# 1922 Encyclopædia Britannica/Cambrai-St. Quentin, Battle of

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​CAMBRAI-ST. QUENTIN, BATTLE OF (Aug. 26-Oct. 5 1918). The first stage of the British offensive in Aug. 1918, the battle of Amiens, had been successfully accomplished, and the second stage, the battle of Bapaume-Peronne, was making good progress (see Somme, Battles of the) when it was considered by British G.H.Q. that on Aug. 25 (to use the words of Lord Haig) "the proper moment had come for the third stage of the operations, in which the First Army should extend the flank of our attack to the north. By driving eastward from Arras, covered on the left by the rivers Scarpe and Sensee, the First Army would endeavour to turn the enemy's positions on the Somme battlefield and cut his system of railway communications which ran south-westward across their front." See map, Plate I.
1. Operations of the First Army (Aug. 26-Sept. 26). The forces at the disposal of Gen. Home's First Army for these operations consisted of the I. and VIII. Corps, to which the Canadian Corps was now added. This last-named formation began to arrive in the army area on Aug. 22, and was put into line on the right or southern wing of the army. Thus the front on Aug. 25, the eve of the offensive, was held as follows, from right to left: Canadian Corps (Currie) (2nd Canadian, 3rd Canadian and sist Div. in line, 1st Canadian Div. in reserve); VIII. Corps (Hunter-Weston) (8th and 2oth Div. in line, 24th Div. in reserve); and I. Corps (Holland) (ssth and i6th Div.in line, i5th Div. in reserve). Of these forces, however, only those astride the Scarpe, i.e. the Canadian Corps, were to be engaged, the main axis of the attack being the line of the Arras-Cambrai road; the two remaining corps were to stand fast, while making all endeavours to deceive the enemy and prevent him dispatching reinforcements to other threatened points. The VIII. and I. Corps therefore will not come again into this narrative.
Facing the right of the First Army were the German I. Bavarian Reserve Corps astride the Scarpe and the II. Bavarian Corps as far south as the Arras-Cambrai railway. These two corps formed the right of the Seventeenth Army and had divisions in line. They held the old German trenches of 1916 from W. of Gavrelle in the N., by Fampoux, Feuchy, and Tilloy to Neuville Vitasse in the south. Behind them lay a succession of strongly fortified zones first, the old British and German defences of 1917 covering all the ground W. of the Coieul river; next the Fresnes-Rouvroy line and the Vis en Artois switches and finally the Drocourt-Queant line. To the E. of this, the last artificial position, there lay the strong natural defence line of the Canal du Nord covering Cambrai. The task upon which the First Army was about to embark was thus no easy one.
The Canadian attack was timed for 3 A.M. on Aug. 26 that is, well before dawn. Some 45 tanks were available, and owing to the absence of some of the corps artillery only 600 guns covered the advance. Two objectives were assigned, the first running E. of Fampoux and W. of Monchy and Wancourt, the second including Roeux, Monchy and Guemappe, while exploitation was to be carried out beyond this latter line as far as possible.
The operation was carried out exactly as ordered. The Germans opposite the Canadians appear to have been warned of the attack and to have thinned out their front line, so that resistance was weak at first. Heavy fighting, however, took place for the second objective, particularly in the southern sector, where the 2nd Canadian Div. was operating; here the ridge E. of Wancourt and Guemappe was not finally secured till late at night. The 3rd Canadian Div. had pushed its troops beyond Monchy and up to the edge of Pelves by midday, while N. of the Scarpe the 51st Div., advancing at 9 A.M., occupied Fampoux and Gavrelle with little opposition. The Germans delivered counter-attacks S. of the river without success and at the end of the day the Canadians had penetrated into and maintained themselves within the enemy defences some two and a half miles to the E. of their starting points.
The operations were continued during the following two days by the same divisions in line. The 3rd Canadian Div., moving off at 4:55 A.M. on the 27th, met with steadily increasing hostile resistance, chiefly on the left in the Scarpe valley; the 2nd Canadian Div. commenced its advance only at 10 A.M. Both made progress, and by the evening had reached the line of the Sensee, between Cherisy and Remy. The Canadians now found themselves in front of the Fresnes-Rouvroy line, which in this sector ran from N. of Hendecourt by Remy and Boiry to Biache, and the capture of this line was assigned as the objective for the 28th. The divisions again advanced at different hours, the 3rd at 9 A.M., the 2nd at 12:30 P.M., and the brigades and battalions also attacked in succession from the left, thus enabling all the artillery available to unite in covering the advance of each unit in turn. This method proved highly successful on the left, where by the end of the day the 3rd Div. was in possession of the Fresnes-Rouvroy line along its entire front; the 2nd Div., however, despite valiant efforts, was unable to make much progress.
