# Diplomacy and the War/Part 1/Chapter 3

CHAPTER III.
The Diplomatic Supremacy of the Entente.
It is far easier to discover which nation displayed the greatest diplomatic ability than to discover what measure of responsibility rests upon each country. In the domain of diplomacy the Entente have proved themselves to be our masters. It cannot be denied that, even before the war, England succeeded in carrying off incomparable diplomatic victories over Germany.
Let us compare the relation of England and Germany between 1900 and 1908. In the first years England fought a hard battle against the Boers. It seemed as if the power of the greatest empire of the world was about to be shattered by the heroism of a small nation, and that the story of David and Goliath was going to be repeated. Public opinion of the world turned against England. England could say to herself at the beginning of this century what Germany could say to herself in 1914, namely, that she had lost the sympathy of the world, but there was this difference: Germany still had allies, whereas England was completely isolated. Lord Rosebery complained that his country was hated in an unparalleled manner throughout the whole world. The leader of the opposition, Campbell-​Bannerman, cried out in these bitter words: "We have lost our blood, our treasure, our might and our prestige and the source of our strength has become dried up; we have forfeited the sympathy, the recognition and the esteem of the world."
In France public opinion reached white heat against England on account of Fashoda and in consequence of the pro-Boer sympathies which were prevalent in Paris. The hatred of England was so strong as to put the hatred of Germany into the background. Although this hatred was not so deep, it was all the more poignant. The French Parliament took the part of the Boers, and the French press cast aspersions even upon the old Queen Victoria.
England's old rival, Russia, began to get a footing in China, Tibet and Persia. She entered into competition with England everywhere, so much so that India was in danger. Petrograd wished to intervene on behalf of the Boers, and brought about a convention in Berlin and Paris for the purpose.
The tendency in America was to justify the Boers and to condemn England.
The position of England was just as difficult as Germany's position was advantageous. Every path was open to Germany in all directions. She was on excellent terms with Russia, because that country needed Germany's sympathy on account of her Asiatic expansion. France was never more nearly in sympathy with Germany than in 1899, after the Dreyfus case, while the army was disorganized and social peace was ​disturbed by the militant policy of the Church. Of all the statesmen France has ever had, it was their President, Waldeck-Rousseau (1899–1902), who was most inclined to find a modus viendi for co-operating with his mighty neighbour. Austria-Hungary was not tied as yet by the danger of the Balkans, but she placed all her power at the service of the Alliance. The Monarchy had made an agreement with Russia. The Balkan States pursued a peaceable and modest policy. Germany played a leading part in Constantinople. At this time Germany obtained the concession for building the Bagdad Railway, and simultaneously the whole of the civilized world fought against the Boxer Rising under the leadership of Germany. French soldiers were under the command of a German Field-Marshal. Holland considered a plan, as a result of the sufferings of the Boers, of forming a tariff union with Germany.
How changed was the position eight or ten years later! England proved once more the greatness of her nation. She transported a greater number of troops oversea than had ever been done before. English democracy had proved that she was capable of endurance and also able to support her own imperialism. The Colonies remained loyal. England made an agreement with America. The feeling of solidarity between the two Anglo-Saxon races became more and more deeply rooted. England gained an ally in Japan, who proved to be stronger than Russia and who saved India. The antagonism of France declined, and the Entente Cordiale was established. The rivalry of centuries ​came to an end, and antagonistic Russia gradually became a friend. Italy, although a member of the Triple Alliance, sought the friendship of France and came under British influence. Serbia was at the disposal of England through Russia, and paralysed the power of our Monarchy.
What brought about this complete change? England had scented the foul air of decay, and she recognized that if Imperialism gained strength in all directions, and if the desire for oversea possessions became supreme in every State, her splendid isolation became untenable. England knew, moreover, that she could not save herself without making sacrifices, and that she must pay if she wanted to gain real value. In other words, she read the signs of the times.
