# History of Mexico (Bancroft)/Volume 5/Chapter 19

Table of Contents
CHAPTER XIX.
FALL OF THE CAPITAL.
August-September, 1847.
Panic at Mexico — Scott is Lured into an Armistice — Delusive Peace Negotiations — Patriotic Sentiments — Santa Anna Manœuvring to Gain Time — Mutual Recriminations — Molino del Rey — Capture and Recapture of the Battery — Some Mexican Heroes — A Barren Triumph — Inner Defences of the Capital — The Hill Fortress of Chapultepec — Bombardment and Storming of the Castle — Worth Carries the Gate of San Cosme — Quitman's Operations against Belen — Santa Anna Evacuates the City — Entry of Scott — A Patriotic Uprising
Within the walls of Mexico all was panic and con fusion. The very stillness following the battle had cast an ominous chill upon the people, which spread with the creeping shades of night and the threatening clouds — a fitting pall for the scattered slain. None knew but that the Yankees might be stealing up in the darkness, or lurking beneath the walls; and the bugle-sound of the retreating bands, now growing fainter in the distance, might fall with startling blasts before the coming dawn. There was relief, therefore, in the patter of the rain, in the calls of stalking sen tries, and in the excitement of preparations for de fence, with the hurrying adjutants bearing orders, the tramp of marching regiments, and the bustling noise of sapper parties. Santa Anna was the guiding spirit. With all his blunders and failures, he was still the only one to whom the people could turn, with his energy arid tact, his resolution and ability for providing means and organization.
​The following morning saw the enemy moving toward the south-west, Worth's division occupying Tacubaya, Pillow's Mixcoac, and Twiggs' San Angel, Quitman's still remaining at Tlalpam, where it had obtained a share in the success by checking the cavalry division. The orders to its leader were to cut the American lines, and he hastened to execute them by an imposing demonstration at a sufficient distance to avoid the disorderly effect of bullets; and under cover of this another less valuable officer was sent with a small body to taunt the garrison with a bold though momentary sweep at nearer range, which involved the expenditure of a certain amount of powder. The closer approach of the Americans reminded Santa Anna of the absolute need for a suspension of hostilities in order to recuperate; but after having by his inefficient manœuvres added to the list of disasters, he naturally feared to expose himself still further by appearing as a supplicant. He had already induced among others the British consul-general to sound Scott concerning the proposal made at Puebla; and this official willingly accepted the task, influenced thereto by his jealousy of the Americans. He found it easy to play upon the weaknesses of a stubborn and conceited general, and convince him that by pressing his advantage he might drive away the government, rouse national despair, and dispel the prospects for a near and glorious peace. Already predisposed in favor of some such measure, Scott sent a proposal to open negotiations. This pleased Santa Anna; for it left his opponent in the apparent position of begging for an armistice. His spirit rose accordingly, and Minister Alcorta received instructions to signify in a tone of condescension that the president would listen to the proposal. ​Santa Anna's hesitation was proof in itself of the popular feeling against peace, in the country if not at the capital. He himself was guided wholly by the political vane, swayed especially now by party agitation; and he stood prepared for anything that could promote his own ambitious schemes, regardless of stipulations and rules, however solemn. He boasted loudly that the suspension of hostilities was accepted by him merely to prepare for fresh combats, and that he would willingly serve in a subordinate capacity for the defence of his country. In short, he stood ready as hitherto to sacrifice his life upon its altar.
The conditions for the armistice, arranged on August 22d, prohibited as usual either army from strengthening its position or force, permitted the Americans freely to obtain supplies, save in arms and ammunition, and provided for an exchange of prisoners on equal terms. This was ratified on the following two days, greatly to the chagrin of the majority in the American army: some moved by a thirst for spoils, others by a desire for glory, while a more reflecting class regretted the surrender of evident military advantages, without a single guarantee to bind a man so wily and unscrupulous as Santa Anna. Even Mexican opponents ​to this chief sought to decry terms which granted respite to a foe small in numbers and in want of supplies; but it is undeniable that his diplomacy here gained a triumph that saved the capital for a time.
Commissioner Trist now hastened to open negotiations for peace by urging an early meeting with Mexican commissioners. The selection for the latter fell upon generals Herrera and Mora y Villamil, and the able lawyers Couto and Atristain, the first chosen for his prominence as late president and chief of the peace party, one whose influence would sustain Santa Anna's attitude, and divide the brunt of responsibility. Couto, distinguished also as a writer, was conceded to be the diplomatist of the party. They met first at Atzcapotzalco on August 27th, and subsequently at a less distant place. Trist lost no time in the customary haggling and browbeating, but came at once to the point by presenting the project brought from Washington, which in article four demanded from Mexico the cession of all territory beyond a line following the Rio Grande del Norte along the south border of New Mexico, and up its western boundary to the first branch of the River Gila, thence along this tributary and main stream to the mouth of the Colorado River, and along the centre of the gulf of California into the ocean. It further required free transit across the Isthmus of Tehuantepec, and offered in return a sum of money to be agreed upon, besides abandoning all claims for war expenses, and promising to pay all private claims against Mexico on the part of citizens ​of the United States, as recognized by conventions of 1839 and 1843 or still pending.
It will be observed that this demand was for half the territory of the republic; and there were many who thought that more should have been claimed at first, if only to hasten Mexico into readier acquiescence. The commissioners undoubtedly recognized the forbearance that left them some soil to call their own, and the generosity that abstained from charging for the trouble and cost of appropriating the renainder. They required three days to deliberate, less perhaps for fully grasping this lesson in modesty and magnanimity than to sound once more the public feeling. And this was not slow in asserting itself.
As for the people, their impulses were lofty, determined. They deemed it disgraceful to yield to a handful of enemies, when all the country stood prepared to rise at the call of a worthy leader, even without a clear prospect of success. But they had been blinded to the true condition of affairs, the superior enginery and mancœuvres of the enemy, the desolation of war, the threatening uprisings and dismemberment, the absence of united action on the part of their generals. Those who pondered on these things were sure that past lessons must have taught better tactics, and trained superior officers; for during the war of independence their fathers had triumphed over far greater numbers. It was cowardly even to listen to the insolent demands preferred; it was base treachery to surrender — nay, to sell — their northern countrymen to the foe. Under such taunts and pressure prudence had to give way to a false patriotism, inspired by men guided by base personal motives and aims, and who, caring nothing for the people, misdirected their efforts, and sacrificed them, apparently not realizing what they were doing. They belonged, of course, to the party ​out of power, which looked with envy on the one in possession; and there were men who resolved that as they could have no share in the millions so temptingly tendered, the government should not be permitted to obtain such means for fortifying its position. Vattel and Perreau were flourished with reckless learning; pamphlets and proclamations were scattered broadcast; and so effectual was the rodomontade as to intimidate or drown every other outcry. But the governors and local authorities thought it their duty to protest against listening to overtures; and it was easy for remote states, as yet free from the ravages of war, to join in the cry. The state of Mexico even threatened to separate from the union. Congress behaved no better. When called upon to express the national will in the pending issue, which was of such importance, its members evaded the responsibility under various excuses, notably the unsafe condition of the capital. The change of meeting-place to Querétaro served to stimulate them but slightly. Among the army officers the most incapable were loudest in their bluster, as the only means of covering their blunders.
The peace party saw the futility of their efforts, but in order to gain time for Santa Anna the commissioners continued the negotiations, arguing against the cession of territory beyond Texas proper with the Nueces for the boundary. Taking the cue from the party in the United States which denounced the war as unjust, they put certain leading questions concerning the motives for the war, and the demand for territory — questions which Trist prudently evaded, while conceding the peninsula of Lower California. Softened by the bland tone of Couto, he moreover distinguished ​himself by offering to refer his proposals to Washington, to which end the armistice would naturally have to be prolonged for about six weeks. His judgment in making such an offer may be questioned in face of the growing sick-list among the United States troops, scattered in unhealthy villages, remote from reënforcements, while their opponents were daily gaining strength. To the Mexicans the proposal seemed so extraordinary that they began to suspect a lurking design to gain time for reënforcements; and being now ready to resume the contest, they resolved to break off negotiations by presenting a counter-project, known to be inadmissible, at least by Trist with his limited powers, and even by Mexico, for that matter, under the changed aspect of affairs, for it offered to surrender all territory beyond the Nueces and latitude 37°.
