OpenLLM-France/wikimedia huggingface dataset:
# The Reason of Church-governement Urg'd against Prelaty/Book 1 Chapter 4

CHAP. IV.
THat which was promis'd next, is to declare the impossibility of grounding Evangelick government in the imitation of the Jewish Priesthood: which will be done by considering both the quality of the persons, and the office it selfe. Aaron and his sonnes were the Princes of their Tribe before they were sanctified to the Priesthood: that personall eminence which they held above the other Levites, they receav'd not only from their office, but partly brought it into their office: and so from that time forward the Priests were not chosen out of the whole number of the Levites, as our Bishops, but were borne inheritors of the dignity. Therefore unlesse we shall choose our Prelats only out of the Nobility, and let them runne in a blood, there can be no possible imitation of Lording over their brethren in regard of their persons altogether unlike. As for the office w$^{ch}$ was a representation of Christs own person more immediately in the high Priest, & of his whole priestly office in all the other; to the performanoe of w$^{ch}$ the Levits were but as servitors & Deacons, it was necessary there should ​be a distinction of dignity betweene two functions of so great ods. But there being no such difference among our Ministers, unlesse it be in reference to the Deacons, it is impossible to found a Prelaty upon the imitation of this Priesthood. For wherein, or in what worke is the office of a Prelat excellent above that of a Pastor? in ordination you'l say; but flatly against Scripture, for there we know Timothy receav'd ordination by the hands of the Presbytery, notwithstanding all the vaine delusions that are us'd to evade that testimony, and maintaine an unwarrantable usurpation. But wherefore should ordination be a cause of setting up a superior degree in the Church? is not that whereby Christ became our Saviour a higher and greater worke, then that whereby he did ordaine messengers to preach and publish him our Saviour? Every Minister sustains the person of Christ in his highest work of communicating to us the mysteries of our salvation, and hath the power of binding and absolving, how should he need a higher dignity to represent or execute that which is an inferior work in Christ? why should the performance of ordination which is a lower office exalt a Prelat, and not the seldome discharge of a higher and more noble office w$^{ch}$ is preaching and administring much rather depresse him? Verily neither the nature, nor the example of ordination doth any way require an imparity betweene the ordainer and the ordained. For what more naturall then every like to produce his like, man to beget man, fire to propagate fire, and in examples of highest opinion the ordainer is inferior to the ordained; for the Pope is not made by the precedent Pope, but by Cardinals, who ordain and consecrate to a higher and greater office then their own.
# The Reaper and the Flowers

* "The Reaper and the Flowers" in Voices of the Night, 1839.
* "The Reaper and the Flowers" in The Riverside song book, 1893.
# The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787/Volume 3/Appendix A/CCCXLIII

​ⅭⅭⅭⅩⅬⅢ. James Madison: “Genl. Remarks on the Convention.”
For case of suffrage see Deb.: Aug. 7.
1.Its Members of the most select kind & possessing particularly the confidence of yr. Constituents
2.do- generally of mature age & much political experience.
3.Disinterestedness & candor demonstrated by mutual concessions, & frequent changes of opinion
4.Few who did not change in the progress of discussions the opinions on important points which they carried into the Convention
5.Few who, at the close of the Convention, were not ready to admit this change as the enlightening effect of the discusions—
6.And how few, whose opinions at the close of the Convention, have not undergone changes on some points, under the more enlightening influence of experience.
7.Yet how much fewer still who, if now living, with the recollection of the difficulties in the Convention, of overcoming or reconciling honest differences of opinion, political biasses, and local interests; and with due attention to the varieties & discords of opinion, the vicisitudes of parties, and the collisions real or imagined of local interests, witnessed on the face of the Nation, would not felicitate their Country on the happy result of the original Convention, and deprecate the experiment of another with general power to revise its work.
8.The restraining influence of the Constin on the aberrations of the States of great importance tho’ invisible. It stifles wishes & inclinations which wd otherwise ripen into overt & pernicious acts. The States themselves are unconscious of the effect. Were these Constitul. and insuperable obstacles out of the way — how many political ills might not have sprung up where not suspected. The propensities in some cases, as Mas: Kenty. &c have not been altogether contrould, and but for foreseen difficulties might have been followd. by greater
# The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787/Volume 3/Appendix A/CCCXVI

