# Shivaji and His Times/Chapter 8

CHAPTER VIII.
Struggle with the Mughals, 1671-74.
§1. Campaigns of Mahabat and Daud Khan, 1671.
The second sack of Surat and the Maratha ravages in Baglana roused Aurangzib to a sense of the gravity of the situation in the Deccan. As early as 28th November, 1670, he had appointed Mahabat Khan to the supreme command in the Deccan. The events of December only deepened the Emperor's anxiety. On 9th January 1671, he sent orders to Bahadur Khan to leave his province of Gujrat and take the command of one of the imperial army corps in the Deccan, Dilir Khan being directed to accompany him. The Emperor also repeatedly talked of going to the Deccan and conducting the war against Shivaji in person, but the idea was ultimately dropped. Daud Khan was instructed to attack Shiva wherever he was reported. Amar Singh Chandawat and many other Rajput officers with their clansmen were posted to the Deccan. Reinforcements, money and provisions were poured into Baglana in January, 1671. (Akhbarat, 13-1, 2, 8, 14, 16; M.A., 107.)
Mahabat Khan left Burhanpur on 3rd January 1671 with Jaswant Singh, reached Aurangabad on the 10th, paid his respects to the viceroy, Prince Muazzam, and set out to join the army near Chandor. ​ Daud Khan had been appointed his chief lieutenant and the commander of his Vanguard; but he despised this office as below his rank, and begged the Emperor to recall him. (Akh. 13-12; Dil 102.)
We shall now trace the history of the war in the Chandor range. Late in December 1670 Shivaji's men had laid siege to Dhodap, and Daud Khan had started on the 28th of that month to relieve the fort. But the qiladar, Muhammad Zaman, successfully repelled the attack unaided. Daud Khan had next advanced to the relief of Salhir, but had been too late to save it, as we have already seen. In January 1671, he held a fortified base near the Kanchana pass from which he sallied forth in every direction in which the Marathas were heard of as roving. From the Emperor's letters it appears that Daud Khan was under a general order to right everything that might go wrong in Baglana ! Once after a night-march he fell on a body of the enemy near Hatgarh and slew 700 of them. (Dil. 101; Akhbarat, 13-15.)
Late in January 1671, Mahabat Khan joined Daud Khan near Chandor and the two laid siege to Ahivant, which Shiva had recently taken. After a month had been wasted in a fruitless exchange of fire, the fort was entered from the trenches of Daud Khan and the garrison capitulated to him. Mahabat Khan became furiously angry at losing the credit of this success. He had been previously treating Daud Khan, a 5-hazari, with discourtesy, and now the ​ relations between them became strained to the utmost. Leaving a garrison to hold Ahivant, Mahabat spent three months at Nasik and then went to Parnir (20 miles west of Ahmadnagar) to pass the rainy season (June to September) there, while Daud Khan was recalled to Court(about June.)*
There was excessive rainfall that year and many men and cattle perished of pestilence in the camp; at Parnir. But while his troops were dying, Mahabat Khan attended daily entertainments in the houses of the nobles by turns. There were 400 dancing- girls of Afghanistan and the Panjab in his camp, and they were patronised by the officers. (Dil. 106.)
§2. Campaign of Bahadur and Dilir, 1671-72. Battle of Salhir.
The Emperor was dissatisfied with Mahabat Khan for the poor result of his campaign in the first quarter of 1671 and his long spell of inactivity afterwards, and suspected him of havin g formed a secret understanding with Shivaji. So, he sent Bahadur Khan and Dilir Khan to the Deccan next winter. They marched from Gujrat into Baglana, ​ laid siege to Salhir (now in Maratha hands), and leaving Ikhlas Khan Miana, Rao Amar Singh Chandawat and some other officers to continue the siege, proceeded towards Ahmadnagar. (Dil. 107; O. C. 3567.)
