# Mexico's Struggle Towards Democracy/Chapter 2

The Mexican Revolution of 1910–20
1. THE FOUR REVOLUTIONARY CENTERS.
The Mexican revolution of 1910 has been called "the battle of three ages: serfdom, capitalism and industrial freedom." Within the bounderies of Mexico exist landed estates among the largest in the world, a developing class of Mexican business men and lesser land owners, and thousands of exploited industrial workers employed chiefly in mines and factories and on transport systems owned by foreign investors.
In order to follow the course of the revolution intelligently, one must know the local conditions in the four principal revolutionary centers, situated, respectively, on the south-central plateau, in Yucatan, and in the northern and eastern sections of Mexico.
The state of Morelos may be considered typical of south-central Mexico. Owing to rich soil and fair amount of rainfall, this has always been a productive and thickly populated region and here, during the Spanish rule, peonage early attained a high development. Here the Indians still cling tenaciously to their old communal customs and have little understanding of individual ownership of land. When, under Diaz, their communal lands (ejidos) were seized for division, few attempted to establish individual holdings. The land soon accumulated in the hands of a very few owners, mostly ​Spanish capitalists, who worked tens of thousands of the dispossessed Indians as peons on sugar plantations under a system of extreme exploitation.
Yucatan is separated from the rest of Mexico by distance and tropical forests. The natives are the Mayas, by nature pacific but strongly tribal and proud of their ancient culture. Yucatan has been called Mexico's Ireland and for a century the Mayas have been plotting to break away and join the Central America federation. During the time of Diaz, the planters of Yucatan developed the henequen industry, involving an elaborate system of railroads, irrigation, and considerable capital. Gradually foreign speculators, who came to buy the henequen, acquired a strangle hold upon the industry. They controlled the local banks, loaned money to the planters at extortionate rates, and by 1908 held mortgages on nearly all the plantations, and were thus enabled to buy henequen at very low rates and hold it for high prices in American markets. Thousands of Mayan and imported peons who raised the crop were compelled to work for only a few cents a day, many of them branded and in chains.
In these two centers developed strong agrarian movements, under able Indian leaders, of whom Zapata in Morelos and Carrillo in Yucatan became the most noted, but so universal was the land question that similar movements appeared in almost every Mexican state.
A large share of northern Mexico is semi-arid with a sparse population. Here peonage was never highly developed and was supplemented with free labor having a large intermixture of white blood and ideas of individual ownership. Here, under Diaz, ​American investors acquired rich mining concessions and huge grants of land for cattle ranches, fake colonizing schemes, and other speculative purposes. With the building of railroads, there developed also smaller land holdings, and business enterprises. Sonora, most western of the northern tier of states, is more rugged, with mountains rich in copper, rivers, and fertile valleys. This is the ancestral home of the Yaqui Indians. Fierce, courageous, industrious, they were never subdued to peonage, but up to 1880 practiced their communal system of agriculture. Diaz granted their best river lands to foreign speculators and in retaliation for the Yaquis' determined and continued resistance, thousands of them were sold as slaves at $65 per head to the planters of Yucatan. By 1910 the tribe had been reduced to a small fraction of its former size. From this northern section of Mexico came the leaders of the revolution who represented middle-class interests.
In the state of Vera Cruz, extending in a narrow strip along the Gulf of Mexico, are located most of the great oil fields, the two largest ports, Vera Cruz and Tampico, and also in this state and those adjoining it on the west are situated most of the largest factories in Mexico. This section became the chief center of organized labor.
2. BASIC CAUSES OF THE REVOLUTION.
The basic causes of the revolution were (1st) rapid growth of capitalism, controlled by foreign investors, which caused increasing concentration of land, monopolistic business development and rising price of food; (2nd) a rising Mexican middle class: ​(3rd) a dictatorship which encouraged foreign exploitation, fostered the decadent church and remnants of creole aristocracy, denied the middle class political expression and economic opportunity, and wrested from the masses the hope of freedom which the revolution of 1857 had brought them.
Diaz, during his rule of over thirty years, welcomed foreign investors and put at their disposal the rich and varied resources of Mexico. In 1883, seven years after he came into power, a law was enacted according to which those who surveyed and mapped public lands, should receive as recompense one-third of all land surveyed and an option to buy the remainder at a very low rate. Thus the public lands, which might have been developed into small holdings, fell into the hands of a few foreign speculators. In 1894, a still more sweeping law was enacted by the provisions of which unlimited quantities of land on which titles were uncertain could be acquired. This and the breaking up of the ejidos (under laws enacted but not widely enforced in the time of Juarez) enabled foreign investors to seize large tracts of the best land, evicting families whose ancestors had tilled it for generations. In many cases the legal formality of dividing the lands among the villagers was omitted and unquestionable titles ignored. The courts were so corrupt that appeal to them was useless. In case of serious resistance, armed forces were rushed in and the people ruthlessly massacred. According to official Mexican records, during the Diaz regime, grants of land totaled 180,000,000 acres, one-third the area of Mexico.
​Authorities agree that the concentration of land was much greater in 1910 than a century before. According to most authentic estimates, the number of large estates (each containing 25,000 acres or more) decreased from 25,000 in 1810, when all the land was held by one-fifth of the people, to 11,000 in 1910, when about 98% of the families were landless. In only three of the thirty Mexican states and districts did the percentage of landless families fall below 95% while in five it was 99%. Some of the estates contained several million acres.
Only a small part of the tillable land of these great estates was cultivated, serving the double purpose of keeping up the price of agricultural products and of reducing the number of laborers needed. The methods of cultivation were antiquated and unscientific so that the fertility of the soil during the century 1810 to 1910 was reduced by at least one-third. The price of food was also increased by railway rates and by import duties of from 100 to 250% on corn, wheat, and flour. The condition of the peons was thus worse than at any previous period. Though not uniform, the wages through a large section of the most productive part of Mexico were from 5 to 25 centavos per day, with a standard ration of one quart of corn and one quart of pulque. Wages were usually paid in some sort of script to be traded out at the hacienda store. The most thorough study made of the living conditions of the Mexican working class, by A. J. Pani, estimates that the usual diet of the working man could produce little more than one-half the number of ​calories needed for a normal person to perform his labor.
In 1876, there were 416 miles of railroad in operation in Mexico; in 1910, there were 16,000 miles for which the Mexican government had paid $75,000,000 in subsidies. These railroads for the most part traversed the sparsely settled northern portion of Mexico and were built to connect American enterprises with the United States. The more productive and thickly settled portions of south-central Mexico had relatively little railroad mileage.
