# Heresies of Sea Power/Part 1/Chapter 1

I
THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR
Reviewed generally, the Peloponnesian war, which involved practically the entire Grecian world and lasted twenty years, was as follows:
Athens, the maritime state, with enterprise, expansive skill and genius, stood the leader of a great confederacy stretching from Zante to Phaselis. The zenith of her power was reached about B.C. 456, but when the war broke out (B.C. 431) she was still mistress of the islands, and the almost unquestioned owner of the world's Sea Power. Whatever else she had lost, Sea Power was unquestionably hers.
Her principal rival was Sparta, the leading military state, unenterprising, slow, and tenacious. With Sparta was Corinth, a maritime state whose commercial greatness had fallen as Athenian SEA POWER rose.
The east of Greece was a species of Athenian lake, on the west coast the Peloponnesian power was the greater.
In the war that followed both sides adhered tolerably faithfully to one general idea—to hold the side already controlled and to seek extension on the ​side controlled by the enemy. Hence Athens engaged in defensive war on the east and offensive on the west coast; the Peloponnesians reversed this.
Parallels could be found in the map of the world to-day, or in the map of Europe of a hundred years ago; but it should always be borne in mind that in this old Greek war there were two elements not to be found in many other wars. In the first place, there was in each belligerent confederacy an element politically favourable to the other side. In every 'allied' state there was a party which, being out of power, favoured the 'other side' as its own hope of returning to power. The sentiment is one that after the lapse of over two thousand years is just beginning faintly to assert itself again.
So in the Anglo-Boer War there was in England a party whose sympathies were in some measure with the Boers, and, more markedly, in the Russo-Japanese War, we have seen in Russia sections of the population seeing in Japanese victories their own political salvation. Though for different reasons, this situation existed acutely in the Peloponnesian war, and the strategies of both sides were coloured with it.
The war began in B.C. 431. Up to B.C. 424 it was chiefly in favour of Athens; then the tide of fortune turned, and, despite Athenian naval victories, ended ultimately in the destruction of the entire Athenian ​fleet at Ægospotami and the consequent surrender of Athens. A second feature of the war is that it saw the birth of naval tactics.
At the outbreak of the Peloponnesian war, 'Sea Power' seems to have been as well recognised by the Greeks as it is a recognised force to-day. The early pages of Thucydides indicate this very clearly; the references to the naval power of Agamemnon, to the fleet of Polycrates, to the lack of 'decked vessels' in the Athenian fleet at Salamis, all show that there was a very distinct recognition of the ship as a war force. The platitudes of to-day were platitudes then; and 'Sea Power' is in no way a modern idea. Call 'Sea Power' the use of a fleet, and it has always existed. But it has existed just as the bow existed beside the sword, or to-day the rifle beside the field-piece, the torpedo beside the big gun. It was used as a weapon beside other weapons, or as the most convenient weapon.
* ↑ So much was this the case that when the oligarchy in an 'allied state' favoured Athens, the democratical party sympathised with Sparta.
* ↑ Thucydides, I. 4-5, 8, for the navy of Minos; I. 9, for Agamemnon; I. 13, for maritime progress after the Trojan war; I. 14, Athenian navy at Salamis; I. 15, for the importance attached to Sea Power. As showing the importance attached to naval power by the Greeks, two passages from Thucydides may be noted; the first deals with the reason why Agamemnon was able to assemble so strong a force for the attack on Troy. After alluding to his hereditary position as the first reason, the historian continues, ἅ μοι δοκεῖ Ἀγαμέμνων παραλαβὼν καὶ ναυτικῷ τε ἅμα ἐπὶ πλέον τῶν ἄλλων ἰσχύσας, τὴν στρατείαν οὐ χάριτι τὸ πλεῖον ἢ φόβῳ ξυναγαγὼν ποιήσασθαι (Thucydides, I. 9). The gist of this is that he owed his position to his hereditary power and to his naval power more than to anything else. The second passage points out that in early Greece the only important wars were maritime (Thucydides, I. 15).
Map to illustrate Peloponnesian War
Peloponnesians: Vertical Shading. Athenians and Allies: Horizontal Shading.
​Of sea tactics, few, if any, ideas seem to have prevailed before the Peloponnesian war. Salamis was not characterised by anything that could be dignified with the name of tactics as we understand them; in substance it was a land battle fought on shipboard. Incidentally as ship crashed into ship, there may have been born then ideas as to concerted tactical action with ramming as the objective, but these ideas bore no fruit till the Peloponnesian war.
