# Weems v. United States/Dissent White

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MR. JUSTICE WHITE, dissenting.
The Philippine law made criminal the entry in a public record by a public official of a knowingly false statement. The [p383] punishment prescribed for violating this law was fine and imprisonment in a penal institution at hard and painful labor for a period ranging from twelve years and a day to twenty years, the prisoner being subjected, as accessories to the main punishment, to carrying during his imprisonment a chain at the ankle hanging from the wrist, deprivation during the term of imprisonment of civil rights, and subjection besides to perpetual disqualification to enjoy political rights, hold office, etc., and, after discharge, to the surveillance of the authorities. The plaintiff in error, having been convicted of a violation of this law, was sentenced to pay a small fine and to undergo imprisonment for fifteen years, with the resulting accessory punishments above referred to. Neither at the trial in the court of first instance nor in the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands was any question raised concerning the repugnancy of the statute defining the crime and fixing its punishment to the provision of the Philippine bill of rights, forbidding cruel and unusual punishment. Indeed, no question on that subject was even indirectly referred to in the assignments of error filed in the court below for the purpose of this writ of error. In the brief of counsel, however, in this court the contention was made that the sentence was void, because the term of imprisonment was a cruel and unusual one and therefore repugnant to the bill of rights. Deeming this contention to be of such supreme importance as to require it to be passed upon, although not raised below, the court now holds that the statute, because of the punishment which it prescribes, was repugnant to the bill of rights and therefore void, and for this reason alone reverses and remands with directions to discharge.
The Philippine bill of rights which is construed and applied is identical with the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment. Because of this identity it is now decided that it is necessary to give to the Philippine bill of rights the meaning properly attributable to the provision on the same subject found in the Eighth Amendment, as in using the language of that Amendment in the statute it is to be [p384] presumed that Congress intended to give to the words their constitutional significance. The ruling now made, therefore, is an interpretation of the Eighth Amendment, and announces the limitation which that Amendment imposes on Congress when exercising its legislative authority to define and punish crime. The great importance of the decision is hence obvious.
Of course, in every case where punishment is inflicted for the commission of crime, if the suffering of the punishment by the wrongdoer be alone regarded the sense of compassion aroused would mislead and render the performance of judicial duty impossible. And it is to be conceded that this natural conflict between the sense of commiseration and the commands of duty is augmented when the nature of the crime defined by the Philippine law and the punishment which that law prescribes is only abstractly considered, since the impression is at once produced that the legislative authority has been severely exerted. I say only abstractly considered, because the first impression produced by the merely abstract view of the subject is met by the admonition that the duty of defining and punishing crime has never in any civilized country been exerted upon mere abstract considerations of the inherent nature of the crime punished, but has always involved the most practical consideration of the tendency at a particular time to commit certain crimes, of the difficulty of repressing the same, and of how far it is necessary to impose stern remedies to prevent the commission of such crimes. And, of course, as these considerations involve the necessity for a familiarity with local conditions in the Philippine Islands which I do not possess, such want of knowledge at once additionally admonishes me of the wrong to arise from forming a judgment upon insufficient data or without a knowledge of the subject-matter upon which the judgment is to be exerted. Strength, indeed, is added to this last suggestion by the fact that no question concerning the subject was raised in the courts below or there considered, and, therefore, no opportunity was afforded those courts, presumably, at least, relatively familiar with the local [p385] conditions, to express their views as to the considerations which may have led to the prescribing of the punishment in question. Turning aside, therefore, from mere emotional tendencies and guiding my judgment alone by the aid of the reason at my command, I am unable to agree with the ruling of the court. As, in my opinion, that ruling rests upon an interpretation of the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment, never before announced, which is repugnant to the natural import of the language employed in the clause, and which interpretation curtails the legislative power of Congress to define and punish crime by asserting a right of judicial supervision over the exertion of that power, in disregard of the distinction between the legislative and judicial departments of the Government, I deem it my duty to dissent and state my reasons.
To perform this duty requires at the outset a precise statement of the construction given by the ruling now made to the provision of the Eighth Amendment. My inability to do this must, however, be confessed, because I find it impossible to fix with precision the meaning which the court gives to that provision. Not for the purpose of criticising, but solely in order to indicate my perplexity on the subject, the reasons for my doubt are briefly given. Thus to my mind it appears as follows: First. That the court interprets the inhibition against cruel and unusual punishment as imposing upon Congress the duty of proportioning punishment according to the nature of the crime, and casts upon the judiciary the duty of determining whether punishments have been properly apportioned in a particular statute, and if not to decline to enforce it. This seems to me to be the case, because of the reference made by the court to the harshness of the principal punishment (imprisonment), and its comments as to what it deems to be the severity, if not inhumanity, of the accessories which result from or accompany it, and the declaration in substance that these things offend against the just principle of proportioning punishment to the nature of the crime punished, stated to be a [p386] fundamental precept of justice and of American criminal law. That this is the view now upheld, it seems to me, is additionally demonstrated by the fact that the punishment for the crime in question as imposed by the Philippine law is compared with other Philippine punishments for crimes deemed to be less heinous, and the conclusion is deduced that this fact in and of itself serves to establish that the punishment imposed in this case is an exertion of unrestrained power condemned by the cruel and unusual punishment clause.
Second. That this duty of apportionment compels not only that the lawmaking power should adequately apportion punishment for the crimes as to which it legislates, but also further exacts that the performance of the duty of apportionment must be discharged by taking into view the standards, whether lenient or severe, existing in other and distinct jurisdictions, and that a failure to do so authorizes the courts to consider such standards in their discretion and judge of the validity of the law accordingly. I say this because, although the court expressly declares in the opinion, when considering a case decided by the highest court of one of the Territories of the United States, that the legislative power to define and punish crime committed in a Territory, for the purpose of the Eighth Amendment, is separate and distinct from the legislation of Congress, yet in testing the validity of the punishment affixed by the law here in question, proceeds to measure it not alone by the Philippine legislation, but by the provisions of several acts of Congress punishing crime and in substance declares such Congressional laws to be a proper standard, and in effect holds that the greater proportionate punishment inflicted by the Philippine law over the more lenient punishments prescribed in the laws of Congress establishes that the Philippine law is repugnant to the Eighth Amendment.
