# Philosophical Works of the Late James Frederick Ferrier/Lectures on Greek Philosophy (1888)/Parmenides

Lectures on Greek Philosophy, Philosophical Works of the Late James Frederick Ferrier (1888 ed., Vol. 2). (E. L. Lushington, & A. Grant, Eds.) Edinburgh: William Blackwood and Sons. pp. 88-102.
PARMENIDES.
14. I pass on to Parmenides. This philosopher is the central figure in the Eleatic sect, a man of imposing presence and authoritative aspect. His personal ​influence on his contemporaries was powerful and extensive, and the shadow of his great name stretched down through many generations of antiquity, inspiring reverence and wonder. In the dialogue of Plato entitled 'Theætetus,' Socrates, speaking of Parmenides, says: "This man appeared to me, if I may use Homer's language, to be at once august and commanding (αἰδοῖός τε ἅμα δεινός τε), for I have conversed with him, and listened to his eloquent discourses when I was very young and he very old;" and in the dialogue entitled 'Parmenides,' Socrates describes him "as a man with white hair, beautiful to behold, and about sixty-five years of age."
15. I have mentioned the Platonic dialogue entitled 'Parmenides.' I may therefore take the opportunity of remarking, that although Parmenides is introduced as the principal speaker in that dialogue, and although it is to some extent an exposition of Eleatic principles, it is, at the same time, so mixed up with Plato's own dialectic, that it cannot be accepted as an exact account of the Eleatic doctrines. On the surface it appears to be the poorest quibbling, the merest verbal hair-splitting about the one and the many; but to those who go into its depths, and who observe how each member of the antithesis converts itself into its opposite in the very act of being thought, it will appear as the most wonderful and subtle piece of metaphysic ever given to the world. It is the very quintessence of Platonism. It is not, ​however, the philosophy of Parmenides himself. It is Parmenides carried forward into a subsequent phasis of philosophy; it is Parmenides platonising.
16. The philosophy of Parmenides, in so far as we have it from his own hand, is contained in some fragments of a poem entitled Περὶ φύσεως, concerning nature. The poem opens with an allegory, the literal meaning of which is, that the poet, impelled by his passions, goes in quest of truth. At first the senses are his guides. At length he reaches a spot where the gates stand which open on the paths of truth and of error. Δίκη, that is, justice, or wisdom, or understanding, is the guardian of the gates. She receives him favourably, and points out to him which is the road of reason and truth, and which the road of sense and opinion, bidding him follow out the one and avoid the other. The pathway of inquiry, she says, is twofold: the one way is that which affirms being and denies not-being; this is the way of truth and reason: the other is, the way which denies being and affirms not-being; this is the way of error and sense. The following is a translation or paraphrase of a few of the lines; the horses which bear him along are the passions, the nymphs are the senses:
" Far as the mind can reach conveyed me impetuous horses,
Speeding along God's highway, which runs through the secrets of nature.
Nymphs directed my course, the nymphs of the sun were my escort;
Issuing from chambers of darkness, they threw back the veils from their foreheads.
At length I came to the spot where the gates of light and of darkness
Stood; and there stood Justice, holding the keys that unlock them.
Blandly addressed her the nymphs, and blandly answered the goddess,
Opening the gates with her keys, so that the chariot might enter.
Then, taking me by the hand, she spoke these words of assurance:
'O youth, borne from afar to my house by the hones that brought thee,
Led by omens of good, thou hast come to the dwelling of Wisdom.
I will show thee the way it behoves thee to follow devoutly;
Also the road of appearance, where nought but fallacy reigneth.
Come, then, this is the true road, which says that Being alone is,
And that not-Being is not: whereas the pathway of falsehood
Teacheth that not-Being is, and that Being immutable is not.
