# My War Memoirs/Chapter 13

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On November 15, 1917, Clemenceau’s Cabinet came into power in France. It marked the end of hesitation, nervousness, and a lack of concerted plan in France and among the Allies generally. Clemenceau came into power with a programme, the main trend of which could be expressed as follows: “No further pacifist campaigns, and no intrigues to bring about an undecisive peace. Away with treachery, away with semi-treachery. We are waging war and nothing but war. What we want is a decisive victory.”
This opens the last phase of the war, which coincides with the final establishment of our army in France, the Bolshevik revolution in Russia, and thus also a new turn to the whole of our military movement there. This, too, was the period which brought the final decision on our military movement in Italy.
As Prime Minister and Minister of War, Clemenceau immediately initiated a vigorous policy both in home and external affairs, and he remained faithful to this policy until the end.
Clemenceau deserves a large share of credit for the result of the war. He has been reproached with acting in an impulsive and ruthless manner towards men and events, but he is, and will remain, one of the great figures in the war. Behind an apparently rough exterior was hidden a refined and educated personality with a broad outlook and an ample store of experience. He knew that one of the great factors which often decides the course of action adopted by politicians is their lack of courage. Clemenceau never lacked courage or resolution, and that is why, although he made mistakes just as others did, he contributed so largely to victory.
​He first of all brought about order in home affairs. He eliminated the direct and indirect causes of defeatism, and he concentrated around him a great majority of the Parliament whom he inspired with fresh confidence. As Minister of War he devoted himself chiefly to the preparation of victory, leaving the diplomatic side of affairs to S. Pichon, his Foreign Minister, although he himself decided, either partly or completely, about matters of high policy.
Under his regime the view which superseded all others was that the interests of all the Allies coincided; that there must be a united military and diplomatic front; that in order to solve the political war problems satisfactorily the main requirement was to end the war by a military victory in common. Towards the end of March, at the very moment when the Germans were taking the first steps for their last great offensive on the Western front, General Foch was appointed supreme Allied Commander. Clemenceau realized the necessity of sending the Italians reinforcements after the reverse at Caporetta, and in the same way he understood how essential it was for the Allies to put forth their utmost resources for the attainment of victory. He therefore supported the formation of a Polish Army and concluded negotiations with us for the establishment of a Czechoslovak Army. At a later date he saw the significance of our movement in Siberia, and he did everything in his power to enable our troops to reach France.
The negotiations between General Smuts and Count Mensdorff-Pouilly began before Clemenceau took office, and they were completed a month after he made his first proclamation in Parliament on the subject of undecisive peace and the alternative which he favoured. It may therefore be safely assumed that he was aware of these events. When Lloyd George made his speech on January 5, 1918, Clemenceau sent him a telegram of congratulation to which I have already referred. I have also given my reason for supposing that this telegram had no bearing upon the Austro-Hungarian question in a sense unfavourable to us.
By this time the French Government was conscious of its commitments to us. When Clemenceau came into power, the text of the decree authorizing the formation of our army, as well as the statutes of the army, had practically been completed by agreement with the preceding Government of Painlevé. In Russia the organization of the army was making ​satisfactory progress, while in Italy we were preparing the final decisive measures concerning our army there. In the United States we had started a recruiting movement for France, and about 2,000 of our troops were already waiting in barracks at Cognac for the final decision on our army in France. The development of affairs in Russia during December and January aroused the hope that about 50,000 of our troops would be able to proceed to France.
Such was the general view which was taken of our movement by official circles and the Ministry of War. It subsequently turned out that on a number of points the estimates made by them and us were too optimistic, but it meant a great deal to Clemenceau as Minister of War, who realized the full significance of Caporetta, who could see the military consequences of the collapse of the Eastern front, who in the meanwhile had only a few American regiments at his disposal in France, and who understood that France was at that very moment passing through the most critical juncture of the war in which every contribution to victory, however small, deserved to be appreciated.
The events during the first months of 1918 crystallized Clemenceau’s policy. Czernin’s speech on December 4, 1917, at Budapest, in which he made it plain that Vienna would act with Berlin until the end of the war; the Italian reverse, the consequences of which demanded a final military victory upon that front also; the armistice in the East, which merged into peace negotiations, and concluded on March 3, 1918, with the peace of Brest-Litovsk; and the peace concluded on March 7th at Buftei with Rumania, now completely humiliated and obliged to cede considerable areas to Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria; finally, the preparation of a great offensive in the West and the danger of an approaching attack on Paris—all this, far from inducing despondency in a man of Clemenceau’s temperament, on the contrary made him exert every effort to cope with all these problems in the only possible way, by achieving a final and decisive military victory.
In my opinion, the great political and military victories of the Central Powers at the end of 1917 and the beginning of 1918; their ruthless and, from a political and psychological point of view, faulty tactics, which culminated in the humiliation of Rumania and the Balkans; the assumption of control over Poland, the new Balkan States, and Finland; the separa​tion of the Ukraine from Russia and its evident subordination to Germany and Austria-Hungary; and, finally—as it appeared in Western Europe—in the systematic exertion of political influence upon the Bolshevik Government in Russia, formed the greatest and indeed the decisive factor in convincing the Allies that there must now be no wavering whatever, that all reservations and illusions must be abandoned, and there must be a concerted effort for victory on the military fronts. We saw how the Eastern events and the peace negotiations with Russia were reflected in the speeches of Lloyd George, Wilson, and Pichon, in which they emphasized their own war aims, and made it quite clear that the Allies would not recognize the results which threatened to emerge from the negotiations at Brest-Litovsk.
In April and May 1918 the two Anglo-Saxon powers definitely associated themselves with Clemenceau’s policy. The decisive factor in bringing about this change consisted of all these events; but our own political and military movement, as we shall soon see, helped to a large extent in bringing about this decision.
(b) The Decree for the Establishment of our Army in France
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Towards the end of the first half of October I returned from Rome to Paris, and then proceeded to London on October 20th, as I had received an urgent summons from those in charge of our interests there. After Masaryk’s departure to Russia our movement in England centred in a Press Bureau, directed as a branch of the National Council by Vladimir Nosek, in accordance with my instructions from Paris. Olga Masaryk acted as a direct link between Professor Masaryk and our London representatives, and the London colony, under the leadership of Sýkora, Kopecký, and Pochobradský, helped us in our work.
The progress made by our movement in France, Italy, and Russia, taken into conjunction with the state of affairs in England, demanded a more active procedure on the part of the National Council in London. Messages from Wickham Steed and Dr. Seton Watson had repeatedly urged me to take steps in this direction. My negotiations for an army in France ​and Italy, the direct invitations on the part of Sir Rennell Rodd and Sir Samuel Hoare, indicated to me the possibility of entering into immediate touch with Government circles, and of informing them what had been done on our behalf in France and Italy. At this time I was in touch with the British Embassy in Paris, and in particular I was on good terms with Lord Derby, the British Ambassador there.
Although the negotiations in London were brief, they denoted further progress in the development of our work in England; they inaugurated official relations between the British Government and the National Council. Hitherto the authorities in London had dealt with Masaryk mainly as a political personality. Their relations with our fellow-countrymen in England had been of an official character, but they were confined to administrative affairs, and involved the granting of preferential treatment in certain respects, without any kind of commitments on their part.
The present negotiations accordingly formed the preliminaries to the development of a concrete agreement at a later date. I spent several days in London, and met a number of officials at the Foreign Office. Sir Samuel Hoare, who had also come to London, introduced me to Lord Robert Cecil. This was my first meeting with this prominent English statesman, who at that time was Blockade Minister and who, a few months later, rendered us such great services by making a fundamental decision on the subject of our movement. I had two further interviews with him, and gave him the memoranda which I had prepared concerning the progress of our cause. I also explained to him in detail our opinion on Austro-Hungarian and other Central European matters. Even before this he had been favourably disposed towards us. He was personally acquainted with Masaryk, whom he esteemed highly. In the meanwhile I made no concrete demand, wishing merely to gain confidence for my subsequent action. From my talks with Sir Samuel Hoare and Lord Robert Cecil I gained the impression that they had confidence in me and also in our movement.
I returned to Paris on October 28, 1917, and immediately began to discuss our military affairs with Lieut. Colonel Cros and Major Dresch. In addition to current military questions, largely concerning the organization of the detachment formed from the prisoners of war, who had arrived from Rumania ​in the summer of 1917, I at once raised the question of the decree which had been prepared. The Poles had in the interim made considerable progress with the organization of their army. They had volunteers from America and elsewhere, as well as a certain number of prisoners of war from among the German troops. They had thus been able to publish their decree on the establishment of their army as early as May 28, 1917.
