# Transcribed Interview of Kashyap Pramod Patel, (December 9, 2021)/12:07pm

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​Mr. Sofer. Okay. We just—initially, we did a couple of quick housekeeping matters before we started, but we just wanted to confirm that this is, in fact, a closed hearing, that there's no members of the media or anybody else—I mean, we obviously saw many members of the media running around right outside the door, but I just wanted to confirm that it wasn't being piped into any other public forum or anything like that.
Nope, not at all.
No. The rules, Gregg, as we explained by phone, provide this is an executive session of the select committee, so it's not a public proceeding. No press, no one other than the people in the room. I see your lawyer, Mr. Jensen, and—
Mr. Sofer. Well, he's not technically my lawyer. I wish he was.
. Right, you're correct. So, no, that's correct, no other participants.
Mr. Sofer. Okay. And we're going to have just—I want to understand the process. We'll have some exhibits, including we want the opening statement obviously to be made part of the record.
. Sure.
Mr. Sofer. We'll have some other exhibits we'd like to be made part of the record. Is there—I'm used to courtrooms, not rooms like this, so tell us what—how you would like us to proceed procedurally with respect to exhibits.
. In terms of you providing us exhibits?
Mr. Sofer. Yeah, I mean, as we go through them, or do you want us to stop and say we'd like this to be—we've marked them already. I just want to do it in a way that's smooth for the committee.
. I'm sure it will be fine. Yeah, we'll coordinate on it. If you've marked your own numbers, that's fine. I'll mark this as 53. I think we're up to ​exhibit 53.
Mr. Sofer. Okay.
# # # # # # # # nmmmmm— — —. Okay?
Mr. Sofer. Okay. Great.
# # # # # # # # nmmmmm— — —. Anything else?
Mr. Sofer. No. Anybody else? I think we're ready to proceed.
The Witness. Jeff, do you got anything?
Mr. Jensen. No, I do not. Thank you.
. Okay. This is a deposition of Mr. Kash Patel conducted by the House Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, pursuant to House Resolution 503.
Could you all state your names for the record, please?
Mr. Sofer. Sure.
Ms. Lomax. Brittany Lomax with Husch Blackwell.
Mr. Sofer. Gregg Sofer with Husch Blackwell.
The Witness. Kashyap Patel.
Mr. Glabe. Scott Glabe, Husch Blackwell.
Mr. Jensen. Jeff Jensen with Husch Blackwell.
# # # # # # # # nmmmmm— — —. Great. On this side, the select committee members, my name is . I'm the senior investigative counsel.
# # # # # # nmmm— — —. I'm . I'm the chief investigative counsel.
# # # # # # nmmm— — —. I'm , investigative counsel.
. , researcher.
. And also on Webex is , a staffer, as well as—I think that's it.
​# # # # # # # # nmmmmm— — —. .
# # # # # # # # # # nmmmmmmm— — —. .
Under the House deposition rules, neither committee members nor staff members may discuss the substance of testimony provided today unless the committee approves release. You and your attorney will have an opportunity to review the transcript.
I should say that there may be members who appear via Webex, and I'll do my best to acknowledge once they are on the Webex platform. They do have the opportunity to ask questions as well.
Let me give you some ground rules. We will follow the House rules that were provided to you as part of the subpoena that you had. Under the House deposition rules, counsel for other persons or government agencies may not attend. You are permitted to have an attorney present, as obviously you do.
There is an official reporter transcribing the record of this deposition. Please wait until each question is completed before you begin your response so there's not overtalk. Obviously, the stenographer cannot record nonverbal responses. We ask that you provide complete answers based on your best recollection, and if my questions are not clear, please ask at me to clarify them.
If you need any time to consult with your attorney, feel free to do so. We'll pause. As I mentioned to Mr. Glabe, there's no rounds of questions. We'll take a break maybe every hour if you need one, and at every kind of turn of topic, I'll see if there's additional questions from staffers or from members.
If you refuse to answer a question based on privilege, staff may either respond with the deposition on seeking a ruling from the chairman on the objection, which is a separate proceeding we can talk about. But I want to remind you that it is unlawful to ​deliberately provide false information to Congress.
Since this is a deposition under oath, I'm going to ask to swear you in, if you could stand and take that oath.
Court Reporter. Do you solemnly declare and affirm under the penalty of perjury that the testimony you shall give will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth?
The Witness. I do. Thank you.
Mr. Sofer. Can I just—I'm sorry to interrupt already—
# # # # # # # # nmmmmm— — —. Sure.
Mr. Sofer. —but can I just ask a couple quick questions? Are the two of you the only people that are going to be asking questions in this room other than the potential members who join us?
# # # # # # # # nmmmmm— — —. Yes.
# # # # # # nmmm— — —. Yes.
Mr. Sofer. Okay. And I just want to warn everyone that we were told this was going to be a 4-hour block, and we're up against a—my flight in particular, so it's a pretty hard stop.
# # # # # # # nmmmm— — —. We should get started.
Mr. Sofer. So we're willing to push as quickly as we can.
# # # # # # # nmmmm— — —. Great. Mr. Patel, I see that you have an opening statement that you'd like to provide. I've marked it as exhibit 53, but go ahead and read it or submit it for the record.
. If you want to read it, you can, or if you want in the interest of time.
The Witness. I'd appreciate it if I could read it into the record. Thank you.
​# # # # # # nmmm— — —. Sure.
The Witness. Members of the select committee and staff, good afternoon. I am here today because I am willing and able to share with you and the American people the truth about the events of January 6th, including the Department of Defense's preparation for and response to the unrest at the Capitol.
I am and will remain proud of my 16 years in public service, including during the Trump administration. Let me say unequivocally that I have no information about and never would have participated in any attempt to improperly maintain power following the conclusion of President Trump's term.
I'm also proud to have been the first person of color to serve in several of the positions that I held in government.
