# The Civil Service and the Patronage/Chapter 06

CHAPTER VI.
IMMEDIATE EFFECTS OF THE NEW POLICY.
1837-1845.
Jackson had sown the wind, and Van Buren was to reap the whirlwind; nor can there be much doubt that, so far as the civil service is concerned, he deserved the harvest that he garnered. Martin Van Buren is a man with a recently rehabilitated reputation: we find in him now a force and an ability unacknowledged by his contemporaries, and the temptation is to go to the extreme and to sink the politician in the statesman. It is true that in 1829 he did not directly meddle in minor politics to any considerable extent, and that as president he made but eighty removals. His indirect influence under Jackson, however, we have seen to be enormous; and the chief reason for his moderation while at the head of the government was that the personnel of the service was favorable to him, as is shown by the large number of office-holders who supported his candidacy at the Baltimore convention. It is quite true that the spoils system was not the work of Van Buren or of Jackson, or of any one man; it was the result of a gradual development: but evolution cannot relieve an individual of his personal responsibility any more than predestination excuses a man's sin. The fact remains that Van Buren stood before the country as the head of the Albany Regency and the representative supporter of the spoils system; that he associated with politicians who represented what was worse in the politics of the
time; and that he appointed Jesse Hoyt to succeed Samuel Swartwout as collector at New York.
It is because of the opportunity which it affords for a study of the results of the spoils system on governmental efficiency that Van Buren's administration is chiefly interesting to the student of the civil service. Principles remained as Jackson had enunciated them; qualifications were the same as in 1829; and the machinery was in a state of transition between the confusion which we observed in the last chapter and the definite order of the fifties. While the materials for such a study are unusually abundant, it is peculiarly difficult to arrive at a fair judgment. Conditions, as we have seen, varied greatly in different parts of the country, and Jackson added another element of diversity.
A spoils system does not drive ability from the civil service; it rather attracts many brilliant men who think they can sail best in troubled waters; it appeals to the gambler's instinct. Such men have characteristics different from those of the seekers after the safe monotony of a life position, but their capacities are fully as great. The really deleterious change that the spoils system does make is to throw open the doors of office to a very inferior class of men, and to lower the minimum of capacity required. This fact, by increasing the distance between the extremes, makes the task of generalization more difficult. A special condition must also be given due weight at this time, — the panic of 1837.
Investigation into the efficiency of the civil service under Van Buren is not much aided by popular criticism of the details of administration, for comments on them are almost as rare, during the twelve years from 1829 to 1841, as during the previous period. The department of the national government that most nearly affects the larger part of our population is the post-office. At the beginning of Jackson's administration, when the great change of personnel had disturbed the delicate machinery of the mails, there was some public fault-finding, but after the
first few months it was heard no more; the tolerance of the American public cannot be exaggerated. There was some congressional investigation, but it was hushed by the death of Barry. Our discussion must therefore be based chiefly on official documents, and, in the main, be confined to two departments, — the land office and the customs service.
The land office was peculiarly liable to suffer from all the adverse conditions of the times. The local offices were widely scattered, and often in places difficult of access; the officers were therefore comparatively independent. The majority of them, moreover, were situated along the frontier, or in the newer districts, where it was often impossible to find, except at long intervals, proper means of forwarding to the central government the money received for lands. Local banking institutions were unsound and local currency worthless a hundred miles away. Moreover, the frontier lacks the business knowledge, and consequently the high standard of business honesty, of a long-established community. As Mr. Garesche, a clever agent of the treasury, wrote to Secretary Woodbury, the code of morality in general was lower than that acknowledged in the East. When, in addition to these circumstances, the sudden expansion of land purchases, springing from $5,000,000 in 1834 to nearly $25,000,000 in 1837, is remembered, with the temptations to speculation thus brought to the land officers, it cannot be astonishing that irregularities are to be found.
During these years the treasury department had special agents travelling about the country examining the condition of the offices, the local standing of the officers, and sometimes their political affiliations. Whether the investigations on the latter point were or were not in pursuance of verbal instructions cannot be ascertained, but the fact that the subject is very often not mentioned would seem to indicate that they were not. A characteristic summing up of such an investigation is as follows: “Messrs. Ball and Leiper appear intelligent men, and no doubt will conduct the business with fidelity and impartiality. They
are zealous supporters of the administration, and very popular.” Mr. Garesche, the ablest of these agents, reported that very few officers understood bookkeeping: there is scarcely an office reported in which the examiner did not find errors that, on examination, proved careless rather than fraudulent; the different sets of books hardly ever coincided. In 1836 Garesche was sent to New Orleans to investigate fraudulent land purchases, which rumor magnified to such an extent that the governor mentioned the subject in a message to the legislature; but close examination by a legislative committee revealed scarcely anything definite, except some looseness in dealing with purchasers.
Such incompetent bookkeepers could not successfully cover up extensive frauds; but the government was not as particular as it should have been in enforcing the land laws, and a clever man could buy as much land as he wished regardless of restrictions. Many of the officers bought land extensively on their own account, sometimes covering it with the name of a near relative or partner. Some loaned out for their own advantage the government balances that they held; and many were in the habit of exchanging money, a practice which might or might not be dishonest, but which was certainly improper considering the monetary conditions of the time. One receiver of public money was reported as farming out his office. The locating of purchases upon the plats seems to have been poorly done, a circumstance from which resulted much confusion; but the only complaint commonly made to the special agents by the public was that the land surveying was not done rapidly enough, and this may have been the result of the voracious demand rather than of inactivity.
