# Imperialism, the Last Stage of Capitalism/Chapter 9

CHAPTER IX. The Critique of Imperialism
We understand the critique of imperialism, in the broad sense of the term, to mean the attitude towards imperialist policy of the different classes of society taken as part of their general outlook.
The enormous dimensions of finance-capital concentrated in a few hands and creating an extremely extensive network of close ties and relationships which involves not only the small and medium capitalists, but also even the very small; this, on the one hand, and on the other the bitter struggle against other national State groups of financiers for the partition of the world and the right to rule over other countries—these two factors taken together cause the complete conversion of all the possessing classes to the side of imperialism. The signs of the times are a "general" enthusiasm regarding its prospects, a passionate defence of imperialism, and every possible camouflage of its real nature. The imperialist outlook also penetrates the working class. There is no Chinese wall between it and the other classes. And the leaders of the so-called "Social-Democratic" Party of Germany are to-day justly called Social-Imperialists; that is, Socialists in words and Imperialists in deeds. But as early as 1902, Hobson noted the existence of "Fabian Imperialists" belonging to the opportunist Fabian Society.
The bourgeois scholars and publicists generally undertake the defence of imperialism only in a ​somewhat veiled form, neglecting or concealing its complete domination and its profound roots, trying to concentrate attention on special aspects and secondary characteristics and doing their very best to distract attention from the main issue by means of fantastic schemes for "reform," such as police supervision of the trusts and banks. Very rarely do we meet with straight-out cynical imperialists who have the boldness to recognise the absurdity of all ideas of "reforming" the fundamental characteristics of imperialism.
Let us give an example. The German imperialists make a valiant attempt in the Archives of World Economy to follow the movements for national emancipation in the colonies, especially, be it noted, in other colonies than in those belonging to Germany. They dwell on the disturbances and movements of protest in British India; the movement in Natal (South Africa); the movements in the Dutch East Indies, etc. One of them writes the following in connection with an English report of the conference of subject peoples and races, which brought together, on June 28-30, 1910, delegates from various peoples of Africa, Asia and Europe, which are subject to foreign domination:
"They tell us we should fight against imperialism. The dominant States should recognise the right of subject peoples to dispose of themselves; an international tribunal should supervise the execution of treaties concluded between the Great Powers and backward peoples. The conference goes no farther than the expression of these pious hopes. We do not see any trace of understanding of the fact that imperialism is indissolubly tied up with capitalism in its present form; and that the ​direct struggle against it is, therefore (!!) absolutely vain, unless it is to be confined to protests against isolated excesses of a particularly flagrant kind."
It is a fundamental point in the critique of imperialism to know whether a reformist modification of the bases of imperialism is possible; that is, whether we must go forward to an increase of the antagonisms which they engender, or backwards to a reduction of their acuteness. As the political characteristics of imperialism are reaction all along the line and increased national oppression consequent upon the yoke of the financial oligarchy and the elimination of free competition, a democratic petty bourgeois opposition is rising against it in almost all imperialist countries at the beginning of the 20th century.
The breakaway from the Marxism of Kautsky and the broad international tendency which he represents, consists just in the fact that Kautsky and his fellow believers not only did not trouble to, but actually could not take up a stand against this petty bourgeois reformist opposition which is really reactionary in its economic basis; and, on the contrary, became practically identified with it.
In the United States, the imperialist war waged against Spain in 1898 stirred up the opposition of the "anti-imperialists," the last of the Mohicans of bourgeois democracy. They declared this war to be "criminal"; denounced the annexation of foreign territories as being a violation of the constitution, and they denounced the "jingo treachery" by means of which Aguinaldo, leader of the rebel native Philippinos, was deceived (first the Americans promised him the independence of his coun​try; then they landed troops and annexed it.) They quoted the words of Lincoln: "It is self-government when the white man governs himself; but when he governs himself and also governs others, it is no longer self-government, it is despotism."
