# My War Memoirs/Chapter 5

V
PARIS AND LONDON AS CENTRES OF OUR REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT
(a) My Beginnings in Paris
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I had brought with me from Prague, besides important news on the whole situation, a fundamental decision arrived at by our political circles, who were represented directly or indirectly in the “Maffia,” that Masaryk and Dürich could take open action against Austria in a public manifesto, the wording of which had already been agreed upon in Prague, and thus begin officially, on behalf of the Czech nation, definite resistance to the Habsburg Empire. Accordingly, at a conference in Geneva on September 4th, it was decided that on about September 15th I should meet Masaryk in Paris, where our open action against Austria-Hungary would be prepared with the agreement and co-operation of Professor Denis and our fellow-countrymen from France, England, Russia, and America.
I left on September 16th for Paris, where I spent a little less than two weeks, completing, as had been arranged, the first preparations for systematic political activity on French soil. Masaryk, who left at the end of September for a prolonged stay in London, introduced me to Professor Denis and instructed the Czech colony in Paris to co-operate with me. He also asked me to visit on his behalf, as soon as possible, our volunteers at Lyons (which I immediately did), and entrusted to me the management of our propagandist and political activities in Paris and France generally.
My beginnings in Paris were difficult. I took up my quarters in the Rue Léopold Robert in a small room on the fifth floor, for which I paid 120 francs a month. The few acquaintances which I had made in France during my first and second stay there (1905–8 and 1911) had either forgotten me or else had disappeared in consequence of the war. I was not in touch with official circles, and in accordance with the principles which we ​practised throughout the war I made no attempt to secure an entry into those circles at this early stage of our affairs; for we did not want to start any negotiations until our position was sufficiently strong.
There were two courses left for me to adopt:
(a) I could avail myself of the professors at the Sorbonne with whom I was to some extent acquainted from my previous stay in Paris. These included particularly E. Denis, A. Meillet, E. Durkheim, C. Bouglé, under whom I had studied, and also L. Eisenmann, who had been a professor at Dijon while I was studying there, and who, as the author of an important book on Austria-Hungary, had taken an interest in the thesis which I had written on the same subject. Through Masaryk and Denis I now entered into direct touch with him.
(b) I could approach the French Socialists, as since 1907 I had been a contributor to such Socialist periodicals as La Revue Socialiste, Le Movement Socialiste, etc., and was acquainted with their editors and with such leading men as Albert Thomas, Lagardelle, etc.
These, then, were the circles in which I began my work. Professor Eisenmann, as an expert on Austro-Hungarian questions, had been assigned to the Information Department of the French War Ministry. I had arrived from Austria with a quantity of fresh news and documentary material. He had been carefully following the Austro-Hungarian newspapers, and often needed a commentary on the events from one who had witnessed them at close quarters. Thus, in the very first month of my stay in Paris, I established an important contact with the War Ministry.
It was on September 30, 1915, that I first discussed with Professor Eisenmann what form our co-operation should take. It was agreed, in particular, that as the opportunity arose I should supply him with news and comments for the War Ministry. Immediately after that, on October 2nd, Eisenmann introduced me to officials of the War Ministry, where it was decided notably that counter-action against Austria-Hungary should be taken in Switzerland, and that assistance in this project should be given by our organization and Dr. Sychrava. I also at once received permission from the Ministry to arrange for newspapers to be sent to me through official channels from Austria and Germany, as well as books and reports from Dr. Sychrava in Switzerland. In this way I was enabled to establish rapidly ​the contact with Prague which was so necessary for our work in Paris.
My former relations with Albert Thomas made it possible for me at an early date—on October 16th—to get into touch with Professor Roques, his personal secretary at the Ministry of Munitions. At about the same time the members of the “Rovnost” (Equality), a Czech Socialist society in Paris, asked me to give a public lecture for the French Socialist organizations. I agreed; but I wanted a Frenchman also to speak at the same meeting, and I applied to Paul Louis, a Socialist and journalist whom I had known previously as the author of a history of the Labour movement in France. At that time Paul Louis was one of the foreign editors of the Petit Parisien. The lecture was held, and Paul Louis spoke ably on Austria and against Austria. In this way we gained fresh ground.
Paul Louis, who had been surprised by what I reported about the situation in Austria-Hungary, was anxious for me to speak to somebody in the Foreign Ministry. He referred me to M. l’Hermit, an acquaintance of his and then an influential official, who received me on November 16th and discussed Austro-Hungarian affairs with me. This did not immediately lead to any appreciable result, but, considering that I was an unknown foreigner, it was an important beginning, since it opened up a channel which, by systematic work and further connections, became more and more extensive and gradually led to definite political results.
It was about the same time that I met Auguste Gauvain, one of those men who, during the war, rendered valuable services to our cause in France. At the end of September 1915 I had become acquainted with the journalist P. Quirielle, through the painter L. Strimpl, who is now our Minister in Belgium, and Quirielle introduced me to Gauvain on November 10th, shortly before we took open action against Austria-Hungary. I was anxious for Gauvain on this occasion to write something about our cause.
Gauvain, the foreign editor of the Journal des Débats, was one of those French journalists who, from the very beginning of the war, thoroughly realized its significance and meaning. He was well acquainted with Austro-Hungarian politics, and it was no drawback to him that he was on the staff of a Conservative paper with Catholic tendencies. From the beginning to the end his attitude towards Vienna and Budapest was unrelenting, ​for he realized that they were the factors who were responsible for the outbreak of the war. Gauvain is also one of those few journalists of world-wide reputation who have had the courage to republish unchanged in book form their daily articles on the foreign situation during the war, the events of which he was able to comment upon with a rare insight. From the first moment he became our friend. On the occasion of my first visit he promised me that he would write a leading article on our movement, and even at that early date he succeeded in forming a correct estimate of the Czech problem. It was he, I believe, who alone of all French and, in fact, Allied journalists, supplied a serious and detailed report of our first official action. From that time onwards I was in constant touch with the editorial staff of the Journal des Débats, which became the most important journalistic pivot for our war-time policy in France. Such were the relationships with which I began my work in Paris, and I made every effort to extend them systematically. The friends I gained in this manner helped devotedly to extend the scope of our influence. And when Štefánik joined us he brought with him a number of politicians and, later, representatives of military circles.
