# History of Mexico (Bancroft)/Volume 5/Chapter 21

Table of Contents
CHAPTER XXI.
REORGANIZATION UNDER HERRERA,
1849.
Obstacles to Reform — Weakness of the Government — Party Agitation — Opposed by Popular Sentiment — Arrangement with Foreign Creditors — Consolidation of the Interior Debt — Effort to Reduce Expenses — Smuggling and Other Inroads on the Revenue Involved Finances — A Succession of Ministerial Changes — Military Corruption — The Service in Disrepute — Its Reconstruction — New Armament — Reduction of Force — The Navy — Militia System — Efforts at Colonization — Military Colonies on the Frontier, and their Value
Nothing could be more trying than the position of Herrera s government. It was expected to resurrect the country, reorganize departments, aid institutions, and restore prosperity generally; and all this without means, and in face of violent opposition from parties intent only on their own advancement, and ready to plunge the nation into greater troubles by fomenting outbreaks in different quarters. Paredes was still in hiding, and none knew but that he might at any mo ment reappear, and lead his partisans to fresh achieve ments. Although the suspense could not profit the ​monarchists, who now centred their hopes in him, others availed themselves of the unsettled disposition, notably the Santanists, who with their elastic principles stood prepared to promise anything, and even fulfil it, if their main object could be attained. Petitions were sent in to the chambers for permission to recall their leader, but, only too eager to keep so dangerous an agitator out of the country, the representatives hastened to declare that he must not set foot on Mexican soil without their permission.
This measure was precipitated by the pronunciamiento, February 10, 1849, of Leonardo Marquez, actually the head of a battalion engaged against the revolted Indians of Sierra Gorda, later one of the foremost conservative generals. He believed that the discontented troops would welcome their stanch champion, Santa Anna; and being personally devoted to him, the intriguing Marquez thought it best to secure for himself the credit of initiating the call. But he had miscalculated. Even some of his own battalion withdrew, and others deserted on finding that Querétaro, the proposed key for operations, refused to open its gates. The valiant General Bustamante happened to have his headquarters here, and took such steps that the retreating rebels soon submitted, although not until their leader had managed to secure terms for himself. Had the movement not been checked at the onset, the Santanists would probably ​have risen in force in different quarters; for the capital was in a ferment, and spasmodic though ineffectual pronunciamientos took place during the summer and autumn in the provinces around. Even the troops, on which Marquez counted in vain, rose for a moment with Santanist cries against the unpopular governor of San Luis Potosí, and farther north in Tamaulipas a band did succeed in holding its ground for some time; while in the Mizteca the Indians sought to renew their former prolonged fray, with its attendant raids and turmoil, although General Álvarez this time prevented it.
The feebleness of these outbreaks was due rather to inherent weakness than to efforts of the governments to check them, as may be instanced by the impunity with which Governor Cosío of Zacatecas manœuvred the dissolution of the local legislature and bid defiance to the supreme authorities when they sought to interfere. The desolation of the late war was still too fresh among the people for them to encourage the petty military pronunciamientos; and more, the war of races in Yucatan, and in the Sierra Gorda, which bordered on the valley of Mexico itself, acted as a fear-inspiring sedative on the white and mixed races, especially as it was well understood that ​revolutionary factions, notably the Santanists, would not hesitate to stir aboriginal prejudices to suit their aim. Nevertheless, while holding aloof from actual revolution, the people and provincial authorities neglected to display that patriotic spirit, and offer that passive if not active coöperation needed by a government charged with so important a task as the reorganization of the administrative departments.
Attention was called foremost to a decree dated June 14, 1848, requiring the reconstruction of the treasury department, the reduction of the civil service force and army list, overcrowded in course of time by a host of supernumerary and useless officials, and the presentation of a plan to the chambers for the consolidation of the debt, to which special funds had not yet been assigned. The latter effort proved most difficult, although a favorable readjustment of the foreign debt had led to equally flattering expectations the interior credits.
This readjustment was prompted by a protest from the English creditors who claimed that, as the cession of territory to the United States affected the landed security tendered them, they were entitled to a share of the indemnity obtained for that cession. The demand was too fair to be ignored; but the minister ​of finance availed himself of the gloomy prospects to extort from the bondholders a large abatement on the usuriously swollen capital, together with a reduction of the interest from five to three per cent, in consideration of a draft on the United States treasury for two and a half million pesos. The total of the regular foreign debt, contracted at London, was thereupon fixed at £10,241,650, with an assignment on the custom-houses for the payment of the interest.
Encouraged by this successful transaction, Minister Payno proceeded with somewhat blind confidence to consolidate the interior debt into one fund, with uniform bonds, and an interest of three per cent. This was decreed by law of November 30, 1850, under which, in conjunction with an insufficient representation of creditors, a rather arbitrary discount was imposed upon the different classes of debt, the remainder being allowed an interest of three per cent from the fund assigned of twenty per cent on the custom-house revenue, with an annual redemption of $300,000. ​A special council was created to manage the consolidation and direct the custom-houses, appointing also agents therein, at expense of creditors, to watch the collection of duty on their behalf. The issue of bonds for the new fund was fixed at forty million pesos, leaving an extorted gain for the treasury of nearly thirty millions. But several circumstances combined to interfere with the plan which aimed foremost at restoring the national credit, while relieving a burdened treasury. There was not a sufficient surplus from the indemnity to meet the demands assigned upon it by the funding law, and the prospect of guarantee for paying even the reduced interest appeared so slim that it assisted materially in raising a wide outcry against this partial repudiation of the debt. The proper step should have been to plan the reorganization of the finance department, notably by economic curtailments and establishing the necessary taxes for responding to the new funding law. Instead of this, a leap was made in the dark, with the result of exposing most glaringly the insolvent condition of the ​government. Under such circumstances and with the fear of future repudiation, such loud remonstrances were made by certain creditors, notably by the clergy and by foreigners under ministerial protection, that the plan had to be modified and infringed in a number of cases, thus defeating its main object.