I want to state for the record that I'm here voluntarily, and the subpoena served on me on September 24th was not necessary to secure my appearance. The committee contacted me privately and asked me to voluntarily could've contact me—excuse me—provide information as it has done for dozens, if not hundreds, of other witnesses. Instead I—
Mr. Sofer. Slow down for the stenographer.
The Witness. Sorry. I should know that.
Instead, I first learned that I had been issued a subpoena without prior reach from the committee when members of the media contacted me on the evening of September 23rd on my personal cell phone. I had still yet to be served with a subpoena or any notice of it.
I was subsequently the victim of vile, racist, and physically threatening messages. To quote some, "Pack your fucking carpet bag and start swimming, you fucking treasonous bitch. America is going to chew you up and they'll slice that fucking sand ​monkey neck of yours in prison on day one. They always need a couple token niggers to use. We may even be able to execute you bastards, cut your fucking head off the way they do in your country. You are a traitor and will pay," end quote.
These threats have been reported to the FBI and marked as exhibit—our exhibit 1 for entry into the record.
Mr. Sofer. So we have that exhibit here, and it's marked as K. Patel Exhibit No. 1. We'd like to submit it for the record.
. Great. Thank you.
Mr. Sofer. I ask that it be made part of the record.
. You can just pass it to the reporter. Thanks.
The Witness. I was therefore extremely upset when, after these threats of violence were made known to the committee, Representative Schiff personally attacked me in an October 14th New York Times podcast as a, quote, "evil Zelig," end quote, and part of a group of, quote, "unscrupulous," end quote, advisers.
These inflammatory remarks caused me to question whether I could or would receive a fair hearing before this committee. Nevertheless, my attorneys communicated my continued willingness to appear and answer your questions.
On October 19th, they were told that I had been subpoenaed because the committee had incorrectly assumed that I would not be cooperative. During that meeting, committee staff expressly reclassified me as a cooperative witness and committed to withdrawing the subpoena in connection with my agreement to appear for a voluntary interview.
On November 20th, the committee abruptly reversed course. During a call on November 20th, staff apologized for misleading my lawyers while insisting that I appear under subpoena. The committee then showed extreme reluctance when we tried to ​find a mutual—mutually agreeable date for testimony this week.
On Monday, December 6th, our final preparations were disrupted when we were made aware that the committee had been provided 3,000 additional pages of DOD documents that we were first able to access on Tuesday, just 2 days ago. Additionally, among the exhibits transmitted to my team by the committee on Monday were several documents to which I had not previously been given access.
Much of what has transpired to date, included but not limited to those events I've just described, lead me to question the fundamental fairness of these proceedings. Nevertheless, I am here of my own volition and plan to answer your questions to the best of my ability.
As a former congressional senior staffer, I understand and appreciate the role of this body and the value of congressional oversight. However, to provide additional context, in the extent—excuse me—in the event I am unable to answer any of your questions, I wanted to highlight some concerns I have about the proceedings today.
The events about today, which you are inquiring, occurred 11 months ago or more. I do not, as I sit here today, have a clear recollection of these specifics of the—of that period of time and do not want to speculate or guess when answering your questions. I know that the committee respects my need to ensure that my answers are completely accurate.
As you know, I am no longer a United States Government employee and do not have access to my own government communications or records that relate to your questions to the extent that such records exist. DOD has made available to us certain documents that it has produced to the committee, and these documents likely represent just a small fraction of the official records relevant to the topics you have indicated that you wish to discuss. My attorneys have requested your assistance in facilitating access ​to additional records. Without such access, my recollection may be particularly limited.
As you know, I have a deep background in national security matters. My priority has always been the national security of the United States. I believe that many of the communications, records, and facts related to certain lines of inquiry are classified. Specifically, many matters relating to defense, intelligence, and foreign policy, including communications with and among senior White House officials about such matters are classified.
To date, neither I nor my attorneys have been cleared to review or provided with access to any classified information related to this inquiry. Indeed, to the extent that I have knowledge of classified information relevant to this inquiry, I am unable to share or discuss it with my attorneys. As I'm sure you will understand, I must err on the side of protecting classified information, and thus not may be able to answer certain questions that appear to call for a classified answer.
The select committee was authorized by House Resolution 503. Pursuant to section 4 thereof, the committee's functions are to, quote, "investigate the facts, circumstances, and causes relating to the domestic terrorist attack on the Capitol; identify, review, and evaluate the causes of and the lessons learned from the domestic terror attack on the Capitol; and issue a final report to the House containing finding, conclusion, and recommendation for corrective measures," end quote.
Given the legislative purpose set forth in H.R. 503, I was therefore astounded by some of the potential lines of inquiry, many expressly derived, according to staff, from books such as Bob Woodward and Robert Costa's "Peril," that were shared with my attorneys before today's deposition. These topics include but are not limited to personnel changes at DOD in November 2020, 2 months before January 6th; my potential appointments to CIA and/or FBI; a purported directive about withdrawal from Somalia ​and Afghanistan.
Although I am here voluntarily to answer as many questions as possible, I request the committee explain how questions on topics—
Mr. Sofer. Slow down.
The Witness. Sorry. I should know this. We used to work together.
I request that the committee explain how questions on topics with no discernible connection to H. Res. 503 serve a, quote, "valid, legislative purpose," end quote, as required by Supreme Court precedent.
Although I was a DOD official on January 6th, I understand the committee may wish to ask me about events that occurred while I was a senior White House official at the National Security Council, as well as about directed communications I may have had with the President and some of his most senior advisers. I am aware that former President Trump has initiated litigation, which is currently ongoing, to block the release of certain records from the National Archives and could take similar action with respect to the testimony of myself and others.
To the extent the committee's questions today implicate core executive privilege concerns, I'm committed to trying to expeditiously resolve any issues, including by consulting with representatives of the current and former President, if necessary.
