# History of Mexico (Bancroft)/Volume 6/Chapter 7

Table of Contents
CHAPTER VII.
MAXIMILIAN IN MEXICO.
1864.
Conciliating Policy and Conservative Jealousy — Growing Dislike of the French — Maximilian's Weakness of Character — Reorganization of the Army — Excursion to the Interior, and Maximilian's Inferences therefrom — Guerrillas Termed Brigands, and Ordered Hunted down — Church Question — Nuncio in Mexico — Commission to Rome — Property Confiscation — Juarist Reverses.
Measures so far were directed in particular to conciliate the people, and thereby to counteract the influence of and win over the liberals, who relied mainly on the masses. In doing so, Maximilian paid perhaps too little attention to the conservatives, to whom he owed his election. At any rate, they expected recognition and reward for their services, and all could not be satisfied. As we have seen, party spirit in Mexico had early drifted into personal currents, intent on offices and other spoils, and regardless of principles and the common good. They refused to see that their own and the national weal demanded for the present a conciliatory policy toward the contending factions, in order to place the empire on a sure basis. It was to their interest to forbear a while, but they would not. One pressed the other. Individual and party jealousies, and the insensate selfishness of the clerical element, quickly created obstacles to block their path. ​Liberal-minded by nature, Maximilian could not well sympathize with the conservatives; and he felt less and less inclined to yield to the French, chafing under his dependence upon them till the feeling broke out in actual hostility. This feeling was shared by a number with republican tendencies, yet consenting to an empire — men who may be termed moderate liberals, and who were gaining favor with the emperor.
He was ready to go even further in his effort to reach the people, as the foundation of his empire, and he began by admitting into the cabinet known republicans, like the able lawyer and scholar José Fernando Ramirez, and Juan Peza, as colleagues of the two conservative ministers Leon and Gonzalez de la Vega, and the moderate liberals Escudero y Echánove and Robles Pezuela — a composition soon further colored by substituting the liberal Cortés y Esparza for Vega, and strengthened by the appointment of prefects and other officials of similar tendencies.
The usefulness of these men might have been greatly increased had they not been placed in a certain humiliating dependence on a private cabinet of polyglot character, under the direction of Félix Eloin, a Belgian mining engineer, who acquired a ​preponderating influence over Maximilian, but whose ceaseless energy and plans lacked practical application. As for his comrades, intent mainly on their own projects, and having no sympathy for Mexico, these foreigners failed to understand or to study the true interests of the country. Maximilian himself judged the people from a wrong standpoint, entangled as he was in the meshes of intriguers and flatterers, and being possessed mainly by theories. Energetic enough, but without force or true aim, he wasted time on the organization of the palace, and on details which depended on a constitution yet to be framed.
With an honest desire to promote the true interests of the country, the emperor resolved to increase his scope of observation and judgment by creating a council of state, under the presidency of José María Lacunza, to project laws and sit as a tribunal in cases concerning high officials, and to give advice in all matters submitted to it; but the advice had to suit the mood as much as the circumstances.
Commissioners had been appointed to project the reorganization of the different departments, notably those of justice, finance, and army. In the former some useful reforms were outlined, but finances became as involved as ever. The reorganization proposed from France involved the imposition of fresh taxes; and afraid of the difficulties these might rouse, ​as well as the reflection on his management, Maximilian preferred to economize in a different direction, and believed that this could be most effectively done by reducing, or at least keeping down, the costly and not very efficient Mexican army.
This project was wholly to the taste of his French advisers; for the national army, instead of being placed on an effective footing corresponding to the gradual withdrawing of French troops, met with every possible check from Bazaine. In a letter to Maximilian, the latter declared that he could not afford to leave garrisons in the towns, but recommended the formation of militia bodies to act in accord with the flying French detachments, which were deemed best for operating against the Juarists; yet he threw obstacles in the way, even, of arming the towns. The explanation for this lies in the secret articles of the compact with Napoleon. It is readily understood that the French emperor may have had reasons for desiring to retain control of the country, besides the prestige and good pay drawn from the employment there of an army; and this is evident from the policy outlined by Forey, and forced upon the regency, aiming, above all, to secure the pecuniary interests of France, which depended greatly on confiscated church property. The conservatives being decidedly opposed to this policy, it was necessary to render them harmless by reducing their power in civil as well as military departments, and limiting to narrow proportions an army which naturally would side against French rivals and intruders. To this end even Miramon and Marquez, the leading Mexican generals, were sacrificed by honorable exile.
In June 1864 the imperial forces embraced 35,550 French and 20,280 Mexicans, the latter distributed ​mainly at garrisons, and in April of the following year, while the French were reduced to 28,000, the Mexican force remained undiminished. The rural guard had grown to 8,500; but a regular corps had risen in the Austrian and Belgian recruits of 7,300 men. The former were stationed chiefly in Puebla and on the Vera Cruz road, the Belgians farther in the interior, and both roused ill feeling by their presumption. The creation of the guard proved in a sense a blow to the regulars, and afforded a plea for not fully carrying out the measure, thus leaving a rankling injury as well as a sad deficiency. These half-way proceedings have been the bane of Mexico.
Early in 1865 was announced the reorganization of the national army on the rather theoretic plan prepared by the commissions, having for an object its limitation to 31,200 men, including officers. The latter, forming a host of ignorant and unfit commanders, either self-created or risen by favor and intrigue during the series of petty revolutions, were to be reduced to eighteen generals, with a fair proportion of subordinates. To attempt a reform so sweeping in the face of the enemy seemed dangerous. Aside from this, the officers were not likely to submit humbly to a loss of position and prospects in life. So serious became the discontent that the project had to be modified, and since Bazaine show ed little desire to effect ​it, the task was intrusted to the Austrian general, De Than, but with so little coöperation as to yield no results. Maximilian never appreciated the army, and its discontent diminished both his estimation and faith, causing him to rely more and more on his Austrians, to the disgust of both Mexicans and French. His neglect to increase the Mexican forces created not alone suspicion and ill-will, but obliged the defenceless towns from fear of retaliation to favor the Juarists, thus adding another strong encouragement for the guerrilla.
