# Shivaji and His Times/Chapter 7

CHAPTER VII.
1667—1670.
§1. State of Mughal Deccan, 1667.
On returning home from Agra in December 1666, Shivaji found the political situation in the Deccan entirely changed. The Mughal viceroy, Jai Singh, was no longer in a position to repeat his former success over the Marathas. Worn out by age, toil, disappointment and domestic anxieties, discredited in his master's eyes by the failure of his invasion of Bijapur, and expecting every day to be removed from his post, Mirza Rajah was visibly hastening to his grave. In May 1667 Prince Muazzam, the newly appointed governor, reached Aurangabad and relieved Jai Singh of his charge. The Rajput veteran set out on his homeward journey in extreme misery of mind and sense of public humiliation, and died on the way at Burhanpur on 2nd July.
The return of the weak and indolent Muazzam and the friendly Jaswant to power in the Deccan (May 1667) relieved Shivaji of all fear from the Mughal side. It is true that soon afterwards an able and active general, bearing implacable hatred to the Marathas, joined the Mughal camp. Dilir Khan returned from the Gond country to the side of Prince Muazzam in October 1667, but the coming of this ​ famous warrior brought no accession of strength to the imperialists. The Prince was jealous of Dilir's influence and prestige at his father's Court, resented his insubordinate spirit, and regarded him as a spy on behalf of the Emperor. The proud Rohila general, on his part, publicly slighted Maharajah Jaswant Singh, the right-hand man and trusted confidant of the Prince. Nor was this the only source of discord in the Mughal army in the Deccan. Rao Karn Rathor, the chief of Bikanir, was an officer in Dilir's contingent. His worthless son Anup Singh, when acting as his father's agent at the imperial Court, influenced the Emperor to transfer the principality of Bikanir to himself. "At the news of this event, the Rao became even more negligent of his duties and reckless than before,...... disobeying the wishes of the Khan. His Rajputs practised gang- robbery in the camp at night, because, his lands having been given to his son, he ceased to get the necessary money for his expenses from his home. It was proved that his soldiers had looted some villages also. Dilir Khan, to save his credit with the Emperor, reported the matter to Court, and the Emperor [in reply] ordered him to arrest the Rao if he [still] acted in that manner. The Court agent of Rao Bhao Singh Hada, learning of the contents of the imperial letter, wrote to his master about it. When Dilir Khan, on the pretext of hunting, approached the camp of Rao Karn and invited him to join in the chase,... the Rao came to him with a ​ few Rajputs. Bhao Singh, on getting news of Dilir Khan having ridden out towards the camp of Rao Karn that morning, arrived there quickly with his own troops and carried off Rao Karn to safety from the midst of Dilir's guards. The two Raos marched together to Aurangabad, 24 miles behind Dilir's army. Dilir Khan did not pull well with Muazzam and Jaswant. He was sent towards Bidar to punish the enemy, but the two Raos remained behind at Aurangabad by order [of the Prince.]" (Dil. 66-68.) The Prince used to help Rao Karn with money in his distress and enforced idleness at Aurangabad.
Thus, Dilir's enemies found a ready shelter with Muazzam. After sending Dilir Khan away to Bidar, the Prince freely indulged his natural love of hunting and witnessing animal combats, and no attempt was made to crush Shivaji.
But even if the viceroy of the Deccan had been a man of greater spirit and enterprise, it would have been impossible for him for some years from this time to get adequate men and money for an attempt to crush Shivaji. The resources of the empire had to be concentrated elsewhere, to meet more pressing dangers. Within a fortnight of Shivaji' s escape from Agra, a large army had to be sent to the Panjab to meet the threat of a Persian invasion, and the anxiety on this point was not removed till December. But immediately afterwards, in March 1667, the Yusufzai rising in Peshawar took place, which taxed the imperial strength for more than a year. ​ It was, therefore, the Emperor's interest not to molest Shivaji at such a time.
§2. Shivaji's peace with the Mughals, 1668.
The Maratha chief, on his part, was not eager for a war with the imperialists. For some years after his return home from Agra, he lived very quietly,! and avoided giving any fresh provocation to the I Mughals. He wanted peace * for a time to organise his Government, repair and provision his forts, and consolidate and extend his power on the western coast at the expense of Bijapur and the Siddis of Janjira. As early as April 1667 he had sent a letter to the Emperor professing terror of the imperial army which was reported to have been despatched against him, and offering to make his submission again and send a contingent of 400 men under his son to fight under the Mughal banners. (Akhbarat, 10-9.)
Aurangzib had taken no notice of this letter. Some months later Shivaji made another attempt. He entreated Jaswant Singh to be his intermediary in making peace with the empire. He wrote to the ​ Maharajah, "The Emperor has cast me off. Otherwise I intended to have begged the task of recovering Qandahar with my unaided resources. I fled (from Agra) in fear of my life. Mirza Rajah, my patron, is dead. If through your intercession I am pardoned, I shall send Shambhu to wait on the Prince and serve as a mansabdar at the head of my followers wherever ordered." (Dil. 69-70.)
