# Decisive Battles Since Waterloo/Chapter 14

CHAPTER XIV.
BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG—1863.
It is not our purpose to trace the causes of the civil war in the United States of America, in the years from 1861 to 1865, a war which deluged the land with blood and brought mourning into many thousands of homes from one end of the country to the other. Each side battled for what it believed to be the right, and each displayed, valor, determination, and heroism, that will forever be the pride of all Americans, without distinction of creed or party. From its commencement in 1861 the war progressed with varying fortunes until the event of which this chapter treats.
With its smaller population and its limited resources, the South had been compelled to see the war confined to its own area. In the West the Union armies had steadily advanced into the Southern territory; in the East the ports of the South were blockaded, while the land forces chiefly confined their operations to Virginia, one of the foremost of the slave-holding States, and an ardent supporter of the cause of secession. In September, 1862, the Confederate army of Northern Virginia crossed the Potomac with the intention of invading the Northern States, but the result of the battle of Antietam, in Maryland, caused its commander, General Lee, to retreat to Virginia, and abandon, for the time, his cherished design.
Early in June, 1863, General Lee had again decided on ​a campaign which was to give the Northern States a taste of the horrors of war. Hitherto the fighting had all been on Southern soil, but now it was to be carried straight into the heart of Pennsylvania, amid the rich farms and prosperous towns of that sober commonwealth. Instead of waiting for the Army of the Potomac under Fighting Joe Hooker to attack him, Lee proposed to dodge it, and to push forward towards Maryland by the valley of the Shenandoah. If he could conceal his movements for some time from the national army he might be able to get well on his way before efficient measures could be taken to oppose him. His plan was to detain the Union army before Fredericksburg by a large display of troops, then to turn its right wing and push up the Shenandoah Valley under cover of the Blue Ridge Mountains.
He had a veteran army on which he could depend, its effective force being some 80,000 men, of whom 68,352 were infantry. This was about the strength of the army under Hooker. The armies were thus equal, but Lee had one great advantage, he had absolute authority and could do what he saw was best at the moment, while Hooker was continually hampered by orders from Washington.
On June 3d Longstreet's 1st division moved forward into the Wilderness, and the other divisions followed closely, until on the evening of the 7th, the 1st corps had reached the neighborhood of Culpepper Court-House. Ewell's 2d corps started in the same direction on the 4th. Gen. A. P. Hill's 3d corps was the only one left to occupy the positions where the army had passed the winter, and it had to string out very thinly in order to conceal the departure of two thirds of the army.
These great movements could not entirely escape the attention of the Unionists, but they were at a loss to know what was on foot. Hooker believed that Lee intended to resume the campaign of the preceding year. ​and to push forward over the Rappahannock to Manassas. Believing that Lee's army was stretched along the Culpepper road he determined to attack the weakened line at Fredericksburg. Two pontoon bridges were thrown over the river at Franklin's Crossing, and on June 6th Howe's division crossed. Hill's corps advanced in opposition and Lee prepared to recall Ewell if he found it necessary. When Hooker saw this display of force he checked his advance, and failed to learn how small was the force opposed to him. Learning that the Confederate cavalry under General Stuart was stationed at Culpepper, Howe determined to make a cavalry reconnoissance on a large scale in that direction. His object was to learn whether Stuart meditated a raid or was trying to cover the movements of infantry. In the meantime Longstreet arrived at Culpepper and joined Stuart.
Lee's plan of invasion was now in full operation. Stuart was to conceal the movements of the infantry by menacing the Unionists near Warrenton, while the army was to proceed to the northwest by way of Sperryville and Thornton's Gap and so reach the valley of the Shenandoah. This would leave the Union army in the rear.
At daybreak of the 9th, Pleasanton's two columns, seven thousand five hundred cavalry and three thousand infantry, crossed the Rappahannock. The Confederates, deeply occupied with their own plans, and suspecting nothing, were taken by surprise, and Stuart narrowly escaped losing his artillery. He was driven back and lost his baggage, and in it were found instructions revealing Lee's plans.
Stuart was preparing to attack Buford's division, when he learned that Greggs' division, having crossed the river unobserved, was coming up in his rear and was then engaged with Robertson's brigade at Fleetwood Hill. Leaving the brigades of W. H. F. Lee and Fitzhugh Lee to resist Buford, Stuart hurried back and attacked Gregg. ​There was desperate fighting, and Gregg was compelled to fall back. He did so none too soon, for as he was leaving Brandy Station he could see the head of Ewell's corps debarking from a train which Lee had sent over in great haste from Culpepper.
Buford and Gregg joined forces and retreated over the river.
The importance of the engagement of Brandy Station lies chiefly in the fact that it disclosed a part of Lee's plans to Hooker. It was also the first time that the Union cavalry had boldly attacked the Confederate cavalry.
It did not change Lee's plans, nor did it trouble Stuart very much. While Hooker knew that Lee with much of his army was at Culpepper, he still did not know how far he intended to go. He extended his right wing along the upper Rappahannock so as to meet Lee's change of base, and be prepared for any emergency.
