# On the Basis of Morality/Part IV

Translated in 1903
part IV.
ON THE METAPHYSICAL EXPLANA- TION OF THE PRIMAL ETHICAL PHAENOMENON.
CHAPTER I.
HOW THIS APPENDIX MUST BE UNDERSTOOD.
IN the foregoing pages the moral incentive (Com- passion) has been established as a fact, and I have shown that from it alone can proceed unselfish justice and genuine loving-kindness, and that on these two cardinal virtues all the rest depend. Now, for the purpose of supplying Ethics with a foundation, this is sufficient, in a certain sense ; that is, in so far as Moral Science necessarily requires to be supported by some actual and demonstrable basis, whether existing in the external world, or in the consciousness. The only alternative is to tread in the footsteps that so many of my predecessors have left, in other words, to choose arbitrarily some proposition or other, some bare and abstract formula and make it the source of all that morality prescribes ; or, like Kant, to sublimate a mere idea, that of law, into the key-stone of the ethical arch. But, dismissing this method for the reasons discussed above, in the Second Part, the investigation proposed by the Royal Society appears to me now completed. For their question, as it stands, deals only with the foundation of Ethics ; as to a possible metaphysical explanation of this foundation nothing whatever is asked. Nevertheless,
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at the point we have reached, I am very sensible that the human spirit can find no abiding satisfaction, no real repose. As in all branches of practical research, so also in Ethical Science, when all is said, man is inevitably confronted with an ultimate phaenomenon, which while it renders an account of everything that it includes, and everything deduc- ible from it, remains itself an unexplained riddle. So that here, as elsewhere, the want is felt of a final interpretation (which, obviously, cannot but be metaphysical) of the ultimate data, as such, and through these, if they be taken in their entirety of the world. And here, too, this want finds utterance in the question : How is it that, what is present to our senses, and grasped by our intellect, is as it is, and not otherwise ? And how does the character of the phaenomenon, as manifest to us, shape itself out of the essential nature of things ? Indeed, in Moral Science the need of a metaphysical basis is more urgent than in any other, because all systems, philosophical no less than religious, are at one in persistently attaching to conduct not only an ethical, but also a metaphysical significance, which, passing beyond the mere appearance of things, transcends every possibility of experience, and therefore stands in the closest connection with human destiny and with the whole cosmic process. For if life (it is averred) have a meaning, then the supreme goal to which it points is undoubtedly ethical. Nor is this view a bare unsupported theory ; it is sufficiently established by the undeniable fact that, as death draws nigh, the thoughts of each individual assume
HOW THIS APPENDIX MUST BE UNDERSTOOD. 259
a moral trend, equally whether he be credulous of religious dogmas, or not ; he is manifestly anxious to wind up the affairs of his life, now verging to its end, entirely from the moral standpoint. In this particular the testimony of the ancients is of special value, standing, as they do, outside the pale of Christian influence. I shall therefore here quote a remarkable passage preserved by Stobaeus, in his Florilegium (chap. 44, . 20). It has been attri- buted to the earliest Hellenic lawgiver, Zaleucus, though, according to Bentley and Heyne, its source is Pythagorean. The language is graphic and un- mistakable. Ael ri6eo-6ai Trpb o/uLfj,dra)v rov icaipbv rourov, ev d> <ylyvrai rb reXo9 e/cacrrw T rov r)z>. TlaaL yap e/j,7ri7rrei, fjt,era[jie\eia rots re\evrdv, fiefj-vrjuevo^ &v r)$i,Kr)Kacri, teal opftr) rov f3ov\eo-0ai rcavra TrtTrpayQai StKaltoS aurofc. 1
Furthermore, to come to an historical personage, we find Pericles, on his death-bed, unwilling to hear anything about his great achievements, and only anxious to know that he had never brought trouble on a citizen. (Plutarch, Life of Pericles.) Turning to modern times, if a very different case may be placed beside the preceding, I remember having noticed in a report of depositions made
1 We ought to realise as if before our eyes that moment of time when the end comes to each one for deliverance from living. Because all who are about to die are seized with repentance, remembering, as they do, their unjust deeds, and being filled with the wish that they had always acted justly. 'ATraXAayrj = Erlosung. V. Joannes Stobeaus, Florilegium, edit. Meineke ; publ. Lipsiae : Teubner, 1855. Vol. ii., p. 164, 1. 7 sqq. (Translator.)
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before an English jury the following occurrence. A rough negro lad, fifteen years old, had been mortally injured in some brawl on board a ship. As he was dying, he eagerly begged that all his companions might be fetched in haste : he wanted to ask if he had ever vexed or insulted any one of them, and after hearing that he had not, his mind appeared greatly relieved. It is indeed the uniform teaching of experience that those near death wish to be reconciled with every one before they pass away.
