# The Proletarian Revolution in Russia/Part 1/Introduction

INTRODUCTION
The revolutionary mass action of the workers of Petrograd, their strikes, demonstrations and riots, was the force the impact of which made Czarism totter on its throne and then dragged it to the ground in ruins.
It was this irresistible mass action that smashed through the barriers of authority and rent asunder the fetters of the ideology of submission. It was this elemental action that swept away the apathy of other groups of the masses and rallied them for the Revolution. It was this proletarian action that encouraged the soldiers to revolt and secured their adhesion to the revolutionary cause. And this great action had been preparing itself throughout the agonizing years of the war, of hunger, of misery and o£ oppression. Hatreds and rancors develop, the forces of revolt accumulate; but the mass of the people is apathetic, feeling itself helpless before the imposing enginery of authority, until action somewhere, somehow, breaks loose and throws the whole of society up into the air. The proletariat, united by the discipline of industry, rendered conscious of class by a common life and common oppression, aware of its control of the economic process, was the only class capable of developing the initial action out of which could arise the general mass action of revolution.
It is a fact of history, and a fact that must be emphasized, that the workers of Petrograd made the Revolution; it was their revolutionary blows that shattered Czarism. The liberal bourgeoisie and the propertied classes generally did not participate in the actual making of the Revolution; their contribution was the passive one of not opposing the workers when the forces of revolt flared up into action, and of being willing to use the conquests of the workers in their own class interests. Some months before the great revolt, Paul N. Milyukov, leader of the Constitutional Democrats, the party of the bourgeoisie, declared: "If victory can be secured only by means of a revolution, then we don't want any victory." And on February 23, 1917, Milyukov, in an open letter to the press, protested against the "false use" of his name by agitators who were trying to get workers to demonstrate before the Duma at its coming opening on March 3. At the same time, the commander of the Petrograd military district appealed to the workers' patriotism to refrain from demonstrations, and backed up his appeal by threats of force. M. Milyukov and the representative of the Czar were united as against the masses.
All through the month of February things were stirring. The Duma was to meet, and the people began to hope. Protopopoff, Minister of the Interior, talked of concessions to the Jews. The class of 1898, the boys of 19 and 20, ​were called to the colors, emphasizing the horrible slaughter and futility of the war. Eleven members of the "Workmen's Group" of the Central Military Committee, a patriotic civilian body, were arrested, charged with belonging to revolutionary organizations and with planning to establish a "Social Democratic Republic" in Russia. Four others in Petrograd were arrested on similar charges. The people were stirring, agitators active. While the guns spat out death on all the bloody fields of Europe and the ghastly military machinery of the Czar was apparently working smoothly, while the elite of society were enjoying this best of al possible worlds, while the comfortable "representatives of the people" were still playing the old game of talk, talk; talk, the masses were thinking in their own slow, apparently dumb and yet eloquent way, an elemental calm which gradually accumulates the explosives for the great upheavals of history.
And the bourgeoisie, the liberals, the representatives of industrial and profit-yearning Russia? They were masticating the bitter herbs of approaching defeat, of the collapse of their dreams of "appropriating" Galicia and Constantinople. They were intriguing to get through the pro-German camarilla of the Czar, to approach the Czar with the request to dean out the corrupt bureaucrats responsible for Russia's defeats, and organize a new government for victory. Michael Rodzianko, president of the conservative Duma, tried to approach the Czar hat in hand, but was ruddy rebuffed. The liberal representatives of the bourgeoisie were preparing a palace revolt, the "reformation" of Czarism, by means of which the Czar would recognize the right to power and rule of the bourgeoisie. These bourgeois liberals did not want to overthrow the monarchy, but to bend the monarchy to their will,—as the imperialistic bourgeoisie did in Germany. They did not want a revolution, being afraid that in that event the proletariat might seize power—and how prophetic was their fear! These liberals did not act, they pleaded and intrigued; they did not appear as the daring, magnificent makers of a new world, but as humble beggars at the gates of Czarism.
All the pleading, all the intrigues of the liberals availed them nothing, and when the Duma convened they were prepared to resume their old task of talking, while Czarism acted. The Duma was not only a conservative, even reactionary body, it was in its very nature incapable of creative action: this creative action could arise only out of the people itself. On March 4, Deputy Milyukov dedared that Constantinople as the goal of Russian efforts seemed certain—"if we cannot conquer with this Government, we will conquer in spite of this Government, but we will be victorious." Deputy A. F. Kerensky demanded that the Allies should refrain from all aggressive and imperialistic schemes—and we shall see Kerensky again demanding this at a time when he was not a simple deputy, but Premier of Revolutionary Russia. Deputy N. S. Cheidse, Socialist, denounced the exploitation of the masses and the Duma's failure to intercede, accusing the government and the employers of waging a struggle against the workers and breaking the "national unity." The government was warned that relations between it and the country were unchanged, that the internal crisis was dragging along. And Deputy Kerensky declared that a conflict in "decisive form" was coming between the government and the people.
