# Littell's Living Age/Volume 138/Issue 1779/Vice-Admiral Baron von Tegetthoff

From Fraser's Magazine.
VICE-ADMIRAL BARON VON TEGETTHOFF.
There is a certain tendency in the minds of those who are most earnest in the cause of naval education to confuse the means with the end, and to imagine that all that is wanted is a competent knowledge of such science as mathematics, physics, geography, astronomy, navigation even, or pilotage, gunnery, or naval architecture. In reality, and so far as the duties of a naval officer are concerned, all these are but branches, however important, each in its different degree, of that one science, the art of war, which it is the business of his life to practise. From this point of view, the raison d'être of a ship of war is her power of fighting; that of her captain is the skill to use that power. The captain of a ship of war is therefore called on to possess not merely the skill of the navigator, of the seaman, of the engineer, of the gunner, or nowadays of the electrician, but of all together, directed by the knowledge of how and when to use each to the best advantage so as to attain the desired end. As a matter of first necessity, young officers are specially instructed in the details of those several branches a knowledge of each of which must be joined together in the perfect commander; but it is not by that detailed instruction alone that they become fitted for the duties which promotion will lay on them. Where the official instruction ends, the higher education really begins. From that time, it is the man's own experience, and reading, and thought, and judgment, which must fit him for the requirements of higher rank.
It is a trite proverb that experience teaches even fools. But needful personal experience is not always to be had, or the cost of its lessons may be ruinous. The wise man will learn from the experience of others: and just as a naval officer learns navigation from the theories and practice of centuries, embodied in his Inman or his Raper, or as he learns seamanship from the traditions of old, whether handed down by word of mouth, or recorded by Darcy Lever, or Boyd, or Nares; so also will he learn the art of commanding ships or fleets from the history of his great predecessors, *31 of what they have done, and how they have done it. But this is a higher and graver study than all that has gone before. Certain fixed rules can be laid down for observing the sun or for regulating the chronometers. The different points of seamanship are learned and understood by the average boatswain, as well as by his commanding officer. A given battery will send an electric current through a known resistance. Steam at a given pressure will drive the ship at a known speed; and the measures necessary for obtaining that pressure and that speed are acquired by hundreds. But the science of war is not one of mere rule and precedent; for changing conditions change almost every detail, and that too in a manner which it is often impossible to foresee.
The commanding officer who hopes to win, not merely to tumble into distinction, must therefore be prepared beforehand for every eventuality. The knowledge of what has happened already will not only teach him by precedent; so far as that is possible, it is easy, and within the compass of every-day abilities; it will also suggest to him things that have never yet been done; things in the planning of which he may rise to the height of genius, in the executing of which he may rise to the height of grandeur. And it is in this way that the exact story of difficulties overcome,, of brave defence or brilliant achievement, interesting in itself as a story of gallantry or heroism, becomes, to the naval officer, a study of real and technical importance. It was, I may believe, some such ideas as these which determined Captain Colomb, shortly after the Austro-Italian war of 1866, to bring before the United Service Institution a paper which he aptly named "Lessons from Lissa." But the conditions of Captain Colomb's lecture led him to devote the short time at his disposal to discussing some of the details of the battle — then only imperfectly known — rather than to giving a complete and connected account of it, or entering at all into the personal, political, or even ​strategical conditions under which the battle was fought. The paper is an admirable and suggestive essay on the tactics of the two fleets; but it is not, it does not pretend to be, the story of the battle, still less of the campaign; and thus in a measure loses sight of the circumstances which neutralized the greater force of the Italians, and originated the successful attack of the Austrians.
But imperfect as it is. Captain Colomb's paper is the only account of Lissa which has appeared in English; with the exception, of course, of the hasty, incorrect, or entirely false accounts which were sent home on the spur of the moment by the correspondents of the several newspapers, some of whom dated their letters from Trieste or Pola, but many from Vienna or Milan, retailing the merest gossip of the cafés. It thus happens that of this battle, which Captain Colomb has described as ‘‘beyond all bounds the most important naval occurrence since Trafalgar," a battle fought only twelve years ago, little or nothing is accurately known: scarcely an incident in it that is not every day misrepresented, and even the name of the victorious admiral misspelt. This is not very satisfactory: to us, as a nation supposed to be the nursery and the storehouse of naval science and naval tradition, it is not very creditable.
Wilhelm, the son of Lieutenant-Colonel Karl von Tegetthoff, was born at Marburg in Styria on the 23rd of December, 1827. We are, as yet, told nothing of his childhood, except that he spent some of it in the gymnasium at Marburg; but at the age of thirteen he was sent to the College for Naval Cadets at Venice. There he stayed for five years; he was nearly eighteen when he made his first experience of sea-service. On the 23rd of July, 1845, he was appointed to the "Montecuccoli," brig, and afterwards to the corvette "Adria;" on board which ships, whilst cruising in the Adriatic and Archipelago, he learned the more practical part of his duties. On the 27th of January, 1848, he was made an ensign of the second class; and was raised to the first class, three months later, on the 18th of April.
The Austrian navy was, at this period, a service of extremely small importance, either from a national or political point of view. It was feeble: it was neglected by the government; and every kreuzer spent on it was grudged. In the interior of the country, it was scarcely known that there was a navy at all. The officers were, almost to a man, natives of the Italian provinces: the few Germans amongst them — sons of government officials civil or military, whose rank and position gave them an opportunity of pushing forward their relations in a service where competition was not keen — had either to assimilate themselves to their Italian comrades, or to lead a life of solitude or seclusion. In Venice the fleet was openly spoken of as belonging to the Italian nation; and "Young Italy" counted many of its warmest supporters on board the Austrian ships of war. The two Bandieras, chiefs of the rising of 1844, wrho had been shot at Co-senza, were naval officers, a lieutenant and ensign, and the sons of a naval officer, an admiral. Of the seven who were executed with them, one other, Moro, was also an officer of the navy. They had tampered, on a large scale, with the fidelity of the seamen; and they had all but made themselves masters of the "Bellona," frigate. These were things of public notoriety; and those Austrians who knew that a navy did exist, connected their idea of it principally with the memory of convicted traitors; in which they were afterwards justified by the fact that when the war of 1848 broke out, and Venice threw off the Austrian yoke, most of the naval officers flung in their lot with the revolutionary cause. In doing so, however, they failed to secure the ships. These were still held by the Austrians, but were for the time useless, as the few officers that remained were insufficient in number, and the Sardinian fleet, mistress of the Adriatic, prevented all attempts at reorganization. It was not till ​the Sardinians, after their defeat at Novara (March 23, 1849), and the pressure thus brought on Piedmont by land, were compelled to withdraw their ships, that the Austrian navy could show signs of life, and was able with the few ships they could fit out to close the blockade of Venice, which finally surrendered on the 22nd of August, 1849.
During the early part of this period of enforced inactivity, Tegetthoff was an ensign on board, one after the other, the brig "Montecuccoli," the brig "Trieste," and the frigate "Bellona," where, at best, he was but perfecting himself in habits of discipline, and in the knowledge of the internal economy of ships of war. He was afterwards aide-de-camp of Field-Marshal Martini, the then head of the navy, and went with him in his embassy to Naples; but returned in time to take his share of the blockading on board his old ship "Adria." After the peace he served on board the steamer "Maria Anna" in the Levant, and was present in the Peirasus during the English blockade of that port on account of the Don Pacifico affair, now almost forgotten, or remembered only by Dr. Dasent's clever skit. He was promoted on June 4, 1851, to the rank of lieutenant of the second class; and on November 4, 1852, to the first class, in which grade he served again on board the "Montecuccoli" and the corvette "Carolina," and in 1854 was appointed to command the schooner "Elisabeth," from which shortly afterwards he was transferred to the steamer "Taurus."
These rapid changes speak of the disorganized and unsettled condition in which the Austrian navy was at the time. The ships were there, though in bad state, but the officers were very few, and seem to have been transferred from one to the other, either at the caprice of the authorities, or in accordance with the necessities of the dockyard. In command of the "Taurus," however, Tegetthoff remained for some time, employed, during the Crimean war, in a sort of police duty in the Sulina mouth of the Danube. This duty was neither pleasant nor easy; and Tegetthoff not only gained credit by the way in which he performed it, but was brought to the favorable notice of the archduke Maximilian.