But there is evidence of another kind that Ethics can only be finally explained by Metaphysics. It is well known that, while the author of an intellectual performance, even should it be a supreme master- piece is quite willing to take whatever remuneration he can get, those, on the other hand, who have done something morally excellent, almost without exception, refuse compensation for it. The latter fact is specially observable where conduct rises to the heroic. For instance, when a man at the risk of his life has saved another, or perhaps many, from destruction, as a rule, he simply declines all reward, poor though he may be ; because he instinctively feels that the metaphysical value of his act would be thereby impaired. At the end of Burger's song, " The Brave Man," we find a poetical presentment of this psycho- logical process. Nor does the reality, for the most part, differ at all from the ideal, as I have frequently noticed in English papers. Conduct of this kind occurs in evefy part of the world, and independently of all religious differences. In human beings there is an undeniable ethical tendency, rooted (however uncon-
HOW THIS APPENDIX MUST BE UNDERSTOOD. 261
sciously) in Metaphysics, and without an explanation of life on these lines, no religion could gain standing- ground ; for it is by virtue of their ethical side that they all alike keep their hold on the mind. Every religion makes its body of dogmas the basis of the moral incentive which each man feels, but which he does not, on that account, understand ; and it unites the two so closely, that they appear to be inseparable. Indeed the priests take special pains to proclaim unbelief and immorality as one and the same thing. The reason is thus apparent, why believers regard unbelievers as identical with the vicious, and why ex- pressions such as "godless," "atheistic," "unchristian," " heretic," etc., are used as synonymes for moral depravity. The religions have, in fact, a sufficiently easy task. Faith is the principle they start from. Hence they are in a position to simply insist on its application to their dogmas, and this, even to the point of employing threats. But philosophy has no such convenient instrument ready to hand. If the different systems be examined, it will be found that the situation is beset with difficulties, both as regards the foundation to be provided for Ethics, and in relation to the point of connection discoverable in. any such foundation with the given metaphysical theory. And yet, as I have emphasised in the introduction, with an appeal to the authority of Wolff and Kant we are under the stringent necessity of obtaining from Metaphysics a support for Moral Science.
Now, of all the problems that the human intellect has to grapple with, that of Metaphysics is by far the hardest ; so much so that it is regarded by many
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thinkers as absolutely insoluble. Apart from this, in the present case, I labour under the special dis- advantage which the form of a detached monograph involves. In other words, I am not at liberty to start from some definite metaphysical system, of which I may be an adherent ; because, if I did, either it would have to be expounded in detail, which would take too much space ; or else there would be the necessity of supposing it granted and unquestioned, an exceed- ingly precarious proceeding. The consequence is that I am as little able to use the synthetic method here as in the foregoing Part. Analysis alone is possible : that is, I must work backwards from the effects to their cause, and not vice versd. This stern obliga- tion, however, of having at the outset no previous hypothesis, no standpoint other than the commonly accepted one, made the discovery of the ethical basis so laborious that, as I look back upon the task, I seem to have accomplished some wondrous feat of dexterity, not unlike that of a man who executes with subtlest skill in mid air what otherwise is only done on a solid support. But now that we have come to the question whether there can be given a metaphysical explanation of the foundation obtained, the difficulty of proceeding without any assumption becomes so enormous, that but one course appears to me open, namely, to attempt nothing beyond a general sketch of the subject. I shall, therefore, indicate rather than elaborate the line of thought : I shall point out the way leading to the goal, but not follow it thither ; in short, I shall present but a very small part of what, under other circumstances, could be
HOW THIS APPENDIX MUST BE UNDERSTOOD. 263
adduced. In adopting this attitude for the reasons stated, I wish, before beginning, to emphatically remark, that in any case the actual problem put for- ward has now been solved ; consequently, that what I here add is an opus supererogationis, an appendix to be given and taken entirely at will.
CHAPTER II;
THE METAPHYSICAL GROUNDWOEK.
So far all our steps have been supported by the firm rock of experience. But at this point it fails us, and the solid earth sinks from under our feet, as we press forward in our search after a final theoretical satisfaction, there, where no experience can ever by any possibility penetrate ; and happy shall we be, if perchance we gain one hint, one transient gleam, that may bring us a certain measure of content. What, however, shall not desert us is the honesty that has hitherto attended our procedure. We shall not make shift with dreams, and serve up fairy tales, after the fashion of the so-called post-Kantian philosophers ; nor shall we, like them, seek, by a wordy exuberance, to impose upon the reader, arid cast dust in his eyes. A little is all we promise ; but that little will be presented in perfect sincerity.