Jaswant Singh and Prince Muazzam jumped at the offer and recommended Shiva to the Emperor (9th March 1668), who accepted the proposal, and thus a peace was made which lasted nearly two years. The Emperor recognised Shivaji's title of Rajah, but so far as we can judge did not restore to him any of his forts, except Chakan. For instance, Kalian- Bhiundy continued in the hands of the Mughals. For the next two years Shivaji lived at peace with the Mughal Government. The English factory letters at the close of 1668 and in 1669 describe him as "very quiet" and as "Aurangzibs vassal, (bound) to do whatsoever is commanded by the Prince." His relations with Bijapur also were pacific. "The country all about [Karwar] at present is in great tranquillity. Shivaji keeps still at Rajgarh, and though as yet there is no peace made between this king [Adil Shah] and him, yet both refrain from committing any acts of hostility against one another." [F. R. Surat Vol. 105, Karwar to Surat, 16 Sep., 1668.] Still later, on 17th July, 1669, the English traders at Hubli speak ​ of "Shivaji being very quiet, not offering to molest the king's country." (Ibid.)
In fact, during these three years (1667-69), he was busy framing a set of very wise regulations, which laid the foundations of his Government broad and deep, and have remained an object of admiration to after ages. (Sabh. 27-33, 58; Chit. 78-88.)
In terms of the agreement with the Mughals, Shambhuji was sent to the viceroy's Court at Aurangabad with a Maratha contingent of 1,000 horse, under Pratap Rao Gujar. He was created a Commander of Five Thousand again and presented with an elephant and a jewelled sword. Jagirs were assigned to him in Berar. Half his contingent attended him at Aurangabad, while the other half was sent to the new jagir to help in collecting the revenue. After some months Shambhu was permitted to go back to his father on account of his tender age. For two years the Maratha contingent lived in the jagir, "feeding themselves at the expense of the Mughal dominion," as Sabhasad frankly puts it. (Dil. 70.)
But the peace was essentially a hollow truce on both sides. Shivaji's sole aim in making it was to save himself from the possibility of a combined attack by three great Powers and to recover his strength during this respite from war. Aurangzib, ever suspicious of his sons, looked upon Muazzam's friendship with Shiva as a possible menace to his throne, and he secretly planned to entrap Shivaji a second time, or ​ at least to seize his son and general as hostages. (Sabh. 62.)
The rupture, inevitable in any case, was precipitated by financial causes. Retrenchment of expenditure had now become a pressing necessity to Aurangzib, and he ordered the Mughal army in the Deccan to be greatly reduced. The disbanded soldiery took service with Shiva, who had to find employment for them. Another ill-judged measure of imperial parsimony was to attach a part of Shiva's new jagir in Berar in order to recover the lakh of Rupees advanced to him in 1666 for his journey to the Court. The news of it reached Shivaji when he had completed his military preparations. He sent a secret message to Pratap Rao to slip away from Aurangabad with his men. The other half of the contingent fled from Berar at the same time, plundering the villages on the way! (Dil. 71.) The Zedhe Chronology and Chhatraprakash, p. 68, indirectly suggest that Shivaji renewed the war as a protest against the temple destruction on which Aurangzib launched in 1669.
Sabhasad, however, tells us that Aurangzib wrote to his son to arrest Pratap Rao and Niraji Pant, the Maratha agents at Aurangabad, and attach the horses of their troops, and that the Prince, who had learnt of the order beforehand from his Court agent, revealed it to Niraji and instigated the Marathas to escape, while the imperial order arrived a week ​ afterwards, when it was too late to carry it out. (Sabh. 61-62.)
§3. War renewed, 1670.
This rupture with the Mughals occurred in January 1670, or a month earlier. On 11th Dec. 1669, the Emperor received a despatch from the Deccan reporting the desertion of four Maratha captains of Shiva's clan (biradari) from the imperial service. Aurangzib soon set to strengthening his forces in the Deccan. On 26th January 1670 an order was sent to Dilir to leave Deogarh in the Gond country and hasten to Aurangabad. Daud Khan was ordered to arrange for the defence of his province of Khandesh and then go to Prince Muazzam's assistance. Many other officers were transferred from North India to the Deccan. (Akhbarat, year 12.)
Shivaji opened his offensive with great vigour and immediate success.* His roving bands looted Mughal territory, and he attacked several of the forts ​ which he had ceded to Aurangzib by the Treaty of Purandar. "The imperial officers in command of most of these forts fell after fighting heroically. Every day the Emperor got news of such losses. But some of these places defied capture by reason of the strength of their fortifications and abundant supply of war material." (Dil. 64.)
His most conspicuous success was the capture of Kondana from Udaibhan, its Rajput qiladar, (late in January.) Assisted by some Koli guides who knew the place well, one dark night Tanaji Malusare, with his 300 picked Mavle infantry scaled the less abrupt hill-side near the Kalian gate by means of rope-ladders and advanced into the fort, slaying the sentinels. The alarm was given; the Rajputs, stupefied with opium, took some time to arm and come out; but in the meantime the Marathas had made their footing secure. The garrison fought desperately, but the Mavles with their war cry of Hara ! Hara ! Mahadev ! carried havoc into their ranks. The two chiefs challenged each other and both fell down dead, after a single combat. The Marathas, disheartened by the fall of their leader, were rallied by his brother Suryaji Malusare, opened the Kalian gate to their supporting columns, and took complete possession of the fort. The rest was butchery. Twelve hundred Rajputs were slain, and many more perished in trying to escape down the hill-side. The victors set fire to the thatched huts of the cavalry lines and the signal blaze informed Shivaji at Rajgarh, nine ​ miles southwards, that the fort had been taken. He mourned the death of Tanaji as too high a price for the fort, and named it Singh-garh after the lion-heart that had won it.
