# Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Coughlin/Opinion of the Court

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 22–227
LAC DU FLAMBEAU BAND OF LAKE SUPERIOR CHIPPEWA INDIANS, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. BRIAN W. COUGHLIN ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT [June 15, 2023]
Justice Jackson delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Bankruptcy Code expressly abrogates the sovereign immunity of “governmental unit[s]” for specified purposes. 11 U. S. C. §106(a). The question presented in this case is whether that express abrogation extends to federally recognized Indian tribes. Under our precedents, we will not find an abrogation of tribal sovereign immunity unless Congress has conveyed its intent to abrogate in unequivocal terms. That is a high bar. But for the reasons explained below, we find it has been satisfied here.
I
Petitioner Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians (the Band) is a federally recognized Tribe that wholly owns several business entities. In 2019, one of the Band’s businesses, Lendgreen, allowed respondent Brian Coughlin to borrow $1,100 in the form of a high-interest, short-term loan. But Coughlin filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy before he fully repaid the loan.
Under the Bankruptcy Code, Coughlin’s filing of the bankruptcy petition triggered an automatic stay against ​further collection efforts by creditors, including Lendgreen. See §362(a). Yet, according to Coughlin, Lendgreen continued its efforts to collect on his debt, even after it was reminded of the pending bankruptcy petition. Coughlin alleges that Lendgreen was so aggressive in its efforts to contact him and collect the money that he suffered substantial emotional distress, and at one point, even attempted to take his own life.
Coughlin eventually filed a motion in Bankruptcy Court, seeking to have the stay enforced against Lendgreen, its parent corporations, and the Band (collectively, petitioners). Coughlin also sought damages for emotional distress, along with costs and attorney’s fees. See §362(k) (providing a damages award to individuals injured by willful violations of the automatic stay).
Petitioners moved to dismiss. They argued that the Bankruptcy Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over Coughlin’s enforcement proceeding, as the Band and its subsidiaries enjoyed tribal sovereign immunity from suit. The Bankruptcy Court agreed; it held that the suit had to be dismissed because the Bankruptcy Code did not clearly express Congress’s intent to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity.
In a divided opinion, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed, concluding that the Bankruptcy Code “unequivocally strips tribes of their immunity.” In re Coughlin, 33 F. 4th 600, 603–604 (2022). In so holding, the First Circuit deepened a split among the Courts of Appeals on this question. Compare Krystal Energy Co. v. Navajo Nation, 357 F. 3d 1055, 1061 (CA9 2004) (holding that the Bankruptcy Code abrogates tribal sovereign immunity), with In re Greektown Holdings, LLC, 917 F. 3d 451, 460–461 (CA6 ​2019) (concluding the reverse). We granted certiorari to address the lower courts’ inconsistent holdings. 598 U. S. ___ (2023).
II A
Two provisions of the Bankruptcy Code lie at the crux of this case. The first—11 U. S. C. §106(a)—abrogates the sovereign immunity of “governmental unit[s].” It provides: “Notwithstanding an assertion of sovereign immunity, sovereign immunity is abrogated as to a governmental unit to the extent set forth in this section.” Section 106(a) goes on to enumerate a list of Code provisions to which the abrogation applies, including the provision governing automatic stays.
The second relevant provision is §101(27). That provision defines “governmental unit” for purposes of the Code. It states that that term
   “means United States; State; Commonwealth; District; Territory; municipality; foreign state; department, agency, or instrumentality of the United States (but not a United States trustee while serving as a trustee in a case under this title), a State, a Commonwealth, a District, a Territory, a municipality, or a foreign state; or other foreign or domestic government.”
The central question before us is whether the abrogation provision in §106(a) and the definition of “governmental unit” in §101(27), taken together, unambiguously abrogate the sovereign immunity of federally recognized tribes.
