# The German Classics of the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries/Volume 10/Letters and Historical Writings of Moltke/Fighting on the Frontier

FIGHTING ON THE FRONTIER
TRANSLATED BY CLARA BELL AND HENRY W. FISCHER
PREPARATIONS FOR WAR
HE days are gone by when, for dynastical ends, small armies of professional soldiers went to war to conquer a city, or a province, and then sought winter quarters or made peace. The wars of the present day call whole nations to arms, there is scarcely a family that does not suffer by them. The entire financial resources of the State are appropriated to the purpose, and the different seasons of the year have no bearing on the unceasing progress of hostilities. As long as nations continue independent of each other there will be disagreements that can only be settled by force of arms; but, in the interest of humanity, it is to be hoped that wars will become less frequent, as they have become more terrible.
Generally speaking, it is no longer the ambition of monarchs which endangers peace; the passions of the people, its dissatisfaction with interior conditions and affairs, the strife of parties, and the intrigues of their leaders are the causes. A declaration of war, so serious in its consequences, is more easily carried by a large assembly, of which none of the members bears the sole responsibility, than by a single man, however high his position; and a peace-loving sovereign is less rare than a parliament composed of wise men. The great wars of the present day have ​been declared against the wish and will of the reigning powers. Now-a-days the Bourse has assumed such influence that it has the power to call armies into the field merely to protect its interests. Mexico and Egypt have been swamped with European armies simply to satisfy the demands of the haute finance. Today the question, "Is a nation strong enough to make war?" is of less importance than that, "Is its Government powerful enough to prevent war?" Thus, united Germany has, up to now, used her strength only to maintain European peace; a weak Government at the head of our neighboring State must, on the other hand, be regarded in the light of a standing menace to peace.
The war of 1870–71 arose from just such relations. A Napoleon on the throne of France was bound to establish his rights by political and military success. Only for a time did the victories won by French arms in distant countries give general satisfaction; the triumphs of the Prussian armies excited jealousy, they were regarded as arrogant, as a challenge; and the French demanded revenge for Sadowa. The liberal spirit of the epoch was opposed to the autocratic Government of the Emperor; he was forced to make concessions, his civil authority was weakened, and one fine day the nation was informed by its representatives that it desired war with Germany.
PREPARATIONS FOR THE WAR
The wars carried on by France on the other side of the ocean, simply for financial ends, had consumed immense sums and had undermined the discipline of the army. The French were by no means archiprêts for a great war, but the Spanish succession to the throne, nevertheless, had to serve as a pretext to declare it. The French Reserves were called to arms July 15th, and only four days later the French declaration of war was handed in at Berlin, as though this were an opportunity not to be lost.
KING WILLIAM AT THE MAUSOLEUM OF HIS PARENTS ON THE DAY OF THE FRENCH DECLARATION OF WAR
It is very probable that the French were counting on the old dissensions of the German races. True, they dared not look upon the South Germans as allies, but they hoped to reduce them to inactivity by an early victory, or even to win them over to their side. Prussia was a powerful antagonist even when isolated, and her army more numerous than that of the French, but this advantage might be counterbalanced by rapidity of action.
The French plan of campaign was indeed based on the delivery of unforeseen attacks. The strong fleets of war and transport ships were to be utilized to land a considerable force in Northern Prussia, and there engage a part of the Prussian troops, while the main body of the army, it was supposed, would await the French attack behind the fortresses on the Rhine. The French intended to cross the Rhine at once, at and below Strassburg, thus avoiding the great fortresses; and also, at the start, preventing the South-German army, which was destined to defend the Black Forest, from uniting with the North-Germans. To execute this plan it would have been imperative to assemble the main forces of the French army in Alsace. Railway accommodation, however, was so inadequate that in the first instance it was only possible to carry 100,000 men to Strassburg; 150,000 had to leave the railways near Metz, and remain there till they could be moved up. Fifty thousand men ​were encamped at Châlons as reserves, 115 battalions were ready to march as soon as the National Guard had taken their places in the interior. The various corps were distributed as follows:
Imperial Guard, General Bourbaki—Nancy. Ist Corps, Marshal MacMahon—Strassburg. IId Corps, General Frossard—St. Avoid. IIId Corps, Marshal Bazaine—Metz. IVth Corps, General Ladmirault—Diedenhofen. Vth Corps, General Failly—Bitsch. VIth Corps, Marshal Canrobert—Châlons. VIIth Corps, General Félix Douay—Belfort.
Thus there were only two Corps in Alsace, and five on the Moselle; and, on the day of the declaration of war, one of these, the IId Corps, was pushed forward close to the German frontier, near St. Avoid and Forbach. This IId Corps, however, received instructions not to engage in any serious conflict.
The regiments had marched out of quarters incomplete as to numbers, and insufficiently equipped. Meanwhile the reserves called out to fill their place had choked the railway traffic; they crowded the depôts, and filled the railway stations.
The progress to their destination was delayed, for it was often unknown at the railway stations where the regiments to which the reserves were to be sent were at the time encamped. When they at last joined they were without the most necessary articles of equipment. The Corps and Divisions had no artillery or baggage, no ambulances, and only a very insufficient number of officers. No magazines had been established beforehand, and the troops were to depend on the fortresses. These were but ill-supplied, for in the assured expectation that the armies would be almost immediately sent on into the enemy's country they had been neglected.