While awaiting the result of the labor by different commissions engaged in projects for the reorganization of the public departments, Maximilian decided upon a tour into the interior, to present himself to the people and acquire personal knowledge of the country.
the organic law of the army, in Méx., Col. Ley. Imp., iv. 27 et seq.; also previous decrees, in Méx., Boletin Ley., 1864, 76-9, 198-9, 230-5; Id., May 164, 64-182, passim, bearing on pay, court-martial, etc., and forbidding the purchase by citizens of soldiers' arms and clothing, and the incorporation of prisoners of war into the army. The latter, so common a feature in Mexico, was afterward allowed. Forced levies being suppressed, as creating discontent and procuring poor soldiers, Bazaine recommended conscription; but Maximilian fearing that this would not answer in Mexico, with its castes and class feeling, the bounty system was used to some extent, especially with the rural guard, and also the demand for municipalities to supply a certain number of men. The new army was to embrace a legion of gendarmes, over 1.900 in number, of whom about half were to be French, at a high pay — an objectionable feature to Mexicans, as Zamacois, Hist. Méj., xvii. 819, observes. Additional sources for regulations and comments, in Hans, Quer., 18-24; Domenech, Hist. Mex., 153-79; Valle, Viagero Mex., 67-89; Diurio Imp., Jan. 12, 28, June 10, Sept. 9, Dec. 20, 26, 1865, etc.; Bullock's Mex., 264; Dur., Guardias Rur., 1-28; Arellano, Ley de 1865, 1-21, with charges against war minister; Pap. Var., ciii. pt 5. The navy also received attention, almost wholly on paper. Méx., Col. Ley. Imp., iii. 1-4, 27-38; Diario Imp., Nov. 22-7, 1865. ​He set out on the 10th of August from Chapultepec, where he then resided, leaving the empress in charge of affairs. The route lay through Querétaro into Guanajuato, public offices and institutions, industrial establishments, and places of interest being visited in an informal manner. Appointments were made of prefects and minor officials, and audiences granted. September 16th was appropriately celebrated at Dolores, the cradle of independence, the emperor in a speech lauding the heroes of that epoch. He returned to Mexico at the close of October, by way of Michoacan, convinced "that the empire was a fact, firmly based on the free-will of an immense majority of the nation," and that this majority anxiously demanded peace and justice. His duty being to grant this desire and to protect the people, he could no longer remain indulgent to the political adversaries who used a banner merely as a pretence for robbing and killing, and ordered that all armed bands overrunning the country and creating disorder and desolation should "be regarded as bandits, and subjected to the inexorable severity of the law."
In this document are revealed two mistakes of Maximilian: first, in allowing himself to be deceived by enthusiasm, evoked partly by flattered curiosity, partly by official prompting, and along a narrow circuit in ​the centre of the country; second, in taking so extreme a measure as to treat patriotic opponents as bandits. He may have assumed the sincerity of popular allegiance in order to find an excuse for the firmness necessary to success. However that may be, he had bitterly to rue the step. A ware of the lawless proceedings of many guerrillas, and the reflection cast thereby upon his own party, Juarez had taken strict measures to check them, and with promising results, so as to gradually regain popular favor, with a consequent reaction in behalf of his daring bands.
No less serious was the hostility evoked by his attitude toward the church. Aware of the liberal tendencies of Maximilian and the aim of Napoleon, the pope had preferred to await developments rather than precipitate affairs by means leading to a speedy settlement. He was accordingly reminded that measures would have to be taken independent of him unless a representative was sent. The result was the arrival in December of a nuncio in the person of Monsignore Meglia, bearer of a letter from the pontiff with complaints of Maximilian's neglect to redress the wrongs of the church, as promised by him while at Rome, and now asking him to revoke the laws which had been oppressing it, to reorganize ecclesiastic ​affairs with the coöperation of the bishops, to sustain the Roman religion exclusively, to reëstablish and reorganize the religious orders, to protect the patrimony of the church, to let public and private instruction be directed and guarded by ecclesiastic authorities, and to liberate the church from dependence on civil powers.
In reply, Maximilian declared that duty and conscience would direct his measures. As a basis for arrangement, he proposed religious tolerance, yet with special protection for the catholic faith as the state religion; the expenses of the latter to be defrayed by the public treasury, the clergy being supported like civil servants, and granting free ministration to the people; the church to cede to the government all the revenue from property which had been declared national during republican rule; the emperor and his successors to enjoy rights equivalent to those conceded from the American church to the kings of Spain; conditions to be arranged for restoring orders, for clerical jurisdiction, and cemeteries; civil registry to be kept, where deemed desirable, by priests acting as civil functionaries.
The nuncio answered that he had no power to deal with other questions than those indicated in the papal letter, the prospect of countenancing Juarez' laws being wholly unexpected. He must confer with the Vatican. Maximilian declared that he could not submit the course of justice and the interests of the ​people to such delays, and ordered his minister to proceed with the revision of church property sales in accordance with the laws under which they had taken place. Several prelates joined the archbishop in loud protest, only to receive a sharp reprimand from the sovereign, and the haughty nuncio was silenced by the observation that, while Maximilian as member of the christian community inclined submissively before the spiritual authority of the pope, as emperor, representing Mexican sovereignty, he recognized no power superior to his own. This put a stop to further communications; and the nuncio soon after took his leave, preceded by a commission which should seek to form an amicable arrangement with the holy see.
Meanwhile the government hastened to carry out the policy outlined, by issuing a decree for religious freedom, ordering the council of state to revise the nationalization of church estates, confirming sales legally made, and subjecting bulls to government approval ere they could be issued.
​Such measures could not fail to imbitter the party which regarded itself as having exalted Maximilian to the throne. They declared them contrary to the bases on which the empire had been erected, the maintenance of the church being the chief reason for war against the Juarists. To approve their fundamental acts was to proclaim the justice of their cause, and withdraw the main principles for which the national armies of the empire were fighting. It was not duly considered that the empire had been created really by Napoleon, whose views and material interests demanded these enactments. The tolerance decree was denounced as exceeding the most iniquitous reforms of republicans. It would sever the only strong bond between the races of the country, and give an intensity to caste differences that might lead to a war of extermination. While in accord with the general march of progress, the law was deemed needless for a nation so wholly catholic, and this fact in itself demanded that its aim to promote immigration should be restricted to co-religionists. The conservatives chose not to see how irresistible was the advance of liberal ideas, and that their resistance could serve to delay only for a brief term the inevitable.