The people were in the grip of hunger, and hunger was again playing its historic role of developing revolution. The Duma was asked to vote an ​extension of powers to the municipality of Petrograd to enable it to control the food supply in the district. But the Duma was not disposed to tackle the problem of food. Its sessions were wasted in futile grumblings and expressions of dissatisfaction with the government. It was more interested in a military victory than in the starving people. Nothing definite was done. The "revolutionary Duma," subsequently so much eulogized, was preparing to pass, as did its predecessors, into the years of wasted opportunity.
But suddenly a change came. The proletariat forgot the Duma and turned to its own activity in mass action. On March 8 strikes were declared in several big munition factories in Petrograd. The impetus of this stirred the people into life, and food riots began anew and on a large scale. On March 9 more and more masses marched out into the streets, antagonisms developing acutely. Cossacks patrolled the streets. General Chavaloff, commander of the Petrograd district, issued a proclamation forbidding assemblages in the streets, and warning citizens that the troops had been ordered to use their arms or any other means to preserve order. On March 9 a correspondent cabled the New York Timess "A number of causes, working together, brought the crisis momentarily to a head, although I do not personally believe there can be serious trouble while the Duma is sitting. … Throughout yesterday the streets were full of people, although Petrograd is heavily patrolled by Cossacks and mounted police. The general atmosphere of excitement is like a bank holiday with thunder in the air." [My italics.]
There was thunder in the air. Military orders and Cossacks could not quell the people. More strikes were declared, the workers fraternizing with the masses in the street and stimulating events. The masses were at first timid, but the women of the working class, active and implacable in all revolutions, encouraged the masses by their aggressive attitude. These women organized the food riots; they marched boldly up to the troops, alert and intrepid, and cried out, now appealingly, now tauntingly: :You wouldn't kill us really, would you? You know all we want is food. Will you obey those who starve us?" The troops were impressed. The Cossacks, most of them young and new recruits, hesitated and were not rigorous in the execution of their orders. Clashes occured between the troops and the people, which enraged the masses and made the troops, already verging on revolt, sick of their jobs. Ob March 11 orders were issued to the troops to fire upon the populace, but only isolated detachments here and there obeyed. Soldiers and masses began to fraternize, the fetters of authority about to be snapt asunder. Practically every worker in the Petrograd district was now on strike. Then the people, spontaneously and as independent groups, began to fire upon the troops, barricades sprang up, and instead of "bread," the world revolution was on every one's tongue.
On March 12 the Revolution was definitely in action. Workers, armed and prepared for a struggle to the end, crowded out upon the streets, the unifying centre of all activity. Battles in the streets assumed formidable proportions btween the masses and the loyal troops. Then came news that five celebrated regiments had joined the revolutionists, and soon practicaly all the troops flocked to the colors of the Revolution. The centre of resistance to the masses was the police, and the battles with them were fierce and unrelenting. Women and children were in the thick of the fighting, while others scorned the flying bullets and took care of the wounded. Soldiers ​joined the revolutionary masses, their bayonets flaunting red bunting. The initial action had become general; the masses were out upon the streets, eager, aggressive, uncompromising. The Revolution was in action!
The Czar, who was "in safety" with his "loyal" army, issued two ukases suspending the sittings of the Duma and the Council of Empire. The Duma might have meekly obeyed, as in former years, but the pressure of events and of the masses encouraged it and the Czar's ukase met with a refusal. On March 11, Michael Rodzianko, president of the Duma, wired the Czar: "The situation is serious. The capital is in a state of anarchy. The government is paralyzed. There is universal discontent The streets are filled with disorderly fighting, units of the army are firing on each other. It is necessary to appoint some one immediately whom the country trusts to form another ministry. Make haste. Procrastination means death. I pray to God that the responsibility will not fall upon him who wears the crown!" The next day, Rodzianko again wired the Czar: "Affairs are worse. You must act at once. To-morrow it will be too late. This is the last hour In which to decide the fate of the country and of the dynasty."
It is apparent that the Duma "liberals" did not favor the overthrow of the Czar. Months later, Milyukov, at a convention of his party, said: "When the revolution broke out I thought it would be suppressed in a quarter of an hour, but after several days I understood that the real Russian Revolution had begun and that it could not be put down." The "revolutionary Duma" was not the instrument of Revolution, but simply tried to squeeze profit for itself out of the Revolution once it had been accomplished by the masses and could not any longer be resisted.
