# The Civil Service and the Patronage/Chapter 01

THE CIVIL SERVICE AND THE PATRONAGE
CHAPTER I.
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE NATIONAL CIVIL SERVICE.
1789-1801.
The makers of the constitution fully realized that the adjustment of the power of appointment to office required careful consideration. From their youth up they had seen the rivalry for office, they had felt the influence of the patronage, in the politics of colony and state. John Adams complained that Governor Hutchinson of Massachusetts passed over proper candidates in order to advance members of his own family; and, while this particular charge may be unjust, it is certainly true that in most cases colonial governors owed their positions wholly to favoritism, and that one of their chief duties was to use the offices within their gift for the upbuilding of a British party. All Americans were familiar, moreover, with the power wielded in England by the “King's Friends,” the most mighty faction ever based almost solely on the distribution of offices, and the source to which the colonies attributed much of the evil treatment which had estranged them from the mother country. While they knew, however, the evil possibilities of the patronage, they regarded the disease as peculiarly characteristic of monarchy, and were unacquainted with the new conditions presented by a democratic form of government.
A mechanical system for the choice of public servants existed at that time in no considerable country except China, to whose example the convention at Philadelphia was not likely to turn;
nor in the ancient civilizations could any precedent for such a scheme be found. The responsibility for appointments must be personal, and the question to be decided was, in what person or persons it should reside. The national civil service under the Confederation was so small, and the conditions were so exceptional, that the experience to be drawn from its history was slight. It was practically certain, moreover, even before the convention of 1787 met, that the old system must be changed. The call for a constitution was largely the result of a reaction against the extreme democracy and decentralization of the Revolution; and it is not strange, therefore, to find in the earliest plans for “a more perfect union” the proposal to transfer the appointing power from Congress to the executive. In other words, the question of the civil service was part and parcel of the more general problem of the extent of the executive power, and was itself scarcely drawn into debate.
While it was thus tacitly admitted that the power of appointment should be taken from the legislature, the feeling was by no means universal that the executive could be safely intrusted with it. The idea of a council, one of whose duties should be to aid and limit the president in making appointments, was pertinaciously pressed. Its chief supporter was George Mason, who could point for authority to the constitutions of several states, and particularly to that of New York, which provided for a special council of appointment. It was urged, however, that the Senate could perform these functions; and it was said by Davie of North Carolina that this proposition was strongly supported by the smaller states because of their equal representation in that body. Opposition arose from those who feared the power, not of the executive alone, but of the whole central government; and Dickinson, supported by Randolph, suggested that officers be selected by the president with the advice and consent of the Senate, “except where by law the appointment shall be vested in the Legislatures or Executives of the several States.” This plan, so foreign to the spirit of the convention, was dropped by unanimous consent; and the two following clauses were finally framed, and have stood unchanged to the present time.
The president “shall nominate, and, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall appoint ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, judges of the Supreme Court, and all other officers of the United States, whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by law; but the Congress may by law vest the appointment of such inferior officers as they think proper in the president alone, in the courts of law, or in the heads of departments.
“The President shall have power to fill up all vacancies that may happen during the recess of the Senate, by granting commissions which shall expire at the end of their next session.”
In the debates on the adoption of the constitution, these clauses received a fair share of attention, though in all probability no single vote was changed because of them. In Pennsylvania the power of the Senate was most feared. “Centinel,” the strongest Antifederalist writer, predicted that the Senate would control appointments; and it was argued that, since that body was to judge officials when they were impeached, it should not share in their election. Thomas McKean replied that in practice the president would name the successful candidate in nominating him; and James Wilson relied upon the president's power to fill vacancies during the recess of Congress, to secure him his proper share of influence. In New York the Antifederalists occupied different ground from those of the neighboring state; and George Clinton, who was perhaps of all Americans the man best fitted by experience to judge, feared lest the president, by choosing subordinates from his own circle, should build up “an imperfect aristocracy, bordering on monarchy.” Similar differences of opinion existed among Federalists, and John Adams
and Roger Sherman carried on an interesting correspondence with regard to the subject in 1789. Adams graphically depicted the chances for combination and corruption opened by the participation of the Senate; and, while he perhaps underrated the danger of according the full power to the executive, he certainly grasped the nature of the problem better than his correspondent, who argued that the senators would in general be the most respectable citizens of their respective states, and deduced therefrom that they would be diffident about recommending even friends and kindred of other members, “lest they should be thought unduly to favor a person who is related to a member of their body.”
On one point there was widespread criticism: it was claimed that the president would be able to control the action of Congress by appointing its members to offices, and that congressmen should therefore be made ineligible during their terms. Roger Sherman answered this objection boldly by declaring that for many places they would be best fitted, and that all danger was prevented by the provision that they could accept no positions which had been created, or the emoluments of which had been increased, during their terms. Such arguments did not fully meet the issue; and three state conventions, those of New York, Virginia, and North Carolina, included a clause providing for such a restriction in their suggested amendments to the constitution. It will be found that at a later period this question assumed a peculiar importance.
While these discussions were progressing, it was claimed that in the very struggle then being waged instances of the evils dreaded were present. The Antifederalists, particularly in Pennsylvania, asserted that the Federalist mail authorities curtailed the circulation of newspapers hostile to the proposed constitution. These charges are made with great particularity, and may contain a kernel of truth; for the carriage of newspapers was not a part of the regular mail service, but was arranged
for by special bargain with the riders, a system which afforded opportunity for favoritism. A change in postal regulations made about this time may, however, explain the facts presented.
More extensive and more telling were the charges made by the Federalists. James Wilson of Pennsylvania pointed out that the transfer of the customs from the states to the national government, and the establishment of many new judicial and administrative offices, would turn the stream of patronage into a new channel, and that the constitution would therefore be opposed by all those who profited by existing conditions. Francis Hopkinson, in his famous satire, The New Roof, depicted the old woman who led the opposition to the improvement as using the cornice of the old roof for a cupboard, and as boiling her pot with the shingles that blew off. Specific charges were also made. The fact that Elbridge Gerry held no office in Massachusetts did not prevent the Federalists from attributing his opposition to a desire to retain one; and Luther Martin was accused of refusing to sign the draft of the constitution because he despaired of receiving under it an office that he desired.
