# United States – Vietnam Relations, 1945–1967: A Study Prepared by the Department of Defense/IV. A. 5. 3. Notes

FOOTNOTES
1. U.S. Congress, Senate Background Information Relating to Southeast Asia and Vietnam (2d Revised Edition) Committee on Foreign Relations, 89th Congress, 2d Session (Washington: GPO, 1966), 36-48. Article 14 of the "Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Viet Nam, July 20, 1954" describes "political and administrative measures," 39-40.
2. Fourth Interim Report of the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1955)) 6-7. Bernard B. Fall, The Two Viet Nams (New York: Praeger) Revised Edition) 1964), 129.
3. State Department Memorandum, INR/REA/AC: Brieman, 5/7/67.
Countries Maintaining Relations with DRV. :
| (* Resident in Peking) |||||
| Ambassador | Ambassador | Ambassador | Consul |
| Albania | Guniea* | North Korea | France |
| Algeria* | Hungary | Poland | India |
| Bulgaria | Indonesia | Romania | UK |
| Communist China | Laos | UAR* |
| Cuba | Mali* | USSR |
| Czechoslovakia | Mongolia | Yugoslavia |
| East Germany |
U.S. Dept. of State, Ltr, Under Secretary Katzenbach to Congressman Evans (March 5) 1968) gives 24 countries, 12 communist. Cf., John Norton Moore, "The Lawfulness of Military Assistance to the Republic of Viet Nam," American Journal of International Law, (Vol. 61, No. 1, January 1967), 2-4; also) Fall, op. cit., 204; and P. J. Honey, Communism in North Vietnam (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1963), 40-41.
4. Hammer, The Struggle for Indochina, op. cit., 179; Bernard Fall, The Viet Minh Regime (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1956), 156 ff. translates the full text.
5. Ibid., 178, 181; DA Pamphlet 550-40, op. cit., 235·
6. Ibid., 179. It should be noted that this announcement followed the peasant revolt in Nghe-An Province in November 1956.
7. A translated text of the 1960 Constitution is in Fall, Two Viet-Nams, op. cit., 409 ff.
8. The National Assembly is elected for 4 years by universal, direct, and secret suffrage on the basis of one deputy for every 50,000 citizens. Article 44 establishes the Assembly as the "only legislative authority." Two meetings per year are prescribed. The Assembly ​elects the President and Vice President, and may amend the Constitution. It appoints the Premier upon recommendation of the President, and the Ministers upon recommendation of the Premier. In the interval between the sessions of the National Assembly, its powers are exercised by the permanent Standing Committee. One-seventh of the Assembly seats are reserved for national minorities. The Council of Ministers "the executive organ of the highest state authority" (Art. 71) is responsible to the National Assembly (or the Standing Committee). Following diagram is from NIS 43C, op. cit., 31.
Constitutional structure of the government
​9. Vo Nguyen Giap, People's War, People's Army (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1961), 35, also 67-108; Cf., "Let Us Step Up the Theory-Formulating Task of the Party," Hoc Tap (No.9, September 1966), in Joint Publications Research Service, "Translations from Hoc Tap" (No. 38,660, November 16, 1966), p. 2. Also, U.S. Interagency Intelligence Committee, "The North Vietnamese Role in the Origin, Direction, and Support of the War in South Vietnam," (DIAAP-4, May 1967) SECRET, Draft, 1-6.
10. NIS 43C, op. cit., 28-32.
11. Hoc Tap, op. cit.
12. NIS 43C, op. cit., Figure 12, 30.
13. Ibid., George A. Carver, "The Faceless Viet Cong," Foreign Affairs (vol. 44, No.3, April 1966), 361; Douglas Pike, Viet Cong (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1966), 11, 308, 313, 327-329, 356.
14. Fall, Two Viet-Nams, op. cit., 101, 182-183; Central Intelligence Agency, Current Intelligence Weekly Review (22 September 1955), B.S.N. Murti; op. cit., 191.
15. NIS 43C, 27; Central Intelligence Agency, Biographic Handbook - North Vietnam (CIA/CRBH 6.6).
16. Ibid.
17. Central Intelligence Agency, "The Militant and Moderate Elements in the North Vietnamese Communist Party" (Memorandum, Directorate of Intelligence, 1 December 1955); P. J . Honey, Communism in North Vietnam, op. cit., 28-35.
