# The Spirit of Russia/Volume 1/Chapter 7

CHAPTER SEVEN
PROBLEMS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY AND OF RELIGION IN RUSSIA—A SUMMARY STATEMENT
I
§ 38.
AFTER this glance at the leading facts of Russian history, we have to attain to clear views concerning the chief problems of the philosophy of history and of religion in Russia.
As an initial step, it will be well to say something about Russian philosophy in general. The task is far from easy. There is no history of Russian philosophy to which we can refer, for as yet the Russians have made no more than preliminary essays in this field. E. Radlov has recently published A Sketch of the History of Russian Philosophy. The author knows his subject well, and I shall therefore avail myself of his characterisation of Russian philosophy.
Radlov admits that Russia has not yet produced a thoroughly original and independent system of philosophy. He refuses, however, to accept the sceptical view that, while philosophy is known in Russia, there is no Russian philosophy. Radlov distinguishes three spheres of mental life wherein Russian philosophical thought has made itself manifest. Individual spiritual needs find expression in the philosophical trend which is characterised by the writings of Skovoroda, the slavophils, Vladimir Solov’ev, and Tolstoi, and which may be regarded as a reaction against the unceasing transference to Russian soil of the data of foreign thought. The thinkers of a second group are concerned with educational philosophy at the universities and ecclesiastical academies. Finally, Radlov distinguishes the political and social trend, manifesting itself chiefly in journalism and sociology; literary criticism is ​represented as belonging to the same sphere; Radlov refers in this connection to Radiščev, Bělinskii, Černyševskii, Mihailovskii, Grigor'ev, and Strahov.
This classification manifestly lacks precision, for Radlov fails to distinguish accurately between "sphere" and "trend." He goes on to say, in amplification, that Russian philosophers have no interest in the more abstract problems of philosophy, such as the theory of cognition, but that they delight in practical questions. Ethics, in particular, is the favourite field of Russian philosophy. It is from this practical predilection of Russian thought that Radlov deduces the second leading quality he ascribes to it, namely the mysticism which permeates all manifestations of the Russian mind.
Radlov confirms my own views upon Russian philosophy, but it seems to me that a more precise definition of certain concepts is essential.
It is perfectly true that Russians are now mainly busied with ethical questions. To use Tolstoi's phrase, they desire to grasp the meaning of life in order to apply their theory to practical living. We need not now discuss whether this is a specific characteristic of the Russian spirit. At any rate, western philosophy was for a long period, and still is, largely busied about these same ethical problems.
Ethics leads on logically to politics. The political and social trend of Russian philosophy is ethical; ethical theory is to be practically applied to extant society. In concrete, therefore, we have to do with socialism and its justification. To carry matters a stage further, we have to ask how the goal of socialism is to be attained, whether by reform of the existing political organisation or by revolution. The problem of revolution, an ethical problem, is the crux of contemporary politics.
But socialism does not involve politics merely, the principles of social practice, it involves sociology in addition, the theory of social organisation and evolution; and it is here that history and the philosophy of history have their parts to play. Russian thinkers are not satisfied with enquiring as to the meaning of life in abstracto; they wish also to learn the meaning of Russian life, Russian social order, and Russian history.
But this implies a comparison of Russia with the west. It implies, in a word, the problem, Russia and Europe, if we conceive the contrast between these two areas as expressed ​in existing evolutional differences. Thus is the contrast conceived by the Russians.
Analysis of ethical fundamentals leads likewise to the religious problem, for morality is an extremely important element of religion, of the Christian religion, of the Christian church. Naturally and by logical development, Russian moral philosophy becomes a philosophy of religion.
Thus we arrive at mysticism, which Radlov associates with ethics. From the logical outlook, the problem with which we are concerned is that of the relationship between morality and religion. In actual fact, when we analyse Russian ecclesiastical religion we find mysticism in the foreground of the picture, for Russian religious sentiment is impregnated with mysticism to a far greater extent than the same sentiment in Europe. We have, of course, to grasp the quality of this mysticism. To formulate the problem in other words, we must examine Russian mysticism psychologically, must define it more precisely in the light of the theory of cognition.
Radlov is right in holding that Russian literary criticism is philosophic criticism, for literary criticism has a quite peculiar significance in Russia. Let me hasten to add that Russian literature is itself peculiar in that it pays peculiar attention to ethical, socio-political, and religious problems.