'Cutting the line' existed as a battle object, just as indiscriminate ramming existed; but in both cases only because such things were the nearest analogy to land warfare.
At the same time tactical ideas were evidently being evolved, and in the Athenian navy concerted action—the first necessity of tactics—was fully recognised. In a battle between the Corinthians and Corcyreans which preceded the great war, the Athenian ships, hanging on the outskirts of the fight, acted together in their evolutions with the distinct object of affecting the Corinthian movements, and it goes without saying that this efficiency could not have been acquired without very considerable practice towards a definite end; and so, when, war having broken out, Phormio with his fleet of twenty ships was in the Gulf of Corinth off Naupaktis, it was but natural that, having the power to use his ships as one, he should think out a means of doing so in order to win a victory.
The Peloponnesian fleet consisted of forty-seven ​vessels of various sizes. They were emphatically a fleet of the old regime, and they made their first acquaintance with the new order of things when they found that, as they coasted along out of the gulf, they were 'watched' by Phormio, who wished to attack in the open sea.
As the Peloponnesians coasted, the twenty Athenian ships kept in line with them, observing. A battle was not expected by the Peloponnesians, who lay to during the night in hopes of evading the watching fleet.
This, however, failed in its object, and some action seeming inevitable, they ranged themselves in a circle, prows outward, with their small craft inside, also the five fastest ships, which were intended to issue out, and support the circle at whatever point it might be attacked. These dispositions show very clearly that nothing was anticipated save a fight on classical lines.
Phormio, his ships being in line ahead, rowed round and round the Peloponnesian circle, and by keeping very near gave the impression that he purported to attack. This narrowed the circle, and presently, as he had foreseen, this and the morning breeze flung his enemy into confusion. Then, seizing the favourable moment, he attacked and destroyed in detail, while the Peloponnesians broke and fled.
​This battle of Naupaktis is a clear instance of a victory won by tactical ability.
It was the direct result of training. It teaches us that most tactical ideas are as old as the hills—and that (as ever) the best man will win.
Much interest attaches to the addresses delivered after the fight. On the Peloponnesian side, the situation was rightly grasped: 'Against their greater skill set your own greater valour, and against the defeat which so alarms you set the fact that you were unprepared. But now you have a larger fleet; this turns the balance in your favour; and you will fight close to a friendly shore under the protection of heavy armed troops. Victory is generally on the side of those who are more numerous and better equipped. Even our mistakes will be an additional advantage, because they will be a lesson to us.'
Except for the 'friendly shore' piece, this address might be used as a free translation of a portion of Captain Klado's articles in re the Russian Baltic Fleet, 1904-5.
Phormio's address gives us his tactical principles: If I can help it I shall not give battle in the gulf or even sail into it. For I know that where a few vessels which are skilfully handled and are better sailers engage with a larger number which are badly managed, ​confined space is a disadvantage. Unless the captain of a ship see his enemy a good way off, he cannot advance or ram properly; nor can he retreat at need when pressed. The manœuvres suitable for fast vessels, such as breaking the line or circling under the enemy's stern, cannot be practised in a narrow space, for here the sea fight must of necessity be reduced to a land fight, in which numbers tell. In the moment of action remember the value of silence and order, things always important in war, especially at sea.'
There is any amount of sound principle in either address, and plenty of regard for the science of killing the enemy—which was the business in hand. But is there visible here any conception of the theory that the ancients bothered about grand principles of strategical results elsewhere to follow from their operations as a distinct sequel?
We can, by judicious selection, build up such a theory even out of the fragments here quoted. We can take Thucydides' opening remarks about ships and without any imagination say: This indicates that the general sentiment among the educated Greeks was that Sea Power had won the war against Troy, consequently it was recognised by those in authority at Athens that the 'steady silent pressure' of Athenian Sea Power would, properly applied, bring Sparta to her knees. The long walls to Piræus, the only expenditure on 'bricks and mortar' sanctioned, show ​that Athens was felt to rely on Sea Power alone. In fighting the battle of Naupaktis, Phormio was influenced by the same principles, the same ideas, that animated Nelson when at the Nile and Trafalgar he fought to render possible the battle of Waterloo, etc. We can say it all very plausibly, and absolutely correctly as regards the opening sentences.
