# Secret Diplomacy/Chapter 14

​== XIV. RECENT AMERICAN EXPERIENCE ==
UP until a recent date Americans could con- template the play of secret diplomacy in Europe and Asia with a feeling of entire aloofness, as belonging to a political society which had neither need nor inclination to utilize such methods. Our unmenaced continental position, the natural pro- tection and separation implied in distance and ocean boundaries, and the conscious intention of keeping clear of international entanglements, all contributed to make the foreign policy of the United States entirely public and straightforward. The fathers of the Constitution had established the sound principle that treaties are the law of the land. This not only involves mature consid- eration of a treaty before it is made, but publicity as well. The American people have known at all times what obligations had been incurred, and the world had the same information. There has been no room for guesswork and suspicion.
The instructions which were issued to John Jay when he was sent as special envoy to Eng​land in 1794 lay down the following rule of conduct: "It is the President's wish that the characteristics of an American minister should be marked on the one hand by a firmness against improper compliances, and on the other by sincerity, candor, truth and prudence, and by a horror of finesse and chicane." These straightforward words began a tradition which has ever since animated the American diplomatic service. When after the Spanish war, under Secretary Hay, American diplomacy entered more fully into world-wide problems than in any previous era, the expression "the new diplomacy" was currently used in a laudatory sense to designate what Hay had implied when in a public address he had declared the Golden Rule to be the cardinal principle of American diplomacy—an ideal which makes secrecy and intrigue unnecessary.
In order to give the public an opportunity of informing itself concerning the conduct and development of foreign affairs, the United States Government has from an early date published an annual collection of diplomatic correspondence. Since 1861, this publication is known as Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States. It was formerly published within two or three years of the year to which it related, but ​
during the war this interval was considerably ex- tended. The precedents and principles elabo- rated in the diplomatic correspondence of the United States have been collected, codified and published in a very important and useful com- pendium by Francis Wharton, under the title of Digest of International Law. This work was ex- panded, amplified and brought down to date by Prof. John Bassett Moore, under the same title, in 1906. It is of the highest importance, not only as a repository of diplomatic and legal precedent, but as a definite and public record of the position taken by the American Government on all inter- national questions that had arisen up to the date of its publication. The preparation of such di- gest on the part of other governments is highly to be desired for the purpose of clarifying interna- tional law and policy, and for giving them a sound basis of reason and experience upon which the people and governments may rely. The fact that a precedent reported in this digest, might be cited against the American Government as an admis- sion, does not imply a disadvantage which would at all offset the benefits resulting in general from public knowledge.
With respect to the details of negotiation, there are confidential relationships which have always ​
been observed by the American Government. Or- dinary considerations of courtesy require that those who may speak to us frankly in confidence shall not be made to suffer by being quoted and thus perhaps be exposed to misunderstanding and criticism. On our part, in preparing a sound basis of action, favorable as well as unfavorable matters have to be considered; yet there is ordi- narily no need of publicly advertising the short- comings of individuals and governments as set forth in reports on such unfavorable matters. Such considerate action is not based on a desire to mislead or to take advantage, but to save un- necessary irritation. For the purpose of permit- ting complete freedom of discussion and of criti- cism without the risk of giving offense, the United States Senate, as a matter of its ordinary pro- cedure, goes -into secret session when discussing a treaty submitted to it. There have, however, been several exceptions. Thus, for instance, the debates on the Bayard-Chamberlain Fisheries Treaty of 1888, on the Taft arbitration treaties of 1912, and on the Nicaragua Treaty of 1916, were carried on, and concluded, in open session. Many senators are in favor of making this the common practice.