The clergy were stirred to actual hostility, menacing ​the credulous with the anger of the church, and using other means that created a wide-spread feeling against the empire, and consequently in favor of the republicans. The emperor was driven by bent as well as circumstances toward the liberals, yet failing to gain more than the lukewarm adherence of a small fraction, the great majority being repelled by the elements sustaining him, and enraged by reason of every step taken by him in securing his own interest. Moreover, while missing the main party, the republicans, and losing his own, he was even estranging himself from the French, by whom the throne was upheld.
The commission to Rome had not succeeded in effecting anything, as might have been expected after the independent and radical enactments of Maximilian, and intercourse was practically broken off, ​Minister Aguilar having found it necessary to informally retire. Arrangoiz, a stout conservative, hastened to resign his mission to the courts of England, Belgium, and Holland for the same reason, yet relations with these countries remained amicable, as they did with other European states, nearly all of which had recognized the empire.
The year 1864 had continued to bring disaster on the Juarists. Only two respectable armies upheld their banners, under Diaz in the south, and under Uraga in Jalisco. The rest of their adherents were broken up into guerrilla bands, or little better, waging an unsuccessful contest in nearly every province. In Mexico, Riva Palacio claimed a certain advantage, only to lose it in Michoacan. And elsewhere defeat ​was the rule; notably in Jalisco, under Neri; in Guanajuato, where the republican governor, Gallardo, was driven out of the state; and in Guerrero, where the prominent port of Acapulco had surrendered June 3d.
The campaign for the latter six months was directed essentially toward the north, beyond latitude 24°, below which the Franco-Mexican columns stood prepared for the advance. The eastern forces centred in those of Mejía, which were cantoned from Rio Verde to Tula and Catorce, supported on the right by Dupin's guerillas in Tampico, on the left by the brigade of Aymard at San Luis Potosí and Venado, and in the rear by Castagny's division, with headquarters at Querétaro, all of which were destined to sweep Tamaulipas, Nuevo Leon, and Coahuila. In Zacatecas the brigade of L'Hériller was about to enter Durango, and on the Pacific coast the squadron of Kergrist lay ready to coöperate with Douay in Jalisco, and support a movement into Sinaloa.
Nevertheless the position of Juarez at the beginning of the second semester seemed not altogether alarming. His leading generals in the north, Negrete, Ortega, and Patoni, with Cortina and Garza in Tamaulipas, had still about 12,000 men under their orders, although somewhat scattered; and considerable means were flowing from the custom-houses of Manzanillo, Mazatlan, and Guaymas on the Pacific, of Piedras Negras on the Texan frontier, and Matamoros on the gulf. Add to this loans in the United States, forced contributions, church property, and other resources, and not least the moral support of the northern republic. Arms were all the time ​coming in from Texas and California, and even a few recruits, encouraged at one time by liberal land bounties.
But this outlook was soon to be darkened, owing partly to internal discord. A quarrel broke out between Uraga, commander-in-chief of the army of the center, and Arteaga, general of the fourth division, and in charge of Jalisco. The latter accused Uraga of treasonable correspondence with the imperialists, and refused obedience. Finding the mutinous party too strong, Uraga offered to resign in favor of any one whom the officers might elect. Echeagaray was chosen; but recognizing his own strength, Arteaga allowed prejudice and ambition to prevail, and Juarez was persuaded by decree of July 1st to give him the chief command. The step was judicious so far as concerned Uraga, who now openly gave his adhesion to the empire, and received a seat in the council.
Still more serious were the troubles pressing upon the republican government in its immediate surroundings. Encouraged by the overwhelming defeat of ​Doblado's forces in May, the Vidaurrists had again risen in Nuevo Leon under Quiroga, who kept the remnants of Juarist forces busy. At the same time the advance of imperialists uder Mejía and Castagny, the former north ward into Tamaulipas, the other by way of Saltillo, obliged a division of the Juarist forces,
with a view to check the invasion at certain approaches, notably at Angostura. Quiroga, assisted by ​Indalecio son of Vidaurri, took advantage of the diversion to obtain possession of Monterey on August 15th, Juarez and his minister having a narrow escape, and being conmpelled to flee by a circuitous route through Coahuila and Durango into Chihuahua, pursued as far as Parras by Aymard. So desperate seemed the situation that the president sent his family to New Orleans.
He had intended to seek Saltillo, but learned that Castagny had entered it on the 17th with over 3,000 men, meeting with little or no opposition. This general thereupon advanced against Monterey, regardless of the entreaties of Vidaurri, who had joined his forces at this city, and desired to let the submission of his state appear as a voluntary act of the people by public vote; nor would Castagny recognize him as governor. Licenciate Aguilar was made prefect, and Vidaurri and Quiroga, who prudently took the oath of allegiance, had to proceed to Mexico, where the conciliatory Maximilian consoled the former by appointing him councillor.
The republicans still held out for a while in this region, but a final defeat in December hastened the submission of Nuevo Leon and the greater part of Coahuila, to the banks of the Rio Grande. Resistance seemed the more useless since Mejía had overrun Tamaulipas. Instead of taking advantage of the difficulties presented during the imperialist march in the rainy season through swamps and passes, Cortina, the ​new governor of the province, preferred to hurry back to Matamoros. The movement was not unwarranted, however, for the squadron of Admiral Bosse had on the 22d of August taken Bagdad, thence blockading the river and menacing the port. On the approach of Mejía, Cortina thought it best to surrender without a blow; and thus on the 26th of September the last important town on the gulf was lost to the Juarists. He lowered himself still further by aiding in the pursuit of his late brothers in arms, including Canales and J. M. Carbajal, the new governor.
The foreign legion under Dupin had rendered good service by subduing the district between Ciudad Victoria and Soto la Marina, receiving the submission of Garza, and dispersing the guerrillas not without some severity, which served to stir anew the republican movements. Dupin was created governor of the province, Nuevo Leon, Coahuila, and Matamoros being intrusted to the care of Mejía. The subjugation of Tamaulipas was followed by the adhesion of mountainous Huasteca, in northern Vera Cruz, where the republicans had in October been reduced to extremities near their last stronghold of Huejutla. At this stage their proposal to submit was entertained, and ​they were allowed to reoccupy for the empire several towns taken from them, a course which led to fresh troubles.
