# The Theoretical System of Karl Marx/Chapter 3

The first of the objections to the Materialistic Conception of History advanced by the Marx-critics which we will consider here is the so-called "philosophic" objection. We will consider it first because of its great pretensions and because of its old age, it being in reality merely a new edition of the old idealistic philosophy with which Marx had to deal as far back as 1845. In its pure, idealistic form Marx squared his accounts with it in his own masterly fashion in his book "Die Heilige Familie." The account was settled, the balance was struck, and no more was heard of idealism. It now re-appears bashfully under cover of a scientific theory of cognition and psychology. No matter what its garb, however, it is essentially the same, except that with the loss of its purity it has lost its logic. Pure idealism, as represented by Hegel, for instance, is logically a perfectly constructed edifice. It rests on false foundations. But its premises admitted, its logical construction is impregnable. Not so with modern "philosophy." It is idealistic without the logic of the finished idealistic structure. What is worse, however, it is reactionary, which is not necessarily an attribute of idealism. Desiring to avoid the logical consequences of the development of philosophy, in which the idealistic system of Hegel must inevitably be followed by the materialism of Marx, its watchword is: "Go back." And the further back the better. . . . So that we find Weisengruen, a leading light among these philosophers, throwing loving glances at Berkeley, who was perhaps as much of an idealist as Hegel himself, but ​utterly devoid of the historic sense which made Hegel a truly great philosopher and his system a great step forward in the development of philosophy.
Indeed, their aversion towards anything that has some historic sense leads Weisengruen, otherwise a sane and bright thinker, to declare that the real force that makes History is the imagination or phantasy (Phantasie). To use his own words: "Phantasy is the demi-urge of all History. . . . Not the developed intellect, but the elementary phantasy." A discovery which is worthy to rank with that of the charlatan Nossig, who, after posing as a great scientific Marx-critic, gravely announced, with all the pomp of pseudo-science, that he discovered a remedy to all our social evils in the old Jewish custom of the Jubilee.
We cannot, however, go here into the details of the philosophic objection and its numerous variants. Such discussions are only intended by their authors for German professors and such others as enjoy the perusal of bulky volumes. Under no circumstances are they meant for people who have no time to spend on the verbiage of metaphysical speculation. We will simply say, therefore, that the sum and substance of all these arguments amounts to this: That there is no way in which material conditions can be shown, philosophically, to turn into ideas; consequently, that ideas cannot be the result of economic conditions; and that, therefore, the existence of ideas and their influence on History not being denied, economic conditions cannot be the prime movers of History.
The answer to all of which is, again without going into long and abstruse philosophic discussions, that, as Engels puts it, the proof of the pudding is in the eating; that if we can prove by historic data that the development of ideas did follow the development of economic conditions then we need not worry over the "philosophic" question of how the transformation was accomplished. It will then be the ​business of "philosophy" to take care of itself and show how it was done or frankly confess its impotency. It is clearly a case of those philosophers' own funeral.
It is true that the learned philosophers, in the person of Professor Masaryk, strongly object to the introduction of such vulgar "matters" as puddings into the discussion of such lofty subjects. But the loftiness is all theirs, and we who do not soar in the realms of phantasy can very well afford to stick to the gross "material" facts. We, therefore, claim, with Engels, that the proof of the materialistic conception of history is to be looked for in history itself.
But when it comes to actual history, these philosophers must admit that the facts, or at least a good many of them, happen to tally with the "unphilosophic" Materialistic Conception of History. So says Weisengruen himself:
"For certain historical relations within certain periods of time this historical theory (The Materialistic Conception of History) is a relatively correct, practical, explanatory principle (Erklärungsprincip). We can, for instance, by its aid drag out from historical obscurity the more hidden economic forces which propelled the French Revolution. We can, by its aid, I am convinced, throw more clear and glaring light on the period of decline of the Roman Empire, than could be done until now. Many phases of the German middle ages may be understood by us with the aid of a mild economic motivation. The powerlessness of the German Bourgeoisie, particularly during the year 1848, may be partly explained by purely economic causes."
