# A History of the Knights of Malta/Chapter 18

CHAPTER XVIII.
1565.
The festival of St. John the Baptist, on the 24th June, was celebrated by the inhabitants of the Bourg with very gloomy feelings. The sad tragedy enacted at the capture of St. Elmo had struck a panic into the hearts of all, and the horrifying spectacle of the headless and mutilated corpses which greeted their sight on the first dawn of their patron saint’s day increased the general despondency. To overcome this feeling La Valette exerted all his eloquence, and in a public address which he delivered, he urged them rather to emulate the deeds of those massacred heroes, than to mourn their fate. “What,” said he, “could a true knight desire more ardently than to die in arms? And what could be a more fitting fate for a member of the Order of St. John than to lay down his life in defence of his faith? Both of these precious boons have been vouchsafed to our brethren; why, then, should we mourn them? Rather should we rejoice at the prospect of the glorious future which they have earned. They have gained a martyr’s crown, and will reap a martyr’s reward. Why, too, should we be dismayed because the Moslem has at length succeeded in planting his accursed standard on the ruined battlements of St. Elmo? Have we not taught him a lesson which must strike dismay throughout his whole army? If that poor, weak, insignificant fort has been able to withstand his most powerful efforts for more than a month, how can he expect to succeed against the stronger works and more numerous garrison of the Bourg? With us must be the victory. Let us then, on this holy day, once more renew before the altar of God those vows of constancy which our slaughtered brethren have so ​nobly fulfilled.” After this stimulating address, a procession was formed to the conventual church of San Lorenzo, and the same solemn scene of consecration was re-enacted which had before been witnessed there.
Whilst these ceremonies marked the festival on the part of the Christians, the camp of the Turks was, on its side, filled with sounds of rejoicing at the victory. The Marsa Muscetto was now open to their fleet, and a long line of galleys, gaily decorated, triumphantly rounded Point Dragut to the strains of martial music resounding from the poops, and came streaming in succession into the newly-acquired haven. The works of St. Elmo were dismantled, and the guns captured on its ramparts despatched to Constantinople as a token of the success that had been achieved.
​Now that Mount Sceberras was in possession of the Turks, Mustapha moved the greater portion of his army round to the other side of the grand harbour, and enclosed the two peninsulas. A glance at the map will shew that two bold promontories of very high land jut out one on either side of the Bourg and Senglea, that on the south, which is the larger and most dominant, being the Coradin Hill, the one on the north being called Bighi. The trenches of the Turks were traced so as to stretch from one of these hills to the other, and when they were completed the garrison was completely cut off from succour. Before this was accomplished, however, four galleys, under the command of Don Juan de Cardona, had reached Malta, and landed their forces on the north of the island. This reinforcement consisted of forty-two knights, twenty gentlemen volunteers from Spain, eleven from Italy, three from Germany, two from England (whose names have been recorded as Edward Stanley and John Smith), fifty-six gunners, and a body of 600 imperial troops under the command of Don Melchior do Robles.
Taking advantage of a thick mist which most fortunately overspread the island (an event very unusual at that time of the year), de Robles succeeded in passing the Turkish lines in safety with his little force, and joined his brethren in the Bourg on the 29th of June. This reinforcement, slender as it was, greatly raised the spirits of all, the more so that the new corners brought the intelligence that a far more efficient force was being assembled in Sicily, which would shortly make its appearance in Malta. In proportion as the spirits of the garrison were raised, those of the Turkish army were depressed. They soon learnt that fresh troops had entered the Bourg, and their fears greatly exaggerated the number. Rumours also reached them of the large preparations going forward in Sicily, so that they felt they might at any moment be called upon to meet a new foe.
Mustapha entertained much dread at the thought of an interruption to his enterprise, and, the disastrous consequences likely to ensue therefrom, lie had no great confidence in the staunchness of his troops, so many of the best of them having been already sacrificed during the various assaults on St. Elmo. He therefore thought it advisable, if possible, to bring matters to ​an issue by means of negotiation. For this purpose he selected as an envoy a Greek slave, whom he despatched, under a flag of truce, as the bearer of most liberal terms should the Grand-Master consent to capitulate. These conditions included all that had been granted on the surrender of Rhodes, and the Order was guaranteed security both for life and property. To La Valette this mission was very unacceptable. lie had from the first determined either to carry his defence to a successful issue or to bury himself and his Order beneath the ruins of his fortress. His eloquent exhortations and his own example had roused a similar feeling in the minds of all his knights, and he was most unwilling that their firmness should be shaken by the offer of such alluring terms as those proffered by the pasha. To prevent, therefore, any further repetition of these messages, he directed that the envoy should at once be hanged. The unfortunate Greek implored mercy on the ground that he had been compelled to undertake the office. For some time La Valette remained obdurate, but at length he relented, and pointing to the ditches surrounding St. Angelo, bade the envoy inform his master that there lay the only ground within the island of Malta which he was prepared to surrender, and that only as a grave for the Turkish army.
This defiant reply shewed Mustapha that he had nothing to gain by negotiation, and that if the fortress was to be won it must be by force of arms alone, he therefore pushed forward his siege works with the utmost vigour, and early in July had completely surrounded both the Bourg and Senglea. The latter, secured at its extremity by the fort of St. Michael, was the object of his first attack, and he opened batteries upon it from every available point. Both from Mount Sceberras and the Coradin hill a tremendous fire was brought to bear upon that portion of the work which it had been determined to breach. The point selected was called the Spur bastion, which formed the extreme end touching the harbour. It ​was therefore open to assault by water as well as by land. As it was impossible for Mustapha to bring his galleys to the attack of this work by the ordinary channel through the entrance of the grand harbour without subjecting them to a deadly fire from the batteries of St. Angelo, he determined on the adoption of a novel expedient. From the upper extremity of the Marsa Muscetto to the head of the other harbour across the isthmus of Mount Sceberras the distance is not great. Mustapha caused a number of galleys to be transported by land across this neck, and relaunched under the Coradin hill. This service, which was necessarily most laborious, was performed by the Christian slaves, of whom a large number were retained in the Turkish camp for duties of this nature. In a few days La Valette beheld no less than eighty vessels of various sizes floating in the upper portion of those waters whose entrance he had so sedulously guarded.
