# My War Memoirs/Chapter 8

VIII
(a) The First Peace Overtures
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From the end of September 1916 we passed through trying times in the National Council at Paris, in company with our French and Jugoslav friends. Military and political events assailed us with overwhelming weight, many of them of such a character that we had perforce to look on as passive spectators, a circumstance which served only to emphasize how critical they were from our point of view.
We greeted with enthusiasm the entry of Rumania into the war on August 27, 1916, for we regarded this as a further guarantee of victory. On behalf of the National Council I sent Prime Minister Bratianu a manifesto wishing success to the idea of the unification of the Rumanians, and the liberation of the oppressed nations in Austria-Hungary. From September the Allies were occupied with Balkan problems, especially the intrigues of King Constantine in Greece, which culminated with the revolution of Venizelos and the establishment of his government at Salonica. This somewhat strengthened the position of the Allies in the Balkans, especially when a French army, under General Sarrail, established itself at Salonica and the Serbs recaptured Monastir.
In spite, however, of these partial successes, matters soon became critical. The Rumanians, desiring chiefly to occupy Transylvania, were not expecting attacks from Bulgaria; and, moreover, not having sufficient support from the Allies, upon which they were relying, they were soon driven back on to their own territory after the first successes, and then thoroughly defeated by the Germans and Bulgarians. The Rumanian Government was obliged to migrate to Jassy, and at the beginning of December 1916 Bucharest was occupied by the Germans. The Russian offensive had been completely stopped. ​The Central Powers had now occupied the whole of the Balkans as far as Monastir and Salonica, a great part of Rumania, Russian Poland, nearly the whole of Belgium, and nine French departments. The Italian Front remained unchanged. From a military point of view the Central Powers seemed to be victorious.
The Central Powers were nevertheless conscious that their internal situation was precarious. They also knew-that there was war-weariness both among them and among the Allies. They therefore took advantage of their favourable military position for the purpose of attempting new politico-diplomatic manœuvres on a large scale. On November 5, 1916, they proclaimed the independence of Poland and the establishment of a Polish national army. The purpose of this was to bring the Poles and the new national army on to the side of the Central Powers, but actually it led to political results which were favourable both to the Poles arid to ourselves. Germany and Austria-Hungary, being unable to agree about frontiers, constitution and regime, the head of the new State, or its incorporation either with Germany or Austria-Hungary in the near future, were obliged to leave these questions unsettled. They demanded only the establishment of an army which was to be subordinated to the military command of the Central Powers. They refused to add German and Austrian Polish territory to the new Poland.
The Allies naturally took advantage of this dilemma. After difficult negotiations, Russia decided upon the declaration of November 14th providing for the renewal of Poland as a State which was to remain in constitutional union with Russia. At the same time the necessity was emphasized for all territories inhabited by Poles, i.e. Russian, German, and Austro-Hungarian territory, to be united in a single State. Mr. Asquith and M. Briand associated themselves with this declaration on November 16th, and on the following day P. Boselli did the same on behalf of Italy.
We Czechoslovaks welcomed this step with great satisfaction. German-Austrian diplomacy had again played into our hands by compelling Russia and the Allies to make public commitments which brought our question also further into the foreground. If the Allies undertook to settle the thorny Polish question in this open manner, or even if they thus merely formulated the Polish problem, this could be only to our ​advantage, both as regards the duration of the war and also the further political consequences which we would derive from this contingency. What it really meant was that the problem of the integral character of Austria-Hungary, and thus the whole question of the reorganization of Central Europe, had again emerged. As far as we were concerned, any such tendency coming at that particular time was all to the good. Moreover, in consequence of this, the Poles were brought closer to the Allies, and began to have a serious interest in the struggle against the Habsburg Empire.
