# My War Memoirs/Chapter 14

XIV
TRIUMPH OF THE POLICY OF SELF-DETERMINATION
(a) Our Co-operation with the Jugoslavs
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While the idea of national liberation formed the theoretical basis from which the Congress originated, the preliminary arrangements in connection with it showed that the practical incentive which led to its being convened was the endeavour to settle the Jugoslav-Italian controversy. The other nations from Austria-Hungary were successively approached when it was realized, bit by bit, how the Jugoslav-Italian dispute was connected with the whole problem of the Habsburg Empire, and thus also with the future of the other Central European nations who were struggling for freedom. When, finally, our Italian friends understood Italy’s direct interest in attempting, during the war, to settle her attitude towards the whole group of problems which would involve the dismemberment of the Habsburg Empire, i.e. the relation of Italy towards the Czechoslovaks, the Poles, and the Rumanians in their future independent status, they themselves acknowledged the necessity for common action on the part of us all.
In the early years of the war the need for such co-operation was not properly realized even by those nationalities whose interests were closely affected by it. The dismemberment of the Habsburg Empire was not looked upon as a problem of urgent political interest, especially as the émigrés during the initial period of their exile were absorbed almost entirely with organizing their own national movements. The mutual relationship and interdependence of all these problems in their earlier phases were not understood sufficiently as to bring about common and systematic co-operation on the part of all the interested nationalities.
The rapprochement of the Central European nations in their struggle for liberty was thus a gradual process, and it was not until the end of 1917 that there was any considerable amount of organized co-operation between them and Italy. ​Between the Jugoslavs and ourselves, of course, there had been a close and amicable contact and work in common from the very beginning of the war. With the Poles, too, we had been in touch from the outset, and occasionally we had exchanged views with them while, notably after the outbreak of the Russian revolution, there had been a certain amount of co-operation between us. Until the Congress of Rome, however, there had been comparatively little contact between the Poles and the Jugoslavs, while the Rumanians did not join the movement until after their reverses in the first half of 1917.
Before describing the events associated with the Congress of Rome, I will say a few words about our co-operation with the Jugoslavs, Poles, and Rumanians during the war, both in its general aspects, and also with regard to my own part in it. I have already stated that we had shared activities with the Jugoslavs from the beginning of the war. This was a matter of course, being a natural consequence of the pre-war traditions and policy of the two nations. Our interests were identical, we were comparatively well-acquainted with each other, we had always taken action in common within the Habsburg Empire, and during the war Vienna and Budapest adopted the same methods against us. Masaryk, who was at the head of our movement, was personally acquainted with many of the Jugoslav politicians, and his pre-war participation in all their struggles formed a significant link between us. He was highly esteemed by the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes alike, who valued his judgment and sought his advice. Masaryk himself has given a detailed account of his work with the Jugoslavs, and I will therefore refer to these matters only as far as I myself was concerned in them.
The Jugoslav problem presented more difficulties to the Allies than did ours or that of the Rumanians. Serbia had differences with Bulgaria and the Habsburg Empire, as well as with Italy. In addition, there were the problems of Montenegro and Albania, to say nothing of the internal dissensions among the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes themselves. Little was known about these matters, and much propaganda work had to be carried on in order that the official circles, and also the public opinion in the Allied countries, might obtain a proper idea of the points at issue. The future of the Croatian and Slovene territories was, of course. closely bound up with ​that of the Habsburg Empire, and this circumstance united the work of the Jugoslavs with our own. Accordingly, from the beginning, we worked in common, transforming our two national problems into a single cause. Our work was carried on in the same surroundings, and we gained the same friends and helpers. We were in practically daily contact with each other, and this lasted until the end of the war.
We Czechoslovak émigrés were in the same position as the Jugoslavs from Austria-Hungary, who, to a certain extent, acted independently of the officially recognized Serbs. As compared with ourselves, however, they had the advantage, especially in the early part of the war, of being backed by an independent State already existing, but it was not long before differences arose between them and official Serbia, as well as with Italy, and hence also with the rest of the Allies. This made work difficult for them, and it also caused considerable embarrassments to Serbia and often to ourselves as well.
The Jugoslav Committee, under the leadership of Trumbić, Supilo, and Hinković, often reproached official Serbia, which for all practical purposes meant Pašić, for its lukewarm policy in the problem of unification. For some time Pašić was suspected by a number of people, including Supilo, of deliberately working for the unification of only the orthodox Jugoslavs. During the period from 1916 to 1917, Trumbić had similar misgivings, and on more than one occasion he confided to me his troubles in this respect.
What formed a more dangerous obstacle to the aims of our Jugoslav friends was the Jugoslav-Italian disagreement. The Allies had rewarded Italy for entering the war against Austria-Hungary by the London Pact, which was concluded on April 24, 1915. All the Jugoslavs waged a most resolute struggle against the Pact from its very inception. It thus gave rise to the protracted Jugoslav-Italian dissension, the history and consequences of which are now familiar enough, and it must be regarded as one of the great mistakes made by the Allies during the war.
The attitude of the Jugoslav Committee in both these matters was uncompromising. The policy which they consistently pursued involved complete national unification, as well as a logical application of the principle of nationality to the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary. It also emphasized the strength and significance of the Croatian-Slovene element, ​for which it demanded complete equality with the Serbs. The dispute was complicated by the action of the Croats in Austria, and particularly by the very vigorous manner in which the Croatian troops had fought against Italy. This circumstance was adduced against the Jugoslav Committee as a proof that the Croatians and Slovenes were really pro-Austrian. The Committee, on the other hand, made use of this to show that the London Pact was untenable, but many Italians regarded this proceeding of the Committee as implying approval of the anti-Italian attitude of the Croatian troops, for which they therefore blamed the Committee. This led to suspicions, recriminations, and personal attacks upon members of the Committee, whose work for several months was nullified as a result.
Our movement naturally sided on principle with the Jugoslav Committee, but we endeavoured to transfer the dispute in all its aspects to a tactical domain. We advocated the necessity for showing consideration towards official Serbia, and knowing that the friends of Austria-Hungary would use this against the Jugoslavs and ourselves, we tried to moderate the high feeling occasioned by the disputes. With regard to the differences of opinion concerning the equality of all three parts of the Jugoslav national unit, we suggested that the Jugoslavs should settle this matter after the final victory had been achieved. This was the principle upon which we acted in the Slovak question.
We urged the Jugoslavs to moderation in their dispute with Italy, in order that they might not arouse against themselves too great a prejudice, the effect of which would perhaps be to make the Allies dissatisfied with all of us, and possibly make them unwilling to continue against Austria to the end. Several times we pointed out that the downfall of Austria-Hungary was our chief purpose, and that for the sake of it certain sacrifices might have to be made to Italy. We judged that these sacrifices would be smaller. if both sides could agree upon them of their own accord at a suitable moment, and that preparations ought to be made for this eventuality. We resolutely opposed the practice of continually reproaching the Allies for their blunder over the London Pact, and we also opposed anything which might be construed as an indirect approval of the action of the Croatian troops on the Austrian front.
​More than once the Jugoslav Committee evinced disapproval of, or even dissatisfaction with, our policy, or with certain of our tactical moves. I always expressed our point of view with considerable reserve in order to moderate the conflict or to bring the two parties together. On the whole I followed the tactics of avoiding direct interference, and of bringing a conciliatory influence to bear upon the two parties by means of private conversations. It often happened that certain of the radical Italians asked me to express my views on these matters publicly, their ulterior motive being to use any of my statements against the Jugoslavs. I therefore always declined to follow their suggestion. A number of the Jugoslavs, on the other hand, considered that I was too cautious in my attitude. I consistently avoided any public declaration, my point of view being that in the disputes between the two Allies it was our function to draw attention, in a private and amicable manner, to possible reasonable and just settlements, and not to make any untimely public statements which would only extend the dispute by introducing some third Ally into it. When the proper moment came we would let both sides know our point of view, but we should then do so frankly. When the appropriate moment did come we fulfilled our duty towards the Jugoslavs accordingly.
Throughout these proceedings I laid stress, both privately and publicly, that as Slavs we had maintained, were maintaining, and always would maintain, a sincere friendship towards the Jugoslavs, and on account of these sentiments we should never deny that it was in our own interest for the conflict to be justly settled, and for the two nations to be brought together, in order that we later on might not find ourselves in a difficult situation on account of any trouble which might arise between them. In this way I succeeded, as General Secretary of the National Council, in warding off any serious disputes and conflicts which might have been detrimental to our movement.
The Jugoslav Committee found abundant support in France and England. In Paris particularly the Jugoslav cause was taken up by all those who were in contact with us as well. This applies especially to such Slavists as Denis, Gauvain, Brunhes, Eisenmann, and Haumant, together with quite a number of politicians and journalists. In England the Jugoslavs were assisted by Wickham Steed, Dr. ​Seton Watson, Sir Arthur Evans, and a large number of the contributors to the New Europe. The Jugoslav-Italian dispute formed a subject of daily debates in these and other Allied circles throughout the period between 1916 and 1918, and there were times when these differences in opinion threatened to estrange the Allies, and to assist the friends of Austria-Hungary in the Allied countries to gain many adherents to the idea of preserving the Habsburg monarchy. This was a source of embarrassment to the Allied Governments even during their official negotiations, and there was actually a danger that their effective military co-operation might be impaired by it.
These matters caused us serious concern. The attitude I adopted towards them as General Secretary of the National Council coincided with that of Masaryk. Štefánik took more active steps and outwardly, too, he was more uncompromising. He did not disguise the fact that he disapproved of the radical tactics of the Jugoslav Committee, and on several occasions he had recourse to direct intervention for the purpose of inducing the Committee to make concessions. What led him to take this course was his more frequent contact with the Italians, especially the official and political circles in Rome. That is why Trumbić, Vesnić, and other members of the Jugoslav Committee several times openly opposed Štefánik.
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As a representative of the National Council I began direct co-operation with the Jugoslav Committee on February 11, 1916, at a meeting with Trumbić, Zupanić, and Vošnjak, in Paris. In the course of time I made the acquaintance of Supilo, Hinković, Meštrović, Vojnović, Cvjetiša, Grigorin, and others. From March 1916 onwards our work together was systematic, close, and amicable. We were drawn together very much by our common labours and our common danger. Our friendships were personal, and they continued to be so throughout and also after the war. Of the Jugoslavs from Austria-Hungary, Trumbić was the one with whom I was most in contact, and I recall with pleasure the work which we carried on in common, as well as the anxiety and dangers which we shared. I shall never forget the touching moment when, in August 1918, he came to congratulate me on having achieved British recognition of the National Council as a de facto Government, and of ​the Czechoslovak nation as an ally. He regarded that as a decisive blow to the Habsburg Empire and as a victory for the Jugoslavs also.
In the second half of March 1916, Trumbić, Hinković, Štefánik, and myself frequently met to discuss the differences with the Italians. Štefánik strongly advised the two Jugoslavs to arrive at a direct agreement with Italy, and at the same time he negotiated to this effect with M. Vesnić, the Serbian Minister in Paris. In the spring of 1916 he had observed that political circles in Paris were beginning to be seriously alarmed at the Italo-Serb-Jugoslav disagreement, and he indicated to some of his French friends that we Czechoslovaks might be able to help in bringing about a settlement. He suggested that in view of his activity on the Serbian front and his visits to Italy, where he had gained a number of friends, he himself might find an opportunity of doing something in this connection. I have already stated that as a result of this he was entrusted with a non-official mission to Italy in March 1916, for the purpose of ascertaining the views of Italian circles as to the chances of a Jugoslav-Italian agreement. He had proceeded on this mission on March 24, 1916, but the Jugoslavs had looked rather askance at this undertaking, and from that time onwards they regarded Štefánik with reserve, considering him to be too pro-Italian.