The principle, which we discovered to be the final explanation of Ethics, now in turn itself requires explaining ; so that our present problem has to deal with that natural Compassion, which in every man is innate and indestructible, and which has been shown to be the sole source of non-egoistic conduct, this kind alone being of real moral worth. Now
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many modern thinkers treat the conceptions of Good and Bad as simple, that is, as neither needing, nor admitting any elucidation, and then they go on, for the most part, to talk very mysteriously and devoutly of an " Idea of the Good," out of which they make a pedestal for their moral system, or at least a cloak for their poverty. 1 Hence I am obliged in this connection to point out parenthetically, that these conceptions are anything but simple, much less a priori ; that they in fact express a relation, and are derived from the commonest daily experience. What- ever is in conformity with the desires of any individual will, is, relatively to it, termed good ; for instance, good food, good roads, a good omen ; the contrary is called bad, and, in the case of living beings, malicious. And so one, who by virtue of his character, has no wish to oppose what others strive after, but rather, as far as he reasonably may, shows himself favourable and helpful to them ; one, who, instead of injuring, assists his neighbours, and promotes their interests, when he can ; is named by the latter, in respect to themselves, a good man ; the term good being applied to him in the sense of the above definition, and from -their own point of view, which is thus relative,
1 The conception of the Good, in its purity, is an ultimate one, " an absolute Idea, whose substance loses itself in infinity." (Bouterweck : Praktische Apkorismen, p. 54.)
It is obvious that this writer would like to transform the familiar, nay, trivial conception " Good " into a sort of AtiVtr*;?, to be set up as an idol in his temple. [AuVrerjfs- lit., " fallen from Zeus " ; and so " heaven-sent," " a thing of divine origin." Of. Horn., II. XVI., 174 ; Od. IV. 477. Eur., Bacch., 1268. (Translator.)]
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empirical, and centred in the passive subject. Now, if we examine the nature of such a man, not only as it affects others, but as it is in itself, we are enabled by the foregoing exposition to perceive that the virtues of justice and loving-kindness, which he practises, are due to a direct participation in weal and woe external to himself ; and we have learnt that the source of such participation is Compassion. If, further, we pause to consider what is the essential part in this type of character, we shall certainly find it to lie in the fact that such a person draws less dis- tinction between himself and others than is usually done. In the eyes of the malicious individual this difference is so great that he takes direct delight in the spectacle of suffering, a delight, which he accordingly seeks without thought of any other benefit to himself, nay, sometimes, even to his own hurt. From the egoist's point of view the same difference is still large enough to make him bring much trouble on his neighbours, in order to obtain a small personal advantage. Hence for both of these, between the ego, which is limited to their own persons, and the non-ego, which includes all the rest of the world, there is fixed a great gulf, a mighty abyss : Pereat munduSj dum ego salvus sim (the world may perish, provided I be safe), is their maxim. For the good man, on the contrary, this distinction is by no means so pronounced ; indeed, in the case of magnanimous deeds, it appears to become a vanishing quantity, be- cause then the weal of another is advanced at the cost of the benefactor, the self of another placed on an equality with his own. And when it is a question of
THE METAPHYSICAL GROUNDWORK. 267
saving a number of fellow-beings, total self-obliteration may be developed, the one giving his life for many.
The inquiry now presents itself, whether the latter way of looking at the relation subsisting between the ego and the non-ego, which forms the mainspring of a good man's conduct, is mistaken and due to an illusion ; or whether the error does not rather attach to the opposite view, on which Egoism and Malice are based.
No doubt the theory lying at the root of Egoism is, from the empirical standpoint, perfectly justified. From the testimony of experience, the distinction between one's own person and that of another appears to be absolute. I do not occupy the same space as my neighbour, and this difference, which separates me from him physically, separates me also from his weal and woe. But in the first place, it should be observed that the knowledge we have of our own selves is by no means exhaustive and transparent to its depths. By means of the intuition, which the brain constructs out of the data supplied by the senses, that is to say, in an indirect manner, we recognise our body as an object in space ; through an inward perception, we are aware of the continuous series of our desires, of our volitions, which arise through the agency of external motives ; and finally, we come to discern the manifold movements, now stronger, now weaker, of our will itself, to which all feelings from within are ultimately traceable. And that is all : for the perceiving faculty is not in its turn perceived. On the contrary, the real sub- stratum of our whole phaenomenal nature, our inmost
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essence in itself, that which wills and perceives, is not accessible to us. We see only the outward side of the ego ; its inward part is veiled in darkness. Consequently, the knowledge we possess of ourselves is in no sort radical and complete, but rather very superficial. The larger and more important part of our being remains unknown, and forms a riddle to speculate about ; or, as Kant puts it : " The ego knows itself only as a phaenomenon ; of its real essence, whatever that may be, it has no knowledge." Now, as regards that side of the self which falls within our ken, we are, undoubtedly, sharply dis- tinguished, each from the other ; but it does not follow therefrom that the same is true of the re- mainder, which, shrouded in impenetrable obscurity, is yet, in fact, the very substance of which we consist. There remains at least the possibility that the latter is in all men uniform and identical.
