# Observations on Man (6th edition)/Part I/Conclusion
### CONCLUSION:CONCLUSION:

CONTAINING SOME REMARKS ON THE MECHANISM OF THE HUMAN MIND.
Besides the consequences flowing from the doctrine of association, which are delivered in the corollaries to the fourteenth proposition, there is another, which is thought by many to have a pernicious tendency in respect of morality and religion; and which therefore it will be proper that I should consider particularly.
The consequence I mean is that of the mechanism or necessity of human actions, in opposition to what is generally termed free-will. Here then I will,
First, State my notion of the mechanism or necessity of human actions.
Secondly, Give such reasons as induce me to embrace the opinion of the mechanism of human actions.
Thirdly, Consider the objections and difficulties attending this opinion.
And, lastly, Allege some presumptions in favour of it from its consequences.
By the mechanism of human actions I mean, that each action results from the previous circumstances of body and mind, in the same manner, and with the same certainty, as other effects do ​from their mechanical causes; so that a person cannot do indifferently either of the actions A, and its contrary a, while the previous circumstances are the same; but is under an absolute necessity of doing one of them, and that only. Agreeably to this I suppose, that by free-will is meant a power of doing either the action A, or its contrary a; while the previous circumstances remain the same.
If by free-will be meant a power of beginning motion, this will come to the same thing; since, according to the opinion of mechanism, as here explained, man has no such power; but every action, or bodily motion, arises from previous circumstances, or bodily motions, already existing in the brain, i.e. from vibrations, which are either the immediate effect of impressions then made, or the remote compound effect of former impressions, or both.
But if by free-will be meant any thing different from these two definitions of it, it may not perhaps be inconsistent with the mechanism of the mind here laid down. Thus, if free-will be defined the power of doing what a person desires or wills to do, of deliberating, suspending, choosing, &c. or of resisting the motives of sensuality, ambition, resentment, &c. Free-will, under certain limitations, is not only consistent with the doctrine of mechanism, but even flows from it; since it appears from the foregoing theory, that voluntary and semi-voluntary powers of calling up ideas, of exciting and restraining affections, and of performing and suspending actions, arise from the mechanism of our natures. This may be called free-will in the popular and practical sense, in contradistinction to that which is opposed to mechanism, and which may be called free-will in the philosophical sense.
I proceed now to the arguments which favour the opinion of mechanism.
First, then, it is evident to, and allowed by all, that the actions of mankind proceed, in many cases, from motives, i.e. from the influence which the pleasures and pains of sensation, imagination, ambition, self-interest, sympathy, theopathy, and the moral sense, have over them. And these motives seem to act like all other causes. When the motive is strong, the action is performed with vigour; when weak, feebly. When a contrary motive intervenes, it checks or over-rules, in proportion to its relative strength, as far as one can judge. So that where the motives are the same, the actions cannot be different; where the motives are different, the actions cannot be the same. And it is matter of common observation, that this is the case in fact, in the principal actions of life, and such where the motives are of a magnitude sufficient to be evident. It is reasonable therefore to interpret the obscure cases by the evident ones; and to infer, that there are in all instances motives of a proper kind and degree, which generate each action; though they are sometimes not seen through their ​minuteness, or through the inattention or ignorance of the observer. Agreeably to which, those persons, who study the causes and motives of human actions, may decypher them much more completely, both in themselves, and those with whom they converse, than others can.
Suppose now a person able to decypher all his own actions in this way, so as to shew that they corresponded in kind and degree to the motives arising from the seven classes of pleasures and pains considered in this theory; also able to decypher the principal actions of others in the same way: this would be as good evidence, that motives were the mechanical causes of actions, as natural phænomena are for the mechanical operation of heat, diet, or medicines. Or if he could not proceed so far, but was able only to decypher most of his own actions, and many of the principal ones of others, still the evidence would scarce be diminished thereby, if the deficiency was no more than is reasonably to be expected from our ignorance and inattention, in respect to ourselves and others. Let the reader make the trial, especially upon himself, since such a self-examination cannot but be profitable, and may perhaps be pleasant; and that either according to the seven classes of pleasures and pains here laid down, or any other division, and judge as he thinks fit upon mature deliberation.
It may be of use in such an inquiry into a man’s self, as I here propose, for him to consider in a short time after any material action is past, whether, if he was once more put into the same rigidly exact circumstances, he could possibly do otherwise than as he did. Here the power of imagination will intervene, and be apt to deceive the inquirer, unless he be cautious. For in this review, other motives, besides those which did actually influence him, will start up; and that especially if the action be such as he wishes to have been performed with more vigour or less, or not to have been performed at all. But when these foreign motives are set aside, and the imagination confined to those which did in fact take place, it will appear impossible, as it seems to me, that the person should have done otherwise than the very thing which he did.
