OpenLLM-France/wikimedia huggingface dataset:
# United States ex rel. Jennings v. Ragen/Opinion of the Court

* Court Documents
* Case Syllabus
* Opinion of the Court
United States Supreme Court
358 U.S. 276
United States ex rel. Jennings v. Ragen
The motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and the petition for writ of certiorari are granted.
Petitioner, confined under sentence of an Illinois court following his conviction of armed robbery, sought a writ of habeas corpus from the Federal District Court. His petition contained allegations, primarily concerning the introduction into evidence at his trial of a confession coerced by physical mistreatment by police officers, which if true would entitle him to relief. Appended to the petition were various documents, including an opinion of the Supreme Court of Illinois affirming his conviction and simultaneously affirming the denial to him of post-conviction remedies which he had sought in the trial court while his appeal from the conviction was pending. See People v. Jennings, 11 Ill.2d 610, 144 N.E.2d 612. In that opinion, the state court held that the evidence before it warranted the trial court's finding that petitioner's confession had been voluntary.
The State responded to petitioner's application and urged dismissal. The District Court, on a record limited to the aforementioned documents augmented by a 'report' prepared by an amicus curiae appointed by it, dismissed the application without a hearing. The Court of Appeals, in turn, denied petitioner's motion for a certificate of probable cause, 28 U.S.C. § 2253, 28 U.S.C.A. § 2253, and dismissed his appeal.
It appears from the record before us that the District Court dismissed petitioner's application without making any examination of the record of proceedings in the state courts, and instead simply relied on the facts and conclusions stated in the opinion of the Supreme Court of Illinois. We think that the District Court erred in dismissing this petition without first satisfying itself, by an appropriate examination of the state court record, that this was a proper case for the dismissal of petitioner's application without a hearing, in accordance with the principles set forth in Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 463-465, 506, 73 S.Ct. 397, 97 L.Ed. 469. See also Rogers v. Richmond, 357 U.S. 220, 78 S.Ct. 1365, 2 L.Ed.2d 1361. It follows that the judgment of the Court of Appeals must be vacated and the case remanded to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

## Notes

This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
Public domainPublic domainfalsefalse
# United States ex rel. Knapp v. Lake Shore Michigan Southern Railway Company

* related portals: Supreme Court of the United States.
* sister projects: Wikidata item.
United States Supreme Court
197 U.S. 536
United States ex rel. Knapp v. Lake Shore Michigan Southern Railway Company
Argued: February 28, 1905. --- Decided: April 10, 1905
Mr. L. A. Shaver and Assistant Attorney General McReynolds for plaintiffs in error.
[Argument of Counsel from pages 537-539 intentionally omitted]
Mr. George C. Greene for defendant in error.
Mr. Justice McKenna delivered the opinion of the court:

## Notes

This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
Public domainPublic domainfalsefalse
# United States ex rel. Knight v. Lane

* related portals: Supreme Court of the United States.
* sister projects: Wikidata item.
United States Supreme Court
228 U.S. 6
United States ex rel. Knight v. Lane
Argued: March 5 and 6, 1913. --- Decided: March 17, 1913
Retirement of Walter L. Fisher as Secretary of the Interior suggested, and Franklin K. Lane, his successor in office, substituted March 6, 1913, as the party defendant in error herein.
Messrs. Frederic D. McKenney, James M. Givens, James W. Zevely, Richard William Stoutz, John Spalding Flannery, William Hitz, and Edgar Smith for plaintiff in error.
Assistant Attorney General Cobb and Solicitor General Bullitt for defendant in error.
[Argument of Counsel from page 7 intentionally omitted]
Mr. Justice Van Devanter delivered the opinion of the court:

## Notes

This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
Public domainPublic domainfalsefalse
# Trigg v. Drew/Opinion of the Court

* Court Documents
* Case Syllabus
* Opinion of the Court
United States Supreme Court
51 U.S. 224
Trigg v. Drew
This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record of the Supreme Court of the state of Arkansas, and was argued by counsel. On consideration whereof, it is now here ordered and adjudged by this court, that the judgment of the said Supreme Court in this cause be, and the same is hereby, affirmed, with costs and damages at the rate of six per centum per annum.