In 1884, a code of mining laws was adopted by the federal government which took the regulation of mines out of the hands of the states and, departing from the old Spanish-Mexican idea that ownership of surface and subsoil is distinct, provided that a person who secured title to the land should also have a right to coal, petroleum, and certain other minerals beneath the surface. The ownership of mines soon fell almost entirely into foreign hands, and mineral production was greatly increased. Factory development was not so extensive and consisted largely of textile mills, smelting, and power plants. Industrial development was fostered by concessions to foreigners under special legislation, often granting monopoly privileges, exemption from taxes and from duties on imported machinery, etc. Banks were established with exclusive rights of currency issued, to the amount of two or three times their currency reserve, exemption from federal and municipal taxes, and the right to foreclose on mortgage securities by private action of bank officials without judicial procedure. These banks ​were controlled by small groups of capitalists who lent large sums of money to their friends and rendered small land holders helpless.
The labor needed in railroad construction, mining and factories was recruited from the dispossessed and surplus supply of peons. Sometimes they were collected and driven en masse by mounted men to the seat of enterprise, but more and more they came voluntarily, for they were leaving the estates and wandering about the country in search of work. The wages for industrial laborers, though very low, were higher than for agricultural workers, but they were forced to live and work under conditions of extreme poverty and filth. Workers in the large cities were particularly wretched, as there rents were relatively high and food as costly as in the United States. The death rate in Mexico City from 1895 to 1912 ranged from 42 to 50 per thousand, two or three times as high as in the cities of the United States and Europe, and comparable only to a few of those in the orient.
The political machinery of government, though nominally based upon the constitution of 1857, was in reality a dictatorsihp by Diaz and a bureaucracy headed by the cientificos. Through thoroughly subsidized courts and an efficient system of secret police, freedom of press and public utterance was rendered non-existent and even private criticism of the government, dangerous. Political agitation was prevented by imprisonment or death of leaders. Law and order was maintained by 3,000 rurales, one of the best drilled and most highly paid constabularies in the world, and a federal army of 25,000 or 30,000 men in reserve. Mexico City was said to be the "safest city" in the world. Public instruction was ​practically confined to the well-to-do and was used to safeguard the established order. The teaching of the constitution was forbidden in the schools. Towards the end of the regime, student clubs were organized to support Diaz.
3. IMMEDIATE CAUSES OF THE REVOLUTION.
The immediate causes of the revolution were (1st) increasing fear of United States imperialism; (2nd) the rush for oil lands; (3rd) the financial depression of 1907; (4th) Mexican crop failures and decrease in importation of cereals; (5th) bloody suppression of strikes; (6th) political agitation.
The imperialistic outburst of the United States, shown in the Spanish American and Philippine wars, the Rooseveltian Panama policy, and the control of Cuba as provided by the Platt amendment, impressed the Mexican moneyed classes and increased their aversion to United States investors. There was much discussion in the Latin-American press concerning the probable intention of the United States to "Cubanize" all Latin America.
The modern oil industry in Mexico began about 1900. In 1901 a law was promulgated which authorized permits good for one year, giving exclusive right to explore for oil specified lands at five cents per hectare (2.5 acres); ten-year patents for exploitation of oil lands; privilege of importing machinery, needed in the business, free of duty; exemption of all capital invested from federal taxation for ten years; right to buy national lands, needed for installation of plans, at low fixed rates, and other special privileges. In the following years ​occurred a great scramble for oil lands, in which Mexican small investors felt themselves discriminated against by law and government policy. Scores of small companies were formed and two large ones, i. e., in 1907, the Mexican Petroleum Company (Doheny) under the laws of Delaware with a capital stock of $60,000,000, controlling 550 thousand acres of land; and, in 1908, under the laws of Mexico, the Mexican Eagle Oil Company (Lord Cowdrey and several Mexican directors) with a capital of $50,000,000, controlling 800 thousand acres. Thus the stage was set for the struggle between American and English oil interests.
The business depression of 1907 in the United States caused financial pressure upon Mexico which led to the reorganization of the Mexican national debt, establishment of currency upon a gold basis, and negotiation for a loan. It was currently understood that these transactions brought large profits to financiers and feeling became so high that the loan was given up. Government control of the railroads was effected in 1909 by purchase of stock, controlling over half the mileage. This was supposedly done in opposition to the railroad merger at the time being put through by E. H. Harriman, whose exclusive control Diaz feared. All these measures were costly, added taxation and pressure upon business interests and the masses.
In 1907 and 1908 severe frosts and droughts caused failure of crops in Mexico. In average years the value of Mexico's corn-crop exceeded that of any other one product, vegetable or mineral, but ​in years of drought, it was insufficient for the needs of the masses whose chief articles of food are corn and beans, and importation was necessary. In the year 1907–08 the importation of cereals was valued at less than one million dollars, as compared with an average of two million for each of the two preceding years, while in the following year it dropped to only one-tenth of a million. In October, 1909, removal of the tariff on importation of grains was decreed and Diaz was authorized by the legislature to spend a million pesos for corn and beans to relieve the masses. In the year 1909–10, the value of imported cereals was five million dollars.
In 1906, several thousand miners at the great American-owned copper works in the state of Sonora, struck for $2.50 per day and an 8-hour shift. Troops were sent in and hundreds of miners killed, causing excitement on both sides of the border. In 1907, a large number of employees of the French-owned Orizaba cotton mills in the state of Vera Cruz, went on strike for a wage of 75 cents per day for day men, 40 cents for women and 30 cents for children, with a reduction of working hours from 16 to 14 per day. To break this strike, the workers were forbidden to use company wells, their only source of water. When this had stirred up some little violence, troops were brought in and many workers slaughtered. Several freight cars of bodies were rushed to Vera Cruz to be thrown into the ocean. In his opening message to Congress, 1907, Diaz deplored property losses due to this disorder and promised to increase armed forces to preserve law and order.
​During the decade 1900–1910, agrarian reformers, among whom were Soto y Gama, Villareal, the Magon brothers, and others afterward prominent in the revolution, agitated in Morelos with pamphlets, speeches and proclamations, and even attempted revolt in 1906. They were forced to flee the country and joined a group of Mexican propagandists who organized as the revolutionary committee of the Mexican liberal party with headquarters at St. Louis, Mo. They seized the opportunity of the Mexican strikes to circulate propaganda in the United States and by underground methods in Mexico. The secret service of the Roosevelt administration caused a number of these agitators to be arrested in St. Louis, San Antonia, El Paso, and California, and, finally, three of them were sentenced to imprisonment for breach of neutrality laws. Magon died in prison. The American socialist and labor movements were aroused and declared their sympathy with the Mexican revolutionary movement. There was also agitaion in Yucatan, where a Cuban labor organizer was deported and Felipe Carrillo was imprisoned for reading the constitution to the Indians.
In 1908, middle class political agitation began in Mexico after publication of the Creelman interview, in which Diaz stated that his country was now ready for democracy, that he would allow political opposition, and retire in favor of any opponent legally elected. This statement caused much surprise in the United Statees and in Mexico. A few months later, Madero came out with a moderately expressed criticism of the Diaz regime a a book, "The Presidential Succession", which, 1910, had been published in three editions. Sev​eral political parties were organized, two of which nominated Madero for president. The administration attempted to allay popular dissatisfaction by establishing a bank for promotion of irrigation and other agricultural improvements, but loans were given to only a few rich favorites and made matters worse.