Secondly, According to the theory here laid down, all human actions proceed from vibrations in the nerves of the muscles, and these from others, which are either evidently of a mechanical nature, as in the automatic motions; or else have been shewn to be so in the account given of the voluntary motions.
And if the doctrine of vibrations be rejected, and sensation and muscular motion be supposed to be performed by some other kind of motion in the nervous parts; still it seems probable, that the same method of reasoning might be applied to this other kind of motion.
Lastly, To suppose, that the action A, or its contrary a, can equally follow previous circumstances, that are exactly the same, ​appears to me the same thing, as affirming that one or both of them might start up into being without any cause; which, if admitted, appears to me to destroy the foundation of all general abstract reasoning; and particularly of that whereby the existence of the First Cause is proved.
One of the principal objections to the opinion of mechanism is that deduced from the existence of the moral sense, whose history I have just given. But it appears from that history, that God has so formed the world, and perhaps (with reverence be it spoken) was obliged by his moral perfections so to form it, as that virtue must have amiable and pleasing ideas affixed to it; vice, odious ones. The moral sense is therefore generated necessarily and mechanically. And it remains to be inquired, whether the amiable and odious ideas above shewed to be necessarily affixed to virtue and vice respectively, though differently, according to the different events of each person’s life, do not answer all the purposes of making us ultimately happy in the love of God, and of our neighbour; and whether they are not, cæteris paribus, the same entirely, or at least in all material respects, in those who believe mechanism, who believe free-will, and who have not entered into the discussion of the question at all; or if there be a difference, whether the associations arising from the opinion of necessity, do not tend more to accelerate us in our progress to the love of God, our only true happiness. It appears to me, that the difference is in general very small; also that this difference, whatever it be, is of such a nature as to be a presumption in favour of the doctrine of necessity, all things being duly considered.
When a person first changes his opinion from free-will to mechanism, or, more properly, first sees part of the mechanism of the mind, and believes the rest from analogy, he is just as much affected by his wonted pleasures and pains, hopes and fears, as before, by the moral and religious ones, as by others. And the being persuaded, that certain things have a necessary influence to change his mind for the better or the worse, i.e. so as to receive more sensible, sympathetic, religious pleasures, or otherwise, will force him still more strongly upon the right method, i.e. put him upon inquiring after and pursuing this method.
If it be objected, That the moral sense supposes, that we refer actions to ourselves and others, whereas the opinion of mechanism annihilates all those associations, by which we refer actions to ourselves or others; I answer, that it does this just as the belief of the reality and infinite value of the things of another world annihilates all the regards of this world. Both have a tendency to these respective ends, which are indeed one and the same at the bottom; but both require time, in order to produce their full effects. When religion has made any one indifferent to this world, its pleasures and pains, then the kingdom of God, or pure unmixed happiness, comes in respect of him; so that he may then well refer all to God. However, a man may be ​thoroughly satisfied in a cool deliberate way, that honours, riches, &c. can afford no solid happiness; and yet desire them at certain times, eagerly perhaps, from former associations. But such a thorough general conviction applied previously to the particular instances, is a great help in a time of temptation, and will gradually destroy the wrong associations. In like manner, the opinion that God is the one only cause of all things, has a tendency to beget the most absolute resignation, and must be a great support in grievous trials and sufferings.
We may shew by a like method of reasoning, that the affections of gratitude and resentment, which are intimately connected with the moral sense, remain notwithstanding the doctrine of mechanism. For it appears from the account of resentment above delivered, that this, and by consequence gratitude, in their nascent state, are equally exerted towards all things, animate and inanimate, that are equally connected with pleasure and pain. By degrees all succeeding circumstances are left out, and our love and hatred confined to preceding ones, which we consider as the only causes. We then leave out inanimate objects entirely, brutes and children in most circumstances, and adults in some. All which is chiefly done, because acknowledgments, rewards, threatenings, and punishments, with the other associated circumstances of gratitude and resentment, can have no use but with respect to living intelligent beings. By farther degrees we learn such a use of the words cause and effect as to call nothing a cause, whose cause, or preceding circumstance, we can see, denominating all such things mere effects, all others causes. And thus, because the secret springs of action in men are frequently concealed, both from the by-stander, and even from the agent himself, or not attended to, we consider men in certain circumstances as real causes; and intelligent beings as the only ones that can be real causes; and thus confine our gratitude and resentment to them: whence it seems to follow, that as soon as we discover created intelligent beings not to be real causes, we should cease to make them the objects either of gratitude or resentment. But this is, in great measure, speculation; for it will appear to every attentive person, that benevolence, compassion, &c. are amiable, and the objects of gratitude, envy, and malice, the contrary, from whatever causes they proceed; i.e. he will find his mind so formed already by association, that he cannot withhold his gratitude or resentment: and it has been my business in the foregoing analysis of the affections, to point out the several methods by which this and such like things are brought about. And, for the same reasons, a person must ascribe merit and demerit, which are also intimately connected with the moral sense, to created intelligent beings, though he may have a full persuasion, that they are not real causes.