## Notes

This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
Public domainPublic domainfalsefalse
# Trilateral Statement on the Middle East Peace Summit at Camp David

* related portals: Historical documents, Multilateral and regional documents.
* sister projects: Wikidata item.
President William J. Clinton Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak Palestinian Authority Chairman Yasser Arafat
Between July 11 and 24, under the auspices of President Clinton, Prime Minister Barak and Chairman Arafat met at Camp David in an effort to reach an agreement on permanent status. While they were not able to bridge the gaps and reach an agreement, their negotiations were unprecedented in both scope and detail. Building on the progress achieved at Camp David, the two leaders agreed on the following principles to guide their negotiations:
1) The two sides agreed that the aim of their negotiations is to put an end to decades of conflict and achieve a just and lasting peace.
2) The two sides commit themselves to continue their efforts to conclude an agreement on all permanent status issues as soon as possible.
3) Both sides agree that negotiations based on UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 are the only way to achieve such an agreement and they undertake to create an environment for negotiations free from pressure, intimidation and threats of violence.
4) The two sides understand the importance of avoiding unilateral actions that prejudge the outcome of negotiations and that their differences will be resolved only by good faith negotiations.
5) Both sides agree that the United States remains a vital partner in the search for peace and will continue to consult closely with President Clinton and Secretary Albright in the period ahead.
This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
Public domainPublic domainfalsefalse
# Trigg v. Drew

* related portals: Supreme Court of the United States.
* sister projects: Wikidata item.
United States Supreme Court
51 U.S. 224
Trigg v. Drew
THIS case, like the two preceding, was brought up, by writ of error, from the Supreme Court of the state of Arkansas. It was similar to the case of Paup et al. v. Drew, except that Trigg was here the principal instead of being the surety, and the amount of the bonds was greater, because Trigg purchased a larger amount of land. In every other respect, the cases were identical, and therefore neither the statement nor arguments of counsel need be repeated. Trigg's debt was $6860, and the judgment against him for that sum, with $3849.10 interest and costs, with interest on the debt and damages at the rate of ten per cent. per annum, from the 23d of December, 1847, till paid.
Mr. Justice McLEAN delivered the opinion of the court. This case is here under the twenty-fifth section of the Judiciary Act of 1789, from the Supreme Court of Arkansas, on a writ of error.
An action was commenced in the Pulaski Circuit Court, on certain bonds given by the plaintiffs in error to Archibald Yell, Governor of the state of Arkansas, and his successors in office, to pay certain sums of money at the time specified, which bonds were negotiable at the principal bank of the state of Arkansas, and to be paid 'in specie or its equivalent,' &c., in payment for certain tracts of land, sold by the Governor under a law of the state, as a part of the Seminary lands given by Congress for the support of a seminary, under certain acts of Congress.
A plea was filed setting up in defence a tender of the notes of the State Bank of Arkansas, and that in the charter of said bank the state bound itself to receive said notes in payment of debts, &c.
A judgment was finally entered against the defendants below, for ten thousand seven hundred and nine dollars and ten cents, and costs. That judgment was taken to the Supreme Court of the state of Arkansas, and was there affirmed.
As this case is similar in principle to the above case of Paup et al., it is unnecessary to repeat the reasons assigned in that case for the judgment of the court. The judgment of the state court is affirmed.
Note by the Reporter.-For the separate opinions of Mr. Justice CATRON, Mr. Justice DANIEL, Mr. Justice NELSON, and Mr. Justice GRIER, see the preceding case of Paup et al. v. Drew.

## Notes

This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
Public domainPublic domainfalsefalse
# Trimble v. Woodhead

* related portals: Supreme Court of the United States.
* sister projects: Wikidata item.
United States Supreme Court
102 U.S. 647
Trimble v. Woodhead
APPEAL from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Kentucky.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
Mr. John G. Carlisle for the appellant.
Mr. Stanley Matthews and Mr. William M. Ramsey, contra.
MR. JUSTICE MILLER delivered the opinion of the court.

