# Diplomacy and the War/Part 3

Part III.—Internal Crisis and Collapse.
I am setting myself a painful task in speaking of the collapse which overthrew everything, or which, at any rate, shook to its foundations that order, for which countless Hungarian patriots have fought and suffered for a thousand years, and for which our heroic soldiers bled, and for which the whole of patriotic Hungarian society, men, women and children, mobilized their enthusiasm and for which I also have worked and lived.
During the war I once declared in Parliament that the opportunism and lack of courage of Hungarian society had shaken my belief in the virtues of the Hungarian people. In view of the heroism and endurance which we witnessed during the war, I am, however, proud once more of my nation. I know, moreover, that I have every right to say so. Even to-day it is a consolation to remember with what heroic enthusiasm, manly endurance and ennobling determination the majority of the Hungarian nation sacrificed everything they had, as well as their blood, for the holy cause of continuing their existence.
Although this memory is a rich source of satisfaction, pride and hope, it is also a source of fearful embitterment. All the holy determination, all the virtue and the love of country, ail the suffering, were ​in vain. We have been destroyed, our country has been torn to pieces, and we have become paupers. The fight against the enemy has been exchanged for a class war. The most cruel class tyranny and other quarrels are bleeding us to death. We may boldly assert that our fate amongst all the belligerent nations is the hardest of all!
How could this happen? What causes have led to this terrible tragedy, in which it was my sad fate to play a part?
The development of Hungary had been under an unfortunate constellation for a long time. In the course of the last half-century, ever since the adjustment of the year 1867, we should have made good the mistakes of centuries, and we should have strengthened and developed ourselves, but unfortunately this did not occur to a sufficient degree.
The tragedy of the past century had been that we had had to seek assistance against the superior power of the Turks, and that the ruler to whom we offered the crown of Stefan in exchange for his help, did not identify himself with the Hungarian nation. The nation and the dynasty did not understand each other sufficiently. The object of the nation was "herself," the object of the dynasty was also "herself." The general interests of the countries dominated by this dynasty did not unfortunately hold together. The nation, goaded by her instincts, sought to establish an independent national life, based upon a protective alliance with other states. The instincts of the dynasty, ​on the other hand, urged her towards the creation of an imperial unity.
From time to lime the nation desired complete independence (Rakoczi, Kussuth), the dynasty, on the other hand, demanded a complete fusion (Caraffa, Joseph II, Bach). Generally, a compromise was found between the opposing tendencies, compromises which satisfied the momentary interests but which were not able to produce a real power or a real harmony.
The nation and the dynasty rendered each other great services. Buda and South Hungary were liberated from the Turkish yoke by troops that had been gathered together by the Habsburgs. The Habsburgs represented the idea of the national unity of Hungary at a time when our dominion was torn into three peices. The dynasty also owed us a great debt of gratitude. Hungary protected Austria against the Eastern danger. The Zrinyi saved Vienna. Marie Thérèse owed her throne to the insurrection of the Hungarian nobility. The victories of Napoleon failed to destroy the Habsburg dynasty only because the Hungarian nation remained faithful. Notwithstanding all these mutual services, we in Hungary never quite forgot the period of tyranny and repression, and Vienna always remembered the struggles with the Kuruczen. None of our kings participated personally in our battles; not one of them identified himself truly with the people. Amongst our rulers it was only Marie Thérèse who spoke warm words to us, but only in her own interest. On the other hand, the Hungarian ​nation never regarded herself as part and parcel of their ruler. Those Hungarians who became courtiers lost their nationality in the eyes of those who remained at home. As they were precluded from foreign politics, the Hungarian statesmen lost their European horizon. They did not share the cares and ambitions of their king, and therefore could not exercise a decisive influence over him. The Hungarian nation was often forced to shed its blood for foreign purposes, for the rule of the Habsburgs in Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands.
The final result of these discords was that the nation preserved her rights on paper, but actually surrendered her independence in practice and became a province. The power of the Hungarian States could not be used for the development of the internal strength of the nation, as in the case of France, Prussia, Austria or Bavaria. As the Hungarian nation had to dedicates most of her energies to the protection of her constitution, the mental energy of the nation acquired a tendency to make itself felt in a negative way, that is to say, they made themselves more felt by asserting those rights which were designed for their protection rather than by creating new ideas for the furtherance of her economic and administrative possessions. The mentality of the lawyer took the place of the mentality of the statesman. The result was that we were unable to keep pace with the development of the world. Economically, we remained backward, and we failed to obliterate the economic damages wrought by the long rule of Turkey.
​Alter the Napoleonic wars and the reaction to them, the nation entered upon the modern phases of her development. Cultural and economic competition grew more powerful and intensive, while Hungary was threatened with her downfall unless we regenerated ourselves; and it was at this time that we were saved by the mighty renaissance which is associated with the names of Széchenyi, Kossuth, Deák, Kölesey, Vörösmarthy, Petöfy. Unfortunately, however, this new development of our national consciousness only brought us into conflict with the idea of the Empire. Our first efforts to raise ourselves once more to the European level led to the battles in 1848 and 1849, finally to Világos and to complete suppression.
It was the function of the last half-century to obliterate the effect of this depressing heritage. After many bitter lessons and many severe tests, Francis Joseph recognized that the dynasty must turn its attention to gaining the sympathy of the Hungarian nation. The adjustment which took place in the year 1867 was intended to realize this idea. Even in those days there were a few, and to-day there are many, who hold the opinion that this adjustment could not lead to the desired end because a common foreign policy and a common army had been decided upon. I did not agree with this opinion, and I do not do so now. In the beginning everything went splendidly. The mere fact of the coronation, the economic developments, the restitution of the integrity of the Hungarian States, the influence of great statesmen like Deák, ​Andrassy, Eötvös, made the ruler a part of the nation, the very ruler in whose name Haynau and Bach created the revolution. The King spent much of his time in Hungarian society, and the Queen, who had learnt to love the Hungarian nation, and who was worshipped by them, negotiated, thanks to her genius, between her husband and the Hungarian nation. Rudolf, his successor, also had Hungarian sympathies. Confidence and hope combined in mutually interdependent factors: the nation and the king. The nation gradually accustomed herself to regarding the narrow family circle of the king as Hungary, but unfortunately the dynasty remained a stranger because its members were unknown.
This promising epoch was of short duration. The king regarded the adjustment of 1867 as a contract between the nation and himself, a contract which was based upon the assumption that the nation should not interfere with the unity of the army, that the leadership in military questions was left entirely to him, in exchange for which the king undertook to respect the re-instituted constitution. When the demand became increasingly urgent in Hungary that the Hungarian portion of the army should be reorganized upon a national basis, when the opposition attempted to influence the rights of the king in military matters by parliamentary means, when that party gained in strength which aimed at a complete change of the 1867 adjustment, the king was disappointed and even hurt. He was afraid that the national motive might have a ​deteriorating influence upon the military efficiency of the army.
