# My War Memoirs/Chapter 7

VII
OUR REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT AMONG THE TROOPS AND PRISONERS OF WAR
(a) Beginnings of the Military Activity of the National Council. Our Military Work in Russia and France
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The important decisions arrived at by the National Council during Masaryk’s presence in Paris in February 1916 were concerned also with military matters.
At the outbreak of the war our colonies had everywhere begun to fulfil their military duties. Our colony in France, for example, had immediately arranged for several hundreds of our people to enter the Foreign Legion. In England the colony, directed by Sykora and Kopecký, proceeded in a similar manner, and the scope of its work there extended to our volunteer movement in Canada. The most important military movement, however, from a political point of view, at that time was the formation of our brigade in Russia. Altogether, what we accomplished in Russia in a military respect is of quite special significance, and I shall therefore refer in greater detail to these matters in my chapter on Russia. For the time being, I will mention only the essential facts. Our military activity in Italy, where there was no colony in the strict sense of the word, and where the National Council immediately took charge of things, will be dealt with specially in the chapter on Italy.
All this initiative, and all revolutionary work which the colonies spontaneously began, met with the warm approval and recognition of our political leaders at home and abroad. The “Maffia” had attended closely to it, and when Masaryk started his work abroad, he supported all such tendencies among our colonists. Before the organization of political headquarters in the National Council, his movement enhanced the good repute, and also the legal security, of our colonies in the Allied countries. At first it had no direct political consequences in Western Europe.
​In Russia, where the number of our colonists was proportionately greater, and where the Russian military command soon made use of our brigade for special purposes, this movement acquired a political character, chiefly because it was thought that the Russian troops would advance rapidly into our territories. Besides this, before long, when our troops were surrendering wholesale on the Russian front, our colonists had to consider how they should deal with the problem of the prisoners of war. The disputes which arose on these matters in our Russian colony weakened the political effect of this important and meritorious work. Nevertheless, the first granting of the colours to our brigade at Kiev on September 28, 1914, as well as a number of deputations of our colonists to the Tsar and the Russian Government with regard to the organization of the brigade and the prisoners of war, at once imparted a definite political character and scope to the Czechoslovak military affairs in Russia.
Masaryk frequently intervened in these matters. Thus, in May 1915 he notified the “Maffia” at Prague of the organization of our troops in Russia as the most important item in our projected opposition to Austria-Hungary. He mentioned that a detachment of about twenty thousand prisoners of war was being prepared there, and that this was a matter which demanded the closest attention. For that reason, as I have previously stated, he wanted Dr. Scheiner to escape from Prague and devote himself to the organization of these military contingents in Russia.
The Russian colony, having acknowledged Masaryk’s leadership, in spite of various contrary tendencies, referred to him in controversial matters concerning the troops and the prisoners of war, and on several occasions asked him to come to Russia as soon as possible. That is why, at our first deliberation in common in Geneva on September 3, 1915, we began by deciding that Dürich should prepare to proceed to Petrograd to attend chiefly to military matters.
During the negotiations at Paris in February 1916, concerning the organization of the National Council, these resolutions were again confirmed. Besides this, however, knowing as we did, the military activity of our colony, and seeing the increase of disputes on matters relating to the troops and the prisoners of war in Russia, as well as the increasing importance of the prisoners of war in the whole of our future military activity, ​we were compelled, when organizing the National Council, to elaborate a systematic and practical scheme for our military operations and organization.
I have already explained that it was not possible for us to allow the colonies by themselves to embark upon political activities, and this applied still more to our military movement, which we had to found upon a broad political basis and take under our control. The colonists themselves did not possess sufficient political discernment or moral authority for this purpose, as they depended too much upon the States in which they had taken up their residence. This was evident most of all in Russia, notably from the disputes which arose from our action in these matters. It was inevitable that there should have been, in any case, a difference of opinion between prisoners of war and colonists, and if it had not been settled by transferring the whole military movement to the broad basis of the policy directed by the National Council, it would have been a perpetual menace to the whole of our revolutionary movement.
At the moment when the National Council began its systematic work in matters relating to troops and prisoners of war, our brigade in Russia and our volunteers in France and England numbered slightly more than two thousand men. It was the task of the National Council to transform this movement into an enterprise of great political, diplomatic, and military scope. It would be wrong to underestimate the importance of the pioneer military work of our colonists in France, England, America, and, above all, in Russia. In the latter country the National Council exerted its influence upon the military undertakings, partly by Masaryk’s intervention and more decisively by sending Dürich and Štefánik to Petrograd and Kiev respectively.