That the crisis of 1837 should under these conditions have
staggered the land office can cause no surprise. The statement of Clay, that sixty-four out of sixty-seven of its local officers were defaulters, may have been temporarily true; but owing to the wise leniency and careful nursing of Secretary Woodbury the loss was not so great as might have been anticipated. It is impossible to state, with any near approach to accuracy, what the loss finally amounted to; $750,000 would fairly approximate it.
If we may trust the apparently frank reports of the special agents, it is noticeable that nearly all these men had the confidence of their communities; and often, though they had an unfavorable balance against them, they retained the confidence of the treasury department. An interesting case is that of the receiver of public money at Columbus. He had speculated with government funds and had lost, and he appeared as a defaulter. Mr. Garesche, who examined the case, wrote to Woodbury: “The man seems really penitent; and I am inclined to think, in common with his friends, that he is honest, and has been led away from his duty by the example of his predecessor, and a certain looseness in the code of morality which here does not move in so limited a circle as it does with us at home. Another receiver would probably follow in the footsteps of the two. You will not, therefore, be surprised if I recommend his being retained, in preference to another appointment; for he has his hands full now, and will not be disposed to speculate any more. . . . He has, moreover, pledged his word that, if retained, he will strictly obey the law. . . . Lenity towards him . . . might stimulate him to exertions which severity might perhaps paralyze.” He further stated that the deficit amounted to $55,965.54, and that the defaulter owned land that, if sold at
$1.25 per acre, would amount to $61,549.98. We may disagree with Mr. Garesche as to the expediency of retaining the officer under the circumstances, but he was certainly right in his estimate of conditions. It was, in the mind of most frontiersmen and inhabitants of new places, a very long step between stealing another's money and speculating with it. The main fault lay in the general unfamiliarity with business methods; and we may question whether even Adams could have kept the service entirely above its environment, though he might well have done better than Jackson and Van Buren.
Somewhat different was the plight of the customs department. There the defalcations were less widespread; but the individual cases were more striking, and the losses were due to simon-pure dishonesty. Educated by thirty years of corrupt politics, the New York politicians were ready to make the most of the chance that Jackson gave them. Swartwout proved a “king of defaulters”; his stealings were estimated, in 1838, at $1,250,000. So cleverly had his books been falsified that as late as 1836 he deceived a committee politically hostile to him. He passed the evening of his days abroad, accompanied in his flight by Price, the district attorney, who stole a paltry $60,000 on his own account, but aided Swartwout in his operations.
Jesse Hoyt, who succeeded to the New York collectorship, was more fortunate rather than essentially better than Swartwout. He drew the interest on large sums of public money, and left a temporary deficit of $160,563.31, which would have been much larger if he had not written off in his own favor, without any legal justification, $201,580 as a one per cent fee on the duties collected. The congressional reports make it clear that the
custom-house was regarded as the Democratic citadel of New York, and that the collector's chief function was to return a Democratic majority. Some idea of the loss of efficiency is given by the fact that, while the collection of customs under Adams cost one and one-half per cent, it cost under Swartwout two and one-half, and under Hoyt five and one-half; it is impossible to estimate the financial loss of the government, as much of this was the result of fraudulent assessment and connivance at the illegal entry of goods. These evils, unlike those of the land office, were due solely to the spoils system: Jackson alone was responsible for Swartwout; Van Buren alone was responsible for Jesse Hoyt, and neither Swartwout nor Hoyt would have been appointed by any previous administration.
The spoils system was violently attacked from the beginning. The leaders of the opposition were personally affected by it. Clay wrote, “Our poor friends, Cutts, Watkins, and Lee, are among the sufferers.” It was easy for those who were being despoiled to see distinctly the evils which the system brought in its train. Clay wrote, May 15, 1829, “Incumbents, feeling the instability of their situation, and knowing their liability to periodic removals, at short terms, without any regard to the manner in which they have executed their trust, will be disposed to make the most of their uncertain offices while they have them, and hence we may expect immediate cases of fraud, predation and corruption.” In a debate in 1831, Webster magniloquently elaborated these and other evils; and in the same year the National Republican convention in New York violently denounced the proscription.
The efforts of the Whig leaders to check Jackson's course were futile, as we have seen, but they served to make both sides think out their principles. The first attempt to define the programme of the opposition was made March 7, 1834, when Clay
introduced into the Senate a series of resolutions embodying some doubtful constitutional interpretations and referring several questions to committees. At the next session of Congress a committee was appointed to consider the whole subject of the reduction of the patronage, and to report to the Senate such measures as seemed advisable. Calhoun was chairman, and Judge White, who had served on the similar committee of 1826, was an active member. Benton, who had been the leading figure in the previous investigation, was now in favor with the administration, and so could take no prominent part in a proceeding which was an implied criticism of Jackson. The report was submitted February 9, 1835, and was at once ordered to be printed for public distribution, together with Benton's report of 1826. The bills which were its logical outcome were not presented with the report itself, but may be combined with it in treatment. The suggestions in brief were: (1) a constitutional amendment to secure the distribution of the surplus; (2) a provision that banks be charged interest on the national money left with them on deposit — measures intended to cut down the patronage. In addition, the following regulations in regard to that part of the civil service which must be retained were proposed: (3) that the Four Years' Bill be repealed; (4) that the accounts of all disbursing officers be periodically laid before the Senate; (5) “that, in all nominations made by the President to the Senate, to fill vacancies occasioned by removal from office, the facts of the removal shall be stated to the Senate at the same time that the nomination is made, with a statement of the reasons for such removal.”
The debate brought forth by this report was brilliant. Webster devoted the greater part of his speech to the exposition of his favorite doctrine that the Senate possessed the constitutional right to advise and consent to removals. He was willing to support the bill proposed, because he thought that the
restrictions, and particularly the regulation that the president should present to the Senate the causes of removals, “mild and gentle” as they were, would have some effect in correcting the evils which beset the progress of the government. Clay took the same general ground, but proposed an amendment resembling the Tenure-of-Office Bill of 1867. Calhoun delivered by far the ablest speech, but he, too, occupied himself chiefly with the constitutional question, taking it up from the point of view of expediency.
