# Heroic Story of the Czecho-Slovak Legions/The famous "retreat"

VIII.
THE FAMOUS “RETREAT“.
MILAN, March 28.
The Czecho-Slovak National Assembly in Russia, after the Bolshevik revolution of October, 1917, acted very prudently, waiting for further developments. The leaders had to maintain relations with two separate Governments, the one at Petrograd and the other at Kieff, for Ukrainia had declared her independence before the end of the year. The two Czecho-Slovak divisions amounted, with their additional formations of artillery and engineers, to about 50,000 men. They had to be fed and clothed, and they had to use a good deal of tact in obtaining supplies. Both divisions being stationed in Ukrainian territory, the first in Volhynia and the second in the government of Poltava, the Ukrainian Government, which continued friendly to the Czechs, consented to supply the CzechoSlovak legions. There was no trouble till it was known that Ukrainia had decided to make separate peace overtures to Germany and Austria. Events then followed very rapidly, and the story is told by Captain “S.,“ who was then at Borispol, as follows:
The Ukrainian Government had taken over the control of the Russian troops in its territory when it proclaimed its independence, and it was therefore also obliged to keep our army. Our leaders, however, insisted on it being understood they took no part in the interior disputes of Russia. We agreed to hold a part of the front and to guard the depots in the interior.
The situation remained very critical during the months of December, 1917, and January, 1918. It was sometimes difficult to discern between Bolsheviks and Bolsheviks, some from Greater Russia and some from Ukrainia. They all worked in one direction as regarded the war, and that was to come to separate peace with the enemy. It soon became apparent that German influence was at work at Kieff, and that German ​emissaries had already arrived. Early in January one of our delegates was at the Government House of Kieff when he heard that preliminary negotiations for peace had already begun. He asked the Ukrainian officials if it were true, and was told that it was. He at once went to report the conversation to Professor Masaryk, who convened the National Assembly, or, at least, as many of the members as were in or near Kieff, and consulted with them. The first Ukrainian Government had been everthrown, and a Germanophile Hetman, General F., took command and supreme power. He executed a real coup d’état, relying on German and Austrian support.
Our National Assembly declared that as the new Government had begun separate peace negotiations, it was obliged to sever all relations with it. To sever our relations with a Government in whose territory our whole army was stationed was too paradoxical a situation to last very long. There would soon be no more fighting on the front; an armistice, to which our troops could not consent, was about to be proclaimed, and rapid measures had to be taken if our army was not to fall into the hands of the enemy. Our council decided on the immediate removal of our troops from the front their transportation to the Western front. It was impossible to think of conveying the army north to Murmansk, as that region was deserted; there were no supplies; the railway lacked material; and the Bolsheviks would give no end of trouble.
MARCH THROUGH SIBERIA.
The only was to transport our whole army by way of Siberia to Vladivostock, and thence, by ships supplied by the Entente, to Europe. The consent both of the Ukrainians and the Russian Bolsheviks to this plan was reluctantly given. The question of disarming us was not yet broached, but there were many other questions still to be decided. Instructions were given to all our regiments to prepare immediately for transport eastward. Our Assembly could not even lose its time in idle negotiations with the Ukrainians, who had betrayed the Allied cause, for railway transportation for our troops. If such immediate transport was lacking, the only way was to start on foot. Our entire first division was in this critical situation. In a few days its camps were struck, its convoys, ammunition, supplies, and artillery trains were set moving, and the men started on foot on a march of 200 kilometres from Volhynia to the banks of the Dnieper, in the direction of Jakotin.
This was the beginning of what afterwards became the famous “Retreat of the 100,000.“ We anticipated many difficulties, hardships, and reverses, but I think few of us thought that after more than one year, in the spring of 1919, our “Legions“ would still be waiting in Siberia for the famous retreat to finish. The march began on Feb. 15, 1918, ​and a week later the advance echelons formed their junction with the Second Division at Jakotin. At the very outset the “Retreat“ was marked by skirmishes, and the Dnieper Division did not finish its march without some serious engagements.
