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# Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers: Series I/Volume V/On Nature and Grace/Chapter 53

Chapter 53 [XLV.]—Pelagius Distinguishes Between a Power and Its Use.
Well, are there other things to listen to? Yes, certainly; both to listen to, and correct and guard against. “Now, when it is said,” he says, “that the very ability is not at all of man’s will, but of the Author of nature,—that is, God,—how can that possibly be understood to be without the grace of God which is deemed especially to belong to God?” Already we begin to see what he means; but that we may not lie under any mistake, he explains himself with greater breadth and clearness: “That this may become still plainer, we must,” says he, “enter on a somewhat fuller discussion of the point. Now we affirm that the possibility of anything lies not so much in the ability of a man’s will as in the necessity of nature.” He then proceeds to illustrate his meaning by examples and similes. “Take,” says he, “for instance, my ability to speak. That I am able to speak is not my own; but that I do speak is my own,—that is, of my own will. And because the act of my speaking is my own, I have the power of alternative action,—that is to say, both to speak and to refrain from speaking. But because my ability to speak is not my own, that is, is not of my own determination and will, it is of necessity that I am always able to speak; and though I wished not to be able to speak, I am unable, nevertheless, to be unable to speak, unless perhaps I were to deprive myself of that member whereby the function of speaking is to be performed.” Many means, indeed, might be mentioned whereby, if he wish it, a man may deprive himself of the possibility of speaking, without removing the organ of speech. If, for instance, anything were to happen to a man to destroy his voice, he would be unable to speak, although the members remained; for a man’s voice is of course no member. There may, in short, be an injury done to the member internally, short of the actual loss of it. I am, however, unwilling to press the argument for a word; and it may be replied to me in the contest, Why, even to injure is to lose. But yet we can so contrive matters, by closing and shutting the mouth with bandages, as to be quite incapable of opening it, and to put the opening of it out of our power, although it was quite in our own power to shut it while the strength and healthy exercise of the limbs remained.

## Footnotes

* ↑ Necesse est me semper loqui posse. This obscure sentence seems to point to Pelagius’ former statement: Cujusque rei possibilitatem non tam in arbitrii humani potestate quàm in naturæ necessitate consistere.
# Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers: Series I/Volume V/On Nature and Grace/Chapter 55

Chapter 55 [XLVII.]—The Same Continued.
Mark also what follows. “We may perceive,” says he, “the same thing to be true of hearing, smelling, and seeing,—that to hear, and to smell, and to see is of our own power, while the ability to hear, and to smell, and to see is not of our own power, but lies in a natural necessity.” Either I do not understand what he means, or he does not himself. For how is the possibility of seeing not in our own power, if the necessity of not seeing is in our own power because blindness is in our own power, by which we can deprive ourselves, if we will, of this very ability to see? How, moreover, is it in our own power to see whenever we will, when, without any loss whatever to our natural structure of body in the organ of sight, we are unable, even though we wish, to see,—either by the removal of all external lights during the night, or by our being shut up in some dark place? Likewise, if our ability or our inability to hear is not in our own power, but lies in the necessity of nature, whereas our actual hearing or not hearing is of our own will, how comes it that he is inattentive to the fact that there are so many things which we hear against our will, which penetrate our sense even when our ears are stopped, as the creaking of a saw near to us, or the grunt of a pig? Although the said stopping of our ears shows plainly enough that it does not lie within our own power not to hear so long as our ears are open; perhaps, too, such a stopping of our ears as shall deprive us of the entire sense in question proves that even the ability not to hear lies within our own power. As to his remarks, again, concerning our sense of smell, does he not display no little carelessness when he says “that it is not in our own power to be able or to be unable to smell, but that it is in our own power”—that is to say, in our free will—“to smell or not to smell?” For let us suppose some one to place us, with our hands firmly tied, but yet without any injury to our olfactory members, among some bad and noxious smells; in such a case we altogether lose the power, however strong may be our wish, not to smell, because every time we are obliged to draw breath we also inhale the smell which we do not wish.
# Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers: Series I/Volume V/On Nature and Grace/Chapter 49

