# Black v. Cutter Laboratories/Dissent Douglas

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* Case Syllabus
* Opinion of the Court
* Dissenting Opinion Douglas
United States Supreme Court
351 U.S. 292
Black v. Cutter Laboratories
Argued: April 26, 1956. --- Decided: June 4, 1956
Mr. Justice DOUGLAS, with whom The CHIEF JUSTICE and Mr. Justice BLACK concur, dissenting.
I believe, with all deference, that the decision of the Court abuses the rule that we will not undertake to review a decision of a state court that rests on an independent state ground. No independent state ground is present in this case. Rather, it is easily demonstrated, I think, that the decision of the Supreme Court of California squarely and directly raises an important question under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
At times we have ambiguous opinions that make us unsure of the precise grounds of the decision of the state court. In this case, however, we are left in no doubt. The arbitrators found that the employer discharged this worker because of her labor union activities, using the charge of Communism as a mere pretext. The Supreme Court of California went on no such ground. It is clear from a reading of its opinion, 43 Cal.2d 788, 278 P.2d 905, that it approved the employer's discharge of this worker because she was a Communist. The tactics of Communists and the dangers of Communism make up a total of 11 pages of the 21-page majority opinion of the Supreme Court. Among other things, the Supreme Court of California said:
'From the array of congressional and legislative findings which have been quoted above, if not from the common knowledge of mankind, it must be accepted as conclusively established that a member of the Communist Party cannot be loyal to his private employer as against any directive of his Communist master.' Id., 43 Cal.2d at page 806, 278 P.2d at page 916. It went on to hold that 'acts of sabotage by Communists are reasonably to be expected at any time such acts may be directed by the party leader', id., 43 Cal.2d at page 807, 278 P.2d at page 916, and that an employer has the 'right to discharge employees who upon the established facts are dedicated to be disloyal to him, to be likewise disloyal to the American labor union they may purport to serve, and who constitute a continuing risk to both the employing company and the public depending upon the company's products.' Id., 43 Cal.2d at page 807, 278 P.2d at page 917.
The arbitrators found that any grievance against Doris Walker was a stale one, the employer having known all her Communist activities for two years. The Superior Court upheld that finding. The District Court of Appeal ruled that the employer 'sat back for two and a half years' and then used her Communist activities as an excuse for injuring the union in its lawful labor activity. 266 P.2d 92, 100. But the Supreme Court held that she was discharged not for her 'labor union activities' but for her 'Communist Party activities.' 43 Cal.2d at page 808, 278 P.2d at page 917. It said that the fact that the employer, knowing all the facts, did nothing for two years was irrelevant, since it was against the 'public policy' of California to conclude that there was a waiver by the failure to discharge a Communist. Id., 43 Cal.2d at page 806, 278 P.2d at page 916. It is plain, therefore, that the judgment of the Supreme Court of California sustains a discharge of this worker because she was a Communist.
The Court says that the parties to a collective-bargaining agreement may make Communist Party membership 'just cause' for discharge of an employee, that discharge for that reason is merely a matter of contract between the union on the one hand and the employer on the other, and that when the contract is enforced no federal right is infringed. I disagree with that doctrine. It is a dangerous innovation to meet the exigencies of the present case. It violates First Amendment guarantees of citizens who are workers in our industrial plants.
I can better illustrate my difficulty by a hypothetical case. A union enters into a collective-bargaining agreement with an employer that allows any employee who is a Republican to be discharged for 'just cause.' Employers can, of course, hire whom they choose, arranging for an all-Democratic labor force if they desire. But the courts may not be implicated in such a discriminatory scheme. Once the courts put their imprimatur on such a contract, government, speaking through the judicial branch, acts. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 68 S.Ct. 836, 92 L.Ed. 1161; Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 73 S.Ct. 1031, 97 L.Ed. 1586. And it is governmental action that the Constitution controls. Certainly neither a State nor the Federal Government could adopt a political test for workers in defense plants or other factories. It is elementary that freedom of political thought is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment against interference by the States, DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364-365, 57 S.Ct. 255, 259-260, 81 L.Ed. 278, and against federal regimentation by the First Amendment.
Government may not favor one political group over another. Government may not disqualify one political group from employment. And if the courts lend their support to any such discriminatory program, Shelley v. Kraemer, supra, teaches that the Government has thrown its weight behind an unconstitutional scheme to discriminate against citizens by reason of their political ideology. That cannot be done in America, unless we forsake our Bill of Rights.
It has hitherto been assumed that Communists, except and unless they violate laws, are entitled to the same civil rights as other citizens. In 1937, Chief Justice Hughes wrote to that effect for a unanimous Court in DeJonge v. Oregon, supra. That decision held that a State could not punish Communists for having a public meeting to discuss a matter of public concern. Chief Justice Hughes said that First Amendment rights might be abused 'to incite to violence and crime.' Id., 299 U.S. at page 364, 57 S.Ct. at page 260. But he went on to say, 'The people through their Legislatures may protect themselves against that abuse. But the legislative intervention can find constitutional justification only by dealing with the abuse. The rights themselves must not be curtailed. The greater the importance of safeguarding the community from incitements to the overthrow of our institutions by force and violence, the more imperative is the need to preserve inviolate the constitutional rights of free speech, free press and free assembly in order to maintain the opportunity for free political discussion, to the end that government may be responsive to the will of the people and that changes, if desired, may be obtained by peaceful means. Therein lies the security of the Republic, the very foundation of constitutional government.' 299 U.S. 364-365, 57 S.Ct. 260.
Cutter Laboratories is an important pharmaceutical factory. It may need special protection. It may need to establish safeguards against sabotage and adulteration. It may need special screening of its employees. But there is not a word in the present record indicating that it needs protection against Doris Walker. She has no criminal record. She is guilty of no adulteration, no act of sabotage. The factory in question has not been plagued with any such problem. It is only the fear that Doris Walker might at a future time engage in sabotage that is made the excuse for her discharge. I do not think we can hold consistently with our Bill of Rights that Communists can be proscribed from making a living on the assumption that wherever they work the incidence of sabotage rises or that the danger from Communist employees is too great for critical industry to bear.
The blunt truth is that Doris Walker is not discharged for misconduct but either because of her legitimate labor union activities or because of her political ideology or belief. Belief cannot be penalized consistently with the First Amendment. As Mr. Justice Roberts wrote for a unanimous Court in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-304, 60 S.Ct. 900, 903, 84 L.Ed. 1213, the First Amendment 'embraces two concepts,-freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be. Conduct remains subject to regulation for the protection of society.' The Court today allows belief, not conduct, to be regulated. We sanction a flagrant violation of the First Amendment when we allow California, acting through her highest court, to sustain Mrs. Walker's discharge because of her belief.

## Notes

This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
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