Knowing the situation in Prague and in our political circles generally, and remembering my experiences with the “Maffia,” I proposed, after having discussed the matter with Masaryk, to supply my friends in Prague as regularly as possible with reports on the military and political situation in the Allied countries. I had seen when I was still in Prague what valuable services were rendered to us by even the smallest piece of news, and how great an encouragement it was to all of us when we obtained authentic information as to what was or was not true in the Austrian and German versions of current events.
At the same time, however, I was fully aware how fantastic and exaggerated certain of the reports were which emanated from our uncritical enthusiasts at home, who imagined that the military side of the war was already won, and that on the political side everything had long since been decided in our favour.
Accordingly, almost immediately after my arrival in Switzerland and Paris, as soon as I had taken stock of the situation, I sent a report on it to Prague. I spoke with M. Bibikov, the Russian Ambassador at Berne (he was married to a Czech lady), with Svatkovsky and with all my new friends in Paris; I read ​the newspapers, I observed the people and the conditions, and then compared everything with Masaryk’s reports. The general view of the situation which I thus acquired was sent to Prague in the middle of October 1915. My report was couched in hopeful terms, but it contained a warning against our passive attitude. I drew attention to the fact that certain Allied circles were disappointed at our lack of activity at home, and that, as scarcely anything was known about the Czech cause, it was particularly important for more politicians of standing to join us.
To-day I regard this and all my following reports as documents which give quite a good idea of the general progress of our movement, our aims, our struggles and fears, our hopes, successes, and the gratification which they caused us.(14)
(b) Our First Open Action
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Having settled in Paris I began, as I had agreed upon with Masaryk, to prepare for open action in which our colonists and émigrés were to take part. It was necessary to discuss this with our colonists in Paris, London, America, and Russia, and these discussions were not easy. Our colonies were not yet firmly organized, and there were differences of opinion as to the persons who should sign the manifesto. I myself did not sign it, since I desired to remain in the background for some time, out of consideration for my wife and friends. Moreover, my position among our people abroad was not yet sufficiently prominent. Then, too, seeing the differences which had arisen with regard to the persons who should sign the manifesto, I thought it would be better if I set our colonists an example of political reserve. I first arranged the matter with our colony in Paris, and as Dr. Sychrava had already discussed the subject with our people in Russia and America, on September 30, 1915, at Masaryk’s request, I again went to Geneva to obtain Dürich’s consent also.
There a course of action was agreed upon with Dr. Sychrava, and an arrangement was made also with Svatkovsky with regard to sending reports on our affairs to Russia. I then proceeded to Lausanne where Dürich gave me permission to take action, and on October 2nd I returned to Paris. I sent a report ​on these arrangements to Masaryk, who was making all preparations in London, and we reached an agreement by telegram with Masaryk and our unions in America and Russia concerning the signature of the manifesto. Finally, I went into the whole matter with Professor Denis on October 9, 1915. The reason for this was that Professor Denis considered the wording of the manifesto, as agreed upon in Prague, to be unsuitable for the French public. It was, he said, too dry and historical in tone, and he suggested changes. With Masaryk’s consent he then revised our wording for the French public.
It was then for the first time that the problem of organizing our movement abroad became an urgent one. What had to be considered was the relationship of Masaryk and those of us who had arrived from Prague, towards our colonists abroad. Another important point was the extent to which our colonists were to take part in our work. As early as March 1915 Masaryk had drawn up a scheme for the activity of the colonists, which he had submitted to them. In it he had indicated what their status and duties should be in the work of liberation. The question was a delicate one in its personal aspect, chiefly because of the status, the interests, and the aims of some of the leading personalities among the colonists. It was clear that for managing our national and political movement we needed a firmly established central organization which would be permanently representative of our movement, and by its composition would form a serious body worthy of the confidence of our own people and especially of Allied political circles.
In September 1915 these matters were not sufficiently advanced for the purposes of a definite organization. A kind of ad hoc political body was therefore set up, and it exhibited all the marks of a provisional arrangement. At that time our colonists had no definite organization either in Paris or London, America or Russia. Altogether, from a political point of view, we saw how unprepared our colonists were; and so we created spontaneously a “Czechoslovak Foreign Committee,” whose function was chiefly to provide signatures for our manifesto, and thus to exhibit unity among all who were concerned in our struggle for liberation and who at that time were able to speak freely. There were various difficulties and disputes with regard to the persons who were to sign the manifesto on behalf of the colonies and the regional associations, but an agreement was finally reached. The definite organization was postponed until ​such a time as the development of events should throw a clearer light on the situation and our requirements.
And so we took open action and declared war officially upon “the Habsburg Empire on Sunday, November 14, 1915, when the proclamation of the Czechoslovak Foreign Committee was published in Switzerland, France, Russia, and the United States.
In this proclamation the Foreign Committee emphasized the fact that the Czechoslovak nation was entering upon hostilities, irrespective of their result. at a moment when Russia was retreating and Serbia was crushed. It associated itself with the Slavonic nations and the Allies, and proclaimed a life and death struggle against the Empire which was responsible for the war and had already lost its independence, having become a mere implement in the German war policy of an advance towards the East. The manifesto further described the struggle of the Czechoslovak nation against Vienna and Budapest before the war, and drew attention to the regime of persecution against us in Austria-Hungary during the war. It emphasized our historical right to a State of our own, and referred to the fact that the whole nation was resolved to gain its independence by its combative efforts in the war. The cause of Vienna and Budapest was proclaimed to be already a lost one, the downfall of the Habsburg Empire and the formation of an independent Czechoslovak State certain and inevitable.
The publication of the manifesto formed the beginning of our official opposition to Austria-Hungary. It was a step of historic importance, although the immediate effect was not considerable. It was the first decisive measure, open and deliberate, undertaken in agreement with the politicians at home and therefore fraught with responsibility to the nation and its future. There could now be no turning back. With this step began the phase of our organized activity abroad. That problem occupied us entirely for some time.
