# My War Memoirs/Chapter 10

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(a) Our Military Movement in the United States. The Mission of Štefánik and Franklin-Bouillon
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After my return from Rome and my talk with Masaryk in London at the beginning of February 1917, I directed all the work of the National Council towards settling the problems connected with the prisoners of war and the organization of an army in France and Italy. The two great events of international politics—the Russian revolution and the entry of America into the war—provided us with a further incentive for carrying out these plans, since we now had additional ways and means of realizing them. I therefore worked in this direction at Paris and Rome during the months of March and April, waiting for Štefánik’s return, and hoping that when Masaryk reached Petrograd our affairs in Russia would take a turn for the better.
In the first half of April 1917 I received a fresh message from Štefáník, in Petrograd, announcing that he would be in London after April 20th. I was anxious to take advantage of his presence there to hold a general meeting of the National Council, and discuss questions relating to Russia and ourselves in the light of the new international situation. I therefore started for London on April 25th, but failed to meet Štefánik. We must have passed each other in the Channel.
It turned out that Štefánik had reached London somewhat earlier than he had expected. He missed Masaryk, who had already started off for Russia, and by this time was waiting on board a vessel in the North of Scotland. Štefánik sent G. Košík, who was returning with him from Russia, to overtake Masaryk, and to ask him to come back to London to hear Štefánik’s report. Masaryk did so, and having heard what Štefánik had to say, he introduced him to a number of ​politicians in London. Štefánik had then left for Paris, on the day that I arrived in London.
Masaryk’s journey to Russia was thus postponed for a month, the delay being partly due to the fact that on his return to London he fell ill and had to remain in bed for two weeks. Upon the conclusions he had formed from Štefánik’s report, he told me that the time had now come when he could most opportunely intervene in Russia. He had not been greatly disposed to go to Russia while the old regime was in power. While preparing for the journey, he felt misgivings that he would never return. He had heard reports of intrigues against his personal safety, and he had also felt uneasy about the possible danger from submarines. Then, too, there was the likelihood of treachery or unforeseen developments in Russia. He had therefore written his will (together with some political notes) in the form of a letter addressed to me. He had given it to his daughter Olga, with the message that I was to act as his executor if he did not return.
I was deeply touched by this episode which occurred when we had little time for personal feelings. I am not sentimental, but I sat for hours over that sealed letter in August 1917, and wondered what would happen to Masaryk and what would be the fate of our movement.
Štefánik had returned from Russia with a number of new plans. First in London, then in Paris, he had given an account of his experiences, and he wanted to make a similar report in Rome. He had a good opportunity for doing so, as Carlotti, the Italian Ambassador in Petrograd, had given him messages for his Roman friends. He therefore proceeded to Rome in May 1917 and spent about a month there.
His second plan, which he had evolved while in Russia, was to go to the United States. He had returned from Russia with scanty results in the military affairs on which he had been sent there by the French Government, but he had not lost hope that our military endeavours would finally meet with success. He saw that our work in connection with the prisoners of war in France was making considerable progress, and he still felt confident that it would be possible to transport a number of our prisoners of war from Russia. Indeed, he himself had already prepared the first contingent in Rumania for this purpose. What he therefore proposed to do in the United States was to assist in organizing the volunteer movement ​for our national army among the Czechs and Slovaks there. As a matter of fact, all of us in Paris felt confident that among the one and a half millions of our fellow-countrymen in America, we should find several thousand volunteers, and the reports from those who were working for us in America tended to confirm this view. Štefánik also thought that he would be able to win over the United States Government to our cause.
After discussing matters with Stefanik we adopted the same procedure as in the previous year when dealing with Štefánik’s mission to Russia. On behalf of the National Council, I asked the French Government to entrust Stefanik with a mission involving negotiations with the American authorities for the purpose of obtaining the consent of the latter to the proposed volunteer movement on behalf of our army in France. The consent of Ribot, as Foreign Minister, was again secured through the help of Berthelot, who even at that early period was a sincere friend to Stefanik and myself, and a supporter of all our undertakings. We secured the consent of the War Minister by means of direct interventions with M. Painlevé, the Minister of War, and through the help of Franklin-Bouillon. This was the first occasion on which I got into touch with Painlevé, and I maintained this personal contact until the end of the war. He was a sincere and devoted friend to us, and it is to him that we owe a settlement of the many questions relating to our army. Under his regime also a definite agreement was reached with regard to our army in France, although in a formal respect a number of documents were not actually signed until his successor, Clemenceau, came into power. Štefánik was also on good personal terms with Painlevé.
It would not, however, be quite correct to attribute the initiative in this matter to us alone. It was facilitated by the fact that the possibility of securing volunteers in America had already been brought to the notice of the French Government from other quarters. At this very moment M. Jusserand, the French Ambassador in the United States, and André Tardieu, the French High Commissioner there, were working in a similar way for the organization of the Polish Army in France. In this they were supported to a considerable extent both by the Government and the public opinion in the United States.
The Polish National Committee in Paris had, like ourselves, ​been working very closely at the organization of a national army from 1916 onwards. The Poles did not have our opportunities in Russia, Italy, or even at first in France, and probably for reasons of their own they did not wish to ventilate the question of the prisoners of war to the extent that we had done. They therefore had recourse chiefly to the United States, where their activities were concerned solely with volunteers. Their organization in America was a strong one, partly because of the large number of Polish emigrants there, partly also because of the good feeling which had been shown towards them by the American Government and people ever since the beginning of the war, such as had not been shared in the same degree by other oppressed nations. The position of the Poles in America proved advantageous to us also, just as elsewhere they benefited by the more privileged status which we had secured.
The French Government, having first accepted the Polish scheme and then ours, began to give them practical effect. It was decided to send a special political mission for this purpose to America. This mission was to be headed by M. Franklin-Bouillon, and its aim was expressly stated thus: “To secure the consent of the United States Government for recruiting volunteers from the emigrants in America for the Slav national armies in France.” This referred to the Polish and Czechoslovak armies.
The political importance of this mission was considerable. Franklin-Bouillon was a prominent statesman, and at that time was also a parliamentary deputy. The undertaking had been arranged at a moment when America’s entry into the war had aroused general enthusiasm. Under these circumstances such a step on the part of France was a sign of further progress towards our goal.
At this time Franklin-Bouillon was actively engaged with the Inter-Allied Parliamentary Committee, the purpose of which was to seek for new paths of collaboration in the war, and thus to help towards a speedy victory. The secretary of the French group was E. Fournol, with whom I co-operated very closely.
From 1916 onwards, and more especially since the outbreak of the Russian revolution, this body had been paying very careful attention to Slavonic matters, and to the problems of Central Europe generally. It was, I believe, among the members ​of this body that the idea of Franklin-Bouillon’s mission originated. We of the National Council assisted actively with the preliminary arrangements of the American mission. I myself discussed the matter with the Government on several occasions. I also supplied material necessary for carrying on the work among our colonists, and I conferred with the Poles on the course of action. Franklin-Bouillon sailed for America on August 10th. We benefited to no small extent, both in France and the United States, as the result of his mission.
The difficulties of recruiting troops in America at that time were not due merely to international politics. The United States Government had two considerable objections to our volunteer movement. In the first place, the Americans were afraid that if they permitted recruiting for national armies, this would prove detrimental to their own army, which was then in process of formation. Besides this, the United States were here faced by one of the most serious problems of their war-time policy. The war could and should serve to cement all American citizens, whatever their origin; the war could and should bring together and unify all the nationalities living in America; the war could and should serve to transform the heterogeneous emigrant elements into a real American nation. A movement such as ours tended rather to frustrate this process.
It was therefore necessary for Franklin-Bouillon, in stating a case for the Polish and Czechoslovak national movements, to keep their demands within limits acceptable to the United States.(27) Štefánik quickly adapted himself to these conditions. With the help of the French authorities he succeeded in obtaining the concession that those Czechoslovaks who were not liable for American military service would be allowed to volunteer for the Czechoslovak National Army. Our original estimates of the number of volunteers which we should obtain proved excessive ; between the end of 1917 and the summer of 1918, nevertheless, we managed to secure about 2,500 of our fellow-countrymen from America for service in France. When Štefánik left the United States at the beginning of November, he was able to bring the first eighty volunteers with him.