What is the explanation of all plurality, of all numerical diversity of existence ? Time and Space. Indeed it is only through the latter that the former is possible : because the concept " many " inevitably connotes the idea either of succession (time), or of relative position (space). Now, since a homogeneous plurality is composed of Individuals, I call Space and Time, as being the conditions of multiplicity, the principium individuationis (the principle of individua- tion) ; and I do not here pause to consider whether this expression was exactly so employed by the Schoolmen.
If in the disclosures which Kant's wonderful acumen gave to the world there is anything true beyond the shadow of a doubt, this is to be found
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in the Transcendental Aesthetics, that is to say, in his doctrine of the ideality of Space and Time. On such solid foundations is the structure built that no one has been able to raise even an apparent objection. It is Kant's triumph, and belongs to the very small number of metaphysical theories which may be regarded as really proved, and as actual conquests in that field of research. It teaches us that Space and Time are the forms of our own faculty of intuition, to which they consequently belong, and not to the objects thereby perceived ; and further, that they can in no way be a condition of things in themselves, but rather attach only to their mode of appearing, such as is alone possible for us who have a consciousness of the external world determined by strictly physiological limits. Now, if to the Thing in itself, that is, to the Reality underlying the kosmos, as we perceive it, Time and Space are foreign ; so also must multiplicity be. Consequently that which is objectivated in the count- less phaenomena of this world of the senses cannot but be a unity, a single indivisible entity, manifested in each and all of them. And conversely, the web of plurality, woven in the loom of Time and Space, is not the Thing in itself, but only its appearance- form. Externally to the thinking subject, this appear- ance-form, as such, has no existence ; it is merely an attribute of our consciousness, bounded, as the latter is, by manifold conditions, indeed, depending on an organic function.
The view of things as above stated, that all plurality is only apparent, that in the endless series
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of individuals, passing simultaneously and successively into and out of life, generation after generation, age after age, there is but one and the same entity really existing, which is present and identical in all alike ; this theory, I say, was of course known long before Kant ; indeed, it may be carried back to the remotest antiquity. It is the alpha and omega of the oldest book in the world, the sacred Vedas, whose dogmatic part, or rather esoteric teaching, is found in the Upanishads. 1 There, in almost every page this profound doctrine lies
1 The genineness of the Oupnek'hat has been disputed on the ground of certain marginal glosses which were added by Mohammedan copyists, and then interpolated in the text. It has, however, been fully established by the Sanskrit scholar, F. H. H. Windischmann (junior) in his Sancara, sive de Theologumenis Vedanticorum, 1833, p. xix ; and also by Itochinger in his book De la Vie Contemplative chez les Indous, 1831, p. 12. The reader though ignorant of Sanskrit, may yet convince himself that Anquetil Duperron's word for word Latin translation of the Persian version of the Upanishads made by the martyr of this creed, the Sultan Dara-Shukoh, is based on a thorough and exact knowledge of the language. He has only to compare it with recent translations of some of the Upanishads by Rammohun Koy, by Poley, and especially with that of Colebrooke, as also with Roer's, (the latest). These writers are obviously groping in obscurity, and driven to make shift with hazy conjectures, so that without doubt their work is much less accurate. More will be found on this subject in Vol. II. of the Parerga, chap. 16, 184. [V. The Upanishads, translated by Max Muller, in The Sacred Books of the East, Vols. I. and XV. Of. also Max Muller, The Science of Language, Vol. I., p. 171. Now that an adequate translation of the original exists, the Oupnek'hat has only an historical interest. The value which Schopenhauer attached to the Upanishads is very clearly expressed also in the Welt als Wille and
THE METAPHYSICAL GROUNDWORK. 271
enshrined ; with tireless repetition, in countless adaptations, by many varied parables and similes it is expounded and inculcated. That such was, more- over, the fount whence Pythagoras drew his wisdom, cannot be doubted, despite the scanty knowledge we possess of what he taught. That it formed practically the central point in the whole philosophy of the Eleatic School, is likewise a familiar fact. Later on, the New Platonists were steeped in the same, one of their chief tenets being : Sia ryv evortjTa airdvrwv Tracra? -^vya? piav elvai. (All souls are one, because all things form a unity.) In the ninth century we find it unexpectedly appearing in Europe. It kindles the spirit of no less a divine than Johannes Scotus Erigena, who endeavours to clothe it with the forms and terminology of the Christian religion. Among the Mohammedans we detect it again in the rapt mysticism of the Sufi. 1 In the West Giordano Bruno cannot resist the impulse to utter it aloud ; but his reward is a death of shame and torture. And at the same time we find the Christian Mystics losing themselves in it, against their own will and
Vorstellung, Preface to the first Edition ; and in the Parerga, II., chap, xvi., 184. (Translator.)]
