# A Prisoner of the Khaleefa/Chapter 25

Contents
CHAPTER XXV
HOW GORDON DIED
When the news of the Sirdar's splendid victory reached England, the British nation may be said to have breathed again, and when the great rush was made for the cheap edition of "Ten Years' Captivity," which was extensively advertised with my portrait to catch attention, the few known details of Gordon's death became as fresh again in people's minds as they had been years before. I was constantly asked to relate all I had heard concerning Gordon. When I had done so I was invariably met with quotations and readings from "Mahdism," "Ten Years' Captivity," "Fire and Sword," and other works; for what I had been told of Gordon's death by eye-witnesses was an entirely different history to those published.
The first to relate the story of Gordon's death was a man whose tongue Gordon had threatened to cut out as the only cure for his inveterate lying, and when he escaped and reached Cairo, in telling his tale he sustained his reputation. All accounts of Gordon's death have apparently been based upon this first one received. Gordon, the world has been ​made to believe, died as a coward, for what other construction may be placed on the assertion that he turned his back upon his assailants, and in his back received his mortal wound? It is an infamous lie; but, then, what was to be expected from a man whom Gordon knew so well, and who, maybe, had good reason to invent the tale he did? I quote, side by side, what may be called the three official accounts of Gordon's death: —
| Mahdism. | Ohrwalder. | Slatin. |
| "He (Gordon) made a gesture of scorn with his right hand, and turned his back, where he received another spear wound which caused him to fall forward and was most likely his mortal wound ... He made no resistance, and did not fire a shot from his revolver."   "... One of them rushing up, stabbed him with his spear, and others then followed, and soon he was killed. ... He (Nejoumi) ordered the body to be dragged downstairs into the garden, where his head was cut off." | "The first Arab plunged his huge spear into his body. He fell forward on his face, was dragged down the stairs many stabbed him with their spears, and his head was cut off and sent to the Mahdi." | "The first man up the steps plunged his huge spear into his body; he fell forward on his face without uttering a word. His murderers dragged him down the steps to the palace entrance, and here his head was cut off and at once sent over to the Mahdi." |
Those who knew Charles George Gordon, will believe me when I aver that he died, as they must all have believed that he died — in spite of the official and semi-official accounts to the contrary — as the soldier and lion-hearted man he was. Gordon did not rest his hand on the hilt of his sword and turn his back to his enemies to receive his mortal wound. Gordon drew his sword, and used it. When Gordon fell, his sword was dripping with the blood of his assailants, for no less than sixteen or seventeen did he cut down with it. When Gordon fell, his left hand was blackened with the unburned powder from his at least thrice-emptied revolver. When Gordon fell, his life's blood was pouring from a spear and pistol-shot wound in his right breast. When Gordon fell, his boots were slippery with the blood of the crowd of dervishes he shot and hacked his way through, in his heroic attempt ​
​to cut his way out and place himself at the head of his troops. Gordon died as only Gordon could die. Let the world be misinformed and deceived about Soudan affairs with the tales of so-called guides and spies, but let it be told the truth of Gordon's death.
A week before the fall of Khartoum, Gordon had given up hopes. Calling Ibrahim Pasha Fauzi, he ordered him to provision one of the steamers, get all the Europeans on board, and set off for the north. To their credit be it said, they refused to leave unless Gordon saved his own life with theirs. Finding him obdurate, a plot was made to seize him while asleep, carry him off, and save him in spite of himself; but he somehow heard of the plot, smiled, and said it was his duty to save their lives if he could, but it was also his duty to "stick to his post." As the troops must be near, then sail north, he told them, and tell them to hurry up.