England did not fear risk or shame, nor did she shrink from sacrifice. She gained Japan by being ready to ally herself with the yellow race against a white nation. This decision was certainly not an easy one, but it was necessary, and for this reason the decision was taken without delay in London. In order to defend her possessions in India with the sword of Japan, England accepted the danger of having to face a Franco-Russian coalition in opposition to herself and Japan. England wanted to approach France, but notwithstanding, she risked making the alliance with Japan. Her calculations proved to be correct. Japan succeeded in arresting the progress of France's ally, Russia, and England succeeded at the same time in gaining France, Japan's friend, as ally. It was ​partially the personal ability of King Edward which won France. Partially it was also due to England's decision to meet France's colonial demands even at the expense of real interests. England made heavy sacrifices by abandoning the idea of including Morocco within the sphere of her own power, and by allowing France, who had been her rival hitherto, to get a footing in Fashoda and near to Gibraltar, and finally, by her offer to risk everything in the interests of France in Morocco. In order not to cause jealousy in France, England sought to find a counterbalancing factor in the Moroccan question, by transferring responsibility to Spain. These sacrifices and this circumspection have been amply rewarded in England, for she succeeded in binding the rival of centuries to her with chains.
England also knew how to attach Russia to herself by a similarly bold decision. England had convinced France in Fashoda that it was futile for France to attempt to occupy a leading position in international policy without her. Having surmounted this test of strength, England gained French sympathy by concessions and extreme courtesy. England's procedure with regard to Russia was just the same. It was the duty of Japan to teach Czardom that modesty which could alone make a union with England possible. But even after the Russian forces had been sapped, her sympathy could only be gained by considerable sacrifices. Hitherto. England had frustrated Russia's desire for expansion in every way, but during this period ​England was forced to permit Russian expansion, and even to assist her in those places in which such expansion was least dangerous to England. As there was no agreement between Germany and England, it would have been dangerous for England to oppose the Russian attempts at expansion in the future, because Germany and Russia might have formed an alliance with a view to threatening the connection between Suez and India and China. Napoleon I had often contemplated forming a Franco-Russian alliance with a view to attacking England via Turkey and Egypt, and through Central Asia. The same danger might become acute once more in a new form. The arm of Germany would extend as far as Bagdad at an early date. What would happen to England's position if the Czar increased the pressure of the Kaiser by threatening Central Asia? It would have been easy for Russia to come to terms with Germany and to advance with her on the Constantinople-Bagdad line. The adoption of such a course might have led much more easily to Russia's revenge against Japan and to securing for herself the enormous resources of China and domination in Afghanistan and Persia. All these objects were within Russia's reach if she could form an alliance with Germany against England, who had forced her hitherto to complete inaction. While the Boer War was in progress, the Russo-German alliance was about to be created. England was faced by the most acute danger. In order to avoid this danger, England was obliged to render possible and even to facilitate the ​expansion of Russia wherever it was least dangerous. England feared Russia's advance into Asia in the direction of China or Persia far more than her territorial aggrandizement in the Balkans. Having induced Japan to check the advance of Russia in Manchuria, and having paralysed Russia's scheme in Persia (1907), England supported Russian ambitions in the Balkans. England was all the more ready to adopt this policy because she was thereby put in a position to defend herself the more easily against the danger that lay in Constantinople. If Russia had really succeeded in carrying od substantial territorial victories from Turkey, thereby penetrating the first line of defence of the Indian Empire, England would still have had time to form a second line of defence. In the event of the dreams of Peter the Great and Catherine II coming to be realized, in spite of the fact that Pitt, Palmerston and Disraeli had fought against their realization, England would attempt to re-create the empire of Alexander the Great. With Egypt at her back, she would lay hands upon Arabia and Mesopotamia, so that Malta, Cyprus and Egypt should become connected with India by an unbroken British Empire.
