# The Russian Revolution (Foster)/Chapter 3

III.
THE RED ARMY.
One of the greatest achievements of the Russian revolution was the creation of the Red Army. This famous organization is the protector of the revolution, which it has successfully shielded from an armed and hostile capitalist world. When at its maximum, during the most critical period of the civil wars, the Red Army numbered 5,300,000 members and was the strongest military organization in the world.
In order to understand the events and forces leading up to the creation of the Red Army we must go back at least as far as the breaking-up of the old Czar's army. Already, even before the February, 1917, or "first" revolution, this enormous military machine was disintegrating. The workers and peasants, weary of the murderous imperialist war and rebellious at the outrageous treatment they got from their officers, were deserting by tens of thousands. When the Czar's Government collapsed this disintegration was greatly hastened. Kerensky tried to hold the old army together and make it fight, but it melted away like snow under a July sun. Millions of soldiers quit it, taking with them whatever equipment they had, and made for their homes in all parts of Russia.
The journey homeward of this multitude of soldiers, and the great armies of munition workers who abandoned the factories at the same time, was one of the most spectacular and tragic events in history. Enormous numbers of them walked as much as four or five thousand miles back to their native villages, living, or dying, on the way; no man knows how. The railroads were choked beyond belief. The trains were literally packed with humanity, inside, outside, top, and bottom; every place where human beings could hang on had its occupants. Large numbers were killed by the over-crowded car roofs falling in and crushing the people below, and by those on top being swept off as the trains went through the tunnels. The whole thing was a horrible nightmare.
With the old army rapidly going to pieces, a pressing need arose for the creation of a defense force to ​preserve order and to protect the revolution from the machinations of imperialistic counter-revolutionaries. Consequently the Red Guard was organized. This happened while Kerensky was still in power. The Red Guard, which was an entirely distinct organization from the Red Army, was a loose body, composed for the most part of workers recruited from the various shops and factories in the big industrial centers, together with a few remnants of the old army. Notwithstanding its lack of numbers, organization, equipment, and discipline, it served its purpose well, covering itself with glory in many a hard-fought fight. It was sharply revolutionary in spirit, and it finally went hand in hand with the Bolsheviki in overthrowing the Kerensky Government during the "second," or October revolution.
Hardly was the present Soviet Government in power than it set about remedying the evident inadequacy of the Red Guard. The whole capitalist world was arrayed against Russia; terrific struggles were surely ahead; and in order to survive them a great, powerful, military machine had to be built up. Hence plans were laid for the Red Army and their carrying out entrusted to the remarkably able Peoples' Commissar for War, Leon Trotzsky.
Tremendous problems lay in the path of the new Red Army—military experts the world over considered them insoluble and treated the whole project as visionary. One was to convince the people that they should have an army. They had just destroyed their old army, and were utterly sick of war and all forms of militarism. To arouse them to a realization that the revolution had to be defended was a great task, but it was finally accomplished.
Another problem related to the question of compulsory military service. Because of their bitter experiences under Czarism the Russian people, especially the revolutionary elements, had gained a deep hatred of conscription. Hence when they founded the old Red Guard they based it upon the system of volunteer enlistment. But this did not work out well. The mass of the people were war-weary and the burden of the struggle fell upon the best and most militant elements of the city workers. Russia was slaughtering off her most precious mechanics (a loss from which her indus​tries are still suffering severely), while the slacker elements either stayed aloof from the army altogether; or, having joined it, would soon desert, fed up, with good clothes on their backs, and rifles in their hands.
Under such conditions the building of a real fighting force was out of the question. The Russian leaders did not hesitate before the obvious remedy; they established universal compulsory military service. For this they have been criticised by utopian theorists who see the revolution through the rosy spectacles of a celestial idealism. But the shallowness of such criticism is evident to everyone who has had actual contact with the masses in action and knows their limitations. Even in the trade union movement the principle of compulsion must be applied in many ways. What, for instance, would become of that movement if it depended upon a volunteer system of dues? It would degenerate into chaos in a hurry. Labor unions the world over have found it necessary to adopt stringent regulations, the practical effect of which is to virtually compel the more ignorant and indifferent workers to fight intelligently and vigorously in their own behalf. And so it was in Russia: the leaders had to introduce the discipline of compulsory military service in order to make the backward masses defend the conquests of the revolution. They are not at all sentimental about the thing; they know very well that there is a world of difference between conscription to protect your masters’ interests, and conscription to protect your own. They have no apologies to offer.
