# Jay v. Boyd/Dissent Douglas

* Court Documents
* Case Syllabus
* Opinion of the Court
* Dissenting Opinions Warren Black Frankfurter Douglas
United States Supreme Court
351 U.S. 345
Cecil Reginald Jay, v. John P. Boyd.
No. 503. Argued: May 3, 1956. --- Decided: June 11, 1956.
Mr. Justice DOUGLAS, dissenting.
The statement that President Eisenhower made in 1953 on the American code of fair play is more than interesting Americana. As my Brother FRANKFURTER says, it is Americana that is highly relevant to our present problem. The President said: 'In this country, if someone dislikes you, or accuses you, he must come up in front. He cannot hide behind the shadow. He cannot assassinate you or your character from behind, without suffering the penalties an outraged citizenry will impose.'
That bit of Americana is relevant here because we have a question as to what a 'hearing' is in the American meaning of the word. Fairness, implicit in our notions of due process, requires that any 'hearing' be full and open with an opportunity to know the charge and the accusers, to reply to the charge, and to meet the accusers. And when Congress provides for a hearing, as it implicitly has in § 244 of the present Act, it should be assumed that Congress has the same lively sense of the requirements of fair play as the Eisenhower code demands.
The philosophy of the full hearing, especially as it involves the right to meet the accusers, has been put in classical words by Professor Zechariah Chafee, Jr., in his recent book The Blessings of Liberty (1956), p. 35:
'One important benefit from confronting the suspect with his accusers is the opportunity to cross-examine them and rigorously test any dubious statement. As old Sir Matthew Hale says, it 'beats and boults out the truth much better.' Add to that the old-fashioned value of putting people face to face out in the open. Accusers who secretly confer in private with an official or two and a couple of clerks may, as in Hale's time, 'oftentimes deliver that which they will be ashamed to testify publicly.' An honest witness may feel quite differently when he has to repeat his story looking at the man whom he will harm greatly by distorting or mistaking the facts. He can now understand what sort of human being that man is. As for the false witness, the tribunal can learn ever so much more by looking at him than by reading an F.B.I. abstract of his story. The pathological liar and the personal enemy can no longer hide behind a piece of paper.'
And see Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331, 350—352, 75 S.Ct. 790, 799, 800, 99 L.Ed. 1129; O'Brian, National Security and Individual Freedom (1955), pp. 61—63.
Harry P. Cain, member of the Subversive Activities Control Board, recently joined the President in endorsing this code of fair play:
'In all of our traditional efforts to protect the individual against oppression and false conviction by the state, we have relied basically and primarily on confrontation and cross-examination. By no other means can those who must judge their fellow man minimize to the fullest and desired extent the mistakes which humans make. Without recourse to these means, it is impossible for anyone accused of anything to protect himself fully against enemies whose evidence may consist of nothing more than malice, vindictiveness, mistaken identity, intolerance, prejudice, or a perverted desire to destroy.'
A hearing is not a hearing in the American sense if faceless informers or confidential information may be used to deprive a man of his liberty. That kind of hearing is so un-American that we should lean over backwards to avoid imputing to Congress a purpose to sanction it under § 244.

## Notes

* ↑ The entire statement made at the B'Nai B'Rith Dinner in Washington, D.C., November 23, 1953, reads as follows:
* ↑ Address before New York Civil Liberties Union, New York City, February 22, 1956.
This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
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