Chapter 49 [XLII.]—A Man Can Be Sinless, But Only by the Help of Grace. In the Saints This Possibility Advances and Keeps Pace with the Realization.
“Well, be it so,” says he, “I agree; he testifies to the fact that all were sinners. He says, indeed, what they have been, not that they might not have been something else. Wherefore,” he adds, “if all then could be proved to be sinners, it would not by any means prejudice our own definite position, in insisting not so much on what men are, as on what they are able to be.” He is right for once to allow that no man living is justified in God’s sight. He contends, however, that this is not the question, but that the point lies in the possibility of a man’s not sinning,—on which subject it is unnecessary for us to take ground against him; for, in truth, I do not much care about expressing a definite opinion on the question, whether in the present life there ever have been, or now are, or ever can be, any persons who have had, or are having, or are to have, the love of God so perfectly as to admit of no addition to it (for nothing short of this amounts to a most true, full, and perfect righteousness). For I ought not too sharply to contend as to when, or where, or in whom is done that which I confess and maintain can be done by the will of man, aided by the grace of God. Nor do I indeed contend about the actual possibility, forasmuch as the possibility under dispute advances with the realization in the saints, their human will being healed and helped; whilst “the love of God,” as fully as our healed and cleansed nature can possibly receive it, “is shed abroad in our hearts by the Holy Ghost, which is given to us.” In a better way, therefore, is God’s cause promoted (and it is to its promotion that our author professes to apply his warm defence of nature) when He is acknowledged as our Saviour no less than as our Creator, than when His succour to us as Saviour is impaired and dwarfed to nothing by the defence of the creature, as if it were sound and its resources entire.

## Footnotes

* ↑ Rom. v. 5.
# Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers: Series I/Volume V/On Nature and Grace/Chapter 50

Chapter 50 [XLIII.]—God Commands No Impossibilities.
What he says, however, is true enough, “that God is as good as just, and made man such that he was quite able to live without the evil of sin, if only he had been willing.” For who does not know that man was made whole and faultless, and endowed with a free will and a free ability to lead a holy life? Our present inquiry, however, is about the man whom “the thieves” left half dead on the road, and who, being disabled and pierced through with heavy wounds, is not so able to mount up to the heights of righteousness as he was able to descend therefrom; who, moreover, if he is now in “the inn,” is in process of cure. God therefore does not command impossibilities; but in His command He counsels you both to do what you can for yourself, and to ask His aid in what you cannot do. Now, we should see whence comes the possibility, and whence the impossibility. This man says: “That proceeds not from a man’s will which he can do by nature.” I say: A man is not righteous by his will if he can be by nature. He will, however, be able to accomplish by remedial aid what he is rendered incapable of doing by his flaw.

## Footnotes

* ↑ Luke x. 30. Rather, “robbers;” latrones, λησταί.
* ↑ Luke x. 34.
# Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers: Series I/Volume V/On Nature and Grace/Chapter 51

Chapter 51 [XLIV.]—State of the Question Between the Pelagians and the Catholics. Holy Men of Old Saved by the Self-Same Faith in Christ Which We Exercise.
But why need we tarry longer on general statements? Let us go into the core of the question, which we have to discuss with our opponents solely, or almost entirely, on one particular point. For inasmuch as he says that “as far as the present question is concerned, it is not pertinent to inquire whether there have been or now are any men in this life without sin, but whether they had or have the ability to be such persons;” so, were I even to allow that there have been or are any such, I should not by any means therefore affirm that they had or have the ability, unless justified by the grace of God through our Lord “Jesus Christ and Him crucified.” For the same faith which healed the saints of old now heals us,—that is to say, faith “in the one Mediator between God and men, the man Christ Jesus,”—faith in His blood, faith in His cross, faith in His death and resurrection. As we therefore have the same spirit of faith, we also believe, and on that account also speak.

## Footnotes

* ↑ 1 Cor. ii. 2.
* ↑ 1 Tim. ii. 5.
# Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers: Series I/Volume V/On Nature and Grace/Chapter 52

