# Coolidge v. New Hampshire/Dissent White

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United States Supreme Court
403 U.S. 443
Coolidge v. New Hampshire
Argued: Jan. 12, 1971. --- Decided: June 21, 1971
Mr. Justice WHITE, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE joins, concurring and dissenting.
I would affirm the judgment. In my view, Coolidge's Pontiac was lawfully seized as evidence of the crime in plain sight and thereafter was lawfully searched under Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 87 S.Ct. 788, 17 L.Ed.2d 730 (1967). I am therefore in substantial disagreement with Parts II-C and II-D of the Court's opinion. Neither do I agree with Part II-B, and I can concur only in the result as to Part III.
* The Fourth Amendment commands that the public shall be secure in their 'persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures * * *.' As to persons, the overwhelming weight of authority is that a police officer may make an arrest without a warrant when he has probable cause to believe the suspect has committed a felony. The general rule also is that upon the lawful arrest of a person, he and the area under his immediate control may be searched and contraband or evidence seized without a warrant. The right 'to search the person of the accused when legally arrested to discover and seize the fruits or evidences of crime * * * has been uniformly maintained in many cases.' Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392, 34 S.Ct. 341, 344, 58 L.Ed. 652 (1914). Accord, Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969).
With respect to houses and other private places, the general rule is otherwise: a search is invalid unless made on probable cause and under the authority of a warrant specifying the area to be searched and the objects to be seized. There are various exceptions to the rule, however, permitting warrantless entries and limited searches, the most recurring being the arrest without a warrant.
The case before us concerns the protection offered by the Fourth Amendment to 'effects' other than person papers or documents. It is clear that effects may not be seized without probable cause but the law as to when a warrant is required to validate their seizure is confused and confusing. Part of the difficulty derives from the fact that effects enjoy derivative protection when located in a house or other area within reach of the Fourth Amendment. Under existing doctrine, effects seized in warrantless, illegal searches of houses are fruits of a constitutional violation and may not be received in evidence. But is a warrant required to seize contraband or criminal evidence when it is found by officers at a place where they are legally entitled to be at the time? Before a person is deprived of his possession or right to possession of his effects, must a magistrate confirm that what the officer has legally seen (and would be permitted to testify about, if relevant and material) is actually contraband or criminal evidence?
The issue arises in different contexts. First, the effects may be found on public property. Suppose police are informed that important evidence has been secreted in a public park. A search is made and the evidence found. Although the evidence was hidden rather than abandoned, I had not thought a search warrant was required for officers to make a seizure, see United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 47 S.Ct. 746, 71 L.Ed. 1202 (1927) (boat seized on public waters); Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 44 S.Ct. 445, 68 L.Ed. 898 (1924) (liquor seized in open field); any more than a warrant is needed to seize an automobile which is itself evidence of crime and which is found on a public street or in a parking lot. See Cooper v. California, supra.
Second, the items may be found on the premises of a third party who gives consent for an official search but who has no authority to consent to seizure of another person's effects. Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 89 S.Ct. 1420, 22 L.Ed.2d 684 (1969), would seem to settle the validity of the seizure without a warrant as long as the search itself involves no Fourth Amendment violation.
Third, the police may arrest a suspect in his home and in the course of a properly limited search discover evidence of crime. The line of cases from Weeks v. United States, supra, to Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 67 S.Ct. 1098, 91 L.Ed. 1399 (1947), had recognized the rule that upon arrest searches of the person and of adjacent areas were reasonable, and Harris had approved an incidental search of broad scope. In the next Term, however, Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.s. 699, 68 S.Ct. 1229, 92 L.Ed. 1663 (1948), departed from the Harris approach. In Trupiano, officers, with probable cause to arrest, entered property and arrested the defendant while he was operating an illegal still. The still was seized. Time and circumstance would have permitted the officers to secure both arrest and search warrants, but they had obtained neither. The Court did not disturb seizure of the person without warrant but invalidated seizure of the still since the officers could have had a warrant but did not. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 70 S.Ct. 430, 94 L.Ed. 653 (1950), however, returned to the rule that the validity of searches incident to arrest does not depend on the practicability of securing a warrant. And, while Chimel v. California, supra, narrowed the permissible scope of incident searches to the person and the immediate area within reach of the defendant, it did not purport to reestablish the Trupiano rule that searches accompanying arrests are invalid if there is opportunity to get a warrant.
