# Phillips v. Mobile

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United States Supreme Court
208 U.S. 472
Phillips v. Mobile
Argued: January 17, 1908. --- Decided: February 24, 1908
The plaintiff in error herein seeks to reverse a judgment of the supreme court of Alabama which reversed a judgment in his favor given by the city court of Mobile.
The action was brought in the city court by the city of Mobile, by a written complaint, wherein the city sought to recover from the plaintiff in error (defendant in that court) the sum of $15, the amount of the fine imposed upon him by the recorder for the violation of what is termed the license ordinance of the city, approved March 14, 1904, by failing to obtain and pay for a license under the 28th subdivision of the 2d section of that ordinance, relating to the selling of beer in that city. The defendant filed a plea, setting up what he alleged was a defense.
Upon the trial in the city court the parties agreed upon a statement of facts.
From such statement it appears that the city council, as authorized by the state legislature, had, prior to the complaint in question, adopted an ordinance, § 2 of which imposed a license tax for the fiscal year beginning March 15, 1904, 'on each person, firm, corporation, or association doing business or trading or carrying on any business, trade, or profession, by agent or otherwise, within the limits of the city of Mobile, . . . and such licenses are hereby fixed for such business, trade, or profession . . . as follows.'
Subsection 28 of § 2 fixes the amount, upon the payment of which the license may be granted in such a case as this, as follows:
'28. Breweries.-Each person, firm, corporation, dealer, brewer, brewery, agent or handler for a brewery, selling beer by the barrel, half barrel, or quarter barrel (this clause is not to include license for wholesale or retail vinous or spirituous liquors), $200.'
The statement of facts as agreed upon then continues as follows:
'That the defendant herein is an individual who resides in Mobile, Alabama, and that he is engaged in the business of being a retail beer dealer, for which, under the exhibit hereto, he has paid the amount of his license, as required by said ordinance for and during the fiscal year, beginning March 15, 1904, and ending March 14, 1905; and that said payment having been made, a license therefor was duly issued by the proper authorities of the city of Mobile, authorizing the defendant to carry on the business of retail beer dealer during said time; that the defendant, in addition to his other liquor business, carried on under the authority of said paid license under said ordinance, has likewise, but at the same place, and with the same employees, before the institution of this prosecution in the recorder's court, and since March 15, 1904, been engaged in the business of buying and selling beer in kegs, but only under the following circumstances: That the defendant would, by letter or telegram sent from Mobile, Alabama, order from a brewery or breweries owned and conducted by residents and citizens of states other than Alabama, certain quantities of lager beer, which, pursuant to said orders, would be shipped by continuous interstate transportation by said nonresidents to the defendant at Mobile, Alabama, in kegs, which kegs were, without other packing, loaded into railroad freight box cars and transported by the railroad companies from said breweries in other states to the defendant at Mobile, Alabama. The said purchases by the defendant were outright, and that the defendant by and through said purchases became the owner of said lager beer, to do with as he pleased; that he paid for it usually after its arrival, but never until a bill of lading for each such shipment so paid for had been received by the defendant at Mobile; that the packages in which said beer came were invariably kegs of the ordinary, usual, and customary commercial sizes in which the same is packed for sale and shipment, and that in such usual commercial original packages the same was taken from the car upon arrival at Mobile, and stored in the storehouse or warehouse of the defendant in the city of Mobile until sold by the defendant; that the defendant made sales of said kegs in quantities of one or more to his various customers in and about the city of Mobile and the vicinity thereof, and that such sales were made in contemplation by defendant of deliveries by the defendant in said kegs as original packages, and that the deliveries were thereafter made by delivery wagons owned and operated by the defendant in the city of Mobile to such customers in such original packages. That from the time of the packing and shipment of said beer at the breweries in other states than Alabama, until after sale and delivery thereof by the defendant to his various customers in the city of Mobile and the vicinity thereof, none of said kegs as original packages ever became broken or open, but the deliveries by the defendant to his respective customers of said beer was always in the same, original, usual, commercial packages in which the same was packed and shipped from the breweries in said foreign states. That each and all of the kegs herein mentioned contained more than one quart of beer. That this mode of business has been conducted by the defendant since March 15, 1904, and still continues, and that, except as is herein above stipulated, the defendant, neither as a brewery, person, firm, corporation, dealer, brewer, brewery agent, or handler has ever sold beer by the barrel, half barrel, or quarter barrel in the city of Mobile, Alabama, since March 15, 1904. That nearly 50 per cent of all the offenses against the ordinances of the city of Mobile ordained to secure peace and order is brought about by the use of intoxicating liquors. Neither the license sued for nor the fine assessed by the recoroer has been paid.'
The case was submitted to the jury upon this agreed statement.
The plaintiff, the city of Mobile, asked the court to charge the jury that, if they believed the evidence, they must find for the plaintiff. The defendant also asked the court to charge the jury that, if they believed the evidence in this case, they ought to find for the defendant.
The court charged the jury in accordance with the request of the defendants, and a verdict was thereupon rendered in his favor.
On appeal from the judgment to the supreme court it was reversed, the court holding that the trial court should have refused the request of the defendant, and directed the jury to find a verdict for the plaintiff. The case was therefore remanded with such directions.
Messrs. Richard Wm. Stoutz and Walter A. White for plaintiff in error.
[Argument of Counsel from pages 475-477 intentionally omitted]
Mr. Burwell Boykin Boone for defendant in error.
[Argument of Counsel from pages 477-478 intentionally omitted]
Mr. Justice Peckham: after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court:

## Notes

This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
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