# History of Mexico (Bancroft)/Volume 1/Chapter 33

Table of Contents
CHAPTER XXXIII.
CONTINUATION OF THE SIEGE.
June-July, 1521.
Something about Quauhtemotzin — Infamous Pretensions of European Civilization and Christianity — Prompt Action of the Mexican Emperor — Repetitions of the Entry Assault — Submission of the Surrounding Nations — Dire Condition of the Mexicans — Spanish Defeat and Disaffection — Resolution to Raze the City.
In their present position, with the advantages of superior civilization, there was equal glory accruing to the Spaniards in winning Mexico, and to the Mexicans in manfully losing their city. Quauhtemotzin as a patriot and a skilful general was fully alive to the perils of his position, but he was prepared to use to best advantage all the resources at his command, and that is all any one can do. Stern as Saturnius, and passionately patient, from the day of the capture of Montezuma his nature had been proof against all pleasure. Of an imperious temper, haughty and overbearing as Coriolanus, yet was he as faithful to defend the city as any Hector or Horatius. I hold that Spaniards of the sixteenth century were no worse than their neighbors. It was a bigoted and cruel age; though for that matter enough of bigotry yet remains, and there is sufficient cruelty in our latter-day fightings to keep us humble. And while we see much to condemn in the motives that brought hither these foreigners, and much in their conduct that was cruel and unjust, yet we are constrained to admit that the work which they accomplished was in the pathway of destiny. ​The conquest of the country, the destruction of its barbarous and inhuman rites, and the establishment of the religion of Christ in their place were the inevitable consequences of the discovery of America. Once brought face to face with the sacrificial stone, and other brutal atrocities of the Aztecs, and Christianity had no alternative but to eradicate these evils or be itself overthrown.
The victorious advance into the heart of the city had been a pleasant surprise to the Spaniards, while to the Mexicans it was incomprehensible. If such were the results of the first day's doings, what would the days following bring forth? Quauhtemotzin immediately issued orders to reopen the channels and construct fresh intrenchments and pitfalls. Such were the forces employed, and such their zeal, that when the morning dawned the causeways and streets presented even greater difficulties than before. The allies of the Mexicans were not so easily reassured, however, and several began to waver, among them the Xochimilcans, to the rear of Olid's camp, who sent in their submission to Cortés, promising not only active aid but much needed supplies. The same offer came from the more numerous Otomís, occupying the western mountain border of the valley, followed by the substantial reinforcement of twenty thousand of their sturdy warriors, with large supplies. Still larger reinforcements arrived just before these from Tezcuco, where ever since Cortés' departure the young king and his brothers had been busily engaged in forwarding supplies? and fitting out troops. Fifty thousand were raised and placed under the command of the energetic Ixtlilxochitl, who had great military reputation and possessed far more influence than his ruling brother. He joined Cortés with thirty thousand, and distributed the rest among the other ​captains. Cortés praises him for his bravery and good traits, a eulogy which serves only to embitter Mexican writers against one who favored aliens against his own race, and aided to overthrow their liberty and religion. During the campaign he was frequently taunted as a renegade, traitor, and fratricide, but he never swerved in his allegiance, and found ready retorts and excuses, the strongest being that he favored the Christians for introducing the true faith. Yet this strange religion he was in no haste, personally, to adopt. "Curses on his odious memory!" exclaims the rabid Bustamante.
Three days after the last assault a second was made, supported by more allies than ever. Cortés' Spanish` forces consisted of twenty horses, three hundred infantry, with three guns. Although he had noticed the operations of the Mexicans, he was hardly prepared to find his work so completely undone. As before, each channel with its intrenchments had to be captured anew, and while the causeway was readily gained with the aid of brigantines, the advance along the street was slower, although the soldiers were somewhat less exposed to roof volleys since the burning of so many of the buildings during the previous entry. The breaches and channels were filled up as they advanced. In the plaza the houses were yet intact and the missile showers severe, so much so that Cortés found
3 His biographer admits to a certain extent the truth of the invectives, but eager to please his Spanish masters he seeks rather to extol the self-sacrifice and loyalty of his kinsman. He claims that with this reënforcement the Tezcucan auxiliaries reached the improbable number of 250,000 men, of whom 5000 wounded were now sent home. Next to God, Cortés owed to Tezcucan aid the conquest and the planting of the faith.' He further assumes that Ixtlilxochitl was already king, and had been with Cortés since the fleet set sail, while his brother Ahuaxpictzoctzin remained at Tezcuco to provide supplies. Hor. Crueldades, 21-33. He contradicts himself on several points in his Relaciones, 314 et seq. Duran also, as may be expected from a compiler of native records, extols the hero, 'à quien dió una espada dorada que Don Hernando Cortes traia y una rodela.' Hist. Ind., MS., ii. 493. With Ixtlilxochitl came half a dozen out of his hundred brothers. Gomara, Hist. Mex., 198; Chimalpain, Hist. Conq., ii. 55. Torquemada, i. 548, sends Cohuanacoch as general of the forces, while Clavigero allows King Fernando Ixtlilxochitl to send his brother Cárlos Ixtlilxochitl. Storia Mess., iii. 202. He is evidently confused with respect to the surname. ​it necessary to apply the torch, among others to the Axayacatl palace, his former head-quarters, wherein he had sustained so fierce a siege, and to the House of Birds, which formed so prominent and admired a feature in the city. It was of vast extent, and devoted almost wholly to the maintenance of beasts and birds of every species, some kept in the gardens, some in courts, others in galleries, rooms, and cages; altogether a collection which must tend to cast a favorable light on the culture of the race. Both palaces were splendid specimens of Nahua architecture, adorned with marble galleries supported on monolith pillars, with elaborate cornices and stucco work, and surmounted by turrets and battlements, while within and around rose groves of rare trees, choice shrubbery, and flowers, refreshed by ever sparkling fountains. Cortés had rightly concluded that the destruction of such monuments, cherished not alone for their beauty and contents but for their hallowed associations, would be a more severe lesson than the loss of numerous lives; and as the flames rose over all that vast area, fed by the roofs, interior wood-work, and other combustible material, lamentations mingled with the maddened cries of burning animals. Around in the suburbs, also, could be seen column after column of dense smoke started by the torches of the cruisers, and settling in dense masses over the city as if threatening to bury her forever from sight. Fortunately for the inhabitants, the houses thereabout were too wide apart to allow the flames to spread far. Even at this juncture the work of destruction might have been stopped for the reason that Cyrus stopped the sack of Sardis when Crœsus said to him: "These are not my goods, but thine, O Cyrus, that thou art spoiling!"
All this time waged the conflict of arms, the Mexicans seeking by repeated charges and sallies to check the advance of the Spaniards and to harass them. The native chronicles relate that during one of the ​countercharges by the cavalry a horseman pierced a warrior with such force that the lance remained fast in the ground. Regarding it as a disgrace to abandon his weapon he rashly dismounted to unfasten it, only to be surrounded by the foe and cut in pieces. His comrades hastened to the rescue, but could recover only the mangled remains.
When evening came and the signal was given for return to camp, the Mexicans fell upon the rear with renewed ardor. It seems as if courage came to them in proportion to their misfortunes. For their fury broke forth anew, fed by the dire conditions round them, by the sight of lately enslaved Otomís, Xochimilcans, and Chalcans, now fighting against them under the sheltering wings of the invaders, and exulting over their misfortunes with bitter taunts. "Behold?' they cried, displaying dismembered limbs of Aztecs, "we shall fill our bellies with your braves, and have enough over wherewith to feed the beasts. Do not starve yourselves, for to-morrow we will return for more." "And in truth they both supped and breakfasted on the limbs," says Cortés. Camp was regained without serious trouble.
