OpenLLM-France/wikimedia huggingface dataset:
# United States v. Google/Conclusions of Law/Section 6

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​VI. EFFECTS IN THE MARKET FOR GENERAL SEARCH TEXT ADVERTISING
To prove a Section 2 violation in the general search text ads market, Plaintiffs again must show that the exclusive agreements “indeed [have] the requisite anticompetitive effect.” Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 58–59. Plaintiffs contend that Google’s conduct has caused three anticompetitive effects particular to the text ads market: (1) market foreclosure, (2) supracompetitive text ads pricing, and (3) product degradation through diminished transparency regarding text ads auctions. As before, Plaintiffs argue that the exclusive deals deprive rivals of scale, which freezes competition in the text ads market in the same manner as in general search.
# United States v. Google/Conclusions of Law/Section 6A

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    A. The Exclusive Agreements Foreclose a Substantial Share of the Market.
As previously discussed, evaluating an alleged exclusive dealing agreement first requires an estimation of market foreclosure. See supra Section V.A.1. Recall, the D.C. Circuit has said that “a monopolist’s use of exclusive contracts . . . may give rise to a § 2 violation even though the contracts foreclose less than the roughly 40% or 50% share usually required in order to establish a § 1 violation.” Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 70; see also McWane, 783 F.3d at 837 (“Traditionally a ​foreclosure percentage of at least 40% has been a threshold for liability in exclusive dealing cases.”).
Here, Dr. Whinston has calculated that Google’s distribution agreements foreclose 45% of the text ads market, measured by ad spend. FOF ¶ 192. As before, Google does not dispute the underlying methodology used to calculate this figure, but rather mounts various objections as to its sufficiency, each of which the court has already considered and rejected. Supra Section V.A.1. Google does not make additional arguments specific to the text ads foreclosure percentage. See GTB at 41–47.
The court thus accepts Dr. Whinston’s determination that the challenged agreements foreclose 45% of the general search text ads market. The court also concludes that the market foreclosure is significant in light of same factors that court considered in the general search market. See supra Section V.A.1.b.
# United States v. Google/Conclusions of Law/Section 6C

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    C. The Exclusive Agreements Have Allowed Google to Degrade the Quality of its Text Advertisements.
Google’s text ads product has degraded in two ways: (1) advertisers receive less information in search query reports (SQRs) and (2) they no longer can opt out of keyword matching. FOF ¶¶ 269–278. Specifically, Google removed information from SQRs that provided advertisers with insight into low-volume queries, which diminished advertisers’ ability to tailor their ad strategy in light of such queries. FOF ¶¶ 272–274. Similarly, disallowing advertisers from opting out of keyword matching created thicker auctions at the expense of advertiser control. FOF ¶¶ 277–278. These are arguably small changes, but they reveal Google as a monopolist unconcerned about product changes that have decreased advertisers’ autonomy over the auctions ​they enter and the ads they purchase. Google has suffered no consequences because it does not operate in a competitive text ads market.
# United States v. Google/Conclusions of Law/Section 6D

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    D. The Exclusive Agreements Have Capped Rivals’ Advertising Revenue.
The exclusive distribution agreements allow Google to maintain its text ads monopoly in much the same way as in the general search services market. That is, Google’s rivals must distribute their GSEs through less efficient, non-default access points, which results in fewer users and fewer ad dollars spent to target those users. See supra Section V.A.2. With less ad revenue, Google’s rivals are limited in their ability to reinvest in quality improvements (both as to search and general search text ads) to attract more users and more ad dollars. Supra Sections V.A.2 & V.A.3. That cycle puts rivals in no position to compete with Google for the increased ad revenue that accompanies greater query volume. See supra Section IV.A.
Advertising witnesses consistently testified to this reality. They uniformly cap their text ads spending on Bing at no more than 10% to approximate its relative market share. FOF ¶ 233. So, even if Bing’s ads were to offer better value than Google’s, Bing could not effectively constrain Google’s ad pricing. As one witness put it, once the spending maxes out on Bing, there is simply “[nowhere] else to go.” Tr. at 4875:19–4876:4 (Lim). By locking in a huge comparative query volume advantage through its exclusive agreements, Google ensures that advertisers will continue ​to spend 90% of their text ad dollars with Google, regardless of increases in price or decreases in quality. That is an anticompetitive effect in the marketplace.
Google has not argued that the contracts generate procompetitive benefits beyond those already addressed and rejected, supra Section V.B. The court thus concludes that Plaintiffs have proven that Google’s exclusive distribution agreements substantially contribute to maintaining its monopoly in the general search text advertising market, violating Section 2 of the Sherman Act.
# United States v. Google/Conclusions of Law/Section 7