He acted in complete good faith. He thought that he had kept his word, and that therefore he could justly demand that the nation should carry out her promise. However, his point of view was wrong. The nation had not abandoned in 1867 the rights which were re-instituted according to the constitution, and which referred to military questions. The nation had undoubtedly the right to sanction the number of recruits from year to year and to make such conditions restricting their numbers as would be binding upon the rights of the Chief War Lord.
There is no such thing as stagnation in life. The nation could regard the status quo in the new army as satisfactory only as long as it served her own purposes, or as long as they appeared to be advantageous for political reasons. As soon as the nation considered that existing circumstances demanded a reform, it was natural that they sought to make their determination felt. The action of Parliament could only have been avoided if the king himself had ordered the necessary developments step by step. This gradual progress, however, did not come about. The spirit of the army was prepared to adjust itself to the rights of the State, only very slowly. It was impossible that the nation should send her sons without opposition into an army in which the special patriotism of the Hungarians was repressed by an artificial communal feeling, and in which the Hungarian language and the Hungarian flag did not play a corresponding rôle.
​The national tendency gained strength through the theory that the law which brought about the adjustment, especially in regard to questions regulating the army, the "Hungarian Army" is mentioned, and it was therefore regarded as the duty of the king to organize the Hungarian Army on a Hungarian basis as a supplementary portion of the entire forces.
Personally, I regarded this theory as no less erroneous than the theory of the king.
I have fought against this idea as much as against the wishes of the king. Nevertheless, this theory was far spread and accentuated the opposition because it caused the impression that the king would violate the law. The struggles of the Hungarian nation had in the past century been designed to protect the constitution against the interference of the king, and for this reason the struggle was increased, because the quarrel concerning the army could assume the old shape and because Parliament could demand the desired reforms as part of the execution of the law.
The situation in Parliament also assisted in increasing the conflict. After the many crises, the country needed rest in order to devote itself to economic and cultural work after the many political battles. The régime of the first Tisza recognized this necessity. This régime bears an extraordinary resemblance to the régime of Walpole in England in the eighteenth century, whose historical duty was the same as that of Tisza's régime. Koloman Tisza was the greatest tactician of the Hungarian Parliament and he possessed ​enormous knowledge of human nature and great tact. He was a past-master at exploiting the weaknesses of men. He had the power of organizing a well-disciplined party, he was an able debater who never tired his audience by scientific explanations, but who knew how to find the right phrase which was necessary for every argument, to create enthusiasm in his party and to convey the impression that the speaker was in the right. His ambition did not lead him to the creation of great ideas, but he tried to avoid heated controversy; he wanted to assure a quiet and long period in office, much as the English statesman above referred to had done. Moreover, he knew how to direct the elections admirably.
But the Government of Tisza lasted too long, just as the Government of Walpole. He did not seek able collaborators any more than the English statesman. All the talents that existed combined in opposition against him as against Walpole. As a statesman his personality lacked brilliance, and his regime exercised no power over the imagination. He was unable to satisfy the idealists and concerned himself primarily with opportunism.
Parliament is based upon change of Government; and if this change is not brought about, the public life becomes poisoned. It is a well-known fact that a party which monopolizes power loses its sense of responsibility towards the nation and brings about its own downfall. A party, however, which remains in opposition too long becomes embittered. Such a party feels ​hurt, both in its patriotic convictions and its individual egoism. And the embitterment is especially great when the minority believe that their victory is impeded by the violence of the Government and their corruption. In such circumstances the opposition is prepared to employ any means, and they develop a state of mind which is comparable to civil war. This occurred during the last years of Walpole's regime, just as in the last years of Tisza's Government.
This bitter fight for power was turned into one of the means of agitation in the army question, because it had been able by itself to make feeling run high, and for this reason it was well adapted for the exploitation of public sentiment.
The armaments debate in the year 1889 formed the turning point in the parliamentary history of Hungary. In addition to the new proposals made usually with care and ability by Tisza, an unpopular and erroneous departure from the earlier laws had crept in, which rendered the Parliamentary battle very acute. This question has never disappeared from the order of the day ever since. Parliament could not find peace or prosper any more. The opposition gained support from popular feeling, but met with an obstacle in the shape of the king, who saw in the military demands a danger and a breach of faith. The harmony between the king and the nation was placed in the forefront of the political combat.
The régime of Tisza was unable to survive the blows which had been dealt to it in the course of the armaments ​debate. His downfall, however, did not involve necessarily a change of party in Parliament or a fall of the old party, but it only meant that the party obtained a new leader as president—a process which only added a new and evil element to the diseased condition of public life. The majority which remained unchanged displayed the same obedience, the same faith to the new leaders, and thereby lost its sting and its respect. It is a natural condition of a well functioning Parliamentary system that the leader is chosen by the confidence of the party. This, however, did not occur before Stefan Tisza. The Government was led by Szápary, Bánffy, Száll, Khuen-Héderváry, Wekerle, and only by nomination of the King. Every new crisis, every new formation of the Cabinet, meant a new humiliation and difficult situation. A politician who but yesterday was a leading general becomes a common soldier to-day in his own old troop. A politician who but yesterday was his subordinate, or who even attacked him, became a leader overnight. The supporters of the majority displayed a new enthusiasm from one day to another for a different politician, and saw in him the providential statesman. This applied as much to the Members of Parliament as to the press.
The real historic trait of Hungary is decentralization. Ever since 1867, however, everything became centralized gradually. The economic life, the administration, and the railway communication, all lead to Budapest and emanated from there. The whole of the political power rested in the hands of the Government. Party interests ​and the effort to defend the national unity did not permit the creation of a real autonomy. Every day more and more individuals depended for their existence upon the Government. National economy gradually came within the sphere of the banks, and these banks, with their position and their influence, were in the service of the majority party. The opposition gained considerable popularity in vain; they were not strong enough to get into power. They did, in fact, succeed, after heated scenes, in causing the downfall of the Government, but they failed to take its place. They were strong enough to bring about the downfall of single ministers, but they lacked the power to break the party monopoly. The victory of the Opposition would have involved a defeat for the King. In such a situation feeling of responsibility cannot be developed among the Parliamentary minority. Their policy was purely one of opposition, and not one which contemplated the realization of the demands that they made to-day.
