# Report of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives: Impeachment of Donald J. Trump, President of the United States/Article I: Abuse of Power

Article I: Abuse of Power
I.The First Article of Impeachment
The Constitution provides that the House of Representatives "shall have the sole Power of Impeachment" and that the President "shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors". In his conduct of the office of President of the United States—and in violation of his constitutional oath faithfully to execute the office of President of the United States and, to the best of his ability, preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States, and in violation of his constitutional duty to take care that the laws be faithfully executed—Donald J. Trump has abused the powers of the Presidency, in that:
Using the powers of his high office, President Trump solicited the interference of a foreign government, Ukraine, in the 2020 United States Presidential election. He did so through a scheme or course of conduct that included soliciting the Government of Ukraine to publicly announce investigations that would benefit his reelection, harm the election prospects of a political opponent, and influence the 2020 United States Presidential election to his advantage. President Trump also sought to pressure the Government of Ukraine to take these steps by conditioning official United States Government acts of significant value to Ukraine on its public announcement of the investigations. President Trump engaged in this scheme or course of conduct for corrupt purposes in pursuit of personal political benefit. In so doing, President Trump used the powers of the Presidency in a manner that compromised the national security of the United States and undermined the integrity of the United States democratic process. He thus ignored and injured the interests of the Nation.
President Trump engaged in this scheme or course of conduct through the following means:
(1) President Trump—acting both directly and through his agents within and outside the United States Government—corruptly solicited the Government of Ukraine to publicly announce investigations into—
(A) a political opponent, former Vice President Joseph R. Biden, Jr.; and
(B) a discredited theory promoted by Russia alleging that Ukraine—rather than Russia—interfered in the 2016 United States Presidential election.
(2) With the same corrupt motives, President Trump—acting both directly and through his agents within and outside the United States Government—conditioned two official acts on the public announcements that he had requested—
(A) the release of $391 million of United States taxpayer funds that Congresshad appropriated on a bipartisan basis for the purpose of providing vital military and security assistance to Ukraine to oppose Russian aggression and which President Trump had ordered suspended; and ​(B) a head of state meeting at the White House, which the President of Ukraine sought to demonstrate continued United States support for the Government of Ukraine in the face of Russian aggression.
(3) Faced with the public revelation of his actions, President Trump ultimately released the military and security assistance to the Government of Ukraine, but has persisted in openly and corruptly urging and soliciting Ukraine to undertake investigations for his personal political benefit.
These actions were consistent with President Trump's previous invitations of foreign interference in United States elections.
In all of this, President Trump abused the powers of the Presidency by ignoring and injuring national security and other vital national interests to obtain an improper personal political benefit. He has also betrayed the Nation by abusing his high office to enlist a foreign power in corrupting democratic elections.
Wherefore President Trump, by such conduct, has demonstrated that he will remain a threat to national security and the Constitution if allowed to remain in office, and has acted in a manner grossly incompatible with self-governance and the rule of law. President Trump thus warrants impeachment and trial, removal from office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of honor, trust, or profit under the United States.
II.Introduction
The President is entrusted with extraordinary power and commanded to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed." At minimum, that means the President must use his office to serve and protect the American people. It is thus a grave violation of the Constitution for a President to betray the public by exercising power for his own personal gain while injuring and ignoring vital national interests. As the Framers confirmed, such abuse of power warrants impeachment.
President Donald J. Trump used the power of his office to solicit and pressure a foreign nation to interfere in the 2020 United States Presidential election. He did so not for any legitimate United States policy objective, but to obtain a personal political advantage and to harm a political opponent. His scheme involved directly soliciting the announcement of investigations related to former Vice President Joseph Biden and the 2016 United States Presidential election. It also involved leveraging military and security assistance to a fragile foreign ally, as well as a valuable White House meeting, as part of a pressure campaign to induce that sought-after announcement.
These corrupt efforts by President Trump to manipulate the next election in his favor harmed the national security of the United States and imperiled the integrity of our democratic system. But when President Trump was caught, he did not apologize or cease his misconduct. He instead persisted in urging foreign nations to investigate an American citizen who dared to oppose him politically. If President Trump is allowed to remain in office, he will unquestionably continue to pursue personal ​political benefits at the direct expense of our security and self-governance.
This conduct, and the risk posed by President Trump's pattern of misconduct, is the very definition of an impeachable offense. It captures the Framers' worst fears about how Presidents might someday abuse the powers of their office. To protect democracy and safeguard national security, the Committee on the Judiciary has no choice but to recommend that President Trump be impeached.
III.President Trump Committed "High Crimes and Misdemeanors" by Abusing the Powers of his Office
"[A]buse of power was no vague notion to the Framers and their contemporaries. It had a very particular meaning to them." This meaning encompassed the use of official powers in a way that "on its very face grossly exceeds the President's constitutional authority or violates legal limits on that authority." As relevant here, it also included "the exercise of official power to obtain an improper personal benefit, while ignoring or injuring the national interest." This understanding is rooted in the Constitution's Take Care Clause, which commands the President to "faithfully execute" the law. That duty requires Presidents "to exercise their power only when it is motivated in the public interest rather than in their private self-interest."
Numerous Framers confirmed that a President can be impeached for exercising power with a corrupt purpose. As James Iredell explained, "the president would be liable to impeachments [if] he had … acted from some corrupt motive or other," or if he was "willfully abusing his trust." Alexander Hamilton deemed impeachment proper for "offenses which proceed from the misconduct of public men, or, in other words, from the abuse or violation of some public trust." In a similar vein, James Madison reasoned that the President could be impeached if there were "grounds to believe" he used his pardon power for the corrupt purpose of obstructing justice by "shelter[ing]" persons with whom he is connected "in any suspicious manner." As these and many other historical authorities show, "to the Framers, it was dangerous for officials to exceed their constitutional power, or to transgress legal limits, but it was equally dangerous (perhaps more so) for officials to conceal corrupt or illegitimate objectives ​behind superficially valid acts."
The proceedings against President Nixon confirm and exemplify the point. Two of the three articles against him—Article I (obstruction of justice) and Article II (abuse of power)—accused President Nixon of using his executive power for corrupt ends. The second article principally addressed President Nixon's use of power, including powers vested solely in the Presidency, to aid political allies, harm political opponents, and gain improper personal political advantages. In explaining this article of impeachment, the House Committee on the Judiciary (the "Committee") stated that President Nixon's conduct was "undertaken for his personal political advantage and not in furtherance of any valid national policy objective." His abuses of Presidential power were therefore "seriously incompatible with our system of constitutional government" and warranted removal from office.
It is occasionally suggested that a President cannot be impeached for the use (or abuse) of powers vested in him by the Constitution. As the Framers made clear, and as President Nixon's case proves, that interpretation is plainly incorrect and, moreover, would eviscerate our system of checks and balances. The fact that a President is vested with powers does not mean he can exercise them with impunity. Nor does it mean he is free to set his own personal gain as the de facto policy of the United States. To the contrary, when the President wields power entrusted to him by the people of this Nation, he must honor and serve that public trust. Where a President betrays that obligation by corrupting his office, he is subject to impeachment.
In warning against abuse of power, the Framers repeatedly returned to two very specific risks: betrayal of the national interest and corruption of elections. Informed by history, the Framers perceived these abuses as existential threats to the Republic. The United States could not survive if Presidents used their high office to conspire with foreign nations in pursuit of personal gain. And democracy would be in grave danger if Presidents used their powers to subvert elections. As John Adams warned in a letter to Thomas Jefferson, these risks were unavoidable and might sometimes overlap: "You are apprehensive of foreign Interference, Intrigue, Influence. So am I. … [A]s often as Elections happen, ​the danger of foreign Influence recurs." In Federalist No. 68, Hamilton cautioned that the "most deadly adversaries of republican government" may come "chiefly from the desire in foreign powers to gain an improper ascendant in our councils." The Framers sought to guard against this threat in the Impeachment Clause. If a President succumbed to temptation, placing his own personal interests above our national security and commitment to domestic self-governance, he faced impeachment and removal from his position of power.
Betrayal of national security was not an abstraction to the Framers, who had just waged a war for independence and knew the peril of corrupt foreign entanglements. "Foreign powers," warned Elbridge Gerry, "will intermeddle in our affairs, and spare no expense to influence them." In explaining why the Constitution required an impeachment option, Madison argued that a President "might betray his trust to foreign powers." Benjamin Franklin, in turn, referenced the Prince of Orange, who had reneged on a military treaty with France under suspicious circumstances, inciting "the most violent animosities and contentions" in Dutch politics. These and other Framers made clear that impeachment was a safeguard against Presidents who betrayed vital national interests through plots with foreign powers. The President's broad authority in conducting foreign affairs makes it more important, not less, that he display unswerving loyalty to the United States. "Accordingly, where the President uses his foreign affairs power in ways that betray the national interest for his own benefit, or harm national security for equally corrupt reasons, he is subject to impeachment by the House ... A President who perverts his role as chief diplomat to serve private rather than public ends has unquestionably engaged in 'high Crimes and Misdemeanors'—especially if he invited, rather than opposed, foreign interference in our politics."
This last point speaks to a distinct but related fear: that Presidents would improperly use the vast power of their office to ensure their own re-election. William Davie saw impeachment as "an essential security for the good behaviour of the Executive," who might otherwise spare "no efforts or means whatever to get himself re-elected." George Mason agreed that the threat of electoral treachery "furnished a peculiar reason in favor of impeachments whilst in office": "Shall the man who has practised corruption & by that means procured his appointment in the first instance, be suffered to escape punishment, by repeating his guilt?" Gouverneur Morris later added that "the Executive ought ​therefore to be impeachable for ... Corrupting his electors." Based in their own experience under King George III, as well as the writings of John Locke and other luminaries, "those who wrote our Constitution knew, and feared, that the chief executive could threaten their plan of government by corrupting elections." They included impeachment in the Constitution largely to thwart such treachery. As explained above, "The true nature of this threat is its rejection of government by 'We the People,' who would 'ordain and establish' the Constitution ... When the President concludes that elections threaten his continued grasp on power, and therefore seeks to corrupt or interfere with them, he denies the very premise of our constitutional system. The American people choose their leaders; a President who wields power to destroy opponents or manipulate elections is a President who rejects democracy itself."
These authorities make clear that a President commits "high Crimes and Misdemeanors" where he exercises official power to obtain an improper personal benefit, while ignoring or injuring the national interest. Such an abuse is especially abhorrent where it involves a betrayal of the national interest through foreign entanglements or an effort to corrupt our democracy. "Any one of these violations of the public trust justifies impeachment; when combined in a single course of conduct, they state the strongest possible case for impeachment and removal from office."
The complete evidentiary record bearing on President Trump's abuse of power is set forth in the Trump-Ukraine Impeachment Inquiry Report, (the "Ukraine Report"), and we rely on that Report and its findings here. Because we do not restate all of the facts contained in that Report which support the Committee's conclusions, we fully incorporate the Ukraine Report by reference here. On the basis of that full record, it is indisputable that President Trump engaged in abuse of power. The essential facts bearing on that judgment include the following:
* Donald J. Trump, the 45th President of the United States—acting personally and through his agents within and outside of the U.S. government—solicited the interference of a foreign government, Ukraine, in the 2020 U.S. presidential election. The President engaged in this course of conduct for the benefit of his reelection, to harm the election prospects of a political opponent, and to influence our nation's upcoming presidential election to his advantage. In so doing, the President placed his personal political interests above the national interests of the ​United States, sought to undermine the integrity of the U.S. presidential election process, and endangered U.S. national security.
* In furtherance of this scheme, President Trump—directly and acting through his agents within and outside the U.S. government—sought to pressure and induce Ukraine's newly-elected president, Volodymyr Zelensky, to publicly announce unfounded investigations that would benefit President Trump's personal political interests and reelection effort. To advance his personal political objectives, President Trump encouraged the President of Ukraine to work with his personal attorney, Rudolph Giuliani.
* As part of this scheme, President Trump, acting in his official capacity and using his position of public trust, personally and directly requested from the President of Ukraine that the government of Ukraine publicly announce investigations into (1) the President's political opponent, former Vice President Joseph R. Biden, Jr. and his son, Hunter Biden, and (2) a baseless theory promoted by Russia alleging that Ukraine—rather than Russia—interfered in the 2016 U.S. election. These investigations were intended to harm a potential political opponent of President Trump and benefit the President's domestic political standing.
* To create additional leverage against Ukraine and force them to open these investigations, President Trump ordered the suspension of $391 million in vital military assistance urgently needed by Ukraine, a strategic partner, to resist Russian aggression. Because the aid was appropriated by Congress, on a bipartisan basis, and signed into law by the President, its expenditure was required by law. Acting directly and through his subordinates within the U.S. government, the President withheld from Ukraine this military assistance without any legitimate foreign policy, national security, or anticorruption justification. The President did so despite the longstanding bipartisan support of Congress, uniform support across federal departments and agencies for the provision to Ukraine of the military assistance, and his obligations under the Impoundment Control Act.
* President Trump used the power of the Office of the President and exercised his authority over the Executive Branch, including his control of the instruments of the federal government, to apply increasing pressure on the President of Ukraine and the Ukrainian government to announce the politically-motivated investigations desired by President Trump. Specifically, to advance and promote his scheme, the President withheld official acts of value to Ukraine and conditioned their fulfillment on actions by Ukraine that would benefit his personal political interests:
** President Trump—acting through agents within and outside the U.S. government—conditioned a head of state meeting at the White House, which the President of Ukraine desperately sought to demonstrate continued United States support for Ukraine in the face of Russian aggression, on Ukraine publicly announcing the investigations that President Trump believed would aid his reelection campaign. ​
** To increase leverage over the President of Ukraine, President Trump, acting through his agents and subordinates, conditioned release of the vital military assistance he had suspended to Ukraine on the President of Ukraine's public announcement of the investigations that President Trump sought.
** President Trump's closest subordinates and advisors within the Executive Branch, including Acting Chief of Staff Mick Mulvaney, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, Secretary of Energy Rick Perry, and other senior White House and Executive Branch officials had knowledge of, in some cases facilitated and furthered the President's scheme, and withheld information about the scheme from the Congress and the American public.
* In directing and orchestrating this scheme to advance his personal political interests, President Trump did not implement, promote, or advance U.S. anti-corruption policies. In fact, the President sought to pressure and induce the government of Ukraine to announce politicallymotivated investigations lacking legitimate predication that the U.S. government otherwise discourages and opposes as a matter of policy in that country and around the world. In so doing, the President undermined U.S. support of anticorruption reform and the rule of law in Ukraine, and undermined U.S. national security.
* By withholding vital military assistance and diplomatic support from a strategic foreign partner government engaged in an ongoing military conflict illegally instigated by Russia, President Trump compromised national security to advance his personal political interests.
* Faced with the revelation of his actions, President Trump publicly and repeatedly persisted in urging foreign governments, including Ukraine and China, to investigate his political opponent. This continued solicitation of foreign interference in a U.S. election, as well as President Trump's other actions, present a clear and present danger that the President will continue to use the power of his office for his personal political gain.
The conduct set forth in the First Article of Impeachment unquestionably constitutes an "abuse of power" as that term was understood by the Framers. Indeed, it is falls within the heartland of the concerns raised at the Constitutional Convention as necessitating Presidential impeachment. It is the judgment of the Committee that President Trump has therefore committed "high Crimes and Misdemeanors."
As explained above, a President commits an impeachable abuse of power where he exercises official power to obtain an improper personal benefit, while ignoring or injuring the national interest. The first requirement is satisfied here: President Trump exercised official power, entrusted to him by ​the Constitution, in soliciting and pressuring the Government of Ukraine to announce investigations that would benefit his reelection, harm the election prospects of a political opponent, and influence the 2020 United States Presidential election to his advantage.
This conclusion is straightforward. On his July 25, 2019 call with President Zelensky, President Trump was acting as our Nation's head of state and chief diplomat. The call was itself an official act rooted in President Trump's powers under Article II of the Constitution. So, too, were many of the President's other acts throughout this scheme. It was only by virtue of his supervisory powers over the Executive Branch, as well as his power to appoint and remove certain officials, that President Trump could order the Office of Management and Budget to block or allow the release of Congressionally-appropriated military and security assistance to Ukraine. Similarly, it was only by virtue of his executive powers—including his authority to "receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers"— that President Trump could offer and then withhold a White House meeting (as well as the many other official governmental acts involved in such a high-stakes diplomatic visit). And it was only by virtue of his executive authority that President Trump could fire U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine Marie Yovanovitch (whom he knew would have stood in the way of his corrupt scheme), direct other administration officials in the execution of his agenda relating to Ukraine, and instruct United States officials to cooperate with his private attorney, Rudy Giuliani. The scheme or course of conduct described in the first Article of Impeachment is shot through with official acts.
The official acts comprising the First Article of Impeachment, moreover, had the natural and foreseeable effect of obtaining a personal political benefit for President Trump. On January 20, 2017, President Trump filed initial paperwork to launch his re-election campaign with the Federal Election Commission. On April 25, 2019, former Vice President Biden publicly announced his campaign for the Democratic nomination for President of the United States and launched his effort to unseat President Trump in the 2020 election. President Trump and former Vice President Biden were widely recognized as political opponents for the 2020 United States Presidential election. In using the powers of his office to solicit and pressure the Government of Ukraine to publicly announce an investigation related to former Vice President Biden and his son—and into a discredited theory that Ukraine, not Russia, interfered with the 2016 United States Presidential election—President Trump sought an ​announcement that would help him politically. By its very nature, and on its face, the President's conduct thus involved an exercise of power to obtain a personal political benefit. Although there can be no doubt that the abuse of power set forth in Article I involved the exercise of official power, it is helpful to closely consider the scheme at issue, as well as two of the means by which President Trump pursued it: specifically, his solicitation and pressuring of the Government of Ukraine to announce investigations that would result in a personal political benefit.
Beginning in the Spring of 2019, President Trump and his agents undertook a scheme to pressure the newly-elected President of Ukraine to announce politically-motivated investigations related to former Vice President Joe Biden and the 2016 United States Presidential election. That scheme included extensive efforts by the President's personal attorney Mr. Giuliani, who sought to tarnish former Vice President Biden and pressed Ukrainian officials to initiate the investigations. Mr. Giuliani publicly confirmed that the President was aware of his efforts, which were undertaken not as part of official U.S. foreign policy but to help the President personally.
But the task of carrying out this scheme was not limited to the President's personal attorney. On May 23, 2019, following the inauguration of Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky, the President met with United States officials, including Ambassador to the European Union Gordon Sondland, Special Representative for Ukraine Negotiations Ambassador Kurt Volker, and Secretary of Energy Rick Perry. These three officials, who would later dub themselves the "Three Amigos," reported their favorable impressions of Ukraine's new president, who had been elected on an anti-corruption platform, and recommended that President Trump invite President Zelensky to the White House. President Trump reacted negatively. He expressed the view that Ukraine "tried to take [him] down" in 2016, and told the Three Amigos to "Talk to Rudy"—not U.S. diplomats and experts—about Ukraine. Ambassador Sondland testified that "he understood the President's instruction to be a directive to work with Mr. Giuliani if [the delegation] hoped to advance relations with Ukraine." Following that May 23 meeting, Mr. Giuliani made clear to Ambassadors Sondland and Volker, "who were directly communicating with the Ukrainians, that a White House meeting would not occur until Ukraine announced its pursuit of the two political investigations."
​With these directives in mind, Ambassadors Sondland and Volker "worked to obtain the necessary assurance from President Zelensky that he would personally commit to initiate the investigations in order to secure both" the White House call and meeting. On July 10, for example, "Ambassador Bolton hosted a meeting in the White House with two senior Ukrainian officials, several American officials, including Ambassadors Sondland and Volker, Secretary Perry, Dr. Fiona Hill, Senior Director for Europe and Russia at the NSC, and Lt. Col. Vindman." When, as had become customary, the Ukrainians asked about the "long-delayed White House meeting," Ambassador Sondland revealed "an arrangement with Acting Chief of Staff Mick Mulvaney to schedule the White House visit after Ukraine initiated the 'investigations.'" Despite Ambassador Bolton ending that meeting, Ambassador Sondland "ushered many of the attendees to the Ward Room downstairs to continue their discussion" and, at that meeting, Ambassador Sondland explained again "that he had an agreement with Mr. Mulvaney that the White House visit would come only after Ukraine announced the Burisma/Biden and 2016 Ukraine election interference investigations."
