# Decisive Battles Since Waterloo/Chapter 22

CHAPTER XXII.
CAPTURE OF GEOK TEPE—1881.
Down to 1869 the Russian advance into Central Asia was conducted from Orenburg and the various military posts of Western Siberia. Year by year the frontier was pushed to the southward, and the map of the Asiatic possessions of Russia required frequent revision. The long chain of the Altai Mountains passed into the control of the Czar; the Aral Sea became a Russian lake; and vast territories with a sparse population were brought under Russian rule. As mentioned previously, in the account of the fall of Khiva, most of this conquest was a bloodless one, as it was fought chiefly by the diplomatist, though backed always by the military power.
The Kirghese, who occupy the region immediately south of the Altai Mountains, and are still found on the southern confines of the Baraba Steppe, are broken into many independent tribes; they are nomadic in their habits, wandering from place to place in search of pasturage for their immense flocks and herds. In winter they frequent the valleys among the outlying hills of the Altai Mountains, and in summer descend upon the plains. Many of the tribes live altogether on the plains, and their range covers many thousands of square miles.
Quarrels were numerous among them, chiefly growing out of disputes about pasturage or water, and in these quarrels the Russians interfered, both in the interest of humanity and the spread of their power. They usually ​took the side of the weaker party, who was always glad to have their assistance, but found when too late that he was altogether dependent upon them. In case of their retirement he would be subject to the revenge of his late antagonists, and whenever the Russians proposed to go away they were earnestly urged to remain. Thus they obtained a secure footing in the country and speedily became masters of the situation.
Frequently the disputes between the tribes led to raids for purposes of plunder; quite as frequently one tribe would make a raid on another with which it was at peace for the sole object of robbery. Attacks were generally made at night, and if they were successful the robbers would drive off the flocks and herds of the tribe assailed. Men, women, and children were taken to be sold into slavery in the markets of Khiva or Bokhara, or kept among their captors. These slaves were treated with the greatest cruelty; they were severely beaten for the slightest offence or failure to perform what had been ordered, were poorly fed, and often compelled to wear chains. They were generally maimed for life, by means of a horse-hair run through the heel, in order to prevent their escape from captivity.
All this business was brought to an end by the Russians when they occupied the Kirghese country. They compelled the tribes to live peaceably with each other, and if any dispute arose about water or pasturage it was referred to the Russian commander of the district for adjustment. If one tribe made a raid on another it was compelled to give up the stolen property, and furthermore a heavy fine was levied upon the raiders—half going to the Russian government and half to the injured tribe. The Russians generally made the fine heavy enough to furnish a percentage for the officers who took the trouble to adjust the differences.
Russian goods were introduced among these nomadic ​people, markets were opened, and every facility was offered for the increase of commerce. Long caravans were constantly in motion between Orenburg, Sempolatinsk, and other points in Russian territory, and Khiva, Bokhara, and Samarcand, far to the east. They traversed the Kirghese and Turcoman country, and wherever they went they found a material difference in the matter of safety, whether the territory was under Russian rule or remained independent. If the latter, the caravans were constantly liable to attack and plunder; if the former, they were invariably free from molestation.
The capture of Bokhara, Samarcand, and Khiva reduced the slave markets of the Turcoman raiders, but by no means put an end to their plundering expeditions. The independent Turcomans were estimated to be about a million in number, divided into several tribes, who sometimes warred upon each other, but constantly upon the Persians and other peaceable people. In the wars between Khiva and Bokhara, Samarcand and Kokan, they took sides with those who would pay the most for their services.
Down to very recently the whole of Northern Persia was subject to Turcoman raids, and agriculture was carried on under great difficulties. The raids were sometimes carried up to within 100 miles of Teheran, or about 500 miles inside the Persian boundary. They were organized months beforehand, and sometimes as many as 5,000 or 6,000 men were engaged in a single enterprise. A raid was called a "chapow" by the Persians; in the Turcoman language it was an "alaman."
