# Moral letters to Lucilius/Letter 67

LXVII. ON ILL-HEALTH AND ENDURANCE OF SUFFERING
$^{1.}$ If I may begin with a commonplace remark, spring is gradually disclosing itself; but though it is rounding into summer, when you would expect hot weather, it has kept rather cool, and one cannot yet be sure of it. For it often slides back into winter weather. Do you wish to know how uncertain it still is? I do not yet trust myself to a bath which is absolutely cold; even at this time I break its chill. You may say that this is no way to show the endurance either of heat or of cold; very true, dear Lucilius, but at my time of life one is at length contented with the natural chill of the body. I can scarcely thaw out in ​the middle of summer. Accordingly, I spend most of the time bundled up; $^{2.}$ and I thank old age for keeping me fastened to my bed. Why should I not thank old age on this account? That which I ought not to wish to do, I lack the ability to do. Most of my converse is with books. Whenever your letters arrive, I imagine that I am with you, and I have the feeling that I am about to speak my answer, instead of writing it. Therefore let us together investigate the nature of this problem of yours, just as if we were conversing with one another.
$^{3.}$ You ask me whether every good is desirable. You say: “If it is a good to be brave under torture, to go to the stake with a stout heart, to endure illness with resignation, it follows that these things are desirable. But I do not see that any of them is worth praying for. At any rate I have as yet known of no man who has paid a vow by reason of having been cut to pieces by the rod, or twisted out of shape by the gout, or made taller by the rack.” $^{4.}$ My dear Lucilius, you must distinguish between these cases; you will then comprehend that there is something in them that is to be desired. I should prefer to be free from torture; but if the time comes when it must be endured, I shall desire that I may conduct myself therein with bravery, honour, and courage. Of course I prefer that war should not occur; but if war does occur, I shall desire that I may nobly endure the wounds, the starvation, and all that the exigency of war brings. Nor am I so mad as to crave illness; but if I must suffer illness, I shall desire that I may do nothing which shows lack of restraint, and nothing that is unmanly. The conclusion is, not that hardships are desirable, but that virtue is desirable, which enables us patiently to endure hardships.
​$^{5.}$ Certain of our school, think that, of all such qualities, a stout endurance is not desirable,—though not to be deprecated either—because we ought to seek by prayer only the good which is unalloyed, peaceful, and beyond the reach of trouble. Personally, I do not agree with them. And why? First, because it is impossible for anything to be good without being also desirable. Because, again, if virtue is desirable, and if nothing that is good lacks virtue, then everything good is desirable. And, lastly, because a brave endurance even under torture is desirable. $^{6.}$ At this point I ask you: Is not bravery desirable? And yet bravery despises and challenges danger. The most beautiful and most admirable part of bravery is that it does not shrink from the stake, advances to meet wounds, and sometimes does not even avoid the spear, but meets it with opposing breast. If bravery is desirable, so is patient endurance of torture; for this is a part of bravery. Only sift these things, as I have suggested; then there will be nothing which can lead you astray. For it is not mere endurance of torture, but brave endurance, that is desirable. I therefore desire that “brave” endurance; and this is virtue.
$^{7.}$ “But,” you say, “who ever desired such a thing for himself?” Some prayers are open and outspoken, when the requests are offered specifically; other prayers are indirectly expressed, when they include many requests under one title. For example, I desire a life of honour. Now a life of honour includes various kinds of conduct; it may include the chest in which Regulus was confined, or the wound of Cato which was torn open by Cato’s own hand, or the exile of Rutilius, or the cup of poison which removed Socrates from gaol to heaven. Accordingly, in praying for a life of ​honour, I have prayed also for those things without which, on some occasions, life cannot be honourable
$^{8.}$ O thrice and four times blest were they Who underneath the lofty walls of Troy Met happy death before their parents’ eyes!
