# The Theoretical System of Karl Marx/Chapter 2

One of the most amusing features of modern Marx-criticism is the grave discussion by the critics, of the question whether or not Marx was a philosopher and whether or not Marxism is a philosophy. Most divergent and contradictory opinions are current among the many eminent and learned critics. And not only this but the most contradictory accounts are given by them as to what Marx himself thought on the subject. The confusion is so great that there seems to be no way out of it,—unless one turns to Marx himself, or to Engels. . . . This, by the way, is always the best way out when one finds himself in one of the mazes of contradictory accounts of Marxism which so abound in anti-Marxian literature.
A careful study of the writings of Marx and Engels discloses the fact that in their opinion what used to be known before their day as "philosophy" reached its culminating point and came to a close with Hegel; that henceforth the place of philosophy is taken by science. Already Ludwig Feuerbach said:—"My philosophy is—no philosophy," and Marx and Engels carried this statement into effect by replacing abstract philosophy by concrete science. Engels therefore says: "This conception (the materialistic conception of history) puts an end to philosophy on the historical field, just as the dialectic conception of nature makes all natural philosophy unnatural and impossible." Marxism is no abstract philosophy. It is just the ​reverse, it is concrete science, and therefore the heir and successor of all philosophy.
It is heir to all philosophy, because notwithstanding the break with the old philosophy which the new method of treating human society has effected, and the superceding of philosophy by science, there is a continuity of thought running through philosophy and the science of human society just as there is a continuity of human society itself notwithstanding the changes in the form of its organization, or just as there is continuity in the economic structure of human society notwithstanding the different "economies" which were prevalent at different stages of its development.
The Marxian science is the result and logical sequence of the whole development of mankind. Marx found awaiting him the component parts of his philosophy: the dialectic or evolutionary method of contemplating the world, and the materialistic view, the view that the material conditions of the world being the only thing we know are therefore the only thing we can take cognizance of. His was the new combination and the method of application which, however, were loudly demanded by the needs of the time.
In order, however, that we may come unbiased to the study of this science which is variously known as "economic materialism," "dialectic materialism," or "The Materialistic Conception of History," we must rid ourselves of some prejudices which cling to the name because of the association of the words which represent the ideas forming its component parts, in vulgar parlance, with certain objectionable moral and mental qualities. Dialectics is commonly associated with a certain mental trick by which a shrewd debater seemingly proves something which may be quite untrue; the reasoning by which the proof is produced contains a mental shuffling of cards. It is sometimes used in the same sense as "sophistic,"—another much-abused term. But worse yet are the vulgar associations of materialism. A materialist is commonly supposed to be a man who is gross, mean and egotistical. A materialist phi​losopher, according to the common notion, is a man whose ideas are chained to the gross pleasures of life, who always has his eyes open to the main chance; a man who has neither God in his thoughts nor humanity in his feelings; a man to whose constitution any "ideal" or "higher" motive is an absolutely foreign element.
This is, of course, fallacious. Philosophic idealism or materialism have absolutely nothing in common with the influence of, or adherence to, ideal motives in practical life. Idealism or materialism in philosophy is simply the question whether we must go beyond the world that we perceive with our senses in order to get to the real world, that is to say, to the world which has a full and independent existence, and therefore contains in itself the laws of its own existence and development. The idealists or at least those of them who are consistent insist that the world of matter which surrounds us and includes us has no independent existence at all; that certain non-material things, or ideas, are the only things having an independent existence, and therefore their own laws of development; and that the material world merely follows the development of those ideas, of which it is the shadow or manifestation. The materialists, on the other hand, declare that the only real world, for us, is that material world which we perceive with our senses; that, furthermore, we know nothing beyond what knowledge we gain by the help of our senses, that ideas have not, and can not have any real independent existence, but are merely the reflection of the material world as perceived by us through the medium of the senses.
This is something different, and apart, from the preconceived notions of idealism and materialism. It is now easy to understand that the fact that one is a materialist in his philosophic views cannot possibly prevent him from, or have any bearing upon, his being an "idealist" in practical life. Nor is this changed by adding "dialectics" to materialism, that is to say by transferring the discussion to the historical field, because that is all that "dialectic method" really ​means. In other words it simply means that we do not look at the world as something dead and unchangeable, but as something which is continually changing; as the great Greek philosopher who first saw this great truth expressed it: nothing is, everything becomes; or, to be more exact, existence is a constant process of change or growth. If we want to understand things we must understand their appearance and disappearance, their growth and decline.
This way of contemplating things in their movement, of studying their birth, growth and decline, when applied to the study of the history of human society by a materialist, that is to say by one who knows that only material facts exist and develop independently, and ideas only reflect the existence and development of the material world,—is the Materialistic Conception of History, the foundation of the Marxian Scientific System. In other words, the Materialistic conception of history maintains that the evolution of human society as a whole, and that of all human institutions, is not, as the idealists insisted, the result of the changes in men's ideas relative to the society they were living in and its institutions, which changes are brought about by the inherent law of development of the ideas; but that, quite to the contrary, the development of society, including men's ideas of human society and institutions, are the result of the development of the material conditions under which men live; that these conditions are the only ones which have an independent existence and development; that the changes of the material conditions cause the institutions of human society to be changed to suit them; and that the ideas on all subjects relating to man in society, including those of right and wrong between man and man and even between man and his God, are changed by man in accordance with and because of, those changed material conditions of his existence.