The mission of Franklin-Bouillon and Štefánik denoted a considerable advance in our work. In the United States it had a distinct effect, especially as propaganda. Štefánik himself was able to reach representatives of the Government, and draw ​their attention to our endeavours. In this way he gained the sympathies of several military men and notably of Roosevelt. Towards President Wilson he maintained an attitude of reserve, and he continued to do so, even to a greater extent, at the Peace Conference. There was much in Wilson’s democratic ideas and his political tendencies with which Štefánik was unable to agree. In this connection, I should recall the valuable work accomplished by Štefánik in overcoming the difficulties of organization among the Czech and Slovak colonists in America. From the end of June I kept him informed in detail about the progress of our military movement in France, and about my negotiations with the French Government for the purpose of obtaining official permission to constitute a Czechoslovak Army of liberation. On July 17th I was able to notify him that this had been secured, and on August 10, 1917, in a letter which was taken by Franklin-Bouillon, I announced to the National Alliance that the agreement between the National Council and the French Government was complete.
This accelerated the success of the volunteer movement in America, especially as in the meanwhile Masaryk had adjusted our military organization in Russia, and our brigade, by distinguishing itself at Zborov on June 3rd, 1917, helped indirectly to promote the success of our military schemes with the other Allies.
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After Štefánik’s departure to America I embarked upon a series of activities, the scope of which I made as wide as possible. In this I was prompted by the success which our movement had scored in organizing a strong army, more especially in Western Europe. My tactics would have been the same, so far as this was concerned, even if the Russian revolution had not occurred. What I had always feared was that the Western Powers might object to any predominance of Russia in matters affecting Austria-Hungary and ourselves, and my work in the National Council at Paris was guided by the principle of imparting a general European character to every​thing we did, whether in politics or military affairs. It was my belief that this was the right basis upon which to build. Apart from this, I was always anxious lest Russia should exert too marked an influence upon our internal affairs. Even at that time, what I aimed at was a policy which was neither Eastern nor Western, but European and Czechoslovak. After the first symptoms of collapse in Russia, I further accentuated this line of policy.
Thus, all the centralizing military activity of the National Council was directed by four considerations:
(a) To transfer from Russia to France the greatest possible number of prisoners of war or other troops.
(b) To concentrate as rapidly as possible all the prisoners on French soil, together with the prisoners which it might be possible to obtain from the Serbian Government.
(c) To undertake an extensive volunteer movement in America.
(d) To make full use of the new and large resources which were provided by our numerous prisoners, who in the meanwhile had been collected in Italy.
From the end of June 1917 it was clear that we should establish our army in France. All that remained was to make it as large as possible. The concentration of our prisoners of war in France, in special Czechoslovak camps, and the recruiting activities among them which were carried on by the National Council, continued to make satisfactory progress during the spring of 1917. A similar concentration of prisoners was begun also in Italy. From Russia, Masaryk announced that at Petrograd, on June 13, 1917, with the consent of the Russian Government, he had signed an agreement with Albert Thomas, the French Minister of Munitions, by which at least 30,000 of our prisoners of war would be transferred to France, partly for military service, partly for munitions work. This was a further important step in our progress.
In the same communication Masaryk requested me to discuss the matter in detail with Albert Thomas, as soon as he returned, and to organize the arrangements for allotting the prisoners to their respective duties, either in the army or in factories. He also sent me the rough draft of a scheme for organizing our army in France on the same model as that adopted in Russia, and asked me to try to reach an agreement on the subject with the French authorities.
​Hitherto we had obtained no binding agreement with France on the subject of an army. What we had was, in the first place, Briand’s very important declaration to Masaryk, and then the mission of Štefánik and Franklin-Bouillon. There had also been discussions and negotiations between the National Council and the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, as well as Briand’s sanction for our scheme in connection with the prisoners of war. But as I have indicated, none of these things involved any definite political commitments. After the signature of the agreement between Albert Thomas and Masaryk, what was wanted was a definite undertaking on the part of the French Government with regard to the formation of a Czechoslovak Army, and a clear statement of how such an army would be regarded by the French Government from a political and diplomatic point of view.
Thus on June 20, 1917, the National Council began to negotiate on the subject of an army with the French Ministries of War and Foreign Affairs respectively. These negotiations concluded with a decree which was issued on December 16, 1916, the signing of the statutes of our army on February 7, 1918, the decisive letter of Pichon on June 28, 1918, and finally the recognition of an independent Czechoslovak State on October 15, 1918.
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The year 1917 and the beginning of 1918 formed a period of crises for France. The Russian revolution, resulting in the defection of her great Eastern ally, the military reverses in Nivelle’s offensive, the unsatisfactory internal conditions, the war-weariness and spread of defeatism, the encyclical of Pope Benedict on the subject of peace, the proceedings of the Socialists at Stockholm, the defeat of Italy at Caporetta, the peace of Brest-Litovsk, the preparations for a resolute German offensive after the relief of the Eastern Front—all this aroused misgivings in Government circles as regards the French war aims set forth in the note to President Wilson.
In February 1917 there began a series of secret attempts to bring about a separate peace with Austria-Hungary. During 1917 and up to the early part of 1918 the French Government regarded itself as faced by these alternatives: either defeat, involving the loss of the position which France had hitherto occupied in Europe, the loss of her political and cultural ​influence, the loss of her colonial power, and perhaps ruin with even worse consequences; the possibility of arranging the separation of the Habsburg Empire from Germany, a course which could almost certainly lead to a military victory over Germany. This was the idea dominating the plan of the French military leaders.
It is not surprising that the French statesmen, thinking themselves confronted with these alternatives, should have chosen the one which seemed to them to be in conformity with the vital interests of France, and there is no doubt that they would have concluded peace with Vienna at that time. All the various Governments responsible for the destinies of France, from Briand to Clemenceau, as well as such brilliant leaders as Foch, were of the same opinion. They evidently considered that they should not fail at least to make an attempt, in order that they might not later be reproached with having unnecessarily caused the death of hundreds of thousands of French soldiers. I shall not discuss whether, in taking this view, they had formed a correct estimate of the situation of the Central Powers. The events themselves showed that they had not. I am here concerned only with the moral issues. It is my view that the French Government regarded its commitment in the note to President Wilson as a sincere programme of aims on a maximum scale, for the realization of which France would do everything in her power, short of sacrificing herself. I did not and I do not therefore regard the French negotiations for a separate peace with Austria-Hungary as a breach of faith. In this respect the attitude of Ribot, in particular, was exemplary, loyal, and honourable.
During 1917, therefore, France was apparently pursuing a twofold policy. She was granting us permission to organize the prisoners of war and to establish our own army, and at the same time she was prepared to conclude peace with the Habsburg Empire should the opportunity present itself. I cannot reproach her for this. France was waging a life-and-death struggle. Never, in my dealings with the French, had I expected them to assist us in securing an independent State at the price of their own ruin. I only wanted them to make it possible for us to exert all the powers at our disposal for achieving success. That was my attitude towards the commitments of France, and in adopting it I was prompted by the certainty that the forces of the oppressed nations, once they ​were released, would never let themselves be kept back. Then, too, I firmly believed that all the conjectures on the part of France and the other Allies as to the possibility of separating Austria-Hungary from Germany were erroneous, chiefly because, in the end, such an arrangement could not depend upon the will and strength of Vienna and Budapest. I knew that it was merely harmful to take into account the possibility of a separate peace, since it weakened the Allies in their intensity of purpose.
I was never in agreement with those opportunists amongst us who, fearing a premature or undecisive end of the war, or wishing to conceal their alarm and lack of decision, were always asking what guarantees the Allies would give us if we entered on a life-and-death struggle, and what reasons we had for believing that they would not end by deserting us or concluding a premature peace. I had not failed to take these possibilities into account, but I was in agreement with Masaryk’s views; I regarded the struggle against Vienna and Budapest, first and foremost, as a fundamental moral question.
As far as the Allies were concerned, our only guarantee could be the success of our revolutionary activities. The Allies could desert us only if we ourselves were to desert beforehand. This meant a perpetual struggle, and the gradual establishment of our independence during the war by means of our own work and the sacrifice of our own blood. We simply had to thrust our cause into the main streams of world events, in the midst of which it would become too important a factor to be afterwards ignored.
