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# Persian Letters/Letter 68
#### Letter 68

Rica to Usbek, at ***
The other day I dined at the house of a magistrate, who had often invited me. After we had talked of a variety of things, I said to him, "Sir, it appears to me that your profession is very laborious." "Not so much as you imagine," he rejoined;
"As we prosecute it, it is only an amusement." “But how! Is your head not always full of other people’s business? Are you not always occupied with matters that do not interest you?” “You are right; these matters do not interest us, because we take not the least interest in them; and that is how our profession is not so fatiguing as you supposed.” When I saw that he took the matter so carelessly, I continued, and said, “Sir, I have not seen your study.” “I believe you; for I have none. When I took this post, lacking the money to pay for it, I sold my library. The bookseller who bought it, out of a vast number of volumes, left me only my account book. Nor do I regret them: we judges have no need to stuff our heads with useless knowledge. What have we to do with all these legal volumes? Almost all of the cases are questions of fact, and outside the general rule.” “But, sir, may it not be because you make them so? For, in short, why should all the peoples of the world have laws, if these laws are not to be applied? And how can one who does not know them, apply them?” “If you were acquainted with the courts of justice,” replied the magistrate, “you would not speak as you do. We have living books, the advocates: they work for us, and take upon themselves the task of instructing us.” “ And do they not also sometimes take upon themselves the task of deceiving you?” I retorted. “It would not be a bad thing to guard yourself against their wiles. They have weapons with which to attack your justice: it would be well if you were in a condition to defend it: you ought not to rush into the midst of the fight, thinly clad, among people armed to the teeth.”
Paris, the 13th of the moon of Chahban, 1714.
# Persian Letters/Letter 75
#### Letter 75

Usbek to Rhedi, at Venice
I must confess that I have not noticed in the Christians that lively faith in their religion which prevails among Mussulmans. With them there is a vast difference between profession and belief, between belief and conviction, between conviction and practice. Religion is not so much a matter of holiness as it is the subject of a debate, in which everybody has a right to join. Courtiers, warriors, women even, array themselves against the ecclesiastics, and insist upon their proving what they have made up their minds not to believe. Not that, willing to be guided by reason, they have taken the trouble to examine the falseness of that religion which they reject: they are rebels who have felt the yoke, and have shaken it off before knowing what it is. Nor are they any securer in their incredulity than in their faith: their life is a constant ebb and flow between belief and unbelief. One of them said to me once, “I believe in the immortality of the soul for six months at a time; my opinions depend entirely upon my bodily condition: I am a Spinozist, a Socinian, a Catholic, ungodly or devout, according to the state of my animal spirits, the quality of my digestion, the rarity or heaviness of the air I breathe, the lightness or solidity of the food I eat. When the doctor is at my bedside, the confessor has me at a disadvantage. I know very well how to prevent religion from annoying me when I am in good health; but I allow myself to be consoled by it when I am ill: when I have nothing more to hope for here below, religion offers itself, and gains me by its promises; I am glad to give myself up to it, and to die with hope on my side.”
A long time ago the Christian princes enfranchised all the slaves in their dominions; because, said they, Christianity makes all men equal. It is true that this religious action was of great service to them, for by its means they diminished the power which the great lords exercised over the lower classes. Afterwards, having made conquests in countries where they found it to their advantage to keep slaves, they permitted them to be bought and sold, forgetting that religious principle which had moved them so strongly. What can one say? Truth at one time, error at another. Why should we not do like the Christians? We were very simple-minded to reject settlements and easy conquests in pleasant climates, because we could not find water pure enough to wash us according to the principles of our holy Koran. I give thanks to Almighty God, Who sent His great prophet Hali, whence it is that I profess a religion which requires to be preferred before all human interest, and which is as pure as the sky from which it came.
Paris, the 13th of the moon of Saphar, 1715.
# Persian Letters/Letter 76
#### Letter 76