Scott had been duly warned that Santa Anna was not only infringing the terms of the armistice by defence operations, but displaying an attitude in common with the leaders of public opinion that could not be misunderstood; he was urged to resume hostilities ere the enemy grew too strong. But his suspicions were lulled by the aforesaid neutrals, duly instructed by the chief at Mexico. Perhaps he was ashamed to acknowledge openly that he had been duped. The final turn of the negotiation, however, woke him from his dream.
He now gave vent to his anger in a sharp ​note, September 6th, to Santa Anna, accusing him of violating the armistice, and declaring it at an end by noon on the following day, unless a satisfactory answer was given. This came the same evening in an unequivocal denial of the accusation, with counter-charges against Scott, preferred in a tone of well-feigned grief and indignation, and concluding with the bold declaration that he would repel force with force. And now the alarm-calls burst forth within the city, announcing the speedy recommencement of hostilities. Fresh panic and confusion ensue; and from the gates north and west flow streams of refugees, especially women, children, and foreigners, to hide before the impending storm.
There were sufficient grounds for charges on both sides, although Santa Anna had shown less scruple in securing advantages from the cessation of hostilities, by strengthening the fortifications of the city, calling in troops, enrolling and organizing fresh forces. Scott, on his side, had taken care especially to obtain supplies for nearly three weeks in advance, forage alone being scanty. His artillery had received a valuable addition by the capture of heavy metal, hitherto lacking, and so essential to siege operations; but his force had diminished under casualties and sickness to less than 9,000 effective men, and the efficiency of several corps had suffered somewhat from the sudden interruption to active service and the enforced idleness. It was thought necessary, therefore, to improve the morale of the army by dealing severely with the captured San Patricio ​deserters. Fifty were hanged, and the rest lashed, branded, and imprisoned. The military depôt and hospitals were transferred from Tlalpam to Mixcoac, and orders issued approximating the corps in anticipation of a general assault on the capital, Riley's brigade advancing to Nalvarte, and Pillow dividing his forces between San Borja and Tacubaya.
Scott had been informed, perhaps at the instance of the astute Santa Anna, that at Molino del Rey, King's Mill, a mile from Tacubaya and near the western foot of Chapultepec hill, a cannon foundery was in operation. Worth received orders to make a night descent on the place between the 7th and 8th of September, and destroy the machinery, seizing the powder stored near by. A closer examination by this officer revealed, if not the full strength of the position, at least that the task would prove more than he could accomplish in the proposed raid. His force was accordingly increased, and fearing entanglement in the dark among unknown buildings, he was permitted to postpone the attack till dawn, and to have the help of the artillery. He also proposed to draw greater advantage from the fight than the destruction of a probably imaginary foundery, by following it up, if successful, with an assault on Chapultepec; but Scott's views had not yet risen to the great importance of this fortress, intent as he was ​on attacking the southern front of the city; hence he objected.
Molino del Rey consisted of a range of massive stone buildings, with crenellated walls and parapeted roofs, commanded by the plunging fire of Chapultepec at a distance of some 3,000 feet. A smaller but equally solid building, the casa mata, stood 1,500 feet to the west, surrounded by a quadrangular bastioned field-work. Between these two points rose a battery of three small guns, and in front extended a line of embankment with ditches and patches of maguey, screening the Mexican force, which numbered somewhat over 4,000 effective men under Leon, the next highest officer, General F. Perez occupying the casa mata. To these must be added the cavalry corps of Álvarez, nearly 4,000 strong, which occupied the hacienda de los Morales, a mile westward, with orders to support Leon by flank operations. The force at Molino was much larger on the 7th; for Santa Anna believed Chapultepec to be the next objective point, and proposed to personally defend it, but deceived by the well-directed demonstrations of Scott along the southern line of the city, he retired with a large proportion of his forces to strengthen this line, and left the mill without recognized head or distinct plans. ​
​Worth made dispositions for a vigorous assault on the Mexican centre, to be followed by attacks on either flank; and to this end assigned the centre, facing the Mexican battery, to a storming party of 500 men under Major Wright, Garland's brigade with two light pieces taking position on the right to threaten the molino and cut off support from Chapultepec, and to sustain two twenty-four pounder battering guns on his left. Clarke's brigade under McIntosh with three light pieces faced the Mexican right, which rested on casa mata, and still farther to the left a troop of cavalry was stationed to observe Álvarez, while Cadwalader's brigade stood in reserve behind the centre. This force, reaching 3,500, moved forward during the night and took position along the clear and gently declining ground in front of Molino del Rey, watching for the dawn. With its first faint gleam, the battering guns open fire on the mill, and a whistling of balls and crashing of masonry follow. Yet not a sound rises from the Mexican lines; the place might be deserted. Wright's storming party forms and rushes toward the point marked for the central battery. Its position had been changed, however, and as they advance it bursts upon them at an angle with round shot and grape. They pause, startled; but only for a moment, and then turn upon it with the cry of 'Forward!' Once more a shower of shot that mows its bloody swath, disabling, of officers alone, eleven out of seventeen. There is no further halt, however. The remnant gains the batteries. A brief struggle, hand to hand, and the guns are seized, ready to be turned against their own lines. It is now daylight. Colonel Echeagaray of the 3d light infantry observes the danger; the garrison discharges a withering volley on the storming party, and then with a stentorian ​'Á ellos!' he pounces from out the smoke and hurls them back in disorder, reoccupying the battery.
Worth is equally prompt. He orders forward three companies of the light battalion and a part of the reserve to sustain and rally the shattered column. Garland on his side moves from under the plunging fire of Chapultepec upon the Mexican flank, while his battery runs forward to enfilade the recaptured point. Once more the Americans charge simultaneously from centre and right, under a raking volley of balls and bullets, especially from the roofs. Numbers and impetus prevail. Again the disputed battery falls, and now its deadly vomit turns upon the mill. The fight concentrates in the reëntering angle of the Mexican lines, which had been quickly recognized as the weakest. The heavy cross-fire from the azoteas prevents concerted action among the assailants for a while; but soon a company finds shelter under a bank, and begins to pick off one marksman after another, with steady and fearful precision. The men on the roofs quail as they behold the widening gaps. Their fire slackens, and no sooner do the assailants observe it than on they rush toward the mill, driving back the broken remnants of the front lines. They reach the very walls; and covered by the well-directed fusillade in their rear and flank, they commence almost unmolested to batter the gates and shoot into apertures, widening at the same time the breaches already made. The southern portal yields, and some spring in, while others climb the roof and assist in gaining the north-western entrance. The Mexicans stoutly dispute the passage, under the valiant lead of General Leon; but a bullet stretches him low, and now they waver and fall back. Colonel Balderas steps forward to encourage them. ​His inspiring cheer is taken up; they rally and rush upon the advancing foe. One more effort and the point is gained; but Balderas also falls; and now without another such noble head they retreat, though slowly, step by step, closely pressed by the enemy. Balderas' regiment is conspicuous for its firmness under the onslaught. A rush is made for its banner, but Suazo, one of the officers, tears it down, winds it round his body, and fighting his way through the lines, reaches the cypress grove at the foot of the castle hill, covered with wounds. To this spot the rest of the mill garrison has also retired, save a body of 700 which is cut off, and has at last to hoist the white flag.
The casa mata had played an equally stirring though less important rôle. After a preparatory cannonade with Duncan's battery, McIntosh rushed to the assault of what he regarded as a common fieldwork; but was met by a fusillade so withering as to almost level entire platoons, like gusts of fire shrivelling all before them. McIntosh fell, mortally wounded; Scott, the next in command, was struck dead; and so along the line. Still they struggled on, and still the bullets poured down in unabated fury till nearly one third of the force was disabled. It seemed madness thus to enter the jaws of death. They wavered. And now the Mexicans sallied, with shouts of triumph, and turned the check into a hurried retreat; but instead of following up the advantage by pressing the disordered column and perchance utterly routing it, Perez, the commander, hastened to turn the flank of the assailants of the mill, only to be effectually stopped by a battalion of Cadwalader's reserve. Even now the Americans might have been worsted if Álvarez' cavalry had performed its duty. It had advanced from Los Morales, and stood on the level ground ​about half a mile west of the casa mata, prepared to advance, partly by the main road to the molino, narrowed by a bridge at a small intervening ravine, partly by a clear sweep round it to the left. Álvarez saw his opportunity as McIntosh prepared to assault the casa, and ordered a charge by front and flank. But his seconds bungled and dallied till Duncan, for the time unable to fire on the casa mata, was able to bring up his guns. A few shots sufficed to throw the advancing body into disorder, of which the voltigeur regiment took advantage for a vigorous assault that forced a retreat. Duncan was relieved just in time to renew his cannonade upon the casa, and this time with such effect as to seriously trouble Perez. The fort was a powder-magazine. By this time the mill had fallen, and seeing that soon the brunt would concentrate upon him, he determined to retreat in time. The pursuing Americans captured less than two score of his men.
