# The Theoretical System of Karl Marx/Appendix 1

The following essay was written over six years ago, and appeared originally in the Haverhill Social Democrat. It is reproduced here substantially without any change, except that passages of a purely personal nature and containing allusions which would not be readily understood by the general reader were left out. Some of the statements would be couched by the author in different language now. But there is no substantial difference between the views then expressed and those held by the author now. And as the purpose of the essay was not to give an exposition of the subject but to record the views held by the socialists, it was deemed advisable to retain not only the substance but also the form, and to bring it up to date by adding at the end some opinions expressed since its first publication.
In the September, 1900, issue of the International Socialist Review appeared an article by Comrade Robert Rives LaMonte under the caption of "Science and Socialism," in which was treated, among other things, also of the materialistic conception of history. In a communication to The People, printed October 28th, 1900, I took exception to the views expressed by Comrade LaMonte in his article, claiming that the article sinned against the truth in drawing an analogy between Society and the Individual with respect to the motives that impel him to action and in asserting that the individual is prompted in his action by his own material interests. I insisted, on the contrary, that there was no analogy in this respect between Society and the Individual; that the individual in his private conduct is not always guided by his material interests; that with the best ​of men ideal motives are supreme; that the materialistic conception of history applies to Society only, and to history only, that is, to Society in the process of change; that, however, when we take society in a given moment detached from what preceded it and what follows it, we find that even in society as a whole, in this stationary condition, ideal motives and not pecuniary interests play the leading role. And that, notwithstanding this, the materialistic conception of history is correct. And, furthermore, that because when viewing society in its process of change, we find that the ideas which play an important role in the activity of any given society at any given moment, had their genesis in the economic conditions of the time or of some time which preceded it, it follows that considering the history of society philosophically, the economic factor is supreme in the evolution of society.
Speaking of the article generally, I characterized it as confusing, because it is a mixture of correct Socialist doctrine and the views just now criticized which are contradictory to those doctrines, and as pernicious, because it plays into the hands of the enemies of Socialism in lending a semblance of authority to the perversions of the materialistic conception of history, which our enemies have all along tried to confuse with a grossly materialistic view of life, and brand as opposed to practical idealism.
I particularly objected to the article because it assumed to express not the individual views of Comrade LaMonte, but the accepted doctrines of all authoritative Socialists, and all those who "talk intelligently" of the materialistic conception of history. This communication of mine aroused the ire of H. L. Slobodin. In quite a lengthy article (The People, November 4, 1900), salted and peppered with personal abuse after the famous recipe of a late unlamented master, he invokes heaven and earth, the shades of Hades and the rhetorical figures in Brown's grammar, to a relentless war against my "ignorance," "arrogance," and most of all my "noble-mindedness."
The points he makes, as far as they appertain to the discussion, are, as follows:
1. I garbled LaMonte's article when I ascribed to LaMonte the notion that pecuniary interests dominate the life of the individual.
2. That, assuming LaMonte to have intended to say that private material interests dominate the life of the individual in the same way as the economic factors dominate the his​tory of society, his position is still correct, as such views are "much more akin to historic materialism than" my own views as stated in my communication to the People. To quote the whole passage: "Comrade Boudin distorts LaMonte's proposition, attaching a meaning very remote from it, namely, that by economic conditions LaMonte means 'pecuniary interests.' But even in its garbled form, the proposition of LaMonte is much more akin to historic materialism than the 'noble-minded idealism of Boudin.'" I have committed all manner of crime by saying that Socialists are usually "idealists of the purest type" in practical life. To use his own classical language: "I am in doubt whether the Socialists will receive this as a flattery or a libel. Myself, I am inclined to retort: 'Comrade Boudin, you are another.'"
And I have sinned even more in stating that, in practical life, men are moved by a sense of justice and by ideals.
It follows from the above that the questions now at issue are:
First: Have I garbled Comrade LaMonte's article, or distorted its meaning?
Second: Does the materialistic conception of history apply to the conduct of individuals or are the factors that impel the actions of individuals the same that move societies? More particularly, is the view that individuals are moved by pecuniary interests only, "much more akin to historic materialism" than the veiw that the materialistic conception of history has nothing to do with practical idealism, and that Socialists may therefore be, and usually are, idealists in practical life? ········· I want to state right here that, for the purposes of the present discussion, it is immaterial whether this position of LaMonte is correct in itself or not. We may yet have a chance to break a lance on that score. Here the only question is whether what LaMonte and his friend say is what authoritative Socialists mean when speaking of the materialistic conception of history. In my communication to the People I expressly stated that I objected principally to LaMonte's article because he insisted that his views were those of authoritative Socialists, and that in my opinion that was not so, whatever the merits of those views may otherwise be. And this is the only thing that I intend to prove now.
