# The Emancipation of South America/Chapter 48

CHAPTER XLVIII.
THE FIRST NATIONAL GOVERNMENT OF PERU.
1822-1823.
One of the heaviest charges brought by his contemporaries against San Martin, and which history has repeated, is the precipitate manner of his retirement from Peru. He left his army under the command of a General without prestige; he left the country in the hands of a Government which had no authority; and he made no provision for an efficient Government. If he had delayed his departure until he had arranged all this it is probable that he would never have gone at all. The fact is that he left everything in a state of complete disorganization. It was more than an abdication, he abandoned the country.
Congress instead of appointing at once an efficient executive appointed a governing Junta of three of its own members, two of whom were foreigners. General La Mar, a native of Quito, was President; his colleagues were Don Felipe Alvarado, a brother of the Argentine General, and Don Manuel Salazar y Baquijano, Count of Vista Florida, a citizen of Lima, and a leader of society. The selection pleased nobody. The popular party, headed by Riva-Agüero, commenced to conspire. The new Government had no support, save in Congress itself. Abandoned by the Protector, the only hope of Peru was now in the Liberator.
Bolívar no sooner saw the coast clear than he wrote to the new Government offering them a reinforcement of 4,000 ​men, and promising, if these were not sufficient, six or eight thousand more. Bolívar had not seen that San Martin was eager to open the way for him; San Martin had failed to see that by rousing the national spirit of the Peruvians he had shut them off from help. Government suspected the intentions of Bolívar, and coldly declined his proffered assistance. The answer was long in coming, and Bolívar in alarm wrote to General Castillo, the commander of the Columbian contingent, not to incur any risk of defeat, but rather to retire on Columbia, and afterwards notified these instructions to the Government of Peru.
Jealousy of foreign influence then induced Congress to decree that all vacancies in the civil, military, and naval services should be filled by Peruvians alone, and then set to work to debate what constitution they should give to the country.
The nation was named "The Peruvian Republic;" the constitution was drawn up on the basis of popular sovereignty, and a special clause was inserted providing that executive offices should be neither for life nor hereditary, which was directed against Bolívar.
The plan drawn up by San Martin for the ensuing campaign depended upon the efficient co-operation of two armies; one acting in the South under Alvarado, the other in the Centre under Arenales.
The whole line of the main Cordillera was held by the Royalists, but the Patriots commanding the sea had the choice of the point of attack. The bulk of the Royalists, under Canterac, occupied the Centre of their line from Jauja to Huancayo. Arequipa was weakly garrisoned. La Serna had his head-quarters at Cuzco with a reserve at Puno. Olañeto was at Potosí, and Valdes was fully occupied in Upper Peru by Lanza the guerilla chieftain. Consequently, a simultaneous attack from the South and Centre would place the main army between two fires. This plan was adopted by Government.
The Army of the South, consisting of 1,700 Argentines, 1,200 Chilians, and about 1,600 Peruvians, with ten light ​field pieces, embarked on transports at Callao in September. Alvarado wished to take the Columbian contingent also, but Castillo refused to go. The expedition did not sail till October, and was fifty-seven days on the voyage; a most unfavourable commencement which presaged a catastrophe.
On the 3rd December the convoy reached Arica, but Alvarado sent one battalion to Iquiqui, which landed there on the 7th. Miller, with a very small force, had performed wonders in the previous campaign in this district, but Alvarado remained three weeks at Arica without doing anything. He consulted Miller, who told him anything was right if it was only done quickly. He then detached Miller with 120 men further north to make a diversion, and occupied Tacna with a strong vanguard under General Martinez. These long delays had given the Royalists time to concentrate their forces, and the indefatigable Valdés, with a flying column of 800 men, descended the hills, crossed the sandy plain, and on the 1st January, 1823, encamped in a fertile valley about twelve miles from the city. The Patriots were so superior in number that his position was one of great peril; nevertheless he put on a bold front, and while Martinez was wasting time in an attempt to surround him, he succeeded in effecting his retreat during the night and the following day to the foot of the hills at Moquegua.
On the 13th January Alvarado occupied the valley of Locumba, but again by dilatory movements lost his chance of overwhelming a small force of Royalists which had been detached by Valdés to watch him. Valdés, who was expecting Canterac with a strong force, allowed Alvarado to occupy the city of Moquegua on the 18th without resistance, but then prepared to dispute his further progress.