Lee proceeded with his campaign with his usual vigor. Ewell's corps was pushed forward into the valley of Virginia, marching on the 10th. It was in light order and advanced rapidly, crossing the Blue Ridge at Chester Gap, and reaching the banks of the Shenandoah at Cedarville on the 12th. The Unionists knew nothing of this movement, and Ewell took advantage of their ignorance to press forward against McReynolds' Union brigade under Milroy, at Winchester. Milroy was taken by surprise and overwhelmed by numbers. He was driven out of Winchester on the 14th, and was attacked on his retreat. The retreat became a rout and his men scattered. Some escaped to Harper's Ferry, but nearly 4,000 were captured. The fleeing men created a panic in Pennsylvania, and caused a profound sensation in the North.
Hooker learned on the 12th that Ewell's corps had passed Sperryville, and on the following day he moved the 2d, 6th, and 12th corps to Fairfax Court-House.
When Hill saw that the Unionists had withdrawn he ​joined Longstreet at Culpepper. Pleasanton was still watching Stuart near Warrenton.
Ewell pushed his troopers as far forward as Williamsport on the Potomac. The population of the neighboring Maryland towns fled in terror, carrying off their valuables and driving their herds before them on their way to Harrisburg. The greatest excitement prevailed in that city.
On June 16th Jenkins' troopers entered Greencastle, the first Pennsylvania village and then marched forward to Chambersburg. The Northern farmers now had an experience with which their Southern countrymen were entirely familiar. Horses, cattle, fodder, and provisions were confiscated, or, what was as bad, paid for in Confederate money. Free negroes were seized and sent South to be sold as slaves. There was, however, no plundering or bad behavior on the part of the soldiers.
This was as far as Jenkins dared go, and he returned to Williamsport, where Ewell was awaiting the arrival of the two other corps.
In order to learn clearly what Lee intended to do Hooker sent Pleasanton to the foot of the Blue Ridge, with instructions that if he did not meet the enemy to push forward by way of Leesburg to Harper's Ferry.
This was on June 17th, and on the same day Stuart hastened to occupy the passes of the Bull Run Mountains. The two forces were therefore moving in the same direction, and they met near Aldie, where Kilpatrick, with the Second New York, at once charged Munford's brigade and drove it before him. Col. Duffie's division surprised Stuart at Middleburg, and gave him barely time to make his escape. Stuart returned with Robertson's brigade and forced Duffie to fall back.
These minor engagements showed the direction in which the greater portion of Lee's army was moving, and caused Hooker to move his army westward that he might be ​prepared to cross the Blue Ridge or the Potomac, as might be required.
It was not long before Pleasanton and Stuart were fighting again. On the 19th the former attacked Stuart at Middleburg and drove him out. This victory was followed up, and Stuart was driven back eight miles to Upperville. The Union scouts were now able to climb the peaks of the Blue Ridge, where they had a full view of the whole lower valley of the Shenandoah, and saw Ewell's corps marching towards the Potomac.
On the 21st Lee ordered Ewell to march on Harrisburg, and on the 23d sent the other two corps forward. They passed into Pennsylvania, and requisitions of every kind followed. The Confederates, accustomed to their impoverished lands, were amazed at the richness of the country. They were able to fit themselves out anew with every thing they needed. Ewell reached Carlisle on the 27th and his scouts reconnoitred Harrisburg, where the citizens were making desperate preparations for defence.
As Lee was marching away from Washington, it was necessary to guard his flank from an attack from that quarter, and Early was sent east of the mountains. On June 26th he bivouacked at Gettysburg, after driving out a thousand Pennsylvania militia. Gordon pushed forward to cross the big wooden bridge at Wrightsville, but it was burned before he could do so.
When Hooker learned of the arrival of Ewell at Hagerstown, he sent three army corps to Poolesville to hold the left bank of the Potomac and to guard Washington, and he prepared to follow Lee into Maryland with the remainder of his army. He crossed the Potomac on the 26th, and the two armies were now only 40 miles apart. Lee heard nothing of this movement. He relied on Stuart for information, but that enthusiastic officer had started off on a raid of his own, and was out of reach. Stuart proposed to make a circuit of the Federal army by passing ​between it and Washington. He might have succeeded if the army had been stationary, but it was on the move and he had frequent encounters with detached bodies. He had fights at Haymarket with the 2d corps, pushed on and crossed the Potomac at Dranesville, entered Maryland and destroyed the canal, captured a large supply train at Rockville, and then moved on towards Hanover, where he had hopes of finding Early. Here he met Pleasanton's cavalry and a sharp fight followed. Night came on, and Stuart, by a forced march, reached Dover, and then passed on to Carlisle, where he arrived on July 1st, only to find that Early had gone. His men and horses were worn out, and he had done no real harm to the enemy. Orders here reached him to march immediately on Gettysburg, where the battle had begun. When Lee learned that Hooker had crossed the Potomac he determined to push on towards Baltimore, so as to threaten its communication with the North and compel the Union army to follow him. He hoped to lead them to the north, and possibly to engage them near Philadelphia. With this intent he directed his three army corps to assemble at Gettysburg, having no reason to suppose that Meade was moving in that direction.
Ewell was recalled from before Harrisburg, and marched to Scotland on a road connecting with the Gettysburg turnpike. Longstreet's corps moved forward from Chambersburg and Hill's corps from Fayetteville. On June 30th, Pettigrew's brigade pushed on to Gettysburg and was about to enter the place, when Buford's advance compelled him to fall back. Hill then advanced on Gettysburg with his whole division.