It does indeed appear, that this is owing to our present imperfect state, in which we begin with the idolatry of the creature, ​with the worship of every associated circumstance; and that as we advance in perfection, the associations relating to the one only, Ultimate, Infinite Cause, must at last overpower all the rest; that we shall pay no regards but to God alone; and that all resentment, demerit, sin, and misery, will be utterly annihilated and absorbed by his infinite happiness and perfections. For our associations being in this, as in many other cases, inconsistent with each other, our first gross and transitory ones must yield to those which succeed and remain.
While any degree of resentment, or unpleasing affection, is left, it may be shewn, that the same associations which keep it up, will turn it upon the creatures, and particularly upon ourselves. And, on the other hand, when the consideration of the Ultimate Cause seems ready to turn it from ourselves, it will also shew that it ought to be annihilated.
These may be considered as general remarks, tending to remove the difficulties arising from the consideration of the moral sense. I will now state the principal objections to the opinion of mechanism, in a direct, but short way, adding such hints as appear to me to afford a solution of them.
First, then, It may be said, that a man may prove his own free-will by internal feeling. This is true, if by free-will be meant the power of doing what a man wills or desires; or of resisting the motives of sensuality, ambition, &c. i.e. free-will in the popular and practical sense. Every person may easily recollect instances, where he has done these several things. But then these are entirely foreign to the present question. To prove that a man has free-will in the sense opposite to mechanism, he ought to feel that he can do different things, while the motives remain precisely the same: and here I apprehend the internal feelings are entirely against free-will, where the motives are of a sufficient magnitude to be evident; where they are not, nothing can be proved.
Secondly, It may be said, that unless a man have free-will, he is not an agent. I answer, that this is true, if agency be so defined as to include free-will. But if agency have its sense determined, like other words, from the associated appearances, the objection falls at once. A man may speak, handle, love, fear, &c. entirely by mechanism.
Thirdly, It may be said, that the denial of free-will in man is the denial of it in God also. But to this it may be answered, that one does not know how to put the question in respect of God, supposing free-will to mean the power of doing different things, the previous circumstances remaining the same, without gross anthropomorphitism. It does not at all follow, however, because man is subject to a necessity ordained by God, that God is subject to a prior necessity. On the contrary, according to the doctrine of mechanism, God is the cause of causes, the one only source of all power.
​Fourthly, It may be said, that men are perpetually imposed upon, unless they have free-will, since they think they have. But here again free-will is put for the power of doing what a man wills or desires, &c. for, in the sense opposite to mechanism, few persons have ever entered into the discussion of the point at all; and those who do with sufficient attention, cannot but determine against free-will, as it seems to me.
Fifthly, It may be said, that the doctrine of mechanism destroys the notion of a particular providence altering the course of nature so as to suit it to the actions of men. I answer, that laying down philosophical free-will, such an alteration in the course of nature may perhaps be necessary. But if man’s actions, and the course of nature, be both fixed, they may be suited to each other in the best possible manner; which is all that can be required, in order to vindicate God’s attributes, as well as all that man can desire.
Sixthly, It may be said, that all motives to good actions, and particularly to prayer, are taken away by denying free-will. I answer, that according to the mechanical system, prayer and good actions are the means for obtaining happiness; and that the belief of this is the strongest of motives to impel men to prayer and good works.
Seventhly, It may be said, that the denial of free-will destroys the distinction between virtue and vice. I answer, that this is according as these words are defined. If free-will be included in the definition of virtue, then there can be no virtue without freewill. But if virtue be defined obedience to the will of God, a course of action proceeding from the love of God, or from benevolence, &c. free-will is not at all necessary; since these affections and actions may be brought about mechanically.
A solution analogous to this may be given to the objection taken from the notions of merit and demerit. Let the words be defined, and they will either include free-will, or, not including it, will not require it; so that the proposition, merit implies freewill, will either be identical, or false.