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​VII. SA360
As noted at the start of this opinion, Plaintiff States alone claim that Google engaged in additional exclusionary conduct that centers on SA360, Google’s proprietary search engine management tool, or SEM tool. See PSTB at 20–31. An SEM tool allows advertisers to run online marketing campaigns across multiple platforms in one centralized place. FOF ¶¶ 279–281. When it acquired the platform, Google vowed that SA360 would be a “neutral third party.” FOF ¶ 281. But Google has not acted in that way. Instead, Plaintiff States say, Google has prioritized and advantaged its own ad platform, Google Ads, over Microsoft’s ad platform on SA360. PSTB at 21–22. Specifically, they assert that for years Google has intentionally slow-rolled the development and launch of various features for Microsoft Ads that Google has fully integrated into SA360 for Google Ads. Id. at 22–24. Most critically, Google ignored Microsoft’s repeated pleas to integrate auction time bidding (ATB), a feature that permits advertisers to change their bid strategies in real time during auctions. Id. at 24–26; FOF ¶ 286. ATB remained unavailable for Microsoft Ads on SA360 at the time of trial. FOF ¶ 286. According to Plaintiff States, this feature disparity has caused anticompetitive effects in the proposed markets. They maintain that Google’s conduct harmed both “advertisers by diminishing the efficiency of their ad spend on ​SA360” and “rival GSEs that use Microsoft Ads to attract customers . . . by driving down demand for advertising on these search engines.” PSTB at 29–30.
# United States v. Google/Conclusions of Law/Section 8A

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    A. The Court Need Not Make a Finding of Anticompetitive Intent.
Plaintiffs seek a finding of “anticompetitive intent,” but the court need not make one. UPTB at 75–76. A finding of anticompetitive intent is not an element of a Section 2 violation. ​See Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 59 (stating that in determining whether conduct is deemed exclusionary “our focus is upon the effect of that conduct, not upon the intent behind it”). “Evidence of intent behind the conduct of a monopolist is relevant only to the extent it helps [a court] understand the likely effect of the monopolist’s conduct.” Id. (citation omitted). Given that the court already has concluded that Google’s exclusive dealing agreements have anticompetitive effects in two relevant markets, supra Parts V & VI, it is unnecessary to consider intent evidence to further “understand” that conduct.
Still, the court is taken aback by the lengths to which Google goes to avoid creating a paper trail for regulators and litigants. It is no wonder then that this case has lacked the kind of nakedly anticompetitive communications seen in Microsoft and other Section 2 cases. See, e.g., Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 73 (stating that Microsoft could “use Office as a club” to coerce Apple to adopt Internet Explorer); McWane, 783 F.3d at 840 (citing evidence that left “little doubt” that the defendant’s program was meant to prevent its rival from “any critical mass market”); Dentsply, 399 F.3d at 190 (referencing “clear expressions of a plan to maintain monopolistic power”). Google clearly took to heart the lessons from these cases. It trained its employees, rather effectively, not to create “bad” evidence. Ultimately, it does not matter. Section 2 liability does not rise or fall on whether there is “smoking gun” proof of anticompetitive intent. Areeda ¶ 1506 (discussing the role of intent evidence in Sherman Act cases).
# United States v. Google/Conclusions of Law/Section 8B

