# United States – Vietnam Relations, 1945–1967: A Study Prepared by the Department of Defense/III. A. Notes

| 1. | MemCon between Douglas MacArthur II (State, Europe) and Laniel at Bermuda, December 4, 1953 (SECRET). |
| 2. | Radford memorandum to the Defense Secretary (Wilson), March 12, 1954 (TOP SECRET). |
| 3. | Dept. of State Press Release No. 165, March 29, 1954. See Part II.B. |
| 4. | Dulles "EYES ONLY" tel. No. 3476 to American Embassy – Paris (Dillon) and No. 5175 to American Embassy – London (Aldrich), April 3, 1954 (TOP SECRET); also Dulles "EYES ONLY" tel. NIACT 5179 to American Embassy – London (Aldrich), April 4, 1954 (TOP SECRET). |
| 5. | Dulles "EYES ONLY" tel. DULTE 15 to the Acting Secretary (Smith) for passage to the President, April 24, 1954 (TOP SECRET). |
| 6. | Dulles "EYES ONLY" tel. DULTE 9 from Geneva for Smith, Dillon, and Aldrich, April 26, 1954 (TOP SECRET). |
| 7. | "United States Position on Indochina to be Taken at Geneva," undated. (TOP SECRET). |
| 8. | The briefing was reported in a priority cable from Dulles at Geneva, tel. SECTO 6, April 25, 1954 (CONFIDENTIAL); emphasis supplied. |
| 9. | Radford memorandum to SecDef, May 7, 1954, Enclosure: "Comments to be furnished to the Secretary of Defense re Radios SECTO 106 and SECTO 110, dated 5 May 1954, and DA IN 59296, dated 6 May 1954" (TOP SECRET). |
| 10. | Ibid. |
| 11. | Reported in Dulles "EYES ONLY" tel. TEDUL 43 to Smith at Geneva, May 8, 1954 (TOP SECRET). |
| 12. | Verbatim Minutes of the Geneva Conference (Dept. of State), Second Plenary Session, p. 87. (Hereafter cited as U.S. Verb Min [session]) |
| 13. | U.S. Verb Min/3, p. 122. |
| 14. | Dulles priority tel. TOSEC 138 to Smith at Geneva, May 12, 1954 (CONFIDENTIAL); emphasis supplied. |
| 15. | Ibid. |
| 16. | Dillon priority tel. No. 134 from Paris, July 11, 1954 (TOP SECRET). |
| 17. | Dulles to American Consulate – Geneva, tel. TEDUL 171, June 7, 1954 (TOP SECRET). |
| 1. | Dillon tel. from Paris No. 4287 to Dulles, May 10, 1954 (TOP SECRET). |
| 2. | In forwarding these conditions to the Embassy for transmittal to the French, Dulles noted that a prompt, favorable decision would be premature inasmuch as it might internationalize the war in a way offensive to the British, leaving the French with the difficult choice of internationalization or capitulation. Dulles "eyes only" tel. to Paris NIACT 4023, May 11, 1954 (TOP SECRET). The conditions are also cited in Jean Lacouture and Philippe Devillers, La fin d'une guerre: Indochine 1954 (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1960), pp. 176–77. |
| 3. | Dulles' words are as paraphrased. In a State Department Memorandum of Conversation, May 11, 1954, of a White House conference May 10 attended by the President, Dulles, Wilson, Deputy Defense Secretary Anderson, Radford, Robert Bowie, and Douglas MacArthur II (TOP SECRET). |
| 4. | Dillon "eyes only" from Paris to the Under Secretary (for Dulles) No. 4383, May 14, 1954 (TOP SECRET). |
| 5. | Dillon commented: "I am certain that unless we can find some way to get around this requirement [that the Vietnamese have the option of leaving the French Union], French will never ask for outside assistance." In Ibid. Dillon proposed that the real objection among Asians to the position of the Associated States rested not on the "purely juridical" problem of the right to leave the Union, but on Indochina's lack of powerful national armies. The Ambassador recommended that American training and equipping of the Vietnamese National Army (VNA), coupled with a French statement of intention to withdraw the Expeditionary Corps after the establishment of peace and a national army, would significantly dampen Asian antagonism to the Bao Dai regime. (Dillon from Paris tel. NIACT 4402 to Dulles, May 17, 1954, TOP SECRET). Why Dillon assumed Asians would significantly change their attitude toward French Indochina when, even with an American takeover of the training and equipping of the NVA, French forces would still be on Vietnamese territory for a lengthy period is not known. |
| 6. | Dulles "eyes only" to Paris (Dillon) tel. NIACT 4094, May 15, 1954 (TOP SECRET). |
| 7. | Dulles "eyes only" to Smith at Geneva tel. TEDUL 75, and to Dillon at Paris No. 4104, May 17, 1954 (TOP SECRET). |