But while all this criticism shrank from recognising the indissoluble bond between imperialism and the trusts, and, therefore, between imperialism and the very foundations of capitalism, while it shrank from joining up with the mighty forces engendered by large-scale capitalism as it develops—it remained a "pious hope."
This is also the attitude of Hobson in his critique of imperialism. Hobson anticipated Kautsky in revolting against the "inevitability of imperialism," and in calling for the need to "raise the consuming capacity of the people" (under capitalism!!).
The petty bourgeois point of view in the critique of imperialism, the domination of the banks, the financial oligarchy, etc., is that adopted by authors often quoted by us, such as Agahd, Lansburg, L. Eschwege; and, amongst French writers, Victor Bérard, author of a superficial book called British Imperialism, which appeared in 1900. All these authors, who make no claim to be Marxians, contrast imperialism with free competition and democracy; they condemn the Bagdad railway "scheme" as leading to disputes and war, and they utter "pious hopes" of peace in every circumstance. This even applies to the compiler of international stock and share issues statistics, M. Neymarck, who, after calculating the hundreds of milliards of francs representing "international" values, exclaimed in 1912: "Can we admit that there is any danger of peace being ​disturbed? Can we admit, in the presence of these enormous figures at stake, that anyone would risk starting a war?"
Such simplicity of mind on the part of the bourgeois economists does not astonish us. In any case their interest lies in appearing so naive, and in talking seriously about peace in the presence of imperialism. But what remains of Kautsky's Marxism when, in 1914-15-16, he takes up the same attitude as the bourgeois reformists and affirms that "everybody is agreed" (imperialists, pseudo-Socialists, and social pacifists?) on peace? Instead of the analysis of imperialism and the demonstration of its deeply-rooted internal contradictions, we have nothing but the "innocent desire" of the reformist not to see these contradictions, and not to mention them at all.
Let us give a brief example of Kautsky's economic critique of imperialism. He takes the statistics of British export and import trade with Egypt for 1872 and 1912. This import and export trade has developed more slowly than that of England itself. And thereupon Kautsky concludes: "We have no reason to suppose that English trade with Egypt would have been less developed under the influence of pure economic factors, even without military occupation." And "the tendencies of capital to expansion can be best satisfied not by the violent methods of imperialism, but by peaceful democracy."
This reasoning of Kautsky, which is repeated in every key by his Russian followers, constitutes the substance of his critique of imperialism, and that is why we must pause on it for a moment. Let us begin by referring to a passage by Hilfer​ding, whose conclusions Kautsky on many occasions and notably in April, 1915, declared have been "unanimously adopted by all Socialist theoreticians."
"It is not the business of the proletariat," wrote Hilferding, "to set up in opposition to progressive capitalist policy, the era which has passed of free trade and of a hostile attitude towards the State. The reply of the proletariat to the economic policy of finance-capital, of imperialism, cannot be free trade, but Socialism alone. It is not an ideal such as the restoration of free trade—now become a reactionary ideal—which should be the object of proletarian policy, but solely the complete abolition of competition by the overthrow of capitalism."
Kautsky broke away from Marxism by defending, in the period of finance-capital, the "reactionary ideal" of "peaceful democracy," "the simple action of economic factors," etc.—for this ideal is objectively retrogressive from monopoly capitalism to the non-monopolist stage, and is a reformist swindle.
Trade with Egypt (or with any other colony or semi-colony) would have been "better developed" without a military occupation, without imperialism, and without finance-capital . . . What does this mean? That capitalism would develop more rapidly if free trade were not restrained either by monopolies in general or by the "connections" or the yoke, (i.e., again the monopoly) of finance capitalism, or yet again by the colonial monopoly of certain countries?
Kautsky's reasoning can have no other meaning. Admitting that this is so, admitting that free competition, without any sort of monopoly, would ​develop capitalism and trade more rapidly. But the more rapidly capitalism and trade develops, the greater is the concentration of trade and capital which gives birth to monopoly. And monopolies have already been born—precisely out of free trade. Even if monopolies have begun to delay progress now, still this is not an argument in favour of free competition, which has become impossible once it has given birth to monopoly.
