# Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021)/3:46pm

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​[3:46 p.m.]
Mr. Donoghue. I don't specifically recall. I don't think so. But I know the SIOC was operational at some point over the summer when there was unrest in D.C.
    BY
Q I want to move on to the 5 o'clock call with DOD, and your notes on that call is exhibit 38.
A Okay. I have it.
Q So again on this call, it's DHS, DOJ, NSC. Do you remember who, in particular, attended from those agencies?
A From DOD, I do recall General Milley being on and Secretary Miller. I don't recall specifically who was there from the other components, or who else might have been there from DOD.
Q You have a note in about the fourth or fifth line. It states RMVE and Antifa. Do you remember what prompted you to take those two notes down?
A Not specifically. Obviously, these were mentioned. It's RMVE, Racially Motivated Violent Extremists, and Antifa.
We were at this point still very concerned that we were going to have large groups of political factions that were in opposition to each other.
So getting back to our original concern that we were going to have sort of street brawls and violence across D.C., that was still there. Even though, the intelligence was telling us that it was less likely, we were still very much concerned that we were going to have city-wide violence with political factions who oppose one another.
So I think that's probably a reference to, on the one hand, you're going to have potentially RMVEs, on the other hand, you're going to have these Antifa guys, and they're ​all going to start shooting at each other all across D.C.
Q Do you know who mentioned RMVE or Antifa?
A I think it was the DOD guys. I don't think that was us. I think that came—we spoke later in the conversation.
Q Well, midway down the page, it says "4 buckets." Can you just talk us through that note?
A So you recall that the night before when General Milley asked for DOJ to serve as the lead agency, the DAG said we could not do that for a variety of reasons that we would explain later.
The next day we discussed this issue in more detail with Dave Bowdich. And Dave had been using this sort of paradigm to explain how the FBI was viewing this thing, and we thought it was helpful. He said, if you break it down to four buckets, you have intelligence, command posts, investigations, and street operations.
So this is the DAG explaining to DOD, and others on the call, what we as the Department were able to do. He said, with regard to intelligence, we're already doing that. The FBI is disseminating intelligence, others are as well, DHS, et cetera. But we are already doing that, and the FBI has an established mechanism through which it disseminates intelligence to State and local law enforcement officers. We'll continue to do that.
With regard to command posts, we're doing that as well. We are standing up with SIOC. Everyone is invited to be there. We have a command post at WFO, and we're staffing other command posts that are being hosted by other agencies. So that's also functioning.
With regard to investigations, which really means investigations and prosecutions, we, DOJ, of course, have the lay on that because we're the only ones who can prosecute.
​So in terms of any criminal investigations that might arise from whatever happens on the 6th, we would conduct those criminal investigations and the prosecutions.
The last bucket is street operations. And the DAG was very clear on this: We do not do street operations. We do not have police officers to man the streets of Washington, D.C. That's the Metro Police.
With regard to the specific facilities, like the Capitol, that's the Capitol Police. At the monuments, it's the Park Police.
We can provide reserves. If someone has a real problem, tell us, and we'll throw a few hundred FBI and ATF agents at it. But we cannot man the streets of D.C. as a regular police force, because that's not what we're trained and equipped to do.
So he is very clear that in terms of street operations, and whatever might happen on the streets of D.C., we were happy to play a supporting role, but we would not be taking a lead role in any of that.
And he explained that in, I thought, pretty clear terms to the people who were on the call, and then we moved on.
Q And were the people on the call, particularly DOD, satisfied that DOJ would be taking, as you wrote down, "We can take the lead on all of these," meaning the four buckets that you just described?
A The first three, right, that we would—DOJ would have a leading role for that, but that we would not have any leading role for street operations. Yes, everyone understood that and seemed satisfied with it.
Q At the bottom half of this, of your handwritten notes, where it says "summer," and then it has a breakdown of all of the different components. Can you explain to us who provided that information and what it means there?
A That was General Milley.
​So after the DAG explained what our view was of our role, General Milley began again reiterating that no one should want Active Duty troops used except as a last resort. And, again, we were all in agreement with that. And we began—
Q Was this after you all agreed that you would take on the, you know, the intel command posts until—that aspect of it, this was brought up again by General Milley?
A Yes. He went back to reiterate what he had started the conversation with the day before: No one should want Active Duty troops on the streets of our Capitol. Which we all agreed to.
But then he began reciting those numbers: You know, by my count, Park Police has 500, Secret Service has 160, the Capitol Police have 600, and so on.
I don't know where they got these numbers. No one questioned them. There was no need to. It really wasn't relevant to the conversation.
But he was saying: So by my count, there were thousands of civilian law enforcement officers available to protect Washington, D.C., we are providing National Guard, and with all of those resources, there should be no reason to have Active Duty troops on the streets.
We all agreed. No one was in opposition to that. So we moved on.
Q On the right-hand side of your notes, where it says, "There should be plenty of police forces available without using federal military troops," is that what General Milley said?
A Yes.
Q To your recollection?
A Yes.
