# Transcribed Interview of Kashyap Pramod Patel, (December 9, 2021)/2:12pm

Layout 2
​[2:12 p.m.]
    BY :
Q What was your understanding of what your role was going to be in the sense of it would now be after President-elect Biden had been declared the winner of the 2020 Presidential election? Did you discuss what your plans were for the next 2 months in that role?
A In that role, same—you know, the question appears; it does implicate core privilege of executive privilege. I'm prepared to answer it, but I want the record to reflect my serious concerns about congressional overreach in this regard.
It was largely policy objectives that were—I was familiar with because, having been the deputy assistant to the President, senior director for counterterrorism, a lot of those mission sets folded over into one another. So we talked about policy and operational objectives generally that I can talk about here.
Q That'd be great. Go ahead.
Yeah. Generally speaking, he had stated publicly he wanted to wind some of the wars that were happening overseas. That was generally one of the policy objectives. And we at the CT Directorate were responsible for a large piece of that anyway in the National Security Council.
We were also similarly responsible for the hostage portfolio, American citizens detained and remained in captivity overseas. We were responsible for, in the National Security Council and the CT Directorate, for countering Iran, sanctions, wiping out Al Qaeda senior leadership, taking out the emirs of ISIS. A whole host of things that we had—I had continuously worked on seemed to merge with some of those priorities that -- or policy decisions of the President.
​Q And what was your response to that—the policy mission set, in the last few months it appears, to wind down a war? Based upon your experience and expertise, is that feasible?
A In my opinion, in some of the theaters, it was feasible. In some of the other theaters, depending on intelligence on the ground, it was a longer extenuated process. And I'd have to remind you guys that the Afghan, for example, was a process that had been ongoing with the diplomatic relations with Secretary Pompeo and Ambassador Khalilzad meeting in Doha regularly with the teams in Afghanistan. So that had been an ongoing process for some time.
We were in tune, at the CT Directorate, to the national security mission sets that were in country and around country in the manning and equipment. So, generally speaking, what I did was, from a national security perspective, was obtained my policy and operational directives from the chain of command, and I implemented all of them that were lawful and appropriate.
Mr. Glabe. Just for the record, we'd like to submit what's been marked as exhibit 5, K. Patel Exhibit 5-1. It's an op-ed in the New York Post, entitled "I Ran Team Trumps Afghan Withdrawal: Biden's Attempt to Blame Us Is Just Sad," that speaks to some of the things that Mr. Patel was involved in at DOD related to Afghanistan policy and its continuity with the ongoing peace process as he just described.
Mr. Patel. Thanks.
    BY :
Q Did you discuss what your role would be in terms of the transition to the Biden-Harris team?
A With who?
Q The President.
​A I don't believe we—he and I had discussions regarding transition, my role in the transition.
Q At any time?
A With the President, I don't believe so. But I will add—thank you—we were directed by Chief of Staff Meadows to conduct an ordered and full-scale transition to the Biden transition team, so that's what we did.
Q When was that order given?
A On or about the time the GSA memo came in permitting us to begin that process lawfully, is my understanding of it. And that GSA memo came in on November 23rd, right before Thanksgiving of 2020.
Q Got it. Before—
Mr. Sofer. Can we take a break again? Sorry. You can do—if you want to finish something, that's great.
    BY :
Q Sure, just before we move off this. I know when you walked through your prior career, did you have—what management experience did you have prior to getting—taking on the role of chief of staff of the Army?
A Sure. Yeah. So I had some management experience in my time as a public defender, at the Department of Justice, and at JSOC. Specifically, I had a large, what I can say in this setting is, number of lines of effort that would report in to the unit I was serving at and the role I was serving at to perform the mission set of that unit. There was a—the large unit. And then I came to the White House, and I believe at the time I was the director of the largest directorate on the National Security Council, so I had the largest number of directors under me.
Q Which means what, like how many people are we talking about reported to ​you as your manager?
A In the National Security Council, I believe it was 15 to 20 people's details would expire. As you know, that's sort of how that process goes, so it would be a coming and going, but that's the general number.
Q So is the 15 to 20—I mean, I know you were a public defender right out of law school, so is the 15 to 20 the outset number of number of people that you managed?
A Outset—
Q Prior to—meaning the largest number of people you managed prior to becoming the chief of staff?
A No, so, when I became the principal deputy to the Acting DNI Ric Grenell over at the office of Director of National Intelligence, they had—and I'm ballparking this number—I believe 7,000 to 10,000 billets, jobs, at the ODNI that reported to me and through our deputies, to me through the acting directors. So I had that experience—
Q I see.
A —running the intelligence community and prioritizing our targeting efforts there. And that's what generally ODNI does.
Q Got it.
A So that and then the White House time and then I became—like my predecessor, who was the chief of staff that I replaced, she and I were Hill staffers together on the Hill and that was her background.
Q I'm sorry. Did you want to take a break now?
Mr. Sofer. If this is a good breaking point, just a short one.
# # # # # # # # nmmmmm— — —. Sure. I just want to be cognizant of time, but, yeah.
Mr. Sofer. Understood. So do I.
[Recess.]
    BY :
Q I just want to go back to some other appointments that were made that day as your appointment to DOD along with Tony Tata. Are you familiar with Mr. Tata?
A General Tata, yes.
Q General Tata, sorry. Did you work with him prior?
A Yeah. General Tata had been in and out—well, in DOD for, I'm guessing, 20-plus years, so we had crossed paths for sure.
Q And Ezra Cohen had worked with DOD prior, correct, but was—
A Prior to, sorry—
Q November 10th, to your position?
[Discussion off the record.]
The Witness. Right. So Mr. Cohen was already at DOD as a Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense when I arrived.
    BY
Q Did you work with Mr. Cohen prior to—
A Before?
Q Correct.
A I think we had—when he came—when he was at the Pentagon, his specific DASD role was in a lot of counterterrorism matters, and I think, if I have my timeline right, I think Acting Secretary of Defense Miller was in his—in the role above him. I'm not exactly sure. So we all sort of worked together on CT things, if I have my timeline right.
