# United States v. Google/Findings of Fact/Section 2F

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    F. GSE Distribution
58. Search providers have multiple channels to make accessible, or distribute, their GSE to users on mobile and desktop devices. They include but are not limited to: (1) the search bar integrated into browsers; (2) search widgets on Android device home screens; (3) search applications; (4) preset bookmarks within the default browser; (5) downloading an alternate browser; and (6) direct web search (i.e., navigating to www.google.com or www.bing.com). These channels of distribution are known as search access points.
       1. Default Distribution
59. The most efficient channel of GSE distribution is, by far, placement as the preloaded, out-of-the-box default GSE. That access point varies by device. On Apple products, it is the integrated search bar in the Safari browser (and to some extent, Apple’s voice assistant, Siri, and on-device search, Spotlight). Tr. at 632:9-10 (Rangel); infra Section VI.A.1.a. On Android devices, it is the search widget (prominently displayed at the center of the device’s home screen) and the search toolbar in the Chrome browser. See infra Section VI.B.1. The Chrome browser typically appears on the home screen of Android devices either in the “hotseat”—that is, the row of applications at the bottom of the home screen—or in a folder on the home screen along with other Google applications. Tr. at 797:7-17 (Kolotouros); see infra Section VI.B.1. And, on Windows desktop computers, the default access point is the integrated search bar in the Edge browser. Tr. at 3096:14-18 (Tinter). Google is the default GSE on all of these access points except on Edge, where the default GSE is Bing. Id. at 540:4-12, 632:6-8 (Rangel).
​60. Other browsers, which are not preloaded on devices but can be downloaded, also use an integrated search bar. Id. at 1963:3-12 (Weinberg) (DDG); M. Baker Dep. Tr. at 189:3-12 (Firefox). Google is the current default search engine on Firefox. From 2014 through 2017 it was Yahoo. See infra Section VI.A.2.a. On Firefox, a drop-down menu allows users to select a non-default search provider for the next search without changing the default search engine. M. Baker Dep. Tr. at 92:11-25. This is called the “this time, search with” feature. Id. Those options include SVPs, like Amazon. Id. (listing Bing, Amazon, or DDG as options).
61. Default settings can be changed by the user. On all major browsers, users can navigate to the browser’s settings and change the default to their preferred GSE. See, e.g., M. Baker Dep. Tr. at 61:1-4 (Firefox); Tr. at 2630:3–2631:15 (Cue) (discussing DXD6) (Safari); id. at 7650:10-17 (Pichai) (Chrome). No browser allows a user to change the default GSE to a specialized vertical provider, such as Amazon, or to a social media platform. Id. at 7426:21–7427:4 (Raghavan).
62. Notwithstanding the option to switch, the default remains the primary search access point. Roughly 50% of all general search queries in the United States flow through a search access point covered by one of the challenged contracts. See id. at 5755:6-11 (Whinston) (discussing UPXD104 at 34–36). Of that 50%, 28% of those queries are entered into search access points covered by the Google-Apple Internet Services Agreement, 19.4% through Google’s agreements with Android OEMs and carriers, and 2.3% through search access points on third-party browsers, such as Mozilla’s Firefox. See id.
63. Another 20% of all general search queries in the United States flow through user-downloaded Chrome, which defaults to Google. Id. at 5762:22–5763:13 (Whinston) (discussing UPXD104 at 37).
​64. Thus, only 30% of queries in the United States run through a search access point that does not default to Google. See id. at 5762:22–5763:13 (Whinston) (discussing UPXD104 at 37). (To be clear, those 30% of searches are not all run on GSEs other than Google. A large percentage of those searches still are entered into Google, but through channels other than the default search access points, such as user-downloaded Google Search app or a search on www.google.com.)
65. That users overwhelming use Google through preloaded search access points is explained in part by default bias, or the “power of defaults.” The field of behavioral economics teaches that a consumer’s choice can be heavily influenced by how it is presented. Id. at 526:7-21 (Rangel) (describing the concept of “choice architecture”). The consensus in the field is that “defaults have a powerful impact on consumer decisions.” Id. at 526:22-25 (Rangel).
