# Organon (Owen)/Topics/Book 4

(1853) Translator's annotations not included.
Layout 2
Chap. 1. Of Topics relative to Genus.
    1st Top. Genus deceptively assumed, if it applies not to every thing, in the same species with that, of which it is predicated.
    2nd Top. The definition of accident to be regarded.
    3rd Top. Also whether the genus and the species are in the same category.
    4th Top. Whether the definition of species is predicated of genus.
    5th Top. If the genus is not predicated of what the species is.
    6th Top. If what is contained in the genus is subject to no species.
    7th Top. If what is placed in genus is of wider extension than, or equal to, the genus itself. (Vide Crakan Log ii. 5.)
    8th Top. If what are in the same species are not in the genus.
Chap. 2. Of Topics relative to Genus, Species, and Difference.
    1st Top. Whether there is another genus of the same thing.
    2nd Top. Examine the genus to which the assigned genus belongs.
    3rd Top. Whether the assigned genus is predicated of the same, as the species is predicated of, as genus.
    4th Top. Whether the definitions of the genera are predicated of the species and its subjects.
    5th Top. Whether difference has been assigned as a genus;
    6th Top. or as a species.
    7th Top. Whether genus is placed in species;
    8th Top. or difference is so placed.
    9th Top. Whether genus is made subject to difference;
    10th Top. or genus predicated as difference.
    11th Top. Whether no difference of genera is predicated of species.
    12th Top. If species is naturally prior to the genus;
    13th Top. or the genus and difference are not necessarily joined to the species.
Chap. 3. Of the proper Constitution of Genus and Species.
    1st Top. Genus erroneously assigned if its subject partakes either of some contrary to genus, or of what cannot be joined to it.
    2nd Top. If the species and genus are not employed in the same sense.
    3rd Top. If there be only one species of the genus.
    4th Top. If genus has not been taken in its right sense. (Vide Aldrich, cap. 1, de Metaphorâ. Cf. Top. vi. 2.)
    5th Top. If any contrary exist to species: this consideration multiform.
    6th Top. That the genus is rightly constituted, if there be a contrary to species, is proved in three ways.
    7th Top. From derivations; how the same topics may be obtained, useful for confirmation and refutation.
Chap. 4. Of Topics belonging to Similitude, Relatives, etc.
    1st. Arguments to be obtained from similars.
    2nd. How the argument about genus is to be conducted, if what is opposed to species be privation.
    3rd. Negatives to be considered inversely.
    4th. Of expression by relation, if species be relative, genus also is.
    5th. If species be not referred to the same thing, both per se, and according to genus.
    6th. Or according to all the genera of the genus. Objection.
    7th. Whether genus and species are redicated in the same case.
    8th. Whether those similarly called relatives as to cases, do not alike reciprocate.
    9th. In as many ways as species is referred to another thing, in so many also, ought genus to be and vice versâ.
    10th. Whether the opposite is the genus of the opposite.
    11th. If genus and species are stated as related to something, they ought to have the same ratio to those in which they are inherent.
Chap. 5. Topics relative to Genus continued.
    1st. The error of those, in stating the genus, who refer energy to habit, and vice versâ.
    2nd. Or a power.
    3rd. Or assume as genus, what is in some way consequent to species.
    4th. Genus and species ought to be inherent in the same.
    5th. Species ought to partake of genus, "simpliciter non quondam modo."
    6th. Error in taking a part of species for genus.
    7th. Or in referring a failing to a faculty.
    8th. Or involving in a faculty what is good per se; or subjecting to one genus, what is in more.
    9th. Error in assigning genus as difference, and vice versâ.
    10th. Also in making the thing affected, the genus of the affection.
    11th. Or of which there is passion, the genus of the passion.
Chap. 6. Of Topics relative to Genus, continued.
    1st. Examine whether the proposed genus possesses subject species.
    2nd. Whether the consequent of all, has been taken as genus or difference.
    3rd. Whether the assigned genus is stated to be in the subject species.
    4th. Whether genus and species are not synonymous, etc.
    5th. Error in assigning the better of two contraries to the worse genus.
    6th. Argument useful to the subverter from the more and less.
    7th. If the more or similar be not genus, neither is that which is assigned.
    8th. This place not useful to the supporter, if the assigned genus and species accept the more. Comparison of genera, etc., useful.
    9th. To establish genus we must show that it comprehends species, with whose nature it concurs.
    10th. How genus is to be distinguished from difference.
    11th. We must collect the genus from the noun and its derivatives.
    12th. Examine whether one is a consequent to the other, whilst the two do not reciprocate.

