sufficient for the necessary patroles of the camp; so that the first intelligence of the enemy's march was from Lieutenant Chisholm at Conjeveram, sent as soon as they appeared there. It arrived in the afternoon; Colonel Coote immediately set off with the cavalry, and ordered the whole army to follow, which was in march before the sun set, and before it rose at Conjeveram, where Colonel Coote, with the cavalry, had arrived at one in the morning. The way is twenty-one miles.
It was now a month, that Mr. Bussy had acted once more in the field in conjunction with Mr. Lally; and the intercourse had only encreased the aversion. The late errors of Mr. Lally's operations, which had lost Vandiwash and Carangoly, without gaining any thing equivalent by the expedition to Seringham, had lowered his military character throughout the army; and even his own regiment as well as Lorrain, although the King's troops, began to acknowledge the ​superior talents of Mr. Bussy to conduct the war: the battalion of India always thought so. Mr. Lally imputed this rising predilection in the officers to the influence of Mr. Bussy's money, and amongst the soldiers to the intrigues of Father St. Estevan, a crazy, busy Jesuit, who officiated in the camp, and confessed the regiment of Lorrain: his antipathy no longer listened to any restraints. As soon as the army returned to Trivatore, Mr. Bussy asked his leave to retire to Pondicherry for the recovery of a painful disorder, which incapacitated him for fatigue: but Mr. Lally forbid him in the name of the king to quit the field. He obeyed, and gave his best opinion concerning the future operations of the campaign. "The English, he said, would not see Vandiwash taken, without risquing a battle to save it, in which the French army would be deprived of all the force employed in the siege; and from the necessity of covering it, not master of the choice of advantages in the action; whereas, if the whole of the regular troops kept together on the banks of the Paliar, and detached the whole body of Morattoes to lay waste the English districts, their army would soon be reduced to the necessity, either of giving battle at disadvantage, or of seeking its subsistence under the walls of Madrass." No advice could be more judicious; for the first division of the Morattoes, although only 1000, had ventured to carry their ravages as far as Pondamalee and Vendalore, and by cutting off every kind of provision on every side had reduced the English camp to as great want, as they brought abundance to the French, where they sold the beeves they had plundered at seven for a rupee, and rice at half its value in any other part of the country; and at this very time the Presidency of Madrass, anxious for the loss of their surest revenues, repented that they had not bought the Morattoes on their own terms, and were advising Colonel Coote to fall back nearer to the adjacencies of the town. But Mr. Lally suspected Mr. Bussy's advice, as designed to prevent or disparage the activity of his own operations; and on the 14th marched away from Trivatore, with a detachment of 500 Europeans, half the European cavalry, 500 Morattoes, 1000 Sepoys, and four field-pieces, leaving Mr. Bussy with the main body at Trivatore, as the most ​central situation, at band to join his own division, if the English army should march after it; or ready to oppose and interrupt them, if they should go against Arcot, in order to divert the siege of Vandivash.
On the 14th in the evening, Colonel Coote received intelligence of Mr. Lally's arrival at Vandivash, and the next day marched with his whole force from Conjeveram, crossing the Paliar to the s. E. instead of following the enemy by the longer, but better road of Trivatore. On the 17th, they arrived, and encamped near Outramalore. This situation, lying half-way in the road between Vandivash and Chinglapett, secured the communication with this place, and from hence with Madrass: it likewise had Carangoly in its rear to the left. The fort at Outramalore having long been neglected, was open in several parts from top to bottom of the wall; but was a much more defensible repository for the stores and baggage of the army, than any post in the open plain.
Captain Sherlocke kept 30 Europeans and 300 Sepoys in the south pettah of Vandivash, which Mr. Lally attacked at three in the morning with all his infantry, in two divisions: the one, in which the Europeans were marines from the squadron, was allotted to the western rampart, and only intended to make a diversion during the real attack on the opposite; where the Europeans were of Lally's regiment, and led by himself. Both divisions were discovered and fired upon before they gained the foot of the wall; and the marines, unused to such services, broke, and ran round to Mr. Lally's division, who, supposing them enemies, fired upon them until the mistake was discovered. Nothing more was attempted until eight o'clock the next morning, when all the infantry in one column, with two field-pieces at their head, advanced against the south-side of the pettah; but the fire to which they were exposed, brought the front of the column to a halt without orders. Mr. Lally rode up, dismounted, and calling for volunteers, ran to the ditch, and mounted the wall, himself the first. The whole column immediately poured after him; and the troops in the pettah, having no orders to defend it to extremity, escaped along the streets, and regained the fort without any loss in the retreat; in the whole defence only four or five had been killed; but the enemy lost twelve Europeans, besides Sepoys, ​and more wounded of both. They immediately entrenched the openings of the streets facing the fort, and began to raise a battery in the N. E. angle of the pettah, against the same tower which Colonel Coote had breached, and nearly on the same ground.
A thousand of the Morattoes had been ordered to observe the motions of the English army; but they followed nothing but plunder, and continued spreading themselves to the north of the Paliar; and as Mr. Lally never rewarded sufficiently to encourage daring spies, the first news he received of the approach of the English army, was on the 17th at sun-rise, by a letter from Mr. Bussy at Trivatore, by which time they were arrived at Outramalore. His aversion to the authority, made him unwilling to accept the information as authentic; and at first he only ordered part of the army to advance from Trivatore: but, on farther intelligence, left Mr. Bussy to act according to his discretion; who at five in the afternoon marched with the whole, and arrived at Vandivash before midnight.
The English army arrived at Outramalore without provisions, and too much fatigued to march on, and reach Vandivash, before Mr. Bussy's division had joined Mr. Lally's there, which, otherwise, on their appearance, must either have retreated, or would have stood their ground with great inferiority and disadvantage. The horse, as soon as the foot were encamped, went abroad to rummage the villages for provisions, and the next day the troop of hussars fell in with 50 Morattoes, of whom they killed one, and took twelve with their horses. Still the want of grain continued in the camp, and it was found that the renter, although he depended on Madrass, had sold his store to some agents, probably employed by the French, at Sadrass; on which he was seized, and confined without eating, until the army was supplied; and his people in a few hours brought enough for the immediate want, and promised more. The scarcity had, however, been no obstacle to the operations of the army; for Colonel Coote had resolved not to advance upon the enemy, until they were ready to assault Vandivash, when he should have his choice of attacking either the troops employed against the fort, or the army which covered them in the plain. This Mr. Bussy foresaw, and again advised ​Mr. Lally to desist from the siege until a better opportunity; and to keep his whole force together, until the English either fought or retired; but Mr. Lally as before could not brook instruction from the rival he detested, and persisted.
Their battery did nob open until the 20th; having waited for the cannon, which were brought 70 miles from the ramparts of Valdore, on carriages sent from Pondicherry. They were two eighteen, and two of twenty-four. By the night of the 20th the wall of the faussebray was opened. Colonel Coote, on this intelligence, marched the next day with all the cavalry to reconnoitre the enemy's situation and the state of the siege, and receiving, when near, a message from Sherlocke, that they had breached the main rampart, went back, and halted at Tirimbourg, a village half way, to which he ordered the main body of the army to advance without delay from Outramalore, but to send their heavy baggage, for better security, to Carangoly. They arrived at Tirimbourg in the night; at sun-rise, Colonel Coote taking with him 1000 of the black horse, and the two troops of European, with two companies of Sepoys, advanced in front of the main body of the army, which he ordered to follow, but without pressing their march.
The distance from Tirimbourg to Vandivash is seven miles; the road leads from the N. E. to the s. w. The mountain of Vandivash lies in the same direction, extending more than a league in length. The fort stands two miles to the s. of the mountain, but nearer to the western than the eastern end. The French army was encamped directly opposite to the eastern end of the mountain, at the distance of three miles, and at two to the west of the fort. The camp was in two lines separated by paddy fields; a great tank covered the left flank of both lines. At 300 yards in front of this tank, but a little on its left, was another, and farther on, likewise on the left of this, another, neither more than 200 yards in circumference, and both dry; and the bank which surrounded the foremost tank had been converted into a retrenchment, in which were mounted some pieces of cannon, which commanded the plain in front, and flanked in its whole length the esplanade in front of the camp. ​All the Morattoes were returned, and lying with their plunder under the foot of the mountain, extending along it towards the N. E. end. their scouts brought intelligence of the approach of Colonel Coote's division, on which all mounted, as did the European cavalry in the French camp, and the whole spread in different bodies across the plain to tho east of the mountain. Colonel Coote, with 200 of the black cavalry, followed by the two companies of Sepoys, was advancing a mile in front of the rest of the cavalry, which composed the division he was leading; and the Morattoes sent forward 200 of their horse, on which he halted, called up the Sepoys, and interspersed them in platoons between the troops of horse.
The advanced body of the Morattoes nevertheless pushed on, but were stopped by the fire of the Sepoys, before they came to the use of the sword. Nevertheless, they recovered after their wheel, stood till within reach of the Sepoys again, then turned again, and in this manner fell back to their main body, which with the French cavalry had gathered, and were drawn up, extending in a line to the east, from the end of the mountain; the French on the right of the Morattoes.
Colonel Coote, whilst halting for the Sepoys, had sent off a messenger, ordering up the body of cavalry, which were a mile behind, and the first five companies of Sepoys with two of the field-pieces from the head of the line of infantry, to come on likewise as fast as they could march: the cavalry soon joined him, but more time was requisite for the Sepoys and guns, as the line was three miles off. During which, Colonol Coote, by continual halts, advanced very slowly; and the enemy's cavalry continued on the ground they had chosen. At eight o'clock the detachment of Sepoys, with the guns, came up, when the division with Coote were at an ascent, which intercepted them from the sight of the enemy, who, although they had perceived the cloud of march, had not distinguished the two guns which accompanied the Sepoys, who, joined by the other two companies, formed in a line in the rear of the cavalry, with the guns in the center; the two troops of European horse were in the center of the cavalry in the fist line. In this order the two lines advanced ​against the enemy, who were still waiting for them; but when at the distance of 200 yards, the cavalry opened from the centre, and brought themselves round, divided on each wing of the Sepoys, in the second line; and the instant the ground was clear, the two field-pieces began quick firing on the enemy's line of cavalry, which were setting off to take advantage of the evolution making by the English. The fieldpieces were, one a twelve, the other a six-pounder, both of brass; and Captain Robert Barker, although he commanded the whole of the Company's artillery, had come up with, and now served them himself: the effect answered the good-will and dexterity; the fire was directed amongst the Morattoes; and every shot was seen to overset men and horses, which stopped their career, but not before they were within reach of the musketry of the Sepoys; and some of them on the wings had even rode in amongst the outward of the English cavalry during their evolution; but the encreasing havock which fell amongst them soon after, put the whole body to flight, and they galloped away to their camp, leaving the French cavalry alone, who were advancing in regular order on their right, against whom the field-pieces were then directed, which they stood for some time, seeming to expect the Morattoes would rally; but seeing them entirely gone off, turned and went off themselves, but still in order, and with much composure.
Colonel Coote advanced with his division to the ground they had quitted, and seeing the plain clear, quite up to the French camp, sent orders to his line of infantry to halt, wheresoever the order should meet them, until he returned to them himself. There were some gardens and other enclosures half a mile to the right of the ground which the French cavalry had occupied, whilst drawn up in a line with the Morattoes extending from the end of the mountain. The enclosures were good shelter on necessity, and the ground beyond them excellent for the display and action of the whole army, which Colonel Coote having reconnoitred, ordered his division to file off to the left, and to form on this ground, in the same order as before; the cavalry in a line in front, the Sepoys in another behind them. ​As soon as this disposition was executed, he rode back to the line of infantry, which were halting, drawn up in two lines according to the order of battle he had issued to the principal officers in the preceding night. He signified his intention of leading the army on to a general action, which was received with acclamations, that left no doubt of the ardour of the troops to engage the enemy they had so long been seeking. The plain dry, hard, and even, admitted of their marching on in the same order they were drawn up, without filing off in columns, so that they were soon upon the ground where the advanced division were halting, when the cavalry wheeled from the right and left, and formed the third line of the main battle, and the five companies of Sepoys took their place again on the right of the first line; but the two field-pieces, still attended by Captain Barker with the two detached companies of Sepoys, kept apart at some distance in front, but to the left of the first line.
In this array the army stood in full view of the French camp, in which no motions were perceived; but no firing was heard against the fort of Yandivash. Colonel Coote having waited half an hour to see the effect of his appearance, rode forward with some officers to reconnoitre the enemy's camp, who suffered them to approach near, without cannonading or sending out a party of cavalry to interrupt them.
The day began to wear, and Colonel Coote, as soon as he returned to the troops, ordered the whole to file off to the right; the infantry marched in two lines at the same parallels they had drawn up; the baggage formed a third column on the right, and the cavalry followed in the rear of all the three. They proceeded towards the south side of the mountain, but inclining a little towards the French camp. As soon as the first files of the infantry came to the stony ground which extends from the foot of the mountain, on which the enemy's cavalry could not act, the whole halted, and the two lines of infantry facing to the right, presented themselves again in order of battle, opposite to the French camp, at the distance of a mile and a half, but outstretching it on the right; the baggage falling back at the same time, gave place to the cavalry to resume their former station as the third line. ​The Morattoes were spread under the mountain to protect their own camp, and none of them ventured within reach of the two guns, which during the march had kept on the left of the first line; but some of the French cavalry came out to reconnoitre, and were driven back by their fire. The army halted some time in this situation, in expectation that the defiance would bring the French out of their camp; but they still remained quiet; which obliged Colonel Coote to prosecute the rest of the operations he had meditated.
The ground for some distance from the mountain, is, as under all others in the Carnatic, encumbered with stones and fragments of rock. From this rugged ground up to the fort the plain was occupied by rice fields. The English army coasting the mountain until opposite to the fort, and then making a conversion of their lines to the right, would immediately be formed in the strongest of situations; their right protected by the fire of the fort; their left by the impassable ground under the mountain, and with the certainty of throwing any number of troops, without opposition, into the fort; who, sallying with the garrison to the other side, might easily drive the enemy from their batteries in the pettah; from whence the whole of the English army might likewise advance against the French camp, with the choice of attacking it either on the flank, or in the rear, where the main defences, which had been prepared in the front of their encampment, or arose from the usual dispositions on this side, would become entirely useless.
The English army had no sooner began their march along the foot of the mountain, than Mr. Lally perceived the intention, with all the consequences of this able operation. The camp immediately beat to arms, and soon after the troops were seen issuing to occupy the ground in front of its line, where the field of battle had been previously marked out.
The French cavalry, 300 riders, all Europeans, formed on the right; next »to them were the regiment of Lorrain, 400 firelocks: ​in the centre, the battalion of India, 700; next to them Lally's, 400, whose left were under the retrenched tank, in which were posted the marines or troops from the squadron, with Poete's from Ganjam, in all 300, with four field-pieces. Between the retrenchment and Lally's were three, the same number between Lally's and India, India and Lorrain, Lorrain and the cavalry; in all 16 pieces. Four hundred of the Sepoys of Hyder Jung, whom Mr. Bussy had brought from Cudapah, were posted at the tank in the rear of the retrenched tank were the marines were, whom they were to support on occasion: 900 Sepoys were ranged behind a ridge which ran along the front of the camp; and at each extremity of this ridge was a retrenchment guarded by 50 Europeans, which covered, the entrances into the camp. The whole force drawn out, infantry, cavalry, and artillery, was 2250 Europeans, and 1300 Sepoys: 150 Europeans and 300 Sepoys continued at the batteries against Vandivash; but none of the Morattoes, although 3000, left the ground and protection of their own camp to assist their allies in this decisive hour.
The sight of the French army issuing into the open plain gave Colonel Coote all he intended by the preceding operations of the day. He instantly halted his lines, which had advanced some way along the foot of the mountain. Facing as soon as they halted, the two first lines were in order of battle, opposite, but obliquely, to the enemy. The baggage was sent back under the escort of two companies of Sepoys, to a village in the rear, and the cavalry as before, took their place in the third line.
The English army consisted of 1900 Europeans, of whom 80 were cavalry, 2100 Sepoys, 1250 black horse, and 26 field-pieces. In the first line were Coote's regiment on the right, the Company's two battalions in the centre, Draper's on the left; but all without their grenadiers; and 1800 Sepoys were equally divided on the right and left of the Europeans in this line; in the intervals of which were 10 pieces of cannon, three on each side of the Company's battalions, and two between Coote's and Draper's and the Sepoys. In the second line were all the grenadiers of the army, 300, with a field​piece next, and beyond 200 Sepoys on each of their flanks: the cavalry formed the third line; the 80 Europeans, as before, in the centre of the black horse; the two field-pieces with the two companies of Sepoys of the morning still continued apart, advanced as before a little on the left of the first line.
As the English army were marching up, and before they were within cannon shot, Mr. Lally, putting himself at the head of the European cavalry on the right, set off with them, and taking a large sweep on the plain, came down, intending to fall upon the horse of the English army, which made their third line. The black horse, who were nine-tenths of this body, pretended to wheel, in order to meet the enemy's, but purposely confused themselves so much, that some went off immediately, which gave a pretext to the rest to follow them, and the 80 Europeans were left alone, who faced and drew up properly to receive the charge, relying on better assistance. As soon as the intention of Mr. Lally was understood, the division of Sepoys on the left of the first line were ordered to fall back in an angle from the front, ready to take the enemy's cavalry in flank as they were approaching, but performed the evolution with so little firmness, that little hope was entertained of any execution from their fire; but Captain Barker with the two guns of the separate detachment, had watched, and directing his own by the movement of the enemy, was within point blank of them just before they were opposite and riding in on the flank and rear of the horse, where only the European were ready to oppose them, for all the black were gone. In less than a minute the quick firing of the two guns brought down ten or fifteen men or horses, which, as usual, threw the next to them, and they the whole, into confusion; and the horses growing every moment wilder, all turned and went off on the full gallop, leaving Mr. Lally, as he asserts, singly alone. If so, he could not have staid long where he was, for the European horse, on seeing the enemy's check, were advancing; and many of the black, encouraged by the security, were returning, and the whole soon after set off after the enemy, whom they pursued in a long course quite to the rear of their camp. ​The English army halted ten minutes in attention to this attack, during which the French line cannonaded, but beyond the proper distance even for ball, and nevertheless often fired grape, and neither with any effect. The English did not begin to answer until nearer, and then perceiving their own fire much better directed, halted in order to preserve this advantage, as long as the enemy permitted it to continue, by not advancing from the front of their camp. Mr. Lally retiring from the English cavalry, and deserted by his own, rejoined his line of infantry, which he found suffering, and with much impatience, from the English cannonade: his own impetuosity concurred with their eagerness to be led to immediate decision, and he gave the order to advance. The English line was not directly opposite to the front of the French, but slanting outwards from their left, which required the French troops on this side to advance much less than those of their right, who had more ground to wheel, in order to bring the whole line parallel to that of the English.
Colonel Coote seeing the enemy coming on gave the final orders to his own. None but the Europeans of the first and second lines were to advance any farther. The Sepoys on the wings of both, and the cavalry in the third line, were to continue where they were left, and to take no share in the battle, until they should hereafter receive orders how to act.
The enemy began the fire of musketry at one o'clock, but Colonel Ooote intended to refrain until nearer; nevertheless the company of Coffrees, which was inserted in one of the Company's battalions, gave their fire without the order of their officers, and it was with difficulty that the irregularity was prevented from extending. Colonel Coote was at this time passing from the right to the left to join his own regiment, and received two or three shot in his cloaths from the fire of the Coffrees. As soon as he arrived at his regiment they began, and the fire became general through the whole line.
