# Philosophical Works of the Late James Frederick Ferrier/Institutes of Metaphysic (1875)/Section 2/Proposition 5

The Institutes of Metaphysic, Philosophical Works of the Late James Frederick Ferrier (1875 ed., Vol. 1). (E. L. Lushington, & A. Grant, Eds.) Edinburgh: William Blackwood and Sons. pp. 419-427.
PROPOSITION V.
IGNORANCE OF MATTER PER SE.
DEMONSTRATION.
Material things out of all relation to a mind, subject, or self, cannot possibly be known (Prop. IV. Epistemology). But there can be no ignorance of what cannot possibly be known (Prop. III. Agnoiology.) Therefore we cannot be ignorant of material things out of all relation to a mind, subject, or self; in other words, there can be no ignorance of matter per se.
OBSERVATIONS AND EXPLANATIONS.
1. This proposition is merely a special application of the preceding more general theorem. But in ​The main business of the agnoiology.laying the foundations of a science, it is better to over-do than to under-do the work. Part of the business of the epistemology was, by means of strict demonstration, to run a number of things, which have hitherto been a source of much trouble to philosophy, into a position in which it is evident that there can be no knowledge of them: the main business of the agnoiology is to run these same things, also by means of strict demonstration, into a position in which it is evident that there can be no ignorance of them, and thus to disable them from operating any longer as impediments to the onward march of speculation. This tactic is now humbly submitted to the judgment of philosophers, as the only true dialectical art, and as the only method by which the highest problems of philosophy can be settled, without any further appeal being competent.
The disadvantage of not studying necessary truth. 2. The execution of this achievement—which is no optional or arbitrary stratagem devised by an individual theorist, but an inevitable evolution of the catholic understanding, thinking, not as it wishes, but as it must,—bears evidence to the advantage which accrues from a steadfast contemplation of the necessary truths of reason, and to the loss and disadvantage which ensue from their neglect. Many philosophers had eliminated matter per se, things by and in themselves, from our ​knowledge; but having done so, on the mistaken ground of a special incompetency in the human faculties to apprehend them in that condition, they were unable to eliminate them from our ignorance. In point of fact, the very door which shut them out of our knowledge opened for them a refuge under the cover, or within the pale, of our ignorance. And there, accordingly, matter per se has stuck until this time,—a dark and defiant inscrutability.
The doctrine of ignorance entertained by psychology and common opinion.3. Hence the agnoiology hitherto propounded by philosophers, in so far as they have touched loosely on this subject, has been a tissue of contradictions, inasmuch as it represents us as ignorant of that which it is not possible for any intelligence to be ignorant of, and which we cannot suppose ourselves ignorant of without violating the first principle of reason. Here, no less than in their opinions as to knowledge, ordinary thinking and psychological science move in a series of contradictions, which have their origin in a neglect of the necessary truths of reason, and which, as in the epistemology, require to be corrected by the substitution of true ideas in the place of contradictory inadvertencies.
The advantage of studying necessary truth.4. These contradictions are corrected in the theory of ignorance, which is now in the course of being constructed; and as has been said, it owes its whole strength to a sedulous contemplation of ​the necessary truths of reason. Unlike the ordinary doctrine which discharges matter per se from our knowledge, on the grounds of the limitation of our cognitive faculties, and thus consigns it to the province of our ignorance, this system eliminates it From our knowledge on the necessary principles of all reason, and thus eliminates it equally from our ignorance. It shows that matter per se is not a thing to be known on any terms by any intelligence, because oneself or the ego must always be known along with it;—in short, it dissolves into a contradiction this hitherto obstinate insolubility, and thus expels it from our ignorance just as much as from our knowledge, because it is obvious that there can be no ignorance of the contradictory, or of that of which there can be no knowledge. If any flaw can be detected in this reasoning, its author will be the first to admit that these Institutes are, from beginning to end, a mere rope of sand; but if no flaw can be detected in it, he begs to crave for them the acknowledgment that they are a chain of adamant.
The agnoiology carries out the work of the epistemology.5. The agnoiology carries out and completes the work entered on in the epistemology. In the epistemology we beheld only the backs—the dorsal fins, if we may so speak—of the necessary truths; in the agnoiology we see under them, and all round them. We look upon them—like Horace's first mariner on the swimming sea-monsters—siccis oculis, as they ​turn up their shadowy sides, and gleaming abdomina. In the former section it was shown that there could be no knowledge of their opposites; in the present section it is shown that there can be no ignorance of their opposites. Thus all those things which we are prevented from knowing by the necessary laws of all reason, are struck down right and left, and are exterminated in their ultimate citadel of refuge—the stronghold, namely, of our ignorance—to which they have always hitherto betaken themselves when expelled from our cognition and conception, (see Prop XI. Epistemology, Obs. 1.) This operation effectually clears the ground, as will be seen in the sequel, for the establishment of a demonstrated and impregnable ontology.