Early in March, he recovered Purandar, capturing its qiladar Razi-ud-din Khan. (M. A. 99.) A few days later he looted the village of Chandor, seizing an elephant, 12 horses and Rs. 40,000 belonging to the imperial treasury, then entered the town and plundered it, while the imperial qiladar was shut up in the fort. At one place, however, he met with repulse. The fort of Mahuli (in North Konkan, 50 miles n. e. of Bombay) was held for the Emperor by a gallant and able Rajput named Manohar Das Gaur, the nephew of Rajah Bithal Das of Shah Jahan's time. Shiva invested it in February 1670 and attempted a surprise at night. He sent up 500 of his men to the ramparts by means of rope-ladders. But Manohar Das, who "used to be on the alert day and night," fell on the party, slew most of the men and hurled the rest down the precipice. Shivaji then raised the siege, turned to Kalian-Bhiundy and recovered it after slaying its thanahdar Uzbak Khan and driving out the Mughal outpost there. (Dil. 65; O. C. 3415, Surat to Co., 30 March 1670.) Ludi Khan, the faujdar of Konkan, was wounded in a battle with the Maratha forces, defeated in a second encounter, and expelled from his district. The Mughal faujdar of Nander (?) fled away, deserting his post. ​ About the end of this year (1670) Mahuli too was lost to the Emperor. Manohar Das, conscious of the inadequacy of the garrison and provisions of the fort to repel another attack of the superior Maratha forces, resigned his post in despair of getting reinforcements.Shivaji seized the opportunity, and about December captured Mahuli, slaying its new commandant Alawardi Khan and his garrison of 200 men. (Dil. 65.) By the end of April 1670* he had looted 51 villages near Ahmadnagar, Junnar and Parenda.
The only officer who made an attempt to uphold the imperial prestige in the Deccan was Daud Khan Qureshi, who had been second only to Dilir Khan during Jai Singh's Maratha campaign of 1665. Leaving the province of Khandesh in charge of his son, Daud Khan arrived at Ahmadnagar on 28th March 1670. Six days afterwards he set out with 7,000 cavalry to expel Shiva's men who were roving near Parnir, Junnar, and Mahuli. They evacuated Parnir and Junnar and retired before him, while he occupied these two posts. Meantime, Shivaji had invested three Mughal forts in that region, and Daud Khan left Junnar to relieve them. But at the approach of his Van (under his gallant son Hamid and Ludi Khan) the Marathas raised the siege and fled away, ​ and the Mughal advanced division fell back on their main body.
Soon afterwards, these two officers went with a detachment and destroyed an old fort which the Marathas were repairing on the frontier, 20 miles from Mahuli. Towards the end of April, Daud Khan himself marched to Mahuli. The Emperor in open Court highly praised Daud Khan for his spirit in invading the enemy's country, regardless of the smallness of his own force, and thereby creating a useful diversion of Shivaji's attention. The hot weather evidently put an end to the campaign soon afterwards. (Akhbarat, year 13.)
§4. Quarrel between Muazzam and Dilir.
But the Mughal administration of the Deccan was in no condition to make a stand against Shivaji. For half of the year 1670 it was passing through a civil war of its own. In obedience to the Emperor's anxious and repeated orders, Dilir Khan* had left the Gond country, where he had been profitably employed in squeezing the local chieftains, and set off for the Deccan. Starting from Nagpur on 19th March 1670, he expected to reach Aurangabad and to ​ wait on the Prince on 12th April. But at his near approach the old quarrel between the viceroy and his general broke out afresh. We have seen how they had disagreed in 1667. So, now too, when Dilir, after pursuing some enemy raiders, reached Pathri, 26 miles w. of Aurangabad (about 8th April) and received an order from the Prince to wait on him, he feared to go to the interview lest he should be treacherously imprisoned or killed by the Prince. "Twice or thrice he took horse for the purpose of visiting the Prince, but returned from the way, and spent some days on the plea of illness."
At this act of insubordination, Muazzam and Jaswant wrote to the Emperor accusing Dilir Khan of rebellion. The Khan had already denounced the Prince to the Emperor, saying that he was in collusion with Shivaji and had done nothing to defend the imperial dominions, and offering to crush the Maratha chief if the command of the army in the Deccan were left in his (Dilir's) hands for two years with an adequate supply of artillery and siege-material.
Aurangzib was at this time filled with serious anxiety at Muazzam's wilful conduct, neglect of the imperial business, and failure to carry out orders. Popular voice in the Deccan could account for the open audacity and easy success of Shivaji 's raids and the Prince's inactivity, only by ascribing to Muazzam a treasonable design to attempt his father's throne In alliance with the Marathas .