It appears that before our division in Volhynia started, Austrian offers were made through the Ukrainian Government for an honourable surrender. Kaiser Karl’s agents, either hypocritically or seriously, offered that if we surrendered we should not only not be treated as traitors, but should be sent back to our country, and that, furthermore, Bohemia would obtain its full autonomy. It was an offer that could only be rejected with indignation by our leaders, as they knew too well the perfidy and treachery of Austria towards our nation. It was evidence, incidentally, that the Austrians and Germans knew of our resolution to retreat, and as might well be expected, they took measures to prevent it. On its line of march through Volhynia our division was obliged to pass through the very centre of large German-speaking colonies not very favourably disposed to us. They, no doubt, would give the enemy indications of our movement. We soon learned that German and Austro-Hungarian troops were making forced marches to overtake us and cut off our retreat. Had they succeeded, our enterprise would have been defeated at the very start. But our scouts were also active everywhere, and we were able to elude the pursuit.
PURSUED BY ARMED MOTORS.
The first contact our echelons had with the enemy was at Zitomir, or, as it is variously spelt, Jitomir or Zytomierz. It was a short skirmish with German detachments sent in pursuit in armed motor cars. Several of these cars passed our troops, and they were allowed to get well beyond our last columns. Then, from each side of the road, our companies who had been prepared to stop them, opened fire on them. The first car contained an officer, who happened to put his head out of the car just as our machine-guns opened fire on it. His head sank, never to rise again, and the soldiers jumped out after the car came to a halt. Two of them were killed, as we learned, and the rest captured. The other cars that followed the first one met a similar fate. None of the Germans cars thus sent in pursuit ever returned to their own. The next engagement was at the big bridge over the Dnieper at the outskirts of Kieff.
It was a warning to us that we had not begun our retreat a minute too soon. The Germans had full liberty to enter Ukrainia. The whole southern front had ceased to exist. The soldiers of the former Russian army had either voluntarily abandoned their trenches and scattered over the country, or had fraternised with the Germans and Austrians, selling ​them entire batteries for a few packets of cigarettes. There was nothing, therefore, to hinder the Germans from starting in our pursuit even before an armistice had been officially declared and before peace negotiations had actually been begun at Brest. In fact, three or four German divisions started across Volhynia to overtake us. The skirmishes we had were with the outposts sent ahead of the armies. At the bridge over the Dnieper these outposts were no longer isolated. They consisted of several companies followed by strong battalions. One of our companies took up position at the head of the bridge and held it a whole day against big odds. Later our battalions got into action and easily routed the Germans. The bridge was held till every man and all our material had got safely across.
The question of our safe retreat now became an extremely serious one, not only strategically, but also from the point of view of transport and freedom of movement. It required all the tact and genius of our military commanders and of our patriotic leaders. All co-operated with the greatest energy and self-abnegation, and individual commanders of companies and battalions each contributed his share to make it a success. Had it not been for this sincere, whole-hearted, and devoted co-operation of all, and the initiative, courage, and intelligence of our men, the success of our retreat might have been jeopardised at the very outset. We could feel certain that the Germans would bring pressure to bear on the Bolsheviks to put all sorts of difficulties in our way, and this was clearly proved when soon afterwards the Bolsheviks demanded that we should leave most of our arms and equipment behind. No railway material was placed at our disposal, and it was, therefore, clearly a case of our taking it without asking leave or doing without it.
ROLLING STOCK SEIZED.
Our commanders, as well as our privates, always showed themselves equal to any emergency Engines, trucks, railway cars of every description, wherever found, stationed or abandoned, were seized or requisitioned by them. No discussion was tolerated. We either had to use our authority and force or give up our plan. In a short time we had under our control more than 100 engines and 3,000 cars, enough to make up seventy big transport trains on the lines between Borispol and Poltava and Kieff and Kursk. Our task was facilitated by the general disorder. Stationsmasters had become accustomed to arbitrary requisitions by the Russians before us and by the Ukrainians. There was no longer any fixed order or general direction. Russian deserters had freely compelled engine drivers and railway employees to do their bidding at all the stations, to stop passenger trains, goods trains, and empty trains, and drive in any direction, according to the caprice of the soldiery, the ​Red Guards, or anyone who had sufficient force or audacity to command them. Our privates had learned it themselves, and having seen Russian soldiers command enginedrivers at will, they also resorted to the same means, and brought together numerous trains even without the assistance of our officers.