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It was just after Masaryk’s visit to Briand that Štefánik proceeded on his first journey to Italy. Masaryk remained in Paris, partly to discuss Slavonic affairs and the proposed series of lectures at the Sorbonne with Professor Denis and his friends, partly to elaborate with us a common plan for our political and military work. Dürich paid no great attention to these political matters, maintaining a certain reserve, and so, in the course of February, during numerous conversations with Masaryk almost every day after our evening meal, we made ​our own decisions as to military plans and the principles of our organization and action among the prisoners of war in Russia, Italy, Serbia, and France.
From the very beginning of our revolutionary work Masaryk had never for a moment lost sight of his proposal for a large army. In political terms he formulated this in February 1915 somewhat as follows:
If we establish an army we shall acquire a new juridical status as regards Austria and the Allies. A further step might possibly consist of a formal declaration of war upon Austria-Hungary. This will create a political situation enabling us to attain at least our minimum demands when peace is negotiated. In any case, neither the Allies nor Vienna will be able to pass us by in silence if we have soldiers. The Allies and our people at home will have a compensatory means of attaining concessions to our national cause, even if it were to turn out badly. But without a decisive and military struggle we shall obtain nothing from anybody.
That was how our scheme was formulated before we had actually ventured to reckon with certainty upon complete success.
By its military activity the National Council became connected with one of the important factors in the whole war. France, then desperately defending herself for the second year against enormous pressure from Germany, was suffering great losses in man power, and was continually needing more and more soldiers for her front. Many difficult negotiations were being carried on in England and America by the French for the purpose of securing reinforcements. This question continued to occupy the Allies until the end of the war, and up to the last moment it had a decisive bearing upon our movement and the whole of our war policy.
Thus, in the spring of 1916 Russia agreed to send about 400,000 soldiers to the French front. This undertaking was carried out only to a very small extent, the actual number of Russians thus supplied being about 10,000, under the leadership of General Lokhvitsky. When it was ascertained what obstacles the dispatch of Russian troops would involve, the question was asked first by us, later also by French Government circles, whether it would not be possible to send to France, together with the Russian troops also, detachments of Czechoslovak prisoners of war from whom the national Czechoslovak Army in France could be organized. It was upon this ​that in February 1915 we based all our hopes and computations with regard to establishing large numbers of our contingents in France. It was accordingly arranged with Masaryk that the National Council would attend very carefully to questions concerning prisoners of war in the Allied countries as a whole, and that in particular it would not lose sight of the possibility of obtaining Czechoslovak prisoners of war from Russia for service in France. The intention was to inaugurate this scheme at the earliest opportunity, and if possible to adopt similar methods in Italy.
Within the next three months the journey of Dürich and Štefánik to Russia brought the scheme close to the stage where its gradual realization could have been started. Thus arose the idea which in its final consequences resulted two years later in our Siberian anabasis.
The proposal to transport at least a part of our prisoners of war from Russia to France was prompted by other important considerations.
The Russian reverses on the Eastern front were more and more shifting the centre of gravity of the war to the West. Masaryk’s fears concerning Russia were being fulfilled to an ever more alarming extent, and we saw that: the centre of our own movement was thus more decisively being fixed in Western Europe. This led to the natural conclusion that our problem would have to be settled in Paris, which was quickly developing into what was perhaps the most important Allied centre. It was clear that we should achieve success there if we had our own soldiers on the Western front, and it seemed to us then that we should obtain them most easily from Russia. The question of the Italian prisoners of war had at that time not yet been taken into account, and we still had very little news about our prisoners in Serbia. As a matter of fact, there were very few of them.
It was not our purpose to transport all our troops and prisoners of war from Russia to France. All we wanted was merely a part of the prisoners of war so as to have on the Western front in France, for all contingencies, thirty or forty thousand of our troops. Our alarm as to the turn which events might take in Russia confronted us with the question as to what would happen to our troops if they were all in Russia and a catastrophe were to occur there. In organizing the National Council, and in negotiating with the authorities, I myself saw clearly that our political significance in Paris would rise if we ​could manage to place a large number of military units on the French front. Being permanently settled in Paris and in Western Europe, I directed the whole activity of the National Council and of the secretariat consistently and unremittingly in accordance with this factor. In this matter I never changed my point of view or my tactics throughout the war.
Further events gradually tended to confirm us in this policy. The Franco-Russian agreement for the transport of Russian troops to the Western front soon broke down for political and technical reasons. It was evident that Russia was unable to keep her promise. General Lokhvitsky, who was in command of the Russian troops in France, was greatly upset at this, and so was General Count Ignatyev, the Russian military attaché in Paris. In the conversations which I had with them they made no secret of the fact. When we mentioned to them the scheme for transporting a part of our prisoners of war to France they both emphatically approved of it, and they took the view that our army might in some way be linked up with the Russian troops in France, so that close co-operation could develop between them, thus increasing their influence and strengthening their authority. These were the arguments which they brought to bear on me, on Diirich, and on the National Council in general.