18. NIS 43C, op. cit., Figure 11, compared with CIA, Biographic Handbook, op. cit.
19. Fall, ed., Ho Chi Minh on Revolution, op. cit., 339-340.
20. Hoang Van Chi, From Colonialism to Communism (New York: Praeger, 1964), 166-168, 209-229. Hoang is a Vietnamese scholar and former Viet Minh cadre; Bernard B. Fall, The Viet-Minh Regime (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1956), 118-135; Bernard B. Fall, Le Viet Minh (Paris: A. Colin, 1960), 101-105 (RAND Translation, Incl to L-13439 of 19 July 1967); and George A. Carver, Jr., "The Faceless Viet Cong," Foreign Affairs (Vol 44, No.3, April 1966), 352-358. The proponent of these undertakings was Ho's Sino-phile lieutenant Truong Chinh; see Central Intelligence Agency, Biographic Handbook, North Vietnam-South Vietnam (CIA/CR BH 6.6), item on Truong dated 15 March 1965; also Bernard B. Fall, ed., Primer for Revolt (New York: Praeger, 1963), XIX-XX; P. J . Honey) Communism in North Vietnam (Cambridge : M.I.T. Press, 1963), 11-14, 32-35, 45-46; and William Kaye) "A Bowl of Rice Divided, he Economy of North Vietnam," in P. J. Honey, ed., North ​Vietnam Today ( New York: Praeger, 1962), 107–108. For Ho's statement on Land Reform in late 1953, see Bernard B. Fall, ed., Ho Chi Minh on Revolution (New York: Praeger, 1967), 258–269; the statement was made to the Third Session of the National Assembly of the DRV (Dec 1–4, 1953), in which the Assembly enacted an Agrarian Reform Law based on reports by Ho and Pham Van Dong.
21. Truong Chinh, The Resistance Will Win (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1960; Facsimile Edition , New York: Praeger, 1963), 211.
22. Fall, ed., Ho on Revolution, loc. cit.
23. Hoang Van Chi, op. cit., 211.
24. P. J. Honey, ed., North Vietnam Today, op. cit., 8–9; Fall, Le Viet Minh, op. cit.; Hoang, op. cit., 166. Bernard B. Fall, Viet-Nam Witness (New York: Praeger, 1966), 96–98.
| | NIE 63-5-54 (3 Aug 1954) |
| | NIE 63.1-55 (19 Jul 1955) |
| Special | NIE 63.1-4-55 (13 Sep 1955) |
| | NIE 63.1-3-55 (11 Oct 1955) |
| | NIE 63-56 (17 Jul 1956) |
| | NIE 63.2-57 (14 May 1957) |
| | NIE 63-59 ( 26 May 1959) |
Also: Department of State, Office of Intelligence Research (INR) International Communism, Annual Review (December 1955) (5650.49) (SECRET) 82–83; INR, International Communism Asian Communist Orbit Review 1955 (January 1956) (5650.50) (SECRET) 19; INR, "North Vietnam Braces Itself for Socialism," (Oct. 13, 1958) (7837) (SECRET) 2–5, 17–18; INR, "The Outlook for North and South Vietnam," (May 5, 1959) (8008, SECRET/NOFORN), 25–26; CIA, Current Intelligence Weekly Review (6 December 1956).
26. For a description of village polity in South Vietnam which suggests why Northerners might have reacted adversely to disruption of the traditional society see Gerald Cannon Hickey, Village in Vietnam (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964), 178–211.
​27. DRV Government Decree No. 239 of March 1953, translated in Fall, The Viet Minh Regime, op. cit., 172–178, is an early example; the process was considerably refined thereafter. A particularly vivid eye-witness account is in Zasloff, op. cit., 47–48.
28. Hoang, op. cit., Fall, Le Viet Minh, op. cit.
29. Carver, op. cit., 354; Fall, Viet-Nam Witness, op. cit., 124; Hoang, op. cit., 166. Ellen Hammer: "at least 50,000 were killed"; Hammer, op. cit., 341.
30. Fall, ed., Ho Chi Minh on Revolution, op. cit., 305–309.
31. Fall, The Two Viet-Nams, op. cit., 156–158.
32. Hoang, op. cit., 209–210, quoting Nhan Dan, No. 970 (Oct. 31, 1956).
33. USIS, Saigon, "Notes on the Anniversary of the Peasant Uprising in Nghe-An" (November, 1967).
34. Ibid.
35. Hoang, op. cit., 224–228. For data on employment of Southerners against the uprisings, see DIA "The North Vietnamese Role in the Origin.…" op. cit., esp. Vol II, Item 84, 80, Text, p. 74.