As the reader will see, this great opponent of Marxism, who in another place of his book insists that Marxism must be thrown overboard, bag and baggage, is willing to concede quite considerable to the Materialistic Conception of History. In fact, he has nonchalantly conceded almost all of European History since the beginning of the Christian Era (the breaking up of the Roman Empire, the German ​middle ages, the French Revolution, the German Revolution), with the exception of the Renaissance, which he specifically exempts from the influences of material conditions and reserves it, supposedly, for "higher" influences. He then draws the general conclusion that some relations ("Zusammenhänge") and periods may be treated according to the Materialistic Conception of History, and others may not. Curious as it may seem for a philosopher to arrive at such half-way conclusion about a purely philosophic matter, it is even more curious to observe that this same philosopher and critic, instead of following up his conclusion by an examination of the provinces and periods in which the Materialistic Conception of History does apply and in which it does not, turns around and declares that as far as we can see, there are no historical laws at all, and that it is practically impossible to write or treat history scientifically; in short, that there is no historical science. This Nihilism, which, as we have said, is the last recourse of the opponents of Marxism if they want to keep at least the show of being scientific, is very significant, as we meet with it not only in the province of philosophy of history, but all along the line of sociology, including political economy, as we shall see later.
But it is not only the Nihilists among the Marx-critics who do not follow up their criticism with the only decisive proof, that mentioned by Engels, the proof of history. Instead, they indulge in generalities; such, for instance, as:—Marx gives "undue" "prominence" to the material factors and disregards factors which ought to be considered. Expressions that mean absolutely nothing, because of their indefiniteness, and are absolutely incapable of verification, by any method, except, perhaps, the "subjective" one of everybody deciding for himself, according to his fancy, which factor got its "due," and which did not.
The slowness on the part of Marx-critics to talk more definitely is not due to any desire to be brief. These gentlemen are usually quite voluble. It is simply a case of dis​cretion. Whenever they do say something definite it can easily be shown that either the historic facts do not bear out the critics or that Marx never said the things attributed to him. It seems that most of the critics of Marxism suffer with a singular malady which may be termed, "Confusion of Terms and Ideas," which makes them attribute to Marx and his disciples all sorts of things which neither Marx nor his disciples said or could have said, as appears plainly from their writings, with which these critics are very familiar. So do, for instance, Professor Barth, Weisengruen and others, make what they evidently regard as a very strong point against the Materialistic Conception of History by showing that the changes in the technical development of the means of production can not, alone, explain all the facts of History. In this they are undoubtedly right. But,—and there is the rub,—the Marxists never claimed any such thing. The assumption that the Marxists do claim such a thing evidently rests on the confusion by the critics of the terms "economic conditions," usually employed by the Marxists with the term "technical development." A confusion which does not do much credit to the faculty of discrimination possessed by these gentlemen, and which seems most surprising in such acute and astute thinkers.
It seems peculiar that such a simple matter should require long explanations. But all Marx-critics seem to be so much affected by the disease referred to, that it is pretty dangerous business to take it for granted that they are able without outside aid to see the most obvious distinctions and differences. Be it therefore said here for the Nth time, that while changes in the technical development of the means of production usually go together with changes in the material conditions of the people, they do not necessarily so go together and are separate and distinct from each other. While the technical developments in the means of production and distribution are the chief cause of changes in the ​material conditions of the people, they are not always so and not necessarily so. There are other causes which may affect the material conditions of the people, and there are changes in the technical part of production and distribution which do not at all affect the material conditions of the people. And the Marxists claim that it is the changes in the "material conditions" that are the prime movers of history, no matter what the causes of these changes may be. The technical development only affects the course of history indirectly and only in so far as it causes changes in the material conditions under which people live and work.
The same malady,—Confusion of Terms and Ideas,—is the cause of another great objection to the Materialistic Conception of History. This is advanced with great vehemence by most critics of an "ethical" bent of mind, among others, by the well-known English socialist, E. Belfort Bax. It is to the following effect: People do not always act out of self-interest. They are very often swayed by ideal motives and then act quite contrary to their own interests. Hence, the fatal error of the Materialistic Conception of History in making the "material interests" the prime movers of History.
This objection has been partly answered already in a preceding chapter, where it was pointed out that the Materialistic Conception of History has nothing to do with the question of individual idealism. That it was not a theory explaining the motives which impel individuals to act, but a historical theory explaining the motive powers which bring about those actions of the masses, the aggregate of which make up what we call history; the powers which are the "causes of the causes" of individual action. A man may very well act against his own interest, even sacrifice his life, for the sake of an ideal, and yet his ac​tion may be the result of the material interests of a class or group to which he belongs or which produced that ideal. For example: The ruling class of Japan needs new markets for its expanding industries. Russia is in its way because the ruling classes of Russia for some reason or other need the same markets. Japan and Russia go to war for the control of these markets. This begets a high patriotic fever in both countries, and thousands and tens of thousands of people sacrifice their lives willingly for the high ideal of "My country forever." Among those thousands there are very few who are directly "interested" in the issue of the war, and even these would probably never give away their lives for those "interests" if it were put up to them as a mere business proposition. Most of those who will sacrifice their lives in this war for the "honor" of their country will be people who have no "interest" in the war, who may be even affected injuriously by the war, but they sacrifice their lives for the high ideal born and begotten of the interests of their class, or of the ruling class under whose moral and intellectual tutelage their class stands. While the actions of the individual participants in the war are, therefore, the result of ideal motives, the historic event itself, the war, is the result of material interests, which are in their turn the result of economic conditions.