| 8. | FEA memorandum, "Procedural Steps for Intervention in Indochina," undated, (entered, into FE files May 17, 1954) (TOP SECRET). |
| 9. | FEA, Annex on "Studies to be Undertaken Immediately within United States Government," attached to ibid., (TOP SECRET). ​ |
| 10. | OCB, Studies with Respect to Possible U.S. Action Regarding Indochina, Tab E, "Plan for Political Warfare in Regard to Communist China intervention in Indochina," undated, in enclosure to memorandum from E. F. Drumright to Robert Murphy, May 24, 1954 (TOP SECRET). |
| 11. | This conceptualization stemmed from discussions of the NSC Planning Board, and was part of a broader contingency study program. See the Board's statement in an enclosure to a memorandum for Robert Bowie (the Board's chairman), May 19, 1954 (TOP SECRET). |
| 12. | Memorandum from JCS to the Secretary of Defense, May 20, 1954 (TOP SECRET). |
| 13. | These conclusions were subsequently confirmed when, at the direction of General Ridgway, a technical team of seven officers representing the Engineer, Transportation, and Signal Corps went to Indochina on a covert mission to determine military and military-related resources available there in the event U.S. intervention was implemented. The team spent the period May 31–June 22 in the field. Their conclusions were, in general, that Indochina was devoid of the logistical, geographic, and related resources necessary to a substantial American ground effort such as Ridgway felt would be required for a success. The group's findings are in a report from Col. David W. Heiman, its leader, to Ridgway, July 12, 1954 (CONFIDENTIAL). The Chiefs' conclusions were disputed, however, by Drumright (in a memorandum to MacArthur, May 24, 1954, TOP SECRET). He argued that if, as everyone agreed, Indochina was vital to American security, the U.S. should not consider more than a token ground troop commitment to be a serious diversion of our capabilities. While not arguing for a substantial troop commitment, Drumright suggested that the U.S. plan for that eventuality rather than count on defense with atomic weapons or non-nuclear strikes on Chinese territory. Somehow, however, Drumright's concern about the Chinese did not extend to the consideration that a massive U.S. troop commitment, which he stated elsewhere in the memorandum might prove necessary should token forces fail to do the job, risked bringing on the Chinese. |
| 14. | Smith from Geneva "eyes only" tel. DULTE 100 to Dulles, May 23, 1954 (TOP SECRET). |
| 15. | Dulles to Smith at Geneva tel. TEDUL 116, May 24, 1954 (TOP SECRET). |
| 16. | On April 28 French and Vietnamese representatives in Paris initialled separate treaties of independence and association. The treaties did not take effect, however, until June 4, when the French National Assembly finally approved the documents. |
| 17. | Dulles tel. to American Embassy – Paris No. 4272, May 26, 1954 (TOP SECRET). See also Lacouture and Devillers, p. 192. ​ |
| 18. | Dillon priority telegram from Paris No. 4596, May 29, 1954 (TOP SECRET). See also Smith from Geneva SECTO 331, May 28, 1954 (TOP SECRET) and Dillon from Paris (reporting talks with Schumann) No. 4580, May 28, 1954 (TOP SECRET). |
| 19. | McClintock from Saigon No. 2468 to Dulles, May 19, 1954 (SECRET); Dillon from Paris "eyes only" for Dulles, Smith, and McClintock No. 4566, May 27, 1954 (TOP SECRET), reporting Trapnell–Ely talks. Ely and O'Daniel were still at odds, Dillon noted, over structural changes in the NVA, war strategy, and the role of U.S. advisors. |
| 20. | Ibid.; also, Dillon priority telegram from Paris No. 4612, May 31, 1954 (TOP SECRET). |
| 21. | Murphy (acting Secretary) to American Embassy – Paris NIACT 4325, May 29, 1954 (TOP SECRET). |
| 22. | Dillon from Paris No. 4607, May 30, 1954 (TOP SECRET). See also Dillon from Paris No. 4625, June 1, 1954 (TOP SECRET). |
| 23. | Murphy to American Embassy – Paris NIACT 4332, May 31, 1954 (TOP SECRET). |