Finally, officers may be on a suspect's premises executing a search warrant and in the course of the authorized search discover evidence of crime not covered by the warrant. Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 48 S.Ct. 74, 72 L.Ed. 231(1927), flatly held that legal presence under a warrant did not itself justify the seizure of such evidence. However, seizure of the same evidence was permitted because it was found in plain sight in the course of making an arrest and an accompanying search. It is at least odd to me to permit plain-sight seizures arising in connection with warrantless arrests, as the long line of cases ending with Chimel has done, or arising in the course of a hot-pursuit search for a felon, Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 87 S.Ct. 1642, 18 L.Ed.2d 782 (1967); Hester v. United States, supra; and yet forbid the warrantless seizure of evidence in plain sight when officers enter a house under a search warrant that is perfectly valid but does not cover the items actually seized. I have my doubts that this aspect of Marron can survive later cases in this Court, particularly Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624, 66 S.Ct. 1277, 90 L.Ed. 1477 (1946), vacated on other grounds, 330 U.S. 800, 67 S.Ct. 857, 91 L.Ed. 1259 (1947), where federal investigators seized a cancelled check evidencing a crime that had been observed during the course of an otherwise lawful search. See also Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 569, 89 S.Ct. 1243, 1250, 22 L.Ed.2d 542 (1969) (Stewart, J., concurring in result). Cf. Chimel v. California, supra; Warden v. Hayden, supra; Frazier v. Cupp, supra. Apparently the majority agrees, for it lumps plain-sight seizures in such circumstances along with other situations where seizures are made after a legal entry.
In all of these situations, it is apparent that seizure of evidence without a warrant is not itself an invasion either of personal privacy or of property rights beyond that already authorized by law. Only the possessory interest of a defendant in his effects is implicated. And in these various circumstances, at least where the discovery of evidence is 'inadvertent,' the Court would permit the seizure because, it is said, 'the minor peril to Fourth Amendment protections' is overridden by the 'major gain in effective law enforcement' inherent in avoiding the 'needless inconvenience' of procuring a warrant. Ante, at 467, 468. I take this to mean that both the possessory interest of the defendant and the importance of having a magistrate confirm that what the officer saw with his own eyes is in fact contraband or evidence of crime are not substantial constitutional considerations. Officers in these circumstances need neither guard nor ignore the evidence while a warrant is sought. Immediate seizure is justified and reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
The Court would interpose in some or all of these situations, however, a condition that the discovery of the disputed evidence be 'inadvertent.' If it is 'anticipated,' that is if 'the police know in advance the location of the evidence and intend to seize it,' the seizure is invalid. Id., at 470.
I have great difficulty with this approach. Let us suppose officers secure a warrant to search a house for a rifle. While staying well within the range of a rifle search, they discover two photographs of the murder victim, both in plain sight in the bedroom. Assume also that the discovery of the one photograph was inadvertent but finding the other was anticipated. The Court would permit the seizure of only one of the photographs. But in terms of the 'minor' peril to Fourth Amendment values there is surely no difference between these two photographs: the interference with possession is the same in each case and the officers' appraisal of the photograph they expected to see is no less reliable than their judgment about the other. And in both situations the actual inconvenience and danger to evidence remain identical if the officers must depart and secure a warrant. The Court, however, states that the State will suffer no constitutionally cognizable inconvenience from invalidating anticipated seizures since it had probable cause to search for the items seized and could have included them in a warrant.
This seems a punitive and extravagant application of the exclusionary rule. If the police have probable cause to search for a photograph as well as a rifle and they proceed to seek a warrant, they could have no possible motive for deliberately including the rifle but omitting the photograph. Quite the contrary is true. Only oversight or careless mistake would explain the omission in the warrant application if the police were convinced they had probable cause to search for the photograph. Of course, they may misjudge the facts and not realize they have probable cause for the picture, or the magistrate may find against them and not issue a warrant for it. In either event the officers may validly seize the photograph for which they had no probable cause to search but the other photograph is excluded from evidence when the Court subsequently determines that the officers, after all, had probable cause to search for it.
