# FW/PBS, Inc. v. Dallas/Concurrence White

* Court Documents
* Case Syllabus
* Opinion of the Court
* Concurring Opinions Brennan White Stevens Scalia
Justice WHITE, with whom the Chief Justice joins, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I join Parts I, III, and IV of the Court's opinion but do not agree with the conclusion in Part II that the Dallas ordinance must include two of the procedural safeguards set forth in Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 85 S.Ct. 734, 13 L.Ed.2d 649 (1965), in order to defeat a facial challenge. I would affirm the Fifth Circuit's holding that Freedman is inapplicable to the Dallas scheme.
The Court has often held that when speech and nonspeech elements "are combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms." United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376, 88 S.Ct. 1673, 1678-79, 20 L.Ed.2d 672 (1968). See also Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 298-299, 104 S.Ct. 3065, 3071-3072, 82 L.Ed.2d 221 (1984); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 562-564, 85 S.Ct. 476, 479-481, 13 L.Ed.2d 487 (1965); Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 48, n. 7, 87 S.Ct. 242, 247, n. 7, 17 L.Ed.2d 149 (1966). Our cases upholding time, place, and manner restrictions on sexually oriented expressive activity are to the same effect. See Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 106 S.Ct. 925, 89 L.Ed.2d 29 (1986); Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 96 S.Ct. 2440, 49 L.Ed.2d 310 (1976). Time, place, and manner restrictions are not subject to strict scrutiny and are sustainable if they are content neutral, are designed to serve a substantial governmental interest, and do not unreasonably limit alternative means of communication. Renton, supra, 475 U.S., at 47, 106 S.Ct., at 928. See also Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 647-648, 101 S.Ct. 2559, 2563-2564, 69 L.Ed.2d 298 (1981); Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771, 96 S.Ct. 1817, 1830, 48 L.Ed.2d 346 (1976). Renton and Young also make clear that there is a substantial governmental interest in regulating sexually oriented businesses because of their likely deleterious effect on the areas surrounding them and that such regulation, although focusing on a limited class of businesses involved in expressive activity, is to be treated as content neutral.
Justice O'CONNOR does not suggest that the businesses involved here are immune from the kind of regulation sustained in Young and Renton. Neither is it suggested that the prerequisites for obtaining a license, such as certificates of occupancy and inspections, do not serve the same kind of a substantial governmental interest dealt with in those cases nor that the licensing system fails the test of content neutrality. The ordinance in no way is aimed at regulating what may be sold or offered in the covered businesses. With a license, operators can sell anything but obscene publications. Without one-without satisfying the licensing requirements-they can sell nothing because the city is justified in enforcing the ordinance to avoid the likely unfavorable consequences attending unregulated sexually oriented businesses.
Justice O'CONNOR nevertheless invalidates the licensing provisions for failure to provide some of the procedural requirements that Freedman v. Maryland, supra, imposed in connection with a Maryland law forbidding the exhibition of any film without the approval of a board of censors. There, the board was approving or disapproving every film based on its view of the film's content and its suitability for public viewing. Absent procedural safeguards, the law imposed an unconstitutional prior restraint on exhibitors. As I have said, however, nothing like that is involved here; the predicate identified in Freedman for imposing its procedural requirements is absent in these cases.
Nor is there any other good reason for invoking Freedman. The Dallas ordinance is in many respects analogous to regulations requiring parade or demonstration permits and imposing conditions on such permits. Such regulations have generally been treated as time, place, and manner restrictions and have been upheld if they are content neutral, serve a substantial governmental interest, and leave open alternative avenues of communication. Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574-576, 61 S.Ct. 762, 765-766, 85 L.Ed. 1049 (1941); Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, supra, 468 U.S., at 293-298, 104 S.Ct., at 3068-3071. The Dallas scheme regulates who may operate sexually oriented businesses, including those who sell materials entitled to First Amendment protection; but the ordinance does not regulate content and thus it is unlike the content-based prior restraints that this Court has typically scrutinized very closely. See, e.g., Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 51 S.Ct. 625, 75 L.Ed. 1357 (1931); National Socialist Party of America v. Skokie, 432 U.S. 43, 97 S.Ct. 2205, 53 L.Ed.2d 96 (1977); Vance v. Universal Amusement Co., 445 U.S. 308, 100 S.Ct. 1156, 63 L.Ed.2d 413 (1980); Freedman v. Maryland, supra.
