# Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021)/4:47pm

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​[4:47 p.m.]
    BY
Q And the next line is Chief of Staff Meadows. Is that right?
A Yeah, I guess that's right. I don't remember writing that, but it does say "chief of staff," so I guess Chief of Staff Meadows was on that call.
Q Do you remember if there were any questions—it looks like he was on the 1900 call but not on the 1800 call. Is that correct?
A That's possible. My recollection is that the 1800 call was more DOD and law enforcement, talking about where are we, is the building clear, how long will it take the building to get clear, are we going to be able to secure the perimeter, things like that. And the 1900 call was more toward the political leadership about when they can get back to work.
Q Q Do you remember if there were any questions posed by Mr. Meadows during that 1900 call?
A I don't remember that.
. Ms. Cheney, did you have any additional questions before I move on to the 1800 call?
Ms. Cheney. Mr. Chair, thank you.
Did anyone on the call ask or address the question of why the President had not been involved in the call?
Mr. Donoghue. No, not that I recollect.
Ms. Cheney. So there was no discussion about the lack of the President's involvement?
Mr. Donoghue. No. There was no discussion about why the President's not on ​the call. Again, I have POTUS written there and the Chief of Staff is on this call. I think this is a vague recollection, but I think he made some representation about what the President wanted to happen, and I think it was in line with what he had told me earlier that afternoon, and that's why I didn't write anything more about it.
Ms. Cheney. Okay. Thank you.
    BY :
Q Turning to the 1800 call, your notes, I just wanted to go through number five and number six.
A Yes.
Q Can you read that for us?
A Number five says: This may have to be sustained through approximately the 27th—that was General Milley saying that—thinks will need approximately 6,000 National Guard to maintain the perimeter through that date.
Number six says: Adjacent police forces - all are on standby or already helping.
Those were police departments in Virginia and Maryland and places like that.
Q General Milley's suggestion, was that—takes you up to the date of the inauguration? Is that the 27th?
A It would take us a week after the inauguration. So it seemed to me he was planning the inauguration plus a week, seemed to be what he was planning for, thinking might be necessary.
Q And number—under number four, if you could just read the notes that you have on the side there.
A So the title of that block is "D.C. National Guard," and on the left, I have: General Hokansen—H-o-k-a-n-s-e-n. He's from the National Guard Bureau in the Pentagon. I believe he's the Commander of the National Guard Bureau. I think that ​says: VA, Virginia; PA, Pennsylvania; and other States would make National Guard troops available, if necessary. I think that's what that note means.
Major General Wagner, also reflected in that same bullet, is the Commander of the National Guard for Washington, D.C. He is reporting that they had 154 on scene, and then he gave some other details about how long it would take to get additional National Guard forces there.
And I should point out that I never saw the National Guard there, but I didn't go outside. I was in the building throughout. And, when we got to the rotunda and we met with that Capitol Police officer, and I said, "This is what we have available, what do you need," and he made his requests, he said: National Guard is coming too, but when they get here, we're going to put them on the perimeter, free up some of our guys.
And that made perfect sense. So my understanding was, as they arrived, they were going to be put on the perimeter. So, since I didn't go outside and walk the perimeter at that point, I didn't expect to see any National Guard, and I didn't.
Q Who was the Capitol Police leadership that became your point of contact on the site?
A It was a lieutenant in the rotunda whose last name started with an S. I apologize. It escapes me right now. But, when I asked for the ranking Capitol Police officer, I was led over to this individual. I said: Are you in charge of the Capitol Police here?
He said: I'm Lieutenant So-and-So. I'm in charge of our tactical units. Basically we're running this operation at this point.
I said: Fine. This is who I am. This is who David Bowdich is. This is who Ashan Benedict is. This is what we have for you. I know you guys know we've had these resources, but what he needs to do right now to fix this, and then he asked for ​specific assistance that we gave him.
Q Was that the same lieutenant who was on the 1900 call when you referred to Capitol Police leadership was on that call?
A I think he sent one of his guys. I don't think he was sitting with us. I think he sent one of his assistants with us to sort of shepherd us around because he was taking care of his tactical units who were still very engaged at that point.