Fifth counter-proposition. 6. It may be proper to explicate this doctrine somewhat more fully, and to point out certain historical circumstances connected with it—the corresponding counter-proposition being first of all subjoined. Fifth Counter-proposition: "We are altogether ignorant of material things out of all relation to a mind, subject, or self; in other word; we are profoundly ignorant of matter per se."
Psycological conclusion as to our ignorance of matter per se.7. Many philosophers have seen that the human mind cannot know things by and in themselves, because it can know them only as modified and supplemented by its own faculties of cognition; ​in other words, that it can know them only as seen things, as touched things, and so forth—some subjective contribution being always added to the thing, and the total object apprehended being thus a composite product made up of a part which was objective, and a part which was subjective. Hence they concluded, very rashly and inconsiderately, that we were ignorant of the objective part per se, or separated from the subjective part. They adopted this counter-proposition. They gave out that we were ignorant of matter per se, of things by and in themselves. This conclusion is more particularly embraced and insisted upon by Kant.
It rests on a contradictory assumption.8. This conclusion, however, rests on an assumption which contradicts the most strongest and essential principles of reason. It is founded on the assumption that these things may possibly be known as they are, by and in themselves, and out of relation to all intelligence. This premiss must be postulated by those who maintain that we are ignorant of material things per se; because it would be manifestly absurd to assert that we could be ignorant of what could not possibly be known. This, then, is their postulation; and if it were true, or if it could be conceded, their conclusion would be perfectly legitimate.
9. But the whole tenor of this work has proved ​The psychological conclusion, therefore, is contradictory.that the postulation in question is contradictory. It stands opposed to the primary law of all knowledge, as expressed in the first proposition of the epistemology, which declares that all cognition of material or other things per se is impossible, inasmuch as every intelligence (actual or possible) which apprehends material things, must apprehend itself along with them; in other words, must apprehend them, not per se, but cum alio. Hence the conclusion now under discussion is contradictory, because it is founded on an assumption which is contradictory: and thus the counter-proposition which contends for our ignorance of matter per se, or of the universe as it exists by and in itself, is annihilated by the artillery of necessary truth.
The origin of the psychological mistake pointed out.10. From these remarks it is obvious that Kant and other philosophers have fallen into the mistake of supposing that we could be ignorant of material things per se through an inattention to the causes which render them absolutely unknowable. They supposed that they were simply unknowable by us on account of the limitation or imperfection of our faculties of cognition, but that they were still possibly knowable by intelligences competent to know them. In the course of this work, however, it has been repeatedly shown that our incompetency to know matter per se is due to no such cause, but is attributable to the essential ​structure of all intelligence, and to the necessary laws of all cognition. Hence matter per se is not the simply unknowable and inconceivable to us—it is the absolutely unknowable and inconceivable in itself; in other words, it is the contradictory,—a consideration which dislodges it from our ignorance just as effectually as it dislodges it from our knowledge, as must be apparent to all who have mastered the very simple argument by which this conclusion is established.
No ontology is possible, if we can be ignorant of matter per se.11. Unless this conclusion were established, no ontology would be possible, and to the failure to establish it is to be attributed the shipwreck which all previous attempts to consolidate this department of metaphysical science have suffered. Ontology, or the science of true Being, undertakes to demonstrate what true Being is, what alone absolutely exists. But our ignorance being, beyond all question, excessive, we must get the ontological demonstration into such a shape that we shall be able to affix the same predicate to absolute existence—to declare with certainty what it is, whether we suppose ourselves to know it, or to be ignorant of it. By working the system into such a shape that the result is the same on either alternative, a valid ontology may be constructed. But if it were true that we could be ignorant of matter per se, an obstacle would be interposed which would frustrate all our ​endeavours. Because if we are ignorant of matter per se, and if we are also ignorant of absolute existence (as may very well turn out to be the case), matter per se may, in these circumstances, be absolute existence, for anything that we can show to the contrary—or it may not be this. We are reduced to a condition of dubiety. We can neither affirm nor deny anything about "Being in itself" with any assured certainty. Our lips are sealed—our advance is blockaded. The issues of the system are sceptical and unsatisfactory. Science is out of the question,—for there is no science in an alternative conclusion: and, finally, we are driven to have recourse to those arts of vague conjecture and loose declamation which genuine speculation disdains. But let it be once proclaimed and demonstrated, as it has now been, that we cannot (without running into absurdity) suppose ourselves ignorant of matter per se any more than we can suppose ourselves cognisant of it,—and at the blast of that trumpet down fall all the obstructions and defences which have fortified, from time immemorial, the enchanted castle of ontology.