# Reflections upon Ancient and Modern Learning/Chapter 7

CHAP. VII.
General Reflections relating to the following Chapters: With an Account of Sir William Temple's Hypothesis of the History of Learning.
IF the bold Claims of confident and numerous Pretenders might, because of their Confidence and Numbers, be much relied on, it were an easie Thing to determine the present Question, without any further Trouble. The Generality of the Learned have given the Ancients the ​Preference in those Arts and Sciences which have hitherto been considered: But for the Precedency in those Parts of Learning which still remain to be enquired into, the Moderns have put in their Claim, with great Briskness. Among this Sort, I reckon Mathematical and Physical Sciences, considered in their largest Extent. These are Things which have no Dependence upon the Opinions of Men for their Truth; they will admit of fixed and undisputed Mediums of Comparison and Judgment: So that, though it may be always debated, who have been the best Orators, or who the best Poets; yet it cannot always be a Matter of Controversie, who have been the greatest Geometers, Arithmeticians, Astronomers, Musicians, Anatomists, Chymists, Botanists, or the like; because a fair Comparison between the Inventions, Observations, Experiments and Collections of the contending Parties must certainly put an End to the Dispute, and give a more full Satisfaction to all Sides.
The Thing contended for on both Sides is, the Knowledge of Nature; what the Appearances are which it exhibits, and how they are exhibited; thereby to show how they may be enlarged, and diversified, and Impediments of any sort remo​ved. In order to this, it will be necessary, (1.) To find out all the several Affections and Properties of Quantity, abstractedly considered; with the Proportions of its Parts and Kinds, either severally considered, or compared with, or compounded with one another; either as they may be in Motion, or at Rest. This is properly the Mathematician's Business. (2.) To collect great Numbers of Observations, and to make a vast Variety of Experiments upon all sorts of Natural Bodies. And because this cannot be done without proper Tools, (3.) To contrive such Instruments, by which the Constituent Parts of the Universe, and of all its Parts, even the most minute, or the most remote, may lie more open to our View; and their Motions, or other Affections, be better calculated and examined, than could otherwise have been done by our unassisted Senses. (4.) To range all the several Species of Natural Things under proper Heads; to assign fit Characteristicks, or Marks, whereby they may be readily found out, and distinguished from one another. (5.) To adapt all the Catholick Affections of Matter and Motion to all the known Appearances of Things, so as to be able to tell how Nature works; and, in some particular Cases, to com​mand her. This will take in Astronomy, Mechanicks, Opticks, Musick, with the other Physico-Mathematical and Physico-Mechanical Parts of Knowledge; as also, Anatomy, Chymistry, with the whole Extent of Natural History. It will help us to make a just Comparison between the Ancient and Modern Physicks; that so we may certainly determine who Philosophized best, Aristotle and Democritus, or Mr. Boyle and Mr. Newton.
In these Things therefore the Comparison is to be made, wherein one can go no higher than the Age of Hypocrates, Aristotle and Theophrastus, because the Writings of the Philosophers before them are all lost. It may therefore be plausibly objected, that this is no fair Way of Proceeding, because the Egyptians and Chaldæans were famous for very many Parts of real Learning long before; from whom Pythagoras, Thales, Plato, and all the other Græcian Philosophers, borrowed what they knew. This Sir William Temple insists at large upon; so that it will be necessary to examine the Claims of these Nations to Universal Learning: In doing of which, I shall follow Sir William Temple's Method; and first give a short Abstract of his Hypothesis, and then enquire how far it may be relied on.
​Sir William Temple tells us, That the chiefest Argument that is produced in behalf of the Moderns, is; (i) Pag. 5.'(i) That they have the Advantage of the Ancients Discoveries to help their own: So that, like Dwarfs upon Giants Shoulders, they must needs see farther than the Giants themselves." To weaken this, we are told, (k) Pag. 6-10.'(k) That those whom we call Ancients, are Moderns, if compared to those who are ancienter than they: And that there were vast Lakes of Learning in Egypt, Chaldea, India and China; where it stagnated for many Ages, till the Greeks brought Buckets, and drew it out."