After the general break-up in 1848, and the disappearance of the overwhelming Italian element, the navy seems to have become suddenly popular. Many officers from north Germany and Denmark were induced to take service under the Austrian flag. The command-in-chief was given to a Dane, Admiral Dahlerup, who is described as having some difficulty in accommodating himself to the very mixed materials put at his disposal — Old Austrian, north German, and Danish officers, merchant skippers, Germans, Slaves, Dalmatians, and Illyrians: to fuse them into one homogeneous whole was no easy task.
Numbers of cadets, too, came in, members of the best Austrian families, and among them, setting the example, the emperor's brother, the archduke Ferdinand Maximilian. After a short service in the subordinate ranks, the archduke was appointed, in 1854, rear-admiral and head of the navy. He was then only twenty-two: but his zeal compensated, to some extent, for his want of experience; and for the next ten years he devoted himself to the good of the service over which he really presided. Under his fostering care an excellent dockyard and arsenal were constructed and fortified at Pola. Many ships were built, amongst them a line-of-battle ship and three large frigates. One of these, the "Novara," was sent on a combined scientific and training expedition, a voyage round the world; and in 1857, also in the interests of navigation and the development of Austrian commerce, Tegetthoff was despatched, in company with the distinguished ornithologist, Dr. Heuglin, on a semi-official journey in. Egypt and Arabia; the object being to collect local .information which might throw new light on the project of cutting a canal through the Isthmus of Suez, with a possible view to take an early advantage of the canal, if it should be completed, and, amongst other things, to select a point suitable for a coaling station.
The two travelled up the Nile to Thebes, and from there, by caravan, to Kosseir, on ​the Red Sea, and thence southwards, examining both coasts as they went. Near Bender Gam, in Somali Land, they were attacked by the natives, taken prisoners, and detained until their ransom was duly paid. Dr. Heuglin, who had been severely wounded, crossed over to Aden and returned to Cairo, whilst Tegetthoff pursued his investigations by himself. In an open boat, and against the north-easterly monsoon of the Gulf of Aden, he crossed over to Makallah, coasted along to Ras Fartak, and crossed again to Socotra. After exploring this island, he went back to Aden, and so to Egypt and to Europe.
Whilst at Aden he received his promotion to the rank of captain of the third class; and after serving on shore at Trieste for a few months, he was, in the autumn of 1858, appointed to the command of the screw corvette "Erzherzog Fried rich," and sent to the coast of Morocco to inquire after the crew of a merchant ship wrecked there, who were said to have been carried as slaves into the interior. What with the Spanish war, the wanton attacks of some French ships and the threatening neighborhood of an English squadron, the whole coast was in a very disturbed state, and any Europeans, Austrians or others, thrown helpless on shore, would certainly be condemned to slavery if not to death. The "Erzherzog Friedrich" had examined the whole coast of Morocco east of the Straits without obtaining any tidings of the castaways. Before going west she put into Gibraltar for letters, and received orders to return at once to the Adriatic. War with France and Italy was imminent, and the safety of the ship, as well as the defence of the home ports, rendered her immediate recall necessary.
In the Adriatic, however, nothing was done. The French fleet, in overpowering force, swept the sea, but was not at first strong enough to attack Venice. Afterwards, when a number of floating batteries and ships of the line had been brought round, Louis Napoleon judged it opportune to send an autographic note to Franz Joseph; and on the basis of this, peace was shortly afterwards concluded. During this time the Austrian fleet was altogether unequal to any offensive measures, though such were indeed proposed. Admiral Jurien de la Gravière, who commanded the ships which instituted the blockade, tells us that
    The officers of the Austrian squadron were full of ardor; they were, even then, the same brave officers who afterwards triumphed at Lissa. They asked to be led out. They felt humiliated by the blockade: they would endeavor to raise it. But the archduke would not venture his fleet. If it should be lost, Austria would never sanction its being replaced. He chose rather to follow the example set by the defenders of Sebastopol, and applied himself to prevent our approaching the town. The line-of-battle ship "Kaiser," which had been lately launched at Pola, was anchored in mid-channel; and instead of completing her equipment, arrangements were made to sink her at once, if necessary, so as to close the only passage available for ships having even a moderate draught of water.
We are told that amongst those anxious to make a dash against the French squadron Tegetthoff was conspicuous: and it seems not improbable that a man of courage and resource, such as he afterwards proved himself to be, might have cut off some of the small cruisers or store-ships in the Adriatic, and have made an unexpected diversion by an attack on the coast of France. But the attempt was not permitted; and till the close of the war the "Erzherzog Friedrich" remained as inactive as the other ships.
After the peace Tegetthoff was appointed aide-de-camp to the archduke, and in this capacity accompanied him to Brazil on board the steamer "Kaiserin Elizabeth." The account of this voyage has been written at great length by the archduke himself. Apart from the circumstance of its being the journal of a prince and emperor — round whose name such a halo of romance has circled — it is a very commonplace record of travel, and has here no special interest beyond describing to us how the archduke and his aide-de-camp T —— were ducked on crossing the line, and reminding us of the bond of union between Tegetthoff and the head of the Austrian navy. Of the two, Tegetthoff was five years the senior; he was altogether the stronger intellect, and there seems reason to believe that the relation between them was that of friend to friend rather than of commander to admiral, or of lordling to prince. It is certain that there was a close intimacy, and the archduke was able to advance his friend's interests at the same time that he advanced "those of the service.
On their return from Brazil, Tegetthoff was, on April 24, 1860, made a captain of the second class, and in this rank he commanded the frigate "Radetzky" in the Levant until the autumn of 1861, when she was put out of commission. On November 3 following he was advanced to the ​first class, and appointed to the command of the "Novara," the fifty-gun frigate which had just come home from her voyage round the world. He was then, notwithstanding his want of seniority, sent into the Levant as commodore, and was present in Greek waters, in Phalerum Bay or the Peiraeus, for a great part of 1862-3, during the Revolution and the accession of King George. Afterwards, as the "Novara" was found to be in want of extensive repairs, he was turned over to the "Schwarzenberg," a frigate of the same size, and in her, in company with the "Radetzky," of thirty-one guns, was, at the end of 1863, at Port Said, inspecting the works of the canal, on which, in fact, he is said to have written a clear and valuable report. He was still there when he received orders to go immediately to the North Sea, where the naval power of Denmark threatened to baulk some of the military plans of the Germanic spoilers.
With the "Schwarzenberg," "Radetzky," and a gun-vessel, the "Seehund," Tegetthoff immediately went round to Brest, where he was joined by three Prussian gunboats, "Blitz," "Basilisk," and "Adler." These were put under his orders, and with the squadron so formed he left for a cruise against the Danes, who were, it was said, blockading the mouths of the Elbe and the Weser. It was about noon on the 9th of May, 1864, that, within sight of Heligoland, he met the Danish squadron under Commodore Suenson. The "Seehund" was not in company, and the three Prussian gunboats were paltry little things, so that his effective force consisted of simply: —
| Schwarzenberg | 400 H.P. | 48 guns |
| Radetzky | 300 H.P. | 31 guns |
As against the Danish force:
| Niels Juel | 300 H.P. | 42 guns |
| Jylland | 400 H.P. | 44 guns |
| Heimdal | 350 H.P. | 16 guns |
The Austrians were clearly overmatched, and the Danes, both in prestige and efficiency, were not an enemy to whom one would willingly give odds. Nevertheless, Tegetthoff did not hesitate a moment. He was steering towards the north, Suenson towards the south; and the two, advancing straight against each other, came within range about a quarter before two o'clock.
The action which followed was the first, and with the exception of that, a few months later, between the "Kearsage" and "Alabama," remains the only one fought between wooden ships under steam and armed with heavy shell guns; but on neither side does any exceptional use seem to have been made of the steam-power; and the damage and loss inflicted by the shells were no greater than were in many cases, during the Old French War, inflicted by much smaller cold shot. The hostile frigates, on each side in close order, one astern of the other, passed in opposite directions, interchanging their starboard broadsides. The Danes then turned to starboard, trying to cut off the Prussian gunboats, which were a long way astern; and to prevent this the Austrians also turned to starboard, countermarching their line. But in this they were a little late, and the "Schwarzenberg," as she advanced towards the south, received a raking broadside from the 44Niels Juel." They did, however, prevent any attack on the gunboats, and the two squadrons ran in parallel lines at a distance of about five hundred yards apart, and heading at first towards the south-west; the "Schwarzenberg" and the "Niels Juel," the "Radetzky" and the "Jylland," supported by the "Heimdal," keeping up a brisk fire on each other. About three a shell from the"Niels Juel" lodged in the bunt o£ the "Schwar-zenberg's" foresail and burst there, setting it on fire. This rapidly spread, and the fore topmast was enveloped in flames. The fire of the "Niels Juel" prevented all attempts at extinguishing them, and the ship had to be kept right before the wind, which was easterly. A little after four they were within the territorial waters of Heligoland, and the action ended.
