# The Air Force Role In Developing International Outer Space Law/Germination of Outer Space as a Legal Concept
## Germination of Outer Space as a Legal Concept

The Paris and Chicago Conventions of 1919 and 1944, respectively, recognized the exclusive sovereignty of states to the airspace above their territory. Delegates did not discussouter space as such. Thus they established no line of demarcation as to where airspace ended and outer space began. Whether national sovereignty extended indefinitely over a nation’s territory was not resolved.
Even with the rapid changes in technology extending flight higher and higher, sovereignty over outer space was seldom discussed until the early 1950s. By then the launching of rockets into space and plans to boost an object into orbit madediscussion of this issue more imperative. As has often occurred,not until technology demands does a development in or of thelaw follow. From the beginning, the sovereignty issue—how high a state’s sovereignty extends, if at all, into outer space—has been the genesis of much discussion regarding outer space law. While many other outer space law issues were eventually resolved, the issue of how high sovereignty extends—the issue that started much of the discussion—remains unresolved.
In 1951 John Cobb Cooper—law professor and head of the Institute of Air and Space Law, McGill University in Montreal,and a member of the Princeton University Institute for Advanced Study—published “High Altitude Flight and National Sovereignty,” a seminal and thought-provoking treatise. Professor Cooper had served as part of the US delegation to the 1944 ICAO meetings and was a major force behind the decision to conclude the Chicago Convention. His 1951 treatise generated substantial discussion within the legal and scientific communities regarding the need to define where airspace became outer space.
Cooper’s article led to a clamor by academics and international jurists for a definition of outer space. Their efforts to achieve a clear delimitation between airspace and outer space were driven by the hope that outer space might be “saved from the chaos of national rivalries.” They theorized that once outer space was defined by international agreement, all claims regarding it would be easily resolved. These scholars and jurists likewise theorized that freedom of exploration in outer space would evolve similarly to the exploration of the sea. Otherwise, it was feared that the “outcome of the growing interest in outer space [would] result in a constantly increasing clash of interest between those statesmost interested in outer space, and between [their] citizens.” Prince Welf Heinrich of Hanover of the Gesellschaft für Weltraumforschung (the [German] Society for Space Flight) noted that nations did not have the same needs and interests in outer space as they had in airspace. He

### Eisenhower, a Nuclear Pearl Harbor, and Air Force Balloons

Prior to Professor Cooper’s treatise, many elements within the United States, including the US Army Air Forces (AAF), had been interested in outer space and its potential exploitation for military or intelligence purposes. Concurrent with Project RAND’s start up in 1946, Maj Gen Curtis E. LeMay, deputy chief of staff for research and development, directed that RAND assist the AAF in demonstrating its capabilities vis-à-vis space. Within three weeks, RAND produced a study titled Preliminary Design of an Experimental World-Circling Spaceship, an engineering analysis of satellite feasibility. This 1946 study concluded that such satellites were an unlikely base for offensive weapons.
By April 1951, Project RAND had completed an Air Force sponsored study contemplating the eventuality of earth observation satellites. As a result of the RAND report and because the Air Force Strategic Air Command needed assistance in developing reconnaissance that could help determine appropriate targets behind the Iron Curtain, the Air Force, in January 1952, convened a Beacon Hill study group (formally titled Project Lincoln) under the auspices of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). The study group was to assess various issues generated by such satellites. The study group included industry scientists and academicians. In its final report issued in June 1952, the Beacon Hill group concluded that observation satellite systems could infringe on another country’s sovereignty. Its report specifically acknowledged the potential for “intrusion” over Soviet territory.