From the environs of Ahmadnagar, Bahadur Khan advanced to Supa (in the Puna district), while Dilir Khan with a flying column recovered Puna, massacring all the inhabitants above the age of 9 years, (end of December 1671.) Early in January 1672, Shivaji was at Mahad, draining his forts of men to raise a vast army for expelling the invaders from the home of his childhood.* But the pressure on Puna was immediately afterwards removed and Bahadur Khan was recalled from this region by a severe disaster to the Mughal arms in Baglana. ​ There, the division left to besiege Salhir was attacked by Shiva himself with a large force. After an obstinate battle, Ikhlas Khan and Muhakam Singh (the son of Rao Amar Singh Chandawat) were wounded and captured, with 30 of their principal officers,* while Rao Amar Singh and many other commanders as well as several thousand common soldiers were slain, and the entire siege-camp was taken by the enemy. Shortly afterwards Shivaji captured Mulhir, and then putting fresh men, munitions and provisions in the two forts, he hurried back to Konkan unmolested. This took place in the second half of January 1672. Shivaji's prestige and confidence in his own power were immensely increased by these successes. Surat was now in, constant terror of him, as he entirely dominated Baglana. (Dil. 107; Ishwardas, 60b; F. R. Surat 87, M. Gray to Bombay, 15 Feb. Vol. 106, Bombay to Surat, 16 Feb., 1672; Sabh. 74; K. K. ii. 249.)
From the English records we learn that Shiva now "forced the two generals (viz., Bahadur and Dilir), who with their armies had entered into his country, to retreat with shame and loss." † But the ​ Persian accounts are silent about it. We can, however, be sure that the Satnami rising in March and the rebellion of the Khaibar Afghans in April next, made it impossible for the Emperor to attempt the recovery of his prestige in the Deccan, and Shiva was therefore left the master of the situation throughout the year 1672. (M.A. 115-116.)
Bahadur Khan returned from Baglana with failure, encamped for some time on the bank of the Bhima, and then went back to Ahmadnagar to canton for the rains. About May 1672 Mahabat left the Deccan for Hindusthan, and a month later Muazzam did the same. Bahadur Khan was appointed commander-in-chief and acting viceroy of the Deccan, in the place of these two, becoming sub- stantive subahdar in January 1673 and holding that office till August 1677. (Dil 108-109; M.A. 121.)
§3. Maratha occupation of the Koli country, 1672.
So greatly was the spirit of the Marathas roused by their victory over Ikhlas Khan, capture of Mulhir, and expulsion of Bahadur and Dilir from Puna, that their activity continued unabated even during the hot weather and the rainy season of this year. About 5th June, a large Maratha army under Moro Trimbak Pingle captured Jawhar from its Koli Rajah, Vikram Shah, and seized there treasure amounting to 17 lakhs of Rupees. The place is only 100 miles from Surat, and adjoins the Nasik district, from which it is separated by the Western Ghats. Advancing further north, he threatened the other Koli State of ​ Ramnagar* which is only sixty miles south of Surat. The Rajah fled with his family (about 19th June 1672) to Chikli, six miles s. e. of Gandavi and 33 m. s. of Surat. Even Gandavi was deserted by the people in fear of the coming of the Marathas. But the invaders speedily retreated from Ramnagar on hearing that Dilir Khan was assembling his forces for a campaign. Heavy rain stopped the activity of the Marathas for a few days. But soon afterwards Moro Pant, with his army raised to 15,000 men, returned to the attack, and took Ramnagar in the first week of July.
The annexation of Jawhar and Ramnagar gave the Marathas a short, safe and easy route from Kalian up Northern Konkan to Surat, and laid that port helplessly open to invasion from the south. The city became subject to chronic alarm, whenever any Marathas were heard of even 60 miles off, at Ramnagar.
§4. Surat threatened for chauth.
From the neighbourhood of Ramnagar, Moro Trimbak Pingle sent three successive letters to the governor and leading traders of Surat demanding four lakhs of Rupees as blackmail, and threatening a visit to the city in the case of their refusal. The ​ third of these epistles was very peremptory in tone; Shivaji wrote, "I demand for the third time, which I declare shall be the last, the chauth or quarter part of the king's revenue under your Government. As your Emperor has forced me to keep an army for the defence of my people and country, that army must be paid by his subjects. If you do not send me the money speedily, then make ready a large house for me, for I shall go and sit down there and receive the revenue and custom duties, as there is none now to stop my passage."