Q I just want to go back in time a little bit, and then we are wrapping up for my portion here. But to go back to exhibit 51, I just wanted to get some confirmation on some email traffic that was going on that day. Exhibit 51 is an email between Mr. Engel and Mr. Rosen where you're cc'd.
Mr. Rosen says to Mr. Engel: We may need your input on whether any deputizations are needed and perhaps who has the authority to authorize the National Guard for the Capitol.
Hadn't that question already been cleared up prior to January 6th with the communications with DOD?
A So the mayor had requested 350 National Guard, and that had all been approved. So those National Guard forces were on the streets of D.C. The problem was, when you then move them to the Capitol, it's a different situation. So, again, the Capitol Police have sole authority over the Capitol. We couldn't even send forces there, FBI agents or otherwise, without their permission. They have sole jurisdiction and authority over the Capitol.
Moving—the mayor herself doesn't have the authority to move the National Guard on to the Capitol grounds. So that's got to be done pursuant to a request by the Capitol Police. In order to protect Guard members, it was probably necessary for them to be deputized because, again, they don't have inherent authority to do law ​enforcement. They can direct traffic. They can do all kinds of things. But if they've got to place someone in custody, actually make an arrest on Capitol grounds, they've got to have law enforcement authority to do that.
So that's what the DAG was concerned about, and that's what someone like Steve Engel can give you guidance on, because we didn't want to put these guys in a terrible situation where they now arrest someone because they're doing the right thing and 7 suddenly they've got personal liability because they weren't deputized and, therefore, didn't have the law enforcement authority to make an arrest.
As these emails were flowing that afternoon, I've got to tell you, I didn't see a lot. So, you know, the fact that there were emails coming through, I certainly wasn't staring at my phone reading every email as it came in. So I've seen them after the fact, but a lot of these I didn't see at the time.
Q Do you know if anyone was ultimately deputized on that day, on January 6th? I understand later they were.
A I don't remember. I know we deputized them for the inauguration, for these very same reasons.
Q Exhibit 52 is a 4:27 outgoing email from yourself saying: 250 National Guard are heading to the Capitol, as per Secretary Army.
Was that a direct conversation you had with Mr. McCarthy?
A I think so. I only have the vaguest recollection of this, but I think what happened was the Secretary of the Army called my cell phone. He said: I understand you're on the ground. Just wanted to give you an update. We've got 250 National Guard guys headed there now.
I said: Great.
I think I told him: Yeah. The Capitol Police said they're going to put your guys ​on the perimeter. That makes sense.
And he said: Fine.
It was a very short phone call, and I have only the vaguest recollection of it at this point.
Q And, just so we're crystal clear on this DOD versus DOJ kind of narrative about the designation of the lead Federal agency, at no point did Mr. McCarthy or Mr. Miller or anyone from DOD, well, did they ever defer to you that day, in your role that you took on, or did they ever inform you, "Oh, I heard DOJ is the lead Federal agency now"?
A No. No one said that, and I didn't tell them that. And I didn't take what the chief of staff said in that phone call to mean that I should be moving troops around the Nation's Capital. I just never—you know, when he said, "You're in charge of the Federal agencies," I did not take that to mean National Guard.
And I knew that I had no authority, even with the blessing of the chief of staff or the President himself, to take control of the Capitol Police or the Metro PD. So I wasn't going to get into that discussion and debate with the chief of staff at that point. I was confident that we could make the situation happen or the situation resolved.
But I did not tell anyone, aside from Dave Bowdich, that the chief of staff had given those instructions at that point. It was not necessary. It was going to confuse things. The Capitol Police were in charge of the Capitol no matter what the chief of staff said, and they were more than happy to have the help. So there was no need to bring that up with the Capitol Police, DOD, or anyone else.
Q I think that wraps up my portion.
I just have a couple questions to round it out. But, at any point on January 6th or prior to, did you sense any resistance from any DOD official to respond on that day, ​starting with January 6th, in terms of authorizing the D.C. National Guard to arrive?
A No. I didn't—I didn't sense any resistance. I sensed, prior to January 6th, a great reluctance by General Milley to have the military involved any more than is absolutely necessary, and I thought that was appropriate, and we were all in agreement. But, on January 6th, I didn't hear anything about any reluctance.
