# The Boxer Rebellion/Part I

PART I
CAUSES OF THE BOXER REBELLION
PART I
Causes of the Rebellion
Meaning of the Boxer Rebellion - China and the World in Past History - The Manchu Conquest - China and Europe in the XVIth and XVIIth Centuries - Results of the Opium War - Real Significance of the China-Japanese War - Territorial Aggressions of the Powers - Restraining Influence of the Hay Circular Note of September, 1899 - Character of the Emperor Kuang Hsu - Dismissal of Weng Tung-ho - Kang Yu-wei as advisor - First Reform Decree of June 11, 1898 - Further Decrees - Decree of September 5 - The Coup d' Etat - Tzu Hsi's Resumption of the Regency - Reasons for Failure of Reform - Indifference of Powers to "Palace Revolution" - Persecution of Reformers - Policy of Empress Dowager - Reception to Wives of Diplomats - Health of Emperor - Resumption of Regency by Tzu Hsi a Vital Cause of the Rebellion - Other Immediate Causes - The Missionary Question - The Outbreak in Shantung - Other Outbreaks - Europe's Failure to Appreciate the Situation.
The Boxer Rebellion may be regarded as the culmination of misunderstandings between China and the Powers in every phase of international activity. It was the last, the supreme, the most desperate effort of all to keep the middle Kingdom riveted to the standards of antiquity, and its failure, complete in every respect, even from the viewpoint of the Chinese themselves, made possible and inevitable the China of to-day.
A detailed examination of the causes, immediate and remote, of this final protest against western civilization would demand an exhaustive review of Chinese institutions, character and customs entirely beyond the scope of this volume, an examination leading back at least to the days of Confucius. A brief outline, however, may be given in passing, showing how contributory events, one piled upon the other, at last brought about this racial cataclysm, with consequences so momentous and far-reaching that they could not be understood at the time, much less fully appreciated. In effect, the Boxer Rebellion, through the very completeness and humiliation of its failure made possible the future position of China as a real member of the sisterhood of nations; this, however, at a heart-breaking cost, involving a shock to the national consciousness such as stands without parallel in history.
The Chinese had not always been isolated from the rest of mankind. Before the Manchu conquest in the XVIIth century there had been quite an extensive though spasmodic commercial intercourse with the west and a slight acquaintance with western culture. The products of China had been interchanged with those of the Roman Empire; Chinese engineers had been employed on the construction of public works in Persia; Buddhism had been introduced from India; a Chinese army had penetrated as far west as the Caspian region; Marco Polo and his two uncles had found a flattering welcome; the Jesuits had flourished at Peking; the Nestorian Tablet had been erected, a mute reminder to-day of what the current of history might have been; and the first embassies from Europe had been graciously received, provided they kowtowed. By such means a healthy curiosity toward the outside world had been occasionally stimulated. But, on the other hand, the Chinese had already developed to a great extent that exclusiveness characteristic of them up to the close of the last century. Nor is this to be wondered at, for such was the inevitable resultant of their past history, national ideals and environment.
Surrounded by tribes in a savage or semi-civilized state, which were greatly inferior from every point of view, it is not surprising that the Chinese should have looked upon these as barbarians, fitly to be designated by the radical for dog. Furthermore, a vast expanse of desert and mountain and sea made intercourse with the advanced parts of the world extremely hazardous and uncertain, all the more so when the favorite land routes were cut off by the fall of Constantinople and the ascendancy of the Suljuk Turks in western Asia. Moreover, the occasional exchanges of goods and ideas with European nations had been too small in volume appreciably to affect the Chinese race or to influence its development. Yet these little beginnings, if carefully fostered, might have led to greater things, and such undoubtedly would have been the case had it not been for the rigid policy of seclusion adopted by the alien Manchu monarchs, the greatest misfortune, considering the age of world expansion, which China could have suffered. Although in this the Manchus only copied the preceding Ming dynasty, yet the XVIIth century was not the century for the continuance of such a state policy, and therein lay the evil, to be accentuated all the more in the years to come.