The Question which is first to be asked here, is, Where are the Books and Monuments wherein these Treasures were deposited for so many Ages? And because they are not to be found, Sir William Temple makes a Doubt, (l) Pag. 8.(l) Whether Books advance any other Science, beyond the particular Records of Actions, or Registers of Time. He may resolve it soon, if he enquires how far a Man can go in Astronomical Calculations, for which the Chaldeans are said to be so famous, without the Use of Letters. The Peruan Antiquities, which he there alledges, for Twelve or Thirteen Generations, from ​Mango Capac, to Atahualpa, were not of above Five Hundred Years standing. The Mexican Accounts were not much older; and yet these, though very rude, needed Helps to be brought down to us. The Peruan Conveyances of Knowledge, according to Garçilasso de la Vega, were not purely Traditionary, but were Fringes of Cotton, of several Colours, tied and woven with a vast Variety of Knots, which had all determinate Meanings; and so supplied the Use of Letters, in a tolerable Degree: And the Mexican Antiquities were preserved, after a sort, by Pictures; of which we have a Specimen in Purchas's Pilgrim. So that when Sir William Temple urges the Traditions of these People, to prove that Knowledge may be conveyed to Posterity without Letters, he proves only what is not disputed, namely, That Knowledge can be imperfectly conveyed to Posterity without Letters; not that Tradition can preserve Learning as well as Books, or something equivalent.
But since Sir William Temple lays no great Weight upon this Evasion, I ought not to insist any longer upon it. (m) Pag. 6.He says (m) therefore, That it is a Question, whether the Invention of Printing has multiplied Books, or only the Copies of ​them; since, if we believe that there were 600000 Books in the Ptolemæan Library, we shall hardly pretend to equal it by any of ours, nor perhaps by all put together; that is, we shall be scarce able to produce so many Originals that have lived any Time, and thereby given Testimony of their having been thought worth preserving,' All this, as it is urged by Sir William Temple, is liable to great Exception. For, (1.) If we should allow that there is no Hyperbole in the Number of Books in the Ptolemæan Library, yet we are not to take our Estimate by our Way of Reckoning. Every Oration of Demosthenes and Isocrates, every Play of Æschylus or Aristophanes, every Discourse of Plato or Aristotle, was anciently called a Volume. This will lessen the Number to us, who take whole Collections of every Author's Works in one Lump; and call them accordingly in our Catalogues, if printed together, but by one Title. (2.) Sir William Temple seems to take it for granted, that all these Books were Originals; that is to say, Books worth preserving; which is more than any Man can now prove. I suppose he himself believes that there were Ancients of all Sorts and Sizes, as well as there are Moderns now. And ​he that raises a Library, takes in Books of all Values; since bad Books have their Uses to Learned Men, as well as good ones. So that, for any Thing we know to the contrary, there might have been in this Alexandrian Library a great Number of (n) Ibid.(n) Scribblers, that, like Mushrooms or Flies, are born and die in small Circles of Time. (3.) The World can make a better Judgment of the Value of what is lost, at least, as it relates to the present Enquiry, than one at first View might perhaps imagine. The lost Books of the Antiquity of several Nations, of their Civil History, of the Limits of their several Empires and Commonwealths, of their Laws and Manners, or of any Thing immediately relating to any of these, are not here to be considered, because it cannot be pretended that the Moderns could know any of these Things, but as they were taught. So neither is what may have related to Ethicks, Politicks, Poesie and Oratory here to be urged, since in those Matters, the Worth of Ancient Knowledge has already been asserted. So that one is only to enquire what and how great the Loss is of all those Books upon Natural or Mathematical Arguments, which were preserved in the Alexandrian, Asiatick and Roman Libraries, ​or mentioned in the Writings of the Ancient Philosophers and Historians. By which Deduction, the former Number will be yet again considerably lessened.
Now, a very true Judgment of Ancient Skill in Natural History may be formed out of Pliny, whose Extracts of Books, still extant, are so particular for the present Purpose, that there is Reason to believe they were not made carelesly of those that are lost. Galen seems to have read whatever he could meet with relating to Medicine, in all its Parts: And the Opinions of Abundance of Authors, whose Names are no where else preserved, may be discovered out of his Books; of the famous ones especially; whom at every Turn he either contradicts, or produces to fortifie his own Assertions. Ptolemee gives an Account of the old Astronomy in his Almagest. Very many Particulars of the Inventions and Methods of Ancient Geometers are to be found in the Mathematical Collections of Pappus. The Opinions of the different Sects of Philosophers are well enough preserved in the entire Treatises of the several Philosophers who were of their Sects; or in the Discourses of others, who occasionally or expresly confute what they say. So that I am apt to think, that the Philosophical and Mathe​matical Learning of the Ancients is better conveyed to us than the Civil; the Books which treated of those Subjects suiting better the Genius's of several Men, and of several Nations too: For which Reason the Arabs translated the most considerable Greek Books of this kind; as, Euclid, Apollonius, Aristotle, Epictetus, Cebes, and Abundance more, that had written of Philosophy or Mathematicks, into their own Language; whilst they let Books of Antiquity and Civil History lie unregarded.
