# Shaw v. Cooper/Opinion of the Court

* Court Documents
* Case Syllabus
* Opinion of the Court
United States Supreme Court
32 U.S. 292
Shaw v. Cooper
It would seem to be of little importance in this cause, to discuss the plaintiff's position, 'that the second patent is original and independent, and not a continuation of the first patent;' because the only object of disconnecting the two patents in this case, would be to rescue the second patent from the operation of the act of 1800, under which the first patent was taken (the judge having charged the jury that the act of 1800 was sufficient to control the case.) Now, we not only admit that the act of 1793 should receive a similar construction with that of 1800, as to previous knowledge or use of an invention, but the plaintiff's counsel labor to establish this very ground. Their position, however, is not a correct one. The object of cancelling a first patent, and taking out a second, is not to take a fresh start for the term of years during which the law allows the exclusive right to be conferred. It is to enable the inventor to enjoy, for the remainder of that term, the privilege which was originally intended to be granted. And in this view, even if the construction of the two acts were different, we apprehend, that the judge laid down the law correctly, viz., that the plaintiff's rights depended upon the state of things in 1822, and upon the act of 1800.
It is only necessary to follow the plaintiff's argument on his third point, to perceive the impediment which the first section of the act of 1800, taken either in reference to that act only, or as explanatory of the act of 1793, offers to his case. To get rid of this difficulty, it is, in substance, contended by his counsel, that the legislature did not mean what they have said in this section, when certain cases came to be considered; and that the positive and unequivocal language used by them, in this respect, is unimportant. Now, the very fact that this section was intended to be declaratory of the law in all cases, whether arising under that, or the former act of 1793, shows that the explicit language used, was considered to be all-important by the legislature; and it certainly was not contemplated, that this explicit language should be frittered away to suit particular cases.
If the facts of this case, as we have endeavored to show, make out negligence or unreasonable delay on the part of the plaintiff in taking out his patent; and that such negligence or unreasonable delay amounts in law to an abandonment; the case is disposed of. We contend also, that the delay was not accounted for; the alleged reason for it being virtually contradicted by the testimony offered to make out his case; and further, that the finding of the jury is conclusive as to this point. The intent of the delay of the patent, and whether the allowing the invention to be used, without a patent, should not be considered an abandonment, or a present of it to the public, are questions for the jury. Morris v. Huntington, 1 Paine 22.
The principles which we contend for, being recognised in many of the cases cited on the part of the plaintiff (particularly the case of Pennock v. Dialogue), it has been deemed unnecessary to refer to those cases more particularly. If the charge of the judge was not erroneous as to the law, there can be no ground for granting a new trial.
McLEAN, Justice, delivered the opinion of the court.
This writ of error brings before this court, for its revision, a judgment of the circuit court of the United States for the southern district of New York. An action was brought in the cricuit court, by Shaw, against the defendant Cooper, for the violation of a certain patent-right, claimed by the plaintiff. The defendant pleaded the general issue, and gave notice that, on the trial, he would prove, 'that the pretended new and useful improvements in guns and firearms, mentioned and referred to in the several counts in the declaration, also, that the said pretended new and useful improvements, or the essential parts or portions thereof, or some or one of them, had been known and used in this country, viz., in the city of New York, and in the city of Philadelphia, and in sundry other places in the United States, and in England, in France, and in other foreign countries, before the plaintiff's application for a patent, as set forth in his declaration,' &c. On the trial, the following bill of exceptions was taken.
'To maintain the issue joined, the plaintiff gave in evidence certain letters-patent of the United States, as set forth in the declaration, issued on the 7th day of May 1829; and also that the improvement for which the letters were granted, was invented or discovered by the plaintiff, in 1813 or 1814; and that the defendant had sold instruments which were infringements of the said letters-patent. And the defendant then proved, by the testimony of one witness, that he had used the said improvement in England, and had purchased a gun of the kind there, and had seen others use the said improvement, and had seen guns of the kind in the Duke of York's armory, in 1819. And also proved by the testimony of five other witnesses, that, in 1820 and 1821, they worked in England at the business of making and repairing guns, and that the said improvement was generally used in England in those years; but that they had never seen guns of the kind, prior to those years; and also proved, that in the year 1821, it was used and known in France; and also that the said improvement was generally known and used in the United States after the 19th day of June, 1822.
