# National Geographic Magazine/Volume 16/Number 7/The Purpose of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance

THE PURPOSE OF THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE
By Hon. Eki Hioki
First Secretary of the Japanese Legation
No Japanese need feel himself among strangers when he addresses a British or American audience, excepting for the language that he has to use, and in talking to a gathering of Englishmen living in America he doubly feels among friends. We of Japan realize how much we owe to the great Anglo-Saxon nations, how much they have taught us, and how much we have still to learn from them. Some of your English writers have called us "the English of the Orient," and it was an American who termed Japanese "the Yankees of the Far East." We have not as yet progressed so far on the road to Yankeedom as to be able to sell you gentlemen of Boston wooden nutmegs, but we are still young in the ways of modern civilization. Give us time and there is hope we may even teach Connecticut a thing or two.
Having the honor to be with you tonight—inadequately taking the place of His Majesty's minister plenipotentiary, whose health unfortunately makes it impossible for him to be present, greatly to his regret—it is proper for me to express felicitations for this great day, echoing the sentiment deeply imbedded in the bosoms of the fifty millions of His Japanese Majesty's loyal subjects. Nothing would be more out of place, however, than an attempt on my part to dwell upon the significance of the Empire Day before the British audience. Let it suffice to say that the memory of Queen Victoria, that high personage, whose reign distinguishes itself in history not only in point of length, but in the fact that it is so peculiarly coincident with the wonderful tide of general advancement of civilization and material prosperity which has blessed Great Britain and the world in general, may perpetually be preserved in so fitting a manner as is done here tonight by the United British Societies in America.
This is not an occasion for making a long address, but being present here as the representative of Japan and as a guest of Britishers, I feel I cannot let the opportunity pass without saying a few words about that remarkable compact that binds our two countries to the satisfaction of ourselves and to the benefit of the world.
The object of the alliance, as is well known to you, cannot be better explained than by the language of Lord Lansdowne. In his covering and explanatory dispatch to Sir Claude McDonald, British minister at Tokio, Lord Lansdowne wrote: "We have each of us desired that the integrity and independence of the Chinese Empire should be preserved; that there should be no disturbance of the territorial status quo either in China or in the adjoining regions; that all nations should within those regions, as well as within the limits of the Chinese Empire, be afforded equal opportunities for the development of their commerce and industry, and that peace should not only be restored, but should for the future be maintained.
"His Majesty's government trusts that the agreement may be found of mutual advantage to the two countries; that it will make for the preservation of peace ​and that should peace unfortunately be broken it will have the effect of restricting the area of hostilities."
Here you have in the fewest possible words the spirit that animated Japan no less than Great Britain. Various comments have been made by different writers and statesmen as to the effect of the alliance upon the world. It has been asserted by some newspapers that this alliance is directly responsible for the present war.
Let them say whatever they choose, but a conscientious study of the document itself cannot fail to convince any fair-minded man that these allegations are entirely groundless. The alliance is purely peaceful and defensive. In one of the passages of the dispatch above referred to, Lord Lansdowne said that "we join in entirely disclaiming any aggressive tendencies." But you must observe that the fact which made Great Britain abandon her long cherished traditional pride and policy of "splendid isolation" is in itself a sufficient proof that the situation in the Far East was one of grave danger and demanded unusual precaution. It was evident that Russian aggressions were no mere phantoms, but were terribly real and threatening.
These aggressions mainly called this alliance into existence for the mutual protection of the interests of the signatories, and later forced Japan to take up arms against her colossal neighbor for the defense of her rights and her very existence.
The primary objects of the alliance are the maintenance of the integrity of the Chinese Empire and the maintenance of the open-door policy in China, the policy which was conceived and so ardently advocated by the British statesmen, and which was so skillfully and happily inaugurated as a matter of international concern by one of the foremost statesmen and diplomats of our day—Hon. John Hay—three years before the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. In spite of all the adverse criticisms emanating from unfriendly sources, I confidently declare that all the objects of the alliance have been so far nobly and successfully accomplished.
By the recent course of events in the Far East these conditions which imminently menaced the integrity of the Chinese Empire have largely been removed and the ground for the open-door policy has been made firmer. Were it not for the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, the war might have occurred in 1902, when China demanded the evacuation of Manchuria by Russia. It was in fact delayed at least for some time, and the area of hostilities has been quite effectively restricted, since its outbreak, by reason of this alliance, which has in this respect received indirectly a very strong support from the enlightened policy pursued by the United States in reference to China.
To me it appears that the effect of the alliance has given so much satisfaction that, if the language used by the President of the Victorian Club in his invitation to this banquet extended to the Japanese representative expressed the sentiment of the British public—which I believe and hope to be the case—the renewal of that compact after the expiration of the prescribed terms is inevitable.
We are anxious, with Great Britain and the United States, to see China become rich, strong, and self-repecting. We have our own salvation to work out in our own way. We wanted simply to be let alone and to settle the problems that demanded solution. We were not animated by territorial greed or lust of conquest. We preferred the conquest of peace to the victories of war. We know that the Far East has a great future, and the greater the future the better for all the world. Japan could hope to gain nothing by war and had ​everything to gain by peace. The Anglo-Japanese alliance sought to give no advantage either to Great Britain or to Japan that was not common to all other nations. England, too, always stood for "equal opportunity," for a fair field and no favor, and that is our policy, and it has long been the avowed policy of the United States. The saying, "May the best man win," applies to nations as well as to individuals.
Certainly, neither England nor Japan made this alliance with the hope that it will provoke war. In laying the treaty before the House of Lords, Lord Landsdowne said that it was a guarantee of peace, and so it was regarded by the Japanese statesmen.