I know there was some complaints afterwards about delays and things of that nature. You'd have to talk to them about it, but I think those delays were driven by the fact that the mayor insisted that the Guard be unarmed and that they not have body armor. And so, when they were asked to assist, they then had to go back to the armory so that they were appropriately equipped, and that took some time. I think that's what accounted for the delay, if there was a delay.
Q Did you sense any resistance from any White House official on January 6th in terms of responding to the Capitol that day?
A No. It was the opposite. There was a certain amount of urgency clear in the phone calls and the communications from both the chief of staff and the White House counsel basically saying: Get over there and fix this.
Q What's the single most—what do you attribute as the single most—biggest failure of that day in terms of securing the Capitol? Who do you attribute that to? What do you attribute that to?
A The Capitol Police failure to maintain the perimeter. I mean, there were certainly heroic acts by the Capitol Police that day. I would never undercut what those individual officers did, but there was a complete failure of planning and leadership.
There's no reason they should have gotten in that building. The Capitol Police had more than enough manpower. They were the agency that was best equipped and best positioned to defend the Capitol. Everyone knew that the Capitol was at risk. ​Everyone knew that there were going to be thousands of angry protesters showing up at the Capitol. Certainly, no one anticipated this type of breach, but you plan for the worst, and the Capitol Police should have planned for the worst, and they should have been prepared to defend that perimeter.
And, to this day, I'm completely shocked that they were unable to do so, because they had the manpower to do it. Why they failed to do so, I don't know. And, again, that doesn't take away in any way, shape, or form from the heroic acts of those individual officers, but there's a leadership failure there. And it doesn't shift blame off the individuals who committed crimes to get into that building; that's entirely on them, and that's disgraceful criminal conduct. But they should've been able to hold that perimeter. I don't know why it didn't happen.
Q How much responsibility, if any, do you put on the intelligence community for not issuing any specific warnings about January 6th?
A I think there were a lot of specific warnings about January 6th. I think that the Capitol Police certainly knew about threats. They knew that the Capitol was a target, just as we knew that the Department itself was a target, the White House was a target, Lafayette Square was a target. There was lots of targets all over D.C. that day. The Capitol was one of the obvious ones.
And intelligence was shared. I'll leave it to Director Wray and others to talk about exactly what intelligence was shared at what points in time and all of that. But you didn't need an intelligence report to know that thousands of angry people were going to be showing up at the Capitol that day who were upset about the election and who wanted to disrupt the congressional proceedings that day. And Capitol Police should've been prepared to handle that. I think they had the personnel. I think they had the intelligence. I'm not sure why it went the way it did.
​Q So you don't think an issuance of a joint intelligence bulletin by the Bureau or DHS could've—would've impacted the security planning of the Capitol Police?
A Again, I'll leave it to others to do the postmortem on this, but I think there was plenty of intelligence, whether it came from FBI, DHS, MPD, or others, as to what we were looking at here. And it wasn't a surprise to anyone that thousands of angry people showed up at the Capitol that afternoon. It certainly wasn't a surprise to the Capitol Police.
I don't have anything else.
Ms. Cheney, do you have anything on—and then I can shift.
Ms. Cheney. Oh , I have some questions on some other issues. Were you all done? I'm happy to go ahead with those or—
I'm done. I'm going to turn it over to at this point or to you, but my portion is finished. Thanks for your time.
Mr. Andres. Please, could we just take—like just give us 1 minute. We don't have to go off camera. Let me just—okay. Sorry. Sorry. Go ahead.
Ms. Cheney, you can go ahead while we do some camera shifting here.
Ms. Cheney. Okay. I'm not sure what topics is covering. Mr. Donoghue, were you aware—did it come to your attention at any time on January 6th or after that there were any discussions going on on the 25th Amendment?
Mr. Donoghue. No. There were no discussions regarding the 25th Amendment, to my knowledge, my entire time in Washington.
Ms. Cheney. And, with respect to the Insurrection Act, between the election and January 20th, were there discussions about the possibility of the President invoking the Insurrection Act that you became aware of?
​Mr. Donoghue. I don't believe so, no.
Ms. Cheney. And then, with respect to martial law, what's the impression—did you become aware at any time that there were any discussions about the implication of martial law, whether in conjunction with [inaudible] ballot boxes or anything else [inaudible].
The Reporter. Ms. Cheney, your audio cut out. Can you please repeat that?