On 24 February and 27 March 1954, President Dwight D. Eisenhower met with his National Security Council (NSC) and then with the civilian scientists of the Science Advisory Committee in the Office of Defense Mobilization. With the memory of Pearl Harbor still fresh in his mind, Eisenhower related his concern regarding the potential for a surprise nuclear attack on the United States. Stressing the need for avoiding or containing such aggression, President Eisenhower was resolved to ensurethat the United States would never again be vulnerable to a direct sneak attack. He challenged the US scientific community to address hisconcern. In response, scientists created the Surprise Attack Panel-later known as the Technological Capabilities Panel (TCP)-chaired by MIT president James R. Killian. The panel issued its final report, “Meeting the Threat of Surprise Attack,” on 14 February 1955. Among other things, the report recommended that the United States develop satellites to operate at high altitudes. These satellites would establish as a principle of international law the freedom of passage for any subsequent military satellites. The panel had created a blueprint for Eisenhower as to how the US should proceed regarding resolution of the freedom of passage issue.
Given a lack of intelligence regarding the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and given that the United States was not able to implement the reconnaissance satellite system envisioned by the TCP, ​President Eisenhower initiated Project Genetrix in January 1956. This space “research” project consisted of the Air Force launching 516 Skyhook “weather” balloons from locations in Europe. These balloons carried automatic cameras. Given prevailing winds, the balloons were certain to pass over Eastern Europe and the USSR. If the research succeeded, the balloons-equipped with radio tracking beacons-were eventually to be recovered near Japan and Alaska. The program produced limited intelligence.
When the balloons passed over their territory, Eastern European nations and the USSR protested, complaining that the balloons disrupted civilian aircraft and were equipped for automatic aerial photography in an effort to obtain targeting information. Belgium and Czechoslovakian airlines canceled several flights to Czechoslovakia because of the balloons. The United States initially admitted that Radio Free Europe, an affiliate of a “privately financed anticommunist organization in the US,” was flying propaganda balloons from West Germany. Further, the Air Force admitted that as part of Operation Moby Dick, it had released some two thousand balloons from various sites around the earth but denied that these releases were a threat to civilian flights.
On 7 February 1956, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles responded to the Soviet protests by stating that, in the interest of “decent friendly relations,” the US would “try” to stop the release of the “weather” balloons. While admitting that some of the weather balloons carried photographic equipment, the United States asserted that the equipment was only for taking pictures of high-altitude cloud formations. The Soviets responded that they had developed film from the balloons containing pictures of Turkish airfields. In the face of criticism that the balloons clearly violated the USSR’s airspace, Dulles agreed to stop releasing them. He noted, however, that “the ownership of upper air” was “a disputable question under international law.” Some in the media attacked Dulles for making this statement and for having approved the launch of the balloons.
These critics argued that the sovereignty issue had long been resolved and that sovereignty extended indefinitely into the sky. Further, they argued that the Chicago Convention forbade the sending of unmanned missiles over another nation’s airspace without consent. The position of these critics was correct with respect to a nation’s sovereign rights over its own airspace. However, no international law, practice, or custom had as yet established the issue of a nation’s sovereignty in outer space. ​Further, the position of these critics was diametrically opposed to Eisenhower’s goal of achieving freedom of passage for intelligence gathering satellites in outer space as had been initially envisioned by the Surprise Attack Panel.
After Dulles’ response, the Air Force disputed that its balloons were intended for anything other than charting the jet stream. The Air Force cover story stating that the balloons “were being used for weather research also made reference to the International Geophysical Year (IGY).” When the Air Force later proposed to release even higher flying balloons in mid-March 1956, Eisenhower informed Gen Nathan F. Twining, Air Force chief of staff, that he (Eisenhower) “was not interested in any more balloons” and terminated any further launches.
In the meantime, a more promising avenue of gathering information, the U-2, was becoming operational and would make its maiden flight five months after Eisenhower ordered an end to the balloon flights. By 1956 the practices of the Air Force and others involved in the balloon “experiments” and the contemplation of an earth orbiting observation system had focused substantial attention on and begun a dialogue regarding international outer space law.

