# Taylor v. Knox

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Taylor verʃus Knox, et al.
F
On the argument, the garniſhee Henderʃon (who was alſo a co-partner with the defendant) produced ſeveral witneſſes, by whoſe teſtimony the following facts were eſtablifhed:—That David Knox came to Philadelphia in the ſpring of 1784; that he brought furniture with him, hired a dwelling houſe and ſtore, and profeſſed an intention “to lay his bones here.” That he went to Virginia in February 1785, and ſailed thence to England, in conſequence of receiving intelligence of ſome miſconduct of another partner, named Cowan, who reſided there, and had never been in America. That during his abſence, and at the time of laying the attachments, the copartner, now garniſhee, continued in poſſeſſion of the houſe in Philadelphia, with much the ſame eſtabliſhment of ſervants &c. but after the attachments were laid, he broke up houſe-keeping. That David Knox was a ſingle man, and it was not known, whether he had taken the oath of allegiance to this ſtate, or not.
The plaintiffs to ſhew their cauſe of action, produced affidavits of accounts from their reſpective books, ſworn to before the Lord Mayor of London.
The queſtion being argued by Ingerʃol and Rowle, in ſupport of the motion, and by Lewis and Wilcocks againſt it, the President, at an adjourned ſitting on the 15th of February 1786, delivered the opinion of the Court.
Shippen, Preʃident.—The firʃt point to be decided, is, whether the foreign attachments ought not to be diſſolved, on the proofs given of Knox's being an inhabitant of Penʃylvania at the time they iſſued?
We would avoid laying down any general rules as to what will or will not, make a perſon an inhabitant within the attachment law, leſt cafes ſhould hereafter happen, which might come within thoſe general rules, but were not in the contemplation of the Court in the particular caſe before them. We think, however, if any general rule was made, it would be reaſonable, and very conſonant to our laws and conſtitution, that the perſon's reſidence here, to make him ​
1785.
an inhabitant fhould be fo long as to give him the rights of citizenfhip– to wit, for twelve months. And we fhould have no heftitation in laying this down as a rule, if it were not for thofe cafes of difpute which may arife between creditors on a domeʃtic attachment, and creditors on ƒoreign attachments, where it may frequently happen that the debtors's refidence may be lefs than 12 months, and yet he may, and ought, to be an object of the domeftic attachment law, fo as to have his effects divided among all his creditors, and not fwept awa by the firft creditor who takes out a foreign attachmentBut in cafes where a ftranger comes among us, and remains here for a fhort time, and then goes away under fuch circumftances, as not to make him as object of the domeʃtic attachment, it will always have confiderable weight with us, that he has not refided here for twelve months.
In Knox's cafe his refidence here was only eight or nine months ; the family he left behind him, does not appear to be of a kind to denote an uneqivocal continuation of his refidence, being probably no more than was fufficient for his partner Henderʃon's own accommodation as a fingle man.
The ʃecond question is, whether there has been fuch proof of a debt due, as is fufficient to fhew a caufe of action ?
And here it will be proper to mention the reafon and occafion of making the rules with regard to proofs neceffary for holding to bail on 'writs of capias. When I came into this Court, I found a practice had lately taken place of requiring proofs of the debt, fimilar to thofe required by the ftatute of 12 G.I. fo as to difable abfent plaintiffs from holding defendants to bail, for want of a pofitive affidavit before one of the judges of this Court of a fubfifting debt. I confidered this practice as not founded in law, and as tending to injure the credit of the country. That it was not founded in law I took to be clear, from the words of our act of Affembly, made fhortly after the revolution, extending only fuch of the ftatute laws of England as had thereƒore been in force in Pennʃylvania. The act of 12 G.I. was certainly not in force, nor ever practiced un, before me, thought there was good reafon to keep up a kind of reciprocity between England and us, upon this fubject, and not being willing to relax the rule totally, it became neceffary in order to preferve a uniformity of determination in the feveral judges of the Court, to fettle another mode, fo as to avoid extending an act of Parliament by their authority, which had not been extended by the Legiflature, and yet not to give the inhabitants of that country the fame eafy method of proving their debts to England before the Lord Mayor, or other magiftrate there, which had been practifed previous to the revolution under their own acts of Parliament. A middle way was, therefore, ftruck out ; and fignature of the party to fome inftrument of writing, or fome letter, or acknowledgment ​
1785.
of the debt, was made neceffary to be fuperadued to the ufual probate made before the war. This rule, however, affects the inhabitants of other countries as well as England; and it may poffibly be found neceffary, at fome future time, to make an alteration in it more conformable to the general law on thofe fubjects. But, as at the time of making the rule, we had no eye to any other kind of procefs, than writs of capias, and it was exprefsly confined to them in favour of perʃonal liberty, we do not think it fhould be extended to other cafes, not then within our view. In cafes of attachments, therefore, we think it fafeft, to follow the law as we find it in our books before the ftatute of 12 G.I. And as it appears by the cafe in 8 Mod. 323, that an affidavit of a plaintiff, before a notary public in Holland, was deemed fufficient to hold the defendant to bail, we think the like affidavit in this cafe, fhould be fufficient for the fame purpofe.
Motion to diffolve the attachments difcharged.