# Aircraft in Warfare (1916)/Chapter 17

CHAPTER XVII.
(December 24th, 1914).
THE MAINTENANCE OF BRITISH SUPREMACY. GOVERNMENT VERSUS PRIVATE MANUFACTURE. CONTINUITY OF POLICY. SCHEME OF CONTROL. A BOARD OF AERONAUTICAL CONSTRUCTION.
§ 110. Maintenance of British Supremacy. The maintenance of the present superiority of the British reconnaissance machine and the development of different types, and, in short, the building up and consolidation of the Aeronautical Arm, both as to quality and quantity, in order to ensure our capacity to hold our own with the other great Powers, is a task of national importance, and, as such, one of the first magnitude. In order that our Aeronautical Arm may be raised and maintained as a whole at the necessary high degree of efficiency, more will be needed than merely the technical superiority of our machines; many other questions of vital consequence will require to be adequately dealt with. However, the basis of strength lies in possessing the right types of machine in adequate numbers. Hence there must be no relaxation of effort; we must retain our technical ascendancy by every means in our power.
There is much to be said at the outset in favour of the exercise of greater secrecy in the matter of technical information. At present a great deal of work of an important character is done at the public expense which is of the utmost value to the aeronautical constructor, and forthwith it is given complete publicity; one has only to glance through any one of the annual reports of the Advisory Committee to realise the extent to which this ​is the case. There is, it is true, also a certain amount of work which is not published, being considered as of a confidential character. The question arises whether the main body of the work, or, at least, some of the more important sections, should not be held back, and treated as confidential for a certain period, possibly one complete year, in order to give our own designers a twelve months' lead. The difficulties in the way of any such scheme are, firstly, that, to be effective, the first twelve months' output of any new design would require to be met as output from the Government factory; the conditions issued with designs and specifications for tenders, though nominally intended to ensure secrecy, can never be really effective. Secondly, in a branch of Governmental activity as little understood by the public as that of aeronautical construction, the public and Parliament expect to see something for their money, and for those entrusted with aeronautical development to have shrunk from publicity would have been equivalent to committing suicide. In spite of any disadvantage which may have resulted from publicity in the past, the net result has been highly satisfactory. It is more than probable, however, that the Continental Powers have somewhat underrated the importance of the work which had been done in this country, and have taken no particular pains to follow or study that work; this neglect is not likely to be repeated. Certain it is that, technically, the Continental nations are, without being aware of the fact, some way behind us in aeroplane design. The author is disposed to think that, all things considered, it will be found advisable in the future to restrict publication somewhat, and considerably to strengthen the Aircraft Factory, to enable full control to be exercised over new models, and otherwise to take steps to ensure secrecy where, in the national interest, it may be deemed wise.
​§ 111. Government versus Private Manufacture. In every problem of production in quantity, otherwise that which is termed "manufacture," the essence of true economy is continuity. The whole of the organisation of a modern factory is based on the work in progress being of the nature of a "flow," rather than a succession of jerks. In actual practice it is only in the case of certain industries in which the goods manufactured are not liable to change from year to year, and in which the demand is not of a fluctuating character, that the "flow" can be maintained under ideal conditions—that is to say, with perfect uniformity. In other cases fluctuations are inevitable; changes in design necessitated by the stress of competition and the advance of knowledge prevent the condition of perfect continuity from being realised. Under these conditions a not inconsiderable part of the duties of the organisation is that concerned with negotiating the necessary irregularities and changes. The work still is dealt with on the theory that it remains a flow, but it is actually a succession of batches, the flow being comparable to that of a river subject to seasonal fluctuations, periods of flood alternating with periods of slack. The system of organisation requires to be framed to deal with the consequent unavoidable breakages of continuity, and it is the business of the works and engineering staff so to regulate the progress of work that the resulting disorganisation is minimised, and the economy of production is not too seriously impaired. The possibilities of the situation, so far as the management staff" is concerned, are very much circumscribed by considerations of finance and the exigencies of the market. These latter questions are, or should be, dominated by the prevision of the directorate; they are matters governed by the policy of the company, for which the board of directors (directly or through their managing ​director) should be definitely responsible. The policy thus includes such questions as the market or markets to be attacked; the quantities and dates at which it is estimated sales can be effected; the financial needs, whether it be for building or plant extensions or for stock-in-trade; and the provision of, or the raising of, the necessary finance.
