# The Philosophical Review/Volume 1/Review: Gallwitz - Das Problem der Ethik in der Gegenwart

Although this book has for its ultimate aim the solution of a problem which is theological, it deals with ethical questions to such an extent and in such a manner as to be a fit object for criticism in this place. It is, indeed, a peculiar production, displaying a scientific spirit and a full appreciation of the results of modern philosophical thought, and yet, at times, adhering to notions that science as such must reject. But, with whatever suspicion we may regard the author's enterprise, we must at least give him ample credit for the purely scientific way in which he approaches the subject. The preface, it is true, gives no promise of this merit, but formulates a problem which, in my opinion, does not confront philosophy at all, unless we return to the intellectual practices of scholasticism. The question, How can the Christian faith that God revealed himself in Jesus Christ be reconciled with the scientific fact ​that no individual knowledge can be the norm for all times? or, "How can the universal be present in the particular, the absolute in the historically concrete, the divine in the human?" concerns dogmatic theology only.
In a purely Socratic manner, Gallwitz proceeds to search for a moral principle, endeavoring first to mark off the sphere in which morality moves. "The predicate 'moral' is ascribed to an act not on account of the act itself but simply because that act is, under the given circumstances, a consistent expression of the agent's character." What, then, is this organ of morality? The human will alone, apart from its relation to the phenomenal world, as Kant would hold? No, for the human personality is a unit, a whole, whose development is conditioned by its interaction with the external world. We cannot limit morality to the sphere of moral willing, but must take account also of the technical aspect, of the moral Können. Nor is it proper to designate feeling as the sole organ of morality, after the manner of hedonists, though feeling, to be sure, cannot be altogether excluded from a science of ethics. Neither can the sensuous functions be separated from the mental functions. The organ of morality, the author concludes, is the entire, undivided, sensuous-mental (sinnlich-geistig) human personality, in its interaction with the external world. But what is the principle by which we measure the content of the territory thus marked off? Now, inasmuch as a moral act is a combination of natural excitations and reactions of the personality, ethics must be teleological. But the utilitarian theory demand, though satisfying this, is insufficient, because it fails to do justice to the subjective factor. Furthermore, it is irreconcilable with two facts: (1) that moral rules command with absolute authority; (2) that they disregard the wishes of the actor. Besides, the assertion that it is external nature alone which impels a man to moral action rests on the false assumption that external occurrences are uniform and act uniformly on the subject. The notion of law is, however, a mere abstraction, which introduces into reality a uniformity (Gesetzmässigkeit) foreign to it. The general proposition that pleasure determines a man to develop his faculties and further the common weal does not hold, for the feelings of different persons on occasion of the same natural excitations show differences. In short, utilitarianism cannot explain the most important phenomena of moral life. Welfare or happiness is the end of life; moral laws serve that end. But the individual morality of a people may bring it pain and even death. Moreover, men do not consciously aim at this end.
A survey of history shows us that a nation aims not at the mere maintenance of life but at the security and preservation of its individuality. The ego does not strive after pleasure. It is determined by law to ​follow the power impelling it onward and to fulfil its historical vocation. "The type inherent in the ego as germ must be developed even at the expense of life." "The choice of moral ends is determined for the personality by the inexorable law of its individuality." Personality, then, is the ideal. Since, however, it cannot be developed in isolation, there arises the duty to participate in social life. But, "in situations where the assertion of individual life of personality conflicts with the maintenance of civilization, i. e. social ends, the regard for the latter must unconditionally vanish, in order that the ego may preserve its freedom and individual peculiarity." Only that power which has made for the subject its individuality can reveal to it the law of its own being. No fixed formula or principle can be discovered that shall be binding for all personalities. Habits and customs as expressed in conscience generally guide us. In exceptional cases acts are due to the pressure of a given situation, some slumbering predisposition is aroused by some external object or other in which the deity reveals itself.
There can be no perfect morality without religion. It requires a life in God, an understanding of his thought moving the universe. We must believe in the moral order of the world. No scientific contemplation of nature or of history alone could inspire such a faith. The highest good can be given only in a unique moral personality, in which the essence of God and morality reveals itself. Such a personality is Jesus Christ, whose conception of the universe reveals all the dark, mysterious features of natural and historical occurrence. Christ teaches a teleological system of ethics, whose laws serve self-interest. "The highest and ultimate good is an individual, egoistical one: the perfection of one's own moral personality, the happiness of the soul." The Christian God is a personal God, creator of heaven and earth, the life-giving spirit underlying all natural occurrence, whose existence inspires us with the hope that our moral life may reach completion. "If there were no God, we should have to invent one in the interest of ethical science."
Gallwitz falsely accuses utilitarianism of not taking account of the subjective factor of morality on which he himself lays such stress. Yet Paulsen, whom he takes as the representative of this school, bases morality on sympathetic impulses which grow with human reason and thus insure ethical progress. Besides, I fail to see what can be the significance of a personality that is determined in critical periods by the deity working upon it through external circumstances. Paulsen would also agree with the author that there are individual diversities; indeed, he insists on them quite as strongly as Gallwitz does. Evolutionary ethics, too, grants that the same impressions affect different individuals differently, and bases on this fact the elimination of some and the preservation of others. In spite of these differences, however, we discover ​fundamental similarities in human nature, some impulses being common to all mankind, and observe, under like conditions, a regularity of action. And this is all that is meant by embracing phenomena under general terms, and referring to the uniformity of nature. When the writer denies the reign of law in the universe, and in the same breath speaks of the inexorable law of personality, it is difficult to know whether to take him seriously or not.
His objections against the utilitarian theory seem to me to rest on a misunderstanding of its doctrines. We might easily forgive him for identifying welfare with mere passive enjoyment, but surely his contention that some nations have not consciously aimed at welfare cannot be urged as an argument against the principle. The absolute authority of the law which he instances as another serious difficulty would also militate against his own system. Besides, he himself afterwards gives a satisfactory explanation of this phenomenon when he characterizes conscience as a "remnant of education." Again, the assertion that moral nations have been destroyed does not warrant the conclusion that morality is not a preservative. No society could exist without moral rules, yet the mere observance of these prescriptions cannot be an absolute guarantee of survival. I cannot live without eating, but eating will not keep me alive forever. Gallwitz also points out that peoples have perished because of their customs, and infers from this that customs do not conduce to the common weal. No one maintains that all customs lead to general welfare; there are good, bad, and indifferent courses of conduct, those which injure the race being bad.
The development of individual personality is accepted by the author as the ethical end. The vagueness generally belonging to the term is obviated by the introduction of theological conceptions. Wherever the theory fails, the deus ex machina steps in. The writer is, however, bolder and more logical than self-realization moralists usually are in drawing the necessary conclusion of the theory. Where there are collisions between personal and social ends, the latter must yield. Yet this consistency divulges the weakness of the principle, and invites attack. Call such a system egoistic hedonism or egoistic perfectionism, it is none the less selfish.
But these objections must not blind us to the real excellences of the book. It deserves commendation for the way in which it approaches the problem as well as for its general appreciation of the facts both psychological and historical, and cannot fail to be of service to those interested in the subject of ethics.
Frank Thilly.
This work is in the public domain in the United States because it was published before January 1, 1929.
The longest-living author of this work died in 1934, so this work is in the public domain in countries and areas where the copyright term is the author's life plus 89 years or less. This work may be in the public domain in countries and areas with longer native copyright terms that apply the rule of the shorter term to foreign works.
Public domainPublic domainfalsefalse