4. GROUPS IN THE MEXICAN REVOLUTION.
The elements that were against the revolution were the bureauracy, supported by most of the foreign interests, the creole aristocracy and the church. Those for the revolution were a considerable section of the middle class, a large portion of the laboring class, and probably certain of the foreign interests.
The cientificos, who headed the bureaucracy, were a small group, perhaps a score, of astute business manipulators, who obtained huge graft from all large enterprises, public and private. Contracts, monopolies, concessions, adjustment of the public debt, all brought them wealth, and their example was emulated by most public office holders and employees to the extent of their opportunity. Owing to the small amount of middle class business in Mexico, educated workers and professionals depend very largely upon the government for employment. Diaz, who is described by business men as "honest" and was proud of the fact that he left several millions in the public treasury, grew old in office and it is generally supposed that the cientificos carried things with a high hand towards the last.
General Reyes, long an important adherent of Diaz, conceived a desire to supplant him and for ​some time prior to 1910 conducted a covert campaign through Masonic lodges and Reyes clubs. His following was particularly strong in several states in north-central Mexico where he had held political office. Shortly before the presidential election, Diaz adroitly sent Reyes to Europe on a mission and Madero inherited his following.
The remnants of the corrupt old creole aristocracy, mostly rich non-resident hacendados, who lived riotously in the capital or in foreign cities, took little active part in the government, but approved of it since it protected their interests.
The church which had been allowed to evade the constitution and reform laws, and had thus regained huge tracts of land, became increasingly arrogant and oppressive. The masses still bowed before it in superstitious reverence, but many of the educated middle class deeply resented its encroachments. During the revolution the church organized politically as the Catholic party, stored arms in its places of worship and used all its influence, religious and economic, to support the old regime.
The greatest economic power in Mexico, the foreign investors, were divided and shifting in their stand at various stages of the revolution, always, of course, with the idea of advancing their immediate interests. Accurate estimates of the various foreign investments in Mexico are impossible. One most often quoted for this period places the total wealth of Mexico at approximately 2,434 million dollars, of which United Statese investors owned 1,058 million, Mexicans, 793 million, English 321 million, French, 143 million, and all other foreign​ers, 119 million dollars. The English possessed large investments in metal mining. The French dominated the textile industry. The Americans exceeded the English in mining, owned about 650 million dollars in railroad stocks and bonds, and 100 million dollars in national bonds, banks, and land. The action of the Mexican government in opposing Harriman's railroad merger, and in granting Lord Cowdrey very favorable oil concessions may have disgruntled some American investors. There is some testimony that Madero in his struggle for power received financial backing from certain American bankers and from Standard Oil interests. Be that it may, at the outset, most of the investors were satisfied with the Diaz regime. Later, the competition for the oil fields, which rapidly grew in value, caused a schism among American investors and a struggle between American and English oil investors.
The chief official leaders of the revolution were members of the upper middle class, land owners, industrialists, men who had filled important political and military positions. They represented the Mexican property owners who felt that Diaz had discriminated against them in favor of foreign investors. The sub-leaders, those actually in contact with the masses, and who came into more and more prominence as the struggle advanced, were men of the working class, educated reformers, and small dispossessed property owners, often illiterate but spirited men, who sought freedom in the hills, as "bandits."
​The middle class, under Diaz, had attained education and a moderate degree of economic prosperity, but was small numerically and stifled politically. Many of its members were lawyers and other professionals who served the ruling class. Another section of the lower middle class were the rancheros, owners of relatively small land holdings, usually tilled by and supporting a single family. Many of these ranchos were formed by the breaking up of the ejidos and by acquisition of public lands under the homestead law of 1863. Some of these holdings were absorbed by the large land owners during the latter part of the Diaz regime, but on the whole, their number was considerably increased between 1876 and 1910. The rancheros, being in fairly comfortable circumstances, were a conservative rather than a revolutionary force.
According to the census of 1910, three million people still tilled the soil as serfs and with their dependents formed at least ten million inhabitants, two-thirds of the total population of Mexico. It was this class who fought the battles of the revolution.
Workers in mines and factories were less than 60,000. Railroad workers numbered 30,000 or 40,000. The few unions organized prior to 1910 had no power, importance, or inter-relations. The industrial workers participated in the Madero uprising passionately, but without definite constructive aim.
5. PHASES OF THE REVOLUTION
The stages of the revolution were (1st) Madero's accession to power and rapid decline, 1911–1913; (2nd) Huerta's military coup d'etat, supported by the Pearson syndicate and most of the other foreign interests and his elimination by the action of the United States government, 1913–1914; (3rd) period of struggle between revolutionary factions 1915–1916; (4th) triumph and decline of Carranza, 1917–1920; (5th) De la Huerta-Obregon-Calles administration, 1920—.
Shortly before the election of 1910, Diaz imprisoned Madero, but allowed him to escape after the election which Diaz carried as usual by strict control of the election machinery. Madero's activity now became frankly revolutionary. He found useful as nuclei of his organization the Reyes clubs already mentioned. His revolutionary proclamation was issued in October, 1910, its declarations for non-re-election of executives and free suffrage being almost identical with those of the Diaz proclamation more than thirty years before. There were also included abolition of the "jefes politico" (local bosses), a corrupt system by which the federal government controlled local affairs, and a vague clause promising restitution of lands to those who had been wrongfully dispossessed. For the moment Madero received the support of all dissatisfied factions from the conservative supporters of Reyes to the radical agrarian reformers. Guerilla bands formed all over the country. Gonzales, governor of the state of Chihuahua in the north, with his state troops came over to support of Madero. Diaz combatted uprisings in a dozen states and his small army of ​25,000 was wholly inadequate for the task. In his message to Congress, April 1911, he promised division of rural estates, reform of the courts, etc., but was soon after requested by the cientificos to resign. Madero came into power, June, 1911, with very little bloodshed, not because he had formulated a program to meet the situation, but because he dared take the leadership in breaking a dictatorship that had become intolerable to both the middle class and the masses.
Under Madero's leadership no reforms were made. His official appointees included some of the old cientificos, but his cabinet consisted principally of members of the Madero family, wealthy land owners, also interested in smelting and banking, who blocked all attempts at land reform. President Madero suggested legislation, authorizing the establishment of a fund to purchase land for distribution. A few concessions were revoked, but others were granted.
In a few months nearly all the groups that had supported Madero were against him. The counter revolutionists were led by General Reyes in the name of Felix Diaz, backed by the Pearson Syndicate. The opposition of the masses was led by the Zapata brothers, whose proposal to reconstitute the ejido system, formulated in 1910, had been ignored. Zapatism spread rapidly. By the end of Madero's regime it dominated not only Morelos, but five or six of the neighboring states and the federal district and Zapata with his following of ragged and hungry peons had almost reached Mexico City.