The charges of interested opposition seemed most reasonable in New York. There the patronage was particularly valuable, owing to the commercial importance of New York City, where goods destined for a large part of New Jersey and of Connecticut paid duty. It will be remembered that New York had been willing that the Congress of the Confederation should lay certain customs dues, if the state government might retain the appointment of the collecting officers. In the state convention of 1788 the charge was definitely made that Governor Clinton was using this patronage to defeat the constitution. A prompt denial was made; it was pointed out that some of the state officials supported the new plan, and the charge was partly
withdrawn. Undoubtedly the state machine formed the chief prop of the opposition; but Clinton, as will be shown later, was moderate in his use of the appointing power, and it is extremely improbable that he made any direct threats of removal or promises of reward. The more serious accusation made by the Federalists, that the governor was chiefly influenced in his opposition by fear of loss of prestige, must be dismissed as entirely unfounded. It was perfectly natural that the men in office should oppose the constitution: they represented the ideas of the Revolution; they had been the active agents in destroying the governmental control of Great Britain over the colonies; and by their type of mind they were opposed to centralized government and vigorous administration. The adoption of the constitution marked a change of party dominance; and many of the men prominent in 1787 by 1790 had retired, some to be restored by the Democratic wave of 1800.
When the new government was installed, almost the first task with which it had to deal was that of filling the offices, in order that the constitution, and the laws as they were passed, might be executed. The question of qualification was left entirely to the discretion of President Washington, who formed his plans with the punctilious exactness which was characteristic of him. Early in May, after his inauguration, he wrote to Edward Rutledge, “I anticipate that one of the most difficult and delicate parts of the duty of my office will be that which relates to nominations for appointments;” and in the same letter he remarked that he had made it a rule to say nothing definite on particular appointments until his mind was made up. In 1796 he said that his plan was “to lay the recommendations . . . by, until the hour comes when nominations are to be made, and then after reference to them and an attention to other circumstances (which is often essential) prefer those who seem to have the greatest fitness for the office.”
There can be no doubt that Washington considered fitness for the post to be filled a sine qua non for appointment. His
letters constantly repeat this, and he was a man honest even with himself. An excellent example is a letter of May 21, 1789, to Mary Wooster: “ Madam, I have duly received your affecting letter, dated the 8th day of this month. Sympathizing with you as I do in the great misfortunes, which have befallen your family in consequence of the war, my feelings as an individual would forcibly prompt me to do everything in my power to repair those misfortunes. But as a public man, acting only with reference to the public good, I must be allowed to decide upon all points of my duty, without consulting my private inclinations and wishes. I must be permitted, with the best lights I can obtain, and upon a general view of characters and circumstances, to nominate such persons alone to offices, as in my judgment shall be the best qualified to discharge the functions of the departments to which they shall be appointed.” This absolute requirement of capacity seems to have been generally understood, and nearly every existing application for office under Washington dwells on the applicant's ability.
There is a broad difference between appointing only fit men to office, and appointing those who are most fit; and Washington pursued this second aim also. It was a difficult task. There were many applicants who appealed to his benevolence; and it must have been particularly hard to turn away soldiers of the Revolution, great numbers of whom urged their sufferings upon him as just ground for reward. Yet he always answered that these considerations could not offset superior efficiency. He refused to make public office a bounty, though in some cases he did assist such applicants with his private means. One class of seekers he cut off from all hope of office by writing to his nephew, Bushrod Washington, that relationship must be an absolute bar to preferment. So clear did he make the honesty of his attempt to fulfil his difficult task impartially, that sometimes even disappointed candidates acknowledged the justice or the necessity of his selections.
Into Washington's idea of fitness, however, several elements entered. The ability to perform the functions of the post was, of course, essential; but that alone was not a sufficient qualification. A large and loose-jointed federation, such as the United States was in 1789, made geographical considerations of special importance. From the very beginning of the attempts at union, honors had been distributed with anxious care among the several states and sections, the nice balance maintained between Virginia and Massachusetts being particularly noticeable. Washington himself was indebted to such considerations for a part of his prestige, as it is scarcely possible that he could have been chosen commander-in-chief in 1775 had he lived in Delaware. As president, he prudently consulted geography in making his general appointments: his cabinet at first contained two men from Virginia, one from New York, and one from Massachusetts. When party lines came to be drawn more closely, the task became more arduous. John Adams wrote to his wife, January 7, 1796, “There seems to be a necessity of distributing the offices about the States in some proportion to their numbers; but in the southern part of the Union, false politics have struck their roots so deep, that it is very difficult to find gentlemen who are willing to accept of public trusts, and at the same time capable of discharging them.” Still, a certain balance of sections was always preserved in the cabinet. After the retirement of Jefferson and Hamilton, it consisted of one member from Virginia, one from Pennsylvania, and two from New England; afterward Maryland was substituted for Pennsylvania. The balance would appear more nearly perfect if Timothy Pickering were counted as from the West, where he lived when appointed, and not as from New England, where he was born and died.
In addition to this attempt to prevent jealousies between the several sections was the desire to make each choice acceptable to the section especially concerned. The constitution was as yet but an experiment; and Washington, who was responsible for
its success, wished it to be put in force, not only by competent men, but by men known and respected in the localities in which they were to serve: he preferred to have the federal authority represented by men who had been esteemed and honored by their neighbors. He therefore considered the previous career of the various men whose names were presented, and allowed any marks of the confidence of their fellow-citizens to count in their favor. To have previously held an elective office was considered the best recommendation. Some administrative officers were transferred from the State to the national service, — as Oliver Wolcott, comptroller of public accounts for Connecticut, who was made an auditor.
This qualification was particularly insisted upon for judicial appointments. The new judiciary had much to contend against. Legal changes are always looked upon with disfavor; and Washington wished to draw into the national service, so far as possible, judges from the benches of the states. This plan would serve to create a judiciary tried and therefore trustworthy, would indicate that the line of promotion lay from the State to the nation, and would tend to lessen the rancor of the disappointed. His letters to Madison show the solicitude with which he applied himself to the filling of the judicial list; and it is largely owing to this care that the national courts so soon acquired the confidence of the public.
To Washington's anxiety that the officers of the general government should be men of established reputation, was added a desire that they should be sound supporters of the new system; that is, political orthodoxy was considered as one of the elements of fitness for office. The supreme importance of this qualification in later periods lends special interest to the
attitude of the first president in regard to it. It is, however, a subject so elusive that his policy can be made clear only by a somewhat detailed account of the conditions existing, and a study of some characteristic instances of his practice.