Not wishing to postpone the matter further, I urged that there should be an agreement as to the wording of the decree. Lieut.-Colonel Cros placed before me a wording analogous to that of the Polish decree. I asked for a short time to think matters over, as I was anxious to secure certain changes, which I began to discuss after having conferred with the National Council. The Ministry of War admitted that the conditions in our case were different from those of the Poles, and so after a few days the wording of the decree was agreed upon. Meanwhile Štefánik informed me that he was returning to Paris, and I therefore decided to postpone the publication of the decree which the Ministry of War itself now began to urge. I preferred, however, to wait until Štefánik had returned (he actually arrived on November 18, 1917), because I wanted him, as a soldier, to give his opinion of everything which the National Council had done as regards military affairs during his absence.
Štefánik approved of the text which had been agreed upon, but he took exception to one important detail. The first article of the decree declared that the French Government was constituting the Czechoslovak Army. I had accepted this formulation because the Poles had also accepted it, and then, too, after my return from Italy, I shrank from the prospect of attempting to struggle for fresh concessions after all the negotiations on the army statute, in which the French Government had really shown considerable indulgence towards me personally. Štefánik was of the opinion that it would nevertheless be possible to secure an alteration in the decree by which the constituting of the army would be attributed to the National Council and the Czechoslovak nation itself. The political significance of this formulation is obvious at the first glance, and Štefánik rightly attached great importance to it.
Štefánik’s negotiations on behalf of this new formulation ​lasted until nearly the middle of December. At the beginning of December the military authorities in the Ministry informed me that, in view of the precedent with the Poles, the Government would not accept the formulation we asked for, but in the end Štefánik succeeded in obtaining at least a compromise. The French Government withdrew the formulation attributing the constitution of the army to them, but would not comply with the proposal to attribute the constitution to the National Council. All reference to the constitution of the army was therefore omitted from the first article of the decree, which now assumed the following neutral aspect: “The Czechoslovaks, organized in an independent army, and acknowledging the authority of the Supreme French Command in military affairs. . . .”
And so, on December 16, 1917, it was possible to publish two important documents relating to the establishment of the Czechoslovak Army, and negotiated by the National Council. The first one was a report of the Government to the President of the Republic, stating the political and military reasons why France had decided to organize a Czechoslovak Army. At my request, emphasis was laid in this report upon the participation of our volunteers in the Foreign Legion, and it was pointed out that other States had already permitted the dispatch of Czechoslovak troops to France for military purposes.
The text of the actual decree comprised the main principles already contained in the previous army statutes which had been arranged. It first of all announces the full political recognition of the National Council and the autonomy of the army. There were a number of details contained in the statutes, but for fairly obvious reasons they were not yet formulated in the decree. The decree was to be published immediately, the statutes at a later date. The decree relating to the Polish Army had been drawn up in its first form as early as the summer of 1917, when events were not so far developed as in December of the same year. To declare in the solemn form, which distinguished the decree drafted in the summer of 1917, everything that was contained in the prepared army statutes, would have been a political manifesto which the situation at that time hardly justified. Moreover, by its very character, the decree was meant to be only concise and general in tone. And then, too, the Poles, who were somewhat more advanced ​in their organization of an army, had accepted a similar wording some considerable time previously. It was out of the question then to demand more for us than the Poles had been granted, both out of consideration for them and for the French themselves.
The wording of the decree was as follows:
Art. 1. The Czechoslovaks, organized in an independent army, and acknowledging the authority of the supreme French command in military affairs, will fight under their own flag against the Central Powers.
Art. 2. In a political respect the management of this national army devolves upon the National Council of the Czech and Slovak territories, with headquarters in Paris.
Art. 3. The equipment of the Czechoslovak Army, as well as its further activity, is ensured by the French Government.
Art. 4. As regards its organization, control, administration, and legal jurisdiction, the same regulations will apply to the Czechoslovak Army as are current in the French Army.
Art. 5. The independent Czechoslovak Army will be recruited from:
(ii)(i) Czechoslovaks now serving in the French Army.
(ii) Czechoslovaks serving elsewhere, in as far as they are granted permission to be transferred to the Czechoslovak Army, and also volunteers who enter this army for the period of the war.
Art. 6. This decree will be carried out in accordance with ministerial instructions, which are to be issued later.
Art. 7. The Prime Minister, the Minister of War, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, are each requested to carry this decree into effect, as far as it applies to himself, and it will be published in the official gazette of the French Republic and printed in the bulletin of laws.
Given at Paris, December 16th, 1917.
R. Poincaré, President of the Republic. G. Clemenceau, Prime Minister and Minister of War. S. Pichon, Minister of Foreign Affairs.
For this reason my efforts were more and more directed towards bringing about at an early date the signature of the statutes by the French Government and the National Council, as well as their publication. New circumstances made it desirable that a few minor additions should be introduced in them (for example, on the subject of the uniform, as demanded by Štefánik), so that, as I have already stated, they were not actually published until February 7, 1918.
These two documents, the decree and the statutes, are ​unquestionably of great political significance. After Briand’s promise to Masaryk, after the French action in connection with the note to President Wilson, after the signature of the agreement on June 13, 1917, by Albert Thomas and Masaryk, relating to the transfer of our troops to France, these two further commitments formed the successful culmination of our political and military work in France at a critical and decisive juncture.(37) And what lent it a peculiar significance was that it was signed by such eminent men as Poincaré and Clemenceau.
In a juridical and political respect, our French army was the first of our independent national armies. Our troops in Russia, who at that time were more important from a military point of view, still formed a constituent part of the Russian Army, a state of affairs which continued until February 3, 1918, when Masaryk declared them to be a section of our independent national army in France. The army in Italy was not established in its definite form until the agreement between Štefánik and the Italian Government on June 21, 1918. In constructing our French army, Štefánik and myself continually bore in mind the need for impressing upon the Allies that the whole of this military movement was a single one, and that our three armies were to be regarded as the constituent parts of one and the same military unit. That is why the gradual unification of the army in France and Russia was such an important process, and why it was equally important that Štefánik, when organizing the army in Italy, should secure from the Italian Government, as an expression of this uniformity, if only in a theoretical declaration, the recognition of General Janin as Commander-in-Chief of all our troops, including the Italian section, on condition, however, that General Janin would not in any way interfere with our military movement in Italy.(38)
This systematic military work in France coincided with a great international crisis, in which the fate of the Habsburg Empire was at stake. I was well aware of this, and that is why, during this period, the National Council exerted every effort to present our movement as a serious, well-developed, and powerful factor. The signature of the statutes by Clemenceau on behalf of the French Government, and by myself on behalf of the National Council was, to my mind, not merely a signature to military instructions, but also a binding diplomatic document ​of great political importance. I also hoped that before long more such documents would come into existence in France. Moreover, according to the reports from Rome, our success with the army in France had produced a marked impression in Italy, which was tending to bring about the recognition of our military efforts by the authorities in Rome.
(c) Difficulties of our Military Organization
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Having secured the army decree and statutes, we immediately set to work on our military organization. This, however, leads me to say a few words about the progressive development of our army in France from the various categories of troops which successively joined it.
The first ingredient of our French army consisted of a group of prisoners of war, whom Štefánik had obtained from Rumania. They reached France in the middle of June 1917, and met with a hearty welcome there. They had an encouraging effect upon us in the National Council, and strengthened our hopes that more troops would soon arrive from Russia. The French military authorities, however, were not prepared for them and sent them to the department of Lande, situated south of Bordeaux, a sandy and unpleasant region. There they were allotted to a camp containing black troops and also Bolshevized Russian soldiers.
This produced a very distasteful impression upon our first troops in France. Apart from this, their juridical situation was not clear. They had ceased to be prisoners, but they were not yet free soldiers, for neither we nor the French could deal with the various legal and other problems involved before the question of the army decree and statutes had been officially settled. This uncertainty and the disappointment which it involved with regard to the position of the Czech soldier in the Czech Army—above all, in France—proved still more demoralizing to them.
There was a slight improvement in the situation when, as a result of the French recruiting mission in Russia, Captain Husák’s contingent, numbering about 1,100 men, reached France by way of Archangelsk. These troops arrived at Havre on November 12th, where they were well received by the ​French authorities, and were joyfully welcomed by myself and Dr. Sychrava on behalf of the National Council. In accordance with an agreement which we had made, the Ministry of War had prepared accommodation for our future forces at Cognac, in the environs of Bordeaux. Later on, arrangements were made for additional troops at Jarnac and Joinville, close by. The two detachments comprised sufficient troops to enable us to organize the first regiment, to proceed with the issue of the decree and the statutes, and to adjust their legal and material status. Immediately after my return from Havre I proceeded to Cognac to inspect the accommodation provided for Husák’s detachment, and to ascertain by my own observation and by discussing matters with Husák what steps would have to be taken in the Ministry of War to secure effective organization.