​ⅭⅭⅭⅩⅥ. Thomas Jefferson to John Adams.
Monticello, August 10, 1815.
Do you know that there exists in manuscript the ablest work of this kind ever yet executed, of the debates of the constitutional convention of Philadelphia in 1788? The whole of every thing said and done there was taken down by Mr. Madison, with a labor and exactness beyond comprehension.
# The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787/Volume 3/Appendix A/CCCXV

​ⅭⅭⅭⅩⅤ. Gouverneur Morris to Moss Kent.
Morrisania, January 12th, 1815.
When, in framing the Constitution, we restricted so closely the power of government over our fellow citizens of the militia, it was not because we supposed there would ever be a Congress so mad as to attempt tyrannizing over the people or militia, by the militia. The danger we meant chiefly to provide against was, the hazarding of the national safety by a reliance on that expensive and inefficient force. An overweening vanity leads the fond many, each man against the conviction of his own heart, to believe or affect to believe, that militia can beat veteran troops in the open field and even play of battle. This idle notion, fed by vaunting demagogues, alarmed us for our country, when in the course of that time and chance, which happen to all, she should be at war with a great power.
Those, who, during the Revolutionary storm, had confidential acquaintance with the conduct of affairs, knew well that to rely on militia was to lean on a broken reed. We knew, also, that to coop up in a camp those habituated to the freedom and comforts of social life, without subjecting them to the strict observation and severe control of officers regularly bred, would expose them to such fell disease, that pestilence would make more havoc than the sword. We knew that when militia were of necessity called out, and nothing but necessity can justify the call, mercy as well as policy requires, that they be led immediately to attack their foe. This gives them a tolerable chance; and when superior in number, possessing, as they must, a correct knowledge of the country, it is not improbable that their efforts may be crowned with success. To that end, ​nevertheless, it is proper to maintain in them a good opinion of themselves, for despondency is not the road to victory.
But to rely on undisciplined, ill-officered men, though each were individually as brave as Caesar, to resist the well-directed impulse of veterans, is to act in defiance of reason and experience. We flattered ourselves, that the constitutional restriction on the use of militia, combined with the just apprehension of danger to liberty from a standing army, would force those entrusted with the conduct of national affairs, to make seasonable provision for a naval force. We were not ignorant of the puerile notions entertained by some on that subject, but we hoped, alas! we vainly hoped, that our councils would not be swayed by chattering boys, nor become the sport of senseless declamation.
# The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787/Volume 3/Appendix A/CCCXLIX

​ⅭⅭⅭⅩⅬⅨ. Rufus King to C. King.
Senate Chamber, 23 March, 1824.
The election of the Pr., as it is one of the most important, so it is one of the most intricate provisions of the Constitution, and in its object, except in the first stage of the process, is assigned to the States acting in their federal equal capacity. For this reason, measures which may be employed in the several States, under regulations and provisions of simple, and single sovereignties, could not be adopted in the balanced system of the Constitution of the U.S. ​—a compact between the States, wh. contains special provisions whereby the executive, legislative and judicial officers must be appointed.
Because Conventions may be, and are, held to nominate State officers it does not hence result that they may be held in order to concentrate the opinion, of the States, relative to the election of any officer of the U.S.
# The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787/Volume 3/Appendix A/CCCXLV