Third. That the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment controls not only the exertion of legislative power as to modes of punishment, proportionate or otherwise, but addresses itself also to the mainspring of the [p387] legislative motives in enacting legislation punishing crime in a particular case, and therefore confers upon courts the power to refuse to enforce a particular law defining and punishing crime if in their opinion such law does not manifest that the lawmaking power, in fixing the punishment, was sufficiently impelled by a purpose to effect a reformation of the criminal. This is said because of the statements contained in the opinion of the court as to the legislative duty to shape legislation not only with a view to punish but to reform the criminal, and the inferences which I deduce that it is conceived that the failure to do so is a violation of constitutional duty.
Fourth. That the cruel and unusual punishment clause does not merely limit the legislative power to fix the punishment for crime by excepting out of that authority the right to impose bodily punishments of a cruel kind, in the strict acceptation of those terms, but limits the legislative discretion in determining to what degree of severity an appropriate and usual mode of punishment may in a particular case be inflicted, and therefore endows the courts with the right to supervise the exercise of legislative discretion as to the adequacy of punishment, even although resort is had only to authorized kinds of punishment, thereby endowing the courts with the power to refuse to enforce laws punishing crime if in the judicial judgment the legislative branch of the Government has prescribed a too severe punishment.
Not being able to assent to these, as it to me seems, in some respects conflicting, or at all events widely divergent propositions, I shall consider them all as sanctioned by the interpretation now given to the prohibition of the Eighth Amendment, and with this conception in mind shall consider the subject.
Before approaching the text of the Eighth Amendment to determine its true meaning let me briefly point out why in my opinion it cannot have the significance which it must receive to sustain the propositions rested upon it. In the first place, if it be that the lawmaker in defining and punishing crime is imperatively restrained by constitutional provisions to apportion [p388] punishment by a consideration alone of the abstract heinousness of the offenses punished, it must result that the power is so circumscribed as to be impossible of execution, or at all events is so restricted as to exclude the possibility of taking into account in defining and punishing crime all those considerations concerning the condition of society, the tendency to commit the particular crime, the difficulty of detecting the same, the necessity for resorting to stern measures of repression, and various other subjects which have at all times been deemed essential to be weighed in defining and punishing crime. And certainly the paralysis of the discretion vested in the lawmaking authority which the propositions accomplish is immeasurably magnified when it is considered that this duty of proportioning punishment requires the taking into account of the standards prevailing in other or different countries or jurisdictions, thereby at once exacting that legislation on the subject of crime must be proportioned, not to the conditions to which it is intended to apply, but must be based upon conditions with which the legislation when enacted will have no relation or concern whatever. And when it is considered that the propositions go further and insist that if the legislation seems to the judicial mind not to have been sufficiently impelled by motives of reformation of the criminal, such legislation defining and punishing crime is to be held repugnant to constitutional limitations, the impotency of the legislative power to define and punish crime is made manifest. When to this result is added the consideration that the interpretation by its necessary effect does not simply cause the cruel and unusual punishment clause to carve out of the domain of legislative authority the power to resort to prohibited kinds of punishments, but subjects to judicial control, the degree of severity with which authorized modes of punishment may be inflicted, it seems to me that the demonstration is conclusive that nothing will be left of the independent legislative power to punish and define crime, if the interpretation now made be pushed in future application to its logical conclusion.
[p389] But let me come to the Eighth Amendment, for the purpose of stating why the clause in question does not, in my opinion, authorize the deductions drawn from it, and therefore does not sanction the ruling now made.
I shall consider the Amendment a, as to its origin in the mother country and the meaning there given to it prior to the American Revolution; b, its migration and existence in the States after the Revolution and prior to the adoption of the Constitution; c, its incorporation into the Constitution and the construction given to it in practice from the beginning to this time; and, d, the judicial interpretation which it has received, associated with the construction affixed, both in practice and judicially, to the same provision found in various state constitutions or bills of rights.
Without going into unnecessary historical detail, it is sufficient to point out, as did the court in In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 446, that "the provision in reference to cruel and unusual punishments was taken from the well-known act of Parliament of 1688, entitled An act declaring the rights and liberties of the subject and settling the succession of the crown." And this act, it is to be observed, was but in regular form a crystallization of the declaration of rights of the same year. Hallam, Const. Hist., vol. 3, p. 106. It is also certain, as declared in the Kemmler case, that "this declaration of rights had reference to the acts of the executive and judicial departments of the government of England," since it but embodied the grievances which it was deemed had been suffered by the usurpations of the crown and transgressions of authority by the courts. In the recitals, both in the declaration of rights and the bill of rights, the grievances complained of were that illegal and cruel punishments had been inflicted, "which are utterly and directly contrary to the known laws and statutes and freedom of this realm," while in both the declaration and the bill of rights the remedy formulated was a declaration against the infliction of cruel and unusual punishments.
Whatever may be the difficulty, if any, in fixing the mean- [p390] ing of the prohibition at its origin, it may not be doubted, and indeed is not questioned by any one, that the cruel punishments against which the bill of rights provided were the atrocious, sanguinary and inhuman punishments which had been inflicted in the past upon the persons of criminals. This being certain, the difficulty of interpretation, if any is involved, in determining what was intended by the unusual punishments referred to and which were provided against. Light, however, on this subject is at once afforded by observing that the unusual punishments provided against were responsive to and obviously considered to be the illegal punishments complained of. These complaints were, first, that customary modes of bodily punishments, such as whipping and the pillory, had, under the exercise of judicial discretion, been applied to so unusual a degree as to cause them to be illegal; and, second, that in some cases an authority to sentence to perpetual imprisonment had been exerted under the assumption that power to do so resulted from the existence of judicial discretion to sentence to imprisonment, when it was unusual, and therefore illegal, to inflict life imprisonment in the absence of express legislative authority. In other words, the prohibitions, although conjunctively stated, were really disjunctive, and embraced as follows: a, Prohibitions against a resort to the inhuman bodily punishments of the past; b, or, where certain bodily punishments were customary, a prohibition against their infliction to such an extent as to be unusual and consequently illegal; c, or the infliction, under the assumption of the exercise of judicial discretion, of unusual punishments not bodily which could not be imposed except by express statute, or which were wholly beyond the jurisdiction of the court to impose.