The following day the entry was repeated, and early as it was, the channels had been nearly all reopened and provided with the usual intrenchments. This involved a repetition of the previous day's manœuvres, but the Mexicans fought with greater obstinacy, partly because they had become accustomed to the Spanish tactics, and it was one o'clock before the plaza was reached, by which time the archers and arquebusiers had exhausted their quivers and ammunition-pouches. Cortés now advanced beyond the temple along the Tlacopan road, well known to the veterans from the hard fighting there met during the previous siege, and captured two canal crossings, which were filled up, ​while to the buildings on either side the torch was applied. The object of the movement was partly to open intercourse with Alvarado's forces, which were advancing less rapidly, owing to the number of intrenched channels. Progress was slowly increased during the succeeding entries, when Andrés de Tápia and Ávila pushed along adjoining streets with detachments.
One result of the Spanish successes was the submission of all the threatening and neutral lake and island towns to the south and south-west of Mexico, from Iztapalapan and Culhuacan to Cuitlahuac. To this step they had been partly impelled by the repeated raids of the Chalcan confederates, and since their submission was so tardy they were employed chiefly as laborers and purveyors. Gomara now estimates the native auxiliaries at two hundred thousand men, "some engaged intent on fighting, some on eating, some on stealing, and many on gazing." These lake peoples, known as Chinampanecs, from their floating gardens and aquatic life, possessed canoes in abundance, and Cortés availed himself of this to reënforce the blockading fleet with a boat flotilla, three thousand in all, which harassed the city on every side, entering into the canals to burn and pillage, and landing sallying parties to carry desolation all through the suburbs.
Allured by the prospect of spoils, the Chinampanec crews arranged a plan whereby a still richer draught might be made. Before their adhesion to the Spanish cause, or knowledge of it had yet come to Quauhtemotzin, they sent to offer him their services against the invaders, with whom they proposed to deal treacherously. They were assigned a post and played their part well. No sooner were the Mexicans occupied with the Spanish forces than they rushed ​into the dwellings of their pretended allies and began to rob, slay, and carry off women and children. An alarm was given and reënforcements hurried up speedily overwhelmed the traitorous crews, killing a number, capturing others, and recovering nearly all the booty. The captives were condemned to the stone of sacrifice, those of Cuitlahuac by one of their own caciques, Maychuatzin, a companion of Quauhtemotzin. The incident cost many lives on both sides, greatly to the delight of the Spaniards, to whom this mutual throat-cutting was the economy of war.
With so large a hostile fleet upon the lake the Mexican crews never ventured abroad by day, but when darkness set in, their canoes sped across, impelled by the demand for food. Informed of this, Cortés detached two brigantines, under Portillo and Pedro Barba, to cruise all night. This proved a severe blow to the poor Mexicans, although a number of canoes still ran the blockade successfully, and it was resolved to entrap the vessels, since open battle could not avail against them. Thirty of the largest canoes, or piraguas, were accordingly manned with stout warriors and strong boatmen, and hidden amongst the rushes near a heavily staked channel, into which some swift canoes were to decoy the brigantines. This succeeded, and no sooner were they fast on the stakes than the canoes attacked them with such which spirit that every Spaniard was wounded, while Portillo fell, and Barba died within three days. The brigantines managed to escape. Encouraged by this attempt the Mexicans became more brisk in their blockade-running, and stationed forty piraguas to ​repeat the decoy surprise. Advised of this by two captives, Cortés sent six brigantines by night to hide near the spot, leaving one to cruise about for canoes. Some of these soon appeared, and the sailer pursued them for a distance toward the hiding-place of the Mexicans. Suddenly she turned about as if afraid of stakes. Observing this, the forty piraguas ventured forth and were allured toward the Spanish ambuscade. At the proper moment the six vessels came down upon the pursuers, overturning and sinking a number, and capturing others, together with many warriors. The Mexicans attempted no further naval surprises.
By the night cruisers and the Chinampanecs, supplies were nearly all cut off, and gaunt hunger began to stalk the streets of the fated capital. The ravages of the fleet and the flotilla along the eastern suburbs had rendered these wholly untenable, and the southeastern district had been desolated by Cortés' divisions, compelling the inhabitants to abandon the greater part of Tenochtitlan and concentrate chiefly in Tlatelulco. These two main divisions of the city had been rivals ever since its foundation, with frequent disputes to sustain the flame of discord. Gradually the Tenochtitlans had assumed the sway, honored by imperial presence, while the other division had assumed a plebeian stamp, patronized by the former. During this common misfortune, however, rivalry was forgotten, and the more warlike Tlatelulcans unhesitatingly aided the others and now welcomed them into their quarter.
Every loss of allies to the Mexicans was a corre sponding gain to the Spaniards, less in regard to fresh auxiliaries than to the relief from hostile attitude and to supplies. The Chinampanecs, for instance, were ordered to bring material and construct barracks along ​the causeway on either side of Fort Xoloc. These afforded shelter for all the Spaniards and two thousand servants, and proved most welcome, for the rainy season had already set in. The same natives were obliged to provide supplies, such as fish and a species of cherry, which together with maize formed the chief sustenance of the army. Frijoles, or beans, cacao, quilite herbs, and nochtli, afforded variety. The maize was ground by hand and made into tortillas, or pancakes, by the slave women and mistresses of the soldiers, either for their individual lords or for the mess to which they belonged. These duties were also assumed by some of the few Spanish and mulatto women who had accompanied their husbands. Although there was little fear of starvation in the Spanish camps, yet the fare was at times not of the best. The less fastidious auxiliaries were content with a range of eatables which the soldiers would not touch; human meat with them was a bonne-bouche for which they were prepared to risk even their own flesh. Alvarado's men enjoyed perhaps the least comfort, for they had moved their camp to a point on the causeway, leaving the auxiliaries at Tlacopan, together with the slaves and tortilla-makers. Nor were their barracks properly constructed, so that exposure to wind and rain was added to poor fare and miry roads, while the situation of the camp added to danger and guard duty.
The camp had been formed round a temple square on the causeway, quite close to Mexico, or rather to Tlatelulco, for Alvarado had tired of having his day's work destroyed every night, and he resolved at least to protect the approach to the suburb. One deep channel yet intervened, beyond which the camp could not well be moved, but a large force was stationed to guard it at night, so that the crossing should be ​assured for the morning's attack. On the other side gleamed the watch-fires of the Mexicans, behind and between which might be seen the flitting figures of their warriors, signalling to one another by whistling. This and other operations were forced upon them to a great extent by Spanish tactics, from which they had copied many features with no little effect.
From Alvarado's camp to the Tlatelulco market, the heart of the enemy's stronghold, the distance was less than from the camp of Cortés, though the first part of the way was more difficult than the Iztapalapan road. The immense stride of the Fort Xoloc party had wholly eclipsed the progress of the others, and Alvarado's men began to fear that, near as they were to the enemy's centre, the more distant comrades might reach it before them. It was therefore resolved to make strenuous efforts to penetrate into the suburb. The assault being on Tlatelulco itself, the Mexicans found no difficulty in offering so strong a resistance that hardly any advance could be made. Several vessels were thereupon directed against the suburb to coöperate with a brisk fire, and to divert attention by landing sallying parties. This succeeded for a while, but inspired by the prowess of two Tlatelulcans named Tzoyetzin and Temoctzin, the warriors rallied and drove back the invaders. Another brave who distinguished himself during the repulse was Tzilacatzin. În the guise of an Otomí warrior, and protected by cotton armor and shield, he rushed toward the Spaniards as if bewildered, in advance of his comrades, and threw his stone, knocking down an opponent at each throw. This man appeared in different guise on different days, and did no little to encourage his companions.