About this time a very welcome addition was made to the garrison in the form of a deserter of high position from the Turkish army. This man, whose name was Lascaris, was a Greek of good family, who in early youth had been captured by the Turks, and being brought up as a Mahometan, had attained high rank in their army. A sense of the shame which overshadows the career of even the most brilliant renegade had long haunted Lascaris, and now, when he beheld the votaries of that faith in which he himself had been born, so nobly fighting in its cause, he determined upon sacrificing all that he had gained, and joining their fortunes. One evening, therefore, he descended Mount Sceberras opposite St. Angelo, and made signals by waving his turban to show his desire to be taken into the fort. Before this could be done, he was discovered by the Turkish sentries, and a body of men sent to seize him. In this juncture Lascaris, though a very poor swimmer, plunged into the water, and contrived to keep himself afloat until he was picked up by the boat which the Grand-Master sent to his aid. On his arrival at St. Angelo he informed La Valette of the motives which had prompted him to desert his colours, and also gave information of the attack that was impending on the spur of St. Michael. There was much in the incident that must have reminded La Valette ​of the case of Maître Georges during the first siege of Rhodes, the history of which was, of course, well known to him. He does not, however, appear to have had his suspicions in any way aroused by the ominous similarity, but on the contrary, was so struck with the noble sacrifice made by Lascaris, that he appointed him a pension from the treasury. He had no cause to regret his confidence. Throughout the remainder of the siege the fugitive proved himself not only a valiant captain in the field, but also a most able adviser in the council.
Following out the suggestions of Lascaris, La Valette took every precaution to avert the impending storm. The seaward ramparts of St. Michael’s were all strengthened, additional guns were planted at every point where they could be brought to bear upon the approaching foe, and as a last step a strong stockade was constructed, running from the spur of St. Michael parallel to the line of ramparts which faced the Coradin hill, at a distance of some six yards from the shore, and only terminating at the neck of the peninsula. This stockade was formed of huge piles driven into the bed of the harbour, and connected together by chains passing through iron rings fixed into the head of each. Large spars were also fastened from pile to pile, and a barrier thus constructed which would materially impede any boat attack on Seglea from the side of the Coradin hill. A similar obstacle was erected in front of the posts of Germany and Castile. This work could, of course, only be carried on by night, ​but the Maltese, who have from a very early period been celebrated as divers, were able to complete it in an incredibly short time. Mustapha was dismayed at perceiving so novel and formidable an obstacle rising to impede his projected attack, and anxious, if possible, to prevent its completion, he selected a body of the most expert swimmers in his army, whom he provided with axes, and despatched with instructions to destroy the barrier. The admiral de Monte, who commanded at St. Michael’s, met this attack by a similar sally. His Maltese divers, with their swords between their teeth, dashed into the water, and their superior activity in that element giving them a great advantage over their opponents, the latter were soon overcome, and but few succeeded in regaining the opposite shore.
Whilst the assault was still pending, the viceroy of Algiers named Hassan, son of the redoubtable Hayradin Barbarossa, and son-in-law of Dragut, arrived with a reinforcement of 2,500 men, all of whom had served a long apprenticeship in the desperate piratical warfare of the Mediterranean. Hassan, whose great success as a leader had made him very vainglorious, sneered at the numerous failures which had hitherto taken place. A survey of the ruins of St. Elmo led him to express his amazement that Mustapha should have allowed himself to be baffled for such a length of time by so insignificant a work. Following up the taunt, he volunteered, with the troops he had just brought with him, to lead the assault against Senglea. The Turkish general was only too glad to give the young braggart an opportunity of making good his words. He was therefore appointed to head the attack on the land side, whilst his lieutenant, Candêlissa, led that upon the spur by water.
At a given signal, early on the morning of the 15th of July, the action commenced by the advance of the Turkish flotilla. Its progress was enlivened by the strains of martial music, and the sun on that summer’s morn flashed upon many a glittering weapon, and lighted up many a gay and fluttering pennon. It was a beautiful sight, and but for the fearful stake at issue, would have struck with admiration the gazers who crowded the bastions around. The war had, however, been ​carried on with so much ferocity, and such extreme venom on both sides, that the only feeling aroused by the display was one of rancorous hatred. Men called to mind the barbarous outrages which had been perpetrated on their brethren at St. Elmo, and each one, as he gazed upon the proudly advancing foe, registered a vow that he would avenge that fatal day. In advance of the squadron came a boat containing two Turkish priests, who recited from the Koran such texts as were most likely to arouse the enthusiasm of their followers. When they neared the scene of strife, these holy men cared no longer to occupy their conspicuous position, but resigning their post to Candêlissa wisely returned to camp, and watched the conflict from a safe distance.
Candêlissa’s first attempt was on the stockade, through which he endeavoured to force a passage. He had, as an alternative, provided himself with a number of planks with which he proposed to bridge over the space between it and the rocks. Both attempts proved complete failures. The barrier was too strong and the intervals were too small to permit him to push his boats through, whilst the planks were not long enough to form a bridge. Galled by the fire from the ramparts, Candêlissa felt that he could not remain where he was. Plunging, therefore, into the water, which reached to his neck, he forced his way through the stockade, and calling on his men to follow him, waded to the shore, where he drew his sword and made a dash at the breach.