Each day at dawn, when he retired to rest, he bolted his door from the inside, and placed his faithful bodyservant — Khaleel Agha Orphali — on guard outside it. On the fatal night, Gordon had as usual kept his vigil on the roof of the palace, sending and receiving telegraphic messages from the lines every few minutes, and as dawn crept into the skies, thinking that the long-threatened attack was not yet to be delivered, he lay down wearied out. The little firing heard a few minutes later attracted no more attention than the usual firing which had been going on continuously night and day for months, but when the palace guards were heard firing it was known that something serious ​was happening. By the time Gordon had slipped into his old serge or dark tweed suit, and taken his sword and revolver, the advanced dervishes were already surrounding the palace. Overcoming the guards, a rush was made up the stairs, and Gordon was met leaving his room. A small spear was thrown which wounded him, but very slightly, on the left shoulder. Almost before the dervishes knew what was happening, three of them lay dead, and one wounded, at Gordon's feet — the remainder fled. Quickly reloading his revolver, Gordon made for the head of the stairs, and again drove the reassembling dervishes off. Darting back to reload, he received a stab in his left shoulder-blade from a dervish concealed behind the corridor door, and on reaching the steps the third time, he received a pistol-shot and spear-wound in his right breast, and then, great soldier as he was, he rose almost above himself. With his life's blood pouring from his breast — not his back, remember — he fought his way step by step, kicking from his path the wounded and dead dervishes — for Orphali too had not been idle — and as he was passing through the doorway leading into the courtyard, another concealed dervish almost severed his right leg with a single blow. Then Gordon fell. The steps he had fought his way — not been dragged — down, were encumbered with the bodies of dead and dying dervishes. No dervish spear pierced the live and quivering flesh of a prostrate but still conscious Gordon, for he breathed his last as he turned to face his last assailant, half raised his sword to strike, and fell dead with his face to heaven. ​Even had I not been specially requested, as the last of the Soudan captives, to relate in my narrative all that I had heard and learned concerning Gordon, I should have done so to a certain extent at all events, for he was no more the hero of the British people than he was mine, and the belief that he was still alive had no little to do with my ill-starred journey in 1887. The truth about his death, which is now published for the first time, is ample justification for what follows concerning him while still alive. It is true, as I have been told, that all I can have to say will be from "hearsay;" but then all the reports published concerning Gordon's last days are from hearsay. I have the advantage over all others in this — that I was maybe the one man, captive or not, in Omdurman whom Mahdist and "Government" man alike could trust implicitly and confide in, for there was no questioning what my attitude was towards Abdullahi and Mahdieh. The consequence was that old "Government" people and the powerful men who from time to time became my fellow-prisoners, and, as a consequence, enemies of Abdullahi, gave me confidences which, if given in other quarters, might have resulted in the loss of a head.
Again, almost all the tales told about the Soudan may be classed in one of two categories; the first, tales like mine, related by people interested in putting their own version upon events and incidents with which they were personally connected, and the second, tales told by people with versions for which they believed their questioners were hankering, so that what ​was white to "A" became black to "B," if it was considered that this colour pleased "‘B" best. The system scarcely puts a premium on accuracy.
But before proceeding to my comments on the criticisms, a few introductory remarks are called for to prevent misconceptions and misunderstandings arising in the minds of my readers. As an evidence that the following is not intended — far from it — to lacerate the feelings of any of those who suffered with me, I might mention that I have read over the notes of this chapter to many of my fellow-captives, and have, at their suggestion, cut out a series of incidents well known to Gordon, which influenced him in the stand he took towards certain people, and other incidents which prove how clear and long-sighted he was, and how events justified his taking up the stand which he did. One incident ought to be written, to punish on this earth, if possible, the man whose escape has not been recorded, and whose deserted and broken-hearted wife lies by the side of their unshriven baby-boy in the sands of the Soudan. However, maybe Gordon, had he come back alive to meet all the calumnies directed against him, would have hesitated to help his "clearance" by stabbing the living with a dead hand, and out of respect to his memory this incident, with a number of others, has been expunged.
I have already told Father Ohrwalder that, in commenting upon what he says in "Ten Years' Captivity," when speaking of Gordon's actions, the remarks I may feel called upon to make are not intended for him personally, and although I foresee ​that I must in the main have to speak as to the second person, I think Father Ohrwalder quite understands that the second person in this instance is his book, not himself. I do not, as I have told him, consider that he is directly responsible for the opinions he is credited with in "Ten Years' Captivity," and this notwithstanding the remark, "The reader is reminded that all opinions expressed are those of Father Ohrwalder." Considering that Father Ohrwalder is a priest and missionary, and has ventured upon thin ice in attacking Gordon's memory, such a statement is hardly fair to him, as in the preface to the book it is stated, that "Father Ohrwalder's manuscript, which was in the first instance written in German, was roughly translated into English by Yusef Effendi Cudzi, a Syrian; this I entirely rewrote in narrative form; the work therefore does not profess to be a literal translation of the original manuscript. . . ."