However, I want to state for the record my serious concerns about how the committee's attempt to bulldoze any and all claims of executive privilege, which is virtually unprecedented, infringes on the separation of powers and will likely have a negative, long-term consequence of the effect—of the effective functioning of the executive branch.
Because some, including in this room or on video, have mistakenly claimed that I was unqualified for the positions I held or was considered for, I want to briefly describe ​my career up to and including my service in the Trump administration.
I have devoted the vast majority of my professional career to public service and the protection of American lives and liberties. I started my legal career as a State public defender, where I safeguarded the rights of individuals'—charged with serious criminal offenses—standing for due process.
I then became an assistant Federal public defender representing individuals charged with, among other things, complex international and national security related crimes that included narcotrafficking, arms, human smuggling, and large-scale fraud.
During the Obama administration, I joined the Justice Department's National Security Division where I led investigations and oversaw prosecutions of terrorists aligned with Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups. I also served as DOJ's liaison to Joint Special Operation Command, where I worked closely with our Nation's most elite and effective terrorism—counterterrorism units.
In 2017, I became a congressional staffer and served as national security advisor and senior counsel for counterterrorism for the U.S. House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. In these roles, I conducted oversight of sensitive programs and worked on legislation to authorize funding for intelligence and counterterrorism operations worldwide.
In 2019, I joined the National Security Council, where I held several positions and eventually served as deputy assistant to the President, senior director for counterterrorism.
In early 2020, I was asked to serve on detail as the principal deputy to the Acting Director of National Intelligence, whom I assisted in leading 17 intelligence community agencies. I also worked to prioritize the collection of intelligence to focus on hard targets and global threats.
​In November of 2020, I was asked to serve as chief of staff at the Department of Defense, and thereby became a senior member of a leadership team responsible for, among other things, a budget over $700 billion and nearly 3 million employees. It was one of the greatest honors of my life to be able to serve the American people in this capacity. My time at DOD was extremely eventful. In addition to the matters we will discuss today, I was deeply involved in and most of my time was devoted to senior-level operational decisions to counter our adversaries around the globe.
With respect to the events surrounding unrest at the Capitol, I supported the Acting Secretary in my role as his chief of staff. Additionally, I directed the creation of a timeline of events that my lawyers have marked as exhibit 2, I believe, but—
Mr. Sofer. And we'd ask at this time that the committee receive that exhibit into the record. It's a 9-page document marked as K. Patel Exhibit 2.
The Witness. Additionally, I directed the creation of a timeline of events that my lawyers have marked as exhibit 2 and would like to submit for the record. Thank you.
# # # # # # # # nmmmmm— — —. Great
The Witness. This timeline was created and signed off by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of the Army, and other sections within the Department of Defense.
Although I look forward to discussing these events in detail, I would like to make three things clear at the outset—excuse me—at the outset: One, the actions the DOD took before January 6, 2021, to prepare for the planned protest in Washington, D.C., on January 5th and 6th, 2021, were appropriate, supported by requirements, consistent with the DOD's roles and responsibilities, and compliant with laws, regulations, and other applicable guidance; two, the DOD's actions to respond to the United States Capitol Police request for assistance on January 6th, 2021, were appropriate, supported by ​requirements, consistent with the DOD's roles and responsibilities, and compliant with the laws, regulations, and other applicable guidance; and, three, DOD officials did not delay or obstruct the DOD's response to the United States Capitol Police request for assistance on January 6th, 2021.
These are not just my words but, in fact, the findings of the DOD's independent inspector general under President Biden's administration. The IG's November 16, 2021, report has marked—has been marked as exhibit 3, I think.
Mr. Sofer. Three, uh-huh.
The Witness. And I respectfully request to submit it for the record.
Mr. Sofer. And I'll hand it to the committee for entrance into the record as well, the whole report.
The Witness. In conclusion, thank you for the opportunity to provide these opening remarks, which I respectfully request to enter into the record along with the accompanying exhibits, and I look forward to your questions.
# # # # # # # # nmmmmm— — —. Great. Thanks, Mr. Patel. I'm not going to address each point you made in your statement, but I appreciate the statement. I understand your concerns.
A couple things off the bat. Any question I ask that you think might trigger a classified answer, I'm asking it in a nonclassified way. If you feel you have to—if it triggers some sort of classified answer, you can let us know, but it's certainly—this is an unclassified interview, and I don't expect or intend to get into classified information.
As far as the scope concerns, we can address that when a topic that you think is outside the scope of the House resolution when we begin to address such topic.
I just want to spend a minute on your section on executive privilege where you stated you're committed to trying to expeditiously resolve these issues, including by ​consulting with representatives of the current and former President. I just want to make sure that you and your counsel were aware of the letter received by DOD counsel from the White House. Do you have this?
Mr. Sofer. I don't know. I'd have to take a look at it.
. This is the letter provided from Jonathan Su to Mr. Richards, which states that the—the second paragraph sentence says, "Despite"—
. Excuse me, . It's in your binder, I think, Mr. Sofer. Yeah.
The Witness. Yeah. Thank you.
. Great. I'll wait until you have it.
Mr. Sofer. Is this—this is the December 7th letter?
. Uh-huh.
Mr. Sofer. Okay. Yeah.
. "Despite efforts made to do so, we have been unable to discuss with Mr. Patel's counsel the nature of Mr. Patel's communications with former President Trump and his advisers about the events that are subject of the planned interview. For that reason, we are unable to provide specific guidance regarding any privileges that may be associated with those communications," which seems in contrast to your statement that you would consult with representatives of the current President.
So I just wanted to give you an opportunity to address that, as well as acknowledge that several representatives that have joined us today, including Representative Cheney, Representative Kinzinger, and Representative Aguilar, and Representative Lofgren. And then we can start with your—with January 6th itself.
Mr. Sofer. Can we just respond? Mr. Glabe would like to briefly respond to your concern regarding the letter of December 7th.
. Sure.