Aside from the confusion, however, between the motives of individuals and the motive powers of History, this objection also rests on the further confusion of "conditions" with "interests." The Marxists never claimed that material "interests" control the course of History. They always use the expression, "material conditions" in formulating their theory; and material conditions are something entirely different from material interests. Material conditions usually beget material "interests," which shape the course of History, but not always and not necessarily so. Sometimes material conditions will bring about historical phenomena which are not the result of any "interest" in ​the usual sense of that word, but merely of the condition itself. Karl Kautsky in a discussion with Belfort Bax used this example: The turning away from all earthly interests, the longing for death, of early Christianity may,—he says—very well be explained by the material conditions of the Roman Empire at that time. But it would, of course, be monstrous to attribute the longing for death to some material interest.
If the learned critics would only carefully refrain from substituting other terms and ideas in place of those used and expressed by Marx and his disciples a good deal of their criticism would fall of itself, and the rest could easily be answered. So, for instance, would a careful reading of Marx and a clear comprehension of the terms used by him do away with all the objections which admit that the economic factor plays an important role in history but think that "too much" is claimed for it, and that other factors are "not taken into account."
So do most of the critics talk of Marx's failure to "take into account" such things as human nature, race, geography, etc. Those of our readers who have read carefully the preceding chapters will have seen that these things have all been "taken into account"; and that when the Marxists still insist upon the economic factor as the determining factor of historical progress it is because this factor is the only one which accounts for the movement of history, the progress of the human race from one state to another, as all the other factors are comparatively stationary, and could therefore account perhaps for a condition of the human race but not for its Progression.
That it was not any failure to "take" these things "into account" that led Marx to proclaim the economic factor as the material factor which moves history, a mere cursory reading of Marx will show. In his work on Capital, he says:
"Aside from the more or less developed condition of social production, the productivity of labor depends on natu​ral conditions. They are all reducible to the nature of man himself, such as race, etc., and his natural surroundings. The outward natural conditions can be divided, economically, into two great classes; natural wealth in the means of subsistence, such as richness of soil, fish-abounding waters, etc.; and natural wealth in means of production, such as usable water-falls, navigable rivers, woods, metals, coal, etc. In a primitive community the first class of natural wealth is of paramount importance, on a higher plane of civilization it is the second class that is the most important."
To insist after this on the "technical development" being the only historical factor recognized by Marxists would seem absurd. But Marx critics are a peculiar race. There is nothing that they cannot do, or at least say. From what was said in the preceding chapters it would seem clear that Marx and his disciples not only recognize the influence of ideas, but accentuate it, and that in their scheme of the transition of the capitalist system into socialism, ideas play a distinct and quite important role. And yet most of the critics still tell the old yarn of the Marxists not admitting the influence of ideas. Furthermore, they are not a bit abashed when they are shown by quotations from Marx that he thought just the other way. When they are caught "with the goods on," they very coolly declare that Marx is contradicting himself. That is, the Marx of "Capital" and his other well-known works, is contradicting the Marx which they put up for their readers' delectation. Indeed, lately this business of "refuting Marx by Marx" has developed into a special industry, which would contribute a good deal to the gayety of nations if they were only in the mood for it. As it is, the "nations" which read these things are worried too much by the subject-matter to be amused. It will, however, be amusing to our readers, and we shall attend to these "contradictions" in due time. We must, however, defer this treat until the time when we will come to consider the Marxian system in its entirety, as a ​reward to our readers for their patience. Besides, it will then be better appreciated. Here, we will mention only one as an example:
The Russian critic Ludwig Slonimski finds this contradiction: Marx,—he says—put up the theory that economic and class interests are the only motives of the political and legislative activity of the State, and yet he himself tells us of the praiseworthy activities of some factory inspectors, particularly Leonard Horner, who, he says, deserved well of the working class for protecting their interests!