Q Did you have professional interactions or relationship with Mr. Cohen before you both started—
A Yes.
Q —at DOD together?
​A That's fair.
Q Josh Whitehouse, are you familiar with him?
A The liaison, the DOD—yes, the—he was the PPO, the Presidential Personnel Office, representative that—the way it works is the way you're structured is you have PPO in the White House and then you have your teams, your agencies and departments, and Mr. Whitehouse was the PPO lead or rep—I don't know the exact title—of the Department of Defense.
Q Did you work with him prior to DOD?
A I don't think so.
Q What was your interactions with him, if any?
A Prior to?
Q Or at DOD once he became the liaison.
A Once I got to the Department of Defense, any political appointees, the process for any administration is political appointees go from the White House to their liaison offices and their departments and agencies, and Mr. Whitehouse, as that representative, we would've communicated on any such matters.
Q Colonel Macgregor, Douglas Macgregor?
Mr. Glabe. Sorry, what's the question?
    BY
Q Do you know him?
A Do I know him? Before going—before going to the Department, I don't 22 believe I knew Colonel Macgregor. Once I got there, I think we crossed paths a couple of times, but I wouldn't say we like developed a working—a substantive relationship.
Q What was his title there?
A I'm not sure.
​Q Okay. Are these typically Senate-confirmed seats?
A Which ones? Sorry.
Q The seats that—your seat or Mr. Cohen's seat, actually.
A The chief of staff at DOD is not a PAS, Presidentially appointed/Senate-confirmed seat. Mr. Cohen's seat at—
Mr. Glabe. Which—sorry, which role do you mean? Because he occupied several roles.
The Witness. I think—
    BY :
Q Mr. Cohen's role—
A Yeah.
Q —position as of November 10th.
A I believe, as of November 10th, he was serving in a DASD capacity. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense do not require Senate confirmation.
Q And Mr. Tata's role, if you know, is that—
A Similarly, I think, at that timeline, that's the same answer. I believe he was also a DASD for something.
Q What's—I'm sorry—
A Sorry. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense—
Q Got it.
A —and then over to the—whichever section you're in in the Pentagon.
Q Okay. I want to shift gears and talk about the November—mid-November memo to withdraw from Somalia and Afghanistan. That—
Mr. Glabe. Do you have a—sorry, do you have a document that you can show us on this?
​# # # # # # # # nmmmmm— — —. As I flagged this in our email correspondence to you, this would be the mid-November memo that was described in "Peril" that Douglas Macgregor delivered to DOD?
Mr. Glabe. Right. And my question is, do you have a source for this purported memo other than a book by Bob Woodward and Robert Costa?
# # # # # # # # nmmmmm— — —. Well, other DOD officials have spoken about the memo, and I can provide it to you as—
Mr. Patel. Can I just cut in. Can I just look at the memo? Would that be—
. I don't have the memo.
The Witness. Okay. So I'll try to answer it, but I don't think it's in what you provided in—
# # # # # # nmmm— — —. We don't have the memo.
    BY :
Q We don't have the memo.
A Okay.
Q Do you have any memory of a memo to withdraw from Somalia and Afghanistan being delivered by Colonel Macgregor to you that you provided to General Milley?
A So I'll say the select committee was authorized by H. Res. 503 to investigate the events of Jan. 6th. This question falls outside the scope of your legislative purpose. I'm concerned about this improper question, inappropriate line of inquiry, and apparent fishing expedition. Nevertheless, I will do my best to answer this question. So—
Mr. Glabe. But, before you do, let me ask, I know we had discussion about scope and topics offline, and—but in this particular case, for the record, could you please help us understand what a purported memo in a book by Bob Woodward and Robert Costa ​that you don't have relating to Somalia and Afghanistan has to do with the subjects that the committee is charged to investigate under its resolution 503?
# # # # # # # # nmmmmm— — —. Sure. And as we discussed in our email correspondence back and forth, part of the mandate of the House resolution is about the facts, circumstances, and causes that relate to the interference of the transfer of power. This is a November 11th memo that was issued after President-elect at that time, Joe Biden, had been declared. The unlawfulness of the order has been discussed, and that is how it impacts the transfer of power.
Mr. Glabe. How would withdrawing troops from Afghanistan or Somalia impact the transfer of power in the United States? That's, I guess, what I'm trying to understand or have you articulate for the record.
# # # # # # # # nmmmmm— — —. The unlawfulness of the order is what we're inquiring about.
The Witness. Look, I got it. It's fine. Let me—can—would you mind just rephrasing your question—
    BY :
Q Sure.
A —and then let me see what I can co.
A Sure.
Q What's your memory about the order?
A About the order?
Q About the order, how it came about.
A So my first preface to that is you're talking about this order I've never seen, so I don't know if I've ever seen it, A, to begin, with, order, memo, whatever you want to call it.
Q Sure.
A I don't know that that's accurate in its premise. I believe not. In my habit, ​my practice in the Department of Defense when I was engaging with the Acting Secretary and the Chairman, I believe you asked, was we—I would not hand him some random memo order. That is not how the mission works. That is not how the chain of command works. That is actually how you counter the interest of national security. That was not my habit. I don't ever recall giving an inappropriate, random memo to General Milley, the Secretary of the Army—excuse me, Secretary of Defense or anyone else related to this.
Q Do you have any memory of handing a piece of paper to General Milley concerning the withdrawal of troops from Somalia or Afghanistan—
A General Milley and I, Chairman Milley and I had many exchanges in rooms handing pieces of paper back and forth to each other and our teams about Somalia and Afghanistan. We had a ton. He was the Chairman.
Q Was there ever any discussion about an order, a piece of paper, a memo, whatever, coming from the White House about the withdrawal from Somalia and Afghanistan that had not been vetted by anyone at DOD or anyone at NSC?