In one sense, Washington had a clear field before him in the creation of a civil service: there were absolutely no hold-over officers; the servants of the Confederation became private citizens the moment the new government was established. Justice demanded, however, that the men thus legislated out of office should be considered as having a special claim to the new offices that involved similar functions, and Washington recognized these claims whenever he was convinced that the old occupant possessed the requisite qualifications. John Jay, who had been president of the old Congress and was in 1789 secretary of foreign affairs, was given his choice among the new offices, partly because of the new president's esteem for him, but partly, doubtless, because of his official position. Jefferson, who held the ministry to France, the most important post in the diplomatic service after that to England, which Adams had vacated to become vice-president, was made secretary of state. Samuel Osgood, who had been commissioner of the board of the treasury, was appointed postmaster-general; Charles Thomson, the secretary of the old Congress, might have been secretary of the Senate, but declined, as he expected a higher office; and Washington broke his rule of not interfering with departmental appointments, to recommend Thomson's assistant secretary, Roger Alden, to Jefferson for a place in the state department. In addition, the governor and judges elected by Congress for the Northwest Territory were reappointed, with the exception of General Varnum, who had died in the interregnum.
A similar policy was pursued with regard to the state offices. Richard Henry Lee, writing early in June, 1789, says: “Conversing on the subject of these appointments [those in the
revenue service] lately with the P., I mentioned two principles which I had the pleasure to hear him approve of. The first that State officers in similar lines who had behaved well, deserved preference in the service of the United States; and that having discharged these duties undivided, now that they become divided, the same officers were entitled to the best.” Many applications for office were grounded on these principles, and such statistics as can be obtained tend to show that the rule was adhered to. There were 136 offices in the customs service as at first established under the new government: in 42 cases the old occupants were reappointed; in 4 cases they received some office in the service; in 15 cases they were not appointed; and in 75 cases either there is no record or the office was a new one.
The fact that such was the general policy gives peculiar importance to one case in which it was not carried out, that is, in Rhode Island. The struggle for the adoption of the constitution was particularly bitter in that state, and even before it was finally decided Washington began to receive applications for office. John Brown and John Francis, great merchants who favored the new establishment, sent him a letter of advice: they describe the iniquities of the opposition, and “sincearly Hope that none of these carrectors may be promoted to Aney office,” and “take the Libberty of Recommending a core of Honest Faithfull and Vigilent Custom House Officers for this Department Such as will cause Every Copper of the Revenew . . . to be punctually paid to the Treasury of the United States.” While the Antifederalists were yet in control of the state, they had elected a board of customs officers with but one of their opponents upon it. When the constitution was at last adopted, it was fully expected that a change would be made; and one of the Rhode Island senators was asked to advise the president to divide the offices between the several parties. The subject excited much local interest, and was most carefully considered
by the administration. The very pressure put upon it by the one side and the other showed how bitter the previous contest had been, and how important it was that the new officers should be such as would not only perform their duties well, but would strengthen the hold of the constitution on the people. Each case was minutely considered.
The list of customs officers finally made out contained ten new names, only two of those who had served under the state being appointed. One of those retained was Theodore Foster, naval officer at Providence, who has just been referred to as the single Federalist in office. As a matter of fact, Foster, though generally rated as a Federalist, had friends and enemies in both parties, and seems to have been reported to Washington as an Antifederalist. Immediately after his second appointment he was elected senator, and his successor as naval officer was Ebenezer Thompson, who had been collector under the state government and was avowedly opposed to the adoption of the constitution. Job Comstock, the other representative of the old corps of officials, declined to serve the new government; but on the declination of Aborn, the newly selected surveyor at Pawtuxet, Zachariah Rhodes, the old incumbent there, who had been passed over when the list was first made out, was chosen.
The fact that two representatives of the state board of customs officials were thus persistently retained may indicate that Washington judged it proper to recognize to that extent the Antifederalist element. The remaining officers, both in the customs and in the judicial service, seem to have been all strong Federalists; and at least three of them had previously held state offices, but had lost them during the “Know Ye” troubles. If the general government hoped to allay political rancor in Rhode Island by recognizing both factions, it was unsuccessful. Three years later, on occasion of a vacancy in Rhode Island, Henry Marchant wrote a letter to Hamilton carefully estimating
the several candidates, and adding, “It is indeed to be regretted that this affair should assume a Party Complection.”
A similar care was observed in making the North Carolina appointments, for the conditions were similar. So far as can now be discovered, there were no reappointments in the state. There exists in Jefferson's handwriting, under date of June 7, 1790, an annotated list of candidates for the judicial positions there, such as it has always been customary to prepare for the president's use in important cases; in it one man is definitely recommended as being a “federalist.” The fact that Jefferson made this note shows that the term “federalist” was not used in its later party signification, but referred to those who had supported the adoption of the constitution. If ever political discrimination was justifiable, it was at this time; and fair-minded Republicans of a later date recognized that the conditions had been unusual, and that it was especially important that the constitution should be in the hands of its friends while receiving its trial. Nor should the sharpness of the distinction drawn be exaggerated. Washington wrote with regard to the district judgeship of Maryland: “Mr. Paca has been mentioned for that appointment, and, although his sentiments have not been altogether in favor of the general government, and a little adverse on the score of paper emission, I do not know but his appointment on some other accounts might be a proper thing.” The important post of collector of New York was given to General John Lamb, a vigorous Antifederalist.
When political strife grew hotter and the Republican and Federalist parties began to emerge, and when, too, the irascibility of old age came upon him, Washington became more of a party man. He made only seventeen removals, and these strictly for the efficiency of the service; but in 1795 he wrote to Pickering, “I shall not, whilst I have the honor of administrating the
government, bring men into any office of consequence knowingly whose political tenets are adverse to the measures the general government is pursuing; for this, in my opinion, would be a sort of political suicide.” It was the popular charge of the Republicans that, in his second term, after the dismissal of Randolph, he confined his appointments to members of the Federalist party; and certainly in 1798 he advised McHenry to be cautious about enlisting Jacobins in the new army.
Such seem to have been the ideals which Washington set before himself, and which he attempted, with his usual conscientiousness, to realize. Like all his policies, they were proper and practical; but he was not omnipresent, he could not control his subordinates in all their actions, and his practice did not, therefore, accord wholly with his theory. The members of the cabinet were given power to appoint their clerks, and how unrestricted that power was, the long employment of Freneau in the state department shows.