If we correct this reasoning, and if it be said as "Spectator" says, that the trade of the British colonies with the mother country is now developing more slowly than their trade with other countries—then this also does not save Kautsky. For Britain is being defeated still by monopoly, still by imperialism, only of another country (Germany, America). It is known that the cartels have resurrected tariffs, but of a kind which is new and original: i.e., products suitable for export are protected. (Engels noted this in Vol. III. of Capital.)
It is known, too, that the combines and finance-capital have a system peculiar to themselves, that of exporting goods at a price below their real value or "dumping," as the English say: inside a given country the combine sells its products at a high price fixed by monopoly, abroad it sells them three times cheaper to undercut a competitor, to extend its own production to the utmost, etc. If German trade with the British colonies is developing more rapidly than that of Britain with the same colonies, that only proves that German imperialism is younger, stronger, and better organised than British; in short, is superior to it. But this by no means proves the superiority of free competition, ​for it is not free competition fighting against protectionism and colonial dependence in this struggle, but two rival imperialisms, two monopolies, two groups of finance-capital. The superiority of German imperialism over British imperialism is stronger than the wall of colonial frontiers or of protective tariffs. To "conclude" from this that there is any advantage in favour of free trade and "peaceful democracy" is to forget the essential features and qualities of imperialism, is to substitute reformism for Marxism.
It is an interesting fact that even the bourgeois economic, A. Lansburg, whose critique of imperialism is as superficial as Kautsky's, nevertheless came nearer to a scientific study of the data of commercial statistics. He did not confine himself to a consideration of one country, chosen at random, and only to colonies in their relation to other countries; but he examined the export trade of an imperialist country (1) with countries which are financially dependent upon it, being its creditors; and (2) with countries which are not so dependent. He obtained the following results:
Export Trade of Germany. :
| | | | | | | Millions of Marks | Millions of Marks | |
| | | | | | | 1889 ​ | 1908 ​ | Percentage Increase |
| Countries Dependent On German Finance Capital | $\scriptstyle {\left\{{\begin{matrix}\ \\\\\ \\\ \\\ \\\ \\\ \\\ \ \end{matrix}}\right.}$ | Roumania | ... | ... | ... | 48.2 | 70.8 | 47 pc |
| Countries Dependent On German Finance Capital | $\scriptstyle {\left\{{\begin{matrix}\ \\\\\ \\\ \\\ \\\ \\\ \\\ \ \end{matrix}}\right.}$ | Portugal | ... | ... | ... | 19.0 | 32.8 | 73 pc. |
| Countries Dependent On German Finance Capital | $\scriptstyle {\left\{{\begin{matrix}\ \\\\\ \\\ \\\ \\\ \\\ \\\ \ \end{matrix}}\right.}$ | Argentine | ... | ... | ... | 60.7 | 147.0 | 143 pc. |
| Countries Dependent On German Finance Capital | $\scriptstyle {\left\{{\begin{matrix}\ \\\\\ \\\ \\\ \\\ \\\ \\\ \ \end{matrix}}\right.}$ | Brazil | ... | ... | ... | 48.7 | 84.5 | 73 pc. |
| Countries Dependent On German Finance Capital | $\scriptstyle {\left\{{\begin{matrix}\ \\\\\ \\\ \\\ \\\ \\\ \\\ \ \end{matrix}}\right.}$ | Chili | ... | ... | ... | 28.3 | 52.4 | 85 pc |
| Countries Dependent On German Finance Capital | $\scriptstyle {\left\{{\begin{matrix}\ \\\\\ \\\ \\\ \\\ \\\ \\\ \ \end{matrix}}\right.}$ | Turkey | ... | ... | ... | 29.9 | 64.0 | 114 pc |
| | | Total | ... | ... | ... | 234.8 | 451.5 | 92 pc. |