### “Space-for-Peace” and the International Geophysical Year

Driven by the advent of IGY-1 July 1957-31 December 1958-and other considerations, the United States and the USSR increased their focus on their respective space programs. On 15 April 1955 the USSR announced the establishment of its Special Commission for Interplanetary Communications, making reference to a globe circling satellite program. In 1955 the US was completing the formulation of its first space policy, but it did so in a somewhat ambivalent manner. The United States assumed that its space program was technologically superior to the USSR’s space program. Indeed, the US was far ahead of the Soviets in miniaturizing its warhead devices (which fact was highly classified at that time); however, as discussed later, this US advantage was to become a double-edged sword.
In drafting its space policy, the Eisenhower administration demonstrated an ambivalent desire to be first in space. Such ambivalence by Eisenhower was not unique to outer space but was generally the hallmark of Eisenhower’s approach to problem solving, particularly and ironically regarding issues relating to foreign affairs. For example, Eisenhower pursued a space-for-peace policy and proposed to rely upon nonexistent “nonmilitary” boosters as the launch vehicle. As drafted by Air Force secretary Donald A. Quarles, this policy declared that the IGY satellite program would not interfere with intercontinental and intermediate range ballistic missile (ICBM and IRBM) programs. The US satellite would be launched for “peaceful purposes” and would assist in establishing the right of unimpeded overflights in outer space. This decision was confirmed by the National Security Council (NSC Directive 5520, Draft Statement of Policy on US Scientific Satellite Program) on 26 May and approved by President Eisenhower on 27 May 1955. However, the administration did not immediately communicate this decision to themilitary services, one of which was to be assigned to manage the development of the boosters.
By pursuing a space-for-peace policy, President Eisenhower, at least publicly, began a persistent effort by his administration to marry space ​exploration, disarmament, and the creation of international law, providing that space was free from national military rivalries. As noted earlier, underlying Eisenhower’s space-for-peace policy was his resolve to prevent a nuclear Pearl Harbor. Following the blueprint provided by the Surprise Attack Panel, he sought to obtain a free passage for intelligencegathering satellites in outer space as being essential to preventing a surprise attack. Therefore, while publicly articulating a space-for-peace policy, Eisenhower maneuvered to obtain freedom of passage for intelligence-gathering devices in outer space. He saw no inconsistency in his stalking-horse strategy.
While the product of such intelligence-gathering satellites could clearly be used to facilitate warfare by identifying targets, Eisenhower perceived that the satellites were passive not “offensive” and argued that it was his intent that they be used to maintain peace. As part of his “open skies” proposal, Eisenhower offered to share such intelligence with the Soviets much the same as President Ronald W. Reagan would propose 30 years later. Eisenhower hoped that the free passage of IGY scientific satellites in outer space would establish the precedent of free passage for subsequent intelligence-gathering satellites. Accordingly, the Eisenhower administration worked to ensure that an earth satellite project was included as part of the US IGY program.
While maneuvering to include a scientific satellite system as part of IGY. President Eisenhower waited until the Geneva summit with Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev in July 1955 to propose the US open skies position. Eisenhower suggested that as part of open skies the United States and USSR provide facilities from which aerial photography taken of the other could be shared, thereby precluding any surprise attack. The USSR rejected the open skies proposal as a ploy for gathering target data. The USSR stuck to its claim of absolute sovereignty of all its space (air and outer) over its homeland.
Upon returning to the United States from Geneva, President Eisenhower announced officially on 29 July 1955 that the here-to-fore undisclosed US IGY satellite project was to be powered by nonmilitary boosters that had not yet been built. In September 1955 the Navy’s proposal to manage the “civilian” IGY booster program was approved. Neither President Eisenhower nor his advisers appear to have appreciated how much their idealistic insistence on developing nonmilitary boosters would delay the American satellite project and what the impact of that delay would be. No IGY boosters were ever fully developed and ​
launched under the Navy’s Viking-AerobeeHi/Vanguard program. However, the military services did not cease working on their boosters and continued to attempt to launch them. When the Navy’s Vanguard program ebbed, the secretary of defense turned too late to the Air Force in hopes of launching a satellite during the IGY program.

