# A Philosophical Inquiry Concerning Human Liberty (1735)/Chapter 1

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London: R. Robinson, pages 9–52
A
PHILOSOPHICAL
INQUIRY
Concerning
HUMAN
LIBERTY.
To Lucius.
“ Here send you in writing my thoughts concerning Liberty and Necessity, which you have so often desired of me: and in drawing them up, have had regard to your penetration, by being as short as is consistent with being understood, and to your love of truth, by saying nothing but what I think true, and also all the truth that I apprehend relates to the subject, with the sincerity belonging to the conversation of friends. If you think me either too short in any respect, or to have omitted the consideration of any objection, ​by its not occurring to me, or, that you think of importance to be consider'd: be pleased to acquaint me therewith, and I will give you all the satisfaction I can.”
Introduction.'Tis a common observation, even among the learned, that there are certain matters of speculation, about which it is impossible, from the nature of the subjects themselves, to speak clearly and distinctly. Upon which account, men are very indulgent to, and pardon the unintelligible discourses of Theologers and Philosophers, which treat of the sublime points in theology and philosophy. And there is no question in the whole compass of speculation, of which men have written more obscurely, and of which it is thought more impossible to discourse clearly, and concerning which men more expect, and pardon obscure discourse, than upon the subjects of Liberty and Necessity. But this common observation, is both a common and a learned error. For whoever employs his thoughts either about God or the Trinity in Unity, or any other pro​found subject, ought to have some Ideas, to be the objects of his thoughts in the same manner as he has in thinking on the most common subjects: for where Ideas fail us in any matter, our thoughts must also fail us. And it is plain, whenever we have Ideas, we are able to communicate them to others by words: for words being arbitrary marks of our ideas, we can never want them to signify our Ideas, as long as we have so many in use among us, and a power to make as many more as we have occasion for. Since then we can think of nothing any farther than we have Ideas, and can signify all the Ideas we have by words to one another; why should we not be able to put one Idea into a Proposition as well as another? Why not to compare ideas together about one subject as well as another? And why not to range one sort of Propositions into order and method, as well as another? When we use the term God, the Idea signify'd thereby, ought to be as distinct ​and determinate in us, as the Idea of a triangle or a square is, when we discourse of either of them; otherwise, the term God is an empty sound. What hinders us then from putting the Idea signify’d by the term God into a Proposition, any more than the Idea of a triangle or a square? And why cannot we compare that Idea with another Idea, as well as any two other ideas together: since comparison of Ideas consists in observing wherein Ideas differ, and wherein they agree: to which nothing is requisite in any Ideas, but their being distinct and determinate in our Minds? And since we ought to have a distinct and determinate Idea to the term God, whenever we use it, and as distinct and determinate as that of a triangle or a square: since we can put it into a Proposition: since we can compare it with other Ideas on account of its distinctness and determinateness; why should we not be able to range our thoughts about God in as clear a method, and with as great perspicuity as about figure and quantity.
​I would not hereby be thought to suppose that the Idea of God is an adequate Idea, and exhausts the subject it refers to, like the Idea of a triangle or a square; or that it is as easy to form in our Minds as the Idea of a triangle or a square; or that it does not require a great comprehension of Mind to bring together the various Ideas that relate to God, and so compare them together; or that there are not several Propositions concerning him that are doubtful, and of which we can arrive at no certainty; or that there are not many Propositions concerning him subject to very great Difficulties or objections. All these I grant: but I say, they are no Reasons to justify Obscurity. For, first, an inadequate Idea is no less distinct, as such, than an adequate Idea, and no less true, as far as it goes; and therefore may be discours’d of with equal clearness and truth. Secondly, Tho’ the Idea of God be not so easy to form in our Minds as the Idea of a triangle or a square, and it requires a great comprehension of Mind to bring together the various Ideas that relate to him, and compare them together; yet these are only reasons, for using a greater application, or for not writing at all. Third​ly, if a writer has in relation to his subject any doubts or objections in his mind, which he cannot resolve to his satisfaction, he may express those conceptions or thoughts no less clearly, than any other conceptions or thoughts. He should only take care not to exceed the bounds of those conceptions, nor endeavor to make his reader understand what he does not understand himself: for when he exceeds those bounds, his discourse must be dark, and his pains useless. To express what a man conceives is the end of writing; and every reader ought to be satisfy’d when he sees an author speak of a subject according to the light he has about it, so far as to think him a clear writer.
When therefore any writer speaks obscurely, either about God, or any other Idea of his mind, the defect is in him. For why did he write before he had a meaning; or before he was able to express to others what he meant? Is it not unpardonable for a man to cant, who pretends to teach?
These general reflections may be confirm’d by matter of fact from the writings of the most celebrated dogmatical authors.
​When such great men as Gassendus, Cartesius, Cudworth, Locke, Bayle, Sir Isaac Newton and Mr. De Fontenelle treat of the most profound questions in metaphysicks, mathematicks, and other parts of philosophy; they by handling them as far as their clear and distinct Ideas reach’d, have written with no less perspicuity to their proper readers, than other authors have done about historical matters, and upon the plainest and most common subjects.