Nevertheless, the co-operation between the Czechoslovak National Council and the Jugoslav Committee, both in Paris and London, became increasingly intimate. What differences there were, concerned chiefly tactics and methods of procedure. At a special meeting with Trumbić on April 16, 1916, we arranged a common programme and a practical course of action, to which we fully adhered until the end of the war. Our community of action was made more conspicuous when Denis extended the scope of our review, La Nation Tchéque, so as to include not only Czechoslovak matters, but also Jugoslav questions.
It was not long before the results of this became manifest. During his visit to Rome, Štefánik encountered strong opposition, which the political circles there explained to him as being due partly to the fact that La Nation Tchéque was adopting an anti-Italian attitude, and that they could not be expected to strengthen and support us against their own interests. Thus, from the intensified co-operation between the ​National Council and the Jugoslav Committee, there emerged our first conflicts with the Italians, with the Jugoslavs, and partly also with Professor Denis.
On his return to Paris, Stefanik at once drew attention to these difficulties, and emphasized the need for observing greater caution. He even took the view that it would be necessary to explain in La Nation Tchéque that we could not make common cause with the Jugoslav Committee in carrying out their policy. He reminded us that even the friends of the Jugoslavs in Rome, notably Barrère, Loiseau, and Giers, the Russian Ambassador, were unable always to approve of the radical tactics advocated by the Jugoslav Committee. This was the origin of a number of misunderstandings and even disagreements amongst us. To-day, especially after the Jugoslav endeavour to achieve an amicable agreement with Italy, there can be no harm in mentioning these matters.
On May 18, 1916, I was invited to call on M. Vesnić at the Serbian Legation. I had been discussing these topics with him for a long time, but this was the first occasion upon which he raised any objections to Štefánik’s policy. I then discussed matters with Denis to the same effect, explaining to him why and to what extent I was in agreement with Štefánik. We also considered the tactics of the Jugoslav Committee an unpractical one in certain respects, and detrimental to their own interests. I had heard various complaints on this score in Allied official circles. We took the view that between them and the Italians a compromise would have to be reached sooner or later, and that it would be dangerous not to prepare for it in good time, otherwise they would end by incurring a serious set-back by which they would probably lose more than if they agreed to a reasonable compromise involving some voluntary sacrifice on their part. On the other hand, I was bound to admit that Stefanik’s policy went too far, and that some of the Jugoslav complaints were well-founded.
In June a number of objections were raised to Štefánik’s policy by Trumbić, and again I had to admit that some of his remarks were justified. Štefánik, it should be said, believed that much would be accomplished as a result of the London Pact, and he arranged his tactics accordingly. He said that our duty was to save as much as possible for the Jugoslavs by means of a moderate attitude towards Italy, even if the Jugoslavs viewed the situation in a wrong light and occa​sionally complained about us. This was a subject to which Vesnić always recurred whenever I visited him. His most emphatic remarks about us were made during my visit to him on September 19, 1916. It was then that I intervened for the first time with the Serbian Government on behalf of the National Council, asking for the liberation of our prisoners of war from Serbia who, after the retreat through Albania, had taken refuge in France. M. Vesnić promised to secure the sanction of his Government for the liberation of about 4,000 of our prisoners, and he then took advantage of the opportunity to remind me once more of Štefánik’s policy in the Jugoslav-Italian question. He asked in very emphatic terms that there should be no repetition of this, and I promised that I would speak to Štefánik about it. I did so, and although Štefánik maintained his previous point of view we agreed upon a tactical course of action which prevented any untoward incidents in the future. I may add that no further trouble occurred in this respect, with the possible exception of two episodes during the Peace Conference. On one of these occasions the Jugoslavs were offended at Štefánik’s action and complained to me about it, while on the other occasion the Italians were dissatisfied with what I had done and took their grievance to Štefánik. Both these misunderstandings, however, were settled amicably.
Perhaps I ought here to say that the Jugoslavs, smarting under their grievances against the Italians, and distressed by their country’s disasters, were not quite fair to Štefánik, who was prompted by the best of intentions, and who really desired to bring about a timely agreement between the Italians and the Jugoslavs. After my interview with M. Vesnić we noticed a definite abatement of the Jugoslav-Italian tension. Then the preparation for the Congress of Rome and the active part which we took in it met with the approval of the Italians also, while the success of the Congress itself for the Jugoslavs provided a concrete proof of the effective work which we had accomplished in common with the Jugoslav Committee.
Our relation to official Serbia and to the Serbs in general was marked by the same sentiment, and was directed towards the same purposes. Throughout the war we received friendly support from the Serbian authorities. In this respect I can pay a tribute to the Serbian Legation in Paris, where M. Vesnić, by means of his extensive connections and ​diplomatic experience, supplied me with information, advice, and direct assistance for several years. In the same way, M. Jovanović, the Serbian Minister in London, did much to promote our co-operation, and in Rome we were helped by the Serbian Minister, M. Antonjević, who had previously been a Legation Counsellor in London. In Russia also the co-operation between our organizing bodies and the Serbian authorities was very active, nor must we forget the joint effort of our organizations in America with the Serbian Legation and the members of the Jugoslav Committee there. Finally, let me mention that our military co-operation with Serbia was of the same gratifying character. The Serbian Government highly appreciated the services of our volunteers in its army, and later on readily granted permission for them to be transferred to our own army in France. In Russia our military co-operation with the Serbs was pervaded by the same spirit, and I need refer only to the excellent results of our joint activities in the Dobruja division under the leadership of General Živković.
Continual interest was evinced in our national cause by Alexander, the Serbian heir-apparent, with whom Professor Masaryk was in touch. Pašić, too, who during the war had a fairly accurate idea of how the military problems of Central Europe ought to be settled, found suitable opportunities for reminding the Allies of our claims. It was a long time, of course, before we could keep pace with Serbia in matters of high international policy. Serbia was an Allied State on whose account the war had started, and as such she had a Government, commitments from the Allies, and so on, while for a long time we were mere émigrés. Nevertheless, in 1918 we were now and then able to contribute towards a settlement of Jugoslav problems. Masaryk did much in this respect, while I endeavoured to act as advocate for the Jugoslavs in cases where they were being unfairly treated. I pleaded their case not only with the Italians, but also with the other Allies, and when in June 1918 I secured the recognition of the National Council at the Quai d’Orsay, I asked for a reference to the unified Jugoslav State to be made in M. Pichon’s note, a request which was complied with. And there were several other instances.
Our relation to the successes of the Serbian and Jugoslav policy was fairly analogous to that in Polish affairs, although we were on closer terms with the Jugoslavs. When in August ​1917 Pašić and Trumbić signed a joint declaration of the Serbian Government and the Jugoslav Committee at Corfu, we regarded this as one of the most decisive phases in Jugoslav policy and as an advantage to our own cause. It meant not merely a formulation of the future relationships between the three branches of the Jugoslav race, the principles of their future constitution and their existence in common, but also a great international manifesto for Jugoslav unity, and thus for the abolition of the Habsburg Empire. This declaration fulfilled its international mission perfectly, and its effects brought it within the scope of our own movement.
Our successes in the organization of an army and in the organization of the National Council and its branches, as well as in securing our recognition from the Allies, were welcomed by the Jugoslavs with a corresponding interest and gratification. Our recognition and the proclamation of our independent Government on October 14, 1918, were greeted by them as a victory of the Jugoslav idea. The Serbian Government, by a communication from Pašić, was one of the first to acknowledge our independence. At the Peace Conference also we took joint action in all common and fundamental problems. The treaties of alliance which were concluded later on between the two independent States, through the co-operation of Trumbić, Vesnić, and Ninčić, formed merely a logical conclusion to our common policy during the war.
(b) Our Co-operation with the Poles and Rumanians during the War
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The character of our relations with the Poles during the war was partly determined by the circumstances under which our two nations had lived before the war. In this respect the chief factor was the relation of the Poles to the Habsburg Empire and also to Russia. At the beginning they were indulgent towards Austria, or at least were little concerned with the problem which the Monarchy presented, while we were uncompromisingly anti-Austrian. Towards Russia, on the other hand, they became more and more uncompromising and remained so until the end, while we were endeavouring to find methods of reconciling our conflicting interests. Of course, the division of ​the Poles into an Allied camp and a camp of the Central Powers, by which they differed from us and the Jugoslavs, correspondingly characterized the Polish policy during the war, and exerted much influence upon our relations, especially as in the Allied countries many Poles were among the ranks of the pro-Austrians and pro-Magyars. These divergencies, however, were gradually modified by the events of the war, so that as our mutual interests ceased to be so diametrically opposed, a close relationship was established between us.
As a result of these divergencies of interest the official policy of our National Council did not, until the time of the Russian revolution, altogether harmonize with the Polish aims. What we then demanded was the unification of all the Polish regions of Russia, Austria, and Germany into a single State, with the widest possible measure of State autonomy under Russian suzerainty. We did not approve of the ambiguous policy of the Austrian-Poles, and we objected to the anti-Russian agitation which the Poles carried on in the Allied countries. It was our wish to be loyal to all the Allies, even though our attitude towards Tsarist Russia was a critical one. We therefore worked in favour of that maximum of the Polish claims which, before the outbreak of the Russian revolution, we regarded as compatible with the interests of all the Allies, as well as of the Poles themselves. In so doing we endeavoured to win the Poles over to our anti-Austrian attitude, and we managed to secure their support for agitation aiming at the destruction of Austria-Hungary. I never underrated the influence of the Poles, especially in this question. Among their émigrés there were many who sympathized with the movement for a separate peace with the Habsburg Empire, because they considered that only in this way would Germany be defeated and compelled to give up Posen and Silesia. On the other hand, they had no misgivings as to the future of Galicia, especially when they knew that the Emperor Karl was willing to let Poland have it in return for the protection of his monarchy. These Poles even regarded with sympathy the idea of a reduced Austria-Hungary, with which they thought that an independent Poland might be able to elaborate a political system, and thus better cope with both Russia and Germany. This was only a slightly different application of the Austrophile theory by which Vienna might counterbalance Berlin. Its advocates counted upon the assistance of the ​Magyars, and we were only a subordinate factor in their calculation. At the same time, any degree of Polish opposition to the Habsburg Empire was of great value to our cause, since the fact that the Poles were on good terms with Vienna, and wanted to see her treated with consideration during the war imparted a sense of detachment to any anti-Austrian attitude they might adopt, and tended to confirm the justice of the policy pursued by the Jugoslavs and ourselves. The Poles, in their turn, were inclined to demur at what they considered the excessive moderation of our attitude towards Russia. Even those, such as Erazm Piltz, who showed much consideration for Russia and the Allies, in their confidential conversations with me made no secret of their intention to secure complete State independence at any price. This led to various minor misunderstandings between us. When the Russian revolution broke out it was followed by the proclamation of a provisional Government in Poland, and when the Russian front collapsed, it was clear that the last obstacle to the realization of Polish aims had been removed. From then onwards we worked in close agreement with the Poles, although we sought to moderate their territorial claims, and advocated the principle of a Polish State within ethnographical frontiers, with access to the sea at Danzig. (Of course we always realized that a strict application of the principle of ethnographical frontiers was never practicable, and that there would always have to be concessions on both sides.)
It was in the spring of 1918 that the first symptoms of the Teschen dispute made their appearance. I had several discussions with Dmowski about this, urging how essential it was to reach a timely agreement on the basis of a reasonable compromise in order to avoid trouble after the war. (It was always my opinion that the frontier between us should be formed by the River Vistula, which would then connect us also with the Baltic.)
Dmowski was the strongest political personality among the Poles who were working in the Allied countries during the war, while Piltz, by reason of his moderation, did most to further the interests of the Polish cause in Paris. He it was also, who had the best understanding of our common interests, and from the very outset planned his activity so as to facilitate co-operation with us. The most popular of the Poles, and the one who proved a great asset to his country, ​especially in America, was Paderewski, whom I did not meet until the Peace Conference.