### Who Would Be First in Space?

Some have concluded that the USSR was first in space by default because of Eisenhower’s “ambivalence” and his secretary of defense’s penchant for fiscal conservatism regarding space programs. These factors might partially explain why the United States failed to be first in space. Other factors explain why the USSR was first in space with Sputnik. First, Eisenhower had been assured that physics precluded dropping a bomb from a satellite in orbit; therefore, he was not concerned about a surprise attack from outer space. Second, the Eisenhoweradministration did not fully appreciate the “psychological shock value” of a successful Sputnik launch or the reaction of the American people to having Sputnik overhead. Third, Eisenhower’s administration did not appreciate fully the propaganda and prestige value of being “first in space,” despite warnings to this effect by the National Security Council, the scientific community’s TCP, and RAND. Finally, and probably most importantly, the US was not first in space because the USheld a significant lead over the USSR in miniaturizing its hydrogen bomb devices.
While Eisenhower was concerned about a nuclear surprise attack, the main emphasis of the US missile program (including budgetary spending) was not the launching of a satellite into space but the precise delivery of a hydrogen warhead anywhere on earth. Because of its miniaturization advantage, the United States did not need rockets with heavy throw weights (thrust). In fact, in the years before Sputnik, the Air Force had actually reduced the number of stages in its Atlas program. Because the USSR warhead devices were larger and heavier, they required the concomitant development of rockets with greater thrust than did the US devices. While the United States was ahead in being able to deliver a hydrogen warhead more precisely anywhere on earth, the USSR had rockets with greater thrust and throw weights that were advantageous for launching objects into outer space. The US focus on attaining a technological/miniaturization advantage was disadvantageous to its being first in space.
Given the underestimation of the “shock effect” of Sputnik, given the perception that we were technologically far ahead of the USSR in space, and given Eisenhower’s interest in establishing the principle of freedom of passage for spy satellites, the failure to push such a crash program isunderstandable. Nonetheless, it was probable that the US could have been first in space had the president established that achievement as a national goal. As an example of his administration’s commitment to ensuringthe principle of free passage in outer space, the Eisenhower administration (Quarles) in 1956 “restrained” government officials from ​any public discussion of spaceflight. Eisenhower administration officials feared that any discussion of military space operations would engender a “worldwide debate” on outer space law issues. They further feared that the debate might result in efforts to preclude the passage in outer space of military related devices.
Despite Eisenhower’s “civilian” emphasis in the booster program, the military had not ceased development of its boosters. In fact, prior to Sputnik I, the military continued to attempt to launch military boosters that would have been necessary to launch such a satellite into orbit. These efforts failed. The Air Force, like the other services, had continued in its efforts to develop multistage rockets. Not until November 1956, when Secretary of the Air Force Quarles issued his order and indicated that no US military satellite would precede a civilian scientific satellite into orbit, did the Air Force cease all vehicle construction and intentionally put its space efforts on hold.
Determining whether Quarles and the Eisenhower administration purposely delayed orbiting a satellite is problematic. Some complained that Eisenhower delayed because he wanted to wait for the development of nonmilitary boosters instead of using existing military boosters. Had the Eisenhower administration clearly indicated to the military services that it desired to be first in space with a satellite, the military might have designed a booster strictly for that purpose. But for the space-for-peace policy, the Eisenhower administration might well have implemented a “crash” program to develop a nonmilitary booster. To conclude that President Eisenhower’s space-for-peace proposal, by itself, allowed the USSR to be “first” is speculative at best. Nevertheless, it appears that Quarles was perhaps willing to accept the USSR being first in space so long as the freedom of passage in space principle was established as a result.
The Eisenhower administration’s initial response to the two Sputniks was to advance with same due deliberation as it had been proceeding and to treat the Soviet achievement as being “no big deal,” in the current vernacular. Eisenhower did perceive a need to demonstrate some success in the missile programs and appointed a panel to study the US missile program. The “fevered tone” and substance of the resulting report of the Security Resources Panel (known as the Gaither Report) helped generate public pressure that caused President Eisenhower to agree to increased spending on missile programs. While a long-term salient impact of the report was increased emphasis on better scientific education and ​basic research, the Gaither Report also helped give rise to the misperception of a “missile gap” between the United States and the USSR. The USSR may have been ahead in developing satellites and some aspects of missile development, that is, thrust. However, as discussed above, the US was ahead in many important aspects regarding the delivery of weapons of mass destruction by missiles.
