# My War Memoirs/Chapter 11

XI
(a) The Year 1917 a Crisis in Allied Policy
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The Allied Note to President Wilson was a great encouragement to all who wanted to fight to the end; but for that very reason it stimulated the opportunists to press their peace negotiations. I cannot precisely say to what extent Vienna interpreted the wording of the note as a warning sign of her ultimate fate, and was thus frightened into repeated peace overtures, either with or without Germany. Nor do I know to what extent some of the Allied politicians considered that the note was to be regarded only as a threat to the Habsburg Empire which need not be carried out, but which could be used in the attempt to separate Austria-Hungary from Germany, and to obtain a separate peace with Vienna.
Having spent the month of January at Rome, I left on February 5th to visit Masaryk in London. During my stay in London, Svatkovsky came to Paris where, on February roth, he had an interview with Dr. Sychrava, with whom he left a message for Masaryk and myself. Dr. Sychrava was startled by this interview. Svatkovsky spoke about Austria-Hungary in the same terms as in December, but he was more emphatic. The dismemberment of Austria-Hungary was, he said, to be postponed for some twenty or thirty years. “You Czechs,” declared Svatkovsky, who had visited Izvolsky on the same day, had brought him news from Switzerland, and had received instructions from him, “cannot withdraw. You must aim directly and thoroughly for the destruction of the Empire. But the Entente and Russia are entitled to attempt a separate peace with Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria.” He thereupon gave an account of the news which he had from Vienna. At the Court there was said to be a strong feeling against the Germans. The ​Government circles considered that the Southern army, which was purely an Austrian one, could be relied upon for all eventualities. Andrássy was in Switzerland and Radev, the Bulgarian Minister, was there too. Svatkovsky had had an opportunity of a conversation with him at Geneva. It was possible to negotiate with them, and it seemed clear that such negotiations would take place. He added that Russia herself was so weak that any final victory on her part was now out of the question. Coming from Svatkovsky, this was a serious admission.
Dr. Sychrava showed Svatkovsky No. 79 of our Russian paper, Čechoslovák, which he had just received, and in which it was stated that “the public opinion of Slavonic Russia, which ought to have the initiative in Slavonic and consequently also in Czechoslovak affairs, unfortunately continues to be in a backward state.” Svatkovsky’s reply to this was a surprising one: “I, too, have reports on that from Vienna. Czernin recently expressed an almost identical opinion. In Vienna they appear to be aware that our success with the Allied Note to Wilson did not proceed from Russia. They conjecture that it was managed by England.” He added that with regard to the peace negotiations a favourable moment was being awaited, and as far as possible it would be when the Germans had suffered some kind of military blow. The general plan would be that Russia would receive Eastern Galicia, Rumania the southern part of the Bukovina, while the share of Serbia would be Bosnia and Herzogovina. Arrangements would be made with Italy for minor concessions, as the latter country was unwilling to fight until the end. Some authorities wanted to let Austria have Upper Silesia in order the more easily to induce her to change sides, and they even reckoned with the possibility that Austria would fight on their side against Germany. We and the Jugoslavs were to receive a certain measure of autonomy within Austria. It was explained that the word “liberation” in the Allied Note to President Wilson was not to be interpreted in the sense of “independence.”
At that time I saw no immediate and direct danger in Svatkovsky’s statement. I, too, had not taken the wording of the note to President Wilson in the sense mentioned, as I had faith in the Allies. I was strongly under the influence of this success which we had achieved, and I myself had seen under what circumstances it had come our way. Nevertheless, I was ​taken aback when I noticed that just as Svatkovsky had made his statement, the Matin, which was in touch with influential persons at the Quai d’Orsay, and had rendered me so much assistance in connection with the note to Wilson, suddenly changed front and began to publish suspiciously Austrophile articles.
We soon ascertained through Osusky that the articles came from Switzerland, that they were directly connected with Svatkovsky, and that they coincided with the beginning of the peace overtures of Sixtus of Bourbon. Simultaneously with this, I observed a certain hesitation and uneasiness with regard to us in various French circles, including those who were well disposed to our cause. To-day, knowing all that was going on behind the scenes, we can form a correct estimate of these matters in their political aspect. I myself did not lose confidence. I regarded these symptoms as resulting from the numerous manœuvres on the part of Austrophiles in France, who were connected with certain prominent Russian circles. In my opinion the best course was not to worry about these matters, but to proceed unswervingly on our way.