Over the next two weeks, "Ambassadors Sondland and Volker worked closely with Mr. Giuliani and senior Ukrainian and American officials to ensure that," on the telephone call between President Trump and President Zelensky, President Zelensky would promise to undertake the investigations that Mr. Giuliani had been pushing on the President's behalf. As Ambassador Sondland testified, "Mr. Giuliani was expressing the desires of the President of the United States, and we knew these investigations were important to the President." The Ukrainians were reluctant to get involved, noting that they did not want to be "an instrument in Washington domestic, reelection politics." Mr. Giuliani and the American officials made clear, however, that there would be no White House meeting without the investigations.
President Trump's official act of soliciting the investigations is apparent on the face of the transcript of his July 25 call with President Zelensky. On that call, he requested that President ​Zelensky investigate the widely debunked conspiracy theory that the Ukrainian government—and not Russia—was behind the hack of Democratic National Committee (DNC) computer network in 2016. According to this conspiracy theory, the American cybersecurity firm CrowdStrike moved a DNC server to Ukraine to prevent United States law enforcement from examining them. Here is how President Trump presented his solicitation:
   I would like you to find out what happened with this whole situation with Ukraine, they say Crowdstrike... I guess you have one of your wealthy people... The server, they say Ukraine has it. There are a lot of things that went on, the whole situation. I think you're surrounding yourself with some of the same people. I would like to have the Attorney General call you or your people and I would like you to get to the bottom of it. As you saw yesterday, that whole nonsense ended with a very poor performance by a man named Robert Mueller, an incompetent performance, but they say a lot of it started with Ukraine. Whatever you can do, it's very important that you do it if that's possible.
Shortly thereafter, on the same phone call, President Trump expressly solicited an investigation into former Vice President Biden and his son. In so doing, he referenced former Vice President's Biden involvement in the removal of a corrupt former Ukrainian prosecutor:
   The other thing, There's a lot of talk about Biden's son, that Biden stopped the prosecution and a lot of people want to find out about that so whatever you can do with the Attorney General would be great. Biden went around bragging that he stopped the prosecution so if you can look into it... It sounds horrible to me.
On July 18, 2019, OMB notified the agencies that President Trump had directed a hold on military and security assistance funding for Ukraine. No explanation was provided for that hold. This was exceedingly irregular, given that the assistance had bipartisan Congressional support, was supported by the President's national security agencies and advisors (including the State Department, Department of Defense, and National Security Council), and was widely perceived as crucial to both Ukrainian and American security. Moreover, there were substantial concerns about the legality of the hold under the Impoundment Control Act. Adding to the irregularity, a career civil servant at OMB with decades of experience in this arena (Mark Sandy) was deprived of sign off authority, which was shifted to a political appointee of President Trump (Michael Duffey) who had virtually no relevant experience or expertise and no history or stated interest in managing such issues.
As early as July 25—the day that President Trump spoke by phone to President Zelensky— Ukrainian officials recognized and grew nervous about the delay in receiving their military and security assistance. That same day, Ukrainian officials contacted their American counterparts in Washington, D.C. to express those concerns. Specifically, the Department of Defense received two e-mails from the State Department revealing that the Ukrainian Embassy was "asking about the security assistance" and knew about the "[security assistance] situation to an extent." Former Ukrainian Deputy Foreign Minister, Olena Zerkal, also reported that her office, and the Ukrainian Presidential Administration, received a diplomatic cable from Ukrainian officials in Washington the week of the July 25 call, stating that the Trump administration had frozen military aid for Ukraine; she elaborated: "We had this information. ... It was definitely mentioned there were some issues."
In the weeks that followed, President Trump's top officials came to understand and communicated to Ukrainian officials that release of the assistance was in fact conditioned on President Zelensky publicly announcing the two investigations that President Trump had requested on his July 25 call. For example, on August 22, Ambassador Sondland e-mailed Secretary Pompeo, copying the State Department's Executive Secretary, Lisa Kenna, that to break the "logjam" on the assistance, President Zelensky should "look [President Trump] in the eye" and tell him he would "move forward publicly and with confidence on those issues of importance to Potus and to the U.S." Ambassador Sondland testified that the "issues of importance to Potus" were the two investigations.
​Around this time, according to his testimony, Lt. Col. Vindman "was getting questions from Ukrainians about the status of the hold on security assistance." By August 28, after Politico "first reported that President Trump had implemented a hold on nearly $400 million of U.S. military assistance to Ukraine that had been appropriated by Congress," Ukrainian officials "expressed alarm to their American counterparts." Ambassador Taylor states that the Ukrainians were "just desperate" to receive the assistance, and that "American officials could provide little reassurance."
On September 1, Ambassador Sondland stated to President Zelensky's aide, Mr. Yermak, that "the resumption of U.S. aid would likely not occur until Ukraine took some kind of action on the public statement that we had been discussing for many weeks." National Security Council senior director Timothy Morrison also testified that he recalled this interaction. According to Mr. Morrison, he saw Ambassador Sondland and Mr. Yermak have a private conversation and, immediately after their conversation ended, Ambassador Sondland walked over to Mr. Morrison and reported that he had communicated to Mr. Yermak that a statement about the investigations was needed "to obtain release of the aid." That same day, Ambassador Taylor texted Ambassador Sondland: "Are we now saying that security assistance and WH meeting are conditioned on investigations?" Ambassador Sondland then confirmed to Ambassador Taylor over the phone that President Trump wanted President Zelensky "in a public box," making a "public statement" about the investigations that President Trump had requested on July 25. Ambassador Sondland agreed that the United States position was that if President Zelensky did not announce those investigations, Ukraine was not "going to get" the assistance.
On September 5, the Washington Post published an editorial exposing President Trump's scheme, entitled "Trump Tries to Force Ukraine to Meddle in the 2020 Election." Two days later, on September 7, Ambassador Sondland called Mr. Morrison to report on a call he had just concluded with President Trump. Ambassador Sondland told Mr. Morrison that "there was no quid pro quo, but President Zelensky must announce the opening of the investigations and he should want to do it." The following day, on September 8, Ambassador Sondland conveyed via text message to Ambassadors Volker and Taylor, too, that he had spoken with President Trump: "Guys multiple convos with Ze, Potus. Lets talk." On the phone with Ambassador Taylor, Ambassador Sondland then "confirmed ​that he had talked to President Trump" and that "President Trump was adamant that President Zelensky himself had to clear things up and do it in public. President Trump said it was not a quid pro quo." Ambassador Sondland added that, following his call with President Trump, he had told President Zelensky and Mr. Yermak that, "although this was not a quid pro quo, if President Zelensky did not clear things up in public, we would be at a stalemate." In response, President Zelensky agreed to make a public statement announcing the investigations in an interview on CNN. Both Ambassadors Taylor and Sondland confirmed that the term "stalemate" referred to the hold on the security assistance to Ukraine. Early the next morning on September 9, Ambassador Taylor texted Ambassadors Sondland and Volker: "As I said on the phone, I think it's crazy to withhold security assistance for help with a political campaign."
Ultimately, the connection between the assistance and the announcements was apparent to the relevant parties—including United States officials working with Ukraine and senior Ukrainian officials. Ambassador Sondland and Mr. Holmes both testified that President Trump's use of military and security assistance to secure his sought-after announcements became as clear as "two plus two equals four." Moreover, at a press conference on October 17, Acting White House Chief of Staff Mick Mulvaney confirmed this equation. According to Mr. Mulvaney, President Trump "[a]bsolutely" mentioned "corruption related to the DNC server" in connection with the security assistance. Mr. Mulvaney also stated that the server was part of "why we held up the money." After a reporter attempted to clarify this explicit acknowledgement of a quid pro quo, Mr. Mulvaney replied: "We do that all the time with foreign policy." He added, "I have news for everybody: get over it. There is going to be political influence in foreign policy."
Turning to the White House visit, documentary evidence and testimony from multiple witnesses confirms that this official act—like the release of assistance—was conditional on Ukraine announcing investigations into former Vice President Biden and interference in the 2016 election.
As discussed above, prior to the July 25 call, President Trump's personal attorney repeatedly urged Ukraine to pursue investigations into "two matters of intense interest" to his client, President ​Trump: the "involvement of the former Vice President Joseph R. Biden Jr.'s son" on the board of a Ukrainian gas company and 2016 election interference. In those statements, Mr. Giuliani clarified that "my only client is the President of the United States," and that this wasn't "foreign policy," but rather "information that will be very, very helpful" to President Trump. Ambassadors Sondland and Volker were also enlisted by President Trump to work with Mr. Giuliani and "obtain the necessary assurance from President Zelensky that he would personally commit to initiate the investigations," and each had delivered their messages to the Ukrainians prior to the call. On July 2 in Toronto, Ambassador Volker "conveyed the message directly to President Zelensky, specifically referencing the 'Giuliani factor.'" On July 19, Ambassador Sondland emailed several top Administration officials, confirming that Ambassador Sondland had "talked to Zelensky just now," and that President Zelensky was "prepared to receive Potus' call" and "assure [President Trump] that he intends to run a fully transparent investigation and will 'turn over every stone.'" On the morning of the July 25 call, Ambassador Volker texted President Zelensky's aide: "Heard from White House—assuming President Z convinces trump he will investigate / 'get to the bottom of what happened' in 2016, we will nail down date for visit to Washington. Good luck!"
On the July 25 call itself, when President Zelensky thanked President Trump for "great support in the area of defense" and raised the matter of purchasing anti-tank missiles from the United States, President Trump responded, "I would like you to do us a favor though." That "favor," President Trump then made clear, was for Ukraine to investigate the 2016 United States Presidential election, as well as former Vice President Biden and his son. These were the same two investigations that Mr. Giuliani had repeatedly, publicly stated in the preceding months were of "intense interest" to President Trump. President Zelensky understood what President Trump meant about the connection between a meeting and these investigations: "I also wanted to thank you for your invitation to visit the United States, specifically Washington D.C. On the other hand, I also want to ensure [sic] you that we will be very serious about the case and will work on the investigation." President Zelensky also confirmed that his staff assistant had spoken to Mr. Giuliani, and President Trump reaffirmed that Mr. Giuliani "very much knows what's going on."
The pressure for the investigations continued after the call, as well. Several weeks later, on August 9, when discussing possible dates for a White House visit, Ambassador Sondland wrote to Ambassador Volker: "I think potus really wants the deliverable." The next day, President Zelensky's aide texted Ambassador Volker about setting a date for the meeting before making a statement ​announcing the investigations, stating: "I think it's possible to make this declaration and mention all these things. Which we discussed yesterday. But it will be logic [sic] to do after we receive a confirmation of date. We inform about date of visit and about our expectations and our guarantees for future visit." Ambassador Volker replied: "Let's iron out statement and use that to get date and then PreZ [Zelensky] can go forward with it?" President Zelensky's aide responded, "[o]nce we have a date, will call for a press briefing, announcing upcoming visit and outlining vision for the reboot of USUKRAINE relationship, including among other things Burisma and election meddling in investigations." The day after that, Ambassador Sondland emailed Secretary of State Pompeo: "Kurt & I negotiated a statement from Ze [Zelensky] to be delivered for our review in a day or two. The contents will hopefully make the boss [i.e., President Trump] happy enough to authorize an invitation."
Based on this and other evidence, it is clear that Ambassador Sondland spoke truthfully when he stated: "Was there a quid pro quo? As I testified previously with regard to the requested White House call and the White House meeting, the answer is yes."
By making military and security assistance and a White House meeting conditional on announcing investigations that would benefit him politically, President Trump used official power to pressure Ukraine to make those announcements. Ukraine is at war with Russia and more than 13,000 Ukrainians have died in that conflict. Ukraine relies heavily on the United States for military and security assistance and support on the global stage. But as Ambassador Taylor described in his deposition, Ukraine is also "a young nation struggling to break free of its past, hopeful their new government will finally usher in a new Ukraine, proud of independence from Russia eager to join Western institutions and enjoy a more secure and prosperous life." That is why, for weeks, Ukrainian officials expressed concern about President Trump's demands, advising United States officials that they did not want to be an "instrument in Washington domestic, reelection politics." As Ukrainian Prosecutor General Ruslan Ryaboshapka stated, in an apparent reference to President Trump's demand for Ukrainian interference in United States elections, "[i]t's critically important for the west not to pull us into some conflicts between their ruling elites, but to continue to support so that we can cross the ​point of no return." Nonetheless, as President Trump's pressure campaign continued, and as Ukraine contemplated the loss of military and security assistance necessary to defend itself in active hostilities with Russia, the Ukrainians became desperate. So desperate, in fact, that, as Ambassador Sondland told the President, President Zelensky was willing to do anything that President Trump asked of him. And, as set forth above, President Zelensky capitulated, and ultimately agreed to publicly announce the investigations in an interview on CNN. President Zelensky canceled that interview only after President Trump's scheme was exposed and the assistance was released.
To be sure, President Zelensky has subsequently denied that President Trump pressured him. But although President Zelensky did not publicly announce the investigations, the power disparity between the United States and Ukraine remains unchanged, and President Zelensky thus remains under pressure from President Trump to this day. As Mr. Holmes testified, there are still things the Ukrainians want and need from President Trump, including a meeting with the President in the Oval Office; for these reasons, Mr. Holmes explained,
   I think [the Ukrainians are] being very careful. They still need us now going forward. In fact, right now, President Zelensky is trying to arrange a summit meeting with President Putin in the coming weeks, his first face to face meeting with him to try to advance the peace process. He needs our support. He needs President Putin to understand that America supports Zelensky at the highest levels. So this doesn't end with the lifting of the security assistance hold. Ukraine still needs us, and as I said, still fighting this war this very day.
Ambassador Taylor likewise confirmed that, as President Zelensky is currently engaging in negotiations with President Putin concerning the war on their border, Russia is "watching closely to gauge the level of American support" for Ukraine. The United States' public and unwavering support is therefore critical to Ukraine in approaching those negotiations from a position of strength. Indeed, ​just last week on December 9, President Zelensky met with President Putin to discuss and negotiate an end to the war. President Zelensky's team was "discouraged by the absence of expected support" from President Trump in advance of that meeting, "as well as the lack of follow-through from the White House on a promised Oval Office meeting. Moreover, the next day, on December 10, President Trump hosted the Russian foreign minister in the Oval Office.
In addition, although the majority of the military and security assistance was ultimately released, certain of the funds to Ukraine remain unobligated, and, moreover, in order to ensure that Ukraine "did not permanently lose $35 million of the critical military assistance frozen by the White House," Congress had to pass a provision to ensure that the military assistance could be spent. "As of November 2019, Pentagon officials confirmed that the $35 million in security assistance originally held by the President and extended by Congress had still yet to be disbursed," and would not provide an explanation for the delay.
The evidence thus demonstrates that President Trump used the powers of his office to make Ukraine an offer it had no real choice but to accept: Help me get re-elected or you will not get the military and security assistance and diplomatic support you desperately need from the United States of America. In other words, under these circumstances, it is understandable that President Zelensky has sought to serve his national interest by avoiding any statement or confession that might offend President Trump and also demonstrate his own weakness in dealings with the United States and on the world stage. But the record supports only one conclusion. President Trump took advantage of Ukraine's vulnerability and used his high office to solicit and pressure Ukraine to announce criminal investigations into a United States citizen. These investigations would clearly help President Trump's re-election campaign and harm a political opponent.
In exercising official power to obtain a personal benefit, the President acted with motives forbidden by the Constitution. The first article of impeachment thus states: "President Trump engaged ​in this scheme or course of conduct for corrupt purposes in pursuit of personal political benefit."
To evaluate whether President Trump acted in pursuit of personal political advantage, the Committee has carefully considered the full evidentiary record, as well as arguments put forth by the Minority in its "Report of Evidence in the Democrats' Impeachment Inquiry in the House of Representatives" (the "Minority" or the "Minority Report") seeking to demonstrate that the President acted in pursuit of legitimate policy goals. Consistent with past practice and constitutional requirements, the Committee has focused not on reasons that could have motivated the President's conduct, but rather on what the record shows about his actual motives. After all, "[t]he Framers designed impeachment to root out abuse and corruption, even when a President masks improper intent with cover stories." The question is therefore whether "the evidence tells a story that does not match the [asserted] explanation."
On President Trump's July 25 phone call with President Zelensky, President Trump referenced two very specific investigations. Then, in describing who he wanted Ukraine to investigate, President Trump mentioned only two people by name: former Vice President Biden and his son. He also referred more generally to investigating the 2016 United States Presidential election, but reserved specificity for the Bidens.He used their name three times on the call.
Any presumptions of good faith that the President might normally enjoy must be suspended when he calls a foreign leader and asks that leader to investigate a United States citizen who is also an announced candidate in the primaries for the next Presidential election. To be sure, the call summary "contains no reference to 2020 or President Trump's reelection bid." But for good reason, multiple officials on the call immediately understood that President Trump was soliciting President Zelensky to announce an investigation into his political opponent. As Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Vindman testified, "I thought it was wrong. I thought it was wrong for the President of the United States to call for an investigation of—call a foreign power to investigate a U.S. citizen." Jennifer Williams, an ​advisor to Vice President Michael Pence, similarly testified that "it struck me as unusual and inappropriate."She later added, "the references to specific individuals and investigations, such as former Vice President Biden and his son, struck me as political in nature."
Events leading up to the July 25 call strongly support Ms. Williams's concern that President Trump's request was "political in nature." On May 2, 2019, President Trump retweeted a New York Times article entitled Biden Faces Conflict of Interest Questions That Are Being Promoted by Trump and Allies. That article concluded that Mr. Giuliani's efforts underscored "the Trump campaign's concern about the electoral threat from the former vice president's presidential campaign" and noted that "Mr. Giuliani's involvement raises questions about whether Mr. Trump is endorsing an effort to push a foreign government to proceed with a case that could hurt a political opponent at home." On May 9, 2019, it was reported that President Trump's private lawyer, Mr. Giuliani, planned to meet with President Zelensky "to urge him to pursue inquiries that allies of the White House contend could yield new information about two matters of intense interest to Mr. Trump." Those matters were the same two investigations that President Trump raised on his July 25 call. And as Mr. Giuliani stated in early May, "this isn't foreign policy." Instead, Mr. Giuliani was seeking information that "will be very, very helpful to my client," namely "the President of the United States." Again on May 9, Mr. Giuliani stated on Fox News, "I guarantee you, Joe Biden will not get to election day without this being investigated." The next day, in an interview, upon learning that Mr. Giuliani was traveling to Ukraine to pursue investigations, President Trump responded, "I will speak to him about it before he leaves."
​Over the months that followed, Mr. Giuliani aggressively pursued his efforts to get Ukraine to investigate Mr. Biden. During these efforts—and subsequently—he claimed to act on behalf of his client, President Trump. On October 30, 2019, he tweeted, "All of the information I obtained came from interviews conducted as ... private defense counsel to POTUS, to defend him against false allegations." On November 6, 2019, he tweeted, "The investigation I conducted concerning 2016 Ukrainian collusion and corruption, was done solely as a defense attorney to defend my client against false charges ..." The Ukraine Report observes, "Numerous U.S. officials, including Ambassadors Sondland, Volker, and Bolton, as well as Lt. Col. Vindman and others, were well aware of Mr. Giuliani's efforts to push Ukraine to pursue these political investigations."
As Mr. Giuliani worked hard to advance his client's personal and political interests—and not "foreign policy"—President Trump also required United States officials responsible for Ukraine to "talk with Rudy." For example, Ambassador Sondland recalled that during a meeting in the Oval Office on May 23 with the U.S. officials who had attended the Ukrainian inauguration, President Trump "just kept saying: Talk to Rudy, talk to Rudy." Ambassador Sondland explained that they "understood that talk with Rudy meant talk with Mr. Rudy Giuliani, the president's personal lawyer," and "if we did not talk to Rudy, nothing would move forward on Ukraine." President Trump thus directed key U.S. officials to coordinate with and carry out the requests of his private lawyer, who was acting "solely" as President Trump's "defense attorney," regarding Ukraine.