'And the plaintiff, further to maintain the issue on his part, then gave in evidence, that he, not being a worker in iron, in 1813 or 1814, employed his brother, in England, under strict injunctions of secrecy, to execute or fabricate the said improvement, for the purpose of making experiments. And that the plaintiff afterwards, in 1817, left England and came to rside in the United States; and that after his departure from England, in 1817 or 1818, his said brother divulged the secret, for a certain reward, to an eminent gun-maker in London. That on the arrival of the plaintiff in this country, in 1817, he disclosed his said improvement to a gun-maker, whom he consulted as to obtaining a patent for the same, and whom he wished to engage to join and assist him. That the plaintiff made this disclosure, under injunctions of secrecy, claiming the improvement as his own, declaring that he should patent it. That the plaintiff treated his invention as a secret, after his arrival in this country, often declaring, that he should patent it; and that this step was only delayed, that he might make it more perfect, before it was introduced into public use; and that he did make alterations which some witnesses considered improvements in his invention, and others did not. That in this country, the invention was never known or used, prior to the said 19th day of June 1822; that on that day, letters-patent were issued to the plaintiff, being then an alien, and that he immediately brought his invention into public use. That afterwards, and after suits had been brought for a violation of the said letters-patent, the plaintiff was advised to surrender them, on account of the specification being defective; and that he did, accordingly, on the 7th day of May in the year 1829, surrender the same into the department of the secretary of state, and received the letters-patent first above named.
'And the plaintiff also gave in evidence, that prior to the 19th day of June 1822, the principal importers of guns from England, in New York and Philadelphia, at the latter of which cities the plaintiff resided, had never heard anything of the said invention, or that the same was used or known in England; and that no guns of the kind were imported into this country, until in the years 1824 or 1825. And that letters-patent were granted in England, on the 11th day of April 1807, to one Alexander J. Forsyth, for a method of discharging or giving fire to artillery and all other fire-arms; which method he described in his specification as consisting in the 'use or application as a priming, in any mode, of some or one of those chemical compounds which are so easily inflammable as to be capable of taking fire and exploding, without any actual fire being applied thereto, and merely by a blow, or by any sudden or strong pressure or friction given or applied thereto, without extraordinary violence; that is to say, some one of the compounds of combustible matter, such as sulphur, or sulphur and charcoal, with an oxmuriatic salt; for example, the salt formed of dephlogisticated marine acid and potash (or potasse), which salt is otherwise called oxmuriate of potash; or such of the fulminating metallic compounds as may be used with safety; for example, fulminating mercury, or of common gunpowder mixed in due quantity with any of the above-mentioned substances, or with any oxmuriatic salt, as aforesaid, or of suitable mixtures of any of the before-mentioned compounds;' and that the said letters-patent continued in force for the period of fourteen years from the time of granting the same.'
And the defendant, further to maintain the issue on his part, gave in evidence a certain letter from the plaintiff to the defendant, dated in December, in the year 1824, from which the following is an extract: 'Some time since, I stated, that I had employed counsel respecting regular prosecutions for any trespass against my rights to the patent; I have at length obtained the opinion of Mr. Sergeant of this city, together with other eminent in the law, and that is, that I ought (with a view to insure success) to visit England, and procure the affidavits of Manton and others, to whom I made my intention known, and also of the person whom I employed to make the lock, at the time of invention; for it appears very essential, that I should prove that I did actually reduce the principle to practice, otherwise a verdict might be doubtful. It is, therefore, my intention to visit England, in May next, for this purpose; in the meantime proceedings which have commenced here are suspended for the necessary time.'