By many avenues, intrigue and faction crept in. The following extract from a letter exhibiting the political situation in Savannah shows what a part local politics played in the establishment of the civil service: “Col.$^o$ Few will nominate me with the others. Our other Senator [James Gunn] I expect no Friendship from. . . . His Man will be a Wretch who now fills the Office of Collectorship at this place — his Name is Ruben Wilkinson — he is from our back Woods low and illiterate as possible, but served our Honorable Senator Gunn in geting him Votes.” In a similar way the other possible candidates were discussed. Theodore Foster, senator from Rhode Island, wrote February 17, 1791, of the difficulties of steering between the Scylla of favoritism and the Charybdis of ingratitude in making
suggestions to the president, and spoke of charges made against the former Rhode Island delegate of improperly using his influence. It is said that in New York, where Hamilton's advice was naturally potent, the appointments were such as tended to aid the Schuyler faction and weaken Clinton, but the force of this charge is weakened by the appointment of Lamb. The Livingston family, so great an influence in that state, felt slighted; and perhaps their turning to Jefferson is to be thus accounted for. It lies not in man to give universal satisfaction; and small as was the part which politics played in the selections of the first administration, the government did not escape the charge of intolerance. John Tyler, Sr., was one of the judges of the admiralty court of Virginia, the functions of which, under the constitution, fell to the United States district court. Tyler was not the only admiralty judge; and Cyrus Griffin as judge of the federal Court of Appeals in Cases of Capture had as high, if not higher, claim, and was appointed. Yet Tyler was displeased and wrote, long after the event, “This kind of conduct began the strong distinction which has embittered the cup of life, and, in a great measure, produced a spirit of retaliation.”
The constitution of the consular service, moreover, was unsatisfactory. The law provided that a consul be appointed for the Barbary coast at a salary of not more than two thousand dollars. This post involved semi-diplomatic functions, and for that reason, and because there was little legitimate trade in the region, was made an exception to the general rule that the service support itself by fees. The system of paying consuls by fees is a very wasteful one: the agents at a few great posts are overpaid, while in many places where the trade may be important, though small, the fees do not afford a living. Washington found it impossible to secure proper candidates for many minor posts, and was thus forced to appoint natives of the country, or at
least Americans residing abroad for business purposes, whose administration of their duties might be affected by their private interests. This expedient was, however, the result of conditions rather than of policy; and the evils resulting from it have only recently been eradicated from the service.
Such facts should not obscure the wisdom of Washington in laying down the proper general qualifications for office, and his unusual skill in applying them. His success in quietly and satisfactorily organizing the new government is indicated by the fact that the press of the day contains so few references to the change in administration. One of the few allusions to it, aside from the mention of local appointments, is the simple change under “Ship News,” of the heading, “Naval Office” to “Custom House,” and a notice in the Massachusetts Centinel, in fancy type, of the location and office hours of the new board of officers. The constitution was quietly launched and was manned with a good crew. Washington was perhaps the only president who could write, after passing through the ordeal of appointing a new staff of officers, “I have the happiness to find, so far as my information extends, that they are highly acceptable to the good people of this country.”
John Adams became president in 1797 under circumstances quite different from those of 1789. The constitution was now fully accepted, at least as a basis for development; but while this question was out of politics, the country was more distinctly divided into two parties than before, and Adams had been definitely elected as the representative of one of them. Further, he found a well-established civil service, and had to deal with the question of appointments only as vacancies occurred from time to time. As the total number of public officers was then small, he had comparative freedom from the irritating task of selection, a freedom which he increased by
leaving most minor appointments to the members of his cabinet. No president has enjoyed such immunity from this vexatious task as did he; still he found opportunity to develop a policy which is significant as marking a transition from the principles of Washington to those of Jefferson.
The war with France rendered the military appointments the most important of the administration. The pressure brought to bear upon Adams to make Hamilton second in command is too well known to need description; but there was then, as there has been ever since, a conviction that the army should stand on a different footing from the civil service, and that the two parties should unite to defend the country. In response to this sentiment, Burr and Muhlenberg were placed on the list of generals. Although the Republicans received representation, the control remained in the hands of the Federalists: probably Washington's caution to McHenry against enlisting Jacobins indicates the general attitude of the war department. The same policy was advocated with regard to critical diplomatic missions. Hamilton, in 1797, advised that either Jefferson or Madison be sent to France to conciliate the republic, but that Federalist colleagues be joined with them to control their action; he did not wish a repetition of the Monroe episode. The plan was carried out, but Elbridge Gerry, who was not fully identified with any party, was substituted for the Republican leaders suggested.
Turning to the ordinary appointments, we miss the careful statements of policy which are found in Washington's letters. Adams wrote to Wolcott, in October, 1800, strenuously denying that he had told any one that “political creed would be an insuperable bar to promotion.” He added, however: “Washington appointed a multitude of democrats and jacobins of the deepest die. I have been more cautious in this respect; but there is danger of proscribing, under imputations of democracy, some of the ablest, most influential, and best characters in the Union.”
This letter is rather an omen of the coming break between Adams and the more extreme Federalists than an indication of political tolerance. With one wing of the Republicans, — with men like Elbridge Gerry, — Adams had more in common than with the Essex junto, but the active and dominant members of that party he would include under the name “Jacobin”; and while there are repeated requests for office from his political opponents, no instance has been noticed in which a “Jacobin” was appointed.
Not only was a bar placed against Jacobins, but there is a suspicion of the influence of personal prejudice on appointments. The collectorship of New York fell vacant in the first year of the administration. Hamilton wrote a letter (apparently to Wolcott) suggesting and carefully characterizing seven men, and recommending four of them. If one may judge by what is known of the relations between the three men, these recommendations were pressed upon the president by Wolcott, secretary of the treasury; yet no one of the men recommended was appointed. This can hardly be construed otherwise than as a slight to Hamilton; but it should be attributed rather to personal dislike than to the ulterior purpose of undermining the latter's influence in New York. Adams had too few supporters there to form even the nucleus of a personal faction.