Says Karl Kautsky, now the leader of Socialist thought ​the world over (Neue Zeit, XV, I 215): "I have pointed out to Bax in my reply to his article in the Zeit, that he commits the quite preposterous blunder of confusing material conditions with material interests. And what does Bax answer? Not enough that he confuses material conditions with material interests, he actually sticks to this confusion, after his attention is called to the nonsensity of interchanging these terms! Does Bax really not know what is to be understood under the material conditions of a society? The material conditions are the conditions of production,—this word taken in its most comprehensive sense. How can one insist that this is for the materialistic conception of history quite the same as the material interests of classes and nations? (We imagine Kautsky's surprise if he were to learn that here are materialists who are not content with confusing material conditions with the material interests of classes and nations, but actually confuse it with the material interests of individuals!) The difference between the two words can be seen from the following consideration: It is in my opinion possible to explain the aversion to earthly things and the longing for death of Christianity by the material conditions of the time of the Roman Empire. It were however preposterous to try to find a material interest as a cause of the longing for death!"
And again: "Others, again, throw into the same pot the animal organism and the social organism, the law of the evolution of society and of the individual and the species."
This hits the nail squarely on the head. The law of the evolution of society is not the same as the law of the evolution of the individual; and in the evolution of society even, it is not the material interests of classes or nations that is the moving power, but the material conditions, which is something quite different.
As a logical corollary of the ignorance displayed by Kautsky in the above, come his views about the role of the individual in history. Ignorant as he is of the great doctrine of "economic determinism" announced by LaMonte, which compels the individual to act in accordance with his material interests, Kautsky has the "arrogance" of expressing himself as follows on that point: "Here we come to the question what role does Man, or if you like it better, Spirit, the 'psychological impulse,' the Idea, play in history. To the idealistic philosopher the idea may have an independent existence. To us the idea is only a function of the brain, and the question whether and how the idea can ​influence society is identical with the question whether and how the individuals can do it. Bax will be much surprised when I declare that I agree entirely with the proposition laid down by him in seeming opposition to my views, namely: "Economic formations make history only in conjunction with the human spirit and will."
What a pity that Kautsky did not read a few books on natural history or at least the article of LaMonte's Champion, because then he would not have talked such nonsense about "Man" and the "human spirit," he would then have known that there is nothing about man and human nature to talk about, that "there is a species of small but ferocious pig that are known to deliberately" sacrifice themselves for a friend.
As it is, however, Kautsky abides in ignorance, and therefore proceeds in this wise: "On the other hand, the selection of the problems to which he (the individual) devotes himself, the view-point from which he approaches their solution, the direction in which he looks for the solution, and finally the energy with which he goes to battle, for an explanation of these we cannot look to economic conditions only. Alongside of these there also come into play the peculiarities in which the individual has developed owing to the peculiarities of his natural parts, and the peculiarities of the particular circumstances in which he found himself. All the above mentioned circumstances exert an influence if not on the direction, then on the way and manner in which the, after all inevitable, result is to be. And in this respect single individuals can do much, very much for their contemporaries . . . Some as thinkers, by obtaining a deeper insight than those who surround them, by freeing themselves more than those from the inherited traditions and prejudices, by overcoming class-stupidity."
It is clear from the above that Kautsky is of the opinion that some people may, for no other reason but because they think, accomplish very much for their contemporaries. And in order to do such good they not only neglect their own material interests, but they rise above the material interests of their class, overcome the stupidity or narrow-mindedness (Bornirtheit) of their class.
