# A Few Plain Observations Upon the End and Means of Political Reform

A
FEW
PLAIN OBSERVATIONS
UPON THE
END AND MEANS
OF
Political Reform,
AND THE
MEASURES ADOPTED
BY THE
PRESENT SUPPORTERS
OF THAT
CAUSE.
IN A LETTER TO
A MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT.
London: Printed by Thomas Collins, Harvey's Buildings, Strand, FOR JAMES CAWTHORN, No. 24, Cockspur Street, Bookseller to Her Royal Highness the Princess of Wales.
1809.
PLAIN OBSERVATIONS,
&c. &c.
    My Dear Sir,
My Dear Sir, I have maturely reflected upon the conversation which lately passed between us, principally relating to the subject of my determined refusal to dine with the Association, who met on the 1st of May at the Crown and Anchor, under the denomination of the Friends of Reform.
You appeared to consider that refusal as inconsistent with the principles which I have long and uniformly avowed, and which lead me earnestly to desire a ​substantial improvement in the state of the National representation, as well as in certain of the executive departments of the Government.
It seems that we most fully agree as to the political expediency, I might perhaps have said the imperious necessity, of a competent Reform at the present momentous crisis.—We are both anxious that it should be directed to the same ends—the general security and internal tranquillity of the State—But we differ materially as to the principles on which it should be founded, as most conducive to the views which we both entertain.
You are an advocate for an extension of the privilege of voting to such a degree as would be little short of universal suffrage; whilst I am fully convinced that the danger resulting from such an extension ​would more than counterbalance any probability of good; and would in truth be more hostile to the principles of our Constitution, than even the present corrupt system of bribery and borough traffic.
But I will not in this place anticipate the discussion of questions to which in their due order I shall endeavour to allot a competent degree of attention—as I take up my pen with the express intention of complying with your late request, by communicating to you without reserve the principles on which I consider a temperate Reform as a salutary and necessary measure; and offering to your consideration the detail of such a Reform as would meet my decided and hearty concurrence and approbation.
First then, with respect to the beneficial ​influence of such a measure I am convinced that, originating from its proper source, and conducted with a reasonable degree of firmness and moderation, it would produce far greater and more multifarious advantages, than have yet been attributed to it by the warmest of it's advocates, or calculated upon by the most sanguine of it's supporters.
It is not in the House of Commons alone alone that I augur these effects; although I am far from considering it as a trifling advantage that the members of that house should be, to a much greater extent than at present, freed from the over-weening influence of the Treasury; and still more from the schemes of party-dominion, and mercenary controul of borough patrons.
But the greater and more general good which I anticipate, is that an efficient ​resistance will by such means be interposed, to restrain that deluge of corruption which has overwhelmed the country in every direction, and threatens to sweep away the last vestiges of our national spirit, with the remaining bulwarks of our Constitutional liberties.
Such a Reform I consider as the surest pledge of the renovation of that lofty independence, once the proudest boast of the English Nation, and which now seems to be fast sinking into the languor of indifference.—I confide in it's power to arrest the declining progress of our sun, and fix it for ages yet to come in it's meridian brightness—I am convinced of it's efficacy to restore the high energy of the National character, and to call forth that constitutional attachment to the Government which it has been the glory of our ancestors to evince under the most trying ​circumstances, for which they struggled and bled in the senate and in the field, and by which they were victorious and renowned—I anticipate from it's influence a vigorous and well-regulated Government, and a free united and obedient People.—For these reasons it is that I feel and avow myself enthusiastically interested in it's success.
But let us clearly understand each other. I have already stipulated that the Reform which I would be inclined to support should originate from it's proper source, and be conducted with a due mixture of firmness and moderation.
In the first place therefore I must unequivocally declare to you, that, in my opinion, such meetings as that at the Crown and Anchor are neither proper nor competent to give the first shape and impression to this Political renovation.
​It is not amidst the confusion and tumult and uproar of so many hundreds, assembled without previous intimation of the nature of those measures which are to be brought forward by the self constituted representatives of Counties and Boroughs.—It is not amidst the yellings and factious vociferations of those who are equally ready to clamour for a question of which they have neither considered the true foundation nor calculated the several bearings and various effects, or to rush forward at the nod of their demagogues to insult the magistracy and mock at the very semblance of justice, by refusing to hear the statement of principles, or the defence of conduct inconsistent with their own crude and vague opinions.—It is not from men, who, whether as speakers, or hearers eager to speak, flushed with wine, with acclamation, with applause, are precisely in ​that state in which they may with equal facility be impelled or moulded to good or evil, that I would look for the true springs of that salutary fountain, which is to restore and invigorate the purity and energy of the British Constitution.