More important, the inadvertence rule is unnecessary to further any Fourth Amendment ends and will accomplish nothing. Police with a warrant for a rifle may search only places where rifles might be and must terminate the search once the rifle is found; the inadvertence rule will in no way reduce the number of places into which they may lawfully look. So, too, the areas of permissible search incident to arrest are strictly circumscribed by Chimel. Excluding evidence seen from within those areas can hardly be effective to operate to prevent wider, unauthorized searches. If the police stray outside the scope of an authorized Chimel search they are already in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and evidence so seized will be excluded; adding a second reason for excluding evidence hardly seems worth the candle. Perhaps the Court is concerned that officers, having the right to intrude upon private property to make arrests, will use that right as a pretext to obtain entry to search for objects in plain sight, cf. Chimel v. California, supra, 395 U.S., at 767, 89 S.Ct., at 2042, but, if so, such a concern is unfounded. The reason is that under Chimel the police can enter only into those portions of the property into which entry is necessary to effect the arrest. Given the restrictions of Chimel, the police face a substantial risk that in effecting an arrest and a search incident thereto they will never enter into those portions of the property from which they can plainly see the objects for which they are searching and that, if they do not, those objects will be destroyed before they can return and conduct a search of the entire premises pursuant to a warrant. If the police in fact possess probable cause to believe that weapons, contraband, or evidence of crime is in plain view on the premises, it will be far safer to obtain a search warrant than to take a chance that in making an arrest they will come into plain view of the object they are seeking. It is only when they lack probable cause for a search when, that is, discovery of objects in plain view from a lawful vantage point is inadvertent-that entry to make an arrest might, as a practical matter, assist the police in discovering an object for which they could not have obtained a warrant. But the majority in that circumstance would uphold their authority to seize what they see. I thus doubt that the Court's new rule will have any measurable effect on police conduct. It will merely attach undue consequences to what will most often be an unintended mistake or a misapprehension of some of this Court's probable-cause decisions, a failing which, I am afraid, we all have.
By invalidating otherwise valid, plain-sight seizures where officers have probable cause and presumably, although the Court does not say so, opportunity to secure a warrant, the Court seems to turn in the direction of the Trupiano rule, rejected in Rabinowitz and not revived in Chimel. But it seems unsure of its own rule.
It is careful to note that Coolidge's car is not contraband, stolen, or in itself dangerous. Apparently, contraband, stolen, or dangerous materials may be seized when discovered in the course of an otherwise authorized search even if the discovery is fully anticipated and a warrant could have been obtained. The distinction the Court draws between contraband and mere evidence of crime is reminiscent of the confusing and unworkable approach that I thought Warden v. Hayden, supra, had firmly put aside.
Neither does the Court in so many words limit Chimel; on the contrary, it indicates that warrantless Chimel-type searches will not be disturbed, even if the police 'anticipate that they will find specific evidence during the course of such a search.' Ante, at 482. The Court also concedes that, when an arresting officer 'comes within plain view of a piece of evidence, not concealed, although outside of the area under the immediate control of the arrestee, the officer may seize it, so long as the plain view was obtained in the course of an appropriately limited search of the arrestee.' Id., at 466 n. 24. Yet today's decision is a limitation on Chimel, for in the latter example, the Court would permit seizure only if the plain view was inadvertently obtained. If the police, that is, fully anticipate that, when they arrest a suspect as he is entering the front door of his home, they will find a credit card in his pocket and a picture in plain sight on the wall opposite the door, both of which will implicate him in a crime, they may under today's decision seize the credit card but not the picture. This is a distinction that I find to be without basis and which the Court makes no attempt to explain. I can therefore conclude only that Chimel and today's holding are squarely inconsistent and that the Court, unable to perceive any reasoned distinction, has abandoned any attempt to find one.