This last phrase about the class-stupidity (Klassenbornirtheit) is interesting. And Kautsky, who was evidently aware that he was treading upon the corns of some so-called Marxists, proceeds to elucidate his position thus:
​"The last assertion may sound strange in the mouth of a Marxist. Socialism is however, in fact, based on the overcoming of class-stupidity. For the narrow-minded (bornirt) bourgeois the social question consists of the problems how to keep the workingmen peaceful and their necessities minimal; for the narrow-minded wage worker it is only a question of stomach, the question of high wages, short hours, and secure employment. We must overcome the narrow-mindedness of the one as well as of the other, before we can come to the understanding that the solution of the social problem of our times must embrace much more, much that is only possible in a new form of society . . . The thinker, who overcomes tradition and class-stupidity, assumes a higher standpoint and thereby discovers new truths, that is, comes nearer the real solution of the problem than the average individual. He must not, however, expect to be received with favor by all classes. Only those classes will agree with him whose interests lie in the same direction as the general evolution,—often not even these when the thinker has raised himself too far above his surroundings."
The question of the limits of the influence of economic conditions, and the play of the influences in society, is more fully discussed by Kautsky in his articles written in the Neue Zeit in answer to Bernstein's famous book. In the article on Materialism Kautsky says:
"But let us look a little closer at the different factors to which Bernstein calls our attention: Here we have alongside of the forces and circumstances of production, the juridical and moral conceptions, and the historic and religious traditions. But what are the traditions even according to the 'more progressive' formulation of the materialistic conception of history if not the product of preceding social forms, consequently, also of preceding forms of production; and likewise the juristic and moral conceptions, as far as they are traditional and do not arise out of the social forms existing at that moment. . . .
"So we can upon closer scrutiny reduce the factors which play a part on the surface of history, which Bernstein points out, to ultimate economic factors; and his demand will simply mean that the history of a given time cannot be explained by its own economic history only, but that we must 'take into account' the whole economic development preceding it, together with its heritage from primitive times. . . .
​"Had Bernstein wanted to say that the materialistic conception of history developed, in that, in the beginning, it overestimated the direct influence of the form of production prevalent at a given time, and undervalued the indirect influence of pre-existing forms, then there would be room for discussion. In fact, the progress of prehistoric research, which was scarcely born at the time of the original formulation of the materialistic conception of history has materially influenced the latter. A development of the theory in this sense is to be noticed, and it was stated as a fact by the fathers of the materialistic conception of history themselves."
The reader will have seen that in Kautsky's mind there was absolutely no question that the juridical and moral notions current in society have a great influence on that society, because the changes in society are worked by the agency of individuals, and individuals are admittedly (to Kautsky's mind) influenced by their judicial and moral notions. The debatable ground to him was, as to the origin of these notions, whether they could be traced to economic conditions directly by showing that they were the result of the economic forces and circumstances of that society itself, or whether they could be traced to economic conditions only indirectly, that is, by showing that although they were inherited, and therefore not the result of the economic conditions of the society over which they exert their influence, they were originally the result of economic conditions, namely, of the conditions of some previous society in which they had their origin. And even as to that Kautsky says (as we have heard him say before in his answer to Bax, quoted above) that there is no question but that some ideal influences can be traced only indirectly to economic conditions, and the question then reduces itself to one of the relative strength of the ideal influences which can be explained by the economic conditions of the time, and those which we have inherited from our fathers and can, therefore, be explained only by the economic conditions of some former historical epoch. And as to the this latter question, he says that, in the younger days of our materialistic philosophy, we were prone to over-estimate the direct influences at the cost of the indirect, but that now we give those influences which can be traced only indirectly to economic conditions their full due, and this is done not in opposition to the views of Marx and Engels, the fathers ​of our modern materialist philosophy, but in conformity to their views.
When we remember that so-called indirect influences of economic conditions have absolutely nothing whatever to do either with our economic or material interests, nor even with our economic conditions, in the sense in which Kautsky uses the word,—Kautsky's views reduce themselves to the following: Not only are individuals prompted in their actions by ideal motives, but moral (that hated word "moral"), juridical, and other ideal influences which are not in any way connected with the economic conditions of our own society, play an important role in it.
And in order to prove to Bernstein that it is pretty hard to "improve" on Marx and Engels, and incidentally to guard against confusionists who do not know the difference between a theory of history and a code of practical ethics, he uses the following example: "Suppose that a naturalist had in one of his earlier works declared that the light and heat of the sun were the ultimate moving powers of all organic life on earth. In his later years he received an inquiry as to whether it were true that, according to his theory, the growth of a tree depended solely on the quantity of light and heat that it received directly from the sun. To this he naturally answered, that it was nonsense; that his theory must not be interpreted that way, that he knew very well that the quality of the seed, the soil, the condition of moisture and dryness, the direction and strength of the winds, etc., have likewise an influence on the growth of trees. And then comes a commentator, confuses the direct influence of the sun on vegation with his being the ultimate sole power-source on the earth, and declares, then, that the theory of the naturalist must not be taken in its first, one-sided, form, but in its last, qualified and therefore much more scientific form. He overlooks entirely the circumstance that in this form the theory ceases to be of scientific importance; it becomes a commonplace, familiar to every farmer during thousands of years."