The scope and power of the guarantee as we have thus stated it will be found portrayed in the reasons assigned by the members of the House of Lords who dissented against two judgments for perjury entered in the King's Bench against Titus Oates. 10 Howell's State Trials, col. 1325. [p391] The judgments and the dissenting reasons are copied in the margin.
As well the dissent referred to as the report of the conferees [p392] on the part of the House of Commons, made to that body concerning a bill to set aside the judgments against Oates above referred to, (Cobbett's Parl. History, vol. V, col. 386), proceeded upon the identity of what was deemed to be the illegal practises complained of and which were intended to be rectified by the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments [p393] made in the declaration of rights, and treated that prohibition, as already stated, as substantially disjunctive, and as forbidding the doing of the things we have above enumerated. See, for the disjunctive character of the provision, Stephen, Comm. Law of England, 15th ed., p. 379.
When the origin and purpose of the declaration and the bill of rights is thus fixed it becomes clear that that declaration is not susceptible of the meaning now attributed to the same language found in the Constitution of the United States. That in England it was nowhere deemed that any theory of proportional punishment was suggested by the bill of rights or that a protest was thereby intended against the severity of punishments, speaking generally, is demonstrated by the practise which prevailed in England as to punishing crime from the time of the bill of rights to the time of the American Revolution. Speaking on this subject, Stephen, in his history of the criminal law of England, vol. 1, pp. 470-471, says:
"The severity of the criminal law was greatly increased all through the eighteenth century by the creation of new felonies without benefit of clergy. . . . However, after making all deductions on these grounds, there can be no doubt that the legislation of the eighteenth century in criminal matters was severe to the highest degree, and destitute of any sort of principle or system."
For the sake of brevity a review of the practises which prevailed in the colonial period will not be referred to. Therefore, attention is at once directed to the express guarantees in certain of the state constitutions adopted after the Declaration of Independence and prior to the formation of the Constitution of the United States, and the circumstances connected with the subsequent adoption of the Eighth Amendment.
In 1776, Maryland, in a bill of rights declared (1 Charters and Constitutions, pp. 818, 819):
"XIV. That sanguinary laws ought to be avoided, as far as is consistent with the safety of the State; and no law to inflict [p394] cruel and unusual pains and penalties ought to be made in any case, or at any time hereafter."
"XXII. That excessive bail ought not to be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel or unusual punishments inflicted, by the courts of law."
The constitution of North Carolina of 1776 in general terms prohibited the infliction of "cruel or unusual punishments."
Virginia, by § 9 of the bill of rights adopted in 1776, provided as follows:
"That excessive bail ought not to be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."
In the Massachusetts declaration of rights of 1780 a direct prohibition was placed upon the infliction by magistrates or courts of cruel or unusual punishments, the provision being as follows:
"ART. XXVI. No magistrate or court of law shall demand excessive bail or sureties, impose excessive fines, or inflict cruel or unusual punishments."
The declaration of rights of New Hampshire of 1784, was as follows:
"XVIII. All penalties ought to be proportioned to the nature of the offense. No wise legislature will affix the same punishment to the crimes of theft, forgery and the like, which they do to those of murder and treason; where the same undistinguishing severity exerted is against all offenses; the people are led to forget the real distinction in the crimes themselves, and to commit the most flagrant with as little compunction as they do those of the lightest dye: For the same reason a multitude of sanguinary laws is both impolitic and unjust. The true design of all punishments being to reform, not to exterminate, mankind."
"XXXIII. No magistrate or court of law shall demand excessive bail or sureties, impose excessive fines, or inflict cruel or unusual punishments."
The substantial identity between the provisions of these several constitutions or bills of rights shows beyond doubt that [p395] their meaning was understood, that is to say, that the significance attributed to them in the mother country as the result of the bill of rights of 1689 was appreciated, and that it was intended in using the identical words to give them the same well-understood meaning. It is to be observed that the New Hampshire bill of rights contains a clause admonishing as to the wisdom of the apportionment of punishment of crime according to the nature of the offense, but in marked contrast to the reenactment, in express and positive terms, of the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the English bill of rights, the provision as to apportionment is merely advisory, additionally demonstrating the precise and accurate conception then entertained of the nature and character of the prohibition adopted from the English bill of rights.
Undoubtedly, in the American States, prior to the formation of the Constitution, the necessity for the protection afforded by the cruel and unusual punishment guarantee of the English bill of rights had ceased to be a matter of concern, because as a rule the cruel bodily punishments of former times were no longer imposed, and judges, where moderate bodily punishment was usual, had not, under the guise of discretion, directed the infliction of such punishments to so unusual a degree as to transcend the limits of discretion and cause the punishment to be illegal, and had also not attempted, in virtue of mere discretion, to inflict such unusual and extreme punishments as had always been deemed proper to be inflicted only as the result of express statutory authority. Despite these considerations, it is true that some of the solicitude which arose after the submission of the Constitution for ratification, and which threatened to delay or prevent such ratification, in part at least was occasioned by the failure to guarantee against the infliction of cruel and unusual punishments. Thus, in the Massachusetts convention, Mr. Holmes, discussing the general result of the judicial powers conferred by the Constitution and referring to the right of Congress to define and fix the punishment for crime, said (2 El. Deb. 111):
[p396] "They are nowhere restrained from inventing the most cruel and unheard-of punishments, and annexing them to crimes; and there is no constitutional check on them, but that racks and gibbets may be amongst the most mild instruments of their discipline."
That the opposition to the ratification in the Virginia convention was earnestly and eloquently voiced by Patrick Henry is too well known to require anything but statement. That the absence of a guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment was one of the causes of the solicitude by which Henry was possessed is shown by the debates in that convention. Thus Patrick Henry said (3 El. Deb. 447):
"In this business of legislation, your members of Congress will lose the restriction of not imposing excessive fines, demanding excessive bail, and inflicting cruel and unusual punishments. These are prohibited by your declaration of rights. What has distinguished our ancestors? That they would not admit of tortures, or cruel and barbarous punishment. But Congress may introduce the practice of the civil law, in preference to that of the common law. They may introduce the practice of France, Spain and Germany—of torturing, to extort a confession of the crime. They will say that they might as well draw examples from those countries as from Great Britain, and they will tell you that there is such a necessity of strengthening the arm of government that they must have a criminal equity, and extort confession by torture, in order to punish with still more relentless severity. We are then lost and undone. And can any man think it troublesome when we can by a small interference prevent our rights from being lost? If you will, like the Virginian government, give them knowledge of the extent of the rights retained by the people, and the powers of themselves, they will, if they be honest men, thank you for it. Will they not wish to go on sure grounds? But, if you leave them otherwise, they will not know how to proceed; and, being in a state of uncertainty, they will assume rather than give up powers by implication."