Finally, Radlov aptly points out a comparative defect of Russian philosophy, and it is that Russian philosophers evade the discussion of the theory of cognition. Provisionally, and in unduly summarised phraseology, I may say that whilst literary criticism is known to the Russians, they lack epistemological criticism.
I have at least shown, I believe, that the association in these studies of the philosophy of history with the philosophy of religion is in conformity with the character of Russian philosophy. This will be rendered clearer by a brief excursus on the evolution of Russian philosophy.
II
§ 39.
FOR purposes of comparison a suitable summary of European philosophy would be useful. It would be possible to refer to a number of authorities on this subject, but I will ​myself give a brief outline of European philosophy, for such comprehensive statements are not numerous. Moreover, for the beneﬁt of competent students of philosophy, I desire to define my outlook. A preliminary survey of this character will prove helpful when we come to the description of individual Russian thinkers.
I shall confine myself to the later history of philosophy, beginning, like Radlov, with the eighteenth century.
First let us consider the problem of the philosophy of history.
The century of the enlightenment was characterised by the rise of the historic sense. Scientific historiography, the new method in history, begins with the latter half of the eighteenth century. Prior to this date the historic sense was lacking; there was no comprehension of the signiﬁcance of comparing historical epochs, and there was no historical enlightenment. Chronology existed, but scientific history was unknown. This is not to say that there were no initial attempts at the new outlook, but the eighteenth century is the first we can speak of as thinking historically, the first century to secure a clear grasp of the concept of historical progress.
In the development and organisation of historical science, the profounder historic sense of the age was displayed in the scientific investigation of history, in the study of social life and its development. More especially was it manifest in the establishment of the new historical and sociological disciplines.
It was no chance matter that in every country numerous men of note became busied in this field. In his New Science, Vico produced the first philosophically planned treatise on sociology, a work in which the philosophy of history found a logical place as an integral constituent. French writers, in particular, devoted themselves to the philosophy of history. Voltaire was the first to use the term. Among other Frenchmen who were fruitful workers in this ﬁeld may be mentioned Condorcet, Montesquieu, Target, and Rousseau. In Germany, we have Lessing, Herder, Schiller, and many other writers; and here, too, concrete historical investigation was methodically pursued (Schlözer, Schlosser, etc.). In England, Ferguson and other writers were at work, whilst Hume undertook historical research and wrote many sociological essays. The economic doctrines of Adam Smith have an important bearing upon sociology, and so have those of Malthus and the statisticians ​(Süssmilch, Schlözer, Achenwall), who all endeavoured to grasp the nature of social organisation and evolution.
With reference to Kant a doubt may be expressed whether his century, the century of the enlightenment and of rationalism, may also be regarded as characterised by an increase in the historic sense. At any rate Kant paid but little attention to historical and social problems, and it has therefore frequently been suggested that a contrast exists between rationalism and the historic outlook. But in conflict with this contention reference may be made to notable rationalists and distinguished adherents of the enlightenment who were likewise characterised by a well marked historic sense, to such men as Hume, Voltaire. Lessing, and at a later date Comte. Rationalism and the historic outlook are not mutually exclusive. Kant was a mathematician and a physicist, and in so far as he was these he belonged to the group of philosophers who from the days of Descartes onwards thought along the lines of mathematics and natural science.
In view of the powerful effect exercised in Russia by German philosophy, this matter was one of considerable significance to Russian philosophy. Kant had comparatively little influence upon Russian thought, whereas since the eighteenth century the philosophico-historical and sociological outlook has been dominant in Russia.
Kant's successors, and above all Hegel simultaneously represented rationalist and historical views. Indeed, the idealism of Kant and of the postkantians was no less predominantly historical than contemporary French and English philosophy
Not by chance were Hegel and Comte contemporaries. Both-represented the historical trend of thought, just as the socialists, culminating in Marx, likewise endeavoured to base their systems on a historical foundation.
The philosophers of the restoration and of the reaction, the opponents of the revolution and of the new philosophical trends, such writers as de Maistre, de Bonald, Savigny, Stahl, etc. were also predominantly historical ("historical school of law").