A Turcoman leader would announce his intention of making an alaman, but the route was always kept secret through fear of betrayal. The Turcomans are splendid horsemen, and while organizing an expedition they put their steeds under a system of training to enable them to make long and swift marches whenever occasion required. When every thing was ready the party started; it travelled ​slowly until it reached the Persian frontier, and was often weeks on the way.
Passing the frontier, the hard work of the campaign began. The region selected for the raid was reached as soon as possible; then the invading force was divided into small parties, and each had a particular village assigned to it. Their movements were made so as to catch the people at work in the fields, and capture the cattle before they could be driven into a place of safety. Not only the cattle, but all the men, women, and children that could be seized were taken. The old and useless were slaughtered without mercy; the young and able-bodied were carried off to be sold into slavery. A wealthy Persian was held for a heavy ransom, but the poor man had no chance of redemption. The plundering was kept up as long as there was any thing to steal, and then the expedition returned to its own territory. Sometimes in a single raid as many as a hundred thousand horses, sheep, goats, and other animals were captured, and a thousand or more people were carried into slavery.
The Persian government made very little provision for the protection of its people. The Persian troops were in the cities and large towns, which the Turcomans never attacked, and as there was no telegraph through the country, the raiders almost invariably got to a safe distance before a pursuit could be started. Very often the Persian officials on the frontier connived at the raids, and the people were forced to rely upon themselves for protection, which was almost wholly of a defensive character.
​would never think of dismounting to pass the low doorway. Inside there is a stone door which may be closed to prevent ingress; it is thick and strong, and once inside of their mud village the people are safe.
To further protect themselves, they had towers of refuge in their fields, where they could run in case of danger. Some of the towers had ladders on the outside, which were drawn up as the Turcomans approached, while others were entered by narrow door-ways similar to those of the villages. On the hills there were signal-towers where watchmen were stationed; when the dust of an approaching alaman was seen, the watchmen gave warning and the people fled for safety.
Thus these Turcoman thieves hampered agriculture, and they also restricted commerce by plundering the caravans. Merchants travelled with an armed escort and in large numbers. Even this did not save them from attack, as a great caravan was unwieldy, and often the robbers would dart in and seize a few camels laden with merchandise, while the escort was so far away in another part of the line that it could not rush to attack the marauders until they had finished their work and departed.
The Turcoman country extends westward as far as the Caspian Sea. To put a stop to the organized thieving of the Turcomans, and more especially to increase the extent of territory under their control, and open the land route to India; the Russians occupied the eastern shore of the Caspian in 1869. A military expedition was landed at Krasnovodsk where it built a fort, and took permanent possession of the country in the name of the Czar. Points on the eastern coast of the Caspian had been occupied during the time of Peter the Great, and again during the reign of Nicholas I., but the occupation of the region was only temporary. The force which established itself at Krasnovodsk consisted of a few companies of infantry, two sotnias of Cossacks, and half a dozen pieces of artillery.
​Three men who afterwards obtained considerable prominence in the affairs of Central Asia, and one of whom gained a world-wide reputation as a soldier, were attached to this expedition. The last was Skobeleff, the hero of Plevna and the Russo-Turkish campaign of 1877-78. The others were Stolietoff and Grodekoff; Stolietoff was a general, while the other two were captains, and down to that time had had no opportunity for distinguishing themselves. Skobeleff was perhaps the man of least promise; as he was looked upon as a wild sort of fellow, with a great fondness for conviviality, which was constantly getting him into trouble, and he was so reckless that his elders predicted he would be killed in the first battle, or the first skirmish of any magnitude.
It was the Russian plan to make haste slowly in conquering the Turcoman country. Reconnoitring expeditions were sent out from the fort at Krasnovodsk, but no other point was immediately occupied.