The Duma hesitated, and did not know what to do. It still had faith in the Czar, as proven by the telegrams of Rodzianko. But on the afternoon of March 12 the revolutionary troops appeared before the Duma and demonstrated for the revolution. This evidence of the solidarity of the soldiers with the masses decided the Duma, and only then did it appoint the "Duma Committee" to take charge of events, headed by Rodzianko.
On March 13 the final struggles with the police occured and they were ruthlessly exterminated. The jails were opened and the prisoners freed, including thousands of revolutionary agitators. Two hundred officials of the old regime were arrested, including former Premier Boris V. Sturmer. That ​night the Council of Empire sent a telegram to the Czar, pleading for "the immediate convocation of the legislative bodies, the retirement of the present staff of the Council of Ministers, and the entrusting to a person deserving of the national confidence, to present to you. Sire, for confirmation, the list of a new cabinet capable of managing the country in complete accord with the representatives of the people. Every hour is precious. Further delay and hesitation threaten incalculable misfortunes." Among the signatures was that of A. F. Guchkov, a few days later to become Minister of War in the cabinet of the "revolutionary" Provisional Government.
The counter-revolutionary character of the "Duma Committee" was evident not only in its parleys with the Czar, but in the additional fact that the first act of its head, Rodzianko, was an order to disarm the masses. The Committee still hoped, even after its defiance of the Czar, to prevent the monarchy from being annihilated, and it sent Guchkov and others to the front to acquaint the Czar with the situation and again plead with him.
But the masses refused to limit the Revolution. A Council of Workers and Soldiers was organized in Petrograd, which in a proclamation on March 14 said: "All together, with united forces, we shall fight for the complete removal of the old government and the convocation of a Constituent Assembly, chosen on the basis of universal, equal, direct, and secret suffrage."
This accelerated and decided the course of events. On March 15 the Czar was arrested, and abdicated, naming Grand Duke Michael Alexandrovitch as regent. The Duma Committee appointed the cabinet of a provisional government, with Prince Lvov as Premier, Milyukov Minister of Foreign Affairs, Guchkov Minister of War and Marine, and Kerensky Minister of Justice. On March 16 the Provisional Government issued the following declaration:
"Citizens: The Executive Committee of the Duma, with the aid and support of the troops and the people of the capital, has succeeded in triumphing over the dark forces of the old regime.
"The new cabinet will base its policy on the following principles:
"1.—An immediate general amnesty for all political and religious offences, including terrorist acts and military and agrarian crimes.
"2.—Liberty of speech and of the press, assembly, unions and strikes, with extension of political liberty to those in military service within the limits of military requirements.
"3.—Abolition of all social, religious and national restrictions.
"4.—Immediate preparation to convoke, on the principle of universal, equal, direct and secret suffrage, a Constituent Assembly, which will establish the form of administration and constitution.
"5.—Substitution of a national militia in place of the police, with chiefs elected and subject to the local administrations.
"6.—Communal elections to be based on universal suffrage.
"7.—Troops which participated in the revolutionary movement will not be disarmed, but will remain in Petrograd.
"8.—While maintaining strict military discipline for troops on active service, all limitations upon soldiers in the enjoyment of public rights accorded other citizens are to be abolished.
"The Provisional Government desires to add that it has no intention to take advantage of the circumstances of war to delay the realization of the measures of reform mentioned above."
​The Provisional Government, however, did not consider that the monarchy had been abolished. In a speech in Catherine Hall of the Duma, Milyukov had expressed the intentions of the new government:
"The old despot, who brought Russia to te edge of disaster, will voluntarily abdicate or be deposed. The government will pass to a regent, the Grand Duke Michael Alexandrovitch, and the heir Alexis the Czarevitch. (Yells—'But that is the old dynasty!') Yes, gentlemen, that is the old dynasty, which perhaps you do not like and which perhaps I dislike myself. We propose a parliamentary constitutional monarchy."
But the Revolution had spread throughout Russia, and in the army; it was deemed prudent to wait upon events for a restoration of the monarchy. Grand Duke Michael declined to accept the regency, urged "all citizens to submit to the Provisional Government," and said he might accept the throne if offered by the Constituent Assembly.