In the north, the Yaqui Indians, enraged at Madero's failure to return their land and by his ​grant of a new concession of their territory to a foreign company, took to the war path with the avowed intention of exterminating all foreigners. In the adjoining state of Chihuahua, Orozco, an agrarian leader who had supported Madero, came under the influence of the rich Terrazas family who owned a six-million-acre hacienda, and became the leader of the reactionary forces in the north. Madero was obliged to maintain a large army to fight guerilla bands in many parts of the country. Early in 1913, Madero's commander-in-chief, Victoriano Huerta, entered into an agreement with Felix Diaz and during "the tragic ten days" a sham battle was fought in the capital in which the military suffered but little, but several hundred non-combatants were killed in the streets. The United States ambassador, Henry Lane Wilson, during this time was in frequent consultation with Huerta and Felix Diaz and, as he had been for some time previously, very antagonistic to Madero, using his influence to discredit him at Washington.
6. HUERTA THE COUNTER REVOLUTION
After Huerta's dictatorship was declared, Ambassador Wilson and diplomats representing European countries urged his recognition by their respective governments and such recognition was immediately extended by England, France and Spain. The Taft administration, however, hesitated. Carranza, leading political power in Coahuila, backed by the state legislature, refused to recognize Huerta and was soon supported by Generals Obregon, Hill and Alvarado of Sonora and by Villa with a strong following of the laboring classes in Chihuahua. The ​general in command at Vera Cruz and the Zapatistas independently rejected Huerta. Military operations converged towards the east coast to gain control of the ports, with customs houses and war supplies.
Within a few months after his inauguration, President Woodrow Wilson publicly announced that Huerta would not be recognized, nor would any government established by intrigue and assassination, and thereafter conducted a determined campaign for his elimination. John Lind, as the president's personal representative, was sent to Huerta with proposals for an immediate armistice on the part of the warring factions, an "early and free" election in which Huerta should not be a presidential candidate and by the results of which all parties should abide, followed by a promise that upon prompt compliance with these suggestions, the United States Government would favor a bankers' loan to the Mexican Government. This proposal being rejected, President Wilson adopted more. conventional methods—control of shipment of arms, and diplomatic negotiations as a result of which England's support of Huerta was withdrawn and a second European loan was denied him. This period of diplomatic strategy, which President Wilson described as "watchful waiting," and during which the demand instituted by the interests for direct military intervention became insistant, ended when United States troops were ordered to occupy Vera Cruz. This was done under pretext of maintaining the dignity of the United States following the Tampico flag incident, but was in reality to cut Huerta off from his chief source of supplies. The immediate action of the United States troops was ​to prevent delivery of arms to Huerta from a German steamer, and thereafter to control the port and collect the customs. For four months after Huerta had left Mexico, the occupation of the port continued under protest from Carranza who voiced the resentment of the Mexican people at this invasion of their territory. American oil interests were advanced in Mexico by the elimination of Huerta who was admittedly supported by the British oil interests. That President Wilson and the American oil interests acted in accord is shown by the testimony of Mr. Doheny before the Senate investigating committee that "with the knowledge and consent and after consulting with John Lind" the oil interests assisted the Carranzistas with sympathy and money.
In a few weeks after the flight of Huerta, Carranza entered Mexico City, in the same month that the world war began. The capitalists of the United States turned their attention to making fortunes in war industries and finance. Mexico, for the time being, except as a source of oil, became to them a matter of secondary importance.
7. STRUGGLE BETWEEN REVOLUTIONARY FACTIONS.
With the elimination of Huerta, the various revolutionary leaders who had been more or less united in opposing him now turned against each other, and for two years a period of internal conflict continued. Villa, who had been led to hope by emissaries from President Wilson and the approval of some of the interests, that he would be supported for the presidency, broke with Carranza. The ​Zapatistas, whose agrarian program Carranza refused to consider, came up from the south. Villa and the Zapatistas took turns in occupying Mexico City while Carranza retreated to Vera Cruz. He was supported by Obregon with a following of the Yarquis and other revolutionary elements of Sonora, by Alvarado of Yucatan, and by organized labor.
This period of chaos was of great value to the Mexican revolution. With the central government non-existent and the attention of the great powers somewhat diverted by the world war, the various agrarian elements and the leaders of organized labor were able to do some constructive work.
The Zapatistas established a provisional government in Morelos with a secretary of agriculture who appointed in each of the districts controlled an agrarian commision to make surveys and recommended steps for the reconstruction of the ejidos. This proving a difficult task, in 1915–1916, provisional distribution of land was made and an agricultural co-operative system centered about an agricultural loan bank was established. Under this regime, "the state of Morelos achieved comparative prosperity." The main points of the plan, modelled on the Raiffeison co-operative system, were as follows:—local credit associations were formed of the farmers in each village which jointly determined methods of applying loans; these local associations united to form larger credit associations which had charge of larger districts and the prevention of general crop failures by means of concentrating resources upon certain localities; the directive head of the system was the rural loan bank of the state of Morelos; the local associations guaranteed loans from the bank for the purpose of buying seed, tools, ​and work animals, and carrying the farmer until his crops could be grown and harvested; the larger associations guaranteed negotiable certificates, issued by the bank on the produce in warehouses, pending its sale; the bank also took charge of marketing sugar cane, the growers delivering their cane at the proper stations and receiving immediate fixed payment, supplemented by dividends after the goods was marketed.
During Madero's administration, Governor Vales of Yucatan instituted a commission for the regulation of the henequen market, the object of which was to create a fund with which to buy enough of the henequen to break the power of the speculators. This plan failed to gain the confidence of the planters, and during the reaction under Huerta was used as an excuse for exorbitant taxation. Carranza sent General Alvarado to Yucatan as military governor. He modified the plan of the henequen commission by issuing to each planter who signed a contract, a bond representing his pro rata share in the capital of the commission fund. In a few months all the planters signed up and the speculators disappeared. Later the commission was strengthened by legal provisions which made it obligatory for planters to sell to it for a fixed price with profits after re-sale to be divided pro rata or added to the fund. The commission was also empowered to supervise plantations, limit or increase production, control transportation and create a mutual insurance scheme. During the World War, Yucatan gained a monopoly of henequen and became very prosperous. While all the rest of Mexico was flooded with paper money, issued by the ​various warring factions, Yucatan did business on a gold basis and General Alvarado is said to have sent 20 million pesos to Carranza from the treasury of the commission and was one of the most powerful factors in his success. In the mean time, under leadership of Felipe Carrillo, native Mayan reformer and labor leader, the workers of Yucatan were organized in the Liga de Resistencia del Partido Socialista, a socialistic labor organization of 100,000 members, male and female. The planters were forced to return plots of land to the peons, co-operative stores were founded, schools were opened on every hacienda, and prohibition and other social reforms instituted. Laborers received as high as 7 or 8 pesos per day and annoyed the planters by taking days off to till their own plots of land and otherwise enjoy their newly acquired privileges.