It seemed to us that the whole situation of Germany and Austria-Hungary was complicated by two diametrically opposing tendencies. On the one hand, there were those who favoured arrogance and intimidation, and on the other, there were the alarmists, whose endeavour it was, by means of intrigues and secret negotiations, to obtain peace with decisive promptness. This is what we instinctively felt, and from time to time we received proofs that such was the case. The undeniable military victories of the Central Powers at this juncture caused us some dismay, even though they did not deprive us of our hope and our optimism. We were convinced that Austria-Hungary would not be able to hold out, but we were misled by certain events, and also by the tactical measures of the Central Powers. We could interpret the Austro-German proclamation concerning Poland as a manifestation of power and self-confidence. A number of internal events in Austria and Hungary tended to produce the same impression. Thus, the projected unification of Cis-leithan territories in a single constitutional whole under the name of “Austria,” with the exclusion of Galicia, the regulations concerning the use of the German language, Tisza’s dictatorship in Hungary, the economic preparations and discussions on the subject of “Mittel-Europa”—all these things bewildered and alarmed us.
But the secret news from Prague which depicted the situation as being desperate, weakened the effect of these impressions, and often gave rise to the conjecture that the two Central Powers were not undertaking peace moves from a consciousness of power, but to strengthen themselves internally, and as a result of misgivings, if not actual alarm, as to the future.
These reflections and misgivings of ours were upset on October 21st by a regular bombshell. Friedrich Adler had killed Prime Minister Stürgkh with a revolver-shot. Koerber had ​become the first Prime Minister of “Austria” (not of the kingdom and provinces represented in the Reichsrat), had signed an agreement between Austria-Hungary and Germany concerning the re-establishment of Poland, and had prepared for a further internal development corresponding to the German wishes. In the latter process he had waged a severe struggle with Tisza on the subject of the Austro-Hungarian Ausgleich. At this juncture, however, there came a fresh piece of news which was fraught with great significance. On November 21st the Emperor Franz Josef had died, and had been succeeded by the Emperor Karl.
The period which now followed was a difficult one for us. The Emperor Karl did not have a bad reputation in the Allied countries. It was well known—and it was a matter which now began to much talked about again—that the Empress Zita was a Bourbon princess, and that she had two brothers in the Belgian Army. It was emphasized that the new Emperor was not responsible for the war, and that he would have no interest in prolonging it, and thus endangering his throne. In the meanwhile, on November 7th, Woodrow Wilson had again been elected President of the United States of America. His electoral campaign, in the course of which Roosevelt, an avowed partisan of the Allies, had carried on an agitation against him, had been followed in France with some alarm and even with exasperation. This was accentuated by the fact that soon afterwards the Viennese newspapers, notably the Neue Freie Presse and then those of Berlin, began to discuss “President Wilson’s Peace Plan.”
At the same time the Russian crisis quickly came to a head. On November 23rd Boris Stürmer handed in his resignation and was succeeded by Alexander Trepov. In Paris this news was received with relief, and the satisfaction at Stürmer’s departure would have been complete but for the fact that Protopopov had remained Minister of the Interior. While this was going on, von Jagow had left the Wilhelmstrasse, and Zimmermann had become Minister of Foreign Affairs. The reasons for these events were not clear to us then. We knew only that Stürmer had withdrawn in consequence of the threatening attitude of the Duma, whose opposition he was unable to overcome, and that von Jagow’s resignation was perhaps directly or indirectly connected with Bethmann-Hollweg’s dispute with the General Staff, the Admiralty, and a part of the Reichstag on questions ​of war tactics, in particular those relating to unrestricted submarine warfare.
Our reflections on these events were disturbed by vague news that Russia, represented by Stürmer and Protopopov, were negotiating for a separate peace. We also heard reports about Rasputin and a forthcoming upheaval in Russia, about Court intrigues and the pro-German Tsarina, about dubious persons in and around the Government at Petrograd. We were somewhat reassured by Trepov’s energetic pronouncement in the early days of September that Russia would not cease fighting until the Allies had gained a complete victory, and that there would be no negotiations for a premature or a separate peace.