* ↑ International Convention for Air Navigation and Convention on International Civil Aviation, respectively
* ↑ Sir Arnold Duncan McNair, Michael R. E. Kerr, and Robert A. MacCrindle, The Law of the Air, 2d ed. (London: Stevens, 1953), appendix, 295-328, cited in Lee Bowen, “An Air Force History of Space Activities 1945-1959” (Washington, D.C.: USAF Historical Division Liaison Office, August 1964), 59; and Col Martin B. Schofield, USAF, “Control of Outer Space,” Air University Quarterly Review 10, no. 1 (Spring 1958): 93-104.
* ↑ John Cobb Cooper, “High Altitude Flight and National Sovereignty,” International Law Quarterly Review 4 (July 1951): 411-18.
* ↑ Bowen, 58-59.
* ↑ Ibid.
* ↑ Welf Heinrich, Prince of Hanover, Gesellschaft für Weltraumforschung, “The Legal Problems of Space,” trans. Robert W. Schmidt (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Documentary Research Division, Research Studies Institute, 1953), 1.
* ↑ The society, founded by the well-known German-Romanian scientist / mathematician Hermann Oberth, among others, in 1927, eventually became the most influential of the European rocket societies. See David N. Spires, Beyond Horizons: A Half Century of Air Force Space Leadership, rev. ed. (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1998), 5.
* ↑ Heinrich completed his doctor of law thesis entitled “Air Law and Space” (“Luftrecht und Weltraum”) in 1953 while at Georg-August University in Göttingen, Germany. His doctoral thesis was a continuation of the work initiated in the 1930s by Vladimir Mandl.
* ↑ Heinrich, 2-7.
* ↑ Bowen, 61. Bowen cites “Space Law,” a symposium prepared at the request of Senator Lyndon B. Johnson, chairman, Senate Special Committee on Space and Astronautics, 85th Congo 2d sess. 31 December 1958, 129 (hereafter “Space Law”), which in turn cites Oscar Schachter, “Who Owns the Universe?” in Corneilus Ryan, ed., Across the Space Frontiers (New York: Viking Press, 1952).
* ↑ Project RAND began operating in May 1946 and was initially an independent consulting contractor of the Army Air Forces with Douglas Aircraft Company in Santa Monica, California. RAND was created in 1946 at the direction of Gen Henry H. “Hap” Arnold, commanding general of the US Army Air Forces (AAF). In 1948 Project RAND was reorganized as a nonprofit consulting firm, the RAND Corporation. In 1949 and again in 1951, RAND published studies titled, “Utility of a Satellite Vehicle for Reconnaissance.” Over the years, RAND has produced a series of studies for the Air Force and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). Between 1946 and 1956, little was accomplished in the actual development of a satellite as contemplated by RAND due in part to fiscal restraints, skepticism within the scientific community, and interservice rivalries. Such rivalry was typified by LeMay's 1946 request to RAND and other actions. (Spires, 14-24.) These rivalries continued into the 1950s with guided missiles spawning contentions. Robert J. Watson, Into the Missile Age, 1956-1960, vol. 4, History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Washington, D.C.: Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1997), 40-41. Concurrent development of a booster to launch such a satellite into orbit had not progressed very far and for many of the same reasons.
* ↑ Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach. The CIA and the U-2 Program, 1954-1974 (Langley, Va.: Center for Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 1998), 17.