I should have thought that when Gordon was being attacked the original manuscript might have been treated a little differently. Of course it is easily understandable that when a Syrian, with Arabic for his mother tongue, translates from one difficult language which he has picked up into another equally difficult, and translates roughly too, when moreover this rough translation is handled in the manner admitted, errors may have crept in or been passed unnoticed, whilst salient points were lost sight of. It is also quite possible that the peculiar idioms of the Arabic, German, and English languages ​got into a hopeless tangle, and were left so. Whatever the cause, there is no gainsaying the fact that Father Ohrwalder is credited with the expression of opinions which he, as a priest and missionary, ought to be one of the last on this earth to give utterance to. That he did not appreciate to the full the real import of the opinions he is credited with, I feel certain of after my long interview with him, when, with the Bible in one hand and a copy of "Ten Years' Captivity" in the other, we compared the Opinions expressed in the latter with the teachings of Christ in the former.
Father Ohrwalder may or may not have been illadvised in omitting or suppressing the relation of well-known incidents, which accounted for Gordon's attitude in certain cases. It was only by omitting to mention these incidents that the criticisms on Gordon were rendered possible, or I should say that, had those incidents been included, the criticisms would not have lived a day. It would have been far better to tell everything to the generous and sympathetic world which he and Slatin met when they escaped, and to leave it to condone, if any condoning was called for, and to sympathize with them in the parts force of circumstances compelled them to act, which must have been so repugnant to them; for to omit, when criticizing Gordon, the relation of the very acts which compelled him also by force of circumstances to act as he did, was, to say the least of it, very unwise.
In "Ten Years' Captivity" the reader is led into a maze of opinions, and left there. Once inside, you ​discover that you can neither gain the centre of the maze or return to the starting-point; you must either wander round for an eternity, or do as I shall do, cut your way through the hedges planted to bewilder you, and thank Heaven when on the outside that you are clear of the tortuous passages. Compare, for instance —
"He (Cudzi) added that Gordon should have no anxiety about Berber as long as Hussein Pasha Khaleefa was Mudir,"
with,
"Gordon himself committed a mistake by which he gave a deathblow to himself and his mission. On his way to Khartoum, he stopped at Berber, and interviewed the Mudir Hussein Pasha Khaleefa; he imprudently told him that he had come up to remove the Egyptian garrisons, as Egypt had abandoned the Soudan."
Gordon cannot be blamed for confirming, as Governor-General of the Soudan, the news telegraphed to his subordinate, the Mudir of Berber, through whose hands the retiring garrisons must pass, nor can he be blamed if, when his suspicions were aroused, he deferred to the opinion of the man who was acting British Consul, Government representative, and his own agent, when he wrote and telegraphed as he did, "Trust in Hussein Pasha."
"The catastrophe which had overtaken Hicks filled the inhabitants of Khartoum with indescribable dismay. Several of them returned to Egypt, and the members of the Austrian Mission, with their blacks, quitted Khartoum on the 11th December, 1883."
I therefore take it for granted that Father Ohrwalder's fellow-workers saw that all was hopeless ​two months before Gordon's name had been suggested to the Egypttan Government, yet, in the face of this, we are first asked —
"What could Gordon do alone against the now universally worshipped Mahdi?"
and then told —
"General Gordon's arrival in Khartoum gave fresh life and hope to the inhabitants."
Then,
"As it appeared to us in Kordofan, and to the Mahdi himself, Gordon's undertaking was very strange; it was just as if a man were attempting to put out an enormous fire with a drop of water,"
and,
"I have not the slightest hesitation in saying that had the Egyptian Government not sent Gordon, then undoubtedly the evacuation originally ordered could have been carried out without difficulty."
One is simply staggered by such an assertion. When Gordon arrived in Khartoum, the whole of the western Soudan had fallen.. The town was overrun with the mourning women and children — the widows and orphans, I should say — of the troops who, under Hicks Pasha, had been annihilated a few months before on their way to extricate the garrisons. Slatin had surrendered Dara to Zoghal. Said Bey Gumaa, the last man to fight for the Government in the western Soudan, was compelled to capitulate very shortly before Gordon's arrival, and this only after a second siege when his men were dying with thirst. ​Bahr-el-Ghazal fell before Gordon had had time to turn round, and, for all that he or the Mahdi knew, the Equatorial province had fallen also. The town was hemmed in by the Mahdists, and the commanders of the garrisons which Gordon was expected to extricate were holding various commands in the dervish army, while Slatin had taken part already as a Mahdist in the subjugation of his subordinate, Said Bey Gumaa of El Fasher, who had refused to surrender. Am I not justified in saying that only the suppression of such facts made possible such attacks upon Gordon?