Our confidence and peace of mind were increased when a few days later a Government crisis ensued in London. Asquith retired and was replaced by Lloyd George as Prime Minister. Lloyd George had the reputation of being an energetic and capable man. It was known that he wished to set up a small military committee in the Government for carrying on the war more smoothly, and that he was anxious for the formation of a united Allied front, political, diplomatic, and military.
It was under these circumstances that, a few days after the occupation of Bucharest by the Allied Powers, and three weeks after the accession of Emperor Karl, there came the culminating political event of the winter of 1916—the well-known peace overtures of the Central Powers on December 12, 1916.
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The ideas which we had in Paris as to the origin of the peace note dispatched by the Central Powers were quite inaccurate. I am inclined to believe that even the Allies at that time were imperfectly acquainted with the underlying facts of the case.
It is certain that the note was not the result of any initiative on the part of Karl, as we in the National Council supposed, but that it was prepared some weeks before he came to the throne. It may be safely asserted that the actual instigator of the whole affair was Baron Burian.
While visiting the German headquarters in the middle of October 1916, Burian suggested to Bethmann-Hollweg that the Central Powers might prepare some peace overtures. He justified this on the ground of the general military and economic exhaustion. He also emphasized the prospect of appalling warfare in ​the spring of 1917 which, he urged, could not lead to any definite decision. Finally, he added that even if the attempt did not lead to success, it would not do any harm to the Central Powers, but on the contrary might prove a source of moral strength to them, and show the two States that they must fight to a victorious conclusion.
Burian’s idea was that several weeks, if not months, of preparation would be necessary for the whole undertaking. Moreover, he wanted the Central Powers to define clearly what their peace conditions were. Bethmann-Hollweg agreed in principle with Burian, but stipulated that he must first obtain the Kaiser’s consent. On October 28th he sent the Ambassador, von Stumm, to Vienna with the definite answer which he had promised, but it contained a proposal for a different procedure. The German Government accepted the scheme with such eagerness that they were anxious to carry it out as early as the first week of December. It was further their intention to publish within the course of the next two or three days the agreement on the independence of Russian Poland, which had been already prepared between the two Empires, to draw up a peace note with great speed, and to dispatch it to the Allied Powers, using neutral countries as an intermediary. Bethmann-Hollweg himself then wanted to make a special speech in the Reichstag during the same period, in which he would surprise the world with his peace offer. He was, however, resolutely opposed to Burian’s suggestion that the peace conditions should be precisely defined. He laid stress on the fact that Germany could not state her conditions, for if she were to do so, matters would not reach the stage of concrete negotiations. It was, for example, not possible to say anything about Belgium, because German public opinion would not tolerate the demands of England, while England would not negotiate at all, if there were even only a remote indication of what were regarded as minimum demands by German official circles and public opinion.
This led to a dispute between Vienna and Berlin which lasted for several weeks. In the course of it the diplomats and politicians at Vienna formed a better estimate of the situation, gauged the international possibilities more accurately, and, on the whole, were on a higher level than the responsible circles at Berlin. This is an interesting and characteristic fact, and it is well that the world should know it.
The death of Franz Josef did not change the course of these ​negotiations. It would seem that he, just as Karl later on, had no decisive voice in the matter at all. Karl, however, nevertheless intervened in the negotiations, although only at the last moment. When on November 5th the independence of Poland had been proclaimed, Berlin suddenly postponed the peace move. It turned out that this change was made as a result of pressure from the General Staff. Hindenburg and Ludendorff, regarding the matter only from a military point of view, had the intention of acting upon the Allies chiefly by a military thrust. They therefore proposed to start the peace overtures and to issue the proclamation of Polish independence simultaneously, as they considered that this manœuvre was in accordance with the psychology of the war and the tactics which it demanded—to deliver a blow with one hand and to offer peace with the other.
