# My War Memoirs/Chapter 9

IX
(a) Italy and the Czechoslovak Question
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After our success in connection with the Allied Note to President Wilson, I decided that the time had come to pay a visit to Italy. Our work at Paris with regard to political matters and the prisoners of war was making satisfactory progress. In London Masaryk’s influence and authority had advanced considerably, and our propaganda was spreading ever further afield. In Russia, where Štefánik was at work, the whole of our political and military movement was developing on hopeful lines. In America our colonists were unsparing in their efforts. Only in Italy was our movement still at its initial stage.
Masaryk himself had been in direct touch with Italy until 1915, and he had kept this up from London indirectly through a number of his friends. Štefánik had stopped in Rome on his way back from the Serbian front in the winter of 1915, and on this occasion he had been received by a number of Court functionaries, as well as by the French and Russian Ambassadors. Then, in the spring of 1916 he had been entrusted with a mission in matters relating to the Jugoslavs. Both his visits had been of considerable importance, leaving definite traces in Rome. But there had been no attempt at organization.
In Italy not much was known about us, although in some ways matters were more favourable there. The Italian public, anti-Austrian and anti-Habsburg in feeling, entertained sympathies towards any movement directed against Austria. The responsible statesmen were not a priori unfavourably disposed towards us, even though their attitude on the whole was reserved. Difficulties arose from the fact that the public ​and the greater part of the politicians, were apt to mistake us for the Jugoslavs.
The Jugoslav movement had naturally been closely followed by the Italian Government and the Italian public. They turned their attention to us at a later date. Sonnino, when entering the war, was not thinking of the break-up of Austria-Hungary. The attention of official Italian circles was drawn to our movement, partly by the increasing number of our prisoners of war who, from the very outset, came forward as volunteers for our revolutionary activity, partly through the reports from the Italian Ambassadors and intelligence departments on our movement, principally in France, England, and Switzerland.
My first contact with official Italy had been at Paris in the summer of 1916. In connection with his visits to Italy, Štefánik had come into contact with the Italian military mission at Paris, at the head of which was Prince Brancaccio, and, as I have mentioned in the previous chapter, I supplied him with reports from Prague. Our movement in Switzerland and France began to receive closer attention from the ministry of Commandini, whose function in the Cabinet it was to keep a careful watch on all Austro-Hungarian propaganda against Italy and the Allies, and to follow the internal affairs of Austria-Hungary, more particularly those involving the Jugoslavs, but also, of course, the Czechoslovaks and Poles. Gino Scarpa, who was Commandini’s secretary, visited Switzerland in 1916 and got into touch with our Bureau there. He then came to Paris and arranged to work in collaboration with me. He subsequently began to co-operate at Rome with Veselý, Brázda, and the rest of our workers there, and this was the beginning of our co-operation with official Italy.
Definite co-operation was established in the autumn of 1916. I sent Scarpa reports systematically on the internal conditions of the Habsburg Empire, either direct to the Ministry or through Veselý. The latter then began, with Scarpa’s assistance, to place our reports in the leading daily papers in Rome, When the peace overtures of the Central Powers were imminent, we were, in fact, asked for help in the form of information. At the same time the wish was expressed that I should go to Rome, come into personal contact with the officials at the Ministry, arrange contact with Commandini, and establish an office at Rome analogous to our Paris headquarters. On ​December 17, 1916, Veselý reported the opinion of the Ministry that we were holding too much aloof from Italy; that our movement at Rome should be established on a footing equal to that in Paris and London, and that, above all, we should not concern ourselves so much about Jugoslav matters, since this would tend to alienate Italian sympathies from us. I promised to go to Italy as soon as possible, and in the following month I went.
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Before his death San Giuliano, who was the Foreign Minister of Italy at the outbreak of the war, was evidently inclined to believe that the Triple Alliance was dead, and that Italy would be obliged to enter the war in company with the Triple Entente. This would mean the fall of Austria-Hungary and the gain of considerable territories by Italy. There were, however, two dangers which caused him concern. On the one hand he was not certain whether the Triple Entente would continue to oppose the Habsburg Empire until the end, and on the other he feared the expansion of the Russians and the Slavs in general, if they were victorious.
In spite of his defects and political blunders Baron Sonnino was indisputably Italy’s strong man during the war. He was honest, consistent, and persevering, even to the point of obstinacy. If he gave his word he kept it, but he did not always properly understand the problems on which he made decisions, and he kept too rigidly to his preconceived ideas. The general design of his policy was simple. The majority of the leading politicians in Italy must soon have realized that an attitude of neutrality could not be indefinitely maintained. The war had become a European war, and its influence on Italy, both in a political and economic respect, was such that the whole country was faced daily with difficult problems arising from it. Neutrality would, in the end, have had worse results for Italy than actual warfare. Sonnino did not think that a permanent, or at least a prolonged, neutrality was impracticable. He was in agreement with Salandra’s later formula concerning sacro egoismo.
