# My War Memoirs/Chapter 17

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After the events which I have just described, our cause made rapid progress in Paris, London, and Rome towards its final success. Foch’s counter-offensive in July produced the first military results which pointed to a definite turn of the tide in a military respect. Nevertheless, not having any detailed knowledge of the situation in Germany, and being aware of our own difficulties, we felt sure that the war would continue until the spring of 1919 at the least. We supposed that by that time all the promised American troops would be in France at the front, and that only then would it be possible to carry out successfully the last decisive onslaught against Germany and Austria-Hungary. We therefore distributed the rest of our work in France, England, and Italy accordingly.
Our main concern was to be recognized as an independent State among the Allied nations before the war was over, and this had been achieved to an adequate degree as a result of the last negotiations in England. France, Italy, and America had raised no objections to this decision, and I therefore devoted all my endeavours to induce the French and Italian Governments to confirm this state of affairs by new diplomatic documents and by a mutual agreement with us direct.
Having returned from London to Paris in the middle of August, I at once started to try to bring about the signature of a political agreement analogous to the one with England. For this purpose I negotiated with Degrand, Laroche, and ​Berthelot, to whom I submitted the unsigned text of the Anglo-Czechoslovak Agreement; and after exchanging views on this subject I suggested that the Quai d’Orsay itself should formulate the draft of an analogous Franco-Czechoslovak Agreement, having special regard to the position of France towards our movement. I emphasized the necessity of clearly formulating in such an agreement, not only our share in the inter-Allied conferences, but also our territorial demands, with a view to securing, if possible, the support of France for them at the coming Peace Conference. Finally, I aimed at arranging for the French Government to grant a formal and public proclamation of the National Council in Paris as the Government of the Czechoslovak State.
Berthelot entrusted the elaboration of the first draft of the agreement to M. Fromageot, the legal expert at the Quai d’Orsay, and to M. Degrand, his secretary, from whom I received it towards the end of August during my stay in London. But before these negotiations had entered on a decisive phase, matters took a new turn which was of great importance to us. This was the proclamation of the United States Government on September 2, 1918, concerning our liberation movement. This declaration defined our precise position among the Allied States, and solemnly confirmed the assurances which we had received from the European Allies:
Washington, September 2, 1918.
The Czechoslovak peoples having taken up arms against the German and Austro-Hungarian Empires, and having placed in the field organized armies, which are waging war against those Empires under officers of their own nationality and in accordance with the rules and practices of civilized nations, and Czechoslovaks having in the prosecution of their independence in the present war confided the supreme political authority to the Czechoslovak National Council, the Government of the United States recognizes that a state of belligerency exists between the Czechoslovaks thus organized and the German and Austro-Hungarian Empires.
It also recognizes the Czechoslovak National Council as a de facto belligerent Government, clothed with proper authority to direct the military and political affairs of the Czechoslovaks.
The Government of the United States further declares that it is prepared to enter formally into relations with the de facto Government thus recognized for the purpose of prosecuting the war against the common enemy, the Empires of Germany and Austria-Hungary.
There can be no doubt that the step taken by Wilson reacted favourably upon the further action of the Governments in London and Paris. When, on September 3rd, I signed the British-Czechoslovak Agreement in London I was able to show Lord Robert Cecil the American declaration as a proof that the Government at London had acted wisely, and when I was negotiating in Paris for a Franco-Czechoslovak Agreement, the American declaration made it possible for me to demand various commitments which, after Wilson’s action, the French Government was willing to grant me.
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When I returned to Paris on September 5th, I found the situation there slightly changed. General Štefánik had arrived from Italy towards the end of August, and was now preparing for his journey to Siberia. On seeing my plans and also the proposal drawn up at the Quai d’Orsay, he expressed certain reservations. He did not consider that matters were sufficiently mature to make it possible to form an actual Government so early. Altogether, he entertained doubts as to the whole political ​character of the agreement, and he wanted us to conclude an agreement in Paris on the subject of the National Council and our army, analogous to the one which he himself had signed with Italy on April 21 and June 30, 1918.
I found it impossible, however, to find acceptance for Štefánik’s point of view. He himself, immediately before his departure for Siberia, vainly endeavoured to persuade Fromageot. Berthelot regarded Štefánik’s views as impracticable. He agreed with the scheme originally drawn up, which was analogous to the agreement with Italy, and he agreed also that a provisional Government should be constituted at a favourable opportunity. He therefore asked me to arrange for the National Council to arrive at an agreement in this sense with Fromageot and Degrand. I acted in accordance with Berthelot’s wishes, especially as Štefánik, seeing the views which predominated at the Quai d’Orsay left me with complete freedom of action in this respect. What I aimed at was that the original draft which Degrand had shown me should, on the political side, be brought as close as possible into line with the memorandum which had been submitted to the Quai d’Orsay.
In my interviews at the Ministry I had laid stress upon the following points:
1. There should be a settled formulation of our military assistance to France and the Allies, which would place us on an equal footing with them, and by which France would undertake, by way of reciprocity, to promote the reconstitution of our free State, and to allow usa free decision with regard to our army.
2. The National Council should be not merely the representative or the basis of a future Government, but an actual provisional Government, which in the agreement was to be recognized as the de facto Czechoslovak Government.