Is it not really surprising that Marx is still thought of a good deal in some quarters, and that people generally refuse to accept the decision of M. Slonimski who announces that: "No matter how much the admirers and followers of Marx who believe in the scientific character of his method may protest, the truth is that he merely created a Utopia which is vulgar in its nature and is only suited to the narrow horizon of ordinary workingmen and to the notions of the imagination of those who see in the amount of pay they receive for their labor the highest blessing?"
We will also leave for future consideration the question of the "modification" of the Marxian theories at the hands of their authors, of which there is so much talk in the literature of Revisionism. These supposed "modifications" are really nothing more than an attempt to make the supposed contradictions plausible, and deserve to take their place alongside of them. We will, therefore, limit ourselves at this place to objections springing from mere confusion of terms and ideas. We want to say again, however, that the malady is so general with Marx-critics, and its ravages so extensive that it is absolutely impossible even to recount them properly, not to say analyze them all, and we will perforce be compelled to attend only to some shining examples. There are some individual writers who at least ​by volume, if by nothing else, have won for themselves a place of honor in the roster of Marx-critics, and we will have to return to them again when occasion offers. So, for instance, Professor Masaryk, to whom we intend to pay our respects later on. Here we only wish to add to the confusionists already mentioned, our own Professor E. R. A. Seligman of Columbia University, President of The American Academy of Political and Social Science, etc., etc., who has written what our book-reviewers call "a very readable" little book entitled "The Economic Interpretation of History." It must be admitted that Professor Seligman, being an American, believes in fair play, and that he is "eminently fair" and even generous to Marx. With this, however, and perhaps, because of it, he is exceedingly superficial, and scandalously confused. We shall return to the gentleman at some future time in a discussion of the question of "monism" in history, of which he treats. We do not consider a discussion of that question properly within the bounds of the present discussion, for the reason that the question of "monism" is not one which affects the Materialistic Conception of History alone. It affects the idealistic conception of history just as well. In other words, it is a question that affects philosophy in general. As such it also affects the materialistic conception of history, but it is not an objection exclusively directed against Marxism,—our present topic of discussion. Of course, all these questions are inter-dependent, particularly with the confused mode of treatment pursued by most Marx-critics, who usually serve up in their writings a Hungarian Gulash or an American hash of objections of all sorts and kinds thrown together. Here, therefore, is, for the present, a mere taste of our American Marx-critic. We will serve the preparation in its original wrapper, and let the readers dissect or analyze for themselves. He says:
   "All human progress is at bottom mental progress; all changes must go through the human mind. There is thus an undoubted ​psychological basis for all human evolution. The question, however, still remains: what determines the thought of humanity? . . . This claim (that all sociology must be based exclusively on economics, and that all social life is nothing but a reflex of economic life) can not be countenanced for the obvious reason that there are as many kinds of social relations as there are classes of social wants. We have not only economic wants, but also moral, religious, jural, political and many other kinds of collective wants; we have not only collective wants, but individual wants, like physical, technical, æsthetic, scientific, philosophical wants. The term 'utility,' which has been appropriated by the economist, is not by any means peculiar to him. Objects may have not only an economic utility, but a physical, æsthetic, scientific, technical, moral, religious, jural, political or philosophical utility. The value which is the expression of this utility and which forms the subject-matter of economics is only one subdivision of a far greater class. For all the world is continually rating objects and ideas according to their æsthetic, scientific, technical, moral, religious, jural, political or philosophical value without giving any thought to their economic value. So far as utility and value are social in character, that is, so far as they depend upon the relation of man to man, they form the subject-matter of sociology. Economics deals with only one kind of social utilities or values, and can therefore not explain all kinds of social utilities or values. The strands of human life are manifold and complex.
   "In this aspect what is untrue of the individual can not be true of the group of individuals. We have passed beyond the time when it was incumbent to explain the fallacy lurking in the phrase 'the economic man.' There is indeed an economic life and an economic motive—the motive which leads every human being to satisfy his wants with the least outlay of effort. But it is no longer necessary to show that the individual is impelled by other motives than the economic one, and that the economic motive itself is not everywhere equally strong, or equally free from the admixture of other influences. A full analysis of all the motives that influence men, even in their economic life, would test the powers of the social psychologist. There is no 'economic man,' just as there is no 'theological ​man.' The merchant has family ties just as the clergyman has an appetite. . . .
