# The Dialogues of Plato (Jowett)/Lysis Introduction

LYSIS.
INTRODUCTION.
Lysis. No answer is given in the Lysis to the question, 'What is Friendship?' any more than in the Charmides to the question, 'What is Temperance?' There are several resemblances in the two Dialogues: the same youthfulness and sense of beauty pervades both of them; they are alike rich in the description of Greek life. The question is again raised of the relation of knowledge to virtue and good, which also recurs in the Laches; and Socrates appears again as the elder friend of the two boys, Lysis and Menexenus. In the Charmides, as also in the Laches, he is described as middle­ aged; in the Lysis he is advanced in years.
Analysis The Dialogue consists of two scenes or conversations which seem to have no relation to each other. The first is a conversation between Socrates and Lysis, who, like Charmides, is an Athenian youth of noble descent and of great beauty, goodness, and intelligence:
this is carried on in the absence of Menexenus, who is called away to take part in a sacrifice. Socrates asks Lysis whether his father and mother do not love him very much? 'To be sure they do.' 'Then of course they allow him to do exactly as he $^{208}$ likes.' 'Of course not: the very slaves have more liberty than he $^{209}$ has.' 'But how is this?' 'The reason is that he is not old enough.' 'No; thereal reason is that he is not wise enough: for are there not some things which he is allowed to do, although he is not allowed to do others?' 'Yes, because he knows them, and does $^{210}$ not know the others.' This leads to the conclusion that all men everywhere will trust him in what he knows, but not in what he does not know; for in such matters he will be unprofitable to them, and do them no good. And no one will love him, if he does them no good; and he can only do them good by knowledge; and as he is still without knowledge, he can have as yet no conceit of know­ledge. In this manner Socrates reads a lesson to Hippothales, the ​
Lysis. Analysis. foolish lover of Lysis, rc:c;pecting the style ofconversation which he should address to his beloved.
Arter the return of Menexenus, Socrates, at the requc! t of Lysis, $^{211}$asks him a new question: 'What isfriendship? You, Mencxcnus, who have a friend already, can tell me, who am :cilways longing to $^{212}$find one, what is the serrd ofthis great blessing.'
When one man loves another, which is th,: friend he who loves, $^{213}$ or he who is loved? or are both frieuds? Fron.1 th,: fir ,t of these suppositions they arc c1riven to the second; and from the second
to the thir d; and neither the two boys nor Socrates are satisfi< d with any of the three or with all nf them. Socrates turns to the $^{214}$ poets, who affirm that God briugs like to like ([Iomer), aud to philosophers (Empedocles), who also assert that like is the friend
of likt:. But the bad are not friends, for they are not even like themselves, and still less are they like one another. i\nd the good h>tve no need of one another, and therefore do not care about $^{215}$ one another. Moreover there are others who say that likeness is
a cause of aversion, and unlikeness of love and friendship; and they too adduce the authority of poets and philosophf'rS in support of their doctrines; for Hesiod says that ‘potter is jealous of
potter, bard of bard;' and subtle doctors tell us that 'moist is the $^{216}$ friend of dry, hot of cold,' and the like. But neither can their doctrine be maintained; for then the just would be the friend of
the unjust, good of evil.
Thus we arrive at the conclusion that like is not the friend of like, nor unlike of unlike;, and therefore good is not the friend of good, nor evil of evil, nor good of evil, nor evil of good. What remains but that the indifferent, which is neither good nor evil, should be the friend (not of the indifferent, for that would be 'like $^{217}$ the friend of like,' but) of the good, or rather of the beautiful?
e this attachment to the beautiful or good? There are circumstances under which such an attachment would be natural. Suppose the indifferent, say the human body, to be desirous of getting rid of some evil, such as disease, which is not essential but only accidental to it (for if the evil were essent ial the body would cease to be indifferent, and would become evil) in such a case the indifferent becomes a $^{218}$ friend of the good for the sake of getting rid of the evil. In this intermediate 'indifferent' position the philosopher or lover of ​
wisdom stanc1s : he is not wi ;c, and yet not unwise, but he has L;,sis. ignorance accidentally clinging to him, :rnd he yearns for wisdom ANALvs1s. as the cure of the evil. (Cp. Symp. 204.)