A So I can't speak for anyone at DOD and anyone at NSC. What I can tell you is that I would never and did not ever present an order or memo, and I'm using huge quote marks for the record, that was not vetted appropriately having been at the National Security Council and the White House. That would be a subversion of the chain of command and that is not something I've done in my tenure, in 16 years.
Q Okay. Mr. Patel, do you have any independent memory about this incident?
A No.
    BY :
Q So, just to be clear, Mr. Patel, I just want to—this is important, because we ​have developed other evidence that there was a very short one- or two-sentence order purportedly signed by the President directing the withdrawal of troops from both Somalia and Afghanistan by dates certain that was never vetted by the Chairman, by the National Security Advisor, by anyone, and then that you had some involvement in passing that along, communicating that to Chairman Milley and others. Do you have any recollection of that?
A So I don't—I—
Q And I don't have the memo.
A Yeah, I get it. I get it. We agree nobody has the memo.
Q Yes.
A The order, memo, whatever we're talking about, nobody has it. You don't have it; we don't have it. I've never seen it; you've never seen it. So I think you're relying on—I don't know what evidence you have to say that I might have handled it. I'm telling you I don't have a memory of ever handling a memo like that through the chain of command to Secretary—Acting Secretary Miller or the Chairman, Chairman Milley, as you pointed out.
Q Tell us more broadly about that topic. Do you recall—
A Which—
Q The withdrawal of troops—
A Oh.
Q —from those two countries during the time that you served as chief of staff to the Secretary.
A Yeah, I mean, so—let me—to advance our discussion—
Q Yes.
A —let me just generally say, massive conversations. I mean, we're removing ​20 years of blood and treasure out of Afghanistan, Somalia. We're dealing with Syria and Iraq. The bulk of the details is classified.
Q Yes.
A But the general directives were, as you stated and as I've stated.
Q Okay. And I don't want to get into the classified stuff. Do you remember there being dates certain before the end of the administration that were, I don't want to say ordered, but were—
A I think there were targets like in any other—what we—so what we call campaign plans that the Department of Defense, CAM plans, are how the Department of Defense operates, Russia, China, CENTCOM, AFRICOM, what have you.
In a situation like this, what we do is we go to our combatant commands, or commanding generals in the theater of war, and our special forces community and say, what is the best campaign plan to do X, Y, or Z. We did that in these instances. We received their timelines.
On top of that, Acting Secretary Miller and I wanted to ensure that we were doing something that was appropriate from a soldier's standpoint. So we traveled 65,000 miles in the 80-some days we were there to visit with our soldiers in Afghanistan and the Middle East, in Africa and elsewhere, to obtain the ground-level intelligence of the people that would be fighting these wars if they came—if they continued to serve there.
So that's just some of the mixture that went in, and there was an extensive memos that would come back from combatant commands, which I haven't reviewed in a long time, from commanders on the ground, from the Secretary, from myself. So that's my general recollection of how we handle these events.
Q Okay. And then—so nothing outside of that normal process in which ​combatant commanders in particular countries are consulted ever occurred that you recall during the time that—in your personal experience when you were the chief of staff to the Secretary?
A I don't recall me dealing with something outside of the chain of command. I do know and can say I would not do that because I would view that to be improper.
Q Okay. So, if other witnesses told us that there was such a directive with a certain deadline to withdraw from those countries that did not get vetted by specifically the National Security Advisor or the Chairman—
A Well—
Q —that—
A Sorry. Go ahead.
Q —that would be outside of the process that you just—
A If other witnesses—I can't speak to them. I can speculate. If other witnesses are telling you about a document which you or I have never seen and don't have about dates, what I can tell you about dates in general is dates come in through the theaters, through the combatant commanders, and they move. So were there discussions about dates? Yes, we've had discussions about dates around those topics.
Q Yes.
A But I can't speak to this memo of somebody who did or didn't write it.
Q Okay. It sounds like you're saying you don't recall any such memo, that there was an order from the President outside of the chain of command to withdraw from Somalia and Afghanistan by dates certain within—
A So I want to be very clear: You're talking about this memo we've never seen. I'm talking about memos that I can't get into because they're all classified, and there is a lot of information in them regarding generally withdrawal, timelines, dates, ​opinions, adjudications, and all that in these campaign plans and memorandums from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I haven't seen those in forever, and they're also classified.
Mr. Glabe. Can we pause for just a second?
[Discussion off the record.]
The Witness. So—and to clarify, and pointedly to your question, I'm not saying the memo you're referencing ever did or did not exist. I'm saying I don't recall ever seeing it.
    BY :
Q Okay. So, moving off whether you saw it or not, do you recall an incident where a—it was mentioned to General Milley that there was an order from the White House, whether it's a piece of paper or not, to withdraw from Somalia and to withdraw from Afghanistan before January 15th, and the surprise of General Milley then asking you and Secretary Miller to go to the Oval White House to ask President Trump about said order, directive, piece of paper? Does that jog any memory you have?
A —The only memory it jogs that I have is that we had extensive discussions with General Milley, the Secretary of the—the Acting Secretary of Defense, and the President about the withdrawal process in general.
Q So you don't recall any directive coming from the White House that had not been vetted by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or by the Secretary of Defense or by Robert O'Brien?
[Discussion off the record.]
A Right. Right. Okay. Thanks. What I do recall is that my former boss, Ambassador Robert O'Brien, the National Security Advisor, the Chairman, and the Acting Secretary of Defense had a conversation regarding, I don't know if it was this memo or not, but about an un—or improper procedure. I was not—I don't recall being privy to ​those direct communications. I may have been there for a piece of it or not, but that's the extent of my knowledge. They didn't come back to me and say, "Look at this," is what I recall.
Q Were you—when you say "improper procedure," what do you mean?
A Like you said, some memo saying, as you characterized, going outside the chain of command to say do X, Y, or Z.
Q Were you asked about that by General Milley?
A I believe the only conversation that I was around regarding this purported memo, which I still don't think I've ever seen, was a conversation that I was in and out of between Ambassador O'Brien, the Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Q At the White House?
