# The Empire and the century/The Bond of Military Unity

THE BOND OF MILITARY UNITY
By MAJOR-GENERAL SIR EDWARD HUTTON, K.C.M.G., Late Commanding the Military Forces of Canada (1898-1900), and of Australia (1901-1904)
The question of Commercial Unity has for the last two years, in the masterful hands of Mr. Chamberlain, so filled the public eye as the basis for consolidating the Empire that the earlier proposal for the much-to-be-desired Military Unity has in a large measure been relegated to the background. Yet signs are not wanting to show that if the conditions of the War Office administration three years ago had possessed the confidence of the Mother Country and her Colonies, a National Defence System would have formed the primary element in that consolidation of the Empire which all now recognise as the question of the hour.
Mutual defence has from the outset of human existence been the keystone of the social arch. It has bound at all times in the past, as it assuredly will in the future, individuals as well as nations together by ties at once of mutual sentiment, sympathy, and self-interest. Who is there who will deny the fact that mutual protection is the primary factor which binds man to man? It would be regrettable indeed if an element in the building-up of a great Empire so wholesome and so invigorating to patriotism and self-discipline should be even temporarily abandoned for an element which is secondary only in the primitive instincts of mankind.
​Necessity, however, governs all our actions. The South African War had clearly shown the yearning of the whole Empire for some means by which to consolidate the ties which up to that time had been more sentimental than real. The moment had arrived for action. If 'the sons of Britain throughout the world were not then to stand shoulder to shoulder to defend their mutual interests and their common rights,' some other means must be found for effecting a result which all alike recognised as paramount.
Doubt now obscures the future of Commercial Unity, and it is opportune to consider whether Military Unity may not, even yet, be effected under a rejuvenated War Office. There is on the part of the great Colonies an unmistakable aspiration towards a closer union and for a broader citizenship. There is on the part of the Mother Country a feeling, more and more intense each year, that the future successful maintenance of the Empire, vital to all concerned, is to be found only in a closer union with her children. That union is strength is more true now than ever before! Under modern conditions war assumes gigantic proportions; hundreds of thousands are and will be necessary where thousands and even hundreds have in past times decided the fate of Empires. By combination alone can nations now hope to defend their rights and guard their independence.
What could Canada hope to effect with her 3,500 miles of frontier, unaided by the other members of the British family? How could Australia expect to keep inviolate her 8,000 miles of seaboard, and to maintain for her future generations the heritage she possesses from the grasp of the teeming millions of China and Japan without the aid of her partners in the Empire? What hope has South Africa of consolidation and development without the Pax Britannica under the British flag?
​All agree that it is incumbent upon all portions of the Anglo-Saxon race owning allegiance to the King to draw closer the bonds of unity, and within our own social family to seek that strength and support which we can never hope to find from alien nations.
The Military Obligations of the Empire.
The necessity for a Military Unity may therefore be regarded as universally acknowledged, and it will only be necessary to consider in its turn the military obligations of our Empire for which this unity is so desirable. These may be divided as follows:
(a) The maintenance of order and of our sovereign rights in all parts of our world-wide dominions, and the conduct of those military operations necessitated from time to time by the natural expansion of our trade and commerce.
(b) The defence of the Empire in whole or part from foreign aggression and the fulfilment of our treaty obligations.
It is obvious that for (a) we have, in addition to our great fleets, the Regular Army of 197,889 men (vide table on p. 248), which, with the garrison of India, 74,450, gives in all a total of 271,839 of all ranks. Of this number, however, it is estimated that no less than 40,953 are under twenty years of age, and therefore ineffective for war. The Reserves will accordingly, when called out, do little more than make up wastage and complete the existing peace establishments. It was found in 1899 that with forces similar to those now in existence a field force from the Regular Army at home of more than 70,000 was not procurable. In the event of a war with a European Power, or combination of Powers, it is doubtful if even this number would be available for a field army.
​To consider the military obligations comprised under (b) it is necessary to carefully consider the principles recently laid down by the Prime Minister, in an answer given to a question in Parliament on March 7 last, as follows:
'The governing considerations which, as it seems to us, ought to determine the number of troops to be maintained depend not so much on considerations affecting Home Defence as upon the claims which colonial, and still more Indian, needs may make upon our military resources.'
