# Secret Diplomacy/Chapter 5
## V. TRIPLE ALLIANCE DIPLOMACY AND MOROCCOV. TRIPLE ALLIANCE DIPLOMACY AND MOROCCO

TOWARD the end of the nineteenth century the dominating development in the diplomacy of Europe was the actual formation of the two great alliances the Triple Alliance created by Bismarck, and the Russo-French Alliance which had come into being in 1896 as a counterpoise to the former. The treaties upon which these alliances rested were made secretly; they were part of an authoritative policy based on the theory of balance of power. The texts of the Triple Alliance Treaty were not published until after the beginning of the Great War. The so-called Counter- Insurance Treaty with Russia by which Bismarck attempted to stabilize the situation and isolate France through a mutual neutrality agreement between Russia, Austria and Germany, was one of the most characteristic examples of complicated methods followed by the old diplomacy; it was, of course, also kept secret. When after Bismarck' ​s retirement the German Government did not renew this secret treaty, it made possible a fundamental change in the grouping of powers with the result that Russia, after a very short interval, identified herself with France in the Dual Alliance.
While Bismarck had been in control of German diplomacy, the main lines of German foreign policy were kept quite clear and their general direc- tion was definite, no matter how complicated and indirect were the means frequently applied to carry it out. Emperor William II sought to free himself from the tutelage of the powerful Chancellor, but from then on the orientation of German diplomacy was far from definite. No one could be clear where its main objective lay; it seemed to seek expansion of influence in Asia Minor, the Far East, Morocco, South Africa, and almost everywhere, even with the inclusion of South America. Germany appeared to have many irons in the fire, although meanwhile she did not make much progress in any specific direction. This uncertainty of her diplomatic aims in an increasing manner aroused the apprehension of her neighbors; none of them felt any assurance about what Germany actually wanted. That her actual wants may not have been un ​reasonable, that she herself apparently did not know exactly which of her interests should predominate, did not help matters; all those who had more possessions than she felt themselves endangered, and a general suspicion and lack of confidence resulted.
In the years after the Chino-Japanese war the German Government showed a great desire to play a prominent part in Far Eastern affairs. Thus, it took the lead in bringing about the joint intervention of Kussia, France and Germany, which obliged Japan to surrender Port Arthur, a part of the spoils of war just taken from China. The three powers who had thus come to the res- cue, however, forthwith proceeded to exact from China an enormous commission for their good of- fices, and forced her to make to them grants of lease-holds and other concessions, in which was in- cluded the very territory that they had rescued from Japan. In this keen onset, which amounted to an attempt to divide up the Chinese Empire, Great Britain in her turn also participated. The Far Eastern situation was rendered decidedly un- stable, and the frantic and unorganized resistance of the Boxer levies was the result.
After the settlement of these troubles, in 1901, the German Government, as we now know, tenta- tively suggested the formation of an alliance in​
eluding Great Britain and Japan. This proposal shows how far German diplomacy at the time had departed from the fundamentals of policy under Bismarck. Japan proceeded most assiduously to work on this suggestion, but Germany was left out when the highly important Anglo-Japanese Al- liance was secured by the Japanese Minister in London. Negotiations between Great Britain and Japan were carried on with the greatest secrecy. Lord Lansdowne himself seems at one time to have been very anxious for prompt action; he said to Count Hayashi, as reported by the latter, that " there was great danger in delay, as the news of the proposed treaty might leak out and objections might then be raised."
It is significant that while Lord Lansdowne and Count Hayashi were in the depth of their negotiations, Marquis Ito, on his return journey from the United States, proceeded to Russia and, entirely in opposition to the express judgment of Count Hayashi, "plunged into conversations on the most delicate of matters'* at St. Peters- burg. In fact, the Japanese Government allowed almost identical secret negotiations to be carried on in London and St. Petersburg at the same time. Count Hayashi considered this procedure as im- plying "a lack of faith and a breach of honor.'" ​When the Anglo-Japanese treaty had been ac- tually signed it was, through the indiscretion of some official, published in Japan three days too soon. The Japanese Foreign Office promptly de- nied its existence, and Baron Rosen, the Russian Minister at Tokyo, who no doubt knew of the Ito negotiations at St. Petersburg, very emphatically denied the very possibility of such a treaty. The effect on Russia of the truth when it became known there, can be readily imagined. In the Anglo-Japanese treaty, England, which had re- cently joined in the solemn guarantee of the in- tegrity of China and of the independence of Korea, made engagements scarcely consistent with either.
