# The Clarita and the Clara/Opinion of the Court

* Court Documents
* Case Syllabus
* Opinion of the Court
United States Supreme Court
90 U.S. 1
The Clarita and the Clara
IN THE CLAIM FOR DAMAGES.
I. Vessels engaged in commerce are held liable for damage occasioned by collision on account of the complicity, direct or indirect, of their owners, or the negligence, want of care or skill on the part of those employed in their navigation. Owners appoint the master and employ the crew, and consequently are held responsible for their conduct in the management of the vessel.
Whenever, therefore, a fault is committed whereby a collision ensues, that fault is imputed to the owners, and the vessel is just as much liable for the consequences as if it had been committed by the owner himself. Consequences of the kind, however, do not follow when the person committing the fault does not in fact or by implication of law stand in the relation of agent to the owners. Unless the owner and the person or persons in charge of the vessel sustain in some way towards each other the relation of principal and agent the injured party cannot have his remedy against the colliding vessel.
By employing a tug to transport their vessel from one place to another the owners of the tow do not necessarily constitute the master and crew of the tug their agents in performing the service, as they neither appoint the master of the tug nor employ the crew, nor can they displace either one or the other. Their contract for the service, even though it was negotiated with the master of the tug, is, in legal contemplation, made with the owners of the vessel employed, and the master of the tug continues to be the agent of the owners of his own vessel, and they are responsible for his acts in her navigation and management.
Apply those rules to the case before the court, and it is clear that the owners of the burning ferry-boat are not liable for the consequences of the collision, as the evidence shows to a demonstration that the steam-tug was in the charge of her own master and crew, and that those in charge of her undertook, in the usual and ordinary course of her employment, to transport the burning ferry-boat from one place to another over waters where such accessory motive power is usually employed, and consequently that the steam-tug, in the absence of the officers and crew of the tow, must be held responsible for the proper navigation of both vessels, and that third persons suffering damage through the fault of those in charge of such motive power must, under such circumstances, look to the steam-tug, her master or owners, for the recompense which they are entitled to claim on account of any injuries that their vessel or cargo may receive by such means.
Whether the party charged ought to be held liable is made to depend, in all cases of the kind, upon his relation to the wrong-doer. Where the wrongful act is done by the party charged, or was occasioned by his negligence, of course he is liable, and he is equally so if it was done by one towards whom he bears the relation of principal, but the liability ceases, in such a case, where the relation of principal and agent entirely ceases to exist, unless the wrongful act was performed or occasioned by the party charged. Grant that and it follows, beyond peradventure, that the owners of the ferry-boat are not responsible for the consequences of the collision, as it is clear that the officers and crew of the steam-tug were the agents of the owners of their own vessel and not of the burning ferry-boat.
II. Suppose that is so, still it is insisted by the respondents that those in charge of the steam-tug were without fault; that the collision, as far as they are concerned, was the result of inevitable accident, though they insist that it might have been prevented by proper care on the part of those in charge of the schooner.
Obviously the defence of inevitable accident finds no support in the evidence, even upon the theory assumed by the respondents, as they insist that the collision was occasioned by the fault of the schooner. Such a defence can never be sustained where it appears that the disaster was caused by negligence, for if the fault was committed by the respondent alone then the libellant is entitled to recover, or if by the libellant then the libel must be dismissed, or if both parties were in fault then the damages must be apportioned equally between the offending vessels. Unless it appears that both parties have endeavored by all means in their power, with due care and a proper display of nautical skill, to prevent the collision, the defence of inevitable accident is inapplicable to the case. None of the circumstances given in evidence favor such a theory, as the collision occurred on a fair, clear evening and in the open harbor, and inasmuch as the primary cause that led to it was one which ought to have been foreseen and removed by the employment of other means to attach the two vessels together it is plain that the case is one of fault.
III. Two faults are imputed to the schooner: (1.) That she was anchored in an improper place. (2.) That she had no watch on deck.
1. Argument to show that the collision occurred is unnecessary, as the fact is admitted, and it is equally clear that the schooner was lying at anchor with the signal light displayed required by the act of Congress, and under those circumstances the rule is well settled that the burden of proof is upon the respondents to show either that the steam-tug was without fault or that the collision was occasioned by the fault of the schooner, or that it was the result of inevitable accident.
Neither rain nor the darkness of the night nor even the absence of a light from a vessel at anchor, said this court, nor the fact that the moving vessel was well manned and furnished and conducted with caution will excuse such moving vessel for coming in collision with the vessel at anchor in a thoroughfare out of the usual track of navigation.
Mr. Parsons lays down the rule that if a ship at anchor and one in motion come into collision, the presumption is that it is the fault of the ship in motion, unless the anchored vessel was where she should not have been.
Undoubtedly if a vessel anchors in an improper place she must take the consequences of her own improper act. But whether she be in a proper place or not, and whether properly or improperly anchored, the other vessel must avoid her if it be reasonably practicable and consistent with her own safety.