At this moment, unfortunately, a store of combustibles, which had been accumulated on the rampart for the use of the defenders, suddenly became ignited and exploded, killing and wounding a number of those who were crowded around. All was for a time in hopeless confusion, and when the smoke cleared away the Turks were found to have established themselves on the summit of the breach, where they were planting several small banners in token of triumph. The dismay of the defenders speedily gave way to feelings of rage, and determination to regain the lost ground. Rallying his forces the commander Zanoguerra dashed into the midst of the enemy, and the conflict once more raged with doubtful success. Long and desperate was the struggle, the tide of battle turning first ​to the one side and then to the other. At last the force of numbers began to prevail, as more and more of the assailants forced their way through the breach, and in spite of their indomitable determination the defenders were driven back step by step.
La Valette and Mustapha were both watching the course of events, the one from St. Angelo, the other from the summit of the Coradin hill, and they decided, at the same moment, upon sending reinforcements to the scene of action. Mustapha, who had seen with exultation the progress made by Candlissa, determined to complete the success and overcome all further opposition. He therefore embarked a body of 1,000 janissaries in ten large boats, and despatched them to the assistance of the assaulting column. To avoid the obstacle of the stockade, this flotilla steered well round to the northward, and thus exposed itself to the fire of St. Angelo, from which the first attack had been screened by the point of Senglea. It has been already mentioned in Chapter XVI. that La Valette, amongst other works of defence, had constructed a small battery for three guns, à fleur d’eau, upon the rooks at the foot of St. Angelo, for the express purpose of protecting the spur of St. Michael. The knight who had command of this post, when he saw the advance of the hostile force, caused his guns to be loaded to the muzzle with grape, musket-shot, and other missiles, and then waited quietly until the boats had approached within easy range. At a given signal the battery, which had, from its position, escaped the notice of the Turks, belched forth its fire at a distance of little more than 200 yards, lashing the surface of the water into a foam with its iron hail. The result was awful. The boats were all crowded together, and the discharge had taken effect in their midst. Nine out of the ten sank instantly, and such of their occupants as were not killed were seen struggling in the water. The wondrous effect of this deadly discharge has been described with great unction by contemporary annalists, and the loss sustained by the Turks variously computed at from 400 to 800 men. For days after, the bodies of the killed floated on the water, and were seized by the expert Maltese swimmers, who reaped a rich harvest from the plunder found on them
Meanwhile La Valette had on his side despatched a powerful ​reinforcement from the Bourg by means of the temporary bridge connecting that point with Senglea, and this succour reached the scene of action at the moment when the Turks were paralysed by the incident they had just witnessed. Their appearance at this critical juncture decided the fortunes of the day. With fierce shouts they dashed at the enemy, and drove them headlong over the breach. Even Candêlissa, whose reputation for courage and daring had till that moment been above suspicion, was seized with panic, and was amongst the earliest to turn his back on the scene of strife. When first landing on the rock lie had directed the boats, as their occupants left them, to draw away from the stockade into deep water, so that his troops might fight the more desperately from feeling that their retreat was cut off. Ho now found this valiant direction highly inconvenient, and as he stood up to his waist in the water beckoning them back again, he presented a spectacle not very edifying to the spectators on the Coradin hill. He hurried ignominiously into the first boat that reached the spot, and was followed by such of his troops as were able once more to scramble through or over the stockade. The remainder fell almost unresisting victims to the fury of the besieged. Their cries for quarter were met with the stern reply, “Such mercy as you showed to our brethren in St. Elmo shall be meted out to you and none other.” From that day similar acts of vengeance became known amongst the knights by the name of St. Elmo’s pay.
Candêlissa and his fugitive comrades having made good their escape, the defenders employed in their work of butchery became exposed to the fire from the enemy’s batteries, which now opened furiously on the point. In this cannonade, the young son of the viceroy of Sicily, Frederic de Toledo, was killed. La Valette had hitherto, out of consideration for his father, studiously kept him from the more exposed and dangerous posts, but the enthusiasm of the young soldier could not tamely brook this state of inglorious security. When, therefore, the reinforcement left the Bourg for Senglea, Toledo contrived to join its ranks unnoticed, and bore himself right gallantly in the short but decisive struggle that ensued. His untimely fate, whilst fighting for a cause in which he had no ​personal interest, created a universal feeling of deep regret, even the stern and impassive La Valette himself exhibiting the most poignant sorrow at his loss.
Whilst Candêlissa had been thus engaged, Hassan had, on his side, made several desperate but futile attempts to penetrate into the defences on the land front of Senglea. Wherever the assaulting columns shewed themselves they were met by an impenetrable array which no efforts could dislodge. The young Algerine exerted himself to the utmost to urge on his followers. lie was mindful of the scornful boast he had uttered whilst standing on the ruins of St. Elmo, and strove hard to accomplish what he had then undertaken. He now discovered, to his cost, that he was fighting an enemy very different in power from that with whom he had hitherto come in contact, and at length, exhausted with his fruitless efforts, he was compelled sullenly to withdraw his troops and acknowledge the bitterness of defeat.