Eighthly, It may be said, that the doctrine of mechanism makes God the author of sin. I answer, that till we arrive at self-annihilation, sin always will, and ought to, appear to arise from ourselves; and that, when we are arrived thither, sin and evil of every kind vanish. I answer also, that the doctrine of philosophical free-will does not remove our difficulties and perplexities, in respect of the moral attributes of God, unless by transferring them upon the natural ones; i.e. by our supposing that some prior necessity compelled God to bestow free-will on his creatures. It seems equally difficult, in every way, to account for the origin of evil, natural or moral, consistently with the infinity of the power, knowledge, and goodness of God. If we suppose that all tends to happiness ultimately, this removes the difficulty so far as to produce acquiescence in the will of God, ​and thankfulness to him; and that just as much upon the system of mechanism as that of free-will. Moral evil has no difficulty in it, besides what arises from the natural evil attending it.
Ninthly, It may be said, that the exhortations of the Scriptures pre-suppose free-will. I answer, that they are to be considered as motives impelling the will, and contributing, as far as they are attended to, to rectify it. A parent who believes the doctrine of mechanism may, consistently with it, or rather must necessarily, in consequence of this belief, exhort his child. Therefore God, who is pleased to call himself our heavenly father, may do the same. And if we embrace the opinion of universal restoration, then all the exhortations contained both in the word and works of God, will produce their genuine effect, and concur to work in us dispositions fit to receive happiness ultimately.
I come now to hint some consequences of the doctrine of mechanism, which seem to me to be strong presumptions in its favour.
First, then, It entirely removes the great difficulty of reconciling the prescience of God with the free-will of man. For it takes away philosophical free-will, and the practical is consistent with God’s prescience.
Secondly, It has a tendency to beget the most profound humility and self-annihilation; since, according to this, we are entirely destitute of all power and perfection in ourselves, and are what we are entirely by the grace and goodness of God.
Thirdly, It has a tendency to abate all resentment against men. Since all that they do against us is by the appointment of God, it is rebellion against him to be offended with them.
Fourthly, It greatly favours the doctrine of universal restoration. Since all that is done is by the appointment of God, it cannot but end well at last.
Fifthly, It has a tendency to make us labour more earnestly with ourselves and others, particularly children, from the greater certainty attending all endeavours that operate in a mechanical way.
Lastly, There are many well-known passages of Scripture, which cannot be reconciled to the doctrine of philosophical free-will, without the greatest harshness of interpretation.
It may also be objected to the whole foregoing theory, as well as to the doctrine of vibrations in particular, that it is unfavourable to the immateriality of the soul; and, by consequence, to its immortality. But to this I answer, that I am reduced to the necessity of making a postulatum at the entrance of my inquiries; which precludes all possibility of proving the materiality of the soul from this theory afterwards. Thus I suppose, or postulate, in my first proposition, that sensations arise in the soul from motions excited in the medullary substance of the brain. I do indeed bring some arguments from physiology and pathology, ​to shew this to be a reasonable postulatum, when understood in a general sense; for it is all one to the purpose of the foregoing theory, whether the motions in the medullary substance be the physical cause of the sensations, according to the system of the schools; or the occasional cause, according to Malbranche; or only an adjunct, according to Leibnitz. However, this is not supposing matter to be endued with sensation, or any way explaining what the soul is; but only taking its existence and connexion with the bodily organs in the most simple case, for granted, in order to make farther inquiries. Agreeably to which I immediately proceed to determine the species of the motion, and by determining it, to cast light on some important and obscure points relating to the connexion between the body and the soul in complex cases.
It does indeed follow from this theory, that matter, if it could be endued with the most simple kinds of sensation, might also arrive at all that intelligence of which the human mind is possessed: whence this theory must be allowed to overturn all the arguments which are usually brought for the immateriality of the soul from the subtlety of the internal senses, and of the rational faculty. But I no ways presume to determine whether matter can be endued with sensation or no. This is a point foreign to the purpose of my inquiries. It is sufficient for me, that there is a certain connexion, of one kind or other, between the sensations of the soul, and the motions excited in the medullary substance of the brain; which is what all physicians and philosophers allow.
I would not therefore be any way interpreted so as to oppose the immateriality of the soul. On the contrary, I see clearly, and acknowledge readily, that matter and motion, however subtilely divided, or reasoned upon, yield nothing more than matter and motion still. But then neither would I affirm, that this consideration affords a proof of the soul’s immateriality. In like manner the unity of consciousness seems to me an inconclusive argument. For consciousness is a mental perception; and if perception be a monad, then every inseparable adjunct of it must be so too, i.e. vibrations, according to this theory, which is evidently false. Not to mention, that it is difficult to know what is meant by the unity of consciousness.
But it is most worthy of notice, that the immateriality of the soul has little or no connexion with its immortality; and that we ought to depend upon Him who first breathed into man the breath of the present life, for our resurrection to a better. All live unto him. And if we depend upon any thing else besides him, for any blessing, we may be said so far to renounce our allegiance to him, and to idolize that upon which we depend.