Usbek to his friend Ibben, at Smyrna
European law is dead against suicide. Those who kill themselves suffer, as it were, a second death: they are dragged with ignominy through the streets: their infamy is published, and their goods confiscated.
It seems to me, Ibben, that this law is very unjust. When I am loaded with grief, misery, and contumely, why should I be hindered from putting an end to my sufferings, and cruelly deprived of a remedy which is in my hands?
Why should I be forced to labour for a society to which I refuse to belong? Why in spite of myself, should I be held to an agreement made without my consent? Society is founded upon mutual advantage; but, when it becomes burdensome to me, what hinders me from leaving it? Life was given me as a blessing; when it ceases to be so I can give it up: the cause ceasing, the effect ought also to cease.
Will any prince require me to be his subject, if I reap none of the benefits of subjection? Can my fellow-citizens require our lots to be so unequal; theirs, usefulness—mine, despair? Will God, unlike other benefactors, condemn me to receive favours which are a burden to me?
I am obliged to obey the laws while I live under them; but, if I cease to live, can they still bind me?
“But,” some one may say, “you disturb the order of Providence. God has joined your soul to your body; in separating them, you oppose His designs and resist His will.”
What force is there in this argument? Do I disturb the order of Providence, when I alter the qualities of matter, and square a ball which the first laws of motion, that is to say the laws of creation and preservation, made round? Certainly not; I only exercise a right which has been given me; and, in that sense, I can disturb, as my fancy dictates, the whole order of Nature, without any one being able to say that I oppose Providence.
When my soul shall be separated from my body, will there be less order, less harmony, in the universe? Do you think that that new combination will be less perfect, and less dependent upon general laws; that the world would lose anything by it; that the works of God would be less great, or rather less immense?
Do you think that my body, become a blade of grass, a worm, a grass-green turf, will be changed into a work of nature less worthy of her; and that my soul, freed from all its earthly trammels, will become less sublime?
All these ideas, my dear Ibben, have their only source in our pride. We do not feel our littleness; and, however small we may be, we wish to count for something in the universe, to cut a figure there, and to be of some consequence in it. We imagine that the annihilation of such a perfect being would degrade all nature: and we cannot conceive that one man more or less in the world—what do I say?—that the whole world, that a hundred millions of worlds like ours, can be more than one small frail atom, which God perceives only because His knowledge is all-embracing.
Paris, the 15th of the moon of Saphar, 1715.
# Persian Letters/Letter 72
#### Letter 72

Rica to Ibben, at ***
I found myself recently in a company where I met am man very well satisfied with himself. In a quarter of an hour, he decided three questions in morals, four historical problems, and five points in physics. I have never seen so universal a decider; his mind was not once troubled with the least doubt. We left science, and talked of the current news: he decided upon the current news. I wished to catch him, so I said to myself, “I must get to my strong point; I will betake me to my own country.” I spoke to him of Persia; but hardly had I opened my mouth, when he contradicted me twice, basing his objections upon the authority of Tavernier and Chardin “Ah! Good heavens!” said I to myself, “what kind of man is this? He will know next all the streets in Ispahan better than I do!” I soon knew what part to play-to be silent, and let him talk; and he is still laying down the law.
Paris, the 8th of the moon of Zilcade, 1715.
# Philosophical Works of the Late James Frederick Ferrier/Institutes of Metaphysic (1875)/Section 3/Proposition 8

The Institutes of Metaphysic, Philosophical Works of the Late James Frederick Ferrier (1875 ed., Vol. 1). (E. L. Lushington, & A. Grant, Eds.) Edinburgh: William Blackwood and Sons. pp. 477-478.
PROPOSITION VIII.
WHAT ABSOLUTE EXISTENCE IS NOT.
DEMONSTRATION.
The ego per se, or the mind in a state of pure indetermination, is what we cannot know (Prop. IX. Epistemology): it is what we cannot be ignorant of (Prop. VII. Agnoiology). But Absolute Existence is what we either know or are ignorant of (Prop. V. Ontology). Therefore Absolute Existence is not the ego per se, or the mind in a state of pure indetermination; in other word; the ego per se is not that which truly and absolutely exists.
OBSERVATIONS AND EXPLANATIONS.
1. Eighth Counter-proposition.—"Absolute ​existence Eighth counter-proposition.is, or may be, the ego per se; in other words, the mind in a state of pure indetermination, or with no thing or thought present to it, is, or may be, Being in itself."
Importance of the ego as a constituent of Absolute Existence. 2. It must be borne in mind, that although Absolute Existence cannot be attributed to the ego or mind per se, still this element is infinitely the more important of the two in the constitution of Absolute Existence, just as it is infinitely the more important of the two in the constitution of Absolute Cognition. In both cases this is the essential, eternal, and universal factor, while the other element is contingent, temporary, and evanescent.
Why the reduction of the ego per se to a contradiction is important. 3. It has further to be remarked that the reduction of the ego (or universal) per se to the condition of a contradiction is important on this account, that unless the reduction had been effected, matter (the particular) could not have been reduced to the predicament of a contradiction either; for the same measure which is dealt out to one of the factors of cognition must be dealt out to the other. But if matter per se had not been reduced to a contradiction, it could not have been disfranchised of Absolute Existence; in which case materialism, with all its gloomy consequences, would have carried, while it also blackened, the day.
# Philosophical Works of the Late James Frederick Ferrier/Institutes of Metaphysic (1875)/Section 3/Proposition 6