As a means to enforce the reorganization of the treasury, and the reduction in expenses, a law of November 1849 limited the administrative expenses to $500,000 a month, whereof two thirds were for the war department. This involved a reduction on salaries of one fourth for officials in actual service, and one third for others, which in itself produced a pressure that caused the limit to be ignored and also an increased draft on the convenient United States indemnity money to cover the usual deficit, besides a continued anticipation of custom-house revenue, contrary to all intentions. One reason for the deficits lay in the tariff reductions and other charges imposed during the recent occupation, and which necessitated a subsequent corresponding abatement on the restored tariff ​of October 1845 of about forty per cent,owing to the mass of low-duty goods flooding the markets. The measure was also intended to counteract the ruinous contraband trade, facilitated more than ever by the Guadalupe treaty. A further reduction not being deemed advisable, the government was instructed to increase the revenue cruisers and coast guards; but lack of funds and official dishonesty rendered the order of little effect. Traders grew rich publicly by the traffic. Local authorities or conspirators would raise a dispute or pronounce, with a view to remove the federal officials, when the opportunity arose for obtaining large plunder; or they joined in favoring irregular importations at the ports, lest the treasury should lose all through smuggling.
The total estimated revenue for the year 1849-50 was $8,000,000, of which $3,500,000 came from import and export duties, and $1,000,000 from state contingents; while the expenditure was placed at $16,500,000, whereof $5,800,000 toward the debt and $7,600,000 for the war department, leaving a deficit of $8,500,000. For the following year the income and expenditure were placed at $9,000,000 and $20,300,000 respectively, showing a deficit of $11,300,000. These debit balances had to be met, the easiest ​way being to defer payment to creditors and withhold salaries, as we have seen; the next temporary relief was found in the ruinous method of mortgaging prospective revenue, and the most dreaded yet final recourse, in levying taxes and contributions at the risk of inviting fresh pronunciamientos. A few were imposed, such as a double quota from real estate and income within the federal district, and more pressing demands for state contingents. But what availed these — even with the addition of the accidental war indemnity — to provide for the demands of the reorganization, and offset the shrinkage in duty receipts and other sources? The perplexed ministers would make a superficial examination of the assets, clutch at more or less impracticable suggestions for banks and mints, hint at further curtailment of expenses, which they would never enforce, cast furtive glances at the tempting church estates, and then unfold a budget or project, roseate with plausible recommendations to brighten the actual dark picture. A more critical and prudent congress tore some projects into fragments as visionary, rejected others as doubtful or unpopular, and frittered away valuable time in discussing the remainder. A plan worthy of consideration was to induce the clergy by concessions to guarantee the new consolidated fund, and thereby connect them as well as the creditors more closely with the interests of the country; but they very naturally feared that this ​would only open the door for wider encroachments, and refused even to listen to it.
Finding their suggestions unappreciated, and without means to carry out the task intrusted to them, the finance ministers entered office and resigned in rapid succession, and it became difficult to induce any prominent and able man to accept a position so troublesome and thankless. In the ministries of relations and justice there were only four changes during the two years and a half of Herrera's administration, Lacunza, well known as lawyer and writer, holding the former portfolio for nearly two years, while General Arista, of whom the president stood in awe, retained the war department during the whole period, and used its resources with great success and for his own advancement, as will be seen.
In the proposed reorganization, the military department received an attention corresponding to its economic and political importance. At the close of the late war a general outcry rose against the army for its inefficiency, so utterly out of proportion to its enormous cost, its pompous assumption, and its readiness to create local disturbances and revolutions. What a contrast to the body of well-trained soldiers and ​veterans which entered Mexico in 1821 to affirm the independence, headed by officers who had been educated in military colleges, and developed under a system of slow and merited promotion, and fitted to hold its own against almost any opponents! Since then it had sunk into an instrument or accessory of factions, under the leadership of men who owed their advancement chiefly to intrigue; men wholly untrained and unfitted, who by heading or adhering to pronunciamientos had swung themselves from the position of sergeants to captains, colonels, and generals, and maintained the position by virtue of their influence over a certain number of followers, bribed or intimidated, and who now assisted to intimidate a weak government risen by the same process, and therefore dependent on the caprice of factions. Under such circumstances, merit was ignored, proving sometimes even an obstacle to success; and insubordination being thus fostered by extraordinary rewards, it naturally spread among the rank and file, to the general demoralization of the army. Embezzlement by officers, and a chronic poverty of the treasury, contributed greatly to this state of affairs, by driving a neglected and starving army to desperate acts. The service fell into such disrepute that recruits could not be obtained save by cruel impressment, chiefly of Indian peasantry, who with a natural distaste for the business had to be driven into battle and guarded in camp.
At the conclusion of the late campaign the government found that desertion had reduced the troops to small proportions, with an excess of officers, although a large number of them had, from a lack of faith in their courage or skill, sought safe retirement. The moment was favorable for reconstructing the army, since to abolish it, as some proposed, was out of the question, as the northern frontier was ever threatened by raiding Indians, to say nothing of the turbulent disposition of the people generally.
But apart from this circumstance, the necessity of ​a standing army which separates the soldiers from the citizens in a republic, for the maintenance of the internal peace, almost throws such a commonwealth out of the category of republic. A true republic implies the existence of a people capable of governing and defending themselves. A permanent army implies the inability of self-government, and the necessity of a standing menace to make the people behave.