My first meeting with Dmowski took place at Paris on May 18, 1916. I was immediately captivated by his shrewdness and the trenchant character of his political plans. He was well aware of our Russophile tendencies and at first he spoke guardedly, endeavouring to influence me by his moderation towards official Russia. At subsequent meetings, however, he became more and more radical, until he began an offensive against our line of policy by complaining of me and also of Masaryk, whose activities in London were, he alleged, not sufficiently favourable to the Poles.
I vindicated the tendency of our policy on the ground that we had to show consideration to the Allies and to Russia as well. At this period Dmowski was strongly opposed to the Allied policy, which in his opinion made too many concessions to Russia. He foretold and also desired the fall of Russia, and he himself told me that the day when the Russian revolution broke out was one of the happiest days in his life. He then began to advocate the theory that Russia was eliminated from European policy for another fifty years, and that France and the Allies must compensate themselves in Eastern Europe against Germany by means of a strong Poland. This theory met with much approval, and its prospects were further strengthened by the advent of Bolshevism. This policy, of which Dmowski was the foremost advocate, contributed largely to the subsequent advantageous position of Poland at the Peace Conference. Promoted by the further developments of European events, it rendered possible the later territorial extension of Poland, against which the Americans and particularly the English demurred for a long time at the Peace Conference.
It should be added that Dmowski had many opponents, particularly in London, where the chief of them was Mr. Lloyd George. This was due to his anti-Semitism, which he often exhibited rather ostentatiously, and his equally ostentatious nationalism. On the other hand, however, he understood better than the other Poles that in order to achieve the Polish aims it would be necessary to destroy Austria-Hungary, and in this respect he was always consistently on our side. We carried out a great deal of work jointly with the Poles during the war. From the spring of 1916, when I established official ​contact with the Polish National Committee in Paris, our central organizations there were in continual touch with them. After the Russian revolution our organizations in Russia also co-operated considerably with the Poles. For the reasons which I have stated above, our co-operation with them made slow progress, but it reached its culminating point in the spring of 1918, when we succeeded in inducing them definitely to oppose Austria-Hungary, and to take part in the Congress at Rome. From that point onwards our work together became systematic and effective.
Up till that time most of the Poles had gone their own way, as they did not wish to complicate their cause, which had been an international one from the very outset, and increased in importance as time went on, with problems which affected the rest of us. In the Jugoslav question they maintained an attitude of reserve, as they were unwilling to offend Italy. As regards matters affecting the Habsburg Empire, in addition to what I have already said, the Poles always proceeded with due consideration for the Austrophiles in the Allied States and also for the Vatican, because these circles, who were opposed to the dismemberment of the Empire, were at the same time almost entirely in favour of the Poles.
The development of events in the spring of 1918, however, showed the Poles that they too would have to share the struggle for self-determination and the ideas advocated by Wilson. As regards Russia, ever since the peace of Brest-Litovsk, the freedom of Poland in one form or another had been assured. Nevertheless, they realized that by associating themselves with our line of action they would be certain of the immediate union of all three portions of former Poland. Hence, from 1918 onwards the Poles in the Allied countries were entirely on the side of those who proclaimed uncompromisingly the policy of liberating the oppressed nations and abolishing the Habsburg Empire. The Congress of Rome gave concrete expression to this tendency.
On the whole, therefore, the policies of the Poles and ourselves, which had been divergent at the beginning of the war, became closer in the course of 1917, and from 1918 onwards coincided. The Teschen dispute was regarded as a subordinate question which could be settled on amicable lines. When our independence was declared in October 1918, the Polish National ​Committee in Paris sent a special deputation to congratulate us, and to emphasize the need for political work in common after the war.
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Our contact with the Rumanians during the war was naturally not so close as that with the Jugoslavs and Poles, but we laid the foundations of a common policy, which we have continued to pursue. From the first moment when they entered the war we sought contact with them in Paris and London, and our relations became even closer from the time of the Rumanian military reverses. In the winter of 1916, while on his way to Russia, Štefánik visited the Rumanian front, where he secured permission for several hundreds of our prisoners to be transferred from Rumania to France. An important visit to the Rumanian front was paid also by Masaryk in the autumn of 1917, his object being to discuss the question of using our troops from Russia there. He entered into contact with official circles, with the Government, and with the military authorities, and he was duly received as the representative of an Allied nation. Here I may add that our volunteers served side by side with those of Rumania in the Serbian division on the Dobruja front.
My own co-operation with the Rumanians was mainly of a propagandist character. From 1917 onwards I worked for several months in Paris with Senator G. Draghicescu, who was received there on the same terms as the Jugoslavs, the Poles, and ourselves. In the same way we co-operated with the Transylvanian representatives in Paris, at the head of which was T. Vuia, and also with the Socialist, Dr. Lupu, who was later a minister.
It gives me pleasure to recall my first meeting with Take Jonescu at London in October 1917. It was at the period when, after the collapse of the Russian front, nothing more could be done on the Rumanian front, and the fate of Rumania seemed to be sealed. On that occasion I met Jonescu, in company with the Rumanian minister, Titulescu. In discussing the situation we agreed that we should win in the end, and that after the war we should pursue a common policy in Central Europe. Jonescu, who was one of the most capable of the war politicians, had already met Masaryk. He had a high opinion of PaSi¢ and was on terms of close friendship with Venizelos. He was one of those politicians with whom it ​was possible during the war to discuss all the post-war problems of Central Europe, and when he referred to our future joint activity I was able to agree with practically everything he said.
After the Rumanian catastrophe a number of other Rumanian politicians, especially from the Liberal camp, came to Paris. In the winter of 1917 my work brought me into contact chiefly with Florescu, a former minister, with Goga, who was subsequently a minister, and with the authoress Helena Vacarescu, all of whom, together with Senator Draghicescu, shared in the now highly developed activities of the oppressed nations of Austria-Hungary. They at once associated themselves with the movement inaugurated by Franklin-Bouillon and Fournol, and also with the preparations for the Congress of Rome.
When Rumania concluded peace with the Central Powers, the activities of their representatives abroad by no means came to an end. On the contrary, they realized that their only hope of national liberation and unification lay in the victory of us all. They therefore became even more closely attached to our movement, and in the end they achieved victory. In spite of the passing difficulties which were encountered at the Peace Conference between the Jugoslavs and the Rumanians on the subject of the Banat, and between the Rumanians and ourselves regarding Carpathian Ruthenia, this co-operation during the war prepared the ground for that post-war Little Entente policy at which Masaryk and the rest of us had been systematically working since 1917.
Thus, under the influence of the military events, the policy enunciated by Wilson, the Russian revolution, and the activity of all of us who were struggling for the liberty of oppressed nations, there gradually came into being that policy of self-determination which found its expression in the Congress of Rome and which in the course of the summer of 1918 became so obvious and essential a factor in Allied tactics.
(c) The Congress of Oppressed Nations in Rome. Its International Significance
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After long and difficult discussions in London between Trumbić and A. Torre, an agreement was reached on March 7, 1918, about the terms for settling the Jugoslav-Italian dispute, ande ​also about their joint anti-Habsburg policy at the Congress of Rome. At the same time, in the course of these discussions, principles were formulated for defining the co-operation of all the oppressed nations of Austria-Hungary, and the path to the Congress of Rome was thus opened.
We arrived at Rome on April 8th, and at once began to discuss the formal procedure of the Congress, which was solemnly inaugurated at the Capitol on April 9th, under the presidency of Senator Ruffini. It was attended by numerous Italian politicians, while Bissolati and Commandini sent congratulatory telegrams.
On April 10th, the four following committees began their work; (1) For propaganda; (2) for matters affecting members of the Austro-Hungarian nationalities who were military or civil prisoners of war in the Allied countries; (3) for the organization of a future Congress; (4) for formulating the resolutions of the Congress.
At the final plenary meeting, which was held on April 11th, there were special declarations from the representatives of the individual nationalities. Thus, Zamorski, on behalf of the Poles, emphasized the fact that while the main adversary of Poland was Germany, whose defeat was an essential condition for achieving the unity and independence of Poland, the Poles would nevertheless continue side by side with the other nations against the Habsburg Empire. Then Dr. Lupu and Senator Mironescu protested against the peace which had been signed at Buftei, and pointed out that the Austro-Hungarian Government, while speaking of peace without annexations or indemnities, was annexing extensive territories and at the same time taking possession of the main sources of Rumanian wealth. Trumbić next demanded the unification of all the Jugoslavs, emphasizing the principles of the agreement which had been reached with Torre, and declaring that the detailed discussions for a territorial agreement would have to be postponed until a later period. I myself, speaking on behalf of our National Council, laid stress on two points, which met with the approval of the Congress. (1) The struggle was not merely against Vienna, but also and equally against Budapest. As regards ourselves, the most important question was that of unity with the Slovaks. (2) The events which were then taking place within the Habsburg Empire formed the best proof that the Empire was slowly but surely collapsing.
​Thereupon declarations were made by Senator Draghicescu, Franklin-Bouillon, Wickham Steed, and Albert Thomas, while the concluding speeches were delivered by Ruffini and Barzilai. The declarations of Franklin-Bouillon and Wickham Steed were particularly important. The former, as President of the Parliamentary Committee for Foreign Affairs, announced his authorization for stating that the French Government gave its complete sanction to the action of the Congress, and that, in view of the discussion just held on Czernin’s last speech, he could give an assurance that the French Government and the French Parliament would never conclude a separate peace without Italy and the other Allies, great and small. Wickham Steed stated that he could confirm how completely the British Government approved of the Congress, and that the interview which he had just had with Sonnino enabled him to make the same statement as regards the Italian Government also.
The Congress was an undoubted success. The Governments of all the Allied countries had followed its proceedings with interest and understanding, the effects of which soon made themselves felt.
After the Congress was concluded, a joint delegation of the nationalities represented was received by Orlando, who in the presence of Bissolati made a speech identifying himself with the work of the Congress, and emphasizing the readiness of Italy to co-operate with the Jugoslavs and, in fact, all the oppressed nations.
In Paris the Congress had a good press, and in official circles it was regarded favourably. Clemenceau himself made this clear to us when, in the middle of April, we returned there from Rome. A delegation of those who had attended the Congress, comprising representatives of all the nationalities, and headed by Franklin-Bouillon, was received at a special audience by Clemenceau, to whom the results of the negotiations and the details of our further plans were submitted. Clemenceau very emphatically expressed his approval. He was generous with words of encouragement, and in particular he unreservedly condemned the Habsburg Empire. In this he was greatly influenced also by his conflict with Czernin, with which I will now proceed to deal.
(d) The Armand-Revertera Secret Peace Negotiations, and the Clemenceau-Czernin-Emperor Karl Conflict
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In the middle of June 1917, at a time when the negotiations of Sixtus of Bourbon had not been entirely disposed of, application was made, according to the official version of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at Vienna, to Count Revertera, an Austrian nobleman, whose private circumstances kept him at Freiburg, in Switzerland, by a certain Swiss “throat specialist,” to the effect that an important French personality had made important peace overtures to him, and asked him if he could communicate them to the Emperor. (I should add that the official French account differs from this Austrian version in attributing the initiative for the whole affair to Vienna.) At the beginning of June, Revertera notified Czernin of this, and received instructions to ascertain who the personality in question was, and at the same time to bring the proposals so that they might be submitted to the authorities in Berlin.
According to the Viennese version, Revertera discovered at the beginning of August that the personality referred to was Major Count Abel Armand, who at that time was in charge of the Intelligence Department at the Ministry of War, and who was said to be coming to Switzerland to negotiate with Revertera, bringing with him proposals drawn up by Thomas and Painlevé, and approved by Ribot and Lloyd George. He was said to be anxious to negotiate for a separate peace with Vienna. In the course of a conversation with Armand it was discovered that the general lines of the scheme proposed were very anti-German in character, involving, as they did, the separation of Bavaria from Germany, the division of Silesia, and the incorporation of Poland with the Habsburg Empire. These were evidently plans emanating from the French General Staff. Vienna was asked to cede the Trentino to Italy, Trieste was to become a free harbour, and the whole of the Empire was to be federalized.