Thus ended this memorable day. Nearly 3,000 of the flower of the Ottoman army perished on the occasion, most of whom were either janissaries or Algerine corsairs, whilst the loss of the defenders did not exceed 250. Amongst these, however, in addition to the son of the viceroy, was the commander Zanoguerra, who fell at the moment of victory. La Valette caused a solemn thanksgiving for this important success to be offered up in the conventual church of San Lorenzo. Mustapha, on his side, felt that still greater exertions wore necessary to atone for the failure. The strength of the garrison being now much reduced, he conceived that he could best take advantage of his own superior numbers by carrying on an attack against Senglea and the Bourg simultaneously. He therefore retained the direction of the siege against the first-named place in his own hands, whilst he confided the other to the admiral Piali. As regards the former, it was found impracticable, owing to the stockade, to rerew the attack on the spur of St. Michael. All further efforts were therefore directed solely against the land front. Candêlissa, whose conduct during the late assault had not raised him in public estimation, was placed in charge of the fleet, with directions to cruise off the mouth of the harbour and intercept any attempts at reinforcement. This ​division of command created great rivalry and emulation. Each felt that if he were the fortunate man to gain a first footing within the enemy’s defences, the whole glory of the expedition, and consequently its reward, would fall to him. Piali, therefore, determined to push forward his attack on the Bourg with the utmost vigour. A battery had already been constructed on Mount Salvator, which played upon the post of Castile and on part of that of Auvergne. To this Piali added another, still larger, on the bluff of Bighi, containing both guns and mortars. He thus encloed the post of Castile between two fires, and soon reduced its ramparts to a state of ruin. At the same time he pushed forward his trenches so that he was quite close to the bastion by the time matters were ripe for a storm.
Mustapha, meanwhile, had employed the time in increasing the number of his guns in battery, and in harassing the defenders of Senglea by a constant and galling cannonade. On the 2nd of August, being anxious, if possible, to forestall the operations of Piali, he delivered an assault at the point where Hassan had previously failed. For six hours the struggle was maintained with equal obstinacy on both sides. Five times were the Turks driven from the breach, and as often were they rallied by their indomitable general. At length, owing to the sheer exhaustion of his men, he was compelled to abandon the attempt, and the wearied garrison was once more permitted to enjoy a brief repose. Piali was on his side ready to assume the offensive within a few days of Mustapha’s failure, and on the 7th of August a fresh attack was made on both points simultaneously.
Piali exerted himself to the utmost to penetrate through the gaping breaches established by his batteries in the ramparts of Castile, but in vain. Retrenchments had been formed in rear of the exposed points, and so galling a fire was maintained upon the assailants that they were unable to face its intensity. Whilst thus thrown into confusion, the disorder being, rendered still more complete by the various obstacles strewn upon the breach, the knights suddenly assumed the offensive, and dashing from their cover drove the Turks headlong backward. No efforts on the part of Piali could succeed in rallying his men, and he was compelled eventually to relinquish the attempt. Mus​tapha’s attack was at first attended with better success. His columns obtained a footing on the summit of the breach, and a desperate hand-to-hand encounter ensued, in which his superiority of number gradually made itself felt. He himself was to be seen in every direction, sword in hand, cheering on his forces with promises of reward and booty, and eventually he succeeded in driving the defenders back from the contested rampart.
At this time, when all appeared lost, and when a few moments more must have decided the fate of Senglea, Mustapha, to the amazement of the combatants, sounded the retreat. This step on his part seemed at first inexplicable, but the cause which led to it was in reality very simple. The commandant of the Città Notabile had heard the ceaseless din, which, since early dawn, had raged around the fortress, and rightly conjectured that the Turks were delivering a fresh assault. He determined, therefore, on making a diversion. Mustering all his cavalry, he sent them forth with the general instruction to make an attack wherever they might find a suitable opportunity. The knight in command advanced cautiously towards the head of the harbour, where the sick and wounded of the Turkish army were lying in camp. The guards had all left their posts, and were on the neighbouring heights gazing intently upon the conflict that was raging around. The little band, seeing the advantage thus offered, rushed upon the camp, and commenced an indiscriminate massacre of the helpless creatures lying there. Shrieks, yells, and groans resounded on all sides, and a panic spread through the army. It was supposed that the relieving force from Sicily had landed, and that its advanced guard was already in their rear. The news spread like wildfire. Terror and dismay were on every face, and each one, without waiting to meet the enemy, bethought him how he could best escape from the general massacre. The intelligence reached Mustapha in the thick of the contest at. Senglea, and at the very instant of victory he saw the prize torn from his grasp. An immediate retreat was sounded, and he assembled his disheartened troops to meet the new enemy supposed to be at that moment on their flank. To his astonishment and rage, when he reached the scene of action, he dis​covered the true state of the case. The cavalry of the Città Notabile, having attained their object and created a diversion, wisely retired in time, and. Mustapha found, to his unspeakable indignation, that he had abandoned a victory already in his grasp on a false alarm.
From this time he resolved to carry his point rather by the harassing frequency of his attacks than by their intensity. Each day, therefore, witnessed a repetition of the struggle at one or both points of attack. It would weary the reader to enter into a detail of all the incidents by which these constant assaults were marked. Their general character was always the same. At the appointed signal the besiegers would rush forward with shouts and yells, and would make a dash at the gaping breach, the shrill notes of the atabal ringing forth with inspiriting tones. But there they would be met by an enemy who cared little either for the notes of the atabal or the shouts of the Moslem. Then would ensue that hand-to-hand encounter, in which the chivalry of St. John, standing on the summit of the breach, invariably proved superior to the assailants struggling up the rugged pathway. Less and less obstinately would the combat be maintained, until the signal of retreat, rising above the din of battle, announced one more failure to the Turk, and one more triumph to the Christian.
