# Pipefitters v. United States/Dissent Powell

* Court Documents
* Case Syllabus
* Opinion of the Court
* Dissenting Opinion Powell
[p442] MR. JUSTICE POWELL, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE joins, dissenting.
The decision of the Court today will have a profound effect upon the role of labor unions and corporations in [p443] the political life of this country. The holding, reversing a trend since 1907, opens the way for major participation in politics by the largest aggregations of economic power, the great unions and corporations. This occurs at a time, paradoxically, when public and legislative interest has focused on limiting—rather than enlarging—the influence upon the elective process of concentrations of wealth and power.

## I

The majority opinion holds that unions lawfully may make political contributions so long as they come from funds voluntarily given to the union for such purpose. The Court seeks to buttress this holding by a long and scholarly presentation of the legislative history of 18 U.S.C. § 610. But some of that history invites conflicting inferences, and the background of § 205 of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, to which the majority also devotes extensive attention, is of dubious value in interpreting an earlier statute which on its face is clear and unambiguous.
In its preoccupation with the legislative history, the Court has overlooked the central point involved in this case: that the conviction of petitioners accords with the plain language of the controlling statute. Nor does the majority demonstrate an ambiguity in that statutory language that makes relevant its long journey into the legislative history.
The operative language of § 610 states that: "It is unlawful... for any corporation whatever, or any labor [p444] organization to make a contribution or expenditure in connection with" any federal election. Despite this unqualified proscription, the majority opinion sustains the right of unions and corporations to make political contributions directly, provided only that the fund therefor come voluntarily from members, employees, or stockholders and are maintained separately from the other funds of the union or corporation. With all respect, this holding is precisely contrary to the express language of the law. At the risk of unnecessary repetition I set forth in juxtaposition the operative language in § 610 as contrasted with that of the Court's holding:
| Section 610 | Court's Holding |
| "It is unlawful... for... any labor organization to make a contribution or expenditure in connection with any [federal] election...." | "[Section] 610 does not apply to union contributions and expenditures from political funds financed in some sense by the voluntary donations of employees." Ante, at 409. |
If words are given their normal meaning, the statute and the Court's holding flatly contradict each other. One says that it shall be unlawful for a union to make a political contribution or expenditure. The other says this is perfectly lawful, so long as the funds which the union contributes or expends were donated freely and knowingly. The Court has simply added a qualification, [p445] not found in the statutory language, which significantly changes the meaning of this Act of the Congress.
The Court's holding, moreover, directly counters the purposes for which § 610 was enacted. Congress passed this legislation to restrict and minimize the influence corporations and unions might exert on elections. In United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 113 (1948), with respect to corporations, the Court stated:
   "This legislation seems to have been motivated by two considerations. First, the necessity for destroying the influence over elections which corporations exercised through financial contribution. Second, the feeling that corporate officials had no moral right to use corporate funds for contribution to political parties without the consent of the stockholders."
In commenting on the reasons for extending the legislation to labor organization, the Court in the same case observed
   "Its legislative history indicates congressional belief that labor unions should then be put under the same restraints as had been imposed upon corporations. It was felt that the influence which labor unions exercised over elections through monetary expenditures should be minimized, and that it was unfair to individual union members to permit the union leadership to make contributions from general union funds to a political party which the individual member might oppose." Id., at 115.
The two principal motivations for the enactment of § 610, as identified in CIO, are (i) the minimizing of influence of labor unions (as well as corporations) on elections "through monetary expenditures"; and (ii) the elimination of the unfairness "to individual union members" of allowing union management to make political [p446] contributions from general union funds. It seems self-evident that both of these legislative purposes will be frustrated by the Court's holding that, despite the language of the statute forbidding union contributions, unions may now make political contributions and expenditures, provided only that the source of a fund is voluntary.
To be sure, there is some language in the congressional debates which emphasizes the freedom of union members, as well as that of employees and stockholders of corporations, to make uncoerced political contributions. No one contests this basic freedom. But whatever may have been said in congressional debates, courts are bound by what is written into legislation. If the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous there is no occasion to resort to legislative history. Nor can such history, however illuminating it may seem, be relied upon to contradict, or dilute, or add unspecified conditions to statutory language which is perfectly clear. Where statutory provisions were "clear and unequivocal on their face," the Court has found "no need to resort to the legislative history of the Act." United States v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 643, 648 (1961). As Justice Black observed, "[n]o legislative history can justify judicial emasculation" of the unambiguous language of a statute. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Cushing, 347 U.S. 409, 437 (1954) (dissenting).

## II

Accepting, as I think we must, § 610 as written, the issue in this case is whether the political fund of Local [p447] 562 was in reality a sham or subterfuge through which the union itself made the contributions forbidden by the statute. The indictment in this case was framed on this basis, and the jury was so instructed. The question properly addressed by the Court of Appeals was "whether the contributions or expenditures were [in fact] made by a labor organization." 434 F. 2d 1116, 1121 (1970). After summarizing the evidence submitted to the jury on this issue, the Court of Appeals concluded:
   "There is substantial evidence to support a jury finding that the fund was not a bona fide separate and distinct entity but was in fact a device set up to circumvent the provisions of § 610 and that the fund constituted union money." 434 F. 2d, at 1121.
It is not normally the function of this Court in a case of this kind to determine whether a jury verdict is supported by substantial evidence. It may not be inappropriate, however, to say—in light of the record before us—that the evidence was more than sufficient to show that union officials supervised closely the collection of the "contributions," sought "contributions" in much the same manner as compulsory assessments, viewed them as part of the total cost burden which the union member had to bear, expended them freely both for union projects and political purposes, and so generally commingled the administration of the fund with the administration of the union as to entitle the jury to believe the gifts by Local 562 from the fund to candidates for federal office constituted union political contributions in violation of § 610.
[p448] The majority opinion of this Court does not contest this view. It concludes, rather, that the jury was erroneously instructed, and that accordingly the verdict and judgment must be set aside. If a new trial is held, the jury must be instructed in accordance with the COurt's interpretation of § 610 that a union may lawfully make political contributions from a fund it collects and administers so long as the payments into it are voluntary.
It is from this interpretation of § 610—one which in my view will render the statute largely ineffectual—that I dissent.