​Notwithstanding these rebuffs Alvarado persevered, and the Mexicans resolved to take advantage of his zeal to entrap him. Two or three wide channels intervened between the end of the causeway and the great market, and the first of these was now the point of contention, a chasm of sixty feet in width and over ten feet in depth. By great effort a crossing had here been formed with débris. This the Mexicans undermined one night and covered a part with a false ground. In the morning they attacked the Spanish outpost with great demonstration, but retired as soon as the horsemen charged. Flushed with success, the Spaniards followed in divided parties, and one of fifty with a number of allies pursued across the channel. No sooner were they over than the boatmen below tore away the support, while the warriors turned with overwhelming force upon the band. Resistance was impossible, and they retreated only to fall into the opening, where crews were at hand to pounce upon them. Indescribable confusion ensued. Thick fell the blows off the despairing men, as they sought to beat back the triumphant foe. Bernal Diaz, who was among the number trapped, felt himself seized by stout arms, but although badly wounded he managed to cast off the assailant and spring to the bank, where he fell exhausted. Fortunately Alvarado came up at this moment, after driving back a division in another direction, and so startled the assailants that they retreated, though with four captive Spaniards, one or two more being killed, besides a horse and a number of allies.
​When Cortés heard of the affair he came over to administer a reprimand, but on learning the particulars he could not withhold his admiration for the valiant deeds performed, and merely exhorted his lieutenant to be more cautious. Great was the exultation of the Mexicans over their success, and tauntingly they hovered round the camp, imitating the cries of the entrapped soldiers. So encouraged did they feel as to make several determined night attacks on the different camps or their advance posts. Alvarado's being nearest and most exposed had to sustain quite a severe fight, losing several men.
Although Alvarado had made little advance into the city, the planting of his camp so near it saved much fighting and enabled him to direct daily operations almost at once against the main points. In this he possessed an advantage over Cortés, who was compelled daily to recapture a number of positions already gained. He himself remarks on this loss of time and work. "Your Majesty may blame me for retreating instead of holding what is gained," he writes, but guards at the bridges, which must be large, would be so harassed as to unfit them for the next day's work, while to take up a position within the city would draw the whole of the large population upon them, and might lead to the cutting off of communication and supplies, and probably to a repetition of the great disaster of the previous year. Such a position would besides render it possible for the Mexicans to obtain supplies from the mainland, for the Spanish allies could not be relied on to watch them. ​Cortés' own officers, however, could not fail to observe that Alvarado's course might have been followed with some advantage. They began to tire of the slow progress, attended as it was with so much fighting for so little gain; so much exposure to alternate rain and heat; so much discomfort in rude camps with poor diet and want of proper care for wounded or sick men. This was represented to Cortés, with the request that a general storming be attempted with a view to abbreviate the siege. He represented the danger of advancing over so many channels, along streets lined with houses, against hosts of determined warriors, with the prospect of being caught in the rear. Still he was as eager as any one to end the siege, and would call a council to deliberate on the matter. The result was a decided majority for the proposition to attempt the capture of Tlatelulco market and there establish a permanent camp.
Since Sandoval will not be able to render efficient service on his route for an attack on Tlatelulco, he is ordered to join Alvarado with the weightiest part of his forces, and to take advantage of the movement to entrap the Mexicans. He will pretend to make a general evacuation of his camp, and thus allure the foe to an attack on the baggage-train, during which the ambuscaded cavalry can inflict a lesson which shall also serve to secure the camp against later attack. Sandoval sends another portion of his forces to Cortés, who has more points to cover, and receives instructions to attend in particular to the capture of the channels and their filling, and otherwise to secure the safety of the more impetuous Alvarado.
On the day appointed, the brigantines with their flotillas are sent early to aid in clearing the causeways and approaches. The troops find little trouble in ​reaching the Tlacopan avenue, from which three long roads give access to the market. It is advantageous to push the advance on each of these, and three divisions are accordingly formed, one to follow the main street under command of the comptroller and treasurer, Julian de Alderete, who has been among the foremost to urge the assault; another under Andrés de Tápia and Jorge de Alvarado, brother of the Tlacopan leader, both dashing and able men; the third and somewhat larger body, swelled particularly by auxiliaries, Cortés himself directs along the most dangerous approach, a sort of causeway, lined with houses but bordered with water. Two cannon are placed on the Tlacopan road, guarded by eight horsemen, and Cortés leaves his horse at the entrance of the road taken by him, and gives strict orders to all captains for filling every channel behind them.
Cortés at first leads his men on foot, and with the aid of a field-piece readily gains the first bridge and barricade, carrying all before him, while the auxiliaries swarm into the houses and drive slingers and archers from the roofs. The determination of the assaulting party seems to have disheartened the Mexicans, for the advance is quite rapid, so much so that the captain who has taken Cortés' place at the head of his division soon reports that he is approaching the market and can hear the operations of Alvarado and Sandoval. May he advance? This message reaches Cortés on a section of his causeway to the rear, where he has remained to gain a contested point, and to oppose assaults from the cross-streets. He replies that the captain must first secure his rear and flanks, and look ​particularly to the channels, of which there are three in that causeway. "They are filled," was the answer, made without a thought as to its accuracy, for flushed with the success of the advance, soldiers and cavaliers alike cast prudence to the winds, and disregarding common ditches bend their eyes alone upon the goal. Immediately after comes the doleful sound of the teponastli, and a shrill trumpet blast, the alarm signal of Paynalton, the mythic page of the war-god. Struck on the summit of Tlatelulco temple, the sounds float over the contestants, sending a chill into the heart of the Spaniards and allies as they rush onward filled with visions of success. To the Mexicans, on the other hand, it comes as a magic appeal from Huitzilopochtli, stirring their spirit with fresh energy: a resistless appeal to make a supreme effort for imperilled home, and faith, and liberty.
Cortés also hears the warning, only too deeply impressed since that Sorrowful Night, and with anxious heart he hastens forward to see how matters stand. His anxiety is increased as the jubilant cries of his own men appear to change, while high above them rise the unmistakably triumphant shouts of the Aztecs. Just then he comes to one of the crossings formed by his party at a channel ten to twelve paces wide, and over ten feet deep. It seems insecure, and on looking he finds it constructed of some loosely thrown pieces of wood and reed, covered with a little earth. He at once orders the auxiliaries in his following to rebuild the structure. Scarcely is the order uttered before he sees his forces coming down the causeway in disorderly flight, led by the allies. Cortés makes frantic efforts to stay the current. None heed him. Fears lend wings and drown all appeal. On come the pressing throng, on to the frail bridge, which sinks with its living freight into the deep water. Still onward rush the mass behind, impelled by their mad momentum, tumbling ​on the heads of these, scrambling and wading, adding their cries for help to the shrieks of despair beneath, while from the rear roll the terrifying shouts of hot pursuers. Already the house-tops teem with slingers and archers; the lanes pour forth their warriors with swords and long pikes to pierce the flanks, and the canals are alive with canoes whose crews secure the struggling fugitives for sacrifice, or deal the more grateful coup de grace. The Spanish soldiers are among the last to come up, and a terrible gauntlet they have had to run. Regardless of the showering missiles or the pressing foe, Cortés stands on the brink to strike back the hungry crew and lend a helping hand to his floundering men. "I was determined to remain there and die fighting," he writes. But so many are beyond his reach, and there he must stand helpless to watch the struggle; to behold now this soldier felled, now the other carried off; and more, to see the banner torn from the hands of his alférez. Tlapanecatl is the name given by the records to the doughty captor of so esteemed a prize.
