# My War Memoirs/Chapter 2

II
THE BEGINNINGS OF OUR REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT
(a) Professor Masaryk’s Activity
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When the first volleys were fired against Belgrade, I was spending my holidays in the country. The entry of England into the war meant, in my judgment, the certain defeat of Germany and accordingly, for the reasons already mentioned, the probable end of Austria-Hungary. I explained these views to my wife and my closest friends, and at the same time I expressed my determination to enter upon revolutionary activity against the Habsburg Empire for the purpose of hastening its end.
A few days later I went to Prague to see what impression the events had made on the ordinary people there, what views of the situation were taken by a number of my friends in the Progressive Party, among the National Socialists, and in Social Democratic circles. A week later I paid another visit to Prague and decided to apply for a passport. I had at once taken several eventualities into account; it would perhaps be a good thing to see what was going on abroad; it would perhaps be necessary to escape if I were called up for the army; or, finally, the necessity would perhaps arise of making good my escape should there be any revolutionary movement which would make it dangerous to remain at home.
I spent the month of August in a state of suspense, following events at home and on the Western front, paying weekly visits ​to Prague to see how it was reacting to events. I was in touch with the young Progressives, and I learnt also from the journalist Šašek that at the very beginning of August the young Radicals (later joined by the young Progressives) had met, had discussed the war, and had evinced the desire to do something. They wanted somebody to go abroad(3) and to send news home. I at once got into touch with a number of them.
It was about September 10th when I decided to join the staff of the newspaper Čas and work there as an unpaid contributor. At the same time I intended to visit Professor Masaryk and tell him my opinion of what was taking place. I was exceedingly dissatisfied with the events and conditions at home. Among the leaders there were still marked traces of the quarrels due to the Šviha affair, while public opinion was in a state of confusion. The arrests of a number of people (Klofáč, for example) had, on the whole, not produced any reaction. With few exceptions the Press was behaving badly, expressing its fulsome approval of the mobilization, which had been accomplished without a hitch. Certain of the parties distinguished themselves in this respect to such a degree that it filled me with repugnance and shame. At the same time I was observing the advance of the Germans in the West and the first Austrian failures in Serbia. In spite of the overwhelming advance of the Germans on Paris, when I again recapitulated all my memories of Paris, of the spirit of France, of the moral qualities of the French people, I was filled with hope, if not with certainty, that the French would rally and hold out. And I felt that we could not continue in our present attitude, that the attitude of our Press and our passive policy were hopeless. Something would have to be done.
This was what I told Professor Masaryk whom I met while on my way to his house. The end of our long conversation on events at home, on the situation of Germany, France, ​England, and Russia, which took place on that pleasant autumn day on the slope of Letná, with its delightful view of the whole beauty of Prague, was that Professor Masaryk informed me that he had already started working and that we should therefore work together. He further told me that he was in touch with abroad and that he proposed very shortly to visit Holland. He added, however, that at the moment he was concerned about a number of his foreign friends whom the war had brought into an awkward situation. He also said that money was needed, and would be needed too, should we embark upon any political activity. Even at that time he expressed considerable fears about the ability of France to hold out, and he did not disguise his doubts with regard to Russia, in whose success he did not believe. He was quite hopeful about the English.
I at once went over my personal accounts and promised to provide financial help. In a few days I was able to supply Professor Masaryk with the first instalment of funds. We agreed that I should go regularly to the office of Čas and that my further work for the paper would develop in accordance with the views and plans which we exchanged.
6
In August 1914 Professor Masaryk proceeded on his first journey to Holland, where he got into touch with his English friends, Mr. Wickham Steed and Dr. Seton Watson. He wrote also to Professor Denis and gave him an account of the situation. On his return he called together the first meeting of his friends in the Progressive Party to tell them of his views and observations and to explain his plans to them. This meeting, like several of those which followed, was a focus from which later was formed what was known as the “Maffia.”