1 For the Sufi, more correctly S u f I y a sect which ap- peared already in the first century of the Hijrah, the reader is referred to : Tholuck's Bliithensammlung am der Morgen- landischen Mystik (Berlin, 1825) ; Tholuck's S-dfismits, sive Theosvphia Persarum Pantheistica (Berlin, 1821); Kremer's Oeschichte der Herrschenden Ideen des Isldms (Leipzig, 1868) ; Palmer's Oriental Mysticism (London, 1867) ; Gobineau's Les Religions et les Philosophies dans VAsie Centrale (2nd edit. Paris, 1866) ; A Dictionary of Islam, by T. P. Hughes (London, 1885), p. 608 sqq. (Translator.)
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intention, whenever and wherever we read of them 1 l Spinoza's name is identified with it. Lastly, in onr own days, after Kant had annihilated the old dogmatism, and the world stood aghast at its smoking ruins, the same teaching was revived in Schelling's eclectic philosophy. The latter took all the systems of Plotinus, Spinoza, Kant, and Jacob Boehm, and mixing them together with the results of modern Natural Science, speedily served up a dish sufficient to satisfy for the moment the pressing needs of his contemporaries ; and then proceeded to perform a series of variations on the original theme. The con- sequence is that in the learned circles of Germany this line of thought has come to be generally ac- cepted ; indeed even among people of ordinary educa- tion, it is almost universally diffused. 2 A solitary exception is formed by the University philosophers of the present day. They have the hard task of fighting what is called Pantheism. Being brought
1 This is too well-known to need verification by references. The Gantico del Sole by St. Francis of Assisi sounds almost like a passage from the Upanishadsor the Bhagavadgit3. (Translator.)
2 Onpeut assez long temps, chez notre espece, Fermer la porte a la Raison.
Mais, des qu'elle entre avec adresse, Elle reste dans la maison,
Et bientot die en est maltresse.
(Voltaire.)
(We men may, doubtless, all our lives
To Reason bar the door. But if to enter she contrives,
The house she leaves no more, And soon as mistress there presides.)
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through the stress of battle into great embarrassment and difficulty, they anxiously catch now at the most pitiful sophisms, now at phrases of choicest bombast, so only they may patch together some sort of re- spectable disguise, wherein to dress up the favourite petticoat Philosophy, that has duly received official sanction. In a word, the *Ev teal -rrav l has been in all ages the laughing-stock of fools, for the wise a subject of perpetual meditation. Nevertheless, the strict demonstration of this theory is only to be obtained from the Kantian teaching, as I have just shown. Kant himself did not carry it out ; after the fashion of clever orators, he only gave the premises, leaving to his hearers the pleasure of drawing the conclusion.
Now if plurality and difference belong only to the appearance-form; if there is but one and the same Entity manifested in all living things : it follows that, when we obliterate the distinction between the ego and the non-ego, we are not the sport of an illusion. Rather are we so, when we maintain the reality of inclividuation, a thing the Hindus call Maya, 2 that is, a deceptive vision, a phantasma. The former theory we have found to be the actual source of the phaenomenon of Compassion ; indeed Compassion is nothing but its translation into definite expression. This, therefore, is what I should regard as the metaphysical foundation of Ethics, and should describe
1 To tV = the eternal Reality outside Time and Space To ivav = the phaenomenal universe. (Translator.)
3 May is " the delusive reflection of the true eternal Entity." (Translator.)
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it as the sense which identifies the ego with the non-ego, so that the individual directly recognises in another his own self, his true and very being. From this standpoint the profoundest teaching of theory pushed to its furthest limits may be shown in the end to harmonise perfectly with the rules of justice and loving-kindness, as exercised ; and conversely, it will be clear that practical philosophers, that is, the upright, the beneficent, the magnanimous, do but declare through their acts the same truth as the man of speculation wins by laborious research, by the loftiest flights of intellect. Meanwhile moral excellence stands higher than all theoretical sapience. The latter is at best nothing but a very unfinished and partial structure, and only by the circuitous path of reasoning attains the goal which the former reaches in one step. He who is morally noble, however deficient in mental penetration, reveals by his conduct the deepest insight, the truest wisdom ; and puts to shame the most accomplished and learned genius, if the latter's acts betray that his heart is yet a stranger to this great principle, the metaphysical unity of life.