I will not go into a description of the various stages of the fight. On the one side the fight was waged with violence on the part of the Government and sometimes with the aid of the most brutal means. The royal authority was employed, and sometimes great Parliamentary ability was displayed. At others, the Government appeared to give way and to make peace and gain sympathy with smooth words. On the other hand, the Opposition, fought by means of heated debates and obstruction, and even by technical obstruction such as ​the revelations with regard to the Panama affair, etc., until finally Stefan Tisza, the most outstanding leader of the Government party, made a proclamation in order to paralyse this obstruction, the result of which was that he was forced to dissolve the Chamber of Deputies. The election which resulted returned the Opposition in a majority for the first time since 1867.
The whole of this period was dominated by the military question, even at times when quite other problems appeared in the foreground, as, for example, the policy of the Church. The Government partially raised these questions in order to remove the military question from the order of the day, and in view of the attitude of the Opposition to the armaments question; the King stuck to the Government party out of fear through thick and thin, although in the question at issue, that is to say, the question of the marriage laws, he shared the point of view of the Opposition entirely.
The King did not give way to the demands of the new majority which was formed as a result of Tisza's election. He was, of course, prepared to give them the power, but not as based upon their programme, but as based upon his own. The conflict in regard to the military question developed into a conflict with regard to the constitution. The majority wanted to bring about the downfall of the régime of General Baron Féjeváry, which was represented by the minority in Parliament. The minority, on the other hand, sought to suppress the majority by aid of the power of the Government. Finally, Parliament, which would give ​way to nothing but violence, was dispersed by military force. The Government of the minority was unable to protect the Crown. The King was accused of having broken his oath. The confidence in the King and the good old relations between the nation and its ruler, the hope of the future, were also shaken by the fact that there was a general belief that the new successor to the throne, Francis Ferdinand, did not love the Hungarians, that he was determined to counteract their efforts, that he worked for the idea of a unified Monarchy, and that he would not allow himself to be crowned King. The sad present was spoilt by even more sad possibilities of the future. Those who had hitherto placed their confidence in the good intentions and ability of Francis Joseph, and who had consequently more or less accepted the excesses of his regal power, could not do the same now when they realized that the royal power would probably before very long pass into the hands of the Prince of Estei.
It was a fatal mistake that the complications of the régime of Féjeváry were not unravelled in spite of all my efforts by a solution of the military question, but by the provisional exclusion of it. The Opposition, it is true, acquired power, but the opposition in regard to the military question continued none the less and drove a cleft between the King and his new Government. The Army was weakened internally at a time when there was the possibility of our standing in need of it at short notice. The nation was dissatisfied and thought it humiliating that the majority was unable ​to carry out its programme, provided it contained a national element. The Hungarian people regarded their constitution as worthless. The King had no trust in his Government, and the Government had the feeling that it could look for no support from him. The King visited his Hungarian capital less and less. His old confidants disappeared one after another. The personal ties which had linked the King to Hungarian society became loosened. The idea which in its creation had given rise to so many fair hopes fell to the ground.
During this long crisis I often had the opportunity of appearing before the old King. As one of the leaders of the Opposition, I negotiated between the King and the Opposition.
In the beginning, when the military question began to occupy the forefront, I was strongly in favour of not forcing the language question in the army as a party question, but that the Government on its own initiative should tend towards this end, so that the spirit of the army should undergo a change, and that the majority of the officers should be drawn from Hungary and that Hungarian patriotism should be given a place in the army in accordance with its deserts. If this had been done, it might have been possible to avoid the disastrous fight which broke out later. However, nothing was done.
When I saw that the natural demand for a national army was developing into political determination and could not be obviated, I used the whole of my power ​to represent this determination to the King and to persuade our ruler to fulfil their demands. It was difficult for me to take up an attitude of opposition to the King. The Crown of the Holy Stefan demands reverence. It represents everything for which a Hungarian lives. That portion of the history of the world which is associated with his person and his great age, his many sufferings and his incomparable qualities, demanded this reverence. Unfortunately, I was often forced to take up an attitude which was displeasing to him, but he never allowed me to feel his dissatisfaction, and he suffered every interjection. I had the impression that he did not take my attitude amiss, because he recognized that I was guided by disinterested motives. Politically, we became estranged, but not personally. Francis Joseph was every inch a grand seigneur; and he had a simple, natural way about him. He made one feel at home, but one could not forget for an instant in whose presence one was. His mind was observant and never diffuse. His way of debating was most interesting. He argued ably, loved humour and a little joke. His appearance was sympathetic, and there was charm in his eye. He never said more than he meant to say, he was absolutely discreet. He never repeated anything which he had heard from somebody else, nor did he ever play the rôle of father confessor. Everybody knew that whatever he told the King was as good as buried there. No one ever had to suffer for whatever he had advised the King. During the council meetings of the Crown, he knew how to preside most ​ably and how to summarize decisions. He was quite at home in the most divergent branches of the life of the State, and he had an enormous experience and a good knowledge of human nature at his disposal. He was a bureaucrat of the first order, indefatigably assiduous and punctual as a clock. He lived exclusively for his duties, and was prepared to sacrifice everything to them, even his views, his liberty and his comfort. He was one of the most objective men that I have ever known, and never allowed himself to be guided by his feelings. His being lacked all impulse completely. In his hands everyone was only a tool. He possessed little genius, and he had a command of detail rather than a power to view things as a whole, for he occupied himself far too much with the details of each department to allow him to find time to weigh the main decisions. He was a good stylist and possessed clear, sound taste, but he had no trace of an artistic nature. For anything new, uncommon or modern, he had absolutely no comprehension.
He probably did not possess a warm heart. At any rate, he knew how to control his feelings. Shortly after the terrible death of the Crown Prince Rudolf, my father had to see the monarch on a political subject, namely, the question of the new armament-proposals in connection with which he advised the King to give way. The King was the more calm, or at any rate, appeared to be so, of the two men. He began at first to talk about the official business. If nature had given him a more sensitive heart; he would never have been ​able to bear for so long or so heroically the many misfortunes which visited him in the course of his long reign. He was just and could be generous, but he was never friendly. He treated his ministers well as long as they were in power, and as long as they were in power he gave ear to what they had to say; but as soon as a minister had fallen, he exercised no more influence upon him, and the King was not even curious to hear his opinion.
The greatest successes of Francis Joseph took place during the Government of my father; at that time he gained the sympathy of the Hungarian nation and became an integral part of the nation. It was at this time that he acquired Bosnia and Herzegovina, and that he played a leading part in international policy. But since my father had left office he did not listen to him any more. It was hard for the King to part from my father, but afterwards my father had the impression that he was glad to be rid of the statesman whose convictions were too independent and too strong, and whose superiority was felt by the King.