The question has often been mooted whether an action, begun outside, may not be finished within neutral waters. Bynkershoek has laid down the rule that it may; some of Stowell's decisions seem to sanction it; and, apart from the arguments of lawyers, there are cases on record in which an English admiral has taken the same view — notably, that of August 19, 1759, when Boscawen captured or burnt De la Clue's ships in Lagos Bay. It is quite possible that Commodore Suenson, who had the Austrians distinctly in his grip, might have followed the precedent, and given rise to international disputes and certain ill feeling; but the presence of the English frigate "Aurora," under the command of Sir Leopold McClintock, prevented any such complication. The Austrians anchored, and shortly afterwards the "Schwarzenberg's" foremast went over the side, but the fire was not completely extinguished till ten o'clock at night. The ​Danes, meanwhile, after lying-to for some time, repairing damages, had gone north. They had suffered heavily, and were in no condition to keep up a blockade of Heligoland, so that the Austrians, getting under way, crossed over, unhindered, to Cuxhaven, where they anchored early the next morning.
Independent of the damage done to the ships — and the "Schwarzenberg" was certainly incapable of any prolonged defence — the loss in men stands thus: Danes, fourteen killed, fifty-four wounded. Austrians, thirty-six killed, fifty-two badly wounded, and a great many slightly; of which total quite six-sevenths fell on the "Schwarzenberg." But the blockade was raised: the Austrians had met the Danes with a weaker force and had not been crushed. The convenient neighborhood of neutral water was not put too prominently forward, and the Germans claimed an effective victory, as, in fact, it strategically was, for the Danish operations on the coast were perforce ended. The Austrian emperor acknowledged Tegetthoff's telegraphic message by one promoting him to the rank of rear-admiral, and conferring on him the order of the Iron Crown, with a war decoration. Undoubtedly Tegetthoff deserved well of the allied sovereigns. He had fought a superior enemy, superior both in force and in prestige. He had fought boldly, and though beaten, was still so far successful that the Danish navy had no further influence on the war.
Tegetthoff was now employed for a few months in the war office at Vienna, and in 1865 was again in command of a small squadron in the Mediterranean. With this, in the beginning of 1866, he was recalled to Pola, to take part in the war with Italy, which was finally declared on June 20.
This new war found the Austrian navy in a very unprepared condition. The popular idea seems to have been that the late alliance with Prussia had inaugurated a reign of peace; that there were to be no more wars; and though, as a measure of precaution, an army might be necessary, to spend money on a fleet was downright waste, and, in the impoverished state of the treasury, a thing not to be thought of. Accordingly the ships which were unfinished when the archduke Maximilian went to Mexico, were unfinished still; and what ships there were had been permitted to lie by, waiting till it was convenient to repair them. But though Maximilian was no longer there to direct the work, or to push it forward, when the necessity occurred, the navy still enjoyed the benefit of his rule. He had insisted that the navy should be a national force, that the ships and their engines, as well as their men, should be Austrian. The arsenal at Pola was a reality; and the ships, though unfinished, were in their own hands, to be got ready as soon as possible. The one point in which they had trusted to foreign resources was the only one that utterly failed them. But it was an important one. A number of heavy guns which had been ordered from Krupp's works were stopped by the Prussians, and the want could not now be adequately supplied.
The spirit of the service was, however, excellent. Tegetthoff, with the few ships ready for sea, took up his station at Fasana; and whilst the men — raw recruits most of them — were drilled almost incessantly, the admiral inspired the commanding officers, and through them the seamen, with courage and confidence. Other ships were fitted out, hastily, imperfectly, but still equal to the emergency. The two large ships, armored frigates of the first class, were pushed forward; their spars were not ready, but they were jury-rigged, and sent to Fasana. These were ships which, though somewhat smaller, may, in horse-power and armor, be compared to our "Royal Oak;" wooden ships, with 41-2 inch plating, of eight hundred horse-power, of five thousand one hundred and thirty tons displacement, and, failing the Krupp guns, armed with sixteen smooth-bore forty - eight - pounders. On board one of these, the "Erzherzog Ferdinand Maximilian" — which was shortly called "Ferdinand Max," or, affectiontionately, "Max" — Tegetthoff hoisted his flag. Presently came' the "Kaiser," a ninety-gun ship, similar to those two deckers which, only three or four years before, had formed the bulk of our Mediterranean fleet. Then came the "N ovara," which had narrowly escaped burning at the hands of an incendiary, but which had been repaired as quickly and as well as circumstances permitted; then also the "Don Juan de Austria," meant for an armor-plated ship, but ironclad only at the water line, and the after part; forward, the want of the plates was supplied by wooden planking. By the end of June the admiral had with him, under his immediate orders, the whole of the available force of the Austrian navy: seven ironclad frigates, the ninety-gun ship, two fifty-gun frigates, four smaller, and a number of gun-vessels, gunboats, and fast steamers, including one of the Austrian Lloyd's boats. But ​everything was in the rough — the ships, as I have just said, very much so; the masts and rigging, the fittings and the guns, such as could be got most readily and most quickly. "Only send them," wrote Tegetthoff — "send them as they are; I'll find some use for them."
The men were almost all newly raised; their gun-drill went on all day and every day; they were exercised more especially in firing concentrated broadsides — that is, in laying the guns by marks on the ships' decks, so as all to converge to a focus, and firing them as one, at the word. Above all, the several captains were fully in the admiral's confidence. Promoted as he had been, for actual service without reference to seniority, Tegetthoff was probably junior to many of those under his command. Possibly he felt this might be a difficulty in his way. It does not appear to have been so; the hopes and fears, and plans and strategy and tactics of the campaign before them seem to have been discussed in friendly conclave, of which Tegetthoff was the president and the soul. He imbued them with his fiery spirit. The wooden ships might be roughly armored with ranges of chain-cable fastened on abreast of the boilers: it would give the stokers some sense of protection. The guns were weak: they must be supplemented by the ships themselves; if a forty-eight-pound shot would not pierce the enemy's plates, a five-thousand-ton ship might. Hence the determination to use the ships freely as rams. To fire by concentrated broadsides and to ram — these were the elements of the tactics, the details of which were discussed in all their probable bearings. When the day came that saw them face to face with the enemy, every captain knew the admiral's intention as well as the admiral himself did; every officer knew what had to be done, and every man had some idea of it, and above all knew that he had to fight.
The Italian navy was on a widely different footing from the Austrian. From the birth of the kingdom, six years before, the fixed idea of the Italians had been to have a navy. They aimed at being a great naval power; and by a liberal expenditure, had got together a number of ships that could compare even with the fleets of England or France. They were able to collect at Ancona a force of twelve armor-plated ships, besides a large number of powerful wooden frigates and smaller craft.
Of their armored ships, most had been built abroad; the two largest, the "Rè d'Italia" and the "Rè di Portogallo," in America. These were wooden ships, of five thousand seven hundred tons displacement; they were armored with five-and-one-half-inch plates, had engines of eight hundred horse-power, and could steam at from twelve to thirteen knots. Some controversy arose afterwards as to whether their construction was as good as it was believed to be; they were said to be unsound, built of green wood, and incurably foul from the filth that had been thrown down the lining, and so built into them. I find no mention of all this on the part of the Italians, and believe that it was merely a trade report, raised by rival builders eager for a contract. But in any case, though such defects, if they existed, would have rendered the ships unserviceable as cruisers or for a prolonged campaign, they could have no influence on a campaign which lasted for barely a week. Their armament consisted of two three hundred-pounder Armstrong guns, ten smooth-bore ten-inch guns, and twenty-four rifled guns throwing a shot of ninety pounds. If we remember what our own navy was in 1866, we shall see that the "Bellerophon" was the only ship we had then afloat, which, as an effective man-of-war, could be said to be decidedly superior to these. Our ships of the "Prince Consort" class, though a little bigger, had thinner armor, and had no rifled guns; no more had the "Achilles," whose extreme length would have made her compare unfavorably, as a tactical engine, with either of these two Italians.