On these lines Sonnino began to negotiate with Vienna on the subject of the well-known concessions in return for continued neutrality in the war, and a disinterested attitude in ​Balkan matters. He demanded the Trentino, Gorizia, Gradiscia, a number of islands, and also the proclamation of Trieste as a free city. There are politicians who hold the view that, if Vienna had accepted these terms, Sonnino would have demanded colonial concessions from the Triple Entente in return for his neutrality. If both negotiations had proved successful, he would have continued his policy of neutrality, reserving for himself, however, the opportunity of entering the war at any moment which he might consider most favourable to Italian interests.
But in spite of all Bülow’s endeavours, Vienna remained firm. For concrete reasons, in addition to their prestige, the Austrian diplomats refused to make the slightest concession to their one-time enemy, and so Sonnino, not being able to sell neutrality for his country’s profit, was obliged to sell his military power to the best advantage. He decided to repudiate the Triple Alliance and to conclude the well-known London Agreement with the Triple Entente. This was done on April 26, 1915, and on the basis of it Italy entered the war on May 24, 1915. By the terms of the London Agreement Italy was to receive Trient, Gorizia, Istria with Trieste, but without Fiume, and Dalmatia as far as Narenta.
When entering the world-conflict, official Italy, just like the rest of the Allies, had no definite political design. This is proved by the London Agreement itself. (I may add that the Allies were dissatisfied with this Agreement, the awkward consequences of which they realized as soon as they had signed it.) Sonnino, personally, was a Conservative and a legitimist, and he therefore could not have much understanding of, or propensity for, the traditions of Mazzini, which were democratic and national (in the sense of justice to nationalities). He thought of the war as being solely an Italian one, and the idea of destroying Austria-Hungary hardly entered his mind. Moreover, for many years he had been an advocate of the Triple Alliance policy, believing in the great strength of Germany. He was sceptical of a decisive victory, which could only destroy one side or the other. For that reason also he feared the strength of the Germans after the war, and allowed a considerable time to elapse before he declared war on them.
But his opinion and attitude with regard to the Jugoslav question constituted a source of trouble. For one thing, it was ​a subject about which he knew very little, as I discovered in the course of several conversations with him. Then, too, he was strongly influenced by the theories of the extreme Italian nationalists during 1915 and 1916. He, as well as the rest of the Allies, regarded the London Agreement as denoting the preservation of an Austria-Hungary reduced by the territories ceded to Italy, the establishment of a Greater Serbia with the Croats and Slovenes, the preservation of Montenegro, and later, after the entry of Rumania into the war, the incorporation of Transylvania and Bukovina with Rumania. He therefore consistently pursued a policy favouring the fulfilment of the London Agreement and opposed to the unification of the Jugoslavs. This accounts for his reserve upon all schemes involving the complete break-up of the Habsburg Empire. It explains why, in spite of his sincere good will towards us, he would never utter his final word on the subject of our cause, at least not until October 24, 1918, when he acknowledged our provisional Government.
In this respect his constant opponent in Orlando’s Cabinet was Leonido Bissolati. Together with his immediate followers (Salvemini, Antonio da Viti de Marco, and others), Bissolati was perhaps the only man in Italy who, at the beginning of the war, realized with anything like clarity the significance of the war for Central Europe. As a Socialist he proceeded from democratic principles, identifying himself with the ideals which Mazzini had entertained with regard to the oppressed nations of Central Europe. He was in favour of Italian intervention on behalf of European democracy, as well as on behalf of the unification of the Italian people. He was therefore in favour of a peace based upon permanent factors. Bissolati was one of those few politicians and thinkers in Europe and America who, from the beginning of the war, in varying degrees, correctly gauged the scope of the ideas behind it. For this reason Bissolati was in favour of an agreement between Italy and the Serbs, as well as all the oppressed nations of Austria-Hungary, whom he always unreservedly supported in their endeavours during the war. In his opinion an agreement between Italy and the Serbs would have made it possible to conclude the war against the Habsburg Empire rapidly and victoriously. Such an agreement would also have ensured a long period of peace for Italy and Central Europe in the years immediately following the war.