B
To “abrogate sovereign immunity,” Congress “must make its intent … ‘unmistakably clear in the language of the statute.’ ” Financial Oversight and Management Bd. for P. R. v. Centro De Periodismo Investigativo, Inc., 598 U. S. ___, ___ (2023) (slip op., at 6). This well-settled rule applies ​to federally recognized tribes no less than other defendants with sovereign immunity. Ibid. We have held that tribes possess the “common-law immunity from suit traditionally enjoyed by sovereign powers.” Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U. S. 49, 58 (1978). Our cases have thus repeatedly emphasized that tribal sovereign immunity, absent a clear statement of congressional intent to the contrary, is the “baseline position.” Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community, 572 U. S. 782, 790 (2014).
This clear-statement rule is a demanding standard. If “there is a plausible interpretation of the statute” that preserves sovereign immunity, Congress has not unambiguously expressed the requisite intent. FAA v. Cooper, 566 U. S. 284, 290 (2012); accord, United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U. S. 30, 37 (1992).
The rule is not a magic-words requirement, however. To abrogate sovereign immunity unambiguously, “Congress need not state its intent in any particular way.” Cooper, 566 U. S., at 291. Nor need Congress “make its clear statement in a single [statutory] section.” Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U. S. 62, 76 (2000). The clear-statement question is simply whether, upon applying “traditional” tools of statutory interpretation, Congress’s abrogation of tribal sovereign immunity is “clearly discernable” from the statute itself. Cooper, 566 U. S., at 291.
III
We conclude that the Bankruptcy Code unequivocally abrogates the sovereign immunity of any and every government that possesses the power to assert such immunity. Federally recognized tribes undeniably fit that description; therefore, the Code’s abrogation provision plainly applies to them as well.
A
Several features of the provisions’ text and structure compel this conclusion.
As an initial matter, the definition of “governmental unit” exudes comprehensiveness from beginning to end. Congress has rattled off a long list of governments that vary in geographic location, size, and nature. §101(27) (including municipalities, districts, Territories, Commonwealths, States, the United States, and foreign states). The provision then proceeds to capture subdivisions and components of every government within that list. Ibid. (accounting for any “department, agency, or instrumentality of the United States … , a State, a Commonwealth, a District, a Territory, a municipality, or a foreign state”). And it concludes with a broad catchall phrase, sweeping in “other foreign or domestic government[s].” Ibid.
When faced with analogously structured provisions in other contexts, we have noted their all-encompassing scope. See, e.g., Taylor v. United States, 579 U. S. 301, 305–306 (2016) (characterizing as “unmistakably broad” a criminal statute defining “commerce” to include a list of specific instances in which the Federal Government would have jurisdiction, followed by a broad residual phrase); see also Marietta Memorial Hospital Employee Health Benefit Plan v. DaVita Inc., 596 U. S. ___, ___, n. 1 (2022) (slip op., at 4, n. 1) (similar). We find the strikingly broad scope of §101(27)’s definition of “governmental unit” to be significant in this context as well.
The catchall phrase Congress used in §101(27) is also notable in and of itself. Few phrases in the English language express all-inclusiveness more than the pairing of two extremes. “Rain or shine” is a classic example: If an event is scheduled to occur rain or shine, it will take place whatever the weather that day might be. Same with the phrase “near and far”: If people are traveling from near and far, they are coming from all over the map, regardless of the particular ​distance from point A to point B.
The pairing of “foreign” with “domestic” is of a piece with those other common expressions. For instance, if someone asks you to identify car manufacturers, “foreign or domestic,” your task is to name any and all manufacturers that come to mind, without particular regard to where exactly the cars are made or the location of the companies’ headquarters. Similarly, at the start of each Congress, a cadre of newly elected officials “ ‘solemnly swear’ ” to “ ‘support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic.’ ” 5 U. S. C. §3331. That oath—which each Member of Congress who enacted the Bankruptcy Code took—indisputably pertains to enemies anywhere in the world. Accordingly, we find that, by coupling foreign and domestic together, and placing the pair at the end of an extensive list, Congress unmistakably intended to cover all governments in §101(27)’s definition, whatever their location, nature, or type.
