# History of Mexico (Bancroft)/Volume 5/Chapter 16

Table of Contents
CHAPTER XVI.
OPERATIONS IN THE NORTH BUENA VISTA.
JULY 1846 MARCH 1847.
Expeditions against New Mexico and California — Doniphan's March to Chihuahua — Battle of Sacramento — Operations of the Gulf Squadron — Taylor's Plans — He Advances to Saltillo — Tampico Evacuated by the Mexicans — Taylor Occupies Victoria and Abandons It — Scott Takes Command — Withdrawal of American Troops — Mexican Preparations — Santa Anna at San Luis Potosí — His March to Agua Nueva — Taylor Takes up a Position at La Angostura — Description of the Pass — Dispositions of the Two Armies — Battle of Buena Vista — The Final Charge Repulsed — Santa Anna Retreats
In anticipation of war with Mexico, the government of the United States had issued orders to the naval commanders in the Pacific to take possession of the California ports immediately upon receiving news of the commencement of hostilities, without waiting for further instructions. The neglect with which Mexico had long treated that province had rendered its inhabitants lukewarm. Not that they were wanting in patriotism; but their frequent appeals to the government never having been answered, there had been engendered a corresponding indifference with regard to their continuing in the Mexican republic. This indifference was, moreover, fostered by the agents of the United States government; and when in July the American admiral, having received information that hostilities had broken out on the Rio Grande, proceeded to carry out his instructions, he met with no active resistance, and the United States flag was ​raised in California without the shedding of blood. Unfortunately the arrogant conduct of a certain United States officer had alienated the kindly feelings of the inhabitants. An uncalled-for revolt of the American citizens against the authorities had further aggravated this antipathy, and thereby led to the only bloodshed that occurred in the acquisition of California. It gradually inflamed the spirits of the people, who some months later rose against the newly constituted power, and appealed to arms. Meanwhile the government at Washington had organized a land expedition against New Mexico and California. under General Kearny, who began his operations in August. Taking possession of the former territory, and establishing a provisional government, Kearny pressed forward to California, and arrived there just in time to aid in suppressing the rebellion. His operations, combined with those of the fleet, soon ended matters. Left to their own resources, the Californians offered but a feeble resistance, and their rich territory was lost to Mexico forever. It is unnecessary, however, to enter further into the particulars connected with the conquest of California and New Mexico, as they are fully narrated in other volumes of this history.
Besides the expedition against these provinces, another was planned about the same time against Chihuahua, with the object of furthering the scheme of cutting off the northern provinces of Mexico, as advocated by Taylor. This latter undertaking was, ​however, of a more experimental nature than that directed against California. In the first instance, it was presumed that the northern departments, being opposed to the central system of government, would not only observe neutrality, but would avail themselves of the presence of a strong American force as an opportunity to throw off their allegiance to Mexico, as Texas had done. But this hope was frustrated by the change in the government, and the adoption of the federal system; and the cabinet at Washington soon became aware that the inhabitants of these regions were not only hostile, but would actively obstruct a march into the interior.
Meanwhile General Wool had been placed in charge of the troops that were to operate in Chihuahua. He was instructed to concentrate his command at San Antonio de Béjar, in Texas, and direct his march according to instructions from Taylor, under whose orders the expedition was placed. Taylor, however, considering that Wool was charged by the government with a distinct operation, refrained from controlling his movements, and confined himself to directing him to march on the city of Chihuahua with such portion of his force as could be transported and subsisted. At the same time it was suggested that he should advance by way of Monclova.
About the end of September Wool began his march from San Antonio de Béjar, his force amounting to nearly 3,000 men. On the 8th of October he reached the Rio Grande at the presidio of that name, and crossing the river without difficulty on the 11th, arrived at Santa Rosa on the 24th. Finding that the only route from this place to Chihuahua practicable for wagons and artillery lay through Monclova, he ​directed his course thither, and reached that city on the 29th. His long march had been arduous, and Wool began to realize that nothing would be gained by proceeding to Chihuahua, which could be occupied at any time if necessary. He wished to be engaged in more significant movements than an isolated incursion into a remote province, where the only difficulties to be encountered would be those of marching through an almost sterile region. He accordingly expressed his views to Taylor, who, being of the same opinion, instructed him to remain at Monclova until he could decide what disposition to make of his command. Thus the Chihuahua expedition was abandoned. It had already cost heavily in material and money, and was apparently of no benefit to the American cause. Nevertheless, it afforded Wool an opportunity of converting his raw and refractory volunteers into a well-disciplined and efficient force, the value of which result became manifest on the hard-fought field of Buena Vista. Taylor shortly afterward instructed Wool to locate himself at Parras; the army of the centre accordingly was marched from Monclova November 24th, and reached its designated post on the 5th of December.
In connection with Wool's expedition against Chihuahua mention must be made of Colonel Doniphan's incursion into that state, and his capture of its ​capital but as more details are given in another portion of this work, an outline will be sufficient here.
Kearny, finding that he had more troops than were necessary for his own enterprise, at the latter end of September despatched Doniphan from Santa Fé with
the surplus, consisting of Missouri volunteers, to Chihuahua, of which place he supposed Wool would be in possession. Doniphan, having concluded a treaty with the Navajos according to instructions, arrived at ​Valverde December 12th. Thence he proceeded to El Paso del Norte, which place he entered on the 27th, after having repulsed with loss, on the 25th, a strong body of Mexicans which attacked him at a bend of the Rio Grande called el Brazito. Hearing now for the first time that Wool had not advanced into Chihuahua, he still determined to penetrate to that city, and commenced his march February 8, 1847. His force numbered 924 effective men, with six pieces of artillery.
El Paso is some 225 miles distant from the city of Chihuahua; and as the route lay through sterile deserts destitute of water, much of hardship and suffering was undergone. Doniphan's advance, however, was not interrupted by any effort of the enemy until he arrived at the pass of Sacramento, about twenty miles to the north of the state capital. Here the Chihuahuans were prepared to receive him, having taking up a strong position in superior numbers. They, however, sustained a disastrous defeat, and Doniphan entered Chihuahua without further opposition, taking possession of the city in the name of the United States government.
His situation, however, was embarrassing. He was entirely isolated, at a distance of many hundred miles from the American army, of whose operations only vague rumors had reached him. Understanding that Wool was at Saltillo, he applied to him for orders to move to that town. Having received instructions to that effect he left Chihuahua at the end of April and reached Saltillo on the 22d of May. Thence the command proceeded to the Rio Grande and beyond, arriving about the middle of June at New Orleans, where it was discharged. Thus terminated this celebrated march, which extended over 3,000 miles through an almost unknown country, and was conducted under innumerable difficulties. As a military ​movement, it was a great achievement; but the expedition, as a factor of the war, was barren of effect.
While the American land forces were thus successfully operating on the Rio Grande the Mexican ports on the gulf were blockaded by a naval squadron, under Commodore Connor. The United States had long contended for a more liberal construction of the law of blockade than that held by European powers, and 1now proceeded to carry out the principles which had been advocated. Not only was the doctrine of a paper blockade exploded, but a special warning was ordered given to vessels appearing before blockaded ports; without such warning a vessel was not subject to seizure, and if she effected an entrance was free to depart without hinderance. The duties which devolved upon the American navy were extremely irksome, and the enforcement of the blockade difficult, owing to the nature of the Mexican ports, and the prevalence in the gulf of violent north winds, which frequently compelled the blockading ships at Vera Cruz to seek shelter to the leeward of the islands south of that port. Under these circumstances several neutral ships ran the blockade by entering the harbor by the northern channel. The small maritime commerce of Mexico was, however, destroyed.
The operations of the squadron were not always attended with success. In August and October Connor made two attempts against the port of Alvarado, which were frustrated by bad weather and the state of the river. On the second occasion the steamer McLane ran aground on the bar, and the vessels she ​had in tow got foul of each other in great disorder. More successful was an expedition during the latter month up the Tabasco River, under Commodore Perry, which resulted in the capture of the town of Frontera, two Mexican steamers, and five merchant vessels. In August the squadron sustained a loss by the wreck of the brig Truxton, twelve guns, Commander Carpender, on the reef of Tuxpam; and a still more serious disaster occurred December 8th, by the capsizing of the brig Somers, Lieutenant Semmes. The vessel sank in ten minutes, and thirty-nine of her crew were drowned. The operations of the squadron in the Pacific were principally confined this year to the coast of California.
