# Brent v. Maryland/Opinion of the Court

* Court Documents
* Case Syllabus
* Opinion of the Court
United States Supreme Court
85 U.S. 430
Brent v. Maryland
The point chiefly insisted upon in the argument of the counsel for the plaintiff in error, is this: that Digges, the trustee, had no notice of the auditor's report and of its confirmation, and that for the want of such notice this action cannot be maintained. We are of the opinion that this point is not well taken. We recognize the soundness of the decision in Oyster v. Annan and other decisions in the State of Maryland, cited to us, that before a suit can be brought against a trustee, he must have had notice of the duty he is required to perform, and must have had an opportunity to perform it. In the case just named the court say: 'The trustee, as to the suit, is not in the situation of a common debtor who knows his liability, and whose business it is to look to a compliance with his engagements. . . . This proceeding, as to the trustee, is res inter alios acta, and it is but reasonable that when it terminates, he shall be notified of the result before any steps are taken against him, either by attachment or by action on his trustee's bond against him and his sureties.' These remarks are founded in good sense, and do not conflict with the authorities cited on the other side, to the effect that where the trustee is himself an actor in the transaction, and has full knowledge of his duties, such notice and demand are not required.
Daniel Digges, the principal in the bond sued on, was not only the trustee, but he was the solicitor or attorney who procured himself to be appointed trustee, and as such solicitor himself procured the court to grant and the clerk to enter the orders, out of which the liability arises. Thus, after he had obtained the orders for the sale of the property, had sold the same and received the proceeds thereof, he caused an order to be entered in November, 1853, ratifying all that he had done. In June, 1854, he caused an order to be entered, referring it to an auditor to make distribution of the trust fund among the creditors and parties thereto entitled. In the execution of this order, Mr. Hance reported, in 1859, that there was due and payable to each of the plaintiffs, the sum of $704.39 1/4. On the 11th of April, 1860, Mr. Digges causes an order to be entered, finally ratifying the auditor's report, and ordering that the trustee be directed to pay all the trust fund to the several parties named in the auditor's report. Here was a positive direction to the trustee to pay specific sums to persons named, and without qualification or delay. He became an absolute debtor to each of them for the amount payable to each. The order was of his procuring, made and entered through his agency. That it should be necessary to give a man notice of what he had himself done, or that a demand of performance should be required of that which he had himself directed should be done by himself at once and without condition, would be quite remarkable. No such necessity exists. The case falls within the other principle referred to, that notice and demand are not necessary where the trustee is himself an actor and has full knowledge of all that is required to be done. He was, in the language of the court in Oyster v. Annan, 'a common debtor who knows his liability, and whose business it is to look to a compliance with his engagements.' No case has been cited to support the views of the plaintiff in error, and we think none can be found. In State v. Digges, the court place their dismissal of the suit upon other grounds, and the circumstance that Mr. Digges was both the trustee and solicitor in the transaction, is not alluded to, either in the argument of counsel or in the opinion of the court.
The remaining objections, that the bond cannot be sued upon by the plaintiffs below jointly, and that the action cannot be maintained in a court of law, but that equity must be resorted to, are not sustained by the authorities. The suit in the present form in the name of the State, for the use of parties interested, is according to the practice in Maryland and in the District of Columbia.
In Brooks v. Brooke, it was decided that the action against the sureties upon the bond could properly be brought in a court of law; and the circumstance that the trustee died before notice was given to him, where notice was necessary, it was held would justify the interposition of a court of equity. To the same purport is the case of State v. Digges, where it was held that the death of the trustee without having received notice of the order and demand of payment, required the action to be brought in a court of equity. The case is not applicable to an instance like the present, where notice and demand is not required to be given.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.

## Notes

* ↑ See supra, p. 433.
* ↑ 21 Maryland, 24.
* ↑ See Oyster v. Annan, cited supra.
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