Revertera received instructions from Vienna that the proposals made must be quite precise so that they could be submitted to Berlin, and that if Berlin agreed to negotiate on the basis of them, such negotiations would have to be carried ​out by responsible persons, possibly the two Foreign Ministers. Czernin at once proposed a meeting of the two ministers or their representatives at Vaduze, in Liechtenstein. Revertera, however, received an answer from Armand stating that the point at issue was a separate peace, and that for the present, at least, there could be no discussions of the matter with Berlin. He therefore returned to Vienna, where he informed Karl and Czernin accordingly, the result being that no information on the subject was transmitted to Berlin. Revertera then returned to Switzerland with fresh instructions.
On August 22nd Armand and Revertera met again. Armand produced his written peace proposals, which were so far-reaching in character (they involved the restitution of Belgium and the French invaded departments, with complete compensation, the ceding of Alsace and Lorraine, the neutralization of the left bank of the Rhine, the ceding of the Trentino and Trieste, the restitution of Rumania and Serbia, the establishment of an independent Poland as formerly constituted, the federalization of the Habsburg Empire, etc.) that it seemed as if the negotiations were not intended seriously. On August 28th Czernin informed Revertera that these proposals were not acceptable for any sort of negotiations, that it was impossible to transmit them to Berlin, and that any separation from Germany was entirely out of the question. Accordingly, there were no further negotiations.
But in the middle of September 1917 and again in January 1918, Revertera—according to the Austrian version—through the same channels, received a message that Armand was anxious to renew the conversations with him. Czernin sent Revertera instructions from Brest-Litovsk to the effect that he was quite willing for further discussions to take place, but it must be made clear to Armand that if France desired a genuine exchange of views, it would be best for a meeting to take place between the Foreign Ministers or their plenipotentiaries. This would at once make things clear.
On February 2nd Revertera and Armand had an interview, from the general purport of which, as reported by Revertera, it is clear that Clemenceau, like the preceding Government, was willing to negotiate with Vienna for a separate peace. What he wanted were counter-proposals to the last French peace offer of August 1917. He insisted upon securing Alsace-Lorraine, and emphasized the requirement that Austria-​Hungary was not to identify herself so completely with the imperialistic programme of Berlin, as Czernin was doing in his declarations. Thereupon Czernin, on February 22nd, requested Revertera to point out that there were no prospects of any serious negotiations until France renounced her claims to the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine. Revertera carried out these instructions at a meeting on February 25th. On that occasion he also furnished Armand with a written memorandum from which, however, it would appear that the Viennese version attributing the initiative for these negotiations with Paris is incorrect, and that on the contrary the whole scheme emanated from Vienna. Other indications lead me to believe that Revertera’s action, which in point of time coincided with the final stages of the negotiations carried on by Sixtus of Bourbon, had the same basis and originated from the same circles as these did. In any case, Karl was closely associated with the action, which in its early stages was certainly not divulged to Berlin.
Armand then at once informed Revertera that under these circumstances Clemenceau would not embark upon the negotiations. Shortly after that, on March 4th, Revertera again received a message that Clemenceau would not entertain any peace offer which did not settle the question of Alsace-Lorraine.
From the official French documents, and also from the controversy which developed on this subject between Clemenceau and Czernin, emerged the following facts which tend to rebut the Austrian version and, I think, to confirm the conclusions which I have suggested above:
1. In his declaration of April, Painlevé stated that according to the Intelligence Section of the Ministry of War, the initiative came from Austrian quarters in June 1917, and that through the agency of a certain Swiss citizen, Count Armand was several times invited to meet his relative, Count Revertera (Armand and Revertera are, I believe, cousins).
2. From Clemenceau’s declaration on April 8, 1918, “it follows that the meeting was the result of Austrian initiative, and that Painlevé and Ribot gave their permission for Major Armand, of the Intelligence Department of the Ministry of War, to proceed to Switzerland. Although the negotiations produced no result, when Clemenceau, on November 18th, the day after his entry into office, was informed of the new démarche from ​Switzerland, dated November 10th, he did not consider it desirable to interrupt the negotiations, as they might provide the Ministry of War with useful information. Major Armand therefore received permission to proceed again to Switzerland, after having been instructed by Clemenceau, in the presence of his chief, Colonel Goubet, that he was to listen to Revertera but to say nothing himself.
3. On February 25, 1918, according to the French version, Revertera, wishing to lay stress upon the purpose for which negotiations had been started, handed Armand a written explanation as follows: In August 1917 conversations were instituted for the purpose of securing from the French Government peace proposals for Austria-Hungary, which should be of such a character that they could receive the backing of Austria-Hungary.
From the above evidence it can be inferred that the initiative in June 1917 did actually emanate from Revertera, that the basis of the negotiations was identical with that underlying the activity of Sixtus of Bourbon, and that Karl was implicated in the matter. When Vienna saw the conditions upon which Paris insisted, and realized that they could not possibly lead to any results, the matter was dropped. It would also seem that in January 1918 the negotiations were started by Armand, but that Czernin at once insisted on discussing, not a separate but a general peace.
Thus, for the third time it was seen that the aims of Vienna and those of the Allies were still opposed. Clemenceau, without obviously pursuing such a purpose, received a fresh and decisive proof that such was the case, at a moment which was of particular importance to us. I should not here refer to these matters again if the negotiations between Armand and Revertera had not given rise to the well-known conflict between Clemenceau and Czernin at the very moment when international events were compelling the Allies to adopt a definite attitude towards the Habsburg Empire. This conflict was the last and culminating factor leading to the first mortal blow which was inflicted upon Austria-Hungary.
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On April 2nd Czernin delivered a speech to a delegation from the municipality of Vienna which had important reactions both within the Empire and abroad. From the point of view ​of Austria-Hungary, the Habsburg dynasty, and the Foreign Minister himself it was a fundamental blunder. Although it did not actually decide the fate of the Empire, there could be no doubt that it facilitated and hastened the collapse of the Monarchy. It is difficult to estimate what could have been the immediate causes of so serious a mistake. In any case, it shows that at this period of his apparently great successes Czernin had entirely lost his balance, and was now incapable of any clear judgment about the situation of the Empire at home and abroad.
In his speech Czernin at first made a violent attack on our foreign movement. He referred to Masaryk in uncomplimentary terms, and pointed out that although equally such treacherous leaders were to be found both within the Empire and outside it, the Czech nation was loyal to Austria. These remarks produced a violent conflict within the Empire, in which the Jugoslavs and Poles made common cause with us. The Czech delegation protested in most emphatic terms to Seidler, the Prime Minister, who, without actually disassociating himself from Czernin’s speech, endeavoured to tone it down in certain respects. Nevertheless, the speech provided our politicians and those of the Jugoslavs in Austria with a pretext for greater opposition to the Government, and for the manifesto against the Empire which occurred in April. The effect of the speech abroad was principally to provide our movement with the best possible tribute. The Allied Governments realized better than ever the extent to which Vienna was harassed by our movement, and Masaryk became an even more significant symbol of the struggle against the Empire.
There was a second noteworthy point in Czernin’s speech which produced results of equal importance. His defence of Vienna and Berlin for a policy of annexation after the conclusion of the three peace treaties, by which the Central Powers and Bulgaria had come into possession of extensive territories, and his taunting of the Allies with the responsibility for the prolongation of the war, aroused more violent protests against him than against the Germans, who made no secret of their intentions and did not attempt to make them appear innocent by means of pacifist phraseology.
But the most important part of Czernin’s speech was his reference to the secret peace negotiations with France. In order to brace the political circles at home to further efforts, ​and to explain why the war was being continued, why the last offensive had been launched, and why Vienna would remain side by side with Berlin against France until the end, he declared that Clemenceau had recently endeavoured to start peace negotiations with Vienna, but that Czernin had insisted on the need for first renouncing all claims to Alsace-Lorraine. As Paris had refused to do so, there was no alternative but to continue victoriously to the end. Here Czernin was evidently alluding to the interview between Armand and Revertera at Freiburg on February 2nd and 25th, to his instructions to Revertera, and also to the report which Revertera had sent to Vienna on the subject of his action. The blow which Czernin wished to inflict was aimed in two directions. It was intended to strengthen confidence at home, and to demoralize Allied public opinion, especially that of France, at the moment when the severest German offensive was being launched. It was also intended as a proof to Italy that she had been betrayed by France, who had been making peace negotiations without her knowledge.
As soon as this speech had been delivered, Clemenceau repudiated Czernin’s version, and Czernin, who in the meanwhile had left for Bucharest to settle the peace terms with Rumania, immediately returned and started a controversy with Clemenceau. The latter, in a number of official reports, emphasized the fact that it had not been France but Vienna who had sought peace negotiations, and these attempts at a separate peace had been made on several occasions. At the same time he alluded to the intervention of Sixtus of Bourbon and to Karl’s agreement with the French claims to Alsace-Lorraine.
This filled Czernin with consternation, and then ensued his controversy with Karl on the subject of the Emperor’s well-known letter to Sixtus. Karl first of all repudiated to Czernin the authenticity of the letter, and sent a telegram in this sense to the Kaiser. Czernin made an official declaration accordingly, but when Clemenceau published a facsimile of the letter, Vienna had recourse to the explanation that the letter was purely personal and non-official, and that it had been forged. To all these evasions on the part of Vienna, Clemenceau replied with a severe indictment of Karl and Czernin. The whole world then saw that the Emperor had been lying, and that Czernin had fallen a victim to the results of this intrigue. ​It is not quite clear whether he had been imposed upon or not, but there can be no doubt that at the moment when he was publicly testifying against Clemenceau he was quite aware of what was going on. The memoirs of Windischgraetz prove this.
Czernin fully realized what this moral catastrophe involved. Victorious Berlin would regard the affair as treachery at the moment when its armies were again approaching Paris. The Germans and Magyars in Austria would use this against him, so that his policy, the policy of the Empire, and the situation within it were all threatened. Czernin, who evidently at that period regarded himself as the protector of the Empire, now opposed all attempts at secret anti-German negotiations or at a downright separation from Germany on the part of Karl and Zita as firmly as he had shared their views in April 1917. It is said that he was now considering the possibility of forcing Karl to abdicate as a sequel to the affair. The matter ended, however, with his resignation on April 14, 1918. The net result of the episode had been to reveal to the Allied countries the deplorable character of Viennese policy. Czernin was the last Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister who had any kind of Austro-Hungarian policy. His fall denoted the end of the Empire, and his successors, Burian and Andrdssy, were merely liquidators of a ruined concern.
Austro-Hungarian policy could scarcely have sustained a severer blow than the incidents to which I have just referred. And when Paris, Rome, and London received further reports, concerning the telegram of Karl to Wilhelm on the subject of an indefeasible alliance between the two Empires and Karl’s journey to Spa, followed by a new agreement of alliance by which Vienna entered into fresh commitments to Berlin, all the Allied Governments could only infer that any separation of Austria-Hungary from Germany was now out of the question, and that the war would have to be won by force of arms. As a matter of fact, the agreement at Spa was the closest military, political, and economic union which the two Empires had hitherto concluded. Vienna had up till then avoided such binding commitments, notably in economic matters, but at Spa Karl succumbed in this respect also. The further discussions as to the development of an economic union were carried out in all detail by the appropriate experts at Salzburg between July 9 and October 11, 1918. The fall of the Empire, of course, made these things null and void.
​It was now felt that the Allied Governments had passed sentence on the Habsburg Empire. I myself drew this conclusion from the political events which immediately followed the news from Spa. On April 11th the French Government issued an official communiqué announcing that all the documents relating to the Clemenceau-Czernin incident were to be submitted to the Parliamentary Committee of Foreign Affairs. This was done a month later and, as we shall see, it led to declarations on the part of Clemenceau which proved decisive in their bearing upon the policy of France towards Vienna and ourselves.