On the first of these roads thy mind may travel securely;
But if it enters the second, 'twill be lost in the mazes of error.' "
|Karsten, i. 2, p. 28.}}
17. Such, in translation, is an imperfect specimen of a somewhat imperfect poem, a poem which, even if it had come down to us entire, would present few points that would be readily intelligible to our modern apprehensions. The first part of the poem, which is entitled Τὰ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν, that is, "concerning truth," continues to ring the changes upon truth as that which centres in Being, Being one and immutable, Being not apprehensible by the senses, but only by the reason. It also describes falsehood as centring in not-Being, as the multifarious, the particular, the sensible, the non-existent, and the inconceivable. The poem has a second part, not very consistent with the first, entitled Τὰ πρὸς δόξαν, that is, "concerning ​appearance or opinion." In this part the poet-philosopher makes some attempt to describe and explain the phenomena of the sensible universe. In addition to the tenets propounded in this poem, we find in Plato's works, particularly in the dialogue entitled 'Sophista,' some notices of the speculations of Parmenides, and the other Eleatics, respecting Being and not-Being. But these speculations must be worked out mainly by means of one's own reflections. We have only a few crumbling bones from which to construct our skeleton as we best may, and to give it, if that be possible, some semblance to the remains of an organic creature.
18. The whole philosophy of Parmenides centres, I think, in these two points; first, the conception of Being; and, secondly, the determination of the relation between Being and not-Being. Let us consider each of these points separately.
19. First, then, of the conception of Being. To set forth Being as the universal, as that in which all things are identical, to declare that Being is the truth of the universe; this, to us, who live in these latter times, may seem to be a very trivial and uninstructive dogma. But we have to remember, for one thing, that we, as soon as we were born, have entered on an inheritance of thoughts and of words from which these early thinkers were altogether cut off. They had to think out and to devise what we find ​already thought out and devised to our hand. What we pass by as rubbish, because we are so familiar with it, was, in its first revelation, a divine spark which enlightened the irrational darkness of man's original nature, and bespoke the presence of a reasoning and reflective mind. This consideration may serve to explain how the conception of being should appear to us to be at once the shallowest, and yet should be, in itself, the most fundamental and essential of all the conceptions of reason. But there is this also to be considered. There is this question to be asked: How far does the philosophy which sets up Being as the universal principle, how far does it tally with our definition of Philosophy; the definition which declares that philosophy is the pursuit and attainment of truth as it is for all, and not merely as it is for some intelligence? I conceive that this philosophy of Parmenides corresponds, if not adequately, at any rate largely, with our definition. Being is not the truth of the universe for our minds, or for any minds in particular; but it is the truth of the universe for all minds. Being is a necessary conception, a conception valid for all reason. An intelligence which had no conception of Being could not be an intelligence at all. Attempt to explain to an intelligence with no such senses as ours—attempt to explain to him the sensible universe, the universe as it appears to the senses, and he would not understand you. But tell him that the universe is, that it has Being, and to the extent of that conception he ​would understand you. He would understand you because he necessarily knows and understands that his own thought is. He would understand what you by Being (remember I am supposing him to be an intelligence, and therefore able to think, although he has no such senses as ours); he would understand this, because the thought of being is itself being. Being, then, is a wider universal—that is to say, it is more a truth for all intellect, for intellect in its very essence—than any principle set forth in the Ionic school, than water, or infinite matter, or air. It is a wider universal even than number, the principle of Pythagoreans. It may possibly be a question whether an intelligence might not work without thinking number; but it can be no question whether an intelligence can work without thinking Being. Deprive it of this category, and you annihilate its intelligent functions. It may turn out hereafter that Being is only a half category, only half a necessary thought. Meanwhile, however, we accept it as a necessary conception of reason (without inquiring whether it be a whole or only a half conception); we accept it as a true universal, as that in which all has unity, as a truth valid for all intellect. And we regard the system of Parmenides, in which this truth was first enunciated, as a true philosophy, inasmuch as it comes up, to some extent at least, to the standard of our definition.