36. Fall, Viet-Nam Witness, op. cit., 101–102.
37. Lauve, op. cit., 428–429.
38. Fall, {{|Two Viet-Nams}}, 157.
39. Lauve, op. cit., 428.
40. P. J. Honey, ed., North Vietnam Today, op. cit., 33. It is significant that the DRV armed forces near the border assumed a defensive posture in 1956; Central Intelligence Agency, Current Intelligence Weekly Review (31 May 1956).
41. Fall, Viet-Nam Witness, op. cit., 102; Fall, Le Viet Minh, op. cit., 169.
42. Fall, Viet-Nam Witness, loc. cit.
43. Fall, Le Viet Minh, op. cit.
44. Fall, Viet-Nam Witness, op. cit., 124.
45. Ibid., 25, 39; Fall, Two Viet-Nams, 188–190; Hoang, op. cit., 228–239.
46. Fall, Two Viet-Nams, op. cit., 187.
​47. NIS 43C, op. cit., 39.
48. Hoang, op. cit., 212–213.
49. NIS 43C, op. cit., 25, 43.
50. Ibid., 41.
51. Ibid., 35–38, 41–50, 52–53.
52. Ibid., 45.
53. Ibid., 53.
54. Ibid., 52.
55. Loc. cit.
56. Fall, ed., Ho on Revolution, 296. It should be noted that in the same context Ho offered "preferential" economic relations with France; no such offers were repeated after 1956, when it was clear that France would not meet its Geneva commitments to the DRV, and was pulling out of Vietnam.
57. Harold Isaacs, No Peace for Asia (New York: 1947), reprinted in Marvin E. Gettleman, ed., Vietnam (New York: Fawcett , 1965), 50.
58. Ho was born in 1890, and left Vietnam for revolutionary exile in 1910 or 1911 . Central Intelligence Agency, Biographic Handbook, North Vietnam-South Vietnam (CIA/CR BH 6.6, entry for Ho dated 21 January 1965).
59. Bernard B. Fall, ed., Ho Chi Minh on Revolution (New York: Praeger, 1967), 232–244, 260, 276; Ellen J. Hammer, The Struggle for Indo-China (Standord: Stanford University Press, 1966), 251.
60. Central Intelligence Agency, "The Impact of the Sino-Soviet Dispute on North Vietnam and its Policies," (SNIE 14.3–63, 26 June 1963; Central Intelligence Agency, North Vietnam, General Survey (National Intelligence Survey, NIS 43C, July 1964), 32–33, Donald S. Zagoria, Vietnam Triangle (New York: Pegasus, 1967), 99–104.
61. Pravda quote from U.S. Department of State, "Viet Minh Reactions to Indochina Settlement" (Intelligence Brief, 5 August 1954), CONFIDENTIAL, in U.S. Interagency Intelligence Committee, "The North Vietnamese Role in the Origin, Direction, and Support of the War in South Vietnam." (DIAAP-4, May, 1967) SECRET Draft, Supporting Documents, Vol I., Item 15. The Soviet UN delegate is quoted in B.S.N. Murti, Vietnam Divided (New York: Asia Publishing ​House, 1964), 176–177; and in John Norton Moore, "The Lawfulness of Military Assistance to the Republic of Viet Nam," American Journal of International Law, Vol 61, No. 1, January, 1967), 3 (n.7). CIA, Memo for Record, 8 Feb 1957, on the Soviet UN proposal of 24 January 1957.
62. Ho on Revolution, op. cit., 272
63. Ibid., 334
64. Cf., Bain, op. cit., 54–78; Hoang, op. cit., XIV, XV; Fall, Two Viet-Nams, op. cit., 4–6, 16–19. Even the name of the country reflects the turmoil of its history. Gia Long called his empire Nam Viet (South Viet). Since the Dai Viet were ethnically related to the people of Kwang-si and Kwang-tung, the Chinese decided that the name Nam Viet implied an irredenta, and reversed the name to Viet Nam. Up to 1945, Gia Long's successors used the more pretentious name Dai Nam (Great South), but only internally, when the DRV revived "Vietnam."
65. Pike, op. cit., 48.
66. Bernard Fall, ed., Ho Chi Minh on Revolution (New York: Signet, 1968), 242. (Hereafter cited as "Signet Edition")
67. Quoted in Pike, op. cit., 67.
68. Cf., J. J. Zasloff, Political Motivation of the Viet Cong: The Viet~minh Regroupees (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, August, 1966, RM-4703-ISA/ARPA), 25–26; Central Intelligence Agency, Current Intelligence Weekly Review (2 February 1956) SECRET. The former speculates based on interviews with POVs and defectors, but reaches conclusions similar to those of the latter. A like 1954 estimate by the U.S. Army Attache, Saigon, is included in Current Intelligence Weekly Review (7 October 1954), 6.