The sense of historical evolution became yet stronger during ​the nineteenth century with the growth of natural science and the formulation of the theory of evolution. Darwin is but the representative of the intensive historical thought which characterises the labours of the entire century. History of men and of the human race underwent expansion into history of the world and of the universe. On the other hand, history fructified natural science. Darwin's thought was based upon that of Malthus.
§ 40.
THE increasing vigour of the historic sense, the fact that during the eighteenth century people became aware of the existence of historical evolution, is largely explicable on the ground that at this epoch the development of society, social changes, the historical process, were perceived and felt more plainly than before. The social changes which had accumulated as the outcome of the reformation and the renaissance, those innovations which were realiyd and appraised as progress in the sense of perfectionment, were now being recognised. A new idea of progress and a new faith in progress had arisen, and concurrently there developed the new historic outlook. History came to be conceived as a history of the future. Such is the meaning of the enthusiastic philosophical disquisitions on progress penned by numerous eighteenth-century writers, as for example by Condorcet.
The theoretical historic outlook and historic enlightenment are intimately associated with practical endeavours towards reform, and in the new era history becomes vitae magistra, history guides practical life, guides politics. Strengthening of the historic sense and a belief in progress manifest themselves as an impulse towards reform, as an effort to bring about the essential reconstruction of social organisation. This impulse, this endeavour, leads to revolution, to the great revolution. The great revolution is defeated by the restoration, that is to say, by a reactionary revolution, and it therefore becomes necessary to think out anew andto rediscuss the problems of social organisation and reorganisation. The restoration is followed by the July revolution; a further reaction is followed by the general revolution of 1848; Europe fails to attain to repose, and has to make a choice between the old regime or the acquirements of the revolution. The problem of revolution as a whole must be grasped in its true significance, ​which is not political merely, but philosophical as well. In the study of philosophy, of literature, and of the sciences which deal with man and society, thinkers become aware that the revolution signifies a new age, a new life. We speak of renascence in all domains, a renascence which must be deliberately conceived in theory and must be efficiently carried out in practice.
§ 41.
THE eighteenth century is generally and rightly termed the century of the enlightenment and of rationalism. The titles of two works of this epoch, Paine's Age of Reason and Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, are distinctive of the rationalising enlightenment.
The Critique of Pure Reason provides the epistemological foundation of philosophical criticism. In opposition to the blind faith that had hitherto prevailed (which Kant speaks of as "dogmatism") but in opposition also to the scepticism of David Hume, Kant demonstrates that a critical awareness of the powers of the human intelligence is the only possible and the only correct attitude for the philosopher to assume. This is the historical, the world-historical significance of criticism.
In concreto, Kant's criticism like Hume's scepticism, was directed against theology, for theology makes belief in authority the basis of our entire outlook on the universe. It was in this sense that Hegel defined the philosopher's task as follows: "to disturb to the utmost of his power the theologians who with the zeal of ants are endeavouring to assemble critical building materials for the firm establishment of their Gothic temple, to make everything difﬁcult for them, to whip them out of every corner of refuge, until, no longer finding shelter, they are compelled to expose their nakedness to the light of day."
This opposition between philosophy and theology is at the same time opposition towards the church as a religious organisation upon a theological basis. In ultimate analysis the new philosophy is philosophy of religion. If the new philosophy is so frequently conceived as hostile to religion, all that this really signifies is that between philosophy and historically extant religion, the so-called positive religion, an opposition exists, that there is hostility towards the doctrine and the practice of the church.
​In one form or another, the church is a state church. Since the middle ages, even, church and state have constituted a unity, this unity being based upon identity of general outlook. Theology furnishes the official outlook of the state, and in conformity with this unity, society is theocratically organised.
Philosophy, therefore, as philosophy of religion, is a criticism, not merely of theology, but in addition of theocracy, of church doctrine, church morality, church politics—of official doctrine, morality, and politics in general.
§ 41a.
IT must be carefully noted that the opposition is between philosophy and theology, not between philosophy and religion. It is true that philosophy is opposed to the religion of the churches.
Hume's scepticism was directed against metaphysics and theology, but in addition he rejected religion on the ground that it was an inherited system of tranquillisation. Since he considered that the essence of religion was anthropomorphism, religion was in his view equivalent to superstition.