Seeing this, I was not slow to take advantage of their personal interest to secure support for our movement, and I began, through them, to influence the Russian Ambassador in Paris and the authorities in Petrograd direct. I did this because I was afraid that the opposition of the leading people in Russia might spoil our plan. I did not anticipate any difficulties from the French, because I saw the continually increasing shortage of troops on the French front. Through our relations with official circles, Štefánik and I had already received the unequivocal answer that if the Russian government gave its consent, France would promote the organization of the army in every possible way.
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It was under these circumstances that in the spring of 1916 the question of Dürich’s departure for Russia arose. On April 2nd Dürich informed me that he had received a message from Petrograd asking him to go there. On April 7th Masaryk telegraphed to me from London that it was time for Dürich to ​proceed to Russia and start work in Petrograd. Then, on April 12th, Dürich himself received a letter from M. Bibikov, the Russian Minister in Berne, who stated that, in accordance with a previous promise from Petrograd to inform Dürich of the moment regarded by the official circles there as suitable for his arrival, he could now start on his journey. Bibikov’s letter was brought, I believe, by Svatkovsky from Berne to Paris.
On April 13, 1916, Dürich, Svatkovsky, and I met to discuss matters together, and to arrange a course of action for our work in Russia. At this meeting it was emphasized that the co-operation with Paris and London was to be thorough and continual. Approval was given to the plan, already agreed upon, of transporting a certain number of our prisoners of war to France in order that on the Western front also we might establish an army of some size in co-operation with Lokhvitsky, Ignatyev, and the Russian Embassy. Dürich and myself were to discuss this question further with them.
Finally Svatkovsky emphasized to Diirich one more matter which at that time was particularly important to us. He had often spoken with Masaryk and myself about affairs in Russia, and he was not at all satisfied with them. He, like ourselves, was afraid that events might take an unfavourable turn from within. He criticized the military unpreparedness, the political fickleness, and the internal disorder which threatened to produce an outburst. Moreover, he was dissatisfied with the politics of Petrograd in matters relating to the Poles, the Jugoslavs, and ourselves. He was well acquainted with these matters, and he did not conceal from us his opinion of what Petrograd was undertaking. He was also offended by the attitude of the Tsarist Government towards us. Among my notes on this meeting of ours I have a record of his exact words to Dürich: “Insist upon telling them in Petrograd quite plainly: In the West they have done everything for us that we wanted, but you in Russia have done nothing.”
Dürich made preparations for his departure. First of all he paid a number of political visits to Briand, Berthelot, Lokhvitsky, Ignatyev, and to the Russian Embassy where he was received by Sebastopulo, the Ambassador’s deputy. Unfortunately, he made a number of political blunders which did us considerable harm even in Paris, and from which (and, I may add, from a number of other symptoms) we saw that Dürich’s political mission would probably end badly. After Dürich ​had visited Briand and Berthelot the people at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs told Štefánik quite plainly that they were unfavourably impressed, and the terms in which Sebastopulo expressed himself to me on the subject were even more emphatic.
This was a great blow to us and to the whole of our movement, which was then in its very promising initial stages. When General Lokhvitsky summoned me to him on June 16th to discuss once more the question of transporting troops from Russia to France, he said to me in the most direct manner: “Don’t send Dürich to Russia. That’s no job for him; he is incapable of it, and you won’t do any good that way. Write and tell Masaryk to go to Russia himself while you negotiate here with the Embassy. Visit Protopopov and explain your whole business to him.”(17)
To these blunders Dürich added a number of further new ones. He entangled himself in preposterous negotiations with the Czech colony in Paris, and particularly with certain of its members who compromised him in the eyes of the French Government. The persons whom he selected to work with him were quite unsuitable for such a political mission, and in private conversations the political views which he expressed on our relation to Russia, on our movement, and on Russia in general completely ran counter to our line of action in Paris.
This led to a disagreement with Stefanik and myself, which became acute at the beginning of June, when Štefánik decided to prevent Dürich’s departure for Petrograd at all costs. I shared his view that under these circumstances Dürich ought not to go to Petrograd on behalf of the National Council. After a very heated scene with Štefánik, Dürich admitted his mistakes, and on June 14, 1916, he promised that in future he would adhere to our common line of action and avoid his previous blunders. He made it up with Štefánik, and at last again obtained his consent for the journey to Russia. I myself had no violent disagreements or scenes with Dürich, as I always endeavoured to persuade him in a friendly manner, but I persisted in opposing his journey to Russia because I did not believe that he was able to accomplish anything worth while, and I was afraid that a new and far-reaching complication would be added to the disagreements already existing in our colony.