It is also significant that the abrogation of sovereign immunity in §106(a) plainly applies to all “governmental unit[s]” as defined by §101(27). Congress did not cherry-pick certain governments from §101(27)’s capacious list and only abrogate immunity with respect to those it had so selected. Nor did Congress suggest that, for purposes of §106(a)’s abrogation of sovereign immunity, some types of governments should be treated differently than others. Instead, Congress categorically abrogated the sovereign immunity of any governmental unit that might attempt to assert it.
B
Other aspects of the Bankruptcy Code reinforce what §106(a)’s and §101(27)’s plain text conveys.
Through various provisions, the Bankruptcy Code offers debtors a fresh start by discharging and restructuring their debts in an “orderly and centralized” fashion. See, e.g., 1 ​Collier on Bankruptcy ¶1.01 (16th ed. 2023); Lamar, Archer & Cofrin, LLP v. Appling, 584 U. S. ___, ___ (2018) (slip op., at 4). The automatic-stay requirement, for example, keeps creditors from “dismember[ing]” the estate while the bankruptcy case proceeds. Chicago v. Fulton, 592 U. S. ___, ___ (2021) (slip op., at 2); 11 U. S. C. §362. The Code’s discharge provision enjoins creditors from trying to collect debts that have been discharged in a bankruptcy case. §524(a). And its plan-confirmation provisions, as relevant here, “bind … each creditor” to whatever repayment plan the bankruptcy court approves, “whether or not the claim of such creditor is provided for by the plan, and whether or not such creditor has objected to, has accepted, or has rejected the plan.” §1327(a); see also, e.g., §§1141(a), 1227(a).
These protections sweep broadly, by their own terms. To facilitate the Code’s “orderly and centralized” debt-resolution process, Collier on Bankruptcy ¶1.01, these provisions’ basic requirements generally apply to all creditors. Courts can also enforce these requirements against any kind of noncompliant creditor—whether or not the creditor is a “governmental unit”—by virtue of §106(a)’s abrogation of sovereign immunity. §§106(a)(1)–(3).
At the same time, so as to avoid impeding the functioning of governmental entities when they act as creditors, the Code contains a number of limited exceptions. For instance, the automatic-stay requirement does not preclude “governmental unit[s]” from enforcing their “police and regulatory power[s]” in certain proceedings, §362(b)(4), or from ​pursuing specific tax-related activities, §§362(b)(9), (18), (26). The Code additionally exempts from discharge certain debts for a “fine, penalty, or forfeiture” owed to a “governmental unit.” §523(a)(7).
Reading the statute to carve out a subset of governments from the definition of “governmental unit,” as petitioners’ view of the statute would require, risks upending the policy choices that the Code embodies in this regard. That is, despite the fact that the Code generally subjects all creditors (including governmental units) to certain overarching requirements, under petitioners’ reading, some government creditors would be immune from key enforcement proceedings while others would face penalties for their noncompliance. And while the Code is finely tuned to accommodate essential governmental functions (like tax administration and regulation) as a general matter, petitioners would have us find that certain governments are excluded from those provisions’ reach, notwithstanding the fact that they engage in tax and regulatory activities too. There is no indication that Congress meant to categorically exclude certain governments from these provisions’ enforcement mechanisms and exceptions, let alone in such an anomalous manner. Cf. Law v. Siegel, 571 U. S. 415, 424 (2014) (declining to read into the Code an exception Congress did not include in its “meticulous” and “carefully calibrated” scheme).
C
Our conclusion that all government creditors are subject to abrogation under §106(a) brings one remaining question to the fore—whether federally recognized tribes qualify as governments. Petitioners do not seriously dispute that federally recognized tribes are governments, and for good reason. Federally recognized tribes exercise uniquely governmental functions: “They have power to make their own substantive law in internal matters, and to enforce that law in their own forums.” Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U. S., at ​55–56 (citations omitted). They can also “tax activities on the reservation.” Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 554 U. S. 316, 327 (2008).
It is thus no surprise that Congress has repeatedly characterized tribes as governments. And this Court has long recognized tribes’ governmental status as well. See, e.g., Bay Mills, 572 U. S., at 788–789; Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U. S., at 57–58. We have done so generally and also in the specific context of tribal sovereign immunity. Tribal sovereign immunity, “we have explained, is ‘a necessary corollary to Indian sovereignty and self-governance.’ ” Bay Mills, 572 U. S., at 788; see also id., at 789 (discussing immunity as an example of tribes’ “governmental powers and attributes”).
