# My War Memoirs/Chapter 15

XV
114
The Bolshevik revolution showed the Allies, as early as November and December 1917, that they could no further count upon the military assistance of Russia. The preparations of the Bolshevik Government for concluding peace, which began with the application for an armistice with Germany on December 3, 1917, naturally confronted the National Council with the question as to what was to happen to our legions in Russia. If peace were concluded, our purpose in Russia would be at an end, and our only salvation would be to transfer the whole army rapidly to France.
From June 1917 onwards much work was being done in connection with the transport of our prisoners of war from Russia to France, as arranged by Masaryk with Albert Thomas and the Russian Government. Captain Husák reached France with his contingent in October 1917, and a second contingent, commanded by Captain Gibiš, arrived at Cognac in February 1918. From the summer of 1917, in the prisoners’ camps and among our soldiers throughout Russia, the desire to reach France became more and more pronounced, and in proportion as the disorder and chaos in Russia increased, this demand became more and more emphatic. The Bolshevik revolution had made it imperative for us to leave Russia. When, therefore, in January and February 1918 the Bolsheviks had gained control of Moscow and Kiev, together with the whole of the Ukraine by a gradual process, Masaryk’s chief concern was to ensure the safety of the army, and to arrange for its departure ​in accordance with the agreement with France. With this end in view he had given telegraphic instructions on November 7, 1917, the day of the coup d’état, to Jiří Klecanda, the authorized representative of the National Council on the General Staff, and through him to Prokop Maxa, the commissary of the Czechoslovak Army, that under all circumstances they were to maintain neutrality towards internal Russian disagreements. Then, after his arrival at Kiev, he made an arrangement with the Ukrainian Government then in power, by which the Czechoslovak Army should continue to receive supplies of all necessities. Finally, he discussed with the representatives of the Allied Powers, especially with the French representative, the methods by which the continued safety of the army corps was to be secured, and he urged that the troops should with the least possible delay be transferred from Russia to the Western front, although some of the Allied representatives wanted our army, jointly with the Rumanian, Ukrainian, and Polish troops, to renew the military action against Germany.
The measures taken by the Soviet Army against the Ukrainian Government, however, soon created an entirely new situation, making it even more urgent for our departure to be accelerated. As a result of pressure from the Soviet authorities, the Ukrainian Government on January 24th declared the independence of the Ukraine, and began to negotiate with the Germans. But before these negotiations were completed, the Soviet troops, under the leadership of Muravyev, drew near to Kiev and started a resolute offensive. This caused the leaders of the second Czechoslovak division, in accordance with the principles which Masaryk had insisted upon, to begin negotiations with the Soviet leader for neutrality. An agreement was reached in this, respect at Yagotin on January 31, 1918, and on the following day there was a supplementary agreement making the terms of the settlement applicable to all the Czechoslovak contingents.
It was under these circumstances that on February 7th Masaryk, as President of the Czechoslovak National Council, proclaimed all those Czech troops in the various regions of the former Russian State as being a component part of the Czechoslovak Army in France. When, on the next day, Kiev was occupied by the Soviet Army, negotiations were at once started between the National Council and the Soviet commander, Muravyev, who received representatives of the Allied armies and with them Prokop Maxa, the Czech representative. On ​Sunday, February 10th, the negotiations were completed: Kotsiubinsky, the military secretary of the Ukrainian Soviet, and Muravyev, the Soviet Commander-in-Chief, assured Masaryk, who was present on that occasion, that they would fully recognize the armed neutrality of the Czechoslovak troops, and that they would give instructions for all necessities in the way of equipment, money, and food supplies to be issued to our army. The only stipulation made by the Soviet was that the Czechoslovak Army should continue to maintain order wherever it was garrisoned.
On this occasion Masaryk also discussed with Muravyev the question of transferring our army to France, and of its recognition as a component part of the Czechoslovak Army in France. Muravyev admitted the Czechoslovak point of view in this respect also, and gave permission for the troops to be transferred, but he stated that it was not within his jurisdiction to make any authoritative decision on this point. He evidently made inquiries in Moscow, for on February 16th Masaryk received a communication from him stating that the Commander-in-Chief had no objections to the departure of the Czechoslovak contingents to France.
The rapid advance of the German troops on Kiev made an immediate solution imperative in this sense. Our troops, who were handicapped in the Ukraine by their lack of proper equipment and artillery, as well as of reliable supplies and good lines of communication, could scarcely venture on further fighting with the well-prepared Germans. The first encounters with them began on February 24th. Four days later the Germans were already in Kiev, and from March 8th to March 13th violent fighting took place at Bakhmatch, where the Bolsheviks, who were opposed to the policy of the Germans in the Ukraine, fought successfully against them in common with our legionaries.
I shall not discuss the question why our troops did not immediately act against the Bolshevik revolution in Russia. I have no personal experience of the local conditions prevailing there, and what information I received on the subject was only of an indirect character. Masaryk himself has given a documentary account of this in his Making of a State.
On March 7, 1918, Masaryk left Moscow on his way to Vladivostok, Tokio, and America. Immediately after the fighting at Bakhmatch our troops left the Ukraine for Russia ​proper, and in accordance with Masaryk’s instructions prepared for the journey to France by way of Siberia and Vladivostok. On March 15, 1918, Prokop Maxa, the commissary of the Czechoslovak Army, was informed that the Soviet Government had given permission for this journey, in which connection the Soviet Commander-in-Chief, Ovseyenko, had expressed the wish that Czechoslovak troops should hand over part of their arms to the Soviet Army. On March 16th, therefore, Major-General Shokorov, the commander of the Czechoslovak Army Corps, gave orders for preparations to be made for departure. At the same time instructions were given that any part of the equipment which would prove a hindrance on the journey was to be voluntarily given up to the Soviet Army Command. In a special order, which was issued publicly, Ovseyenko expressed thanks for this equipment, and on the same day issued an order to all commanders and station-masters instructing them. not to hinder the movements of the Czechoslovak Army Corps, but to expedite them in every possible way. By March 18th, however, the situation in Moscow had changed, and the military authorities began to make difficulties about the departure of our troops to Omsk, their explanation being that the Czechoslovak Army might join Semyonov or the Japanese. Fresh negotiations were therefore started with the Soviet Government, who on March 26th again granted permission for the Czechoslovak Army to proceed to France, not as a fighting unit, but as a group of free citizens carrying a definite quantity of arms to protect themselves against the attacks of the counter-revolutionaries. On this occasion also an agreement was reached for the removal of the greater part of the Russian officers in our army, and the Council of People’s Commissars undertook to grant our troops “all possible assistance on the territory of Russia, provided that they maintain an honourable and sincere loyalty.”
Thus began that remarkable march of our revolutionary army across Russia and Siberia to the Western front. On its way eastward the army was joined by further detachments of our people, who had hitherto been prisoners of war, or who were scattered in small groups over Siberia. At the end of May the total number of troops who were ready for transport to Europe was about 45,000, according to the statistics of the French authorities.
​The events connected with negotiations about our army after the outbreak of the revolution in Russia, the disputes about their transport, their action against the Bolsheviks and their preparations for the journey to Europe were strongly reflected in the negotiations with the Allies in Paris and London. I conducted these negotiations from the end of 1917 until our legionaries finally returned home, and the proceedings which they involved were of great importance in their bearing upon the recognition of our independence.
We of the National Council in Paris regarded the return of our troops as an essential condition for the whole of our success in France and, indeed, in Western Europe generally. For this reason, from the time when our army decree had been published, all our efforts were concentrated upon the transport of our army from Russia to France. From the spring of 1918 onwards I experienced for months at a time an alternation of hopes and disappointments, and I used all the resources at my disposal to promote the success of the scheme. As an example of the anxieties which this entailed to the National Council, I will mention only the case of the inaccurate report from Russia, notified to us officially from the Ministry of War on March 4, 1918, and signed by General Foch. This report alleged that Masaryk had made an agreement with the Bolshevik Government by which our troops were to remain in Russia, and the French Military Mission there had accordingly suspended all preparations for transferring them to France. On March 11th de Margerie sent me from the Quai d’Orsay an official communication on this alleged compromise.
It soon proved, however, that the report was based upon an error, and that General Niessel, from whom it had emanated, must have misunderstood Masaryk’s negotiations with Muravyev. But from the resulting conversations at the Ministry of War and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as from the official documents and the reports which General Janin gave me on the subject of his discussions with the General Staff, I realized what attention the French were giving to the problem of our troops, what policy they were pursuing in this matter, and what political successes it would be possible for us to achieve in Paris and with the rest of the Allies as a result. Incidentally this shows also how mistaken were the views of ​those who blamed us for what they regarded as the ill-conceived scheme of transferring our troops to France. It was precisely this scheme which saved the integral character and the cohesion of our army, which without it would have been dispersed in the Soviet ocean. And from de Margerie’s letter it is plain what the Western Allies would, in such a case, have thought of our action.