8. THE ROLE OF ORGANIZED LABOR.
Under Madero, for the first time labor was allowed to organize, and did so rapidly in the chief industrial centers. Organizers came from southern Europe and Latin America, bringing with them syndicalist ideas. The strongest union formed was the Casa del Obrero Mundial (House of the Workers of the World) in Tampico, with a revolutionary program of direct action. Organizations of the same type sprang up in many places. In Vera Cruz, the Camara del Trabajo was organized by a deported Spaniard who had spent years in organizing South American workers. In Yucatan, Carrillo and others organized the railroad workers. When Madero fell, the workers' organizations had ​grown so strong that Huerta's reign of terror could not overthrow them. During Carranza's fight for supremacy, in order to win the support of labor from Villa, Carranza's secretary signed a written pact with the leader of the Casa del Obrero Mundial, promising to put into effect at the earliest opportunity an enlightened labor code. Then the various labor leaders organized the workers into the Batallones Rojos (red batallions) industrial units whose union officials became their military leaders. These rendered Carranza valuable service.
It was at this period that Mexican and United States labor first entered into friendly relations. A message signed by Morones and other prominent Mexican labor leaders appealed to the A. F. of L. to use its influence on the United States Government for withdrawal from Mexico of the Pershing punitive expedition. This was sent ostensibly to capture Villa after his Columbus raid, but was also used to strengthen the demands of American investors, represented by the American and Mexican Joint Commission. Carranza captured some of the United States soldiers and refused ta comply with a preemptory demand from President Wilson for their release. Jingoism rose to a high pitch. Senator Fall's intervention speech covered 17 pages of the Congressional Record. Senator Gallinger presented a letter from ex-Senator Blair, declaring that "our southern boundary is Panama." After a conference in Washington between Mexican labor representatives and the executive commitee of the A. F. of L., Gompers sent a message to Carranza, urging him in the name of humanity and to pre​vent bloodshed to release the soldiers. They were immediately released and tension relieved. Gompers then presented the Mexican visitors with a letter heartily endorsing their project for forming a Pan-American Federation of Labor.
9. CARRANZA'S REGIME.
Carranza was a land owner, described as the country gentleman type, who in a long respectable political career had never shown any particular interest in the masses. He was wholly out of sympathy with the demands of militant labor which he had pledged himself to support. In 1916, following a strike in the Federal District which paralyzed industry and traffic, he issued a decree making it a criminal offense, punishable by death, for a workman to take part in a strike, and followed up with military suppression of all radical labor organizations. He countenanced the organization of the C. R. O. M., of more conservative type, but by military action rendered all effective mass action impossible. When the Queretaro Constitutional Convention met in 1916, the constitution proposed by Carranza contained no labor code and was more conservative than the existing constitution of 1857. Radical representation was, however, in the majority and forced through amendments which made the constitution of 1917 more liberal in its provisions for the masses than any other constitution in the world. Carranza made no attempt to execute these provisions, either in connection with labor or agrarian reform, but, on the contrary, abandoned ​efforts to enforce his own decree of 1915 for distribution of land. He sent troops to destroy the Zapatistas organization and to drive the people back into the hills where their inability to raise crops caused a famine. During his years of bitter campaign against them, more than half of the population of their district perished and Zapata was finally killed.
Meanwhile, in Yucatan, absentee landlords found their profits decreasing. The high price of henequen annoyed the United States Government, which needed it for war purposes. The Yucatan Henequen Commission was bitterly opposed by the United States Food Commission as well as by the McCormick Company. Denouncement of the Yucatan Commission as a monopoly was unsuccessfully sought in the United States Supreme Court. Much pressure was brought to bear upon Carranza and towards the end of his administration he attempted to break the power of the Yucatan Commission by getting control of the state railroads. Later, when Obregon was endorsed by the Liga de Resistencia for a presidential candidate, Carranza sent a military governor to control the elections. This his troops prepared to do by pillaging co-operative stores ,driving farmers from their land, flogging naked Indians in the streets and demolishing villages with machine guns.
In many other states Carranza pursued a similar policy of driving peons from the land and imposing miiltary governors. Other factors contributing to his downfall were the opposition of the oil interests, financial and industrial exhaustion of a ​large share of the country, and corruption and brutality of the army.
Carranza attempted to carry out those provisions of the new constitution which vests control of oil lands in the nation and to gain for his depleted finances some of the wealth that the immense production of oil was bringing to foreign investors. His decrees, requiring registration of holdings and establishing taxes on oil output and lands, were claimed by the oil companies to indicate intention to confiscate. They protested all decrees as unconstitutional, refused to pay taxes and were backed by their respective governments. Meanwhile the companies were paying Pelaez, leader of an outlaw group, $200,000 per month to protect their oil fields.
After entering the world war, the United States declared an embargo on both food stuffs and gold going into Mexican territory, which added to the economic distress following the years of warfare. Carranza as well as opposing factions financed their campaigns on paper money with the result, that speculators made fortunes while the people starved. By using military force as the chief basis of his power, crushing instead of promoting social reconstruction, Carranza allowed the feudalistic army to get entirely out of hand. The whole country was ravaged.
Obregon, Calles and De la Huerta, who occupied leading positions in the cabinet of Carranza, became disgusted with the conduct of his administration, resigned and retired to Sonora, where De la Huerta was elected governor, and Calles, organ​ized the workers. Obregon accepted the position as mayor of his native pueblo and later announced his candidacy in the coming elections. Sonora, during the war had become, next to Yucatan, the most prosperous state in Mexico, since it has closer economic connection with the United States than with the rest of Mexico. There General Calles had made some progress in settling his troops in agrarian colonies and in carrying out constitutional land reform. Carranza now attempted to gain control of the state by sending in additional federal troops. This action was strongly opposed by De la Huerta and led to the final break between state and federal authorities.
At this time, Morones, president of the C. R. O. M., organized the workers politically in the Partido Laborista, nineteen out of the twenty-seven states being represented, in support of Obregon. Obregon was also endorsed by a convention of labor unions in Tampico which included the railway workers who are not affiliated with the C. R. O. M. The railway workers' union was one of the strongest in Mexico and rendered Obregon valuable service in sabotaging trains used by Carranza in military operations. Obregon was placed under arrest by Carranza, but escaping from Mexico City, organized the forces in the district west of the capital where the Partido Socialista de Michoacan gave him strong support. Obregon came into power in the spring of 1920 by the time-honored method of revolutionary proclamation and armed revolt, but he came, supported by practically all the revolutionary elements of Mexico, more solidly organized and with a more definite program of reform than ever before.