After the capture of Monterey, Taylor was prepared to speak as to the advisability of his moving upon the capital. He was evidently opposed to it. Recommending the policy of occupying a defensive line along the Sierra Madre, with corps stationed at Saltillo, Monclova, Linares, Victoria, and Tampico, he said that if it was the determination of the government to strike a decisive blow at Mexico a force should be landed at Vera Cruz or Alvarado. In the mean time the United States government had decided to make a descent on the gulf coast, with the intention of capturing Tampico and invading Tamaulipas. Proposals to open negotiations with the ​object of terminating the war had been rejected by the Mexican government, which deferred the matter till the assembling of a new congress on the 6th of December. The cabinet at Washington determined to prosecute its design without loss of time, and that no delay might occur, issued, September 22d, instructions directly to General Patterson, then at Camargo, to make preparations for the invasion of Tamaulipas with a strong detachment from Taylor s command.
When Taylor received the despatch ordering the cessation of the armistice, he began to put in opera tion his scheme of taking up a defensive line. Deeming the occupation of Saltillo important as a necessary outpost to the main army at Monterey, and as con trolling a region from which supplies could be obtained, on November 13th he marched from Monterey with Worth s division and two squadrons of dragoons, and occupied that city on the 16th without opposition, Ampudia having already retired to San Luis Potosí. Almost simultaneously with this movement one of the objects for which it had been under taken — namely, the occupation of Tampico — had been unexpectedly gained. Santa Anna, having become informed by an intercepted despatch that Tampico was to be attacked, ordered it to be evacuated, which was carried into effect October 27th. To protect his,own position from attack in that direction, he stationed a force of cavalry and infantry, 5,000 strong, under generals Urrea and Valencia at the Tula pass. On November 14th Commodore Perry arrived before Tampico and immediately occupied it. General Patterson, on receipt of the news, promptly despatched six companies of artillery, with a sufficient supply of heavy ordinance to garrison the place, followed soon afterward by a regiment of Alabama volunteers. ​Taylor's defensive line was now nearly complete. Wool was at Parras with his division; Worth held Saltillo; Butler's headquarters were at Monterey, which was garrisoned by a portion of his command, the remainder being employed in holding the route to Camargo and the mouth of the Rio Grande; and Tampico was occupied by a force 1,000 strong. With the possession of Victoria the occupation of Tamaulipas would be accomplished, and Taylor accordingly put in motion the troops, over 5,000 strong, destined to operate against that point. On the 15th of December he left Monterey, and on the 17th, a junction of the troops, except those under Patterson, was effected at Montemorelos. Here, however, Taylor received a despatch from Worth, informing him that Santa Anna, designing to take advantage of the diversion toward Victoria, intended to attack him at Saltillo, and if successful then fall on Wool at Parras. Taylor therefore returned with Twiggs' division to Monterey, but finding that both Butler and Wool had hastened up to Worth's support, retraced his steps, leaving Butler in command, and entered Victoria on the 4th of January, 1847, Quitman's division having already occupied the city on the 29th of the previous month. No resistance was offered; Urrea's cavalry corps, then at Victoria, slowly retired to the pass of Tula, and Valencia made no attempt to oppose the American general. But the movement was barren of result other than the concentration of the troops, and on the 14th, owing to the want of supplies, Taylor began to evacuate the city, ordering the command to march to Tampico. He himself with a small escort returned to ​Monterey, where he arrived on the 24th of the same month.
General Taylor had by this time received news of important changes that had been effected at Washington relative to the conduct of the war and the command of the army. Whether it was that the government had lost some portion of its confidence in him owing to the absence of active resources or suggestions, or that ill-feeling had been created by his strong protests against interference with his command on the part of the war department, during the latter part of November, Scott, who had several times repeated his desire to be sent to the field, was ordered to Mexico to take command of the forces there assembled, and organize an expedition to operate against Vera Cruz. Scott immediately made preparations for his departure, and left Washington for New York on the 24th of November. On the following day he wrote a confidential letter to Taylor, apprising him of his approach and the necessity of drawing from his command the greater portion of his best troops. It was not until the 30th of December that Scott arrived at Matamoros, and finding that Taylor had proceeded to Victoria, addressed, January 3d, a communication to Butler, instructing him to put in movement, without waiting to hear from Taylor, for the mouth of the Rio Grande, a large portion of the troops for embarkation for Vera Cruz. Scott also wrote to Taylor, enclosing a copy of this letter, and sent the despatch by way of Monterey, and on the 6th sent other copies of the same direct from Matamoros to Victoria. The first ​communication was intercepted by the enemy at some distance from Monterey and forwarded to Santa Anna, who thus became aware, not only of the design against Vera Cruz, but also of the great reduction made in Taylor's force. Taylor received the second despatch at Victoria on the 14th of January, and its contents caused him deep mortification. He expressed himself bitterly to Scott on the course that had been pursued and the withdrawal of the best of his troops when an army of 20,000 men was in his front. He felt that he had lost the confidence of the government, and suspected that he was being sacrificed.
Meantime Butler used great despatch in carrying out Scott's instructions. On Taylor's arrival at Monterey the withdrawal of most of the troops had been effected, and his force was reduced to about 7,500 men of all arms occupying positions all the way from Saltillo to Matamoros.
In the preparations to carry on the war Mexico was sorely crippled by internal dissensions and the want of money. Scheme after scheme of defence was stifled by the poverty of the government, and it was not until the return of Santa Anna that any vigor was shown in the organization of an army to repel the invaders. Measures certainly had been adopted to make face against the danger, and various decrees were passed for the raising of troops and the acquisition of means; but these were rendered in a great measure abortive by the alarm which prevailed in the capital, and the general feeling that an internal rupture was imminent. When, however, Santa Anna arrived, the patriotism of the public became more animated, and ​activity and enthusiasm were manifested throughout the country. By decree of September 11th, the national guard was called into existence in all states, districts, and territories of the republic. from the age of sixteen to fifty were ordered to enlist, under penalty of losing their political rights. Regulations were laid down for the organization, arming, and discipline of the force, and provisions made for the payment of the troops. Punishments were, moreover, prescribed for civil and military employés who should refuse their services when required.
Santa Anna, who had been appointed commander-in-chief of the army, left the capital, September 28th, with 3,000 men for San Luis Potosí, where he intended to assemble a powerful army to operate in the north. About the middle of October he was joined by the forces under Ampudia, who had moved from Saltillo, and one of Santa Anna's first acts was to deprive that general of his command for his attempt to hold Monterey contrary to his own suggestion to abandon it. The enthusiasm in San Luis Potosí was unbounded; and as it was at first supposed that Taylor would advance against that city Santa Anna began to fortify it and outlying places to the north of it. These defensive measures, however, were soon discontinued and he turned his attention to the discipline and instruction of his troops. Nevertheless, the delay caused by these important preparations was the subject of much animadversion. By the end of the year large contingents from different states had arrived, All males ​and the army at San Luis numbered over 20,000 well-trained troops, amply provided with munitions of war. But Santa Anna took his time in perfecting the organization of his army. Cramped by want of funds, he felt that it would be unwise to hastily move his large force, under circumstances that would tend to damp the ardor of the men. He was ill supplied with provisions and army clothing necessary for a campaign through the sterile regions which separated him from the enemy. But these considerations had no weight with the impatient public. The opposition press gravely censured his inactivity, as his delay at San Luis was called, and attributed it to an unwillingness to enter upon the campaign, proceeding from sinister motives. The effect of all this was exasperating, and finally drove him prematurely to march against Taylor in the most inclement season of the year, ill provided against the natural difficulties with which he would have to contend. Apprised, moreover, of the withdrawal of a large portion of Taylor's force, he really hoped by a rapid movement to surprise and crush him.
On the 28th of January he began his march. His army numbered 18,183 men of all arms, and was divided into three divisions under the generals Pacheco, Lombardini, and Ortega. He had, moreover, twenty pieces of artillery of varying calibre, and General ​Miñon with a strong detachment of cavalry had been stationed in advance for some time at the hacienda of Potosí, observing the movements of the enemy. Santa Anna's advance was conducted under every hardship that nature could inflict. Pitiless storms of rain, alternating with icy sleet and impeding snow, beat for days upon the ill-clad troops, who at night bivouacked shelterless and half-frozen on the cold ground. When the sky cleared the burning sun, as it poured its rays on the desert, caused no less affliction. Heat and thirst were as insupportable as the cold and wet. Many perished, numbers sank exhausted on the ground, and desertions were numerous. By the time the army reached Encarnacion, it was greatly reduced.