I therefore set to work again with fresh enthusiasm to arrange the organization of our French army, and to prepare for the arrival of our legionaries from Russia. Štefánik, in the meanwhile, had proceeded to Italy, and my work was carried on in conjunction with General Janin, who had established his General Staff in the Rue Bonaparte, not far from the premises of the National Council. After his return from Russia, Janin was able to occupy quite an important post in the French Army.
It was in March 1918 that I began to carry on regular negotiations with the French and English authorities about the use, transport, and organization of our army in Russia and Siberia.
On April 1st an inquiry from London, relative to the use of our army in Siberia, was handed to me by the French Government. In it the British War Office stated that our army, then on its way to Vladivostok, numbered about 40,000 men. Trotsky, it was said, had demanded that it should remain in Russia to form the nucleus of the reorganized Russian Army. Our troops had declined to do this, but the British War Office was doubtful whether this army, which possessed real military significance, could actually get to Europe. It ought, therefore, to be used in Russia or Siberia. The English military authorities held the opinion that it would be possible to occupy Siberia in the region of Omsk, or else to proceed to Archangelsk where a military base could be established, from which communication with Siberia could be maintained by way of Perm. Finally, it might be possible to pass beyond Baikal and join Semyonov, and this latter solution was the one which the English favoured.
I at once discussed the matter with General Alby, Chief of the General Staff in the Ministry of War. Together with him, and then with General Janin, I drew up a reply which was sent to Clemenceau on April 2, 1918. In this communication I opposed the use of our troops in Western Siberia, and I would have permitted them to be sent to Archangelsk only for the sake of more rapid transport to France. It was my wish that ​if the case arose, they were to remain in Eastern Siberia only until the vessels for their transport were ready. This was the policy consistently followed by the National Council in Paris from February 1918 until the end of the war and beyond it.
By the terms of our agreement with the French Government, signed in our army statute on February 7, 1918, the Allies were not allowed to make use of our army without our consent. The point of view of the National Council was thus decisive, and, as a matter of fact, it coincided with the wishes of the French Government at that time. Accordingly, the French authorities continued to make preparations for the transport of our troops. On April 11th the French military attaché in Moscow reported that conflicts had arisen between our army and the Bolshevik authorities.(49) He further stated that it was difficult to decide whether our troops would, under such circumstances, actually reach Vladivostok. Trotsky had given orders for their advance to be stopped, and there were continual differences of opinion about their disarmament. On this point he mentioned that the Czechs had realized the danger of such a course, and had therefore declined to give up their arms. In spite of Trotsky’s orders they were proceeding eastward, and he laid stress upon the fact that their one desire was to get to France.
At this juncture the Paris Government and the General Staff asked the American Government on April 2oth to make arrangements for a supply of vessels at Vladivostok. They also applied to the French and English authorities for vessels which could be sent to Archangelsk for a similar purpose. This, I believe, was the first official suggestion on the part of the French Government that a section of our army might perhaps be transported by way of Archangelsk.
116
Thus the question of our army became an important factor in the policy of the Allies and their conduct of the war. Everything which came from Russia was loyally brought to my notice by the Government, so that on the whole I was kept informed on all points in quite a detailed manner, and my official point of view on behalf of the National Council was consulted. I was often in a serious dilemma; I had little direct contact with our army in Russia on account of the physical ​difficulties involved. From time to time I received a message from Masaryk, which enabled me either to understand or occasionally only to surmise the chief things which were going on. It was in accordance with these circumstances that I made my arrangements and decisions in Paris. Beyond this I had only the official Allied reports. This inadequacy of communication was a great handicap.
On two occasions there were differences between us in Paris and our leaders in Russia and Siberia. At the beginning I agreed to the plan of transporting a part of our army by way of Archangelsk, because I saw that the Governments in Paris and London approved of it, and also because I had confidence in the French official reports. Our military leaders, however, expressed themselves against it. It is difficult to say which of the two views was the right one. When I ascertained how our troops were situated I defended their point of view before the Supreme Military Council at Versailles.
The second case was rather more serious. The decision of the executive committee of the army on July 7, 1918, to set up an anti-Bolshevik front in the Volga area, to begin an advance against the Soviets and to proceed further into Central Russia, seemed to me a political and military blunder, and I still think so. I was always in favour of resolute defensive action against the Bolsheviks, of establishing a firm front to cover the gradual evacuation, thus making it possible for our troops to leave Siberia by gradations and in good time without any detriment to their morale. The scheme which had been started, however, was not adequately prepared. It counted upon Allied help which could not be given, and was stimulated partly by the insistence of the anti-Bolshevik elements in Russia, partly by unfounded reports about Allied intervention which was alleged to be already in progress. Moreover, the hopes of any adequate help from Russian quarters proved to be vain. The scheme was therefore doomed to be abortive.
In view of the controversy about the use of our army and our policy in Siberia and France at this time, I draw attention to an official telegram concerning an interview which Masaryk had with M. Regnault, the French Ambassador in Tokio, just about this period in the middle of April. It is an extremely valuable document, and gives a good idea of our plans with regard to the army in Siberia, and of Masaryk’s views on the situation in Russia at that time. The telegram runs as follows:
Tokio, April 15, 1918. M. Masaryk, President of the Czechoslovak National Council, who after a long journey in Russia has just arrived here, made the following statement to me:
If the Allies recognize the Bolshevik Government, Lenin, who is an honourable man, will be glad to seek in the Quadruple Entente a factor of resistance and help against German aggressiveness. With the help of France and the United States he would re-establish the army and construct the railways.
An international company should aim at purchasing wheat and petroleum, and transporting them northwards for sale to the Russian peasants in exchange for footwear, clothing, and agricultural implements. The German invasion is certainly limited only to the Ukraine, Finland, and the border provinces of the Baltic, which are already regarded as lost provinces. If these disputes and struggles are settled, the Germans will have a free field for exploiting Russia.
Nothing can be expected from the social revolutionaries, who are the opponents of the Bolsheviks. As regards the monarchist movement, it is obvious from the failures of the Cossack generals that they would not gain any adherents.
M. Masaryk added that if he were granted a free hand in carrying on recruiting activities among the Czechoslovaks, of whom he has 50,000, this would be worth while because he would thus gain the confidence of the Maximalists. He would be unwilling to interfere in the internal policy of Russia, and emphatically declined to subordinate the troops to the orders of generals.
I informed him that according to the newspapers his troops had been disarmed, and the officers had received orders not to leave Russia. In his opinion the first point is of no consequence, because France needs men and not arms. It is necessary to save these men from being given to Austria, and from having to keep on fighting against the Allies. The prohibition to leave Russia applies only to the Russian officers and not to the foreign cadres.
My informant stated that he is able to despatch these troops to France, although he is aware of the difficulties involved by the preparation. It would be necessary to establish seventy trains passing through Russia and Siberia; this problem can be solved only with the assistance of Russia. Further, it would be necessary to have from twenty-five to thirty vessels; this would be the affair of the Allies. He himself is willing to organize the enlistment of a further detachment numbering 50,000 men.
(Signed) Regnault.
This telegram, and still more the memorandum on events in Russia which Masaryk prepared in Tokio for President Wilson and handed to Mr. Morris, the American representative there, aroused some resentment in Paris, and in certain military circles made matters difficult for us. The Allies in Western Europe were not familiar with the situation in Russia. Western Europe had been anxiously following the attempts of Kornilov, ​Alexeyev, Semyonov, and other generals to restore the army and to wage war on the Bolsheviks. Archangelsk had been occupied by the Allies, and there had been a suggestion of possible help ta those elements who were well disposed to the Allies, although nobody desired intervention on a large scale, for which there were no adequate resources at that time, in view of the decisive German offensive on the Western front. On the whole, however, there was a firm belief that a change would soon ensue.
In France, under the pressure of the German offensive, there was ill-feeling against the Bolsheviks, who were regarded there as traitors, agents of Germany, destroyers of the common front, destroyers of Russia, propagandists of peace without annexations and indemnities, and of revolution in the armies. In France there were many who had confidence in the generals, the monarchists, the cadets, and the social revolutionaries. The views expressed by Masaryk as to the possibility of negotiations with Lenin and as to the duration of his regime, and the scanty hopes which Masaryk placed in the success of the other anti-Bolshevik factors, caused astonishment in some quarters and anger in others. Some of the Paris papers, such as the Echo de Paris, published a telegram from Washington containing a summary of Masaryk’s propaganda, together with an attack on him and us.