At the first news of the arrival of the Maratha army in Ramnagar, the governor of Surat summoned all the leading Hindu and Muhammadan merchants and proposed that they should subscribe Rs. 45,000 for engaging 500 horse and 3,000 foot to guard the town for two months. Officers were immediately sent to make a list of all the Hindu houses in the town for assessing this contribution. But no soldiers were enlisted, and the governor pocketed whatever money was actually raised for the defence.
On the receipt of the third letter from Shiva, the helpless citizens were seized with a panic. The rich went to the governor that very night and wanted permission to remove their families to Broach and other towns for safety. He kept them waiting till after midnight, gave them the permission, but retracted it next morning, when he held a second conference with the townsmen, asking them to raise the blackmail demanded, — the merchants paying one ​ lakh and the desais raising two lakhs from the cultivators of the villages around. After a discussion lasting a day and a night, in which he reduced his demand to Rs. 60,000, the people finally refused to pay anything, as they knew too well that he would appropriate the money instead of buying the enemy off with it. Thereafter, every time that there was an alarm of the approach of Shivaji's troops the citizens of Surat hastened to flee from the town, but the governor shut the gates to keep them in ! *
We may conclude the history of the Koli Rajahs here. Vikram Shah, the ex-chief of Jawhar, on losing his kingdom in June 1672, fled to the adjoining Mughal district of Nasik. From this place he used to sally forth with roving bands of his own, plunder the peasantry, and cut off communications in the north Thana district, now in Maratha hands. In January 1678 when Moro Trimbak invaded Nasik, Vikram Shah joined the Mughal faujdar and offered a vigorous resistance, but was defeated and put to death. His son escaped, and joining Dhara Rai Koli (another dispossessed chief) took to brigandage, causing considerable loss to Maratha territory and military routes. Finally both were captured and executed. (Z. C; T. S. 40a; Dig. 400.) ​ The Rajah of Ramnagar fled to Devnes on losing his kingdom (June 1672.) T. S. (40a) is wrong in saying that he was captured by Moro Pant.
§5. Further Maratha successes in 1672, but raid into Khandesh and Berar, Dec. 1672, defeated.
From their base in the Koli country of Jawhar and Ramnagar, a Maratha force under Moro Trimbak easily crossed the Ghats into the Nasik district, in the middle of July 1672, plundered and occupied it. Jadun Rao Deccani, a great-grandson of Lukhji Jadav (the maternal grandfather of Shivaji) with 4,000 men, was the Mughal thanahdar of Nasik-Trimbak. He was defeated and captured after losing many of his troops in battle. Siddi Halal, the thanahdar of Vani-Dindori (or North Nasik), was also defeated and his charge looted by the Marathas. For this failure, both the officers were sharply reprimanded by Bahadur Khan, and in anger they deserted to the Marathas, with two other officers and all the men of their "four great regiments of horse" (October.) Other desertions were apprehended, and Dilir Khan was left in great danger with a weakened army to defend the province of Gujrat against the exultant enemy. (Dil. 116; F. R. Surat 87, Surat to Bombay, 20 July, 1672, Vol. 3, Surat, 26 October; Bombay to Surat, 18 October, in F. R. Surat 106. T. S. 33b for the two deserters.)
On 25th October, a large Maratha army ​ appeared at Ramnagar again, and Surat trembled in alarm, especially as a party of Shivaji's horse advanced to Chikli. But that city was not Shivaji's objective now. He made a lightning raid into a different corner of the Mughal Empire.
He sent his light cavalry to plunder Berar and Telingana.* The viceroy Bahadur Khan, on hearing of it, set out from Ahmadnagar due eastwards, left his heavy baggage at Bir (70 miles to the east) and Qandahar, and arrived as fast as he could near the fort of Ramgir (18.35 N. 79.35 E.) in pursuit of the raiders. But they had been two days beforehand with him, looted the village at the foot of the fort, and carried off the families of most of the inhabitants for ransom. So the baffled Mughal general returned by way of Indur (modern Nizamabad), 95 miles due west. Entering the Qutb-Shahi territory, he ravaged the land at the instigation of Dilir Khan. The Marathas in their retreat divided into two bodies; one escaping south into the Golkonda State and the other turning northwards to Chanda, and thence westwards into Berar proper. Dilir Khan was sent off to pursue the first division, while Bahadur Khan tried to cut off the retreat of the second.