3. There was to be a binding declaration on the subject of our future frontiers and the whole of our territory.
4. There was to be a confirmation of our share in inter-Allied conferences, and official diplomatic relations were to be instituted between the new Government and the French Government.
There was another question which was no less important, and which emerged as a necessary and logical result of the new agreement and the new juridical relationship between France and ourselves. This was the question concerning a new and ​special military agreement instead of the hitherto existing decree issued in December 1917. This decree was no longer in accordance with the juridical state of affairs which had now been arranged, or with the stage which our political and juridical independence had now reached. It was therefore my aim that our army should be dealt with in a manner analogous to the juridical status achieved by our cause as a whole. This, however, was a very delicate matter, and I had to proceed with extreme caution, as otherwise the military circles would have opposed us. I also wanted to take advantage of this opportunity for emphasizing the fact that we ourselves would maintain our army and Government, and that after peace was concluded we would defray all expenses.
The extent of these demands can be grasped by anyone with a sense of politics. They show the logical and systematic manner in which our progress was made. Every fresh set of negotiations, every fresh diplomatic document necessarily denoted progress in the construction of our State. I hasten to point out that I never concealed any of these plans from the Allies, nor did I ever confront them unexpectedly with anything. I quite frankly explained our aims to them and always let them know the real purpose which I had in view.
The wording of the agreement, which complied with all the fundamental points in my demands, provided me yet again with an indication that we were proceeding on the right lines. We had achieved everything which could be achieved and which at that period we needed. Negotiations were completed about September 10, 1918.
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Together with the accord on the text of the agreement, the Quai d’Orsay took due note of my information that at an early date we intended, in a formal and public manner, to announce the establishment of a provisional Government and to appoint diplomatic representatives. This was to be done at the moment which we should consider the most suitable according to the circumstances.
I therefore made the final preparations for this concluding phase of our diplomatic struggle for an independent State. In notifying Masaryk about all the important developments which ensued during my negotiations, I still had to arrange with him in detail for the course of action and the principles ​which we should follow in taking our final steps, for the persons who were to be taken into account in this connection, and for the exact juncture at which the matter was to be completed. From the reports which he was sending from Washington I observed that we were acting in complete agreement, and the Washington recognition of September 2nd showed me that there also matters had come to a head.
It was also my concern to prepare this final phase for our army too, as I was anxious for the proclamation of independence and a provisional Government to take effect not only before the Allied public, but also at the front and in the garrison centres amongst our troops, so as to impart a solemn and truly national character to the whole proceedings. I had also thought that it might be possible to choose November 8, 1918, as a symbolic day for this purpose. I was prompted to this far-reaching initiative, partly in realization of my complete agreement with Masaryk, partly in realization of the responsibility which was then resting upon me. Masaryk was at Washington, Štefánik on his way to Siberia, but the decision on the whole undertaking could be reached only in Europe, in accordance with the situation in Paris, Prague, and Vienna. I therefore acted with great care and consideration, but at the same time in a determined manner, such as is necessary at critical moments of this kind.
And so on September 13, 1918, I sent the following telegram to Masaryk in Washington:
In consequence of negotiations carried out in Paris and London their Governments fully accept principle of complete recognition of our Government. I have made an agreement with Ministry of Foreign Affairs enabling us at once to organize our central administrative body, the Czechoslovak Government, with regular diplomatic service. Seat of Government should be Paris, and we should have same status as Belgian Government with all advantages and entire public recognition internationally.
I submit this matter to you with my personal opinion of these questions: In view of situation here it would be good to set up a ministry under your presidency, with headquarters at Paris. It would be necessary to set up, beside the presidency of the ministerial council, also a Ministry of War and of Foreign Affairs. I do not know your opinion as to distribution of portfolios. I think that it will be essential to set up these three ministries, and as regards the others we should keep to the opinion that they are to be given to political leaders from Bohemia.
We could, in addition, set up State secretariats for finance and the interior.
​The minister who might be in Paris in absence of the others could, for the interim, manage the remaining ministries. It would also be necessary to establish legations at Rome, Paris, London, Washington, and Tokio, and also to appoint our representatives to the Serbian Government, with the title of Chargé d’Affaires, at least for the time being. . . . In view of situation I am compelled to begin making these new arrangements now. Considering the last declaration and the situation as a whole, I regard it as somewhat dangerous not to start without having our juridical status precisely defined, or without immediately transforming the National Council into a regular Government. I see from the Austrian papers that our people at home are reckoning upon this. Kindly let me have a telegraphic reply to all these questions, and inform me of your fundamental views.—Beneš.
I received a reply on September 26th through M. Vesnić, the Serbian Minister. Masaryk expressed his complete satisfaction with everything we had done in Paris, and at the same time he declared himself entirely in agreement with the scheme for constituting a Government and with the other measures proposed in my telegram. The date upon which this reply was dispatched was then taken as the date when the provisional Czechoslovak Government was constituted.
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Having thus completed all necessary preparations, and after obtaining the requisite consent of all the parties concerned, I considered it essential to send a final detailed report to Prague, and in this way prepare our political circles at home for all that was now to ensue. In a message which I sent on September 11, 1918, I summarized the facts and the contents of the document defining our international status, and I emphasized the unequivocal character of the Allied declarations in order to counteract any contrary statements on the part of the Austrian Press and Government which might be calculated to mislead our people at home.