This and the subsequent meetings, held at Dr. Bouček’s house, were attended by Professor Masaryk and Dr. Bouček, together with Dr. Herben; the journalist Cyril Dušek; Dr. ​Šámal; Dr. Veselý; Dubský, the publisher; and Pfeffermann, an engineer. Professor Masaryk explained in general outline his views about the war, referred to the action of our soldiers, criticized the measures adopted at Vienna, told us what he had learnt about food supplies, armaments, muddles in Vienna, Government plans for persecution, the policy of Archduke Frederick, Thun and Heinold. He urged the necessity for us to pursue a policy which would prevent our being crushed by the war and which would enable us to derive the greatest advantage from it. He also told us what he had seen and learnt in Holland. At the same time he gave us confidential reports from Vienna and even from Government circles such as the Ministries. We saw that he was in touch, on the one hand, with military men, and, on the other hand, with people who were well informed about the situation in the Government.
During subsequent meetings he showed us documents and confidential statements sent by Thun from Prague to Heinold, Minister of the Interior, and Prime Minister Stürgkh. Then there came reports on the ministerial councils, ministerial decrees, letters of Heinold and Stürgkh to Thun, reports sent to Archduke Friedrich’s headquarters staff, statements on the political situation in the Czech territories, in Galicia and in the Jugoslav areas, together with reports which made it possible to form a judgment as to the further political plans of the Government and the Supreme Command.
I soon learnt more about the source of these reports. I frequently accompanied Professor Masaryk on his way home from the office of Čas. Gradually, and with some reserve, he told me things which he was unable to mention at the meetings. Thus I heard about his first conversations with Dr. Scheiner, his conversations with other politicians, and also how he, together with Machar, had obtained the extremely valuable documents, to which I have already referred, through Kovanda, who was Heinold’s servant and who had offered his services in this matter.
​One day, at the beginning of November, Professor Masaryk suddenly called on me at my residence in Vinohrady. He told me that it was urgent to proceed at once to Vienna and obtain news from Machar. I went the same day. I met Machar the next day in his house, and he told me all about Kovanda, who, during the night, was making typewritten copies of documents which Heinold was bringing home every day to keep himself informed about events and the political situation. The next day Machar introduced me to Kovanda at the Länderbank in order that we could arrange matters between ourselves personally according to our needs.
When Professor Masaryk could not go to Vienna, it was I who went there to fetch documents from Kovanda. On these occasions I learnt many things which afterwards stood me in good stead abroad. This continued after Professor Masaryk had finally gone abroad. The danger which threatened Kovanda caused him to find employment elsewhere in the second year of the war. But what he had done gave us a unique insight into the purposes and political methods of the Viennese Government, of Stürgkh, Heinold, and Thun, and was of the utmost service to us in our work.
I also acted as substitute for Professor Masaryk in the office of Naše Doba before his departure abroad. When Machar obtained new documents from Kovanda at Vienna, he sent a postcard saying that he had a manuscript for Naše Doba, and I at once went to Vienna. Later on, when my time was more taken up by work in the “Maffia,” Jan Hájek, also on the staff of Čas, would go to Vienna. The meetings, discussions, visits to Vienna, and attempts at contact with abroad were known not only to Dr. Herben, Dušek, and Hájek, but to the whole staff of Čas—Kunte, Šašek, Fischer, Cvetiša, later also Hajšman—although they did not take any direct part in the proceedings. On November 26th Cyril Dušek was arrested and then released, and for that reason was unable to attend the last and most ​important meeting at Dr. Bouček’s. Drtina was on leave from the University, writing his Introduction to Philosophy at Hněvšín. I had enlisted Hájek’s services at a very early date.
There were several meetings at Dr. Bouček’s. The earliest were of an informative character with regard to the general situation. Their tendency was, of course, anti-Austrian, but for the time being they were without any expressly revolutionary or conspiratorial plans. As time went on there were more and more discussions on the possible results of the war, the aims of our policy, and the course of action we should undertake. With the exception of Professor Masaryk all those present, like our public as a whole, were so convinced of the weakness of Austria-Hungary that although they viewed Russia with critical eyes they were convinced that she would gain an easy and fairly rapid victory. The first Russian defeats, however, affected Professor Masaryk more deeply than all the others.