In the United States the position of the soldier is below that of the average citizen; in Mexico it is far above. The poor people are exceedingly poor, ill fed and clothed, and worked like beasts of burden; hence the soldier will remain such as long as he can get his pay. And the ignorant and timid people must pay the cost of his support, while the high official alone commands his services. Having been kept so long under the yoke of a foreign despotism, its equivalent is continued now in the form of military rule, moral courage and independence in certain quarters are paralyzed, and there is presented this singular state of things, namely, a people with a representative government, nominally sustained by universal suffrage, held in helpless subjection by a one thousandth part of their number armed and organized.
By a law of November 4, 1848, the army was limited to 10,000 men, namely, 6,000 infantry, 1,800 cavalry, 1,800 artillery, and 400 sappers, all to be voluntarily enrolled, partly from old troops, and consequently with a higher rate of pay to secure them. The ​suppression of forced levies was applauded as in true consonance with republican institutions; yet so slow was the response of recruits that conscription had finally to be reintroduced in 1852, for up to that date less than half of the required 10,000 of regular troops had been enrolled. It required further reforms and time to restore the prestige of an institution injured by decades of abuse; for a number of obstacles stood still in the way, such as the stay of promotion from the ranks, which prevented ambitious men, the most desirable for soldiers, from enlisting. The reason for this rule lay partly in the desire to obtain more scientifically trained men for the command, partly in the wish to give preference in this direction to the large number of officers retired from the army under the new pruning operations, and to the aristocratic youth educated at the military college. So loud were the protests against this exclusion of commoners that even the war minister joined in opposing it, but in vain. Equally futile was the appeal from a host of neglected invalids, aged, disabled, or retired men and officers, who, under the sad condition of the finances, had to ​be disregarded in favor of the more imperative demands from the active army. Yet even the latter had frequently to suffer from the same cause, which thus tended to discourage enlistment. Artillerists and medical men were especially difficult to obtain.
A most important feature connected with the reorganization of the military department was the introduction of improved armament from France and Belgium, of which the report for 1851 announced the receipt of over 20,000 muskets alone. Foreign workmen and patent machinery were also brought for local gun factories, with a view to replace the artillery destroyed or carried off during the invasion. The fortresses and military stations, on the other hand, received little attention, mainly owing to the lack of funds, and partly because the late war had tended to diminish their importance, and so they remained for the most part half ruined and dismantled. Among the ideas adopted from abroad was the gymnastic evolution practised in the French army. The navy was in a more deplorable condition even than the fortifications; for in 1849 the republic possessed only one small vessel, a transformed trader; but a portion of the intended ​coast-guard fleet was on the stocks, and in 1851 the navy had with this indirect addition swollen to seven vessels, five of them manned by 133 sailors, besides an imposing staff of officers, and with 19 guns.
To compensate for the reduced strength of the regular army, greater attention was given to the militia, now divided into local and mobile, the former embracing all able Mexicans between the ages of 18 and 55, the latter composed of a proportion corresponding to six per mille of the population, and liable to serve beyond the state where enrolled, although not for a period exceeding six months. When leaving the place of residence for a day or more, the militia received the same pay as the regular troops, from state funds unless employed on federal service, in which case the state deducted their allowance from money due the supreme government. They were therefore entirely at the command of the states, and in sympathy with them, forming a powerful element for supporting demands against the federal authorities. The duty demanded even from the constantly employed mobiles, known also as the federal reserve army, was comparatively easy; especially as they were commanded by officers of their own election, and those who chose to enlist naturally preferred this service to the regular. Many states neglected to issue proper regulations for the militia, and but few chose to enforce them; so that great laxity prevailed, and this was increased by the loose character of the substitutes provided by those who could purchase exemption. A special allowance had to be made for equipping thirty-four companies of mobiles in the northern ​provinces, as a permanent supplement to the deficient regulars, for guarding the border and repelling Indian raids.
The northern frontier had become more than ever the object of anxious care, less because of the closer approximation of a feared neighbor than because of the growing inroads of wild Indians. The treaty of Guadalupe provided that the United States should assist in checking this evil, since the source of invasion lay within their territory; but the border was too extensive to be guarded in any adequate manner, and their efforts to suppress the turbulent savages only tended to drive them southward into the less protected Mexican provinces, where the superior arms furnished by unscrupulous United States traders gave them great advantages. Vast uninhabited tracts here favored them, and colonization had long suggested itself as a remedy; but who would settle in a country so subject to political disorders and civil war, so maleadministered and oppressed by arbitrary taxes and restrictions, where the enactments by one congress were on the morrow annulled by another, where lawlessness and insecurity went hand in hand? The inducements were slight, particularly when equally rich lands in the adjoining northern republic were offered free, with every advantage and protection. The efforts so far made in this direction had brought insignificant fruit; partly because of their spasmodic, illiberal, and inconsistent nature, and of the not unreasonable fears grown out of the Texan experiment. ​This lack of success suggested the planting of military colonies by the government, which were to serve also as bulwarks for other settlements. Recruits were received for a service of six years, after which they obtained a tract of land, together with certain privileges, as exemption from taxes and aid to till the soil and erect a home. The chronic lack of funds interfered as usual to prevent enthusiasm for the plan; and although a thousand recruits were sent to the front in 1849, with the full staff of inspectors, paymasters, and so forth, they formed rather flying or roaming columns than fixed settlers. In the ​following years, however, more funds were provided, and according to the report for 1851 some order had been introduced, so that half of the colonies could be regarded as founded and in a fair way of development, with settlers gathering around them, while the remainder stood provisionally organized; yet the total number of recruits was still less than half of the stipulated figure, and large stretches of frontier, some of ​the most exposed, remained unprotected. But it was expected that the military colonies would soon attract civil settlers, and as these grew stronger the former might push onward to form fresh outposts and nuclei for settlement. This expectation received an unlooked for and most welcome response in the application for land by several hundred Seminole and other peaceful agricultural Indians from the United States, who were received with open arms and rendered good service against savage invaders. A similar system of colonies was applied to maintain in subjection the rebellious Indians of Sierra Gorda, centring in Querétaro, and to set them a good example in agricultural development. Success attended both aims; and in 1851 there were three flourishing settlements, embracing 250 soldiers and over 2,200 other settlers, with schools and rapidly unfolding home comforts.