Beyond Moquegua the ground rises in abrupt steps which give great facilities for defence. The Royalist skirmishers covered the heights, and detached parties lay in ambush in the hollows. One by one they were driven ​from these positions, but at Torata Valdés drew up his force in line of battle. On the afternoon of the 19th the two armies faced each other, and the Patriots advanced to the attack. A Spanish battalion in skirmishing order covered the centre, and at the same moment the heights beyond were occupied by an advanced party of Canterac's division, whose shouts of "Viva el Rey!" re-echoed from the mountain sides. Canterac strengthened his right flank and beat back a vigorous attack of the left wing of the Patriots, upon which the whole Royalist line advanced and drove the Patriot infantry, who had exhausted their ammunition, before them in utter rout with great slaughter. The Patriots lost about 500 men killed and wounded, the Royalists about half that number. The Peruvian legion, which was now for the first time under fire, distinguished itself by its steady behaviour.
The routed battalions rallied under the fire of their artillery, but during the following night the whole army retreated, and encamped next day at Moquegua, seventeen miles from the field of battle. The ammunition was nearly exhausted. Alvarado summoned a council of war, but the advice of his officers was so discordant, that before he had formed any resolution the enemy was again in his front on the 21st.
Alvarado then took up a strong position, with his left resting upon the suburbs of the city, and his line extending along the ridge of a steep declivity, broken in the centre by a road which was swept by the fire of his artillery. His right rested upon a bare hill. Valdés, with two battalions and two squadrons of horse, seized this hill and turned the right flank of the Patriots, while the rest of the Royalist cavalry menaced the left, and Canterac led the main body against the ridge. Alvarado wheeled back his right wing, and for a short time the Patriots held their ground with great determination, but were at length driven from the position and totally routed with a loss of 700 in killed and wounded, and 1,000 prisoners. The mounted grenadiers, led by Lavalle, made two desperate charges to cover the ​retreat, but were in their turn overwhelmed by the Royalist horse.
About 1,000 men reached Ilo with General Martinez, and embarking there, returned to Lima. Alvarado went to Iquiqui in search of the detachment he had left there, and on the 14th February landed a small party on shore, which was all either captured or destroyed by Olañeta, who had occupied the city. Alvarado then invited Olañeta to a conference concerning the prisoners, and found this general to be so disaffected to the Viceroy and his adherents, whom he styled "traitorous Liberals," that he declared his intention of separating from them and confining himself to the defence of Upper Peru for the King.
Miller, with his 120 men, accomplished more than all the rest of the army; he alarmed all the South, and kept the whole reserve under Caratala in check.
Meantime Arenales lost much time in endeavouring to persuade General Castillo to incorporate his auxiliaries with the army he was organizing for the attack on the centre of the Royalists. Castillo refused to join at first, on the plea that success was doubtful, and then demanded that a Peruvian should be appointed to command the allied army. His demand being refused, he then asked permission to retire altogether from the country. Government, anxious to free itself from so arrogant an ally, furnished transports, and the Columbian contingent left Peru for Guayaquil, taking with it the Numancia battalion, 600 strong, which Bolívar had claimed, as being a Columbian corps. This Columbian contingent had cost Peru 190,000 dollars and had been of no service whatever.
Nevertheless Arenales, who hoped to make up by speed for paucity of numbers, had organized a column of 2,000 men, when Martinez arrived with a remnant of the Army of the South. The news brought by him produced great irritation, but by no means disheartened the people, who were confident of ultimate success. Their anger was turned against Government; the army encamped at Miraflores was almost in open revolt. Arenales was ​asked to put himself at the head of the movement, but this stout soldier would have none of it, and giving up the command to Santa Cruz left Peru for ever.
The leaders of the army headed by General Martinez, on the 26th February, 1823, presented an address to Congress, asking that Riva-Agüero might be placed at the head of the Executive. The city militia supported them. Congress yielded, and on the 27th Riva-Agüero was named President of the Republic, and afterwards Grand Marshal of the armies, although he was simply a colonel of militia and had never been under fire.
Riva-Agiiero was a true representative of the people, and his popularity was enhanced by his activity and by the skill shown in the first measures he adopted. He reorganized the army, making Santa Cruz general-in-chief, and Martinez general of the division of the Andes and Chile. He reopened relations with Chile, and wrote to Bolívar accepting the help which Congress had refused. Bolívar made a treaty with him, in which he promised 6,000 men, who were to be equipped and paid by Peru. Chile promised a further contingent of from 2,000 to 2,500 men, and 1,500 muskets in addition. San Martin in Mendoza pushed on the organization of an Argentine division, which was to operate on the frontiers of Salta, under the orders of Urdininea. At the same time news was received that the Peruvian commissioners, in London, had abandoned their monarchical schemes, and had effected a loan of one million two hundred thousand pounds sterling, which was ratified by Congress.
Before two months had passed Peru had an army of 5,000 men ready for the field, in addition to the Argentine and Chilian auxiliaries, who were 2,500 more. Riva-Agüero determined upon another expedition to the intermediate ports, directed against Arequipa and Puno, while another army, composed of troops of the four Allied Nations, should advance by Jauja upon the centre, a repetition of the previous plan. Bolívar approved of the plan when his opinion was asked, and promised his 6,000 ​men. Chile again promised a fresh contingent, which should be sent to the south of Peru, and offered to supply-horses for the expedition. The Royalists, ignorant of these preparations, made ready on their part for an attack upon Lima.