'And the court, on these facts, charged the jury, that the patent of the 7th of May 1829, having been issued, as appears by its recital, on the surrender and cancelment of the patent of the 19th day of June, in the year 1822; and being intended to correct a mistake or remedy a defect in the latter; it must be considered as a continuation of the said patent, and the rights of the plaintiff were to be determined by the state of things which existed in the year 1822, when the patent was first obtained. That the plaintiff's case, therefore, came under the act passed the 17th day of April 1800, extending the right of obtaining patents to aliens; by the first section of which, the applicant is required to make oath, that his invention has not, to the best of his knowledge or belief, been known or used in this or any foreign country. That the plaintiff, most probably, did not know, in the year 1822, that the invention for which he was taking out a patent, had, before that time, been in use in a foreign country; but that his knowledge or ignorance on that subject was rendered immaterial, by the concluding part of the section, which expressly declares, that every patent obtained pursuant to that act, for any invention, which, it should afterward appear, had been known or used previous to such application for a patent, should be utterly void. That there was nothing in the act confining such use to the United States; and that, if the invention was previously known in England or France, it was sufficient to avoid the patent under that act. That the evidence would lead to the conclusion, that the plaintiff was the inventor in this case, but the court were of opinion, that he had slept too long on his rights, and not followed them up, as the law requires, to entitle him to any benefit from his patent. That the use of the invention, by a person who had pirated it, or by others who knew of the piracy, would not affect the inventor's rights, but that the law was made for the benefit of the public as well as of the inventor; and if, as appears from the evidence in this case, the public had fairly become possessed of the invention, before the plaintiff applied for his patent, it was sufficient, in the opinion of the court, to invalidate the patent; even though the invention may have originally gotten into public use through the fraud or misconduct of his brother, to whom he intrusted the knowledge of it.'
Under this charge, the jury found a verdict for the defendant, on which a judgment was entered. There is a general assignment of errors, which brings to the consideration of the court the principles of law which arise out of the facts of the case, as stated in the bill of exceptions.
It may be proper, in the first place, to inquire, whether the letters-patent which were obtained in 1829, on a surrender of the first patent, have relation to the emanation of the patent in 1822, or shall be considered as having been issued on an original application? On the part of the plaintiff, it is contended, that 'the second patent is original and independent, and not a continuation of the first patent.' That in adopting the policy of giving, for a term of years, exclusive rights to inventors in this country, we adopted, at the same time, the rules of the common law, as applied to patents in England; and that by the common law, a patent, when defective, may be surrendered to the granting power, which vacates the right under it, and the king may grant the right de novo either to the same or to any other person. This being the effect of the surrender of a patent in England, it is insisted, that the same consequence should follow a surrender in this country. On this subject, it is said, that the decisions of the English courts are uniform, and that not even a dictum can be found, that a second patent is a continuation of the first.
The counsel seems to consider this point of great importance, as the plaintiff was an alien, when the first patent was obtained, but had become naturalized, before the date of the second; and consequently, that this right under the second patent, cannot be governed by the law applicable to aliens. As the inquiry on this head is, whether the second patent has relation to the first, it is not necessary to look into the laws, to ascertain the respective rights of aliens and citizens on this subject. In regard to the right of the patentee to surrender a defective patent, and take out a new one, there can be no difference between a citizen and an alien. That the holder of a defective patent may surrender it to the department of state, and obtain a new one, which shall have relation to the emanation of the first, was decided by this court, at the last term, in the case of Grant v. Raymond, 6 Pet. 220. The chief justice, in giving the opinion of the court says, 'but the new patent, and the proceedings on which it issues, have relation to the original transaction. The time of the privilege still runs from the date of the original patent. The application may be considered as appended to the original application; and if the new patent is valid, the law must be considered as satisfied, if the machine was not known or used before that application.' As this decision must be considered as settling the construction of the patent laws on this point, it is conclusive in the present case; and it is, therefore, unnecessary to examine the argument of the plaintiff's counsel, which was designed to lead to a different conclusion.
The second patent being a continuation of the first one, the rights of the plaintiff must be ascertained by the law under which the original application was made. This law was passed on the 17th of April 1800, and provides 'that all and singular the rights and privileges given to citizens of the United States, respecting patents for new inventions, &c., shall be extended to aliens, who, at the time of petitioning, shall have resided for two years within the United States, &c.: provided, that every person petitioning for a patent for any invention, art or discovery, pursuant to this act, shall make oath or affirmation before some person duly authorized to administer oaths, before such patent shall be granted, that such invention, art or discovery hath not, to the best of his or her knowledge or belief, been known or used, either in this or any foreign country; and that every patent which shall be obtained pursuant to this act, for any invention, art or discovery, which it shall afterwards appear had been known or used previous to such application for a patent, shall be utterly void.'