In November Professor Masaryk was already presenting his plans clearly and without reserve. Whatever happened, we must carry on an active opposition to the Government, otherwise we should obtain nothing from Vienna even if Austria were not victorious. And if Austria were to lose we also should have to be called to account. The various political possibilities were discussed. Masaryk admitted the possibility of defeat, but this I was not to be regarded as a reason for adopting a passive attitude. For political and moral reasons, active opposition to the Government must be carried on, whatever the outcome of events. We also discussed our possible independence, the frontiers of the State, measures to be adopted at home, the need for work abroad. Masaryk finally announced his decision to go abroad and work there.
In the meanwhile I was travelling frequently to Vienna and, before long, to Germany as well. On his second journey to Holland Professor Masaryk had arranged for Dr. Seton Watson to send us the English papers (Times and Morning Post) to the Central Post Office at Dresden, as a number of foreign newspapers were allowed in Germany. Then from time to time, ​always on Saturdays, I proceeded to Dresden and smuggled the papers across the frontier. In addition I arranged with the Czech waiters in the café opposite the railway station at Dresden to keep for me the Italian, Rumanian, and Dutch newspapers which were circulated in Germany either illicitly or with official permission. In this way I used to bring quite regularly to the office of Čas a considerable supply of news, which all of us in the office drew upon until my next excursion. The news thus obtained was utilized, of course, for journalistic purposes, but was also circulated privately. In this way, in the autumn and winter of 1914 and the spring of 1915, in the face of considerable obstacles and dangers, I accomplished a number of journeys, in the course of which I succeeded in smuggling over supplies of newspapers, sometimes also of books and pamphlets.
(b) Attempts at Co-operation with the Socialists
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In the October and November of 1914 I began more decisively to touch on these questions in socialistic circles. What exasperated me was the policy of the Social Democratic Party (with which I was closely connected), by reason of its intolerable opportunism, the absolutely inexplicable abandonment of its principles, and its attempt to justify its attitude by means of Marxist phrases. In the documents obtained from Kovanda and Machar we had found evidence of how this policy was approved by Vienna, of how the Social Democrats were compromising us in the eyes of history, and of how bad an example it was giving to those of our people who were not carrying out their national revolutionary duty.
I endeavoured to explain the matter to some of the leading elements in the party. What I said was noted rather with satisfaction, for from the secret Government documents it was evident that the party would be protected against persecution, if matters were carried to that length. As a regular contributor to the literary section of Právo Lidu, I began my discussions and arguments with F. V. Krejčí. ​ Krejčí realized how matters stood, but he himself was unable to take any decisive step. I then began to talk to Dr. Soukup and later on with Šmeral. Dr. Soukup hesitated. His hesitation, I think, was partly the outcome of his journey to Switzerland, during which he had talked to various people, including Jean Longuet, who throughout the war was throughout the war was a defeatist and wished to bring it rapidly to an end. These people naturally impressed Dr. Soukup that the Allies had not the remotest interest in our cause. Dr. Soukup accordingly returned in a pessimistic frame of mind, and until the spring of 1915, when I induced him to attend the meetings of the “Maffia,” his attitude, out of regard for his party, was on the whole non-committal.
My experiences with Dr. Šmeral were less satisfactory. I had told F. V. Krejčí, who knew my views about the war, much of what I was doing. I made it clear to him in his capacity as a Socialist that we must aim at opposition to the Government, not only in a national, but also in a social respect. I added that it would be immoral for us to support Austria in any way, even by a passive attitude, and I showed that the point at issue was a struggle against the absolutism of Berlin, Vienna, and Budapest. I told him that the Socialist Party was simply failing to carry out its duties if it remained passive, and that it would be committing a crime were it to persist in its present course of action. Finally, I emphasized the fact that the end of the war, if it were not accompanied by the complete military defeat and political downfall of Austria-Hungary, must bring about a social upheaval and that we must at once prepare for these social struggles by subversive activities. It was the duty of the Czech Social Democrats to take their place at the head of all these activities.