A It would've been in Ambassador O'Brien's office, I believe, at the White House.
    BY :
Q And just tell us what you remember about that conversation or that whole subject.
A Yeah, that's literally—so my job, you know, I'm not the Cabinet guy, so I get to go run in and out. So a lot of times I was running around the White House when I was there. What I recall is I was in and out of this—of a meeting. We were talking about a number of things. This came up. I didn't see anything. I don't remember seeing a piece of paper. And I remember, as I usually do, going around to do various other tasks. That is what I remember.
Q Okay. And, at any time, not just in the moment right there in the National Security Advisor's Office, what do you generally remember about this topic, this—this ​outside of the chain of command or improper whatever—
A What I remember is—
Mr. Glabe. Kash, hold on. Let me just say, we've previously entered an exhibit that has an op-ed that states his policy views and recollections of—that's public on what Kash did—
The Witness. But what I remember is—I got it. Hang on. What I remember is the general agreement obviously was reached between the National Security Advisor, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Acting Secretary of Defense that we would not follow or execute any improper order or memo, if it existed as you characterized. I don't remember seeing a memo, but I remember that conversation was had in part while I was running in and out.
    BY :
Q Yeah. So my question though is that's kind of a big deal that there's some discussion about some improper order being issued. You're the chief of staff to the Secretary of Defense. What, if anything, happened after? Did you have other conversations? Did you learn more about that?
A I think, as people, you know, collectively is the Acting Secretary of Defense, the Ambassador, and the Chairman, and I, as I think I've stated before, would never follow an unlawful or improper command. So I don't think there was much for us, in my opinion, to discuss if somebody was saying do something that is improper or unlawful. I know the three, four of us—or they would've agreed amongst themselves, having worked for them extensively—were not going to do that. And I think that would have been the end—my recollection is that was the end of that discussion.
Q Did that happen a lot that there were improper, unlawful orders that you just—people just didn't follow?
​A Well, you keep characterizing it as an order or whatever. I don't know what you're talking about. Neither do you because you haven't seen it, and I don't recall seeing it. But in a situation where an improper, unlawful order was even discussed, none of us would have executed it because that's not who we are and signed up for. And, on this occasion, you asked did I recall other times when I was chief of staff at DOD; I don't recall other times that discussion like that coming up.
Q Mr. Patel, I completely appreciate that you wouldn't execute an unlawful order because you're duty bound to follow procedure. So, when the topic comes up, and I think I heard you say a few minutes ago that it did, that there was some discussion with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the National Security Advisor, and your boss, the Acting Secretary of Defense, about the existence of such an order and an unlawful, whatever you want to call it. That's kind of an unusual and big deal. Is that right?
A Is it unusual?
Q Yeah.
A Yeah. I would agree with you that if, again, agreeing to call it whatever it is since we've never seen it he, if any time it was unlawful or improper, we wouldn't do it. If, on this one instance, when we did discuss this matter and I was in and out, I agreed with my bosses obviously, that's not what we're going to do. And what I'm telling you is, I don't remember revisiting that issue with those individuals ever again.
Q Right. That's exactly my question. So that, despite the fact that this was so unusual and you're in such a prominent position, there's never any other discussion with Secretary Miller, with Chairman Milley, about this issue?
A We're not going to—we're just not going to act on it. If it's improper or unlawful, the Secretary and the Chairman, we—so you might find this hard to believe, ​but we don't waste time with improper and unlawful orders. What we were busy doing was preparing the transition, handing off—and securing—what people forget is we had to secure the inauguration of President Biden. That was a DOD responsibility.
We were—also had to continue to issue the—what people don't know is the National Command Authority. That flows from the President to the Secretary of Defense. No one else. The mission sets in there are almost wholly classified, but we had to continue to operate those operations and policy.
Whether someone else was coming in or not, we ran through the echo of the whistle. That's what we did every time. When those guys were in uniform, when I was downrange with them serving, we ran until the mission said stop running.
Q Yeah. It's just hard to imagine, Mr. Patel, if somebody gave me an unlawful order or I even heard about anyone giving me an unlawful order, I would talk to people about that. That would be kind of a big deal, and there—
A I'm telling you, I mean, I don't know who else you want me to talk to. We spoke to the National Security Advisor to the President of the United States, the Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. That's who you want to talk to if there's an improper or unlawful order. There isn't any other person that I would say would want to be—need to be in the room to have that discussion. We had it. They had it without me in and out of the room, came to a decision, and we moved on because we had other stuff to do.
Mr. Sofer. Can we have just one second?
[Discussion off the record.]
The Witness. Thanks. Sorry.
    BY :
Q Yeah, Mr. Patel, again, I don't want to belabor this, I just—anything at all ​that you remember about whatever this improper action was we would really appreciate anything at all you can remember, any conversation, any information about that subject.
A I think I've answered to the best of my recollection what I recall about this.
Q You were in and out—just to make sure I'm understanding, you were in and out of a conversation, don't remember anything anybody said, don't remember any of the subject matter, other than it was about some improper withdrawal of troops from those two countries?
Mr. Glabe. Just to note, "improper" is your characterization; it's not his characterization.
. Well, you tell me. What's the characterization?
. No, I think he used the word "improper."
    BY :
Q I think you used the word "improper."
A What I—and I'll rely on my previous testimony that my normal pattern of conduct when I went to the White House with the Secretary was I was running around doing a lot of things. I'm saying, as a pattern of habit, in this meeting, it would have been the same. I was rarely just sitting in one location with Cabinet officers. And, in this instance, this conversation came up, as I've testified. That's my knowledge of it. I don't have any other recollection of it.
Q And you just kept running in and out and didn't have any other involvement in that whatsoever?
A Well, the conversation ended. And, as I told you, no action was taken and we moved on to other important matters that we at the Department of Defense had to address, including but not limited to Operation Warp Speed, Afghanistan, Syria, Somalia, Iraq, the border, everything else you can think of, intelligence, NSA matters, the ​Inauguration, transition.