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The actual discussions with the various Ministries concerning the organization of our army caused me some difficulties. I had no military experience, and was aware of the political responsibility with which I was faced as a representative of the National Council. I received ample help from Dr. ​Sychrava, but he, too, was without military experience. I therefore bought a number of books on military subjects, and made a rapid study of army organization, modern warfare, the new military aspects of the Great War, and various current military topics in general. We had a number of officers among our volunteers in the Foreign Legion, but they had no political training. They lacked judgment and had a marked bent for adventurous escapades. For this reason I dealt personally with all negotiations on army matters from the very outset.
In the French Ministry of War the Government had set up a special section to deal with “the organization of national armies,” these being chiefly those of Poland and Czechoslovakia, although at a certain period Rumanian contingents from Transylvania were also involved. This department was under General Vidalon, and Lieutenant-Colonel Cros was in charge of it. Our affairs in the department were handled by Major Dresch. These were the military authorities with whom I conducted the chief technical negotiations in the War Ministry, while for negotiations on fundamental matters I was summoned direct to General Alby, Chief of the General Staff, and then also to M. Painlevé. During June and July I had several conversations with Painlevé on the subject of the army and our political affairs in general. I never encountered the slightest obstacle in my dealings with him. He discussed matters with me direct in a sincere and straightforward manner. He told me plainly what he considered to be possible, and what he thought could not be managed. Let me add that he always carried out what he promised me. With Briand and Clemenceau he deserves the greatest credit for our political triumph in France.
I handed to General Vidalon and Lieutenant-Colonel Cros the text of the proposals which had arrived from Petrograd. The Ministry itself had also received them from the French Mission in Russia. The negotiations on these proposals began, as I have said, on June 20, 1917, and were concluded on August 4, 1917. The outlined scheme for the organization of an army which had been sent from Russia was regarded as being of secondary importance. The French military authorities, whose mistrust of affairs in Russia was increasing from day to day, at the very beginning emphasized the fact that conditions in France were quite different, and that the organization of our ​army in Western Europe would have to be directed in accordance with them.
The Ministry of War and Ministry of Munitions, therefore, in agreement with myself, re-drafted the Russian proposals in their technical aspect. Their political bearings were discussed at the Quai d’Orsay with M. de Margerie and M. Laroche, who is now French Minister at Warsaw. The negotia- tions at the French Ministry of Munitions were carried on partly with Professor Roques, who was then working with M. Thomas, and partly with the economist, Professor Nogar, who was concerned with the problem of recruiting foreign munition workers in France. The point at issue was to establish the conditions under which our prisoners of war, who had not entered the army, would work in French munition factories as free citizens.
At the very first discussions with General Vidalon and then in greater detail later, the following problems were dealt with:
1. The relation of the Czechoslovak National Army to the French Government and Amny, and also to the Czechoslovak National Council.
2. The question of the flag, the uniform, and various distinguishing marks to indicate the national character of the army.
3. The recruiting of Czechoslovak troops.
4. The appointment of officers.
5. The question as to the use of the Czech language for the purposes of command, and also on the administrative side.
6. The question of court-martial discipline.
7. The question of financing the army and payment of Czechoslovak troops in relation to that of French troops.
8. Conditions under which the army could be used at the front.
9. The question of prisoners of war, not in the army, but as volunteers for munition work.
10. The question of disabled and discharged soldiers.
The political and military importance of each of these problems is obvious. The first one was of a fundamental character, and from the manner of its settlement would depend the logical solution of the remainder. In this respect the difficulties in France were considerable, perhaps even greater than those in Russia, for at the beginning neither the Ministry ​of War nor the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had reckoned with any large measure of autonomy for the Czechoslovak Army.
Apart from this, at the time when I was discussing these matters, a precedent had been created with the Polish Army in France which was unfavourable to us. The Polish National Committee had accepted a proposal of the French Government to the effect that the organization of the Polish Army in France should be presided over by a special mixed “Commission militaire franco-polonaise,” directed by a French General. It was to comprise officers of both nationalities, and would be the leading body for organizing and administering the Polish Army, while at the same time it was to form a connecting link between the French Government and the Polish Committee.
The Ministry of War suggested a similar organization to me. My attitude was one of decisive opposition to such a proposal, and Dr. Sychrava, who saw the political danger of the plan, was also against it. We objected to the existence of any intermediary between the National Council and our army. I demanded that the army should be entirely ours, and that its political administration should be fully allotted to us as representatives of a sovereign nation, but that the French Government should have the right of supervision so as to satisfy itself that things were being done in accordance with the preliminary agreement which it had made with the National Council. The Ministry of War was to have full control in all technical matters and details of pure organization, but that, in this respect, the consent of the National Council was necessary for any measures which might at all affect the fundamental politico-military questions.
In the end this principle was accepted. The Ministry of War reluctantly abandoned the idea of a mixed Franco-Czechoslovak commission, since in this way an analogy with the Polish Army would have been produced, and it was feared that all further negotiations with us would be more complicated. In reality it soon proved that the contrary was the case, and that the direct contact of the Government and the army with the National Council simplified matters. It was, of course, true that this made our army less dependent on the Ministry.
As I have said, the rest of the problems were, of necessity, settled logically in accordance with this first and governing ​principle. It was agreed that there should be a Czechoslovak flag and uniform with special Czechoslovak badges and a béret. The National Council reserved to itself the right and duty of submitting its proposals to the Ministry of War. Negotiations on the practical and technical side of these matters were long, and were still in progress when Stefanik returned from America. In negotiating on the wording of the agreement in July and August, I was concerned only with specifying the principles and our rights involved in these practical matters.
The main principles of the new military organization included, of course, the recognition on the part of France that the soldiers of this army must take an oath of allegiance to the Czechoslovak nation. The recruiting of troops was to be carried out by the National Council in France, Russia, America, Serbia, and Italy for the whole duration of the war. The implication of this was that this agreement with France contained a formulation of our whole politico-military scheme, as elaborated by us with reference to the current political events in Paris. The elaborated scheme of organization dealt with all details of recruiting, and provided for recruiting committees, their rights and duties. Recruiting could be carried out only in the name of the National Council, and the French authorities were to act merely as executive bodies.
The officers were to be appointed and promoted only by the National Council in agreement with the French Government, and Czechoslovaks were to have the preference. The language of command was to be the national language, but all important documents were to be bilingual. The head of the army was to be a French General, appointed after agreement with the National Council. As regards discipline, the French military legal code was to be adopted, and it was agreed to set up Czechoslovak courts-martial as soon as an adequate staff of Czechoslovak officers was available for this purpose.
In financial matters the principle agreed upon was that our troops should receive the same pay as the French, and that all expenditure should be recorded in special accounts, a settlement of which by the Czechoslovak nation could, if necessary, be stipulated during the peace negotiations.
As regards prisoners of war who were unfit for military service, and disabled soldiers, the National Council and the Ministry of Munitions were to arrange a special “Statut du travail pour les ouvriers tchécoslovaques en France.” The ​negotiations concerning this were begun and concluded at the same time as those with regard to the army. The Czechoslovak workmen(28) were to be regarded as free citizens, and the National Council was to have the same consular rights with regard to them as were enjoyed by the Allied Governments towards their subjects in France.
Considering the circumstances existing at that time, it must be deemed a great success that the negotiations secured the autonomy of the army and the political supremacy of the National Council, which thus received express recognition by the French Government as a body representing the Czechoslovak nation. The same remark applies to the circumstance that our troops were permitted to take an oath of allegiance to the Czechoslovak nation. By these concessions France acknowledged our right to independence, and made it a constituent part of her war programme.
It was therefore my concern that this significant document should include an express statement to the effect that the army in process of formation, being composed of volunteers, was purely political in character, and that its aim was to achieve the independence of the nation. It was further my concern to guarantee this success in one form or another. From the outset my leading idea was to adopt a course of action which would obviate the possibility of our being set aside at the peace negotiations.
In negotiating on the subject of the army I therefore formulated the demand that a part of our future army, even though it might be used at the front, should, as far as possible, be preserved so as to be still in existence at the time of the peace negotiations. In this way it would help to promote the political demands of the Czechoslovak nation. What I feared was that our army would be destroyed after its first use at the front in such fighting as the Verdun struggle, and that thus our political significance as regards diplomatic negotiations would be lost.
No less serious was the question of the decree by which the army was to be constituted. It had been arranged that the decree should simply contain, in the abbreviated form of a few paragraphs, all the political principles agreed upon in the scheme for the organization of the army. The final wording, however, was not to be drawn up until after my return from Italy, whither I proposed to proceed in August for the purpose ​of discussing the question of our prisoners there, and the possibility of their transport to France.