Standing there conspicuously on the brink, Cortés becomes the target for hundreds of missiles, though protected by his mail; but soon the foe begin to press round him, and even in his rear, separating him from the men. The next moment more than one pair of arms had coiled round his body, and, with triumphant shouts of "Malinche! Malinche!" they seek to drag him into the water to the canoes. Alarmed by the outcry, his body-soldier, Cristóbal de Olea, hastens to his side, and with a sabre-blow severs the arm which was well nigh pulling over the bent form of his master. The next instant he himself falls beneath the furious onslaught roused by the magnitude of the prize, "a glorious death in so good a cause!" exclaims Herrera. Another soldier, named Lerma, rushes to the spot and is nearly overpowered; while a stout ​Tlascaltec, Temacatzin, plants himself in front of the leader, half prostrate with exhaustion and wounds, and wards off the blows till Antonio de Quiñones, captain of the guard, manages to force his way forward and sustains him, followed by a number of men whom the report of their general's danger has stirred to fierceness. "Away from here, your worship, and save your person," cries the captain, "for without you all will be lost!" Cortés refuses, "for I desired rather death than life," he writes; but finally by dint of pleading and main force he is induced slowly to retire, seeking to cover the rear of the fleeing. And well it was, for a longer stay would have proved fatal. But for the eagerness of the Mexicans to secure as prisoner so magnificent a prize, they could easily have despatched him. Aztecs made it a point to obtain as many prisoners as possible, particularly chiefs and nobles, and white men, who ranked even above these, in order to do honor to the war-god. This effort was prompted by a deep religious obligation as well as by warrior spirit.
Not far from the disastrous channel a horse was ​brought, upon which Cortés was mounted, though wounded in the leg. Shortly before, his chamberlain, Cristóbal de Guzman, a great favorite, had ridden up with a charger to the relief of his master, only to be surrounded with warriors and cut down, together with the animal, while another rider was obliged to retreat with a lance-thrust in the throat. On retiring from the section of causeway assigned to the horse, another animal was killed and a third narrowly escaped. Finally the troops reached the broader Tlacopan road, and now Cortés, with the nine horsemen left in his division, was able to take a firm stand against the enemy. Checked in their pursuit, and made timid in their charges by the presence of the bold line of horses and lances, they flung their missiles and insults with increased energy. Suddenly two or three Spanish heads were cast before the horsemen, with the cry: "Tonatiuh!" "Sandoval!" The meaning could not be misunderstood, and as the Spaniards gazed on the gory and disfigured faces a sickening fear crept over them. Could it be that these beloved leaders had fallen! There was no time for deliberation. Finding his own party now comparatively secure, Cortés hurriedly sent messengers to recall the other divisions under Alderete and Tápia.
There was hardly need for this message. The triumphant shouts of the Mexicans in pursuit of the troops of Cortés and the increased attack on their own had already warned these leaders. Still they persevered, although their men manifested some discouragement. It was not long, however, before two or three mutilated, bearded heads were cast before them with the cry, "Malinche is dead!" "Tonatiuh and all their men have fallen!" The leaders saw that farther advance was useless, especially since the Mexicans now attacked with great fury. The leaders kept their men in good order, and were already retiring ​when the order of recall reached them. The streets there being wider and easier, and the channels all filled, they found no trouble in rejoining their general. Now jointly they retreated through the plaza and down the Iztapalapan road, furiously pursued by the warriors, who showed themselves more reckless than usual on seeing their prey escape. The central temple was filling with a vast throng to watch the onslaught, and on the summit the priests were already burning incense and chanting in honor of victory, while the rabble railed at the humiliated children of the sun.
Alvarado had meanwhile advanced along the road to Tlatelulco from his causeway, leaving Sandoval to coöperate along the flank and to direct the movements of the brigantines and the filling of the channels. The advance was fiercely resisted by the Mexicans from roofs, cross-lanes, and barricades, and hundreds had been severely wounded, chiefly Tlascaltecs, only too many fatally, yet he persevered. He was already near the market, the aim of all efforts, when the drum and trumpet came to startle his men and to encourage the Mexicans to greater resistance. Progress was now almost checked, and soon came the cry, "Malinche is dead!" "Sandoval and the other captains are dead!" "Behold their faces!" And therewith several heads with gory beards were cast before them. "This shall be your fate!"
Alvarado's men were white with dismay, and but for the intrepid courage of their leader the rout of Cortés' party might have been repeated. Making a bold stand with his Spaniards, he ordered the Tlascaltecs to fall back and leave the retreat open. They needed no second instructions to this end, for the bleeding heads lent wings to their haste. Then grew the onslaught fiercer than ever, for the retreat of Cortés' forces enabled a larger number of enemies to turn against Alvarado and Sandoval. The latter also received his cast of bloody heads with a new string of prominent names, all calculated to inspire terror. ​"By this time they had us all killed," adds Bernal Diaz, "but, in truth, we were all wounded, and filled with anguish concerning the fate of our chief. Without God's aid we could never have escaped from the swords and clutches of the Mexicans." Some pious chroniclers, indeed, assert as usual that the virgin appeared in person, together with perennial Santiago, to save the Spaniards from their greatest peril.
Encouraged by the victories on land, the Mexicans had ventured forth also in their canoes to harass the vessels which were occupied in protecting the retreat of the armies. Unable in some instances to leave their position, or impeded in their movement by stakes and other obstacles, many of the brigantines were severely pressed, and one, commanded by Briones, in Alvarado's division, was actually captured, with the loss of four men, one being taken alive. Jaramillo came to the relief of the vessel, however, drove forth the enemy, and kept them at bay. By this time both the forces of Alvarado and Sandoval had reached the causeway, pursued by a great host, reckless in their endeavor to inflict all the injury possible ere the Spaniards escaped. Some delay occurred in crossing the only partly filled channel to the causeway, and a number of soldiers were detained waistdeep in water, seeking to lift a brigantine over the stakes, for the auxiliaries were already away from the front; and all this time the cavalry were compelled to remain before the causeway to cover the infantry and bear the brunt of the terrible onslaught. Charge ​after charge they made to keep back the advancing foe, through the shower of blinding missiles, against the line of bristling lances, amidst the whirling swords and clubs, until not a rider but felt his arm droop and his body grow faint with loss of blood. Sandoval himself had a number of wounds. "For God's sake make haste and retire," he cried to his foot-soldiers, "or we shall all be lost!"
Finally the passage was clear, and they fell back along the causeway, still fighting, and now exposed to the canoe sallies. On reaching his quarters, Alvarado turned two cannon against the swarm which sought to scale the camp, and this with the fusillade procured a much needed respite. It was time, for the increasing darkness would soon have added fresh dangers to the retreat. Sandoval had already hurried away with a solitary companion to seek the camp of Cortés and calm his fears. With a similar object Andrés de Tápia had been sent with three horsemen from Fort Xoloc to Alvarado's camp, where he arrived with some scars from marauding stragglers. Not wishing to discourage the soldiers, he reduced the losses of his party to quite a small number, and made light of the matter.
By this time the enemy had retired, but from the city rose their shouts of triumph, and every temple was ablaze with fires to celebrate the victory. The summit of the Tlatelulco pyramid, the highest of them all, was the scene of great commotion, and soon the sombre notes of the melancholy drum called to it attention. A number of instruments now added their discordant notes, in clash and blast, and a procession ​with torches, swinging censers, and religious paraphernalia circled round with imposing ceremony. Then a space was cleared, and a long file of naked men stood revealed. A cry of horror burst from the gazing soldiers. There could be no mistake. Distant as was the temple, the glare of fire clearly revealed the white hue and bearded faces of their comrades, bound for sacrifice, and plumed. Now they were made to march forward, and with blows to dance before the idol to whom they had been consecrated. Ah, to be a helpless looker-on at such a time! Again they formed in line exhausted, and then one was seized by several priests and borne struggling to the stone of sacrifice. He was thrown on his back and held down by the limbs while the high-priest with ceremonious flourish raised the glittering blade. The gazing soldiers clutched each other's hands in agony, as their eyes followed the instrument and saw it plunged into the breast of the victim. They seemed to hear his stifled cry, to feel the knife in their own heart, and realizing that they were still safe they thanked heaven for their escape.