We are next told —
Why did not those perfectly ready to leave leave with the members of the Austrian mission, or leave between the date of their departure, December 11, and the early days of February, when the news of Gordon's mission first reached Khartoum? Who prevented their leaving during that interval of at least two months from the moment when they were all thrown into "indescribable dismay" until they heard of Gordon's appointment? And if, when he did arrive, they were so bitterly disappointed at his not being accompanied with five hundred British bayonets — ​much good these would have been against the "universally worshipped Mahdi" in extricating those who had surrendered to him — why did they stay on? Did not Gordon beg them to leave? did he not try and compel them to do so? did he not put boats at their disposal to sail north or south as best suited them? And has not Gordon himself given the real reason for their staying on? — though to this should be added their unbounded faith and confidence in Gordon.
Gordon, I venture to believe, sustained his reputation in the Soudan up to the end — up to the moment when, with the hand of Death on him, he fell facing his last assailant. True, he lost his reputation for telling the truth, but there are few men in this world whose telling of an untruth would startle and astonish a community. The people of Khartoum, their eyes dry and wearied with looking for a sign of the returning steamers which Gordon had sent off three months before to bring up the troops expected to arrive at the beginning of November, turned to each other, and, in an amazed whisper, said, "Gordon has told a lie," and were startled and afraid at their own words.
Having dealt as tersely as possible with this curious collection of contradictions, I proceed to the quotation of and replies to the criticisms passed upon Gordon in the book I have already quoted from.
1. "Looking back on the events of the siege of Khartoum, I cannot refrain from saying I consider Gordon carried his humanitarian views too far, and this excessive forbearance on his part added to his difficulties,"
2. "It was Gordon's first and paramount duty to rescue the ​Europeans, Christians, and Egyptians, from the fanatical fury of the Mahdi, which was especially directed against them. This was Gordon's clear duty, but unfortunately he allowed his kindness of heart to be made use of to his enemy's advantage."
3. "Thus, in his kindness of heart, did Gordon feed and support the families of his enemies. It was quite sufficient for a number of women to appeal to Gordon, with tears in their eyes, that they were starving for him to order that rations of corn should be at once issued to them, and thus it was that the supplies in the hands of the Government were enormously reduced."
4. "Gordon should have recognized that the laws of humanity differ in war from peace time, more especially when the war he was waging was especially directed against wild fanatical savages, who were enemies to all peace."
5. "He was entirely deceived if he believed that by the exercise of kindness and humanity he was likely to win over these people to his side; on the contrary, they ridiculed his generosity, and only thought it a sign of weakness. The Soudanese respect and regard only those whom they fear, and surely those cruel and hypocritical Mahdists should have received very different treatment to civilized Europeans."
6. "I also think that Gordon brought harm on himself and his cause by another action, which I am convinced led to a great extent to his final overthrow. Such men as Slatin, Lupton, Wad-el-Mek, and others, had offered, at the risk of their lives, to come and serve him. . . . Gordon would not, however, vouchsafe an answer to the letters of appeal these men wrote to him."
In the first five extracts, Father Ohrwalder, from an initial mistake in forgetting or being unaware of the presence in Khartoum of the thousands of widows and orphans of the soldiers of Hicks' army, flounders on until, as I have said, he is credited with opinions which he should be the last to give utterance to. It is passing strange that any missionary should place limits to the humanitarian views and forbearance of a military commander in time of war, who may invariably be ​depended upon to err on the wrong side from the biblical point of view. Gordon, in keeping in mind the Sermon on the Mount, and acting up to its precepts as far as the exigencies of a state of war permitted, performed no act derogatory to him as a military commander. Gordon was no worse a Christian than he was a soldier — and the world never saw a better soldier. And whatever Gordon's paramount duty may have been, it certainly was not his paramount duty to weaken his little garrison by sending an expedition into Kordofan to rescue, say, a dozen people who, as far as Gordon and every one else in Khartoum knew, had disavowed the Christian religion and adopted that of the Mahdi.
