OpenLLM-France/wikimedia huggingface dataset:
# Federal Base Ball Club of Baltimore v. National League of Professional Base Ball Clubs

* related portals: Supreme Court of the United States.
* sister projects: Wikidata item.
Federal Baseball Club v. National League, 259 U.S. 200 (1922), is a case in which the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the Sherman Antitrust Act did not apply to Major League Baseball. Warning: template has been deprecated.
United States Supreme Court
259 U.S. 200
Federal Base Ball Club of Baltimore v. National League of Professional Base Ball Clubs
Argued: April 19, 1922. --- Decided: May 29, 1922
Messrs. Charles A. Douglas, of Washington, D. C., Wm. L. Marbury, of Baltimore, Md., and William L. Rawls, Hugh H. Obear, Jo. V. Morgan, and Charles S. Douglas, all of Washington, D. C., and L. Edwin Goldman, of Baltimore, Md., for plaintiff in error.
[Argument of Counsel from pages 201–205 intentionally omitted]
Messrs. George Wharton Pepper, of Philadelphia, Pa., and Benjamin S. Minor, of Washington, D. C., for defendants in error.
Mr. Justice HOLMES delivered the opinion of the Court.

## Notes

This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
Public domainPublic domainfalsefalse
# Federal Communications Commission v. American Broadcasting Company

* related portals: Supreme Court of the United States.
* sister projects: Wikidata item.
United States Supreme Court
347 U.S. 284
Federal Communications Commission v. American Broadcasting Company
Argued: Feb. 1, 1954. --- Decided: April 5, 1954
The Federal Communications Commission, concurrently with the Department of Justice, has power to enforce the statute prohibiting the broadcasting of any lottery or similar scheme offering prizes dependent upon lot or chance, but its power in such respect is limited by the scope of the statute. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1304.
Mr. J. Roger Wollenberg, Washington, D.C., for appellant.
Mr. Alfred McCormack, New York City, for appellee in No. 117.
Mr. Paul W. Williams, New York City, for appellee in No. 118.
Mr. Max Freund, New York City, for appellee in No. 119.
Mr. Chief Justice WARREN delivered the opinion of the Court.

## Notes

This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
Public domainPublic domainfalsefalse
# Garnett v. Jenkins

* related portals: Supreme Court of the United States.
* sister projects: Wikidata item.
United States Supreme Court
33 U.S. 75
Garnett v. Jenkins
APPEAL from the circuit court of the United States for the district of Kentucky.
This case was commenced in the circuit court by a bill in chancery, filed by Reuben Garnett, a citizen of Virginia, on the 30th of December 1815, against Henry Jenkins and others, citizens of the state of Kentucky, in the seventh circuit court of the United States for the district of Kentucky, for the purpose of asserting his claim to one thousand one hundred and sixty-four and two-thirds acres of land. Since which time the complainant died, and the suit has been revived in the name of his representatives.
The only question put in issue by the bill and answers, is the validity of the following entry under which the complainants claim: 'May 10, 1708, Reuben Garnett enters one thousand one hundred and sixty-four and two-thirds acres upon a treasury warrant on the seventh big fork, about thirty miles below Bryant's station, that comes in on the north side of North Elkhorn, near the mouth of said creek, and running up both sides thereof for quantity.'
A copy.
RICHARD HIGGINS, F. C.
The defendants have exhibited no title papers, and by consent of the parties, the validity of this entry was the only question submitted to the court below, as will appear by the following agreement. 'Reuben Garnett's heirs v. Christopher Greenup's heirs and others, in chancery. The counsel for the complainants in this cause, and the counsel in the defence, believing that the case, so far as it depends on the validity or invalidity of the entry of the complainants, to wit, the entry in the name of Reuben Garnett deceased, is as fully prepared as it can be at this day. For the purpose of saving costs, the parties agree to try the cause as relates to the validity or invalidity of the entry, and that the complainants, in case the entry is sustained by the court, shall be permitted to make such further preparations by survey, revival against the heirs or representatives of deceased parties if necessary, &c., as may be necessary to carry into effect the opinion of the court. Therefore, for the present, it is conceded that the patent boundary of Garnett covers the claim of each of defendants in part.'
The court below dismissed the complainant's bill, to reverse which decree this appeal is prosecuted.
The case was submitted to the court on an argument by Mr Allan, for the appellants.
Mr Justice M'LEAN delivered the opinion of the Court.