From Regnault’s telegram I realized what the point at issue was, and I began to make Masaryk’s point of view understood in political, journalistic, and official circles of Paris. To some extent I succeeded in this, but I was unable to set Štefánik’s mind at rest for long. He was greatly influenced by the impression which he had formed in certain military circles, where Masaryk’s attitude was condemned. He himself, as regards Russian affairs, had accepted the view current in those circles, and at that time he was decidedly in favour of intervention. I ought to add, however, that Štefánik subsequently changed his views on Russia.
Even at that time I was convinced that Masaryk was right, and I therefore identified myself with his opinions, in spite of the contrary attitude of Štefánik and a number of the English and French authorities. (Here I may mention that in French military and political circles there were many who shared Masaryk’s views in this respect.) Subsequent events proved that Masaryk was entirely right.
​In spite of these differences of opinion as to the development of affairs in Russia we were all united on the subject of our army, and the French Government itself took no steps which were at variance with the terms of our agreement.
When, on April 20th, I was received by Clemenceau, he emphasized to me this direction of his policy, and referred in very eulogistic terms to our Siberian troops, adding: “They are admirable soldiers. I should like to have them here at the front at all costs. Fifty thousand of your people in France will be the best guarantee of our victory and yours.”
This was at a time when, after the Congress of Rome had come to an end and the Clemenceau-Czernin controversy was over, our situation in France and with the Allies generally was a very favourable one. The negotiations for transferring our troops from Russia to France strengthened our position still more. We were constantly in touch with the French and English authorities on this subject, which came up for discussion at various inter-Allied conferences. I participated in these indirectly. General Janin and myself, on behalf of our General Staff and the National Council respectively, first of all conferred with the French Government, and then in a number of cases I negotiated direct in London with the British Government. The matter under discussion was then transferred by the Governments concerned to the agenda of the Allied conferences. The first occasion when the problem of our army thus became a subject for Allied consideration was at the military conference held at Versailles on April 27, 1918, as the result of French initiative. The military representatives of France, Great Britain, Italy, and the United States (Generals Belin, Sackville-West, Bianchi d’Espinosa, and Bliss) here prepared a collective note for the future conference of the Supreme Allied Military Council on the situation of our troops in Siberia. They demanded their transfer to Europe at the earliest possible date, those west of Omsk by way of Archangelsk and Murmansk (the latter base to be held by them provisionally for the Allies) and those east of Omsk by way of Vladivostok.
A few days afterwards, on May 2nd, the Supreme Military Council held its fifth session at Abbeville, and was attended by the military and political representatives of the Allied Powers (Clemenceau, Pichon, Foch, Pétain, Belin, Lloyd George, Lord Milner, Sir Douglas Haig, General Sackville-West, General Bliss, Orlando, Sonnino, etc.). Among other important questions, ​it dealt also with the transport of our troops from Russia, and it passed the following resolution (No. 3):
The Supreme Council, in approval of Circular Note No. 25 of the military representatives, has decided:
1. That the British Government should take all steps to ensure the transport of the Czech contingents now at Vladivostok.
2. That the French Government should assume responsibility for these contingents until the moment of their embarkation.
3. That the British Government should notify M. Trotsky of the concentration of the Czech divisions at Murmansk and Archangelsk, not belonging to the army corps which left Omsk for Vladivostok.
This resolution of the Supreme Council established officially a unified course of action for the Allied Governments with regard to the events in Siberia, and this strengthened our status in the Allied countries. The resolution was communicated to the National Council and the General Staff of our army in France, and also to the Allied representatives in Moscow. Further steps were immediately taken for carrying out the terms of the resolution. Representations were made to the Bolshevik Government by the Allied representatives in Russia (General Lavergne and Mr. Bruce Lockhart). On May 7th the authorities in Paris received a message from General Lavergne to the effect that the Bolshevik Government had agreed that the section of our troops who had not yet crossed the Omsk line should be transported by way of Archangelsk, entirely in accordance with the Abbeville resolution, and General Ogorodnikov was said to have non-officially sanctioned the guarding of the White Sea harbours by our troops. These arrangements were looked upon as a great concession on the part of the Bolsheviks, indicating their willingness for an agreement with the Allies. With the help of Sadoule, Lavergne had secured from Trotsky the sanction for allotting to our troops a part of the war material located in Archangelsk.
In view of these favourable circumstances I considered that the moment had now come for discussing all these questions direct with the British Government. Since my last visit to London the situation in England had changed considerably to our advantage. In Russia the British were taking an active part in the scheme for safeguarding our troops, in which they were deeply interested. This is shown by an inquiry addressed by the War Office to Paris on April 1st, and also by the devoted services which were rendered to us in Moscow by Mr. Bruce Lockhart. ​In Paris I was in continual contact with Lord Derby, the British Ambassador, whom I kept informed of the progress of our movement. I had occasion to ask for his intervention in London on our behalf, and he always readily complied with these requests. It was after consultation with him that on May 7, 1918, I proceeded to London for the purposes of negotiation.
(b) Our Military Action in Russia and the Siberian Anabasis
117
The agreement reached by Masaryk with Muravyev on February 16th and by the branch of the National Council with the Moscow Government on March 26th regarding the disarmament, neutrality, and transport of our troops to France, had met with unexpected obstacles almost immediately. The precise character of some of them has not yet been made clear by documentary evidence, although the conditions then prevailing provide a satisfactory clue to their psychological and political origins. Our first transports, on their progress eastward, had encountered difficulties at the end of March in Penza from the local Soviets, whom the Central Government at Moscow had allowed a sufficient degree of autonomy to make decisions in accordance with their wishes and requirements. The local Soviets feared our troops as an armed force which might upset their authority, the result being that at every station of any importance difficulties arose, and it became necessary to hold continual negotiations to secure consent for further progress eastward, which was to be granted in return for the surrender of arms. This aroused the suspicion and opposition of our troops who, having from the beginning been mistrustful of the Government and the local Soviets, regarded all these proceedings as a source of danger to the army, increased, moreover, by the continually developing agitation of the Communists in our army, who were trying to incorporate it with the Red Guards.
In the early days of April the tension on both sides increased. The Central Soviet Government was undoubtedly in a dilemma because the Germans and Austrians, seeing in our army the only military unit in Russia with any degree of cohesion, and fearing that our troops might actually reach France—which would mean a real danger, especially to the Habsburg Empire— ​had secured a clause in the peace of Brest-Litovsk by which Russia undertook not to allow on her territory any foreign or Allied armies, and they then exerted a strong pressure in this direction upon the Soviet Government. They hoped that in this way they would succeed in dispersing our army, and it seems that the Central Powers also instructed the Austro-Hungarian and German prisoners of war, especially in Siberia, to promote this policy.
Thus the lack of confidence on both sides, which was, I think, quite natural and comprehensible, increased until the inevitable conflict ensued. As early as April 13, 1918, at a military conference between a part of the leaders of our first division the majority were in favour of not handing over arms in future to the local Soviet authorities in accordance with the agreement between us and the Bolsheviks, but to proceed forcibly eastward, using, if necessary, other means than negotiation. The congress was, however, a confidential one, and officially the army knew nothing about its resolutions. The military leaders themselves had not trusted the Soviet authorities from the very beginning when the agreement of March 26th had come into force, and on their own initiative they had retained a quantity of arms exceeding the stipulated amount. The branch of the National Council was aware of this and tacitly sanctioned it. In other respects, however, both the branch of the National Council and the leaders of the army corps endeavoured loyally to fulfil the terms of the agreement with the Bolshevik Government.
Nevertheless, our army managed to proceed eastward during the month of April, although its progress was very slow and precarious. At the beginning of April some of the Allied military authorities devised a scheme by which a part of our army was to be transported to the Western front by way of Archangelsk. But this plan aroused fresh suspicions, uncertainty, and disputes in the ranks of our troops.(50) They had formed the idea that this was a trick on the part of the Bolshevik Government to divide them into two camps. They were also afraid that if the journey were made by sea from Archangelsk the Germans would get to know about the departure of the vessels and would sink the transports. It was certainly a tactical and political blunder that the Allied plan was not notified in time and in sufficient detail either to the Czech military leaders or the branch of the National Council in Moscow, but the negotiations on this subject were carried on between the Allied repre​sentatives in Russia and the Soviet authorities direct, and as a result of the agreement between them the Central Soviet Government issued an order that further transport. by way of Irkutsk was to be stopped. This order gave rise to the most varied conjectures among our troops, especially as at the same time the Soviet Government issued another order relating to the transport of German prisoners from Eastern to Western Siberia.