Two others, the "Terribile" and "For-midabile," had been built in France; these were iron ships of two thousand seven hundred tons, with four-and-one-half-inch plates over fourteen inches, of backing — they had ram bows, then still a novelty, and were said to have a speed of twelve knots. Of the others, I will only mention in detail the "Affondatore," a turret ship, built in England; she was of four thousand tons, and seven hundred horse-power; she had a spur thirty feet long; and though she had only two guns they were three-hundred-pounder Armstrongs. Besides these, there were five others of about four thousand tons; and two smaller, of two thousand tons, the "Palestro" and "Varese," which were only partially plated, their bows and sterns being left unarmored. These ships were all armed with rifled guns, principally of cast iron with strengthening coils, which threw a ninety-pound shot. In mere material force, the Italian fleet was at least ​double the Austrian; but the government, whilst spending freely on their new ships and guns, had neglected to insure the quality of their officers and the discipline of their seamen.
The officers were young, without knowledge or experience, without the discipline or even the social training which teaches men so thrown together to live in mutual amity; there was a lamentable want of harmony between those of the same grade, and of deference from inferiors to superiors. This was nothing new; it had always been so in the Sardinian navy; and was aggravated by the coalition with the Neapolitan. It was so universal that the writer from whom I quote concludes that it is the necessary condition of naval life: "Everybody," he says,‘‘knows that this poisonous plant takes root and flourishes amongst other seafaring people; and it seems that the compulsory and continual living together renders it difficult to avoid the clashing of individual characters, and makes their differences more acrimonious."
The command-in-chief of this fleet was entrusted to Persano, the one admiral of the Italian navy; under him were Albini, vice-admiral; and Vacca, rear-admiral. Vacca was a Neapolitan; Albini, a native of Sardinia. Carlo Pellion di Persano, of noble family, was born at Vercelli in Piedmont, in 1806. At the age of eighteen he entered the Sardinian navy, and having passed through the regular grades of the service, was made a captain in 1841. He then commanded the "Eridano" brig for a three years' commission in the Pacific; and, during the Adriatic campaign of 1848-9, had had command of the brig "Daino," in which he is said to have distinguished himself. In 1851, he was in command of the "Governolo," which carried to London the Piedmontese contribution to that first International Exhibition. Afterwards, in 1859, he had command of the "Carlo Alberto," a fifty-gun frigate; and having served in her through the operations of that year, was, in October, raised to the rank of rear-admiral. He then had charge of the squadron which, in the early summer of 1860, was co-operating with Garibaldi on the coast of Sicily; after which he conducted the naval attack on Ancona, and received the surrender of Lamorici£re on board the flag-ship, the "Maria Adelaide," on the 30th of September. For this service he was made a vice-admiral; Albini, the second in command, being at the same time made a rear-admiral. In 1862, Persano was a member of the Ratazzi cabinet, as minister for the navy; and, on its breakup in the end of the year, before he retired from office, promoted himself to the rank of admiral.
This is a short outline of Persano's service claims to distinction. He was generally esteemed as a man of good family and of amiable temper; he had married an English lady, and being thus connected with English society, was looked on as partly an Englishman, or at least was supposed to have caught, as by infection, the good qualities of the typical English naval officer. When the war broke out in 1866, he was considered the man of the day, and great things were expected from him. He proved, however, wanting in almost every gift which raises an officer to the height of an emergency. At Taranto, where he took the command on May 16, he found that a great deal was still wanting to make the fleet fit for active service; the equipment was imperfect, the men were newly raised, the senior and commissioned officers were inefficient, and of petty officers there was a great scarcity. Such defects were of course very real; but Tegetthoff, at Fasana, was struggling manfully against the same: at Taranto or at Ancona, Persano does not seem to have realized that it was his duty to do this. "Send me what you have," wrote Tegetthoff to the minister for the navy, "I will do something with it." Persano's tone was rather, "If you don't send me what I ask for, I can do nothing." And, meantime, he did nothing. The drills were slack, discipline uncared for, and the equipment left very much to itself.
Any competent witness who had been able to study the condition, the preparation, above all the temper of the two fleets, as they lay in their respective roadsteads, would have had no doubt as to the result of a hostile meeting between them. Though the material superiority lay so entirely with the Italians, he would have remarked that a large proportion of the Austrian seamen were Dalmatians, the descendants of the the Uscocchi and other maritime tribes of the Gulf of Quarnero, the best and sturdiest seamen that the Mediterranean has ever seen, the men who had, for centuries, upheld the supremacy of Venice in the Adriatic, or who, on their own account, had questioned the rule alike of Venetian, Turk, or Spaniard; he would have remarked the personal ​differenceof the admirals, and its effect on the courage and temper of their subordinates; and, finally, he would have remembered that at St. Vincent, the Nile, or Trafalgar, an English fleet had conquered against nominal odds as great as, or even greater than, those which now told in favor of the Italians.
But to the general public or even to the government of Italy, nothing of this was known. It was known that the Austrian ships were paltry; it was, perhaps, supposed that they were worse than they really were. It was known that three hundred millions of lire (12,000,000l.) had been spent on the Italian fleet within the last five years; and it was taken for granted that good value had been got for the money; as indeed it had. But beyond this public knowledge did not go; and neither the government nor the people doubted for a moment that Persano was master of the situation. "The Adriatic," wrote Depretis, the minister for the navy, "is an Italian sea, and the Austrian flag must disappear from it. Do as you think best, but this end must be attained." In every café in Venice, in Milan, throughout the north of Italy, this end was spoken of as certain. Young Italy was as ready to discuss naval as political affairs, and knew as little about one as about the other.
As soon as war was declared, on the 20th of June, Tegetthoff had despatched the "Stadium," the Austrian Lloyd's steamer, to find out exactly where the Italian fleet was, and what its force. The "Stadium" reported, on the 23rd, that as far south as Bari it was not to be seen. The admiral jumped to the conclusion that it would be coming round from Taranto, probably in scattered order, possibly in small detachments; and at once resolved to go with what force he had and look for it. With six ironclads, the "Schwarzenberg," and four gun-vessels, he left Fasana on the 24th of June; at daybreak of the 27th he was off Ancona. The main body of the Italian fleet had arrived there two days before: they mustered eleven ironclads, four large frigates, and sundry smaller vessels: a force certainly more than double that of the Austrians. But they were coaling in a promiscuous and disorderly manner. The "Rè d'Italia's" coal had caught fire in the bunkers; the "Rè di Portogallo" had got water in her cylinders; almost every ship had some defect due to carelessness, stupidity, or ignorance; and none was ready to go out and attack the enemy. When at last some of them did get under way, they pottered about, performing silly or pedantic evolutions in the entrance or the harbor; while Tegetthoff, having seen all that he wanted to see, and having encouraged his men by the sight of a timid or disorganized enemy, went quietly back to Fasana. Some rumors, much to Persano's discredit, were not slow to arise, but they do not seem to have then taken any definite form. The minister urged him to do something — anything you will, provided you cause the Austrian flag to disappear from the Adriatic. Persano replied, making difficulties: the Austrians would not meet him; Pola was impregnable; his ships were not properly equipped; his men were undisciplined; his officers were incompetent.
Than Count Carlo di Persano and the Honorable John Byng, few men have been more unlike each other. Persano was gentle, amiable, social, and personally brave; Byng was a small-minded martinet, haughty, and reserved. But Persano's correspondence has a curious resemblance to Byng's; it shows the same querulous incapacity, the same desire to have things done by others, the same unwillingness to do anything for himself. Byng's letters have long been before the world: if I quote one or two disjointed sentences, it is only by way of emphasis: —
    I am firmly of opinion … that the throwing men into the castle will only … add to the numbers that must fall into the enemy's hands, for the garrison, in time, will be obliged to surrender.
    I am afraid all communication will be cut off between us; … for if the enemy have erected batteries … it will render it impossible for our boats to have a passage.
