# Williams v. Georgia/Opinion of the Court

* Court Documents
* Case Syllabus
* Opinion of the Court
* Dissenting Opinions Clark Minton
United States Supreme Court
349 U.S. 375
Williams v. Georgia
Argued: April 18, 1955. --- Decided: June 6, 1955
The Court has here under review the decision of a state court rejecting a claim of infirmity in a conviction for murder based on a constitutional ground raised for the first time in an extraordinary proceeding after the conviction had been affirmed on appeal. Respect for the State's administration of criminal justice requires a detailed narrative of the procedural course of this litigation and an adequate consideration of the legal factors relevant to our disposition.
Petitioner, a Negro, was convicted in Fulton County, Georgia, of the murder of a white man and sentenced to death. According to the allegations before us, the petit jury which convicted him was selected in the following manner:
On February 18, 1953, a judge of the Fulton County Superior Court selected from a box the names of prospective jurors. The names of white persons were on white tickets and the names of Negroes were on yellow tickets. The tickets were handed to a deputy sheriff, who in turn gave them to a deputy clerk for listing. The named jurors were subsequently summoned, some were excused, and the remaining 120 were available for the ten panels of twelve jurors each to serve in the trial of civil and criminal cases in the Fulton County Superior Court for the week of March 9, 1953. Of the 120 jurors, four were Negroes, and all four were assigned to the criminal docket.
On March 10, 1953, a panel of 48 of the 120 jurors was 'put upon' Williams at his trial. Thirteen jurors, including three of the four Negroes, were excused for cause. The State peremptorily challenged the fourth Negro, so that no Negroes served on the jury of twelve which was finally selected to try Williams.
The trial, which immediately followed the selection of the jury, lasted one day. Twenty-three witnesses appeared against Williams. His only defense was a short unsworn statement to the effect that he had not committed the crime and that he had been 'afraid' when he signed the written confession introduced against him.
Williams' court-appointed attorney filed a formal motion for new trial on March 27, 1953, and a more detailed amendment to the motion on June 29, 1953. The motion was overruled, and an appeal to the Georgia Supreme Court followed. On October 14, 1953, that court affirmed the judgment. 210 Ga. 207, 78 S.E.2d 521.
On December 1, 1953, Williams' counsel filed in the trial court an extraordinary motion for new trial under Ga. Code Ann., § 70-303. In this motion he alleged for the first time that Williams had been denied equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution by the manner in which the petit jury had been selected, organized, impaneled and challenged. An affidavit by Williams accompanied the motion, stating that at the time of trial he had no knowledge of the methods used to select the jury. A similar affidavit by his counsel stated further that 'the same could not have been discovered by him (the counsel) in the exercise of ordinary diligence.' The law partner of Williams' counsel submitted a third affidavit to the effect that he had taken no part in the trial or in its preparation.
On January 18, 1954, the trial court dismissed the extraordinary motion for new trial. An appeal was taken to the Georgia Supreme Court. In the appeal, reliance was placed almost exclusively upon the case of Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 73 S.Ct. 891, 97 L.Ed. 1244, for the claim that Williams had been denied equal protection of the laws. The pertinence of that case to this turns on the time sequence in the two cases as well as on the relevant substantive facts.
Avery was convicted of rape on September 20, 1951, in Fulton County, Georgia-the same county in which Williams was tried a year and a half later. Avery's petit jury was drawn with yellow and white tickets precisely in the manner used later in the case of Williams. In Avery's case, no Negroes appeared on the list of 60 jurors put upon him at the trial, whereas here, four Negroes appeared on the list of 120 jurores from which Williams' jury was selected. Avery, however, challenged the array when the jury was put upon him; Williams did not. Avery's challenge was overruled, and after trial he appealed on the ground of discrimination in the selection of the jury. The Georgia Supreme Court disapproved of the use of yellow and white tickets but affirmed the judgment on the ground that no discrimination was actually shown.