[p397] These observations, it is plainly to be seen, were addressed to the fear of the repetition either by the sanction of law or by the practice of courts, of the barbarous modes of bodily punishment or torture, the protest against which was embodied in the bill of rights in 1689.
The ultimate recognition by Henry of the patriotic duty to ratify the Constitution and trust to the subsequent adoption of a bill of rights, the submission and adoption of the first ten amendments as a bill of rights which followed ratification, the connection of Mr. Madison with the drafting of the amendments, and the fact that the Eighth Amendment is in the precise words of the guarantee on that subject in the Virginia bill of rights, would seem to make it perfectly clear that it was only intended by that Amendment to remedy the wrongs which had been provided against in the English bill of rights, and which were likewise provided against in the Virginia provision, and therefore were intended to guard against the evils so vividly portrayed by Henry in the debate which we have quoted. That this was the common understanding which must have existed on the subject is plainly to be inferred from the fact that the Eighth Amendment was substantially submitted by Congress without any debate on the subject. 2 Elliot's Deb. 225. Of course, in view of the nature and character of the government which the Constitution called into being, the incorporation of the Eighth Amendment caused its provisions to operate a direct and controlling prohibition upon the legislative branch (as well as all other departments), restraining it from authorizing or directing the infliction of the cruel bodily punishments of the past, which was one of the evils sought to be prevented for the future by the English bill of rights, and also restrained the courts from exerting and Congress from empowering them to select and exert by way of discretion modes of punishment which were not usual, or usual modes of punishment to a degree not usual and which could alone be imposed by express authority of law. But this obvious result lends no [p398] support to the theory that the adoption of the Amendment operated or was intended to prevent the legislative branch of the Government from prescribing, according to its conception of what public policy required, such punishments, severe or otherwise, as it deemed necessary for the prevention of crime, provided only resort was not had to the infliction of bodily punishments of a cruel and barbarous character against which the Amendment expressly provided. Not to so conclude is to hold that because the Amendment in addition to depriving the lawmaking power of the right to authorize the infliction of cruel bodily punishments had restricted the courts, where discretion was possessed by them, from exerting the power to punish by a mode or in a manner so unusual as to require legislative sanction, it thereby deprived Congress of the power to sanction the punishments which the Amendment forbade being imposed merely because they were not sanctioned. In other words, that because the power was denied to the judiciary to do certain things without legislative authority, thereby the right on the part of the legislature to confer the authority was taken away. And this impossible conclusion would lead to the equally impossible result that the effect of the Amendment was to deprive Congress of its legitimate authority to punish crime, by prescribing such modes of punishment, even although not before employed, as were appropriate for the purpose.
That no such meaning as is now ascribed to the Amendment was attributed to it at the time of its adoption is shown by the fact that not a single suggestion that it had such a meaning is pointed to, and that on the other hand the practise from the very beginning shows directly to the contrary and demonstrates that the very Congress that adopted the Amendment construed it in practice as I have construed it. This is so, since the first crimes act of the United States prescribed a punishment for crime utterly without reference to any assumed rule of proportion or of a conception of a right in the judiciary to supervise the action of Congress in respect to [p399] the severity of punishment, excluding always the right to impose as a punishment the cruel bodily punishments which were prohibited. What clearer demonstration can there be of this than the statement made by this court in Ex parte Wilson, 114 U.S. 427, of the nature of the first crimes act, as follows:
"By the first Crimes Act of the United States, forgery of public securities, or knowingly uttering forged public securities with intent to defraud, as well as treason, murder, piracy, mutiny, robbery, or rescue of a person convicted of a capital crime, was punishable with death; most other offenses were punished by fine and imprisonment; whipping was part of the punishment of stealing or falsifying records, fraudulently acknowledging bail, larceny of goods, or receiving stolen goods; disqualification to hold office was part of the punishment of bribery; and those convicted of perjury or subornation of perjury, besides being fined and imprisoned, were to stand in the pillory for one hour, and rendered incapable of testifying in any court of the United States. Act of April 30, 1790, ch. 9; 1 Stat. 112–117; Mr. Justice Wilson's Charge to the Grand Jury in 1791, 3 Wilson's Works, 380, 381."
And it is, I think, beyond power even of question that the legislation of Congress from the date of the first crimes act to the present time but exemplifies the truth of what has been said, since that legislation from time to time altered modes of punishment, increasing or diminishing the amount of punishment as was deemed necessary for the public good, prescribing punishments of a new character, without reference to any assumed rule of apportionment or the conception that a right of judicial supervision was deemed to obtain. It is impossible with any regard for brevity to demonstrate these statements by many illustrations. But let me give a sample from legislation enacted by Congress of the change of punishment. By § 14 of the first crimes act (Art. April 30, 1790, ch. 9, 1 Stat. 115), forgery, etc., of the public securities of the United States, or the knowingly ut- [p400] tering and offering for sale of forged or counterfeited securities of the United States with intent to defraud, was made punishable by death. The punishment now is a fine of not more than $5,000, and imprisonment at hard labor for not more than fifteen years. Rev. Stat., § 5414.
By the first crimes act also, as in numerous others since that time, various additional punishments for the commission of crime were imposed, prescribing disqualification to hold office, to be a witness in the courts, etc., and as late as 1865 a law was enacted by Congress which prescribed as a punishment for crime the disqualification to enjoy rights of citizenship. Rev. Stat., §§ 1996, 1997, 1998.
