# The Prince (Byerley)/Chapter 13

CHAP. XIII.
Of auxiliary, mired, and national Troops.
Auxiliary troops are those which a prince borrows of his allies to assist and defend him. It was thus that Pope Julius II. having in the enterprise against Ferrara made a lamentable experiment of the danger of employing mercenaries, had recourse to Ferdinand, King of Spain, who entered into a treaty to send troops to his assistance.
This kind of military force may perhaps be useful to him who sends it; but it is always injurious to the prince who uses it. For if it is defeated, he suffers the consequences; and if it is victorious, he lies at its mercy. Ancient history is replete with facts in support of this doctrine. To confine myself, however, to a recent example. Julius II. being desirous to possess himself of Ferrara, was advised to confide the execution of this expedition to a foreigner. Fortunately for him, however, an incident took place which prevented the disaster of such an imprudence. This was, that his auxiliaries having been defeated at Ravenna, the conqueror was unexpectedly attacked by the Swiss, who put him to flight: so that this pontiff escaped both from his enemy, who was in his turn ​defeated; and from his auxiliaries, who had but a small share in obtaining the victory.
The Florentines wishing to besiege Pisa, and being entirely destitute of national troops, took into their service ten thousand French, an error vhich drew on them mischiefs they had never before experienced. The Emperor of Constantinople being threatened by his neighbours, caused ten thousand: Turks to enter Greece, which at the end of the war he could not driye out again, and that provinces, became subjected to the infidels.
The prince, therefore, who would deprive bim self of the power of conquering, has only to apply this kind of military force, which is still worse than mercenary troops; because they form. a separate body, and are under the command of another. Mercenaries, on the contrary, being raised by him who takes them into his pay, and not forming a separate hody, cannot so easily injure him after having vanquished his enemies. Their general, named by the prince himself, cannot immediately acquire such authority over those he commands, as to turn their arms against his employer. Finally, I. am of opinion, that there is much more to be dreaded from the valour of auxiliary troops, than from the cowardice of mercenaries; and a wise prince wil prefer being defeated with his own troops only, than to cọnquer with auxiliaries, insomuch as that is no true, viotory which is gained by foreign aid. ​In proof of thiş assertion, I shall never cease to quote the example of Cæsar Borgia. He made himself master of Forli and Imola with auxiliaries, wholly French; bụt perceiving that he could not rely on their fidelity, he had recourse to mercenaries, those who commanded the Orsini and the Vitelli, from whom he thought he had less to fear. But finding afterwards that there was no morę safety in those than the others, he resolved to get rid of them all, and from that time never employed any other than his own national troops,
Now, if we would know the immense difference there is between these two kind of troops, we need only compare this duke's campaigns, when he used the troops of the Orsini and the Vitelli, with those which he made at the head of his own; for we never knew the whole extent of his abilities till he was absolute mąster of his soldiers.
I am desirous of confining myself to examples drawn from the modern history of Italy; but that of Hiero of Syracuse, of whom I have already spoken, is so stropgly in point, that I think I ought not to omit it. That city had confided to him the commạnd af its troops, which were composed of foreigners in its pay. This general soon found how very little he had tọ expect from these mercenaries, the conduct of whose generals was nearly on a par with that of our present Italians. But seeing that he could not without danger either ​employ or disband them, he deterimined to have them all massacred, and afterwards caried on the war with his own troops only.
I will also advert to a trait of history drawn from the Old Testament. David having offered to go to combat that formidable Philistine Goliah, Saul, to inspire him with greater ardour, armed him with his sword, his helmet, and his cuirass; but David told him they would more inconvenience than serve him, and declared that he would fight his enemy only with his sling.
Finally, foreign soldiers either become a charge to you, or abandon you at the very moment they can serve you, or else turn their arms against him who employs them. Charles the VII. the father of Lewis XI. after having by his valour delivered France from the English, being convinced of the necessity of fighting with his own troops, established throughout all France companies of artillery, of cavalry, and infantry. His son Lewis XI. has since disbanded the infantry, for whom he substituted the Swiss. This fault, which was also committed by his successors, has been the source of the evils experienced by the state at this moment. These kings, by giving superior credit to the Helvetic soldiery, have made their own contemptible, who from being accustomed to fight with the Swiss, think they cannot conquer without them. So that the French were afraid either to ​contend with the Swiss, or to go to war without them.
The French armies are therefore partly mercenaries, and partly national. This mixture renders them better than troops which are either all mercenaries or all auxiliaries, but far inferior to those raised in their own country; and what I have just said is a sufficient proof that France would be invincible if they had adhered to the military regulations established by Charles VII. But such is the imprudence of men, that they undertake things from which they promise themselves advantages, but a secret venom is hidden under these promising appearances as in the hectic fever I have before described.
Thus the prince who remains ignorant of evils till it is too late to prevent them is not truly wise, and this wisdom is allotted to very few of them.
The first cause of the decline of the Roman empire was that of taking the Gauls into their pay, which brought these barbarians into credit at the expence of the Roman soldiers.
A prince who cannot defend his dominions without the assistance of foreign troops is ever at the mercy of fortune, and without resource in adversity. It is a generally received maxim, that there is nothing so weak as a power that is not supported by itself, that is to say, that is not defended by its ​own citizens or subjects, but by foreigners, whether allies or mercenaries. It would be easy to set on foot a national force, if the same means were employed as were used by Philip the father of Alexander the Great, with so much ability, as well as by several other states, both monarchical and republican, of which I have already spoken, and to which I again refer my readers.