## Notes

This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
Public domainPublic domainfalsefalse
# Garnett v. United States

* related portals: Supreme Court of the United States.
* sister projects: Wikidata item.
United States Supreme Court
78 U.S. 256
Garnett v. United States
ERROR to the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia; the case being this:
By an act passed in 1801, there was organized for the District the 'Circuit Court of the District of Columbia, vested with all the powers of the Circuit Courts of the United States.' It had 'cognizance of all crimes and offences committed within said District, and of all cases in law and equity,' & c.
By act of 1802, it was provided that the chief judge of the District of Columbia should hold a District Court in and for the said District, 'which court shall have and exercise within said District the same powers and jurisdiction which are by law vested in the District Courts of the United States.'
On the 3d March, 1863, by act of that date the courts of the District were reorganized.
The first section of that organic act established a court, to be called the Supreme Court of the District of District of Columbia, which shall have general jurisdiction in law and equity, and consist of four justices, one of which shall be chief justice.
The third section provided that the Supreme Court should possess the same powers and exercise the same jurisdiction as was then possessed and exercised by the Circuit Court of the District of Columbia.
The justices of the court (the act proceeds) shall severally possess and exercise the jurisdiction now possessed and exercised by the judges of the said Circuit Court. Any one of them may hold the District Court of the United States for the District of Columbia, in the manner, and with the same powers and jurisdiction possessed and exercised by other District Courts of the United States.
With this organization of the courts of the District of Columbia, the present suit was begun in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia sitting for the District Court of the same, for the forfeiture of certain real property of one Garnett, under the act of Congress of July 17th, 1862, entitled 'An act to suppress insurrection, to punish treason and rebellion, to seize and confiscate the property of rebels, and for other purposes.'
The District Court decreed a condemnation of the property, and it was sold. Garnett sued out a writ of error from the Supreme Court of the District. This writ having been returned, the District Attorney moved to dismiss it, on the ground, among others, that a writ of error from that court would not lie to the District Court; and the Supreme Court dismissed the writ on that ground. An exception was duly taken to this ruling; and from the judgment of dismissal the case was brought here on writ of error.
Messrs. B. R. Curtis, Cushing, and Brent, for the plaintiff in error; Mr. Bristow, Solicitor-General, contra, for the United States.
Mr. Justice SWAYNE delivered the opinion of the court.

## Notes

* ↑ 2 Stat. at Large, 105.
* ↑ 2 Ib. 166.
* ↑ 12 Ib. 762.
This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
Public domainPublic domainfalsefalse
# Garner v. Yeager/Opinion of the Court

* Court Documents
* Case Syllabus
* Per Curiam Opinion of the Court
United States Supreme Court
389 U.S. 86
Garner v. Yeager
Certiorari was granted in this case on October 9, 1967. The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit is vacated and the case is remanded to the District Court of New Jersey for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Petitioner sought federal habeas corpus on the ground, among others, that prior to his state trial, the assistant prosecutor who handled the prosecution concealed the existence of a promise or agreement to recommend a specific sentence or leniency for an accomplice who testified as a State's witness against petitioner. The District Court rejected the claim without a hearing and upon its examination of the trial record, the record upon a motion for new trial, and the decision of the Supreme Court of New Jersey, State v. Sullivan, 43 N.J. 209, 203 A.2d 177. However, subsequent to the entry of the judgment of the Court of Appeals on April 7, 1967, the Supreme Court of New Jersey, on July 5, 1967, in a state post-conviction proceeding brought by petitioner's co-defendant Taylor under N.J.Rev.R. 3:10A, granted Taylor a new trial after a trial court hearing on similar allegations. State v. Taylor, 49 N.J. 440, 231 A.2d 212. In that circumstance the judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated and the case is remanded to the District Court for reconsideration of petitioner's claim in light of the action of the Supreme Court of New Jersey in State v. Taylor. The District Court's reconsideration may include whether petitioner should be required first to exhaust any remedy which may be available in the state courts. It is so ordered.