This decision caused much unrest among our troops, and it was not allayed even when inquiries in Moscow from the French representative there showed that the transport of the army located westward from Irkutsk was to be carried out by way of Archangelsk and Murmansk at the wish of the Soviet Government and the Allies. When this had been ascertained, the Moscow branch of the National Council decided to comply with this wish, and started negotiations with the Soviet Government on the necessary procedure. The essential details had already been arranged with the army commissary when unexpected events upset the results of the negotiations. For while these had been in progress, the now well-known incident at Chelyabinsk had occurred on May 14th. A Magyar prisoner of war had provocatively, and without reason, wounded a Czech soldier, whereupon our troops had retaliated by executing the offender. The Soviet authorities had then intervened and arrested several of our troops, and after unsuccessful attempts to secure their liberation by negotiating with the local Soviet authorities, the troops decided to free them by forcible means. Urged by the rank and file, the leaders sanctioned this step, and placed themselves at the head of the movement, as they feared that if it were carried out in a disorganized manner serious complications might ensue. They occupied the town, liberated the prisoners, and at once departed. The incident gave rise to serious military and political dealings between us and the Soviet Government, and had a considerable influence upon the development of our action in Siberia. In itself it was of no great significance, but it was one of those factors which bring accumulated tension to the breaking-point.
118
Although this tension did not lead to open hostility it caused both sides to make preparations for possible conflicts. The military congress summoned at Chelyabinsk, and started on May 18th, in accordance with the instructions given to the ​delegates, resolved in its negotiations on May 20th to decline to proceed to Archangelsk, since it regarded this scheme as a Bolshevik trick against the army. On the same day Trotsky ordered the arrest of Maxa and Čermák, the delegates of the Moscow branch of the National Council, who on the following day were to have made a definite arrangement with him for adjusting the progress of our troops eastward. Maxa and Čermák then sent a message to our troops urging them to keep to the agreement and to surrender their arms, as that would be the only course by which they could reach Vladivostok. Our troops, however, thought that this message had been sent as the result of pressure from the Soviet Government, and they refused to obey it. At the same time our military leaders intercepted Aralov’s telegram instructing the Soviet authorities to call upon the Czechoslovaks to organize themselves into labour brigades and to enter the ranks of the Soviet Red Army. This naturally aroused indignation among our troops, and on the next day, May 23rd, the military congress decided to inform the Bolshevik Government that they would cease handing over their arms to the Soviet authorities, and that they would force their way eastward. Evidently, as a reply to this resolution, Trotsky issued, on May 25th, the order to disarm the Czechoslovaks forcibly and to shoot all those who did not submit, the remainder to be interned in prisoners’ camps. On the same day, May 25th, evidently as a result of telegrams from Aralov and Trotsky, the first Soviet attempt was made at Maryanovets, near Omsk, to disarm a military transport, and on the two following days similar attempts were made at Irkutsk and Zlatoust, near Chelyabinsk. On the same days, in accordance with the resolution of the Chelyabinsk congress of May 23rd, Captain Kadlec and Captain Gajda decided to proceed eastward at their own discretion and to occupy Mariinsk and Novo-Nikolayevsk.
Thus began the Czechoslovak action in Siberia. On May 27th Chelyabinsk was occupied, on the 29th Penza was captured, on the 31st Tomsk, on June 6th and 7th Omsk, on June 8th Samara, and on June 19th Krasnoyarsk. The Czechoslovak action was at once resolutely opposed by the French military representatives, Vergé and Quinet, following the instructions from Paris by which they had been urged to secure the transport of our troops to France, and fearing that a conflict with the Bolsheviks would frustrate the realization of this scheme.
This throws a clear light upon our policy in Russia and in ​France, and it provides an answer to both schools of thought, i.e. those who blame us for not having intervened, and those who attack what they call our interventionist policy. It also answers those who explain that our action at that time in Siberia was the decisive factor which caused the Allies to adopt a definitely favourable attitude towards our movement. With regard to the view that our diplomatic recognition by the Allies and the decision as to the fate of the Habsburg Empire were brought about by our Siberian action against the Bolsheviks, I would say this: It by no means implies a disparagement of the great importance of our Siberian action if I state that this is not the case. It is an inaccurate conjecture. I was discussing the question of our Siberian army in Paris, and I saw every day the great importance that France attached to the transfer of our troops to the Western front, but not to their employment in Siberia. I negotiated in Paris, London, and Rome on the subject of our recognition, and in none of those centres was the question of our action against the Bolsheviks in Russia raised either by me or by the Allied Governments in this connection. This particular problem was always settled solely and exclusively within the limits of the general Allied policy towards the Habsburg Empire.
The army in Siberia played, of course, an important part, and in the course of my negotiations I always used it as an argument in our favour, just as I did our military movement in Italy and France, or the resistance of our nation to the Austro-Hungarian regime at home. In Paris no particular importance was attached to the incident at Chelyabinsk, and the action at the end of May was regarded as local in character. Our army in Siberia contributed towards our recognition and the decision as to the Habsburg Empire mainly by its mere existence. Its eastward march fitted in admirably, of course, with our strong propaganda in Western Europe and the United States. By this I do not mean that it did not render important services to Allied policy as a whole, especially by holding the Siberian line and preventing the return of the German and Austro-Hungarian prisoners, some of whom, at least, could have been used for military purposes again by the Central Powers. In my opinion, it is often forgotten that our Siberian army was our strongest political factor at the end of the war and during the Peace Conference. I made use of its retention in Siberia to win our peace terms.
​Against the attempts of the Central Soviet Government to disarm our troops and prevent them from proceeding to the East, the Allied representatives in Moscow, prompted by our action in Siberia, undertook a joint démarche on June 4, 1918, by declaring that as the Czechoslovaks were to be regarded as a constituent part of the Allied Army, any attempt to disarm them would be treated as a hostile act against the Allies. This was opposed on June 8, 1918, by Count Mirbach, the German Ambassador, who lodged a protest with the Soviet Government, demanding that the transport of our troops to the Western front should not be allowed, on the ground that it would infringe the commitments of the peace of Brest-Litovsk. On June 13th Chicherin, on behalf of the Soviet Government, replied in a note to the Allied representatives that the Czechoslovaks were supporting the Russian counter-revolutionaries and that, as this involved intervention into the internal affairs of Russia, the Soviet Government must insist upon their being disarmed.
The warfare which had arisen between our troops and the Bolsheviks accordingly continued. Towards the end of April 1918 the newspapers announced that the first consignments of our troops had reached Vladivostok. Thus, from the beginning of May, they were distributed from Rtishchev, Penza, and Samara up to Vladivostok, and afterwards, when fighting began, they formed three groups: The Penza group in Central Russia as far as the Urals; the Chelyabinsk group from the Urals to Omsk; and, finally, the eastern group reaching from Omsk by way of Irkutsk as far as Vladivostok. They had not yet gained possession of the Siberian Railway, having occupied only some of the main junctions. The sections between these junctions were in the hands of the Bolsheviks and their local authorities, who thus prevented the Czechoslovaks from occupying the line. Being continually harassed by the local Soviets, and fearing that they might be split up into separate groups without any mutual contact, the Czechoslovaks, especially after May 3rd, were anxious to establish an uninterrupted connection between the separate military groups, and also to secure continuous occupation of the railway line so as to be able to reach the sea without delay.
The struggle for the Siberian Railway was therefore continued. On June 29th Vladivostok, at the eastern extremity of the line, was occupied, and on July 4th Ufa, on the western extrem​ity, was captured. Within two days both our military groups, those of Penza and Chelyabinsk respectively, achieved the desired connection, and on July 7th the most important decision of our military leaders was reached. The executive committee of the Penza military group instructed Lieutenant Čeček to change the objective of his operation. The Penza Corps was not to continue its progress eastwards, but to remain where it was, and act as an Allied advance-guard for establishing a new Eastern front against the Germans. A report now reached Vladivostok that our second military group had been hindered in its free passage eastwards by the interference of Bolsheviks and prisoners of war. The Vladivostok group therefore decided, towards the end of June, to proceed to the help of their comrades. They refused to embark on the vessels which were now ready, and returned westwards, gaining possession of railway stations as they went, and occupying the eastern part of the Siberian railway line.