From Cognac, where several days were spent with Husák, full of hope that the army would be rapidly established, I returned to Paris, where I met Štefánik, who had just returned from America (November 16th). Together we-worked at the solution of the more urgent military questions. The first thing we did was to arrange for the Rumanian contingent to be transferred from their demoralizing surroundings to Cognac. Shortly afterwards a number of Czech officers from the Serbian Army arrived at Cognac, but they at once confronted us with a serious problem, since the arrival of Husák’s detachment had at once brought us a surplus of officers, of which there had hitherto been a shortage. Here I may add that the problem of officers was one of our outstanding difficulties throughout the war. It was the cause of disagreements and ill-feeling, especially at the outset, even in France.
It was not long before there were fresh disappointments at Cognac. The army statute had been agreed upon as early as August, but we had aranged with the Ministry of War not to publish the decree until there was a considerable body of our troops in France. At the very moment when Husák’s detachment arrived and the question was to be settled, the negotiations on the subject of the decree were delayed because Štefánik, as I have already mentioned, wanted to have the wording changed. Apart from this, the bureaucratic mechanism of the Ministry did not move with any rapidity even in dealing with matters relating to the military administration at Cognac, which were quite independent of any decree.
​As a result of this, 2,000 of our volunteers at Cognac continued to remain in an ambiguous juridical situation, being neither soldiers nor prisoners of war. There was no proper administration or organization, there were difficulties with the living arrangements, the food, the command, and the French authorities. The majority of the troops who had arrived from Russia were already in regular military formation (many of them had taken part in the engagement at Zborov), and signs of disappointment soon began to make themselves evident among them. Six weeks spent in this uncertainty filled many with indignation, and demoralized others. Not having been fully acquainted with the status of our soldiers in France, they had come there full of enthusiasm, expecting to join an independent army completely established. It was natural that they soon began to lay the blame on the National Council and upon myself in particular. I at once realized this, and attempted to pacify them as far as I could, holding out hope to them that the army decree would soon be issued, that the conditions would be changed before long, that we had already achieved successes, and so on. But it took a long time before I could allay-the agitation at Cognac.
The day upon which the decree was issued was a red-letter day both in Paris and Cognac. The soldiers became soldiers both legally and officially, they became Czechoslovak soldiers, and with enthusiasm they read the decree and the newspaper articles on the new army which had arrived to help France and the Allies. An eager start was made with the detailed organization and the internal administration of the army, as well as with preliminary arrangements for military training. Our troops threw themselves heart and soul into the work. It became necessary for them to make themselves acquainted with the organization and training in accordance with the terms of the army statutes. I therefore arranged with the Ministry for the appointment of a regimental commander, Colonel Philippe, and also for a number of French officers to be allotted to the regiment. On January 10, 1918, I accompanied them to Cognac in order to introduce the troops to their commanders and instructors, and to hear any applications or complaints they might wish to make. The National Council in Paris would then have to take any necessary steps with the Government, to whom it would transmit whatever details were in the interests of our troops.
​On reaching Cognac I found that our troops, especially the officers, were in a despondent mood and showed signs of resentment against the National Council. Several weeks of uncertainty had produced a demoralizing effect; the unsettled financial conditions, the surplus of officers, and certain unfair arrangements with regard to the promotion or appointment of those who had already been officers; the disappointment prevailing in a corps of about 120 officers and cadets who had come from Russia on the understanding that they would serve in France as privates, and would wait until they obtained their nominations—all this was now intensified by a fresh disappointment. First of all, the French Ministry of War had decided that the command was to be restricted to French officers, the Czechs being allowed only to act as their assistants, and to learn their duties gradually. Our newly arrived officers from Serbia added to the number of those who were dissatisfied, or of those against whom a grievance was harboured by the officers not yet appointed, and then, to make matters worse, our officers had discovered that the process of appointment and the general procedure in France were far more difficult and far stricter than in Russia, and that they would not therefore be in charge of their companies, battalions, or regiments for very long.
The French Ministry of War had thus refused to grant our officers the same standing in the army as they had had in Russia, on the grounds that the fighting on the Eastern front was different from that in France, and that our officers were not qualified to prepare troops for the front. They were therefore to start from the beginning again under the leadership of French officers and then, in the course of time, they could be made independent. The feeling which this aroused among our officers was such that it was ready to break out at any moment. Such was the situation which I found on my arrival at Cognac, and it showed me what difficulties we were likely to encounter in organizing our army.
Owing to its political status the National Council was compelled to accept the ruling of the Ministry of War. In the first place, I had admitted that it was a reasonable one as far as the chief points were concerned, and besides this we had no particular interest in having our troops sent to the front at an early date. From our point of view it was more important to wait until our forces were sufficiently numerous to enable us ​to derive political capital from their military functions. But for our officers this decision of the Ministry was a severe blow. Their conclusion was that in actual fact we had no independent army in France, and this provided the malcontents with a plausible reason for starting agitation against the National Council, and arousing mistrust of its political leadership. A number of officers regarded the proposed arrangement as a personal humiliation to them in the eyes of the troops whom they had hitherto been commanding.
It can be well imagined that I had a difficult time at Cognac during my negotiations with Husák and all the rest. It is only fair to add that Husdk himself, although he did not approve of what was being done by the Ministry, realized how matters were, and helped me to pacify the others. In order to achieve this it became necessary to use much personal influence, and also to give a long account of our actual situation in France. I spent three days at Cognac for this purpose, and our officers then resigned themselves to the situation. Nevertheless, they continued to be dissatisfied with Paris for a long time to come. The troops objected that we were arbitrarily carrying out the plans of the French Government with regard to them, irrespective of their own wishes. I knew that this was the case, but I would not give way. The French military authorities at first regarded with suspicion everything which emanated from Bolshevik Russia. They felt misgivings because of the brotherly spirit among our troops, and there were a number of usages which they regarded as the germs of military Soviets. On a number of occasions they told me their opinions of these matters. The Russian Army, especially since the revolution, had been regarded by them with considerable reserve, and this attitude was intensified in the case of our volunteers who had originally been organized in that army. They expressed an altogether non-committal opinion of their technical knowledge. The fact was that they had practically no acquaintance with us, and were cautiously observing how the conditions in our army would develop.
Our troops had arrived from Russia at the time of the Bolshevik revolution, and during the first weeks of their stay in Cognac even the population displayed an exasperating mistrust of them. This, however, did not last long.
This juncture was a decisive one for me. The time was now approaching when decisions of far-reaching political scope ​would have to be made, and the conduct and development of our army formed one of the factors which would influence the measures taken by the Government, either for us or against us. I realized that this was going to be an important test, not only of the ability of our officers but of that of our whole nation. I had already witnessed at close quarters how the French military circles had ruthlessly disparaged the Polish Army on account of various disorders and disputes whilst in the course of formation, and I therefore determined at all costs to prevent similar occurrences amongst us, and to show that we were more disciplined, better prepared, and more advanced generally. Realizing thus how fateful the consequences would be to us if at this early stage we were to make the slightest blunder, I was uncompromising towards the troops. I insisted that they should unconditionally submit to all instructions from Paris, and in particular I prohibited them from engaging in politics, for that was a subject about which the Ministry of War was most touchy. And so for several months there was continual tension between Cognac and the National Council in Paris. I deliberately overlooked the unpopularity among the troops which I had incurred at the outset. My hope was that after a certain time they would realize that I was in the right, and all the reasonable elements soon did so. I must admit that I often subjected their patience to a severe test, and this only makes their merits all the more praiseworthy. I now affirm that our officers and men from France reached the highest standard of all our troops, and it was not long before the Ministry of War itself began to confirm me in this view. Within three months our troops had won the approval of the French Government, but the difficulties and the nerve-racking disputes which arose in connection with this military enterprise, taken in conjunction with the increasing pressure of our work during the spring of 1918, caused me much weariness and distress.
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These troubles of the National Council were increased by the difficult conditions prevailing in our colony at Paris. The colony had split up into various groups, one of which aroused serious and indeed well-founded suspicions that it contained Austrian spies. Being possessed of ample means, this group ​was able to assist our volunteers in the French Foreign Legion, and incited a number of them against the National Council and against me personally by alleging that we did not desire the formation of an army, and that we were not disposed to admit volunteers from the Foreign Legion into it.
The question of these volunteers was one of the most painful problems which I had to deal with at that time. The reputation of the Foreign Legion is well known. The discipline in it was severe, and it contained representatives of every European nation. Owing to the conditions under which it was recruited, it included numbers of men whose moral characters were dubious. Life in these surroundings was a terrible ordeal to those of our troops who entered the Legion out of sheer enthusiasm, and were now spending their fourth year in it. They found scarcely any congenial spirits among the men serving with them, with the exception of a few of the French commanding officers. Moreover, owing to the enormous losses sustained by the French, the Ministry of War naturally tended to assign the most exposed positions to the Foreign Legion, which under these circumstances was destined to be wiped out.