Under these circumstances our work in Paris progressed admirably. I have already referred to the visit of representatives of the oppressed nations of Austria-Hungary, and it was upon this occasion that Clemenceau expressed himself to me in terms of particular approval concerning our military and political movement, emphasizing the necessity for transferring our Siberian army to France. Shortly after that I again applied to Clemenceau for an audience and for a more concrete discussion of our affairs, particularly as regards the status of our army and our political position in general. I was received on April 20th, when I gave Clemenceau an account of our various achievements. I asked him to agree to the recognition of Czechoslovak independence and of the National Council as a de facto Government. He expressed himself as being entirely favourable to my application on principle, but pointed out that before his sanction could take effect the preliminary arrangements would have to be duly made, and an agreement reached with the various authorities concerned: He was still reacting to the effects of his controversy with Czernin, and declared that he himself regarded the Czechoslovak question as settled, that he would recognize the National Council as a Government body, and that he was prepared to grant it the Government prerogatives for which I had asked—recognition of diplomatic representatives, passports, the grant of a loan, etc. A month later, at a fresh audience, he repeated and amplified his promise, giving also his consent to a procedure by which it.could be carried into effect.
The important effects of these events was shown when, on May 10, 1918, Clemenceau submitted to the Parliamentary Committee of Foreign Affairs a report on the Sixtus of Bourbon incident and the Armand-Revertera negotiations. In outlining the fundamental features of the attempts at a ​separate peace with the Habsburg Empire, especially the last episode with Czernin and Karl, Clemenceau indicated the aims of the French Government. No real interest of France or any other Ally had been neglected. The negotiations could not have led to any satisfactory result, because there had never been any real possibility of concluding an acceptable peace with Vienna and isolating Germany. This was clear from the documentary evidence submitted. Clemenceau accordingly inferred that the only remaining possibility was to proceed to the last extremity against the Habsburg Empire, to support all the efforts of the Austro-Hungarian nations to secure their independence, and thus to accelerate the fall of the Habsburg Empire and, with it, the fall of Germany. The published communiqué on the subject of this meeting shows quite plainly the direction followed by the committee in its deliberations.(43)
(e) Last Attempts at an Agreement with Vienna on the Part of Great Britain and the United States
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Similar conclusions as to the possibilities of a separate peace with Vienna were reached at this period by Great Britain and the United States, not through the influence of Clemenceau’s policy, but as the result of other events which were no less important, but which concerned these two countries exclusively.
The whole of Lloyd George’s action on the subject of Austria-Hungary in 1917 showed plainly that England would not have hesitated to make an agreement with Vienna if the opportunity had presented itself. This was shown beyond any doubt by Lloyd George’s attitude in the Sixtus of Bourbon incident, his initiative for negotiations in December 1917, and his speech on January 5, 1918. In spite of the fact that the action of General Smuts and the public declarations of Lloyd George had produced no positive result, the Government was convinced in February 1918 that its procedure with regard to the Habsburg Empire was the correct one. When Balfour, on February 13, 1918, replied to a question which Mr. Whyte had asked concerning the negotiations of General Smuts at Geneva, he declared quite frankly that the Government considered it their duty to avail themselves of all means which, while ade​quately protecting the interests of the British Empire, would tend to shorten the war for the general advantage. He thus indicated that if it were possible to come to some arrangement with Vienna, and then more easily and quickly defeat an isolated Germany, London would endeavour to do it. In spite of this, the latest events on the Eastern front, and the German offensive which was being prepared in the West, compelled the British Government to follow Clemenceau’s example and, while not entirely ruling out the scheme in hand, to avail themselves of all possible resources for securing a military victory against the German and Austrian Empires. In the middle of February this led the British Cabinet to establish an extensive and systematic network of propaganda in the enemy countries for the purpose of undermining the enemy battle-fronts, and also of weakening the opposition behind the front among the population and the political circles. London was only now beginning what Germany had been doing for some time past, and it was also then that the Bolsheviks began the same kind of work on a large scale. By arrangement with the Governments in Paris and Rome, it was decided that a joint Allied system of propaganda should be started, and that the English side of it should be managed by Lord Northcliffe, who had recently returned from a mission in America.
Lord Northcliffe accepted Lloyd George’s offer and, after conferring with Mr. Wickham Steed, he prepared a whole organization, the London headquarters of which were located at Crewe House. An inter-Allied agreement on the subject of joint propaganda was reached at a meeting in London, which was attended by Wickham Steed on behalf of England, Franklin-Bouillon and Moysset on behalf of France, and Callenga Stuart on behalf of Italy. All these close friends of ours were advocates of the policy which aimed chiefly at the destruction of the Habsburg Empire.
The preliminary arrangements for this scheme in London throw an interesting light on the policy of the British Cabinet at that juncture. Lord Northcliffe, having accepted the post as director of this propaganda, was advised by Steed to ascertain the precise political basis upon which his work was to be carried on. In a letter to Balfour on February 24th he rightly pointed out that the tendency of the propaganda would necessarily depend upon whether the Allies wished to make peace ​with Karl and his monarchy, without paying any attention to its internal condition, or whether their policy aimed at the destruction of the Habsburg Empire and the liberation of the non-German and non-Magyar nationalities within it. Balfour’s reply, dated February 26, 1918, is a very instructive one. He stated that the British Government was still unable to make any definite reply to so far-reaching a question. They must first of all know what view was taken of this by France, Italy, and the United States. He added that it would nevertheless be possible to carry on the propaganda for the time being in such a way that neither of the two eventualities would be excluded. If propaganda was going to be carried on with a view to liberating the oppressed nationalities, and in such a way that the destruction of the Habsburg Empire seemed to be its objective, it might have the effect of forcing the Empire to decide more quickly in favour of a separate peace. If, nevertheless, this result were not to be reached, the dissolution and collapse of the Empire would accelerate the liberation of the peoples in it. Therefore, announced Balfour, although the propaganda must be carried on as though we wished to destroy the Empire, we must not in the meanwhile shut the door to any possibility of peace with Karl by any definite promise as to the liberation of the oppressed peoples.
Lord Northcliffe and Mr. Steed accepted this condition, although reluctantly, and asked that the Allied Governments should at least make no definite declarations in favour of the Habsburg Empire, but should, on the contrary, manifest their sympathies with the oppressed peoples. They added that in any case the Foreign Office would soon see that it had taken an incorrect view as to the method of procedure.
The British Government very soon received proof of this. At the conclusion of their meeting at Geneva in December 1917, General Smuts and Count Mensdorff-Pouilly had agreed that they would continue their negotiations if the Governments concerned wished to proceed in the same manner as before, i.e. with Sir Horace Rumbold and Legation Counsellor V. Skrzynski as intermediaries.
In accordance with this agreement, Mr. Phillip Kerr arrived at Berne on March 10, 1918, with new proposals from Lloyd George for further negotiations with the Viennese Government. Skrzynski at once notified Czernin, who, however, on this occasion very decisively instructed Skrzynski not to ​negotiate with Mr. Kerr. His reasons for this were, firstly, that London had divulged the Smuts negotiations which had actually been referred to in the British Parliament, with the result that Czernin had been attacked by Press and Parliament both in Germany and at home; and then it was Czernin’s view that both the previous and the present English overtures were merely an attempt to arouse nervousness and mistrust, for the purpose of separating Vienna from Berlin.
Nevertheless, Mr. Kerr found a means for reaching Skrzynski, who discussed matters with him, and he afterwards made various excuses to Czernin for having thus acted contrary to his orders. There can be no doubt that the people in Berne did not agree with Czernin’s view of the situation, and considered that it would be advisable to meet Kerr. The latter again inquired whether Vienna would or would not make peace without Germany and cease to support German imperialism. Skrzynski, on his own account, could only say that he had received instructions from Vienna to negotiate with nobody, and that Vienna, as he himself knew, would in no case separate from Berlin. Thus Lloyd George’s scheme again fell through.
On March 7th the Jugoslav-Italian agreement, to which I have previously referred, was signed at London provisionally by Trumbić and A. Torre, and this step was followed with interest and sympathy by the Foreign Office. The preparations for the Congress of Rome had been completed, and Steed left for France, partly to carry on the propaganda which had been arranged, partly on account of the Congress of Rome, as he judged from Balfour’s letter that London would support all schemes in favour of the oppressed peoples if the consent of Paris and Rome could be secured.
During the Congress of Rome the British representative showed himself very favourably disposed to our movement. After the Congress he attended the demonstration which was held in connection with our army, and when the Prince of Wales came to Rome in May 1918 he was present at the demonstration in Augusteo, which Stefanik also attended. These were symptoms of a more resolute policy on the part of London. Then came the Clemenceau-Czernin incident, which definitely influenced British public opinion and Government circles against Karl and the Habsburg Empire.
I may add that when I went to London to negotiate for the ​recognition of the National Council, Lord Robert Cecil assured me that under certain conditions the British Government would recognize our independence.
Thus we see that the month of April 1918 was a critical period in England, as elsewhere, in which events had matured sufficiently to settle the fate of the Habsburg Empire.
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The same influences operated in the United States. I have already sketched the main outlines of President Wilson’s policy towards the Habsburg Empire. On various occasions and in various forms he had repeated his principles: a struggle against the imperialism and autocracy of the Central European Governments in favour of their internal democratization and the self-determination of peoples, the allotment of Italian territory to Italy, of Polish territory to Poland, the reconstitution of Serbia and Rumania, the settlement of injustices, and compensation for devastated areas, the evacuation of occupied territories, the freedom of the seas, disarmament after the war, arbitration courts, the League of Nations. All this, however, did not necessarily mean the destruction of the Habsburg Empire.
The United States at this moment had no political scheme which would affect the existence of the Empire. Wilson’s attitude towards Austria had not changed since he had declared war on her. Vienna therefore thought it advisable to pass from public declarations to secret negotiations.(44)
On February 17, 1918, Czernin, at the Emperor’s request, sent to Prince Fürstenberg, the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in Madrid, a telegram entrusting him with a long message from Karl to President Wilson. The Ambassador was instructed to hand it personally to King Alfonso, and to ask him on behalf of the Emperor to act as intermediary between Karl and President Wilson. At the same time Karl indicated his belief that the last declarations of Wilson and Czernin had cleared up the situation to such an extent that it was now possible for representatives of Karl and President Wilson to proceed to a direct exchange of views on the subject of peace.
In the message itself the Emperor based his argument on four principles expressed by Wilson in his speech on February 12th, and in accordance with them he explained his views on the war and the possibilities of peace negotiations. ​Karl’s proposal was that both sides should declare their readiness to renounce any kind of annexations or indemnities. He added that this would mean the complete liberation of Belgium. He expressed the opinion that the agreement between the views of President Wilson and his own was such as to make it possible to set about concrete negotiations. He concluded by proposing a meeting between the representatives of President Wilson and his own delegates.
Prince Fürstenberg delivered the message to King Alfonso on February 22nd, and three days later Alfonso informed Karl that he would willingly dispatch the message to President Wilson, and that he hoped for its success. At the same time he demanded the strictest secrecy in the whole matter. On March 2nd he sent Karl a fresh report on the audience of the Spanish Ambassador at Washington, giving an account of how the message had been delivered, and how Wilson had reacted to it.
According to the report of the Spanish Ambassador, Wilson, after thanking King Alfonso for delivering Karl’s document, expressed great interest in the message, which seemed to him to be rather “‘transcendental,” and announced that he would have to examine it carefully before replying. This was all the more necessary because this intervention had placed him in a somewhat awkward predicament; he was opposed to any kind of secret negotiations, and these were matters which interested all his other Allies. Besides this, any peace negotiations or settlements of territorial problems must be based upon the principle of national justice and not upon any secret agreements on the part of one side or the other. Nevertheless, it appeared that the Spanish Ambassador and King Alfonso were favourably impressed by the effects of the step they had taken. In Alfonso’s opinion, Wilson would agree to a direct exchange of views, but would not enter into any discussions through the agency of delegates. Such a process would constitute actual negotiations, and Wilson would be obliged to notify his Allies about such a matter beforehand.