Victim after victim was carried to the stone, some with frantic struggles, others resigned, and still others weighed down in helpless fear of what they had beheld. Heart after heart was torn from the gaping breasts and held before the idol, while the bodies were cast down the steps. The skin, particularly of the head and upper body, was removed and used as a dress for festive occasion, and the flesh was hacked to pieces, the limbs for the banquet table, the trunk for the beasts. After a while came darker-hued victims, and now the Tlascaltecs and other allies shuddered. To them the sacrifices were not so terrifying as to the ​Spaniards, but they could not unmoved behold the cruel death of their countrymen. Then came more processions, music, and idolatrous rites, followed by fresh companies for the sacrifice, white and dark; and so passed the night, until the horror palled on the gazers, and many expressed the opinion that the priests were pretending sacrifice by producing the same bodies upon the stone several times so as to inspire greater fear. This belief was strengthened when they observed similar ceremonies take place on other minor temples, and by the continuance of the sacrifices for several days. The offering at the minor temples consisted chiefly of the lower class of allies. All the pyramids, however, received a quota of heads from Spanish, leading native, and equine victims, wherewith to decorate their summits.
Aware that the sight of the sacrifice, purposely intensified for Spanish edification, must have stirred deeply the breasts of the survivors, the Mexicans took advantage of this to attack the camp of Alvarado during the night. "Behold the fate in store for you all!" they cried, casting in half-roasted pieces of flesh from white and dusky bodies. "Eat, for we are satiated!" The Spaniards were too well prepared to suffer from the assault, but it added to their sorrows. The lesson had been costly, for about sixty men were lost, with six horses, one gun, and a number of smallarms, while the ranks of the allies had been diminished by from one to two thousand, and this without reckoning the vast number of wounded. ​When Sandoval reached Camp Xoloc and learned the news he burst forth, "Señor Capitan, what is this? Where are the fine counsels and warlike skill which you are wont to exhibit?" With tears springing to his eyes, Cortés replied: "Sandoval, my son, my sins I admit, but I am not so guilty in this matter as I appear. The officer whom I charged to fill the channel failed to obey." He further intimated that Alvarado might be led by his daring into difficulties, and bade Sandoval watch carefully over the safety of the western and northern camps, particularly for the present, while Cortés was restrained by his wounds. The injunction ​was needful in view of the reoccupation by the Mexicans of the channels from which they had lately been driven, and their harassing attacks, chiefly by night, against the camps and fleets. Alvarado's camp, as the nearest to the city, was the most exposed, and Sandoval with his tried prudence could be best relied on to counteract the recklessness of its commander in repelling these attacks. Knowing the signal for the sallies, usually a shot, the enemy were warned in time to retire, or to form some trap or combination, so that the charge of the soldiers carried little advantage.
On one occasion, it is related, a shield-bearer named Peinado stepped outside the camp gate and found himself surrounded by a horde of marauders. Escape was cut off. In this dilemma he began to rattle his shield and sword, and shout, looking at the same time toward the camp. The enemy assumed at once that he was signalling to some party in ambush, and beat a hasty retreat. For several days the Spaniards remained inactive. During this time the Mexicans continued their daily sacrifice of captives, with conspicuous rites and loud demonstrations.
As usual amidst trying scenes, there were here examples of the devotedness of woman. In one of the encounters on the causeway to drive back the prowling Mexicans, Beatriz Bermudez de Velasco, wife of Francisco de Olmos, accompanied the soldiers, in cotton armor, and with sword and shield. Such was the pressure of the enemy that the troops were thrown into disorder and began to turn in flight. With raised sword she planted herself in their path and cried, "Shame upon you, Castilians! turn at once against this vile rabble, for I will kill any man who attempts to pass this way." So abashed were the men by this resolute demeanor that they again fell ​upon the Mexicans and defeated them. Other women of less valor did equally good service as sisters of mercy, to tend and cheer the many disabled. One, named Isabel de Rodriguez, attained quite a reputation in curing wounds, a success attributed chiefly to her holy invocation, for in applying the bandage she invariably uttered the formula, "In the name of the father, the son, and the holy ghost, one true God; may he cure and restore thee!"
Cortés found it absolutely necessary to resume operations in order to prevent the utter demoralization of his men, although they could advance no farther than the last canal on the Iztapalapan road, which was strongly fortified to protect the plaza. On the Tlatelulco side the channel separating the city from the causeway had been reopened as a barrier. No serious effort was made to pass these points, and the movements were effected with the greatest prudence possible.
For this caution several reasons existed, based on momentous consequences of the late defeat. In their exultation the Mexicans had imprudently published the oracular utterance that within eight days the Spaniards would be destroyed, though many Aztecs would also perish. Care was taken that this divine proclamation should be known in the Spanish camps, with the intent of disheartening the allies and procuring their desertion. This main object accomplished, ​it was hoped that neighboring districts might be again persuaded to join in hostile operations, or at least assume a neutral attitude against the isolated Spaniards. Severely harassed by all the strength of the capital and its allies, the Spaniards would be unable to maintain the siege or even to sustain their own position, particularly if supplies were cut off, and so be obliged to retreat. Many indeed looked upon the Spaniards as doomed, and tired besides of the long siege, so contrary to native ideas of warfare, corps after corps of their allies disappeared, in secret retreat to their homes. Others were sufficiently shaken in their belief to lose all ardor, the more so when they recalled the prophecy of disaster uttered by the hanged Xicotencatl. Cortés and his officers did all they could to counteract this influence by referring to previous failures of oracles, to the comparatively small percentage of the late losses, the critical condition of the besieged, and their efforts to gain advantages by spreading lies. Let the allies but abide till the end of the term mentioned by the oracle and they would be convinced of its falsity. The last argument was perhaps the strongest that could be offered under the circumstances, and it was decided to take no risks that might imperil the proof.
These precautions were imperative in view of the effect of Aztec machinations in the lake districts and outlying provinces. The lake towns last to join the Spaniards relapsed into a frigid neutrality, and might have risen but for the imposing proximity of the fleet and army. Remoter districts assumed a more decided attitude, and from Quauhnahuac came an urgent appeal for help against the attacks of the Malinalcas and Cohuixcas, prompted by Mexico. Immediately ​after the late victory Quauhtemotzin had sent envoys to these and other provinces, in every direction, bearing heads or flayed skins of Spaniards and horses, and other tokens, wherewith to impress their story that more than half of the white besiegers were slain, and that the remainder would soon perish, as declared by the oracle. It behooved them, therefore, to decide at once whether they would join for a share in the spoils, or be forever excluded from all favor at the hands of victorious Mexico. Thus, while many were frightened into severing their connection with the invaders, secretly or openly, more aggressive provinces like Malinalco hastened to profit by the state of affairs.