This is the beginning of the actual anti-Bolshevik action of the Czechoslovaks. It constituted a change of military and political plans and aims. The results showed themselves immediately. Our troops proceeded to attack Syzran, Saratov, and Kazan, advancing from the Ural base westwards. On August 6th ensued the long-prepared intervention of the Japanese, the original aim of which was to assist the Czechoslovaks in occupying the railway and reaching Vladivostok. In the course of events, however, the Japanese intervention changed its character, and assumed the form of an occupation of the eastern part of Siberia, partly to prevent the Bolsheviks from penetrating to the Far East and partly to secure a basis in the Far East for undertaking any extensive anti-Bolshevik operations which the Allies might decide upon.
Thus, as events developed, the Czechoslovaks, at the beginning of August, were distributed all along the Siberian line, continuing to engage in small-scale hostilities, and gradually occupying the important railway centres. At the most westerly extremity of the territory occupied in European Russia, at Kazan, Penza, and Samara, their regiments faced Bolshevik Russia and the Red Guards. On August 28, 1918, Jan Syrový was appointed supreme commander of our army, all the Russian officers, with very few exceptions, having left. In the middle of September the whole of the Siberian railway line was in the hands of our troops, and partly in those of the Japanese. ​At the same time, however, it was reported that the Bolshevik Government, having completed its military preparations, was inaugurating an advance against our legionaries.
At the beginning of October 1918 our troops on the Volga front realized that in their exposed position they would not be able to hold out for long against the pressure of the Bolsheviks. They were disappointed because no help had arrived from the Japanese or the rest of the Allies, and they saw that the anti-Bolshevik Russians were incapable of rallying for any firm resistance which might lead to a restoration of the Russian State authority. It was under these circumstances that on October 4th our troops began to retreat, first from Syzran then from Kazan and Samara. Our army was now wearied and discouraged, but the turn of the tide on the Western front in Europe, the recognition of the National Council in Paris as a Government, and the collapse of the Central Powers at the beginning of November 1918 saved the situation.
Koltchak’s coup d’état on November 18, 1918, removed our troops from military co-operation with the Russians. Not wishing to bear any responsibility for the internal events in Siberia, they gradually left the Volga front, handing it over to the Russians, and retaining only the railway for their own purposes. At the end of December the Czechoslovaks had definitely withdrawn from the Volga area. On December 30th Ufa was lost, and at the beginning of 1919 Generals Stefanik and Janin withdrew all our troops from the Russian anti-Bolshevik front. By this time, too, the Czechoslovaks, knowing that the war was at an end, and that their country had been liberated, were anxious to reach home with as little delay as possible.
The above is a concise account of our Siberian anabasis. It was a remarkable exploit from a military and a human point of view, while in a political respect it was of great significance. In Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia our common soldiers had joined the Austro-Hungarian regiments, they had then passed over to the ranks of the Russians, and after severe hardships and sufferings the greater part of them, amid the chaos of revolution, had entered the improvised volunteer organizations, in which for some time they fought against the very people whom they had just left. Then, under the auspices of their great leader, they set out on their march across the vast spaces of Russia and Siberia; they occupied close upon 8,000 kilometres of railway, little by little, fighting against all kinds of ​hostile forces, until at last, after traversing the entire globe, they might reach the Western front in Europe to take part in the battles for their nation’s freedom. In many respects their story is a unique one, and while this long series of adventures and vicissitudes was in progress they improvised, not only the military organization, but also the economic and educational aspects of their legions. Their leaders were men who, though fundamentally non-military in their inclination, adapted themselves with the determination and energy of their race to the rigours of the situation.
On the whole our troops may be taken as representing the chief features of the Czech national character. They exhibited its vitality, its perseverance, its common-sense methods of handling a situation, but at the same time its tendencies towards contentiousness and undue sensitiveness. This, incidentally, applies also to the majority of our troops in France and Italy.
General Syrový was a favourable type of the Czechoslovak leader. He inspired the confidence of the rank and file by his straightforwardness and sound judgment. The troops knew that a man of this kind would never lead them into rash and aimless adventures. By his military achievements, which can be appraised only in a more specialized account of our anabasis in Siberia, he rendered invaluable services to our liberation movement.
(c) First Negotiations with the British Government for the Recognition of the Czechoslovak National Council
119
After Masaryk’s departure for Russia in May 1917 I visited England from time to time for the purpose of keeping in touch with our friends in London, and ensuring that the London office of the National Council continued to work in uniformity with the secretariat in Paris. Masaryk had entrusted me with the management of our political affairs during his absence, and had given me authority to carry on any negotiations which might be necessary with the Government in London. Here, too, Olga Masaryk participated in our political work. As I have already mentioned, I left for London on May 7th, as I considered that after recent events this was a suitable time for attempting to ​improve our position still further by direct negotiations with the British Government.
I remained in London until May 19th, and the negotiations which I conducted during that period with Lord Balfour and Lord Robert Cecil represent the first decisive step on the part of England which promoted our national and political aims. I was asked to call on Lord Balfour on Friday, May 10, 1918. Having been introduced by Mr. Wickham Steed, I outlined the situation in Austria-Hungary, and particularly in Bohemia, giving also an account of our movement abroad, with special reference to the attitude of the French Government towards our efforts. At the same time I asked for the recognition of the National Council as an outward sign that the British Government was in agreement with our war aims. I also asked for our army to be recognized to the same extent as in France. Finally, I pointed out that Great Britain had already made a number of concessions to the Poles, and that we were equally entitled to some such consideration. At Lord Balfour’s request I then submitted two memoranda in which I had explained the juridical situation of the National Council in France and Italy, and the significance of the military instructions signed by Clemenceau on February 7th.
Knowing that the British were guarded in their attitude towards Austro-Hungarian affairs, and not wishing therefore to precipitate matters, I asked only for an undertaking that the British Government would not oppose the policy of the other Allies in our affairs, and that it would at least follow their lead in anything which was done on our behalf.
After our first interview Lord Balfour declared that he personally was an adherent of the anti-Austrian and anti-Hungarian policy. He fully recognized our endeavour to establish an army in France and Italy, and admitted that we had formed the only element in Russia which had shown itself able to cope with the Bolshevik chaos, and had held out longest on the Eastern front against the Germans. Having then asked for a written statement of the questions which I had submitted to him, he promised that within the next few days he would be able to tell whether he could sanction our policy by recognizing the National Council and granting an open documentary undertaking with regard to our military aspirations. I reminded him that the French Government had already promised me a public political manifesto on our behalf at an early date, and also its ​agreement with any joint Allied manifesto in our favour which might be made. I therefore asked him that, should there be any negotiations with the Allies on this subject, Great Britain might not oppose an Allied collective manifesto of this kind.
I negotiated also with Lord Robert Cecil, to whom I submitted the same demands. The negotiations at once took a very favourable turn. Lord Robert considered the possibility of a political manifesto which would apply to our nation and our army, and he linked this up with the general question of the use of our troops within the scope of Allied military operations as a whole. He took the view that a manifesto of this kind could not be regarded as a promise that fighting would be continued until we were liberated (as in the case of Belgium), but merely the eventual recognition of the sovereignty of the National Council and of our army as an Allied army. I expressed my agreement with this conception of the situation.
The decisive negotiations with Lord Robert Cecil on the subject of political recognition and the utilization of our army took place on May 15th and 17th, when I explained our point of view to him: The Czechoslovak National Council had made an arrangement with France by which our troops, numbering about 30,000 at a minimum, were to be transferred to that country. We insisted upon carrying this out, although we were to fight also on the Eastern front if it should be renewed. The transport of these troops, however, would have to be taken into account, and in this respect Britain, in particular, was to afford assistance. In view of the precarious conditions of our troops in Siberia, it was desirable that they should receive moral encouragement by a solemn declaration recognizing the unity of our army on all fronts. This would acknowledge us as Allies on an equal footing with the rest of the minor Allies.
In my decisive interview with Lord Robert Cecil on May 15th, when for the first time he admitted the possibility that Great Britain would recognize us as Allies actually during the war, it seemed to me that there was a marked divergency of views between France and Britain as regards our Siberian army. France, needing at home every possible soldier, took her stand upon the resolutions passed at Abbeville, and demanded the transfer of our Siberian army to the Western Front. The British, as I then conjectured, fearing the pressure of the Bolsheviks eastward, had, for the time being, exhibited merely a tendency to maintain our troops in Eastern Siberia chiefly to limit the ​advance of the Bolshevik military action and propaganda towards the Far East, and also with a view to the possibility of renewing the Eastern front against the Germans.
