# Seymour v. Freer (75 U.S. 202)/Opinion of the Court

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United States Supreme Court
75 U.S. 202
Seymour v. Freer
The contract which lies at the foundation of this suit, was entered into by Jeremiah Price and Henry Seymour on the 9th of May, 1835. Upon looking into it carefully, we find it contains the following provisions:
Price agreed that he would devote his time and attention and exercise his best judgment, in purchasing lands to an amount not exceeding $5000, in the States of Indiana, Illinois, and Ohio, and in the Territories of Michigan and Wisconsin, or in such of them as he should find most advantageous for the interest of Seymour: the contracts were to be made and the conveyances to be taken in Seymour's name: the purchases were to be made after full and careful search for the most profitable investments 'in or near the sites or expected sites of towns or places of business,' and in general in tracts of land of moderate extent: Seymour agreed to furnish $5000 wherewith to make the purchases contemplated: that the land so purchased should be sold within five years from the date of the contract: that after charging the investment, the taxes, and 7 per cent. interest on the investment, there should be paid to Price one-half of the profits which should be made: it was agreed that this half of the profits should be in full for Price's services and expenses of every kind in making the explorations and searches, and in doing all such other things as should be requisite and proper in making the purchases: the purchases were to be made during the current year: nothing was to be paid by Seymour for Price's services or expenses, except from the profits as aforesaid. The premises in controversy were bought by Price, and the titles vested in Seymour, pursuant to the contract. The property consisted of 2440 22/100 acres of land in the State of Illinois, and several lots in the village of Joliet, in that State.
It was agreed by the parties to this suit, that at the expiration of the five years within which the premises were to be sold, they were unsalable, 'and that it is entirely uncertain how much they could have been sold for, or whether they would even have brought enough to pay the original investment and interest.'
Before the commencement of the suit the property had become very valuable; 200 acres had been sold for $69,200.
Seymour died in 1837, and Price in 1854. The five years within which the property was to be sold, expired in 1840.
The duties and obligations with which the contract clothed Price, were those of an agent. He was to make the requisite searches and explorations in the States and Territories named, and to receive and invest the money of Seymour as he might deem best for Seymour's interest. He was to contribute his time, labor, skill, and judgment, but no money except what might be expended in the service he had undertaken to perform. The titles were all to be taken in the name of the principal, who was to advance the money. These functions were performed by Price. His duties and responsibilities thereupon came to an end, and those of Seymour to him commenced. For his expenditures, whatever they might be, he was to receive no immediate or certain return. The same remark is applicable in respect to his labor and services, and the exercise of his skill and judgment. Everything to be done by the agent he was to do, without any charge to his principal.
Seymour was to receive the titles of the property purchased, as if the purchases had been made by himself at home. All the burdens incident to the acquisition of the property were to be borne by Price, with only the contingency of reimbursement and compensation provided in the contract.
The lands were to be sold within five years. It is not stated by whom, but as the legal title was vested in Seymour, the duty of selling, by the clearest implication, devolved upon him. Price had no power to move in the matter, nor to exert any control, except the right to insist that the property should be sold by Seymour, within the time limited, and that the sales should be fairly conducted. By an implication equally clear, Seymour was to pay all the taxes upon the property which might accrue.
It is proper here to consider the legal and equitable relations of the parties arising out of the contract.
We think Seymour took the legal title in trust for the purposes specified. A trust is where there are rights, titles, and interests in property distinct from the legal ownership. In such cases, the legal title, in the eye of the law, carries with it, to the holder, absolute dominion; but behind it lie beneficial rights and interests in the same property belonging to another. These rights, to the extent to which they exist, are a charge upon the property, and constitute an equity which a court of equity will protect and enforce whenever its aid for that purpose is properly invoked. Interests in real estate, purely contingent, may be made the subjects of contract and equitable cognizance, as between the proper parties. The object of the trust here was to sell the property within the time limited, and, after deducting from the proceeds the outlay, with interest and taxes, to pay over to Price one-half of the residue. To this extent, Seymour was a trustee, and Price the cestui que trust. They had a joint interest in the property. Seymour held the legal title, but the rights of Price were as valid in equity as those of Seymour were at law.