The Kantian criticism endeavoured to show that transcendental concepts and ideas lack critical justification. In the last resort, however, Kant was willing to tolerate a "more subtle" anthropomorphism when it was necessary to discuss the concept of God, the most important of all concepts. The tendency to anthropomorphise transcendental concepts of the reason was in Kant's view the outcome of natural and inevitable illusions and sophistications of the pure reason itself, illusion and sophistications from which the wisest of mortals cannot hope to be free.
After Kant, Auguste Comte developed yet further the contrast formulated by Hume between anthropomorphism and sceptical critical thought. Three stages, said Comte, can be recognised in the historical development of the human race: the theological, the metaphysical, and the positive (or scientific). The theological stage may be subdivided into three: fetichistic, polytheistic, and monotheistic. The metaphysical stage is no more than transitional.
Here Comte was merely developing Vico's ideas systematically. According to Vico the first of the three stages of human development was the era of gods, demigods (heroes), and men. ​Elsewhere Vico terms the first epoch the poetic epoch, saying that poets were the first philosophers. In this age we have expression given to the outlook of the senses and the imagination in default of rationalised activity, and the outlook is chieﬂy conditioned by fear. This is the age in which nature is animated and deified by the poetic imagination: self-surrender and piety prevail, whilst manners remain rude and barbarous. There follows an epoch of partial awakening. Still later comes the era of complete awakening, of enlightened reason, and of humanitarianism.
In German philosophy, Feuerbach referred religion to anthropomorphism, becoming thereby the real founder of the Hegelian radical left. In this teaching Feuerbach was followed by Strauss, and above all by Stirner and Marx. In England, Spencer, and Tyler the ethnologist, studying primitive man, perfected Comte's doctrine in certain details.
This problem, or rather these problems, cannot be fully considered here, but for our purposes the following points must be emphasised. First of all I should like to render my terminology precise. Following Plato's example, I wish to take my stand with those who replace the term anthropomorphism by the term myth, and to speak therefore of mythopoiesis, which is contrasted with critical, scientifically precise thought and behaviour of human beings vis-à-vis the world. Behaviour of human beings, let me repeat, for we are concerned, not with religion alone, but also with morality, with the whole conduct of man in relation to the world and to society. At a certain stage of development man is not only characterised by having a mythical religion, but in addition his philosophy is mythical; mythical too are his poetry and his art, his ethics and his economics, his language. To express the matter brieﬂy, the essence of myth is found in man's purely objective attitude, in man's complete self-surrender to the object, in his explanation of the world and of himself by analogies, and by hasty analogies. Contrasted with this are scientific and critical thought and conduct. By the critical mind, things are deduced from other things as a result of careful observation and comparison; the critical thinker generalises and makes abstractions; he thinks, in fact, thinks scientifically and critically.
Thus the historical significance of Kantian criticism arises out of the way in which it conceives the attitude of the ​critical thinker towards the world and towards himself, as opposed to myth, but also as opposed to scepticism. Comte, with his positivism. endeavoured to rest content with critical and scientific thought as developed in the special sciences, and to justify such thought historically as the latest stage of evolution. But such a naïve historical outlook is inadequate; it is necessary, with Kant, to establish epistemologically the opposition between mythopoiesis and scientific thought. It is a case of criticism versus positivism.
From the history of European thought we learn how among the Greeks there occurred a gradual severance between mythical and critical thought. Philosophers became more fully aware of the contrast as soon as individualism and subjectivism gathered strength during the age of Socrates, the sophists, Plato, and Aristotle. Thenceforward the opposition between mythology and philosophy had become established.
After Aristotle, philosophical thought grew weaker, mythology stronger. The mythical thought of the cast was superadded to that of Greece, and from this syncretism theology developed as Christian mythology. Christian mythology was the child of Greek philosophy. Theology, the name given to the most important section of the Aristotelian metaphysic, is the correct denotation for Christian dogma.
Just as classical mythology was contrasted with philosophy, so was Christian dogmatics, Christian mythology, contrasted with scholasticism. Primarily scholasticism was the handmaid of theology, but from it the new scientific philosophy developed, and promptly displayed its opposition to theology. This opposition was epistemologically expounded by Hume and Kant. Theology is to-day recognised to be the instrument of myth, philosophy to be the instrument of science.
