# History of Mexico (Bancroft)/Volume 5/Chapter 15

Table of Contents
CHAPTER XV.
CAPTURE OF MONTEREY.
MAY-SEPTEMBER. 1846.
The United States Declares War — Scott and the Government at Variance — Call for Volunteers — Gaines' Unadvised Action — The Volunteer Question — Want of a War Plan — March to Monterey — Preparations of the Mexicans — Ampudia Appointed Commander-in-Chief — Description of Monterey — The Siege — Capture of Fort Tenería — Hard Fighting — Worth's Operations — Ampudia Capitulates — Monterey Evacuated — Dissatisfaction in the United States
When the government of the United States became aware, by news of the capture of Captain Thornton's party, that hostilities had broken out, the president addressed an extraordinary message, May 11th, to congress, then in session, invoking its prompt action to recognize the existence of the war, and to place at the disposition of the executive the means of prosecuting it with vigor, and thus hastening the restoration of peace. It is to be observed that Mr Polk is both inconsistent and unjust, not to say wilfully mendacious, in his endeavor to throw the whole blame of the war upon Mexico. After giving the details of Slidell's failure at negotiations to adjust the questions in dispute, "both the questions of the Texas boundary and the indemnification of our citizens" — an admission that the boundary question was still unsettled he asserts that "Mexico has passed the boundary of the United States, has invaded our territory, and shed American blood upon American soil." ​Nevertheless congress adopted his views without delay, and on the 13th declared that by an act of the republic of Mexico, a state of war existed between the two governments; it authorized the president to call for volunteers to any number, not exceeding 50,000, to serve for twelve months after arrival at the place of rendezvous, and placed at his disposal $10,000,000.
The president immediately intimated to General Scott, the commander-in-chief of the United States army, his intention to assign to him the command of the forces in Mexico. But a rupture soon occurred, brought on by the strictures of political parties. Scott held a high reputation for military skill, and he had already been spoken of by the whig party as their candidate for the presidency. His action was therefore narrowly watched by both friends and enemies. The plan of the campaign, arranged at private consultations between the president, W. L. Marcy, secretary of war, and General Scott, was to seize the northern territories of Mexico, and, making the Rio Grande the base of future operations, compel Mexico to come to terms, by moving the main army against the capital, the centre of her resources. But serious difficulties presented themselves at the outset. The nearest. base of supplies was New Orleans, too distant from the Mexican frontier. It was agreed that an army of 30,000, regulars and volunteers, would be required. But to provide and send in advance to the several places of rendezvous arms, accoutrements, and supplies of all kinds; to procure proper means of transportation by land and water; and at the same time to study the routes of march and all other details ​connected with the movement into the interior of Mexico, were not the labors of a few days. Scott knew this full well. He suggested the 1st of September as the earliest day for passing in full force beyond the Rio Grande, ard assiduously applied himself to the preliminary work, in which he was engaged fourteen hours daily. But the nation was excited and impatient. His necessary delay at Washington was regarded as inactivity. Why did he not hasten to the seat of war? it was asked; and prominent men made unfavorable comments upon his presence in the capital. It was forgotten that the vast preliminary arrangements could only be made advantageously at that place, through the respective chiefs of the general staff. Within only a week after the declaration of war Marcy informed Scott that much impatience was felt because he had not already put himself en route for the Rio Grande. There was, moreover, a bill before the senate which proposed to authorize the appointment of two additional major-generals, giving the president power also of selecting generals for the command of the 50,000 volunteers. This measure, if adopted, would have given the president power to place some new general over the head of Scott. The sensitiveness of the commander-in-chief, who as yet had received only verbal orders assigning him to the command, was irritated, and on the 21st of May he addressed a letter to the secretary of war which contained expressions that were construed into reflections upon the conduct of the president.
After four days' consideration of his note, the president directed Marcy to inform him that he was relieved of the command, but would be continued in his ​position at Washington making arrangements and preparations for the campaign. In his reply Scott endeavored to explain that those portions of his communication which had given offence were intended to apply to Marcy and the president's advisers, and disclaimed all intention of attributing, either to the president or the secretary of war, any unworthy motives. He concluded by expressing the wish to be retained in command. But the president saw no reason to change his mind, and though Scott, in a further letter on the 27th to the secretary of war, appealed to the justice of the president and the rights of senior rank, Marcy, by letter of the 8th of June, informed Taylor of his assignment to the command, and the president's intention to continue him in it.
Had not congress called for this correspondence and published it, the supersedure of Scott miglht have been regarded by the nation as an injustice; but when the particulars became known it was indorsed by public opinion, which was biased, however, by the ridicule ungenerously heaped upon him by his enemies, to whom he gave an unfortunate opportunity of displaying their malignity by an unlucky expression in one of his letters.
Taylor's position at Matamoros was not an enviable He was embarrassed by the arrival of volunteers in numbers far exceeding his requisitions; he was crippled in his movements by the want of means of transportation; he was perplexed by discrepant instructions from Washington, and by the indecision of the government as to the plan of the campaign; and lastly, he felt his responsibility increased by not being one. ​in full possession of the views and policy of the government in regard to future operations.
On the 26th of April he had called on the governors of Louisiana and Texas for a force each of four regiments, General Gaines at New Orleans being desired by him to assist in organizing them. The news of Thornton's disaster had been just received, and exaggerated conclusions were drawn. The army was believed to be in extreme peril, and much alarm was felt. Gaines, a veteran of the war of 1812, patriotic and fervent, adopted a course which, apart from the embarrassment in which it involved affairs, is comical. His enthusiasm, thoroughly aroused, ran away with his judgment. The old soldier completely lost his head. Without a shadow of authority he called for six-month volunteers, in numbers greatly in excess of Taylor's requisition. In the existing excitement his calls were quickly responded to, and regiment after regiment, ill conditioned, was hurried off to the seat of war. He extended his calls for volunteers to other states, proceeded to make appointments of officers, and, in fact, seemed about to raise an army on his own account, without a thought as to what might be the government's intentions. The secretary of war, by despatch of May 28th, sharply directed Gaines to discontinue his independent action, and confine himself to carrying out the orders and views of the president so far as they had been communicated to him. But Gaines could not stop, and to prevent further mischief, he was relieved of his command and ordered to Washington. Brevet Brigadier-general George M. Brooke was assigned to the command of the western division.
But the mischief was done. The volunteers, all of whom Gaines had mustered into service for six ​months, could not according to law be detained for a period exceeding three months, while those who were in excess of Taylor's requisition, and not included in the president's sanction, were not even legally in the public service. The government could find only one escape from the dilemma, and that was to offer these troops the alternative of becoming twelve-month volunteers under the act of May 13th. Accordingly instructions to that effect were sent to Taylor, who was ordered to cause the volunteers to be returned to their respective homes if they declined, and to muster out at the expiration of three months' service the volunteers legally enrolled by Gaines. Much dissatisfaction was exhibited by the six-month volunteers when the rumor was received from home that they were to be disbanded unless they volunteered for twelve months; but though Taylor requested to be allowed to retain them in service to the end of the term for which they had engaged, the government remained firm. Meantime the different quotas of the twelvemonth volunteers commenced to arrive, and those who had responded to Gaines' calls were gradually discharged. Of all the Louisiana volunteers only one company consented to be mustered into the service for twelve months.
