# Two Career Lieutenants Killed and Two Career Fire Fighters Injured Following a Flashover at an Assembly Hall Fire—Texas/Investigation

​Investigation
On February 15, 2013, a motorist passing by the assembly hall at approximately 2319 hours noticed fire coming from the roof and immediately placed a cellular 9-1-1 call. Fire and police units were dispatched for a structure fire. Police units arrived on scene at the same time as the fire department. Police units observed a 3- to 4-foot flame with smoke coming from the A/B corner roof and thick, black smoke emitting from an attic vent on the D-side. Note: Arriving fire department units could not confirm thick, black smoke emitting from the attic vent on the D-side. Additionally upon their arrival, ​police observed that no vehicles were in the parking lot and the building appeared secured and empty of people.
The first fire department apparatus to arrive on scene was E1. Over the radio from E1, Victim #1 advised incoming units that fire was showing through the roof and they were in an offensive fire mode. Victim #1 then passed command to the next arriving officer. Victim #1 directed his probationary fire fighter to place a positive-pressure ventilation (PPV) fan (see Photo 7) at the A-side front door and pull the 1¾-inch hoseline (200 feet of red hose) off the rear of E1. While these tasks were being performed, Victim #1 conducted a 360-degree walk-around of the structure. T1, EMS1, and B1 arrived shortly after E1. B1 took over as the IC and advised dispatch and responding units that they were in an offensive mode for a single-story commercial structure with fire showing from the B/C corner roof. Following departmental procedures, the IC directed EMS1 to become the ISO and to position himself at C-side after he finished his walk-around of the structure. The ISO also shut off the main electrical breaker, which was located on the D-side. He noticed fire coming from the A/B corner roof and smoke pushing from the eves on C-side.
A non-free image has been removed from this page. Photo 7. Photo of a PPV fan used during the incident. (Photo courtesy of fire department.)
A non-free image has been removed from this page. Photo 8. Shows vestibule and red hoseline on left leading into bingo hall. Yellow hoseline on right leads straight ahead into the dance hall. Photo taken after incident scene cleared of fire debris. (Photo courtesy of state fire marshal.)
While the E1 crew operated in the bingo room, two members from T1 began breaching exterior doors. T1 first breached an office door on D-side, which contained no smoke or fire. They then closed the door and repeated this procedure for a single door on C-side; light smoke was visible but no fire was observed. T1 then bypassed a double door on the B-side close to the B/C corner and breached the door on B-side close to where the fire was believed to have originated (doorway to kitchen area). When the T1 crew breached the door and pushed it in, fire was observed coming around this door and the entire room (kitchen) was engulfed with heavy fire. At this point, all three members of the T1 crew were together and they had gone on air while breaching the door, due to the amount of fire and smoke in the immediate area. The T1 crew blocked the door open for ventilation, and fire began rolling out the door.
Passing the T1 crew, personnel from E2 were completing their walk-around at this time and were heading back to A-side where they observed that the E1 operator had pulled a second 1¾-inch hoseline off the rear of E1 (200 feet of yellow hose). The IC tasked the E2 crew with backing up E1 so they grabbed the yellow hoseline and walked with it into the vestibule (see Photo 9). They then turned left ​into the bingo hall where they had to crawl due to conditions. They followed the red hoseline until they came upon Victim #1. A brief face-to-face discussion occurred about finding the seat of the fire. The E2 crews then backed out of the bingo hall and back into the vestibule where they then decided to proceed into the dance hall area (see Diagram 2). They entered the dance hall, advancing approximately 25 feet. The E2 crew observed fire over their heads so they immediately flowed water into the ceiling above them, knocking down acoustic tiles.
A non-free image has been removed from this page. Photo 9. Looking toward the A-side entry door, red and yellow hoselines are stretched into the structure and a PPV fan is in position. (Photo courtesy of law enforcement.)