At this moment, when the battle was practically over, reënforcements appeared along the road skirting the northern side of Chapultepec, under the direction of Santa Anna, as if to retake the mill; but the Americans quickly brought up and unlimbered their guns, assisting the infantry to repulse them, with the loss of a field-piece. Nevertheless the proximity of the commander-in-chief with additional troops restored a certain degree of confidence among those who had retreated into the grove, and assisted indirectly the retreat of Perez. A combined movement might therefore have been undertaken with good prospects, but for the approach of reënforcements ​under Pillow, who on noticing that the battle had become serious hastened to the relief before Scott sent him orders. Still intent on his project to follow up the advantage, and flushed with victory, Worth urged Pillow to aid him in carrying the hill fortress; but this officer would not infringe the distinct instructions of his superior. Perhaps he also objected to assist in plucking another laurel for a rival general. Worth had no alternative save to pick up his dead and wounded and fall back on Tacubaya in face of taunting demonstrations from the Mexicans, to whom he thus abandoned the field, and under the boom of the castle artillery which sounded like trumpet-blasts of victory. Indeed, Santa Anna assumed, and not without reason, that the objective point of the enemy was the fortress, and that his opportune arrival frustrated their plans and compelled them to retreat. At all events, he caused to be sounded a peal of triumph from the city bells, and spread throughout the country a glowing account of his achievement.
So ended a battle which takes rank as perhaps the most strongly contested of any during the war, and, proportionately, the bloodiest; for out of the American force of barely 3,500 men, the casualties numbered 787, among which were 116 killed, the officers suffering exceptionally, to the extent of nearly one third of those engaged. The Mexicans also lost ​heavily, notwithstanding their intrenched position, and they had to surrender about 690 prisoners, four guns, and much ammunition. As for the result achieved, this was reduced to the destruction of a few old cannon moulds, and a furnace, the only vestiges of the foundery, and the weakening and demoralization of the Mexican army; but the moral effect was about equalized by the exultation of the people at the apparent repulse of the Americans, and by the dissatisfaction in the invading army at the narrow escape from defeat and the enormous sacrifices for such barren triumphs, when so much direct work still remained to be done. Scott admitted by the subsequent operations his mistake in neglecting to pursue the advantage gained at the mill. The capture of Mexico seemed as remote as ever, and many officers spoke despondently of the necessity to intrench themselves and await reënforcements, believing, in common with many Mexicans, that the cost of further achievements by their reduced number would ruin them. Notwithstanding their defeat, the Mexicans can point with pride to the brave resistance of their soldiers at the casa and molino, and to the noble efforts of leaders like Echeagaray, Balderas, Gelaty, and Leon. ​One effect of the defeat was a marked increase in desertion, and a declining confidence among the corps, due greatly to the glaring lack of unity and energy among the leaders. This in itself compelled Santa Anna to confine himself more than ever to defensive operations along the inner lines of the capital, with their walls, embankments, and ditches, and their eight garitas, or gates, each forming an intrenched fort, which in times of peace served for customhouses. Owing to the marshy nature of the surrounding land, during this the rainy season, the approach was practically restricted to the corresponding roads, five of them main causeways, whereof the two on the west, and the others more or less, were obstructed by cuts and barricades. The western roads were commanded to some extent by Chapultepec, the only outwork now entering into consideration. The increased demonstrations by the enemy along the south front, marked by the location of a battery at La Piedad, only one mile distant, and the advance of several corps toward it, led naturally to the belief that this was their objective line. Aware of its weakness, as formerly explained, Santa Anna at once directed a large force to throw up a line of intrenchments, extending from Niño Perdido diagonally to the exterior barricade of San Antonio Abad, and provided with ​three batteries, of eleven guns, strong curtains, and wet ditches; in addition to which the main canal was cut, flooding nearly the whole front, the south-east being unapproachable. Scott had been reminded that it was easy to stop this work by cannonade. Instead of doing so, however, he wasted his time with slow disposition of troops and reconnoitring. A strong attack at any time before the 11th of September might have readily gained this front, and with it the city; but when Scott awoke to the reality the intrenchments were finished. At the council now held the opinion of most officers appeared still to favor an attack on the south, rather than against the comparatively unknown lines on the west, which demanded a preliminary and probably costly reduction of Chapultepec. The lately completed defences, however, decided Scott for the western approaches, and especially for the hill fortress, to which he assigned an undue importance, believing that its capture would materially hasten that of the capital. Twiggs was accordingly ordered to continue the demonstrations from La Piedad, against the south, with two batteries, supported by Riley's brigade, while Pillow and Quitman, supported by a portion of Worth's forces, marched during the night to take up position to the west and south of Chapultepec, and erect four batteries with which to open fire upon the castle at daybreak on the 12th. One was located within the Molino del Rey to cover the west approach to the castle, another immediately south of the mill building; the third midway between Tacubaya and the castle, facing its south-west angle; and the fourth on the ​Tacubaya road, directed against the castle front and the battery at its south-east foot. The latter contained three of the eight pieces of artillery here distributed. A fifth battery was placed to the west, with some dragoons and infantry, to check any movement on the part of Alvarez, who had advanced a few hundred feet from his former position, toward the casa mata.
Chapultepec is a picturesque mound, famed far back in the dim traditions of Aztec migrations, and later consecrated to royalty. Montezuma and his predecessors there sought distraction from administrative cares, and communed with dryad oracles in the hallowed grove, whose majestic ahuehuete cedars, furrowed by the sweep of ages, have since inspired a long line of noble viceroys and democratic presidents, and shaded the play-ground for the rising generations of successive races. The north side is inaccessibly steep, and the east and south-east nearly so, leaving a practicable slope only toward the west, besides a triangular road along the southern acclivity, protected at the knee by a bastion. At a height of 160 feet the summit extends into a terre-plein 600 feet in length, surmounted along the northern edge by a heavy yet not untasteful building, erected in 1785 for a viceregal palace. Republican rulers converted it into a college and citadel, and matched the dome and colonnade adornments with ungainly flank projections, parapets, and bomb-proofs, with adjoining bastions and outhouses, the whole enclosed by a parapet wall tapering westward in a crémaillère line to a priest-cap, and protected by ten serviceable pieces of artillery, several of heavy calibre. The slopes were, moreover, provided with walls, and on the west with ditches, mines, and a midway redan. Along the south base ran a wall 1,600 feet long, protected on the southeast by a barricade with artillery across the Tacubaya ​road, and a similar work swept the road skirting the aqueduct along the north base. The exterior fringe of the grove at the western foot was shielded by an embankment with ditch and redan, facing the Molino del Rey. General Bravo, of independence-war fame, commanded here a garrison reduced by desertion to about 800 regular troops, of which 250 were posted on the summit and the rest in the grove and batteries.
Pillow takes possession of the unoccupied mill at dawn on the 12th, under an ineffective fusillade from the grove, and at the same time the southern batteries open fire. Blazing fuse and balls whirl fast and furious against the castle, crushing through the walls, and scattering dust and débris upon the defenders. The monumental frame begins to gape in ruins, and even the girdling parapet is torn by noisy shells. But like a lion at bay, it rises in defiance and roars in prompt reply, a counterpart to the song of battle. It is a music of the spheres; but death wields the baton beneath a lurid canopy, wherein Valkyries chant the dread refrain while watching for their prey.