On the other side, when authors, who in other respects are equal to the foregoing, treat of any subjects further than they have clear and distinct Ideas; they do and cannot but write to as little purpose, and take as absurd pains, as the most ignorant authors do, who treat of any subject under a total ignorance, or a confus’d knowledge of it. There are so many examples of these latter occurring to every reader; and there are such frequent complaints of mens venturing beyond their ability in several questions; that I need not name particular Authors, and may fairly avoid the odium of censuring any one. But having met with a passage concerning the ingenious Father Malebranche in the Letters of Mr. Bayle, who was an able Judge, a friend to him, and a defender of him in other respects, I hope I may, without being liable to exception, produce Father ​Malebranche as an example. He has in several books treated of and vindicated the opinion of seeing all things in God; and yet so acute a person as Mr. Bayle, after having read them all, declares, that he less comprehends his notion from his last book than ever. Which plainly shows a defect in F. Malebranche to write upon a subject he understood not, and therefore could not make others understand.
You see, I bespeak no favor in the question before me, and take the whole fault to myself, if I do not write clearly to you on it, and prove what I propose.
And that I may inform you, in what I think clear to myself, I will begin with explaining the sense of the Question.
The Question stated.Man is a necessary Agent, if all his actions are so determined by the causes ​preceding each action, that not one past action could possibly not have come to pass, or have been otherwise than it hath been; nor one future action can possibly not come to pass, or be otherwise than it shall be. He is a free Agent, if he is able, at any time under the circumstances and causes he then is, to do different things: or, in other words, if he is not unavoidably determin’d in every point of time by the circumstances he is in, and causes he is under, to do that one thing he does, and not possibly to do any other.
1st. Argument wherein our Experience is considered.I. This being a question of fact concerning what we ourselves do; we will first consider our own Experience; which if we can know, as sure we may, will certainly determine this matter. And because experience is urg’d with great triumph, by the patrons of Liberty, we will begin with a few general reflections concerning the argument of experience: and then we will proceed to our experience itself.
General Reflections on the argument of Experience1. The vulgar, who are bred up to believe Liberty or Freedom, think themselves secure of success, constantly appealing to Experience for a proof of their ​freedom, and being persuad’d that they feel themselves free on a thousand occasions. And the source of their mistake, seems to be as follows. They either attend not to, or see not the causes of their actions, especially in matters of little moment, and thence conclude, they are free, or not mov’d by causes, to do what they do.
They also frequently do actions whereof they repent: and because in the repenting humour, they find no present motive to do those actions, they conclude, that they might not have done them at the time they did them, and that they were free from necessity (as they were from outward impediments) in the doing them.
They also find, that they can do as they will, and forbear as they will, without any external impediment to hinder them from doing as they will; let them will either doing or forbearing. They likewise see, that they often change their minds; that they can, and do chuse differently every successive moment; and that they frequently deliberate, and thereby are sometimes at a near ballance, and in a state of indifference with respect ​to judging about some propositions, and willing or chusing with respect to some objects. And experiencing these things, they mistake them for the exercise of Freedom, or Liberty from Necessity. For ask them, whether they think themselves free? and they will immediately answer, Yes: and say some one or other of these foregoing things, and particularly think they prove themselves free, when they affirm, they can do as they will.
Nay, celebrat’d Philosophers and Theologers, both ancient and modern, who have meditated much on this matter, talk after the same manner, giving definitions of Liberty, that are consistent with Fate or Necessity; tho’ at the same time they would be thought to exempt some of the actions of man from the power of Fate, or to assert Liberty from Necessity. Cicero defines Liberty to be, a power to do as we will. And therein several moderns follow him. One defines Liberty to be, a power to act, or not to act, as we will. Another defines it in more words thus: a power to do what we will, and because we will; so that if we did not will it, we should not do it; we ​should even do the contrary if we will’d it. And another, a power to do or forbear an action, according to the determination or thought of the mind, whereby either is preferr’d to the other. On all which definitions, if the Reader will be pleas’d to reflect, he will see ’em to be only definitions of liberty or freedom from outward impediments of action, and not a Freedom or Liberty from Necessity; as I also will shew them to be in the sequel of this Discourse, wherein I shall contend equally with them for such a power as they describe, tho’ I affirm, That there is no Liberty from Necessity.
Alexander the Aphrodisæan, (a most acute philosopher of the IId Century, and the earliest commentator now extant upon Aristotle, and esteemed his best Defender and Interpreter) defines Liberty to be, a power to chuse what to do after deliberation and consultation, and to chuse and do what is most eligible to our reason; whereas otherwise, we should follow our fancy. Now a choice after deliberation, is a no less necessary choice, than a choice by fancy. For tho’ a choice by fancy, or without deliberation, may be one way, and a choice with delibe​may be another way, or different; yet each choice being founded on what is judged best, the one for one reason, and the other for another, is equally necessary; and good or bad reasons, hasty or deliberate thoughts, fancy or deliberation, make no difference.