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    B. The Court Declines to Impose Sanctions.
On the request for sanctions, the court declines to impose them. Not because Google’s failure to preserve chat messages might not warrant them. But because the sanctions Plaintiffs request do not move the needle on the court’s assessment of Google’s liability. UPTB at 75–76 (requesting evidentiary sanctions such as “a presumption that deleted chats were unfavorable to ​Google”; “a presumption that Google’s proffered justifications are pretextual”; and “a presumption that Google intended to maintain its monopoly”). An adverse evidentiary inference would not change the court’s finding that Google lacks monopoly power in the market for search ads or that there is no relevant market for general search ads. Nor would it change the court’s legal conclusion that Google had no duty to deal with Microsoft on its preferred terms as to SA360, nor its finding on the absence of anticompetitive effects, as Google is not likely to have possessed such evidence. See Areeda ¶ 1506 (“[I]n the absence of . . . provable anticompetitive effects, an evil mental state will not serve to condemn it.”). The court therefore declines to sanction Google for its failure to preserve its employees’ chat messages.
The court’s decision not to sanction Google should not be understood as condoning Google’s failure to preserve chat evidence. Any company that puts the onus on its employees to identify and preserve relevant evidence does so at its own peril. Google avoided sanctions in this case. It may not be so lucky in the next one.
# United States v. Google/Conclusion

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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court concludes that Google has violated Section 2 of the Sherman Act by maintaining its monopoly in two product markets in the United States—general search services and general text advertising—through its exclusive distribution agreements. The court thus holds that Google is liable as to Counts I and III of the U.S. Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint, Am. Compl. ¶¶ 173–179, 187–193. To the extent that Counts I and III of the Plaintiff States’ Complaint are co-extensive with the U.S. Plaintiffs’ Counts I and III, the court finds Google liable. Colorado Compl. ¶¶ 212–218, 226–232.
​The court enters judgment for Google as to Count II of both the U.S. Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint and the Plaintiff States’ Complaint, Am. Compl. ¶¶ 180–186; Colorado Compl. ¶¶ 219–225, as well as the remainder of Counts I and III of the Plaintiff States’ Complaint.
Dated: August 5, 2024
Amit P. Mehta United States District Court
# The Times of San Mateo/1945/Miss Whitfield and Ensign Burke Wedded on Sunday

Peter Robert Whitfield Jr. (1918-1987) in the The Times of San Mateo on January 18, 1955.
Miss Whitfield and Ensign Burke Wedded on Sunday
Miss Mary Marvel Whitfield, daughter of Mr. and Mrs. Peter Whitfield of 1128 Juanita avenue, Burlingame, was married to Ensign John J. Burke of the merchant marine last Sunday. The wedding was in St. Catherine's church, Burlingame, at 2 o'clock. Miss Dorothy Geucke of San Diego acted as maid of honor, and there were three bridesmaids, the Misses Jean Vael of San Francisco and Barbara and Lelane Weight, sisters, of Burlingame; Arthur Ooghe, a naval student, was best man; the ushers, Lieut. (jg) Lee Mason and Ensigns Robert Ramsey and John Haynes. Both families are strongly represented in the fighting forces. The bride has three brothers, Floyd Whitfield, a yeoman at Moffett field; Peter Jr., a seaman first class in the navy; and Eugene, who recently received his honorable discharge from the air corps. Ensign Burke, the bridegroom, is the son of Frank W. Burke and the late Mrs. Burke of Jersey City, New Jersey. One of the brothers is Lieut. Comdr. Edward Burke, USN, of New York. Another is Lieut. James Burke, also of the navy. And the third is Sergt. Thomas Burke of the army. There are two sisters, the wife of Lieut. William Hawley of the navy, and Miss Elizabeth Burke. They all reside in the East and inability to get transportation prevented them from coming to the wedding.
This work is in the public domain in the United States because it was legally published within the United States (or the United Nations Headquarters in New York subject to Section 7 of the United States Headquarters Agreement) before 1964, and copyright was not renewed.
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Works could have had their copyright renewed between January 1st of the 27th year after publication or registration and December 31st of the 28th year. As this work's copyright was not renewed, it entered the public domain on January 1st of the 29th year.
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It is imperative that contributors ascertain that there is no evidence of a copyright renewal before using this license. Failure to do so will result in the deletion of the work as a copyright violation.
Public domainPublic domainfalsefalse
# The Folly and Fashion of the Present Time (1802, Glasgow)/The Willow Will