In my message to Prague I also referred to our decision concerning the immediate development of a State organization, with a regular Government and the whole of the diplomatic apparatus. As a provisional step, the Government was to consist of a Prime Minister, which post had been accepted by Masaryk, Minister of War (Štefánik), and a Minister of Foreign Affairs (myself), while the remaining portfolios were to be assigned to politicians in Bohemia. I emphasized the fact that we regarded ​ourselves as a constituent part of the provisional revolutionary Government existing de facto in Bohemia, and I called upon them at home to maintain this conception, so that whatever might happen in Bohemia there would be no break in the unity between us in this respect.
Under no circumstances (I wrote) must there arise any dissension or schism between us. Nor must there be one Government coming into existence here, and another Government among you. Whenever a Government is to come into existence in Bohemia, the step must be taken in agreement with us, in unity with us, and in continuity with us. . . . It is out of the question for the Allies to instigate any negotiations whatever with Austria-Hungary. This is an eventuality which need not be feared. Nor need there be any misgivings as to whether the Allies intend to fight to a finish. It would therefore be a suicidal policy on our part to make any arrangements with Austria. For these reasons we consider it essential for you, at the right moment (we do not wish to decide this, as you will be in a better position to judge), to refuse point-blank to enter Parliament, and also to break off all relations with Austria-Hungary. You would thus demonstrate that you understood what was meant when the Allies proclaimed us an Allied nation.
At the same time we urge you not to provoke the Germans or anybody else to a premature revolt. Any revolution which is to come, and for which you should be prepared and organized, must take place in agreement with us. The chief military move on the part of the Allies will not be made until the spring. By that time we shall be adequately organized, and as a Government we shall be able to reach a definite political and military agreement with the Allies on the subject of the plan for overthrowing Austria-Hungary by an external offensive and an internal revolution.
I concluded my message by giving concise information as to the stage reached by our movement abroad and the position of our troops, especially in Siberia. I dispatched the message on September 5th, and accelerated as much as possible the realization of all the plans referred to, in view of the Allied military situation and our agreement with the Allied Governments, and particularly in view of what was then taking place in Austria-Hungary. The reports of critical happenings there were so precise that I was prepared for the utmost possibility, especially as a number of messages arriving from Prague via Geneva referred to the possibility of an impending military capitulation on the part of the monarchy. I was somewhat disturbed by rumours that the Austrian Government were preparing to revise the constitution. From time to time statements emanating from pacifist quarters were published, from which it appeared ​that Lammasch or Redlich would be appointed to the Preparatory Commission for drawing up the new constitution. At another time there was a rumour as to the promising progress made by the preparations for dividing Bohemia into administrative areas, and the measures adopted later by the Austrian Government showed me that Vienna was determined to take some decisive step without awaiting further developments. I therefore realized that we had no time to lose, and I made a special point of this in my telegram to Masaryk. Not wishing to be taken unawares by the course of events, I urged our business forward. The political situation in the Habsburg Empire, as well as the state of things on the various battle-fronts, tended only to confirm me in these proceedings.
On the Western front Foch’s victorious advance, initiated by the offensive on July 18th, proved to be the beginning of the end of the Central Powers from a military point of view. Four consecutive German offensives in March, April, May-June, and July, on a larger scale than anything of the kind hitherto attempted in the war, indicated an extreme and final effort on the part of the Central Powers. These offensives used up enormous supplies of material, and entailed the sacrifice of hundreds of thousands of lives, without producing any success. The exhaustion of supplies and food-stuffs had reached its culminating point, and a renewal of the raw materials which had thus been used up was out of the question. The losses sustained in this final exertion of strength could never be made good, and the military and economic resources of the Central Powers could now only continue to diminish until they were exhausted.
The Allies, on the other hand, had at this juncture just reached a far more favourable situation, especially through the collaboration of America. Their resources were increasing, while those of the Central Powers were on the decline. The last effort of the Central Powers, at a moment when they were still in the ascendancy, proved unsuccessful. The inference was clear that a military catastrophe on the part of the Central Powers was now only a question of time, and it would evidently not be long in coming.
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While the Central Powers were thus being overtaken by a complete military disaster, the internal situation of the Habs​burg Empire was moving towards ruin with redoubled speed. At the time when I had secured our recognition by Great Britain, it was clear to the Government at Vienna that a catastrophe was inevitable unless peace could be made at the earliest possible moment. At a meeting between the two Emperors and their Ministers at Spa on August 14, 1918, Burian expressly declared that if the war were not ended within two months, the Habsburg Empire, being exhausted in every respect, would be unable to hold out. On his return to Vienna, Burian, just like Czernin at an earlier period, clutched at every opportunity for bringing peace negotiations within reach of the Empire. Burian’s official peace proposal was made on September 15th in a note which he sent not only to the neutral States and to the Papal See, but also to Germany, Bulgaria, Turkey, and the Ukraine. In it he proposed that the competent States should, at the earliest possible date, meet together for an exchange of views as to the basic principles of the coming peace. It would not be in the nature of actual peace negotiations, nor would it denote a suspension of hostilities, but it would merely be a rapprochement for elucidating a number of points at issue and thus accelerating the arrival of the peace negotiations themselves.