Hooker was preparing to follow Lee, when he was succeeded in command by General Meade, who made no
GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN MAP.
​took positions at Emmettsburg, Taneytown, and Frizzellburg, and so held the whole breadth of the valley. Pleasanton's cavalry covered the march and watched the movements of the enemy. Meade had now learned of Lee's intention to concentrate at Gettysburg, and he made preparations for battle.
The two armies were moving towards one point and they must soon meet. Lee did not know that Meade also proposed to concentrate his forces at Gettysburg. The coincidence was quite accidental, and it brought on the conflict between the two armies earlier than had been expected.
A description of the surroundings of Gettysburg will be of value in understanding the details of one of the bloodiest and most important battles of modern times. The battle-field is between two small streams, Willoughby Run and Rock Creek, to the west and east, respectively, of the city. The ground is broken up by two groups of hills, each with three ridges, of which the central one is the highest. In the first group, northwest of Gettysburg, are Oak Hill, Seminary Hill, and the Seminary Ridge running north and south. The second group is to the southeast of the first. It starts with Cemetery Hill, and runs along as Cemetery Ridge until it suddenly rises again and forms the hills called Round Top and Little Round Top. Gettysburg is situated in the valley between these two groups, and its streets run to the base of Cemetery Hill. It is naturally the centre of all roads, so that three turnpikes and seven other roads pass into the town. East of Cemetery Hill is Gulp's Hill, well wooded.
Suspecting that the Confederates might move to Gettysburg, Meade directed Buford to occupy the place and defend it until the arrival of the 1st corps. Buford reached there just in time to frighten away Pettigrew's brigade. He soon learned that Hill was advancing on him in force, and perceived the advantage in holding the ​strong positions around Gettysburg. He dismounted his men and deployed them as infantry in such positions as would best conceal their numerical weakness. Of his 4,200 men, one quarter had to be withdrawn to look after the horses, so that really only about 3,000 were prepared to oppose Lee's advance. They were disposed in a circular arc from west to northeast of Gettysburg, with Gamble's brigade on the left and Devin's on the right.
On the morning of July 1st Buford's scouts reported that Heth's division (Confederate) was rapidly advancing from the direction of Cashtown. The battle was imminent. Heth deployed his two advance brigades south of the Chambersburg road, and at eight o'clock his line, preceded by skirmishers, passed down the slopes on the right bank of Willoughby Run. Buford opened fire, and a fierce struggle followed on the banks of the stream. Buford's fire was so well sustained that Heth thought he had an infantry corps opposed to him. This idea prevented him from advancing to take possession of Gettysburg and he waited for Pender's troops to reinforce him.
Buford was terribly overmatched, and realizing that he could not resist much longer, he eagerly watched the Emmettsburg road for signs of Reynolds. Hill and Pender were pushing forward, when the signalman stationed in the belfry of the seminary on Seminary Hill discovered a large column of infantry moving forward on the Emmettsburg road where only friends could come.
It was Reynolds whom the sound of battle had hurried forward at his utmost speed. Wadsworth's division soon followed. Reynolds rode on ahead and met Buford on the stairs of the belfry. A moment sufficed to tell of the critical situation. Reynolds ordered Wadsworth's division to relieve Gamble's men, who had suffered greatly. He sent word to the other two divisions to hasten, and also notified Howard, requesting him to hurry forward with the 11th corps.
​There were still far too few troops on the ground to resist the Confederate army for any length of time, but Reynolds determined to hold it in check as long as possible, until help could come. He led his troops down the Cashtown road, to cut off all passage there. Meredith made a dash for the wood where Archer had entered, and Reynolds hastened to join the Iron Brigade in its attack.
While encouraging the soldiers, General Reynolds was shot through the head and fell dead. He was one of the ablest of Meade's officers, and his death was a great loss to the national cause.
It was then 10.45. Meredith advanced with such rapidity that he captured one thousand prisoners, and drove the enemy down the slope at the point of the bayonet. Wadsworth's three regiments were attacked by Davis, and compelled to fall back to the Oak Hill Ridge, where they took shelter in a thick wood. Doubleday sent the Sixth Wisconsin to them, and, by a sharp attack on Davis' lines threw them into confusion, and captured two entire regiments with their colors.
Heth moved up to take the place of Archer and Davis, while Doubleday formed his lines anew and awaited events. He was gladdened by the arrival of Rowley and Robinson's divisions.
The Confederate army now moved forward again. Brockenbrough tried to out-flank Biddle on the left, while Pettigrew hurled himself on Stone. The latter's brigade was formed of Pennsylvania lumbermen, called "Bucktails," from the ornaments attached to their hats. They were fighting on their native soil, and this filled them with an enthusiasm which laughed at death. Their position was exposed, and many were slain, but they held their ground and shouted "We've come to stay."
It was no use attacking such men as these, and the Confederates again fell back discomfited. An artillery ​duel followed, and as the Confederates had far more guns, the Union army got the worst of it.
