# The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War/Chapter 12
## CHAPTER 12: COUNTERAMBUSH

Counterambush is a tedious, time-consuming effort requiringroute planning, patrols, timely intelligence, counterambush drillsand flank security. Planning should ensure that alternate routes andtimes of travel are used, that potential ambush sites are cleared andthat movement through areas is coordinated with local forces.Movement details need to be safeguarded and deception measurestaken to prevent ambush. Page 342 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War VIGNETTE 1 CAUGHT IN A SOVIET AMBUSHby Mawlawi Mohayddin Baloch In 1983, we had one GMC pickup truck to support my force. Wecalled GMC pickups ahu (deer), since they were fleet and nimble Itwas the month of Ramadan and we were going from our base in Qala-e Naw to Kotalak to get some gasoline. Soviet soldiers were the mainsource of our gasoline. We would buy it from them. Our rendezvouspoint for gasoline was north of Kotolak. We left early in the afternoonand drove along the river avoiding the main roads (Map 12-1 -Kotolak). There was a Kochi1 in our truck who had visited our baseand we were giving him a ride back to his village camp. As we gotabout 10 kilometers south of Kotolak, we saw the Kochi's camp nearthe river. We stopped, both to let our passenger off and to wait fordark, since we were now within 50 kilometers of the Soviet base atDelaram and should not travel any further in the day light. Wewatched as the Kochi entered the woods some 500-600 meters awayon his way to his camp. We saw some people attack him and drag himto the side. We didn't know what was going on and thought that itwas a fight between Kochis. "What's going on?" we yelled. They didnot answer so we fired some shots into the air. The people whograbbed the Kochi realized that they had been seen and started firingat us. We exchanged fire for about a half hour until helicopters land-ed behind the wooded area. The other group boarded the helicoptersand left. It was late afternoon. • We had prematurely and inadvertently triggered a Sovietambush. We were on the western bank of the Khash Rud river andthe ambush force was on the eastern bank. Soviet ambushes werealways better planned and prepared than those of the DRA. TheSoviets would drop their ambush party by helicopter at night and theparty would walk into position so that their ambush could not bedetected. This ambush party was probably from Delaram2 and had Mawlawi Mohayddin Baloch is from Nimroz province. His base was at Lowkhai, the KhashRud district capitol on the Khash Rud river. He was initially with Malawi Mohammad NabiMohammadi of the Harakat-e Ingelab-i Islam' (HAR). Later, on he switched to HIK (Khalis).[Map sheet 1680]. 1 Kochi are nomadic tribesmen of Afghanistan. They live primarily by herding and tradingsheep, goats and camels. 2 More probably, these were Spetsnaz from Lashkar Gah. Page 344 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War probably moved into their wooded position the previous night. TheSoviets suffocated the Kochi who had been our passenger and hadkilled another Kochi earlier in the same fashion. The river was ford-able, so after the helicopters left, we forded the river to look at theambush sight. Villagers found the bodies of the two murdered Kochi.We crossed back to the west side, got in our truck and began drivingon the road to Kotolak since it was now night. About two kilometers south of Kotolak the Soviets had set anotherambush in some hills straddling the road. We were moving in enemyterritory and I considered the route dangerous so we stopped short of the hills and I had seven of my men dismount and walk the road to theother side of the hills checking for ambushers. If they saw nothing,then we would move the truck forward. This left eight Mujahideenwith the truck—three in the cab and five in the pickup bed. My sevenwalkers walked past the hills, checked for ambush and gave us an all-clear sign—a signal rocket. The ambush party let my walkers pass through unmolested. Whenwe saw the rocket, we moved out confidently. Suddenly, I thought thatsomeone had set us on fire. We were in an ambush kill zone and bul-lets were flying all around us. Two men in the truck bed and the mannext to me in the cab were killed. The driver was wounded in theshoulder. One tire was hit. The driver slammed the truck into reversegear and tried to drive out of the kill zone. He