# City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.

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City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) is a U.S. Supreme Court case involving discrimination against the mentally retarded. In 1980, Cleburne Living Center, Inc. (CLC) submitted a permit application seeking approval to build a group home for the mentally retarded. The city of Cleburne, Texas refused to grant CLC a permit on the basis of a municipal zoning ordinance. CLC then sued the City of Cleburne on the theory that the denial of the permit violated the Equal Protection rights of CLC and their potential residents. Applying rational basis review the U.S. Supreme Court struck down the ordinance as applied to CLC. The Court declined to rule that the mentally retarded were a quasi-suspect or suspect class.

## Concurring Opinion

    Stevens

## Concurrence/Dissent

    Marshall
Supreme Court of the United States
473 U.S. 432
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.
Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
No. 84-468 Argued: March 18, 1985; Reargued April 23, 1985 --- Decided: July 1, 1985
Respondent Cleburne Living Center, Inc. (CLC), which anticipated leasing a certain building for the operation of a group home for the mentally retarded, was informed by petitioner city that a special use permit would be required, the city having concluded that the proposed group home should be classified as a "hospital for the feebleminded" under the zoning ordinance covering the area in which the proposed home would be located. Accordingly, CLC applied for a special use permit, but the City Council, after a public hearing, denied the permit. CLC and others (also respondents here) then filed suit against the city and a number of its officials, alleging that the zoning ordinance, on its face and as applied, violated the equal protection rights of CLC and its potential residents. The District Court held the ordinance and its application constitutional. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that mental retardation is a "quasi-suspect" classification; that, under the applicable "heightened-scrutiny" equal protection test, the ordinance was facially invalid because it did not substantially further an important governmental purpose; and that the ordinance was also invalid as applied.
Held:
1. The Court of Appeals erred in holding mental retardation a quasi-suspect classification calling for a more exacting standard of judicial review than is normally accorded economic and social legislation. Pp. 439-447.
(a) Where individuals in a group affected by a statute have distinguishing characteristics relevant to interests a State has the authority to implement, the Equal Protection Clause requires only that the classification drawn by the statute be rationally related to a legitimate state interest. When social or economic legislation is at issue, the Equal Protection Clause allows the States wide latitude. Pp. 439-442.
(b) Mentally retarded persons, who have a reduced ability to cope with and function in the everyday world, are thus different from other persons, and the States' interest in dealing with and providing for them is plainly a legitimate one. The distinctive legislative response, both national and state, to the plight of those who are mentally retarded demonstrates not only that they have unique problems, but also that the lawmakers have been addressing their difficulties in a manner that belies a continuing antipathy or prejudice and a corresponding need for more intrusive oversight by the judiciary than is afforded under the normal equal protection standard. Moreover, the legislative response, which could hardly have occurred and survived without public support, negates any claim that the mentally retarded are politically powerless in the sense that they have no ability to attract the attention of the lawmakers. The equal protection standard requiring that legislation be rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose affords government the latitude necessary both to pursue policies designed to assist the retarded in realizing their full potential, and to freely and efficiently engage in activities that burden the retarded in what is essentially an incidental manner. Pp. 442-447.
2. Requiring a special use permit for the proposed group home here deprives respondents of the equal protection of the laws, and thus it is unnecessary to decide whether the ordinance's permit requirement is facially invalid where the mentally retarded are involved. Although the mentally retarded, as a group, are different from those who occupy other facilities--such as boarding houses and hospitals--that are permitted in the zoning area in question without a special permit, such difference is irrelevant unless the proposed group home would threaten the city's legitimate interests in a way that the permitted uses would not. The record does not reveal any rational basis for believing that the proposed group home would pose any special threat to the city's legitimate interests. Requiring the permit in this case appears to rest on an irrational prejudice against the mentally retarded, including those who would occupy the proposed group home and who would live under the closely supervised and highly regulated conditions expressly provided for by state and federal law. Pp. 447-450.
726 F.2d 191, affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded.
White, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Powell, Rehnquist, Stevens, and O'Connor, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Burger, C. J., joined, post, p. 451. Marshall, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part, in which Brennan and Blackmun, JJ., joined, post, p. 455.
Earl Luna reargued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Robert T. Miller, Jr., and Mary Milford.
Renea Hicks reargued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Diane Shisk and Caryl Oberman.

#### Notes

* ↑ . Solicitor General Lee, Assistant Attorney General Reynolds, Deputy Solicitor General Fried, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Cooper, and Walter W. Barnett filed a brief for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the State of Connecticut et al. by Joseph I. Lieberman, Attorney General of Connecticut, Elliot F. Gerson, Deputy Attorney General, and Henry S. Cohn, Assistant Attorney General, John Steven Clark, Attorney General of Arkansas, John K. Van de Kamp, Attorney General of California, Duane Woodard, Attorney General of Colorado, Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General of Illinois, Jill Wine-Banks, Solicitor General, and Robert J. Connor, Special Assistant Attorney General, William J. Guste, Jr., Attorney General of Louisiana, and Robert A. Barnett, Assistant Attorney General, Nicholas J. Spaeth, Attorney General of North Dakota, Arlene Violet, Attorney General of Rhode Island, W. J. Michael Cody, Attorney General of Tennessee, and Charles G. Brown, Attorney General of West Virginia; for the State of Maryland by Stephen H. Sachs, Attorney General, Dennis M. Sweeney, Deputy Attorney General, and Judith K. Sykes, Assistant Attorney General; for the State of Pennsylvania et al. by LeRoy S. Zimmerman, Attorney General of Pennsylvania, Allen C. Warshaw, Chief Deputy Attorney General, and Andrew S. Gordon, Senior Deputy Attorney General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Thomas J. Miller of Iowa, Frank J. Kelley of Michigan, Hubert H. Humphrey III of Minnesota, Stephen E. Merrill of New Hampshire, Irwin I. Kimmelman of New Jersey, Anthony J. Celebrezze, Jr., of Ohio, and Bronson C. La Follette of Wisconsin; for the State of Texas et al. by Jim Mattox, Attorney General of Texas, David R. Richards, J. Patrick Wiseman, and James C. Todd and Philip Durst, Assistant Attorneys General; for the American Association on Mental Deficiency et al. by James W. Ellis, Ruth A. Luckasson, Stanley S. Herr, and Donald N. Bersoff; for the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation et al. by Burt Neuborne, Charles S. Sims, Robert M. Levy, Paul Hoffman, Stanley Fleishman, Joseph Lawrence, James Preis, and James C. Harrington; for the Association for Retarded Citizens/USA et al. by Thomas K. Gilhool, Frank J. Laski, Michael Churchill, and Timothy M. Cook; for the Disability Rights Education and Defense Fund by Arlene Brynne Mayerson; for Disabled Peoples' International and Human Rights Advocates, Inc., by Karen Parker; and for the National Conference of Catholic Charities et al. by Lewis Golinker, Herbert Semmel, and Kathleen E. Surgalla.
Elliott W. Atkinson, Jr., filed a brief for the Federation of Greater Baton Rouge Civic Associations, Inc., as amicus curiae.
This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
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