69. Fall, Ho on Revolution, op. cit., 302.
70. Some 1,000 Chinese advisers entered North Vietnam; hundreds of Vietnamese were trained in China; and a steadily increasing stream of war material, variously estimated at 400 to 4,000 tons per month, flowed south from China: Central Intelligence Agency , "Probable Developments in Indochina through mid-1954 " (NIE-91, June 4, 1953) SECRET; Memorandum, OSD, Robert H. B. Wade to Brig. Gen. Bonesteel, April 13, 1954, (SECRET). J. J. Zasloff, "The Role of the Sanctuary in Insurgency: Communist China's Support of the Vietminh, 1946–1954," (Santa Monica: RAND, RM-4618-PR, May 1967), passim.
71. Hammer, op. cit., 331–337.
72. NIS 43C, 32–35.
​73. Cf., Anita Lauve, Troika on Trial (MS Study for OSD/ISA) ARPA Contract, 1967), 428; and P. J. Honey, ed., North Vietnam Today, op. cit., 33.
74. Zasloff, RM-4703-ISA/ARPA, op. cit., 44–53, 159–160; U.S. Dept of State, INR, "North Viet Nam Braces Itself for Socialism" (Oct 13, 1958), op. cit.
75. Defense Intelligence Agency, Annual Review of Demographic and Government Control Composition (U) (AP-1-460-3-5 -65-INT, 1 January 1965), 41; NIS 43C, 38, 56, 59.
76. Ibid., 59.
77. NIS 43C, op. cit., 59.
78. Central Intelligence Agency, "Probable Developments in North Vietnam to July 1956," (National Intelligence Estimate 63.1–55, 19 July 1955), 7; CIA) SC09206 of 19 May 1954: the same report holds the Viet Minh disappointed in the Chinese People's Republic for lack of support, and well aware of Soviet distaste for an Asian involvement. Cf., Hammer, op. cit., 320–21.
79. Ibid., 346; also 342–344; cf., Ho on Revolution, op. cit., 276–277; and P. J. Honey, ed., North Vietnam Today, 30–32.
80. For summaries of the windings of French policy in this period see: Central Intelligence Agency, Current Intelligence Weekly Review (14 October 1954, 11 November 1954, 16 December 1954, 20 January 1955, and 5 May 1955, respectively); also, NIE 63.1-55, op. cit., 9–10.
81. Zagoria, op. cit., 27, 40–41, 100–102.
82. Ibid., Cyril E. Black and Thomas P. Thornton, Communism and Revolution (Princeton: Princeton U. Press, 1965), 271–273, 417–448.
83. Honey, ed., North Vietnam Today, op. cit., 30; Central Intelligence Agency, National Security Council Briefing for 12 July 1955; CIA, Current Intelligence Weekly Review (7 July 1955); B.S.N. Murti, Vietnam Divided (New York: Asis Publishing House, 1964), 181–184.
84. Phillipe Devillers, in P. J. Honey, ed., North Vietnam Today, op. cit., 32–33; Zagoria, op. cit., 42, 101–102.
85. P. J. Honey, Communism in North Vietnam, op. cit., 43–58.
86. Zagoria, op. cit., 19–20.
87. Fall, ed., Ho on Revolution, op.cit., 298–299.
​88. B.S.N. Murti, Vietnam Divided (New York: Asia Publishing House, 1964), 176; Central Intelligence Agency, "The Prospects for North Vietname"(National Intelligence Estimate 63.2-57, 14 May 1957), 6.
89. CIA, Current Intelligence Weekly Review (2 August 1956).
90. CIA, Memorandum for the Record, 8 February 1957; Murti, op. cit., 176–177; John Norton Moore, "The lawfulness of Military Assistance to the Republic of Viet Nam," American Journal of International Law, (Vol 61, No. 1, January 1967), 3, n. 7; Devillers, in Honey, ed., {{|North Vietnam Today}}, op. cit., 33.
91. Honey, Communism in North Vietnam, op. cit., 6–7, 52–62; Douglas Pike, Viet Cong (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1966), 77–79; Philippe Devillers, "The Struggle for the Unification of Vietnam," The China Quarterly (No. 9, January–March, 1962), 17; U.S. Department of State , "North Vietnam Braces Itself for Socialism" (Intelligence Report No. 7837, Oct. 13, 1958), 6–7.