10. OBREGON'S ADMINISTRATION.
The new administration had three principal problems for immediate solution, the agrarian, the military, and relations with the United States. Each agrarian leader was at once granted land on which to settle his followers; given arms with which to defend their property, seed, tools and machinery with which to till it, and aid in establishing schools. During the six months in which De la Huerta was ad interim president, he signed grants for the return of 100,000 acres of land. He encouraged and strengthened the Zapatista co-operative system, but Obregon later decided to replace the agricultural bank by a national bank which has since been established. In Yucatan, Felipe Carrillo became governor and with the assistance of his Liga de Resistencia made Yucatan one of the foremost states in distribution of land and social advancement. He introduced cultivation of a variety of crops, believing that thus rather than by the exclusive culture of henequen, his people would become economically independent. His policy aroused the bitter animosity of the reactionary planters and led to his murder during the De la Huerta rebellion.
The army, after the assured triumph of the administration had brought all the various groups under the control of General Calles, numbered about 180,000, of which a large proportion were officers, costing the government a million pesos a day in direct upkeep. Obregon proposed to demobolize this army to 50,000 and to that end employed many soldiers in road building and other public works, and settled others in agrarian colo​nies. By October, 1923, the army had been demobilized to 75,000. The process was then interrupted by the De la Huerta rebellion.
During the Obregon revolt, the attitude of the American press indicated that commercial interests believed that he would prove more amenable than Carranza to foreign influence. Obregon's revolutionary proclamation contained declarations in favor of investment of foreign capital, restitution of seized properties and encouragement of business on a basis of equal favor to all. Hearings of the Fall United States Senate Committee for investigation of Mexican affairs, instigated by American investors, was in progress when Obregon's accession to power came. The committee immediately submitted recommendations that the new government should be recognized only on condition of its pledge that articles in the constitution of 1917 in regard to confiscation of lands, control of petroleum, religious organizations and foreigners should not apply to citizens of the United States. The official conditions of recognition presented by the Harding administration to Obregon were that, previous to recognition, a treaty should be signed repudiating retroactive clauses of the constitution and guaranteeing recogniztion of United States property rights. Obregon refused to enter into such treaty on the ground that it would create special privilege for United States investors and violate his oath to support the constitution. The deadlock continued for two years despite the recognition of Mexico by 24 countries and the growing demands of United States business men for resumption of diplomatic ​relations. Finally, a bankers' international committee headed by Thomas Lamont of J. P. Morgan & Co., who was also a member of the Association for Protection of American Rights, arranged a detailed plan for the payment of the Mexican national debts, after which Secretary of State Hughes announced that an informal commission would hold conferences for adjustment of differences. This commission, consisting of two Mexican and two United States representatives, came to no formal agreement excepting the claims conventions. The final statement of the Mexican commissioners, however, signified the intention of the Mexican executive to carry out the principle established by the decisions of the Mexican Supreme Court in regard to oil claims acquired prior to 1917, namely: that such claims should be validated in case owners had performed, before the promulgation of the new constitution, some positive act towards extracting the oil. The United States comissioners stated that their government reserved all rights of its citizens in respect to the subsoil, as acquired under the laws existing before the promulgation of the 1917 constitution. The Mexican commissioners recognized the right of the United States Government to do this but reserved the rights of the Mexican Government, under its laws, as to all lands in connection with which no positive act as specified had been performed.
Meanwhile, oil companies operating in Mexico were refusing to pay their taxes. In 1922, the British companies decided to pay up and conform to the law and the United States companies were obliged ​to follow suit to hold their places in the market. At last, in August, 1923, more than three years after Obregon had come into power, the United States Government accorded him formal recognition.
11. RESULTS OF THE REVOLUTION.
The results of the revolution may be summarized as (1st) the constitution of 1917; (2nd) economic, political and social changes actually made; (3rd) psychological changes.
As the constitution of 1857 expressed the ideals of the revolutionists who broke the power of church-controlled feudalism, so the constitution of 1917 expresses the ideals of the Mexican revolutionists of today. In general, it follows the plan of the constitution of 1857, but adds long clauses in regard to control of natural resources and protection of labor. It materially strengthens safeguards against church domination and alien interference, increases the power of the executive, abolishes the "jefes politicos," and makes minor changes in governmental machinery, civil rights, monopolies and instruction.
Ownership of land, water and minerals is vested in the nation. Measures are to be taken to break up the great estates, develop small land holdings, and reconstitute the ejido system. Payment for expropriated lands is to be in government bonds and equal to assessed taxable value, plus 10%. Buyers of land are to reimburse the government in twenty annual payments. Concessions of mineral resources are conditioned upon regular development ​and are granted only to Mexican citizens or foreigners agreeing to act as citizens in regard to such grants. No foreigner is to acquire direct ownership of lands situated within 100 kilometers of the border or 50 kilometers of the ocean. All contracts and concessions made by former governments since 1876 which have resulted in monopoly may be annulled by the executive. (Art. 27) Legislation is to be enacted providing the 8-hour day, minimum wage, profit sharing, three months' wages in case of unjust dismissal of worker and a long list of other protective labor measures. Social insurance and co-operative housing are to be encouraged. (Art. 123.)
Actual accomplishment in the working out of the ideals expressed in the constitution include a beginning in the distribution of the great estates, limited government control of the exploitation of mineral resources; phenomenal growth in the organization of the working classes; broadened opportunity for middle class development; restoration of constitutional government; a decided check upon the returning power of the church; considerable increase in educational facilities.
On the other hand, results that hamper constructive development, are a large increase in the size of the army and a revival of its feudal characteristics, an increase in the national debt and foreign bankers' hold upon the resources of the country, a falling off in agricultural production due to unsettled conditions and uncertainty of titles.
Constitutional provisions for distribution of the land have been moderately interpreted in various federal and state laws administered by agrarian commissions. Actual distribution has been carried out quite fully in the chief agrarian revolutionary cen​ters while in some of the more remote districts almost nothing has been done. Distribution has been hampered on the one hand by the estate owners who particularly object to payment in government bonds and on the other by the poverty and ignorance of many of the peons. Soto y Gama, who is now leader of the national agrarian party, is quoted as recently saying "only the ejido can confront the proprietor with an economic fortress against the battering ram erected to destroy it." The hope is thus to gradually educate the peons in better methods of agriculture, to supply them with machinery and means of irrigation, and by rendering them more independent, raise the price of farm labor, force the owners to use more efficient methods and increase production. In September, 1924, Obregon reported that during his administration he had returned to the villages in absolute or provisional possession between two and three million acres. In August, 1925, it was announced that one-third of the proposed return of land to the villages had been accomplished. Since 1915, 12 million acres had been given. Several hundred co-operative societies have also been granted land. Various laws, the latest the homestead law promulgated in 1926, provide for individual acquisition of land, by residence and cultivation, and for renting of land with payment of a small per cent of the crop. In general, however, most of the rural population remain landless as before the revolution.