The North-West Frontier of India.—One of the most important lessons taught us by the recent war is the comparative ease and relative simplicity with which Russia massed and maintained a vast field army of not less than 600,000 men at the end of 6,000 miles of a single line of railway. An authorized statement was recently published to the effect that 775,000 of all ranks had been sent to Kharbin since the beginning of the war. This number added to the troops already in Manchuria makes, says the well-informed Times correspondent in St. Petersburg, an aggregate of not less than 820,000 men (Times, March 26, 1905). If Russia can place so large an army in the field at such a distance from its base, and can maintain it effective for so long a period by only a single line of railway, what could she not effect in Afghanistan with two lines of completed railway, and with a far less distant base? Our requirements for the defence of our North-West Frontier, at a modest calculation, can not be estimated under such circumstances at less than 500,000 men. Towards this number India can only at present provide, exclusive of Imperial Service troops, a total field army of 139,000 men (Military Member, Indian Council, Times, March 30, 1905).
The Southern Frontier of Canada.—It is customary to forget the treaty obligations, apart from sentiment, which we have accepted in holding inviolate the 3,500 miles of the Southern Frontier of Canada. Nine years ​have not elapsed since we were on the verge of war with the United States, and, however reluctant we may be to recognise it now, the truth still remains that a positive war frenzy seized at least the Western States of America, which threatened at one time to force hostilities upon our more sober-minded kinsmen.
The military force required to hold Canada, with its population of 6,000,000, against the resources of a great nation numbering not less than 70,000,000, cannot be computed at less than 500,000 men.
Integrity of Belgium.—Our treaty obligations as regards Belgium, shared though they be by other European Powers, may at any moment force us to take active military measures for which a large army would be required.
We have, moreover, only recently emerged from a war within the Empire which necessitated 448,400 men being placed in the field; and the 'North Sea incident,' so lately as October last year, brought us within measurable distance of war with a first-class European Power.
The Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for War have, moreover, definitely adopted the principle that the defence of England is not the passive military defence of English snores, but the active offensive defence by a powerful navy. Naval and military strategists have always held this view, but the corollary of this principle must equally be remembered, that it is not possible for any navy, however invincible, to defeat and destroy the fighting power of our enemies by land as well as by sea. It has been truly said that war can only attain a successful end by the annihilation of our enemies, and annihilation by a navy alone is impossible. The real defence of England, Australia, and all the component parts of our vast domain, must therefore be in the future, as it has been in the past, by a vigorous offence, by a policy of war forced upon our enemies, and fought out to a finish upon other than English soil. Thus did England defeat Napoleon in the nineteenth ​century, and thus only can the British Empire defeat its enemies in the twentieth.
Having the forgoing obligations in mind, it is surely not wrong to say that we require a field army of not less than 500,000 men, or at least the organization by which such an army can be brought into existence rapidly and effectively.
The Creation of a Field Army of 500,000 Men.
The Anglo-Saxon race has declared against conscription upon the European model, and it is impracticable under the conditions now prevailing to expect any change in public feeling. The ingrained and not unnatural dislike of the Anglo-Saxon for standing armies is a factor which must always be borne in mind and cannot be disregarded, and a decrease rather than an increase of our own Regular Army is not unlikely to be demanded by Parliament and by public opinion. It is, at any rate, useless to suppose that by any possible process a regular or standing army can be created or maintained which will provide the troops shown to be necessary.
It is, at the same time, a significant fact that the liability to military service is generally recognised as one of the obligations of citizenship, and a general feeling is showing itself that the solution of the problem will be found in the further development of that ancient and constitutional force the Militia, 'whose theory,' as described by Mr. Cardwell, 'is conscription, but whose practice is voluntary engagement.' A Militia system is common to all the great branches of the Anglo-Saxon people, and is generally acknowledged as being the form of military service at once applicable and sufficient to the requirements of national defence. Evolved from early times, when, under the guiding hand of King Alfred the Great, a system of universal military service first took definite shape, this Anglo-Saxon form of military service has slowly but surely matured with the growth of the race itself. It is to this form, therefore, of military ​service that we must look for that bond of Military Unity which is to provide the field army required, and thus to form the true basis of our Imperial defence system.
