OpenLLM-France/wikimedia huggingface dataset:
# Proclamation 8124

Delivered on 11 April 2007.
Thomas Jefferson Day, 2007
A Proclamation by the President of the United States of America
On Thomas Jefferson Day, we commemorate the birthday of a monumental figure whose place in our Nation's history will always be cherished. Thomas Jefferson was a scholar, statesman, author, architect, and patriot, and today we celebrate his many accomplishments and lasting legacy.
Thomas Jefferson continues to capture our imagination because our country still echoes his ideals. In 1776, as a young lawyer from Virginia, he drafted the Declaration of Independence for the Continental Congress and articulated the American creed. From that document was born a Nation with a message of hope that all men are created equal and meant to be free. The words Jefferson penned were a bold statement of revolutionary principles, and they have lifted the lives of millions in America and around the world.
As the third President of the United States, Jefferson worked to realize the vision he held for our young democracy. He signed legislation in 1802 that established the United States Military Academy at West Point, New York, and began the great tradition of service academies that have contributed immensely to the defense of our freedom. He believed in the possibility of westward expansion, doubling the size of our Nation with the Louisiana Purchase and encouraging the Lewis and Clark Expedition to help open the unknown West for future development.
Thomas Jefferson served his fellow citizens in many other important roles, including Governor of Virginia, Secretary of State, and Ambassador to France. Yet, of his many accomplishments, Thomas Jefferson will always be remembered for his belief in liberty and in the ability of citizens to govern their own country and their own lives. As we celebrate his birthday, we are proud that the Nation he helped establish remains free, independent, and true to the ideals of our founding. Today, the United States of America is the world's foremost champion of liberty, moving forward with confidence and strength, and an example to the world of what free people can achieve.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, GEORGE W. BUSH, President of the United States of America, by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and laws of the United States of America, do hereby proclaim April 13, 2007, as Thomas Jefferson Day. I encourage all citizens to join in celebrating the achievements of this extraordinary American, reflecting on his words, and learning more about his influence on our history and ideals.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this eleventh day of April, in the year of our Lord two thousand seven, and of the Independence of the United States of America the two hundred and thirty-first.
GEORGE W. BUSH
This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
Public domainPublic domainfalsefalse
# Porter v. Investors' Syndicate (287 U.S. 346)

United States Supreme Court
287 U.S. 346
Porter v. Investors' Syndicate
Argued: Nov. 14, 1932. --- Decided: Dec 5, 1932
Appeal from the District Court for the District of Montana.
Messrs. T. H. McDonald and L. A. Foot, both of Helena, Mont., and J. W. Freeman, of Great Falls, Mont., for appellant.
Mr. Milton S. Gunn, of Helena, Mont., for appellee.
Mr. Justice ROBERTS delivered the opinion of the Court.

## Notes

This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
Public domainPublic domainfalsefalse
# Porter v. Graves

* related portals: Supreme Court of the United States.
* sister projects: Wikidata item.
United States Supreme Court
104 U.S. 171
Porter v. Graves
ERROR to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of New York.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
Mr. Henry J. Scudder for the plaintiff in error.
Mr. Francis Kernan, contra.
MR. JUSTICE MILLER delivered the opinion of the court.

## Notes

This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
Public domainPublic domainfalsefalse
# Porter v. Investors' Syndicate

* Search for titles containing or beginning with: "Porter v. Investors' Syndicate."
* sister projects: Wikidata item.
This is a disambiguation page. It lists works that share the same title. If an article link referred you here, please consider editing it to point directly to the intended page.
* Porter v. Investors' Syndicate (286 U.S. 461)
* Porter v. Investors' Syndicate (287 U.S. 346)
# Porter v. Investors' Syndicate (286 U.S. 461)

United States Supreme Court
286 U.S. 461
Porter v. Investors' Syndicate
Argued: April 22, 1932. --- Decided: May 23, 1932
Messrs. T. H. MacDonald and L. A. Foot, both of Helena, Mont., and J. W. Freeman, of Great Falls, Mont., for appellant.
[Argument of Counsel from page 462 intentionally omitted]
Mr. M. S. Gunn, of Helena, Mont., for appellee.
[Argument of Counsel from page 463 intentionally omitted]
Mr. Justice ROBERTS delivered the opinion of the Court.