Štefánik gave his consent to Dürich’s journey, but with a new stipulation. He decided that he, too, would proceed to ​Russia, partly because he was afraid that Dürich, in spite of the reconciliation and although he had repeatedly given his word, would not keep to the agreement and would work against Paris, partly also that under these circumstances our troops from Russia would certainly not reach France. I gave my consent to Štefánik’s plan, although I was not entirely convinced.
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On June 2, 1916, we began to make arrangements for Štefánik’s journey to Russia. Officially, its purpose was to be indicated to the effect that Štefánik, being a French subject, was not going on behalf of the National Council, but in the interests of the French Government to study the conditions among the Czechoslovak prisoners of war in Russia, and to ascertain whether, and, if so, under what conditions, a definite part of them could be transported to France. He was also to negotiate immediately with the Government for sanction to carry out these plans. The mission was to be a French one, and, as I have said, it was the French Government and not the National Council which was to use its efforts to obtain this sanction. The arrangement had its advantages and also its disadvantages, the most dangerous of the latter being that Russia might possibly be aroused to jealousy against France on account of this initiative in Czechoslovak affairs.
Štefánik’s proposal was as follows: I, as General Secretary of the National Council, was to secure Masaryk’s consent, and Masaryk was to apply to Briand and the Russian Ambassadors in Rome and London, asking them to support this plan and to invite Štefánik to Russia.
I myself began to discuss the matter with Lokhvitsky and his officers Doroshevitch and Dalboshevsky, finally also with the Russian Ambassador in Paris. Masaryk gave his consent to Štefánik’s journey, but he was not enthusiastic about it. He had no confidence that anything of real moment could be achieved in Russia at that time, nor did he regard the journey suggested by Štefánik as a feasible one. He therefore did not apply to Briand, Giers, or Benckendorff, and this gave Štefánik the impression that Masaryk was entirely opposed to this policy of his. At first he wanted to take extreme measures in consequence, and to sever his connection with us. I succeeded in ​pacifying him, and when Masaryk sent him a telegram of recommendation to Izvolsky, Štefánik was placated and resumed his work. On June 23rd he discussed the matter with Izvolsky and Sebastopulo, from whom he secured at least the promise that they would support him in his mission to Russia.
On the same day Dürich, with his escort, left for Russia. Before his departure I paid him another visit, and on behalf of the nation and of the whole of the revolutionary movement I again asked him either not to go at all, as we were not in complete agreement in this matter, or at least to remember that at all costs he must work in uniformity with us in Paris. But in particular I urged him not to take his escort, Crkal, and Lieutenant Štafl.(18) He tried to prove to me that I ought not to be opposed to his mission and his course of action, and that after Štefánik had given his sanction I should not insist upon my dissent. At the same time he declared that he took full responsibility before the nation for everything that he was doing and was about to do.(19)
Štefánik himself was unable to take the necessary steps for arranging his journey to Russia. He asked me, as General Secretary of the National Council, to attend to the whole matter, and to make the necessary arrangements both with the French and with the Russians. He was of the opinion that if the preparations were made by the Czechoslovak National Council, there would be a better chance to secure the consent of French and Russian official circles. His chief fear was that his journey to Russia might be regarded as his own personal undertaking, and he therefore asked for Masaryk’s intervention also.
At that period Štefánik, seeing the departure of Dürich, and being alarmed as to what he might do in Russia, was in a state of feverish activity. He was impatient to know whether, as a French subject and a soldier, he would obtain sanction from the Government for his journey. He thought that if he were entrusted with the projected political mission it would be a great success for us, as the French Government would thus express its agreement, in principle, with the organization of our army in France, and at the same time would assist us to take the necessary steps in Russia. What he feared was that Dürich might have too long a start, and in the meanwhile would do harm in Russia.
On June 25, 1916, in accordance with my agreement with ​Štefánik, I again went to the Russian Embassy and officially submitted the demand of the National Council to Legation Councillor Sebastopulo, the Ambassador Izvolsky not being present. I again received a promise of support and sanction in principle. A few days later, on June 30th, I proceeded officially as General Secretary to my first audience with M. de Margerie, then political director of the French Foreign Ministry and now French Ambassador in Berlin. Both Sebastopulo and de Margerie told me candidly that Dürich’s journey was a political blunder, and that chiefly for that reason they agreed to Štefánik’s journey, hoping that this would obviate at least any very serious mistakes and predicaments.
These were my first dealings with de Margerie and Berthelot who rendered us such extensive and important services in the later course of the war. What actually happened on that occasion was that the National Council had been officially recognized by the French Foreign Ministry, which for the first time negotiated with the National Council and with me as its Secretary, in a matter of such far-reaching political significance. This method of action was then always adhered to, and it was clear that our political position in France was becoming stronger every day.