66. According to U.S. Plaintiffs’ expert, Dr. Antonio Rangel, whose testimony the court credits, “the vast majority of individual searches, or queries, are carried out [by] habit,” because search is a high frequency activity done on a familiar device that provides an instant response. Id. at 543:2-9 (Rangel) (“Habits develop very strongly in those situations of high repetition and immediate feedback.”); see also id. at 543:14-19 (Rangel) (“When a consumer encounters their devices for the first time and they start searching, they start searching with the default search engine, which for many of them is the case. . . . If that search engine that is the default generates adequate experiences, the consumer will get habitized to that.”). A 2020 Google study confirmed this. A group of iOS users were asked what app they would choose to open a link in an email: Chrome, the Google Search app, or Safari? Regardless of the option the user selected, their leading rationale for doing so was “Habit/Regular Usage.” UPX757 at 628.
​67. Individuals often are not aware that they are acting out of habit. Tr. at 542:4-12 (Rangel). Consequently, when users are habituated to a particular option, they are unlikely to deviate from it. As Google’s behavioral economics team wrote in 2021: “Inertia is the path of the least resistance. People tend to stick with the status quo, as it takes more effort to make changes.” UPX103 at 214; see also UPX171 at 190 (2015 Google study based on 26 user interviews; almost half of the users (12) did not notice a surreptitious change from Google to Bing on their iPhone; “People expressed interest (but not huge urgency) to switch back to Google”); Tr. at 7677:5–7682:19 (Pichai) (discussing UPX172, a 2005 letter from Google to Microsoft stating that “most end users do not change defaults”).
68. Many users do not know that there is a default search engine, what it is, or that it can be changed. Tr. at 548:24–549:3 (Rangel); id. at 9942:7-10 (Murphy); see UPX123 at 469, 485 (2007 Google study showing that the default homepage on a browser is “[c]onfigurable by user but very few know/care to change it” and that “[u]sers do not always make an active, deliberate choice of a” search engine); PSX216 at 126 (2016 Google-internal email identifying “one fundamental issue [a]s that users on Edge don’t even realize they aren’t using Google”); UPX66 at 73 (2018 Google study showing substantial user confusion regarding which browser and GSE was in use); UPX2051 at 520 (2020 Google study showing that over half of iPhone users in the United States were “unsure” which GSE powered Safari and concluding that users are “often unaware they’re using Google”).
69. Even users who “are not in this habitual mode and try to change the default will get frustrated and stop the process” if there is “choice friction.” Tr. at 547:5-16 (Rangel). “Choice friction” refers to the concept that subtle challenges or barriers make it increasingly more difficult ​to implement a change. Id. at 554:5-16 (Rangel). “[T]he more choice friction it takes to change the defaults, the sticker the defaults are.” Id. at 554:20-21 (Rangel).
70. The amount of choice friction varies and depends on many factors. For instance, default effects are weaker when the product is of poor quality or is unknown to users. Consumers “start thinking about switching more if the experience is unsatisfactory” or if they have, “over years, developed a very strong preference for a [rival] brand[.]” Id. at 548:15-20 (Rangel). By contrast, default effects are stronger when the user is satisfied with the product. Id. at 650:22–651:9 (Rangel).
71. The type of device matters as well. Default effects are stronger on mobile devices, as opposed to desktop computers, in part because of the smaller interface. Id. at 625:21-23 (Rangel); id. at 6311:1-8 (Nayak) (“I think the most salient difference between mobile and desktop is in the user experience. . . . The mobile device has very limited real estate. . . . Whereas, the desktop device, of course, has a lot of real estate to provide your search experience. . . . It’s just a very different experience.”); id. at 9764:6-12 (Murphy) (“[M]obile screens are smaller, hard to change the default, as compared to a PC where the screen is bigger[.]”); id. at 3498:14-19 (Nadella) (“[C]hanging defaults today is . . . toughest on mobile platforms because . . . they’re locked up on the browser that is allowed, they’re locked up with app store access. So there are many, many sort of friction points on mobile operating systems.”). Also, switching certain default settings on an Android device is arguably harder than on an iPhone. See UPX171 at 186 (iPhone user study participants were “able to switch back with relatively little effort” to Google from Bing); Tr. at 559:23–561:16 (Rangel) (discussing UPXD101 at 25–35) (replacing the Google Search Widget with Bing’s rival widget is a 10-step process).