The aim of the assailing batteries is becoming fearfully precise for the garrison pent up above within the narrow space, the artillerists suffering so severely that toward noon several of the cannon are silenced. But the din and crash do not diminish, for Pillow seizes the opportunity to place the battery just south of the mill, so far held in check by the summit fire; and now the bombardment grows fiercer still, throughout the afternoon, till darkness interferes. ​Despite the damage inflicted, the enemy had gained little by his day's work, save in keeping the adversary in doubt as to his real intent. Santa Anna therefore remained inactive, unwilling to hazard a field movement with the reserve. Later in the day he visited the castle and made some dispositions, swelling the force in the grove to 500 men. Night brings a cessation of hostilities, but no repose. The noise of preparations for the portentous morrow resounds on both sides, and the soldiers rest on their arms watching for the dawn. Scott has issued orders for an assault both by Pillow and Quitman, led by two picked storming parties of 250 men each, while Worth advances in closer support, and Twiggs throws out Smith's brigade to his left to check reënforcements from the city. Early on the 13th, the batteries burst forth anew in lively cannonade along the south front of the capital as well as against the castle. Meanwhile the infantry moves into position for the fray. Bravo now becomes convinced of the enemy's object, and sends a warning message to Santa Anna, pointing out the need for supporting the hill fortress; but the latter holds aloof with other views, deceived to some extent by a feint against the south-western city gates.
Suddenly at 8 a. m., the roar of artillery ceases, and a significant silence intervenes, the prelude to another struggle. A voltigeur regiment is seen to rush from the crumbling precincts of the mill and flit along the southern wall. Its goal is the redan in a breach of the wall at the southern end of the ​entrenchments that fringe the western slope of the grove. So quick is the advance that ere a second volley can be delivered the voltigeurs are springing over ditches and parapets, and falling in the rear of the intrenched line, whose defenders are occupied by a simultaneous front attack by the fellow-regiment. Thus surprised, there is no alternative save to fall back among the sheltering trees, where they hold forth a while against the ever-growing numbers brought up by Pillow. General Perez falls in covering the retreat, but Colonel Xicotencatl, worthy descendant of the famed Tlascaltec chieftain, rallies this overwhelmed band to fresh efforts till he also succumbs; and then they break at the foot of the hill. Now the hill batteries direct their fire into the very grove, and shot and shell come crashing through the branches, scattering splinters in all directions, and shaking the heavy moss that hangs like stalactites, or even felling some ancient ahuehuete that for centuries had mutely preached the nothingness of man.
The fire from the hill is becoming unendurable, and, as the storming party is still delayed, Pillow orders the front line to take its place. A few rounds of canister and a fusillade to clear the way, and up charge the voltigeurs, seeking what shelter they can from bowlders and projections against the galling rain of bullets. Several officers fall; Pillow himself is wounded; and maddened by the loss, the men rush blindly on, changing the cry of 'Forward' into a wild yell of 'Vengeance!' Ah! the beastliness of war! Good men killing good men; patriots hewing down patriots as if each regarded the other as poisonous reptiles, when indeed there is no personal issue between them. Fools all, they and their masters — blinder than bats, more senseless than donkeys, thus to feel obliged to butcher each other a while, before settling down to an ​adjustment of differences on some plan within the domain of reason! But what have wire-pulling politicians to do with right or reason? What care office-seekers, men who spend their lives in their efforts to supplant others and gain for themselves a better place — what do they care who and how many are killed or mangled and buried in the ditches?
Numbers and impetus prevail; the redan is carried, and so closely are the defenders pursued that the officer charged to fire the saucissons of the mines, just beyond, waits for a moment. That moment saves the pursuers. He is disabled; the saucissons are destroyed, and the rush continues to the crest of the hill. Here the enemy have to pause, however, at the foot of the parapet, from which grape and bullets now pour upon them, tearing wide gaps in the ranks.
While waiting for ladders, they crouch back behind rocks and into hollows which have been neglected by the engineers, and thence begin to pick off artillerists and sharp-shooters with a precision so terrible as soon to silence the artillery and force the evacuation of the bastion at the knee of the front ascent. By this time Cadwalader, who had replaced the wounded General Pillow, brings up the ladders and fascines; and now there is a rush across the ditch to plant the ladders. The musketry fire redoubles, and down come the first climbers, dead and disabled, and so the next daring stormers; but assailants cluster thick and eager at the foot to take the vacant places, and finally they gain a foothold on the parapet.
A resistless number follows across the vacated priestcap and into the precincts of the yard, joined by ​another party, whose ascent along the south side has been facilitated by a top fire upon its bastion. Light howitzers and captured guns are turned upon the castle and the raised terrace along the eastern verge, mingling their thunder with the sharp ring of rifles, driving the defenders from the windows and roofs and forcing them over the walls, while covering the entrance of the stormers. A chance shot strikes the staff, and the castle flag bends over; but the next moment it is righted again by sturdy hands, and flutters forth defiantly. The assailants press closer, however, and are already in hand-to-hand conflict within the citadel. The excitement of battle and the loss of comrades seem to have frenzied them, for they rage with a ferocity never before displayed during the war, granting little or no quarter. And few ask it. The very cadets, mere boys of fourteen years and upward, fight with heroic daring, and cheer their elders on as they stand at bay to sell their lives dearly, banishing sombre premonitions and quailing not at death. The blood of stripling and graybeard mingle in their flow, and bear the mournful tidings in the red-tinged waters of the aqueducts. Finally a party gains the roof and strikes the flag; and as the banner of the invaders rises, midst deafening huzzas, a change sets in. The authoritative voice of the officers prevails; the slaughter stops; the vanquished yield. Bravo surrenders, together with four generals and 100 other officers, the total number of prisoners captured on and round the hill being placed at 800. ​Quitman's division and storming party had also advanced to the assault, aiming for the south-east angle of the castle enclosure. This was protected by a strong battery under the command of Rangel, who opened so galling a cannonade and fusillade as to break the lines and drive them for shelter under some buildings midway to the goal. These proved of little avail, however, against the heavy metal that came crashing and plunging down upon them, and left them exposed to a flank fire from the reserve on the causeways. The volunteer regiments in support were thereupon directed to cross the meadows to the left and gain the enclosure through the southern wall, while Smith's brigade made a sweep to the right to check the causeway troops and threaten to fall in the rear of Rangel's position, two of the bombarding batteries resuming fire, with a view to silence the opponents in some degree and to prepare the way for a fresh advance. Smith's manœuvre had a good effect, and the volunteers gained the wall, although not without being severely cut up by the cross-fire. Now the storming party made another rush, followed by its support, to be once more checked by scathing volleys; but only for a moment. Pillow's party had already cleared the terre-plein of the hill, and was beginning to fire on the rear of Rangel's lines, creating a diversion which enabled the stormers to enter the battery. The defenders still held forth in gallant fight, at close quarters, with bayonets crossed and rifles clubbed. But the rear fire grew heavier; Bravo's men were springing and sliding down the eastern declivity in disorderly flight, closely pursued, and Peña y Barragan was already in retreat along the northern road, pressed by a considerable force from Pillow's and Worth's divisions, whose progress had been facilitated by the summit fire on the barricade in this direction.There ​was no alternative save to retreat, and this Rangel effected in admirable form along the Verónica avenue, covering at the same time the retrograde movement of Santa Anna, who as usual appeared with reënforcements when too late. The commander-in-chief made up for tardiness of movement, however, by a brisk volley of virtuous indignation against the 'infamous conduct' of those who had permitted the castle to fall. The cavalry leader was too far away to receive his share of compliments in all their freshness. He was besides absorbed just then in an elaborate pirouette on the enemy's left, sufficiently beyond range to combine safety with healthful exercise.
Worth and Quitman halted merely to re-form their columns, and then hastened onward in pursuit, the former along the Verónica causeway, the other on the Belen, supported by Smith and subsequently by Pierce. Both approaches presented a double roadway, divided by an aqueduct of strong masonry, with open arches and massive abutments that afforded shelter against missiles, especially to the pursuers. Scott despatched heavy ordnance to both divisions, partly from Twiggs' line, which gradually ceased its cannonade. The heaviest reënforcements were sent to Worth; for the San Cosme approach, as farther from the scene of battle, was regarded as the least protected. And this was verified already at the works covering the junction of the Verónica and San Cosme roads, which possessed not a single gun. Beyond, however, rose a barricade from which Worth's advance was driven ​back and kept in check till artillery could be brought up. With this and the musketry, so lively a fire was thereupon opened from the barricade and houses as to completely sweep the road, and prevent even the placing of cannon at the abandoned works near the junction. To push onward seemed impossible; but Worth ordered the brigades of Clarke and Garland into the buildings which lined the road on either side, and made them hew their way through the walls with pick and crowbar. When the men were sufficiently advanced for a flank fire, a howitzer was hoisted to a roof and brought to bear upon the barricade, compelling its evacuation. Some of the retreating troops penetrate during the confusion into the city, but Santa Anna appears in time to rally, and returning with them to the gate he atones somewhat for his previous neglect by prompt dispositions and aid. The assailants mine their way with impunity, however, maintaining from windows and azoteas a fusillade of terrible volume and accuracy. By five o'clock they have burrowed their way almost to the gate fortress, unseen yet not noiseless, for midst the din and excitement can be heard the dull thud of battering beams, with the cracking of timber and the crumbling of walls. Now a light gun is advanced to the captured barricade, at a run through the bullet shower, and then pours against the gate the responsive roar of three pieces, one located as if in mockery upon San Cosme church. While attention is thus centred on the front, the roofs of the adjoining buildings suddenly heave with a living mass. The next moment comes a withering discharge from a line of rifles on either flank, under cover of which storming parties rush at a signal from their retreats. So rapid is the movement and such the onslaught from different sides that the works are scaled and lines formed before the defenders recover from the shock. The reserve, however, is still prepared to ​dispute further progress, and falls into position to rally the broken ranks. Just then a bugle sound is heard, intended to recall one of the corps from an exposed point. It is misinterpreted, and the whole mass recedes, quickened by raking volleys from the lost guns now turned upon it by the victors. Santa Anna hastens forward with reënforcements; but it is too late, and he can only direct the movement toward the citadel. The approaching darkness tends to stay the pursuers, and Worth establishes his headquarters just inside the gate.