* ↑ Air Force Lt Col Richard S. Leghorn, who would later be instrumental in creating Eisenhower's open skies policy, was the Air Force liaison to the study group. In 1946 and 1948 he had presented papers arguing that the United States should develop a high altitude strategic and tactical reconnaissance capability. Leghorn, an MIT graduate, had served as an Army Air Forces reconnaissance officer in Europe during World War II. After the war, he worked for Eastman Kodak but was recalled to active duty during the Korean War. Initially, in April 1951, he became the head of the Reconnaissance Systems Branch of the Wright Development Command, Dayton, Ohio, but in early 1952 was assigned to the Pentagon staff of Col Bernard A Shriever, assistant for development planning to the Air Force deputy chief of staff for development. In the latter position, Leghorn helped lay the groundwork for what would eventually become the U-2. Members of the study group included Chairman Carl F. P. Overhage (Eastman Kodak), Edward M. Purcell (Harvard University), Saville Davis (Christian Science Monitor), Allen F. Donovan (Cornell Aeronautics Laboratory), Peter C. Goldmark (Columbia Broadcasting System Laboratories), Edwin H. Land (founder, Polaroid Corporation). Stewart E. Miller (Bell Laboratories), Richard S. Perkin (Perkin-Elmer Company), and Louis E. Ridenour (Ridenour Associates), Pedlow and Welzenbach, 4, 6-7, 18.
* ↑ R. Cargill Hall, “Origins of US Space Policy: Eisenhower, Open Skies, and Freedom of Space,” Colloquy (December 1993), 19.
* ↑ Ibid. Eisenhower was not the first United States official to express concern about a nuclear Pearl Harbor. Gen Henry H. “Hap” Arnold, commanding general of the AAF, had expressed the same concern nearly 10 years earlier. See Spires, 30.
* ↑ While Eisenhower may have feared a nuclear surprise attack, the primary focus of the US ballistic missile program, even under Eisenhower, was never the launching of a space satellite for intelligence purposes, but rather the creation of a system to deliver a hydrogen warhead on target anywhere on earth.
* ↑ The Surprise Attack Panel's membership was drawn from the US scientific and engineering communities, including many who had served on the Beacon Hill Study Group. During the time the TCP/Surprise Attack Panel was meeting, the Air Force continued to move forward with a program to develop a reconnaissance satellite system. On 27 November 1954, the Air Force's Research and Development Command had made the decision to pursue a satellite system and on 16 March 1955 had completed a formal statement of objectives. Hall, “Origins,” 20. Also see “USAF Space Programs, 1945-1962” (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: USAF Historical Division Liaison Office, undated), 9-10.
* ↑ Hall, “Origins,” 19-20
* ↑ Pedlow and Welzenbach, 85.
* ↑ Hall, “Origins,” 6.
* ↑ Welles Hangen, “Russia Charges Balloon Forays by US & Turks; Reports Inroads by Spheres Equipped with Cameras and Radio Equipment; Leaflets Noted Anew: State Department Suggests Moscow May Refer to Air Force Weather Balloons,” New York Times, 6 February 1956; “US Studying Protest,” New York Times, 7 February 1956; and Anthony Leviero, “Balloon Activity Explained By US-Air Force Says Some of 200 Loosed in Scotland May Have Drifted to Soviet,” New York Times, Special Edition, 9 February 1956.
* ↑ Elie Abel, “Dulles Hints US Will Try to Curb Balloon Flights: Implies Weather Apparatus Will Be Kept From Soviet Skies as Friendly Move--Espionage Use Denied,” special to New York Times, 8 February 1956. “Balloon Flights Stopped by US to Satisfy Soviet,” special to New York Times, 9 February 1956.
* ↑ “Russians Display Balloons of US-Call Flights a Brink-of-War Act-Insist Spying, Not Weather Study, Is Aim,” special to New York Times, 10 February 1956.
* ↑ “Transcript of the Record of News Conference Held by Dulles,” New York Times, 8 February 1956.