As in the case of all work, especially that of a political and revolutionary character, the problem of method and organization has a decisive effect upon the results achieved. What therefore concerned us mostly was how to organize, in a unified and well-knit movement, the co-operation of the colonies with those in charge of our policy; how to keep in touch with Prague; how to organize our propaganda and pass gradually from propaganda to politics while creating the executive bodies and ​financial resources necessary for this process. We were also faced with the task of finding competent workers and linking up the whole of our movement in the various Allied States. Finally, the question also arose as to how we were to organize our activity with regard to prisoners of war and fighting forces.
The solution of these problems could not be postponed for long. We were also urged forward by the Czechoslovaks in America, to whom our action then meant a great deal, since there our people were concentrated in serried masses. Moreover, in America, which at that time was still neutral, our action was to have the effect of inciting our people to open warfare against Austria-Hungary, and to clear up the situation among our émigrés who, from a political point of view, were unsettled in their tendencies.
Masaryk asked me to come to London to discuss these matters. It was at the time when the first envoy, Mme. Tvrzická, had just arrived from our fellow-countrymen in America. She had brought news about the situation there, and on behalf of our friends had asked Masaryk for the information and guidance needed by the Czech and Slovak colony.
I started for London on November 21, 1915. At the outset we discussed matters of organization, and then reported to Mme. Tvrzická on our plans and requirements, as well as on the military and political situation in Europe. We decided upon the next step which we should take in England and France immediately after our manifesto was issued. The final decisions on the form which our organization should take were not made until February 1916 when Masaryk visited Paris and Štefánik joined our movement.
During my stay in London Masaryk received a letter from Dr. B. Štěpánek in Holland announcing, as I have previously mentioned, the arrest of several members of our family and of our secret organization in Prague. Masaryk therefore asked me to go immediately to Switzerland to find out exactly what had happened, and what effect it would have upon our communication with the people at home. I was to reorganize with Dr. Sychrava the whole of our arrangements for keeping in touch with Prague, and I was to inform Dürich about the situation in Paris and London.
I returned to Paris on December 6th, and on December 9th I left for Geneva, from where I proceeded to Lausanne for the ​purpose of visiting Dürich. At Geneva I settled the question of how we were to establish touch with the people at home, and on December 12th returned to Paris, where I set about organizing my personal work. I secured A. Kudrnáč, the chairman of the Social Democratic society "Rovnost" in Paris, as my secretary, and in my small room I set up my first provisional propaganda office, in which the chief item of its scanty equipment was a typewriter.
(c) Štefánik Joins the Revolutionary Movement. Masaryk at Paris in February 1916
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On December 13, 1915, the day after my arrival from Geneva, I met Dr. Milan Štefánik for the first time during the war. Two days later we again met to discuss plans for our further co-operation and the general directives of our political activity in France. I have given a detailed account of Štefánik elsewhere, notably in a speech which I made when laying a foundation-stone for his mausoleum. Here I will mention only the leading facts of our co-operation in accordance with the actual development of events. We became loyal and devoted friends and fellow-workers. There were many points upon which I did not agree with Štefánik, just as he, on his part, did not agree with me in everything, but this never hindered us in our common task. We had only one dispute, but that was not until the Peace Conference, and it was settled in a friendly manner.
Dr. Milan Štefánik, who was then a lieutenant in the flying corps, had returned to Paris from the Serbian front on December 6, 1915. He had called on Masaryk at an earlier date, as soon as he had heard of his residence abroad. He had then gone off on active service, after which nothing was heard of him until he now reappeared in Paris. My first meeting with him in Paris had been exactly ten years earlier, in 1905; now we saw each other again under new and strange conditions. Štefánik ​told me what he thought of the situation, what he had been doing in the army, and what we could now undertake in common. The plans which he unfolded to me were extensive. He indicated the possibility of powerful political connections in France and outlined a scheme for our journalistic and political co-operation. Finally, he asked me also to go to London again, to submit the whole scheme to Masaryk. I was to induce him to come to Paris to negotiate with the French Government, as the opportunity might arise.
I was in agreement with the idea of going to London, especially as Masaryk had just telegraphically informed me of a request from our fellow-countrymen in Holland for someone to proceed there. I therefore left for London on December 22nd, and on the same evening I had a long conversation with Masaryk in the hotel about our common work with Štefánik, about news from home, and the journey to Holland, where a new branch of our organization was to be established.(15)
Masaryk received Štefánik’s plans with reserve, but on the whole he was in agreement with them. He asked us to make preparations for his arrival in Paris and to let him know when everything was ready.
From January 12th to the 28th, the latter being the date of Masaryk’s arrival, we were kept extremely busy in Paris. Štefánik had been operated on for stomach trouble, and was in the hospital. I therefore acted on his behalf and prepared quite an extensive journalistic campaign with the Matin. Further, in accordance with the proposal made by Denis, I discussed the question of a special series of lectures on Slavonic affairs to be held at the Sorbonne. Masaryk was to give a lecture on the position of the Slavs in the world, and I was to give one on the Czechoslovak problem. An arrangement was also made with Senator Louis Martin for the Government to be approached on our behalf. Finally, all the rest of our friends were informed of Masaryk’s forthcoming arrival, and preparations were made for a press campaign.
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Masaryk arrived in Paris on January 28, 1916. On February Ist he visited the Russian Ambassador, Izvolsky, and explained to him our plans and activities. Štefánik, who had now more or less recovered, applied through Deputy Lemery and Mme. de Jouvenel for Masaryk to be officially received by Briand, and ​this was managed without difficulty on Friday, February 4th. In addition to this audience with Briand, Masaryk had important political conversations with Deschanel and with G. Leygues, the chairman of the foreign committee of the Chamber of Deputies.
Masaryk explained to Briand our whole thesis. He pointed out the significance of the Pan-German Berlin-Bagdad scheme, and showed that it was Austria-Hungary which made the aggression of Germany possible and promoted the Pan-German aim. It was therefore necessary to limit Germany to her own resources by the destruction of Austria-Hungary and the creation of new independent States which, by their very existence, would be the natural aids of France against German expansion eastwards. This involved the organization of the whole of Central Europe, the regions situated between France and Russia, and between Finland and Greece. Their reorganization for the advantage of France and of European peace would mean the granting of independence to the small nations in Central Europe and particularly the destruction of Austria-Hungary. Such was the programme of the war, which was a war against Pan-Germanism, against the violent absolutism of the Central European States, and for European democracy and the freedom of the oppressed. These aims were in accordance not only with the interests of France, but also with her lofty traditions.