Quitman's division had distinguished itself by a more rapid progress, the cost of which, however, far outweighed the result. Although his orders were to advance cautiously with the main object of keeping up a diversion, he allowed himself to be impetuously led onward. He received his first check at Puente de los Insurgentes, a redoubt forming part of the intrenched line toward San Cosme; but an opportune flank fire by Worth's division enabled him to cross it and push onward, his men springing from arch to arch under the aqueduct, and seizing every opportunity to deliver a volley. As they approached the fortified gate of Belen, General Terrés, who commanded here, brought them to a momentary halt with a succession of round shot, grape, and musketry, which cut terribly into all who were not sheltered. During the intervals, however, they crept nearer, and shortly after one 'clock the gate was carried by a simultaneous and overwhelming rush. Terrés fell back with his small force, raked by one of his own guns now turned upon him, and so closely pressed that it was feared the pursuers would push their way with his own men into ​the citadel. Just then Santa Anna appeared on the scene with reënforcements drawn from other points, and rallied them. 'Coward!' he cried to Terrés, and wrought up by excitement he pounced upon him, struck his face, and tore off his insignia. Guns were quickly planted on the paseo; the citadel was strengthened, and troops took position around, directing so withering a discharge upon the invaders as to compel them to recede, shattering the captured works and silencing its artillery, yet not attempting to drive Quitman beyond the gate.
The firing continued till nightfall, when, under cover of darkness, the enemy hastened to plant a heavy battery with which to shell the citadel on the morrow. Worth did the same, while preparing to push into the heart of the city with the first gleam of morning. His battery being quickly in line, he resolved to impress the inhabitants with a sense of the impending danger, by sending into their midst an instalment of shot and shell. It was a severe but salutary lesson. A whole city followed with awe-stricken faces the flight of the portentous missiles as they tracked the sky with trails of fire, and sank behind the dented fringe of buildings to scatter desolation and blend their verberating rumble with agonizing shrieks of startled women and bereaved families. The effect proved decisive.
At eight o'clock a council of war was forming at the citadel to discuss the situation. Santa Anna showed that the army was wholly demoralized, partly from lack of ammunition and other means, and because of overdue wages and insufficient rations. The force had greatly ​diminished, without prospects of filling the gaps. The citadel would soon be battered down, and perhaps the entire city, to bury in its ruins thousands of innocent victims. It was accordingly resolved to evacuate the capital. The cavalry, numbering 4,000, was at once despatched, and 5,000 infantry followed after midnight, the militia and irregulars being dissolved.
About one o'clock in the morning of the 14th a deputation from the city council presented itself at Worth's headquarters, and being directed to Scott at Tacubaya, demanded of him guarantees for life and property. Scott refused to bind himself to any terms, except such as were imposed by honor and customary usages, and Worth hastened to affirm possession by advancing at dawn to the alameda, while Quitman, after receiving a white flag from the citadel and occupying it, marched to the central square and hoisted over the palace the stars and stripes, the first foreign colors to flaunt within ​Anáhuac's capital since Cortés planted his banner upon the ruins of Tenochtitlan.
Scott made his entry during the forenoon at the head of a brilliant suite and an imposing force, midst a dense gathering of spectators who lined the streets and azoteas and filled the balconies, in some of which were white flags and foreign colors, in protestation of peace and protection. Yet even along this main line of the march, houses with closed shutters stared the invaders coldly in the face, as did many a quarter of the city with its bleak, deserted aspect. And no welcome glance or cheering sound mingled with the music of the march. All around was chilling silence, emphasized in frigid or frowning looks, and relieved here and there only by glances of curiosity or a passing gleam of admiration at the imposing figure and benevolent mien of the victorious general. In this lay more than mere sullenness, which in itself tended to rouse a counter-irritation among the invaders, with an unpleasant display of arrogance and drunken disorder. The feeling became marked as the soldiers dispersed in search of quarters, and every insolent act or gesture added fuel to the fire, till it burst forth in a determined uprising of the Mexicans, prompted especially by disbanding militiamen. The first shot was aimed at a crowd of officers clustering round General Worth. This was followed by a scattering fusillade in different directions, and by showers of stones from the roofs. The onslaught resulted in several deaths and a large number of wounded for the invaders. Scott recognized the danger of allowing such a movement to gain strength in a large and populous city, where every ​building formed a stronghold, with a redoubtable garrison in every family. The smallness of his force compelled him to take prompt and severe measures. Artillery was at once brought out to sweep the different streets with grape and canister, and to batter down houses from which missiles came, while troops charged the crowds and stormed the dwellings.
The long-feared horrors of a siege had come at last in aggravated form, intensified by outrages on the part of criminals whom Santa Anna had released before his departure, with a view, as many declared, of occupying the enemy and retarding pursuit. The confusion was swelled to a panic by alarmed families who hastened to leave the city, or who crowded the churches to implore protection from the virgin. Santa Anna sent some troops to give direction to the outbreak, but they were too few to effect anything. The Mexicans wasted their valor in barren achievements, that stood relieved for a moment by noble gallantry, only to sink the next into oblivion. All day the city trembled before the roar of cannon and the flash of musketry, which changed from one quarter to another. Night brought no respite; for although the battle lessened, darkness magnified the din, now swelled by the tramp of noisy soldiers, while bandits crept within the shadows of the walls upon their kindred errand. Early on the 15th a few enthusiasts began anew the conflict; but the earnest proclamations of the ayuntamiento had their effect, sustained by the imposing demonstrations of Scott to carry out his threat of razing every building that revealed a hostile movement. With the rising of the sun the struggle ceased. ​The valley campaign was ended, at a cost to the victors of more than 2,700 killed and wounded, besides the sick. This heavy inroad upon a force of 11,000 speaks well for the resistance of the Mexicans, as do their losses, estimated by Scott at over 7,000. Their lack of success must be attributed first of all to bad generalship, which permitted the unchallenged advance of Scott across the range and round Chalco Lake; which depended too much on certain positions in ​the blind hope that the enemy would fall into traps; which manifested itself in the insubordination and neglect of Vałencia, the inaction of Santa Anna at Padierna and his lack of firmness and provision in subsequent encounters, and in the remissness of Álvarez. Other causes are found in the defective organization and rawness of the troops, mostly composed of inexperienced recruits and militia, and supplied with inferior arms, circumstances that swell the glory of the defence at Churubusco, Molino del Rey, and Chapultepec.
* ↑ A modification of a harsher note prepared during the preceding evening, demanding the surrender of the capital. Santa Anna, on his side, had allowed his representative to urge an armistice for burying the dead — but only in non-committal verbal form.
* ↑ Santa Anna fails not to reproduce this documentary proof of his cleverness, in Detall, 102-4.
* ↑ See intercepted correspondence with the ex-minister Rejon, wherein is added that the justice of the Mexican cause demanded that overtures should be listened to. Semmes' Campaign, 302-4. Ripley, War with Mex., ii. 332, believes he personally desired peace. See also U. S. Govt Doc., Cong. 30, Ses. 1, Sen. Ex. 65, p. 445.
* ↑ By generals Mora y Villamil and Quijano for Mexico, and by the American generals Quitman, Smith, and Pierce.