And here let me ask most seriously, is there a man who would have possessed sufficient hardihood, in such an assembly, and under such circumstances, to venture on proposing an amendment, an abridgment, or an alteration of those resolutions, which it had pleased these self-elected leaders to frame as the substance of their political creed?
Mistake me not as censuring those resolutions which actually were agreed upon; they contain a series of incontrovertible facts, and just and logical deductions, which it is impossible to refute, or even, ​consistently with the exercise of unprejudiced reason, to deny.
But I again repeat my question; whether any man, boldly objecting to these or any other possible resolutions so brought forward would have had the least chance of being listened to with patience? Would he not have been talked down—hooted down—perhaps knocked down?—Would not his remonstrances have been overwhelmed with the long-winded speeches of the leaders, and drowned in the clamour of their prejudiced and devoted admirers and adherents?—I need not pause for an answer, for I read it in what actually did occur.
It was to have been supposed that resolutions of such importance would have been offered singly to the approbation of ​the persons assembled—that some shew at least of deliberation should have preceded their adoption—but not so—these clamourous and purblind followers of any man who has the boldness to aspire to the unenviable distinction of guiding their proceedings, these servile clamourers for freedom, with whom it is an equal chance whether they be led to good or ill, Impatient of discussion, and shrinking from an enquiry (which to men whose minds are already made up to approve whatsoever others may be inclined to suggest, would of course prove equally tedious and superfluous) called loudly for the whole of the resolutions to be put at the same time; thus palpably and effectually precluding opposition, modification, or even observation.
And shall we say that such is the spirit ​in which the Opus Magnum should be conceived and carried forward to it's completion? Are these the true principles of that political alchymy which is to purify and exalt the spirit of constitutional liberty from the dross of self-interest and the dregs of corruption?
Vain and useless were the study and toil which a dull race of philosophers, legislators, and statesmen have in less enlightened times conceived it necessary to bestow upon this interesting, this awful speculation: Such qualifications are no longer requisite to these gifted adepts, who, like the Antient Pythagoreans, are prompt to swear by the opinions of their leader—the mob-worshipped alderman or ruling common-councilman of the day.
It was asserted by one gentleman ​present, who therefore did not obtain a very patient hearing, that little hope could now be entertained of effecting a Parliamentary Reform.—If he had stated that little hope could be entertained from such meetings and such measures, I should have concurred in the statement; being fully satisfied that such assemblies are ill calculated for the purposes of temperate discussion—that the moderation of their proceedings depends exclusively upon a few of their most popular leaders—That if their resolutions be of a strong and decisive nature they will excite alarm, opposition, and distrust—If otherwise they must necessarily fall short of the attainment of their object, because they offer no affirmative proposition sufficiently distinct and determinate to interest the feelings and combine the exertions of the people in it's support.
​And, after all, what has been done? (and as often as the same holiday farce shall be repeated, the same will be the result) why, it is agreed and resolved that Reform is necessary and expedient—and Counties, Cities, and Boroughs are invited to join in the cry.
But what species of Reform?—aye, there's the rub—there the centrifugal force begins to operate, and repels these associators from each other in every conceivable direction.
Have these associators—have even their stewards yet determinately agreed upon the extent of their object, and the means of effecting it?
And is it to be supposed that the several Counties, Cities, and Boroughs of England will be more unanimous, or more likely to ​agree in one specific plan of Reform; nay, even to the extent of such a majority as shall turn the scale? London may, perhaps, content itself with it's antient liberties; while Westminster may clamour for universal suffrage: respectable commercial Cities may wish to establish the system of representation on the basis of property; manufacturing towns on that of population:—And who shall decide between the conflicting claims of Free-Burgesses, Scot and Lot Men, Pot-wallopers, and Paupers!—In a measure of this description, where so many jarring interests are to be reconciled, where so many mutual concessions will be necessary, through what medium is it proposed to amalgamate the contending opinions into one system; to direct so many divergent lines as radii towards one common centre?—by delegation? God forbid!—Then indeed would havock be loose upon the earth—and this popular, ​and consequently mob-governed, assemblage of delegates would swallow up and supersede the constitutional authorities of the state.