   "In one sense, accordingly, there are as many methods of interpreting history as there are classes of human activities or wants. There is not only an economic interpretation of history, but an ethical, an æsthetic, a political, a jural, a linguistic, a religious and a scientific interpretation of history. Every scholar can thus legitimately regard past events form his own peculiar standpoint."
Has anybody ever been across a greater mix-up of truths, half-truths, untruths, platitudes and meaninglessness? Whatever may be said as to whether or not "the strands of human life are manifold and complex," one thing is quite certain: Human life is too short for one man to attempt to unravel all this nonsense.
If all changes (Changes of what? Of environment or of environment into institutions or ideas?) must go through the human mind but do not originate there, why is all human progress at bottom mental progress? Isn't the thing which changes, and its changes which go through the human mind, at the bottom of human progress, and the mental progress, the result of these changes going through the human mind, only the top of human progress? Is not Marx right when he insists that the changes which go through the human mind are the basis of all social progress?
What does the learned professor mean by "social wants" and "collective wants," and are these terms interchangeable? And why does he slide down from social or collective wants to individual wants? Does he mean to say that the Materialistic Conception of History is incorrect because it does not explain or "take into account" individual wants? What does he mean by "technical" want as an individual want? Does he mean to say that Physical and Technical "wants" (whatever these may mean) are not material wants? Are not technical relations exclusively so​cial and economic relations? Doesn't the learned professor know that some Marx-critics, among them his distinguished colleague Professor Barth, object to the Materialistic Conception of History because the technical development alone does not explain history? And who is right? Professor Barth, according to whom the "technical development" is all there is of Marx's explanation; or Professor Seligman, who objects to Marx's explanation because it does not include the "technical wants?" Will the gentleman kindly vouchsafe an explanation of "scientific" want, "philosophic" want, and "jural" want? What does he mean by "jural" relations? Does he mean the social relations as expressed in codes of positive law? If so, does not he know that these laws deal almost exclusively with the property relations of people, which are certainly material and economic relations; and that all the few exceptions, "deal" in "morality;" and that all jural relations are, therefore, necessarily contained in the economic and moral relations, indeed, are their expression?
What does Professor Seligman mean by suddenly, without warning or explanation, substituting "economics" for economic interpretation of history, and in talking of "economic," "economists," "utility," "value," as if the Materialistic Conception of History were an explanation of history by means of the special science known as political economy? Does he mean to say there there is any warrant in Marx even for a suggestion of this kind, or does he simply speculate on the ignorance of his readers who probably know nothing about Marx, except that he was a writer on political economy? And is that why he first changed the Materialistic Conception of History into an "Economic Interpretaton of History?" Is it all intentional confusion, or is he really so confused? And why does he tell the Marxists "that it is no longer necessary to show that the individual is impelled by other motives than the economic one," have not they themselves reiterated this for the benefit of their critics ad nauseam? And hasn't Marx himself​put the "economic man" to rest in his grave, from which the opponents of Marx are now trying to raise him? As an economist he ought to know these things. But if the demise of the "economic man," and the attempts at his resuscitation have not been noted in Professor Seligman's statistical department, why didn't he inform himself of it from his friend, Professor John B. Clark?
Again, what does he mean by a "linguistic" explanation of history, and is that based on a "linguistic" relation which is the result of a "linguistic" want? What does he mean by a "religious" explanation of history, besides an "ethical" one, (whatever that may mean)? Does he mean a creed or church explanation? And does he really mean that a "scholar" can "thus legitimately" "regard past events" from such a "standpoint?" And does he really think that notwithstanding all this, there is still room for a "scientific" interpretation of history?
There are some other very interesting questions we might ask Professor Seligman, but the strands of human life being so manifold and complex, as Professor Seligman truly observes, and the Marx-critics being so many and so multifarious, we must leave him in peace, particularly as he probably meant no harm. But before leaving him we must ask him what has become of his quest for the cause which "determines the thought of humanity," with which he started out? Has he forgotten all about it? And yet, that was the question under consideration!
That was the question to be considered, if he was really anxious to find a scientific explanation of history, or, rather, if he wanted to treat history scientifically. But that is just what modern Marx-critics are extremely anxious to avoid. Hence, their plea for all sorts of "standpoints," "factors," etc., etc., which they themselves do not define or explain, but which serve the general purpose of making the scientific treatment of history impossible. In this even such extremes as Seligman and Weisengruen meet. Except that while the superficial and democratic American is "easy" with the ​historians, and announces that any tommyrot, written from any "standpoint," is as good science as anything else, the thorough and conservative German makes the task of the historian impossible of accomplishment by claiming that scientific history must contain things which it is impossible for it to contain, and which, if it were possible to put them there, would make it absurd.