If Seymour, within the five years, had conveyed the property to one of his children, by way of advancement, or to a stranger, otherwise than upon a bon a fide sale for its fair value, the grantee would have taken the title, subject to the trust upon which Seymour held it, and a court of equity would have followed the property and dealt with it in all respects as if the title had still remained in Seymour. If a valid sale had been made, the trust would have followed and bound the proceeds in like manner as it bound the property.
Upon the death of Seymour, the legal estate passed to his devisees.
The principle of equitable conversion has an important bearing upon the case. Equity considers that as done which is agreed to be done. Money which, according to a will or agreement, is to be invested in land, is regarded, in equity, as real estate; and land which is to be converted into money, is regarded as money, and treated accordingly. In this view of the subject, the personal representative of Price is the proper person to maintain this suit, and it is not necessary that his heirs-at-law should be parties.
There is another view of the subject, which we think may properly be taken. The agreement, that the property should be sold, and half of the profits paid to Price, was a charge upon the property, and gave him a lien to the extent of the amount to which he should be found entitled upon the execution of the agreement, according to its terms. The principle involved in this proposition, is a familiar one in equity, and constantly applied in the administration of its jurisprudence.
It is insisted by the appellees that the contract made the parties copartners in respect to the lands to be bought. We cannot adopt that view of the subject. The adjudications which bear upon it are conflicting and irreconcilable. The case of Berthold et al. v. Goldsmith is conclusive in this forum against the proposition. We deem it sufficient to refer to that authority, without reproducing the considerations which control the judgment of the court.
But the result is the same as if we held that the parties were copartners. In that event, Seymour would still have held the property as trustee for the firm, according to the rights of the respective members.
The appellants contend, that for any violation of the contract to the injury of Price, he had a remedy at law, and that neither he nor his legal representative could have any other.
An action at law, sounding in damages, may, undoubtedly, be maintained in such cases for the breach of an express agreement by the trustee, but this in nowise affects the right to proceed in equity to enforce the trust and lien created by the contract. They are concurrent remedies. Either, which is preferred, may be selected. The remedy in equity is the better one. The right to resort to it, under the circumstances of this case, admits of no doubt, either upon principle or authority. Such, in our judgment, were the effect and consequences of the contract.
At the end of the five years, limited for its complete fulfilment, a new element, not anticipated by the parties, and, hence, not provided for, intervened. The property, if then sold, would have afforded no profit. There would have been nothing to divide. It is uncertain whether it would have yielded enough to reimburse the cost and interest. According to the views we have expressed, there was a trust and lien for the benefit of Price. They could be destroyed only by some thing subsequently to occur. Either Price or Seymour's devisees might have insisted upon the sale of the property according to the contract. This would have extinguished the rights of both parties touching the lands, but it would have benefited neither. There would have been no profit for either party. Price would have lost his expenditures of time, money, and skill. The devisees might have lost the interest upon the investment, and, perhaps, a part of the principal.
The devisees might have held the property, and denied that, under the circumstances, the trust subsisted any longer. If Price acquiesced, his rights would have been at an end.
Price might, also, have expressly or tacitly abandoned his claim. This would have worked the same result. Both parties might have concluded to continue their existing relations, and to wait for a more auspicious period for the disposition of the property. Their interests were the same. What would benefit or injure one could not fail to have the same effect upon the others. If the purchases were judiciously made, the course last suggested was obviously the wisest and best for both parties. Was either of the alternatives adopted? and if so, which one?
This is the turning-point of the case.
The burden of the proof as to the two former rests upon the appellants.
Upon a careful examination of the record we have failed to find the slightest proof of any disclaimer by the devisees, or of any renunciation by Price. If such evidence exist we must suppose it is contained in the correspondence between the parties. They are annexed to the bill accounts, showing the receipts and disbursements of Price down to the time of his death. The receipts, after the death of Seymour, commence on the 24th December, 1841, and terminate on the 16th of June, 1854. All the moneys were received from Messrs. John F. and Horatio Seymour. It appears, by a stipulation in the record, that the sums with which Price debited himself had all been verified by comparing them with the original receipts in the possession of the counsel of the appellants. The Messrs. Seymour lived in the State of New Youk, and Price at Chicago. The moneys were all remitted by checks. It is apparent, from the face of the accounts, that the receipt of the money, in many instances, if not in all, must have been acknowledged by letter. None of these letters have been produced. Why not? The inference is a fair one, to say the least, that they contain nothing unfavorable to the claim of the appellee. This negative feature of the case is not undeserving of consideration. If Price, neither by expression nor acquiescence, did anything to impair his rights, they must still subsist in full force.