The new British system of alliances was faced by considerable difficulties. One of England's friends, Russia, had to make peace with another of England's friends, namely, Japan. Russia and Japan had to forget the bloody events of the recent past. The fact that England succeeded in carrying out this policy is in itself the highest praise of her diplomatic ability. ​An agreement was made between Russia and Japan which facilitated the growing intimacy between England and the other two powers.
English diplomacy succeeded, moreover, in gaining the friendship of Japan and North America, in spite of the strained relations of the two last-named States. England entered into an agreement with Japan by which she undertook to defend her in case of North American aggression, and at the same time England succeeded in gaining the friendship of the United States. England made considerable sacrifices to gain this end during the Boer War. England had the right to bring the new junction of the world's transport, namely, the Panama Canal, at any rate partially, under her influence; but Great Britain abandoned this valuable privilege in favour of the United States by leaving the Canal entirely under American influence, merely to gain the goodwill of the United States.
England did not have to make any sacrifices in order to gain Italy. It was France, rather, who did this by ceding Tripolis. Moreover, no particular ability was needed in order to gain Italy. At the same time, it needed considerable art to induce Italy to enter into intimate relations and friendship with the Entente without ceasing to be a member of the Triple Alliance.
It would be exceedingly interesting to gain an insight into the details of this diplomatic work. It is an achievement which deserves a place by the side of the enormous performance of Bismarck. This great German statesman succeeded in subduing his political oppo​nents one after another. He succeeded in holding France, Austria-Hungary and Russia apart, and at the end of all his victories he proved his ability by establishing an alliance which has governed the world in order to preserve peace and the security of Germany's position.
Theorists delight in comparing the courses of the nations to the courses of the stars, which are guided by eternal laws. Such a method, however, is seriously at fault. The automatic consequence of the action of the nations is not the cause of action by the state in the way in which the combination of the centrifugal and centripetal forces brings about the movement of the stars, but the action of a slate is determined by the view which is taken of the interests concerned, and this is indeed a movable feast. These views are subject to the irresistible influence of the feelings and moods and attitudes of the statesmen. And for this reason the art of politics is not only concerned with the correct calculation concerning the interests of the state, but also with bringing influence to bear upon the states concerned. A statesman must seek to bring about such a set of circumstances as will appear to be in the interests of the state when viewed in the light of the policy he wishes to pursue. On the other hand, his ability depends on his success in influencing other states in the manner he desires. He must know how to give such a tendency to the views and feelings of foreign states that they are led to pursue a course of action which is in agreement with his own convictions. ​A statesman must possess a tremendous knowledge of human nature, tact, ability, and the agility which enables him to apply the means in his power correctly and to understand the leaders of foreign nations. He must be adaptable, agile and cautious and, in certain circumstances, he must also be bold, in order that he may inspire confidence, sympathy and respect amongst the members of foreign nations. At the present day those means find favour in the eyes of statesmen which enable them to play upon the psychology of the masses and which are suitable for exercising the power of suggestion over public opinion.
Englishmen have excelled in the application of these means. They have proved themselves to be far superior in these matters to the Germans during the last epoch in their history. When Germany no longer possessed such a genius as Bismarck, the diplomatic training, and the greater political talents of the English race made themselves felt. It was not so much the superiority of single statesmen as the political weight of the nations which were united in the Entente, and especially the ability of the English nation, which brought about unfavourable diplomatic results for us.
One of the most powerful means of English diplomacy is the enormous political prestige of her nation. German genius is just as deep and just as wide as that of an Englishman or a Frenchman. The culture of Germany is as old, as versatile and as profound as the culture of any other nation in the world. Her greatest men belong to the greatest that have ever lived. Know​ledge was more general and more profound in Germany at that time than in any other country. Capacity for organization, discipline, and the art of united action, had achieved an incomparable degree of perfection in the past fifty years in Germany. None the less, in the sphere of politics Germany was unable to attain her natural position for a long time. Ever since the days of the Hohenstaufen she had ceased to occupy a leading position. The Germany of the Hohenzollerns was always regarded as an upstart who threatened the traditional rights of other nations. The prestige of Germany was not as large nor as stable nor as traditional as that of Englishmen, which has never ceased to develop for centuries past. The ability of Englishmen was greater than that of the Germans in Paris, Rome, Constantinople and Petrograd. Moreover, Englishmen generally inspire more sympathy because their inner life is rather freer and the idea of militarism does not permeate them.