In the same manner, Bishop Bramhall, who has written several books for Liberty, and pretends to assert the Liberty taught by Aristotle, defines Liberty thus: He says, That act which makes a Man’s actions to be truly free, is election; which is the deliberate chusing or refusing of this or that means, or the acceptation of one means before another, where divers are represented by the understanding. And that this definition places Liberty wholly in chusing the seeming best means, and not in chusing the seeming worst means, equally with the best; will appear from the following passages. He says, actions done in sudden and violent passions, are not free; because there is no deliberation nor election.—To say the will is determined by motives, that is, by reasons or discourses, is as much as to say that the Agent is determin’d by himself, or is free. Because motives determine not naturally, but ​morally; which kind of determination is consistent with true Liberty—Admitting that the will follows necessarily the last dictate of the understanding, this is not destructive of the liberty of the will; this is only an hypothetical necessity. So that Liberty, with him, consists in chusing, or refusing necessarily after deliberation; which chusing or refusing is morally and hypothetically determined, or necessary by virtue of the said deliberation.
Lastly, a great Armenian Theologer, who has writ a course of Philosophy, and enter’d into several controversies on the subject of Liberty, makes Liberty to consist in an indifferency of mind while a thing is under deliberation. For, says he, while the mind deliberates, it is free till the moment of action; because nothing determines it necessarily to act or not to act. Whereas when the mind ballances or compares Ideas or motives together, it is then no less necessarily determin’d to a state of Indifferency by the appearances of those Ideas and motives, than it is necessarily determin’d in the very moment of action. Were a man to be at liberty in this state of indifferency, he ought to have it in his power to be not indifferent, ​at the same time that he is indifferent.
If experience therefore proves the liberty contended for by the foregoing asserters of liberty, it proves men to have no liberty from necessity.
2. As the foregoing asserters of liberty, give us definitions of Liberty, as grounded on experience, which are consistent with Necessity; so some of the greatest Patrons of liberty, do by their concessions in this matter, sufficiently destroy all argument from Experience.
Erasmus, in his treatise for Free-will, against Luther, says, That among the difficulties which have exercis’d the Theologers and Philosophers of all ages, there is none greater than the question of free-will. And Mr. Le Clerc, speaking of this Book of Erasmus, says, that the question of free-will, was too subtile for Erasmus, who was no Philosopher; which makes him often contradict himself.
The late Bishop of Sarum, tho’ he contends, Every Man experiences liberty; yet owns, that great difficulties attend the subject on all hands, and that therefore he pretends not to explain or answer them.
The famous Bernard Ochin, a great ​Italian Wit, has written a most subtile and ingenious book intituled, Labyrinths concerning Free-will and Predestination, &c. wherein he shews, that they who assert, that Man acts freely, are involv’d in four great difficulties; and that those who assert that Man acts necessarily, fall into four other difficulties. So that he forms eight Labyrinths, four against Liberty, and four against Necessity. He turns himself all manner of ways to get clear of them; but not being able to find any solution, he constantly concludes with a Prayer to God to deliver him from these Abysses. Indeed, in the progress of his work, he endeavors to furnish means to get out of this prison: but he concludes that the only way, is to say, with Socrates, Hoc unum scio quod nihil scio. We ought, says he, to rest contented, and conclude, that God requires neither the affirmative nor negative of us. This is the title of his last chapter, Qua via ex omnibus supradictis Labyrinthis cito exiri possit, quæ doctæ ignorantiæ via vocatur.
A famous author, who appeals to common experience, for a proof of liberty, confesses, that the question of liberty ​is the most obscure and difficult question in all Philosophy: that the learned are fuller of contradictions to themselves, and to one another, on this, than on any other subject: And that he writes against the common notion of liberty, and endeavors to establish another notion, which he allows to be intricate.
But how can all this happen in a plain matter of fact, suppos’d to be experienc’d by everybody? What difficulty can there be in stating a plain matter of fact, and describing what every body feels? What need of so much Philosophy? And why so many contradictions on the subject? And how can all men experience Liberty, when it is allow’d that the common notion of liberty is false, or not experienc’d; and a new notion of Liberty, not thought on before (or thought on but by few) is set up as matter of experience? This could not happen if matter of fact was clear for liberty.