Westward, the French, under L'Hériller, had entered Durango July 3d, Acting Governor Mascareñas retiring toward Nazas and joining Governor Patoni, who, reënforced by Ortega and Carbajal, prepared in September to retake the city. They approached to Estanzuela with nearly 4,000 men, and gained at first an advantage over the smaller Franco-Mexican force which marched against them; but superior discipline prevailed over raw recruits, and they were obliged to retreat, with a loss of about 400 men, dead, wounded, and captured, and twenty cannon. Two months later the new republican governor, Quesada, suffered another defeat.
Juarez and his cabinet had reached Nazas in September, proceeding thence to Chihuahua, where the capital was established on the 15th of October. General Ortega, who had lost prestige since his late defeat at Durango, and been wholly ignored, made a ​demand about this time for the presidency, claiming that Juarez' term expired on the 30th of November, and that to himself, as president of the supreme court, belonged the office, since no proper election could be held, owing to the disorders created by war. It was pointed out, however, that the term did not expire till the following year. Disgusted with his position, Ortega thereupon proceeded to the United States, to await developments.
After sharing the reverses in Durango, General Corona had passed into Sinaloa to increase his forces for a campaign in Jalisco, and finding Governor Morales there indisposed to assist with funds from the rich custom-house at Mazatlan and other sources, he had him seized and replaced by the more tractable Rosales. Meanwhile the imperialists were preparing to enter the state. On the 12th of November a French squadron, under De Kergrist, appeared before the harbor and demanded a surrender, threatening otherwise to bombard the town. At the same time came news of the rapid approach of Lozada, the Tepic chieftain, with 3,000 Indians, to coöperate from the land side. Thus pressed, Corona thought it best to evacuate the place that night, his forces now breaking into guerrilla bands for harassing the enemy. This made a large garrison less needful, and Lozada returned at once, leaving but a small force to assist the ​French in keeping the bands in check, and in holding from the Juarists so valuable a source for funds, as well as an avenue for supplies from abroad. The guerrilla campaign proceeded with alternate successes as far north as the Sonora border..
A blow equally severe was dealt in Jalisco, where the only respectable Juarist army north of Mexico — that of the centre, under Arteaga — had remained in comparative inactivity on the northern border of Colima, hemmed in by the French lines, and later detained, like them, by the rainy season. This over, General Douay set out from Guadalajara, and joined by Marquez, he made, October 28th, a well-planned attack on Arteaga, in the ravine of Atenquique. The position was strong; but finding themselves taken also in rear and flank, the republicans turned and dispersed, leaving their artillery and a large number of slain. A few days later Gutierrez and Rojas were routed near Ameca by Rivas, opportunely reënforced by a French column. Marquez now occupied Colima; and on the 18th of November took possession of the important seaport of Manzanillo, which was not retained, however. An attempt by Rojas and others to retake Colima resulted in a disastrous failure. Arteaga himself was overtaken near Jiquilpan by a French force, four days later, and routed.
These reverses were relieved only by a faint glimmer of success in the southern states, General Vicario being repulsed at Chilapa in October, while on the ​way from Iguala to replace the French garrison at Acapulco. The result was, that the port had to be abandoned by the imperialists in the beginning of December. The whole country south of Puebla, including Guerrero, Oajaca, Chiapas, Tabasco, and southern Vera Cruz, practically remained in hands of the republicans, under the direction of Porfirio Diaz. The French being unable to spare sufficient troops for this direction, the proposed operations under Brincourt from Puebla southward were deferred, but a garrison was retained at Yanhuitlan, and exploration and road-making were pursued during the closing months, with a view to advance at the turn of the year.
* ↑ On his return from Miramare, after Maximilian's preliminary acceptance of the crown, Miranda expressed fears that a wrong choice had been made, 'parecía hombre de carácter ligero.' Arrangoiz, Méj., iii. 218. This doubt was aroused mainly on the question of church rights.
* ↑ Bazaine complained of the attitude of provincial officials toward the troops, only to be snubbed by the ministers. Napoleon consoled him with a marshal's baton. The growing dislike to the French is pointedly told in La Estrella de Occil., Dec. 9, 1864, and Niox, Expéd. du Mex., 392. See also Gwin's Mem., MS., 231-3.
* ↑ The conservatives were called both retrogressionists and men of Philip II. Martinez, Hist. Rev., i. 222-4. Domenech's view of the parties savors of rabid sarcasm. Le Mex., 207 et seq. As for Maximilian, 'los franceses le llaman el archidupe; los Mexicanos el empeorador.' Iglesias, Revistas, iii. 10 — ironic punnings very common with Mexicans. The last term may be rendered the deteriorator, the first explains itself. The press became gradually less cautious in observations, so much so that a check had to be placed upon it. Comments in Liberalismo y sus Ejectos, 1-14.
* ↑ Ramirez, an honorable lawyer of some ability, had shown himself so hostile as to refuse to enter the assembly which voted for an empire. He refused to decorate his house during the entry of the imperial pair. I shall refer more fully to his literary attainments elsewhere. He became minister of relations. Peza took the war portfolio, and Vega and Escudero those of gobernacion and justice. Méx., Boletin Ley., 1864, 39, 184-5, 246 Robles was appointed to the fomento department only in Oct., when Peza received formally the charge he had so far attended to as assistant secretary, Martin de Castillo administering the treasury.
* ↑ A protestant, besides, recommended by Leopold. Kollonitz praises him for modesty and loyalty, for sense of justice and fearless frankness. Court Mex., 216-17. Domencch asserts that he owed his rise wholly to certain talents as a society man. Hist. Mex., iii. 202-3. His hostility toward the French may account for some of the coloring. His colleague, Scherzenlechner, from Hungary, former tutor of Maximilian, and of similar tendency, soon quarrelled with him and left. Niox, Expéd. du Mex., 383-4, Arrangoiz, and others are equally severe on the foreign members of the departiments, as may be understood from the national jealousy. They are accused of avarice, of inquiring into, or rather meddling with, everything, and yet accomplishing nothing. See also Valle, Viagero Mex., 39-66, 725-50.