### Chapter 1Chapter 1

Our attention must now be directed to what appertains to genus, and property, and these are the elements of such as belong to definitions, but about them there is seldom a consideration by disputants. If then it should be laid down that there is a genus of any certain thing, we must first have respect to all things allied to what is spoken, whether it is not predicated of something, as is the case with accident, as if good is assumed as the genus of pleasure, (we must see) whether a certain pleasure is not good; for if this happens, it is clear that good is not the genus of pleasure, since genus is predicated of all things under the same species. Next, whether it is not predicated in answer to the question, what a thing is; but as accident, as whiteness, of snow, or what is moved by itself, of the soul; for neither is snow, the same thing as whiteness, wherefore whiteness, is not the genus of snow, nor is the soul, the same as what is moved, but it is accidental to it, to be moved, as also it frequently happens to an animal, to walk and to be walking. Moreover, the being moved, is not a certain thing, but appears to signify something active, or passive; likewise also whiteness, for it does not discover what snow is, but what kind of thing it is; hence neither of these, is predicated in reply to the question what a thing is.
Notwithstanding, we must especially have regard to the definition of accident, if it concurs with the stated genus, as also in what has just now been mentioned, for the same thing may possibly move, and not move itself, likewise also may be white, and not white, so that neither of these is genus, but accident, since we denominate that accident, which possibly may, and may not be present, with a certain thing.
​Further, whether the genus and the species, be not in the same division, but the one, essence, and the other, quality, or the one, relative, but the other, quality, for instance, snow is essence, also a swan, yet whiteness is not essence, but quality, so that whiteness is neither the genus of snow, nor of a swan. Again, science is of the number of relatives, but good, and beautiful, are each a quality, hence neither the good, nor the beautiful, is the genus of science, since the genera of relatives, must necessarily themselves also, be relatives, as in the instance of the double, for the multiple being the genus of the double, is itself of the number of relatives. To speak universally, genus must be under the same division with species, for if the species be essence, the genus also is, and if the species be a quality, the genus also is some quality, as if whiteness is a certain quality, so also is colour, and likewise in other cases.
Further, (we must examine) whether it is necessary or contingent that genus partake of that which was laid down in genus, and the definition of partaking, is to receive the definition of what is participated. Now it is evident that species partake of genera, but not genera of species, since the species accepts the definition of genus, but not genus that of the species. Wherefore we must observe, whether the proposed genus partakes, or can partake, of species, as if some one should declare that there is a certain genus of "being," or of "the one," for the genus will happen to partake of the species, since "being" and "the one" are predicated of all entities, so that their definition is (predicated) also.
Besides, whether the assigned species is truly predicated of a certain thing, but not the genus, as if "being" or the object of science is laid down as the genus of what is the object of opinion, for the object of opinion will be predicated of non-entity, since many non-entities are the objects of opinion. Still that being, or the object of science, is not predicated of non-entity, is evident, wherefore neither "being" nor the object of science, is the genus of the object of opinion, as of what species is predicated, genus must also of necessity be predicated.
​Again, whether what is placed in the genus can possibly partake of no species, since it is impossible that what partakes of no species, should partake of genus, unless it should be one of those species according to the first division, for these alone partake of genus. If, then, motion be assumed as the genus of pleasure, we must see whether pleasure be not production, nor alteration, nor any one of the other assigned motions, for it is palpable, that it partakes of no species, wherefore neither of the genus, since it is necessary that the participant of the genus, should also be participant of some species, so that pleasure can neither be a species of motion, nor an individual, (neither among those which are under a species of motion). For individuals partake, also, of genus and species, as a certain man, participates both of man, and of animal.
Besides, whether what is placed in genus, is of wider extension than the genus, as the subject of opinion, than entity, since both entity, and non-entity, are objects of opinion, wherefore, the object of opinion, will not be a species of entity, as the genus is always more widely extended than the species. Again, whether the species and the genus are predicated of an equal number of things, as if amongst those which are consequent to all, one should be placed as species, but the other as genus, as "being," and "the one;" for "being," and "the one," (are consequent) to every thing, so that neither is the genus of the other, since they are predicated of an equal number. Likewise also, if the first and the principal, be placed, one upon the other, since the principal is what is first, and what is first is principal, so that either both stated are the same, or neither is the genus of the other. Still the element relative to all such is, ​that the genus is of wider extension than the species and the difference, for difference, also, is predicated of fewer things than genus.
Also, examine whether what has been mentioned be not, or appear not to be, the genus of some one of those things which do not differ in species, the supporter of the argument, however, (will see) whether it is (the genus) of one of these, for there is the same genus of all things not different in species. If, then, it be shown to be the (genus) of one, it is evidently that of all, and if not of one, evidently not of any, as if some one admitting that there are indivisible lines, should say that their genus is indivisible, for what has been stated is not the genus of lines, admitting division, as they are not specifically different, for all straight lines do not specifically differ from each other.