In brief, in a well-managed concern the Board may be said to control that which is in military parlance the strategy of the company, whilst the management staff look after the tactics. Clearly, just as in military affairs, success must depend very largely upon the strategic scheme being accommodated to the tactical resources, and the tactical work being skilfully adapted to the strategic scheme.
Now, in the case of a Government factory, there is no real board of directors. The financial side is controlled by the Treasury, whose interests are not concerned with the prosperity of the concern in the least degree; it is equally satisfactory from a Treasury standpoint whether the "grant" can be reduced by the most arbitrary and expensive "cheeseparing," or whether it is done by legitimate and proper means—by the exercise of true economy. The result is that anyone acquainted with the working of Government manufacturing institutions could cite innumerable cases of gross extravagance resulting from so-called Treasury economy. Again, there is no one to formulate in advance a proper manufacturing programme with the least assurance that there will be the means available in order to carry it to a successful conclusion; even ironwork of a part-finished structure has been known to be denied the wherewithal for a coat of paint! The cast-iron system of closing the programme at the termination of each financial year without carry forward is destructive of good management. Thus the ​position of a Government factory is equivalent to that of an army with no Minister of War, no strategic scheme, and a capricious and fitful transport and supply. The larger institutions, such as dockyards, etc., represent a national interest of sufficient magnitude to escape some of the disadvantages of Government control, but here the circumstances are exceptional.
Manufacturing by private firms under contract, therefore, has considerable advantages; but even here the want of regularity in the placing out of orders is not conducive to high economy; a private firm, however, is able to work in one job with another, and execute a Government contract in lieu of other work for which there may happen to be a lull in the demand. This is especially the case in war time, when (as at the present moment) a large proportion of our engineering works and factories, having little demand for their regular products, are mainly occupied in turning out munitions of war. Whatever the state of preparedness may be before war is declared, it is almost certain that the needs of the country, whether for aeroplanes, guns, or other items of armament, will be increased many times during the period of hostilities. The employment of private enterprise under these conditions is clearly desirable, and may be looked upon as imperative.
Once admit the above, the propriety of widely utilising the ordinary manufacturing resources of the country during peace time follows as a corollary, for it is only by this means that these resources can be brought promptly into operation when the need arises. A firm which has once executed contracts for any given article is always in a better position than one to whom the work is new; this is true in any case, but is more especially so where the preparations for manufacture involve the duplication of gauges, tool outfits, etc.
​When work is done by contract it is absolutely necessary that it should be first standardised in every detail. The rigid methods of gauging and viewing which have definitely to be adopted when aeroplanes (or other implements of war) are being manufactured to Government specification and contract, render anything in the way of ambiguity or alteration during manufacture intolerable. Therefore, whatever be the relative merits or demerits of private and Government manufacture, the former can only properly be resorted to for work which has passed its experimental stage, and has been finally standardised in every detail. This involves, in the case of anything so progressive as an aeroplane, that the Government will of necessity carry the manufacture of every new design up to a certain point; we may say up to that point at which it has become, after due tests and trials, an officially accepted type. This is almost exactly the position as it has come about: the Royal Aircraft Factory is directly responsible for the initial development of every new model (with the exception of some few "proprietary" types which have been taken into service): the only difficulty at present is that the resources of the factory are not sufficient fully to cope with even this preliminary work, and, in consequence, private enterprise is being called upon to do more than ought to be the case: the standardisation is having to be effected whilst manufacture is under weigh.
In view of the present position and the enormous development which may be anticipated in the course of the next few years, it will, in the author's opinion, be necessary very greatly to strengthen and increase the establishment of the Aircraft Factory in the near future.
§ 112. Future Maintenance of British Supremacy. Continuity of Policy. The supremacy of British aircraft can only be maintained by the adoption of a thoroughly ​progressive constructional policy, guided constantly by the most recent scientific discovery and research, and by utilising to the full information and experience gained in the Services. The day is past when technique or craftsmanship can be permanently bottled, and the trade or craft in question monopolised by any one nation, as was at one time the case. Under present-day conditions the lead can only be obtained and held by mobility and progress in which the motive power is derived by the combination of brains, energy, and material resources. The most that can be hoped is to obtain a lead of two or three years in advance of other nations, and to keep it. The task is not beyond the power of the country; we have both the men and the money, and an Empire whose preservation demands that nothing shall be left to chance.