3. Other Asserters of Liberty seem driven into it on account of suppos’d inconveniencies attending the doctrine of Necessity. The great Episcopius, in his Treatise of Free-will, acknowledges in effect, that the asserters of Necessity have ​seeming experience on their side, and are thereby very numerous; They, as he observes, allege one thing of moment in which they triumph, viz. “that the will is determin’d by the understanding: and assert, that unless it were so; the will would be a blind faculty, and might make evil, as evil, its object; and reject what is pleasant and agreeable: And by consequence, that all persuasions, promises, reasonings and threats, would be as useless to a Man as to a stock or a stone.” This, he allows to be very plausible, and to have the appearance of probability; to be the common sentiment of the schools; to be the rock on which the ablest defenders of liberty have split, without being able to answer it; and to be the reason, or argument (or rather the matter of experience) which has made men in all ages, and not a few in this age, fall into the opinion of the fatal necessity of all things. But because it makes all our actions necessary, and thereby, in his opinion, subverts all religion, laws, rewards and punishments; he concludes it to be most certainly false: and religion makes him quit this common and plausible opinion. Thus also many other ​strenuous Asserters of Liberty, as well as himself, are driven by these supposed difficulties, to deny manifest experience. I say, manifest experience, for are we not manifestly determin’d by pleasure or pain, and by what seems reasonable or unreasonable to us, to judge or will, or act? Whereas could they see that there are not grounds for laws and morality, rewards and punishments, but by supposing the doctrine of Necessity; and that there is no foundation for laws and morality, rewards and punishments, upon the supposition of a man’s being a free agent, (as shall evidently, and demonstratively appear) they would readily allow experience to be against Free-will, and deny Liberty, when they should see there was no need to assert it, in order to maintain those necessary things. And as a farther evidence thereof, let any man peruse the discourses written by the ablest authors for liberty, and he will see (as they confess of one another) that they frequently contradict themselves, write obscurely, and know not where to place Liberty; at least he will see that he is able to make nothing of their discourses, no more than Mr. Locke ​was of this treatise of Episcopius, who in all his other writings, shews himself to be a clear, strong and argumentative writer.
4. There are others, and those contenders for Liberty, as well as denyers of it, who report the persuasions of Men, as to the Matter of fact, very differently, and also judge very differently themselves about the fact, from what is vulgarly believed among those who mantain Free-will.
An ancient author speaks thus: Fate, says he, is sufficiently proved from the general receiv’d opinion and persuasion of Men thereof. For, in certain things, when Men all agree, except a few, who dissent from them on account of maintaining some doctrines before taken up, they cannot be mistaken. Wherefore Anaxagoras the Clazomenian, tho’ no contemptible Naturalist, ought not be judged to deserve any regard, when opposing the common persuasion of all Men he asserts, “That nothing is done by Fate; but that it is an empty name.” And according to all authors, recording the opinions of men in this matter, the belief of Fate, as to all Events, has continued to be the most com​mon persuasion, both of Philosophers and People; as it is at this day the persuasion of much the greatest part of mankind, according to the relations of Voyagers. And tho’ it has not equally prevail’d among Christians, as it has, and does, among all other religious parties; yet it is certain, the Fatalists have been, and are very numerous among Christians: and the free-will-Theologers themselves allow, That some Christians are as great Fatalists, as any of the ancient Philosophers were.
The acute and penetrating Mr. Bayle, reports the fact, as very differently understood by those who have thoroughly examin’d and consider’d the various actions of Man, from what is vulgarly suppos’d in this matter. Says he, They who examine not to the bottom what passes within them, easily persuade themselves, that they are free: but, they who have considered with care the foundation and circumstances of their actions, doubt of their freedom, and are even persuaded, that their reason and understandings are Slaves that cannot resist the force which carries them along. He says also, in a familiar Letter, That the best proofs al​leg’d for Liberty are, that without it, Man could not sin; and that God would be the author of evil as well as good thoughts.
And the celebrated Mr. Leibniz, that universal genius on occasion of Archbishop King’s appeal to experience, (in behalf of his notion of liberty, viz. A faculty, which, being indifferent to objects, and over-ruling our passions, appetites, sensations, and reason, chuses arbitrarily among objects; and renders the object chosen agreeable, only because it has chosen it) denies, that we experience such, or any other Liberty; but contends that we rather experience a determination in all our actions. Says he, We experience something in us which inclines us to a choice; and if it happens that we cannot give a reason of all our inclinations, a little attention will show us, that the constitution of our bodies, the bodies encompassing us, the present, or preceding state of our minds, and several little matters comprehended under these great causes, may contribute to make us chuse certain objects, without having recourse to a pure indifference, or to I know not what power of the Soul, which does upon objects, what they say colours do upon the Camelion. In fine, he is so far ​from thinking that there is the least foundation from Experience, for the said notion of Liberty, that he treats it as a chimera, and compares it to the magical power of the Fairies to transform things.
Lastly, The Journalists of Paris are very far from thinking Archbishop King’s notion of liberty to be matter of experience, when they say, That Dr. King, not satisfy’d with any of the former notions of Liberty, proposes a new notion; and carries indifference so far, as to maintain that pleasure is not the motive but the effect of the choice of the will; placet res quia eligitur, non eligitur quia placet, makes him frequently contradict himself.
So that upon the whole, the affair of experience, with relation to liberty, stands thus. Some give the name Liberty to actions, which when described, are plainly Actions that are necessary; Others, tho’ appealing to vulgar experience, yet inconsistently therewith, contradict the vulgar experience, by owning it to be an intricate matter, and treating it after an intricate manner; Others are driven into the defence of Liberty, by difficulties imagin’d ​to flow from the doctrine of Necessity, combating what they allow to be matter of seeming experience; Others, and those the most discerning, either think liberty cannot be prov’d by experience, or think Men may see by experience, that they are necessary Agents; and the bulk of Mankind have always been persuaded that they are necessary Agents.