| 24. | Eisenhower's unwavering attitude toward action in Asia only in concert with allies put him at odds with Dulles, who was prepared to act unilaterally at least in circumstances of overt aggression. When the issue of possible CPR air intervention came before the President, he is reported to have reacted sharply. Evidently supposing that conflict in the air would mean a Sino–U.S. war, the President said the United States would not intervene in China on any basis except united action. He would not be responsible for going into China alone unless a joint Congressional resolution ordered him to do so. The United States should in no event undertake alone to support French colonialism. Unilateral action by the United States in cases of this kind would destroy us. If we intervened alone in this case, we would be expected to intervene alone in other parts of the world. He made very plain that the need for united action as a condition of U.S. intervention was not related merely to the regional grouping for the defense of Southeast Asia but was also a necessity for U.S. intervention in response to Chinese Communist overt aggression. Yet, when reminded by his Special Assistant, Robert Cutler, of NSC 5405's position that U.S. unilateral action could not be ruled out in the event of overt Chinese aggression against Thailand, Burma, or Malaya, and of Dulles' September 2, 1953 warning to China of a direct U.S. response to Chinese aggression in Indochina, the President stated that no difference existed between himself and. Dulles. (Memorandum of conversation between Eisenhower and Cutler, June 1, 1954, TOP SECRET). ​The next day, June 2, the President directly confronted Dulles on this matter. Dulles distinguished between U.S. involvement in a collective grouping, which could only come about on satisfaction of the preconditions, and action in response to overt Chinese aggression. The Secretary's view was that in the latter case, the U.S. should act unilaterally upon authorization by Congress, citing prior statements by himself and the President that had warned China of the consequences of overt aggression. The President responded, according to Cutler's report, that direct Chinese aggression would force him to go all the way with naval and air power (including "new weapons") directed at air bases and ports in mainland China. He would therefore have to have much more than Congressional authorization in view of the likely public reaction to a Presidential request of Congress for war acts against China. Even though the Thais, Filipinos, French, and Indochinese would likely support such action, other countries, such as Australia, had to be brought along as well. The President, in short, was as concerned about the politics as the logic of getting involved in a conflict with China. (Memorandum of conference in the President's office, June 2, 1954, involving the President, Dulles, Anderson, Radford, MacArthur, and Cutler, TOP SECRET.) At its 200th meeting on 3 June, the NSC received, considered, and agreed upon the President's views. Following this important Presidential determination, Dulles called in the Australian and New Zealand ambassadors on the question of overt Chinese aggression in Southeast Asia. He explained that direct Chinese action was unlikely, but that the French had been pressing for assurance of a U.S. reply to Chinese air intervention in the delta. He reported the U.S. position that Chinese aggression required a collective response and a UN appeal, and distinguished this procedure from the united action concept of March 29. A brief memorandum was suggested by the Secretary by which the ANZUS powers would pledge, in the event of overt CPR aggression, to request approval of their parliaments for the use of armed forces, support a UN appeal by the attacked party, and seek to persuade other free nations to join in acting against China. The ambassadors, however, merely asked questions and, apparently, the proposed memorandum was not agreed upon by any of the Allies during the course of the Geneva Conference. See Dulles priority tel. to American Embassy – Canberra No. 238, June 5, 1954 (TOP SECRET). |
| 25. | Memorandum from Bidault to Eisenhower, Geneva, June 1, 1954 (TOP SECRET). See also Smith from Geneva tel. DULTE 156, June 6, 1954 (TOP SECRET). |
| 26. | Dillon tel. to Dulles No. 4766, June 9, 1954 (TOP SECRET). Also, Dulles tel. to American Embassy – Paris No. 4286, May 27, 1954 (TOP SECRET); here, the American position was that French forces would be maintained during united action except for normal troop rotation, replacement by native forces as the military situation permits, and consultation with allies engaged in the united action. ​ |