In accordance with the request of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and with my consent as Secretary of the National Council, the publication of the decree was to take place at a time which, from a political point of view, was more favourable and opportune than July and August 1917. Another important factor in this respect was the circumstance that it was necessary to wait until some considerable number of our prisoners had been concentrated in France. These prisoners, who had been demoralized by their hardships in Serbia, at Asinara, and, at the beginning, in France as well, could not be regarded as the mainstay of our army, the nucleus of which would have to be derived from Russia, Italy, or America. In agreement with both Ministries we centred our hopes largely on my forthcoming visit to Italy, which had been projected as early as June 1917. In common with the French military authorities, we hoped that we should be able to win over several thousand prisoners of war in Italy, and transfer them to the French front. In July 1917 the number of prisoners at our disposal was too small to form our first military contingent.
We therefore agreed that the final text of the decree should be issued after my return from Rome. The publication of the decree was to confirm the existence of the army, and not merely to announce the preparations for it. Only in this way could the political and military significance of our whole undertaking be made duly prominent.
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When all these questions had been fully discussed at the Ministry of War, the matter was transferred to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The military authorities, who had to cope with practical problems of warfare, little by little conceded my political demands. The task was far more difficult for me at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where de Margerie and Laroche had carefully considered all the juridical and political implications of the scheme for organizing a national army, as arranged between General Vidalon, Lieut.-Col. Cros, and myself. Accordingly, there now ensued a struggle to preserve the concessions which had been made to the National Council when the scheme had been discussed at the Ministry of War. ​In the end the Ministry of Foreign Affairs withdrew all its original reservations with the exception of a few minor details.
In one matter the negotiations were remarkable. I had discussed the wording of the scheme with Laroche. In formulating the article on army expenditure I had asked for an explicit statement that the expenditure was to be recorded in special accounts, for which the Czechoslovak State would make itself responsible after the peace negotiations. The expression “Czechoslovak State” or “Czechoslovak Government” had so far never been used in connection with the scheme. Even when mentioning the autonomous army, the National Council as a representative of the Czechoslovak nation, the political character of the army and the Peace Conference, the French authorities avoided the use of any phrase which would at all form a commitment to the French Government at the future peace negotiations.
By making my specific demand, I endeavoured to clarify the discussions in this respect, but I met with steady opposition. At last Laroche said quite openly: “Do not make this demand of us now. It would mean inserting into the document, indirectly and surreptitiously, a far-reaching political commitment which can be made only in a ceremonious manner on a special occasion, and when the political situation might be opportune for such a course. This is not the case to-day. The recognition of the National Council, the autonomy of the army, the undertaking to preserve a portion of the army for the peace negotiations, so as to emphasize its political character, are far-reaching matters. I assure you quite frankly that we are willing and anxious to render you political assistance, and that when the proper moment comes we will give you a solemn assurance to that effect. But if we enter upon such a commitment we shall keep our word, and for that reason we cannot do so on this occasion and in this form.”(29)
In consequence of this statement I withdrew my demand. These negotiations with Laroche took place at the Quai d’Orsay on August 4, 1917. On the same day the whole of the negotiations with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were completed, and the wording of the agreement received the approval of both parties.
This was one of my happiest days throughout the course of our movement abroad. I attached great political importance to these negotiations, and in my mind’s eye I saw the army in ​course of formation, the National Council as a Government, our share in the Peace Conference, and the establishment of our State. At that time, too, I was already convinced that even before the war was over the moment would come when we should be obliged to form a real national army abroad.
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In accordance with what had been arranged between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and ourselves, this agreement was to become a binding diplomatic document, signed by the head of the French Government on the one hand, and by the authorized representative of the National Council on the other. The actual signatures were to be affixed after the wording of the decree had been settled, and after my return from Italy. As we shall see, the signing did not actually take place until February 7, 1918, partly because the negotiations as to the wording of the decree were protracted, partly through the change of Government and the entry of Clemenceau as the new Prime Minister and Minister of War.
At all events, on February 7, 1918, this agreement was signed by Prime Minister Clemenceau on behalf of the French Government, and by me on behalf of the National Council, as the statute for the organization of the Czechoslovak Army in France. The wording differed only slightly from that which had been accepted on August 4, 1917, in the negotiations at the Quai d’Orsay, and during my subsequent conversations with the Ministry of War in the course of January 1918.
The satisfaction which I felt at the success thus attained was expressed immediately after the conclusion of the negotiations, which were carried on parallel with the negotiations concerning the dispatch of Franklin-Bouillon’s mission to the United States, in the reports which I sent to our fellow-countrymen in Russia and America. I at once communicated the results of the negotiations to Masaryk in Russia by a brief telegram which was sent on August 4, 1917.
The French Government realized the importance of the agreement thus arrived at, and at once began to put it into effect. As early as August 8th the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent a telegram to Petrograd informing its Embassy there that the French Government had reached an agreement with the Czechoslovak National Council on all matters concerning the organization of the Czechoslovak National Army. ​At the same time it forwarded the wording of the agreement to show the divergencies in the organization of our army in France and Russia respectively. The French Foreign Ministry intended this also as a confirmation of the arrangement which had been made with the Russian Government concerning the transfer of Czechoslovak prisoners to France, for the policy of the Quai d’Orsay and of the French military authorities as regards our army in August 1917 counted decisively upon the concentration of a substantial number of our troops from Russia, America, and Italy. The struggle to achieve these aims was continued in Paris until the summer of 1918.
For these reasons I arranged with the French Government for the dispatch of a special French Mission to Russia for the purposes of recruiting and organizing the transport of our prisoners and, in fact, for carrying out the Masaryk-Thomas agreement. This Mission, headed by Major Verger (who during his stay in Russia did admirable work in the interests of our troops, and made it possible for at least the first contingent of them, under Captain Husák, to be transferred to France), started for Russia in the first half of August 1917.
Simultaneously with the negotiations for a politico-military agreement, the agreement with the Ministry of Munitions concerning our workmen, to which I have already referred, was reached in the course of July. The negotiations with Professor Nogar concluded on July 30, 1917, and on August 4th Albert Thomas sent me a note in which, on behalf of the Government, he gave his consent to the scheme drawn up by Professor Nogar and myself. In itself, this document has no special military significance, but judged in connection with the rest of the negotiations it denotes the logical solution of the problem concerning our civilians in France, who were gradually granted the status of subjects belonging to an independent country.
The conclusion of these tasks marks a definite landmark in the progress of the National Council in France. A further step towards the development of our political and military organization could now consist only of a proclamation incorporating our agreements, and of a binding character in an international respect. Such a proclamation would then lead to the establishment of the Czechoslavak Government, and to its international recognition by France and the Allies.
An undoubted success was attained by our systematic ​policy in France, which consisted of proceeding gradually, step by step, of allowing things to take their course and come to a head through the influence of persistent but unobtrusive work, and of gathering together a variety of helpers to co-operate in pursuit of our common aims. We were also careful not to embarrass France by far-reaching and premature demands, declarations, formulations of schemes, or official visits and audiences.
(d) Negotiations with the Italian Government and our Army. My Second Visit to Rome
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I now turned my whole attention towards winning the Italian Government over to our military plans. I had been arranging ways and means for doing this throughout the period of the negotiations with the French Government. What I proposed to do was not to proceed to Rome until I had made a provisional arrangement with Italian circles, and until the scheme had been prepared from Paris in some detail.
Since my first visit to Italy, I had been in constant touch, on the one hand, with the Italian Ambassador in Paris, but most of all with the Italian Military Mission. At the time when I first established relations with the Embassy, it was under the charge of T. Tittoni, the supreme President of the Senate, a distinguished politician and a diplomat of a broad outlook who had a thorough understanding of our affairs. He always received me willingly and gave me abundant help in my work. He continued to be a sincere friend to us later on when he became Minister of Foreign Affairs and President of the Senate. The military intelligence section throughout the war was presided over by Prince Brancaccio, a man of refinement, who was loyal and favourably disposed to us. He was a moderate nationalist, who gradually abandoned Sonnino’s ideas as to the annexation of Dalmatia and the reduction of Austria, which by this scheme would retain the Croats, and under our influence he came round to the opinion that the monarchy must be destroyed and the Jugoslavs united. He was, however, mistrustful of the Jugoslavs until the very end. He rendered us useful service, in spite of the fact that his official position in Rome was not of the strongest.