The number of Czech troops in the Legion at this time was about 300, and it was only by means of the utmost self-restraint that they had managed to hold out so long there. They accordingly welcomed the establishment of a Czechoslovak Army as a release from what was nothing short of a hell upon earth, but their applications for discharge from the Foreign Legion encountered serious obstacles. The supreme French command had hitherto systematically opposed a transfer of any considerable number of troops from the Foreign Legion, fearing that if this were granted to one nation, the same request would be made by all the others, and this would have meant the complete disappearance of the Legion. My efforts to secure the transfer of our troops to our army naturally met with opposition for months at a time, and this difficulty was overcome only when we were in a position to point to the existence of our complete regiments, in which it was possible to make better military use of our experienced legionaries from the French front.
I here recall one of the saddest and most touching episodes of my life during the war. One morning, in the spring of 1918, at the time when this seditious agitation in the colony against ​me among the volunteers from the Foreign Legion had reached its height, I was visited by about eight of our volunteers, who were then serving their fourth year in the Foreign Legion. Their attitude was desperate and threatening. On the previous day they had been informed that within three days they would be sent to the trenches somewhere near Verdun, and they were afraid that this meant taking part in an attack which involved almost certain death. With mingled entreaties and menaces they called upon me to do everything in my power which would lead to their being transferred to our army. When they arrived, they were under the impression that I was opposed to this course. One of them, in his excitement, produced a hand-grenade, which he threatened to throw at my feet. Another bitterly reproached me for the treachery of which I had been guilty, and declared that they would refuse to obey orders. This agitated interview, which lasted for three hours, more than once assumed a dramatic character, but in the end they were entirely assuaged. I gave them an account of everything that I had done on behalf of the cause, and explained why success had not yet attended my efforts. I disposed of their mistaken conjectures, and made them understand that it was their duty to hold out, since by so doing they would render a great service to our cause. Within three days they went to the trenches in accordance with orders, but only one of them ever returned. He came to me a few days later in the Rue Bonaparte with a revolver and a bayonet, with which he wanted to kill me. He was at once taken away to a military mental hospital. He had escaped death at the front only a short while before the attack, by behaving in such a deranged manner that he was regarded as being of unsound mind.
Finally, however, we succeeded in getting our volunteers transferred from the Foreign Legion to our independent army, by which process the number of our troops was increased and the greater part of our men were saved from the Legion. It cost me much work, and aroused a great deal of resentment against me.
The number of volunteer troops in our army was increased also by a further step on the part of our French colony. When the army statutes had been signed, Dr. Sychrava undertook the somewhat difficult task of arriving at an agreement with all our colonies in France by which they would submit com​pletely to the authority of the National Council, acknowledge its sovereignty as a national Government, and agree to the introduction of compulsory military service. With the help of certain members of the colony, notably the well-known artist, F. Kupka, this scheme had successfully matured by March 1918. The French authorities were greatly impressed by the manner in which the colonies submitted to the orders of the National Council, and also by the smooth working of the recruiting arrangements. Much credit is due to our fellow-countrymen in France who, with enthusiasm and a full consciousness of their national duties, did excellent work.
A further component part of our army in France consisted of volunteers from America, amongst whom there was a considerable percentage of Slovaks. The total number of these men was about 2,000. In view of the difficulties with which we had to contend in forming the various regiments, and also of our urgent need to place at least one division in the field in France, we greatly appreciated the services of these arrivals from America.
Finally, Italy too helped by sending 500 of our Italian troops to complete our French division, and received in return a few dozen of our trained officers from France.
From the above account it will be seen what great difficulties we had to contend with when collecting and organizing our army in France. In spite of the fact that our Russian Army never reached France in its entirety, we managed in the end to obtain four regiments, comprising about 10,000 men. By their presence on the Western front they enabled us to secure those diplomatic successes which the National Council in the summer of 1918 achieved for the nation.
(d) The National Council and the General Staff of our Army. General Janin
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To the above account of the development of our army in France will now be appended a few remarks on its internal organization as it progressed under the management of the National Council after the signature of the army decree and statutes.
In January 1918 special premises in the Rue Bonaparte were allotted to our military authorities, the General Staff of ​our army being the first of these. Through Štefánik’s action our first general was Maurice Janin, who had been the head of the French military mission in Russia, had rendered Štefánik much assistance during his first visit there, and altogether had done much for our cause in Russia at the beginning of 1918. Stef4nik persuaded him to devote himself to the organization of our army in France, particularly drawing his attention to the heavy task which would await him before our troops reached France from Russia. Janin complied with this request and the Ministry gave its consent. From that time onwards all the internal organization of the army passed under his control, and his management of it, to which he devoted his full attention, was altogether successful. He himself was not satisfied with this activity, as he would have preferred a broader sphere of work. In the summer of 1918 he left with Štefánik for Siberia as the supreme commander of our whole army.
The personality of General Janin was of great importance to our movement. The General Staff was composed first of French officers exclusively, but later it comprised Czechs as well. Our special military delegate acted on it as a representative of the National Council. This officer, in his capacity as a military expert, was at the same time assigned to me as secretary of the National Council, and thus formed a link between us and the General Staff. These functions were first carried out by Colonel Chalupa and subsequently by Colonel Fierlinger. It was the duty of this officer to vindicate the Czech character of our army with the General Staff, to see that the terms of the statutes were strictly fulfilled, to satisfy himself that the army was sufficiently autonomous, and to report to the National Council on the general conditions prevailing in it. These duties were mainly of a technical description, as I myself was in daily touch with General Janin and the members of the staff, and I personally discussed with them all questions involving matters of principle.
Our two representatives, whose names I have mentioned, acquitted themselves most satisfactorily. Their relation to the National Council was that of a high official of the Ministry to a Minister. Altogether, at this time, the National Council, by its method of work and its contact with the French authorities and with our army, had acquired a governmental character, being to all intents and purposes a combination of a Ministry of Foreign Affairs and a Ministry of War. From the ​spring of 1918 the French authorities treated it accordingly on all occasions.
The General Staff, acting with me as the representative of the National Council, saw that the regiments stationed at Cognac and Jarnac were properly equipped by the Ministry of War, and arranged all the details concerning the utilization of the army at the front. In December 1917 and January 1918, after his arrival from America, and before his departure to Italy, it was mainly Štefánik, besides Dr. Sychrava and Colonel Chalupa, who took part in the daily conferences and discussions on all these questions in the National Council and with the General Staff. I, as general secretary, attended to that side of the work which by the army statutes was reserved for the National Council. In January 1918 General Janin, Štefánik, Dr. Sychrava, and Colonel Chalupa were much occupied with the negotiations and discussions involved by the preliminary arrangements concerning uniforms, flag, badges, etc. Much labour was also demanded by the daily process of inducing the French authorities to grant all the facilities which were necessary for carrying out the statutes. This involved continual visits every day to the various official military departments, and as long as Štefánik was in Paris I arranged with him that he was to attend to this part of the business.
At the beginning of the summer of 1918 the internal organization of our division was completed in its essentials, and so, from May onwards we were able to consider the question of sending our 21st regiment to the front. This was done in June 1918, and was made an occasion for a solemn presentation of the colours. Messages were sent by President Poincaré and S. Pichon, Minister of Foreign Affairs; these messages proved to be the starting-point which led to the recognition of our independence and of our provisional Government by all the Allies.
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After the reverse at Caporetta, Italy found herself in a serious predicament as regards war aims. The internal difficulties of Italy, to which I have already referred, had reached their ​culmination just at this time, and it was under these circumstances that there were new secret negotiations with Austria-Hungary for the purpose of an agreement, in which the Italian war aims would necessarily have been abandoned. Indeed, the whole of Italian public opinion inferred from two important speeches by Lloyd George and Wilson on January 5 and 8, 1918, that this agreement had actually been reached. At that time the Government were naturally acquainted also with the details of Smuts’ secret negotiations at Geneva. When on February 13th Balfour made his Parliamentary statement on the Geneva negotiations with Austria-Hungary, the full gravity of the events as far as Italy was concerned were plainly acknowledged in the Press there.
There was another reason, however, why the situation was serious for Italy. Wilson’s speech containing the famous fourteen points made it clear that the London Pact between Italy and the Allies could not be carried out.(39) This was the most severe blow which had been sustained by Sonnino’s policy, and Government circles, as well as public opinion, which had hitherto taken its stand completely on the London Pact, were perhaps even more affected by it than by the words addressed to Vienna. Nor was it essentially mitigated even by Wilson’s declaration of war on Austria-Hungary after the reverse at Caporetta. This was the psychological moment for a fundamental change in the line of policy which had hitherto been followed by the Italian Government both in political and military matters. It would seem that to a certain extent the Government had become aware of the mistakes in its previous course of action, i.e. the waging of what was known as “our war” (guerra nostra), “the Italian War,” the rejection of a common front, certain considerations shown to Germany, violent and unnecessary disputes with the Jugoslavs on the subject of the London Pact, signs of compromise with regard to the oppressed nations of Austria-Hungary, and altogether a marked hesitation to adopt a definite attitude towards the problem of the existence of the Habsburg Empire.(40) With this was correlated an uncertain and undecided internal policy. After the serious military reverse the greater part of public opinion realized this, and assigned the blame to the faulty and uncertain Government policy. Thus, all these last events were interpreted as being so many blows directed against Sonnino’s tactics.