(b) Count Mensdorff-Pouilly’s Mission
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While Sixtus was negotiating, other more or less important attempts were being made. Some of them were actual attempts to bring about negotiations, while others were mere intrigues. Some of them emanated from authorized persons who were equipped with direct official instructions, but in addition to them there were, especially at Berne, Lausanne, Geneva, the Hague, and Stockholm, various agents and other unofficial intermediaries, all of whom, in one way or another, were endeavouring to bring the belligerent Powers into touch, directly and indirectly.(32)
On the Austrian side the most active part in this respect was taken by Count Mensdorff-Pouilly, the former Austrian Ambassador in London, and also by Count L. Skrzynski, at that time Austrian attaché at Berne. Mensdorff’s first action was taken in March and April 1917. On March roth the Austro-Hungarian Minister in Berne communicated a statement from Rostworowski and Haguenin to the effect that the French authorities would like to discuss peace problems with some ​representative of Austria-Hungary. At that time there was a feeling of great anxiety in France and in Austria-Hungary. Both these States were exhausted by the war, and after the tension which had been produced by the peace movement in the previous December, and the conflicts over the note to President Wilson, a strong reaction and weariness had set in on both sides, to which the uncertainty arising from the Russian revolution had added.
Czernin eagerly availed himself of the Rostworowski-Haguenin interview (this was at a time when Sixtus was busy with his peace scheme). On March 18th Czernin announced that he would send Count Mensdorff to Switzerland for the purpose of negotiating. The ostensible purpose of Mensdorff’s visit was to inspect the Swiss hospitals for the troops of the Allies and Central Powers. Czernin also informed Berlin of what was being done, but Zimmermann, the German Minister of Foreign Affairs, displayed very little readiness to negotiate, although in the end he gave his consent with reservations. In no case must there be any discussion on the Alsace-Lorraine problem. Mensdorff left for Switzerland at the beginning of April and spent a few days there. The French delegate, however, who, according to the news from French quarters, was to undertake his mission with the knowledge of England, did not arrive. With regard to willingness for peace negotiations, Mensdorff could learn nothing more than Vienna had already been informed by the Austro-Hungarian Legation at Berne. I have been unable to ascertain how far Rostworowski and Haguenin were acting merely upon their own conjectures, or whether they really had any instructions from official quarters.
Nevertheless, a certain importance may be attached to Mensdorff’s interview with Mrs. Barton at Geneva(33) on April 4, 1917. As a result of this interview, Mensdorff learnt the following facts, which he reported to Vienna: (1) France and England were willing to reach an agreement with Austria-Hungary, but they did not wish to negotiate with Germany. (2) The problem of Alsace-Lorraine must be settled to the advantage of France. (3) Austria-Hungary would have to separate from Germany if she desired to attain peace, for in Allied circles it was felt that Germany was making use of the Habsburg Empire as an emissary, through whose peace overtures she wished to arrive at negotiations for a general peace. Mrs. Barton also indicated to Mensdorff that it was of no use ​reckoning upon negotiations with the French delegate, as America’s entry into the war had produced an encouraging effect in France and England. The result would be for some time to come that the most bellicose element in France would predominate.
The report of Mensdorff’s interview, which was transmitted to Berlin, caused Zimmermann much uneasiness. At that time the authorities at Berlin were strongly opposed to any kind of concessions, as they believed in the success of the submarine warfare. They also underestimated America as a source of danger to them, and felt confident that the Allies would be weakened through the effects of the Russian revolution. Zimmermann expressed this point of view very emphatically to Prince Hohenlohe, the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, who at once informed Czernin of the feeling in Berlin.
Czernin did not share Zimmermann’s views in the least. On April 7, 1917, in the sense of the conversation which had taken place during Karl’s visit to Hamburg, he sent Zimmermann a detailed statement which undoubtedly had considerable significance. This statement disclosed the situation at Vienna, and indicated the views which were held by Government circles in Vienna as to the destiny of the Empire. Germany must bear in mind—so declared Czernin—that Austria-Hungary was unable to continue fighting on account of her internal political and economic situation. Germany, too, he said, was in a similar situation, and the war must therefore be concluded by the summer of 1917 at the latest. Hence Germany would have to make considerable concessions on the Western front, or else the Central Powers would be compelled to conclude peace on more unfavourable terms. Austria-Hungary was willing to help in this, and had given proof of her willingness by the offers which she had made at Homburg (Czernin here referred to the concessions which Vienna had made for the benefit of Germany in Polish affairs).