92. U.S. Interagency Intelligence Committee, "The North Vietnamese Role…," op. cit., 11–12, 24–28.
93. CIA, Biographic Handbook, {[u|op. cit}}.
94. SNIE 14·3-63, op. cit., 4–5.
95. Robert A. Rupen and Robert Farrell, eds., Vietnam and the Sino-Soviet Dispute (New York: Praeger, 1967), 52.
96. Fall, The Two Viet-Nams, op. cit., 17–19.
97. Hoang, op. cit., 13. The French administered two provinces of Laos from Hanoi (Kieng Quang and Sam Neua), RAND Corporation, "DRV Relations with Laos and the Pathet Lao, 1954–1962" (Attachment (2) to L-14982) 11 August 1967).
98. Ibid.
99. DIA, "The North Vietnamese Role…," op. cit., Vol II, Item 2; P. J. Honey, "The Foreign Policy of North Vietnam;" Remarks prepared for the Asia Society and Association for Asian Studies Conference, May 14–15, 1965, pp.12–14.
100. Ibid., 12–14, 18–19.
101. DIA, "The North Vietnamese Role…," loc. cit.
102. NIS 43C, op. cit., 33.
​103. Cf. Tab 1, pp. 43–44, n. 71, Ch ester L. Cooper, "The Complexities of Negotiation," Foreign Affairs, (Vol. 46, No. 3, April 1963), 465; Ltr, Under Secretary of State Katzenbach to Congressman Evans, op. cit.
104. U .S. Defense Intelligence Agency, Military Factbook on the War in South Vietnam, V.; Zasloff, RM 4703-ISA/ARPA, op. cit., 4, 10–11.
105. DIA Fact Book, July, 1967, A-127.
106. Zasloff, RM 4703-ISA/ARPA , op. cit., 169–183.
107. Katzenbach-Evans Letter, op. cit., quoting the interrogation of Le Van Thanh, Viet Cong Signal Platoon leader.
108. RM 4703, op. cit., 31.
109. DIA AP-4 (May , 1967), op. cit. This study was designed to answer queries from Congressman Evans (f. Katzenbach Letter), and was considered for publication, modified, as a "White Paper."
110. Interrogation of a Montagnard originally from Quang Tri Province, infiltrated into South Vietnam in October, 1961. DIA, "Role," 69–70; Katzenbach letter.
111. Interrogation of a member of one of the "special border-crossing teams." DIA, "Role," 70.
112. Ibid., 71. Interrogation of two members of the 603d Battalion.
113. Ibid., 71, 72. Interrogation of Senior Sergeant of VC 5th Military Region (Zone V) captured in Quang Ngai.
114. Ibid., 73. Interrogation of several agents captured in June and July, 1961; Interrogation of a member of a VC communications cadre.
115. Ibid., Interrogation of a 1962 infiltrator.
116. Ibid., Interrogation of several former NVA officers who surrendered in 1963; interrogation of officer of "1st VC Regiment," who defected in April 1963.
117. Carver, op. cit., 360.
118. DIA, "Role….", op. cit.,; Katzenbach letter.
119. Ibid.
120. {Devillers, loc. cit., and New Facts Phu Loi Mass Murder, op. cit., flyleaf.
121. Ibid., 15–16.
​122. Carver, op. cit., 358; Zagoria, op. cit., 160–161.
123. Zasloff, RM 4103, 13.
124. CIA, Biographic Handbook, op. cit.
125. NIS 43C, op. cit., 30.
126. DIA, "Role …," op. cit., 10–11; CIA, Biographic Data.
127. Ibid., 11–14. E.g. a Viet Minh cadre who surrendered in March, 1956, reported Le Duan's disgust with the ICC and with DRV policy toward it; a document taken from a VC cadre in November, 1956, quoting Le Duan. Cf., CIA, FVS-1071, of 21 September 1956, and CS-82270 of 16 January 1956.
128. Cf., Honey, Communism in North Vietnam, op. cit., 52–58.
129· Carver, op. cit., 359–360.
130. DIA, "Role …," 14–15.
131. Ibid., 28–29.
132. Carver, op. cit., 369–310. One prisoner attended an infiltration course at Son Tay in January, 1960, with a group of 60, and infiltrated with the same group in March, 1960. All 60 were officers or NCO's. One became a company commander of a VC unit in Quang Ngai; another a political officer of a battalion in the same province; another a deputy commander of the same battalion. DIA, "Role …," 77.