* ↑ El Universal, the ablest journal of the time at Mexico, advocated strongly the conservative, and less openly the monarchical, systems, and El Tiempo up held the latter without subterfuge; while El Monitor Republicano, although friendly to the prevailing republicanism, freely criticised the weakness of the government, a feature which proved the chief target for La Palanca and other minor sheets. A number of pamphlets appeared to the same end, Baz, for instance, corning out to refute articles of the Palanca, in Defensa, 1-12; Miscel., xii. pt 3. Mier discussed republicanism in Profeca Politica, 1-28; Pap. Var., xii. pt 11; and consolidation principles find support in Méx., Segund. Part. Consolid. Rep., i. 1 et seq. Comments on party strife in Repúb. Mex. Reseña, 1-80, with partisan views.
* ↑ Act of Feb. 14th. He must signify to the government his desire to return, and the congress would thereupon consider the request. Heraldo, Mar. 6, 1849. In Apunt. Hist., 1849, 1-12; Pap. Var., xli. pt 1, the agitation stoops to personalities.
* ↑ He declared that the resignation of Santa Anna should be considered void, and his term of office unexpired, owing to the absence of the congress at the time. Herrera should surrender the presidency to a person chosen by a council till Santa Anna could return and convoke a new congress. The army was to be fixed at 50,000 men. Marquez arrested General Guzman, his immediate chief.
* ↑ Among them Captain Tomás Mejía, later his companion in arms, yet formidable rival.
* ↑ From Col Vasquez, who besieged him at La Griega. He was arrested at Popotla, but released on presenting a pass signed by Bustamante. After this he went into hiding. Siglo XIX., for Feb. 1849.
* ↑ Los Reyes. General Uraga quarrelled with him, and withdrew his men from the city, leaving it exposed to the revolted Indians of the ranges.
* ↑ Under leadership of Flores. About the same time that he raised the standard of revolt, in June, a conspiracy was discovered at Orizaba. Three months later a man named Villalva made a call for Santa Anna at Cocula, troops of Izcúar displayed mutinous sentiments, and the natives of Tlascala rose against tax collectors. Details of these movements are given in Universal, Siglo XIX., etc., for June to Oct. 1849, passim.
* ↑ They appear to have been encouraged by a military outbreak at Temascaltepec and Sultepec under Zamudio and E. Leon, and Felipe Santiago figured as the chief leader among the score of villages which had rallied. Heraldo, Jan. 17, 19; Universal, June 26, 27, July 1, 1849. Allusions in Мéх., Меm. Рolit., 1850, 1-62, ар. 1-13; Revisor, Jan. 12, 1830, etc.
* ↑ Partly by seeking to substitute the vice-governor, Garcia. In this case, however, the governor had the people chiefly on his side, for the legislature was taking a course not wholly in accord with the constitution. Zacatecano, no. 118, etc.; Universal, Oct. 6, 8, 11, 23, 1849. There were troubles also in and round the federal district that called the attention of the government. Id., Sept. 10th, 25th, attended by an increase of the garrison. Méx., Legisl. Меј., 1849, 179.
* ↑ At Tulyahualco, close to the capital, Santanists ventured to excite race feeling, simply because an alcalde was objectionable. The attempt was promptly suppressed. Heraldo, Jan. 26, 1849.
* ↑ The decree declared further, in its 25 articles, that the government could not dispose without authorization of the indemnity due from the United States. The consolidation plan, to be presented within three months, embraced pensions, overdue salaries, mileage. All extra federal officials, known as agregados, auxiliaries and supernumeraries, were to be dismissed at once, and no money expended beyond the sums designated in the estimates, gratuities, extra allowances, and so forth being forbidden, as well as pay during absence. Arrangements must be made with creditors against the tobacco revenue for paying them from this branch alone. The excise, consumption, and municipal taxes in the federal district and territories should be replaced by direct contributions. All extra officers in the army and navy were to be given leave, without pay, unless they had served from 10 to 30 years, in which case the compensation would range from 1/1 to whole pay pensions, and montepío allowances being stopped, save for disabled men, Méx., Legisl. Mej., 1848, 162-8.
* ↑ By decree of Feb. 19, 1850, the government was authorized, in conjunction with a congressional committee, to arrange with the creditors. Méx., Legisl. Mej., 1850, 42-3.
* ↑ Embracing 25 per cent of the import duties, 75 per cent of the export duties from Pacific ports, and 5 per cent of those from the gulf. For the first six years the surplus from the assignments was to be applied to a sinking fund, and subsequently $250,000 a year should be remitted to redeem the bonds. Méx., Piezas Justific. Deuda Est., passim; Mex., Debt Rept, id.; Prieto, Informe Deuda Estran., 1-15. The ministerial reports in Méx., Mem. Hac., 1850 and 1851, Payno, Méx., Espos. Hac., 1-128, Murphy, Deuda Ester., contain full particulars of the transaction, which was effected on Oct. 14, 1850, and in the finance chapter of the next volume the history of the foreign debt will be reviewed. Manuel Payno deserves the credit which he claims for an arrangement which reduced this debt practically from 76 to 51 million pesos.