​Accordingly, in the spring of 1918 matured that profound moral crisis among the Italians which lasted throughout the war and, in fact, continued to operate after it. The state of Italy after the war is largely due to that crisis, and the policy which has been carried out since then may be regarded to a large extent as merely a continuation of that vagueness and lack of determination which dominated Italian policy during the war. In this sense Fascism and the policy of Mussolini were a reaction against the earlier events to which I have referred.
As time went on, the reaction against all this became increasingly stronger. Even during 1917 it was manifested by a number of groups concentrated around the Secolo and especially the Corriere della Sera, and including such men as Senator Albertini, A. Torre, G. Amendola, and Professor Borgese. Similar tendencies showed themselves among the independent Socialists associated with Bissolati and his followers. Mussolini consistently adopted a similar attitude in his paper, Popolo d’Italia. In ultra-nationalistic terms he expressed his disapproval of the lack of resolution shown by the Government circles connected with the “Idea Nazionale.” This policy was directed against Sonnino, and expressly criticized Orlando, the new Prime Minister, for his inability to break down Sonnino’s opposition, and thus lead the whole of Italian policy in a direction which would enable it to emerge from the crisis.
In Parliament also there was a strong reaction in this respect, and endeavours were made to bring about, if not a strong mass movement, at least a Parliamentary grouping of considerable strength, which would give a genuine impetus to the policy of Orlando’s new Government, constituted just at the period of the Caporetta offensive, and brought into power at the height of the crisis. Accordingly, in December 1917, a Parliamentary League of National Defence (Fascio della Difesa Nazionale) was formed, consisting of senators and deputies who desired to wage war resolutely until a complete victory had been gained.
For this purpose abundant influence was brought to bear upon the Press of certain parties. Meetings and demonstrations were arranged which soon made their influence felt upon public opinion. The league comprised the nationalists, the anti-Austro-Hungarian elements (Federzoni, Colonna di Cesaro), the Liberals connected with the Secola and the ​Corriere della Sera (Albertini, Agnelli), and also the Socialist reformists (Canepa, de Ambris, da Viti de Marco, Salvemini, and others). This policy was resolutely and effectively supported in the Popolo d’Italia by Mussolini, who afterwards supplied direct assistance to our movement.
This group soon came forward as a factor with a new and definite programme, the chief items of which were as follows:
1. It desired to carry on the war energetically till the end.
2. It accepted the policy of dismembering the Habsburg Empire.
3. It realized the necessity of co-operating with the oppressed nations in Austria-Hungary, and even considered it right that Italy, in the sense of Mazzini’s ideals, should place herself at the head of this movement against Vienna. Thus arose what was known as the Italian policy of nationality.
4. It declared a condition of success to be a settlement between Italy and the Jugoslavs on the basis of a reasonable compromise and amicable co-operation in the future.
5. From the preceding items it followed logically that support should be given to the Czechoslovak movement as well as to the Polish and Rumanian policy.
These ideas were nothing new at the time of the Caporetta reverse, either to those who advocated them, or to other political circles. They had been discussed long since. Bissolati had associated himself with them at the very beginning of the war, and from time to time thay had been proclaimed clearly enough by Albertini’s group and those connected with the Secola. There were many members of Government circles who were not opposed to them on principle, but who had not sufficient confidence in their success, or sufficient courage to champion them. The political and military situation was not of the kind which would render these ideas suitable for popular consumption. They had been recommended to the Italians ever since 1915 by French friends of Italy and the Jugoslavs, and also by Wickham Steed, Dr. Seton Watson, and Sir Arthur Evans, in London. Štefánik and myself had also emphasized them during our repeated journeys to Italy. As I have mentioned above, Štefánik’s visit to Italy in the spring of 1916 was specially devoted to these matters and they had been publicly advocated by Salvemini, da Viti de Marco, Zanotti-Bianco, and others from 1916 onwards.
The present political situation suddenly created a favourable ​atmosphere for this policy. The conditions in France were analogous, and it was therefore possible to rely upon co-operation with Paris. There also the slogan of a fight to a finish for the benefit of oppressed nations was gaining ground more and more, and the Italian public were not slow to notice the attitude of reserve which Paris adopted towards the two declarations of Lloyd George and President Wilson. The Franklin-Bouillon-Fournol committee for inter-Allied Parliamentary contact was working in close touch with a number of Italian politicians (Galenga, Ruffini, and others), and it formed the Paris headquarters of the movement for liberating the oppressed nationalities in Central Europe. This body directed all its activities in France in favour of war to the end, and more particularly in favour of anything which would render victory possible, including the fulfilment of the demands made by the Jugoslavs, the Poles, the Rumanians, and ourselves. I have already mentioned that after the outbreak of the Russian revolution this body started regular meetings with a programme involving mainly the Slavs and the other oppressed nations. Here, too, attempts were made to bring about an agreement between Italy and the Jugoslavs. The good personal connections which Franklin-Bouillon and Fournol had with a number of Italian politicians exerted an excellent influence in this respect. It was from this body that the idea of a congress of oppressed nations emanated in the autumn of 1917.
The situation in London was analogous. There this movement was concentrated round the New Europe group, which was often attacked for its uncompromising opposition to the London Pact, but in it Wickham Steed and Dr. Seton Watson frequently succeeded in moderating the attitude of the extreme radical Jugoslavs, urging matters as far as possible towards a reasonable compromise. Under Steed’s influence discussions took place at London in the middle of December 1917 between certain Italians (General Mola) and Jugoslavs (Trumbić), which tended considerably to bring the two camps closer together. These discussions were followed with interest by the Italian, Serbian, and British Governments, the latter of which made no secret of its sympathy for undertakings of this kind.
In December and January this change of situation had created an atmosphere which induced influential political ​circles in Italy to try to translate it into concrete action. My negotiations in September and October 1917 at Rome on the subject of our army, and the journalistic campaign started by me and systematically kept up by our Bureau in Rome, formed a suitable basis for developing this new line of policy. In the course of December, with the help of the Italian circles, which I have indicated, our prisoners of war, and the possibilities of our army, were written about and discussed as an almost general topic. When, on December 19th, our army decree was published in France, this campaign reached a decisive point. The manifestations in the Italian Parliament on behalf of our French army on December 20, 1917 (intended partly also as a demonstration against Sonnino), formed the most typical indication of how affairs were shaping.
Our movement was closely associated with the development of the new conditions in Italy after Caporetta. We must not, however, blind ourselves to the real meaning of these events. As far as the Italians were concerned, our cause occupied only a secondary position. Those who realized the importance of an agreement between Italy and the Jugoslavs in its bearings upon the results of the war and the policy of Italy after the war, began to pay attention to our movement so that they could take advantage of it for furthering their political aims as regards the Jugoslavs. To support the Czechoslovaks meant favouring the destruction of the Habsburg Empire and advocating this integral solution of what was for Italy the most important problem of the war. It meant also accepting, in consequence of this, the principles of the Corfu Pact for the unification of the Jugoslavs, and this, in its turn, demanded an agreement with the Jugoslavs themselves. It would have been too difficult a matter to demand outright a solution of the Jugoslav problem as early ‘as December 1917. But to ask the Government for something on our behalf could not result in any opposition, for at least it did not involve any embarrassment to Italy. Such was the argument of those who were associated with this new policy, and such was the basis of their course of action.
Thus, at the beginning of January 1918, more decisive stress was being laid at Rome on our problem, and there was even a suggestion that it might be possible to arrive at Italo-Jugoslav negotiations by way of our National Council. We were to act as intermediaries in the manner which Štefánik ​had desired in the spring of 1916. On January 19, 1918, Hlaváček wrote to me from Rome to this effect, and added that the Parliamentary circles concerned would approach me in the matter. I did not reject the idea, but I maintained a guarded attitude as I always do towards anything which involves my acting as intermediary. This is always a delicate and thankless task.
Meanwhile, under the influence of this inner political development in Italy, a committee for Italo-Jugoslav agreement and for co-operation with the other Austro-Hungarian revolutionaries had been formed at Rome (“Comitato italiano per l’accordo tra i popoli soggeti aU’Austria-Ungheria”). Besides this, the Socialist irredentists from Istria and the Trentino, acting in collaboration with Bissolati’s group, had formed their own committee with the same object in view.