133. Ibid., 61–62.
134. This judgment is based on interrogations of 19 Vietnamese officers and senior NCO's who infiltrated in the years 1959-1963, and of NVA officers who surrendered in 1963. Under Secretary Katzenbach Letter, op. cit., 19.
135. DIA, "Role …," 62–64.
136. Ibid., 4–8.
137. Ibid., 9–13; Modelski, "The Viet Minh Complex," op. cit., 185–199.
138. Captured document identified as a Lao Dong Party official paper, entitled "Decision to Create the Central Office for South Viet-Nam," cited in Katzenbach Letter, op. cit., 6, DIA, "Role …," 11–13.
​139. Ibid., 9–10.
140. Zasloff, RM 4703-ISA/ARPA, 25–37. A senior captain in the Viet Cong intelligence service wrote a record of his experiences in a document entitled Regroupment Diary: according to this document, his political officer lectured the unit as follows: a/
"(1) Have confidence in the leadership of the General [Central?] Committee. In two years, the country will be re-unlfied, because that was the decision of an international body, which gives us reason to trust it. This does not mean that we should be too trustful, but we must continue to struggle.
"(2) The Party will never abandon the people of the South who will stay to fight; when the time comes, they will be led.
"(3) Those who go north should feel happy in their duties. Those who remain behind should carry out the glorious missions entrusted to them by the Party, standing side by side with the people in every situation of struggle."
The political officers also stressed the dangers to which the stay-behinds would be subjected. A cadre whose party history extended back to 1930 stated that: b/
"Those who did regroup did it voluntarily, after realizing that it was the thing to do. They did it to protect themselves from being arrested by the authorities in the South. They were afraid of being charged with having participated in the Resistance before. All cadres were afraid of future persecution by the South Vietnamese authorities; they all wanted to regroup … They were afraid …"
Still, the Regroupment Diary records that one cadre bet his comrades "three to ten, the country won't be reunified in two years," and that many cadres were worried about leaving family and friends behind. c/ In the RAND Study, the regroupees were asked, "Were you a volunteer for regroupment?" The following responses were typical: d/
(A Defector) At the time it was said that we were volunteers. In reality, they took measures to make sure that everyone left. At the time of regroupment, we had to go. If I had remained, I would have been arrested. I believed that I would remain in the North two years.
​(Another Defector) I was a political officer. I went to the North just like all the other combatants in my unit. I believed, at the time, that regroupment was only temporary, because from the study sessions on the Geneva Agreement we drew the conclusion that we could return to the South after the general elections.
(A PW) [Our political officer] explained that: we were granted Vietnam north of the 17th parallel now, but in 1956 there would be a general election and we would regain the South and be reunited with our families. Because of interest and curiosity and the opportunity to travel, everyone was happy. They thought they would be there in the North only two years and then would be able to return to their homes.
a/ RM 4703, 27, 35.
b/ Ibid., 34.
c/ Ibid., 35.
d/ Ibid., 36.
141. DIA, "Role …," 50–53; CIA, "… Evidence of North Vietnamese Violations of the Geneva Agreements on Vietnam Since 1955" (SC No. 2955/64, 10 March 1964), Section I.
142. DIA, "Role …," 20–26; CIA, "Evidence…" (SC No. 2955/64), loc. cit.
143. Cf., Pike, op. cit., 31–56, 74–84.
144. DIA, "Role …," 47–48.
145. Ibid., 49–50.
146. Ibid., 46–47.
147. U.S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam, Central Office of South Vietnam (COSVN). (Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence , ST-67-023, 29 April 1967)·
148. Carver, op. cit., 363–364.
149. CIA, Current Intelligence Weekly Review, 7 July 1955, mentions the Soviet Ambassador in Hanoi's hint that violent action would ensue were consultations delayed, but there was little other indication of Soviet intention to act.
​150. CIA, CIWR, 27 October 1955·
151. CIA, CIWR, 22 September 1955.
152. CIA, CIWR, 10 November 1955.
153. U.S. Department of State, Soviet World Outlook (Publication 6836, July 1959), 98.
154. Ho on Revolution, (Signet) op. cit., 269–270; cf., Central Intelligence Agency, Current Intelligence Weekly Review (10 May 1956).
155. Ibid., and CIA NSC Briefing for 2 July 1956. The difference in the two texts is readily explained in that Fall used the version of the speech published in the presumably edited four-volume edition of The Selected Works of Ho Chi Minh (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1960, 1961, 1962); see Fall, Ho Chi Minh on Revolution (Signet edition), page x.