Putting the pieces together, our analysis of the question whether the Code abrogates the sovereign immunity of federally recognized tribes is remarkably straightforward. The Code unequivocally abrogates the sovereign immunity of all governments, categorically. Tribes are indisputably governments. Therefore, §106(a) unmistakably abrogates their sovereign immunity too.
IV
Petitioners raise two main arguments in an attempt to sow doubt into these clear statutory provisions. Neither creates the ambiguity petitioners seek.
A
For their opening salvo, petitioners try to make hay out of the simple fact that neither §101(27) nor §106(a) mentions Indian tribes by name. Had Congress wanted to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity, petitioners claim, the most natural and obvious way to have expressed that intent would have been to reference Indian tribes specifically, rather than smuggle them into a broadly worded catchall phrase.
But, as explained at the outset, supra, at 4, the clear-statement rule is not a magic-words requirement. Thus, Congress did not have to include a specific reference to federally recognized tribes in order to make clear that it intended for tribes to be covered by the abrogation provision. As long as Congress speaks unequivocally, it passes the clear-statement test—regardless of whether it articulated its intent in the most straightforward way. Cooper, 566 U. S., at 291.
Trying a different tack, petitioners point to historical practice. In statute after statute, they say, Congress has specifically mentioned Indian tribes when abrogating their sovereign immunity. And in no case has this Court ever found an abrogation of tribal sovereign immunity where the statute did not reference Indian tribes explicitly. See Brief for Petitioners 24–26.
These statistics sound quite noteworthy at first glance. But they do not move the needle in this case. For one thing, none of petitioners’ cited examples involved a statutory provision that was worded analogously to, and structured like, ​the ones at issue here. Moreover, the universe of cases in which we have addressed federal statutes abrogating tribal sovereign immunity is exceedingly slim.
In any event, the fact that Congress has referenced tribes specifically in some statutes abrogating tribal sovereign immunity does not foreclose it from using different language to accomplish that same goal in other statutory contexts. Even petitioners appear to concede this basic point. They agree that Congress could have used a phrase like “every government” or “any government with sovereign immunity” to express unambiguously the requisite intent to abrogate the sovereign immunity of tribes. Id., at 27 (internal quotation marks omitted). For the reasons discussed above, we believe Congress did just that.
B
Petitioners further contend that even if the relevant provisions could theoretically cover tribes, the statute can plausibly be read in a way that preserves their immunity.
1
According to petitioners, the catchall phrase “other foreign or domestic government” might simply capture entities created through “interstate compacts,” which cannot neatly be characterized as a State or an instrumentality of a State under §101(27)’s enumerated list. Id., at 40–41 (internal quotation marks omitted). Interpreted in that fashion, petitioners maintain, the catchall phrase would exclude governmental entities that are not purely foreign or purely domestic—like tribes or the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Tr. of Oral Arg. 8–9.
If this interpretation of the statute sounds far-fetched, that is because it is. To find petitioners’ construction plausible, we would have to interpret “other foreign or domestic government” to impose a rigid division between foreign governments on the one hand and domestic governments on the other, leaving out any governmental entity that may have both foreign and domestic characteristics (like tribes or the IMF). But Congress has expressly instructed that the word “or,” as used in the Code, “is not exclusive.” 11 U. S. C. §102(5). As a result, we have serious doubts that Congress meant for §101(27) to elicit the laser focus on “or” that petitioners’ reading of “foreign or domestic” would entail.
​The dissent’s own arguments undermine any suggestion that Congress adopted such a siloed view. For instance, the dissent repeatedly paints tribes as occupying a hybrid position between foreign and domestic, post, at 6, 8–9 (opinion of Gorsuch, J.), and posits that Territories historically share this hybrid status as well, post, at 10 (describing Territories as tribes’ “close comparator”). Yet, as the dissent readily acknowledges, Congress expressly included Territories within §101(27)’s definition of “governmental unit.” If, on the dissent’s own account, Territories are “neither foreign nor domestic,” ibid.—and fall within §101(27)’s purview nevertheless—it is hard to see how §101(27)’s catchall phrase would simultaneously exclude other entities that share that same feature. §101(27) (“ ‘governmental unit’ means United States; State; … Territory; … foreign state; or other foreign or domestic government” (emphasis added)).