### Chapter 2Chapter 2

Consider, also, whether there is any other genus of the assigned species, which neither comprehends the assigned genus, nor is under it, as if some one should assert science to be the genus of justice, since virtue also is genus, and neither of these genera comprehends the other, so that science would not be the genus of justice, for apparently, when one species is under two genera, one is comprehended under the other. This, nevertheless, is doubtful in some cases, for to some, prudence seems both virtue and science, and neither of the genera to be comprehended under the other, yet it is not admitted by all, that prudence is science; if, then, any one admitted the statement to be true, yet it will appear necessary that genera of the same thing, should be either subaltern, or both under the same genus, just as it happens in virtue and science, for both are under the same genus, since each of them is habit and disposition. We must see, therefore, whether neither of them is present with the assigned genus, for if they are ​neither subaltern genera, nor both under the same genus, what is assigned will not be a genus.
We must observe too the genus of the assigned genus, and so always the superior genus, whether all things are predicated of the species, and whether they are so in reply to what a thing is, for all superior genera must be predicated of species, in respect to what a thing is; if then there is any where a discrepancy, what is assigned, is evidently not the genus. Again, whether the genus partakes of the species, either itself, or any of the superior genera, as the superior (genus) partakes of none of the inferior. The subverter must use what we have said, but for the supporter it will be sufficient (if the proposed genus is admitted present with the species, but it is doubtful whether it is present with genus) to show that some one of the superior genera is predicated of species, in reference to what a thing is. For if one thing is predicated in reference to what a thing is, all, both above and below this, if they are predicated of species, will be so predicated in reference to what a thing is, so that the assigned genus also is predicated in reference to the same. But that if one is predicated in reference to what a thing is, all the rest will be so, if they are predicated, must be assumed from induction: nevertheless, if it is doubted whether the assigned genus is simply inherent, it is not enough to show that any of the superior genera is predicated of species, in respect to what a thing is, e.g. if some one gave lation, as the genus of walking, it is not sufficient to show that walking is motion, in order to prove that it is lation, since there are other motions also, but we must prove besides, that walking partakes of none of those in the same division, except lation. For it is necessary that the participant of genus, should also participate of some one species, according to the first division; if then walking, neither partakes of increase, nor of diminution, nor of the other motions, it clearly partakes of lation, so that lation would be the genus of walking.
Again, in those where the assigned species is predicated as genus, observe whether the assigned genus also is predicated of the same things of which species is, in reference to what a thing is, ​likewise whether all those things which are above the genus. For if there is any discrepancy, what is assigned is evidently not genus, as if it were genus, all things above this, and the very thing itself, would be predicated in reference to what a thing is, of which things species also is predicated, in respect of the same. Now this is useful to the subverter, if the genus is not predicated in respect to what a thing is, of which thing, species also is predicated, but to the confirmer it is useful, if it is predicated in the question, what a thing is. For both the genus and the species, will happen to be predicated of the same, in respect to what a thing is, so that the same thing is under two genera, wherefore the genera are necessarily subaltern. If then what we wish to constitute genus is shown not to be under species, species will be evidently under it, so that it will have been proved that this is genus.
Examine moreover, the definitions of the genera, whether they suit the assigned species, and the participants of the species, since it is necessary that the definitions of the genera, should be predicated of the species, and of what partakes of the species, so that if there is any where a discrepancy, it is manifest that genus is not, what has been assigned.
Again, whether a person has given the difference, as a genus, must be (looked to); for instance, whether the immortal, as a genus of God, for immortal, is the difference of animal, since of animals, some are mortal, but some immortal, so that there is evidently an error, for the difference, is not the genus, of any thing. But that this is true is evident, for no difference signifies what ​a thing is, but rather of what quality it is, as pedestrian, and biped.
Also whether difference is placed in genus, as that the odd is that which is number, since the odd is a difference, not a species, of number. Neither does difference seem to partake of genus, for every thing which partakes of the genus, is either species or individual; but difference is neither species nor individual, wherefore clearly difference, does not partake of genus, so that neither would the odd, be species, but difference, since it does not partake of genus.
Moreover, whether genus is placed in the species, for instance, that conjunction is continuity, or that mixture is temperament, or as Plato defines, that local motion is lation, since it is not necessary that conjunction should be continuity, but on the contrary that continuity should be conjunction, since not every thing which touches is continuous, but every thing which is continuous touches. The like also occurs with the rest, for neither is all mixture, temperament, (as the mixture of dry things, is not temperament,) neither is all local change, lation, since walking, does not seem to be lation. For (the latter) is asserted generally of those, which involuntarily change their place, as happens to inanimate natures. Nevertheless, it is evident, that species is more widely predicated than genus, in the cases advanced, when the contrary ought to occur.
