# History of Mexico (Bancroft)/Volume 5/Chapter 18

Table of Contents
CHAPTER XVIII.
INVASION OF THE VALLEY OF MEXICO.
August, 1847.
Scott Advances — Mustering of the Mexicans — Defences of the Capital — The Chalco Route — A Flank Movement — Valencia's Insubordination — His Ambitious Designs — The Battle of Padierna Begins — Santa Anna's Inaction-The Morning Surprise — Effect of Valencia's Defeat — Bravo Outflanked — Fortifications of Churubusco — Antiquated Tactics — Cannonading the Convent — Critical Position of Shields — The Tête de Pont — Gallantry of Rincon And Anaya — Santa Anna Retreats within the Gates — Peril of the City.
The arrival of General Pierce with reënforcements enabled Scott to begin the long-meditated march upon the capital. The rarefied air of the table-land affected the men severely, and combined with climatic fevers, dysentery, and other causes to swell the sick-list at Puebla. The care of these as well as the city itself devolved upon Colonel Childs, with a few hundred men. This deduction made, left at the disposal of Scott about 11,200 men, with which force he set out from Puebla between the 7th and 10th of August, en echelon, leaving one short day's march between each of the four divisions, under Worth, Twiggs, Pillow, and Quitman, respectively. ​Scott had naturally expected to meet with opposition in crossing the range into the valley of Mexico, for here a very effective resistance could have been made with a small force; and he was not a little elated as he saw further evidence of the enemy's neglect. The route followed was along the less elevated Rio Frio, north of the hoary-headed sentinels, Iztaccihuatl and Popocatepetl, at whose feet was verdure bright with flowers of a never-ending sunmer. With emotions not unlike to those that stirred the first intruding Spaniards three centuries before, the soldiers yielded themselves to the entrancing view from the summit of the pass. The contrast with the bleak ridges around lent to it the glamour of a terrestrial paradise, and, with senses quickened in the aroma-laden air, their eyes lingered on the winding lakes with azure skies reflected, on undulating fields and meadows bright with blossoms, on villages nestling in gleaming whiteness midst shady groves, and beyond on the checkered domes and fretted turrets of the foremost capital upon the continent.
With far different feelings the Mexicans beheld the advance in its tortuous march along the slopes of volcanoes, extinct or slumbering within, but girdled without by a death-bearing cestus, marked by a broken gleam of bayonets, by the white-covered wagons and fluttering pennons. Many a patriot's heart beat high with indignation at the sight of the invaders, while others felt a creeping fear akin to that of the spectators of yore at the winding march of pagan processions round the temple pyramids, from whose summits were to rise the agony shrieks of human victims and the fumes of blood.
With his usual evanescent energy Santa Anna had bestirred himself to meet the threatening danger, by ​
Profiting by experience, Santa Anna had resolved to await the enemy behind the lines with the main body, while two divisions, under Valencia and Álvarez, the latter consisting of cavalry, and each of about 4,000 men, advanced in the direction of Tezcuco and Chalco respectively, prepared to fall upon ​the flank and rear of the assailants whenever they should attack the intrenchments. Till then no conflict was to be engaged in, save to harass the advance. The city itself possessed many natural advantages, which, with means and prudent generalship, might have rendered her wellnigh impregnable. The prevailing rains had transformed the surrounding lands, formerly covered by the now half-drained lake, into a marsh which presented almost insurmountable obstacles, especially on the east side. Approach was therefore confined to the several raised causeways, notably the south-eastern or Vera Cruz road, the southern to Tlalpam and Acapulco, the western to Chapultepec and Toluca, and the northern to Guadalupe. Between these lay a number of minor or branch roads, especially on the south and west, each protected more or less by barricades, lunettes, trous-de-loup, and wet ditches. Beyond rose a line of formidable outworks, centring on the north side upon the hills near Guadalupe, with a score of guns. The hill fortress of Chapultepec, two miles off, commanded the western roads of San Cosme and Belen, and the square-bastioned citadel of the city adjoined the latter gate. The southern approaches were defended by strong works at Churubusco and Mexicalcingo, nearly five miles from the city, and at San Antonio, still farther south; while the eastern were enfiladed by the impregnable rock known as El Peñon, now surrounded by the overflowing waters. The route between the lakes of Chalco and Tezcuco was regarded as the only one practicable for the enemy, and although nature had assisted in protecting the eastern semicircle, the southern and south-eastern outworks received special attention. Between the southern and western points of the exterior line, however, lay a wide, open stretch, and the corresponding inner works were of no importance; but it was supposed that this weak spot could be readily strengthened in case of need. ​The general plan of Santa Anna had undoubtedly its good features, but he counted too much on the efficiency of his subordinates, and on the readiness of the enemy to fall into his traps. On the other hand, it was a perilous feat for Scott to penetrate into the very heart of a strange country filled with patriotic people, cut off by rocky barriers and vast plains, by deserts and fever-zones; and with the prospect, not of decisive battles, but of costly assaults or prolonged sieges, for which his force seemed wholly insufficient. But retreat appeared out of the question. Furthermore, he was governed somewhat by jealousy of Taylor's successes, and emboldened by the lack of unity in the opposing generals, by his own superior arms, and by the prestige of victory.
