# Mein Kampf (Stackpole Sons)/Volume 2/Chapter 13

13. German Alliance Policies After the War
The desultoriness of the leaders of the Reich’s foreign policy in establishing guiding principles for a purposeful policy of alliances not only continued after the Revolution, but became worse. For if before the war a general confusion of political ideas was in the first place the cause of our poor state leadership in foreign affairs, then after the war it was just plain lack of honest intention. It was obvious that those groups which had finally achieved their destructive aims by the Revolution, were not interested in a policy of alliances, the object of which would have been the reconstruction of a free German State. Not only would such a development have contradicted the real sense of the November crime, not only would it have interrupted or even ended the process of internationalizing German economy and workers, but beyond that the political domestic effect resulting from a battle for liberty in the domain of foreign politics, would have had dire consequences later on for the present representatives of the Reich’s government. For it is impossible to think of the rise of a nation, before it has first been nationalized; on the other hand, each huge success in foreign policy has as a matter of course an effect along similar lines. It has been proven by experience that every battle for liberty leads to an increase of nationalism, or self-assurance, and, along with it, to a greater sensitiveness in regard to anti-national elements and similar tendencies. Conditions and persons which are tolerated or not even noticed in peace times, in periods of stirring national enthusiasm meet not only with rejection but with a resistance which often proves to be their undoing. One needs only to remember, for instance, the general spy-scare which, upon the ​outbreak of war, suddenly bursts forth in the feverish heat of human passions, leading frequently even to unjust persecutions, although everybody ought to realize that the danger of espionage is much greater during the long years of peace; but for evident reasons it does not then attract general attention to such a degree.
The State parasites, carried to the surface by the November events, have, with their fine instincts alone a foreboding of the possible destruction of their own criminal existence, should our nation, backed by a wise foreign policy, arise to a battle for liberty and kindle the national passions.
Thus one understands why since 1918 the responsible government officials made a failure of their foreign policy and why the national government almost constantly and intentionally worked against the real interests of the German nation.
For what may seem purposeless at first sight is unmasked upon closer study as the logical pursuance of a policy adopted publicly for the first time in 1918 in the November Revolution.
Of course, we must in this connection differentiate between the responsible (or rather the “should-have-been responsible”) leaders of our national affairs, the average of our parliamentary would-be-politicians, and the large, stupid flock of sheep, our own people with the patience of sheep.
Those on the one hand know what they want. The others just follow suit, because, although they know what they have recognized and feel to be harmful, yet they are too cowardly to fight ruthlessly against it. Still others are submissive on account of their lack of understanding and their stupidity.
As long as the National Socialist German Workers’ Party was but a small and little-known society, problems of foreign policy were regarded by some of its adherents as of minor importance. A special reason for this lies in the fact that our movement must proclaim and has always proclaimed, as a matter of principle, that external freedom is never given as a gift either by the heavenly or the earthly powers, but that it can only be the fruit of forces which work from within. Only the removal of the causes of our collapse and the destruction of those who are ​taking advantage thereof will bring about the external battle for liberty.
Viewed from such a standpoint it is therefore easy to understand why during the first days of the young movement the importance of questions of foreign policy took second place as compared with the vital aims for domestic reform.
However, as soon as the scope of the little insignificant society was enlarged and finally blown up, and as soon as the young organization rose to the importance of a large union, the necessity arose at once to outline a definite program in regard to developments in foreign policy. Standards had to be established, which had not only to be in harmony with our world-concept but which had to be the result of our way of thinking.
The very lack of schooling of our people in matters of foreign policy carries with it an obligation for the young movement to impart to the individual leaders as well as to the large masses in broad outlines a line of thought concerning foreign policy. This is the basis of any coming practical fulfillment of the foreign policy in preparing for the work of regaining the liberty of our people and of a real sovereignty of the Reich.
As an essential principle and guide we must always bear in mind that the foreign policy too is but a means to an end whose purpose is exclusively the improvement of our own nation. It is impossible to decide any problem in the domain of foreign policy from any other viewpoint than this one: It is now or in the future profitable to our people, or will it be harmful to them?
This is the only preconceived opinion that must have any weight in deciding this question. Party-political, religious, humanitarian and all other viewpoints must be completely disregarded.
Before the war it was the task of German foreign policy to assure the sustenance of our people and their children on this planet by paving the way to this goal, and to win the needed auxiliary forces in the form of allies. Today’s task is the same, with one difference: before the war the aim was the preservation of the German people, taking into account, however, the actual forces ​of the independent power-state. The task is still first to give the people strength in the form of a free power-state. This is the basis for the practical foreign policy of the future, which aims to preserve, foster and nourish our people in days to come.
In other words: the aim of Germany’s foreign policy today must be to take preparatory steps towards regaining tomorrow’s freedom.
In this connection one must not lose sight of a fundamental principle, the possibility of regaining independence for a people does not rest entirely upon the existence of a fully established nation, but rather upon the existence of a part of this people or state—however small it may be—which enjoys the necessary freedom and is capable of assuming the leadership not only of the spiritual union of the whole people, but also of the preparations for a military battle for freedom.
If a people of one hundred million men, in order to preserve their existence as a state, jointly take upon themselves the yoke of slavery, it is worse than if such a state and such a people had been crushed, leaving only a part of them enjoying full liberty, provided this last remnant has a vision of its holy mission, not only to constantly proclaim its spiritual and cultural indivisibility but also to prepare along military lines for the final liberation and the reunion of the unlucky oppressed parts.
We have to consider, moreover, that the question of regaining lost territories once belonging to a people of a state, is always primarily a question of regaining political power and independence for the mother country. In other words, the interests of the lost territories must in such a case be ruthlessly ignored, the chief interest being concentrated upon regaining liberty for the main part of the country. For the liberation of oppressed and cut-off splinters of a nation or of provinces of an empire is not brought about through any desire on the part of the oppressed population, nor through a protest by those who have been left behind, but by the power of the remnants of the once common fatherland which have more or less kept their sovereignty.
Therefore, the first step in the regaining of lost territories is ​the intensive development and the strengthening of the remaining part of the State, as well as of the indwelling unchangeable resolve to dedicate the newly won power, when the time comes, to the liberation and unification of the entire nation! Thus we must ignore the interests of the lost territory as against but one interest, namely to gain for the remainder of the country that degree of political power and strength, which alone is apt to change the mind of victorious enemies. It is not by flaming protests that oppressed lands are brought back into the fold of a common Reich but by a sword ready to strike.