In accordance with the decision of the Ministry, Štefánik at once discussed his mission with the Ministry of War. Even at that early date he conferred with Admiral Lacaze on the technical preparations which would be necessary to transport our troops via Vladivostok and Archangelsk to France. After his departure I continued the work very energetically, and from that time onwards we kept it continually in view. By a combination of circumstances it concluded with the famous Siberian anabasis.
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At that time we in Paris established our first direct contact with our political and military fellow-workers in Russia. Hitherto we had been in touch with them only by correspondence. On March 16, 1916, B. Pavlů arrived in Paris from Russia. He had been sent by our people in Petrograd to give us an account of the situation in the East, and to view the state of affairs in the West, upon which he was then to report to Russia. In this way it was intended to strengthen the unity of the whole movement, as the uncertainty and the disagreements ​among our people in Russia demanded some authority which was to come from Masaryk and from Paris.
Pavlů had travelled via London, where he had discussed everything with Masaryk, and had then come to us in Paris. He had long been known to Štefánik, with whom he immediately reached an agreement. There had been certain differences of opinion between him and myself in Prague before the war, but now these were all cleared up and disposed of. Pavlů stayed in Paris for two weeks. First of all he initiated us thoroughly into the differences of opinion in the personal disputes which existed among our fellow-countrymen in Russia, and told us all there was to be told concerning their plans and ideas of our national revolution. He fully realized what was involved in the diversity of opinions about our position in Russia and in Western Europe, and he also quickly understood the political and military situation in Paris and London. He saw for himself how important Western Europe was with regard to Russia, and he also discovered our difficulties with Dürich. He agreed with us entirely, and approved of our plans in every respect. From that time onwards he was a loyal and unremitting advocate of the policy of the National Council, and of co-operation between our people in Russia and ourselves in Paris and London. He returned to Russia with messages to this effect on April 1, 1916.
The final preparations for Štefánik’s departure to Russia had been completed. I discussed with him in detail the measures that would be necessary should our troops reach France, i.e. how they were to be organized, with which of the authorities the matter would have to be arranged, and what preparations should be made for the beginnings of the army. On July 26th Štefánik was invited once more to visit the French Supreme Command at Chantilly, where he received his final instructions from French quarters. At a new suggestion of mine the Ministry for Foreign Affairs at the same time sent an official communication to the Ministry of War and to Field-Marshal Joffre, instructing them to identify themselves with the policy which the French Government, by arranging Štefánik’s mission, was inaugurating in Czech affairs and in its attitude to the National Council. The communication in question also instructed them to make every preparation which they might deem suitable for the transport of the Czechoslovak prisoners of war from Russia to France.
​Two days later, on July 28, 1916, Štefánik left for Russia. From Paris he proceeded via Brest to Archangelsk. I accompanied him by train as far as Laval. Two days after that I went to London, as I wanted to give Masaryk an account of what we had been doing in Paris, and also to confer with him on our future work. It seemed reasonable to infer from recent events that the National Council was now entering upon a period of very important political and military activity. From the negotiations of the French authorities with the National Council and with myself as its secretary, I saw that they were beginning to assign to us a genuine political significance.
I remained in London two weeks. We discussed in detail all our problems, needs, and further plans. With Voska’s help we sent an envoy, Miss Kvíčal, from London to Prague. She was returning from America to Austria, and at Masaryk’s request the English authorities detained her and brought her to see us in London.(20) On August 10th I gave her a message which she learnt by heart and faithfully delivered to Dr. Šámal in Prague. The contents of this message give a very striking indication of the stage which our movement reached at that time, and also of our views, plans, hopes, and needs.
While in London with Masaryk I met Supilo and Milyukov. Supilo gave us a very frank account of his disputes with Pašić, of his experiences in Russia with Sazonov, of his discussions with Giers, and of his negotiations with the English authorities. He was impetuous and resolute, but he possessed also political instinct and sound intelligence. In London he was regarded favourably. He took an adverse view of Russia. He was convinced that Petrograd had consciously and deliberately betrayed the idea of Jugoslav unity by assenting to the London Pact with Italy, and by opposing the scheme for joining the Croats and Slovenes with the Serbs. Altogether he considered that Russia had no political policy of a Slav and anti-Austrian character. In my presence Masaryk discussed in detail with Milyukov the whole of our political plan for reorganizing Central Europe.(21) Milyukov agreed with it. He, too, criticized Russia severely. Masaryk and I paid a visit to Oxford, partly to interview English professors there—notably Dr. J. Holland Rose—partly also to have another meeting with Dmowski and Milyukov, who were then lecturing at Oxford on the problems of the war, with special reference to Russia and Italy.