Lord Rosebery, in a public address, October, 1905, expressed his sense of the great importance of this treaty. "The treaty," he said, "is an en- gine of tremendous power and tremendous lia- bility. Whatever else is certain, this at least is sure, that it will lead to countless animosities, many counter intrigues, and possibly hostile com- binations. But I want to point out to you the enormous importance of the engagements in which this treaty involves you, the reactions which it will cause elsewhere, and to bid you to be vigilant and prepared, and not negligent, as ​
sometimes you are, of the vast bearings of your foreign policy."
The German Emperor, having failed to obtain a treaty with England, now turned to his Rus- sian cousin with the design of inducing him to make an alliance. The Willy-Nicky correspond- ence which was published by the Russian Revo- lutionary Government in 1917, as well as the memoirs of Isvolsky, give us a complete insight into the action of William II in this matter. The correspondence shows that Emperor William neg- lected no means of arousing resentment and sus- picion of England in the mind of Nicholas, par- ticularly in attempting to show a complicity of England with Japan in the war against Russia. In November, 1904, William proposed the imme- diate signature by Russia, without the knowledge of France, of a defensive treaty of alliance, evi- dently directed against Great Britain. France was to be invited to join after the signature by Germany and Russia. The Czar, however, in- sisted that he could not entertain this proposal without first submitting it to his ally. William, in a long telegram, argued insistently upon the danger of informing France before the signature. He said: "Only the absolute, undeniable knowl- edge that we are both bound by the treaty to give ​
mutual aid to each other, can induce France to exercise pressure upon England to remain tran- quil and in peace, for fear of placing France in a dangerous situation. Should France know that a German-Russian agreement is simply in prep- aration and not yet signed, she would immediately inform England. England and Japan would then forthwith attack Germany. ' ' Therefore, William concluded that if the Czar should persist in re- fusing to sign the treaty without the previous consent of France, it would be better not to at- tempt making an agreement at all. He stated that he had spoken only to Prince Buelow about it, and that as undoubtedly the Czar had spoken only to Count Lamsdorff, the foreign minister, it would be easy to keep it an absolute secret. He then congratulated the Czar on having concluded a secret agreement of neutrality with Austria. As a matter of fact, Count Lamsdorff had not been informed by the Czar of the Emperor's pro- posal.
In the summer of 1905, Emperor William re- turned to the charge, taking advantage of the dis- couragement of the Czar due to many external and internal troubles resulting from the Japanese war. He visited the Czar at the Island Bjorkoe in July, and used every resource of his ​personal influence to prevail on Nicholas. This time he succeeded, and the two sovereigns signed a secret treaty of alliance, which contained four articles to the following effect :
* If any European state shall attack either
of the empires the allied party engages itself to aid with all its forces on land and sea.
* The contracting parties will not conclude a
separate peace.
* The present agreement comes in force at
the moment of conclusion of peace between Rus- sia and Japan, and may be denounced with one year's notice.
* When the treaty has come into force Rus-
sia will take the necessary steps to inform France and to propose to her to adhere to it as an ally.
On this occasion the Emperor was accompanied by Von Tschirsky, who soon after became German Foreign Minister and who countersigned the agreement. The Russian Foreign Minister was not present but Admiral Birileff, the Minister of the Navy, was called in to countersign the Czar's signature. After his return to St. Petersburg, the Czar allowed fifteen days to pass before informing Count Lamsdorff. When informed, the Czar's advisers took a very strong position against the agreement, with the result that notwithstanding ​the insistent arguments of Emperor William, who in his telegram signed himself "Your friend and ally," the treaty was never given full force. William strongly appealed to the gratefulness of the Czar for having stood by him during the Japanese war, at a time when, ' * as afterwards the indiscretions of Delcasse have shown, although allied to Russia, France had nevertheless made an agreement with England to attack Germany without warning, in time of peace." The latter phrase gives the effect upon William's mind of all he knew or believed to know about the arrangements concluded between France and Great Britain concerning Morocco.