Our forces took two directions, following two railway lines, one over Poltava to Kharkov and Kursk, the other from the junction north of Kieff, vià Bakmatch, Bjelopol, and Loom to Kursk. The larger part of the Second Division moved over Poltava. The First Division started north, via Bakmatch. A parth of the forces had already passed through safely when, on March 7, it was learned that the Germans had succeeded in throwing several columns against Bakmatch, and that more regular German troops were coming to cut of the rest of our echelons. A curtain, therefore, had to be thrown out between Nieshin and Bakmatch to protect the line for a distance of about forty kilometres. Two battalions were detailed from Bakmatch to move in the direction of the oncoming Germans and to test their strength. They had several skirmishes with outposts, and after getting in touch with the main force of the enemy they fell back.
They reported the strength of the enemy to be about one division. All the railway material was immediately requisitioned. Three extra trains were thus quickly formed and conveyed troops beyond Bakmatch. The Ukrainian stationmasters were kindly disposed to our troops. The Ukrainian local authorities and soldiers themselves became very nervous and excited at the approach of such a large German force. Vaguely they looked to us for protection, not being quite certain yet as to what would happen. A Ukrainian colonel came with assurances from the general staff that they had negotiated with the Germans, and it was agreed that the station of Bakmatch would be neutral and free for our troops to pass. We little trusted this assurance, and deemed it best to take its protection into our own hands. In fact, later on it was learned that general Linsingen declared that his subordinate had given his consent without authorisation. He ignored the promised neutrality, and gave orders that we were to be attacked at once.
A FOUR-DAYS’ BATTLE.
Three of our battalions, however, had been sent forward to protect Bakmatch and its approaches. One battalion took entire charge of the railway station, the telephone and telegraph wires and all the public offices. In the midst of the excitement a small detachment of Bolshevik soldiers joined us, and were going to help us to defend the line. The Germans continued to concentrate around us from March 7 to March 10, and our preparations were pushed with equal energy. Captain Čeček ​of the 4th Regiment directed these operations. We felt that it was one of the biggest actions we had yet been called upon to fight, and took steps accordingly. The 4th Regiment and two battalions of the 6th and 7th Regiments defended Bakmatch, and began the attack on the morning of March 10. The Germans were taken by surprise and some confusion followed. Three of our batteries opened fire at a distance of about a mile and a half, and the whole German line staggered.
But they had large reserves coming up, and brought them into action. Their artillery also replied, and the battle continued for several hours, with great stubbornness on both sides. I may say that a Bolshevik battery which took part in the action did very good work for a while, and enabled our men to make a successful bayonet attack on the Germans, routing their gunners and taking possession of their batteries. But when an attempt was made to take away the guns it was found too difficult a task owing to the marshy ground, and they were abandoned.
On March 11, 12 and 13 the battle continued over a large area, our battalions beating and routing the Germans everywhere, so that at last, after four days of most obstinate fighting, the enemy retreated in disorder. Our operations were commanded by Colonel Červinka, whose strategy proved superior to that of the Germans, just as the courage of our men was superior to theirs. Our losses were severe enough, for we could not afford to weaken our numbers, but the German losses were far greater. Our men counted from 1,500 to 2,000 Germans dead on the various battlefields, and we lost 400. To cover their failure the Germans announced that they had taken 11,000 Czecho-Slovak prisoners. This was most absurd, as on principle not one of our men surrendered, and we could account for all. Our regiments after the severest action we had yet fought returned almost intact.
The glorious result was that our railway communications were now fully assured, and our retreat could continue without further menace from the enemy. The Germans were so thoroughly beaten that they did not renew their attempt, and we learned later they fell back on their positions at Gemel. Our reputation and prestige rose enormously and reports went round that we numbered more than 300,000. The fact is in one of our battalions defending the nearest point to Bakmatch we had only 580 bayonets and two machine guns. Our whole fighting force was only 4,000. The German division was one of the best, too, composed exclusively of the so-called “Reichstruppen“, and they expected an easy victory. They learned that we were more than a match for them.