Traitors stood ready here as elsewhere to disclose by-paths and gate-ways, and by the time Scott had gained Ayotla, after a march of five days, he possessed sufficient information to decide him to advance against the western side of the city. Reconnoissances toward El Peñon and Mexicalcingo convinced him further that to penetrate this outer line in this direction, along the narrow causeways, would prove both dangerous and costly; but as the route round the southern shore of Chalco was understood to be too difficult, without questioning this supposition, he prepared to break through by attacking Mexicalcingo. At the last moment, however, General Worth, who had more prudently investigated the matter, produced a report which changed the plan in favor of a southern march, which was begun on August 15th. He took ​the lead, and reached Tlalpam,on the second day, after a slight skirmish with Álvarez, who might readily have inflicted trouble and injury by harassing the enemy along the several defiles, encumbered as they were with heavy trains, while he possessed a flying corps of fully 4,000 men.
As soon as Santa Anna found that the Americans had changed their route, he threw his forces to the southern side, and hastened to strengthen its defences. Valencia's northern army, embracing 4,000 of the most experienced soldiers in the country, was ordered from its post of observation at Tezcuco to San Ángel. A preliminary examination caused Valencia to report against the occupation of either San Ángel or Padierna, a point southward, by which the invaders might branch off toward Tacubaya; and as later indications led to the belief that they proposed to march straight along the main road upon San Antonio, he was ordered to fall back to Coyoacan.
By this time Valencia's views had expanded. He had lately made himself conspicuous by objecting to timid defence operations, and boasting that he knew how to crush the enemy. The bombast proved so contagious as to revive a proposal of investing him with the chief command. Santa Anna became alarmed, ​and hastened to send him aside with such force and instructions as should restrain his ambition. Valencia naturally chafed under this restraint. By reconsidering the situation, he was now induced to blunder into the very admirable conclusion that Scott would probably not confine himself to the narrow front presented by San Antonio and Churubusco, but attempt at least a flank movement by way of Padierna. By selecting a good position here he might check this movement, and certainly distract the enemy's operations by threatening his rear. The manœuvre promised in any case to promote the main point, his reputation for zeal, dash, and sagacity, while even a moderate success would so buoy his schemes as to land him perhaps in the presidential seat. He accordingly refused to withdraw to Coyoacan. Santa Anna's fury was mingled with suspicions; but as he had not the means to enforce compliance, and dared not remove him lest he should expose his own jealousy and lack of judgment and provoke a mutiny, he had to yield.
Meanwhile Valencia had moved his entire force, with 22 guns, to the eastern slope of the hill known as Padierna or Contreras, which commanded the debouché of the only direct route between the roads to San Antonio and San Angel; a route leading over a pedregal, or lava-bed, lashed as it seemed into broken billows of stone, and most difficult to cross. The position, by no means the best, was protected in front by a rugged ravine, and by three low breastworks, with a detached lunette on the right; but it could be enfiladed from any direction, especially the summit of the hill, which remained most unaccountably neglected.
The objections which led Scott to turn from the eastern approach to Mexico applied in a measure to an advance along the Tlalpam road, for a direct assault on San Antonio must involve a heavy sacrifice. ​He therefore resolved to turn this position by crossing the pedregal and thus disconcert the garrisons by a rear movement, opening at the same time the way toward the Chapultepec line, as the weakest. The task of making a road was assigned to Pillow's division, guarded by Twiggs, the former being authorized to join forces and drive Valencia from his position if he proved troublesome. The latter, who had already feebly contested the ground with the reconnoitring party, was not slow in opening fire, and Pillow proving equally prompt in accepting the challenge, the conflict began early in the afternoon of August 19th. Valencia's skirmishers were driven from the pedregal and beyond the rancho Padierna into the camp, and two light batteries were planted to cover an assault by Smith's brigade. So murderous, however, was the fire from the heavier metal of the intrenchments that the batteries were practically silenced, and the brigade had to fall back for shelter. Another brigade was sent to its aid; but now occurred a diversion of which the Mexicans took advantage for a spirited sally, during which they recaptured the rancho, although holding it only for a time.