In any case, neither petitioners nor the dissent explain why the Code would draw such a line in the sand. None of the carefully calibrated exceptions noted in Part III–B, supra, for governmental units performing regulatory and tax-related functions turn on whether a government is purely foreign or domestic. Likewise, it is hard to see why the Code would subject purely foreign or domestic governments to enforcement proceedings while at the same time immunizing government creditors that have both foreign and domestic attributes. Considering that the one thing every entity in §101(27)’s enumerated list has in common is its governmental nature—and that is the same characteristic that matters when the Code addresses “governmental unit[s]” ​from one provision to the next—we are highly skeptical that Congress distinguished between governments in the way petitioners suggest.
2
Undaunted, petitioners note that Congress has historically treated various types of governments differently for purposes of bankruptcy law. Tr. of Oral Arg. 14–15; Reply Brief 21. They assert that, in the decades leading up to the Bankruptcy Code’s enactment, bankruptcy law afforded certain benefits to “ ‘the United States or any State or any subdivision thereof,’ ” leaving out entities that did not fall into one of those enumerated categories. Reply Brief 21 (quoting §64(a)(4), 52 Stat. 874).
Even if petitioners’ understanding of this history is correct, they have failed to demonstrate that the Code carried forward any such differential treatment. Congress ushered in “a new, unprecedented era in bankruptcy practice” when it enacted the Code in 1978. 1 W. Norton, Bankruptcy Law and Practice §1:9, p. 1-17 (3d ed. 2023); Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U. S. 50, 52–53 (1982) (plurality opinion) (describing the Code as “a comprehensive revision of the bankruptcy laws”). Both §101(27)’s definition of “governmental unit” and §106(a)’s abrogation of sovereign immunity were some of the many changes Congress made. The prior statute did not provide a general definition for governmental entities, much less ​include any provision expressly abrogating governments’ sovereign immunity. Instead, it set forth a general definition for “States,” which encompassed Territories, possessions, and the District of Columbia. 52 Stat. 842. Then, in each provision where governmental entities were relevant, Congress specified the particular governmental entities to which that provision pertained. See, e.g., §17(1), id., at 851 (exempting from discharge debts “due as a tax levied by the United States, or any State, county, district, or municipality”); id., at 874 (providing priority status to “the United States or any State or any subdivision thereof”).
Section 101(27)’s definition of “governmental unit” has an undeniably broader reach than the statutory provisions that preceded it. Section 101(27)’s definition includes, for instance, foreign countries and instrumentalities, when such entities had generally been previously absent. And the expansive definition of “governmental unit” in §101(27) applies throughout the Bankruptcy Code. In addition, for those who find legislative history useful, the Senate and House Reports that accompanied the Code indicate that “governmental unit” was intended to be defined “in the broadest sense.” S. Rep. No. 95–989, p. 24 (1978); H. R. Rep. No. 95–595, p. 311 (1977). When Congress later added §106(a)’s abrogation provision, it was that comprehensive definition of governmental unit that Congress used to specify the scope of the abrogation’s sweep.
Thus, however Congress may have treated governmental entities in bankruptcy law prior to 1978, it had clearly altered its view about the scope of coverage relative to governments by the time it enacted §101(27) and §106(a). Those provisions unequivocally extend to all governments, for the reasons already discussed, and we decline to read ambiguity into the statute where none exists. *** We find that the First Circuit correctly concluded that the ​Bankruptcy Code unambiguously abrogates tribal sovereign immunity. Therefore, the decision below is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
* ↑ It is undisputed in this case, and we assume herein, that the Band’s subsidiaries are arms of the Tribe and enjoy the Band’s sovereign immunity. In re Coughlin, 33 F. 4th 600, 604, n. 1 (CA1 2022); In re Coughlin, 622 B. R. 491, 493 (Bkrtcy. Ct. Mass. 2020).