​Mr. Glabe. Sure. Thanks for bringing the letter to our attention. I think, as we've endeavored to communicate, our position is that, if there are questions or topics that implicate core executive privilege concerns, we'd rather address those in a concrete manner rather than in the abstract. But, that being said, I just want to reiterate that our client is here of his own volition, and our hope and his hope is that he's able to answer as many of your questions as possible today.
The Witness. Can I just say good morning to the Representatives? It's nice to see you all again, and thank you for joining.
# # # # # # # # nmmmm— — —. Scott, I think the question was, were efforts made to communicate with Mr. Patel's attorneys, and were those efforts met or not met? I didn't get your answer.
Mr. Glabe. Maybe we could touch base on that offline.
# # # # # # # # nmmmm— — —. Okay. All right. We'll follow up on his efforts to kind of resolve this with the current and former President.
EXAMINATION
    BY :
Q So I appreciate you going through your career background, Mr. Patel, so I won't go through it as I had planned to. Do you have one kind of highlight that you think, in terms of your 16-year background, that you're most proud of that you—
A I wasn't expecting that. I guess, one that stands out is the night we killed al-Baghdadi when I was senior director for counterterrorism at the National Security Council. It's probably one of the most memorable moments for me in government.
Q I know you started in at DOD coming straight from the NSC, is that right, I think in your—
A Yes. Yeah, I think you have that right.
​Q And, in the NSC role, were you an advisor to the—to the President himself, or was there a layer of—in between you and the President?
A I think if you could help me the navigate what timeline you're referring to because, as I stated in my opening, I served as a couple of roles—
Q Sure.
A —while I—
Q Right before DOD.
A Right before DOD. Thank you. So I think that's about the summer, fall-ish of 2020, my best estimation. I was the deputy assistant to the President, which means I was a credentialed, designated officer of the President of the United States; and I was the senior director for counterterrorism, which meant I was the individual responsible for the entire counterterrorism directorate, where we had approximately anywhere from, ballpark, 8 to 16 directors under me working on various portfolios. And they reported through me. And depending on the topic, I reported to the—what's called the APNSA, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, which was Robert O'Brien, Ambassador O'Brien, and then he would report to the President. But, again, depending on what topic, sometimes that system varies.
Q Were there times when you reported directly to the President depending upon what the topic was?
A Yes. Thank you for that clarification. Depending on the topic, and also I was one of the few individuals who were charged with the—as the what we call national security rep. So I took numerous trips with the President
On a lot of those trips, the ambassador was not present. It was usually myself, him, or another one of the few individuals who were read into those programs. So I ​might have had contact directly on those flights.
Q Got it. And how long did you have this position where you were a little bit closer to the President than the other—than the positions that preceded it?
A So I'm not entirely sure. I didn't—I didn't check those dates before coming in today, but I would—it—my best guess would be for most of 2020 or the bulk of 2020—
Q Got it.
A —I think, is a fair way to put it.
Q So would you say—would you estimate you had daily contact with Robert O'Brien and you might have daily contact with the President himself?
A It honestly just depended on the day.
Q Did you feel that you—it's been described that you were a trusted ally of the President. Do you think that's accurate?
A I'm not sure who said that, but I was told to do a job, and that was to run the counterterrorism portfolio and assist the President on national security matters as they arose during his travels, and I tried to fulfill that to the best of my ability.
Q Did you advise him on issues other than just national security issues?
A As I sit here today, not having looked at any of my work from the National Security Council, emails or logs or anything, I don't believe so. I think he and I probably talked about sports was a common topic. When you're stuck in an airplane for 6, 10, 17 hours, other matters come up.
Q Both New York guys?
A We're both from Queens.
Q Did you work with Chris Miller before the DOD appointment?
A Yes. Former Acting Secretary of Defense Chris Miller and I have known ​each other for some years. I don't know exactly how long. We have crossed paths. Acting Secretary Miller was an Army Special Forces officer. I served in JSOC. He served in some elite units other than that, and we've had some crossover on counterterrorism and national security matters going back years, as best as I can recall sitting here today, without having looked at any of the documents to help.
Q Is it—while you were at NSC, was Chris Miller the head of NCTC? Does that sound right?
A Sorry.
[Discussion off the record.]
The Witness. Yeah, no, that's a good point. Thank you. Okay. So, okay, that timeline is, as best I recall, and, again, I don't recall seeing those—that material in the documents we reviewed to prepare today, so I'm going to guess as best I can.
When I first got to the NSC, I believe Chris was the senior director for counterterrorism. And, if I recall, he was transitioning out to become the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations in Low-Intensity Conflict at the Pentagon. And I was transitioning into that seat, so he and I had a bunch of crossover in those roles.
And then, when I got there, within a couple months, I believe, he and I were both the senior director for counterterrorism while he transitioned out. And then he later became the director of the National Counterterrorism Center at the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
    BY :
Q Okay.
A Yeah.
Q Okay. Thanks for that. I want to spend the first part of our interview here ​with starting with the preparations for January 6th, then going through the day of.
A Uh-huh.
Q Before I do that, I know you gave us this timeline.
A Yes.
Q Is this similar to exhibit 46 that we had provided to you?
A Can I look? Sorry.
Q Yeah, of course.
A I don't have that one.
Q I know there was a number of different timelines, and we'll talk about it—
A Sure.
Q —because I know you will be helpful on that front. There's the D.C. National Guard timeline, the Army timeline, the Sec Defense timeline. But this one that you handed me appears to be exhibit 46.
A I mean, I don't want to waste your time so I'm not going to leaf through it.
Q Right.
A I would ask the committee and I to come to an accommodation that, if it's different, that was not my intention, but I believe them—
Q Okay.
A —to be the same.
Q All right.
A And my memory of these events is largely within the confines of this timeline. I think the only difference between the timeline you have in 46 and the one I provided is a—there's a date difference, but the header is the big difference, I believe.