| Countries Not Dependent On German Finance Capital | $\scriptstyle {\left\{{\begin{matrix}\ \\\\\ \\\ \\\ \\\ \\\ \\\ \ \end{matrix}}\right.}$ | Great Britain | Great Britain | ... | ... | 651.8 | 997.4 | 53 pc. |
| Countries Not Dependent On German Finance Capital | $\scriptstyle {\left\{{\begin{matrix}\ \\\\\ \\\ \\\ \\\ \\\ \\\ \ \end{matrix}}\right.}$ | France | ... | ... | ... | 210.2 | 437.9 | 108 pc. |
| Countries Not Dependent On German Finance Capital | $\scriptstyle {\left\{{\begin{matrix}\ \\\\\ \\\ \\\ \\\ \\\ \\\ \ \end{matrix}}\right.}$ | Belgium | ... | ... | ... | 137.2 | 322.8 | 130 pc. |
| Countries Not Dependent On German Finance Capital | $\scriptstyle {\left\{{\begin{matrix}\ \\\\\ \\\ \\\ \\\ \\\ \\\ \ \end{matrix}}\right.}$ | Switzerland | Switzerland | ... | ... | 177.4 | 401.4 | 127 pc. |
| Countries Not Dependent On German Finance Capital | $\scriptstyle {\left\{{\begin{matrix}\ \\\\\ \\\ \\\ \\\ \\\ \\\ \ \end{matrix}}\right.}$ | Australia | ... | ... | ... | 21.2 | 64.5 | 205 pc. |
| Countries Not Dependent On German Finance Capital | $\scriptstyle {\left\{{\begin{matrix}\ \\\\\ \\\ \\\ \\\ \\\ \\\ \ \end{matrix}}\right.}$ | East Indies | East Indies | ... | ... | 8.8 | 40.7 | 363 pc. |
| | | Total | ... | ... | ... | 1,206.6 | 2,264.4 | 87 pc. |
​Lansburg has not added up his columns, and thereby gives evidence of a singular piece of inattention in not noticing that if these figures show anything, they speak against him; for the export trade into countries financially dependent on Germany has in spite of all developed more quickly (if only a little) than in the countries which are independent. (Let us emphasise the if, for Lansburg's figures are far from being complete.)
On the relation between export trade and loans, Lansburg wrote:
"In 1890-91, a Roumanian loan was subscribed through the German banks, which had previously made advances on this loan. The loan was used chiefly for purchases by Roumania of railway material in Germany. In 1891, German export trade into Roumania rose to 55,000,000 marks. The following year it fell to 39,400,000 marks; then, with intervals, to 25,400,000 marks in 1900. It only regained the level of 1891 during recent years, thanks to two new loans.
"German export trade into Portugal rose, following the loans of 1888-9 to 21,100,000 (1890), then fell, in the two following years, to 16,200,000 and 7,400,000; and only regained its former level in 1903.
"German trade with the Argentine is still more remarkable. Following the loans floated in 1887 and 1890, German export trade into the Argentine reached, in 1889, 60,700,000 marks. Two years later it only reached 18,600,000 marks, that is to say, less than one-third of the previous figures. It was not until 1901 that it regained and surpassed its level of 1889, and then only in connection with new loans floated by the State and by municipali​ties, with advances to build power stations, and with other credit operations.
"As for Chili, German export trade with that country rose to 45,200,000 marks in 1892 after the loan negotiated in 1889. The following year it fell to 22,500,000 marks. A new Chilian loan floated by the German banks in 1906 was followed by a rise of German exports in 1907, to 84,700,000 marks, only to fall again to 52,400,000 marks in 1908."
From all these facts Lansburg draws an amusing petty bourgeois moral. He says that they illustrate how unstable and irregular is export trade when it is bound up with loans, how bad it is to invest capital abroad instead of "naturally" and "harmoniously" developing national production, how "costly" are commissions to be paid by Krupps when foreign loans are floated, etc!