156. Fall, Ho on Revolution (Signet), 274.
157. CIA, NSC Briefs of 2 July 1956 and 10 July 1956.
158. CIA, CIWR, 2 August 1956.
159. Fall, Ho on Revolution (Signet), 277.
160. Ibid., , 279; Devillers, "The Struggle for Unification," op. cit., 10–11.
161. CIA, Memo for Record of 8 February 1957.
162. CIA, Singapore CS-82270 of 16 January 1956, and FVS-I071 of 21 September 1956; DIA, "Role…," 23–29. For further evidence of impatience and diminished faith in the South see CIA, Saigon CS-3,311,416 of April 1957.
163. Ibid.
164. The sequence of events conc erning this UN action went as follows:
    23 Jan 1957 U.S. and 12 other UN members (in a resolution) call upon the UN Security Council to recommend South Vietnam and South Korea for membership in in the UN.
    24 Jan 1957 Soviet delegate in UN Security Council, Arkady A. Sobolev, proposes that North Vietnam and North Korea, as well as South Vietnam and South Korea, be recommended for membership in the UN, as a "package deal."
    30 Jan 1957 UN General Assembly's Special Political Committee endorses a resolution (backed by the U.S. and 12 other nations) calling for UN membership for South Vietnam and South Korea. On the same day, the Committee declines to endorse a "package deal" proposed by the Soviet Union for simultaneous admission of North Vietnam and North Korea.
    28 Feb 1957 UN General Assembly recommends to the Security Council UN membership for South Vietnam and South Korea (40 to 8 with 18 abstentions, and 40 to 8 with 16 abstentions respectively).
    9 Sep 1957 After making an unsuccessful attempt to postpone consideration of the question until Vietnam had been unified, the USSR vetoed the admission of the RVN to the UN.
    25 Oct 1957 UN General Assembly (by votes 49 to 9, with 23 abstentions) passes resolution declaring that South Vietnam is eligible for membership in the UN. The resolution "noted 'with regret' the continued inability of the Security Council to recommend the admission of [South Korea and South Vietnam]… to the UN because of the negative vote of the Soviet Union." (Asian Recorder, New Delhi, Vol. 111, No. 51.)
Sources: U.S. Dept. of State, "Chronology on Vietnam," (Historical Studies DiviSion, Hist. Office , Bureau of Public Affairs, Research Project No. 747, November 1965; also, "Deadline Data on World Affairs," entries for "North Vietnam " and "South Vietnam," dates listed.
165. Ibid., and U.S. Dept. of State, "Chronology on Vietnam" (1950–1965); Warner, op. cit., 131–132.
166. Honey, Communism in North Vietnam, op. cit., 50.
167. Ibid., 50–51.
168. U. S. Department of State, "Chronology on Vietnam," op. cit.
169. Honey, Communism in North Vietnam, op. cit., 51–62.
170. N. S. Khrushchev, "40 Years of Great October Socialist Revolution," Pravda (November 22, 1957), translated in Current Digest of the Soviet Press (IX, No. 14, 1 Jan 1958), 13–18.
​171. Ibid., 3–7. For examples of the subsequent import attached to the Declaration of 1957, cf., "The Statement of Conference of Representatives of Communist and Workers' Parties," The Current Digest of the Soviet Press (Vol XII, No. 4B, 28 Dec 1960, and No. 49, 4 Jan 1961), No. 49, p. 6, which refers to the "1957 Declaration" and quotes the cited text verbatim; also Foreign Broadcast Information Service Bulletin, "Nhan Dan Views Moscow, Party Statements" (13 January 1961, p. EE 9 ff.), which relates the proceedings of the Lao Dong's Third Party Congress (September, 1960) to the 1960 Moscow Conference, and to the "declaration of 1957."
172. Quoted in Honey, Communism in North Vietnam, op. cit.
173. E .g. Bernard B. Fall, "Power and Pressure Groups in North Vietnam," China Quarterly (No.9, January-March 1961), 38–39; P. J. Honey, "The Position of the DRV Leadership and the Succession to Ho Chi Minh," ibid., 32–34.
174. Honey, Communism in North Vietnam, op. cit., 59.
175. Ibid., 61–62.
176. Zagoria, op. cit., 102–103.
177. Cooper, et al., Case Studies in Insurgency …, op. cit., 77–80.
178. Ibid.
179. Modelski, "The Viet Minh Complex," op. cit., 200–201.
180. Fall, "Two Viet-Nams," op. cit., 63, 66–71; U.S. Department of State, Political Alliance of Vietnamese Nationalists, (Office of Intelligence Research, Report No. 3708, October 1, 1949), 66–67, quoting the Factual Record of the August Revolution (Hanoi, September, 1946).
