# Guns for Gold: The Wagner Network Exposed/Conclusions and recommendations

​Conclusions and recommendations
A decade of entrenching Russian interests abroad
1. The Wagner Network is a collection of individuals and entities linked to Yevgeny Prigozhin and undertaking military, economic, political and influencing operations internationally. It formed in 2014 and began its military activities in Ukraine, where it has had sustained involvement. The network subsequently expanded to several other countries in Africa and the Middle East. It has undertaken offensive military operations in at least seven countries since 2014: Ukraine; Syria; the Central African Republic (CAR); Sudan; Libya; Mozambique; and Mali. There are 10 further countries where we have medium or high confidence that it has been involved in a non-military capacity since 2014, and many more countries where the network’s presence is rumoured. (Paragraph 13)
2. The Wagner Network is highly opportunistic and not a straightforward proxy for Russia, even though the Russian state has sometimes directed, facilitated, and supported its military operations, notably in Libya and Ukraine. Even when the network has acted purely in its own economic interests, Russia is likely to have benefited financially or in geopolitical influence from its presence. Its guiding hand has been the Russian state. (Paragraph 15)
3. Host governments and other non-regime actors must perceive benefits from engaging with the Wagner Network, because they consider it the most effective form of protection and security. There are examples of its fighters furthering a regime’s security objectives, even if this meant neutering political opposition. (Paragraph 17)
4. There is a significant gap between perception and capability when it comes to the Wagner Network. Despite the continued belief by some that inviting them into a country will result in benefits, the reality is that regimes pay a high price for working with the Wagner Network. The original outcomes are rarely achieved. During the past 10 years, Wagner fighters have left behind a trail of atrocities in virtually all theatres where they have operated, with limited accountability. They may present themselves as a highly trained, professional fighting force but their indiscipline, their excessive violence and their financial motivation mean that the network has functioned like an international criminal mafia, fuelling corruption and plundering natural resources. Some regimes’ reliance on the network for survival means that Wagner actors show little respect for the citizens or the laws of the countries where they operate. The network’s military and political involvement in the Central African Republic is all-encompassing and should serve as a warning of what may happen elsewhere. Even when Wagner’s deployments do not result in benefits for the host country, they are often a great success for the network itself due to the lucrative resources it accesses, particularly in the Central African Republic and Sudan. (Paragraph 25)
5. There are serious national security threats to the UK and its allies of allowing the network to continue to thrive, not to mention devastating human consequences, including contributing to the refugee crisis for example, Sudan. (Paragraph 30) ​6. Over the past year and a half, the Russia-Ukraine war eroded the Wagner Network’s deniability and Prigozhin’s public arguments with the Russian Ministry of Defence confirmed the network’s long-suspected links to the Russian state. The brutality of its fighters in Ukraine is appalling but not atypical. So long as the network survives in some form, we believe that countries may still turn to it in future. Many leaders—mostly in insecure environments in Africa—are likely already to have known the price of engaging the network when they decided to work with it. (Paragraph 31)
7. We recommend that the Government explicitly states that it opposes the co-operation of any country with the Wagner Network, or future iterations thereof, due to the security threats of the ‘Wagner model’ of business and governance. Where countries can be incentivised not to partner with the network or to re-engage after partnering with it, they should be. National governments that collude with the Wagner Network to breach UN sanctions, or that take no steps to protect their populations from Wagner-perpetrated atrocity crimes, should face financial and diplomatic consequences, where appropriate. (Paragraph 32)
Responses to the Wagner Network
8. Supporting Ukraine militarily is the Government’s priority when it comes to countering the Wagner Network. We fully support the continued supply of defence assistance and wider support to Ukraine as it fights to liberate itself from Russian illegal occupation. Through this, the UK has enabled Ukrainian Armed Forces to challenge Wagner fighters directly, often resulting in a high rate of attrition. (Paragraph 39)