Lord Robert Cecil asked me direct whether we would not prefer to leave our troops in Siberia for these purposes. I answered him by explaining our point of view: We wanted to arrange the transport of at least 30,000 of our troops to France in accordance with our original agreement. We had, of course, no objection to an arrangement by which our troops in the East would, jointly with the Allies, renew the Eastern front against Germany, if any such Allied action were really to be reckoned with.
Although the whole matter was left at this stage, I regarded these negotiations as a considerable success for our cause in England.(51) At a second interview on May 17th Lord Robert Cecil spoke in even clearer terms than before, indicating his resolution not only as regards us, but also in the affairs of the Jugoslavs and of Austria-Hungary in general.
During my visit to England on this occasion I met also Lord Milner, to whom I was introduced by Lady Muriel Paget. I asked him to enter into official touch with our army by assigning a military attaché or possibly a military mission to it and also to the National Council in Paris. I also asked him to allow all the Czechoslovak soldiers in the English and Canadian Armies to be transferred to our army in France.
The result of these negotiations was favourable on the whole. Demand after demand was complied with by the British authorities, just as I had been promised by Lord Balfour, Lord Robert Cecil, and Lord Milner. A few days after my visit, on May 22, 1918, Lord Robert Cecil made a speech at a demonstration to commemorate the entry of Italy into the war; and on behalf of the British Foreign Secretary he expressed his gratification at the agreement reached between Italy and the Jugoslavs as a result of the Congress of Rome, and he stated that one of the aims of Allied policy must be the liberation of all oppressed peoples from the Austro-Hungarian yoke. He also expressed his satisfaction at what Italy and France had conceded to the Czechoslovaks, a remark which tended to emphasize still further the significance of our negotiations in London.
In accordance with the undertakings entered into by Lord Balfour and Lord Robert Cecil, the Foreign Office in London transmitted to the National Council in Paris a communication ​confirming its policy towards us, recognizing the National Council and our army, and stating that in this respect it would adopt the same measures as the other Allied countries. The British War Office also complied with all my requests. It appointed a special military mission to be assigned to our army, at the head of which was General Spears.
The Foreign Office communication is as follows:
Sir,
In reply to the memoranda with which you were so good as to furnish me on the roth and 11th instant, I have the honour to assure you that His Majesty’s Government, who have every possible sympathy with the Czechoslovak movement, will be glad to give the same recognition to this movement as has been granted by the Governments of France and Italy.
His Majesty’s Government will thus be prepared to recognize the Czechoslovak National Council as the supreme organ of the Czechoslovak movement in Allied countries, and they will also be prepared to recognize the Czechoslovak Army as an organized unit operating in the Allied cause, and to attach thereto a British liaison officer so soon as the need for this may arise.
His Majesty’s Government will at the same time be prepared to accord to the National Council political rights concerning the civil affairs of Czechoslovaks similar to those already accorded to the Polish National Committee.
I have to add that the above decisions have been communicated to the Allied Governments concerned.
I am, sir, Your obedient servant, Arthur James Balfour.
Dr. Beneš, Thanet House, 231, Strand, London.
120
I returned to Paris on May 2oth. One of my fellow-travellers on this occasion was the English general, Delmé-Radcliffe, who was conveying to the French Government the reports from Lord Robert Cecil on the results of my negotiations in London. As far as I could judge from my conversation with General ​Radcliffe on the journey, Lord Robert Cecil, on behalf of the British Government, had indicated the possibility of an agreement with France on the subject of our Siberian army and its utilization in accordance with the British point of view, as suggested to me in London. On the following day I was summoned to the Quai d’Orsay, where, in discussing the matter with Pichon and Berthelot, I clearly realized the divergencies on this point which had arisen between the two Governments.
My point of view coincided on the whole with that of France, where public opinion and the majority of the politicians regarded the position in Russia and on the Eastern front as hopeless. They had little confidence in the possibility of renewing the front there, and considered these attempts as a scheme whose chief purpose was to protect the interests of the British Empire.
On the following day I was sent for by Clemenceau who, as Minister of War, discussed with me the question of our Siberian army and my negotiations on the subject in London. His attitude in this respect was identical with that of Pichon and Berthelot. In the course of this conversation I emphasized our political aims to Clemenceau, who repeated the promise which he had made to me a month previously after my return from Rome. He also referred me to Pichon who, he said, shared his views on this matter, and he spoke in such emphatic and decisive terms that I considered it essential to quote a portion of this interview in the report which I sent immediately afterwards to Prague, in order to encourage our people there to continue their struggle against the Empire.(52)
It had been arranged between the British and French Governments that, in the week between May 2oth and 30th, a special conference was to be held in London as a preliminary to the Allied conference which was to be held at Versailles on June 1st, and at which, it was assumed, the question of a joint policy in Austro-Hungarian and Polish affairs was to be discussed. In view of this fact, the subject of our army would have to be discussed between France and Britain almost immediately.
In view of the fact that our 21st regiment, which was stationed at Cognac, was very shortly to proceed to the front, the French Ministry of War suggested to me that this would be a suitable opportunity for organizing the demonstration which had been proposed, and that on this occasion the French view of the Czechoslovak question could be solemnly pronounced. ​This was all the easier because, in the meanwhile, the organization of the Polish Army in France had made considerable progress, and an analogous demonstration was just being prepared in favour of the Poles. Accordingly, a fundamental agreement was reached on this point, and the details were to be arranged subsequently between the Ministry and myself. The date of the demonstration was fixed for June 15th.
Ever since the Congress of Rome I, in common with our friends in Paris and London, had not lost sight of the possibility of a collective Allied declaration in favour of the oppressed peoples. The recent negotiations in Paris and London, and still more the events in Siberia, had increased my hopes of the success of such a scheme. The Chelyabinsk incident, its immediate consequences, the arrest of Maxa and Čermák, and Trotsky’s order to disarm our troops had resulted in a situation which tended to imperil the scheme for transporting our army to France, and for this reason the attention which Paris was devoting to the matter had been redoubled. It was just about this time that I had applied to Berthelot for help in this connection, and the joint Allied intervention had taken place at Moscow on June 4th.
121
The preliminary Franco-British conference was held at London on May 26 and 27, 1918. Those present included Lloyd George, Balfour, Robert Cecil, and Field-Marshal Wilson, representing Great Britain; and Pichon, Paul Cambon, and a number of military authorities, representing France.
At the conference it was agreed that on the subject of our army the resolutions of the Abbeville conference should, on principle, be adhered to, i.e. our troops were to be transferred as soon as possible from Russia to the Western front, while in the Far East the Allies would make common cause with them, and co-operate with them as necessity arose. The transport was to be effected partly by way of Vladivostok and America, partly by way of Archangelsk. If necessary a portion of the army would remain in Russia to hold the Archangelsk base. These questions were to be discussed at the forthcoming meeting of the Supreme Military Council at Versailles.
The possibility of an Allied declaration in favour of the Austro-Hungarian nations and on the Polish question was also discussed in some detail. Such a declaration would form the ​first public evidence that the Allies had now definitely ceased to contemplate the possibility of preserving the Habsburg Empire. According to my information, the British Government accepted the French proposal that such a declaration should be made, the nations in question being the Poles, Czechoslovaks, and Jugoslavs. With regard to the latter, however, it was emphasized that any definite decision on their question could be taken only after Italy had been consulted, and this was to be done also at the Versailles conference.
As previously arranged, the conference was held on June 1, 1918. After a discussion on Austro-Hungarian and Polish affairs, the following joint declaration was issued:
The formation of a unified and independent Polish State, with a free access to the sea, constitutes one of the conditions for a permanent and just peace and the rule of justice in Europe.
The Allied Governments have with satisfaction taken note of the declaration of the State Secretary of the United States, and desire to associate themselves with it, expressing their keenest sympathies for the national aspirations of the Czechoslovak and Jugoslav peoples.
The incomplete character of this declaration caused general disappointment. The original plan of all those who had attended the Congress of Rome was to secure from the Allies a common programme which should apply to all the oppressed nations in equally emphatic terms. Its purport was to be a definite condemnation of Austria-Hungary, the overthrow of which it should tend to bring about. We were hoping that this idea would emerge triumphant from the Versailles conference, and that the Allies would finally give open expression to a policy which they were individually carrying out with us against the Empire. France had given us a promise in this respect, and was working on behalf of this scheme. Our negotiations with England as to the utilization of the Czechoslovak Army, together with Lord Balfour’s letter which was the sequel to them, and also the proceedings between the French and British Governments at the London meeting, had likewise given us hope that the British point of view in matters of Central European policy was now firmly established.