" Individuation is real. The principium individua- tioniSj with the consequent distinction of individuals, is the order of things in themselves. Each living unit is an entity radically different from all others. In my own self alone I have my true being ; every- thing outside it belongs to the non-ego, and is foreign to me." This is the creed to the truth of which flesh and bone bear witness : which is at the root of all egoism, and which finds its objective expression in every loveless, unjust, or malicious act.
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" Individuation is merely an appearance, born of Space and Time ; the latter being nothing else than the forms under which the external world necessarily manifests itself to me, conditioned as they are by my brain's faculty of perception. Hence also the plurality and diiference of individuals is but a phaenomenon, that is, exists only as my mental picture. My true inmost being subsists in every living thing, just as really, as directly as in my own consciousness it is evidenced only to myself." This is the higher knowledge : for which there is in Sanskrit the standing formula, tat tvam asi, " that art thou." 1 Out of the depths of human nature it wells up in the shape of Compassion, and is therefore the source of all genuine, that is, disinterested virtue, being, so to say, incarnate in every good deed. It is this which in the last resort is invoked, whenever we appeal to gentleness, to loving-kindness ; whenever we pray for mercy instead of justice. For such appeal, such prayer is in reality the effort to re- mind a fellow-being of the ultimate truth that we are all one and the same entity. On the other hand, Egoism and its derivatives, envy, hatred, the spirit of persecution, hardness of heart, revenge, pleasure at the sight of suffering, and cruelty, all claim support from the other view of things, and seek their justification in it. The emotion and joy we experience when we hear of, still more, when we see, and most of all, when
1 This expression is used in the Brahmanical philosophy to denote the relation between the world-fiction as a whole and its individualised parts. V. A. E. Gough, Philosophy of the Upanishads, 1882. (Translator.)
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we ourselves do, a noble act, are at bottom traceable to the feeling of certainty such a deed gives, that, beyond all plurality and distinction of individuals, which the principium individuationis, like a kaleido- scope, shows us in ever-shifting evanescent forms, there is an underlying unity, not only truly existing, but actually accessible to us ; for lo ! in tangible, objective form, it stands before our sight.
Of these two mental attitudes, according as the one or the other is adopted, so the </u?ua (Love) or the veiKos (Hatred) of Empedocles appears between man and man. If any one, who is animated by z/et/co?, could forcibly break in upon his most detested foe, and compel him to lay bare the inmost recesses of his heart ; to his surprise, he would find again in the latter his very self. For just as in dreams, all the persons that appear to us are but the masked images of ourselves ; so in the dream of our waking life, it is our own being which looks on us from out our neighbours' eyes, though this is not equally easy to discern. Nevertheless, tat tvam asi.
The preponderance of either mode of viewing life not only determines single acts ; it shapes a man's whole nature and temperament. Hence the radical difference of mental habit between the good character and the bad. The latter feels everywhere that a thick wall of partition hedges him off from all others. For him the world is an absolute non-ego, and his relation to it an essentially hostile one ; consequently, the key-note of his disposition is hatred, suspicion, envy, and pleasure in seeing distress. The good character, on the other hand, lives in an external
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world homogeneous with his own being ; the rest of mankind is not in his eyes a non-ego ; he thinks of it rather as " myself once more." He therefore stands on an essentially amicable footing with every one : he is conscious of being, in his inmost nature, akin to the whole human race, 1 takes direct interest in their weal and woe, and confidently assumes in their case the same interest in him. This is the source of his deep inward peace, and of that happy, calm, contented manner, which goes out on those around him, and is as the "presence of a good diffused." Whereas the bad character in time of trouble has no trust in the help of his fellow-creatures. If he invokes aid, he does so without confidence : obtained, he feels no real gratitude for it ; because he can hardly discern therein anything but the effect of others' folly. For he is simply incapable of recognis- ing his own self in some one else ; and this, even after it has furnished the most incontestible signs of existence in that other person : on which fact the repulsive nature of all unthankfulness in reality de- pends. The moral isolation, which thus naturally and inevitably encompasses the bad man, is often the cause of his becoming the victim of despair. The good man, on the contrary, will appeal to his neigh- bours for assistance, with an assurance equal to the consciousness he has of being ready himself to help them. As I have said : to the one type, humanity is a non-ego ; to the other, " myself once more." The magnanimous character, who forgives his enemy,
1 Homo sum : humani nil a me alienum puto. Terence, Heaut., I. 1, 25. (Translator.')
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and returns good for evil, rises to the sublime, and receives the highest meed of praise ; because he recognises his real self even there where it is most conspicuously disowned.
Every purely beneficent act all help entirely and genuinely unselfish, being, as such, exclusively inspired by another's distress, is, in fact, if we probe the matter to the bottom, a dark enigma, a piece of mysticism put into practice ; inasmuch as it springs out of, and finds its only true explanation in, the same higher knowledge that constitutes the essence of whatever is mystical.