In the same way the Staff-officers had been provided with ​maps of Germany, but not of their own provinces. The Ministry of War in Paris was inundated with claims, protestations, and expostulations, and finally it was left to the troops to help themselves as best they could. On se débrouillera was the hope of the authorities.
When the Emperor arrived at Metz, a week after the declaration of war, the regiments were not yet complete, and it was not even exactly known where whole Divisions were at that time encamped. The Emperor ordered the troops to advance, but his Marshals declared that the condition of the troops made this impossible for the time being.
It was gradually dawning upon them that, instead of attacking the enemy in his country, they would have to defend their own. Rumor had it, that a strong army of the enemy had assembled between Mayence and Coblentz; instead of sending reinforcements from Metz to Strassburg, they were ordered to proceed from the Rhine to the Saar. The determination to invade South Germany was already abandoned; the fleet had sailed round, but without any troops to land.
Germany had been surprised by the declaration of war, but she was not unprepared. The possibility of such an event had been foreseen.
When Austria had separated her interests from those of the other German states, Prussia undertook the sole leadership, and paved the way to more intimate relations with the South-German states. The idea of national unification had been revived, and found an echo in the patriotic sentiments of the entire people.
The means of mobilizing the North-German army had been reviewed year by year, in view of any changes in the military or political situation, by the Staff, in conjunction with the Ministry of War. Every branch of the administration throughout the country had been kept informed of all it ought to know of these matters. The Berlin authorities had likewise come to a confidential understanding with the army chiefs of the South-German states on all important ​points. It had been conceded that Prussia was not to be reckoned on for the defence of any particular point, as the Black Forest, for instance; and it was decided that the best way of protecting South Germany would be by an incursion into Alsace across the central part of the Rhine; which could be backed up by the main force assembled at that point.
The fact that the Governments of Bavaria, Würtemberg, Baden, and Hesse, denuding their own countries as it were, were ready to place their contingents under the command of King William proves their entire confidence in the Prussian generals.
As soon as this understanding was arrived at the other preparations could be made. The orders for marching, and traveling by rail or boat, were worked out for each division of the army, together with the most minute directions as to their different starting points, the day and hour of departure, the duration of the journey, the refreshment stations, and place of destination. At the meeting-point cantonments were assigned to each Corps and Division, stores and magazines were established; and thus, when war was declared, it needed only the Royal signature to set the entire apparatus in motion with undisturbed precision. There was nothing to be changed in the directions originally given; it sufficed to carry out the plans prearranged and prepared.
The mobilized forces were divided into three independent armies on a basis worked out by the general of the Prussian staff.
The First Army, under the command of General von Steinmetz, consisted of the VIIth and VIIIth Corps, and one division of cavalry; 60,000 men all told. It was ordered to encamp at Wittlich and form the right wing.
The Second Army, under the command of Prince Frederick Charles, was 131,000 strong, and constituted the central army. It consisted of the Hid, IVth, and Xth Corps of Guards, and two divisions of cavalry. Its meeting-point was in the vicinity of Homburg and Neunkirchen.
​The Third Army, under the command of the Crown Prince of Prussia, was to form the left wing, near Landau and Rastat, a strength of about 130,000 men. It consisted of the Vth and XIth Prussian, and the 1st and IId Bavarian Corps, the Würtemberg and the Baden Field Divisions, and one division of cavalry.
The IXth Corps, consisting of the 18th and the Hesse divisions, was united with the XIIth Royal Saxon Corps to form a reserve of 60,000 men, and was encamped before Mayence, to reinforce the Second Army, which was thus brought up to the strength of 194,000 men.
The three armies combined numbered 384,000 men.
There were still the Ist, IId, and IVth Corps, 100,000 men; but they were not at first included, as the means of railway transport were engaged for twenty-one days.
The 17th Division and the Landwehr troops were told off to defend the coast. During the night of July 16th the Royal order for the mobilization of the army was issued, and when His Majesty arrived in Mayence, a fortnight later, he found 300,000 men assembled on and in front of the Rhine.
In his plan of war, submitted by the Chief of the General Staff, and accepted by the King, that officer had his eye fixed, from the first, upon the capture of the enemy's capital, the possession of which is of more importance in France than in other countries. On the way thither the hostile forces were to be driven as persistently as possible back from the fertile southern states into the narrower tract on the north.
But above all the plan of war was based on the resolve to attack the enemy at once, wherever found, and keep the German forces so compact that a superior force could always be brought into the field. By whatever special means these plans were to be accomplished was left to the decision of the hour; the advance to the frontiers alone was preordained in every detail.
It is a delusion to believe that a plan of war may be laid ​for a prolonged period and carried out in every point. The first collision with the enemy changes the situation entirely, according to the result. Some things decided upon will be impracticable; others, which originally seemed impossible, become feasible. All that the leader of an army can do is to get a clear view of the circumstances, to decide for the best for an unknown period, and carry out his purpose unflinchingly.