## Notes

This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
Public domainPublic domainfalsefalse
# Triethylenetetramine (2540)

​TRIETHYLENETETRAMINE See ETHYLENEDIAMINE, Method 2540, for Procedure (NH2CH2CH2NHCH2)2
MW: 146.2
METHOD: 2540, Issue 2
CAS: 112-24-3
RTECS: YE6650000
EVALUATION: UNRATED
OSHA : no PEL NIOSH: no REL ACGIH: no TLV (1 ppm = 5.98 mg/m 3)
PROPERTIES:
Issue 1: 15 May 1989 Issue 2: 15 August 1994
liquid; d 0.98 g/mL @ 20 °C; BP 277.4 °C; VP unknown; flash point 118 °C
SYNONYMS: triethylenetetramine: TETA; trientine; N,N-bis(2-aminoethyl)-1,2-diaminoethane; 3,6-diazaoctane-1,8-diamine
SAMPLING SAMPLER:
MEASUREMENT TECHNIQUE:
HPLC, UV DETECTION
ANALYTE:
naphthylisothiourea derivative of analytes
FLOW RATE: 0.01 to 0.1 L/min [1]
DESORPTION:
2 mL dimethylformamide (DMF), ultrasonic 30 min
VOL-MIN: -MAX:
1 L @ 10 ppm 20 L
INJECTION VOLUME: 10 µL
SHIPMENT:
routine
COLUMN:
10-µm radial cyano, 10 cm x 8-mm ID in Waters RCM-100 radial compression mode
MOBILE PHASE:
50/50 isoctane/isopropanol at 3 mL/min
CALIBRATION:
standard solutions of derivatives in DMF
SAMPLE STABILITY: BLANKS:
SOLID SORBENT TUBE (1-naphthylisothiocyanatecoated XAD-2, 80 mg/40 mg)
>30 days @ 20 °C [2] 2 to 10 field blanks per set
ACCURACY
RANGE: 0.016 to 8 mg/m 3; (10-L samples)
RANGE STUDIED:
ˆ ): OVERALL PRECISION (S rT
1 to 119 µg per sample
ESTIMATED LOD: 0.3 µg per sample PRECISION (Sr):
0.018
0.06 [1]
BIAS:
-1.9%
ACCURACY:
±13.7%
APPLICABILITY: The working range for TETA is 0.08 to 160 mg/m 3 for a 10-L air sample. This method is the result of evaluation [2] of OSHA Method #60 for DETA, EDA, TETA [1]. The theoretical capacity of each front section is 1.6 mg of TETA.
INTERFERENCES: Other primary or secondary amines may react with the sampler coating reagent, and thereby reduce the sampler capacity.
OTHER METHODS: This replaces NIOSH Method P&CAM 276 [3]. The method of Anderson, et al., for EDA [4] is an alternate method using thiourea derivatization and HPLC analysis.
NIOSH Manual of Analytical Methods (NMAM), Fourth Edition, 8/15/94
# Trimble v. City of Seattle

* related portals: Supreme Court of the United States.
* sister projects: Wikidata item.
United States Supreme Court
231 U.S. 683
Trimble v. City of Seattle
Argued: and submitted December 9, 1913. --- Decided: January 5, 1914
Messrs. C. W. Corliss and George McKay for plaintiffs in error.
[Argument of Counsel from pages 684-687 intentionally omitted]
Messrs. Howard A. Hanson, William B. Allison, and James E. Bradford for defendant in error.
Mr. Justice Holmes delivered the opinion of the court:

## Notes

This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
Public domainPublic domainfalsefalse
# United States Code/Title 11/Chapter 5/Section 560