​It is very difficult to account for the conduct of the viceroy at this juncture. It is a well-known fact that he was warmly attached to the Order, and especially so to LaValette himself. He had even intrusted his son to the knights through the perils of the siege. It cannot, therefore, be supposed that under such circumstances he would be indifferent to the fate of the island. Whether he feared, by too hasty an intervention, to compromise the safety of the Spanish fleet, or whether, as is very probable, he was acting under secret instructions from Philip himself, can never now be ascertained. It is, however, quite clear that, but for the indomitable nature of La Valette’s resistance, the succour by means of which the island was eventually relieved would have arrived only to find the Turkish flag waving over the castle of St. Angelo, and the sad scenes of St. Elmo re-enacted on a larger scale. The remonstrances of the ambassador induced the viceroy to summon a special council to deliberate on the steps to be taken. A proposition was actually made at the board, and supported by several voices, to leave Malta to its fate. Fortunately for the reputation of both Philip and his viceroy, other and nobler counsels prevailed, and an assurance was forwarded to La Valette that if he could hold the fortress until the end of August he should most positively be relieved by that time.
Meanwhile, the daily assaults continued without intermission, but on the 18th of August they assumed a more important. character than ordinary. Both points were, as usual, to be attacked, but the attempt upon the post of Castie was deferred for some time after that upon Senglea had been commenced, partly with the hope of inducing some of its defenders to withdraw to the assistance of their friends, and partly to enable Piali to spring a mine, which had, with incredible labour, been successfully driven through the rock beneath the bastion. Finding that the delay did not tempt any of the knights to leave their stations, Piali fired his mine, and a large extent of rampart was thrown down by the explosion. The solid nature of the rock upon which the works stood had led the garrison to consider any attempt at mining an absolute impossibility, and the idea of such a mode of attack never occurred to them. The panic caused by so unlooked-for an event was consequently extreme, ​and whilst it was paralysing the defence the assailants made their onset. When the dense smoke caused by the explosion had cleared away, the Turks were masters of the post. The alarm spread instantly, and the great bell of the conventual church pealed forth to notify the peril. A terrified priest, rushing into the presence of La Valette, besought him to take refuge in the castle of St. Angelo, as the Bourg was irretrievably lost. All was fear and confusion, and but for the presence of mind displayed by the Grand-Master at that critical moment the place must have fallen. Instead of following the advice of the priest La Valette seized a pike and rushed to the scene of action, calling upon his brethren to die manfully where they stood. A desperate encounter ensued, in which the Grand-Master was wounded, but he succeeded in attaining his object; the breach was re-taken and cleared of the enemy.
The catastrophe thus averted had been so imminent, and appeared so likely to threaten them again, that La Valette determined upon taking up his quarters permanently close to the exposed bastion. In vain his knights remonstrated with him; in vain they pointed out the inestimable value of his life to the defence; he persisted in his determination, and the result proved that he was right. That same night the Turks renewed the attack, and then the spirit inspired amongst the besieged by his presence materially aided them in successfully resisting it. The 19th, 20th, and 21st each beheld an assault upon some point, and, although on every occasion it failed, the steadily reducing numbers of the garrison proved clearly that they would be unable to sustain many more such efforts. Scarce a knight of that little band remained unwounded, and La Valette was each day called on to mourn the death of some one whose gallantry had endeared him to the hearts of his comrades. Nor was he spared the pang of a nearer loss. His own nephew, Parisot de la Valette, was struck down during a daring sortie, which he had led, in company with another knight named Polastron, who was also killed. It was only after a long and fiercely-contested struggle that their comrades succeeded in rescuing the corpses. La Valette himself was an eye-witness of the scene, and rejected all attempts at condolence by assuring his hearers that the whole fraternity ​was to him as kindred, and that he did not mourn the loss of his nephew more than that of any other knight who had fallen.
Whilst the besieged were being reduced to this pitiable condition the position of Mustapha was but little better. The incessant attacks he had persisted in making had, it is true, harassed the besieged beyond all endurance, but their constant failure at the same time produced the worst possible effect upon his own troops. He had lost the flower of his army, partly on those deadly breaches, which they had in vain endeavoured to storm, and partly by a pestilence which had latterly raged with the most frightful violence throughout their camp. The power of the sun in Malta during the month of July is very great, and at all times likely to produce disease unless the most stringent sanitary precautions are insisted on. The Turkish camp had remained stationary for nearly two months, and, as is well known, the habits of Easterns are not sufficiently cleanly to stave off sickness under such conditions. It is not, therefore, to be wondered at that by the time August had been reached a very large proportion of the force was laid low. Further, their ammunition was running short, and a scarcity of provisions had long been felt. It appears strange that with so large a fleet as that which Piali had at his command, they should have found any difficulty in maintaining their communications with the African coast, but certain it is that whilst the ships were lying in idleness in the Marsa Muscetto, Sicilian cruisers were permitted constantly to intercept supplies. The only explanation possible for this anomaly seems to be that the Turkish commander lived in perpetual dread of the arrival of such a powerful succouring force from Sicily as might necessitate his abandonment of the siege. He did not, therefore, wish to run the risk of having his retreat cut off by such an event taking place during the absence of any considerable number of his galleys.
Long and anxious consultations were held between Mustapha and Piali. The former, who felt that his reputation—nay, most probably even his life—depended upon the successful issue of the enterprise, strongly urged that the army should, if necessary, winter upon the island; but Piali declared that he ​could not allow his vessels to run so great a risk. That fleet had been placed under his own especial command, and he alone was responsible to the sultan for its safety; he announced, therefore, that as soon as the summer began to break up he should quit Malta and return to Constantinople, either with or without the army. A constant jealousy had, indeed, from the first existed between the rival commanders of the Ottoman forces. So long as Dragut lived that feeling had been kept in check, and the Algerino had, by mutual consent, been permitted to take the lead in conducting the attack on St. Elmo, but after his death the ill-will between the two chiefs broke out with increased rancour. Each was more intent upon depriving his colleague of the honour of success than carrying on the main object of the expedition, and each felt that if he were not himself the principal actor at the capture of the island he would rather the attempt were a failure than that the other should reap the fruits of success.