The principles included within the present Militia Act of 1882 are largely accepted in their general bearing by other parts of the Empire, and are embodied in the Militia Act of Canada, 1867, the Defence Act of Australia, 1903, and the Defence Act of Natal, 1903. Legal powers for an extension of Militia service beyond the limits of the United Kingdom are alone required to make the existing Acts of Parliament sufficient for the present requirements. Legislation in this regard has already been undertaken by the Imperial Government, and it is safe to assume that the various Colonial Governments will come to see the necessity of following suit.
No military system can be put into effect which is not in accord with the natural instincts of the people, and as Anglo-Saxondom is practically unanimous in regard to the soundness of a Militia system of military service, if carried out upon the thorough and effective lines demanded by modern developments, it is to such a system that we must look. The Commonwealth of Australia, the latest born of the British Sisterhood of Nations, has recently adopted a Militia Army System, which, it is urged, best fulfils the conditions for national defence imposed by the Anglo-Saxon form of constitutional Government and by the radical developments of modern democracy.
Militia System adopted by Australia, 1903.
The Commonwealth military system was drawn up in accordance with certain defined strategical considerations which were embodied in a special minute on the subject, and laid before the Australian Parliament in April, 1902. It provides:
1. A Permanent (or Regular) Cadre Force, consisting of the General and Instructional Staff, a regiment of Artillery, small detachments of Engineers, Army Service ​Corps, Ordnance Corps, and of Army Medical Corps, for partially garrisoning the naval strategical bases, for technical duties, for maintenance of valuable stores and equipment, and, above all, for the instruction of the Militia and Volunteer forces during peace and for stiffening them in times of war.
2. A Field Force of Militia troops for the purpose of carrying out active operations in the field in defence of the Commonwealth as a whole. This force consists of six light horse brigades and three brigades of infantry.
3. A Garrison Force of Volunteers combined with Militia for the local defence of each State.
The permanent or regular force, consisting of 91 officers and 1,204 other ranks, bears only a small proportion to the Militia and Volunteer troops, which together form the real defence forces of Australia.
The numbers are as shown in Table I. (p. 235).
Each brigade is organized upon the principles shown in Tables II. and III. (pp. 236, 237).
It will be seen that a field force of six brigades of light horse and three brigades of infantry is provided for the defence of the Commonwealth within the limitations imposed by the Defence Act. Each of these brigades is complete in itself, with the proportion of all arms and of those administrative departments which are essential for a mobile force in the field. Each of the six States contribute their quota to the field force in proportion to their population.
Garrison troops for local or State defence, comprising garrisons for the defended ports, and a small district reserve or movable column, are also provided. The numbers allotted for this purpose to each State vary in proportion to the local requirements of defence and to the willingness of the inhabitants to engage in voluntary military service.
While the field force is composed entirely of Militia, paid at the market rates of labour, with a nucleus of permanent officers and men, the garrison troops are primarily Volunteers. The yearly cost is estimated at ​
£609,400, when the organization is carried into effect in its entirety.
It is obviously impracticable to carry out successfully and economically any military organization suited to rapid expansion and mobilization in time of national emergency unless the units of the various arms are ​
organized upon a defined and uniform basis. Each unit, therefore, of the field force has a peace as well as a war establishment. The peace establishments which have been adopted are based upon the present possibilities and funds available. They are numerically small, but provide for nearly a full complement of officers and non-commissioned officers, with approximately one-half of ​
* ↑ Staff field company not included.
* ↑ Includes staff of field company.
the rank and file laid down for the war establishments. Thus a squadron of light horse and a company of infantry are constituted as follows:
The peace cadres by this plan, with practically their full complement of trained officers and non-commissioned officers, can be completed upon mobilization in time of national emergency by partially trained or even untrained men to the requirements of war without serious difficulty. The degree of training to be given to officers and non-commissioned officers in peace is solely governed by expense. The formation of schools of instruction has been carried out, but they must be still further elaborated by the Commonwealth if they are to be really effective and to successfully achieve the desired result. The expenditure necessary is relatively insignificant.