It is the task of the national leaders to forge that sword through the means of their domestic policy. The purpose of their foreign policy must be the safeguarding of the work of forging and the securing of allies.
In Part I of this volume I have discussed the half-heartedness of our policy of alliances before the war. Of the four possible ways of preserving and sustaining our nation the fourth and least practical one was chosen. Instead of a sound European land policy we concentrated on a colonial and trade policy. This was all the more erroneous, since the leaders thought they would avoid a decision by arms. It was an attempt to sit on all chairs at the same time, and the result was the proverbial fall between them. The World War was but the last of the bills presented to the Reich in testimony of its ill-conceived foreign policy.
Even at that time the right way would have been the third one: a strengthening of the power on the continent by winning new territory in Europe, thus making a later solution of the colonial question more likely and feasible. This policy, however, could only have been carried out by an alliance with England or through so abnormal a strengthening of military power that for forty to fifty years cultural tasks would have had to be completely ignored. Yet one could have taken the responsibility for such a course. The cultural importance of a nation is almost always derived from its freedom and independence, the latter being the basis of the former. No sacrifice is too great if it is made in the ​interest of safeguarding political freedom. Whatever is taken away from cultural aspirations by an exceedingly strong development of the military powers of state, will later be restored fully. It is in fact safe to say that after such a concentrated effort along the lines of preserving the national independence, usually a counterbalancing relaxation sets in, in the form of an astonishing flourishing of the previously neglected cultural energies of the nation. The distress of the Persian wars led to the bloom of the Periclean age and even amid the worries of the Punic wars the Roman State began to devote itself to the service of a higher culture.
It is true, however, that such complete subordination of all the interests of a nation to the one task of preparing for a coming decision by arms for the future protection of the state, cannot be left to the decision of a majority of parliamentary simpletons and good-for-nothings. The father of Frederick the Great was indeed able to prepare for war by ignoring everything else, but the fathers of our parliamentary folly, of the Jewish brand, are not able to do it.
For this reason alone armed preparation for the acquisition of new land and soil in Europe could be only moderate in the pre-war days. That is why one could not do without the help of proper allies.
But since one did not like at all the idea of a systematic preparation for war, the thought of acquiring new territory in Europe was given up, and, by turning to colonial and trade policies, the then possible alliance with England was sacrificed, but without doing the next logical thing, namely leaning towards Russia; and deserted by all but the Hapsburg ‘arch-evil’ we finally stumbled into the World War.
In characterizing our present foreign policy, it must be stated that no evident or distinct standards are existent at all. While before the War, the fourth method was erroneously chosen, though only in a half-hearted way, after the Revolution no method at all can be discovered even by the keenest eye. All careful planning is ​lacking to a larger extent than before the War, except perhaps for the attempt to crush the last possibility of a renewed rise of our nation.
An unprejudiced evaluation of the distribution of power in the Europe of today leads to the following result:
For the last three hundred years, the history of our continent has been decisively influenced by England’s attempt in roundabout ways to maintain the balance of power of the European countries and to insure herself the necessary protective covering for her great world political aims.
The traditional tendency of British diplomacy—which in Germany has but one counterpart—the tradition of the Prussian army—has since the days of Queen Elizabeth been directed deliberately towards preventing by every possible means the rise of any European power beyond the scope of the established balance of power and, if necessary, to block it by force of arms. The means employed by England in such a case varied according to the situation or the task at hand, but the will and the determination to use such means were always the same. The more difficult the position of England became in the course of time, the more the British government felt the necessity of maintaining in a generally paralyzed condition the powers in the different European states, caused by mutual rivalry as to their respective greatness. The political detachment of the erstwhile North American colonial territory led to even more concentrated efforts to safeguard the certainty of eventual support in Europe. After Spain and the Netherlands had been destroyed and ceased to be great sea powers, the efforts of the British State were concentrated against the rising power of France, until finally, with the fall of Napoleon I, the danger of a hegemony of this military power, which was the most dangerous of all to England, appeared to be definitely broken.
British statesmanship moved slowly before it changed to a hostile attitude towards Germany. The German nation, because of its lack of any national unity within, did not seem to present any evident menace to England. Furthermore, public opinion, ​once it has been influenced in a certain direction by means of government propaganda, is rather slow in changing toward a new aim. The cool reasoning of the statesmen appears here to take into account sentimental values, which are not only stronger in their effect, but also more stable as time goes on. After a statesman has reached his goal, he may without hesitancy turn his thoughts towards new aims, but the masses can be won over to becoming instruments of the new views of their leader only by the slow work of propaganda.
By 1870–71, however, England had already taken a definite new stand. Unfortunately Germany did not take advantage of England’s occasional hesitations, caused by America’s importance in world economics and Russia’s development of power politics, so that the historic tendency of British statesmanship became more and more firmly established.
England regarded Germany as the power whose influence in trade and therefore in world politics (as a consequence of her enormous industrialization) was growing so menacingly fast, that it became possible to counterbalance the power of the two states in certain identical spheres of influence. The conquest of the world by “peaceful penetration,” which appeared to our statesmen to be the last word in wisdom, became for the British politicians the basis for organizing the resistance against it. The fact that this resistance assumed the form of a thoroughly organized attack was fully consistent with a statesmanship whose aim never was the maintenance of a questionable world-peace, but the strengthening of British world dominion. The fact that England secured as allies all the states which might eventually render military assistance, was the natural result of her traditional caution in estimating the strength of her opponent as well as her own weakness at the time being. This cannot be termed as “unscrupulousness,” since such a comprehensive organization of a war must not be judged by heroic standards but by its suitableness. It is the task of diplomacy to see to it that a nation does not perish heroically but is maintained by practical means. Every road that leads in that direction answers the purpose. Not to ​follow it is a neglect of duty and a crime.
When Germany turned revolutionary, the British worries with respect to a threatening German world hegemony ceased in a way quite satisfactory to British statesmanship.
Since that time England has no longer been interested in seeing Germany completely wiped off the map of Europe. On the contrary, the disastrous collapse of November, 1918 put British diplomacy face to face with a new situation, which at first had appeared to be impossible:
For four and a half years the British Empire had fought in order to break the presumed predominance of a continental power. All of a sudden a collapse occurred, that seemed to wipe out this power entirely. The lack of even the most primitive spirit of self-preservation became apparent to such an extent, that within forty-eight hours the European balance of power seemed to have been taken off its hinges: Germany destroyed, and France the strongest political power in Europe.