Q Yeah, I understand all that. So you didn't alert anyone. You didn't talk to anybody else outside of the people that were in that room?
A Well, right. The people that were alerted were the people who made the decisions. The individual who is in the National Command Authority, the individual who is the highest ranking uniformed military officer in the land, and the individual that is the National Security Advisor to the President of the United States, they were informed and made a decision.
Q Yeah, well—
# # # # # # # # nmmmmm— — —. I just—go ahead.
# # # # # # nmmm— — —. No, you go ahead.
    BY :
Q I just wanted to be clear that you keep saying that you haven't seen this memo. We haven't seen this memo.
A Neither have you.
Q We—but—and it's clear to you that based on your memory here you've never seen the memo either?
A I don't recall ever seeing—I can't recall seeing a memo that describes what you and I have been talking about. I can't recall if you—I don't think it's unfair to ask me a question that says, do you recall seeing a memo that no one can produce?
Q Do you have any memory of providing it to General Milley?
A I do not.
Q We have—as you know, we've talked to many officials over at DOD, and the memory of DOD officials is that this memo, directive, piece of paper was provided to you and you directly handed it to General Milley.
​A Is that what Chairman Milley said?
Q That is what Chairman Milley said.
A Okay. Well, I don't recall ever doing that.
Q Okay.
A So, if you showed me this memo, you keep talking about this memo and if Chairman—
Q We do not—as I mentioned, we do not—
A But hang on. But, if Chairman Milley said that, and I take your word that that's what he said, you could've asked him to produce this memo that I handed him, and I'm sure General Milley is not in the habit of throwing things out that are especially improper, and you could've shown me that production today. You chose not to do that.
I'm answering to the best of my recollection about a memo that may or may not exist. What happens if the memo that Chairman Milley had talks about something entirely different? I don't know. I've handed Chairman Milley, as I said, a ton of memos, lots of memos.
Q Were any of them unlawful or improper directives from the White House?
A I would not ask Chairman Milley to follow any improper or unlawful activity—
Q That's not the question.
A —activities.
Q That's not the question. I'm not asking you that. My question is, do you have any memory of handing this particular memo, directive, piece of paper to General Milley?
A I do not have any memory of that.
    BY :
​Q Let me just read you what General Milley said in discussing—
A Which you could've provided to us ahead of time but chose not to, but go ahead.
Q It's a November 11th memo directing the withdrawal from Somalia and Afghanistan. And General Milley said: When he—Mr. Patel—slid the paper across the desk for me, I said, "Are you behind this?" He said, "No, no. I just saw it. It just came into my inbox. I just saw it."
A Okay.
Q And that doesn't jog your memory or refresh your recollection about giving General Milley—
A Me sliding something to the general across the desk, probably happened 150 times.
Q A November 11th memo purporting to order the withdrawal of troops from Somalia and Afghanistan by January—a date certain before the end of the administration?
A I don't remember that occurring.
Q Is the improper order that we've been discussing—and, again, I think "improper" was your word—is that something having to do with the withdrawal of troops from Somalia and Afghanistan? Is that what triggered this conversation in which you were in and out with Mr. O'Brien, General Milley, and Secretary Miller?
A At the White House?
Q Yes.
A Is that what triggered it? I'm not sure what triggered it. We were over there for a number of matters.
Q What was it that was improper that you—that was being discussed when ​you were in and out of this meeting?
A No, I think what I said was, and I'll let the record reflect, that it would have been improper and unlawful for us to follow any improper or unlawful order from the chain of command. And these gentlemen, decidedly so, made the decision not to follow any improper orders, and you can ask them—
Q Right.
A —what they talked about in that room.
Q So we have, and that's what I'm asking about.
A Yeah, you've asked one gentleman about some memo that no one's ever seen. I'm not—I'm telling you, from the best of my memory, I don't remember that. If you have the memo, I would take a look at it.
Q Okay.
A You don't. You could've asked Chairman Milley for the memorandum. You are the United States Congress. You have access to all these memorandums. You apparently interviewed him, so he could've provided it to you had you asked, and you could have provided it to me.
Q He told us—
A You chose not to.
Q —he got it from you. You're saying you don't remember?
A I don't remember that.
Q Okay. I just wanted to be clear that you don't remember Chairman Milley handing you this illegal or unlawful memo about withdrawing troops from—
A You keep saying, you know, that—that's your characterization. I'm telling you, I don't remember this incident with the memo you're characterizing. I'm telling you I remember many incidents where I handed Chairman Milley memorandum.
​Q Okay. I think we've established the record. Thank you.
    BY :
Q Did you have any discussion—before this incident happened, whether you handed it over, you do remember going to Robert O'Brien's office and discussing this in and out; they discussed it in and out. But the bottom line is it was improper; you weren't going to follow it?
A Yeah, other than what I've testified, no.
Q Prior to that conversation, did you have any conversation with anyone at the White House that this type of improper order, any discussion from Somalia or Afghanistan was coming over to DOD?
A Not that I recall.
Q Not that you recall?
A Uh-huh.
Q Does that mean, no, you did not have any conversations with anyone at the White House?
A No, it means not that I recall.
Mr. Glabe. Wait, any conversations with the White House about what?
    BY :
Q About the improper order, as he's described it.
A You keep saying I've described it as an improper order.
Mr. Glabe. I believe—
    BY :
Q Whatever it is.
A What would make this easier—
Q Improper withdrawal.
​A —is if you produced it, but you failed to produce it. And I want the record to be abundantly clear you're asking me about a document you say exists based on a book that I don't know and haven't seen.
Q Well, it's not just a book, Mr. Patel, but let me just—
A No, don't cut me off. Let me finish my answer. I want the record to be abundantly clear what you're trying to do is say I may or may not have had my hands on an order that may or may have never existed. If you can show it to me, I can answer the question better. I'm doing the best to answer the question from the memory I have about something that happened over 1 year ago.
So, if you have other lines of question—we can do this, but if you want to talk about the truth about what happened on January 6th, as is your directive, or do you want to talk about Afghanistan and Somalia, you choose. But we're leaving at 4 o'clock because my counsel has a flight to catch.