The departure of the French troops to the frontier, before they were thoroughly prepared for service in the field, which is a very serious step to take, was evidently ordered for the purpose of surprising the German army, with the forces immediately at command, and thus interfering with the formation of their advance. But, in spite of this, the German commanders did not deviate from their purpose of massing their armies on the Rhine and crossing that river. The railway transport of the troops of the IId and IIId Corps, however, was to end at the Rhine; thence they were to march on foot into the cantonments prepared on the left bank of the river. They moved in echelon, advancing only so many at a time as would make room for the Division behind them, as far as the line marked by the towns of Bingen, Dürkheim, and Landau.
The final advance towards the frontier was not to be undertaken until the Divisions and Corps were all collected, and provided with the all-necessary baggage train; and then proceed in a state of readiness to confront the enemy at any moment.
The assembling of the First Army appeared to be less threatened, as its route lay through neutral territory, and was protected by the garrisons of Trèves, Saarlouis, and Saarbrücken, the German outposts on the Saar.
The First Army, 50,000 strong, was concentrated at Wadern, in the first days of August. The Second Army, which meanwhile had been increased to a strength of 194,000 men, had pushed forward its cantonments to Alsenz-Günnstadt, at the termination of the Haardt Mountains, a position ​which had been thoroughly reconnoitered by an officer of the Staff, and where the troops might boldly await an attack.
The 5th and 6th Cavalry Divisions were reconnoitering the country in front. The regiments and squadrons of the Third Army were still gathering on both banks of the Rhine.
The French so far had made no serious attempt at Saarbrücken; Lieutenant-Colonel Pestel was able to successfully withstand their petty attacks with one battalion and three squadrons of cavalry.
It had meanwhile been observed that the French were moving further to the right, toward Forbach and Bitsch, which seemed to indicate that the two French Corps, known to be drawn up at Belfort and Strassburg, might purpose crossing the Rhine and marching on the Black Forest. It was therefore of very great importance to set the Third Army moving at the earliest opportunity, first to protect the right bank of the Upper Rhine by an advance on the left; secondly to cover the progress of the Second Army towards that point.
A telegraphic order to that effect was dispatched on the evening of July 30th, but the General in command of the Third Army Corps desired to wait for the arrival of the Fourth and its baggage train. In spite of this hesitancy the Second Army was ordered to proceed towards the Saar, where the French were showing much uneasiness.
The time had gone by when they might have taken advantage of their over-hasty mobilization; the condition of the men had prohibited any action. France was waiting for news of a victory; something had to be done to appease public impatience, so, in order to do something, the enemy resolved (as is usual under such circumstances) on a hostile reconnoissance, and, it may be added, with the usual result.
On August 2d three entire Divisions were sent forward against three battalions, four squadrons, and one battery in Saarbrücken. The Emperor himself and the Prince Imperial watched the operations. The IIId Corps advanced on ​Völklingen, the Vth on Saargemünd, the lid on Saarbrücken.
The Germans evacuated Saarbrücken after a gallant defence and repeated sorties, but the French did not cross the Saar. They may have convinced themselves that they had wasted their strength by hitting in the air, and had gained no information as to the resources and position of the enemy.
After this the French generals hesitated for a long while between contrary resolutions. Orders were given and recalled on the strength of mere rumors. The left wing was reinforced on account of a current story that 40,000 Prussians had marched through Trèves, the Guards received contradictory orders, and, when a small German force showed itself at Lörrach in the Black Forest, it was at once decreed that the VIIth Corps must remain in Alsace. Thus the French forces were spread over the wide area between the Nied and the Upper Rhine, while the Germans were advancing in compact masses on the Saar.
This scattered state of the army finally induced the French leaders to divide their forces into two distinct armies. Marshal MacMahon took provisional command of the Ist, VIIth, and Vth Corps, the latter being withdrawn from Bitsch. The other Divisions were placed under Marshal Bazaine, with the exception of the Guards, the command of which the Emperor reserved to himself.
It had now become a pressing necessity to protect the left wing of the advancing Second German Army against the French forces in Alsace; the Third Army was therefore ordered to cross the frontier on August 4th, without waiting any longer for the batteries to come up. The First Army, forming the right wing, was already encamped near Wadern and Losheim, three or four days' march nearer to the Saar than the Second Army in the centre. They were ordered to concentrate in the neighborhood of Tholey and there await further orders. In the first place this, the weakest of the two Divisions, was not to be exposed single-handed to ​an attack of the enemy's main force; and, secondly, it was to be used for a flank-movement in case the Second Army should meet the enemy on emerging from the forests of the Palatinate.
To execute this order, the First Army had to extend its cantonments in a southerly direction as far as the line of march of the Second Army, and evacuate its quarters near Ottweiler. This was a difficult matter to accomplish, as all the towns and villages to the north were billeted, and quarters had also to be found for the Ist Corps, now advancing by the Birkenfeld route. General von Steinmetz therefore decided to march his entire forces in the direction of Saarlouis and Saarbrücken. The Second Army had assembled, and was ready for action on August 4th, and received orders to take the field on the farther side of the wooded zone of Kaiserslautern.