I think no further evidence is needed to prove that the alliance was not concluded with the hope that it would lead to war; I think, on the contrary, every fair-minded man must be convinced that both Great Britain and Japan were animated solely and sincerely by the single purpose to preserve peace and give commercial development full sway. And I repeat it to you, gentlemen, with full appreciation of my statement, that the alliance has fulfilled its purpose. It had made for peace as much as it could. There comes a time in the life of every nation, as in the life of every individual, when the nation must choose between duty and its stern responsibilities, or weakly yield to escape obligations and pay the penalty for weakness tenfold. The war now unhappily waging in Manchuria was inevitable. It is a war not of our seeking. It was forced upon us, as I said before, by aggression and arrogance.
I assume you are familiar with the history of the negotiations preceding the outbreak of hostilities, and I feel confident that you can have only reached one conclusion from a study of the facts. You cannot fail to have been impressed by the spirit of forbearance, patience, and absolute fairness displayed by His Majesty's government, and the desire, pushed almost to the extreme limit of generosity, to do everything possible to avoid war. But we should have been unworthy the respect of our friends in England as well as in America, we should have forfeited our own self-respect, if we had permitted our desire for peace to make us play the part of weaklings and surrender our rights and interests because we were not men enough to defend them. We have done what Englishmen would have done. We have done what Americans, Frenchmen, Germans, and even Zulus would have done. Our national existence was at stake. To die in its defense was more honorable than to live and lose all that we hold most precious. It is most fitting to quote as an expression of my own desire what was said by President Roosevelt: "We wish peace; but we wish the peace of justice; the peace of righteousness. We wish it because we think it right, and not because we are afraid."
JAPAN DOES NOT MENACE THE UNITED STATES POLITICALLY OR COMMERCIALLY
The sympathy of America having been so freely expressed in our favor—a sympathy, I beg to assure you, very precious to us and which we shall ever most sacredly cherish—it may appear ungracious for me to take exception to any expressions of American opinion, but I avail myself of this opportunity, knowing that what I say will not be misinterpreted, to correct an erroneous impression. It is quite evident a belief exists that the strength and power of Japan is both a political and commercial menace to the United States. It has been said that Japan dwells with covetous eye on the Philippines and longs for the Pacific Island possessions of the United States. I assure you no seriousminded person in Japan entertains any such thought. Japan has enough to do for many a year to come to develop her ​own resources, to assist in the regeneration of Korea, to improve the condition of Formosa, to profit by the commercial growth of Manchuria. The Philippines are outside of the sphere of our interest and form no part in our industrial and commercial expansion. Instead of Japan coveting the possessions of the United States in the Pacific, Japan welcomes the United States as a neighbor as tending still further to increase the bonds of friendship that exist between the two countries.
For the same reason that Japan does not menace the United States politically Japan does not threaten the United States commercially. I have seen it stated that Japan will control the markets of China to the injury of American trade; but that is an imaginary fear. There never has been, is not now, or ever will be a strong commercial rivalry between Japan and the United States. Japan sells to China principally seaweeds, salt fish, beche-de-mer and other marine products, mushrooms, ginseng, copper, coal, matches, cotton yarns and fabrics. The United States sells to China flour, kerosene oil, timber, machinery, railway materials, and cotton goods. Where do Japan and the United States come into conflict? Each is supplying China with articles which admit of no competition. Japan is buying a large quantity of flour from the United States. She does not produce kerosene, timber, machinery, and railway materials. The only article in which there can be a possible competition is in cotton goods. In this, however, the competition is in theory rather than in fact. In the first place, Japan does not produce cotton, and therefore all raw material used in the cotton industry is imported from the United States, India, and China. Now, there are five competitors in this line of goods in the Chinese market — Great Britain, the United States, India, Japan, and China. The British and American interests lie principally in cotton fabrics and yarns of the finer quality, and between these two countries there exists competition. The interests of Japan and India lie principally in cotton yarns and fabrics of a coarser kind, while the Chinese interests are similar to those of Japan and India, and there exists competition between these three countries. But between the former two and the latter three there is almost no competition.
Further, a careful study of the result of competition in China shows that instead of one article driving its competitor out of the market, both competitors simultaneously increased their respective sales. The reason for this is that in a vast country like China, where there exists practically an unknown and an inexhaustible market and as yet such a small portion is open to the influence of foreign commerce, the result of competition is always to widen the extent of the market.
Nay, instead of ugly commercial rivalry between Japan and the United States, we shall, I hope, have a peaceful and harmonious trade relation between the two countries. We shall sell to America in increasing quantities products that America needs and does not produce — such as tea and silk — and take from her such articles as are more profitable to buy than to raise or produce in our own country. Instead of being rivals we shall be in the broadest sense partners — the one country will be a complement of the other. The United States will not be swamped by the products of the loom and the forge of Japan; Japan will not be stifled under an avalanche of factory-made goods of New England and the Pacific coast; but those great ships that move so majestically across the broad bosom of the Pacific will be freighted deep with the wares of the Orient and the Occident, adding to the wealth of the world and making both countries richer because of the enlightened policy that leads nations to buy and sell to each other and profit by both operations.
​In China, Japan seeks no unfair advantage. She asks no favor from China that is not granted to England or the United States or to the entire world. With England and the United States she stands for the open door and, in the words of your great President, "square deal."
Under these conditions Japan is willing to take her chances in the rivalry of trade. We believe in the survival of the fittest in trade as well as in social development. If, in a fair field, we cannot hold our own position we shall be crowded out of the race, and it is right we should be. But we know that the trade of China is large enough for us all; that we can all share in it to our profit as well as to that of China, and instead of building on the ruins of a rival, we can build side by side for mutual advantage.