drove the truck behinda sheltering hillock and stopped it. I had three KIA and two WIA. Wechanged the tire and left the area in the dark. My walkers continuedto Kotolak. Later on, the walkers returned individually to my basecamp. As we were reversing the truck out of the kill zone, the body ofone of my dead Mujahideen fell out of the truck bed. The next daywhen we returned to recover his body, we discovered that it was boobytrapped. We had to tie a rope to our dead comrade and drag him for adistance, before it was safe to carry him home for burial. COMMENTARY: At the first ambush site, the Soviets failed to put outflank observers and consequently were surprised by the Mujahideen intheir stationary truck. This failure compromised their ambush. At the second ambush site, the Mujahideen walkers walked aroundthe hills, not along the military crest where the ambushers should be.The ambushers wisely let the patrol pass to concentrate on the vehicle.However, the Soviets failed to employ directional, command-detonatedmines or an RPG to effectively stop the truck in the kill zone. Further,the ambush commander did not know the size of the Mujahideen force Chapter 12, Vignette 1 Page 345 and, following the ambush, did not pursue the Mujahideen or push outa patrol to determine the Mujahideen's position and status. After the first ambush, the Soviets knew that the Mujahideenintended to move north. It was also clear that the Soviets were in thearea, yet the Mujahideen did not contact other local Mujahideengroups to check on Soviet and DRA activities in the area. The faction-alized nature of the resistance prevented the spread of tactical intelli-gence which may have saved the Mujahideen from disaster. ESTALIF FARZA tiEHOW 0 2 KM op• 84■ 1 PM1 11/ 11/ 1/I //• ZARG AR AN •• ARA DEH ■ ■ MIRAFGHAN ••FARZA Map 12-2 Page 346 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War VIGNETTE 2 AMBUSHED AT FARZAby Commander Sofi Lal Gul In April 1984, the regional Mujahideen called for a shura (localcouncil) to discuss local issues and decide on common approaches. SofiRasul and myself were to attend as the local Mujahideen commandersfrom Farza. The meeting would be held five kilometers to our north inEstalif. We were accompanied by 28 Mujahideen armed with AK47sand two RPG-7s. Someone must have been working for DRA intelli-gence in our area, since the DRA knew about our plans and set anambush on the trail near Farza. We left Farza while it was still dark so that the enemy would notsee us. Our route took us between two hills near a DRA air defensebattery position (Map 12-2 - Farza). We were about half way to Estalifat a point which we call Wotaq, when the enemy opened fire on us fromthe surrounding hills. A DRA force had set up the ambush during thenight. There is no doubt that they knew the exact route we would take.We went to ground in the kill zone and tried to find good fighting posi-tions. The firing was fierce, we were totally surprised and we did notknow the enemy strength and exact positions. Our return fire wasineffective and uncontrolled. As dawn broke, our situation improved slightly, but we were still inshock. I had no command or control over my men and they acted asindividuals trying to break contact and leave the kill zone. Enemy firewas still heavy. During a lull in the fighting, I managed to find a fewMujahideen sheltering in a ditch. I led them to the safety of the moun-tains in the west. Twelve Mujahideen eventually reached the safety of the terrain folds and mountain valleys in the west. Two others andmyself were wounded. We remained hidden in the valley until we sawthe ambush force leave that afternoon. Then we returned to theambush site where we discovered that 18 of our comrades were killed.Some of their bodies were mutilated by the enemy and most had theirclothing shredded. Late that afternoon, we moved their bodies forburial. I do not know if there were any enemy casualties, but during Commander Sofi Lal Gul is from Farza village of Mir Bacha Kot District. This is about25 kilometers north of Kabul. He was affiliated with Mojaddedi's Afghanistan NationalLiberation Front of Afghanistan (ANLF) during the war with the Soviets. Commander SofiLal Gul concentrated his efforts on the Kabul-Charikar highway. [Map sheet 2886, vicgrid 0350]. Page 348 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War the fighting, I saw helicopters landing and taking off. They may havecome to