But the facts are clear. The increase in export trade is closely connected with the swindling efforts of finance-capital, which cares not at all for middle class morality, but flays the same ox twice. First, it pockets the profits from the loan: then it pockets other profits from the same loan used by the borrower to make purchases from Krupps, or in obtaining railway material from the Steel Trust, etc.
Let us repeat that we by no means consider Lansburg's figures to be perfect. But we had to quote them because they are more scientific than Kautsky's and because Lansburg showed the correct way of approaching the question. When discussing the importance of finance-capital in export trade, etc., it is necessary to be able to distinguish the special relations of export trade with the operations of the financiers, with the circulation of the ​products of the combines, etc. To make a simple comparison between colonies and non-colonies, one imperialism and another imperialism, one semi-colony or colony (Egypt) and all other countries is to obscure the very basis of the question.
Kautsky's theoretical critique of imperialism has nothing in common with Marxism and serves no other purpose than as a preamble to propaganda for peace and unity with the opportunists and the jingo Socialists, just because this critique avoids and obscures precisely the most profound and essential inherent contradictions of imperialism: the contradiction of monopolies existing side by side with free competition; the contradiction between the immense "operations" (and immense profits) of finance-capital and "honest" trade on the open market; the contradiction between combines and trusts on the one hand and non-trusted production on the other, etc.
We have seen previously that the notorious theory of "ultra-imperialism," born of Kautsky's imagination, bears quite as much a backward character.
Indeed, it is quite enough to compare facts which are well-known and indisputable, to become convinced of the entire falsity of the prospects which Kautsky presents to the German workers and the workers of all lands. Let us consider India, Indo-China and China. It is known that these three colonial and semi-colonial countries, inhabited by six to seven hundred million human beings, are subjected to the exploitation of the finance-capital of several imperialist States: Britain, France, Japan, the U.S.A., etc.
Admitting that these imperialist countries form alliances amongst and against one another in order ​to defend and extend their possessions, their interests, and their spheres of influence in these Asiatic States. These will be "inter-imperialist" alliances. Admitting that all the imperialist powers conclude an alliance for the "peaceful" sharing out of these parts of Asia. This would then be an "international unification" of finance-capital. (Such alliances have been produced in the 20th century, notably with regard to China.)
We ask, is it permissible to suppose, granted the permanence of the capitalist regime, and it is just this that Kautsky takes for granted, that such alliances would be more than temporary, that they would do away with frictions, conflicts and struggle in every possible form?
This question only requires to be stated clearly enough to make it impossible for there to be any other reply than a negative. For there can be no other conceivable basis, under capitalism, for the sharing out of spheres of influence, of interests, of colonies, etc., than a calculation of the strength of the participants, their general economic, financial, military strength, etc. And strength among them is constantly varying, for there cannot be, under capitalism, an equal development of different undertakings, trusts, branches of industry or countries. Half-a-century ago, Germany was an insignificant country, as far as capitalist strength is concerned, by comparison with Britain. Japan was similarly insignificant as compared with Russia. Is it thinkable that in ten or twenty years' time, there will have been no changes in the relative strengths of the capitalist powers? Absolutely unthinkable.
And so "inter-imperialist" or "ultra-imperialist" ​alliances, whatever form they may assume, whether of one capitalist coalition against another or of a general union embracing all the capitalist powers—are inevitably nothing but truces in periods between wars. Peaceful alliances prepare the ground for wars and in their turn grow out of wars, the one conditioning the other, generating the alternating forms of peaceful and warlike struggle out of the one same basis of imperialist connections and the relations between world economics and world politics.
An American writer, D. J. Hill, in his History of Diplomacy in the International Development of Europe, points out in his preface the following periods of contemporary diplomatic history.
(1) The revolutionary period.
(2) The constitutional movement.
(3) The present period of "commercial imperialism."
Another writer divides the history of Britain's external policy, since 1870, into four periods.
(1) The Asiatic period: that of the struggle against Russian progress, in Central Asia, towards India.
(2) The African period (approximately 1885-1902): of struggles against France for the partition of Africa (the Fashoda incident of 1898, which brought France within a hair's-breadth of war with Britain).