As was stated before, both the component elements of this philosophy, the materialistic "view" and the dialectic "method," were found by Marx ready to do service, and his ​great merit in this field was the combination of the two, and the reduction of the combination to a clearly defined system.
This, however, was not all, and perhaps not even the most distinctive contribution of Marx to philosophy-science. The mere statement of the philosophic doctrine still left the course of human history unexplained, until Marx applied his genius and transformed history, a sealed book to his predecessors, into a science. A science which, if not as exact, is just as useful, as any one of the exact sciences. This he achieved by abandoning abstract speculation and treating history scientifically. That is to say, he examined history itself for the facts, in order to obtain from such examination the laws of their evolution and relation to each other. This was strictly in accordance with his materialistic "philosophy" which would not admit of any outside preconceived constructions, and insists that we get all our knowledge and ideas from the existing "matter" itself.
His "Materialistic" conception gained, the next thing for Marx to do was to determine what were the "material" factors of history. His investigations led him to the belief that the economic conditions were the prime movers of history. Accordingly, he found it necessary to substitute the term "economic" for the term "material." This completed Marx's conception of history and gave it that distinguishing characteristic which stamps it, and the whole of it, as truly Marxian, notwithstanding the many claims of priority; that characteristic which at once gives it its scientific value and makes it the butt of all pseudo-scientific criticism.
The great merit of this theory of history, is—that it really explains the course of history, something which could not be said of the previous attempts at explaining history, including those of "materialists" like Taine and Buckle.
Marx's insistence on the predominance of the economic factor is not the result of any arbitrary predilection or any ​preconceived schematic explanation brought into the study of history from outside considerations. The economic factor is insisted on as the material factor because it is the only material factor that changes and develops, and consequently is the only one which can cause change and development in what Marx calls the "superstructure" of society. It goes, of course, without saying, that something that does not change can not produce any change. No mathematician has ever attempted to ascribe the change in the result of a mathematical operation to the factors that remain constant. It is the varying factors that produce changes in the result. But all the material factors that have been mentioned beside the economic factor remain constant, or nearly so. Such are race, geography, etc. To the extent, however, that these factors do change, and by their change affect the course of human history, full credit is given them. So in the study of primitive, undeveloped, society, where, owing to the crude character of his tools, man is dependent entirely upon nature and is directly affected by its least changes, or where, as in the case of great discoveries, certain geographical features hitherto of no importance become important, these factors are fully recognized and their influence carefully studied and determined.
In other words, fall the material factors, outside the economic, are "taken into account," except that upon careful account taken the influence of these factors appears to be very small and tributary to the main, the economic, factor; and, (and this is most important of all) this influence is constantly diminishing with the progress of mankind. They may, therefore, be left out of account when outlining the general scheme of the evolution of society.
The adherents of the Materialistic Conception of History therefore assert that production, and, next to production, distribution of the product, is the basis of every social order; that in every historic form of society the division of the product of human labor produced by it, and with it the social arrangement into classes or estates, depends on ​what and how is produced in that society, and how the product is exchanged. Accordingly, the last causes of all social changes and political transformations are to be sought not in the increasing insight of men into the laws of eternal truth and justice, or some similar "ideas," but in the changes of the methods of production and distribution—not in the philosophy, but in the economics of the given epoch. They are not to be sought in morality, because morality itself is changeable and is itself the result of circumstances which lie deeper in the structure of human society. "Every moral theory which has existed until now was, in last analysis, the result of the economic conditions of the society in which it prevailed. The awakening insight that the existing social arrangements are unreasonable and unjust, that reason became nonsense and charity torture, is only a sign of the fact that the methods of production and forms of exchange have been quietly undergoing such changes that the social arrangements which have been cut to suit previous economic conditions are now out of joint. It also betokens that the means of remedying the discovered evils have already to a more or less degree been evolved with the changed relations of production."
The basis and superstructure of society of which Marx speaks in his famous preface to his "Zur Kritik," a portion of which was quoted in the preceding chapter, may therefore be formally constructed on something like the following plan: The basis of the structure is a given state of the development of the productive forces of society; this brings about certain relations between the individuals composing that society in the social process of production and distribution, which determine the division of the product among them; this, in its turn, results in a certain form of. society, certain social institutions, which express these relations; the society is then permeated by a condition of the minds and a set of habits and customs which conform to the social forms of that society; and all this culminates in the philosophy, literature, and art of the society which will be ​the result of the abilities, the tastes, and inclinations which this condition of the minds, the habits and customs will produce.