Not only was the Provisional Government ideologically and politically inclined to the restoration of monarchy, it was part and parcel of all the imperialistic causes and purposes involved in the war previously organized and directed by Czarism. The urge for peace had animated the masses. But If Milyukov declared on behalf of himself and his colleagues in the new government: "We assume control of the government in order to bring victory to the Russian arms." On March 17, Foreign Minister Milyukov, in a note to the representatives of Russia abroad, said: "In the domain of foreign policy the cabinet, in which I am charged with the portfolio of the ministry of foreign affairs, will remain mindful of the international agreements entered into by the fallen regime and will honor Russia's word. … The government of which I am a part will devote all its energy to preparation of victory." In a proclamation issued Mach 19, the Provisional Government emphasized the attitude of Milyukov: "The government will do its utmost to provide the army with everything to bring the war to a victorious conclusion. The government will faithfully observe all alliances uniting us to the oilier powers and all agreements made in the past." The determination of the Provisional Government to adhere to the rapacious foreign policy of Czarism was emphasized again and again. It conceived the overthrow of Czarism as being simply a means of more efficiently carrying out the policy of Czarism. The imperialistic bourgeoisie was in power and its predatory character was immediately manifest.
The issue of war and peace split the Revolution, and acted as an accelerator of the struggle of class against class. Class relations and class policy became the determining factors in the course of events. The circumstance that the Revolution occured in the midst of a general imperialistic war, in which world power was at stake, made it impossible for the bourgeoisie to compromise or conceal its class interests: the imperialistic war had to be continued. But the masses wanted peace, and it was through the issue of peace, which could not be avoided or compromised, that class antagonisms developed immediately and acutely, and aroused anew the revolutionary consciousness and action of the masses. In the normal times of peace, it would have been much more difficult to drive on the bourgeoisie to the fatal conclusion of its class policy, much more difficult to deliver the masses from the deceptions and ideology of the bourgeoisie. The issue of peace assisted mightly in accomplishing the work of clarification, events proving to the masses that peace itself was a class issue: the proletariat and the impover​ished peasantry wanted peace, the imperialistic bourgeoise and its "liberal" sycophants clamored for war. "Peace, land, and liberty" was the slogan of the Revolution; the Miyukov-Guchkov government granted the usual "bourgeois freedoms" and promised fuller liberty and land—in future; while it prepared to wage a new and more aggressive war. The personnel of the government had been changed, but its policy was still the policy of the regime of Czarism.
At this stage, the Russian Revolution is identical with and yet dissimilar to the earlier, bourgeois revolutions. It is identical in this, that the bourgeoisie does not make the revolution but steps in and tries to direct its course and policy, assuming control of the government; it is dissimilar in that the opposition of the proletariat to the bourgeoisie is not disorganized, inchoate, unaware of means and purposes: the masses do not disintegrate, becoming the helpless prey of the bourgeoisie, but are organized and disciplined through their own class organizations and class policy. In spite of immaturity, immediate hesitations, compromises and defeats, these organizations and this class policy impulsively drive the masses onward toward future action, providing the mechanism for the development of fuller class consciousness and class action. The significant and determining fact was the formation of two governments: the government of the bourgeoisie, the imperialistic Provisional Government, and the "government" of the revolutionary masses, the Soviet, or Council, of Workers' and Soldiers' Delegates. Immediate antagonisms developed between these two governments, antagonisms that acted as an educator of the masses and as a means of converting the general revolution into a revolution definitely and consciously of the proletariat and proletarian peasantry.
Councils were organized throughout the country, and in the army. These Councils were thoroughly democratic and representative institutions, consisting at first of Councils of Soldiers, of Workers, and Peasants; later the Bolsheviki organized separate Councils of the poorest peasants and of farm-workers to intensify the agrarian class struggle, and rescue the mass of the peasantry from the domination of the more prosperous and petit-bourgeois peasants, who naturally were conservative. The delegates to the Councils of Workers were elected directly by the workers in factories and plants, on the basis of equal male and female suffrage, each person over 20 having the right to vote. The representation at first was rather haphazard, but the principle was there and it gradually acquired more adequate expression. All delegates could be recalled immediately by their constituents. The functions of the Councils of Workers' Delegates varied with conditions and the consciousness of the masses. In certain sections they took over, even at this early stage, all the functions of government, and organized their own volunteer police of workers. Where employers shut down plants as a means of starving the workers, many of these local Councils expropriated the plants and granted the workers power to manage them directly. The Councils of Peasants' delegates, where dominated by the radicals, began immediately to seize the land and put in operation an agrarian revolution. These Soviets acted as the centre of the elemental bursting forth of the life of the people, of their political activity and purposes. Indeed, this new life of the people, of a people awakening after the sleep of ages, was positively feverish.
