# Political fragments of Archytas and other ancient Pythagoreans/From the treatise of Ecphantus, the Crotonian, on a kingdom

FROM THE TREATISE OF ECPHANTUS, THE CROTONIAN, ON A KINGDOM.
That the nature of every animal is adapted to the world, and to the things contained in the world, appears to me to be evident from many arguments. For every animal thus conspiring [into union and consent], and having such a ​colligation of its parts, it follows a series which is most excellent, and at the same time necessary, through the attractive flux of the universe about it, which is effective of the general ornament of the world, and the peculiar permanency of every thing which it contains. Hence it is called κοσμος kosmos, and is the most perfect of all animals. But in its parts, which are many, and naturally different, a certain animal excels; both from its native alliance to the world, and from participating of divinity in a greater degree. [And in the nature, indeed, of the God who is eternal, the stars called planets are comprehended, forming the first and the greatest series]. But in the sublunary region, where bodies move in a right line, the nature of demons has its subsistence. And in the earth, and with us, the most excellent nature is man; but the most divine is a king, who surpasses other men in the common nature: in his tabernacle, indeed, [i.e. in his body], resembling other men, as being generated from the same matter, but fashioned from the best of artificers, who fa​bricated him, by using himself as the archetype. Hence, in a certain respect, a king is one and alone; being the production of the supernal king, with whom he is always familiar: but being beheld by his subjects in his kingdom as in a splendid light. For a kingdom is judged and proved to resemble the eagle, the most excellent of winged animals, which looks undazzled at the sun. And a kingdom is, indeed, analogous to the sun, because it is divine; and through excess of splendour cannot be seen without difficulty, except by genuine eyes. For the numerous splendours which surround it, and the dark vertigos which it produces in those who survey it, as if they had ascended into a foreign altitude, evinces that their eyes are spurious. But those who can fitly arrive thither, on account of their familiarity with, and alliance to it, are able to use it properly. A kingdom, therefore, is a thing pure, genuine, uncorrupted, and through transcendency, most divine; and difficult to be acceded to by man. Hence it is necessary that he who is established in it should be naturally most pure and pellucid [in his soul], in order that he may not obscure by his stains that which is most splendid; as some persons defile the most sacred places, and the impure pollute those they ​may happen to meet. But it is requisite that a king, who associates with men, should participate of an undefiled nature, and should know how much more divine both himself and his qualifications are than other things; and from the exemplars to which he assimilates himself, he should use both himself and his subjects in the best manner. And to other men, indeed, if they are delinquents, the most holy purification is for them to be assimilated to their rulers, whether law or a king administers their affairs. But kings who cannot find any thing on the earth to imitate more excellent than their own nature, ought not to wander any farther in search of a paradigm, but should immediately become benefited by imitating God. For neither should any one search for the world, since he exists in, and is a part of it; nor should he who governs others be ignorant of him by whom he is governed. This, however, is a most abundant ornament, that nothing [in the universe] can be found without a ruler.
The manners of a king also ought to be the preceptors of his government. For thus the beauty of it will immediately shine forth, since he who imitates God through virtue will be dear to him whom he imitates; and much more will he be dear to his subjects. For no ​one who is beloved by divinity will be hated by men; since neither do the stars, nor the whole world hate God. For if they hated their ruler and leader, they would never be obedient to him. But because he governs properly, mundane affairs are well governed. I therefore, indeed, apprehend that the terrene king ought not to be deficient in any one of the virtues which pertain to the celestial king. But as the former is a certain foreign and external thing, in consequence of proceeding to men from the heavens; so, likewise, his virtues may be conceived to be the works of God, and to accede to him through divinity. And if you consider the thing from the beginning, you will find what I say to be true. For the terrestrial king obtains possession of the race of men by a communion, which is the first and the most necessary of all things. And this race is also the possession of him who governs every thing in the universe. For it is impossible that any thing can subsist without friendship and communion; the truth of which may be easily seen, if the accustomed communion which exists among citizens is supposed to be destroyed; since this is much inferior to a divine and royal nature. For natures of this kind are not oppressed by any such indigence; but, conformably to intellect, they supply the ​wants of others, and afford them assistance in common. For they are perfect in virtue. But the friendship which is in a city, and which possesses a certain common end, imitates the concord of the universe. But without the arrangement of magistrates no city can be inhabited. In order, however, to effect this arrangement, and to preserve the city, laws are necessary, and a certain political domination, and also a governor and the governed. But the consequence of these things is, the general good, a certain concinnity, and the consent of the multitude in conjunction with concordant persuasion. He, likewise, who governs according to virtue, is called a king, and is so [in reality]; since he possesses the same friendship and communion with his subjects as divinity possesses with the world, and the natures which it contains. All benevolence, however, ought to be exerted; in the first place, indeed, by the king towards his subjects; but in the second place, by the subjects towards the king: and this benevolence should be such as that of a parent towards his child, of a shepherd towards his flock, and of law towards him who uses it.