20. Secondly, of the relation of Being and not-Being ​as determined by the system of Parmenides. Here we find the fundamental antithesis of which I have spoken carried out by the dialectic movement of thought into its most extreme opposition. This antithesis has come before us as the universal and the particular, the intelligible and the sensible, matter and form, the one and the many, the permanent and the changeable: it now comes before us as Being and not-Being. This is a form into which the antithesis is inevitably forced, forced by a logical necessity. If the one term be Being, the other must be not-Being, otherwise it would be the same term over again, and there would be no antithesis. Whatever the one member of the antithesis be, the other must be its direct opposite; otherwise the antithesis would not be fundamental, it would have its foundation in a higher unity. Run over each pair of terms. Here the particular is obviously the non-universal; if it were the universal there would be no antithesis; there is no antithesis between the universal and the universal. The particular, then, is the non-universal, and we may express the opposition as the universal and the non-universal. In the same way the intelligible and the sensible is equivalent to the intelligible and the non-intelligible; matter and form is equivalent to matter and not-matter; the one and the many is equivalent to the one and the not-one; the permanent and the changeable is equivalent to the permanent and the not-permanent. So likewise, when we make Being one of the terms of the antithesis, it ​must be faced by not-Being as the other term; nothing else would yield an opposition. We cannot oppose Being to Being; and therefore not-Being is the only counter-term to Being.
21. The antithesis, then, of the one and the many, the intelligible and the sensible, the permanent and the changeable, has passed in the Eleatic school into that of Being and not-Being. The next movement of thought in dealing with this relation is the question, Does not-Being exist? Is there any not-Being at all? It is difficult, I believe it is impossible, to state in precise terms how the Eleatics answered this question. In the first part of his poem Parmenides seems to maintain that there is no not-Being; in the second part of it he accords to not-Being a sort of spurious existence. In fact, answer the question in either way, and the difficulties that arise are insuperable. Suppose, in the first place, we say that there is no not-Being, then the whole material world, all sensible existence, is annihilated, for this is not-Being. The world of sense stands logically opposed to Being in the fundamental antithesis of thought, as the particular to the universal, the sensible to the intelligible, the many to the one. This solution, then, which abolishes the one member of the antithesis, abolishes likewise the material world. The other member, Being, to wit, alone is left. And what sort of universe is this? It is a universe in which there is no plurality, no diversity, no difference of one thing from another, ​no motion, no change anywhere, nothing but a dead immovable uniformity. The many is identical with not-Being; there is no not-Being, therefore there is no many, but only one. The changeable is identical with not-Being; there is no not-Being, therefore there is no changeable, but only an unvarying permanent. The universe, according to reason, is evidently in a quandary. Mere Being can never change, because there is nothing to change it. But may not Being be added to Being, and may not change be the result of the synthesis? No, there cannot be a synthesis of only one element. Being added to Being is merely a repetition of one and the same factor, and nothing can come of that, nothing can emerge in the shape of a new product. The universe of the Eleatics having been reduced to one homogeneous element, Being namely—i.e., the universal without the particular—has in it no change, no variety, no life; it is mere stagnant undiversified unity. That is the difficulty which the Eleatics have to face when they maintain that there is no not-Being at all.