Q And the last line there says, "Do we need a," I believe it says, "a police department QRF"?
​A Yes. At that point we were just kind of wrapping up the call, saying, okay, does anyone else think we need anything else? Is there something we're missing? Are there any holes? And so on.
And people were just sort of chiming in. We were spitballing at this point. Do the police departments need a QRF, a quick reaction force? And then some chimed in and said, no, they all have QRFs, of course they do. This is not some small county police department. It's the Metro PD. It's the Capitol Police. They know what they're doing.
And so he said, no, of course, no, they've got that covered.
What about rules of engagement?
No, these are professional law enforcement officers. They know what they can engage and how. And all that sort of stuff.
So at that point we were just king of throwing out ideas to see if we had missed anything.
Q Did anyone address the need for an integrated security plan?
A No. No one used that term. I think that―I don't know exactly what the definition of that would mean from one agency to another.
But it was clear that everyone understood what everyone else's responsibility was, and everyone understood what was available to them if they needed more resources to meet their responsibilities.
Q And during that call, did anyone, whether DOD or otherwise, bring up any potential for Proud Boys to be attending or the Boogaloo Boys, or raise any concerns about particular groups who may be attending that?
A I don't remember Proud Boys or Boogaloo Boys specifically being mentioned. I think we just talked more generally about left-wing, right wing, or Pro-Trump, ​anti-Trump groups coming to the Capitol. It didn't really matter what they called themselves. It was a matter of they're upset, they're coming to the Capitol, and there's a potential for violence.
Q All right. The January 4th call was the last coordination call before January 6th. Is that right?
A Yes, that's right.
Q And is it fair to say at the end of that call people felt prepared as they entered January 6th, in terms of the agency response?
A Yes. I think that's right. Like I said, everyone knew what everyone else was doing. We had not just created the wheel here. This had been done in many times in D.C. The Park Police knew their responsibilities. The Secret Service knew their responsibilities. The Capitol Police knew their responsibilities. MPD. FPS.
Everyone knew what everyone else was doing. Everyone knew that there was a danger of violence. Everyone knew that the Capitol and other facilities were potential targets. And I think we all felt comfortable that we were aware what the situation was, and we had the resources in place to address it.
I do remember now, as I'm looking at these notes, Dave Bowdich was in the DAG's office for this call. So Dave and I and the DAG were in that same office. There might have been some other people representing DOJ.
But, you know, when we hung up the phone, we sat around talking about it, again, amongst ourselves. Do we have everything in place? Have all the SWAT teams and HR teams been moved, or are they at least en route? That sort of thing to make sure that we had everything available.
Q Did anyone from DOJ on your side or within the Bureau have any contact with anyone from Capitol Police about their preparations?
​A I know Mike Sherwin did. And I can't speak for the other agencies. You'd have to ask them directly.
Q Do you know who Mike Sherwin was in touch with specifically from Capitol Police?
A I don't. I don't know if he was talking to Chief Sund. I don't know if Dave Bowdich was talking to Chief Sund. I spoke to Chief Sund on the 6th, but I did not speak to him before that. I know that they were sitting at the same command centers together, and things of that sort.
Q Before we wrap up January 4th, let me just go through this email that evening, exhibit 39. This would be the acting AG, Mr. Rosen, approved the Secretary of the Army's plan to approve D.C. National Guard in support of Mayor Bowser's request.
Are you familiar with that?
A Right. I am. I'm familiar with the process because, unlike a governor, the Mayor of D.C. doesn't have the authority to call out the National Guard. That authority is with the President. The President has delegated that authority to the Secretary of Defense.
So when the D.C. Mayor wants to use the National Guard, they put in a request. It goes up the DOD chain of command. DOD asks DOJ about the legality of it.
And this is clearly a situation where it's perfectly legal to use the D.C. National Guard to back up local law enforcement. So they just formalized that with an opinion that says, yes, it's legal to use D.C. National Guard in this way.
It's not approving a plan or not, or anything like. It's simply saying, as a legal matter, you can use the Guard this way.
Q In other words, DOJ didn't review any of the requests the Mayor had concerning the D.C. National Guard?
​A No. We understood, as part of these conversations on the 3rd and the 4th that the Mayor had requested 350 National Guard, that she wanted them to be unarmed and to have no body armor, and that she wanted them positioned at Metro centers and traffic intersections and things like that to free up Metro PD to have more bodies to address other things. And that was fine.
Q And that was memorialized in the January 12th letter there, that's exhibit 40. Is that right?
A Right.
Q DOJ's stating it was appropriate for the D.C. National Guard to respond. Do you have that?
A Yeah.
Q Okay. Going now to January 4th, exhibit 41 is essentially a suggested press release for DOJ.
Now, it's my understanding that, in searching DOJ's website, the statement was never issued. Do you know why not?
A I don't know if it was issued.
Q Okay.
A I just don't know.
Q In the draft release, or draft press, you state at some point that we anticipate the protests to be peaceful.
Now, at that point you already knew there could be the potential for violence, as you described. Could you just explain the words that you use there for the press release?