We did not want to include that header when we were giving this timeline out to, whether it be Members of Congress or the press or whatever decisions were being made. ​That was for internal purposes so we could verify who worked on the timeline, and as you can see, there was 30-some people and seniors that worked on this timeline—
Q Right.
A —that ultimately came together.
Q Okay.
A Sorry.
[Discussion off the record.]
The Witness. Oh, sorry, my counsel has as they should—highlighted that the 46 one is 3 pages. So I had that confused. Your exhibit 46 is 3 pages.
    BY :
Q Uh-huh.
A The one I submitted is about nine, give or take.
Q Okay.
A So I believe the difference, off the top of my head, is there was a short-form timeline that, as I look at the signature block, Captain who is the executive secretary at the Department of Defense, I believe, from my best recollection, we wanted to put something out because so many Members of Congress were asking for information, as they should, because we wanted to put something out for them.
Q Got it.
A And I believe that's the short-form timeline. I don't believe, in my best estimation, that anything substantive would be different from 46 to what I provided.
Q Okay. Great.
Mr. Sofer. Excuse me, one second.
# # # # # # # # nmmmm— — —. Sure.
[Discussion off the record.]
​The Witness. Yeah, and we had to—I'd ask we—actually, that's a great point. So Captain was the ExecSec. He put his signature on this because he was the ExecSec and that's standard operating procedure. But he received some substantial death threats when this timeline leaked to the media, so much so that we had a put a personal security detail on him. And, last I checked, he was still in service and uniform, so if we could just—
    BY :
Q Sure.
A —protect his name going forward.
Q Great. So you—as the chief of staff for Acting Secretary Miller at that time, again, and we'll go back in time to the—your appointment to—over to the position itself, but just, starting with January 6th, when did the preparations, from your perspective, begin?
A From the DOD's perspective?
Q Yes.
A So, again, I would refer you to our—the timeline I submitted, and I believe in that exhibit the first date is December 31, 2020. So I would estimate on or about then without having access to other underlying documents, is my—is what I can best recall now when there was an engagement from Muriel—excuse me, Mayor Bowser of D.C. and her team with the D.C. National Guard request. There may have been conversations prior to that, I'm just—I can't recall.
Q Were you aware of the January 6th event prior to the Mayor Bowser event—letter coming to request D.C. National Guard?
A Was I aware of her request for the National Guard?
Q No, were you aware that the January 6th Joint Session and the rally that was ​planned prior to the request for National Guard by Mayor Bowser?
A I believe, from my memory, the best I can recall, is that it had come in to the Department in some format, the Department of Defense. And there was we analyzed, as we routinely do, security assistance we could provide. So that's what probably generated it, is my guess, is Mayor Bowser's office or the Capitol Police called the—someone at the Department of Defense.
And, if it relates to the National Guard, the way the chain of command works is, the National Guard reports to the Secretary of the Army; then he reports into the Office of Secretary of Defense. So, probably in DOD land where you have 3 million people working, someone in the Sec Army's office probably got notified by Mayor Bowser on or before December 31st, and around there it came up to us in the Office of Secretary of Defense, but there could have been a delay. I don't know.
Q What was your understanding of the threat landscape going into January 6th?
A My understanding of the threat landscape going into January 6th, without having really viewed any of that intelligence, and I caveat that the DOD did not have the intelligence capabilities or lawfully permitted to collect on domestic citizens. So we relied on partners in law enforcement, the FBI, Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Homeland Security, the U.S. Postal Service, and others to provide us, as we always do, interagency meetings at medium and senior levels. And I believe there may have been an exchange at those levels of the threat or possible threats of violence.
We had instructed, I believe—Acting Secretary Miller and I had instructed our team to, as we do with other matters, highlight significant issues, especially in security, for anything, be it the Inauguration or Jan. 6th and bring it up to our attention through the chain of command, which was the process.
​Q So what was brought to your attention, if you remember, concerning January 6th?
A I'm not sure as I sit here today. If you have a document I could look at, happy to do that. I'm not saying nothing was or a bunch was, I just don't know, unless—if you could point to something in the documents, I can take a look.
Q Sure. We can start with—well, we can start with some of these calls that have occurred in preparation for the January 6th. I think exhibit 15 is a call that was set up for January 2nd, and then exhibit 13 is the mayor's request herself. But, if we could just go back to what you said, that DOD obviously, you explained, does not collect domestic intelligence, and you rely on your law enforcement partners.
A That's correct.
Q Where you were, as the chief of staff, was there one law enforcement partner that was relied on more than the other, meaning did you rely on DHS a lot more than the Bureau or—based upon—and I won't—if you could add some context to your own experience in the intelligence community. Did you feel that the information you were receiving portrayed an accurate picture going into the 6th?
A So I'm going from memory because I haven't had any of the Bureau cables, the FBI's cables to look at in over a year. In my opinion—and being a former Federal prosecutor, maybe I'm biased—but I relied on the FBI heavily for law enforcement capabilities and knew they had the relationships with police, i.e., the Capitol Police, the MPD, the Metropolitan Police Department, and the mayor's office to provide law enforcement-related intelligence that they collect to the Department as it was needed.
We also talked to DHS, the Department of Homeland Security, frequently on similar issues, but it would vary upon the subject. So that's a general answer of how I think we approached things to January 6th that I can—that—as I can best remember.
​Q Do you remember Secretary Miller or Chairman Milley raising any concern about the potential of the Proud Boys or Oath Keepers attending the rally?
A If you have something I could look at that shows me that we had a meeting or something like that, but as I sit here today, I don't recall having those discussions.
Q Secretary Miller stated on a January 4th interagency call publicly and it was reported in the Senate report that he brought this up, that the Proud Boys and the Oath Keepers and the increased political rhetoric had created an atmosphere that he—
A He, Secretary Miller brought it up?
Q Yes.
A And, look—
Q Does that jog your memory?
A —I've known Secretary Miller a long time. If that's what he said, then that's—you know, he's been a man of his word the entire time I've served with him. So, if that's what he said, then I believe that's what happened.