So, at the end of March 1670 the Emperor had ​ sent his Chamberlain (Khan-i-saman), Iftikhar Khan, to Aurangabad to investigate how matters really stood, — whether Muazzam was really bent on treason and what his relations with Shivaji were. This officer was now instructed to inquire into the Prince's charges against Dilir Khan, and, if the Pathan general was found to be really guilty, to bring him by any means to the Prince's presence and there "do to him what the exigencies of the State required." (Dil. 74.) Iftikhar's brother, a high officer of the imperial Court, learning of this order, wrote secretly to Dilir to be vigilant when visiting the Prince. This message only deepened the alarm and suspicion of Dilir Khan.
Iftikhar, after his arrival at Aurangabad, went out to visit Dilir, and listen to his explanations of his conduct. When he tried to dispel the alarm of the general and swore that no disgrace would be done to him in the Prince's presence, Dilir put him to shame and silence by showing him the letter of his brother at Court, reporting the Emperor's instructions. Iftikhar, therefore, could only advise Dilir to keep away from the Prince longer by pretending illness and then march away without seeking an interview or permission from the viceroy.
Iftikhar, no doubt moved by kindly intentions, thus became guilty of double-dealing. As an English gunner in Muazzam's service wrote, "He played the jack on both sides, and told the Prince that Dilir Khan was his enemy, and went to Dilir Khan and told ​ him that the Prince would seize on him if he came to Aurangabad." (John Trotter to President of Surat, 20 Dec. 1670, in F. R. Surat, Vol. 105.) His unfortunate advice to Dilir only prolonged the tension.
Iftikhar then returned to the Prince's Court and falsely testified to Dilir 's illness, adding many imaginary details to it. Dilir marched southwards to attack a Maratha force (under Pratap Rao) that was raiding Mungi-Pattan (in May.)
Muazzam complained to the Emperor that Dilir Khan had openly defied his authority and that the Khan's Afghan troops used to rob the people and sack the villages along their line of march; and the latter charge was borne out by the reports of the news- writers. Then Dilir, finding his position in the Deccan intolerable, wanted to go back to the imperial Court without waiting for permission; but the Prince ascribed this course to a wicked desire of creating disorder in Northern India. Imperial orders reached him to force Dilir Khan back to the path of obedience. The Prince set himself to raise an army for a war with Dilir and called in the Mughal detachments from the outlying posts to his banners.
Dilir Khan was pursuing a Maratha band across the Godavari river, when he heard of the arrival of a farman from the imperial Court, and divined its purport. His former suspicion and anxiety now deepened into alarm and perplexity. Though it was the height of the rainy season (August), the rivers swollen and the roads miry, he burnt his tents and ​ stores and fled northwards with his army on horse- back. Marching "in great fear of life, without distinguishing between night and day," he reached the ferry of Akbarpur on the Narmada and swam his horses across the raging stream, losing many men by drowning. Thence he proceeded to Ujjain, the capital of Malwa, to rest for a few days from the fatigues of this march.
As soon as he started from the south, Prince Muazzam and Jaswant gave him chase with all the available Mughal troops, calling upon Shivaji to come to their aid ! The Deccan was filled with wild rumours of a civil war among the imperialists, which were "so confused that we cannot write them for credible." (O. C. 3470, Bombay to Surat, 1 Sep. 1670.)
In the pursuit of Dilir Khan, Prince Muazzam reached the pass of Changdev, six miles from the Tapti, intending to cross the river and enter Burhanpur, the capital of Khandesh, of which Daud Khan was subahdar. This governor refused to let him cross his frontier and prepared for armed resistance. The Prince distributed a month's pay to his soldiers to hearten them for the coming struggle. But this unexpected opposition brought him to a halt for some time, during which a letter came from the Emperor ordering Muazzam back to Aurangabad (September.) The Prince's evil genius, Jaswant Singh, was separated from him and posted at Burhanpur until further orders. ​ For, in the meantime, Bahadur Khan, the governor of Gujrat, had taken Dilir Khan under his protection and written to the Emperor praising Dilir's loyalty and past services, explaining how the unreasonable antipathy of J as want and the misrepresentations of backbiters had turned the Prince's mind against the Khan, and recommending that Dilir might be permitted to serve under him as faujdar of Kathiawad. The Emperor's suspicion and alarm had also been excited by Muazzam's approach to Hindusthan; it looked so very like his own move in 1657 ! Indeed, his own position now was weaker than Shah Jahan's in that year, for, the war with Shivaji had drawn the greater part of the Mughal forces into the Deccan and Aurangzib had no army in Northern India large enough to confront his sons. It was the talk of the Prince's camp that " if he had marched forward, he would before this have been king of Hindusthan." (Trotter to Surat.) Muazzam promptly obeyed his father's order and returned to Aurangabad at the end of September, 1670.* ​ These internal troubles paralysed the Mughal arms, and Shivaji made the most of this goldenopportunity. We have seen how he had recovered several of his forts early in the year. His cavalry bands roamed over the country, plundering far and wide. In March the English factors at Surat wrote, "Shivaji marches now not [as] before as a thief, but in gross with an army of 30,000 men, conquering as he goes, and is not disturbed though the Prince lies near him." (O. C 3415)
§5. Second Loot of Surat.