Although the Mensdorff-Czernin scheme came to nothing, Vienna continued to pursue the same policy. New opportunities were sought in Switzerland, Holland, at Copenhagen, and Stockholm. The most important efforts were those made in Holland, where Count Szechenyi, with the help of M. Loudon, the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs, tried to get into touch with the British in August and September 1917. Czernin again decided that Mensdorff should be sent to Holland for the same ​ostensible purpose as that connected with his visit to Switzerland. Matters had already been definitely settled, but at the last moment the scheme proved abortive. These details indicate the general feeling among the authorities at Vienna in the summer of 1917.
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Without awaiting the results of his peace efforts in the West, or comprehending the actual difficulties and obstacles which stood in the way of their realization, Czernin carried on the same manœuvres in the East. He thought that the Russian revolution and its consequences could be well utilized for the benefit of the Central Powers, even by diplomatic means, and that the precarious situation of Russia might cause the Russian revolutionaries to conclude a separate peace with the Central Powers, if skilful advantage were taken of the new circumstances. Czernin therefore, supported by Karl and Zita, with perseverance and skill continued his peace efforts.
From an international and also internal point of view, the spring of 1917 was certainly the final date for Austria to conclude a peace which would more or less maintain her existence, although, of course, with the loss of some of her territory. Czernin’s whole policy shows that he realized this fact. Herein we find an explanation of the steps taken by Czernin from the outbreak of the Russian revolution to the victory at Caporetta. After the latter battle, and more particularly after the conclusion of peace with the victorious Bolsheviks, he slightly changed his attitude and procedure.
(c) Our Liberation Movement Abroad and our Policy at Home
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I must now discuss our policy at home and its relations to our movement abroad. In the first place, this was just the period when our policy at home definitely emerged from its previous passivity. Then, too, the overtures for a separate peace with Vienna were made at a period when the Viennese Government was passing through the most critical phases of its existence during the war, and when its chief concern was to prevent ​anything from happening at home which might be detrimental to its peace efforts. Accordingly, there are a number of moves, especially those taken by Czernin, which must be explained in connection with the policy of the Czech delegates at Vienna in the spring and summer of 1917.
I have already explained in detail how we began our activities with the full knowledge and consent of the chief political personalities at home. All of them were familiar with the feelings and desires of the Czech nation at the outbreak of the war. Throughout the war, too, we were in communication with them. Our plan necessarily involved close co-operation with our politicians at home, and it was a condition for our success that we should not be disavowed by them in the sight of the Allies.
The Austro-Hungarian Government and the military command knew as well as we did that the feeling of the great bulk of the population was against Austria-Hungary. They therefore adopted terrorizing tactics, partly against the leading politicians, who were regarded as dangerous persons, partly against the more venturesome individuals or newspapers. Later on, these tactics were extended so as to include Czech books, Czech schools, and all aspects of the national culture and tradition in general. However, these facts are sufficiently well known, and I shall not dwell upon them here.
In our propaganda abroad we took full advantage of this situation. The official terrorism in Austria-Hungary served the interests of our cause. The first phase of our policy at home—political passivity accompanied by persecution of the bolder elements—provided our movement abroad with a proof of the revolutionary feeling of our nation, and we were able to confirm this by pointing to the wholesale surrendering of our troops to the Allies. So altogether, during the first two years of the war, our nation impressed itself favourably upon Allied opinion. The persecution of such politicians, journalists, and authors as Klofáč, Dušek, Machar, and Dyk, especially the trial and condemnation of Kramář and Rašín, supplied our propaganda with weapons which proved to be most troublesome to our opponents. We were also assisted very effectively in our work by the discussions and efforts in the political and economic circles of Austria during 1916, which aimed at bringing about a closer co-operation between Germany and the Habsburg Empire in political, and especially in economic, matters. In view of the fact that the Balkans and Poland were then dominated ​by the Central Powers, these efforts on the part of the German nationalists in Austria were a strong argument in our favour. The political schemes in Vienna to introduce German as the State language, to centralize Austria as a complete entity with the exclusion of an autonomous Galicia, to Germanize the administration in Bohemia, at the very moment when Wilson and others were beginning to discuss the self-determination of nations, strengthened our position abroad and showed that our propaganda against the Habsburg Empire was justified.