Mustapha felt greatly dismayed at the now openly expressed opposition of his coadjutor; still, he retained the secret of his despondency within his own breast. Instructions were issued for a fresh general assault at all points on the 23rd August. Some friendly hand among the besiegers shot into the town an arrow, to which was attached a piece of paper having on it the word Thursday. The hint was sufficient, and La Valette at once guessed that on that day an attack of more than usual importance was to take place. A general council was summoned to deliberate upon measures of defence. It was there strongly urged that both the Bourg and Senglea should be abandoned, and that the garrison, which was so fearfully reduced, should be withdrawn into the castle of St. Angelo. The Grand-Master, however, would not listen to this proposition. He pointed out that St. Angelo was far too small to contain all the persons who would require shelter, also that the supply of water would be insufficient for their wants. Both the Bourg and Senglea must, he said, be maintained to the last, and, with the view of shewing that he was determined to carry his ideas into execution, he withdrew from the castle the greater portion of its strength to reinforce that of the two towns. Early on the morning of the 23rd the assault took ​place as anticipated. Every member of the Order whose wounds were not so severe as positively to incapacitate him, had on this occasion left the infirmary and once more resumed his post upon the shattered ramparts. Yet even with this aid the number of the defenders had dwindled to a comparative handful. Nothing but their indomitable spirit and the demoralization which had so destroyed the vigour of the Turks, could have enabled them to maintain a successful resistance before the overwhelming odds which were brought against them. Once again, however, they were victorious, and the baffled Mustapha was compelled to withdraw his troops, now utterly cowed, from the scene of their latest failure.
For a week after this defeat the Turks attempted nothing further, but contented themselves with keeping up a sullen cannonade from their batteries. At length on the 1st of September Mustapha once more essayed his fortune at a last desperate assault, and on this occasion he used every incentive in his power by which his troops could be stimulated and their flagging vigour aroused. It was, however, all in vain; a spirit of disorganization and despondency had spread itself through their ranks; they declared that it was evidently not the will of Allah that they should become the masters of Malta, and loudly demanded to be carried away from the dreaded island where so many of their comrades had either found a bloody grave or were dying of pestilence like rotten sheep. It was not by men imbued with such feelings as these that victory was to be snatched from the determined and now utterly desperate garrison. Mustapha’s quailing and reluctant battalions recoiled almost without a blow from the firm front still maintained against their advance. The feebleness of this last effort spread the greatest exultation and the most sanguine expectations of ultimate success amongst the besieged. They began to hope that they should themselves be able, alone and unaided, to drive the enemy from their shores, as their predecessors at Rhodes had done in the glorious siege of 1480, and they almost ceased to wish for the presence of that relieving force whose coming had till then been looked for with such earnest desire.
This long-expected aid was, however, at length on its way to ​their rescue. On the 25th of August a fleet of twenty-eight galleys, containing 8,500 troops, of whom nearly 300 were members of the Order, the remainder being Italian and Spanish soldiery, set sail from Syracuse and appeared off Malta. Whilst the viceroy was reconnoitring the island with a view to deciding upon the most prudent measures to adopt for the relief of the fortress, one of those sudden and violent storms so frequent in the Mediterranean arose and dispersed his fleet, compelling him to return to Sicily to refit. His troops were so eager to be led to the rescue that the repairs were speedily completed, and on the 6th of September he again set sail, and anchored that same night between the islands of Comino and Gozo. The next morning he landed his army in Melleha Bay, a small but commodious inlet on the north of the island; and having witnessed the commencement of its march towards the Città Notabile, he returned to Sicily for a further body of 4,000 men who were still at Syracuse awaiting transport.
Meanwhile Mustapha had remained in his camp, after his last failure, in a state of the most abject despondency. Every effort which his ingenuity could devise had been made to overcome the obstinate resistance of the knights; their works had been battered by a train far more powerful than had ever been previously used at a siege; they had been subjected to a series of the most desperate and prolonged assaults; and in spite of the difficulties of the ground mining had been resorted to. All, however, was useless. A cavalier had been raised in front of the post of Castile, from the summit of which the interior of that bastion could be overlooked, but it had been captured by the defenders, and actually converted by them into an outpost. At the last assault a cask had been thrown into the town filled with combustibles with an ignited slow match attached to it, but the knights had succeeded in hurling it back into the midst of a column which was at that very moment advancing to the attack; the cask exploded, and the column was shattered and dispersed by a missile devised by themselves. An attempt had been made against the Città Notabile, but had been baffled by the determination of the commandant. Nothing seemed to succeed, and Mustapha felt that he had been thwarted at every point. It was at this moment, whilst he was plunged in the ​depth of despondency, and whilst his troops were clamorous for the abandonment of the siege, that he received the first information of the lauding and advance of the succouring army.
Intelligence had, indeed, long before reached him that this relieving force was assembling, but its lengthened delays and procrastination lured him into the hope that it would never really set sail. He had, moreover, decided, in his own mind, that, even if it did arrive, its efforts would be directed. towards forcing the entrance of the grand harbour, and against such a step he had taken ample precautions. Great was his dismay, therefore, when he learnt that an army had actually landed on the island, and was marching rapidly towards the Bourg. Rumour had, as usual, greatly magnified the numbers of the advancing force, and Mustapha began to fear lest he should be surprised in his intrenchments, and the whole of his troops cut to pieces. He, in consequence, gave the order for immediate embarkation. The artillery and stores were at once removed, as far as was practicable, from the batteries, and throughout the night of the 7th of September his soldiers laboured with far more zeal and diligence in carrying off their guns than they had originally shewn in landing them. The sounds of departure were not lost upon the inhabitants, and with glad hearts they listened to the constant rumbling of wheels, which for many hours marked the movement going on in the Turkish camp.