By the act of the 21st of February 1793, which limits patent-rights to citizens, it is prvided, 'that every person or persons, in his or their application for a patent, shall state that the machine, &c., was not known or used before such application.' The sixth section of this act provides, that a defendant, when prosecuted for a violation of a patent-right, may give in evidence, under a notice, among other matters, 'that the thing secured by patent was not originally discovered by the patentee, but had been in use, or had been described in some public work, anterior to the supposed discovery of the patentee, or that he had surreptitiously obtained a patent for the discovery of another person; in either of which cases, judgment shall be rendered for the defendant with costs, and the patent shall be declared void.'
It would seem, from the above provisions, that citizens and aliens, as to patent-rights, are placed substantially upon the ground. In either case, if the invention was known or used by the public, before it was patented, the patent is void. In both cases, the right must be tested by the same rule.
From the facts in the case, it appears, that the plaintiff, while residing in England, in 1813 or 1814, invented the instrument secured by his patent. That before the came to the United States, he made known his invention to his brother, to Mr. Manton, a gun-maker in London, and to others. That shortly after he came to the United States, in 1817, he disclosed his invention to a gun-maker in Philadelphia, and that in 1817 or 1818, the plaintiff's brother sold the invention to a gun-maker in London. That in 1819, the invention was sold and used in England; and that in the two following years, it was in public use there, and in the latter year, also in France. That on the 19th of June 1822, his first patent was obtained. It also appears, that in April 1807, a patent was granted in England, to one Forsyth, for fourteen years, for an invention on the same subject. This fact was shown by the plaintiff, it is presumed, as a reason why he did not take out a patent in England. The question arises from these facts, and others which belong to the case, whether there was such a use in the public, of this invention, at the date of the plaintiff's first patent, as to render it void? By the plaintiff's counsel, it is insisted, that if an invention has been pirated, or fraudulently divulged, the inventor cannot thereby lose his right to his own invention and property; and it makes no difference, that the public have acquired the use of the invention, without any participation in the fraud, unless the inventor has acquiesced in such use. The right of the plaintiff to his invention, is compared to his right to other property, which cannot be divested by fraud or violence; and the case of Millar v. Taylor, 4 Burr. 2303, where seven judges against four held, that at common law, an author, by publishing a literary composition, does not abandon his right, is referred to as illustrative of the principle.
Several decisions by the circuit courts of the United States are cited to sustain the right of the plaintiff. In the case of Whittemore v. Cutter, 1 Gallis. 482, the court say, 'It will not protect the plaintiff's patent, that he was the inventor of the improvements, if he suffered them to be used, freely and fully, by the public at large, for so many years, combined with all the usual machinery; for in such case, he must be deemed to have made a gift of them to the public, as much as a person who voluntarily opens his land as a highway, and suffers it to remain for a length of time devoted to public use.' In the case of Goodyear v. Mathews, 1 Paine 301, the court, in substance, say, 'that if the plaintiff be the inventor, it is immaterial, that the invention has been known and used for years before the application.' And in the case of Morris v. Huntington, 1 Paine 354, the court say, that 'no man is to be permitted to lie by for years, and then take out a patent. If he has been practising his invention with a view of improving it, and thereby rendering it a greater benefit to the public, before taking out a patent, that ought not to prejudice him. But it should always be a question submitted to the jury, what was the intent of the delay of the patent, and whether the allowing the invention to be used without a patent, should not be considered an abandonment, or present, of it to the public.' This was a case where a second patent had been obtained, the first being defective; and this, it would seem, was deemed sufficient to protect the right of the plaintiff, though the public had been in possession of the invention for six years before the emanation of the second patent. Of the same import are the cases cited from 4 Mason 108, and 4 W. C. C. 438, 703.