Certiorari in the Avery case was filed in this Court on July 28, 1952, nine weeks before the alleged murder in the Williams case. The ground, as here, was that the use of different-colored tickets for whites and Negroes deprived the defendant of equal protection of the laws. Avery's petition for certiorari was granted March 9, 1953, the day before the petit jury was put upon Williams. This Court reversed the Avery case on May 25, 1953, holding that Avery had made out a prima facie case of an unconstitutional discrimination by showing the use of different-colored tickets which the State had not rebutted.
While this Court's decision in the Avery case was thus rendered over two months after Williams' trial, it came a month before the amendment to his formal motion for new trial. Yet Williams' counsel did not rely upon the ground raised by the Avery decision until some six months later in his extraordinary motion for new trial.
As already stated, the extraordinary motion was dismissed by the trial court, and Williams again appealed to the Georgia Supreme Court. That court affirmed the dismissal of the extraordinary motion. The court concluded that Williams, having failed to challenge the array when put upon him, had waived any objections to the jury's selection. The affidavits of Williams, his counsel, and his counsel's partner were deemed insufficient to excuse Williams' failure to challenge the array at the outset of the trial.
The court did not rest on this consideration. It urged that the facts inherent in the case contradicted the affidavits. The court said that its own decision in the Avery case, prior to the Williams trial, had fully set out the practice of using different-colored tickets in the selection of juries. 'Due diligence would certainly have required the defendant and his attorney to make themselves familiar with the opinions of this court on the question now raised. It follows that, for this reason, the motion for new trial was not sufficient as an extraordinary motion for new trial.' 210 Ga. 665, 668, 82 S.E.2d 217, 219.
In view of the entanglement of this case with our decision in Avery, we granted certiorari. 348 U.S. 854, 75 S.Ct. 83. Since the attorney appointed by the Georgia court advised the Clerk of this Court that he would not be in a position to present oral argument before this Court, we appointed amicus curiae to present argument on Williams' behalf. 348 U.S. 957, 75 S.Ct. 449.
In his brief on behalf of the State before the State Supreme Court, the Solicitor General of Fulton County had urged, inter alia, that there was no showing of a denial of equal protection in this case. On oral argument here, however, the State, with commendable regard for its responsibility, agreed that the use of yellow and white tickets in this case was, in light of this Court's decision in Avery, a denial of equal protection, so that a new trial would be required but for the failure to challenge the array. We need only add that it was the system of selection and the resulting danger of abuse which was struck down in Avery and not an actual showing of discrimination on the basis of comparative numbers of Negroes and whites on the jury lists. The question now before us, in view of the State's concession, is whether the ruling of the Georgia Supreme Court rests upon an adequate nonfederal ground, so that this Court is without jurisdiction to review the Georgia court.
A state procedural rule which forbids the raising of federal questions at late stages in the case, or by any other than a prescribed method, has been recognized as a valid exercise of state power. The principle is clear enough. But the unique aspects of the never-ending new cases that arise require its individual application to particular circumstances. Thus, we would have a different question from that before us if the trial court had no power to consider Williams' constitutional objection at the belated time he raised it. But, where a State allows questions of this sort to be raised at a late stage and be determined by its courts as a matter of discretion, we are not concluded from assuming jurisdiction and deciding whether the state court action in the particular circumstances is, in effect, an avoidance of the federal right. A state court may not, in the exercise of its discretion, decline to entertain a constitutional claim while passing upon kindred issues raised in the same manner.