In April Bahadur Khan visited Surat with 5,000 horse, to guard the town against an apprehended attack by Shiva. In August there were false rumours that Muazzam, then supposed to be in rebellion against his father, was coming to Surat, "to take possession of this town and castle." The Mughals demanded from the Court of Bijapur a contingent of 12,000 horse for service against Shivaji, and some ammunition from the English at Bombay for the fort of Koridru ( ?) People were expectant as to what the imperialists would do when the rains would cease and campaigning again become possible. (F. R. Surat, Vol. 3. Consult. 16 and 18 Aug. 1670. O. C. 3457.) But Shivaji, as usual, struck the first blow.
Muftakhar Khan, too, was punished for communicating official secrets to Dilir Khan. Both brothers remained deprived of office for some months. (M. A. 101; Akhbarat, 13-3.) ​ On 3rd October he plundered Surat for the second time.
Throughout September he had been assembling a large body of cavalry at Kalian, evidently to invade Gujrat. (F. R. Surat, Vol. 3. Consult. 12 Sep. 1670.) The matter was so notorious that on 12th September the English factors at Surat* had rightly concluded that "that town would be the first place he would take," and "foreseeing the ensuing danger, [we] had taken a convenient time to empty all our ware-houses at Surat of what goods were ready baled and sent them down to Swally ;" even their entire Council with the President (Gerald Aungier) were at Swally at the beginning of October. And yet the Mughal governor was so criminally negligent as to keep only 300 men for the defence of the city. On 2nd October came successive reports of Shiva's arrival with 15,000 horse and foot within 20 miles of Surat. All the Indian merchants of the city and even the officers of Government fled in the course of that day and night. On the 3rd, Shivaji attacked the city which had recently been walled round by order of Aurangzib. After a slight resistance the defenders fled to the fort, and the Marathas possessed themselves of the whole town except only the English, Dutch and French ​ factories, the large New Serai of the Persian and Turkish merchants, and the Tartar Serai midway between the English and French houses, which was occupied by Abdullah Khan, ex-king of Kashgarh, just returned from a pilgrimage to Mecca. The French bought off the raiders by means of ' Valuable presents." The English factory, though it was an open house, was defended by Streynsham Master with 50 sailors,' and the Marathas were received with such a hot fire from it that they lost several men, and, leaving the English alone, assaulted the Kashghar king's serai from the advantageous position of some avenues next to the French factory, which they were suffered by the French to occupy. The Tartars made a stout resistance all the day, but finding the post untenable" they fled with their king to the fort at night, giving up to plunder their house with its valuable property, including a gold palki and other costly presents from Aurangzib.
From the safe shelter of the Tartar Serai the Marathas prepared to open fire on the English factory the next day, but the resolute attitude of the handful of Englishmen cowed them, and after an angry parley they came to an understanding and agreed not to molest the English. The Dutch warehouse was untouched. "A messenger came from the invader to assure us that no harm would befall us if we remained quiet and gave him our assurances that we would not interfere for or against him." (Dutch Records, Translations, Vol. 29, Surat to Directors, 14 Nov. ​ 1670.) The Turks in the New Serai successfully defended themselves, inflicting some loss on the raiders.
The Marathas plundered the larger houses of the city at leisure, taking immense quantities of treasure, cloth, and other valuable goods, and setting fire to several places, so that "nearly half the town" was burnt to the ground. They then approached the fortress of Surat, threatening to storm it; but it was a mere demonstration, as they were not prepared to conduct a siege, and did not venture close to the walls. The third day (5th Oct.) they again appeared before the English factory, threatening to burn it down. Shivaji and his soldiers were greatly enraged at the loss of their men in the first assault on this house, and they clamoured for vengeance. But the wiser among his captains knew that a second attack would result in further loss of life, and at their request two English agents waited on Shivaji in his tent outside the town, with some presents of scarlet cloth, sword blades and knives. The Maratha king "received them in a very kind manner, telling them that the English and he were good friends, and putting his hand into their hands he told them that he would do the English no wrong." (Surat to Co., 20 Nov. 1670, in Hedge's Diary.)
On 5th October, about noon Shivaji suddenly retreated from the town, though no Mughal army was near or even reported to be coming. "But he had got plunder enough and thought it prudent to ​ secure himself. When he marched away he sent a letter to the officers and chief merchants, saying that if they did not pay him twelve lakhs of Rupees as yearly tribute, he would return the next year and burn down the remaining part of the town. No sooner Shivaji was gone than the poor people of Surat fell to plundering what was left, in so much that there was not a house, great or small, excepting those which stood on their guard, which were not ransacked." Even the English sailors under S. Master took to plundering.
During the three days that Surat was undergoing this fate, the sea-port of Swally marine, ten miles west of it across the Tapti, was not free from alarm. There the English, Dutch and French had built their warehouses and landing-places for ocean-going vessels. Here lay during those days all the members of the English factory, their treasure, and most of the goods bought for Europe. Here the shah-i-bandar (harbour and custom-master), the qazi, and the most eminent merchants (Hindu, Muslim and Armenian) of Surat had taken refuge with the English. Many rich people of the town, too, had fled to the villages north of Surat, across the river and close to Swally. On the 3rd it was reported that Shivaji wanted to send 500 horsemen north of the river to plunder the villages and seize these rich men; and it was feared that he might even come to Swally to demand the surrender of the Surat refugees and blackmail from the European merchants. But the coming of the ​ spring-tide made it impossible for the Marathas to cross the river, and Swally remained safe. So great was the alarm there, however, that on the 3rd the English factors removed their treasure from the shore to one of their ships, and next day loaded all their broadcloth, quicksilver, currall (coral?) &c, on board ship, "to secure them against any attempts of Shivaji." Two other English ships, which were due to sail, were detained at Swally till 10th October, by which time the Marathas were expected to withdraw from the district. The English factors with the help of the ships' carpenters even ran up a wooden platform at one end of the marine yard and mounted eight guns on it, "to defend the Company's estate the best we could."