The Allied Press immediately rejected this proposal, which it unanimously interpreted as a fresh proof of the chaos and exhaustion prevailing in the Habsburg Empire. At that time I was negotiating with the French Government on the subject of our agreement, and I at once saw that Burian’s proposal was not viewed with any great favour. What a great contrast there was between this and the reception accorded to the first attempt of this character in December 1916 and also to Czernin’s attempts in 1917.
At first a certain amount of surprise was occasioned by the fact that the note was dispatched by Vienna alone, without the other members of the Quadruple Alliance; and a number of Austrophiles in Allied circles endeavoured to show that this was a fresh symptom of conflict with Berlin, so that it would be a good opportunity to make another attempt to separate Vienna from Berlin. It soon appeared, however, that this was a preconcerted manœuvre, and the Allied answers, which were not long in making their appearance, came as a severe blow to the Habsburg Empire. As early as September 16th Balfour replied that any conversations, such as those suggested ​by Burian, could serve no useful purpose, and that the proposal made by Vienna would not mean peace, but an armistice leading soon to a new war. Immediately afterwards Lansing replied on behalf of President Wilson in terms which left no doubt that the latter, having publicly entered on a commitment to destroy the Hohenzollern autocracy, meant this to include all that the Habsburgs stood for. “The American Government,” declared Lansing, “has already on several occasions most precisely defined the conditions which would allow it to discuss peace. It therefore does not intend to deal with any proposal whatever for a meeting in a matter on which it has already indicated its point of view and made so plain and sincere a decision.”
Finally, Clemenceau delivered his answer, which was couched in the most emphatic terms, and was thus typical of his activity throughout the war. On the assumption that the Austrian offer had been made with the consent of Berlin—as was actually the case—he first of all turned his attention to Germany. He recalled various objections which the Allies had raised to her policy, diplomacy, and conduct of the war, and he concluded with the drastic declaration:
Germany desired to enforce the end of the war by military power. Let her wish be therefore fulfilled. The most fearful account is tendered from nation to nation. It will be paid.
We now realized how we were situated. We saw that our cause was in no danger when such replies as these were made to the Austrian offer. We understood, too, that such replies would inflict a further severe blow on the Habsburg Empire, the inner disruption of which would thus be accelerated. The Austrian Government would certainly be compelled to take further steps, involving possibly constitutional reform in agreement with the various nationalities inhabiting the Austro-Hungarian Empire.
The series of replies to Burian were completed two days later by Sonnino’s reply, which was of a special character. In a simple communiqué, issued by the Stefanio Agency, Sonnino laconically stated that as the other Allies had already explained in detail the condition upon which the future peace must depend, any kind of negotiations would be superfluous.
Rarely has any diplomatic action ended in such material and moral failure. And the further course of events resembled more a tragi-comedy than a politico-diplomatic attempt to secure ​peace. Burian had received no favourable replies from the Allied camp, but Berlin, Sofia, and Constantinople had all expressed their approvalof the Austrian offer. Accordingly, Burian thought that he might as well continue discussions with the Allies at least in the newspapers and official communiqués, now that they had refused to parley with the Austro-Hungarian Government. The Viennese Press announced that Parliament would deal with Burian’s offer, and that the Austrian nations would show the Allies, who were unwilling for peace, that it was only the Central Powers who were striving to bring about a genuine peace among nations.
The discussion on the peace offer thus proceeded parallel with the continuing military defeat on the Western front and in the Balkans. The news on September 26th that the Bulgarians were asking for a separate armistice without their Allies, and that the Central European Quadruple Entente had ceased to exist, produced the alarming impression in Vienna that the moment of definite defeat was now at hand. The Government and all the authorities were aware that they would now have to adopt their final safety measures. In their opinion, although peace would be secured on severe terms involving territorial losses and the necessity to federalize the Empire in some form or other, they would, nevertheless, be able in the end to save the general framework of the Empire and the dynasty.
At the Ministerial Council on September 27th Burian, in the presence of Karl and General Arz, Chief of the General. Staff, stated that the defeats on the Piave, the reverses in Albania, together with the events on the Western front, had so shaken the nerves of the population throughout the Empire that the Bulgarian catastrophe must be regarded as the last straw. Moreover, danger was threatening from Rumania, the Jugoslavs would again become a menace to the Empire from the South, and Turkey was now cut off. Under these conditions it was again necessary to make a peace offer to the Allies by October 15th at the latest, and Hohenlohe had already received instructions to start negotiating with Berlin on the subject of the new offer. The new adjustment of the Empire was also a more urgent matter now than it had been before. The war could not be continued beyond the end of the year. This information was also conveyed to Berlin. General Arz confirmed this in his statement, with which the ministers expressed their agreement.
​It was under these circumstances that on September 28th I signed our agreement of alliance with France, arranged for a Government to be constituted and a proclamation of independence to be issued, besides settling with the Italian Embassy in Paris the details of my journey to Rome for completing similar negotiations with Italy. I left for Rome on the evening of October 1st in a very hopeful mood. Although I saw that events were taking a precipitant course, I still did not believe that the end of the war was at hand—in fact it is hardly likely that such a belief was entertained by anyone around us in the Allied countries or even in the camp of the Central Powers. From the circumstances as they were then I judged that we had a few weeks for realizing all our plans, and I wanted to make all preparations so that the solemn day for the proclamation of our national and State independence should fall on November 8, 1918.
