# The Philosophical Review/Volume 1/Summary: Dunan - Le problème de la vie - Part 1

Rev. Ph. = Revue Philosophique
This is the first part of a three-part article; the second part is Summary: Dunan - Le problème de la vie - Part 2, and the third part is Summary: Dunan - Le problème de la vie - Part 3.
Physiology recognizes five characteristics of the living being: (1) organization, (2) generation, (3) evolution, (4) nutrition, (5) deterioration, disease, death. These cannot be explained by physico-chemical laws. The conception of nature demands a primitive formal element. The question is, How can the dualism between vitalism and materialism be avoided. Whoever admits universal mechanism must also admit the presence in matter of a principle of organization. The most natural solution of the difficulty would seem to be the explanation of Leibniz. ​The universe is subject to two sets of laws, which are in harmony with one another and organize cosmic matter, the law of efficient causes and the law of final causes. Yet D. rejects this system on account of the insufficiency of both the mechanical and teleological hypothesis on which the reasoning rests. As space is only the universal and necessary form of corporeal nature, motion cannot be regarded as the fundamental phenomenon, to which all phenomena are reducible. Motion is not a primordial, but a derived or relative phenomenon founded on some anterior reality. It is an abstraction, a necessary consequence from the fundamental principle that the universe is a unity, and that there is an absolute connection between all phenomena. Each phenomenon has for its antecedents and conditions all the other phenomena of the universe. Scientific knowledge of a particular existence is therefore impossible. A divine intellect would understand phenomena not according to laws and causes, but by the concrete principles of which each concrete reality is formed. Motion is a law of nature, the most abstract and general of all laws. Such laws express the nature and demands of our mental constitution rather than the true constituent principle of phenomena. The mechanical theory must be rejected as an unintelligible conception. But assume it to be true, we find the other support of Leibniz's theory, that of final causes, untenable. The only way to explain organisms by means of a thought, co-ordinating the movements of matter, is to determine the end aimed at by that thought, and to show that the constitution of individuals and species would be the best means of realizing the same. Neither the view of transcendent nor immanent teleology is acceptable. But assume an immanent end, then we must show that its idea is really realized in the world, which cannot be shown. The intervention of the law of sufficient reason does not satisfy us. It is no explanation to hold that the co-ordinated existences have been desired and produced by a thought or by any other force of psychical nature. Granting the doctrine of final causes, do the elementary movements of matter form a multitude of co-ordinate systems in one system embracing all? Under such a co-ordination there could be no mobility, no evolution such as is observed in organized beings. The teleological theory further demands that the co-ordinating force be in the elements themselves. We can form no satisfactory conception either of these elements or the nature of the organizing power. The latter cannot be explained to be a tendency or a desire, for neither the one nor the other of these is able to co-ordinate the elements in organic nature according to mechanical laws and in conformity with a certain end. Mere desire or impulse knows no such laws. We must, therefore, add to this organizing principle the idea of mechanical laws, and the idea of the end. This gives us three powers, the harmonious action of ​which is an impossibility. The difficulties of the teleological conception render its acceptance impossible. We must start from something concrete and real, as from something fundamentally given, and proceed to the parts, elements, and conditions. Metaphysical thinking requires that we regard the metaphysical being as something primordially given, and absolute as to time.