The system of instruction and the periods of training for the whole force thus organized are made as elastic as possible, and have been so arranged as to give ample latitude to meet local requirements, and to interfere as little as may be with the civil occupations of those professional men and of those well-to-do and intelligent individuals of the community who are found, as a rule, in the ranks of the Volunteers, and but rarely in the ranks of the Militia of the United Kingdom. The result is that the rank and file in Australia, as in Canada, are far superior in intelligence, physique, and in social status to the rank and file of the Regular Army or Militia at home. Military knowledge and instruction are consequently absorbed more readily, and under ​officers who are well trained, experienced, and tactful, a very high standard of discipline can be maintained. The individuality and self-reliance so essential in modern war need no encouragement. The Corps of Engineers, the Supply and Transport Corps, and the Ordnance and the Army Medical Service, are recruited from those classes who exercise in civil life the functions which they are required to discharge in war. Little difficulty is found in obtaining men experienced in supply, in transport, and in medicine, to fill the ranks of the departmental corps charged with such work, so that automatically, and without special departmental training, recruits for these essential and technical services can be obtained, which at home in the Regular Army are created with much difficulty, and only maintained by a system of laborious and expensive training.
It was generally admitted that no administrative unit in the South African War was more effective or complete than the New South Wales Army Medical Corps, which was organized in 1893 upon the principle described.
A complete military organization has thus been created in Australia, which, while capable of expansion, forms a carefully constructed framework into which the additional and necessary fighting material can be fitted when the time of action arrives. A military system, therefore, suited to the modern requirements of a self-governing and democratic community has been brought into being, which has satisfied all shades of opinion. There can be no better test of the unanimity of feeling in this regard than the fact that the military system of the Commonwealth now adopted was evolved in less than three years out of the motley defence forces previously existing in the six States of Australia, in spite of drastic retrenchment, and in spite of the halting administration of three successive Governments so widely divergent in ​their views as those of Sir Edmund Barton, Mr. Watson, and Mr. Reid.
Militia System of Canada.
The organization of the National Militia Army adopted by Australia followed closely the plan adopted in 1867 for Canada by that able and accomplished soldier General Sir Patrick MacDougall. Political exigencies, however, caused the excellently conceived Militia system of Canada to lapse, and its governing principles to be forgotten. It was not until the rude shock which Canada experienced in 1895 during the strained relations with our kinsmen of the United States over the Venezuela Boundary Question that public attention was directed to the discreditable condition of Canadian defence. Large sums were then hurriedly laid out in arms and equipment, and belated efforts were made to improve the standard of military training. It was, however, 1898 before the essential equipment arrived, before money was provided for the complete training of the whole of the Canadian Militia, and before measures were adopted for improving and completing the all-essential administrative organization. The stimulus thus given to the natural military spirit of the Canadians, the consequent improvement in military training and knowledge, and, above all, the vastly improved military organization, showed its value and result in the relative excellence of the representative units contributed by Canada to the South African War.
The keynote, however, of the success of the National Militia System, adopted by Canada in 1867 and by Australia in 1903, is the organization in complete form of the larger military units, and the allotment of complete brigades to defined districts, together with the association of the smaller military units of regiments, squadrons, batteries, and companies within certain allotted areas in these districts. The districts, be they the provinces in Canada, the States in Australia, or the ​counties in the United Kingdom, are thus identified with their representative contribution to the defence of the whole nation. Officers and men organized on this principle bring to their corps all the cohesion, feeling of comradeship, and local association, which are so essential for insuring the highest standard of discipline in the field and of gallantry before the enemy. Each corps is thus not only representative of its own province, State, or county, but also of its own special district and of its own particular community. Each individual soldier feels that upon him rests, in bivouac and in battle, the responsibility of adequately representing his friends and kinsmen, and of doing honour to his own name and to the fair reputation of his own countryside.