There is another aspect to the case. Gordon's troops were Muslims. The "Christians" had adopted the "true faith" and become Muslims also. Why, then, should Muslim lives be sacrificed to "rescue" them from Islam and bring them back to Christianity? And it must not be forgotten that Slatin, so far from denying his conversion, excused himself on the ground that his religious education had been neglected at home. Gordon is not to be blamed for having believed that the "Christians" had sincerely adopted Islam, for apart from the mere adoption of the religion, people sworn to celibacy and chastity had entered the matrimonial state, which was considered a further evidence of their conversion. While the gardener of the Khartoum Mission was bewailing the money he had sent to the "apostates," Consul Hansal wrote, asking that the matter be kept secret, to the Austrian ​General in Cairo, informing him of what had occurred. Had there been any "Christians" to rescue from the Mahdi, doubtless Gordon's paramount duty would have exhibited itself in some action. Nor is there any evidence that the Mahdi's "fanatical fury" was in any single instance especially directed against the "Christians." but there is a great deal of evidence to the contrary. With the exception of putting Slatin in chains, when he believed that he was playing him false, I know of no case of wanton cruelty practised by the Mahdi towards the "Christians," and I am not sure whether "clemency" would not be the proper word to use in Slatin's case, when it is remembered what happens to prisoners of war who break their parole, for Slatin and the others had sworn the oath of allegiance.
Extract No. 3, apart from the extraordinary censure on Gordon for feeding the families of his enemies, and being moved to pity at the sight of the tears of starving women, calls for a more detailed reply to the criticism. Gordon, according to "Ten Years' Captivity," ought to have turned these women out of the town to be at the tender mercies of the "wild fanatical savages" and been responsible for the rehearsal under his own eyes of the hunt for lust which followed on the fall of Khartoum. Father Ohrwalder can never have heard of England's proud roll of heroes who on land and sea have given their lives to save those of helpless women and children. In feeding these women — even had all been the wives of his enemies, which they were not — Gordon committed ​no graver military crime than did the commander of the troops on board the Birkenhead, when, instead of seeing first to the safety of the soldiers for whose lives he was responsible, he placed the women and children in the boats which could have saved the troops, and called upon his men to present arms as the boats left the side of the ship — and to stand to attention as the vessel sank under them. So much for British principle, apart from Christ's teachings, in peace and war; now for the facts in Gordon's case.
When Gordon arrived in Khartoum, he found wandering — hungry and helpless — the thousands of widows and orphans of the soldiers who a few months before constituted Hicks Pasha's army. Throughout his journals you will discover constant reference to the food question, with accounts of his successful search for the stolen biscuits, which had "enormously reduced" the supplies in the hands of the Government. Gordon had calculated that the relieving army would reach him at the beginning of November, so that we find him writing on the 2nd of that month that he has six weeks' food supplies. In making this estimate he was allowing for full rations to the troops (who were also in receipt of the money with which to buy those rations), and the wants of the poor. On the 11th of that month he discovers nearly a million pounds of stolen biscuits. On the 21st he writes, "I do not believe one person has died of hunger during the months we have been shut up." On December 14 — that is a month after the latest date he had estimated for the arrival of the relief expedition, he ​says that unless the troops come in ten days the town may fall, and this because he had on November 12 written, "Omdurman fort has one and a half months' supply of food and water." With the fall of this fort, he knew that the end would soon come.
But up to this date the soldiers, who were not entitled to rations since they received money for their purchase, were given full rations, and there is every reason to believe that the pinch only came when Omdurman fort fell on January 14 or 15, and the town was completely hemmed in. Food was short, no doubt, but, eight days before the fall of the town, Gordon could spare from the stores fifteen hundred pounds of biscuits to provision a boat for the Europeans. One should only be filled with amazement that Gordon held out so long after the date when he had expected relief, and it is not only ridiculous but monstrous to attack him, because he did not calculate that the expedition would only arrive seventy-eight instead of seventy-six days late, when we know for certain that his troops were receiving full rations which they were not entitled to for at least a month after the date of the expected arrival of the expedition.