Our experience itself considered.Having thus pav’d the way by shewing that liberty is not a plain matter of experience, by arguments drawn from the asserters of liberty themselves, and by consequence subverted the argument from experience for liberty; we will now run over the various actions of Men which can be conceiv’d to concern this subject, and examine, whether we can know from experience, that Man is a free or a necessary Agent. I think those actions may be reduc’d to these four: 1. Perception of Ideas. 2. Judging of Propositions. 3. Willing. 4. Doing as we will.
Perception of Idea's.1. Perception of Ideas. Of this there can be no dispute but it is a necessary action of man, since it is not even a voluntary action. The Ideas both of sensation and reflection, offer themselves to ​us whether we will or no, and we cannot reject ’em. We must be conscious that we think, when we do think; and thereby we necessarily have the Ideas of Reflection. We must also use our senses when awake; and thereby necessarily receive the Ideas of Sensation. And as we necessarily receive Ideas, so each Idea is necessarily what it is in our mind: for it is not possible to make any thing different from itself. This first necessary action, the reader will see, is the foundation and cause of all the other intelligent actions of man, and makes them also necessary. For, as a judicious author, and nice observer of the inward actions of Man, says truly, Temples have their sacred images, and we see what influence they have always had over a great part of mankind. But in truth, the Ideas and images in mens minds, are the Invisible Powers that constantly govern them, and to these they universally pay a ready submission.
Judging of Propositions2. The second action of man is judging of propositions. All propositions must appear to me either self-evident, or evident from proof, or probable, or improbable, or doubtful, or false. Now ​these various appearances of propositions to me, being founded on my capacity, and the degree of light propositions stand into me; I can no more change those appearances in me than I can change the Idea of red rais’d in me. Nor can I judge contrary to those appearances: for what is judging of propositions, but judging that propositions do appear as they do appear? which I cannot avoid doing, without lying to myself: which is impossible. If any man thinks he can judge a proposition, appearing to him evident, to be not evident; or a probable proposition, to be more or less probable than it appears by the proofs to be; he knows not what he says, as he may see, if he will define his words. The necessity of being determin’d by appearances, was maintain’d by all the old Philosophers, even by the Academicks or Sceptiks. Cicero says, You must take from a Man his senses, if you take from him the power of assenting; for it is as necessary the mind should yield to what is clear, as that a scale hanging on a balance should sink with a weight laid on it. For as all living creatures cannot but desire what is agreeable to their natures, so ​they cannot but assent to what is clear. Wherefore, if those things whereof we dispute are true; it is to no purpose to speak of assent. For he who apprehends or perceives any thing, assents immediately. Again, assent not only precedes the practice of vice; but of virtue, the steady performance whereof, and adherence to which, depend on what a man has assented to and approv’d. And it is necessary, that something should appear to us before we act, and that we should assent to that appearance. Wherefore he who takes away appearances and assent from man, destroys all action in him. The force of this reasoning manifestly extends to all the various judgments men make upon the appearances of things. And Cicero, as an Academick or Sceptick, must be suppos’d to extend necessity to every kind of judgment or assent of man upon the appearances (or as the Greeks call them Φιανομένα and himself the Visa) of things. Sextus Empiricus says, they who say, the Scepticks take away appearances, have not convers’d with them, and do not understand them. For we destroy not the passions, to which our senses find themselves expos’d whether we will or no, and which force us ​to submit to appearances. For when it is ask’d us, whether objects are such as they appear? we deny not their appearances nor doubt of them, but only question, whether the external objects are like the appearances.
Willing.3. Willing, is the third action of man which I propose to consider. It is matter of daily experience, that we begin, or forbear, continue or end several actions barely by a thought or preference of the mind, ordering the doing or not doing, the continuing or ending, such or such actions. Thus, before we think or deliberate on any subject, or before we get on horse-back, we do prefer those things to anything else in competition with them. In like manner, if we forbear these actions, when any of them are offer’d to our thoughts: or if we continue to proceed in any one of these actions once begun, or if at any time we make an end of prosecuting them; we do forbear, or continue, or end them on our preference of the forbearance to the doing of them, of the continuing of them to the ending them, and of the ending to the continuing them. This power of the man thus to order the ​beginning or forbearance, the continuance or ending of any action, is call'd the will, and the actual exercise thereof, willing.
There are two questions usually put about this matter: first, Whether we are at liberty to will, or not to will? secondly, Whether we are at liberty to will one or the other of two or more objects?
1. As to the first, whether we are at liberty to will or not to will? it is manifest, we have not that liberty. For let an action in a man's power be propos'd to him as presently to be done, as for example, to walk; the will to walk, or not to walk, exists immediately. And when an action in a man's power is propos'd to him to be done to morrow, as to walk to morrow; he is no less oblig'd to have some immediate will. He must either have a will to defer willing about the matter propos'd, or he must will immediately in relation to the thing propos'd: and one or the other of those wills must exist immediately, no less than the will to walk, or not to walk in the former case. Wherefore, in every proposal of something to be done which is in man's ​power to do, he cannot but have some immediate will.