I repeat, my dear Sir, that it is impossible, as it is also intolerable, that the work should begin from the People.—Every such attempt must be considered as a wild and wanton inversion of axioms of political wisdom which time and experience have consecrated; and although it might begin with an apparent promise of good, would inevitably produce (as such attemps invariably have produced) revolution and ruin.
From whom then must the measure of Parliamentary Reform originate, if not from the people?
The proposition which I am about to ​offer to your consideration may perhaps excite your surprise; since it has often been flippantly decried as absurd and impossible—but I do not therefore despair of making it out upon such fair ground of practicability, as (considering it's superior advantages in all other respects) ought certainly to recommend the trial of it's efficacy.
I will not wrong the House of Commons by supposing that there is not to be found among them a considerable number of men, independent in fortune, distinguished by talent, firm and incorruptible in principle, unprejudiced in opinion, who by the union of these qualities, if they will detach themselves from party views, are fully competent to preserve a steady balance between the ministry and their opponents.
​It is from men like these that we must expect the salvation of the State.—From their efforts we must expect the re-establishment of the Constitution upon it's true basis, and the conservation of those blessings which it still so eminently bestows—the equal security of our personal freedom—the equal protection of the rights of property—the equal and impartial administration of justice.
If a few such men as these (assisted by any friends of their own selection, whose abilities and acquirements might fit them for such a duty) would undertake to prepare and bring in "a bill for establishing and insuring the Purity and Freedom of the Representation, &c., &c.," It could not fail of producing an interesting, animated, and full discussion of the subject in the House of Commons. Then indeed ​the voice of the People in their legitimate, provincial, and local Assemblies might be addressed with effect to the several branches of the legislature, in support of such a measure; and would press with irresistible energy upon the probable reluctance of the legislature: while the whole of their collective influence, thus directed to the attainment of one established point, would be under the salutary controul of their only Constitutional Representatives.
Nor would it be possible for either House, however individual Members of it might be interested in the continuance of the present system, to withstand the force of general opinion: The will and power of the Nation, concentrated in the representatives of the People, have ever proved irresistible, when the expression of them has been duly called forth and wisely and steadily directed to one important ​point—nay, even in times when they appeared to be most disregarded, they have possessed a prevailing, though a silent interest—and in the most corrupt and servile periods of our history, the terror of this sleeping lion has restrained the temerity that would invade, or the treachery that would surrender, those rights which it is interested to defend.
It is certainly to be expected that men of such a description as I have mentioned, standing forward upon such a question, on which many will differ from motives of conscience but more from those of prejudice, must expect at first to be baffled, calumniated, and insulted.—But is not this the common lot of public virtue in every situation—they must, and I trust they would be prepared to meet and bear with these things, until their plan should be duly ​estimated, and the opinion of the nation conciliated in their favour—an effect which steady perseverance, when founded on generous principle and enforced by prudent and manly conduct, can never fail to produce.
And now having briefly stated the quarter from which alone I conceive that every Constitutional Reform must originate, I will enter more fully upon the detail of those principles on which I most earnestly desire that it should proceed.
In the first place, as I am by no means desirous to increase the number of those Voters whose only pretensions to such a franchise are the accidents of birth, servitude, simple inhabitancy, or freeholds of trifling value, so on the other hand would I wish scrupulously to avoid depriving any man of his existing franchise, or it's ​legal incidents.—But feeling a strong conviction that the true spirit of the British Constitution, (in the first origin, and through all the progressive stages of the House of Commons, from precarious existence to their present dignified and exalted character) has required that property should be the basis of representation, I am anxious that the evils of such tumultuous elections should be counteracted by extending the freedom of Boroughs (as far only as concerns the right of voting for Members of Parliament) to all residents who possess real property of a given extent, or rent occupations of proportionate value within the precincts of such Borough; and by associating in the same privilege the inhabitants of certain neighbouring hundreds (to be ascertained by a schedule annexed to the act) who respectively possess similar (or perhaps greater) qualifications.
​If these claimants were compelled yearly to register their names and the nature of their respective claims with the town-clerk of such Borough, and to pay a moderate fine on every renewal of such registry, on pain of forfeiting their franchise, such a regulation would be productive of two good effects—first, it would enable the returning officer in almost every case to decide with certainty upon the validity of the suffrages, and thus obviate the necessity of those tedious and expensive appeals to the House of Commons, which generally occupy so great a part of their time on the meeting of every new Parliament.—Secondly, it would perhaps, by degrees, cause a considerable number of the most objectionable and non-resident voters to forego the exercise of their franchise, in order to avoid this annual expence.