| 27 | Dulles to American Embassy – Paris tel. No. 4421, June 4, 1954 (TOP SECRET). |
| 28. | Murphy (acting Secretary) "eyes only" tel. to American Embassy – Paris (Dillon), No. 4508, June 10, 1954 (TOP SECRET). |
| 29. | Dulles "eyes only" priority to American Embassy – Paris No. 4579, June 14, 1954 (TOP SECRET). |
| 30. | Dulles priority to American Consul – Geneva (Smith) TEDUL 197, June 14, 1954 (TOP SECRET). |
| 31. | Dillon "eyes only" from Paris to Dulles No. 4841, June 14, 1954 (TOP SECRET). |
| 32. | See, e.g., Schumann's remarks to Dillon in the latter's cable from Paris No. 4766, June 9, 1954 (TOP SECRET). |
| 33. | Dulles to American Consul – Geneva (Smith) TEDUL 208, June 16, 1954 (TOP SECRET). |
| 34. | Smith "eyes only" for the Secretary from Geneva DULTE 164, June 9, 1954 (TOP SECRET). |
| 35. | Dillon priority telegram to Dulles No. 4424, May 18, 1954. Cf. Dulles' comment of June 7 in a cable to Geneva (priority TEDUL 169, TOP SECRET): "I have long felt and still feel that the French are not treating our proposal seriously but toying with it just enough to use it as a talking point at Geneva." |
| 36. | Dulles priority tel. to American Consul – Geneva TEDUL 175, June 8, 1954 (TOP SECRET). |
| 1. | Johnson priority tel. SECTO 557 from Geneva, July 3, 1954 (TOP SECRET). |
| 2. | Smith tel. SECTO 267 from Geneva, May 20, 1954 (SECRET). |
| 3. | Smith tel. DULTE 193 from Geneva, June 17, 1954 (TOP SECRET). |
| 4. | Dulles to Smith tel. TEDUL 196, June 14, 1954 (TOP SECRET). |
| 5. | Dulles priority tel. TEDUL 212 to Smith at Geneva, June 17, 1954 (TOP SECRET). |
| 6. | Dulles "eyes only" tel. TEDUL 222 to Smith at Geneva, June 18, 1954 (TOP SECRET). |
| 7. | Smith from Geneva priority tel. DULTE 195, June 18, 1954 (SECRET). |
| 8. | Smith from Geneva tel. DULTE 202, June 19, 1954 (TOP SECRET). |
| 9. | Dulles to American Consulate – Geneva tel. TOSEC 478. June 24, 1954 (SECRET). |
| 10. | In Dulles to American Embassy – Paris tel. No. 4852, June 28, 1954 (TOP SECRET). |
| 11. | New York Times, June 29, 1954, p. 2. |
| 12. | Anthony Eden, Memoirs: Full Circle (Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1960), p. 149. |
| 13. | Dulles to American Embassy – Paris "eyes only" for Dillon priority tel. No. 52, July 3, 1954 (TOP SECRET). |
| 14. | Ibid. |
| 15. | Dillon from Paris priority tel. No. 50, July 6, 1954 (SECRET). |
| 16. | Dulles to American Embassy – Paris tel. No. 77, July 7, 1954 (SECRET). Regarding the U.S. view of a Ho Chi Minh electoral victory, we not only have the well-known comment of Eisenhower that Ho, at least in 1954, would have garnered 80 per cent of the vote, but also the privately expressed view of Livingston Merchant (Dept. of State) that Ho would be the likely winner. See the latter in Dept, of State Memorandum of Conversation of May 31, 1954, at which Merchant reportedly "felt their [the Associated States'] status was sufficiently independent so that they could freely express their will on a point of this type, although he recognized the possibility that in Viet Nam Ho might win a plebiscite, if held today." (TOP SECRET). ​ |
| 17. | Dillon priority tel. No. 118 from Paris, July 9, 1954 (TOP SECRET). |
| 18. | Dulles "eyes only" tel. NIACT 101 to Aldrich in London, July 7, 1954 (TOP SECRET). |
| 19. | Dulles priority tel. to Dillon in Paris No. 85, July 8, 1954 (TOP SECRET). |
| 20. | Dulles to Dillon tel. No. 127, July 10, 1954 (TOP SECRET). |
| 21. | Dillon from Paris priority tel. No. 134, July 11, 1954 (TOP SECRET). |
| 22. | "Memorandum of Points Referred to in Paragraph 2 of the France–United States Position Paper," July 14, 1954 (SECRET). |
| 23. | Annex A to Dulles letter to Smith of July 16, 1954, signed July 14 by Dulles and Mèndes-France (SECRET). |
| 24. | Dulles priority tel. No. 179 from Paris, July 14, 1954 (SECRET). |
| 25. | Ibid. |
| 26. | Dulles letter to Smith, July 16, 1954 (TOP SECRET). |
| 27. | In a talk between Huang Hua (of the CPR delegation) and Seymour Topping of the New York Times, as reported in Smith's tel. SECTO 661 from Geneva, July 19, 1954 (TOP SECRET). |
| 28. | Dillon priority tel. No. 118 from Paris, July 9, 1954 (TOP SECRET). |
| 29. | This threat was transmitted through Seymour Topping by Huang Hua near the end of the conference. See Smith's tel. SECTO 639 from Geneva, July 18, 1954 (TOP SECRET). |