    Many of the ships that come out with me are foul. I fear from the inconveniences we shall meet here there will be great difficulty in keeping the ships clean, as there is but one wharf for them to prepare and careen at.
And now for Persano: —
    It is my duty to submit to your Excellency that the ships which join the fleet from day to day are incompletely manned, especially in regard to their petty officers; and — which is of more consequence — are without trained gunners, who are now, more than ever, necessary, on account of the greater number of rifled guns, which require long arid careful drill. And this when hostilities are every moment expected to begin!
    This awakens very serious thoughts.
    The fleet is not ready for war.
    It will take at least a month to bring it to a tolerable pitch.
    Help me, I earnestly entreat you.
Finally, on July 8, Persano was induced ​to put to sea. He went for a five days' cruise, but kept carefully out of sight of land. It had been rumored that the fleet was to range the Istrian coast, and confront Tegetthoff at Fasana or Pola. It did nothing of the kind: it stood to the south-east, and in mid-channel sailed backwards and forwards in open order, the ships keeping one thousand yards apart from each other, and exercising none of the manoeuvres of battle. They were better hidden, it was said, in the middle of the Adriatic than were the Austrians at Pola. Boggio, a member of the Chamber of Deputies, had embarked on board the "Re d' Italia," as Persano's guest, and seems to have understood that he was to pay for his entertainment by indiscriminate praise. "How cowardly are these Austrians!" he said, "they will not give us a chance; they fly before us." But the Marquis Paolucci, Albini's chief of the staff, to whom the remark was addressed, replied: "It is not the Austrians who should be called cowardly, it is we who have been humiliated:" and Albini had previously permitted himself to say in Paolucci's hearing: "This is not the way to make war. We have lost an opportunity which may never return."
The feeling against Persano was general, and he was urged to go out. "Would you tell the people," wrote Depretis, "the people who are vain enough to believe our sailors the best in the world, that after spending three hundred millions, we have done nothing better than get together a squadron which dare not meet the Austrian? Why, they'd stone us! As if the mere name of the Austrian navy has not always been a subject of ridicule! If Tegetthoff declines to meet us, we will effect a landing somewhere on the coast; At Lissa, for instance. Lissa, by its central position, would insure us the sovereignty of the Adriatic: let us take Lissa." There seems to have been no positive order to attack Lissa; only to do something: but Lissa had been suggested, and Persano had not sufficient force of character or originality of judgment to disapprove of it, or to suggest any distinct alternative. He would have preferred remaining at Ancona, brilliant in a gold coat trimmed with blue cloth; but that he was not allowed to do. And so, on the afternoon of July 16, in a state of hurry and flurry, he put to sea; having neither detailed charts, nor plans, nor information as to the defences of Lissa; without even the soldiers that had been offered him as a force for landing.
But why Lissa? In England, Lissa, if known at all, is known only as the headquarters of our Adriatic cruisers in the Old French War, and as giving a name to the brilliant little action (March 12, 1811) in which Captain Hoste, with his squadron of three frigates and a corvette, not only defeated the Franco-Venetian squadron of six frigates, a brig, and four small craft, a force more than double his own, but drove the French commodore's ship irrecoverably on shore, captured two others, and compelled a third, which afterwards escaped, to strike her flag. Just at the present time it is pleasant to remember that one of the participators in this, one of the most sparkling affairs on record, was the twenty-two-gun corvette "Volage," commanded by Captain Phipps Hornbv, the father of the admiral whose flag is now flying as commander-in-chief of our fleet in the Mediterranean.
Lissa is an island, or rather a mass of hill and mountain, eleven miles long from east to west, and six broad from north to south, rising in some of its peaks to a height of nearly two thousand feet. Its principal productions, according to the gazetteer, are wine, oil, almonds, and figs; bees, sheep, and goats are reared in great numbers by its inhabitants; and near its coasts are rich sardine fisheries. But neither figs nor sardines formed its value in Italian eyes. The English had fortified the principal harbor, the Bay of San Giorgio, and on its recurring to the Austrians the fortifications had been preserved and added to. In time of war it evidently might, from its position and security, become a place of the utmost importance. Besides San Giorgio, in the north-east corner of the island, there are two minor harbors, Comisa at the extreme west, and Manego at the south-east corner, the fortifications of which, though small, were situated on high ground, so as to be secure against any mere naval attack: they might very well have been left to surrender when the forts of San Giorgio had been carried.
Persano, however, thought differently. The fleet arrived in the neighborhood of the island on the night of the 17th; by dawn of the 18th it was off San Giorgio. Albini with the wooden ships was to attack Manego; Vacca with three of the ironclads was to shell Comisa; Persano with the main body was to operate against San Giorgio. By eleven o'clock, fire was opened on Comisa. It was quite futile. The forts were perched on the hills at heights of five hundred feet, which to ​Vacca seemed more than twice as much. After an hour or two he gave up the attempt, and joined Albini off Manego, The forts there were judged to be even higher than at Comisa, and as the big Dahlgren gun which one of the frigates carried in her forecastle could not reach up to them, no other shots were fired. Towards evening, the two divisions went round and rejoined the admiral off San Giorgio.
There the action had been lively. The forts at the entrance of the harbor had been blown up by shells bursting in their magazines; and the main fort (Madonna) which raked the harbor had been silenced several times; but the Austrians stuck manfully to their guns, and each time renewed their defence. The "Rè d'Italia" alone fired thirteen hundred shot. Boggio enjoyed his holiday on the poop, and wrote the next day to his friend Depretis: "The noise was infernal. Your humble correspondent remained on the poop from eleven o'clock to half past six, exposed to a storm of shell." After which he was good enough to send a certificate of the admiral's conduct. "Persano is most unjustly accused; he deserves the perfect confidence of the government and the country. The heavy responsibility may have rendered him unduly careful; but now that the time of action has arrived, what a difference is there between him and others!" Nevertheless, when evening closed in, no decisive advantage had been gained, nor did it seem probable that, without troops, any could be gained. And time was scant; for the obvious precaution of cutting the telegraph wire had not been adopted till the fleet had been seen and reported from the island to Pola — not indeed till the engagement had actually commenced; and the record of a return message from Tegetthoff had been found: "Hold out till the fleet can come to you."
The following day the "Affondatore" and two wooden frigates joined from Ancona, bringing a strong detachment of soldiers. This put Persano in a position to land twenty-two hundred men, and he determined to persevere. The "Terri-bile" and "Varese" were again sent to occupy the attention of Comisa. The "Formidabile" and "Affondatore" were to go into the harbor and engage Fort Madonna; Vacca in the "Principe di Carignano" was to support them. For this, Vacca found there was no room. The "Formidabile," leading in, took up a position in front of the fort; the "Affondatore" was held in play by some flanking works which did her no more damage than she did them; but the "Formidabile" had a hot time, and after an hour she had had enough of it and drew off. She had three or four men killed and about sixty wounded; her rigging, boats, bulwarks and everything not covered by the armor were cut to pieces, her funnel shot away, and six of her port-lids; and though neither shot nor shell had penetrated her armor, a shell bursting on the sill of one of the ports had killed two and wounded ten men at the gun, and filled the battery with such a dense smoke that the guns' crews were nearly stifled. The attack for that day had failed; the only result of it had been to get the "Formidabile" knocked to bits. It was resolved, therefore, to try on the morrow what the landing party could do. And this resolution Persano stuck to, notwithstanding Tegetthoff's intercepted telegram: "Hold out till the fleet can come to you." He seems to have been positively unable to entertain or weigh two ideas: the one, to capture San Giorgio, had filled his mind; the other, the probable advent of Tegetthoff, could find no place.
Accordingly, the next morning preparations were made for landing. The "Terribile" and "Varese" were to renew the attempt on Comisa. Albini, from the wooden ships, was to land the troops and small-armed men. The ironclads were to engage the forts. No intimation was given to the captains of the ships, nor even to the vice and rear admirals, that the enemy's fleet might be expected. Vacca alone had heard of the telegram; and that only by reason of the accident of his having had direct communication with the flagship. When about eight o'clock in the morning (July 20, 1866), the "Esploratore," a despatch vessel, came in from her lookout station, with the signal flying, "Enemy in sight," it was to the whole fleet as startling as a thunderclap. Albini, with his division, had the boats out and full of military stores, waiting for the signal to land. The signal was, instead, to hold on, and a few minutes later, "Enemy in sight — prepare for action." It was the first intimation he had that there was a near chance of the enemy's fleet coming. Neither on the previous evening, nor at any other time, had there been any consultation, or any explanation of the admiral's wishes or intentions. The order had indeed been given that, as Albini had been ​placed by the minister in more immediate command of the wooden or reserve squadron, Vacca was to command the van or right wing, and Ribotty, the captain of the "Re di Portogallo," to command the rear or left wing, according as the fleet was in line ahead or abreast. But nothing more. Vacca's words, as afterwards given in evidence before the court, are: "No council was called, nor was the plan of battle discussed, as the regulations direct. I was unable to form any idea of what the commander-in-chief meant to do."