Whether I was on that call—I was on most calls with the Acting Secretary, but we were doing a million other things at that time. So I might not have been. And I'm happy to get into the other activities we were undertaking if you would like.
Q Non Jan. 6th?
Q Yes.
Q That's okay, just to be time—cognizant of time. Were—did you—
Mr. Sofer. I'm sorry to interrupt, but I guess the point—and we're not trying to slow this down. We want to move. But the reason that that might be important to you is you might think that that was the—this was the only thing going on, and there was a tremendous amount of other things going on, at least that's our understanding talking to our client. He could probably, in 10 seconds or 15 seconds, describe sort of the plate ​of information that—and the portfolio that he was dealing with.
    BY :
Q Sure.
A Yeah, I'll keep it really brief. So DOD's main mission: safeguard the homeland. We were working on numerous theaters of war, including Afghanistan, Somalia, Iraq, Syria, and other places, lots of issues within those theaters. We were working on Operation Warp Speed. DOD was charged with the logistical operation to unload and deploy the vaccine. We were dealing with the National Security Council issues, White House issues, border issues, and also a ton of stuff in space, underwater, and we were also coordinating with our combatant commanders.
But I think the most important thing that we were working on that we were charged with, which I think is relevant here, is the transition. We were charged with handing off the mission from one administration to the other, and I'm sure we'll talk about that, but those are some of the things we were collectively working on.
Q I appreciate that. But, for the interagency calls preparing for January 6th, I believe you said publicly that you were on those calls with the Sec Def, Acting Secretary—
A I believe most of them. I don't think I was on every one, but I think it's fair to say most of them.
Q Before we move off this kind of threat landscape issue, was there anything that concerned you, maybe not what you were seeing from what the Bureau or DHS was providing you, but concerned you just as, you know, a citizen going into January 6th about what might occur?
A I had not seen, as best that I can remember, anything provided by law enforcement partners that caused us a great concern. But what we did preemptively was, if law enforcement, as you know, in order to enact the National Guard, you need ​two things under the law: You need the President's authorization to do so, and you need a request from a mayor, a Governor, or a Federal law enforcement agency.
So, at some point in time, we undertook—because it takes time to employ, deploy, and mobilize the National Guard. We're pulling these people out of their daily lives of being doctors, lawyers, and cops. So we preemptively—I don't know the exact date—prepared slowly, and as—ultimately as you see outlined in the outline that I provided—went to, I believe Mayor Bowser and the Capitol Police and said, "Do you need the National Guard before January 6th?" And I believe—the timeline is the best record, but I believe the timeline says they said—they, the mayor and the Capitol Police said, "No, we don't need National Guard."
Q What prompted you—and we've seen emails where you've—there was back and forth of make sure they—that we ask them and get the dates down for creating the timeline as to when Capitol Police was asked. What prompted DOD or yourself to make sure the Capitol Police did not need any additional help?
A Well, it was one of our responsibilities. It was—we, the Department of Defense, are responsible for the National Guard. And so I believe at the time I was reacting to a number of things that were coming in from FBI and DHS. And I thought, and I believe the Acting Secretary and I believe the Chairman as well, but you'd have to ask them, the DOD's bottom line: Prepare, be prepared, and hope for the best. And we did that across every theater of war and every line of effort we had, including Jan. 6th, as best we could.
Q On—does anyone have any questions on that point?
On exhibit 15 is, "The chairman has confirmed a call for 13:30 today," so that is January 2nd at 1:30. And it states, "The chairman also recommends that a policy representative like Ken Rapuano and an OGC rep participate based on their prior ​experience with this topic."
Do you remember if you were on that call or a part of setting up or discussions after that call?
A Thanks for the exhibit. So what I see is my name on the "To" line with about 20, ballpark-ish, other people. If the Acting Secretary and the Chairman are on the call, there's a good chance I was on the call. I don't have an independent recollection of what was said in that call.
Q Are you familiar with Ken Rapuano?
A Sure, of course.
Q What's his role?
A Mr. Rapuano was a representative in the Under Secretary for Defense for Policy. So, in the structural regime at the Department of Defense, the USDP, is basically, after the Secretary of Defense and the DepSecDef, the USDP is the number three in the chain of command. So it's an important role because they interact—USDP interacts with the White House and the interagency on all policy level decisions. So I think it was smart to have Mr. Rapuano on that call.
[Discussion off the record.]
The Witness. Yeah, sorry. Right, he wasn't the Under Secretary for Defense. He worked in the Under Secretary's office.
    BY :
Q Got it. At any time during the discussions, preparations for January 6th, did the issue of the response of DOD to the summer protests ever was it ever brought up?
A I'm sorry?
Q The DOD's response to the summer 2020 civil unrest, was that ever discussed while you were present in—
​A While I was at DOD, was it discussed—
Q In preparations for January 6th.
A Well, so, yeah, I was not at DOD during the—I think you're referring to the Lafayette Square stuff, if I'm correct.
Q Correct.
A I was at the White House at that time. At DOD, in preparation for the Jan. 6th stuff, I believe, from the best of my recollection, some of those incidents naturally came up because the Department was heavily involved and in the media at the time of the summer incident.
So I think Chairman Milley was, you know, front and center there, and I think he had expressed not a comparison but a how do we use that past incident to prepare better and apply it as a lessons learned for the Department. So I think there was some conversations from my—from what I can recall from the Chairman and possibly the Acting Secretary.
Q Were you aware that—some of the criticism that DOD received as part of their response to the summer?
A I recall reading the media, and, as I said, I was at the White House. So I'm not sure if I was there on the day of, but, yes, I remember.
Q Did—do you remember any more details as far as those discussions from Chairman Milley or Acting Secretary Miller?
A Yeah, I think same thing. If you have something I could look at—
Q Sure.