On the 8th of June Marcy wrote Taylor, informing him of his promotion to the rank of brevet major-general, and of the president's intention to assign to him the command of all the land forces that would operate against Mexico. He also informed him that he might expect soon to have nearly 20,000 twelve-month volunteers besides the regular forces then under his command. He was told that the president was desirous of receiving his views in relation to the plan of the war, and while the hope was expressed ​that he might be able to place a considerable portion of his troops in healthy towns on the Rio Grande and take and hold Monterey, the important question of striking at the city of Mexico was left pending upon Taylor's advice. Four days later General Scott wrote him in quite a different strain, setting it down as the wish and expectation of the president that he would press his operations toward the heart of the enemy's country, making the high road to the capital one of the lines of march which he was expected to take up beyond the Rio Grande. Such contradictory orders could only perplex Taylor, and engender indecision.
Taylor replied in a communication to the adjutant-general of the army, dated July 2d. Confining himself almost entirely to the question of subsistence, he expressed the opinion — based upon calculations made on the supposition that the people of the country would at least be passive, and willing to part with their produce — that a force exceeding 6,000 men could not be maintained beyond Saltillo. The distance from Camargo, where he proposed to establish his depôt, to the capital was little less than 1,000 miles; and except in the improbable case of entire acquiescence on the part of the Mexican people, he considered it impracticable to keep open so long a line of communication. It was, therefore, his opinion that operations from the northern frontier should not look to the city of Mexico, but should be confined to cutting off the northern provinces — an undertaking comparatively easy.
Previous to the receipt of this communication at the war-office, the necessity of striking directly at the Mexican capital through Vera Cruz seems to have dawned upon the government. With the facts before its eyes that Mexico was without a commercial ​marine, and that free communication with the interior did not exist, it was evident that she could only be effectively assailed at the centre of her resources. Partial operations in the north, however successful, could not be expected to enforce the submission of Mexico and obtain concessions from her. In a confidential letter of Marcy to Taylor, dated July 9th, the suggestion is made that the main invasion might take place at some point on the coast, as Tampico or in the vicinity of Vera Cruz, and Taylor is asked his views. Although the government cannot as yet be said to have formed any definite plan, it is evident from this communication that it began seriously to consider what might be the best means of promptly bringing the war to an end. Taylor, however, could express no opinion as to the practicability of an expedition against Vera Cruz, or the amount of force that it might require, while he considered an expedition against the capital directed from Tampico to be out of the question, owing to the impracticable character of the routes. Moreover, he was equally indefinite in additional remarks which he made relative to operations from the Rio Grande, and stated that it must be determined by actual experiment whether a large force could be subsisted beyond Monterey.
When it is borne in mind that the war men at Washington had to contend against the captious spirit and interference of the commander-in-chief, against the indiscreet and unwarranted proceedings of the commander at New Orleans, and against the antagonism of the opposition party, while at the same time they obtained no suggestion of any value from the commander in the field, it cannot be denied that their difficulties in the formation of a war plan were considerable. But the cabinet soon realized the fact that Taylor's experimental movements, with no more definite object than to test the capacity of the northern ​districts as regarded the subsistence of an army, would not conduce to a speedy termination of the war.
Meantime Taylor's movements were delayed from want of the means of transportation. When the fresh troops began to arrive, he contemplated advancing against Monterey; and to carry on operations in the valley of the San Juan toward that city, the establishment of his depôt at Camargo was necessary. To effect this, the Rio Grande presented the only feasible means of communication, and the shallowness of the water necessitated the use of light-draught steamers, to navigate which across the gulf from New Orleans was a hazardous undertaking. On the 28th of May Captain John Sanders was despatched by him to that city to procure steamboats suitable to the navigation of the river; but though the official correspondence proves that both the general's agents and the officers of the quartermaster's department promptly performed their duties, Taylor complained of the delay.
He nevertheless pushed troops up the river in furtherance of his design against Monterey. Reynosa, Camargo, and Mier were occupied without resistance, and on the 24th of July General Worth arrived with his division at Camargo. As the steamboats kept arriving, the difficulties of water transportation were to a great extent removed, but still innumerable inconveniences had to be overcome, and it was not until the 8th of August that he was able to make that town his headquarters. The different ​routes to Monterey, through Cerralvo and China, having been reconnoitred and the former selected as the more advantageous, the first brigade of regular troops, under Worth, was sent forward August 19th, and occupied Cerralvo without opposition. The army concentrated at Camargo for the movement on Monterey numbered a little over 6,600 officers and men. This force was divided into three divisions, under tho commands of generals Twiggs and Worth, and Major-general Butler, the third division being composed of volunteers to the number of nearly 3,000. The remainder of the volunteer force, amounting to over O 6,000 men, was left in camp and garrison at Camargo and other towns on the Rio Grande. On September 5th Taylor left Camargo and
​proceeded to Cerralvo, where he arrived on the 9th. On the llth he issued his order of march to Marin, and on the 15th the last division moved forward, Twiggs' division having marched in advance on the 13th. The army met with no opposition, though parties of Mexican
cavalry were several times seen. As Twiggs marched through Marin on the 15th, a body of Mexican lancers retired before him. During the two following days the army was concentrated on the banks of the Rio San Juan, about three miles beyond Marin ​and twenty-four from Monterey, and on the 18th the whole force moved forward.
The numerous delays which retarded the prosecution of hostilities on the part of the United States afforded the Mexicans ample opportunity for preparation. But political intrigues and party animosities prevented harmonious action. After the removal of Arista and the provisional appointment of Mejía to the command, the army, reduced to 1,800 men, was transferred from Linares to Monterey, as soon as it became apparent that the latter city would be the point of Taylor's attack. The troops arrived at Monterey during the last week of July, and were soon reënforced from the surrounding districts. Mejía, in pursuance of his plan to carry on a defensive warfare, proceeded to improve the fortifications without making any attempt to arrest the operations of the enemy. While thus occupied, the change in the government occurred, involving the downfall of Paredes and the return of Santa Anna; and Ampudia, who had been summoned to the capital to attend the investigation into the affairs at Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma, was appointed by the general government to the command of the army in the north. The dilatory proceedings of Paredes had done little toward providing a military force corresponding to the danger which threatened; but the new government began to act with more promptness. Immediately after the arrival of Santa Anna a levy of 30,000 men had been ordered, and the capital, or San Luis Potosí, appointed as the rendezvous. Ampudia, meanwhile, moved from that city with a large reënforcement for Monterey, where he arrived at the end of August.
​On the 31st of that month he issued a decree proclaiming the penalty of death against every native or foreigner who, directly or indirectly, should give aid to the enemy, or engage in contraband traffic with him. He moreover caused numbers of circulars to be dropped on the line of march of the American army, inviting the soldiers to desert under promises of kind treatment and protection. But vacillation marked Ampudia's action, and the antipathy between him and his generals rendered it impossible to arrive at any settled plan. At first he conceived the idea of opposing the enemy at Marin, and concentrated there a large force of cavalry under Torrejon. The plan was soon abandoned, however, and Torrejon retired on the approach of the Americans. Several councils of war were held, but the opposing opinions expressed caused repeated changes to be made in the defensive preparations. Fortifications were commenced, then destroyed, and again resumed. Such indecision had a most disheartening effect upon the army and seriously injured its morale. The defensive works of Monterey were nevertheless made very formidable.