Coote's had only fired twice, when Lorrain formed in a column twelve in front: the operation is simple and was expeditious. Colonel Coote made no change in the disposition of, his regiment, ​but ordered the whole to preserve their next fire; which Lorrain coming on almost at a run, received at the distance of 50 yards in their front and on both their flanks; it fell heavy, and brought down many, but did not stop the column. In an instant the two regiments were mingled at the push of bayonet; those of Coote's opposite the front of the column were immediately borne down, but the rest, far the greatest part, fell on the flanks, when every man fought only for himself, and in a minute the ground was spread with dead and wounded, and Lorrain having just before suffered from the reserved fire of Coote's, broke, and ran in disorder to regain the camp. Colonel Coote ordered his regiment to be restored to order before they pursued, and rode himself to see the state of the rest of the line.
As he was passing on, a shot from one of the guns with Draper's regiment, struck a tumbril in the retrenched tank on the left of Lally's, where the marines were posted, and the explosion blew up 80 men, many of whom, with the chevalier Poete, were killed dead, and most of the others mortally hurt. All who were near, and had escaped the danger, fled in the first impulse of terror out of the retrenchment, and ran to gain the camp by the rear of Lally's, and were joined in the way by the 400 Sepoys at the tank behind, who, although they had suffered nothing, likewise abandoned their post. Colonel Coote on the explosion, sent orders by his aid de camp Captain Izer, to Major Brereton, to advance with the whole of Draper's regiment, and take possession of the retrenched tank before the enemy recovered the confusion which he judged the explosion must have caused; as in this situation they would command, under cover, the flank of Lally's regiment. The ground on which Draper's was standing opposite to Lally's when the order came, obliged them, in order to prevent Lally's from enfilading, or flanking them as coming down, to file off by the right. Mr. Bussy, who commanded on this wing, had before endeavoured to rally the fugitives, of whom he had recovered 50 or 60, and adding to them two platoons of Lally's, led and posted them in the tank, and then returned to support them with the regiment. But Brereton's files kept wheeling at a distance, and moving at the quickest pace, suffered little from their fire, and coming upon the ​left of the retrenchment, assaulted it impetuously, and carried it after receiving one fire of much execution from the troops within, under which Major Brereton fell mortally wounded, and when fallen refused the assistance of the men next him, but bid them follow their victory. The first of Draper's who got into the retrenchment fired down from the parapet upon the guns on the left of Lally's, and drove the gunners from them; whilst the rest, being many more than required to maintain the post, formed, and shouldered under it, extending on the plain to the left to prevent the regiment of Lally, if attempting to recover the post, from embracing it on this side. Mr. Bussy wheeled the regiment of Lally, and sent off platoons from its left, to regain the retrenchment, whilst the rest were opposed to the division of Draper's on the plain. But the platoons acted faintly, only skirmishing with their fire instead of coming to the close assault. The action likewise continued only with musketry, but warmly, between the two divisions on the plain, until the two fieldpieces, attached to the right of Draper's, which they had left behind when marching to attack the retrenchment, were brought to bear on the flank of Lally's, who had none to oppose them; on which their line began to waver, and many were going off. Mr. Bussy, as the only chance of restoring this part of the battle, put himself at their head, intending to lead them to the push of bayonet, but had only advanced a little way when his horse was struck with a ball in the head, and floundering at every step afterwards, he dismounted; during which the fire from Draper's had continued, of which two or three balls passed through his cloaths, and when he alighted only 20 of Lally's had kept near him, the rest had shrunk. Two platoons set off on the full run from Drapers to surround them: the officer demanded and received Mr. Bussy's sword, and sent him with a guard into the rear; he was conducted to Major Monson, who had wheeled three companies of the grenadiers of the second line, and was halting with them and their field-pieces at some distance, ready if necessary to support the event of Draper's. Mr. Bussy asked who the troops he saw were; and was answered 200 grenadiers, the best men in ​the army, who had not fired a shot; he clasped his hands in surprize and admiration, and said not a word.
During the conflict on this side, the two centers, which were composed of the troops of the two East India Company's, had kept up a hot, but distant fire; neither chusing to risque closer decision until they saw the event between Draper's and Lally's; but as soon as Lally's broke, the enemy's center went off likewise, but in better order, although in haste, to regain their camp. Many of Coote's, in the first fury of victory, had pursued their antagonists of Lorrain up to the retrenchment, by which the fugitives entered the camp: they might have suffered by this rashness, if the guard there, as well as the nearest Sepoys along the ridge, had not taken fright, and abandoned their posts on seeing the rout of Lorrain. It took some time to bring the pursuers back to their colours, when the officers, sending off the wounded, formed the rest into their ranks, and afterwards only made the appearance of advancing, whilst the rest of the battle remained in doubt, lest Lorrain with the Sepoys should rally; to prevent which the four field-pieces on the left kept up an incessant fire plunging into the camp.
As soon as the other wing and the center of the enemy's army gave way, their opponents, the Company's battalion and Draper's regiment got into order, and with Coote's, who were ready, advanced to the pursuit, leaving their artillery behind. They entered the enemy's camp without meeting the least opposition. India and Lally's had passed through it hastily to the other side, although not in rout as Lorrain's before. Mr. Lally, after the rout of Lorrain, rode away to join his own regiment on the left, but on the way saw the explosion of the tumbril at the retrenched tank, the dispersion of the marines in this post, and the flight of the Sepoys out of the tank behind. He was in this instant near, and intended to speak to Mr.Bussy, but turned suddenly, and ordered the Sepoys stationed along the ridge in front of the camp to advance. None obeyed; and most of them being those of Zulphacarjung who had served with Mr. Bussy in the Decan, he rashly suspected treachery, and, unable to controul the impulse of distraction, rode into the camp to stop the fugitives of Lorrain. ​The whole body of the French cavalry, near 300, who were all Europeans, appeared on the plain in the rear of the camp to which they had retreated, followed by the cavalry of the English army, whose encounter they had hitherto avoided by abler evolutions: so that neither of these two bodies had been within sight of the brunt between the two infantries. The French cavalry chanced to be near enough to see the flight of Lorrain through the camp, and, animated by a sense of national honour, resolved to protect them, if, as might be expected, they should endeavour to escape still farther by gaining the plain. In this purpose they united their squadrons, and drew up in the rear of the camp, and in face of the English cavalry, of whom the black horse, awed by their resolution, dared not, and the European were too few, to charge them. This unexpected succour probably prevented the utter dispersion of the French army. There were in the rear of the camp three field-pieces with their tumbrils of ammunition; at which the fugitives of Lorrain, encouraged by the appearance of the cavalry, stopped, and yoked them. These protections restored confidence to Lally's and the India battalion as they arrived, likewise beaten from the field. They set fire to the tents and undangerous stores near them, and the whole filed off into the plain in much better order than their officers expected. The three fieldpieces kept in the rear of the line of infantry, and behind them moved the cavalry. They passed to the westward, and when opposite to the pettahs of Vandivash were joined by the troops, who had continued at the batteries there, which they abandoned, leaving all the stores and baggage, and received no interruption from the garrison as they were going off. The Morattoes, who were under the mountain when the cannonade began, intended not only to protect their own camp, but to fall upon the baggage of the English army; but when they saw the whole body of Sepoys remaining in the rear of the action, were deterred from advancing to the village, to which the baggage was sent; and having their own all ready loaded on their bullocks, sent off the whole train to the westward soon after the cannonade commenced; and with the first notice from their scouts of the rout of Lorrain, began to go off ​themselves. Their rout led them across the way, along which the French were retreating; whom 700 of them joined and accompanied, Colonel Coote sent repeated orders to his cavalry to harass and impede the retreat of the French line. They followed them five miles until five in the afternoon, but the black horse could not be brought up within reach of the carbines of the French cavalry, and much less of their field-pieces. The brunt of the day passed intirely between the Europeans of both armies, the black troops of neither had any part in it, after the cannonade commenced. The commandants of the English Sepoys complimenting Colonel Coote on the victory, thanked him for the sight of such a battle as they had never seen.
Twenty-four pieces of cannon were taken, 19 in the field and camp, and five in the battery against Vandiwash, 11 tumbrils of ammunition, all the tents, stores, and baggage, that were not burnt. Two hundred of the Europeans were counted dead in the field, and 160 were taken, of whom 30 died of their wounds before the next morning; six of the killed, and 20 of the prisoners, were officers: wounded continually dropt on the road; so that the immediate diminution of the enemy's force was computed 600 men. Of the English army, 63 Europeans were killed, and 124 wounded, in all 190; of this number, 36 of the killed, and 16 of the wounded, belonged to the Company's battalions, 17 and 66 to Draper's, 13 and 36 to Coote's regiment; four of the European horse, and two of the artillery, were wounded, but none of either killed. Of the black troops, 17 of the horse were killed, and 32 wounded: in all, 22 and 47: of the Sepoys only 6 and 15. The killed, as well in the European as the black troops, was, although not in the different bodies, one half of the number wounded, a proportion on the whole which rarely happens, excepting as in this action, by cannonade.
The first news of the victory was brought to Madrass at sun-rise the next morning by one of the black spies of the English camp. At noon came in another, with a note of two lines, written with a pencil, by Colonel Coote on the field of battle; other accounts followed, and soon after eye-witnesses. The joy which this success diffused throughout the settlement, was almost equal to that of ​Calcutta on the victory at Plassey. Their congratulations to Colonel Coote and the army were abundant as their joy.
The day after the battle scarcely sufficed for the variety of orders necessary to restore the army to its strength, and to make the dispositions, by which Colonel Coote, with his usual activity, resolved to prosecute his success. Captain Wood was ordered to advance with his garrison from Covrepauk, and invest the fort of Arcot; Lieutenant Chisholm to send to Covrepauk the sick and invalids left by the army at Conjeveram: Madrass was requested to send to Conjeveram the recovered men of the King's regiments left in their hospital, together with stores, battering cannon, and ammunition: this line was meant to sustain the siege of Arcot. Whatsoever other troops could be spared from Madrass were to be sent to Vandivash, with medicines and conveniences for the wounded there. The baggage at Outramalore was ordered to rejoin the army; a letter was written to Innis Khan, advising him to quit the province, with all his Morattoes, without delay, or that no quarter would be given to any of them wheresoever met. Orders were issued for 1000 of the black horse to march to the south; 200 set off immediately to plunder and lay waste the country between Allamparvah and Pondicherry: the next day, which was the 25th, 800 with 20 of the hussars, under the command of Vasserot, marched with the same intent against the districts between Pondicherry and Gingee, and were to act in correspondence with the other detachment.
The French army reached Chittapett the next day, where they only remained the day after; and then Mr. Lally, without reinforcing the garrison, fell back with all the European force, to Gingee, sending the Sepoys of Zulphacarjung, of whom he had still suspicious, although Mr. Bussy was taken, to act under the commandant at Arcot, and advised the Morattoes to renew their incursions to the north of the Paliar. Colonel Coote, on intelligence of Mr. Lally's retreat, and the little care he had taken of Chittapett, resolved to attack this place before he marched against Arcot. The baggage from Outramalore, waiting for some stores from Chinglapett, did not arrive until the 26th. In the same evening, a ​detachment marched from Vandivash, and the next morning invested Chittapett, when the commandant, De Tilly, refused to surrender. On the 28th, the whole army encamped within cannonshot, and the commandant still persisting in his refusal, a battery of two eighteen-pounders was erected in the night, against the N. E. angle, and a howitz was planted in the pettah, to enfilade the north line of the rampart. The fire opened at five the next morning, and the breach was nearly practicable by eleven, when a flag of truce appeared, and De Tilly surrendered without terms. The garrison consisted of four commissioned officers, and 52 private Europeans, with 300 Sepoys. In the hospitals were 73 Europeans, wounded in the late battle. The artillery were nine pieces of cannon; the store of ammunition was considerable, and amongst the arms were 300 excellent muskets, which were distributed amongst the English Sepoys. The garrison reported, that a party, with two field-pieces, were marching from Arcot and Gingee, having taken the round-about road by Arni and Trinomalee; on which Captain Stephen Smith was detached, with 200 black horse, and two companies of Sepoys, to intercept them.
In the mean time, the horse sent to the southward had performed their mission with great alacrity, having burnt 84 villages, and swept away 8000 head of cattle, many of which were of those the Morattoes had taken on the north of the Paliar, and sold to whomsoever would buy them, at four-pence a head. The whole collection was driven under different convoys to Vandivash, Carangoly, and Outramalore, and more than restored the number which these districts had lost. Besides what they had sold, they had driven away a great multitude of the best cattle into the vallies leading from Lalliput to Damalcherri, which they intended to send, with the rest of their booty, to their own country on the other side the hills; but the menaces and success of Colonel Coote raised apprehensions in Innis Khan, that he might risque the loss of this plunder, if he continued any longer in the province. He therefore quitted Arcot, with all his Morattoes, on the same day that Chittapett surrendered; and continued his march through the pass, from ​whence he wrote to Mr. Pigot, that he should at any time hereafter be ready to wait on him with his troops, if they could agree upon the terms.
On the 30th, intelligence was received from Captain Wood, that he had marched with his garrison of Covrepauk to Arcot, and found the Sepoys of Zulphacarjung strongly posted in the streets of the town; he nevertheless attacked them, and after much firing drove them from their stands, with considerable loss on their side, and little on his own. They retreated out of the town, as the garrison in the fort did not want their service. On the 31st, the army, which had moved by two successive divisions, encamped near Arni, where they were rejoined by the detachment sent with Captain Stephen Smith, who had taken the party they had been sent after, which was much less than had been represented, consisting only of 20 Europeans and 50 Sepoys, escorting two brass field-pieces, which Mr. Lally had ordered from Arcot. Captain Smith had likewise picked up three commissaries, who were travelling to Pondicherry in their pallankeens.
The next day, which was the first of February, Colonel Coote, with the first division of the army, joined Captain Wood in the town of Arcot, having left the second with Major Monson, to attack Timery, which lies in the road. This fort being very small, although well built, only shells were fired, which before the evening reduced the garrison to surrender: they were one serjeant commanding 20 soldiers, and 60 Sepoys, with five pieces of cannon. The next day Major Monson arrived at Arcot, and all immediately set to work in erecting batteries, for which Captain Wood had prepared the materials, and had nearly finished one on the north face of the fort.
The defences of the fort had been greatly improved since it was defended by Captain Clive, against Rajahsahib, in 1752. The English had contributed most; but the French finished what was intended, but left undone by them, when they abandoned the fort on Mr. Lally's approach to Madrass. The ditch was mostly in the solid rock, and had every where been dug to man height: the faussebray ​was clear, but open; being neither skirted with a parapet-wall, nor even with a palisade: a glacis, and a covered-way had been carried round the fort; and from the center of the north-side of the coveredway projected a strong ravelin, mounting six guns, round which the glacis was continued; a gate with a draw-bridge communicated with this ravelin: the narrow rampart of the old wall had in many places been widened, and ramps raised to it, for the ready running up of cannon; each of the towers, of which there were twenty two, was rendered capable of a gun of any size, those at the four angles would admit three, and the platforms of the two gateways more. The extent of the fort from the western to the eastern side is nearly 800 yards; the eastern face 350; but the southern wall, receding as it stretches to the eastward, reduces the eastern face to 260 yards, of which 50 are occupied in the middle by a gate-way, and the main rampart on this face had only the two towers in the angles.
Two batteries were raised to the East; one, of three embrasures in the front of some houses, standing at the distance of 360 yards, nearly opposite to the rampart between the gateway and the tower in the angle on its right; and was intended to breach in the interval: the other battery was on the left of this, but 100 yards nearer; it mounted only two guns, of which, one was to dismantle the tower in the angle to the right of the gateway, and the other the angle on the right of the gateway itself. A battery of three guns was raised to the south, nearly opposite the s. w. angle of the fort, and bore upon the lower in this angle, and the two next to the eastward. This battery was at the distance of 200 yards, where a few houses gave shelter to the guards, and covered the workmen in the outset of the approaches, The fourth battery was that raised by Captain Wood on the north; it was to the left of the ravelin, at the distance of 200 yards, and mounted two guns, which were to plunge over the ravelin, in order to break the drawbridge behind, by which the ravelin communicated across the ditch with the body of the fort: but this battery was of little use because it enfiladed no part of the rampart, and the ravelin it fired upon bore only one gun against the two ​batteries to the eastward, and, in case the bridge should be broke, the guard would be withdrawn into the fort, where their service if the breach should be assaulted, would be of more detriment than their continuance in the ravelin; and the battery was employed only because it was ready.
On the 3d and 4th, whilst the batteries were constructing, the garrison threw many shells to interrupt the work, but no men were hurt by them. On the 5th, all the three batteries opened; and the garrison still continuing their shells, returned likewise on all sides with more cannon than fired upon them; and a soldier was killed on the N. E. attack, and four artillery-men to the south. On the 6th, the enemy dismounted two guns in the battery of three to the east, in which two Europeans were killed and two wounded, and two were likewise wounded at the south battery. This day, 200 cohorn-shells arrived from Madrass, instead of eight-inch shells for the howitz, which was the only piece of bombarding artillery with the army; no powder came with the shells; and from the defence, the stock in camp seemed likewise to be exhausted before the place could be opened to assault; and shot grew equally scarce. Four hundred bullocks were therefore sent off to bring a supply of both from Madrass, with two eighteen-pounders to replace the two which had been dismounted. In the night between the 6th and the 7th, the army began their approaches from both attacks. On the 7th, two eighteen-pounders arrived from Chinglapett; but from the want of serviceable bullocks they were accompanied by only 50 shot, and 50 barrels of powder expected with them were still lagging on the road. From the preceding to the present evening, only one man was killed, and two wounded. The approaches were pushed on all night; and the next day, which was the eighth of the month, arrived the powder from Chinglapett, and a quantity was discovered buried in one of the houses of the town; but all the shot were so nearly expended, that, at four in the afternoon, Colonel Coote beat a parley, in order to get time to pick up what the enemy had fired. The French officer, Captain Hussy, accepted the message, which was a summons to surrender, as he could expect no succours: ​he answered, that not a man had been killed in the fort; but that he was willing to surrender it, if not relieved before, at the end of six days, on condition the garrison should be free, have the honours of war, and retire to Pondicherry. This to and fro lasted two hours, when the firing was renewed until dark. The loss this day was only one man killed, and two wounded. In the night, the trenches to the s. were pushed on with much diligence, and the garrison employed every means to interrupt their progress, cannon and shells from the body of the place, musketry, grenades, and fire-balls, which set on fire the blinds, gabions, and fascines of the advancing sap, dangerously wounded Ensign Macmahon, who conducted it, killed one, and wounded ten more of the men employed. Nevertheless, the sap before the morning was very near the foot of the glacis. With the day, which was the 9th, the batteries, having received some more shot from Chinglapett, continued, and by noon their fire had opened both breaches to six feet of the bottom of the rampart; and had dismantled the towers that flanked them: but still the ditch remained to be filled, and no lodgement way yet made in the covered-way. Great therefore was the surprize, to see a flag, followed by a voluntary offer of surrendering the next day, if allowed the honors of war; which as before, implied that the garrison were not to be made prisoners. Colonel Coote refused; and soon after came another letter, offering as the condition, that they might all retire to Pondicherry on their paroles not to serve again. Colonel Coote replied, that he should allow the officers and men whatsoever belonged to them, and good treatment; but reserved the right of disposing of their persons: at the same time, he invited the commandant to supper, who came. The fort was closely surrounded during the night, to prevent any of the garrison from escaping; and early the next morning, the grenadiers of the army took possession of the gates. The garrison consisted of 11 officers, three of whom were captains, and 236 soldiers and artillery-men, in all 247 Europeans, and nearly the same number of Sepoys. The artillery were 4 mortars, and 22 pieces of cannon, of which some were eighteen-pounders: there was likewise a plentiful stock of ​ammunition, and military stores of all kinds. The batteries must have ceased firing the next day, until convoys arrived; the garrison had not lost three men, arid the fort might have held out ten days longer before the assault by storm could be risqued. They extenuated the early surrender by the certainty of not being relieved. It required the respite of some days to refit the wear and tear which the army had endured during the activity of the late operations; for all the carriages were shattered, all the men wanted clothing, and all the bullocks were sore.