Military Value of Militia.
There will be many, no doubt, who will question the military value of a Militia thus raised, who will query their cohesion and discipline, will query their degree of training and efficiency, and will even query their steadiness and gallantry in action. To such a careful study, among others, of the War of the American Revolution (1776–1783) is suggested. 'Taking into consideration,' says Sir Charles Trevelyan, the latest historian of this period, 'the quality of the regular British Army opposed to them, some of their feats have seldom been surpassed except in legendary warfare.' When they failed, a want of a satisfactory organization, an absence of qualified leaders, and a deficiency in equipment, will usually be found to be the causes. It was the Canadian Militia in 1812 who almost single-handed, in the absence of the Regular Army, not only held the Southern Frontier successfully, but carried the war into the enemy's country. The fighting value of the vast armies engaged in the American War of Secession, more closely resembling a National Militia than a Regular Army, has never been questioned. Their early failures were due to lack of initial organization, of military training, and ​to the absence of a sufficient number of qualified leaders, but never to a lack of military spirit or of soldierly qualities in the troops themselves.
The Militia of the United Kingdom, raised by voluntary enlistment, with the ballot in reserve in case of national emergency, has been frequently embodied, but has never, except on two minor occasions, taken any direct or leading part as distinct military units in any war until the late South African campaign. The Militia contributed largely to the Peninsular Army; and it was stated by Mr. Sidney Herbert in Parliament that at Waterloo, of 18,000 line soldiers, the majority were volunteers from the Militia. If in the recent campaign the Militia, taken generally, did not realize the expectations formed of its value, the reasons are that the force has for years received little encouragement, has had few advantages as regards training and instruction, and has been consistently emasculated by the annual transfer of officers and men to those regular battalions to which it is affiliated. It would be unreasonable to expect a high degree of fighting value from a force thus sorely tried.
It is beyond all question that the Colonial Militia from Australia and Canada contributed largely to the success of the campaign in South Africa. The excellent service rendered by the Royal Canadian Infantry Regiment at Paardeberg will always be a well-remembered feature of Kronje's surrender; while mounted corps from Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, did excellent service, and are conspicuous examples of what Militia troops can do. The later irregular corps were not Militia; and, suffering from the disadvantage of inadequately trained officers, insufficient previous military knowledge, and defective organization, they in many instances left much to be desired. It is safe to assume that the defects revealed will be largely removed by the improved methods of instruction, and by the defined organization now adopted in both Australia and Canada.
National Militia Army of 500,000 Men.
Following the principles above explained, the Militia and Yeomanry of the United Kingdom could jointly, with the Militia of Australia, Canada, and the self-governing Colonies, provide the field army of 500,000 men which has been shown to be required.
Having in view the population and resources of the various portions of the Empire, the following proportion might well be alloted:
The difficulties in providing the peace establishment of 250,000 men allotted to the United Kingdom are not so great as may at first sight appear. There already exist 133,091 Militia, of which approximately 80,000 should be available for a field army and 27,290 Yeomanry. A balance of approximately 90,000 men will thus have to be gradually raised, which, divided upon a population basis between the different counties in accordance with the system adopted by Australia and ​Canada, could be obtained without serious difficulty. It only remains to act upon the plan announced By Lord Lansdowne as the policy of the Government, that 'the Militia should retain its identity, and that it should not be merged into the short-service army, but that, on the other hand, it should be so framed, so equipped, and so officered that it should be fit, when occasion arises, to take its place alongside the best troops of the line for the purposes of foreign service' (House of Lords, March 30, 1905). A considerable reconstruction of the existing Militia units will, however, be necessary, and their reorganization into brigades, complete in all arms and in administrative departments, must be undertaken in a bold and businesslike spirit. 'The possibilities of that admirable body [the Militia],' wrote Mr. Arnold-Forster to the Times on November 30, 1897, 'will never be properly utilized until it be taken seriously by some energetic War Minister. Instead of being the drudge of the army, the despised channel through which officers and men may pass to the line regiments, the Militia should be organized as a self-contained and self-respecting force.'
