# Hylton v. United States/Separate Iredell

3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171 (1796), is the first time a question regarding the constitutionality of an act of Congress was questioned before the Supreme Court of the United States. The argument of John Wickham, counsel for the United States, in the trial court is entitled The Substance of an Argument in the Case of the Carriage Duties.
Supreme Court of the United States
3 U.S. 171
Hylton v. United States
Argued: February 23, 1796 --- Decided: March 8, 1796
​ Iredell. Justice.—I agree in opinion with my brothers, who have already expressed theirs, that the tax in question, is agreeable to the Constitution; and the reasons which have satisfied me, can be delivered in a very few words, since I think the Constitution itself affords a clear guide to decide the controversy.
The Congress possess the power of taxing all taxable objects, without limitation, with the particular exception of a duty on exports.
There are two restrictions only on the exercise of this authority:
* All direct taxes must be apportioned.
* All duties, imposts, and excises must be uniform.
If the carriage tax be a direct tax, within the meaning of the Constitution, it must be apportioned.
If it be a duty, impost, or excise, within the meaning of the Constitution, it must be uniform.
If it can be considered as a tax, neither direct within the meaning of the Constitution, nor comprehended within the term duty, impost or excise; there is no provision in the Constitution, one way or another, and then it must be left to such an operation of the power, as if the authority to lay taxes had been given generally in all instances, without saying whether they should be apportioned or uniform; and in that case, I should presume, the tax ought to be uniform; because the present Constitution was particularly intended to affect individuals, and not states, except in particular cases specified: And this is the leading distinction between the articles of Confederation and the present Constitution.
As all direct taxes must be apportioned, it is evident that the Constitution contemplated none as direct but such as could be apportioned.
If this cannot be apportioned, it is, therefore, not a direct tax in the sense of the Constitution.
| | | | | | Dolls. | Cts. |
| This would produce in the whole | This would produce in the whole | This would produce in the whole | This would produce in the whole | This would produce in the whole | 1050 | |
| The share of Virginia being 19–105 parts, would be | The share of Virginia being 19–105 parts, would be | The share of Virginia being 19–105 parts, would be | The share of Virginia being 19–105 parts, would be | Dollars 190 | | |
| The share of Connecticut being 7–105 parts, would be | The share of Connecticut being 7–105 parts, would be | The share of Connecticut being 7–105 parts, would be | The share of Connecticut being 7–105 parts, would be | 70 | | |
| Then suppose | Virginia had | 50 | carriages, | | | |
| | Connecticut | 2. | | | | |
| The share of Virginia being 190 dollars, this must of course be collected from the owners of carriages, and there would therefore be collected from each carriage | The share of Virginia being 190 dollars, this must of course be collected from the owners of carriages, and there would therefore be collected from each carriage | The share of Virginia being 190 dollars, this must of course be collected from the owners of carriages, and there would therefore be collected from each carriage | The share of Virginia being 190 dollars, this must of course be collected from the owners of carriages, and there would therefore be collected from each carriage | The share of Virginia being 190 dollars, this must of course be collected from the owners of carriages, and there would therefore be collected from each carriage | 3 | 80 |
| The share of Connecticut being 70 dollars, each carriage would pay | The share of Connecticut being 70 dollars, each carriage would pay | The share of Connecticut being 70 dollars, each carriage would pay | The share of Connecticut being 70 dollars, each carriage would pay | The share of Connecticut being 70 dollars, each carriage would pay | 35 | |
If any state had no carriages, there could be no apportionment at all. This mode is too manifestly absurd to be supported, and has not even been attempted in debate.
But two expedients have been proposed of a very extraordinary nature, to evade the difficulty.
1. To raise the money a tax on carriages would produce, not by laying a tax on each carriage uniformly, but by selecting different articles in different states, so that the amount paid in each state may be equal to the sum due upon a principle of apportionment. One state might pay by a tax on carriages, another by a tax on slaves, &c.
I should have thought this merely an exercise of ingenuity, if it had not been pressed with some earnestness; and as this was done by gentlemen of high respectability in their profession, it deserves a serious answer, though it is very difficult to give such a one.
* This is not an apportionment, of a tax on Carriages, but of the money a tax on carriages might be supposed to produce, which is quite a different thing.
* It admits that Congress cannot lay an uniform tax on all carriages in the Union, in any mode, but that they may on carriages in one or more states. They may therefore lay a tax on carriages in 14 states, but not in the 15th.
* If Congress, according to this new decree, may select carriages as a proper object, in one or more states, but omit them in others, I presume they may omit them in all and select other articles.
| | Dolls. |
| Suppose, then, a tax on carriages would produce | 100,000 |
| And a tax on horses a like sum | 100,000 |
| and a hundred thousand dollars were to be apportioned according to that mode. Gentlemen might amuse themselves with calling this a tax on carriages, or a tax on horses, while not a ​single carriage, nor a single horse, was taxed throughout the Union. |||
The second expedient proposed, was, that of taxing carriages, among other things, in a general assessment. This amounts to saying, that Congress may lay a tax on carriages, but that they may not do it unless they blend it with other subjects of taxation. For this, no reason or authority has been given, and in addition to other suggestions offered by the Counsel on that side, affords an irrefragable proof, that when positions plainly so untenable, are offered to counteract the principle contended for by the opposite counsel, the principle itself is a right one; for, no one can doubt, that if better reasons could have been offered, they would not have escaped the sagacity and learning of the gentlemen who offered them.
There is no necessity, or propriety, in determining what is or is not, a direct, or indirect, tax in all cases.
Some difficulties may occur which we do not at present foresee. Perhaps a direct tax in the sense of the Constitution, can mean nothing but a tax on something inseparably annexed to the soil: Something capable of apportionment under all such circumstances.
A land or a poll tax may be considered of this description.
The latter is to be considered so particularly, under the present Constitution, on account of the salves in the southern states, who give a ratio in the representation in the proportion of 3 to 5.
Either of these is capable of apportionment.
In regard to other articles, there may possibly be considerable doubt.
It is sufficient, on the present occasion, for the court to be satisfied, that this is not a direct tax contemplated by the Constitution, in order to affirm the present judgment; since, if it cannot be apportioned, it must necessarily be uniform.
I am clearly of opinion, this is not a direct tax in the sense of the Constitution, and, therefore, that the judgment ought to be affirmed.