Colonel Coote, in consideration of Mr. Bussy's generosity to the English factory when he took Vizagapatam, had permitted him to repair to Pondicherry from the field of battle, immediately after he was taken. He arrived there the next day, and represented the defeat as far from irretrievable. On the 25th in the evening, came in Mr. Lally, and the troops were following from Gingee to Valdore. His ill success, and the abandoning the field, rendered him still more odious than ever. No invective, howsoever unjust, was spared. Cowardice borrowing courage from drunkenness was imputed as the cause of wrong dispositions, redressed by worse, until the battle was lost, and the retreat to Pondicherry as a design to lose the city, in revenge for the universal detestation in which he was held.
Nevertheless, the best ability and will would have been perplexed what measure to pursue after the defeat. The necessity of refurnishing the army with the stores and artillery they had lost, would alone have required them to fall back near to Pondicherry; and the protection of the districts in the rear of Alamparwah and Gingee now became of great concernment; for since the loss of Masulipatam of the northern provinces, and of their settlements in Bengal, very little grain in proportion to the former importations had been brought to Pondicherry by sea; and the distresses for money to answer more immediate calls had hitherto prevented the government from laying in a store of provisions; so that their greatest resource at this time was from the harvests in these districts, which was ripe and gathering in.
The interruptions continually opposed by the garrison of Tritchinopoly to the French troops remaining in the island Seringham, had ​prevented the controllers, appointed to manage these districts, from collecting enough to defray the expences of the late expedition, although the revenues, if unmolested, would have furnished more: Mr. Lilly had ordered the whole to return, and expected they would join him before Vandivash. They were, besides the 300 Europeans In Seringham, two detachments lately sent from Pondicherry, with stores and ammunition, who were arrived, and halting at Utatore. The manager appointed to collect the revenues, who was a counsellor of Pondicherry, thought that matters would mend, when he should be reinforced by the detachments at Utatore, and ventured to disobey the orders. The Nabob and Captain Joseph Smith at Tritchinopoly resolved, as the best means of preventing the arrival of the detachments, to get possession of the fortified pagoda of Pitchandah, on the farther bank of the Coleroon, which terminates the only high road leading from Samiaveram and Utatore into the Island of Seringham. The pagoda was reported to be garrisoned only by a company of Sepoys, with a few Europeans. Accordingly Captain Richard Smith, who was recovered of his wound, crossed the river on the 28th of December, and took the command of the country troops, and those from the garrison, which had continued at Samiaveram since the defeat of the French party, which had advanced a few days before. Early the next morning, Captain Joseph Smith moved with a party from the city, and began to cannonade the pagoda of Seringham from across the Caveri, in order to divert the French troops from sending a reinforcement to Pitchandah; for the attack of which, his fire upon Seringham was to be the signal. The troops from Samiaveram were in time on their ground near Pritchandah. The two field-pieces which were to beat down the gate were in the road; the oxen were cast off from them, and they were to. be dragged the rest of the way, which was 50 yards, to a choultry within six yards of the gate. The troops were not discovered until they had got under the wall, and were fixing the scaling-ladders: the garrison, more numerous than supposed, tire hotly from the walls, and especially on the field-pieces. Most of the Europeans in the detachment were foreigners, and none of those employed in bringing oh the field-pieces liked the service; and to encourage them, ​Captain Smith and Lieutenant Horne pulled themselves at the guns; their example brought more assistance: but of ten, who were at the gun with Smith, two were shot dead, and three wounded, before they got them into the choultry, when a few rounds brought down the gateway; in this instant Captain Smith received a ball under his shoulder, which totally disabled him. Lieutenant Home then took his place and endeavoured to lead the men to the assault, but the detachment had suffered so severely that rone would follow him; he, however, prevailed on them to abide, and bring off the wounded, and the two guns. Soon after, a certain account was received of the strength of the French parties at Utatore, which appeared an overmatch for the dispirited troops at Samiaveram: nor could Tritchinopoly spare a reinforcement equal to what the French troops in the island might then safely send to act in conjunction with those coming from Utatore; the whole detachment at Samiaveram were therefore recalled, and arrived the second of February at Tritchinopoly. Their retreat relieved the French troops in the pagoda of Seringham from great distress; for they had little ammunition left, and straightened towards the Caveri by the garrison of Tritchinopoly, and on the other side of the Coleroon by parties from the encampment at Samiaveram, they could neither venture out to seek, nor the country people to bring them in provisions; so that all their subsistence, for-several days, had been what they had plundered from the bramins in the pagoda, whose houses they pulled down for fire-wood to dress the victuals they found in them.
The French troops at Utatore having waited for some stores, which were lagging on the road, did not arrive at Seringham until the 8th: they were 140 Europeans, five pieces of cannon, and 600 Sepoys; and brought with them a competent stock of ammunition and spare arms. A day or two after their arrival, 200 of their Europeans, with 600 Sepoys, commanded by Hussan Ally, marched against Totcum, which had been taken for the Nabob on the 26th of December. The garrison left in it were four companies of Sepoys, under the command of two European Serjeants; all of whom, although there were guns in the fort, behaved very ill, and ​surrendered the place before any impression had been made on the walls.
At the same time that Mr. Lally recalled the troops from Seringham, he likewise ordered the fort of Devicotah to be evacuated; and the garrison, having made several breaches in the walls and towers, marched away in the beginning of February, but left a company of Sepoys in the pagoda of Atchaveram, which stands five miles inland of Devicotah.
Captain Joseph Smith, on this intelligence, detached two companies of Sepoys, under the command of Serjeant Sommers, on whose approach the French Sepoys at Atchaveram were reinforced by another company from the pagoda of Chilambarum, with which, they marched out, and met Sommers's detachment on the plain, who routed them completely, taking five stand of their colours, with four of their officers, and, beside the Sepoys who were killed, many were drowned in the hurry of crossing the Coleroon. Immediately after this encounter, Sommers proceeded, took possession of Devicotah, and began to repair the breaches.
The news of the victory at Vandivash reached Tritchinopoly on the 30th of January, and cleared at once the cloud of despondency which had overwhelmed the Nabob ever since he left Madrass to proceed thither. He pitched his tent, displayed his great standard, and declared his intention of returning into the Carnatic; but waited until the French troops should be removed from Seringham; and his wish was soon gratified; for Mr. Lally, on his arrival at Pondicherry, despatched a second order, under the severest penalties of disobedience, for all the troops between Volcondah and Tritchinopoly to join his army without delay. They hoped to. conceal their retreat from the garrison of Tritchinopoly, and made the preparations with all secrecy; but some of the Malabars employed by them were natives of this part of the country, who, solicitous to secure pardon, if not favour, with the change of government, gave immediate and constant intelligence to Captain Joseph Smith, who made ready to take such advantages as usually occur, when troops retreating are pursued. The ​whole body of the French troops were 450 Europeans and Coffrees, and 1200 Sepoys; of which 150, with the commissary, were in the pagoda of Jumbakissna. The retreat was appointed at nine at night, on the 6th of February; of which previous intelligence was brought to Captain Smith; and almost the whole garrison of Tritchinopoly were on the bank of the Caveri, opposite to the pagoda of Seringham, ready to move as soon as the enemy. The notice were punctual; and the first division of the English troops entered the south gate of the pagoda as the last of the French were going out of the opposite: the rest of the English troops marched round the pagoda to the west. When all were united on the north side, they advanced to the bank of the Coleroon, and, when nearly opposite to Pitchandah, heard the sound, and thought they saw the motion of a line of men marching across them to pass the river. Capt. R Smith, who led the troops of the garrison, formed in order to receive or attack the strangers; but Captain Joseph coming up bid him not fire, because he had ordered the troops of the polygar Tondiman, which had for some time attended the garrison, to advance between the pagodas of Seringham and Jumbakissna, and what troops they now descried might as probably be them, as a part of the enemy; who they really were, being those moving from Jumbakissna to join their main body: they were soon after ascertained by a black servant of R.Smith's, who had straggled into their line, and talking, was answered in French. On which the English troops immediately proceeded, and began to enter the bed of the Coleroon, as the enemy were leaving the farther bank, who in their hurry flung away fifty barrels of gunpowder, which were recovered; and they destroyed a tumbril of gunammunition at Pitchandah. But their line never stopped until they got to Utatore. The Nabob's horse followed, hanging in their rear, and continually picked up a deserter or a prisoner, in all 30 Europeans, or something belonging to their equipages and stores; but the infantry, black and white, halted at Samiaveram until the horse returned, which was the next day; when a detachment of 1000 Sepoys, and 50 Europeans, with two guns and a cohorn, and part of the Nabob's horse, marched under the command ​of Lieutenant Horne, against Totcum and Cortalum: at the same time, all the other troops retained from Samiaveram to Tritchinopoly; and, besides what had been gathered in the road, brought in two excellent 18-pounders, which the enemy had left in the pagoda of Seringham. The Nabob, solicitous to make his new appearance in the Carnatic with as much figure as possible, requested Joseph Smith to go and ask 500 horse of the king of Tanjore. The king was ill, and with difficulty admitted the visit, but promised every thing, and referred the adjustment to his Dubbeer, or minister, which, amongst the Indians, is equivalent to the Duan of the Mahomedan princes. The Dubbeer, notwithstanding the late successes of the English arms, insisted, that the Nabob should furnish the pay and expences, which he knew would not be complied with; and Captain Smith returned, as he had expected, without obtaining a single horseman. In the mean time, Hassan Ally had abandoned Totcum, on the appearance of Lieutenant Horne's detachment, but went away with the garrison, which were 400 Sepoys, to reinforce Cortalum. Lieutenant Horne followed him; and here the enemy made a stand for three days, until a battery was raised, when they all went off in the night, leaving a gun and some ammunition in the fort. Some Sepoys were posted in both, and the rest of the detachment returned to the city; where the Nabob was making, with accustomed tediousness, the preperations for his departure.
The ravages which had been committed by the English cavalry, in the districts around Pondicherry, brought forth a part of the French troops from Valdoor; but not before the cavalry were gone off with their plunder. The French detachment seeing nothing to oppose them, advanced within 20 miles of Carangoly; which, on intelligence of their approach, the Presidency reinforced with 40 Europeans. Captain Preston had already been sent to command there; and on the 6th of February Colonel Coote had detached 500 black horse, and 20 hussars, from the siege of Arcot, with orders, if Preston should think proper, to lead them against the enemy's detachment, who, gaining intelligence of their march before they had, reached Carangoly, retreated fast; and on the 8th, 27 hussars with their horses deserted and came to Vandivash, where ​they were enlisted in the English service. Mr. Lally, on hearing that his detachment was retreating, and that Arcot was pressed, took a sudden resolution of marching with all the rest of the cavalry, in order, as he gave out, either to throw reinforcements into Arcot, or to retake Chittapett by surprize, and release the wounded prisoners there; but the cavalry, when drawn out, mutinied, refused to proceed with him, and all went out of the bounds, as if they intended to go over to the English garrisons; their officers however brought them back; but such was the general discontent for want of pay, that several of the common soldiers were overheard, in the night of the 11th, proposing among themselves to turn the guns in the ramparts against the government house, as the only means of bringing Mr. Lally to reason. He immediately represented the depositions of the witnesses to Mr. De Leyrit and the Council, who, having no money in the public treasury, proposed expedients, which Mr. Lally did not approve. All the country in the rear of Vandivash and Chittapett, quite up to Pondicherry, had been let for five years to two of the European inhabitants of the colony, at the rent of 1,450,000 rupees a year: they were applied to in this exigency, and answered, that they had no money, having been disappointed of much they expected by the loss of Vandivash and Chittapett; on which the Malabar, to whom Mr. Lally had rented the districts round Arcot, whilst they remained under his authority, offered to advance 50,000 rupees in ten days, and 80,000 in twenty more, if what remained of the districts let to the two Europeans were leased out to him, with the addition of all the country to the south of Pondicherry, as far as Chillambarum and the banks of the Coleroon. His proposal was accepted; but the present assistance he supplied could not serve long, and the future depended on the protection of the countries: they were farmed to him at 1,750,000 rupees a year.
This arrangement was not approved by the council, because they doubted of the credit and integrity of the Malabars; and, perhaps, because it was a supercession of their own authority in the administration of the revenues. Immediately after, arrived intelligence of ​the loss of Arcot, which with that of Chittapett gave new scope to the imputations against Mr. Lally. it was said, that he himself had declared, the one incapable of holding out four days, the other not more than five. Why then leave in them 400 Europeans, so much wanted in his own army, to fall a certain prey to the English? But this conduct, as his retreat to Pondicherry, was not void of justification; for, had he withdrawn these garrisons, the English army, having nothing to apprehend in their rear, might have immediately followed him to Gingee, and from thence to the adjacencies of Pondicherry, when the produce of the country, so necessary to store Pondicherry, would have fallen under the power of the enemy, whom the necessity of reducing Chittapett and Arcot had turned another way; and, besides the time they must employ against these forts, other delays might concur to keep them still longer at a distance.
The English army, after the reduction of Arcot, encamped without the town, towards Velore. The Kellidar Mortizally trembled for his fort; and having been very complacent to the English, since the French had been repulsed from before Madrass, he now intreated the Presidency to spare the attack, and sent a present of 30,000 rupees to Colonel Coote; who refused it, signifying, that he was not empowered, either by the Nabob or the Presidency of Madrass, to levy tributes. The Kellidar replied, that it was intended as a homage to himself, a great commander, according to the custom of the country; on which the money was accepted, and appropriated to the general stock of prize-money for the army.
The army had not restored its equipments sufficiently to move from the neighbourhood of Arcot until the 20th of February, and even then left behind two eighteen-pounders and a ten-inch howitz, which were not repaired. They halted this day at Timery, and 500 Sepoys, with 100 black horsey were dispatched with Captain Stephen Smith against Trinomaly. The next day the army encamped under Arni. The Kellidar of this fort, which is considerable, and a fief belonging to the king of Tanjore, had conducted himself with so much hospitality to both sides, that neither the French nor the Nabob considered him as an enemy. On the 23d ​they arrived at Chittapett, when intelligence was received from Stephen Smith, that he had got possession of the pettah of Trinomaly; but that the troops in the fort seemed resolved to hold out. The pettah could not be maintained without the fort; and the possession of the fort was at this juncture of much consequence, as its detachments might harass and interrupt convoys of provisions coming from the country in the rear of the army, when advanced to the southward. Colonel Coote therefore reinforced Stephen Smith with two twelve-pounders, and 50 Europeans, who were French deserters lately incorporated into a company under the command of one of their own Serjeants; they were called the French Volunteers, and were intended to be employed on hazardous services; but this did not prove one; for, although the guns could not breach, the garrison offered on the 29th to give up the fort, if they were permitted to march out free whither they pleased, with their arms and baggage; their terms were accepted: they were 250 Sepoys, and left six pieces of cannon, and a considerable quantity of ammunition, in the fort. Of the English detachment, one of the volunteers and a Lascar were killed, and a Sepoy wounded, during the attack.
On the 23d, Rear-Admiral Cornish arrived at Madrass, with six ships of the line. They were the squadron which had sailed under his command from England, and met Mr. Pococke, with his ships, off Pondicherry in October, whom they accompanied to Tellicherry: from whence they sailed again for the coast of Coromandel on the 15th of December, whilst Mr. Pococke, with his own, was proceeding to Bombay. Contrary winds and currents had retarded their passages from one coast to the other. The crews had received very little refreshment from land ever since they left England about this time in the preceding year, and many were down with the scurvy.
The army marched from Chittapett on the 26th, striking across the country to the s. E. On the 29th in the forenoon they arrived and halted at Tondivanum, a town of much resort, at which meet the high roads leading from Chittapett, Vandivash, Qutramalore, and Carangoly, towards Pondicherry, from which place it is 30 ​miles distant to the N. E. In the other direction of the country, it stands nearly midway between Gingee and Alamparvah on the sea-shore; and on its left, five miles towards Alamparvah, is a fortified rock, called Permacoil. The wars between the two nations having never before brought any decision before this place, it had hitherto remained neglected by both: But as soon as the French army fell back towards Pondicherry, Permacoil became of importance to the protection of the intermediate districts; and Mr. Lally, immediately after the defeat of Vandivash, had prevailed on the Kelladar to admit a party, with some cannon, into his fort; but the easy reduction of Chittapett and Arcot made the Kelladar repent of his hasty compliance; and, as soon as the English army were returning from Arcot to the southward, he wrote to Colonel Coote, pretending, that the French party had got into his fort by surprize, advised him to attack it, and promised all the assistance in his power; and Colonel Coote resolved to try the sincerity of his professions.
In this intention, he set off before the army in the last march to Tondivanum, with most of the cavalry and two companies of Sepoys, and arriving there before day-break went on to reconnoitre Permacoil. Besides the fortified rock, lie others of less height before and behind it; the direction in length of the whole plot is 1200 yards, and extends from the N. E. to the s. w.: end of the rocks lay nearest to Tondivanum; but Colonel Coote, having no guide, followed the best ground, which brought him to the north-east end, opposite to the northern face of the pettah, which lies under the western side of the rock of Permacoil, and extends beyond it under part of the other rocks to the north. When near, the troops were fired upon by cannon from the nearest tower on the rock, and by field-pieces and musketry from the walls of the pettah below. Soon after came a man, commissioned by the Kellidar, who informed Colonel Coote, that the French in the fort were 50 Europeans, 30 Coffrees, and 50 Sepoys; that they had got some guns up the rock; but that four large pieces of cannon, which arrived the day before, were still remaining in the pettah below; and offered to conduct them to the gate; for, although the pettah was under the main rocks, the ​plain on all side round the walls was encumbered with large fragments, which might afford shelter to the approach. Colonel Coote immediately followed the guide with the Sepoys, ordering the horse to form, and keep on the left, under cover of the main rocks to the N. E.
The rock on which the fort of Permacoil stands does not extend, even at its base, more than 500 yards in length. In breadth, it is at the northern end about 400 yards, at the southern not more than 200: its height is likewise various, being at the narrow end 300 perpendicular feet, and diminishing by slopes and declivities to 200 at the other. Of these differences in the height, there is one more particularly marked, which crosses in a natural zig-zag of two re-entering angles, about the middle of the mountain, and all the ground to the eastward behind this ridge is 30 feet higher than the other part before it to the westward. This eastern part is the upper, and the only real fort; being inclosed and fortified with high stone walls and towers strongly built. The other inclosure, although called the lower fort, is only surrounded with a wall of loose stones, and was principally intended for the immediate refuge of the cattle and inhabitants on sudden alarm. The rock falls every where so steep, that the area of the fortified surface above is equal to half the base below. The adjacent rocks before and behind are not high enough to carry any detriment to its fortifications.
Colonel Coote with the Sepoys, led by the guide, took post behind some rocks opposite to the gateway in the north face of the pettah, which stands nearly in the middle of the rampart. Two large pieces of cannon, mounted on field-carriages, were standing at the entrance of the gateway, which was in the left side of its projection; and some Coffrees and Europeans, with two field-pieces, were on the tower just behind to protect them. This guard, knowing that the cavalry in the rear could not act on the ground where the Sepoys were, ventured to sally. Colonel Coote ordered Ensign Carty to meet them, with one of the companies of Sepoys; which turned out with great alacrity, gave their fire, and advanced to the bayonet. The French party, startled by their resolution, ran back, and were followed so ​close by Carty's company, and they by Colonel Coote with the other, that tho fugitives made no stand at the gateway, but continued their flight, still pursued, through the pettah, to the foot of the rock at the farther end, where steps were cut winding up to the upper fort, by which they escaped into it; but Colonel O'Kennedy, the commander, who was at the steps, and lame with old wounds, had very nearly been taken. Here were lying two twenty-four pounders, of which the garrison had burnt the carriages, because there was no path to draw, and no means to raise them, into fort. As soon as the pettah was cleared of the enemy's guards, Colonel Coote posted the Sepoys in the best shelter the houses afforded against the fire of the cannon in the upper fort, and the musketry from the lower, which recommenced immediately, and continued through the day. The horse were distributed, some under the walls of the pettah, ready to dismount and assist, if any descent should be made; and the rest in different guards round the hills. In the evening came up six companies of Sepoys, with the French Volunteers, and an eight-inch howitz, from Tondivanum: the enemy continued their fire through the night, and small parties came down the side of the rocks, who threw grenades, and fired musketry, by which a Sepoy was killed, and nine, with three Europeans, wounded before the morning; no loss had been sustained in the day. All the return was from the howitz, which did no damage in either of the forts.