A —that that could jog my memory, sure, I'm happy to; but, independently, not off the top of my head.
Q Well, are you familiar with the report the Army did concerning—
​A Which—sorry.
Q And I believe it's actually in the IG report as well in terms of some of the scrutiny the DOD received, such as the low-flying helicopters.
A Sorry. Do you have the number?
Q Sure. Well, it's in your own IG report there, and then let me give you the Army report. It's exhibit 48.
A Oh, okay.
Q Exhibit 48 is the report of U.S. Army operations. On page 2 there, letter D, lessons learned from civil disturbance in D.C. in June 2020.
A So, sorry, what's the question? I'm reading it, but what's the question?
Q The question is, were you involved in and does that jog your memory as to any additional discussions that were had about the scrutiny DOD received during the summer and how it impacted the preparations for January 6th?
A I don't believe so, but I just want to highlight that this report was produced on March 18, 2021, a few months after I'd left. So I haven't spent too much time looking at this report, but this paragraph does not jog my memory for anything else.
Q Okay.
Mr. Glabe. And let me just state for the record that it appears the referenced paragraph recounts events up to—that occurred from after the summer of 2020 through approximately November 8, 2020. And Mr. Patel joined Department of Defense just around that time, shortly after the election. So I don't have the day off the top of my head, but point being that these—these sort of paragraphs refer to events that largely, if not entirely, took place before he joined the Department of Defense.
    BY :
Q The greater point of the paragraphs are how that summer impacted the ​preparations for January 6th. And I understand if you haven't had the opportunity to review it, but that's the point of those paragraphs.
A Okay.
Q Were you involved in the January 5th memo that Secretary Miller drafted in response to the guidelines for the D.C. National Guard?
A Yeah, which memo, the number?
Q I'll show you the number. It would be 51.
A Okay.
Q Do you recognize that?
A Yes, I recognize this document. Thank you. Dated Jan. 4, 2021?
Q Right.
A Yes.
Q Were you involved in drafting that or discussions leading up to that memo?
A From my recollection of what I see here, naturally I would have been involved as the Acting Secretary's chief of staff. And, in summary, I'll let the memo speak for itself, but it's just the limitations that were placed on the D.C. National Guard by the mayor.
And under the law and what the Department of Defense has to do is they cannot go outside the lines of what the request for National Guard was. And, in this instance, the mayor did not want them armed or body guarded or kitted out in any way, and this outlines that. This then gets pushed down to the Secretary of the Army, and the Secretary of the Army then sends it to Commanding General Walker of the D.C. National Guard.
Q Okay. But are you kind of aware of the background or the backdrop about some of these guidelines that were put in place, putting aside what the mayor's request ​was for the 340 unarmed guardsmen?
A I'm not sure why the mayor requested that. I'm guessing what you're saying is it relates to the summer incident. It may have, but I didn't have any conversations with the mayor on—
Q Not with the mayor, within DOD. It's been told to us by DOD officials that these guidelines were based in part on a memo that was issued by Secretary Esper that was issued after the summer protests, in response to the summer protests. And this memo came, for example: To employ the—without my subsequent, personal authorization, the D.C. National Guard is not authorized the following.
A I've not read the Esper memo that you're referencing. I don't believe I've seen it. But, to my memory, I remember the Acting Secretary and I and the Chairman had some discussions about how should we best proceed; are there lessons learned. And we left it to our staff to give us those recommendations who were there at the time, in the summer of 2020, to provide us with those recommendations.
Q Okay. But you don't have any additional context about those—what those lessons learned were?
A Not that I can recall.
Q Okay. Now, prior to this memo being issued on the—
A Oh, can I just add? Sorry.
Q Sure, of course.
A We were keenly aware of the current—the belief at that time that people were not to be armed. That was one of the biggest things that we were aware of and trying to adjudicate while assisting and executing Mayor Bowser's request. The Secretary of the Army would have the back and forth discussions, but we know from the summer, as you alluded, that that was one of the concerns. So I do remember that one ​concern coming from those conversations.
Q Okay. Before this January 5th memo was issued there was a number of interagency calls. Were you—do you remember being on a call on January 4th with other—with the—with DOJ, DHS?
A So, on the—on January 4, 2021, the short answer is probably, but I don't—I haven't seen my call logs. And I think we asked for DOD cables and stuff, but I have no idea.
Q Do you remember any primary concern that was conveyed in terms of the preparations from DOD's perspective as—
A To—
Q To DOJ, DHS, DOI?
A I do remember from those conversations around that time, and my best recollection is that a concern for the Department of Defense was we, DOD, are not the responsive unit under the law for anything related to law enforcement matters.
So I remember the Cabinet Secretaries having those discussions that the FBI and DOJ were the lead law enforcement agency, and I think there was some sort of the proclamation from DOJ that they were, in fact, the lead law enforcement agency, but that's just from my memory.
Q Okay.
A I remember having those conversations.
Q I appreciate that. You stated to the Epoch Times, and I don't have the date of this, that you, quote, "I was on the phone calls on January 4th, 5th, and 6th with the President, the chief of staff, with the Attorney General, with the Department of Homeland Security, and the only person missing from those phone calls was the Director of the FBI. He was nowhere to be found."
​A Do you have a transcript for that? Sorry. Or is it in here?
Q Yeah, it's—I can give you the date of the Epoch Times statement. It would be July 9, 2021.
A So I haven't—if that's the transcript, you know, if there's a transcript of it, we're happy to look at it. I haven't looked at that.
Q Of your own statement? You don't remember making that to Epoch Times?
A Well, it was 6 months ago. I'm not saying I did not make it or did make it; I'm just saying, outside of what you provided, I don't have any other context for that conversation.
Q Okay.
A But, if I made that statement to the Epoch Times and the transcript shows that, then I would, of course, stand by it. But I haven't had a chance to review it.
Q Sure. We can get it printed for you so you can look at that before. My question is, at that time, in July, apparently, you did have a memory about being on these phone calls and made it a point to say that the Director of the FBI was the only person missing from those phone calls.
