# Eau Claire National Bank v. Jackman/Opinion of the Court

* Court Documents
* Case Syllabus
* Opinion of the Court
United States Supreme Court
204 U.S. 522
Eau Claire National Bank v. Jackman
Argued: January 16 and 17, 1907. --- Decided: February 25, 1907
A motion is made to dismiss on the ground that the record presents nothing but questions of fact. It is contended that neither in the pleadings of the bank nor in any way was any right, privilege, or immunity under a Federal statute specifically set up or claimed in the state courts. The only questions presented by the pleadings, it is urged, were, did the bankrupt give the bank a preference, and did the bank accept it with reasonable grounds to believe that a preference was intended? The supreme court, however, considered the pleadings to have broader meaning, and answered some of the contentions of the bank by the construction it gave to the bankrupt act. The case, therefore, comes within the ruling in Nutt v. Knut, 200 U.S. 12, 50 L. ed. 348, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 216. It was there said: 'A party who insists that a judgment cannot be rendered against him consistently with the statutes of the United States may be fairly held, within the meaning of § 709 (U.S.C.omp. Stat. 1901 p. 575), to assert a right and immunity under such statutes, although the statutes may not give the party himself a personal or affirmative right that could be enforced by direct suit against his adversary. See also Rector v. City Deposit Bank Co. 200 U.S. 405, 50 L. ed. 527, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 289.
On the merits of the case we start with the facts established against the bank, that the property of Young, at the time he executed the chattel mortgages and when he executed the deed to the lumber company, at a fair valuation, was insufficient to pay his debts, and that, by the execution of those instruments, and the transfer of his property effected thereby, he intended to give the bank a preference over his other creditors, and that the bank had reasonable cause to believe that he intended thereby to give it a preference, and to enable it to obtain a greater percentage of its debt than any other creditor of Young of the came class. These, then, are the prominent facts, and seemingly justified the judgment. Against this result what does the bank urge? It urges, first, that there is included in the judgment the sum of $1,335.62, the net proceeds of the sale of certain logs, called the 'up-river-logs,' which, it is contended, were not covered by either of the mortgages, and that the supreme court, in its opinion, apparently supposed that those logs were covered by the mortgages, and erred in giving judgment therefor. This is a misunderstanding of the opinion. While the court did not explicitly distinguish between the mortgages and the deed to the lumber company, we think it is clear that the court regarded the deed, and what was to be done under it, as the consummation of the 'legal wrong,' to use the language of the court, which went back to the time of the mortgages. In other words, that the upriver logs as well as the other property were conveyed to the lumber company for the purpose of giving a preference to the bank.
The bank also attempts to urge against this conclusion the different views expressed by the trial court and the supreme court upon the finding of the jury as to the relation which the lumber company stood to the bank. The jury found, in answer to questions 4 and 5, that the lumber company, acting for the bank, took the legal title for the benefit of the latter under an agreement with Young and the bank to account to it for a portion of the proceeds. The trial court said that this was not a finding 'that the lumber company was the agent of the bank.' The supreme court thought that the jury 'pretty clearly decided' that the bank was a principal and the lumber company 'a mere agent' in the matter. It is true the supreme court immediately added: 'However, the evidence seems to clearly establish that the lumber company purchased the property from Young in the regular course of business, without any understanding with the defendant, other than that its interest in the property as mortgagee and claimant under numerous statutory labor liens should be recognized, and the equivalent thereof in money delivered to it out of the proceeds.' [125 Wis. 478, 104 N. W. 102.] And this was deemed sufficient to accomplish the preference which Young intended to give the bank. The court passed over, as not important, the distinction between the notes given by the lumber company to Young as the purchase price of the lumber.
These minor matters out of the way, we come to the more important contentions of the bank. These contentions are expressed in the form of questions, the first of which is: 'Can a trustee in bankruptcy, under the provisions of the bankruptcy act, lawfully maintain a suit to recover the value of a voidable preference without first electing to avoid such preference by notice to the creditor receiving such preference, and by demand for its return?'
It is urged by the bank that it cannot, and to sustain this contention, that a preference is not void, but voidable. And voidable solely at the election of the trustee, who must indicate a purpose to do so. The argument is that, a preference being voidable, the creditor receiving it is not in default until he fail to or refuse to surrender it on demand. Prior to that time his possession is rightful and lawful, and he is not guilty of any wrong, tort, or conversion. And the demand, it is further urged, must be made before suit, for, it seems also to be contended, that the creditor must be given an opportunity to exercise the election given him by subdivision g of § 57 of the bankrupt act to surrender the preference and prove his claim. We say, 'seems to be contended,' because we are not clear that counsel for the bank claims that the rights of a creditor under 57g depend upon the action of the trustee. Counsel say:
'The bankrupt act, therefore, contemplates that the trustee shall exercise his election as to whether or not he shall avoid a preference, and it also contemplates that the creditor receiving such alleged preference must exercise an election as to what course he shall take. Until the trustee exercises his election, no cause of action accrues. The creditor is not called upon to elect what course he shall take until the trustee has acted. It therefore follows that the trustee should exercise his election and make his demand before commencing suit.'