The Georgia courts have indicated many times that motions for new trial after verdict are not favored, and that extraordinary motions for new trial after final judgment are favored even less. But the Georgia statute provides for such motion, and it has been granted in 'exceptional' or 'extraordinary cases. The general rule is that the granting or denying of an extraordinary motion for new trial rests primarily in the discretion of the trial court, and the appellate court will not reverse except for a clear abuse of discretion. In practice, however, the Georgia appellate courts have not hesitated to reverse and grant a new trial in exceptional cases. For example:
In Wright v. Davis, 1937, 184 Ga. 846, 193 S.E. 757, the defendant was sentenced to death, his motion for new trial was overruled, and the judgment was affirmed on appeal by the Georgia Supreme Court. Three months after the affirmance the defendant made an extraordinary motion for new trial on the ground that an ex-convict had obtained a seat on the jury by impersonating his father, whose name was properly on the jury list. The trial court denied the extraordinary motion. The Georgia Supreme Court granted mandamus and made it absolute. It said:
'In the instant case we are of the opinion that the extraordinary motion for a new trial and the proffered amendment presented a state of facts which, standing without dispute, required as a matter of law that a new trial should be granted. * *
'* * * The verdict itself shows that the defendant was not benefited, as he received the extreme penalty, and it is clear that he was deprived of his right to have a jury composed entirely of upright men. Code, §§ 2-4502, 59-106. It will not do to speculate on whether the accused suffered actual injury, when so vital a right has been violated. There are some conditions from which injury will be presumed. * * *' 184 Ga. at pages 851, 853, 193 S.E., at page 760.
The court rejected the State's contention that the defendant had not shown due diligence in discovering the juror's disqualification.
Smith v. Georgia, 1907, 2 Ga.App. 574, 59 S.E. 311, involved a conviction for arson. A motion for new trial was denied, the judgment was affirmed on appeal, and five months later the defendant filed an extraordinary motion for new trial on the ground that one of the jurors was related to the deceased wife of the prosecutor within the ninth degree, and several of the prosecutor's children continued the kinship by affinity. The trial court denied the motion, but the appellate court granted a new trial. It said:
'* * * There is no higher purpose to be subserved in the administration of the criminal law than that every defendant shall be accorded a trial by jury, and jury trial is a mockery unless the jury be not only impartial, but also beyond just suspicion of partiality. * * *' 2 Ga.App. at page 578, 59 S.E. at page 313.
In answer to the State's contention that the defendant and his attorney had not shown due diligence in discovering the prohibited relationship, the court said that the trial judge had inquired into the question of relationship when the jury was impaneled, and then the court added this quotation from a Georgia Supreme Court opinion:
'* * * 'Parties are not required to make searching investigation out of court to determine whether the jurors who are summoned are disqualified in their cases. Not only is such a duty not placed by the law upon parties and their counsel, but the contrary practice is to be encouraged for obvious reasons." 2 Ga.App. at page 582, 59 S.E. at page 315.
In Crawley v. Georgia, 1921, 151 Ga. 818, 108 S.E. 238, 18 A.L.R. 368, four defendants were convicted of murder. Two were sentenced to death and two to life imprisonment. A motion for new trial was overruled, the judgment was affirmed on appeal, a motion for rehearing was denied, and a week later the defendants filed an extraordinary motion for new trial, which the trial court overruled. The Georgia Supreme Court reversed. The extraordinary motion showed that the wife of one juror was within the ninth degree of relationship to the wife of the murdered man. A new trial was granted even though the State submitted an affidavit by the juror that he did not know of the relationship at the time of the trial and therefore could not have been prejudiced.
In Doyal v. Georgia, 1884, 73 Ga. 72, the defendant was convicted of murder. His motion for new trial was denied, and the judgment was affirmed on appeal. He filed an extraordinary motion for new trial on the ground that five witnesses were ready to testify that one of the jurors had said in effect before the trial that the defendant ought to be hung and that the juror would see to it if he got on the jury. The defendant and his attorney filed affidavits to the effect that they had been ignorant of the facts at the time of trial. Despite affidavits submitted by the State showing the availability of three of the five witnesses at the time of trial, the Georgia Supreme Court granted a new trial.