The ideas which prevail in a given society exert a powerful influence on that society. These ideas, however, have their source in the social milieu of that society, which milieu, in its turn, is the result of the economic relations of that society. The ideas, therefore, whether political, moral, religious, or otherwise, which prevail in a given society, and which influence the conduct of men in that society while they prevail, cease to prevail, and are gradually discarded, when the economic conditions in which they had their inception undergo a change. Furthermore, in our society, which is divided into classes based on economic interest, the ideas prevailing in it at any given time will not only be the result of certain economic conditions, but will in the main answer the needs, desires, or aspirations, of some social class which was brought to the front by those economic conditions. So that there may be, and very often there is, more than one set of ideas current in a given society at the same time; that these ideas may be in direct conflict with each other; and they are held, respectively, by those classes of that society whose interests they give expression to.
Usually there is only one set of ideas prevailing in society, and for the following reasons: In our society, that is, a society based on the private ownership of property, there is always a class of persons having in their possession or control the means wherewith society produces the things on which it subsists and from which it derives its comfort. This class, by reason of its control of society's means of production, carrying as this does with it the management and supervision of society's production and exchange, shapes the institutions and customs of society to suit its interests and to insure its dominion in society. It has absolute sway except that it must not disregard the law of its own existence. That is to say: its dominion must be ​exercised in conformity with and in furtherance of the economic powers which created it, giving them full play, so that their latent forces may fully develop and give to society all the benefit there is contained in them.
This dominion of the class which controls the production of society is due not only to the coercive power it possesses over the other members of society by reason of such control, and of the control of society's means of subsistence and comfort which result therefrom, but also to its persuasive powers. From the standpoint of interest it must be admitted that its interests lie along the road of the progress of society, and therefore coincide with the interests of society as a whole. From the higher, "ideal," standpoint its position is also impregnable: what it obtained by might has in due course of time become its right by the rule of prescription, (euphoneously known as "tradition,") the greatest and most potent source of right, as it requires no evidence of title and works itself into the very inner consciousness of man and becomes co-extensive with his feelings. To help and augment this natural feeling of its right, the dominating class, which controls the spiritual food of society along with the material, inculcates the ideas of its rights into the members of society artificially. So that the whole of society is usually permeated with the ideas of the dominating class.
But "the world do move." Man, in his struggle with nature for its domination, is very inventive. His inventiveness (its tempo) will depend on many circumstances, but is almost continual, resulting in an almost constantly progressing change of the tools wherewith he exploits nature. With the change of tools he changes the methods, and sometimes the field of his exploitation. The change does not, however, come suddenly. The new, improved, tools, and the new methods which they bring with them, are being slowly perfected and brought into use, and slower still are the new fields of exploitation becoming popular. But the march of the new economic force embodied in the new tool is irresisti​ble. Slow though its progress be at first, it gains in velocity and momentum as it proceeds onward, like the falling stone, until its slow progress is converted into a rushing torrent sweeping along in its course all obstacles.
When a new tool makes its appearance, a new political force is born into society. This force grows with the growth of the importance of the new tool in the economy of society, and, in its turn, helps the new tool to unfold itself properly, if it is hampered by artificial barriers from asserting itself. This new political force, the class which owns and controls the new tool, and consequently the product which is produced by means thereof, enters into a struggle with the then governing class, that is with the class which owns and controls the old means of production, and this struggle for the control of the organization of society grows from day to day with the growth of the use of the new tool. Each recruit to the new field of economic activity becomes a soldier in the army of the class controlling that field.
This struggle continues until the inevitable result is reached: Economically, the new improved means of obtaining society's goods becomes pre-eminent; politically, the class which operates and controls those improved means of production becomes predominant. Then a new order of things is created; if the new method of production is sufficiently different a new society is born; new political institutions, new religious beliefs, new moral notions, new æsthetic tastes, new philosophic systems. So does History run her course. The new of yesterday is the old of to-day, and the new of to-day is the old of to-morrow. Each order of things is in turn young and old; struggling for existence and recognition first and then struggling for existence and the maintenance of its authoritative position against the recognition of new elements which threaten to undermine its existence. The progressive of to-day is the reactionary of to-morrow.
In this struggle for existence between two economic ​forces and the two classes of society representing them, for social dominion, force as well as persuasion is usually used, the manner and proportion of their use being determined by local influences. The established opinion, whether born of interest (class-interest) or received by tradition exerts a powerful influence on society as a whole, as already stated, until the new economic forces become strong enough to formulate their own set of opinions, their own "ideology," and inculcate them into the minds of men. The new ideas formulate slowly, and make converts even more so. But when the time has come, society has become sufficiently revolutionized economically, these ideas become a revolutionary factor in themselves and help destroy the old order of things. Not only is the class whose interests lie in the economic changes which gave birth to these ideas fired by these ideas to such an extent that it often forgets those economic interests themselves and is carried away by the ideas alone, but neutral classes of society and even people whose interests lie in the opposite direction are carried away by the new ideas and enter the lists for the new order of things. And this for the reason that the new ideas are always the reflection of the economic changes which lie along the progress of society as a whole.
New ideas, therefore, are always the result of new economic conditions, produced sometimes directly and sometimes indirectly; but they always have an important place in the struggle of the classes for the progress of human society, for each new class fights for society as well as for itself. They truly characterize the social forces engaged in the struggle.