As in the meanwhile the campaign in Rumania was making good progress, the German military command regarded the fall of Bucharest as imminent. They therefore wanted the peace move to be postponed until after Bucharest had fallen. The authorities at Vienna were annoyed at this, and their estimate of the situation proved to be the more accurate. They were alarmed at the idea of proclaiming the independence of Poland simultaneously with an offer of peace, since they considered that the Allies would look upon such a step as provocative. They felt the same alarm with regard to any peace offer which might be made immediately after the fall of Bucharest. Accordingly Burian and Karl himself endeavoured to have the peace overture made before the fall of Bucharest.(24)
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In the note which was sent on December 12, 1916, by the Central Powers to the chief neutral countries, i.e. the United States of America, Spain, Switzerland, and the Vatican, they suggested immediate peace negotiations, and announced that it would certainly be possible to regard as a basis for a lasting peace the concrete proposals which they would then submit. They emphasized the fact that the war had been forced upon them as a means for defending their existence against the hatred and treachery of enemies, and that the only purpose of their proposals would be to vindicate the honour and the free development of the nations comprised in the Central Powers.
​The whole attempt was carried out on somewhat sensational lines, with much ostentation, and with a vast impetus derived from international propaganda. The aim of this was to produce the maximum of public excitement, and to create a strong impression throughout the world that the Central Powers were sincere in their endeavours for peace. A further aim was to derive the most favourable political and military results possible from the scheme, both at home and abroad.
On December 18th the representatives of the United States in Paris, London, Rome, and Petrograd handed the Allies the German and Austro-Hungarian peace offer. On the same day Baron Sonnino in the Parliament at Rome, just as Briand and Prokovsky had done, very decisively repudiated and rejected the whole of the peace manœuvre of the Central Powers. On December 19th Briand and Lloyd George again made speeches in their respective Parliaments declining the peace proposals, and some of the statements which they made became slogans which remained current for some time.
Briand, for example, designated the peace proposal as a new battle attack, and Lloyd George, speaking for the first time as Prime Minister, and emphasizing the need for Allied unity both in war aims and in the common action on the battle-fronts, energetically repudiated the manœuvre of the Central Powers. With the full weight of his authority he then pronounced the well-known formula: ‘Our war aim is complete territorial restoration, full compensation for property destroyed, effective guarantees against a repetition of a similar attack in the future.”
The discussion on the Government proclamation had not yet ended, when a new and important item of news became public property. On Wednesday, December 20th, President Wilson’s representatives in the belligerent countries had delivered a special note calling upon all the belligerent Powers to inform President Wilson of their war aims. President Wilson, speaking for the United States as the largest neutral country, emphasized the interest of the neutrals in a speedy conclusion of peace, and demanded that the States engaged in the war should, in some form or other, publicly inform the world what they desired to obtain by the war, in order that it might be clear “how far the world still is from the harbour of peace.” President Wilson did not offer to act as intermediary, nor did he propose any peace negotiations. He merely wanted to sound both sides, and ​thus to gain both for them and for the neutrals the information necessary for clearing up the situation, and for making it possible, at the psychological moment, to start peace negotiations.
It was now that we in Paris felt most alarmed. We had already heard that both in Vienna and Berlin they were placing a certain amount of hope upon a peace intervention prepared by President Wilson. The papers had, at the same time, published reports to the effect that Mr. Gerard, the American Ambassador in Berlin, had been summoned to Washington for this purpose, and that Count Tarnowski, the new Austro-Hungarian Ambassador who had replaced Dumba at Washington after the latter had been withdrawn on account of his well-known intrigues against America, would be favourably received by Wilson.
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Our uncertainty and alarm were increased when, during the period of excitement while preparations were being made for an answer to the peace overtures of the Central Powers and also to President Wilson’s inquiry as to war aims, we received confidential reports with regard to projected secret peace negotiations, partly with Germany, partly with Austria-Hungary.
On December 20, 1916, Prince Brancaccio, head of the intelligence department of the Italian Military Mission in Paris, came to me with reports about peace negotiations between Germany, France, and Russia. Brancaccio was obviously perturbed. All similar reports about peace negotiations carried on without the direct participation or official knowledge of Italy gave the Italians the impression that their interests were going to be sacrificed. As far as I observed them, the Italians—whether they belonged to non-official political circles or whether they were in an official position—constantly had one idea in mind: they had entered the war, and in return for that were promised Trentino, Dalmatia, Trieste, and the Littoral. If the war were concluded before Austria-Hungary was compelled to grant these concessions, they would neither receive what was promised nor an adequate return for their share in the war. In this case it would be clear that they would have done better to have remained neutral (as Giolitti wished) and let Austria-Hungary and Germany reward them accordingly.