And this, it is argued, is more than a mere question of state practice, and involves the question whether the property consisting of the alleged preference is any part of the trust estate. If it be intended by this to assert that the action of the creditor under 57g is to wait upon or depends upon the action of the trustee under § 60, we do not assent, and nothing can be deduced, therefore, from the supposed relation of those sections as to the necessity of a demand before suit. We do not see how such a demand can even be an element in the consideration of the creditor, whether he will surrender the preference and prove his debt. The right of surrender exists as well after suit as before suit. Keppel v. Tiffin Sav. Bank, 197 U.S. 356, 49 L. ed. 790, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 443.
Independently of such considerations, whether the election by a trustee to avoid a preference should be exercised by a demand before suit or can be exercised by the suit itself might be difficult to determine if it were necessary on the record. 1 Chitty, Pl. 176, and cases cited; Shuman v. Fleckenstein, 4 Sawy. 174, Fed. Cas. No. 12,826; Brooke v. McCraken Fed. Cas. No. 1,932; Wright v. Skinner, 136 Fed. 694; Goldberg v. Harlan, 33 Ind. App. 465, 67 N. E. 707. But we do not think it is open to the bank to urge the first. The bank, it is true, demurred to the complaint and urged as a ground of demurrer the absence of an allegation of a demand. But the bank did not stand on the demurrer. It answered, and not only traversed the allegations of the plaintiff, but set up an independent defense, and showed that a demand would have been unavailing, and a demand is not necessary where it is to be presumed that it would have been unavailing. Davenport v. Ladd, 38 Minn. 545, 38 N. W. 622; Bogle v. Gordon, 39 Kan. 31, 17 Pac. 857. Besides, it appears that a demand was made before suit. In determining from what date interest should be given the trial court said: 'There is evidence of a demand, but I think only a short time elapsed until action was commenced, so that it will make little difference whether interest is computed from the time of the demand or the commencement of the action.'
The trial court instructed the jury substantially, in the words of subdivision a of § 60 of the bankrupt act, as to when a debtor should be deemed to have given a preference, and, in explanation of the intention of the debtor, said to 'intend to prefer would be to make a transfer for the purpose of enabling the bank to obtain a greater percentage of its debt than any other debtors of the same class.' And, defining this class of creditors, said further: 'So far as creditors' rights are involved in this action, they are all of the same class, by which is meant they would receive the same percentage of their claims. Claims for taxes or wages within certain times, so as to be preferred, would be of a different class. But claims of general creditors, like those approved in the Young bankruptcy proceedings, are all of the same class.' The bank excepted, and assigned as error the charge that all of the creditors were of the same class. Disposing of the assignment the supreme court said: 'Whether that is right or wrong does not seem to in any way concern the case. This action, as we have indictated, is simply one in trover to recover the value of property which, as is alleged, was, in fraud of the bankrupt act, wrongfully converted by defendant to its own use. Whether there was one or more classes of creditors, and in what manner the property sought to be recovered would, if the suit were successful, be administered, did not vary in the slightest degree the legal rights of the plaintiff. If the property was obtained by the defendant in fraud of the bankrupt act, plaintiff was entitled to recover the same, and this is the only question involved.'
The bank contests this view, and contends that, if accepted, 'it would be impossible to ascertain whether or not the preference had been received without first determining the question of whether the enforcement of the transfer would enable the bank to recover a greater percentage of its debt than other creditors of the same class.' But there is a question of fact to be considered. It was a question of fact what claims were proved against the estate. At the trial the learned judge who presided described them in his instructions as claims of general creditors. In his memorandum opinion he said that, from his minutes and the statements of the evidence in the briefs of counsel, he was inclined to believe that the point was not well taken that the evidence did not show that the effect of the enforcement of the transfer would be to enable the bank to obtain a greater percentage of its debt than other creditors of the same class. The bank, in its brief in this court, says, 'certain other claims were filed and allowed in the bankruptcy proceedings as preferred claims. These were probably claims for wages after the time of the transfers in question.' In the list of claims referred to some only are marked preferred. But, granting that they all were, they were represented by the trustee.
The other questions propounded by the bank are based on the sixth assignment of error. We will not examine the arguments of counsel for the bank in detail. Their fundamental contention is that the transfers to the bank were not invalid as a preference if their enforcement would not operate to give the bank a greater percentage of its debt than other creditors of the same class would receive. And such, it is further contended, was not the result, and it is intimated that claims of possible and fictitious creditors were in effect considered. But this contention encounters the facts found by the jury and the trial court. We have already seen what, in the opinion of the trial court, the evidence established as to the effect of the transfers, and the jury found that Young was insolvent at the time they were made, and that the purpose of their execution was to give the bank a preference and to enable it to obtain a greater percentage of its debt than other creditors of Young of the same class. These findings were not disturbed by the supreme court, and we must accept them as stating the facts established by the evidence, although counsel seem to invoke an examination by us of the record against them. Taking them as true, they show a case of preference and grounds to set it aside. The bank also contends, in effect, that in such suit the validity of all other claims against the bankrupt can be litigated, and whether they have received voidable preferences and have not been required to surrender them. The broad effect of the contention repels it as unsound. To yield to it would transfer the administration of a bankrupt's estate from the United States district court to the state court.
Judgment affirmed.

## Notes

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