(b) My Third Journey to Rome. Draft of an Agreement of Alliance with Italy. Visit to the Italian Front
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Having obtained Masaryk’s consent to my proposed course of action, I made all the necessary preparations in Paris, and then turned my attention to Italian affairs. I regarded it as essential to proceed in Italy on the same lines as we had followed in France and England, i.e. by preparing the ground for realizing our political plans, partly by a political agreement, partly by personal interview.
The dispute between Italy and the Jugoslavs was still exerting a considerable influence on our affairs. Since the British proclamation on August 9th with regard to us, and the progressive collapse of the enemy front in the Balkans, this dispute was tending rather to become more accentuated against Sonnino. At the beginning of September, through Bissolati’s initiative, the Jugoslav question had become a subject for official negotiations within the Italian Government. Finally, the protracted dispute was settled by Sonnino’s withdrawal, the credit for which is due to Bissolati and Orlando. On September 8, 1918, the Italian Government passed a resolution that Italy would identify herself with the principle of complete liberation and unification of the Jugoslavs. This resolution was, for a time, withheld from the public, but ​through official diplomatic channels it was transmitted to the Allies. This was a victory for the Jugoslavs and all their friends, a victory which had been won with difficulty, and which was received in all the Allied countries with much gratification.
Under these circumstances I felt sure that I should meet with no opposition. I had discussed things in detail first of all with the Italian Ambassador in Paris. I had given him a full account of my negotiations with the French Government, of the plans which the National Council had in view for the definite establishment of a provisional Government, and I had asked him to secure a favourable attitude on the part of Italy towards these plans. After reaching an agreement with him I handed him, on September 24th, a comprehensive memorandum on the position of our movement at that time and particularly on its future development, which I asked him to transmit to Orlando, relying on the amicable attitude which the latter had shown towards us on various occasions.
I left for Italy on October 1, 1918, immediately after the French Agreement was signed. My intention was, after arriving at a political agreement at Rome, to proceed to the front, and to arrange with those in charge of our troops there what should be done as soon as the provisional Government had been proclaimed. The process of constituting the Government was to be accomplished by a special solemn declaration which, as previously arranged between us, was to be prepared by Masaryk and published simultaneously in all Allied countries at the moment when the Government had been constituted. These proceedings were to culminate in solemn ceremonies at the front among the troops in France, Italy, Russia, and Siberia, and also by celebrations in the colonies, especially in America. As I have already mentioned, we had contemplated fixing the proclamation of our independence for November 8, 1918, the anniversary of the battle of the White Mountain.
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While travelling to Rome I decided to visit our troops on the Italo-Austrian front, and this visit was one of my war experiences which I recall with the greatest pleasure. I started from Verona for the front by Lake Garda, and it is still with emotion that I remember the sight of the Alps occupied by our troops. Our cars passed through places where suddenly on the slopes there appeared hundreds of green uniforms and Italian hats ​with the red-white cockade. Farther on we unexpectedly passed from the mountain defile into a broad cavity, above which, in an amphitheatre, were assembled about 2,000 of our troops in a deluge of flags and waving hats. There was a long outburst of cheering, and I was then deeply moved as they intoned the strains of our national hymn, accompanied by the regimental band. The commander of the sector, having learnt about my visit, had rapidly organized this touching celebration which among these mountains at a height of several thousand feet, impressed me as few things have done in my life. I was greeted by several of those who had attended my university lectures. They were all filled with resolution and confidence, and they reminded me of the veiled suggestions which I had managed to embody in my lectures and which they had thoroughly understood.
During these moments there passed through my mind the memory of all that had happened from 1914 until October 1918, i.e. from the time when I had been creeping through the streets of Prague with treasonable documents in my pockets; when I had received messengers from Switzerland with suspicious luggage; when, as an outlaw, I had succeeded at the eleventh hour in escaping across the frontier; when I had begun my life of hardship in Paris, right up to that very moment when our national army were greeting me with songs and rifle salutes as a representative of our national Government, with a general of an Allied Great Power, and when, only a few miles away, the Austro-Hungarian military forces were awaiting an attack which was perhaps to have fatal consequences for them.
Amid the cheering of the soldiers we continued our journey until, in the vicinity of the front lines, I went with General Graziani and a number of officers into the trenches, which were a few hundred paces from those of the Austrians. We were standing immediately above Rovereto. General Graziani explained the position to me, and pointed out the scene of the recent conflicts, where several hundred Austrians had been captured. He also showed me another place where a number of our troops had been taken unawares and had defended themselves to the last with hand grenades rather than be taken prisoners. Now and then we heard the sound of firing, but on the whole the front at this point was quiet after the fighting which had taken place there in the preceding days.