With mechanical and polite simplicity he parted from his old advisers and accustomed himself to the new ones, if his interests or his duty demanded it. He possessed no initiative. He was accustomed from childhood to choose from the plans that had been worked out by others. He laid great stress upon the necessity of energy, but I cannot say that I found him truly energetic. By nature he was conservative. He was always afraid of bold decisions and possessed a ​peaceful nature through and through. All his wars ended in disaster, so that he had little optimism left. He was never a victim to the desire for fame, and he only wanted to end his life without incurring new risks.
He never felt the desire to realize great ideals. His highest ambition was to fulfil his duty. He accepted as final the judgment of history, even when it went against him. He did not long to be revenged against Italy, nor did he wish to regain his position in Germany. He did not strive to regain the absolutism which he had lost, but he defended tenaciously that which existed and did not wish to cede anything of it. For this reason, he continued the long battle with Hungary which destroyed his popularity, because he was of the opinion that the Hungarians wanted to reduce the sphere of his legal power. For this reason, he accepted the enormous responsibility for the war at his advanced age, because he was convinced that an attempt was being made to rob him of that which was his own. During the time when it was given to me to get to know him more intimately, I could notice two strong convictions. The one was his attachment to the German alliance, which was never near his heart, but which his common sense had recognized as a necessity. The second conviction was his attachment to dualism, or rather, to dualism according to his interpretation, by which the army remained completely within the sphere of his power.
It was often painful for me, as I was tied by ​memories from my early childhood and by reverence for my father that I found myself in opposition to the old King. At the same time, the reverence and attachment which I felt for him made it my duty not to adapt myself to his pet ideas, or to run after his moods or those of the nation, but only to advise that which was good for them.
I have often been told that owing to this policy of mine in connection with the army question, I placed myself at variance with the traditions of my father. I will not examine the details of this question before a foreign audience, but I will content myself with pointing out that, of all the lessons which I received as the inheritance of my father, the one which is the most sacred to me is the one that told me that I must never do anything but that which my conviction demands. I could face the responsibility of all my mistakes except in the event of my sacrificing in a cowardly manner that which was my conviction. My conviction, however, demanded that I should desire a change of our system of government.
At a time when the whole world bristled with arms, and our situation was especially dangerous, it was impossible to accept without protest a situation in which every increase of our army led to serious complications. It was necessary at such a time to make the army popular and to bring the army and the King into closer contact with the people.
I also saw a serious danger in the fact that the same party was at the head of affairs since Koloman Tisza ​and that a large portion of the nation began to regard the King as an enemy. If the party monopoly that had existed up to date was to continue, one had to reckon with revolutionary feeling.
I wanted to minimize the power of the Government, to secure the freedom of the elections, and to decentralize the administration. I thought that the uncertainty of the future was sufficient reason for this alone.
This point of view of mine brought me into opposition with Stefan Tisza, who sought to fight the danger which he also had recognized by an even more strict régime and by a more decided predominance of his party. With regard to the military question, he adopted the point of view of the King completely, not because he shared the attitude of the ruler, but because he was of opinion that the King was acting in accordance with his rights if he exercised his authority in the question of the army, according to his point of view, and because the harmony between the King and the nation seemed to him to be more important than the reform of the army. By the introduction of a common administration of the State and by a powerful disciplined party, as well as a rigid adherence to the order of the day in Parliament, he thought he could manage the Opposition, which was a factious one in his opinion.
In the days of our youth we were friends, and our political careers began in the same camp. I was the one who departed from our common political tendency, and he was the more logical of the two. Nevertheless, ​I am Still of the opinion to-day that the victory of my policy alone would have been able to restore the popularity of the King, to establish the harmony between him and the nation, to strengthen the army, to introduce a healthy party change in the Government, and to lend such a solidity to the whole Government that it would have been strong enough to face the storms that were ahead of it.
The old friendship developed into a powerful antagonism, but I nevertheless valued immensely the personality of Tisza in the midst of the most strenuous political strife. The fact that I often opposed him, and led a ceaseless campaign against him, did not alter anything in the fact that I regarded him as a brave individual with great powers, as a thorough Hungarian, a patriot and a first-rate Parliamentary leader, who wielded the powerful might of an agitator. It gives me great satisfaction to reflect that we succeeded in healing our breach before his death.
His system and his fundamental ideas were from beginning to end those of his father. His individuality, however, was unlike that of his father in many respects. His father avoided difficulties; he sought them. His father was cautious; he was bold and daring. Passion and anger could never be discerned in the father, and he was never insulting, and never said anything but what he intended to say. The son, on the other hand, allowed himself to be carried away by the heat of the combat, and was insulting even when he did not mean to be so. Tisza the elder was ​a Parliamentary tactician; Tisza the younger was a political athlete. The individuality of the father made the functioning of his system more easy, whereas the personality of his son rendered it more difficult. Both of them were absolutely determined to control their party and their Cabinet, and suffered no interference and could only bear individual independent personailties with difficulty. Both wanted to make the party which they controlled all-powerful in the State, on the English pattern. They wanted to do so without the English decentralization, without the English public opinion, without the English law, and without the freedom and the independence of Englishmen. The individual qualities of Koloman Tisza hid his despotism and made him bearable. The nature of Stefan Tisza, on the other hand, made it more difficult to endure this system. In addition, Koloman Tisza was popular, while he was the leader of the Opposition, and with this enormous backing he gained the leadership of the Government. Stefan Tisza, however, began his political career at a time when the star of his father began to wane in the political sky, a fact which made Stefan Tisza's position more difficult. He was never in the Opposition, and he shared from the first moment of his appearance the unpopularity of the Government party. He personified from his youth onwards the idea of party monopoly.
Wekerle's Government, which had been formed from the Opposition which gained the majority after Tisza's election, was turned out when the bank question arose. ​When the privilege granted to the common banks expired, a large portion of the Coalition Government wanted to create an independent Hungarian bank, whereas the King repudiated this plan upon the advice of the most distinguished Hungarian experts. The King, therefore, was once more in opposition to the majority in Parliament. The old Liberal Party revived under the name of "National Labour Party," but they retained the old leaders and the old spirit.
Thus it came about that the battle between the National Labour Party and the Opposition broke out once again à propos of the armament-proposals. Stefan Tisza, the President of the Chamber of Deputies, succeeded in forcing the new proposals through by violation of the ordinary routine. The police entered the Chamber of Deputies, the Opposition was removed from the house by force, indescribable scenes took place; one member received a sword wound in the house, and another fired several shots at Stefan Tisza, who sat in the President's chair. Parliament could only meet under military protection.