## Notes

This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
Public domainPublic domainfalsefalse
# Porter v. Foley (65 U.S. 415)/Opinion of the Court

* Court Documents
* Case Syllabus
* Opinion of the Court
United States Supreme Court
65 U.S. 415
Porter v. Foley
The record of this case does not show that any question arose or was decided by the State court, which this court has authority to re-examine by virtue of the 25th section of the Judiciary act.
Without entering into a tedious analysis of the case, it is sufficient to state, that the chief or only question in it was, whether an act of Assembly of Kentucky, authorizing an executor to sell the real estate of minors, was a valid exercise of power by the Legislature.
The counsel for plaintiff objected to the admission of the deed made in pursuance of such authority, 'because said act and supplement were unconstitutional and void.'
This objection was very properly construed by the court as having reference to the validity of the act of the Legislature of Kentucky, not as contrary to any provision of the Constitution of the United States, but as raising the question whether the Legislature had a power under the Constitution of that State, by general or special enactment, to authorize the sale of real estate of infants. The court decided that it had such power; and if it had, it is abundantly evident that there is no article nor clause in the Constitution of the United States which could interfere with it.
Let the writ of error be dismissed.

## Notes

This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
Public domainPublic domainfalsefalse
# Porter v. Investors' Syndicate (287 U.S. 346)/Opinion of the Court

* Court Documents
* Case Syllabus
* Opinion of the Court
United States Supreme Court
287 U.S. 346
Porter v. Investors' Syndicate
Argued: Nov. 14, 1932. --- Decided: Dec 5, 1932
In this cause, reversing the decree of the United States District Court, we held (286 U.S. 461, 52 S.Ct. 617, 76 L.Ed. 1226) that the appellee had failed to exhaust the administrative remedy afforded by the Montana statute, and that the federal court was therefore without jurisdiction as a court of equity to enjoin enforcement of the state auditor's order.
The appellee has presented a petition for rehearing which concedes the correctness of our ruling that the statute gives a remedy partly administrative in character, by suit in the state district court, but contends that by this grant the act violates article 4, section 1, of the Montana constitution, which is: 'The powers of the government of this state are divided into three distinct departments: The legislative, executive, and judicial, and no person or collection of persons charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments shall exercise any powers properly belonging to either of the others, except as in this constitution expressly directed or permitted.'
As this question was not briefed or argued when the case was first heard, we granted a reargument; and the cause has again been presented on this point.
The statute plainly affords a remedy which, though in certain respects judicial, is in others administrative. The courts of Montana have not passed upon its constitutionality as affected by the quoted section of the fundamental law of the state. Such expressions of the Supreme Court as have been brought to our attention indicate that article 4, section 1, does not forbid the conference on the state district courts of administrative powers in connection with and ancillary to their judicial functions. O'Neill v. Yellowstone Irrigation Dist., 44 Mont. 492, 121 P. 283; State v. Johnson, 75 Mont. 240, 249, 243 P. 1073. Compare State ex rel. Kellogg v. District Court, 13 Mont. 370, 34 P. 298; State ex rel. Hillis v. Sullivan, 48 Mont. 320, 137 P. 392.
An adjudication of the question by the state Supreme Court would bind us. Gulf, C. & S.F.R. Co. v. Dennis, 224 U.S. 503, 32 S.Ct. 542, 56 L.Ed. 860. In the absence of such decision we are reluctant to construe a state constitution, Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Garrett, 231 U.S. 298, 34 S.Ct. 48, 58 L.Ed. 229; but as our decision requires that the alleged conflict of state statute and state Constitution be resolved we must pass upon it. Southern R. Co. v. Watts, 260 U.S. 519, 522, 43 S.Ct. 192, 67 L.Ed. 375.
In view of the Montana cases to which reference has been made, we are not convinced that the statute is offensive to the Montana Constitution, and adhere to the judgment heretofore entered.