9. However, it is a significant failing to see the Wagner Network primarily through the prism of Europe, not least given its geographic spread, the impact of its activities on UK interests further abroad, and the fact that its wealth creation sits largely in Africa. (Paragraph 40)
10. The Government believes that it is becoming more important to consider the network’s activities, although it did not say where it would do so. In February 2023, the FCDO told us there was now “much more activity” in Government to understand and respond to the network than there had been six months earlier. The Government also said it had surged resources into the Russia Unit over the last year. Paragraph 41)
11. The Wagner Network began its activities in 2014. By early 2022, when the Government began to invest greater resource in understanding the network, Wagner fighters had already undertaken military deployments in at least seven countries. It is deeply regrettable that it took this long, and that the Government continues to give so little focus to countries beyond Ukraine. This leaves us even less prepared to respond to the evolution of this notoriously shape-shifting network. (Paragraph 42)
12. We have received no evidence of any serious effort by the Government to track the Network’s activities in countries other than Ukraine. (Paragraph 54)
13. We recommend that the Government improve its intelligence-gathering on the Wagner Network’s activities in a wider range of countries, particularly in the countries where ​we have medium-confidence of attempts at Wagner involvement. This intelligence should make use of network-mapping capabilities. A cross-Government taskforce would be particularly useful as the Wagner Network transforms, following the attempted march on Moscow. (Paragraph 54)
14. The UK’s efforts to sanction the Wagner Network are underwhelming in the extreme, compared to those of the European Union and the United States. The responses from the Minister leave us with limited confidence that the UK coordinates effectively with its allies to share intelligence on the Wagner Network and to impose sanctions on relevant individuals and entities. Equally, the Government left us with very little confidence that those British nationals pursued by the Wagner Network receive any meaningful support from the British Government; indeed, they were made more vulnerable due to decisions made from within Government. (Paragraph 55)
15. The Government claimed that its sanctioning of the ‘Wagner Group’ automatically covered all the entities that the Group owns or controls. This approach under-appreciates the complexity of the network. It is also completely unrealistic. It leaves both enforcement agencies and implementing organisations, such as banks, estate agents and other financial services, with no idea which affiliated entities they should target. This makes it possible, if not probable, that Wagner-linked entities are continuing to benefit from access to the UK’s financial markets. The lack of certainty about this denotes a scandalous failure to exercise due diligence. At its worst, this could mean the UK is inadvertently undermining the efforts of our allies. (Paragraph 56)
16. The Minister had no specific knowledge of work within his Department to analyse whether Wagner activities undermine the financial impact of UK sanctions on the Russian war machine. Despite finding it “likely”, he could not confirm that the FCDO had had any input to HM Treasury’s unwise decision to issue sanctions waivers to Prigozhin. Despite assuring us that the Treasury and FCDO communicate over sanctions waivers in general, the Minister himself had not received any official advice specifically on sanctions waivers. Given his position as the Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Europe, we would expect him to have an interest and role in questions relating to sanctions waivers linked to Russia and Ukraine. His statements also lead us to question whether the Russia Unit is providing the necessary join-up between the FCDO and Treasury, given the central role of sanctions as a tool of UK foreign policy. (Paragraph 57)
17. We recommend that the Government move faster and harder in sanctioning Wagner-linked individuals and entities. Specifically, it should: (Paragraph 58)
    (a) Sanction all individuals and entities provided in Appendix 1, which the United States and European Union have already targeted but which the UK has not;
    (b) Consider bringing forth sanctions on civilian enablers and corporate ‘ frontmen’ for the network’s activities; and
    (c) Close enforcement gaps. ​18. We recommend that the Government establishes a specific and regular mechanism for coordinating with the United States and the European Union over Wagner- linked sanctions; it should report back to us on what these mechanisms are, and how frequently and effectively they are being used. (Paragraph 59)