Kautsky claims, and he is certainly right in doing so, that when a great thinker announces a new theory he need not go into lengthy explanations that it is not what other people may think it is by absurdly perverting it, but he may leave that to the common sense of those that follow him. And yet, had Kautsky had a chance to read the Socialist literature on this side of the ocean he would not have scoffed so cruelly at Bernstein's painstaking state ​ments of the limitations of the materialistic conception of history, as he would have seen that there are farmers here who, after having heard of our naturalist's theory insist on planting trees on brick walls as long as they are directly against the sun.
That Kautsky is correct in his statement that Marx and Engels never denied the influence of ideas in the history of society, and gave quite a prominent place to indirect influence of economic conditions, this even in the earlier of their writings—is plain to every student of Marx and Engels, who has studied their philosophy not from second hand. Of course, there is, as far as I can remember now, nowhere in their writings to be found a direct denial of the absurdities of LaMonte & Co., for the reason stated by Kautsky and quoted above; but there is abundant refutation of it. I shall bring only one quotation from Marx and one from Engels directly in support of Kautsky's views, and when we bear in mind that Marx at least has never written any book or even essay giving an exposition of his philosophy, this will be enough to satisfy the most exacting.
Says Marx in 1845:
"The teaching of the materialists (the ante-Marxian materialists, of course) that man is the product of circumstances and education (Erziehung), that changed men are, therefore the product of different circumstances and changed education, forgets that circumstances themselves are changed by men, and that the educator himself must be educated." Sapientis satis.
Engels is more circumstantial. Says he:
"Men make their history, whatever way this may turn out, by each one pursuing the aims he consciously sets to himself, and the resultant of these wills, in many different directions working, and their manifolded influences on the outer world, are just history. It is therefore also important what these many individuals want. The will is determined by passion or consideration. But the levers which in turn directly determine the passions or considerations are of different kinds. Partly, these may be circumstances standing outside the individual; partly, ideal motives, ambition, enthusiasm for truth and right, personal animosity, or even purely individual whims of all sorts. But, in the first place, we have seen that the many individual wills which are active in the making of history produce mostly quite different, often just opposite, results from those desired; their motives are therefore, also, for the collective result only of ​secondary importance. And, secondly, the question still remains, what propelling forces are behind these motives, what historical causes are they that form themselves in the minds of the acting personages into these motives?
"This question the old materialism never put to itself. Its historical conception, so far as it had one at all, was therefore in its essence pragmatical, judging everything by the motives of the action; it divides the persons acting in the historical process into noble and ignoble ones and finds then that as a rule the noble ones are the conquered and the ignoble the conquerors. Whence it follows, for the old materialism:—that the study of history is not very edifying; and, for us, that on the historical field the old materialism is untrue to itself, because it takes the ideal motives which exert their influence there as the last causes, instead of examining what may be behind them, what are the motives of these motives. Not in that lies the inconsistency that ideal motives are acknowledged. But in that that they are accepted as final, and are not reduced to the causes that move them."
This is quite plain. No wonder LaMonte does not like Engels and appeals from him to Deville (to whom, by the way, he ascribes nice "distinctions," which do not rightfully belong to him.)
The question as to whether those who believe in the materialistic conception of history can be idealistic in practical life, have ideals the attainment of which they desire, and be actuated in their actions by ideals, has naturally been discussed more or less by the leaders of Socialist thought. As is also natural, such discussions were always provoked by some opponent of Socialism trying to make believe that the materialistic conception of history led its followers to adopt "materialistic" views of life and excludes all ideals. This the Socialist theorists were not slow to brand as malicious fabrications and imaginings born of ignorance.