The diversion was caused by, the approach of Santa Anna, on the road from San Ángel, at the instance of the insubordinate Valencia, with a force of not less than 6,000. Anticipating some such movement, Pillow had, at the opening of the conflict, despatched Riley's brigade to occupy San Gerónimo, a village situated midst fields and orchards on a small plateau one mile north-west of the intrenchments. His object was also to operate on the flank and rear of the latter; and this soon occupied his exclusive attention, ​for Valencia's cavalry displayed great activity especially while led by General Frontera, who fell mortally wounded during one of the charges. It was consequently fortunate for the Americans that the failure of the front assault induced Pillow to send against the rear another brigade under Cadwalader. This arrived at San Gerónimo just in time to check, by a bold demonstration, the advance of Santa Anna, who thereupon contented himself with forming in line upon the rising ground, about half a mile north of Cadwalader's position. His evident course was to promptly attack the far inferior column before him, which for that matter stood between two fires, with Valencia's cavalry and other available support in the rear. Instead of this, he allowed the precious time to pass, fuming and sneering at the advices transmitted by Valencia, which magnified into overwhelming victories the advantages so far gained. Scott, on the other hand, hastened to send additional reënforcements to San Gerónimo, thus averting the danger and snatching the prospects of victory from his opponent. By this time night had set in, and with it the usual showers during this season, which tended to close operations for the day.
A drenching rain caused Santa Anna to return to the quarters at San Angel. What his next attempt would be, it was difficult to say; for "in view of the impending rout," he observes, "I ordered General Valencia that same night to spike his guns and retreat to San Ángel." This message reached the latter in the midst of a general and noisy celebration of the American defeat, attended by a lavish distribution of preferments among the officers, Valencia having with great foresight reduced to documentary form a glowing account of his triumph, well calculated to ​promote his schemes against Santa Anna. That similar designs influenced the latter may readily be supposed. A council of officers supported Valencia in an indignant refusal to obey the order of the general-in-chief, which implied an exchange of victory for demoralizing defeat, that left the way of the enemy open to Mexico. No, they would rather perish with the whole army. Nevertheless, the abandonment of his advantage by Santa Anna cast a gloom over the hitherto festive camp.
Santa Anna's retreat was not observed by the invaders, who passed the night in preparations for the morrow. Persifer Smith had assumed command at San Gerónimo, and had planned a night attack upon the exposed rear of Valencia's camp, with three brigades, leaving a fourth to check the vanished forces of Santa Anna, and a fifth to mask the movement by active demonstrations in front. He set out shortly after midnight, groping his way in the dark through the forest and along the slopes, favored to some extent by the patter of the rain and the whistling wind. The need for caution and silence, and the difficulties of the imperfectly known route, delayed the march; and it was not till dawn that he found himself in position, just behind the brow of the neglected summit. The brigade in front had already engaged the Mexicans, and protected by the din, he could reload the wet arms and arrange for the assault. Meanwhile Valencia discovered the advance, and turned two guns to assist in checking it; but the ​Americans lost no further time. Riley took the lead, followed by Cadwalader from the western rear, while Smith supported them by a northern flank movement. On gaining the summit one blinding volley was delivered, and then, regardless of the sweeping fire in response, they rushed down the hill with deafening shouts. Riley's men entered the camp almost in a body, with bayonets and clubbed muskets driving the cavalry in disorder upon the infantry. The con fusion was increased by the stampede of train-mules and the shrieks of terrified women. The soldiers, disheartened by Santa Anna's abandonment, were further demoralized by the sudden disappearance of Valencia. With such acknowledgment of defeat the less responsible subordinates, many of them enrolled by force, could not be blamed for following so contagious an example. The efforts of a few men like Ex-president Salas to rally the fleeing proved of no avail amidst the turmoil. Within a quarter of an hour the camp was taken, and the fight turned into pursuit and slaughter, wherein shared the troops in front as well as those at San Gerónimo, that blocked the main exit from the ravines. The road to Mexico was strewn with dead for over a mile.
Thus ended the battle of Padierna, which involved the destruction of the foremost military division of the army, so far as veterans were concerned; with the loss of nearly 700 in killed, 813 prisoners, including four generals, besides 22 pieces of brass ordnance, 700 pack-mules, and a large quantity of small arms and stores. The Americans suffered comparatively ​little, owing to the rapidity of their movements. The disaster, moreover, left the way open to Mexico, toward its weakest point; with the additional advantage to the enemy of turning the dangerous southern outworks, although Scott neglected this opportunity.
And now for a way among the discomfited officers to shift the responsibility each from his own shoulders. As Valencia prudently kept aloof, Santa Anna could direct the torrent of indignation against him for a time. Salas again sought to extol himself at the expense of Torrejon, the cavalry leader.
Santa Anna claims to have been preparing to advance toward Padierna when fugitives brought him news of the disaster. He at once fell back on Churubusco, ordering Bravo, who commanded the line at San Antonio, to retire also toward the capital. These movements were timely, for the Americans were coming up in hot pursuit. Worth's division, which had occupied Coapan a short distance in advance of the ​headquarters and depôt at Tlalpam, and was thence threatening San Antonio, received orders to carry it. As a direct attack would involve a heavy loss of men and time, Worth resolved to turn it by a sweep to the left through the eastern fringe of the pedregal. This was executed by Clarke's brigade, and so rapidly that, although Bravo was already retreating in obedience to orders, the Americans gained upon him and cut his column in two, compelling the rear part to abandon the narrow causeway and seek safety across the meadows, eastward, with the loss of several guns on the way as well as at San Antonio. Beyond, toward Churubusco, all was confusion — cavalry, infantry, artillery, all rushing onward midst the rumble of trains, the mad plunge of spurred horses, the yell of drivers and arrieros, the frantic shouts and gesticulations of officers, and the groans of the wounded; while behind pressed the foe, halting only for a moment to take more deadly aim, and then pressing forward over the dead and dying to swell the horrid heap.