* ↑ Art. 5 at first demanded the evacuation of Chapultepec as a guarantee, but Scott was induced to yield the point to Mexican pride. American residents were allowed to return to their business. Intercourse with Vera Cruz had to be protected by Mexico. Arts 11-14 provided for Mexican rights in places occupied by Americans; and 15-16 for the ratification of the armistice. Id., H. Ex. 1, p. 356. An account of foraging is given by Gen. Lane, 'Gallant Joe,' himself, in his Autobiog., 30-5, a valued MS. on my shelf, full of interesting campaign details and anecdotes.
* ↑ Pillow among others had at first opposed any armistice; Worth had demanded at least the surrender of Chapultepec; and Quitman and Pierce held out a while. Scott himself had laid down rules for Taylor to grant no armistice without receiving sufficient guarantee of good faith; and in correspondence with the war department, Id., no. 60, p. 960-2, he had alluded to the need for caution, yet a short-sighted infatuation is after all allowed to prevail in a question of such grave importance, involving the safety of the army and the aim of the expedition.
* ↑ See charges in Santa Anna, Informe sobre Acusaciones Gamboa; Gamboa, Impug., 49-51.
* ↑ Atristain had financial tact and English sympathies, and Mora, regarded rather as consulting engineer, favored peace 'à toda costa.' Apunt. Hist. Guerra, 269. Herrera had at first declined on the ground that his former peace efforts had caused his removal from the presidency; but while excusing the two associates first proposed, A. F. Monjardin and A. Garay, Santa Anna insisted on retaining him. Correspondence in Diario Gob., Aug. 26, 1847, etc. At first their power was limited to merely receiving and reporting on American proposals, but when they threatened to resign on Aug. 30th, it was amplified.
* ↑ U. S. Govt Doc., Cong. 30, Ses. 1, Sen. Ex. 52, p. 85, etc.
* ↑ He 'should have demanded more, and not come at once so near the ultimata,' says Ripley, War with Mex., ii. 349. But Trist wished to lose no time.
* ↑ So intense grew the excitement at Mexico that the léperos attacked the American trains as they came in on the 27th to obtain supplies, killing one man and wounding several. Henceforth supplies were transported to the camp during the night. Some believe that Santa Anna instigated the tumult, in order to figure as patriot, and to hide from Americans his defence preparations. Herrera bravely interposed.
* ↑ Otero and Gamboa clamoring with the rest for war, and the latter spending his main efforts in abuse of Santa Anna. See Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos, 410-18.
* ↑ He pleads the wish to commit the Mexican government to yielding a part of the national domain, and the prospect of better weather in October for fighting. U. S. Govt Doc., Cong. 30, Ses. 1, Sen. Ex. 52, p. 192. But these were doubtful gains.
* ↑ The line to follow the eastern border of New Mexico to 37°, and along this parallel to the Pacific, the territory between the Nueces and Rio Grande to remain neutral ground. The money offers of the U. S. were accepted. See U. S. Govt Doc., Cong. 30, Ses. 1, H. Ex. 40; Mex. Treaties, vii. pt 5, as above, and Apunt. Hist. Guerra, 280-6, with a note from the commissioners, condemning the war as unjust, and giving the reasons for not ceding more territory. See also Herrera, Contest. al Comis., 1-36; Contest. entre Sup. Gob., 1-36; Mex. Pamphlets, iii. pt 3, iv. 141-384; Rayon, Asedio, 112-25, 305-40; Diario Exact. Mex., 1-68; Arco Iris, Sept. 1, 26, 1847, etc.; Sonorense, Diario Gob., and other journals, and notably the later chapter on final peace treaty.
* ↑ Text in Santa Anna, Apel., 104-6.
* ↑ These and other points are noticed in the Diario Gob., and other periodicals, from Aug. 21st into Sept. Herrera was appointed comandante general at Mexico, and Bravo at Chapultepec, with Leon for second. The different lines of the city were intrusted, the north and north-west to Palomino and M. Martinez; the western and south-western to Lombardini and M. Perez; the southern at first to Leon, subsequently to Juan N. Perez; and the eastern to Carrasco. Anaya and other prominent officers were accorded their liberty by Scott, in return for American prisoners. The Prussian minister offered his sympathy and mediation in behalf of Mexico.
* ↑ The latter being saved by the mitigating circumstances of having deserted before the war began, etc. Hitherto deserters had been driven off in disgrace or lightly punished. Manfield's Mex. War, 280-1. In Mex. War, by English Soldier, 255, is an allusion to maltreatment by officers as a cause for desertion. Mexican writers naturally condemn the execution as barbarous; yet greater strictness in their own army would undoubtedly have improved its value. To the pleading of the clergy and influential residents in behalf of the deserters, Scott replied that the Mexican government was to blame for tempting them to desert; yet he enrolled guerrillas to raid upon their countrymen. A striking account of the execution is given in the fourth number of the American Star, Sept. 28, 1847, a journal brought out at Mexico by the followers of the invading army. See also Arco Iris, Sept. 12, Nov. 4, 7, 1847; Gen. of Lib., Oct. 19, 1847. Their form of organization is recorded in Mex., Col. Ley., 1847, 181-2; Correo Nac., Nov. 30, 1847; Sonorense, Sept. 10, 1847.
* ↑ This assertion by Ripley, Semmes, and other less friendly writers is partly confirmed by Scott's own despatch, with his ideas modified by experience, wherein he still thinks that the capture of the hill castle may not be necessary. 'We were not entirely ready' to take it on the 8th, he adds. U. S. Govt Doc., Cong. 30, Ses. 1, Sen. Ex. 1, p. 355. Yet his biographer, Mansfield's Mex. War, 281, writes that he determined on this occasion to attack 'the defences of Chapultepec.'
* ↑ The southern part of the molino was a wheat-mill, the northern the foundery, formerly a powder-mill. Their total length was about 1,400 feet. Two main entrances existed on the south and west.
* ↑ Including the garrison of the buildings. Roa Bárcena estimates them at exactly 4,000, including 40 artillerists. Recuerdos, 426-8. About the same in Apuntes Hist. Guerra, 392. Worth swells the number to 14,000, including the reënforcements that arrived after the battle was practically over. U. S. Govt Doc., as above, p. 365. Mansfield has 'at least ten thousand;' and 4 guns are assigned to the battery.
* ↑ Santa Anna, Detall, 108-9, places his force at 4,000, other Mexicans incline to 3,000. While luring Scott into a dangerous movement against the mil, Santa Anna was in his turn deceived by the feint against the south line of the city.
* ↑ Worth's field return, which Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos, 429, accepts, yet increasing the guns to 9 or 10. Apunt. Hist. Guerra, 293, about the same. Mansfield reduces the force to 3,154.
* ↑ The Americans charge that here and elsewhere Mexicans bayoneted the wounded.
* ↑ General Ramirez is accused in the Apunt. Hist. Guerra, 295, with neglecting to hold the centre; but the main defect must be sought in Santa Anna's withdrawal of troops on the preceding evening.
* ↑ Led by Major Buchanan and Capt. McKenzie, of the 4th infantry and 2d artillery.
* ↑ Another account removes him before Leon.
* ↑ Santa Anna intimates that the molino was lost through the sally of a part of the defenders, which found it impossible to return. Detall, 109; but Roa Bárcena denies it.
* ↑ Álvarez accuses Andrade, who should have crossed the bridge, of insubordination as well as cowardice. Letter in Santa Anna, Apel., 126-31. Major Sumner crossed the bridge under a scathing fire from the casa, and assisted with his body of dragoons to enforce the retreat, and a twenty-four pɔunder was brought up to support him. Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos, 445-6, blames Álvarez for not removing Andrade earlier than he did and leading in person. Correo Nac., Nov. 4, 1847, hints at cowardice among officers. The retreat of one division involved the other. Semmes points out that the lack of organization and the lightness of the horses made the cavalry worthless for front operations. Campaign, 329.
* ↑ Roa Bárcena blames Scott for this tardiness.