* ↑ Any surplus from the assignment was to be applied to increasing the interest at the half per cent every five years till it reached 5 per cent. All bonds must be exchanged for the new uniform issues, within six months for Mexico and twelve for foreign parts. Creditors who refused to accept this compromise would be disregarded for ten years, and so with non-classified credits. The discounts were applied as follows: Debts antedating the independence would lose 50 per cent of the capital and 80 of the interest; the twenty per cent bonds would lose the interest in arrear, and a million and a half of capital, receiving in compensation $500,000 from the U. S. indemnity of 1851 and 1852; the copper fund remained intact, and also the money loaned at not above legal interest, which was to be paid, half from the U. S. indemnity, half with bonds from the new fund; debts due to employés would be recognized for 80 per cent, if in the hands of the original claimant or his heirs, at 15 per cent if in the hands of speculators; debts due on administered property would receive 30 per cent from the indemnity and 70 in new bonds; the obligations of this class bearing interest were reduced to 6 per cent, of which only half would be paid with the new bonds; of the debt created during the forced occupation of the United States war, 40 per cent would be paid from the indemnity and 60 in new bonds; of the floating loans with obligations, 35 per cent would be settled with the indemnity, and the remainder entered into the new fund at par, the accrued interest was cancelled, the convention of two and one per cent would be liquidated by paying half of its interest with the indemnity of 1851 and 1852; of the convention of five per cent 40 per cent would be settled with indemnity money, and 60 with new bonds; the debt owing to wounded soldiers and benevolent institutions would enter at par into the new fund. Méx., Legisl. Mej., 1850, 233-60, with forms for new bonds, special instructions, etc. Another law of March 4, 1850, had classified the debts to be included in the funds under 17 headings. See Id., 47-8.
* ↑ The council was to consist of six members and a president, holding office for six years, with a salary of $4,000 and $6,000 respectively. They had also to take steps against contraband. Regulations for this body were issued on Dec. 9th. For committee reports, preliminary to the new fund law, see Méx., Dictámen Comis. Crédito Púb. en que se propone proyecto, 1849, 1-18; Id., Arreglo de Deuda, 74 and lxvii. pp; Id., Dictámen de la Mayoria, 1-41; Pap. Var., clxxxi. pt 4, ccvi., pts 1-3.
* ↑ According to the account of the exuberant Payno already referred to.
* ↑ This required $5,995,000, besides more than $400,000 a year, while the surplus from the U. S. indemnity amounted to little over $4,0Õ0,000, Esteva's Espos. of March 28, 1851, on which, for that matter, new assignments were being made. The amount of the debt has been underestimated through lack of proper data.
* ↑ Minister Esteva, who succeeded Payno for a brief period as finance minister, condemns the law as a blow against the national credit. 'La ley declaró la bancarota, si no total, á lo ménos parcialmente.' Espos., 9, Mar. 28, 1851. Payno naturally rose to defend the object of the plan. The consolidation into one fund would reveal the extent of the indebtedness and diminish much of the financial confusion, destroy the jealousy existing between different classes of creditors, procure gain for the treasury, throw into circulation a large amount of now hidden and useless money, and join personal with national interests. Mem. of June 30, 1852, 14-16. He deplores infringements on the plan.
* ↑ Instance law of May 19, 1852, Méx., Legisl. Mej., 1852, 112-17, which also imposes a contingent on the states to aid the fund. Hardly any of the foreign debts were properly left with the fund. The claims, for example, of Fort & Co. and Drusina, for about $1,200,000, were covered by an arrangement of Jan. 21, 1851, offering $300,000 from the U. S. indemnity, $600,000 from half of the tax on circulated and exported money, and the balance in the new bond. Rules for these foreign conventions in Convenciones Diplom., 1852, 1-31.
* ↑ Arrillaga, Recop., 1849, 163-6. The apportionment stood $333,333 for army and navy, $61,273 for treasury, $18,993 for justice, $53,810 for the relations department, $33,482 for the congress, and $2,250 for the executive.
* ↑ Which had been partly authorized by the above and other decrees. Concerning the payment of the indemnity, see U. S. Govt Doc., Cong. 31, Ses. 2, Sen. 31, iii; Id., Cong. 31, Ses. 1, Acts and Res., 79; Universal, Feb. 16, 20, 27, Маy 2, 1850, etc.; Мéх., Сol. Ley. у Dec., 1850, 113-14, 198; Id., Col. Ley., Dec. y Órd., 1850–1, i. 74-5.
* ↑ This was decreed on May 3, 1848, the new duty being 60 per cent of the 1845 tariff, with some exceptions gradually introduced. Méx., Leyisl. Mej., 1848, 128-9. The loss to the treasury in consequence was placed at nearly $2,000,000 in Peña y Cuevas' budget of Jan. 1849.
* ↑ Minister Elorriaga, indeed, urged greater reductions in the tariff as a check. Mem. of Feb. 12, 1850, 8-9.
* ↑ Placing two steamers and thirteen small vessels on the gulf and on the Pacific. The carrying-out of this measure was impeded by lack of funds as usual, save in a small degree. Arrillaga, Recop., 1849, 134-5.
* ↑ Supercargoes would detain vessels off the ports till they could obtain a reduction of duty, and this failing, the cargoes were landed on unfrequented parts of the coast, or on islands and introduced gradually. Honest officials were therefore often prejudicial to the interests of the government, as Minister Esteva confesses in his Memoria of Apr. 4, 1851, 100-2, addressed to the congress.
* ↑ For the preceding four years the income and expenditure stood at $10,700,000 and $25,200,000, $10,200,000 and $24,300,000, $10,400,000 and $21,600,000, $5,500,000 and $13,800,000, the last being for 1848-9. Méx., Presupuesto, 1849, 1-9; Méx., Breve Manif., 3-15; Méx., Mem. Hac., 1850, 127 pp.; Id., 1851, 1-18; Pap. Var., xxxi. pt 56, cxcii. pt 6; Economista, April, etc., 1849; Heraldo, Jan. 8, 1849.