evacuate dead and wounded. CO1VIIVIENTARY: This successful DRA ambush inflicted more than 60percent loss on the Mujahideen force. Soviet/DRA recruitment of localagents and informants gradually expanded their intelligence network.in the Afghan rural areas. Often, agent/informant information was nottimely, but when it was, the Soviet/DRA planners reacted to it.Intelligence was central to Soviet/DRA ambush planning and attemptsto assassinate Mujahideen commanders. The Soviets/DRA usuallyconducted ambushes based on hard information and seldom placedrandom ambushes on the hope that a force might stumble into it. If the Mujahideen felt that they were moving through uncontestedterritory, they often failed to post route security or send a forward andflanking patrols. This lack of attention to tactical security stemmedfrom the notion that they completely controlled the countryside andthat the DRA/Soviet forces were unable to operate covertly in the coun-tryside for long. This over-confidence cost the Mujahideen dearly. TheSoviet/DRA forces exploited this Mujahideen hubris by settingambushes even in areas located deep inside Mujahideen-controlledterritory. When ambushed, the Mujahideen had difficulty maintaining com-mand and control. This exacerbated the situation and increased theircasualties. Mujahideen commanders often failed to train their person-nel in drills and counter-ambush procedures. In this example, thecommander lost control immediately and failed to regain it. This wasa contributing factor to the very-high Mujahideen losses. Further, themiddle of a kill zone is no place to establish a defense. If the comman-der had a counterambush battle drill where his men immediatelyassaulted into the teeth of the ambush, more of his force might havesurvived. VIGNETTE 3 BLASTING OUT OF AN AMBUSHby Amir Mohammad It was in 1985. We had a large truck that we were haulingweapons, rockets and ammunition in from Pakistan to our base campin the Argandab river valley (No map). We were taking a circuitousroute. We neared Lora near sunset when we saw a helicopter. Therewas nowhere to hide since we were on an open plain. The helicopterlanded and Soviet soldiers jumped out of it and took up positions allaround us. We stopped the truck, jumped out and took up positions allaround the truck. We had 13 Mujahideen and there were 10-12Soviets. The Soviets had the advantage of better weapons, positionand fire power. We started firing at each other. The Soviets started toadvance on us. The driver was afraid that we would be captured, so hetook a jerry can of gasoline, poured the gasoline onto the truck and setit on fire. He yelled at us to take cover. Despite the Soviet small-armsfire, we scurried to new positions for cover. Soon, the fire reached theammunition and rockets and the truck exploded with a tremendousroar. The rockets and rounds were not stacked neatly, but werestacked in every possible direction. Consequently, the rockets and bul-lets were exploding and streaking off in every possible direction. Itwas spectacular. The explosion and flying rounds frightened theSoviets. They ran back to their helicopter and took off. After the heli-copter left and things stopped exploding, we walked to a nearby vil-lage. Neither side had any casualties, but we lost a good truck and lotsof ammunition and we had to walk back to our base camp. COMMENTARY: The Mujahideen felt that they were in a secure areaand were driving during the day. Usually, Mujahideen trucks movedat night. Evidently the Soviets hoped to capture the truck or theywould have shot it up and created the same explosion that theMujahideen did. Amir Mohammad was a combatant in Abdul Razik's group in the Shahr-e Safa districtnortheast of Kandahar. There is no map with this vignette. VIGNETTE 4 CAUGHT IN A DRA AMBUSHby Mawlawi Mohayddin Baloch In 1986, we were moving three pickup trucks full of ammunitionfrom Iran to our base. We had two motorcyclists patrolling five kilo-meters in front of the pickup trucks. We were near the border of Iranat Shand near Helmond lake. There is a point where two hills constrictthe road and limit maneuver. The DRA border guard set up an ambushthere (No map). Our two motorcyclists rode through the ambush zoneand the DRA let them pass. As the motorcyclists cleared the ambushzone, they saw the DRA. They dismounted their motorcycles and tookup firing positions on an adjacent hill Our trucks rolled into the killzone. The motorcyclists