Weisengruen objects to the theory of the class-struggle. But not because there is no such struggle. Oh, no! That there is a struggle of the classes into which society is at present divided he can no more deny than Seligman can deny that the economic relations of society are the principal motive-power of History. But just as Seligman finds other "relations" which enable him to write history from all sorts of "standpoints," so does Weisengruen find all sorts of struggles which he claims must be "taken into account" by a scientific historian. These struggles, which, according to Weisengruen, go to make up real history, are not merely social struggles but also struggles between individuals, and are of every nature and description. His demands upon scientific history are, therefore, so many that they cannot all even be recounted here. Here are some of them, as a sample:
The "scientific" historian must embrace, with an "intuitive" gaze, the real essence of the period of which he desires to treat, and must at the same time be able to correctly measure its "psychical range." He must know every occurrence, even the smallest; and must be acquainted with every document, even of the least importance. And in order that the reader may not think lightly of this task, Weisengruen takes care to warn him of the insuperable difficulties which will beset the scientific historian. And those difficulties are indeed insuperable. For it must be remembered that Weisengruen does not refer to social occurrences, or public documents. No, he means every individual occurrence of any kind or description, and every private document of whatever import. Quarrels between husband and wife, neighborly gossip, love-letters, everything is here in​cluded. And everything about everything. For our author has suddenly grown very democratic, and insists that everybody makes history. Nothing is so mean, nor is any station in life so lowly, as not to influence the course of history. In order that there be no mistake about it, he gives the following express instructions: "He (the historian) must know all the persons (of the period he describes), their family relations, their actual course of action, as well as the opinions they held of each other. . . . All to the smallest detail."
Then he must know everything about everything else in creation: All sorts of relations between all sorts of groups in society, covering all the social relations of the people, the economic structure of society, the politics, ideas, sciences, etc., etc., and everything to the minutest detail. The Marxists also demand knowledge of all these social matters but Weisengruen does not mean it that way at all. No. He is a thoroughgoing scientist, as we have already seen, and therefore the historian's knowledge of social matters which he demands must be on a par with his knowledge of individuals and their relations as already hinted at. For instance, the historian must not only be acquainted with the tools, manner and processes of production in use, and the things produced during the period of which he treats, but he must have an actual inventory of all the "goods, wares and merchandise," as well as of all the household furniture, clothing and other worldly goods, possessed by each and every person who lived during that period, with all of whom, as we already know, the historian must be personally acquainted.
If this is not materialism run mad, what is it?
Of course, Weisengruen knows the absurdity of all this. And this would never have been said if it were not for the terrible plight in which he found himself in attempting to disprove the claim of the Materialistic Conception of History to the sole and exclusive possession of the attribute ​science, in its own proper field. Weisengruen's madness has method. All this moonshine is put up to us in all seriousness for one purpose only. If all this is impossible, and there is nq denying that fact, then scientific treatment of history is impossible until some dim and distant future of which we can take no cognizance. And meanwhile, (and there is the rub), there is no science, and anybody and everybody has license to write any rot he pleases from any "standpoint" he pleases. . . .
You see, we are at the same old game again. . . .
Weisengruen and Seligman, Masaryk and Slonimski, and the rest of the tribe, are essentially alike. Whether by way of ponderous philosophic moonshine, or elegant phrase-mongering, the flow of objections to the Materialistic Conception of History runs from the same source, and it wends its course towards the same objective point.
* ↑ Paul Weisengruen, Der Marxismus und das Wesen der sozialen Frage. Leipzig, 1900.
* ↑ T. G. Masaryk, Die philosophischen und sociologischen Grundlagen des Marxismus. Wien, 1899.
* ↑ Paul Barth, Die Philosophie der Geschichte als Sociologie. Leipzig, 1897.
* ↑ E. Belfort Bax, Die Materialistische Geschichtsauffassung, in Die Zeit (1896). Synthetische contra Neumarxistische Geschichtsauffassung.— Die Grenzen der Materialistischen Geschichtsauffassung, in Neue Zeit (1897).
* ↑ Ludwig Slonimski, Karl Marx' Nationaloekonomische Irrlehren. Berlin, 1897.
* ↑ Edwin R. A. Seligman, The Economic Interpretation of History. The Columbia University Press, 1903.