Howard, with his three divisions, was now hurrying from Emmettsburg. He rode on ahead, and found that by the death of Reynolds the command had fallen into his hands. He also realized the importance of holding the town, and sent urgent instructions to the 3d and 11th corps to push forward. The latter arrived at 12.45 o'clock, Schurz leading with his division. Rodes' Confederate division made a detour, and came in from the north to take possession of Oak Hill. Howard prepared for the attack by sending Schimmelpfennig's division, into the woods of Oak Hill, with two batteries of artillery.
At 2.15 Rodes advanced and occupied Oak Hill before Schimmelpfennig could get there; he immediately opened fire on the Union line with five batteries. Schurz, who had succeeded Howard in command of the 11th corps, pushed on to intercept him. Three of Rodes' brigades crossed the Mummasburg road and attacked Cutler's troops; O'Neil attacked Baxter and was repulsed with heavy loss. Iverson fell savagely on Robinson's two brigades, only to find that he had run into a trap. Cutler moved from the wood and took him on the flank. The Confederates fought bravely, but they were overmatched, many were killed and more than one thousand were taken prisoners. Daniel came up too late to save Iverson, but threw himself from the north on Stone at the railway cut, and drove him out of it. Brockenbrough attempted to drive Meredith from McPherson's wood but was himself routed.
It was 2.45 o'clock, and the Confederates had been repulsed all along the line, but the battle had now reached a turning point and was soon to assume a different aspect.
Daniel was reinforced by Ramseur, and Heth by three brigades of Pender's division,—fresh men who had not been under fire that day.
​The first national misfortune of the day fell to Schimmelpfennig's division. His two brigades advancing near the Oak Hill slopes were battered on the flank by Rodes' artillery, and thrown into great disorder. Dole's division fell upon them and drove them for some distance. Early's division advanced on the Heidlersburg road, and its artillery opened fire on Barlow who was trying to relieve Schimmelpfennig. Gordon's brigade charged on Von Gilsa's position, and forced him and Barlow back at the point of the bayonet; Hays and Hoke took them on the flank, and the retreat became a rout. Howard ordered the 11th corps to retreat, but it had already been driven back.
Pender fell with his whole division on the tired and depleted brigades of Stone, Meredith, and Biddle. Ramseur's brigade, with the remnants of Iverson's and O'Neil's brigades, and supported by a heavy fire of artillery, descended on Robinson, whom the retreat of the 11th corps had left isolated. Robinson fell back on the wood occupied by Cutler. Doubleday's men were outnumbered and overpowered and he recalled them to Seminary Hill, and, joined by Biddle's men, they stationed themselves in the trenches which had been thrown up around the seminary. Supported by a few cannon they succeeded in checking the advance of the enemy.
Howard saw that this resistance could not be maintained. It was useful only in assisting the retreat. He ordered the abandonment of Seminary Hill, and as the 1st corps, with ranks greatly thinned, marched down the eastern slopes. Hill occupied the position. Doubleday found Gettysburg filled with the fugitives of Barlow's and Schimmelpfennig's divisions. Their condition was very perilous, as Ewell was advancing on the town from the eastward. Howard abandoned the town and fell back on Cemetery Hill. The 1st corps reached there safely, all but Stone's brigade, which was mixed up with the fugitives in the streets of the town. The Confederates dashed in with ​a rush, the fugitives scattered in every direction, but nearly 4,000 were taken prisoners. General Schimmelpfennig hid himself under a load of wood and so managed to escape. Ewell found two cannon abandoned in the streets.
The national troops were now in a very critical situation. With 16,500 men against 22,000 Confederates, they had made a good fight. They had now only five thousand fighting men left. Five thousand had been taken prisoners, four thousand were dead or wounded, and the rest were scattered. The latter hurried to Taneytown and Westminster, and greatly discouraged the regiments which were moving up from that direction.
The Union forces were thus routed and disorganized, and in actual danger of complete extermination when a new factor appeared on the field. Hancock arrived at four o'clock. Meade, on learning of the serious nature of the battle, had hurried him forward to take the place of the slain Reynolds. He assumed command and at once sought to restore order. The 11th corps reformed around Von Steinwehr on Cemetery Hill. Wadsworth was stationed on Culp's Hill and Doubleday on the left. These manœuvres consumed an hour. Lee might easily have prevented it, but he was cautious and waited for the rest of his army to arrive. He could see that Howard was well intrenched on Cemetery Hill, and supposed that reinforcements must have arrived. In truth they did not arrive until 5.15 P.M., when Sickles and Birney came up from Emmettsburg with a division of the 3d corps. Graham and Ward's brigades followed, and soon afterwards Slocum appeared with the 12th corps. Slocum started to occupy Wolf's Hill, but gave up the idea when he learned that the enemy held Gettysburg. Geary's division arrived at Cemetery Hill at 5.30.
Slocum assumed the command, and Hancock went to Taneytown to inform Meade of the situation. Meade had already determined to concentrate his army between ​Gettysburg and Taneytown. Hancock met the 2d corps marching towards Gettysburg. The 5th corps was marching from Union, and the 6th from Manchester.
Meade hastened to Gettysburg, arrived at Cemetery Hill at 1 A.M., and at once began preparations for the great battle which must follow in the morning. He realized the full importance of the result. If he was defeated, the North was open to invasion, and Philadelphia and Baltimore would be liable to capture.