(3) The second Asiatic period: (Alliance with Japan against Russia), and
(4) The European period, chiefly anti-German.
"The political skirmishes of the advance troops takes place on the financial field," wrote Riesser, the banker, in 1905, showing how French ​capital operating in Italy was preparing the way for a political alliance between the two countries, and how in the same way struggle was being developed between Britain and Germany over Persia, between all the European capitalist powers over Chinese loans, etc. Behold, here the living reality of peaceful "ultra-imperialist" alliances, indissolubly bound up with ordinary imperialist conflicts!
The covering up of the deepest internal contradictions of imperialism by Kautsky inevitably becomes a camouflage of imperialism; and it does not fail to leave traces in this writer's critique of the political qualities of imperialism. Imperialism is the epoch of finance-capital and of monopolies, which introduce everywhere the tendency to domination, not to freedom. The result is reaction all along the line, whatever the political system, and an extreme intensification of existing antagonisms. Particularly acute becomes the yoke of national oppression and the striving for annexations, i.e., the violation of national independence (for annexation is nothing else but a violation of the right of a nation to dispose of itself). Hilferding justly draws attention to the relation between imperialism and the strengthening of national oppression. "Where-ever there are new countries," he writes, "the capital imported into them intensifies contradictions and antagonisms and excites the growing resistance of the people, who are awakened to national consciousness against the intruders. This resistance can easily become transformed into dangerous measures directed against foreign capital. Former social relations are profoundly revolutionised. The thousand-year-old agrarian isolation of countries situated outside the main current of history is ​broken, and they are dragged into the capitalist whirlpool. Capitalism itself gradually procures for the vanquished the means and resources for emancipating themselves. And they set out to obtain the objective which once seemed to the European nations to be the highest object: national unity as a means to obtain economic and cultural freedom. This movement for national independence threatens European capital in its most valuable fields of exploitation, where the most radiant prospects are opening up before it, and in those places European capital can only maintain its domination by continually increasing its military forces."
To this must be added that it is not only in new countries, but also in the old, that imperialism is leading to annexation, to the intensifying of national oppression, and, consequently, also to increasing resistance.
Kautsky, while objecting to the strengthening of political reaction by imperialism, leaves in the shade the very burning question of the impossibility of unity with the opportunists during the imperialist epoch. While objecting to annexations, he couches his arguments in a form which will be most acceptable and least offensive for the opportunists. He is directly addressing a German audience, yet he mitigates the most topical and important facts, for instance the annexation by Germany of Alsace-Lorraine. Let us take an example to appreciate this "deviation of thought." Let us suppose that a Japanese condemns the annexation of the Philippine Islands by the Americans. Will many believe that he protests because he has a horror of annexation, and not because he has a desire himself to annex the Philippines?
​And shall we not recognise the "struggle" of the Japanese against annexations as being sincere and politically honest, only if he revolts against the annexation of Korea by Japan, and urges freedom of separation for Korea from Japan?
Kautsky's theoretical analysis of imperialism, his economic and political critique, are penetrated by a spirit, absolutely incompatible with Marxism, of obscuring and glozing over the most profound contradictions of imperialism and by a striving to defend at all costs that unity with opportunism in the European Labour Movement which is now crumbling away.
* ↑ 93.—"Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv," vol. ii., p. 193.
* ↑ 94.—J. Patouillet: "L'Impérialisme américain," Dijon, 1904, p. 272.
* ↑ 95.—Kautsky: "Nationalstaat, imperialistischer Staat und Staatenbund," Nürnberg, 1915, pp. 72 to 80.
* ↑ 96.—"Finance Capital," p. 567.
* ↑ 97.—Die Bank, 1909, pp. 2 and 819.
* ↑ 98.—David Jayne Hill: "A History of Diplomacy in the International Development of Europe," vol. 1, p. x., New York, 1905.
* ↑ 99.—Schulze-Gaevernitz: "Grdr. Soz.-Oek.," p. 146.
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