​72. Google understands that switching on mobile is more challenging than on desktop. To illustrate, in 2016 and 2020, Google estimated that if it lost the Safari default placement, it would claw back more search volume on desktop than on mobile. See UPX142 at 886 (2016) (Google would recover only 30% on iOS but 70% on MacOS); UPX148 at 826 (2020) (same, projecting 60–80% query loss on iOS); see also UPX84 at 728 (2016) (“User behavior is more heavily influenced by default settings on mobile and tablet[.]”); UPX139 at 119 (2020) (“People are much less likely to change [the] default search engine on mobile.”).
73. Google appreciates that increased choice friction discourages users from changing the default. See UPX103 at 214 (2021 Google document from Google’s Behavioral Economics Team stating that a “[s]eemingly small friction points in user experiences can have a dramatically disproportionate effect on whether people drop or stick”); UPX848 at 612 (“[Y]ou want to think about each step, as small as it might be, and see if there is a way to eliminate it, delay it, simplify it, default it.”); UPX172 at 731 (“[O]f the tiny fraction of end users who try to change the default, many will become frustrated and simply leave the default as originally set[.]”).
74. A GSE’s placement as the default thus drives search volume through that access point. Tr. at 3689:21-24 (Ramaswamy) (testifying that “the convenience of easy accessibility and tapping into . . . engrained default behaviors are the deciding factors when it comes to whether a search engine gets lots of usage”); id. at 7674:6–7675:21 (Pichai) (“[B]ecause you’re taking existing users, and by giving them more convenient access points, you’re making them search more. . . . Done correctly, and if you’re putting a product out in front of users which users like and want to use, yes, defaults can make a difference.”). In 2017, over 60% of all queries entered on Google flowed through defaults. UPX83 at 967; see id. (60% of iOS queries were through the ​Safari default, and 80% of Android queries were through defaults secured by the distribution deals). Far fewer users search directly on Google’s website.
75. Google recognizes that securing the default placement is extremely valuable for monetizing search queries. In 2017, Google estimated that its default placements drove over half (then 54%) of its overall search revenue, a percentage that had grown since 2014. UPX83 at 968. For devices manufactured by Samsung—the largest Android OEM—80% of search revenue earned on those devices in 2016 flowed through default placements secured by the MADAs (Chrome and the Google Search Widget). See UPX639 at 266; UPX660 at 369. In 2019, about 50% of all search revenue on Android devices flowed through the Google Search Widget. UPX0316 at 906. In 2020, Google’s internal modeling projected that it would lose between 60–80% of its iOS query volume should it be replaced as the default GSE on Apple devices, UPX148 at 826, which would translate into net revenue losses between $28.2 and $32.7 billion (and over double that in gross revenue losses), UPX1050 at 887. And in a 2015 presentation, Google expressed confidence in its standing among Apple users, but warned that its position “is still very vulnerable if defaults were to change.” UPX171 at 186.
76. Neeva exemplifies the importance of search distribution through a readily accessible channel. Neeva secured the capital and human resources needed to build a search engine. Tr. at 3671:4–3672:13 (Ramaswamy). Although it initially syndicated search results from Bing, it eventually crawled the web, built an index, and developed a ranking model, which relied heavily on artificial intelligence technology, to generate its own search results for about 60% of its queries. Id. at 3775:9–3776:21, 3739:14-16 (Ramaswamy). But Neeva was unable “to be even a default provider on things like the major browsers or operating systems,” which “was what made [its founders] conclude that it was hard to have Neeva consumer search as a viable business.” Id. ​at 3701:1-7 (Ramaswamy). The reason “why Neeva failed . . . was simply because [it] could not get enough users to be in that state where they regularly used Neeva.” Id. at 3712:10-12 (Ramaswamy); id. at 3677:2-3, 3700:25–3701:7 (Ramaswamy) (testifying that more users on Neeva would result in greater revenues through subscription fees); id. at 3724:18-21 (Ramaswamy) (“[I]f a well-funded and exceptionally talented team like Neeva could not even be a provider on most of the browsers, I don’t see that as the market working.”).
       2. Other Search Access Points
77. There are access points other than the default that can be used to distribute a GSE, but those channels are far less effective at reaching users. That is due in part to users’ lack of awareness of these options and the “choice friction” required to reach these alternatives. FOF ¶¶ 65–73.