England also spent much more money on her wars than Germany. She also conducted a great many more of them than Germany, and she subjugated many more foreign races. The English race is the most imperialistic in the world; in fact, one may say that since Rome, she is the greatest conqueror, and the only really successful conqueror the world has known. At the same time, England's constitution and her internal organization are the freest because the State and the Government are absolutely bourgeois and not in any way militaristic. England is the only great ​nation in Europe where general military service is not obligatory, and the Army has, relatively speaking, very little political influence in England, with the result that this country does not create that militaristic and hard impression which was created by the German Empire. England was able to gain the sympathy of modern democracy more readily than Germany. Behind King Edward there was a military power just as large as that which was at the back of the Kaiser. Ability and tact in foreign politics enabled King Edward to have as decisive a word in all questions of peace and war as the Kaiser, who always came arrayed in the full glory of his authority, and at the same time the King of England always created the impression of a middle-class gentleman and always appeared in plain clothes, whereas the Kaiser always embodied the idea of the War Lord.
The difference that has been described above can always be traced among the members of the nations which their rulers represent. The German diplomat could easily be led on to show his power, and he loved to point to the sharp sword of his powerful nation. The fist of an Englishman may be as rough as that of a Prussian Junker, but his glove is made of softer leather. The Englishman has much more pleasant manners; he is not as flattering or as agile as the Frenchman, nor does he possess as much esprit as the latter, nor does he display the profound and versatile knowledge of a German; but social intercourse with an Englishman is the surest and most pleasant, and ​this is an important item for a diplomat. The English type is imitated everywhere, Anglomania and snobbery are diseases that have spread far and wide, but they are also powerful weapons of English diplomacy. Many people are glad to be mistaken for Englishmen. A large proportion of our diplomats are very much impressed by the English gentleman. Most of our diplomats are proud, if they meet an English lord, and they believe blindly whatever a Salisbury or a Grey says to them. The natural, easy and simple appearance of Englishmen gives the impression of honesty. However, in the blood of every Englishman there is so much political experience and such a tradition of self-government as has never been inherited by the sons of another nation. Every Englishman has been brought up in the school of international politics and self-government in a measure in which no son of the same social strata of another nation, either in the past or in the present, has ever done.
The phenomenal successes which were achieved during the reign of King Edward VII I do not trace to the genius of single statesmen, but rather lo these general national characteristics which have been bred in the nation and developed by their freedom and their power in the world. Together with French diplomacy, which has also admirable traditions and a sound school, English diplomacy knew how to exercise its influence over the press and the large mass of the people of foreign countries. No other alliance and no other State had so much material for the purpose of influencing ​the outside world as the Entente, The Entente possessed the main cables and the great international financial trusts; they controlled the largest newspaper organizations and telegraph agencies, and were assisted by the enormous prestige which surrounds Englishmen and Frenchmen. No group of States has ever had at its disposal a force that was so suitable for propaganda as those forces which are aided by the pride and solidarity of the Anglo-Saxon race.
The classical example of how a foreign State can win public opinion will always be the action of the Entente in Rome. The Entente succeeded in obliterating the memory of half her past and the necessity of executing her contractual duties in a short time. They succeeded, moreover, in gaining such power over public opinion that the influence of the Entente proved stronger than the constitutional elements during a moment of crisis.