​ⅭⅭⅭⅩⅬⅤ. James Madison to George Hay.
Montpellier Aug 23. 1823.
I have recd. your letter of the 11th with the Newspapers containing your remarks on the present mode of electing a President, and your proposed remedy for its defects. I am glad to find you have not abandoned your attention to great Constitutional topics.
The difficulty of finding an unexceptionable process for appointing the Executive Organ of a Government such as that of the U.S., was deeply felt by the Convention; and as the final arrangement of it took place in the latter stage of the Session, it was not exempt from a degree of the hurrying influence produced by fatigue and impatience in all such Bodies: tho’ the degree was much less than usually prevails in them.
The part of the arrangement which casts the eventual appointment on the House of Reps. voting by States, was, as you presume, an accomodation to the anxiety of the smaller States for their sovereign equality, and to the jealousy of the larger towards the cumulative functions of the Senate. The Agency of the H. of Reps. was thought safer also than that of the Senate, on account of the greater number of its members. It might indeed happen that the event would turn on one or two States having one or two Reps. only; but even in that case, the Representations of most of the States being numerous, the House would present greater obstacles to corruption than the Senate with its paucity of Members. It may be observed ​also, that altho’ for a certain period the evil of State votes given by one or two individuals, would be extended by the introduction of new States, it would be rapidly diminished by growing populations within extensive territories. At the present period, the evil is at its maximum.…
I agree entirely with you in thinking that the election of Presidential Electors by districts, is an amendment very proper to be brought forward at the same time with that relating to the eventual choice of President by the H. of Reps. The district mode was mostly, if not exclusively, in view when the Constitution was framed and adopted; & was exchanged for the general ticket & the legislative election, as the only expedient for baffling the policy of the particular States which had set the example.
# The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787/Volume 3/Appendix A/CCCXVII

​ⅭⅭⅭⅩⅦ. Gouverneur Morris to W.H. Wells.
Morrisania, February 24th, 1815.
The Constitution, I think, intended that certain offices should be held at the President’s pleasure. It is unquestionably an abuse to create a vacancy in the recess of the Senate, by turning a man out of office, and then filling it as a vacancy that has happened. … Shortly after the Convention met, there was a serious discussion on the importance of arranging a national system of sufficient strength to operate, in despite of State opposition, and yet not strong enough to break down State authority. I delivered on that occasion this short speech. ‘Mr President; if the rod of Aaron do not swallow the rods of the Magicians, the rods of the Magicians will swallow the rod of Aaron.’
You will ask, perhaps, how, under such impressions, I could be an advocate of the Federal Constitution. To this I answer, first, that I was warmly pressed by Hamilton to assist in writing the Federalist, which I declined. Secondly, that nothing human can be perfect. Thirdly, that the obstacles to a less imperfect system were ​insurmountable. Fourthly, that the Old Confederation was worse. And, fifthly, that there was no reason, at that time, to suppose our public morals would be so soon and so entirely corrupted. Mr. Mason, a delegate from Virginia, constantly inveighing against Aristocracy, labored to introduce Aristocratic provisions. Some of them might have been wholesome, but they would have been rejected by public feeling, in the form proposed, and if modified to render them acceptable, by detracting proportionately from executive authority, which was his plan, we should have risked less indeed from the whelming flood of Democracy, but we should have had a President unable to perform the duties of his office. Surrounded by difficulties, we did the best we could; leaving it with those who should come after us to take counsel from experience, and exercise prudently the power of amendment, which we had provided.
# The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787/Volume 3/Appendix A/CCCXLVII

​ⅭⅭⅭⅩⅬⅦ. James Madison to Thomas Jefferson.
Montpellier, Jany 14, 1824.
An appeal from an abortive ballot in the first meeting of the Electors to a reassembling of them, a part of the several plans, has something plausible, and, in comparison with the existing arrangement, might not be inadmissible. But it is not free from material objections. It relinquishes, particularly, the policy of the Constitution in allowing as little time as possible for the Electors to be known and tampered with. And beside the opportunities for ​intrigue furnished by the interval between the first and second meeting, the danger of having one electoral body played off against another, by artful misrepresentations rapidly transmitted, a danger not to be avoided, would be at least doubled.
# The Psychological Origin and the Nature of Religion

* information about this edition.
* related portals: Religion.
* sister projects: Wikidata item.