It is true that Gordon, seeing the food supplies giving out, recommended people to leave him and join the Mahdi, but this was only after more days had slipped away after the "ten days from December 14." He had then abandoned all hope, and saw that his prophecy was to come true — the expedition would arrive just "too late." In comparison with the number of widows whom Gordon had had to support ​for ten months, without the slightest assistance or aid from outside, the number of wives of his "enemies" in the Mahdi's camp was so insignificant as to be unworthy of notice. But even supposing that all the starving women who went to Gordon crying for the bread which Father Ohrwalder suggests should have been represented by a stone, were the wives of his enemies, his own writing justifies Gordon's feeding of them, for he says, "These crafty people thus assured themselves that, should the Mahdi be victorious, their loyalty to him would ensure the safety of their families and property in Khartoum, while, on the other hand, should Gordon be victorious, then their wives and families would be able to mediate for them with the conquerors."
It is quite evident, then, that these people who went over to the Mahdi's camp did so, not from conviction of his divine mission, but to save the lives of their wives and families, whom by preference they entrusted to Gordon even at the last hour, and nearly a year after the date when his arrival without five hundred British bayonets is supposed to have ruined his reputation in the Soudan. I am inclined to think that the "craftiness" displayed by some in trying to secure their wives and daughters against violation and death, was no less justifiable than the "craftiness" displayed by others for an entirely different purpose. What a tribute these "crafty" people paid to Gordon! I mean the crafty people who left Khartoum in January, 1885, and trusted Gordon with the lives of their wives and children. ​In discussing this food question with Khartoum survivors, I laid particular stress upon the feeding of the women and children, and I can do no better than give the summing-up of it in the words of a native survivor, after I had translated to him the criticisms I am replying to — "What! Would Gordon Pasha send away the hungry women and children of soldiers who had been killed fighting for the Government?"
I pass over extract No. 5 for the moment to refer to No. 6. The use of my portrait in advertising the book I am quoting from led most to believe that I approved of the criticisms it contained, and I have taken this opportunity of showing how thoroughly I disagree with them. To say that Slatin and others had offered, at the risk of their lives, to join Gordon is hardly correct, and if Gordon did not vouchsafe a written answer to the letters he received, he probably had good reason for not doing so, especially as it appears likely that some of Said Bey Gumaa's letters addressed to the GovernorGeneral before Gordon's appointment had succeeded in getting through to Khartoum, and from these and deserters from the Mahdi, Gordon must have learned all.
Under pretence of intending to submit, Gumaa gained time, and tried to hurry up reinforcements, but this having been suspected, Zoghal ordered Slatin, Tandal, the President of the Civil Court, Aly Bey Ibrahim-el-Khabir, Slatin's head-clerk Ahmad Riad, and a few others, to send in an ultimatum to Gumaa, ​and await his reply. The reply travelled quickly; as soon as he read the letter, Gumaa opened fire upon the spot where Slatin and his companions were awaiting him. During the first siege of El Fasher, Gumaa must have accounted for at least fifteen thousand dervishes, and utterly defeated the army which retired to Walad Birra, from whence a party was sent off to Dara to bring up the ammunition which, as appears from Gordon's Journal, was handed over to the Mahdists by Slatin when he surrendered the province. This occupied eleven days, and then the second siege was laid. The wells were filled up, thus depriving the garrison of water; but for seven or eight days they held out, dying of thirst, while the town was constantly bombarded with Government ammunition. Said "Bey Gumaa has always protested that had it not been for the ammunition handed over by Slatin to the Mahdists he could have held out — and more,
The knowledge of these things must have influenced Gordon, especially when Slatin writes to him, through Consul Hansal, offering to place his services at his disposal, but only on condition that Gordon should guarantee never to surrender, for, if he did, Slatin would be maltreated by the Mahdists when they laid hands upon him. Gordon was the best judge as to the value of services offered under such conditions. For "moral and political reasons," Gordon considered it unadvisable to have anything whatever to do with what he called "apostate" Europeans in the Mahdi's camp, but appreciating the enormous responsibility ​thrown upon his shoulders, he appealed to the Ulema for their advice, as these apostates were now their co-religionists, and they decided to have nothing whatever to do with their "proposals of treachery," as no good could come of it. Matters were made still worse by Slatin writing to Gordon asking him to be a party to proceedings very foreign indeed to Gordon's nature at all events. Slatin's request to Gordon was to write to him personally one letter in French, and another letter in Arabic, "asking him to obtain permission from his Master to come to Omdurman and discuss with him the conditions of his (Gordon's) surrender," which letter he could use in order to obtain permission to come to Omdurman. If Gordon had written that Arabic letter. . . .