Mr. Giuliani's importance was not lost on the Ukrainians. By July 10, 2019, President Zelensky's top aide came to appreciate "that the key for many things is Rudi [sic] and I ready to talk with him at any time," and, as set forth above, key U.S. officials worked with Mr. Giuliani to convey messages to the Ukrainians and prepare President Zelensky for his July 25 call. Thus, on the July 25 call, President Zelensky preemptively mentioned that "we are hoping very much that Mr. Giuliani will be able to travel to Ukraine and we will meet once he comes to Ukraine." President Trump replied, "I would like him to call you. I will ask him to call you along with the Attorney General. Rudy very much knows what's happening and he is a very capable guy. If you could speak to him that would be ​great." Two sentences later, President Trump turned directly to his request that President Zelensky announce an investigation into the Bidens—and then, later in their discussion, confirmed that "I will have Mr. Giuliani give you a call and I am also going to have Attorney General Barr call ..." The call transcript thus confirms that President Trump saw Mr. Giuliani as his point person for organizing an investigation into the Bidens and the 2016 election, and that President Zelensky knew of Mr. Giuliani's role. Once again, it is therefore noteworthy that Mr. Giuliani has stated emphatically that he acted "solely" to advance his client's own interests—and that he was not engaged in "foreign policy."
Many other considerations support the conclusion that President Trump's concerns had nothing to do with the legitimate foreign policy interests of the United States and everything to do with the President's personal political interests. First, after the removal of Ambasador Yovanovitch, President Trump's primary focus relating to Ukraine throughout this period was the announcement of two investigations that would benefit him politically. The day after the July 25 call, President Trump called Ambassador Sondland to ask whether President Zelensky "was going to do the investigation." Ambassador Sondland stated that President Zelensky was "going to do it" and would do "anything you ask him to." According to David Holmes, who overheard the conversation, Ambassador Sondland and President Trump spoke only about the investigation in their discussion about Ukraine. The President made no mention of other major issues of importance in Ukraine, including President Zelensky's aggressive anti-corruption reforms and the ongoing war it was fighting against Russian-led forces in eastern Ukraine. After Ambassador Sondland hung up the phone, he told Mr. Holmes that President Trump "did not give a shit about Ukraine." Rather, he explained, the President cared only about "big stuff" that benefitted him personally, like "the Biden investigation that Mr. Giuliani was pitching."
Second, in pursuit of these investigations, President Trump made it clear to AmbassadorSondland—who conveyed this message to Ambassador Taylor—that "everything was dependent on such an announcement, including security assistance." Ambassador Sondland's admission confirms ​that President Trump's actions were motivated only by the announcement of investigations. Ukraine is a key strategic partner of the United States. It had just elected a promising new leader who ran on an anti-corruption platform and was making strong progress in his reform agenda. But it had been invaded by Russia and depended heavily on United States support and assistance. The United States had provided such assistance on a bipartisan basis, with an overwhelming consensus in Congress and the national security community that this was vital to our own national interests.To be sure, the President has broad latitude for certain policy judgments in foreign affairs in order to advance the national security interests of the country as a whole, but no witness interpreted the President's request for these investigations to be a change in policy, nor did his cabinet or Vice President. This further supports the alternative and only plausible explanation that the President pressed for the public announcement of those investigations because they were of great personal political value to him.
Third, the President's request for these investigations departed from established channels for making such a request. On the July 25 call, President Trump told President Zelensky that he should speak to Mr. Giuliani and Attorney General Barr. But after the July 25 transcript was released, the Department of Justice publicly stated as follows:
   The President has not spoken with the Attorney General about having Ukraine investigate anything relating to former Vice President Biden or his son. The President has not asked the Attorney General to contact Ukraine—on this or any other matter. The Attorney General has not communicated with Ukraine—on this or any other subject. Nor has the Attorney General discussed this matter, or anything relating to Ukraine, with Rudy Giuliani.
Ukraine's current Prosecutor General Ruslan Ryaboshapka, who assumed his new position in late August 2019, has since confirmed the Justice Department's account. He told The Financial Times in ​late November 2019 that Attorney General Barr had made no formal request regarding a potential investigation into allegations of wrongdoing by former Vice President Biden.
Many Administration officials have also confirmed that there was no formal investigation into these matters within the Department of Justice or formal request to Ukraine for information in connection to the investigations and, moreover, that without going through the official process, the investigations were not proper. As Ambassador Volker testified, "[Mr. Yermak] said, and I think quite appropriately, that if they [Ukraine] are responding to an official request, that's one thing. If there's no official request, that's different. And I agree with that." When Ambassador Volker discovered that no official request for investigations had been conveyed by the Department of Justice, he recalls thinking, "let's just not go there."
In his testimony, Ambassador Taylor corroborated this account. He told the Committees that, on August 16, in a text message exchange with Ambassador Volker, he "learned that Mr. Yermak had asked that the United States submit an official request for an investigation into Burisma's alleged violations of Ukrainian law, if that is what the United States desired." Ambassador Taylor noted that "a formal U.S. request to the Ukrainians to conduct an investigation based on violations of their own law" was "improper" and advised Ambassador Volker to "stay clear." Mr. Kent similarly testified that on August 15, Ambassador Volker's special assistant asked him whether there was any precedent for the United States asking Ukraine to conduct investigations on its behalf. Mr. Kent replied: "[I]f you're asking me have we ever gone to the Ukrainians and asked them to investigate or prosecute individuals for political reasons, the answer is, I hope we haven't, and we shouldn't because that goes against everything that we are trying to promote in post-Soviet states for the last 28 years, which is the promotion of the rule of law."
Fourth, the President's decision disregarded United States foreign policy towards Ukraine and did so abruptly and without explanation. To make a demand that benefits him personally, while endangering the rights of a United States citizen and political opponent is a bright red flag that supports only one conclusion—that the President was putting his own personal and political interests over the Nation's foreign policy interests. There is no dispute that President Trump's requested investigations were not part of any U.S. policy objectives relating to Ukraine, including its anti-corruption policies. Mr. Morrison, Lt. Col. Vindman, Mr. Kent, and Ambassador Taylor all confirmed that an investigation into the Bidens, or the 2016 election, was not a stated or recognized United States foreign policy ​objective. Notably, President Trump was briefed on official policy prior to both calls that he had with President Zelensky—on April 21 and July 25. Yet he chose not to follow talking points about corruption reform, and instead decided on the July 25 call to go off-book and seek the criminal investigation of his political opponent.
Finally, President Trump's request was almost universally viewed by key United States and Ukrainian officials as improper, unusual, problematic, and, most importantly, purely political:
* Mr. Holmes: "I was shocked the requirement was so specific and concrete. While we had advised our Ukrainian counterparts to voice a commitment to following the rule of law and generally investigating credible corruption allegations, this was a demand that President Zelensky personally commit on a cable news channel to a specific investigation of President Trump's political rival."
* Dr. Hill: "[Ambassador Sondland] was being involved in a domestic political errand, and we were being involved in national security foreign policy, and those two things had just diverged."
* Lt. Col. Vindman: "What I was trying to do . . . was express my concerns about something that I viewed to be problematic."
* Ambassador Taylor: "The Ukrainians did not owe President Trump anything. And holding up security assistance for domestic political gain was crazy."
Other officials also voiced alarm. For example, Dr. Hill testified that Ambassador Bolton told her to "go and tell the [NSC Legal Advisor] that I am not part of whatever drug deal Sondland and Mulvaney ​are cooking up on this"; Dr. Hill explained that "drug deal" referred to Ambassador Sondland stating in a July 10 meeting, which included Ukrainian officials, that he had an agreement with Mr. Mulvaney for a White House meeting "if [Ukraine would] go forward with investigations." On July 11, Dr. Hill "enlisted another NSC official who was present at the July 10 meeting" to attend a longer discussion with the NSC Legal Advisor about her concerns. Similarly, although the Minority holds up his reaction as proof that nothing improper happened, Mr. Morrison immediately reported the July 25 call to the NSC legal advisor "to make sure that the package was reviewed by the appropriate senior level attention." Further, Mr. Morrison tried to stay away from President Trump's requests because these investigations were not related to "the proper policy process that I was involved in on Ukraine," and "had nothing to do with the issues that the interagency was working on."
Ukrainian officials, too, expressed similar reservations. On July 20, Ambassador Taylor spoke with Oleksandr Danyliuk, the Ukrainian national security advisor, who conveyed that President Zelensky "did not want to be used as a pawn in a U.S. reelection campaign." As Ambassador Taylor testified, the "whole thrust" of the activities undertaken by Mr. Giuliani and Ambassador Sondland "was to get these investigations, which Danyliuk and presumably Zelensky were resisting because they didn't want to be seen to be interfering but also to be a pawn." Further, as noted above, Ukrainian Prosecutor General Ruslan Ryaboshapka later stated—in apparent reference to President Trump's demands—that "it's critically important for the west not to pull us into some conflicts between their ruling elites, but to continue to support so that we can cross the point of no return." In short, experienced officials on both sides of President Trump's scheme saw it for what it was: an effort to solicit Ukraine to assist his reelection campaign.
Although the President has declined to participate in these proceedings, the Minority Report offers three alternative justifications for President Trump's conduct. The implausibility of these justifications, which are inconsistent with the evidence, only further proves that President Trump's motives were constitutionally improper.
The Minority's principal contention is that President Trump denied a White House visit, ​withheld military and security assistance, and demanded these two investigations due to his "deepseated, genuine, and reasonable skepticism of Ukraine" for "pervasive corruption." This after-thefact contention is not credible.
To start, it is inconsistent with President Trump's own prior conduct respecting Ukraine. Under the previous Ukrainian administration of President Petro Poroshenko, which suffered from serious concerns about corruption issues, President Trump approved $510 million in aid in 2017 and $359 million in 2018; he also approved the sale of Javelin missiles to Ukraine in December 2017. It was not until 2019, after Ukraine elected President Zelensky, who ran on a strong anti-corruption platform, that President Trump suddenly punished Ukraine by refusing a White House meeting and military and security assistance. If his goal were to fight corruption, President Trump would have withheld assistance from a corrupt leader and provided it to a reformer. Instead, he did the opposite, just a few months after former Vice President Biden announced his candidacy.
Nor did President Trump take any other steps one would expect to see if his concern were corruption. He was given extensive talking points about corruption for his April 21 and July 25 calls, yet ignored them both times and did not mention corruption on either call. President Trump's staff uniformly agreed that President Zelensky was a credible anti-corruption reformer, yet President Trump suspended a White House meeting that his entire policy team agreed would lend support and cache to President Zelensky's anti-corruption agenda in Ukraine. He withheld military and security assistance without any stated explanation, yet his own Department of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of State, had certified in May that Ukraine satisfied all anti-corruption benchmarks necessary for that assistance to be released. He continued to withhold the assistance, yet the White House never ​requested or independently conducted any subsequent review of Ukraine's anti-corruption policies— and the Defense Department adhered to its view that all anti-corruption benchmarks had already been satisfied. He persisted in denying the public and his own staff any explanation, even though Congress and every agency other than OMB (headed by the President's Acting Chief of Staff) supported the provision of military and security assistance to Ukraine and strongly objected to President Trump's hold. Tellingly, the President's purported concerns about corruption in Ukraine as a reason for placing the hold on security assistance were not conveyed at the time of the hold or any time prior to lifting the hold.
Moreover, as numerous United States officials observed, it would be squarely inconsistent with advancing an anti-corruption agenda for an American President to avoid official channels and demand that a foreign leader embroil themselves in our politics by investigating a candidate for President. Yet President Trump made that very same demand. He also fired, without any explanation, an ambassador widely recognized as a champion in fighting corruption, praised a corrupt prosecutor general in Ukraine, and oversaw efforts to "cut foreign programs tasked with combating corruption ​in Ukraine and elsewhere overseas."
Nothing about President Trump's conduct in the relevant period supports the theory that he was motivated by a "deep-seated, genuine, and reasonable skepticism of Ukraine" for "pervasive corruption." He gave Ukraine hundreds of millions of dollars under a regime that ultimately lost power because of mounting concerns about corruption and then punitively withheld funds when a reformer came to power. He launched a general attack on anti-corruption programs while growing closer with Vladimir Putin and other corrupt despots. His Administration cut anti-corruption programs in Ukraine during the relevant period. And he ignored, defied, and confounded every office and agency within the Executive Branch seeking to promote anti-corruption programs, while demanding that Ukraine investigate his own domestic political rival. Even in the May 23 White House meeting with other U.S. officials, President Trump equated corruption in Ukraine with the false allegations that Ukraine tried to "take [him] down" in 2016, and directed his three senior U.S. government officials to assist "Mr. Giuliani's efforts, which, it would soon become clear, were exclusively for the benefit of the President's reelection campaign."
In short, there is overpowering evidence that President Trump acted with corrupt intent. The after-the-fact claim that he asked for foreign investigations of his political rivals and withheld military aid because of a generalized concern about corruption defies all the evidence before us and common sense. The President's actions were unexplained and inexplicable, contradicted legal and factual findings reached by credible experts, and are indefensible given they involved soliciting a foreign power to open an investigation into an American citizen and rival political candidate.
We next consider the second justification proposed in the Minority Report: that President Trump has "been vocal about his skepticism of U.S. foreign aid and the need for European allies to shoulder more of the financial burden for regional defense." This explanation is based largely on the fact that President Trump told President Zelensky on the July 25 call that European countries should be doing more to help Ukraine. But there is no evidence that this concern was the actual reason why he withheld a White House meeting, blocked the release of Congressionally approved military and security assistance, and requested the announcement of two investigations; in fact, the evidence available is inconsistent with that offered explanation.
To this day, President Trump has not explained why he withheld the valuable White House meeting. And until the whistleblower complaint was filed, there was no explanation for why President ​Trump had blocked release of the military and security assistance. This was extremely unusual. OMB Deputy Associate Director Mark Sandy, the senior budget official responsible for the Department of Defense portion of the aid to Ukraine, testified that he could not recall another instance in which a significant amount of assistance was held with no rationale provided. Deputy Assistant George Kent testified that, upon learning of the hold on July 18, there was "great confusion" among representatives from the Department of Defense, State Department, and National Security Council because they "didn't understand why" the aid had been frozen.
If the President's reason for ordering a hold was concern about Europe's contributions, he had no reason to keep that fact a secret from his own administration. Moreover, if that was his concern, the normal response would be to undertake a review process at the time of the hold. Yet, while Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Laura Cooper and other witnesses testified that they received some inquiries in late June about Ukraine security assistance, Ms. Cooper testified that there was no policy or interagency review process that she "participated in or knew of" in August 2019. Ms. Cooper further testified that she had "no recollection of the issue of allied burden sharing coming up" in the three meetings she attended about the freeze on security assistance, or hearing about a lack of funding from Ukraine's allies as a reason for the freeze. Under Secretary of State David Hale also testified that he did not hear about the lack of funding from Ukraine's allies as a reason for the security assistance hold. And Ambassador Sondland, the ambassador to the European Union, testified that he was never asked to reach out to European countries to get them to contribute more. Finally, President Trump ultimately released the military and security assistance without any further contributions from Europe. According to Lt. Col. Vindman, none of the "facts on the ground" had changed when this occurred.
If the President's concern were genuinely about burden-sharing, it is implausible that he kept his own administration in the dark about that issue, never made any public statements about it, never ordered a review process focused on the question of burden sharing, never ordered his officials to push Europe to increase their contribution, and then released the aid without any change in Europe's ​contributions.
To be sure, after the whistleblower complaint was filed and the President became aware he had been caught, Mr. Sandy began receiving questions in September about burden sharing. But that sequence only underscores the fact that this explanation was an after-the-fact justification to cover his tracks, as the hold had been in place for nearly two months without burden-sharing provided as a reason. Moreover, after Congress began investigating President Trump's conduct, the White House Counsel's Office reportedly conducted an internal review of "hundreds of documents," which "reveal[ed] extensive efforts to generate an after-the-fact justification" for the hold on assistance for Ukraine ordered by President Trump. These documents reportedly included "early August email exchanges between acting chief of staff Mick Mulvaney and White House budget officials seeking to provide an explanation for withholding the funds after the president had already ordered a hold in mid-July on the nearly $400 million in security assistance." Given the substantial evidence of irregular conduct at OMB—including, according to Mr. Sandy, the resignation of two OMB officials partly based on their objection to OMB's handling and rationale for the hold on assistance to Ukraine—this effort to manufacture a pretext cannot reasonably be credited.
It also bears mention that European countries do, in fact, contribute substantial assistance to Ukraine. Since 2014, the European Union and European financial institutions have provided more than $16 billion in grants and loans to Ukraine, making the EU the largest donor to Ukraine. This far exceeds the approximately $1.95 billion in assistance that the United States has provided during the same period, according to USAID. Although the United States is the largest donor of military assistance to Ukraine, European countries also provide military aid to Ukraine through a NATO assistance package. For example, the United Kingdom has sent more than 1,300 soldiers to Ukraine since 2015 and has trained approximately 10,000 Ukrainian troops.
The third and final justification that the Minority Report offers to explain President Trump's conduct is that he had a legitimate basis to request investigations into his political rival and the ​United States Presidential election. Like the others conjectured by the Minority, this explanation is contradicted by the facts, the President's own statements, and common sense.
First, this theory presumes that the President was motivated by an overriding concern about events that occurred in 2015 and 2016—and that were widely reported at the time. Yet it was not until 2019 that the President requested these investigations and placed a hold on assistance to Ukraine. In other words, President Trump requested the investigations only after Vice President Biden had entered the 2020 presidential race and began beating him in the polls—thus giving him a personal and political motive to harm Vice President Biden publicly—and only after Special Counsel Robert Mueller's investigation affirmed the Intelligence Community Assessment's finding that Russia interfered in our election, and that it did so in a "sweeping and systematic" fashion in order to benefit President Trump. The timing of President Trump's solicitation and pressure campaign, so shortly after Vice President Biden announced his candidacy and the Special Counsel Mueller's report was released, is powerful proof of the President's true motives for seeking the investigations.
Second, as explained above, had President Trump genuinely believed there was a legitimate basis to request Ukraine's assistance in law enforcement investigations, there are specific formal processes that he should have followed. Specifically, he could have instructed DOJ to make an official request for assistance through a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT). But even though the United States and Ukraine have entered into an MLAT, multiple witnesses and DOJ itself have confirmed that there was never an official United States investigation into the Bidens' conduct in Ukraine, nor was there an official request to Ukraine for an investigation into its alleged interference in the 2016 United States Presidential election. The President's failure to follow legitimate procedures is further proof that he was acting improperly.
Third, the role of Mr. Giuliani also belies the suggestion that this was about legitimate United States investigations. Mr. Giuliani is not a representative of the United States government and had no formal role in facilitating Ukraine's involvement in United States criminal investigations. His ​involvement, as well as the lack of formal, official involvement by DOJ, provide ever more evidence that President Trump's actions were unrelated to legitimate United States criminal investigations, but rather about Giuliani's effort to "meddle in investigations" on behalf of his client, President Trump, as Giuliani told the New York Times in May.
Indeed, the record makes clear that President Trump was not seeking Ukrainian assistance in United States criminal investigations; rather, he wanted Ukraine to announce its own investigations of Vice President Biden and the 2016 United States Presidential election. This is clear from DOJ's noninvolvement, as well as the President's public comments that Ukraine should "start a major investigation into the Bidens." Multiple witnesses testified that it is extremely inappropriate and irregular for the United States to ask Ukraine to investigate a United States citizen—particularly when that citizen is a former Vice President and current political candidate. For example, Lieutenant Colonel Vindman testified that he reported President Trump's July 25 call to legal counsel because he "did not think it was proper to demand that a foreign government investigate a U.S. citizen." Ambassador Taylor echoed this concern, stating that "[a] formal U.S. request to the Ukrainians to conduct an investigation based on violations of their own law struck me as improper, and I recommended to Ambassador Volker that we stay clear." Ambassador Volker, too, testified that "[t]o investigate the Vice President of the United States or someone who is a U.S. official. I don't think we should be asking foreign governments to do that. I would also say that's true of a political rival." The President's improper request that Ukraine announce investigations varied from standard rules and norms; further demonstrating that it marked a dangerous abuse of power by the President.