The enormous propaganda promulgated during the War in order to influence the British people to persevere and to maintain their ground, at the same time inciting it boundlessly by stirring up all primitive instincts and passions, rested now upon the power of decision of the British statesmen like a load of lead. The British war aim was reached when Germany’s colonial, economic and trade policy was destroyed and anything going beyond this would be harmful to British interests. Only England’s enemies would profit by the wiping-out of German power in continental Europe. In spite of it all it was no longer possible for British diplomacy (from the November days of 1918 till late in the summer of 1919) to change its attitude, since it had during the long war exploited the emotional powers of the masses more extensively than ever. A change was not possible in view of the acquired position of the military powers. France had taken the law of action into her own hands and was in a position to dictate to others. The only power which might have brought about a change during those months of bargaining and trading, Germany herself, was lying in the convulsions of civil war, and repeatedly ​announced through the mouths of her so-called statesmen her readiness to accept any dictate whatsoever.
If in the life of nations one nation ceases to be an “active” ally on account of its complete lack of a spirit of self-preservation, it usually degenerates into a nation of slaves and its country has to share the fate of a colony.
Now in order to prevent the power of France from becoming too great, the only remaining possibility for an initiative of its own was the participation of England in France’s lust for robbery.
In fact England had failed to achieve her war aim. The rise of a European state beyond the ratio of power in the continental state-system of Europe had not only not been prevented, but it had rather been firmly established.
Germany, as a military state, was in 1914 wedged in between two countries, one of them being equal in power, the other being more powerful. Then there was the superior strength of England as a sea-power. France and Russia alone hindered and resisted all extraordinary development of German greatness. In addition to this also the unfavorable military and geographic position of the Reich was a further safeguarding factor against too great an increase of power in this country. The coastline, especially, was, from a military standpoint, unfavorable to a battle with England, being small and cramped, while the battlefront of the interior would be wide and open.
France’s position is quite different today: from a military standpoint she is the greatest power, without any serious rival on the continent; her borders in the South near Spain and Italy are as good as safe; she is protected against Germany by the impotency of our Fatherland; her coastline runs in a long front parallel to the life nerves of the British Empire. Not only are these British centers of life important targets for airplanes and long-range batteries, but the arteries of British trade would be wide open to the effect of submarines. A submarine war, with the long stretch of the Atlantic coast and the equally long stretches of the French territories bordering on the Mediterranean in Europe and North-Africa as bases, would have disastrous effects.
​Thus the political result of the battle against Germany’s developing power was the creation of a French hegemony on the continent. The military result: the consolidation of France as the greatest power on land, and the acknowledgment of the Union as an equally strong seapower. The economic result: surrender of large British spheres of influence to the former Allies.
To the same degree that British traditional political aims desire and need a Balkanization of Europe, those of France strive to bring about a Balkanization of Germany.
England’s permanent desire is the prevention of the rise of one continental power to world importance, i. e., the maintenance of a certain balance of power among the European states, for this is the basis for British world hegemony.
France’s permanent desire is to prevent Germany from becoming a united power to maintain the system of small German states, with well-balanced powers and no unified leadership, by the occupation of the left bank of the Rhine as a basis for the creation and the safeguarding of her hegemony in Europe.
The final aim of French diplomacy will be in eternal contradiction to the final tendencies of British statesmanship.
Anyone who examines from the above stated point of view the present possibilities for alliance with Germany, must get the conviction that as a last possible connection there remains only a dependence upon England. Although the result of the British war policy has been disastrous for Germany, yet one must not overlook the fact that England today is no longer interested in completely destroying Germany. On the contrary, British policy is bound to aim more and more as the years go on at hindering the boundless urge for a French hegemony. Now an alliance policy is not made from the standpoint of past misunderstandings, but it is rather made fruitful by the knowledge gained from past experiences. We should have learned that alliances with negative aims are inherently weak. The fate of nations is welded together only by the expectation of a common success, in the sense of common acquisitions, conquests in short, by mutual expansion of power.
​That our people are not used to thinking in terms of foreign policy can be seen best by reading the current press reports concerning the more or less great “love of Germany” on the part of this or that foreign statesman. One looks upon the supposed attitude of such individuals towards our people as being a special guarantee for political aid to us. This is an incredible folly and a speculation on the unparalleled simplicity of the normal small town German playing politics. There is no British, American or Italian statesman whose real attitude could be classified as “pro-German.” As a statesman every Englishman is of course an Englishman first of all, an American is first of all an American, and no Italian will ever be ready to pursue another policy than one which is pro-Italian. Therefore, anyone who expects to build up alliances with foreign nations relying upon the pro-German attitude of their statesman is either an ass or a dishonest man. The finking together of the fate of nations is never based upon mutual esteem or even love, but rather upon the expectancy of some practical results for both parties. For instance: an English statesman will always pursue pro-English and never pro-German politics. Yet it is possible that some particular elements of this pro-English policy are for a number of reasons identical with pro-German interests. This of course may be so only to a certain degree and may turn some day to the contrary; here it is where a statesman will show his masterful hand: if he wants to carry out plans vital to his own nation he will, when the necessity arises, find those partners who must travel the same road to promote their own interests.
The practical consequences drawn for the benefit of the present time must be found in the answers to the following questions: What states are at the present time not vitally interested in seeing France’s military and economic power attaining an absolute and predominant hegemony by the elimination of a German Central Europe? What states will in view of their own situation and their hitherto traditional policy look upon such a development as a menace to their own future?
About this finally one must be perfectly clear: France is and remains the inexorable enemy of the German people. Whoever ​reigned or will reign in France, whether Bourbons or Jacobines, followers of Napoleon or bourgeois democrats, clerical Republicans or red Bolsheviks, the final aim of their foreign policy will always be an attempt to take possession of the Rhine frontier and to make this river secure for France by keeping Germany broken up and crushed.
England does not desire Germany as a world power, France however does not want Germany to have any power whatsoever: a very essential difference! Today, however, we are not fighting to regain our world power, because we have to struggle for the very existence of our Fatherland, for our national unity, and the daily bread for our children. If we look around from this standpoint in search for European allies, only two states are left over for us: England and Italy.