Comprehensively looking at the rulings of this court, it may be conceded that hitherto they have not definitely interpreted the precise meaning of the clause in question, because in most of the cases in which the protection of the Amendment has been invoked the cases came from courts of last resort of States, and the opinions leave room for the contention that they proceeded upon the implied assumption that the Eighth Amendment did not govern the States by virtue of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment. However, in Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, a case coming to this court from the Territory of Utah, the meaning of the clause of the Eighth Amendment in question came directly under review. The question for decision was whether a sentence to death by shooting, which had been imposed by the court under the assumed exercise of a discretionary power to fix the mode of execution of the sentence, was repugnant to the clause. While the court in deciding that it was not, did not undertake to fully interpret the meaning of the clause, it nevertheless, reasoning by exclusion, expressly negatived the construction now placed upon it. It was said (pp. 135–136):
[p401] "Difficulty would attend the effort to define with exactness the extent of the constitutional provision which provides that cruel and unusual punishments shall not be inflicted; but it is safe to affirm that punishments of torture, such as those mentioned by the commentator referred to, and all others in the same line of unnecessary cruelty, are forbidden by that amendment to the Constitution. Cooley, Const. Lim. (4th ed.), 408; Wharton, Cr. L. (7th ed.), sec. 3405."
And it was doubtless this ruling which caused the court subsequently to say in In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447:
"Punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death; but the punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of that word as used in the Constitution. It implies there something inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere extinguishment of life."
Generally viewing the action of the States in their bills of right as to the prohibition against inhuman or cruel and unusual punishments, it is true to say that those provisions substantially conform to the English bill of rights and to the provision of the Eighth Amendment we are considering, some using the expression cruel and unusual, others the more accurate expression cruel or unusual, and some cruel only, and in a few instances a provision requiring punishments to be proportioned to the nature of the offense is added to the inhibition against cruel and unusual punishments. In one (Illinois) the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments is not expressed, although proportional punishment is commanded, yet in Kelley v. The People, 115 Illinois, 583, discussing the extent of punishment inflicted by a criminal statute, the Supreme Court of Illinois declared that "it would not be for the court to say the penalty was not proportioned to the nature of the offense." In another State (Ohio) where in the early constitution of the State proportionate punishment was conjoined with the cruel and unusual punishment provision, the proportionate provision was omitted in a later constitution.
[p402] Here, again, it is true to say, time forbidding my indulging in a review of the statutes, that the legislation of all the States is absolutely in conflict with and repugnant to the construction now given to the clause, since that legislation but exemplifies the exertion of legislative power to define and punish crime according to the legislative conception of the necessities of the situation, without the slightest indication of the assumed duty to proportion punishments, and without the suggestion of the existence of judicial power to control the legislative discretion, provided only that the cruel bodily punishments forbidden were not resorted to. And the decisions of the state courts of last resort, it seems to me, with absolute uniformity and without a single exception from the beginning, proceed upon this conception. It is true that when the reasoning employed in the various cases is critically examined a difference of conception will be manifested as to the occasion for the adoption of the English bill of rights and of the remedy which it provided. Generally speaking, when carefully analyzed, it will be seen that this difference was occasioned by treating the provision against cruel and unusual punishment as conjunctive instead of disjunctive, thereby overlooking the fact, which I think has been previously demonstrated to be the case, that the term unusual, as used in the clause, was not a qualification of the provision against cruel punishments, but was simply synonymous with illegal, and was mainly intended to restrain the courts, under the guise of discretion, from indulging in an unusual and consequently illegal exertion of power. Certain it is, however, whatever may be these differences of reasoning, there stands out in bold relief in the State cases, as it is given to me to understand them, without a single exception, the clear and certain exclusion of any prohibition upon the lawmaking power to determine the adequacy with which crime shall be punished, provided only the cruel bodily punishments of the past are not resorted to. Let me briefly refer to some of the cases.
[p403] In Aldridge v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. Cas. 447, decided about twenty years after the ratification of the Eighth Amendment, speaking concerning the evils to which the guarantee of the Virginia bill of rights against cruel and unusual punishments was addressed, the court, after referring to the punishments usually applicable in that State to crime at the time of the adoption of the bill of rights of Virginia, said (p. 450):
"We consider these sanctions as sufficiently rigorous, and we knew that the best heads and hearts of the land of our ancestors had long and loudly declaimed against the wanton cruelty of many of the punishments practiced in other countries; and this section in the bill of rights was framed effectually to exclude these, so that no future legislature, in a moment perhaps of great and general excitement, should be tempted to disgrace our code by the introduction of any of those odious modes of punishment."
And, four years later, in 1828, applying the same doctrine in Commonwealth v. Wyatt, 6 Rand. 694, where a punishment by whipping was challenged as contrary to the Virginia bill of rights, the court said (p. 700): "The punishment of offenses by stripes is certainly odious, but cannot be said to be unusual."
Until 1865 there was no provision in the constitution of Georgia expressly guaranteeing against cruel and unusual punishments. The constitution of that year, however, contained a clause identical in terms with the Eighth Amendment, and the scope of the guarantee arose for decision in 1872 in Whitten v. State, 47 Georgia, 297. The case was this: Upon a conviction for assault and battery Whitten had been sentenced to imprisonment or the payment of a fine of $250 and costs. The contention was that this sentence was so disproportionate to the offense committed as to be cruel and unusual and repugnant to the guarantee. In one of its immediate aspects the case involved the guarantee against excessive fines, but as the imprisonment was the coercive means for the payment of the fine, in that aspect the case [p404] involved the cruel and unusual punishment clause, and the court so considered, and, in coming to interpret the clause said (p. 301):
"Whether the law is unconstitutional, a violation of that article of the Constitution which declares excessive fines shall not be imposed nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted, is another question. The latter clause was, doubtless, intended to prohibit the barbarities of quartering, hanging in chains, castration, etc. When adopted by the framers of the Constitution of the United States, larceny was generally punished by hanging; forgeries, burglaries, etc., in the same way, for, be it remembered, penitentiaries are of modern origin, and I doubt if it ever entered into the mind of men of that day that a crime such as this witness makes the defendant guilty of deserved a less penalty than the judge has inflicted. It would be an interference with matters left by the Constitution to the legislative department of the government for us to undertake to weigh the propriety of this or that penalty fixed by the legislature for specific offenses. So long as they do not provide cruel and unusual punishments, such as disgraced the civilization of former ages, and made one shudder with horror to read of them, as drawing, quartering, burning, etc., the Constitution does not put any limit upon legislative discretion."