The T1 crew (acting lieutenant, the operator, and a fire fighter) then entered through the A-side door carrying their hand tools. Standing up, they began a left-handed search into the bingo hall. Upon entering this room, the smoke was dark and thick but not a lot of heat. After a few minutes, they had to exit the structure because the T1 operator had a seal issue with his facepiece. While the T1 operator attended to his facepiece issue on the exterior, the T1 acting lieutenant and his fire fighter re-entered the structure through the A-side door and crawled in following the red hoseline further into the bingo hall to locate the E1 crew. T1 came upon Victim #1 who requested them to feed him additional hoseline. The E1 probationary fire fighter stated that he and Victim #1 then crawled deeper with the hoseline, eventually making it over to a large amount of fire from floor to ceiling that was rolling over them at times (B-side). The E1 probationary fire fighter stated they sat there flowing water on the fire for a few minutes and conditions then got really dark and hot. The T1 crew (two members) exited the structure to change bottles.
While the E1 probationary fire fighter was flowing water, Victim #1 asked him to check his remote pressure gauge. Note: The lieutenant who worked the night before advised NIOSH investigators that the heads-up display (HUD) on the same SCBA used by Victim #1 wasn’t working during a structure fire that extended through shift change. This lieutenant advised NIOSH investigators that he immediately advised Victim #1 of the SCBA issue when he changed shifts the morning of the incident. Victim #1’s tank was at ¼ full and the E1 probationary fire fighter’s HUD was reading amber. Victim #1 then advised his probationary fire fighter that they needed to leave. The E1 probationary fire fighter dropped the nozzle where they had been spraying down the fire and began to follow their hoseline (red hoseline) out first. Victim #1 followed behind him but soon became separated from his probationary fire fighter. The E1 probationary fire fighter reported hearing Victim #1 over the radio say he was lost and also hearing the IC tell Victim #1 to follow the red hoseline out. Note: Prior to Victim #1’s radio transmission and at the request of the IC, a second PPV fan was placed near the first PPV fan at the Aside door by RIT personnel (see Diagram 2). The E1 probationary fire fighter then stopped, called out to Victim #1, but heard no response or a PASS alarm. The E1 probationary fire fighter continued to crawl out because his Vibralert® was sounding. The E1 probationary fire fighter stated he briefly got turned around on the hoseline because there was a loop in it (see Diagram 2, Photo 10 and Photo 11). He was able to use his stream light to find the hose direction leading out. He eventually came upon all three members of the T1 crew (in the bingo room just before the vestibule) who directed him to the exit. The E1 probationary fire fighter advised the T1 crew that Victim #1 was following him out on the hoseline and that they had gotten separated.
The T1 fire fighter advised the T1 officer he could hear a PASS alarm sounding in the room that the E1 probationary fire fighter had just exited from. The T1 crew then followed the red hoseline in, following the sound of the PASS device. They stated that it seemed like the sound of the PASS alarm was moving away from them as they advanced. The T1 crew advanced as far as the loop in the hoseline that the E1 probationary fire fighter had described when he was exiting the structure. The T1 fire fighter was low on air again so the T1 crew had to turn around and exit. The T1 crew met the E2 crew who were also exiting due to low air in the vestibule. The T1 acting lieutenant asked the E2 crew if they had heard a PASS alarm; they hadn’t heard a PASS alarm. During this time, an evacuation tone ​was requested by the IC as the T1 crew was exiting the bingo hall. The T1 officer stated he thought he heard two pops right before exiting the structure that came from the bingo hall.
A non-free image has been removed from this page. Photo 10. Close up of loop in hoseline. Photo taken after incident scene cleared of fire debris. (Photo courtesy of state fire marshal.)
A non-free image has been removed from this page. Photo 11. Aerial view of structure, after floor was cleared of fire debris, showing stretch of hoseline used by Victim #1 and his probationary fire fighter. Orange arrow shows location of loop in relationship to size of structure. (Photo courtesy of state fire marshal.)
When Victim #1 got separated from his probationary fire fighter, he immediately made a radio transmission indicating he was lost, running out of air, and needed someone to come get him on the red hoseline. The IC advised Victim #1 to follow the red hoseline out, but Victim #1 stated he could not. Victim #1 had also pressed his emergency activation button on his hand-held radio which was never reset by him. The dispatch supervisor advised NIOSH investigators that Victim #1’s radio mic was keyed up and opened for the duration of the fire. The fire department believed that the radio continued to activate due to thermal damage from the fire. This would interrupt communications on the fireground. The IC had to do face-to-face communications to assign tasks at times. The IC also noticed that the fire was now intensifying and spreading across the roof line toward C-side.