Adams was also charged with nepotism. Washington had explained to General Webb, in 1789, that it was necessary for him to find a post for Colonel Smith, the vice-president's son-in-law; but it is not known whether Adams urged the suit by personal solicitation. In 1798 Colonel Smith was again a candidate. Washington, as commander-in-chief, suggested that he be made a brigadier-general, and also mentioned him as third choice for adjutant-general. The president promptly nominated him for the latter more lucrative position. When Timothy Pickering, the secretary of state, heard of this action, he hastened to the Senate and secured a rejection of the nomination, claiming afterward that his step was an act of kindness toward
Adams. The kindness is open to doubt; but certainly few things tend more to hurt a man politically than a reputation for feathering the family nest with the salaries of public offices. Even the transfer, by his father, of John Quincy Adams from the post of minister to Portugal to that of minister to Prussia, so amply justified by the event, furnished material for detractors.
In Adams's letter to Wolcott, quoted above, mention is made of the fact that Washington appointed many violent Republicans to office. The break between the Federalists and the Republicans did not follow quite the same lines as that between the Federalists and the Antifederalists; hence, in spite of Washington's policy of excluding most of the latter from the service, many vigorous supporters of Jefferson were in office. It would have been indeed surprising, considering the bitterness of party spirit at the time, if they had remained unmolested. One of the most obnoxious was Tench Coxe, commissioner of revenue, an intense partisan and very useful to the opposition. In 1797 he received his dismissal from Wolcott, who based it upon the ground of deliberate misconduct in office. This misconduct was the giving of aid to the opposition, and it may be that Coxe used his official position to make this aid more effective; but that does not alter the fact that the removal was made for party purposes, and that a precedent was set which might prove dangerous. The Federalists were exceedingly gratified, and warmly congratulated Wolcott on having finally expelled the traitor from the treasury.
This may be considered the first case of removal for party reasons. It was not the only one under Adams. In June, 1798, Jeremiah Smith wrote to Wolcott complaining of Joshua Whipple and William Gardner, the collector at Portsmouth and the commissioner of loans for New Hampshire. He said: “They have been it is generally said faithful and punctual in the discharge of the duties of their offices. They have some property and I believe are pretty free from debts and speculations. Their political conduct has been disrespectful to the Government and offensive to good men in the extreme.” He
described at length their methods of instilling Jacobinical ideas into the minds of their fellow-citizens, and concluded: “I have no hesitation in saying that I think Justice to the public requires the removal of these men. They surely cannot complain if that Government which is the object of their execrations should weaken their means of injuring and abusing it.” The next day Eliphalet Ladd wrote, complaining particularly of Whipple, and adding charges of unjust exactions. On June 30, successors to both of these accused men were nominated.
Here we have an indubitable case of political removal; for of course no credence can be placed in the vague eleventh-hour tales of injustice. Callender writes that the removals of Gardner and Whipple were made because they would not sign one of the eulogistic addresses to the president that were so numerous at the outbreak of the French war; and the conjunction of these first removals with the Federalists' high hopes based on the war, and with the Alien and Sedition Acts, is indeed striking. The Columbian Centinel had previously asked: “Why does not the President tumble headlong from their places the collector, loan-office commissioner, and commander of the revenue cutter at Portsmouth? These ingrates ought not for a moment to be suffered to eat the bread of the public, when they wait only for a safe occasion to betray our country to France.” Pickering, who as secretary of state chose the newspapers that should print the laws of the United States, deprived Freneau of that privilege, which in those days of scanty circulation was much prized; and General Knox apparently voiced the desires of many Federalists when he urged the president to make a general sweep of all the more pronounced Republicans.
That Adams resisted the pressure for a general proscription is made evident by the statistics of removals during his administration. The total was only nineteen, and most of these seem
to have been for some cause connected with the efficiency of the service. The dismissal of Pickering, the secretary of state, was due to the break in policy between Adams and the more extreme elements in the Federal party. After this removal had been made, Stephen Higginson accused Adams of using his patronage to help the Republicans elect Gerry to the governorship of Massachusetts; but he did not cite any specific instance, and this was undoubtedly only a vague charge caused by personal spleen. On the whole, Adams seems to have developed no such systematic policy of appointments as Washington, but to have yielded more to influence, time, and circumstance; he was more moderate than some of his advisers, but more proscriptive than the first president; the line of division that he drew was not exactly between the Federalist and Republican parties, but rather between those with whom he agreed, as Gerry and Marshal, and those with whom he differed, as Pickering, Hamilton, and Jefferson.
The constitution assigned to the president the duty of nominating public officers; but, in a country so extended as the United States, even a man with the wide personal acquaintance of Washington needed assistance in finding proper men. A machinery for presenting names to the executive therefore grew up outside of the constitution. This was based in part on experience, and was in part the natural result of conditions; it has grown in scope and importance with every increase in the civil service, but for almost a century from the foundation of the government no essentially new elements were introduced into it.
Under the Confederation, appointments were made by Congress. Often the delegates from a single state, or from several
states, would agree upon a candidate, and would press his appointment with their combined votes. This precedent, and the fact that under the new constitution the Senate shared the appointing power, led to a belief in many sections that officers would actually be elected by that body. James Seagrove of Georgia wrote to General Webb, January 2, 1789: “As the new government of the United States will soon take place, and of course all appointments be made, it behoves us all to look round and try what we can get. I am advised by all my friends this way to offer for the Collectorship of the Import for Georgia and have little doubt of being Nominated by our Senators to Congress — But this alone will not do. It will also be necessary to have as many friends as possible in the Senate.” On February 22 he wrote, “There will be four Candidates for that office from Georgia so that it must be determined by a Vote of the Senate.”
The senators, who were burdened with numberless applications for the few offices within their respective states, differed broadly in their interpretation of their duties. George Cabot was apologetic when he made recommendations. Roger Sherman understood that the method to be employed by those desiring office was to write a letter to the president, “mentioning the office to which they wish to be appointed, and their past services and sufferings as a ground of claim, — and if the President is not personally acquainted with their character, their letter is accompanied with a certificate from persons of distinction, certifying their qualifications, and they sometimes in their letters refer the President to members of Congress, or other persons residing at the Seat of Government for information.”
Republican senators were more insistent on their rights. Monroe boldly protested against the rumored appointment of Hamilton as special envoy to Great Britain in 1794; and Davis, in his life of Burr, asserts that, after the recall of Gouverneur Morris from France, it being conceded that some
prominent Republican must be sent to succeed him, the Republican members of Congress held a caucus, and decided to press the appointment of Burr. This statement is confirmed by Monroe's letters of the period; for he positively refused to accept the mission until assured that Burr would, under no circumstances, be appointed.
