# The Proletarian Revolution in Russia/Part 3/Chapter 8

Published in Rabochy Put No. 10, September 27 (14), 1917. Also titled "One of the Radical Questions of the Revolution" or "One of the Fundamental Questions of the Revolution"
VIII
ALL POWER TO THE SOVIETS!
(Lenin)
The most important problem in every revolution is the problem of state power. In whose hands is this power—that is decisive in all things. And if Dyelo Naroda, the newspaper of the main government party in Russia, the Social-Revolutionary Party, complains as it did recently that while arguing about power the question of bread is forgotten,—then this is their answer: You have yourselves to blame, since it is precisely the hesitation and indecision of your party, more than anything else, that is to blame both for the ministerial delays and the never-ending postponements of the Constituent Assembly; you are to blame for the dropping of the decisive measures to establish state monopoly of bread, thus destroying the country's chances of obtaining bread.
The problem of power can not be set aside or evaded, as that is precisely the fundamental question determining all conditions in the development of the Revolution, in its external and internal policies. That six months of our Revolution have been "spent in vain" hesitating about the arrangements of power is a fact which one can't argue about; it is a fact determined by the hesitating policy of these parties that was, in the long run, defined by the class position of the petite bourgeoisie and its economic instability in the struggle between proletariat and bourgeoisie.
The whole question now is this: Has the petit bourgeois democracy learned anything during these six vital months of the Revolution, or has it not? If not, then the Revolution is doomed, and only the victorious uprising of the proletariat can save it. If yes, then it is necessary to begin anew with the immediate creation of a stable power and end the period of vacillation.
In a popular revolution, that is, a revolution brought about by the masses, the majority of workers and peasants, the only power that can be permanent and decisive is a power based consciously and without reservation on the majority of the people. Up until ​this time the government power in Russia has been, in fact, and still is, in the hands of the bourgeoisie, which is obliged only to make private concessions (and taking them back the very next day), to issue promise after promise, to fool the people with the semblance of an "honest coalition," etc. In words, the government is popular, democratic, revolutionary; in deeds it is against the people, anti-democratic, counter-revolutionary, bourgeois. This is the contradiction prevailing in the government, and which is the source of the complete instability and vacillation of power, the source of the "ministerial leap-frog game" which Messrs. the Social-Revolutionists and Mensheviki played, with, for the people, such an unfortunate zeal.
Either the dissolution of the Soviets and their inglorious death, or all power to the Soviets,—that is what I said before the All-Russian Congress of Soviets early in June and the history of July and August unqualifiedly confirm the accuracy of my contention.
"Power to the Soviets" alone can make power stable, permanent, because based consciously on the majority of the people, in spite of how the lackeys of the bourgeoisie, Potresof, Plekhanov, etc., may lie and declaim that an actual handing over of power to an insignificant minority of the people, the bourgeoisie, the exploiters, is really a "broadening of the basis" of power. Only the Soviet power can be a stable power, it alone could not be overthrown even in the most stormy period of our stormy revolution, only this power could assure a constant and broad development of the Revolution and the peaceful party struggles within the Soviets. Until all power is in the Soviet, indecision, instability and hesitation are inevitaible, never-ceasing "crises of power," the inescapable comedy of the "ministerial leap-frog game," explosions from the right and the left, etc.
But the slogan, "Power to the Soviets" is, very often, if not in the most cases, absolutely misunderstood in the sense of "a ministry of the parties of the Soviet majority." This profoundly erroneous view requires consideration in detail.
A "ministry of the parties of the Soviet majority" means simply a change in the personnel of the ministry, with the retention and inviolability of the old apparatus of government power, an apparatus thoroughly bureaucratic and unable to carry out serious reforms which are of importance even in the programs of the Social-Revolutionists and Mensheviki.
"Power to the Soviets" means a radical and complete change in the old government apparatus, a bureaucratic apparatus choking the expression of democracy. This apparatus must be abolished ​and one truly democratic must be substituted,—the popular apparatus of the Soviet, an organized and armed majority of the people, workers, soldiers and peasants. The Soviet state would assure and deepen the initiative and independence of the people; the people would actually express their initiative, not only in the election of delegates, but in the management of the government and in the work of re-organization and reform.
To make this point of difference clearly evident, let us remind you of a very valuable confession made some time ago by Dyelo Naroda, the organ of the government party, the Social-Revolutionary Party. Even in those ministries, wrote that paper, which contain Socialist ministers, the whole apparatus of government remains antiquated and hinders all work. Quite right. The whole history of bourgeois parliamentary, and in more significant measure of bourgeois constitutional countries, proves that a change of ministers means very little, as the actual work of government is in the hands of a gigantic army of bureaucrats. And this, army is permeated through and through with an anti-democratic spirit, bound up by thousands and millions of threads with landowners and capitalists, and dependent upon them in all ways. This army is in an atmosphere of bourgeois relations and breathes this atmosphere; it has become rigid and has not the power to escape—it is unable to think, feel and act other than in the old manner. This bureaucratic army is enslaved by considerations of rank and precedence, of respect for the well-known privileges of "government" service. The upper layers of this army, by means of stocks and banks, are completely subservient to financial capital, and, moreover, themselves furnish to a certain extent agents and promoters of the interests and influence of financial capital.