​In Counties, and Cities which are Counties of themselves, copyhold or leasehold property of a certain amount, combined with actual residence, might also confer the same franchise under the same condition of registry.—And in the former I do not consider it difficult to establish an unexceptionable method of collecting the votes for the several districts of a county in the principal town of each district, and transmitting them to the Sheriff at the county-town, which would considerably diminish the confusion and expence of such elections. To this I would wish to add the transfer of the privilege of a few of the most ruinous and decayed Boroughs, now almost if not entirely destitute of inhabitants, to populous and opulent towns which at present possess not the elective franchise, subject however to the same restrictions as I have before proposed.
​With respect to the extent of the new qualification required, I should propose that in Boroughs it should amount to at least £.10 per annum in freehold, or £.40 per annum on lease; and in the neighbouring hundreds the double of that amount.—By this regulation the numbers of electors would be so extended, and include such a description of persons, as to render it almost impossible that the influence of bribery should be co-extensively prevalent; and the landed interest would be restored to their due weight, in the exercise of their elective franchise.
I have endeavoured to point out some of the direct advantages which might be expected from a Reform upon these principles; among which I conceive the just preponderance which it would give to the natural interest of the Country, the landholders and yeomanry, to form a principal ​feature.—At the same time I am aware that the commercial and manufacturing interests, exclusively of the great influence which they would possess in the elections for particular Cities and Boroughs, would at all times be enabled to preserve their due proportion of weight, even in those elections which at first view may appear to be laid open more particularly to the landed interest.
To these regulations in the mode of election I think it would be highly expedient to add the revival of that antient Constitutional principle which excludes placemen and pensioners from the Lower House of Parliament, or at least to limit specifically the number and description of those servants of the crown who should continue admissible thereto.—Nor do I consider it an unavailing ​regulation to exact from every member an oath, strictly corresponding to that which the law has required from the electors.
There remains another and a serious consideration which has often been urged against the practicability, or rather against the eligibility of parliamentary Reform.—It is this:—
Under the present system of Borough patronage it is not to be denied that men of the most eminent and brilliant talents have been raised from the obscurity and inactivity, to which their original situation in life appeared to have confined them, by mere personal connexion—while others have risen to the station for which it would seem that Nature had designed them by the facility of purchase which the present system affords.
​It is certainly not desirable that the British Senate should be altogether deprived of such adventitious Members, as have been thus from time to time enabled to soar above their native hopes, redeeming the temporary discredit arising from the dependent conditions of their first elevation, and not unfrequently exhibiting to their country the noblest patterns of administrative wisdom, or patriotic firmness.
But if no means could be devised for reconciling the difficulty, I must avow that I would sacrifice even this advantage to the general good which I conceive must result from the principle of a liberal and temperate Reform—and that the more readily, because I am constrained to acknowledge that among such political adventurers we, at least as frequently, meet with ​a prostitution of public character, a perversion of talent, and a degree of venal profligacy, which inflict deep and lasting wounds upon the frame of the constitution.
Allowing, however, that a considerable proportion of political good may result, nay in many instances has actually resulted, from the elevation of men of the former description, and feeling persuaded that the scale of effects has upon the whole inclined to the favourable side—yet when I reflect upon the enormous extent and variety of those means which the government possesses (and must necessarily continue to possess in the present complicated state of the revenue and under the existing accumulation of the funded and other public debts) to influence so large a portion of the community by the dispensation of beneficial employments, I confess that ​I no longer feel uneasiness upon this point; but that my fears rather tend toward a different object—and I almost entertain apprehension lest the numbers of such men should become so formidable as to endanger the existence of a respectable and countervailing opposition.
I do not mean to deny that some sort of influence, beyond the mere wisdom and justice of their conduct, may be requisite at all times to secure to any Administration that preponderance in the House of Commons which is necessary to the success of their measures, and the duration of their power.—There is certainly a species of influence inseparable from Human Nature; the result of education, connexions, attachment, prejudice, and habits of association—to which may be added such motives of interest as are perhaps too impalpable to be distinctly recognized ​in their real form, even by the individuals who are acting under their impulse.—But this word influence has become the pretence under which the most extensive system of corruption has been allowed to pervade every order of Society.—A system which bears in itself the principle of it's own extension, and which in proportion to it's extent assumes a hardihood, and blushes not to shew itself in the face of day.—It is against this abuse I would excite the Spirit of Reform; for though perhaps it may be difficult, and almost impossible to detect or punish it in many instances, among those who move in the higher walks of life, it would be easy to inculcate such abhorrence and detestation of it in the bulk of the Nation, as might prove the best security of Public Decency, and consequently of Public Morals.