## Notes

This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
Public domainPublic domainfalsefalse
# Garnharts v. United States

* related portals: Supreme Court of the United States.
* sister projects: Wikidata item.
United States Supreme Court
83 U.S. 162
Garnharts v. United States
ERROR to the District Court for the Middle District of Alabama; in which court, on an information against certain distilled spirits seized on land, and answer and claim, the court, on motion of the district attorney of the United States, ordered the claim and answer to be stricken from the files; and refusing to let the claimants either amend the old answer or file a new one, entered a decree condemning the property seized.
To this action of the court the claimants excepted, and brought the question of its propriety here.
Messrs. J. W. Noble and N. P. Chipman, for the claimant, plaintiffs in error; Mr. G. H. Williams, Attorney-General, and Mr. C. H. Hill, Assistant Attorney-General, contra.
Mr. Justice CLIFFORD stated the case more fully, and delivered the opinion of the court.

## Notes

This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
Public domainPublic domainfalsefalse
# Garner v. Teamsters, Chauffeurs and Helpers Local Union No. 776

* related portals: Supreme Court of the United States.
* sister projects: Wikipedia article, Wikidata item.
United States Supreme Court
346 U.S. 485
Garner v. Teamsters, Chauffeurs and Helpers Local Union No. 776
Argued: Oct. 20, 21, 1953. --- Decided: Dec 14, 1953
Mr. James H. Booser, Harrisburg, Pa., for petitioners.
Mr. Sidney G. Handler, Harrisburg, Pa., for respondents.
Mr. Justice JACKSON delivered the opinion of the Court.

## Notes

This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
Public domainPublic domainfalsefalse
# Garner v. Yeager

* related portals: Supreme Court of the United States.
* sister projects: Wikidata item.
United States Supreme Court
389 U.S. 86
Garner v. Yeager
Judgment vacated and case remanded for reconsideration.
PER CURIAM.

## Notes

This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
Public domainPublic domainfalsefalse
# Garnett v. United States/Opinion of the Court

* Court Documents
* Case Syllabus
* Opinion of the Court
United States Supreme Court
78 U.S. 256
Garnett v. United States
This is a writ of error to the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia.
The original proceeding was instituted in the District Court of the United States for same territory. Its object was to procure the condemnation and sale of the property of the plaintiff in error, described in the libel of the United States, pursuant to the provisions of the act of Congress of July 17th, 1862, entitled 'An act to suppress insurrection, to punish treason and rebellion, to seize and confiscate the property of rebels, and for other purposes.' The libel alleged that the property belonged to Garnett, and that he was within three of the categories defined in the 5th section, which rendered it liable to be proceeded against in the manner prescribed. His offences were specifically set forth. The property was condemned and sold. Garnett sued out a writ of error from the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia. The attorney of the United States filed a motion to dismiss the writ. The court dismissed it upon the ground that a writ of error would not lie from that court to the District Court. Garnett excepted. His bill of exceptions is found in the record.
This is the only point in the case which we have found it necessary to consider. In coming to this conclusion the learned court fell into an error.
The case was decided prior to the decision of this court in Ex parte Bradley. It was not seriously controverted by the counsel for the defendants in error, in the argument at the bar, that this authority is conclusive upon the subject. The proposition is too clear to require discussion. Error, and not appeal, was the proper revisory remedy. The other objections taken to the writ are also without validity. The order dismissing it must therefore be reversed. This will restore the case to the place it occupied before the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, when the order dismissing it was made. As that court did not pass upon the alleged errors of the District Court, we cannot consider them. Our province is to exercise appellate jurisdiction touching the proceedings of the Supreme Court of the District. We can examine those of the District Court only after they have been the subject of review by the Supreme Court, and then only in connection with the action of that court in affirming or reversing them. We cannot regard them until they have received the impress of the judgment of the higher local court.
The order dismissing the writ of error is REVERSED, and the cause will be remanded to the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, with directions to proceed in the cause
IN CONFORMITY TO LAW.