Finally, both theories asserted by President Trump have been proven false. None of the 17 witnesses who appeared as part of this inquiry testified that they were aware of any factual basis to support the allegation that Ukraine interfered in the 2016 election; rather, multiple witnesses confirmed that these were false, debunked conspiracy theories. As Dr. Fiona Hill testified, "[t]his is a fictional narrative that is being perpetrated and propagated by the Russian security services themselves." Further, on December 9, 2019, FBI Director Christopher Wray stated, "We have no information that ​indicates that Ukraine interfered with the 2016 presidential election."The Republican-led Senate Select Committee on Intelligence concluded the same. It is therefore entirely not credible to suggest that the President's actions were based on a sincere belief that Ukraine interfered in the 2016 United States election or that the so-called "Crowdstrike theory" had any validity.
Similarly, there is no legitimate basis for President Trump to claim former Vice President Biden behaved improperly in calling for the removal of Ukrainian prosecutor general Viktor Shokin. When he called for Mr. Shokin's removal, then-Vice President Biden acted in accordance with and in furtherance of an official United States policy and the broad consensus of various European countries and the International Monetary Fund. Indeed, in late 2015, the International Monetary Fund threatened Ukraine that it would not receive $40 billion in international assistance unless Mr. Shokin was removed. Vice President Biden was subsequently enlisted by the State Department to call for Mr. Shokin's removal—and in late 2015 and early 2016, he announced that the United States would withhold $1 billion in loan guarantees unless Mr. Shokin was dismissed. Ultimately, in March 2016, Ukraine's parliament voted to dismiss Mr. Shokin. Moreover, multiple witnesses confirmed that the removal of Mr. Shokin would have increased the likelihood that Burisma would be investigated for corruption, not the opposite, given that Mr. Shokin was widely considered to be both ineffective and ​corrupt. Any suggestion that former Vice President Biden called for Mr. Shokin's removal in order to stop an investigation of Burisma, the company whose board Hunter Biden sat on, is inconsistent with these facts.
The Committee does not lightly conclude that President Trump acted with corrupt motives. But the facts, including the uncontradicted and corroborated testimony and documents, as well as common sense once again, all support that inescapable conclusion. President Trump exercised his official powers to solicit and pressure Ukraine to launch investigations into former Vice President Biden and the 2016 election. He did so not for any legitimate reason, but to obtain an improper personal political benefit by aiding his reelection, harming the election prospects of a political opponent, and influencing the 2020 United States Presidential election to his advantage. In so doing, President Trump violated his Oath of Office and abused his public trust. The Framers could not have been clearer that Presidents who wield power for their own personal advantage are subject to impeachment, particularly when their private gain comes at the expense of the national interest.
President Trump's abuse of power harmed the United States. It undermined our national security and weakened our democracy. There is no indication that the President attended to these concerns in pursuing his own political errand—and there is every indication that he purposely ignored them. This is exactly what the Framers feared, and it is why they authorized Presidential impeachment.
While carrying out his corrupt scheme in Ukraine, President Trump ignored and injured the national security of the United States. He did so by threatening our safety and security, weakening democracy at home and abroad, undermining our efforts to promote the rule of law on a global stage, and tarnishing our reputation with allies. This is not a matter of policy disagreement. It is an objective assessment of the consequences of President Trump's conduct—an assessment that the House is entitled and required to make in these circumstances.
First, when he withheld military and security assistance from Ukraine (and did so for his own personal political benefit), President Trump threatened the safety and security of the United States. ​Ukraine is a "strategic partner of the United States." By contrast, United States "national security policy" correctly identifies Russia as an adversary. As multiple witnesses affirmed, the United States therefore has an interest in supporting Ukraine, to ensure it remains an independent and democratic country that can deter Russian influence, expansion, and military aggression. For example, Ambassador Yovanovitch explained in her testimony that "[s]upporting Ukraine is the right thing to do. It's also the smart thing to do. If Russia prevails and Ukraine falls to Russia dominion, we can expect to see other attempts by Russia to expand its territory and influence." Mr. Morrison elaborated: "Russia is a failing power, but it is still a dangerous one. The United States aids Ukraine and her people so that they can fight Russia over there, and we don't have to fight Russia here."
The military and security assistance that the United States has approved with bipartisan support to Ukraine since 2014 is critical to preventing Russia's expansion and aggression. Ukraine is on the front line of conflict with Russia; its forces defend themselves against Russian aggression every day, in an ongoing war. When the United States provides assistance that allows Ukraine to equip itself with "radar and weapons and sniper rifles, that saves lives. It makes the Ukrainians more effective. It might even shorten the war. That's what our hope is, to show that the Ukrainians can defend themselves and the Russians, in the end, will say 'Okay, we're going to stop.'" In addition, as Ambassador Taylor explained, the delay occurred "at a time when hostilities were still active in the east and when Russia was watching closely to gauge the level of American support for the Ukrainian Government."
Above and beyond the security assistance itself, public support from the United States demonstrates to Russia that "we are Ukraine's reliable strategic partner." In withholding not only assistance, but also a White House meeting, the President denied Ukraine a show of strength that could deter further Russian aggression and help Ukraine negotiate an end to its five-year war with Russia (a war that has already killed over 13,000 Ukrainians). Indeed, the very fact of delayed assistance quite certainly emboldened our enemies and weakened our partner. President Trump's conduct continues to ​exacerbate these dynamics; for example, the day after Presidents Zelensky and Putin met to negotiate an end to the war in their border region, on December 10, President Trump met with Russia's top envoy in the Oval Office, but has yet to schedule a White House meeting with President Zelensky.
Second, our national security goals in support of Ukraine are part of a "broader strategic approach to Europe," whereby we seek to facilitate negotiation of conflicts in Europe, maintain peace and order in that region, and prevent further Russian aggression not just in Ukraine but in Europe and elsewhere. Ambassador Taylor explained the importance of Ukraine to these policy goals in his testimony:
Russians are violating all of the rules, treaties, understandings that they committed to that actually kept peace in Europe for nearly 70 years. Until they invaded Ukraine in 2014, they had abided by sovereignty of nations, of inviolability of borders. That rule of law, that order that kept the peace in Europe and allowed for prosperity as well as peace in Europe was violated by the Russians. And if we don't push back on that, on those violations, then that will continue. … [This] affects the kind of world that we want to see abroad. So that affects our national interests very directly. Ukraine is on the front line of that conflict.
Third, President Trump's actions diminished President Zelensky's ability to advance his anticorruption reforms in Ukraine—and, in turn, to help the United States promote our ideals abroad. President Zelensky, who ran on a strong anti-corruption platform, was elected by a large majority of Ukrainians; subsequent to that election, Ukrainians voted to replace 80% of their Parliament to endorse a "platform consistent with our democratic values, our reform priorities, and our strategic interests." Mr. Kent thus emphasized that President Zelensky's anti-corruption efforts could ensure that "the Ukrainian Government has the ability to go after corruption and effectively investigate, prosecute, and judge alleged criminal activities using appropriate institutional mechanisms, that is, to create and follow the rule of law." Of course, it is always in our national security interest to help advance such democratic and anti-corruption platforms. At a time of shifting alliances, "Ukrainians and freedom loving people everywhere are watching the example we set here of democracy and rule of law." "If Ukraine is able to enforce that anti-corruption agenda, it can serve as an example to other ​post-Soviet countries and beyond, from Moscow to Hong Kong." "A secure, democratic, and free Ukraine [thus] serves not just the Ukrainian people, but the American people as well. That's why it was our policy and continues to be our policy to help the Ukrainians achieve their objectives. They match our objectives."
As Mr. Holmes testified, a White House visit and U.S. support was "critical" to President Zelensky implementing his platform. President Zelensky was a new leader, "looking to establish his bona fides as a regional and maybe even a world leader." In that context, a meeting with the United States—the most "powerful country in the world and Ukraine's most significant benefactor"—would have gone a long way in ensuring that President Zelensky had the credibility to implement his reforms. Yet, to this day and as a result of President Trump's desire to obtain a personal political advantage in the upcoming election, no such meeting has occurred. This surely has not gone unnoticed by Ukraine, our democratic allies, or countries struggling to enforce similar democratic ideals. Indeed, Zelensky administration officials already are reportedly "now reconsidering their strategy on communication with and about the Trump administration."
Fourth, President Trump's brazen use of official acts to pressure Ukraine to announce a politically motivated investigation undermined our credibility in promoting democratic values and the rule of law in Ukraine and elsewhere. As Ambassador Taylor underscored, "[o]ur credibility is based on a respect for the United States," and "if we damage that respect, then it hurts our credibility and makes it more difficult for us to do our jobs." Mr. Kent, too, agreed that the President's request for investigations "went against U.S. policy" and "would've undermined the rule of law and our longstanding policy goals in Ukraine, as in other countries, in the post-Soviet space."
Ukrainian officials' reaction to American requests following President Trump's demand illuminates this concern. When Ambassador Volker advised Mr. Yermak about "potential problems" with investigations that the Zelensky administration was contemplating into former Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko, Mr. Yermak retorted, "what, you mean like asking us to investigate Clinton and Biden?" Ambassador Volker did not respond.
​Finally, President Trump's conduct threatened to harm America's alliances more broadly. "The U.S. is the most powerful country in the history of the world in large part because of our values, and our values have made possible the network of alliances and partnerships that buttresses our own strength." Yet President Trump's scheme—using Ukraine's desperation for military assistance and support to pressure our ally to announce an investigation into his political rival—shook Ukraine's "faith in us." Even worse, it sent a message to our allies that the United States may withhold critical military and security assistance for our President's personal political benefit; if such conduct is allowed to stand, our allies will "constantly question the extent to which they can count on us."
President Trump ignored and injured our national security when he corruptly abused the powers of his office for personal political gain. As Ambassador Yovanovitch summarized in her testimony, President Trump's "conduct undermines the U.S., exposes our friends, and widens the playing field for autocrats like President Putin. Our leadership depends on the power of our example and the consistency of our purpose. Both have now been opened to question."
As explained at the outset, the Framers of our Constitution were particularly fearful that a President might someday abuse the powers of his office to undermine free and fair elections. The heart of the Framers' project was a commitment to popular sovereignty. In an age when "democratic selfgovernment existed almost nowhere on earth," the Framers imagined a society "where the true principles of representation are understood and practi[c]ed, and where all authority flows from, and returns at stated periods to, the people." But that would be possible only if "those entrusted with [power] should be kept in dependence on the people." This is why the President, and Members of Congress, must stand before the public for re-election on fixed terms. Through free and fair democratic elections the American people protect their system of political self-government.
President Trump's conduct ignored and injured the Nation's fundamental interest in selfgovernance and free and fair elections. As Professor Pamela S. Karlan of Stanford Law School explained in her testimony before this Committee, "[t]he very idea that a President might seek the aid ​of a foreign government in his reelection campaign would have horrified [the Framers]." Professor Karlan added:
   [O]ur elections become less free when they are distorted by foreign interference. What happened in 2016 was bad enough: there is widespread agreement that Russian operatives intervened to manipulate our political process. But that distortion is magnified if a sitting President abuses the powers of his office actually to invite foreign intervention ... That is not politics as usual—at least not in the United States or any other mature democracy. It is, instead, a cardinal reason why the Constitution contains an impeachment power. Put simply, a candidate for president should resist foreign interference in our elections, not demand it.
When asked to elaborate on her view that President Trump's conduct endangered the right to vote, which ranks among our most precious rights, Professor Karlan observed: "The way that it does it is exactly what President Washington warned about, by inviting a foreign government to influence our elections. It takes the right away from the American people and it turns that into a right that foreign governments decide to interfere for their own benefit. Foreign governments don't interfere in our elections to benefit us; they intervene to benefit themselves."
Ultimately, the Constitution does not care whether President Trump, former Vice President Biden, or any other candidate wins the 2020 United States Presidential election. It is indifferent to political parties and individual candidates. But it does care that we have free and fair elections. That is why foreigners can be excluded from activities of democratic self-government, including voting and contributing to political candidates. And it is why a President who uses the powers of his office to invite foreign government interference in an election, all for his own personal political gain, is a President who has abandoned our constitutional commitment to democracy.
The first Article of Impeachment charged President Trump with an abuse of power as that constitutional offense has long been understood. While there is no need for a crime to be proven in order for impeachment to be warranted, here, President Trump's scheme or course of conduct also ​encompassed other offenses, both constitutional and criminal in character, and it is appropriate for the Committee to recognize such offenses in assessing the question of impeachment.
"Bribery" under the Impeachment Clause occurs where a President corruptly offers, solicits, or accepts something of personal value to influence his own official actions. In that respect, "Bribery is . . . an especially egregious and specific example of a President abusing his power for private gain." Based on their lived experience, the Framers had good cause to view such conduct as grounds for impeachment. Bribery was considered "so heinous an Offence, that it was sometimes punished as High Treason." And it was received wisdom in the late-17th century that nothing can be "a greater Temptation to Officers [than] to abuse their Power by Bribery and Extortion."
Since the Founding, "[a] number of impeachments in the United States have charged individuals with misconduct that was viewed as bribery." However, "the practice of impeachment in the United States has tended to envelop charges of bribery within the broader standard of 'other high Crimes and Misdemeanors'" and, for the most part, "the specific articles of impeachment were framed as 'high crimes and misdemeanors' or an 'impeachable offense'" without ever "explicitly referenc[ing] bribery." Here, the First Article of Impeachment alleges what is, among other things, a bribery scheme, whereby President Trump corruptly solicited things of value from a foreign power, Ukraine, to influence his own official actions—namely, the release of $391 million in Congressionallyauthorized assistance and a head of state meeting at the White House.
The elements of impeachable bribery under the Constitution are not expressly set forth in our founding document. As Justice Joseph Story and other authorities have made clear, however, the AngloAmerican common law tradition supplies a complete and "proper exposition of the nature and limits of the offense." This Committee has reaffirmed for more than a century that "[t]he offense of bribery had a fixed status in the parliamentary law as well as the criminal law of England when our Constitution was adopted, and there is little difficulty in determining its nature and extent in the application of the law of impeachments in this country." Indeed, the four legal experts who testified before this ​Committee agreed on the basic definition of common law bribery: it occurs where a President (1) offers, solicits, or accepts (2) something of personal value (3) to influence the official duties he is entrusted with exercising by the American people; (4) corruptly. The experts also agreed that an impeachable offense need not be a crime.
Two aspects of this definition merit special note. First, at the time of the Constitutional Convention, bribery was well understood in Anglo-American law to encompass soliciting bribes. As Judge John T. Noonan, Jr. explains, the drafting history of the Impeachment Clause demonstrates that "'Bribery' was read both actively and passively, including the chief magistrate bribing someone and being bribed." In a renowned bribery case involving the alleged solicitation of bribes, Lord Mansfield explained that "[w]herever it is a crime to take, it is a crime to give: they are reciprocal." William Blackstone likewise confirmed that "taking bribes is punished," just as bribery is punishable for "those who offer a bribe, though not taken." In addition, at common law, soliciting a bribe—even if it is not accepted—completes the offense of bribery. "[T]he attempt is a crime; it is complete on his side who offers it."
Second, under common law, bribery occurred when the thing offered or solicited was of personal value to the recipient. Common law treatises explained that a bribe broadly encompassed "any ​undue Reward," "valuable thing," or valuable consideration, even where "the things were small." The value of the thing was measured by its value to the public official who was offering, soliciting or receiving it. Accordingly, as Professor Turley recognized in his testimony, the common law encompassed non-pecuniary things of value—even including, in the case of King Charles II (as would have been well known to the Framers), "a young French mistress." Consistent with this broad understanding, in guarding against foreign efforts to corrupt American officials, the Constitution forbids any "Person holding any Office of Profit or Trust," from accepting "any present, Office or Title, of any kind whatever, from . . . a foreign State," unless Congress consents. An equally capacious view applies to the impeachable offense of "Bribery."
Applying the constitutional definition of "Bribery" here, there can be little doubt that it is satisfied. President Trump solicited President Zelensky for a "favor" of great personal value to him he did so corruptly. and he did so in a scheme to influence his own official actions respecting the release of military and security assistance and the offer of a White House meeting.
Although President Trump's actions need not rise to the level of a criminal violation to justify impeachment, his conduct here was criminal. In this section we address the federal statute banning bribery; in the next section we address the wire fraud statute. Both of these laws underscore the extent to which Congress and the American people have broadly condemned the use of a public position of trust for personal gain. As this Committee observed decades ago, "[n]othing is more corrosive to the fabric of good government than bribery."<ref>Bribery, Graft, and Conflicts of Interest, H. Rep. No. 87-748, at 6 (1961).</ref. The federal anti-bribery statute imposes up to fifteen years' ​imprisonment for public officials who solicit or obtain bribes. The wire fraud statute, in turn, imposes up to twenty years imprisonment for public officials who breach the public trust by depriving them of their honest services. President Trump's violation of both statutes is further evidence of the egregious nature of his abuse of power.
Starting with the federal anti-bribery statute, criminal bribery occurs when a public official (1) "demands [or] seeks" (2) "anything of value personally," (3) "in return for being influenced in the performance of any official act." Additionally, the public official must carry out these actions (4) "corruptly." We address the four statutory elements in turn.
The evidence before the Committee makes clear that the President solicited from the President of Ukraine a public announcement that he would undertake two politically motivated investigations. That conduct satisfies the actus reus element of bribery under the federal criminal code. Section 201 prohibits a wide variety of solicitations, including solicitations that are "indirect." Courts have concluded that a bribe was solicited, for example, where a public official with authority to award construction contracts requested that a contractor "take a look at the roof" of the official's home. Notably, where the other elements are met, the statutory offense of bribery is complete upon the demand—even if the thing of value is not provided. That is because "the purpose of the statute is to discourage one from seeking an advantage by attempting to influence a public official to depart from conduct deemed essential to the public interest."
President Trump solicited from President Zelensky a public announcement that he would conduct two politically motivated investigations into President Trump's political rival and into discredited claims about election interference in 2016. These demands easily constitute solicitation under federal law. To begin with, the President's improper solicitation is apparent in the record of his July 25 phone call with President Zelensky. As the record makes clear, after President Zelensky raised the issue of United States military assistance to Ukraine, President Trump immediately responded: "I ​would like you to do us a favor though[.]" President Trump then explained the "favor," which involved the two demands for baseless investigations. In addition, the July 25 call "was neither the start nor the end" of these demands. In the weeks leading up to it, for example, Ambassadors Volker and Sondland had both personally informed President Zelensky and his staff of the President's demands and advised the Ukrainian leader to agree to them. These and other related actions by the President's subordinates were taken in coordination with Rudolph Giuliani, who was understood to be "expressing the desires of the President of the United States." There can thus be no doubt that President Trump's conduct constituted a solicitation.
The next question is whether any of the "things" that President Trump solicited from President Zelensky count as a "things of value." Section 201 makes clear that bribery occurs when the thing offered or solicited is "anything of value personally" to the recipient—and in this instance, President Trump placed significant personal value on the "favor[s]" demanded.
"The phrase 'anything of value' has been interpreted broadly to carry out the congressional purpose of punishing the abuse of public office." It "is defined broadly to include 'the value which the defendant subjectively attaches to the items received.'" For example, it has been held to include shares of stock that had "no commercial value" where the official receiving the bribe expected otherwise. As the court in that case explained, "[c]orruption of office occurs when the officeholder agrees to misuse his office in the expectation of gain, whether or not he has correctly assessed the worth of the bribe." The term "thing of value" encompasses intangible things of value as well. As used throughout the criminal code, it has been held to include (among other things): research work ​product, conjugal visits for a prison inmate, confidential government files about informants, information about the location of a witness, a promise of future employment, a promise to contact a public official, "the amount of a confidential, competitive bid" for a government contract, copies of grand jury transcripts provided to the target of an investigation, and the testimony of a witness at a criminal trial.