England does not desire a France, whose military fist, unrestrained by the rest of Europe, is able to protect a policy which sooner or later is bound to clash with British interests. England can never desire a France, which, being in possession of the huge western European iron and coal mines, might easily attain a dangerous economic world position. Furthermore England can never desire a France, whose continental-political position appears to be safeguarded to such a degree by crushing the rest of Europe, that the resuming of a more expansive French world policy is not only possible but becomes a necessity. The Zeppelin bombs of old might be multiplied a thousand times every night; France’s military predominance presses sorely on the heart of Great Britain’s world empire.
Nor can Italy desire a further strengthening of French predominance in Europe. Italy’s future will always depend on developments affecting the territories close to the Mediterranean basin. Italy’s motive for entering the War was not any desire to aggrandize France, but rather a determination to give the death-blow to her hated rival on the Adriatic. Any further increase of France’s strength on the continent means a hindrance to Italy in the future, because we would be deceiving ourselves by believing that any kind of kinship among the nations excludes rivalries.
​Cool and unbiased consideration will show that primarily England and Italy are the two states whose own natural interests are least in opposition to the conditions essential to the existence of the German nation, and are, to a certain degree, identical with them.
But in weighing the possibilities of such alliances we must not overlook three factors. The first one lies with us, the other two with the respective states.
Is it possible for any state to ally itself with the Germany of today? Is it possible for a power, which looks upon an alliance as a help to carry out its own aggresive aims, to ally with a State, whose leadership has for years presented a picture of pitiful impotence and pacifistic cowardice and the greater part of whose citizens, blinded by democratic-marxist doctrines, betray the interests of their own people and country in a revolting way? Could any power today expect to enter into a valuable relationship with a State, hoping to fight some day unitedly for common interests, when this State evidently lacks all courage and desire to do even the least bit in defense of its own bare life? Will any power that sees more in an alliance than the maintenance of a state of slow decay (like the disastrous former Triple-Alliance) risk its very existence by binding itself with obligation to a State, whose characteristic actions consist of cringing servility towards those outside and shameful suppression of national virtues at home; to a state, that has lost all greatness, since it does not deserve it any longer on account of its general conduct; to a government that cannot boast being held in any esteem by its own citizens, thus hardly stimulating any admiration in countries abroad?
No, a power that wants to preserve its dignity and expects more of alliances than graft for greedy politicians, will not enter upon an alliance with the Germany of today; indeed it would be simply impossible. After all, our present unfitness for alliances is the main and last reason for the solidarity of our enemy-robbers. Since Germany never defends herself, except by a few flaming protests from our elite parliamentarians, and since the rest of the world ​does not see any reason to fight for our protection, and since the Lord, as a matter of principle, never liberates cowardly people—in spite of the continued whining of our patriotic societies—even those states that are not directly interested in our complete destruction, do not see any other way but to participate in France’s marauding expeditions, even if it be for the sole reason of prohibiting, by concurring and participating in the robbery, the exclusive strengthening of France.
Secondly it must not be overlooked that it is difficult to change the attitude of the people at large, in the former enemy countries, after they have influenced by means of mass-propaganda in a certain direction. It is impossible to denounce for years a nation as “Huns,” “Robbers,” “Vandals,” etc., and then discover all of a sudden the opposite and to recommand the erstwhile enemy for a future ally.
Still more attention must be paid to a third fact, which will be of essential importance for the relationship of coming European alliances:
Little though it is to England’s interest—viewed from the standpoint of British State policy—that Germany should be further crushed, such a development is very much to the interests of Jews of international finance. The contrast between the official or rather traditional British statesmanship and the leading Jewish financial powers can be most easily noticed by looking at the different attitudes some take in regard to the questions of British foreign policy. The Jewry of finance wishes not only the complete economic destruction of Germany but her entire political enslavement, which is contrary to the interests of the welfare of the British State. The internationalization of our German economics, i.e. the transfer of German working power into the possession of Jewish world finance, can only be carried out completely in a politically Bolshevik state; but if the Marxist soldiers of the international Jewish capitalists finally do break the backbone of the German National State, it can only be done by kind cooperation from outside. Therefore France’s armies must storm the structure of the German State until the battered Reich falls ​prey to the Bolshevik soldiers of the international world Jewry of finance.
Therefore the Jew is today the great agitator for the complete destruction of Germany. Wherever in the world we read offensive articles against Germany, the Jews have manufactured them, just as during peacetime as well as during the war, the Jewish financial and Marxist press stirred up intentionally the barred against Germany, until one state after the other gave up its neutrality and joined the World War coalition, thus ignoring the real interests of their people.
The trend of thought in Jewry is clear. The Bolshevizing of Germany, i. e. the extermination of the national, racial, German intelligence, and the exploitation of German workers under the yoke of Jewish world finance, is only preliminary to the further spreading of this Jewish tendency of conquering the world. Just as it has happened so often in history, Germany is again the great center in the huge struggle. If our people and our State become victims of these blood-thirsty and money-thirsty Jewish tyrants, then the whole world will be ensnared by this polyp; if Germany succeeds in liberating herself from its embrace, this greatest danger for all the nations of the world may be regarded as passed.
Thus it is quite certain that Jewry will do all the undermining work it possibly can, in order not only to maintain the animosity of the nations towards Germany, but to increase it if possible, just as it is as certain that this activity is only to a small extent identical with the real interests of the nations thus poisoned. In general Jewry will now fight in the varied national bodies more and more with such weapons as appear to be the most powerful ones on the basis of the recognized mentality of these nations and which promise the most success. In our own national body, very much torn from the standpoint of ‘blood’, Jewry employs as weapons in its fight for power the pacifist-ideologic thoughts, which are more or less thoughts of a “world-citizenry,” in short, the international tendencies. In France it is with the recognized and correctly evaluated chauvinism, in England with economic and world-political viewpoints. In short it employs always the ​essential qualities representing the mentality of the respective nation. Not until it has in such a manner achieved a certain overshadowing influence by means of economic and political powers does it throw off the fetters of such traditional weapons and begin to emphasize the real intentions of its aspirations and fight. It destroys faster and faster, until it had laid state after state into ruins, upon which the sovereignty of the eternal Jewish Empire is to be established.
In England as well as in Italy the divergence of views between the old and more solid statesmanship and the aspirations of the Jewish financial world is not only obvious but often crudely apparent.