## Notes

* ↑ 7 Wallace, 364.
* ↑ Armstrong's Foundry, 6 Id. 766.
This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
Public domainPublic domainfalsefalse
# Felicia Hemans in The Monthly Magazine Volume 2 1826/The Illuminated City

The Monthly Magazine, Volume 2, Page 515
THE ILLUMINATED CITY.
The hills all glowed with a festive light,
For the royal city rejoiced by night:
There were lamps hung forth upon tower and tree—
Banners were lifted and streaming free;
Every tall pillar was wreathed with fire—
Like a shooting meteor was every spire;
And the outline of many a dome on high
Was traced, as in stars, on the clear dark sky.
I passed through the streets; there were throngs on throngs— Like sounds of the deep were their mingled songs;
There was music forth from each palace borne—
A peal of the cymbal, the harp, and horn;
The forests heard it, the mountains rang,
The hamlets woke to its haughty clang;
Rich and victorious was every tone,
Telling the land of her foes o'erthrown.
Didst thou meet not a mourner for all the slain?
Thousands lie dead on their battle-plain!
Gallant and true were the hearts that fell—
Grief in the homes they have left must dwell;
Grief o'er the features of childhood spread,
And bowing the beauty of woman's head:
Didst thou hear, 'midst the songs, not one tender moan,
For the many brave to their slumber gone?
I saw not the face of a weeper there—
Too strong, perchance, was the bright lamp's glare!
I heard not a wail 'midst the joyous crowd—
The music of victory was all too loud!
Mighty it rolled on the winds afar,
Shaking the streets like a conqueror's car;
Through torches and streams its floods swept by—
How could I listen for moan or sigh?
Turn then away from life's pageants! turn,
If its deep story thy heart would learn:
Ever too bright is that outward shew,
Dazzling the eyes till they see not woe!
But lift the proud mantle which hides from thy view
The things thou shouldst gaze on, the sad and true;
Nor fear to survey what its folds conceal:
So must thy spirit be taught to feel!
F. H.
# Gesenius' Hebrew Grammar/154. Sentences connected by Wāw

Layout 2
a Wāw copulativum (וְ) serves to connect two or more sentences, or single words (on its various vocalization, cf. § 104 d–g). Its use, however, is by no means restricted merely to joining sentences which ​are actually co-ordinate. Frequently the language employs merely the simple connexion by Wāw, even to introduce an antithesis (Gn 17, 19, Lv 2, Jb 6, and very frequently in circumstantial noun-clauses), or when one of the two clauses is not co-ordinated, but subordinated to the other. On the use of וְ to introduce circumstantial clauses, cf. especially § 141 e and § 142 d; introducing causal clauses, § 158 a; comparative clauses, § 161 a; final clauses, § 165 a; consecutive clauses, § 166 a. On wāw apodosis, cf. § 143 d, and the sections there cited; on the use of Wāw in numerical sayings, cf. § 134 s.
b Rem. Sometimes wāw copulativum joins a sentence apparently to what immediately precedes, but in reality to a sentence which is suppressed and which must, therefore, be supplied from the context. So especially וְ with imperatives to express inferences, e.g. 1 K 2 וְשַֽׁאֲלִי ask now rather; Ez 18 for I have no pleasure in the death of him that dieth..., וָהָשִׁיבוּ wherefore turn yourselves. Also at the beginning of a speech in loose connexion with an act or speech of another person, e.g. Ex 2, 2 S 18, 24, 2 K 4, 41, 7:13, 2 Ch 25; cf. also Jos 7 (וְלוּ), ψ 2, 4, Is 8. Sometimes the suppression of the protasis is due to passionate excitement or haste, which does not allow time for full expression; this is especially illustrated by Nu 12, 20 (וְלוּ), 1 S 10, 15, 22, 28, 2 S 18, 24, 1 K 2 (וָלָ֫מָּה), 2 K 1, 7 (cf. verse 2); Is 3, Zc 2, ψ 2 (at the same time a circumstantial clause whereas I=and yet I have, &c.); cf. also a new clause beginning with the formula of wishing וּמִי Nu 11, Ju 9; on the disconnected use of וָלֹא and וָיֵשׁ cf. § 159 dd.
# Gesenius' Hebrew Grammar/158. Causal Clauses

