# The Proletarian Revolution in Russia/Part 7/Chapter 2

II
A NEW PHASE OF THE REVOLUTION
We have defeated the bourgeoisie, but it is not yet destroyed and not even completely subjugated. We must, therefore, resort to a new and higher form of the struggle with the bourgeoisie, we must turn from the very simple problem of continuing the expropriation of the capitalists to the more complex and difficult problem—the problem of creating conditions under which the bourgeoisie can neither exist nor come into existence again. It is clear that this problem is infinitely more important and that we shall have no Socialism until it is solved.
Comparing our revolution with the revolutions of Western Europe, we are now approximately at the point which was reached in 1793 and 1871 in France. We have a right to be proud of the fact that we have reached this point and that in one respect we have, undoubtedly, gone somewhat further, as we have decreed and established throughout Russia a higher type of state—the Soviet government. But we cannot possibly rest satisfied with these achievements, for we have only begun the transformation toward Socialism, and in this respect we have not yet accomplished anything decisive.
Of decisive importance is the organization of strict and universal accounting and control of production and distribution. But, we have not yet effected accounting and control in those enterprises and in those branches and departments of economic effort which we have taken away from the bourgeoisie, and without this there can be no question of the second, just as essential, condition for the establishment of Socialism, viz: to increase the productivity of labor on a national scale.
It would therefore be impossible to formulate the problem of the present period in the simple sentence: continue the offensive against capital. In spite of the fact that we have, undoubtedly, not conquered capital—and that it is absolutely necessary to continue the attack on this enemy of the toilers,—such a proposal would be vague and not concrete, it would not indicate the peculiarity of the ​present period, when, in the interests of a successful final offensive, it is necessary to "halt" the offensive for the present.
This can be explained by comparing our position in the war against capital with the position of a victorious army which has captured, let us say, half or two thirds of the enemy's territory and is compelled to halt the offensive in order to recuperate, to increase the supply of ammunition, to repair and to strengthen the communication lines, to build new store-houses, to bring up new reserves, etc. A halt in the offensive of the victorious army under such conditions is necessary in the interests of conquering the remaining territory from the enemy, that is, in the interests of complete victory. Whoever fails to understand that just such a "halt" in the offensive against capital is dictated to us by the objective situation of the pesrent period does not understand anything of this situation.
Of course, we can speak only metaphorically of a "halt" in the offensive against capital. In an ordinary war it is possible to issue a general order to halt the offensive, it is possible actually to stop the forward movement. In the war against capital the movement forward cannot be stopped, and there can be no question of our renouncing any further expropriation of capital. We are considering here changing the centre of gravity of our economic and political work. Heretofore measures for the immediate expropriation of the expropriators were prominent. At present prominence must be given to the organization of accounting and control in those enterprises in which the capitalists have already been expropriated.
Were we to attempt now to continue the expropriation of capital with the same intensity as heretofore, we would surely be defeated, for our work in the organization of proletarian accounting and control has—it is clear and obvious to every thinking person—not kept pace with the work of the direct "expropriation of the expropriators." If we will now turn all our efforts to the work of the organization of accounting and control, we shall be able to solve this problem, we shall overcome our shortcomings and win our "campaign" against capital.
But is not the admission that we have shortcomings to overcome, equivalent to an admission that some mistake has been committed? Not at all. We will again use a military example. If the enemy can be defeated and forced back by the use of light cavalry only, this should be done. And if this can be done successfully only up to a certain line, it is quite conceivable that beyond this line it becomes necessary to bring up the heavy artillery. Admitting that it is ​now necessary to overcome our shortcomings in bringing up the heavy artillery, we do not at all admit that the victorious cavalry attack was a mistake.
We were frequently reproached by the servants of the bourgeoisie for conducting a "Red Guard" attack on capital. An absurd reproach, worthy indeed of the servants of the money pouch. For the "Red Guard" attack on capital was at that time absolutely dictated by the circumstances.
First, capital was offering military resistance through Kerensky and Krasnov, Savinkov and Gotz, (Gegechkori is even now offering such resistance), Dutoff and Bogajevsky. Military resistance can be crushed only by military means, and the Red Guards were contributing to the noblest and greatest historical cause, the cause of the emancipation of the exploited toilers from the oppression of the exploiters.
Second, we did not at that time give preeminence to the method of management over the method of suppression for the additional reason that the art of management is not an inherent quality, but is gained through experience. At that time we did not have this experience. But now we have it.
Third, then we would not have had at our disposal specialists in different branches of knowledge and technology, for they were either fighting in the ranks of the Bogajevskys, or were still in a position to offer systematic and persistent passive resistance through sabotage.
Does this mean that the "Red Guard" attack on capital is the right method always and in all circumstances, and that we have no other methods of fighting capital? To think so would be very naive. We have won with light cavalry, but we also have heavy artillery at our disposal. We have won thus far by the method of suppression. We shall be able to win also by methods of management. We should be able to change our fighting methods with the changing circumstances. We do not for a moment reject the "Red Guard" suppression of the Savinkovs and Gegechkoris as well as of any other bourgeois counter-revolutionist. But we will not be so stupid as to give exclusive preference to the "Red Guard" methods.
At present, when the epoch of the necessity of "Red Guard" attacks is, in the main, past (and completed victoriously), it is becoming urgent for the proletarian state authority to make use of ​the beourgeois specialists for the purpose of re-plowing the soil so that no bourgeoisie may ever grow on it.