Our visit to Oxford is associated with memories which I ​recall with great emotion. It was at a time when the prospects of our success were precarious, and when we daily had to face the possibility of spending the rest of our lives abroad under conditions of great hardship. Professor Masaryk, too, had to contend with great anxieties about his family. Alice Masaryk, his daughter, had recently been imprisoned, and Mme. Masaryk, whose health was now seriously impaired, was living isolated at Prague. “When I take everything into account,” said Masaryk to me on our way back to London, “I often consider whether I ought not to go home again. Of course, they would hang me, but at least I should see my wife once more; and I am afraid that she will not live till the end of the war. It would cause a stir among our people at home and would certainly stiffen their opposition to Vienna.”
I was deeply moved by these remarks, which caused me to reflect upon my own personal troubles. At that very moment my wife was in some Viennese prison, and the whole outlook was dark and uncertain. Nevertheless, I reminded myself that whether our undertaking ended in victory or defeat, what was now happening would one day be regarded as a great epoch in the history of our nation. Moreover, I had been brought closer to Professor Masaryk by what he had said to me, and I felt grateful to Providence for having allowed me to work with him at so great a task. Thus it was that I returned to Paris strengthened and encouraged for further work.
(b) The National Council and the Prisoners of War in France
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I returned to Paris on August 17th and at once set about my new and onerous tasks as arranged with Masaryk. The formation of an army in France was now to enter upon a stage of practical realization. It was now necessary to make preparations for receiving our prisoners of war from Russia, and also for systematically organizing those who were already in France. At the same time considerable activity had to be started in connection with our prisoners of war in Italy. After the marked success of the Press campaign in France in June, July, and August 1916, which had aimed at the destruction of Austria-Hungary and had taken advantage of Brusilov’s offensive, as well as of the ​political persecutions and trials in Bohemia, we found a greater comprehension of our movement with regard to the prisoners of war and our military schemes.
From the moment when there appeared a justifiable hope that detachments of our prisoners of war were going to be transported from Russia, the question of our prisoners of war in the West acquired a new political significance. At that time there were in France about 4,000 Czech prisoners from Serbia who formed the remainder of about 25,000 of our people who had originally been captured there.(22) The greater part of these had, in company with the Serbian Army, undertaken that desperate retreat through Albania. For our troops this retreat had involved enormous suffering. While the Serbian Government had been concerned with saving the remnants of its army, it had regarded our prisoners merely as ballast who were depriving the Serbs of their food supplies, and so the Czech prisoners died of hunger and hardships by the wayside. The extent to which this catastrophe affected our people can be indicated roughly in figures. The total number who, in a pitiable condition, managed to reach the Albanian coast at Jadran and from there, with Italian help, the Island of Asinara, was about 11,000. There the treatment which they, as well as the Austrians, received was very bad. They contracted infectious diseases, such as typhus and dysentery, and again perished wholesale, their bodies being thrown into the sea.
As a result of intervention by the Serbian Government and by us, we managed to arrange for their transport to France. The number arriving there being, as I have mentioned, only about 4,000. And even there, at the beginning, they were wretchedly situated. This forms one of the instructive episodes in our history during the war. We were far from sharing the belief which prevailed in Viennese circles and amongst certain of our own people that the Allies were awaiting us with open arms. And if the official world of politics knew little about us at that time, the subordinate authorities were almost completely ignorant of us and treated our people accordingly. There were, of course, exceptions, but on the whole what our prisoners went through everywhere was in truth a calvary of suffering. This applies to Serbia, Russia, Italy, and France, particularly at the beginning. The Czechs who were prisoners of war in those countries could tell harrowing stories of their experiences. On Slavonic territory they were just as badly off as elsewhere. I ​am not complaining of this, but merely placing the fact on record. It will help to throw an accurate light upon our movement abroad. In the literature dealing with our struggle for independence there are detailed accounts of all these matters. I will therefore make no further reference to these hardships, disappointments, and struggles. I will add a few words on the subject from a political point of view.
When in September 1916 we began our systematic movement among the prisoners of war in France, and shortly afterwards in Italy, we could reckon with tens of thousands of such prisoners. In Russia their number certainly exceeded 50,000; in Italy there were more than 10,000; and in France about 4,000. We thus had the opportunity of forming an army containing tens of thousands. In Russia the movement among the prisoners was already in progress, while in the West the recent successes of the National Council had led us to expect equally rapid results.
The character of this movement was, of course, the same in all the Allied countries. It encountered the same difficulties and followed the same procedure. Accordingly, what I have to say about the organization of the prisoners in France will, in general outlines, apply to all the Allied countries.