But what have we to omit to say the rest of it?
For one thing we have to omit that the Athenian soldiers were quite unequal to the Spartan ones, that they built the long walls so as to avoid having to fight superior soldiery, because these walls enabled them to neglect the tilling of Attica and subsist instead on food brought to them over-sea. They needed ships to bring that food; they needed warships to collect the unwilling contributions of their island allies, and to fight any hostile warships likely to interfere with the food ships. But what dreams had they of ships used with the distinct objective of affecting military issues on land? What ideas had Phormio, an obviously great admiral, beyond killing as many Peloponnesians as possible with the minimum loss to himself?
We may now follow the result of the defensive tactics adopted by the Peloponnesians. Four deep these skirted the coast, their twenty fastest ships leading. Thus they made a feint upon the town of Naupaktis and their scheme was so successful that they easily drew the Athenians after them. Turning ​suddenly, they came down upon the Athenians and cut off nine ships. Eleven others escaped into the open sea pursued by the twenty in disorder. Ten reached Naupaktis, but the eleventh lagged behind. Hotly chased by one of the Peloponnesians, this ship dodged round a merchant vessel and rammed her pursuer. Inspirited by this success, the Athenians turned and defeated their enemy, and eventually recovered most of the nine ships which had been lost.
After which nothing in particular happened for some while.
To follow this war through its entire length would be as tedious as it is unnecessary. There are, however, certain portions of it—the Athenian expedition to Syracuse, the battle of Cyzicus and the battle of Ægospotami which deserve some close attention.
The Syracusan expedition in the seventeenth year of the war was briefly as follows:
Seeking expansion, the Athenians sent an armada to Syracuse which blockaded the port and besieged the town by land (414 B.C). In the Grand Harbour indecisive actions were fought—the Syracusans making great use of soldiers afloat. A second Athenian armament was sent, but succumbed to the methods adopted by the Syracusans. Thus the bare outlines.
The Syracusan expedition was undoubtedly an example of the use of Sea Power, insomuch that the Athenians, having command of the sea, used that command to invade Sicily. But there was no ​'profound determining influence of maritime strength upon great issues' in the matter for them, since they lost their fleets fighting in the harbour with Syracusans who, lacking aptitude for grand sea fights, extemporised barge-like warships filled with heavy-armed soldiery and turned the sea into land for the occasion. They had neither command of the sea nor Sea Power, but they were completely victorious.
Should one use this as an argument that Sea Power, as generally understood, is useless? Hardly : but it is a fair inference that well-trained seamen and ships are not alone factors of determining importance, unless the conditions are otherwise suitable. At Syracuse they were not suitable; but that does not affect the deduction, of which this is a most remarkable instance, that Sea Power is an illusive thing and not a universal weapon. It is only of service in the hands of the better man, and without it he will probably find some other means to win.
In a fight in the open sea Athenian skill would have annihilated the Syracusan barge fleet, but the Syracusans did not give the opportunity. They waited to be attacked by Sea Power under their own conditions, conditions which neutralised the value of Sea Power, and made it of no account. They used their barge ships, it is true; they used them to crash into the light Athenian vessels in that constricted harbour of Syracuse, where seaman-ship availed nothing : their men were 'soldiers at ​sea,' and the primary use of their ships to carry these soldiers to destroy the sailors of Athens. They hit on the right antidote, and being the better men, they won. The end of the 'silent pressure of Sea Power'
map of syracuse to illustrate peloponnesian war
on this occasion was the Athenian navy prisoners in the stone quarries.
Can we draw further deductions or press any already made further home? Of what avail is it to do so? There is no call to make points beyond showing that for instances of Sea Power, influencing military and ​general history, we may find other instances of military affairs profoundly influencing Sea Power.
The battle of Cyzicus is of special interest from the tactical standpoint. It took place in the twenty-second year of the war (B.C. 410). The Athenians under Alcibiades were inferior in numbers, and by no means sure of victory. They resorted, therefore, to tactics almost identical with those adopted by Togo off Port Arthur in the Russo-Japanese war.
The Athenian fleet was divided into three squadrons, of which only one showed itself. This squadron under Alcibiades being attacked, presently retreated till the Peloponnesians were drawn a long way from their base.
