# All the Works of Epictetus, Which Are Now Extant/Book 2/Chapter 19

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CHAPTER XIX.
Concerning Those who embrace Philosophy only in Word.
§. 1.The Argument, called The ruling one, concerning which Disputants questioned each other, appears to have its Rise from ​hence. Of the following Propositions, any Two imply a Contradiction to the Third. They are these. That every thing past is necessarily true: That an Impossibility is not the Consequence of a Possibility: And, That something is a Possibility, which neither is nor will be true. Diodorus, perceiving this Contradiction, made use of the Probability of the Two first, to prove, That nothing is possible, which neither is nor will be true. Some again hold the Second and Third; That something is possible, which neither is nor will be true; and, That an Impossibility is not the Consequence of a Possibility: and, consequently, assert, That not every thing past is necessarily true. This Way Cleanthes and his Followers, took; whom Antipater copiously defends. Others, lastly, maintain the First and Third; That something is possible, which neither is nor will be true: and That every thing past is necessarily true: but then, That an Impossibility may be the Consequence of a Possibility. But all these Three Propositions cannot be at once maintained, because of their mutual Contradiction. If any one should ask me then, which of them I maintain; I answer him, That I cannot tell. But I have heard it related, That Diodorus held one Opinion about them; the Followers of Panthœdes, I think, and Cleanthes, another; and Chrysippus a third.
What then is yours?
None. Nor was I born to examine the Appearances of Things to my own Mind; to compare what is said by others, and thence to form some Principle of my own, as to the Topic [which you mention]. Therefore, [in respect to it,] I am no ​better than a Grammarian [who repeats what he hath read]. Who was the Father of Hector? Priam. Who were his Brothers? Paris and Deiphobus. Who was his Mother? Hecuba. This I have heard related. From whom? From Homer, But I believe Hellanicus, and other Authors, have written on the same Subject. And what better Account have I of the ruling Argument? But, if I was vain enough, I might, especially at an Entertainment, astonish all the Company by an Enumeration of Authors, relating to it. Chrysippus hath written wonderfully, in his first Book of Possibilities. Cleanthes and Archedemus have each written separately on this Subject. Antipater too hath written, not only in his Treatise of Possibilities, but purposely in a Discourse on the ruling Argument. Have not you read the Work? "No."——Read it then. And what Good will it do him? He will be more trifling and impertinent than he is already. For what else have you gained by reading it? What Principle have you formed upon this Subject? But you tell us of Helen, and Priam, and the Isle of Calypso, which never was, nor ever will be. And here, indeed, it is of no great Consequence, if you retain the Story, without forming any Principle of your own. But it is our Misfortune to do so, much more in Morality than upon such Subjects as these.
§. 2. Talk to me concerning Good and Evil.
Hear.
The Wind from Ilium to the Cicon's Shore Hath driven me——
​Of Things, some are good, some evil, and some indifferent. Now the good, are the Virtues, and whatever partakes of them; and the evil, Vices, and what partakes of Vice: the indifferent, lie between these, as Riches, Health, Life, Death, Pleasure, Pain.
Whence do you know this?
Hellanicus says it, in his Egyptian History. For what doth it signify, whether one names the History of Hellanicus, or the Ethics of Diogenes, or Chrysippus, or Cleanthes? Have you then examined any of these Things, and formed a Principle of your own? But show me, how you are used to exercise yourself on Shipboard. Remember this Division, when the Mast rattles, and some idle Fellow stands by you, while you are screaming, and says, "For Heaven's sake, talk as you did a little while ago. Is it Vice to suffer Shipwreck? Or doth it partake of Vice?" Would not you take up a Log, and throw it at his Head? "What have we to do with you, Sir? We are perishing, and you come and jest." Again: if Cæsar should summon you, to answer an Accusation, Remember the Division. If, when you are going in, pale and trembling, any one should meet you, and say, "Why do you tremble, Sir? What is this Affair you are engaged in? Doth Cæsar within, give Virtue and Vice to those who approach him?"——"What do you too insult me, and add to my Evils ?"——"Nay, but tell me, Philosopher, why you tremble? Is there any other Danger, but Death, or a Prison, or bodily ​Pain, or Exile, or Defamation?"——"Why what should there be else?"——"Are any of these Vice? Or do they partake of Vice? What then, did you yourself use to say of these Things"——"What have you to do with me, Sir? My own Evils are enough for me."——"You say right. Your own Evils are indeed enough for you; your Baseness, your Cowardice, and that Arrogance, by which you were elated, as you sat in the Schools. Why did you plume yourself with what is not your own? Why did you call yourself a Stoic?"