Briand understood. He agreed that an official communiqué should be published concerning his discussions with Masaryk and that this communiqué was to inform the world that France was giving her official support to our movement. This meant that the leading French political circles which hitherto, from our point of view, had been wavering with regard to Austria-Hungary, would support our political ideas and our programme.(16)
As a result of propagandist and press activities on the part of ourselves and our various friends in political, academic, and journalistic circles in France and England, this notion gradually became so widespread that at the end of 1916 its essential points were incorporated into a number of official inter-Allied proclamations (e.g. the Allied Note of December 30, 1916, replying to the Austro-Hungarian proposal for peace negotiations), and also into the famous Allied Note to President Wilson on January 10, 1917. In this respect it may be said without ​exaggeration that Masaryk, by plainly expounding our demands, had shown how the Allied war-aims against the Central Powers should be defined and submitted as a programme to official circles and to the public. President Wilson expressed what in their essentials were the same or cognate ideas—they were in a more general form, as they were concerned with less concrete matters in his famous messages during 1916 and 1917.
Masaryk’s visit to Paris was an important political success. In London, too, he had done extremely well having, through the efforts of our friends, Mr. H. Wickham Steed and Dr. R. W. Seton Watson, been appointed professor at King’s College. On October 19, 1915, he had delivered his inaugural lecture there, the subject being the part played by small nations during the war. The chairman on that occasion had been Lord Robert Cecil, and Mr. Asquith, who was then Prime Minister, had sent a message emphasizing the fact that the Allies were waging war for the protection of small nations. This official English support was now enhanced by official political support on the part of France. Our work thus acquired a starting-point and a basis for extended activity.
Masaryk’s lecture in London, just as his lecture on the position of the Slavs in the world, arranged at the Sorbonne on February 22, 1916; his account of our aims which was given to Briand; various manifestos which he produced in England on other occasions; his memoranda submitted to the Allies and particularly his New Europe, which forms a complete synopsis of all these ideas and views; further, our journalistic activity in La Nation Tchèque from May 1, 1915, onwards; a number of official memoranda produced by the Secretariat of the National Council; my lecture at the Sorbonne issued as a pamphlet in 1916 under the title Destroy Austria-Hungary; and several other manifestos—all this formed the basis of our programme.
We soon produced an impression in Western Europe, not only because we were well informed politically, and supplied accurate diagnoses of Central Europe, but also because Masaryk was able to explain from the philosophy of history the significance of the World War, and how it should be regarded by Western Europe. Apart from Wilson’s later arguments, this formed the only complete synthetic interpretation of the World War, its significance and meaning as a whole, and that is why our ideas had so much influence on all those who examined them in any ​detail. That, too, is why our movement produced considerable influence on current thought, since it everywhere succeeded in demonstrating the sound theoretical basis from which it was derived.
We formulated our proposals and schemes in various ways on various occasions, but always in a direct and graphic manner so that Western Europe, unacquainted with our trend of thought, and without sufficient practical knowledge of Central Europe, could immediately and easily understand our meaning. It was particularly important for us to devise an effective formulation of the problem, and thus to secure the interest of prominent people who had no time to listen to long explanations. Several of our propagandist publications, leaflets, maps, and memoranda were models of what propaganda should be, for they provided a graphic statement of our case, and at the same time were accurate as to the facts.
All this made Masaryk’s stay in Paris a landmark in the history of our revolutionary movement.
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From the very beginning Štefánik emphasized the necessity for rapidly organizing political headquarters. In particular he was afraid that there might be personal antagonisms, and in this way he wanted to avoid them. I myself was not satisfied with the casual and primitive form of the Foreign Committee. Moreover, there were factors in the political psychology then current which compelled us to settle the matter promptly. The Allies as a whole, including even the French, had no knowledge of us as a nation, or of our aims, plans, and ideals. They had no very high opinion of our colonists and émigrés. While acknowledging that the latter were in the main quite estimable people with excellent intentions, our Allied friends did not conceal from us their fears that it would be easy for enemy agents to conceal themselves among them.
As I have already stated, Masaryk in the spring of 1915 drew up a special circular in which he defined the duties of the colonists, and their relationship to the Czechoslovak political movement. He indicated quite clearly that the colonists would ​have to leave the management of their own political and military activities to the organizers who had just arrived from home, as only they would have real political prestige in the eyes of the Allied Governments. The colonists must limit themselves to activities of a local character concerning their internal organization.
We discussed these matters in the presence of Masaryk at Paris. We summoned also Dürich, Dr. Sychrava, and Plesinger-Božinov from Switzerland. It was finally agreed that in place of the “Czechoslovak Foreign Committee,” a body which was too closely dependent upon conditions among our colonists, a new central organization would be established with headquarters in Paris. Paris was chosen for fairly obvious reasons. The chief military front was in France; Paris was, to a considerable extent, the political, diplomatic, and military centre of all the Allied countries, and accordingly it was to be expected that the war would be decided, for us also, in France and not on the Eastern Front in Russia.
After long consideration the new body was given the name of “Conseil National des Pays Tchèques.” In this connection I may point out that Štefánik, himself a Slovak, advocated the term “des Pays Tchèques,” since in view of the complete ignorance of Slavonic affairs in Western Europe he did not wish to complicate our demands by introducing the Slovak question. The coherence and permanence of this body was a corrective to the circumstance that the chief members of the National Council were scattered and without a fixed domicile. A permanent General Secretariat was thus located in Paris, forming the headquarters of the whole movement. This secretariat, with permanent executive functions, was devised as a means of impressing the unified and substantial character of our whole movement upon the Allied Governments and their public opinion. It was also intended as a rallying-point for the whole of our activities, both as regards the Allies and also our troops and colonists in France, England, Russia, America, Italy, Serbia, and the neutral States.