A Well, we certainly expected American citizens coming to the Capitol to conduct themselves lawfully. So we did expect them to be peaceful. That said, we ​prepared for something that was not peaceful.
I think the purpose of this statement was to try to calm things rather than inflame them. And we wanted to make it clear to people that, if you're going to come to D.C. and protest, that's all fine, and everyone's got a First Amendment right to do that, and that First Amendment right will be protected. But, if people are going to come in and engage in acts of violence and property destruction, there would be consequences.
So I think the point of drafting this statement was to make that clear to everyone, that there would be consequences if there was criminal conduct in the Capitol.
Q We talked a little about bit about Mayor Bowser's request for the D.C. National Guard. Exhibit 42 is the letter directed to DOJ as well as DOD, essentially, and I am going to quote the last line here.
"To be clear, the District of Columbia is not requesting other federal law enforcement personnel and discourages any additional deployment without immediate notification to, and consultation with, MPD if such plans are underway."
And this was sent January—it looks like January 5th at 2:55.
Did this impact DOJ's preparation or posture going into the 6th in any manner?
A Not really. It made it clear to us that the Mayor didn't want our Federal assistance or involvement. But the reality was we had already prepared.
We certainly weren't going to be sending people home. We had our own independent responsibility and authority. And we were going to continue our plans to have our people in reserve in case they were needed by our partner.
So it didn't really impact what we were doing.
Q So before we start with the events of January 6th, going into that day, did DOJ have points of contacts with Capitol Police, Park Police, MPD, or was it all coordinated through the SIOC?
​A It was coordinated through the command centers. Sherwin might have had direct contact with Chief Sund or someone like that. I don't recall offhand. But we were relying on the coordination through the command posts.
Q Okay. I can start to march through January 6th or if you guys want to take a break.
Are there any questions from everybody?
Ms. Cheney?
Ms. Cheney. No, I don't have anything.
Mr. Andres. Sorry. Can we just take 5 minutes?
Sure.
Mr. Andres. Okay. Thanks.
[Recess.]
Hi. Are we ready?
Mr. Andres. Yeah. I think there's somebody other than us that can mute us if they don't like what we're saying.
Just kidding.
Is the court reporter on?
The Reporter. Yes, ma'am, the reporter is online.
Okay, great. Thank you.
    BY
Q We're going to start with January 6th. Before we kind of go through the ticktock of your day, I just wanted to start with exhibit 43, which appears to be a situation report from BOP.
A Yeah, I see it.
Q Were you aware of this report, or had you seen it, on January 6th?
​A No, the first I saw this report was in the last few days in preparation for the interview.
Q And just for the components working this, is this a unit within BOP that is collecting this information, if you know?
A I believe so, but I, frankly, don't know much about the intelligence gathering within BOP.
Q Okay. So if we could just start then on January 6th, what time you arrived at the office, and kind of go through your day.
A So at that point, we had 9 a.m. meetings every morning with the DAG, myself, and some other Department leaders. We had a 9:30 meeting with FBI. I do remember Dave Bowdich being at that meeting. I don't specifically remember Director Wray being there, but he might have been there. We discussed, of course, January 6th.
In reviewing these exhibits in preparation for this, it reminded me of something. And I'm not going to go beyond what's in this record that you provided here.
But in exhibit 43, on page 4 of that exhibit, there is a summary, an excerpt, I suppose, of a CBS News report that talks about air traffic controllers receiving a threat. Quote, "We are flying a plane to the Capitol on Wednesday. Soleimani will be avenged."
That was another matter that we discussed with the FBI that morning, and perhaps prior to that morning. But I had forgotten about that particular issue until I saw this exhibit yesterday.
We had a more general discussion with FBI about preparation for January 6th. Were all the teams in place? Yes, they were. I think they were mostly positioned at Quantico. And we talked about a number of other things that were on the Department's radar at that point.
After the 9:30 meeting, the FBI personnel left, and I kind of went about my regular ​day with everything we were dealing with, with election matters and other things.
Q Can I just interrupt. Sorry. I have one thing.
When you say the people were positioned at Quantico, do you mean the components that were prepositioned for January 6th?
A Yes. So I think—I could be wrong about this, and FBI would have to tell you—but I think they took the two SWAT teams that we moved to D.C., the two hostage rescue teams that we moved to D.C., and I think they put them both at Quantico. And they had helicopters and the ability to move them into the Capitol quickly, if needed.
And so they were all just on standby with their equipment in case something happened that day.
Q Okay. Go ahead. Sorry.
A So the morning, I, frankly, can't remember what we were working on. I'm sure there were a million things going on. I do recall at some point, late morning, early afternoon, hearing protesters marching down Constitution, going from the Ellipse toward the Capitol. We could hear them chanting and banging drums and things like that. They passed by the Department.
And then sometime in the early afternoon, I walked into the DAG's office. He had his television on. You could see that people were in the rotunda of the Capitol.
And he said to me, do you see this, do you see what's going on, can you believe this? And that was the first that I learned that the Capitol had been breached.