It was the morning of the 2d of July—a date which is now borne by thousands of white headstones in the national cemetery at Gettysburg. The midsummer sun rose about four o'clock and Meade was able to survey the field more clearly. All of the army that had not arrived was pushing on by forced marches and was expected very shortly. By nine o'clock they were all present, excepting 15,000 men of the 6th corps who were sure to arrive before the day was over. The 1st and 11th corps still occupied their old positions on Cemetery Hill. The 2d was on the left of the 1st. Hay's division was on the right, resting on Ziegler's grove; Gibbon's division was in the centre. Caldwell's division extended along the water-line between Plum Run and Rock Creek. The 3d corps was also on the left. The left of the army rested on the Round Tops, which were farthest to the south, the centre on Cemetery Hill and Cemetery Ridge, and the right on Gulp's Hill. The "Orchard" hill to the northeast of the Round Tops was a commanding position, as it would prevent the enemy from making a flank movement on the left, but it was weak in other respects, as it was commanded by Seminary Hill on the north, and by the Warfield Ridge on the west.
The right on Gulp's Hill was nearest the enemy, and seemed to be in the most danger. Meade sent Geary to
​Wadsworth. Sickles occupied the positions on the slopes of Little Round Top, but owing to some misunderstanding of orders he did not occupy the summit.
Lee was also busy in gathering his forces. Early was in the centre, facing the ridge which connects Gulp's Hill with Cemetery Hill, Ewell was on the left with Johnson, who was on Benner's Hill, Rodes was occupying the town at the foot of Cemetery Hill, his right touching the 3d corps on Seminary Hill. Pender was on the left above the seminary, Heth on the right, along the ridge. The other divisions not yet placed were marching towards the town from the north. By nine o'clock the army was all there, excepting Stuart's cavalry and 6,000 men of Pickett's and Law's divisions who were on the way.
The early part of the day was wasted in preparations, and Meade, astonished at this delay, took advantage of it to strengthen his lines. Sickles, not liking his position, moved forward and took possession of the Emmettsburg road as far as the peach orchard, whose exposed position has already been described. To extend his line to cover his new position he was obliged to abandon the slopes of Little Round Top, which was thus left entirely unprotected. Ward occupied the wood which covered the flank of Devil's Den, with his left on Plum Run and his right running to the summit of the wheat field. De Trobriand's line connected him with Graham, who was on the summit of the hillock. Humphreys covered the right of the division.
Lee ordered Longstreet to attack the Union army on the right wing, the point where they least expected it. At half-past three o'clock Longstreet moved forward. The battle opened with an artillery duel between the Union batteries in the orchard and the Confederate batteries in the Warfield woods. Wilcox threw out skirmishers on one side, and Graham on the other, and the rattle of musketry soon became continuous. Meade visited Sickles' position, ​and seeing its weak points, directed General Warren to support him. Law moved on Little Round Top, and Robertson on Devil's Den. They advanced with the Southern yell, and attacked Ward, who resisted them with five regiments. A savage struggle on the slopes followed. Ward was falling back, when he was assisted by De Trobriand, who took Robertson on the flank. The First Texas, which threatened to capture Smith's battery, was driven back with great slaughter. Anderson advanced to strike De Trobriand's centre, was repulsed and in danger of capture, when he was saved by the arrival of Benning, whose three brigades renewed the attack with great vigor. Ward and De Trobriand, assisted by Smith's and Winslow's batteries, contested every foot of the way, but they were over-matched and began to fall back.
Law made a dash for the Round Tops with his Texas and Alabama veterans. The Fourth Maine, Fortieth New York, and Sixth New Jersey were waiting him in ambuscade, and resisted stoutly. All to no use, however, as the Confederate veterans advanced steadily. Ward weakened his line in supporting the retreat, and this forced De Trobriand to extend his left, leaving only two small regiments in his centre. They managed to repel Anderson's second assault, but fell back before Benning, who captured three pieces of Smith's artillery.
In the meantime McLaw's division was moving across the Emmettsburg road. At 5.30 Kershaw attacked the wooded hill occupied by De Trobriand's centre, and the Confederate guns fired from the Warfield Ridge against Humphreys' and Graham's brigades. Kershaw met Sweitzer's and Tilton's brigades, which Sykes had sent forward to reinforce De Trobriand, and drove them back in confusion. Warren, following Meade's instructions, climbed Little Round Top, and surveyed the country. He saw the Confederates advancing to capture it, and knew that it was undefended. Directing the signal ​officers to remain on the crest so as to make the enemy believe that it was defended, he hastened after the 3d brigade of Ayres' division, which he saw moving some distance away. Weed, who was in command, directed Colonel O'Rorke to lead the One Hundred and Fortieth New York to the summit and defend it at all hazards.
Colonel Vincent with Barnes' 3d brigade had just reached the southern slope of Little Round Top, and was preparing to oppose Law's advance. A moment later Hood's soldiers dashed forward with a yell and attacked him. Vincent's men were well sheltered behind rocks and made a vigorous resistance. Law swooped down on his left, and driving the Sixth Michigan before him, pressed on to the summit. Fortunately O'Rorke's soldiers, going at full run, reached the summit a moment before him. Before they had time to catch their breath or form in line of battle. Law was upon them.