These speeches, and others, were eloquent and sincere; they exhibited high ideals of the civil service pleasing to contemplate, and are full of passages suitable for quotation by the civil service reformer. When we turn, however, to the measures proposed, we find a paucity of invention painful to contemplate. If these men, after ten years of discussion of the civil service, could not propose measures better calculated to improve it, their ability has been overrated. The fact is, that what had so long occupied their attention was not primarily the civil service, but the patronage: their first object was not to secure good work, but to reduce the power of the president; it was still political and administrative reform which they felt necessary. The bill passed the Senate by a vote of thirty-one to sixteen, slept for a year, and then was killed by the House in committee of the whole. The Whigs, therefore, were constrained to wait for the adoption of their plans until they should obtain control of all branches of the government.
The interest in these debates evinced in the country at large was great enough to urge the Whig leaders to redoubled efforts; and when the crises of 1837 and 1839 came, they pointed to them as a fulfilment of their predictions. With unremitting zeal they belabored the administration for the fraud and incompetency which infested the service. As far as issues are discernible in the noisy campaign of 1840, reform was the
most prominent. Particularly was this true in the South, where the state-rights men, a little out of sympathy with many of the schemes of their Northern allies, could join unequivocally in the plan to curtail the powers of the chief executive. The Democrats vainly brought countercharges, claiming that all the defaulters had been Federalists and were now at heart Whigs. This was quite too absurd to fool the people, and the result of the election was to place the Whigs in full control of the government and give them an opportunity to put into effect the reform that they had been so long preaching.
How was the reform to begin? Should the Whigs follow the precedent set by Jackson? These questions forced themselves peremptorily forward in the very hour of victory. Though Harrison, in a letter to the people of Tennessee, indicated that he would not make removals for opinion's sake, the question could not be considered as settled. The cabinet eagerly discussed it, and the opposition papers announced that a prescriptive policy was being forced upon the president by the Whig leaders, especially by Clay. Whatever might be the position of the leaders, the insistent call of the office-seeking mob, numbering from thirty to forty thousand, that travelled to Washington could not be mistaken. We have the testimony of Adams that they were orderly and well-behaved; but their influence on the policy of the administration was precisely the same as that of their predecessors in 1829, and they found a voice in the blatant Madisonian. Whatever its repugnance, the cabinet during March, 1841, decided upon an extensive change of personnel throughout the civil service.
Much time might be spent in discussing the chain of events that led up to this decision; but it would be time wasted, for
the result was practically dictated by circumstances. It was a fundamental weakness of the civil service as established in the United States at that time, that when one party had begun to turn out its opponents, its successors were almost forced to do the same. The long continuance of the Republican party in power after 1801 had put off the evil time, but had not changed the conditions. Ninety-nine out of every hundred Whigs thought that the Democrats deserved punishment for the proscription of 1829, and that the most appropriate penalty would be to turn them out of the offices they had usurped. For many years, moreover, the Whigs had been criticising the civil service as corrupt, and naturally their first step in reform was to put new blood into it: similia similibus curantur. When it is remembered, in addition, that the majority of the Whigs were human Americans, who wanted a good office if they could get it, it must be conceded that a proscription was inevitable.
One result of the proscription was an amusing volte face, not uncommon in American journalism. The Democratic papers were filled with material that might have been cribbed from their opponents of 1829. They resorted to the old device, that the Federalists used in Jefferson's time, of publishing each day extracts from speeches which had been delivered by the Whig leaders in condemnation of Jackson, and beneath these headings citing specimens of their practice now that they were in power. The more conservative Whig papers barely mentioned offices, and printed appointments only, omitting removals, as Niles claimed that Jackson editors did twelve years earlier. The Madisonian, however, boldly took up the gospel of the Telegraph, and resorted to all the old arguments of the spoilsmen, — rotation, and the duty of the executive to complete the proscription that the people, by removing the elective officers, had begun. Papers of a middle type did not defend removals in general, but rejoiced in the ejectment of “brawling and unscrupulous public lecturers.”
The most effective answer to criticism that the Whigs could
have given would have been the adoption of the measures which they themselves had proposed in 1835. This obvious course they did not follow, either because they had become convinced that such schemes were impracticable, or because they merely considered that circumstances alter cases. When Mr. Watterson, in June, 1841, introduced a resolution preceded by a long preamble setting forth the sentiments of Webster, Clay, and Crittenden on the question of the patronage, and calling for “the names of all officers dismissed . . . with the reasons for the dismissals in each particular case,” the House refused, by a vote of 130 to 57, to suspend the rules to allow the resolution to be considered. Two reports were presented to Congress: one to the House by Garrett Davis in 1842, recommending that the law of 1820 be repealed, and that removals be made for stated cause only; and the other to the Senate by J. T. Morehead in 1844, embodying an argument for the right of the Senate to advise and consent to removals; but no action was taken on either of them.
Instead of carrying out their programme and so justifying their good faith, the Whigs attempted the impossible task of defending their own action by showing how black were their opponents. Commissions were appointed to investigate government offices wherever mismanagement was suspected. One was sent to Norfolk; another headed by Matthew St. Clair spread dismay through Washington; the most important was that of which Poindexter was chairman, and which exposed the rottenness of the national service in the city of New York. These commissions exposed much fraud; but some of them committed the error of sitting behind closed doors, and they were therefore denounced by the Democrats as “espionage commissions,” whereby their findings were greatly discredited, and the excuse which they were expected to furnish for the Whig proscription was deprived of its effect.