​Throughout the year 1917 Bissolati was helping to make these ideas familiar in Italy, and in 1918 he endeavoured to get them accepted by the Cabinet, by Orlando, and Sonnino. He thus contributed directly and indirectly to the success of our efforts in Italy, and finally, in September 1918, he caused the Italian Government to issue its proclamation in favour of the unification of the Jugoslavs, although he did not manage to overcome Sonnino’s opposition to withdrawal from the London Agreement and to a new convention with the Jugoslavs.
I do not propose to discuss here further details of Italian policy and diplomacy during the war, the disputes on Greek questions and Albania, on Asia Minor, on the unified front, and what was known as the “Italian” War. Nor do I propose to refer to the struggles in Italy concerning the Jugoslavs. I will mention only what is essential for the understanding of the relations of Italy towards our cause. There is one important fact to add. Throughout the war Italy was, in a certain sense, isolated with regard to the other Allies. They regarded Germany as the chief opponent, while for Italy it was Vienna and Budapest who occupied that position. Up till April 1918 the rest of the Allies believed that it was possible to separate Austria-Hungary from Germany, and they would certainly have concluded peace with the Habsburg Empire if the opportunity had presented itself. Here was the fundamental divergence in the views and interests of both camps. In this respect we were closer to Italy than to the other Allies.
We regarded Italy as a decisive power, and it is my duty to state plainly that she rendered us extremely valuable services in the struggle against a premature or separate peace with Austria-Hungary. It was none other than Sonnino who, by his opinion and character, became the advocate of this policy directed against a premature peace with Vienna, and by this very fact he deserves our gratitude in bringing about the break-up of Austria-Hungary and the liberation of our people. I am glad to place this on record, even though it came about, not through any theoretical sympathies for us or other oppressed nations, but because our vital interests in this matter coincided with those of Italy during the war. It must, of course, be added that the efforts of our nation always had a sincere and friendly reception from the Italian public and from the Government.
(b) My First Journey To Rome. Negotiations in Rome and their Consequences
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The Allied Note to President Wilson proclaimed a life-and-death struggle against Austria-Hungary. Of the greater Allies, Italy was more interested than any other in this question. In referring definitely to us, the note also emphasized the significance of our cause. I judged that under these new circumstances it would be all the easier in Italy to establish a satisfactory basis or organizing our political work, especially in connection with the prisoners of war. My idea was first to organize a political and propagandist bureau at Rome, and to connect it with our organization as a branch office of the National Council at Paris. It was further my intention, as a representative of the National Council, to enter into direct personal touch at Rome with those journalistic circles who were prejudiced against us because of their objection to the Jugoslavs, and I wanted to win over to our cause some influential persons in public life. It was also my aim to try to establish official contact with persons in the Government, to tell them about our military and political work in France and Russia, and to obtain for the National Council, as our official body, something like the position which we had secured in Paris.
With these purposes in view, for the first time in my life, I arrived in Rome on January 12, 1917. At one of the stations before Rome I bought the morning papers. The sensation of the day was the publication of the Allied Note to President Wilson. My arrival in Rome on this occasion was one of the incidents in the war which caused me a deep and lasting gratification.
But a journey to Rome just at this moment involved also serious risks, as far as our cause was concerned. The dispute on the subject of the Jugoslavs had just become acute, and the negotiations with regard to the wording of the Allied Note to Wilson had served only to intensify this dispute. The problem of the London Agreement was one of the topics of the day, the Press was full of articles against the Jugoslavs, demonstrating the Italian character of Dalmatia, the ​unreliability of the Jugoslavs (Croats) in the struggle against Austria-Hungary, they being accused of double-dealing with Vienna, and so on.
Accordingly, the political aspect of my journey to Italy presented considerable difficulties. The Government circles were naturally guarded in their attitude, and a part of the public was mistrustful. On the other hand there were certain Italian circles who welcomed my visit as an opportunity for them to try to use the Czechoslovaks as a counter-weight against the Jugoslavs. They wanted to show that if the Jugoslavs were tractable, and, as it was occasionally expressed, as reliable as we were, Italy would act in the same manner towards them as towards us. But this might have constituted an argument against the claims of the Jugoslavs. The whole month of my stay in Italy was spent in discussions along these lines. All my explanations and endeavours to bring forward the Czechoslovak question merely brought a reiterated statement of the Italian case against the Jugoslavs. There was considerable ignorance of Jugoslav affairs, together with unjust suspicions of the Serbs, the Jugoslav Committee, Trumbić, Hinković, Supilo, etc. With certain of the nationalists these suspicions were deliberately exaggerated. Chauvinism was regarded by the majority quite sincerely as being right and proper; it dominated the greater part of the Italian public. The only reaction against this tendency proceeded from the associates of Bissolati and Salvemini. But there were judicious elements also in Liberal Parliamentary circles, who were seeking a method of reasonable agreement with the Jugoslavs, based upon fair compromise.