As I have already indicated, I was a frequent visitor at the ​Italian Embassy in Paris during 1917 and 1918. The first ambassador whom I met there was Tittoni, who, before my second visit to Rome, placed every facility at my disposal. The subsequent ambassadors were Salvago Raggi and Count Bonin Longare. From January 1918 onwards, the Italian Government, and various bodies connected with it, evinced great interest in all our political and military affairs. At the same time they carefully watched our relations with the Jugoslavs and the rest of the Allies, as they were anxious that amid the tangle of Austro-Hungarian questions our claims should not be settled to the detriment of Italian interests.
From February 1917 K. Veselý, who was in charge of our Press Bureau in Rome, and who was being supported from Paris, redoubled his efforts, partly in the Press, partly with Commandini’s Ministry. With the assistance of G. Scarpa and his friends he prepared the foundation of a Czechoslovak-Italian Committee (Comitato italiano per l’independenza czecoslovacca). He also furnished news to the daily papers, and began to attend to the concentration of our prisoners, to whom he sent supplies of our printed matter. Besides this, Italian editions of our books and pamphlets were in preparation. At the beginning of June, arrangements were made for extending the activities of the Bureau in Rome. In the meanwhile, Plesinger-Božinov had arrived in Italy from Switzerland and visited several prisoners’ camps, where he inspected the preparations for a volunteer movement. He then sent us a report on the situation, and he also negotiated with the Italian authorities, for whom he offered to draw up a special statement concerning the situation of the prisoners. This was done later after an agreement with us in Paris.
These activities gave an impetus to what was being undertaken in connection with our prisoners. Thus, the Italian Government began to make inquiries into what the prisoners had already done independently of us. The first considerable concentration of our prisoners took place at the beginning of 1917 at the camp of Santa Maria Capua Vetere, near Naples. Here, in January 1917, was started the organization of a Czech volunteer corps (later known as the Czechoslovak Volunteer Corps), which grew rapidly, so that by the following May it comprised more than 1,000 members. In April, Plesinger-Božinov visited the camp with messages from Paris, and from that time onwards our prisoners were in regular ​communication with the National Council. In May an attempt was made to secure the consent of the Italian Government for the use of the volunteer corps on the Salonika front, but this was unsuccessful.
The progress of the corps was then hindered for a short time because some of the prisoners were employed for agricultural work, and the remainder were transferred to Padula, south of Salerno. Matters improved, however, towards the autumn, and when I visited them in September 1917 I had every reason to be satisfied with their organization and with the extensive work—propagandist, educational, and political—which they were carrying on. On that occasion I arranged with them what further steps they should take and generally encouraged them to continue their preparations for establishing anational army. At that time there were more than 10,000 men in the camp, and the volunteer corps was beginning to increase enormously. In January 1918 its strength exceeded 5,000, while by the following April some 14,000 men had entered its ranks. They were all drafted into the army and saw active service.
Even then I realized that our volunteers in Italy, by their remarkable initiative and enthusiasm, were performing invaluable work. It was largely due to their efforts that we politicians were able at the opportune moment to achieve success in our negotiations for the official recognition of the army.
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The work thus accomplished in Italy caused the Italians to modify their original attitude of reserve towards us. From June 1917 onwards Brancaccio, during his visits to me, repeatedly urged that I should not limit myself to negotiating with France, but that we ought to co-operate more with Italy. It was he, too, who suggested that I ought to proceed once more to Rome, and take some definite steps in connection with our prisoners.
On the occasion of the Inter-Allied Conference in the spring and summer of 1917 in London and Paris, when Brancaccio discussed matters personally with Sonnino, he assured me that the ground was prepared in Italy for successful action, and that from what he had heard he was sure that Sonnino, like the French and Russians, would liberate our prisoners, and perhaps even allow them to join our army in France.
​The attitude of Brancaccio, who took a closer interest in our affairs than did the authorities in Rome, was connected, I think, with Italy’s military and diplomatic situation at that time. In February 1917 began the notorious secret attempt of Prince Sixtus of Bourbon to bring about a separate peace with the Emperor Karl and Zita, and the Italians rightly feared that this attempt might result in saving Austria at their expense. They saw in us direct allies, and it was therefore in their interest that the Czech movement should not be too much under the influence of the other Allies, who were not so closely concerned about Austria as Italy was.
Another important factor in this respect was the Italian alarm that we, of our own accord, might reach an agreement with the Jugoslavs against Italy. I surmise that Brancaccio and certain other politicians of importance made representations in Rome that we were not to be neglected, but that we were to be granted at least enough to secure Italian influence on our political and military movement. At that time, when it was not clear to the Italians what would happen, and when Sonnino continued to be sceptical as to the fate of Austria-Hungary, this policy was obviously prudent from an Italian point of view.
Under these circumstances I therefore arranged matters so that the initiative for my visit to Rome should not come from us, but that I should be invited in at least an unofficial manner, and that I should receive assurances of at least a partial success in military affairs. After further preparations this was arranged.
On August 22, 1917, Brancaccio called upon me at the office of the National Council and brought a message from Sonnino, who was anxious for me to visit him, and who would see that some of our military schemes were realized. It was noteworthy that Brancaccio transmitted to me also a second message from Sonnino, who was anxious to know whether it was true that a definite agreement had been made between the Czechs and the Jugoslavs with regard to our access to the sea when the respective States were constituted. There was no such agreement, and I gave a plain answer accordingly.
I again impressed upon Brancaccio that after the agreement with the French Government on the subject of our army, I could not proceed to Rome and start negotiations with the Italian Government if they were to lead to nothing. If Sonnino could do nothing for us, if he was unable officially to recognize ​the National Council, and take some steps on behalf of our prisoners, it would certainly be better for me not to go to Rome just yet. I received a prompt and repeated assurance from Brancaccio that something could be managed.
(e) Negotiations with Sonnino
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Sonnino received me on the morning of September 6, 1917. At that time those who were advocating the destruction of Austria-Hungary and the unification of the Jugoslavs regarded him as the evil spirit of Italian and Allied policy. As I have suggested elsewhere, my own opinion of Sonnino was slightly different, although I perceived his faults and errors plainly enough.
Personally, I have the very best impressions of the whole of my intercourse with him. He spoke to me in a frank and pleasant manner, and this caused me a certain amount of surprise, as my Italian friends had always given me to understand that he would listen to everything but make no reply. He gave me the impression of being an honourable man, pleasant to negotiate with, and, in certain respects, politically capable. In the years 1917 and 1918, when the military and political position of the Italians was in a bad way, there is no doubt that the guiding spirit of his policy was to remain cool and resolute.
My interview with Sonnino left a lasting impression upon me. I explained to him the history of our movement, the point it had then reached, its connection with our policy at home, and also how it was situated in Russia, France, and England respectively. I also told him about the organization of the National Council. I then went on to point out what France had already done on our behalf, and I mentioned the purport of the agreement on the subject of our army which I had just concluded with the French authorities. At the same time, I handed him a lengthy memorandum containing all these particulars. I later submitted a copy of this memorandum to all influential members of the Government, and to the various politicians and authorities with whom I discussed our affairs on that occasion.
Together with my statement to Sonnino, I made the following demand: ​(a) The Italian Government should officially recognize the National Council as the central body representing all Czechoslovak interests, and with this body all Czechoslovak questions (relating to the army and prisoners of war) should be discussed officially, exclusively, and directly.
(b) The Czechs and Slovaks should be recognized as a friendly nation, and that in consequence of this all Czechoslovak civilians interned on Italian territory should be released.
(c) The Italian Government should release all our troops who were anxious to join the Czechoslovak Army, and should consent to their transport to France, just as this had been agreed upon with regard to our prisoners in Russia.
Thus, at the beginning, I did not make any direct demand for the organization of a Czechoslovak Army in Italy. In the first place, the Italian Government had already refused a similar application on the part of the Serbs, and then Brancaccio himself had expressed to me his doubts whether it would be possible to establish our army in Italy without much delay. From what Brancaccio had told me, and also from the attitude which Sonnino had hitherto adopted, I inferred that our demand for the establishment of an army in Italy would be regarded by the Italians as excessive. Then, too, I was afraid that our movement in Western Europe might be split up. It seemed to us unnecessary to have two armies, and, in a technical respect, this would mean two sets of difficulties. Moreover, the French front had greater political and military importance than any other, and to collect only an insignificant number of troops there would mean military and political failure, resulting in a menace to the whole of our movement in France.