Q Okay. Let me try to stop you there and get a timeframe here.
Looking at exhibit 44, we have a 10:43 a.m. email from , who states, "There are no credible threats as of the 10:00 brief."
Is that your briefing, or is that a separate briefing?
A No. So at this point is at the SIOC, and the SIOC does periodic briefing ​every few hours, just like virtually every command center I have ever worked in.
So every couple of hours, there's someone in charge of the shift, and they get up, and then they call individuals up who had their own areas of responsibility, and they brief, so everyone knows what's going on.
So there was a 10 o'clock brief at the SIOC, and this is part of the readout from that brief from
Q And in that email it says, "There are reports about 18 predicated subjects traveling to D.C., but of those, 6 are now not going to be traveling."
The reference to predicated subjects, does that mean cases the FBI had on individuals who might be attending the rally?
A Yes. For one reason or another, the FBI was already taking a look at those 18 individuals, wholly apart from the rally, and they learned that those individuals would be traveling to the rally.
Apparently, six of them decided not to go. So you're talking about at least, according to this report, 12 predicated subjects traveling to the rally.
Q Exhibit 45 is an email at 1:57 with, as you said, a SIOC update that located. I wanted to talk a little bit about this before we move on to the Capitol breach time period.
In the first line it says—and I hope you have the unredacted version there. The FBI—
A I do.
Q Yes—has briefed that there are reports of unexploded explosive devices at the RNC.
The second bullet says there's also a report of an unexploded device at the DNC.
A Yes.
​Q Now, when did you first hear about these pipe bombs at the RNC and DNC? Was in through this email, or was it through another manner?
A I don't think it was through the email. I can't be a hundred percent sure. I think called me. But it was an extremely chaotic day, and so it's difficult to piece it all back together.
But this is not the kind of thing that would just land in an email, we've got pipe bombs in the city. I think called me. And maybe that's why I went to the DAG's office to tell him. I can't exact exactly.
But I do recall being advised that there were pipe bombs found at RNC and DNC, and that ATF was responding to the scene, along with Capitol Police and MPD.
Q Are you familiar with where the RNC and DNC are located as it relates to the Capitol?
A Generally, yes.
Q Is it away from the Capitol, not on the Capitol Grounds?
A No, they're not—
Q Pardon?
A No, they're not on the Capitol Grounds, obviously, but they're only a few blocks away.
Q Do you know—are you familiar with how many people responded to deal with the RNC/DNC pipe bomb situation?
A I don't know what the head count was. I knew it was numerous agencies, and I know that ATF was there with the Capitol Police.
Q Okay. I'm sorry. Then you—we can take it from when you went to Mr. Rosen office?
A So I went to his office. He had the television on, I don't know what ​channel, and it was a news channel, and they were showing scenes of people basically walking through the rotunda with flags, and things of that sort. And, obviously, people had gotten into the rotunda who didn't belong there.
And he said, you know, I'm trying to get ahold of FBI. I'm trying to find out what's going on. I can't believe this is happening. I can't believe people got in there. Something to that effect.
And I watched for a few moments. And I said, you know what, sir? I'll just go over to the SIOC, I'll try to find out what's going on, I'll call you from there.
So I left RFK, our headquarters, with my detail, and I went across the street to the Hoover Building, and I went up to the SIOC at FBI.
Q Do you have a sense of what time it was when you got to the FBI SIOC?
A It's very difficult. I know the sequence of what I did that day. It's very difficult to pinpoint exact times and all this. I think it was around 2 o'clock. But I caution when I make these estimates about the exact time.
Q Who did you speak to at the FBI SIOC?
A I got there. There were a number of people there. I was looking for Dave Bowdich. I thought he was might be at the SIOC.
I asked people what's going on. There was a shift leader. I can't remember exactly who it was, but whoever was in charge of the morning shift. I'm pretty sure was there. I had brief conversations with a number of people.
They didn't have a lot of information. They had the screens showing people marching through the rotunda as well, but they didn't have a lot of information as to exactly what was going on at the Capitol.
I asked where Bowdich was. Someone said he left for WFO a few minutes ago, something to that effect. And so I decided I was going to leave and go to WFO.
​While I was at the SIOC, I do recall someone saying that Capitol Police say they don't need help at this point, they've got it covered. I don't know who that was. It might have been . It might have been someone else.
It didn't surprise me because I knew that Capitol Police had more than enough officers to cover the Capitol. And since that was their area of responsibility, I thought that made perfect sense that the Capitol Police were going to push these people out of the Capitol, and that was going to be that.
But, again, because I wasn't able to get the answers I wanted with regard to what 9 was actually going on, on the ground, I decided to leave the SIOC and go to WFO and try to get a little bit closer to the Capitol to see what was going on.
Q What happened when you arrived at WFO?
A En route, I made several phone calls. There were a lot of phone calls in and out that day. So I don't remember them all. And I'm sure some of them are getting conflated in my mind.