That night the divisions in line were relieved, the ist Canadian Div. coming in on the right, the 4th British Div. on the left. The next few days were devoted to preparations for the attack on the Drocourt-Queant h'ne, timed for Sept. i but later post- poned to the 2nd. Artillery and bridging material were brought forward and wire-cutting commenced, while a series of partial infantry attacks took place with the object of securing suitable jumping-off ground. The XXII. Corps (Godley) was now brought in on the Canadian left; the nth Div. was put in on the N. bank of the Scarpe and the sist and 8th taken over from the Canadians and VIII. Corps respectively; the 49th Div. was retained in reserve. As a result of the local operations carried out on both banks of the river, Arleux and Plouvain fell into the hands of the XXII. Corps, and the Canadians completed the capture of the remaining German positions W. of the Drocourt-Queant line. By the evening of Sept. 1 all was ready for the morrow's attack.
This was to be carried out by the ist Canadian Div. on the right, the 4th Canadian Div. in the centre, and the 4th British Div. on the left on the front from N. of Hendecourt to W. of Sailly, measuring some 55 m. in width. Five hundred guns and 45 tanks were detailed off to assist. The first objective was to be the front and support lines of the Drocourt-Queant system; the second the W. bank of the Canal du Nord between the Arras-Cambrai road and the Scarpe, and the third a line just to the E. of that obstacle. The XXII. Corps astride the Scarpe was to secure the Canadian left. The XVII. Corps (Ferguson), on the left of the British Third Army, was to advance on the Canadian right, after the capture of the first objective, and by passing through the breach made by the Canadians to turn from the N. all the German defences in the vicinity of Queant, where the Drocourt-Queant line joined the main Hindenburg line.
The attack began at 5 A.M., rapidly overran all resistance and by 9:15 A.M. had possessed itself of its first objective on all its ​ front. The Drocourt-Queant front and support lines were thus in the hands of the Canadians after little more than four hours' fighting. The operation had been brilliant in the extreme, but the exploitation proved more difficult, as neither tank nor artillery support was available in sufficient strength. As a result the advance on the front of the 4th Canadian and 4th British Div. made no progress beyond the line south of Etaing-Dury. On the right, however, the 1st Canadian Div. got forward beyond Cagnicourt and Villers and established its front some distance to the E. of these places. Meanwhile the XVII. Corps pushed the 57th Div. through the gap opened by the Canadians and swung down astride the Drocourt-Queant line towards its junction with the Hindenburg line, which was at the same time assailed in front by the sand Division. Later in the day the 63rd Div. passed through to continue the advance; by nightfall the tangle of trenches and wire at the junction were in British hands and the villages of Queant and Pronville had also been wrested from the enemy.
That night the German Seventeenth Army withdrew its two right corps in haste behind the Canal du Nord, where they again faced round for a renewed stand. Their losses had been heavy; ii divisions had been defeated with a loss of close on 11,000 prisoners and many guns; the artificial defences had not held up or even appreciably checked the British advance, which now threatened to turn from the N. the whole of the Hindenburg line.
Fortunately for the Germans the Canal du Nord proved a sufficiently formidable obstacle to give pause to the First Army's progress. It was decided that that army should halt and reconstitute for the present, as any further advance could only be carried out by a deliberate and carefully planned assault on the canal line. This attack was not to take place till Sept. 27.
In their operations between Aug. 26 and Sept. 3 the 10 British divisions of the First Army had defeated 13 hostile divisions, and taken from them over 16,000 prisoners and 200 guns. The right wing of the German Seventeenth Army had been forced to fall back some 12 m., abandoning in succession a series of strong and well-fortified defensive systems, the loss of which had an instant effect on the situation to the south.
2. Third Army's Advance to Hindenburg Line (Sept. 3-26). As a result of the First Army's success the German Seventeenth Army on Sept. 2 was ordered to fall back to the Hindenburg line, and to commence the move that same evening. By Sept. 8 the two corps (III. and XIV. Reserve) which faced the British Third Army had completed their withdrawal and held the fortified front from Sains on the Canal du Nord by Havrincourt to just S. of Gouzeaucourt, with detachments to the W. of this line, established in the old British and German trenches of 1917.
The British Third Army followed up the retreating enemy, being impeded only by rearguards whose resistance was easily overcome, and by Sept. 9 were once more in touch with the main body of the German Seventeenth Army along the whole of its front. At this period the line was held from right to left by the V. Corps (Shute) (2ist and i?th Div. in front line, 38th Div. in reserve); the IV. Corps (Harper) (5th New Zealand and 37th Div. in line, 42nd Div. in reserve); the VII. Corps (Haldane) (62nd and 2nd Div. in line, 3rd and Guards Div. in reserve); and the XVII. Corps (Ferguson) (52nd and 63rd Div. in line, 57th Div. in reserve).
In order to obtain observation and jumping-off ground for the attack on the main Hindenburg system it was necessary to clear the enemy from the positions still held by him forward of this line. This was successfully accomplished in two operations, on Sept. 12 and Sept. 18. On the former of these dates the IV. and VI. Corps in the centre of the army advanced on a front of five miles between the Cambrai-Peronne and Cambrai-Bapaume roads. The IV. Corps, attacking with the 37th Div. on the right and the New Zealand Div. on the left, occupied Trescault and the heights north of it, while the 62nd Div. of the VI. Corps carried Havrincourt after stubborn fighting and maintained it in face of a series of counter-attacks, delivered with fresh forces both on this and the following day. The 2nd Div. also made some progress to the N., effectively securing the flank of the 62nd and keeping touch with the XVII. Corps, which had been held up ever since Sept. 2 on the W. bank of the Canal du Nord.