The city, which is the capital of the state of Nuevo Leon, is situated in a fertile valley surrounded by mountain ridges of the Sierra Madre. It extends about a mile and a half along the northern bank of the Rio San Juan, which making a north-easterly turn covers that flank of the town. The suburbs on the north and west were laid out in squares containing scattered huts with gardens enclosed by hedges and irrigating ditches. Directly to the north, about 1,000 yards from the town proper, was the citadel, a bastioned work 270 varas square, erected around the unfinished walls of the new cathedral, protected by dry ditches, and pierced by embrasures for thirty-four guns. It only mounted, however, about twelve, of ​different calibres, from four to eighteen pounders. This fort was situated near the junction of the three roads leading respectively to Pesquería Grande, Monclova, and Marin. Between it and the town an affluent of the Rio San Juan flowed easterly through the suburbs, the banks of which were steep and difficult. Near the middle of its course it was spanned by the bridge of La Purísima. On the east of the town, just above the junction of this rivulet with the main stream, was Fort Tenería, mounting four or five guns which covered the roads from Marin and Cadereita. Farther south was Fort Diablo with three
guns, and still farther in the same direction Fort La Libertad with four guns. A system of lunettes was commanded by these forts, and along the northern bank of the Rio San Juan a line of barricades extended for some distance, and turning northward ​connected with the bridge of La Purísima, which was defended by a tête de pont. To the west of the town, north of the Saltillo road, was situated the Cerro del Obispado, and on the opposite side of the river, the hill of La Federacion; both these elevations were strongly fortified. The approaches to all the fortifications on the east of the city were masked by dense shrubbery so as to render reconnoissance difficult.
The exact number of Ampudia's forces is difficult to be ascertained, but it probably amounted to 10,000 men, 7,000 of whom were regulars. He had, moreover, forty-two guns of various calibres and an abundant supply of ammunition.
On September 19th the American army arrived in front of Monterey and pitched camp near Santo Domingo, at a beautiful spot called by the Americans Walnut Springs, about one league to the north-east. From a despatch addressed to the adjutant-general of the army on the 17th of September, it appears that the commander was doubtful whether any resistance would be offered by Ampudia; and he so greatly underrated the enemy's forces that it is evident that his information, derived from scouts and correspondents, was unreliable. But he soon discovered that the town was occupied in force. By a reconnoissance that was made by the officers of the engineers, Taylor came to the conclusion that the key to the defences was the fortified eminences on the west of the town, and he determined to occupy the Saltillo road, the possession of which would enable him to cut off the enemy's communications. He accordingly detached Worth with his division and a portion of Colonel Hays' Texan rangers, at noon on the 20th, instructing him to carry, if practicable, the batteries in that direction. In order to ​create a diversion in favor of Worth's movement, the remainder of the forces was displayed around the centre and lower part of the town. Ďuring the night a ten-inch mortar and two 24-pounder howitzers were placed in battery to play upon the citadel and town.
Worth, meanwhile, pursued his march through the cornfields lying to the north of the town, and during the night of the same day sent a despatch to Taylor to the effect that he had occupied a defensive position, and intended to storm the heights of La Federacion on the following morning. He suggested that a strong diversion be made against the centre and east of the city to favor his attack.
Accordingly on the morning of the 21st Taylor directed the 1st and 3d regiments of infantry and a battalion of the Baltimore and Washington volunteers, with Captain Bragg's field-battery, the whole under command of Garland, to advance against the lower part of the town and capture one of the enemy's works, if practicable. Major Mansfield of the engineers was charged with designating the points of attack.
As the command advanced it was exposed to a severe fire from the citadel on its right and Fort Tenería on the left. Still the assailants pressed forward, and rushed through the suburbs into the streets of the town.
The fire now from house-roof and barricade was galling. Major Barbour of the 3d fell, shot through the heart; Colonel Watson of the Baltimore battalion, refusing to retire, though urged by some of his men to do so, was soon struck dead; Captain Williams of the engineers and Major Mansfield were wounded, the former mortally; and many another gave his last gasp in those narrow streets. Bragg advanced his battery, but the fire from his light guns against the embrasures of Fort Tenería was ineffectual. His ​men and horses dropped fast, and he had to retire. Their lines being now broken, the Americans paused, and in detached parties sought cover against the murderous fire which they could return with no serious cffect. All was confusion; the companies became separated in the streets; officers and men were ignorant of their location, and all were perplexed. The struggle in this direction was hopeless, and the order was finally given for them to withdraw.
As soon as Taylor became aware, by the discharges of artillery and rattle of small arms, that Garland's command was hotly engaged about Fort Tenería, he ordered up the 4th infantry and three regiments of Butler's division to support the attack by the left flank. The leading brigade, composed of the Mississippi and Tennessee regiments of volunteers, under Quitman, advanced against the work under a heavy fire from the citadel. Three companies of the 4th infantry preceded this column, and pushing rapidly forward to the assault, had advanced in front of the battery within short range, when they were met with so heavy a fire that one third of the officers and men were almost in a moment struck down. Whereupon the rest fell back.
General Butler, after Quitman's brigade was fairly in motion, had turned his attention to his remaining regiment, the Ohio, General Hamer, and had advanced with it under a heavy fire through several squares, when he met Major Mansfield, who informed him of the failure of Garland's attack, and advised him to withdraw his command. Butler immediately communicated in person with Taylor, who gave the order for a retrograde movement.
Thus, so far, the attack was a failure, and Taylor and his generals fully believed that they had lost the day. But a fortunate circumstance, and the decisive ​action of a single officer, turned the scale. About 130 yards to the rear of the fort was a tanyard, within which stood a building with a flat roof, surrounded by a strong wall about two feet high, affording an excellent breastwork for sharp-shooters. In the confusion of Garland's attack, Captain Backus of the 1st infantry, with a portion of his own and other companies, had gained the shelter of this tannery, and had already driven the enemy from their defences on the roof of a neighboring distillery, when he received the order to retire. Backus was actually withdrawing his men, when the firing in front of the fort, caused by the attack of the 4th infantry companies, made him decide to hold his position. The roof of the tannery completely commanded the open gorge of the enemy's battery, and thence he began to pour upon the garrison a murderous fire, which swept down the gunners. Under this hot salute the garrison began to abandon the work.
During this time Quitman, though his men were falling fast, had kept steadily advancing, and the fire from the battery having slackened, when within one hundred yards of the work the volunteers rushed for ward with a loud shout, surmounted the parapet, and gained the lunette. Galled by Backus' fire in the rear, the Mexicans gave way before the assault, and abandoning their guns, fled to Fort Diablo. The distillery in the rear was immediately afterward carried by the Americans, and thirty prisoners were captured.
​Taylor heard of this success almost immediately after he had given the order to retire; he at once countermanded it, and Butler was sent with the Ohio regiment against Fort Diablo by a route more to the left. The troops advanced to within one hundred yards of the work, which was one of great strength, and Butler, while examining it with the object of attempting to carry it by storm, was wounded, and soon after compelled to quit the field from loss of blood. He recognized, however, that the place could not be carried without great sacrifice of life, and on surrendering the command to Hamer, advised him to withdraw the troops, who were falling fast, to a less exposed position. The division was, therefore, moved to a position near the captured fort, but not before having lost many men.
​With these unsuccessful attempts the principal operations of the day ended. During the combat several demonstrations of cavalry were made by the Mexicans, but were effectually checked. The guns of the captured work were turned as soon as possible against Fort Diablo, and one of the 24-pound howitzers of the mortar battery — which had been steadily playing upon the citadel and town — was also brought up and trained against it. At the approach of evening, all the troops that had been engaged were ordered back to camp, except the 1st, 3d, and 4th infantry, a battalion of the 1st Kentucky regiment, and Ridgely's battery, which were detailed to hold Fort Tenería and the adjacent buildings.