To detach troops under the circumstances was not agreeable, and many officers objected, but Cortés considered that it would be far more dangerous to Spanish prestige and prospects to encourage such hostile movements by a passive demeanor. "It was now more necessary than ever," he writes, "to exhibit prowess and spirit, so as to hide our weakness both from friends and foes." Andrés de Tápia was accordingly despatched with ten horse and eighty foot, together with a considerable force of allies. In order to calm the many remonstrances against the expedition, he was instructed to return within ten days. Tápia found the enemy awaiting him in large force near a hamlet not far from Malinalco, and at once prepared to attack, assisted by the Quauhnahuacs. The ground being level, the horses proved of great service, and the hostile army was presently in flight toward Malinalco. This place was strongly situated on a height, well supplied with water, so that Tápia considered it useless to attempt an assault, much less a siege when so short a term had been allowed him, and he accordingly returned. ​The complaint from Quauhnahuac was followed by a deeper wail from Toluca and adjoining Otomí settlements in the mountain region west of the lake. The Matlalzincas, devoted adherents of Quauhtemotzin, had been induced to openly declare for him and to invade their districts, preparatory to advancing against the Spaniards. This intention had been already vauntingly proclaimed by the Aztecs, and since the Matlaltzincas were both powerful and warlike, the necessity for prompt measures became even more apparent in this case. The tried Sandoval was intrusted with the expedition, composed of eighteen cavalry, one hundred infantry, and a large force of allies chiefly Otomís, which soon grew to about seventy thousand. After a quick march he came to the smoking ruins of some settlements and startled into flight a band of marauders, who left behind them a quantity of plunder and provisions, including some tender children still roasting on the spit. He pursued the raiders, and after crossing a river came upon a larger force, which turned as he approached, to seek safety within the town of Matlaltzinco, over two leagues distant. The cavalry made terrible havoc among them, and the infantry following in their wake, killed more than two thousand. Those who escaped made a stand at the town to cover the conveyance of families and effects to a fortified hill close by. This was pretty well accomplished before the infantry came up to assist in capturing the town. The defenders now fled, and the place was entered and burned, after being rifled of what remained to take. Since it was late, the assault on the hill was deferred till the morning. There the natives maintained a loud uproar until some time after midnight, when all became quiet. With early dawn the Spaniards prepared to storm the hill only to learn that it had been abandoned. A number of people were seen in the field, however, and eagerly the soldiers revived the fading expectation for a fray. In a ​twinkling they were among the rabble, and a number were slain before the explanation gained ears that these people belonged to the friendly Otomís. Sandoval now advanced on another fortified town, whose cacique threw open the gates on beholding the hosts before him, and not only offered his own submission, but promised to effect the submission of the allied caciques and those of Malinalco and Cohuixco. Regardless of the insinuations of the Otomís that such promises could not be relied on, Sandoval returned to Mexico, and four days later appeared there the caciques of all these provinces to tender allegiance and aid for the siege.
Meanwhile the portentous eighth day had dawned on the Spanish camps. Hardly less concerned than the natives, the soldiers could not control their trepidation as they thought of the oracle, although striving to appear indifferent. Nor were they without tangible reasons for their fears. With a daily growing desertion among the much needed allies, and fading enthusiasm among those who remained; with supplies greatly reduced owing to the neutral attitude assumed by surrounding districts; with fresh wars upon their hands, which demanded not only more hardships but a division of their weakened forces; with constant vigils and alarms amid the harassing attacks of a triumphant foe; with a large number of wounded deprived of needful care and comforts, and above all the ghastly spectacle of a daily sacrifice of late comrades, attended by wild and imposing celebrations — with all this gloom and distress it required stout hearts indeed to remain steadfast. Yet they were firm; they believed in the strength and justice of their cause, and in their ultimate triumph, though momentarily dismayed, prayer ​afforded them relief. It dissipated fear and infused fresh courage.
Thus passed the day, amidst fear and hope, and the Spaniards still existed. The Mexicans do not appear to have made any special effort to support the oracle by a determined attack. Nor had they been able to open any effective communication with the mainland; for although the lake towns had withdrawn their canoe fleet, they offered no aid to the besieged, while the brigantines maintained too strict a guard to permit many boats to gain the capital with supplies.
The ninth day came, and now it was the turn of the Spaniards to exult, for not only did they feel inspired with the belief that providence was protecting them — and nobly the friars helped Cortés to impart that stirring idea — but they were cheered with revived animation among the allies and the early return of most of the deserters. From Tezcuco, indeed, came additional troops under the command of some Spaniards there stationed. Cortés greeted the returning corps with rather cold forgiveness. He showed them that besides carrying on the siege without their aid he had undertaken victorious campaigns, and needed not their assistance. Nevertheless, since they had served so zealously before, he would not only overlook the grave crime of desertion, due partly to ignorance of Spanish laws, but let them again share in the final reduction of the city, and thus gain both revenge and riches. Cortés could adopt no other course, for the siege could not be carried on without the allies.
Under Spanish training the latter had besides grown very efficient, as the following instance will illustrate: No sooner had the eight portentous days passed by than Chichimecatl, the leading Tlascaltec captain serving under Alvarado, disgusted with the idle fears which had unmanned his people, and eager to retrieve ​them in the eyes of the Spaniards, resolved to show both them and the Aztecs what he could do. With the aid of the soldiers the first fortified channel was captured, and the chief advanced into the city with his own people only, the flower of his warriors, after leaving several hundred archers near the passage to keep the route clear for retreat. With unwavering columns he advanced along the main street and captured the next canal passage after a fierce struggle. Then he passed onward to the next, maintaining a sharp contest all the day. Finally came the hour for returning, and the Aztecs bore down with doubled fury on his flank and rear. The retreat was performed in good order, partly owing to the foresight of leaving a rear body; and Chichimecatl came back a lauded hero.
Messengers had been sent to the allies far and wide to encourage them with the news of the non-fulfilment of the oracle. Ojeda and Marquez went in person to Tlascala, partly also with the object of procuring certain supplięs. They left Alvarado's camp at midnight with only a few natives, and when about half-way to Tepeyacac they perceived a train of men descending from the hills with heavy burdens, which they deposited in a number of canoes. Information was at once sent to Alvarado, who placed a guard along the shore to check this smuggling that had evidently escaped the cruisers. Ojeda's party proceeded to Tlascala and brought a large train of provisions. In addition to this the camps were cheered by the arrival of a party of recruits with quite a mass of war material, chiefly powder and cross-bows, relic ​of Ponce de Leon's Florida expedition. The war stores were particularly valuable; so low had run the actual stock that Cortés was preparing more Chinantec pikes to cover the deficiency in weapons.
Everything was again ready for a serious revival of hostilities. Over six weeks had passed since the siege began, and the end seemed little nearer than before. On the day of the defeat three fourths of the city might be said to have been reduced; but nearly all this advantage had been lost, owing chiefly to the narrow streets, encompassed by houses which served both for attack and retreat, and the numerous traps in the form of canals and channels. So long as these obstacles remained the progress must not only be slow, ever slower as advance was made, but the troops would be constantly exposed to fresh disaster. One more defeat might ruin all, and Cortés resolved to avoid risks. He would tear down every building as he advanced on both sides of the streets, and fill up channel; "not take one step in advance without leaving all desolated behind, and convert water into firm land, regardless of the delay." So writes the general, and yet he expresses regret for this destruction of the city, "the most beautiful in the world." In pursuance of this plan he asked the allied chiefs to summon additional forces of laborers with the necessary implements. They eagerly consented, and within a few days the men stood prepared.
* ↑ 'Eran esclavos del señor de Tenuxtitan,' is Cortés' definition of their vassalage to Mexico. Cartas, 220.
* ↑ A service which employed 20.000 carriers, 1000 canoes, and 32,000 convoy warriors, all at the expense of Tezcuco, says Ixtlilxochitl, Relaciones, 314.
* ↑ Sahagun, Hist. Conq. (ed. 1840), 177-8. Torquemada places the incident earlier, i. 547. Cortés admits no losses of Spaniards this day.
* ↑ Cartas, 222-3. Los combidauan a çena, mostrando les piernas y braços.' Gomara, Hist. Mex., 199.
* ↑ Bernal Diaz speaks of a bridge attack which cost the lives of four Spaniards, besides numerous wounded. Hist. Verdad., 145.
* ↑ He enumerates also the cities of Mexicalcinco and Vitzilopuchtli. Hist. Mex., 202. Herrera adds Mizquic. dec. iii. lib. i. cap. xix.
* ↑ Mazeoatzi, as Sahagun calls the cacique, sacrificed four chiefs, Quauhtemotzin four more; the rest fell by the hands of priests. Hist. Conq. (ed. 1840), 187. He does not speak of a premeditated plan like Torquemada, i. 531-2, and since the account comes from native sources it may be merely an exaggerated version of a flotilla raid.