But I do recall calling Regina Lombardo, and some others. I think I spoke to Don Washington, too, saying, get your guys ready. If the Capitol Police need help, we're sending help right away.
And they had previously—we had previously made clear to them that if they're asked for assistance, they should just deploy. They didn't need permission from me or the AG or anyone else. If a partner asks for help, just send your guys.
So there were some phone calls between the SIOC and WFO. When I got to WFO, I went inside. People were in the main command room. There were lots of different partners there. They, too, of course, had the televisions going and people working the phones and shouting out to each other information that they were getting.
I asked where Bowdich was. They directed me to a conference room in the back. ​I went to the back. Dave Bowdich was in the conference room by himself with a phone on the table.
He was talking to some FBI leader. I don't know who it was. It was not Director Wray. He was asking that leader, Where are our guys? How many are there? Do they have the equipment? That sort of thing.
And he hung up, and we spoke briefly. We decided that it would be better off if we both moved toward the Capitol. Because you're always going to have these lags in information as it gets reported up to a command post. So we thought the best thing to do was for us to both just go to the Capitol and see what was really going on.
Q So when you made that decision, you and Mr. Bowdich, is it fair to say that there was no FBI or DOJ component official on the Capitol complex to have provided you information or Mr. Bowdich information?
A I don't think there were any FBI agents in the Capitol at that point. I think ATF made it to the Capitol first. And I believe they made it to the Capitol because they were there for the pipe bombs. And so they were close by. And if I understand correctly, part of this is based on conversations I had with ATF leadership afterward.
But their guys were at the RNC and the DNC looking at the pipe bombs. And the Capitol Police were there as well. And the Capitol Police heard over their radios that the Capitol had been breached. And they said, you know, we've got to go back to the Capitol.
And they turned again running toward the Capitol. And the ATF agents just followed them to provide whatever assistance they could.
So I think ATF was the first Federal agency to make it into the Capitol that day. And I do have a recollection of some contact with the ATF leader who was in charge, Ashan Benedict. And I remember talking to Ashan and him saying, I'm already in the ​Capitol, I'll meet you when you get here.
Q I just want to add some context to that time period.
According to the Capitol Police official timeline, at 3:07, it states 20 ATF and FBI personnel arrived at the Speaker's lobby.
And in addition to that, exhibit 48 has the 3:32 email from which says, "All FBI SWAT resources in the NCR and agent teams are headed to the Capitol."
Now, for kind of those two points, is it consistent with your recollection that the FBI arrived around the 3 o'clock time period?
A I believe that Deputy Director Bowdich and I got to the assembly area around 3 o'clock. And in the assembly area, which was on D Street, there were, I would guess, hundreds of FBI agents. Plus others. Capitol Police was there. There were others there.
My impression was that the vast majority, if not all, of the FBI agents who participated in this were in the assembly area at that point. ATF was already in the Capitol.
I had spoken to Ashan Benedict, who was the special agent in charge of ATF in D.C. I had known him when he was a special agent in charge in New York. And my belief at that time, and I think it's right, is that ATF and Ashan were in there significantly before the 3 o'clock arrival at the assembly area.
When Bowdich and I went into the Capitol from the assembly area, he took with him a number of FBI agents. I think they were bomb techs. And I think those were the first FBI agents in the Capitol.
Q Let me clarify.
So then, in your memory, Mr. Bowdich arrived, along with yourself, with the first FBI agents to the scene?
​And let me just explain why I'm asking. I'm just trying to get a sense of when the first set of folks, apart from ATF, got there?
A Bowdich and I traveled from WFO to the assembly area together in the same vehicle. Right? So we arrived at the same time. Again, it's very difficult to estimate the time, but I think it was around 3 o'clock.
When Dave Bowdich got to the assembly area, he started talking to some of the FBI leaders who were there. Obviously, they knew who he was. They came up to him. They sort of reported in, sir, I'm so and so, I'm the team leader for this or that, and they began talking to him.
I then went and found a Capitol Police officer who could lead us into the Capitol. Bowdich and I then spoke to that guy, and he let us into the Capitol. And Bowdich basically said, you, you, you, you, you, come with me.
I think those were bomb techs. And I'm pretty sure those were the first FBI agents in the building, but I could be wrong about that.
When we got into the rotunda—
Mr. Andres. Those were the first FBI agents you saw in the building.
Mr. Donoghue. Right.
Mr. Andres. In terms of what you're witnessing.
Mr. Donoghue. Yes, right. But I also think, based on the discussions that I was hearing, that those were the first FBI agents in the building. I think Dave Bowdich was a little concerned that FBI agents weren't already in the building.
And so when we got into the rotunda, I saw ATF tactical officers in full tac gear with ATF on their backs, helping the Capitol Police. And I also saw U.S. Marshals Service Special Operations Group officers in the rotunda area.
So there were a least two other Federal components who were already in the ​rotunda before Dave Bowdich and I got there.
    BY :
Q That's helpful.
And when you say the assembly area, I think we need for the record, where were you specifically?