Licensing schemes subject to First Amendment scrutiny, however, even though purporting to be time, place, and manner restrictions, have been invalidated when undue discretion has been vested in the licensor. Unbridled discretion with respect to the criteria used in deciding whether or not to grant a license is deemed to convert an otherwise valid law into an unconstitutional prior restraint. Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 150-152, 89 S.Ct. 935, 938-939, 22 L.Ed.2d 162 (1969); Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 486 U.S. 750, 757, 108 S.Ct. 2138, 2143, 100 L.Ed.2d 771 (1988); Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313, 78 S.Ct. 277, 2 L.Ed.2d 302 (1958); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 71 S.Ct. 328, 95 L.Ed. 280 (1951); Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 71 S.Ct. 312, 95 L.Ed. 280 (1951); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 68 S.Ct. 1148, 92 L.Ed. 1574 (1948). That rule reflects settled law with respect to licensing in the First Amendment context. But here there is no basis for invoking Freedman procedures to protect against arbitrary use of the discretion conferred by the ordinance before us. Here, the Court of Appeals specifically held that the ordinance did not vest undue discretion in the licensor because the ordinance provides sufficiently objective standards for the chief of police to apply. 837 F.2d 1298, 1305-1306 (CA5 1988). Justice O'CONNOR's opinion does not disturb this aspect of the Court of Appeals' decision, and because it does not, one arguably tenable reason for invoking Freedman disappears.
Additionally, petitioners' reliance on Riley v. National Federation of Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 108 S.Ct. 2667, 101 L.Ed.2d 669 (1988), is misplaced. Riley invalidated a licensing requirement for professional fundraisers which prevented them from soliciting prior to obtaining a license, but which permitted nonprofessionals to solicit while their license applications were pending. We there held that a professional fundraiser was a speaker entitled to First Amendment protection and that because "the State's asserted power to license professional fundraisers carries with it (unless properly constrained) the power directly and substantially to affect the speech they utter," id., at 801, 108 S.Ct., at 2670, the requirement was subject to First Amendment scrutiny to make sure that the licensor's discretion was suitably confined. Riley thus appears to be a straightforward application of the "undue-discretion" line of cases. The Court went on to say, however, that even assuming, as North Carolina urged, that the licensing requirement was a time, place, and manner restriction, Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 85 S.Ct. 734, 13 L.Ed.2d 649 (1965), required that there be provision for either acting on the license application or going to court within a specified brief period of time.
Contrary to the ordinance in these cases, the Riley licensing requirement was aimed directly at speech. The discretion given the licensors in Riley empowered them to affect the content of the fundraiser's speech, unless that discretion was suitably restrained. In that context, the Court invoked Freedman. That basis for applying Freedman is not present here, for, as I have said, the licensor is not vested with undue discretion.
Neither is there any basis for holding that businesses dealing in expressive materials have been singled out; all sexually oriented businesses-including those not involved in expressive activity such as escort agencies-are covered, and all other businesses must live up to the building codes, as well as fire and health regulations. Furthermore, the Court should not assume that the licensing process will be unduly prolonged or that inspections will be arbitrarily delayed. There is no evidence that this has been the case, or that inspections in other contexts have been delayed or neglected. Between the time of the District Court's judgment and that of the Fifth Circuit, Dallas granted some 147 out of 165 license requests, and none of the petitioners in making this facial challenge to the ordinance asserts that its license application was not promptly dealt with, that it was unable to obtain the required inspections promptly, or that it was unable to secure reasonably prompt review of a denial. Clearly the licensing scheme neither imposes nor results in a ban of any type of adult business.
I see no basis for invalidating this ordinance because it fails to include some prophylactic measures that will guard against highly speculative injuries. As Justice O'CONNOR notes in the course of refusing to apply one of the Freedman procedural mandates, the licensing in these cases is required of sexually oriented businesses, enterprises that will have every incentive to pursue the license applications vigorously. Ante, at 229-230. The ordinance requires that an application be acted on within 30 days. Licensing decisions suspending or revoking a license are immediately appealable to a permit and license appeal board and are stayed pending that appeal. In addition, no one suggests that licensing decisions are not subject to immediate appeal to the courts. As I see it, there is no realistic prospect that the requirement of a license will have anything more than an incidental effect on the sale of protected materials.
Perhaps Justice O'CONNOR is saying that those who deal in expressive materials are entitled to special procedures in the course of complying with otherwise valid, neutral regulations generally applicable to all businesses. I doubt, however, that bookstores or radio or television stations must be given special breaks in the enforcement of general health, building, and fire regulations. If they must, why would not a variety of other kinds of businesses, like supermarkets and convenience stores that sell books and magazines, also be so entitled? I question that there is authority to be found in our cases for such a special privilege.
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent from Part II of Justice O'CONNOR's opinion.

## Notes

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