* ↑ As instanced in Sonorense, Oct. 1, 1847, and other country journals. In a subsequent defence he modifies the claim somewhat. 'Á no presentarme en estos momentos con la columna que conducia desde la Candelaria, se hubiera tal vez perdido ese dia á Chapultepec.' Yet he finally succeeded in forcing the enemy to retreat. Detall, 109-11. Other Mexican writers recognize the intent of the Americans; and in Apunt. Hist. Guerra, 302, the battle-field is yielded to them, Santa Anna being blamed for his tardy arrival at 9.30 a. m. General Peña led the movements of the reënforcements. Roa Bárcena thinks that the Americans would have gained in honor and advantages by retaining possession of Molino del Rey. Their feint against the south lines of the city saved them by keeping back Santa Anna. Recuerdos, 430-3. The retreat left the moral effect of a defeat, and the impression that the castle was stronger than it seemed. Santa Anna did not reoccupy the mill. Mansfield, Mex. War, 285, 289, considers that the holding of the mill would have entailed a needless exposure to the Chapultepec fire.
* ↑ Worth places their casualties at the round figure of 3,000, besides 2,000 who deserted after the battle. For a list of his own losses, with names of officers, see his reports in U. S. Govt Doc., Cong. 30, Ses. 1, Sen. Ex. 1, p. 365-73. Over 100 horses were killed and wounded. While admitting the bravery of the Mexicans, Ripley, Semmes, and others exalt the Americans, on the ground that they captured an almost unknown intrenched position with inferior numbers; for to the garrison of over 4,000 is naturally added the 3,000 or 4,000 cavalry, and the heavy reënforcements that came too late for anything but a skirmish. Semmes' Campaign, 331. A large stock of powder was carried away by the victors from the casa mata, the remainder being blown up with the building, but so carelessly as to kill a dozen men. Roa Bárcena claims that this was done by shell from the castle.
* ↑ The chief accusers of Scott are, as before, Riley and Semmes. He may be excused somewhat on the ground that the strength of Molino del Rey was unknown; yet Worth warned him that he expected a severe fight. With earlier reënforcements it might have been a comparatively easy task to drive and follow the defeated mill garrison into the castle.
* ↑ Echeagaray 'aún vive,' says Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos, 452. Promotions, medals, and monuments were freely bestowed by a grateful country, as shown by decrees in Méx., Col. Ley. y Dec., 1847, 267-70, 1853, iv. 345-6; Méx. Legisl. Mej., 253, 619-21, 1856, 111-14; Archivo Mex., Col. Ley. y Dec., 516. For additional details concerning the battle, I refer to Diario Gob., Sept. 1847; Correo Nac., Sept., also Nov. 27, 1847, Jan. 3, Aug. 23, Oct. 10 -17, 1848; Razonador, Nov. 17, 1847; Arco Iris, Dec. 3, 1847, etc.; Rayon, A sedio, 125-57; Bustamante, Mem. Hist. Mex., MS., vii. 221-6; Diario Exact., MS., 60 et seq.; Taylor and his Staff, 13-20; Scott's Mem., 506-7; Peterson's Milit. Heroes, ii. 114-20; Harrison's Battle-fields, 391-402; Frost's Pict. Hist. Mex., 531-75; Perez, Dicc., ii. 467-73; Jenkins' Mex. War, 331-97.
* ↑ Bravo declares that he had to watch his men to prevent further loss. Bustamante, Mem. Hist. Mex., MS., viii. 27 et seq. Governor Olaguíbel of Mexico brought in a body of several hundred recruits, Apunt. Hist. Guerra, 313, and cannon were sent from Acapulco; but these gains were small. Gamboa still assumes a defence force of 17,000, Impug., 52, from which Roa Bárcena deducts desertion and losses at Molino del Rey.
* ↑ At San Antonio, 10 pieces of artillery; at Niño Perdido, 2 pieces; San Cosme, 2 pieces; Belen, 3 pieces, commanded by General Terrés. The other gates had no artillery, but could obtain men and armament in case of need, if the front should change from the south and west, where intermediate works existed with from 1 to 4 pieces. Details in Apunt. Hist. Guerra, 309; Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos, 456.
* ↑ The approach was good, as shown by a flying reconnoissance of some cavalry headed by Santa Anna, which narrowly escaped injury from a masked battery. Even if Scott had intended to occupy the south front merely with feints, it was a mistake on his part to let the opponent strengthen it, and so hold it with a smaller force.
* ↑ Mexican officers regarded it of less value, owing to its merely plunging fire, and to the shelter offered by the aqueducts leading to the city. Apunt. Hist. Guerra, 318, etc. Twiggs sided with Scott, and the vacillating officers were overruled.
* ↑ Including one 24-pounder, three 18-pounders, and four mortars, The first two batteries were not erected during the night.
* ↑ His list enumerates 832 men. Rayon, Asedio, 265-8; to which must be added cadets and irregulars. Desertion had reduced the Toluca battalion alone from 450 to 27. Bustamante, Invasion, MS., 126-35. Santa Anna increases the force to 1,000 above and 500 in the grove. Detall, 112-13; Apunt. Hist. Guerra, 307-8. Americans estimate it at from 2,000 to 6,000. For descriptions and views of Chapultepec, consult Rivera, Mex. Pint., i. 298 et seq.; Soc. Mex. Geog. Bolet., viii, 195-9: Museo Mex., iii. 212: Ward's Mex., ii. 230-2; Mühlenpfordt, Mex., ii. 353-4; Mayer's Mex. as It Was, 155-7; Elton's With French, 36-42; Kollonitz's Court Mex., 186-94; Hall's Life Mex., 145-7.
* ↑ Bravo states that he had only three pieces left with which to reply. Ubi sup.
* ↑ Leaving all in good condition, as he claims, while boasting of the risk he ran from bombs and shells during the trip. Detall, 112. This is sneered at in Apunt. Hist. Guerra, 311, which points out the lack of a head, 'creadora organizadora, directora.' Bravo claims that he was ordered to withdraw men from the grove to the summit, but overruled so bad a disposition. Bustamante, Mem. Hist. Mex., MS., viii. 29 et seq. He further asked for other troops declaring the garrison so demoralized as to be worthless; but Santa Anna refused to cram more men into so small a space.
* ↑ Chosen respectively from the veteran divisions of Worth and Twiggs, and headed by McKenzie and Casey. This effort failed to be made on the evening of the 12th, because the preparations were not complete. Scott's report, in U. S. Govt Doc., Cong. 30, Ses. 1, Sen. Ex. 1, p. 377-80.
* ↑ Apunt. Hist. Guerra, loc. cit.
* ↑ Some leave the impression that he fell on the summit, but he commanded the reënforcement left by Santa Anna in the grove. Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos, 483.
* ↑ Bravo, who appears too ready in his report to charge subordinates with cowardice, says the officer, Alaman, could not be found when required; but American accounts state that he or his deputy was disabled.
* ↑ Pillow reports that Col Johnstone led the voltigeurs foremost up the hill. Lieuts Selden, Rogers, and Smith were among the first to climb and fall. Capt. Barnard was the first to plant his colors in the works, and so on. See U. S. Govt Doc., as above, p. 400 et seq. Fossey, Mexique, 183, claims that a French volunteer, Dargonville, planted the first colors.
* ↑ Ripley attributes it to the killing of wounded Americans at Molino del Rey, after the first repulse by Mexicans. War with Mex., ii. 423-4.
* ↑ And the total of killed, wounded, and prisoners at 1,800, out of the estimated 6,000. Pillow's loss for the whole day is given at 143. Report in U. S. Govt Doc., as above, p. 408. See also list in Correo Nac., Mar. 16, 1848, and later notes. The four generals were Monterde, Noriega, Dosamantes, and Saldaña. Cano, the engineer of the work, fell. For honors accorded to Xicotencatl and his brave San Blas battalion, see Méx., Col. Ley. y Dec., 1853, v. 217-1s; Roa Bárcena, ubi sup. Santa Anna charges that Bravo hid before the close of the battle, and was found in a ditch, Apel., 115; but none will believe this of the old hero, famed for his bravery and magnanimity during the war of 1810-21. He was certainly vindicated before the council of war. Gamboa, Impug, 55.
* ↑ The first advance against this barricade had been checked in nearly as severe a manner as Quitman's. Both these assaults proved a waste of blood; for the capture of the castle by Pillow's division involved the fall of the barricades and batteries below. Quitman claims to have obtained 7 cannon, 1,000 muskets, and 550 prisoners, including 100 officers, in the works. His report in U. S. Govt Doc., ubi sup., p. 413. See also Worth's report, Id., p. 391-2. Semmes, Campaign, 344, pays a tribute to the bravery of the north side parties. The reports of Rangel and Santa Anna, Detall, 14, etc., show that Quitman did not carry the battery till the top fire drove the defenders. Rangel's conduct is praised. Apunt. Hist. Guerra, 316.