We returned by another road along the front and around the ​lake until we reached Spezzia. There we spent some time discussing the problems of military organization, the grievances of officers and men, and similar matters. There were difficulties with our troops and there were difficulties with Graziani, who in many respects was apt to be stubborn. I had some long talks about this with Colonel Vitalini, who understood the situation, and told me quite frankly how matters were. Our troops, he said, were full of enthusiasm and devotion to their great cause, but it had been, and still was, enormously difficult to agree on the ways and means for achieving their great ideals. Nevertheless, in the end we did agree. I promised to intervene at the Ministry in Rome, to improve the material situation of officers and men, to replace a number of Italian officers, and to emphasize in certain matters the Czech character of the army. Graziani also assented to our point of view and promised improvements. Early on the morning of the third day I started on my way back to Verona, where I spent some time in a hospital among our wounded.
While in Verona I heard about the further rapid development of military and political events, especially in the Balkans. After the Bulgarians, the Turks had capitulated. An inter-Allied conference had been hastily convened in Paris for the purpose of discussing the question of an armistice, with which the Allies were confronted as a result of these recent events. I also heard that before leaving for Paris with Sonnino the Italian Prime Minister, Orlando, had made an important statement in Parliament on the international situation and on the policy of Italy, in the course of which he had referred to our affairs in very definite terms. From the report of Orlando’s statement which had been handed to me, I judged that it corresponded not merely to the memorandum which I had sent from Paris, but also to the agreements concluded with England and France, as the opposition had blamed his Government for allowing themselves to be forestalled in connection with our affairs by the two Allies who had less direct interest in the Habsburg Empire. For that reason also Orlando had made a special point of emphasizing the importance of the agreements signed in April and June 1918, and he announced that the concessions now being made by France and England had been granted to the National Council by Italy as early as the spring of the same year.
I at once telegraphed from Verona to Orlando thanking him warmly for his statement, and emphasizing the fact that I was ​just returning from the Italian frontiers, where our troops were defending Italian soil as if it were their native land. On the same day I left for Rome. Now that the fundamental sanction of the Government was confirmed by a public statement in Parliament, I inferred that I should be able to conclude all arrangements with the Consulta and the Ministry of War, which were necessary for realizing our political and military plans. When I reached Rome, however, the circumstances had changed. The recent international events had imparted a new direction to the development of our affairs also.
Orlando and Sonnino had already left Rome when I arrived, and I therefore first discussed questions relating to our army with the Ministry of War, and satisfactorily settled all the grievances of our regiments. I then proceeded to the Consulta and discussed with Demartino the question of a possible agreement and the proclamation of our independence. Demartino assured me that Orlando’s declaration in Parliament was an affirmative reply to my proposals concerning the proclamation of independence and an Italo-Czechoslovak agreement, and that there was no dissent either as regards the matter itself or the methods of dealing with it. He added, however, that it would be necessary to agree about the details and the text of the agreement, in which connection the minister would have to be allowed the final decision. I agreed to this, and at the same time proposed that I would shortly submit my draft of the agreement to the Consulta, so that everything could be prepared before Sonnino and Orlando returned.
I also notified M. Barrère and Sir Rennell Rodd of my proceedings with the Italian Government, and through Sir Rennell Rodd I was able to inform Masaryk about the new situation. The victories in the Balkans, the fall of Hertling, the appointment of Max of Baden as his successor, and the armistice overtures made to Wilson by the Central Powers made it clear to us that fateful decisions were at hand. In this sense I telegraphed on the morning of October 10th, before leaving Rome, to Masaryk in Washington that the decisive moment was approaching, that Rome agreed to our plans, that we should evidently be prepared any day for a proclamation of independence, and that therefore it was necessary to draw up the required declaration immediately and send it to us in Paris.
My negotiations with Demartino on the subject of the Italo-Czechoslovak agreement had not yet been concluded, when I ​received from Dr. Sychrava a telegram of alarm urging me to return at once to Paris, because matters were in preparation which might have very far-reaching and even dangerous consequences for us.
On arriving in Paris on Sunday, October 13th, I found the atmosphere there charged with excitement. The political world and official circles were thinking of nothing else but the Allied discussions and negotiations concerning the events which had happened in the meanwhile, and which were of vital concern to us also.
In the face of these events and reports I asked myself what we should do under such circumstances, and how they might affect the preparations which we had just undertaken and the plans connected with the declaration of independence, which we had intended to realize within the next few weeks. I conferred with my friends in the secretariat of the National Council. The news from Austria concerning the plans of the Viennese Government made me feel uneasy, but, on the other hand, the news as to the action of the National Committee in Prague, which had also just arrived from Geneva, gratified us. At the same time the uncertainty as to how President Wilson intended to reply to Austria-Hungary was a source of anxiety to us and our friends. His reply to Germany had been couched in severe terms, and on the whole, in a number of circles in Paris, it was not expected that he would be severer to the Habsburgs than to the Hohenzollerns. This being the case, a number of our friends began to fear that the idea of a separate action with Austria-Hungary might again emerge. They found a reason for this conjecture in the circumstance that the repetition at Paris on October 15th of the congress of Austro-Hungarian nations which had been held in Rome, had been postponed in view o the fresh developments and also at the request of the French Government. Our French friends asserted that this had been done at the request of England. During this time it may well be imagined what tension there was amongst us in the Rue Bonaparte. Not knowing exactly how things were, we of the ​National Council also shared—some more, some less—these various fears regarding the possibility of a compromise. We all realized, too, the momentous historical significance of the decisions which were being made. On my arrival the first thing I did was to report to my colleagues in the secretariat on affairs in Italy. We then discussed what we should do next, and we all agreed that I must first ascertain from all our friends what the situation was, and what steps were being prepared.