To interpret the thought of another man is difficult. In this case I do not believe that there was a thought to interpret. Persano had formed no plan. He had either not permitted himself to think of the possibility of Tegetthoff's approach; or he had trusted to that inborn genius which I often hear spoken of. When the hour of trial came, the admiral was more utterly unprepared than any of his subordinates. Tegetthoff was advancing from about northwest. The Italian ironclad squadron, or so much of it as was available, was hastily formed in line abreast, and steered towards him. But the "Terribile" and "Varese" were at the other end of the island, some ten or twelve miles off; and the "Formi-dabile" was so shattered that she made the signal for permission to part company, and lay to, repairing damages. Her captain, Saint-Bon — who had joined only just as she left Ancona, and did not know his officers even by name — afterwards deposed that her ports were so low, so near the water, that it was impossible for him to prepare for action in such a swell as was then on; so many of his port-lids had been shot away that he must have been swamped. He hoped to have rejoined the fleet within a few hours; but, contrary to all expectation, the fight was over before he was ready.
After standing towards the enemy for a short half-hour, some hazy recollection of last century's wars seems to have flitted across Persano's mind: he made the signal to form line of battle towards the northeast, that is, nearly at right angles to the course on which the Austrians were advancing. He expected — or at least said so afterwards — that Albini, with the wooden frigates, would form a second line on his starboard, or right-hand side, leaving the picking up of the boats and soldiers to the small craft. But Albini had no orders, and, failing these, fell back on a sort of general understanding that wooden ships were not needlessly to engage ironclads. He accordingly stayed well to the rear, and, as far as the fight which followed was concerned, might as well — or better — have been at Ancona.
And meantime Tegetthoff was advancing at full speed; his seven ironclad ships, in a double oblique line, in front, the "Erzherzog Ferdinand Maximilian" leading, the salient point of this wedge of war. Behind, at a distance of one thousand yards, were the seven wooden ships, in a similar formation, the "Kaiser" leading in the wake of the "Ferdinand Max," the fifty-gun frigates "Novara" and "Schwarzenberg" covering the right and left wings; and another thousand yards farther astern were the gun-vessels also in double dchelon; behind all, the despatch vessels and miscellaneous small craft. But Tegetthoff's plans had been arranged long beforehand, and as he advanced the only signals he had to make were: "Clear for action — close up — full speed;" and lastly, at ioh. 35m., "Ironclads to rush against the enemy and sink him."
The charge of the Austrian squadron must be described as brilliant; it was made in good order and with an admirable unanimity and steadiness; but the speed of it has, nevertheless, been very incorrectly stated. It seems quite certain that none of the ships in the Austrian fleet could steam at a rate exceeding ten knots, if so much. I believe that the speed of the charge was not more than eight knots; but probably enough it seemed more, and especially to the thunderstruck Italians.
And now, as the crash was imminent, Persano carried out the idea of changing his ship. His flag was flying at the main of the "Rè d'Italia." He signalled the "Affondatore" to close. The "Re d' Italia" was stopped for quite ten minutes; and the admiral, with his personal staff, but leaving behind his guest and adulator Boggio, went on board the turret-ship. The two or three ships immediately astern, which, owing to the unexpected stoppage of the "Re d' Italia," had probably ranged up abreast of her, saw what was going on; but no one else did. The van had held on its course, and, at a distance of nearly a mile, only saw that a boat passed; and since the ships were all dressed with flags, an ensign at every mast-head and. everywhere else where an ensign could be hoisted, the admiral's flag — which differs but little from an ensign — could not be distinguished. In their subsequent examination, Vacca and ​Albinistated positively that they had no idea that any such change had been made: they both looked to the "Rè d'Italia" for signals, and saw none. The "Affonda-tore's" masts were mere sticks, quite unsuitable for signalling; and in the crowd of flags, any signals she made were little likely to attract notice, and did not attract it. If signals were made, no one saw them, and the battle fought itself.
About a quarter of an hour after the "Rè d'Italia" had resumed her way, the front line of the Austrians — the ironclads — in a compact mass passed through the Italian line, or rather through the gap which the "Re d'ltalia" had opened. As they approached, Vacca opened fire at a distance stated by the Austrians as one thousand or twelve hundred yards, but which the Italians call two hundred: the, discrepancy may perhaps be reconciled by supposing that some straggling shots were fired at long range, but none by Vacca's orders until the ships were close to. It is at least agreed that the Austrians did not fire till they were within two hundred yards. Then they did; and in the cloud of smoke with which their own fire enveloped them, passed harmlessly through the gap. Captain Colomb suggests that the "Rè d'Italia" may have eased to let them so pass through; but there is no evidence of this, and the gap was already there, owing to the previous stoppage.
As the Austrians advanced, Vacca, with the three leading ships, bore to the left and enfiladed their line; then, also, the line of wooden frigates; and, circling round, came into the rear of all, with the intention of destroying some, at least, of the small craft in the third division. But Commodore Petz in the "Kaiser," and with the wooden ships, was meanwhile edging away towards the south, to attack the wooden division of the Italian fleet. On his part, Ribotty had turned to the left, and was steering with his three ships — the "Varese" had just rejoined — to interpose between Petz and Tegetthoff, so as to let Albini have the undisturbed enjoyment of his share of the fray; but Albini made no move to take advantage of this; and Petz, seeing the "Rè di Portogallo" and the other two ships heading towards him, turned to meet them. On the way he encountered the "Affondatore;" the two ships were running right against each other, bows on; a collision seemed unavoidable, but the "Affondatore" turned off and passed away. The "Kaiser" then engaged the "Rè di Portogallo," firing concentrated broadsides. Between two such ships, the "Kaiser," an old-fashioned line-of-battle ship, and the "R& di Portogallo," an ironclad of five thousand seven hundred tons carrying amongst her thirty-six guns, all rifled, two three-hundred-pounder Armstrongs, the word combat ought to be inapplicable. That the "Kaiser" ever came out of it, speaks, more positively than any detailed evidence, of the inefficiency of the Italians. What happened was this. The "Kaiser," finding that her guns produced no impression on the ironclad's sides, resolved to ram her, and did so. The shock carried away her own stem and bowsprit; her figurehead remained on the "Rè di Portogallo's" quarter-deck; her foremast also went, sweeping away the funnel in its fall; flames and smoke smothered the upper deck, and the ship, grinding alongside the ironclad, received her broadside at this very close range. That she was not destroyed seems almost to confirm the report, that the Italian gunners in their flurry fired blank cartridges.
Still firing, the "Kaiser" passed on, and on her way was again met by the "Affondatore." This ship was fitted specially as a ram. She had a spur thirty feet long — a touch would have been fatal. She was coming straight on. Her quarry was before her, nearly square; a slight turn towards the left would have made its destruction certain. Her commander gave the order for the men to throw themselves flat on their faces, — "Pancia a terra!" when to his surprise, to the surprise of everybody who could see, her helm was put hard over, and she turned away to the right, receiving at a very close range the "Kaiser's" concentrated broadside on her thinly;armored deck. The true reason of the "Affondatore's" conduct will forever remain doubtful. It is certain that the order to turn to the right was given, and given with repeated emphasis, by Persano himself; but whether his doing so was a simple, well-meaning error of judgment, whether he was afraid of the effect of the shock on the exaggerated spur, or whether his humanity revolted from the idea of putting nine hundred Austrians into the water, cannot possibly be decided.