On March 5, 1918, King Alfonso handed Prince Fürstenberg Wilson’s reply. In it Wilson first of all expressed his gratification that Karl accepted the principles which he had laid down before Congress on January 8th and February 11th. He pointed out, however, that there was no need to discuss them with the help of delegates, because they were so clear and pregnant ​that no representative of Wilson could elucidate them further. He said that he would like to see the principles of the other side formulated with equal clarity. In particular he would like to know what was meant by a settlement of Balkan problems, how Karl proposed to deal with the disputes concerning the Adriatic coast and those with Italy, what he understood by the satisfaction of the national aspirations of the Slavonic people in Austria-Hungary, and how he would handle the question of the non-Turkish nationalities in Turkey. Wilson assumed that as regards Polish and Belgian affairs his views were identical with those of Karl. He further assured Karl that he desired knowledge on these points, not for any reasons of tactics, but because he really wished to go into these matters. He said that he was anxious to discover a rational settlement, and to promote the chances of a quick and genuinely lasting peace.
In the opinion of Alfonso and his ambassador, Wilson’s reply did not offer much ground for actual optimism, but it was nevertheless a good sign. Wilson, it appeared, had told the ambassador that he himself had typed out the whole of the reply in order that nobody could divulge the secret. An exchange of views conducted on these lines was not at variance with his opinions about public peace negotiations. If, however, the steps hitherto taken were to be changed into any form of explicit offer, Wilson would be obliged to inform the Allies about it immediately.
Karl and Czernin decided to reply to Wilson’s question through the same channels as before. As early as March 9th they notified King Alfonso of their intention, and made the preliminary arrangements for it. On March 23, 1918, the lengthy text of Karl’s reply left Vienna for Madrid, but the delivery of Karl’s message was delayed in Madrid through what appeared to have been partly technical difficulties and partly political obstacles. King Alfonso seems at this juncture to have had difficulties with Dato, his Prime Minister, who was afraid that Alfonso’s action would involve Spain in awkward consequences if the Allies got to hear of it.
In actual fact, as early as March 13th, the London newspapers reported that Karl was in touch with President Wilson. On the day before, the Matin had published a definite report from Switzerland stating that negotiations were proceeding between Karl and President Wilson. Even earlier than this, ​on March 9th, i.e. immediately after Wilson’s first reply, the Temps published an unmistakable reference to King Alfonso, mentioning in its special report that Karl had applied to Wilson through the agency of a neutral sovereign. These matters were clearly a source of great embarrassment to the Government at Madrid, and it would appear that they caused a considerable delay in the subsequent proceedings and in the delivery of Karl’s reply. Towards the end of March the whole matter was a current topic in the diplomatic circles of Paris and Switzerland, although the precise and detailed facts were not known. It was from these circles that we heard about the negotiations. There was a rumour in Paris that the Allied intelligence service had intercepted and deciphered telegrams which Alfonso had sent to Washington. We ourselves in Paris were very imperfectly informed about the matter. The newspaper reports had drawn our attention to it, but at first I did not place any credence in it, and even afterwards I did not consider that it was of any great importance. At that particular moment I was so taken up by work connected with our army, as well as the preliminary arrangements for the Congress of Rome, and I had such confidence in our early success with the transport of an army to France, that I now no longer regarded such a surprise as possible.
As a result of the diplomatic difficulties, and owing to the circumstance that Karl’s message in its final wording was very late in reaching Madrid, the message was not delivered to Alfonso by the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador until the middle of April 1918.
This important reply of Karl to President Wilson, which was prepared after March 10, 1918, contains the following main ideas:
First of all, Karl emphasizes the agreement of his views with Wilson’s principles, but he points out the advantages of verbal negotiations over lengthy correspondence. As regards the national aspirations of the Slav peoples, who are located in the neighbourhood of Karl’s territories, he desires to offer them a helping hand, but he denies their right to shift nations and provinces from one State sovereignty to another without their will and, in fact, against their interests, since owing to the mixture of races in those parts of Europe it is impossible to settle racial questions so as not to infringe at the same time the equal national rights of other nations. On the shores of the ​Adriatic, Austria, he said, was not pursuing tendencies at variance with Wilson’s principles. He added that a direct conversation would be the easiest way for devising a means of removing antagonisms in the Balkans in the interest of the Balkan nations and in accordance with Wilson’s wishes. In this respect it would be necessary to unite the scattered Bulgarian minorities by incorporating them with Bulgaria, and to ensure the possibility of economic expansion for Serbia and other States. As regards protection of the non-Turkish races in the Ottoman Empire, a solution could be found compatible both with Wilson’s principles and with Turkish sovereignty. In reply to a direct inquiry of Wilson’s as to what concessions to Italy he regarded as reasonable, Karl pointed out that the Italian demands for territory from the Brenner and Ljubljana (Laibach) run completely counter to Wilson’s principles, since the population of these areas is largely German or Slav. Trieste, which is more Slav and German than Italian, had, he said, agreed with Austria, and he would regard its incorporation in Italy as a complete disaster. Southern Tyrol had never belonged to Italy, and the Italian elements which had settled there had done so only for the sake of an economic existence. In conclusion, he repeated the opinion that a settlement of this question in the spirit of Wilson’s principles was possible only by direct conversation. The only obstacle to peace lay in the acquisitive aims of France and Italy, and if Wilson could induce them to abandon these, the doors of peace would open.
I have ascertained that Kühlmann was informed by Czernin about this second message. The second phase of his action was thus proceeding with the knowledge of Berlin. This was Czernin’s customary method of procedure. He began some scheme on his own account, so as not to be interfered with by Berlin, and then he waited for a favourable opportunity of notifying Berlin in such a way that his action could be regarded as correct.
In the meanwhile, however, since Wilson’s first reply, the peace of Brest-Litovsk and also peace with Rumania had been concluded. Then followed Czernin’s well-known speech at Vienna on April 2nd, as well as his conflict with Clemenceau. This brings us to Czernin’s resignation on April 14th, to which I have previously referred, and to the reappointment of Burian as Minister of Foreign Affairs three days later. On ​April 21st Burian sent Prince Fiirstenberg a telegram instructing him not to send Karl’s message to Washington for the time being, if it could not be done by a special courier, as the Spanish cipher was known to the Allies.
President Wilson probably never received Karl’s second message. The Clemenceau-Czernin incident and everything which followed it, the new agreements on the occasion of Karl’s visit to Spa, the new commitments and the greater dependence of Vienna upon Berlin no doubt deprived Karl and the Government at Vienna of any opportunity or desire to continued any such scheme.
On my return to Paris I was asked to call upon Mr. Sharp, the American Ambassador. At that time I was in continual contact with Mr. Frazer, his Counsellor of Embassy, and in fact with the whole of his staff, to whom I had been systematically furnishing reports on our work in the Allied countries and on the conditions in Central Europe ever since the autumn of 1917. I regularly used to receive invitations to visit the Embassy whenever anything of particular importance had happened, and in the second half of April Mr. Sharp had twice asked me to call upon him in connection with the Clemenceau-Czernin conflict, as he was anxious to obtain details about the state of affairs in the Habsburg Empire, the Congress of Rome, and the stage which our movement had reached in France. At first Mr. Sharp had been totally ignorant of Central Europe and our affairs, which he had accordingly regarded in a very naïve manner, but when he became acquainted with our movement, the organization of our army and our political and military activities in the Allied countries, he at once became an enthusiastic supporter of our national demands. I am unable to say whether he had any influence on his Government and on President Wilson. On the occasion of my second visit he read to me the telegrams which he had sent to Wilson on the subject of our affairs. They constituted an enthusiastic plea on our behalf, and a demonstration of the fact that nothing more could be done with the Habsburg Empire, that the nations in it were gradually liberating themselves, and that the Allies in Europe were clearly directing their policy in accordance with this circumstance.
These successes were, of course, supplemented first and foremost by our intensive action in the United States them​selves. Masaryk had reached Chicago on May 5th, and his arrival had become known throughout America on account of the enthusiastic welcome which was extended to him by the American Czechs and Slovaks. From that moment he began a systematic activity on behalf of our political aims, and he collaborated with the representatives of the nations who, like ourselves, were counteracting the efforts of the pro-Austrians and the pro-Magyars. In his Making of a State, Masaryk has given a detailed account of this activity, and, in particular, he explains the whole basis of the Austrophile tendencies in America.
If I again consider what happened in the first four months of 1918 as regards Austro-Hungarian affairs—Lloyd George’s final attempt at negotiations with Austria-Hungary on March roth, Karl’s attempt at peace negotiations with President Wilson in February and March 1918, which on April 21st, after the Clemenceau-Czernin conflict, was abandoned as the result of Burian’s orders—I again arrive at my former conclusion: the Allies had realized that secret negotiations would lead to nothing in 1918. On the other hand the conclusion of peace in the East, and the final desperate offensive of Germany in the West, had impressed upon the Allies two facts which were essential to a proper understanding of the war: Russia, whose intrusion into Central Europe they feared, and whose possible expansion had hitherto formed the argument of many for preserving the Habsburg Empire, had now collapsed; on the other hand Germany had acquired a mastery over the whole of Central and South-Eastern Europe. At length it was fully understood what we had meant when we had said that Austria-Hungary no longer constituted that counterpoise against Germany in Central and Southern Europe which, according to French conceptions, she should still have been in the last century, but she was, on the contrary, a link and an auxiliary factor for German expansion towards the south and the east. It is impossible to exaggerate the significance and the scope of these facts in their bearing upon the change which Allied policy underwent in this question.
109
On May 10, 1918, I sent our political circles in Prague the following brief political report, which gives a clear idea of our ​situation in the Allied countries at that time, and shows the political progress which had been made in the preceding months:
1. Our political situation is excellent. The Clemenceau-Czernin conflict has definitely destroyed all links with Austria-Hungary, against whom they will now proceed here resolutely and with full strength. The war may drag on for about another year and a half, and this must be reckoned with. In France and Italy our position is very good, and in England they are now resolutely moving against Austria. In France, within about three months, we shall have some seventy or eighty thousand troops.(45)
In Italy our division is already at the front. The formation of the army is being carried on energetically by Colonel Stefanik, who completed the chief negotiations with the Italian Government on the subject of the army. Professor Masaryk has reached America from Russia, and he will stay there for some time. At the present moment he is in Chicago.
2. Our movement is at its best in France. Here the National Council is in a strong position, it is exercising supreme rights as regards the Czech Army, it is recognized by the Government as a supreme governing body, and after the arrival of our troops from Russia it will have even more power. The Congress of Rome has strengthened our position. Co-operation has been arranged between all the Austro-Hungarian peoples, and this was of great significance here.
After his return from Rome Dr. Bene, with the other delegates, was received by Clemenceau, who definitely informed him that France would not desert the Czechs, and spoke about our troops in terms of high commendation. At the last military conference at Abbeville our army was likewise a subject of discussion, and it was referred to with approval. If you at home can also continue as hitherto in a relentless struggle, there is no doubt that we shall win the day.
3. Therefore be prepared for fresh political successes on our part. After our return from the Congress of Rome, Clemenceau and Pichon promised us emphatically that they would give us a declaration, and acknowledge us as completely independent. Clemenceau expressed himself similarly on the Commission which dealt with Emperor Karl’s letter, and announced that they would recognize and proclaim the independence of the Austro-Hungarian nations. Our work on this matter is now making rapid headway in Paris. We are sure that the result will be satisfactory, and that in a short time we shall attain recognition. Be prepared for it.
4. It is therefore of enormous importance for preparations to be made at home also. You must do more, not only in political matters but also in other directions, to harm and destroy the whole position of Austria-Hungary. It is essential for the people there to see that we are working with all possible resources. Masaryk will arrive in Europe within eight weeks.