## Preface

This little book, the last of a series of similar volumes each containing an exposition by a recognised authority of one of the many Religions the world has known, might have been put with as much propriety at the head of the series, there to show how Religion originated in the mind of man, what mental powers it presupposes, what is its nature and what its relation to the non-religious life. But one is, no doubt, better able to take up profitably these problems after having familiarised oneself with the several aspects of religious life. Therefore The Psychological Origin and the Nature of Religion was placed at the end, where it fulfils the additional purpose of linking the concluded series of Histories of Religions with a cognate one, now being prepared by the same publishers, on Ancient and Modern Systems of Philosophy.

## CONTENTS

CHAP.
| I. | The Fundamental Nature of Religion |
| II. | Three Types of Behaviour Differentiated |
| III. | Origin of the Ideas of Ghosts, Nature-Beings, and Gods |
| IV. | Magic and Religion |
| V. | The Original Emotion of Primitive Religious Life |
| VI. | Concluding Remarks on the Nature and the Function of Religion |
This work is in the public domain in the United States because it was published before January 1, 1929.
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# The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787/Volume 3/Appendix A/CLXXXIV

​ⅭⅬⅩⅩⅩⅣ. Rufus King in the Massachusetts Convention.
Monday, 28th.—Mr. King, in speaking on the Inspection Laws (Sect. 10, 1st Article), said this was introduced on account of the State of Virginia, where it is the custom to lodge the tobacco in public warehouses for inspection and for safety; that the owner receives a certificate from the inspecting officer of the quantity of tobacco lodged there; that the State insures it, while there remaining, from fire and other accidents; that these certificates pass from one to another as bank-bills, and that the tobacco is delivered to the person who demands it, on presenting the certificate; that, on receiving it, he pays the charge of inspection and storage, and a premium of insurance, which goes into the public treasury, and amounts to a duty on exportation.…
​ Mr. King stated the reasons for not appointing a Council, which were that the small States would insist on having one, at least; and that would make another body similar to the Senate. Therefore it was thought, if in some cases the Senate might answer, and in others the President might require the opinion of the officers of State, that, in this case, secrecy, despatch, and fidelity were more to be expected than where there is a multitudinous executive.
# The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787/Volume 3/Appendix A/CVIII

​CVIII. John Dickinson to George Read.
Mr. Dickinson presents his compliments to Mr. Read, and requests that if the constitution, formed by the convention, is to be signed by the members of that body, Mr. Read will be so good as to subscribe Mr. Dickinson’s name—his indisposition and some particular circumstances requiring him to return home.
September 15th, 1787.
* ↑ W.T. Read, Life and Correspondence of George Read, 456–457.
* ↑ Dickinson’s signature to the Constitution is in Read’s handwriting.
# The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787/Volume 3/Appendix A/CLXXXVII

​ⅭⅬⅩⅩⅩⅦ. Benjamin Franklin to M. Le Veillard.
Philada Feby 17th. 1788
I sent you with my last a Copy of the new Constitution propos’d for the United States by the late General Convention. I sent one also to our excellent Friend the Duke de la Rochefoucault.
I attended the Business of the Convention faithfully for four Months. Enclos’d you have the last speech I made in it.
# The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787/Volume 3/Appendix A/CV

​CV. Jonathan Dayton to Elias Dayton.
Philadelphia, Sept. 9, 1787.
We have happily so far finished our business, as to be employed in giving it its last polish and preparing it for the public inspection. This, I conclude, may be done in three or four days, at which time the public curiosity and our desire of returning to our respective homes, will equally be gratified.
# The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787/Volume 3/Appendix A/CVI