After this cxpl:mation has been received with triumphant accord,
219 a fresh dissatisfaction begins to steal over the mind of Socrates: Must not friendship he for the sake or some ulterior end? and what can that final cause or e11d of frienchhip be, other than the good? But the good is desired by us only as the cure of evil; and
220 therefore if there were no evil there would be no friendship. Some other explanation then has to be devised. May not desire
221 be the source of frirnclship? And desire is of what a man wants and of what is congenial to him. • Rut then the congenial cannot
222 be the same as the like; for like, as has been already shown, cannot be the friend oflike. Nor can the congenial be the good; for good is not the friend of good, as has been also shown. The problem is unsolved, and the three friends, Socrates, Lysis, and Mcnexcnus, a1 e still unable to find out what a friend is.
Thus, as in the Charmidcs and Laches, and several of the other Dialogues ofl'lato (compare especially the Protagoras and Theaete­ tus), no conclusion is arrived at. Socrates maintains his character of a 'know nothing; ‘but the boys have already learned the lesson which he is unable to teach them, and they are free from the conceit of knowledge. (Cp. Charm. pp. I75, I76.) The dialogue is what would be called in the language of Thrasyllus tentative or inquisitive. The subject is continued in the Phaedrus and Symposium, and treated, with a manifest reference to the Lysis, in the eighth and ninth books of the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle. As in other writings of Plato (for example, the Republic), there is a progress from unconscious morality, illustrated by the friendship of the two youths, and also by the sayings of the poets ('who arc our fathers in wisdom,' and yet only tell us half the truth, and in this particular instance are not much improved upon by the philosophers), to a more comprehensive notion of friendship. This, however, is far from being cleared of its perplexity. Two notions appear to be struggling or balancing in the mind of Socrates : First, the sense that friendship arises out of human needs and wants; Secondly, that the higher form or ideal of friendship exists only for the sake of the good. That friends are not necessarily either like or unhke, is also a truth confirmed by ​
experience. But the use of the terms 'like' or 'good' is too strictly limited; Socrates has allowed himself to be carried away by a sort of eristic or illogical logic against which no definition of friendship would be able to stand. In the course of the argument (217 D, E) he makes a distinction between property and accident which is a real contribution to the science of logic. Some higher truths appear through the mist. The manner in which the field of argument is wideneu, as in the Channides and I.aches by the in­ troduction of the idea of knowledge, su here by the introduction of the good, is deserving of attention. The sense of the inter­ dependence of good and evil, and the allusion to the possibility of the non existence of evil, are also very remarkable.
The dialectical interest is fully sustained by the dramatic accompaniments. Observe, first, the scene, which is a Greek Palaestra, at a time when a sacrifice is going on, and the Hermaea are in course of celebration; secondly, the 'accustomed irony' of Socrates, who declares, as in the Syrnposiurn (177 DJ, that he is ignorant of all other things, hut claims to have a knowledge of the mysteries of love. There are likewise several contrasts of character; first of the dry, caustic Ctcsippus, of whom Socrates professes a humorous sort of fear, and Hippothales the flighty lover, who murders sleep by bawling out the name of his beloved; there is also a contrast between the false, exaggerated, sentimental love of Hippothales towards Lysis, and the childlike and innocent friendship of the boys with one another , Some difference appears to be intended between the characters of the more talkative Menexenus and the reserved and simple Lysis. Socrates draws out the latter by a new sort of irony, which is sometimes adopted in talking to children, and consists in asking a leading question which can only be answered in a sense contrary to the intention of the question : ‘Your father and mother of course allow you to drive the chariot?' 'No they do not.' When Menexenus returns, the serious dialectic begins. He is described as 'very pugnacious,' and we are thus prepared for the part which a mere youth takes in a difficult argument. But Plato has not forgotten dramatic propriety, and Socrates proposes at last to refer the question to some older person (223 A). ​
The subject of friendship has a lower place in the modern than in the ancient world, partly bccam,e a higher place is assigned by us to love and marriage. The very meaning of the word has become slighter and more superficial; it seems almost to be horrowecl from the ancients, and has nearly disappeared in modern treatises on Moral Philosophy. The received examples of friendship are to be found chiefly among the Greeks and Romans. Hence the casuistical or other questions which arise ont of the relations of friends have not often hccn considered seriously in modern times. M,my of them will he found to he the same which are discussed in the Lysis. We may ask with Socrates, 1) whether friendship is 'of similars or dissimilars,' or of hoth; 2) whether such a tic exists between the good only and for the sake of the good; or 3) whether there may not be some peculiar attraction, which draws together • the neither good nor evil' for the sake of the good and hecause of the evil; 1) whether friendship is always mutual, may there not be a one sided and unrequited friendship? This question, which, like many others, is only one of a laxer or stricter use of words, seems to have greatly exercised the minds both of Aristotle and Plato.