After the evacuation call from the IC, the ISO advised the IC to go to rescue mode and request a second alarm, which was done. The ISO stated he now observed fire through the roof from the center peak line and back toward C-side, which he relayed to the IC. The ISO also placed a flash light in the opened door way on C-side as a signal to help anyone inside the structure locate the door. The ISO ​then made his way to A-side where he was tasked by the IC to count fire fighters as they exited the structure and handle EMS. The RIT (E5 crew) was also ordered by the IC to make entry into the structure to look for Victim #1. Note: The T1 acting lieutenant did speak with Victim #2 on where he thought they had heard Victim #1’s PASS device earlier, approximately 25 to 30 feet inside the bingo room. Victim #2 advised FF1 and FF2 to follow the red hoseline in to search for Victim #1; they did not take a hoseline with them. They had to crawl inside the bingo hall, which was dark with zero visibility and extremely hot. FF1 and FF2 recalled hearing Victim #1 yelling for help and a PASS alarm was sounding toward the rear of the room. FF1 was leading the RIT, followed by Victim #2 and then FF2. According to FF2, Victim #2 stopped the RIT and took a reading from his thermal imager before entering the bingo hall. FF1 came upon Victim #1 after following the red hoseline in about 40 or 50 feet.
While changing bottles, the E2 officer noticed heavy fire conditions in the dance hall area while looking down the vestibule from the outside. Note: The E2 crew heard the call for the evacuation while they were exiting the structure. E2 re-entered with the yellow hoseline into the vestibule to flow water into the dance hall area from the dance hall threshold. While advancing the hoseline through the vestibule, the E2 officer noticed extremely dark conditions within the bingo hall with no fire, but the dance hall was fully engulfed with fire.
FF1, FF2, and Victim #2 grabbed Victim #1 and began dragging him toward the vestibule. FF1 had the red hoseline under one arm. FF1, FF2, and Victim #2 were dragging Victim #1 when the room flashed over. The RIT continued to drag Victim #1 until FF1 had no choice but to drop Victim #1 in an attempt to shield himself from the fire.
After positioning his nozzle man at the dance hall threshold the E2 officer briefly came off the yellow hoseline to look into the bingo hall again. He now observed what appeared to be fire fighters off to the right enveloped in fire and dragging Victim #1 (see Diagram 3). During the investigation, the E2 fire fighter reported to NIOSH that while advancing the hoseline past the bingo hall doorway, he heard the sound of a PASS alarm in the bingo hall and assumed his officer heard it too.
On the night of the incident, eight personnel were working in the dispatch center. The fire dispatch position was manned by an operator that had been with the center for the past 7 months. This operator had been working the different floor positions for the past 2 months, rotating to the fire dispatch position about once every 2 weeks. According to dispatch personnel, this incident ran smoothly, and the new dispatch operator was closely monitored to ensure the incident continued this way. The operator worked the entire the incident. According to dispatch center procedures, a 10-minute bench mark notification was provided to fire units during the incident, except that the clock was started upon dispatch and not upon the first unit’s arrival. Additionally, on the night of the incident, dispatch was not initially made aware of a fire fighter being down.
Following the emergency activation of Victim #1’s hand-held, the dispatch supervisor advised NIOSH investigators that his radio mic was keyed up and open for the duration of the fire. The fire department believed that the radio continued to activate due to thermal damage from the fire. This would interrupt communications on the fireground. Every dispatch position was alerted of the emergency activation, and it was silenced within the dispatch center. However, the emergency activation can only be reset if the radio that initiated the emergency activation is turned off or its emergency button is depressed. When an emergency button is activated on a hand-held radio, dispatch will know which radio was activated but will only know the location if that fire unit checked in. Dispatch personnel stated they reset the emergency activation within the dispatch center approximately 12 times prior to Victim #1 being removed. At the time of this incident, if an emergency button was activated on a hand-held radio, dispatch would immediately contact the IC and give the radio identification number. The IC would then be responsible for advising dispatch of any additional unit requirements. If no contact could be made, dispatch would respond police code 3 (lights and siren) to the location.