It is at length possible for us to come to an understanding concerning the relationship of philosophy to religion.
The reader need not be alarmed. I do not propose to say much to him about the essential nature of religion. He will know enough if he will turn the subject over in his own mind. It is a subject to which every one is compelled to attend in view of the existing situation."
Religion, piety. has hitherto been mythical in character. Religious knowledge was at first mythology, subsequently ​theology and theosophy. God was the summum of theology and religion. Man's attitude towards myth was entirely objective and uncritical; God's revelation (in teaching and miracle) was the mainspring of knowledge and of conduct; thinking mythicaily, man blindly accepted the objective revelation as the absolute guide of thought and action; belief, faith, was the foundation of the mythical, theological, system of knowledge. Revelation was absolute, was valid for all times and for all men, was catholic. Quod ubique, quod semper, quod ab omnibus creditum est—thus was the principle of catholicity formulated as early as the fifth century.
Belief in divine revelation, belief in God, has ever been, and is of necessity, belief in mediators between God and man, belief in priests. This belief, this faith, created the church, created theocracy.
Philosophy, in contrast to theology, is the instrument of science, is scientific. God is no longer the sole object of contemplation. Philosophy aims at knowledge of the All in all its parts; science is specialised knowledge, and philosophy is the instrument of the specialised sciences. Science and philosophy issue from man, and man has become his own object of contemplation; theism has yielded place to anthropism.
One who thinks and acts scientifically is subjectivist and individualist. Individualism and subjectivism have become for him the great epistemological problem.
The scientiﬁc thinker has ceased to belief in revelation, has indeed ceased to "believe" at all. He doubts, he criticises; he endeavours to attain certainty. To belief, to credulity, to blind faith, he opposes convictions based upon reasoned knowledge. Critical thought has replaced authority and tradition as the decisive test of truth. Herein, once more, lies the historical importance of Kantian criticism. Criticism is the attainment of complete self-consciousness by modern man vis-à-vis the world and society.
The scientific, the critical thinker, recognises no mediator between God and man. He trusts no longer in priests and their church but in science and philosophy. To theocracy he opposes anthropocracy or democracy. The man of science, indeed, recognises catholicity, not the catholicity of external authority, but that of deliberate and critical agreement.
Hume erred when he rejected religion as anthropomorphism Anthropomorphism is in truth nothing more than the method ​of mythical thought. Kant reduced religion to morality. Comte began, like Hume, with the rejection of religion, but subsequently relapsed into fetichism.
To-day the religious problem may be formulated as follows. Can there be an unrevealed religion? Can the scientiﬁc or critical thinker, can the philosopher, have a religion; and if so, what religion?
§ 42.
THE eighteenth century is, in addition, the age of humanitarianism. This concept is conceived extensively and intensively. The brotherhood of the entire human race is to be realised through the inborn love of man for his fellows. To human love, Kant superadds the sense of human dignity.
In this respect, too, Kant and Hume are of historical importance. Hume called a halt to his scepticism when he came to consider ethics, whilst the critical philosophy of Kant culminated in a moral outlook on the world. For the very reason that they had uprooted theology, both these philosophers endeavoured to safeguard ethics, to establish morality upon a natural foundation.
This is why, in modern philosophy since Descartes, so much stress is laid upon the idea of naturalness. Men seek natural religion, natural law, natural morals, a state of nature, natural reason. Art, above all, strives to be natural. The enlightenment had led to the abandonment of the theological basis of thought and conduct. Enlightenment, humaneness and humanity, naturalness—these became synonyms.
During the nineteenth century, owing to the practical trend given to philosophy by Hume and Kant, rationalism, in so far as it was one-sidedly intellectual, was supplemented by emotionalism and voluntarism. These, in their turn, have been apt to receive a one-sided cultivation, commonly in opposition to intellectualism, as in the philosophy of Schopenhauer.
In my own formulation of the problem I contest the existence of a natural opposition between reason and emotion on the one hand and will on the other. My conception of the relationship between the three fundamental energies of the psyche differs both from that of the rationalists (or intellectualists) and from that of the voluntarists (and emotionalists). It is worth noting that in this psychological scheme Kant, the arch-rationalist, accepted feeling or emotion as a distinct ​basic category, following here the example of Mendelssohn and Tetens, both of whom had been pioneers in placing the emotions beside the intellect and the will as fundamental elements of the human mind (1776 and 1777). Kant's tripartite critique of the Pure Reason, the Judgment, and the Practical Reason; was in conformity with this distinction.