In this case, President Trump indisputably placed a subjective personal value on the announcement of investigations that he solicited from President Zelensky. The announcement of an investigation into President Trump's political rival would redound to President Trump's personal benefit; and the announcement of an investigation into purported Ukrainian interference in the 2016 election would vindicate the President's frequent denials that he benefitted from Russia's assistance. Mr. Giuliani recognized as much many times as he pursued his client's own interests in Ukraine. Furthermore, Ambassador Sondland and others testified that President Trump's true priority was the public announcement of these investigations more than the investigations themselves. This fact makes clear that "the goal was not the investigations, but the political benefit [President] Trump would derive from their announcement and the cloud they might put over a political opponent." The ​promotion of these investigations and the political narratives behind them thus "served the [President's] personal political interests . . . because they would help him in his campaign for reelection in 2020."
In Return for Being Influenced: This element of the criminal anti-bribery statute requires showing "a specific intent to give or receive something of value in exchange for an official act."—i.e., a quid pro quo. As detailed above, the evidence satisfies this standard. President Trump sought an announcement of these investigations in return for performing two official acts. First, the President "conditioned release of vital military assistance . . . on [President Zelensky's] public announcement of the investigations." Second, he "conditioned a head of state meeting at the White House . . . on Ukraine publicly announcing the investigations."
Official Act: Federal anti-bribery law defines an "official act" as "any decision or action on any question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy" that may be pending or brought before a public official in that person's official capacity. Both of the acts in question—releasing $391 million in approved military and security assistance, and hosting an official head-of-state diplomatic visit at the White House—plainly qualify as "official act[s]" within the meaning of the statute.
First, the release of much-needed assistance to Ukraine was unquestionably an official act. Release of these funds, totaling $391 million, involved a formal certification process by the Department of Defense regarding certain preconditions and an official notification to Congress, among other things. In addition, President Trump's placement of a hold on the funds precipitated "a series of policy meetings involving increasingly senior officials" across numerous federal agencies. These processes unmistakably involved "formal exercise[s] of government power" as defined by the Supreme Court in McDonnell v. United States. Indeed, McDonnell confirmed that a decision to allocate funds obviously qualifies as an "official act."
Second, when the President hosts a foreign head of state for an official diplomatic visit, he performs an official act specifically assigned to him by Article II of the Constitution. The President's ​official functions include the duty to "receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers." By receiving ambassadors and foreign heads of state under that authority, the President recognizes the legitimacy of their governments. Furthermore, an official diplomatic visit by a head of state is an extensive governmental undertaking. During the type of visit sought here (an official "working" visit), the visiting official is typically hosted at Blair House for several days, during which time the official meets with the President and attends a working luncheon at the White House, along with the Secretary of State. Such engagements usually involve weeks of preparation and agenda-setting, at the end of which significant new policy initiatives may be announced.
For these reasons, it is beyond question that official White House visits constitute a "formal exercise of governmental power" within the meaning of McDonnell. In that case, the Supreme Court held that the former governor of Virginia did not perform "official acts" when he arranged meetings and hosted events for a benefactor. There, however, the actions in question were frequent and informal in nature. Official diplomatic visits to the White House, by contrast, are conducted pursuant to the President's express Article II authority, involve significant use of government resources, and entail extensive preparation. Indeed, the visiting official must even obtain a special kind of visa—a process that itself involves the performance of an official act.
President Trump behaved corruptly throughout this course of conduct because he offered to perform official acts "in exchange for a private benefit," rather than for any public policy purpose. Policymakers may of course trade support or assistance, and that type of "logrolling" does not constitute an exchange of bribes. But that is entirely different from the President seeking an announcement of investigations to serve his personal and political interests, as he did here. Indeed, and as detailed above, the record is clear that President Trump acted with corrupt motives, including that:
* President Trump's request for investigations on the July 25 call was not part of any official briefing materials or talking points he received in preparation for the call; nor were the investigations part of any U.S. official policy objective.
* President Trump's primary focus relating to Ukraine during the relevant period was the announcement of these two investigations that were not part of official U.S. policy objectives.
* There is no evidence that the President's request for the investigations was part of a change in official U.S. policy; that fact further supports the alternative and only plausible explanation that President Trump pressed the public announcements because there were of great personal, political value to him.
* President Trump's requests departed from established channels, including because he used his personal attorney, Mr. Giuliani, to press the investigations and never contacted the Department of Justice or made a formal request.
* President Trump's request was viewed by key United States and Ukrainian officials as improper, unusual, problematic, and, most importantly, purely political.
For all these reasons, President Trump's conduct satisfies the fourth and final element of the federal anti-bribery statute.
In addition to committing the crime of bribery, President Trump knowingly and willfully orchestrated a scheme to defraud the American people of his honest services as President of the United States. In doing so, he betrayed his position of trust and the duty he owed the citizenry to be an honest fiduciary of their trust. That offense is codified in the federal criminal code, which imposes up to twenty years' imprisonment for public officials who (by mail or wire fraud) breach the public trust by ​participating in a bribery scheme. In Skilling v. United States, the Supreme Court confirmed that the statute governing "honest services fraud" applies to "bribes and kickbacks," and noted that this concept "draws content from" the federal anti-bribery statute. As such, public officials who engage in bribery may also be charged with honest services fraud.
Fundamentally, the President has deprived the American people of the honorable stewardship that the Nation expects and demands of its chief executive. Since Skilling, federal courts have looked to federal bribery statutes, paying particular attention to Section 201, to assess what constitutes willful participation in a scheme to defraud in the provision of "honest services." As described above, President Trump engaged in conduct that constitutes a violation of Section 201. President Trump conditioned specific "official acts"—the provision of military and security assistance and a White House meeting—on President Zelensky announcing investigations that benefitted him personally, while harming national interests. In doing so, President Trump willfully set out to defraud the American people, through bribery, of his "honest services."
The underlying wire fraud statute, upon which the "honest services" crime is based, requires a transmission by "wire, radio, or television communication in interstate or foreign commerce any writings . . . for the purpose of executing [a] . . . scheme or artifice." President Trump's July 25 call to President Zelensky, as well as his July 26 call to Ambassador Gordon Sondland both were foreign wire communications made in furtherance of an ongoing bribery scheme. Thus, the President's telephone calls on July 25th and July 26th lay bare the final element to find him criminally liable for his failure to provide "honest services" to the American people.
For the reasons given above, President Trump's abuse of power encompassed both the constitutional offense of "Bribery" and multiple federal crimes. He has betrayed the national interest, the people of this Nation, and should not be permitted to be above the law. It is therefore all the more vital that he be removed from office.
Impeachment exists "not to inflict personal punishment for past wrongdoing, but rather to protect against future Presidential misconduct that would endanger democracy and the rule of law." ​By virtue of the conduct encompassed by the First Article of Impeachment, President Trump "has demonstrated that he will remain a threat to national security and the Constitution if allowed to remain in office, and has acted in a manner grossly incompatible with self-governance and the rule of law." That is true in at least two respects: first, he has shown no remorse or regret, but rather insists that his conduct was "perfect" and continues to engage in misconduct; and second, the egregiousness and complexity of his scheme confirm his willingness to abuse the powers of his office for private gain.
"It is true that the President has expressed regret for his personal misconduct. But he has never— he has never—accepted responsibility for breaking the law. He has never taken that essential step … He has stubbornly resisted any effort to be held accountable for his violations of the law, for his violations of his constitutional oath, and his violation of his duty as President. To this day, he remains adamantly unrepentant."
Representative Charles Canady, serving as a House Manager, spoke those words while urging the Senate to uphold articles of impeachment against President Clinton. They apply here with full force and only one modification: it is not true "that the President has expressed regret for his personal misconduct." When President Trump, for his own personal political gain, asked for a favor from President Zelensky, he did exactly what our Framers feared most. He invited the influence of a foreign power into our elections—and used the powers of his office to secure that advantage at the direct expense of our national security. Yet President Trump has admitted to no wrongdoing. He maintains that he was always in the right and that his July 25 call with President Zelensky was "perfect." President Trump has made it clear that he believes he is free to use his Presidential powers the same way, to the same ends, whenever and wherever he pleases.
Any doubt on that score is resolved by his conduct since the scheme came to light. He has made repeated false statements. He has stonewalled Congressional investigators and ordered others to do the same. He has argued that it is illegitimate for the House to investigate him. He has stayed in contact with Mr. Giuliani, his private lawyer, who remains hard at work advancing his client's personal interests in Ukraine. He has attacked Members of the House, as well as witnesses in House proceedings, who questioned his conduct. He has asserted and exercised the prerogative to urge foreign nations to investigate citizens who dare to challenge him politically.
Indeed, even after the Speaker announced the impeachment inquiry, President Trump stated on October 2, "And just so you know, we've been investigating, on a personal basis—through Rudy and others, lawyers—corruption in the 2016 election." The next day, President Trump went further: he ​not only acknowledged that he wanted Ukraine to investigate former Vice President Biden, but also publicly suggested that China should do the same. When asked what he hoped President Zelensky would do about the Bidens, he stated as follows:
   Well, I would think that, if they were honest about it, they'd start a major investigation into the Bidens. It's a very simple answer. They should investigate the Bidens, because how does a company that's newly formed—and all these companies, if you look at — And, by the way, likewise, China should start an investigation into the Bidens, because what happened in China is just about as bad as what happened with—with Ukraine. So, I would say that President Zelensky—if it were me, I would recommend that they start an investigation into the Bidens. Because nobody has any doubt that they weren't crooked. That was a crooked deal—100 percent. He had no knowledge of energy; didn't know the first thing about it. All of a sudden, he is getting $50,000 a month, plus a lot of other things. Nobody has any doubt. And they got rid of a prosecutor who was a very tough prosecutor. They got rid of him. Now they're trying to make it the opposite way. But they got rid—So, if I were the President, I would certainly recommend that of Ukraine.
President Trump added that asking President Xi of China to investigate the Bidens "is certainly something we can start thinking about." And the day after that, on October 4, in remarks before he departed on Marine One, the President stated:
   When you look at what Biden and his son did, and when you look at other people—what they've done. And I believe there was tremendous corruption with Biden, but I think there was beyond—I mean, beyond corruption—having to do with the 2016 campaign, and what these lowlifes did to so many people, to hurt so many people in the Trump campaign—which was successful, despite all of the fighting us. I mean, despite all of the unfairness.
President Trump then once again reiterated his willingness to solicit foreign assistance related to his personal interests: "Here's what's okay: If we feel there's corruption, like I feel there was in the 2016 campaign—there was tremendous corruption against me—if we feel there's corruption, we have a right to go to a foreign country."
The first Article of Impeachment does not seek President Trump's removal for an isolated error of judgment on the July 25 phone call, or for a mere series of related misjudgments in his public ​statements since then. The President's abuse of power involved a course of conduct in which he willfully chose, time and again, to place his own personal political gain above our national security and commitment to free and fair elections. He did so in ways large and small, using many Executive Branch agencies, offices, and officers to advance his corrupt agenda throughout 2019. Some may have joined knowingly; others, including several witnesses who testified before the Investigating Committees, only recognized the impropriety of the activity once the White House released the record of the President's July 25 call with President Zelensky or were dragooned against their will and resisted within the bounds of professional propriety. In the end, President Trump relied on a network of agents within and beyond the United States government to bend our Ukraine policy to use the powers of the presidency to harm a prominent political opponent, all at the expense of our security and democracy.
No private citizen could do this. Ordinary citizens cannot deny White House meetings, block Congressionally-appropriated military and security assistance, or condition such official acts on an agreement to sabotage their political opponents. These powers reside in the Office of the President. It was thus solely by virtue of powers entrusted to his office that President Trump could distort our foreign policy, and weaken our national security, to his own personal political gain. His conduct is thus an "abuse or violation of … public trust" and evokes the Framers' fear that "the Executive will have great opportunitys [sic] of abusing his power." It also demonstrates that he will continue to engage in such abuses unless he is removed from office.
The Minority has objected that there is no such risk because the assistance to Ukraine was eventually released. But that is irrelevant. The fact that the President's scheme was discovered and disrupted does not cure his abuse of power or suggest that he will honor his Oath of Office in the future. That is true as a matter of law and as a matter of fact.
Starting with the law, as this Committee made clear in President Nixon's case, a President who tries and fails to abuse power remains subject to removal for his underlying wrong. George Mason confirmed this principle at the Constitutional Convention, where he declared that "attempts to subvert the Constitution" rank as "great and dangerous offenses." That is because attempts can still reveal the President as a threat to our society. Impeachment exists to save the Nation from such threats; we need not wait for harm to befall, or for the President to try again, before deeming his conduct impeachable. This principle applies with added force where the President has insisted that he did nothing wrong and has unrepentantly continued his pattern of misconduct.
Turning to the facts, the military and security assistance was released to Ukraine only after President Trump got caught. On August 12, 2019, a whistleblower filed a complaint concerning the ​President's July 25 call and his actions towards Ukraine. In late August, the President's counsel reportedly briefed President Trump about the complaint. On September 5, The Washington Post published an editorial alleging that President Trump had withheld aid to Ukraine in an attempt "to force Mr. Zelensky to intervene in the 2020 U.S. presidential election by launching an investigation of the leading Democratic candidate, Joe Biden." On September 9, several House Committees launched an investigation into "reported efforts by President Trump, the President's personal lawyer Rudy Giuliani, and possibly others to pressure the government of Ukraine to assist the President's reelection campaign." On September 10, Intelligence Committee Chairman Adam Schiff requested that the complaint be provided to the Committee, as required by law. Finally, on September 11, without any public explanation, President Trump abruptly ordered that the assistance be released to Ukraine; remarkably, he still has not held a White House meeting with President Zelensky.
This delay in releasing the assistance had significant real-world consequences. By the time the President ordered the release of security assistance to Ukraine, the Department of Defense was unable to spend approximately 14 percent of the funds appropriated by Congress for Fiscal Year 2019; as a result, Congress had to pass a new law to extend the funding in order to ensure the full amount could be used by Ukraine to defend itself. Moreover, by delaying the assistance for purposes understood by United States and Ukrainian officials as corrupt, President Trump harmed our relationship with Ukraine, signaled vulnerability to Russia, and more broadly injured American credibility and national security. As Ambassador Taylor testified, President Vladimir Putin of Russia would "love to see the humiliation of President Zelensky at the hands of the Americans," which "would give the Russians a freer hand." Ambassador Taylor further emphasized that the Ukrainians "counted on . . . the assurance of U.S. support" and so the hold on assistance had "shaken their faith in us." President Zelensky echoed a similar sentiment in a recent interview with Time: "I don't want us to look like beggars. But you have to understand, we're at war. If you're our strategic partner, then you can't go ​blocking anything for us."
The bottom line is that President Trump used for personal political gain the powers entrusted to his office. He did so knowingly, deliberately, and repeatedly. He involved parts of the Executive Branch in his scheme. He undermined American security and democracy to help ensure his re-election—and did not care. And after he was caught, President Trump not only insisted his conduct was acceptable and did everything in his power to obstruct Congress's investigation into his misconduct, he also sought to normalize and justify his behavior by publicly soliciting foreign powers to investigate a citizen who is challenging him in next year's election.
A President who acts this way believes he stands above the law. That belief is itself a guarantee that allowing him to remain in our highest office, vested with our mightiest political powers, poses a continuing threat to the Constitution. Unless he is stopped, President Trump will continue to erode our democracy and the fundamental values on which the Nation was founded.
The First Article of Impeachment impeaches President Trump for abuse of power relating to Ukraine. Yet, as noted in that Article, President Trump's conduct is "consistent with President Trump's previous invitations of foreign interference in United States elections." An understanding of those previous efforts, and the pattern of misconduct they represent, sheds light on the particular conduct set forth in that Article as sufficient grounds for the impeachment of President Trump.
These previous efforts include inviting and welcoming Russian interference in the 2016 United States Presidential election. On July 27, 2016, then-candidate Trump declared at a public rally: "Russia, if you're listening, I hope you're able to find the 30,000 emails that are missing. I think you will probably be rewarded mightily by our press." The referenced emails were stored on a personal server used by then-candidate Trump's political opponent, Hillary Clinton. And Russia was listening. Within approximately five hours of Trump's statement, Russian hackers targeted Clinton's personal office and the referenced emails for the very first time.
In the fall of 2016, as Election Day approached, WikiLeaks began publishing stolen emails that were damaging to the Clinton Campaign. WikiLeaks received these e-mails from the GRU, a Russian military group. Rather than condemn this interference in our elections, then-candidate Trump repeatedly praised and encouraged Wikileaks. For instance, he said on October 10, 2016: "This just came out. WikiLeaks! I love WikiLeaks!" Two days later, he said: "This WikiLeaks stuff is ​unbelievable. It tells you the inner heart, you gotta read it." Similar statements from then-Candidate Trump continued over the following weeks. As the Special Counsel testified before House Committees, to call these statements "problematic" would be an "understatement" because they gave "hope or some boost to what is and should be illegal activity."
During this period, senior members of the Trump Campaign were maintaining significant contacts with Russian nationals and seeking damaging information on candidate Hillary Clinton. Among other evidence of such contacts, the Special Counsel's Report notes that President Trump somehow knew in advance about upcoming releases of stolen emails; that the Trump Campaign's foreign policy adviser met repeatedly with Russian officials who claimed to have "dirt" on Clinton "in the form of thousands of emails"; and that Trump Campaign Chairman Paul Manafort caused internal campaign polling data to be shared with a Russian national. There is no indication that anyone from the Trump Campaign, including the candidate, reported any of these contacts or offers of foreign assistance to U.S. law enforcement.
A redacted version of the Special Counsel's Report was released to the public on April 18, 2019. The evidence obtained by the Special Counsel relating to this conduct, including Russia's attack on our elections, resulted in the criminal indictment of more than a dozen defendants. It also indicated that the President had sought to thwart rather than advance the Special Counsel's investigation into Russian interference. When this Committee conducted its own investigation, President Trump similarly sought to thwart rather than advance those fact-finding efforts.
Since the release of the Special Counsel's report, President Trump has confirmed his willingness to welcome and invite foreign interference in our elections. For example, two months after the report was released and while President Trump was under congressional investigation, he admitted on live television that he would still welcome foreign interference. In an interview with George Stephanopoulos, President Trump disputed the idea that if a foreign government provided information on a political opponent—as Russia had done in 2016—it would be considered interference in our elections: "[I]t's not an interference, they have information—I think I'd take it if I thought there was something wrong, I'd go maybe to the FBI—if I thought there was something wrong. But when somebody comes up with oppo research, right, they come up with oppo research, 'oh let's call the FBI.' ​The FBI doesn't have enough agents to take care of it."
On July 24, 2019, the Special Counsel testified before HPSCI and this Committee. He affirmed his Report's evidence, which showed that—despite over 100 contacts between individuals associated with the Trump Campaign and Russian nationals or their agents while Russia was attacking our elections—no one from the Trump Campaign reported those contacts to law enforcement. The Special Counsel emphasized to the Committees that reporting such information is something that Presidential campaigns "would and should do," not least because "knowingly accepting foreign assistance during a Presidential campaign" is a crime.
The next day, however, President Trump did the opposite: he did not just accept and fail to report foreign interference in our elections, he demanded it on his July 25 call with President Zelensky. Moreover, this time he leveraged the powers of his presidential office, including military and security assistance and a White House visit, against a vulnerable foreign ally.
The Constitution creates a democracy that derives its power from the American people. Elections are crucial to that system of self-government. But the Framers knew that elections alone could "not guarantee that the United States would remain a republic" if "unscrupulous officials" rigged the process. President Trump has done just that. He has done it before, he has done it here, and he has made clear he will do it again. As Professor Karlan observes, what happened in "2016 was bad enough: there is a widespread agreement that Russian operatives intervened to manipulate our political process." But "that distortion is magnified" when the President uses his official powers to procure and induce foreign intervention, all as part of a scheme to ensure his own re-election.
Although the First Article of Impeachment addresses President Trump's solicitation and pressuring of Ukraine to announce two investigations for his own personal political benefit, as well as his persistence in such conduct since the scheme came to light, the consistency of this scheme with his broader pattern of welcoming and inviting foreign interference into our elections is relevant and striking.