The mere fact that removals were made does not prove that the spoils system was adopted; and it is, therefore, important to study more closely the position of the great Whig statesmen in 1841, and the general policy of the party. Clay was undoubtedly the leader, and he seems to have disdained petty politics. Curtis, the friend of Webster, endeavored to secure Clay's support for the collectorship at New York by promising to work for the latter's nomination for the presidency in 1844 — the matter to be kept secret from Webster. Clay seems to have been shocked at the proposition, to have rejected it, and to have desired to inform Webster. He made it a rule to support no applicants for positions; but this attitude was more a matter of convenience than of probity, and is therefore not particularly commendable, for, when appointments have to be made by personal selection, if the best men refuse to interfere, the choice is thereby left to their inferiors. He evidently found it difficult to maintain his aloofness. March 15, 1841, he wrote to General Harrison that he had not said that Mr. Curtis should not be appointed to the New York collectorship. “I have never,” he said, “gone beyond expressing the opinion that he is faithless and perfidious, and, in my judgment, unworthy of the place.”
Webster wrote to Everett, February 2, 1841, that he did not know what would be done in regard to the foreign agents. “As to officers out of the cabinet,” he said, “little or nothing is yet known. The richer collectorships and attorneyships are subjects of much competition; so are the post-offices in the great cities. I intend to exert my influence to get a snug little place for I. P. Davis, and that is all the purpose, relative to such matters, that I have as yet expressed.” His later official
connection with the administration forced him to take somewhat more interest in appointments; but all the evidence confirms the impression derived from this letter, that on the whole he considered the selection of civil servants a subject unworthy of his serious attention.
The sudden death of Harrison and the accession of John Tyler spread consternation through the ranks of the Whig office-seekers. It was feared that he might be unwilling to remove Democrats; but, as Greeley says, “he turned out better than had been expected.” Tyler felt bound by the hopes that General Harrison had excited, and appointed many to whom the latter had promised places, but whom he did not live long enough to commission. In the end of April he wrote a friendly letter to Clay: “My attention is turned to the removals from office after the manner that you suggest, and I hope that to the recent appointments you have nothing to object. The post-office at Lexington shall be attended to.” The proscription was therefore continued in spite of the “accident.”
The machinery for distribution was not much in evidence in 1841. Whig congressmen naturally received many requests for the use of their influence; but Adams thought that success depended on whether the congressman was in favor with the cabinet; and this administration seems to have more closely controlled appointments, both general and local, than that of twelve years before. Senator Tallmadge wrote to President Harrison: “The more I reflect on the subject, the more I am surprised at the nomination suggested to you of Mr. —— as Marshal for the Northern district of New York. I do not
know the man and I never heard of him — and I insist upon it, that it is my right, representing the State of New York, to be heard in relation to the appointments in the state — no man knows more about the state than myself — and I repeat that the appointment of —— —— is the best appointment that can be made. . . . I am willing to take the responsibility of it.” This vigorous protest was heeded, but not until Tallmadge had written several letters and had secured the support of “a large portion of the Whig senators of New York, the leading members of the Assembly and all the acting canal commissioners.” The local party organization of New York City made an effort to control minor appointments there, but with only fair success; and the hand of the administration was everywhere felt. In the country as a whole there would seem to have been less machinery and less friction than in 1829.
Claims for office were based on a great variety of grounds. There were charges of nepotism; and the removal of Dr. Martin, the experienced chief clerk of the state department to make way for Webster's son, was certainly in questionable taste, though some excuse for it is afforded by the intimate relations which exist between that officer and the secretary of state. As usual, the martyrs of the Jacksonian persecution were considered as having just claims upon the administration; but the most convincing argument that the office-seeker could submit in support of his application was service to the party. Activity or docility in Congress still commanded recognition, though it had now come to be regarded as undignified to leave the legislative for the administrative service, and the old opposition to the appointment of congressmen had not entirely disappeared. Levi Lincoln endeavored to avoid this latter criticism by resigning his seat before receiving his nomination to the collectorship at Boston.
Newspaper men were still the most important single class of
party workers, and they were given fitting recognition, although the Whigs had criticised the appointment of editors by Jackson. Not so many, however, obtained prominent posts as previously, for the business was becoming more profitable and leading editors did not need office. After a bitter debate which very nearly resulted in a duel between Clay and King of Alabama, Thomas Allen received the printing of the Senate as a reward for his dashing conduct of the Madisonian. The Madisonian followed Tyler in his quarrel with the Whigs, whereupon the latter returned to the ever loyal National Intelligencer.
Politicians of a low grade were occasionally successful, particularly those from Pennsylvania, where the Whigs had a reputation for sharp practice. The appointment of Alexander Ferguson, popularly known as Bela Badger, to the naval office at Philadelphia was considered very discreditable. The qualifications of the man who was appointed collector at New York are described as follows in a letter from Peter B. Porter to Clay: “Although not personally popular, [Curtis] is represented as possessing an extraordinary share of tact or stratagem; and as being able, by his skill in planning and combining, and his untiring industry in executing, to produce the most astonishing political results. That, with the office of Collector (which he [Weed] considers as second only in influence to that of Postmaster-General) he could, on all important occasions, command the vote of the city of New York, and par conséquence, of the State. . . . Now I do not doubt that Mr. Curtis is a man of rare address. . . . And I have as little doubt that if he succeeds in obtaining the office, its patronage will be disposed in favors to his particular political friends.”