​Throughout the war, especially in 1917, I had the impression that this was the argument which weighed in the minds of the Italians whenever peace negotiations were mentioned, and proved a decisive factor in the tactics they adopted. This impression was confirmed by Brancaccio’s visit.
Brancaccio informed me that a few days before, a number of Dutch Socialists, under the leadership of Troelstra, had come to Paris, and by arrangement with the German Socialists they were endeavouring to bring about peace negotiations with France and Russia. Brancaccio was convinced that the offer was being made with the knowledge of the German Government, which in this way was exploiting its Socialists, while the latter were making use of the Socialists of a neutral country.
It was at this time, however, that our Russian friend Svatkovsky, whose reports concerned us far more closely, came to Paris. He first conferred with Izvolsky at the Russian Embassy, and then, on December 22nd, he had a meeting with me. Svatkovsky was uneasy and agitated. His attitude towards us was a hesitant one, and altogether I had never seen him in such a frame of mind during our conversations. My impression was that either he was embarrassed at not knowing how to inform us of certain matters, or else that he was concealing important developments from us, and for that reason felt rather ill at ease.
The general impression of my talk with Svatkovsky was disturbing. I saw that matters were more serious than I had supposed from my conversation with Brancaccio. From the reports of both our friends, I came to the conclusion that there really was a serious peace move being skilfully prepared or already under consideration in various quarters.
My tactics and, indeed, our tactics in general at Paris under such critical circumstances, were of a simple character. It was impossible for us in any direct manner to frustrate negotiations of such a kind and such a magnitude. So far we had not sufficient influence, nor even direct access to the authorities who were forming decisions on the subject. We were therefore left with indirect methods. At such moments we had recourse to a very energetic type of public agitation. We sounded the alarm among all our friends—politicians, writers, journalists—seeking to exercise an influence on the negotiating statesmen by stirring up public opinion.
Situations of this kind always constituted a sort of general ​crisis, even for the Allied Governments, and such crises could always be made use of for effective work with a fair chance of success. For if in such far-reaching negotiations the leading persons failed to secure what was expected of them, this generally resulted in a cleavage greater than existed before the negotiations began. There would ensue a movement in the contrary direction, and it was in such psychological situations that the best chance of achieving success was to be found. We therefore set to work with the utmost energy, realizing that even if we did not arrive at any direct success, we should at least have the satisfaction of knowing that we had done everything possible.
We therefore exerted all our efforts in Paris, London, and Rome towards starting a keen Press campaign. We supplied various quarters with detailed accounts of the situation at home, endeavouring in this way to counteract what was being done behind the scenes by the pro-Austrians, who at that time were very strong and dangerous. In addition, I myself attempted to enter into touch with official circles in Paris. Various official pronouncements (that of the King of England on December 22nd, the proclamations in the French Senate on December 23rd, the King of Rumania’s speech from the throne, etc.) made it possible for us to take these steps. Nevertheless, we were painfully dubious about the result.
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The Central Powers interpreted Wilson’s initiative as their success, That at least is how it appeared to us when, on December 27th, we saw that they gladly availed themselves of the opportunity presented to them by Wilson, and on that day handed him their reply to his note of December 2oth, referring to his “generous and lofty proposals.”
This moment, however, represented a definite turning-point in the whole situation. The Central Powers evaded a precise reply to the question regarding war aims. They proposed a meeting of representatives of the two belligerent parties in some neutral place. As for an investigation into guarantees of future peace, this was a process which they wished to postpone ​until after the conclusion of hostilities. In other words, they confirmed the view that the whole of their peace offer was a manœuvre and an attempt to reach the stage of negotiations at all costs, since they supposed that there could then be no resumption of warfare.