The Yomut Turcomans in the Caspian region made no resistance; they are far less warlike than the Tekke Turcomans farther to the east, who afterwards became the defenders of Geok Tepe. A short time before his death, Skobeleff said to a friend: "We made a great mistake when we landed at Krasnovodsk; instead of going ahead we dawdled about reconnoitring the country. The result was we gradually taught the Turcomans how to fight, and at last they fought so well that it needed a series of great campaigns to crush them."
From 1869 to 1873 there were numerous skirmishes and reconnoitrings, during which the steppes were pretty well explored as far as Kizil-Arvat. General Stolietoff was in command until 1872, when he was succeeded by Colonel Markusoff, who pushed his explorations to the wells of Igdy, then bending to the southwest, he passed Kizil-Arvat on his return to Krasnovodsk. There appeared to be no obstacle to a Russian advance into the heart of ​the country. But when General Lomakin was ordered there during the years between 1873 and '79, he found that beyond Kizil-Arvat were the Tekke Turcomans, who seemed determined to make a decided opposition to the Muscovite designs. A regular campaign was required, and General Lazareff was ordered to push back the Turcomans and occupy as a base of operations the first cultivated oasis east of Kizil-Arvat. Lazareff, early in the campaign died, and the command fell upon General Lomakin, who undertook to execute the order. This general, who had so easily conquered, if conquering it may be called where no opposition is offered, the Yomut Turcomans along the borders of the Caspian, mistakenly thought he might deal in the same way with the Tekkes. He advanced with 4,000 men and reached Geok Tepe without resistance, but no sooner was he in front of it than the Turcomans fell upon him. He was severely defeated and made a hasty retreat to Krasnovodsk with the remnant of his army.
General Tergukasoff was next appointed to the command, but when he saw the difficulties confronting him he resigned. He was succeeded by General Petrussovitch under the chief command of Skobeleff. Thus from Stolietoff to Skobeleff there were no fewer than seven generals who had tried to conquer the Tekke Turcomans.
Skobeleff, seeing the vast difficulties of the situation, matured a skilful and scientific plan of operations, for which he obtained the imperial sanction by making a personal visit to Livadia, where the Emperor was then sojourning. His next step was to telegraph to General Kuropatkin, who was then on the Kuldja frontier, to join him with a detachment of troops from Turkestan. Kuropatkin marched from Tashkend to Khiva and thence to Bami, where he was to join Skobeleff; in spite of the difficulties of the route across the desert, he brought his troops through in fine condition ​and secured the profound admiration of all military men for his remarkable achievement. He was twenty-six days covering the distance between Khiva and Bami; the route was but little known and for much the greater part of the way it lies through a sandy desert where water can only be found at long intervals.
When Skobeleff took command in the middle of March, 1880, the position of the Russians was this:—Their base was Tchikishlar and Krasnovodsk, their direct aim Geok Tepe, where Lomakin had been so disastrously defeated the previous year. Their outposts were in '79 at Douz-Aloum, in the valley of the Sumbora, a tributary of the Atrek. Skobeleff's first work was to secure a safe transport, establish a regular line of steamers across the Caspian, to build suitable docks, secure 20,000 camels, and build a railway from Michaelovsk to Kizil-Arvat. Michaelovsk is a small bay near Krasnovodsk and better suited as a harbor than the latter place. Skobeleff's first reconnoitring convinced him that Geok Tepe could only be taken by a regular siege. He started from Douz-Aloum, personally leading the advance, took Khodshom-Kala on June 10th, and then marched on Bami, which afforded him an admirable base, 120 versts from Geok Tepe. On the 13th July, he started with 1,600 men to reconnoitre Geok Tepe, which he reached in five days, amidst constant and severe attacks by the Tekkes, He reached Bami again July 22d, having marched 250 versts in ten days, constantly harassed by the enemy. This concluded the first stage of his operations.