Meanwhile, the other divisions were pursuing the fugitives from Padierna along the road through San Ángel and Coyoacan, driving Santa Anna's columns into the midst of Bravo's retreating men, and so increasing the disorder upon the causeway near Churubusco that a large amount of war-stores had to be abandoned in order to let the troops pass, the abandoned trains serving to some extent for shelter. The promptness of the Americans in following up the advantage at Padierna proved of value to them, for they not only made inroads on Mexican artillery and ammunition, and broke one of their columns, but interrupted defence preparations at the next scene of action. Foremost among the pursuers was Clarke's sixth regiment of infantry, which, at 11 a. m. on August 20th, began the battle of Churubusco. ​This was the name of a small village on the southern causeway, lying on slightly elevated ground about 1,200 feet south of the streamlet Churubusco, which flows eastward into Xochimilco Lake. Its central feature was the massive stone convent of San Pablo, nearly square, with crenellated walls for musketry and unfinished parapets, surrounded by an outer wall which constituted a regular field-work, with embrasures and platforms for cannon, and especially strong toward the south. It was held by General Rincon with about 1,400 men and seven guns. Intent mainly on the inner line of the capital, Santa Anna ordered Rincon to maintain himself at this point to the last, keeping back the enemy, while he sought refuge with the main army across the river, deploying a portion to the left, and the rest behind the artificially elevated banks, which, with their rows of maguey, offered an excellent rampart. At the bridge by which the highway crosses the river was a scientifically constructed work, well bastioned and curtained, with wet ditches and platforms for heavy metal; but the line in front was obstructed by the stalled trains, which served the enemy for a screen. The total strength of the defenders at and behind Churubusco was estimated at from 9,000 to 27,000.
Santa Anna's plan, as we have seen, was to let the ​enemy exhaust themselves by butting against the outworks of the capital. Although the strongest points had been turned, accident assisted him in drawing them toward his best remaining strongholds; and Scott, adhering evidently to the long-exploded tactics of never leaving a fort in the rear, allowed himself to be carried away. He should have called to mind Napoleon's maxim to avoid doing what the enemy desired. The victory of Padierna had opened the way toward Tacubaya and to several intermediate roads, unprotected by outworks, and with weak inner defences. Scott was sufficiently well informed of this to venture in all confidence to avoid the isolated outworks of Churubusco, so far from the capital, especially as he did not need or intend to use the road which it protected. The acquisition of Churubusco was valueless, and the expenditure of time and blood upon it a waste. It must be conceded, however, that the details of the attack, left mainly to the judgment of subordinate generals, were well outlined and managed, with slight exceptions.
The task of engaging and carrying the convent was assigned to Twiggs' division. Worth was left to pursue his advance along the southern road, leading to the river line defended by the main army, and portions of Pillow's and Quitman's divisions were sent to coöperate by a movement against Santa Anna's rear. Twiggs directed the brigades of Smith and Riley to occupy the ground in front and to the left of the convent respectively, assisted by a field-battery. The position could have been improved, for it left them exposed to a galling fire that opened wide gaps in the ranks and obliged the battery to retire after a while with heavy loss; yet the infantry maintained its ground well, even within seventy yards of the convent, sheltered to some extent from the incessant fusillade by obstructions which proved of no avail, ​however, against the heavier metal. The convent seemed a very volcano, enfolded in a dense cloud, and rumbling with the roar of artillery and rattle of musketry, the warning tones of messengers speeding forth on bloody trails, midst flashes of fire that lighted the scene as lightning-rays the storm. Beyond, along the distant hills rolled the echo of the thunder, reverberating in ever-feebler accents until it died in whispered moans; fading like the broken canopy of smoke that drifted in lazy indifference toward the icy summits of Iztaccihuatl.
Although the convent figured as centre point, the main effort of Scott was directed against the forces behind Rio Churubusco, in front and rear. The latter important movement was intrusted to the brigades of Shields and Pierce, which passed from Coyoacan north toward Portales, to turn the right flank of the reserve; but it was not undertaken with sufficient force, for here stood the flower of the Mexican army, with the advantage of position. Santa Anna responded, moreover, by a prompt counter-advance, directing the cavalry to outflank the Americans, and compelling them to change the manœuvre to a more direct attack. This broke against the firm lines of the Mexicans, who sent the columns back staggering and in disorder. They quickly formed anew, however, to charge again and again. But in vain; their opponents repulsed every effort, and inflicted a terrible havoc with their steady fire, the Palmetto regiment alone leaving half its number on the field. And now the Mexicans, elated with success, pressed closer. The situation was becoming critical, and Shields sent a hurried appeal for aid. Just then a cry of alarm rose to the rear of Santa Anna's position, the prelude to a new phase of battle.