The Manchurian conquerors of one of the most favored regions of the globe were not slow in realizing that, being relatively few in numbers, it was to their interest, as overlords of an intelligent and law-abiding though passive race constituting one-fourth of the human family, to close all avenues of approach from outside, to interdict all efforts at change, to seal the country so that a repetition of their own exploit, or disaffection with their own rule resulting from outside influences, would be impossible. In other words, it was the policy of the Manchu monarchs to keep the ideas of the country as they found them, in statu quo, and to prevent any expansion of these ideas either from without or from within. Thus the innate conservatism of the Chinese was immeasurably increased, thus antiquity was lauded as the only period of Chinese history worth while, thus the sages were exalted as the teachers of wisdom such as had never been heard since and never would be heard again by mortal man. Thus a careful watch was kept on all the frontiers; intercourse with Europe was practically prohibited, and humiliating concessions were demanded of the few embassies and traders who braved the discouraging conditions of entry. Thus by degrees the inherent prejudices of the Chinese were encouraged, generation after generation, through a monotonous repetition of this deadening policy, all the more successful as it emanated from the "Son of Heaven," until was reached that stage of overweening national conceit and that dense, impenetrable ignorance of the outside world, unmoved by reason or fact or experience, which may be described as the antithesis of western progress and enlightenment.
* ↑ Holcomb, China's Past and Future (London, -), p. 108.
* ↑ For like Dutch experiences in Japan and at the Deshima "Factory." see Foster, American Diplomacy in the Orient (Boston, 1903), pp. 12-16.
* ↑ For original sources on the early embassies preceding the Opium war, see Johan Nieuhof, L'Ambassade de la Compagnie Orientale des Provinces unis vers l'Empereur de la Chine . . . fait par P. de Goyer et Jac de Keyser, trans. into French by J. de Carpentier (London, 1665), and an English trans. by John Ogilby (2d ed., London, 1673); Adam Brand, Journal of the Embassy from Muscovy into China, 1693-'95. trans from High-Dutch by W. H. Ludolf (London, 1698); E. Y. Ides, From Moscow Overland to China (London, 1798); Sir. G. L. Staunton, Authentic Account of the Embassy to the Emperor of China, undertaken by Order of the King of Great Britain . . . taken principally from the Papers of Earl Macartney (London, 1797); Henry Ellis, Journal of the Late Embassy to China (Amherst Mission), 2 vol. (London, 1818); George Timkowski, Travels of the Russian Mission through Mongolia to China and Residence in Peking in the Years 1820, 1821, trans. into English by H. E. Lloyd, 2 vol. (London, 1827); Edmund Roberts, Embassy to the Eastern Courts of Cochin-China, Siam and Muscat, in the U.S. Sloop-of-War Peacock, 1832-'34 (New York, 1837). See also Mrs. Helen Henrietta Robbins, Our First Ambassador to China, an Account of the Life of George, Earl of Macartney, with Extracts from his Letters, and the Narrative of his Experiences, as told by himself (London, 1908). Other accounts of early embassies and dealings with China are found in Sir John Davis, The Chinese (New York, 1857); A. Delano, Narrative of Voyages (Boston, 1857); Sir Robert K. Douglas, Europe and the Far East; John W. Foster, American Diplomacy in the Orient; Charles Gutzlaff, History of China, 2 vol. (New York, 1834); Walter A. P. Martin, Cycle of Cathay (New York, 1906); S. Wells Williams, The Middle Kingdom, 2 vol., rev. ed. (New York, 1907).
Whatever may be said of the morality of England's act in waging this particular war, the fact remains that by such means, after diplomacy had completely failed, China was at last forced into definite trade relations with the world, and that, through the sacrifice of British blood and treasure, other nations were enabled equally to participate in the advantages thus wrung from China. The Chinese, totally
defeated, and unable further to stem the advance of international relations and commerce, concluded peace with Great Britain under heavy penalties, and later extended like privileges of trade to the United States and France.