* ↑ Charles E. Egan, “Soviet is Accused of Balloon Scare-Air Chief Says Moscow Seeks to Create 'Incident,' Espionage Charge Denied,” New York Times, 12 February 1956
* ↑ Pedlow and Welzenbach, 85. At the same time the Air Force balloon program was receiving criticism, Richard M. Bissell Jr., special assistant to the Director of Central Intelligence Allen W. Dulles and the CIA official designated by Dulles to oversee the U-2 program, had also decided to use “weather research” as the cover story for the U-2 should its existence ever be made public. Killian and Land disagreed with Bissell's proposed cover story. If a U-2 were ever lost over hostile territory, they proposed that the US “not try to deny responsibility but should state that the U-2 overflights were 'to guard against surprise attack.'” Killian and Land's proposal was to be studied (but never was) and Bissell's weather research cover story remained operative and was implemented vis-à-vis Francis Gary Powers's U-2 (discussed later in chapter 5). Ibid., 89, 178-80.
* ↑ Ibid., 86. In reality, some balloons were launched to chart the jet stream. However, launching weather related balloons at the same time that intelligence-gathering balloons were launched caused the baby to be thrown out with the bath water.
* ↑ Hall, “Origins,” 21. Hall provides a complete analysis regarding the policy factors impacting the creation of intelligence-gathering satellites during the Eisenhower administration.
* ↑ IGY was “perhaps the most ambitious and at the same time the most successful cooperative enterprise ever undertaken by nations. The IGY was a scientific year when experts from 67 nations agreed to observe the earth over its whole surface, simultaneously, and with precise instruments designed to the same standards so that the changing phenomena enveloping the earth could be caught and described in their full global sense.” See Lloyd V. Berkner, “Foreword,” in J. Tuzo Wilson, IGY The Year of the New Moons (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961). Beginning in 1945, the US had already contemplated a military space program and shortly thereafter studied the feasibility of a US launched satellite. As noted above, the early consideration of a satellite program got lost in a thicket not only of interservice rivalries over custody of such a program but also in skepticism from influential civilian scientists. For a detailed description of the period from 1945 until 1955, see Bowen and Schofield references cited in note 1.
* ↑ Vechernaya Moskva, “Evening Moscow:” 15 April 55, cited in Harry Schwartz, “Russians Already Striving to Set Up Space Satellite,” New York Times, 30 July 1955, 1; and “Soviet Gives No Date,” New York Times, 30 July 1955.
* ↑ For amplification of this point, see Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower, vol. 2, The President (New York: Simon and Shuster, 1984).
* ↑ Quarles served as assistant secretary of defense for research and development from September 1953 to August 1955. He then served as secretary of the Air Force from August 1955 to April 1957 and became deputy secretary of defense in April 1957 and served in that capacity until May 1959.
* ↑ Spires, 41
* ↑ Some historians assert that the Navy, which eventually was selected to manage the development of the nonmilitary booster, was aware of this NSC decision when it submitted its proposal for developing these boosters to the NSC for approval while the Army and Air Force were not. “USAF Space Programs,” 12.
* ↑ “USAF Space Programs,” 12-13; Hall, “Origins,” 22-23; and Bowen, 57-83.
* ↑ Raymond W. Young, “The Aerial Inspection Plan and Air Sovereignty,” George Washington Law Review 24, no. (5 April 1956): 565-89.
* ↑ Spires (41) correctly concludes that Eisenhower's civilian IGY satellite was a “stalking horse” to establish the precedent of “freedom in space” for eventual military reconnaissance satellites and focused attention on the former as a diversion from the latter.
* ↑ Ibid.; Hall, “Origins,” 6, 19-22
* ↑ Ibid., 21.
* ↑ “Open skies” was part of President Eisenhower's space-for-peace policy. Open skies contemplated the sharing of information regarding the exploration of outer space, the setting of limits on sovereignty regarding outer space, and the inspection of space program facilities. In “Origins of US Space Policy,” Cargill Hall traces the origin of the open skies doctrine to Richard Leghorn. Leghorn, while working for Eisenhower's special assistant Harold Stassen, had written a paper and subsequently a booklet explaining the disarmament proposal made by Eisenhower at the Geneva Conference. In a 5 August 1955 article in U.S. News & World Report, Leghorn explained the Eisenhower administration's rationale for open skies and its implication for arms reduction. See R. Cargill Hall, “The Eisenhower Administration and the Cold War: Framing American Astronautics to Serve National Security,” Prologue, Quarterly of the National Archives 27, no. 1 (Spring 1995): 63-64. Hereafter Hall, “Cold War.”