Worth's two brigades under Clarke and Garland, assisted by Pillow's brigade under Cadwalader, had ​been directing their attention mainly to the river dikes with their tête de pont, soon recognized as the key to the position. The sixth regiment tried at the outset to follow Santa Anna's retreating men into this stronghold; and it might have succeeded but for a well-directed cannonade from the convent side, which made it recoil in confusion. Support was near, however; and now began more cautious operations; for the batteries of the tête de pont stood prepared to hold their own, under the management too of the San Patricios, composed of Irish deserters, who sought in religious sympathy an excuse for turning traitors. The stalled trains afforded a protection against their raking volleys, however, and enabled Cadwalader to penetrate to a point between the bridge and the convent, and cut a valuable connection, while the other brigades deployed to the right and along the dikes. After nearly two hours of ineffectual firing and charging, a part of Clarke's force managed to cross the river some distance east of the tête de pont and fall upon its rear. At the same time another section made a dash across the ditch in front, and climbing over the wall pell-mell, without ladders, carried the works at the point of the bayonet. A stream of men now poured over the bridge, driving the foremost lines in disorder upon the main columns of Santa Anna. Without an attempt to press the advantage gained on the right, and without an effort at a rally, the latter abandoned resistance and turned in flight toward the city walls, with the Americans in close pursuit, among them the lately almost overwhelmed brigades of Shields and Pierce.
But there are stancher officers than Santa Anna, who know how to join patriotic soldiers in redeeming the national honor. The convent still holds forth in stern defiance, its stout handful at bay, single-handed against superior numbers, and even venturing on futile sallies. But the flight of the reserve precipitates its ​fall. Leaving pursuit to others, some of Worth's men hasten to direct against the convent the heavy guns at the tête de pont from which they had suffered so severely, together with a hitherto silenced battery of their own. This sudden attack from the side least protected has a startling effect on the garrison, already disheartened by their apparent abandonment for sacrifice, and by the failing ammunition, which is causing a sensible abatement in the cannonade. Rincon and his second, Anaya, lately acting president, observe the danger, and rushing forward midst the men, they cheer them on to fresh efforts, joining personally in directing the artillery, regardless of the raking cross-fire. But the brigades in front and on the left take advantage of the diversion to renew their exertions, and soon Smith's men follow up with a charge which gains the parapet and holds it. Another bound, and on to slaughter. Just then the white flag is raised; the futility of resistance is admitted. Instantly there is a hush, as the smoke lifts and dissipates in curling wreaths.
The conflict still rages in the distance. The pursuers have reached La Candelaria beyond, slashing and thrusting at the straggling mass of fugitives. They already approach the battery protecting the gates of San Antonio Abad, so close upon their heels as to be prepared to enter with the Mexicans. Just then is heard the bugle sounding the recall. They ​halt and yield the vantage, all save a few blinded by excitement. It is a small band of dragoons, led by Captain Kearny. The battery opens upon them, but they heed it not. They spring from the saddle and across the ditch; the Mexicans turn, and, half cut in pieces, the band falls back. The battle is over.
Its result was a demoralization among the defenders, with the temporary disorganization of their army, placing the capital for the time at the mercy of the victors. Scott places the Mexican losses at 4,000 killed and wounded and 3,000 captives, including 213 officers, among them eight generals, of whom two were ex-presidents; also 37 pieces of artillery and a large amount of small arms and stores. For his own side he admits 139 dead and 876 wounded, including 76 officers. These casualties include the losses at Padierna, Scott embracing the day's operations under five victories, Padierna, San Antonio, Churubusco Convent, the tête de pont, and Shields' charge — a rather fanciful effort with which to draw attention from his several blunders, notably after the actual battle.
It is affirmed by Santa Anna that the victors might have taken the capital by following up their advantage during the pursuit or for some time after, ​for no organized resistance could have been offered; all was disorder among the soldiers as well as citizens.The American general returned most unconcernedly to the headquarters at Tlalpam, surrendering his advantages and giving Santa Anna time to recover himself. Scott explains his extraordinary conduct by saying that he, as well as Trist, "had been admonished by the best friends of peace against precipitation: lest by wantonly driving away the government and others, dishonored, he might scatter the elements of peace, excite a spirit of national desperation, and thus indefinitely postpone the hope of accommodation." He also pleads humane considerations, which, if sincere, are creditable enough to the man, but hardly to the general, in his precarious position, to sacrifice one tenth of his small force for an object of questionable value, and then, neglecting to secure the prize, to be compelled to do his work over again.