Unfortunately, these diplomatic victories were facilitated by the policy of Germany. At a time when it would have been easiest to frustrate the grouping of the new States, Germany did not give enough consideration to this question. While Englishmen were making great sacrifices in order to gain greater ends, Germany did not want to deny herself anything, but rather to secure all her interests simultaneously. The aim of German policy was to preserve the existing alliances and to establish her continental predominance by this means. On the other hand, Germany intended to develop her power at sea to such an extent that in case of emergency she should be in a position to tackle ​England single-handed, so that it should be possible for her to acquire colonies independently of Great Britain. In the interests of her economic and imperialistic development, Germany intended to exploit every possibility, and she believed that this purpose was best served by seeking allies who were weaker than herself. The allies that Germany was looking for were allies whose friendship did not have to be bought by serious sacrifices, and allies which subsequently passed under German control. Germany was afraid that an ally who was equal to herself in strength, or even superior, might exploit Germany's strength and then desert her. Nobody believed in Berlin that the powers of the world would unite against Germany, even in the event of Germany failing to acquire their friendship. Germany did not intend to destroy any other great power or to damage their interests. In the knowledge of her anxiety for peace and the consciousness of her strength, Germany counted on the fact that the great powers of the world, which had many opposing interests, would not sacrifice much that was of value to them in order to ally themselves against Germany.
The traditional opposition between England and France, and England and Russia were estimated in Berlin to be so strong that the anti-German coalition of these powers was not regarded as an immediate danger. Even at a time when Berlin recognized that France approached England and that England approached Russia, one did not believe in such a solidarity of interests as would induce these nations ​to decide upon common action. If Germany had intended to conquer Russia and to acquire Russian territory, or to shake the foundations of Russia's position in the world, Germany would have made every effort to gain the friendship of England, just as Bismarck spared no means at his disposal in order to keep Napoleon III at a distance until he had finished with Austria, and in order to appease Russia until he had vanquished France.
If the Kaiser had wished to fight England, he would most certainly have been prepared to make the greatest sacrifices in order to ensure the neutrality or the alliance of Russia; as, however, he only wished to foster the peaceable development of his country, and as he was of the opinion that his own might was sufficient to protect his interests, he placed a greater value upon the preservation of his own independence than upon the conclusion of new alliances.
This policy would have been justified if the rest of the world had entertained the same opinion of Germany which the Germans entertained about themselves. Unfortunately, however, this was not the case. The Germans would not believe that the world feared and distrusted her. They did not recognize the fact that foreign States saw in certain actions of Germany a desire for conquest, whereas, as a matter of fact, the Germans only wished to make themselves felt economically. Moreover, foreign States suspected Germany of an attempt to establish monopolies where the Germans only thought of participation. The ​Germans failed particularly to realize with what anxiety England regarded her policy, which could so easily have endangered England's position. No true German would believe that England was prepared, even at the cost of heavy sacrifices, to safeguard herself by the creation of strong alliances.
In this manner it came about that at decisive moments the strong will and great activity of England was not opposed by an equally strong will and an equally great activity. Germany could easily have found numerous opportunities, especially in the first years of the century, in order to prevent the alliances which were already created from threatening her. In fact, Germany could have gained the sympathy of England. England made an effort to acquire Germany's friendship (1898–1901) and this very fact is England's greatest justification of her subsequent policy. Before England set out to create a league against Germany, Chamberlain offered Germany an alliance, but unfortunately without sucess.
Germany rendered England an enormous service during the Boer War by her correct attitude, notwithstanding the fact that the general feeling of the people was against the Government. In fact, when Russia, in conjunction with France, intended to intervene, Germany prevented this plan, by making it a condition of her co-operation that France should give adequate guarantees for Germany's possessions, including Alsace-Lorraine. Germany did not demand a counter-service for this great help from England, unless we ​are to regard the agreement relating to the possible purchase of the Belgian colonies as a counter-service. It should, however, be observed that this agreement remained an agreement and nothing more. Germany did not conclude an alliance, nor did she solve the great colonial question, as, for instance, the question of Morocco, which England would have been glad to have seen settled favourably to and by Germany and in such a way as to satisfy France.