Before morning pioneers and tools arrived, and sufficient cover for the whole was formed with earth thrown up and houses broken down; during which some were employed in raising and fixing the two pieces of cannon, one after the other, to transporting carriages, in order to carry them off, which was not executed without difficulty and time; during which, the enemy fired down grenades and musketry, but did no mischief.
In the afternoon Colonel Coote summoned O'Kennedy, who sent down one of his men to receive the letter, and answered it with a temperate negative; on which Colonel Coote resolved to surprize the lower fort. Two guides belonging to the Kellidar offered to ​shew the path leading up the north side of the hill, which being extremely rugged and difficult, was not likely to be suspected; they proceeded with two compaies of Sepoys at eight at night; at the same time a platoon of Coote's grenadiers, with another company of Sepoys, went up the steps leading from the pettah to the back of the upper fort, which made a false attack to divert the enemy from the real, which were forty minutes in gaining the summit, when the foremost got over the wall before they were discovered. The enemy's guards consisted chiefly of Sepoys, and all of them astonished by the first fire ran away from their different stations, and regained the upper fort, where Colonel O'Kennedy, ignorant of the numbers which had got into the lower, and perplexed by the false attack, would not risque a sally which might have recovered the loss; but kept up a hot fire upon them by guess from the defences along the ridge which seperates the upper from the lower fort; but with no effect, for the choultries and rocks rising every where afforded shelter. The guides, as soon as the party was established, came down with information of their success to Colonel Coote, who was waiting at the foot of the path, with the pioneer company, and the Volunteers of France, provided with ladders, gabions, and fascines, and immediately proceeded with them up the hill; where as soon as they had joined the party above, the whole proceeded across the lower fort, to escalade the fortifications along the ridge, notwithstanding the garrison was prepared to receive them. The ridge might be ascended without clambering. The grenadiers carried the ladders; the rest followed, ready to mount, and in the mean time fired up against the parapet; from which the fire instantly became excessively hot. The ladders that were first applied proved too short; it was supposed they would answer better in other parts, to which they were removed, and tried with as little success. Nevertheless the contest continued half an hour; and the Sepoys behaved with as much eagerness as the Europeans, but many dropping or disabled, Colonel Coote oredered the assault to cease. He received a wound in the knee; his aid-de-camp, Captain Admas, was shot through the hip; a serjeant of the pioneers, one of the French Volunteers ​and seven Sepoys, were killed; 10 Europeans and 25 Sepoys were wounded: in the false attack on the upper fort, two Sepoys were wounded, and Ensign Blakeney was killed. The next day, which was the 3d of the month, the fire of the fort diminished considerably, as it was supposed, and rightly, from scarcity of ammunition. At noon, a letter came from Colonel O'Kennedy requesting a cessation of 24 hours, to obtain Mr. Lally's orders concerning the surrender: this was refused, and soon after he sent another letter requesting the honours of war, which were likewise denied. Several Europeans and Sepoys were killed and wounded through the day and night. Before noon of the next day, which was the fifth of the attack, a brass six-pounder was got up the hill with much difficulty by Captain Barker. There were two choultries in the lower fort, standing 100 yards from the ridge and rampart, which divide it from the upper: one of these choultries was near the wall which runs along the edge of the rock on the side over the pettah; and in this choultry the field-piece was planted; the other was a few yards on the left, which sheltered those whom it was not necessary to expose. The defences in the upper fort immediately opposite to the choultries lay in a large re-entering angle, at the two extremities of which was a round tower, one on the edge of the rock overlooking the pettah, the other about the middle of the ridge, which from hence falls back in another zig-zag out of sight of the choultries. The gate leading into the upper fort was on the left of the tower in the middle of the ridge. The field-piece managed by Captain Barker battered, firing upwards out of the choultry, against the gate and the parapet of the tower, both which were ruined before night; but the garrison had heaped earth at the back of the gate, which continued to stop the entrance. Many of those exposed in this service suffered. New scaling-ladders had been provided; and the next morning, as the troops were preparing to advance with them, the garrison beat the chamade, and surrendered at discretion. They were fifteen European gunners, chosen men, 32 Coffrees, and 100 Sepoys: only one of each had been killed. There were in the fort 20 pieces of cannon, but not ammunition ​either for them or the musketry sufficient to have stood the assault, nor had the garrison two days provision left. The total loss and casualties of the English, through the attack, were four Europeans killed and 15 wounded, of the Sepoys 40 and 70; these troops had never behaved so well; of their killed, one was the Subadhar, equivalent to the Captain of a company, and two were Jemidars, the next rank of officers. The gallantry of Bulwansing, who was the senior of the whole body in camp, was rewarded with a gold medal. The Kellidar, for his services, was continued in the fort, in which were left a company of Sepoys, with 12 Europeans and a lieutenant. A large detachment of the French army had advanced as far as Manour, within seven miles of Permacoil, and were in motion to throw in a considerable reinforcement of men and stores, at the very hour they heard of the arrival of the English army at Tondivanum, on which they retreated towards Pondicherry.
On the 7th, Colonel Coote went from the camp at Tondivanum, with the cavalry, black as well as Europeans, and six companies of Sepoys, to discover near the bounds of Pondicherry. The distance to the bound-hedge was 20 miles; and the Sepoys, after marching 10, wanted rest, and were left in the village of Trichimungalum.
The French troops which had been detached to the relief of Permacoil, had, on their retreat, encamped four miles to the west of the town, and three from the bound-hedge. A large collection of sand-hills, of which the whole together is called the red-hills, rises about half a mile from the sea-shore, and a mile and half to the north of the town: they extend four miles to the west ward, and the last hill, where they cease on this side, is called Perimbé: across from north to south they extend two miles, and have passable dales between; directly opposite to the side of Perimbé, stands the Fort of Villenore, a strong out-post, situated near the north bank of the river of Araincopang, which falls into the sea about 500 yards from the wall of Pondicherry, and in its course from Villenore forms a curve to the south. The Red-hill, on the other side the plain, recedes to the N. E. from Perimbé to its end towards the sea. So that the interval between Villenore and Perimbé is the narrowest part of the plain btween ​the river and the Red-hill, being here scarcely more than a mile, whereas farther back it is three. The plain as far as the boundhedge was occupied by country houses, enclosures, avenues, and arable ground. The market of the French troops was in the village under Villenore. Temporary barracks for the European cavalry had been raised on the hill of Perimbé. Their foot and artillery were dispersed in the houses and enclosures which occupied the space between.
Colonel Coote proceeded with the cavalry from Trichimungalum, not in the high road which passeth by Valdore, but across the country to the left, and came in about the middle of the Red-hill, and passing through its dales appeared on the outward ridge between Perimbé and the bound-hedge. The enemy had gained notice of his approach, but not of the force which accompanied him; and, imagining that it consisted of foot as well as horse, suspected likewise that the main body of both might be marching to get between them and the boundhedge, and impede their retreat into the limits. In this persuasion, all their infantry got into march with much hurry and confusion, to gain the avenue nearest the Redhill, which, as well as another on its right, leads to the bound-hedge: they moved with all their field-pieces in front, to oppose the supposed danger, which if real would have been the greatest: but the European horse, which were 250 in three squadrons, remained on the hill of Perimbé to observe and protect their rear. Colonel Coote suspected the error which occasioned the disorder he observed in the infantry, and as fast as his troops came up ordered the European horse, which were only 80, with three squadrons of the blacks, to advance, and keep the enemy's cavalry in check, whilst he himself, with the main body, crossed over to the avenue, in which the last of their infantry were entering; in whose rear he hung, having thus separated them from their cavalry, who, seeing their danger, retreated before the division advancing against them, to gain the other side of the avenue on the right of their infantry, whose flanks were already protected from the cavalry with Colonel Coote by the ditch on each side. Colonel Coote following the infantry, often advanced within ​40 yards, to draw their fire; but the grenadiers of Lorrain, who formed the rear-guard, reserved it with much discipline. At length, however, the foremost troop of horse, led by Assaf beg, a Jemidar of great spirit, broke in upon a platoon, and cub down seven of them; but the next troop drew up their bridles, and were afraid to follow the impression, which otherwise promised to break the whole column, which recovered, and continued its way as before, until they had passed the bound-hedge, under the redoubt of Valdore, which terminates the avenue along which they were marching, when the fire of the redoubt was left free, and Colonel Coote stopped the pursuit. In the mean while, the other division under the command of Captain De Buke, had crossed over to the village of Villenore, and routed the market-people there without resistance, and the black horse with him, joined by more from the main body, collected all worth the while they could carry of, and drove before them all the cattle. The whole assembled again on the hill of Perimbé, where they set fire to the barracks, and the carriage of an eighteen-pounder, for want of proper bullocks to draw it off. In the afternoon, the whole returned to Tritchimungalum, intending to rest the night there; but a corporal of the dragoons deserting, they removed five miles farther back to Manoor; from hence Colonel Coote sent orders to Major Monson, to march the army from Tondivanum against Alamparvah.
The next day he moved himself to Taliaveram, which is five miles from Manoor to the N. E. on the road towards Permacoil; but few of the black horse accompanied him; they were all dispersed to secure or sell the plunder they had got the day before. They, however, came back on the 9th, and he proceeded with them from Taliaveram again to the bound-hedge of Pondicherry, and observed very nearly, without annoyance. On his return, he went to Conymere, where he met Mr. Bussy by appointment, who had been recalled on his parole to Madrass, in order to be sent to Europe, in compliance with the earnest importunity of the Nabob, who regarded him as fraught with more dangerous resources than all his other enemies, and said that if he became free, and commanded, he would ​protract the war ten years. On the 10th Colonel Coote came to Alamparvah, which the army had invested the day before; but the wound he had received at Permacoil was so much exasperated by his late fatigue, that he could not any longer stir without danger, he therefore ordered Colonel Monson to carry on the siege of Alamparvah, but still continued in the camp.
The fort of Alamparvah stands on the sea-shore, about 20 miles E. N. E. of Tondivanum, 15 E.of Permacoil, and 24 to the N. of Pondicherry. It formerly belonged to the Nabobs of the province; and was given to Mr. Dupleix by Murzafajing in 1750. It has many wells of good water, which is not to be found in all parts of the coast so near the sea. The fort was of stone, square, of moderate extent, with four round towers at the angles, a parapeted faussebray, and a wet ditch, but without a glacis. A pettah extends along the strand to the north, and fronts within 250 yards of the fort. An eight-inch howitz bombarded; and a ricochet battery of two guns, to enfilade the north front from the west, was begun in the night, and finished before morning; during which, a serjeant of pioneers and a Sepoy were killed. In the ensuing night, another battery of three eighteen-pounders was finished in the pettah, to batter the tower in the west angle of the north face; and the loss during these 24 hours, was Lieutenant Angus, of Coote's regiment, and a grenadier killed. Both batteries opened together at day-light on the 12th, and in three hours dismounted most of the guns, and ruined the whole line of defence; and in the afternoon the Chevalier Viart, who commanded, surrendered at discretion. The garrison, besides himself, a Lieutenant, and a surgeon, were 50 Europeans, and 150 Sepoys. During the attack, three of their Europeans had been killed, and twelve wounded. There were in the-fort 20 pieces of cannon, a howitz, and abundance of ammunition.
The season was now advancing, when the French squadron might be expected from the islands. The loss of Alamparvah deprived them of the only station under their command to the northward, and Karical remained the only one they had to the southward of Pondicherry; ​cherry; but the importance of Karical rose with the season, and the encreasing distresses of the capital; for becoming, with the change of the monsoon, the windward station, all their vessels arriving on the coast might get their first intelligence here, and, if the road were not occupied by a superior force, were always sure of water, and fresh provisions from the fort, which the foreign settlements of Negapatam and Tranquebar might or might not supply. The grain of the districts, which was considerable, was gathered, and, with what might be purchased in the plentiful country of Tanjore, would become a great resource to Pondicherry, continually losing its own districts by the successes of the army; for it might be conveyed from Karical in the boats of the country, which, favoured by the wind and current, would almost make the passage in a night, and with little risque, even if discovered and pursued, as they can keep close to the surf, in shallow soundings, and along the shore swell of the sea, where vessels of European construction seldom chuse to venture. The French government already repented of the loss of such another possession in Devicotah, although not commanding equal advantages; and had made a strong attempt to recover it. On the 24th of February, a detachment from Chilambrum of 30 troopers, 40 European infantry, and 400 Sepoys, with two field-pieces, invested the fort. On the 27th, they were joined by 80 Europeans and Coffrees from Pondicherry, when the whole intrenched themselves within 200 yards of the walls. The breaches which their garrison had made when they abandoned it, were not completely repaired; and on the 29th in the morning, the enemy made an assault on that which was most practicable; the fire lasted an hour, when they were repulsed, with the loss, as the serjeant supposed, of two officers, and 20 of their Europeans and Coffrees, and more of their Sepoys killed and wounded. They, however, during their stay, and on their retreat, sent and carried away a considerable quantity of grain, which had just been got up from the harvest of the districts.
The Presidency of Madrass now became anxious to get possession of Karical, before the French squadron should arrive on the coast; but, as it was intended that the army should as soon as possible ​encamp near Pondicherry, in order to intercept all convoys of provisions from the adjacent country, a body of troops sufficient for the attack of Karical could not be spared from the camp, without frustrating the other intention. Admiral Cornish contributed to alleviate part of the difficulty, by offering to proceed with all the men of war which had arrived with him, and to land their marines, which were about 300; the Presidency provided for the rest. All the artillery and stores for the siege, with the Chief Engineer, Mr. Call, and a few gunners, were to be sent in the ships from Madrass. Colonel Monson, who was to command, was to embark from Alam parvah, with the company of pioneers, which consisted of 50 choice Europeans, and with Captain Barker to direct the artillery. Captain Joseph Smith, who was escorting the Nabob from Tritchinopoly, was ordered to reinforce his detachment from this garrison to the strength of 1000 Sepoys, 100 European firelocks, 40 artillery-men, and six field-pieces; with this force, he was to march away from wherever he might be, with all expedition; and either invest or lay before Karical, as circumstances permitted, until the arrival of the ships. Captain Richard Smith, appointed to command in Tritchinopoly after the departure of Joseph, was to send from thence, through the country of Tanjore, Lascars for the service of the artillery, 500 Coolies to pull and carry burthens, tents, doolies for the sick and wounded, and cattle for provisions to the squadron as well as the troops on shore. The king of Tanjore was requested to send his troops, and every kind of assistance.
The Nabob, notwithstanding his eagerness to appear at the head of an army in the Carnatic immediately after the victory of Vandivash, was not ready to move from Tritchinopoly until the 18th of March, 40 days after he had received intelligence of that success, and a month after the French had abandoned the pagodas of Seringham. Besides the detachment from the garrison of Tritchinopoly, he was accompanied by 1000 horse, 1000 Sepoys, and a greater number of various sorts of good-for-nothing infantry, entertained by himself. They arrived at Volcondah on the 20th, from whence he was solicitous to proceed towards Arcot; but Captain Joseph Smith, ​in conformity to the orders of the Presidency, wished to lead him towards Pondicherry. This difference of opinion kept them some days at Volcondah, and as a reconciliation, by which some service might be obtained from the Nabob's troops, Captain Smith consented to march against Thiagar, which would bring them nearer Arcot, without being removed farther from Pondicherry. But the Presidency, at the same time that they sent orders to Captain Smith to march away with his detachment to Karical, enjoined the Nabob to keep with his own troops in the country to the s. of Gingee, between Volcondah and Chillambarum, and to employ them in reducing these districts, and especially in preventing any supplies of provisions from being conveyed out of them to Pondicherry from whence he would have nothing to fear, as the English army would be advanced and lying between.
The number of manned Massoolas at Madrass, which are the only boats that can ply the surf, were not sufficient to carry off the ammunition and stores intended for the siege as fast as the men of war could have taken them in; and during this delay, the Falmouth of 60 guns was sent forward to take in Major Monson's party at Alamparvah, whilst the other ships were lading at Madrass: and on the 15th Colonel Coote, continuing much disordered with his wound, came in from the camp to adjust with the Presidency the prizemoney accruing to the army from their late successes.
The Falmouth, standing into the road of Alamparvah on the 16th in the morning, discovered a ship at anchor close in shore, about two leagues to the northward of Pondicherry, and bore down to her with an easy sail, under French colours; but the stranger cut her cable, and ran ashore into the surf, which being boisterous, she immediately bilged, and all but three of the crew got ashore. The boats of the Falmouth, finding it impossible to get the ship off, set fire to her. She was the Harlem, which had been dispatched by Mr. Moracin from Ganjam to Mergui in the month of June, and was returning with rice and other provisions for Pondicherry, and had likewise tutenague and other merchandize on board, none of ​which could be recovered; but the loss of the provisions was by far the greatest detriment to the enemy.
Major Monson, with the pioneers and their equipments, embarked in the Falmouth from Alamparvah on the 25th; they anchored in the road of Karical at day-break on the 28th, when the Captain to the Falmouth, Mathison, went in his boat with Major Monson to reconnoitre the shore. They discovered no signs, either^ of the people expected from Richard Smith at Tritchinopoly, or the detachment with Captain Joseph; whose instructions had not reached them in time to be as yet fulfilled. At eight o'clock, the squadron, which had likewise sailed from Madrass on the 25th, appeared. Major Monson went on board Mr. Cornish's ship, and it was agreed, notwithstanding they were entirely ignorant of the place, and disappointed of the troops they expected to meet, to make the landing immediately. Fifteen massoolas accompanied the ships; they took in 170 of the troops, besides the Macoas, who are the black fellows that row them; these formed the first division, and were towed to the surf by the yawls and pinnaces of the ships, which, besides their rowers, took as many soldiers as they could carry, who formed the second division: all these steered for the shore, five miles to the north of the fort. The third division of the troops embarked in the longboats, which were rigged with sails, and proceeded close to the surf, opposite to the fort, and the mouth of a river which leads to it, where they were to appear as if intending to land by pushing over the bar of the river, which was not impracticable.
A small snow and a sloop, which drew little water, and mounted guns, anchored as close as they could opposite to a village half-way between the real landing and the long-boats. As soon as the yawls and pinnaces reached the surf, they dropped their graplings, and cast off the massoolas, which immediately rowed ashore, and landed the troops in them; then returned, and landed the second division out of the other boats, when a signal was Hung out, on which the long-boats came down, sailing fast with the wind and current, and the troops in them were likewise landed all together by the massolas; ​the whole without the appearance of any opposition intended by the garrison. As soon as all were on shore, they advanced to the village opposite to which the two small vessels were at anchor, and received by catamarans two four-pounders, which belonged to the sloop, and were mounted on ship-carriages; for the reliance on the field-pieces expected with Joseph Smith had prevented any from being embarked at Madrass. They passed the night in the village without alarm; and early in the morning moved on to take possession of the pettah of Karical, which lay on the north side of the fort. It was a spacious town, separated from the fort by an esplanade of 100 yards; regular works had been traced round the other three sides, which on the west had been raised to four feet above the ground, but the bastion in the north-west angle was completed, and converted into a closed redoubt, which mounted nine guns, and had a good ditch all round, and a draw-bridge; it was called Fort Dauphin: the rest of the north line was open, as was the side to the east. The troops advancing from the north, without a guide or intelligence, fell under fire of Fort Dauphin, by which two men were killed, and two wounded, before the whole line got under shelter of the buildings in the pettah; which they entered without meeting any interruption in the streets. They took post in the church -yard, which lay about 200 yards from the east side of the pettah, and about the same distance from the line of houses fronting the fort. They found about them plenty of provisions, as well in the houses of the natives, as of the French inhabitants.