Perhaps I overestimated the extent to which this feeling in Italy involved a danger to us also. My fear was that in the end Italy, a country which should have been at the head of the struggle for the destruction of the Habsburg monarchy, might, through her objection to the Jugoslavs, choose the very opposite policy. That was the question which I often asked myself, bearing in mind Sonnino’s policy, the irritability of Italian public opinion, and the prejudiced attitude of nationalist circles towards the Jugoslavs. I then had quite a high opinion of the influence exerted by Giolitti’s group and politicians such as Nitti, who, as late as the spring of 1918, did not believe in the break-up of Austria-Hungary.
As Italy, both official and unofficial, was then openly ​opposed to the unification of the Jugoslavs, I endeavoured to render the latter a service in as tactful and unobtrusive a manner as I could. I had several discussions, for example, with the leading members of the “Dante Alighieri” League (Zaccagnini, San Miniatelli, Scodnik, and others), to whom, while emphasizing my loyalty and sincerity towards Italy, I endeavoured to demonstrate the inaccuracy of their views.
The attitude which I then adopted towards Italy, both official and unofficial, was one to which I adhered throughout the war. I never concealed the bonds of friendship which united us inseparably with the Jugoslavs, but under all circumstances I continued to be loyal to Italian interests.
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I began my political activities in Rome on January 13, 1917, by visiting my friend Erazim Piltz, who was a member of the Polish Committee. I hoped to obtain from him some account of affairs in Rome, before beginning my negotiations with official Italian circles and with the Allied ambassadors.
Piltz received me in a friendly manner, gave me the information I wanted regarding the situation in Italy, and at once told me about his last visit to the Vatican. He explained that the Vatican was in favour of the Poles, but wanted to save Austria. It appeared that Piltz had spoken to the Pope about us also, and he advised me strongly to get into touch with the Vatican circles and to gain their sympathies, as they were very powerful. He said that their attitude towards us was a reserved one, and that we were not in favour with them; but if a visit were paid to them, it would be possible at least to persuade them from working against us. I followed the advice which Piltz gave me.
It was Veselý who prepared Commandini for my visit, and Gino Scarpa introduced me to his Minister, with whom I had a detailed conversation on the affairs of Austria and ourselves. He was quite well acquainted with these questions, and was keenly interested in them. I gave him an account of the progress which our movement had made, as well as of our plans and aims, and of our work in Russia and France concerning the army and the prisoners of war. I asked for assistance from Italy, in particular, to enable us to get into touch with our prisoners of war and possibly also, in due course, to liberate ​them. Commandini agreed with my plans and views, and he promised me that he would do everything that was possible in Italy under the existing conditions. He and his ministry kept this promise, and in the course of the year 1917 helped us considerably.
Before approaching the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, I visited the Russian and French Embassies. Both Giers and Barrère, as well as all their staffs, received me in a favourable manner. I have the most pleasant memories of these negotiations, more particularly since at that time I was a beginner in diplomatic matters, and at Rome I entered more fully than at Paris into what was then a new world to me.
I was received by Giers, the Russian Ambassador, on January 18th. I explained to him my ideas and also my plans of action in Italy. He recommended me to be cautious with the Italians, but otherwise he spoke of Italy in sympathetic terms, and agreed with my moderate tactics. With regard to the Jugoslavs, he criticized the radical tendencies of their policy. His view of the situation, as he communicated it to me, was as follows: the Italians went too far on the subject of the Jugoslavs, and they were wrong about Dalmatia. The advance of history, he said, could not be held back. Both the Jugoslavs and ourselves would win the day, Austria would collapse, and Russia would fight until the end.
He then promised me all possible assistance in Rome, referred in terms of commendation to Stefanik, who had visited him during his stay there, and he spoke of us and our aims with sympathy. He was sincere and straightforward. He had recently returned from Russia, and was quite well acquainted with the progress of our movement at Petrograd, Moscow, and Kiev. He told me frankly that the conditions prevailing among our people did not impress him favourably. There was a great deal of dissension among them, and the political movement contained elements whose integrity was dubious. Above all, there was not a single political personage who could exercise the necessary authority. I informed him that Masaryk was already making preparations to proceed to Petrograd, and this gave him real satisfaction.