Von Bülow, the Chancellor, was afraid of a union with England. Like Bismarck, he did not consider a union with England as sufficiently safe in view of the fact that England was subject to changing party governments. But I believe that they made a mistake in holding this opinion. Subsequent events have proved this completely. Politically, England has been schooled so well, and is imbued by so much imperialistic tradition, that questions of foreign policy are only rarely mane the subject of party politics, and once public opinion has been secured to adopt a certain tendency in foreign politics, there is more guarantee in this fact than in any secret treaty or the determination of the ruler.
Bülow was afraid that England would exploit Germany to prevent Russia's progress in Asia, which threatened England but not Germany, and, having done so, that England would leave Germany in the lurch. This fear, however, was based upon very slender foundations. As England was interested chiefly in the Asiatic question, it was easy to allow ​England's predominance in all concrete questions, and to confine oneself to playing a smaller part.
German policy, however, did not intend to bind itself with England in any way. Germany was determined to pass through the dangerous time of the building of her Navy by able diplomacy, and, having executed this plan, she meant to emancipate herself from England entirely.
Bülow did not intend to go to war with England later on. He wanted merely to acquire a position in the world which was not dependent upon England, and for this reason he was not in a position to tie himself to Great Britain.
After the favourable opportunity had been allowed to pass without making use of it, it was already more difficult to gain the friendship of England, but I am firmly convinced that this could have been done at a later period by a serious convention with regard to the Navy. In the year 1912, when the Morocco question had been settled, and on the eve of the new complication in the Balkans, an attempt was made to reach such an agreement. Bethmann-Hollweg, who was Chancellor at the time, made an effort to approach England, but he was not successful. England desired to come to an agreement with regard to the building of the fleet. Germany was prepared to do the same, but only subject to a previous political agreement to the effect that England would take up an attitude of sympathetic neutrality in case Germany was attacked on the continent. England, however, was not prepared ​to undertake such an obligation definitely. In view of the fact that all the great powers were on her side, and that there was no opposition between England and France or England and Russia, it was not as necessary for her to pursue the policy of an alliance with Germany with as much determination as at the time of Chamberlain's attempt. England was afraid that, by entering into such an agreement, which was opposed to the traditions of British policy and which made her accept more far-reaching undertakings than those which she had undertaken towards France and Russia, she would endanger her friendship with these two powers.
According to the English point of view, her friendship would have been the automatic result of removing all the concrete questions at issue. England's friendship and mutual trust would have been firmly established provided an agreement with regard to the fleet had been arrived at, and for this reason England did not consider that it was necessary to express her goodwill in a previous agreement. According to German opinion, however, a political alliance would have had to precede the agreement with regard to the Navy. Which party was in the right and what method should have been adopted to secure this settlement? Both parties wished to act in accordance with the traditions of their own customs. And I must say that I believe that both systems would have led to the desired goal. The misfortune of the situation was that public opinion trusted Germany so little, and that public opinion was animated by such antipathy that there was no tendency ​to make an exception for Germany as had been made for Japan. Accordingly, England did not wish lo accept the German method, while public opinion in Germany rejected the method desired by England. For this reason it was impossible to improve the mutual relation of the two countries, in spite of the fact that, in my opinion, I believe both Governments honestly strove to do so.
The sympathy of Russia might also have been gained. If Bülow had accepted the Russian proposal which has been mentioned above during the Boer War, he would have created a cleft between England and Russia by means of which Russia and Germany would have entered into closer relations. Bülow, however, was afraid that Russia wanted to exploit the German Empire against England and afterwards, when Bülow had plucked the chestnut from the glowing ashes, he suspected Russia of intending to desert Germany.