* ↑ By the treaty of Nanking, August 19, 1842, concluding the Opium war, China agreed to open five ports to foreign trade, these five original "treaty ports" being Canton, Amoy, Foochow, Ningpo and Shanghai. In addition the island of Hong Kong was ceded in perpetuity and a war indemnity of $21,000,000 paid by China, which included within that sum the damages for British opium destroyed at Canton in 1839 by the famous Commissioner Lin. A regular tariff was established, and it was agreed that henceforth all diplomatic intercourse between the two nations was to be conducted on a basis of absolute equality.
* ↑ The United States was fortunate in securing probably the most expert man in America for these negotiations, Caleb Cushing, a successful lawyer, later Attorney-General (his opinions while occupying that office still being quoted as authority, especially as regards consuls), a skilled diplomat and a brilliant personality readily adaptable to the intricacies of dealing with the Orient mind. As a result of his talents, the American treaty contained sixteen more provisions than the British treaty of two years previous, and also a far clearer embodiment of the principle of extra-territoriality. It seems quite the fashion with some writers, when comparing Cushing's treaty of Wang-hia with the treaty of Nanking, to disparage teh latter and unduly praise the former. In this regard it must be remembered that England was dealing with a defeated enemy granting concessions only at the sword's point; moreover, had it not been for England's successful conduct of the war, Cushing's mission in all probability would have been a total failure. For President Tyler's comprehensive report on affairs with the Far East at this time, which report was written by Webster in his capacity as Secretary of State, see Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 10 vol. (Washington, 1896), vol. 4, pp. 213, 214. For the act of Congress of March 3, 1842, appropriating $40,000 for the purpose of establishing commercial relations between China and the United States on a treaty basis, see 5 U.S. Stat., 624; John Bassett Moore, A Digest of International Law, 8 vol. (Washington, 1906), vol. 5. p. 416. The full text of Webster's instruction to Cushing is found in Webster's Works, vol. 6, p. 467, and in part in Moore's Digest, vol. 5, pp. 416, 417. Tyler's unique letter to the Emperor of China is given in Foster, op. cit., p. 82, and in United States 28th Congress, 2d Session, Senate Documents, no. 139. Another version, slightly differing in detail, is found in Williams' Middle Kingdom, vol. 2, pp. 565, 566. Says Williams concerning this letter, op. cit., p. 565: "Caleb Cushing... brought a letter... which is inserted in full as an instance of the singular mixture of patronizing and deprecatory address then deemed suitable for the Grand Khan by western nations."
The Opium war begins a new epoch in the relations of China with the Powers, a period which may roughly be estimated as extending from 1840 to 1895, marked on one side by the unreasoning hostility of China to everything foreign and on the other side by constant aggressions of Europe, these aggressions, however, still tempered by a belief in and respect for China's latent military power and the prestige naturally accorded to so vast an empire.
But it was not to be expected that, through the defeats of a single war, China would or even could have reversed the policy and habits of centuries. In fact, there was little to show at the time that the war of 1840 had resulted in any material or moral benefit. The opening of the treaty ports was delayed, on the ground that they were "unsafe" for foreigners, and the same offensive tactics and thousand petty exactions were religiously adhered to by China as before the first international conflict. Only in the payment of the indemnity to England did China act with any degree of celerity, and then for the sole purpose of ridding certain Chinese territories of British troops, who were quartered upon the land until such payment was forthcoming. Government and people were united in the common cause of opposition to all demands of the foreign Powers. The Peking Court, following the customary practice of Oriental nations, pursued a policy of masterly inactivity coupled with a contemptuous disregard for treaty stipulations, although it be be admitted that China was as yet unacquainted with international law and the binding qualities of formal agreements. Especially was China unacquainted with agreements imposed through the agency of force. The great Taiping Rebellion, inspired by the disappointed scholar Hung Sui-tsuen, who had failed in his attempts at advance standing among the litarati, furnished another element of uncertainty and disorder. Trade was paralyzed, merchants complained; all was confusion. It was plain that further corrective punishment was necessary, and this finally came in 1857, indirectly through the accumulation of grievances and abuses ever since 1842, directly on account of the indignity to the supposedly British lorcha "Arrow".