The reply caused dissatisfaction at Washington. The Allies were therefore in a position to make good use of the obvious insincerity of their opponents, and to demonstrate convincingly the moral basis of the whole of this diplomatic move. At this juncture, however, reports reached Paris and London that Wilson’s intentions had been different from what the Central Powers or Allied public opinion had at first supposed. It was said that he had waited for a considerable time before taking this step, and that it was only the Presidential elections which had induced him not to act earlier. The submarine warfare was too closely affecting the interests of America, whose situation had become so serious that there was now a danger of her being involved in the conflicts arising from the war. The purpose of Wilson’s initiative at the moment when military circles in Germany were again threatening to start unlimited submarine warfare was chiefly to draw the attention of the American public to the dangerous position of the United States. The Press even reported a remark by Lansing to the effect that the United States were on the brink of war.
This immediately threw a different light upon the whole matter. The public disapproval which Wilson’s move had evoked among the Allies gradually subsided. In its place the view gained currency that the diplomatic manœuvre of the Central Powers could be turned to their disadvantage, and that a moral and diplomatic victory against them could thus be gained in the eyes of the whole world.
In the Allied Note there are two points to be emphasized. Firstly, the Allies produced the proof that the war was caused by the Central Powers, and secondly, they indicated under what conditions it would be possible to start peace negotiations. They expressly declare that “Peace is not possible until a reparation of all infringed rights and liberties has been secured, together with a recognition of the principle of nationality and the free existence of small States.”
After the various individual declarations on behalf of Belgium, Serbia, Poland, Rumania, the Jugoslavs, and the Czechoslovaks, this was the first collective proclamation containing ​anything like a categorical statement of the principles which were more and more gaining ground among the Allies. It was a proclamation due, largely in an indirect manner, to the activities of our various friends and ourselves. Although it had been drawn up with a view to Belgium and Serbia principally, the remaining countries not being expressly mentioned, it nevertheless showed what great progress had been made to the advantage of oppressed nations since February 1916, when Masaryk had explained to Briand our attitude towards the fundamentals of the Central European problem. I cannot precisely determine whether the wording of this reply was affected by our interventions and activities, which aimed at the adoption of a favourable point of view towards our cause in the note to President Wilson.
It was a source of considerable encouragement to us. We felt that the second projected reply of the Allies to President Wilson would give us an opportunity of achieving even more, and possibly even the maximum of what at that time could be secured.
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The Allied reply certainly produced a very strong effect in the Allied, neutral, and enemy States. We immediately had evidence of this. The Press notices emanating from the countries of the Central Powers clearly showed that the peace manœuvre had failed, and that the official circles there were keenly disappointed and, indeed, depressed. Attempts were made to conceal this, partly by violent language accusing the Allies of being responsible for a further prolongation of the war, partly by open threats that before long something extremely unpleasant would occur.
The truth of the situation was still more plainly revealed in the solemn declarations of the two Emperors to their nations and armies, in which they shift the responsibility for the continuation of warfare to the Allies. They emphasize the great victories which they themselves have hitherto gained over a number of States, and announce that they will compel the Allies by force of arms to accept the terms which they refused when offered in an amicable manner. The Central Powers, seeing that the diplomatic manœuvre had come to grief, adopted a new tone, evidently to ward off depression from their public opinion and demoralization from their army. As far as the ​Habsburg Empire and Karl were concerned, the situation was a tragic one. This was surmised by many people in Vienna; the anxieties and fears for the future had again increased, it being understood more clearly than ever before, that everything was at stake.
This was the international situation when the second Allied reply was prepared, in the form of their memorable note to President Wilson in which, for the first time, the Czechoslovaks received a solemn collective testimony from the Allies that their liberation was, and would be, an issue of the war.
(c) The Note to President Wilson and the Liberation of the Czechoslovaks
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The Czechoslovak National Council, seeing that the situation was psychologically favourable, did everything possible at that time to ensure that the reply to President Wilson should contain a proper account of the Austro-Hungarian problem and of our national demands.
