# Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser

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Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986), was a United States Supreme Court decision involving free speech and public schools. Matthew Fraser was suspended from school for making a speech full of sexual double entendres. The Supreme Court held that his suspension did not violate the First Amendment.

## Concurring Opinion

    Brennan

## Dissenting Opinions

    Marshall
    Stevens
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
478 U.S. 675, 106 S.Ct. 3159
BETHEL SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 403, et al. v. Matthew N. FRASER, a Minor and E.L. Fraser, Guardian Ad Litem.
No. 84-1667.
Syllabus
Respondent public high school student (hereafter respondent) delivered a speech nominating a fellow student for a student elective office at a voluntary assembly that was held during school hours as part of a school-sponsored educational program in self-government, and that was attended by approximately 600 students, many of whom were 14-year-olds. During the entire speech, respondent referred to his candidate in terms of an elaborate, graphic, and explicit sexual metaphor. Some of the students at the assembly hooted and yelled during the speech, some mimicked the sexual activities alluded to in the speech, and others appeared to be bewildered and embarrassed. Prior to delivering the speech, respondent discussed it with several teachers, two of whom advised him that it was inappropriate and should not be given. The morning after the assembly, the Assistant Principal called respondent into her office and notified him that the school considered his speech to have been a violation of the school's “disruptive-conduct rule,” which prohibited conduct that substantially interfered with the educational process, including the use of obscene, profane language or gestures. Respondent was given copies of teacher reports of his conduct, and was given a chance to explain his conduct. After he admitted that he deliberately used sexual innuendo in the speech, he was informed that he would be suspended for three days, and that his name would be removed from the list of candidates for graduation speaker at the school's commencement exercises. Review of the disciplinary action through petitioner School District's grievance procedures resulted in affirmance of the discipline, but respondent was allowed to return to school after serving only two days of his suspension. Respondent, by his father (also a respondent) as guardian ad litem, then filed suit in Federal District Court, alleging a violation of his First Amendment right to freedom of speech and seeking injunctive relief and damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The court held that the school's sanctions violated the First Amendment, that the school's disruptive-conduct rule was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, and that the removal of respondent's name from the graduation speaker's list violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court awarded respondent monetary relief and enjoined the [p676] School District from preventing him from speaking at the commencement ceremonies. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
Held:
1. The First Amendment did not prevent the School District from disciplining respondent for giving the offensively lewd and indecent speech at the assembly. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 89 S.Ct. 733, 21 L.Ed.2d 731 distinguished. Under the First Amendment, the use of an offensive form of expression may not be prohibited to adults making what the speaker considers a political point, but it does not follow that the same latitude must be permitted to children in a public school. It is a highly appropriate function of public school education to prohibit the use of vulgar and offensive terms in public discourse. Nothing in the Constitution prohibits the states from insisting that certain modes of expression are inappropriate and subject to sanctions. The inculcation of these values is truly the work of the school, and the determination of what manner of speech is inappropriate properly rests with the school board. First Amendment jurisprudence recognizes an interest in protecting minors from exposure to vulgar and offensive spoken language, FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 98 S.Ct. 3026, 57 L.Ed.2d 1073, as well as limitations on the otherwise absolute interest of the speaker in reaching an unlimited audience where the speech is sexually explicit and the audience may include children, Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 88 S.Ct. 1274, 20 L.Ed.2d 195. Petitioner School District acted entirely within its permissible authority in imposing sanctions upon respondent in response to his offensively lewd and indecent speech, which had no claim to First Amendment protection. Pp. 3163-3166.
2. There is no merit to respondent's contention that the circumstances of his suspension violated due process because he had no way of knowing that the delivery of the speech would subject him to disciplinary sanctions. Given the school's need to be able to impose disciplinary sanctions for a wide range of unanticipated conduct disruptive of the educational process, the school disciplinary rules need not be as detailed as a criminal code which imposes criminal sanctions. The school disciplinary rule proscribing “obscene” language and the prespeech admonitions of teachers gave adequate warning to respondent that his lewd speech could subject him to sanctions. P. 3166.
755 F.2d 1356, reversed.
BURGER, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which WHITE, POWELL, REHNQUIST, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined. BRENNAN, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. ---. BLACKMUN, J., concurred in the result. MARSHALL, J., post, p. ---, and STEVENS, J., post, p. --- filed dissenting opinions.
[p677] William A. Coats argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs was Clifford D. Foster, Jr.
Jeffrey T. Haley argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief was Charles S. Sims.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Booksellers Association et al. by Ronald Coles; for the Freedom to Read Foundation by James A. Klenk; for the National Education Association by Michael D. Simpson; and for the Student Press Law Center by J. Marc Abrams.
Gwendolyn H. Gregory, August W. Steinhilber, and Thomas A. Shannon filed a brief for the National School Boards Association as amicus curiae.

## Footnotes

* ↑ The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 321, 337, 26 S.Ct. 282, 287, 50 L.Ed. 499.
* ↑ Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the United States by Solicitor General Fried, Assistant Attorney General Willard, Deputy Solicitor General Kuhl, Anthony J. Steinmeyer, and Robert V. Zener; for the Pacific Legal Foundation et al. by Ronald A. Zumbrun, John H. Findley, and George Nicholson; and for the Texas Council of School Attorneys by Jean F. Powers and David Crump.
This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
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