The fort of Karical stands 300 yards from the sea-shore: a river coming from the west strikes when opposite to the west side of the fort in a curve to the south, which continues until opposite to the east side at the distance of 500 yards, when the channel turning again directly to the east, in 100 yards more disembogues into the sea. The fort was an oblong square, completely fortified, but had the greatest of defects, the want of space: for its internal area, exclusive of the four bastions, was no more than 100 yards from w. to E. and only 50 from N. to s. The bastions admitted only three ​guns in their faces, but each of the four curtains was covered by a ravelin much more spacious than the bastions, and mounting six. A wet ditch ran between the three curtains to the N. w. and S. and their ravelins; but on the east face the ditch surrounded the ravelin likewise, and dry ground occupied the space between the rear of this ravelin and the east curtain, continuing round the two bastions in an excellent faussebray, from the interior angles of which the ravelin projected. A covered way well palisaded, and a complete glacis, surrounded the whole, nevertheless the exterior extent, measuring across from the foot of the glacis, was in the longest direction, that from E. to w. not more than 200 yards; and the pettah outstretched this face 200 yards on either hand. The garrison had lately destroyed the line of buildings in the pettah, which skirted the esplanade, and had been suffered to rise within 60 yards of the foot of the glacis; but this demolition added only a space of 40 yards to the esplanade, and that not clear; for the rubbish not being yet removed still afforded some shelter.
As soon as the English troops had taken possession of the pettah, Mr. Call, with the pioneers, marched, and took possession of a saluting-battery, which lay near the mouth of the river, where was likewise the flag-staff for the road. The fort fired fiercely as they were passing, but did no harm; and in the night the pioneers began to construct a battery near the river on the esplanade, which was clear quite up to where the river changes from the curve it has made, and strikes straight to the sea: they were not interrupted in their work; neither did the troops in the pettah receive any alarm from the garrison. The next evening a ten-inch mortar was landed, and at ten at night began to bombard Fort Dauphin. The range was exactly gained at the first shell, and only thirteen were fired before £he guard, consisting of 50 men, abandoned it; and, knowing ways of which the English troops were not apprized, gained the fort without interruption. About the same time twelve gunners sent from Pondicherry, who had landed at Tranquebar, got into the fort, notwithstanding a company of marines were looking out for them, who kept too far from the sea-shore, whilst the gunners travelled ​along the beach until they came to the river, when they continued under the bank unperceived by the pioneers employed in constructing the battery.
The cover afforded by the pettah determined the attack to be carried on against the north face of the fort; and the greater extent of the esplanade to the east, which is 500 yards (whereas to the west it is interrupted by the curve of the river at 300) gave the preference of the enfilade from the east, which of consequence determined the breach to be in the north-east bastion, and on its north face. Accordingly, three batteries were marked out in the pettah, one to breach, and one on each hand to take off the defences; in the battery to the east, two of the guns enfiladed the north line in its whole length, and the other two plunged into the opposite ravelin, and across into the ravelin on the south: so that every part of the fort would be laid under fire. Sailors were landed with the heavy artillery from the ships, and assisted in drawing them, and in the other services usually allotted to bullocks and coolies; for all the neighbouring villages were deserted, and supplied neither man nor beast; and no tidings arrived of the Captain Joseph Smith's detachment, nor of the assistance expected from the garrison of Tritchinopoly; and the king of Tanjore avoided all correspondence with the armament.
Captain Joseph Smith received the orders of the presidency on the 25th, the day he was setting out with the Nabob from Volcondah, against Thiagar; he immediately turned his march to Karical; and the Nabob, unwilling to remain with only his own troops in the middle of the Carnatic, determined to march with the detachment. The nearest road leading from Volcondah towards Karical falls upon the Coleroon, 30 miles N. N. W. of the city of Tanjore. Having crossed the river, which is there spacious, you continue to Combaconum, which stands five miles farther, on the bank of the first arm of the Caveri; and beyond this is another arm to cross, before you join the road leading east to the sea-shore: much of the ground between the rivers is sunk in marshes, and the better ground is overflowed in rice-fields, without any continued road, which greatly retard ​the passage of carriages; and the way between Volcondah and Karical being 120 miles, the march can scarcely be performed in less than ten days; but Captain Smith had received his orders to advance only four days before the armament anchored at Karical, whose ignorance of the impossibility of his apperance aggravated their anxiety concerning the arrival of the French squadron, which intelligence, artfully inculcated from Pondicherry, led them to expect from day to day when all the marines and sailors must have been reimbarked, and Major Monson would have been left with only 60 Europeans, and without a field-piece.
However, these apprehensions only encreased their activity in pushing the attack. The ten-inch mortar, which had been employed against Fort Dauphin, was removed on the 31st, and threw shells all night. The garrison returned round and grape from their cannon, and even used their musketry, although all they fired at was under cover, or out of reach: this early profusion of ammunition is rarely followed by vigorous defence at extremity. In the morning of the 1st of April the two embrasures on the right of the enfilading battery to the east were opened. The passage into the covered way lay opposite to this battery, leading through the glacis on the left face of its angle projecting to the east, and the garrison had laid a row of wood and palmiras in front of the barrier gate, which closed this passage at the foot of the glacis, in order to construct a battery there with these materials. The ten-inch mortar sometimes threw carcasses of fire-balls to set them afire, but without effect; and two royals, of which the shells are 5 inches and 5 twelfths diameter, continually bombarded the fort. In the morning of the 2d, the other two embrasures were opened in the enfilading battery. At ten o'clock, arrived Captain Richard Smith from Tritchinopoly with Lascars, oxen, coolies, and stores; and the Nabob came up likewise with 1000 horse and six companies of Sepoys, whom Captain Joseph Smith had sent forward, as the rains and the badness of the roads retarded the carriages and baggage of his detachment, with which he remained to bring them on. This reinforcement afforded troops sufficient; to ​invest the fort all round. In this day the enemy's fire was excessive, and dismounted one of the guns at the enfilading battery, and endamaged all its embrasures; but all were restored during the night, and the same number of guns began to fire again the next morning, which was the 3d of the month. At eight o'clock of this day, Captain Joseph Smith came up with the rest of his detachment, which were 130 European musketry, thirty artillery-men, two field-pieces, and five companies of Sepoys. The enemy during the night finished two embrasures in one face of their battery at the barrier, which pointed against the enfilading battery; and traces appeared of another face to the north, which seemed intended to scour the opposite street of the pettah, across which the attack had thrown up a slight retrenchment.
Early the next morning, the breaching battery in the centre street opened with three twenty-four pounders against the N. face of the N. E. bastion, at the distance of 150 yards, and was so well served by Captain Barker, who attended it, that in three rounds the enemy quitted the three guns in the face attacked, and in less than an hour all the merlons were beat down; the other face had before been much shattered by the enfilading battery, which had likewise nearly ruined the north face of the east ravelin: so that neither of the batteries had occasion to fire more than a shot now and then through the rest of the day. Sepoys were posted in the ruins of the houses, who kept up a constant fire through the night on the bastion and ravelin, to prevent the enemy from placing sand-bags to repair them. By the next morning, which was the 5th of the month, and the 10th since the landing, a battery, intended to destroy the east face of the north ravelin, was almost completed, and the other against the N. w. bastion quite finished; but the guns for neither were yet landed from the ships. Intelligence was received, that a detachment of 450 infantry and 150 European horse, were arrived at Chillambarum from Pondicherry, intending to advance and interrupt the siege. The breach, though broad, could not be mounted without clambering, and the immediate access to it was still defended by the ditch, to which the besiegers had not yet approached, ​and by the parapet of the fausse-bray, which remained undamaged but the gate of the barrier leading through the glacis to the east ravelin, had been beaten down by ricochet shot flying over the battery, which the enemy had raised before it. The bascul, or carpentry, which raised and let down the draw-bridge before the N. E. face of the east ravelin, had likewise been shot away, and the bridge fallen into its place, and the garrison had not yet destroyed it to interrupt the passage, which thus remained clear to the ravelin. The gateway leading through the curtain into the fort was at the back of this ravelin: and the same fire had destroyed the gates which closed it, nor had any thing been substituted to stop the passage; so that, if the storm had been immediately and desperately attempted this way, the enemy had nothing to oppose it, but the arms in their hands. All these circumstances Major Monson did not know; but the commandant of the fort feared, and answered the summons by requesting to march away with the honours of war: to which Monson replied, that the whole garrison must become prisoners of war; but that the inhabitants should be left in possession of their houses in the pettah, the officers have their baggage, and the Sepoys might go where they pleased. The terms were accepted; and the English troops marched in at two in the afternoon. The garrison consisted of 115 Europeans, of whom 101 were military, 72 Topasses, and 250 Sepoys. Besides smaller arms and stores, there were in the place 155 pieces of cannon of all sorts, and nine mortars, with a large stock of ammunition for both. Only five men were killed in the defence, and in the attack only three Europeans, one of whom was a sailor, and five wounded. Never perhaps was so great an armament prepared, to succeed with so little loss, excepting when Delabourdonnais took Madrass in 1746.
Nevertheless, the capture was well worth the exertion: as besides the advantages of its situation with respect to the sea, it afforded the French a constant and certain inlet to the territories of Tanjore, and by various purchases and cessions from the government they had acquired districts round the fort, containing 113 villages, of which the farms, with the customs of the port and town, never ​produced less than 30,000 pagodas a year, sufficient for the expence of the garrison. As the fort was too small, all the European inhabitants had their houses in the pettah, which were well built, as were many of those belonging to the natives, and room was left and marked for more to both. The Nabob derived no advantage by this success, beyond the detriment it occasioned to his enemies; for a member of the council of Madrass had been sent in the squadron, to negotiate with Tanjore for the redemption of the districts.
The absence of Colonel Coote and Major Monson had left the main army to the command of Major Robert Gordon, who moved with it from Alamparvah on the 28th of March, and on the 1st of April encamped at Killenore, from whence he sent forward a detachment of observation, to take post at Manoor, within five miles of Valdore. The sweep of country to the westward of Killenore as far as Villaporum, which lies 20 miles due west of Pondicherry, abounds in cattle, and is as fertile as any part of the Carnatic, and remained at this time, as the French territory became every day more circumscribed, their last resource for provisions. All the countries, which had been reduced to the south of Chittapett and Vandivash as far as Permacoil, had been let by the Presidency of Madrass to a Malabar, named Ramalinga, who accompanied the army ready to rent more, and kept several companies of irregular Sepoys with him, to place as guards in new districts, as reduced. By his advice, Major Gordon resolved to send a detachment against Villaporum. The distance was 35 miles, and the way lay between the garrison of Gingee on one hand, and of Valdore on the other. The detachment consisted of 200 black horse, and five companies of Sepoys, under the command of Captain Wood, and the renter accompanied with his people. They marched from Kiilenore on the 3d of April, a little after sun-set, and passing through Vicravandi, Captain Wood, with the horse, arrived before Villaporum at ten the next morning, but the Sepoys did not come up until two in the afternoon. The best intelligence that could be obtained, reported, that there were 300 Sepoys and 400 horse in the place; and at six, as soon as the Sepoys were refreshed, Wood led them to the attack, which could ​only be made by scrambling up the wall, as they had no ladders. Eight or ten got up to the parnpet, but three or four mounting at the same time were killed, which deterred those who were next from following, and flung the whole into confusion, on which the enemy sallied, but the horse rode in between, and drove them back. The Sepoys rallied again in the pettah, and were preparing ladders to escalade before day-break; but at eighht o'clock at night the garrison abandoned the fort. Captain Wood placed three of the regular companies of Sepoys, and 200 of the renters, to garrison it, under the command of an Ensign; and at ten at night set out on his return with the cavalry and the other company of Sepoys. They arrived at one in the morning at Vicrivandi, where he left this company, and, proceeding, rejoined the camp a little after sun-rise With the cavalry, which accomplished this march of 60 miles in 36 hours.
Since the retreat of the French army, their countries to the west-ward of Villaporum and Gingee, and the forts intended to protect them, had, like this, been left to the defence of such troops as the renters chose to levy and maintain; and in the end of March, Captain Airey, who commanded in Chittapett, and from thence over Trinomaly, sent a detachment of Sepoys to enable the garrison there to take the field, which in a few days drove the guards out of Soolabgur, Tricalour, and Trivaneloor: these three forts had been taken possession of by Mahomed Issoof and Kistnarow of Thiagar, whilst they were ravaging the countries adjacent to them during the siege of Madrass. Soolabgur is situated on a hill 15 miles s. s. w. and Tricolour on the plain 20 miles s. of Trinomaly: Trivelanoor stands 10 miles s. E. of Tricaloor, and 20 s. w. of Villaporum. The French garrison of Gingee on the one side, and of Thiagar on the other, were the nearest to protect these lesser forts; but both were too much alarmed for their own safety, to risk any detachments abroad: the one by the Nabob's camp then at Volcondah, the other by the English army at Killenore. Kistnarow, after the loss of Thiagar in the preceding month of June, had remained with the Nabob at Tritchinopoly, and, after the victory of Vandivash, obtained his permission to act as a free-booter in the French districts, and, ​having plunder to offer, easily enlisted a number of horse, with which he accompanied the Nabob to Volcondah, and from thence trooped away to the country about Chilambarum, where they were carrying on all kind of ravage, at the time that Captain Wood marched and took Villaparum.
Colonel Coote recovered of his wound, rejoined the army at Killenore on the 7th; and the next day, after reconnoitring Valdore, sent off 350 of the black horse, to join Kistnarow in the country about Chilambarum; so that the chain of troops, or posts, was now established, which encircled Pondicherry in a sweep of 70 miles, from that place to Allamparvah. On the 10th, a large number of Sepoys were seen marching into Valdore from the Gingee road: they were what remained of the body commanded by Zulphacarjung, who, when driven out of the pettah of Arcot by Captain Wood, continued, until this fort was taken, at the back of Velore, encouraged for fear of accidents by Mortizally. From Velore he marched to Gingee; and Mr. Lally, yielding to the representation of Mr. Deleyrit, and the general discouragement, repressed his prejudices against these troops, and recalled them to act again with the European force. Zulpharcarjung left a part of his Sepoys to reinforce Valdore, and marched on with the rest into Pondicherry.
The next day Colonel Coote advanced the army to Manoor, and sent forward Major Robert Gordon, with a large detachment, to take possession of the pettah under the fort of Valdore; the day after, which was the 12th, he brought up the rest of the army, and encamped at Cartaricopum, a village about a mile to the east, nearer Pondicherry. In the night, two batteries were commenced, and shells thrown, which the garrison answered by shot, and both were employed without mischief. The next day all the cavalry, not on duty, were detached, under the command of a Lieutenant, to reconnoitre: and proceeded to the hither end of the Red-hill. The French cavalry with some platoons of infantry advanced towards them, and made some evolutions as intending to fall on their flanks, which the English cavalry prevented by contrary motions, and returned ​to camp. They had perceived at a distence a large cloud of dust, as of troops with cannon, advancing from Pondicherry.
The fort of Valdore stands nine miles N. N. w. of Pondicherry. Its form is an exact parallelogram, squaring with the compass; and extending 300 yards from E. to w. and 210 from N. to s. It is situated in a plain, and its original fortifications, like the generality of the forts in the country, were a rampart with towers, a fausse-bray, and a ditch. Mr. Dupleix, had raised a glacis on the north-side, and had converted the center tower on this side, and that in the s. W. angle, into bastions with faces and flanks; but the pettah, which is to the west, remained within 150 yards of the wall: so that the vicinity of Pondicherry was its best defence. In the morning of the 14th, one of the batteries opened; it fronted and battered the tower in the north-west angle with one gun, and with the other took off the defences of the next tower in the west wall.
The dust seen the day before was from a body of troops marching to encamp under Villenore. The intelligence of the present day said they were the whole army, and that Mr. Lally intended to attack the English camp by surprize in the ensuing night, which determined Colonel Coote to reconnoitre them himself when the sun abated in the afternoon. All the cavalry in two divisions, each accompanied by five companies of Sepoys, marched with him. When arrived at the Red-hill, opposite to Villenore, he proceeded along the foot of it with one of the divisions, and sent the other across the plain, to examine the enemy's out-posts on that side, whilst his own division came opposite to a body of Europeans, with two field- pieces drawn up in the high road nearest the hill, leading to the bound-hedge. They cannonaded, but at too great a distance; and Colonel Coote continued under the side of the hill until dark, in order to persuade the enemy that he intended to patrole the field all night; but returned soon after to the camp. Five or six Sepoys and a horse were killed in this service. In the siege, one of the guns in the battery was ruined by the fire of the fort. Shells continued through the night, and the next morning, which was the 15th, the ​other battery was completed and opened. It faced the tower in the s. w. angle, and the fire from both continued through the day as hot as it could be safely kept up. The whole of the French troops had assembled at Villenore during the night, and pushed on advanced posts, which, in the morning, began to skirmish with those of the camp; where all, excepting the men at the batteries, were kept in readiness to turn out the line, but the enemy's main body did not advance. Intelligence was repeated of their intentions to attack the camp this night, as the night before: on which Colonel Coote struck the tents at sunset, as if he meant to change his ground, but pitched them again in the same place after dark; but half the troops lay on their arms until day-light. The howitz continued through the night; and in the morning the batteries which had been much impaired renewed their fire. The skirmishes likewise recommenced between the outguards of both armies. At two in the afternoon, both breaches appeared practicable; and a deserter from the fort reported, that the garrison had nearly expended their ammunition, and were inclined, if not immediately relieved, to surrender; on which Colonel Coote ordered Major Gordon, who commanded the attack, to summons the commandant at four o'clock, at which hour he should proceed himself with the main body from the camp, and offer battle to the enemy's; which if they refused, and the garrison to surrender, Major Gordon was to storm the breaches, and Colonel Coote would send assistance; but, if the enemy's army came to an engagement, Gordon was to march from the batteries with his division, and form the third line in the order of battle. Accordingly the main body advanced a mile and a half from the camp, and halted in sight of the enemy, who only sent forward their European cavalry and some Sepoys, which were met by parties of the English cavalry, European and black, supported likewise by Sepoys, and some were wounded on both sides by fire-arms, but no charges made hand to hand. At six o'clock, Colonel Coote received word, that the garrison of Valdore had consented to surrender without terms the next morning, and had given up the outer gate, on which ​he returned with the line to the camp. The garrison consisted of a captain, a lieutenant, 80 other Europeans, and 280 Sepoys; they had lost only two men kitted, and three wounded; and the English not more. There were in the fort 25 pieces of cannon, and some paddy. Colonel Coote, as soon as he had taken possession, detached 200 of the black horse, with 300 Sepoys, under the command of Assaf beg, to take Trivadi, in which were some Sepoys that protected the district, and gathered the produce for the French government.
Of the French prisoners which had been taken in the late successes, the Presidency of Madrass had inlisted 60 of those confined there, and sent them to the camp. These men, as soon as they came before Valdore, so near their own army and their capital, deserted daily, and 40 of them were gone before the place was reduced; some of the company of French Volunteers likewise went off, although they had hitherto behaved with as much spirit as if fighting under, instead of against, their own colours. But as soon as Valdore fell, new deserters began to come over from the enemy, three, four, and five in a day: nevertheless all that remained of those sent from Madrass were returned thither to be confined again, for the perfidy of their comrades.