Orlando, being a good Parliamentarian, realized the importance of this change of attitude among the prominent politicians and in the Press. He was naturally influenced by the declarations of the two Anglo-Saxon statesmen, and leaving Sonnino to continue in his attitude of reserve, he began cautiously to co-operate with these various political factors. His visit to Paris and London, upon which he was accompanied by Sonnino (in the second half of January), was undertaken partly through the effects of the two declarations referred to, and it confirmed him in his conviction that the change of attitude was necessary in Italy. On January 26, 1918, he had his first long interview with Trumbić, at which Wickham Steed was present. In a moderate but unambiguous manner Trumbić placed the wishes and principles of Jugoslav policy before him. The interview ended amicably in favour of an agreement between the two nations, and as a result of it Trumbić was invited to Rome. The Press comments laid stress upon this aspect of the negotiations.
At the same time more concrete measures were being taken by the Parliamentary circles in Rome, who were working on behalf of this new line of policy. On January 15th there had been a conference of Allied Socialist parties at Paris, and on January 2oth the Allied Socialist congress was held at London. The Italian Socialists, Arca, Canepa, Lazzarini, Ciccoti, de Ambris, Sestan, and Agnelli came to Paris and asked me to arrange a meeting between them and the Jugoslavs there. On several occasions we met a number of Jugoslavs ​for political discussions, and at the same time we negotiated with the Inter-Parliamentary Committee with regard to the Congress of Oppressed Nationalities. The Italian politicians raised the question whether it would not be more advantageous to hold this congress in Rome, so as to influence the Government and public opinion, and thus accelerate the change in Italian policy. The problem was settled shortly afterwards when J. S. Gallenga, the Under-Secretary of State in Orlando’s Ministry, came to Paris at the beginning of February. The effect of his participation in this movement was to indicate Orlando’s official approval of the whole of the undertaking on the part of Italian Parliamentary circles and the representatives of oppressed nations. We met several times at the Hôtel Crillon and the composition of these meetings (Franklin-Bouillon, Fournol; Dmowski, on behalf of the Poles; Braghicesco, on behalf of the Rumanians; De Giuli, acting as deputy for Trumbić, on behalf of the Jugoslavs; and myself, on behalf of our National Council) was the same as that of the subsequent Congress of Oppressed Nationalities, the organization and agenda of which we arranged. It was decided that the congress would be held in Rome, that Gallenga, on his return home, would reach an agreement with his friends in Rome as to the method of procedure, and that in accordance with this we should then complete the definite preliminary arrangements, settle the agenda and course of action, besides arranging for the possible participation of official representatives from among the Allies.
There were difficulties both on the part of the Italians and the Jugoslavs. Trumbić was unwilling to proceed to the congress until there had been a definite settlement of the Italo-Jugoslav dispute, and we could not induce him to come to Paris for any conversation of a binding character. De Giuli, who, during the absence of Trumbić, was managing the movement of the Jugoslav Committee in Paris, merely accepted messages and passed them on. In the end it was agreed that, before a final decision about the congress was reached, the delegates of the Italian Committee should meet Trumbić and endeavour to bring about a preliminary Italo-Jugoslav agreement comprising the formulation of general principles, which would enable the Jugoslavs to attend the congress at Rome.
On the whole, it was easy to agree on the principles which ​were to govern the participation of other representatives. They were discussed in detail, and settled without any great difficulties at our meetings in Paris. The decisions on this point were as follows:
1. Each of the oppressed nations should draw up its programme of political and economic independence.
2. War to the death should be declared upon the Habsburg Empire, which formed the obstacle to the free development of the small nations in Central Europe.
3. All the oppressed nations of Austria-Hungary should solemnly unite for a common struggle against their common enemy.
4. The action of the congress was, first and foremost, to assume the form of a public demonstration for the purpose of influencing the Governments and also public opinion throughout the world. Its aim was to emphasize the need for the Allies to put an end to negotiations on the subject of a separate peace, and also to overcome the lack of determination concerning Austro-Hungarian affairs in general.
Such were the matters which were discussed at our meetings in Paris. The initiative and organization of the whole scheme were due to the secretariat of the National Council on the one hand, and Franklin-Bouillon and Fournol (later also Albert Thomas) with the Italian Committee on the other. As I have stated, the Jugoslavs were waiting for a preliminary agreement with the Italians. The Rumanians kept solidly with us. The Poles promised their participation, but did not exhibit any considerable activity.
The only thing that remained was to arrange a preliminary Italo-Jugoslav agreement, and this was done at London in the second half of February. The Italian Committee sent A. Torre and Professor Borgese to take part in these negotiations, which were attended also by Gugliemo Emanuele, the London correspondent of the Corriere della Sera.
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Before the congress in Rome actually took place, the moment arrived when the Italian Government gave permission ​for our army to be organized in Italy. As I have explained, during my last visit to Italy in September and October 1916, the recognition of the National Council had been secured, and permission obtained to form semi-military detachments for work behind the front. As I was certain that this step would necessarily be followed by a further one, I instructed the branch of the National Council in Rome not to organize these labour detachments, but to continue working at propaganda on behalf of an army, and to await the course of events in France. I felt sure that this would settle the whole matter at Rome also, and it was my intention to return there and arrange everything on the French pattern. Through the work of our Press Bureau at Rome and—what was more important—independently of it, a number of Italian publicists made their appearance who realized the importance of our cause and, without any prompting, wrote articles on our movement. Those associated with the parliamentary action, which I have referred to above as a product of the Caporetta reverse, also began to pay close attention to our movement, which they used in support of their newly adopted policy, and also as a means of arriving at the Jugoslav problem. As a result of all these circumstances, our position in Italy suddenly became more favourable than it had ever been before. At this juncture, too, the publication of our army decree in France, and the reports on the attitude of the French Government towards our military organization there, proved of the utmost service to us in Italy. The whole of the Press dealt with this subject as being an important political event. There were demonstrations in the Italian Parliament (41) which promoted the popularity of our cause in Italy, in spite of the fact that to a certain extent they represented a protest against Sonnino’s attitude towards the question of our army there. In some cases, those who identified themselves with our cause were prompted by a sense of rivalry with France. The latter country, although not possessing any considerable number of our prisoners, had nevertheless anticipated Italian action with regard to the Czechoslovak Army.
After an internal struggle among the Italian authorities, the question of our army was settled in January and February 1918. Štefánik left me to continue negotiations with the French Government on the wording of the statutes and the internal organization of the army, and then made arrange​ments for a visit to Rome. He shared my view that the Italian Government would ultimately give its consent and, after the publication of our army decree in France, Brancaccio held the same opinion. For several months I had been giving him detailed information about our negotiations in Paris, and he had passed this on to the Supreme Italian Command. We had good reason to believe that the Italian military authorities had practically decided at the end of January that our army was to be sanctioned.
This is indicated by the proposals of General Giardino in January and February 1918, to the Supreme Military Council at Versailles, and by the report which Colonel T. Marchetti, head of the Military Intelligence Section, submitted on February 5, 1918, to the Ministry of War and the Supreme Italian Command. It was here that our long contact with the Italian Intelligence Service stood us in good stead. Marchetti’s report showed a great appreciation of our work, and also a considerable knowledge of the conditions in the Austro-Hungarian Army. He rejected Sonnino’s international arguments against the formation of a Czechoslovak Army, and supported his proposals by referring to the examples of Russia and France.
At all events, by the beginning of February, the Italian command had formed a plan analogous to that previously adopted in Russia for utilizing the Czechoslovak military forces, The Italian commanders at the front had many opportunities of seeing how the Czechoslovak troops behaved there, and how they risked their lives in the interests of their cause. It was thus obvious that they would be reliable supporters of Italy against the Habsburg Empire, that they could supply useful information to the Italians, and that by surrendering they helped to demoralize the Austrian front. The natural conclusion from this was that Czechoslovak detachments should be established all along the front, as they would prove a greater advantage to Italy than a single military unit. The need for some such step as this became even more urgent after the retreat on the Piave. The only opposition to the scheme came from Sonnino.
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All these events led me to consider the scheme for organized labour detachments as the last manœuvre for hindering the ​establishment of our army in Italy. This scheme was being carried out between the end of January and the middle of February under the auspices of General Spingardi, who was evidently acting in agreement with certain authorities at the Consulta and other opponents of our movement. Hlaváček, who was in charge of our Press Bureau at Rome, reported on January 27th that Spingardi had told him to arrange for the National Council to begin organizing military labour detachments for the second line, as the Government had issued an order that all prisoners were to be used for work of urgent necessity, and as within two months he would clearly be obliged to employ all the Czechoslovak prisoners for this purpose, it would therefore be better if these prisoners were properly organized, and could thus assist the Italian Army as free helpers. Hlaváček pointed out that this proposal concealed a threat. If immediate action were not taken to form Czechoslovak labour detachments, our prisoners would be sent with the rest to engage in the usual work.