§ 560. Contractual right to liquidate, terminate, or accelerate a swap agreement
The exercise of any contractual right of any swap participant or financial participant to cause the liquidation, termination, or acceleration of one or more swap agreements because of a condition of the kind specified in section 365 (e)(1) of this title or to offset or net out any termination values or payment amounts arising under or in connection with the termination, liquidation, or acceleration of one or more swap agreements shall not be stayed, avoided, or otherwise limited by operation of any provision of this title or by order of a court or administrative agency in any proceeding under this title. As used in this section, the term “contractual right” includes a right set forth in a rule or bylaw of a derivatives clearing organization (as defined in the Commodity Exchange Act), a multilateral clearing organization (as defined in the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991), a national securities exchange, a national securities association, a securities clearing agency, a contract market designated under the Commodity Exchange Act, a derivatives transaction execution facility registered under the Commodity Exchange Act, or a board of trade (as defined in the Commodity Exchange Act) or in a resolution of the governing board thereof and a right, whether or not evidenced in writing, arising under common law, under law merchant, or by reason of normal business practice.
# United States Code/Title 11/Chapter 5/Section 556

§ 556. Contractual right to liquidate, terminate, or accelerate a commodities contract or forward contract
The contractual right of a commodity broker, financial participant, or forward contract merchant to cause the liquidation, termination, or acceleration of a commodity contract, as defined in section 761 of this title, or forward contract because of a condition of the kind specified in section 365 (e)(1) of this title, and the right to a variation or maintenance margin payment received from a trustee with respect to open commodity contracts or forward contracts, shall not be stayed, avoided, or otherwise limited by operation of any provision of this title or by the order of a court in any proceeding under this title. As used in this section, the term “contractual right” includes a right set forth in a rule or bylaw of a derivatives clearing organization (as defined in the Commodity Exchange Act), a multilateral clearing organization (as defined in the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991), a national securities exchange, a national securities association, a securities clearing agency, a contract market designated under the Commodity Exchange Act, a derivatives transaction execution facility registered under the Commodity Exchange Act, or a board of trade (as defined in the Commodity Exchange Act) or in a resolution of the governing board thereof and a right, whether or not evidenced in writing, arising under common law, under law merchant or by reason of normal business practice.
# United States Code/Title 11/Chapter 5/Section 559

§ 559. Contractual right to liquidate, terminate, or accelerate a repurchase agreement
The exercise of a contractual right of a repo participant or financial participant to cause the liquidation, termination, or acceleration of a repurchase agreement because of a condition of the kind specified in section 365 (e)(1) of this title shall not be stayed, avoided, or otherwise limited by operation of any provision of this title or by order of a court or administrative agency in any proceeding under this title, unless, where the debtor is a stockbroker or securities clearing agency, such order is authorized under the provisions of the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 or any statute administered by the Securities and Exchange Commission. In the event that a repo participant or financial participant liquidates one or more repurchase agreements with a debtor and under the terms of one or more such agreements has agreed to deliver assets subject to repurchase agreements to the debtor, any excess of the market prices received on liquidation of such assets (or if any such assets are not disposed of on the date of liquidation of such repurchase agreements, at the prices available at the time of liquidation of such repurchase agreements from a generally recognized source or the most recent closing bid quotation from such a source) over the sum of the stated repurchase prices and all expenses in connection with the liquidation of such repurchase agreements shall be deemed property of the estate, subject to the available rights of setoff. As used in this section, the term “contractual right” includes a right set forth in a rule or bylaw of a derivatives clearing organization (as defined in the Commodity Exchange Act), a multilateral clearing organization (as defined in the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991), a national securities exchange, a national securities association, a securities clearing agency, a contract market designated under the Commodity Exchange Act, a derivatives transaction execution facility registered under the Commodity Exchange Act, or a board of trade (as defined in the Commodity Exchange Act) or in a resolution of the governing board thereof and a right, whether or not evidenced in writing, arising under common law, under law merchant or by reason of normal business practice.
# United States Code/Title 11/Chapter 7/Section 701