During the Russo-Japanese War, England took the side of Japan and even threatened Germany because of the help which she had afforded to Russia. The German Kaiser made an attempt at that time to gain the friendship of the Czar, and an agreement which was full of promise was made between them in the year 1905. The matter, however, was not pursued because Russia was already too much under the influence of French money and did not dare to break with France. The Kaiser managed the weak Czar, the autocrat, the sovereign, in a most masterly manner; at the same time, he failed to find a solid basis for a common policy of both nations.
​I have always regarded an alliance with one of the great powers as essential, because I felt that the independence which we preserved towards these powers put us at a disadvantage and created too much matter for controversy. Personally, I always supported an alliance with England. When the Kaiser was in Vienna, after the annexation of Bosnia, I had a conversation with him after the dinner at court, during which I mentioned that, having barely escaped the danger of war, it would be highly desirable to improve our relations with England, in order to avoid a repetition of the same danger. The German Kaiser, however, broke off the discussion, and I noticed that the steps I had suggested either did not correspond with his intentions, or that he regarded them as impracticable.
I regarded the tension with England as a decided mistake. Germany was a power in the ascendant, and developed more and more economically, and it was therefore intelligible and only a natural, instinctive desire on the part of Germany to make her power felt upon the sea and to emancipate herself entirely from England. But at the same time this effort was a bad speculation. It could not be expected that the German Navy would rival the British in size and power, or even exceed the proportion of power accepted by England. The only thing that could happen was that England would increase her own shipbuilding activities extensively through Germany's competitive efforts. It was quite impossible that England should give up her ​supremacy on the sea, because this question has always been a question of life or death for the British Empire. No matter how peaceable German policy was, it is nevertheless a fact that England did not trust the peaceful intentions of Germany, and that she was imbued by a feeling that, once the German fleet approached the English fleet in strength, Germany would be a much stronger factor in view of her infinitely greater army than England, and that Germany might possibly yield to the temptation of pursuing a less peaceful policy than she would do during the time of her naval weakness. The possibility had to be considered in London that a combat with England could come about much more easily in such circumstances, and that such a combat might be fatal for the British Empire. Germany might have known that England would remain successful in the competition of armaments, because firstly, Great Britain was much richer; secondly, because the English army was far less expensive than the German one; and thirdly, because public opinion in England understood the necessity for the fleet far better than public opinion in Germany.
The preservation of a strong and powerful army was a tradition in Germany as well as a necessity, whereas the fleet was a new passion. Public opinion in Germany had to face the question sooner or later whether the Empire would not collapse under the burden which she would have to bear if she meant to support the upkeep of the most powerful army as well as one of the ​most powerful navies, if she wanted to exceed the building activity of England. If this competition led to war with England, before the balance of power had been altered, the result of all these efforts would only be either that more millions would find their graves in the depths of the sea, or that the booty of England would contain an even greater measure of German energy. When Germany decided to pursue a naval policy, she deserted the sphere in which she was almost unconquerable, and acquired a vulnerable spot in her armour. Germany attempted to make herself felt where she was weak. In the interests of Germany I would have feared a powerful ally less than a powerful enemy. I did not believe that the acquisition and defence of any colonies which could be acquired without an international war showed promise of substantial gain. Germany could have derived far greater economic advantages from the colonies of other States than from her own, because even at that time England and America were more substantial purchasers of German goods than the German colonies. Serious emigration, which could only have been obviated by colonies for Germany, existed no longer. In my opinion, Germany would have succeeded in acquiring colonies far more easily if she had entered into an alliance with England, than by entering into open competition with Great Britain. Germany could have achieved this end as long as she did not acquire the necessary power to enforce that which was not given to her willingly. If the German Empire had entered ​into an agreement with England, she could have proceeded to build a powerful fleet far more easily than during the continuation of an antagonistic relation which contained without doubt the danger of a European war.
A friendly relation to England would also have served the purpose of strengthening the Triple Alliance because Italy, on account of her long coast, was dependent upon England and would hardly have been in a position to oppose Great Britain in case of war. The interests of Austria-Hungary would also have gained considerably by such a relation, because a Triple Alliance which could lean upon England for support would have been able to pursue such a policy in the Balkans as would have satisfied all our desires there completely.