Sept. 18 saw the V. Corps on the right of the Third Army attacking in its turn, in conjunction with the Fourth Army to the south. The 38th Div. was brought up into line for this operation on the left of the 17th, the 21st Div. being on the right of the corps front. The attack was fairly successful, though the 21st Div. was unable to attain all its objectives and the 38th Div. was held up in front of Gouzeaucourt, and a series of further minor attacks on the succeeding days proved necessary before the positions required for the general offensive against the main Hindenburg line were completely secured along the whole front of the Third Army.
3. Advance of Fourth Army to Hindenburg Line (Sept. 3-26). The results of the fighting on the line of the upper Somme and the Tortille at the end of Aug. and the beginning of Sept. had been such as to induce the German Second Army to give up all hope of putting up any further resistance W. of the Hindenburg line, and to order a withdrawal of its troops to that fortified position. Accordingly, from the morning of Sept. 4th, the British Fourth Army was able to make rapid progress along its whole front. The line at the beginning of this advance was held as follows: on the right was the Australian Corps (Monash) with the 32nd, 5th Australian and 3rd Australian Div. in line, and the 1st and 4th Australian Div. in reserve; on the left the III. Corps (Butler) with the 74th and 12th Div. in line and the 58th in reserve. Facing them the front of the German Second Army was held in order from the right by the LIV., XI. and LI. Corps; in all, eight divisions.
The first few days of the British advance passed with little resistance from the enemy, who fell back rapidly under cover of the fire of light machine-guns and isolated field guns. British cavalry and cyclists found some scope for useful activity and considerable progress was made. On Sept. 8, however, the Germans made a stand in the old British battle zone of March 21 on the general line E. of Vermand to E. of Roisel-Epehy. A series of partial assaults by the various front-line divisions having had little result it became evident that a deliberate attack would be necessary to overcome this obstacle. Accordingly the army front was reorganized, the IX. Corps coming in on the right, taking over the 32nd Div., and putting the 1st into line on its left, with the 6th and 46th in support. Gen. Rawlinson then proposed to undertake an operation on a large scale with the object of capturing the outer defences of the Hindenburg line along the whole front of the Fourth Army. These outer defences consisted of two strongly fortified lines, the first of which had been the German outpost line in the spring of 1917 and the British main line of resistance before March 1918, and the second the British outpost line corresponding to this main line a less formidable obstacle about a mile farther east. The capture of these defences, which would afford observation over the greater part of the main Hindenburg line proper, was of course an essential preliminary to any operation against the latter.
Accordingly the period from Sept. 11 to 17 was devoted to pushing on the preparations for this projected attack. The line was advanced in several places by means of strong fighting patrols, so as to run on the evening of the 17th from Holnon by Maissemy and Jeancourt to St. Emilie and W. of Epehy. By this time everything was ready for the general offensive, which was timed to commence at 5:20 A.M. on the 18th in conjunction with the First French Army to the S. and the Third British Army to the north.
It was intended that the advance should be carried out in three stages, the final objective (which it was not considered must necessarily be reached on the first day) being the old British outpost line from Thorigny by Pontruet, W. of Bellicourt and of Bony to W. of Vendhuille. This gave a front of attack of some 14 m. in length and involved an average penetration of 3 miles. Twenty-three tanks joined in the attack, which was preceded by no bombardment but was covered by the fire of 978 guns.
Generally speaking the operations of the Australian Corps in the centre were completely successful, those of the IX. and III. ​ Corps in the wings less so. The IX. Corps, attacking with the 6th and 1st Div. in line, despite difficulties in assembling its forces, reached its first objectives by 9 A.M., but the 6th Division was held up at Holnon, and was unable to maintain itself in Fresnoy, while the ist Div. got farther forward, but not as far as Pontruet. The corps lost heavily, though some prisoners and guns were taken. The Australian Corps (4th Div. on the right, 1st on the left) also had heavy fighting, particularly in Levercuier village and the woods N. of it, before reaching its first objective, and was checked in front of the final objective till darkness fell, when the last hostile defences W. of the main Hindenburg line were successfully secured under cover of night. The captures of the corps came to over 4,000 prisoners and 87 guns; the attacking strength of the Australians was less than 6,000 and the casualties were just over 1,000 in all. The III. Corps' attack, carried out by the 74th, 18th, 12th and 58th Div. in line from the right, met with very stubborn opposition; the enemy were expecting the attack and fought well. As a result the progress made was less than had been hoped; only the 74th Div. in fact attained the first objective. The 18th was checked after capturing Ronssoy and the 12th and 58th after taking Epehy; 2,300 prisoners were taken and 10 guns.