19. We further recommend that the Government prioritises introducing and enforcing travel bans for Wagner-linked individuals as a likely deterrent to involvement in the network, in particular working with Turkey, a popular holiday destination for Russians. (Paragraph 60)
20. In the public interest, we have compiled Wagner-linked names that are already a matter of public record, as identified via our commissioned open-source research (see Appendix 2). In doing so, we hope to challenge the mystique that the Wagner Network cultivated in many countries, make it as difficult as possible for it to operate, create a deterrent effect, and enable the Government to improve its apparently limited understanding of the network. (Paragraph 61)
21. We implore the Government to urgently assess these names and impose sanctions on these individuals and entities if the necessary threshold is met. (Paragraph 61)
22. There is an opportunity to disrupt the Wagner Network at a time when its future is uncertain. (Paragraph 68)
23. We recommend that the Government seizes this opportunity and works with international partners to deter countries from engaging with the Wagner Network, using a carrot and stick approach. (Paragraph 68)
24. As the Government improves its intelligence on the network, it should declassify it strategically and share it with countries that are considering engaging with the Wagner Network, to demonstrate the organisation’s destabilising effects, following the lead of the United States administration. (Paragraph 69)
25. The Government should offer a genuinely compelling alternative to priority countries in need of investment and security partnership, in collaboration with partners. Priority countries are especially likely to be neighbouring countries to those where the Wagner Network is engaged. A compelling alternative may involve customising packages of military, aid and trade support to specific countries, particularly in the Sahel region. (Paragraph 70)
26. In its response to this report, the Government should set out the factors it will assess in determining whether countries are priorities for UK security partnerships. These factors should include (but not be limited to): (Paragraph 71)
    (a) the UK’s capacity for influence in a specific country;
    (b) the level of security challenge faced by a country (in the short, medium and long term);
    (c) the level of demand for a bilateral/multilateral security partnership within a country; ​
    (d) the possible regional implications of the country’s ‘capture’ by a Russian or other malign proxy; and
    (e) the level of willingness on both sides to uphold transparency and standards of good governance as part of any future partnership.
27. The Government should revive its previous commitment to channel 50% of Official Development Assistance to fragile and conflict-affected countries and regions. The Government should also revive its 2019 manifesto commitment to spending 0.7% of the UK’s Gross National Income on Official Development Assistance at the earliest opportunity, in light of refugee and asylum pressure in multiple countries. (Paragraph 72)
28. As a ‘stick’, the Government should proscribe the Wagner Network as a terrorist organisation, recognising that—while there are risks of doing so—there are also risks of failing to do so, when the Network appears to meet the legal criteria. (Paragraph 73)
What next?
29. The last decade has shown that the Wagner Network is highly effective at reconfiguring itself. We expect its activities to continue in some form, as they are too valuable, especially financially, to the Russian state to be lost. The question is not just what happens to the Wagner Network but what happens to a wider set of PMCs in Russia which continue to have close and intimate relationships with Russian officials (Paragraph 74)
30. We recommend that the UK Government takes advantage of the current uncertainty and seeks to disrupt the Wagner Network. In particular, at a moment when its usual supply channels from the Russian Ministry of Defence are in doubt, the Government should do all within its power to restrict the flow of arms and other military equipment to the Wagner Network, to reduce the viability of future combat operations. The UK Government should also share intelligence with host Governments to demonstrate the ineffectiveness of the Wagner Network and to demonstrate how it is a tool of enrichment for the Russian state. (Paragraph 74)