Ms. Cheney. Yes. With respect to martial law, did you become aware at any time of any discussions in that same time period that the President might be considering declaring martial law or asked for your views on the topic?
Mr. Donoghue. No. There was never any mention or discussion of that.
Ms. Cheney. So your—the seizing of the ballot boxes that you mentioned and [inaudible] sent to the Oval Office was [inaudible] ballot boxes, there was no discussion about the mechanics of doing so?
Mr. Donoghue. I'm sorry, ma'am. You're breaking up.
Ms. Cheney. Sorry. The question was about the discussion that you mentioned, Mr. Donoghue, in the Oval Office about the seizing of ballot boxes. Was there a discussion—
Mr. Donoghue. Yes.
Ms. Cheney. —or any discussion with that about the mechanics for doing so?
Mr. Donoghue. The President made some comment about: If you would seize these machines, I am sure you'd find evidence of criminal conduct.
He seemed to think that we had some administrative role supervising State elections. And, again, we explained to him that that's not our role and we have no authority to seize State election machines. And then Ken Cuccinelli reiterated that.
I didn't—that had nothing to do with martial law or anything of that sort, but the ​President seemed to believe that we had the authority administratively just to do that, and we explained to him that we did not, and then he moved on.
Ms. Cheney. Okay. Thank you.
Mr. Andres. Hi. Sorry, I'm not sure what's next. We were going to talk about the election fraud, January 6th. We were going to go from 10:00 to 4:00. It's 5:08, so just so we're—what's left?
. Hi, this is . I'm senior counsel to Vice Chair Representative Cheney. I just have a few small questions.
Mr. Andres. Great.
. It'll probably be less than 10 minutes.
Mr. Andres. No worries.
    BY
Q Going back to your discussion with the Assistant Attorney Generals and what they would do if the President replaced Acting Attorney General Rosen with Jeff Clark, you mentioned that you said that you hoped that John Demers would stay on, and then—but when they actually decided—told you what they would do, did he say that he would resign as well, or did he say that he would stay on?
A John did not respond. I think he and everyone else on the call took that as me saying he should not resign, you know, unless he said otherwise. I think the presumption would've been, absent John putting up his hand and saying, "No, I am going to resign," I think everyone understood that John would stay in place.
Q Okay. Great. And just last question, I don't know if you've seen there was recently a memo from John Eastman that was published pretty widely. Are you familiar with that? It discusses January 6th scenarios and the Vice President's constitutional role on that day. Are you familiar with that at all?
​A I've seen some media accounts of that, but I did not read the memo.
Q Okay. And is it the case then that you didn't see that—that memo was never shared with the Department of Justice while you were there, to your knowledge?
A No. Not at all.
Okay. Those are all the questions I have.
All right. Let me just look around the room and make sure there's nothing else.
anything else?
Ms. Cheney, are you also—any other questions on your mind before we go off the record?
Ms. Cheney. No. I'm set. Thank you.
Okay. All right.
Well, Mr. Donoghue, I think that concludes it. I know we went beyond—I should never estimate times. I apologize for keeping you longer than expected. But I really appreciate your candor, your patience with us today, your willingness to, yet again, sit down and go through this. It's important to the select committee to get the facts and to talk to people who were at the center of things as you were. So thank you very much for doing this.
The next step is for the court reporter to provide us with a transcript. We will then send that to your attorneys. You will have a chance to look it over and to make any clarifications, corrections to make sure it's accurate. We want to make sure that it accurately captures the questions and answers today. And that should happen here pretty quickly.
And then, again, I'll stay in touch with Greg, with your lawyer, about whether there's anything else we need.
​Mr. Donoghue. Okay. Well, my thanks to the committee, the staff, the Department attorneys who have been on all day, as well as the Davis Polk team here, who did a great job preparing me.
If we can provide further information in the future, let us know.
Okay, Mr. Donoghue. Thanks again. Really, really appreciate it.
Brad and Kira and everybody at DOJ, thank you as well.
Mr. Andres. Thanks.
All right. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 5:14 p.m., the interview was concluded.]
Certificate of Deponent/Interviewee
I have read the foregoing pages, which contain the correct transcript of the answers made by me to the questions therein recorded.
Witness Name
Date