It was decided, in view of the incomplete success attained on this day, that the IX. and III. Corps should continue the attack on the 19th, while the Australians consolidated their gains. A series of partial offensives were therefore undertaken on the succeeding days, on both wings of the army, but with little real result; neither corps could succeed in attaining the final objectives of the first day's attack or clear the enemy entirely from the advanced defences of the Hindenburg line.
Meanwhile it had been definitely decided by British G.H.Q. on Sept. 22 that that line should be attacked along the whole front from the Sensee to N. of St. Quentin by the First, Third and Fourth Armies. To the last named were assigned as reenforcements the XIII. Corps and the II. U.S. Corps; the former was maintained in reserve, but the latter was combined with the Australian Corps and took over the left of its front and the right of the III. Corps front, relieving the ist Australian, 74th and 18th Div. by Sept. 25. The 74th and 58th Div. now left the Fourth Army, which had thus undergone a net increase from 10 to 14 divisions.
During this redistribution the efforts of the IX. and III. Corps to gain further ground continued without cessation. Sept. 21 and 22 saw some progress by the latter formation, which was not, however, successful in completing the capture of the outer German defences before the right of its line was taken over by the 27th and 30th U.S. Div., nor were the new arrivals who carried out their first attack in France on the 26th and 27th able to advance the line to any real extent. On the other hand, during the period from Sept. 24 to 26 the IX. Corps, by repeated efforts, pushed their front to the E. of Gricourt and Pontruet, thus ensuring favourable conditions for the forthcoming offensive on the right wing of the army.
In the series of operations, described above, the Third and Fourth British Armies had engaged 15 divisions against 29 of the German Second and Seventeenth Armies, and had taken from them close on 12,000 prisoners and 100 guns.
4. Preparations for Attack against Hindenburg Line (Sept. 22-26). The Hindenburg line, which now faced the British armies, has been described in detail elsewhere; it will therefore suffice to say here that, together with the Masnieres-Beaurevoir line beyond it, it formed a fortified belt some four to six miles in depth, and was in all respects one of the most formidable defen- sive positions known to history. Despite the risks of failure and the probable consequences of such a failure, from the political and moral as well as the military point of view, it was considered essential both by Marshal Foch and Lord Haig that the attack on it should be carried out and that as soon as possible. In view of the fact that the First and Third British Armies were faced with strong positions in the Canal du Nord and the Scheldt canal, which it was advisable to carry prior to the general attack on the Hindenburg line behind the latter obstacle, it was decided that these two armies should open their operations a day earlier than the Fourth Army, so as to draw off the German reserves from the front of that army, which had to deliver the main attack and was faced with the most formidable defences.
Accordingly the following orders were issued on Sept. 22: "The First Army will attack on Sept. 27 with a view to capturing the heights of Bourlon Wood in the first instance. It will then push forward and secure its left on the Sensee river and operate so as to protect the left of the Third Army. The Third Army will operate in the direction of the general line Le Cateau Solesmes. It will attack on Sept. 27 in conjunction with the First Army and will press forward to secure the Canal de 1'Escaut, so as to be in a position to cooperate closely with the Fourth Army on Sept. 29. The Third Army will assist the Fourth Army with counter battery work on the enemy's guns in the region La Terriere-Villers Outreaux. The Fourth Army, protected on its right flank by the First French Army, will deliver the main attack against the enemy's defences from Le Tronquoy to Le Catelet, both inclusive, operating in the direction of the general line Bohain-Busigny. The bombardment will commence on Sept. 27 and the assault will be delivered on Sept. 29."
5. First Army's Advance to Cambrai (Sept. 27-Oct. 2). At the close of the operations E. of Arras at the beginning of Sept., the right wing of the First Army, consisting of the Canadian and XXII. Corps, stood S. of the Scarpe, facing the obstacle of the Canal duNord and the Sensee. Behind this strong line of defence the German Seventeenth Army had the I. Bavarian Reserve and the II. Bavarian Corps with five divisions in front line and about twice that number in support. The positions held by them were formidable to a degree; the Canal du Nord, although not completed along all its length, was some too ft. in width and its northern half full of water; all the bridges were destroyed, and the E. bank, which commanded the W., had been lined with machine-guns and strongly wired. To the E. of the canal the Germans had as successive defensive positions the Marquion trench line, running from Oisy by Marquion to the main Hindenburg line near Graincourt; the Marcoing line, covering Cambrai at a distance of some two miles from its outskirts; and the Scheldt canal, from the Sensee at Estrun by the western suburbs of the city to Marcoing, Crevecceur and the south.
The task in front of the First Army was thus an extremely difficult one; none the less it had to be tackled, and as early as Sept. 15 the preliminary measures were taken in hand. The XXII. Corps took over the front from the Sensee southwards to the Arras-Cambrai road, and the Canadians relieved the left of the Third Army as far as N. of Moeuvres. By this means the latter, who were to make the main attack, were brought opposite a portion of the Canal du Nord, which was dry along a front of 1½ miles. The plan was to cross the obstacle here and then to expand the front of attack to a frontage of some 9 m. by pushing out divisions fanwise to E., N.E. and N. It was hoped that the assembly of the attacking troops in the restricted zone opposite the crossing point, the rapid bridging of the dry canal, and the pushing forward of guns to cover the farther advance, and of reinforcements, ammunition and supplies to support it, could all be carried out with the necessary speed and security, although the difficulties to be faced were very great and the possible causes of contretemps numerous.