Sending his heavy baggage back to Aurangabad from the neighbourhood of the village of Khair (?), the viceroy hastened by way of Partur, Shellode and Peedola, and arrived near the pass of Antur (38 miles north of Aurangabad.) Here the Marathas ​ turned at bay, and attacked the Mughal Van under Sujan Singh Bundela. But they were repulsed and pursued till evening, many of the horses of traders and other kinds of booty were recovered from the enemy and restored to their owners. Next day the Mughals crossed the pass and encamped at Durgapur, four miles from the fort of Antur.
The following day, when they were marching to Aurangabad in rather straggling groups, before the time fixed for the starting of the general, one division of 10,000 imperialists was charged by 750 picked Maratha cavalry on the left of the pass of Bakapur, six miles (from Durgapur ?) After an obstinate battle, in which the Mughals were reinforced by their general, the Marathas retreated, leaving 400 of their number dead in the field. The credit of this victory belongs to the Bundelas under Subh-Karn, whose gallant son Dalpat Rao was wounded in the fight.
The division under Dilir Khan headed the other Maratha band off into Bijapur territory, capturing much booty and rejoining Bahadur Khan. That general cantoned his troops at Pathri, 76 miles s. e. of Aurangabad. This Maratha raid into Khandesh and Berar, unlike their first incursion in December 1670, was completely foiled, and the Mughal troops showed commendable mobility and enterprise. (Nov.-Dec, 1672.)* ​ To guard against a repetition of these two Maratha penetrations into Khandesh from Balaghat,. Bahadur Khan set up gates across the tops of the chief passes* and posted troops with artillery at each of them. Bajaji Nayak Nimbalkar, a great Deccani zamindar" and father of Shiva's son-in-law Mahadji, with his family, was now won over by the Mughals. (Dil 122-'5.)
§6. Desultory fighting in Desk, 1673.
Maratha activity, thus shut out of Khandesh and Berar, burst forth in another quarter (Jan. 1673.) They next raided the Puna district. Bahadur Khan left his baggage at Chamargunda, hastened to meet the invaders, and defeated them after a severe battle. Then he encamped at Pedgaon, on the north bank of the Bhima, eight miles due south of Chamargunda. This place became the residence of his army for many years afterwards, and here a fort and town grew up from their cantonment, which the Emperor permitted him to name Bahadur-garh. (Dil. 126.)
Pedgaon occupies a position of great strategic importance. It stands on the plain just clear of the
terms: "Bahadur Khan had defeated Shiva after a forced march of 120 miles, made large captures of spoils and sent them with Dalpat to the Emperor, who viewed them on 22 Oct." ​ long mountain spur running eastwards from Puna. From this place the Mughal general could at will move westwards along the north of the range to protect the valleys of the Mula and the Bhima (the North Puna district), or along the south of it to guard the valleys of the Nira and the Baramati (the southern portion of the district.) Northwards he could communicate with his great depot of arms and provisions at Ahmadnagar, without having to cross any river (except at the foot of that fort); and southwards he could easily invade Bijapur through the Sholapur district. In short, the cantonment at Pedgaon served as the Mughal advanced base for some years after this time, exactly as Aurangzib's camp at Brahmapuri, 90 miles s. e. e. of it, did twenty-two years later, when the Mughal empire had extended further south.
It was most probably in this year (1673)* that Shivaji met with a sore disappointment. The fort of Shivner, a mile west of Junnar, was no doubt of strategic importance, as it guarded the Mughal frontier in the north of the Puna district and blocked the shortest route by which he could sally out of North Konkan to overrun Mughal Deccan. But what gave it the greatest value in Shivaji's eyes was that it was his birth-place. The Mughal governor of Shivner was Abdul Aziz Khan, a Brahman convert ​ to Islam and one of the most faithful and valued servants of Aurangzib. Shivaji promised him "mountains of gold" for surrendering the fort into Maratha hands; and he, pretending consent, received the money, appointed a day for the delivery, and asked Shivaji to send 7,000 cavalry to take the fort over. But Abdul Aziz at the same time secretly informed Bahadur Khan of the plot; the Maratha army fell into an ambuscade planned by the Mughals, and retired in disappointment with heavy loss. (Fryer, i. 339-340.)