5) Can we expect friendship to be permanent, or must we acknowledge with Cicero, 'Ni/iii difficili11s q11am amicitiam usque ad extremum m"/ae permanere'? Is not friendship, even more than love, liable to be swayed by the caprices of fancy? The person who pleased us most at first sight or upon a slight acquaint­ ance, when we have seen him again, and under different circum­ stances, may make a much less favourable impression on our minds. Young people swear 'eternal friendships,' but at these innocent perjuries their elders laugh. No one forms a friendship with the intention of renouncing it; yet in the course of a varied life it is practically certain that many changes will occur of feeling, opinion, locality, occupation, fortune, which will divide us from some persons and unite us to others. 6) There is an ancient saying, Qui amicos amicum non /iabel. But is not some less exclusive form of friendship better suited to the condition and nature of man .' And in those especially who have no family ties, may not the feeling pass beyond one or a few, and embrace all ​
with whom we come into contaf't, and, perhaps in a few pas­ sionate and exalted natures, all men Fverywlwre? 7J r!1P anf'ients had their three kind5 of friendship, 'for the sake of the pleasant, the useful, and the good :' is the last to be resolved into the two first; or are the lwo first to be included in the last? The subject was puzzling to them: they muld not ay that friendship was only a quality, or a relation, or a vlftue, or a kind of v1rtuF; and tlwy had not in the age of Plato reached the pomt of regarding 11, likf' justice, as a form or attribute of virtue. They had another per­ plexity : 8) How could one of the noblest feelings of human nature be so near to one of the most detestable corruptions of it? ("P· Symposium r8o ff., 2r8 ff.; Laws VIII, 8JS ff.).
Leaving the Greek or ancient point of view, we may regard the question in a more general way. Friendship is the union of two persons in mutual affection and remembrance of one another. The friend can do for his friend what he cannot do for himself.
He can give him counsel in time or difli. ulty; he can teach him
'to see himself as others see him·; hecan stand by him, when all the world are against him; he can gladden and enlighten him by his presence; he 'can divide his sorrows,' he can 'double his joys;' he can anticipate his wants. He will di::.cover ways of helping him without creating a sense of his own superiority; he will find out his mental trials, but only that he may minister to them. Among true friends jealousy has no place: they do not complain of one another for making new friends, or for not revealing some secret of their lives; (in friendship too thue must be reserves;·l they do not intrude upon one another, and they mutually rejoice in any good which happens to either of them, though it may be to the loss of the other. They may live apart and have little intercourse, but when they meet, the old tie is as strong as ever according to the common saying, they find one another always the same. The greatest good of friendship is not daily intercourse, for circumstances rarely admit of this; buton the great occasions of life, when the advice of a friend is needed, then the word spoken in season about conduct, about health, about marriage, about business, the letter written from a distance by a disinterested person who sees with clearer eyes may be of inestimable value. When the heart is failing and despair is setting in, then to hear the voice or grasp the hand of a friend, in ​
a shipwreck, in a clefeat, in some other failure or misfortune, may restore the necessary courage and composure to the paralysed and disordered mind, and convert the feeble person into a hero; (cp. Symposium 179 ff.).
It is true that friendships arc apt to be disappointing: either we
expect too much from them; or we are in<lolent and <lo not 'keep them in repair;' or being admitted to intimacy with another, we see his faults too clearly and lose our respect for him; and he loses his affection for us. Friendships may be too violent; and they may be too sensitive. The egotism of one of the parties may be too much for the othe r. The word of counsel or sympathy has been uttered too obtrusively, at the wrong time, or in the wrong manner; or the need of it has not been perceived until too late. 'Oh if he had only told me' has been the silent thought of many a troubled soul. And some things have to be indicated rather than spoken, because the very mention of them tends to disturb the cqtwhility of friendship. The alienation of friends, like many other human evils, is commonly due to a want of tact and insight. There is not enough of the Srimus el lumc Jf'ninm petimusquf' dmnusque i1ic1:,sim. The sweet draught of sympathy is not inex­ haustible; and it tends to weaken the person who too freely partakes of it. Thus we see that there are many causes which impair the happiness of friends.
We may expect a friendship almost divine, such as philo­ sophers have sometimes dreamed of : we find what is human. The good of it is necessarily limited; it does not take the place of marriage; it affords rather a solace than an arm of support. It had better not be based on pecuniary obligations; these more often mar than make a friendship. It is most likely to be per­ manent when the two friends are equal and independent, or when they are engaged together in some common work or have some public interest in common. It exists among the bador inferior sort of men almost as much as among the good; the bad and good, and 'the neither bad nor good,' are drawn together in a strange manner by personal attachment. The essence of it is loyalty, without which it would cease to be friendship.