Hlaváček considered that there was a real danger, and therefore asked us to lose no time in sending our national badges for the uniforms of our prisoners, which would designate them as Czechoslovak troops. After a conversation with Štefánik and Brancaccio in Paris I came to the conclusion that the whole thing was a mere manœuvre designed to frustrate the establishment of our army. It would have been a compromise which in any case would have delayed the fulfilment of our plans. Accordingly I decided, after consultation with Štefánik, not to send the badges, but to postpone the formation of the labour detachments, and to accelerate Štefánik’s visit to Rome. We had hoped that he would be able to leave towards the end of January, but his departure was delayed until the middle of February. On February 12th a new letter arrived from Hlavatek informing me that two days previously he had been summoned to Spingardi, who had told him that the Supreme Command required about 5,000 of our troops for work in the war zone, not later than February 20th. If they were not organized by that time, they would proceed there as prisoners. Hlaváček added that he had intervened with the Ministry of War for the purpose of postponing matters, and that he had received a promise to this effect on February 11th. On the next day, however, Spingardi had again sent for him, and told him that he had new instructions ​to dispatch several thousand of our troops to the war zone by April 18th. These detachments, he said, were to be formed in accordance with the pre-arranged regulations, the officers were to be designated by the National Council, the Italian uniforms which had been prepared would be as good as new, and there would be distinguishing marks in the form of cockades, red and white in colour.
In the letter to which I have referred, Hlaváček mentioned the pressure which had been exerted, and he stated that, acting on the instructions of the National Council, he had opposed the whole of this method of dealing with the situation. These matters caused us much dissatisfaction in Paris. We felt sure that before long our military schemes would meet with success, and we were therefore afraid that the manœuvre with the labour detachments would either frustrate the establishment of our army or at least delay it. Štefánik, on receiving Hlaváček’s report from me, hurried to Italy to do the best he could under the circumstances. He started on his task somewhere about February 2oth, and without paying any heed to the question of the labour detachments he immediately concentrated his efforts towards securing permission to establish the army. He achieved this object towards the end of June, and this was his greatest success during his war-time activity. I do not know all the details of his work or the procedure which he adopted, and indeed they are not known to others either. As a rule he never used to record anything in writing, and he explained the details of his plans to his fellow-workers only in a fragmentary manner. I can therefore mention only what he himself told me, or what I was able to discover officially from occasional documents.
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The actual character of Štefánik’s scheme varied from time to time. At first, like myself in October 1917, he aimed at securing a substantial number of prisoners for our army in France. His later plan, however, was more ambitious in its scope. He considered whether it would not be possible to secure more easily the consent of the Italian Government to the organization of our army in Italy, if our troops from France were attached to the auxiliary French corps which were sent to help Italy after Caporetta, and were then supple​mented from the ranks of our prisoners in Italy. I do not know exactly whether this idea originated with Štefánik or with the Italian authorities. I only know that Štefánik would have agreed to it, and that at first it met with the approval of military circles in Italy. Incidentally, I have ascertained that this solution was suggested by General Cadorna as early as January or February 1918 to the Supreme Military Council at Versailles. His successor, General Giardino, repeated the proposal on February 24, 1918, with a slight modification, his chief demand being that our troops in France should be sent to Italy, and Orlando in March 1918 again urged the French Government to express an opinion on this proposal. Štefánik’s plan was a similar one, and as far as I can infer (I had an opportunity of discussing the point with him) it was conceived independently of the Italian suggestions. When, fmally, it was submitted to me as Secretary of the National Council, after having been previously discussed by the French and Italian Governments, and by the military authorities at Versailles, I opposed it. The view I took was that if the situation were such as to permit it, Italy would in the end grant us our army. I was not opposed to this solution on principle, but I insisted that if we were to give our consent to such a change, Italy should clearly undertake to place at our disposal all our prisoners who were on Italian territory. In other respects I was opposed to the integral realization of this plan, as I regarded it as essential that at least a part of our troops should remain on the French front. Besides this, at the beginning of March, owing to the exacting demand of the French military authorities, the organization and training of our army had not made sufficient progress to justify the use of our regiments at the front. After consultation with General Janin we replied in this sense to General Foch. The plan accordingly came to nothing.
The negotiations which Štefánik began towards the end of February enabled him at least to acquaint himself thoroughly with the attitude of the Italian Government. Before the middle of March he had had interviews with Orlando, Sonnino, Bissolati, and Diaz, and he had also been received by the King. The reasons which Sonnino gave him to justify his opposition to the establishment of our army were as follows:
1. Humanitarian considerations: Italy could not guarantee ultimate success in the war, and was therefore unable to accept ​a sacrifice on the part of people who, if they were taken prisoners, could be executed for their share in the military operations.
2. Fear of reprisals against Italian prisoners. Sonnino had mentioned this point to me as early as the previous September, when he had also indicated his scepticism as to the result of the war.
Orlando himself was, on the whole, disposed to grant Štefánik’s demand. Diaz was non-committal as regards the political aspect of the matter, while from a military point of view he raised various technical objections (language difficulties, fear of desertion, espionage, etc.). Finally, on March 9th, the Italian High Command, without giving any details, informed Štefánik that the question would be submitted to the Supreme Military Council at Versailles for solution. Štefánik at once notified me to this effect. It was about this time that he fell seriously ill, and on March 21st he asked me to come to Rome at once and complete the work with him there. I was, however, so much taken up with military arrangements, with the preparation of the Congress at Rome, and the problem of transporting our troops from Russia, that I was unable to leave Paris.
The matters which had been referred to the Supreme Military Council included the above-mentioned proposals of Cadorna and Giardini. On March 16, 1918, I was approached for the first time by General Weygand, who inquired what attitude the National Council would adopt towards the dispatch of our troops from France to Italy. On March 22nd, as the result of a fresh demand from Rome, he addressed the inquiry to me officially.(42) As I have already mentioned, neither General Janin nor myself regarded the project as politically expedient or even, at that time, practicable. Surmising that Italy would in any case sanction our army, and that whatever happened, this would not be the most advantageous solution either for us or anybody else, I declined it.
And, as a matter of fact, almost immediately afterwards, on March 26th, I received the first news from Rome implying the hope that the Italian Government would accept our point of view. In reply to the objections which had been raised by Sonnino and Diaz in their interview with Štefánik, he furnished them on March 2oth with a detailed account of our aims, in which he explained what we had hitherto achieved during the ​war, and what the other Allies had already done on behalf of our army. He also analysed Sonnino’s objections and, in a detailed rejoinder, brilliantly disposed of them. He ended by demanding that a part of the prisoners should be sent to France, while the remainder should be organized as a military body in Italy, some of them being detailed for work on the second line of defence, and the others being used as fighting units.
Štefánik’s negotiations doubtless involved great difficulties, but from the very start he had the military authorities on his side, and they had long been convinced that his proposals were sound. As a result of this circumstance, as well as his personal qualities and his skill as a negotiator, Sonnino’s consent was practically secured in the early part of April. When I reached Rome about that time to attend the Congress of Oppressed Nationalities, Stef4nik informed me that the Italian Government consented to the scheme, and that the only thing that remained was to formulate the wording of the necessary documents. I arranged with Stefanik that I was to devote myself to matters connected with the Congress, while he would continue his negotiations on the wording of the military agreement. This was drawn up on the basis of our army decree and army statutes with France. Štefánik contrived that it should be expressly designated as a convention between the National Council and the Italian Government, which, in a political respect, denoted a step farther than our statutes with France, although the latter was perhaps a more substantial document.
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Before leaving the Congress at Rome, I again discussed with Štefánik all further details of organization, various suggestions as to the wording of the agreement with the Italian Government, and further plans concerning our army in Italy. It was just at this time that Captain Šeba, who had been sent by Masaryk to organize our work in Italy, arrived from Russia. Under Štefánik’s guidance he immediately started work. Dr. Osuský, who had come to Rome for the Congress, also spent about two weeks in Italy to assist with recruiting arrangements in the prisoner-of-war camps. I myself returned to Paris as soon as the Congress was over.
Štefánik’s negotiations with the Italian Government lasted ​until April 18th. On the following day he notified the French Government and myself that the negotiations were concluded, and that the agreement would be signed at an early date. At the same time he forwarded me the text of the agreement. In his report on these negotiations, M. Barrère, the French Ambassador in Italy, stated that the agreement differed in a number of points from the scheme prepared by the Supreme War Council at Versailles, but that Stefanik had succeeded in maintaining the principle of Czechoslovak Army unity, and that this was about the maximum which could be secured from the Italian Government under the conditions then prevailing. M. Barrère also paid a warm tribute to the ability which Štefánik had displayed in his handling of these negotiations. In this connection I should like to remark that one of Štefánik’s difficulties was the question of unity between our army in Italy and that in France and Russia. What Štefánik aimed at was a process of unification in accordance with our common scheme, if not in actual practice, at least in a formal manner, in order that the principle might be recognized by Italy. In the end he succeeded in bringing this about. The Italian Government recognized the principle of the uniformity of all our armies, but in the actual organization it stipulated for complete independence from Paris. In the same way the later recognition of General Janin as the Commander-in-Chief of our armies was only theoretical in character. It had political significance but no military application. Nevertheless, as Barrère rightly pointed out, this was as much as could possibly be secured at that time.