As I have said, F. V. Krejčí readily admitted all this and was in full sympathy with the matter, but he had no clear idea of how to proceed with it in the party. Finally he suggested that we should both meet Dr. Soukup and Šmeral in the office of ​Právo Lidu. This meeting took place in the second half of November 1914. At the last moment Dr. Soukup was unable to come and so only F. V. Krejčí and Dr. Šmeral were present beside myself.
F. V. Krejčí had previously told Šmeral what I thought about the state of affairs and also what I had told him about my work with Professor Masaryk. I repeated my arguments to Šmeral.
I have long remembered Šmeral’s reply as one of the things which affected me most deeply during the war. It was also a striking proof of the aberration of many Czechs before the war, and—what was much worse—also during the war. It was a proof of the erroneous tactics and development of ideas among the Czechoslovak Social Democrats as well as of Dr. Šmeral’s sterility of mind, Marxist doctrinairism, and, of course, political incapacity. People can and do make mistakes. But a man who lays claim to so important a political leadership must not make so serious a mistake as Dr. Šmeral did during and after the war.
Dr. Šmeral plainly informed me that we were mad, that Masaryk was leading the nation to another “White Mountain”(4) (those were the actual words he used), that a politician who was responsible for a large party and, in fact, for the whole nation, could not and must not engage in such a gambling policy as that of Professor Masaryk. Besides, the plans which we had formed were fantastic. The Quadruple Alliance was not concerned about us and was not thinking of us. Dr. Šmeral asked me to show him even a single utterance which would make it evident that the Allies were seriously concerned with our cause. He repeatedly asked where were the slightest guarantees from the Entente which would justify us in such a policy. But when I objected that it was also a moral question for us whether we were to associate ourselves with Vienna and Austrian dishonesty and violence or not, and by no means merely a question of political opportunism, he turned to me and said: “You may declare that I am a cynic, that I am a materialist, that I am heaven knows what, but politics is not a moral affair, it is deceit, cynicism, intrigue, fraud, violence, crime if you like. All this is being used against us, we must reckon with it, and for that reason I cannot be a party to your fantastic scheme which can be attempted and defended only by irresponsible persons.”
​I saw the impossibility of convincing Dr. Šmeral. I had an unpleasant impression, by no means due only to Šmeral. He, after all, was looked upon at that time as a serious and prominent politician and everybody without exception counted upon him. He was a decisive personality in the Czech camp, and there were not many who were his equal. But what I felt then and what I feel to-day is this: How gross was the ignorance of conditions, how defective the philosophical and political training in our ranks!
I attempted to explain to Dr. Šmeral that the Czech working classes must also desire the destruction of Austria and Hungary and the establishment of a Czech State, in which they would be better off than they were then. Šmeral’s reply to this was: “I agree. But I shall wait until your political ideas and your plans have met with success. I pledge you my word that if you are successful all my endeavours after the war will be directed to ensure that the Czech proletariat shall abstain from class-warfare for a period of ten years and shall help to develop the State.”
We parted and did not meet again for the rest of the war. But Dr. Šmeral continued to follow my activities, and he obtained much information from various sources. Twice in the spring of 1915 he sent me a message that the police were after me, and he warned me to be careful as I should be arrested. I was grateful to him for the genuine interest he took in me.
I did not meet Dr. Šmeral again until 1920, just before his first visit to Russia. We talked about the past. He admitted that he had been wrong and I had been right.
(c) Professor Masaryk Leaves for Abroad
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At the beginning of December 1914 Professor Masaryk decided to go to Italy to view the situation abroad once more. He established further points of contact and prepared a definite plan of activity abroad. He intended to return to Bohemia once more, to organize his connections with Prague, to talk matters over finally with various persons in the political world, and then to leave once and for all.