The difficulties of the position were heightened by the question of the electoral laws. No organic reform had been achieved in this direction since the year 1848. The vote was so restricted that the Hungarian Parliament was the only Parliament in Europe from which the Socialists had been excluded. At a time when a moderate reform would have sufficed, nothing was done. The question of the electoral laws had appeared in one form or another on account of its internal ​importance, but no new electoral law was passed. The King himself raised this question at the time of Féjeváry as a battle-cry against the Majority, who were defending the national point of view, and in raising this question he used all his might. By this means he played the Socialistic idea off against the spirit of nationalism which had become uncomfortable. The Minority Government of Féjeváry, which represented the will of the King, used the popular desire for a general and equal vote as well as for voting by ballot in the course of the fray. Momentary success was achieved. The whole manœuvre was to the detriment of the national cause, as they were attacked from underneath while they were fighting the powers above them, and because, at a time when they were met with bayonets, they failed to control the streets.
By this means the Crown, however, was not able to secure the sympathy of labour, which saw in the democracy of the court only a democracy of necessity, and the Crown, moreover, injured Hungarian national feeling, which regretted bitterly that the King of Hungary sought an agreement with the international rather than with the national Hungarian tendencies.
Unfortunately, the problem of the election was not solved in spite of the King's initiative. By virtue of an agreement with the King, the Government of the Opposition had to introduce general suffrage, which I wanted to realize as a member of the Coalition Ministry of Wekerle in another shape. I regarded it as a dangerous step that all of a sudden we were to change ​from a restricted vote to general suffrage with a secret ballot. Unfortunately, the unity of the Majority was split up by the bank question before my proposals could be discussed. There is a great deal which would have been different at the outbreak of the war if the working classes had been represented in the Chamber of Deputies, and they would certainly have been represented if my proposals had been adopted. As a result, the whole procedure was negative in effect, and in view of the King's attitude and the fruitless experiments, the whole problem of the elections became a greater bone of contention than ever. The National Labour Party was now faced with the difficult problem of solving the complex electoral question. They actually did solve this problem formally, by passing the proposed laws, but this solution did not bring about any satisfaction. This could only have been brought about if the new vote of the industrial workman had helped them to acquire a corresponding representation in Parliament. Since the reform of the Labour Party did not succeed in gaining this object, the problem remained, in spite of the new reform, one of the most burning questions of the day.
In this way the outbreak of the war found the nation on the threshold of new internal difficulties, after it had passed through other great internal problems. National and social demands armed themselves for a new attack. The Opposition had lost the first battle against Tisza, but no end had as yet been put to the existing enmity.
A new and bitter struggle was developed à propos of the nationalization of the administration. Stefan Tisza ​wanted to secure his system permanently by this reform. The Opposition, however, recognized clearly that by this means Tisza would secure the party monopoly for himself for ever, and that on the threshold of a dangerous epoch all power would be centralized in the hands of the Government. To-day it does not matter who was in the right: Tisza or the Opposition. All that is important, and unfortunately also very sad, is that the outbreak of the war found the nation in a mood which approached civil war, that party was ranged against party and class against class, and that social intercourse had ceased, even between the leading statesmen, and that, furthermore, the country had to do without its King and a great portion of the nation did not regard him as an unprejudiced ruler, but rather as a partisan. It was a common saying in the circles of the Opposition that the King was the first honorary member of the National Labour Party. It was an exceedingly delicate matter that common opinion considered that the principle of authority had had its day, and that its second source, namely, Parliament, was an institution that had been played out because, during the elections, serious abuses were discovered and because impossible scenes took place during the negotiations.
The saddest heritage of this unfortunate period, however, was the disappearance of manners, and especially the distortion of political manners. More people lived by politics than for politics. Convictions were less and less strong, and individuals, less and less independent, ​but there were proportionately more opportunists. This lack of individuality and independence of character, together with the opportunism of the age, has revenged itself especially in the days of the present great upheaval. At a time when the nation had to display an almost superhuman effort, she was found to be internally diseased.
In order to complete the picture of the existing difficulties, I will point out that the relations between Austria and Hungary and then between Hungary and Croatia, had suffered serious blows. We were faced by the necessity of concluding an adjustment such as is always accompanied by friction, agitation and struggles. The demand for an independent bank which led to the downfall of Wekerle's Government, and the fact that the Independent Party, though only for a short time, could have obtained a majority, caused serious anxiety in Austria. Our relations to Croatia had assumed a serious aspect for a long time. The hatred against the old Liberal Party had brought the Croatian and Hungarian Opposition together. When the Hungarian Opposition gained a victory, the Croatian Opposition gained one likewise, and the only Croatian party which had been faithful to the union with Hungary was thereby defeated. We ourselves helped our greatest enemy, that is to say, the Opposition which was in sympathy with Serbia, to power, and then, by the nature of the circumstances, we became opposed to them. When the Hungarian coalition lost power, we were waging a desperate fight ​with the Serbian coalition, and attempted to create, upon the ruins of the coalition, by the aid of the Catholic Croatians, such a party as would support the union with the Hungarian States.
The new Government of National Labour continued these efforts, but only until—probably as the result of the influence of the successor to the throne, Francis Ferdinand—Stefan Tisza changed his course and transferred the power to that Serbo-Croatian coalition which was really opposed to us at heart, and which was the exponent of the pan-Serbian idea. At the outbreak of the war our enemies, therefore, met with a Government in Croatia which sympathized with them, and they encountered a policy in Serbia which was in open opposition to our foreign policy.
I must also mention here that the national opposition in Austria had paralysed Parliament completely, and that at the outbreak of the war the untalented and bureaucratic ministry of Stürgkh conducted affairs without authority or without Parliament.
In view of such internal circumstances, is it not in the nature of a bad joke to assert that we were determined, without a compelling cause and at our own instigation, to fight the enormous power of the Entente, and that the old King, who had failed in every war hitherto, and who recognized clearly that he was fitted for anything rather than to guide his State through the greatest war in the world, should have approved of such an adventurous policy? I will never forget the tragic impressions which I received when I was commanded to ​appear before the old Emperor during the war. Bowed and broken, without will and without strength, he sat upon his chair. In full possession of his power of judgment, he recognized plainly the enormous responsibility that rested upon him, and he knew that he had to solve a problem which demanded Napoleonic powers, as every final decision rested with him, and as every living power had been placed in his hands. Anyone who has witnessed this spectacle and who knew the difficulties of our internal politics, who was aware of the dangers of a European war, could not believe for one instant that the Monarchy would have entered into this combat if she had not regarded it as inevitable.