For there is one virtue pertaining to the government, and to the life of men. But no one should through indigence solicit the as​sistance of others, when he is able to supply himself with what nature requires. For though there is a general communion [in the city], yet every one should so live as to be sufficient to himself; since he who is sufficient to himself does not appear to require the aid of any other person in his passage through life. If, therefore, it is necessary to lead an active life, it is evident that a king, though he should also assume other things, will, nevertheless, be sufficient to himself. For he will have friends through his own virtue; and in using these, he will not use them by any other virtue than that by which he regulates his own life. For it is necessary that he should follow a virtue of this kind, since he cannot procure any thing which is more excellent. And God, indeed, not having either ministers or servants, nor employing any mandate, and neither crowning nor proclaiming those that are obedient to him, or disgracing those that are disobedient, thus administers so great an empire. But as it appears to me exhibiting himself to be most ​worthy of imitation, he inserts in all things a vehement desire of participating his nature. He is, however, good; and the communication of goodness, and this, with the greatest facility, is his only work. But those who imitate him, accomplish every thing in a better manner through this imitation. And the imitation of him is to every thing the source of sufficiency. For there is not one virtue which makes things to be acceptable to God, and another which imitates him; [but both these are effected by one and the same virtue]. And is not our terrestrial king in a similar manner sufficient to himself? For assimilating himself to one, and that the most excellent nature, he will beneficently endeavour to render all whom he governs similar to himself. But such as offer violence to, and compel their subjects, entirely destroy in every individual of the community a promptitude to imitate [that which is most excellent]. For without benevolence, it is impossible there can be assimilation; since benevolence especially destroys every thing of a terrific nature. It is much to be wished, indeed, that human nature was not in want ​of persuasion for persuasion is the relic of human depravity, of which this temporary animal [man] is not destitute. Persuasion, indeed, is a thing proximate to necessity; since this first of itself performs those things which fly from necessity. Such beings, however, as spontaneously use what is beautiful and good, are not influenced by the reverence of persuasion; for neither are they influenced by the fear of necessity.
Again, a king alone is capable of effecting this good in human nature, that through the imitation of what is more excellent, man may pursue what is fit and decorous; and that those who are corrupted as if by intoxication, and through a bad education have fallen into an oblivion of that which is more excellent, may through his eloquence be corroborated, may have their diseased minds healed, and the oblivion which dwells in them through depravity being expelled, may have memory for an intimate associate, from which persuasion is produced. For this, though it originates from depraved seeds, yet is the source of a certain good to the inhabitants of the terrestrial region, in which language supplies what is deficient (through the imbecility of our nature), in our converse with each other.
AND IN ANOTHER PART OF THE SAME WORK.
He who has a sacred and divine conception of things, will be in reality a king. For being persuaded by this, he will be the cause of all good, but of no evil. And, moreover, that he will be just, being fitted for society, is evident to every one. For communion or association consists in equality, and in the distribution of it. And justice indeed precedes, but communion participates. For it is impossible for a man to be unjust, and yet distribute equality; or that he should distribute equality, and yet not be adapted to association. But how is it possible that he who is sufficient to himself should not be continent? For sumptuousness is the mother of incontinence, and incontinence of wanton insolence, from which so many human evils are derived. But self-sufficiency is not vanquished by sumptuousness, nor by any thing which proceeds from it; but being itself a certain principle, it leads all things, but is not led by anything. And to govern, indeed, is the province of God, and also of a king (on which account, likewise, he is de​nominated sufficient to himself); but it pertains to both, not to be governed by any one. It is, however, evident, that these things cannot be effected without prudence. And it is manifest that God is the intellectual prudence of the world. For the world is connectedly contained by gracefulness, and a fit order of things, which cannot take place without intellect. Nor is it possible for a king without prudence to possess these virtues; I mean justice, continence, communion, and such other virtues as are the sisters of these.
* ↑ I here read, with Victorius, κατ᾽ οικειοτατα εγγενη, for και οικειοτατον εν γενοιν.
* ↑ This sentence within the brackets is not to be found in Stobæus.
* ↑ i.e. God is not in want of ministers or servants to assist him in the government of the universe: for he produces and provides for all things at once by his own immediate energy. But the cooperation of subordinate divine powers with him is necessary to the proper participation of him by the different beings which the universe contains.
* ↑ For οι μιμευμενοι των αυτων in this place, I read οι μιμευμενοι τον αυτον.
* ↑ Instead of ενιοτε here, I read παντοτε.
* ↑ Conformably to this, Plato also in the Politicus says: "It is requisite to call him royal who possesses the royal science, whether he governs or not."