While Taylor was absent on his expedition to Victoria, some partial success had attended the Mexican operations. Wool, who was stationed at Buena Vista, upon rumors arising that the army at San Luis Potosí was advancing, sent forward, January 18th, a reconnoitring party of fifty cavalrymen under Major Borland, to Encarnacion. Borland was joined the next day by Major Gaines and Captain Clay with about thirty men, and decided to extend his reconnoissance to Salado. That night, however, the hacienda was surrounded by Miñon's cavalry, which had rapidly moved from Matehuala, and the American officers, deeming resistance useless, surrendered, the whole ​party being sent as prisoners of war to Mexico. A few days later Captain Heady, Lieutenant Churchill, and seventeen Kentucky volunteers were also captured while reconnoitring. The rumors of the advance of the Mexicans, supported by these untoward circumstances, assumed such a positive shape as to induce Taylor to remove his headquarters from Monterey to Saltillo, where he arrived on the 2d of February. To restore the confidence of the volunteers, which was somewhat shaken by the late occurrences, he decided to establish a camp at Agua Nueva, eighteen miles in advance of Saltillo, and remove the main force thither, leaving at the latter place a suitable garrison. By the 14th the occupation of the new position was completed; a depôt was established; and supplies were brought in as rapidly as possible. As yet nothing certain was known with regard to the movements of the Mexicans, but on the 20th it was ascertained by reconnoissances, skilfully conducted by Major McCulloch and Lieutenant-colonel May in the directions of Encarnacion and Hedionda, that the enemy was i large force at the former place, and Miñon within a short distance of the latter. As the camp at Agua Nueva could be turned on its left flank by the road from Hedionda to Encantada in the rear, Taylor decided to fall back to the hacienda of Buena Vista — about twelve miles distant — where, owing to the nature of the ground, he could take up such a formidable position as would greatly neutralize the superiority in numbers of the enemy. He therefore broke up his camp at noon on the 21st, and moved the main body to the new position. During the same day and night the removal of the stores was assiduously carried on, and Colonel Yell with his regiment of Arkansas cavalry remained behind to protect them against attack, with instructions to fire the hacienda and such stores as remained on the approach of the ​enemy. Having made his dispositions, Taylor, leaving Wool in command, proceeded the same evening to Saltillo, to make arrangements for the defence of the town.
On his arrival at Encarnacion Santa Anna felt confident of surprising the enemy at Agua Nueva; and unaware that Taylor was evacuating the place, laid his plans accordingly. The hacienda of Encarnacion is distant thirty-six miles from that of Agua Nueva, from which it is separated by a dreary, waterless desert. Santa Anna's scheme was to halt during the early part of the night in the desert, and then silently continuing his march, to fall suddenly on Taylor at early dawn on the 22d. On the 20th he issued his order of march, which was to commence at 11 o'clock on the following morning. Ampudia, who had been restored to his command, was to take the lead with the 1st, 2d, 3d, and 4th battalions of light infantry; the 1st division under Pacheco was to follow; then the division of the centre under Lombardini, succeeded by the 3d division, commanded by Ortega. Each division was accompanied by its portion of the artillery, and the cavalry was to bring up the rear, escorting the ammunition and baggage trains. At starting the troops were supplied with rations for only two meals, one of which was to be eaten at night on the desert; and the chiefs of corps were strictly charged to see that each soldier took with ​him as much water as he could carry, and used it with economy. During the halt no fire was to be lighted, and on resuming the march no signal by bugle or beat of drum was to be made.
But with all his care Santa Anna's plan to effect a surprise was already frustrated by Taylor's tactics. Some hours before dawn Ampudia approached the pass of Carnero, some miles to the south of Agua Nueva. Colonel Yell's advanced picket was driven in, and hastened with all speed to report the approach of the enemy. Yell at once set fire to the hacienda and the stores he had been unable to remove, and then fell back to Buena Vista, where he arrived at daybreak. When Santa Anna reached Agua Nueva early in the morning of the 22d, the smouldering ruins told him that the Americans had retreated, and he firmly believed that they had fled. So pausing no longer than to give time for his weary troops to replenish their canteens, he pushed forward in pursuit, trusting that Miñon, who had been instructed to gain the rear of the enemy, would so entertain him as to enable himself to come up with the retreating columns, and fall upon them in disorder. For twelve more miles he impetuously urged his march, to find the foe drawn up in battle array at the formidable position of Angostura.
The hacienda of Buena Vista is situated in a pass which breaks through a lofty range of mountains extending from east to west, and separating the valley of Saltillo from that of Encantada. This pass varies from a mile and a half to four miles in width. At its southern extremity is situated the hacienda of Encantada and at its northern the town of Saltillo. Through this narrow valley a small stream winds its way to Saltillo, keeping its course much nearer to the western side, the portion of the valley east of the stream being elevated sixty or seventy feet above that ​on its other side. The road runs along the eastern bank; and at Angostura, one and a half miles to the south of Buena Vista, and nearly seven from Saltillo, a spur projects from the elevated table on the east, and extends to the road, where it terminates abruptly, barely leaving space for the highway be tween it and the perpendicular bank of the stream. At this point the ground on the west is cut into a network of deep gullies by the stream, extending across the lower level nearly to the base of the mountains.
The sides of the projecting spur on the east are exceedingly steep, and the ridge connects with a ​broad plateau extending to the mountains and protected in front and rear by deep ravines impracticable for artillery and presenting formidable obstacles to cavalry. Thence to Encantada a succession of alternate ridges and barrancas made the manœuvring of any class of troops on such ground difficult, but especially of cavalry. Wool had some time before pointed out the advantages offered by this position, and Angostura, the elevated plateau, and the connecting ridge which commands the road in both directions for some distance, were selected by Taylor as his battle-ground.
As soon as Wool was aware that the enemy was approaching he proceeded to take up the selected position. Washington's battery was posted in the road at Angostura, supported on the left by the 1st Illinois volunteers, which was stationed on the tongue of land projecting from the plateau; to the left of this regiment was the 2d Illinois and a company of Texans; while to the extreme left on the plateau, near the base of the mountains, were posted the Arkansas and Kentucky mounted volunteers; in rear of Washington's battery the 2d regiment of Kentucky occupied the crest of a ridge. As a reserve, the Indiana volunteers, the 1st Mississippi riflemen, two squadrons of dragoons, and Sherman's and Bragg's light batteries were stationed upon the ridges immediately in rear of the plateau and Illinois volunteers.
When the advance of the Mexicans came within sight of the enemy, it halted to enable the different divisions of the army to come up and take their several positions. In the mean time Taylor had arrived from Saltillo, and Santa Anna presently sent in a flag of truce, summoning him to surrender at discretion, as he "was surrounded by twenty thousand men, and could 1not in any human probability avoid suffering a rout and being cut to pieces with his troops. One hour ​was given the American general to make up his mind. Taylor immediately despatched a brief answer, declining to accede to the request.
Santa Anna now made his dispositions to attack. Recognizing the impracticable nature of the ground on his left, and that Taylor had neglected to occupy the heights on his right, he directed Ampudia to take possession of them with his light division by advancing up the southern ridge. Another ridge more to the north led to the same crest, gradually converging toward the first-named ridge, with which it united at the summit. When Ampudia's movement was observed a portion of the Arkansas and Kentucky cavalry was dismounted, and with a battalion from the Indiana brigade, put in motion under Colonel Marshall on the northern ridge. It was now past two o'clock in the afternoon, and the conflict during the day was mainly confined to these opposing troops. As the foes approached each other on the converging ridges they opened fire, the rifles of the Americans being much more effective than the heavy volleys of the Mexicans, from which the former sheltered themselves behind the rocks and crest of their ridge. While these forces ascended higher and higher toward the angle, in their endeavors to outflank each other, Taylor was induced by an apparent movement on the enemy's left to push to his own right, across the stream somewhat in advance of Washington's battery, Captain Bragg's light battery supported by McKee's Kentucky infantry, while the 3d Indiana volunteers was moved up and posted on the eminence in rear of Washington's position. But no serious operations took place, though an occasional cannonade was directed by the Mexicans against the troops on the plateau. The remainder of the afternoon was employed by the Americans in strengthening their position at Angostura. A ditch and parapet among ​the gulleys on the right were made, and occupied by two companies of the Illinois infantry as the immediate supporting force of the battery. Three guns were also detached from Washington's battery and sent on to the plateau under Lieutenant O'Brien, the 2d Indiana volunteers being ordered up to sustain them.