Legislation would be required in the case of the Yeomanry, so as to place them upon the same footing as the Militia in regard to their service. This has been frequently urged, and would, it is believed, be welcomed by the Yeomanry themselves.
The expense entailed by the increase thus indicated, by the improved instruction of officers and non-commissioned officers, and by an increase in daily pay, could be covered by a reduction of the number of immature youths, unfit for service, who now in so large a measure fill the ranks of the Regular Army. It is stated in the Report of the Royal Commission upon the South African War that in April, 1900, of the Regular Army at home, no less than 37,333 men were immature and not fit for active service. It is certain that at least this number of lads unfit for war are still ​to be found among the regular force now serving at home. The elimination of this number of youths will at once give the saving required.
It is obviously impracticable within the scope of this paper to deal in complete detail and in exact figures with the plan thus outlined; it has been sufficiently described to show the facility with which a defined military system, based on the cooperation of Great Britain and her Colonies, could be adopted. The time has not yet arrived for riveting closer the bonds of union and for accepting upon hard-and-fast lines a too sharply defined system of Imperial defence. 'There is noticing more dangerous,' said Lord Salisbury in alluding to Imperial Federation on May 7, 1902, 'than to force a decision before a decision is ready, and therefore to produce feelings of discontent, feelings of difficulty, which, if we will only avoid, if we will only wait, will of themselves bring about the results that we desire. There is no danger that appears to me more serious for the time that lies before us than to attempt to force the various parts of the Empire into a mutual arrangement and subordination for which they are not ready, and which may only produce a reaction in favour of the old state of things.'
The leading statesmen of Canada and of Australia similarly deprecate the forging of 'indissoluble ties,' but would assuredly cooperate in a system of joint defence upon which to organize and maintain their military forces. There would thus be instituted a bond of Military Unity, elastic it may be, and suited to political freedom of action, which, founded upon sound strategical lines of mutual defence, would grow with the growth of the Empire, and form a solid asset for the security of our joint commercial and national interests. It is our duty as a practical people to organize now in time of peace those mighty forces of the Empire which tend to the maintenance and solidity of the British race. It will be too late when the moment of national danger arrives. It would be ​but to court disaster and national disgrace to engage an European army of equal numbers with troops so ill organized, with men so untrained, and with officers so inexperienced as those which composed the majority of those hastily-raised corps during the recent war in South Africa. Men in a mass are much what an organization makes them. The National Militia Armies here advocated provide at least a framework capable of almost indefinite expansion and a complete military organization; it will enable the training of the requisite officers and non-commissioned officers to be effected, the administrative departments to be created, and the stores, guns, and equipment to be purchased. Thus might be gradually evolved at small cost and with slight dislocation of existing institutions a military force which will prove a bond of Unity more consistent with our national sentiments and more universally acceptable than any bond of Commercial Unity, however sound and however plausible.
The writer is deeply conscious of his inability to do full justice to the value and power possessed by a National Militia Army thus organized. He has, however, endeavoured to set before the reader the result of his personal knowledge of, and experience in, the organization and command in peace and war of the Militia of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Great Britain, extending over a lengthened period of service. It is only by an intimate and personal acquaintance with the excellent military qualities possessed by such troops that their real value as a reliable and fighting element can be correctly gauged. The writer will always look back with pride, pleasure, and profit to his association with the Militia troops of the Empire, and is absolutely convinced that a National Militia Army, with a complete and homogeneous organization, with improved training, and with effective arms and equipment, will prove, when the time of trial comes, not unworthy of the best traditions of the British Army.
* ↑ S.A. Constabulary cost £2,505,523 in 1903.
* ↑ To this may be added for Reserves and qualified members of rifle-clubs, 29,341; grand total, 50,963.
* ↑ Exclusive of 17,400 Imperial Service troops.
* ↑ For details, vide below.
* ↑ Mr. Chamberlain, January 18, 1898.
* ↑ Sir Wilfrid Laurier, at Liverpool, June 13, 1897.
* ↑ Report of the Royal Commission on the South African War. Sec. 59 and 60.
* ↑ A reduction of no less than 22 per cent. of the military estimates was effected in 1902.