Then at a given signal Alcibiades turned on his straggling pursuers, while the other two squadrons cut off the retreat. A complete victory was the result. Incidentally it may be mentioned that Sparta there-upon sought peace, but the Athenians refused to accept the offers. From the previous Syracusan disaster, however, Athens never fully recovered, although fresh ships subsequently won battles such as Cyzicus over opponents unduly flushed with the Syracusan victory. But the Athenian naval prestige was gone, destroyed by what was after all a military operation, even as the Athenian fleet was finally so destroyed at the battle of Ægospotami. Here the Athenian fleet, deceived by a clever but fairly obvious strategy, was lulled into a false ​security by the still non-naval Peloponnesians. Their ships drawn up on the beach, the Athenian crews went inland to procure food, and while they were thus scattered their enemies rowed across the Hellespont and captured or destroyed on land an armada that they could never have successfully faced upon the water.
Lysander, the Peloponnesian admiral, had a large fleet, but Sea Power was in no way his. All that a superior navy could confer belonged to Athens—better ships and better sailors. And it gave her Ægospotami!
Her administration was bad, of course, or the fleet would never have been so caught napping by a ruse; but this in no way affects the fact—clear here as at Syracuse—that the greatest sea empire of the period was utterly extinguished by those who only partially, and with ill success, met Sea Power with Sea Power, but very successfully annihilated it in 'other ways.'
Of course, as ships were concerned in those 'other ways,' it is possible to argue that they embodied Sea Power, but such an argument will be academical rather than aught else. Sea Power as understood to-day means battleships and accessory craft and the full ability to handle them. One may argue that the Athenian fleet was the equivalent of a cruiser fleet and that the Syracusan vessels were, relatively, battleships. The Syracusan battleships destroyed the Athenian cruisers as the Merrimac destroyed the frigates of the Northerners in the United States Civil War. If one admits that, Syracuse must be regarded as a normal affair ​enough, and it may be legitimate so to look upon it. Again, Ægospotarni may be regarded as a huge instance of what was a common war object in those days, catching the enemy on the beach.
Yet still the 'other ways' remain, still to Athens belonged the splendid navy, the well-trained crews, the competent seamen and all the things that go to make up Sea Power; to her victorious opponents an inferior navy, incompetent seamen, less proficiency in every branch.
Viewed in any light, it is hard, indeed, to find fault with Athenian strategy. Were any student of Sea Power, ignorant of the history of the war, given its conditions, the forces, and shown the Athenian movements, the last thing he would prophesy would be the thing that befel. Except the Syracusan expedition hardly anything could be criticised, and even that expedition has much to be said for its wisdom. It transferred the war from Attica to Sicily, it promised the essential expansion and refilled coffers; it was precisely the sort of operation that command of the sea is valuable as permitting. Even the landing at Ægospotami is excusable: since it was the invariable custom and necessity of the time.
The war is a little-studied war; Ægospotaini is seldom mentioned like Lepanto and Trafalgar: if mentioned at all, the lessons drawn only concern incompetent strategy, careless neglect, and other hard criticisms such as the actual conditions scarcely merit.
​Its real suggestiveness is in the limitation of Sea Power evidenced by it, but most of all should it be remembered and compared with more recent campaigns from which deductions are drawn.
It is not argued that this war negatives the general principles of Sea Power as laid down by Captain Mahan, but it sorts ill with the elaborations of some of his more ardent disciples. It clearly suggests that besides Sea Power and Land Power there is a greater power still—a power which has as yet no name, though we have seen its action in 1904-1905 as clearly as in the Peloponnesian war. It is called nameless; but perhaps it may be characterised. And its characterisation is this—Fitness to win.
* ↑ For Phormio's tactics see Thucydides, II. c. 81, where it is stated that Phormio declined to assist the Acarnanians because he was obliged to watch the Peloponnesian fleet; cc. 83-84 for tactics leading up to the battle and the battle itself.
* ↑ Compare this general idea with tho battle of Tsushima, 1905.
* ↑ Thucydides, II. 87, speech of Lacedæmonian admirals, c. 89, speech of Phormio. The translation in the text is (except for one or two technical phrases) that of Jowett, Thucydides, vol.i. pp.154-156.
* ↑ See The Punic War.
* ↑ Thucydides, II. 90-92.
* ↑ Xenophon, Hellenica, i. 1. Cf. Diod. Sic. XIII. 50-51.
* ↑ See chapter on the Russo-Japanese war.