# Philosophical Works of the Late James Frederick Ferrier/Institutes of Metaphysic (1875)/Section 3/Proposition 3

The Institutes of Metaphysic, Philosophical Works of the Late James Frederick Ferrier (1875 ed., Vol. 1). (E. L. Lushington, & A. Grant, Eds.) Edinburgh: William Blackwood and Sons. pp. 464-466.
PROPOSITION III.
A PREMISS BY WHICH THE THIRD ALTERNATIVE IS ELIMINATED.
DEMONSTRATION.
There is no absurdity or contradiction involved in the supposition that something (whatever it may be), really and truly, and absolutely exists. And therefore, inasmuch as no absurdity or contradiction attaches to this supposition, no absurdity or contradiction attaches to that to which this supposition refers—namely, to Being in itself. Consequently Absolute existence, or Being in itself, is not the contradictory.
OBSERVATIONS AND EXPLANATIONS.
1. Although a demonstration of this proposition is given, none, strictly speaking, is required. The ​The truth of this proposition is presupposed by the very nature of the inquiry.proposition is postulated or presupposed by the very terms of the inquiry, and must be conceded by all who enter on the study of metaphysics. The ultimate problem of the science is, What it truth?—(See Introduction, § 54.) This problem necessarily takes for granted two points: first, that truth is; and secondly, that truth is not nonsense or the contradictory. The science is not called upon to prove that truth is, and that it is not the contradictory. This must be conceded. The science is merely called upon to find out and prove what truth is; it merely undertakes to affix to truth some predicate descriptive and explanatory of its character. In the same way the science is not called upon to prove either that Absolute existence is, or that it is not the contradictory. It takes, and must be allowed to take, this for granted: it is merely called upon to find out and demonstrate what Absolute Existence is; in other words to affix to it some predicate declaratory of its nature and character. In this respect the metaphysician resembles the mathematician, who is not called upon to prove either that his diagrams are, or that they involve no contradiction, but simply to demonstrate what relations they and their various parts bear to one another. So that if the foregoing demonstration should appear not altogether satisfactory, the reader is requested to remember that the proposition is one which the science is entitled to postulate, and one which even ​the most extravagant scepticism cannot call in question. No form of scepticism has ever questioned the fact that something absolutely exists, or has ever maintained that this something was the nonsensical. The sceptic, even when he carries his opinions to an extreme, merely doubts or denies our competency to find out and declare what absolutely exists.
Third counter-proposition. Why there is none.2. There is no third counter-proposition; and the foregoing considerations sufficiently explain why there should be none. Psychology has never expressly maintained that Absolute Existence is the contradictory: she must be understood to hold that it is the simply inconceivable by us. But, in cone sequence of having neglected to draw a clear line of demarcation between these two categories—the simply inconceivable by us, and the absolutely inconceivable in itself—psychology has left her opinion even on this point in a state of ambiguity. She has nowhere expressly declared whether Absolute Existence is the simply inconceivable by us (i.e. the non-contradictory) or the absolutely inconceivable in itself (i.e. the contradictory). In short, she has overlooked altogether this most important distinction, and thus has contributed largely to that looseness of thought and equivocation of expression which have hitherto prevented the higher problems of philosophy from acquiring even an intelligible shape.