The Court also fails to mention searches carried out with third-party consent. Assume for the moment that authorities are reliably informed that a suspect, subject to arrest, but not yet apprehended, has concealed specified evidence of his crime in the house of a friend. The friend freely consents to a search of his house and accompanies the officers in the process. The evidence is found precisely where the officers were told they would find it, and the officers proceed to seize it, aware, however, that the friend lacks authority from the suspect to confer possession on them. The suspect's interest in not having his possession forcibly interfered with in the absence of a warrant from a magistrate is identical to the interest of Coolidge, and one would accordingly expect the Court to deal with the question. Frazier v. Cupp, supra, indicates that a seizure in these circumstances would be lawful, and the Court today neither overrules nor distinguishes Frazier; in fact, Part III of the Court's opinion, which discusses the officers' receipt of Coolidge's clothing and weapons from Mrs. Coolidge, implicitly approves Frazier.
Neither does the Court indicate whether it would apply the inadvertence requirement to searches made in public places, although one might infer from its approval of United States v. Lee, supra, which held admissible a chemical analysis of bootleg liquor observed by revenue officers in plain sight, that it would not.
Aware of these inconsistencies, the Court admits that 'it would be nonsense to pretend that our decision today reduces Fourth Amendment law to complete order and harmony.' Ante, at 483. But it concludes that logical consistency cannot be attained in constitutional law and ultimately comes to rest upon its belief 'that the result reached in this case is correct * * *.' Id., at 484. It may be that constitutional law cannot be fully coherent and that constitutional principles ought not always be spun out to their logical limits, but this does not mean that we should cease to strive for clarity and consistency of analysis. Here the Court has a ready opportunity, one way or another, to bring clarity and certainty to a body of law that lower courts and law enforcement officials often find confusing. Instead, without apparent reason, it only increases their confusion by clinging to distinctions that are both unexplained and inexplicable.
In the case before us, the officers had probable cause both to arrest Coolidge and to seize his car. In order to effect his arrest, they went to his home-perhaps the most obvious place in which to look for him. They also may have hoped to find his car at home and, in fact, when they arrived on the property to make the arrest, they did find the 1951 Pontiac there. Thus, even assuming that the Fourth Amendment protects against warrantless seizures outside the house, but see Hester v. United States, supra, 265 U.S., at 59, 44 S.Ct., at 446, the fact remains that the officers had legally entered Coolidge's property to effect an arrest and that they seized the car only after they observed it in plain view before them. The Court, however, would invalidate this seizure on the premise that officers should not be permitted to seize effects in plain sight when they have anticipated they will see them.
Even accepting this premise of the Court, seizure of the car was not invalid. The majority makes an assumption that, when the police went to Coolidge's house to arrest him, they anticipated that they would also find the 1951 Pontiac there. In my own reading of the record, however, I have found no evidence to support this assumption. For all the record shows, the police, although they may have hoped to find the Pontiac at Coolidge's home, did not know its exact location when they went to make the arrest, and their observation of it in Coolidge's driveway was truly inadvertent. Of course, they did have probable cause to seize the car, and, if they had had a valid warrant as well, they would have been justified in looking for it in Coolidge's driveway-a likely place for it to be. But if the fact of probable cause bars this seizure, it would also bar seizures not only of cars found at a house, but also of cars parked in a parking lot, hidden in some secluded spot, or delivered to the police by a third party at the police station. This would simply be a rule that the existence of probable cause bars all warrantless seizures.
It is evident on the facts of this case that Coolidge's Pontiac was subject to seizure if proper procedures were employed. It is also apparent that the Pontiac was in plain view of the officers who had legally entered Coolidge's property to effect his arrest. I am satisfied that it was properly seized whether or not the officers expected that it would be found where it was. And, since the Pontiac was legally seized as evidence of the crime for which Coolidge was arrested, Cooper v. California, supra, authorizes its warrantless search while in lawful custody of the police. 'It would be unreasonable to hold that the police, having to retain the car in their custody for such a length of time, had no right, even for their own protection, to search it. It is no answer to say that the police could have obtained a search warrant, for '(t)he relevant test is not whether it is reasonable to procure a search warrant, but whether the search was reasonable.' * * * Under the circumstances of this case, we cannot hold unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment the examination or search of a car validly held by officers for use as evidence * * *.' Cooper v. California, supra, 386 U.S., at 61-62, 87 S.Ct., at 791.
Given the foregoing views, it is perhaps unnecessary to deal with the other grounds offered to sustain the search of Coolidge's car. Nonetheless, it may be helpful to explain my reasons for relying on the plain-sight rule rather than on Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 90 S.Ct. 1975, 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1970), to validate this search.