Again, whether difference is placed in species, as that the immortal, is that which is God. For species will happen to be predicated, either equally or of more, since difference is always predicated equally with, or to a greater extent than, species. Moreover, whether the genus is placed in the difference, as that colour, is what concretes, or that number, is the odd. Likewise, if the genus has been spoken of, as if it were difference; for it is possible that ​some one may adduce, even a thesis of this kind, as that mixture is the difference of temperament, or local change, the difference of lation. All such particulars however, we must consider through the same, (for places intercommunicate,) since both the genus must necessarily be predicated more extensively than the difference, and must not partake of difference, but when it (genus) is thus assigned, neither of what have been mentioned can possibly occur; for it will be spoken of fewer things, and genus will partake of difference.
Besides, if no difference of genera is predicated of the assigned species, neither will the genus be predicated, thus neither the odd, nor the even, is predicated of the soul; wherefore neither is number. Moreover, if species is prior naturally, and co-subverts the genus, (it will not be genus,) for the contrary appears to be true. Once more, if is possible (for species), to leave the proposed genus or difference, as to be moved, the soul, or the true and the false, opinion, neither of these named would be genus or difference, for genus and difference are apparently consequent so long as there is species.

### Chapter 3Chapter 3

Moreover, we should observe whether what is laid down in the genus, partakes or can partake, of something contrary to genus, since the same thing, will, at the same time, partake of contraries, as it (species) never leaves genus, but partakes, or is capable of partaking, of what is contrary. Besides, whether species communicates with any ​thing which cannot altogether be present with those which air under genus, thus, if the soul partakes of life, but no number can possibly live, the soul would not be a species of number.
Notice also, whether the species is equivocal with the genus, employing for (the investigation of) the equivocal, the elements before mentioned, for genus and species, are synonymous.
Since however there are many species of every genus, we must observe whether there may not be another species of the proposed genus, for if there is not, it is evident, in short, that the thing spoken of will not be genus.
Likewise observe, whether a person has proposed as genus, that which is spoken of metaphorically, as that temperance is symphony, for every genus is properly predicated of species, but symphony is not properly predicated of temperance, but metaphorically, for all symphony is in sounds.
Again, whether a thing be contrary to species; and this consideration is multifarious; first, indeed, whether in the same genus there is also a contrary when there is not a contrary to genus, for contraries must necessarily be in the same genus, if nothing is contrary to genus. If however there is any thing contrary to genus, we must observe whether the contrary is in the contrary (genus), since it is necessary that the contrary should be in the contrary, if any thing is contrary to genus; each of these however appears through induction. Moreover, if in short the contrary to species, is in no genus, but is itself a genus, as the good, for if this is not in genus, neither will the contrary to this be in genus, but will be itself genus, as happens in the case of good and evil, since neither of these is in genus, but is each of them a genus. Further, whether both genus and species are contrary to a certain thing, and whether there is any thing between some, ​but not between others. For if there is something between genera, there is also between species, and if between species, likewise between genera, as in virtue and vice, and justice and injustice, for there is something between each of these. To this it may be objected, that there is nothing between health and disease, but that there is something between evil and good, or whether there is something between both the species and genera, yet not similarly, but between the one negatively, and between the other as a subject, for it is probable that something similarly intervenes between both, as between virtue and vice, justice and injustice, for there are intermediates between both, according to negation. Further, when there is not a contrary to genus, we must observe not only whether the contrary is in the same genus, but also whether the medium is, for the media are in the same genus as the extremes, as, for instance, in white and black, for colour is both the genus of these, and of all intermediate colours. An objection may lie, that defect and excess, are in the same genus, (as both are in what is evil,) but the moderate, which is a medium between these, is not in what is evil, but in what is good. Notice too, whether the genus is contrary to a certain thing, but the species to nothing, as if the genus is contrary to a certain thing, the species is also, as virtue and vice, justice and injustice. Likewise, to one who considers other things, such a thing would appear evident. There is an objection in health and disease, for health simply, is contrary to disease, yet a certain disease, being a species of disease, is not contrary to any thing, e. g. a fever and ophthalmia, and every other (disease).
The subverter then, must pay attention in so many respects, for if what have been mentioned are not inherent, the thing assigned is evidently not a genus, but the confirmer (must regard them) triply: first, whether the contrary to species is in the before-named genus, when there is not a contrary to the genus, for if the contrary is in this, it is evident that the proposition is also: next, whether the medium is in the above-named genus, as in what the media are the ​extremes also are: lastly, if there be any thing contrary to genus we most notice whether the contrary also is in the contrary, since if it be, the proposed (species) is evidently in the proposed genus.