The key to the whole situation lies in the proper organisation and control of the manufacturing resources of the Government, as at present represented by the Royal Aircraft Factory. This must be based on a clear conception of the duties of the factory as the birthplace of new types and the nursery for their development, also as the headquarters of full-scale experimental work, that is to say, tests and investigations engineering in character, or those in which actual flying is involved, as distinct from laboratory experiment. The deficiencies at present existing are due, firstly, to the fact that the Treasury has too much control over the Factory, and the Factory not enough control over the Treasury; secondly, there is no one upon whom definitely devolves the duty of initiating any departure in advance of immediate requirements; thirdly, the resources of the factory have been insufficient for the needs of the Services; it has been necessary to send out drawings and specifications to contractors before the designs have been standardised or even thoroughly established, with all the little attendant difficulties in the ​matter of minor alterations, ambiguities as to gauging, etc.; also with the loss of any real pretentions to secrecy. Lastly, there is a tendency to divorce the aircraft development of the two Services—the Army and Navy; this the author considers to be bad. The main supplies of established types may certainly be obtained by the two Services from independent sources or from different contractors, but to separate the experimental or developmental phase of construction appears to have nothing to commend it.
The deficiencies of the present régime, such as they are, in no way reflect adversely on the existing staff and personnel of the Royal Aircraft Factory as it stands; in fact, it is undeniably greatly to the credit of all concerned that so much has been done. It is, however, hard to say who is supposed to be responsible for supplying initiative and foresight. That initiative has not been lacking is evident, but it is an open question whether anyone could have been accused of neglect of duty if the factory had never developed or constructed a solitary aeroplane.
Actually that which is lacking is something analogous to a directorate, a Board whose existence would ensure continuity of policy, and whose members would be definitely responsible for the sufficiency of the constructional programme so far as its developmental side is concerned, and for securing the needed Treasury support.
§ 113. A Board of Aeronautical Construction. The duties adumbrated in the preceding paragraph would be best deputed to a Board of Aeronautical Construction, in which both Army and Navy are represented by the responsible heads respectively of the two branches of the Arm—namely, the Director-General of Military Aeronautics and the Director of the Air Department of the Admiralty, in addition to a strong civilian contingent selected for their eminence or attainments in such ​directions as aeronautical or mechanical engineering, manufacturing, naval architecture, business management (organisation), finance, etc., and including the Superintendent of the Factory. In view of the fact that the future of the new Arm has yet to be determined, and in view of the vital importance of this future, it would seem desirable that certain Cabinet Ministers, such as the Minister of War and the First Lord of the Admiralty, should ex officio be members of the Board. This may possibly appear to be- giving unnecessary importance to the idea, but it must be remembered that the existing Arms of the Services, during the earlier stages of their history, were considered of sufficient importance for the most minute and detailed attention of kings and princes, and the new Arm might almost claim as its right similar solicitude from those on whom the burden of office has fallen.
The duties and functions of the proposed Board would be in nowise limited to the aircraft themselves, but would extend to aircraft and counter-aircraft armament, and, further, to all questions of materiel ancillary to the employment of aircraft in the Services, including aeroplane vessels or ships.
The duties and constitution of the Advisory Committee for Aeronautics would remain as at present, being in no way affected. In some few cases it is possible that questions touching the work done at the Royal Aircraft Factory would be referred to the new Board in place of the Advisory Committee. The arrangements regulating the Board in the matter of expenditure would need to be, on a basis compatible with the responsibilities; a refusal or a cutting down by the Treasury of the requisitions by the Board, either annual or supplementary, should be rendered next to impossible. It would suffice for the purpose if, in case ​of such eventuality, it were made incumbent upon the civilian section of the Board to resign en bloc. Parliament and the public would thus be advised that something had gone wrong with the "machine." To create this position it is only necessary for a public statement to be made by a responsible Minister of the Crown that the Board has at its disposal whatever funds it deems necessary; this is virtually the footing on which the present Advisory Committee is placed.
The alternative to the creation of a Board, such as suggested in the present chapter, would be an extension of the powers of the Advisory Committee. The present functions of that Committee are strictly advisory; and they are, to all intents and purposes, confined to the scientific and technical side of the subject; the personnel of the Committee also has obviously been chosen on the basis of this being the intention. The Committee expends no money directly, but controls grants on account of aeronautics so far as relating to research work and the like. It would be impossible without destroying the whole intention and character of the Committee, to assign to it those duties in relation to the national programme of aeronautical construction for which the author is advocating the formation of a Board of Aeronautical Construction; hence any such change may be regarded as out of the question.