O'Rorke ordered a charge, and his men dashed forward amid a sharp musketry fire, and captured some of the foremost men of the enemy. Vincent came to their assistance, and Hood was checked. O'Rorke and many of his men were killed, but Little Round Top was saved. Hazlett's battery had been dragged to the summit by the most extraordinary exertions, but the guns could not be depressed to reach the enemy on the slope, so Hazlett shelled the Confederate reserve in the valley. Law renewed his attack on the summit, and was repulsed by Vincent, who fell in the defence.
Sweitzer and Tilton were retreating before Kershaw, and Ward and De Trobriand before Benning. The hill of Devil's Den was abandoned, strewn with corpses. Smith saved his three remaining guns with great difficulty. The Confederates drove Winslow's battery from the wheat field and threatened De Trobriand's rear. The latter, assailed in front by Anderson, and out-flanked by Kershaw, retreated with greatly thinned ranks. The Eighth South ​Carolina dashed for Clark's and Bigelow's guns, and were repulsed by the One Hundred and Forty-first Pennsylvania. Just then Caldwell's division of the 2d corps arrived, having been hurried forward by Meade. Cross' brigade supported De Trobriand, and Kelly's brigade supported Ward. The latter was Meagher's old Irish brigade; it rushed into the fight with its well-known gallantry, and at once stopped Anderson's advance. Cross advanced against Kershaw, and forced him back on Semmes' brigade. Cross was killed. Semmes' fresh troops returned the attack but were met by Caldwell's second line, composed of Zook's and Brook's brigades, and driven back with Kershaw to the other side of the ravine.
Weed relieved O'Rorke's tired men, and reached the summit of Little Round Top just as Vincent fell. Law pushed forward to a third attack, and tried to out-flank the Union line by way of the eastern side of the ridge. He was met by the hardy backwoodsmen of the Twentieth Maine and forced back in a hand-to-hand encounter.
The field of battle now grew more extensive. McLaws advanced against the orchard, which Graham occupied with two brigades. Barksdale attacked the west flank and Wofford the south front.
Graham found himself in a very hot position, and his loss was great. He was wounded and taken prisoner, and his troops were driven from the orchard and down the slope. Sickles hastened to his aid, when a bullet struck him in the leg and he was forced to transfer the command to Birney.
The Union batteries on the right, along the Emmettsburg road, retired sullenly, firing as they went. Barksdale, following up his victory, pushed in between Humphreys and Barnes, while Wofford attacked their flank on the east. Anderson's three brigades moved against Humphreys' front. Humphreys retreated with his two brigades in good order. He left nearly half of his men dead and wounded on the field.
​Wofford attacked Tilton's division and forced it back. Kershaw and Semmes again assailed Sweitzer and Zook and drove them out of the wood. Zook was killed and there was a great loss in the rank and file of his command. Finally the Union troops were pushed in disorder to the left bank of Plum Run. Bigelow's battery, unsupported, took position in front of the Trostle House, and fired canister until nearly all the gunners and 80 out of 88 horses were killed. The guns were captured.
Ayres with Day's and Burbank's brigades occupied the crest of Devil's Den, and sustained the attack of Hood and McLaws. He retired slowly, losing nearly half his men, and took position on the northern base of Little Round Top. Fighting had gone on continuously on the summit. Weed was shot down, and Hazlett, bending over to speak to him, was mortally wounded. Many other superior officers were either killed or wounded, but the men held their positions until the enemy was worn out. Colonel Chamberlain then charged, drove them back, and captured three hundred prisoners. Just then Crawford arrived with McCandless' brigade and assisted in driving the enemy to the other side of Plum Run. Ayres' position deterred them from making a fresh attack on Little Round Top.
There was danger of Barksdale and Wofford separating the Union left from the rest of the army. They advanced rapidly, driving every thing before them. To fill in the gap Hancock despatched two regiments of Hay's division and one of Willard's brigades. Alexander's Confederate batteries were shelling Humphreys' lines, and McGilvery's brigade of artillery established itself on the left bank of Plum Run and replied with vigor. Aided by Hancock's artillery it retarded the Confederate movements. Meade, realizing the danger, hurried to the field, and directed reinforcements to hasten from the right. Williams' division, General Lockwood's two regiments, Candy's brigade, and ​Bartlett's brigade all pushed forward to the rescue. United they were superior in number to the enemy in front of the position, but there was danger of their being beaten in detail as they arrived.
Anderson's three brigades continued their advance, confident of victory. But the way was not an easy one.
Meade in person led Lockwood's soldiers at the left against him, in the wood north of the Millerstown road, and McCandless' brigade supported him. Bartlett's, Eustis', and Nevin's brigades of the 6th corps arrived and reinforced the 5th on the line between Little Round Top and McGilvery's battery.
Barksdale and many of his men fell before one of Burling's regiments. Wilcox scaled the slopes and attacked Humphreys and Gibbon. Wright captured a battery on the edge of a wood above Gibbon's front. Webb's brigade dashed forward, destroyed two thirds of his division and recaptured the battery. Wilcox was taken in flank by McGilvery's artillery, and was vigorously met by Humphreys and Hancock. He lost a third of his men and withdrew to the Emmettsburg road. The attack had been a failure all along the line. If it had been supported by Posey's, Mahone's, or Pender's divisions the result might have been far different.