If all these facts were not known to Father Ohrwalder before 1892, six years is quite long enough time to have learned them, and now I have no hesitation in saying that to assert that Gordon brought about his downfall by refusing the services of people willing to risk their lives in reaching him is, to put it charitably, pure fiction.
Irrespective of the opinions expressed in the first four extracts given, extract No. 5 makes out a very good case for the Sirdar to write in large letters at the Soudan Frontier, "No Missionaries Admitted," for Father Ohrwalder proves conclusively that they can do no good. Honestly I believe that for many years to come the only religious teachers allowed to penetrate into the Soudan should be enlightened exponents of the Quoran. Consider that for sixteen years the ​Soudan has been in the throes — is still in the throes of one of the greatest religious upheavals known. While this revival of Islam has been in progress in the Soudan proper, the converts at Uganda and elsewhere have been snicking each other's throats to evidence their zeal for the rival Christian creeds. In the Soudan, missionaries have openly avowed to thousands their acceptance of the "true faith" — Islam, the very religion from which they had gone out to convert the Blacks. I have not the slightest hesitation in saying myself that for some time to come religious revivalism in the Soudan will, if permitted to take place, very soon spell Repetition. Time must be given for the bad (?) effect produced on the native mind by the conversion of the Soudan missionaries to die out, and goodness knows the poor country requires a rest. If missionaries must be sent, then let them be honest traders, the best missionaries for savage countries. When the Soudan has again been opened up, and the natives have become a little more civilized through their contact with trade, and so Europeanized that their simple faith, "There is one God, and He is God," is not sufficient for them, but they must needs snarl and fight over creeds, then and only then remove the "No Admittance" signboard.
I trust that no religious body or society of earnest Christians will think from the foregoing that I am either sneering or scoffing at religion, or that their disinterested efforts to spread the gospel of peace to the remotest ends of the earth have not my sincerest sympathy. I have spoken plainly and to the point, ​for I consider that the occasion calls for it. The missionaries required in the Soudan now are clean-minded, honest traders, who will do more for you by a few years’ preparing the ground for “talking” missionaries than the missionaries can do in a score of years of preaching. It is men like Gordon who, though not preaching religion, yet practise it in their every act, whom the Soudan requires. Ask any one in the Soudan what is his opinion about Gordon, and he will reply, “Gordon was not a Christian; he was a true Muslim; no Christian could be so good and just as he was,” and I believe that this saying, or estimate of him, emanated from the Mahdi himself. I draw your particular attention to the word “just,” which proves that, in the eyes of the Mahdists and Soudanese alike, his justice ranked with his goodness. If any Soudanese or Mahdist ridiculed to Father Ohrwalder Gordon’s generosity, and considered it a sign of weakness, it must have been done for a purpose. During my twelve years amongst all shades of people of the Soudan, I never heard a single word against Gordon, nor did I hear one until I came amongst his own flesh and blood. I cannot do better than relate another example of the esteem he was held in, and this example is from a Christian source.
My friend Nahoum Abbajee, when he reached Cairo, prepared a petition which he had intended forwarding to her Majesty the Queen, asking that the British Government should restore part of the fortune accumulated by him during his twenty-three years’ residence in the Soudan. His argument was that, trusting to ​Gordon, he had delayed in Khartoum until Stewart's departure was arranged for, when, acting on the advice of Gordon, he sold off his goods, realizing but half their value, accepted Gordon Bonds in payment, bought a boat, as no one then would hire one out, set off with Stewart, and was captured by the dervishes. This would not have happened, had not the commander of the gunboat disobeyed Gordon's orders by steaming off to Khartoum, instead of bombarding Berber for three days, and Gordon was consequently responsible for the delinquencies of his subordinate.
On being asked what his personal impressions of Gordon were, he said that his thoughtfulness for every one, his goodness, justice, and innumerable virtues would take years to relate; and then when he was told that his claim could only be sustained on his proving that Gordon was to blame for the loss of Stewart's party, ill as he was, he rose from his couch, tore up the petition, and, with his hand raised, prayed Heaven that if the bit of bread to save him from starvation should be purchased with money obtained through laying a fault upon Gordon, it might choke him. One had to witness the scene really to appreciate it. Ruined, broken down in health, too old to make a new start in life, his eyes lost their dulness and glistened as he breathed his prayer and fell back on his couch exhausted with the effort. Nahoum, I am afraid, will have joined Gordon by the time this appears in print. ​