From July to December the Russians abstained from offensive operations. The Douz-Aloum-Bami line was repeatedly attacked, and several night assaults were made on Bendessen and Khodshom-Kala, but each attack of the Turcomans was repulsed. Meantime, General Kuropatkin left Amou Darya and marched by Igdy, and Kizil-Arvat to Bami, a distance of 400 versts, which he made in eighteen days.
​Supplies, munitions, and siege artillery were accumulatedat Bami; they were nearly all brought by the Tshikishlar route, as Skobeleff could not wait for the completion of the railway to Kizil-Arvat. By the beginning of December the Russians were ready to take the offensive, and the advance upon Geok Tepe was ordered.
Geok Tepe, sometimes called Goek Tepe ("The Green Hills"), is situated on the Akhal oasis, in the Turcoman steppes. 387 versts (250 miles), east of the Caspian Sea. The chain of hills called the Kopet-Dag, lies south andsouthwest of Geok Tepe, and on the other side it touchesthe sandy desert of Kara Kum, with the hill of Geok onthe east. The Turcomans, or rather the Tekke Turcomans, who held it, are the most numerous of the nomad tribes in that region. They are reported to count about 100,000 kibitkas, or tents; reckoning 5 persons to a kibitka, this would give them a strength of half a million. Their great strength in numbers and their fighting abilities enabled them to choose their position and settle on the most fertile oases along the northern border of Persia for centuries. These oases have been renowned for their productiveness, and in consequence of the abundance of food, the Tekkes were a powerful race of men, and were feared throughout all that part of Asia. Their principal stronghold was Geok Tepe, which lies in a depressed hollow near the hill of Geok, as already described. It is traversed by many irrigating canals, which, towards the north, convert the ground into a marsh, and make it almost inaccessible for troops.
The fortress of Geok Tepe at the time of the Russian advance consisted of walls of mud 12 or 15 feet high towards the north and west, and 6 or 8 feet thick. In front of these walls was a ditch, 6 feet deep, supplied by a running stream, and behind the walls was a raised platform for the defenders. The space between the first and second interior wall was from 50 to 60 feet wide, and ​occupied by the kibitkas of the Tekke Turcomans and their families. The second wall was exactly like the outer one, with a ditch and enclosing space inside, and bridged on one corner to allow the passage of the stream. The kibitkas were sunk into the ground, and in order to protect them against shot, they were covered with earth to a depth of several inches. On the south and east the walls were less high and much thinner, without ditches and without the second interior wall. Outworks (kalas) had been thrown up in front, and one of them was connected with the main fortification. The walls of these outworks were much higher and stronger than those of the fortress itself.
In 1878 Tekme Sirdar, a Turcoman chief, submitted to the Russians and was received into their camp at Krasnovodsk. He remained there several months, and then, for some real or fancied injury, fled from the camp, and collected his followers with the determination to make war on the invaders. He made good use of his eyes while at Krasnovodsk, and when the Tekkes determined to make a stand at Geok Tepe, he superintended the construction of the fortress, which he made to resemble the Russian one at Krasnovodsk as much as possible.
Reconnoitring in force on the 1st January, 1881, Skobeleff decided that the most favorable plan for attack was on the Yanghi-Kala, to the southeast of Geok Tepe. Ordering up the two assaulting columns under Colonel Koselkoff and General Kuropatkin, General Skobeleff advanced in person with the main body to repulse the Turcoman sallies. During the reconnoissance of the fortress Skobeleff ordered his men to throw some shells among the enemy's cavalry. The first of these shells upset its carriage and fell in the midst of the Russian detachment. There was a momentary panic, and the detachment seemed on the point of being thrown into confusion, when Skobeleff forced his horse to where the ​shell lay on the ground. It burst; the animal was terribly wounded, but its rider escaped unhurt. On seeing his figure reappear through the smoke after the explosion, the soldiers recovered their confidence and resumed their advance upon the Turcoman position.