The famous debate of 1789, on the subject of the removing power, lies outside the field of this monograph; but one incident of it is worthy of note in this connection. In the House of Representatives the supporters of the president's power won by votes of thirty to eighteen, and thirty-one to nineteen, on the crucial points; in the Senate the casting vote of the vice-president was needed, indicating that the latter body was already alert and jealous of its rights.
Washington recognized that the word of a member of Congress should have special weight with regard to local appointments because of his local knowledge. He insisted, however, in a communication to a committee of the Senate upon his right of nomination, presenting all names to the Senate by a
written message; and he did not suffer himself to be coerced. Monroe received a rebuff for his interference in regard to Hamilton, and the president himself selected the Republican who should go to France. When the Senate rejected one of the nominations presented to it, Washington sent a dignified letter of protest, asking that, in the future, the senators make sure what reasons he had for presenting a name before they rejected it.
During the first administration the influence of the senators was simply that of men with special opportunities for information. Other prominent men sent advice, and Washington's broad acquaintance resulted in his receiving directly many requests for offices, particularly from army officers. In addition to these and to the applications sent to members of Congress, many were sent to the heads of departments and to other prominent officials. The administration, moreover, like any intelligent employer of labor, refused to confine its selection to those who sought employment either directly or indirectly, but I searched out able men from all over the country.
Methods were unchanged under Adams, but conditions were somewhat different; for the Senate was less friendly to him than to his predecessor, and his smaller personal acquaintance left him more at the mercy of advisers. One case of competition for office can be closely followed, and illustrates very well
the conditions of the period. A certain Colonel Lindsay, collector of Norfolk, Virginia, early in Adams's term became mortally ill. Since the deputy of the collector, Francis Taylor, was engaged to Lindsay's daughter, it was felt by Colonel Lindsay's friends that it would be pleasant for Taylor to succeed to the collectorship, marry the daughter, and so provide for the family. In April, 1797, a citizen of Norfolk wrote to some one in authority, probably a member of the Virginia delegation in Congress, in regard to the case. He said that Lindsay had for some time been disabled, would soon die, and that Taylor was well qualified to succeed to the position, as he had for some time performed its duties. This letter was supported, within a few days, by a petition of merchants.
The surveyor, Mr. Bedinger, who had had several contests with Lindsay himself for the post, naturally felt aggrieved at seeing a new rival rise from the grave of the old. He appealed at once to the representative of the district in Congress, a Mr. Parker, who had at one time been collector with Bedinger as his deputy. “I cannot say,” he writes, “but it seems to me that a death-bed resignation looks too much like a bequest — that this kind of succession in office has too greatly the appearance of the inheritance of office, ever to be countenanced by the President of the United States, should he be truly informed of all the circumstances attending this Case.” Bedinger secured the support of Parker, who warmly recommended him to Wolcott. In May, Lindsay was still alive; but the news of his condition seems to have become public, for two new candidates appeared. One of these, a man by the name of Byrd, was brought forward by General William Heth, to whom Wolcott seems to have applied for a suggestion. Byrd was also supported by General Carrington, and was appointed. Parker attributed his success over Bedinger to political reasons. Doubtless these counted, as they usually did under Adams; but probably General Heth's charges of wholesale mismanagement in the Norfolk
custom-house had some weight in deterring the administration from selecting any of the incumbent officers.
This controversy illustrates the machinery for the distribution of offices as it existed under Adams. One candidate, it is noted, presented his claims through his congressman; another sup- ported his with personal letters and petitions. These latter do not seem to have been very highly regarded: there is on one the marginal note, "I should not consider it a very great com- pliment to be highly recommended as a Collector by the Mer- chants, owners and Masters of vessels of Norfolk or indeed any other District." The general government did not, how- ever, rely on these suggestions and simply take what was offered; it sought for the best men. The details also show how strongly, in spite of the removals that Adams made, the idea of property in office was held, and how much greater, at this particular time, seemed the chance that a place would be held too long, become hereditary, than that it would change hands too often. In fact, the idea set forth by John Cotton, in his famous election sermon, that even elected officers should not be changed so long as they properly performed their duties, seems not to have entirely disappeared.
On the whole, the civil service under the Federalists seems to have been exceptionally honest. With the loose business tone prevailing in the country, a certain amount of loss was to be expected; but while there were defalcations, some attributable to dishonesty and some to bad management, they scarcely bear so large a proportion to the amount of money handled as they did in the succeeding period. The best proof of the general integrity of the service is that Gallatin, when directed by Jefferson to conduct a searching investigation of the Federalist financial administration, was able to find no evidence to its discredit. Honesty and efficiency are not entirely
synonymous, and government reports cannot tell how well the various officers of the government performed their duties — whether they were polite and abreast with the progress of the age or not; but the general impression that one carries away from the correspondence and press of the time is that the people were satisfied. It must be borne in mind, however, that official duties were simple as compared with the functions of the modern public officer, and that, in the absence of foreign travel, standards of comparison were lacking. The only branch of the public service that closely affected the mass of the people was the post-office. Jefferson complained that he dared not use the office most convenient for him, lest his mail be tampered with; but this sensitiveness was perhaps exaggerated for political purposes. The continuance of Mr. Lindsay in office until death, in spite of his long sickness, shows that the civil service was not kept constantly pruned; yet one of the very few cases in which an officer has been requested to resign because disabled by permanent ill health occurred in Washington's administration. On the whole, it seems probable that the administration of public business bore a better relation to the business standards of the country under the Federalists than at any subsequent period.
In a summing up of the whole policy of the Federalists toward the civil service, this point should first of all be insisted upon, that fitness was always an essential requirement; other qualifications were often looked for, but these were ever subsidiary to the ability to perform the duties of the office. Of these subsidiary qualifications, correct political opinion was one of the most important both under Washington and under Adams. Political service, however, was never seriously reckoned by them: requests for office made no parade of services at caucuses and polls, and it cannot, therefore, be said that the spoils system had then come into existence.
The Federalist policy of excluding the opposition from office, however, inevitably entailed a policy of removals upon their opponents when the latter should come into power; while the few removals they actually made furnished their enemies with the tu quoque argument, always so telling in political conflicts. In the very last weeks of their power, moreover, they laid themselves distinctly open to the charge of using the patronage for party purposes. The hasty creation of an extensive judiciary in the very death hour of the administration, and the filling of the places created with ardent Federalists, would, if the act were that of a modern legislature, be generally considered as a job. Gouverneur Morris looked upon it in that way at the time.