While the methods of selection were thus much the same under the Whigs as under the Democrats, the former drew, in many parts of the country, from the wealthier portion of the population, and so commanded a greater share of business ability. Webster sent an able circular to the heads of departments, instructing them to prevent all interference with elections on the part of public officers and all assessments for political purposes, and to require promptness in rendering accounts. There were more complaints at the appointment of abolitionists than at the conduct of the service. Although the repeal of the subtreasury act left public money at the discretion of the public officers, there were no defalcations and no frauds for the succeeding administration to investigate. The climax of praise is reached when we are able to quote from the diary of John Quincy Adams, for a date some time after the starting of the new government, that “as yet, the appointments have not been absolutely discreditable.”
The sweep of 1841 was by no means so nearly complete as that of 1829. The 458 removals made, out of a possible total of 924, would seem to represent a proportionately greater change than at that time; but, for reasons which will appear later, only 304 of these removals should be here considered. Of the usual conditions, three — the number of officers who are indispensable, of offices whose emoluments are too small to attract, and of friends in office — should all be kept in mind; but the exemption of the South is not so marked as formerly, and one new condition must be added. In 1841, for the first time, many officers resigned to escape removal. Among them was George Bancroft, collector at Boston, in commenting on whose resignation the prejudiced Madisonian said that he took this
action because of some technicality of the customs law by which a resigning officer might receive certain fees that would not be paid to one who was removed. The proscription extended, as was customary, beyond the presidential offices into the departmental and local offices. Levi Lincoln, at Boston, is reported to have had, within three or four days, 830 personal applications for the fifty places within his gift.
This study of the conduct of the civil service under the first administration of the Whigs reveals the fact that they adopted all the characteristic practices of the spoils system. Their leaders were indifferent; either willingly or perforce they permitted a repetition of the deeds which they had so violently condemned. The fact that the offices were better executed and the public better served than previously proves, not that the spoils system was non-existent, but that it is not absolutely synonymous with bad service; that efficiency depends more on the characteristics of the men appointing and appointed to office than on the method of selection.
Special attention should be paid to Tyler's 154 removals, which involved a curious episode after the resignation of Webster, when the break with the Whigs was complete and the president alone was responsible for the policy pursued. Tyler had looked with disgust on the Jacksonian proscription; and his son, Lyon G. Tyler, asserts that he retained his scruples on becoming president, and countenanced removals only because he felt bound to fulfil many of the promises of Harrison; and that even this feeling of obligation did not prevent his tearing in pieces whole lists of proposed appointments which involved removals. A minute study of his conduct, however, shows that, as the fight grew fiercer, he found it impossible to forego the use of a weapon so ready to his hand as the patronage.
Tyler considered himself a “Republican” of the old school, and Levi Lincoln argued on this supposition in July, 1841, when he desired the treasurer at Boston, who was not a Whig,
to be retained. By the summer of 1842 to be a Democrat became a recommendation to Tyler. W. W. Irwin, one of the “corporal's guard,” wrote to Caleb Cushing in regard to the postmaster at Harrisburg, “He is a Democrat and I don't want to see him removed.” May 16, 1843, Tyler wrote to Hugh S. Legaré, who was acting as secretary of state, advising him to appoint as chief clerk Dr. Martin, who had been removed by Webster. This appointment, he said, would be equivalent to putting a Democrat at the head of a department. Not only were the Democrats to be placated, but a third party was to be formed, and the president eagerly looked about for places to give to friends and supporters. J. A. Scoville wrote to Calhoun, October 25, 1842, “I wish with all my heart we had the control of Mr. Tyler's appointments, but Mr. Rhett writes me that he thinks Tyler is working for his own nomination.” When Calhoun became secretary of state, he wrote to R. M. T. Hunter: “The claims on the part of Mr. Tyler's political and personal friends on him are pressing, . . . many of them have had their expectations excited for a long time. . . . Acting, as I suppose, under the force of the circumstances alluded to, he makes most of his appointments on his own responsibility without consulting the appropriate Department. This, however, is in strict confidence.”
Vacancies did not occur often enough to answer the president's needs, and he gradually began a proscription of his own. April 1, 1842, he wrote to N. Beverley Tucker: “Do you know Samuel Merry, the receiver of public money at St. Louis, who and what is he? And if he is not the proper sort of man, how would Mr. Brown like the place?” While this sweep was not extensive, it included many valuable posts, among them the ministry to Brazil; the collectorships at Portland, Boston, Savannah, Mobile, Baltimore, and New York; the post of surveyor at New Orleans, Baltimore, and New York; the naval office at New York; the post-offices at Indianapolis, Philadelphia, and Albany; the governorships of Florida and Wisconsin; and many more of salient political importance. The climax was
reached in the spring of 1844, when the president was pushing with all his might and main the annexation of Texas. In June the Tribune, apropos of the removal of the surveyor at New York, remarked, “All our office-holders who are not of the latest Tyler and Texas stamp, with India rubber consciences and a firm belief in the integrity and disinterestedness of the Accident, will soon go overboard.”
It is not surprising that a president without a party encountered difficulty with the Senate, and that scarcely a post was filled without one or two rejections or withdrawals. Particularly unwilling were his opponents to allow him to fill an associate judgeship of the Supreme Court, although he made a very creditable selection for it. The Whigs especially opposed this nomination before the election of 1844, in hopes that the appointment might be deferred until Clay became president. After the election had taken away this hope, the Senate confirmed the nomination of Samuel Nelson, previously chief justice of New York.
Tyler's appointments were, as Calhoun said, made from the ranks of his personal and political friends, with the personal element fully as prominent as the other. His personal friends were men of ability and honesty, and consequently the service suffered no detriment except that which was inevitable from the frequent changes. Among his appointees were Caleb Cushing, Robert Rantoul, Jr., and Henry A. Wise, men of ability; while many others, themselves unfamiliar, had names which indicate local respectability. The only removal of special interest was that of Solomon Van Rensselaer, who was at last deprived of office.