On December 27, 1916, at the French Foreign Ministry, I had my first conversation with Albert Kammerer, who had been detailed for service with Philip Berthelot, then head of the political section of the Foreign Ministry. I explained to him the situation in Austria, and mentioned what I then knew from confidential sources with regard to the political conditions and the state of the army. I also spoke of the attempts made by the Government, partly by threats, partly by promises, to destroy the opposition of the Austro-Hungarian nationalities. I specially laid stress on the necessity for strengthening this opposition by expressly mentioning the Czechs and their national demands, as well as the Slovaks. This latter point was one which I regarded as needing special emphasis.(25)
At my first interview with Kammerer he gave me an account of the situation which disconcerted me and very much chilled my optimism. He pointed out the feeling among the Allies as a whole, amongst whom the view prevailed that, although there would be a general statement in favour of the liberty of oppressed nations in Central Europe, it was not possible to enter into any detailed enumeration of the political problems concerning the individual nations in Austria-Hungary. In particular, the Allies shrank from giving any public promise to the Austro-​Hungarian nations that they would fight until the Empire had been completely broken up, since a situation might arise which would make it impossible for them to keep such a promise.
Kammerer then mentioned to me other considerations which had been very carefully thought out. Thus a number of influential factors were opposed to any decisive proclamation on the subject of Austria-Hungary, because it might seem merely absurd in view of the military situation at that time, and might produce the impression of being an empty threat in which the Allies themselves did not really believe. Other opponents of any decisive proclamation against the Habsburg Empire brought forward the further argument that it was impossible to promise us the break-up of the Empire, because many would interpret that as meaning an indefinite prolongation of the war. Moreover, as a matter of fact, the Allied Governments were not entitled to make such a commitment. They were unable to shut themselves off from any path—Kammerer said this to me quite frankly and honestly—which might lead to some other favourable solution.
On my part, I objected that France particularly could not desert us. I told Kammerer that the conditions in Austria were worse than was supposed, and that such a step would, on the contrary, hasten the end of the war. Before I left, Kammerer suggested that I should draw up a summary of my argument in a special memorandum which he would submit to Berthelot and Pichon.
Two days later, on December 29, 1916, I handed in my memorandum at the Quai d’Orsay. I depicted the political situation as I conceived it to be, judging from the newspapers and the special reports from the “Maffia,” and I concluded as follows: “The Czechs form an element which, under present conditions, causes Austria-Hungary the greatest internal difficulties. If, in replying to Wilson, you recognize our political aims and plans, you will strengthen their opposition to Austria, which will thus be completely disorganized.”
Kammerer took the memorandum. He now spoke in a somewhat more favourable tone, and promised to place the matter before his chiefs. He also informed me that I should be received by Berthelot in the near future. Shortly afterwards Berthelot received me, listened to my statement, and told me to have another discussion with Kammerer. My meeting with him produced no new result.
​After experiencing these obstacles in official quarters, I was anxious to gain some other support which would produce influential results at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. I therefore took new steps on the very same day. With the assistance of a friend of mine, Professor Moysset (an historian, a clear-minded and brilliant scholar), I managed to reach the chairman of the Foreign Committee, M. Leygues, later Prime Minister, as Moysset was his chef de cabinet. I asked him for his support, submitted a new memorandum on the situation to him, and explained what the effects would be if the Allied Note contained a declaration in our favour. Through my friend, E. Fournol, I met André Tardieu, then a leader-writer for Le Temps. I gave him an account of the whole history of our movement and asked him if he would write an article on it in his paper. Tardieu promised to do so, the article was published on January 3rd, and through the influence of Le Temps produced a considerable effect in political circles. From the Quai d’Orsay at my next negotiations there I learnt that the discussions on our demands had resulted in three plans and possibilities.
(a) It might be possible to insert into the note a declaration with regard to us.