181. CIA, Biographic Handbook, op. cit.; Modelski, op. cit., 202–203.
182. Ibid., 207–210.
183. CIA, "The Organization, Activities, and Objectives of the Communist Front in South Vietnam," Intelligence Memorandum 1603/66, 26 September 1966; CIA, memorandum, "The Organization, Activities, and Objectives …," dated 7 September 1965; CIA, "… Evidence of North Vietnamese Violation of the Geneva Agreements on Vietnam," op. cit., Section I, II.
184. Ibid.
​185. Ibid.; CIA Current Intelligence Weekly Review, 16 April 1958.
186. CIA, "… Evidence of North Vietnamese …," op. cit.
187. CIA, NIS 43-C, op. cit., 35–36.
188. Ibid., 43–56.
189. U.S. Department of State, "Chronology on Vietnam," op. cit.
190. Ibid.
191. Quotations of Lao Dong leaders are from the English language broadcasts of the Vietnam News Agency, Radio Hanoi, as reported in the Foreign Broadcast Information Service Bulletin, April 30 - May 15, 1959.
192. U.S . Department of State, A Threat to the Peace (White Paper, 1961), op. cit., II, 3.
193. U.S. Department of State, Saigon Despatch 278 to State, March 7, 1960, 1–6.
194. Ibid., 7.
195. Ibid.
196. Central Intelligence Agency, "The Prospects for North Vietnam," (National Intelligence Estimate 63.2–57, 14 May 1957); CIA, "Significance of Cambodia to the Vietnamese Communist War Effort," (Special National Intelligence Estimate, 26 January 1967).
197. NIS 43C, op. cit., 33. Honey, Communism in North Vietnam, op. cit., 168–181; Central Intelligence Agency, "North Vietnamese Violations of the Geneva Agreements on Laos," (SC No. 02988/64, 20 April 1964), TOP SECRET, and CIA, same subject (SC 03026/64, 19 May 1964), TOP SECRET.
198. Ibid.
199. Ibid., 3, Appendices II & III. "Protocol to the Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos," in U.S. Congress, Senate, Background Information Relating to Southeast Asia and Vietnam (Committee on Foreign Relations, 89th Congress, 2d Session, 2d Revised Edition, March 1966), 102–107; CIA, "North Vietnamese Violations…," op. cit.
Following a rupture between Kong Le and the Pathet Lao and the assassination of the pro-Communist Foreign Mini of the RLG in April 1963, the DRV apparently determined to reinforce the Pathet ​Lao, for the U.S . began to receive reports of renewed NVA operations in Laos from multiple sources, including a Pathet Lao defector and a Polish ICC member. By mid-1963, NVA strength was over 10. battalions, with some 5000 to 7000 men plus 3,000 advisers, and new arms and supplies were arriving constantly. For example, members of the Polish ICC team in Hanoi, told their counterparts in Laos in August 1963 that the DRV was dispatching daily shipments of military equipment into Laos, a/and in February 1964 a Pathet Lao officer in southern Laos stated that the DRV was shipping in new and heavier arms, including tanks. b/
a/ Central Intelligence Agency, CIA/TDCSDB 3657725, 4 November 1963, cited in "North Vietnamese Violations…"
b/ CIA/TDCS 3572046 of 4 February 1964, in ibid.
201. Central Intelligence Agency, "Sihanouk's Cambodia" (National Intelligence Estimate 57–66, 6 October 1966), para. 23–27; CIA, NIS 43C, op. cit., SNIE 57-67, op. cit.; U.S . Department of State, "Chronology on Vietnam," op. cit.
202. Fall, Two Viet-Nams, op. cit., 399–401.
203. U.S. Department of State, A Threat to the Peace, op. cit., II, 2–3.
204. Ibid., 3.
205. Ibid., 3–5.
206. "Statement of Conference of World Communist Parties - II," The Current Digest of the Soviet Press (Vol. XII, No. 49, Jan. 4, 1961), 3–11.
207. Foreign Broadcast Information Service Bulletin (North Vietnam, January 13, 1961).
208. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1965), 302–303.
209. E.g., Speech by Honorable Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense, Before the Fellows of the American Bar Foundation Dinner, Chicago, February 17, 1962 (Department of Defense, Office of Public Affairs, Release No. 239–62).
210. Ibid., Schlesinger, loc. cit.; Modelski, op. cit., 198, quotes Soviet News, London (January 21, 1961, 43–44.