# Astoria Federal Savings and Loan Association v. Solimino

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United States Supreme Court
501 U.S. 104
Astoria Federal Savings and Loan Association v. Solimino
No. 89-1895 Argued: April 17, 1991. --- Decided: June 10, 1991
Syllabus
Respondent Solimino filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), alleging that petitioner Astoria Federal Savings and Loan Association had dismissed him because of his age, in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (Age Act). Under a worksharing agreement, the EEOC referred his claim to the state agency responsible for claims under New York's Human Rights Law. That agency found no probable cause under state law to believe that he was terminated on account of age, and its decision was upheld on administrative review. Rather than appealing that decision to state court, Solimino filed in the Federal District Court an Age Act suit grounded on the same factual allegations considered in the state proceedings. The court granted Astoria's motion for summary judgment, holding that the State's age-discrimination findings precluded federal litigation of the claim. The Court of Appeals reversed, inferring from the Age Act's structure a legislative intent to deny preclusive effect to such state administrative proceedings.
Held: Judicially unreviewed state administrative findings have no preclusive effect on age-discrimination proceedings in federal court. While well-established common-law principles, such as preclusion rules, are presumed to apply in the absence of a legislative intent to the contrary, Congress need not state expressly its intention to overcome a presumption of administrative estoppel. Clear-statement requirements are appropriate only where weighty and constant values are at stake, or where an implied legislative repeal is implicated. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 243, 105 S.Ct. 3142, 3147-48, 87 L.Ed.2d 171; EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. ----, ----, 111 S.Ct. 1227, ----, 113 L.Ed.2d 274; Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551, 94 S.Ct. 2474, 2483, 41 L.Ed.2d 290. Such values are not represented by the lenient presumption in favor of administrative estoppel, the suitability of which varies according to context; nor does a finding against estoppel in this case give rise to an implied legislative repeal. Thus, the test for the presumption's application is whether administrative preclusion would be inconsistent with Congress' intent in enacting the particular statute. University of Tennessee v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 796, 106 S.Ct. 3220, 3225, 92 L.Ed.2d 635. The Age Act implies, in its filing requirements, that federal courts should recognize no preclusion by state administrative findings. Both § 14(b) and § 7(d)(2) assume the possibility of federal consideration after state review. However, such proceedings would be strictly pro forma, with the employer likely enjoying an airtight defense, if state administrative findings were given preclusive effect. The provision, in § 14(b), for a claim's consideration in federal court after state proceedings are concluded would as a result be left essentially without effect, notwithstanding the rule that statutes should be read to avoid rendering superfluous any parts thereof. Administrative preclusion was likewise found not to apply with respect to claims arising under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in Elliott, supra, which held that Title VII's provision directing the EEOC to accord substantial weight to state administrative findings allowed for something less than preclusion. Id., at 795, 106 S.Ct., at 3224. It is immaterial that the Age Act lacks a similar delimitation, since the Title VII provision was only the most obvious piece of evidence that administrative estoppel does not operate in a Title VII suit. This holding also comports with the Age Act's broader scheme and enforcement provisions, and, although Congress' wisdom in deciding against administrative preclusion is not relevant to this determination, its choice has plausible policy support. Pp. 107-114.
901 F.2d 1148 (CA 2 1990), affirmed and remanded.
SOUTER, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Paul J. Siegel, New York City for petitioner.
Leonard N. Flamm, New York City for respondent.
Amy L. Wax, Washington, D.C. for U.S., as amicus curiae, pro hac vice, supporting respondent, by special leave of Court.
Justice SOUTER delivered the opinion of the Court.

## Notes

This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
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