Again, in cases and co-ordinates, both the subverter and confirmer (must notice) whether they are similarly consequent, since at the same time they are present, or are not present, with one thing, and with all, as if justice is a certain science, what is justly, is also scientifically, (done), and a just is a scientific man, but if something of these is not, neither is any of the rest.

### Chapter 4Chapter 4

Such things also (must be noticed), which are similarly affected with respect to each other, thus the pleasant subsists with reference to pleasure, similarly to the useful with reference to good, for each is effective of the other. If then pleasure is what is good, the pleasant will be what is useful, for it would be clearly effective of good, since pleasure is good. The like also occurs in generations and corruptions, as, if to build is to energize, to have built is to have energized, and if to learn is to remember, to have learned is to have remembered, and if to be dissolved is to be corrupted, to have been dissolved is to have been corrupted, and dissolution is a certain corruption. So also in those which have the power to generate and to corrupt, and in powers and uses, and in short, according to any kind of likeness, as we have observed in generation and corruption, consideration must be paid both by the subverter and the confirmer. For if what is corruptive dissolves, to be corrupted is to be dissolved, and if what is generative is effective, to be generated is to be made, and generation is making, and the same in powers and uses, since if power is disposition, to be able also is to be disposed; and if the use of a thing is energy, to use is to energize, and to have used is to have energized.
​If however privation be that which is opposed to species, we may confute in two ways: first, if the opposed be in the assigned genus, for either privation simply, is in no genus, which is the same, or it is not in the (same) extreme genus, as if sight is in sense, as the extreme genus, blindness will not be sense. Secondly, if privation is opposed both to genus and to species, but the thing opposed is not in the opposite, neither will the thing assigned be in the assigned; by him therefore who subverts, this must be used as we have said, but by the constructor only in one way, for if the opposite be in the opposite, the proposition also would be in the proposition, thus, if blindness be a certain privation of sense, sight also is sense.
Again, we must consider negatives inversely, as was observed in the case of accident, thus, if the pleasant be what is good, what is not good is not pleasant, for if it were not so, something not good would be pleasant. Now it is impossible, if good is the genus of the pleasant, that any thing not good should be pleasant, for of what genus is not predicated, neither will any species be. He also who confirms, must consider it in like manner, since if what is not good is not pleasant, the pleasant is good, so that the good is the genus of the pleasant.
If however species be relative, we must see whether genus also is relative, for if species be a relative, genus is also, as in the double and the multiple, for each of these is a relative. If then genus be a relative, it is not requisite that species also should be, for science is of the number of relatives, but grammar is not. Or does what was before asserted appear neither to be true? for virtue is that which is beautiful and which is good, and virtue is a relative, but the good and the beautiful are not relatives, but qualities.
Moreover, (notice) whether species is not referred to the same thing, both per se, and according to genus, as if the double is said to be the double of the half, it is necessary also that the multiple should be said (to be the multiple) of ​the half, for if not the multiple will not be the genus of the double.
Besides, whether it is not referred to the same thing, both according to genus and according to all the genera of the genus, for if the double and the multiple are with reference to the half, to exceed will also be predicated of the half, and in short, according to all the superior genera there will be a reference to the half. It is objected, that a reference to the same thing is not necessary per se, and according to genus, for science is said to be of that which is the object of science, but habit and disposition are not predicated with reference to the object of science, but to the soul.
Again, whether genus and species are predicated in the same manner as to case, as whether pertaining to a certain thing, or predicated of something, or in some other way, for as species, so also is genus (predicated), as in the double, and the superior (genera), for both the double and the multiple are predicated of a certain thing. Likewise in the case of science, for both science itself and its genera, as disposition and habit, are (predicated) of a certain thing. It is objected, that sometimes this is not the case, for "the different," and "the contrary," (are predicated) with reference to a certain thing, but "another" being the genus of these, is not predicated with reference to, but from, something, for (a thing) is so predicated "another," (which is different) from, something else.
Moreover, whether what are similarly called relatives, according to cases, do not similarly reciprocate, as with the double and the multiple, for each of these is said to be of something, both itself, and reciprocally, for both the half and the least part, (are said to be so) of something. Likewise with science and opinion, for these are said to be of a certain thing and similarly reciprocate, and both the object of science and of opinion are predicated with reference to something. If, then, the reciprocation is not similar in the respect of something, one is evidently not the genus of the other.