The question, what use in the public, before the application is made for a patent, shall make void the right of the patentee, was brought before this court by the case of Pennock v. Dialogue, 2 Pet. 1. In this case, the court say, that 'it has not been, and indeed, cannot be, denied, that an inventor may abandon his invention, and surrender or dedicate it to the public. This inchoate right, thus gone, cannot afterwards be resumed at his pleasure; for when gifts are once made to the public in this way, they become absolute.' And again, 'If an invention is used by the public, with the consent of the inventor, at the time of his application for a patent; how can the courts say, that his case is nevertheless such as the act was intended to protect? If such a public use is not a use within the meaning of the statute; how can the court extract the case from its operation, and support a patent, when the suggestions of the patentee were not true; and the conditions, on which alone the grant was authorized, do not exist.' 'The true construction of the patent law is,' the court say, 'that the first inventor cannot acquire a good title to a patent, if he suffers the thing invented to go into public use, or to be publicly sold for use, before he makes application for a patent.' In this case, it appeared, that the thing invented had been in use by the public, with the consent of the inventors, and through which they derived a profit, for seven years before the emanation of a patent. And this use was held by the court to be an abandonment of the right by the patentees.
The policy of granting exclusive privileges in certain cases, was deemed of so much importance in a national point of view, that power was given to congress in the federal constitution, 'to promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing, for limited times, to authors and inventors, the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries.' This power was exercised by congress, in the passage of the acts which have been referred to. And from an examination of their various provisions, it clearly appears, that it was the intention of the legislature, by a compliance with the requisites of the law, to vest the exclusive right in the inventor only; and that, on condition, that his invention was neither known nor used by the public, before his application for a patent. If such use or knowledge shall be proved to have existed, prior to the application for the patent, the act of 1793 declares the patent void; and as has been already stated, the right of an alien is vacated in the same manner, by proving a foreign use or knowledge of his invention. That knowledge or use which would be fatal to the patent-right of a citizen, would be equally so to the right of an alien.
The knowledge or use spoken of in the act of 1793, could have referred to the public only, for the provision would be nugatory, if it were applied to the inventor himself. He must, necessarily, have a perfect knowledge of the thing invented and its use, before he can describe it, as by law he is required to do, preparatory to the emanation of a patent. But there may be cases, in which a knowledge of the invention may be surreptitiously obtained, and communicated to the public, that do not affect the right of the inventor. Under such circumstances, no presumption can arise in favor of an abandonment of the right to the public, by the inventor; though an acquiescence on his part, will lay the foundation for such a presumption.
In England, it has been decided, that if an inventor shall suffer the thing invented to be sold, and go into public use, for four months; and in a later case, for any period of time, before the date of his patent; it is utterly void. In that country, the right emanates from the royal prerogative; in this, it is founded exclusively on statutory provisions. But the policy in both governments is the same, in granting the right, and in fixing its limits. Vigilance is necessary to entitle an individual to the privileges secured under the patent law. It is not enough, that he should show his right by invention, but he must secure it in the mode required by law. And if the invention, through fraudulent means, shall be made known to the public, he should assert his right immediately, and take the necessary steps to legalize it.
The patent law was designed for the public benefit, as well as for the benefit of inventors. For a valuable invention, the public, on the inventor's complying with certain conditions, give him, for a limited period, the profits arising from the sale of the thing invented. This holds out an inducement for the exercise of genius and skill, in making discoveries which may be useful to society, and profitable to the discoverer. But it was not the intention of this law, to take from the public, that of which they were fairly in possession. In the progress of society, the range of discoveries in the mechanic arts, in science, and in all things which promote the public convenience, as a matter of course, will be enlarged. This results from the aggregation of mind, and the diversity of talents and pursuits, which exist in every intelligent community. And it would be extremely impolitic, to retard or embarrass this advance, by withdrawing from the public any useful invention or art, and making it a subject of private monopoly. Against this consequence, the legislature have carefully guarded in the laws they have passed on the subject. It is undoubtedly just, that every discoverer should realize the benefits resulting from his discovery, for the period contemplated by law. But these can only be secured by a substantial compliance with every legal requisite. His exclusive right does not rest alone upon his discovery; but also upon the legal sanctions which have been given to it, and the forms of law with which it has been clothed.