Five thousand Peruvian troops left Callao in May for the South under General Santa Cruz, with Colonel Gamarra as chief of the staff. For the first time Peru had an army of her own, commanded by Peruvian generals. Before leaving, Santa Cruz presented himself to Congress and swore to return triumphant or to die. He did neither the one thing nor the other.
Santa Cruz showed more activity than Alvarado had done. On the 17th June the convoy reached Arica. On that same day Canterac, with an army of 9,000 men, rushed down from the Highlands and captured Lima. The expedition was thus isolated, but the move was a false one on the part of the Royalists.
Bolívar did not share in the general confidence, he was more clear sighted than most others, as is seen in a notable letter which he wrote at this time to General Sucre. He had concentrated his forces at Guayaquil, and on hearing of the disasters of Torata and Moquegua, before signing the treaty of which we have already made mention, he at once sent off an expedition of 3,000 men under Sucre, with instructions to gain possession of the fortresses of Callao at any cost. Sucre, whom he called "his right arm," was also named minister plenipotentiary to Peru, and was sent to prepare the way for the accomplishment of the secret designs of the Liberator, who saw that Peru would soon be in a condition to welcome him as her saviour.
The occupation of Lima by the Royalists was a mistake, it gave them no military advantage while Callao and the ocean were held by the Patriots. The Government fled to Callao, and the army collected under shelter of the guns of that fortress. Sucre was made general-in-chief. Congress dispersed; some of the members went over to the enemy; but a minority, who were hostile to Riva-Agüero, ​kept together, and sent for Bolívar on the 19th Juue, 1823, giving him the title of Generalissimo and ample powers for the salvation of the country. Riva-Agüero retained the title of President, but was sent out of the way to Trujillo.
Bolívar accepted the invitation, saying that "for a long time his heart had yearned towards Peru." Pending his arrival Sucre exercised his powers as his representative; the secret wish of Bolívar was accomplished, he was master of Peru.
The Viceroy soon perceived the mistake he had made, and recalled his army from Lima. On the 16th July Canterac evacuated the city, and returned to the Highlands unmolested. On the 20th Sucre sailed southwards with 3,000 Columbians and Chilians and a squadron of Peruvian cavalry, leaving an army of Peruvians, Argentines, and Columbians at Lima with orders to occupy Jauja and secure the line of the Apurimac. His intention was to combine the movements of the three armies, with Arequipa as the base of his operations, and to advance on Cuzco with 8,000 or 12,000 men, but when he reached the south coast Santa Cruz was already far inland. He then landed at Quilca and marched on Arequipa; but the same day Santa Cruz had fought a battle of doubtful result on the borders of Lake Titicaca.
Santa Cruz had changed the plan. Instead of keeping his army together he had divided it into two columns, directed against Upper Peru. With the first he landed near Ilo, and advanced to Moquegua, while the second, under command of Gamarra, landed at Arica, and occupied Tacna. Here he remained till the middle of July, awaiting the Chilian contingent; but as it did not come he, on the 13th July, ascended the Cordillera, crossed the Desaguadero by the bridge of the Inca without opposition, and on the 8th August occupied the city of La Paz. Gamarra at the same time marched by the Tacora road, crossed the Desaguadero lower down, and occupied the city of Oruro, which is about 170 miles from La Paz.
Olaneta, who was retreating towards Potosi with 1,500 ​men, was almost surprised by Gamarra, of whose movements he knew nothing, and withdrew to the South. Gamarra was then joined by Lanza, the Guerilla chieftain, with 600 men, and learned that Urdininea, with the Argentine division, was advancing from Salta; but he lost the opportunity of destroying Olañeta, which was part of the plan of Santa Cruz, by remaining inactive at Oruro.
Santa Cruz, hearing that La Serna was concentrating his scattered divisions at Puno, then turned back to cover the line of the Desaguadero, and stationed himself on the left bank at the bridge of the Inca. Valdés advanced against him with 2,000 men, but finding the bridge was defended by artillery, he withdrew to the town of Zepita. Santa Cruz crossed the bridge and went after him, and overtook him in a strong position between the mountains and the lake of Titicaca. By a feigned retreat he drew Valdés into the plain, where two Peruvian squadrons cut the Royalist horse to pieces, but the attack upon the infantry was less successful, and night put a stop to the action. Both sides claimed the victory, but Valdés retreated, and soon after Santa Cruz returned to his position on the Desaguadero. This was the first and last battle of the expedition.