To attempt, by means of this government apparatus, to introduce such reorganization as the abolition of private ownership of land, without re-purchase, or a state monopoly of bread, etc., is the greatest illusion, the greatest self-deception and deception of the masses. This apparatus can serve the republican bourgeoisie to create a republic in the sense of "a monarchy without a monarch," as the Third Republic of France; but it is absolutely unfit to introduce reforms, not to abolish, but simply to seriously repress and limit the rights of capital, the rights of "sacred private property."
The inevitable outcome of "coalition" ministries, therefore, participated in by Socialists, is that these Socialists, even under absolutely conscientious agreement of individual members of their class, become in fact empty ornaments or screens of the bourgeois ​government, buffers against the indignation of the masses against the government, instruments of deception of the masses. It was so with Louis Blanc in 1848; so it has been dozens of times since then, in England and France, when Socialists participated in the ministry; so it has been with Chernov and Tseretelli; so it has been and so it will be as long as the bourgeois system remains and the old bureaucratic apparatus of government is preserved intact.
The Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Delegates are especially valuable in that they represent a new, immeasurably higher and incomparably more democratic type of government. Social-Revolutionists and Mensheviki have done all that was possible and impossible to turn the Soviets (especially the Petrograd Soviet and the Central Executive Committee of the All-Russian Soviets,) into empty talking machines, occupied under the guise of "control" in the promulgation of impotent resolutions and desires, which the government postpones until doomsday with a most courteous and polite smile.
But there was quite enough of the "fresh wind" of Kornilovism, promising a good storm, to blow away everything musty in the Soviet. The initiative of the revolutionary masses began to proclaim itself as something great, mighty and invincible. Let those of little faith learn from this historical example. Let those be ashamed who say: "We have not the means to change the old, oppressive government apparatus, which necessarily inclines to defend the bourgeoisie." The means exist—the Soviets. Don't be afraid of the initiative and independence of the masses. Trust yourself to the revolutionary organization of the masses, and you will behold in all fields of government activity an expression of the imposing power and invincible will of the workers and peasants. Distrust of the masses, fear of their initiative and independence, is directly counter-revolutionary.
"Power to the Soviets" alone can break the opposition of the landowners and capitalists; an opposition that also realizes itself in the government of Kerensky (a government, in fact, absolutely bourgeois and Bonapartist), and in the direct and indirect pressure of Russian and "allied" financial capital.
Audacity and resolution were lacking in our government through all its changes of personnel. Revolutionary democracy ought not to wait; it should itself take the initiative and act efficiently to end the economic chaos. If they are necessary anywhere, then firmness of course, audacity and decisive power are necessary here. The truth is the truth—these are golden words. But the question of ​firmness of course, audacity and resolution, is not a personal question: it is a question of the class which is capable of showing courage and decision. That class is the proletariat, and the proletariat alone. Courage and resolution, firmness of course and power, mean nothing else than the dictatorship of the proletariat and of the poorest peasants.
Just what would such a dictatorship mean? Simply that the opposition of counter-revolutionary Kornilovism would be broken, and the democratization of the army re-established and perfected. Of the soldiers, 99 per cent would be enthusiastic participants in such a dictatorship two days after its establishment. The dictatorship would give the land to the peasants and full power to the local peasant committees. How can one in his senses doubt the fact that the peasants would support a dictatorship of the proletariat? That which the Social-Revolutionist, Pyeshekhonov, simply promised, "the opposition of the capitalists is broken: (the exact words of Pyeshekhonov in his celebrated speech before the Congress of Soviets) would be really accomplished by this dictatorship, would be translated into reality, without in any way pushing aside the already developing democratic organizations for the control of production, of the food supply, of administration, etc. On the contrary, a dictatorship of the proletariat would support and strengthen these organizations, brushing aside all obstacles to their work. Only this dictatorship of the proletariat and poorest peasants is capable of destroying the opposition of the capitalists, of actively displaying marvels of courage and stability of power, of securing a triumphant and unlimited, truly heroic support of the masses, both in the army and among the peasants.
Power to the Soviets—that alone can assure the further development of the Revolution, in accordance with the experience and decisions of the majority of the masses.
Power to the Soviets signifies the complete handing over of the government and the control of its functions to the workers and peasants, whom no one would dare oppose; a government of the Soviets, which would quickly learn by experience and its own practice to distribute land, products and bread.