The Institutes of Metaphysic, Philosophical Works of the Late James Frederick Ferrier (1875 ed., Vol. 1). (E. L. Lushington, & A. Grant, Eds.) Edinburgh: William Blackwood and Sons. pp. 472-474.
PROPOSITION VI.
WHAT ABSOLUTE EXISTENCE IS NOT.
DEMONSTRATION.
Matter per se is neither that which we know (Prop. IV. Epistemology) nor that which we are ignorant of (Prop. V. Agnoiology). But Absolute Existence is either that which we know or that which we are ignorant of (Prop. V. Ontology). Therefore Absolute Existence is not matter per se; in other words, mere material things have no true and independent Being.
OBSERVATIONS AND EXPLANATIONS.
Sixth counter-proposition.1. Sixth Counter-proposition.—"Absolute Existence is, or at least may be, matter per se; in other words, mere material things have, or may have, a true and independent Being."
Is approved of by ordinary thinking, and by psychology.2. There can be no doubt that ordinary thinking embraces this counter-proposition in its most dogmatical expression, and asserts positively that mere material things not only may have, but have a true and absolute and independent existence. Psychology, too, has a decided leaning towards this positive asseveration, which is advocated more particularly by our whole Scottish philosophy of common sense. After all that has been said, it is unnecessary to do more than refer to this opinion as part of the débris of a defunct and exploded psychology, which is now swept away and effaced for ever from science by these ontological institutes.
In what sense material things exist.3. When it is asserted that material things have no Absolute Existence, this must not be confounded with the affirmation that they have no existence at all. They have a spurious, or inchoate, or dependent existence. This has always been conceded by genuine speculation, although even this kind of existence may have been denied to them by some ​spurious systems of idealism. But absolute or independent existence only arises when the incipience of material things is supplemented by the element necessary to complete it. In short, they are what the Greek speculators called the μή ὄντα (that is, the contradictory), but they are not the οὐκ ὄντα (that is, the intelligibly non-existent). By themselves, material things are not nothing, but they are nonsense.
# Philosophical Works of the Late James Frederick Ferrier/Lectures on Greek Philosophy (1888)

This volume, the second in this set of Ferrier's works, is the first of the posthumous volumes and is also referred to as "The First Volume".
PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS
OF THE LATE
JAMES FREDERICK FERRIER
B.A. OXON., LL.D.
PROFESSOR OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY AND POLITICAL ECONOMY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF ST ANDREWS
IN THREE VOLUMES
VOL. II.
LECTURES ON GREEK PHILOSOPHY
EDITED BY SIR ALEXANDER GRANT, BART., LL.D., PRINCIPAL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH; AND E. L. LUSHINGTON, LL.D., LATE PROFESSOR OF GREEK IN THE UNIVERSITY OF GLASGOW
NEW EDITION
WILLIAM BLACKWOOD AND SONS
EDINBURGH AND LONDON
MDCCCLXXXIII
All Rights reserved
EternalScribe2 (talk) 07:20, 3 August 2024 (UTC)
CONTENTS.
This work was published before January 1, 1929, and is in the public domain worldwide because the author died at least 100 years ago.
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# Philosophical Works of the Late James Frederick Ferrier/Institutes of Metaphysic (1875)/Section 3/Proposition 4