§7. Raids into Kanara and S. Maharashtra, 1673.
In another direction, however, a wide door of conquest was now opened to the Marathas. Ali Adil Shah II. died on 24th Nov., 1672, and in a few months the Government of Bijapur fell into disorder and weakness. This was Shivaji's opportunity. On 5th March 1673, he got possession of Panhala a second time, by bribery, and early in September he secured the hill-fort of Satara by the same means. In May his men under Pratap Rao Gujar burst into the inland parts of Bijapuri Kanara, looting Hubli and many other rich cities. But they received a great check from the Bijapuri general Bahlol Khan, who repeatedly defeated the Maratha rovers and expelled them from Kanara, and then (in June 1673) took post at Kolhapur, to watch the road and prevent their return. Soon afterwards the rains put an end to military operations, and Maratha activity in this region was checked, but for a time only. (B.S. ​ 397-399; O. C. 3779; F. R. Surat 106, Bombay to Surat 16 Sep., 1673; Dutch Records, Vol. 31, No. 805; O. C. 3800.)
As Mr. Gerald Aungier, the English President of Bombay, wrote on 16th Sep. 1673, "Shivaji bears himself up manfully against all his enemies...... and though it is probable that the Mughal's army may fall into his country this year and Bahlol Khan on the other side, yet neither of them can stay long for want of provisions, and his flying army will constantly keep them in alarm, nor is it either their design to destroy Shivaji totally, for the Umarahs maintain a politic war to their own profit at the king's charge, and never intend to prosecute it violently so as to end it." (F.R. Surat, 106.)
Shivaji took full advantage of his enemies' moral and political weakness.* Early in October 1673, he was reported to have made 20,000 sacks "ready to convey what plunder he can get, having also a considerable flying army ready for that action." Soon afterwards, this army, 25,000 strong, led by Shiva in person, burst into west Bijapur territory, plundering many rich towns, and then passed into Kanara for more plunder. This work occupied him till the end of December. In the first week of that month he was at Kadra with 6,000 men, and stayed there only four days. But his detachments were twice ​ defeated at this time, by Bahlol Khan at Bankapur and by Sharza Khan at Chandgarh (midway between the towns of Belgaum and Savant-vadi) and forced to quit Kanara.
§8. Battles with Bahlol Khan : Umrani and Nesari.
It was probably in November or December of this year, while Shivaji was campaigning in Kanara, that Bahlol Khan* marched from Bijapur with a large army (12,000 men according to the Maratha chronicle) to protect the Miraj-Kolhapur district, and cut Shiyaji's northern line of communication with his ​ dominions by the Satara-Panhala route. If this strategic move had succeeded, the road for Shiva's return from Kanara through the Southern Desh country would have been closed, while the Portuguese State of Goa would have barred the land-route west of the Ghats, and he would have been compelled to make the journey in ships or make a wide detour eastwards and try to force his way between Miraj and Bijapur and run the risk of an attack on both flanks by the large Adil-Shahi forces at these two places.
Pratap Rao Gujar, the Maratha commander-in- chief, was detached with a slightly larger force and artillery, to meet the danger. He tried to envelop Bahlol's army near Umrani, between Miraj and Bijapur, cutting him off from his water supply. The battle raged all day with intense ferocity. Many were slain on both sides, the Marathas suffering less than the Bijapuris. After sunset, Bahlol induced Pratap to grant a truce, while he promised not to
is at least 200 miles. It is very far away from Bijapur, off the usual track of campaigns, and occupying an out-of-the-way hilly nook. I cannot imagine any motive that could have brought Bahlol to this place; there was no rich city in this region for him to plunder, no Maratha outpost to break up. If the battle-field was correctly named Nesari, it must have been some other Nesari, nearer to Panhala and connected with it by a frequented road. Is Nesari a copyist's error for Nigva? There are two places of the latter name near Kclhapur (Sh. 40 S. W.) ​ commit any further hostility against Shivaji. So the Maratha army withdrew, instead of following up their success and capturing the whole of the stricken enemy force.
