# Shaw v. Railroad Company Same/Opinion of the Court

* Court Documents
* Case Syllabus
* Opinion of the Court
United States Supreme Court
100 U.S. 605
Shaw v. Railroad Company Same
We think it clear that the appellants are not entitled to the relief they ask. They were not parties to the original suits, except through their trustees, against whom they make no charges. Indeed, their counsel says in his brief, 'It is probable that they [the trustees] believed that they were doing the best possible for their beneficiaries.' The trustee of a railroad mortgage represents the bondholders in all legal proceedings carried on by him affecting his trust, to which they are not actual parties, and whatever binds him, if he acts in good faith, binds them. If a bondholder not a party to the suit can, under any circumstances, bring a bill of review, he can only have such relief as the trustee would be entitled to in the same form of proceeding. To avoid what the trustee has done in his behalf, he must proceed in some other way than by bill of review. All the errors complained of in these bills of review, as occurring before the confirmation of the sale, are such as affect only the railroad company injuriously. If, in fact, they are errors at all, they were in favor of the trustees and those they represent, and not against them. Of these the trustees could not complain. As no relief was granted under the amendment to the bill in the foreclosure of the railroad mortgage, the court clearly had jurisdiction of that case for the purposes of the decree as rendered.
But if the bills, as filed, are original in their character, to set aside the decrees complained of and not for review only, the appellants are in no better condition. The trustees had an undoubted right to commence these suits when they did, and it is apparent from the whole record that all their proceedings, both before and after the sale, were in the interest of their beneficiaries generally, since one hundred and eighty in number, representing in the aggregate eight million out of the eight million five hundred thousand dollars of bonds outstanding, accepted the result and exchanged their bonds for stock in the new corporation. To allow a small minority of bondholders, representing a comparatively insignificant amount of the mortgage debt, in the absence of any pretence even of fraud or unfairness, to defeat the wishes of such an overwhelming majority of those associated with them in the benefits of their common security, would be to ignore entirely the relation which bondholders, secured by a railroad mortgage, bear to each other. Railroad mortgages are a peculiar class of securities. The trustee represents the mortgage, and in executing his trust may exercise his own discretion within the scope of his powers. If there are differences of opinion among the bondholders as to what their interests require, it is not improper that he should be governed by the voice of the majority, acting in good faith and without collusion, if what they ask is not inconsistent with the provisions of his trust. This company and these trustees were peculiarly situated. The road was unfinished, and the land grant, to a large extent, unearned. While the mortgages, as they stood, were first liens, there was great danger that their value would be seriously impaired unless more money could be raised. The attention of both the trustees and bondholders was called to that fact, and at first it seems to have been thought that the end might be accomplished through the instrumentality of a receiver and receiver's certificates. This necessarily contemplated the creation of a lien on the mortgaged property superior to that which then existed. Although the mortgages were separate, and on separate properties, the value of each depended, to a large extent, on the ability of the railroad company to finish its road.
For some reason the idea of a receiver and receiver's certificates seems to have been abandoned, and what, to our minds, was a much more desirable plan adopted. The power of the courts ought never to be used in enabling railroad mortgagees to protect their securities by borrowing money to complete unfinished roads, except under extraordinary circumstances. It is always better to do what was done here whenever it can be; that is to say, reorganize the enterprise on the basis of existing mortgages as stock, or something which is equivalent, and by a new mortgage, with a lien superior to the old, raise the money which is required without asking the courts to engage in the business of railroad building. The result, so far as incumbering the mortgage security is concerned, is the same substantially in both cases, while the reorganization places the whole enterprise in the hands of those immediately interested in its successful prosecution.
The bare fact that some of the trustees were holders of bonds secured by their trust is not sufficient of itself to make them incompetent to consent to such a decree as was rendered. From the whole case it is apparent that from the beginning their conduct was governed by the wishes of a very large majority of bondholders. If there was anywhere the slightest evidence of fraud or unfaithfulness, their conduct would be carefully scrutinized. The acts of trustees when personally interested should always be open and fair. Slight circumstances will sometimes be considered sufficient proof of wrong to justify setting aside what has been done. But when every thing is honestly done, and the courts are satisfied that the rights of others have not been prejudiced to the advantage of the trustee, the simple fact of interest is not sufficient to justify the withholding of a confirmation of his acts.
Here the name of Gookin, one of the trustees, appears in the list of bondholders appointing the committee to make the purchase at the sale as the holder of two hundred thousand dollars of the bonds. Associated with him in the list were others representing near six millions of dollars. His name openly appeared on the paper when the court was asked to confirm the sale on the conditions agreed to. Certainly this is not sufficient to defeat the plan to which he and his associates gave their consent. Atkins, another trustee, was a creditor of the company, whose debt came within the provision made in the decree for payment by the new corporation. All this was fully explained to the court when the modification of the decree in this particular was asked for, and since no claim can now be paid except with the approval of the court after notice to the appellants, we see no reason why what has already been done is not sufficient for the protection of all concerned.
On the whole, we see no reason for interfering with the decrees below, and they are each, therefore,
Affirmed.

## Notes

This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
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