It is only in France that there exists today more than ever a conformity between the intentions of the stock exchange, as represented by the Jews, and the desires of a chauvinistically orientated national statesmanship. This very identity constitutes an immense danger for Germany. For this reason France remains by far the most terrible enemy of Germany. This nation, which is being permeated more and more with negro blood, represents, on account of its identity with the aims of Jewish world dominion, a lurking danger to the existence of the white race in Europe. The poisoning through negro blood along the Rhine, in the heart of Europe, corresponds just as much to the sadistic-perverse hate of this chauvinistic arch-enemy of our nation as to the cool-blooded reasoning of the Jews, who want to start in this way the bastardizing of the European continent right in the center, thus depriving the white race of the basis for its sovereign existence by mixing it with a lower type of people.
The present acts of France, instigated by her own hatred and carried out under the leadership of the Jews, constitute a sin against the existence of the white race and will some day turn loose upon that nation all avenging spirits of a generation, which has recognized degradation of race to be the original sin of humanity.
For Germany, nevertheless the French danger means the duty to forget all sentimental feelings and to join hands with those ​who, just as much menaced as we, are unwilling to suffer and bear France’s lust for dominion.
For some time to come there will be only two possible allies for Germany: England and Italy.
Anyone who goes to the trouble of studying the foreign policy of Germany’s leaders since the Revolution must be shocked by the incessant failures of our government; as a result he will then either give up, or in flaming protest declare war upon such a government. These acts cannot be classified as acts of lack of under-brainstanding. For the mental cyclops of our November parties have done what would appear unconceivable to any thinking brain: they strove for France’s favor. Yes, indeed, with the touching simplicity of an incorrigible visionary they have tried during these years again and again to offer themselves to France, made bows to the “great nation,” and believed that they could see at once in every shrewd trick of the French executioner the first signs of a change of heart. The actual wire-pullers in our politics of course never entertained such foolish ideas. For them the wooing of France was nothing but the obvious means of blocking every sound policy of alliance. They never were in the dark in respect to the aims of France and her backers. However they were forced to pretend to believe honestly in the possibility of a change in the fate of Germany by the sober acknowledgement that otherwise, indeed, our people themselves would probably have chosen a different path.
It is, of course, not easy for us, to present England to the rank and file of the Nationalist-Socialist movement as a possible future ally. Our Jewish press has always succeeded in concentrating all hate upon England, whereat so many a good and stupid German bullfinch readily landed upon the lime-twig offered by the Jew, chattered of the “new strength” of the German seapower, protested against the robbery of our colonies, recommended regaining them, thus helping to gather the material which the Jewish scoundrel could transmit to his racial friends in England for purposes of practical propaganda. It should by now become clear ​to even our bourgeois simpletons, playing in politics, that our fight is not one for “Power on the seas,” etc. Even before the war it was madness to concentrate the German national forces upon this aim, without having first positively safeguarded our position in Europe. In politics today such follies are called crimes.
It became very often a matter of despair to have just to look at the way the Jewish wire-pullers succeeded in keeping our people busy with matters of no account, agitating demonstrations and protests, while at the same time France snatched one piece after the other out of the body of our nation, and we were deprived of the basis for our independence according to planned purpose.
I must mention, moreover, one particular hobby pursued in these years by the Jew with special skill: South Tyrol.
Yes, South Tyrol. On which of the intellectual faces of our Philistines does not the flame of utter indignation burn? If I take up this question here at this juncture, I do this in order to settle an account with that mendacious rabble, which, counting upon forgetfulness and the stupidity of the masses of our people, takes it upon itself to fake a national indignation, which these parliamentary rascals possess less than a magpie possesses a conception of the rights of property.
I wish to state that I personally belong to those, who at the time when the fate of South Tyrol was being decided—early August 1914 until November 1918—went where the actual defense of this territory took place, namely into the army. I did my share of fighting in those years, not that South Tyrol should be lost, but that together with every other German territory it should be preserved for the Fatherland.
Those who did not join the actual fighting were the parliamentary vagabonds, the whole gang of the political mob. On the contrary, while we fought under the conviction that victory alone could preserve South Tyrol as well to the German people, the mouths of these Ephialtes contrived and plotted so long against this victory that finally the fighting Siegfried succumbed to the thrust of the dagger into his back. For the possession of ​South Tyrol by Germany was of course not guaranteed by the lying and inflammatory speeches of smart parliamentarians on the Vienna Rothaus Square, or before the Feldherrnhalle in Munich, but solely by the battalions at the fighting front. Those who broke up this front did not only betray South Tyrol, but at the same time all the other German territories.
Anyone who believes today that the question of South Tyrol can be solved by means of protests, declarations, and by local parades, is either an especially great rascal or a typical German small-town burgher.
It must be thoroughly understood by this time, that the lost territories will never be won back by solemn appeals to the good Lord nor by pious hopes in a League of Nations, but only by force of arms.
Therefore the only question is: who is willing to obtain the regaining of the lost territories by armed forces?
As far as I am concerned, I can assure anyone that I could still muster up enough courage to put myself at the head of a newly formed parliamentary storm-battalion, consisting of parliamentary chatter-boxes and party leaders, and various councillors, to take part in the victorious conquest of South Tyrol. The devil knows I would love it if all of a sudden some shrapnel would burst over the heads of such a “flaming” protest-demonstration. I am convinced that if a fox would break into a fowl-house, the cackling could harly be worse, and the chicken could hardly run for safety faster than such a “protest-demonstration.”
The disgraceful part of it all is that these gentlemen themselves do not believe that anything is to be gained by such procedure. They know better than anybody else that all their to-do is harmless and hopeless. They do it only because naturally it is easier today to chatter about recovering South Tyrol than it was at one time to fight for its retention. Everyone does his bit: we offered our blood in those days, now these people are sharpening their noses.
It is amusing to see how the Vienna legitimists bristle up in their work for the regaining of South Tyrol. Seven years ago, ​however, their noble and illustrious dynasty helped the world-coalition, by means of the villainous act of a perjured treachery, to gain the victory and with it also South Tyrol. In those days the same men supported the policy of their treacherous dynasty and did not care a bit about South Tyrol nor anything else. Today, of course, it is much simpler to take up the battle for these lands, since now it is fought only with “spiritual” weapons, and it is easier, too, to talk oneself hoarse in a “protest meeting”—due to righteous indignation—and to cripple one’s hands in writing an article for a paper than, for instance, to blow up bridges during the occupation of the Ruhr territory.