* ↑ The former by decree of Oct. 6, 1848, the latter of April 10, 1851, demanding $790,000, whereof $100,000 each from Mexico and Guanajuato, $80,000 from Jalisco, $70,000 each from Puebla and Zacatecas; several states paid $10,000 and $6,000, and Colima ended the list with $3,000. Méx., Legisl. Mej., 1851, 11l-12. A decree of April 1849 admitted articles of food free into the north-east provinces, a concession which aided fraud.
* ↑ Piña y Cuevas urged strongly the establishment of a national bank, 'which would facilitate the disposal of two thirds of the revenue.' Espos. of Feb. 14, 1849, 3-4. It may be mentioned here that a bank of savings was opened in the Monte de Piedad pawn establishment. Arrillaga, Recop., 1849, 76-89. Concerning the extension of mints, see full report in Méx., Mem. Hac., 1849, 1-80, and suggestions in Méx. Mem., 47-52, in Doc. Mex., pt 4; Soc. Mex. Geog. Bolet., i. 177, 219. Instances of greater strictness with officials appear in Méx., Manif., 1849, 1-23; Pap. Var., xli. pt 5.
* ↑ As advocated by Esteva, Plan of Apr. 4, 1851, who proposed that new imposts for the interest of the fund should be intrusted to clerical control.
* ↑ From June 1848 till January 1851 there were 16 changes, 6 of them prɔvisional, and several made within a few days of the preceding. Among the ablest ministers figure Mariano Riva Palacio; Piña y Cuevas, the bank projector; Arrangoiz, a prominent conservative and later minister under Maximilian, and who, after his resignation in July 1849, accepted the embassy to France; Gutierrez, who had been long trained in the treasury; Manuel Payno, under whom the debts were refunded. He and Pia held the office for over 6 months. For dates and comments, see Méx., Legisl. Mej., 1848, 360, 379, 482; 1849, 54, 92, 177, 324-6; 1850, 158; Méx., Col. Ley. y Dec., 1848, 159, 361, 380, 481-2; 1850, 130-1, 143, 169; Id., Col. Ley., Deс. у Оrd., 1850-1, і. 90; Domenech, list. du Mех., iі. 230-3. 'Se dificulta extraordinariamente encontrar una persona honrada que quiere hacerse cargo del ministerio de hacienda.' Monitor Rep., Nov. 14, 1849. Arrangoiz admits that he did nothing important, and that under direction of Alaman and Peña y Peña. Méj., ii. 298; Universal, July 22, Aug. 2, 1849, Mar. 3, May 15, June 29, July 4-5, 1850; Heraldo, Jan. 1849, etc. For certain unsustained charges against ministry. Castillo, Sentenc. Absol., 1-18; Pap. Var., xii. pt 12.
* ↑ From May 1849 till Jan. 1851, preceded by Luis G. Cuevas and M. Otero, with Monasterio for provisional occupant. The other secretariate was managed successively by J. M. Jimenez and Marcelino Castañeda.
* ↑ Recruits were to be between 18 and 40 years of age, and without near relatives depending on them for support. Ten pesos were offered on enlisting, and the pay was fixed at $15 a month for infantry, $16 for cavalry, and $17 for artillerists and sappers, with an increase for certain classes in accordance with the regulations issued Dec. 1, 1847, sergeants receiving $26, $29, and $30, respectively, infantry captains $67, lieutenant-colonels $133, colonels $200, generals $333 and $417. The quota demanded in each state varied from 2,231 from Mexico, Tlascala, and the federal districts, to 104 from Tabasco, the northern states being called upon for a special proportionate enrolment for militia and military colonists, amounting to a little over 11/2 per mille of the population. Méx., Ley Nov. 4, 1848, sobre Ejército, 1-16; Méx., Legisl. Mej., 1848, 476-80; Arrillaga, Recop. Ley., Dec., Circ., 1-112. Preceding projects in Herrera, Proyecto Ejército, 1-72; Arista, Id., 1-21, ap. 1-15; Id., Refut., 1-44; Méx., Dictámen Ējército, 1-116; Pap. Var., lvi. pts 1-4, cciv. pt 1, ccxxiv. pt 8. See also detailed regulation of April 22, 1851, Méx., Col. Ley., Dec. y Órd., 1850, 288–321, with subdivisions, pay, etc.
* ↑ Regulation in decree of Feb. 28th. Méx., Legisl. Mej., 1852, 47-50. Preceding rules are found in Arrillaga, Recop., 1849, 90-1, 130-1, 148-9.
* ↑ The ministerial report of 1850 shows only 3,545 infantry and cavalry, Méx., Mem. Guer., 1850, doc. 10, while that of 1852, Id., 1852, doc. 12, has 4,400, or 5,320 short of the required 9,720, including officers. The total permanent army in 1850, including active militia, military colonists, and national guard paid by the federation, was 8,513, with a pay of $2,703,934, the total cost of the department for the year being $5,753,654. Id., 1851, docs 1-14.
* ↑ With two thirds pay. They numbered 839 at the close of 1849, and received $302,103 during the year. During the following year 81 more were retired, but 141 either died, withdrew, or were called into active service. Méx., Mem. Guer., 1850, 34, and doc. 22; 1851, 34.
* ↑ By decree of April 22, 1851, the college was assigned 16 guardians and instructors for 90 and odd alumni, at a cost of $54,748 a year, whereof the alumni were apportioned at the rate of $216 a year each. Four were to be annually sent to Europe. Méx., Col. Ley., Dec. y Órd., 1850, 209-10, 302-3; Colegio Mil., in Pap. Var., cciii. pt 14. Yet the condition of finances caused the neglect of the college, and but for private aid it might have been closed.
* ↑ A decree of 1853 confirms the restriction issued in 1847 and 1849. Méx., Mem. Guer., 1850, 22, etc. Instances of arguments of protests in Ordoñez, Opús., 1-82; Pap. Var., ccxxiv. pt 9. Richthofen, Rep. Mex., 424, 442, etc., approves the limitation, as may be supposed, from his German views of discipline.