But the "Kaiser," closely followed by the "Novara" and the others, passed through the rear of the Italian line, interchanging a heavy fire with the ships of that division — the "Rè di Portogallo," "Maria Pia," and "Varese." The loss fell almost entirely on the "Kaiser" and "Novara." The "Kaiser," in addition to the loss of her masts and funnel, had ​twenty-four men killed, and seventy-five — amongst whom was the commodore — wounded. The "Novara" had seven, including her captain, killed, and twenty wounded. The rest of the division had in all but three killed and nine wounded. But the "Kaiser" was disabled; her engineer reported that he could not keep up steam; and she made her way with difficulty, though unopposed, into San Giorgio.
The crisis of the fight was, however, farther north, amongst the ironclads. The three leading ships, forming Vacca's division, had encircled the rear of the Austrian small craft, but too slowly to inclose them or even to do them any harm. The three sternmost ships under Ribotty, as well as the "Affondatore," were engaged with the "Kaiser" and her consorts; and the three in the centre — the "Rè d'Italia," "Pa lestro," and "San Martino" — were opposed to the concentrated force of the seven Austrian ironclads. The result of Persano's want of forethought, or of his trust in the inspiration of the moment, was, that with a fleet of twelve ironclad ships against seven, the actual condition of the fight was that three were opposed to the seven, and were beaten by them.
This is the one great tactical lesson which the action seems to me to convey. Captain Colomb has spoken of the result of the first charge of the Austrian ironclads as the dividing of the Italian line. In this I am compelled to differ from him. The Italian line was divided before the charge quite as much as after; and no part of it was really cut off by the mere passing through a very wide gap. The resulting break was, in fact, rather in the Austrian fleet, whose wooden division was exposed to a concentrated attack from Vacca, Ribotty, and Albini, which must have been overwhelming had these been men of energy and decision, had there been between them a fixedness and unanimity of purpose; and which, even as it was, might well have been fatal.
Of this Tegetthoff seems to have been quickly aware. The ironclads were turned, as soon as the threatened attack could be seen; the signal was to support the second division; and with that they charged back again. For,a few minutes the centre of the battle was enveloped in smoke. When it cleared away the fight was virtually at an end.
The Austrian ironclads were painted black, but their funnels were all differently colored, so that a glimpse through the smoke was sufficient to identify the ship. Between the Italians there was no such difference; they were all painted grey, and, under the circumstances, were undistinguishable from each other. There was thus no choice of an enemy, and once again in the smoke, Tegetthoff's order was simple: "Ram everything grey!" Backwards and forwards, it is impossible to say how often, the ships passed: the "Don Juan" and the "Kaiser Max" hunted the "San Martino;" the "Prinz Eugen," "Salamander" and "Drache"took the pressure off the "Kaiser" and "Novara," and engaged the rear division. Moll, the captain of the "Drache," was killed; and for a few minutes the command devolved on a young ensign, Weyprecht, who has since won European fame as the commander of the Arctic discovery ship "Tegetthoff." Twice, in the smoke, the "Ferdinand Max" rammed a grey »mass, but inefficiently; the angle of impact was too oblique. A shell from one of her forty-eight-pounders, a smooth, round, old-fashioned shell, burst in the "Palestro's" ward-room, and set her on fire. Suddenly, through the smoke, a stationary grey mass was dimly seen. Tegetthoff pointed her out to his flag-captain, Baron von Sterneck. The engine-room telegraph carried down the order: "Full speed ahead!" The "Max" started forward and struck the grey mass — an enemy's ship — abreast the foremast, on the port-side. It rolled to starboard through an angle roughly estimated at 450; then, as the "Max" backed out of the hole she had made, it rolled heavily to port, showing the deck and the terror-stricken crowd on it to the appalled conquerors, and sank. At such a moment, seconds are as years; but it is believed that between the blow and the disappearance the time did not exceed two minutes; it was twenty minutes past eleven; thirty-seven minutes since the first shot had been fired.
The "Elizabeth," a paddlewheel despatch boat which had followed Tegetthoff into the thick of the fight, was ordered to pick up as many of the drowning men as she could; but the Italian ships, knowing nothing of what had happened, presently drove her away. She was struck four times, had one man killed and four wounded; and was compelled to look out for her own safety. It was then, and only then, known from the prisoners that the sunken ship was the "Rè d'Italia." Amongst the few picked up by the boats of one of the Italian ships was the ​commander Del Santo: his deposition can scarcely fail to be interesting. He says that after the first Austrian charge, the "Ferdinand Max" "began a series of evolutions with the intention of sinking us; keeping up all the time a very hot fire of musketry and artillery, at a distance of only a few yards." It seems therefore that no attempt was made to turn the tables; the idea of sinking the "Max" did not occur to the Italians.
    Two or three times our men were called to repel boarders, as the enemy threatened our stern or broadside; and once the division of firemen, to extinguish the fire which an enemy's shell had kindled in the admiral's cabin. Our ship's company behaved splendidly, and especially those of them stationed on the poop, where they were quite without shelter. Amongst these was Boggio, the deputy, who, with his eyeglass in his eye, was firing away with his revolver, determined to sell his life as dearly as possible. All at once, as the smoke slightly lifted, I saw the "Ferdinand Max" coming down against us on our port side. I rushed to warn the captain of it. As our rudder had been rendered almost unserviceable by the enemy's fire, he gave the order, "Full speed astern!" but it was too late to prevent the enemy striking us just abreast the foremast. The ship did not feel any such shock as one would think the necessary consequence of the blow, but heeled over to port, very gradually, and sank.
With the "Rè d'Italia" sunk, and the "Palestro" at a distance trying to extinguish the flames, the action in the centre was at an end. The two fleets collected themselves, but in a changed position. The Austrians were now in shore and covering Lissa. The Italians had been pushed out to seaward; the "Palestro" blew up about two o'clock; and thoroughly cowed by the loss they had sustained, they were in no humor to attempt to regain their position. The Austrians, on the other hand, had accomplished their purpose; and there was no reason why they should hazard their advantage by a fresh attack on a force still numerically superior. They waited for a couple of hours, and seeing no intention on the part of the enemy to renew the engagement, they went into San Giorgio; the gun-vessels first, then the wooden frigates, the ironclads following; the "Ferdinand Max," the last of all, let go her anchor about sundown. Such in its broad facts was the battle of Lissa, concerning which — as I have already said — some curiously wrong ideas have got into circulation. These are assuredly not worth looking for and contradicting one by one: but perhaps the most common of them is, that an Austrian wooden line-of-battle ship rammed and sank an Italian ironclad; and from that the inference is drawn that a wooden ship can encounter an ironclad on fairly equal terms. As giving rise to and supporting such an inference, the mistake is therefore important. So far as it is possible to trace its origin, I think it arose from a confusion between the "Ferdinand Max," the "Kaiser Max" and the "Kaiser," three totally distinct ships; the two first were ironclads; the third a ninety-gun ship. What the "Ferdinand Max" and the "Kaiser" severally did, I have already told at length; but as opposed to the popular misrepresentation, I will say, in so many words: The ship which rammed and sunk the Italian ironclad was herself an ironclad of nearly the same size; and the line-of-battle ship, which rammed an ironclad, injured herself very much and her enemy very little. That of the whole Austrian loss of thirty-eight killed, thirty-five were on board the wooden ships, and twenty-four of them on board the "Kaiser" alone, shows how little the efficiency of the two classes of ships can be compared. As to other absurd stories that have been circulated, it would be trouble thrown away to repeat them or to contradict them.
As is very well known, the Italians were excessively disgusted with the result of the action, so different from what they had flattered themselves it would be. Persano was loudly accused of gross misconduct — of cowardice — of treason — of everything that was vile; and that so persistently, that after some delay it was determined to bring him to trial. But he was a senator — a peer of the realm, so to speak — and could not, according to the constitution, be tried by a court-martial. The whole Senate was therefore formed into a high court of justice. The trial lasted for several months: a vast number of witnesses were examined; and their evidence, joined to the detailed Austrian accounts, leaves us little to wish for so far as knowledge of the facts is concerned; a knowledge of motives can never perhaps be satisfactorily ascertained. ​The court, which on the 29th of January, 1867, acquitted the admiral on the more serious charges of cowardice and treason, on the 15th of April found him guilty of negligence and incapacity (negligenza e imperizia). On the 27th of June he had manifestly disobeyed his instructions, which were to clear the Adriatic of enemy's ships; on the cruise from the 8th to the 13th of July he had equally violated his instructions by not seeking an opportunity to attack the enemy, or to blockade him in his harbors; and finally at Lissa he had let himself be surprised by the enemy, he had made no disposition for battle, had called no council of war, had gone without general intimation on board the "Affon-datore," had permitted the enemy to break his line, had managed the "Affondatore" badly, and had left the battle to itself; and the court therefore sentenced him to be deprived of his rank as admiral, to be dismissed the service, and to pay the costs of the trial.