The second phase of our domestic policy from the end of 1916, however, caused us much alarm and anxiety at first, and serious political embarrassments later on. What we feared was that we should be disavowed, and in all the messages which we sent home we insisted that any step of this kind should be most carefully avoided.
When Koerber came into office and announced that he would govern with the Parliament, we realized that our internal policy would have serious troubles to contend with. Either each party would go its own way—in which case we feared that there would be manifestos of loyalty to the dynasty on the part of the Catholics and the Social Democrats, nor were we sure of the Agrarians and the Young Czechs—or else the parties would arrive at a joint compromise which would necessarily involve a basis of opportunist policy.
Nevertheless, we publicly welcomed the formation of the “League of Czech Deputies” and the “National Committee” on November 19, 1916. We interpreted this step as indicating that important internal events were in preparation. We drew attention to Koerber’s measures as regards Poland and Galicia, which were to be excluded from Cis-leithania, and thus by bringing about the isolation of the Czechs in Vienna would facilitate the coercive nationalistic policy. We emphasized the fact that the formation of the bodies referred to constituted our defensive measures against the Germans, and that by causing Vienna fresh internal difficulties they would help to weaken the Central Powers in a military respect also.
From December 1916 until the manifesto issued by the Czech authors in May 1918, the problems of Czech domestic policy caused us much concern. What caused us particular embarrassment in the Allied countries were the acts of opportunism among certain of our Parliamentary representatives, and more than once we had to explain that the Czech nation itself was opposed ​to these time-serving leaders, and that it would subsequently call them to account. Official circles in France, Great Britain, and Italy did not allow these details to shake their faith in us. They were acquainted with the activities of our “Maffia,” concerning which they received information from independent sources. In the same way their own news service enabled them to form an idea of the actual situation in Austria-Hungary. Nevertheless, the attitude of our political parties in 1917 caused them at various times to wonder whether we were only extremists who could not be regarded as advocating the wishes of the whole Czech nation.
Our misgivings increased when Clam-Martinitz became Prime Minister on December 20, 1916, and Czernin Minister of Foreign Affairs two days later. The establishment of this Government coincided, in point of time, with one of the peace moves of the Central Powers. From Prague we were receiving news about the coercion of our politicians, and the movement for the defence of Kramář and Rašín. We heard that Austrian Government circles were adopting a menacing attitude towards our people, saying that peace would soon be declared, and that they would then embark upon an anti-Czech policy which would involve the dismemberment of Bohemia, new language laws, and new administrative measures, unless the Czechs displayed proper loyalty towards the Empire. I included all these points in the memorandum which I submitted to the Quai d’Orsay on December 29, 1916, when the Allied reply to Wilson was being discussed. I had, of course, hoped that our success in connection with the note to President Wilson would produce a stimulating effect upon our politicians at home. Yet as early as January 14, 1917, the National Catholic Party repudiated the note as being hypocritical and tendencious. The League of Czech Deputies then held a long discussion on the attitude which it was to adopt towards the note, and on January 23rd a resolution against the note was passed and transmitted to Clam-Martinitz and Czernin. On January 30th Czernin gave an audience to representatives of the League, before whom he placed a new resolution, similar to the former one as far as the contents went, but couched in terms far more acceptable to the Government. Czernin asked the League to send him this revised resolution, and at a meeting on January 31st the League decided to do so. Czernin thereupon issued the resolution in its revised form. It ran as follows:
​“With regard to the reply of the Entente States to President Wilson, in which it is declared that one of the war aims of the countries fighting against our Monarchy is ‘the liberation of the Czechs from foreign rule,’ the presidency of the Czech League repudiates this insinuation, which is based upon entirely false suppositions, and it emphatically proclaims that, as always in the past, so too at the present time and also in the future, the Czech nation envisages the conditions of its development only beneath the sceptre of the Habsburgs.”
The first news that we in Paris received of this was by way of Switzerland in a telegram emanating from German-Magyar propagandist sources, precisely at the moment when Sixtus of Bourbon was beginning his activities in Switzerland, and when the Austrophiles in France and England had started an agitation against the war aims formulated in the note to Wilson. As can be imagined, this produced a painful impression upon Masaryk and the rest of us. Hitherto we had acted in concert with the politicians at home, but now this course of action had been interrupted. From what we knew of the feeling among our people, we judged that they had succumbed to strong pressure on the part of the Government. That is how we explained this regrettable occurrence to official circles and the Press in Allied countries. Fresh news arriving from Prague partly reassured us. Before long we heard that Czech public opinion was extremely dissatisfied with the resolution of the League and the National Council, and that it had shown its disapproval in an unmistakable manner.