With the first dawn of the next day the actual embarkation began. St. Elmo was abandoned; all the trenches and batteries which it had taken so many months, and so fearful an expenditure of blood to construct, were relinquished. La Valette’s measures on this joyful morning were as prompt and decisive as those of Mustapha had been injudicious. The whole town poured forth into the trenches, and. in a few hours the labour of months had been destroyed. The banner of the Order was once more triumphantly raised over the ruins of St. Elmo, and Piali was driven to hurry the departure of his galleys from the Marsa Muscetto, which was no longer a safe shelter now that Mount Sceberras was again in possession of the enemy. The embarkation of the Turkish ​army had not been completed when Mustapha received more accurate intelligence as to the munbers of the advancing force. His proud spirit was struck with indignation at the thought that he should thus hastily have abandoned his position upon the approach of a body of troops so far inferior in number to his own. A council of war was promptly summoned, in which it was decided, by a slender majority, that the troops should be again landed and marched into the interior of the island to encounter the new enemy. This decision caused the greatest dismay and consternation amongst the disorganized Turks, who had trusted that their labours and perils were at last ended. They were, with the utmost difficulty, torn from the ships in which they had hoped to be borne away from the scene of so many hardships and privations. Mustapha was a man endowed with too much determination of purpose to allow the discontent of a mutinous soldiery to divert him from his aim. A body of about 9,000 men was, therefore, landed in St. Paul’s Bay, to the north of the island, and with this force he advanced to meet the enemy, now lying between him and the town.
The viceroy had placed his army under the command of an Italian officer named Ascanio Corneo, second to whom was Alvarez Sandeo, a Spanish knight who had on several occasions greatly distinguished himself. La Valette sent timely notice to these officers that a body of Turks was being once more landed, and would probably advance against them. Corneo, upon receipt of this intelligence, took decisive measures to meet the attack, lie secured a very strong position on the summit of a ridge in front of the casal or village of Nasciar, where what is geologically termed the great fault of Malta runs almost across the island, dividing it into two nearly equal parts with a sudden and very considerable drop of level between them. Along the crest of this line he hastily threw up intrenchments, behind which ho proposed to await the approach of the Turks. He had, however, those under his command who could ill brook such a defensive policy. A body of 200 knights, each accompanied by several armed followers, had been formed into a battalion which was by far the most efficient in his little army. These knights were burning with eagerness to cross swords at once with their hated enemy, and to avenge in the blood of the Moslem the loss ​of so many of their comrades who had fallen in the defence. No entreaties, no commands could restrain their impetuosity, and they openly declared that if the force were not at once led to the attack they would rush on the enemy unsupported. Corneo perceived that he could not hold them back; he therefore decided upon making the best possible use of the enthusiasm by which they were fired, and which had spread through his troops. No sooner had the Ottoman army reached the foot of the hill than he ordered a general advance. Down rushed the battalion of knights, the White Cross banner waving in the van, and their brandished weapons gleaming in the sun as though eager to be bathed in the blood of the enemy. The Turks, who had with difficulty been brought thus far, were struck with awe at the furious onset. Without waiting for the shock they turned and fled with precipitation.
​The siege was now over; the shattered remnants of that powerful army which a few short months before had landed with all the pomp and circumstance of war, were wending their way homeward to Constantinople, there to meet the angry frowns of a sovereign who, till that moment, had scarcely known defeat. It now only remained that the victors should advance upon the town and greet their friends in the Bourg. A joyful meeting it was between those enfeebled war-worn soldiers and the gallant comrades who had so opportunely come to their rescue. Their wan and haggard faces, attenuated with vigils and hardships, were lighted up with the proud consciousness of the glorious victory they had gained. Alone and unaided, they had for months withstood the shock of one of the most powerful armaments that had ever left the port of Constantinople. Their ruined and blood-stained ramparts could tell a tale of heroism and endurance that would long linger in men’s minds. As friend met friend and was clasped in fraternal arms, each felt that another triumph had to be emblazoned upon the banner of the Order, before which all previous victories seemed poor and trivial. Well might La Valette be excused the natural exultation of the moment when he directed that the name of his town should be changed from its old appellation of the Bourg, to the proud and well-earned title of the Città Vittoriosa.
The troops which accompanied Mustapha to Malta had originally consisted of upwards of 30,000 men, mostly picked from the flower of the Ottoman army. The successive reinforcements brought by the corsairs Dragut and Hassan had increased that number to nearly 40,000. Of this vast force little more than 15,000 survived to return with their leader to Constantinople. On the other hand, the original garrison of the fortress had barely reached 9,000 men. The reinforcement received shortly after the fall of St. Elmo added only 700 to their strength. Of this small body only 600 remained unwounded. The process of exhaustion had been carried on by Mustapha almost to the point at which he had aimed. It had been his design to harass them by constant assaults in order to reduce their numbers so much that they would fall an easy prey to his arms. This policy had proved successful at St. Elmo, and ​would undoubtedly have answered equally well at the Bourg had the means at his command been sufficiently unlimited. His own forces, however, suffered so much from both sword and pestilence, that when the critical moment arrived he was unable to reap advantage from the weakness of the enemy.