In the summer of 1844 the political status of Tyler and his friends was precarious. Nominally a candidate for reëlection,
he really had no chance whatever of success. What, then, would be the standing of the men he had placed in office? Most of them were Democrats and could support Polk's nomination. Could not Tyler, by withdrawing in his favor, secure consideration for them? These questions were in everybody's mouth. Robert J. Walker, unwilling to risk Texan annexation by a divided vote, wrote to Polk asking if Jackson would not reinstate Tyler in the Democratic party; while Tyler's friends suggested to Jackson a union of forces, whereby they would be brought “into the support of Polk and Dallas,” and would be “received as brethren by them and their friends, all former differences forgotten.” Jackson answered these propositions with an emphatic “no”; but Tyler apparently believed that, openly or tacitly, some arrangement had been reached. He withdrew from the race, and on September 13, 1844, wrote to his daughter that if Polk came to power, the new administration would be a continuance of his own.
Polk seems to have been in some danger of committing himself to this policy, as he requested Tyler to give a certain position to his brother. Tyler readily assented to this proposition, which seemed to establish his position in the Democratic party; but if he really thought that an agreement had been made to retain his friends in office, he showed bad faith and an extreme lack of tact by continuing, between the election and the inauguration of Polk, to make removals and appointments, for which at that time there could have been no motive other than a desire to provide for his friends. The result was that Polk, even if he wavered for a time, in the event justified the confidence of Jackson, who wrote to him: “The offices are filling up by Tyler. . . . I have said to my friend Blair that you have sufficient energy to give yourself elbow room, whenever it becomes necessary.”
“The revival of the old democracy by the elevation of General Jackson in 1828, and the accession of a new set of men in 1829, presented the first rabid and hungry scenes of office-begging that the government of this country ever experienced. The spirit with which the democratic dynasty of 1829 went into power began to leaven the whole political world in the country. Violence and rancor increased throughout the republic. . . . On Harrison's accession was there reform or change in their exhibitions? Not at all. . . . The torrent of office beggars set over him and the cabinet like the torrent of Niagara over its precipitous cliffs. . . . The principle of rewarding friends and punishing foes, by using the public offices of the country for the purpose, has been recognized and practised for the last twenty years by both parties; but it is a practice and a principle which has existed only in modern times.” This editorial from the New York Herald of 1849 was in substance perfectly true. Both parties were now thoroughly committed to proscription; and he was indeed a hypocrite, as Marcy said, who did not acknowledge that, as an actual fact, to the victor belonged the spoils. So far as the national service was concerned, this policy was, moreover, an innovation of “modern times”: some political removals had indeed been made by Adams, many by Jefferson, and there was from the first some play of factions about the federal offices in various states; but not until 1829 did the genuine spoils system come into existence; and since that date it has flourished without break, though with some recent diminution.
We have found that, by turning our attention from national politics to those of the states, it is possible to discover for the spoils system a pedigree the authenticity of which is vouched for by strong family resemblance. In 1820 it was an institution of New York and Pennsylvania; it found adherents even in staid Massachusetts, and strong pressure was being brought to induce the central government to give it favor. As years passed, adherents increased and pressure grew, until we are surprised, not so much that it received general recognition at last, as that its adoption was delayed so long. This steady progress, advancing with constantly accelerated speed towards
universal acceptance, overcoming the repugnance of the Whig leaders, although they were committed against such use of the patronage, and of Tyler, although his father had been one of the first to raise his voice against the evils of political appointments, implies such an impelling force behind the movement as can be roused only by an institution peculiarly adapted to the time and fitted to serve some important function in the body politic. It is not sufficient, therefore, to have traced the rise of the spoils system: we cannot claim to have any adequate understanding of its history until we have discovered the cause of its strength by discovering the need which it fulfilled.
The true cause for the introduction of the spoils system was the triumph of democracy. If the people as a whole are to exert any tangible influence on the conduct of government, they must be organized. Unorganized they may effect a revolution, but they cannot thereby control administration. The division of the people into parties is not sufficient to secure this pervasive influence; it gives them an opportunity to vote on special questions and at stated intervals, but not to select the questions or to vote when the issue is fresh in the public mind. If the majority is to mould the policy of the party, if the demos is to be kept constantly awake and brought out to vote after the excitement of the hour has passed away, it is necessary that the party be organized. There must be drilling and training, hard work with the awkward squad, and occasional dress parade.
This work requires the labor of many men: there must be captains of hundreds and the captains of tens, district chiefs and ward heelers. Now, some men labor for love and some for glory; but glory comes only to the leaders of ten thousands, to the very few — it cannot serve as a general inducement, and even those who love must live. It is an essential idea of democracy that these leaders shall be of the people; they must not be gentlemen of wealth and leisure, but they must — the mass of them at any rate — belong to the class that makes its own living. If, then, they are to devote their time to politics, politics must be made to pay. It is here that the function of the spoils system becomes evident; the civil service becomes the pay-roll of the party leader; offices are apportioned according to the rank and
merits of his subordinates, and, if duties are too heavy or new positions are needed, new offices may be created. To apply these facts to America, the spoils system paid for the party organization which enabled the democracy of Pennsylvania to rule after 1800 and which established “a government of the people” in the United States in 1829.
An interesting illustration of the interrelation of democracy and these, its two concomitants, is to be found in the history of the old South before the war. There democracy did indeed exist, but without party organization or the spoils system, and the aristocracy habitually controlled the government. It is to be noticed, however, that when in a party convention the leaders of the South met the leaders of the North, the latter often had to yield; for they knew that although the platform might be a little distasteful to the rank and file of their supporters, party organization and discipline would prevent the dissatisfaction from reaching the polls — the party would stick together. In the South, on the other hand, very many men formed their own political opinions and acted upon them, while many more followed some particular leader, irrespective of party.