Zero hour was to be 5:20 A.M. on Sept. 27. The 4th Canadian Div. was in line on the right, and the ist on the left, and were to carry out the first phase of the attack, as far as the line Fontaine Notre Dame-W. of Haynecourt-Sauchy L'Estree. Up to this line four successive objectives were assigned; from there onwards the second phase of the advance was to carry the assailants to the line of the Scheldt canal and the Sensee. During the pause between these two phases the 3rd Canadian Div. was to come in on the right of the 4th, and the nth British Div. on the left of the 1st, so that the second phase would be carried out by the 3rd, 4th and 1st Canadian and nth British Div. in that order from the south.
Punctually at the appointed time, at dawn on Sept. 27, the assault was delivered. The crossing of the narrow defile over the ​ canal between Inchy and Moeuvres was carried out according to programme, thanks in large measure to the intensity of the barrage covering the operation. All the field artillery of the Canadian and XVII. Corps were firing on this area, and as a frontage of only 9 yd. was allotted to each gun the resistance of the enemy was speedily stifled. While the infantry pressed forward to carry the Marquion line bridges were swiftly thrown over the dry canal bed, and batteries went over at a gallop to take up their positions for supporting the farther advance. The first objective and part of the second were carried on time and without great difficulty, but the left of the 1st Canadian Div., swinging to the left against Marquion, was checked for a time, until reinforcements, including units of the 11th Div., came up to complete the capture of the village and its defences. The second objective was in Allied hands by midday everywhere. Further progress was difficult, particularly on the right, where the 4th Canadian Div., which had outstripped the advance of the left of the Third Army, was held up by flanking fire and counter-attacks from the S., and was unable to do more than establish itself on the fourth objective by the evening, with its right thrown back along the Bapaume-Cambrai road. On this line it was relieved during the night by the 3rd Canadian Div. Farther to the N., the first phase of the attack was successfully completed by 2 P.M., and it was found possible to commence the second phase at 3:20 P.M.
At this hour the 1st Canadian and 11th Div. moved forward. The former stormed Haynecourt, pressed up to and beyond the Douai-Cambrai road E. of that village, and maintained its position despite repeated and violent hostile efforts to regain the lost ground. The nth Div. also met with great success, and before nightfall was in possession of Sauchy Cauchy, Sauchy L'Estree, Oisy and Epinoy.
The line therefore at the end of the day ran from just W. of Fontaine Notre Dame to the Douai-Cambrai road N.E. of Haynecourt, thence to Epinoy and Oisy le Verger. Four thousand prisoners and 100 guns had been taken in this day's advance of some 7,000 yd. in depth on a front of 15,000. The whole operation, investing as it did a most complicated and yet perfect combined action, had been a most brilliant success.
It was decided that the attack should be continued on the 28th, the 3rd and 4th Canadian Div. on the right and the 11th Div. on the left advancing at 6 A.M., while the ist Canadian Div., which was farther advanced than they, followed suit only at 8 A.M. The Germans resisted stoutly all along the line, but were unable to stem the drive. On the right the 3rd Div. cleared Fontaine Notre Dame and the 4th Sailly and were then held up for the time being in front of the Marcoing line, which, however, was completely cleared later in the evening by a renewed attack. The 1st Div. made little headway, but the nth Div. got well forward along its front and established itself from Epinoy to Aubencheul on the Sensee. Large captures were made besides the substantial gain of ground.
At the same hour on the 29th the infantry again went forward, the objectives being to complete the capture of the Marcoing line and the seizure of the Scheldt canal bridges W. and N. of Cambrai. The 11th Div. made no progress, but the line on the rest of the front was advanced to the junction of the roads from Arras and Bapaume in the suburbs of Cambrai and the line of the Douai-Cambrai road and railway, including the village of Sancourt. A certain amount of ground gained beyond the railway had to be evacuated before the violent counter-blows of the enemy against the left of the ist and then of the 4th Div.
None the less neither side was prepared to give up the struggle. At dawn next day the 3rd and 4th Canadian Div. advanced once more with the object of securing the cqveted bridges over the Scheldt canal, to be followed later by the 1st Canadian and 11th Div., which were to clear the peninsula between that canal and the Sensee. A certain amount of progress was made, the village of Tilloy being entered by the 3rd Div. and Blecourt by the 4th Div., but not all these gains could be maintained in face of repeated hostile counter-attacks, and at the end of the day the line ran much as before on the front of these two divisions. The second phase of the offensive as planned could not even be commenced. Another effort was made on the morrow to complete the operation. It met with stubborn resistance from German divisions in line, now increased to ten. These endeavoured again and again to check the Canadian advance by blows against their left front and left from the direction of the con- fluence of the Sensee and the Scheldt canal. The Canadian advance began at 5 A.M. and went well despite all obstacles. The 3rd and 4th Div. attained their objectives the line of the canal south of Ramillies and the road between that place and Cuvillers. The 1st Div. had even more desperate fighting before it succeeded in clearing Blecourt, Cuvillers and Bantigny, and when it had finally captured them a powerful thrust against its exposed left from the direction of Paillencourt forced back the Canadian line to the west of Cuvillers and Bantigny. Meanwhile the 11th Div. on the N., attacking in the afternoon, secured and held its objectives and thus eased the situation on that flank. On the evening of Oct. 1 the Canadian line ran from the western suburbs of Cambrai by Tilloy to the Douai-Cambrai railway W. of Blecourt and along that railway to the Sensée.