The Moroccan intrigues and secret negotiations, during the first decade of the twentieth century, contributed in no small measure to rendering in- ternational relations strained and generating a general sense of insecurity and suspicion. In July, 1901, a protocol was signed between the Sul- tan of Morocco and the French Government in which the latter declared its respect for the in- tegrity of Morocco. At the same time M. Del- casse began secret negotiations with Spain for a delimitation of spheres of influence in that coun- try. In September, 1902, the first Franco-Span- ish secret treaty concerning Morocco was given its ​
final form. It was, however, not ratified because of British opposition at the time. In 1904, the formation of the Anglo-French Entente agree- ment, in which the French Government declared that it had no intention "of altering the political status of Morocco," was accompanied by the con- clusion of a secret understanding concerning Morocco which was not revealed until 1911. Ac- cording to the terms of that agreement the Brit- ish Government was to be informed of any under- standing on Morocco which might be concluded between France and Spain. These two coun- tries, in fact, on October 3, 1904, consummated a convention for the partition of Morocco into spheres of influence. A copy of this secret agree- ment was given to Lord Lansdowne, the British Foreign Minister, who wrote, in acknowledging it : 1 'I need not say that the confidential character of the. Convention entered into by the President of the French Republic and the King of Spain in regard to French and Spanish interests in Mo- rocco is fully recognized by us, and will be duly respected."
The German Government, which had been ig- nored, now suggested the holding of an interna- tional conference. After considerable opposition the conference met at Algeciras, ​in February, 1906. The Powers represented there again sol- emnly recognized the independence and integrity of Morocco. Meanwhile, various incidents were brought on by the actions of French and Spanish commissaries in Morocco. The French parlia- ment repeatedly reiterated its intention to ob- serve the act of Algeciras, particularly in the dec- laration of February, 1909, regarding Morocco, in which declaration Germany joined. In 1911, events happened which induced a serious Euro- pean crisis. The French Government undertook military operations against Fez, the capital of Morocco, on the ground that the foreign colony there was in danger. In reply to questions in the House of Commons, Sir Edward Grey con- firmed that such measures were being undertaken by the French Government "for the succor of Europeans in Fez." He added: "The action taken by France is not intended to alter the po- litical status of Morocco, and His Majesty's Gov- ernment cannot see why any objection should be taken to it."
The facts of the Fez affair have been thus de- scribed by the French publicist, Francis de Pres- sense :
"At this point the Comite du Maroc and its organs surpassed themselves. They organized a ca ​mpaign of systematic untruth. Masters of almost the entire press, they swamped the public with false news. Fez was represented as threatened by siege or sack. A whole European French Colony was suddenly discovered there, living in anguish. The ultimate fate of the women and children was described in the most moving terms. . . . At all costs the Europeans the Sultan, Fez itself must be saved. ... As ever from the beginning of this en- terprise, the Government knew nothing, willed nothing of itself."
While these events were happening, the Foreign Offices both in Paris and London failed to give any information concerning the aims which un- derlay the action taken. On May 23d, Mr., Dillon in the House of Commons asked to what extent England was committed to this ' ' ill-omened and cruel expedition." The Foreign Secretary replied, "We are not committed at all." The French Foreign Minister declared at the same time that he had never heard of any treaty with Spain concerning Morocco.
When the international crisis came to a head suddenly in July, 1911, through the disconcerting action of the German Government in sending a war vessel to Agadir, the public was totally taken by surprise and was absolutely in the dark as to the issues and interests involved as well as to the commitments which had been made by the British ​
and French foreign offices. The text of the se- cret treaty between France and Spain had, how- ever, now been secured by the Paris papers Le Temps and Le Matin. This revelation led to party attacks on secret diplomacy in the British House of Commons and in the French Parlia- ment. Baron d'Estournelles de Constant, in February, 1912, said:
. . . "Why was the French Parliament told only half the truth when it was asked to pass its opinion upon our arrangement with England? Why was it allowed to suspect that this arrangement had as its complement and corrective some secret clauses and other secret treaties? It is this, it is this double game towards Par- liament and towards the world which becomes morally an abuse of trust. . . . Now the whole effort of the ar- rangement of 1904 appears to-day in its truth and in its vanity. It was a treaty of friendship with England recognizing the freedom of our political action in Mo- rocco and also proclaiming our will to respect the integ- rity of that country; that was what the public knew and approved. But the public was ignorant that at the same time, by other Treaties and by contradictory clauses hidden from it, the partition of Morocco between Spain and France was prepared, of that Morocco of which we guaranteed the integrity. ' '
In the House of Commons, Mr. John Dillon charged that "the Foreign Office policy has be​
come during the last ten years progressively more secret every year. For ten years the foreign pol- icy of this country has been conducted behind an elaborate screen of secrecy."