Franz Mehring, one of the brightest minds of the party in Germany, and one of those who are accused of being too strict and "narrow-minded" materialists, has the following to say on the subject (Lessing-Legende):
"We shall first dispose of two current objections to historic materialism, which attach to the meaning of the word. Idealism and materialism are two answers, in opposition to each other, to the basis question of philosophy: the relation between the understanding and reality, or to put ​it in a simpler way: the question as to the priority of mind or matter. In themselves these two terms have nothing to do with ethical ideas. A philosophical materialist may cherish such ideals in the highest and purest degree, while the philosophical idealist may be completely destitute of them. However, the term materialism, owing to its being continually defamed by persons, has in time acquired something suggestive of immorality which gradually made its way into bourgeois literature. 'The Philistine understands under materialism gluttony, drunkenness, lust, pride, rapacity, greed, profit-hunting, etc., in short, all those repugnant vices to which he is covertly subservient; and under idealism he understands the firm belief in virtue, the brotherhood of man, and generally a "higher world" of which he declaims, and in which he perhaps believes when he has to go through all the misery which necessarily follows his "materialistic" excesses, chanting the refrain: "What is man,—half brute, half angel" (this quotation is from Engels). If we are to use these words in this, secondary, sense, it must be admitted that nowadays it requires a good deal of ethical idealism to have the courage of professing historic materialism, for it invariably carries with it poverty, persecution and slander, while the profession of historic idealism is the business of every heeler, for it offers the best prospects to all earthly goods, to fat sinecures, orders, titles and dignities."
As the reader sees, far from being horrified at the thought that a Socialist may be an idealist, as LaMonte's Champion is, Mehring says that it requires a lot of ethical idealism to be a materialist, or, as I said, simply a Socialist.
So says also Sadi Gunter, perhaps the only man in Germany who has the distinction of being acknowledged a philosopher both by Socialists and bourgeois. In an article which appeared in the Neue Zeit (1897-98, No. 41) he makes use of the following language:
"There is a firmly rooted prejudice in the educated circles of the bourgeoisie that the materialistic conception of history excludes all ideals. Even men who begin to advance theoretically towards the materialistic conception of history, and do not dismiss it, like Dr. Barth, with a few phrases which only show a lack of understanding on the part of those who use them, still find in that prejudice a cause which prevents them from joining it entirely. . . . We must however discuss more fully the second objection which is based on that very widely accepted metaphysical ​error, that practical ideals must have as their foundation theoretic ideals (all italics in the text). Here we must prove that Stammler uses an untenable double book-keeping in which the entries do not balance. And this we must prove by a positive demonstration,—1st, That and how the spiritual phenomena must work in the chain of cause and effect; 2d, That and how in the historic materialism—which must be carefully distinguished from common materialism—a practical idealism is not only possible, but necessary.
"In such cases the ideal acquires in man a quite all-powerful impetus. And it retains its power of a forward motor even if the goal to be achieved cannot be reached in the way looked for; because it enhances the powers and impels to find other ways of solution, when those originally hoped for prove inadequate. This is the reason why the goal of Socialism, the emancipation from the yoke of capitalism and the establishment of a more harmonious social order, could seize upon the masses so powerfully, impel them forward and elevate them even while the present system continues (heute bereits emporzuheben vermochte). . . . This ideal in social life is the Socialistic ideal of to-day. Socialism requires the nationalization of the means of production not for the material reason that the proletarian should be able to eat and to drink more comfortably. The Erfurter Program, to which the whole German Party adheres, states most emphatically that the socialization of the means of production is necessary in order to transform the capitalistic mode of production from a 'source of misery to a source of the highest well-being and harmonious development of man.'" ············· "We must not overlook the phrase 'harmonious development.' . . . If this be the case, it is evident that we may require the nationalization of the means of production only in so far as it serves our aim as a harmonious development. This nationalization is a means only, and not an end in itself. The ideal for the sake of which nationalization is desirable, is human perfection. And this ideal is a necessary motive power to further development;—a motive power which is as well an effect of evolution as it is a necessity to the further realization of our aim."
"Not only is historical materialism, therefore, far from destroying practical idealism, but on the contrary, it raises it to such a power over the mind and clarifies it to such a ​purity as no other system was hitherto able to attain for it." ············· The point I wish to make here is in relation to the horror with which the "sense of truth and justice," attributed by me to the uncorrupted human nature, inspired my adversary. If it were not for the fact that he probably considered himself among those whom I excepted from this horrible imputation, he would have said that I was another. . . . As it is, however, he limits himself to instructing us about the nature of the celebrated "small but ferocious pig," which is not exactly to the point, as I have never harbored any designs upon the fair name and reputation of my friend's protege, and informs us that an old writer is quoted as saying: "A dog is the only thing on this earth that loves you more than he loves himself." After having thus exhausted the wells of wisdom of all the ages, and after having cruelly enjoyed my humiliation, he introduces a "philosophical sow" to the utter discomfiture of all "idealists," whom my friend cordially hates.