I spent the following days discussing matters with Charles Loiseau, the French journalist, who was attached in an undefined manner to the French Embassy. He was concerned with ecclesiastical affairs, and was in close touch with Vatican ​circles. He and the Rumanian priest, Vladimir Ghika, introduced me to the Belgian priest, Monsignor Deploige, Professor of Christian sociology at Liége, who was working at the Vatican on behalf of Belgium. They also brought me into touch with Cardinal Bourne, who was then spending some time in Rome. With the help of these new acquaintances I supplied the Vatican with a detailed account of our affairs. All four—Loiseau, Ghika, Monsignor Deploige, and Cardinal Bourne—assured me that they would draw the attention of the appropriate persons at the Vatican to our conversations, and would hand over to the right quarters my notes on our aims and opinions which I had placed at their disposal. Loiseau himself, with whom I continued to maintain friendly relations from that time onwards, did so in a thoroughly conscientious manner and with the best of intentions, acting in this capacity as intermediary until the end of the war. I never ascertained definitely what the others did, but I was informed that they had made a report to the Vatican.
My statement for the Vatican presented the fundamentals of the Czech problem in terms of moderation. I particularly pointed out the unfortunate influence which the Austro-Hungarian State exerted on the Church, and the manner in which it was misused to our detriment. I showed how the Catholic Church there had been the instrument used by those in authority against the oppressed, and at the same time I indicated that we should be quite satisfied if the Vatican merely refrained from acting against our interests. If it were to oppose us in an active manner, and we were then to emerge victorious, this would prove detrimental to Catholicism amongst our people, all the more so since it was our intention to grant full liberty and rights to all religions and churches in our State and accordingly also to Catholicism, which had a strong position amongst us.
I have never discovered whether the Vatican took this into account during the war. At any rate, wherever it could, it rendered all possible assistance to Austria-Hungary as being the most Catholic of all the belligerent Powers. Loiseau used to tell me that the dominant forces in the Vatican had misgivings about our Hussitism, and that they were displeased because our troops in the Russian brigade had gone over to the orthodox Russian Church. He advised us to put a stop to this, as by so doing we should demonstrate our good will, and ​win over the Vatican to our side. I sent this information to our people in Russia.
On January 23rd Loiseau introduced me to Barrère, the French Ambassador. At that time he was one of the most influential personalities in Rome, partly because he had been ambassador there for nearly twenty years, and partly through the prestige of the country which he represented. Like Giers, he expressed approval of our moderate tactics and urged us to be cautious. When I told him that I wanted to ask the Italian Government to liberate our prisoners of war and allow them to be transferred to our national army in France, he informed me that the Jugoslavs had made a similar application, but that Italy had emphatically refused it. The conditions, however, in our case were different. There were difficulties, but it was not altogether out of the question that we, in contrast to the Jugoslavs, might have our request granted.
Barrère criticized Italy and the Italian policy which, he said, was sometimes short-sighted and selfish. Nevertheless, he manifested considerable sympathies for Italy, as well as admiration for her efforts during the war. He also commended Sonnino, although in a number of respects he condemned his line of policy. He referred approvingly to him as a strong man who, although he made mistakes, knew what he wanted and remained firm until the last, even although others gave way. He also spoke favourably of Giers, whom he described as an honest man with progressive ideas. Finally, he promised me his personal assistance, and asked us to keep in touch with him. He also gave me a number of practical hints as to how I should proceed when negotiating with official circles in Rome, especially as regards Demartino, the general secretary of the Consulta, and De Morciere, Sonnino’s secretary. Throughout the war he helped me liberally and proved himself to be a sincere and devoted friend.
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I obtained access to the Italian Foreign Ministry through the recommendation of Commandini and of my new acquaintances from the “Dante Alighieri” League. I was received for the first time on January 24th by Demartino, the general secretary.
Being a novice, and more particularly one who had come to ask a favour, I was considerably disconcerted by his ​bureaucratic reserve and the self-assurance of his manner as a diplomat. At the same time the general tendencies of official Italian policy at that period prompted me to be extremely guarded.
However, I expounded our cause, explaining why I had come to Italy, and what significance the Czech problem had in its bearings upon the struggle against Austria-Hungary. I pointed out that here our interests were identical with those of Italy, and that an independent Czechoslovakia would be an important factor in the affairs of Italy after the war. I added that we were anxious to organize our prisoners of war and to create a national army. For this purpose we were applying to Italy for assistance, just as we had already done in France. Finally, I made no secret of our relations with the Jugoslavs. We were quite sincere in acclaiming them as a kindred race, but we wanted them to arrive at an agreement with Italy on a basis involving reasonable compromise and action in common, for which purpose we wished to work on both sides.
