# Epictetus, the Discourses as reported by Arrian, the Manual, and Fragments/Book 2/Chapter 2

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CHAPTER II
On tranquillity
Consider, you who are going to court, what you wish to maintain and wherein you wish to succeed; for if you wish to maintain freedom of moral purpose in its natural condition, all security is yours, every facility yours, you have no trouble. For if you are willing to keep guard over those things which are under your direct authority and by nature free, and if you are satisfied with them, what else do you care about? For who is master of them, who can take them away from you? If you wish to be self-respecting and honourable, who is it that will not allow you? ​If you wish not to be hindered nor compelled, what man will compel you to desire what does not seem to you to be desirable, to avoid what you do not feel should be avoided? Well, what then? $^5$The judge will do some things to you which are thought to be terrifying; but how can he make you try to avoid what you suffer? When, therefore, desire and aversion are under your own control, what more do you care for? This is your introduction, this the setting forth of your case, this your proof, this your victory, this your peroration, this your approbation.
That is why Socrates, in reply to the man who was reminding him to make preparation for his trial, said, "Do you not feel, then, that with my whole life I am making preparation for this?"—"What kind of preparation?"—"I have maintained," says he, "that which is under my control."—"How then?"—"I have never done anything that was wrong either in my private or in my public life." $^{10}$But if you wish to maintain also what is external, your paltry body and your petty estate and your small reputation, I have this to say to you: Begin this very moment to make all possible preparation, and furthermore study the character of your judge and your antagonist. If you must clasp men's knees, clasp them; if you must wail, then wail; if you must groan, then groan. For when you subject what is your own to externals, then from henceforth be a slave, and stop letting yourself be drawn this way and that, at one moment wishing to be a slave, at another not, but be either this or that simply and with all your mind, either a free man or a slave, either educated or uneducated, either a spirited fighting cock or a spiritless one, ​either endure to be beaten until you die, or give in at once. Far be it from you to receive many blows and yet at the last give in! But if that is disgraceful, begin this very moment to decide the question, "Where is the nature of good and evil to be found? Where truth also is. Where truth and where nature are, there is caution; where truth is, there is confidence, where nature is."
$^{15}$Why, do you think that if Socrates had wished to maintain his external possessions he would have come forward and said, "Anytus and Meletus are able indeed to kill me, but they cannot harm me"? Was he so foolish as not to see that this course does not lead to that goal, but elsewhere? Why is it unreasonable, then, to add also a word of provocation? Just as my friend Heracleitus, who had an unimportant lawsuit about a small piece of land in Rhodes; after he had pointed out the justice of his claim he went on to the peroration in which he said, "But neither will I entreat you, nor do I care what your decision is going to be, and it is you who are on trial rather than I." And so he ruined his case. What is the use of acting like that? Merely make no entreaties, but do not add the words "Yes, and I make no entreaties," unless the right time has come for you, as it did for Socrates, deliberately to provoke your judges. If you, for your part, are preparing a peroration of that sort, why do you mount the platform at all, why answer the summons? $^{20}$For if you wish to be crucified, wait and the cross ​will come; but if reason decides that you should answer the summons and do your best to have what you say carry conviction, you must act in accordance therewith, but always maintaining what is your own proper character.
Looked at in this way it is also absurd to say, "Advise me." What advice am I to give you? Nay, say rather, "Enable my mind to adapt itself to whatever comes." Since the other expression is just as if an illiterate should say, "Tell me what to write when some name is set me to write." For if I say, "Write Dio," and then his teacher comes along and sets him not the name "Dio," but "Theo," what will happen? What will he write? But if you have practised writing, you are able also to prepare yourself for everything that is dictated to you; if you have not practised, what advice can I now offer you? For if circumstances dictate something different, what will you say or what will you do? $^{25}$Bear in mind, therefore, this general principle and you will not be at a loss for a suggestion. But if you gape open-mouthed at externals, you must needs be tossed up and down according to the will of your master. And who is your master? He who has authority over any of the things upon which you set your heart or which you wish to avoid.
* ↑ A somewhat free version of what Xenophon records in his Apology, 2 f.
* ↑ These last three sentences make no satisfactory sense in themselves, and none of the numerous emendations which have been offered seem convincing, while at the same time they interrupt the course of the argument where they stand. It would appear, as Schenkl suggests, that they constitute a seriously mutilated section of the preceding chapter (possibly from the very end), which by some accident has become imbedded in an alien context.
* ↑ That is, it is a sheer waste of effort to speak in so provocative a manner as to invite condemnation. If that is what you wish, simply do nothing at all and you will gain your end.