However, one consolation still remains for me, discomfited as I am; and that is that I am in quite good company. There is for instance, J. Stern, a man who only recently was held out by George Plechanoff, that "narrowest" of the doctrinaires of materialism, as the model of a Socialist philosopher. In his book on the philosophy of Spinoza, published by the German party's publishing house, Stern takes the position I do. But, finally, here is Kautsky again, to share the odium of "noble-minded idealism." In his response to Bernstein, he says:
"The ideologists ceased to be a ruling class. But they have at the same time ceased to be a class altogether. They ceased to present a compact class with separate class-interests. They form an aggregation of individuals and coteries with the most widely different interests. As repeatedly said before, these interests touch partly with those of the Bourgeoisie, and partly with those of the proletariat. At the same time their education enables them the quicker to gain a higher standpoint in the contemplation of social development. Not actuated by pronounced class-interests, often acting on the basis of a deeper insight into the interdependence of social phenomena gained by mental work, the representatives of the intellectual classes (Intelligenz) feel themselves to be the representatives of the common interests of the community as opposed to the class-interests,—the rep​resentatives of ideas that are independent of economic motives. And the intelligent classes (Intelligenz) are constantly growing. Therewith grows visibly the common-interest as against the class-interests, grows the independence of the arts, sciences and the ethical viewpoint of the economic forces. Only when we interpret Bernstein's words to mean this, they become understandable (begreiflich) and lose their mystical character; but then they also cease to prove anything against the materialistic conception of history." ············· In a review of Anton Menger's book "Neue Sittenlehre," in the Neue Zeit of October 14, 1905, Karl Kautsky says, among other things:
"Political and social struggle is impossible without moral indignation (sittliche Empoerung) against the opponent.
"The moral indignation against given political and social conditions, against the material oppression of the social powers, is therefore the first and the last, the basic form of the manifestation of the class differences, the most primitive and lasting mainspring (Triebfeder) of the class struggle."
And then he states, referring to Menger's ethical theory and the statements of some reviewers that it was identical with the theory of ethics of the Matrialistic Conception of History:
"To say that the conception of historical materialism, that morality is generated by the material conditions of society, is the same as Menger's conception that it is generated by material force is just as false and misleading as is the oft-repeated confusion of material conditions with the material interests of the individual, which reduces Marxism to that low level of ethics according to which all morality is reduced to egoism. People who so represent and propagate the Materialistic Conception of History may consider themselves good Marxists, but they really belong to those who reflect little credit on the Marxian teachings, who made Marx shudder, and with whom he begged not to be confounded."
And in his recent book: "Ethics and the Materialistic Conception of History," Kautsky says:
"While the growing contradiction between the changing social conditions and the stagnating morality expresses itself in the conservative, that is in the ruling classes, in growing immorality, hypocrisy and cynicism, which often ​go hand in hand with a weakening of the social instinct, the effect upon the rising and exploited classes is entirely different. The interests of those classes stand in direct opposition to the social foundations which created the reigning morality. They have not the slightest reason to defer to it, and all the reasons to oppose it. With the growth of their consciousness of their opposition to the existing social order, grows their moral indignation, their opposition to the old and antiquated morality, to which they oppose a new morality, which they advocate as the morality of society as a whole. Thus there arises in the rising classes a moral ideal, which grows in intensity with the growth of the power of these classes. At the same time, as we have already seen, the social instincts of these same classes gain in strength and are particularly developed by the class-struggle, so that with the intensity of the new moral ideal grows also the enthusiasm for the same. Thus it is that the same process of evolution which produces in the conservative and declining classes growing immorality, begets in the rising classes in a steadily increasing number those phenomena, the aggregation of which we describe as ethical idealism, which must not, however, be confounded with philosophical idealism. It is just the rising classes that often incline towards philosophic materialism, which the declining classes, on the other hand, oppose from the moment that the fact begins to dawn upon them that the natural course of evolution has sealed their doom, from which they can only escape by the intervention of some supernatural, divine, or ethical power."