On the 19th, Colonel Coote went out again in the afternoon, with the cavalry, and six companies of Sepoys, to reconnoitre on the Red-hill; the French cavalry, supported likewise by some Sepoys, came out, and advanced along the nearest avenue, but only the Sepoys on either side engaged, and that with distant firing, until four field-pieces came up from Villenore, on which Colonel Coote returned to the camp. Two of his black horsemen were killed, and the horse of a trooper, with five Sepoys, wounded.
During these operations of the main army, Colonel Monson was advancing with his division from Karical. The French prison taken there were sent to Tritchinopoly, under the escort of two companies of Sepoys, and of 60 of the Europeans, who had been drawn from that garrison on this service; two other of these companies, and two lent by the Nabob, with 12 Europeans, were left ​in Karical. Captain Joseph Smith, with the rest of his command from Tritchinopoly, of which 30 were artillery-men, remained, as did half the marines from the squadron; the other half, with all the battering artillery, were re-embarked. The Nabob with his troops, likewise accompanied Major Monson. They moved on the 10th of April, and continued by the road along the sea-shore, until they came to the mouths of the Coleroon near Devicotah, when they struck to the west, and passed the river in its single channel opposite to the pagoda of Chilambarum. At the passage, they were joined by Kistnarow, with his party of horse, who a few days before had intercepted two companies of Sepoys, escorting three tumbrils of ammunition to Chilambarum, which he took, having killed and dispersed all the Sepoys, and gathered up their arms. Major Monson summoned this place on the 19th; and on refusal, two eighteen-pounders were disembarked from the squadron, which was at anchor off the bar of Devicotah. There were brought on catamarans up the Coleroon, and joined the camp the next day. The slender walls of the pagoda would not have resisted a single shot, and, although the French had projected redoubts at the four angles, and one in the middle of the north, and another of the south wall; these works had only been carried up a little way in earth, and could only serve for cannon fired in barbette: scaffoldings had been erected for musketry, and there was a gun in each of the towers at the angles. In the twilight of the evening, the garrison perceived the artillery-men of the camp bringing fascines to the spot where the battery was intended, and mistook the fascines for scaling-ladders; on which the officers held a consultation, which did not resolve until midnight; when the camp, to their great surprize, saw a number of torches held out together upon the wall, and discovered amongst them a white flag, which the torches were illuminating. The signal of surrender was accepted; some troops advanced to the gate, and were admitted on the promise of good treatment to the garrison; which consisted of eight officers, and 40 other Europeans. The next day, the marines were sent to Devicotah, to be re-embarked on the squadron; and Kistnarow, with his horse, was detached to ​destroy the French districts about Cuddalore. This way lay the nearest road to Valdore; but Major Monson, imagining that Mr.Lally might post a force at Cuddalore to interrupt the march of his own, which was not strong in Europeans, if they should take this route; and, being unwilling to expose the person of the Nabob to any danger, resolved to turn inland, and attack Verdachelum; from whence he might proceed to Valdore, keeping the main body of the army between his own division and Pondicherry.
The enemy kept only Sepoys in their station at Trivadi, who abandoned it on the approach of Assaf beg's detachment, although they came without cannon. Encouraged by this easy success, Assafbeg proceeded towards Cuddalore, where the same panic had prevailed, and no troops remained to oppose his entrance; but the town was not entirely deserted by the inhabitants. This station was of much utility, as the road was in sight, and at this season to windward of Pondicherry: two companies of Sepoys were posted in the town; the houses of the factory were prepared to serve as an hospital to the squadron; bullocks were sent off to supply the ships with fresh provisions; and the few boatmen remaining in the town received encouragement to collect more of their own craft from different parts of the coast. On the 25th Rear-admiral Cornish anchored in the road, with the six men of war from Karical, and on the 29th was joined by Admiral Stevens, with four more from Bombay: they were part of the nine, which composed Mr. Pocoeke's squadron in the preceding year, two of which were arrived before with Mr. Cornish. Of the three others, the Salisbury was not completely repaired, and the Cumberland had not entered the dock when Mr. Stevens sailed; the Yarmouth remained, in consequence of orders from the admiralty, to convey Mr. Pococke to England from whence he had been absent five years. All the presidencies followed him with the most grateful acknowledgements of the eminent services he had rendered the nation during his continuance and command in the seas of India, which he completed, by escorting safely from St. Helena, in the heat of the war, 13 sail of the company's ships returning from their settlements, which arrived in ​England in the October following, and were the richest fleet that had ever entered the Thames at one time.
The two armies had continued in their respective encampments, their advanced guards in full sight, and continually alarming one another; and on the 27th at day-break, the French cavalry, with 50 of their infantry, attacked a post of Sepoys and black horse, killed six or seven of each, and wounded more; and lost themselves two hussars killed, and their officer, with several wounded.
Nothing of consequence passed for several days after, and in the night between the first and second of May, the whole French army decamped from Perimbé, and retreated close to the bound-hedge, leaving only an advanced post with two guns about half a mile in front of the main body. Colonel Coote went in the afternoon, with his usual escorte of horse and Sepoys, to reconnoitre their position, and, advancing too near, several of his Sepoys were killed by the fire of the cannon from the advanced post.
Major Monson with his division, and the Nabob with his troops, arrived before Verdachelum on the 26th. This place stands 60 miles N. N. w. of Chillambrum, and 60 s. w. from Valdore. It is extensive, and was originally a pagoda, and although converted into a fort by the addition of towers at the angles, and projected masses of masonry in each of the sides as gateways, still continued of very feeble defence against cannon. It seemed therefore only to acquit his military honour, that the commanding officer refused to surrender on the first summons; for the next day, on the appearance of the two eighteen-pounders in battery, he of his own accord threw out the white flag, and surrendered at discretion. His garrison were, besides himself and another officer, 13 Europeans, and 150 Sepoys. This place as well as Chillambrum was delivered over to the Nabob, who gave them in charge of his own Sepoys, and put both garrisons under the command of Kistnarow. He was here joined by his brother, Maphuze Khan, who when least expected, had left the Pulitaver in the beginning of January, and joined Mahomed Issoof at Tinivelly; from whence he was sent, with an escorte, to Puducotah, the principal town of the polygar Tondiman ​where he remained, still full of supicions of the evil intentions of the Nabob, until encouraged to trust him by repeated assurances from the Presidency, that no harm should befall him. He arrived with very few attendants, and had not money to entertain more. From Verdachelum, the troops continued their route by Villaporum and Vieravandi, and arrived at Valdore on the 3d of May. The Nabob remained in the camp until the 10th, much delighted with the army and commanders, who had restored him to so great a part of his dominions. He then proceeded to Madrass, in order to regulate with the Presidency the modes of administration in the countries which had been recovered.
The French, when they abandoned Cuddalore, demolished the parapets of the bastions, took down the three gates, and made several breaches in the rampart, and the whole face of the town fronting the sea never had a wall. Several informations had been lately received, that Mr. Lally intended to retake Cuddalore, of which Colonel Coote advised the officers there, and warned them to keep special guard. On the 10th at night, 100 Europeans with 60 hussars and three companies of Sepoys, entered the town, suprized and dispersed the Sepoys, and advanced to the hospital, where they took five surgeons, six petty officers, and 58 sailors and marines belonging to the squadron, mostly sick, whom they earned away, and left none of their own men to maintain the place. The next day, a reinforcement of two companies of Sepoys, with 20 of the European horse, and a field-piece, under the command of Lieutenant Fitzgerald, were sent into the town from the camp, and 60 marines were landed from the squadron. At four in the ensuing morning, whilst it was yet dark, a stronger party than the night before entered the town again, and took the field-piece; but, finding more resistance than they expected, retreated over the rivers towards Fort St. David, of which the fortifications had been so completely demolished, that a single redoubt was not left to give post to a company of infantry. Lieutenant Fitzgerald, with the hussars and some Sepoys, for all would not move, and none of the marines, followed, and hung in their rear, until they had recrossed the Panar ​beyond Fort St. David; where the enemy abandoned the fieldpiece they had taken. It was said, that the commander was killed, three other officers wounded, and 32 of the common soldiers killed and wounded. Of the English troops a Jemidar with 20 Sepoys were wounded, and a Subadhar was killed. From this earnestness, other attempts were expected, and diligence was used to render the place more desensible, and the Sepoys were augmented to 700. On the 20th, information was received, that the enemy intended another attack, with a much greater force than the last; on which, Colonel Coote detached an officer, with 30 Europeans, and 300 black horse, to interrupt their parties, or succour the place. The officer went with the Europeans into the town, and stationed the horse at a distance without; between one and two in the morning, the expected attack was made by 700 Europeans, 400 Sepoys, 150 of the French horse, which were half this body: and they had four field-pieces. They divided into five different assaults; all entered the town, but were stopped at the traverses which had been thrown up in the streets leading to the hospital, which resisted the direct fire of their field-pieces, and commanded their musketry; They however persisted, until two of their officers were killed, and 60 private men killed and wounded. The English officer followed them, with the black horse and some Sepoys, to the Panar: but their cavalry and field-pieces keeping in order in the rear, deterred any effectual attempt to interrupt their retreat.
On the 23d, the Salisbury joined the squadron from Bombay, and brought from thence to the assistance of the army three companies of the royal artillery, which the King had sent for the defence of that island; and the government there, very judiciously to the coast, where they were more immediately wanted. They were 178 men, exclusive of officers, all sound, and joined the army a few days after from Cuddalore, where they landed. After the retreat of the French troops to the bound-hedge, the two camps were at too great a distance to afford such continual occasions of skirmish as before. ​The successes of the English army, had not a little conduced to encrease the dissentions which had long rent the government of Pondicherry, where calamity, instead of reconciling, only exasperated the animosities of those who were sharing the same distresses. The loss of Permacoil was imputed to the retreat of the army, which was on march to relieve it; but they were only faulty in not having advanced with more expedition; and in either case Mr. Lally, not being present, was exempt from blame: which nevertheless was urged, because the officer who commanded in his absence was of his own regiment, and supposed to be much in his favour. The fall of Alamparvah was ascribed to the loss of Permacoil, and Valdore to malignant treachery, that Pondicherry might be deprived of the last post which remained to protect any convoys which might attempt to get into the town. Mr. Lally was informed of what every one thought and said concerning himself; and retaliated with sarcasms on their soreness for the loss of their own peculations out of the districts which he had been obliged to abandon. In this state of virulence were minds, when the squadron with Mr. Cornish was working up the coast to Karical. There were in the town of Pondicherry, 600 Europeans, invalids, fit only for garrison duty: and the inhabitants were 500 more Europeans. These, added to the regular troops, would contribute to make a formidable display, which Mr. Lally intended to exhibit on the strand to the view of the squadron, as they were passing through the road: orders were given in consequence. The covenanted servants of the French company were to be a part of the parade; but a little before, at the hour appointed, they came into the court of the government-house, and sent up word to Mr. Lally, that they would not march unless led by the Governor and Council, whom Mr. Lally had exempted from this duty. Mr. Deleyrit, the governor, immediately offered to put himself at their head; but the counsellors coming in, said, that none of the Company's servants were obliged to bear arms out of the walls of the town. On this declaration, Mr. Lally arrested the two spokesmen of the Council, and two of the forwardest of the repugnants, disarmed and dismissed the rest, and went on with the review ​without them. The offence and punishment left no bounds to the mutual aversion between him and the company's servants. Whilst the English army were attacking Valdore, two ships arrived from the islands: they brought neither troops nor money, but unfavourable advices, which were with much caution suppressed, and published as good news with salute of cannon, fireworks, and rejoicings, "That Mr. D' Aché's squadron, reinforced from France to 25 sail of the line, might be soon expected on the coast, with a large body of land forces on board." After the fall of Valdore, a few enclosures under the guns at Villanore and Ariancopang, with the ground within the bound-hedge, and the town of Pondicherry itself, contained all the live provisions, on which the colony was to rely for their future sustenance, and all further means were precluded of bringing in grain or other articles of store from the country without; for although Gingee and Thiagar remained in the hands of the French, their situation was distant, and their garrisons not strong enough to furnish sufficient escorts, and no parties equal to the same purpose could be detached from the main body, without incurring the risque of interception. When the farm of the districts adjacent to Pondicherry was taken from the European renters, and let to the Malabar, after the defeat at Vandivash, there was a sufficient quantity of grain on the ground in reach of Pondicherry, to have stocked the place, as some say, for years; but money was then more scarce than victuals, and the new farmer was permitted to sell his grain, that he might be enabled to pay his rent in coin into the treasury, instead of delivering grain, as acquittal, into the magazines. As soon as Permacoil and Alamparvah fell, and the English army advanced between Gingee and Pondicherry, Mr. Lally saw this error, and that it was not retrievable, but by means which he had hitherto, with too much presumption, despised.
Hyder Ally, the general of the Mysoreans, had at this time acquired the whole power of the government. He had lately taken the King out of the hands of his uncle, the Dalaway, whom we have seen commanding the Mysore troops before Tritchinopoly. ​The Dalaway had agreed to retire to the fort of Mysore with a jaghire allowed for his maintenance and security, and Hyder Ally was left without controul; for the King was young, weak, and timid. Not unmindful, however, of a reverse of fortune, Hyder Ally cast about to get some place of refuge immediately for his treasures, and contingently for his own person; and judiciously preferred Thiagar in the Carnatic, as well for the difficulty of access to it from Mysore, as the inexpugnable nature of its fortifications. A Portuguese monk, named Norognha, who assumed, and perhaps had obtained, the title of Bishop of Halicarnassus, had, by residence under the pretext of religious mission, acquired much knowledge of the adjacent countries, as well as of the Carnatic itself, and Mr. Lally, immediately on his arrival at Pondicherry, gave him his confidence, and employed him in all his transactions with the chiefs of the country. The bishop performed his commissions with zeal; for he was greedy of money, and it is a common custom in India to give some to the negotiator of a treaty. It was he who bargained for the Morattoes who joined the French army at Arcot; after which he continued in Velore, watching over opportunities, and either suggested to Hyder Ally, or discovered his inclinations, to obtain Thiagar. Mr. Lally seeing no other means of procuring relief to the necessities which began to threaten Pondicherry, repressed the contempt with which he had hitherto regarded the military faculties of the princes in India, and sent two of his officers to conclude the treaty with Hyder Ally. It was agreed, that Hyder should immediately send a body of 2000 horse, and 3000 Sepoys, with artillery, who, on their arrival at Thiagar, were to be put in possession of that fort, and of Elvanasore, with the dependencies of both, which were to remain the property of the Mysoreans in perpetuity as long as the flag of France existed in India. This army was to be paid at the rate of 100,000 rupees a month, from the day of their arrival at Thiagar. Ten eighteen-pounders were to be given as a present to Hyder, exclusive of the artillery in the two forts, which, as well as all the military stores, was to be delivered with them. His troops were to be furnished ​with ammunition, whilst serving for the French; who, after the Carnatic should be cleared, were to assist him in conquering the southern countries of Madura and Tinivelly. Besides the number already stipulated, Hyder Ally engaged to supply 1000 horse and 2000 Sepoys more: in consideration of which, half the countries which should be recovered in the Carnatic, were to be assigned to his government, excepting the French company's domains of Villenore, Valdore, Bahoor, and Alamparvah: the territory of Vellore, as belonging to Mortizally, their ally, and the districts dependant on Trinomalee, having been granted in appanage to Rajahsaheb, the son of Chundasaheb, were likewise exempted; and whatsoever portion of the Carnatic should fall to the Mysoreans, was to be delivered back to the French, in proportion to the progress of the acquisitions in the southern countries."
The negotiation was conducted with so much secrecy, that no surmises of it were obtained by the English until the 24th of May, just as their late successes seemed to have left nothing on the land, which could interrupt the prosecution of their intention to blockade Pondicherry; for which, preparations were making at Madrass, when Colonel Coote received intelligence of this unexpected alliance by a letter from one of his correspondents in Pondicherry, signifying, that Mr. Lally was preparing a considerable detachment, to march and join Hyder Ally at Thiagar. Hyder it was known was not there, nor was there any probability that his other interest would permit him to leave Seringapatam: nor were any dispositions observed in the enemy's encampment, which signified such a detachment as was said to be going. On the 30th, Colonel Coote went out to reconnoitre them himself, accompanied as usual by the black horse and Sepoys. The enemy cannonaded hotly, and killed some of the horsemen; but Assaf beg, with two or three squadrons, broke in upon their Sepoys, and killed 14 of them. Nothing appeared for several days after to confirm the intelligence; and Colonel Coote began to regard it as a rumour thrown out by Mr. Lally himself, to conceal some other design, when, on the 7th of June, he received a confirmation of it from ​Kistnarow, who had been ordered to look out, and had advanced with his party to Volcondah.
The first division of the Mysore troops, consisting of 1000 horse, and 2000 Sepoys, arrived at Thiagar on the 4th of June, and the next day some of their parties, roaming to collect cattle, skirmished with Kistnarow's near the pettah of Volcondah. The rest of the division still remaining at Thiagar were 30 miles nearer Pondicherry; and Kistnarow believing the exaggerated accounts of their numbers, and being in want of ammunition, hurried back to protect the districts of Verdachelum, which had been entrusted, not without profit, to his care; from hence he sent his report and his fears to Colonel Coote, with earnest request of reinforcements; and then, he said, he would march, and beat the Mysoreans.
A month before the rumours of these troops, the forces which the Mysore government maintained in Dindigul had commenced hostilities against the adjacent Polygars depending on Tritchinopoly; and it was reported that they intended to get possession of the pass of Nattam, which would preclude the immediate communication between Tritchinopoly and Madura. But as the Mysoreans in these quarters had several times before attacked the possessions of the Nabob, their present hostilities had not led to any suspicions of the greater effort which Hyder Ally was preparing against the Carnatic; nor were they deemed of danger to require immediate resistance from this province: but Mahomed Issoof sent a detachment from Tinivelly to Madura, from whence they were to take the field and enter the districts of Dindigul; and the troops maintained by the Nabob for the protection of the districts of Tritchinopoly, assembled at the pass of Nattam, under the command of Hussain Cawn, who had served with the French at Terriore and Seringham. until they retreated out of these countries, when he offered his service to the Nabob, and was accepted.
The heats of the season, since the land-winds had set in in April, had this year been much more intense than usual; and had struck sickness through the camp. Sixty Europeans had died, and 300 were in the hospital, and to preserve the rest from the sun, the day-duty of the line was done by the Sepoys. From the same attention ​fifty of the late deserters had been incorporated, and called the Free Company, under the command of two French officers, brothers, of the name of Martin: like the French volunteers, they were intended for the services of most fatigue and danger, and were now employed, for the first time. They marched on the 10th, accompanied by 25 Coffrees, two companies of Sepoys, 1000 black horse, and an iron gun with five European gunners, to join Kistnarow at Villaporum; as it was supposed the Mysoreans would attempt to pass either by this place or Trivadi.
Although no regular detachments had marched from Pondicherry, small parties to the amount of 200 Europeans had passed at different times undiscovered to Gingee, and from thence proceeded to Thiagar, before the first division of Mysoreans arrived there; but remained in order to accompany the main body to Pondicherry. Preparing for this important convoy and reinforcement, the garrisons both of Thiagar and Gingee had collected all the cattle, which the inhabitants had not driven out of their reach: but the Mysore horse in three days swept a much greater number; but refused to proceed with them, until fully apprized what interruption they were likely to meet in the way; and the French officers were afraid to tell them that they only ran the risque of more by this delay.
The Martins arrived at Villaporum on the 11th, and heard nothing of Kistnarow; and the commandant of Gingee, thinking he could cope with their detachment, marched from his forts with 100 Europeans, some Sepoys, and black horse. The Martins, as well as the deserters they commanded, behaved with much spirit in their new cause, and repulsed their countrymen, who acted but faintly. Some of the French Sepoys were killed, and two Europeans, a Topaze, and a Coffree, were made prisoners.