In State v. White (1890), 44 Kansas, 514, it was sought to reverse a sentence of five years' imprisonment in the penitentiary, imposed upon a boy of sixteen for statutory rape. The girl was aged sixteen, and had consented. It was contended that if the statute applied it was unconstitutional and void, "for the reason that it conflicts with section 9 of the bill of rights, because it inflicts cruel and unusual punishment, and is in conflict with the spirit of the bill of rights generally, and is in violation of common sense, common reason, and common justice."
The court severely criticised the statute. After deciding that the offense was embraced in the statute, the court said:
[p405] "With respect to the severity of the punishment, while we think it is true that it is a severer one than has ever before been provided for in any other State or county for such an offense, yet we cannot say that the statute is void for that reason. Imprisonment in the penitentiary at hard labor is not of itself a cruel or unusual punishment, within the meaning of section 9 of the bill of rights of the Constitution, for it is a kind of punishment which has been resorted to ever since Kansas has had any existence, and is a kind of punishment common in all civilized countries. That section of the Constitution probably, however, relates to the kind of punishment to be inflicted, and not to its duration. Although the punishment in this case may be considered severe, and much severer indeed than the punishment for offenses of much greater magnitude, as adultery, or sexual intercourse coupled with seduction, yet we cannot say that the act providing for it is unconstitutional or void."
In State v. Hogan (1900), 63 Ohio St. 218, the court sustained a "tramp law," which prescribed, as the punishment to be imposed on a tramp for threatening to do injury to the person of another, imprisonment in the penitentiary not more than three years nor less than one year. In the course of the opinion the court said:
"The objection that the act prescribes a cruel and unusual punishment we think not well taken. Imprisonment at hard labor is neither cruel nor unusual. It may be severe in the given instance, but that is a question for the lawmaking power. In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436; Cornelison v. Commonwealth, 84 Kentucky, 583. The punishment, to be effective, should be such as will prove a deterrent. The tramp cares nothing for a jail sentence. Often he courts it. A workhouse sentence is less welcome, but there are but few workhouses in the State. A penitentiary sentence is a real punishment. There he has to work, and cannot shirk."
In Minnesota a register of deeds was convicted of misappropriating the sum of $62.50, which should have been turned [p406] over by him to the county treasurer. He was sentenced to pay a fine of $500 and be imprisoned at hard labor for one year. The contention that the sentence was repugnant to the state constitutional guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment was considered and disposed of by the court in State v. Borgstrom, 69 Minnesota, 508, 520. Among other things the court said:
"It is claimed that the sentence imposed was altogether disproportionate to the offense charged, and of which the defendant was convicted, and comes within the inhibition of Const. art. 1, § 5, that no cruel or unusual punishments be inflicted. . . . We are not unmindful of the importance of this question, and have given to it that serious and thorough examination which such importance demands4 In England there was a time when punishment was by torture, by loading him with weights to make him confess. Traitors were condemned to be drowned, disemboweled, or burned. It was the 'law that the offender shall be drawn, or rather dragged, to the gallows; he shall be hanged and cut down alive; his entrails shall be removed and burned while he yet lives; his head shall be decapitated; his body divided into four parts.' Browne, Bl. Comm. 617. For certain other offenses the offender was punished by cutting off the hands or ears, or boiling in oil, or putting in the pillory. By the Roman law a parricide was punished by being sewed up in a leather sack with a live dog, a cock, a viper, and an ape, and cast into the sea. These punishments may properly be termed cruel, but happily the more humane spirit of this nation does not permit such punishment to be inflicted upon criminals. Such punishments are not warranted by the laws of nature or society, and we find that they are prohibited by our Constitution. But, within this limitation or restriction, the legislature is ordinarily the judge of the expediency of creating new crimes and of prescribing the penalty. . . . While the amount of money misappropriated in this instance was not great, the legislature evidently had in mind the fact that the misappropriation by a [p407] public official of the public money was destructive of the public rights and the stability of our government. But fine and imprisonment are not ordinarily cruel and unusual punishments. . . ."
In Territory v. Ketchum, 10 N.M. 721, the court considered whether a statute which had recently been put in force and which imposed the death penalty instead of a former punishment of imprisonment, for an attempt at train robbery, was cruel and unusual. In sustaining the validity of the law the court pointed out the conditions of society which presumably had led the lawmaking power to fix the stern penalty, and after a lengthy discussion of the subject it was held that the law did not impose punishment which was cruel or unusual.
The cases just reviewed are typical, and I therefore content myself with noting in the margin many others to the same general effect.
In stating, as I have done, that in my opinion no case could be found sustaining the proposition which the court now [p408] holds, I am of course not unmindful that a North Carolina case (State v. Driver, 78 N.C. 432) is cited by the court as authority, and that a Louisiana case (State ex rel. Garvey et al. v. Whitaker, Recorder, 48 La. Ann. 527) is sometimes referred to as of the same general tenor. A brief analysis of the Driver case will indicate why in my opinion it does not support the contention based upon it. In that case the accused was convicted of assault and battery, and sentenced to imprisonment for five years in the county jail. The offense was a commonlaw misdemeanor, and the punishment not being fixed by statute, as observed by the court (page 429), was left to the discretion of the judge. In testing whether the term of the sentence was unusual and therefore illegal, the court held that a long term of imprisonment in the county jail was unlawful because unusual, and was a gross abuse by the lower court of its discretion. Although the court made reference to the constitutional guarantee, there is not the slightest indication in its opinion that it was deemed there would have been power to set aside the sentence had it been inflicted by virtue of an express statutory command. But this aside, it seems to me as the test applied in the Driver case to determine what was an unusual punishment in North Carolina was necessarily so local in character that it affords no possible ground here for giving an erroneous meaning to the Eighth Amendment. I say this because an examination of the opinion will disclose that it proceeded upon a consideration of the disadvantages peculiar to an imprisonment in a county jail in North Carolina as compared with the greater advantages to arise from the imprisonment for a like term in the penitentiary, the court saying:
"Now, it is true our terms of imprisonment are much longer, but they are in the penitentiary, where a man may live and be made useful; but a county jail is a close prison, where life is soon in jeopardy, and where the prisoner is not only useless but a heavy public expense."
As to the Louisiana case, I content myself with saying that it, in substance, involved merely the question of error com- [p409] mitted by a magistrate in imposing punishment for many offenses when, under the law, the offense was a continuing and single one.