In spite of the attempts of the Provisioned Government to supress them, ​Councils of Soldiers' Delegates were organized in the army at the front. In the early days of the Revolution, news of events in Petrograd was scarce, but the soldiers were prepared for revolt, and, scattered and without contact with each other, Soviets of Soldiers were organized. The officers acted against these organizations, but the soldiers persisted, and recalcitrant officers were often expelled. The army Soviets were not simply propaganda groups: they often assumed the functions of commissariat and of education, and often military functions when deserted and betrayed by the officers. The basis of the army Soviets were local committees in each company, regiment, division, corps, culminating in the general Soviet of Soldiers' Delegates. These Soviets issued literature, held meetings, published newspapers, and became the means of revolutionary expression for the soldiers.
Each of the Soviets of a particular character elected delegates to an Executive Committee; and each of the Soviets, of workers, of soldiers, and of peasants, elected delegates to a Congress of All-Russian Soviets, which in turn elected a Central Executive Committee sitting permanantly in Petrograd. The first All-Russian Soviet Congress was held in Petrograd in June, and it was decided to convene the Congress every three months. The Soviets comprised the actual mass of the people, the only organized expression of the Revolution, and it alone possessed a real power. It was fully admitted after the organization of the Provisional Government that it had no power except in "appeals to patriotism," and it tried to obscure all issues by appeals to the patriotic emotions of the people—"The Country is in danger!" The Councils constituted the real power; and yet they yielded all power to the Provisional Government of the imperialistic bourgeoisie.
The Soviet constituted itself as the active representative of the revolutionary masses. But it consisted, as yet, of the old revolutionary opposition, of the moderates whose "legal" propaganda had made it possible for them to acquire publicity and general reputations: the Council did not represent the new revolutionary activity and requirements. The Council dared not assume power, it dared not act aggressively. As early as the end of March a split is apparent between the Council and the revolutionary masses; the split widens under pressure of events, and upon arrival of revolutionists from Siberia and from, foreign countries. Upon his arrival in Petrograd, early in April, Lenin becomes the storm-centre of the revolutionary opposition equally to the moderates in the Council and to the Provisional Government.
The Provisional Government's policy of an aggressive war and an imperialistic peace aroused the anger, the impatience and the action of the masses. A strike movement of protest against the Milyukov policy is developing, and on April 9 Premier Lvov declares, in answer to the general discussion of war aims: "Free Russia does not aim at the domination of other nations, or at occupying by force foreign territories, but to establish a durable peace based on the rights of nations to decide their own destiny." The moderates in the Council used this declaration to urge support of the war and of the Provisional Government. On the same day, Cheidse, President of the Soviet Executive Committee, proclaims: "Russia's national watchword must be unity—front and rear." But on April 10, Minister of Foreign Affairs Milyukov, in an interview, expresses himself in favor of the Russian annexation of Constantinople. On April 12, a preliminary Congress of Soviets adopted a resolution, 325 to 55, declaring it would be a good thing should the ​Provisional Government make an official renunciation of any program of annexations, but as long as these conditions are unfulfilled and the war continues, the revolutionary democracy must support the war in all ways. This attitude was emphasized by the appearance at the Congress of George Plekhanov, Russian social-patriot, and Will Thorne and M. Moutet, sent by the British and French governments, who pledged Russian and Allied labor to the war. At the same time, the Congress decisively rejected a resolution of the Bolsheviki that the Soviets should assume all government power, but a proclamation was issued to the people to disregard orders of the Provisional Government where they conflicted with the Council's.
All this, of course, was in contravention of the desires of the masses and the objects of the Revolution. The Provisional Government was distincly counter-revolutionary, and yet it was supported by the representative of the masses, the Soviet. On all issues the government adopted a reactionary policy. It did not make any effort or lay plans to convene the Constituent Assembly. It did not energetically act to provide food for the people, being restrained by its capitalistic affiliations and interests. It acted against the expropriated peasantry by protecting the interests of the large propertied owners. It retained the bureaucracy of the old regime and its attitude on all large problems of policy. It proclaimed itself die government for carrying on an imperialistic war, in spite of promises and subterfuges to the contrary. The Provisional Government allowed the institutions of the old regime to exist, and directed its activity toward the disarming of the masses and the castration of the Revolution. Minister of War Guchkov used every means and opportunity to destroy the Soviets in the army, and die Soviets behind the front were intrigued against in an effort to destroy their influence and existence. On all general problems of the Revolution the Provisional Government was reactionary; but it was its reactionary attitude on war and peace that was most manifest to the masses, provoking discontent and action.