All these cases (barring Harris v. Georgia, note 14) involved objections to individual jurors, as contrasted with the objection to the whole panel in this case. But the two situations cannot be distinguished on this ground. Georgia has a rule, as the State Supreme Court noted in this case, that an objection to the whole panel must be made by way of a challenge to the array at the time the panel is put upon the defendant. Cornelious v. Georgia, 1941, 193 Ga. 25, 17 S.E.2d 156; Wilcoxon v. Aldredge, 1941, 192 Ga. 634, 15 S.E.2d 873, 146 A.L.R. 365; Cumming v. Georgia, 1923, 155 Ga. 346, 117 S.E. 378; Lumpkin v. Georgia, 1921, 152 Ga. 229, 109 S.E. 664. But none of these cases declare that an extraordinary motion is not available in a proper case for granting a new trial when the objection is to the panel. On the contrary, several factors indicate that the trial judge and the appellate court have the same degree of discretion in the 'array' cases as in cases involving individual jurors. First: There is also a rule in Georgia that an objection to an individual juror must be made at the trial by a challenge to the poll. But as the cases above demonstrate, this rule gives way in an exceptional case to the need for a new trial shown by extraordinary motion. It does not appear rational to deny that the rule as to challenges to the array is likewise not inflexible. Second: The opinion of the Georgia Supreme Court in this case supports this conclusion. If the trial court had no power to entertain the motion, it was immaterial whether the affidavits were faulty. Yet the Supreme Court felt called upon to question the reliability of the affidavits, concluding that Williams' counsel must have failed to use due diligence and 'for this reason' the motion was 'not sufficient.'
We conclude that the trial court and the State Supreme Court declined to grant Williams' motion though possessed of power to do so under state law. Since his motion was based upon a constitutional objection, and one the validity of which has in principle been sustained here, the discretionary decision to deny the motion does not deprive this Court of jurisdiction to find that the substantive issue is properly before us.
But the fact that we have jurisdiction does not compel us to exercise it. In Patterson v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 600, 55 S.Ct. 575, 79 L.Ed. 1082, we remanded a case to the highest court of the State, even though that court had affirmed on state procedural grounds, because after that affirmance we had reversed on constitutional grounds a case having identical substantive facts. We said there:
'While we must have proper regard to this ruling of the state court in relation to its appellate procedure, we cannot ignore the exceptional features of the present case. An important question under the Federal Constitution was involved, and, from that standpoint, the case did not stand alone. * * * '* * * We are not satisfied that the court would have dealt with the case in the same way if it had determined the constitutional question as we have determined it. * * *
'We have frequently held that in the exercise of our appellate jurisdiction we have power not only to correct error in the judgment under review but to make such disposition of the case as justice requires. And in determining what justice does require, the Court is bound to consider any change, either in fact or in law, which has supervened since the judgment was entered. We may recognize such a change, which may affect the result, by setting aside the judgment and remanding the case so that the state court may be free to act. We have said that to do this is not to review, in any proper sense of the term, the decision of the state court upon a nonfederal question, but only to deal appropriately with a matter arising since its judgment and having a bearing upon the right disposition of the case. * * *' 294 U.S., at pages 605, 606, 607, 55 S.Ct. at pages 577, 578.
In the instant case, there is an important factor which has intervened since the affirmance by the Georgia Supreme Court which impels us to remand for that court's further consideration. This is the acknowledgment by the State before this Court that, as a matter of substantive law, Williams has been deprived of his constitutional rights. The Solicitor General of Fulton County, it should be recalled, had urged before the Georgia Supreme Court that no denial of equal protection was involved, and that court may well have been influenced by the contention. Moreover, if there is another remedy open to Williams, as the Attorney General of the State intimated in his brief to the Georgia Supreme Court, that court should have an opportunity to designate the appropriate remedy.
The facts of this case are extraordinary, particularly in view of the use of yellow and white tickets by a judge of the Fulton County Superior Court almost a year after the State's own Supreme Court had condemned the practice in the Avery case. That life is at stake is of course another important factor in creating the extraordinary situation. The difference between capital and noncapital offenses is the basis of differentiation in law in diverse ways in which the distinction becomes relevant. We think that orderly procedure requires a remand to the State Supreme Court for reconsideration of the case. Fair regard for the principles which the Georgia courts have enforced in numerous cases and for the constitutional commands binding on all courts compels us to reject the assumption that the courts of Georgia would allow this man to go to his death as the result of a conviction secured from a jury which the State admits was unconstitutionally impaneled. Cf. Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 55 S.Ct. 340, 79 L.Ed. 791.
Remanded.
Williams Case Avery Case
convicted.
Supreme Court affirms.
filed in this Court.