While this desperate fighting was taking place on the left, Ewell was not idle on the right. His orders were to move forward when he heard Longstreet's guns, but owing to a contrary wind he did not hear them until five o'clock. His six batteries on Benner's Hill opened against the Union entrenchment on Gulp's Hill, but being entirely unprotected, were quickly silenced. Johnson attempted to turn the Union position on Gulp's Hill by moving in the gorges of Rock Greek on the southeast. The 12th corps was abandoning this position, and on their way to the right, when Johnson attacked it. A few detachments of Green's brigade alone defended the intrenchments, and ​Stewart's brigade had no difficulty in occupying all that part south of the ravine. He continued to advance and drove Green before him. Night came on and he halted, ignorant that the Baltimore turnpike was only a short distance away, and that to capture it would endanger the Union line of retreat.
Jones was not so successful in his attack on Green's left. He found it ambushed on the steep slopes of Gulp's Hill, and lost many men in a vain attempt to dislodge it. A brigade from Schurz' division and also Kane's brigade came to reinforce Green, and Nichols was pushed back. While they had thus gained some ground, the Confederates had obtained no material advantage.
This was only a portion of Ewell's attack. When he had set Johnson in motion he gave the order of attack to Early and Rodes. Early was quick to march, while Rodes hung back for some reason, and the effect of a united movement was thus lost.
Hoke's and Hays' brigades ascended the eastern slope of Cemetery Hill under a terrific fire of artillery. As they approached nearer they fell under the volleys of Barlow's men; but their gallant advance was not stopped, and they drove the Unionists from the first line back to the intrenchments on the top of the hill. They followed them there, and penetrated into the works. Steinwehr and Schurz, who were guarding the opposite slopes, were obliged to about face and assist Barlow. Although the Unionists were greater in number, the Confederate veterans were a match for them, and held the northern side of the hill. Rodes failed to come to their assistance, while Hancock, learning of the situation, sent Carroll's brigade to aid Howard. It arrived at an opportune moment, recaptured the northern side, and drove back Hoke. Early fell back defeated.
While the infantry and artillery were battling as thus described, the cavalry was also busy. Kilpatrick tried to ​head off Stuart, and had a brisk encounter with Hampton's brigade at Hunterstown. He then moved to a point on the extreme left. Gregg stationed himself on the right. Johnson in his advance sent a detachment to reconnoitre Brinkerhoff's ridge, and Gregg met them and repulsed them.
When night ended the battle, it was hard to say on which side the advantage lay. Lee occupied a portion of Gulp's Hill; he had held Cemetery Hill and Little Round Top for a short time; he had routed the Unionists in the peach orchard, and these advantages he considered sufficient to warrant him in continuing the battle on the next day. Only seventeen of his brigades had been in action.
Although Meade had repulsed all attacks, his situation was still alarming. Forty-two of his fifty-two brigades had been engaged. He had lost over 20,000 men in the two days' fighting, and hundreds of men were straggling towards Baltimore. He looked forward with apprehension to the next day of battle, and made every preparation for retreat. He called a council of war, and it was decided to remain and defend the position.
The night was passed in reforming the lines and picking up the wounded. The 12th corps marched back from the right to its old position, to find it occupied by Stewart. Kane's brigade joined them. Shaler's and Neill's brigades were stationed on the extreme right on the east side of Rock Creek. Lockwood reinforced Williams. The 5th corps was placed on the left on the steep slopes of Great Round Top, and the disabled 3d was held in reserve. Caldwell's division was again stationed on the left of the 2d corps. Wadsworth was on Gulp's Hill, Robinson on Cemetery Hill. Stannard occupied the small wood where Perry had been driven out.
Lee made no change in his plan of battle. He intended to resume his tactics of the previous day—a double attack on both wings.
​Johnson on the left was reinforced by Smith's brigade. Rodes' old brigade and Daniels' came to support his left. The Power and McAllister Hills commanded his position in the wood, and Williams, having planted his artillery there, began a destructive fire on the morning of the 3d July, and demolished Johnson's weak entrenchments. Williams pushed forward his infantry to the attack, and Johnson's infantry, without waiting, dashed forward to meet them. This enabled them to catch sight of the turnpike crowded with wagons, and stragglers, and the sight spurred them to great exertions.
A savage hand-to-hand fight followed among the rocks. Meade's artillery poured in a terrible fire on the Confederates, who had no guns with which to reply. Lockwood moved to Geary's assistance. After seven hours' fighting Stewart led a charge on Ruger, who threatened his left. It was all in vain, and in turn Geary and Ruger advanced, drove Stewart from the slopes of Gulp's Hill, and captured three stand of colors and five hundred prisoners.
It was eleven o'clock. The Unionists were completely victorious on their right wing and the turnpike was safe. On the extreme left Farnsworth made a gallant charge on Laws' lines, and was met and annihilated by Robertson's brigade.
It was just about this time that Pickett, who was stationed on the strip of ground between Warfield Ridge and Seminary Hill, set fire to the Codon House, and exchanged shots with the enemy. This amounted to little, and it was not until one o'clock that the battle really began.
Two cannon-shots gave the signal, and a moment later
​maintained their positions bravely. Finally Meade silenced his guns in order to draw the enemy to the attack. Pickett believing the guns to be disabled, threw his soldiers forward on Ziegler's grove. Kemper moved on his right and Armistead on his left.