At night the contest on the mountain ceased, the Mexicans having finally outflanked the Americans, and the two armies bivouacked in their respective positions, waiting for the coming morn to continue the conflict. The night was a bitter one. The wind blew almost a hurricane, and cold rain-squalls beat upon the shivering troops; while to add to the sufferings of the Mexicans, they were weak from want of food. But their enthusiasm was not damped, nor were their hearts faint; and when Santa Anna addressed them that evening, their loud cries of "Liberty or death!" with which they responded to his words, were distinctly heard in the American lines. Taylor, confident that no attack would be made till the following morning, and still anxious about Saltillo, returned thither during the night with the Mississippi regiment and a squadron of the second dragoons.
At daylight on the 23d Santa Anna recommenced the action. During the early hours of the morning he had reënforced Ampudia's light division with 2,000 men from Lombardini's and Pacheco's commands, and these forces, having gained several elevated positions, to the left and rear of the American skirmishers, began to open fire as soon as it was light. Presently the Mexicans were seen pouring from their ridge in great numbers into the ravine which separated them from the Americans, but this movement was soon checked by O'Brien, who brought up a 12-pounder howitzer and swept the ravine with shrapnel.
Santa Anna had drawn up his army in three columns of attack. The first, under General Mora y Villamil, ​was designed to move down the road and carry the pass of Angostura. The second, composed of the commands of Lombardini and Pacheco, was to move in two divisions to the right, one across the mountain ridge occupied by Ampudia, and at the upper termination of which a battery of 8-pounders having a plunging fire on the plateau had been planted by General Micheltorena, and the other was to advance up the deep ravine in front of the plateau, and effecting a junction with the first turn the Americans' left. The third column was composed of the troops under Ampudia, destined to sweep the mountains and operate on the extreme left of the enemy. General Ortega's division constituted the reserve. A battery of 12-pounders was placed in position in front of Angostura to assist in the attack of the first column.
Shortly before eight o'clock the columns advanced to the attack. The one directed against Angostura was received, however, with such a destructive cannonade from Washington's battery that Santa Anna soon recalled it and ordered it to take shelter behind a ridge projecting from the plateau toward the road. Meantime Pacheco's division had moved up the ravine, while that of Lombardini was already descending into it from the ridge at a point somewhat higher up. Both these columns were supported by strong bodies of cavalry and lancers. As soon as Pacheco's position was known, General Lane, the senior in command on the plateau, ordered forward O'Brien's three guns to oppose the enemy's advance, leading in person the 2d Indiana volunteers as a support. The guns were thrown into battery at the base of the southern ridge, and the infantry was formed into line on the left, facing toward the road. Pacheco's infantry was already ascending from the ravine and deploying into line on the ridge. Lane had hardly got ​into position before the Mexicans opened fire; and though the American artillery caused great havoc among their thick ranks, they held their ground with great obstinacy; and continually re-forming, as fresh men crowded up, an unceasing fire was poured upon the Americans. Hitherto the Indiana men had behaved well. But the Mexican battery on their left had begun to enfilade their ranks, and when Lane ordered an advance to a more favorable position, the companies broke one after another; a panic seized the men, and leaving the artillery unsupported, they fled from the field, the greater portion to Buena Vista, and many of them even to Saltillo.
Thus abandoned, O'Brien could not possibly hold his position; he was compelled to fall back to the line, leaving one of his pieces in the hands of the enemy. Finding that he had not a single man uninjured, he withdrew his remaining two pieces to Washington's battery.
Pacheco's forces now pressed on to the plateau and effected a junction with Lombardini's division, which soon came up. The American riflemen on the slopes of the mountain, upon the flight of the Indiana regiment, left their position and retreated along the plain to the rear, and four companies of Arkansas cavalry that had been stationed in Lane's rear fled almost at the first fire; while the remaining Arkansas cavalry and the Kentucky cavalry, at the base of the mountain, followed the retrograde movement. Ampudia's light division poured down the slopes in pursuit; the Mexican cavalry advanced from cover, and masses of horse and foot pressed along the base of the mountain on the Americans' left, and were gaining the rear in great force. The American position was completely ​turned. The second Illinois regiment, supported by two pieces of artillery, had manfully stood its ground, but was soon outflanked and compelled to fall back to a point nearer the road. Bragg's battery and the 2d Kentucky regiment were withdrawn from the extreme right, and with two pieces of Sherman's battery, which were stationed in the rear, were hurried up to avoid disaster. At this critical moment Taylor arrived upon the field from Saltillo with two companies of the 2d dragoons and the Mississippi regiment of riflemen. With the dragoons he hastened to the plateau, having directed the Mississippi regiment to oppose the advance of the Mexicans, who were pressing on the fugitives as they flocked into the hacienda of Buena Vista.
To follow all the movements during this eventful day, after the arrival of Taylor, pertains rather to the part of an analyst of military tactics than to that of the historian. The 2d Illinois and 2d Kentucky gallantly repelled every attempt of the Mexicans to drive them from the plateau, while the supporting artillery which formed a line of guns across the lower portion of the table played with terrible effect upon the hostile masses. In this part of the field a portion of the lost ground was recovered. The Mississippi regiment, joined by some few of the 2d Indiana, who were rallied by the great exertions of their officers, by a brilliant charge checked the advance of the victorious Mexicans, who, sorely cut up by the rapid fire, rolled back in confusion upon the supporting columns.
Still the aspect of affairs was gloomy for the Americans. Their position was most critical, and nothing but the bad generalship of the Mexican commander saved them from defeat. Nearly all the artillery was removed from Angostura — the key to Taylor's position — and the supports at that point were reduced to a mere handful. Mora y Villamil's column lay in strong force behind the southern ridge, and Ortega's ​powerful reserve was close at hand. Had Santa Anna directed a vigorous assault with these fresh troops against Angostura at this time, it would have required all the infantry and artillery on the plateau to hold the point. The plateau would have been gained; the American troops in the rear unaided by artillery would probably have been overwhelmed by numbers, and Washington overpowered by being attacked in reverse, or Saltillo and all the stores and ammunition lost. But the important movement was neglected, Taylor was allowed to strengthen his left and rear with artillery, and for hours the combat continued over a space of ground upwards of two miles in length.
While the Mexican infantry sustained a check, a body of cavalry about one thousand strong, under General Torrejon, having skirted the base of the mountains, bore down upon Buena Vista, where they were met by the Kansas and Kentucky mounted volunteers, who had retreated thither. In overwhelming numbers the Mexicans bore the Americans before them, and mixed in utter confusion, the whole mass of horsemen poured down upon the hacienda and into the narrow street which separated the buildings. But here the fugitives from the field, collected on the housetops and behind the walls of the yards, opened fire upon the Mexicans. The brigade divided; onehalf, wheeling to the right, returned, the other pressed on through the hacienda with the Kentuckians and Arkansas men. These now disentangled themselves, and Colonel May having come up to the support with two companies of regular dragoons and two more of Arkansas volunteers with two pieces of artillery, the Mexicans continued their course to the mountains on the west, and pelted at by the artillery till out of range, escaped through a gorge. In this sharp melée Colonel Yell fell on the American side and many of the best and bravest men. The Mexicans left ​thirty-five men dead upon the field, and Torrejon was severely wounded.
Meantime Santa Anna, finding that he could not drive the Americans from the plateau, planted a heavy battery of 24-pounders at its upper end, the fire from which enfiladed its whole extent. When the attack against Buena Vista failed, an attempt was made by a splendid brigade of cavalry to gain the road at a point in rear of the plateau by advancing along the ridge on which was stationed the Mississippi regiment, now strengthened by the 3d Indiana. But the lancers were driven off with heavy loss by the fire of the Americans without even coming to close quarters.
The Americans now began to press upon the Mexican right, which gradually gave way; while the artillery, intercepting the retreat and directed against the masses, did great execution. So terrible and rapid were the discharges that the right wing of the Mexican army seemed hopelessly cut off from its main body. The men crowded in confusion into the ravines and gullies, and as the enemy's guns, continually advancing, poured their shot into them, were gradually being driven up into an angle of the mountains. At this time Taylor, then on the plateau, received a message purporting to come from Santa Anna, and conveying his wish to know his demands. Concluding that the right wing would surrender, Taylor sent Wool to the Mexican commander and gave orders to cease firing. It is by no means certain that this was a scheme designed to effect the escape of the right wing; nevertheless, during the temporary cessation from firing, it gained the upper portion of the plateau, and under cover of the battery there joined the main army.