Before his departure Professor Masaryk gave me a detailed ​account of his discussions with Dr. Hajn, Švehla, and others. He again expounded to me his view of the whole international situation and indicated how we should proceed in the case of various eventualities. He gave me the addresses of persons abroad with whom he was in touch (Mr. Wickham Steed, Dr. Seton Watson, Captain Voska, Ernest Brain, who was The Times correspondent in Holland, Professor Milyukov, and Professor Denis). He explained to me what he thought would be our future relationships with Germany, Russia, the Magyars, the Jugoslavs, and Poland. He examined in detail the difficulties which would be encountered in any attempt to unite the Jugoslavs, and he pointed out that we must try to reconcile the Jugoslavs and the Italians to prevent Austria-Hungary deriving any advantage from their dissension. Even at that time he mentioned the possibility of a corridor, and he pointed out the economic and financial problems which would emerge at the beginning of our independence. He also indicated the functions that should be exercised by the National Committee on the collapse of Austria, and expressed his wish for the formation of Sokol legions at home. Finally, he went closely into the question of the arrival of the Russians and of what steps our people ought to take, should this occur.
Professor Masaryk discussed all these matters in considerable detail. For example, he dictated to me the contents of a manifesto to be published in Čas if the Russians came. This was moderate and cautious in tone. He proposed a method for arranging the administration in Prague and Brno (he proposed to unite Moravia and Silesia). He also suggested how the mistakes of the Russians could be obviated and what precautions should be taken in case the Russians were driven back again by the Germans. In short, he had a complete political programme for the future in which he had provided for all possible contingencies.
I took down shorthand notes of all these details, as at all ​costs I wanted to keep a record of them for every eventuality. And so, later on, when in danger of being searched, I destroyed many documents, but saved these jottings. Finally, when in September 1915 I went abroad, I put them, together with other notes on discussions with Professor Masaryk in Switzerland, on meetings of the “Maffia,” and a number of messages sent by Masaryk to Prague, into a bottle which I buried in a garden in the country place where I was spending my holidays.(5)
We then decided how we were to keep in touch with each other after Masaryk’s departure. We first of all agreed upon code-words for telegraphic communications. We arranged whole sentences which were to mean that such and such a person was in prison, that Čas was suspended, that there was danger either of the betrayal or arrest of Masaryk, that further persecutions were being prepared, and so on, as the case might be. Our relations with Kovanda made it possible for us to learn of these things in time. We also discussed, at least in rough outlines, how we were to keep in touch should Professor Masaryk not return.
Professor Masaryk left Prague on December 18, 1914. It was arranged that he would return about February 1st by way of Geneva, where he would receive telegraphic information as to whether he could do so safely or not. Should he not return I was to act as a link between him and the politicians with whom he was co-operating at Prague. These details were arranged shortly before our last meeting at Dr. Bouček’s in the first week of December 1914. At this meeting Professor Masaryk described his plans and his intention of returning once more. But he also sketched out what he intended to do if he should be prevented from coming back to Prague. He announced to his friends that for this eventuality he had authorized me to direct the work and to keep in touch with him.
He brought to this meeting a number of documents which had just arrived from Vienna, and he spoke about his last interview with Thun. He again expressed his doubts about the Russians and ended up by giving his conception of what our future State would be like. With regard to the form of the State he was decidedly in favour of a republic and regarded a kingdom as a necessary evil. The Russian dynasty was referred to in this connection, but Professor Masaryk insisted that he would give the preference to some Western dynasty (he men​tioned the Duke of Connaught) in order that we might be able more easily to introduce a parliamentary system on the Western model. The frontiers were also discussed, and with regard to them we took into account the racially mixed areas and Slovakia. Masaryk expressed the view that if Austria-Hungary were defeated we should have a Czech national state. If Germany were also crushed we should obtain a state with historical frontiers and including Slovakia.
* ↑ The Progressive (Radical) State Rights Party came into existence as a result of what is known as the Progressive movement in 1897. Its programme adhered consistently to the historic State rights, demanding the restoration of an independent Czech State. The leader of the party was Dr. Antonín Hajn, and before the war its press organ, Samostatnost (Independence), used to appear daily.
* ↑ The National Socialist Party came into existence in the same year as the Radical Progressive Party (1897), and it had the same political programme, for which, however, it aimed at securing support from among the masses. Its leader was V. Klofáč, and its organ the daily paper České Slovo (The Czech Word).