Sir William Temple's next Enquiry is, From whence both the Ancients and Moderns have received their Knowledge? His Method does not seem to be very natural, nor his Question very proper, since, if Discoveries are once made, it is not so material to know who taught the several Inventors, as what these Inventors first taught others. But setting that aside, the Summ of what he says, in short, is this:
(o) Pag. 11, 12.'(o) The Moderns gather all their Learning out of Books in Universities; which are but dumb Guides, that can lead Men but one Way, without being able to set them right if they should wander from it. These Books, besides, are very few; the Remains of the Writings of here and there an Author, that ​wrote from the Time of Hippocrates, to M. Antoninus, in the Compass of Six or Seven Hundred Years: Whereas Thales and Pythagoras took another sort of a Method; Thales acquired his Knowledge in Egypt, Phœnicia, Delphos and Crete; (p) Pag. 13, 14, 15.(p) Pythagoras spent Twenty Two Years in Egypt, and Twelve Years more in Chaldea, and then returned, laden with all their Stores; and not contented with that, went into Ethiopia, Arabia, India and Crete; and visited Delphos, and all the renowned Oracles in the World.'
(q) Pag. 16, 17.'(q) Lest we should wonder why Pythagoras went so far, we are told, that the Indian Brachmans were so careful to educate those who were intended for Scholars, that as soon as the Mothers found themselves with Child, much Thought and Diligence was employed about their Diet and Entertainment, to furnish them with pleasant Imaginations, to compose their Mind and their Sleeps with the best Temper, during the Time that they carried their Burthen. It is certain that they must needs have been very learned, since they were obliged to spend Thirty Seven Years in getting Instruction: Their Knowledge was all Traditional; they thought the World was round, and made by a Spi​rit; they believed the Transmigration of Souls; and they esteemed Sickness such a Mark of Intemperance, that when they found themselves indisposed, they died out of Shame and Sullenness, though some lived an Hundred and Fifty or Two Hundred Years. (r) Pag. 22, 23.(r) These Indians had their Knowledge, in all probability, from China, a Country where Learning had been in Request from the Time of Fohius, their first King. It is to be presumed, that they communicated of their Store to other Nations, though they themselves have few Foot-steps of it remaining, besides the Writings of Confucius, which are chiefly Moral and Political; because one of their Kings, who desired that the Memory of every Thing should begin with himself, caused Books of all sorts, not relating to Physick and Agriculture, to be destroyed.'
(s) Pag. 21.'(s) From India, Learning was carried into Ethiopia and Arabia; thence, by the Way of the Red Sea, it came into Phœnicia; and the Egyptians learnt it of the Ethiopians.'
This is a short Account of the History of Learning, as Sir William Temple has deduced it from its most ancient Beginnings. The Exceptions which may be ​made against it are many, and yet more against the Conclusions which he draws from it: For, though it be certain that the Egyptians had the Grounds and Elements of most parts of real Learning among them earlier than the Greeks, yet that is no Argument why the Grecians should not go beyond their Teachers, or why the Moderns might not out-do them both.
Before I examine Sir William Temple's Scheme, Step by Step, I shall offer, as the Geometers do, some few Things as Postulata, which are so very plain, that they will be assented to as soon as they are proposed. (1.) That all Men who make a Mystery of Matters of Learning, and industriously oblige their Scholars to conceal their Dictates, give the World great Reason to suspect, that their Knowledge is all Juggling and Trick. (2.) That he that has only a Moral Persuasion of the Truth of any Proposition, which is capable of Natural Evidence, cannot so properly be esteemed the Inventor, or the Discoverer rather, of that Proposition, as another Man, who, tho' he lived many Ages after, brings such Evidences of its Certainty, as are sufficient to convince all competent Judges; especially when his Reasonings are founded ​upon Observations and Experiments drawn from, and made upon the Things themselves. (3.) That no Pretences to greater Measures of Knowledge, grounded upon Accounts of Long Successions of Learned Men in any Country, ought to gain Belief, when set against the Learning of other Nations, who make no such Pretences, unless Inventions and Discoveries answerable to those Advantages, be produced by their Advocates. (4.) That we cannot judge of Characters of Things and Persons at a great Distance, when given at Second-hand, unless we knew exactly how capable those Persons, from whom such Characters were first taken, were to pass a right Judgment upon such subjects; and also the particular Motives that biassed them to pass such Censures. If Archimedes should, upon his own Knowledge, speak with Admiration of the Egyptian Geometry, his Judgment would be very considerable: But if he should speak respectfully of it, only because Pythagoras did so before him, it might, perhaps, signifie but very little. (5.) That excessive Commendations of any Art or Science whatsoever, as also of the Learning of any particular Men or Nations, only prove that the Persons who give such Characters never heard of any ​Thing or Person that was more excellent in that Way; and therefore that Admiration may be as well supposed to proceed from their own Ignorance, as from the real Excellency of the Persons or Things; unless their respective Abilities are otherwise known.
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