The armor in which democracy won its early victories in this country, and to which it still clings in great part, may now seem crude and heavy and inapt to the wearer; but we should not forget that at the time of its introduction it was the very best that had been devised; that by it, for the first time in history, a numerous and widely scattered people was enabled itself to direct its whole force to its own advancement; and present appreciation of the evils of the spoils system should not blind us to the fact that in the period of its establishment it served a purpose that could probably have been performed in no other way, and that was fully worth the cost.
* ↑ Fish, in American Historical Association, Reports, 1899, i. 75.
* ↑ Niles's Register, xlviii. 248.
* ↑ Mackenzie, Benjamin F. Butler and Jesse Hoyt and Martin Van Buren, passim; Von Holst, United States, ii. 354, note; Executive Journal, v. 66 (January 29, 1838).
* ↑ Massachusetts Spy, May 13, 1829, quoted in Albany Argus, July 17, 1829; Richmond Enquirer, May 18, 1841; Niles's Register; xxxvi. 315. There are more complaints in letters than in the press, and the blame is generally thrown on the difficulties of travel rather than on the government.
* ↑ Bourne, Distribution of the Surplus.
* ↑ Senate Documents, 23 Cong. 1 sess. vi. No. 439, p. 26.
* ↑ Ibid. p. 19.
* ↑ House Documents, 25 Cong. 2 sess. ix. No. 297, p. 297.
* ↑ Senate Documents, 23 Cong. 1 sess. vi. No. 439, p. 2; House Documents, 25 Cong. 2 sess. ix. No. 297, pp. 192, 205, 297 ff. Every report contains a list of such lands.
* ↑ Senate Documents, 23 Cong. 1 sess. vi. No. 439, p. 28; House Documents, 25 Cong. 2 sess. ix. No. 297, pp. 192, 292.
* ↑ Senate Documents, 23 Cong. 1 sess. vi. No. 439, p. 18.
* ↑ Speech at a Harrison convention, August 17, 1840, Clay, Works, vi. 218.
* ↑ House Documents, 25 Cong. 3 sess. iv. No. 122, particularly pp. 15-37; House Reports, 25 Cong. 3 sess. ii. No. 313 (pp. 143-147 give a list of the unfavorable balances). The amount due from receivers on the list of defaulters, January 15, 1838, was $1,073,837.41, of which $248,159.13 had accrued prior to March, 1829. Niles's Register, lvi. 140-141.
* ↑ What few complaints are found are chiefly made by disappointed land purchasers, and they rarely make out a good case. See House Documents, 25 Cong. 2 sess. ix. No. 297.
* ↑ House Documents, 25 Cong. 2 sess. ix. No. 297, pp. 241-258. Von Holst, unfamiliar with the American idiom, understood Garesche as saying that the man had “his hands full” of stolen money, and as advising Woodbury to keep him for that reason, on the analogy of the fox and the gorged flies; and he uses the case as a text for a denunciation of the administration. Von Holst, United States, ii. 355, note.
* ↑ Woodbury's Report, House Documents, 25 Cong. 2 sess. v. No. 111; Ibid. 25 Cong. 3 sess. ii. No. 13, iii. No. 54, iv. No. 122; Von Holst, United States, ii. 350-354; Poore, Perley's Reminiscences, i. 129; Globe, May 22, 1839.
* ↑ House Documents, 27 Cong. 2 sess. vi. No. 212, pp. 65-67. The entire report contains 1720 pages.
* ↑ House Documents, 27 Cong. 2 sess. vi. No. 212, pp. 67, 459-462, 479-481, 487-488; Senate Documents, 23 Cong. 1 sess. v. No. 422, vi. Nos. 435, 442; House Documents, 27 Cong. 2 sess. ii. No. 77, vi. No. 212.
* ↑ D. B. Eaton's report, House Executive Documents, 46 Cong. 2 sess. No. 94.
* ↑ Clay, Private Correspondence, 226.
* ↑ Clay, Works, v. 376; Sargent, Public Men and Events, i. 286; Niles's Register, xl. 278.
* ↑ Senate Documents, 23 Cong. 1 sess. iii. No. 155.
* ↑ Senate Journal, 23 Cong. 2 sess. 148. In regard to it, see Madison, Letters and Other Writings, iv. 34; J. Q. Adams, Memoirs, ix. 357; Tyler, The Tylers, i. 524.
* ↑ Senate Documents, 23 Cong. 2 sess. iii. Nos. 108, 109; Congressional Debates, 23 Cong. 2 sess. 361, 422.
* ↑ Webster, Works, ii. 88 ff.; Congressional Debates, 23 Cong. 2 sess. 461, 518-524, 553-563.
* ↑ Ibid. 576.
* ↑ See a petition from the legislature of Connecticut (House Documents, 25 Cong. 2 sess. xi. No. 442) and a resolution of the Tennessee legislature, October 12, 1835 (Good Government, June 15, 1896).
* ↑ See speech of Mr. Duncan in Congress, Globe, May 23, 1839. Lists are given showing money lost to the government by defalcations of Federalists, beginning with the $12,898 hypothecated by John Adams, and including the $1,250,000 taken by Swartwout. It will be remembered that in 1836 Swartwout supported White for the presidency.
* ↑ Poore, Perley's Reminiscences, i. 259, 382; Globe, April 27, 1841; J. Q. Adams, Memoirs, x. 439; Richmond Enquirer, March 6, 11, 1841; Tyler, The Tylers, ii. 32. Niles, quoting from the Madisonian of April 6, 1841, attributes to the pertinacity of these men the death of Harrison. Niles's Register, lx. 83.