Chambers upheld the seizure and subsequent search of automobiles at the station house rather than requiring the police to search cars immediately at the places where they are found. But Chambers did not authorize indefinite detention of automobiles so seized; it contemplated some expedition in completing the searches so that automobiles could be released and returned to their owners. In the present case, however, Coolidge's Pontiac was not released quickly but was retained in police custody for more than a year and was searched not only immediately after seizure but also on two other occasions: one of them 11 months and the other 14 months after seizure. Since fruits of the later searches as well as the earlier one were apparently introduced in evidence, I cannot look to Chambers and would invalidate the later searches but for the fact that the police had a right to seize and detain the car not because it was a car, but because it was itself evidence of crime. It is only because of the long detention of the car that I find Chambers inapplicable, however, and I disagree strongly with the majority's reasoning for refusing to apply it.
As recounted earlier, arrest and search of the person on probable cause but without a warrant is the prevailing constitutional and legislative rule, without regard to whether on the particular facts there was opportunity to secure a warrant. Apparently, exigent circumstances are so often present in arrest situations that it has been deemed improvident to litigate the issue in every case.
In similar fashion, 'practically since the beginning of the Government,' Congress and the Court have recognized 'a necessary difference between a search of a store, dwelling house or other structure in respect of which a proper official warrant readily may be obtained, and a search of a ship, motor boat, wagon or automobile, for contraband goods, where it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.' Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153, 45 S.Ct. 280, 285, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925). As in the case of an arrest and accompanying search of a person, searches of vehicles on probable cause but without a warrant have been deemed reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment without requiring proof of exigent circumstances beyond the fact that a movable vehicle is involved. The rule has been consistently recognized, see Cooper v. California, supra; Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949); Harris v. United States, supra, 331 U.S., at 168, 67 S.Ct., at 1110 (dissenting opinion); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 609, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 1269, 90 L.Ed. 1453 (1946) (dissenting opinion); Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251, 59 S.Ct. 174, 83 L.Ed. 151 (1938); Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694, 51 S.Ct. 240, 75 L.Ed. 629 (1931); United States v. Lee, supra; and was reaffirmed less than a year ago in Chambers v. Maroney, supra, where a vehicle was stopped on the highway but was searched at the police station, there being probable cause but no warrant.
The majority now approves warrantless searches of vehicles in motion when seized. On the other hand, warrantless, probable-cause searches of parked but movable vehicles in some situations would be valid only upon proof of exigent circumstances justifying the search. Although I am not sure, it would seem that, when police discover a parked car that they have probable cause to search, they may not immediately search but must seek a warrant. But if before the warrant arrives, the car is put in motion by its owner or others, it may be stopped and searched on the spot or elsewhere. In the case before us, Coolidge's car, parked at his house, could not be searched without a valid warrant, although if Coolidge had been arrested as he drove away from his home, immediate seizure and subsequent search of the car would have been reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
I find nothing in the language or the underlying rationale of the line of cases from Carroll to Chambers limiting vehicle searches as the Court now limits them in situations such as the one before us. Although each of those cases may, as the Court argues, have involved vehicles or vessels in motion prior to their being stopped and searched, each of them approved the search of a vehicle that was no longer moving and, with the occupants in custody, no more likely to move than the unattended but movable vehicle parked on the street or in the driveway of a person's house. In both situations the probability of movement at the instance of family or friends is equally real, and hence the result should be the same whether the car is at rest or in motion when it is discovered.
In Husty v. United States, supra, the police had learned from a reliable informant that Husty had two loads of liquor in automobiles of particular make and description parked at described locations. The officers found one of the cars parked and unattended at the indicated spot. Later, as officers watched, Husty and others entered and started to drive away. The car was stopped after having moved no more than a foot or two; immediate search of the car produced contraband. Husty was then arrested. The Court, in a unanimous opinion, sustained denial of a motion to suppress the fruits of the search, saying that '(t)he Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the search, without warrant, of an automobile, for liquor illegally transported or possessed, if the search is upon probable cause * * *.' Id., at 700, 51 S.Ct., at 241. Further, '(t)he search was not unreasonable because, as petitioners argue, sufficient time elapsed between the receipt by the officer of the information and the search of the car to have enabled him to procure a search warrant. He could not know when Husty would come to the car or how soon it would be removed. In such circumstances we do not think the officers should be required to speculate upon the chances of successfully carrying out the search, after the delay and withdrawal from the scene of one or more officers which would have been necessary to procure a warrant. The search was, therefore, on probable cause, and not unreasonable * * *.' Id., at 701, 51 S.Ct., at 242.