The change in the international situation which was brought about by the entry of America into the war and the Russian revolution, was evidently the cause of the very marked change of tactics in Vienna with regard to the Czechs during March and April 1917. Czernin was laboriously seeking methods for reaching negotiations with the Allies; the Russian revolution, just as in 1905, was producing a disruptive effect upon Austria-Hungary, and Milyukov’s proclamation on our behalf had evidently not failed to exert an influence upon Vienna. The Czechs at home, just like ourselves abroad, welcomed the revolution as a new political era for Russia, which would bring about an equally profound change in our own conditions. Under these circumstances, Clam-Martinitz could no longer reckon with the fulfilment of his anti-Czech schemes in Austria.
We, too, believed that these two great historical events would ​bring about important results. We knew that at that time the situation of Austria-Hungary was precarious in every respect, and we hoped that our politicians at home would attach the same importance as we did to the events in question. These hopes of ours were justified when, at the end of April, we came into possession of the first manifesto of the Czech League which displayed any considerable degree of determination. This manifesto, which was issued on April 14, 1917, while not actually opposing the Empire, nevertheless demanded that Austria should deal with the most urgent questions involving ideas of democracy, the Parliamentary system, and the revision of the Constitution on the lines implied by the self-determination of nations. It was clear that the wording of this manifesto had been prompted by the events in Russia.
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I had heard on good authority that the Austrian Parliament was to be definitely convened for May 30, 1917, and as I wished to prevent any repetition of the previous political mistakes at home, I sent the following message to Prague in the second half of April 1917, after consultation with Masaryk:
​We urgently draw attention to the fact that the victory is not yet completely gained. It would be a mistake to consider it a matter of course that Austria will be destroyed and you liberated. We still have powerful opponents who are producing proof here that the Austrian nations do not wish to be liberated. Právo Lidu is being read and quoted here as a proof against us that we are not entitled to speak on behalf of our people, who desire merely an Austrian Federation.
To-day, then, is the decisive moment. It is now no longer sufficient to repeat that your manifesto and your guarded attitude were the result of compulsion. We are aware that it is so, but the people here cannot understand it. When Serbia and Belgium have suffered so severely, they see no reason why our people should be so much afraid of prison or even greater sacrifices. You must speak your minds plainly and openly. Now, at the convening of Parliament, is the opportunity. Seeing that we need a decisive and unmistakable proof that the dynasty is not entitled to speak on behalf of the Czech nation, we call upon you to carry out the following unconditionally:
1. To grant no sanction either to the war or to the budget estimate, to the levy of troops, or to any single enactment of paragraph 14. Further, to give no permission for the continuance of the war.
2. To demand the release of all deputies, freedom of speech for them, stoppage of treason trials, and freedom of the Press. By these tactics you will best prevent the convening of Parliament.
3. To demand permission for a number of people to come and consult with us and Professor Masaryk (more particularly if he too should receive an amnesty and thus be entitled to enter Parliament) on neutral soil, and reach an agreement on our policy as a whole. In no case will Masaryk return to Bohemia and enter Parliament.
4. At all costs to repudiate any disavowal of what has been done by us or the National Council.
5. To demand historical State rights without prejudice to the gaining of Slovakia, and without prejudice to the existence of Austria.
6. In no case must all our deputies attend Parliament. At least the Bohemian and Moravian radicals must abstain. Here it would not be understood how our people can attend Parliament without causing obstruction and disorder, etc.
7. To sum up: You must set forth the problem of Czech State rights. That means that as far as we are concerned the December Constitution does not exist. In consequence, you must not attend the Emperor’s ceremony of taking the oath to the Constitution and the manifestation of loyalty. We therefore ask you not to attend Parliament for these ​ceremonies, and we will see that this produces an appropriate effect here.
I therefore repeat that these are essential for our preservation, which to-day rests in your hands.
1. Not to vote with the Government on any point.
2. Not to be present at the manifestations of loyalty in Parliament.
3. The Radicals at least, if not all, must set up a passive opposition.
4. Not to disavow us.
5. To demand State rights.
Whatever you do, there must be no repetition of the mistake made in 1848. None of you must vindicate the existence of Austria. Remember that there is a revolution in Russia, and that Russia will be a republic.