What does it matter whether you offer this prayer for some individual, or admit that it was desirable in the past? $^{9.}$ Decius sacrificed himself for the State; he set spurs to his horse and rushed into the midst of the foe, seeking death. The second Decius, rivalling his father’s valour, reproducing the words which had become sacred and already household words, dashed into the thickest of the fight, anxious only that his sacrifice might bring omen of success, and regarding a noble death as a thing to be desired. Do you doubt, then, whether it is best to die glorious and performing some deed of valour? $^{10.}$ When one endures torture bravely, one is using all the virtues. Endurance may perhaps be the only virtue that is on view and most manifest; but bravery is there too, and endurance and resignation and long-suffering are its branches. There, too, is foresight; for without foresight no plan can be undertaken; it is foresight that advises one to bear as bravely as possible the things one cannot avoid. There also is steadfastness, which cannot be dislodged from its position, which the wrench of no force can cause to abandon its purpose. There is the whole inseparable company of virtues; every honourable act is the work of one single virtue, but it is in accordance with the judgment of the whole council. And that which is approved by all the virtues, even though it seems to be the work of one alone, is desirable.
$^{11.}$ What? Do you think that those things only are ​desirable which come to us amid pleasure and ease, and which we bedeck our doors to welcome? There are certain goods whose features are forbidding. There are certain prayers which are offered by a throng, not of men who rejoice, but of men who bow down reverently and worship. $^{12.}$ Was it not in this fashion, think you, that Regulus prayed that he might reach Carthage? Clothe yourself with a hero’s courage, and withdraw for a little space from the opinions of the common man. Form a proper conception of the image of virtue, a thing of exceeding beauty and grandeur; this image is not to be worshipped by us with incense or garlands, but with sweat and blood. $^{13.}$ Behold Marcus Cato, laying upon that hallowed breast his unspotted hands, and tearing apart the wounds which had not gone deep enough to kill him! Which, pray, shall you say to him: “I hope all will be as you wish,” and “I am grieved,” or shall it be “Good fortune in your undertaking!”?
$^{14.}$ In this connexion I think of our friend Demetrius, who calls an easy existence, untroubled by the attacks of Fortune, a “Dead Sea.” If you have nothing to stir you up and rouse you to action, nothing which will test your resolution by its threats and hostilities; if you recline in unshaken comfort, it is not tranquillity; it is merely a flat calm. $^{15.}$ The Stoic Attalus was wont to say: “I should prefer that Fortune keep me in her camp rather than in the lap of luxury. If I am tortured, but bear it bravely, all is well; if I die, but die bravely, it is also well.” Listen to Epicurus; he will tell you that it is actually pleasant. I myself shall never apply an effeminate word to an act so honourable and austere. If I go ​to the stake, I shall go unbeaten. $^{16.}$ Why should I not regard this as desirable—not because the fire, burns me, but because it does not overcome me? Nothing is more excellent or more beautiful than virtue; whatever we do in obedience to her orders is both good and desirable. Farewell.
* ↑ See Introduction (Vol. I. p. x), and the opening sentences of Epp. lxxvii., lxxxvii., and others.
* ↑ Seneca had a delicate constitution (see Introduction). In the letters he speaks of suffering from asthma (liv.), catarrh (lxxviii.), and fever (civ.).
* ↑ Cf. lxxv. 1 qualis sermo meus esset, si una sederemus aut ambularemus.
* ↑ i.e., the Stoics.
* ↑ Banished from Rome in 92 B.C. Cf. Ep. xxiv. 4.
* ↑ Vergil, Aeneid, i. 94 ff.
* ↑ Cf. Livy, vii. 9. 6 ff. . . . legiones auxiliaque hostium mecum deis manibus Tellurique devoveo.
* ↑ Ut litaret: i.e., that by his sacrifice he might secure an omen of success. Cf. Pliny, N. H. viii. 45, and Suetonius, Augustus, 96: “At the siege of Perusia, when he found the sacrifices were not favourable (sacrificio non litanti), Augustus called for more victims.”
* ↑ Donaria at the doors of temples signified public rejoicing; cf. Tibullus, i. 15 f. Flava Ceres, tibi sit nostro de rure corona Spicea, quae templi pendeat ante fores. Myrtle decorated the bridegroom’s house-door; garlands heralded the birth of a child (Juvenal, ix. 85).
* ↑ Cf. Pliny, N. H. iv. 13. Besides the Dead Sea of Palestine, the term was applied to any sluggish body of water.
* ↑ Cf. Ep. lxvi. 18.