In spite of the situation that has been sketched above, the enthusiasm was general at the beginning of the war, and people were dominated by the admirable determination to leave all internal quarrels on one side and to combine all forces in the interests of the war. The tragedy of Serajevo had made the danger apparent which surrounded the Monarchy. We, the leaders of the Hungarian opposition, decided instantly to cease our oppositional activity and to support the Government. In my opinion the same procedure should have been observed as was observed everywhere else: a new Government should have been formed out of a coalition of all parties—but this did not occur. Tisza thought the continuation of the homogeneous Government which was subjected to his leadership more important than the Parliamentary peace and the concentration of all forces.
If the war had had similar results to the campaigns of ​1866 or 1870, and if we had opposed our foe victoriously, with a rapid succession of victories, and if a favourable decision had been arrived at within a few months, then this situation might have been preserved. The war, however, began to drag out. The old haired and the old distrust spurred on to new quarrels. Deputies from the provinces brought with them at the beginning of each session the complaint that the old party rule had been preserved in the provinces, and the power which special measures had transferred to the Government was being used for party purposes. I will not go into the question as to whether these statements corresponded with the truth or whether they were exaggerated, but one thing is a fact, that this attitude and this assumption were spread in many sections of the population and that they poisoned the general feeling. The leaders were only able, by the exertion of the utmost powers, to preserve the Treuga Dei. When, however, we ourselves were dissatisfied with the war-policy of the Government, when we considered that the Government had deteriorated our position by their procedure against Italy, when we began to have our doubts on account of Tisza's Polish policy, and when those who were concerned with the policy of supplies and equipment condemned this policy—then even we were unable to remain passive any longer. It would have been as unjust to reopen the old battle based upon the old opposition as it would have been unjust to render passive support as soon as points of difference occurred in the war policy.
​It was a natural result of the long war that among the internal political questions the problem of electoral reform forced itself with fundamental power into the foreground. Many considered that the reform of the vote was more important than any other reform, and many believed that the war lent the demand of the populace irresistible force and internal justification, many hoped that the social peace which was of such importance during the war could be attained by a quick reform, but everyone pressed for the extension of the voting rights.
I recognized from the very beginning that this reform was now inevitable, and that an extension which only satisfied the demands of the artisans among the Labour Party would not be sufficient, and that those enormous masses which bled for us in the theatres of war and which laboured for the nation at home would have to be included in the new measures. When election reforms had been passed or promised in England, Prussia, Roumania and Italy, and when we were dependent upon the support of the masses, it was impossible to evade the reform that had been promised so often.
The Government took up an attitude of severe refusal. Nevertheless, it would have been the only correct and the only conservative policy to act in advance of the pressure that was being exerted and to solve the question by the display of the Government's own initiative as long as it was still powerful.
The question of land reform also arose together with ​the electoral problem. In other countries the idea also made itself felt that soldiers, or, at any rate, invalided soldiers should be given land of their own. In our case, this natural wish combined with an idea of a radical change of ownership, "Grund und Boden dem Volke!" This was the pet cry by aid of which much agitation was set on foot. Karolyi and his supporters accepted the battle-cry and thereby created considerable popularity for themselves in the country. It was easier, however, to throw out such a battle-cry than to realize it, especially at such a time.
It cannot be denied that the agricultural position in Hungary was unsound. Nowhere is the relation between owners and workers so unfavourable to those whose life is dependent upon the soil. Something had to be done. It was, however, impossible to increase the division of the land at a time when it was imperative for the supply of the nation and the successful bearing of the burden of the war that the most intensive and undisturbed agricultural labour should be proceeded with.
The fact that the law of individual possession was endangered had a damaging influence upon agricultural activity. At a time when the necessity for increased production became burning, an agitation was especially dangerous, because a too far-reaching division of agricultural possession is damaging to production. There was no need of demagogic battle-cries, but there was need of knowledge and serious consideration of the interests of everyone and a reform carried out in ​accordance therewith. Such a procedure, however, was only rendered more difficult by the unbridled agitation that took place. In this connection, initiative from the authorities and energetic action would have been the most cautious and the most conservative policy.
Just as the germs of disease develop in the body during a fever of long duration, so did every evil flourish within the body of the nation under the pressure of the long war. The military question was rendered worse by the experiences in the theatres of war. The hatred between parties that had lasted for decades in its diseased excess was fanned into flame because the excessive monopoly of power remained untouched, the Government acquired unusual power by virtue of the support of the Opposition, who had passed special resolutions, at a time when the great interests of the State demanded the co-operation of all parties and the co-operation of all mental forces. And the sufferings of the war added new sufferings to the old ones, all of which, whether rightly or wrongly, were used to blame the Government.
I do not wish to describe the details of the internal difficulties. The aim of the Opposition was firstly to achieve a coalition and to bring about a union of all the forces in the interests of the war. When this attempt had failed, I tried to divert the activity of the Opposition to the control of our foreign policy, which was most important. It was quite impossible to master the parties. The struggle extended to everything. ​The activity of the other parties created the fear that the party of Karolyi might gain the upper hand owing to their continuous agitation.
During the time of King Karl, I was in favour of a parliamentary battle along the whole of the line, because at that time I anticipated obtaining results from this procedure. I saw in advance with certainty that the new King would look about for new men, and that he would attempt to inaugurate a new tendency. I also knew that his interests demanded such a course of action, because it would have been a fatal mistake to take upon his shoulders the old haired by preserving the old régime. If the old régime had been continued, it might have led to a revolutionary atmosphere in certain circles. I feared, moreover, that if the new régime continued to neglect the Opposition, so great an embitterment would be created that a catastrophe was bound to occur in view of the given and difficult circumstances. The monopoly of the one party, which had lasted so long already, had this disadvantage anyhow: that the Conservative element of this party had become accustomed to a revolutionary atmosphere, and in certain leading strata of society a dangerous amount of hatred had been accumulated against the dynasty and the Government.
I advised the King to demand concentration, which is the most natural and best form of Government during the war. The King, however, adopted the platform of electoral reform and dismissed the Government of Tisza because his Government was not prepared to go far ​enough in the question of the election. As I have already stated, the reform of the election was undoubtedly urgent. The new Government had to make electoral reform one of the first items in their programme, but the initiative on the part of the King was not suitable in so delicate a question. If, however, he persisted in doing so, it was necessary that the royal promise should be carried out quickly.
Any further hesitation was all the more dangerous as the basis of the new proposal was an agreement with the Socialists, because, when the King had resolved to tackle the problem of the election, I attempted, in order that the royal promise might come to be realized without too radical a reform and without excessive difficulty, to come to an agreement with the Social Democratic Party.
I succeeded in so doing, and this agreement subsequently became the programme of the Cabinet of Esterhazy, and later on of the Cabinet of Wekerle. On the basis of this agreement, Vázsonyi, who had also played a leading part in calling this agreement into existence, drew up the proposals when he was Minister of Justice.