There has been in England a tendency to believe that Persano was a victim, sacrificed to the Italian's wounded self love; for myself, after a careful study of the minutes of the trial, I would accept the decision as just, and even lenient. It is, of course, impossible to offer at length the grounds for this opinion; they fill a closely printed quarto of nearly three hundred pages. But in a few words, nothing would more strongly support it than the opening sentences of Persano's own address in reply to the charge. He might almost have been condemned out of his own mouth.
    I cannot understand [he began] how I should be accused of having failed in my duty against the enemy's fleet, which came upon us almost before it was signalled, and whilst we were in considerable embarrassment from the fact that our ships had lately come in from a long voyage and were short of stores.
He then enumerated a number of defects, some of which had been repaired a month before, and went on: —
    So that of the eleven ironclads there were not more than four fit for a long chase. The other seven were, at best, only fit to take part in a battle, but could not be relied on for a chase; and the more so as most of them wanted the guns and ammunition necessary for fighting with ironclads.
    If Tegetthoff had come really with a wish to fight, he would not have withdrawn as soon as we were ready to meet and attack him. I could not, of course, suppose that he had come merely to go away again; and it was therefore my duty, in the first place, to form the fleet so as not to expose it to needless risk; and then to oppose and attack the enemy. But instead of that, he went off after a short time, two or three hours perhaps, much to our regret, and notwithstanding the dashing conduct of our ships' companies.
Of which, a great part is not true; a great part is irrelevant; a great part is self-condemnatory; and all is extremely silly. It is impossible to think or speak with respect of a man who at such a critical period, when honor, perhaps life, was at stake, could give voice to such imbecile maunderings; and so, in the words of the old sagas, he is now out of the story.
Tegetthoff's reception from his country was, as might be expected, very different. It is believed that the result of the battle had a very distinct influence on the terms of the peace which was concluded shortly afterwards, and was the direct means of preserving to Austria the Dalmatian and Illyrian provinces. It may well be that this was so; undoubtedly, had Lissa fallen, Austria would have stood in a very different position with regard to the Adriatic. But coming in a time of great depression and calamity, the moral effect of the victory was greater than any mere material advantage, and the nation and the government hastened to show honor to their champion. The news was sent to Vienna by telegraph; and by telegraph on the very next day Tegetthoff received a message from the emperor promoting him to be a vice-admiral. Decorations were showered on him; but perhaps of all these, the one most grateful to him was that sent by the emperor of Mexico in an autograph letter, dated Chapultepec, August 24, 1866, which ran thus: —
    My dear Rear-Admiral Baron von Tegetthoff, — The glorious victory which you have gained over a brave enemy, vastly superior in numbers and nurtured in grand old naval traditions, has filled my heart with unmixed joy. When I handed over to others the care of the navy which had become so dear to me, and relinquished the task of making the land of my birth great and mighty by sea, amid the clash of contending nations, ​I looked hopefully to you and the young generation of officers and men whom I had been proud to see growing up and striving in a noble emulation under my command. I felt deeply thankful at being able to leave to Adria so many ships — a body of which such an able staff of officers and such brave sailors constituted the soul. Although Providence has led me into another track, my heart still burns with the fire of naval glory; and bright and joyful for me was the day when the heroic fleet to which I had dedicated my youth, under your heroic leadership, wrote down, with a blood-red pen, the 20th of July, 1866, on the pages of naval history. For with the victory of Lissa your fleet becomes enrolled amongst those whose flag is the symbol of glory, and your name is added to the list of the naval heroes of all time. To you, the officers, and the ships' companies, I send my heartfelt good wishes; and you, as a remembrance of your admiral and friend, and as a proof of my admiration, I invest with the Grand Cross of my Guadalupe Order. Maximilian.
After the end of the war, Vice-Admiral Tegetthoff travelled for a few months in France, England, and the United States. His visit could scarcely be called private, though in name, at least, unofficial; but he had nevertheless the direct object of seeing the great naval arsenals of those countries, and studying their organization. He had returned from America, and was on his way to Paris, the seat then in 1867, as now in 1878, of a "Great Exhibition," when he was recalled by telegraph to Vienna. There he received the honorable though melancholy commission to go to Mexico, to reclaim from the government (if it may be so called) and bring home the body of the late emperor Maximilian. This duty was performed, though not without difficulty and delay raised by the government and Juarez: the body was recovered and brought to Vienna, where it now lies in the imperial vault. So great throughout Germany was the interest felt in this deep Mexican tragedy; and, notwithstanding the recent development of the north German and Austrian navies, so little familiarity is there with nautical matters, that I am barely overstating the case if I say that to the majority of even educated Germans, Tegetthoff is not so much the victor of Lissa, as the bringer home of Maximilian's body.
But his career was drawing to a close. In March, 1868, he was appointed head of the naval section of the war office, and commander-in-chief of the navy, and this he held till his death, which took place, after a short illness, on April 7, 1871; in the words of the semi-official notice — "zu früh für Oesterreich."
The portraits of Tegetthoff that I have seen represent a hard Scotch type of face. I do not know how far they are to be trusted, but they are not out of keeping with his recorded character. He is described as a man of few words, emphatically a man of action, one able to execute his meaning, but not always able to tell it; at the same time ready to speak out, and sharply too, if occasion called for it or the good of the service required it. But, as has happened to other naval officers, there were moments when he was tempted by feelings-of disgust or dissatisfaction; and once, at least, he had made up his mind to retire into private life. That he was persuaded to remain for the glory and the welfare of his country, is perhaps not the least of the benefits which the Austrian navy received from the unfortunate Maximilian.
J. K. Laughton. Greenwich, May 1878.
* ↑ Journal of the United Service Institution, vol. xi., p. 104.
* ↑ The misspellings show considerable ingenuity. Starting with the data that its consonants are t, g, f, and a doubtful h, these have been arranged by ones or twos, in almost every possible combination. Tegethoff, Tegetoff, Teggetoff, Tegnetoff, are only some of the many ways that have come under my notice.
* ↑ Jest and Earnest, vol. ii., p. 110.
* ↑ La Marine d'Aujourd'hui, p. 158.
* ↑ La Guerra in Italia nel 1866. L'Esercito, la Flotta e i Volontarj Italiani. Studio militare. Milan, 1867, p. 344.
* ↑ The port-lids are the solid shutters that close the ports: the idea conveyed in the term would seem to be analogous to that in eyelids.
* ↑ The wording of this signal, which may be considered as Tegetthoff s tactical legacy, was, "Panzerschiffe den Feind anrennen und zum sinken bringen."
* ↑ The time of the "Kaiser's" ineffectually ramming the "Rè di Portogallo" is given as 11h. 17m. The two were thus almost simultaneous.
* ↑ "Rendiconti delle udienze pubbliche dell' Alta Corte di Giustizia nel dibattimento della causa contro l'Ammiraglio Senatore Conte Carlo Pellion di Persano, preceduti dalla relazione della Commissione d'Istruttoria" (Firenze, 1867). The fullest Austrian account is in "Oesterreichs Kämpfe im Jahre 1866. Nach Feldacten bearbeitet durch das k. k. General-stabs. Bureau für Kriegs-Geschichte," vol. v. (Wien, 1869). As Tegetthoff was, in 1869, at the war office, I think it is probable that he revised this history of the naval campaign, and the sketch of his own life which accompanies it. The account given in the Archiv für Seewesen for 1866 must also be considered semi-official; but is much shorter, and, by so much, less perfect. There are, of course, many other Austrian and Italian accounts. Persano's own version of the story is "L' Ammiraglio C. di Persano nella campagna navala dell' anno 1866. Confutazioni, schiarimenti e documenti" (Torino, 1873). The French accounts, as given in the Revue Maritime, vols. xviii. and xix., may also be referred to; and the very interesting narrative that appeared in the Revue des Deux Mondes (Nov. 15, 1866), and which, rightly or wrongly, has always been attributed to the Prince de Joinville.