France and Great Britain joined forces in the sharp and decisive struggle which followed. It was soon over, but again China misjudged the trend of international events. A supplementary punitive expedition in 1860, as the last argument of the exasperated Allies, struck at the very heart of the Chinese Government, burned the Summer Palace, drove the Court into hasty flight, and by these drastic measures gained that final step in diplomacy for which Europe had been laboring for centuries, namely, representation at Peking and recognition of equality.
A period of comparative international tranquility followed, one phase of which was the unique Burlingame mission in 1868 to the United States and Europe. It seemed that China at last understood the impossibility of keeping foreigners out of the Middle Kingdom, and that the attempt to refuse all diplomatic and commercial intercouse with the rest of the world could be henceforth hardly more than a Utopian dream, a condition of th epast enver again to be realized. Therefore to all outward appearances China made the best of the unwelcome situation and, barring a desultory war with France over Tongking in 1885, remained on fairly good terms with the rest of mankind until 1894-1895.
* ↑ The Taiping Rebellion is interesting from an international point of view as several times Europe was on the verge of recognizing the rebels. But sympathy for the movement soon changed to disgust at the lawless character and impossible claims of the revolutionary government, which finally collapsed through the victories of the Imperial troops led by Generals Ward and Gordon.
* ↑ For a sympathetic treatment of Burlingame and his career, see F.W. Williams, Anson Burlingame and the First Chinese Mission to Foreign Powers (New York, 1912).
Nevertheless, the outbreak at the close of the last century revealed conclusively that ever since 1842, though outwardly acquiescent, China never forgave nor forgot, and that when the supreme moment should come, as it was judged to have come in 1900, in it would be expressed to the fullest measure the "concentrated wrath and hate of sixty years". Defeated with monotonous regularity by Europe, forced at the cannon's mouth to conform to a mass of new and bewildering and in their eyes onerous treaty stipulations, none of which they desired, at no time had the Chinese met the Powers in a mutuality of interests. The Burlingame peace mission was an episode in itself, inspired by the idealism of one man, and may be regarded as entirely detached from the general current of Chinese politics. Though gifted with a vision of the future, Burlingame was fifty years ahead of his time, and his ideas regarding China's relations with the rest of the world were impossible of realization in his day as each country had to learn by bitter experience the lessons which culminated in the establishment of the Far Eastern Republic
A further fact to be noted is, that by successfully weathering the great Taiping Rebellion, the Manchu monarchy gained a new lease on life, and, gradually increasing in power, by 1895 seemed strong enough to last indefinitely.
Consistent in its opposition to the foreigner and foreign relations, with the exception of the first two emperors of the dynasty, this recovery of power in the monarchy meant that the policy of closing the country would become stronger than ever, coupled as it was with the instincts of self-preservation; and that, once sure of its ground, the Peking Court would not hesitate to throw down the gauntlet to united Europe if necessary. it was the war with Japan that brought matters to a climax, revealed China's rottenness to the world, struck a blow at royalty comparable only to the disasters of 1860, and hastened the inevitable conflict with the Powers, a struggle which, considering all events, was bound to come sooner or later, and the surprise was that it so soon followed the humiliation of 1895.