Hence appears the mistake of those who think men at liberty to will, or not to will, because, say they, they can suspend willing, in relation to actions to be done to morrow; wherein they plainly confound themselves, with words. For when it is said, man is necessarily determin'd to will; it is not thereby understood, that he is determin'd to will or chuse one out of two objects immediately in every case propos'd to him (or to chuse at all in some cases; as whether he will travel into France or Holland), but that on every proposal he must necessarily have some will. And he is not less determin'd to will, because he does often suspend willing or chusing in certain cases: for suspending to will is itself, an act of willing; it is willing to defer willing about the matter propos'd. In fine, tho' great stress is laid on the case of suspending the will, to prove liberty, yet there is no difference between that and the most common cases of willing and chusing upon the manifest excellency of one object before another. For as when a man wills or chuses living in En​gland before going out of it (in which will he is manifestly determin'd by the satisfaction he has in living in England) he rejects the will to go out of England; so a man who suspends a will about any matter, wills doing nothing in it at present, or rejects for a time willing about it; which circumstances of wholly rejecting, and rejecting for a time, make no variation that affects the question. So that willing, or chusing suspension, is like all other choices or wills we have.
2. Secondly, let us now see, whether we are at liberty to will or chuse one or the other of two or more objects. Now as to this, we will, first, consider, whether we are at liberty to will one of two or more objects wherein we discern any difference: that is, where one upon the whole seems less hurtful than another. And this will not admit of much dispute, if we consider what willing is. Willing or preferring, is the same with respect to good and evil, that judging is with respect to truth or falshood. It is judging, that one thing is upon the whole better than another, or not so bad as another. Wherefore, as we judge of truth or falshood according to appearances, so we ​must will or prefer as things seem to us, unless we can lye to ourselves, and think that to be worst which we think best.
An ingenious author expresses this matter well when he says, “the question, whether a man be at liberty to will which of the two he pleases, motion or rest; carries the absurdity of it so manifestly in itself, that one might hereby be sufficiently convinc’d, that liberty concerns not the will. For to ask, whether a man be at liberty to will either motion or rest, speaking or silence, which he pleases? is to ask, whether a man can will what he wills, or be pleas’d with what he is pleas’d with? A question that needs no answer.”
To suppose a sensible being capable of willing or preferring, (call it as you please) misery, and refusing good, is to deny it to be really sensible; for every man, while he has his senses, aims at pleasure and happiness, and avoids pain and misery; and this, in willing actions, which are suppos’d to be attended with the most terrible consequences. And therefore the ingenious Mr. Norris very justly observes, that all who com​mit sin, think it at the instant of commission all things consider'd, a lesser evil; Otherwise it is impossible they should commit it: and he instances in St. Peter's denial of his Master, who, he says, judg'd that part most eligible which he chose; that is, judg'd the sin of denying his Master, at that present juncture, to be a less evil, than the danger of not denying him, and so chose it. Otherwise, if he had then actually thought it a greater evil, all that whereby it exceeded the other, he would have chosen gratis, and consequently have willed evil as evil, which is impossible. And another acute Philosopher observes, that there are in France many new converts, who go to mass with great reluctance. They know they mortally offend God, but as each offence would cost them (suppose) two pistoles, and having reckon'd the charge, and finding that this fine, paid as often as there are festivals and Sundays would reduce them and their families to beg their bread, they conclude it is better to offend God than beg.
In fine, tho' there is hardly any thing so absurd, but some ancient philosopher or other may be cited for it; yet, according to Plato, none of them were so ​absurd as to say that men did evil voluntarily; and he asserts, that it is contrary to the nature of man, to follow evil, as evil, and not pursue good; and that when a man is compell’d to chuse between two evils, you will never find a man who chuses the greatest, if it is in his power to chuse the less; and that this is a truth manifest to all. And even the greatest modern advocates for liberty allow, that whatever the will chuseth, it chuseth under the notion of good; and that the object of the will is good in general, which is the end of all human actions.
This I take to be sufficient to shew, that man is not at liberty to will one or the other of two or more objects, between which (all things consider’d) he perceives a difference; and to account truly for all the choices of that kind, which can be assign’d.