Chapter 52.—The Whole Discussion is About Grace.
Let us, however, observe what our author answers, after laying before himself the question wherein he seems indeed so intolerable to Christian hearts. He says: “But you will tell me this is what disturbs a great many,—that you do not maintain that it is by the grace of God that a man is able to be without sin.” Certainly this is what causes us disturbance; this is what we object to him. He touches the very point of the case. This is what causes us such utter pain to endure it; this is why we cannot bear to have such points debated by Christians, owing to the love which we feel towards others and towards themselves. Well, let us hear how he clears himself from the objectionable character of the question he has raised. “What blindness of ignorance,” he exclaims, “what sluggishness of an uninstructed mind, which supposes that that is maintained and held to be without God’s grace which it only hears ought to be attributed to God!” Now, if we knew nothing of what follows this outburst of his, and formed our opinion on simply hearing these words, we might suppose that we had been led to a wrong view of our opponents by the spread of report and by the asseveration of some suitable witnesses among the brethren. For how could it have been more pointedly and truly stated that the possibility of not sinning, to whatever extent it exists or shall exist in man, ought only to be attributed to God? This too is our own affirmation. We may shake hands.
# Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers: Series I/Volume V/On Nature and Grace/Chapter 48

Chapter 48 [XLI.]—How the Term “All” Is to Be Understood.
His opponents adduced the passage, “All have sinned,” and he met their statement founded on this with the remark that “the apostle was manifestly speaking of the then existing generation, that is, the Jews and the Gentiles;” but surely the passage which I have quoted, “By one man sin entered the world, and death by sin, and so death passed upon all men; in which all have sinned,” embraces in its terms the generations both of old and of modern times, both ourselves and our posterity. He adduces also this passage, whence he would prove that we ought not to understand all without exception, when “all” is used:—“As by the offence of one,” he says, “upon all men to condemnation, even so by the righteousness of One, upon all men unto justification of life.” “There can be no doubt,” he says, “that not all men are sanctified by the righteousness of Christ, but only those who are willing to obey Him, and have been cleansed in the washing of His baptism.” Well, but he does not prove what he wants by this quotation. For as the clause, “By the offence of one, upon all men to condemnation,” is so worded that not one is omitted in its sense, so in the corresponding clause, “By the righteousness of One, upon all men unto justification of life,” no one is omitted in its sense,—not, indeed, because all men have faith and are washed in His baptism, but because no man is justified unless he believes in Christ and is cleansed by His baptism. The term “all” is therefore used in a way which shows that no one whatever can be supposed able to be saved by any other means than through Christ Himself. For if in a city there be appointed but one instructor, we are most correct in saying: That man teaches all in that place; not meaning, indeed, that all who live in the city take lessons of him, but that no one is instructed unless taught by him. In like manner no one is justified unless Christ has justified him.

## Footnotes

* ↑ Rom. iii. 23.
* ↑ Rom. v. 12.
* ↑ Rom. v. 18.
* ↑ Compare De Peccatorum Meritis et Remissione, i. 55.
# Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers: Series I/Volume V/On Nature and Grace/Chapter 54

Chapter 54 [XLVI.]—There is No Incompatibility Between Necessity and Free Will.
Now how does all this apply to our subject? Let us see what he makes out of it. “Whatever,” says he, “is fettered by natural necessity is deprived of determination of will and deliberation.” Well, now, here lies a question; for it is the height of absurdity for us to say that it does not belong to our will that we wish to be happy, on the ground that it is absolutely impossible for us to be unwilling to be happy, by reason of some indescribable but amiable coercion of our nature; nor dare we maintain that God has not the will but the necessity of righteousness, because He cannot will to sin.
# Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers: Series II/Volume XII/Gregory the Great/Title Page

THE
Book of Pastoral Rule,
and
Selected Epistles,
OF
GREGORY THE GREAT
BISHOP OF ROME,
Translated, with Introduction, Notes, and Indices,
by the
REV. JAMES BARMBY, d.d.,
vICAR OF nORTHALLERTON, yORKSHIRE.
# Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers: Series II/Volume XII/Gregory the Great/The Book of Pastoral Rule/Part III/Prologue

Part III.
How the Ruler, While Living Well, Ought to Teach and Admonish Those that are Put Under Him.
Prologue.
Since, then, we have shewn what manner of man the pastor ought to be, let us now set forth after what manner he should teach. For, as long before us Gregory Nazianzen of reverend memory has taught, one and the same exhortation does not suit all, inasmuch as neither are all bound together by similarity of character. For the things that profit some often hurt others; seeing that also for the most part herbs which nourish some animals are fatal to others; and the gentle hissing that quiets horses incites whelps; and the medicine which abates one disease aggravates another; and the bread which invigorates the life of the strong kills little children. Therefore according to the quality of the hearers ought the discourse of teachers to be fashioned, so as to suit all and each for their several needs, and yet never deviate from the art of common edification. For what are the intent minds of hearers but, so to speak, a kind of tight tensions of strings in a harp, which the skilful player, that he may produce a tune not at variance with itself, strikes variously? And for this reason the strings render back a consonant modulation, that they are struck indeed with one quill, but not with one kind of stroke. Whence every teacher also, that he may edify all in the one virtue of charity, ought to touch the hearts of his hearers out of one doctrine, but not with one and the same exhortation.
# Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers: Series II/Volume XII/Leo the Great/Introduction
## Contents