Before the war, as Prof. John Bassett Moore, ​
whose knowledge of the records is unequaled, said to me, the State Department had no secrets whatsoever, with the exception of personnel re- ports. We, too, however, can depart from a well- established tradition, as is shown by our diplo- matic history during the war. I do not believe it will ever be charged that in any matter big or little the American Government sought narrow, selfish advantages. Secrecy due to such motives, there was none. There was no American policy or enterprise that needed concealment, apart from military policies and strategy during a war. When I glanced over at the end of my mission in Peking the extra-confidential cable correspond- ence, I was inwardly amazed by the entire lack of anything that really needed concealing, in that closely guarded dossier.
Yet American diplomacy did during the war fall somewhat under the spell of the traditional meth- ods still in vogue in Europe. We were not a party to any secret engagements for the division of spoils after the war, although from the time of the peace conference on, the influence of the American Government was exercised mostly in se- cret, and the agreements subsidiary to the gen- eral settlement were secretly signed. These did not contain any apportionment of advantage to ​
the United States, but on the contrary were sup- posed to contain the nearest approach to the equitable ideas of American policy which was, un- der existing conditions, obtainable. But through- out this trying period the conduct of American diplomacy did not rest on the foundation of a con- tinuous, frank appeal to the public opinion of our own nation or of the world.
Even before the armistice some very important matters were dealt with in this fashion. Though the permanent importance of the Lansing-Ishii note as affecting in a concrete and specific way the definition of rights and policies in the Far East is very doubtful, yet in its immediate effect under all of the circumstances of the time, this was cer- tainly a noteworthy document to issue from the American foreign office. Yet, its conception and execution was absolutely surrounded with secrecy so that not even the high officials normally con- sulted in such matters, with the exception of the Secretary of State himself, were informed as to what was coming. This secrecy worked entirely in the interest of the Japanese government. By privately giving out the agreement in Japan and in China before the date when its publication had been agreed upon, the Japanese government suc- ceeded to a certain extent and for a time, in giv​
ing this matter the appearance of a great Japa- nese diplomatic victory and of a highly important concession on the part of the United States.
It is not necessary to recall the general disil- lusionment that came about when President "Wil- son agreed to the policy of secrecy at the peace conference. Undoubtedly this decision was based on the motive to secure, with a promptness re- quired by the stress of the times, a settlement which would in general commend itself to the sense of justice of the world, although it might neces- sarily contain details which, if published by them- selves, would cause lengthy public discussion and delay the final solution. If such an expectation was entertained, it was not as a matter of fact fulfilled in the results of these secret consulta- tions. The method adopted did not favor the broad and permanent view, but rather the more shortsighted bargaining in which the old diplo- macy excels. In their solutions neither the con- sultations of the peace conference, nor the sub- sequent diplomatic negotiations among the Al- lies, got beyond the old methods of bartering the destinies of small and weak peoples, which had been used by the Congresses of Vienna and of Berlin with disastrous results. The various con- ferences of 1919 to 1920 recorded a complete re​
turn to the system, of secret diplomacy, to such an extent that it appeared constantly as if the plenipotentiaries feared to let their doings be known. Even when there was no reason from any point of view for concealment, information came out in a roundabout fashion which left the public mind confused; as for instance in the giv- ing out of a decision regarding the fate of Con- stantinople, and in the reports concerning the text of President Wilson's Adriatic memorandum which were current before its publication.
From the entanglements of this procedure American diplomacy did not keep itself free, nor did it, at this time, assist the world in finding a more straightforward method more in accord with American political experience.
The disadvantages of secret methods of trans- acting public business have been brought home to the American people through several incidental matters of no small importance. It evidently was the intention of President Wilson to reserve American rights as to the Island of Yap which is a vital link in the chain of cable communication between America and the Far East, and a reser- vation of this kind is indicated by references in the official minutes, though not by a written proto- col. Without the knowledge of the United States, ​
the Council of the League of Nations later dis- posed of the mandate for all of the North Pacific Islands. As this action was secret, it could not be known whether the American interest bearing on Yap Island had been safeguarded or not. It was stated as late as January 26, 1921, that the American Government was not in possession 'of the greater part of the minutes of the Peace Con- ference. Notwithstanding the protests of the United States, Japan based her claim to the North Pacific Islands on the secret treaties made during the war.