Notwithstanding this success and repeated injunctions Kistnarow still kept aloof; and, as it was supposed that the Mysoreans already arrived were the whole body, and would advance, accompanied by the Europeans from Thiagar, to which force that with the Martins, although strong, would in no wise have been equal, another ​detachment still stronger was sent from the camp: both when joined would amount to 190 European infantry, 30 European horse, 25 Coffrees, 600 Sepoys, and 1600 black horse; and were to be commanded by Major More, the same who marched in January to Tripetty, and had lately been promoted from the rank of captain.
More Mysoreans arriving, they called in their parties, and being joined by 40 or 50 of the French troops from Thiagar, appeared before Tricalore on the 10th; but, the Frenchmen having brought only two or three small field-pieces, and the fort being of stone, the Sepoys within, who were three good companies left there by Captain Airey, refused to surrender; and by the fire of their musketry from the walls obliged the enemy to retire; who then went against Trichimungalum, a fort five miles to the east, where the garrison, which was likewise of Sepoys, took fright, and evacuated it on their approach. From this place all the Mysore cavalry, now 1500, set off for Pondicherry, driving a multitude of cattle, but unaccompanied by any troops on foot, even their own, that, if interrupted, the horse might be free to force their way, or retire. The rule of these countries had so often been shifted to and fro by the fortune of war, and they had suffered so much, as well from the ravages of hostility, as the concussions of unsettled government, that they regarded both the English and French at least as tyrants, when not enemies; and, at this time, the renters and heads of villages, not knowing how soon they might have new masters, gave no assistance to Major More's detachment, who, distressed for provisions, and misled by false intelligence, advanced from Villaporum towards Tricalore, where they expected supplies, and hoped to intercept the Mysoreans in their route; who had passed before to the south, by Trivanelore, and arrived at Trivadi on the 23d, where they halted the day. Mr. Lally, apprized of their approach, had moved his whole army from the bound hedge to his former encampment at Perimbé in full sight of Valdore, and then detached 50 of his European cavalry to join the Mysoreans on the road. Colonel Coote received quick intelligence of their arrival at Trivadi, with an account of their numbers, ​and immediately sent out all the cavalry remaining in the camp, which were 1000 black, and 80 European horse: they were led by Vasserot, but whilst proceeding straight towards Trivadi, the Mysoreans filed off from thence along the Panar, until they reached the bounds of Fort St. David, and then crossing the plain, and keeping about a mile from the sea, came in towards the evening at Ariancopang, three miles in the rear of the French camp at Perimbé. They set out from Trivadi, with 2000 head of cattle, which retarding their march, they left in different herds in various places, intending to return and bring them in by detachments; so that only 300 bullocks arrived with them at the French camp.
The day after, Mr. Lally, in order to make proof of their service, advanced with them all, and the French European horse, towards the grand guard of the English cavalry, which was posted a mile and a half in front of the camp. All, when at a proper distance, set off on the gallop, and surrounded the guard on every side. Colonel Coote immediately pushed to relieve them with the main body of the cavalry, from the camp; but before they came up, as these kind of onsets are generally decided in a very few minutes, the whole guard was dispersed, and hurrying back to take shelter with the main body. The Mysoreans carried off 30 horses belonging to the black cavalry, and seven to the hussars.
Ensign Turner, who commanded at Cuddalore, receiving intelligence of the cattle which had been left on the way, went out with the Sepoys of his garrison, and in two or three days collected and drove in 900 of them; and none of the rest got into Pondicherry.
The detachment of Mysoreans escorted the officers appointed by Hyder Alley to settle the treaty and the plan of operations with the French government. A little before their arrival a report had been spread, that orders were on the way recalling Mr. Lally to France; which the Mysoreans hearing insisted that Mr. Deleyrit, and all the members of the Council, should sign the treaty; had they refused, no further assistance was to be expected; they therefore signed at, but at the same time composed a protest, which they kept entirely ​secret amongst themselves, objecting more especially to the monthly sum which the Mysoreans were to receive as pay, to discharge which no money existed; and that the territories ceded to them were of much more value than the indefinite services they were likely to perform. Nevertheless this clandestine disapprobation was unworthy their office, being calculated to exempt themselves from blame, and to exaggerate it on Mr. Lally, if affairs should better with the assistance of the Mysoreans; at the same time the apparent sanction evinced that the council saw no immediate means so likely to stop the progress of the English successes, which had taken every thing abroad but Thiagar and Gingee, and were at this instant menacing the capital, Pondicherry: so that had the council meant sincerely, they only promised the half of what they had lost, or never possessed, to obtain the only chance of gaining the other half, perhaps of preserving what remained. The treaty was signed on the 27th, and on the 28th at night all the Mysoreans went away, promising to return very soon with their whole force, and abundance of provisions. The next day the French army retreated from Perimbé to the bound-hedge.
In this interval, the squadron had bren joined by two ships of the line from England, the Norfolk of 74, and the Panther of 64 guns, which anchored at Cuddalore on the 15th; and a few days after one of the Company's ships arrived from Tellicherry on the Malabar coast, with a detachment of 100 Europeans, and 122 Topasses, sent from that settlement by order from Bombay. This, with the detachment of artillery which arrived a little before, would have been a great reinforcement at any time, but was at this juncture more especially seasonable; and these exertions did honour to the councils of that Presidency, which had hitherto been very cautious of parting with any part of its force.
On the 30th, the day after the French army returned to their bounnds, Colonel Coote detached the remainder of the hussars, who were 20, 500 black horse, 50 European infantry, and four companies of Sepoys, to Major More, that he might be strong enough to encounter the whole body of the Mysoreans in their approach to Pondicherry. This officer had been joined at Tricalore on the 24th, by Kistnarow, ​with 500 horse, and as many Sepoys. They proceeded against Trichimungalum, which surrendered after a short resistance on the 26th. The garrison were a serjeant, another European, and 180 Sepoys, with a much greater store of ammunition than their number required. They had collected 900 head of cattle in the fort, and a large quantity of grain in the town. Major Moore was again misled by his intelligence, and the party of Mysoreans returning from Pondicherry to Thiagar passed again out of his reach.
Mr. Lally determined to risque nothing before the main body of the Mysoreans arrived; and his troops were too strongly posted in front of, and within the bound-hedge, to be attacked by a force, which exceeded them so little as the English army, since the detachments it had lately sent abroad. So that both armies concurring in the same caution, in expectation of the same event, nothing of any moment passed between them for twenty days. Colonel Coote, in this interval, went to Madrass. He left the camp on the 6th of July, and returned on the 14th. The next day he received intelligence from Major Moore, that the Mysoreans were set out from Thiagar, with a very large convoy of provisions. This intelligence was confirmed the next day, with their route; and at three the next morning, which was the 17th, the van division of the army under Colonel Monson moved, and took possession of Perimbé, which is the ground under the point of the red-hill directly opposite to Villenore. The rest of the army came up before daylight; a party was immediately detached to take possession of the pettah of Villenore, and make preparations for batteries; another destroyed a redoubt on the hill over Perimbé, which the enemy had lately erected, in the spot where they before had raised the barracks for their cavalry, which Colonel Coote had burnt on his first excursion to reconnoitre this ground from Permacoil. The distance across, from the Red-hill, to the fort of Villenore and the river of Ariancopang, is little more than a mile, and the army possessed the whole space in posts and enclosures, which could not be attacked in front towards Pondicherry without great disadvantage; and nothing was apprehended in the rear, although the Mysoreans were coming; for ​they, it was not doubted, would, as before, endeavour to join the French army, by avoiding the English.
On this day, the 17th, the troops with Major Moore, and the whole body of the Mysoreans, advancing by different routes, arrived nearly at the same hour in sight of Trivadi. With Moore were 180 European infantry, 30 Coffrees, and 50 hussars, and together with Kistnarow's the black horse were 1600, and the Sepoys 1100. The Mysoreans were 4000 horse well mounted, 1000 Sepoys, and 200 Europeans, or Topasses of the French army, of whom a part managed eight pieces of cannon. At this time, when the English troops had been so long accustomed to success, it was supposed, that the force with Major Moore, notwithstanding the inequality of numbers, might have stood at least an obstinate brunt; but it happened otherwise; for by some mischance or misconduct, of which no certain account has ever been given, they were totally routed. The black horse and Sepoys, who it is said first gave way, dispersed on every side; five and twenty of the hussars were cut to pieces, and most of the rest were wounded; they were the only part which behaved with firmness, fighting after they were deserted by the European infantry, who retreated in great hurry and disorder to the fort of Trivadi, which they gained with the loss of 15 killed and 40 wounded.
The news of this misfortune reached Colonel Coote the next day,and encreased his anxiety to get possession of Villenore; for it was not doubted that Mr. Lally, as soon as joined by the Mysoreans, would make every effort to save this place.
The left of the English encampment was at the foot of the hill of Perimbé, and it extended 1500 yards to the right, across the plain towards Villenore. Through the center of the camp passed a road (raised as all the others on the plain above the common level of the ground, and) with a row of trees on each side. This avenue comes almost in a straight line from a redoubt in the bound-hedge, called the Villenore; but receives its name from the village of Oulgarry, through which it passeth about half-way between the bound-hedge and the hill of Perimbé. At a thousand yards in front ​of the English encampment, and 2000 from the bound-hedge, another avenue called the Villenore, strikes off from the avenue of Oulgarry, on the left as you come from the boundhedge, on the right, if looking from the camp. The Villenore, after continuing 400 yards at a right angle from the Oulgarry, turns nearly at another right angle, and leads straight west, and parallel to the other avenue; but ceases midway in the plain between Perimbé, and the fort of Villenore, which Colonel Coote was preparing to attack, and which must always be distinguished, in considering our narrative, from the redoubt of the same name in the boundhedge: the Villenore avenue, towards its termination, covered the right flank of the English camp. From a redoubt in the boundhedge, at 1000 yards to the right of the avenue of Oulgarry, commenceth another avenue, called, as well as the redoubt itself, the Valdore: this avenue continues only 1000 yards straight to the west, when, stopped by the opposition of the Red-hill, it inclines in another straight line to the left, until it has verged within 300 yards of the avenue of Oulgarry, which it then joins in another straight line, and at a right angle on the right, exactly facing the junction of the Villenore avenue on the other side the road, so that both together intersected the avenue of Oulgarry at right angles in the same point. It was along the Valdore avenue that Colonel Coote, with his cavalry, followed the French troops, when they retreated before him on the 7th of March, the first time he went to reconnoitre the ground about Pondicherry. Exactly opposite to the second angle of the Valdore avenue, as you come from the bound-hedge, and the first if you are going to it from the avenue of Oulgarry, stands a hillock, the highest, and the only conspicuous one on the plain, detached from the Red-hill; from the outward ridge of which this hillock is about 300 yards distant: thus situated, it commanded in flank the third or last, and in slant the middle or second turning of the Valdore avenue. Colonel Coote, having considered all the ground we have described, fortified the hillock with a closed redoubt of three guns, threw up a retrenchment of three guns across the avenue of Oulgarry, 150 yards in front of the ​spot where it is joined by the two others, and raised another across the Villenore avenue. Both retrenchments, and the redoubt on the hillock, lay nearly in the same line in front of the camp, which the hill of Perimbé defended on the left; on the right, the plain on the other side of the Villenore avenue was open and passable to cannon and cavalry, even to the rear of the camp. But this approach would now be protected, by the troops stationed in the villages under Villenore, and employed in the attack of this fort. All the three works were finished between the night of the 17th and the morning of the 19th. This disposition was devised with much science; for every thing was obviated which might produce a general disaster, if the troops should be compelled to quit the attack of Villenore, of which the success was scarcely probable, if the enemy, as might be expected, risqued boldly for its safety.
A thirteen-inch mortar, sent from Madrass, and landed at Cuddalore, arrived in camp on the 19th, and was immediately planted to bombard the fort; but the shells sent with it were too small, and would not take any certain range, and heavy rains prevented any work at the batteries during the night.
The next morning the French army, not yet joined by the whole body of Mysoreans, appeared advancing along the river of Ariancopong, as if they intended to attack the detachments stationed to guard the batteries; on which Colonel Coote marched from the right of the camp with the two battalions of the company's troops, and half the horse and Sepoys to meet the enemy, who halted, and began to cannonade; during which Draper's and Coote's regiments with the rest of the black troops, by previous disposition, marched from the left of the camp along the foot of the Red-hill., as if they intended to storm the redoubts of the boundhedge, and get into the rear of the enemy's army. Mr. Lally believed this feigned intention to be real, and immediately retreated to his former stations; a few of the English cavalry and Sepoys were wounded. In the evening the Mysoreans arrived from Trivadi with 3000 bullocks, carrying their baggage, and drawing their artillery, and 3000 more laden with rice, and other provisions; the ​French detachments from Thiagar and Gingee accompanied them: they came in unmolested, as before, by Ariancopang, and their arrival was complimented with a long salute of cannon. In the evening the guards before Villenore were reinforced, and double diligence employed through the night at the batteries.
The fort of Villenore was a circle 50 yards in diameter within the wall; it was surrounded by a ditch, a covered-way, and a glacis cut in angles, as a star. The rampart was a construction of masonry, divided into ten lodgements, or chambers, which were arched, the vaults bomb-proof, and the interstices at top were filled up to an equal level, which formed the terrace on which the cannon were mounted. Each of the chambers, was likewise opened through the outside of the wall in casements intended for cannon, but none were mounted in them. The breadth of the rampart, which was the length of the chambers, was 30 feet, and reduced the area within to a small pentagon, which in no direction was more than 45 feet over; so that if the chambers had not been bomb-proof, the place could not have stood an hour against this kind of artillery. Two villages lay near the fort, one directly north, the other to the north-east. They were about 200 yards from each other, and both were occupied by the English troops. The passage through the glacis to the fort was straight, and nothing obstructed the view quite up to the foot of the wall but the barrier gate, and the drawbridge, when up; neither of which could resist a shot; nevertheless, the French had neglected to cover this opening by a traverse, either in front or behind the passage. The advantage was taken, and a battery of two eighteen-pounders was erected between the two villages, to breach through the opening: another of the same force was erected in the village to the north, to destroy the parapet, and take in reverse the part intended to be breached.
Both batteries opened with the day on the 16th. At nine o'clock the French army, with all the Mysoreans, horse and foot, approached along the bank of the river of Ariancopang. Some of the black horse and Sepoys, with three field-pieces, were sent from the English camp to stop their advanced parties, whilst the line got ​under arms; and as soon as they were in motion, a detachment of Europeans, with four field-pieces, filed off from the right to reinforce the villages of Villenore. By this time the batteries there had beat down the parapet, and silenced the enemy's fire from the fort, when two companies of Sepoys set off on the full run, and posted themselves under the brick facing of the covered-way, in a hollow, where the earth had not been filled up, as in other parts, to the crest of the glacis; some, more adventurous, jumped over the wall. Still the garrison had nothing to fear; for the Sepoys had a ditch to pass, and a very imperfect breach to mount: but the commanding officer held out a flag of truce, and opened the gates to a detachment of Europeans, who hastened up on the first sight of the flag. They immediately raised the English colours on the rampart, and turned the guns against the French and Mysoreans, who were advanced along the river-side within the random reach of cannon-shot. The change was received with the curses of every man in the French army. All the lines stopped involuntarily, and at once, stricken by horror; and Mr. Lally, more confounded than any, immediately ordered the whole to retreat under the guns of Ariancopang. There were in the fort 30 Europeans, 12 Coffrees, and eight pieces of cannon on the ramparts, which might have held out two days longer, before the English would have ventured to storm; and ten minutes more in the present hour would have brought on a general engagement to decide its fate. Of all his successes, Colonel Coote deemed this the most fortunate, because least expected. Nevertheless he had exerted much ability to place the army in a situation to make the attack in sight of the enemy's, and, if it failed, have nothing unequal to apprehend.
The first arrival of the Mysoreans in the province had alarmed the Presidency of Madrass, as much as it surprized the army; for, besides the interruption they might give to the success of the war, the Nabob's revenues were lost wherever their parties appeared; and, as horse, they might in the back country extend their ravages from Tritchinopoly to Arcot: and this detriment was the more dreaded, because the company in England, relying on the treasures of Bengal, ​had determined to send no bullion to any of their settlements in India, and the Presidency of Bengal had consumed all their incomes, and were borrowing money. It was therefore proposed to the Nabob, who was at Madrass, to march with what troops had accompanied him thither, supported by a detachment of Europeans from the garrison, in order to protect the countries between Gingee and Trinomaly, and all behind them to Arcot. Captain Richard Smith, at Tritchinopoly, as soon as he had acquired intelligence of the strength and intentions of the Mysoreans which were come into the Carnatic, proposed the expediency of a diversion, by marching with a force from his garrison, and attacking the districts of Mysore, which confine on the westward to those of Tritchinopoly, whilst the troops ordered by Mahomed Issoof from Madura, should keep the Mysoreans of Dindigul at bay. The idea was approved as the most probable resource; he was ordered to carry it into execution, and Tanjore and Tondiman were requested to give him what assistance he might require.
The Nabob marched from Madrass on the 3d of July, and on the 7th he arrived at Vandivash; after loitering there some days, he suddenly changed his mind from keeping the field against the Mysoreans, and went away to make his entrance into his captial of Arcot; but left 700 of his horse, and 500 of his Sepoys, with his brother Maphuze Khan, who on the 22d came with them to the army at Perimbé. The day after Colonel Coote, with all the cavalry of the army, a great part of the Sepoys, several field-pieces, an eighteen-pounder on a field-carriage, but without any European infantry, advanced towards the bound-hedge. This defiance as it were of meeting the Mysoreans with equal arms could not provoke them to come out and try their strength; but the French infantry advanced and cannonaded from seven pieces of cannon, which only wounded two European gunners.
The next morning, the 24th, on intelligence that a large body of the Mysoreans intended to march that night to the westward to escort provisions, Major Monson was detached, with all the black cavalry, six companies of Sepoys, and two field-pieces, to take post ​at Valdore, near which, it was supposed, the Mysoreans would return; but only a few were gone out, who halted at Rangapillah's choultry on the sea shore, six miles to the north of the boundhedge, where they were joined on the 26th by the large body from Pondicherry, of which intelligence had been given on the 24th. All went on to Permacoil; Major Monson followed them on the 27th, and arrived on the 28th, when none were remaining there. In the mean time, Lieutenant Eiser had been detached from the camp on the 26th, with 400 Sepoys, 30 Europeans, and a hundred black horse, the best in the army, to proceed from Rangapillah's choultry along the sea-shore, whilst Major Monson was endeavouring to come up with them on the other side; but they had struck off in several parties, some towards Gingee, others to the northward, spreading to collect cattle, and destroying whatsoever else belonged to the inhabitants, who, as their ground now supplied the English army with provisions, were every where considered by the French as armies. One of these parties went to Allamparvah, where they plundered the pettah, and took a Lieutenant, who was sick, and chancing to be taking the air, having shot him through the back as he was endeavouring to escape in his palakin; however the cannon of the fort drove the party away, and, as they were returning along the shore towards Pondicherry, they fell unawares across Eiser's detachment, by whom they were intirely routed, and 30 of their horse surrendered to him, with which he returned to the camp in the evening, where major Monson's division likewise rejoined the same day; for the whole cavalry of the camp had marched in these two divisions.
The last day of the month brought the welcome arrival of five of the Company's ships from England in the Road of Cuddalore: and two days after came in another, which had separated from them. There were on board of the six, 600 men drafted from regiments in England, to replace the deficiences which might have happened in Draper's and Coote's.
On the 3d of August, the free company of Frenchmen were sent to get in the rear of one of the enemy's advanced posts, which lay ​in the Valdore road, about half a mile from the bound-hedge. They marched along the skirts of the Red-hill, and, coming by surprize, killed and wounded several, and drove the rest to the bound-hedge.