We think there is proof in the record, that he and his personal representative considered the time within which the sales were to be made, prolonged until they could be made profitably, and, that in all other respects, the contract remained as if it had originally contained this modification.
We can hardly conceive how the devisees, who advanced the money to pay the taxes, and with whom Price must have corresponded, could have understood his position differently. It is admitted that from the time of the purchases down to the time of his death, Price had the care and charge of the property, and paid the taxes upon it, the devisees furnishing the money. His accounts are long, and the items numerous. There is no proof that he ever made any charge, or claimed anything for his services. His accounts are silent upon the subject. How can this be accounted for, unless he expected to be compensated by his share of the profits of the lands, to be realized when the proper time for selling should arrive?
Upon his death, High, his administrator, succeeded to the agency. He was employed by the devisees, and performed the same duties as his predecessor. He negotiated the sales mentioned in the bill, and at once claimed a share of the profits for Price's estate, according to the contract. The claim was resisted by the devisees, and he thereupon instituted this suit.
The theory insisted upon by the appellees is consistent with all the evidence in the case. It is in conflict with nothing which has been developed. It is alleged, in one of the answers, that Price 'never pretended to the defendants to have any interest, . . . but claimed that he ought to be allowed a reasonable compensation for his services as agent, and not under the contract.' When, where, and how was the claim made? If by letter, why is not the letter produced? The fact is important, but the allegation is wholly unsupported by anything in the record.
The answers set up the bar of the statute of limitations. Where there is no disclaimer the statute has no application to an express trust, such as we have found to exist in this case.
It is said there is a misjoinder of parties in the bill with respect to the executors of Seymour. The doctrine of equitable conversion renders their presence in the case necessary, if not indispensable. If the objection were well taken, the bill as to them would be dismissed. The error would have no other effect.
It is alleged, also, that there is a defect of non-joinder as to the heirs-at-law of Price. The application of the same doctrine is a sufficient answer to this objection.
Conceding that the appellee is entitled to have the contract specifically executed, the appellants insist that the court below erred in decreeing that it should be done by a receiver instead of themselves. There being a trust and a lien a court of equity had unquestionable authority to apply its flexible and comprehensive jurisdiction in such manner as might be necessary to the right administration of justice between the parties. The devisees are numerous. The death of any one of them might seriously retard and embarrass the execution of a decree shaped as the appellants suggest. The appointment of the solicitor of the appellants as receiver, and the stipulation, which appears in the record, that he might sell at private sale, protects in the best manner the interests of all concerned.
The court below held that the contract made the parties to it copartners, and the decree was framed accordingly. But, as the provisions of the decree conform in all respects to our views, this theoretical error constitutes no ground of reversal. A wrong reason was given for what was properly done.
The litigation appears to have been conducted in a spirit of candor and fairness on both sides, which is eminently creditable to the parties.
We find no error in the record, and the decree of the Circuit Court is
AFFIRMED.

## Notes

* ↑ Mann v. Butler, 2 Barbour's Chancery, 368.
* ↑ 2 Story's Equity, § 964; Sturt v. Mellish, 2 Atkyns, 612.
* ↑ Phyfe v. Wardell et al., 5 Paige, 268; Armour v. Alexander, 10 Id. 571.
* ↑ Oliver v. Piatt, 3 Howard, 401; Taylor v. Plumer, 3 Maule & Selwyn, 562; Sweet v. Jacocks, 6 Paige, 355; Wylie v. Coxe, 15 Howard, 416.
* ↑ Anstice's Administrator v. Brown et al., 6 Paige, 448.
* ↑ Pinch v. Anthony and others, 8 Allen, 539; Legard v. Hodges, 1 Vesey, Jr. 477; Roundell v. Breary, 2 Vernon, 482; Gardner v. Townshend, Cooper's Equity Cases, 303; 2 Story's Equity, § 1, 214-16-17; Denston v. Morris, 2 Edwards' Chancery, 37.
* ↑ 24 Howard, 536.
* ↑ Anderson v. Lemon, 4 Selden, 236.
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