A It's on D Street. I think it's in my notes that were provided, but I can't remember exact cross street. Maybe it's 1st. Somewhere over there. It's near the Dirksen Senate Building. It's just a large parking lot. It was a predesignated assembly area that everybody went to so that we could tactically move into the Capitol.
Q And what happened after you arrived to the rotunda, if you could describe to us what you saw?
A We got to the assembly area. We found a Capitol Police officer who could lead us in.
That police officer, I think, took us first to Chief Sund's office, the head of the Capitol Police. We checked in with him very briefly. We told him we were going into the Capitol, that we were there to provide whatever assistance we could, that we had, obviously, ATF and FBI and Marshals and other units who were, as he knew, ready to provide whatever assistance they needed. He thanked us. We went on our way.
We went into the Dirksen Building. We went through the tunnels and came up somewhere near the rotunda, not directly in the rotunda, but somewhere near the rotunda. And then we moved into the rotunda area where there were hundreds of mostly Capitol Police officers, but other law enforcement as well.
I did not see any protestors at that point. You could smell that there had been some chemical agents used, pepper spray or something like that.
And I found Ashan Benedict, who was the ATF special agent in charge there in the ​Capitol. And then he, Dave Bowdich, and I kind of stuck together from that point forward to provide whatever assistance we could to the Capitol Police.
Q And you say you did not see any protesters at that time. Is that right?
A No, my entire time at the Capitol, I did not see any protesters.
Q And that's through the tunnels as well, coming from the—
A No, there were no protesters in the tunnel at all. There was a lot of law enforcement.
And then when we came up, there was a lot of law enforcement in the rotunda area and in the hallways, the rest of it, but I did not see any protesters.
Q I want to turn to exhibit 49 just to get, again, a sense of the timing here. This is email.
"HRT will be fast roping into the Capitol area. FBI will be staging DOJ resources to secure and clear the Capitol."
So that's 3:48. And, again, I understand you're estimating the time. In your estimate, you and Mr. Bowdich are already at the Capitol, is that right, by that time?
A Yes. Yeah, we were I'm present sure we were in there by that time. And you have to keep in mind that what is reporting out, there's always a time lag. So by the time it worked its way up to the SIOC and he sends an email out, you know, this is somewhat old news. I mean, it's not very old, but there's always a time lag.
And so this did not actually happen. The HRT did not fast rope into the Capitol. But this was their plan, obviously, at some point.
Q Now, before we get into some of the steps you personally took at the Capitol, I just want to turn to exhibit 50 to discuss briefly this DOD statement that was issued.
I believe around 4 o'clock, in the middle of page there, it says, "The D"—this is a ​DOD statement—"The D.C. Guard has been mobilized to provide support to federal law enforcement in the District. Acting Secretary Miller has been in contact with Congressional leadership, and Secretary McCarthy has been working with D.C. government. The law enforcement response will be led by the Department of Justice."
Now, I understand you probably were not aware of the DOD fleet, or whatever official statement this was. Did you learn of this statement by DOD at any time on January 6th?
A No, I didn't learn of this until I was preparing for this interview.
Q Were you in touch with Mr. Miller or Mr. McCarthy at any point on January 6th?
A I believe I received a call from Mr. McCarthy while I was at the Capitol, where he reported that they were sending National Guard, and they reported that out to the Acting Attorney General.
Also, they were on phone calls that took place later that evening while I was still in the Capitol and trying to provide situation reports to the Vice President and congressional leadership, amongst others.
Q Can you just talk about who specifically you remember speaking to as far as congressional leadership is on January 6th?
A There were a lot of calls that day, but two specifically that I remember, there was an 1800 call and a 1900 call. So 6 p.m., 7 p.m.
The 7 p.m. call, I know, had at least Senator Schumer, Speaker Pelosi, Mr. McCarthy from the House, Senator McConnell, the Vice President, General Milley, Secretary Miller, I think the White House Chief of Staff. I'm pretty sure White House Pat Cipollone was also on that call.
Q It's exhibit 54, Mr. Donoghue, that—it talks about this call. Is that right?
​A Yeah, yeah, yeah. I am looking at it, but, you know, I didn't detail all the actual people participating.
But that's what I remember off the top of my head. I'm sure there were others on this call.
Q We can skip ahead to this call then. I think the next page goes through—well, did you provide the briefing, essentially, to the congressional leadership on that call?
A Yes, I did.
Q And apart from this 1900 call that's in exhibit 54, did you receive any calls directly from any congressional leaders before this or after this?
A Not congressional leaders, no.
Q From any White House officials?
A Yes, I definitely received calls throughout the day. There were a lot of them.
But I do recall specifically getting a call from the White House Chief of Staff while I was en route between WFO and the assembly area. I think Pat Cipollone was also on that same phone call. And I believe I received at least one separate phone call from Pat Cipollone as well.
And I spoke to the Acting AG a number of times throughout the day, obviously, updating him on what I was learning and what I was doing next, and that sort of thing.
But it was a very, very hectic afternoon.
Q Sure. The call from Mr. Meadows while you were en route to the Capitol or to the assembly area, just in substance, can you tell us what that conversation was?