Another question (9) maybe raised, whether friendship can safely exist between young persons of different sexes, not connected by ties of relationship, and without the thought of love or marriage; ​
whether, again, a wife or a hushand should have any intimate friend, besides his or her partner in marriage. The answer to this latter question is rather perplrxing, and would probably bf' different in different countrie" (cp. S)mpos. p. 182J. \l\Thik we do not deny that great good may result from such attachments, for the mind may be drawn out and the charactPr enlarged by them; yet we feel also that they are attended with many dangers, and that this Romance of Heavenly Love requires a strength, a freedom from passion, a self control, which, in youth especially, are rarely to be found. The propriety of such friendships must he estimated a good deal by the manner in which public opinion regards them; they rnust he reconciled wilh the ordinary duties of life; and they must be Justified by the result.
Yet another question, 10). Admitting that friend!:>hips cannot be always permanent, we may ask when and upon what conditions
LYSIS, OR FRIENDSHIP.
PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.
| Socrates, who is the narrator. | Menexenus. |
| Hippothales.. | Lysis. |
* Ctesippus.
Scene:—A newly-erected Palaestra outside the walls of Athens.
Lysis. Socrates, Hippothales. IWAS going from the Academy straight to the Lyceum, Lysis. intending to take the outer road, which is close under the wall. When I came to the postern gate of the city, which is by the fountain of Panops, I fell in with Hippo­ thales, the son of Hieronymus, and Ctesippus the Paeanian, and a company of young men who were standing with them. Hippothales, seeing me approach, asked whence I came and whither I was going.
I am going, I replied, from the Academy straight to the Lyceum.
Then come straight to us, he said, and put in here; you may as well.
Who are you, I said; and where am I to come?
He showed me an enclosed space and an open door over against the wall. And there, he said, is the building at which we all meet: and a goodly company we are.
And what is this building, I asked; and what sort of enter­ tainment have you?
$^{204}$ The building, he replied, is a newly erected Palaestra; and the entertainment is generally conversation, to which you are welcome.
Thank you, I said; and is there any teacher there?
Lysis. Socrates, Hippothales, Ctesippus. Yes, he said, your old friend and admirn, Miccus. Indeed, r replied; he is a very eminent professor.
Arc you disposed, he said, to go with me and see them?
Yes, 1 said; hut I should like lo know first, what is expected of me, and who is the favourite among you?
Some persons have one favmirite, Socrates, and some another, he said.
And who is yours? I asked: tell me that, Hippothali s.
The love fancies of Hippothales are very ridiculous. At this he blushed_: and I said to him, 0 Hivpothales, thou son of I Iicronymus ! do not say that you are, or that you arc not, in love; the confession is too late; for I sec that you are not only in love, but are already far gone in your love. Simple and foolish as T am, the Gnds have given me the power of understanding affections of this kind.
Whereupon he blushed more and more.
Ctesipvus said : I like to sec yuu blushing, Ilippothaks, and hesitating to tell S0cn1tes the name; when, if hP were with you but for a very short time, you would have plagued him to death by talking about nothing else. Indeed, Socrates, he has literally deafened us, and stnpped our ears with the praisPs of Lysis; and if he is a little intoxicated, there is every likelihood that we may have our sleep murdered with a cry of Lysis. His performances in prose are bad enough, but nothing at all in comparison with his verse; and when he drenches us with his poems and other rompositions, it is really too bad; and worse still is his manner of singing them to his love; he has a voice which is truly appalling, and we cannot help hearing him : and now having a question put to him by you, behold he is blushing.
Who is Lysis? I said: I suppose that he must be young; for the name does not recall any one to me.
Why, he said, his father being a very well known man, he retains his patronymic, and is not as yet commonly called by his own name; but, although you do not know his name, I am sure that you must know his face, for that is quite enough to distinguish him.
But tell me whose son he is, I said.
He is the eldest son of Democrates, of the deme of Aexone.
Ah, Hippothales, I said ; what a noble and really perfect ​Page:The Dialogues of Plato v. 1.djvu/90 ​Page:The Dialogues of Plato v. 1.djvu/91 ​Page:The Dialogues of Plato v. 1.djvu/92 ​Page:The Dialogues of Plato v. 1.djvu/93 ​Page:The Dialogues of Plato v. 1.djvu/94 ​Page:The Dialogues of Plato v. 1.djvu/95