For these reasons I had arranged with the French Foreign Ministry, before my departure to Rome, that the main purpose of my discussions there would be to secure from the Italian Government the permission to liberate our prisoners of war in Italy, and to transfer them rapidly to France. Politically, it was most important for our movement to have a large military unit ready for action on the French front with the least possible delay.
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I have already stated that Sonnino surprised me by the frankness of his attitude. He informed me that my statements ​were very convincing, that he was in complete agreement with our political aims, and that we could reckon upon his help. He added that Italy, of all the Allies, had the greatest interest in the realization of these aims, and had most in common with the Czechs in the struggle against Austria-Hungary.
On this subject Sonnino showed no reserve or hesitation. He did, however, openly express to me his fear that the Allied victory would not be decisive enough for us to secure all we desired.
He accordingly promised me the immediate fulfilment of my first two demands, which were purely political in character. The Italian Government would recognize the National Council, and would give its consent to the organization of a branch of that body, which would be subordinated to the secretariat at Paris, and would have official dealings with the Italian authorities in the settlement of all questions affecting our interests in Italy. He also agreed to our second demand concerning Czechoslovak civilians in Italy, and said that he would give me a recommendation to the Ministry of the Interior for a satisfactory settlement of this matter. He at once did so, and I thereupon applied to the Minister of the Interior—Orlando—who received me, and in quite a short time settled the principles involved by these questions. This was the first time that I had come into contact with Orlando. For the details of all the matters which we discussed, Sonnino referred me to his officials, Demartino and Manzoni, as well as to the Ministry of War.
On all military matters Sonnino expressed very decided reservations. Italy, being a direct neighbour of Austria-Hungary, must be particularly cautious in all matters relating to prisoners of war, and must, above all, adhere to the terms of the Hague Convention, so as to give Austria no ground for reprisals. For that reason, he said, Italy did not want to make use of the prisoners, and the question was whether she was able to liberate them at all. For the same reasons, of course, she could not sanction their transport to France. If Italy were to allow that, Austria-Hungary would begin to dispatch her thousands of Italian prisoners to the devastated Balkans, to Asia Minor, to Syria and Turkey, where they would perish wholesale. This would arouse so much opposition and ill-feeling among the Italian public that he could not, in the face of Parliament and public opinion, vindicate any transfer of our troops. Under such circumstances, the whole scheme would cause the Allies more trouble than it was worth.
​One of the main reasons why he took this point of view—so Sonnino explained to me—was his regard for internal politics, and particularly his delicate position towards the followers of Gioliti, towards the Socialists, and also the extreme nationalists, who would seize every opportunity for defeating the Government then in power. The Government, therefore, must not, of its own accord, increase the difficulties it already had, by creating fresh difficulties. And if Austria were to apply such reprisals towards the Italian prisoners of war, it would certainly cause Italy fresh embarrassments as soon as the relatives of the prisoners heard about it.
The manner in which Sonnino laid his arguments before me convinced me immediately that Italy would not permit any wholesale transfer of our troops to France. From what he said, I also felt that in addition to the arguments which he brought forward, there were others, perhaps still stronger, which he did not mention. As a matter of fact, Sonnino himself told me what they were later on during the discussions with regard to the recognition of our independence. It seems that he had two further special reasons: He judged that Italy must preserve all her prisoners for the peace negotiations, in case Austria-Hungary should be saved, and then, too, he was unwilling in this form to assist France in extending her political influence upon our affairs.
I accordingly at once changed the plan, and asked Sonnino for permission to liberate the prisoners and establish our national army on Italian soil, as had been done in France. In particular, I gave him a detailed account of what had already been done in this respect by France, Russia, and the United States, all of whom, unlike Sonnino, had not taken into account any considerations of international law. Sonnino did not oppose these arguments, and after some hesitation he replied that he would look into the matter from a juridical point of view. He declared that he would be willing to grant the establishment of our army in Italy, if a convenient formula could be found for this purpose. In such a case it would be necessary to discuss the details with Demartino, the general secretary of his department, and also with General Montanari and Colonel Vacchelli, of the Ministry of War. He added that Demartino, after investigating the whole scheme from a legal and technical point of view, would, within a few days, let me have Sonnino’s definite answer.
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On September 7th Demartino received me at the Consulta for our first extensive interview. I repeated to him what I had already explained to Sonnino, and also placed at his disposal a memorandum on the Czechoslovak movement in the Allied countries.
In reply, Demartino first of all discussed with me the question of Captain Putdlka. The latter had come to France and Italy, as I heard, with a mission from certain Czechs and Serbs in Russia to establish a Czechoslovak-Serbian Army on the Balkan front from among the prisoners of war in Italy. His plans resulted from difficulties which had arisen in the organization of our army in Russia, and indicated the differences of opinion and the embarrassments existing among our fellow-countrymen there in their political and military activity. While passing through Italy, Captain Pučálka had called upon M. Giers, the Russian Ambassador, and had endeavoured to win him over to his scheme. At first he had obtained a certain measure of support, but when the Russian Ambassador became more closely acquainted with the situation he refused to assist Pučálka any further.
We, as well as the prisoners in various Italian camps, had been informed by Pučálka that he had a promise from the Italian Government to allow our prisoners to be liberated and transferred to the Balkan front. In view of our plans and negotiations in Paris, we on the National Council were, in principle, opposed to letting our troops join the Russian contingents at Salonika, quite apart from the fact that we were acquainted with the situation in Italy, and could therefore tell beforehand what attitude the Italian Government would adopt towards such a scheme. To ask Italy, at a time when the most desperate struggle was being waged with the Jugoslavs, and when the Russian front was breaking up, to surrender prisoners for active service on behalf of the Serbs and Russians in the Balkans, showed a complete ignorance of political methods. This proposal naturally did us much harm in Rome, and was certainly one of the reasons why the Italian Government objected to the transfer of Czechoslovak prisoners even to France.
Demartino declared in the most emphatic terms that he would have nothing to do with Dr. Pučálka, and that he had ​not promised him a single soldier. He further stated that the Ministry of War had expressed a similar view, and would not allow our prisoners to proceed to the Balkans. A few days later M. Giers also expressed the same opinion about Pučálka’s undertakings.
We thereupon discussed the demands which I had submitted to Sonnino. Demartino asked me to draw up my arguments and requests in writing. In this way I should obtain an official reply from the Government. At the same time he informed me that after my visit Sonnino had decided upon what point of view he would adopt towards the political questions which I had submitted to him. He added that the Government was disposed to grant political recognition to the National Council, to enter into official contact with it openly, and to accept whatever consequences that this would involve. He also indicated that the Government would evidently be opposed to sending our troops to France, but that negotiations could be arranged for organizing our army in Italy.
The text of the statement which I had submitted to Sonnino on September 14, 1917, became the starting-point for detailed discussions with both Ministries on political and military affairs, and these discussions lasted until October 8, 1917. During this visit to Rome I negotiated with Demartino on five occasions altogether. I also had several discussions on the same subjects with Manzoni. It was on September 14th that Demartino gave me verbally the official reply of the Consulta to my communication. It was affirmative in principle on all the points concerned, but there were reservations as to the form of organization which the army should assume. In informing me of this, Demartino explained that the outstanding questions would have to be settled by the Ministry of War, acting in agreement with the Consulta. He therefore recommended me to discuss these practical matters with the Ministry of War direct. This was no less interesting and no less important than the negotiations with Sonnino and his Ministry.
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Having concluded my personal negotiations with Sonnino and Demartino, I informed Barrére, Giers, and also Sir ​Rennell Rodd, the English Ambassador. Of these three the only one who was not satisfied with the results was Barrère. From Paris he had received instructions to support me in the scheme for transferring our prisoners to France. When I gave him an account of my first interview with Sonnino, he was indignant. He rightly regarded the attitude of the Italian Government as indicating opposition to the military and political anti-Austrian movement in France. He promised that he would tell Sonnino this, and advised me not to accept the Italian scheme, but to insist that our troops should be sent to France.(30) Seeing the situation in Rome, I did not agree with Barrére. Giers, on the other hand, declared that the results of the negotiations were a great success, and he added that, considering the Italian opposition towards the Jugoslavs and Sonnino’s sceptical opinions as to the fate of Austria-Hungary, he had not expected that matters would turn out so favourably for us. He advised me to accept as a first step whatever concessions the Italian Government might now make. The general trend of affairs would then show what could be done later.