The Court apparently cites Husty with approval as involving a car in motion on the highway. But it was obviously irrelevant to the Court that the officers could have obtained a warrant before Husty attempted to drive the car away. Equally immaterial was the fact that the car had moved one or two feet at the time it was stopped. The search would have been approved even if it had occurred before Husty's arrival or after his arrival but before he had put the car in motion. The Court's attempt to distinguish Husty on the basis of the car's negligible movement prior to its being stopped is without force.
The Court states flatly, however, that this case is not ruled by the Carroll-Chambers$ line of cases but by Dyke v. Taylor Implement Mfg. Co., 391 U.S. 216, 88 S.Ct. 1472, 20 L.Ed.2d 538 (1968). There the car was properly stopped and the occupants arrested for reckless driving, but the subsequent search at the station house could not be justified as incident to the arrest. See Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 84 S.Ct. 881, 11 L.Ed.2d 777 (1964). Nor could the car itself be seized and later searched, as it was, absent probable cause to believe it contained evidence of crime. In Dyke, it was pointed out that probable cause did not exist at the time of the search, and we expressly rested our holding on this fact, noting that, '(s)ince the search was not shown to have been based upon sufficient cause,' it was not necessary to reach other grounds urged for invalidating it. 391 U.S., at 222, 88 S.Ct., at 1476. Given probable cause, however, we would have upheld the search in Dyke.
For Fourth Amendment purposes, the difference between a moving and movable vehicle is tenuous at best. It is a metaphysical distinction without roots in the commonsense standard of reasonableness governing search and seizure cases. Distinguishing the case before us from the Carroll-Chambers line of cases further enmeshes Fourth Amendment law in litigation breeding refinements having little relation to reality. I suggest that in the interest of coherence and credibility we either overrule our prior cases and treat automobiles precisely as we do houses or apply those cases to readily movable as well as moving vehicles and thus treat searches of automobiles as we do the arrest of a person. By either course we might bring some modicum of certainty to Fourth Amendment law and give the law enforcement officers some slight guidance in how they are to conduct themselves.
I accordingly dissent from Parts II-B, II-C, and II-D of the Court's opinion. I concur, however, in the result reached in Part III of the opinion. I would therefore affirm the judgment of the New Hampshire Supreme Court.

## Notes

* ↑ This was the common-law rule. 1 J. Stephen, A History of Criminal Law of England 193 (1883); 2 M. Hale, Historia Plactorum Coronae 72-104 (new ed. 1800). It is also the constitutional rule. In Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925), the Court said that '(t)he usual rule is that a police officer may arrest without warrant one believed by the officer upon reasonable cause to have been guilty of a felony * * *.' Id., at 156, 45 S.Ct., at 286. There in September 1921, officers had probable cause to believe the two defendants were unlawfully transporting bootleg liquor, but they had neither effected an immediate arrest nor sought a warrant. Several months later they observed the two men driving on a public highway, stopped, and searched the car and arrested the men, and this Court sustained both the search and the arrest. So also in Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, 68 S.Ct. 1229, 92 L.Ed. 1663 (1948), officers were amply forewarned of criminal activities and had time to seek a warrant but did not do so. Instead, some time later they entered on property where Trupiano had a still and found exactly what they expected to find-one of the defendants engaged in the distillation of bootleg liquor. His arrest without a warrant was sustained, the Court saying that '(t)he absence of a warrant of arrest, even though there was sufficient time to obtain one, (did) not destroy the validity of an arrest' in the circumstances of the case. Id., at 705, 68 S.Ct., at 1232.
* ↑ Lee permitted the revenue officers who seized the boat to take and chemically analyze bootleg liquor found aboard it and then to testify as to the results of their analysis.
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