The secrecy of the peace conference, and the revelations before and during its sessions, con- cerning the secret treaties for the division of the spoils, produced a great disillusionment in the public mind. The fact that the United States though asked to make enormous sacrifices in the common cause had been kept in the dark concern- ing at least some of these treaties, and particu- larly of those which affected its own interest, did not inspire the American public with any confi- dence in the general conduct of affairs among the nations.
After the adjournment of the conference the American President and Government still contin- ued to take a part in the various attemp ​ts to set- tie outstanding questions, particularly with re- spect to the Adriatic. When President Wilson towards the end of February, 1920, addressed a note to the allied powers concerning the Adriatic settlement, the documents and negotiations which had gone before were entirely unknown to the public. On December 9, 1919, an agreement had been signed by Great Britain, France and the United States, Undersecretary Polk signing for the latter. On January 9th, the British and French premiers had agreed with the Italian premier on a modified plan of settlement. On February 10th, the American Secretary of State wrote a note containing President Wilson's ob- jections to the plan of January 9th. The allied premiers replied to this note on February 18th. All these agreements and this correspondence were kept secret, nor was President Wilson's final answer given out for some time; only more or less accurate prognostications appeared in the press.
The American Government at this time was at a disadvantage in not participating in the ne- gotiations directly; the American ambassador at Paris was invited from time to time to hear what the conference of premiers cared to tell him, but the proceedings of the conference were ap ​parently not transmitted to the American Government. The British press at the time quite generally ex- pressed great dissatisfaction with the methods followed by the diplomats. The Westminster Ga- zette wrote: "The whole of both peoples is acutely concerned in the result. We must, there- fore, register a protest against the manner in which the negotiations are being conducted. They are being carried on in secrecy, only broken by unreliable rumors, by the three principal gov- ernments. The peoples have a right to know what is being done in their name, so that they may be able to protest, if need be, against deci- sions which may affect their future relations." The Times protested: "We are not going to stand by and have our friendship and relations with America jeopardized by the proceedings of a triumvirate sitting behind closed doors. The American democracy, we imagine, will not be less resolved to assert their rights and stifle this ef- fort at secret diplomacy."
At this time Mr. Bonar Law, the government spokesman in the House of Commons, denied ab- solutely that a harsh and uncompromising reply had originally been drafted to President Wilson's despatch, and that it had subsequently been changed through the influence of Viscount Grey ​
and Lord Robert Cecil. The Times characterized this denial as "an example of verbal quibbling which inferior intelligences mistake for diplo- macy," and maintained that "though it may be verbally true, it conveys and is designed to con- vey what is untrue"; and the Daily Mail stated that the country owed a debt of gratitude to Lord Grey for his activities in the matter. This all illustrates on how insecure a foundation, and with what chances of confusion, public opinion has to work in matters of foreign affairs where the prac- tices of the old diplomacy are followed.
The American people at this time very nearly lost patience with the entire business, and turned away from European affairs with complete dis- gust. This is the most outstanding effect pro- duced by the secret diplomacy of Europe as far as the American people are concerned. The dan- ger now is that their feeling of disgust and con- fusion, and their impatience with the selfish and shortsighted manipulations of European diplo- macy, will over-emphasize the desire of America to live by and for herself alone. If such a mood and temper should prevail, it would be a great loss to America and to the world. At no time has the world needed America more than at present, not so much from the point of view of direct eco​
nomic assistance, as on account of the fact that American experience, principles and ideals con- stitute at the present time the hope of the peo- ples of the whole world; and America could, if she desired, exercise an enormous influence in making the popular desire for such action active, vital and fruitful.