Mr. Glabe. Let me just say two things for the record on this topic. One, we talk about the memo, a memo. I want the record to be clear that my—I want—I want the record to be clear that my client has testified that he was involved in many discussions about Afghanistan, including Afghanistan withdrawal, with General Milley and others, but doesn't have the specific recollection of the purported memo referenced in the Woodward book.
Two, I believe, and we can pause and go back—read back the record if we need to, I believe that improper or unlawful was originally your characterization, counsel, and that jogged my client's memory that he recalled Ambassador O'Brien, General Milley, and Acting Secretary of Defense Miller discussing something that they might have thought was improper or unlawful. I do not believe that it is my client's testimony that he has made a judgment as to whether this purported memo was unlawful or improper insofar ​as he doesn't recall ever seeing it.
And I guess, just as an addendum, remarkable to me that the testimony—how close the testimony of General Milley is to what was in Bob Woodward and Robert Costa's book, which makes one wonder whether he was speaking to those authors, but I'll stop at that.
Mr. Sofer. Yeah, I think the most important point, the general point I think we all can agree on is this would be a lot easier if someone had provided us with the actual memo that could help our client. He's made very clear he doesn't recall, and since it's not around, it's very difficult for us to have a conversation about something that we can't see.
. Yeah, you're right, Mr. Sofer, it is, and we don't have it either, as we've said. This is not—
Mr. Sofer. I'm not suggesting the committee is holding it back. I just think it makes the conversation exceedingly difficult.
# # # # # # nmmm— — —. To be clear, the point of the—the basis of the question is not simply the Woodward book. It is the testimony of General Milley and evidence developed from other witnesses about a memo, as we have described, that is directing the withdrawal of troops from Iraq and—excuse me, from Somalia and Afghanistan, and the testimony about your client's direct involvement in that—passing that memo along to the people who would be in a position to act on it. That's the basis of the question. I wish I had the memo to give you and show you; I do not.
Mr. Sofer. As do we. I'm just saying, and, again, I think the record is clear, he doesn't recall.
# # # # # # nmmm— — —. Okay.
Mr. Sofer. It would be very helpful to his recollection obviously—
​# # # # # # nmmm— — —. I understand.
Mr. Sofer. —if someone could present to him the critical piece of data or evidence, if you will, that we're talking about. Without doing it, we're stuck in this world where everybody is speculating.
Mr. Glabe. And it's not his testimony, as I've heard it, that he did not pass along a purported memo in the manner that other witnesses may have described. I believe it is his testimony that he does not have a specific recollection of doing so.
# # # # # # nmmm— — —. We're hopeful that there will be some documents coming from the National Archives that would include this memo, and, at some point, we may very well want to bring Mr. Patel back and ask him about that. As of now, we are showing our cards and telling you exactly the basis of the question.
Mr. Sofer. Understood. The last thing we want to do is come back.
# # # # # # nmmm— — —. I understand.
Mr. Sofer. And we want to get this done today, so—
Mr. Glabe. There's no question—
Mr. Sofer. —I would hope that that wouldn't happen.
Mr. Glabe. Yeah, there's no questions we haven't answered, and it is our intent to answer all of your questions.
# # # # # # nmmm— — —. It's hard to finish when we keep getting speeches from counsel as opposed to testimony from the witness.
The Witness. Carry on.
Mr. Sofer. Well, then let's go on.
# # # # # # nmmm— — —. Okay.
    BY :
Q I want to shift towards your role for the transition team at DOD. How did ​you get that position?
A It's not a position one seeks. The Department of Defense regulations, as I understand it, have been in place for many, many years, and the Department of Defense's regulations designate as a head the chief of staff for all administrations for any Presidential transition. So I was designated the head of the transition, but the operational work was done completely separately.
Q And who did the operational work?
A So Mr. Muir, Tom Muir, a decorated Army officer and civilian now at the Pentagon, led what we call the Washington Headquarters Services. He was designated by the Acting Secretary of Defense, I believe, to be the ART, the transition director.
So his team is a group of career staffers that work on Presidential transitions and transitions time and time again, and they are they were responsible to interact with the Biden transition team, the beachhead team as we call it, to come in and provide all of the transition work.
Me as the—I don't know what the right word is—quote/unquote, head was not involved in the day-to-day operations. We entrusted that to Tom Muir because he was excellent at that job, had been doing it for some time.
Q When is it supposed to begin, the transition from the old administration to the new?
A So, as best as I understand it from—and, again, I just need to add for the record, we reviewed many, many documents in which I had conversations with general counsel at the Department of Defense, and they were all completely redacted. So we asked for those redactions to be lifted, but I believe you also haven't been able to see them. So—
Q That's correct.
​A —a lot of conversations that would help—a lot of the material that would help me recollect details on this may be contained in those materials as well because it involved transition, because they were answering the legal questions of, as you said, when does a transition begin. My understanding is a transition begins, my understanding, is when the GSA memorandum was issued for the transition to begin, and I believe we cited that earlier happening on or around November 23, 2020.
Q Right. So I believe it's November 24th. Did you have any conversations with the White House from the time period of your appointment, November 10th, until GSA green lit the transition about the—
A My general recollection from Chief of Staff Meadows is pretty clear. I'm uncertain of the exact date, but he said: You at the Department of Defense are to conduct a full-scale transition to the Biden team immediately and forthright and give them the access that they need and the documents that they need to prepare so we can hand off the national security mission to the incoming administration.
Q But what was the delay from the November 7th declaration until November 24th, if you know?
A Well, so you say declaration on November 7th. I'm not sure entirely what you're referring to, whose declaration. We, the Department of Defense, as best as I recall, could prepare for the transition pursuant to the decisions that would have been made by the Office of General Counsel at DOD once the order from GSA came in to do the transition. I don't know if—I wouldn't characterize in any way, shape, or form that we delayed the transition material, I think, quite the opposite.