The reason why certain groups in recent years have made the question “South Tyrol” a center of German-Italian relationships, is very obvious. Jews and Hapsburg legitimists are deeply interested in blocking a German alliance policy that might eventually lead to the regeneration of a free German Fatherland. It is not love for South Tyrol which prompts all these sham activities,—because the interests of South Tyrol are not furthered but rather harmed by them—but the fear of a possible German-Italian understanding.
It is in harmony with the general lying and slandering tendencies of these groups to attempt to present the situation with impudence and a high head in such a fashion as though we had “betrayed” South Tyrol.
These gentlemen should be told in very plain language: First, that South Tyrol was “betrayed” by every German, who, from 1914–1918, was a healthy man yet could not be found anywhere at the front or did not offer his services to the Fatherland;
Secondly by everyone, who has not cooperated during these years to strengthen the power of resistance of our nation for the finishing of the war, and to build up the perseverence of the people for seeing this struggle through to the end.
Thirdly, South Tyrol was betrayed by everyone participating in the November Revolution—either directly by action, or indirectly by cravenly allowing it to happen—thus destroying the only weapon that might have saved Tyrol.
​In the fourth place South Tyrol has been betrayed by all those parties and their partisans, who put their signatures under the shameful Treaties of Versailles and St. Germain.
Yes, my dear gentlemen of word-protests, this is the situation!
Today I am only guided by the cool reasoning that lost territories cannot be conquered by the volubility of sharp parliamentarian tongues, but by a sharp sword, i. e. through a bloody battle.
In this connection I do not refrain from stating that now, since the dice is cast, I consider the regaining of South Tyrol by means of war not only impossible, but also I personally would decline to take such a course, because I am convinced, that in this question it would be impossible to stir up enough flaming national enthusiasm in the German people in a mass to guarantee a victory. To the contrary, I believe, that if such blood has to be sacrificed, it would be a crime to do it in behalf of two hundred-thousand Germans, while close by seven millions are languishing under a foreign regime, and the vital highway of the German people has become the playground of hords of African negroes.
If the German nation is to end a condition which threatens to exterminate it in Europe, it must not fall into the errors of the pre-war period, and make enemies of God and the world, but it must instead ascertain who is its most dangerous opponent, in order to strike at him with the whole concentrated force. And if such victory is to be won by sacrifices in other places, the coming generations of our people will not condemn us for it. They will be able to appreciate the great emergency and the deep worries which lead up to such a resolution all the more, if the result is a radiant success.
Today we must be continuously guided by the principle that the regaining of territories lost by a government is primarily a question of regaining the lost political independence and power for the mother country.
It is the first task of a powerful foreign policy of our State to make this possible by means of a wise policy of alliances.
We National Socialists must be especially careful not to be taken in tow by our bourgeois word-patriots, who are under the ​leadership of the Jews. Woe to our movement if it too would indulge in protest-speeches, instead of preparing to fight!
One reason for the ruin of Germany was the fantastic idea of a Nibelung-alliance with the dead carcass of the Hapsburg State. Fantastic sentimentality in connection with the possibilities of our foreign policy of today is the best means for definitely preventing our rise to power.
I am obliged to take this opportunity to deal briefly with the objections to the above mentioned three quesions, namely: whether anyone
first; will be willing to enter upon an alliance with the present Germany in view of her obvious weakness;
secondly; whether such a change of attitude of the enemy-nations will be possible and
thirdly; whether the doubtless existing influence of Jewry is stronger than all reason and good will, so that it is apt to cross and destroy all plans.
I believe that I have answered the first part of the first question sufficiently. It goes without saying that nobody will seek an alliance with present Germany. No nation in the world will dare to link its fate with a State, the governments of which are bound to destroy all confidence. If many of our fellow-countrymen attempt to condone or even excuse the acts of the government by pointing out the pitiful mental condition of our people at that time, we must strongly protest against such a course.
There is no doubt that for the last six years the fickleness of our people has been pitiful, their indifference towards the most important interests of our nation has been depressing, indeed, and the cowardness has frequently cried out towards heaven. However, one must not forget that in spite of it all it is the same people that only a few years earlier gave the world a wonderful example of the highest human virtues. Beginning with the days of August 1914 till the end of the huge struggle of the nations, no people on earth have revealed more manly courage, persevering endurance and patient bearing than our German people, ​which has now become so miserable. Nobody can assert that the present shame is a telling expression of the character of our people. What we find today in us and around us is but the dreadful, unreasonable and illogical influence of the perjured act of November 9th, 1918. Well may we apply the word of the poet, who speaks of the evil that continues to beget evil. Yet even in these days the good basic elements have not been fully lost to our people, they just slumber under the surface and once in a while, like lightning against a dark sky, virtues flare up, which the future Germany will once remember as the first signs of an approaching recovery. More than once thousands and thousands of young Germans have united, resolved to sacrifice and to offer their young lives again, voluntarily and joyfully, as in 1914, upon the altar of the Fatherland. Again millions of men are working industriously and diligently, as though no revolution had even brought destruction. The blacksmith is standing again at his anvil, the farmer follows the plough, and the scholar sits in his study, all toiling and trying to do their duty.
The suppression coming from our enemies does not meet any longer with the one-time smile, but with embittered and careworn faces. There is no doubt that a great change of opinion has taken place.
If all this has not yet led to a regeneration of the political idea of power and of the spirit of self-preservation in our people, then it is the fault of those men who since 1918, not by the call of heaven, but by their own, rule our people to death.
Yes, indeed, if one deplores today the state of our nation, one may well ask: What has been done to improve it? Is the meagre support of the decisions of our government, what little there was of them—significant for the diminished vitality of our people or rather a sign of the complete failure in handling this precious treasure? What did our governments do to instil into this nation once again the spirit of proud independence, manly defiance and passionate hatred?
When in 1919 the Peace Treaty was imposed upon the German people, one would have been justified in hoping that this ​instrument of unlimited oppression would greatly intensify the cry for German liberty. Peace treaties, the demands which fall upon a nation like lashes with a scourge, frequently are the first drum-call to a future uprising.
How much might have been made out of the Treaty of Versailles!
How easily might this instrument of boundless extortion and shameful humiliation have been turned by a determined government into an instrument of inciting the national passions to fever point! How easy it would have been by means of a genial propaganda to turn the indifference of a people into revolution, and the revolution into flaming rage on account of these sadistic cruelties!