The result of the day was not encouraging. On three several occasions the Americans had been repulsed, and though a point in the enemy's defence had been taken, no important success could be claimed. Fort Tenería was by no means the key to Monterey — as the failure of the two attempts against Fort Diablo proved — and its capture had cost a heavy loss. Three hundred and ninety-four officers and men had fallen in killed and wounded, among the former some of the most gallant and promising in the army. It is true a strong diversion had been made in favor of Worth's attack, but if he had sustained a corresponding loss with no more decided advantage, it did not seem very probable that Monterey would fall till half the army had been killed. These were gloomy thoughts, and the ardor of the invaders was damped. As night set in, however, Taylor received a despatch from Worth reporting that he had occupied the Saltillo road, thus cutting the enemy's line of ​communication, had stormed, with comparatively small loss, the heights of La Federacion, and expected to carry the Cerro del Obispado in the morning.
Worth's progress on the 20th had been slow. Owing to the delay caused by making the route practicable for artillery, it was nearly sunset before he had accomplished six miles. He had then, however, reached a suitable position near the intersection of the Pesquería Grande road, by that leading to Topo, north of the Cerro del Obispado, and just out of range of the enemy's batteries. During the same evening he made a reconnoissance in person of the ground. Skirting round the base of the hills on the west of the valley, the Topo road connects with the Saltillo highway just before the latter enters the gorge through the sierra. Worth by following the former for some distance, and then ascending the slope of a spur, obtained a full view of the position, and decided to occupy the junction of the two roads.
At daylight on the following morning the advance commenced, the 1st Texan regiment, Colonel Hays, leading, supported by light companies of the 1st brigade, under Captain C. F. Smith, followed by Duncan's light battery. But Worth's movements on the previous evening had been noticed by the enemy, and his intention divined. A strong force of cavalry with some infantry had been stationed overnight at the junction of the roads, and as the Americans turned an angle of the mountain they came in full view of the Mexicans, about 1,500 strong, drawn up ready to oppose them. The Texans were ordered to dismount in a cornfield, and take up a position behind the fence along the road side. Duncan's battery was ​placed in position on the sloping ground. The conflict ensued immediately, and was short, bloody, and decisive. McCulloch's company of Texans, not having received the order to dismount, still advanced, and as the Mexican lancers came sweeping upon them the rangers emptied their rifles into the compact mass and then fell back. The lancers eagerly pursued, and exposing their flank to the Texans in the cornfield, a deadly fire was poured into them. Smith's light infantry opened upon them in front, while over the heads of the latter Duncan's battery delivered its fire. The squadron was terribly cut up. It halted, broke, and fled. In fifteen minutes the engagement was over, but in that short time over a hundred brave Mexicans had been stretched dead or wounded on the road, among the former their gallant leader, Colonel Juan Nájera. As the fleeing lancers endeavored to escape up the slopes of the mountains many a saddle was emptied by the shots of unerring marksmen. The American casualties were insignificant.
Worth now pressed forward to the Saltillo highway — the remainder of the Mexican force retiring before him in disorder — and occupied the mouth of the gorge where the different routes from Monterey unite; but being exposed to the fire from the hill of La Federacion, he presently moved half a mile farther up the road.
After a careful examination of the two fortified heights, he decided to make his first attempt against that of La Federacion, and by mid-day his dispositions were made. Accordingly a force consisting of four companies of the artillery battalion, and about an equal number of Texans, in all 300 effective men, under Captain C. T. Smith, was detached to storm that height.
​The hill, or rather ridge, of La Federacion extends from east to west; on its western crest was a battery of one gun, and its eastern summit, about 600 yards nearer the city, was occupied by the fort known by the name of El Soldado, mounting two guns. Smith was directed first to storm the nearer or western height, and then if successful assault Fort Soldado. As the command approached the river through fields of high cane and maize, it was discovered by the enemy, who opened a plunging fire of grape and canister; but the height of the hill rendered it ineffectual, the shot for the most part passing over the heads of the storming party. Having crossed the river waist-deep in safety, Smith halted his division at the base of the height for his men to gain breath, and a party of skirmishers being observed descending and occupying favorable points on the slope, Worth immediately sent forward the 7th infantry under Captain Miles to support the stormers. Presently the assailants moved forward and the firing became general. As reënforcements on the summit were seen to arrive from Fort Soldado, the 5th regiment and Blanchard's company of volunteers, under Brigadier-general Smith, were also sent to sustain the attack. Meantime Captain Smith's party pressed up the rocky and difficult height, driving the enemy before them, the rifles of the Texans, who were deployed as skirmishers, telling with deadly effect. As the Americans neared the summit they increased their pace, and pouring in volley after volley on the retreating foe, with wild shouts carried the height. The Mexicans fled to Fort Soldado, and their captured gun was turned against them.
While this was occurring General Smith had reached the base of the ridge, and discovering that by directing a portion of the force to the right and moving obliquely up the height he could assault Fort Soldado simultaneously, led the 5th, 7th, and Blanchard's company against it. His movement was entirely ​successful. The eager Texans were in hot pursuit of the flying Mexicans as the command reached the summit, and at a charging pace, the 5th, 7th, and Texans rushed over the low parapet almost simultaneously, carrying the fort before the enemy could recover from his confusion. As the Mexicans fled down the hill the excited victors followed in pursuit, but were quickly recalled, and the guns of the two batteries immediately turned upon El Obispado, which now began to open fire. As the day closed active operations ceased. The Texans were ordered to rejoin the main body, while Captain Smith's companies and the 5th and 7th infantry were left to keep possession of the height.
This important success had been attained with trifling loss to the Americans; and though the night set in with a violent storm of rain, and the greater part of the troops bivouacked without shelter, their spirits were high. Nor did Worth delay matters. That same night he arranged his plan of attack on the Cerro del Obispado. At three o'clock in the morning three companies of the artillery battalion, three companies of the 8th infantry, and two hundred Texans under Hays and Walker, were roused from their rest to storm the height. The whole force was placed under the direction of Lieutenant-colonel Childs.
The crest of the cerro, about 800 feet high, was defended by a battery of two guns. It overlooked the fort of El Obispado — which was situated on a lower point of the ridge, nearer the town — and was deemed inaccessible on account of the almost perpendicular ascent; but favored by the thick mist which hung ​around, the stormers, who commenced to scale the height in two separate columns at the earliest dawn, nearly reached the summit before being perceived. Then, however, the enemy was aroused and poured in a volley upon them; but the Americans silently pressed on and did not return the fire, which became incessant, until they were within a few yards of the summit. A destructive volley was then delivered; a a deafening shout was raised; the regulars rushed on with the bayonet; and in a few minutes the work was cleared of the defenders, who fled to the Obispado. While this was occurring a demonstration was made, according to previous orders, against el Obispado from Fort Soldado. This diversion held the garrison in check and prevented any support being sent to the summit. The 5th infantry and Blanchard's volunteers were immediately ordered to move from the hill of La Federacion and reënforce the position.