​Santa Anna now prepared to make a final effort for victory. At this time the Americans had but three guns on the plateau, and three regiments of infantry. Far to the left were the Mississippi and Indiana regiments, all the cavalry, and six pieces of the artillery. Santa Anna, advancing his battery of 8-pounders, moved his first column of attack, under Mora y Villamil, to his right, and uniting it with his reserves and remnants of his right wing as they came up, formed, under cover of the southern ravine, a single massive column, under the direction of General Perez. The artillery on the plateau had been advanced to strike the retreating Mexicans, and the infantry was also noving forward. The manœuvres of the enemy in the ravine below were hidden from sight, and as the Illinois and Kentucky men approached the head of the plateau the dense column poured over the southern crest, delivering a withering fire. Masses of the Mexicans closed in upon the Americans, who were almost instantly swept into the gorge in their rear. The edges on both sides were rapidly occupied by the Mexicans, and a murderous fire poured down upon the fugitives as they rushed down the gulch to the road to seek the protection of Washington's battery. Meantime a strong body of cavalry had swept over the salient spur of the southern ridge and was hastening to occupy the mouth. The destruction of the Illinois and Kentucky regiments seemed certain; but Washington turned his guns upon the cavalry, driving it back from the only gateway of escape, and the shattered remnants gained the shelter of the battery. But the loss had been very heavy. Colonel Hardin, 1st Illinois, and Colonel McKee and Lieutenant-colonel Clay, of the 2d Kentucky, had fallen, and ​numbers of inferior rank. While this was occurring, O'Brien and Thomas made a desperate stand with their guns. But though their discharges of grape and canister tore through the opposing ranks, they could not arrest the advance of the Mexicans. There was no faltering on the part of these; the shock on the column at each discharge was terrible, but the gaps were instantly filled up, and the masses surged ever forward. O'Brien, a hundred yards in advance of Thomas, worked his pieces till their flash scorched the nearest files as they were swept down. He and his few remaining men were wounded, and delivering his last fire in the very faces of their foes, they escaped to the rear, leaving the guns in the hands of the Mexicans. Victory seemed certain. But Taylor, after the successes on the left, had at once ordered the Mississippi and Indiana regiments, and Bragg's and Sherman's batteries, up to the plateau, and these forces are now hastening thither at full speed. Bragg first arrives — at the critical moment when O'Brien's guns are taken — and though there is no infantry to support him, opens fire at once. The hostile columns are almost at the muzzles of his pieces, but the first discharge causes them to hesitate; a second and a third quickly follow and throw them into disorder. Sherman arrives, and the havoc spreads. The Mississippi and Indiana regiments, which have hastened across the gullies and ridges, mount the northern edge of the plateau, and pour their fire into the right flank of the Mexicans, who can no longer stand their ground. At all points they are repulsed and retreat into the depths of the ravine.
It was now late in the afternoon. A violent storm fell on the fiercely contending armies, the lightning and thunder quelling the cannon's flash and roar; the operations on both sides nearly ceased. When night fell the ​two armies occupied nearly the same positions which they had held in the morning, the Mexicans having gained possession of a point at the upper part of the plateau where their heavy battery was planted.
During the day Miñon had been hovering about Saltillo, having occupied the road to Buena Vista, and intercepted several fugitives from the field of battle. Captain Shover, however, in charge of the headquarter camp at Saltillo, moved his piece, supported by a gun from Captain Webster's battery, against him, and after a few effective shots compelled Miñon to abandon the pass and take refuge in the ravines.
Every preparation was made by Taylor during the night for a renewal of the conflict in the morning, but when daylight broke it was discovered that Santa Anna had abandoned the field and retreated to Agua Nueva, leaving great numbers of his wounded. He could no longer continue the contest with his faint and famished troops. Both sides claimed a victory. As to the engagement itself, it consisted of a succession of alternate successes and repulses, and at the close of the day the attitude of neither army was one of triumph. But the necessity which compelled Santa Anna to withdraw turned the scale of advantage immensely in favor of the Americans, and the horrors attending the retreat crushed the morale of his army.
On both sides the loss was severe. That of the Americans was 267 killed, 456 wounded, and 23 missing, a total of 746 out of 4,769 officers and men engaged in the action. The Mexican loss was ​admitted by Santa Auna to have been 1,000 killed and wounded, but it was probably nearer 2,000. On both sides, too, the courage of the combatants was conspicuous; the bravery displayed by the American volunteers, hitherto untried in battle, and the valor with which the Mexicans pressed up to the cannons' mouths, capturing three pieces and two standards, excite equal admiration.
On the 25th an exchange of prisoners was effected, by which the release of the Americans taken at Encarnacion was agreed upon; and on the same day Santa Anna called a council of war, at which it was decided, on account of the deplorable condition of the troops, to retreat to San Luis. Of that terrible retreat I shall give no account. Taylor again occupied Agua Nueva on the 27th, and on March 1st sent Colonel Belknap with a detachment in pursuit of the Mexican rear. That officer advanced to Encarnacion and found the road cumbered with the dead and dying victims of wounds, hunger, and exhaustion. When Santa Anna reached San Luis Potosí his army was reduced by more than 10,000 men.
* ↑ Hist. Arizona and New Mexico; Hist. California, this series. For Mexican views on the acquisition of California, the reader can consult Otero, Negoc. Diplom., 1-12.
* ↑ Marcy, in his letter to Taylor of June 8, 1846, writes: It is proper that I should advise you that a considerable force, which will also be under your command, will soon assemble at San Antonio de Béjar. The ultimate destination of this force is Chihuahua.' Its destination, however, was not as yet definitely determined upon. U. S. Govt Doc., Cong. 30, Ses. 1, H. Ex. 60, p. 323-4. Taylor, replying July 2d, expressed the opinion that operations on the frontier 'should be confined to cutting off the northern provinces — an undertaking of comparative facility and assurance of success.' Id., p. 331.
* ↑ Assist Adj.-gen. Bliss to Wool, in Id., p. 410.
* ↑ Namely, five companies U. S. dragoons, one of light artillery — 6 pieces, Captain Washington — and three of the 6th infantry, making 500 regulars; one regiment of Arkansas cavalry, two of Illinois infantry, and one company of Kentucky infantry; in all 2,440 volunteers, giving a total of 2,940 efficient men. Ripley's War with Mex., i. 301; Mansfield's Mex. War, 85. This force was called the army of the centre.
* ↑ Taylor, writing to the adj.-gen. Nov. 9th, says: 'He [Wool] inquires what is to be gained by going to Chihuahua. And I am free to answer, nothing at all commensurate with the excessive length of his line of operations. Chihuahua, moreover, is virtually conquered.' U. S. Govt Doc., Cong. 30, Ses. 1, H. Ex. 60, p. 361. The government at Washington had already, Oct. 22d, begun to doubt whether any advantage would be gained by the occupation of Chihuahua, and suggested that Wool's column should be united with Taylor's at Monterey, or on the Rio Grande. Id., p. 364-5. For fuller particulars of Wool's march, consult Id., Cong. 31, Ses. 1, H. Ex. 32, 5-34.
* ↑ Wool was a strict disciplinarian, and was regarded as an uncompromising martinet by the volunteers, whose 'complaints were loud and many.' After they had been in action they had reason to change their opinion. See farewell letter of the 1st Ill. volunteers to Gen. Wool on their departure from Mexico for home, dated June 23, 1847, in Democratic Review, Nov. 1851, and reproduced in Wool, Sketch of Life, 24.
* ↑ This engagement is called the battle of Brazito.
* ↑ This squadron in July consisted of three 50-gun frigates, three 24-gun sloops of war, four 10-gun brigs, one 10-gun schooner, the steamer Mississippi of 8 guns, and the steamer Princeton of 10 guns; in all 13 ships wvith 290 guns. Semmes' Service Afloat, 75. At the beginning of the war Mexico had the steamers Guadalupe and Moctezuma, the goleta Aguila, each of 6 guns, seven small vessels of 1 gun each, the Mexicano and Zempoalteca, of 10 carronades, and a few other vessels in bad condition. Rivera, Hist. Jalapa, iii. 744.