As soon as it became evident that the existing Parliamentary majority would not allow the new reform to pass which had been accepted by the King on the basis of this agreement, the Chamber of Deputies should have been dissolved. And if new elections, no matter for what reason, were impossible, the Government was bound to abide by its proposals, which had ​been made on the strength of the promises they had already given. However, this did not happen. The proposal was changed in accordance with the desire of Tisza, which was impossible without such alteration as violated the agreement.
Political and Parliamentary struggles of the acutest nature generally only touched leading society, that is to say, the real political world. The votes of the soldiers, however, stirred up the minds of the lower strata of the people in view of all the declarations which had been given and the promises which had been made. The trust in the King and in the Government was shaken in widespread circles. It was said that the vote had been promised under pressure of the nightmare of the Russian Revolution, and this promise had been broken as soon as the pressure had been relieved. This impression brought about so violent an agitation against the person of the King that its later fruits were inevitable. I have often pointed to this danger in the Chamber of Deputies and in various articles. This caution, however, was merely refuted by the argument that I intended to increase the agitation by this prophecy. My arguments were treated as if it was the mention of, and not the disease itself, which did harm. Since the proposals for electoral reform had been changed, it was impossible for the non-revolutionary element to moderate those elements which tended towards revolution. Those leaders who were determined to bring about an upheaval, or those who were ready to do anything in order to preserve their influence, met with no opposition.
​If the King had lived in Hungary, it would have been easy to call forth royalistic sentiments and to work against the destructive work of the agitators. In defiance of all advice, however, the King would not go to Budapest. The memory of the brilliant day of coronation and the understanding of the King for the idea of a Hungarian Army, all these were unable to preserve the old glory and popularity of the Crown. In regard to the Hungarian Army the King took the initiative himself, which was all the more surprising and all the more satisfactory, and which implied a great change, because the one-time successor to the Crown, Francis Ferdinand, had told me in the year 1908 that we would have to accept his point of view on the military question, because three ruling generations had adopted this attitude: Francis Joseph, he himself and Karl.
But even this advantageous turn in the tide was unable to bring about a change in the general feeling. The promises in regard to the army did not satisfy the general mass of public opinion any longer, because people were not inclined to believe the promises, because the promises made with regard to the election had not been kept, and because no real improvement could be shown in the military problem. And the promise which had lost its satisfactory effect in Hungary caused an evil reaction in Austria and in certain military circles because it increased the quarrel between Austria and Hungary and made politics fashionable in the army, and thereby weakened our hope of a sound solution.
​The catastrophe was brought on by this development of affairs, because, at so critical a period, the control of affairs lay in the hands of a minority Government. This Government did not enjoy any respect because it was unable to carry out its programme, and because it did not light as tenaciously for its programme as had been expected of it. In fact, this Government owed the continuation of its existence only to the mercy of the majority, which was antagonistic to it.
When the Opposition took over the Government, I thought one might expect the advantage that the old hatred would not weaken the capacity for action of the Government, and that the burden of responsibility for the fateful future could be borne more lightly by the new elements than by the old ones. The responsibility for the war did not attach to these new forces, and I counted upon the fact that those new elements which had suffered most from the war and had least to lose by it, and could therefore threaten the existing order most easily, would approach the Government and would consequently be more easy to satisfy. I knew, however, that in the beginning it would be a weak spot in the new regime that it did not enjoy a Parliamentary majority and that it lacked experience of Government. The unfortunate development of affairs resulted in adding the unpopularity of the old régime to the inexperience and lack of discipline of the Opposition, which, moreover, suffered from the weakness which is always associated with a Minority Government and which renders it incapable of action in the long run.
​In consequence of these circumstances, it was impossible during the last phase of the war for the constitutional elements of the nation to exercise control. They enjoyed no respect, no trust, there was no body of which the people believed that it spoke and acted for the people and in their interests. The masses suffered and believed that they played the part of the stepdaughter who has been deceived and whose fate has been decided without consulting her.
In addition to the above, the food problem excited a deep hatred in the widest circles against Austria. The frontier was closed, and in many ways an independent tariff area was established de facto, since the supplies of Austria depended upon the action of the Hungarian Government. I did not occupy myself in detail with this question, but I was always in favour of giving greater supplies to Austria in spite of the fact that all the people in responsible positions and the experts considered this method as impossible. As the average food supply was more favourable in our country than in Austria, it was easy for the agitators to gain a victory in spite of our powerful arguments. The blame for the many errors of the Austrian Government was laid to the charge of Hungary. If the Austrian Government had requisitioned with the same energy in Bohemia and Moravia, which she demanded from us, Austria could have been fed much better. This, however, was denied, and Austria was made to believe that it had to starve only on account of Hungarian selfishness.
​The national opposition which appeared to relax in the early days of the war under the influence of patriotism, increased more and more, especially in Austria. The treachery of Czeckish and Ruthenian regiments excited glowing hatred against them. Many a German or Hungarian died or was captured or wounded simply because his brother in arms had broken his oath and had gone over to the enemy. Even in Hungary the situation was not controlled as much as in Austria on account of the opposition in national questions. The majority of the Roumanian intelligentsia proved faithless where the enemy broke in, and a considerable portion of the Serbs and certain Ruthenes did the same; but the conflict of the nationalities had not paralysed our power as yet. The majority of the nationalities justified themselves and fulfilled their duties faithfully as citizens. Serious revolutionary attempts were not to be found anywhere.
In view of such chronic internal suffering, we had to prepare to fight the infection of revolution, which was a product of this long war, and for which there was only one cure, namely, victory, and that never fell to our lot.
War, and especially a long war, renders the people wild and embittered, and these feelings are natural hothouses for revolution. Wild abandonment was brought about by the fact that the soldiers daily saw and caused violent destruction, that they learnt to place a low value on human life, and because they became hardened to the sufferings of others, and therefore ​brutality became second nature to the soldier. There is but a step between requisition and robbery. Private property ceased to be respected. The blockade created unbearable circumstances with regard to the food supply. The unspeakable sufferings, dangers and denials, the anxiety and excitement which were experienced by millions in the trenches and by millions at home, the cruelty and abuse, and the excess of militarism, all tended towards embitterment and hatred. Class war was engendered by these circumstances and by the fact that the officer enjoyed greater advantages than the rank and file, and that both these elements belonged to different classes.
The consumer in general became embittered against the producer and the middleman.
Moreover, anti-Semitic feeling increased from day to day. The enormous war profits excited hatred and envy everywhere, but anti-Semitism was specially powerful because the majority of the war profits went into Jewish hands. The official was unable to live on his fixed salary, and the luxury of the new rich heightened the embitterment. Ignorant, uneducated egoists became millionaires without work, by dishonesty and clever tricks; they bragged with their money, whilst others, honest patriots, were exposed to the most inhuman self-sacrifices, while the families of these heroes were starving at home. In such circumstances it is easily intelligible that the number of those who supported the revolutionary Social Democratic Party grew from day to day.