One feature of this act, especially, gave opportunity to suspect the good faith of its framers: among the offices created were those of twenty-four justices of the peace for the District of Columbia; these positions were not to be held during good behavior, that practice having become unpopular, but for a term of years, which, out of all analogy with the other fixed terms for national officers, was to be five years. Republicans could not refrain from the reflection that this provision would protect the justices until another election, which might give the patronage to the Federalists once more. Politically these minor sins of the Federalists almost offset the general decorum of their administration, and must be held, at least in part, responsible for the evil times into which they were soon to fall.
* ↑ Greene, Provincial Governor, ch. 3.
* ↑ Elliot, Debates, iii. 371.
* ↑ Pelatiah Webster, Dissertation on the Political Union, art. ii. § 6. In his Political Essays, 221.
* ↑ Madison Papers, ii. 1130, iii. 1522; Ford, Pamphlets on the Constitution, 341; Federalist (Ford ed.), 513.
* ↑ Elliot, Debates, iv. 122.
* ↑ Madison Papers, iii. 1423, 1434.
* ↑ McMaster and Stone, Pennsylvania and the Federal Constitution, 366, 375, 401, 673.
* ↑ Ford, Essays on the Constitution, 264.
* ↑ John Adams, Works, vi. 433-442.
* ↑ Ford, Essays on the Constitution, 234.
* ↑ Federalist (Ford ed.), 637, 644, 648. Virginia debate in Elliot, Debates, iii. 369-375.
* ↑ McMaster and Stone, Pennsylvania and the Federal Constitution, 530, 637, 650-654, 666-668; Harding, Federal Constitution in Massachusetts, 18.
* ↑ Ford, Pamphlets on the Constitution, 161; McMaster and Stone, Pennsylvania and the Federal Constitution, 440, 511; Ford, Essays on the Constitution, 129, 187, 188.
* ↑ Massachusetts Centinel, January 5, 1788; Federalist (Ford ed.), 37, note.
* ↑ Elliot, Debates, ii. 220; Hammond, Political Parties in New York, i. 85.
* ↑ May 5, 1789, Washington, Writings (Sparks ed.), x. 1; Rowland, Charles Carroll, ii. 204.
* ↑ Washington, Writings (Sparks ed.), x. 6.
* ↑ American Historical Review, i. 275, 278.
* ↑ Ibid. i. 276, 278; Boutell, Roger Sherman, 223-224; Washington, Writings (Sparks ed.), x. 23, 24; Webb, Correspondence, iii. 141.
* ↑ Washington, Writings (Sparks ed.), x. 26; Jefferson, Anas, August 6, 1793, in his Writings (Ford ed.), i. 256-258.
* ↑ John Adams, Works, i. 483.
* ↑ Richardson, Messages and Papers, i. 58-59.
* ↑ He wrote to Madison, August 10 (?), 1789: “My solicitude for drawing the first characters of the Union into the judiciary is such, that my cogitations on this subject last night, after I parted with you, have almost determined me, as well for the reason just mentioned, as to silence the clamors, or more properly, soften the disappointment of smaller characters, to nominate Mr. Blair and Colonel Pendleton as associate and district judges, and Mr. Edmund Randolph for the attorney-general, trusting to their acceptance.” Washington, Writings (Sparks ed.), x. 26; Gibbs, Memoirs of the Administration of Washington and Adams, i. 165, 22-27.
* ↑ Pellew, Jay, 262; he cites no contemporary evidence.
* ↑ Harley, Thomson, 128-134; Washington, Writings (Sparks ed.), x. 40; Journals of Congress, xii. 174 (October 5, 1787); Executive Journal, i. 18 (August 18, 1789); Appleton's Encyclopædia of American Biography, Varnum.
* ↑ Washington, Writings (Ford ed.), xi. 394 note; American Historical Review, i. 277; Appendix A, table ii.
* ↑ June 11, 1790, American Historical Review, i. 280.
* ↑ Massachusetts Centinel, September 30, 1789; Foster Manuscripts, i. 22, 23.
* ↑ Massachusetts Centinel, September 30, 1789; Jameson, in Rhode Island Historical Society, Publications, viii. 109, 131, 135.
* ↑ Ibid. 131, 133; Arnold, Rhode Island, ii. 525, 544. One of them, Jeremiah Olney, had been commissioner of the town of Providence at the time it proposed to secede from Rhode Island and join the Union (Greene, Providence Plantations, 64).
* ↑ American Historical Review, i. 281.
* ↑ Ibid. i. 273-274.
* ↑ Amory, James Sullivan, ii. 94; Washington, Writings (Sparks ed.), x. 56; Leake, Lamb, 337. John Lowell (in his New-England Patriot, 21) says that Major Melville, appointed inspector at Boston, had also been an Antifederalist.
* ↑ C. R. Fish, Removal of Officials by the Presidents, in American Historical Association Reports, 1899, i. 69.
* ↑ September 27, 1795, Washington, Writings (Ford ed.), xii. 107.
* ↑ Oracle of Dauphin and Harrisburgh Advertiser, August 10, 1801; alluded to in Coleman, Examination of the President's Reply, 24; Washington, Writings (Ford ed.), xiv. 104; see also Appendix B below.
* ↑ Washington, Writings (Sparks ed.), x. 40. See account of the Goddard papers, in Facts, July 12, 1902. Miss Mary K. Goddard was removed from the post-office of Baltimore in 1789. Washington's influence was sought, but he declined to interfere. She was reinstated by Osgood on petition of patrons of the office.
* ↑ Letter of Seagrave, February 22, 1789, in Webb, Correspondence, iii. 123.
* ↑ Foster Manuscripts, i. 36.
* ↑ Hammond, Political Parties in New York, i. 30; H. Livingston, March 29, 1791, complains of Washington's appointments from the South, and adds, “I wish to see a change.” Webb, Correspondence, iii. 172, 176.
* ↑ Tyler, The Tylers, ii. 171, 246.
* ↑ Even for Lisbon proper candidates did not apply. Jefferson, Writings (Ford ed.), v. 344; Statutes at Large, i. 254-257.
* ↑ August 19 there appeared the following notice: “The Collector, Naval-Officer, and Surveyor, of this district, have opened their respective offices, at the house next door to Mr. Paine's Insurance-Office in State-Street — Constant attendance will be there given by the several officers, each day in the week, from Nine o'clock in the morning, until One, and from Three in the afternoon until sunset — Sundays, Saturdays in the afternoon, and Publick Days of Thanksgiving and Fasting excepted.”