To assault Fort Obispado, with its massive walls and outworks, in broad daylight, would have entailed an enormous loss of life; and as the defenders of the captured work had thrown one of their guns down the steep and carried off the other, Worth ordered a 12-pounder howitzer of Duncan's battery to be taken up the height: This undertaking was accomplished in, two hours, and fire opened upon the fort. For some hours the cannonade continued with visible effect, and a desultory fire was kept up by skirmishers partially covered by rocks and bushes. Finally, the Mexicans having been reënforced with infantry and cavalry, a strong sortie was made with the object of ​recapturing the summit. But the movement had been foreseen, and as the lancers swept up the sloping ridge — the only ground available for cavalry — they were received by a strong, firm line of the infantry which apparently had been retreating on each side of the ridge, but which suddenly closed in on the top, and fronting the enemy, poured in a rattling volley, while the Texans kept up an irregular but destructive fire on either flank. The charge was repulsed; the cavalry recoiled; its supporting infantry wavered and then broke; and the Mexicans in a confused mass of horse and foot rushed down the slope, the Americans hotly pursuing. No time is given for the fugitives to reënter the fort; they hurry past, wildly fleeing to the city; the pursuers leap through the embrasures and openings; the remnant of the garrison offers only a feeble resistance, and in a few minutes the American flag waves over the fort. The captured guns and the batteries of Duncan and Mackall, which were brought up at a gallop, were soon playing upon the retreating Mexicans, inflicting heavy loss as they crowded along the street into the city.
The investment on the west side was now complete. Not only the Saltillo road but the city itself was commanded by the captured heights, and Worth moved his division to the Cerro del Obispado, leaving on the hill of La Federacion a force sufficient to hold that position and serve the guns. He then made his preparations to assault the town on the following day.
During the 22d, while Worth was carrying the fortifications on the Cerro del Obispado, no active operations occurred on the eastern side of the city. The citadel and Fort Diablo maintained a fire against
​Fort Tenería, and such parties of Americans as became exposed to range while relieving the guard in the last-named work; but the day passed without any offensive movement on either side. It is surprising that during this inactivity of the enemy, Ampudia, with the forces at his command, did not make more vigorous effort to retain the important heights on the west. But decision and energy were no strong traits of his character. As it was, the success of the Americans raised a panic among his troops; officers and men alike lost heart, and the general himself was infected with the prevailing hopelessness. That night he abandoned Fort Diablo and all his exterior lines of defence, except a few works to the south on the river's bank, and concentrated himself within the interior line around the principal plaza.
Early in the morning of the 23d Taylor was apprised that the enemy had evacuated nearly all his defences in the lower part of the town, and immediately gave directions to Quitman to advance his brigade carefuly and enter the city. Ordering out the remainder of the troops as a reserve under Twiggs, Taylor then visited the abandoned works. A portion of Quitman's brigade had already entered the town, and was successfully pushing forward toward the principal plaza. The 2d regiment of Texas volunteers was now ordered up, and dismounting, coöperated with Quitman's brigade. Advancing cautiously but vigorously from house to house and street to street, the Americans forced their way with little loss to within one square of the principal plaza, driving the Mexicans before them from the barricades and houseroofs in spite of heavy fires of grape and volleys of musketry. But the defences were now of a more formidable nature, and the Mexicans were concentrated in great force behind them. Taylor, ​moreover, recognized the necessity of coöperating with Worth for a combined attack, and satisfied that he could successfully operate within the city, withdrew the troops to the evacuated works. The Mexicans made no attempt to reoccupy the portions of the town thus abandoned.
Meanwhile Worth, who had received no communication from the commander-in-chief, when he heard heavy and continued firing in the lower part of the town during the morning of the 23d, naturally concluded that Taylor's instructions directing him to cooperate had miscarried. Under this conviction he made his dispositions to assault the town on the west. Two columns of attack were moved forward along the two principal streets leading to the great plaza. Worth's instructions, similar to those of Taylor, were given with a special view to protect the troops as much as possible from exposure. The men were to be masked whenever practicable, during their advance through the suburbs, and when they reached the houses they were to work their way carefully from street to street, by breaking through the sectional walls and occupying the roofs. Artillery supported by reserve troops followed at suitable intervals.
The undertaking was both difficult and complicated. Across the streets, at well-chosen points, heavy walls of masonry, with embrasures for one or more guns, and supported by cross-batteries, had been erected; many of the houses were crenellated for musketry; while the assault was rendered doubly dangerous, from the fact that it was commenced at the time when Taylor suspended that on the eastern side, thereby enabling the enemy to throw the strength of his men and guns against Worth. Nevertheless the ​storming columns successfully forced their way forward. Building after building and square after square were gained, the Mexican artillery causing little harm to the sheltered men as they worked their way through the inner walls of the houses. But the rifles of the Texans were plied from house-top and window with fatal effect. By night the Mexicans had been gradually driven back to the great plaza, and the assailants, leaving a covered way in their rear, had reached to within a square of it. Meanwhile Major Munroe arrived with the ten-inch mortar, which had been of little service on the eastern side, and it was placed in position in the plaza de San Antonio, near the cemetery. By sunset it was ready, and the range having been soon obtained, the artillerists dropped the shells with great precision into the principal plaza. When darkness set in the more active operations ceased; but Worth, determined to hold his position, continued during the night his preparations to follow up the assault on the following morning, and the roof of a large building, which towered over the principal defences, was mounted with two howitzers and a six-pounder. But at dawn a flag of truce was sent in, and a suspension of arms asked for. The last shot had been fired; the siege of Monterey was ended.
Early in the morning of the 24th, Colonel Francisco R. Moreno appeared in Taylor's camp, the bearer of a communication from Ampudia offering to evacuate the town, taking wvith him all the arms and munitions of war, and asking for a suspension of hostilities. The proposal was rejected. Taylor ​demanded a complete surrender of the town and garrison, the latter as prisoners of war, but stated that in consideration of the gallant defence of the place, the garrison would be allowed, after laying down its arms, to retire into the interior on condition of not serving again during the war, or until regularly exchanged. An answer to this communication was required by twelve o'clock, until which time a cessation of fire was agreed upon. Whatever mistakes Ampudia might have committed during the defence, he now showed great firmness in sustaining the honor of his nation. Exclaiming to those around him that he would perish beneath the ruins of Monterey before he would submit to such terms, he requested a personal interview with the American commander-in-chief. Taylor had in the mean time proceeded to Worth's headquarters, but on his arrival a conference took place after some demur on his part, on the ground that he would open no negotiations except to arrange terms of capitulation. Upon the representations of Ampudia that the recent change in the Mexican government had altered the position of affairs, and that the latter was favorable to the establishment of a peace between the two nations, Taylor consented to the appointment of a joint commission to consider the terms under which the Americans should occupy the city. Accordingly he named General Worth, General Henderson, governor of Texas, and Colonel Jefferson Davis of the Mississippi volunteers, on his part; Ampudia designating generals Requena, Ortega, and Manuel María del Llano, governor of Nuevo Leon.
So tenaciously did Ampudia adhere to his ​determination to save the national honor, that the proposal on the part of Taylor's commissioners that the army should be allowed to retire without parole, the officers retaining their side-arms, was refused. The Mexican commissioners insisted on the retention of the arms and artillery, and though Taylor, responding to the wish expressed by Ampudia to avoid further bloodshed, instructed his commissioners to concede the former, the Mexican general, with a persistency that grievously tried the patience of Taylor, still held out for the artillery. Taylor was on the point of closing the negotiations, and announcing the conference closed rose to depart, when one of the Mexican commissioners entered into conversation with him. The result was that an agreement was finally arrived at by which the Mexican army was allowed to retire from Monterey, retaining the small arms, and one field-battery of six pieces with twenty-one rounds of ammunition. An armistice for eight weeks was also arranged, by the terms of which the Mexican troops were to retire within seven days beyond the line formed by the pass of the Rinconada, the city of Linares, and San Fernando de Presas, while Taylor engaged himself not to advance his force beyond that line before the expiration of the specified time. When the ​commission met on the following morning for the purpose of signing the instrument, Ampudia still attempted to gain further concessions by the substitution of the word 'stipulation' for 'capitulation' in the heading of the document, but failed. The English and Spanish copies of the document were signed and the agreement was complete.