By acting as an intermediary for news, by communicating instructions, and concentrating the whole of our movement in Paris, the National Council and its secretariat later became a real practical link between our colonists, between our prisoners of war, who afterwards became our fighting forces, and also between our leading political personalities. Although we at first had not ​seen the full scope of these measures in all their consequences, the scheme proved to be a sound one. From the National Council and its secretariat was then developed a body which attained first-rate importance in our revolutionary activity.
The Czechoslovak National Council was thus constituted in February 1916. Its president was, of course, Masaryk, its vice-president Dürich, while Štefánik was the representative of the Slovaks, and I was the general secretary.
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Our task was to include in our organization all the Allied and important neutral countries and to unite in a central body the resources of all our colonies, as well as the whole of our movement relating to prisoners of war and the troops.
We in Paris were well aware that we must, as rapidly and efficiently as possible, develop headquarters there which, both formally and practically, would deal with matters relating to our diplomatic policy, as well as the whole organization of our troops. We set up quite a substantial office, where I worked regularly in the general secretariat. We notified this officially to all our colonies, and began our work of concentration. As the moral authority of Masaryk had never been contested by anyone, we had no initial difficulties with regard to the fundamental acceptance of the authority of the General Secretariat. The express recognition of the leadership of Masaryk and the National Council reached us from the various representative bodies abroad, whether civil or military, only by a gradual process, but morally this leadership was recognized from the time when our first public action was taken.
What was chiefly necessary was that in the various countries uniform central organizations of our colonies should be established, and then that these bodies, each of which had jurisdiction only for the affairs of the respective colony, should subordinate themselves to the main authority of the National Council. In matters relating to volunteers for military service, the colonies were allowed a free hand, but those involving prisoners of war and the organization of an army, being questions with a wide political range, were from the very outset reserved for the National Council. This development was accomplished with comparative speed in France and England, even though a number of minor disputes regarding the political jurisdiction of the National Council continued for some time. ​The situation was equally simple in Italy where, however, the number of our fellow-countrymen was small, and also in the neutral States, where we were glad of the assistance offered by our people, but we were unable to permit their direct intervention in our political and military affairs in the Allied countries.
In France we succeeded in uniting our people, to the number of about 2,000, in the central organization at Paris. This organization attended to the civil protection of its members and also to their economic support. It brought together about 700 Czechoslovak volunteers serving in the Foreign Legion, over whose interest it carefully watched until the time when they were transferred to our national army. Its work received support from a number of our friends, such as Denis, Gaye, Senator Louis Martin, Sansbœuf, Regamey, later on, Lebon, and others. From the time when the leading members of the colony succeeded in gaining for the Czechs and Slovaks a special civil status as for the Alsatians and Poles, the colony exercised what may be regarded as consular duties.
As elsewhere, in this colony too there were disputes and factions. Just as in England, America, and Russia the leaders overestimated their powers at the outset, and tried their hand at high politics. They proclaimed the dethronement of Franz Josef and the establishment of a Czechoslovak Republic, they intervened in Ministries, etc. This was natural enough in the situation as it was then. As our movement progressed, what we had to do was gradually, and without causing offence, to replace these improvised measures on the part of political amateurs (who, it should be added, had the best of intentions and did excellent work) by the organized activity of political representatives from Prague, who were really proficient at work of this sort. After the establishment of the National Council in Paris a certain tension accordingly arose, but it never resulted in open disputes, as from the very start the colony in Paris had acknowledged the authority and leadership of Masaryk. There was a certain opposition to the secretariat of the National Council and to myself at the early stages, before the secretariat could confront the colony with the results of its work. I avoided conflicts, allowing the colony to carry on its previous activities in matters concerning volunteers, money grants, and consular functions, and waiting for a suitable occasion to adjust precisely the reciprocal relationship. In those early days my situation was not always an easy one. But the more influence the National ​Council acquired, the more the colony withdrew, automatically ceasing to take part in politics. Štefánik had no dealings with the colony at all.
From the moment when the National Council obtained recognition of the status of our army in France, its relations with the colony were almost completely accommodated. In the end there was a settled agreement with regard to co-operation, so that, especially from the spring of 1918, the colony supported with great devotion the activities of the National Council. In the summer of 1918, when preparations were being made to transfer our volunteers in France from the Foreign Legion into our army, the political side of our volunteer movement, and the agenda of a politico-consular character were entrusted to the National Council.
When a provisional Government was set up, the final stage of this development was reached. The colony resumed its function as a central union of compatriots, and all its requirements in relation to the French authorities were attended to by the offices of the National Council. In addition to the central colony in Paris, a Sokol society and the Social Democratic league, “Rovnost,” were active as well, and a Franco-Czechoslovak Chamber of Commerce also was established.
(e) The National Council and our Revolutionary Organization in the Allied Countries
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In England, at the very outbreak of the war, an organization of our fellow-countrymen was formed, which arranged for volunteers to join the British and Canadian Armies and attended also to the legal protection of our people who were exempted from internment as members of a nation friendly to the Allies. It also immediately got into touch with our colonies in the other Allied countries. From time to time, too, it ventured upon political work. After Masaryk’s arrival it recognized his authority and acted upon his suggestions.
At the end of 1916 Masaryk established in London the Czech Press Bureau, which at his request placed itself under the direct control of the secretariat in Paris. Later on it almost entirely severed its connection with the colony, which began to limit its activities to matters involving legal or material assistance to our fellow-countrymen, especially those who ​had volunteered for military service. Political activities were handled exclusively by Masaryk, and after he left for Russia and America they were transferred to the secretariat in Paris, where I personally dealt with them. At this period our work received very generous help from Olga Masaryk.