Again, if genus and species are not predicated with reference to an equal number of things, for ​each, seems predicated similarly, and of the same number, as in "a gift," and "giving," for a "gift," is said to be "of" some one, or "to" some one, and "giving" also, "of" a certain one, and "to" a certain one; still "giving" is the genus of "gift," for "a gift," is "a giving" not to be returned. With some, predication with reference to an equal number, does not occur; for the double is the double of something, but the excessive, and the greater, (are predicated) of, and with reference to, a certain thing, for every thing excessive, and that which is greater, exceeds in something, and is the excess of a certain thing. Wherefore, what are mentioned, are not the genera of the double, since they are not predicated with reference to an equal number in species, or it is not universally true that species and genus are predicated with reference to an equal number of things.
Examine, likewise, whether the opposite is the genus of the opposite, as if the multiple is the genus of the double, the sub-multiple is so, of the half, for the opposite must necessarily be the genus of the opposite. If, then, any one asserts science to be sense, it will be requisite that the object of science should be sensible, which, however, is not the case, for not every object of science is sensible, as some things intelligible are objects of science. Wherefore, the sensible is not the genus of the object of science, but if it be not, neither is sense, the genus of science.
Nevertheless, since of those which are enunciated with reference to any thing, some are necessarily in, or about, those, to which they happen to be referred, as disposition, habit, and symmetry, (for these can possibly be in nothing else, than in those things to which they are referred;) but others are not necessarily in those, to which they are sometimes referred, yet may be in them, (as if the soul is an object of science, since nothing prevents the soul having science of itself, yet it is not necessary, since this very science may possibly be in something ​else;) others, again, cannot simply be inherent in those to which they happen to be referred, (as the contrary can neither be in the contrary, nor science in its object, unless the object of science should be the soul or man;) we must observe, whether any one places a thing of this kind in a genus, which is not of this kind, as if he declared that memory is the permanency of science. For all permanency is in, and about, that which is permanent, so that the permanency of science is in science; memory therefore is in science, since it is the permanency of science, yet this is impossible, for all memory is in the soul. The place here spoken of, is common also to accident, for it does not signify whether we say that permanency is the genus of memory, or call it accidental to it; since if in any way whatever, memory is the permanency of science, the same reasoning will suit it.

### Chapter 5Chapter 5

Again, if a person has referred habit to energy, or the energy to the habit, as that sense is a motion through the body, for sense is a habit, but motion an energy. Likewise, if he has stated memory to be a habit retentive of opinion, since no memory is a habit, but rather an energy.
They also err, who arrange habit under consequent power, as that mildness is a command of anger, and that courage and justice are the control of fear and lucre, for the impassive man is said to be courageous and mild, but he is self-controlled, who, when he suffers, is not carried away. Perhaps, therefore, such ​a power as this is consequent to each, so that if he suffers, he should not be transported by, but command (passion). Yet this is not the essence of a courageous or a mild man, but not to be affected at all, by such things.
Sometimes, indeed, they admit as genus, that which is in any way consequent, as that pain is the genus of anger, and opinion of faith, for both these we have named follow in a certain way the assigned species, yet neither of them is a genus, for the angry man is pained, pain having been produced in him before, since the anger is not the cause of the pain, but the pain of the anger, so that anger simply is not pain. On this account, neither is faith opinion, since it is possible to have an opinion of, without believing in, a thing; and this is impossible, if faith is a species of opinion, for it is impossible that a thing should remain the same any longer, if it has been altogether changed from species, as neither can the same animal by possibility be sometimes man, but sometimes not. Still, if any one say, that he who opines, of necessity also believes, opinion and faith will be predicated of an equality, so that neither thus can it be genus, since it is necessary that genus possess a greater extent of predication.
Observe, moreover, whether both are naturally adapted to be in any the same thing, for in what the species is, the genus also is, as in what there is whiteness, there is also colour, and in what grammar is present, science also is. If then, any one should say that shame is fear, or that anger is pain, species and genus will not happen to be in the same thing, since shame is in the reasoning, but fear in the irascible part of the soul; pain also, indeed, is in the appetitive part, (for pleasure also is in this,) but anger in the irascible part, so that what have been assigned are not genera, ​since they are not naturally adapted to be in the same (subject) with the species. In like manner also, if friendship be in the appetitive, it could not be a certain will, for all will, is in the reasoning part. This place, indeed, is useful for accident, also; for accident, and that to which it is accidental, are in the same thing, so that unless they should appear in the same thing, they are evidently not accidents.
Further, (notice) whether species partakes of what is said to be genus partially, since genus does not appear to be partially participated, as man is not partially an animal, nor grammar partially a science, likewise also, in other things. Observe, therefore, whether genus is partially partaken of in certain things, as if animal has been said to be that which is sensible or visible, for animal is partially sensible and visible; as to the body, sensible and visible, but not as to the soul; so that the visible and the sensible would not be the genus of animal.