## Notes

This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
Public domainPublic domainfalsefalse
# Porter v. Lazear

* related portals: Supreme Court of the United States.
* sister projects: Wikidata item.
United States Supreme Court
109 U.S. 84
Porter v. Lazear
D. T. Watson, for plaintiff in error.
No counsel for defendant in error.

## Notes

This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
Public domainPublic domainfalsefalse
# Religious Persecution

RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION
A STUDY IN POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY
BY
E. S. P. HAYNES
LATE SCHOLAR OP BALLIOL COLLEGE, OXFORD
LONDON DUCKWORTH & CO. 3 HENRIETTA STREET, COVENT GARDEN, W.C. 1904
This work is in the public domain in the United States because it was published before January 1, 1929.
The longest-living author of this work died in 1949, so this work is in the public domain in countries and areas where the copyright term is the author's life plus 74 years or less. This work may be in the public domain in countries and areas with longer native copyright terms that apply the rule of the shorter term to foreign works.
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# Religious Poems

RELIGIOUS POEMS.
BY
HARRIET BEECHER STOWE.
WITH ILLUSTRATIONS.
BOSTON: TICKNOR AND FIELDS. 1867.
Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1867, by
HARRIET BEECHER STOWE,
in the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the District of Massachusetts.
University Press: Welch. Bigelow, & Co., Cambridge.
CONTENTS.
Page
Pressed Flowers from Italy.
This work was published before January 1, 1929, and is in the public domain worldwide because the author died at least 100 years ago.
Public domainPublic domainfalsefalse
# Rabe v. Washington

* related portals: Supreme Court of the United States.
* sister projects: Wikipedia article.

## Concurring Opinion

    Burger
Supreme Court of the United States
405 U.S. 313
Rabe v. Washington
Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Washington
No. 71-247 Argued: February 29, 1972 --- Decided: March 20, 1972
Petitioner was convicted of violating Washington's obscenity statute for showing a sexually frank motion picture at a drive-in theater. In affirming his conviction, the Washington Supreme Court did not hold that the film was obscene under the standards of Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, and Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, but that it was obscene in "the context of its exhibition" at a drive-in. The statute proscribing the knowing display of "obscene" films did not mention the location of the exhibition as an element of the offense.
Held: A State may not criminally punish the exhibition of a motion picture film at a drive-in theater where the statute assertedly violated has not given fair notice that the location of the exhibition was a vital element of the offense.
79 Wash. 2d 254, 484 P. 2d 917, reversed.
William L. Dwyer argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioner.
Curtis Ludwig argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Herbert H. Davis.
Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by Stanley Fleishman and Sam Rosenwein for the National Association of Theatre Owners, Inc., and by Louis Nizer and James Bouras for the Motion Picture Association of America, Inc.
Constantine Regusis filed a brief for Morality in Media, Inc., as amicus curiae, urging affirmance.
# Rabeck v. New York/Dissent Douglas

* Court Documents
* Case Syllabus
* Per Curiam Opinion of the Court
* Dissenting Opinion Douglas
United States Supreme Court
391 U.S. 462
Rabeck v. New York
Mr. Justice DOUGLAS, with whom Mr. Justice BLACK concurs, would reverse for the reasons stated in his dissenting opinion in Ginsberg v. State of New York, 390 U.S. 629, 650, 88 S.Ct. 1274, 1286.
Mr. Justice HARLAN would affirm the judgment of the state court on the premises stated in his separate opinion in Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 704, 88 S.Ct. 1298, 1313. In addition, he considers it a particularly fruitless judicial act to strike down on the score of vagueness a state statute which has already been repealed.

## Notes

This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
Public domainPublic domainfalsefalse
# Rabinowitz v. Kennedy

* related portals: Supreme Court of the United States.
* sister projects: Wikidata item.
United States Supreme Court
376 U.S. 605
Rabinowitz v. Kennedy
Argued: March 2, 1964. --- Decided: March 30, 1964
David Rein, Washington, D.C., for petitioners.
Stephen J. Pollak, Washington D.C., for respondent.
Mr. Justice GOLDBERG delivered the opinion of the Court.