A That's accurate. So, from some of the phone calls that I remembered at that time and from my memory today, I don't recall Director Wray being on those phone calls with the interagency Cabinet Secretaries and heads of agencies.
Q And why was that significant to you?
A We—I believe, from my best recollection, is that after DOJ and FBI had been designated the lead law enforcement agency, I, as chief of staff for Acting Secretary of Defense, wanted him to have a direct line of contact with his counterpart, the Director of the FBI. And we—if what you're reading is correct, and I have no reason to doubt it, I ​believe that he was not on those phone calls based on my memory at that time.
Q Got it. Do you remember who designated DOJ as the lead Federal agency?
A My understanding is only DOJ can make that designation, but—
Q To themselves?
A —I'm not DOJ anymore.
Q Okay.
Mr. Glabe. Can I ask just one question to go back a minute? You referenced the memo, the Miller memo that's exhibit 51. I think a couple times you called it the January 5th memo, and it's got a January 4 date stamp on it. And I just want to—
# # # # # # # # nmmmm— — —. It's got a January 4th stamp on it? Is that what you're—
The Witness. Is it two different ones, or is it the same one?
    BY :
Q It's the same one.
A Okay.
Q Sorry. I misstated the date. Obviously, Mr. Patel, you worked at DOJ, so you're aware that, as you stated in your statement, that the Attorney General was on that call, correct? They're the boss of the Director of the Bureau?
A Yeah, I think at the time—what was his name?
Q That would have been Rosen.
A Thank you.
Q Sure.
A Rosen, Mr. Rosen was the Acting Attorney General, I believe. And I don't remember all the phone calls off the top of my head, but what we—the information that the Acting Secretary and the chairman were trying to get from law enforcement was not able to be obtained from the acting AG, just didn't have that level of detail, and that's ​why we were seeking what the FBI was doing. And I believe, from the best of my recollection, even the Acting AG said that that would be a matter that the FBI would be aware of; I, the Acting AG, am not aware of those details.
Q But presumably the Acting AG is the head—
A Well, he's his boss, but he admitted to us he didn't know what his subordinate was doing.
Q You remember that on the call?
A In sum and substance, yeah. We were looking for specific law enforcement details, including intelligence, and we couldn't—and what law enforcement was doing to prepare and the Acting AG didn't provide, as best as I can recall, those details.
Q Got it. I want to shift to a meeting that was held at the White House on January 5th. There's no exhibits that go along with this.
A Oh, okay.
Q Unless you want me to print out the Vanity Fair article for you?
A If you're going to cite from it, sure, but—
Q Sure.
A —let's see what you're going to do. I don't know.
Q We'll get those. Do you have a memory of the January 5th meeting at the White House with Secretary Miller?
A I have a meeting of—I—excuse me, I have a memory of many meetings at the White House with Secretary—Acting Secretary Miller in and around that time. Sometimes it may have even been twice a day. I just don't know the ins and outs off the top of my head.
Q This is what—do you remember, I believe few days before, a Vanity Fair reporter was basically embedded with you and Acting Secretary Miller and—
​A Yeah.
Q —went to all the meetings with you all?
A No, no. That's—I don't think that's accurate.
Q Okay.
A So what we did was the Vanity Fair reporter, through our public affairs shop, asked to be embedded for when we went out West to surveil some of our DOD strategic capabilities that were unclassified, and the Department made the decision to allow him to do so. So I don't believe he was in any meetings with us, unless I have it wrong.
Q I think there was a report of the meetings back, but I can read this for you—
A Sure.
Q —and we'll get it printed for you. According to the Vanity Fair article, the January 5th meeting with President Trump on an Iran issue is what Secretary Miller told the reporter.
A Okay.
Q "But then the conversation switched gears. The President, Miller recalled, asked how many troops the Pentagon planned to turn out the following day."
A Oh, okay. And the date of that, the meeting?
Q January 5th. It was you, Secretary Miller, and President Trump—
A Thank you. So just—
Q —and I believe Mark Meadows.
A Sorry. Yeah, I didn't mean to cut you off.
Q Does that jog your memory?
A I believe so, but if I could have the article, and when it's brought in—
Q Sure.
A —I'm happy to address that. I just want my attorneys to have a second ​look at it.
Q According to the article, "We're like, "We're going to provide any National Guard support that the District requests,' Miller responded. And Trump goes, 'You're going to need 10,000 people.' No, I'm not talking bullshit. He said that."
A Oh, so you remember stuff like that. So, going off just the memory, and we can go back to the article when you bring it up, there was a meeting with the President of 7 the United States, Acting Secretary Miller, and some others—I can't recall off the top of my head—where we were discussing, as the article states, something related to Iran.
And, in that same meeting, I believe it was on or around January 4th, 3rd, 4th, or 5th, the—as I stated earlier, in order for the Department of Defense's National Guard to be activated in any way we needed Presidential authorization. And President Trump at that—
[Discussion off the record.]
    BY
Q Sure. Go ahead.
A Okay. And so this question appears to implicate core executive privilege concerns. I'm prepared to answer it, but I want the record to reflect my serious concerns about congressional overreaching of this matter.
So what I remember is that we knew, in order to get the National Guard even mobilized, we needed the President to at least say yes first. So what—my recollection of that meeting is the President preemptively authorized 10 to 20 National Guardsmen and -women around the country—sorry? 10- to 20,000.
Mr. Sofer. You said 10 to 20.
The Witness. Sorry, 10- to 20,000 National Guardsmen and -women to be utilized around the country. The second part of that, of course, would have to be the ​Governors, the Federal agencies, and the mayors would have to ask us for that to satisfy the law.
But what he, I believe, and the Acting Secretary at the time were working out was we would not need to come back to the President should Mayor Bowser or anyone ask for 100, a thousand, 5,000, up to 20,000.