From the spring of 1917 I extended the Press Bureau so as to make it a branch of the general propaganda department of the National Council. As the National Council in Paris increased its influence and sphere of its activities, the colony in London readily adapted itself to the new requirements. The office of the National Council gradually developed into a regular official department, which in the spring of 1918 became the direct exponent of the Government then coming into existence. After consultation with members of the colony, I supplied the London Press Bureau with new statutes in May 1918. The effect of this was to divide it into a propaganda and a consular section respectively. The former was entrusted to V. Nosek, who showed great proficiency in propaganda work, while the consular section was placed under the charge of Pochobradský, hitherto president of the colony. The office of the National Council became the headquarters of the secretariat in Paris, and when on October 14th an interim Government was established there, it automatically became a Legation. Excellent work was done in the colony for several years by Sykora, Kopecký, Professor Baudiš, Pochobradský, and others, the office of the National Council being carried on by Nosek and Aleš Brož. Matters connected with volunteers for the army were managed by Kopecký and Sykora.
The progress of our organization in Italy was analogous to our proceedings in France and England. On the declaration of war by Italy the greater part of our fellow-countrymen were interned, and it was only in course of time that various influences succeeded in liberating them. It was not long before a number of colonists and prisoners of war reported themselves to Masaryk and to us in Paris, offering to join the liberation movement or to enter the army. When the prisoners of war began to increase in numbers, they organized themselves in their camps, and later on placed themselves at the disposal of the National Council. I shall say more about this later.
In January 1917 I proceeded to Italy and set up a Press Bureau in Rome as a branch of the Paris secretariat of the National Council. This office in Rome kept closely in touch ​with us in Paris and acted in accordance with our suggestions. This was particularly the case during the second phase of our movement, when we were concerned not with mere propaganda, but with an actual policy in co-operation with Italy. During my second visit to Rome in September and October 1917, seeing that it was necessary to give our organization a wider scope, I established an office of the National Council with a more extensive sphere of influence. Its work was of a twofold character, being connected partly with the prisoners of war and partly with propaganda. A number of devoted workers were released from the camps for the former purpose, while the political and diplomatic work—in view of the delicacy of the situation in Italy—was, by a common agreement, just as in London, reserved for the members of the National Council and the secretariat in Paris. What we, especially Štefánik and myself, feared was that the influence of the serious Italian differences with the Jugoslavs, by which we also were affected, might be detrimental to our policy, and that things might happen which, not fitting in with our political plan and our tactics as a whole, might do harm to our national movement.
Our organization in Italy produced excellent results. Just as in London, our office there was recognized as a branch of the National Council, so that at the moment when a provisional Government was set up, it automatically became a Legation, of which Dr. Borský took charge in November 1918.
In Switzerland we had our permanent centres of activity, partly for maintaining communication with Prague, partly for propaganda, and for combating German-Austrian-Magyar espionage. Our people in Switzerland were permanently in touch with us, but the arrangements in this respect were not too rigid on account of the dangerous character of the surroundings in Switzerland, where thousands of Austro-German agents were at large. From the end of 1917 a regular Press Bureau was established on an entirely reorganized basis, and it was directed by Dr. Osuský until the beginning of the Peace Conference.
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In Russia, just as in France, the representatives of the individual associations endeavoured to get into touch with similar bodies in the other Allied States as soon as they had succeeded in organizing themselves on a firm basis. These attempts, however, met with little or no success until Masaryk ​came forward openly and was at once acknowledged by the vast majority of our people in Russia as their leader and the representative of the revolutionary movement. At first, chiefly for technical reasons, Masaryk’s communications with the Czechs in Russia were infrequent (I believe that they began in January 1915 as soon as Masaryk left Rome for Geneva). Correspondence was difficult since it might reach the hands of the enemy, and travelling presented obstacles on account of passports and the other formalities which it involved. From the time when Masaryk’s public action was first taken, and notably from the autumn of 1915, Čechoslovák, a periodical edited by Bohdan Pavlů, and issued by the League of Czechoslovak Associations in Russia, referred to him as a leader who was entitled to speak on behalf of the nation.
The first public manifesto of our centralized movement abroad, announcing the formation of a central revolutionary body under Masaryk’s leadership (the proclamation of the Foreign Committee on November 14, 1915), was signed by B. Čermák and B. Pavlů as representatives of the Czechs living in Russia; but as it was not of a definitive character, it did not settle once and for all the question of the relation between the Czechoslovak organization in Russia and the Paris headquarters. What made it difficult to unite the whole movement with its Russian portion was partly the remoteness and the geographical isolation of the Czechoslovak colony in Russia, partly the special political conditions under which the Czechoslovak revolutionary movement had been obliged to work during the Tsarist regime. Moreover, a certain number of Russians and Czechs in Russia were prejudiced against Masaryk on account of his radical political opinions. And even among our colonists in Russia there were people who thought the Czechoslovak question should be solved by the Russians themselves in accordance with their interests.
These factors, as far as they could exert any influence upon the relations between the Czechoslovak revolutionary organization and the Paris headquarters, were not plainly manifested up to the summer of 1916, although the Russian Government, especially since Masaryk’s audience with M. Briand in February, had begun to adopt a favourable attitude towards certain intrigues against him, and later prepared a scheme for a separatist National Council. Among the Czechoslovaks themselves these intrigues had no success from the very start.
​In consequence of the reports which B. Pavlů brought from London in April 1916, the League of Czechoslovak Associations in Russia decided to reply to Masaryk’s message to the Czechs and Slovaks in Russia by a telegram of greeting, referring to Masaryk as their leader, acknowledged by the will of the Czech and Slovak elements. Serious complications, however, arose when, at the beginning of June 1916, Dürich proceeded to Russia and was regarded by the Tsarist Government as a suitable person for placing in the foreground of the Czechoslovak revolutionary movement to counterbalance the influence of Masaryk. Štefánik, who was sent to Russia after Dürich, endeavoured to dispose of these difficulties with the support of the Petrograd group of Czechs. He succeeded in arranging what is known as the Kiev memorandum of August 29, 1916, in which for the first time all the Czechoslovak groups in Russia recognized not only the authority of the Czechoslovak National Council with Masaryk at its head, but also its supremacy as an organization above the League situated at Kiev. Soon afterwards, however, under the influence of the Russian Government, the question of the relationship between the League and the National Council met with fresh complications. The Russian Foreign Office refused to acknowledge the Kiev memorandum, induced Dürich to repudiate it, and drew up conditions connecting the establishment of a Czechoslovak Army and the leadership of Dürich in Russia. It also began to promote the idea of a separatist National Council managed by Dürich. Under the influence of this situation, a cleavage began to develop among the Czechoslovaks in Russia. As a result, those in charge of the League, harassed by the opposition in Petrograd and the discontent among the organizations dealing with prisoners of war, endeavoured to strengthen their position by making concessions to the Russian Foreign Office and to Dürich. In the middle of November 1916 this cleavage was publicly manifested, and from that date onwards the administration of the League at Kiev openly identified itself with the principles advocated by the Russian Foreign Office and by Dürich, to the effect that “the League could successfully negotiate only in complete agreement with the authorized and acknowledged representative of the nation, Deputy Dürich, who had placed himself at the head of our movement in Russia, just as Professor Masaryk had done in Western Europe.”