In a word, democracy is opposed to theocracy in the fields alike of practice and of theory.
§ 43.
THE effort to secure a natural and human system of morals logically culminates in political reforms, and may in the last resort lead to revolutionary reforms. Implicit in the enlightenment was the proclamation of the rights of man by the French revolution. Paine, who played a part in the great revolution, gave in his Rights of Man a vivid demonstration of these tendencies.
The wider endeavour to secure social reforms awakened pari passu with the growth of the movement for political rights and reforms. It is true that the French revolutionists had the socialists executed as communists, but during the postrevolutionary restoration and the period of reaction, socialism ceased to be the political program of isolated individuals and became that of the working classes at large.
Socialism and sociology frequently appear in association as practice and theory. The enlightenment and the humanitarian philosophy had to throw light above all upon the social and historical domains, upon the most complicated of all facts and phenomena. It has already been pointed out that there is no opposition between Kantian rationalism and the historical outlook. Just like the French and the English enlightenment, German idealism, founded by Kant as a moral outlook upon the world order, led to socialism.
Finally, too, the idea of nationality is deducible from the humanitarian ideal. Herder was one of the first thinkers to contrast the nation as a natural organisation with the state as an artificial organisation, and he attempted to show that the essence of nationality is to be found in literary monuments and above all in folk poetry. After Herder, philosophy tended more and more to devote itself to the problem of nationality, as we see in the writings of Fichte, Schopenhauer, etc. During ​the nineteenth century the principle of nationality ripened to become a great political force.
§ 44.
THE development and strengthening of the historic sense, enhanced understanding of the evolutionary process in human society and in the universe, made reﬂective persons fully aware of the antithesis between the individual and the whole of which he forms a part. It is to-day regarded as an obvious fact that the modern age is individualistic in comparison with earlier days. For us this signifies that the modern human being, through his critique of cognition and of his own mental processes in general, has become critically aware of the antithesis between the individual and the collectivity, that collectivity wherein the individual is himself comprehended.
Kant conceived individualism also as subjectivism, for in opposition to epistemological objectivism (realism) he made the assumption that the object adapts itself to our faculty of cognition instead of conversely. From this assumption, which Kant compared with the bold speculation of Copernicus, Fichte and Stirner advanced to solipsism.
Kant's critical rationalism, inasmuch as it was subjectivist, was thoroughly activistic. Cognition seemed to him to be an active process of the understanding. He extolled the autoprocreation of our reason, valued reason for its spontaneity as contrasted with receptivity. Voluntarism, in fact, began with Kant.
Epistemologically and metaphysically, however, even Kant failed to carry his subjectivism to its logical conclusion, and for this reason Fichte spoke of him as a "three-quartershead." Holding that consistent subjectivism, solipsism, was an absurdity. Kant assumed the existence of an objective thing-by-itself. But even Fichte, despite his verdict upon Kant's half measures, evaded solipsism. If we examine the Fichtean ego closely, its "logical fanaticism" (Jacobi) vanishes. Fichte helped himself out with the expedient oi diversified egos (the absolute ego, the ego of intellectual contemplation, the ego as idea, the individual ego), and took refuge in history and the philosophy of history, discovering there nationality as the objective to which he subordinated the ego. Fichte, too, and Fichte above all, applied subjectivism to the cultivation of morality.
​After Fichte, Schelling turned away from Fichte and Kant, and turned back to nature and history. Hegel escaped solipsism by pantheism; Stimer, Hegel's pupil, was the ﬁrst to conceive solipsism as egoism; whilst Schopenhauer transformed subjectivism into his voluntarist nihilism.
We shall see how the question of subjectivism and objectivism, and in particular the problem of solipsism, caused a great commotion in Russian thought. Nor is this surprising, for consistent subjectivism, the solipsistic autoapotheosis to which Fichte and Schelling were prone, is brutal and positively absurd. From the critical outlook, Stirner's egoism is nothing more than a bogey to terrify the philistines—and a not particularly terrifying bogey after all. From Hegel, Feuerbach advanced objectivistically towards socialism, desiring to reconcile the ego with the tu. Marx, on the other hand, conceiving historical objectivism in an absolute sense, went so far as positive elimination of the ego and his individual consciousness, extreme subjectivism thus evoking extreme objectivism.