* ↑ It was to consist of a president, eight councillors, and eight auditors, appointed and summoned solely by the emperor, and paid $6,000, $4,000, and $1,500 respectively. The councillors, appointed Dec. 4, 1864, included Uraga and Bishop Ramirez. Méx., Boletin Ley., 1864, 246-8, 283. Honorary members were added, and Vidaurri received a seat. Méx., Regla. Consejo, 1-12%3; Pap. Var., ccxxvii., pt xi.
* ↑ The former to Berlin, to study Prussian army organization; the other on a more flimsy religious mission to Jerusalem, combined with the position of minister to the Porte. 'La Inglaterra habia puesto por condicion para el envio de su ministro, el destierro de los generales,' says Rivera, Hist. Jal., v. 632.7
* ↑ Even Marquez, Mejía, and Vicario, with 6,000, 5,270, and 1,876 men respectively, in Michoacan, San Luis Potosí, and south Mexico, were chiefly engaged in holding their ground. For a distribution of the rest, see Niox, Expéd. du Mex., 730.
* ↑ Or nearly so. The last detachment arrived May 5, 1865.
* ↑ Leading at Orizaba to a bloody encounter and punishment of Mexican rioters which lingered in their memory. A Belgian colonel being placed over higher Mexican officers in Michoacan, remonstrances ensued leading to counte-rorders. The Belgians in their turn refused to submit to Mexicans. Changes and concessions had to be made all round. See Lefêvre, Doc. Maximiliano, ii. 229, etc.; Domenech, Hist. Mex., iii. 317.
* ↑ By decree of Nov. 7, 1864, with subsequent modifications. Méx., Col. Ley. Imp., iv. 133-48.
* ↑ Several pronunciamientos were among the natural features, Rivera, Hist. Jal., v. 630, and a number of men joined the republicans at once. The project would have amounted to a disbandment of the forces on February 1st, with a gradual reorganization after the models to be formed. For details, see
* ↑ Although he had both force and ability to do so, says a French officer, he confined himself to blaming the Mexican authorities for their opposition.
* ↑ The empress herself writes clearly on this point. See Domenech, Hist. Mex., iii. 284-5. The distribution of medals did not serve to conciliate them. Mex., Anuario Ordenes.
* ↑ In his Aus den Gefechten in Mex., Schonovsky shows that the large proportion of Austrians were raw and unreliable, including Poles, Hungarians, Ítalians, etc. Belgiaus formed a guard of honor to the empress. Bonnevie, Volont. Belges, 65-102. See also Diario Imp., Jan. 5, 19, 1865; Periód. Ofic., Nov. 10, Dec. 1, 1864.
* ↑ Republicans commented hopefully on this neglect, and on the resolution not to increase the stationary forces, thereby rendering sterile the victories achieved. 'Es un sueño imaginarse que bastarán 30,000 hombres,' says Iglesias, Revistas, iii. 235.
* ↑ Preparations to receive him being forbidden, so as not to burden the people, who still felt the effect of the war. Méx., Boletin Ley., 1864, 90-1. At Querétaro the absence of the bishop during such a time displeased Maximilian highly. Lefêvre, Doc. Maximiliano, i. 437-40. Inflammation of the throat detained the emperor for a while in the mining state, as did the bad roads and rainy weather throughout the journey.
* ↑ Who had released the country from centuries of serfdom. The conservatives hardly liked either allusion, and writers with Spanish tendencies, like Zamacois and Arrangoiz, declaimed against that of Spanish despotism. At Mexico the foundation-stone was laid for a monument to the independence, instead of the one proposed for the empress. Decrees of emperor, in Méx., Boletin Ley., 1864, 31-2, 109-10.
* ↑ All military and civil officials were ordered to persecute and annihilate them. Decree of Nov. 3, 1864. Méx., Boletin Ley., 1864, 188-9. Further allusions to this decree and to the tour may be found in La Voz de Méj., Oct. 20, 1864, etc.; Periód. Ofic., Aug. 18th, and following numbers. Gen. Yañez proceeded at the same time to inspect the frontier departments. Méx., Boletin Ley., 1864, 131; Id., Col. Ley., 1863-7, ii. 157; Anales del Foro Mex., Nov.Dec. 1864.
* ↑ Id. Arrangoiz alludes to Maximilian's assumption of wide adherence as 'hiciera efecto en Europa.' Méj., iii. 231. He also picks up a trivial incident at Toluca as indicating growing unpopularity; but omits to state that the reception at Mexico was everything that could be desired. The Estrella de Occid., May 27, 1864, already relates the execution of three guerrilla chiefs for robberies by Juarist generals. The mistake was made by French commanders in several places of imposing fines or contributions on neutral land proprietors, who naturally feared to openly espouse a cause that exposed them to the vengeance of another.
* ↑ This reminder was dated July 22d.
* ↑ Archbishop of Damascus in partibus. He reached Vera Cruz Nov. 29th, and the capital on Dec. 7th. Although received with great distinction, says Arrangoiz, he was kept isolated from Mexicans, and 'en ninguna parte. . .se hicieran demostraciones oficiales.' Méj., iii. 234; La Voz de Méj., July 8, 1881.
* ↑ After signing the French convention, it is not likely that Maximilian made any definite promises, although he may have left impressions, and so his minister declared to the nuncio; yet Arrangoiz and others insist that the earlier promises at Miramare were strong; 'prometió el restablecimiento completo del catolicismo, con sus comunidades religiosas.' Mej., iii. 262-3.
* ↑ This embraced entire freedom for bishops in their pastoral duties, and prohibition of false teachings. It has been assumed in some quarters, Pruneda, Hist. Méj., 151, etc., that a threat was held out in case of non-compliance; but this is only supposition.
* ↑ Parishioners were to be liberated from every fee, tithe, or other emolument. The pontiff to designate in accord with the emperor what orders should be reëstablished, how to subsist, etc.; existing communities to remain, but not to receive novices until conditions were settled. The civil registry clause was modified by decree of Dec. 18, 1865, requiring catholics to fulfil church obligations ere submitting to the civil marriage rite.
* ↑ Pretending that such demands were startling after the promises held out by Maximilian; yet when pressed, he declared tolerance contrary to the doctrines of the church and to the sentiments of the Mexicans, who were all catholics; the clergy as well as people would look with horror on support from the treasury, preferring the charity of the faithful.