* Life
* Manuscripts
* Editions
* Translations
* Authorities and Materials
# Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers: Series II/Volume XII/Leo the Great/Introduction/Authorities and Materials

Authorities and Materials.
The chief ancient and medieval authorities for the life and times of Leo the Great are such works as Prosper’s, and Idatius’ Chronicles, Iornandes de rebus Geticis, Anastasius Bibliothecarius Historia de vitis Romanorum Pontificum (9th cent.), the Historia Miscella (10th cent.), &c.
Among lives may be mentioned the following:—(1) La vie et religion de deux bons papes Léon premier et Gregoire premier par Pierre Du Moulin (the younger: a protestant theologian), Sedan, 1650. 12mo. (2) Quesnel’s valuable Dissertatio de vita et rebus gestis S. Leonis Magni, originally included in his edition of Leo and re-printed by Migne in Vol. ii. of his edition with the Ballerinii’s annotations and critical remarks, Paris, 1675, Lyons, 1700. (3) Histoire du Pontificat de Saint Léon le Grand par Monsr. L. Maimbourg La Haye, 1687. (4) The Bollandists’ Life by Canisius (Acta Sanctorum), April, vol. ii. pp. 14–22.  (5) Alphonsi Ciaconii Vitæ Pontificum (Tom. 1, pp. 303–314), Rome, 1677, 4to. (6) Le Nain de Tillemont, Memoires pour servir à l’histoire Ecclesiastique (vol. xv. pp. 414–832, 885–934), Paris, 1711. (7)
Breve Descrizione della vita di S. Leone Primo di Gabrielle Bertazzolo: Mantova, 1727.  (8) Memoire istoriche di Sa. Leone Papa da Teofilo Pacifico:  Brescia, 1791, 8vo. (9) Du Pin, L. E., History of Ecc. writers (Eng Edn. vol. 1, pp. 464–480), Dublin, 1722. (10) C. Oudinus, de Scriptoribus Ecclesiæ (vol. 1, pp. 1271–5), Leipzig, 1722. (11) Wilhelm Amadeus Arendt (Roman Catholic), Leo der Grosse und seine Zeit, Mainz, 1835, 8vo. (12) Eduard Perthel, Papst Leo’s I. Leben und Lehren, Jena, 1843, 8vo. (a counterblast to No. 11, and no less exaggerated and prejudiced in statement). (13) A. de Saint-Chron, Histoire du pontificat de Saint Léon le Grand, Paris, 1846. (14) F. Böhringer, die Kirche Xti und ihre Zeugen (vol. 1 part 4, pp. 170–309), Zürich, 1845. (15) Charles Gore’s Life of Leo the Great (S.P.C.K.); also his article in Smith’s Dict. of Christian Biogr.  (16) The article in Herzog’s Real-Encyklopädie of which a condensed English edition was edited by Dr. Philip Schaff at New York in 1883. Other more general accounts of his times will be found in (1) l’abbé Fleury, Histoire du Xtianisme (vol. ii. pp. 384–480), Paris, 1836. (2) Bright’s History of the Church from 313–451 (chaps. xiv., xv.), Oxford and London, 1860. (3) Milman’s Latin Christianity (Book ii. chap. 4), London, 1864. (4) R. J. Rohrbacher’s Histoire Universelle de l’Eglise catholique (15th edn., vol. 4, pp. 461–575), Paris, 1868. A short account of Leo’s writings is given in Alzog’s Grundriss der Patrologie, § 78, pp.368–375: a most exhaustive one in Ceillier’s Histoire générale des Auteurs sacrés (new edition) (vol. x., pp. 169–276), 1858–1869.  Bähr’s Geschichte der Römischer Literatur-Supplement Band II. Abtheilung (pp. 354–362), im Abendland, vol. 1, p. 448, may also be consulted; and Ebert’s Allgemeine Geschichte der Literatur des Mittelalters.
# Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers: Series II/Volume XII/Leo the Great
## Contents