Layout 2
a A complete clause, assigning the reason for statements, demands, threats, &c., sometimes follows with the simple wāw copulative, e.g. ψ 60 give us help against the adversary, and (for) vain is the help of man; Gn 6 (וַֽאֲנִי), 22:12, Ex 23, Jb 22, perhaps also ψ 7; or even without Wāw, e.g. Gn 17. As a rule, however, special conjunctions in various combinations are used to introduce causal clauses.
b The most common causal conjunctions are יַ֫עַן כִּי Is 3, &c., and יַ֫עַן אֲשֶׁר because, prop. on account of the fact that; both, however, may also be shortened to the simple יַ֫עַן Nu 20, &c., or to כִּי because, Gn 3, 17, &c., or to אֲשֶׁר Gn 30, 31, 34, 27, 1 S 15, 20, 26, 23, 1 K 3, 8, Ho 14, Zc 1; also בַּֽאֲשֶׁר Gn 39, 23. On the other hand, the simple יָ֫עַן is sometimes repeated for emphasis, יָ֫עַן וּבְיַ֫עַן (something like the German sintemal und alldieweil) Lv 26, Ez 13 (without וּ 36:3); also עַל־אֲשֶׁר 2 S 3, and עַל־כִּי Dt 31, Ju 3, Mal 2 on the ground that; עַל־דְּבַר אֲשֶׁר because of the circumstance that, Dt 23; עַל־כָּל־אֹדוֹת אֲשֶׁר for this very cause that, Jer 3. But just as the simple יַ֫עַן is used for יַ֫עַן אֲשֶׁר, so also the simple עַל־ with the perfect stands for עַל־אֲשֶׁר ψ 119, Ezr 3; cf. עַל־בְּלִי Gn 31 and מִבְּלִי Dt 28 both with the perfect, equivalent to because... not.—Cf. further עֵ֫קֶב אֲשֶׁר Gn 22, 26, 2 S 12, all with the perfect, and עֵ֫קֶב כִּי (2 S 12 with the perfect; Am 4 with the imperfect) prop. in return for the fact that; similarly again the simple עֵ֫קֶב Nu 14 with the perfect, and Dt 7, 8 with the imperfect; finally, מֵֽאֲשֶׁר Is 43 arising from the fact that,= because; תַּ֫חַת אֲשֶׁר 1 S 26, &c., and תַּ֫חַת כִּי Dt 4, Pr 1 for the reason that.
c Rem. 1. The preposition עַל־ (because of, on account of) with the infinitive (§ 114 e) is frequently used as the equivalent of a full causal clause; cf. e.g. Am 1, 6, 13, 2:1, 6. Such a construction with the infinitive may, however, according to § 114 r, be continued by means of a finite verb, in which case עַל־ governs the verb as a conjunction; e.g. Am 1 עַל־הַסְגִּירָם... וְלֹא זָֽכְרוּ because they delivered up... and remembered not, &c.; 1:11, 2:4; without Wāw, Is 30.
d 2. The choice of tense is regulated by the general principles stated in § 106 ff., viz. the perfect (cf. especially § 106 f) refers to causes already brought fully into effect, the imperfect to those which may contingently arise; cf. e.g. Dt 7, 8, 1 K 8, where the imperfect leaves the possibility still open that the persons addressed will perhaps escape the threatened punishments by avoiding disobedience.—Cf. further, § 111 h on the imperfect consecutive, and § 112 nn on the perfect consecutive in the apodosis to causal clauses.