§ 45.
IN conclusion, then, what has been said about modern philosophy may be summarised in three antitheses. Philosophy is absolutely opposed to theology, anthropism to theism; but this must not be taken to imply that theism is utterly false, or that anthropism is atheistic, for all that is meant is that the anthropistic outlook and point of departure has come into its own in modern philosophy. At the same time, in the political sphere, democracy is counterposed to theocracy, to theocratic aristocracy, this signifying that democracy, likewise, possesses theoretic and philosophical importance. In ultimate analysis, modern philosophy has ceased to be the queen of the sciences. It does not occupy a higher plane than the special sciences, but ranks beside them. It is scientia generalis.
III
§ 46.
RUSSIAN philosophy of history, sociological analysis of the motive forces of evolution, and the attempt to grasp the laws that regulate the temporal succession of social phenomena, ​date from the time of Peter the Great, for they arose in connection with the reforms effected in his reign and in that of his successors. It is true that Russians have been without clear ideas concerning the existence of Russian philosophy of history and of philosophy of history in general. Nevertheless, closer contact with Europe compelled thinking Russians to compare their home with the foreign world, and judgments of the present necessitated judgments of the past.
The Russian chronicler who passes by the name of Nestor propounded tasks for Russian historiographers substantially identical with those undertaken by writers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The Kievic twelfth-century historian drew attention to the conglomeration of ethnic types prevailing in Old Russia, and referred also to the peculiar relationship of the Russians as Slavs to their numerous nonslavic neighbours. More especially did Nestor lay stress upon the polyglot character of the Russian state.
Conditions were still much the same in the state of Peter. The prevalence of foreign (chieﬂy Teutonic) influence, and the fact that in the parts of Russia adjacent to Europe the rôle of the Germans was so decisive for Russia, gave Nestor's utterances a living contemporary meaning. Remarkable for his day was Nestor's knowledge of the various Slav stocks, In the eighteenth century the relationship of the Russians to the Poles entered a critical stage; the incorporation of the greater part of the Polish state gave occasion for the discussion of the Slavic tongues, all the more because at this epoch the Slavs in Austria and in the Balkans were experiencing a cultural and political awakening. The historical and Slavic researches of these nonrussian Slavs, and the similar researches of the Germans, found attentive and sympathetic readers in Russia.
All these conditions were extremely favourable to the development of Russian historiography. In addition to the polyhistor Lomonosov, whose History of Russia was completed in the year 1763, there came a whole series of historians, Tatiščev, Tredjakovskii, Ščerbatov, and Boltin. The name of Karamzin may be added to complete the list.
​German writers exercised notable influence upon the development of Russian historical research. Bayer (who came to Russia in 1725), G. F. Müller, above all Schlözer, whose attention was turned to Russia towards 1770, and in addition Ewers and Reutz, form a stately series.
In accordance with the spirit of the age, the interest of these historians was concentrated upon the chronicle of the reigning dynasty and its origin. Now began the controversy whether the Russian state had been founded by Norsemen, whether it was of foreign origin. The patriotism of Tredjakovskii led him to defend the Slavic theory; other writers followed in his footsteps, contending further that the Russians and the Slavs in general were autochthons. German writers, led by Bayer, denied the indigenicity of the Slavic Russians, and assumed the Norse origin of the Varangians. It must be conceded that these German historians of Russia were here following Russian chroniclers, and that apart from this they excelled their Russian colleagues in respect of critical perspicacity and method.
But if Russian historians idealised the primal age of Russia, in doing so they followed the general view. It must be admitted, too, that similar idealisation was voiced from the German side, notably by Herder; whilst, on the ether hand,Ščerbatov and Boltin displayed a more critical spirit than Tatiščev and Lomonosov.
It was natural that extremely hazy ideas should prevail concerning happenings in primitive Russia, for even today accurate knowledge is scanty.