* Title Page
* Prefatory Note
* Introduction
* Letters
* Sermons
# Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers: Series II/Volume XII/Leo the Great/Introduction/Editions

Editions.
1. The earliest important edition is P. Quesnel’s (prêtre de l’oratoire), Paris, 1675, Lyons, 1700, of which Migne’s Dict. de Bibliogr. catholique says, ‘on reproche aux éditions du P. Quesnel un grand nombre de falsifications, par lesquelles le P. Quesnel se proposait notamment d’affaiblir l’autorité pontificale.…L’edition que l’on doit aujourd’hui préférer, est (naturally enough!) celle qui a été publiée par M. l’abbé Migne sous le titre d’
2. Œuvres très complètes de Saint Leon le Grand publièes d’après l’édition des frères Ballerinii et celle de Paschase Quesnel enrichées de préfaces, d’avertissements et de commentaires, suivies des exercices de Cacciari sur toutes les œuvres du saint docteur. Paris 1846.
3. P. Cacciari (a carmelite) brought out editions at Rome, 1751 and 1753–5, the latter with dissertations.
4. The edition of the brothers P. and H. Ballerinii (Jesuists), Venice, 1753–7, was a recension of Quesnel’s second edition with copious dissertations and notes.
5. H. Hurter, S. J., has published selections of Sermons and Letters in vols. xiv., xxv. and xxvi. of his SS. PP. opuscula selecta, 1871–4.

## Footnotes

* ↑ That is to say, it upheld the Gallican opinions; and so it was condemned and put on the Index in 1682. But being too valuable a work to be altogether suppressed, Benedict XIV. enjoined the issue of (4), which rebutted and rectified Quesnel’s false deductions in its notes and excursuses.
# Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers: Series II/Volume X/Works/On the Holy Spirit
## Contents

* Introduction
* Book I
* Book II
* Book III
# Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers: Series II/Volume X/Works/On the Duties of the Clergy/Introduction

Introduction.
St. Ambrose, esteeming very highly the dignity of the ministerial office, was most desirous that the clergy of his diocese should live worthily of their high vocation, and be good and profitable examples to the people. Consequently he undertook the following treatise, setting forth the duties of the clergy, and taking as a model the treatise of Cicero, De Officiis.
The writer says that his object is to impress upon those whom he has ordained the lessons which he had previously taught them. Like Cicero, he treats of that which is right, becoming, or honourable [decorum], and what is expedient [utile]; but with reference not to this life but to that which is to come, teaching in the first book that which is becoming or honourable; in the second, what is expedient; and in the third, considering both in conjunction.
In the first book he divides duties into “ordinary,” or the way of the commandments, binding upon all alike; and “perfect,” which consist in following the counsels. After treating then of some elementary duties, such as those towards parents and elders, he touches upon the two principles which lead the mind, reason and appetite, and shows that what is becoming consists in thinking of good and right things, and in the subjection of the appetite to reason, and supplies certain rules and examples, ending with a discussion on the four Cardinal Virtues, Prudence, Justice, Fortitude, and Temperance.
In the second book, passing from what is becoming to what is expedient, he points out that we can only measure what is really expedient by reference to eternal life, in contradiction to the errors of heathen philosophers, and shows that what is expedient consists in the knowledge of God and in good living. Incidentally he shows that what is becoming is really that which is expedient, and ends the book with several chapters of practical considerations.
In the third book he treats of duties of perfection, and lays down as a rule that in everything we must inquire what is expedient, not for individuals, but for many or for all. Nothing is to be striven after which is not becoming; to this everything must give place, not only expediency but even friendship and life itself. By many examples he then proves how holy men have sought after what was becoming, and have thereby secured what was expedient.
The object of St. Ambrose in basing his treatise on the lines of that of Cicero would seem to have been the confutation of some of the false principles of heathenism, and to show how much higher Christian morality is than that of the Gentiles. The treatise was probably composed about a.d. 391.

## Footnotes

* ↑ II. 6, § 25.
* ↑ I. 9, § 28.
* ↑ I. 24, § 106.