# Chaffee v. Boston Belting Company

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United States Supreme Court
63 U.S. 217
Chaffee v. Boston Belting Company
THIS case was brought up by writ of error from the Circuit Court of the United States for the district of Massachusetts.
It was an action of trespass on the case brought by Chaffee against the Boston Belting Company, for an infringement upon a patent granted for the manufacture of India-rubber, granted to Chaffee in 1836, and extended for seven years from the 31st day of August, 1850.
The respective claims of the plaintiff and defendants are fully stated in the opinion of the court.
The presiding judge in the court below ruled that the defendants had a right to continue the same machinery for the same purposes, and in conformity with the directions contained in the specification, after the expiration and renewal of the letters patent, and, consequently, that the plaintiff could not recover.
To this ruling the plaintiff excepted, and brought the case up to this court.
It was argued by Mr. Jenckes and Mr. Clarence A. Seward for the plaintiff in error, no counsel appearing for the defendants.
The case having gone off upon a single point, the argument of the counsel for the plaintiff in error upon that point is alone reported.
The court below erred in charging the jury, that, under their title, the defendants had a right to continue to use the same machinery for the same purposes. This charge was predicated upon an assumption of title in the defendants, which they had not proved. They had proved that Goodyear, while the owner of the original term of the patent, had granted to Edwards a license for a specific purpose. They did not prove any privity between themselves and that license. They did not prove an assignment of that license to themselves. They did not prove the assent of Edwards to their use of the plaintiff's patent in the manufacture of the articles specified in the license. The only purpose for which the license seems to have been introduced was to identify the uses to which the defendants applied the plaintiff's patent, to wit: 'for the preparation and application of India-rubber to the manufacture of the articles mentioned and described in the indenture between Goodyear and Edwards.' This identification was not a justification of the use, by the defendants, of the plaintiff's patent. It proved satisfactorily the nature and extent of that use; but it proved nothing more. It did not prove that the defendants were rightfully in the enjoyment of the thing patented, during the original term of the patent.
The defendants, therefore, having failed to establish any privity between themselves and Goodyear, the owner of the original term of the patent, failed also to establish and right, as against the plaintiff, to use his patent during its extended term. The defendants, upon the record, appear as naked infringers of the plaintiff's patent.
The charge of the court below, therefore, was erroneous in assuming the existence of a license from Goodyear to the defendants, and entitles the plaintiff to a reversal of the judgment and to a venire facias de novo.
Mr. Justice CLIFFORD delivered the opinion of the court.

## Notes

This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
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