* ↑ The Mexican government, by decree of Sept.11th, exempted blockade runners from tonnage dues, and one quarter of the importation duties. Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Mex., v. 169; Mex., Col. Ley. y Dec., 1844-6, 441-2.
* ↑ The McLane was got off without much injury, but the enterprise was given up. Connor's report, in U. S. Govt Doc., Cong. 29, Ses. 2, H. Ex. 4, p. 630-1.
* ↑ Id., p. 632-5. In the engagement which occurred the Americans lost three men killed and several wounded. Among the former was Lieut C. M. Morris, son of the commodore of that name. He was a valuable officer, and his death greatly deplored. Ib.; Semmes' Service Afloat, 90. Further details in Bustamante, Invasion, MS., 10-11; Id., Mem. Hist. Mex., MS., v. 210-123; Iris Españ., Nov. 11, 1846, 4.
* ↑ The officers and crews became prisoners to the Mexicans, and were exchanged for Gen. Vega, and the officers who accompanied him to U. S. as prisoners of war. U. S. Govt Doc., ut sup., p. 382.
* ↑ More than one half of her crew, which consisted of 76 persons. See Semmes' report, in Service Afloat, 93-9.
* ↑ U. S. Govt Doc., Cong. 30, Ses. 1, H. Ex. 60, p. 351-3. He considered that the amount of troops should not be less than 25,000 men, 10,000 of whom should be regulars.
* ↑ Id., p. 339-40, 343, 338. This action of the government greatly irritated Taylor. In his reply of Oct. 15th he protested against it, claiming the right of organizing all detachments from the troops under him, and declaiming against the war department corresponding directly with his subordinates. Id., p. 353-4.
* ↑ Id., p. 374-5, 377, 378. Patterson afterward ordered the Illinois regiments of foot at Matamoros. and a regiment of Tennessee horse, also to proceed to Tampico. Taylor disapproved of his action, countermanded the order, and rebuked Patterson. Id., p. 383-5. Respecting the evacuation of Tampico, the reader can consult Tampico, Mem. sobre Evac., 53; Parrodi, Mem., 53; Id., Vindicacion, 17.
* ↑ These consisted of the regulars at Monterey under Twiggs; Quitman's brigade of volunteers; the 2d inf. regiment and 2d Tenn. foot at Camargo; and three regiments of volunteers under Patterson, who was instructed to march from Matamoros. U. S. Govt Doc., Cong. 30, Ses. 1, H. Ex. 60, p. 385.
* ↑ Id., pp. 861-2, 890; El Sonorense, Feb. 26, 1847, i. no. 28, pp. 3-4.
* ↑ Scott's Memoirs, ii. 397.
* ↑ U. S. Govt Doc., Cong. 30, Ses. 1, H. Ex. 60, p. 373. Taylor received this communication Dec. 24th while on route to Victoria. Id., p. 848.
* ↑ Namely, 500 regular cavalry; 500 volunteer cavalry; Duncan's and Taylor's batteries; 4,000 regulars, including artillery, under General Worth; 4,000 volunteer infantry; in all 9,000 men exclusive of the specified batteries. From this number were to be deducted the troops at Victoria and Tampico, less the garrison for the latter, and a volunteer regiment at Matamoros, The whole number of the force under Taylor's command at this time was estimated by Scott at 17,000, seven of regulars and ten of volunteers.
* ↑ 'But, however much I may feel personally mortified and outraged by the course pursued, unprecedented at least in our history, I will carry out in good faith, while I remain in Mexico, the views of the government, though I may be sacrificed in the effort.' See his correspondence with Scott, in Id., p. 862-4, and with the adjutant-general, p. 1100-2.
* ↑ The reader is referred to Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Mex., v. 134-6, 143; Méx., Col. Ley. y Dec., 1844-6, 393-4, 378-9; El Restaurador, Aug. 28, 1846; Derecho Intern. Mex., 3 p$^{te}$, 435-8.
* ↑ Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Mex., v. 161-9; Méx., Col. Ley. y Dec., 1844-6, 424-41. The classes which were excepted had to pay a month!y contribution, varying from 2 reales to $2, according to grade.
* ↑ By decree of Aug. 31st. Id., 417.
* ↑ Bustamante, Nuevo Bernal Diaz, ii. 111-13; El Iris Españ., Oct. 7, 1846, 3.
* ↑ Santa Anna had not considered Monterey tenable. 'Santa Anna, á quien. . .contrariaba en sus planes la resistencia que Ampudia se habia decidido á oponer en una plaza que él no consideraba fuerte ni defensible, se manifestó en estremo irritado.' Méx., Apunt. Hist. Guerra, 69. Ampudia, May 14, 1847, published a defence of his conduct. Ampudia, Manifiesto, pp. 10. Santa Anna, however, soon reinstated him in his command.
* ↑ According to Méx., Apunt. Hist. Guerra, 76-7, the number amounted to 19,996. To this number should be added 1,541 chiefs and officers — exclusive of 16 generals — and a brigade 1,000 strong, under Gen. Parrodi, which joined the army later at Matehuala. Ramsey's Other Side, 95, 97. From a private letter written from San Luis Potosí Nov. 14, 1846, to a person in Mexico, and published in El Monitor, it is stated: There are here 25,000 men — rather more than less — 52 pieces of artillery, and a good assortment of powder and balls of all sizes.' Reproduced in El Sonorense, Jan. 1, 1847, tom. i., no. 21, p. 4. See also Rápida Ojeada, Campaña Santa Anna, 4.
* ↑ Santa Anna, Apelacion, 23-4. 'Así es que éste [Santa Anna] salió de San Luis para la Angostura, escaso de víveres y armas.' Méx., Apunt. Hist. Guerra, 77.
* ↑ Namely, three 24-pounders, three 16, five 12, and eight 8 pounders, and one howitzer, according to Santa Anna's general orders of Jan. 28th, found on the battle-field of Buena Vista, and a translation of which is given in U. S. Govt Doc., Cong. 30, Ses. 1, Sen. Ex. 1, p. 154-6. See also Santa Anna, Apelacion, 24-5.
* ↑ Pacheco's division arrived on the 17th, and the last brigades on the 20th and 21st of February. The loss is put down at 4,000 in Méx., Apunt. Hist. Guerra, 93-7. Santa Anna reviewed his troops at Encarnacion. They then amounted to 14,048 men, exclusive of Miñon's cavalry division, numbering 1,200, stationed at the hacienda of Potosí, and which was ordered to advance by the pass of Palomas de adentro, and intercept the enemy then at Agua Nueva between that place and Saltillo. Rápida Ojeada, Campaña Santa Anna, 8, 11-12. American accounts place Minon's brigade at 2,000 cavalry-men. Carleton's Battle of Buena Vista, 11. Taylor estimated it at about 1,500. U. S. Govt Doc., Cong. 30, Ses. 1, Sen. Ex. 1, p. 133.
* ↑ Wool's report in Id., 60, p. 1106--7. Miñon reported having captured two field-officers, four other officers, and 76 men. El Sonorense, Feb. 18, 1847, tom. i. no. 29, p. 3-4. The total number of captives according to Taylor's official list was 70. U. S. Govt Doc., ut sup., 56, p. 301-3.
* ↑ Id., p. 299.
* ↑ He was already at Guachuchil. Carleton's Battle of Buena Vista, 16.
* ↑ Carleton, Battle of Buena Vista, 234, in a note referring to Santa Anna's official report of the battle, leaves it to be inferred that the Mexican general made a misstatement in saying that the troops had only one ration during the 22d and 23d, and points out what seems to him a discrepancy between Santa Anna's order of march and his report. There is, however, no contradiction in the two documents. The order makes it apparent that three rations were issued on the 20th. The first ration was eaten on the 21st before starting; the second at night on the desert; and on the morning of the 22d there was only one ration left, which was all the half-famished troops had during that day and the following. I see no discrepancy, therefore, in Santa Anna's assertion that the army, 'without other food than a single ration, which was dealt out at Encarnacion, endured the fatigue of combat for two days.' Id., 151. A literal translation of Santa Anna's order which was found on the battle-field is supplied in U. S. Govt Doc., Cong. 30, Ses. 1, H. Ex. 1, pp. 156-8.
* ↑ Santa Anna, Apelacion, 26.
* ↑ Meaning the narrows. This name was given to the spot later, its proper appellation being El Clmpadero, that is, the sucker. Rápida Ojeada, Campaña Santa Anna, 13.