* ↑ An officer's complaint in Argüelles, Anuncio, 1857; Pap. Var., ccvii. pt 12. Rules for monte pio and pensions. Arrillaga, Recop., 1849, 100, 114, 127-8, 143-4, 227-8; Méx., Legisl. Mej., 1849, 28–9, 186-7, 235-6, 369-70; 1850, 157-8; 1851, 53-64; 1852, 15-16, 108-9; Universal, Aug. 26, 1852, 3. It was proposed to abolish comandancias generales, but protests against the project found hearing. Ordoñez, Estincion Com. Gen., 1-11.
* ↑ Méx., Mem. Guer., 1852, 73-6, and doc. 6. Concerning the ordering of arms, see Arrillaga, Recop., 1849, 145; Id., Recop. Ley., Dec. y Circ., 123-4; Economista, May 2, 1849, etc.
* ↑ And text-books were issued to spread it. Officers were required to study topography. Méx., Legisl. Mej., 1850, 37-9; 1851, 11-13. Concerning the new regulations for the medical crops, see Méx., Col. Ley. y Dec., 1850, 102-5, 137-42; Id., Col. Ley., Dec. y Ord., 69-71, 85-9; Correo Nac., Oct. 23, 1848; Universal, Apr. 22, 1850. Military tribunals are considered in Маnif. Sup. Trib., 1-38; Méх., Doc. Jueces Мil., 1-43; Рар. Var., lxxxvii. pt 4, clxxxvi. pt 4; Suarez y Navarro, Discurso sobre Trib. Mil., 1-60; Miscel., xii. pt 1. Their code of procedure is given in Méx., Legisl. Mej., 1852, 201-2. Further general rules and orders in Méx., Leyisl. Mej., 1848, 361-2; 1850, 58-60, 114-18; 1851, 26-7, 50-3, 61-2, 74-83, 170-2, 235-69, 303-43B 1853, 335-46; Méx., Col. Ley., Dec. y Órd., 1850-1, 41-2, 79-82, 219-25, 236, 338-60. On the moral condition and influence of the army, see Rep. Mex., Lijera Reseña, 35 et seq. Mora has strong hostile views. Rev. Mex., i. 407-38.
* ↑ The total annual cost being $89,000. The fleet embraced a steamer, a brigantine, and five schooners, two in the Pacific, and another steamer was building at New York. Méx., Mem. Guer., 1850, 35; 1851, 37-8; 1852, 86-7.
* ↑ Law of July 15, 1848, Méx., Legisl. Mej., 1848, 240 et seq.; Guardia Nacional, Ley Orgán., 1-8. A report of Feb. 24, 1849, places the mobile force at 24,973. Apportionment in Méx., Legisl. Mej., 1849, 32-5. Other regulations, etc., in Id., 161-3, 175-7, 183-4, 237-8; Méx., Col. Ley. y Dec., 1848, 529-30; 1850, 82-3, 110-20, 300-1; Guardia Nac., ii. 44.
* ↑ This embraced the 7 northern states, of which Coahuila obtained 300 men, Durango 400, and the rest 200 each, at a total cost of $674,118 a year. Méx., Legisl. Mej., 1849, 218-22. Yet the necessary measures were hampered by a lack of funds. Méx., Mem. Guer., 1850, 14. The total militia employed by the federation, by list of Dec. 1851, numbered 6,983 men and 393 officers. Id., 1852, doc. 14.
* ↑ Concerning some recent efforts for French and other Latin immigration, see Mem. de Coloniz. é Indust., 1851, 3 et seq. A Spaniard named Mier y Teran obtained great praise for offering large tracts to this end. Monitor Rep., Feb. 28, 1850. He was shrewd enough to see that settlement would increase the value of his other land or his trade. Colony projects may be studied in Méx., Proyecto Coloniz., 1-12; Coloniz., Nuevo Proyecto., 1-19; Coloniz., Doc. que pub. la Direccion., 1848, 1-46; Pap. Var., cxiv. pt 5. Decree against illegal settlements. Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Mex., v. 572-3. The clergy naturally raised the objection of intolerance, which was maintained. Coloniz., Inconvenientes, 1-24; Pap. Var., xi. pt 5, cxiv. pt 4; Correo Nac., Aug. 18, 29, 1848.
* ↑ By decree of July 19, 1848, such colonies were ordered to be formed, at a cost not exceeding that of the presidio companies, created by law of March 23, 1826, and with all privileges that may be granted to colonists in general. To this end the northern frontier was divided into three sections, the Oriente, embracing Tamaulipas and Coahuila; the Chihuahua, for the state of this name; and the Occidente, including Sonora and Lower California. For gifts to friendly Indians $10,000 a year were assigned. Each section was placed under a colonel, as inspector, who must visit every colony at least once in two months. A lieut-col took charge of two to three colonies, as sub-inspector and jefe político subalterno, and a captain commanded at each settlement. The enlistment was voluntary, with a bounty of $10 for six years' service. At the end of this term the soldier might retire and settle on the land granted him, the grant being doubled for twelve years' service; no pension could be obtained. The land so given varied from half a fanega de sembradura to three fanegas. On planting a colony on tracts purchased from private owners or otherwise obtained, the recruits were to receive six months' pay in advance, and the necessary tools, beasts, and material for houses. Married settlers were exempted from every tax, even parochial. A justice of the peace in each colony had cognizance in first instance. Méx., Legisl. Mej., 1848, 261-9; Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Mex., v. 422-6, 747-50. Military colonies were proposed as early as 1828.