* ↑ This was the lieutenant of Velazquez at Habana, who joined Cortés during the Tepeaca campaign. Portillo was a soldier from the Italian wars. Bernal Diaz adds that one brig was captured, but this is doubtful. Hist. Verdad., 143; Clavigero, Storia Mess., iii. 214; Sahagun, Hist. Conq., 46.
* ↑ Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 144-5.
* ↑ Cortés exultantly claims that three fourths of the city is now captured. Cartas, 227; Sahagun, Hist. Conq. (ed. 1840), 181; Torquemada, i. 550.
* ↑ 'No ses hartauan de pescado, que tuuierõ pocos dios: y demas de la hambre con q̄ peleauan, el sol, y frio no les dio pequeño trabajo.' Herrera, dec. iii. lib. i. cap. xix.
* ↑ 'Soliti sunt hostes in prælio cadentes intra suos ventres sepelire,' explains Peter Martyr, dec. v. cap. viii., and with some truth.
* ↑ Forty soldiers watched till midnight, when a similar number relieved them, and they again were relieved two hours before dawn; all three divisions camping on the spot. Often every man was kept awake by alarms. Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 142-3. The old soldier waxes eloquent over the hardships, for he served at this camp.
* ↑ The Spaniards tried in vain to despatch him. Sahagun states that during these attacks fifteen soldiers were captured, and shortly after eighteen more, who were sacrificed in a temple of Tlacuchcalco ward, 'donde agora es la iglesia de Santa Ana.' Hist. Conq., 183, ed. 1840, 188-9. One repulse took place in Coyonacazco ward. Torquemada, i. 550-2. Spanish versions indicate no such losses, and they may probably belong to the later great defeat.
* ↑ Such is in main the version of Bernal Diaz; the other accounts differ greatly. This author states that five Spaniards were captured, nearly all the men wounded, and two rowers killed, for the brigantines in seeking to aid had become fast on stakes and exposed to attack. Had the Mexicans not been so frightened by the horsemen the loss would have been very great. Hist. Verdad., 143-4. Cortés allows three or four captured. Cartas, 228; Clavigero, Storia Mess., iii. 196. Duran places the scene where rose afterward the San Hipólito hermitage. Hist. Ind., MS., ii. 500. But for Quauhtlizcatzin, the prince who led the Tezcucan auxiliaries, all the Spaniards would have been lost, exclaims Ixtlilxochitl, Hor. Crueldades, 36. Herrera assumes that the fault lay with Alvarado for neglecting to fill the channel. dec. iii. lib. i. cap. xx.
* ↑ 'No solo no le culpo, mas loole.' Gomara, Hist. Mex., 203.
* ↑ The most serious attacks took place on June 24th and 25th, as if oracles had impelled the Mexicans to seek the destruction of the Spaniards on the anniversary of their reëntry into the city after the Alvarado massacre. The Tlacopan camp lost ten soldiers and had a dozen severely wounded, including Alvarado. Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 142, 145.
* ↑ Bernal Diaz seeks to convey the idea that he or his camp were opposed to the attempt, id., 146, but had it succeeded, he would probably have declared the truth, that Cortés was urged on all sides to make the effort, as stated in Gomara, Hist. Mex., 203, Herrera, dec. iii. lib. i. cap. xx., and Cortés, Cartas, 228-9. Perhaps the general made objections chiefly to cover his responsibility in case of failure.
* ↑ Alderete's party consisted of 70 infantry, 7 or 8 horsemen, and 15,000 to 20,000 allies, besides a force of laborers to tear down and to fill up: Tápia's of 80 men and over 10,000 allies, and Cortés' of 8 horsemen, 100 infantry, and an immense number of allies. Cortés, Cartas, 230-1. Gomara and Herrera differ slightly. Ixtlilxochitl says that his namesake followed Cortés with 8000 Tezcucans. Hor. Crueldades, 37. This insignificant number makes it difficult to account for the 250,000 Tezcucans which he lately introduced into the camps. Chimalpain names the three streets Cuahuecatitlan, Tecontlanamacoya, and the later Santa Ana. Hist. Conq., ii. 62.
* ↑ See Native Races, ii. 303; iii. 293 et seq.
* ↑ He crossed the channel with fifteen soldiers to sustain the fugitives, says Torquemada, i. 554; but this seems incorrect.
* ↑ The claims to the honor of rescuing the general are conflicting. Gomara, followed by Herrera and Torquemada, names 'Francisco' de Olea. Bernal Diaz, who states that this soldier slew four of the captains hoiding Cortés, lets Lerma dispose of the remainder. After this came other soldiers and Quiñones. Cristóbal de Olea was quite young, 26 years of age, a native of Medina del Campo, muscular, and skilled in arms, and a general favorite. Bernal Diaz adds other particulars. Hist. Verdad., 146, 246. Ixtlilxochitl, on the other hand, claims for his namesake the credit of having done what Spaniards claim for Olea, aided by his Tezcucans, who kept the enemy at bay. This, he adds, is proved by a painting on the gate of the monastery of Santiago Tlatelulco. Hor. Crueldades, 38-9. Herrera briefly alludes to Ixtlilxochitl as coming up after Olea, and then relates with some detail that at the same time came the Tlascaltec, Tamaxautzin he calls him, a native of Hueyotlipan. He was afterward baptized as Antonio or Bautista, and became a good Christian, the first native to receive extreme unction. dec. iii. lib. i. cap. xx. Torquemada, i. 555, copies, but calls the man Teamacatzin. Both evidently prefer Tlascaltec to Tezcucan records. In fact, Ixtlilxoclhitl adds certain incredible particulars about the prowess of his wounded hero in pursuing the Mexican general into a temple, although such pursuit could not have taken place under the circumstances. See also Duran, Hist. Ind., MS., ii. 503, and Camargo, Hist. Tlax., 130. Cortés writes that he would have been lost but for Quiñones, and one of his men who lost his life to save him. Cartas, 233. A small chapel was erected in the convent de la Concepcion to commemorate the escape. See Saavedra, Indio Peregrino, canto 20.
* ↑ Bernal Diaz assumes that Guzman rode up after Cortés was mounted, and fell captive into Aztec hands. Hist. Verdad, 147.
* ↑ 'Como lo hallarán pintado en la Yglesia de Tlatilulco, los cuales Indios confesan haberle visto.' Duran, Hist. Ind., MS., ii. 512. Why these patrons did not give their aid before is a question to which Bernal Diaz answers 'porque Nuestro Señor Iesu Christo lo permitiò.' Hist. Verdad., 146.
* ↑ Herrera relates how two captains, Flores and Mota, advanced with their vessels up a narrow channel. Flores was severely pressed at one time, and the latter had to sally on the street to relieve him and enable the brigantines to gain more open water. Flores died within a week of his wounds. dec. iii. lib. i. cap. xx. Torquemada says that Briones' vessel was lifted through a breach in the causeway. i. 555. Bernal Diaz speaks of several such narrow escapes. loc. cit.
* ↑ The artillerists being all disabled or dead, Pedro Moreno de Medrano, afterward a settler at Puebla, took their place. Id.
* ↑ Bernal Diaz writes as if Sandoval gained the camp at an early hour, rode over to Fort Xoloc, and came back in time to aid in Alvarado's retreat. But he would never have ventured to leave his command and his comrade in their danger; nor does it seem likely that he could have ridden the long distance to Xoloc and back in time to join in Alvarado's conflict, even if Cortés' defeat took place before 'misa mayor,' as he assumes. Hist. Verdad., 146-8. This author is here very confused, assuming, for instance, that Sandoval was fighting from his own camp instead of coöperating near Alvarado.