THE WILLOW WILL.
THE willow you say is a pretty flower, which you have caused me for to wear; Thee have I courted for many long hours, but all in vain it hath proved I fear. The willow you say, etc.
False you have turned, tho' now you complain, don't you remember the garland you sent, The willow-will fram'd it, & false hearts adorn'd it, little once did I think of your intent. Falsse have you-turned etc
I am the young man who says he loves you, ready to come and speak it I vow, The garland you sent, it don't become me, tho' you do force me to wear it now. I am the young man, etc.
On Monday morn I am ready to meet you, and to love's alter lead you away; The ring I'll get, the licence is ready, dear girl for thee I no longer can stay. On Monday morn, etc.
I think every moment it is a long hour, every hour as long as three, Until the time my love does appear, in the green bower for to meet me. I think every moment, etc.
My love is dainty, tho' false hearts are plenty, my love sincere as when it was new, As it grow's older it ne'er shall grow colder, nor fade away like the morning dew. My love is dainty, etc.
# The Folly and Fashion of the Present Time (1802, Glasgow)/The Cruel Parents Deceived: or, the Happy Lovers Meeting

CRUEL PARENTS DECEIVED: Or, the HAPPY LOVERS MEETING.
AS I walk'd but one morning to taste the sweet air, A damsel lay deploring for the loss of her dear, My love is gone and left me to sigh and to moan, All joys are bereft me, O when will be return?
How cruel were my parents to prove so severe, It causes me to sigh and shed many a tear;
He now is forc'd from me to plough on the main, It runs in my mind I'll ne'er see him again.
Ye gods above restore him safe to me again, The losing of my jewel increases my pain, Confin'd now in Bedlam all for his dear sake, With grief and vexation my heart it will break.
But as she was sighing and tearing her hair, O what should she hear but the voice of her dear, With joy and with rapture she flew to his arms, Saying, My dear creature has a million of charms.
Altho; I was forc'd to plough the raging main, With joy I'm returned to you once again, With gold and with silver, to you I'll resign, If you will consent, my dear, to be mine.
It was your cruel parents that forc'd me away, Else with you, my jewel, I'd rather have stay'd, All in your sweet company, which I do adore, Alas! I was afraid I ne'er should see you more.
So now my dear charmer, let's no longer delay, But now to the church let us haste away, Where you and I'll join in love's fweet content, They ne'er stood to parley, but to church they went.
# The Folly and Fashion of the Present Time (1802, Glasgow)/Jack Tar's Return

JACK TAR'S RETURN.
ONE night at ten o'clock as I a reading sat
letters of old I receiv'd from my dear, Somebody at the door like a Jack Tar did roar, which drove my senses I cannot tell where.
I rose at the shock, I the door did unlock, such a fine light fare my eyes did behold, Trowsers as white as snow, buckles down to the toe, with a flashy curl'd gee, his hat lac'd with gold.
Then I did stand in view, straight in my arms he flew, gave me a kiss far sweeter than rue, That he reviv'd my heart, from the deadly smart, nothing, no nothing, my mind could bring too.
Then to delight me more, straight in my apron sure, he began to throw handfuls of gold, Saying. I'll you deck wi' a gold chain 'bout your neck, for I've fail'd with Rodney of courage so bold.
Come each lad and lass, drink off a flowing glass, drink at health to the lads that are at sea; God send-them safe home, unto their native home, Or what comfort and joy that will be.
# The Folly and Fashion of the Present Time (1802, Glasgow)/The Happy Wedding