Accordingly, I made inquiries on these points from M. Vesnić, who had taken part in the Allied negotiations, and who at once gave me news which set my mind at rest. I also approached several French friends and then, on the morning of October 14th, I called on Berthelot at the Foreign Ministry, and reported to him about my Italian visit, at the same time letting him know that all preparations had been made for carrying out our plans. I asked him to inform me how matters were being viewed in Paris. In consideration of the agreements which we had hitherto made with the Allies, I questioned him directly about the negotiations with Austria and again insisted upon the necessity for the Allies, now more than ever, to hold out until the end. He replied emphatically and without hesitation: “There can be no question whatever of any serious separate negotiations with Austria. The forces which have been let loose cannot be held up. Nothing can avert the downfall of the Central Powers; Austria is condemned to destruction and cannot be saved. Even if an attempt were made in one quarter or another at some sort of negotiations, it would merely be an insignificant intrigue. The elemental forces and fateful influences which are now at work can no longer be mastered by human beings.”
Such was Berthelot’s diagnosis. His conviction as to the outcome of the war and the fate of the Central Empires had, as a matter of fact, been always very firm, even at the most critical periods of the war. This opinion I shared with him.
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The discussion between President Wilson and the German Minister of Foreign Affairs was followed by the whole world with close and anxious attention. It was felt by everybody that each of President Wilson’s replies was pressing the German Government more and more into a tight corner. As I have already stated, the fact that President Wilson was not replying to Austria-Hungary while carrying on this exciting diplomatic ​duel with Berlin, made me wonder the whole time whether this implied that discussions with Vienna were proceeding elsewhere and on different terms. There were various indications which led me to suppose that Vienna, while approaching Wilson officially, openly, and in concert with Germany, was intervening secretly either in France or England, possibly in both countries. The success of such proceedings was improbable after the reply which Clemenceau and Pichon had recently made to Karl. Nevertheless, the situation seemed to me somewhat dangerous, chiefly on account of the uncertainty as to whether these happenings denoted the end of the war or not.
This led me to continue my previous course of action with the greatest determination and more rapidly than hitherto. I accordingly decided on the immediate realization of the plan which I had prepared for November 8th. The reassuring results of my interview with Berthelot were calculated to strengthen me in this resolve rather than otherwise; and in the course of the interview itself I asked him what the French Government would do if I were to notify it officially that the Czechoslovak Government had been appointed and Czechoslovak independence proclaimed, or if a Czechoslovak diplomatic representative were to be immediately accredited to it. The answer which I received from Berthelot was the only one which I could possibly have expected from him and from a representative of the French Minister at that time: ‘‘French policy is based upon the previous agreements with the National Council. France has plainly indicated her attitude by means of the documents which she has signed, and she will keep her word. If the Government is notified of any decision on the part of the National Council, it will certainly at once adopt a favourable attitude towards anything of the kind.” In reply to my further inquiry, Berthelot assured me that if I sent him the notification immediately I should certainly receive the French official reply on the following day.
I returned to the secretariat of the National Council in the Rue Bonaparte, and at once prepared an official note concerning the establishment of an interim Government. At six o’clock in the evening I handed a copy to the Quai d’Orsay and also to the diplomatic representatives of the Allied Powers in Paris. I announced that on September 26th (the date of Professor Masaryk’s telegram sanctioning the realization of the plan) we had established an interim Czechoslovak Government, and that ​we were now publicly proclaiming the formation of an independent Czechoslovak State.
Together with this note I sent to the Allied Governments separate communications with regard to the accrediting of our diplomatic representatives in Paris, London, Rome, and Washington. These communications were also dated October 14, 1918.
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I based the juridical justification for this step mainly upon the declaration of the United States and on the agreements with England and France. My reasons for this were as follows:
(a) At that time the United States had so great a prestige among the Allies that I regarded this as the best step on tactical grounds.
(b) It was in the declaration of the United States that for the first time, in reference to the National Council, use had been made of the phrase “de facto Government” without any provisos.
(c) I regarded Pichon’s letter of June 28th as tantamount to recognition on the part of France, and the declaration of the British Government on September 9th as analogous to it.
Wishing to obviate any further controversies with the Allied Governments concerning the justification for this step, I was anxious to have the support of diplomatic documents unreservedly binding the Allies and devoid of any juridical ambiguities.
Masaryk’s functions in the interim Government were important both to us and to the Allies. From the very beginning he had managed the finances of our movement, and we were all confident that his great authority would rule out the possibility of any recrimination in this respect. He was appointed head of the State mechanism and President of the Government for reasons which are too obvious to need explanation.
In accordance with Berthelot’s promise, M. Pichon replied to me as Foreign Minister of the new Government on the next day, October 15th, granting full recognition to State and Government. In a second communication of October 16th, M. Pichon notified his acceptance of Dr. Lev Sychrava as our diplomatic representative.