Before I take leave of the subject of ​Parliamentary Reform, I must distinctly enter my protest against a doctrine very prevalent among it's Advocates, which inculcates the necessity of voting for any Candidate who shall solemnly pledge his attachment and support to that cause, in preference to those who may decline such an avowal.
I conceive that the general adoption of such a principle would have the effect of facilitating the views of a description of men who, conscious of possessing no other of the requisite pretensions sufficient to entitle them to aspire to a seat in Parliament, would eagerly take advantage of this circumstance for the purpose of conciliating to themselves the support of a Party, and the interest which might be excited in their favour by a Popular Clamour.—It would hold out a pretext from ​which the unprincipled advocates for Corruption would not fail to draw a temporary advantage, to the exclusion of those whose honest doubts a mature investigation of the subject would ultimately remove—and indeed, until some specific system of Reform be duly brought forward to Public notice, what can be the effect of such a pledge?—It will never be contended that it binds the Party having given it to support any proposition which may assume the plausible appearance of Reform, without the freedom of discriminating between the temperate dictates of wisdom and experience, and the wild dreams of fanaticism or absurdity.
If not, what security will there be that the Member so pledged will be influenced by his former declaration?—That he will not, under the pretence of exercising such ​discretion, oppose and reject every measure which may be suggested, (for this has already been the case in more than one instance); or that he will not on the other hand blindly consider himself as bound in honour to support the question under any possible modification.
But allowing that he will act from a sincere wish to perform his promise according to the true spirit of it (and this is surely allowing a great deal), I would still much rather trust to the general good character and general good sense of a respectable man, who in the first instance might be decidedly, nay even suspiciously, adverse to the question, and whose concurrence, if at length obtained, would be the result of mature deliberation and honest conviction, than I would confide in one whose conduct and principles in private ​and social life belied the profession which a sense of temporary interest might extort from him; or whose prejudices in behalf of a favourite system might warp his better judgment:—In short, it is only in the case where other qualifications may be nearly balanced, that I would allow this circumstance to determine my vote.
Having thus briefly discussed the question on which we both feel so much interest, perhaps indeed in a manner too summary considering it's vast importance and multifarious relations, I now proceed to give the outline of those improvements in the executive department of the State to which I conceive that the attention of a pure and patriotic Legislature would naturally be directed; and which I am convinced would more immediately and powerfully interest the People of this Country than even the Reform of our ​Representation, when considered abstractedly from these, it's probable effects.
The complicated state of the Law in it's various departments calls aloud for the adoption of some measures to simplify and reduce it to a plain and consistent uniformity.
The Administration of Justice is indeed pure beyond the thought of calumny; but even here much remains to be done—I shall however on this occasion confine my observations to the equitable jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery, which has drawn to itself such a multitude of causes as far exceed the physical power of those to whom the investigation of them is committed to decide within any moderate compass of time; and are consequently attended with expence beyond all ​reasonable limits.—It might not be amiss if each of the six circuits had it's subordinate Chancery, with proper officers, upon a more contracted scale, both of salary and jurisdiction.
The sale of offices in any way connected with the Administration of Justice (even those which are ministerial) is repugnant to the National feelings, which inculcate in our countrymen a veneration for it's principles unknown to and unfelt by any other People.—The increase of salary to the Judges, which would be considered an adequate compensation for these little advantages, cannot be an object of much consequence in the general account of National Expenditures; and the withholding it may be considered as among those pitiful savings by which a Government, profuse and prodigal in many other respects, ​deludes itself with the shadow of œconomy.
The Foreign Office and it's several relations, the diplomatic and consular branches, require to be placed upon a systematic and liberal establishment—and, in proportion as their advantages may be consulted, the Members of those Corps should be placed under stricter regulation, and subjected to a regular gradation of promotions, which should seldom be departed from, and only in consideration of particular merit.