The Mysoreans, according to their contract, had delivered all the provisions they brought into the magazines of Pondicherry, where they were carefully stored for future need. The pursuit of Monson, and the success of Eiser, deterred them from going out again in large detachments, and although the English army could not cover the ground sufficiently to prevent small parties from getting back, with a few head of cattle or other provisions, yet all these supplies were unequal to the daily consumption of 10,000 mouths; for, with their followers, the Mysore army amounted to this multitude; and in a few days rice began to sell in their camp at the rate of two pounds for a rupee. This distress, the constant fatigue and risque necessary to redress it, and their convictions of the superiority of the English army, as well by the loss of Villenore, as the caution of the French to risque an engagement since that event, made them weary of their expedition and alliance; and their Sepoys, foreseeing less likelihood of retreating with safety than the horse, began to desert in numbers every day.
The garrison of Gingee had collected 2000 carriage bullocks, and rice to load on them, and, with various parties which had got out from Pondicherry, 150 Europeans of the infantry, and 100 of the cavalry, were waiting there to escort this train, expecting to be joined by the Mysore horse; who were by this time determined to go away to Thiagar, and return no more; on which, 50 more Europeans, with three companies of Sepoys, were detached from Pondicherry, to reinforce the convoy. Colonel Coote took measures to prevent its arrival. Some Sepoys patroled along the sea-shore, as far as Rangapillah's choultry; from Alamparvah, Martin, with the free company, four of Sepoys, and three field-pieces, marched on the 12th, to lie between Valdore and Permacoil, and were reinforced the next day by 30 hussars with Lieutenant Kircher. Whilst these parties were on the north and N. w. Ensign Turner marched from Cuddalore to Trivadi, with the seven companies of Sepoys ​belonging to that garrison, in which Major Monson remained with the troops just arrived from England: so that the outlets to the s. w. and s. were equally well guarded, and the main body of the army lying between Villenore and the Red-hill utterly precluded the passage to or from the west. The convoy from Gingee were expected to set out on the 12th, but did not until the evening of the 13th; intelligence of which was soon after brought to Colonel Coote, who went off at 11 at night, with all the black cavalry, 200 Europeans, the hundred Topasses from Bombay, and two fieldpieces, and proceeded towards Killenore. The same night the greatest part of the Mysore horse decamped from the glacis of Pondicherry, and marching fast fell in when it was deep dark with Martin and Kircher, who, charging them unexpectedly met no resistance, killed 40, took 200 of their horse, and 900 bullocks laden with their baggage. At day-break Colonel Coote came up with his party, when all the Mysoreans were not yet out of sight; they were retreating in broken parties to the west-ward. Colonel Coote divided his force in pursuit of them, which returned the same day with many more bullocks and two European prisoners. One division of the Mysoreans escaped both the encounter and pursuit. They were at some distance in the rear, when the front was stopped, on which they immediately turned back, and passing as they had come at the back of the Red-hill, and by the sea shore, regained the bounds of Pondicherry.
Notwithstanding this rout, it was still considered as doubtful, whether the Mysoreans might not join and return with the convoy waiting at Gingee: and to prevent the continual fatigue of detachments marching from the camp on every report, to watch and intercept their approach, it was determined to post a force sufficient to cope with them separate from the main body of the army, which continued at Perimbé. The detachment which had accompanied the Nabob from Madrass, when it was supposed he intended to keep the field towards Trinomaly, advanced from Vandivash; and on the 19th encamped at Ratlagramon, a town under the hills to the east of Gingee, and ten miles north of Valdore; a station which the ​convoy could not avoid without much circuit and trouble. The detachment was immediately joined by another from the camp, when the whole amounted to 200 European foot, 50 Coffrees, 500 Sepoys, 50 European horse, hussars, and 500 black horse; they were commanded by Captain Preston.
The 500 Mysoreans which had returned to Pondicherry were afraid to venture out again in a body, but in every of the succeeding nights sent off small parties, which passed undiscovered. To stop those which remained, two companies of Sepoys, with 100 of the black horse, where detached with Ensign Meredith, and took post at Rangapillah's choultry. Another detachment of Sepoys marched the same day from the camp in quest of a party of Europeans which had marched the night before from Pondicherry for Gingee, but only brought back four, whom they had picked up lagging on the road with fatigue. Early the next morning, a strong detachment from the bounds attacked the post at Rangapillah's choultry, and obliged the party there to retreat. On the first notice, two companies of Sepoys, and all the grand guard of cavalry, marched to sustain them, and the enemy retired on their appearance.
In two or three nights more, all the Mysoreans who had returned to Pondicherry were gone, and all their parties had escaped without interruption. News was received at this time that their main body which had assembled at Thiagar, were marched from thence to attack Trinomaly; it was therefore concluded, that they would make no farther efforts of consequence to succour Pondicherry with provisions; and in this persuasion, the Presidency rosumed the intention of blockading Pondicherry by sea and land; and the Governor Mr. Pigot came from Madrass to confer with Admiral Stevens and Colonel Coote on the means.
The ground between Villenore and Perimbé was the best on which the English army could continue, whilst the Mysoreans remained with the French; for it presented a narrow front, was of hazardous approach, afforded several strong posts, and was centrically situated for the expedition of detachments to interrupt any which might be sent from, or coming to the enemy's camp. But this situation did ​not fully answer the purpose of a blockade, which was to reduce the town by famine; for, being five miles distant, the army was not sufficient to form a chain of posts in a curve of 15 miles from the sea-shore on the north to the sea-shore on the south of the town, close, or in all parts strong enough, to intercept every thing. The bound-hedge of Pondicherry sweeps from the north to the s. E. of the town, where it ceases on the bank of the river of Ariancopang, which in two arms, with an island between them, supplies the rest of the barrier to the south of the town. The area included by the hedge with the arms of the river, comprizes nearly seven square miles. This ground afforded pasture for a number of cattle, which, if unmolested, might, whilst the English army, remained at their present distance, supply the troops and inhabitants with porvisions for seveal months; and the daily consumption might be replaced by small convoys from without; so that the enemy could not be severely distressed, until pent within the bound-hedge, when its redoubts and other stations in possession of the English, would suffer nothing to remain abroad beyond the foot of the glacis, and even there not in quiet. These posts would likewise obstruct the introduction of supplies in the whole extent of the hedge, and the present stock would remain the principal reliance, until the French army should be sufficiently reinforced to recover them; but now that the Mysoreans were gone, no probabiltiy remained of any troops coming to the succour of the town, excepting from the sea. Nevertheless the English force was not yet sufficiently superior, even if in possession of the bound-hedge, to open trenches against the town; and if it had, the preparation, embarkation, and transport of the artillery and stores, which were all to come from Madrass, could not be accomplished before the setting-in of the monsoon, which at farthest might be expected in the middle of October. If the French fleet appeared before this time, the issue of the fight at sea would determine the future success of the siege; if not, their delay must arise from the want of force to cope with Mr. Stevens's squadron; and in this case, it was scarcely to be doubted that single ships, or more, would at any risque venture with relief ​in the height of the stormy weather, in expectation that the English squadron would have left the coast to avoid it, as they had done during every monsoon for the last five years. Thus it became necessary to get possession of the bound hedge and its redoubts without delay; and then that the squadron should continue in sight of Pondicherry through the monsoon, in order to intercept whatsoever ships might be coming either with troops or provisions: but, previous to the attack of the hedge, Colonel Coote thought it necessary to reduce the fort of Ariancopang, which standing on the south side of the river, almost opposite, although at some distance from the termination of the hedge on the other bank, commanded all the ground between, as well as in front down to the strand of the sea so that from the garrison of the town on the one hand, and the fort on the other, this quarter of the circumvallation, supposing the hedge to be taken, could not be completed without more force than the army could spare from other parts; and even then the posts established on this side would be continually exposed to dangerous attacks; in the mean time, this extent of ground would remain open for the introduction of convoys; which, detachments from the fort of Ariancopang, if taken, might easily intercept. The force of the English army before the town, exclusive of garrisons and detachments, was 2000 Europeans, and 6000 natives, either horse or Sepoys. If Ariancopang were attacked by a detachment, the number requisite, of 800 Europeans, would leave the main body scarcely a match for the whole of the enemy's force, if collected to attack them, who doubtless would make the effort. If Ariancopang were invested by the whole army, they must move from the advantageous ground between Villenore and Perimbé, which would leave all to the north of Pondicherry open, and admit the French army then to detach a force, which, joined with the party already at Gingee, would be able to drive Preston from Rattlagrammon, and bring in, if not the whole, at least a considerable part of the convoy collected there. These grounds and circumstances Mr. Pigot represented in a memorial to Admiral Stevens, and, in consequence of them, requested that he would land all the marines of ​the squadron, to enable the army to attack Ariancopang, and take possession of tho bound-hedge; and that he would determine to remain on the coast with the whole squadron, through the monsoon. Mr. Stevens was very loth to deprive his ships of their marines during the expectation of an engagement with the enemy's squadron, but at length acquiesced to the necessity and importance of the service they might render on shore; and promised without hesitation that his squadron should not quit the coast until compelled by irresistible necessity. Accordingly, the marines were landed at Cuddalore on the 27th; they were, including officers, 422 Europeans.
The Mysoreans, as soon as they arrived before Trinomaly, made an attack on the pettah, in which they were repulsed with the loss of fifty or sixty men: but continued to invest the place. Captain Preston, on intelligence of their intention, sent off on the 22d two companies of Sepoys from Ratlagrammon, who, by bye ways in the mountain, got into the fort on the 26th; and the day after, the enemy in greater force than before made another assault, in which they were again beaten off, with the loss of sixty men, and an officer of distinction; the garrison sallied as they retreated, and obliged them to abandon two field-pieces, which they had brought up and used in the attack. The whole raised the siege immediately, and returned to Thiagar.
Two hundred Europeans, with some Sepoys, and two guns, marching round the Red-hill in the night of the 23d, escaped the interruption of the English guards, and arrived the next day at Gingee; from whence they set out again in different parties, escorting 2000 bullocks loaded with provisions; of which some were dispersed by Preston, as they were coming out of the hills; and 300 were taken, when advanced within a few miles of the English camp, by a detachment of Sepoys and black horse, sent out to look for them; and none got into Pondicherry: but as all that had been attacked had been met in the night, the escorts regained Gingee with very little loss. Three or four thousand more bullocks were ready to be substituted as the convoys sent might fail, and it was now determined to send the whole of this collection together, under the ​strongest escort that could be risqued abroad; accordingly Mr. Lally detached 100 of the French cavalry and several more companies of Sepoys from Pondicherry, to join the troops already at Gingee; so that one third of his whole force was now employed in this service; and he had by much solicitation, and by inducements of which we are ignorant, prevailed on the Mysoreans to send back 800 of their horse to Gingee, who were likewise to accompany the convoy; and this body of horse arrived there at the same time as the last detachment from Pondicherry. Intelligence was received on the 29th, that the convoy with the whole escort intended to set out from Gingee in the ensuing night; on which, dispositions were made to oppose their passage.
The whole of the Red-hill is intersected by winding dales, in which troops may march unperceived until met within them, or discovered from the rising grounds above: in the middle of the general plot of the Red-hill, stands one eminence higher than any of the others, and called from the trees it bears, the Tamarind grove: this hillock has dales on each side of it, which join with others, leading from the plain of the country on the outside of the Red-hill to the N. w. at the farthest distance from the English camp, from the left of which shouldered under the extremity of the Red-hill at Perimbé, the Tamarind grove was two miles to the N. E. and it was three to the N. W. of Pondicherry. This situation being central for the interruption of troops marching through the dales of the Red-hill, either to or from Pondicherry, Colonel Coote, who, by his continual excursions, knew all the ground in the adjacencies of his camp, ordered a redoubt to be raised there, which was finished in the day. Lest the convoy should attempt to make their way to the south of the river of Ariancopang, the whole body of marines, which were still remaining at Cuddalore, were ordered to march some miles from thence along the river Paliar, and to advance six companies of Sepoys beyond them towards Trivadi; whilst scouts from the camp patroled between the two rivers: and, to watch the convoy if coming by the direct road from the west, several companies of Sepoys from Valdore proceeded along it towards Gingee. The convoy set ​out from hence on the 29th, the day appointed; but Captain Preston having two days before taken a mud fort, called Penamalee, situated at the opening of the hills, posted a strong guard there, which the enemy mistaking for the whole of his force, retired again, and afterwards hearing of the dispositions made from the English camp, resolved to proceed as before in separate troops.
On the 2d of September arrived at Cuddalore three of the King's ships, convoying several of the company's from England. Of the men of war two were the America, and Medway, each of 60 guns, which compleated the squadron before Pondicherry to 17 sail of the line. In the Company's ships were part of a Highland regiment, supplied by the government, in addition to the troops it had already sent to India. These mighty aids witnessed in this quarter, of the globe, as equal efforts, wheresoever necessary, in every other, the superior energy of that mind, who possessing equally the confidence of his sovereign and the nation, conducted the arduous and extensive war in which they were engaged against their great and only rival.
The same evening Colonel Coote ordered 400 men to march and invest the fort of Ariancopang; but Colonel Monson, the next in command, did not approve the operation, although it had been pleaded to Admiral Stevens, as the principal inducement to land the marines of the squadron: and Colonel Coote, not to disgust pertinacity, when concurrence was so necessary, countermanded the detachment.
Mr. Lally received information, that the detachment had been paraded, and suspected the service for which it had been intended. Such a proof of the opinion which the English army entertained of their own superiority, convinced him that it would soon be followed by some real blow of equal detriment, if they were not immediately convinced, that his own was capable of more than acting on the defensive. He resolved to attack their camp by surprize on the night of the 4th, and his dispositions were made with much skill and sagacity.
In the three ships at anchor before the town, were 150 European mariners; they were all landed, and Lascars sent on board. These ​Europeans, with some Sepoys, were allotted to guard the redoubts in the bound-hedge, that all the regular European military might serve in the intended attacks, excepting the artillery men, who were distributed on the rampar's of the town, and in the out-posts which mounted cannon. By the detachments lately sent abroad, the whole force that could march on the present service were 1100 European infantry, 100 European horse, and 900 Sepoys. The battalion of India and the volunteers of Bourbon, amounting to 300 rank and file, had for some days been encamped under the fort of Ariancopang; the Portugueze company, which was likewise called the company of Jesus, and had a Jesuit at their head, with some Sepoys, were quartered in the Company's gardens, situated within. the bound-hedge in the road towards the Valdore redoubt; the regiments of Lorrain and Lally, 500 men, the marines of the squadron, 200, and 500 Sepoys, were in the town; the horse were distributed in different patroles. The gates of the town were shut early, and opened again at ten at night; and although Colonel Coote entertained spies and correspondents in the town, not one of them acquired the least surmise of Mr. Lally 's intentions, or suspected any unusual operation.
The marines and Sepoys marched out of the town in two parties, told off in equal numbers of each. They proceeded to the Valdore redoubt, and in the way the Portugueze company, with the Sepoys at the garden, fell into the rear and formed the third subdivision of this line. Continuing in the avenues from the Valdore redoubt, the first party soon turned to the right, to gain the Red-hill, and proceed in it to the attack of the Tamarind redoubt; in which, if they succeeded, they were to march across to the left and join the second; which followed them, and quitting the avenue likewise, were to advance along the foot of the outward ridge of the Red-hill, until they had gained the flank of the English redoubt on the hillock in the plain, which they were then to bear down upon, and attack. The Portugueze and Sepoys, which were the third sub-division, were to proceed quite through the three ​lines of the Valdore avenue, dispersing what patroles and out-guards might be in the way, and to take post at the junction of this avenue with that of Oulgarry, where they were to wait the orders of the officer who commanded the attack, which was to be made by the regiments of Lorrain and Lally. These troops, in two divisions, marched from the town, and through the bound-hedge, along the avenue of Oulgarry, until they came to the head of this village, where a deep water-course crossed the avenue, and had a bridge over it, which was defended by a retrenchment with guns. Here Lorrain halted, whilst Lally's regiment, quitting the avenue by the left, marched outwards in the fields to fall on the right flank of the English redoubt in this avenue; to which Lorrain was to advance straight along the avenue, and attack at the same time. When carried, the Portuguese company, with the Sepoys, which were the third sub-division of the attack to the right, were to join, and, with Lorrain's and Lally's, proceed across on the left to attack the retrenchment in the Villenore avenue which stood in the same parallel as that in the avenue of Oulgarry; but the Villenore retrenchment had on its left a large garden, called from its owner, Barth elmi's; in which were likewise posted a strong guard with some field-pieces. When this garden and retrenchment were carried, all the troops of this attack were to regulate themselves by the success of another attack on their left, which was to be made by the India Battalion and the volunteers of Bourbon. They were to march from the fort of Ariancopang, across the river, to the villages under the fort of Villenore; but were to leave two field-pieces on the plain in their way from the river, in order to secure their retreat. As soon as the firing became general, at the retrenchment in the Oulgarry road, the redoubt on the hillock, and the tamarind redoubt, these troops were to advance from the village in which they were halting, and proceed along a short road which would bring them to the termination of the Villenore avenue, and exactly in the rear of the right flank of the English encampment; on which they were to fall with the utmost vigour, in full confidence, that the other attacks would have thrown the whole camp into disorder, ​by the uncertainty and distraction of what and where succours were to be sent. Mr. Lally, with a guard of horse, remained at the bridge of Oulgarry. Calculation had been made, when all the troops would arrive within equal reach of their respective attacks, where they were to wait in silence for the signal of two sky-rockets, which were to be thrown up at Oulgarry, when all were to advance to the attacks allotted them.
The sky-rockets were shot off a little before midnight, and soon after the firing commenced nearly at the same time, at the tamarind redoubt, the hillock, and at the retrenchment in the avenue of Oulgarry. The attack at the tamarind redoubt was repulsed; but the redoubt on the hillock was carried; the lieutenant of the artillery and three gunners were made prisoners there, and the rest of the guard driven out, nor did they rally; which gave the enemy time to carry off a brass three-pounder, destroy the carriage of another gun, spike up a third, and burn down the battery. At the retrenchment in the Oulgarry road, the attack and defence were more fierce. Colonel Coote himself brought down troops to that in the Villenore avenue and Barthelmi's garden, and, instead of waiting to be attacked, advanced across to sustain the other redoubt; against which Lorrain and Lally's persisted until eight Serjeants, besides common men, of Lally's, were killed; when the officers, hearing no signs of the main attack on the right and rear of the English camp, drew off. This division, by some unaccountable mistake, instead of advancing to the villages under the fort of Villenore, halted in another a mile to the south of it, not far from the river, and in a line with the village of Oulgarry. At this erroneous distance, they had not time, after the sky-rockets were fired, to reach the ground of their attack, before the three others were either repulsed or ceased. They were led by D'Harambure, who had always behaved hitherto with gallantry, and especially during the march of Mr. Law's reinforcement to Hyderabad in 1756; but Mr. Lally, with the usual severity of his prejudices, imputed the failure to a design, as the commander of the Company's troops, of frustrating the honour which would have redounded on himself, had the hardly effort ​he was making succeeded to his expectation. About twenty Sepoys were killed and wounded of the English troops, but fewer Europeans. Of the enemy, 30 Europeans were supposed to be killed, and most of them either in Lorrain or Lally's; four were made prisoners, with Mr. D'Autueil, the same officer we have seen opening the intestine war of the Carnatic at the battle of Amboor, in which the Nabob's father fell, and who afterwards surrendered to Clive at Volcondah.
The ships last arrived from England brought commissions from the war-office appointing majors Brereton and Monson to the rank of lieutenant colonels, with prior date to Colonel Coote; but both were oredered not to assert their commissions whilst he remained on the coast. Colonel Coote nevertheless concluded that it was intended he should remove as soon as might be to his original and established command in Bengal, nor did Monson propose to continue serving under him, but offered to retire to Madrass; but Coote immediately delivered over to him the command of the army, and went thither himself, and requested to proceed with his whole regiment to Bengal. The Presidency remonstrated against the detriment, and Monson declared that the blockade of Pondicherry must be raised if these troops were taken away: on which Coote consented to leave them.
End of the Twelfth Book.