But even aside from the general confidence which is felt by the peoples of Europe and Asia in the character and ideals of the United States, there are a great many specific contributions which America could make to the solution of Eu- ropean problems. No matter how much we shall desire during the next decade to hold aloof from Europe and to concentrate on our own affairs, nevertheless, should European affairs go radically wrong through a constant denial and deception of the hopes and aspirations of the people for hon- est and sensible solutions, America in the end will again have to share the burden thus laid on the shoulders of mankind.
The fundamental American principle that treaties have the force and status of law con- tains in itself the promise of solving some of the worst troubles of the world, if it could be gener- ally applied. America should continue, for her own safety and that of the world, to use her whole ​
influence for making that principle a part of the universal public law. No international engage- ment shall be binding unless ratified by a repre- sentative body, and published to all the nations. Otherwise it shall be absolutely void, and shall not give rise to any rights or obligations; in fact, an attempt to make an agreement contrary to these conditions shall be considered an act hostile to the peace of the world. That should be the recognized law.
Nothing shows so clearly how human develop- ment has halted at this point, as the fact that it should still require an argument to show the ne- cessity of publicity and lawfulness with respect to the most essential interests of the vast popula- tions that make up the international family.
The record and constant practice of the United States, as well as her great actual and potential power, fit her above all others to be a leader in the establishment of this principle. The Amer- ican nation possesses a great moral capital in the confidence and trust that the peoples of the world repose in it. No matter if unsympathetic chan- ceries should plot to prevent America from mak- ing her influence felt in the affairs of the world, no matter how European diplomacy may occa- sionally sneer at American idealism, the peoples ​
themselves, great and small, including particu- larly those areas so immensely important Rus- sia and China would willingly look to America for leadership and guidance, with complete trust and confidence. When this is fully realized, we shall also be able to judge how vitally what Amer- ica stands for in the world will be strengthened by a constant adherence to open and straightfor- ward methods in international intercourse.
But America herself, it will be said, cannot fun- damentally change the spirit that animates for- eign policies, and bring about the universal use of honest and open practices. We are living un- der a system which is the result of historic forces that have not yet fully spent themselves and which put the potential enmity among nations in the foreground.
I do not believe that it is necessary to shut our eyes to reality and to seek recourse in a Utopian policy, in order to escape the menace inherent in current international practices. If America will only not fall in line with the absolutist tradition in diplomacy, but will emphasize at all times, with all her influence, those principles of international conduct which our natural freedom from entan- glements has permitted us to develop as of actual experience, America will contribute in a most po​
tent manner to the realization of that new spirit which must surely come to deliver humanity. That spirit is not a mere ideal, it is fortunately already present in much of international prac- tice; but it needs constantly to be followed up and supported in order that it may become the custo- mary and instinctive guide, superseding such prejudices as are still current which favor tor- tuous manipulation and perpetuate an uninformed and confused state of the public mind.
In order to fulfil this promise and destiny the United States would have to rely in the first place on the inherent merit of her ideals and princi- ples of action, and on the support which they will receive from the approval of the peoples of the world. As far as organized governments go, as distinguished from the people, some will be more inclined than others to cooperate with the United States in a reform of international practice. There is no question but that the great majority of governments will thus cooperate, though some of the most important may for a time be left on the other side.
With those peoples and governments who are in language, political traditions and general im- pulses most closely related to us, there should grow up a particularly strong feeling of confi​
dence making all our intercourse absolutely open. There certainly need not be any secrets between the United States and the great commonwealths of Canada and Australia. Our interests, our con- dition, our institutions, all make for the closest understanding. Through them there may be also realized that harmony which ought by every nor- mal reason to exist between the United States and the English people, and which is disturbed only from time to time when the policy of the British government is determined more from the point of view of the supposed needs of the British Em- pire in India, than of that of the true tradition of the English-speaking world. I do not think of treaties or of alliances, but of something much stronger an intimate understanding among peo- ples, based on mutual trust and confidence, and the consciousness of a common destiny, common purposes, and a common belief in the things which alone will prevent civilization from extinguishing itself in senseless hatreds.