For how, otherwise than metaphysically, are we to account for even the smallest offering of alms made with absolutely no other object than that of lessening the want which afflicts a fellow-creatare ? Such an act is only conceivable, only possible, in so far as the giver knows that it is his very self which stands before him, clad in the garments of suffering ; in other words, so far as he recognises the essential part of his own being, under a form not his own. 1 It now becomes apparent, why in the foregoing part I have called Compassion the great mystery of Ethics.
He, who goes to meet death for his fatherland, has freed himself from the illusion which limits a man's existence to his own person. Such a one has broken the fetters of the principium individuationis. In his
1 It is probable that many, perhaps, most cases of truly disinterested Compassion when they really occur are due not to any conscious knowledge of this sort, but to an unconscious impulse springing from the ultimate unity of all living things, and acting, so to say, automatically. (Translator.)
THE METAPHYSICAL GROUNDWORK. 279
widened, enlightened nature he embraces all his countrymen, and in them lives on and on. Nay, he reaches forward to, and merges himself in the genera- tions yet unborn, for whom he works ; and he regards death as a wink of the eyelids, so momentary that it does not interrupt the sight.
We may here sum up the characteristics of the two human types above indicated. To the Egoist all other people are uniformly and intrinsically strangers. In point of fact, he considers nothing to be truly real, except his own person, and regards the rest of man- kind practically as troops of phantoms, to whom he assigns merely a relative existence, so far as they may be instruments to serve, or barriers to obstruct, his purposes ; the result being an immeasurable differ- ence, a vast gulf between Ms ego on the one side, and the non-ego on the other. In a word, he lives ex- clusively centred in his own individuality, and on his death-day he sees all reality, indeed the whole world, coming to an end along with himself. 1 Whereas the Altruist discerns in all other persons, nay, in every living thing, his own entity, and feels therefore that his being is commingled, is identical with the being of whatever is alive. By death he loses only a small part of himself. Putting off the narrow limitations of the individual, he passes into the larger life of all mankind, in whom he always recognised, and, recog- nising, loved, his very self; and the illusion of Time and Space, which separated his consciousness from that of others, vanishes. These two opposite modes
1 Cf. Richard Wagner : Jesus von Nazareth ; pp. 79-90. (Translator.)
280 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.
of viewing the world are probably the chief, though not indeed the sole cause of the difference we find between very good and exceptionally bad men, as to the manner in which they meet their last hour.
In all ages Truth, poor thing, has been put to shame for being paradoxical ; and yet it is not her fault. She cannot assume the form of Error seated on his throne of world-wide sovereignty. So then, with a sigh, she looks up to her tutelary god, Time, who nods assurance to her of future victory and glory, but whose wings beat the air so slowly with their mighty strokes, that the individual perishes or ever the day of triumph be come. Hence I, too, am perfectly aware of the paradox which this metaphysical explanation of the ultimate ethical phaenomenon must present to Western minds, accus- tomed, as they are, to very different methods of providing Morals with a basis. Nevertheless, I cannot offer violence to the truth. All that is possible for me to do, out of consideration for European blindness, is to assert once more, and demonstrate by actual quotation, that the Metaphysics of Ethics, which I have here suggested, was thousands of years ago the fundamental principle of Indian wisdom. And to this wisdom I point back, as Copernicus did to the Pythagorean cosmic system, which was sup- pressed by Aristotle and Ptolemaeus. In the Bhagavadgita (Lectio XIII. ; 27, 28), according to A. W. von Schlegel's translation, we find the following passage : Eundem in omnibus animantibus consis- tentem summum dominum, istis pereuntibus hand pereuntem qui cernit, is vere cernit. Eundem vero
THE METAPHYSICAL GROUNDWORK. 281
cernens ubique praesentem dominum, non violat semet ipsum sua ipsius culpa : exinde pergit ad summum iter. 1
With these hints towards the elaboration of a metaphysical basis for Ethics I must close, although an important step still remains to be taken. The latter would presuppose a further advance in Moral Science itself ; and this can hardly be made, because in the West the highest aim of Ethics is reached in the theory of justice and virtue. What lies beyond is unknown, or at any rate ignored. The omission, therefore, is unavoidable ; and the reader
1 That man is endowed with true insight who sees that the same ruling power is inherent in all things, and that when these perish, it perishes not. For if he discerns the same ruling power everywhere present, he does not degrade himself by his own fault : thence he passes to the highest path. For the Ehagavadflitd the reader is referred to Vol. VIII. of The Sacred Books of the East (Oxford : Clarendon Press), where (p. 105) this passage is translated as follows : " He sees (truly) who sees the supreme lord abiding alike in all entities, and not destroyed though they are destroyed. For he who sees the lord abiding everywhere alike, does not destroy him- self * by himself, and then reaches the highest goal."
destruction."