In general, Russia was identified with the dynasty, and it seemed to these writers that tsarist absolutism constituted the true essence of Russia and of its civilisation. For the development of this absolutism Tatiščev propounded a formula which was subsequently adopted in the main by Karamzin, and was still held at a later date. From the first, he said, the Russian state was a hereditary monarchy. Through subdivision of the inheritance among the heirs, decay set in, this rendering subjugation by the Tatars possible. But from the days of Ivan III onwards Muscovy abolished the "democratic" polyarchy of the petty princes, Russia was reunited, and became strong once more. Opinions varied in points of detail, but this general view as to the nature and value of absolutism continued to prevail. German historiographers accepted the same estimate of absolutism and endorsed Tatiščev's formula.
​In the spirit of Peter and of the age, Tatiščev conceived absolutism as enlightened absolutism. He was himself permeated by the German philosophy of enlightenment. In the reign of Anne he advocated the constitution of a deliberative senate.
Karamzin defended absolutism in the spirit of the post-revolutionary reaction. His panegyric upon Alexander I was extended to cover all the rulers of Russia. Before him, indeed, Lomonosov advanced the theory that no notable progress had taken place among the Slavic peoples because there was no reason for them to alter. In Karamzin's opinion, as far back as the ninth century Russia had been the greatest and most civilised state in the world.
During the period of reaction in the reigns of Alexander I and Nicholas I, this opening epoch of Russian,historical research was superseded by new historical trends. Fresh and important material was discovered in the state archives and in the monasteries, the value of this material to the historian receiving due recognition. To an increasing extent, history, which had hitherto been purely political and dynastic, became enriched by historical studies dealing with administration, law, and economics.
Schlözer, following the example of Achenwall, had already made extensive use of statistics, which he termed "quiescent history" (whilst, conversely, for him history was "statistics in motion"). Storch, the political economist, had compiled detailed statistics of the Russian realm. In his historical retrospects he was the first to draw attention to the socio-political significance of trade for Kievic Old Russia.
The content of history was further enlarged by the history of literature, language (Slav linguistic studies), and the other activities of civilization (art, etc.) More and more, history expanded from the field of pure politics to cover the whole story of civilisation.
Comparative historiography played its part in this development. Granovskii, of whom a more detailed account will shortly be given, was perhaps the first Russian to write a universal history.
It need hardly be said that after the days of Schlözer, Russian historiography was continually assisted by the progress of German historical research. It can, for example, be shown, that Niebuhr exercised considerable influence in Russia.
​The greatest changes in the conception of history were those resulting from the experiences Russians acquired in contact with Europe and actually in Europe. Moreover, as has been previously pointed out, historical thought in Russia was stimulated and matured by German philosophy.
Russia participated in the European revolution. Russia fought against republican and Napoleonic France. Russia had joint experience with Europe of the postrevolutionary restoration and reaction, so that the European problem became a Russian problem as well. The causes which led in Europe to the rise of the philosophy of history and to the foundation of sociology were likewise responsible in Russia for the origination of Russian philosophy of history and Russian sociology. With the aid of German idealistic philosophy (in especial that of Schelling and Hegel), and simultaneously with the aid of French socialist thought, after the decabrist rising, the July revolution, the Polish revolt, and the year 1848, Russian philosophy became predominantly historical.
It was during the reaction under Nicholas and under Uvarov his minister for education that Russian philosophy of history became organised as an independent discipline (Čaadaev and the slavophils).
Following Hegel came Comte, Buckle, and the English evolutionists to exercise a notable influence on Russian sociology. Of late, and above all, the teaching of Marx and the Marxists has been predominant. The subsequent studies will attempt a detailed account of this epoch of Russian historical and social philosophy.
* ↑ Although Kant devoted little time to history, it is possible to maintain that he possessed a historic sense. I cannot discuss the question here, but may refer to the able study by Fritz Medicus.
* ↑ In his History of Greece, Grote, basing his demonstration upon the ideas of Comte, gives a clear account of this development.
* ↑ I refer to the oft quoted passage which describes how during the years 860 to 862 the Variag Norsemen were invited to become rulers. I draw especial attention to the fact that according to Nestor the invitation was jointly issued by the Slavs and the Finns.
* ↑ Section 47 of the German edition, containing a list of authorities for the study of Russia, is printed as an appendix to Vol. II at the English edition.