Oct. 4, 1952-alleged murder occurs.
Oct. 17, 1952-Williams arrested,
placed in a line-up, confesses.
Oct. 21, 1952-Williams indicted.
trials during week of March 9th.
grants certiorari.
March 10, 1953-jury put upon Williams,
trial held, and verdict of guilty.
March 11, 1953-sentenced.
new trial filed.
in this Court.
reverses, holding jury
selection
unconstitutional.
for new trial filed; motion overruled.
July 16, 1953-bill of exceptions filed.
affirms.
to death.
for new trial filed.
extraordinary motion.
affirms.
certiorari.
Mr. Justice CLARK, with whom Mr. Justice REED and Mr. Justice MINTON join, dissenting.

## Notes

* ↑ 'In case of a motion for a new trial made after the adjournment of the court, some good reason must be shown why the motion was not made during the term, which shall be judged of by the court. In all such cases, 20 days' notice shall be given to the opposite party. Whenever a motion for a new trial shall have been made at the term of trial in any criminal case and overruled, or when a motion for a new trial has not been made at such term, no motion for a new trial from the same verdict shall be made or received, unless the same is an extraordinary motion or case, and but one such extraordinary motion shall be made or allowed.'
* ↑ See Appendix for table comparing the dates in the two cases.
* ↑ The court said: 'And while the statute does not say so, its manifest intention is that the tickets shall be of uniform size and color, so as to make discrimination impossible in the drawing of jurors; and, where not so done, this is prima facie evidence of discrimination, and, if nothing else appeared, would require a reversal. In this case, however, it is not charged or contended that any discrimination was practiced in drawing the challenged jurors; and the judge who drew them, as a witness for the accused, testified there was in fact none. Therefore, the practice of placing the names of white and colored jurors in the jury box on tickets of different colors did no harm in this instance, and consequently furnished no sufficient objection to the jurors challenged by the accused.' 209 Ga. 116, 124, 70 S.E.2d 716, 722.
* ↑ Counsel were informed that this case would be argued in this Court on March 3, 1955. On February 14, 1955, the Assistant Attorney General of Georgia wrote the Clerk of this Court that his office had been informed by Williams' counsel that 'in all probability he would not participate in the oral argument of this case.' The Clerk requested the attorney on February 18 to inform the Court of his plans. Under date of February 22, the attorney wrote to the Clerk as follows:
* ↑ The Solicitor General said at the end of his brief: '* * * In the Avery Case no negro jurors were drawn and impanelled. In this case 4 negro jurors were actually impanelled and sworn for the trial
* ↑ See, e.g., Parker v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 571, 68 S.Ct. 708, 92 L.Ed. 886; Radio Station WOW, Inc., v. Johnson, 326 U.S. 120, 128, 65 S.Ct. 1475, 1480, 89 L.Ed. 2092; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Illinois Brick Co., 297 U.S. 447, 462-463, 56 S.Ct. 556, 561, 80 L.Ed. 796; Central Union Telephone Co. v. City of Edwardsville, 269 U.S. 190, 46 S.Ct. 90, 70 L.Ed. 229.
* ↑ Cf. Rogers v. Alabama, 192 U.S. 226, 24 S.Ct. 257, 48 L.Ed. 417; Abie State Bank v. Bryan (Weaver), 282 U.S. 765, 772 773, 51 S.Ct. 252, 255, 75 L.Ed. 690; Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354, 358, 59 S.Ct. 536, 538, 83 L.Ed. 757; Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 172-173, 69 S.Ct. 1018, 1025-1026, 93 L.Ed. 1282; Vandalia R. Co. v. Indiana ex rel. South Bend, 207 U.S. 359, 367, 28 S.Ct. 130, 132, 52 L.Ed. 246.
* ↑ E.g., Parks v. Georgia, 1948, 204 Ga. 41, 48 S.E.2d 837; Brown v. Georgia, 1914, 141 Ga. 783, 82 S.E. 238; Tyre v. Georgia, 1928, 38 Ga.App. 206, 143 S.E. 778.
* ↑ Ga.Code Ann., § 70-303. See note 1, supra.