This was the final day of the Cambrai battle on the First Army front. After its exertions and achievements during the previous five days of incessant fighting the Canadian Corps was in urgent need of rest and refitment. It was therefore decided to postpone further attacks for a few days, until the effect of the Third and Fourth Armies' advance in the S. should make itself felt. The results of the First Army's battle were in any case satisfactory to a degree.
Though Cambrai itself only fell into Allied hands a week later, its fate was in fact sealed by the five days' fighting which has just been narrated. During its course the First Army's line had been advanced close on eight miles; its four divisions had driven back the 13 German divisions engaged by the Seventeenth Army on their front, and taken from them over 7,000 prisoners, 205 guns and 950 machine-guns, besides inflicting losses in killed and wounded which certainly far outweighed their own casualties. The last German fortified system had been breached on this front and the first stage and the most difficult stage completed of that triumphant advance which was to lead the First Army, in six weeks' time, back to Mons.
6. Assault of Third Army on Hindenburg Line (Sept. 2?-Oct. 2). The front of the Third Army on the evening of Sept. 26 ran W. of Villers Guislain and Gouzeaucourt, E. of Trescault and Havrincourt to the line of the Canal du Nord S. of Moeuvres and along its W. bank to that village. From right to left along this front were the V. Corps (33rd, 21st and 38th Div. in line), the IV. Corps (jth and 42nd Div. in line, New Zealand Div. in support), the VI. Corps (3rd and Guards Div. in front, 62nd in support) and the XVII. Corps (52nd and and 63rd Div. in front, 57th in support). Facing them the German Seventeenth Army held the Hindenburg system with seven divisions in front line.
In view of the great strength of the defences in the southern section of the Third Army zone it was decided that there should at first be no attack by the V. Corps, but that the salient held by the enemy in that area should be left until the progress of the operations on either flank should endanger the garrison's line of retreat. Accordingly the offensive of Sept. 27 was carried out by the Third Army with its three leftmost corps only.
The task of the IV. and VI. Corps was to clear the Hindenburg front and support lines on either side of the Ribécourt valley as far E. as Highland Ridge (running N. from Villers Plouich) and the spur overlooking Marcoing from the west. Five objectives were laid down, and exploitation was to be carried out beyond the final one to Welsh Ridge (N. of La Vacquerie) and the Scheldt canal. The XVII. Corps was first to carry the Hinden- burg system on its front and then to advance to the line Graincourt-Anneux, with exploitation if possible as far as Cantaing-Fontaine Notre Dame. Zero hour was at 5:20 A.M.
The 5th Div. of the IV. Corps moving off at that hour early met stubborn resistance and suffered from flanking fire from the south. Beaucamp was not taken till 11:30 A.M. after hard fighting, and then had to be surrendered again late in the evening to a ​
heavy counter-attack. In consequence the right wing of the 42nd Div. was somewhat checked in its advance, and whereas the left of that division, starting off at 7:52 A.M., was well beyond its third objective by midday the right wing had only just completed the first stage of its advance. By 2:30 P.M. the left of the 42nd in conjunction with the right of the 4th Div. (VI. Corps) had captured Ribecourt, but the final stages of the advance had to be postponed till next morning.
The VI. Corps met with more success. The 3rd Div., over-running the hostile defences with little difficulty, shortly after midday seized Flesquieres and Ribecourt and established itself east of these villages, where the 62nd Div. passed through to continue the advance and carried the line to the outskirts of Marcoing, thus attaining all the corps' objectives for the day. On the left the Guards, despite heavy losses from flanking fire against their left, owing to the fact that the XVII. Corps was unable to keep up with their rapid progress, pressed forward between Flesquieres and Graincourt and reached the neighbourhood of Premy chapel (N.W. of Marcoing). They were relieved by the 2nd Div. on that evening.
The XVII. Corps had first to clear the W. bank of the Canal du Nord W. of Graincourt before it could attempt to pass it and get forward to its day's objectives. The right division, the 52nd, successfully carried out this operation with a portion of its forces, while other units crossed the canal on the right in conjunction with the 63rd Div., and met with severe resistance. It was not till late in the afternoon that Anneux and Graincourt fell into Allied hands and the 57th Div. passed into first line for the further advance on Cantaing, which proved to be impracticable before nightfall.