On the morning of the 25th the Mexican garrison evacuated the citadel, and during the following days the army left in successive divisions for Saltillo, the last brigade marching on the 28th. The number of guns which fell into possession of the Americans was thirty-five, the amount of ammunition and other stores being very great.
With the fall of Monterey the campaign on the Rio Grande may be considered as ended. The undertaking from its first conception was hazardous, and in a military point of view ought to have failed. The force with which Taylor advanced against the city, considering the circumstances under which he made that movement, was inadequate. He was unable to take with him artillery of any service in a siege; his supply of ammunition was moderate; he had rations for only fifteen days; and he had to leave behind no little portion of the camp equipage necessary for the comfort of his troops. He was so little informed of the ​enemy's strength and the defences of the city, that not until he arrived in front of it did he become aware that its possession would be disputed. In his operations against the place, the element of chance contributed greatly to his success. His detachment of Worth to the western side, six miles away, was a rashly dangerous experiment, and contrary to the rules of war. It exposed that general to the risk of being cut off from the main body — a result which would undoubtedly have been effected by the Mexicans under a more efficient commander. The attack on the 21st was designed as a demonstration in favor of Worth; but though it proved, under the bad generalship of the Mexicans, most advantageous to Taylor's operations, it was a rash experiment. The movement of troops into the town, exposed to a flank fire from the citadel, against a position of the approach to which nothing was known, cannot be regarded as an exhibition of military skill. Daring it certainly was, but it naturally resulted in a repulse; and brilliant as was the later attack of Quitman's volunteers on Fort Tenería, it is more than doubtful whether it would not have failed but for the fortuitous circumstance that Backus' fire from the tannery coincided with it in point of time. In fact, Taylor, so far from anticipating a successful result, ordered a retrograde movement at the very time when the fort was being carried. The subsequent operations against Fort Diablo were not attended with similar good fortune — and did not succeed.
Worth's operations on the western side were conducted with great prudence and skill. His seizure of a secure position before making any assault, the promptness with which he supported in strong force ​the storming columns, and his dispositions for the capture of the summit of the Cerro del Obispado prove his efficiency in a most difficult position, and Taylor's discernment in selecting him.
The loss sustained by the Americans was severe, being over 500 in killed and wounded; that of the Mexicans is not known, but it probably far exceeded that of the invaders. As to the bravery of the Mexicans in their defence of Monterey there is no dispute. Taylor admitted that the gallantry displayed was alike creditable to the troops and the nation, and the officers of his army bore ample testimony to it.
With regard to the terms of the stipulation, it caused no little dissatisfaction, not only to the army, but to the United States at large. That the Mexican forces should have been allowed to retire, when every circumstance seemed to assure the necessity of their unconditional surrender, caused general disappointment; and the suspension of hostilities interfered with the plans of the government for the vigorous prosecution of the war. The public press severely criticised the convention, and on the 13th of October Marcy addressed a letter to Taylor which plainly indicated the dissatisfaction of the government. It disapproved of the armistice, and Taylor was instructed to give the requisite notice that it was to cease at once. ​Such was the reception which the news of the capture of Monterey met with in the United States. As a material result bearing upon the ultimate object of the war, the possession of the city at the cost of so much bloodshed was of no advantage. It was an experimental movement, which merely proved the bravery and endurance of American troops, and the impracticability of carrying on the war with any effect, through sterile regions, in the direction of the Mexican capital. In fact, the campaign on the Rio Grande had proved by no means consequential.
* ↑ U. S. Govt Doc., Cong. 30, Ses. 1, H. Ex. 60, p. 48. Benton, Thirty Years View, ii. 678, in his remarks upon throwing the blame of the war upon Mexico, and the cool assumption that it had been made by her, says: History is bound to pronounce her judgment upon these assumptions, and to. say that they are unfounded....The actual collision of arms was brought on by the further advance of the American troops to the left bank of the lower Rio Grande, then and always in possession of Mexico, and erecting field-works on the bank of the river, and pointing cannon at the town of Matamoras (sic) on the opposite side....It was under these circumstances that the Mexican troops crossed the river, and commenced the attack. And this is what is called spilling American blood on American soil. The laws of nations and the law of self-defence justify that spilling of blood.'
* ↑ He afterward, May 25th, came to the conclusion, according to most reliable information, that such operations could not be assumed with the least possible advantage before the Ist of October. U. S. Govt Doc., Cong. 29, Ses. 1, Sen. 378, p. 11.
* ↑ See Scott's letter to Marcy in Id., p. 16.
* ↑ Marcy replied on the 25th, astonished at Scott's language. I do not want a fire upon ny rear from Washington,' Scott returned, 'and the fire in front from the Mexicans.' U. S. Govt, Cong. 29, Ses. 1, Sen. Doc. 378, pp. 4-9.
* ↑ 'I beg as an act of justice, no less to myself than the president, to sayI meant "impatience" and even "pre-condemnation" on your part, and the known, open, and violent condemnation of me on the part of several leading friends and supposed confidants of the president, in the two houses of congress.' Id., pp. 12-13.
* ↑ 'But I have, for many days, believed that you have allowed yourself to be influenced against me, by the clamor of some of the friends to whom I have alluded.' Ib.
* ↑ See his letter to Marcy of May 11, 1846, in U. S. Govt Doc., Cong 29, Ses. 1, Sen. 378, p. 51.
* ↑ Id., p. 60-1. The reader is referred to this document, which contains official correspondence on this matter, and to General Taylor's despatches in U. S. Govt Doc., Cong. 30, Ses. 1, H. Ex. 60, pp. 299, 305-6.
* ↑ Consult the correspondence on this matter between the governor of Louisiana and Marcy, dated June 12 and 25, 1846, in Id., pp. 309-15.
* ↑ For full particulars relative to this volunteer question, consult the official correspondence in Id., p. 307-23.
* ↑ 'Shall the campaign,' says Marcy, 'be conducted with the view of striking at the city of Mexico? or confined, so far as regards the forces under your immediate command, to the northern provinces of Mexico?' Id., p. 324.
* ↑ Consult this correspondence in Id., 333-9.
* ↑ On Sept. 1st, just before marching for the interior, he addressed a letter to the adjutant-general, impeaching in unqualified terms the management of the quartermaster's department. The correspondence on this subject will be found in Id., pp. 557-61.
* ↑ As the reader is aware, Worth had left the army in April and returned home, with the intention cf resigning. He had already sent in his resignation, when the news reached Washington that hostilities had commenced. He at once withdrew it and returned to the Rio Grande, where he resumed command of his division on the 28th of May.