* ↑ Washington, Writings (Sparks ed.), x. 51.
* ↑ American Historical Review, ii. 242.
* ↑ C. F. Adams, John Adams, 529; Muhlenberg, Muhlenberg, 324.
* ↑ Hamilton, Works (Lodge ed.), viii. 445, 449, 450.
* ↑ John Adams, Works, ix. 87.
* ↑ American Historical Review, ii. 245, 247; Executive Journal, i. 240.
* ↑ Webb, Correspondence, iii. 141; Washington to Hamilton, July 14, 1798, Washington, Writings (Sparks ed.), xi. 265; Executive Journal, i. 292, 293; Pickering, Pickering, iii. 465.
* ↑ Callender, Sedgwick & Co., or a Key to the Six Per Cent Cabinet.
* ↑ American Historical Review, ii. 261.
* ↑ American Historical Review, ii. 254-256; Executive Journal, i. 283.
* ↑ Callender, The Prospect before Us, 31-32.
* ↑ Ibid. quoting Wood.
* ↑ Jefferson, Anas, March 14, 1800, in his Writings (Ford ed.), i. 286; Lodge, Cabot, 230; Duane, Examination of the Question who is the Writer of Two Forged Letters, 18.
* ↑ See, for example, Pickering to Cabot, June 16, 1800, e.g. the consul at Cape St. Francis had attacked Pickering's honesty, and had interfered with the consul-general at San Domingo. If the facts are as stated, the reason was good. Lodge, Cabot, 275.
* ↑ Fish, in Tables of Removal, in American Historical Association, Reports, 1899, i. 70, table ii.; Report, 1896, i. 836.
* ↑ The relations between Adams and Hamilton are not discussed here, because to bring anything new to light would demand a long chapter devoted to that subject alone.
* ↑ Austin, Gerry, i. 294-295.
* ↑ Webb, Correspondence, iii. 121-124.
* ↑ McRee, Iredell, i. 275; Foster Manuscripts, passim, for Foster's term as senator; Lodge, Cabot, 43, 94; Boutell, Sherman, 223-224.
* ↑ Monroe, Writings, i. 291-292.
* ↑ Davis, Burr, i. 408-409 (given on the authority of Burr, and of “a gentleman of high standing”). See also Parton, Burr, 196. Monroe wrote to Jefferson, May 26, 27, 1794, that Burr is sole candidate “under auspices very favorable to his success,” that “of course he goes as a Republican,” that the New Jersey members are in his interest; then that Monroe has accepted, after being assured that Burr could not be appointed, and after consulting friends. Monroe, Writings, i. 298, 299-301.
* ↑ Lucy M. Salmon, Appointing Power of the President (American Historical Association, Papers, i. No. 5), ch. ii.
* ↑ The following notes of the opinions of the new congressmen from North Carolina are in Jefferson's handwriting, and were to guide the president in making the North Carolina appointments (American Historical Review, i. 273-274): — “ District judge. Col$^o$ Davie is recommended by Steele. Hawkins says he is their first character. Brown sais the same. Samuel Spencer. Steele sais he is a good man, one of the present judges, not remarkeable for his abilities, but deserves well of his country. Bloodworth sais Spencer desires the appointment, but sais nothing of him. John Stokes. Steele names him at his own request, he is a Virginian, was a Capt$^n$ in the late war, lost his right hand in Beaufort's defeat, practises law in S. Carolina with reputation and success; has been frequently of the legislature, was a member of the convention, a federalist, is now a Col of Militia cavalry and additional judge of the Supreme Court. Hawkins has understood he is a worthy man. Ashe names him.” Davie was appointed, declined, and Stokes was selected (Executive Journal, i. 50, 53). See also Oliver Wolcott's application for office and reliance in the decision of the Connecticut delegation (Gibbs, Memoirs, i. 20).
* ↑ Washington to a committee of the Senate, August 8, 1789, Washington, Writings (Ford ed.), xi. 417.
* ↑ Monroe, Writings, i. 292 note, 301; Executive Journal, i. 16; Richardson, Messages and Papers, i. 58.
* ↑ Higginson to Adams, July 4, August 10, 1789, American Historical Association, Report, 1896, i. 767; Washington, Writings (Sparks ed.), x. 3; American Historical Review, ii. 241, 271, 276; Monroe, Writings, i. 227; Washington, Writings (Sparks ed.), x. 25-26; Lodge, Cabot, 107, 109.
* ↑ Note the rejection of his son-in-law mentioned above, and Pickering's success in securing the rejection of General George Mathew's nomination as governor of Mississippi (Massachusetts Historical Society, Collections, 6th series, viii. 322); American Historical Review, ii. 241.
* ↑ This account is taken wholly from the documents printed by Mr. Gaillard Hunt, in the American Historical Review, ii. 247-254.
* ↑ “It is the height of ingratitude, says a correspondent, to endeavor to remove the Honorable Mr. Dunbar from the Senate” (Massachusetts Centinel, April 4, 1789).
* ↑ Leake, Lamb, 353-354; Senate Documents, 16 Cong., 1st sess., ii. No. 89; J. A. Hamilton, Reminiscences, 121-122.
* ↑ Jefferson, Writings (Washington ed.), iv. 230-231, 256; Massachusetts Spy, October 9, 1799.
* ↑ But Pickering, in 1796, advised William Lithgow, district attorney of Maine, to resign (Massachusetts Historical Society, Collections, 6th series, viii. 281). Lithgow resigned (Executive Journal, i. 217).
* ↑ “Every person holding office must either quit it, or think and vote exactly with Mr. Adams.” The hope was also expressed that on March 4, 1801, Gardner and other “expelled public servants” would be replaced (Callender, The Prospect before Us, 32-33). See also Coleman, Examination, 27. As late as 1808 the charge was repeated (Address to the People of the American States who Choose Electors, 13).
* ↑ “That the leaders of the federal party may use this opportunity to provide for friends and adherents is, I think, probable; and if they were my enemies, I should blame them for it. Whether I should do the same thing myself is another question. . . . They are about to experience a heavy gale of adverse wind; can they be blamed for casting many anchors to hold their ship through the storm?” (Roosevelt, Gouverneur Morris, 333).
* ↑ Statutes at Large, ii. 107.