On the night of Sept. 27, then, the Third Army front ran from W. of Beaucamp by Ribecourt, Premy chapel and Anneux to W. of Fontaine Notre Dame, where it connected with the right of the Canadian Corps a maximum penetration of some 35 m. from the jumping-off line. Operations were resumed next day. The IV. Corps began its attack at 2:30 A.M. under cover of darkness; Beaucamp was once more secured, Highland Ridge was carried by storm, and parties pushed forward to Welsh Ridge which was cleared of the enemy by 6 P.M. The VI. Corps, attacking with the 62nd and and Div. as soon as it was light enough to see, cleared the Germans from the W. bank of the Scheldt canal and established itself on the line Marcoing-Noyelles; it was found impossible, however, to get over the canal at the moment. The line of the canal was also reached on the XVII. Corps' front, E. of Cantaing, and her parties succeeded in getting over the obstacle and establishing themselves there despite the counter-attacks of the enemy.
September 29 saw the V. Corps on the Army right joining in the attack in conjunction with the Fourth Army to the south. Little progress was made in this sector, but on all the rest of the front considerable results were achieved. The IV. Corps, advancing with the 5th Div. on the right and the New Zealanders on the left, carried Gonnelieu and Banteux in the right section, securing a bridge-head at Crevecoeur in the left section of its zone of attack. The VI. Corps to its left had passed the canal in force before the end of the day and established itself to the E. of Masnieres; the XVII. Corps also got the 63rd Div. over the obstacle, while the 57th Div. on the left cleared the Marcoing line between the canal and the Bapaume-Cambrai road and pushed on to the outskirts of the city itself.
On Sept. 30 and Oct. 1 the advance was continued, but more slowly and with greater difficulty. The Germans, menaced on either flank, as had been foreseen, withdrew from their salient on the V. Corps' front, and the latter were able to get forward to the canal line and commence preparations for forcing it. The IV. Corps secured its footing on the E. bank about Crevecceur, while the VI. Corps occupied Rumilly after two attempts, and the XVII. Corps on the left flank reached the suburbs of Cambrai on both banks of the Scheldt canal.
The battle on the Third Army front was now over. The Hindenburg line had been breached on a front of nine miles, and an average advance of seven miles effected in the face of the most formidable obstacles, both natural and artificial. Thirteen German divisions had been forced to give ground before 12 British, and had left behind them many prisoners and guns during the five days' fighting. The fate of Cambrai was sealed and only a part of the incompletely constructed Masnieres-Beaurevoir line, already broken in its northern sector by the Third Army and in its southern sector by the Fourth Army, was left as a dyke to stem the further British advance. That line, as the attack of Oct. 8 was to show, was destined to prove quite insufficient to hold up those troops who had stormed the immensely powerful defences of the Hindenburg system.
7. Storming of Hindenburg Line by Fourth Army (Sept. 27-Oct. 5). The forces at the disposal of the Fourth Army for the attack of the formidable defences of the Hindenburg line on the front of 12 m. from Selency to Vendhuille consisted of the IX. Corps (Braithwaite) (1st and 46th Div. inline, 32nd in support); the composite American-Australian Corps (Monash) (27th and 30th U.S. Div. in line, sth and 3rd Australian in support, 2nd Australian in reserve) ; and the III. Corps (Butler) (12th and 58th Div. in line, 18th in support). The IX. Corps' zone of attack included the Canal du Nord and the defences on either side of Bellenglise, while that of the composite corps was the canal tunnel on either side of Bellicourt. The III. Corps had the subsidiary role of covering and securing the left flank of the composite corps. The first objective assigned to be captured by the divisions in line included the Hindenburg system on both banks of the canal and the Hindenburg reserve line a mile to the E.; once these had been secured the supporting divisions were to pass through and carry the last line of defence, the Masnieres-Beaurevoir line, between the latter village and Le Tronquoy.
The German Second Army, facing the Fourth Army, consisted at this time of the LIV., IV. Reserve and LI. Corps in line, and the XL Corps in reserve. The III. Corps on the right of the German Eighteenth Army was also partly on the Allied front. Ninety-eight divisions were in line and others in support, but neither physically nor morally were these troops all that could be desired. Moreover, though they must have been well aware that an attack was coming, the date and time were unknown and remained unknown till the moment of the assault.
The preliminary bombardment commenced at 10 P.M. on Sept. 26 and went on for 56 hours; about 1,600 guns of all calibres took part in it, yet so formidable were the hostile defences that the task of the infantry still remained one of great difficulty. This was enhanced by the fact that only in certain sectors where the canal passed under the Belh'court tunnel was it possible to employ tanks, of which some 130 were allotted to the left of the IX. Corps and to the Composite Corps.
Nevertheless, when the infantry broke forward to the attack at 5:55 A. M. on Sept. 29 under cover of the morning mist their advance made rapid progress.
On the IX. Corps front, while the 6th Div. on the right secured the army flank about Gricourt, the 46th Div. overran all obstacles in its front, swam or crossed the canal, stormed Bellenglise village and the defences beyond, and by 3 P.M. was in possession of its objectives everywhere. At the cost of only 800 casualties it had penetrated some 3½ m. deep into the most formidable part of the hostile fortress, routed the four enemy divisions in its front and taken 4,200 prisoners and 70 guns. It was perhaps the most astonishing single feat of arms in the World War. The 32nd Div. passing through found its task much sim- plified, and before nightfall had carried the Hindenburg reserve line on practically the whole of its front, taking a further 800 men and 20 guns in its advance.