* ↑ Čas (The Age), the organ of the Realist Progressive Party. It was founded in 1886 and became a daily in 1900. It exerted considerable influence under the editorship of Dr. Jan Herben. Professor Masaryk and J. S. Machar, in particular, were its regular contributors. It was suspended at the beginning of the war, and after the war it was renewed for a short period (1920–23).
* ↑ Dr. Karel Šviha, the Parliamentary deputy of the National Socialist Party. In 1913 he was accused of being connected with the Austrian police, and he resigned his mandate.
* ↑ V. Klofáč ( (b. 1868), founder and for many years the leader of the National Socialist Party. Was Minister of National Defence in the first Czechoslovak Government.
* ↑ Letná, a park in Prague on a hillside forming the left bank of the Vltava.
* ↑ Dr. V. Bouček, a Prague barrister and a member of the Realist Party. He was a deputy in the revolutionary National Assembly.
* ↑ Dr. Jan Herben (b. 1857), a prominent Czech author and journalist, editor-in-chief of Čas. He was a deputy in the revolutionary National Assembly, and later a senator of the National Democratic Party, which he left in 1925.
* ↑ Dr. Cyril Dušek (1882–1924), a journalist on the staff of Čas. After the war held diplomatic posts at Berne and Cairo.
* ↑ Dr. P. Šámal (b. 1867), a Prague barrister and a politician belonging to the Realist Party. Was a prominent member of the “Maffia,” and is now chief of President Masaryk’s chancellery.
* ↑ Dr. F. Veselý (b. 1863), a barrister and politician belonging to the Realist Party. After the war was a member of the National Assembly, where he represented the National Socialist Party, and for a time was Minister of Justice.
* ↑ Dr. Josef Scheiner, Chairman of the Executive Headquarters of the Sokol Organization.
* ↑ J. S. Machar (b. 1864), poet and author, who at the outbreak of the war was living at Vienna. He exerted great influence on public opinion by his literary activity and, in particular, by his articles in Čas, where he co-operated with Professor Masaryk. After the war he spent some time as General Inspector of the Czechoslovak Army, but has now retired from this post and has resumed his work as a writer.
* ↑ Naše Doba, a monthly review, founded in 1893 and issued by the publishing firm of Laichter. Its first editor was Professor Masaryk.
* ↑ František Drtina (1861–1925), University professor and author of various books dealing mainly with the history of philosophy. He was one of the leaders of the Realist Party, which for some time he represented as a deputy in the Reichsrat. During the war he edited Naše Doba.
* ↑ Hněvšín, a village in Central Bohemia, the birthplace of Drtina.
* ↑ F. V. Krejčí (b. 1867), a prominent Czech critic who was associated with the Progressive movement. He has contributed to the literary review Rozhledy (Survey), and then to Právo Lidu. Later on he wrote novels and plays. After the war he was a member of the revolutionary National Assembly, and acted as envoy of the Czechoslovak Government to the Czechoslovak army in Siberia.
* ↑ Dr. F. Soukup (b. 1871), a Prague lawyer, one of the leaders of the Social Democratic Party. Took part in the Progressive movement before the war, and was a deputy in the Reichsrat. He was a member of the “Maffia,” and after the war was Minister of Justice in the first Czechoslovak Government. He now represents his party in the Czechoslovak Senate.
* ↑ Dr. Antonín Hajn (b. 1868), one of the leaders of the Progressive movement, and then a leader of the Radical Progressive Party (State Rights). For some time he was a deputy in the Reichsrat. He was also editor of the party organ Samostatnost (Independence), which was founded in 1897. It appeared from 1911 as a daily, and was suspended in 1914. During the war he joined the National Democratic Party, of which he is now a deputy.
* ↑ Antonín Švehla (b. 1873), a prominent member of the Agrarian Party, of which he became the leader when the Czechoslovak Republic was established. He was Minister of the Interior in the first Czechoslovak Government, and is now Prime Minister.