From all the considerations which have been stated I can deduce no ground whatever which to my mind sustains the interpretation now given to the cruel and unusual punishment clause. On the contrary, in my opinion, the review which has been made demonstrates that the word cruel, as used in the Amendment, forbids only the lawmaking power, in prescribing punishment for crime and the courts in imposing punishment from inflicting unnecessary bodily suffering through a resort to inhuman methods for causing bodily torture, like or which are of the nature of the cruel methods of bodily torture which had been made use of prior to the bill of rights of 1689, and against the recurrence of which the word cruel was used in that instrument. To illustrate. Death was a well-known method of punishment prescribed by law, and it was of course painful, and in that sense was cruel. But the infliction of this punishment was clearly not prohibited by the word cruel, although that word manifestly was intended to forbid the resort to barbarous and unnecessary methods of bodily torture, in executing even the penalty of death.
In my opinion the previous considerations also establish that the word unusual accomplished only three results: First, it primarily restrains the courts when acting under the authority of a general discretionary power to impose punishment, such as was possessed at common law, from inflicting lawful modes of punishment to so unusual a degree as to cause the punishment to be illegal because to that degree it cannot be inflicted without express statutory authority; second, it restrains the courts in the exercise of the same discretion from inflicting a mode of punishment so unusual as to be impliedly not within its discretion and to be consequently illegal in the absence of express statutory authority; and, third, as to both the foregoing it operated to restrain the lawmaking power from endowing the judiciary with the right to exert an illegal [p410] discretion as to the kind and extent of punishment to be inflicted.
Nor is it given to me to see in what respect the construction thus stated minimizes the constitutional guarantee by causing it to become obsolete or ineffective in securing the purposes which led to its adoption. Of course, it may not be doubted that the provision against cruel bodily punishment is not restricted to the mere means used in the past to accomplish the prohibited result. The prohibition being generic, embraces all methods within its intendment. Thus, if it could be conceived that to-morrow the lawmaking power, instead of providing for the infliction of the death penalty by hanging, should command its infliction by burying alive, who could doubt that the law would be repugnant to the constitutional inhibition against cruel punishment? But while this consideration is obvious, it must be equally apparent that the prohibition against the infliction of cruel bodily torture cannot be extended so as to limit legislative discretion in prescribing punishment for crime by modes and methods which are not embraced within the prohibition against cruel bodily punishment, considered even in their most generic sense, without disregarding the elementary rules of construction which have prevailed from the beginning. Of course, the beneficent application of the Constitution to the ever-changing requirements of our national life has in a great measure resulted from the simple and general terms by which the powers created by the Constitution are conferred or in which the limitations which it provides are expressed. But this beneficent result has also essentially depended upon the fact that this court, while never hesitating to bring within the powers granted or to restrain by the limitations created all things generically within their embrace, has also incessantly declined to allow general words to be construed so as to include subjects not within their intendment. That these great results have been accomplished through the application by the court of the familiar rule that what is generically included in the words [p411] employed in the Constitution is to be ascertained by considering their origin and their significance at the time of their adoption in the instrument may not be denied (Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 624; Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100, 124, 125), rulings which are directly repugnant to the conception that by judicial construction constitutional limitations may be made to progress so as to ultimately include that which they were not intended to embrace, a principle with which it seems to me the ruling now made is in direct conflict, since by the interpretation now adopted two results are accomplished: a, the clause against cruel punishments, which was intended to prohibit inhumane and barbarous bodily punishments, is so construed as to limit the discretion of the lawmaking power in determining the mere severity with which punishments not of the prohibited character may be prescribed, and, b, by interpreting the word unusual adopted for the sole purpose of limiting judicial discretion in order thereby to maintain the supremacy of the lawmaking power, so as to cause the prohibition to bring about the directly contrary result, that is, to expand the judicial power by endowing it with a vast authority to control the legislative department in the exercise of its discretion to define and punish crime.
But further than this, assuming for the sake of argument that I am wrong in my view of the Eighth Amendment, and that it endows the courts with the power to review the discretion of the lawmaking body in prescribing sentence of imprisonment for crime, I yet cannot agree with the conclusion reached in this case that because of the mere term of imprisonment it is within the rule. True, the imprisonment is at hard and painful labor. But certainly the mere qualification of painful in addition to hard cannot be the basis upon which it is now decided that the legislative discretion was abused, since to understand the meaning of the term requires a knowledge of the discipline prevailing in the prisons in the Philippine Islands. The division of hard labor into classes, one more irksome and it may be said more painful than the other in the [p412] sense of severity, is well known. English Prisons Act of 1865, Pub. Gen. Stat., § 19, page 835. I do not assume that the mere fact that a chain is to be carried by the prisoner causes the punishment to be repugnant to the bill of rights, since while the chain may be irksome it is evidently not intended to prevent the performance of the penalty of hard labor. Such a provision may well be part of the ordinary prison discipline, particularly in communities where the jails are insecure, and it may be a precaution applied, as it is commonly applied in this country, as a means of preventing the escape of prisoners, for instance where the sentence imposed is to work on the roads or other work where escape might be likely. I am brought, then, to the conclusion that the accessory punishments are the basis of the ruling now made, that the legislative discretion was so abused as to cause it to be necessary to declare the law prescribing the punishment for the crime invalid. But I can see no foundation for this ruling, as to my mind these accessory punishments, even under the assumption, for the sake of argument, that they amounted to an abuse of legislative discretion, are clearly separable from the main punishment—imprisonment. Where a sentence is legal in one part and illegal in another it is not open to controversy that the illegal, if separable, may be disregarded and the legal enforced. United States v. Pridgeon, 153 U.S. 48. But it is said here the illegality is not merely in the sentence, but in the law which authorizes the sentence. Grant the premise. The illegal is capable of separation from the legal in the law as well as in the sentence, and because this is a criminal case it is none the less subject to the rule that where a statute is unconstitutional in part and in part not, the unconstitutional part, if separable, may be rejected and the constitutional part maintained. Of course it is true that that can only be done provided it can be assumed that the legislature would have enacted the legal part separate from the illegal. The ruling now made must therefore rest upon the proposition that because the law has provided an illegal in addition to a legal punish- [p413] ment it must be assumed that the legislature would not have defined and punished the crime to the legal extent, because to some extent the legislature was mistaken as to its powers. But this I contend is to indulge in an assumption which is unwarranted and has been directly decided to the contrary at this term in United States v. Union Supply Company, 215 U.S. 50. In that case a corporation was proceeded against criminally for an offense punishable by imprisonment and fine. The corporation clearly could not be subjected to the imprisonment, and the contention was that the lawmaker must be presumed to have intended that both the punishments should be inflicted upon the person violating the law, and therefore it could not be intended to include a corporation within its terms. In overruling the contention it was said (p. 55):
"And if we free our minds from the notion that criminal statutes must be construed by some artificial and conventional rule, the natural inference, when a statute prescribes two independent penalties, is that it means to inflict them so far as it can, and that if one of them is impossible, it does not mean on that account to let the defendant escape."