* ↑ Russell Baker, “US To Launch Earth Satellite 200-300 Miles Into Outer Space; World Will Get Scientific Data,” New York Times, 30 July 55, 1.
* ↑ A. Kislov and S. Krylov, “State Sovereignty in Air Space,” International Affairs (Moscow) (March 1956) cited in Maj Howard J. Neumann, USAF, “The Legal Status of Outer Space and the Soviet Union,” Space Law, 495-503.
* ↑ Bowen, 64; Hall, “Cold War,” ibid.
* ↑ Bowen, ibid.
* ↑ While the first stage of the Vanguard was fully developed and a number successfully launched, three stages of the Vanguard were necessary to launch a satellite into orbit. The second and third stages of the Vanguard never got beyond dummy status.
* ↑ Marven L. Whipple, “Atlantic Missile Range/Eastern Test Range Index of Missile Launchings, 1950-1974.”
* ↑ “USAF Space Programs,” 15-16.
* ↑ Bowen, 57-107; Watson, 157-79.
* ↑ Sputnik as used hereafter refers specifically to the spaceflights of Sputniks I and II not to the general term sputnik, which is the Russian word for satellite.
* ↑ Watson, 123-26.
* ↑ [[Author:Piers Brendon|]], Ike, His Life and Times (New York: Harper & Row, 1986), 347-49; Marquis William Childs, Eisenhower: Captive Hero; A Critical Study of the General and the President (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1958), 258-63.
* ↑ For a more detailed discussion of the Soviet and US capabilities, see Robert H. Ferrell, American Diplomacy: A History (New York: Norton, 1969), 659-60.
* ↑ In his first meeting with DOD officials after Sputnik was in orbit, Eisenhower learned from the Army that its Redstone rocket may have been able to launch a US satellite into orbit two months earlier than Sputnik. Further, Eisenhower learned that the Army never made such an attempt because the president had given the mission to the Navy Vanguard program. On 8 October 1957, Eisenhower asked Deputy Secretary of Defense Quarles if the assertion of the Army officials was true. Quarles responded to the effect that the situation was even worse given that the Army could have accomplished the launch two years earlier, had not DOD officials and Quarles himself had decided that it was “better to have the earth satellite proceed separately from military development” so as to “stress the peaceful character of the satellite program.” See Ambrose, 428.
* ↑ Hall, “Origins,” 22.
* ↑ Spires, 47.
* ↑ Given that the Explorer satellite program successfully launched after Sputnik and given that on 20 September 1956 a Jupiter-C with a Redstone rocket as a first stage plus upper stages like those proposed for the Orbiter had successfully carried an 84-pound payload that could have been replaced by a satellite, Quarles and the Army officials may have been correct when they informed Eisenhower that the United States could have placed an object into orbit before Sputnik. See also Whipple.
* ↑ Hall, “Origins,” 22; Whipple.
* ↑ Hall, “Origins,” 21-22. A valid question, not answered herein, is whether the Eisenhower administration purposefully allowed the USSR to be “first-in-space” to lure the USSR into creating by its own actions the principle of freedom of passage in outer space. Such could explain why Eisenhower assigned to nonexistant nonmilitary boosters, the task of sending a satellite into orbit. Perhaps, Eisenhower knowingly and intentionally proposed an “impossibility.” If anyone appears to have had such a design in mind, it appears to have been Air Force secretary (later Deputy Secretary of Defense) Quarles. (See note 36, chapter 2.)
* ↑ The panel was chaired by H. Rowan Gaither, chairman of the board of directors of the Ford Foundation. For a more complete description of the panel and its membership and its interworkings, see Watson, 136-41.
* ↑ Ibid., 132-55, 179-87, 293-322.