The Institutes of Metaphysic, Philosophical Works of the Late James Frederick Ferrier (1875 ed., Vol. 1). (E. L. Lushington, & A. Grant, Eds.) Edinburgh: William Blackwood and Sons. pp. 467-468.
PROPOSITION IV.
ELIMINATES THE THIRD ALTERNATIVE:
DEMONSTRATION.
Whatever we neither know nor are ignorant of is the contradictory (Prop. II.) Absolute Existence is not the contradictory (Prop. III.) Therefore Absolute Existence is not what we neither know nor are ignorant of.
OBSERVATIONS AND EXPLANATIONS.
What this proposition effects.1. This proposition clears off one of the alternatives in regard to Absolute Existence. In the next proposition the residuum which remains is enunciated and proved.
​Fourth counter proposition. Why there is none.2. There is no fourth counter-proposition; because the system has now reached, by legitimate steps, the conclusion which Counter-proposition I. reached illegitimately and prematurely.
The previous propositions are preliminary. Prop.V. is the starting point.3. To some persons, the logical operation developed in the preceding propositions, by which the third alternative, in regard to Absolute Existence, is eliminated from the list, may appear superfluous. It is, indeed, by no means certain that the operation referred to is not superfluous. Its performance has been prompted by the anxiety to do the work completely, to deal with every difficulty which may arise, and to staunch all the possible sources of objection. To those, however, who think that it might have been dispensed with, the starting-point of the ontology will present itself in the next proposition.
# Philosophical Works of the Late James Frederick Ferrier/Institutes of Metaphysic (1875)/Section 3/Proposition 5

The Institutes of Metaphysic, Philosophical Works of the Late James Frederick Ferrier (1875 ed., Vol. 1). (E. L. Lushington, & A. Grant, Eds.) Edinburgh: William Blackwood and Sons. pp. 469-471.
PROPOSITION V.
THE REMAINING ALTERNATIVES.
DEMONSTRATION.
It was proved by Proposition I. that Absolute Existence has only three alternative characters: it is either, first, that which we know; or, secondly, that which we are ignorant of; or, thirdly, that which we neither know nor are ignorant of. The third alternative has been excluded by Proposition IV. Absolute Existence, therefore, must be the one or other of the two remaining alternatives: in other words, it is either that which we know or that which we are ignorant of.
OBSERVATIONS AND EXPLANATIONS.
1. The elimination of the third alternative, and the proof that Absolute Existence is either that ​This proposition secures the key of the ontology.which we know or that which we are ignorant of, secures the key of the ontology, and renders her position impregnable. Her victory is now assured against whatever force may be brought against her. She has now but to put forth her hand to pluck the fruit of all her previous labours. Because the alternative characters of Absolute Existence having been reduced to two—in other words, Absolute Existence having been proved to be either that which we know or that which we are ignorant of, the system is able to deal with it and to declare what it is, whichever of the two alternatives be embraced. Should "Being in itself" be held to be that which we know, the result of the epistemology enables us to affix to it a predicate declaratory of its nature—for the epistemology has settled what alone it is possible for us to know. Should "Being in itself" be held to be that which we are ignorant of, the result of the agnoiology (which has been proved to be coincident with the result of the epistemology) enables us to affix to it the very same predicate declaratory of its nature. Thus the system makes good its point, and redeems its pledge (see Introduction, § 60), whichever horn of the dilemma be presented to it, as shall be shown articulately in Proposition X. Meanwhile a few articles must be introduced for the purpose of clearing away the wrecks of antecedent systems, and of giving the finishing-stroke to the ​cardinal doctrines of psychology, which are still dragging out, in book and in lecture-room, a debilitated and semi-animate existence.
Fifth counter-proposition. Why there is none.2. Fifth Counter-proposition.—There is no fifth counter-proposition, for the reason assigned under the preceding proposition (Obs. 2.) That we must be either cognisant or ignorant of Absolute Existence, is conceded both by ordinary thinking and by psychology.
# Philosophical Works of the Late James Frederick Ferrier/Institutes of Metaphysic (1875)/Section 3/Proposition 7