There is an instinct in any investigation to seek more evidence, interview more witnesses, and ​turn over every remaining stone. But there also comes a point when the evidence is powerful enough, and the danger of delay is great enough, that inaction is irresponsible. We have reached that point here. For all the reasons given above, President Trump will continue to threaten the Nation's security, democracy, and constitutional system if he is allowed to remain in office. That threat is not hypothetical. As noted above, President Trump has persisted during this impeachment inquiry in soliciting foreign powers to investigate his political opponent. The President steadfastly insists that he did nothing wrong and is free to do it all again. Every day that this Committee fails to act is thus another day that the President might use the powers of his office to rig the election while ignoring or injuring vital national interests. In Chairman Schiff's words: "The argument 'Why don't you just wait?' amounts to this: 'Why don't you just let him cheat in one more election? Why not let him cheat just one more time? Why not let him have foreign help just one more time?'"
Members of the Minority have objected that the evidence is too thin; that it rests entirely on hearsay, speculation, and presumptions. That accusation is false. The evidentiary record developed by the Investigating Committees is extensive. The Committees heard more than 100 hours of deposition testimony from 17 witnesses with personal knowledge of key events. HPSCI heard an additional 30 hours of public testimony from 12 of those witnesses. In addition, the Committees considered the records of President Trump's phone calls with President Zelensky. They obtained hundreds of text messages, which navigate the months-long efforts by Mr. Giuliani and United States officials to push Ukraine to make a public statement announcing the politically-motivated investigations sought by President Trump. They relied on hundreds of public statements, interviews, and tweets by the President and Mr. Giuliani, his personal attorney, unabashedly describing efforts to pursue investigations into former Vice President Biden prior to the 2020 election. And they relied on the press briefing by Mr. Mulvaney, who confirmed why the military and security assistance was withheld and then told Americans to "get over" it.
The record contains extensive direct evidence—powerfully corroborated by circumstantial evidence—rendering the key facts indisputable. Most critically, the record includes the President's own words on the July 25 call, which by itself reveals his corrupt scheme. It includes testimony and contemporaneous text messages from Ambassadors Volker and Sondland, who were directed by the President to "Talk to Rudy," and who pushed Ukrainian officials to publicly announce the two investigations to "break the logjam" on assistance and a White House visit. It includes the testimony of three first-hand witnesses to the July 25 phone call. It includes the testimony of Mr. Holmes, who overheard President Trump ask Ambassador Sondland whether President Zelensky was "going to do the investigation," and who was then told by Ambassador Sondland that President Trump cared only ​about the "big stuff" (namely, the investigations and nothing else relating to Ukraine). It includes the testimony of Ambassador Sondland, a political appointee of the President who had multiple discussions with him—and who confirmed that there was a "quid pro quo" relating to the potential White House visit for President Zelensky, and that, in light of President Trump's statements and conduct, it became clear that assistance was also conditioned on an announcement of the investigations..
Collectively, the evidence gathered by the Investigating Committees is consistent, reliable, well-corroborated, and derived from diverse sources. It paints a detailed picture of President Trump's scheme. To the extent that the Committees did not obtain additional documents—or additional testimony from witnesses with personal knowledge of the relevant events—that is a direct consequence of the President's unprecedented, categorical, and indiscriminate order that the entire Executive Branch unlawfully defy duly authorized Congressional subpoenas. As explained in the discussion of the Second Article of Impeachment, the President's obstruction of Congress is not cured by the possibility of judicial review, which, among other difficulties, would undoubtedly last well beyond the very election that President Trump seeks to corrupt. Given the President's unlawful cover up, and given the powerful evidence of a looming Presidential threat to the next election, this Committee cannot stand silent. Nor can it agree that the record is insufficient just because it could be broader. The record stands firmly on its own two feet. Indeed, President Trump has not stonewalled the entire impeachment inquiry so that he can protect a hidden trove of exculpatory evidence.
Put simply, President Trump's own words reveal that he solicited a foreign government to investigate his political rival. The President did so for his own political gain, rather than for foreign policy reasons. The testimony of experienced, expert officials in his own administration—including several of his own appointees—reveal that the President used his official powers as leverage to pressure a vulnerable strategic partner to do his bidding. And every indication, every piece of evidence, supports that the President will abuse his power again. Under these circumstances, Congress is duty-bound to invoke its "sole Power of Impeachment."
To the Framers of our Constitution, tyranny was no abstraction. They had suffered under King George III. They had studied republics that faltered when public virtue fell to private vice. They knew that freedom demands constant protection from leaders whose taste of power sparks a voracious need for more. So even as they created a powerful Presidency, they authorized Congress to impeach and remove Presidents whose persistence in office threatened the Constitution. As they designed this impeachment power, they turned repeatedly to three risks: corrupt abuse of power; betrayal of the nation through foreign entanglements; and corruption of free and fair elections.
President Trump has realized the Framers' worst nightmare. He has abused his power in soliciting and pressuring a vulnerable foreign nation to corrupt the next United States Presidential ​election by sabotaging a political opponent and endorsing a debunked conspiracy theory promoted by our adversary, Russia. President Trump has done all this for his own personal gain, rather than for any legitimate reason, and has compromised our national security and democratic system in the process. After he was caught, President Trump defiantly insisted his conduct was "perfect."
Democracy is fragile. Men and women have fought and died to protect ours—and for the right to participate in it. The President of the United States is a steward of that system, in which "We the People" are sovereign. His duty is to uphold the Constitution and protect our lives and liberty. But President Trump has betrayed that trust. He has placed his own interest in retaining power above our national security and commitment to self-governance. He has done so before, he has done so here, and he will undoubtedly do so again. To protect the Nation, and preserve our freedom, President Trump must be impeached by the House of Representatives for abuse of power.
* ↑ See Staff of H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong., Constitutional Grounds for Presidential Impeachment 18 (Comm. Print 2019) (hereinafter "Constitutional Grounds for Impeachment (2019)").
* ↑ Id.
* ↑ Id. at 8.
* ↑ U.S. Const., art. II, § 3, cl. 5.
* ↑ Andrew Kent et al., Faithful Execution and Article II, 132 Harv. L. Rev. 2111, 2120, 2179 (2019).
* ↑ Background and History of Impeachment: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 49 (1999) (statement of Michael J. Gerhardt).
* ↑ The Federalist No. 65, at 426 (Alexander Hamilton) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed., 2004).
* ↑ 3 Jonathan Elliot, ed., The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution 497-98 (1861) (hereinafter "Debates in the Several State Conventions").
* ↑ Constitutional Grounds for Impeachment (2019), at 20. Many other Framers agreed that abuse of power is an impeachable offense. In explaining why the Constitution must authorize Presidential impeachment, Edmund Randolph warned that "the Executive will have great opportunit[ies] of abusing his power." 2 Max Farrand, ed., The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, 67 (1911). Charles Pinckney agreed that Presidents must be removed who "behave amiss or betray their public trust." 4 Debates in the Several State Conventions, at 281. Reverend Samuel Stillman asked, "With such a prospect [of impeachment], who will dare to abuse the powers vested in him by the people?" 2 Debates in the Several State Conventions, at 169.
* ↑ Report of the Committee on the Judiciary, Impeachment of Richard M. Nixon, President of the United States, H. Rep. No. 93-1305, at 1-4 (1974) (hereinafter "Committee Report on Nixon Articles of Impeachment (1974)"). Obstruction of justice was also the basis for an article of impeachment against President Clinton, though his conduct did not involve official acts. See H. Res. 611, 105th Cong. (1998).
* ↑ Committee Report on Nixon Articles of Impeachment (1974) at 139.
* ↑ Id.
* ↑ Papers of Thomas Jefferson, To Thomas Jefferson from John Adams, 6 December 1787, National Archives, Founders Online.
* ↑ The Federalist No. 68, at 441 (Alexander Hamilton).
* ↑ Brianne Gorod & Elizabeth Wydra, The First Magistrate in Foreign Pay, The New Republic, Nov. 11, 2019.
* ↑ 2 Farrand, Records of the Federal Convention, at 66.
* ↑ Id. at 68.
* ↑ Constitutional Grounds for Impeachment (2019), at 45.
* ↑ Id. at 24. Thus, "[a]lthough the Framers did not intend impeachment for genuine, good faith disagreements between the President and Congress over matters of diplomacy, they were explicit that betrayal of the Nation through plots with foreign powers justified removal." Id. at 23.
* ↑ 2 Farrand, Records of the Federal Convention, at 64.
* ↑ Id. at 65.
* ↑ Id. at 69.
* ↑ See Constitutional Grounds for Impeachment (2019), at 27.
* ↑ Id.
* ↑ Id. at 11.
* ↑ The Trump-Ukraine Impeachment Inquiry Report: Report for the H. Perm. Select Comm. on Intelligence Pursuant to H. Res. 660 in Consultation with the H. Comm. on Oversight and Reform and the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs at 208, 116th Cong. (2019) (hereinafter "Ukraine Report")
* ↑ The facts that follow constitute the "key findings of fact" set forth in the Ukraine Report. Id. at 34-36.
* ↑ See, e.g., Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2086 (2015); see also id. at 2099 (finding that the "[e]arly practice of the founding generation also supports th[e] understanding of the President's "role of chief diplomat").
* ↑ See id. art. II, § 2 ("The President shall . . . appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law.").
* ↑ U.S. Const. art. II, § 3.
* ↑ Those official acts include the President's public statements openly and corruptly urging and soliciting Ukraine to undertake investigations for his personal political benefit (which were made in his capacity as President and expressly directed to a foreign nation), as well as conduct undertaken by Mr. Giuliani while acting as the President's agent and facilitated by the President's implied or express direction that United States officials facilitate Mr. Giuliani's efforts.
* ↑ Donald J. Trump, FEC Form 99 Miscellaneous Text, Image No. 201701209041436569, filed January 20, 2017.
* ↑ Alexander Burns & Jonathan Martin, Joe Biden Announces 2020 Run for President, After Months of Hesitation, N.Y.Times, Apr. 25, 2019.
* ↑ Kenneth P. Vogel, Rudy Giuliani Plans Ukraine Trip to Push for Inquiries That Could Help Trump, N.Y. Times, May 9, 2019 (hereinafter "Vogel Giuliani") (reporting on interview with Giuliani) ("Somebody could say it's improper. And this isn't foreign policy—I'm asking them to do an investigation that they're doing already and that other people are telling them to stop. And I'm going to give them reasons why they shouldn't stop it because that information will be very, very helpful to my client, and may turn out to be helpful to my government.").
* ↑ Ukraine Report at 16-17.
* ↑ Id.
* ↑ Id.
* ↑ Id. at 17.
* ↑ Id. at 19.
* ↑ Id. at 19.
* ↑ Id.
* ↑ Id.
* ↑ Id. "Following these discussions, Dr. Hill reported back to Ambassador Bolton, who told her to 'go and tell [the NSC Legal Advisor] that I am not part of whatever drug deal Sondland and Mulvaney are cooking up on this.' Both Dr. Hill and Lt. Col. Vindman separately reported the incident to the NSC Legal Advisor." Id.
* ↑ Id. at 18-20.
* ↑ Sondland Hearing Tr. at 18.
* ↑ Ukraine Report at 94.
* ↑ The White House, Memorandum of Telephone Conversation: Telephone Conversation with President Zelenskyy of Ukraine 3 (July 25, 2019) (hereinafter "July 25 Call Record"). That said, President Trump's solicitation was not confined to the July 25 call, but rather was reiterated and conveyed continuously by his agents within and outside the United States Government (including Mr. Giuliani). See, e.g., Ukraine Report at 34-35, 147-49.
* ↑ July 25 Call Record at 3.
* ↑ Id. at 4.
* ↑ H. Res. 755, 116th Cong. (2019).
* ↑ Ukraine Report at 72.
* ↑ Id. at 67-70.
* ↑ Id. at 78-80.
* ↑ Id. at 22.
* ↑ Id. at 81, 173 n.451.
* ↑ Andrew E. Kramer, Ukraine Knew of Aid Freeze in July, Says Ex-Top Official in Kyiv,N.Y. Times, Dec. 3, 2019.
* ↑ Ukraine Report at 127, 190 n.843 (quoting from written statement of Ambassador Sondland in Impeachment Inquiry: Gordon Sonland: Hearing Before the H. Perm. Select Comm. on Intelligence, 116th Cong. (Nov. 20, 2019)). 465
* ↑ Id. at 127; see also Sondland Hearing Tr. at 104.
* ↑ Ukraine Report at 82.
* ↑ Caitlin Emma & Connor O'Brien, Trump Holds Up Ukraine Military Aid Meant to Confront Russia, Politico, Aug. 28, 2019.
* ↑ Ukraine Report at 129.
* ↑ Id.
* ↑ Id. at 132.
* ↑ Id. at 180-81.
* ↑ Id. at 133-34.
* ↑ Editorial, Trump Tries to Force Ukraine to Meddle in the 2020 Election, Wash. Post, Sept. 5, 2019.
* ↑ Ukraine Report at 134.
* ↑ Id. at 135.
* ↑ Id. at 135. Ambassador Sondland's recitation of his call with President Trump is the only evidence that President Trump suggested this was "not a quid pro quo." Moreover, Ambassador Sondland testified that President Trump made that statement, unprompted, on September 7—only after the White House had learned of a whistleblower complaint regarding the July 25 call and President Trump's efforts to pressure Ukraine, and the Washington Post had reported about the President's pressure campaign on Ukraine. In addition, President Trump immediately followed his stated denial of a quid pro quo by demanding that President Zelensky still make a public announcement, while the military assistance remained on an unexplained hold. For these reasons, and those detailed in the Ukraine Report, President Trump's self-serving denial of conditionality after he had been caught is not credible.
* ↑ Id. at 135.
* ↑ Id.
* ↑ Ukraine Report at 23; Sondland Hearing Tr. at 58.
* ↑ Ukraine Report at 139; The White House, Press Briefing by Acting Chief of Staff Mick Mulvaney (Oct. 17, 2019).
* ↑ Vogel Giuliani
* ↑ Id.
* ↑ Id. at 18.
* ↑ Id. at 19.
* ↑ Sondland Opening Statement at 21, Ex. 4.
* ↑ Ukraine Report at 20.
* ↑ July 25 Call Record at 5.
* ↑ Text Message from Yermak to Ambassador Volker (Aug. 10, 2019, 5:42 PM).
* ↑ E-mail from Ambassador Sondland to Thomas Brechbuhl and Lisa Kenna (Aug. 11, 2019, 10:31 AM) (forwarded to Secretary of State Pompeo).
* ↑ Sondland Hearing Tr. at 26. While President Trump and President Zelensky met at the U.N. General Assembly on September 25, no White House visit date has been set. The fact of the White House visit, as confirmed in the Ukraine Report, is "critical" to President Zelensky, to show "U.S. support at the highest levels." Ukraine Report at 84 & n.456 (quoting Holmes Dep. Tr. at 18).
* ↑ John M. Donnelly, Ukrainian Lives Hung in Balance as Trump Held Up Aid, Roll Call, Oct. 24, 2019.
* ↑ See id.
* ↑ Taylor Dep. Tr. at 42-43.
* ↑ See Text Message from Ambassador William Taylor to Ambassador Sondland (July 20, 2019, 1:45 AM).
* ↑ Roman Olearchyk, Cleaning Up Ukraine in the Shadow of Trump, Fin. Times, Nov. 27, 2019 (interview with Ruslan Ryaboshapka) (hereinafter "Olearchyk").
* ↑ See Taylor Dep. Tr. at 137-38 ("Mr. Yermak and others were trying to figure out why this was . . . . They thought that there must be some rational reason for this being held up, and they just didn't—and maybe Washington they didn't understand how important this assistance was to their fight and to their armed forces. And so maybe they could figure–so they were just desperate.").
* ↑ Hill-Holmes Hearing Tr. 24, 54.
* ↑ Impeachment Inquiry: Ambassador William Taylor and Mr. George Kent: Hearing Before the H. Perm. Select Comm. on Intelligence, 116th Cong. 41 (Nov. 13, 2019).
* ↑ Andrew E. Kramer, Ukraine's Zelensky Bowed to Trump's Demands, Until Luck Spared Him, N.Y. Times, Nov. 7, 2019.
* ↑ Tara Law, "Nobody Pushed Me." Ukrainian President Denies Trump Pressured Him to Investigate Biden's Son, Time, Sept. 25, 2019.
* ↑ Ukraine Report at 146-47.
* ↑ Id. at 129.
* ↑ Kenneth P. Vogel & Andrew E. Kramer, Ukraine's Leader, Wiser to Washington, Seeks New Outreach to Trump, N.Y. Times (Dec. 13, 2019).
* ↑ Id.
* ↑ Molly O'Toole & Sarah D. Wire, $35 Million in Pentagon Aid hasn't Reached Ukraine, Despite White House Assurances, Los Angeles Times, Nov. 11, 2019.
* ↑ Ukraine Report at 145. Notably, "Ms. Cooper testified that such an act of Congress was unusual—indeed, she had never heard of funding being extended in this manner." Id.
* ↑ Id.
* ↑ H. Res. 755, 116th Cong. art. I (2019).
* ↑ See Ukraine Report at 47-49.
* ↑ Id. at 47.
* ↑ Dep't of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2575 (2019).
* ↑ July 25 Call Record at 3.
* ↑ Id. at 3-4.
* ↑ Id.
* ↑ Republican Staff of the H. Perm. Select Comm. on Intelligence, 116th Cong.,Rep. on Evidence in the Democrats' Impeachment Inquiry in the House of Representatives 12 (Comm. Print 2019) (hereinafter "Minority Report").
* ↑ Vindman Dep. Tr. at 152; see also Impeachment Inquiry: Jennifer Williams and Alexander Vindman: Hearing Before the H. Perm. Select Comm. on Intelligence, 116th Cong. 19 (Nov. 19, 2019) ("On July 25th, 2019, the call occurred. I listened in on the call in the Situation Room with White House colleagues. I was concerned by the call. What I heard was inappropriate, and I reported my concerns to Mr. Eisenberg. It is improper for the President of the United States to demand a foreign government investigate a U.S. citizen and a political opponent. I was also clear that if Ukraine pursued an investigation—it was also clear that if Ukraine pursued an investigation into the 2016 elections, the Bidens and Burisma, it would be interpreted as a partisan play.").
* ↑ Williams Dep. Tr. at 149.
* ↑ Vindman-Williams Hearing Tr. at 34.
* ↑ Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter (May 2, 2019, 6:21 AM) (retweeting Kenneth P. Vogel & Iuliia Mendel, Biden Faces Conflict of Interest Questions That Are Being Promoted by Trump and Allies, N.Y. Times, May 1, 2019) (online and searchable at http://www.trumptwitterarchive.com/archive).
* ↑ Vogel & Mendel, Biden Faces Conflict of Interest Questions.
* ↑ See Kenneth P. Vogel, Rudy Giuliani Plans Ukraine Trip to Push for Inquiries That Could Help Trump, N.Y. Times, May 9, 2019.
* ↑ See id.
* ↑ Id.
* ↑ In this interview, Mr. Giuliani stated: "My only client is the president of the United States . . . He's the only one I have an obligation to report to." Id. He also stated that the information he sought to gather "may turn out to be helpful to my government"—confirming that advancing his client's interests was all that mattered, and any incidental relation to United States public policy was secondary and incidental. See id.
* ↑ Ian Schwartz, Giuliani: "Massive Collusion" Between DNC, Obama Admin, Clinton People & Ukraine to Create False Info About Trump, Real Clear Politics, May 10, 2019.
* ↑ Andrew Restuccia et al., Transcript: POLITICO Interviews President Donald Trump on Joe Biden, Impeachment, Bill Barr, North Korea, Politico, May 10, 2019.
* ↑ Rudolph Giuliani (@RudyGiuliani), Twitter (Oct. 30, 2019, 3:15 PM), https://twitter.com/RudyGiuliani/status/1189667099871981573; Rudolph Giuliani (@RudyGiuliani), Twitter (Oct. 30, 2019, 3:15 PM), https://twitter.com/RudyGiuliani/status/1189667101079932928.
* ↑ Rudolph Giuliani (@RudyGiuliani), Twitter (Nov. 6, 2019, 12:43 PM), https://twitter.com/RudyGiuliani/status/1192180680391843841.
* ↑ Ukraine Report at 90.
* ↑ See Sondland Hearing Tr. at 4.
* ↑ Sondland Dep. Tr. at 61-62.
* ↑ Sondland Hearing Tr. at 21, 71.
* ↑ Jordan Fabian, Giuliani Says Ukraine Efforts 'Solely' for Trump's Legal Defense, Bloomberg, Nov. 6, 2019.