The text of the army agreement was signed on April 21, 1918, by Orlando, as Prime Minister, Zupelli, the Minister of War, and Štefánik. It contains a recognition of the autonomy of our army, which is subordinated to the authority of the National Council as a supreme administrative body, paying the military expenses from the sums advanced to it by Italy. It is stipulated that the army will fight side by side with the Entente against the Central Powers. The internal organization and the statutes are reserved for a later agreement. In addition to our own officers, appointed by the National Council, Italian officers were also to be allotted to it and an Italian general would be in command. The status of our troops was the same as that of the Italians. The agreement contained also an undertaking that the Italian Government would facilitate the ​departure of our citizens, i.e. liberated prisoners of war, to France, and that after the war it would give our troops the opportunity of acquiring Italian citizenship. By means of this formulation Sonnino aimed at maintaining his original point of view. He wanted our people to proceed to France, not as prisoners but as free citizens, and in this he was actuated by fear of reprisals on the part of Austria. He inserted the clause relative to the acquisition of Italian citizenship for the eventuality of defeat which would make it necessary for our people to remain in Italy.
Štefánik was anxious to supplement the agreement with the authorities in Rome by a personal interview on the subject. On April 25th he therefore proceeded to visit General Diaz, the Italian Commander-in-Chief, to whom he submitted a detailed analysis of the agreement, emphasizing two points: (1) the unity of our army in Italy with the rest of our troops, and (2) the employment of our army as a fighting unit at the front, in connection with which the National Council would not interfere with the tactical arrangements of the Italian military authorities. According to Štefánik’s report, General Diaz expressed his agreement and altogether showed himself entirely favourable to our military undertakings.
In accordance with the terms of paragraph 3 of the military convention of April 21st, the agreement was supplemented by additional and more detailed instructions as to the internal organization of the army, methods of recruiting, the appointment of officers, etc., which were analogous to those contained in our French statutes. This was signed on April 30, 1918, by General Zupelli and Štefánik.
None of these agreements contained any express political commitments as regards our future independence. Sonnino, although he had taken part in the discussions at which their wording had been agreed upon, declined to put his signature to them, and avoided everything which might denote an undertaking with regard to us or the rest of the Allies on the subject of our future State or the destruction of Austria-Hungary. Nevertheless, these military documents undoubtedly represented a considerable advance towards the realization of Czechoslovak independence.
(g) The Organization of our Army in Italy. Its Share in Operations at the Front
97
The actual organization of our army in Italy proceeded very quickly. About March 10th more than 4,000 of our troops at Padula were constituted into labour detachments. As I have already mentioned, Štefánik did not oppose this scheme, as it was his intention later to transform the labour detachments straight away into a regular army. This intention was actually carried out.
When, in the early days of April, the Government gave its consent to the formation of an army, the systematic work of recruiting and organizing the troops began in earnest. It was directed largely by Captain Šeba, who formed a link between Štefánik and the camp where the army was being formed. Here the military experience which he had gained in Russia stood him in good stead, and later on he became the representative of the National Council with General Graziani’s staff. After Štefánik’s departure for Siberia I appointed him our military plenipotentiary at Rome.
The centre of the recruiting and organizing arrangements was in Umbria. The chief garrison was located at Foligno and individual regiments were stationed in the neighbourhood at Perugia, Spoleto, and elsewhere. The recruiting of our troops immediately after the army had been sanctioned was carried out rather hastily. From the report supplied to Štefánik by Captain Šeba on May 5, 1918, it appears that up to that date the number of Czechoslovak prisoners entered on the records of the National Council was 17,000, and 14,000 of these volunteered for military service at the first summons. It was from these men that our first division, 11,500 strong, was formed by the middle of May, the remainder being organized as reserves. This division comprised four regiments of artillery, each containing three battalions and each battalion four companies, one of which was a machine-gun company.
In Italy, as elsewhere, the question of officers long continued to be a sore point to us. Our officers there were enthusiastic but unprepared, and for a long time we had no training schools for them. All posts were occupied by Italians, and this caused much dissatisfaction to our troops. In France we had a surplus of officers, and it had been arranged that they should be ​transferred to Italy. For a long time, however, it was not possible to carry out this plan, although I still did not know what there was to prevent it.
General Graziani, whose appointment took place as a result of an agreement between General Diaz and Štefánik, was soon a great favourite with our troops. What they particularly liked about him was his straightforwardness and his unaffected regard for the rank and file, with whom he made a point of coming into contact. On the other hand they demurred to his attitude towards the influence of the Czechoslovak element in the army. He did not favour the exercise of authority by our people or any attempt to impart a Czech character to the internal affairs of the army. He also alarmed our officers by his evident tendency to engage in active service without sufficient preparation, and to embark on undertakings which were regarded as rash adventures.
In Italy, as in all the other centres of our activity, the Sokol movement rendered us valuable services. In the first place, the discipline in our volunteer corps was derived from that of the Sokol organization. Then, too, the aptitude shown in military organization and the rapid progress in training were due mainly to the experience acquired by the Sokols. It is therefore no exaggeration to say that the Sokol movement formed the basis upon which the success of our army organization was built up.
98
The military qualities of our army in Italy were attested by its record at the front. It is not my intention to discuss this in detail, but I will remind my readers that in its very first engagement, which took place on June 16, 1918, it acquitted itself with distinction. Our second share of active service, which was taken on September 22nd, proved to be the most important military achievement of our regiments on the Italian front. The Austrian forces made an attack on the Dosso Alto sector, which was being held by our division. After severe fighting, our troops drove the Austrians back, and inflicted considerable losses upon them. In the second half of October our troops were transferred to the Piave front, where they likewise won the approval of the Italians.
I must add a few words on the subject of our intelligence section, the organization of which had started as early as ​January 1918. At first these sections were unconnected with each other or with the main body of our army, but when our military organization was completed, the National Council insisted that these formations should be incorporated with the national army as an integral part of it. This was done, and the 2,000 men who formed this unit distinguished themselves by their exceptional courage and the excellent results which they achieved. A greater proportion of them than of any other branch of our army fell into the hands of the Austrians, and met their end by execution.
99
After he had settled all the details necessary for the organization of our regiments, Štefánik turned his attention to a number of political matters. He first of all arranged with the Italian Government that the ceremony of presenting the colours to our 34th regiment should take place on May 24, 1918. This was attended by the whole of the Allied diplomatic corps in Rome and also by such ministers as Orlando, Sonnino, Bissolati, Nitti, and others. Speeches were made by Orlando, Mr. Nelson Page, the United States Ambassador, and also by M. Simon, the French Minister of the Colonies, who happened to be in Rome at the time. The ceremony concluded with a speech by Graziani and an address by Dr. Sychrava to our troops.
Štefánik now regarded his task of military organization in Italy as completed. It was his intention, after a short stay in France, to return to Italy to see how the organization was working. Before leaving Rome he therefore asked M. Barrère to obtain for him, as a French soldier, the sanction of the Ministry of War in Paris, and on June 6th M. Barrère made a most laudatory report on Štefánik’s activity in Rome. As a result of this, Štefánik was able to carry out his intention, and by July 1st he was back in Italy again. On this occasion he dealt with a number of outstanding details concerned mainly with the administration of courts-martial.
In the meanwhile I had been continuing the organization of our army in France. In particular, I arranged for the presentation of the colours to our troops on the French front, analogous to that in Rome. On this occasion, too, there were enthusiastic demonstrations in favour of our movement. Representatives of the French Government confirmed the status of the National Council as the supreme executive body of the Czechoslovak ​nation. I then proceeded to London to negotiate with the British Government. At that time the National Council was beginning to concentrate its attention upon our movement in Siberia, the problem of our intervention in Russia, and the transport of our troops to France. Dr. Ivan Markovič had just arrived from Russia with news on the situation which helped us to understand what had happened in Russia and Siberia with regard to our troops. I had discussed these matters in July 1918 with the Ministry of War and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who had urged that one of our representatives ought perhaps to visit our army in Siberia. It was also suggested that our Commander-in-Chief, General Janin, should also go there, partly for the purpose of provisionally directing the essential military operations, and partly to arrange on the spot the process of transferring our troops to the Western front. I reported these matters on July 24th to Štefánik, who at that time was in Rome. He immediately informed me that he was returning to Paris at the earliest possible moment, and that he was preparing to proceed to Siberia. He arrived in Paris at the beginning of August, at the time when I was in London discussing the question of our recognition with the British Government.