The Bijapuris with their numerous wounded, fell back on Tikota (13 m. west of Bijapur); but being reinforced appeared in the Panhala district again a few months later (Feb. 1674.) Shivaji sharply censured Pratap Rao for having let Bahlol Khan escape, when he could have easily crushed him and ended for ever his frequent menace to the Maratha possessions in the Southern Desh tract and the roads leading across the Ghats to South Konkan. Pratap Rao, immediately after the battle of Umrani, had dashed off to plunder parts of Golkonda, Telingana and Berar. On returning from this raid, which was utterly useless from the military point of view, he found Bahlol back near Panhala and received an angry message from his master saying, "Bahlol has come again. Go with your army, destroy him and win a complete victory. Otherwise, never show your face to me again ! "
Stung to the quick by this letter, Pratap Rao sought Bahlol out at Nesari, "in a narrow passage between two hills." Smarting under his master's censure, he threw generalship to the winds, and rushed upon Bahlol followed by only six horsemen, the rest of his army hanging back from the mad charge. The gallant seven were cut down by the swarm of foes, and much havoc was done among ​ the Marathas who were disheartened by the fall of their leader; "a river of blood flowed." Shivaji greatly mourned the death of Pratap Rao and repented of his angry letter. The dead general's relatives and dependents were well provided for, and his daughter was married to Raja Ram, the favourite son of the king.
Anand Rao, a lieutenant of Pratap Rao, rallied the disheartened army of his chief. Shiva appointed Hansaji Mohite* commander-in-chief in succession to Pratap Rao, gave him the title of Hambir Rao, and ordered him not to return alive without defeating the enemy. At this Hambir Rao went off with the whole body of his cavalry far into Bijapur territory in search of Bahlol. Dilir Khan with the Mughal army advanced promptly to the succour of his brother Afghan, Bahlol Khan. But Hambir Rao, not daring to fight two such large forces, retreated towards Kanara, making forced marches of 45 miles a day. The two Khans, unable to overtake the mobile Marathas, gave up the pursuit and turned,— Bahlol to Kolhapur and Dilir to Panhala, whence, after a ​ 5 days' halt with the intention of besieging it, he fell back on his base (Parnir?)
Hambir Rao, penetrating further into Kanara, robbed the city of Pench,* 24 miles from Bankapur, in Bahlol's jagir, looting at least 150,000 hun worth of booty. Thence he returned with 3,000 ox-loads of plunder. Bahlol and Khizr Khan, with 2,000 cavalry and many foot-soldiers,tried to intercept him near Bankapur, but were defeated after a desperate battle and put to flight with the loss of a brother of Khizr Khan. Hambir Rao robbed the entire Bijapuri army, captured 500 horses, 2 elephants, and much other prize. (March, 1674.) † ​ But the Bijapuris had their revenge immediately afterwards. Bahlol Khan, "regarding the loss [of the elephants] as a great disgrace to him, became desperate, attacked the robbers again, and being reinforced secured such a victory that the robbers had to abandon 1,000 horses and were pursued for a long distance." It was not the Maratha policy during a raid to fight pitched battles. So, Hambir Rao rapidly retreated with his booty to Shiva's dominions, left it there in safety, and then (in April) burst into Balaghat. *
§9. Defeat of Dilir Khan, Jan. 1674.
Late in January 1674, a Mughal army tried to descend into Konkan and cause a diversion in that quarter simultaneously with the Bijapuri invasion of the Panhala region. But Shiva stopped the paths by breaking the roads and mountain passes and keeping a constant guard at various points where the route was—most difficult"; and the Mughals had to return baffled. It was probably this expedition to which the English merchants refer in a letter written at the end of January 1674, in the following words, "Dilir Khan hath lately received a rout by Shivaji and lost ​ 1,000 of his Pathans, and Shivaji about five or six hundred men" If so, Dilir Khan had either made a rash frontal attack on one of the entrenched passes or fallen into an ambuscade of the Marathas. Throughout these four months, December 1673 to March 1674, Shivaji's wars with Adil Shah and the Siddis were carried on languidly with only occasional outbreaks of vigour. The soldiers on both sides were weary of fighting and their commanders not in earnest to end this paying business. The winter rains of this year were very heavy and bred pestilence. Shiva in December and January was compelled to distribute his horses throughout his dominions in order to stable them in comfort.*
Soon afterwards, the Mughal power in the Deccan was crippled. The rising of the Khaibar Afghans became so serious that Aurangzib had to leave Delhi (7th April) for Hassan Abdal, in order to direct the war from the rear, and next month Dilir Khan was called to the North-western frontier. Bahadur Khan was left alone in the Deccan with a greatly weakened force. This lull in the war was utilised by Shivaji to crown himself with the greatest pomp and ceremony. (M. A. 132; F. R. Surat 88, Oxinden's Letter, 21 May, 1674.)