A Yes. I got the call on my cell phone. I answered it. It was, I believe, the Chief of Staff and the White House Counsel.
​And the Chief of Staff said, essentially, I understand you're on your way to the Capitol.
I said, yes, sir. I'm with Bowdich now. We should be there in a few minutes.
And he said something to the effect of the President wants this situation brought under control. When you get over there, you need to take charge of the Federal agencies. You need to get that place cleared out and operational as quickly as possible.
That's not a quote, but that was the gist of what he told me.
And I said, basically, yes, sir, I understand that, we'll be there in a few minutes, and we'll clear the place, and we'll get it operational.
Q Do you have any idea how he knew you were on the way to the Capitol?
A I assume that the DAG told him. I was keeping the DAG—I wasn't going to do these things on my own. He's my boss. So I was calling him and saying, hey, look, I'm going to go to the WFO now. I'm going to go to the assembly area and all that. And he was in agreement with all that. So he knew where I was going, and he must have—I assumed he told the Chief of Staff.
Q Is that the only call you remember directly with Chief of Staff Meadows?
A Yes. I know there was at least one other one with Pat Cipollone, but the Chief of Staff may have been on there, I just don't remember.
Q And do you remember the nature of the call -- of the conversations with Mr. Cipollone?
A He said something to the effect of there are a lot of calls going on, but there are very few people who are close to what's actually happening on the ground. So if you can be on these calls, it would be extremely helpful.
And so if you can make these calls, I know, you know, they're showing up on your calendar or coming in emails and things like that, please try to pay attention to them. ​What you are doing there is more important. But if you can spare the time, get on these calls so we can hear directly what's going on, on the ground.
That might have—
Q Is that what led to you—
A That might have been before the Chief of Staff called in the car. I can't really remember.
Q And is that what led to you, essentially, leading the 18—the 1900 call?
A Yes. Both the 1800 call and the 1900 call, I was told in advance, at least in one case by the DAG himself, that you're the senior official on the ground in terms of civilian executive branch agencies. And, therefore, when we start this call, we're going to turn it over to you to brief up what the situation is on the ground. And I did that both in the 1800 and 1900 calls.
Q And I just want to turn to the page of your handwritten notes where you state: Prepped for the 1800 call.
A Right.
Q Sorry, we've gone a little bit out of order, but it's completely fine.
So we talked about the 1900 call, and you told us what leadership was on that call. I want to clarify in your notes for the 1900 call, it says POTUS and VP.
Was the President on that call?
A No, I never spoke to the President that day. He was not on any calls that I was on.
Q Was there any attempt by the President to contact you that day?
A Not that I'm aware of.
Q Did you later learn that the President attempted to call you that day after—
A No. On January 6th? No, I never heard that the President tried to contact ​me on January 6th.
Q And apart from Mr. Cipollone and Mr. Meadows, did any White House official attempt to call you directly on January 6th?
A No. We had a call from the Situation Room, so that was operated out of the White House, but there were no other officials reaching out to me that I'm aware of.
Q Who was in the Situation Room at the White House? Do you remember?
A I don't. This call, this 1800 call, this did not have the congressional leadership on it. And I don't believe the Vice President was on that call either. It was more of, I think, a law enforcement-level call.
Q If we could just go through what you briefed them on in that 1800 call, that would be helpful.
A So these notes I have in exhibit 54 titled Prep for 1800 Situation Room Call, I made these notes to myself a few minutes in advance of the 1800 call because I wanted to make sure that I covered each of these points.
So I made this list with Dave Bowdich and Ashan Benedict and some of the Capitol Police officers with me to make sure I wasn't missing any key information.
I ran through the list. I prepared it. When the 1800 call started out of the Situation Room, they turned it to me first. That's why I have the first entry there as, "See call prep notes." And I, essentially, read this list, and I briefed them on what the situation was.
And then the call continued from there with other people chiming in about perimeter fencing. General Hokansen, H-o-k-a-n-s-e-n, talked about the D.C. National Guard role and things like that.
Q Before we move on from the 6 p.m. and the 7 p.m. call on January 6th—and just so I'm clear, you're still at the Capitol at that time. Is that right, Mr. Donoghue?
​A Yes. I left the Capitol shortly after 8 p.m. I waited to make sure that the Senate was back in session. They gaveled back in just a few minutes after 8. And once they were back in session and everything was operational, I then left.
Q Just as a question about how your role came to be so that these calls, was it—Mr. Bowdich was still with you at that time, correct?
A Yes, he was with me throughout.
Q Was there any sense that given his capacity as number two at the Bureau, that he would be the security and operational person in charge at that time versus yourself?
A No. He was certainly in charge of the FBI assets that were there. But what we did, essentially, was as soon as Bowdich and I got to the rotunda and linked up with Ashan Benedict, we asked for the senior Capitol Police officer on scene.
We were put in contact with him there in the rotunda. I explained who I was. And I said we have ATF, we have FBI, we have marshals, we have whatever you need. Tell us what you need to get this building cleared and operational. And then he asked for certain specific things.