No matter by what means an invention may be communicated to the public, before a patent is obtained; any acquiescence in the public use, by the inventor, will be an abandonment of his right. If the right were asserted by him who fraudulently obtained it, perhaps, no lapse of time could give it validity. But the public stand in an entirely different relation to the inventor. The invention passes into the possession of innocent persons, who have no knowledge of the fraud, and at a considerable expense, perhaps, they appropriate it to their own use. The inventor or his agent has full knowledge of these facts, but fails to assert his right; shall he afterwards be permitted to assert it with effect? Is not this such evidence of acquiescence in the public use, on his part, as justly forfeits his right? If an individual witness a sale and transfer of real estate under certain circumstances, in which he has an equitable lien or interest, and does not make known this interest, he shall not afterwards be permitted to assert it. On this principle it is, that a discoverer abandons his right, if, before the obtainment of his patent, his discovery goes into public use. His right would be secured, by giving public notice that he was the inventor of the thing used, and that he should apply for a patent. Does this impose anything more than reasonable diligence on the inventor? And would anything short of this be just to the public?
The acquiescence of an inventor in the public use of his invention, can in no case be presumed, where he has no knowledge of such use. But this knowledge may be presumed from the circumstances of the case. This will, in general, be a fact for the jury. And if the inventor do not, immediately after this notice, assert his right, it is such evidence of acquiescence in the public use, as for ever afterwards to prevent him from asserting it. After his right shall be perfected by a patent, no presumption arises against it from a subsequent use by the public.
When an inventor applies to the department of state for a patent, he should state the facts truly; and indeed, he is required to do so, under the solemn obligations of an oath. If his invention has been carried into public use by fraud; but for a series of months or years, he has taken no steps to assert his right; would not this afford such evidence of acquiescence as to defeat his application, as effectually, as if he failed to state that he was the original inventor? And the same evidence which should defeat his application for a patent, would, at any subsequent period, be fatal to his right. The evidence he exhibits to the department of state is not only ex parte, but interested; and the questions of fact are left open, to be controverted by any one who shall think proper to contest the right under the patent.
A strict construction of the act, as regards the public use of an invention, before it is presented, is not only required by its letter and spirit, but also by sound policy. A term of fourteen years was deemed sufficient for the enjoyment of an exclusive right of an invention by the inventor; but if he may delay an application for his patent, at pleasure, although his invention be carried into public use, he may extend the period beyond what the law intended to give him. A pretence of fraud would afford no adequate security to the public in this respect, as artifice might be used to cover the transaction. The doctrine of presumed acquiescence, where the public use is known, or might be known to the inventor, is the only safe rule which can be adopted on this subject.
In the case under consideration, it appears, the plaintiff came to this country, from England, in the year 1817, and being an alien, he could not apply for a patent, until he had remained in the country two years. There was no legal obstruction to his obtaining a patent in the year 1819; but it seems, that he failed to apply for one, until three years after he might have done so. Had he used proper diligence in this respect, his right might have been secured; as his invention was not sold in England, until the year 1819. But, in the two following years, it is proved to have been in public use there, and in the latter year, also in France. Under such circumstances, can the plaintiff's right be sustained?
His counsel assigns as a reason for not making an earlier application, that he was endeavoring to make his invention more perfect; but it seems, by this delay, he was not enabled, essentially, to vary or improve it. The plan is substantially the same as was carried into public use through the brother of the plaintiff, in England. Such an excuse, therefore, cannot avail the plaintiff. For three years, before the emanation of his patent, his invention was in public use, and he appears to have taken no step to assert his right. Indeed, he sets up, as a part of his case, the patent of Forsyth, as a reason why he did not apply for a patent in England. The Forsyth patent was dated six years before.
Some of the decisions of the circuit courts which are referred to, were overruled in the case of Pennock v. Dialogue. They made the question of abandonment to turn upon the intention of the inventor. But such is not considered to be the true ground. Whatever may be the intention of the inventor, if he suffers his invention to go into public use through any means whatsoever, without an immediate assertion of his right he is not entitled to a patent; nor will a patent, obtained under such cir cumstances, protect his right. The judgment of the circuit court must be affirmed, with costs.
THIS cause came on to be heard, on the transcript of the record from the circuit court of the United States for the southern district of New York, and was argued by counsel: On consideration whereof, it is adjudged and ordered by this court, that the judgment of the said circuit court in this cause be and the same is hereby affirmed, with costs.

## Notes

* ↑ Planing-Machine Co. v. Keith, 101 U.S. 479.
* ↑ Wyeth v. Stone, 1 Story 273.
This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
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