The manly attitude of the English and their success in scaring away the Maratha myriads, greatly impressed the people of the country. These traders had, as a reward of their brave defence of their factory during the loot of 1664, received commercial privileges from the Emperor. And now the son of Haji Said Beg, the richest merchant of Surat, who had found shelter at Swally, publicly swore that he would migrate with his family to Bombay.
The fact that all the three European factories at Surat were untouched while evey other shop and house was ransacked by the raiders,naturally excited suspicion. Both at Surat and the imperial Court people" 'talked of the three Christian nations having made a league with Shivaji when he was here." The ​ foreign merchants therefore received no reward from the ruler of the land this time. (Master to Swally Marine, 3 Jan. 1671, in F. R. Surat, 105.)
An official inquiry ascertained that Shivaji had carried off 66 lakhs of Rupees' worth of booty from Surat, — viz., cash, pearls, and other articles worth 53 lakhs from the city itself and 13 lakhs worth from Nawal Sahu and Hari Sahu and a village near Surat. (Akhbarat, 13-10.)
But the real loss of Surat was not to be estimated by the booty which the Marathas carried off. The trade of this, the richest port of India, was practically destroyed. For several years after Shivaji's withdrawal from it, the town used to throb with panic every now and then, whenever any Maratha force came within a few days' march of it, or even at false alarms of their coming. On every such occasion the merchants would quickly remove their goods to ships, the citizens would flee to the villages, and the Europeans would hasten to Swally. Business was effectually scared away from Surat, and inland producers hesitated to send their goods to this the greatest emporium of Western India.
For one month after the second sack, "the town was in so great a confusion that there was neither governor nor Government," and almost every day was troubled by rumours of Shiva's coming there again. "On the 12th (i. e., only a week after his departure) it was again rumoured that he was returning with 6,000 horse and 10,000 foot, and that he had ​ already reached Pent, a place about 25 miles distant. At once there was a general exodus and the town was changed from a busy port into the death-like quiet of a desert. The Turkish, English and French merchants abandoned their factories." But the Dutch, 52 men in all, with flags flying and drums beating proceeded from their ship to their factory. This was their belated imitation of the English demonstration of January 1664, when " the English president, at the head of some 200 men, had marched through the town, declaring that he meant to withstand Shivaji with this handful of men !" (Dutch Records, Trans., Vol. 29, letter No. 763 and Vol. 27, No. 719.)
At the end of November, and again about 10th December, 1670, the alarm was revived; and the European merchants met together to concert means of guarding their respective interests. The landward defences of Swally were strengthened by adding a breastwork on the north side of the choultry, and the entrance to the harbour or "hole" was guarded by stationing a ship there. The English used to remove their money and goods from Surat to this place at every such alarm.
In June 1672 the success of the Maratha forces under Moro Pant in the Koli State of Ramnagar, on the way to Surat, kept the city in constant terror for a long time. The Maratha general openly demanded chauth from Surat, threatening a visitation if the governor refused payment. There was the same panic again in February and October 1672, September ​ 1673, October 1674, and December 1679. In short, the destruction of the trade and financial prosperity of Surat was complete. (F. R.)
§6. Battle of Vani, Oct. 1670.
Having concluded the story of the Maratha dealings with Surat, we turn to Shivaji's activities in other quarters.
Prince Muazzam had just returned to Aurangabad after chasing Dilir Khan to the bank of the Tapti, when he heard of the plunder of Surat. He immediately summoned Daud Khan from Burhanpur and sent him off to attack the Maratha raiders. Meantime, Shivaji had left Surat, entered Baglana, and plundered the villages nestling at the foot of the fort of Mulhir. Daud Khan, after sending his baggage back to Aurangabad, marched westwards with light kit to Chandor, a town at which the road from Nasik to Baglana crosses the hill range. Spies brought him news that Shivaji had started from Mulhir, and intended to cross the Chandor range by the pass of Kanchana-Manchana, ten miles west of Chandor. Arriving at the hamlet of Chandor (below the fort) at about 9 P.M., Daud Khan waited to verify the news of the enemy's movements. At midnight his spies reported that Shiva had already issued from the pass and was rapidly following the road to Nasik with half his forces, while the other half of his army was holding the pass to pick up stragglers. Daud Khan at once resumed his march. ​ But the moon set about three o'clock in the morning, and in the darkness the Mughal soldiers were somewhat scattered.