An agreement with England could be achieved far more easily than an agreement with Russia, especially since the Russo-Japanese War.
There never really was any opposition of interests between England and Germany. If there had been no naval competition between these two powers, and if England had not been convinced by her belief that she was forced, in order to protect her own position, to ally herself with Germany's enemies, Germany and England would not have been found in opposite camps. England took up a point of view which was antagonistic to Germany in Morocco, only for the sake of France, and in the Balkans only for the sake of Russia. In both cases this attitude was against England's local interests, ​and England's own desires could have been satisfied far more easily by adopting a line of action parallel to that of Germany. The Anglo-German opposition was not created by the opposition of their interests but the antagonism called forth opposing interests. The difficulty of reaching an agreement was not to be found in such opposition of interests as existed, but rather in the mutual distrust and the antipathy which developed between the two nations to the detriment of the whole of humanity.
All the experience of the foreign policy of the new German Empire up to the Chancellorship of Bülow, proves how natural a friendly relation would have been between her and England. Bismarck owed the success of establishing German unity in a large measure to his friendship with Russia. This greatest of all Junkers felt more sympathy with the conservative policy of Czardom than the Parliamentary system of England. He did not trust in a friendship with England because he considered British policy changeable and because he had no means of influencing public opinion in England; whereas the Court of the Czar hid no secrets from him, and Bismarck always knew how to treat the Czar with masterly skill. Bismarck never really pursued an international, but only a continental, policy, and he expected more from the old friendship with Russia than from a friendship with England. For this reason Bismarck was a convinced Russophile even after 1870, when he stood at the head of the new Empire. Nevertheless, he developed very soon a policy ​that ran on parallel lines with England, and the union with Russia became automatically less solid. The foreign policy of Bismarck harmonized in a large measure with British policy, and was accordingly in opposition to the policy of the Czar.
The Balkan policy of Austria-Hungary and the Balkan policy of the Czar split Bismarck from Russia. He made tremendous efforts to bridge the gulf, but without success, and he was forced finally to put himself on our side. If we had entered into the Russo-Turkish War, Germany would have supported England and Austria-Hungary and made a stand against Russia. The main item of Bismarck's policy during his Chancellorship was the Treaty of Gastein, which was made as a protection against Russia and caused considerable joy in England. Later on, Bismarck attempted to renew his friendship with Russia, but in spite of some measure of success he came very near to opposing Russia, because of the support afforded by England to Austria-Hungary. Germany did not make an alliance with England, but gave England preference, so that England, Austria-Hungary and Italy could unite to take common action in the Balkans in order to create a balance against Russian influence.
Bismarck's English policy found full expression in the interesting letter which the Iron Chancellor wrote in 1877 to Salisbury while the latter was Prime Minister. In this letter Bismarck laid down the following principles: Germany will never permit that France gains the ascendancy over England; he ​regarded with pleasure the fact that England, Austria-Hungary and Italy had combined for the purpose of protecting their interests in the Balkans. He regarded it as impossible that Germany would ever go to war against the power from which support was expected in case Germany should be attacked by Russia; the peace of the world was threatened by the ambition of France and Russia, but not by England, Austria-Hungary and Germany, all three of which were thoroughly contented powers.
Germany's policy should have been directed according to these principles during the last decade.
In my opinion an agreement with England would have been the most advantageous combination, and the worst possible situation was that Germany failed to define her position either with England or with Russia. It was this situation which led to the World War and to the conclusion of it which has been so fateful for us. If Germany could not make an alliance with England, she should have formed a solid alliance with Russia, even at the expense of serious sacrifices. Germany ought to have chosen between the policy of Tirpitz or the Hamburg-Bagdad policy.
The decision to pursue both these policies was bound to bring its own revenge.