* ↑ Richmond Enquirer, May 7, 10, 1841; April 13, 1841, quoting Springfield Gazette.
* ↑ House Journal, 27 Cong. 1 sess. 147-148.
* ↑ House Reports, 27 Cong. 2 sess. iv. No. 945; Senate Documents, 28 Cong. 1 sess. vii. No. 399.
* ↑ Niles's Register; Richmond Enquirer, May 2, 1841; Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, iv. 152, 154, 162; House Documents, 27 Cong. 2 sess. ii. No. 77, iv. Nos. 213, 230, vi. No. 212; Richmond Enquirer, May 21, 28, 1841.
* ↑ Clay, Private Correspondence, 448-451.
* ↑ Ibid. 452-453. He asks Harrison whether he has dictated “in the administration of the public patronage? The whole cabinet as well as yourself,” he adds, “can say that I have recommended nobody for any office. I have sought none for myself or my friends. I desire none. A thousand times have my feelings been wounded by communicating to those who have applied to me, that I am obliged to abstain inflexibly from all interference in official appointments.” See also Tyler to Clay, April 30, 1841, Tyler, The Tylers, iii. 94.
* ↑ Webster, Private Correspondence, ii. 100.
* ↑ See Webster to Button, May 9, 1830; Ibid. i. 500; Harvey, Reminiscences of Webster, 178; Poore, Perley's Reminiscences, i. 382. Van Tyne (Webster, 375-389) discusses his effort to secure a place for his son in 1849, but there is scarcely any reference to general appointments.
* ↑ Greeley, Recollections of a Busy Life, 215, 310; Tyler, Parties and Patronage, 68; Tyler, The Tylers, ii. 32, 310, iii. 94.
* ↑ J. Q. Adams, Memoirs, x. 436, 441, 460. Of one applicant he said, “I might as well undertake by my influence to obtain for him the office of porter at the gate of heaven” (Ibid. 446).
* ↑ Even the names of men to be appointed inspectors in the custom-houses were sometimes sent from the capital. See Richmond Enquirer, May 18, 21, 1841; Tyler, The Tylers, iii. 94-96.
* ↑ From manuscripts not available for reference.
* ↑ House Documents, 27 Cong. 2 sess. vi. No. 212, p. 68.
* ↑ The Richmond Enquirer, May 7, 1841, notes in office two of Clay's relatives, two of Webster's, and one each of Chittenden's, Ewing's, and Tyler's.
* ↑ Tyler to Hugh S. Legaré, May 16, 21, 1843, Tyler, The Tylers, iii. 112.
* ↑ J. Q. Adams, Memoirs, x. 460; Richmond Enquirer, April 2, May 20, 1841.
* ↑ The Richmond Enquirer, April 6, 1841, quoting from the New York Herald, gives half a dozen such cases. The statement that Tyler never made such appointments is disproved by the single case of the editor of the Statesman.
* ↑ Richmond Enquirer, May 11, 1841; Blair and Rives secured the Senate's printing in 1841 (Congressional Globe, 26 Cong. 2 sess. 197). Clay, however, had the matter reconsidered after March 4, and the establishment of the Whig majority, and Allen was then appointed (Ibid. 256; Senate Journal, 27 Cong. 1 sess. 25). For the appointment of Gales and Seaton, see Senate Journal, 28 Cong. 1 sess. 21.
* ↑ Niles's Register, xxxvii. 132; Globe, April 26, 1841; Richmond Enquirer, May 14, 1841. He was removed a year later. Executive Journal, vi. 153.
* ↑ January 28, 1841, Clay, Private Correspondence, 448-450.
* ↑ Niles's Register, lx. 51-52.
* ↑ The appointment of General Wilson to be surveyor-general of Wisconsin was particularly obnoxious. The influence of Joel Eastman and of Webster was supposed to be responsible for these appointments. Richmond Enquirer, January 29, May 14, 1841. The Globe, May 28, 1841, makes some complaint of confusion owing to change of personnel. For praise, see Richmond Enquirer, May 23, 1841; National Intelligencer, June 2, 1844.
* ↑ J. Q. Adams, Memoirs, x. 449.
* ↑ Fish, in American Historical Association, Reports, 1899, i. 76.
* ↑ Madisonian, March 12, 1841.
* ↑ Richmond Enquirer, March 11, April 2, 1841, quoting Boston Post.
* ↑ Congressional Debates, 23 Cong. 2 sess. 596; Tyler, Parties and Patronage, 68; Tyler, The Tylers, ii. 310.
* ↑ Calhoun Correspondence (American Historical Association, Reports, 1899, ii.), 602, 856. Tyler, The Tylers, iii. 94-96, 103, 112.
* ↑ Tyler, The Tylers, iii. 99-100. Executive Journal for the period. See also Appendix D, below.
* ↑ Tyler nominated John C. Spencer, then Silas Wright, then Chancellor Walworth; after the election he withdrew this name and presented Nelson's. Hammond, Silas Wright, 396-401.
* ↑ On the one hand, he was charged with nepotism (Daily Atlas, December 25, 1844), on the other with paying insufficient attention to friendship (Tyler, The Tylers, ii. 404, note).
* ↑ Tyler, Parties and Patronage, 81-82; Tyler, The Tylers, iii. 139-146.
* ↑ Tyler, The Tylers, iii. 88, 155. Niles quotes the Globe and the Richmond Whig to the effect that the “nondescripts” will get nothing from Polk, and advises that Whigs and Democrats combine to exclude Tyler men from office. Niles's Register, lxiv. 331. Executive Journal, vi. December 16, 23, 30, 1844, January 27, February 21, 1845.