The eve of Shivaji's coronation affords a suitable time for making a survey of his territorial ​ position. We have seen at the end of Chapter II. what his kingdom was in 1648 and in 1655. His gains between October 1659 and February 1660 were short-lived except in S. Konkan. Here he completed the conquest of the Ratnagiri district by taking possession of its western part (including all the ports except Rajapur and Vingurla) as well as its southern extremity. From this time his power began to impinge on that of the Savants of Vadi (or the desais of Kudal, as they were then called), and after a long and confused struggle much of the latter's territory as well as the ports of Rajapur and Vingurla passed into Shivaji's hands, (by the middle of 1663), and all South Konkan owned him as its sole master. He had already wrested the western coast of the Kolaba district from the Siddis.
What he ceded to the Mughals by the Treaty of Purandar (1665) touched only his territories in the Puna and Thana districts, while his acquisitions in middle and South Konkan remained intact. Most of these cessions even were recovered in 1671 .
From 1664 the Marathas began to raid Kanara, — both the Karwar coast and the uplands of Hubli and Bednur; but their actual conquest of the coast was achieved as late as 1675.
Maratha activities in 1671 and 1672 resulted in the annexation of Baglana (north of the Nasik district) and the Koli country (Jawhar and Ramnagar) in Konkan, between Surat and the Thana district. The hill-forts in the Chandor range seem to have ​ repeatedly changed hands between the Mughals and the Marathas. But their importance in Shivaji's eyes was only strategical, as they secured his northward route to Baglana and Khandesh.
Southwards, Shivaji's power was firmly planted by his annexation of Panhala in 1673 and Kolhapurand Ponda in l675"." Thus his boundary in 1675 extended beyond the Kolhapur district well into western Karnatak or Kanara uplands.
The full extent of his kingdom at his death (1680) will be described at the beginning of Ch. XV.
* ↑ *Dil. 102-104. 106; Sabh. 73. "Mahabat Khan is come as far as Nasik Trimbak and hath taken 4 castles; Huturnt ( = Ahivant) and Salhir are the names of two of them." (F. R. Surat, 105, Bomb, to Surat, 8 April 1671.) But the Mughals did not recover Salhir, though Sabh. 73 says so. They only captured Ravla-Javla and Markandagarh.
* ↑ *F. R. Sural 106, Bombay to Surat, 13 Jan. and 20 Jan. 1672. The town taken by Dilir Khan is spelt in the English Factory Records as Puna Chackne and Puna Caukna, and described as "a place of great concern in a very large plain in the heart of all Shivaji's upper country." This description suggests Puna and not Chakan; but we have no direct evidence that Shivaji got back Puna and Chakan from the Mughals by the treaty of 1665 or that of 1668. The English record a rumour, which we know was baseless, that at the capture of this place Dilir Khan killed Kartoji Gujar. the Maratha Lieutenant-General, (i.e., Pratap Rao.) Supa, a few lines above, may easily be a copyist's error for Puna in the Persian MS. of Dilkasha, 107, which, however, is silent about this Mughal victory. Chitnis, 119, says that the Marathas recovered Chakan by force in 1667 or later.
* ↑ * They were released after a time and returned to Ahmadnagar (Dil. 115.) On the Maratha side also many soldiers were slain and only one chief of note, Surya Rao Kakre, a comrade of Shivaji's youth.
* ↑ † O. C. 3633, Surat to Co.. 6 April. 1672. Ramaji Pangre's heroic battle with Dilir near fort Kanera (Sabh. 73) must be placed here.
* ↑ * Now called Dharampur. The old capital Ramnagar, now known as Nagar stands 24 m. s. w. of Dharampur, the new capital.