The Institutes of Metaphysic, Philosophical Works of the Late James Frederick Ferrier (1875 ed., Vol. 1). (E. L. Lushington, & A. Grant, Eds.) Edinburgh: William Blackwood and Sons. pp. 475-476.
PROPOSITION VII.
WHAT ABSOLUTE EXISTENCE IS NOT.
DEMONSTRATION.
There can be no knowledge of the particular by itself (Prop. VI. Epistemology). There can be no ignorance of the particular by itself (Prop. VI. Agnoiology). But absolute existence is that of which there is either a knowledge or an ignorance (Prop. V. Ontology). Therefore absolute existence is not the particular by itself. Again, there can be no knowledge of the universal by itself (Prop. VI. Epistemology). There can be no ignorance of the universal by itself (Prop. VI. Agnoiology). But ​absolute existence is that of which there is either a knowledge or an ignorance (Prop. V. Ontology). Therefore absolute existence is not the universal by itself. And thus particular things prescinded from the universal have no absolute existence, nor have universal things prescinded from the particular any absolute existence.
OBSERVATIONS AND EXPLANATIONS.
Seventh counter-proposition.1. Seventh Counter-proposition.—"Particular things by themselves, or prescinded from the universal, have, or may have, an absolute existence—although it is absurd to suppose that universal things prescinded from the particular have any existence, or at least any existence out of the mind which fabricates them." This counter-proposition carries out into ontology the sixth counter-proposition of the epistemology. Both of them are false, and are subverted by their corresponding propositions.
# Organic Law of the Sports Administration, Ministry of Education

* related portals: Law of the Republic of China.
* sister projects: Wikidata item.
https://law.moj.gov.tw/ENG/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?pcode=H0000116 accessed on 2019-08-20

## Article 1

    The Sports Administration, Ministry of Education(also SAMOE) was established to govern national sports affairs.

## Article 2

    The SAMOE oversees the following:
    1.Integrated planning, implementation and supervision of sports policies and system, as well the formulation of pertinent regulations.
    2.Planning, implementation, supervision and incentives for sports lottery, Sports Development Fund and sports industry development.
    3.Planning, implementation and supervision of school sports development.
    4.Planning, implementation and supervision of sports for all development.
    5.Planning, implementation and supervision of competitive sports development.
    6.Planning, implementation and supervision of international and cross-straits sports exchanges development.Planning, implementation and supervision of sports facilities development.
    7.Liaison and coordination matters of professional sports.
    8.Counseling and supervision of the National Sports Training Center.
    9.Other sports related affairs.

## Article 3

    One minister to govern the SAMOE, who holds senior rank position 13 to 14, and who must fulfill university dean qualifications when necessary; two deputy ministers who hold senior rank position 12.

## Article 4

    One secretary-general who holds senior rank position 11.

## Article 5

    Official titles and capacities of all other positions will be formulated in another organization table.

## Article 6

    The effective date will be determined by the Executive Yuan.
This work is in the public domain because it is exempted by Article 9 of the Republic of China's Copyright Act (in effect in the "Free Area"). This excludes from copyright all government and official documents and official translations, including news releases, speeches, laws, and documents. It also excludes from copyright oral and literary news reports strictly intended to communicate facts, test questions from all kinds examinations held pursuant to laws or regulations, slogans and common symbols, terms, formulas, numerical charts, forms, notebooks, or almanacs.
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# Organised Vengeance Called 'Justice;' The Superstition of Government

Contains a translation of L'Organisation de la Vindicte appelée Justice (1901)
FREEDOM LIBRARY
PRICE ONE PENNY.
ORGANISED VENGEANCE, called "JUSTICE."
By P. KROPOTKIN.
THE SUPERSTITION OF GOVERNMENT.
By HENRY GLASSE.
LONDON.
"FREEDOM" OFFICE, 127 OSSULSTON STREET, N.W.
1902.
* Organised Vengeance Called "Justice"
* The Superstition of Government
* Back Matter
This work is a translation and has a separate copyright status to the applicable copyright protections of the original content.
This work was published before January 1, 1929, and is in the public domain worldwide because the author died at least 100 years ago.
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# Organic Law of the State Council of the People's Republic of China

* Organic Law of the State Council of the People's Republic of China (1954)
* Organic Law of the State Council of the People's Republic of China (1982)
* Organic Law of the State Council of the People's Republic of China (2024)