Attempt is made in argument to show that the schooner was anchored in an improper place, but both the subordinate courts were of a different opinion, and the court here, in view of the whole evidence, concurs in the conclusion that that defence is not sustained.
2. Concede all that, and still it is contended by the respondents that the schooner was in fault because she did not have a sufficient watch, but the act of Congress contains no such requirement, and inasmuch as the evidence shows that the schooner was anchored in a proper place and that one of her crew was on deck, the court is of the opinion that the charge of fault made against the schooner in the answer is not sustained.
IV. Plenary evidence is exhibited that all the parties present on the occasion expected that the flames would presently burst through the decks of the ferry-boat at the time the steam-tug made fast to her in order to drag her from the slip where she lay, and to move the vessel into the stream, and both parties agree that it was in view of that expectation that the decision was made to move the ferry-boat from her resting-place, nor is it questioned by either party that if those in charge of the steam-tug had used a chain instead of a manilla hawser, the object contemplated might have been safely and successfully carried into effect.
Even ordinary experience and prudence would have suggested that the part of the hawser made fast to the burning ferry-boat should be chain, and that it would be unsafe to use a hawser made of manilla. Where the danger is great the greater should be the precaution, as prudent men in great emergencies employ their best exertions to ward off the danger. Whether they had a clain hawser on board or not does not appear, but sufficient does appear to satisfy the court that one of sufficient ength to have prevented the disaster might easily have been procured, even if they were not supplied with such an appliance.
All of these matters were fully considered by the district judge, and the same conclusions at which he arrived were reached by the Circuit Court. In those conclusions the court here concurs.
IN THE CLAIM FOR SALVAGE.
In this case the owners of the schooner admit that the steam-tug ultimately succeeded in dragging the ferry-boat clear of the schooner, and that she returned to the schooner after the ferry-boat sunk, and that she rendered service in subduing the flames and saving the schooner from complete destruction, but they deny, in the most positive form, that the libellants are entitled to salvage, or to any compensation by the way of salvage on account of the services rendered, for the following reasons: (1.) Because the schooner would not have caught fire if those in charge of the steam-tug had exercised due and proper care in their attempts to tow the burning ferry-boat from her slip up the river. (2.) Because the schooner was run into and set on fire by the carelessness, negligence, and inattention of those who rendered the alleged salvage service, and not from any accident, nor from any fault or neglect of duty on the part of the schooner.
Further discussion of the matters of fact involved in those propositions is unnecessary, as they have all been conclusively determined in favor of the owners of the schooner in what precedes, which leaves nothing for decision in the case before the court, except the question whether the claim for salvage compensation can be sustained in view of the facts set forth in the propositions submitted by the respondents.
Salvage is well defined as the compensation allowed to persons by whose assistance a ship or vessel, or the cargo of the same, or the lives of the persons belonging to the ship or vessel, are saved from danger or loss in cases of shipwreck, derelict capture, or other marine misadventures.
Other jurists define it as the service which volunteer adventurers spontaneously render to the owners, in the recovery of property from loss or damage at sea under the responsibility of making restitution and with a lien for their reward.
Persons who render such service are called salvors, and a salvor is defined to be a person who, without any particular relation to the ship in distress, proffers useful service and gives it as a volunteer adventurer without any pre-existing contract that connected him with the duty of employing himself for the preservation of the vessel.
Enough appears in those definitions to show that the elements necessary to constitute a valid salvage claim are as follows: (1.) A marine peril to the property to be rescued. (2.) Voluntary service not owed to the property as matter of duty. (3.) Success in saving the property or some portion of it from the impending peril.
Public policy encourages the hardy and industrious mariner to engage in these laborious and sometimes dangerous enterprises, and with a view to withdraw from him every temptation to dishonesty the law allows him, in case he is successful, a liberal compensation. Those liberal rules as to remuneration were adopted and are administered not only as an inducement to the daring to embark in such enterprises, but to withdraw from the salvors as far as possible every motive to depredate upon the property of the unfortunate owner.
Such compensation, however, is not claimable in every case in which work and labor are done for the preservation of a ship and cargo. Suitors, in order to support such a claim, must be prepared to show that the property was exposed to peril and that the undertaking involved risk and enterprise, and that they were successful in securing the property and saving it to the owner, and that the service was voluntary and that it was not rendered in pursuance of any duty owed to the owner or to the property. Conditions of the kind are inherent in the very nature of the undertaking, and salvors, in consideration of the large reward allowed to them for their services, are required to be vigilant in preventing, detecting, and exposing every act of plunder upon the property saved, for the reason that the right to salvage compensation presupposes good faith, meritorious service, complete restoration, and incorruptible vigilance, so far as the property is within the reach or under the control of the salvors.
Seamen belonging to the ship in peril cannot, as a general rule, claim a salvage compensation, not only because it is their duty to save both ship and cargo, if it is in their power, but because it would be unwise to tempt them to let the ship and cargo get into a position of danger in order that by extreme exertion they might claim salvage compensation.