* ↑ Of 2,429 men, with which he had left Vera Cruz July 19, 1847.
* ↑ His report in U. S. Govt Doc., Cong. 30, Ses. 1, Sen. Ex. 1, p. 471. Nearly 700 of the sick died.
* ↑ Not counting train-men and Mexican and army followers, Scott asserts that he left with only 10,738 rank and file. Id., 384. The Mexican version of Roa Bárcena enumerates 40 pieces of artillery, 700 wagons and 500 laden mules. Recuerdos, 299. Gamboa, Impug., 49, assumes over 6,000 horses and mules, and 1,100 wagons. Desertion assisted to reduce the force somewhat, as Mansfield, Mex. War, 223, points out.
* ↑ Twiggs left on the first day, preceded by Harney's cavalry brigade. His two brigades were commanded by Gen. Persifer Smith and Col. Riley; those of Worth by cols Garland and Clarke; Pillow's by gens Cadwalader and Pierce; Quitman's volunteers were mostly under Gen. Shields. Scott's Repts, 31; Sonorense, Sept. 17, 1847.
* ↑ 'Y los batallones contaron bajo sus banderas mas soldados que en cualquiera otra época.' Apuntes Hist. Guerra, 211.
* ↑ A ministerial report of Aug. 30th shows a force of 20,210, including 8 generals and 1,729 subordinate officers. Gamboa, Impug., 51-2, gives details swelling the number to 21,500. Santa Anna reduces the artillery to 90 pieces, Detall, 94, but there were many additional gun scounted as unserviceable. See also Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos, 296. Ripley places the total force, 'according to Mexican accounts,' at over 36,000, War with Mex., ii. 161, and so does Scott, Mem., 496, etc.; which Apuntes Hist. Guerra, 209, declares indignantly to be 'una impostura,' while acknowledging 104 useful guns.
* ↑ For additional details, with plans of the works, see Apuntes Hist. Guerra, 204-21; Mansfield's Mex. War, 236-41; Ripley's War with Mex., ii. 177-84. To Gen. Robles was mainly due the strength of El Peñon. The village of Santa Marta near by had been submissively evacuated and razed. Herrera assisted Santa Anna as second in command. The leading generals besides Valencia and Álvarez were Bravo, holding the southern line from San Antonio, Terrés, Rangel, Perez, Leon, Rincon, Anaya, lately acting president, and ex-President Salas, second to Valencia. Means for the defence were obtained partly by forced contributions, whereof Semmes, Campaign, 201-2, has preserved a specimen list of apportionments. Of the million and half lately granted by the clergy, less than one tenth remained. Santa Anna, Apel., 94.
* ↑ Scott and Worth had quarrelled, and the former felt therefore less disposed to accord credit for a discovery which exposed his own neglect. Scott's Mem., 469. But Worth's friends show that a council of generals held on the 14th decided on the former plan, and declared that the less practicable route south of the lake should be tried merely by Worth's lighter division for a rear movement. Ripley's War with Mex., ii. 190-202. The effort of Scott's friends to explain this plan as a mere feint is further disproved by the testimony of Semmes, Campaign, 239-57, who joined Worth's exploring party, and appends letters by Worth, Scott, and others. The change was fortunate for the Americans, for they might have become involved on the narrow and easily obstructed causeways, which afforded no facilities for operations, while forces from El Peñon could have harassed their rear. The reconnoissance round Mexicalcingo was declared to have been the most daring feat of the kind during the war. A partial movement was made in this direction to deceive the Mexicans. Peterson's Mil. Heroes, ii. 94; Arco Iris, Aug. 25, 1847. The northern route round Tezcuco Lake was declared difficult, with its barren and wet lands and its strong works.
* ↑ The Americans say 6,000, while an official report records him only 2,762; but he had many irregular followers. Santa-Anna, Detall, 95, 106.
* ↑ 'Cinco mil veteranos,' says Santa Anna. Id., 94. In Apuntes Hist. Guerra, 228, this is reduced to 3,700, while Scott raises it as high as 7,000. U. S. Govt Doc., Cong. 30, Ses. 1, Sen. Ex. 1, p. 308.
* ↑ 'Bajo su responsabilidad,' as he explains, Apel., 97, although the assent is not so worded. See correspondence between Valencia and Alcorta, the minister of war, in Rel. Causas, 20 Ag., 1847, 13-28.
* ↑ Under Capt. Lee, on the 18th. A simultaneous reconnoissance toward San Antonio resulted singularly enough in the death of Capt. Thornton. The officer whose capture on the Rio Grande had been the proximate cause of war was the first to fall on penetrating to the heart of the country. He had been exonerated by the court-martial. Ripley's War with Mex., ii. 210.
* ↑ And 5 guns, as admitted in Santa Anna's despatch to Valencia. Rel. Causas, 28. Bárcena reduces the figures to 4,000 and Americans swell it to 12,000.