* ↑ Explanation of plan: A. Ampudia's troops. B. Lombardini's division. C C'. Mexican cavalry in different positions. D. Pacheco's division. G M. Mora y Villamil's attack K P P'. Mexican batteries. Q. Santa Annas headquarters. N N'. Advance of the Mexicans. R. Bragg's battery and the Kentucky volunteers. S. American skirmishers. T. Taylor s position.
* ↑ U. S. Govt Doc., Cong. 30, Ses. 1, H. Ex. 1, p. 98. From Santa Anna's expression Taylor drew the deduction that the Mexicans were really 20,000 strong, and says that later information confirmed his estimate. Id., 138.
* ↑ Carleton's Battle of Buena Vista, 47.
* ↑ Speaking of this attack, Roa Bárcena says: 'Me inclino á creer que el intento de Santa Anna al hacerla, haya sidlo dividir la atencion del enemigo.' Recuerdos, 97.
* ↑ Wool's and Lane's reports, in U. S. Govt Doc., Cong. 30, Ses. 1, Sen. Ex. 1, p. 147, 181-2. Carleton states that this flight of the 2d Indiana regiment was caused by Col Bowles, who commanded it, giving without the authority or knowledge of Lane the order: 'Cease firing and retreat!' Battle of Buena Vista, 60.
* ↑ U. S. Govt Doc., ut sup., p. 160.
* ↑ Carleton's Battle of Buena Vista, 87-8.
* ↑ Wool could not induce the Mexicans to cease their fire, and returned without an interview with Santa Anna. U. S. Govt Doc., ut sup., p. 136. The explanation given of this occurrence in Méx., Apunt. Hist. Guerra, 102-3, is to the effect that a staff officer, named Montoya, finding himself within the American lines, in order to avoid capture had recourse to the stratagem of pretending to be the bearer of a message from Santa Anna, and was conducted to Taylor, who sent him, in company with two officers, to that commander. Montoya, when he had entered the Mexican lines, separated from the commissioners, and Santa Anna was surprised at receiving a summons to surrender, which was promptly declined.
* ↑ The 1st and 2d Illinois and the 2d Kentucky. Two of the guns were under the command of O'Brien, and the third, a 6-pounder, under Thomas.
* ↑ Lombardini had been wounded early in the day, and his command had devolved on Perez. Id., 101.
* ↑ 'No loss falls more heavily upon the army in the field than that of colonels Hardin and McKee, and Lieut-col Clay.' Taylor's report, in U. S. Govt Doc., ut sup., p. 138.
* ↑ In his despatch written that night on the battle-field he says: 'Lo único que aflige en estos momentos mi situacion es no tener ni una galleta ni un poco de arroz siquiera para alimentar á tanto herido.' El Iris Españ., Mar. 2, 147.
* ↑ U. S. Govt Doc., ut sup., p. 138. The report of Inspector Churchill, made later, reduces the American loss to a total of 666. This is explained by the fact that in Taylor's list many only slightly wounded were comprised, and some of the missing were present for duty at a subsequent muster. Carleton's Battle of Buena Vista, 191-212. I cannot omit to mention the exaggerated reports of the loss sustained by the Americans published on the Mexican side. Santa Anna, while stating that Taylor's army was from 8,000 to 9,000 strong, with 26 pieces of artillery, adds that more than 2,000 of that number were stretched upon the field — 'mas de 2,000 cadáveres.' El Iris Españ., Mar. 2, 1847. Ordoñez, writing in May 1847, boldly asserts that the army lost 1,700 in killed and more than 600 wounded, while the Mexican loss was a little over 800 wounded and about 600 killed. Refutacion, 12.
* ↑ His report in El Iris Españ., Mar. 2, 1847. Taylor estimated the number at 1,500, considering it probable that it would reach 2,000. U. S. Govt Doc., ut sup.
* ↑ There were only 453 American regulars engaged in the battle. Id., 137-8.
* ↑ Carleton's Battle of Buena Vista, 111.
* ↑ 'Las bajas que sufrió de la Angostura á San Luis, ascendieron á 10,500. Méx., Apunt. Hist. Guerra, 115. In this work will be found a full account of Santa Anna's retreat. Among the authorities that have been consulted for the history of Taylor's campaign and the operations in the north, and of which I append a list, José María Roa Bárcena's work, Recuerdos de la Invasion Norte-Americana, 1846-1848, por un jovén de entonces, Mexico, 1883, 4°, pp. 686, deserves special mention. The author states that several years ago he began to prepare the material for his book with the intent of recording his personal observations and impressions on the events that passed before his eyes. He tells us that after studying the Mexican documents relating to them, he proceeded to do the same with the American records, from which he experienced the surprise and pleasure of discovering that the American commanders had done justice to the heroism of his country's defenders. He had in view to correct his coutrymen's errors, and while placing his country and her defenders in the right position, do some good to the present Mexico, by pointing out in the causes, course, and results of that war, what international policy may have in reserve for Mexico, and what she should do for self-preservation. Roa Bárcena's style is clear and elegant; his conclusions are as impartial as may be espected from one who looks at the whole question from the Mexican standpoint. Nevertheless, his work is more valuable as a compilation than for depth of reflections. He quotes extensively from official documents and authorities, both Mexican and American, and does not generally flinch from giving the different accounts of events. The spirit of his first chapters is superior to that observable in the latter portion of his book, which lacks unity in plan and form. James Henry Carleton, The Battle of Buena Vista, with the operations of the Army of Occupation for One Month, New York, 1848, pp. 238. This little work is a detailed and excellent account of the battle, from which it derives its title. The author was a captain in the 1st reg. of dragoons, who was present at the engagement, and, as he remarks, had opportunities, during the service he was called on to perform on the battle-field, of deliberate observation on many different parts of the ground. Moreover, he was encamped for eight months afterward on the same spot, and conferred with the different officers engaged. Besides these means of acquiring correct information, he has consulted the official reports of both parties, and combined the substance of them in his narrative. These authorities are generally quoted at the foot of the page, and an appendix of 78 pages is added, containing correspondence with Gen. Wool, and numerous official documents, both Mexican and American. J. Reese Fry, A Life of Gen. Zachary Taylor, sm. 8°, pp. 332, Philadelphia, 1847. A narrative of the life of Taylor, from his birth down to the quiet occupation by him of the positions secured by the victory of Buena Vista. The author derived his information from public documents and private correspondence, which are liberally quoted. The incidents of Taylor's early years are obtained from materials collected by Robert T. Conrad. The work concludes with a number of anecdotes, illustrative of the general's habits and character. Memoria sobre la Evacuacion Militar del Puerto de Tampico de Tamaulipas, pp. 53, is an exposition of General Parrodi, relative to the evacuation of Tampico. It was prepared in April 1843, but not published until some time later, since Parrodi waited for the publication of the Apuntes para la Historia de la Guerra, in order to refute the inaccuracies which he was aware that work would contain in its account of the abandonment of the port. Parrodi received imperative orders from Santa Anna to evacuate the place, but his prompt obedience caused great discontent; he was arrested on his arrival at San Luis Potosí, and subınitted to a court-martial. Appended to the Memoria are copies of 32 official documents. Fuller references on Taylor's campaign are: Derecho Intern. Mex., 3d pt, 435-8; Alaman, Hist. Méj., v. 922-55; Cong. Globe, 1845-6, app. index, p. v.; 1846-7, index, 8, 17, app. index, p. 3; Bustamante, Méx. en 1848, MS., pp. i.