On April 9, in answer to the universal unrest and questionings on war aims. Premier Lvov had declared in favor of "a durable peace based on the fights of nations to decide their own destiny." This was construed by the moderate Socialists as favoring the Revolution's program of "no annexations, no indemnities, and self-determination of nations." But the secret treaties of Czarism had been neither repudiated nor published: until this was done, words had not even the empty value oi words. And on May 1. Minister of Foreign Affairs Milyukov, in a note to the representatives of the Provisional Government in the Entente countries, emphasized "the nation's determination to bring the war to a decisive victory. … The Provisional Government in safeguarding the rights acquired for our country will maintain a strict regard for its engagements with the allies of Russia."
This was the signal for the elemental bursting forth of the indignation and protests of the masses, which had been accumulating for six weeks. It was accelerated but not produced by the intensive and uncompromising propaganda of the Bolsheviki. The Council, apprehensive of the impending action of the masses, demanded that the Provisional Government withdraw Milyukov's note accepting the old treaty obligations, that the treaties should be published and active steps taken to end the war. The government declined to modify the May 1 note of Milyukov. The masses in Petrograd broke loose. On May 2 and 3 the workers demonstrated in great masses, ​shouting "Down with the Provisional Government!" The streets of Petrograd swanned with furious and indignant demonstrators, including whole regiments of soldiers. The resignation of Milyokoy was demanded and refused. One regiment appeared before the Marinsky palace to arrest the ministers of the Provisional Government and depose it by force. Minor counter-revolutionary demonstrations, crying "Down with Lenin," were submerged in the general revolutionary mass action. The demonstrations continued until May 5: and, the Council having by a majority of 30 voted its confidence in the Provisional Government, the masses vented their disapproval by hostile demonstrations against the Council. The Provisional Government was tottering; but the Council came to its support, and ordered all meetings and demonstrations prohibited for two days. At a meeting of the Council, Tseretelli declared: "The trouble is now over, and the Provisional Government will remain in power." The masses, abandoned by their own representatives, met for the moment a temporary defeat.
The Provisional Government was still in power, maintained in power by the moderates in the Council of Soldiers' and Workers' Delegates; but there was, nevertheless, a profound change in the situation. The masses had been temporarily dispersed, but not appeased or suppressed. The position of the Provisional Government was insecure; the Soviet, not being responsible for the government could at any moment nullify the measures of the government. The Provisional Government, accordingly, invited the Executive Committee of the Soviets to participate in forming a coalition government, the invitation being extended through Kerensky. The Soviet at first refused, but the Provisional Government threatened to resign unless its o£Fer of coalition was accepted. Simultaneously General Kornilov resigned as Commander-in-Chief; this action was followed by other generals and by Minister of War Guchkov as a protest against the Soviets, and particularly against the army Soviets, and as a concerted conspiratory move to frighten Russia by disorganizing the army. These events threw the Executive Committee of the Soviets into a panic, and on May 18, with a vote of 41 to 19, it decided to accept the coalition thrust upon it by the imperialistic Provisional Government. This action was approved by the Petrograd Council, against the opposition of the Bolsheviki, who, through Trotzky, declared: "Division of power will not cease with the Socialists' entry into the ministry, a strong revolutionary power is necessary." Milyukov and other ministers resigned, and on May 19 a coalition ministry was formed; which included Kerensky as Minister of War and Marine, M. I. Skobeleff, vice-president of the Soviet Executive Committee, as Minister of Labor, Victor Chernov, Social-Revolutionist, as Minister of Agriculture, I. G. Tseretelli, Menshevik-Socialist, as Minister of Posts and Telegraphs, and the "Populist-Socialist" Pyeshckonov as Minister of Food and Supplies. The annoucement of this coalition declared that it was based "on three cardinal points upon which the Government, the Executive Committee of the Duma, and the Council of Workers' and Soldiers' Delegates have agreed," the "three cardinal points" being as follows:
"1.—The unity of the Allied fronts.
"2.—The fullest confidence of the revolutionary democracy in the reconstructed cabinet.
"3.— A plenitude of power for the Government."
In other words, the Soviets officially accepted the policy of the Provis​ional Government; surrendered to the government, making the Soviet the government's moral apologist and physical supporter. The Provisional Government had absolutely no power by which it could maintain itself; municipal elections through Russia cast an overwhelming majority of votes for Socialist candidates, the bourgeois Cadets being everywhere swamped; and yet the Council accepted coalition with the discredited Cadets. By a simple stroke of moral courage and revolutionary spirit the Council could have constituted itself the government, discarding completely the bourgeoisie. But the petet bourgeois psychology of the moderate Socialists dominating the Council resulted in an acceptance of the ideology of a "democratic war," of "national unity," and a naive faith in the "necessity" of the bourgeoisie to establish the conquests of the Revolution. The representatives of the proletariat having taken the initiative, it was inevitable that the peasants should accept the coalition, as they did on May 24, through the Peasants' Congress.