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While this was being enacted at Paris, on the other side of the Atlantic was being prepared the concluding scene of the great historical tragedy, culminating in the downfall of the Habsburg Empire with its fifty millions of inhabitants. Professor Masaryk was just preparing his Washington declaration, while directly and indirectly using all the influence at his disposal in order that the reply of the American Government to the request of the two Central Empires should accord with our plans and demands. It was at this decisive moment that we received the first reports about the text of Karl’s manifesto issued on October 16, 1918, and dealing with what was termed the federalization of the Habsburg Empire. This occurred when we were about to have our Washington declaration printed, and when President Wilson was preparing his reply to Austria-Hungary. In spite of the firmness of our international position, we could not underestimate this interplay of circumstances. Professor Masaryk therefore intervened direct with the Washington Government, asking that the reply should not affect our interests. He also sent President Wilson a copy of our Washington agreement on October 17th, and at the same time he influenced the Press and official circles to interpret Karl’s manifesto correctly as a last attempt to save the Empire which, on account of its inconsistency, insincerity, and inadequacy (it did not deal with the problem of the nationalities in Hungary or with the Jugoslav problem, etc.) could not be taken seriously. We adopted similar measures against the manifesto in Paris also, and before long nobody doubted in any quarter that Karl’s effort was a failure. Even in countries such as Sweden, Norway, Holland, and Switzerland, which so much sympathized with Vienna, the Press unanimously agreed that the manifesto would serve no purpose. If, they said, it had made its appearance a year sooner, then. . . .
President Wilson acknowledged the receipt of the Washington declaration in a letter sent to Masaryk on October 18, 1918, in which he informed him that he was greatly touched by our pro​clamation of independence, and that Masaryk would certainly be satisfied with the reply which, at the same time, was being sent to Austria-Hungary. This reply was handed to the Swedish Legation in Washington for transmission to the Viennese Government.
Meanwhile, we in Paris, knowing that Wilson was about to make public his reply to Austria, were impatiently awaiting the telegram from Washington. At last, on October 20th, at three o’clock in the afternoon, I had a telephone call from Mr. Frazer, Counsellor of the American Embassy, who informed me that the reply had just arrived from Washington, and that at the Ambassador’s instructions he was officially communicating it to me. At the same time he congratulated us on our new success. The afternoon papers on the same day published the text of the reply:
To Minister of Sweden from Department of State.
Sir,
I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your note of seventh instant, in which you transmitted a communication of the Imperial and Royal Government of Austria-Hungary to the President. I am instructed by the President to request you to be good enough, through your Government, to convey to the Austro-Hungarian Government the following reply:
“The President deems it his duty to say to the Austro-Hungarian Government that he cannot entertain the present suggestions of that Government because of certain events of utmost importance which, occurring since the delivery of his address of January 8th last, have necessarily altered the attitude and responsibility of the Government of the United States of America. Among the fourteen terms of peace which the President formulated at that time occurred the following: ‘The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freest opportunity of autonomous development.’ Since that sentence was written and uttered to the Congress of the United States, the Government of the United States has recognized a state of belligerency exists between the Czechoslovaks and the German and Austro-Hungarian Empires, and that the Czechoslovak National Councilis a de facto belligerent Government, clothed with proper authority to direct the military and political affairs of the Czechoslovaks. It has also recognized in the fullest measure the justice of the nationalistic aspirations of the Yugoslavs for freedom.
The President is therefore no longer at liberty to accept a mere ​‘autonomy’ of these peoples as a basis of peace, but is obliged to insist that they, and not he, shall be the judge of what action on the part of the Austro-Hungarian Government will satisfy their aspirations and their conception of their right and destiny as members of the family of nations.”
(Signed) Lansing.
This was the last Allied step which exerted any influence on the critical orientation among the Allies, and exercised a definite decision on the subject of our independence. Allied Government and official circles, Press and public opinion looked upon it as the last word. All that followed Wilson’s note consisted merely of a political or juridical supplement to it.
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After the recognition of the interim Czechoslovak Government by M. Pichon’s note of September 15th, further recognitions soon followed which confirmed our juridical status, especially when the situation had been made clear by Wilson’s reply to Austria-Hungary. On October 21st the Italian Ambassador, Bonin Longare, informed me by letter that the Italian Government was officially recognizing the Czechoslovak Government, and that this would in due course be communicated to me by a special note from Sonnino. This was done on October 24th, and a further communication on the same date sanctioned the appointment of Dr. Borský as our representative to the Italian Government.
The British Government, by a communication from Mr. Balfour on October 23rd, merely confirmed the receipt of my note of October r4th, and by a special communication from Lord Derby, the British Ambassador in Paris, sanctioned the appointment of Dr. Osuský as our representative in London.
On behalf of the Serbian Government the Prime Minister, M. Pašić, on October 24th sent me a note in which he acknowledged our Government, and at the same time expressed the great gratification of the Serbian people, its King and Government, at the recognition which we had been granted by the Allied Powers. He further expressed his satisfaction that our two nations would continue the same close relations which they had observed in the course of the war. On October 17th the Russian Embassies in Western Europe issued a communiqué by which the Russian provisional Government in Siberia ​recognized the National Council as the legal Government of the Czechoslovak State, and expressed the hope that both nations would in the future co-operate fraternally in close unity as hitherto. Replies were received to our note of October 14th also from the Belgian and Greek Governments on November 23rd and 24th respectively, both granting us recognition. Thus, by October 24, 1918, our independence was unreservedly recognized by all the chief Allied States. Our struggle for liberation had ended in victory.