(f) The Struggle for the Principle of Self-determination within the Habsburg Empire
110
The report reached Prague shortly after the celebrations at the National Theatre in May, at a time when within Austria-Hungary the same development in the struggle against the Empire and for self-determination was being completed, as had just been successfully achieved in the Allied countries. It assumed forms which were more and more revolutionary in character, and which only in a few cases for tactical reasons were still thinly disguised. The parallel action and the direct co-operation of the revolutionary movement abroad, with the political action which was directed in the same spirit within the Empire, was now beginning to be carried into effect. The struggle for the principle of self-determination was thus started to its fullest extent within the Empire also.
The slogan of self-determination was first uttered by our politicians in. the proclamation of the “Czech League” on April 14, 1917. Here, evidently under the influence of the Russian revolution, they appealed for “the application of democracy, of Parliamentarianism, and the revision of the constitution on the lines of self-determination and the requirements of nations in the Habsburg Empire also.”
Under the influence of the Czech’s authors’ manifesto and of public opinion, which received it with enthusiasm, the proclamation of the Czech deputies in the Viennese Parliament on May 30th went even further. It appealed primarily for the principle of self-determination, from which it then deduced the need for a national Czechoslovak State. This was all the more important because analogous proclamations were made by the Poles, Jugoslavs, and Ruthenians, so that from this time onwards the action taken by these nations was uniform or parallel with our own. Allied public opinion interpreted this as a profound crisis, going to the very roots of the Habsburg Empire. The succeeding events tended only to strengthen this impression. Our propaganda was continually striving to hasten this crisis at home, while demonstrating in the Allied countries that the Habsburg Empire was moving towards its inevitable collapse. It was naturally our most ​earnest wish that nothing should happen at Prague and Vienna which might discredit our interpretation of events and the efforts we based upon it, and in our messages to Prague we gave the most emphatic expression to this desire.
Of course, we made the most abundant use of every proclamation and every action emanating from our deputies, our politicians, our Press, and our authors. The declaration made by Clam-Martinic on June 12th, in which he repudiated the declaration of the opposition on May 30th, and insisted that the only programme of the Government was Austria and her inviolable unity; Dr. A. Stránský’s reply, which immediately followed, and which culminated in the declaration that none of the racial problems of Austria-Hungary would be solved in the Parliament at Vienna; the speeches of the Czech deputies, Střírbný and Kalina, together with the proclamations of Korošec and Lazarski on behalf of the Jugoslavs and the Poles respectively—we exploited all this material for the purpose of showing the Allies that what had been advocated by President Wilson on the subject of the freedom of nations found warm response within the Habsburg Empire.
The fall of Clam-Martinic on June 22, 1917, confirmed this impression, while the further steps taken by the Czechs and Jugoslavs against Seidler’s new Government made our work all the easier. The declaration of the Czech deputy, Staněk, on June 26th, declining to vote for Seidler’s Government or for any other which would not recognize the principle of self-determination; the declaration of another Czech deputy, Prášek, who spoke against the alliance with Germany, and who expressed the solidarity of all the Czech deputies with those of their colleagues then in prison; the proclamation against dualism and in favour of the establishment of national States; the proclamation of the Czech deputies Bechyně and Zahradník, in the same sense—all these things were quoted by us as further serious symptoms of the approaching collapse.
The further progress of events assisted our efforts even more thoroughly. Czernin continued his attempts and manœuvres to conclude peace with revolutionary Russia, and issued declarations that he accepted the views of the Russian revolutionary Government on the subject of peace without annexation or indemnities, guaranteeing freedom for all nations. He himself compelled Parliament to debate the principles proclaimed by the Russian revolution, and this led to questions and pro​clamations by the deputies, Soukup and Daszynski, demanding that the nations themselves, and not merely the Emperor, should have a decisive voice in the peace negotiations, the terms of which must be based upon the principles of self-determination.
Czernin was perturbed by this move. He feared that it might weaken the Empire at the peace negotiations, which he now believed to be close at hand, and accordingly, on June 27th, he caused Seidler to deliver a declaration in Parliament, which aroused great attention both within the Empire and abroad, and proved of no little service to our propaganda. The declaration ran as follows: “The assumption expressed in the interpellation made by Deputy Daszynski, implying that the Imperial and Royal Government would acknowledge the right of self-determination as a basis for a permanent peace, is an error. The Imperial and Royal Government takes its stand upon the basis of Article V. of the Constitutional Law of December 21, 1867.”(46)
At the moment when a severe struggle on this subject was being waged in Russia between the Government and the extremists, at the moment when President Wilson was solemnly proclaiming this principle of self-determination, when it was gaining influence and strength in the Allied countries, Czernin’s proclamation served admirably to throw light upon the state of the Empire and the intentions of the Government at Vienna and the Central Powers in general. And in this respect Vienna was considered to be far more moderate than Berlin. The Allied Governments, when speaking about the freedom of nations, had in mind not merely the nations within Austria, but chiefly Belgium, Poland, Serbia, and Rumania, who at that time were in the hands of the Central Powers. The Seidler-Czernin proclamation was taken as indicating what the Governments of the Central Powers would do in this respect if they were to remain masters of the situation.
The Czech deputy, Dr. Baxa, made a speech on June 28th, in which he pointed out that as a logical result of this policy the Czech question and the other racial problems would not be settled in the Empire itself, but at a general peace conference which would decide the future of the small nations. Then came a new declaration by Staněk, published in the newspaper Az Est, emphasizing the programme of Czech ​policy as regards the incorporation of Slovakia into the Czech State. Both these items enabled us to show how far the struggle for the principle of self-determination had proceeded, the inference being that it would cease only when the Empire had succumbed. This was confirmed even more strikingly by the fact that on July 5th our deputies, associating themselves with Dr. Stránský’s very emphatic manifesto in the constitutional committee, declined to take part in the work of revising the constitution, their reason being that they were awaiting the Peace Conference. The decision of the Government to prorogue the session of Parliament on July 15th, because its meetings were giving more and more proof of internal disruption, satisfied us completely. On the other hand we felt some alarm at the amnesty which, at the beginning of July 1917, was granted to the political offenders, and particularly to the Czech deputies, Kramář, Klofáč, and Rašín. We were not sufficiently familiar with the details of the situation, and we did not know whether there might not be some systematic and decisive political scheme behind this step. We could not help wondering whether any definite guarantees had been given in return for the amnesty, or whether it might even denote a turning-point in the line of policy at Prague. When immediately afterwards references began to be made to Seidler’s resignation, and to the preparation of a coalition Cabinet, we felt convinced that danger was really imminent. We knew that the “Czech League” had previously stipulated an amnesty as the chief condition for any kind of Parliamentary co-operation with the Government, and that our deputies had frequently intervened in this sense. The persecution at home had hitherto been our strong political argument, of which we should be deprived if an amnesty were granted. And if on top of this there had been a change in our line of policy, it would have been a severe blow to the whole of our movement.
The fears with which these events inspired us were accentuated by the international situation at that juncture. We were aware that there had been attempts at secret peace overtures, we knew of the war weariness in France, and of the willingness in London to reach an agreement with Vienna. This was at the time when the negotiations of Sixtus had not yet come to an end, and we also knew that the Pope was preparing some action. Any change in our line of policy at home, and ​acceptance of responsibility for the whole policy of the Empire seemed to us a direct support to the movement for a separate Allied peace with Vienna.
111
On July 12th I sent the following report to Dr. Šámal, in Prague:
I must ask you most emphatically, and in the interests of all our successes gained hitherto, to be uncompromising and, in particular, not to enter any ministry. As the situation is now developing, Austria will become weaker and weaker. So will Germany. They will be defeated, and when this comes about you must not be involved in any responsibility for the war. Here this would be understood as work on behalf of Austria. Therefore, no coalition ministry on any account.
This is all the more important because we have arrived at matters of far-reaching significance. Our army has at length been sanctioned. Masaryk has arranged in Russia for the Government and the military authorities there, with the consent of the Soviets, to send thirty thousand of our volunteers to France. Štefánik has gone to America, and has already secured Wilson’s consent for the recruiting and transport of Czech volunteers to France. Dr. Beneš is negotiating with the Italians for the release of Czech prisoners of war, and the Italian Ambassador in Paris has assured him that there will be no fundamental obstacles; Sonnino himself will ask only for conditions which can be easily fulfilled. We hope that by the autumn we shall have forty to sixty thousand troops in France, apart from our volunteers in the Russian brigade, which is already fighting, and has achieved great successes.
Our movement to-day is very extensive. We have two millions of our people adequately organized, and the Allies have a good opinion of us because of the correct and orderly manner in which our policy is carried on. If you do not make any political blunder, we shall gain our purpose. There are still many here who would be willing, in case of peace, to make some compromise with Austria which would not give us what we want. For them, any compromise of yours with Austria would constitute a reason for saving Austria. It is absolutely essential for our policy to be reciprocal, and for you not to disavow us in any way. The voting against the budget produced an excellent impression—those are the lines on which you must continue. Our aim must be absolute independence, and we shall ourselves decide as to alliances and federations. That is the point of view with which we have consistently identified ourselves. You must not do anything to disavow us, or else we should lose all our prestige. It can now no longer be said that you cannot speak out, since the deputies went so far in their proclamation.
In other respects also our work proceeds well. The prisoners of war are already well organized in France, and we are beginning the same work in Italy. In Russia order has at last been attained. Professor Masaryk has been there since May, and has achieved real successes. He has done much work there with Sir George Buchanan, Albert ​Thomas, and Vandervelde. He was with the General Staff, and negotiated with the Ministers Lvov and Tereshchenko on the subject of our army. He put matters straight in the internal affairs of our organization. In America our people have accomplished a great deal of work. By means of collections they have made it possible for us to work successfully, and full recognition must be given to the enormous amount of work which they have done. With the Slovaks we are working in complete harmony.
The military situation is good on the whole. France is the weakest in this respect, and the English and Americans are our chief hopes. The sacrifices of the French are already considerable. They would therefore gladly accept a possible peace with Austria in order to terminate the war more quickly. Hence the danger of any compromise with Austria is greater than would appear. Only if you hold out and help us to show that Austria cannot be saved from collapse will they keep on until the end.
There are two more points which must be added:
The Slovak question will be solved favourably for us on the condition that you do not withdraw. Here the feeling is decidedly in favour of uniting us with the Slovaks in order to give us more power against the Germans. If you do not desert them, they here will not desert us.
A second question: If the Government should want to exploit the case of Dürich, remain completely calm. The dispute about Dürich will do no harm to our work and success. On the contrary, Dürich had to go because he had compromised himself completely with the old regime in Russia, and his departure strengthened our inner situation with regard to both French and Russian opinion, particularly the latter, because they objected to our connections with reactionary circles. So if the Government and the police should exploit this against us, you will know what view is to be taken of the matter.
I emphasize, then, these points: (1) No co-responsibility. (2) No coalition ministry. (3) Not to desert the Slovaks. (4) Not to negotiate with Austria for a compromise or to disavow us.
This report gives a good idea of our wishes, fears, and opinions at that time. It reached Prague somewhere about July 25th.
Here I should like to add something further with regard to our mutual news service between Prague and Paris. After the war I ascertained from my friends in Prague which of the reports actually reached them. Nearly all of them arrived safely. They were eagerly awaited, and their arrival caused much satisfaction. The receipt of most of them was notified to me during the war, just as we in Paris were able to confirm the receipt of news from Prague. From the summer of 1917 we again had a safe and uninterrupted connection by way of Switzerland and also Holland; from the spring of 1918 communications were carried on very quickly, so that as a rule ​it was easy to arrive at an agreement. In Paris I always had the impression that the National Committee in Prague was proceeding at this period in concert with us, upon the basis of our continual contact. I had at least reports from Dr. Šámal to the effect that he and Dr. Štěpánek regularly delivered our reports to the narrow circle in Prague which was preparing for the possibility of revolutionary action, and from which he kept us supplied with news, thus co-ordinating the whole of his work at home in the authoritative political circles with our activity in the Allied countries.