* ↑ So deeply affected was Bernal Diaz, among others, by the sight, and by the fear of himself falling captive — twice had he narrowly escaped — that he ever after had an oppressive feeling before battle. He then had recourse to prayer, and this invariably fortified him for the fight, so that he always maintained his reputation as a good soldier. He enumerates several incidents to prove that he was esteemed a brave man. Hist. Verdad., 157. Oviedo, referring to human sacrifices among the Romans, observes that they could not. have been half so fearful. iii. 515.
* ↑ 'Sacrificados los Nuestros, en el Momoztli, y Templo de su Maior Dios,' observes Torquemada, i. 553, among other points, though all are not exactly true. Huitzilopochtli's image had been brouglht with the retreating Mexicans to Tlatelulco. 'Immediatamente sacrificati,' says Clavigero, Storia Mess., iii. 212, probably on authority of Gomara; but Bernal Diaz states that the sacrifices lasted ten days, Hist. Verdad., 150; others write eight; one victim is said to have been kept eighteen days. See also Sahagun, Hist. Conq., 192. Ixtlilxochitl states that three victims were burned. Hor. Crueldades, 39.
* ↑ A count revealed the loss of 62 men and 6 horses, says Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 146, 152, 241, though he in one place leaves the impression that the men were all captured alive. This could hardly be the case, for a "count' would reveal only the missing; none could tell how many fell captive. Yet Prescott boldly assumes this number to have been taken, besides those who fell. Vetancurt divides the figures into 40 captives and 20 dead, Teatro Mex., pt. iii. 162, and Clavigero also includes dead and captive in that number, while raising the dead horses to 7. Storia Mess., iii. 212. Solis writes that over 40 Spaniards were carried off alive, and that Alvarado and Sandoval lost 20. Hist. Mex., ii. 410. Bernal Diaz acknowledges only a third of such loss between these two captains. Gomara gives 40 captives, several killed, 3 or 4 horses lost, and over 30 wounded. Hist. Mex., 205-6. Ixtlilxochitl raises the allied loss to over 2000. Hor. Crueldades, 37-9. Fifty-three Spaniards, says Sahagun, Hist. Conq., 192. In the cédula of March 7, 1525, granting a coat-of-arms to Cortés, 50 are mentioned, but in his letter to the sovereign the general acknowledges only 35 to 40 and over 1000 allies. Herrera and Torquemada adopt these figures. Oviedo, iii. 516, lowers the number to 30. Duran, who confounds the late repulse of Alvarado with the Sorrowful Night and this defeat, allows 4 banners to be captured. Hist. Ind., MS., ii. 501-4, 508.
* ↑ Bernal Diaz gives this conversation with some detail, and names Treasurer Alderete as the guilty officer who neglected to fill the channel, intimating that Cortés had been heedlessly allured onward by the Mexicans, leaving Alderete to attend to the filling. He even allows the treasurer to retort to the charge, in Sandoval's presence, that Cortés' eagerness had been the cause of the neglect. This is probably an invented account, based on Gomara's statement that the treasurer,' no name being given, neglected to fill a channel on his route. Informed of this, Cortés hastened thither to remedy the fault, only to meet the fleeing. Herrera adopts this version, as do most writers, including Prescott; but it is evidently wrong, for Cortés writes clearly that the misfortune occurred on his own route, some distance above its junction with the Tlacopan road, to which they soon retreated. On reaching this road he sent to recall the 'treasurer and comptroller,' who were leading their division victoriously at the farther end of it. Owing to their care in filling channels 'they received no injury in retreating.' Cartas, 233-4. There can be little doubt about this statement, since Cortés would have been only too glad to cast the blame on any other division than his own. He does not even claim to have been at the front, but in the rear, and near the spot where the neglect occurred. The only question then is, who was the guilty officer? The 'treasurer' commanded the centre division, and although there were several treasurers, the royal, late and new, and he who acted for the army, yet the new royal treasurer is undoubtedly meant, and this appears to have been Alderete, according to the statement of several authorities. Hence the accusation against Alderete must be wrong; anything besides this must be conjecture.
* ↑ 'Bolviò à la grita, Andrés de Tapia [the captain of his party] matò mas de sesenta Mexicanos,' adds Torquemada, i. 558-9.
* ↑ 'Esto no fue sino cinco dias.' Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 149.
* ↑ Similar women of courage were María de Estrada, the heroine of Otumba, Beatriz de Escobar, Juana Martin, and Beatriz de Palacios. Herrera, dec. iii. lib. ii. cap. i.
* ↑ Oil was the chief remedy. Torquemada, i. 558-60. Bernal Diaz speaks of a soldier named Juan Catalan who performed cures with the sign of the cross and psalm-singing. The Tlascaltecs also besieged the man for his attentions. 'Y verdaderamente digo, que hallauamos que Nuestro Señor Iesu Christo era servido de darnos esfuerço, . . y de presto sanauan.' Not twenty of Alvarado's men were free from wounds at this time. Hist. Verdad., 142. Solis allows this wonderful healing power to be attributed to no woman. Hist. Mex., ii. 412. But then he was a strict priest, who saw woman chiefly as a feeble and adoring supplicant.
* ↑ 'Que de ai a ocho dias no auia de quedar ninguno de nosotros a vida, porque assi le lo auian prometido la noche antes sus Dioses.' Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 149.
* ↑ Solis, Hist. Mex., ii. 415, states, and Prescott hastily affirms, that nearly all the allies deserted, and Bernal Diaz enumerates the mere handful that remained; but this must be erroneous, as shown by the course of the narratives in general. Two expeditions were sent forth about this time, and the large number of allies which joined therein may account in part for the gaps which gave rise to the above exaggeration. Cortés, indeed, alludes very indirectly to any defection.
* ↑ Forty thousand, says Ixtlilxochitl, obtained chiefly from Quauhnahuac and other towns subject to Tezcuco. Hor. Crueldades, 40. Herrera and others mention no auxiliaries from the camp. Bernal Diaz is confused.
* ↑ The Chicuhnauhtla, Ixtlilxochitl calls it.
* ↑ 'Y ellos le siruieron muy biẽ en el cerco.' Gomara, Hist. Mex., 207. Ixtlilxochitl claims of course that his Tezcucans formed the chief auxiliaries of Sandoval. Bernal Diaz wrongly gives Tápia this expedition, which Cortés intimates to have been sent about three days after the return of the Quauhnahuac party. Cartas, 237.
* ↑ Farfan and Villareal came, says Bernal Diaz, and Tecapaneca, cacique of Topeyanco, led the returning Tlascaltecs. Hist. Verdad,, 151.
* ↑ Cortés leaves the impression that this incident took place during the days when the Spaniards were making desultory entries into the city; but since he does not speak of the oracle or the defection the affair is undecided. Torquemada, i. 557, intimates that Chichimecatl served under Sandoval, but this is wrong.
* ↑ Ojeda magnifies the train of men to 4000 and the canoes to 3000. Herrera, dec. iii. lib. i. cap. xxii.
* ↑ Fifteen hundred loads maize, 1000 loads fowl, 300 sides venison, besides other effects, including Xicotencatl's confiscated property and women. Id.
* ↑ Herrera intimates that the material may have been a consignment to Leon, for which the disappointed owner sought a market. A vessel of Aillon's fleet, says Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 153.
* ↑ Some time before he had expressed the same intention, and the fear that little or no treasure would be recovered. Cartas, 222, 241. Ixtlilxochitl claims that his namesake provided 100,000 men for the task, Hor. Crueldades, 42, and Bernal Diaz states that this prince proposed purely a strict blockade as a safe and sure plan. Hist. Verdad., 150. The result proves that this would have been the best and as speedy as the one adopted, while the city would have been saved from destruction. That the plan was ever seriously suggested among this impatient crew is affirmed by no other authority.