# Burns v. Wilson/Concurrence Minton

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* Concurring Opinions Jackson Minton
* Dissenting Opinion Douglas
United States Supreme Court
346 U.S. 137
Burns v. Wilson
Argued: Feb. 5, 1953. ---
Mr. Justice MINTON, concurring in the affirmance of the judgment.
I do not agree that the federal civil courts sit to protect the constitutional rights of military defendants, except to the limited extent indicated below. Their rights are committed by the Constitution and by Congress acting in pursuance thereof to the protection of the military courts, with review in some instances by the President. Nor do we sit to review errors of law committed by military courts.
This grant to set up military courts is as distinct as the grant to set up civil courts. Congress has acted to implement both grants. Each hierarchy of courts is distinct from the other. We have no supervisory power over the administration of military justice, such as we have over civil justice in the federal courts. Due process of law for military personnel is what Congress has provided for them in the military hierarchy in courts established according to law. If the court is thus established, its action is not reviewable here. Such military court's jurisdiction is exclusive but for the exceptions contained in the statute, and the civil courts are not mentioned in the exceptions. 64 Stat. 115, 50 U.S.C. (Supp. V) § 581, 50 U.S.C.A. § 581.
If error is made by the military courts, to which Congress has committed the protection of the rights of military personnel, that error must be corrected in the military hierarchy of courts provided by Congress. We have but one function, namely, to see that the military court has jurisdiction, not whether it has committed error in the exercise of that jurisdiction.
The rule was clearly stated in the early case of In re Grimley, 137 U.S. 147, 150, 11 S.Ct. 54, 34 L.Ed. 636, in these words:
'It cannot be doubted that the civil courts may in any case inquire into the jurisdiction of a court-martial, and, if it appears that the party condemned was not amenable to its jurisdiction, may discharge him from the sentence. And, on the other hand, it is equally clear that by habeas corpus the civil courts exercise no supervisory or correcting power over the proceedings of a court-martial, and that no mere errors in their proceedings are open to consideration. The single inquiry, the test, is jurisdiction. * * *'
This case was cited and an excerpt from the above quoted with approval in Hiatt v. Brown, 339 U.S. 103, 111, 70 S.Ct. 495, 499, 94 L.Ed. 691. After approving In re Grimley, we rejected the broader claim of the respondent for review to determine whether certain action of the military court had denied him due process of law and said:
'In this case the court-martial had jurisdiction of the person accused and the offense charged, and acted within its lawful powers. The correction of any errors it may have committed is for the military authorities which are alone authorized to review its decision. * * *'
With this understanding, I concur in affirming the judgment.
Mr. Justice FRANKFURTER.
This case raises questions of great delicacy and difficulty. On the one hand is proper regard for habeas corpus, 'the great writ of liberty'; on the other hand the duty of civil courts to abstain from intervening in matters constitutionally committed to military justice. The case comes to us on a division of opinion in the Court of Appeals. In the interest of enabling indigent litigants to have the case reviewed in this Court without incurring the enormous cost of printing, we have required to be brought here only one copy of a record consisting of a mass of materials in their original form. Consideration of the case has fallen at the close of the Term. Obviously it has not been possible for every member of the Court to examine such a record. In any event there has not been time for its consideration by me. An examination of it, however, is imperative in view of what seem to me to be the essential issues to be canvassed. I can now only outline the legal issues that are implicit in the case.
The right to invoke habeas corpus to secure freedom is not to be confined by any a priori or technical notions of 'jurisdiction.' See my dissent in Sunal v. Large, 332 U.S. 174, 184, 67 S.Ct. 1588, 1593, 91 L.Ed. 1982. And so, if imprisonment is the result of a denial of due process, it may be challenged no matter under what authority of Government it was brought about. Congress itself in the exercise of the war power 'is subject to applicable constitutional limitations.' Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries & Warehouse Co., 251 U.S. 146, 156, 40 S.Ct. 106, 108, 64 L.Ed. 194. It is therefore not freed from the requirements of due process of the Fifth Amendment. But there is no table of weights and measures for ascertaining what constitutes due process. Indeed, it was common ground, in the majority and dissenting opinions below, that due process, in the language of Judge Bazelon, is not 'the same in a military setting as it is in a civil setting.' 202 F.2d at page 352.
I cannot agree that the only inquiry that is open on an application for habeas corpus challenging a sentence of a military tribunal is whether that tribunal was legally constituted and had jurisdiction, technically speaking, over the person and the crime. Again, I cannot agree that the scope of inquiry is the same as that open to us on review of State convictions; the content of due process in civil trials does not control what is due process in military trials. Nor is the duty of the civil courts upon habeas corpus met simply when it is found that the military sentence has been reviewed by the military hierarchy, although in a debatable situation we should no doubt attach more weight to the conclusions reached on controversial facts by military appellate courts than to those reached by the highest court of a State.
In the light of these considerations I cannot assume the responsibility, where life is at stake, of concurring in the judgment of the Court. Equally, however, I would not feel justified in reversing the judgment. My duty, as I see it, is to resolve the dilemma by doing neither. It is my view that this is not just a case involving individuals. Issues of far-reaching import are at stake which call for further consideration. They were not explored in all their significance in the submissions made to the Court. While this case arose prior to the new Code of Military Justice, 64 Stat. 107, it necessarily will have a strong bearing upon the relations of the civil courts to the new Court of Military Appeals. The short of it is that I believe this case should be set down for reargument.
Mr. Justice DOUGLAS, with whom Mr. Justice BLACK concurs, dissenting.

## Notes

* ↑ Art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
* ↑ This particular case comes up under the former Revised Articles of War, 62 Stat. 627, now supplanted by the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 64 Stat. 107, 50 U.S.C. (Supp. V) § 551 et seq., 50 U.S.C.A. § 551 et seq.
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