Pilots, also, are excluded from such compensation for any exertions or services rendered while acting within the line of their duty, but like other persons they may become salvors in legal contemplation, if they perform extraordinary services outside of the line of their duty.
Neither can passengers claim salvage unless they perform extraordinary service.
Persons otherwise entitled as salvors cannot be defeated in making their claim because the vessel was fraudulently imperilled by the master, unless it appears that they were parties to the fraud, or were cognizant of it while it was going on and did not interfere to prevent it as far as they could, or unless they endeavored to conceal the master's misconduct and screen him from detection.
Where two vessels come in collision, if one is not disabled she is bound to render all possible assistance to the other, even though the other may be wholly in fault.
Authorities to support that proposition are quite numerous, and it is very clear that if the vessel in fault renders assistance to the one not in fault, the former cannot make any claim for salvage either from the other vessel or the cargo on board, as it is her duty to render every assistance in her power.
Services of the kind, when required by duty, do not constitute a claim for salvage, and it is expressly decided that salvors are not entitled to reward for saving property which they had by their own wrongful acts contributed to place in jeopardy, and the court here fully concurs in that proposition.
Text writers, also, of high repute adopt the rule that 'persons who have contributed to place property in danger cannot be allowed to claim reward for rescuing it from the consequences of their own wrongful acts,' which is a principle applicable in all respects to the case before the court.
Cases may be found in which it is held that when one ship has rendered assistance to another ship belonging to the same owner that the ship rendering such assistance cannot claim a salvage reward, but the better opinion is that the rule laid down in those cases admits of exceptions, as where the services rendered were of an extraordinary character and were entirely outside of the contract duties of those by whom they were rendered.
Exceptions also exist to the rule that a steam-tug engaged in towing may not, in case she performs extraordinary services outside of her contract, be entitled to salvage compensation, if it appears that the services were meritorious and saved the property from an impending peril which supervened subsequent to the original undertaking.
None of these exceptional cases, however, can benefit the libellants in this case, for the reason that the insuperable objection to their right of recovery is that the peril to which the schooner was exposed was caused by those who rendered the alleged salvage service, and to the rule that such libellants are not entitled to recover there are no exceptions when it appears that the suit is prosecuted in behalf of the wrongdoers.
DECREE AFFIRMED IN BOTH CASES.

## Notes

* ↑ Sturgis v. Boyer, 24 Howard, 123.
* ↑ Morning Light, 8 Wallace, 557; Steamship Company v. Steamship Company, 24 Howard, 313.
* ↑ The Erskine, 6 Notes of Cases, 633.
* ↑ The John Adams, 1 Clifford, 413; The Lochlibo, 3 W. Robinson, 310; 1 Parsons on Shipping, 573.
* ↑ Steamship Co. v. Calderwood, 19 Howard, 246.
* ↑ 1 Parsons on Shipping, 573; The Granite State, 3 Wallace, 310.
* ↑ Strout v. Foster, 1 Howard, 89.
* ↑ Knowlton v. Sanford, 32 Maine, 148; The Batavier, 40 English Law and Equity, 20; 1 Parsons on Shipping, 574.
* ↑ Maude & Pollock on Shipping, 419.
* ↑ Machlachlan on Shipping, 569; The Neptune, 1 Haggard's Admiralty, 236; The Thetis, 3 Id. 48.
* ↑ The Island City, 1 Clifford, 228.
* ↑ Miller v. Kelley, Abbott's Admiralty, 564; The Perkins, 21 Law Reporter, 87; The Speedwell, Ib. 99.
* ↑ The Andries, 1 Swabey, 226; Same Case, 11 Moore Privy Council, 318.
* ↑ The Branston, 2 Haggard's Admiralty, 3, note; The Vrede, Lushington's Admiralty, 322; The Two Friends, 1 Robinson, 285; Maude & Pollock on Shipping, 485; 2 Parsons on Shipping, 268.
* ↑ The Fair American, 1 Peters's Admiralty, 95; Parsons on Shipping, 285.
* ↑ The Celt, 3 Haggard's Admiralty, 328; The Ericsson, Swabey, 40; The Dispatch, Ib. 140; 1 Parsons on Shipping, 529.
* ↑ The Iola, 4 Blatchford, 31; 2 Parsons on Shipping, 289.
* ↑ The Capella, Law Reports, 1 Admiralty and Ecclesiastical, 356; The Queen, Law Reports, 2 Id. 55.
* ↑ Williams & Bruce's Practice, 123; Benedict's Admiralty (2d ed.), 180.
* ↑ The Sappho, Law Reports, 3 Privy Council Appeals, 690; Same Case, 8 Moore Privy Council, N. S. 70.
* ↑ The Potter, Law Reports, 3 Admiralty and Ecclesiastical, 296; The Minnehaha, 1 Lushington's Admiralty, 335; Same Case, 15 Moore Privy Council, 133; Maude & Pollock on Shipping, 479.
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