A similar opinion was expressed by Sir Rennell Rodd, to whom I was introduced by Sir Samuel Hoare, then head of the Military Mission in Rome. Sir Samuel Hoare had first occupied a similar post in Russia, where he had met Professor Masaryk, to whom, I believe, he had rendered assistance. We were staying in the same hotel in Rome, and so I made his acquaintance and we began to work together. Throughout the period of my stay in Rome, and also subsequently, I kept him supplied with information and memoranda on the progress of our movement and on the situation in Austria-Hungary. I kept in touch with him from that time onwards, and we continued a fruitful co-operation until the end of the war.
Sir Samuel Hoare rendered valuable services to our cause in Rome, and later on also in London. I kept him informed about everything that I was doing in Rome, and he passed this information on to his Ambassador there, from whom these details reached the Government circles in London. Through him, too, I make an attempt from Rome to secure the consent of the British Government to our military enterprise, and he it was who suggested that I should visit London for the purpose of taking the same measures there with regard to the recognition of the National Council as I had done in ​Rome. He promised to prepare the ground in London to this end, and he kept his promise. Later on, when I actually visited London, he introduced me to Government circles, and notably to Lord Robert Cecil, who was then acting as deputy Foreign Secretary. When I sent telegraphic reports to Masaryk on the subject of my negotiations in Rome, it was Sir Samuel Hoare who forwarded them through English official channels.
Sir Rennell Rodd himself received me very cordially, and gave me his frank opinion about Italy. He also made a number of suggestions as to how I should proceed in negotiating with the Italians. He considered that the negotiations with Sonnino had resulted in a success, of which advantage ought immediately to be taken. He therefore advised us to give up the idea of transferring our troops to France, and to organize an army in Italy. Finally, he promised that he himself would help us with the Italian Government.
It was during this visit to Rome also that I first met Pasić. He had arrived from Paris and had put up at my hotel. In this way I had an opportunity of observing him throughout his stay. He received me on September 9th. He took a very guarded view of affairs, but he showed a thorough understanding of our cause. He considered, however, that the only chance of realizing the hopes of the Jugoslavs and ourselves lay in a military victory on the part of the Allies. Unlike the other Jugoslavs he spoke of Italy and Sonnino in moderate terms. He was very emphatically opposed to the Italian demands, but he looked at the whole situation in a very practical manner, and endeavoured to make an allowance for the conditions under which the Allies had promised territory to Italy. His attitude in the dispute, which was then occupying public attention, was cautious, reserved, and moderate.
I explained to him my plans in connection with Italy, and told him the results of my interviews with Sonnino. He strongly advised us to accept the Italian point of view, and to try to form an army in Italy. He expressed the opinion that in time this would be a good thing for the Jugoslavs as well, and that for Austria it would be a severer blow than if the army were only in France. He further asked me to arrange for the National Council in Paris to keep in direct touch with him, and to send him personally all documents and reports on the progress of our affairs with the Allies. I kept in touch ​with Pašić until the end of the war, and also during the Peace Conference in Paris. Throughout this time our relations were of the most loyal and friendly character.
While speaking of these political interviews and negotiations, I may mention the visit I paid to Bissolati on September 22nd, 1917. It is a real pleasure for me to recall this and my subsequent meetings with him. Bissolati, an independent Socialist, had been taken into the Cabinet to counteract partly the influence of Sonnino, who was too much opposed to the Jugoslavs, and partly the policy of the neutral-minded Socialists. It was also intended that by his popularity and his well-known optimism he should act favourably upon public opinion at a time of political and military depression. Being a minister without portfolio, he paid attention to a large number of things, notably Jugoslav questions, which included Austro-Hungarian affairs and, later on, ours also. As far as public opinion was concerned, Bissolati’s name was identified with jusqu’auboutisme, a programme which involved the destruction of the Habsburg Empire. I was therefore anxious to gain his sympathies, and to induce him to intervene on our behalf during those decisive weeks.
I gave him an account of the history of our movement, and told him what we had already achieved in Russia and France. I then pointed out what I was aiming at in Italy. He was delighted, and promised to help. He asked for all the memoranda which I had given the others, and declared that he would immediately discuss matters with Sonnino, Giardino, Montanari, and other influential men, with a view to securing for us a complete fulfilment of our aims. He was as good as his word, and granted us the support thus promised.
In the course of the interview Bissolati referred to the importance which he attached to England. He was afraid that the British Government might want to preserve Austria-Hungary. This idea was clearly a sequel to all the negotiations for a separate peace with Austria-Hungary which had been begun by Sixtus of Bourbon, and carried on from February 1917 until the autumn of the same year. To-day I can see that Bissolati knew what was going on, and that his attitude was due to Lloyd George’s proceedings in the Sixtus of Bourbon negotiations. Bissolati asked me with particular interest whether we expected that the National Council would be recognized also by England, for he said from an Italian point of view ​this was the most important factor. He then told me about his last meeting with Lloyd George. He had asked him his opinion, adding that, as he thought, England wanted to preserve the Habsburg Empire. According to him, Lloyd George had replied: “In this matter my opinion is the same as Gladstone’s. Austria has already done so much harm in the world that it must be destroyed.” I was gratified and encouraged by this interview.
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At the Ministry of War the subject of our troops was being attended to by General Montanari (the Under-Secretary of State), Colonel Vacchelli, Lieutenant-Colonel Zanghieri, and Major Sogno. With them I continued all the difficult negotiations about prisoners of war and the organization of the future army, almost daily until October 9th. I found them most considerate and obliging in their personal dealings with me, but there was a sustained struggle over every concession, however slight. At the beginning and conclusion of the negotiations I had a conversation on our affairs with General Giardino. He himself had not been much concerned with these matters, and in everything except purely technical questions it was Sonnino and the Consulta who had the decisive word.
I negotiated on several occasions with General Spingardi, to whom I had been referred for the discusssion of technical measures and details concerning the liberation of prisoners. While discussing matters with me, he exhibited a favourable attitude towards our requests. But in reality he hindered the whole of our movement, and was preventing the prisoners from being liberated. My experiences with him were remarkably similar to the difficulties which we encountered in Russia when dealing with the subject of prisoners. Two reasons were given for this action on his part. In the first place he did not favour the idea of liberating the prisoners for the purpose of forming an army, as this would restrict his sphere of influence, and on the other hand he was said to be an Austrophile, and therefore did not regard our movement with a favourable eye. At all events, the fact is that he stood in our way, and we had many unpleasant conflicts in our official dealings with him.
​On Saturday, September 22nd, I concluded the main negotiations with the Ministry of War and the Ministry of Munitions, where a discussion took place as to the possibility of utilizing as factory workers those prisoners who proved unfit for military service. On behalf of Giardino, the Minister of War, Colonel Zanghieri informed me that I could consider the question of the Czechoslovak Army in Italy as settled. The Ministry of War had, in this sense, given its definite answer to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and now only the details were being discussed. After my return from the prisoners’ camps I should receive a formal answer in writing, and the organization of the army would then immediately begin.
Accordingly, I was fairly satisfied when, at the end of September, I started off to spend a few days among our prisoners. I visited several camps in the South of Italy, especially those at Certosa di Padula, Sala Consilina, Citta Ducale, and Pola. At Certosa di Padula, where more than ten thousand of our people were located, my visit was quite a ceremonial affair. My impressions on this occasion and on my subsequent visits in the other camps are unforgettable memories. I saw how the freedom of the nation was being born, and the State was being formed. Our troops, who by detachments had already been collected in a military organization for several months, were only waiting for the command to proceed to the front. They were getting impatient, and through being kept waiting they were beginning to be mistrustful and embittered. Having Zanghieri’s assurance, I announced the joyful news to them, and promised that they would soon be set free. Unfortunately, this occurred rather later than I myself had expected, and this was the same in the other camps.