But as will be seen from the wording of the declaration, it was very moderate in tone, and it was formulated divergently for each of the nations concerned. It had been accepted as a compromise after a long debate on account of the ​opposition of the Italian delegates who at that juncture were unwilling to go to greater lengths. But it did not amount to very much, and as far as we were concerned it was of less consequence than Lord Balfour’s letter. The Allies were merely repeating the proclamation made by the United States Department of State to their Governments on May 29, 1918, which happened to reach Paris while the conference was being held, and thus provided a temporary solution of the political difficulty encountered at the conference. The most that can be said of this declaration is that it forms an outward and visible sign that the Allies had changed their policy towards the Habsburg Empire, and it expresses the developments which had taken place in this respect during the months of April and May 1918.
122
The declaration of the Versailles conference caused dissatisfaction in all those political circles in Paris, London, and Rome which were working for a decisive policy against Austria-Hungary. The unsatisfactory character of the declaration was attributed mainly to the negative policy of Italy towards the Jugoslavs, but a number of our mistrustful friends were also inclined to wonder how far this result was due to the concealed activity of those who within the Allied ranks were seeking to save the Habsburg monarchy.
I myself expressed our sense of disappointment immediately after the conference to the Italian Ambassador in Paris, pointing out that the Italian policy had hindered the advance of our cause with the Allied Governments, and that Italy should have been the very country to support our anti-Habsburg policy in France. As a reply to my intervention with the ambassador I received on June 4, 1918, an invitation from Orlando to an audience at the Italian Embassy in Paris. This took the form of a long conversation at which both Sonnino and Bonin Longare were also present, and it was one of my most interesting political experiences during the war. The two Italian ministers formulated !to me the principles of their attitude towards Czechoslovak affairs, and the extremely cordial and friendly conversation with them left me with a clear impression that Italy was particularly anxious not to be in any way a hindrance to the progress of the Czechoslovak movement for liberation. The ministers gave me the following account of the attitude ​they had adopted and the measures they had taken hitherto in matters concerning Austria-Hungary:
(a) They were opposed so far to any collective declaration on the part of the Allies because the Jugoslav-Italian dispute had not yet been definitely settled.
(b) They had no objection if one or other of the Allied States were to adopt a decisive attitude on the Czechoslovak question, but they desired to reserve independence of action for Italy. The Versailles conference had been unable to arrive at any decisive manifesto on behalf of the Czechoslovaks because this would have meant a similar manifesto for the Jugoslavs. It had been impossible to draw any distinction between the two cases. But the Jugoslav questions had not yet reached a sufficiently advanced stage to make possible any decisive manifesto in their favour. Sonnino, in particular, emphasized the fact that this did not at all imply that Italy was opposed to the Czechoslovak demands. On the contrary, as early as April 21st, Orlando and Štefánik had signed the agreement relating to our army in Italy, and on May 24th a demonstration had been arranged in Rome, when the colours were handed to the Czechoslovak regiment, on which occasion Orlando had made a speech expressing good will to the Czechoslovak cause.
(c) Italy did not wish to create a situation prejudicial to Jugoslav interests by a manifesto on behalf of the Czechoslovaks. Nor did she wish, in such questions as this which were so important to her, to be à la remorque d’une autre puissance, i.e. to be towed along by another Power. She would make her decision in these questions according to the circumstances dictated by her political needs and interests.
(d) When I insisted upon the community of our interests, both Orlando and Sonnino laid stress upon the identity of Italian and Czechoslovak interests with regard to Austria-Hungary, and stated that they were genuinely concerned for the liberation of the Czechoslovak people. Orlando, at the same time, asserted that in Czechoslovak matters Italy was resolved to go to the last extremities, that she would make her decision to this effect at the appropriate moment according to the political situation, and that in any case she would demonstrate her favourable attitude towards the Czechoslovak cause by her action.
123
Under these circumstances what I aimed at was rather that the French Government, apart from the other Allies, should carry out the terms of its own declaration. After the disappointing results of the attempt to obtain a joint Allied declaration for all the oppressed peoples, I decided to leave this scheme alone and to secure recognition at least for ourselves. With this end in view I therefore redoubled the preliminary activities in the secretariat of the National Council which were being made for the handing of the colours to our 21st regiment. It was the plan of the French Government that on this occasion the President of the Republic should deliver an important speech by which France would be definitely identified with the idea of a Czechoslovak State. I gratefully accepted the French plan which had been arranged and carried out in the same form with the Polish Army, but I could not help thinking that after the proceedings at the Versailles conference it was hardly enough for our purpose. Moreover, I had always given a slightly different interpretation to the promise which Clemenceau had made in April 1918. I therefore wanted something beyond a mere demonstration, however important it might be in a propagandist and political respect. My purpose was to secure a binding political and diplomatic charter as a responsible Government, which would give us a full and final recognition of national independence and sovereignty. Such a document as this would be a substitute for the joint Allied declaration which we had hitherto been unable to obtain.
The question as to what was to be included in the French manifesto formed the subject of long discussions at the Foreign Ministry with de Margerie, Berthelot, and Degrand, the result of which I summarized in a communication to the Ministry. In this document I asked for the following details to be included in the declaration:
(a) The recognition of our historical rights to a State within its historical frontiers, and a substantiation of our claim by reference to the action of our soldiers, our people, and our politicians against Austria-Hungary during the war.
​(b) An express reference to the Slovaks to make it clear that one of the points at issue was the destruction of Hungarian unity and the union of the Slovaks as inhabitants of a component part of the historical areas in a single Czechoslovak State.
(c) The recognition of the National Council as representing the sovereignty of the whole nation, so as to make it clear that a Czechoslovak State was gradually being established with all appropriate attributes, and that the National Council was the first ingredient of its future Government which would later on be set up in its own country.
(d) The alignment of our question with that of the Jugoslavs and Poles in order to accentuate the international importance of this document, and to emphasize the solidarity of all three nations in the struggle against the Habsburg Empire.
Up to the last moment before the demonstration took place the Quai d’Orsay raised a number of objections to my demands.
There had never actually been any rooted objection to the declaration. The only point was to find a suitable opportunity for it, and to decide upon its form and substance. On June 26th I had a long discussion with Degrand on the subject of its exact wording, and on the following day he asked me to call at the Quai d’Orsay, where he submitted for my approval the definite text which the Ministry proposed to send me. The presentation of the colours had been arranged to take place on June 30th at Darney in Alsace, and on the day before leaving to take part in the ceremony, Pichon, in accordance with the agreement between us, sent me a declaration which manifested so generous an attitude towards our cause that it had an overwhelming effect on us in the Rue Bonaparte when we received it on June 29th at about one o’clock in the afternoon.(53) Again and again in my excitement I read the words: “The Government of the Republic will make its utmost efforts in order, at a given moment, to fulfil your aspirations for independence within the historical frontiers of your territories.” Again and again I read the words acknowledging our rights, expressing the desires and obligations of the French Government, acknowledging our activities, efforts, and struggles. And I felt that now we had reached an important stage in the struggle, in the victorious struggle.
The attitude of the French Government towards our inde​pendence was exhibited with equal clearness and emphasis in President Poincaré’s speech also. This speech, to which I should like to add a few remarks, formed the culminating point of the presentation of the colours to our 21st regiment. The ceremony itself was attended by the President of the Republic, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ministers Leygues and Lebrun, military representatives of the Allies, representatives of the municipality of Paris, General Castelnau, General Janin, and others. I first delivered an address to the troops on behalf of the National Council, and this was followed by the President’s speech. I still remember most vividly the preparation for this ceremony. It was the first occasion during the struggle for our independence upon which I found myself in an official situation as a representative of the independent State. It is therefore not surprising if I still recall with emotion that memorable ceremony at Darney on June 30th: the spectacle of our troops marching past the President, the ministers, and generals, and proclaiming their vow, the officers with drawn swords and the rank and file by raising the fingers of their right hand, that they would return home as free men or else die on the French battlefield. I experienced similar emotions on the Italian front in the Tyrolese Alps at the beginning of October 1918, and also on the French front in Champagne with the army of General Gourand, when on November 8th I paid a visit to our troops at Terron. It was at Darney that for the first time I felt confident of victory, while in the Alps above Rovereto I surmised the approaching end of the Habsburg monarchy, and at Terron it was my privilege to inform the troops that we had been victorious in our struggle for freedom, and that they were to prepare for the journey to their liberated country.