## III

The consequences of today's decision could be far-reaching indeed. The opinion of the Court provides a blueprint for compliance with § 610, as now construed, [p449] which will be welcomed by every corporation and union which wishes to take advantage of a heretofore unrecognized opportunity to influence elections in this country.
It may be that the unions, by virtue of a system of collecting "political contributions" simultaneously with the collection of dues and regularizing such collections to the point where they are indistinguishable from dues, will be the primary beneficiaries. But the corporations are more numerous than the unions. They have millions of stockholders and hundreds of thousands of nonunion employees. Both unions and corporations have large financial resources. Today's interpretation of § 610 will enable a more direct and extensive political employment of these resources by both union and corporation.
By refusing to affirm the judgment below, the majority renders the ultimate fate of this litigation uncertain. If, on remand, the techniques of Local 562 should be sanctioned, other unions and corporations could easily follow Local 562 and obtain from members, employees, and shareholders a consent form attesting that the contribution (or withholding) is "voluntary." The trappings of voluntariness might be achieved while the substance of coercion remained. Union members and corporate employees might find themselves the objects of regular and systematized solicitation by the very agent which exercises direct control over their jobs and livelihood.
[p450] The only remaining requirement to meet the new standards is that the fund be separate from other union or corporate funds, although under the majority's interpretation of § 205 it may be established and administered, and the contributions to it solicited, by the union or corporation with its own funds. Again, if Local 562 were to provide the standards, the separateness of such a fund need be nothing more than a separate ledger and bank account.
In sum, the opinion of the Court today, adopting an interpretation of § 610 at variance with its language and purpose, goes a long way toward returning unions and corporations to an unregulated status with respect to political contributions. This opening of the door to extensive corporate and union influence on the elective and legislative processes must be viewed with genuine concern. This seems to me to be a regressive step as contrasted with the numerous legislative and judicial actions in recent years designed to assure that elections are indeed free and representative.
I would affirm the judgment below.

## Notes

* ↑ The majority opinion finds confirmation of its interpretation of the legislative history of § 610 in the recently enacted § 205 of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971. The majority concludes, however, that § 205 is not retroactive and therefore is inapplicable to this case, a view which I share. I find it unnecessary to the disposition of this case to intertwine the legislative history of the two statutes when only one of them is applicable.
* ↑ The alleged separate fund involved in this case was segregated only in the sense that there was a separate ledger and bank account. The Court of Appeals held that there was "substantial evidence to support a jury finding that the fund was not a bona fide separate and distinct entity." 434 F. 2d 1116, 1121 (1970). The decision of the majority focuses attention on the issue of voluntariness and gives little indication that a more realistic segregation of the fund is required.
* ↑ It has been an ancient and cardinal tenet of statutory construction that "where a law is expressed in plain and unambiguous terms, whether those terms are general or limited, the legislature should be intended to mean what they have plainly expressed, and consequently no room is left for construction." Lake County v. Rollins, 130 U.S. 662, 670-671 (1889); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 305 (1957); United States v. Standard Brewery, 251 U.S. 210, 217 (1920).
* ↑ Even on the issue of voluntariness, which the Court of Appeals rightly found "relevant and material" though "'not controlling." 434 F. 2d, at 1120. the evidence was impressive that the collection scheme was inherently coercive. Since Local 562 had consistently collected contributions to its political funds since 1949, "contributions" appear to have become a customary de facto condition to union membership or employment within Local 562's jurisdiction. Moreover, the regularity of these contributions—week by week and year by year and each in the same amount as requested by the union—seems suspiciously incompatible with the concept of free-will gifts.
* ↑ My interpretation of the statute does not imply that no "separate fund" would be permissible. I recognize that, consistently with the statute (as amended by § 205), a union or corporation may be instrumental in establishing a political fund, provided it is a bona fide one—separate and segregated from the union in a genuine, not merely formalistic, way. For example, such a fund might be managed by a separate nonprofit entity, with independent trustees not subservient to the union or corporate sponsor, who engage independent auditors, who make regular reports to contributors, and who provide realistic means by which contributors can express their preference as to political candidates or parties. Safeguards would be required to assure that contributions were not coerced, either directly or by means of an inherently coercive system or relationship. Such a bona fide fund would contrast quite sharply with that operated by Local 562, where there were no bylaws, no constitution, no independent trustees, no audit, no report to contributors, or other indications of genuine separateness or segregation; and where the union itself collected, operated, and expended the "contributions" in substantially the same manner as union dues and assessments.
* ↑ I recognize, of course, that the recent enactment of § 205 of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 has supplemented and extended § 610 in defining permissible limits of union and corporate contributions. But § 205 still leaves intact the operative language of § 610 which explicitly proscribes political contributions by unions and corporations. The interpretative gloss today added unnecessarily on this language will result in rendering ineffectual the basic intention of the Congress to prevent the intrusion of corporate and union power into our political system.