The Italians were pleased with our prisoners, and they received me with readiness and understanding. As time went on, the local authorities showed a willing spirit. On my return to Rome the Ministry confirmed to me the settlement of our army question, but the actual formation of the army was delayed for several months longer. The result was that after my departure from the camps, it was not long before our prisoners again became sceptical and despondent.
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The note from the Ministry of War, which had been eagerly awaited, reached me on October 4th in the form of a letter ​from General Giardino to the Secretary of the National Council as a reply to my conversations in the respective Ministries and to my statement of October 14, 1917. My interviews with Zanghieri and Sogno immediately after my return from the prison camps, had caused me much concern, as both these officers began to formulate reservations which they had not mentioned at first. Nevertheless, I was hardly prepared for the disappointment which Giardino’s reply caused me. I had not expected a complete success at the very outset. Even in France, where the conditions were more favourable, we had worked longer and harder to achieve success than we had done in Italy. I therefore regard the note as a sign that we were making progress, but considering the circumstances at the time I could scarcely describe it as adequate for our purpose.
In his communication Giardino, on behalf of the Italian Government, made the following concessions:
1. In accordance with our demand he would grant political recognition to the National Council as the supreme body representing our movement, and he would enter into official relations with it.
2. He would liberate our prisoners and place them under a kind of joint control by the National Council.
3. He would set up semi-military detachments which would not be used for service at the front, but would perform military service on the second line of defence.
4. These troops would wear special badges as Czech soldiers.
5. They would take an oath of allegiance to the Czechoslovak nation, and their attestations to this effect would be placed in the hands of the National Council.
6. From a juridical point of view they would be subject to the discipline of the prisoners and not of the army.
7. The Italian Government would comply with our wishes with regard to the internment of Czechoslovak nationals.
There were two fundamental matters which caused us extreme dissatisfaction. In the first place, it was proposed to form only semi-military or labour corps, and then, too, our troops, although liberated, would in a juridical respect retain the character of prisoners. Neither of these proposals was acceptable to us. Both of them exhibited Sonnino’s fears and reservations, to which I have already referred, since the suggested compromise was the work of the Consulta. The Italian military authorities, even at that time, were prepared to go ​further than this, as they plainly showed in the course of conversation. At the Ministry of War and the Consulta they were anxious to convince me that these Czechoslovak contingents really represented a considerable advance, and that further progress would soon be made in the direction of an actual Czechoslovak Army. These statements were obviously prompted by the endeavour to show that the reservations were not due to hostility or to any tendency against our movement. In a word, Italy was still seeking a compromise involving something which might be or might not be an army according to requirements. The Italian authorities did not venture to say this plainly, as they were not certain whether the Czechoslovak cause, as an international question, would produce successful results. They were genuinely anxious to do something for us, but they were trying to improvise an arrangement which could be withdrawn if necessary.
I gave them full credit for their good will and, as I realized the circumstances, I continued to be patient. But Sonnino was in error; even the concessions which General Giardino had made in his letter were contrary to the usages of international law then in force, and this alone offended Sonnino’s legitimistic instincts. In its essentials this concession was a considerable one, and among a number of fundamental matters it answered our purpose. The reservations which the Government had made were safety-valves of a formal character, which at the next approach of an explosion could be open to the utmost capacity. So much was clear; the whole scheme was merely an indication of the political weakness and indecision then prevailing in the Government, and of the uncertainty which marked the Italian aims and plans. For this reason I was sure of final success on the next occasion.
Before making any definite decision, I once more visited all our friends in Rome. I discussed matters first with Barrère, then with Giers, Sir Rennell Rodd, and Sir Samuel Hoare. I also consulted the Serbian Minister, Antonjević, who was a loyal friend and fellow-worker of ours. All these persons were familiar with the matter and had an interest in it. I valued their advice and assistance, both in Rome and with their respective Governments, and by discussing matters with them I was emphasizing the fact that we stood in the same relationship to all the Allies, and that the whole of our movement was uniform and. pan-European in character. Incidentally, I ​may add, I acted similarly in Paris and London with regard to the Italian representatives there.
Barrère was very reluctant to reconcile himself to the situation. From Paris I received a message from Dr. Sychrava, whom I had informed about the progress of my negotiations in Rome, that Colonel Cros and Major Dresch, of the French War Ministry, were very disappointed, for they had counted on obtaining five or six thousand of our prisoners from Italy for the army in France, and had already made arrangements accordingly. Barrére had received similar reports from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
At the Secretariat of the National Council in Paris they felt the Italian refusal very keenly, for it had caused a slight set-back to our plan for an army in France. The news which was coming from Russia was not particularly encouraging, and in the meantime nothing was being heard from Štefánik in America. As a result of the unsettled state of affairs in France, there were signs of demoralization among our first contingent of prisoners, who had been sent from Rumania by way of Russia. Dr. Sychrava impressed upon me the necessity of returning to Paris without delay, and of putting an end to this situation by an energetic recruiting campaign among our prisoners in France, so as to save the prestige of the National Council, and prevent the scheme of a national army from being discredited.
Nevertheless, ever Barrére advised me not to refuse Giardino’s offer. He finally admitted that even this half-concession was a greater success than he had expected. Knowing Sonnino and his fears as to the outcome of the war, he would far sooner have expected him to grant a few thousand prisoners for the army in France. He, too, considered this as a far less binding step than was the sanction for a semi-military body, which must necessarily within a short time be transformed into an army. Hence he agreed with me that the offer should be accepted and the way left open for further negotiations. As the organization of our army in France made it urgent for me to return to Paris at once, Barrére suggested that I should come back to Rome in a few weeks when a final settlement would certainly be reached.
Giers and Sir Rennell Rodd, however, from the very beginning, considered the settlement offered in Giardino’s communication as a far greater success than the dispatch of our troops ​to France would have been. They saw in this a change of front in the Italian policy which would be of considerable significance in its bearings upon the affairs of Austria-Hungary and the Jugoslavs. They therefore advised me strongly to accept the proposal, and to come back to Rome at an early date. In their view we could regard this proposal as a sign that our cause was victorious in Italy. The next step which must come soon, and which was a logical consequence of the present one, would be the formation of an independent Czechoslovak Army, and this would mean that Italy was publicly identifying herself with the policy of destroying the Habsburg Empire. This again, they said, would bring her into official agreement with the scheme for unifying the Jugoslavs.
72
It was natural that after these consultations and discussions with diplomats who at that time were playing a leading part in Rome, and who, by notifying their respective Governments to the same effect, were assisting us and our cause, I decided to act in accordance with their advice. I therefore made up my mind to hasten my departure to Paris, where I would deal with the most urgent matters. As I felt confident that before very long it would be possible to induce the Italian Government to take the final step, I planned to return to Rome within three or four weeks for the purpose of definitely settling our military problem in Italy.(31)
After discussing matters with representatives from among our prisoners, who had been released and were already working in the National Council at Rome, I decided in favour of accepting the compromise as indicated. It was clear to me that the Italians would be obliged to concede to-morrow what they did not concede to-day, and that they themselves would abandon their present attitude as soon as the progress made by our movement in France and elsewhere gave them an opportunity of doing so.
I therefore accepted everything I could. With regard to the formation of semi-military labour corps and the discipline to which the prisoners were to be amenable on their release, I made very emphatic reservations in the name of the National Council, so as not to prejudice its future principles or course of action. I formulated all these points in a written communication which was sent to General Giardino on October 8, 1917.
​It was in accordance with the terms of this reply that, when leaving for Paris on October roth, I instructed Hlaváček, who was in charge of the Rome branch of the National Council, to continue organizing our prisoners in the camps, and to assure them that the organization of the actual army was only a matter of time. On no account, however, was he to proceed with the formation of labour corps. My intention was, immediately on my return to France, to hasten the formation of the army in accordance with the scheme agreed upon, as in the meanwhile the first contingents from Russia were announcing their arrival. This would confront Italy with a fait accompli as regards the Czechoslovak Army in France, and judging from the situation in Rome, as I had seen it, I was sure that this was a new argument which would have a decisive effect in Italy.
I did not, however, return to Rome for the completion of the work I had begun there. On my return to Paris my time was fully occupied with urgent business until March 1918. Then, too, Štefánik, on his return from America, expressed the wish to go to Italy himself for the purpose of settling the military problem there. Under these changed conditions I accordingly devoted myself to military work in Paris, to the preliminary arrangements for the Congress of Oppressed Nations, which was held at Rome in April 1918, and also to our affairs in England.