* ↑ He had labored from 5 p. m., when he claimed to have arrived in front of San Gerónimo — others say an hour or more earlier — in vain search for a route by which to break through to Valencia's camp. He left the cavalry and infantry in the field, exposed to the 'tempestad horrorosa,' to be rejoined in the morning for action on the morrow. Detall, 98-9.
* ↑ 'El enemigo ha sufrido una pérdida espantosa,' he writes. Text in Rel. Causas, 27. The final order to spike the guns appears to have come after midnight, a previous despatch, arriving at 9 p. m., having vainly urged him to join Santa Anna's forces in front of San Gerónimo. Id., 28-9. Even Roa Bárcena, who generally seeks to shield Santa Anna, cannot refrain from pointing out that it was far easier for him to reach Padierna than for the other to break through. He blames his conduct throughout this transaction, and states that he began the retreat at 7 p. m. Recuerdos, 331-6; 'como abandono criminal,' adds Apunt. Hist. Guerra, 240. Americans, Ripley's War with Mex., ii. 240-1, and others, freely stamp the act as savoring of treachery.
* ↑ Rel. Causas, 28.
* ↑ Conceded by Shields, who ranked higher.
* ↑ Scott's despatch of Aug. 28th, in U. S. Govt Doc., Cong. 30, Ses. 1, Sen. Ex. 1, p. 308. The Americans claim to have lost comparatively few — not over 60 in killed and wounded 'on the spot,' that is, excluding the casualties of the preceding day. Smith swells the capture to 1,500. Id., p. 329. Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos, 339, estimates the American loss at 300. In Apunt, Hist. Guerra, 239-42, are additional details of Mexican efforts, whereof Salas, as next in command to Valencia, claims his share in a report of the 23d. Rel. Causas, 23-30. Bustamante alludes to defective ammunition as one cause of defeat. Mem. Hist. Mex., MS., vii. 190-4, 202-6, viii. 19-20; Id., Invasion, 101-2, 108-19; Diario, Exact., Mex., MS., 47 et seq. The captured generals were Salas, Blanco, Mendoza, and García. The leaders of the five American brigades were Smith, Riley, and Cadwalader in the rear, Pierce in front, and Shields at San Gerónimo. Semmes, Campaign, 269, 279, condemns the fight on the 19th as a needless waste of blood, and attributes to Smith's plans and execution the victory of the 20th; and Ripley, War with Mex., ii. 296, 305, etc., claimş for Pillow the chief credit, while objecting to Scott's orders for road-making in face of the intrenchments. Their quibbles rest on inadequate reasons, however. It appears conceded that the pedregal had to be crossed, and evidently by the path followed, in order to avoid a costly front attack on the southern outworks. This crossing became the more necessary after Santa Anna's advance, so as to prevent a junction of Mexican forces in the rear. The crossing led unavoidably to a conflict with Valencia, which again demanded the movement to his rear conducted by Smith, but for which Riley had paved the way on the preceding afternoon. As for the Mexican plans, Valencia undoubtedly took the right course in seeking to check the flank movement by Padierna; but this does not excuse his disobedience and many blunders, such as neglecting his rear, the summit of the hill, the pedregal with its excellent skirmishing ground, and so forth. Still the cause for defeat lies primarily in Santa Anna's retreat. Mansfield shows that the actual conflict began at 6 a. m. and lasted 17 minutes; by 8 a. m. pursuit was over. Mex. War, 255, 260. Scott asserts that 4,500 Americans were engaged. Mem., ii. 481. See also Gamboa, Impug., 41-7, condemning Santa Anna; Rayon, Asedio, 39-112; Dicc. Univ., x. 106-13, etc.; Mex. War, by English Soldier, 234-50; Jenkins' Mex. War, 334-73; Harrison's Battle-fields, 374-90; McSherry, El Puchero, 71-81.
* ↑ Santa Anna threatened to shoot him. He collected some fugitives and issued from Toluca a partial defence. Roa Bárcena, ubi sup., 341-2.
* ↑ Santa Anna previno no pasara por el Puente ningun carro, hasta que lo verificase la tropa. . .y esto dió lugar á la pérdida de tantas municiones,' observes the Apunt. Hist. Guerra, 245, as one feature of the bad arrangement. Pillow turned from Coyoacan eastward to assist in cutting off Bravo's retreat.
* ↑ Twiggs' report claims to have captured with Rincon 104 officers, 1,155 men, and 7 guns, U. S. Govt Doc., Cong. 30, Ses. 1, Sen. Ex. 1, p. 324-5, to which must be added dead and fugitives. In the Apunt. Hist. Guerra, 251-2, this brave force is classed as 650 badly armed peasants, with 6 pieces of metal. Roa Bárcena gives its composition, Recuerdos, 353, as chicfly guardia nacional de Independencia and Bravos, with some American deserters, etc. Semmes, Campaign, 284, leaves the impression that only 3 guns were planted inside the walls; while in Ripley's War with Mex., 256, the San Antonio road, it is said, could be swept by its 7 pieces.