Q That wasn't my question. My question was if you had any insight as to what was going on for that period.
A Oh, I don't—yeah, sorry, I don't have insight on that.
​Q Was Mark Meadows your only point of contact at the White House concerning the transition, or did you have others?
A I would say he was my main point of contact for the transition.
Q Were you in contact with anyone at GSA about the ascertainment, I think is the word?
A I don't think I've ever contacted anyone at GSA regarding this. I just don't believe I have. Maybe OGC, general counsel, did and we were there, but, again, I wasn't able to review those records.
Q Who was the Biden-Harris lead that you were in contact with?
A The appointed lead changed a couple of times, but the day that they named Kat Hicks—Ms. Hicks is currently, I believe, the Deputy Secretary of Defense. At the time, she was named the head of the Biden ART transition team, and her point of contact would have been Mr. Muir.
As I recall, as best I recall, as soon as that appointment was made—I don't know the date; we were visiting a Fifth Fleet in Bahrain to feed them for Thanksgiving. I called Ms. Hicks on my phone. I believe it was my work phone, because that was the one that would've worked over there, and said—I welcomed her, and I said: Congratulations. This is my cell phone. This is my email. Please let me know if you are not getting anything you need. Our instructions for transition are very clear. We are to help you with transition. And I never heard from Ms. Hicks again.
Q So that would have been around the November 23rd, 24th timeline?
A Yeah, right around Thanksgiving because I remember us going there to feed the troops.
Q There's a couple of exhibits where there's a—the Pentagon—there's reporting about the Pentagon blocking visits to military spy agencies by the Biden ​transition team, and your reaction to those press reports is exhibits 3 and 4. Was there any accuracy in the reporting that there were any challenges posed to the Biden-Harris transition team?
A I don't believe so.
Q So did you ever learn of any complaints during your time as the head of transition from Biden-Harris folks?
A So, Ms. Hicks, later Ms. Magsamen—sorry, the current chief of staff; I'm unsure how her last name is pronounced—were the people I attempted to communicate with. As I said, I called, I believe, Ms. Hicks. I tried to call the—my successor, the current chief of staff, and I emailed them continuously when things were needed. But I never heard back from them, and Mr. Muir kept me up to date to make sure that the transition process was going as smoothly as possible.
Q Did Ezra Cohen have a role during the transition process?
A Most every member at Mr. Watnick's level would have a role in the transition process. He would have been instructed through Mr. Muir to meet with his counterpart or the person the Biden transition team had designated as the incoming individual into that role or into that section of the Department of Defense. So I don't have any particular insight into what that was, but he should have, I believe, just given his position.
Q I just wanted to ask you about exhibit 4 there. Again, this is about the response to the press story.
Mr. Sofer. Can you give us a page number, please?
# # # # # # # # nmmmmm— — —. Sure. This is going to be Bates No. 2376. It's a whole email string.
The Witness. Yeah.
​Mr. Sofer. Okay.
    BY :
Q And apparently it's you going—asking has someone called Kath—I'm assuming that's Kath Hicks—
A Yes.
Q —about it.
A Uh-huh.
Q And, at the top of that page, "Tell Kath that if her or any ART team continues these total fake narratives, I will shut it all down." What does that mean?
A Yeah, thank you. So this was, in my exceedingly large frustration to see damaging, false information publicized in the media that would hurt the mission of the Department of Defense and the transition, so I took great umbrage to seeing false information leaked out to the media and the media reporting that.
So my team, knowing me and my—and how I operate, I wanted to express to them the severity and the impact of such fake narratives in the media because the world was watching our transition process, and our instructions were to do it as smoothly as possible. So, when I said that, it was in part hyperbolic statement to make sure my team understood the severity in which I wanted this matter adjudicated and the record corrected.
Q You mentioned some emails back with the general counsel. What was the role of the general counsel during the transition?
A A lot. The general counsel would have been in each—a member of the general counsel would have been in each interview of the hundreds if not thousands we gave—I don't remember off the top of my head—to protect the equities of the Department and also protect classified information, make sure the right people were ​there and the right people were getting the right subject matter.
They would also be in contact with the incoming counsel throughout government to address matters that they needed to address. So Mr. Ney's role was extensive and his team—I think there's, I don't know, I'm guessing 300-plus lawyers at the Department of Defense who were involved in the transition in some way.
Q And Mr. Ney was an appointee for—at DOD general counsel?
A He was the general counsel. I don't know that process, but I think he's an appointee.
Q Was it a typical process for the GC to be present at every interview that's—
A Well, the—he, the GC, was not, right. A representative from the General Counsel's Office would be present to make sure there was no spillage of classified information, the people were coming in had the right clearances, and there was nothing shared that should not be shared with people who didn't have the subject matter requirements.
Q Were you familiar that the GC or the representative from the GC's Office would read a card establishing the guidelines at the start of every one of those interviews with the Biden-Harris transition team?
A That sounds familiar. In my recollection with Mr. Muir and his team and the general counsel's team, they wanted to, in the interest to protect the Department, sort of lay out the parameters of what the discussion would be about, and if there were any things that the folks who were meeting wanted other information, those requests were brought back to Mr. Muir.
Q Were you involved in establishing those guidelines that were set forth at the beginning?
A I think, generally, I was—you know, we had meetings regularly about how to ​conduct the transition process. And this was a team of, you know, 25 high-level DOD leadership folks including the Deputy Secretary of Defense, who was more the day-to-day lead on the transition than myself. And so we had many, many, many SVTCs and meetings on this—sorry, video teleconferences, on this. So I probably shaped some of those when the discussions came up.
Q But as this part of kind of investigating kind of the transition aspect that happened at this agency and others, this presence of the general counsel and this card being read by general counsel's representative was viewed as not was viewed as unusual requirement as part of a transition process.
A So I'm not familiar in that level of detail, whether or not it was or wasn't unusual. The recommendation was made that that was appropriate, given the amount of information and people we were dealing with. We gave, from my understanding, the largest Presidential transition in DOD history was conducted under our watch. And so, you know, I relied on the career officials to make recommendations, and I usually went with them.