Sometimes, indeed, they insensibly transfer the whole to a part, for instance, that animal is animated body; yet the part is by no means predicated of the whole, so that body would not be the genus of animal, since it is a part.
Also, see if any thing to be blamed or avoided is referred to power or to the possible, as that a sophist (is one able to acquire wealth from apparent wisdom), or that a calumniator (is one able to calumniate and make enemies of his friends), or that a thief is one able secretly to steal the property of others. For no one of the above-named is said to be such in consequence of being able to act in this way, for both God and a good man are able to perform base actions, yet they are not such in character, since all debased characters are called so, on account of their deliberate choice. Besides, all power is of the number of eligible things, ​for the powers of the bad are eligible, wherefore we say, that both God and the good man possess them, for they are able to perform base actions. So that power would not be the genus of any thing blameable, otherwise it would happen that something blameable was eligible, since there will be a certain power blameable.
Also, (notice) whether any thing which is of itself honourable or eligible, is referred to power, or to the possible, or to the effective, for every power and everything possible or efficient is eligible, on account of something else, or whether any one of those things which are in two or in more genera, have been referred to one, since some things cannot be reduced to one genus, as an impostor and a calumniator; as neither is he who deliberately chooses, but is incapable of effecting, nor he who is capable, but does not previously choose, a calumniator or an impostor, but he who has both these; so that we must not place the above-named in one genus, but in both genera.
Yet further, vice versâ, sometimes they assign genus as the difference, and the difference as genus; e.g. that astonishment is the excess of admiration, and that faith is the vehemence of opinion. For neither excess nor vehemence is genus, but difference; since astonishment seems to be excessive admiration, and faith vehement opinion; so that admiration and opinion are genus, but excess and vehemence are difference. Moreover, if any one should assign excess and vehemence as genera, inanimate things would be susceptible of faith and astonishment, for the vehemence and excess of each thing is present with that of which it is the vehemence and excess; if then astonishment is the excess of admiration, astonishment will be present with admiration, so that admiration will be astonished. In a similar manner also, faith will be present to opinion, if it is the vehemence of opinion, so that opinion will believe. Again, it will occur to him who thus assigns (genus), to call vehemence vehement, and excess excessive, for there is a vehement faith, if then faith is vehemence, vehemence would be ​vehement, likewise also there is an exceeding astonishment, if then astonishment is excess, excess would be exceeding. Nevertheless, neither of these seems right, as neither is science the object of science, nor motion that which is moved.
Sometimes, indeed, an error arises from placing passion in that which suffers, as a genus, which happens to as many as declare immortality to be perpetual life; for immortality appears to be a certain passion or symptom of life, and that what we have stated is true, may become evident, if any one admits that a person from being mortal has become immortal, for no one would say that he takes another life, but that a certain symptom or passion accedes to this life, wherefore life is not the genus of immortality.
Again, (an error occurs) if that of which there is passion, they declare to be the genus of the passion, as that wind is air in motion, for wind is rather the motion of air, since the same air remains both when it is moved and when it is stationary, so that, in short, wind is not air, for else there would be wind when the air is not moved, since the same air remains stationary which was wind. The like will also happen in other such things, if then it is necessary in this to grant that wind is air in motion, yet such a thing is not to be admitted in all cases, (i.e.) of which the proposed genus is not truly predicated, but in those only wherein it is truly predicated. For in some it does not appear truly predicated, as in clay and snow, for they describe snow to be congealed water; but clay, earth, mingled with moisture; yet neither is snow, water; nor clay, earth; so that neither of the assigned can be genus, for genus must of necessity always be ​truly predicated of species. In a similar manner neither is wine putrified water, as Empedocles calls it
    "—the water putrified in wood."
for simply it (wine) is not water.

### Chapter 6Chapter 6

Further, (we must notice) whether, in short, what is proposed is the genus of nothing, for (if so) it will evidently not be that of the thing enunciated; but this must be considered from those which are participant of the assigned genus, not at all differing in species, as, for instance, white things, for such do not at all differ in species from each other; yet of every genus the species are different, so that whiteness will not be the genus of any thing.
Again, whether that which is consequent to all, has been declared genus or difference, for many things are consequent to all, as "being," and "the one," are of the number of things consequent to all. If then a person has assigned being as genus, it will evidently be the genus of all things, since it is predicated of them, for genus is predicated of nothing else than of species, so that "the one" will be a species of "being." Of all then of which genus is predicated, it happens that species is also predicated, since "being," and "the one," are simply predicated of all, when it is necessary that species should be predicated to a less extent. If however he has stated that what is consequent to all, is difference, it is manifest that difference will be predicated to an equal or greater extent than genus, for if genus is of the number of things consequent to all, it will be predicated to an equal extent, but if genus does not follow all, difference will be predicated to a greater extent than it.