* ↑ At this point, Santo Tonás, Col Ramiro rallied a force and sought to capture Magruder's battery, which was in advance of its support, but Magruder unlimbered his pieces in time to save them with a decisive volley. Apunt. Hist. Guerra, 320.
* ↑ Rangel feared a flank movement from cross-roads. Tercera Brig., 4, etc.
* ↑ Rangel is not blamed either in Apunt. Hist. Guerra, 322, in Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos, 502, or by Santa Anna, Detall, 118, who praises him, 'la defensa. . .sostenia con valor.' Rangel pleads insufficiency of troops. Tercera Brig., 1-9. One gun was taken along.
* ↑ Twiggs' brigade being ordered to join him.
* ↑ A corps was also moved out to deliver a flank fire upon them from the south-west, but this received a prompt check from their artillery.
* ↑ Terrés explains that Santa Anna had most unaccountably left him a force wholly insufficient for the defence; but in Apunt. Hist. Guerra, 320, he is accused of having abandoned the gate before the enemy entered it, and Santa Anna says that he compelled his subordinate, Argüeiles, to abandon it against his will. He also asks how he became a prisoner after the battle. Apel., 117. Gamboa, Impug., 55-6, shows that Terrés was absolved by a later council of war, and Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos, 495, adds that Santa Anna repaired his injustice in 1853 with rank and pension.
* ↑ Several details of gunners, as well as Drum, their commander, being killed. Quitman's report, in U. S. Govt Doc., loc. cit., p. 415-16.
* ↑ He as usual charges loudly cowardice and insubordination, and adds that the men had no food. 'En aquel dia, que no habian probado alimento; que en cuatro anteriores se les debian los socorros.' Detall, 119-20. Gamboa denies the lack of food and ammunition, and shows that Governor Olaguíbel suggested that the views of ministers and citizens should be consulted before so grave a step as evacuation should be resolved upon, in face of an enemy inferior in number. Impug., 57-9. Carrera, commanding the artillery, believed a defence to be useless, and so did generals Alcorta, Perez, and Lombardini, although the latter objected at first. Further discussion was stopped by Santa Anna declaring for evacuation. Apunt. Hist. Guerra, 323-4. The scholar Ramirez mentions a curious incident. While making historical extracts a bomb fell upon his house and interrupted him at p. 80 of the MS., bound by me in the collection Dur., Doc. Hist.; on pp. 62-79 are marginal notes bearing on these war operations.
* ↑ And a portion of the garrison at the remote gates was forgotten. Some of the militia objected to such passive yielding. Gamboa points out that Santa Anna had still 13,000 or 14,000 men at his command, including probably the militia. Roa Bárcena condemns the abandonment before guarantees had been sought for the city. Recuerdos, 503-4.
* ↑ Names, etc., in Monitor, Sept. 28, 1847.
* ↑ With the safety of their institutions, and the privilege for the ayuntamiento to control the revenue, maintain armed patrols, and float the national flag.
* ↑ 'And the spirit of the age,' on the ground 'that the city had been virtually in our possession from the time of the lodgments effected by Worth and Quitman.' Scotť's Report, 383, loc. cit.
* ↑ Worth's adherents charge Scott, not alone with misquoting the report of their favorite in order to lessen his achievement, but rail bitterly at the preference given to Quitman on this occasion, when Worth had a prior right, by virtue of his capturing the central gate which left the city at his mercy, while Quitman had been repulsed and kept at bay before the citadel. Semmes, Campaign, 349-52, is among Worth's adherents. Quitman could claim a certain right by his early capture of Belen gate. The question reached the congress, and is fully considered in History of Raising the Flag in Mexico; Houston's Report; U. S. Govt. Doc., Cong. 30, Ses. 1, Sen. Repts 31; Id., Cong. 30, Ses. 1, Sen. Repts 808-10.
* ↑ But Scott was too weak to risk the dangers of a pursuit. He estimates the released criminals at 2,000, who were intent on plunder during the tumult roused by impelling national hatred. U. S. Govt Doc., p. 383-4, ubi sup. Zamacois denies that Santa Anna released convicts for the purpose indicated. Hist. Méj., xii. 844-5. Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos, 507, avows that patriots stirred the tumult; roused by the arrogance of the victors, as explained in Apunt. Hist. Guerra, 326-7, the promoter being Col Carbajal of the guardia nacional. Garland was wounded by the first shot.
* ↑ Several writers condemn the pronounced efforts of the wealthy to check the popular outburst, and their offensive display of flags for protection. Others exaggerate the cruel conduct of the invaders, while admitting that the worst outrages on their side were committed by renegades from Puebla who tore along with red-banded hats. Apunt. Hist. Guerra, 328-42. Roa Bárcena, however, applauds Scott's attitude as really humane under the circumstances, Recuerdos, 511, and believes with Zamacois, Hist. Méj., xii. 849, that another army might have behaved worse. Even the permission by Scott to ravage hostile localities was acted upon with great limitation. Ripley's War with Mex., ii. 444. Peterson points to the deeds of the English at Badajoz and San Sebastian as horrible compared with the worst isolated cases here. Mil. Heroes, ii. 126. Stragglers continued to be killed by lawless Mexicans. Semmes' Campaign, 355; Mex. War, by English Soldier, 261-2. Additional details in Monitor, Sept. 15, 1847, et seq.; Arco Iris, Sept. 26, 1847; Gen. of Lib., Sept. 25, 1847; Sonorense, Oct. 1, 1847, etc., which speak of plundering léperos, of girls collecting stones, etc.
* ↑ Together with 3,730 prisoners, one seventh being officers, including 13 generals, among them 3 ex-presidents. The capture embraced more than 20 colors and standards, 75 pieces of ordnance, besides 57 wall-pieces, 20,000 small arms, an immense quantity of shot, shells, powder, etc. His report is in U. S. Govt Doc., Cong. 30, Ses. 1, Sen. Ex. 1, p. 384-5. Yet the report of the inspector-general adds only 1,330 military prisoners to those taken before Sept. 7th, whereof 823 on the 13th and 14th. Id., p. 430-1. For list of captured officers, see Archivo Mex., Actas, ii. 374-89. Some accounts place Scott's loss in the valley at 4,600 rank and file, 90-100 officers, and about 1,000 sick. Nacional, Boletin and Sonorense, the latter of Nov. 12, 1847. Scott gives the casualties among his officers at 383, and the losses on the 13th and 14th at 862. Roa Bárcena assumes that 300 of his men suffered from the tumult alone. See also reports in U. S. Govt Doc., Cong. 31, Ses. 1, Sen. Ex. 11; Id., Mess. and Doc., 1847-48, ii. app. 1-236. Details and comments in Bustamante, Invasion, MS., 87-152; Id., Mem. Hist., vii. 1-237; viii. 27-35, the autograph records by this venerable historian, who witnessed many of the scenes. Diario Exact. Mex., MS., 61-5, gives a diary of occurrences in the capital during the siege; and Rayon adds many valuable facts from a military standpoint, in Asedio y Defensa, 157-268, with orders and correspondence. Also Rivera, Hist. Jalapa, iii. 934-56, iv. 5 et seq. Observations by medical men, in Vander Linden, Rel.; Id., Mem. Salud. Mil., pt 3. Official reports of the capture of Mexico, in Arco Iris, Sept. 16-19, Oct. 3-4, 10, 15, Nov. 18-22, Dec. 11, 1847, with estimates of losses; Correo Nac., Dec. 10-11, 1847; Razonador, Nov. 24, 1847; Gen. Lib., Oct. 16, 1847; also Monitor, Federalista, Espir. Pub. Moreliano, Sonorense, and other journals; Scott's Mem., 508-17; McSherry's Puchero, 103-26; Jenkins' Mex. War, 427-31; Addley's McClellan, 31-85, giving the share of this rising officer in the campaign; Frost's Pict. Hist. Mex., 576-90; Mayer's Mex. Aztec., i. 415-16; Semmes' Service Afloat, 400-79; Young's Hist. Mex., 534-7; Zamacois, Hist. Méj., xii. 808-40; Rivera, Gob. Méx., ii. 332-7; Perez, Dicc., ii. 473-85; Balbotin, Invasion, 120.
* ↑ Scott's victories, while brightened by the stanchness and moderation of his army, are somewhat dimmed by costly sacrifices, due to dilatory movements and neglect of opportunities, and by allowing an astute opponent to circumvent him.