31. For nearly 10 years, the Government has under-played and under-estimated the Wagner Network’s activities, as well as the security implications of its significant expansion. The Government has not told us anything specific that it is doing to challenge the network’s influence and impunity in countries other than Ukraine, beyond sanctions coordination (which itself appears limited). The Government has also failed to adequately structure its response to the Wagner Network. When asked to give evidence to this inquiry, six weeks were spent on internal discussions to try to identify which was the lead Government department, demonstrating a lack of leadership across Government to tackle the Wagner Network. In oral evidence, the Minister was unable to demonstrate joined-up working within the department, lessons-sharing, strategic thinking, or a clear definition of what the Wagner Network is. It is evident that a taskforce should have been established at least by 2016. (Paragraph 82) ​32. The Wagner Network is merely the best-known and documented example of a PMC acting deniably on behalf of a state to further its interests and enrich its elites, at the expense of local citizens’ safety and stability in the long term – as well as security and stability in Europe. We are deeply concerned that the Government’s failure to address the network hints at a fundamental lack of knowledge of, and policy on, other malign PMCs. (Paragraph 83)
33. The Government should take a more strategic and coherent approach to addressing the challenges of this network and other proxy ‘PMCs’ by: (Paragraph 84)
    (a) assigning clear responsibility for the Wagner Network and adjacent ‘PMCs’ to a senior official in the Russia Unit, whose primary job it is to ensure that all levers of government are working together to tackle the challenges of Russia-aligned PMCs;
    (b) establishing a cross-Government lead on Private Military Companies, operating from the Cabinet Office’s Office for Conflict, Stabilisation and Mediation, focused on analysing this trend, mapping activity globally, and bringing together different geographic desks and teams across the MoD, Treasury, intelligence community and FCDO as appropriate to assess threats to British interests, and to identify British responses as appropriate;
    (c) establishing a taskforce for addressing the challenges posed by the Wagner Network and other linked PMCs, to enable swift cross-government collaboration.
34. The Government appears remarkably complacent about the growing practice of states using PMCs for malign purposes. Although the expansion of the Wagner Network and the harm it has caused appears to have led to some re-examination of the Government’s approach (paragraph 34), we have no detailed information to understand the Government’s new approach to countering state threats. (Paragraph 85)
35. The Government continues to rely on a largely voluntary model of PMC regulation. Our predecessor committee conducted a detailed report into the subject of PMCs in 2002. Even then, the risks of a voluntary model were clear, in that it does little to prevent the “activities of disreputable companies” that are “detrimental to the United Kingdom’s interests”. The current approach also does little to protect the UK’s domestic PMCs, which may be tarred with the same brush as malign actors. We do not want our successor committee to have to raise these issues again in 20 years’ time. (Paragraph 86)
36. The Government should improve its understanding of other PMCs and Private Security Companies (PSCs) connected in particular to Russia and China, and from all states. This is likely to be a growth industry, with more Governments seeking to create PMCs to secure their geopolitical and economic interests. The Government should provide further information on how its new approach to countering state threats, outlined in the Integrated Review Refresh, will tackle the challenge of states’ malign use of proxy PMCs. (Paragraph 87)
37. In its response, the Government should set out the steps that it will take to strengthen the international legal framework governing PMCs’ activities, drawing on the UK’s deep legal expertise. Its response should address the following aspects: (Paragraph 88) ​
    (i) how the UK will take steps to move forward the debates around the definition of ‘mercenaries’ and PMCs;
    (ii) how the UK will work to improve the accountability of Wagner fighters in more countries;
    (iii) how the UK will promote greater accountability and responsibility of states where PMCs are headquartered, if PMCs engage in destabilising activities.
To address the first point (i), the Government should revisit its position on the UN Mercenaries Convention and ratify it, or else propose specific revisions that would make ratification acceptable. The Government could also participate actively in ongoing international debates around a draft convention on private military and security companies (PMSCs). The Government may be able to address the second point (ii), by drawing lessons from work to bolster accountability of Wagner fighters in Ukraine. (Paragraph 88)
38. The UK Government should use its significant support to the Office of the Prosecutor General in Ukraine to identify mechanisms to prosecute the Wagner Network. A prosecution in this theatre would serve to help deter the sense of impunity abroad. (Paragraph 89)
39. The Government should provide the evidence base that leads it to believe in the effectiveness of its mostly voluntary model of PMC regulation. (Paragraph 90)
Layout 2