(b) If this should be too difficult, it would be possible for Briand to make a Parliamentary declaration on the subject of the Czechs.
(c) Briand would be prepared to receive the secretary of the National Council at an official audience, and make the declaration to him. In such a case the audience would be arranged so as to obtain ample publicity.
I emphasized to Kammerer that the declaration must be inserted in the note because any other proceeding would be interpreted by our people at home as an indication that our position was a weak one. I supplied him with a formula which could be enclosed in the note and which would satisfy us. It could also be adapted to the general sentence on the liberation of the Austro-Hungarian nations which, he informed me, had already been prepared for the note and agreed upon among the Allies.
We then arranged for an article to appear in Le Matin, again emphasizing the necessity of supporting the opposition of the Austro-Hungarian nations, especially the Czechs and Slovaks I prepared the article and it appeared on the front page of the ​paper on January 3rd. On the same day I endeavoured to counteract the intention at the Quai d’Orsay of satisfying us otherwise than by the express mention of our aims in the note to Wilson. I visited Robert de Caix, a friend of Berthelot and an expert on colonial and Eastern European matters at the Quai d’Orsay. I asked him to let the Foreign Office have my reasons in favour of a direct mention of our aims in the note, and he expressed his willingness to intervene with Berthelot.
Finally, I applied for support to our friend August Gauvain. I wrote for the Journal des Debats an original letter from Austria, containing the latest news which we had received from Prague. The letter was published towards the end of December. In a leading article Gauvain referred to it, and demanded an unequivocal declaration of the Allies against Austria-Hungary and in favour of the oppressed nations. Other papers also took notice of it, and in this way exerted an influence on public opinion and Government circles.
On January 4th Kammerer invited me for a final interview. He informed me that, on principle, the Quai d’Orsay was resolved to do something for us, but that the form of action was still being considered. A decision would probably be reached at the Inter-Allied Conference then being held in Rome. So far, the Allies had agreed that the note should express in general terms the necessity for liberating the Austro-Hungarian Slavs, the Italians, the Rumanians. What made it difficult to mention the Czechs and Slovaks specifically was, that if this were done, it would be necessary to refer in a similar manner to the Jugoslavs, a course against which the Italians were fundamentally opposed. France would, however, do what she could. I again, and for the last time, urged upon Kammerer how essential it was not to forget the Slovaks, and, as I have already mentioned, I suggested the formula to the effect that one of the Allied war aims was “the liberation of the Czechs united with Slovakia” or else “the liberation of the Czechoslovaks,” leaving the Allies, of course, free to word it in accordance with the context.
On January 7th the Quai d’Orsay at last informed me that the Allies had accepted the French proposal, and that the liberation of the Czechoslovaks would be expressly mentioned in the note. The reference to the Czechoslovaks in the note had been accepted by the Allies as an amendment after the previous formula had already been sanctioned. This formula spoke of the establishment of an independent Poland with access to the ​sea, and of the liberation of the Austro-Hungarian Italians, Rumanians, and Slavs. It will be seen that even in the revised form the note contained no special reference to the Jugoslavs.
The wording of the note thus acquired an inexactitude and inconsistency which caused much surprise. This was a typical example of the political difficulties and disputes between the Italians and the Jugoslavs, which at that time proved troublesome to us and the rest of the Allies. The Jugoslavs made no attempt to conceal their disappointment after the publication of the note.
The account of the matter which I have given makes it clear that the negotiations between the Allies with regard to the contents of the note to President Wilson were the result of French initiative, and were concentrated in Paris. Masaryk was following them from London (Štefánik was now in Russia), and reported to me how matters were regarded there. Our success caused him a pleasant surprise.(26)
The significance of the Allied Note to President Wilson is sufficiently well known. For us who were working abroad it represented the first obvious diplomatic success of any magnitude. There were great rejoicings in our various headquarters abroad. We received telegrams and letters of congratulation from our Russian colony, our troops, our American colony, our compatriots in Italy, Switzerland, and elsewhere. It acted upon me as a stimulus and encouragement to continue our military movement.