* ↑ Méx., Mem. Guer., 1850, 14-18, docs 3, 5. Of the recruits the Oriente, Chihuahua, and Occidente sections had 434, 296, and 340, respectively. The original plan called for 2,426 troops, whereof 1,751 cavalry, with 3,502 horses and 49 cannon, the pay list being estimated at $717,572, of which the officers took $211,000. Of the 18 colonies there were to be 3 in Tamaulipas, 4 in Coahuila, 5 in Chihuahua, 5 in Sonora, and 1 in Lower California. A number of suggestions appeared for promoting their formation and efficiency. Colonias Milit., 1848, 1-6; Id., Proyecto, 1-4, and docs; Plan para Defensa, 9, etc.; Pap. Var., lxxxix. pts 9-11; and a law was issued April 24, 1849, appointing a council of two members of congress, from the states suffering under Indian raids, to frane a plan for defence. Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Mex., v. 551-2; Escudero, Not. Son., 80-1; Universal, Aug. 12, Sept. 23, Oct. 6, 1849. Rules for the colonies, in Méx., Legisl. Mej., 1849, 154-6, 184-5; 1850, 136; 1851, 342; 1853, 347-53. Comments in Sartorius, Import. Mex., 26, 32, etc.
* ↑ 47 The 18 colonies counted 1,093 men and 140 officers, including chaplains, thus lacking 1,333 men and 51 officers. The Oriente frontier, which extended for 170 leagues, was less exposed along the lower or eastern half, owing to the growing river traffic and settlement on both banks of the Rio Grande del Norte. The most easterly colony was therefore Monterey, located at Paso de Piedra, nearly opposite Laredo of Texas, on May 15, 1850. Above this followed Pan, provisionally placed at Lampazos; Rio Grande, located on Feb. 26, 1850, at Mision Nueva, 21 leagues above; Guerrero, placed provisionally on July 19, 1859, at Piedras Negras, 14 leagues above, and opposite Fort Duncan of Texas; Monclova Viejo, located on August 1, 1850, at Moral, 8 leagues above; San Vicente, located at Agua Verde, 10 leagues above, after a provisional stay at Santa Rosa. The seventh colony, Camargo, not being required lower down the river, as originally proposed, a place was sought for it above the preceding, and as the great ford for Indian raiders lay at Paso de los Chizos, not far above the mouth of Rio Puerco, it was intended to move to this region also the Guerrero colony. At San Cárlos, founded in July 1850 at the ancient presidio, began the Chihuahua line of colonies, to cover a frontier of 160 leagues, behind which extended an area of 17,000 square leagues, with a scanty population of 150,000. Above this, near the mouth of Rio de Conchos, lay the old Presidio del Norte, and this point was also retained for the colony of the same name, founded in May 1850; while southward, along the Conchos and Florido, three military outposts were proposed, at Las Babizas, La Cruz, and Punta de la Agua (sic), to guard against Indians. Pilares was established at the same time near Vado de Piedra, 14 leagues above, and 47 leagues intervened between it and the next colony, El Paso, 14 leagues east of the town of Paso del Norte, which forms the gateway to New Mexico. It was founded on Dec. 15, 1849, close to the civil colony of Guadalupe, composed of emigrants from the north side of the river. The fifth colony of Janos was placed provisionally at the presidio of the same name, 70 leagues from Pilares. On both sides, therefore, of El Paso were long stretches of border requiring more protection, one station being proposed for Pilares, a point between Vado de Piedra and Paso del Norte, and others for Sierra de la Florida, Ojo de las Vacas, and the mining camp of Santa Rita del Cobre, west of Paso del Norte. The Occidente frontier was still more extensive, and guarded so far by presidio companies, which stood on the point of abandoning their posts, when in Jan. 1851 the inspector arrived with reënforcements of men and means, and established the six colonies provisionally at the old presidios of Babispe, Fronteras, Santa Cruz, Tucson, Altar, and Santo Tomás mission, the latter in Lower California, along an irregular line that rarely approaches the border. Few of these locations were promising, and it was proposed to move Santa Cruz 12 leagues eastward to San Pedro hacienda, whose owner offered good land, Tucson to Tabaco, Altar to Tres Álamos, 30 leagues from San Pedro, and the one in Lower California to Santa Catalina. For details see reports incorporated in Méx., Mem. Guer., 1850, 14 et seq.; Id., 1851, 15-39; Id., 1852, 35-63, with documents and maps. A portion of this reproduced in Dicc. Univ., ii. 450-4. Rules and provisions. Méx., Legisl. Mej., 1850, 199–205, etc.; Méx., Col. Ley. y Dec., 1850, i. 138-42. For further authorities and particulars, I refer to Hist. North Mex. States, ii., this series.
* ↑ The applicants consisted of 309 Seminoles, Quicapos, and Mascogos, including families. The Quicapos alone deserted. Derecho Intern. Mex., iii. 496-9.
* ↑ The three colonies were Santa Rosa Uraga, established in June 1851 near Iacala, and numbering at the end of the year 438 souls; Arista, founded in April 1851, near Jalpan, and numbering 450 souls; San Ciro de Albercas, 20 leagues from Arista and 14 from Rio Verde, founded a little earlier and containing 1,603 persons. They were known as the Mexico, Querétaro, and San Luis Potosí colonies, respectively; a fourth was needed in the Guanajuato part of the mountains to complete the line. Méx., Mem. Guer., 1850, 18-19, docs 6-7; Id., 1851, 25-6, doc. 5; Id., 1852, 58-63, docs 3-4. They were established in accordance with a decree of Oct. 26, 1849. Méx., Legisl. Mej., 1849, 275-89. Further regulations in Id., 1851, 269-76; 183, 355-68; Arrilaga, Recop., 1849-50, 152-9; Mil., Reglam., 1-15. The decree of July 25, 1851, for placing four colonies on the Isthmus of Tehuantepec, was hampered by a lack of funds and by local outbreaks. Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Mex., vi. 101-5; Méx., Reglam. Colon. Mil., 1-31; Pap. Var., cxiv. pt 8; Universal, Oct. 14, 1849.