Demartino acknowledged the importance of our affairs. Italy was investigating them and would continue to do so, but for the time being the most important question for her was the Italo-Jugoslav dispute. The Jugoslavs must bear in mind that Italy had an agreement with the Allies and, having regard to this, they must make concessions accordingly. He said that we should bring our influence to bear upon them in this sense. In Dalmatia the towns were, he stated, Italian, and the statistics produced as a result of the official Austrian census were inaccurate. Altogether, as far as culture was concerned, Dalmatia was really Italian. Moreover, the Italian claims were based upon considerations of strategy and national security. Apart from this, he agreed that the rest of the southern regions of the monarchy should be given to Serbia, or to whatever State might subsequently be formed there—either Greater Serbia or Croatia and Serbia. Demartino emphasized these concluding ideas, which indicated his reserve on the subject of national and State unification.
From this conversation I obtained a first-hand knowledge of the difficulties which Italian diplomacy was causing, and would continue to cause, as far as Jugoslav affairs were concerned. And although Demartino did not expressly mention the fact, it was clear to me that he was opposed to the unification of the Jugoslavs. I also had a definite feeling that he ​was expressing the view held by the Consulta and the exponents of Italian foreign policy in general.
As regards ourselves, however, he showed that he understood our aims quite well. He promised assistance and asked me to visit him again. He also sanctioned the establishment of a branch office of the National Council-in Rome with which, as in France, the Government would be officially in touch. In the same way he gave his consent for our organization to establish contact with the prisoners of war. This latter question, he said, was one which the Italian Government was then carefully considering, and it would decide to what extent it could adopt the same procedure as the French Government. He recommended me while in Paris to keep in direct touch with the Italian Embassy and military mission there, making any applications to the Italian Government through them.
My interview with De Morciere was similar in character. He was more guarded on the subject of the Jugoslavs, but more amenable to my arguments in their favour. He was greatly impressed by what I told him about our military plans, and about what we were already doing in France and Russia. He was also interested in the possibility of organizing our prisoners of war in Italy. He promised his support and assured me that he would give Sonnino a detailed account of the matter.
Such were my official negotiations. All the promises or agreements which I thus obtained were, in due course, carried out with the loyal co-operation of the Italian authorities. And so the result of my negotiations was by no means unsatisfactory, although it was clear that in Italy our task would not be an easy one. It would depend mainly upon tactics and the manner in which events took shape. The Press and public opinion had shown comprehension, sympathies, and good will to the fullest extent. Official circles were well-disposed as regards procedure, but were guarded in their attitude towards the cause itself.
The events of the year 1917 in France, Russia, and Italy, as well as the political and military progress of our movement in the Allied States, as we shall see, led the Italian Government, in September of the same year, during my second visit to Rome, to take further decisive steps on the subject of our cause.
On January 25, 1917, I received a telegram from Masaryk ​asking me to proceed from Rome direct to London. He wanted to discuss the political situation which had arisen after the last Allied Note to Wilson, and to decide what inferences could be drawn from it as far as our interests were concerned. He was also anxious to decide what action to take with regard to our affairs in Russia, where at that time the energies of Štefánik were being almost entirely exhausted by the dispute between Kiev and Petrograd, between Dürich and his opponents, who were on our side. Masaryk had some misgivings as to whether Štefánik’s course of action was the right one. Then, too, I was to report to him on the situation in Italy and arrange the further organization of our work in Rome.
In the last week of January I concluded the whole of my negotiations. I had one more interview with Demartino, who again assured me that what had already been promised would be carried out. I also saw Barrère and Giers again, and settled the further co-operation between our office in Rome and the Paris headquarters of the National Council. On leaving Rome I travelled by way of Paris, where my stay was very short, to London, where I arrived on February 5th. After having discussed the above-mentioned points with Masaryk, I returned to Paris on February 13th.
(c) The Entry of the United States into the War, and our Movement
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At Paris we eagerly waited to see what effect would be produced at Vienna and Berlin by the Allied reply of December 30th and the note to President Wilson. We were no less curious as to the reports which we should receive from Prague, and how our people there would react to our diplomatic success contained in the note to President Wilson. These are matters, however, to which I shall refer later.
The violent official reply of Germany and Austria-Hungary, stating that the Allied declaration denoted war until the final victory of the Central Powers, taken into conjunction with the confidential reports which we had previously received from Prague, led us to surmise that at Vienna a drama was being enacted which was overwhelming the responsible personalities there. For whenever any decisive action was taken against the Allies, the Austro-Hungarian leaders were either ​dragged into it by Berlin or else in many cases merely confronted with a fait accompli. The news which we received from the “Maffia” at this time confirmed these conjectures. They referred to the desperate situation in the Empire, the gratification in the Czech territories at the note to President Wilson, the dissension between Vienna and Berlin, as well as the conviction of everybody in Austria that the Central Powers could not win the war and that the end was rapidly approaching.