## Notes

This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
Public domainPublic domainfalsefalse
# Rabeck v. New York/Opinion of the Court

* Court Documents
* Case Syllabus
* Per Curiam Opinion of the Court
* Dissenting Opinion Douglas
United States Supreme Court
391 U.S. 462
Rabeck v. New York
Appellant, in seeking reversal of his conviction for selling 'girlie' magazines to a minor under 18 years of age in violation of former § 484-i, New York Penal Law, Consol.Laws, c. 40, argues among other grounds that the statute is impermissibly vague. We agree. While we rejected a like claim as to § 484-h in Ginsberg v. State of New York, 390 U.S. 629, 88 S.Ct. 1274, 20 L.Ed.2d 195, § 484-i in part prohibited the sale of 'any * * * magazines * * * which would appeal to the lust of persons under the age of eighteen years or to their curiosity as to sex or to the anatomical differences between the sexes * * *.' That standard in our view is unconstitutionally vague. 'Nor is it an answer to an argument that a particular regulation of expression is vague to say that it was adopted for the salutary purpose of protecting children. The permissible extent of vagueness is not directly proportional to, or a function of, the extent of the power to regulate or control expression with respect to children.' Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 689, 88 S.Ct. 1298, 1306, 20 L.Ed.2d 225.
Reversed.
Mr. Justice DOUGLAS, with whom Mr. Justice BLACK concurs, would reverse for the reasons stated in his dissenting opinion in Ginsberg v. State of New York, 390 U.S. 629, 650, 88 S.Ct. 1274, 1286.

## Notes

This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
Public domainPublic domainfalsefalse
# Rabe v. Washington/Concurrence Burger

* Court Documents
* Case Syllabus
* Per Curiam Opinion of the Court
* Concurring Opinion Burger
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER, with whom MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST joins, concurring.
I concur solely on the ground that petitioner's conviction under Washington's general obscenity statute cannot, under the circumstances of this case, be sustained consistent with the fundamental notice requirements of [p317] the Due Process Clause. The evidence in this case, however, revealed that the screen of petitioner's theater was clearly visible to motorists passing on a nearby public highway and to 12 to 15 nearby family residences. In addition, young teenage children were observed viewing the film from outside the chain link fence enclosing the theater grounds. I, for one, would be unwilling to hold that the First Amendment prevents a State from prohibiting such a public display of scenes depicting explicit sexual activities if the State undertook to do so under a statute narrowly drawn to protect the public from potential exposure to such offensive materials. See Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767 (1967).
Public displays of explicit materials such as are described in this record are not significantly different from any noxious public nuisance traditionally within the power of the States to regulate and prohibit, and, in my view, involve no significant countervailing First Amendment considerations. That this record shows an offensive nuisance that could properly be prohibited, I have no doubt, but the state statute and charge did not give the notice constitutionally required.

## Notes

* ↑ For examples of recent statutes regulating public displays, see Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-537 (Supp. 1971-1972); N.Y. Penal Law §§ 245.10-245.11 (Supp. 1971-1972).
* ↑ Under such circumstances, where the very method of display may thrust isolated scenes on the public, the Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957), requirement that the materials be "taken as a whole" has little relevance. For me, the First Amendment must be treated in this context as it would in a libel action: if there is some libel in a book, article, or speech we do not average the tone and tenor of the whole; the libelous part is not protected.
# Rabeck v. New York

* related portals: Supreme Court of the United States.
* sister projects: Wikidata item.