* ↑ Ratifying all that seemed legal, and with tolerance principles. Letter of Dec. 27, 1864.
* ↑ They knew not what agreement he had made with the pontiff; the latter had been warned already in July to send an effective representative, and here came a nuncio without power; he could not await the slow proceedings of the vatican. The bishops had been meddling too much in politics, and were neglecting duty by staying away from their dioceses. They had a good excuse for absence in the lack of protection from the Juarists.
* ↑ The nuncio had declared the papal superiority supreme in the matter.
* ↑ He proceeded to the Central American republics, there to await orders from Rome. He embarked at Vera Cruz June 2d, receiving every attention. For details concerning his mission, see Lefêvre, Doc. Maximiliano, ii. 5-32; Zamacois, Hist. Méj., xvii. 491 et seq.; and Arrangoiz, ubi sup., wherein the church is upheld. Niox takes a sensible middle course in Expéd. du Mex., 397-405. Se also Domenech, Hist. Mex., iii. 207-10; Valle, Viagero Mex., 117-42. Testory's defence of Maximilian's policy in Imp. y Clero, 33-44. Counter-arguments in Id., Observ. sobre, 1-47; Bustamante, Cuatro Palabras, 8-103; Arrillaga, Observ., 1-67, 1-87; Pinart Coll.; Ormaechea, Expos., 3-29.
* ↑ It consisted of the plastic Velazquez de Leon, the only and nominal conservative in the cabinet; Joaquin Degollado, a lawyer with republican principles, like his father, the late Juarist general, and Bishop Ramirez of Tamaulipas, appointed imperial almoner in July, Méx.. Boletin Ley., 1864, 42, whom Arrangoiz terms an ignorant Indian, serving with his office to give tone to the commission. They embarked in Feb. following. Minister Aguilar wrote from Rome in March expressing faint hope for any arrangement. Lefêvre, Doc. Maximiliano, ii. 23-9.
* ↑ The latter decree was issued in time to stop the publication of an encyclical letter from Rome of Dec. 8th. Méx., Boletin Ley., 1864, 327-49. The tolerance decree of Feb. 26th recognized the Roman as state religion. Authority had to be obtained for practising other rites. At the same time the public sale of bibles loomed ominous, and the cemeteries were placed under control of local authorities, and opened to persons of any creed, to the horror of the faithful. The revision of property nationalization was to be conducted in accordance with laws of June 20, 1856, and July 12-13, 1859, and supplementary decrees. The alienation of estates by clergy, during the administration of Zaloaga and Miramon, were to be recognized, unless affected by previous claims. Articles 16-24 regulate the bureau of administration for nationalized property not sold, and order the disposal of such property. Domenech, in giving these decrees, Hist. Mex., iii. 313-21, adds a few comments from the journals. Many of the lessees and holders assisted, especially the church, in hampering the execution of the decree. See subsequent mortmain law of 1865. Méx., Decreto 5 Julio, 1865, 1-24.
* ↑ Several pamphlets and books bear more or less exhaustively on this topic, which is besides fully ventilated in the journals of the day, such as the imperialist paper, Pájaro Verde, Dec. 1864 et seq. Zamacois, an ardent defender of the church, embodies a number of them in his Hist. Méj., xvii 850, 892, etc.; but he is loose and verbose as well as prejudiced.
* ↑ In the French journal L'Estafette, at Mexico, Sept. 21, 1864, and subsequent dates, are given somewhat colored accounts of troubles with church property holders in Puebla. In Lefêvre, Doc. Maximiliano, i. 342, 435-7, are instances of priests withholding the sacrament to compel obedience to their wishes. Maximilian was accused of letting journals rail against the clergy.
* ↑ The commission arrived at Rome in April; and although the pope considered it nothing but proper to ignore it, in view of the steps taken to carry out the very measures submitted for consideration, yet a conciliatory attitude was decided upon. Minister Aguilar understood this to be due to French influence, which swayed not with love, for the pope knew well the source for Mexican church policy. On July 8th was issued, not an answer to the memorial presented, for that could not be entertained, but a few general considerations upon the course of the apostolic see with regard to such proposals. It stood charged by God to sustain the church, not to destroy, and owed it to the faithful to disapprove everything hostile to catholic interests and principles. Maximilian had been called upon to repair the ills suffered by the church, instead of which he had undertaken to encroach still further upon its time-honored claims. Its principles permitted no civil interference with its rights. The authority of Spanish kings, colonial patronage, and other matter had been usurped or extorted, and could not be yielded to Maximilian; nor the restriction of ecclesiastic tribunals to spiritual affairs. It was preposterous to surrender to the government all ecclesiastical property, including any future acquirements, and to enslave the clergy, as dependents on the state, by letting them accept its bounty like civil officials. After demanding of them all these material sacrifices, without the least offer of compensation for property already alienated, they were further expected to abandon tithes, fees, and alms. 'The faithful should at least be permitted to recognize with pious offerings the extraordinary privileges which they receive from the apostolic ministration of their pastors,' such as 'marriage and other acts of grace and favor.' The absence is noted of any allusion to episcopal right of free intercourse which the holy see, of supervising education, of censorship over impious or immoral books, etc. In conclusion, the Mexican clergy and people are exhorted to resist encroachment, declaring that the firmness of sacred pastors in critical times would attract the blessings of heaven. Arrangoiz, Méj., iii. 282-99, 333-56, who gives this question much space, contents himself mainly with reproducing the text of documents. Zamacois indulges in verbose newspaper arguments of a nature utterly opposed to the anti-clerical essay, El Imperio y el Clero, by the French chaplain Testory.
* ↑ As presented in a strong letter to Maximilian disapproving his policy. Arrangoiz, Méj., iii. 292, ap. 56. Reflections thereon by Aguilar, Reflex., 1-16.