Finally, it is our wish that influence should again be brought to bear upon our troops. If the Slavonic regiments on the Italian front were to offer resistance, this would be interpreted as showing Austria’s vitality. It would therefore do us much harm. In this matter do all that you can.
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On May 19th, on the initiative of Jaroslav Kvapil, the poet and dramatist, was published the proclamation of the 150 Czech authors who felt the same misgivings as we did abroad, and in trenchant terms called upon the responsible Czech politicians to speak and act in Parliament on behalf of the Czech nation as the nation really desired. And even though it was not stated in so many words, this declaration meant that the Czech parties in Parliament should declare themselves in favour of the programme of the Czech revolutionary movement abroad, and in favour of a restoration of the Czech State, including Slovakia, without the dynasty and irrespective of the Habsburg Empire.
In Paris we received a summary of the declaration only a few days after it was published, and shortly after that the full text. It made us feel that we need have no further misgivings as to the session of Parliament. We realized the difficult situation of our leading politicians at home, and we did not expect them to achieve impossibilities. All that we wanted was that they should not lose ground. In Allied circles we emphasized that our programme was identical with theirs, even though there was a divergency in our tactics. We also insisted that we had no desire to expose our people to persecution unnecessarily. We had reasons for believing that the position of Vienna would grow worse and worse, and we therefore felt confident that now we ​should not be disavowed, but that under the pressure of public opinion the manifestos from Prague would develop more and more on radical lines.
On the day before the opening of the Parliament at Vienna (May 29, 1917) the National Council issued a proclamation, drawn up by Professor Masaryk, in the form of a protest against the summoning of Parliament. It emphasized the illegal character of this proceeding. The mandates of the deputies had not been issued in time, and more than fifty of them were unable to exercise their Parliamentary functions. Moreover, the Constitution of 1867, which did not acknowledge the Czechs, was no longer in existence, having been infringed on several occasions by Franz Josef. There were also other grounds for protest. The Austrian Government had declared war without Parliamentary sanction and against the will of the Czech nation. In every possible manner it had persecuted the Czechs, had expended the sum of 60 milliards on the war, had refused to admit eight Czech deputies into Parliament, and was instituting new repressive measures against Czechs who showed any racial consciousness. By summoning Parliament, the Austrian Government wished to transfer responsibility for the war to the nations which it governed. It also wished to exact declarations of loyalty from them, and thus produce an influence upon the Entente to their detriment.
The Czech authors had repudiated the responsibility of the Czech nation for the war, and declared themselves in favour of independent Czech territories, together with Slovakia. As, however, any considerable anti-Austrian manifestos in the Czech areas would certainly have been suppressed, it was only the National Council in Paris which was free to display the will of the nation. It therefore protested against all Austrian intrigues, and declared that the resolutions of the Parliament at Vienna could not be binding upon the Czech nation, and it expressed an unflinching determination to achieve complete independence. This declaration of the National Council met with wide comment in the Allied Press.
The reservation of State rights which the Czech League, by arrangement with the National Council, brought forward in the Austrian Parliament on May 30, 1917, demanded State rights, and emphasized the principle of the self-determination of nations. It claimed a democratic Czech State, united with Slovakia. It did not contain any declaration against the Empire, ​but only against dualism, and it admitted the possibility of transforming the Habsburg Empire into a federated State comprising free national States.
The most important passage in this proclamation was as follows:
“Therefore in this historical moment, taking our stand upon the natural right of a nation to self-determination and free development, which in our case is strengthened by inalienable historical rights and by State documents which are fully recognized, we, at the head of our people, will strive after a union of all branches of the Czechoslovak nation in a democratic State, in respect of which it is not possible to leave out of account the Slovak branch, living as a complete unit coherently associated with Czech historical territory.”
This was the passage in the proclamation upon which we based our propaganda. We explained to the Allied countries that the suggestion for a federated State was a purely tactical necessity, the purpose of which was to prevent any persecution on the part of the Austrian Government. This interpretation was corroborated by the attitude of the public at home, which, while evincing satisfaction at the outset, ignored the reference to the Empire and a federated State, but more and more laid stress upon that part of the proclamation which claimed a Czech State in combination with Slovakia.