I am authorized to say that MR. JUSTICE HOLMES concurs in this dissent.

# Notes

* ↑ Judgment against Titus Oates upon conviction upon two indictments for perjury, as announced by the court, (10 Howell's State Trials, col. 1316–1317 & 1325). "First, The Court does order for a fine, that you pay 1000 marks upon each Indictment. "Secondly, That you be stript of all your Canonical Habits. "Thirdly, The Court does award, That you do stand upon the Pillory, and in the Pillory, here before Westminster-hall gate, upon Monday next, for an hour's time, between the hours of 10 and 12; with a paper over your head (which you must first walk with round about to all the Courts in Westminster-hall) declaring your crime. And that is upon the first Indictment. "Fourthly, (on the Second Indictment), upon Tuesday, you shall stand upon, and in the Pillory, at the Royal Exchange in London, for the space of an hour, between the hours of twelve and two; with the same inscription. "You shall upon the next Wednesday be whipped from Aldgate to Newgate. "Upon Friday, you shall be whipped from Newgate to Tyburn, by the hands of the common hangman. "But, Mr. Oates, we cannot but remember, there were several particular times you swore false about; and therefore, as annual commemorations, that it may be known to all people as long as you live, we have taken special care of you for an annual punishment. "Upon the 24th of April every year, as long as you live, you are to stand upon the Pillory and in the Pillory, at Tyburn, just opposite to the gallows, for the space of an hour, between the hours of ten and twelve. "You are to stand upon, and in the Pillory, here at Westminster hall gate, every 9th of August, in every year, so long as you live. And that it may be known what we mean by it, 'its to remember, what he swore about Mr. Ireland's being in town between the 8th and 12th of August. "You are to stand upon, and in the Pillory, at Charing-cross, on the 10th of August, every year, during your life, for an hour, between ten and twelve. "The like over-against the Temple gate, upon the 11th. "And upon the 2d of September, (which is another notorious time, [p392] which you cannot but be remember'd of) you are to stand upon, and in the Pillory, for the space of one hour, between twelve and two, at the Royal Exchange; and all this you are to do every year, during your life; and to be committed close prisoner, as long as you live." Dissenting statement of a minority of the House of Lords: "1. For that the king's bench, being a temporal court, made it part of the judgment, that Titus Oates, being a clerk, should for his said perjuries, be divested of his canonical and priestly habit, and to continue divested all his life; which is a matter wholly out of their power, belonging to the ecclesiastical courts only. "2. For that the said judgments are barbarous, inhuman, and unchristian; and there is no precedents to warrant the punishments of whipping and committing to prison for life, for the crime of perjury; which yet were but part of the punishments inflicted upon him. "3. For that the particular matters upon which the indictments were found, were the points objected against Mr. Titus Oates' testimony in several of the trials, in which he was allowed to be a good and credible witness, though testified against him by most of the same persons, who witnessed against him upon those indictments. "4. For that this will be an encouragement and allowance for giving the like cruel, barbarous, and illegal judgments hereafter, unless this judgment be reversed. "5. Because sir John Holt, sir Henry Pollexfen, the two chief justices, and sir Robert Atkins chief baron, with six judges more (being all that where then present), for these and many other reasons, did, before us, solemnly deliver their opinions, and unanimously declare, That the said judgments were contrary to law and ancient practice, and therefore erroneous, and ought to be reversed. "6. Because it is contrary to the declaration on the twelfth of February last, which was ordered by the Lords Spiritual and Temporal and Commons then assembled, and by their declaration engrossed in parchment, and enrolled among the records of parliament, and recorded in chancery; whereby it doth appear, that excessive bail ought not to be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel nor unusual punishments inflicted."
* ↑ Pervear v. Massachusetts, 5 Wall. 475; Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130; In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436; McElvaine v. Brush, 142 U.S. 155; Howard v. Fleming, 191 U.S. 126.
* ↑ Cases decided in state and territorial courts of last resort, involving the question whether particular punishments were cruel and unusual: Ex parte Mitchell, 70 California, 1; People v. Clark, 106 California, 32; Fogarty v. State, 80 Georgia, 450; Kelley v. State, 115 Illinois, 583; Hobbs v. State, 133 Indiana, 404; State v. Teeters, 97 Iowa, 458; In re Tutt, 55 Kansas, 705; Cornelison v. Commonwealth, 84 Kentucky, 583, 608; Harper v. Commonwealth, 93 Kentucky, 290; State v. Baker, 105 Louisiana, 378; Foot v. State, 59 Maryland, 264, 267; Commonwealth v. Hitchings, 5 Gray, 482; McDonald v. Commonwealth, 173 Massachusetts, 322; Luton v. Newaygo Circuit Judge, 69 Michigan, 610; People v. Morris, 80 Michigan, 637; People v. Smith, 94 Michigan, 644; People v. Whitney, 105 Michigan, 622; Dummer v. Nungesser, 107 Michigan, 481; People v. Huntley, 112 Michigan, 569; State v. Williams, 77 Missouri, 310; Ex parte Swann, 96 Missouri, 44; State v. Moore, 121 Missouri, 514; State v. Van Wye, 136 Missouri, 227; State v. Gedicke, 14 Vroom, 86; Garcia v. Territory, 1 N.M. 415; State v. Apple, 121 N.C. 584; State v. Barnes, 3 N.D. 319; State v. Becker, 3 S.D. 29; State v. Hodgson, 66 Vermont, 134; State v. De Lane, 80 Wisconsin, 259; State v. Fackler, 91 Wisconsin, 418; In re MacDonald, 4 Wyoming, 150.
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