§ 701. Interim trustee
    (a)
       (1) Promptly after the order for relief under this chapter, the United States trustee shall appoint one disinterested person that is a member of the panel of private trustees established under section 586 (a)(1) of title 28 or that is serving as trustee in the case immediately before the order for relief under this chapter to serve as interim trustee in the case.
       (2) If none of the members of such panel is willing to serve as interim trustee in the case, then the United States trustee may serve as interim trustee in the case.
    (b) The service of an interim trustee under this section terminates when a trustee elected or designated under section 702 of this title to serve as trustee in the case qualifies under section 322 of this title.
    (c) An interim trustee serving under this section is a trustee in a case under this title.
# United States Code/Title 11/Chapter 7/Section 702

§ 702. Election of trustee
    (a) A creditor may vote for a candidate for trustee only if such creditor—
       (1) holds an allowable, undisputed, fixed, liquidated, unsecured claim of a kind entitled to distribution under section 726 (a)(2), 726 (a)(3), 726 (a)(4), 752 (a), 766 (h), or 766 (i) of this title;
       (2) does not have an interest materially adverse, other than an equity interest that is not substantial in relation to such creditor’s interest as a creditor, to the interest of creditors entitled to such distribution; and
       (3) is not an insider.
    (b) At the meeting of creditors held under section 341 of this title, creditors may elect one person to serve as trustee in the case if election of a trustee is requested by creditors that may vote under subsection (a) of this section, and that hold at least 20 percent in amount of the claims specified in subsection (a)(1) of this section that are held by creditors that may vote under subsection (a) of this section.
    (c) A candidate for trustee is elected trustee if—
       (1) creditors holding at least 20 percent in amount of the claims of a kind specified in subsection (a)(1) of this section that are held by creditors that may vote under subsection (a) of this section vote; and
       (2) such candidate receives the votes of creditors holding a majority in amount of claims specified in subsection (a)(1) of this section that are held by creditors that vote for a trustee.
    (d) If a trustee is not elected under this section, then the interim trustee shall serve as trustee in the case.
# United States Code/Title 11/Chapter 5/Section 558

§ 558. Defenses of the estate
The estate shall have the benefit of any defense available to the debtor as against any entity other than the estate, including statutes of limitation, statutes of frauds, usury, and other personal defenses. A waiver of any such defense by the debtor after the commencement of the case does not bind the estate.
# United States Code/Title 11/Chapter 5/Section 562

§ 562. Timing of damage measurement in connection with swap agreements, securities contracts, forward contracts, commodity contracts, repurchase agreements, and master netting agreements
    (a) If the trustee rejects a swap agreement, securities contract (as defined in section 741), forward contract, commodity contract (as defined in section 761), repurchase agreement, or master netting agreement pursuant to section 365 (a), or if a forward contract merchant, stockbroker, financial institution, securities clearing agency, repo participant, financial participant, master netting agreement participant, or swap participant liquidates, terminates, or accelerates such contract or agreement, damages shall be measured as of the earlier of—
       (1) the date of such rejection; or
       (2) the date or dates of such liquidation, termination, or acceleration.
    (b) If there are not any commercially reasonable determinants of value as of any date referred to in paragraph (1) or (2) of subsection (a), damages shall be measured as of the earliest subsequent date or dates on which there are commercially reasonable determinants of value.
    (c) For the purposes of subsection (b), if damages are not measured as of the date or dates of rejection, liquidation, termination, or acceleration, and the forward contract merchant, stockbroker, financial institution, securities clearing agency, repo participant, financial participant, master netting agreement participant, or swap participant or the trustee objects to the timing of the measurement of damages—
       (1) the trustee, in the case of an objection by a forward contract merchant, stockbroker, financial institution, securities clearing agency, repo participant, financial participant, master netting agreement participant, or swap participant; or
       (2) the forward contract merchant, stockbroker, financial institution, securities clearing agency, repo participant, financial participant, master netting agreement participant, or swap participant, in the case of an objection by the trustee,
    has the burden of proving that there were no commercially reasonable determinants of value as of such date or dates.