This is borne out by a number of important messages which, by that time, I had received from Prague. Thus, before my report of July 12th reached Prague, I received on July 17th a message from Prague which had crossed with mine and which, to a certain extent, formed a reply to my reports.
This message contained the following main political reports:
The necessity of the closest possible co-operation between the committee at Prague and the persons who in the Allied countries are directing the movement for the liberation of the Czechoslovak people, has caused the Czech political leaders to consider sending from time to time reports on the political situation in Bohemia, on the resolutions arrived at, etc. They, on their part, desire to receive absolutely reliable news about the steps taken and the results achieved by the organization abroad, in order that they may arrange their further proceedings accordingly. All instructions coming from the Allied countries will therefore be welcomed.
From the newspapers you will have learnt about the declaration which was made in the Reichsrat and by which the representatives of the Czech people claim the re-establishment of an independent Czechoslovak State. All the Czech political parties decided in unison to make this proclamation, the chief purpose of which is that the voice of the Czech nation should be heard in the Allied countries. Under the present circumstances, particularly in view of the state of war which prevails, it was not possible to proclaim openly in the Reichsrat that by independence the Czech nation understands separation from the Monarchy, The Czech political leaders are of the opinion that at the moment of peace negotiations the Czech question will be discussed as a European question, and the Allies will not permit it to be regarded as an internal affair of the Austrian State. In any case, the Committee at Prague asks to be kept informed about this matter, and also about the effect which the declaration produced in the Allied countries.
This report and the further events at home came as a great relief to us, showing, as they did, that our misgivings had been ill-founded. We attributed this in a large measure to the services rendered by the delegates of the Social Demo​cratic Party who went to Stockholm, and the reports on the international situation and the whole of our movement which they brought home with them. We accordingly explained in Allied circles that the amnesty was a proof of the weakness and chaos prevailing in the Habsburg Empire, the precarious conditions of which it would render even more critical. This opinion of ours was confirmed by the fact that the Emperor’s attempt to form a new coalition Cabinet proved unsuccessful after the express refusal of the “Czech League,” which continued its previous attitude against Seidler’s new Cabinet of officials. The latter Cabinet was appointed on August 30, 1917, for the purpose of carrying out the revision of the constitution upon the basis of national self-administration, while preserving State unity.
Under these circumstances our work in the Allied countries was not disturbed by any fresh fears. The return of Klofáč to the leadership of the party; the formation of a Czech State Rights Parliamentary group on September 26, 1917, consisting of the Young Czech, National Socialists, State Rights and People’s Progressive parties; the election of Habrman as President of the Social Democratic Party on October 18 ,1917; and, finally, the attempt to found a large bourgeois party known as the Czech State Rights Democratic Party, with a pronounced anti-Austrian programme—all these events adequately indicated to us the direction in which matters would now proceed at home, and gave us every reason to believe that from that time onward the two constituent portions of our national policy, at home and abroad, would, little by little, merge outwardly also into one.
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After the Bolshevik revolution in Russia and the first attempt to arrange an armistice between Russia and the Central Powers, an opportunity presented itself for imparting to the progress of events at home a clear public expression which produced excellent results. In the peace offer made by the Bolsheviks to the Central Powers there was an express reference to peace without annexations or indemnities, and in accordance with the principle of self-determination. Seidler, speaking in Parliament about the negotiations with the Bolsheviks, stated that the Austro-Hungarian Government would accept the offer on the condition that both sides agreed ​to abstain from any interference with the internal organization of each other’s States. The “Czech League” realized clearly what this implied, and on December 4th Klofáč and Staněk headed delegations calling upon the Government to admit representatives of the non-German nationalities to the proposed negotiations, and to base these negotiations on the principle of self-determination. The same demand was then made by the “Czech League” and also by the Jugoslav Parliamentary group. When, however, in the second half of December the Armistice had been arranged and definite peace negotiations began, Czernin, at Brest-Litovsk, made a declaration against the Russian attitude towards self-determination, and this was greatly resented by the non-German nationalities.(47)
Political circles in Prague seized this opportunity to incite a strong protest against the policy of the Empire, and this led to the convening of the general Diet of the Czech territories which was held at Prague on January 6, 1918. The Declaration which was passed on this occasion constituted an emphatic demand for Czech State independence within the historical frontiers and including Slovakia. It emphasized the principle of self-determination in the revolutionary sense with which Russia had imbued that term, and it demanded the representation of the Austrian nationalities at the Peace Conference. This declaration was repudiated by Seidler in Parliament on January 22nd, and this assisted us greatly in our movement.
The struggle between Vienna and Prague was now carried on quite openly, and in spite of the fact that the “Czech League” and the official policy of the Czech deputies kept within certain limits, so as not to be exposed to unnecessary persecution, Czernin notably was well aware that declarations of this character might be an indirect obstacle to his negotiations with the Allies. Believing that after the conclusion of peace in the East, and after the German offensive in the West the Central Powers would achieve a final victory, and evidently judging that it was necessary once and for all to suppress with a firm hand any such attempts, he delivered the speech already referred to on April 2, 1918, in which he made a violent attack on the Czechoslovak movement at home and abroad.
This speech had disastrous consequences to him, not only in foreign countries, but also in Prague, where it produced the effect of strengthening the resolution of Czech political ​circles. Czernin had attempted to draw a distinction between the leaders of the Czech nation, who were carrying on a policy against the Empire, and the Czech nation itself, which he described as being still loyal and Austrian. In order, therefore, to show the unity of the whole nation against Vienna and against Czernin’s policy, the Czech politicians in Prague convened a special demonstration of all classes of the Czech people. This demonstration, to which the Jugoslavs were also invited, took place at Prague on April 13, 1918, and the chief feature of it was a solemn vow made by all the representatives of the nation, by which they confirmed their adherence to all previous manifestos, and entered into a national commitment not to give up their struggle until the aims formulated in the previous manifestos had been achieved.
This April demonstration formed a landmark to us in our efforts abroad. Czernin’s speech had inflicted a severe blow upon the Empire from the Allies’ point of view, while at home the whole nation had responded to it by an open adherence to the revolutionary programme. Nothing more was now needed for the success of our work in the Allied countries. We saw that the psychological and moral development of affairs at home had been completed, and that it was now only a question of the actual material collapse of the Empire.
Under these circumstances we were deeply gratified by the first Slovak demonstration, which was held on May 1, 1918, at Liptovský Svatý Mikuláš at the instigation of Dr. Šrobár, and which demanded the recognition of the principle of self-determination “not only beyond the frontiers of our Monarchy, but also for the nations of Austria-Hungary, and hence also for the Hungarian branch of the Czechoslovak stock.” We adduced this as a proof that the Slovaks were at one with us, and that they desired Czechoslovak unification against the Magyars.
This is the conclusion which I should draw from the whole of this development:
The month of April 1918 was the decisive point in the struggle for the self-determination of the Austro-Hungarian peoples, within the Empire also. For the Czechs it meant—especially when taken into conjunction with the May-time manifestos—the culminating period of their resistance to Vienna. The Jugoslavs were advancing solidly with us, while the Poles now regarded their separation from the Empire as ​practically certain. And everything which followed merely tended to confirm and emphasize the April events.
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It will be more convenient here to complete this chapter on our home policy, although by doing so I slightly anticipate the course of international events.
On May Ist the following report was sent to me from Prague by Dr. Štěpánek, who, with Dr. Šámal, Rašín, Kvapil, and Scheiner, was then in charge of the activities of the “Maffia”:
After having placed our own political action on a firm basis, a process which cost much endeavour but which showed unexpectedly extensive results, and after having achieved an absolutely fraternal association, not only with the group of Jugoslav deputies, but also with the political headquarters of the Jugoslavs at Zagreb, we have now for some time been engaged upon the establishment of a league of oppressed nations within the Empire, The relevant dates indicating the progress of this movement were May 30, 1917, January 6th, and April 13, 1918. First and foremost we endeavoured to win over Polish political circles to a joint action, and thus to follow the Socialist groups and the Pan-Poles who have already come over. The prospects of success are good, for the common danger constitutes a real common basis. . . . I will only add that on May 16th there will be celebrations at the National Theatre, which will be attended by large Polish and Jugoslav deputations. Important confidential political conferences have been projected, and according to present arrangements their continuation will be organized partly at Zagreb and partly at Cracow. The Ukrainians, Italians, and Rumanians have also been invited to Prague, and we hope that they will come.
It is evident that this forms an analogy with the Congress of Rome, and our policy here is thus parallel to that abroad. Our programme will naturally remain always the same—an independent Czechoslovak State in connection with which, however, out of regard for present and future Allies, a lesser emphasis will be placed upon historical rights, but there will be a generally acceptable formula of self-determination as regards the economic and other essential requirements of the State, with assurances for the linguistic minorities. Further, in every direction, a joint defensive and offensive movement against Austria, i.e. a federative State, Bohemia, Poland, and Jugoslavia as a fulcrum with great powers of international leverage. All this, of course, is only a rough sketch. The exact programme accepted by all representatives can be communicated only by word of mouth. It is necessary, therefore, to reply as promptly and favourably as possible to the inquiry about transport by submarine.(48)
From all this it will be seen that the political situation with us is a favourable one. On all sides there is a resolute spirit of sacrifice and self-confidence, enormous activity and unity. In our next we shall reply to the inquiries contained in the letter of February 18th.
​I made abundant use of this report in official circles, and when it was confirmed by the news which arrived in the following week, it naturally provided a fresh proof of the agreement, co-operation, and mutual confidence between the National Council and our home policy in Prague and in the Empire generally. More than this we did not need to establish our credentials in the Allied countries.
The fall of the Empire was to be brought about by a military blow which would reduce Austria-Hungary to such straits that, at the moment of the approaching catastrophe, our people at home could give the Empire its last blow by an internal upheaval. We in the meanwhile aimed at making all political preparations, constituting a national army and Government, gaining recognition, becoming Allies, attending Allied conferences.
The further events at home, such as the first enactments of the May Government for setting up local governing bodies in Bohemia, the struggle against which was started by the Czechs and Jugoslavs, joined later by the Poles; the resolution of the “Czech League” to indict the Government; the resignation of Seidler and the appointment of Hussarek’s Cabinet on July 24, 1918, which two days later continued the movement for the administrative division of Bohemia, merely showed that the process of collapse was spreading.
On July 13th came the establishment of the National Committee, which issued an emphatically revolutionary manifesto denoting full and unreserved unity with our movement in the Allied countries. This was of great political significance to us in its bearing upon our contact with Prague. In this manifesto the Committee stated that it would “gather and direct all spiritual, moral, and material forces in the nation for attaining the right of self-determination in an independent democratic Czechoslovak State, with its own administration beneath its own sovereignty.” From the “Maffia” I then received reports on the work of the National Committee to bring about the expected catastrophe of the Empire. This work included political preparations, economic and financial measures, as well as the action of the Sokols in military affairs.
From the time of the May celebrations I had no further alarm about the situation at home, although in none of my reports to Prague did I omit to insist that there should be no ​negotiations with Vienna. My purpose in doing this was chiefly to support our radicals at home against the opportunists there. Nor did I have any further difficulties compelling me to explain or excuse to the Allies what was happening in Prague or Vienna. Only once, in August 1918, I found myself in difficulties during the negotiations with Balfour to secure our recognition by Great Britain. I shall refer to this later.
Of the other events at home I made use only of the manifesto of our deputies in the Vienna Parliament at the beginning of October, when we had proclaimed Czechoslovak independence, and it was again necessary to make it clear that we were taking this step with the knowledge and approval of our politicians at home. I pointed out that the President of the “Czech League” had openly referred in Parliament to our army and to the National Council as being the factor which, in spite of the opposition of Vienna and Budapest, would represent the Czechoslovak nation at the Peace Conference.