124
As I have already pointed out, I was at that time concerned about something more than a merely French proclamation. Being always preoccupied by the necessity for a clearly formulated common policy of the Allies, and still feeling some misgivings as to various peace manœuvres with Austria, we continued to seek a method of securing, either directly or indirectly, an Allied commitment of solidarity against Austria-Hungary. The endeavour to obtain a collective declaration of all the Allies in favour of all the oppressed peoples had not been successful, as we have seen, and to begin with I therefore ​restricted my plan to a collective proclamation on behalf of Czechoslovakia. Should this fail, it was my intention to adopt the tactics of obtaining recognition from the Allies individually and successively by using the successes achieved with one for obtaining similar concessions from another. Accordingly, in my personal negotiations, and also in my note of June 26th, I had asked the French Government on the occasion of the manifesto for Czechoslovakia not only to grant us its special diplomatic charter, but to induce the other Allies to associate themselves with the French manifesto in some form or other. I pointed out that, as far as Great Britain was concerned, the preliminaries had been prepared, as Lord Balfour's letter sent to the National Council on June 3rd stated that Great Britain would grant Czechoslovakia the same recognition as the other Allies did. As for Italy, I knew from my recent interview with Orlando and Sonnino that, owing to their dispute with the Jugoslavs, the Italians would not modify their attitude towards a collective Allied declaration on behalf of all the nations of the Habsburg Empire, but I hoped that the Italian Government would not regard it as prejudicial to Italian interests merely to associate itself with the French manifesto for the Czech cause.
The French Foreign Ministry granted me its sanction for the proposed measures, and on June 27, 1918, I arranged with de Margerie and Degrand the wording of the telegrams which were to be sent to London and Rome respectively. In these telegrams the French Government notified the two Allies what it proposed to do on behalf of the Czech cause within the next few days, and asked them to associate themselves by declarations of their own with the speech of the President of the Republic at the ceremony of presenting the colours to the Czechoslovak Army on the French front. At the same time I approached Lord Derby, the British Ambassador in Paris, and Bonin Longare, the Italian Ambassador there, asking them to use their influence to secure the support of their Governments for our demand. I also informed Mr. Sharp, the American Ambassador, and Mr. Frazer, his Counsellor of Legation, about what had been done in connection with the ceremony of presenting the colours.
The British Government, in fulfilment of Lord Balfour’s promise to me, replied on July 1st by a special communication to Pichon. This was a reply to Pichon’s telegram, the contents of which were analogous, and it was of great importance to us ​since it showed that England was maintaining the line of policy she had adopted. It also indicated the hope of Great Britain that the French policy towards the Czechoslovaks would be applied also to the Jugoslavs and Poles, the reference to whom in the French and English telegrams was intended as a reminder to Italy. This was the period at which a severe diplomatic struggle on the Jugoslav question was being waged in Paris and London with the Italians, and the successful progress of our cause was thus helpful to the Jugoslavs also.
125
Our confidence in the approaching victory thus became stronger and stronger, and was confirmed by the further course of events. The most striking of these was the new declaration of the United States Government, which now made its appearance at the most opportune moment. It will be remembered that under the influence of the Congress of Rome the United States Government had made a declaration of sympathy for the Czechoslovak and Jugoslav causes, and this was taken as the basis for the Allied declaration at the Versailles conference on June 1, 1918. On the same day upon which the telegrams of Pichon and Balfour were issued, we unexpectedly received from Washington this new declaration which formed a supplement to, and a commentary on, the previous American declaration of May 29th. In it the United States Government definitely identified itself with our claim to complete independence, and coming when it did, immediately after Pichon’s declaration, it brought us fresh encouragement in our struggle against Austria. I regarded it as a further indication that the end was now approaching.
The official relations between the National Council and the Serbian Government, the Russian Embassy (which had been officiating in Paris since the time of Kerensky’s regime), and with the Polish National Committee, made it necessary for me to inform them of the declaration of the French Government and all the developments which had arisen from it. I did this in a communication in which I undisguisedly expressed my assurance that these events denoted the approach of our national victory. I received replies from Vesnić, the Serbian Minister; Maklakov, the Russian Ambassador; and Dmowski, the President of the Polish Committee, all of which tended to strengthen our confidence.
​Baron Sonnino, the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, did not associate himself with the French declaration. His point of view, as expressed to me in a conversation at the Italian Embassy on June 5th, was to be applied also to the present case, as I now realized.
(f) My Message to Prague
126
After having completed all the negotiations in Paris, which I have previously described, and while preparing for my journey to London, where I intended to start analogous proceedings for securing recognition by the British Government, I sent the following message to Dr. Šámal in Prague on July 8, 1918:
“On June 28, 1918, we attained our greatest political success hitherto. Pichon sent Beneš a letter in which he recognizes us as independent, emphasizing all our historical rights and also the Slovak question, and engaging France to take every step to enable us at the Peace Conference to achieve all our aims. The National Council is, moreover, regarded as the delegation of a provisional Government, and Pichon also draws attention to the necessity of a joint policy with the Jugoslavs and Poles. As a result of the letter it has been arranged with the Foreign Ministry to establish an actual State structure so that we may at once come into existence via facti as a State, and proceed to the peace negotiations as such.
“The idea with regard to the delegation of a provisional Government denotes, as far as we are concerned, that the other portion of this Government exists in a latent form at home, and will at once be established there as soon as it is necessary and possible. Hence the importance of unity and co-operation with us. It would be fatal for you to do anything not in accordance with our policy here, otherwise we should be compelled to leave the whole matter and resign. It would be a catastrophe if there were no unity now when we have achieved all our political aims.
“Regard the National Council, therefore, as the first ingredient of the Government which, at the first opportunity, will be formed at home. This ingredient here now represents the whole Government. Explain this idea to all our parties. We here are advocating it, and accordingly we can justifiably advocate all ​the interests of the nation as an actual Government, besides at once creating a whole State mechanism long before the Peace Conference. We shall set up a Legation and Consular service, together with a financial system, and we shall have a State loan.
“Pichon’s letter is a commitment and a total recognition of our rights and demands, denoting the absolute victory of our policy here. Hence we shall act accordingly, but you at home must also proceed on the same lines. England has likewise given her recognition and sanction to this policy. There is thus no need to have any misgivings in a political respect. In Italy General Štefánik (he has just been appointed General) has achieved great successes, involving the absolute recognition of our rights to such an extent that we have even our own jurisdiction. Everything, then, is going very well here. Masaryk is in America. He has spoken several times with Wilson, and informs me that our cause there has been won so completely that Wilson and the American Government have promised not to make any fundamental decisions on Austro-Hungarian affairs without us or without our approval.
“In a military respect our cause is doing well; we have a total of about 120,000 men under arms,(54) and our chief concern is to have as many of them as possible at the moment of the negotiation. Austria has sustained a crushing defeat in Italy, and her loses are said to amount to 270,000. Here the military point at issue now is that of intervention in Russia, which will certainly be undertaken, and in which we will play a definite part. The decisive factor is American help, which is being counted upon here a great deal. That will decide the war. Be prepared as far as possible about the end of November for the possibility of a blow against Germany and Austria. In any case, we shall certainly let you know all details in good time.
“It is impossible to reckon with certainty upon a great blow against the Central Powers in the spring, but at that time we here must take into account the possibility of a revolution in Austria. Let everything be prepared in this sense. Have absolute confidence in our victory, in spite of the fact that the military situation is now grave. Politically we have gained such prestige that we cannot be deserted.
“We ask you to cause the action of the Catholics for the dynasty to be stopped, as that is doing us great harm here. Inform the Socialists that we are now backed by the chief set ​of Socialists in Italy, France, and England, and that they are co-operating very well with us, esepcially in France (Albert Thomas).
“Masaryk will arrive in Paris in the second half of August. There is no need to have any fears about our army in Russia. Hitherto they have gained the day everywhere, they are supported by the Allies, and the reports in the German papers are tendencious or fabricated.
“We need news from you about the economic position of Austria-Hungary and Germany, the results of the harvest, the present military strength of Austria-Hungary, and the possibility of a revolt or sabotage. We are sending almost immediately a scheme for direct action.”
All my messages home were written in moments of feverish work or under the impending events relating to our cause. This is clear, I think, in the above report. In particular it shows how the political plans and views as to our further procedure were assuming a precise form, and how the decisive moment for the proclamation of our freedom was being consciously and systematically prepared. That was always most in my thoughts, and in Paris, London, and Rome my chief purpose was that when we did make a declaration of independence, it would not be merely a theoretical step, but a real political success and a death-blow to the Habsburg Empire.