# Heresies of Sea Power/Part 2/Chapter 4

IV
COLONIES AND SEA POWER
Colonies and Sea Power are supposed to be closely connected: it is to be proved that Colonies are only born of Sea Power, and also that Sea Power is born of Colonies.
The natural birth of colonies is admirably described by Captain Mahan. As a nation sent out commercial shipping it felt the need of distant stations—commercial bases—and these grew into colonies. 'A foothold in a foreign land, a new outlet for what it had to sell, a new sphere for its shipping, more employment for its people, more comfort and wealth for itself.' This was the old idea of colonies when the world was vast and mostly unexplored. So were founded those Phœnician colonies which developed into states like Carthage, in no way bound to the mother state, but sympathetic in many matters from ties of self-interest, chiefly through a supreme distrust of other nationalities. Those who went forth, however, went always to found a new empire, not to create a foreign possession.
​In later times the colonising instinct manifested itself in a variety of ways. Thus the Dutch colony in Japan never aimed at possessing Japan or in securing anything save a pied à terre for the convenience of trade: the 'imperial idea' was totally absent here though present elsewhere. Spain on the other hand colonised imperially only, the colony was a foreign possession out of which to extract wealth as tribute and the spoils of war. Then came the English colonising era, which had a good deal of its birth in a desire to steal from Spain the good things which Spain had stolen from others.
Other colonies were founded in emulation with other nations. Speaking generally the British colony was imperial in the sense that it was always a piece of England set down on foreign soil (as in Virginia, where the squire with his country mansion was an early feature); but it was primarily a commercial undertaking. Then there were colonies taken from other nations by force of arms, like South Africa; huge colonies like Australia; colonies that came near to being independent allied nations, like India in the days of John Company; and colonies established purely as military posts, like St. Helena and many another island. Each colony, in fine, had something different in its inception and probably only one thing ​was common to them all and this that they never had about them any notions as to 'Sons of Empire' or (saving perhaps Virginia which is a British colony no more) any poetical idea about 'founding a new England across the seas.' The settler went much as he might have migrated from Northumberland to Cornwall because he considered that he would better himself by doing so. It has been reserved for the present age to discover the 'Sons of the Empire,' 'Britain beyond the Seas,' 'the men who can ride and shoot,' and all those other phrases which sound so big and mean so little because the day of them is passing. When the colonies were peopled by emigrants from home there was no occasion to create sentiments on imperial lines, the colonist was an Englishman and had no more need to proclaim the fact than the man in Cornwall. His descendants, however, are not Englishmen, they are Australians, Canadians, South Africans, or whatever the colony may be, with essentially different interests. A stream of fresh emigrants serves to preserve something of the Old Country sentiment, but the native-born Australian is Australian, reared under a different climate and different conditions. He is 'Britain beyond the Seas' when sensible of advantages to be derived therefrom, but quite ready to 'cut the painter' and cease to be a 'Son of the Empire' when his material advantages run in that direction. And it must be confessed that he could hardly be a good colonist or a logical one without being so. He may ​appreciate the very flattering descriptions of himself to be found in the verses of Kipling, he may in some cases be wrought up to the Imperial Idea so far as the sentimentality of it goes, but despite Kipling and a Navy League Envoy he does not contribute his share to the maintenance of the British Navy. An attempt to make him do so would probably result in something akin to the tea chest incident in Boston Harbour in the days of George III. From the standpoint of the British Imperialist this is deplorable; but from any independent standpoint it is really quite reasonable. The English are a Teutonic race, but this never led them to bother about their German fatherland in the past, simply because they had become of another nationality. So the colonials must, by the nature of things, drift into other nationalities if they have any stamina, unless their interests and those of England are identical—an unlikely event.