Ikhlas Khan Miana (son of Abdul Qadir Bahlol Khan, a former Pathan leader of Bijapur), commanded the Mughal Vanguard. Ascending a hillock in the early morning, he beheld the enemy standing ready for battle in the plain below. While his men were putting on their armour, which was conveyed on camels, he himself with a handful of followers recklessly charged the enemy. The- Maxajha_rear-guard, which had faced about, was 10,000 strong and commanded By distinguished generals like Pratap Rao Gujar, the Master of the Horse, Vyankoji Datto and Makaji Anand Rao (a natural son of Shahji Bhonsla.) Ikhlas Khan was very soon wounded and unhorsed. After a time Daud arrived on the scene and sent up Rai Makarand and some other officers to reinforce the Van, while he left his elephants, flags and drums at a ruined village on a height, surrounded by nalas, with orders to make his camp and rear-guard halt there when they would come up.
For hours together an obstinate and bloody battle raged. Sangram Khan Ghori and his kinsmen were wounded, and many were slain on the Mughal side. The Marathas, "like the Bargis of the Deccan, fought hovering round the imperialists." But the Bundela infantry of the Mughal army with their abundant firearms kept the enemy back. Daud ​ Khan himself entered the fight, repulsed the enemy with his artillery, and rescued the wounded Ikhlas Khan.
Meantime, in another part of the field, Mir Abdul Mabud, the darogha of the divisional artillery, who had been separated from the main army by a fold in the ground, was attacked. He was wounded with one of his sons and some followers, while another son and many soldiers were slain; and his flags and horses were carried off by the enemy. There was a lull in the fight at noon.
At that time Daud Khan had less than 2,000 men with him, while the Marathas outnumbered him fivefold. In the evening they charged him again, but were driven back, evidently by the artillery. At night the Mughals bivouacked under the autumn sky, their camp was entrenched, and they engaged in burying the dead and tending the wounded. The Marathas retreated to Konkan without further opposition. This battle was fought in the Vani- Dindori subdivision late in the month of October, 1670.*
This battle neutralised the Mughal power for, more than a month. The day after the fight, Daud Khan marched with the broken remnant of his army to Nasik, and halted there for one month, evidently ​ to recoup his strength and also to watch the route from Konkan (by the Tal pass?) The wounded were sent to Aurangabad. Late in November, he removed to Ahmadnagar, but at the end of December he was recalled to the scene of his last battle by the revival of Maratha activity in the Chandor range. (Dil 87, 89, 92.)
§7. Raid into Berar and Baglana.
We shall, for the present, pass over Shivaji's activity at sea and in the western coast-strip during the whole of November and part of December 1670 after his return from Surat. Early in December a Maratha force under Pratap Rao made a raid into Khandesh. Advancing by rapid marches, he plundered Bahadurpura, a village two miles from Burhanpur (the capital of Khandesh), but did not come closer to that city, because of the warning of Jaswant Singh, who had been posted there since September last. Passing into Berar, he fell, when least expected, upon the rich and flourishing city of Karinja, and looted it completely. Four thousand oxen and donkeys were loaded with the booty — consisting of fine cloth, silver and gold, to the value of a krore of Rupees, captured here. All the rich men of the place were carried off for ransom. Only the most eminent one among them escaped in the disguise of a woman. The other towns also yielded vast sums of money. That rich province, with its accumulated wealth of more than half a century of ​ peace and prosperity, afforded a virgin soil to the plunderers in this their first raid. A force, reported to be 20,000 strong, looted the neighbourhood of Ausa and collected chauth, but they rode away without attacking the fort. In the neighbourhood of Karinja and Nandurbar the Marathas took from the affrighted people written promises to pay them one-fourth of the revenue (chauth) in future.*
No resistance was made by the Mughals. Khan-i-Zaman, the governor of Berar, moved too slowly to intercept the raiders, and he stopped on reaching Deogarh. Daud Khan, the governor of Khandesh, was absent campaigning near Ahmadnagar, while his son Ahmad Khan, who officiated as his deputy at Burhanpur, was at open war with Maharajah Jaswant Singh, who was trying to raise money for the Prince's expenses and had demanded five lakhs from the treasury of Khandesh. Daud Khan's son replied that if the Maharajah could procure Aurangzib's order, he would pay him even 20 lakhs, or else not a pice, at which message Jaswant threatened to sack the town. (F. R. Surat, 105, Bombay to Surat, 5 February, 1671.)
Daud Khan from his camp near Ankai Tankai hastened towards Burhanpur. Arriving near the pass ​ of Fardapur he heard that the Marathas returning from Berar had turned aside from Burhanpur and taken the road to Baglana. The situation at the capital of Khandesh was also saved by the arrival there on 1st January 1671 of a new supreme commander, Mahabat Khan, who took Jaswant away with himself when leaving the town.
From Fardapur, Daud Khan swerved to the west and entered Baglana on the heels of the Marathas. While Pratap Rao had been sacking Karinja in Berar, another Maratha band under Moro Trimbak Pingle had been looting West Khandesh and Baglana, and now these two divisions had united in the neighbourhood of Salhir. They had plundered the village under the hill-fort of Mulhir and laid siege to Salhir. Daud Khan arrived near Mulhir at about 8 P.M., but could advance no further as most of his camp and army were lagging behind.