* ↑ Five, says Apunt. Hist. Guerra, 252.
* ↑ Americans say that reënforcements came from the city, while Santa Anna end others intimate rather that troops wcre sent into it. Scott estimates the Mexican forces round Churubusco at 27,000. U. S. Govt Doc., ubi sup., p. 310. Roa Bárcena, holding to his first basis of 20,000, and deducting the losses by Valencia and Bravo, estimates that the force could not have exceeded 9,000. Recuerdos, 375-6. But we have seen that a large number of irregular troops at least can be added. The Americans he placed at not less than 8,000, after deducting the men left at Padierna and at the depôt of Tlalpam. See note 5, this chapter.
* ↑ Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos, 347-8, points out some of these blunders on Scott's part.
* ↑ The direct opposing force being 4,000 infantry, supported by 3,000 cavalry. Mansfield's Mex. War, 267.
* ↑ Under capts Hoffman, Walker, and Brooks.
* ↑ The Apunt. Hist. Guerra, 255-6, declares that by the time of surrender the guns could not be supplied at all. The charge is made of treason in connection with the manufacture and supply of ammunition. Semmes attributes the stoppage to the artillerists being driven from their post by the firing in the rear. Campaign, 290.
* ↑ The fight here had lasted from 10.45 a. m. till 3.30 p. m. Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos, 368. Twenty minutes after the tête de pont fell, adds Scott. Mem., 490. Twiggs received the surrender of 3 generals, Rincon, Anaya, and Arellana, 101 other officers, 1,155 men, 7 guns, and other material. U. S. Govt Doc., Cong. 30, Ses. 1, Sen. Ex. 1, p. 324-5. The dead numbered 136 and the wounded 99, including most of the artillerists. Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos, 365. The San Patricio deserters are said to have 'pulled down the white flag of surrender no less than three times.' Letter in New York Courier; Mansfield's Mex. War, 267. Capt. I. M. Smith, who led the assault, according to Scott, himself unfurled the white flag and stayed his men on seeing the condition of affairs. Apunt. Hist. Guerra, 257.
* ↑ Kearny lost an arm, and Major Mills, a volunteer on this occasion, fell as he reached the gate. Scott's Mem., 496. In Apunt. Hist. Guerra, 247. an officer is allowed to penetrate on horseback through an opening in the wall; and Santa Anna, Detall, 101, relates that an officer was captured and treated with great consideration by him because of his valiant resolution to take Santa Anna's life or die. A monument was subsequently erected at Churubusco over the remains of Peñúñuri and Martinez de Castro, who had distinguished themselves at the convent, and pensions and honors were bestowed on Rincon's valiant band. See further, Bustamante, Mem. Hist. Mex., MS., vii. 216-17, viii. 35-43; Id., Invasion, MS., 143-7; McSherry, El Puchero, 81-8; Mayer's Mex. Aztec., i. 396-9; Perez, Dicc., i. 493-7, ii. 459-67; Rayon, Asedio, 74-112, 245-64; Gonzalez, Discurso, 1-8.
* ↑ Besides some missing. U. S. Govt Doc., as above, p. 313-14, 384. Ripley, War with Mex., ii. 282, adds a list of leading officers. Worth suffered most, his casualties being 349, although Shields' loss of 240 was relatively highest; Twiggs had about 200 hors de combat and Pillow nearly 200. Semmes' Campaign, 293, 296. Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos, 371-4, offers no important objections, nor do other Mexican writers. Santa Anna, Detall, 101, vaguely alludes to the loss of more than one third of the army and half of the best artillery.
* ↑ Semmes' Campaign, 293.
* ↑ 'Si el enemigo repite su ataque como yo lo esperaba, seguramente ocupa la capital sin mucha resistencia.' And Scott writes that after the Mexican army was beaten at Churubusco, 'the feebler defences at the gates of the city — four miles off — could not, as was well known to both parties, delay the victors an hour.' Report 32, in U. S. Govt Doc., Cong. 30, Ses. 1, Sen. Ex. 1, p. 380.
* ↑ Id., p. 314. He adds in his Mem., 498, an explanatory note that an assault on the city by day would have involved a loss 'dangerously great — which is contradictory to his official report — and by night the carnage among the citizens, their women and children, would have been frightful, as well as pillage, for the soldiers could not be controlled, and time could not be lost in making prisoners. Mansfield commends this christian magnanimity. Life Scott, 433-4; but Ripley, Semines, Kendall, Battles of Mex., and others, naturally condemn him from a military standpoint. Semmes claims for his favorite, Worth, the chief glory of the victory, by carrying the tête de pont, which led to the defeat of Santa Anna and the fall of the convent; but he also says that Worth called the halt at La Candelaria, when the city might have been carried by following up the advantage. Campaign, 290-1.