* ↑ The English and Belgian mission was now divided between Col J. M. Duran, a liberal, and late assistant secretary of war, and Marquis de Corio, of Milan, the latter sent to Belgium. Aguilar was transferred from Rome to Madrid, replacing Col Fran. Facio, who had caused dissatisfaction in Mexico. Fernando Mangino was sent to Lisbon. Hidalgo had also offended with his decided French ideas, and summoned home from Paris, he resigned in February 1866. The Vatican had been given additional cause for bitterness by the appointment of a representative at Turin, in the person of Gregrio Barandiarán, who was now transferred to Vienna, his place being taken by Peon y Regil, acting also in Switzerland. The mission to Russia and the Scandinavian countries had passed from F. S. Mora to Manuel Larrainzar, and that to Turkey and Greece from Martinez del Rio to General Marquez. For treaty of commerce with Turkey, see Derecho Intern. Mex., pt ii. 363-70. Pedro Escandon held the post in Brazil. The foreign ministers at Mexico were Count Guido von Thun, representing Austria; Alphonse Danó, France; Peter Campbell Scarlett, England; Blondeel van Cuelebroeck, Belgium; Sandoval, Marquis de la Rivera, Spain; Count de la Tour, Italy. There had also appeared representatives from Portugal; from Sweden, in Baron Wetterstedt; from Russia, in Baron Stoeckl. Danó replaced Marquis de Montholon, who in May 1865 proceeded to the U. S., where he had been educated. The ideas he had there imbibed did not suit the Mexicans. The three leading Mexican ministers abroad, to France, England, and Austria, received $12,000 pay and $10,000 for expenses; others $8,000 and $5,000. See further, also, regulations in Méx., Col. Ley. Imp., ii. 115-31; Lefêvre, Doc. Maximiliano, i. 364; Méx., Boletin Ley., 1864, 36, 322 et seq.; Diario Imp., June 21, 1864, and later dates; Almanaque Imp., 1866, 5-8; Arrangoiz, Méj., iv. 27, 44, 276, 306, etc. Payno, Cuentas, 698-9.
* ↑ To French forces, owing to a lack of artillery, as Álvarez explains. Solis, the commander, surrendered 500 men and 81 officers. Gallardo and Neri are said to have had 1,500 and 2,000 men respectively. In Puebla some 1,500 republican guerrillas were still said to be hovering, indirectly encouraged by certain imperialist mistakes, such as the sacking of Huauchinango in Aug., as described in Lefêvre, Doc. Maximiliano, ii. 108-10.
* ↑ Castagny passed onward against Saltillo and Monterey, Mejía marching either against this place or Matamoros. Niox, Expéd. du Mex., 414.
* ↑ Decree of Aug. 11, 1864, Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Mex., ix. 691, annulled soon after. Méx., Col. Ley., 1863-7, iii. 94. The land grants varied in value from $1,000 for privates to $2,000 for officers. The result was a small band of not over 50 from the U. S., who afterward compromised for money. Méx., Mem. Hac., 1870, 627. Vega was in California for some time to secure arms; and though thwarted on more than one occasion by the French consul, he obtained secret countenance from the authorities, and managed to send large supplies, as reported in Vega, Doc., i., passim. Brown, the U. S. treasury agent at S. F., gave aid, and entered the Mexican service. Id., 424, 551; Vega, Ausiliares, MS. The question of shipping arms was discussed in congress. U. S. Sen. Doc. 15, 38th Cong. 2d Sess., 1-22. See also S. F. Bulletin, Aug. 6, 1864; Alta Cal., June 29, 1864.
* ↑ Echeagaray patriotically accepting the second position. Méx., Col. Ley., 1863-7, ii. 77-9; Vega, Doc., i. 587-8. This gave Arteaga control over Jalisco, Michoacan, Guanajuato, Querétaro, and part of Mexico — that is, so far as republican influence extended. The four divisions of this army were intrusted to Echeagaray, Ortiz, Salazar, and Herrera y Cairo, governor of Jalisco, the latter acting only in absence of Arteaga. La Estrella de Occid., Sept. 9, Nov. 4, 1864.
* ↑ Several high officers joined him; but Echeagaray and O'Horan, his supposed intimate friends, refused to listen to his urging. Diaro Deb., 9th Cong., i. 680. Yet in June Uraga had indignantly rejected the invitation extended by the imperialists. La Estrella de Occid., July 29, Aug. 12, 1864. He sought to win over Diaz among others, but met with an indignant repulse. Diaz, Datos Biog., 68-76.
* ↑ Of Ortega's forces there were 500 at Monterey and 1,500 at Saltillo, Naranjo stood south of this point, Quesada had 1,000 men at Salinas, and Patoni was approaching with reënforcements. See also Arias, Reseña, 9-29, and Leg. Mex., Corresp., 1865-6, 53-4.
* ↑ Juarez' carriage was riddled with bullets. Fortunately the pursuing force was too small to accomplish anything more. La Estrella de Occid., Dec. 15, 1864; Niox, Expéd. du Mex., 417. This author assumes that prompt coöperation during the pursuit into Chihuahua might have secured the person of Juarez.
* ↑ Owing to the troubles that might arise from party differences, it was said. At Monterey were found 55 pieces of artillery, besides much ammunition.
* ↑ He had retired from Monterey with his forces on the approach of Castagny, but recognized the hopelessness of exacting any terms. La Estrella de Occid., Dec. 15, 1864, Juarez, Biog., 49, and other republican sources naturally rejoice over his discomfiture. Iglesias, Revistas, iii. 21.
* ↑ Gov. Galindo of Coahuila, after the final defeat Dec. 29th at Palo Blanco, by Lopez, resigning office, Gov. Hinojosa of Nuevo Leon had less ground on which to sustain himself.
* ↑ With four vessels. In Texas, on the opposite bank, the federals were at the time besieging Brownsville, and both they and the confederates sought to interest Mexicans and French, especially with a view to obtain artillery. The French held aloof; but Cortina countenanced the federals, while Cauales, his lieut, formed a futile pronunciamiento in favor of the confederates.
* ↑ Niox gives Cortina 900 men and 12 cannon. A portion escaped with Canales to the confederate side, to return soon after for the guerrilla campaign. La Estrella de Occid., Mar. 17, 1865. Several score of vessels were at the time in the river with cotton and other effects.
* ↑ Iglesias, Intervencion, iii. 110. He had reason for anger with Juarez, as we have seen; yet he intended to turn back to the republicans should fortune again favor the cause.
* ↑ Dupin's movements are fully related in Revue des Deux Mondes, Oct. 1, 1865, Feb. 1, 15, 1866, etc. The outcry against his severity caused his recall soon after.