Interests, indeed, are tending to do anything except converge. Each colony has its own problems. Australia for instance, and British Columbia can never regard the advent of Japan as a world power as that advent is regarded in England. The problem of Japanese immigration will never be felt in England, but it is even now a real thing both in Australia and British Columbia. If Australia shuts out Japanese and Japan objects to any marked extent, what is England's position? Australia has a perfect right to shut out Japanese, Japan has an equal right to demand ​admission, merely following the practice of nations in the past. Supposing matters to become acute, is it England's duty to fight Japan if necessary on the question at her own expense for a matter that concerns only Australia? It is obviously not to England's interest so far as Japan is concerned, but of what use is England to Australia unless she is ready to do this? Australia by herself certainly could not offer any military resistance to Japan worth the name.
Again, there is the case of Canada and the United States. A dispute in which England must fight the United States or sacrifice Canada is quite possible. It is palpably not to England's interest to fight the United States for the sake of retaining Canada as a piece of red upon the map; but the chief use of the Mother Country to Canada is as a safeguard against American expansion northward. Of course did Canada desire to unite with the States the Mother Country would offer no military objection; but the question is: In what way does the Canadian colony benefit the Mother Country? This is a hard question to answer, except on the grounds of sentiment. Corn comes thence, it is true; but corn, wherever it comes from, is sent by people who wish to make money by selling it.
The policy of knitting the colonies closer to the Empire by drawing fighting material from them has much to recommend it; but equally so has that policy of gradual dissociation which contemplates the eventual establishment of the colonies as independent republics, ​and of the two it is the more logical, because the tendency of colonies to become independent units is an historical fact.
The best argument for the retention of the colonies so long as possible is that if independent to-day they would become the property of Germany or some such nation to-morrow. Were England to renounce all ties, South Africa would become German South Africa, Canada part of the United States and Australia a portion of the Japanese Empire. What England would actually lose thereby is difficult to assess. She would certainly not lose financially, for the colonies represent no income while they do represent a loss in the expenses of their naval defence. On the other hand it is probable that trade outlets would be restricted thereby through tariff walls created by the new proprietors—all of whom would rule with heavier hands than England. Canada as a portion of the United States might continue to flourish; but South Africa and Australia would alter very considerably and the present inhabitants become something like 'hewers of wood and drawers of water' to their German and Japanese conquerors. Therefore these two at any rate are very considerable gainers by the existing state of things—a point by no means sufficiently recognised. The question, indeed, is far more whether the Mother Country can afford to continue owning them, than whether they should demand sacrifices from England. It is they who are the chief gainers by things as they ​are; since except in the matter of trade they are of no value at all to England.
The general colonial ideal, and one that will eventually be accomplished, is, however, to be self-supporting entirely. This is a perfectly natural and legitimate ideal, having nothing to do with the subject of this chapter except in so far as it may be regarded as evidence towards the theory that British colonies are or will be luxuries rather than necessities to the nation.
From the naval standpoint the colonies represent nothing worth consideration in the way of assistance financial or otherwise. The colonies are simply something to be defended.
Colonial defence is proposed to be conducted on two lines:—
(1) By the Imperial Navy acting on its own general lines.
(2) By local colonial defence.
This last is the one more in favour with the colonials who, far removed from any conception of war preparations and so forth, appear totally unable to realise that they can only be attacked at all should the Imperial Navy fail to operate effectively nearer the centre of operations.
It is furthermore little recognised that whatever colonial defence may exist, if anything is sent against a colony it will assuredly be a force amply sufficient to annihilate any defence force.
​It should, however, be borne in mind that a colonial defence force of ten ships would necessitate a more powerful attack than would one consisting of two ships, and therefore colonial aspirations towards colonial navies are not so altogether unreasonable as some might imagine.
Yet the point is of small importance owing to the fact that the Imperial Navy bars the way to any hostile expedition. Consequently the only possible conditions under which a colonial local naval force could be used would be after the defeat of the Imperial Navy: in which case it would be used merely to experience annihilation at the hands of a superior force. Thus regarded the best colonial defence, and the only feasible one, is in direct contribution to the Imperial Navy, to the upkeep of which the colonies ought to contribute the same sum per head of population as is contributed by the people of the British Isles.