opened fire on the ambushers to warn thepickup trucks and to distract the ambushers. The DRA opened fire andhit the middle truck. The first pickup truck drove out of the kill zonewhile the Mujahideen in the last truck dismounted and attacked theambushers. The DRA fled. We lost two Mujahideen KIA and one truckwas damaged. There were no known DRA casualties. COMIVIENTARY: When Mujahideen felt that they were in a secure area,they would move supplies during the day. The Mujahideen felt securein this area since they were moving in the daylight. Still, they had aforward patrol checking for ambush. The patrol, however, seems roadbound and did not get off the road to check likely ambush sites care-fully. The patrol had no communication with the main body, so whenthe motorcyclists finally detected the ambush, they were unable toimmediately contact them. Consequently, two of the three trucks werein the kill zone by the time the motorcyclists opened fire. Still, therewas enough spacing between trucks which prevented the entire forcefrom being in the kill zone simultaneously. The Mujahideen showed aggressive spirit and resolve by immediate-ly assaulting the ambushers and driving them from the scene. The DRAcontrolled the dominant terrain and had the opportunity to preparefighting positions. They should have been able to stand, yet they fled inthe face of Mujahideen resolve. The immediate assault into the ambushprobably saved the Mujahideen convoy. Mawlawi Mohayddin Baloch is from Nimroz province. His base was at Lowkhai, the capi-tol of Khash Rud district on the Khash Rud river. He was initially with Mawlawi MohammadNabi Mohammadi of the Harakat-e Islam' (HAR). Later, on he switched to HIK(Khalis). There is no map with this vignette. VIGNETTE 5 AMBUSHED ON THE HIGH PLAINby Commander Haji Aaquelshah Sahak In May 1987, we were moving supplies from Peshawar, Pakistan toour base west of Kabul. We followed the Logar route from Parachinar,Pakistan across the Afghanistan border to Jaji in Paktiya Province.From there, we followed mountain canyons to Dobandi. Past Dobandi,the mountains ended and we had a broad plain to cross before wereached the mountains near our base. We finally reached Dobandi andstayed there for three days (Map 12-3 - Dobandi). We waited therewhile I made sure that the way was clear because the Soviets would setambushes to interdict our supplies. I went from Dobandi to KafarDara canyon for information on Soviet activity. The Mujahideen atKafar Dara did not have any information either, so I went on to Sepetswhere there were several Mujahideen bases belonging to HA.R andHezb-e Islami. These Mujahideen gave us two guides—Akhunzada ofHAR and Mulla Nawab. We brought up all our supplies to Sepets inthe late afternoon. Including the guides, I had 31 Mujahideen withme. I planned to go forward, clear the route, establish security posi-tions on key terrain and likely ambush sites and then bring the sup-plies forward. I moved in the middle of the column. We moved across the open plain from Sepets. There is a placecalled the Childrens' cemetery where we stopped to offer our late after-noon prayers. Since it was still daylight, we moved well spread outwith a distance between every Mujahideen. This was a precautionagainst air attacks. I told the guide, Mulla Nawab, to stay with usuntil we passed through this area and reached the Gardez highway.We followed a stream bed through a brush-covered area. We nearedthe water mill midpoint between Sepets and Khato Kalay at 1920hours, when I looked at my watch to see if it was time for eveningprayer. There was high ground on both sides of us. Suddenly machine-gun fire opened up in front of me. At first, I thought that it was myMujahideen firing, but then I saw Soviets to the north firing on us. MyMujahideen immediately scattered and crouched behind bushes. TheSoviets fired at the bushes, but my Mujahideen held their fire. TheSoviets assumed that they had killed all my Mujahideen and jumped Commander Haji Aaquelshah Sahak is from the Chardehi district of Kabul ( a southern sub-urb). He was affiliated with NIFA. [Map sheet 2884, vic grid 3058]. •1111 •DOBANDI KABUL 64 KM 2817 ■ ABCHAKAN ■ ▪• • •KHATOKALAYDOBANDI Map 12-3p 1?? $ P KM Chapter 12, Vignette 5 Page 353 up from their positions. As I saw the Soviets jump up, I yelled "AllahAkbar"(God is the greatest) and we opened fire on them. This led to aprolonged fire fight. My Mujahideen were spread