## Dissenting Opinion

    Douglas
United States Supreme Court
391 U.S. 462
Rabeck v. New York
Appeal from the Appellate Term of the Supreme Court of New York, First Judicial Department
No. 611. Argued: N/A --- Decided: May 27, 1968
Former § 484-i of the New York Penal Law, which prohibited the sale of "magazines... which would appeal to the lust of persons under the age of eighteen years or to their curiosity as to sex or to the anatomical differences between the sexes," is unconstitutionally vague and it is no answer to say that it was adopted for the salutary purpose of protecting children.
Reversed.
Stanley Fleishman, Osmond K. Fraenkel, and Sam Rosenwein for appellant.
Isidore Dollinger and Daniel J. Sullivan for appellee.
PER CURIAM.

## Notes

This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
Public domainPublic domainfalsefalse
# Reed v. Gardner/Opinion of the Court

* Court Documents
* Case Syllabus
* Opinion of the Court
United States Supreme Court
84 U.S. 409
Reed v. Gardner
It has been frequently held by this court, that in passing upon the questions presented in a bill of exceptions, it will not look beyond the bill itself. #fn-s-s The pleadings, and the statements of the bill, the verdict, and the judgment, are the only matters that are properly before the court. Depositions, exhibits, or certificates not contained in the bill, cannot be considered by the court. The case of Flanders v. Tweed, was exceptional. The court intend to adhere to this practice.
Under this rule there is then nothing whatever in the present case for the court to pass upon.
It is impossible upon a record such as this is, that we should know whether the charge is correct or erroneous, or whether the refusals to charge as requested were justified, or whether they were improper.
As already said, there is absolutely nothing presented to this court for consideration.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
# Reed v. Gardner

* related portals: Supreme Court of the United States.
* sister projects: Wikidata item.
United States Supreme Court
84 U.S. 409
Reed v. Gardner
ERROR to the Circuit Court for the Southern District of Georgia.
Gardner sued Reed in the court below. His declaration alleged that one Wilson had delivered to the defendant cotton, upon an agreement that he, the defendant, would sell the same, and out of the proceeds pay to him, Gardner, the plaintiff, $4000, in which sum the said Wilson was indebted to Gardner; that the property was sold, that the net proceeds were $9000, by means whereof the defendant became liable to pay to the plaintiff the $4000, and that he refused to pay the same. To this the defendant interposed a general denial and several special pleas. A trial was had, and verdict and judgment having been given for the plaintiff, the defendant brought the case here.
The bill of exceptions contained no statement of the evidence, or of the facts upon which the questions arose. It consisted only of the charge of the judge, and of requests and refusals to charge. There was, however, in the transcript a number of depositions, exhibits, certificates, &c., which appeared to have been used in the trial of the case.
Messrs. Carlisle and McPherson, for the plaintiffs in error, stating a case shown, as they conceived, by these, sought to show on it, that there had been error in the action of the court below.
Mr. W. W. Boyce, contra, argued that striking out the depositions, exhibits, certificates, &c., improvidently incorporated in the transcript, no such case as the counsel sought to put before the court was found in what remained, the true record, i. e., the pleadings, bill of exceptions, verdict, and judgment; and asked for an affirmance.
Messrs. Carlisle and McPherson replied that it could not be doubted that such evidence as was contained in the depositions, exhibits, certificates, &c., had been, in fact, given, and that the charge of the judge was based upon it; and suggested that if this court should think that the evidence was not put into the record in proper form, then, that, as in Tweed v. Flanders, the judgment should be reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial; this course being more conducive to justice than to affirm a judgment in a case where it plainly appeared that the court mistook the law, though the mistake might not be so presented as to be capable of being corrected by this court.
Mr. Justice HUNT delivered the opinion of the court.

## Notes

* 9 Wallace, 425, 432.
This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
Public domainPublic domainfalsefalse
# Reed v. Mississippi

* related portals: Supreme Court of the United States.
* sister projects: Wikidata item.
United States Supreme Court
390 U.S. 413
Reed v. Mississippi
Appeal from the Supreme Court of Mississippi
No. 858, Misc. Argued: N/A --- Decided: March 18, 1968
199 So. 2d 803, appeal dismissed and certiorari denied.
Joe T. Patterson, Attorney General of Mississippi, and Guy N. Rogers, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
PER CURIAM.

## Notes

This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
Public domainPublic domainfalsefalse