§. 3. Observe yourselves thus in your Actions, and you will find of what Sect you are. You will find, that most of you are Epicureans; a few Peripatetics, and those but loose ones. For, by what Action will you prove, that you think Virtue equal, and even superior, to all other Things? Show me a Stoic, if you have one. Where? Or how should you? You can show, indeed, a Thousand, who repeat the Stoic Reasonings. But do they repeat the Epicurean worse? Are they not just as perfect in the Peripatetic? Who then is a Stoic? as we call that a Phidian Statue, which is formed according to the Art of Phidias; so show me some one Person, formed according to the Principles which he professes. Show me one, who is sick, and happy; in Danger, and happy; dying, and happy; exiled, and happy; disgraced, and happy. Show him me; for, by Heaven, I long to see a Stoic. But you [will say] you have not one perfectly formed. Show me then one who is forming: one who is approaching towards this Character. Do me this Favour. Do not refuse an old Man a Sight which he hath never yet ​seen. Do you suppose, that you are [asked] to show the Jupiter or Minerva of Phidias, a Work of Ivory or Gold? Let any of you show me a human Soul, willing to have the same Sentiments with those of God: not to accuse either God or Man: not to be disappointed of its Desire, or incur its Aversion: not to be angry: not to be envious: not to be jealous: in a Word, willing from a Man to become a God; and, in this poor mortal Body, aiming to have Fellowship with Jupiter. Show him to me. But you cannot. Why then do you impose upon yourselves, and play Tricks with others? Why do you put on a Dress not your own; and walk about in it, mere Thieves and Pilferers of Names and Things, which do not belong to you? Here, I am your Preceptor, and you come to be instructed by me. And indeed my Intention is to secure you from being restrained, compelled, hindered: to make you free, prosperous, happy; looking to God upon every Occasion, great or small. And you come to learn and study these Things. Why then do not you finish your Work, if you have the proper Intention; and I, besides the Intention, the proper Qualifications? What is wanting? When I see an Artificer, and the Materials lying ready, I expect the Work. Now here is the Artificer; here are the Materials; what is it we want? Is not the Thing capable of being taught? It is. Is it not in our own Power then? The only Thing of all others that is so. Neither Riches, nor Health, nor Fame, nor, in short, any thing else is in our Power, except a right Use of the Appearances of Things. This alone is, by Nature, not subject to Restraint, not subject to Hindrance. Why then do not you finish it? Tell me the Cause. It must be by my Fault, or yours, or from the Nature of the Thing. The Thing itself is practicable, and the only one in our Power. The Fault then must be either in me, or in ​you, or, more truly, in both. Well then, shall we now, at last, bring this Intention along with us? Let us lay aside all that is past. Let us begin. Only believe me, and you will see the Consequence.
* ↑ The curious Reader may see this whole Matter explained, with the greatest Acuteness and Accuracy, by the very learned and ingenious Mr. Harris, in Mr. Upton's Notes.
* ↑ This is spoken to Epictetus by one of his Hearers.
* ↑ With Mr. Upton, I read ουδεν: but it seems necessary, that ουδε should likewise stand; and it is so translated.
* ↑ Some Philosophers affected to show their Learning at such Times; and it is against this idle Ostentation that Epictetus points his Discourse: for the Study of Logic itself, under proper Regulations, he often strongly recommends.
* ↑ This I apprehend to be spoken by one of the Scholars of Epictetus; who seeing the Contempt with which his Master treats logical Subtleties, in the foregoing Paragraph, desires him to discourse upon Ethics.
* ↑ Epictetus gives this absurd Reply to ridicule the Fondness of his Scholars for quoting Authors, and making a Parade of their Reading: and insinuates, that it is not at all material, whether a Person, who on such Subjects, means nothing further than Talk, knows what he is talking of, or blunders about it ever so grossly.
* ↑ Of Things into good, evil, and indifferent.
* ↑ The Peripatetics held other Things besides Virtue to be good; but not in near so high a Degree.
* ↑ See Note e. B. ii. c. 16.