The defence of Malta has justly been considered one of the most brilliant feats of arms recorded in the sixteenth century, and the historian naturally seeks to trace the causes of so glorious a victory. Foremost amongst these must be ranked the jealousy which existed between the military and naval commanders of the Turkish armament. Mustapha and Piali were each eager to prevent the other from reaping too large a share of the glory and reward to be anticipated from the capture of the fortress. They were therefore ill-prepared for that mutual concession and good-will so essentially necessary for the success of their arms. The engineering tactics of the Turks were, moreover, faulty in the extreme. Their oversight in permitting the defenders of St. Elmo to maintain uninterrupted communication with the Bourg detained them before its walls many weeks longer than would otherwise have been possible. Untaught by the results of that siege they subsequently neglected to complete the investment of the Bourg until after a considerable reinforcement had succeeded in making its way into the town from Sicily. Dragut, moreover, was undoubtedly right when he asserted that Mustapha should, in the first place, have made himself master of the Città Notabile. The defences of that town were comparatively insignificant, and it must, after a few days’ investment, have fallen into his hands. His rear would then have been secure from disturbance, and the garrison cut off from the assistance derived from it during the early part of the siege.
Thus far the successful result of the struggle has been traced to the errors of the Ottoman tactics, but it would be a wanton robbery of the renown which had been so justly earned to deny that that result was mainly owing to the heroic and indomitable spirit of the garrison, led by so gallant and determined a chief as La Valette. It was indeed fortunate for Malta that, at a moment when its inhabitants were called on to maintain so desperate a defence, they were governed by a man who, from ​his energy of disposition and determination of purpose, was eminently qualified to guide them through the crisis. The character of La Valette was one calculated to elicit respect and fear rather than love. There was a stern impassiveness in his temperament, a steady and firm resolution which marked how utterly he excluded all personal feeling from the guidance of his actions. his mind was cast in a mould so rigid and unflinching that he extorted an unwavering obedience from those who, perhaps, had they loved him more, would have followed his injunctions less implicitly. His cold and uncompromising sacrifice of the defenders of St. Elmo, in order to insure the prolongation of the siege, marks the character of the man; whilst the obedience to death which he extorted from that gallant band, even after they had broken out into open mutiny, proves the extraordinary ascendency he had gained over them. The crisis required a man who could subordinate all considerations of feeling to those of duty. An utter disregard, not only of self, but also of others when the exigencies of the case demanded it, was imperatively called for, and in La Valette was to be found one capable of such sacrifice. He had also the comparatively rare faculty of arousing in others that deep religious enthusiasm which was the principal motive power of his own life; and the meanest soldier imbibed from his chief a lofty determination to conquer or to die, which was the great secret of their stubborn and successful resistance.
The Order was, moreover, most ably seconded and supported by the bravery and resolution of the Maltese inhabitants. It must be borne in mind that the bulk of the soldiery was composed of the native element. Had this help failed no amount of individual heroism on the part of the knights could in the long run have secured success. The Maltese, whenever they have been tested, have shewn themselves steady and resolute soldiers, and on this memorable occasion were not found wanting. No single instance is recorded throughout the siege in which they failed to do their duty, and on many occasions, notably when the Turks attempted to destroy the stockade of Senglea, proved themselves capable of the most devoted heroism. It is necessary to dwell somewhat strongly on this fact, because, as most of the histories of the siege have been compiled by ​writers in the interest of the Order, everything has been sacrificed to add to its glory. The history of the struggle must, in justice, be indissolubly interwoven with that of the Maltese inhabitants, and they have cause to this hour to remember with feelings of pride and satisfaction the noble deeds of their ancestors in 1565.
The 8th of September, the day on which the siege was raised, was always subsequently celebrated with great rejoicings by the knights. It was already a high festival of the church, as the day of the Nativity of the Blessed Virgin Mary, but from the year 1565 it became to them the most important anniversary in the calendar. On that day a solemn mass was celebrated for the souls of those who had fallen. The names of such amongst them as had attained to any dignity in the fraternity were registered in the records of the conventual church. The following is the number of knights of the various langues who fell either at St. Elmo or subsequently:—
| Langue. | Killed at St. EImo. | Killed at the Bourg and Senglea. | Total. |
| Provence | 12 | 17 | 29 |
| Auvergne | 9 | 4 | 13 |
| France | 14 | 16 | 30 |
| Italy | 31 | 48 | 79 |
| Aragon | 17 | 14 | 31 |
| Germany | 5 | 4 | 9 |
| Castile | 10 | 16 | 26 |
Only three Englishmen were present, viz., Edward Stanley, John Smith, and the knight Oliver Starkey; neither of these was killed. The total, therefore, was 217 out of 516 who are known to have been present, including the reinforcement which arrived under de Robles. Possibly some others had also found their way into the fortress during the siege of St. Elmo.
* ↑ The portion of the defences of Senglea here alluded to formed part of the original fort of St. Michael. As first constructed that fort was an enclosed and isolated work like St. Elmo. When, however, de la Sangle fortified the whole peninsula, he connected the fort with his lines, removing that part which had formed the inner face. The remainder was still known as fort St. Michael, of which the Spur bastion was the extreme point.
* ↑ In all former histories of the siege this stockade is described as stretching from the point of Senglea to the foot of the Coradin hill. The author followed the general error in the first edition of this work, it having been so positively and universally recorded. It had always, however, seemed to him an almost impossible undertaking to construct such a stockade passing through deep water for so great a length and terminating at a point so close to the enemy’s lines. He has since examined a work in the public library of Valetta, not generally known, which was published soon after the siege. In this book there is, among other illustrations, one in which the stockade is shown as now described. There can be no doubt that this position is the correct one. It answers thoroughly the purpose for which it was constructed—viz., to prevent the enemy’s boats from landing on the rocks at the foot of the ramparts throughout any part of the hue. It is in comparatively shallow water, and in close proximity to the defenders’ works.