Pursuant to his request, we did that. We sent FBI toward one Chamber, ATF to another Chamber to work with the Capitol Police to clear the Chambers.
And then he, if you guys can help clear the Chambers, we, the Capitol Police, will clear the hallways and the offices and the closets and all that stuff.
Because we wanted to make sure of two things. One, there was no one left behind hiding in a closet or some other place. And, two, that there were no devices left behind like a pipe bomb left in the Senate Chamber.
So that was the immediate goal in terms of clearing the facility. And we made our people on scene available to the Capitol Police, and they appreciated that, and they ​used them, and that was it.
Q How many hours in total do you estimate you were at the Capitol?
A About 5 or so.
Q Before kind of go back to some emails that were received, does anybody have any questions?
Ms. Cheney?
Ms. Cheney. Thanks. , are you going to walk through Mr. Donoghue's 7 o'clock call, the 1900 call, just to get—I see the note in the exhibit 54.
. Uh-huh.
Ms. Cheney. Just to get some specifics about what messages that were on that call.
Sorry, just to clarify. The notes say that POTUS was on the call, but I think Mr. Donoghue just said that's not the case?
Mr. Donoghue. Right. And I think what I was doing there, I was taking notes during the call. And someone at some point said something about the President. I think they were going to relay something that the President said or some directive or something like that.
And I wrote POTUS, because I was going to relay whatever the instructions were. And then when I heard them, it sounded like to me it was something I had heard previously.
So whether it was the Chief of Staff or someone else saying the President wants the situation brought under control, I think that's what it was, but I'm not a hundred percent certain.
I am a hundred percent certain that the President was not on the call. You know, looking back at the notes, obviously, I was kind of racking my brain a little bit as to why ​did I write POTUS. But I think that was the reason. You know, someone said the President something, and I began writing POTUS, and then I stopped.
So I apologize for the confusion there. But the President was definitely not on that call. And the Vice President definitely was because he asked several questions.
Q Where did you conduct the call?
A From—as you can see at the top, it says HR 228. That's the office number that we were in.
I was in the rotunda. My detail guys could hear that we were planning calls in the rotunda, because of the echo. It was not a good place to do a call. And so my detail guys said, we'll go find you a quiet place to make these phone calls. And then they came back and they led me to 228.
Q Do you know where the Vice President was at that time?
A I don't know exactly, but after this call I learned that he was in the Capitol -- wherever his office is, I don't know offhand where that is -- and I went there. Someone led me to the Vice President's office, and there were some officers stationed outside. I said who I was, and we were just there in case there's anything, any sort of assistance we could provide.
His Chief of Staff came out. I said, look, we were just on the call, you know, I understand the Vice President's here, do you guys need anything at all? And he said, no, thanks, we got it.
And that was it. I never saw the Vice President. I never spoke to him aside from the phone call. I just saw his Chief of Staff.
Q Did it surprise you that he was still in the building?
A No, not really.
Q To Ms. Cheney's point, could you just go through that 1900 call, what you touched upon in that call?
A It was similar to the 1800 call in that I was telling them that the building is ​cleared but not fully secured. You know, there were still protesters on the grounds outside. That we were in the process of sweeping the building. That ATF had taken one Chamber. They were working with Capitol Police to clear the Chamber. FBI took the other Chamber. They were working with the Capitol Police. The Capitol Police were working on all the offices, the hallways, the restrooms, and everything else to make sure that no one was hiding, and that there were no dangerous devices left behind.
I said in that call that we believed that we could get the entire place operational by 9 p.m. Senator Schumer then said, well, we want to be in at 8 p.m. Can we do this by 8?
And I looked at the FBI, ATF, and Capitol Police leadership and kind of gave them a thumbs up, like questioning, can we do it by 8? I thought we could. And they all sort of nodded, yes, we can do it by 8.
So I said, yes, sir, we can do it by 8.
I think the Vice President then chimed in and said, can you do it safely by 8? Meaning—I took it to mean he didn't want any law enforcement officers endangered by rushing the schedule?
And I said, yes, sir, we can do it by 8, we can do it safely, that'll be fine.
There was some other questions. Frankly, I just—I don't remember them, of course. I have a notation that Room 137—Speaker Pelosi asked about Room 137. I didn't know what she meant by that.
I said, I apologize, Madam Speaker, I don't know the building well enough to know what 137 is. And someone said, it's the dining facility. And, apparently, she wanted to know if the dining facility would be up and operational, because she said that the Members would need food throughout the night.
And I said that we would try to find out further, that I have no idea if the dining ​facility would be operational, and it would be probably prudent for Members to bring some food with them if they were going to spend the night.
Q So just to go through your notes on who else was on the call, you have the Acting AG, you have a note, DOD.
Do you remember who from DOD was on the 1900 call?
A General Milley was on that call, because he asked a few questions as well. Secretary Miller was on that call. I believe Secretary McCarthy, Army Secretary McCarthy was on that call. I don't remember who else.