The Soviets, however, were not by any means united on the problems of the day. In the Soviets were represented three groups: the Social-Revolutionists and Mensheviki, constituting the moderates (Cheidse, Skobeleff, Tseretelli, Chernov), and the Bolsheviki, constituting the uncompromising group (Lenin, Zinoviev, Kamenev, and, later, Trotzky, who, while not an affiliated Bolshevik, had a similar program and acted with the Bolsheviki.)
The Social-Revolutionists represented the peasantry, not the mass of agricultural workers, but largely the middle class peasantry dominated by the petty bourgeois ideology. They represented that conservative middle class which in previous revolutions had always acted against and betrayed the proletariat. The interests of this class of peasants moved within the orbit of the bourgeois regime of property, and its representatives acted accordingly. In the normal times of peaces the well-to-do, bourgeois-aspiring peasants first awoke to political consciousness, constituted the real force in the Social-Revolutionary Party, and imparted to the party its petty bourgeois ideology. For a time the peasants, and particularly the soldiers, who were mostly peasants, accepted the leadership of the Social-Revolutionary moderates; but as the Revolution developed its antagonisms and awoke to political consciousness the great mass of agricultural workers, the Social-Revolutionary Party split, and the Social-Revolutionists of the Left accepted the Bolshevik program. But at this stage, and for months after, the Social-Revolutionists and their petty bourgeois policy constituted the real governing force in Russia.
The Mensheviki represented the dominant, moderate Socialism, that moderate Socialism which directed the International straight to disaster by accepting the policy of their governments in all belligerent nations; and which, moreover, had become, in the words of Trotzky, the greatest obstacle to the revolutionary development of the proletariat. The Mensheviki represented those social elements which everywhere have dominated organized Socialism,—the intellectualss, liberal democrats, bourgeois reformers, the lower petit bourgeoisie, and, above all, the upper layers of the working class, the skilled workers, which everywhere are a reactionary force in the councils of Socialism, having been corrupted by Imperialism and striving to secure a place as a caste in the governing system of things. The ideology of this group was the ideology of the petite bourgeoisie, of the bourgeois revolution in which, according to Marx, the phrase surpasses the substance. The Mensheviki were moderate and hesitant, convinced that, the Russian Revol​ution being a bourgeois revolution, the proletariat should support the bourgeoisie; they mistrusted the masses and the action of the masses, trying to limit the Revolution with the orbit of the bourgeois democratic regime, legality and parliamentary action. The Mensheviki used the masses only when they considered action necessary, which was when their own petty purposes were in jeopardy: the masses were a tool to be used or discarded at will; independent action of the masses was discouraged and suppressed, if necessary. Instead of encouraging the dynamic action of the masses, bringing the initiative and action of the masses to bear on all the problems of the Revolution and developing the Revolution, the Mensheviki used the masses as an instrument with which to coerce the bourgeoisie into granting petty, illusory concessions.
The Bolsheviki constituted the party of the revolutionary proletriat; in the words of Lenin, "the class conscious workers, day laborers, and the poorer classes of the peasantry, who are classed with them (semi-proletariat)." The Bolsheviki were completely revolutionary, not in the sense of revolutionary phrases, but in the sense of representing the industrial proletariat and the great masses which alone constitute the instrument of the revolution.
Representing the interests and ideology of the industrial masses, and in continual and active contect with them, the Bolsheviki developed that general, creative and dynamic mass action out of which revolutions arise and develop uncompromisingly. Bolshevism insisted that the bourgeoisie was counter-revolutionary; that precisely as the Revolution had been made by the proletariat, it could be established and continued only by the proletariat in a merciless struggle against the bourgeoisie; that this struggle was determined, not by any abstract considerations of whether Russia was ready for Socialism, but by the actual forces of development and the immediate problems of the Revolution; and that, accordingly, the revolutionary proletariat, acting together with the mass of impoverished peasants, must constitute itself into a dictatorship through the assumption by the Soviets of the complete power of government.
The Bolsheviki constituted a practical revolutionary movement, not a group of theoreticians and mongers of dogmas. They worked out a program, a practical program of action in accord with the immediate problems of the Revolution and out of which would necessarily arise the struggle and power for the larger, ultimate objectives. Revolutions do not rally round dogmas, but programs. The sense of reality of the revolutionist is expressed in this, that he translates his revolutionary aspirations into a revolutionary program in accord with the historic conditions, and which can rally and unite the masses for action and the conquest of power. Revolutions make their own laws, their own programs. Revolutions are the great educators and developers of class consciousness and action. It was the great merit of the Bolsheviki that they gauged accurately the prevailing forces, that they were revolutionists in action, using^the situation to educate the masses and awake their consciousness and revolutionary struggles.
