# YouTube War/Iraqi Innovation: Individual Video Segments

​ Iraqi Innovation: Individual Video Segments.
The twist added by the groups active in Iraq, evident fairly early in that conflict (not available to Khattab ​given the limitations of technology when the Chechens began producing their videos or required of Hezbollah, with control over its own television network), was to film individual attacks as short video segments, perhaps lasting only as long as a few seconds, so that, for example, many attacks on American convoys have been filmed by terrorists hiding in what amount to duck blinds. These segments are then uploaded individually to the web, rather than the terrorists waiting until they have assembled a large collection. This practice likely started in Iraq as a result of a confluence of technology—the easy availability of portable digital cameras and laptops—with opportunity—a combat theater where attacks on American soldiers were, in fact, taking place with some regularity. And once uploaded, of course, these videos become available to anyone who cares to download them. This made possible a radical change in the way terrorist websites were structured: previous sites, even those of groups which were quite violent, had avoided all references to violence, they certainly would not have featured actual images of brutal attacks.
Susan B. Glaser and Steve Coll, writing in The Washington Post, argue that one reason abu Musab al-Zarqawi rose above the pack of terrorists and insurgents operating in Iraq to achieve international stature within the Islamist movement is that he and the people around him understood the possibilities intrinsic to the various technologies coming together at the same time, how to harness the specific technological moment if you will, in service to terrorism. And they further suggest that the way his group has done so makes clear the generational divide between Zarqawi's group and bin Laden's.
Zarqawi launched his jihad in Iraq "at the right point in the evolution of the technology," said Ben N. Venzke, whose firm IntelCenter monitors jihadist sites for U.S. Government agencies. High-speed Internet access was increasingly prevalent. New, relatively low-cost tools to make and distribute high-quality video were increasingly available. "Greater bandwidth, better video compression, better video editing tools—all hit the maturity point when you had a vehicle as well as the tools," he said.
The original al-Qaeda always aspired to use technology in its war on the West. But bin Laden's had been the moment of fax machines and satellite television. "Zarqawi is a new generation," said Evan F. Kohlmann, a consultant who closely monitors the sites. "The people around him are in their 20s. They view the media differently. The original al-Qaeda are hiding in the mountains, not a technologically very well-equipped place. Iraq is an urban combat zone. Technology is a big part of that. I don't know how to distinguish the Internet now from the military campaign in general in Iraq."
After all, as they point out, until very recently, when the original al-Qaeda leadership wished to release an audio file (much less a video file), they went to the effort of getting a physical copy of a tape to an Arab satellite television network, an old-school way of doing things. Zarqawi's group (now in its post-Zarqawi iteration), like the rest of the groups operating in Iraq, from the beginning would simply post the file to the Internet themselves.
This does tell us something about the priorities of the terrorist and insurgent groups American forces are fighting. With the exception of the ever escalating offense-defense arms race surrounding the improvised explosive devices, there are no reports of weapons being particularly advanced. Rather, they tend to be whatever is at hand, whatever can be found in leftover ​Page:Cori Elizabeth Dauber - YouTube War (2009).pdf/30 ​Page:Cori Elizabeth Dauber - YouTube War (2009).pdf/31 ​Page:Cori Elizabeth Dauber - YouTube War (2009).pdf/32 ​Page:Cori Elizabeth Dauber - YouTube War (2009).pdf/33 ​Page:Cori Elizabeth Dauber - YouTube War (2009).pdf/34 ​Page:Cori Elizabeth Dauber - YouTube War (2009).pdf/35 ​Page:Cori Elizabeth Dauber - YouTube War (2009).pdf/36 ​Page:Cori Elizabeth Dauber - YouTube War (2009).pdf/37 ​Page:Cori Elizabeth Dauber - YouTube War (2009).pdf/38 ​Page:Cori Elizabeth Dauber - YouTube War (2009).pdf/39 ​Page:Cori Elizabeth Dauber - YouTube War (2009).pdf/40 ​Page:Cori Elizabeth Dauber - YouTube War (2009).pdf/41 ​Page:Cori Elizabeth Dauber - YouTube War (2009).pdf/42 ​Page:Cori Elizabeth Dauber - YouTube War (2009).pdf/43 ​to host massive files on the web using cybercrime, such as identity theft, to finance the purchase of websites to supplement what he was able to hack as he created a global online network in support of al-Qaeda in Iraq (although he operated out of London.) The laptop of one of his associates contained 37,000 stolen credit card numbers.
For a perfect visual representation of how important all of these various efforts are to the insurgency in Iraq, there is the video posted in June 2007 where the central image is that of the speaker, urging those with the ability to do so to take up the effort, not to fight but to persuade in any way it is possible to do so. The image of a single speaker is flanked on one side by a weapon, and on the other by a laptop, also a weapon, just of another sort. As Lieutenant Colonel Terry Guild put it simply, "[T]heir media infrastructure is quick, it's collaborative, it's virtual, it's global, it's technical, and it's getting better all the time." How seriously is this effort taken? One of the leading authorities on terrorist uses of the Internet, Gabriel Weimann, quotes an al-Qaeda-affiliated website as posting this warning:
We strongly urge Muslim Internet professionals to spread and disseminate news and information about the Jihad through e-mail lists, discussion groups, and their own Websites. If you fail to do this, and our site closes down before you have done this, we may hold you to account before Allah on the Day of Judgment
* ↑ Ibid., p. 53.
* ↑ Susan B. Glaser and Steve Coll, "The Web as Weapon: Zarqawi Intertwines Acts on Ground in Iraq with Propaganda Campaign on the Internet," The Washington Post, August 9, 2005, available from Lexis-Nexis Academic, web.lexis-nexis.com.libproxy.lib.unc.edu/universe/document?_m=b9d74f52e88e19e8531bae8bae901a31&_docnum=1&wchp=dGLbVtb-zSkVA&_md5=973034f5f87f54c5c2f367909c698ccb.
* ↑ Michael R. Gordon, "Deadliest Bomb In Iraq Is Made In Iran, US Says," New York Times, February 10, 2007, nytimes.com, available from www.nytimes.com/2007/02/10worldmiddleeast/10weapons.html?pagewanted=1&ei=5094&en=e9a9ae56cb1df98a&hp&ex=1171170000&partner=homepage.
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