Next day there was a reconnoissance with cavalry which completely encircled the fortress, and was bravely met by the Turcomans. Nothing now remained but to cut the trenches. The first parallel within 800 yards of the walls was successfully cut by January 4th. From that date it was a regular siege, interrupted occasionally by sallies of the Tekkes within the fort or attacks by those outside. In one of these fights General Petrussovitch was killed. The besieging army was about 10,000 strong, while the besieged were from 30,000 to 40,000.
The parallel was armed with cannon on January 11th. General Skobeleff in his report stated that on January 16th "the positions of the enemy forty yards in front of us were successfully taken by assault, and the enemy, who had attacked our centre and left flank, beaten back after a most stubborn fight all along the line. The losses on their side were very great. The work in trenches is difficult, because we are ten times weaker than the enemy. Head of sap is now thirty yards from walls of the stronghold."
Throughout the siege the Turcomans made frequent sallies and there was almost continuous fighting. Sometimes the Turcomans drove the Russians from the outposts, and if they had been as well armed as their besiegers it is highly probable that Skobeleff would have fared no better than did Lomakin in his disastrous campaign. The Turcoman weapons were no match for the breech-loading rifles of the Russians, and in every struggle the latter were victorious, their loss being small in comparison with that of the Tekkes. The Russians had sixty-nine pieces of artillery, while the Turcomans had no ​cannon to oppose them with. Skobeleff found that his cannon made little impression upon the clay walls of the fort, so he ordered his artillery to fire over the walls and into the enclosed space, in order to demoralize the people within as much as possible. In fighting against Asiatics artillery always has a prominent part. Its moral effect in frightening them is certainly ten times as great as its destructive power.
Kuropatkin had charge of the advanced work and displayed extraordinary coolness and courage. Skobeleff was everywhere among the soldiers, encouraging them by word and deed and carefully watching the progress of the sapping and mining operations. When an officer accomplished a specified portion of the tunnelling in less than the time fixed for it, he was complimented in the presence of the soldiers, kissed and caressed, and perhaps treated to a bottle of champagne, while the soldiers were praised as "molodyetz!" good fellows. If the officer failed to make the required progress within the time, he was sure to be roundly abused and threatened with disrating.
The storming columns were ordered to be ready for work on January 24th. They were as follows:
1st—Under Kuropatkin, consisting of 5 companies and 1 battalion of infantry, ½ company of sappers. 1 detachment of volunteers, 1 sotnia of foot Cossacks.
2d—Under Koselkoff, of 2 battalions of infantry, 1 platoon sappers, 1 marine volunteers, 1 artillery.
3d—Under Gaidaroff, of 1 battalion infantry, 1 platoon sappers, 1 detachment marine volunteers, 1 section of mountain artillery.
4th—In reserve, there were 21 companies, among whom were 3 companies of foot dragoons and 24 guns.
At 7 o'clock in the morning of the 24th, Gaidaroff advanced to attack the first fortification on the south front, supported by 36 guns. The wall had already been half crumbled down by an explosion of powder and completely ​broken by the firing of a dynamite mine. At 11.20 the assault took place, and during the action the mine on the east front was exploded. It was laid with 125 cwt. of gunpowder, and in its explosion completely buried hundreds of Tekkes. The firing of this mine was the signal for the columns of Kuropatkin and Koselkoff to advance. The interval between the two explosions was ten minutes. A furious hand-to-hand fight followed, which lasted one hour, and only with great difficulty could the Tekkes be pushed down the walls. Samur's battalion scaled the walls between the breaches. All defenders on the walls were cut down.
About 1.30 p.m. Gaidaroff carried the southwestern part of the walls, and a battle raged in the interior. Half an hour later the Russians were in possession of Denghil-Tepe, the hill redoubt commanding the fortress of Geok Tepe. The Tekkes then seemed to be panic-stricken, and took to flight, leaving their families and all their goods behind. One division of dragoons, 4 sotnias of Cossacks, 6 companies of infantry, and 4 long-range field guns went in pursuit, and the fleeing Tekkes were followed for about 15 versts. The ditches to Geok Tepe were filled with corpses, and there were 4,000 dead in the interior of the fortress. The loss of the enemy was enormous. In the pursuit the Russians are said to have cut down no less than 8,000 fugitives. The total loss of the Tekkes during the siege, capture, and pursuit was estimated at 40,000.