At that time we did not know that, after serious conflicts, the Chancellor had given way on the question of submarine warfare. That decision was reached on January 9, 1917, at a conference which was held at Pless and presided over by the Kaiser. This was done without consulting Austria-Hungary. When Czernin heard of the decision from his ambassador at Berlin, he opposed it. Holzendorf and Zimmermann therefore proceeded to Vienna for the purpose of convincing the Government there. On January 20th a conference was held, the Emperor Karl presiding. Holzendorf and Zimmermann advocated Germany’s point of view, while Czernin and Tisza opposed the scheme for submarine warfare. The two sides failed to agree, but the Viennese Government did not venture to act in opposition to what Germany had decided, and therefore submitted. It is said that Czernin then advised the Emperor Karl to separate from Germany on account of this matter.
It would appear that Germany’s decision, on the whole, did not produce any surprise or considerable excitement either among the Allies, the neutrals, or the Central Powers. It looked as if they had all guessed what was coming. And yet the decision was one which had a considerable, and perhaps even a critical, effect upon the result of the war. On February 3rd, by a solemn declaration in which he analysed the whole course of the dispute between the United States and Germany on the subject of submarine warfare, President Wilson broke off diplomatic relations with Germany, and handed Count Bernsdorf his passport. Those who had any close knowledge of political events realized that this meant the entry of the United States into the war.
In the meanwhile, Wilson had not declared war on Austria-Hungary. It appeared as if he wished to reserve for himself the possibility of adopting a more lenient attitude towards the Habsburg Empire, and that in this respect his point of ​view was fundamentally the same as that of France and England. This implied that Austria-Hungary would, if possible, separate from Germany, who could then be more easily defeated by military means. The Government at Vienna naturally took advantage of this for a long time, and until the spring of 1918 it caused us much anxiety.
Nevertheless the entry of the United States into the war was a new guarantee of victory for us. After the crisis brought about by the peace overtures in December and January, the Allies themselves accepted America’s step as a great success. France was filled with enthusiasm, having now regained her confidence. Wilson immediately became the world’s great moral authority. His preparations for warfare, which were being made on a vast scale, were discussed everywhere with complete hope and confidence. A military victory was now regarded as certain, even though it was realized that the American preparations would take a long time. As soon as the United States entered the war, public opinion in France was practically unanimous that the only thing to do was to hold out until America was ready.
This feeling was shared by us also. We were confident that the United States, partly because of their strength and prestige, partly in view of the principles consistently enunciated by President Wilson, would not relax their efforts until Germany at least had been forced to capitulate. I took this view also because it was obvious that the United States had no direct interest in the war, and thus, as they had no definite war aim of their own, the steps which they had taken had been prompted largely by Wilson’s democratic convictions. He had rightly judged that the point at issue was not merely one of frontiers or States in Central Europe, but the great problem of reorganizing Europe and, indeed, to a certain extent, the whole world.
(d) The Progress of the Russian Revolution, its Foreign Policy and our Movement
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Those associated with our movement in Western Europe welcomed the Russian revolution. I have already mentioned the difficulties which we encountered in Tsarist Russia, and our internal dissensions which developed from them. In conse​quence of the revolution all these obstacles disappeared. The satisfaction which this caused us, however, was soon mingled with a feeling of anxiety as to what course the revolution would take, and what effect it would exert upon the general military situation. At first I, just as Štefánik, who had witnessed the early days of the revolution before returning to Paris in the following April, had supposed that the revolution would reveal Russia’s military strength in an unprecedented manner, but before long we realized that we should have to be satisfied if Russia managed merely to hold the front, and that in any case the war would be decided in the West.
The first actions of the new provisional Russian Government tended rather to justify our early hopes. On March 18th Masaryk sent Milyukov a telegram in which he emphasized our co-operation with Russia and the Slavs hitherto, and greeted the victory of the Russian revolution which was to bring Russia order and success in the war, besides uniting the Poles, Jugoslavs, and Czechoslovaks, whose independent States it would help to establish. Milyukov immediately acknowledged the receipt of this telegram, to which he replied as follows:
I agree entirely with your ideas as to the perspectives which a free Russia is opening to the family of civilized nations as regards the final re-shaping of Central and South-Eastern Europe.