* ↑ Dupin had achieved a certain degree of success, but found the country too difficult for a satisfactory campaign; whereupon Col Tourre entered it from Mexico, and won a hard-fought victory on Aug. 1st at La Candelaria pass, which caused the evacuation of Huejutla, but led to no other results. Capt. Bessol now entered and managed to press the tired guerrillas under Ugalde, Escamilla, and Kampfner into greater compliance. Niox, Expéd. du Mex., 406-10, follows the operations closely.
* ↑ As explained by the letters and articles especially in El Cronista, Nov. 2, 1864, and passim. Iglesias, Revistas, iii. 459, 523. The liberal treaty in their favor was signed April 5th. After a fresh varying campaign, Dec. 1864 to March 1865, another armistice had been arranged. Niox, Expéd. du Mex., 432-3; Zamacois, Hist. Méj., xvii. 831-2, 934-43, 1001-4. More decided triumphs were achieved by the imperialists at Tuxpan and Teziutlan.
* ↑ Sustained by General Ochoa, he had prepared for resistance, hoping that Patoni might come with aid, but in vain. On retreating, one of the chiefs, Corona, of Sinaloa, undertook, unsuccessfully, to operate between Nombre de Dios and Zacatecas, and passed thereupon to Sinaloa. Sarabia was appointed prefect by L'Hériller.
* ↑ This battle, known as Cerro de Majoma, was fought Sept. 21st. According to Niox, the victors numbered only 530 French and 80 Mexicans. Col Martin, the French commander, fell early in the battle, and was replaced by Japy. Iglesias maintained that the republicans had only 2,500 men, of whom less than half were engaged. Revistas, iii. 29. Ortega had the chief command, imposed on him, he claims, to lose his prestige. Leg. Mex., Corresp., 1865-6, 57-9. Accounts in La Estrella de Occid., Nov. 4, 1864, assume that the republicans remained masters of the field. See later versions, in La Voz de Méj., Dec. 13, 1834; Periód. Imp., Oct. 15, 1864.
* ↑ The republicans claiming an advantage by Borrego over a Franco-Mexican column.
* ↑ Ángel Trias had here been appointed governor in June, replacing Casavante, whom the local authorities ignored; Patoni being made chief of all forces in Durango and Chihualhua. Méx., Col. Leyes, 1863-7, 51, 76; La Estrella de Occid., Nov. 11, 1864.
* ↑ His correspondence on the subject may be found in Leg. Mex., Corresp., 1865-6, 35-9, 43-4, 63-6, and passim; Méx., Col. Leyes, 1863-7, ii. 11023, with official resolutions. See also Iglesias, Revistas, iii. 60-1. It was shown that the election having taken place in 1861, the term of four years could end only in 1865. It was proposed at the time to remove Ortega from the bench for having acted as governor of Zacatecas, and being so long away on expeditions; but this was not acted upon till the following year, when his prolonged absence in the U. S. afforded more just cause.
* ↑ He had at first sought to win him by an ostensible uniting among his troops in favor of Morales; but the wily governor was not to be caught, and so his removal became necessary, Roman taking his place till a speedy election made Rosales governor. Morales attempted to resist, but his troops deserted and Mazatlan was readily taken, Oct. 14th.
* ↑ Not aware of the evacuation, De Kergrist began on the 13th to cast some shells, but a white flag soon corrected the measure. Lozada entered as the last republicans departed, and ordered a fruitless pursuit. A vast amount of stores fell to the victors. The French fleet consisted of the frigate Victoire and three smaller vessels. See Hist. North Mex. Stales, ii., this series.
* ↑ Among republicans joining the victors was Francisco Vega, who carried their banner to northern Sinaloa, but was besieged at Vila Fuerte, and captured and shot. A small Franco-Mexican reënforcement by way of Altata was defeated. Iglesias claims 98 French prisoners, and calls it one of the glorious victories. Revistas, iii. 152-6.
* ↑ An effort early in August, by four of his battalions, to break through northward, at Cocula, was frustrated with a loss of 200 men killed, many taken prisoners, and six cannon. Niox, Expéd. du Mex., 430.
* ↑ And a loss of 800 prisoners.
* ↑ With a loss of 500 dead and captured, 2,000 fire-arms, etc. Previous to this he had successfully passed through the French lines by a circuitous route, proposing to gain Michoacan. The fullest account of operations in Jalisco and Sinaloa is found in Vigil, Ensayo Hist., 211, etc., but from a republican standpoint.
* ↑ Diego Álvarez came to the rescue of this place, which Vicario had been besieging for three weeks. The garrison under Pinzon, jointly with the reënforcement, made sad havoc among the imperialists, who were placed at from 2,000 to 3,000 men. Vicario, who had regarded the expedition to the nalarious coast with disgust, was summoned to answer for his evident carelessness. Finding himself suspected of intrigues against the empire, he fled from the country to escape arrest. Diario Ofic., Oct. 28, 1869.
* ↑ Mainly because the French squadron was needed at Mazatlan, and partly because Álvarez and his valorous Pintos, supported by Diaz, had frustrated every effort to gain further foothold in the province, and even cut off supplies from the land side. The last Frenchman embarked Dec. 14th. Niox, Expéd. du Mex., 435. The U. S. war steamer Saranac remained to protect foreigners.
* ↑ Diaz had been actively keeping guard, and had gained several successes at Cazatlan, Calipa, and Tlajiaco, repulsing Visoso; but he had failed in a previous attempt, in August, on Nazahuatipa, near Teotitlan, his brother Félix, nicknanied El Chato, from his flat nose, failing at Ayotla, in the same region. Diaz, Biog., MS., 198-204; Id., Datos Biog., 61 et seq. The Indians of Yucatan, ever suspicious of established governments, appearing troubled, the imperial comissioner hastened to conciliate them by appointing a defensor to represent and plead for them, as in colonial days, promising redress of wrongs. Zamacois has preserved the Maya text of the decree. Hist. Méj., xvii. 583-4. Details concerning the preceding military operations will be found in La Voz de Méj., Sept. 3, 1864, till Feb. 1865, passim; so also in Periód. Ofic., La Estrella de Occid., Diario Ofic. Imp., Pájaro Verde, and other papers for the same period. In Juarez, Biog., 38, it is estimated that 102 battles took place during the last seven months of 1864, in which 3,277 were killed and 1,300 wounded.