The two chief means that have been used to control exploitation of mineral resources are tax or rental on oil lands and tax on oil exports. This ​has brought to the Mexican Government a small fraction of the wealth extracted. In December, 1925, two laws were enacted for putting into effect the principles of the constitution regarding national control of land and oil claims. These aroused storms of protest from United States investors and were the subject of prolonged diplomatic correspondence. The real point of disagreement, as shown in this correspondence, lies in the conception of property rights. Secretary Kellogg maintains that "the very essence of a vested interested is that it is inviolable and cannot be impaired or taken away by the state save for a public purpose upon rendering just compensation." The Mexican position is that social progress may necessitate change in ownership laws. "Whenever a law is enacted which brings a change in the ownership system the main problem consists in laying down temporary measures which make it possible to pass from one system to another." Owners, if damaged, should receive recompense but progress must go on. Accordingly, the 1925 petroleum law requires that oil land titles acquired prior to 1917 should be exchanged for 50 year concessions, if necessary to be extended to provide ample time for extraction of the oil. Likewise, the alien land law provides that foreigners holding land in the prohibited zones or under other conditions forbidden by the constitution, may ​retain such lands during their lifetime but may not transmit it to their heirs, In the case of corporations, the land must be disposed of within a certain number of years.
The chief labor organization is the Confederacion Regional Obrera Mexicana (C. R. O. M.), claiming 1,000,000 members, Other unions total two or three hundred thousand members. The C. R. O. M. includes 200,000 members of the Yucatan Liga de Resistencia, 100,000 mine and factory workers and a large number of agricultural workers. It is a federation, somewhat on the plan of the A. F. of L. but more loosely organized and broader and more socialistic in spirit. The Catholic workers are organized by priests with a pledge to respect the fundamentals of society, i. e., religion, family, country, and property, and are, of course, intended to undermine the true labor organizations.
Although, in general, the labor code of the constitution has not been put into action, several states have passed laws embodying its chief provisions and in some localities progress has been made in enforcement.
The annual budget for education has been increased to 50 million pesos, more than five times that of any previous administration. The number of schools is over 12,000, with 25,000 teachers and more than a million pupils. A great effort is being made to reach rural communities, if only for a few weeks in the year, with extension courses giving instruction in agriculture as well as in reading, writing, and the arts in which Mexicans are gifted.
​The results of the revolution in material conditions is small in comparison with the psychological effects, manifested among the masses in a tremendous awakening of independence, courage, self-respect, and ambition for economic betterment and education; among the middle classes, a quickening in nationalism and racial pride, both Indian and Spanish, and resentment against foreign exploiters and the church.
12. FACTORS MAKING FOR SUCCESS AND FAILURE OF THE REVOLUTION.
Factors making for success are the inability of the old system to provide for wants of the masses and the middle class; schisms among foreign investors due to their conflicting interests; solidarity of Mexican agricultural and industrial labor and their understanding of other labor movements; national dislike of foreign investors which has a tendency to unite middle class and mass interests; growing solidarity among Latin American countries in their opposition to United States aggression. The pre-occupation of the great powers in the world war was a temporary condition, making for success.
Factors making for failure are agreement of world imperialists to give the United States a free hand in Mexico; proximity of the United States; her immense surplus wealth, overbearing nationalism and lack of sympathy for Latin races; religious prejudice, which is used by interventionists to stir up feeling against the Mexican Government's anti-church regulations; Mexico's backwardness in political, economic and educational development and the strangle hold of foreign bankers upon her re​sources. Under the agreement of the bankers' international committee for payment of the external debt, Mexico pledged all her oil and railroad revenues and agreed to return the railways to provate owners, i. e., foreign bond holders. Her budget for education and internal constructive work has been cut down to meet external obligations.
The agreement to give the United States a free hand in Mexico was reached before the world war began, as shown by acquiescence of England and France in Wilson's policy towards Huerta, and was assured by the dominant position which the world war gave the United States. How Mexico is hampered in carrying out her program of reconstruction has been well shown during the last two years, beginning with the sudden warning of Secretary Kellogg issued through the press soon after the reported negotiation for sale of the Doheny Mexican oil properties to a Standard Oil company. Secretary Kellogg stated that in case of another revolutionary movement of which he heard rumors, "it should be made clear that the United States Government will continue to support the Government in Mexico only so long as it protects American lives and American interests." Diplomatic protests against the 1925 land and petroleum laws began before they were enacted but the correspondence was not made public until the spring of 1926. Subversive propaganda was spread broadcast by Catholic organizations and the oil interests. Tremendous pressure was exerted at Washington. "Guy Stevens. counsel for the Association of Oil Producers of Mexico, said before the Foreign Policy’s Association of Providence (February 23, 1927) that he ​would carry the issue, if permitted, to the point of war rather than yield." Matters reached a crisis with refusal of certain of the oil corporations to comply with the registration requirements of the petroleum law. A careful analysis of the claims that failed to register shows that a very large proportion of them are those acquired by E. H. Doheny, of questionable legality, the transfer of which to Standard Oil seems to have been delayed. Publication of these facts early in 1927 strengthened public protest against the belligerent Mexican policy of the Coolidge administration. Open hostilities were averted but the issue remains unsettled. In April the United States Government refused to renew the smuggling treaty with Mexico, under which each government agreed to notify the other of all shipment of liquor, arms and certain other forbidden articles. Abrogation of this treaty makes it easy to supply arms to Mexican rebels. Revolts against the Mexican Government are encouraged, business and constructive work hampered and suffering of the people increased.
* ↑ Beals, Mexico, 89.
* ↑ McBride, Land Systems of Mexico, p. 30 and 176.
* ↑ Beals, Op. Cit., 7–8.
* ↑ Latin American Year Book, 1919, pp. 422–35. Turner, Kenneth, Barberous Mexico.
* ↑ McBride, Op. Cit., pp, 30–34.
* ↑ Carson, Mexico, pp. 404–24.
* ↑ Beals, Op. Cit., pp. 44–48. Whitaker, Herman, The Planter.
* ↑ Schnitzler, The Republic of Mexico, Chapt. 6.
* ↑ McBride, Op. Cit., pp. 73–74.
* ↑ Phipps, Agrarian Phase of the Mexican Revolution of 1910, pp. 1–3.
* ↑ Gonzales Roa, The Mexican People and Their Detractors, p. 8.
* ↑ Phipps, Some Aspects of the Mexican Agrarian Situation, p. 38.
* ↑ McBride, Op. Cit., p. 154.
* ↑ Negri, Survey Graphic, May, 1924, p. 151.
* ↑ Trowbridge, Mexico To-day and To-morrow, pp. 119–29.
* ↑ Beals, Op. Cit., p. 115.
* ↑ Beals, Op. Cit., pp. 117–23.
