# Philosophical Works of the Late James Frederick Ferrier/Lectures on Greek Philosophy (1888)/Empedocles

Lectures on Greek Philosophy, Philosophical Works of the Late James Frederick Ferrier (1888 ed., Vol. 2). (E. L. Lushington, & A. Grant, Eds.) Edinburgh: William Blackwood and Sons. pp. 146-152.
EMPEDOCLES.
1. The next inquirer with whom we have to deal in our survey of the history of ancient philosophy is Empedocles of Agrigentum.
The philosophical remains of Empedocles consist of some fragments of a poem Περὶ φύσεως, or concerning nature; for, like Xenophanes and Parmenides, he recorded his opinions in verse. This didactic poem is rather physical and physiological than ​philosophical, and we can extract from it but little that is of speculative interest and value. It contains, however, some forcible expressions, and was highly esteemed by Lucretius, who, in his own poem, 'De Rerum Natura,' seems to have adopted it to some extent as his model, and who speaks of it and of its author in the following terms, which we cannot but regard as somewhat exaggerated in their eulogy:
" Carmina quin etiam divini pectoris ejus Vociferantur, et exponunt præclara reperta, Ut vix humanâ videatur stirpe creatus." —Lucret., I. 731-733.
The fragments of this poem of Empedocles were collected about twenty years ago, and published, along with those of Xenophanes and Parmenides, by Karsten, a Dutch scholar, to whom I formerly referred.
2. The three features in the philosophy, or rather in the physics, of Empedocles by which it is best known are: First, His enunciation of a distinction which, although of no great scientific value, has kept its place in the popular mind even to the present day. I refer to his division of the constituents of the universe into the four elements, fire, air, earth, and water. Empedocles is said to have been the first who enumerated these four as the roots, ῥιζώματα of all things. Secondly, All things, he held, were formed out of these four elements by a process of mingling and of separation. This mingling was a mere mechanical aggregation or agglutination of the different elements, ​so that all objects were, in themselves, fire, air, earth, and water, whatever might be the appearance which they presented to us. And, Thirdly, This process of mingling and separating was set in motion and governed by two principles, φιλία and νεῖκος; φιλία, friendship or love; and νεῖκος, enmity or hate.
3. After all my study of Empedocles and his expositors, I am unable to find in him anything better than a confused scheme of crude and fanciful physics. I shall therefore dismiss him, after having directed your attention to a certain dogma which has occupied an important place in the history of philosophy, and which, although current before the time of Empedocles, was first laid down by him in distinct and emphatic terms. The dogma to which I refer is the saying that like can be known only by like. "Similia similibus cognoscuntur;" that is to say, the thing which knows must be of a nature cognate or analogous to that which knows it, or, as Empedocles expresses it, "We perceive earth by means of earth (the earth, that is, of which we ourselves are made), we perceive water by means of water, and air by means of air, fire by means of fire, love by means of love, and strife by means of strife;" that is, it is by means of the earth, the water, the air, the fire, the love, and the strife of which our own nature is composed, that we are able to apprehend the earth, the water, the air, the fire, the love, and the strife that are external to us. A crude enough doctrine, as thus stated, ​and yet one which may not be altogether devoid of truth, and which, at any rate, may furnish food for meditation.
4. But my principal reason for alluding to this dogma is on account of the prominent place which has been assigned to it by Sir W. Hamilton in the history of philosophy. From this maxim, "Similia similibus cognoscuntur," he derives the theory of a representative perception; that theory which it was the business of Dr Reid's life to overturn. The theory was, that the mind had no immediate cognisance of external objects, no cognisance of objects themselves, but only of certain vicarious images or representations of them. On what ground does this opinion rest? It rests, says Sir William, on the dogma that like can be known only by like. Real things being unlike the mind—the mind being spiritual, while they are material—they cannot be known by the mind; they cannot be its direct or immediate objects, but their images, being incorporeal—in other words, being of a nature analogous or like to the mind—can be known, and are alone known, by the mind in the intercourse which it holds with external things. Deny this dogma, then, affirm its opposite, that the mind can know what is altogether unlike itself, and of a different nature from itself, and you cut away the ground on which the doctrine of a representative perception rests. Such is the purport of Sir W. Hamilton's statement. You will find the ​point handled in his 'Discussions on Philosophy,' p. 61, 2d edition.
5. The philosophy of Empedocles is, for the most part, rather physical than speculative. This preponderance of physics is indeed the general character of the pre-Socratic systems. Their metaphysical import is rather implied than expressed; and what appears on their surface is generally a mere farrago of crude and fanciful, and often unintelligible, descriptions and explanations of the phenomena of the natural world. Of such materials the poem of Empedocles, Περὶ φύσεως, was mainly composed, if we may judge from the fragments which have been handed down to us, and therefore we may be excused for passing over the greater part of its details without notice. There are, however, certain general considerations involved in the lucubrations of this philosopher which are not without speculative interest, and on which I now propose to touch, although I shall deal with them very shortly. These points are the relation in which the philosophy of Empedocles stands towards antecedent systems, and the relation in which it stands towards the Atomic theory, by which it was immediately succeeded.
6. Instead of supplanting the conception of Being by the conception of Becoming, as Heraclitus did, Empedocles adhered to the Eleatic principle, and attempted at the same time to reconcile with it the changes and operations of the universe. He saw that ​change was impossible, if Being was laid down as invested with one uniform or homogeneous quality; out of such uniformity no diversity could proceed. He therefore supposed that Being was distinguished from itself by original differences of quality; in other words, he supposed several kinds of Being, and then postulating two principles, one of affinity and the other of repulsion, φιλία and νεῖκος he conceived that by the union and the repulsion of these different kinds of matter, all the phenomena and ongoings of the universe might be explained. He thus conceived that, while he embraced the Eleatic principle of Being as the ground of all things, he at the same time avoided their conclusions, by which the universe was locked up in a state of dead, immovable stagnation.
7. This modification of the Eleatic principle seems sufficiently obvious, and the explanation which it affords of the phenomena of change seems sufficiently plausible. But neither the modification of the principle, nor the explanation arising out of it, is logically tenable. The supposition is, that there are different kinds of Being, that is, of matter to begin with. Being is originally distinguished by certain qualitative differences. But here the question arises, Do these different kinds of Being consist of mere Being? Is matter with its qualitative diversities still mere Being throughout? If it be so, then we have only one element, and from this nothing can emerge but absolute, unvarying uniformity. If, on the other ​hand, matter with its qualitative differences consists of Being and some other element, that other element can be nothing else than not-Being, for not-Being alone can be placed in opposition to Being in the ultimate analysis of thought. Place anything else in opposition to it, and you will find that you are opposing Being to Being; in other words, are laying down no antithesis at all.