This is a subject which most strikingly illustrates how ignorant the Allied Government and political circles were of conditions in Austria-Hungary. And although, in the course of time, they began to realize that preferential treatment should be given to our prisoners, and that it was possible even to use them for military and political purposes, we nevertheless for a very long time, and in many cases up to the end of the war, encountered complete lack of understanding on the part of subordinate officials and local authorities. It was a gigantic task to overcome all these obstacles. Our prisoners must have been endowed with superhuman patience to achieve what they did, without giving up hope or surrendering to complete despair.
In addition to this ignorance and lack of understanding, the mistrust and fear of spies which influenced the Allied authorities for so long, prevented us for a considerable time from achieving any noteworthy success. There were prejudices or principles of international law with which the Government circles opposed our endeavours with regard to the prisoners. Certain very authoritative quarters where conservatism, legitimism, and monarchism were rampant, harboured fear of our revolutionary tendencies. It was in Italy and Russia where these motives ​prevailed the longest. Advantage was taken of them in Russia also when, for political reasons, circles which were hostile to us desired to frustrate our purposes.
But there were obstacles on our side which proved difficult to cope with. Our prisoners had been still armed when they reached the Allied countries, and for that reason they had been treated as enemies. It was only in course of time that discrimination was shown towards them. In this respect matters were no better in France than in Russia or Serbia. And it was when they had been embittered by all these disappointments that we began our propagandist activity among them to show that the Allies really wanted to liberate us, and that we must therefore keep with them, even to the extent of being prepared for service at the front, a proceeding in which our prisoners would incur the risk of death on the gallows. Many of them found it difficult to understand at first, while in the case of others we met with direct opposition. It must be remembered that they were still under the control of Austro-Hungarian officers who terrorized them, or else they were exposed to the influence of their own fellow-countrymen who were either sceptics or opportunists. The obstacles which all these circumstances caused us were formidable. In fact, our movement among the prisoners of war produced results which were often miracles of patience and industry. Under the most difficult conditions in all the Allied countries we had to bring about a diametrical change in the official attitude towards our prisoners, and in the prison camps themselves we often had to win our people over with the utmost exertion, man by man. There were camps where the conditions were quite different, and where we found spontaneous enthusiasm, wholesale volunteering for active service. In these cases, however, disappointment and distress of a different character made themselves felt, for the men’s initial enthusiasm was gradually crushed by their endless waiting to be released from the camp and drafted into the projected army.
The procedure was everywhere the same. We first asked for permission to send our publications to the camps, and to grant our people various privileges, such as clean linen, writing material, newspapers, books, etc. We then applied for our people to be separated from the prisoners of other nationalities, and placed under the charge of Czechoslovak officers. It was more difficult to arrange for the Slovaks to be placed with the ​Czechs. Finally we secured permission to carry on recruiting propaganda.
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After being transported from Asinara, our prisoners had been distributed over various camps throughout France, and we got into touch with them through the assistance of the French authorities. As early as spring 1916 the censorship of the prisoners of war and the military authorities had begun to apply to us, through Professor Eisenmann, for help in interpreting the prisoners’ correspondence, in which they had found items of great value for estimating the moral, social, political, and military situation in Austria-Hungary. In this way we began to ascertain the places in which our people were located, as well as their number, the feeling amongst them, their sorrows, complaints, and wishes.
Having thus discovered where all our people were, we began to send them small sums of money, as well as newspapers, books, paper, linen, etc. Then, when the public work of the National Council, our propaganda, our relations with ministries, and finally the agreement connected with Štefánik’s mission had strengthened our position, and we were enjoying sufficient confidence as a responsible political body, I gradually began on behalf of the National Council to undertake a definite political intervention in matters relating to the prisoners of war.
As we had few prisoners in France we had to proceed cautiously. The subordinate official bodies, being unacquainted with our aims or the foundations of our movement, and being unable at the outset to estimate the scope of the whole matter, might easily, for reasons connected with administration and organization, or owing to the personal interests of various local notables, have frustrated the whole movement, even though the central authorities were well disposed towards it. That was a frequent experience of ours, and that was why we had to proceed slowly. But at all costs we had to achieve success, as lack of success in France would have been a severe blow to the possibility of similar action in Italy.
Accordingly, on September 19, 1916, as our prisoners in France were under the jurisdiction of Serbia, I first applied to M. Vesnić, the Serbian Minister, asking him if he would induce the Serbian Government to let the National Council acquire authority over them. I also asked him to use his influence with ​the Serbian and French Governments in promoting our endeavour to organize the whole of our prisoners in France in an independent Czechoslovak Army. M. Vesnić promised his support, and gave us all the help he could.