* ↑ * Conquest of Koli country: F . R. Surat, Vol. 3, Consult. Surat 21 June, 1672; Vol. 87, Surat to Bombay, 21 and 25 June; Vol. 106, Bombay to Surat. 8 July; O. C. 3649; F. R. Surat, Vol. 87, Surat to Persia, 1 November 1673; Sabh. 72
* ↑ *Dil. 116, 120-122 (full.)
* ↑ * It is probably this campaign that is referred to in M. A. 128, among the Court news of 1673, in the following
* ↑ * They are named in Dilkasha as Fardapur, Tundapur, Malkapur, Bararpuri, Rajdhir, Lakanwarah, Deogaon, Rajwara, Dilirpur, &c.
* ↑ * But Z. C. asserts that he besieged Junnar (i.e., Shivner) in Sept. 1670.
* ↑ *F. R. Surat 106, Bomb, to Surat, 10 Oct., 1673 O. C. 3910; F. R. Surat 88, Karwar to Surat, 17 Dec.
* ↑ * Battles of Umrani and Nesari: Sabh. 78-79 (reads Jesari for Nesari); B. S. 399-400 (full about Umrani, but silent about Nesari); Chit. 126 (has Babse Navari for Nesari.) Dig. 271 (meagre.) Z. C. names the place Nivti. Narayan Shenvi writes from Raigarh, 4th April, 1674, "Pratap Rai fell in the encounter of Shivaji's army with Bahlol Khan in a narrow passage between two hills, who with six horsemen more were slain, being not succoured by the rest of the army, so that Bahlol Khan remained victorious." (F. R. Surat, Vol. 88.) Umrani is 36 m. w. of Bijapur (Ind. At., 40 S. E.) According to Duff's authorities, Pratap Rao's appearance near Bijapur induced the Regent to recall Bahlol from Kolhapur and the latter general was intercepted by the Marathas at Umrani on the way to Bijapur. There is no Jesari in the maps. A critic suggests Nesari, 18 m. n. w. of Belgaum city (Sh. 41 N. W.) It is no doubt situated in "a narrow passage between two hills," but there are several objections to this identification. Nesari stands 83 miles s. w. of Panhala in a straight line, across rugged hills, so that the distance by the actual route
* ↑ * The new commander-in-chief's name is given as Hasaji (Hansaji) Mohite by both Sabhasad and Chitnis. The latter adds (p. 126) that Hasaji attacked Bahlol's army when dispersed in pursuit, converted the defeat into a victory, and chased Bahlol back to Bijapur. But Narayan Shenvi, writing from Raigarh, only a month later, on information supplied by Shiva's ministers, states that Anand Rao rallied the leaderless army after the fall of Pratap Rao.
* ↑ * The whole of this paragraph and the next is based upon Narayan Shenvi's letter of 4th April 1674 (F. R. Surat, Vol. 88) and the Dutchman Vain Reade's letter of 15th Dec. 1674, (Dutch Records, Vol. 32, No. 824), which latter calls the pillaged bazar "Honspent, situated on the borders of Bijapur near Bankapur." (Hospet near the ruins of Vijaynagar cannot be the place meant.)
* ↑ † Sabhasad refers to this campaign on p. 80, but gives other names to the place of battle and the Bijapuri general: "Hambir Rao went with his army to Sampgaon [19 m. s. e. of Belgaum.] Husain Khan Miana, a great Bijapuri general, with 5,000 Pathans marched against Hambir Rao. A severe battle took place between them, from noon till next morning. Many men horses and elephants were slain in Husain's army. He was captured with 4,000 horses, 12 elephants, many camels, and property beyond calculation. His whole army was destroyed." See also Chitnis, 146; Dig. 339. Z. C. says that towards the end of March 1674, the Marathas looted Sampgaon and that Anand Rao fought Khizr Kh. capturing two elephants.
* ↑ * Sabhasad, 81, says that Hambir Rao's raid extended over Khandesh, Baglana, Gujrat, Ahmadabad, Burhanpur, Berar, and Mahur, to the bank of the Narmada, and that the tired Mughal pursuers always lagged 30 or 40 miles behind, so that the Marathas returned home unmolested and with all their booty.
* ↑ * Narayan Shenvi's letter from Raigarh in F. R. Surat, Vol. 86; O. C. 3906 and 3939; Dutch Records, Vol. 34. No. 840.