# TikTok Inc. v. Garland (slip opinion)/Opinion of Justice Gorsuch

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Nos. 24—656 and 24—657
TIKTOK INC., ET AL., PETITIONERS
MERRICK B. GARLAND, ATTORNEY GENERAL
BRIAN FIREBAUGH, ET AL., PETITIONERS
MERRICK B. GARLAND, ATTORNEY GENERAL
ON APPLICATIONS FOR INJUNCTION PENDING REVIEW TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
[January 17, 2025]
Justice Gorsuch, concurring in judgment.
We have had a fortnight to resolve, finally and on the merits, a major First Amendment dispute affecting more than 170 million Americans. Briefing finished on January 3, argument took place on January 10, and our opinions issue on January 17, 2025. Given those conditions, I can sketch out only a few, and admittedly tentative, observations.
First, the Court rightly refrains from endorsing the government's asserted interest in preventing "the covert manipulation of content" as a justification for the law before us. Brief for Respondent 37. One man's "covert content manipulation" is another's "editorial discretion." Journalists, publishers, and speakers of all kinds routinely make less-than-transparent judgments about what stories to tell and how to tell them. Without question, the First Amendment has much to say about the right to make those choices. It makes no difference that Americans (like TikTok Inc. and many of its users) may wish to make decisions about what ​they say in concert with a foreign adversary. "Those who won our independence" knew the vital importance of the "freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think," as well as the dangers that come with repressing the free flow of ideas. Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). They knew, too, that except in the most extreme situations, "the fitting remedy for evil counsels is good ones." Ibid. Too often in recent years, the government has sought to censor disfavored speech online, as if the internet were somehow exempt from the full sweep of the First Amendment. See, e.g., Murthy v. Missouri, 603 U. S. 43, 76—78 (2024) (Alito, J., dissenting). But even as times and technologies change, "the principle of the right to free speech is always the same." Abrams v. United States, 250 U. S. 616, 628 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
Second, I am pleased that the Court declines to consider the classified evidence the government has submitted to us but shielded from petitioners and their counsel. Ante, at 13, n. 3. Efforts to inject secret evidence into judicial proceedings present obvious constitutional concerns. Usually, "the evidence used to prove the Government's case must be disclosed to the individual so that he has an opportunity to show that it is untrue." Greene v. McElroy, 360 U. S. 474, 496 (1959). Maybe there is a way to handle classified evidence that would afford a similar opportunity in cases like these. Maybe, too, Congress or even the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure would profit from considering the question. Cf. United States v. Zubaydah, 595 U. S. 195, 245 (2022) (GORSUCH, J., dissenting). But as the Court recognizes, we have no business considering the government's secret evidence here.
Third, I harbor serious reservations about whether the law before us is "content neutral" and thus escapes "strict scrutiny." See ante, at 9—12; Brief for Petitioners in No. 24—656, pp. 25—31; Brief for Petitioners in No. 24—657, pp. 24—26; Reply Brief in No. 24—656, pp. 10—12; Reply Brief in No. ​24—657, pp. 8—11. More than that, while I do not doubt that the various "tiers of scrutiny" discussed in our case law—"rational basis, strict scrutiny, something(s) in between"—can help focus our analysis, I worry that litigation over them can sometimes take on a life of its own and do more to obscure than to clarify the ultimate constitutional questions. Riddle v. Hickenlooper, 742 F. 3d 922, 932 (CA10 2014) (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
Fourth, whatever the appropriate tier of scrutiny, I am persuaded that the law before us seeks to serve a compelling interest: preventing a foreign country, designated by Congress and the President as an adversary of our Nation, from harvesting vast troves of personal information about tens of millions of Americans. The record before us establishes that TikTok mines data both from TikTok users and about millions of others who do not consent to share their information. 2 App. 659. According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, TikTok can access "any data" stored in a consenting user's "contact list"—including names, photos, and other personal information about unconsenting third parties. Ibid. (emphasis added). And because the record shows that the People's Republic of China (PRC) can require TikTok's parent company "to cooperate with [its] efforts to obtain personal data," there is little to stop all that information from ending up in the hands of a designated foreign adversary. Id., at 696; see id., at 673—676; ante, at 3. The PRC may then use that information to "build dossiers . . . for blackmail," "conduct corporate espionage," or advance intelligence operations. 1 App. 215; see 2 App. 659. To be sure, assessing exactly what a foreign adversary may do in the future implicates "delicate" and "complex" judgments about foreign affairs and requires "large elements of prophecy." Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S. S. Corp., 333 U. S. 103, 111 (1948) (Jackson, J., for the Court). But the record the government has amassed in these cases after years of study supplies compelling reason ​for concern.
Finally, the law before us also appears appropriately tailored to the problem it seeks to address. Without doubt, the remedy Congress and the President chose here is dramatic. The law may require TikTok's parent company to divest or (effectively) shutter its U. S. operations. But before seeking to impose that remedy, the coordinate branches spent years in negotiations with TikTok exploring alternatives and ultimately found them wanting. Ante, at 4. And from what I can glean from the record, that judgment was well founded.
Consider some of the alternatives. Start with our usual and preferred remedy under the First Amendment: more speech. Supra, at 2. However helpful that might be, the record shows that warning users of the risks associated with giving their data to a foreign-adversary-controlled application would do nothing to protect nonusers' data. 2 App. 659—660; supra, at 3. Forbidding TikTok's domestic operations from sending sensitive data abroad might seem another option. But even if Congress were to impose serious criminal penalties on domestic TikTok employees who violate a data-sharing ban, the record suggests that would do little to deter the PRC from exploiting TikTok to steal Americans' data. See 1 App. 214 (noting threats from "malicious code, backdoor vulnerabilities, surreptitious surveillance, and other problematic activities tied to source code development" in the PRC); 2 App. 702 ("[A]gents of the PRC would not fear monetary or criminal penalties in the United States"). The record also indicates that the "size" and "complexity" of TikTok's "underlying software" may make it impossible for law enforcement to detect violations. Id., at 688—689; see also id., at 662. Even setting all these challenges aside, any new compliance regime could raise separate constitutional concerns—for instance, by requiring the government to surveil Americans' data to ensure that it isn't illicitly flowing overseas. Id., at 687 (suggesting that effective enforcement of a data-export ban might involve ​"direct U. S. government monitoring" of the "flow of U. S. user data").
Whether this law will succeed in achieving its ends, I do not know. A determined foreign adversary may just seek to replace one lost surveillance application with another. As time passes and threats evolve, less dramatic and more effective solutions may emerge. Even what might happen next to TikTok remains unclear. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 146—147. But the question we face today is not the law's wisdom, only its constitutionality. Given just a handful of days after oral argument to issue an opinion, I cannot profess the kind of certainty I would like to have about the arguments and record before us. All I can say is that, at this time and under these constraints, the problem appears real and the response to it not unconstitutional. As persuaded as I am of the wisdom of Justice Brandeis in Whitney and Justice Holmes in Abrams, their cases are not ours. See supra, at 2. Speaking with and in favor of a foreign adversary is one thing. Allowing a foreign adversary to spy on Americans is another.