* ↑ 11 U. S. C. §362(a) (the filing of a bankruptcy petition “operates as a stay, applicable to all entities” (emphasis added)); §362(b) (providing limited exceptions to the automatic-stay provision, none of which categorically exclude a certain type of creditor for all purposes); §524(a)(2) (the discharge of a debt “operates as an injunction against the commencement or continuation of an action … to collect, recover or offset any [discharged] debt as a personal liability of the debtor” (emphasis added)); §1327(a) (“The provisions of a confirmed plan bind the debtor and each creditor” (emphasis added)).
* ↑ See, e.g., Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, §104(a)(1), 88 Stat. 2207 (referring to “the strengthening or improvement of tribal government”); Tribal Self-Governance Act of 1994, §§202(2), (5)(A), 108 Stat. 4271 (“recogniz[ing] a special government-to-government relationship with Indian tribes,” and “transferring control to tribal governments … over funding and decisionmaking for Federal programs”); Compact of Self-Governance Between the Duckwater Shoshone Tribe and the United States of America, Art. I, §2(c) (1995) (explaining that the Compact would allow the Tribe to “take its rightful place in the family of governments in the federal constitutional system,” and “reorganize tribal government programs and services”).
* ↑ Given this holding, we need not decide whether tribes qualify as purely “domestic” governments. Compare Brief for Petitioners 33 (insisting tribes are not clearly domestic governments), and post, at 5–11 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (similar), with Brief for Respondent 40–41 (contending that they are). See also infra, at 12–14.
* ↑ Petitioners rely, for instance, on the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, which authorizes a “person” to “commence a civil action.” 42 U. S. C. §6972(a). “Person” is defined under that statute to include a “municipality,” which is in turn defined to encompass “a city, town, borough, county, parish, district, or other public body created by or pursuant to State law … or an Indian tribe or authorized tribal organization.” §§6903(13), (15); see also Brief for Petitioners 25 (citing similar provisions). The fact that Congress mentioned Indian tribes specifically when including them in the category of a “person” or “municipality” says little about Congress’s purported need to name Indian tribes when referring to them as a “governmental unit” or “other foreign or domestic government.”
* ↑ The parties’ briefing identifies only two cases. See Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community, 572 U. S. 782, 791 (2014) (recognizing partial abrogation); United States v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 309 U. S. 506, 513 (1940).
* ↑ Our dissenting colleague puts forth two hypotheticals that supposedly cast doubt on this conclusion. See post, at 13–14 (opinion of Gorsuch, J.). The first involves choosing a pet that is “ ‘small or a dog,’ ” while the second concerns an offer to have “chocolate or vanilla” ice cream. Ibid. But these hypotheticals are not remotely analogous to “foreign or domestic.” For one thing, the terms “foreign” and “domestic” are two poles on a spectrum. See supra, at 5–6. Neither “small” and “dog” nor “chocolate” and “vanilla” fit that bill. For another, whereas the pairing of “foreign” and “domestic” often covers the waterfront, see supra, at 6, the dissent’s hypothetical pairings do not have that same effect. And unlike animals (which need not be small or doglike) or ice creams (which need not be chocolate or vanilla), every government must be foreign or domestic to some degree; the question is just where on the spectrum it falls. See post, at 6 (observing that the Constitution “appear[s] to ‘place Indian [T]ribes in an intermediate category between foreign and domestic states’ ”); post, at 8 (tribes occupy a “ ‘hybrid position’ between ‘foreign and domestic states’ ”).
* ↑ For example, the Code defines “domestic support obligation” to include debts “owed to or recoverable by” spouses as well as “governmental unit[s].” §101(14A). And the term “person” covers an “individual, partnership, and corporation,” as well as a “governmental unit that … acquires an asset from a person … as a result of the operation of a loan guarantee agreement” or “as receiver or liquidating agent of a person.” §101(41). The main feature that sets “governmental unit[s]” apart from other entities mentioned in these definitions is their governmental nature.