How easy it would have been to keep on burning every single one of these points into the brain and into the heart of this people, until finally in sixty million heads of men and women the commonly felt shame and the common hatred would have become one sea of flaming fire! Out of its glow a will of steel would have emerged, and a cry would have been heard:
We want to rearm!
Yes, indeed, such a peace treaty may serve such a purpose. The very exorbitance of its oppression, and the shamelessness of its demands constitute the greatest weapon of propaganda for the arousing of the dormant spirit of the life of a nation.
Then, of course, everything, beginning with the primer of the children, every last newspaper, every theater and every motion picture show, every bill-board and every available space must be pressed into the service of this one great mission, until the prayer of fear of our present club-patriots: “Lord, make us free!” changes even in the brain of the smallest boy into the glowing prayer: “Almighty God, bless our arms when the day comes; be as just as Thou hast been always; judge now as to whether we deserve the freedom or not; Lord, bless our battle!”
Every opportunity was missed and nothing was done.
Who wonders that our nation is not what it ought to be or what it might be? What else is possible, since the rest of the ​world sees nothing in us but the beadle, the willing dog, which gratefully licks the hands of those who have beaten it?
There is no doubt that our people are no asset to our ability to enter upon alliances. But our governments are the greatest drawback. Their corruptness is to blame for the fact that after eight years of boundless oppression so little desire for liberty exists.
While on the one hand an active policy of alliances is dependent on our people enjoying the necessary esteem on the part of the other nations, this in turn is later dependent on the existence of a powerful government, which does not intend to be only the handy-man for foreign states or a taskmaker of its own power, but rather the herald of the national conscience.
Should our people get such a government that understands its mission in this respect, no six years will pass, and the leaders of a daring foreign policy of the Reich will have the cooperation of a just as daring people longing for freedom.
To the second objection, namely the great difficulty changing the erstwhile enemy nations into friendly allies, we offer the following answer:
The general anti-German psychosis, existing in the other countries as a result of the war propaganda, is bound to remain in existence, until the German Reich has acquired again the characteristics of a State by a plainly noticeable revival of a German will and spirit of self-preservation, a State that plays its game on the European common chess-board and with which others can play the game also. Not until government and people offer the necessary security for a possible capacity for affiances, will it be feasable for one or the other powers, prompted by parallel interests, to think of changing the public opinion by means of propaganda. This, too, will, of course, require years of continuous, clever work. The very fact that a change in public opinion requires so much time is the reason for the precaution in undertaking it, i.e. nobody wants to start such activities before having the absolute conviction that such work will be valuable and bear fruit in the future. The empty talk of a more or less ​ingenious foreign minister does not offer sufficient motive for changing the mental attitude of a nation, before one has the guarantee that such a changed attitude will be of real value. Otherwise such a course would lead to a complete division of the public opinion. The firm security for the possibility of a future alliance with a state is not given by big talks of some members of the government, but rather by the obvious stability of a certain practical government tendency, and a corresponding public opinion. The faith in it will be all the firmer, the greater the visible activity of a government is as to propagandist preparation and support of its work, and, contrarwise, the more unequivocally the desires of public opinion are reflected in the tendencies of the government.
A nation—in a position such as ours—will thus only be considered fit for alliances, when government and public opinion jointly and fanatically proclaim and upheld their determination to fight for liberty. This is the basis for a later change in the public opinion of other states, which, on account of their knowledge of the situation, and in pursuit of their own interests, are willing to join hands with a suitable partner, i.e. to enter upon an alliance.
There is still another matter to be considered: Since it is a very difficult task to change a certain mental attitude of a nation, a task that will not be understood at first by many, it is a crime as well as a folly to commit such errors as will furnish the opposing elements with weapons for their counterwork.
One must understand that it will require a certain time before a people has fully grasped the intentions of a government, since the final aims of certain political efforts cannot always be explained publicly, but can only be counted on either with the blind confidence of the masses or the intuitive understanding of intellectually higher developed leading groups. Since not many possess this visionary political feeling and understanding, and since on the other hand, for political reasons, no explanations can be offered, a part of the intellectual leaders will always oppose new tendencies, which, on account of their apparant haziness ​may easily be considered a mere experiment. This arouses the opposition of the conservative elements in the state.
Neverthless for this reason it is a supreme duty to see to it that as early as possible all likely weapons are taken out of the hands of these disturbers of a policy of mutual understanding, especially so, when, as in our case, it is only a question of purely fantastic chatter of puffed up would-be politicians and small town coffee-house politicians. For with cool reasoning one cannot deny that the cry for a new war fleet, restoration of our colonies, etc., is obviously mere silly talk, without so much as possessing an idea of practical possibility. But that in England political use is made of these foolish statements of such part harmless, part insane political warriors who are once more always quietly serving the purposes of our arch-enemies, cannot be defined as favorable to Germany. In this way one exhausts oneself in harmful demonstrations against God and the rest of the world, forgetting the first principle which is essential to all success: Whatever you do, do it thoroughly. By howling at five or ten states, we neglect to concentrate the entire intellectual and physical forces for a blow at the heart of our infamous opponent, and we are sacrificing the possibility of strengthening ourselves for the final struggle by means of alliances.
In this connection too the National-Socialist movement has a mission. It must teach our people to disregard trifles and to keep in mind the great aim, not to split up on account of negligible matters, but never to forget that the goal for which we have to fight today is the bare existence of our nation, and that the sole enemy at whom we have to strike is ever the power which is robbing us of that existence.
Many things may bitterly hurt us. But this must not lead us to abandon all reason and to quarrel with the whole world by foolishly hollering at it, instead of concentrating all our powers against the deadly enemy.
Moreover, the German nation has no moral right to accuse the rest of the world for its attitude, until it has called to account criminals who sold and betrayed their oven country. There is no ​holy earnestness in howling and protesting from a long distance against England, Italy, etc., while at the same time one allows the scoundrels to carry on, who, paid by enemy war propaganda, wrested from us our weapons, broke our moral backbone and sold the paralyzed Reich for thirty pieces of silver.
The enemy does only what might have been expected. We should learn from his attitude and actions.
But anyone who does not agree with the loftiness of such a comprehension should know that the only other way out is resignation, since the possibility for any alliance has been definitely eliminated. Since we cannot enter upon an alliance with England, because she robbed us of our colonies, nor with Italy, since it took South Tyrol, nor with Poland or Czechoslovakia, then, outside of France nobody else is left in Europe.