* ↑ Taylor, writing to the adjutant-general July 22d, says: 'I find the difficulties of throwing supplies up the river to be very great, in consequence of the rapidity of the current and the entire absence of dry steamboat fuel.' Id., p. 399
* ↑ The different divisions were composed as follows: Regulars: 1st Division, Brig.-gen. Twiggs. 2d Dragoons, Captain May 250 men Ridgely's and Webster's batteries 110 " 1st, 3d, and 4th infantry regiments, Captain Shiver s company of Texas volunteers, and Bragg's battery 1,320 " Baltimore battalion 400 " Total 2,080 " 2d Division, Brig.-gen. Worth. Duncan s and Taylor s batteries 100 men Artillery battalion 100 " 5th, 7th, and 8th infantry regiments 1,500 " Blanchard s company of Louisiana volunteers 80 " Total 1,780 " Volunteers: 3d Division, Maj.-gen. Butler. 1st Brigade, Brig.-gen. Hamer. 1st Kentucky regiment, 540 men, 1st Ohio regiment 540 " 2d Brigade, Brig.-gen. Quitman. 1st Tennessee regiment 540 " 1st Mississippi regiment 690 " Texas Division, Maj.-gen. Henderson, 1st and 2d regiments mounted volunteers 500 " Total 2,810 " Id., 417-18; Mansfield's Mex. War, 57. Taylor s return of the actual number of his force before Monterey as 425 officers and 6220 men. His artillery consisted of one 10-inch mortar, two 24-pounder howitzers, and four light field-batteries of four guns each. U. S. Govt Doc., Cong. 29, Ses. 2, H. Ex. 4, p. 88.
* ↑ In a paragraph of Orders, no. 108, Taylor assigns as his reasons for not taking a larger number of the volunteers into the field, limited means of transportation, and the uncertainty in regard to the supplies that may be drawn from the theatre of operations. U. S. Govt Doc., Cong. 30, Ses. 1, H. Ex. 60, p. 500.
* ↑ The advance, consisting of McCulloch's and Gillespie's companies of Texan rangers and a squadron of dragoons, left at half-past five in the morning, the three divisions following at intervals of an hour. The habitual order of battle was: The 1st division on the right, the 2d division on the left, and the volunteer division in the centre. Id., p. 506.
* ↑ In El Restaurador, Sept. 4, 1846, will be found copy of decree.
* ↑ Copies of these documents are supplied in Taylor's and Worth's correspondence. Id., pp. 420-3.
* ↑ Explanation of plan: A. Principal plaza. G. Fort of La Federacion. B. Other plazas. H. Intrenchments. C. Citadel. I. American mortar battery on night of the 23d. D. Fort of Teneria. J. Cerro del Obispado. E. Fort of El Diablo. K. Cemetery. F. Fort of La Libertad. L. Cathedral.
* ↑ Taylor states that the town and works were manned with at least 7,000 troops of the line and from 2,000 to 3,000 irregulars. U. S. Govt Doc., Cong. 29, Ses. 2, H. Ех. 4, р. 88.
* ↑ Taylor says: 'It is even yet doubtful whether Ampudia will attempt to hold Monterey. . . .His regular force is small — say 3,000; eked out perhaps to 6,000 by volunteers — many of them forced.' U. S. Govt Doc., Cong. 30, Ses. 1, H. Eх. 60, р. 422.
* ↑ Twiggs was too ill to command. He repaired to the field, however, in spite of his illness. U. S. Govt Doc., Cong. 29, Ses. 2, H. Ex. 4, p. 85; Henry's Campaign Sketches, 193.
* ↑ By some mistake two companies of the 4th did not receive the order in time to join in the advance. Taylor's report, in U. S. Govt Doc., Cong. 29, Ses. 2, H. Eх. 4, р. 84.
* ↑ Hence the name of the fort, tenería or tannery.
* ↑ The authors of Méx., Apunt. Hist. Guerra, 60, attribute the demoralization of the garrison to the cowardly conduct of the lieut-col of the 3d light infantry, which had been sent into the fort as a reënforcement. He had been ordered to make a sally against the Americans advancing in front, but when the word to fix bayonets was given, he rushed through the gorge of the work, and, taking to flight, escaped by plunging into the river. The writer conceals this officer's name, remarking, 'con cuyo nombre no hemos querido manchar estos renglones.'
* ↑ Five pieces of artillery and a considerable supply of ammunition fell into the hands of the Americans. Taylor's report, in U.S. Govt Doc., Cong. 29, Ses. 2, H. Ex. 4, p. 85. In Méx., Apunt. Hist. Guerra, 60, it is stated that there were only four pieces, and that not a single cartridge for cannon remained when the Mexicans abandoned the work.
* ↑ It was here that the command of the 3d regiment devolved upon Captain Henry, who went into action with five senior officers, all of whom were killed or seriously wounded. Henry's Campaign Sketches, 198.
* ↑ This regiment had remained as guard to the mortar battery, and took no part in the day's engagements. Taylor's report, ut sup., p, 84.
* ↑ 'Capt. Williams, topographical engineers; lieuts Terrett and Dilworth, 1st inf.; Lieut Woods, 2d inf.; capts Morris and Field, Brev. Maj. Barbour, lieuts Irwin and Hazlitt, 3d inf.; Lieut Hoskins, 4th inf.; Lieut-col Watson, Baltimore battalion; Capt. Allen and Lieut Putman, Tennessee reg.; Lieut- col Hett, Ohio regiment — were killed, or have since died of wounds received.' Id., 86.
* ↑ Worth in his report of his operations calls this hill the Loma de Independencia, which name and that of Independence Hill are adopted by American writers on these events.
* ↑ Méx., Apunt. Hist. Guerra, 59, where no mention of infantry is made. Worth in his report says: 'A strong force of cavalry and infantry, mostly the former.' U.S. Govt Doc., Cong. 29, Ses. 2, II. Ex. 4, p. 103.
* ↑ Ib.; Ripley's War with Mex., i. 216-18; Reid's Tex. Rangers, 156-8.
* ↑ During this movement, Capt. McKavett of the 8th infantry was struck by a round-shot and instantly killed.
* ↑ Namely, Green's, McGowan's, Gillespie's, Chandlis', Ballowes', and McCulloch's companies, under Major Chevalier. Worth's report, in U. S. Govt Doc., Cong. 29, Ses. 2, H. Ex. 4, p. 103-4.
* ↑ Colonel Hays of the Texan rangers had been detached on special service, but returned in time to share with fifty of his men in the first assault, and to take a prominent part in the second. Id., p. 104.
* ↑ According to Reid, Tex. Rangers, 164, Captain Gillespie of the rangers was the first to mount the parapet, then followed the 5th, and almost at the same time appeared the colors of the 7th.
* ↑ 'Se apoderó del pico ... contra los pronósticos y las seguridades del señor mayor general García Conde, quien habia sostenido que era inaccesible.' Méx., Apunt. Hist. Guerra, 61.
* ↑ It appears that the fort could make no reply, as its guns did not bear upon that point: 'las fortificaciones. . . únicamente tenian fuegos para la ciudad.' Ib.
* ↑ The reënforcement does not seem to have been proportionate to the exigency. Accounts vary, however. 'El general Ampudia ordena que cincuenta dragones desmontados auxilien á Berra' — the Mexican commander of the fort — 'órden singular, porque la columna de reserva permanecia en inaccion dentro de la plaza! nuestras guerrillas rechazan al fin al enemigo auxiliadas por un corto refuerzo de cincuenta hombres de caballería que mandaba el general Torrejon.' The same authority states that the summit of the Obispado first taken was defended by only 60 men, and that Colonel Berra's force in the fort was 200 men with three pieces of artillery. Ib. Reid says: 'Large reënforcements of cavalry and infantry were seen ascending the road from the city.' Tex. Rangers, 185.
* ↑ The Cerro del Obispado was gained with comparatively small loss to the Americans, while that of the Mexicans was severe. The former, however, had to lament the fall of Capt. Gillespie of the Texan volunteers. U. S. Govt Doc., ut sup., pp. 99, 108.