* ↑ Drum, Business Conditions of Mexico, 1810 to 1910.
* ↑ Beals, Op. Cit., pp. 112–13.
* ↑ Mexican Year Book, 1920–21, p. 274, Gonzales Roa, Op, Cit., p. 47.
* ↑ Gonzales Roa, Op. Cit., pp. 44–53.
* ↑ Beals, Op. Cit., p. 126.
* ↑ Priestley, Herbert I., The Mexican Nation, pp. 380–87. Beals, Op. Cit., pp. 43–45.
* ↑ Mexican Year Book, 1911, pp. 255–58.
* ↑ Mexican Year Book, 1914. pp. 86–87.
* ↑ These remarkable financial operations were achieved by Limantour, minister of finance for many years. See E. J. Bell's Political Shame of Mexico, pp. 9–13.
* ↑ Priestley, Op. Cit., p, 383. Encyclopedia Britannica, New Volume, 1922, Mexico.
* ↑ Mexican Year Book, 1911, p. 262.
* ↑ Beals, Op. Cit., p. 132, G. de Lara, Op. Cit., pp. 320–28.
* ↑ Mexican Year Book, 1908, p. 160.
* ↑ Beals, Op. Cit., 94–95.
* ↑ Published in Pearson's Magazine, March, 1908.
* ↑ Bell, Edward I., Political Shame of Mexico, Chap. 1.
* ↑ Priestley, Op. Cit., pp. 394–395.
* ↑ Beals, Op. Cit., pp. 151–61.
* ↑ Dillon, Mexico On the Verge, p. 190. Cabrera, The Religious Question in Mexico.
* ↑ Marsh, Investments in Mexico, p. 3.
* ↑ Daily Consular and Trade Reports, U. S. Dept. of Commerce, No. 168, 1912. p. 316.
* ↑ Rippy, The United States and Mexico, p. 328.
* ↑ U. S. Senate. Foreign Relations Committee. "Revolutions in Mexico," 1913, pp. 104–05.
* ↑ Haberman, Survey Graphic, May, 1024, p. 147. Reed, Insurgent Mexico, Part 2, Chapt. 1.
* ↑ McBride, Op. Cit., pp, 83–100.
* ↑ Phipps, Agrarian Phases of the Mexican Revolution of 1910–1920, p. 3.
* ↑ Gonzales Roa, Op. Cit., p. 54.
* ↑ Beals, Op. Cit., p. 132.
* ↑ Inman, Intervention in Mexico, pp. 54–57.
* ↑ Text of Proclamation, U. S.. Foreign Relations, 1911, pp. 348–354.
* ↑ Trowbridge, pp. 133–35.
* ↑ Mexican Year Book, 1911, p. 6.
* ↑ Phipps, Op. Cit., pp. 4–6.
* ↑ Phipps, Op. Cit., p. 7.
* ↑ Foreign Relations of the U. S., 1912–1913, Mexico.
* ↑ Nearing and Freeman, Dollar Diplomacy, pp. 96–99.
* ↑ Priestley, Op. Cit., pp. 423.
* ↑ Beals, Op. Cit., pp. 262–63.
* ↑ U. S. Senate, 66:2, Sen. Doc., Vol. IX, pp. 276–79.
* ↑ Beals, Op. Cit., p. 97.
* ↑ Beals, Op. Cit., pp. 110–11.
* ↑ Latin American Year Book, 1919, pp. 336–39.
* ↑ Latin American Year Book, 1919, pp. 442–47.
* ↑ Beals, Op. Cit., p. 55.
* ↑ Trowbridge, Op. Cit., pp. 230–31. Beals, Op. Cit., p. 62.
* ↑ Lord, Journal of International Relations, Vol. II, 1920–1921; p. 392. Beals, Op. Cit., pp. 133–35.
* ↑ Public Statement Franklin P. Lane, issued late in November, 1916.
* ↑ Congressional Record, Vol. 53, pp. 6627–28.
* ↑ Proceedings 36th Annual Convention A. F. of L., pp. 54–64.
* ↑ Confederacion Regional Obrera Mexicana (Mexican Federation of Labor).
* ↑ Beals, Op. Cit., pp. 335–36.
* ↑ Ross, Social Revolution in Mexico, pp. 63–67.
* ↑ Beals, Op. Cit., p. 64.
* ↑ Congressional Record, Vol. X, pp. 3155–61.
* ↑ Ibid, Vol. IX. pp. 279–89.
* ↑ Trowbridge, Op. Cit., pp. 174–86.
* ↑ Beals, Op. Cit, p. 59.
* ↑ Beals, Op. Cit., pp. 65–74.
* ↑ Beals, Op. Cit., p. 98.
* ↑ Carrillo, Survey Graphic, May, 1924, p. 139.
* ↑ Beals, Op. Cit., p. 75.
* ↑ Haberman, Survey Graphic, 1924, p. 196.
* ↑ Priestley, Op. Cit., 441–46.
* ↑ Association for International Conciliation, Publication No. 187. 1923.
* ↑ Association for International Conciliation, Op. Cit.
* ↑ Proceedings of the United States and Mexican Commission, Formal Meeting, August 2, 1923.
* ↑ Supplement Annals American Acad. Pol. and Soc. Science, May, 1917. Mexican constitutions of 1857 and 1917 translated and compared.
* ↑ Walling, Current History, April, 1925, p. 40.
* ↑ Saenz and Priestley, Some Mexican Problems, p. 123.
* ↑ Tannenbaum, The Standard, February, 1927, p. 161–6.
* ↑ Official estimates show that since 1901 Mexican produced petroleum has netted more than 100% profits to investors, who still hold property greatly increased in value. On the other hand, the total amount received for oil taxes by the Mexican government would scarcely pay its expenditures for one year, Saenz and Priestley, Op. Cit., ps. 10 and 27.
* ↑ Correspondence between the United States and Mexican Governments, Note of Secretary Kellogg, July 31, 1926.
* ↑ Ibid, Note of Minister Saenz, October 7, 1926.
* ↑ Foreign Policy Association, Pamphlet, No. 38, Series of 1925–6, p. 27.
* ↑ Ibid, p. 25.
* ↑ International Labor Directory, 1925, Mexico.
* ↑ Vasconcelos, Survey Graphic, May, 1924, pp. 167–71, Saenz and Priestley, Op. Cit., pp. 62–74.
* ↑ New York Times. March 11, 1925.
* ↑ Ibid, June 13, 1925.
* ↑ Greene, The Present Crisis in our Relations with Mexico, p. 55. The Knights of Columbus claim to be raising a million dollar Mexican fund to combat bolshevism and to have printed for free distribution millions of copies of "Red Mexico", "Mexico, Bolshevism, the Menace", and others. These pamphlets grossly misrepresent Mexico's social and political aims.
* ↑ Beals, Whose Property Is Kellogg Protecting?, New Republic, February 23, 1927, p. 8.