There can be hardly any doubts as to whether or not this would serve the interests of the German people. The only element of doubt lies in the question: Is this opinion represented by a simpleton, or by a sly rascal?
As far as leaders are concerned, I always believe the latter.
Therefore, according to human judgment, a change in the psychological attitude of the various hitherto hostile nations may well be brought about if their future interests are parallel to our own, and if the domestic power of our state and its obvious resolution to defend our existence make us appear again as a worthwhile ally, and furthermore, if the opponents of such alliances with our former enemies are not furnished with reasons for their opposition by our ineptitude or even criminal acts.
The answer to the third objection is the most difficult one.
Is it conceivable that those who represent the true interests of the nations with whom an alliance is possible, will be able to carry out their intentions against the will of the Jewish arch-enemy of states formed by free peoples and nations?
Will the powers of the British traditional statesmanship, for instance, still be able to break the disastrous Jewish influence? This is a very difficult question to answer. It depends on too many ​factors for a conclusive judgment to be pronounced. One thing is sure however: In one state the present government appears to be so firmly established, serving so exclusively the interests of the country, that a really successful prevention of political necessities by international Jewish groups has been made impossible.
The fight waged by Fascist Italy against the three main weapons of Jewry, unconsciously perhaps (though I personally do not believe that) is the best indication that, indirectly at least, the venomous fangs of this super-state are being drawn. The suppression of the secret Free Mason Lodges, the persecution of the super-national press and the constant displacement of international Marxism on one hand, and the steady strengthening of the Fascist conception of state on the other hand, will in the course of years allow the Italian government more and more to serve the interests of the Italian people, without paying any attention to the hissing of the Jewish world hydra.
The situation in England is more difficult. In this country of the “freest democracy” the Jew dictates still almost absolutely today by the indirect means of public opinion. Yet, even there a constant struggle is going on between the representatives of the British state interests and the partisans of a Jewish world dictatorship.
The contrasting view-points often collide vehemently, as could be seen clearly for the first time after the war by the attitude towards the Japanese problem of the British government on the one hand, and of the press on the other hand.
As soon as the war was over, the old mutual animosity between America and Japan appreared again. Of course it was impossible for the great European powers to remain impassive in front of this new threatening war peril. All ties of affinity cannot prevent England from a certain feeling and envious anxiety in regard to the constant growth of the American Union in every domain of international economic and power politics. It seems as though the one time colonial territory, the child of the great mother, is growing to become a new mistress of the world. It can easily be understood why England today reviews her old ​alliances with vexed care, and why British statesmanship awaits with fear the time when the slogan will not be:
“England over the seas” but: “The ocean for America.”
It is much harder to get after the gigantic American State collossus with its enormous riches in its virgin soil than after the wedged-in German Reich. If the dice should ever be cast in this respect, then England would face disaster, if she should find herself alone. Therefore the yellow fist is most eagerly grasped and all hope is staked on an alliance which, from a racial standpoint is perhaps unjustifiable, which however from a national-political viewpoint offers the only possibility for a strengthening of the British world position against the growing influence of the American continent.
While the British government, in spite of the common battles fought on the European battlefields, could not make up its mind to loosen up the alliance with the Asiatic partner, the entire Jewish world press suddenly attacked it.
How is it possible that the papers of a Northcliffe, the faithful shield-bearers in the British battle against the German Empire, suddenly broke faith and chose a path of their own?
The destruction of Germany did not lie primarily in the British but in the Jewish interest exactly as today destruction of Japan does not lie in the political interest of England but rather complies with the far-reaching aspirations of the leaders of the hoped-for Jewish world-empire. While England over-exerts herself for the preservation of her world position, the Jew is organizing an attack in order to conquer it.
He sees the present European states already as willingless tools in his fist, be it through the indirect means of a so-called western democracy, or in the form of direct control through the Russian Bolshevism. But it is not only the old world that he holds in his net but also the new world is threatened with the same fate. The Jews are the masters of the financial powers in the American Union. Each year makes them more and more the master, controlling the working power of one hundred-and-twenty-million-people; there is today a single great man, Ford, who still has ​served his independence, thus irritating the Jews.
With cunning skill they mold the public opinion and turn it into a weapon for the battle in behalf of their own future.
The big leaders of Jewry already see the time approach for the fulfilment of their testamentary goal of completely devouring the nations of the earth.
One single independent state within this big herd of de-nationalized colonial territories might still be able to ruin the whole work at the last moment, for a Bolshevized world can only exist if it completely comprises everything.
If there remains but one state preserved in its national power and greatness, the Jewish satrapal-world-empire like every tyranny in this world is bound to succumb to the powers of the national idea.
The Jew, after his thousand years of experience in adaptation, now knows very well that he is able to undermine European nations and to bring them up to be neuter bastards but that he could hardly do the same to an Asiatic national state such as Japan. Today he may fake to be a German, or an Englishman, or an American or a Frenchman, but he is at loss when it comes to the yellow Asiatic. Therefore he tries to destroy the Japanese national state with the help of similar existing institutions in order to get rid of the dangerous adversary, before in his fist the last political power is being changed to tyranny over defenseless beings.
He is afraid of a Japanese national state in his Jewish millennium; therefore he wishes to destroy it before establishing his own dictatorship.
For this reason he is today inciting the nations against Japan, as he once did against Germany, and thus it may happen that, while British statesmanship is still counting to build on the alliance with Japan, the British-Jewish press already calls for a fight against the ally, preparing the war of annihilation under the proclamation of democracy, and under the war slogan: Down with Japanese militarism and imperialism!
Thus the Jew in England has become a rebel today.
​For this very reason the struggle against the Jewish world menace will start there.
And again the National-Socialist movement has its biggest task to fulfill:
It must open the eyes of the people across the foreign nations, reminding them again and again of the real enemy of our present day. Instead of hating Aryans, who did everything to alienate us, with whom, nevertheless, we are tied together by bonds of blood and of a traditional common culture, it must expose the arch-enemy of humanity as the actual cause of all suffering, in order that he may be hated by all.
But above all it must see to it that, at least in our own country, the deadly enemy is recognized, and that the fight against him may become a flaming sign of a brighter time, also showing the way to other nations for the salvation of struggling mankind.
Then may reason be our guide, and will our strength. May the holy duty, which prompts our actions, give us perseverance, and may faith remain our highest patron.