THE HAPPY WEDDING
AS I was a walking one morning in May, I heard a young damsel to sigh and to say, My love's gone from me, and shown me foul play, 'Twas down in the meadow amongst the green hay.
What makes my dear Polly to sigh & complain, Did you think, love, I ne'er should return again, Now to the church let us with speed repair, So never mind your father my dearest dear.
My father is worth five thousand a year, And I am his daughter, and his only heir, Not a penny of portion he'll give me I fear, If I marry with you, O my dearest dear.
They went to church & were marry'd straightway, And home to her father the very next day, Saying, Honoured father, I tell unto thee, That marry'd we two are, you plainly may see.
With that, the old man began for to swear,
You have marry'd my daughter, and my only care,
But since that you're marry'd, I've got a new son,
You are welcome, I freely forgive what is done.
You young men and maids of every degree, Wed the man you love, if you think he loves thee, For my father's well pleas'd with his goodson & heir, And settl'd upon him one thousand a year.
# Myths and Legends of Our Own Land/Volume 1/Lord Percy's Dream

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LORD PERCY'S DREAM
LEAVING the dissipations of the English court, Lord Percy came to America to share the fortunes of his brethren in the contest then raging on our soil. His father had charged him with the delivery of a certain package to an Indian woman, should he meet her in his rambles through the western ​wilds, and, without inquiring into the nature of the gift or its occasion, he accepted the trust. At the battle of the Brandywine—strangely foretold by Quaker prophecy forty years before—he was detailed by Cornwallis to drive the colonial troops out of a graveyard where they had intrenched themselves, and though he set upon this errand with the enthusiasm of youth, his cheek paled as he drew near the spat where the enemy was waiting.
It was not that he had actual physical fear of the onset: he had dreamed a dream a few nights before, the purport of which he had hinted to his comrades, and as he rode into the clearing at the top of Osborn's Hill he drew rein and exclaimed, "My dream! Yonder is the graveyard. I am fated to die there." Giving a few of his effects to his brother officers, and charging one of them to take a message of love to his betrothed in England, he set his lips and rode forward.
His cavalry bound toward the scene of action and are within thirty paces of the cemetery wall, when from behind it rises a battalion of men in the green uniform of the Santee Rangers and pours a withering fire into the ranks. The shock is too great to withstand, and the red-coats stagger away with broken ranks, leaving many dead and wounded on the ground. Lord Percy is the coolest of all. He urges the broken columns forward, and almost alone holds the place until the infantry, a hundred yards behind, come up. Thereupon ensues one of those ​hand-to-hand encounters that are so rare in recent war, and that are the sorest test of valor and discipline. Now rides forward Captain Waldemar, chief of the rangers and a half-breed Indian, who, seeing Percy, recognizes him as an officer and engages him in combat. There is for a minute a clash of steel on steel; then the nobleman falls heavily to the earth—dead. His dream has come true. That night the captain Waldemar seeks out the body of this officer, attracted by something in the memory of his look, and from his bosom takes the packet that was committed to his care.
By lantern-light he reads, carelessly at first, then rapidly and eagerly, and at the close he looks long and earnestly at the dead man, and seems to brush away a tear. Strange thing to do over the body of an enemy! Why had fate decreed that they should be enemies? For Waldemar is the half-brother of Percy. His mother was the Indian girl that the earl, now passing his last days in England, had deceived with a pretended marriage, and the letters promise patronage to her son. The half-breed digs a grave that night with his own hands and lays the form of his brother in it.