​This resolution led to violent internal warfare. The opposition in Petrograd, led by B. Pavlů, resolutely sided with the National Council and Masaryk, and started a vigorous campaign against the attempt to divide the Czechoslovak revolutionary movement into a Western and an Eastern group. It carried on an extensive agitation, but in spite of its energetic action and the numerous manifestos of agreement with its point of view, in spite of Štefánik’s personal intervention with Pokrovsky, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Russian Government sanctioned Dürich’s statutes for a separatist National Council, and, moreover, granted Dürich and his organization the financial resources for this struggle.
This led to the expulsion of Dürich from the Paris National Council, and a declaration by the opposition groups that they would never acknowledge his leadership. The revolution in March, which broke out a month after Dürich’s statutes had been sanctioned by the Russian Government, immediately changed the situation. The new Russian Government repudiated Dürich and the League itself as well. Under these circumstances an application was made to Milyukov, the new Minister of Foreign Affairs, for the National Council, under Masaryk’s leadership, to be acknowledged as the sole political representative body of the Czechs in Russia. At the same time B. Čermák, the former chairman of the League at Petrograd, was appointed plenipotentiary of the Czechoslovak National Council, and an attempt was made to constitute a branch of it in Russia.
For a short time the League at Kiev was successful in its endeavours, at least to the extent that Milyukov, fearing further blunders which might be caused by a fresh decision, postponed the question of a branch of the National Council until Masaryk’s arrival in Russia, which had now been provisionally announced. The opposition in Petrograd thereupon took fresh steps against the League, and scored a decisive victory at a new congress comprising representatives of the Czechoslovak colonists, soldiers, and prisoners of war.
This congress, which opened at Kiev on May 6, 1917, unanimously adopted the following resolution:
The Czechoslovak National Council, with Professor Masaryk at its head, is the supreme organ of the Czechoslovak national political struggle, and it is therefore the duty of every Czech and Slovak to spbmit to its management.
​This resolution definitely settled the question of the relationship between the revolutionary movement in Russia and the National Council. A branch of the latter body was established in Russia, its chairman being a member of the Paris organization who happened to be in Russia at that time.
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As in all the other Allied countries, the Czechoslovak colony in the United States, comprising more than a million and a half persons, rose against Austria-Hungary at the very outbreak of the war. On the eve of the declaration of war against Serbia, a large Czech meeting of protest against the Habsburg Empire was held at Chicago, and a committee appointed to collect funds for the support of war victims in the Czech territories.
The Czechs in Omaha were the first to come forward with any constructive plans, and in the middle of August a practical revolutionary scheme was announced in Rosický’s Americká Osvěta (American Enlightenment). Then, on August 18, 1914, on the initiative of R. J. Pšenka, J. Tvrzický, K. Vinklárek, and others, there had been a meeting between representatives of the American National Council, the Czech Press Bureau, and the above-mentioned committee, at which these bodies were amalgamated into a uniform organization known as “The Czech National Alliance.” It was agreed that the programme of this body was to consist of propaganda for the Czech cause, collections on behalf of war victims, and finally, also, what was called political action. At the head of the National Alliance, the headquarters of which were in Chicago, was Dr. L. Fisher, whose place was taken later by Dr. Pecivál, while the movement in New York was directed by E. Voska, with the assistance of V. Sperakus, Koňas, V. Rejsek, Marek, and others.
From the manifesto of the new organization, which was published on the day after the inaugural meeting, we learned that the aim of the National Alliance was to inform the public in America and Europe about the just demands of the Czech nation for independence, and thus to prepare the ground for achieving it. This movement arose at the initiative of our fellow-countrymen in America. It got into touch with the leaders of our revolutionary movement abroad later on, after Voska had returned from Bohemia with the first news of the preparations which were being made by Masaryk and his ​friends. After the declaration of war, Voska was the first envoy from Masaryk to reach our friends in London and America.
The first task of the National Alliance after the outbreak of the war was to convince our fellow-countrymen in America that political action was necessary and opportune. This task was a difficult one, and it was complicated by the lack of unity among the Czechs in America.
The work of Tvrzický, Dr. Fisher, Šerpán, and others, caused the greater part of those in the liberal camp to join the revolutionary movement shortly after the National Alliance was established; but the minority of this group, under the leadership of Dr. Iška, remained hostile almost to the end towards liberation activities, and was reconciled only after it had been divulged that Dr. Iška’s paper, Vesmír (The Universe), had been paid for by the Austro-Hungarian Embassy. The Socialists were divided into two groups. One part, led by J. Martínek and A. Novotný, editors of the Americké Delnické Listy (American Labour News), at once joined the movement while the other part, associated with K. H. Beránek and Jelínek, editors of Spravedlnost (Justice), remained neutral. Immediately after the arrival of Vojta Beneš, however, and after the meeting at Sandusky in September 1915, the majority, including Josef Novák, branch secretary of the Socialist Party, joined the Czech National Alliance.
Great assistance was rendered to the movement by the Czechs in Cleveland who, in January 1916, under the able leadership of K. Bernreiter, devoted themselves to our cause and remained devoted to it until the end. Similar work was directed at Cedar Rapids by C. V. Svoboda and at Boston by Josef Kovář. The Czech Evangelical settlements associated themselves with the movement from the very outset. Their leaders were J. Zmrhal and Dr. Smetánka.