22. Suppose then, again, Parmenides to admit that, in some sense or other, not-Being exists. The question is, in what sense? It is difficult to see that this can be admitted in any sense without running into a contradiction. The admission, however, if allowable, would save the phenomena of the material universe. So much may be conceded. For, suppose it were urged against Parmenides that, in ​identifying sensible existence with not-Being, he had annihilated the former, his answer would be; No: I do indeed identify sensible existence, or the material world, with not-Being; but then I hold that not-Being has a sort of existence (spurious enough, I grant you, but still a sort of existence), and therefore the material universe, which is identical with not-Being, has a sort of spurious existence. That answer, I say, would be sufficient to save the material world and its phenomena from the logical extinction which would overtake them under the other alternative. In conceding this, however, I am not sure, on second thoughts, that I have not conceded too much. Let us investigate a little more closely this spurious kind of existence which, under one interpretation of his system, Parmenides attributes to the presentations of sense. It will be found, I think, that this kind of existence, instead of being merely spurious, is contradictory, and is obtained in defiance of all the laws of logical thinking. We must revert for a moment to the fundamental antithesis of Being and not-Being. In his search after unity Parmenides found Being. This he constituted into a world by itself, a world apart. This is the one. But there is also the not-one or the many, and this is not-Being. But if the one or Being be constituted into a world by itself, the many or not-Being must likewise be constituted into a world by itself; you cannot isolate one thing from another without isolating that other from the first. But what happens when the world of not-Being ​is isolated from the world of Being? This happens, that the particular is prescinded from the universal; you are called upon to conceive particulars under the presidency of no universal; in other words, you are called upon to conceive a contradiction. The spurious existence which we supposed might be attributed to not-Being, and therefore to natural things, is a mere subterfuge, which, when examined, resolves itself into a contradiction. I don't say that such an attribution is inconsistent with the principles of every philosophy, but it is certainly inconsistent with the principles of the Eleatic philosophy; for this philosophy makes no attempt to conciliate the two members of the antithesis of which I have so often spoken, but, on the contrary, does all it can to draw them asunder into their widest opposition. And therefore it perishes beneath this twofold contradiction. The world of Being (the intelligible world of the Eleatics) is a contradiction to all reason, because it is the sphere of the universal prescinded absolutely from the particular; and the world of not-Being (the sensible world of the Eleatics) is also a contradiction to all reason, because it is the sphere of the particular prescinded absolutely from the universal. In the one world there is absolute unity without any diversity; in the other there is absolute diversity without any unity, and neither of these can be conceived.
23. In summing up the philosophy of Parmenides, ​I would call your attention to the distinction between sense and reason, which appears to be more distinctly announced in his system than in any other that had preceded. I am not aware that he calls λόγος or reason the faculty of truth for all, and δόξα or αἴσθησις the faculty of truth for some; but this is evidently his meaning, this was the substance of his distinction between λόγος and αἴσθησις; the latter he did not consider to be properly the organ of truth at all, but only the former. The main points of detail in the system are these: First, Being is the universal, the element in which all things agree. This is apprehended by reason. Secondly, The particular or non-universal in things is not-Being. This is apprehended by sense. Thirdly, No attempt is made to conciliate, but rather to separate absolutely, the members of this antithesis. This separation of the antithesis necessarily preceded the conciliation of the antithesis, otherwise there would have been no antithesis at all. Fourthly, The consequence is that the universe of Parmenides falls asunder into two contradictories, a world of unity on the one hand, where there is no diversity, and a world of diversity on the other hand, in which there is no unity. Fifthly, His attempt to save the material phenomena by attributing to not-Being a spurious Being (if indeed he does make this attempt) is altogether unsuccessful; for he has carried Being wholly over into the intelligible world, and therefore the sensible world, or the world of not-Being, cannot on his principles have any Being at all conceded to it. ​Sixthly, The two contradictories which have been explained break down the system of Parmenides.
24. The philosophy of Parmenides, meagre as its principle, and unsatisfactory as its issues may seem, is a genuine product of the speculative spirit of the world straining towards the light. It is a true philosophy; it has its roots in the necessities of thought. It goes forth in pursuit of the universal, the truth for all intellect. It finds this in the conception of Being; but it mistakes a half conception for a whole one, so that, instead of establishing a whole, it only establishes the half of a necessary thought: in other words, it issues in a contradiction. Nevertheless, this philosophy is great, great in itself, greater in its effects on succeeding thinkers. It is no arbitrary excogitation of an individual mind. It is a product of the universal reason grappling with the universal truth. It represents a speculative movement common to the understandings of all thinking men, a movement through which every mind that reflects must inevitably pass, a catholic crisis in the development of thought itself. It is indeed their broad catholicity, their unindividual thinking, their speculating for the race, or rather, I may say, for all intelligence, and not for themselves, which gives to these old philosophers their interest and value. In this respect Parmenides must be ranked among the highest of those wide and essential souls through which the universal reason has expressed, although not adequately, its ​everlasting laws, and given an articulate shape to the thoughts that wander through eternity.