During the siege the artillery fired from 100 to 500 shots daily, and the infantry used from 10,000 to 70,000 rounds of ammunition in the same time. During the assault and pursuit the infantry fired 273,804 rounds, the cavalry 12,510, and the artillery 5,864; 224 military rockets were also used.
The Turcoman leaders, Tekme Sardar and Makdum Kali, escaped and fled to Merv. Skobeleff pushed on in pursuit as far as Askabad, the capital of the Akhal Tekkes, ​27 miles east of Geok Tepe, and from Askabad he sent Kuropatkin with a reconnoitring column half-way across the desert to Merv. Skobeleff wanted to capture Merv, but with his columns considerably shattered with the siege and capture of Geok Tepe and the near exhaustion of his supply of ammunition, he did not feel strong enough to make the attempt. Kuropatkin was recalled to Askabad, which remained the frontier post of the Russians for several months, until circumstances favored the advance upon Sarakhs and the Tejend, and the subsequent swoop upon Merv, with its bloodless capture.
The siege and capture of Geok Tepe was the most important victory every achieved by the Russians in Central Asia. It opened the way for the Russian advance to the frontier of India, and carried the boundaries of the empire southward to those of Persia. In the interest of humanity, it was of the greatest importance, as it broke up the system of man-stealing and its attendant cruelties, which the Turcomans had practised for centuries. The people of Northern Persia no longer live in constant terror of Turcoman raids; the slave markets of Central Asia are closed, and doubtless forever. The Turcoman barrier against western progress was broken completely when the Russian flag floated in triumph over the Green Hills of the Tekkes.
It is an interesting circumstance that the Turcomans, now that they are forbidden to indulge in raiding, have turned their attention to steady industry, and promise to make good citizens. Whatever may be their faults, they are not a lazy people; they gave up their raiding habits very unwillingly; but when once convinced that they must live by industry, they seem to have accepted the situation. Many of them have entered the Russian service, and already several battalions of Turcoman cavalry have been organized, armed, and drilled after the European system. Their subordinate officers are of their own race; for the present the commanders are Russians, but in course of ​time it is quite likely that all the officers will be Turcoman. In the British army only British officers can aspire to the highest positions, but the Russians have no such prejudices. Some of the most prominent officers in the Russian service are Asiatics; of these may be mentioned Generals Tergukasoff and Lazareff, who commanded divisions in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78, and General Loris Melikoff, whose position was for several years only second to that of the Czar.
In his campaign against the Turcomans, Skobeleff profited by the experience of his predecessors, and the knowledge of the country and people that had been gained by them since the landing at Krasnovodsk in 1869. He made his plans with great care, and completed all his preparations before striking a blow other than was necessary to keep open his lines of communication and protect his advanced position at Bami. The Turcoman does his best work in summer, while the reverse is the case with the Russian. The Russian army was well fed, and its camp was in as comfortable a condition as circumstances would permit. The Turcomans were huddled with their families inside the fortress of Geok Tepe, and poorly supplied with provisions; they had no previous experience in warfare of this kind, and were unacquainted with commissariat requirements. Skobeleff understood the necessities of the campaign, and the character and habits of his enemy, better than did his predecessors, and hence his victory.
The Trans-Caspian railway, which owed its commencement to Skobeleff's campaign against the Turcomans, has been pushed far into Central Asia. It has reached Merv, and perhaps before these pages are presented to the public gaze, the whistle of the Russian locomotive will have resounded in Samarcand or Tashkend. A branch from Sarakhs or Merv to Herat and the frontier of India is in the near future, and it is easily possible that the Russian and Indian railway systems will be connected before the new year of 1890.