* ↑ 'Este suceso infundió ese pavor silencioso que precede á las derrotas; y con una que otra escepcion, los gefes de los cuerpos lo hacian sensible, contagiando al mismo gefe, del que la espedicion y la energia no fueron dotes favoritas.' Méx., Apunt. Hist. Guerra, 62.
* ↑ Taylor's report, in U. S. Govt Doc., ut sup., pp. 86-7.
* ↑ Worth's report, in Id., p. 105.
* ↑ They were well provided with picks and crowbars, which had been found in Fort Soldado. Ripley's War with Mex., i. 234.
* ↑ Taylor says: 'On my return to camp I met an officer with the intelligence that General Worth, induced by the firing in the lower part of the city, was about making an attack at the upper extremity. . .I regretted that this information had not reached me before leaving the city, but still deemed it inexpedient to change my orders.' U. S. Govt Doc., ut sup., p. 87, see also p. 106.
* ↑ See plan on p. 381.
* ↑ According to Méx., Apunt. Hist. Guerra, 64, Ampudia was pressed by his officers to capitulate. Varios de los que no hemos querido mencionar escitan al general en gefe para que solicite una capitulacion.' Ampudia makes the sane statement in his report to the minister of war. Bustamante, Nuevo Bernal Diaz, ii. 114.
* ↑ See the correspondence in U. S. Govt Doc., ut sup., pp. 79-80.
* ↑ 'Indignándose ante las exigencias del enemigo y declarando que ántes de acceder á ellas pereceria bajo los escombros de la ciudad.' Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos, 55.
* ↑ In the conference with Ampudia I was distinctly told by him that he had invited it to spare the further effusion of blood, and because Santa Anna had declared himself favorable to peace.' Taylor's letter to the war-office, Nov. 8, 1846, in U. S. Govt Doc., Cong. 30, Ses. 1, H. Ex. 60, p. 360.
* ↑ I give a verbatim copy of the English reading of the agreement. Art. I. As the legitimate result of the operations before this place, and the present position of the contending armies, it is agreed that the city, the fortifications, cannon, the munitions of war, and all other public property, with the under-mentioned exceptions, be surrendered to the commanding general of the U. S. forces now at Monterey. Art. II. That the Mexican forces be allowed to retain the following arms, to wit: the commissioned officers their side-arms, the infantry their arms and accoutrements, the cavalry their arms and accoutrements, the artillery one field-battery not to exceed six pieces, with twenty-one rounds of ammunition. Art. III. That the Mexican armed forces retire within seven days from this date beyond the line formed by the pass of the Rinconada, the city of Linares, and San Fernando de Presas. Art. IV. That the citadel of Monterey be evacuated by the Mexican and occupied by the American forces to-morrow morning at ten o'clock. Art. V. To avoid collisions, and for mutual convenience, that the troops of the U. S. will not occupy the city until the Mexican forces have withdrawn, except for hospital and storage purposes. Art. VI. That the forces of the U. S. will not advance beyond the line specified in the 2d (3d) article before the expiration of eight weeks, or until the orders or instructions of the respective governments can be received. Art. VII. That the public property to be delivered shall be turned over and received by officers appointed by the commanding generals of the two armies. Art. VIII. That all doubts as to the meaning of any of the preceding articles shall be solved by an equitable construction, and on principles of liberality to the retiring army. Art. IX. That the Mexican flag, when struck at the citadel, may be saluted by its own battery. Done at Monterey, September 24, 1846. U. S. Govt Doc., Cong. 29, Ses. 2, H. Ex. 4, pp. 80-1. This instrument was signed by the respective commissioners and Ampudia, and approved by General Taylor. A copy in Spanish is supplied in Bustamante, Nuevo Bernal Diaz, ii. 115-16. The particulars of the conferences have been derived from the letter of Colonel Davis, one of the commisioners, published in the Washington Union, and reproduced in Fry's Life of Taylor, 258-60.
* ↑ U. S. Govt Doc., Cong. 29, Ses. 2, H. Ex. 4, p. 82.
* ↑ These are Taylor's own statements, made in a confidential letter to General Gaines, who, however, published it in the newspapers for the purpose of vindicating Taylor from accusations made against him in congress and elsewhere. In this letter Taylor says: 'I moved in such a way, and with such limited means, that had I not succeeded I should no doubt have been severely reprimanded, if nothing worse. I did so to sustain the administration.' Niles' Reg., lxxi. 343, 370.
* ↑ Ampudia had ample means of throwing strong reënforcements on to the western heights. His neglect of these important points is inconceivable.
* ↑ Taylor says: "This fire happily coincided in point of time with the advance of a portion of the volunteer division upon No. 1 — that is, Fort Tenería — and contributed largely to the fall of that strong and important work.' U. S. Govt Doc., Cong. 29, Ses. 2, H. Ex. 4, p. 85.
* ↑ Taylor in his report of October 9, 1846, places it at 488, namely, 12 officers and 108 men killed, and 31 officers and 337 men wounded. Id., p. 88. But from the official statements published later the number is given as 506, namely, 16 officers killed and 24 wounded, and 126 men killed and 310 wounded. Worth's division only lost 55 in killed and wounded, to which number must be added 22 killed and wounded of Texan volunteers attached to it. Reid's Tex. Rangers, 2:39-51; Niles' Reg., lxxi. 183-4; Fry's Life of Taylor, 262. Ampudia places the loss of the Americans at 1,500. Despues de una defensa brillante en que el enemigo fué rechazado con pérdida de mil quinientos hombres de varios puestos." Bustamante, Nuvo Bernal Diaz, ii. 111. A translation of this report of Ampudia's to the Mexican minister of war will be found in Niles' Reg., lxxi. 186.
* ↑ Worth states that in the several conflicts with his division the enemy's loss was ascertained to exceed 450 men. U. S. Govt Doc., Cong. 29, Ses. 2, H. Ex. 4, p. 108.
* ↑ Captain Henry writes: Thus far they have fought most bravely, and with an endurance and tenacity I did not think they possessed.' Campaign Sketches, 209.
* ↑ U. S. Govt Doc., Cong. 30, Ses. 1, H. Ex. 60, pp. 355-6. Taylor, in his reply, shows that he adopted the convention from cogent reasons, namely: that with his force he could not so invest Monterey as to preclude the escape of the Mexican army; that the considerations of humanity outweighed the doubtful advantages to be gained by a resumption of the attack. With regard to the armistice, it paralyzed the enemy during a period when, from the want of necessary means, he could not possibly move. Id., pp 359-60. In his letter to Gaines he writes: 'Besides, they had a very large and strong fortification' — the citadel — a short distance from the city which, if carried with the bayonet, must have been taken at a great sacrifice of life, and, with our limited train of heavy or battering artillery, it would have required twenty or twenty-five days to take it by regular approaches.' Niles' Reg., lxxi. 342. Jefferson Davis, writing from Victoria, Tamaulipas, Jan. 6, 1847, says: I did not then, nor do I now, believe we could have made the enemy surrender at discretion;. . .we could drive the enemy from the town; but the town was untenable while the main fort (called the new citadel) remained in the hands of the enemy.' Reid's Tex. Rangers, 205.
* ↑ I do not intend,' says Taylor, writing to Gaines from Monterey, Nov. 5th, 'to rarry on my operations (as previously stated) beyond Saltillo — deeming it next to impracticable to do so.' Niles' Reg., lxxi. 342.