The Khan urged his troops to start next morning in order to raise the siege of Salhir. He himself set out before sunrise. But most of his men had not yet arrived, and the few that had come with him were scattered. They busied themselves in cooking food or taking rest in the camp, instead of resuming the march with their chief. Daud Khan heard on the way that Salhir had already been captured by the Marathas, and so he returned in disappointment to Mulhir, and after a short halt there fell back on his new base near Kanchana- Manchana in the Chandor range. ​ Shivaji had invested Salhir with a force of 20,000 horse and foot, and one day finding the garrison off their guard he had scaled the wall by means of rope-ladders. The qiladar Fathullah Khan fell fighting, and his wife's brother then gave up the fort to the enemy. This happened about 5th January 1671. The success of the Marathas continued. They threatened other forts in the province, such as Mulhir, Chauragarh and Talulgarh. Their roving bands cut off the grain supply of Neknam Khan, the faujdar of Baglana (whose head- quarters were at Mulhir.) They also laid siege to Dhodap, the loftiest hill-fort in the Chandor range.*
In the winter of 1670-71, Shivaji received a visit from Chhatra Sal, the son of Champat Rai Bundela, the late chieftain of Mahoba. This young man had entered the imperial army at Jai Singh's recommendation, but he was discontented with what he considered the inadequate reward of his services in the Mughal invasion of the Gond country. So, he left the Mughal camp on the plea of hunting and made an adventurous journey with his wife tor Maharashtra by obscure and roundabout paths. He offered to serve under Shiva against the Emperor. Shivaji received him with honour, praised his manly spirit, but sent him back with the advice to rise ​ against Aurangzib in Bundelkhand, saying, "Illustrious chief ! conquer and subdue your foes. Recover and rule your native land.... It is expedient to commence hostilities in your own dominions, where your reputation will gain many adherents.... Whenever the Mughals evince an intention of attacking you, I will distract their attention and subvert their plans, by active co-operation." The contemporary historian, Bhimsen, however, tells us that Chhatra Sal returned from Raigarh in disappointment as he found the provincial spirit of the Deccani Court uncongenial to him and Shivaji never gave his trust or any high office to men from Northern India. (Chhatraprakash, canto 11; Pogson's Boondelas, pp. 52-53; Dil. 132.)
* ↑ * Shivaji's two years' peace with the Mughals 1668-1669 and the causes of rupture: Sabh. 59-62; Chit. 121-124; Dil. 69-71. The terms of this treaty are nowhere given in detail. F. R. Surat, 105. Zedhe Chron., p. 188, tells us that the peace was made and Shambhuji was sent to Muazzam in Oct. 1667, and the Maratha contingent under Pratap Rao went to Aurangabad in August 1668 and fled from it in December 1669.
* ↑ * Sabhasad, 59, says, "In four months he recovered the 27 forts he had ceded to the Mughals." But it is an exaggeration. There is a most spirited but legendary ballad on the capture of Singh-garh (Powadas.) The Akhbarat and Dilkasha have been of invaluable help in the history of the campaigns of 1671 as reconstructed here. Marathi bakhars are silent. Z. C. gives dates in the Hindu lunar year, and says that during 1670 the Marathas gained Kondana, Purandar, Trimbak, Rohira, Mahuli, Lohgarh, Ahivant, Ravla-Javla and Markandagarh, but that Mahabat Kh. recovered the last three forts in 1671.
* ↑ * The text of Akhbarat here is doubtful. The year may be 1671. Z. C. asserts that Shiva recovered Mahuli about the middle of Aug. 1670.
* ↑ * Quarrel between Muazzam and Dilir Khan in 1670: Dil. 73-75, 80-82 (main source); Ishwardas (important) 59a— 60a; Storia, ii. 161-166; while M. A. 101, Akhbarat, year 13, and English records give dates and a few details. O. C. 3415, F. R. Surat Vol. 3, Vol. 105 (Bombay to Surat. 5 Sep.) &c. Mirat-i-Ahmadi, 290, merely copies Ishwardas.
* ↑ * We may here conclude this episode in the life of Muazzam. In April his mother, Nawab Bai, was sent from Delhi to visit him and bring him back to the right path by her influence. She returned from her mission in September. Iftikhar Khan, the imperial Chamberlain, had harshly reprimanded the Prince. But when the Emperor learnt that Muazzam's heart was loyal and that his motives had been misrepresented to him by his enemies, the imperial wrath fell upon Iftikhar Khan for having exceeded his instructions and been guilty of double-dealing at Aurangabad. His brother,
* ↑ * The second loot of Surat: Surat Council to Co., 20 Nov. 1670. (Hedge's Diary, ii. pp. ccxxvi— ix.) F. R. Surat Vol. 3, (Consult, at Swally Marine, October); Dutch Records, Trans. Vol. 29, No. 763. M. A. 106 (bare mention.) Sabh. 63-64. Chit. 72, confused and unreliable.
* ↑ * Battle of Vani-Dindori; entirely based upon Dilkasha, 84-88, (Bhimsen was an eye-witness); with a few points from Sabh. 64-65.
* ↑ *Dil. 91. Akhbarat, year 13—5, 10, 11. F, R. Surat. 105, Letter of J. Trotter, 20 Dec. 1670; S. Master to President, 19 Dec. Dil. 64 (bare mention of Karinja.) Sabh. 71 Karinja is 77. 30 E. 20.32 N.
* ↑ *Dil. 98-100. Akhbarat, year 13 — 12. 15. T. S. 33a. K. K. ii. 247-249 (gives another story of the surrender of Salhir.)