* ↑ Text Message from Yermak to Ambassador Volker (July 10, 2019, 4:06 PM).
* ↑ July 25 Call Record at 3.
* ↑ Id. at 3-4.
* ↑ Id. at 4.
* ↑ See Vogel Giuliani. In the months following the July 25 call, as President Trump through his agents continued to apply pressure on Ukraine to announce the investigations, call records confirm that Mr. Giuliani was in regular communication with the White House, Ambassadors Volker and Sondland, and members of President Zelensky's administration. Ukraine Report at 114-21 & nn.719-804.
* ↑ See Hill-Holmes Hearing Tr. at 29.
* ↑ Id.
* ↑ See id. at 29-30, 52.
* ↑ See generally July 25 Call Record.
* ↑ Holmes Dep. Tr. at 25; see also Hill-Holmes Hearing Tr. at 29.
* ↑ Holmes Dep. Tr. at 25; see also Hill-Holmes Hearing Tr. at 29-30.
* ↑ Taylor-Kent Hearing Tr. at 42.
* ↑ Ukraine Report at 68-70.
* ↑ Id. at 132 (describing Ms. Williams' testimony that during the September 1 meeting, the Vice President "assured President Zelensky that there was no change in U.S. policy in turns of our … full-throated support for Ukraine and its sovereignty and territorial integrity."); Williams Dep. Tr. at 83.
* ↑ That point is especially noteworthy given testimony indicating that President Trump did not actually care if the investigations occurred, but just wanted them to be announced. When asked by Chairman Schiff if President Zelensky "had to get those two investigations if [the White House meeting] was going to take place," Ambassador Sondland responded: "[President Zelensky] had to announce the investigations. He didn't actually have to do them, as I understood it." Sondland Hearing Tr. at 43. The Minority Report claims that there is no evidence of corrupt intent because the U.S. "government did not convey the pause to the Ukrainians." Minority Report at ii. But, as explained above, this argument rests on a faulty premise. Ukraine did learn that the assistance had been withheld. And Ukrainian officials came to understand through their communications with United States officials that both the meeting and the military assistance depended on bowing to President Trump's demand for investigations.
* ↑ July 25 Call Record at 3-5.
* ↑ Statement of Kerri Kupec, Dep't of Just. (Sept. 25, 2019).
* ↑ See Olearchyk; see also Ukraine Report at 123. Moreover, with respect to election interference, the President's entire intelligence community had already concluded that Russia was responsible for interfering in the 2016 election and, as President Trump's former Homeland Security Advisor Tom Bossert made clear, the idea of Ukraine hacking the DNC server was "not only a conspiracy theory, it is completely debunked." Id. at 42.
* ↑ Volker Dep. Tr. at 198.
* ↑ Id. at 197.
* ↑ Taylor-Kent Hearing Tr. at 39.
* ↑ Id.
* ↑ Kent Dep. Tr. at 26.
* ↑ Impeachment Inquiry: Kurt Volker and Tim Morrison: Hearing Before the H. Perm. Select Comm. on Intelligence, 116th Cong. 147 (Nov. 19, 2019) (confirming that he did not follow-up on the President's request to "investigate the Bidens" because he did "not understand it as a policy objective"); Vindman Hearing Tr. at 119 (confirming that he prepared the talking points for the call, that those talking points did not "contain any discussion of investigations into the 2016 election, the Bidens, or Burisma," and that he was not "aware of any written product from the National Security Council" suggesting those investigations were part of "the official policy of the United States"); Taylor-Kent Hearing Tr. at 179 ("Mrs. Demings[:] Was Mr. Giuliani promoting U.S. national interests or policy in Ukraine . . .? Ambassador Taylor[:] I don't think so, ma'am. . . . Mr. Kent[:] No, he was not. . . . Mrs. Demings[:] . . . What interest do you believe he was promoting. . .? Mr. Kent[:] "I believe he was looking to dig up political dirt against a potential rival in the next election cycle. . . . Ambassador Taylor[:] I agree with Mr. Kent.").
* ↑ Vindman-Williams Hearing Tr. at 119.
* ↑ Ukraine Report at 52 (citing Deb Riechmann et al., Conflicting White House Accounts of 1st Trump-Zelenskiy Call, Associated Press, Nov. 15, 2019).
* ↑ Hill-Holmes Hearing Tr. at 32.
* ↑ Id. at. 92.
* ↑ Vindman Dep. Tr. at 98.
* ↑ Taylor-Kent Hearing Tr. at 45 (statement of Ambassador Taylor).
* ↑ Ukraine Report at 89.
* ↑ Id. at 90.
* ↑ Morrison Dep. Tr. at 61; see Volker-Morrison Hearing Tr. at 38.
* ↑ Ukraine Report at 106.
* ↑ Id. at 20.
* ↑ Taylor Dep. Tr. at 177.
* ↑ Ukraine Report at 55.
* ↑ Minority Report at ii.
* ↑ USAID, U.S. Foreign Aid by Country (last updated Sept. 23, 2019); Ukraine Report at 100.
* ↑ Ukraine Report at 42 ("[C]ontrary to a public readout of the call originally issued by the White House, President Trump did not mention corruption in Ukraine, despite the NSC staff preparing talking points on that topic. Indeed, 'corruption' was not mentioned once during the April 21 conversation, according to the official call record."); Vindman-Williams Hearing Tr. at 24-25; see July 25 Call Record.
* ↑ Ukraine Report at 38 ("A new president [of Ukraine] had just been elected on an anti-corruption platform."); id. at 52 ("Mr. Zelensky's victory in April 2019 reaffirmed the Ukrainian people's strong desire to overcome an entrenched system of corruption and pursue closer partnership with the West."); id. at 63 ("Ambassador Sondland, Ambassador Volker, Secretary Perry, and Senator Johnson 'took turns' making their case 'that this is a new crowd, it's a new President' in Ukraine who was 'committed to doing the right things,' including fighting corruption. . . . They recommended that President Trump once again call President Zelensky and follow through on his April 21 invitation for President Zelensky to meet with him in the Oval Office."); id. at 65 ("On June 18, Ambassador Volker, Acting Assistant Secretary of State Ambassador Philip T. Reeker, Secretary Perry, Ambassador Sondland, and State Department Counselor T. Ulrich Brechbuhl participated in a meeting at the Department of Energy to follow up to the May 23 Oval Office meeting. Ambassador William Taylor . . . participated by phone from Kyiv. The group agreed that a meeting between President Trump and President Zelensky would be valuable."); Hill-Holmes Hearing Tr. at 23 ("We at the Embassy also believed that a meeting was critical to the success of President Zelensky's administration and its reform agenda, and we worked hard to get it arranged.").
* ↑ Kent Dep. Tr. at 304-05 ("There was great confusion among the rest of us because we didn't understand why that had happened. . . . Since there was unanimity that this [aid] was in our national interest, it just surprised all of us."); Croft Dep. Tr. at 15 ("The only reason given was that the order came at the direction of the President."); Letter from John C. Rood, Under Sec'y of Defense for Policy, Dep't of Defense, to Eliot L. Engel, Chairman, House Comm. on Foreign Affairs (May 23, 2019) ("Ukraine has taken substantial actions to make defense institutional reforms for the purposes of decreasing corruption. . . . [N]ow that this defense institution reform has occurred, we will use the authority provided…to support programs in Ukraine further."); Ukraine Report at 67.
* ↑ Cooper Dep. Tr. at. 92-93 ("Q: But DOD did not conduct any sort of review following this statement about whether Ukraine was making any sort of progress with regard to its anticorruption efforts in July or August or beginning of September. Is that right? A: That is correct. Q: Okay. And that's because, as a matter of process and law, all of those events took place precertification, pre-May? A: That is correct. And in the interagency discussions, DOD participants affirmed that we believed sufficient progress has been made. Q: Okay. And it wasn't just DOD participants who believed that these funds should flow to Ukraine during these interagency meetings, correct? A: That's correct. It was unanimous with the exception of the statements by OMB representatives, and those statements were relaying higher level guidance.").
* ↑ Ukraine Report at 67 ("In a series of interagency meetings, every represented agency other than OMB (which is headed by Mick Mulvaney, who is also the President's Acting Chief of Staff) supported the provision of assistance to Ukraine and objected to President Trump's hold. Ukraine experts at DOD, the State Department, and the National Security Council (NSC) argued that it was in the national security interest of the United States to continue to support Ukraine."); -Vindman-Williams Hearing Tr. at 125 ("Q. And from what you witnessed, did anybody in the National Security community support withholding the assistance? A. No."); Taylor-Kent Hearing Tr. at 35 ("I and others sat in astonishment. The Ukrainians were fighting Russians and counted on not only the training and weapons but also the assurance of U.S. support.").
* ↑ Ukraine Report at 149 ("When it became clear that President Trump was pressuring Ukraine to investigate his political rival, career public servants charged with implementing U.S. foreign policy in a non-partisan manner, such as Lt. Col. Vindman and Ambassador Taylor, communicated to President Zelensky and his advisors that Ukraine should avoid getting embroiled in U.S. domestic politics."); Hill-Holmes Hearing Tr. at 46 ("[O]ur longstanding policy is to encourage them [Ukraine] to establish and build rule of law institutions that are capable and that are independent and that can actually pursue credible allegations. That's our policy. We've been doing that for quite some time with some success. So focusing on particular cases, including cases where there is an interest of the President, it's just not part of what we've done. It's hard to explain why we would do that."); Taylor-Kent Hearing Tr. at 164 (concluding that President Trump's request "went against U.S. policy" and "would've undermined the rule of law and our longstanding policy goals in Ukraine, as in other countries, in the post-Soviet space").
* ↑ Ukraine Report at 38-50; see also id. at 49 ("There was a broad consensus that Ambassador Yovanovitch was successful in helping Ukraine combat pervasive and endemic corruption."); Holmes Dep. Tr. at 142; Hill-Holmes Hearing Tr. at 1819.
* ↑ July 25 Call Record at 3.
* ↑ Erica Werner, Trump Administration Sought Billions of Dollars in Cuts to Programs Aimed at Fighting Corruption in Ukraine and Elsewhere, Wash. Post, Oct. 23, 2019 (hereinafter "Werner").
* ↑ See Werner.
* ↑ Ukraine Report at 17.
* ↑ Minority Report at ii.
* ↑ See, e.g., Ukraine Report at 71-74; Vindman Dep. Tr. at 304-06; Hale Dep. Tr. at 105; Croft Dep. Tr. at 15; Holmes Dep. Tr. at 21; Kent Dep. Tr. at 304, 310; Sondland Hearing Tr. at 56, 80; Cooper Dep. Tr. at 44-45; Sandy Dep. Tr. at 91, 97; Morrison Dep. Tr. at 162-63. Mr. Morrison testified that, during a deputies' meeting on July 26, OMB stated that the "President was concerned about corruption in Ukraine, and he wanted to make sure that Ukraine was doing enough to manage that corruption." Morrison Dep. Tr. at 165. Mr. Morrison did not testify that concerns about Europe's contributions were raised during this meeting. In addition, Mr. Sandy testified that, as of July 26, despite its own statement, OMB did not actually have an understanding of the reason for the hold. See Sandy Dep. Tr. at 55-56.
* ↑ Sandy Dep. Tr. at 49.
* ↑ Kent Dep. Tr. at 304.
* ↑ Cooper Dep. Tr. at 91.
* ↑ Impeachment Inquiry: Laura Cooper and David Hale: Hearing Before the H. Perm. Select Comm. on Intelligence, 116th Cong. 75-76 (Nov. 20, 2019).
* ↑ Id. at 76.
* ↑ Sondland Dep. Tr. at 338.
* ↑ Vindman Dep. Tr. at 306.
* ↑ Sandy Dep. Tr. at 44-45.
* ↑ Josh Dawsey et al., White House Review Turns Up Emails Showing Extensive Effort to Justify Trump's Decision to Block Ukraine Military Aid, Wash. Post, Nov. 24, 2019.
* ↑ Id. Because the White House has withheld these documents from Congress, the Committee is unable to verify the accuracy of the press reporting.
* ↑ Sandy Dep. Tr. at 149-56.
* ↑ European Union, EU-Ukraine Relations – Fact Sheet (Sept. 30, 2019).
* ↑ USAID, U.S. Foreign Aid by Country (last updated Sept. 23, 2019). According to Mr. Holmes, the United States has provided military and security assistance of about $3 billion since 2014. Hill-Holmes Hearing Tr. at 97.
* ↑ Ctr. for Strategic & Int'l Studies, Not Contributing Enough? A Summary of European Military and Development Assistance to Ukraine Since 2014 (Sept. 26, 2019).
* ↑ Minority Report at 78-85.
* ↑ See Robert S. Mueller, III, Report on the Investigation into Russian Interference in the 2016 Presidential Election, Vol. I, 1 (March 2019) (hereinafter, "Mueller Report"); see also Washington Post-ABC News poll, June 28-July 1, 2019, Wash. Post, July 11, 2019 (poll showing Biden at 55, Trump at 41).
* ↑ See U.S. Dep't of Just., Criminal Resource Manual §§ 266-277 (describing the formal process for seeking international assistance in criminal investigations); see also Kent Dep. Tr. at 110-11, 158, 261; Yovanovitch Dep. Tr. at 192, 212; Holmes Dep. Tr. at 201-02; Taylor Dep. Tr. at 136.
* ↑ Kent Dep. Tr. at 111; Yovanovitch Dep. Tr. at 192; see also Matt Zapotosky et al., Trump Wanted Barr to Hold News Conference Saying the President Broke No Laws in Call with Ukrainian Leader, Wash. Post, Nov. 6, 2019.
* ↑ Although the President's supporters have noted that some Ukrainian officials made critical statements about President Trump during his campaign, as witnesses testified, witnesses explained that mere public comments are dramatically different than an orchestrated attempt to interfere in the level of election interference by the Ukrainian government. Moreover, those statements—which the Minority asserts became public in 2016 and early 2017—were not publicly raised by President Trump prior to 2019 nor during his call with President Zelensky, nor is there any evidence that President Trump was concerned about them. Rather, and quite irresponsibly, they have been raised by the President's political supporters in what appears to be an after-the-fact effort to manufacture a pretextual justification for the President's course of conduct.
* ↑ The White House, Remarks by President Trump Before Marine One Departure, Oct. 3, 2019.
* ↑ See, e.g., Taylor-Kent Hearing Tr. at 159 ("it is not role of politicians to be involved in directing the judicial systems of ... other countries"); Taylor Dep. Tr. at 32 ("A formal U.S. request to the Ukrainians to conduct an investigation based on violations of their own law struck me as improper, and I recommended to Ambassador Volker that we stay clear."); VolkerMorrison Hearing Tr. at 156 ("I don't believe it is appropriate for the President to [ask a foreign government to investigate a U.S. citizen]. If we have law enforcement concerns with a U.S. citizen generally, there are appropriate channels for that.").
* ↑ Vindman Dep. Tr. at 18.
* ↑ Taylor Dep. at 32.
* ↑ Volker Hearing Tr. at 103.
* ↑ Hill Dep. Tr. at 173, 175; Kent Dep. Tr. at 198; Vindman Dep. Tr. at 330-31; Hale Dep. Tr. at 121; Holmes Dep. Tr. at 128.
* ↑ Hill-Holmes Hearing Tr. at 40.
* ↑ Luke Barr & Alexander Mallin, FBI Director Pushes Back on Debunked Conspiracy Theory About 2016 Election Interference, ABC News, Dec. 9, 2019.
* ↑ Natasha Bertrand,Senate Panel Look into Ukraine Interference Comes Up Short, Politico, Dec. 2, 2019.
* ↑ In fact, what President Trump raised on his call was a false conspiracy theory that Russia did not hack the Democratic National Committee ("DNC") servers in 2016 and that there is a DNC server hidden in Ukraine. As President Trump's own former Homeland Security Advisor Tom Bossert confirmed and previously advised President Trump, this theory has "no validity" and is "completely debunked." See Sheryl Gay Stolberg et al., Trump Was Repeatedly Warned That Ukraine Conspiracy Theory Was 'Completely Debunked', N.Y. Times, Sept. 29, 2019. The theory appears to stem in part from an inaccurate suggestion by the President that Crowdstrike, an American cybersecurity firm retained by the DNC in 2016 to investigate the origins of Russia's hack on DNC servers, is owned by a Ukrainian. It is not. The intelligence communities have unanimously concluded that Russia interfered in the 2016 election, and the President has been repeatedly advised that the Crowdstrike theory is illegitimate. Dr. Hill testified that Mr. Bossert and National Security Advisor H.R. McMaster "spent a lot of time" in 2017 "trying to refute" the Crowdstrike theory and advised the President that the theory of Ukrainian interference was false. Hill Dep. Tr. at 234
* ↑ Multiple witnesses thus testified that Mr. Shokin was corrupt and failing to fulfill his duties as Prosecutor General. Mr. Kent, an expert on Ukraine and anti-corruption matters, described "a broad-based consensus" among the United States, European allies, and international financial institutions that Mr. Shokin was "a typical Ukraine prosecutor who lived a lifestyle far in excess of his government salary, who never prosecuted anybody known for having committed a crime" and who "covered up crimes that were known to have been committed." Kent Dep. Tr. at 45. In addition, Ukraine's former prosecutor general Yuriy Lutsenko who had perpetuated this allegation of wrongdoing by the Bidens has since recanted and stated that there is no evidence of wrongdoing by Vice President Biden or his son. See Ukraine Report at 42.
* ↑ Courtney Subramanian, Explainer: Biden, Allies Pushed Out Ukrainian Prosecutor Because He Didn't Pursue Corruption Cases, USA Today, Oct. 3, 2019; Neil Buckley, Roman Olearchyk, & Shawn Donnan, IMF Warning Sparks Ukraine Pledge on Corruption and Reform, Fin. Times, Feb. 10, 2016.
* ↑ Taylor-Kent Hearing Tr. at 93; Matt Viser & Paul Sonne, Inside Joe Biden's Brawling Efforts to Reform Ukraine—Which Won Him Successes and Enemies, Wash. Post, Oct. 19, 2019.
* ↑ Andrew E, Kramer, Ukraine Ousts Viktor Shokin, Top Prosecutor, and Political Stability Hangs in the Balance, N.Y. Times, Mar. 29, 2016.
* ↑ Ukraine Report at 42.
* ↑ Because Mr. Shokin failed to prosecute corruption in Ukraine, his removal made it more—not less—likely that Ukrainian authorities might investigate any allegations of wrongdoing at Burisma. In addition, Ukraine's former Prosecutor General Yuri Lutsenko who had perpetuated this allegation of wrongdoing by the Bidens has since recanted and stated that there is no evidence of wrongdoing by Vice President Biden or his son. See Tracy Wilkinson & Sergei L. Loiko, Former Ukraine Prosecutor Says He Saw No Evidence of Wrongdoing by Biden, L.A. Times, Sept. 29, 2019. For these reasons, the allegations that Vice President Biden inappropriately pressured Ukraine to remove Mr. Shokin in order to protect his son are baseless.
* ↑ Taylor-Kent Hearing Tr. at 28.
* ↑ Id. at 53; see also Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community Before S. Select Comm. on Intelligence, 116th Cong. (Jan. 29, 2019) (testimony by Director Daniel R. Coats, Office of the Director of National Intelligence) ("We assess that Russia poses a cyber espionage, influence, and attack threat to the United States and our allies.").
* ↑ Impeachment Inquiry: Marie Yovanovitch: Hearing Before the H. Perm. Select Comm. on Intelligence, 116th Cong. 18 (Nov. 15, 2019). Mr. Holmes elaborated on the importance of Ukraine to our policy goals: "It's been said that without Ukraine, Russia is just a country, but with it, it's an empire." Hill-Holmes Hearing Tr. at 162.
* ↑ Ukraine Report at 69; Morrison-Volker Hearing Tr. at 11.
* ↑ See, e.g., Ukraine Report at 67-69; Kent. Dep. Tr. at 202, 338-339.
* ↑ Ukraine Report at 68; Taylor Dep. Tr. at 153.
* ↑ Ukraine Report at 129; Taylor-Kent Hearing Tr. at 40.