This is a peculiar epoch, or rather period of development, and in order definitely to defeat capital, we should be able to adapt the forms of our struggle to the peculiar conditions of the period.
Without the direction of specialists in different branches of science, technique and experience, the transition to Socialism is impossible, for Socialism demands a conscious mass movement toward a higher productivity of labor in comparison with Capitalism and on the basis which has been attained by Capitalism. Socialism must accomplish this movement forward in its own way, by its own methods; we shall be more explicit, by Soviet methods. But the specialists are inevitably bourgeois, on account of the whole environment of social life which made them specialists. If our proletariat, having obtained power, could have rapidly solved the problems of accounting, control and organization on a national scale (this was impossible on account of the war and the backwardness of Russia)—then, having crushed sabotage, we should have obtained through universal accounting and control the complete submission of the bourgeois specialists. In view of the considerable delay in installing a system of accounting and control in general, although we have succeeded in defeating sabotage, we have not yet created an environment which would put at our disposal the bourgeois specialists. Many saboteurs are coming into our service, but the best organizers and the biggest specialists can be gained by the state either in the old bourgeois way (that is for a higher salary) or in the new proletarian way (that is by creating such an environment of universal accounting and control which would inevitably and naturally win the approval and attract the services of specialists). We have now been forced to make use of the old bourgeois method and consent to a very high remuneration for the services of the biggest of the bourgeois specialists. All those who are acquainted wth the facts understand this, but not all give sufficient thought to the significance of such a measure of the proletarian state. It is clear that this measure is a compromise, that it is a defection from the principles of the Paris Commune and of any proletarian rule, which demands the reduction of salaries to the standard of remuneration of the average worker,—principles which demand that "careerism" be fought by deeds, not by words.
Furthermore, it is clear that such a measure is not merely a halt in a certain part and to a certain degree of the offensive against ​capital (for capital is not a quantity of money but a definite social relationship) but also a step backward by our Socialist Soviet state which has from the very beginning proclaimed and carried on a policy of reducing high salaries to the standard of wages of the average worker.
Of course the servants of the bourgeoisie, particularly of the petty kind, like the Mensheviki and the Right Social-Revolutionists, will chuckle at our admission that we are taking a backward step. But we should pay no attention to their glee. We must study the peculiarities of the highly difficult and new road to Socialism without concealing our mistakes and weaknesses, but trying to overcome deficiencies in time. To conceal from the masses the fact that to attract bourgeois specialists by extremely high salaries is a defection from the principles of the Commune, would mean that we had lowered ourselves to the level of bourgeois politicians and were deceiving the masses. To explain openly how and why we have taken a backward step and then to discuss publicly the means we have to overcome our deficiencies—this means educating the masses and learning from experience, learning together with them how to build up Socialism. There has been hardly a single victorious military campaign in history in which the victor has not chanced to make individual mistakes, to suffer partial defeats, to temporarily retreat somewhere. And the "campaign" against Capitalism which we have undertaken is a million times more difficult than the most difficult military campaign, and it would be foolish and disgraceful to become dejected because of a particular and partial retreat.
Let us take up the question from the practical side. Let us assume that the Russian Soviet Republic must have a thousand first class scientists and specialists in various departments of science, technique and practical experience to direct the work of the people in order to accomplish most quickly the economic rehabilitation of the country. Let us assume that these great "stars" must be paid twenty-five thousand rubles each. Let us assume that this sum (25,000 rubles) must be doubled (assuming premiums granted for particularly successful and rapid accomplishment of the most important tasks of organization and technique) or even made four times as large (assuming that we must get several hundred better paid foreign specialists). Well, then, can this expenditure of 100,000,000 rubles a year for reorganizing the work of the people according to the last word of science and technique be considered excessive or unbearable for the Soviet Republic? Of course ​not. The vast majority of the conscious workers and peasants will approve such an expenditure, knowing from practical life that our backwardness compels us to lose billions, and that we have not yet attained such a high degree of organization, accounting and control which would cause the universal and voluntary participation of these "stars" of the bourgeois intelligentsia in our work.
Of course, there is another side to this question. The corrupting influence of high salaries is beyond dispute—both on the Soviets (the more so, since the rapidity of the Revolution made it possible for a certain number of adventurers and loafers to join the Soviets, together with the incapable and dishonest among certain commissaires, who would not mind becoming "star grafters") and on the mass of workers. But all thinking and honest workers and peasants will agree with us and will admit that we are unable to get rid at once of the evil heritage of Capitalism; that the Soviet Republic can be freed from this "tribute" of fifty or a hundred millions of rubles (a tribute for our own backwardness in the organization of universal accounting and control from the bottom up) only by organization, by increasing discipline among ourselves, by getting rid of all those who "maintain the traditions of Capitalism," that is, of loafers, parasites and grafters. If the conscious workers and peasants will succeed, with the help of Soviet institutions, in organizing and disciplining themselves, and in creating powerful labor discipline in one year, then we will in one year do away with this "tribute" (which may be reduced even sooner) depending on the measure of success attained in creating labor discipline and organization among the workers and peasants. The sooner we ourselves, workers and peasants, shall learn better labor discipline and a higher technique of labor, making use of the bourgeois specialists for this purpose, the sooner we get rid of paying tribute to these specialists.