​CVI. Joseph Jones to James Madison.
13 September, 1787.
The continuance of your session and some stories I have heard since my return and on my visit to Alexandria, make me apprehensive there is not that unanimity in your councils I hoped for and had been taught to believe. From whence it originated I know not, but it is whispered here, there is great disagreement among the gentlemen of our delegation, that the general and yourself on a very important question were together, Mr. M—n alone and singular in his opinion and the other two gentlemen holding different sentiments. I asked what was the question in dispute, and was answered that it respected either the defect in constituting the Convention as not proceeding immediately from the people, or the referring the proceedings of the body to the people for ultimate decision and confirmation. My informant also assured me the fact might be relied on as it came, as he expressed it, from the fountain head. I took the liberty to express my disbelief of the fact and that from the circumstances related it was very improbable and unworthy attention. I mention this matter for want of something else to write to you, and more especially as it respects our delegation in particular.
# The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787/Volume 3/Appendix A/CVII

​CVII. Sydney to Lord Dorchester.
Whitehall, 14 Sept., 1787.
The report of an intention on the part of America to apply for a sovereign of the house of Hanover has been circulated here; and ​should an application of that nature be made, it will require a very nice consideration in what manner so important a subject should be treated. But whatever ideas may have been formed upon it, it will upon all accounts be advisable that any influence which your lordship may possess should be exerted to discourage the strengthening their alliance with the house of Bourbon, which must naturally follow were a sovereign to be chosen from any branch of that family.
* ↑ Bancroft, History of the Constitution of the United States, II, 441.
* ↑ See XCII above.
# The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787/Volume 3/Appendix A/CLXXXV

​ⅭⅬⅩⅩⅩⅤ. Luther Martin to T.C. Deye.
To the Hon. Thomas Cockey Deye, Speaker of the House of Delegates of Maryland.
Sir,
I flatter myself the subject of this letter will be a sufficient apology for thus publicly addressing it to you, and through you to the other members of the house of delegates. It cannot have escaped your or their recollection, that when called upon as the servant of a free state, to render an account of those transactions in which I had had a share, in consequence of the trust reposed in me by that state, among other things, I informed them, “that some time in July, the honorable Mr. Yates and Mr. Lansing of New-York, left the convention; that they had uniformly opposed the system, and that I believe, despairing of getting a proper one brought forward, or of rendering any real service, they returned no more.”—You cannot, sir, have forgot, for the incident was too remarkable not to have made some impression, that upon my giving this information, the zeal of one of my honorable colleagues, in favor of a system which I thought it my duty to oppose, impelled him to interrupt me, and in a manner which I am confident his zeal alone prevented him from being convinced was not the most delicate, to insinuate pretty strongly, that the statement which I had given of the conduct of those gentlemen, and their motives for not returning, were not candid.
Those honorable members have officially given information on this subject, by a joint letter to his excellency governor Clinton—it is published. Indulge me, sir, in giving an extract from it, that it may stand contrasted in the same page with the information I gave, and may convict me of the want of candor of which I was charged, if the charge was just—if it will not do that, then let it silence my accusers.
“Thus circumstanced, under these impressions, to have hesitated ​would have been to be culpable;—we therefore gave the principles of the constitution, which has received the sanction of a majority of the convention, our decided and unreserved dissent. We were not present at the completion of the new constitution; but before we left the convention, its principles were so well established as to convince us, that no alteration was to be expected to conform it to our ideas of expediency and safety. A persuasion that our further attendance would be fruitless and unavailing rendered us less solicitous to return.”
These, sir, are their words; on this I shall make no comment; I wish not to wound the feelings of any person, I only wish to convince.
I have the honor to remain, With the utmost respect, Your very obedient servant,
Luther Martin.
Baltimore, January 27, 1788.
* ↑ Yates, Secret Proceedings and Debates (Albany, 1821), pp. 9–10; first printed in the Maryland Gazette, January 29, 1788.
* ↑ See ⅭⅬⅧ (27) above.
* ↑ See ⅭⅬⅩⅦ above.