Were such a contribution made there would probably be a not unreasonable demand for a voice in the distribution of the Imperial Fleet. The question of the distribution of the fleet is one that demands an appreciation of great generalities possessed by few men: for however self-evident it may be to the thinker that to be in superior force wherever the enemy may be is the surest defence, an enormous number of people are firmly convinced of the possibility of 'raids conducted by forces which have evaded the defending fleet'—a condition possible only when ​that fleet is inadequate. One of the strongest of popular conceptions is that local defence is a sovereign remedy—and there is every reason to suppose that colonial influence upon the question of fleet distribution would be almost entirely made up of demands for local defence. As the population of the colonies is so small in proportion to the area to be protected it would thus follow that either totally inadequate and useless local defences were provided, or else undue calls would be made upon the Imperial fleet to its detriment.
The naval defence of Australia for instance is probably best assured by a fleet some ten thousand miles or so away from Oceania; but it will be a long day before Australians as a whole will realise this and a still longer day before its people will be satisfied to pay their share to an invisible navy. The demand on the faith of the colonial man in the street is too great.
Consequently the colonies are likely to remain a tax upon an Imperial Fleet to which they contribute practically nothing; and this may be the lesser of two evils.
The nightmare of colonials—when such matters enter their thoughts at all—is that some large hostile cruiser may 'get through' and devastate their coasts. In actual fact the devastation so caused by a ship far from a base would be trifling, and would certainly be unlikely to remunerate the enemy for the loss of the cruiser's services nearer home, nor is it probable ​that it would equal in many cases the loss to the Imperial Fleet caused by the detachment of ships beforehand in contemplation of such an eventuality. It may be taken, however, that the colonial view of the matter would be in different perspective to the English view of it. On the whole it may be said that colonies whether
born of Sea Power or not, are assuredly a drag upon it.
The colonies of other nations are of considerably lesser extent, and also of still less utility. Of what value for instance are the Philippines to the United States? They may some day indirectly swell the national revenue; but they represent also a very probable cause of future friction with Japan, for which there is no commensurate advantage. Kiao Chau again, is probably nothing but an expensive toy to Germany, despite its nominal reputation as a trade base. It is certainly a tax on the German navy just as the Philippines are on the United States fleet. In the case of war between any two countries it is clear that all over-sea possessions will fall into the hands of the nation with the superior fleet. This patent fact is used as an argument of great power by naval expansionists, but whether such over-sea possessions really benefit a nation has never been altogether determined. It is in no way clear that a big mercantile marine is the child of colonies, or depends upon the existence of colonies for its own existence. England has much ​the largest mercantile fleet in existence and she has much the largest colonial empire. But Norway with no colonies at all has about one and a half million tons of mercantile marine to a population of about two and a quarter millions. The British mercantile marine is somewhere about ten and a quarter million tons and about one and a half million more for the colonies, &c, with a population for the United Kingdom of about forty-two millions: that is to say the United Kingdom with an immense colonial empire has about .25 of a ton of shipping per head of population where Norway without any colonies at all has .66 of a ton of shipping per head of population—or a good deal more than double as much! The two cases are extreme, but still undoubtedly suggest that there is no necessary connection between the possession of colonies and a large mercantile marine.
It is not the purport of this chapter to try to prove that England's colonies are useless to her—apart from other considerations the question is outside the scope of the book. But it is certainly to be suggested that colonies are of no advantage whatever to the Navy, and that there is a good deal of scope for someone to convince colonials that, instead of the empire depending upon them for its existence, it is they that owe their existence to the empire. It is a point which colonial opinion is often unaware of.
* ↑ Influence of Sea Power on History.
* ↑ Cuba was so regarded by Spain up to the last. The Spaniard who went there invariably regarded the Cubans merely as something out of which he could make a fortune to take back to Spain.