Q So, just so I'm clear, it wasn't your recommendation to have this presence or this card—
A No, I'm not saying that. I'm saying if it was—you know, I'm saying there was many discussions on this and other matters, and what happened was we usually just came to an agreement. Whether it was my independent recommendation or somebody at OGC first say said, "Hey, maybe we want to do this," I don't know what instigated the matter, but I do remember it being a part of the transition.
Q But it wasn't relayed to you at any time that this was a challenge in terms of—from the perspective of the Biden-Harris team, that the presence of the GC during each of these interviews or a GC representative—
​A That wasn't relayed to me, and I don't think the premise of your question is entirely accurate. We didn't require it for high-level folks, such as the Chairman. The Chairman and others were allowed to meet and talk with their representatives after discussing the matter with the General Counsel's Office because we didn't want to hold the high-level folks up because of their scheduling requirements.
Q How about the budget? When was the budget shared with the Biden-Harris team?
A That would be entirely Deputy Secretary—former Deputy Secretary Norquist's lane. He is the budget guru of the Department of Defense, and we left that to him.
Q So you didn't have any role in when the budget was shared with the Biden-Harris team?
A We—it probably came up in the many conversations we had, but I don't have an independent recollection of saying, "This is the date we're going to do the budget," or—I don't even remember when the Biden-Harris team asked for, quote/unquote, the first.
And, when we do budgets, just as a caveat, at the Department of Defense, we don't just present the DOD budget. Each respective budget is broken down into the separate Under Secretaries and their Deputy Secretaries so that the right people can consume those budgets.
Q You'd agree this is a huge part of the transition, is understanding the budget?
A Yeah, the budget was.
Q The budget, as we understand it, wasn't shared until well into January with the Biden-Harris team.
​A As I sit here today, I don't know if that's the case. I'm not sure what the interactions were regarding when to and not to share the budget and who made those decisions. I'd have to go back and look at a whole host of documents to figure it out.
Q But who, other than you, as the head of transition would've made those decisions?
A No. So, when you say I'm the head and I'm making sort of the balls and strikes call, I was not. We left that in place for Washington Headquarters Services and Tom Muir and his team to make those calls. They would inform me and keep me up to date, and a lot of the decisions were adjudicated by Deputy Secretary Norquist because, especially with the budget, he was the guru. I was far from the budget guy, and when they felt it was prepared enough to present, I left it to them to make that decision.
Q So did you respond to any request to have the budget provided to the Biden-Harris team earlier?
A Did I personally?
Q Correct.
A Not that I can remember.
Q Were you involved in the decisionmaking regarding the—kind of the ceasing of engaging with the Biden-Harris team in mid-December?
A So I think I know what you're talking about, and I appreciate you providing that document. I forget what number it is, but—
Mr. Glabe. Can you point us to a particular exhibit to—
The Witness. They can look for it, but let me just try to answer your question—
    BY :
Q Uh-huh.
A —in the interest of time here. What I think you're referring to is there was ​a half-day, 1-day pause on transition. And what happened was the Acting Secretary of Defense and I felt that the transition team was working crazy hours, 24/7 to make the transition happen, and I believe what we decided, what the Acting Secretary and others decided was to give the team a night off and return to their duties either in the next day or so, because we thought it was the holidays and people needed a break. If you're not referring to that, I'm sorry, but that's my recollection of this break.
Q So your recollection it was a 1-day break?
A I believe it was like, yeah, it was a night, morning, something. That's what we were trying to give our team just a breather, and I believe it was misconstrued in the media as a halting to the transition process. That was not our take—
Q So—
A —but I talked about it in my op-ed, which I think we're going to enter, right?
Mr. Glabe. Yeah. So, for the record, we have K. Patel Exhibit 4, "Kash Patel: Defense Department Fully Cooperating With Transition to Biden Administration," published January 13—
The Witness. And I think it's addressed in there.
# # # # # # # # nmmmmm— — —. I'll take a look at it, but I'm just curious, your recollection is it is about a day. The Biden-Harris folks' recollection is it was a 3-week stoppage of any transition occurring from mid-December and not reengaging until after January.
The Witness. So if there's a—
Ms. Lomax. What was the question?
The Witness. Sorry. Yeah, if there's something you could show me, point me to to talk about that?
    BY :
Q I have nothing to point to you. So what—
​A Yeah. I don't—
Q So—
A I don't believe we ever entertained a month-long delay in the transition. That would've contravened the orders we received from the White House, so I just don't think it's something we would've done.
Q You don't believe it's something that you would have done?
A Would have done, would have stopped the transition for that period of time that you stated, approximately 1 month, because the instructions of the White House were clear: Go. What I believe is I gave my guys and gals a day off, and I do remember it coming out in the media that we were stopping transition, and that just wasn't the case. As the chief of staff, I have to take the temperature of the men and women that are doing the work, and I thought they needed to take a knee.
Q So the people who we—who as part of the investigation said that there was no engaging with the Trump DOD from mid-December until January, that in your mind is just not accurate?
A I don't believe so, because the—one of the priorities for the transition was Operation Warp Speed, and there was no way we could get that done and hand it off if we took a 3- to 4-week break. And, in fact, my recollection is, specifically on Warp Speed, since it was so prominent at the time, we had yet to roll out or were rolling out the vaccination program, there was constant communication at least in that part of the transition. So I don't see how we would have turned one on and stopped another. I just don't recall that.
Q I want to go on to your appointments, their potential appointments to—first, to the CIA. Let's start with that one. How did you became—become aware of it?
​A Yeah, I got it. So the select committee was authorized by H. Res. 503 to investigate the events of Jan. 6th. The question falls outside the scope of your legislative purpose. I'm concerned about this improper question, inappropriate line of inquiry, and apparently fishing expedition. I'm not sure what the CIA has to do with Jan. 6th. I will do my best to answer this question.
So, sorry, go ahead?