​The respect due to officialdom was shaken in its foundations by the heavy burden of the central organization of the whole economic life and by the preservation of order and the supply of the army. This weakening of authority could be felt everywhere, but it led to a catastrophe where the sufferings involved defeat. Such a hatred set in against those in power and against the leading circles and classes, and such contempt went with it, that the peaceable life of the state was injured to a serious degree. Demagogues, adventurers, ambitious people and neurasthenic subjects took advantage of the situation and heightened artificially the great excitement which existed already.
This devastating fever went through several stages before it prevented the continuation of the war and led to the October revolution. We suffered from the first from the fact that the war had been begun with a moral error. The battle-cries of modern times and of democracy went home easily against us, and they represented an enormous power, especially during the war, that is to say, during the time when the masses made such terrific efforts, and during the time which, in consequence, developed the self-consciousness of the people. We were particularly hard hit later on by Wilson's action. Demagogues and some naive souls asked whether it was not revolting treachery to continue the war if Wilson declared, in the name of the great American Republic, that the war is not conducted against nations, but against the autocratic system which caused the war and which the people did not wish to ​tolerate any longer anyhow. Why continue the fight when the American President says that the peace will be a just one, and that it will inaugurate the age of eternal peace and the rule of justice? Is it not a duty to mankind and to one's own country to create the revolution when it is obvious that a good peace can be secured by the aid of a new and completely democratic form of government, and when we know that the old leading factors have not entered into negotiations? Is it not possible and necessary for the nation to save herself by rendering public circumstances democratic with one blow and by breaking with the old leaders? Anyone who did not believe the promises of the American President was mercilessly stamped as an agitator for war. Wilson, "the enemy," was more popular than the own statesmen of the people. Since Russia had broken down, and since the American Republic had assumed the position of Czardom, and since it had become a fact that the most democratic nations fought against the less democratic ones, the belief spread that the democratic revolution would lead to the promised Eldorado. The question was asked: Can a war be waged successfully in this manner?
The desire for secession amongst our various nationalities was fostered strongly by virtue of the fact that, in accordance with Wilson's theory, even Hungarian politicians sought to recognize the constructive principles of the new world in the right of every people to determine by vote whether or no they wished to secede from the State. Money and systematic ​propaganda increased the fomenting power of these theories. The ex-officio revolutionary element increased in power because the Monarchy, having recognized the necessity of peace and the power of the above-mentioned tendencies, attempted to bring about the peace conditions by exploiting the jargon of the Socialists internationally. The Government, however, made a serious mistake, because it was not the Government that availed itself of social democracy for the preparations of peace, but, on the contrary, it was the International which availed itself of the Government for spreading the revolutionary spirit. What enormous strengthening it meant to social democracy that, at a time when the whole world naturally and rightly longed for the blessings of peace, the Governments themselves expected the solution from social democracy! What an extraordinary situation, that, while German and French citizens were murdering each other, French and German Socialists were exchanging handshakes. The leading circles placed themselves in a false position because they availed themselves of the battle-cries of the Socialists and pursued their military policy at the same time in the spirit of Ludendorff. The question was asked: How is it possible to combine the hard fight against universal suffrage with the part played by Dr. Adler and Dr. Renner in the question of universal peace during the conference at Stockholm? If only the Socialists can bring about the peace, must the power not be given to them, and in such a case are not they alone worthy of this power?
​The sudden fall of the throne of the Czar created a deep impression. If the greatest autocrat in the world can be brushed to one side by a short revolution lasting only a few hours, what throne rested upon sound foundations? If social democracy has obtained control in Russia, why should this party deny its hope in a place where its roots lay deeper? Consequently, all hope and all expectation turned from day to day more towards social democracy. Law and order began to wane; the revolutionaries became more bold; they were ready for everything and dared everything because they felt that the times were in their favour. After the German Reichstag and the military command became involved in an acute struggle (July, 1917) on account of peace conditions, and since Czernin conducted a fearless battle against the leading German circles, which could not be concealed, also on account of the peace (April, 1917), the feeling increased more and more here that we were the prisoners of our ally. The feeling spread that a knot had been tied about our necks by the aid of which Prussian militarism would cast us into the abyss if this Gordian knot was not cut by the sword of the revolution. Pessimism was at work for a long time to undermine our will-power. This pessimism now spread from above, and it was only from above that this pessimism could have been defeated. Czernin had as little hope of victory as he had of peace—a fact which exercised a demoralizing influence upon him and upon the whole machine of the State. After the failure of the submarine war, the only ​hope that remained for public opinion was that we would succeed in forestalling the development of American power by a decisive result in the West. When this hope had also proved vain, the general fear was complete. Marshal Foch, his offensive, and the fact that Bulgaria deserted us, made it evident that our day was over and that the catastrophe was inevitable and imminent. And then the question was being asked with more and more violence: Can it be allowed that on account of the friendship for Germany the nation shall be forced to drain the bitter cup of suffering to the dregs?
And now the psychological moment for the revolution had arrived!
By what internal policy could the revolution have been forestalled or diminished? With energy or with greater social feeling? By more modern methods?
I am of opinion that the last suggestion might have led to a result more easily than the first; but the best means would have been the employment of both. It would have been easier to succeed by means of reforms because the collapse could not have been avoided anyhow, seeing that we were unable to bring about a decision on the Continent, and before the interference of America took place. After the defeat, however, the rise of the forcibly suppressed elements and revenge would have been inevitable. Would the same thing not have happened in other countries? What would have become of the internal peace in France if she had been defeated as we were, and if the people who had ​been pursued by Clemenceau and placed under lock and key by him had obtained power? I believe we would have had the best chances of avoiding this catastrophic collapse if those Governments which did not share the responsibility of the recent past had combined an understanding for the demands of the time with an energetic battle against the revolutionaries. The least chances of success, however, were to be found in our situation, where neither energy nor sufficient social spirit could make itself felt against the opposing influences, and in such circumstances the final result had inevitably to end in catastrophe. The radical leaders and their parties were merely insulted without having anything proved satisfactorily against them, but at the same time they were not rendered innocuous. Reforms were promised, but they did not come to be realized sufficiently, all of which only increased the embitterment of the masses and strengthened the revolutionary elements without in any way detracting from the revolutionary forces.
The long tragedy has now been disclosed up to the last and disgraceful act. The history of this era, during which I played a greater part, is associated with my own personal experiences.