McGilvery reopened with his battery of forty pieces, and taking Pickett's line in flank did tremendous damage. This did not stop the intrepid Southerners, and Pickett's three brigades advanced on the run, making one of the most magnificent charges in the history of war. Garnett, who led his brigade, fell dead with many of his men, before the withering fire of Gibbon's division.
The Unionists were intrenched behind rocks and fences, where bullets could not reach them. Still Pickett pressed on, and crossed bayonets with Gibbon's men. Stannard's soldiers opened a murderous fire on Armistead's right. It recoiled, and Armistead threw it upon the brigades of Webb and Harrow. It pierced the first line and drove the Unionists back upon their second line of earthworks. Hancock and Gibbon sent forward their reserves. Harrow advanced his left and took Pickett in the rear.
Armistead pressed on, and captured Cushing's battery, which was posted in a clump of trees, and was killed with Gushing in the fight. Pettigrew, Archer, Scales, and Lane, who had advanced on Pickett's left, broke through the first Union line, and ascending the slopes, threw themselves against Hays' line. They could not pierce it and were driven back in confusion, leaving two thousand prisoners and fifteen stand of colors. Some of their regiments joined Pickett, who was still fighting.
The entire fire of the Unionists was now concentrated on Pickett's men, and the division was simply annihilated; three thousand five hundred men and twelve stand of colors were lost.
Wilcox, who should have assaulted Gibbon's right, had wandered off too far to the right, and had reached the ​foot of the slope on which the 3d corps (Union) was stationed. He was preparing to resume his march when Stannard attacked him on the flank and the Union artillery opened fire. Finding himself unsupported he retreated.
The whole Confederate line was now in retreat. The reserve was not near enough to support it, and the artillery alone aided it. It drew off slowly, and Meade was too cautious to take the offensive. McCandless advanced on Kershaw, had a brief engagement, and captured a few prisoners. The battle of Gettysburg was ended.
Before the day's battle had begun Stuart had received orders to move round the Union right and strike the Union column on the Baltimore turnpike if it should retreat in that direction. He wished to create a panic in the Union rear, and he gathered his four brigades commanded by Chamblin, Jenkens, Fitzhugh Lee, and Hampton, on the western slopes of Cress Ridge.
Kilpatrick's division was on the other side of the ridge, and prepared to oppose him. A vigorous engagement took place on the Rummel farm east of the ridge. The opposing cavalry crossed sabres several times; the battle ended in Stuart being defeated, and he withdrew to cover the retreat of Lee's army.
The battle had thus occupied July 1st, 2d, and 3d. Meade's effective force was from 82,000 to 84,000 men, and 300 guns. Lee's effective force was about 69,000 men, and 250 guns. Each side lost 23,000 men, killed, wounded, and missing. Considering the number of men engaged, about 69,000 Confederates, to 80,000 on the Union side, the percentage is enormous; being 36 per cent, for the former, and 27 for the latter. The official report gave the Union loss 2,834 killed, 13,709 wounded, and 6,645 prisoners, or 23,188 in all. The Confederate total was 23,028, and included 2,665 killed and 12,599 wounded. Fully one thousand of those reported wounded ​on the Union side died soon after, and the same was the case with the Confederates. The Union army lost 20 generals, 16 wounded, and four killed. The Confederates lost 17 generals, 13 wounded, three killed, and one captured.
After its defeat at Gettysburg, the Confederate army retreated to Northern Virginia, closely followed by the Union forces. During the remainder of 1863 there were no important movements on either side.
A contrary result to the battle of Gettysburg would have been fraught with disaster to the Union cause, far beyond the loss of men and material during the clash of arms. It would have uncovered Baltimore and Philadelphia to the advance of the Confederate army, and enabled Lee to establish himself in the rich region of Eastern Pennsylvania, whence he could gather abundant supplies for his army, while it rested from the fatigue of the long march, and repaired the ravages of battle. Washington would have been endangered, and it was Lee's plan to give a crushing defeat to the Union army, and then occupy the capital and dictate terms of peace. He was well aware of the discontent that prevailed at the North, and the opposition that politicians and others were making to the prosecution of the war for the suppression of the rebellion. He counted confidently upon an uprising in the North, in case he could carry the war into its territory instead of confining it, as it had been thus far and was ever after confined, to the Southern States. Between the opposition influences and the fears of the people, he hoped to create a sentiment in favor of peace, and with his advantage of position he believed he would be able, in a great measure, to dictate its terms.
His confidence cannot be wondered at when it is remembered that he had, not long before, defeated the Union army of Virginia, at Chancellorsville, and, previous to Chancellorsville, had inflicted other defeats of equal ​importance. His army was composed of the very flower of the Southern troops, and in order to strengthen it and prepare for the invasion of Pennsylvania, he had drawn Longstreet's corps from North Carolina, when it was greatly needed for strengthening Bragg, and enabling him to take the offensive against Rosecrans, and also for preventing the disaster which overtook the Confederates at Vicksburg. By their defeat at Gettysburg, the Confederates suffered as heavily in morale as in material, and from that time onward, to the close of the war, the invasion of the North was not again possible. In all its aspects the battle of Gettysburg is entitled to rank as one of the great and decisive battles in the history of the nineteenth century.