At the same time the Russian Press Bureau distributed another proclamation by Milyukov made to the representatives of the Russian Press. In it the Russian Foreign Minister referred in detail to a scheme involving the dismemberment of Austria, and said:
The establishment of the Czechoslovak State will set a limit to the aggressive German plans towards the Slav countries. German Austria, as well as Hungary, must be kept within its ethnographical frontiers. The Italians will be united with Italy, the Rumanians with Rumania, and the Ukrainian territories will coalesce with our Ukraine. The natural problems propounded by history demand also the unification of all the Jugoslav regions.
Again, on March 18th, Milyukov distributed among the Russian diplomatic representatives in Allied and neutral countries a circular telegram which also gave us reason for satisfaction. In this telegram Milyukov showed the necessity for the revolution by drawing attention to all the harm which ​the old regime had done to Russia, and pointing out its criminal method of procedure even during the war. He indicated the war policy of the new Government in the following emphatic terms:
Revolutionary Russia will continue until a victorious end, unweariedly and unreservedly, in the struggle against the common enemy and its aggressive spirit which desires to achieve hegemony over Europe for the advantage of Prussian militarism.
The manifesto of Prince Lvov’s provisional Government, which was issued just afterwards, emphasized and supplemented these principles. Under these circumstances we in Paris were at first not alarmed by the difficulties which arose after the abdication of the Tsar and the Grand Duke Michael, nor even by the reports about the arrival of the first Russian revolutionaries and anarchists from abroad with the consent and assistance of the German Government. But after March 20th the political circles in Paris and London began to change their opinion of events in Russia. Their misgivings arose when the Petrograd Soviet of workmen and soldiers, which had soon taken upon itself the function of a subsidiary Government, began to exercise an influence both on the political and military policy of the Government itself. In the last week of March 1917 the conflict between the two tendencies had reached its height.
At first it looked as if Prince Lvov’s Government would emerge successfully from the contest. Its proclamation of March 30th that revolutionary Russia would resolve to establish an independent Poland, which was to include the Polish areas in Austria and Prussia, and that this independent State would be bound to Russia only by a military alliance, strengthened the authority of revolutionary Russia and its Government in all Western European States. In the middle of April the Allied Governments replied to Milyukov’s manifesto, “emphasizing . . . their entire solidarity with the plans of the Russian Government concerning the restoration of Poland in its unbroken territorial unity.” This was a source of fresh gratification to us. As I have already pointed out, we were so convinced of the indivisible connection between all Central European problems that we regarded every Polish success as a considerable advance for our own cause also. In the course of April and the first half of May, however, the Government ​was evidently making concessions to the Left Wing elements among the workmen and soldiers, whose council at Petrograd had been established on the same day as Prince Lvov’s provisional Government. The moderate Socialist elements which it had contained at the beginning were gradually overruled by the Radicals under the leadership of Lenin and Trotsky. It had been the Government’s intention to convene a constituent assembly only at the conclusion of the war, when it would proceed to deal with the distribution of the soil by a legislative process. This was skilfully used by the extremists as a means for inciting the masses against the Government. They took advantage of the fact that war-weariness had now permeated the entire population of Russia and, by holding out a prospect of immediate peace and distribution of the soil, they had no difficulty in winning the people over. They disposed of the commitments to the Allies by describing them as part of the imperialistic policy of the former Russian regime, which would involve the shedding of Russian blood for the benefit of English and French capitalists.
Under these circumstances our liberation movement could only intensify its efforts for concentrating all our work in Western Europe, endeavouring at the same time to preserve our army in Russia, which Masaryk had succeeded in organizing on Russian soil during the revolutionary period, when political, administrative, and military affairs were in a state of chaos. He had arrived in Russia on May 16, 1917, two days after Milyukov’s resignation, which had been an unpleasant surprise for him. He had at once taken charge of the branch of the National Council, which had been established by the Congress in Kiev. He was fully recognized by the Russian revolutionary authorities and received everywhere by them with respect, but on account of the disorder prevailing in the ministries and military circles he was not always able to achieve his aims easily. He himself has given a detailed account of this in his Making of a State. Nevertheless, on October 9, 1917, his proposal for the formation of an independent Czechoslovak army corps was finally sanctioned by the Russian authorities.
As a result of the events which ensued in Russia after November 7th, it became urgent to transfer not merely a part, but the whole of our army to France, as this was the only way to save our troops. The establishment of an autonomous Czechoslovak army in France was made possible by a decree of the ​French Government in December 1917, an account of which I shall give in the following chapter, and accordingly Masaryk was able on February 7, 1918, to proclaim the Czechoslovak army corps in Russia as a constituent part of this army. The Soviet Government at once recognized the international character of these troops, and accepted Masaryk’s proclamation of February 7th without demur, likewise granting permission for our army to be removed to France.