* ↑ See Ukraine Report at 83. Mr. Kent also testified to this point, explaining that a White House meeting was "also important for U.S. national security because it would have served to bolster Ukraine's negotiating position in peace talks with Russia. It also would have supported Ukraine as a bulwark against further Russian advances in Europe." Id. at 83-84.
* ↑ Ukraine Report at 68, 83-84.
* ↑ John Hudson & Anne Gearan, Trump Meets Russia's Top Diplomat Amid Scrap Over Election Interference, Wash. Post, Dec. 10, 2019.
* ↑ Taylor-Kent Hearing Tr. at 169-70.
* ↑ Taylor-Kent Hearing Tr. at 52-53.
* ↑ Hill-Holmes Hearing Tr. at 35.
* ↑ Ukraine Report at 149; Taylor-Kent Hearing Tr. at 24.
* ↑ Hill-Holmes Hearing Tr. at 36.
* ↑ Id. at 35.
* ↑ Yovanovitch Hearing Tr. at 17.
* ↑ Hill-Holmes Hearing Tr. at 23.
* ↑ Id. at 38-39.
* ↑ Betsy Swan, Ukrainians: Trump Just Sent Us 'a Terrible Signal', Daily Beast, Dec. 11, 2019; see also Michael Birnbaum, Ukraine Desperately Wants the U.S. on its Side. They Just Don't Know who has Trump's Ear Anymore, Wash. Post, Nov. 22, 2019 (quoting a Zelensky ally who noted that the U.S. delay in military aid is "making us rethink how U.S. policy is operating").
* ↑ Ukraine Report at 150; Taylor-Kent Hearing Tr. at 165.
* ↑ Ukraine Report at 150; Taylor-Kent Hearing Tr. at 164.
* ↑ Ukraine Report at 150; Volker-Morrison Hearing Tr. at 139.
* ↑ Id., at 139. President Trump's removal of Ambassador Yovanovitch following a discredited smear campaign on her character, and subsequent comments attacking her and telling a foreign leader that she would "go through some things," contributed to this harm, as well. As she explained, "[i]f our chief representative is kneecapped it limits our effectiveness to safeguard the vital national security interests of the United States." Ukraine Report at 49; Yovanovitch Hearing Tr. at 22.
* ↑ Yovanovitch Hearing Tr. at 17.
* ↑ Ukraine Report at 136; Text Message from Ambassador Taylor to Ambassador Sondland (Sept. 9, 2019, 12:31 AM).
* ↑ Hill-Holmes Hearing Tr. at 175.
* ↑ Yovanovitch Hearing Tr. at 19.
* ↑ Akhil Reed Amar, America's Constitution: A Biography 8 (2006).
* ↑ 4 Debates in the Several State Conventions, at 331; see also James Madison, Federalist No. 14.
* ↑ James Madison, Federalist No. 37, at 268.
* ↑ The Impeachment Inquiry into President Donald J. Trump: Constitutional Grounds for Presidential Impeachment Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. (Dec. 4, 2019) (written testimony of Professor Pamela S. Karlan).
* ↑ Id.
* ↑ Id. (testimony by Professor Pamela S. Karlan in response to question by Chairman Jerrold Nadler).
* ↑ The sole exception is a provision that restricts the Presidency to natural born citizens. U.S. Const. art. II, § 1. As relevant here, this provision is intended to guard against improper foreign influence in American politics. See 1 James Kent, Commentaries on American Law 255 (1826).
* ↑ See Bluman v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 800 F. Supp. 2d 281 (D.D.C. 2011), aff'd, 565 U.S. 1104 (2012).
* ↑ See Constitutional Grounds for Impeachment (2019) at 24-28.
* ↑ Id. at 3.
* ↑ Id. at 16.
* ↑ Giles Jacob, A New Law-Dictionary 95 (1729) (hereinafter "A New Law-Dictionary"); see also 1 W. Hawkins, A Treatise of Pleas of the Crown, ch. 67, § 6 (1716) (hereinafter "Pleas of the Crown") (noting that bribery "was sometimes viewed as High Treason").
* ↑ Pleas of the Crown, ch. 67, § 3.
* ↑ Cong. Research Serv., Impeachment and the Constitution 45 & n. 475 (Nov. 20, 2019).
* ↑ Id. at 46.
* ↑ Id. at 36 (describing impeachment proceedings against Judge G. Thomas Porteous Jr. and Judge Alcee L Hastings).
* ↑ 2 Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution § 794 (1833).
* ↑ Proceedings of the United States Senate and the House of Representatives in the Trial of Impeachment of Robert W. Archbald, S. Doc. No. 1140, 62nd Cong., at 1695 (1913).
* ↑ See The Impeachment Inquiry into President Donald J. Trump: Constitutional Grounds for Presidential Impeachment Before H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. (2019) (hereinafter "Constitutional Grounds Hearing (2019)") (written testimony of Professor Jonathan Turley) ("Under the common law definition, bribery remains relatively narrow and consistently defined among the states. 'The core concept of a bribe is an inducement improperly influencing the performance of a public function meant to be gratuitously exercised.'") (quoting John T. Noonan, Jr., Bribes: The Intellectual History of a Moral Idea xi (1984)); id. (testimony by Professor Noah R. Feldman in response to question by Representative Jerrold L. Nadler) ("Bribery had a clear meaning to the Framers, it was -- when the President, using the power of his office, solicits or receives something of personal value from someone affected by his official powers."); see also id. (written testimony of Professor Pamela S. Karlan); id. (written testimony of Professor Michael J. Gerhardt) (similar).
* ↑ See Constitutional Grounds Hearing (2019) (written testimony of Professor Jonathan Turley); id. (written testimony of Professor Noah R. Feldman); id. (testimony by Professor Michael J. Gerhardt in response to question by Special Counsel Norman L. Eisen); id. (testimony by Professor Pamela S. Karlan in response to question by Special Counsel Norman L. Eisen); see also Constitutional Grounds for Impeachment (2019), at 31-38.
* ↑ Noonan, Bribes, at 430; Pleas of the Crown, ch. 67, § 2.
* ↑ Rex v. Vaughan, 98 Eng. Rep. 308, 311 (K.B. 1769).
* ↑ William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol. 2, Book 4, ch. 10, § 17 (1771); A New Law-Dictionary, at 95 (defining "Bribery" as "the Receiving, or Offering, any undue Reward . . . to act contrary to his Duty.").
* ↑ See 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries * 139; Rex v. Plympton, 2 Ld. Raym. 1377, 1379 (1724); Rex v. Higgins, 102 Eng. Rep. 269, 276 (1801) ("A solicitation or inciting of another, by whatever means it is attempted, is an act done"); see also John Marshall Gest, The Writings of Sir Edward Coke, 18 Yale L.J. 504, 522 (1909) ("Of bribery: 'They that buy will sell.'") (quoting Coke, C.J.) (citing 3 Inst. 148); Francis B. Sayre, Criminal Attempts, 41 Harv. L. Rev. 821 (1928) (citing additional cases).
* ↑ Vaughan, 98 Eng. Rep. at 311. American courts subsequently repeated this principle; see, e.g., State v. Ellis, 33 N.J.L. 102, 103-04 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1868) (importing the common law definition of bribery to include attempts); see also William O. Russell, A Treatise on Crimes and Misdemeanors 239-40 (1st U.S. ed. 1824).
* ↑ Pleas of the Crown, ch. 67, § 2; Edward Coke, The Third Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England: Concerning High Treason, and Other Pleas of the Crown, and Criminal Causes 147 (1644).
* ↑ A New Law-Dictionary, at 734 (defining the "Value" of a thing to turn on "the valuation of the owner on it."); see also Com. v. Callaghan, 2 Va. Cas. 460 (1825) (holding that the "corrupt agreement" between two Justices of the Peace to trade votes qualified as a misdemeanor at Common Law).
* ↑ Constitutional Grounds for Impeachment (2019) (written testimony of Professor Jonathan Turley). This case was discussed on multiple occasions at the Constitutional Convention. See, e.g., id. ("Louis XIV bribed Charles II to sign the secret Treaty of Dover of 1670 with the payment of a massive pension and other benefits . . . . In return, Charles II not only agreed to convert to Catholicism, but to join France in a wartime alliance against the Dutch.") (citing George Clark, The Later Stuarts (1660-1714) 86-87, 130 (2d ed. 1956)); 5 Debates in the Several State Conventions, at 343 (recounting Morris's argument that the President should be removable through the impeachment process, noting concern that the President might "be bribed by a greater interest to betray his trust," and pointed to the example of Charles II receiving a bribe from Louis XIV).
* ↑ U.S. Const., art. I, § 9, cl. 8 (emphasis added).
* ↑ July 25 Call Record at 3.
* ↑ Ukraine Report at 140 (referring to President Trump's "scheme" to condition release of military aid and White House meeting on favors to benefit his reelection campaign); see supra at Section III.D.2.
* ↑ Id.; see supra at Section III.D.1.c.
* ↑ 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(2).
* ↑ 18 U.S.C §§ 1343, 1346.
* ↑ 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(2).
* ↑ 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(2)(A).
* ↑ As a threshold matter, the President is plainly a "public official" within the meaning of the criminal anti-bribery statute. See 18 U.S.C. § 201(a)(1) ("public official" includes "an officer . . . acting for or on behalf of the United States").
* ↑ 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(2).
* ↑ United States v. Repak, 852 F.3d 230, 238 (3d Cir. 2017); see also id. at 251-52, 254.
* ↑ United States v. Jacobs, 431 F.2d 754, 759-60 (2d Cir. 1970) (reaffirming that statute "is violated even though the official offered a bribe is not corrupted, or the object of the bribe could not be attained, or it could make no difference if after the act were done it turned out that there had been actually no occasion to seek to influence any official conduct").
* ↑ Id. at 759.
* ↑ July 25 Call Record at 3.
* ↑ Ukraine Report at 9.
* ↑ Id. at 85-86.
* ↑ Id. at 19 (quoting Ambassador Sondland).
* ↑ 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(2) (emphasis added).
* ↑ United States v. Renzi, 769 F.3d 731, 744 (9th Cir. 2014) (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Williams, 705 F.2d 603, 623 (2d Cir. 1983)).
* ↑ Id. (quoting United States v. Gorman, 807 F.2d 1299, 1305 (6th Cir. 1986)).
* ↑ Williams, 705 F.2d at 622-23.
* ↑ Id. at 623.
* ↑ United States v. Croft, 750 F.2d 1354, 1361-62 (7th Cir. 1984) (holding labor of government employee, whose research work product was appropriated by defendant for private gain, was "thing of value" under theft statute, 18 U.S.C. § 641). Courts have also explained that "'Congress's frequent use of the term 'thing of value' in various criminal statutes has evolved the phrase into a term of art'" and have therefore applied it broadly and consistently across various federal statutes. United States v. Petrovic, 701 F.3d 849, 858 (8th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Nilsen, 967 F.2d 539, 542 (11th Cir. 1992) (per curiam)).
* ↑ United States v. Marmolejo, 89 F.3d 1185, 1191-93 (5th Cir. 1996).
* ↑ United States v. Girard, 601 F.2d 69, 71 (2d Cir. 1979) (holding that information was "thing of value" under federal theft statute, and listing cases in which the term was held to encompass "amusement," "the testimony of a witness," "the promise of sexual intercourse," "an agreement not to run in a primary election," and "a promise to reinstate an employee").
* ↑ United States v. Sheker, 618 F.2d 607, 608-09 (9th Cir. 1980) (per curiam).
* ↑ Gorman, 807 F.2d at 1305.
* ↑ United States v. Scruggs, 916 F. Supp. 2d 670 (N.D. Miss. 2012) (holding promise to contact public official constituted "anything of value" under bribery theory of honest services fraud, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343, 1346).
* ↑ United States v. Matzkin, 14 F.3d 1014, 1020 (4th Cir. 1994).
* ↑ United States v. Jeter, 775 F.2d 670, 680 (6th Cir. 1985).
* ↑ Nilsen, 967 F.2d at 543; see also Off. of the Chair of the Fed. Election Comm'n, The Law of a 'Thing of Value: Summary of the Sorts of Tangible and Intangible Goods and Services that Have Been Found to Have 'Value' by the Commission and Other U.S. Government Entities 1 (2019) ("Federal courts have consistently applied an expansive reading to the term 'thing of value' in a variety of statutory contexts to include goods and services that have tangible, intangible, or even merely perceived benefits, for example: promises, information, testimony, conjugal visits, and commercially worthless stock.").
* ↑ See Vogel Giuliani (Giuliani acknowledging that investigations would produce "information [that] will be very, very helpful to my client").
* ↑ See Ukraine Report at 21.
* ↑ Id.; see also id. at 134 (Ambassador Taylor testified that according to information he had received, President Trump "insist[ed] that President Zelensky go to a microphone and say he is opening investigations of Biden and 2016 election interference").
* ↑ Id. at 42.
* ↑ United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 526 U.S. 398, 404-05 (1999) (emphasis in original).
* ↑ Ukraine Report at 35.
* ↑ Id.
* ↑ 18 U.S.C. § 201(a)(3).
* ↑ Ukraine Report at 17-18.
* ↑ Id. at 18.
* ↑ 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2368-70, 2372 (2016).
* ↑ Id. at 2370.
* ↑ U.S. Const., art. II, § 3.
* ↑ See Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. at 2086.
* ↑ See Sondland Deposition Tr. at 25; Sondland Hearing Tr. at 42.
* ↑ Julie Moffett, World: How the U.S. Ranks the Visits of Foreign Heads of State, Radio Free Europe, Aug. 6, 1997.
* ↑ United States v. Jefferson, 289 F. Supp. 3d 717, 738 (E.D. Va. 2017); see 9 Foreign Affairs Manual § 402.3-5 (2019) (explaining that diplomats and other foreign government officials traveling to the United States to engage solely in official duties or activities on behalf of their national government must obtain A-1 or A-2 visas prior to entering the United States).
* ↑ McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2361-62.
* ↑ Id. at 2372 (internal quotation marks omitted).
* ↑ See 52 U.S.C. § 30121.
* ↑ U.S. Const., art. I, § 9, cl. 8.
* ↑ United States v. Blagojevich, 794 F.3d 729, 735 (7th Cir. 2015) (emphasis added).
* ↑ Id.
* ↑ 732?
* ↑ See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343, 1346.
* ↑ 561 U.S. 358, 412 (2010); see also id. at 404.
* ↑ Governor McDonnell, for example, was also charged for honest services fraud. See McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2365. See also, e.g., United States v. Nagin, 810 F.3d 348, 351 (5th Cir. 2016).
* ↑ See, e.g., United States v. Suhl, 885 F.3d 1106, 1111 (8th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 172 (2018); Woodward v. United States, 905 F.3d 40, 44 (1st Cir. 2018).
* ↑ 18 U.S.C. § 1343.
* ↑ Constitutional Grounds for Impeachment (2019) at 10.
* ↑ Proceedings of the U.S. Senate in the Impeachment Trial of President William Jefferson Clinton Vol. II: Floor Trial Proceedings, 106th Cong. 1471 (1999) (statement of Rep. Charles Canady).
* ↑ Ukraine Report at 10.
* ↑ See Ukraine Report at 140-50; 207-60.
* ↑ The White House, Remarks by President Trump and President Niinistö of the Republic of Finland in Joint Press Conference (Oct. 2, 2019).
* ↑ The White House, Remarks by President Trump Before Marine One Departure (Oct. 3, 2019).
* ↑ Id.
* ↑ The White House, Remarks by President Trump Before Marine One Departure (Oct. 4, 2019).
* ↑ 2 Farrand, Records of the Federal Convention, at 67 (statement of Edmund Randolph).
* ↑ See Nixon Impeachment Report at 82-136.
* ↑ Cass R. Sunstein, Impeachment: A Citizen's Guide 47 (2017).
* ↑ As Professor Feldman testified, "If the President of the United States attempts to abuse his office, that is a complete impeachable offense. The possibility that the President might get caught in the process of attempting to abuse his office and then not be able to pull it off does not undercut in any way the impeachability of the act . . . . The attempt itself is the impeachable act." Constitutional Grounds Hearing (2019).
* ↑ Letter from Michael K. Atkinson, Inspector General of the Intelligence Community, to Adam Schiff, Chairman, H. Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence, and Devin Nunes, Ranking Member, H. Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence (Sept. 9, 2019).
* ↑ Michael S. Schmidt et al., Trump Knew of Whistleblower Complaint When He Released Aid to Ukraine, N.Y. Times, Nov. 26, 2019.
* ↑ Editorial, Trump Tries to Force Ukraine to Meddle in the 2020 Election, Wash. Post, Sept. 5, 2019.
* ↑ H. Perm. Select Comm. on Intelligence, Three House Committees Launch Wide-Ranging Investigation into Trump-Giuliani Ukraine Scheme (Sept. 9, 2019).
* ↑ Letter from Adam B. Schiff, Chairman, H. Perm. Select Comm. on Intelligence, to Joseph Maguire, Acting Director of Nat'l Intelligence (Sept. 10, 2019).
* ↑ Cooper-Hale Hearing Tr. at 13, 69; see also Continuing Appropriations Act, 2020, and Health Extenders Act of 2019, H.R. 4378, 116th Cong (2019).
* ↑ Taylor-Kent Hearing Tr. at 40.
* ↑ Taylor Dep. Tr. at 210.
* ↑ Id. at 28, 39.
* ↑ Simon Shuster, 'I Don't Trust Anyone at All.' Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky Speaks Out on Trump, Putin and a Divided Europe, Time, Dec. 2, 2019.
* ↑ Mueller Report, Vol. I at 49.
* ↑ Id.
* ↑ Former Special Counsel Robert S. Mueller, III on the Investigation into Russian Interference in the 2016 Presidential Election: Hearing Before the H. Perm. Select Comm. on Intelligence, 116th Cong. 49 (July 24, 2019) (hereinafter "HPSCI Mueller Hearing").
* ↑ Id. at 48-49.
* ↑ Id.
* ↑ Mueller Report, Vol. I at 5-7, 66-144.
* ↑ Id. at 54.
* ↑ Id. at 5-6. This individual—George Papadopoulos has since been sentenced to 14 days in prison for lying to the F.B.I. about his contacts with Russian intermediaries during the 2016 presidential race. See Mark Mazzetti & Sharon LaFraniere, George Papadopoulos, Ex-Trump Adviser, Is Sentenced to 14 Days in Jail, N.Y. Times, Sept. 7, 2018.
* ↑ Mueller Report, Vol. I at 129. Mr. Manafort has since been sentenced to over 7 years in prison for various federal crimes, including conspiracy against the United States and obstruction of justice. See id., Vol I at 129 n.838.
* ↑ See HPSCI Mueller Hearing Tr. at 29.
* ↑ Mueller Report, Vol. I at 14 n.4; see also id., Vol. I at 174-75.
* ↑ Interview by George Stephanopoulos of President Donald Trump, ABC News, Jun. 13, 2019.
* ↑ Oversight of the Report on the Investigation into Russian Interference in the 2016 Presidential Election: Former Special Counsel Robert S. Mueller, III: Before the H. Comm. On the Judiciary, 116th Cong. (July 24, 2019); see also HPSCI Mueller Hearing.
* ↑ See Karen Yourish & Larry Buchanan, Mueller Report Shows Depth of Connections Between Trump Campaign and Russians, N.Y. Times, Apr. 19, 2019.
* ↑ HPSCI Mueller Hearing Tr. at 30.
* ↑ Constitutional Grounds Hearing (2019) (written testimony of Professor Pamela S. Karlan).
* ↑ Id.'
* ↑ Allan Smith & Rebecca Shabad, House Leaders Unveil Two Articles of Impeachment, Accusing Trump of 'High Crimes and Misdemeanors,' NBC News, Dec. 10, 2019 (quoting Chairman Schiff).
* ↑ Ukraine Report at 7.
* ↑ Id. at 12; The White House, Press Briefing by Acting Chief of Staff Mick Mulvaney (Oct. 17, 2019).
* ↑ Sondland Dep. Tr. at 62; Volker Dep. Tr. 305; Morrison-Volker Hearing Tr. at 39.
* ↑ Sondland Hearing Tr. at 29.
* ↑ Hill-Holmes Hearing Tr. at 29.
* ↑ Id.
* ↑ Sondland Hearing Tr. at 26.