in a single file and Iwas the 16th person in the column. Dadgul was next to me, but we didnot really know exactly where the Soviets were and they did not knowexactly where we were. We fired at each other off and on. At approx-imately 2200 hours, we heard the sound of armored vehicle enginesmoving toward us. They had come from the northwest at Pul-e Alam.Mamur Abdul Ali began firing rockets in our support from his base inSepets. One landed close to us and the next went further on. The fifthrocket landed in the enemy column. This slowed down the enemy col-umn. Akhunzada also started firing rockets at the enemy column fromhis base. I instructed my Mujahideen to fall back to the mountainsnear Abchakan and then move south of Sepets to the mountain valleywhere the Mujahideen bases were located. It was 0200 when wereached Akhunzada base. Sixteen of my Mujahideen were missing—those who were in front of me in the column. The next morning at 1000hours, we went forward and found Mohammaday, who was woundedand my RPG-7 man who was killed. The rest of my Mujahideen hadgone on to Logan I do not know what the Soviet losses were, but therewere reports that they had casualties. The Soviets never used thatparticular ambush site again.
COMMENTARY: The Soviet ambush party probably came from the 108thMotorized Rifle Division or the 103rd Airborne Division. Both weregarrisoned in Kabul. The 56th Air Assault Brigade at Gardez wascloser to the site, but the relief element came from the Kabul direction.The Soviet ambush site was not well laid out. There was no attemptto seal the kill zone. There were no firing lanes cleared, no aimingstakes emplaced, no directional mines employed and no indirect fireplanned on the kill zone. The Soviet ambush was triggered by a lonegunner and not by massed fire directed by the ambush commander.The Soviet commander evidently did not know that he had a strung-out Mujahideen column, which could not mass fires, to his front. Oncenight fell, the Mujahideen did not break contact and the ambushcommander then evidently felt that he was in contact with a large forceand called for an armored column to rescue him.
The Mujahideen movement plan was commendable. The comman-der did not hazard his supplies until he had cleared the route and post-ed security at key points. He coordinated with other factions to obtaininformation and tactical intelligence. He moved spread out on open terrain so he did not present an air target and moved in the middle of the column where he could best exert control. He gets low marks forfollowing the guide down a stream bed without sending flankers tosweep the high ground. But, when his force was hit, the commanderwas able to ascertain that his column was not in immediate danger ofannihilation and shut down return fire. This allowed his men to deter-mine where their ambushers were and to draw them out of position.The commander ordered an escape to the northeast and then a movesouth in the safety of the mountains rather than retracing their routeand risking another ambush or drawing the relief column into theSepets area.

### CHAPTER COMMENTARY

Successful counterambush is the result of careful planning, battledrills, rehearsals, information security, patrolling, current tacticalintelligence, and deception measures. Movement of supplies needs tovary by route, time and composition of the supply column.Mujahideen supplies were moved on mule, horse, donkey, camel,truck and human porter. While some factions had their own transport, the bulk of Mujahideen supplies were carried by contracted teamsters and muleteers. The cost of transport was high and a groupwith a reputation of getting ambushed would be hard put to find willing teamsters.
In some areas, the Mujahideen only had to transport ammunition,but in other areas they had to transport food, clothing, and forage aswell. Ammunition requirements for a small ambush by a 20-man group armed with Enfields, Kalashnikovs, an RPG-7, a PK mediummachine gun, and five antitank mines, might exceed 375 pounds. Theweight of required ammunition shoots up dramatically as mortars,recoilless rifles and heavy machineguns are added.' Even if the ammu-nition was furnished free, the cost of getting it to where it was neededwas considerable and the wise Mujahideen commander carefullyprotected his supplies against interdiction. 3 'The Logistics System of the Mujahideen", page 55, unpublished government contractstudy written in 1987.