Having thus interpreted the proclamation in a revolutionary light, and, moreover, having drawn attention to the fact that at the same meeting of Parliament the Jugoslavs, Poles, and Ukrainians had all emphasized their own national programme, we were justified in declaring to the Allied countries that the first plain symptom of dissolution had now made its appearance in the Habsburg Empire.
As I have mentioned, it was already clear to us then that with the progress of events, notably in Russia, our policy at home would assume an increasingly radical character. This assumption was soon confirmed. The refusal of the Czech League on July 12, 1917, to attend the discussions for revising the Constitution was a proof that by this time the majority of our politicians realized that the destiny of the Empire could be decided only by the results of the war. From then onwards we felt more at our ease, as we were able to explain all manifestations of our policy at home as indicating a revolutionary spirit.
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Almost at the same time as the Government at Vienna was making the peace moves which I have described above, there started an important international movement which was prolonged until the autumn of 1917. It caused much agitation in European public opinion, and it undoubtedly produced a number of results which were beneficial to our cause. I am referring to the attempt to summon a congress of the Second International at Stockholm in the summer or autumn of 1917.
At the beginning of 1917, the remaining members of the Central Executive Committee of the Second Intemational, joined by the Swedes, Danes, and Dutch (also the Belgian deputy Huysmans), formed a Dutch-Scandinavian Socialist Committee. This committee, with a view to bringing about the speedy end of the war, addressed a special questionnaire to all the Socialist parties which before the war had been members of the Second International. The questionnaire contained three fundamental queries:
1. Do the parties desire the re-establishment of the International?
2. Are they willing to attend an international Socialist conference?
3. Under what conditions would it be possible, in their opinion, to arrive at peace overtures and the end of the war?
In the Allied States all the Governments were unanimously opposed to the undertaking of the Dutch-Scandinavian Committee. The possible consequences which it involved were against the Allied interests, needs, and plans at that time. It was a source of menace to the Allies because it aimed at bringing about peace during a period when their military position was unfavourable. On the other hand, the whole of the circumstances under which it was being held fitted in more or less with the situation of the Central Powers. Czernin, who neglected no opportunity for promoting his efforts towards a speedy peace, realized that in this particular instance he would do well to make use of the Social Democratic parties of the Central Powers. In this he succeeded to a very large extent with the Austro-Hungarian Socialists, and partially also with the Germans.
As it happened, this scheme was a considerable advantage ​to our cause, as it rendered possible the dispatch of a Czechoslovak delegation to Stockholm. The National Council at Paris conceived and carried out a scheme for utilizing the action of the Dutch-Scandinavian Committee. The representatives of our liberation movement, not being connected with any organized Social Democratic parties, could not expect to be admitted to the negotiations at Stockholm. We therefore suggested to the Socialists who had taken part in our movement in America, Russia, London, and Paris, to apply to the Stockholm Conference with at least a memorandum. This was done, and the committee in Stockholm placed this memorandum at the disposal of all the Socialist parties who attended the negotiations there. The branch of the National Council at Petrograd made even more effective use of the Stockholm Conference for spreading information about our national plans and aims. Bohdan Pavlů proceeded to Stockholm, and shortly afterwards he was joined by Prokop Maxa, who spent some considerable time there. In accordance with Masaryk’s instructions they discussed matters with various members of the conference, informing them of the state of affairs in Russia, and acquainting Socialist circles with our aims. The provisional Russian Government attached considerable importance to our action in Stockholm. Milyukov expressed full approval of it and granted a diplomatic passport to Pavlů and Maxa.
The delegates of the Czechoslovak Socialist Party were Antonín Němec and Gustav Habrman. They discussed matters at great length with Maxa. He placed before them a report on the various branches of our movement, accompanied by documentary evidence. Maxa afterwards stated that the report impressed them all very much. Habrman and Němec expressed their complete approval, and Dr. Šmeral declared that he agreed with 75 per cent. of what we had done. The delegates rendered good service to our cause by giving an unbiassed account of the precarious conditions in Austria. The other Socialist delegates and also the journalists were greatly impressed by what they heard about the distress and national persecutions in Austria. Altogether, the activity of our delegates in Stockholm and the participation of our representatives from Russia promoted our revolutionary movement considerably. We were able to convey to our politicians in Prague a far more precise and detailed account of our work abroad than had been possible hitherto. There was a direct exchange of views and a removal of various doubts and uncertainties.