TRAINSLOADS OF MUNITIONS.
The railway lines as far as Pensa, a distance of 800 kilometres (about 500 miles), were now at our disposal. A huge quantity of material ​fell into our hands, much more, in fact, than we needed. The Bolsheviks withdrew in haste northward at the approach of the Germans, abandoning everything. In the vicinity of Bakmatch alone we found twentyseven locomotives and 750 cars. As we proceeded further up we found hundreds of abandoned locomotives, more than 1,000 cars loaded with all sorte of goods, and army material. There were trainloads of munitions, rifles, flour, sugar, provisions of every description, uniforms, petroleum, even aeroplanes, and a number of guns. I said that a Bolshevik detachment fought with us. But it is hardly right to call them Bolsheviks. They were Russians who still had the national sentiment, and were Bolsheviks only in name. Quite a number of detached loyal troops still remained here and there before the ignominious peace of Brest-Litovsk was signed.
We moved most of the captured material northward, some of it as far as Pensa, at the express request of these troops, and thus we saved huge quantities of it from falling into the hands of the Germans. The value of the material saved by us, which afterwards was mostly restored to the Russians, amounted to something like a miliard of roubles. The Germans had hastened their divisions forward probably as much with the idea of rounding up and carrying away all this war booty as to cut off our retreat. It is known that they already contemplated a vast raid on all Ukrainia, which they afterwards carried out mercilessly when we were no longer there to defend it.
I may mention that one of the difficulties which we had at the very outset of our retreat was that of ready funds. There were only 30,000 roubles in our regimental treasuries at Kieff, and it was necessary to get away our money from Moscow. There was deposited there in sure hands 3,000,000 roubles, and it was very urgent to secure this money. Our National Assembly sent a delegate, Captain “P,“ and another trusted officer and two soldiers on this perilous mission. They spoke Russian perfectly, and dressed as soldiers in Russian uniform. They went further, and joined the Bolsheviks on the way to Moscow, eating and drinking with them, doing sentry duties with them in turn, and thus got to Moscow. After taking possession of the money at Moscow they packed it in their kits with soiled linen, and started on their return journey in the direction of Kharkoff. They had left Kieff at the end of February, and arrived in Kharkoff on March 12, with the 3,000,000 roubles safely in their rough bags, the Bolsheviks never having examined them.
CZECHO-SLOVAKS IN ENGLAND.
Before our general retreat towards Siberia began several of our echelons from Borispol started north by way of Moscow to Murmansk and Archangel for Europe. This was the route which the Allies would ​have preferred us to take, and there were frequent discussions about it in the months of November and December. But the Allies did not realise as we did all the difficulties. The line north of Moscow was not only exposed to the danger of the Bolsheviks, but it led for a distance of more than 1,000 kilometres through regions without any food or possibility of obtaining provisions. To spend the whole winter in the frozen north would have simply meant the death of our army, as the Bolsheviks could easily have cut us off and left us to starve. In Siberia, on the contrary, we were sure of finding provisions in abundance everywhere, as our officers and men had had ample opportunity of seeing when they were in the various prisoners’ camps, and the whole Siberian population, we also knew, would be friendly to us.
The echelons that started north in December got through after many adventures. They had to use their authority on many an occasion, and several times when they reached a station the Bolshevik Soviet simply took to flight, frightened by the very name of the Czecho-Slovaks. They knew that not only were we ready to fight our way, if nesessary, but also that the inhabitants everywhere were favourable to us and sided with us the moment we appeared. Our columns remained for months waiting before they could embark, and had to defend themselves against several attacks from Bolshevik troops sent purposely north to try and annihilate them. Two steamers finally came to their rescue at the end of March, and they were safely taken to England, and landed at Newcastle in the month of April, 1918. They met with an enthusiastic reception from the English public, which gave them an ovation as they marched to the railway station from the steamer, and many of my comrades to this day recall with gratitude the cordial reception given them by the people of Newcastle. It was a relief to them, after years of exile and the danger of being frozen or starved to death in the Artic Circle, to get such a warm welcome in England.