A series of grave difficulties revolved around the question of army control and command. The first had to do with the general system to be employed. The prevailing opinion among the people was for committees of soldiers to direct all military activities. This was a reaction against the old regime. In the Czar's army great bitterness had existed between the officers and the rank and file. The former were an iron-bound caste of aristocrats who lost no opportunity to tyrannize over the common soldiers. Hence, when the "first" revolution came a natural demand of the rank and file was for the right to elect their own officers. This demand was granted them, and the committee system ​introduced into the rapidly decaying imperial army, and later on into the Red Guard.
But the results were fatal to military efficiency. Discipline vanished and the military units degenerated into debating societies. Elections of officers and commanding committees followed one another in rapid succession. There was no head or tail to anything. Orders would be given a regiment to do a certain thing and then, maybe a week later, word would arrive at headquarters that the regiment, after long consideration, had decided that the orders were impractical and should not be obeyed. Consequently the value of the armed forces as a fighting body fell almost to zero.
As usual, the organizers of the Red Army met the issue squarely. They decided that the popular election of officers and commanding committees in the army must go. But it took a lot of work to convince the rank and file. The organizers pointed out that the demand for rank and file control of the officers was a legitimate one under Czarism, but that it was out of place under the Soviet regime, which, being founded upon the interests of the workers, could certainly be trusted to choose the army command. Eventually this view prevailed and, in the name of efficiency, the selection of officers by common soldiers was left out of Red Army practice.
But where could the Government secure the necessary officers? The former ruling class had a monopoly on military knowledge; the workers themselves knowing little or nothing about the complicated business of modern warfare. It so happened, however, that there were a considerable number of ex-Czarist officers at hand, and many of them wanted to join the new army. But because of their previous activities a violent prejudice existed against them. They could not be trusted. Finally, however, many of them were accepted and put at the head of the troops, with the very important provision that side by side with them were placed trusted Soviet Commissars who saw to it that they did not embark upon any counter-revolutionary projects. The authority of the officers was restricted to purely military matters; while the Communist Commissars looked after the political education of the soldiers and made them acquainted with the real meaning of the revolution. They saw that the decrees of the Government were carried out and that the army was not used ​against the interests of Soviet Russia. Ill fared the officers, indeed, who ventured to engage in any treasonable activities. The Commissars fixed them.
By means of the Commissar system the ruling class monopoly of military knowledge was definitely broken. Military experts declare that if this had not been done, if no means had been found to exploit the knowledge of the old officers, it would have been practically impossible for the workers to construct an up-to-date army and carry on modern warfare. As it was the workers were enabled to learn the science of war, and it served them in good stead during the long civil wars that were inflicted upon the country by the exploiters seeking to make their way back to power. Nowadays the Red Army has its own officers' schools which turn out large numbers of Communist officers that are aggressively loyal to the revolution.
And thus it was with a whole maze of problems, many of them unique in military experience. The Red Army triumphed over them all: the breakdown of industry, the food shortage, the disruption of transport, the sabotage by counter-revolutionists, and all the rest. In the United States we make much of the hardships and difficulties of the Continental Army, but they were insignificant compared with those that the Red Army underwent. But it won out in spite of everything and overwhelmingly crushed the multitudinous foes of the Russian revolution.
There is a studied effort being made by the enemies of Russia to make it appear that the Red Army is just the same as other armies and has all their failings. But no one who has ever seen it can believe that for a minute. The Red Army is just as different from other armies as the Soviet Government is different from capitalistic governments. It is pervaded throughout with a democratic spirit totally unknown in other military organizations. Between the officers and the soldiers a feeling of brotherhood prevails; they dress just alike and call each other "comrade." The Red Army is a people's army in the true sense of the word. Its function is to defend the workers' rights.
The Red Army is an organized crusade for the revolution. It defeats its foes not only by force, but also by education. So militant and contagious is its proletarian spirit that its leaders can truthfully boast that ​European troops cannot be used successfully against it. Once it sets its great propaganda machine in operation, the morale of the opposing army begins to fall. The working-class prisoners that are captured are fed, entertained, and taken about the country to see the proletarian institutions of the new social order. Then they are returned to their own lines to spread the good news. Great quantities of literature are published and distributed to the enemy troops, pointing out how they are the dupes of capitalism and why they have no interest in carrying on the war. Soon the effect is produced; the worker-soldiers lose all taste for the war, and either the army begins to disintegrate or its leaders negotiate peace. Even American soldiers were not immune to Red Army propaganda, as their revolt proved.
All told the Red Army is a remarkable institution. It is the strong right arm of the Russian revolution.