But, secondly, some of the patrons of liberty contend, that we are free in our choice among things indifferent, or alike, as in chusing one out of two or more eggs; and that in such cases the man, having no motives from the objects, is not necessitated to chuse one rather than the other, because there is no per​ceivable difference between them, but chuses one by a mere act of willing without any cause but his own free act. To which I answer, 1. First, by asking whether this and other instances like this are the only instances wherein man is free to will or chuse among objects? If they are the only instances where man is free to will or chuse among objects? If they are the only instances wherein man is free to will or chuse among objects, then we are advanc’d a great way in the question; because there are few (if any) objects of the will that are perfectly alike; and because necessity is hereby allow’d to take place in all cases where there is a perceiveable difference in things, and consequently in all moral and religious cases, for the sake whereof such endeavors have been us’d to maintain so absurd and inconsistent a thing as liberty or freedom from necessity. So that liberty is almost, if not quite, reduc’d to nothing, and destroy’d as to the grand end in asserting it. If those are not the only instances wherein man is free to will or chuse among objects, but man is free to will in other cases, these other cases should be assign’d, and not such cases as are of no consequence, and which by the great likeness of the objects to one a​nother, and for other reasons, make the cause of the determination of man's will less easy to be known, and consequently serve to no other purpose but to darken the question, which may be better determin'd by considering, whether man be free to will or no in more important instances. 2. Secondly, I answer, that whenever a choice is made, there can be no equality of circumstances preceding the choice. For in the case of chusing one out of two or more eggs, between which there is no perceivable difference; there is not, nor can there be, a true equality of circumstances and causes preceding the act of chusing one of the said eggs. It is not enough to render things equal to the will, that they are equal or alike in themselves. All the various modifications of the man, his opinions, prejudices, temper, habit, and circumstances are to be taken in, and consider'd as causes of election no less than the objects without us among which we chuse; and these will ever incline or determine our wills, and make the choice we do make, preferable to us, tho' the external objects of our choice are ever so much alike to each other. And, for example, ​in the case of chusing one out of two eggs that are alike, there is, first, in the person chusing will to eat or use an egg. There is, secondly, a will to take but one, or one first. Thirdly, consequent to these two wills, follow in the same instant chusing and taking one; which one is chosen and taken, most commonly, according as the parts of our bodies have been form’d long since by our wills or by other causes, to an habitual practice, or as those parts are determin’d by some particular circumstances at that time. And we may know by reflection on our actions, that several of our choices have been determin’d to one among several objects by these last means, when no cause has arisen from the mere consideration of the objects themselves. For we know by experience, that we either use all the parts of our bodies by habit, or according to some particular cause determining their use at that time. Fourthly, there are in all trains of causes, that precede their effects, and especially effects which nearly resemble each other, certain differences undiscernible on account of their minuteness, and also on account of our not accustoming our​selves to attend to them, which yet in concurrence with other causes, as necessarily produce their effect, as the last feather laid on breaks the horse’s back, and as a grain necessarily turns the balance between any weights, tho’ the eye cannot discover which is the greatest weight or bulk by so small a difference. And I add, that as we know without such discovery by the eye, that if one scale rises and the other falls there is a greater weight in one scale than the other, and also know that the least additional weight is sufficient to determine the scales; so likewise we may know that the least circumstance in the extensive chain of causes that precede every effect, is sufficient to produce an effect; and also know, that there must be causes of our choice (tho’ we do not, or cannot discern those causes) by knowing, that every thing that has a beginning must have a cause. By which last principle we are as necessarily led to conceive a cause of action in man, where we see not the particular cause itself; as we are to conceive that a greater weight determines a scale, tho’ our eyes discover no difference between the two weights.
​But let us put a case of true equality or Indifference, and what I have asserted will more manifestly appear true. Let two eggs appear perfectly alike to a man; and let him have no will to eat or use eggs. (For so the case ought to be put, to render things perfectly indifferent to him; because, if once a will to eat eggs be suppos'd, that will must necessarily introduce a train of causes which will ever destroy an equality of circumstances in relation to the things which are the objects of our choice. There will soon follow a second will to eat one first. And these two wills must put the man upon action, and the usages of the parts of his body to obtain his end; which parts are determin'd in their motions either by some habitual practice or by some particular circumstance at that time, and cause the man to chuse and take one of them first rather than the other.) The case of equality being thus rightly stated, I say, it is manifest no choice would or could be made; and the Man is visibly prevented in the beginning from making a choice. For every man experiences, that before he can make a choice among eggs, he must ​have a will to eat or use an egg; otherwise he must let them alone. And he also experiences, in relation to all things which are the objects of his choice, that he must have a precedent will to chuse; otherwise he will make no choice. No man marries one woman preferably to another, or travels into France rather than into another countrey, or writes a book on one subject rather than another, but he must first have a precedent will to marry, travel and write.
It is therefore contrary to experience, to suppose any choice can be made under an equality of circumstances. And by consequence it is matter of experience, that man is ever determin'd in his willing or acts of volition and choice.
Doing as we will.4. Fourthly, I shall now consider the actions of men consequent to willing, and see whether he be free in any of those actions. And here also we experience perfect necessity. If we will thinking or deliberating on a subject, or will reading, or walking, or riding, we find we must do those actions, unless some external impediment, as an apoplexy, or some intervening cause, hinders us; and then we are as much necessitated to let an ​action alone, as we are to act according to our will, had no such external impediment to action happen'd. If also we change our wills after we have begun any of these actions, we find we necessarily leave off these actions and follow the new will or choice. And this was Aristotle's sense of such actions of man. As, says he, in arguing we necessarily assent to the inference or conclusion drawn from premises, so if that arguing relate to practice, we necessarily act upon such inference or conclusion. As for example, when we argue thus, whatever is sweet is to be tasted, this is sweet; he who infers, therefore this ought to be tasted, necessarily tastes that sweet thing if there be no obstacle to hinder him.