78. Users can download search applications on Apple devices from the App Store or on Android devices from the Google Play Store. Tr. at 1538:1-4 (Roszak); id. at 617:15-22 (Rangel). But to reach such applications, a user would have to (1) know the application exists and (2) download it. Those points of choice friction reduce the effectiveness of a search app as a channel of distribution. To illustrate the point: Google receives only about 10% of its searches on Apple devices through the Google Search App (GSA). Id. at 9758:16–9760:1 (Murphy) (discussing DXD37 at 52); id. at 2494:22-24 (Cue) (“[M]ost people are sitting on a browser, they don’t really want to go search on an app or a different app from that standpoint.”). (Google does not suffer from this problem on Android devices. GSA is preloaded on all Android devices sold in the United States.) See id. at 791:25–792:2 (Kolotouros); see also infra Section VI.B.1.
79. Google recognizes that the user-downloaded GSA is an ineffective way to reach users. A 2018 internal study revealed that over 35% of iOS users did not know they could ​download GSA, and most of those who were aware of GSA did not want to install it. See UPX139 at 149. Over half of Safari users had not installed GSA, and of those that had installed it, over 80% still preferred using Safari. Id. at 150.
80. Another non-default search access point is the bookmarks page on a browser. See Tr. at 10195:21–10196:3 (Murphy) (discussing DXD37 at 47). The Safari “Favorites” page, for instance, contains preloaded icons to access Google, Bing, and Yahoo. Id. A user also can add a new search engine on that page. But few consumers use this channel, as it first requires finding the Favorites page in a new Safari tab, which requires an “extra click[.]” Id. at 10101:19–10102:21 (Murphy). Google itself receives only 10% of its searches on Safari through the bookmark. Id. at 9758:16–9760:1 (Murphy) (discussing DXD37 at 52).
81. Users also can reach GSEs by downloading an alternative browser from an applications store or the web. For example, a user can download Chrome, Edge, or DDG onto an Apple device. This, too, is not an easily accessible search point, as it involves similar choice friction as acquiring a search application. Google receives only 7.6% of all queries on Apple devices through user-downloaded Chrome. Id.
82. To be sure, downloads of an alternative browser occur with greater frequency on Windows desktop computers. On such devices, Edge is the default browser and Bing is the default search engine. Id. at 3096:14-20 (Tinter). Yet, Google’s search share on Windows devices is 80%, with most of the queries flowing through the Chrome default, which means Chrome was downloaded onto the device. See id. at 9737:9-21 (Murphy) (discussing DXD37 at 36, 38). Google’s dominance on Windows cannot, however, be attributed simply to the popularity of Chrome. Google had an 80% search share on Windows when Chrome first launched, and that share has remained steady ever since (see below).
​Search and Browser Shares on Windows Computers (U.S.)
DXD37 at 38.
83. Google’s dominance on Windows does not, however, undermine the power of defaults. Google’s strong product quality and brand recognition likely weakened the effectiveness of defaults on Windows devices before the introduction of Chrome. FOF ¶ 70 (switching the default is more common when the default has inferior product quality and branding). The popularity of Chrome over time only fortified that dominance. See Tr. at 9739:10-17 (Murphy) (discussing DXD37 at 38).
84. The power of defaults is evident, however, from the share of Bing users on Edge. Bing’s search share on Edge is approximately 80%; Google’s share is only 20%. Id. at 5744:24–5745:20 (Whinston) (discussing UPXD104 at 29). Even if one assumes that some portion of those Bing searches are performed by Microsoft-brand loyalists, Bing’s uniquely high search share on Edge cannot be explained by that alone. The default on Edge drives queries to Bing.
85. Finally, users can navigate directly to the GSE on the web to conduct searches—for example, by entering google.com or bing.com in a browser search bar. Id. at 1633:1-8 (Roszak). This is known as an “organic” search. But few users search in this way. On Apple ​devices, Google receives less than 5% of its query volume through organic searches. Id. at 9758:16–9760:1 (Murphy) (discussing DXD37 at 52). On Android devices, that number is only 10%. Sept. 19, 2023 (Sealed Session) Tr. at 23:25–27:2 (Yoo).