* ↑ E.g., Patterson v. Georgia, 1952, 208 Ga. 689, 69 S.E.2d 84; Pulliam v. Georgia, 1945, 199 Ga. 709, 35 S.E.2d 250; Rogers v. Georgia, 1907, 129 Ga. 589, 59 S.E. 288; Echols v. Georgia, 1953, 87 Ga.App. 565, 74 S.E.2d 474; Bivins v. McDonald, 1934, 50 Ga.App. 299, 177 S.E. 829.
* ↑ Cf. Williams v. Georgia, 1913, 12 Ga.App. 337, 77 S.E. 189, in which the presence on the jury of a juror previously convicted of an offense involving moral turpitude was deemed to warrant a new trial on a motion after verdict, as compared with an extraordinary motion after final judgment.
* ↑ Cf. the following cases in which new trials were granted on motion after verdict, as compared with an extraordinary motion after final judgment, because of a juror's disqualification. Harris v. Georgia, 1939, 188 Ga. 745, 4 S.E.2d 651; Ethridge v. Georgia, 1927, 164 Ga. 53, 137 S.E. 784; Currie v. Georgia, 1923, 156 Ga. 85, 118 S.E. 724; O'Berry v. Georgia, 1922, 153 Ga. 644, 113 S.E. 2; Merritt v. Georgia, 1921, 152 Ga. 405, 110 S.E. 160; Hubbard v. Georgia, 1909, 5 Ga.App. 599, 63 S.E. 588; Perrett v. Georgia, 1915, 16 Ga.App. 587, 85 S.E. 820; Cray v. Georgia, 1927, 37 Ga.App. 371, 140 S.E. 402.
* ↑ Under Georgia practice, the headnotes to cases are written by the court. The headnote in this case said: 'Held, that conviction for murder and sentence of death on the verdict of a juror so utterly destitute of truth and uprightness of character, would shock the conscience of civilization, and soil the purity of jury trial; and no matter how heinous the crime committed, the preservation of that purity is of more consequence than the speedy punishment of any one man for any one offense, and public policy, as well as individual right, demand a new trial.'
* ↑ Some of these cases are not entirely clear. For example, Lumpkin stated that all objections to the impaneling of the grand jury should be made by challenge to the array before the indictment is found, where the illegality is known, or, if not known, by plea in abatement to the indictment; objections to 'certain jurors' on the trial jury should be raised by a challenge to the juror when put upon the defendant. This rule is cited in Cornelious for the proposition that an objection to both grand and petit juries must be made by a challenge to the array before indictment or by plea in abatement before trial. In Kato v. Georgia, 1925, 33 Ga.App. 342, 126 S.E. 266, the grand jury rule was applied to individual grand jurors rather than to the panel, and the challenge was said to be one to the array. And in Moon v. Georgia, 1882, 68 Ga. 687, it was said that an objection to a single juror should be made by a challenge to the array. Cf. note 16, infra.
* ↑ E.g., Fudge v. Georgia, 1940, 190 Ga. 340, 9 S.E.2d 259; Bryan v. Georgia, 1905, 124 Ga. 79, 52 S.E. 298; Taylor v. Georgia, 1904, 121 Ga. 348, 49 S.E. 303. In Georgia, challenges to the array go to the form and manner of making up the entire panel, whereas challenges to the poll are directed solely to the individual juror. See Humphries v. Georgia, 1897, 100 Ga. 260, 262, 28 S.E. 25, 26; Mitchell v. Georgia, 1943, 69 Ga.App. 771, 776, 26 S.E.2d 663, 667.
* ↑ 210 Ga. 665, 668, 82 S.E.2d 217, 219.
* ↑ Even if extraordinary motion is the appropriate remedy, local practice may require Williams to be put to his proof. The State, for purposes of presenting its legal arguments, has not disputed the facts alleged in the extraordinary motion, but there has not been a hearing on those facts or an admission of their truth.
* ↑ Cf. Patterson v. Alabama, supra, with Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 62 S.Ct. 1252, 86 L.Ed. 1595.
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