For a conclusion of this argument from experience, let us compare the actions of inferior intelligent and sensible agents, and those of men together. It is allow'd that beasts are necessary agents, and yet there is no perceivable difference between their actions and the actions of men, from whence they should be deem'd necessary and men free agents. Sheep, for example, are suppos'd to be necessary agents, when they stand still, ​lie down, go slow or fast, turn to the right or left, skip, as they are differently affected in their minds; when they are doubtful or deliberate which way to take; when they eat or drink out of hunger and thirst; when they eat or drink more or less according to their humour, or as they like the water or the pasture; when they chuse the sweetest and best pasture; when they chuse among pastures that are indifferent or alike; when they copulate; when they are fickle or stedfast in their amours; when they take more or less care of their young; when they act in virtue of vain fears; when they apprehend danger and fly from it, and sometimes defend themselves; when they quarrel among themselves about love or other matters, and terminate those quarrels by fighting; when they follow those leaders among themselves that presume to go first; and when they are either obedient to the shepherd and his dog or refractory. And why should man be deem’d free in the performance of the same or like actions? He has indeed more knowledge than sheep. He takes in more things, as matter of pleasure, ​than they do; being sometimes mov’d with notions of honour and virtue, as well as with those pleasures he has in common with them. He is also more mov’d by absent things, and things future, than they are. He is also subject to more vain fears, more mistakes and wrong actions, and infinitely more absurdities in notions. He has also more power and strength, as well as more art and cunning, and is capable of doing more good and more mischief to his fellow-men than they are to one another. But these larger powers and larger weaknesses which are of the same kind with the powers and weaknesses of sheep, cannot contain liberty in them, and plainly make no perceivable difference between them and men, as to the general causes of action, in finite intelligent and sensible beings, no more than the different degrees of these powers and weaknesses, among the various kinds of beasts, birds, fishes, and reptiles do among them. Wherefore I need not run thro’ the actions of foxes or any of the more subtile animals, nor the actions of children, which are allow’d by the Advocates of liberty to be all necessary. I shall only ask these questions ​concerning the last. To what age do children continue necessary agents, and when do they become free? what different experience have they when they are suppos’d to be free agents, from what they had while necessary agents? And what different actions do they do from whence it appears, that they are necessary agents to a certain age, and free agents afterwards?
* ↑ I do not mean unknown simple Ideas. These can at first only be made known by application of the object to the faculty: but when they have been once perceiv'd, and a common name agreed upon to signify them, they can be communicated by Words.
* ↑ J’ai parcouru le nouveau Livre du Pere Malebranche centre Mr. Arnauld: & j’y ai moins compris que jamais sa pretention, que les Idées, par lesquelles nous connoiffons les Objets, sont en Dieu, & non dans notre Ame. Il y a là du mal-entendu: ce sont, ce me semble, des equivoques perpetuelles. Letter of the 16th of October, 1705, to Mr. Des Maizeaux.
* ↑ Opera p. 3968. Ed. Gron.
* ↑ Placette Eclairciss. sur la Liberté, p. 2.
* ↑ Jaquelot, sur l’exist. de Dieu, p. 381.
* ↑ Lock’s Essay of Human Underst. Book II. c. XXI. §. 8.
* ↑ Fabricii Bibl. Gr. Vol. IV. 63. Vossius de Sect. Phil. c. 18.
* ↑ De fato. p.m. 57.
* ↑ Bp. Bramhall’s. Works, p. 735.
* ↑ p. 697.
* ↑ p. 702.
* ↑ Le Clerc Bibl. Chois. Tom. xii. p,10.3, 104.
* ↑ Opera Tom. 9. p. 1215.
* ↑ Bibl. Chois. Tom. xii. p. 51.
* ↑ Expos., p. 117.
* ↑ Pag. 27.
* ↑ Printed at Basil.
* ↑ King de Orig. Mali. p. 91, 127.
* ↑ Pag. 99.
* ↑ Pag. 105,
* ↑ Pag. 117.
* ↑ Opera Vol. I. p. 198, 199, 200.
* ↑ Letters, p. 521.
* ↑ Alexander de Fato p. 10.
* ↑ Reeves’s Apol. vol. 1. p. 150. Sherlock of Prov. p. 66.
* ↑ Dictionnaire, p. 1497. 2d. edit.
* ↑ Letter of the 13 of December, 1696, to the Abbott du Bos.
* ↑ De Orig. mali. c. 5.
* ↑ Remarques fur le liv. de l’Orig. du mal, p. 76.
* ↑ Pag. 84.
* ↑ Journal des Savans of the 16 of March 1505.
* ↑ Locke’s Works. p. l, 2.
* ↑ Academ. Quest. lib. 2.
* ↑ Pyrrhon. Hypot. l. 2. c. 10.
* ↑ Locke of Hum. Und. l. 2. c. 21.
* ↑ Locke’s Essay of Human Und. l. 2. c. 21. sect. 25.
* ↑ Theory of Love, p. 199.
* ↑ Bayle Response aux Ques. &c. vol. 3. p. 756.
* ↑ Opera. Edit. Serran. vol. 1. p. 345, 346.
* ↑ Opera Edit. Serran. vol. I. p. 345, 346.
* ↑ Bramhall’s Works, p. 656, and 658.
* ↑ Ethica, l. 7, c. 5, ap. Opera Edit. Par. Vol. II. p. 88, &c.
* ↑ Bramhall’s Works, p. 656, 662.
Footnotes