After the first two weeks of the struggle against Czarism, the course of the Revolution is determined by the struggles within the Soviets, between the moderates, represented by the Social-Revolutionists and the Mensheviki, and the revolutionists, represented by the Bolsheviki.
​The Council, dominated by the moderates, allows every opportunity of action to escape it, becomes a conservative factor in the existing system of things. The Council realizes the immense task it has to perform, but shrinks before the immensity of the revolutionary requirements, shrinks into conservatism and the acceptance of the bourgeois policy of the Provisional Government.
The Council appeals to the proletariat to overthrow the imperialistic governments, and allows its own imperialistic bourgeoisie to assume power; it calls upon the Socialists to break the "civil peace" with the ruling class, and itself acquiesces in an amorphous but disastrous "national unity;" it calls for the proletarian revolution in Europe, but denies and postpones its own proletarian revolution. The Council hesitates, and out of hesitancy comes compromise and an emasculation of the Revolution. It imagines that the course of the Revolution may be determined by interminable discussions among the intellectuals: it acts only under pressure of the revolutionary masses. The Council talks revolution while the Provisional Government acts reaction. It takes refuge In proclamations, in discussion, in appeals to a pseudo-theory, in everything save the uncompromising revolutionary action of the masses directed aggressively to a solution of the pressing problems of the day. The moderates in the Council are tangled and paralyzed in the coils of pseudo-Marxism: Russia's primitive capitalist development is not yet prepared for Socialism, therefore the bourgeoisie must rule, a theory completely neglecting the fact that the coming of Socialism consists of a process of struggles in which the detemining factor is the matuarity and class power of the proletariat. While indulging in this speculative theory, the moderates ignored the fact that the proletariat, and not the bourgeoisie, had made the Revolution; that the bourgeoisie were inimical to the Revolution; that the immediate problems of the Revolution could be solved only by the Councils, and that accordingly the Councils should assume control of the Revolution. But they who always had preached Socialism now shelve Socialism as a problem of the future, conceiving Socialism as an abstract problem of the days to come instead of as a dynamic theory of immediate revolutionary struggle. The Revolution was a proletarian revolution in fact—this was the great circumstance. Where revolutions do not act immediately and aggressively, particularly the proletarian revolution, reaction appears and controls the situation; and the formerly revolutionary representatives of the masses accept and strengthen this reaction. Once revolutionary ardor and action cool, the force of bourgeois institutions and (control of industry weight the balance in favor of the ruling class. Revolutions march from action to action: action, more action, again action, supplemented by an audacity that shrinks at nothing,—these are the tactics of the proletarian revolution. The revolution seizes power and uses this power aggressively and uncompromisingly; it allows nothing to stand in its way save its own lack of strength. But the Council hesitates and compromises, until the day comes when the accomplished fact of reaction stares it in the face. The Council hampers and tries to control the independence and action of the masses, instead of directing them in a way that leaves the initiative to the masses—developing the action of the masses out of which class power arises. Acquiring prestige through its criticism of the government, the Council lacks the revolutionary policy and consciousness of assuming full ​governmental power when conditions convert criticism into the necessity for action. Instead of action—phrases; instead of revolution—a paltering with the revolutionary tasks.
On May 2, when the masses burst forth in an elemental protest against the Provisional Government, the Council of Workers' and Soldiers' Delegates might, and should, have constituted itself the government. Its failure to do so marked the decline of its power and influence as then constituted; the revolutionary task now became that of revolutionizing the Council, of discarding its old policy and personnel. And this process of revolutionary transformation could develop only out of the masses, not out of the Council's intellectual representatives; these representatives had to be thrust aside, brutally and contemptuously.
The first phase of the Russian Revolution consists of the week March 8 to March 15, resulting in the overthrow of Czarism. The first stage of the Revolution ends with the formation of the coalition government on May 19,—the stage of the bourgeois revolution and the establishment of the bourgeois republic. Part One, by Lenin, deals with this first stage.
Sources: Articles in Pravda, the central organ of the Bolsheviki published in Petrograd: "Letters from Abroad, Number One," and "Our Position;" a lecture delivered by Lenin in Switzerland shortly before his departure for Russia; a speech to the Ismailoff regiment in Petrograd; a pamphlet, "Letter on Tactics;" and a pamphlet on "Political Parties in Russia,"—all published during March and April. Note: all dates are, new style, not Russian style.
L. C. F.