The Catholics were at first favourably disposed towards Austria-Hungary, but later, under the influence of events in Bohemia, they adopted an attitude of cautious neutrality, with a bias in favour of the Habsburg Empire. It was not until the spring of 1917, when the United States declared war on Germany, that under the influence of the Rev. O. Zlámal, of Cleveland, they gradually threw in their lot with the national liberation movement. In the end Vojta Beneš succeeded in inducing the central Catholic organization, the National League of Czech Catholics, founded on January 14, 1917, under the leadership of J. Kestl and F. Šindelář, to join the common cause.
​In 1915 the Czech National League was joined by the Sokols and the National Mutual Aid Organization. About that time a regularly monthly levy on the members was introduced for the support of the political movement. The rivalry between Chicago and New York for the leadership was removed by an agreement at a meeting of the two organizations in Cleveland, when the Chicago organization was recognized as the headquarters. By the end of 1915 the organization of the Czech National League had been elaborated by lectures, journalistic work, and propagandist tours of Vojta Beneš, and this led to a great increase in the membership and in the financial resources. The Slovak League also took part in the work at a comparatively early date. As far back as October 22 and 23, 1915, it had sent members to a joint conference with the National League, and its representatives signed the manifesto of the Foreign Committee on November 14, 1915. The President of the Slovak League was Albert Mamatey, of Pittsburg, who rendered invaluable services, while Milan Getting was head of the Slovak Sokols.
The leader of the Slovak Catholics was the Pennsylvanian priest, Murgaš, while the Slovak Evangelicals were represented by Bradáč. Of the Chicago group special reference should be made to the work of Andrej Schustek. Elsewhere I shall refer to the propagandist activity carried on by the National League in American political and journalistic circles. It was equally necessary to carry on propaganda work among our actual fellow-countrymen in America in order to enlist the sympathies of our colony there for the liberation movement of the National Council in Paris. For this purpose meetings and lectures were arranged, personal visits were made, pamphlets, leaflets, and copies of our Paris paper, Československa Samostatnost, were distributed, and so forth.
In 1916 a number of journalists (Pšenka, Dr. Vojan, Mach, Tvrzický, and Vinklárek) founded a weekly paper, V Boj (Into Battle), the aim of which was to counteract the activities of Dr. Iška and his paper Vesmír. Later on, the National League issued a monthly periodical Poselství (The Message), edited first by Vojta Beneš then by F. L. Musil. At the beginning of the war Zeman’s Válečná Tribuna (War Tribune) appeared for some time. An effective and original method of propaganda, partly to promote recruiting, partly to stimulate the national consciousness among our fellow-countrymen, was supplied by the striking posters which the painter Preissig designed. Karel Horký’s ​pamphlet, Teď, anebo nikdy (Now or Never), was issued and distributed by the hundred thousand, also in the prisoners-of-war camps.
In order not to have to return to the matter later, I will give an account of what was achieved by the Czechoslovaks in America in military matters. As early as 1916 a Canadian Brigade was organized from the first Czech volunteers. It was originally proposed to organize a whole Czech regiment in the Canadian Army, but this idea had to be given up on account of many insuperable obstacles (American neutrality, strict frontier surveillance, the impossibility of carrying on open agitation, etc.) The Canadian Brigade was first organized by Jaroslav Císař, with the help of Vinklárek, Votava, Tvrzický, Linhart, and others.
When the United States entered the war there was a swarm of Czech volunteers for the American Army, and accordingly, the recruiting of volunteers for our own army in France, which had been arranged in the United States by Štefánik, met with a comparatively limited success. (The number of American volunteers in the Czechoslovak Army in France was about three thousand.) For several reasons the American Czechs preferred to join the American Army, while others were called up when conscription was introduced, so that there remained for the Czechoslovak Army only an insignificant fraction of the most enthusiastic of our fellow-countrymen, and those who were not American citizens. These military matters were directed by František Kopecký in New York.
The relations between our organizations in America and the Czechoslovak revolutionary headquarters in Paris developed smoothly. Our fellow-countrymen in America had already made the acquaintance of Masaryk during his trip there before the war, and their ideas had much in common with his. He was therefore acknowledged there from the very beginning, as the leading authority and head of the revolutionary movement, not only among the Czechs but very soon among the Slovaks as well. This process was either tacit, or revealed itself by occasional manifestos or by the subscriptions which were sent in from the Czech and Slovak organizations.
Thus there were no differences concerning the association with the European headquarters. Masaryk had communicated with his acquaintances in America immediately after his departure from Prague. Dr. Sychrava co-operated with the ​American Press Bureau and with Tvrzický, while I myself, after the arrival of Vojta Beneš in the United States, was in regular communication with America, and later on, when I was General Secretary of the National Council, this became a systematic and official arrangement. The Czech and Slovak organizations in America identified themselves with the open action we took on November 14, 1915, and this attitude was confirmed by the beginning of a co-operation which was then automatically transferred to the National Council, and continued without difficulties or disputes of any kind until the proclamation of a provisional Government. Formal agreement as to joint action was reached by all our American organizations at the congress held in Chicago from February 9–12, 1918. Professor B. Šimek, of Iowa City, became president of the Joint National Committee of Czechs and Slovaks, with Vojta Beneš as secretary.
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The National Council at Paris thus succeeded gradually in establishing communication with our fellow-countrymen throughout the world. They reported themselves from South America, especially Brazil and Argentine, then from South Africa, Australia, and China, and wherever possible they sent subscriptions. There were frequent cases in which our fellow-countrymen in these States spontaneously offered themselves for military service or sent contributions. As General Secretary I maintained a regular correspondence as far as possible with all organizations in the individual countries, thus linking our people with the central organization and strengthening its authority.
I kept up a correspondence with the League at Kiev, and quite regularly sent news to the National Alliance in America. Our communications with Switzerland and Holland were very active, and we were in close touch, both written and personal, with Italy and England. When we succeeded in starting our movement among the prisoners of war, and carrying out military plans on a large scale in France, Italy, and Russia (in addition to the recruiting scheme in America), our organization reached the highest point of its development as regards unity, discipline, and success. I need hardly add that I had kept in continual touch with Prague.