-iv.; Id., Nuevo Bernal Diaz, i. 15, 113, ii. passim; Id., Invasion, MS., 6-14, 25-7, 50-67, 84-7; Id., Mem. Hist. Méx., MS., iv.-vi. passim, vii. 69-73, 143; Dublan and Lozano, v. 134-6, 143, 156-69, 239, 267; Rivera, Hist. Jalapa, iii. passim; Id., Gob. de Méx., ii. 252; Pinart Coll., nos 812, 851; Brito, Defensa; N. Am. Rev., lxxii. 15-59; Am. Rev., iv. 171-9; Amer., Pict. Hist. of, 30-49, 121-2; Vallejo, Col. Doc. Mex., MS., ii. no. 430; Ramsey's Other Side, 30-2, 36-9, 43-3, 57-61, 63-6, 69, 78-80, 83-5, 93-140, 259-60, 262; Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos, 32-151, 662-7; Hughes' Doniphan's Ex., 13; Guerra entre Méx. y Est. Un., 20-151; Zamacois, Hist. Méj., ix. 172, xi. 761; Young's Hist. Mex., passim; Niles' Reg., lxx.-lxxii. passim; Harrison's Battle-fields, 347-9, 438, 412; Livermore's War with Mex., 51-82, 115-22, 156-61, 287-310; Dicc. Univ. Hist. Geog., ix. 878-80, x. 467-72; San Francisco (Juan de), Vindicac., 1-41; Williard's Last Leaves, 33-6, 77-89; Abbotť's Mex. and U. S., 17-22, 63, 81, 119-20, 271-6; El Contra-Tiempo, March-May 1846, passim; Macgregor's Prog. Amer., i. 637-40, 656-8; McCall's Letters from Frontiers, 456-02; McCabe's Comp. View, 156-7; Kollonitz's Court Mex., 230; Hobbs' Life in Far West, 139-68; Sun of Anah., July 1, 17, 1847; Harper's Mag., xlix. 333; Kenly's Mem. Maryland Vol., 13-487; Dunbar's Romance of the Age, 38-9; Id., Am. Pioneering, 15–16; Tribune Alm., 1847, 17-23; 1848, 17-26; 1849, 30; Ampudia, Ante el Tribunal, 1-27; Id., Manif., 1–10; Reid's Scout Exped., 119-224; Carpenter's Travels in Mex., 24-7; Wise's Los Gringos, 267-73; Cutts' Conq. Cal. and N. Mex., 10, 29–31, 42, 75-100; Diario Exact. Mer., MS., 2-3; Brackett's U. S. Caralry, 53-64, 78-103, 112-24; Wool, Sketch of Life and Services, 1-30; Jal., Préstamos, in Imp. Var., pt viii., p. 33; Wilhelm's Eighth U. S. Inf., i. 277-430, ii. 356-9; Lossing's Pict. Hist. U. S., 483-5; Zaremba's Merchant, 14-15; El Restaurador, Aug.-Sept. 1846, passim; R pub. of U. S., 101, 136-9, 269-79; U. S. Govt Doc., Cong. 29, Ses. 2, H. Com. Rept, 70, pp. 1-4, H. Ex. 4, passim, Acts and Resol., pp. 160-1; Id., Cong. 30, Ses. 1, H. Ex. 56, рр. 285-405, Sen. Repts, p. 30-2, 62-7, 141, арp. 2-19; Id., Сong. 30, Ses. 2, pp. 1161-1237; Id., Cong. 31, Ses. 1, Sen. Ex. 32, Pp. 5-34; Mex. Treaties, vii. nos 1, 4, 11; Méx., Manif. Supr. Trib. Guerra y Marina, 6, 23-7; Id., Camp. contra Amer. del Norte, 1-37, with Docs; Id., Rápida Ojeada sobre Camp. en Coah., 1-19; Id., Doc. rel. Magist. vac., 1-20; Escudero, Memorias, 46-8; Ripley's War with Mex., i. passim; Lossing's Outline Hist. U. S., 298-303; Scott's Mem., ii. 397-414; San Miguel, Rep. Mex. en 1846, i. 170-2, ii. 3-13; Id., Seg. Guia, 7-9; Murray's Pict. Hist. U. S., 470-6; Proy. de Monarq., 32-44; Doc. sobre Méx., no. iv.; Chih. Book, i. 35-6; Memor. Histor., Jan. 1, 3, 6, 9, 22, 20, etc., 1846; Tampico de Tam., Mem. sobre Evac., 1-53; Escalera y Llana, Mex. Hist. Descript., 94-111; Domenech, Hist. Mex., ii. 203-17; Arrangoiz, Méj., ii. 273-9; Hist. Mag., x. 207-13; Iris Español, 1846-7, passim; Robertson's Reminiscences, 1, 76-213; Lane's Autobiog., MS., 8-54; Henry's Camp. Sketches, 1-331; Hardman's Frontier Life, 338-68; De Bow's Indust. Resources, i. 363-73; Armin, Heut. Mex., 145-37; Bazancourt, Mex., 141-215; Mayer's Mex. Ast., i. 334-429, ii. 329; Id., Hist. Mex. War, 149-88; Rouhaud, Rég. Nouv., 27-8; Mason's Pict. Life in Mex., i. 203–16; Taylor and his Cump., 9-128; Corbett's Legisl. Man., 282-4; Encarnacion Prisoners, 1-93; Uraga, Sumaria, 1-40; Méx., Reglam., 1-23; Id., Reg. Arch. Gen., 1-20; Id., Doc. Relat.; Id., Apunt. Hist. Guerra, 29-115, 138-50; Hunt's Merch. Mag., xxii. 364; Jay's Mex. War, 158-95, 223-39, 272-333; Scott, Ill. Life of, 1-156; Fry's Life of Taylor, 12, 163-77, 195-288; Fate of Republics, 119-25; Amer. Quart. Reg., 1848, i. 14; Semmes' Serv. Afloat, 38-40, 62-101, 116-24; Otero, Negoc. Diplom., 1-12; Id., Comunic. sobre Negoc., 11; Heller, Reisen in Mex., 195-7, 270-1, 257-8; Mansfield's Life of Gen. Scott, 359-79, 465–74; Mex. War, Complete Hist. of, 28-66, 85-6; Furber's Volunteer, 12, 44-119, 187–212, 250-89, 342-93, 455-8, 490; Miscel. ó Sea, no. 1, 1-64; Mex. War and its Heroes, i. 249-50, ii. 219; Ober, Mexico, 431-43, 477; Farnham's Mex., 55-6; Peterson's Mil. Heroes, ii. 31-4, 44-51, 61, 71; Howitt's Hist. U. S., ii. 350; Hays' Life, MS., 39; Robinson's Mex. and her Mil. Chieftains, 236-63, 312-43; Ortega (Nuñez), Mem. Relac. Dipl. Mex., 77-81; Payne's Hist. Europ. Colonies, 312-13; Taylor and his Generals, 13-215, 231-68; Mexico, Battles of, passim; Conkling's Guide, 243-4; Taylor's Spec. Press, 603, 612; El Tiempo, Jan.-June 1846, passim; Thorpe's Army Rio Grande, 30-5, 59-72, 123-43, 189-96; Patton's Hist. U. S., 704-14, 741-3; Edward's Camp. N. Mex., 16-184; Rodenbough's 2nd Dragoons, 92-8, 114-30, 518-19; Parrodi, Mem., 1-3; Id., Vindic., 1-17; Perez, Dicc. Geog., i. 467-87, ii. 436-42; Ordoñez, Refut. Rápida Oj.; Alm. Amer., 1849, 193-7; Cuerpo Méd. Mil., Reglam. del, 1-23; Cuba, Battles of, 21-2, 30-49; Museo Mex., ii. 469-70; Santa Anna, A pel. al buen Criterio, 24-32, ap. 66-9; Dix' Speeches, i. 179-97; Taylor and his Staff, 36-80, 146-66; Cal. Star, Jan.-Aug. 1847, passim; El Arco Iris, July 13, 1847; Capron's Hist. Cal., 38-9; Campaign in Mex., 46-8, 74-218, 242-6; Barasorda, Pedim., 1-35; Disposic. Var., v. fol. 49, 53; Arroniz, Biog. Mex., 142-6; Son. Book, iii. 327-32; El Sonorense, Oct. 9, 1846, Jan. 1, Feb. 12, 18, 26, March 5, 12, April 2, 9, 23, 30, Sept. 3, 1817, in Pinart Coll.; Papeles Varios, xv. pt 9, xxxix. pt 22, xli. pt 10, li. pt 8, lvii. pt 8, lxxxvi. pts 7, 10, 13, lxxxvii. pt 13, lxxxix. pt 3, xcix. pts 4, 5, 6, 10, cvii. 120-2, 149-215, 241-3, 433-53; Frost's Mex. War, 13-16, 57-102, 123-8, 154-9, 182-5, 206-17, 331-2; Id., Pict. Hist. Mex., 196, 207, 246-331; Méx., Mem. Hac$^{da}$, 1870, 275, 1043-4; Id., Legisl. Mej., 1849, 227-30; Abr.-Jul. 1853, 161-92; Enero-Jun. 1856, 448–51; Id., Col. Leyes y Dec., 1844-6, passim; 1847, 24-5; Mansfield's Mex. War, 30-4, 44-75, 110–16.