The National Council then began to work on the same lines in French political circles. I have already mentioned that in the spring of 1916 I was introduced by Štefánik into the salon of Mme. de Jouvenel, where we used to meet with a number of politicians, journalists, deputies, and military men. In the same way I came into contact with other influential centres, such as the salons of Mme. Menard-Dorian and of the Baroness Lacaze, in which we began to find political support. From September 1916 onwards these circles exhibited a systematic interest in our problems, and furthered our movement in every possible manner.
On September 2nd M. Picard, a deputy who at that time was in quite close touch with M. Briand, promised me that he would intervene with the Government in the matter of our prisoners. At the same time I applied to a number of other friends, including General Valentin, of the Ministry of War, to whom I made a special written application on this subject. These interventions produced excellent results. The Ministry of War at once began to deal with the matter, and on September 21st it issued a telegraphic order to all prisoner-of-war camps that the Czechoslovaks were to be separated from the other Austro-Hungarian prisoners. They were also to receive more considerate treatment. This order, however, immediately encountered serious difficulties, which emanated from the Supreme Command at the front, and it also had to contend with obstacles of a bureaucratic nature in the various camps themselves. Moreover, there were delays in drawing up the details of the conditions under which the order of the Ministry was to be carried out.
I petitioned M. Briand, and thenceforth I discussed this question of the prisoners with the Government authorities only through official channels. The Foreign Ministry suggested that in order to negotiate on the subject of our demands enumerated in my application to the Prime Minister, I should get into direct touch with the central department in Paris which dealt with all matters relating to prisoners of war. The head of this department was Georges Cahen, with whom I reached an agreement as to all further procedure on October 18, 1916. I ​arranged the introduction of more favourable treatment to our prisoners, as well as our method of contact with them, the supply of periodicals, the carrying on of propaganda for a national army, and at least a partial concentration of them into exclusively Czechoslovak camps. The whole matter was then submitted to the Supreme Command at the front for approval. As from September 1916 I was able to obtain access to the headquarters at Chantilly, where there was a special section for matters relating to us under the charge of Colonel Billote, I applied direct to him both in writing and personally, and asked him for his assistance. Throughout these negotiations I received considerable help from the Ministry of War, on the one hand, from the information department, where Professor Eisenmann was also co-operating with us in this matter, and partly from the organizing department (Lieut.-Col. Cros) attached to the General Staff, where they were already reckoning with the possibility of organizing our army.
The actual work connected with the prisoners of war, which now became an actual fact as a result of the agreement reached with the authorities, proceeded very slowly. For weeks at a time it was necessary to carry on negotiations, and then intervene almost every day in order to overcome prejudices, bureaucratic inaction and pettiness, as well as political ignorance and failure to understand the point at issue.
The final result was excellent. Of the 4,000 prisoners from Serbia who were in France, nearly all passed into our national army in the course of the year 1918.
While this activity was developing, my negotiations with military circles in the Supreme Command at Chantilly were also making progress. Colonel Billote, who was in regular communication with the National Council, had concentrated at headquarters all details relating to us. He used to obtain reports from me and also from Štefánik in Russia, who sent documents dealing with our movement, with Dürich’s activities, and with the progress which his own mission was making. Colonel Billote used to summon me regularly to headquarters, where I discussed everything with him from the point of view of the situation in France.(23)
At French headquarters the Serbian Government was represented by General Rašić, a charming Slav of the old-fashioned type. I entered into touch with him also, and arrived at an ​agreement on the subject of the prisoners as far as Serbia was concerned. My relations with General Rašić were nothing short of fraternal. He was a sincere friend to us, and promoted our cause among the French at headquarters. The progress of the work connected with our army in France led me to ask him whether the Serbian Government could not send us all our prisoners who were still on the Balkan Front, and also let us have all the Czechs and Slovaks who were serving in the Serbian Army. In particular, as I was afraid that we should not have enough capable officers in France, I asked him to induce the Serbian Government to release those of our officers who were serving with the Serbian Army.
The negotiations which these demands involved were protracted, and the plan was actually carried out just a year after the initial intervention. On October 31, 1917, when I again visited General Rašić, I received a notification that the Serbian Army had issued an order for our officers and men to be transported from the Balkan Front to our army in France.
This was the general framework of all my personal activities from the autumn of 1916, and also of those carried out under my management by the office of the National Council in matters relating to propaganda, prisoners of war, and political plans. This activity of ours, its character and its methods, became stabilized. Various persons engaged in it now had their definite function and degrees of authority. The organization was on a firm basis, communication with all our centres was more or less established, and the whole of our work proceeded on normal lines.
Such were the circumstances accompanying the approach of important events in international politics in which we also began to take our share, and in which the Czechoslovak movement became an important factor.