CAMBRAI ST. QUENTIN, BATTLE OF
On the left flank of the army the III. Corps was able to fulfil satisfactorily the subsidiary role assigned to it.
Despite the comparative failure of the Composite Corps the attack had on the whole been a brilliant success, seven Allied divisions having defeated nine enemy divisions ensconced in immensely powerful works, capturing from them 5,300 prisoners and loo guns and effecting such a wide breach in the last German line of defence that its complete capture in a few days was assured.
Gen. Rawlinson decided that the offensive should be continued on the 30th, the U.S. Div. being withdrawn from line for the present. The IX. Corps was to round off its success on the right by clearing the Thorigny area on the near bank of the canal, and occupying the ground on its front as far as the Masnieres-Beaurevoir line; the Australians were to secure the remainder of the first day's objectives in its sector between Bellicourt and Vendhuille, while the III. Corps would occupy the latter village to cover their left. The IX. and III. Corps were able to carry out this programme without serious difficulty; but the Australians again met with stubborn resistance, and at the end of the day, though their right division, the 5th, had cleared the greater part of the Hindenburg reserve line, the 3rd Div., on the left, working up the Hindenburg line from the S., had been able to get no farther than S. of Bony. The completion of the operation therefore was deferred till Oct. 1, when the 3rd Australian Div., after fighting all night, succeeded by a combined attack from W. and S. in clearing the Hindenburg line entirely and pushing forward to the edge of Le Catelet. The IX. Corps also had a successful day; the 32nd Div., advancing in conjunction with the sth Australian Div., cleared Joncourt and Estrees and breached the Masnieres-Beaurevoir line on a mile front E. of the former village. This hold was maintained all next day, despite desperate hostile efforts to recover the lost ground; two British attacks on Sequehart were, however, repulsed.
During the first two days of Oct. the army front was redistributed in preparation for the general offensive to be undertaken on the 3rd against the last defensive position left to the enemy the Masnieres-Beaurevoir line. On the evening of the 2nd the line was held by the IX. Corps on the right, with all three divisions, 1st, 32nd and 46th, in front line; the Australian Corps with the 2nd Australian Div. in front line; and the XIII. Corps, with the 50th Div. in line, and the 25th and 66th in support. The orders were for the IX. Corps to take Sequehart and Ramicourt and push forward to Montbrehain; for the Australians to occupy the line from W. of Ramicourt to S.W. of Beaurevoir and then to seize the latter place and Ponchaux; and for the XIII. Corps to clear Gouy and Le Catelet.
Zero hour was at 6:5 A.M. on the 3rd. The IX. Corps on the right had heavy fighting, and after attaining their final objectives about 10:30 A.M. were counter-attacked repeatedly and forced to relinquish Montbrehain and some of the ground gained to the south. The Australian Corps also successfully attained its first objectives, though not till later in the evening, so that the exploitation of their success on this day proved out of the question. The main object of the day's attack had, however, been completely achieved, for along all the front of these two corps the Masnieres-Beaurevoir line was in Allied hands. The XIII. Corps on the left established itself in Gouy and Le Catelet by midday, and though a strong hostile counter-attack recovered the former village for a time the ground lost was regained before the nightfall.
After a redistribution of the front the operations were resumed on the 4th. The main task fell to the XIII. Corps, but little progress was made in that sector, as the enemy, who was believed to be preparing for a withdrawal eastwards, resisted stubbornly around Beaurevoir to cover his retirement. The Australian and IX. Corps also had little result to show for their efforts. Oct. 5th, however, saw the successful completion of the programme, the XIII. Corps taking possession of Beaurevoir with the 25th Div. and pushing the 5oth Div. on its left wing well north of Gouy towards Aubencheul in conjunction with the right of the Third Army, while the Australians secured Montbrehain. It was to be their last feat of arms in the World War, and they had the satisfaction of knowing, as they left the line on the 6th, that the last fortifications of the Germans on the Fourth Army front had fallen, and that the way was clear into the open country beyond.
During the period between Sept. 29 and Oct. 5 the Fourth Army's 12 divisions had completely defeated 20 enemy divisions, driving them from a succession of defensive lines of unexampled strength and taking from them close on 15,000 prisoners and 120 guns, and could claim for themselves with justice a preponderating share in the decisive victory of the war.
8. Results of the Battle.—The results of the battle may be thus summed up: 35 British divisions had been engaged against 79 German divisions. The latter had been forced to retreat some 20 m. on a front of 30, and had lost 67,000 prisoners, 680 guns and vast quantities of other material, besides their killed and wounded. The formidable defensive system on which the German Higher Command, apparently with good reasons, relied to hold up the Allied advance until the winter should give pause to active operations and secure for their hard-driven troops and war-weary people a little respite from their trials and disillusionments, had been burst into fragments, and there was left for German arms no further resource for staving off disaster.