La Serna joined Valdés at Zepita, and crossed the Desaguadero with 4,500 men. Santa Cruz retreated before him, and on the 8th September joined Gamarra to the south of Oruro. He then manoeuvred to prevent a junction between La Serna and Olañeta, who was returning from Potosí with 2,500 men, but La Serna by a flank march over the heights succeeded in effecting the junction on the 14th September. Santa Cruz thought himself lost, and without attempting to bring on an action in which the chances would have been in his favour, retreated precipitately. The retreat soon became a flight, arms and baggage were thrown away, and he recrossed the Desaguadero utterly routed, without fighting and without even seeing an enemy. He left a company of infantry with two guns to defend the bridge, who capitulated to the Royalist vanguard at the ​first summons. Barely 1,000 men reached the coast, and the Chilian contingent, which just then arrived, returned at once to their own country.
Sucre, seeking to affect a junction with Santa Cruz, had shown in the prosecution of his arduous task both the prudence and the ability of a master in the art of war. At Arequipa he heard of the fight at Zepita, and marched on Puno supposing that Santa Cruz was still holding his ground at the bridge of the Inca, but was met by the intelligence of the total dispersion of the Patriot army, and of the concentration of the Royalists. Placing himself so as to cover the flight of the fugitives, he steadily retreated and re-embarked at Quilca.
Before the result of the first expedition to the intermediate ports was known, two of the admirers of San Martin had written to him in his retirement at Mendoza, telling him that "the hand of San Martin alone can crown his work and give liberty to Peru." Even Riva-Agüero wrote to him, beseeching him to return to public life. After the disasters of Torata and Moquegua, the eyes of all Peruvians were turned to their late Protector, and a multitude of letters to the same effect reached him in his solitude. The new Government of Chile wrote to him that posterity would forget his immense services unless he completed his work. After the failure of the second expedition a council of Peruvian officers, headed by General Porto Carrero and Admiral Guise, with the authorization of Riva-Agüero, passed a resolution that all Peruvians of every class called upon their Protector to fly to their assistance, now that their country was in danger. Guido wrote to him that all Patriots looked to him for help. Riva-Agüero, who had quarrelled with Congress, and was opposed to the alliance with Columbia, offered him the supreme power, by a special messenger. But San Martin had no faith in Riva-Agüero, and wrote to him to re-establish the authority of Congress, and on his refusal, rejected his offers with disdain.
Riva-Agüero, in his semi-exile at Trujillo, had dissolved ​Congress, and on the 19th July had convened a Senate of his own selection, but he had no support in public opinion. On the 6th July thirteen members of the late Congress met at Lima, called up some substitutes, formed themselves into a sovereign Congress, appointed Torre-Tagle chief of the Executive, and on the 8th August declared Riva-Agüero an outlaw. He replied by declaring them traitors and their decrees null and void. He then collected an army of some sort, proposed an armistice to the Spaniards and offered to dismiss the auxiliaries. But the auxiliaries refused to recognise his authority, and the Columbian troops called upon him to lay down the command.
Then came Bolívar. The castles of Callao thundered him a welcome; Lima decked herself in flags in his honour. He landed in Peru on the 1st September; no American ever received so enthusiastic a reception. Congress made an appearance of consulting him, but in reality only awaited his orders. As at Caracas, at Angostura, in New Granada, and at Cúcuta, he renounced all claim to civil power, placing only his sword at their disposal. Congress paid no attention to these empty phrases, invested him as Liberator with supreme authority, both military and civil, and voted him an annual salary of 50,000 dollars, which, with his usual disinterestedness, he declined to touch.
At a banquet which followed, the name of San Martin was not mentioned among the many toasts proposed. Whereupon Bolívar rising to his feet proposed one himself:—
"To the good genius of America, which brought General San Martin with his liberating army from the banks of La Plata to the shores of Peru; and to General O'Higgins who had sent him on from Chile."
Then as the banquet drew to an end, he proposed another:—
"That the peoples of America may never raise a throne upon their soil."
At night as he entered the theatre, the whole audience rose to their feet. He occupied the official box with the ​President, under a drapery of the festooned flags of Peru and Columbia.
Procter, an English traveller who was present on this occasion, thus describes him:—
"He is very thin, but his whole person shows great activity. His features are well formed, but are worn by fatigue and anxiety. The fire of his black eyes draws attention at once. Never did the exterior give a more exact idea of the man himself. Egoism, determination, activity, intrigue, and a persevering spirit, are clearly expressed in his bearing, and in each movement of his body."
Bolívar's first care was to put an end to the dispute with Riva-Agüero, but finding all friendly overtures unsuccessful, he resolved upon using force. The country seemed on the verge of a civil war, when his own troops mutinied against the ex-President. He disappeared from public life, and the danger was averted.
Bolívar remained absolute master of Peru. He thought that all America was now his.