Contrary to the general impression, the Chino-Japanese war cannot be called a national conflict in so far as China was concerned. Strictly speaking, it was regarded as an affair of the Manchu régime; its disasters were their disasters, its mistakes their mistakes. Also, the war was principally fought in a region foreign to the "Eighteen Provinces", the invading Japanese for the most part entering, not China proper, but the dependency of Manchuria, the ancestral home of the reigning dynasty, and which the latter alone in duty were bound to defend. Therefore the Chinese considered themselves removed from all responsibility, and persisted in viewing the conflict as an incident of the Manchu foreign policy of no intimate concern to any but the Manchus. A like analogy to this somewhat curious reasoning was revealed a decade later when the Russian bureaucracy, not the Russian people, was supposed to have engaged Japan in this identical region. Of course, had both wars been successful instead of dismal failures, the train of reasoning in both instances would have been precisely the opposite in the case of all those affected. Thus the apparent lack of patriotism in both countries is afforded an easy and convenient explanation, as an unfortunate situation in which the governments were involved, but not the people. Granting the above weak argument, why should the Chinese have cared much about the unexpected turn of events? As a matter of fact, the mass of them did not care; they remained indifferent, aloof, almost neutral, one might say. It was not the war itself which in the main contributed to the cyclonic frenzy of a few years later. It was the consequences of that war, the revelation of the weakness of China to the world, the fastening of the stupendous indemnity, by which Japan realized a hundred per cent profit, upon the people at large, who thus had to pay a heavy price for Manchu folly; and, above all, the territorial loot of the Empire by Europe following the intervention at Chefoo. These staggering results in turn were among the causes of the catastrophe of 1900.
In order fully to understand the position of the European Powers in regard to the Far East at the time of the Boxer Rebellion, it will be necessary to sketch their territorial aggressions in China during the years immediately preceding the conflict. Of all immediate causes of this last upheaval of China against the Occident, these aggressions were the most important factor. Had they never occurred, it is doubtful whether there would have been a rebellion. To Europe's land-greed this sorry page of history is primarily due; and more than that, furnished the example and excuse for a series of recent events so effectively limiting China's sovereignty and integrity that even to-day the ultimate consequences cannot be foreseen.
After the intervention of Russia, France and Germany at Chefoo in 1895 on China's behalf, for which China well knew there would be a heavy reckoning in the near future, Russia was the first to show her hand. This, however, was done in a friendly manner and with perfect diplomacy, through the floating of a 4 percent loan of 400,000,000 francs at 94 1/8 payable in thirty-six years, without security, the Czar himself guaranteeing the interest by royal ukase.This unexampled generosity enabled China to liquidate half the war indemnity to Japan. The next step of Russia was to "facilitate the execution of the loan", which was the ostensible purpose of founding the Russo-Chinese Bank with its thirty branches throughout Siberia and the Far East. The bank proved of immense service to Russia as it was a desirable and necessary screen for demands on China, which demands, though seemingly obtained for this corporation, supposedly a private one, were in reality granted to the Imperial Russian Government through this convenient agency. The climax of early Russian concessions was revealed by the unauthorized publication of an agreement known as the Cassini Convention, the first part of which dealt primarily with railway and mining grants and the second with unusual privileges accorded Russia in Manchuria. Most significant of all was the provision that, as Russia " has never possessed a seaport in Asia which is free from ice and open the year around", China was " willing " to lease the port of Kiaochau (Tsingtao) for fifteen years (Art. I). Russia was also to help fortify Port Arthur and Talienwan (Dalny, now called Dairen by the Japanese), (28)
* ↑ For the negotiations of M. Witte, Russian Minister of Finance, with Hottinguer and Co. and other French bankers, see Henri Cordier, Histoire des Relations de la Chine avec les Puissances Occidentales, 3 vol. (Paris, 1902), vol. 3, pp. 304-308. See W. W. Rockhill, Treaties and Conventions with or concerning China and Korea, 1894-1904 (Washington, 1904), pp. 207-211, for "Charter of the Russo-Chinese Bank," Dec. 10, 1895, Engl. version.
* ↑ See Kanichi Asakawa, The Russo-Japanese Conflict (New York, 1904), p. 85, from "Statutes of the Bank," published Dec. 8, 1896, in a Japanese source, the Tokushu Joyaku, pp. 642-660.