For years a system of family compact has prevailed in the regulation of diplomatic arrangements, and their allowances as well ordinary as extraordinary, have been nicely proportioned to the Parliamentary influence of the individual, rather than to the importance of his duties, or the ​exigencies of his situation.—What is yet more unpardonable, every rank of Public Agency, from the Ambassador to the Consul, has been left without competent instructions—their representations have been unnoticed, their zeal unrecompenced, their exertions unsupported, their remissness unreproved.
This, it is true, forms a picture of melancholy prospect; but all who know the manner in which our foreign affairs have long been conducted will feel, though they may not choose to acknowledge, the correctness of the sketch.
Our Navy certainly stands confirmed in as high, respectable, and unrivalled a superiority as the most patriotic heart could wish, or the wisest Minister devise; but it is not altogether so with the Army; the ​materials of which it is composed are indeed not less distinguished for enterprizing and persevering courage—but the wretched system of purchasing Promotion has a strong tendency to damp and repress the ardour of the soldier of fortune, and cannot fail in too frequent instances to elevate inexperienced and sometimes undeserving young men above those who have superior merit, maturer talents, and longer services to plead—I will readily admit that it is expedient, as a general rule, that every officer should have a considerable stake in the welfare of his Country—but why not increase the pay of the lowest rank of subalterns, and with the pay, the original purchase; leaving no future possibility of trafficking for promotion; and setting aside the rule of seniority in no case where eminent merit and brilliant services shall not require and authorize such a distinction.
​Subordinate to, and as a nursery for the army, I conceive it would be highly proper to establish a strong and well disciplined body of Militia and Fencibles—again under these a respectable Local Militia—and to complete the Military System, by including under a general Training Act the whole disposable Population of the Country; so fixing the periods of discipline as least to interfere with their ordinary labour; and allotting to the several classes into which they may be distributed such arms, and occupations, as would be most consistent with their respective habits and situations, and most compatible with the general security of the State.
This arrangement would naturally, and imperceptibly introduce a stricter and more vigilant Police throughout the kingdom; and that, by means less ​repugnant to the feelings and habits of the People, than any other which could possibly be devised.
The detail of these Reforms would occupy much more time than I can now bestow upon the subject—yet I venture to assert that little difficulty would be found in effectuating these suggestions, if party-men could once resolve to sacrifice the Jeux des Enfans which now occupy their attention to the general welfare of the country.—I have, as a man of leisure, employed some idle hours in drawing the outlines of such Statutes as might be requisite to enforce them—but these I shall reserve for our next personal communication.
It will be enough, indeed more than I can flatter myself to have effected, if I ​shall have convinced you that the great and leading Reform which we so ardently desire must be derived from a different source, founded upon different principles, and carried into effect by other measures than those which have been hitherto adopted, and more particularly in this latest instance.—In any event I trust I shall have proved to you that, if I have resolutely declined taking an active part in these meetings, it was not from a disposition unfriendly to the cause of Reform, or to the principles of that Constitutional Freedom, which I deem every subject of this Country in his respective station is justly entitled to claim, and lawfully authorized to defend.
I am, &c., &c.
POSTSCRIPT.
I had nearly forgotten your request that I would also give you my opinion respecting the Provincial Meetings which have been so generally called throughout the kingdom for the purpose of voting thanks to Mr. Wardle for his conduct on the late enquiry.
The principal objection which I feel against such a measure is the personality of it.—I could have no reluctance to support and join in a vote expressive of the satisfaction which the Country had felt at the institution of that enquiry, or the spirited and manly way in which it had been conducted—neither should I have objected to a resolution expressive of our earnest hope to see this measure followed up by the general Detection and Reform of abuses in every department of the State wherein they should be found to exist.—I am fully aware of the importance which ​may justly be attached to such expressions of the National feeling, inasmuch as they tend to evince to the Members of the House of Commons that in the faithful and intrepid discharge of their duty they will be supported by the concurrent voice of the Nation against every attempt to deter them from it by contumely, or over-awe them by menaces.—But I know, and every one who reflects upon the disgraceful cry of Wilkes and Liberty will be convinced of the dangerous tendency of holding up an Idol, even though he may be (as in the present instance I believe he is) a worthy and deserving character, to the admiration and adulation of the Populace.
I have never yet known that the cause of Freedom, of Justice, or of Patriotism has profited even in a single instance by this alliance with a name.
This work was published before January 1, 1929, and is in the public domain worldwide because the author died at least 100 years ago.
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