​Yet more, (we must observe) whether the assigned genus is stated to be in subject species, as whiteness in snow, so that it will evidently not be genus, for genus is predicated alone of the subject species.
Notice, moreover, whether genus and species are not synonymous, as genus is synonymously predicated of all the species.
Besides, (it is erroneous) when there being a contrary both to species and to genus, the better of the contraries is referred to the worse genus, for the remainder will happen to be in the remainder, since contraries are in contrary genera, so that the better will be in the worse, and the worse in the better, yet the genus of the better, seems also to be better. Also, if when the same species subsists similarly, with regard to both, it is referred to the worse, and not to the better genus, e. g. that the soul is motion or what is moved. For the same (soul) appears equally to possess the power of resting and moving, so that if permanency be better, it ought to be referred to this genus.
Again, the subverter (may argue) from the more and less, if genus accepts the more, but species does not, neither itself, nor what is enunciated according to it. For instance, if virtue accepts the more, justice also, and the just man (do so), for one is said to be more just than another, if then the assigned genus accepts the more, but the species does not, neither itself, nor what is enunciated according to it, the thing assigned cannot be genus.
Again, if what seems to be the more or similarly, is not genus, it is evident that neither is the ​thing assigned. This place however is useful, especially in such things wherein those appear many, which are predicated of species, in reference to the question what a thing is, and when there has not been definition, neither can we say what is their genus; as of anger, both pain, and the opinion of contempt, seem to be predicated, in reference to what a thing is, since the angry man is pained, and thinks that he is contemned. Indeed there is the same consideration in species, to any one comparing it with something else, as if the more, or what appears similarly to be in the assigned genus, is not in the genus, the assigned species, it is evident, cannot be in the genus.
The subverter then must employ this as we have said, but to the supporter this place is not useful, if the assigned genus and species accept the more, for there is nothing to prevent, when both accept it, one from becoming the genus of the other; for both the beautiful and the white accept the more, and neither is the genus of the other. Yet the comparison of the genera and of the species with each other is useful, as if this, and that, are similarly genus, if one of them is genus, the other also is. Likewise, if the less, the more also is, as if power more than virtue is the genus of continence, but virtue is a genus, so likewise power. The same things will be adapted to be said also of species, for if this, and that, are similarly species of the proposed (genus), if one be species, the other also is, and if the less seeming is species, the more is likewise.
Moreover, in order to confirm, we must examine whether the genus in those things in which it is assigned, is predicated in reference to what a thing is, when the assigned species is not one, but there are many and different (species), for it will be evidently genus. But if the assigned species be one, see whether the genus is predicated also of other species in reference to what a thing is; since, again, it will occur that the same thing is predicated of those which are many and different.
​Nevertheless, since difference also appears to some to be predicated of species, in reference to what a thing is, we must separate genus from difference, by employing the above-mentioned elements: first, indeed, because genus is of wider predication than difference; next, because genus is more suitable than difference to enunciate, in answer to the question what a thing is; for he who says that man is an animal, developes in a greater degree what man is, than he who terms him pedestrian—and because the difference always signifies the quality of the genus, but the genus not that of the difference; for whoever terms man pedestrian, describes what kind of animal he is; but he who calls him animal, does not describe of what quality is the pedestrian.
Thus then, we must separate the difference from the genus; since however what is musical, so far as it is musical, appears to be scientific, and music to be a certain science, and if what walks is moved by walking, walking to be a certain motion, we must consider in what genus we desire to construct any thing after the manner stated, e. g. if (we wish to show) that science is faith, (we must notice) whether he who is scientifically cognizant, so far as he is so, believes; for it will be evident that science is a certain faith, and the same method (must be used) in other such cases.
Once more, since it is difficult to separate what is always consequent to a certain thing, and does not reciprocate, (so as to show) that it is not genus, it this is consequent to every individual of that, but that not to every individual of this—as quiet to tranquillity, and divisibility to number, but not the contrary, (as not every thing divisible is number, neither (all) quiet, tranquillity,)—(the disputant) must employ this place, as if genus were that which is always consequent, when the other does not reciprocate; but if another proposes (this argument), it must not be admitted in all cases. The objection to it is, that non-entity is consequent to every thing generated, (for what is being generated, is not,) and ​does not reciprocate, (for not every non-entity is generated,) yet, nevertheless, non-entity is not the genus of what is being generated, for simply non-entity has no species. About genus then, we must carry on the discussion, as we have stated.