Of. Fauche : Le Maha-Bharata : Paris, 1867 ; Vol. VII., p. 128:
" Celui-la possede une vue nette des choses, qui voit ce principe souverain en tous les gtres d'une maniere 6gale, et leur survivre, quand ils pe>issent. II ne se fait aucum tort a soi-meme par cette vue d'un principe qui subsiste egalement partout : puis, apres cette vie, il entre dans la voie superieure."
The obscurity of Schlegel's Latin in the second sentence is sufficiently removed by these more recent translations. (Translator.)
282 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.
need feel no surprise, if the above slight outline of the Metaphysics of Ethics does not bring into view even remotely the corner-stone of the whole meta- physical edifice, nor reveal the connection of all the parts composing the Divina Commedia. Such a presentment, moreover, is involved neither in the question set, nor in my own plan. A man cannot say everything in one day, and should not answer more than he is asked.
He who tries to promote human knowledge and insight is destined to always encounter the opposition of his age, which is like the dead weight of some mass that has to be dragged along : there on the ground it lies, a huge inert deformity, defying all efforts to quicken its shape with new life. But such a one must take comfort from the certainty that, although prejudices beset his path, yet the truth is with him. And Truth does but wait for her ally, Time, to join her ; once he is at her side, she is perfectly sure of victory, which, if to-day delayed, will be won to-morrow.
JUDICIUM
EEGIAE DANICAE SCIENTIARUM SOCIETATIS.
QUAESTIONEM anno 1837 propositam, " utrum philo- sophiae moralis fons et fundamentum in idea morali- tatis, quae immediate conscientia contineatur, et ceteris notionibus fundamentalibus, quae ex ilia prodeant, eocplicandis quaerenda sint, an in alio cognoscendi principio" unus tantum scriptor explicare conatus est, cujus commentationem, germanico sermone com- positam, et his verbis notatam : " MORAL PREDIGEN IST LEICHT, MORAL BEGRUNDEN IST SCHWER," praemio dignam judicare nequivimus. Omisso enim eo, quod potissimumpostulabatur, hoc expeti putavit, ut princi- pium aliquod ethicae conderetur, itaque earn partem commentationis suae, in qua principii ethicae a se propositi et metaphysicae suae nexum exponit, appen- dicis loco habuit, in qua plus quam postulatum esset praestaret, quum tamen ipsum tkema ejusmodi disputa- tionemjlagitaret t in qua velpraecipuo loco metaphysicae et ethicae nexus consider aretur. Quod autem scriptor in sympathia fundamentum ethicae constituere conatus est, neque ipsa disserendi forma nobis satisfecit, neque reapse, hoc fundamentum sufficere, evicit ; quin ipse contra esse confiteri coactus est. Neque reticendum videtur, plures recentioris aetatis summos philosophos
283
284 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.
tarn indecenter commemorari, ut justam et gravem offensionem habeat.
JUDGMENT OF THE DANISH EOYAL SOCIETY OF SCIENCES.
In 1837 the following question was set as subject for a Prize Essay : " Is the fountain and basis of Morals to be sought for in an idea of morality which lies directly in the consciousness (or conscience), and in the analysis of the other leading ethical conceptions which arise from it ? Or is it to be found in some other source of knowledge ? " There was only one competitor ; but his dissertation, written in German, and bearing the motto : " To preach Morality is easy, to found it is difficult" l we cannot adjudge worthy of the Prize. He has omitted to deal with the essential part of the question, apparently thinking that he was asked to establish some fundamental principle of Ethics. Consequently, that part of the treatise, which explains how the moral basis he proposes is related to his system of metaphysics, we find relegated to an appendix, as an " opus supererogationis" although it was precisely the con- nection between Metaphysics and Ethics that our question required to be put in the first and foremost
1 The Academy has been good enough to insert the second " is " on its own account, by way of proving the truth of Longinus' theory ( V. De Sublimitate : chap. 39, ad fin.\ that the addition or subtraction of a single syllable is sufficient to destroy the whole force of a sentence. [ V. Longinus : De Sublimitate Libellus ; edit. Joannes Vahlen, Bonnae, 1887. (Translator.*)]
REGIAE DANICAE SCIENTIARUM SOCIETATIS. 285
place. The writer attempts to show that compassion is the ultimate source of morality ; but neither does his mode of discussion appear satisfactory to us, nor has he, in point of fact, succeeded in proving that such a foundation is adequate. Indeed he himself is obliged to admit that it is not. 1 Lastly, the Society cannot pass over in silence the fact that he mentions several recent philosophers of the highest standing in an unseemly manner, such as to justly occasion serious offence.
1 I suppose this is the meaning of contra esse confiteri. (Translator.)