# A Philosophical Essay on Probabilities/Chapter 7

CHAPTER VII.
CONCERNING THE UNKNOWN INEQUALITIES WHICH MAY EXIST AMONG CHANCES WHICH ARE SUPPOSED EQUAL
Inequalities of this kind have upon the results of the calculation of probabilities a sensible influence which deserves particular attention. Let us take the game of heads and tails, and let us suppose that it is equally easy to throw the one or the other side of the coin. Then the probability of throwing heads at the first throw is ½ and that of throwing it twice in succession is ¼. But if there exist in the coin an inequality which causes one of the faces to appear rather than the other without knowing which side is favored by this inequality, the probability of throwing heads at the first throw will always be ½; because of our ignorance of which face is favored by the inequality the probability of the simple event is increased if this inequality is favorable to it, just so much is it diminished if the inequality is contrary to it. But in this same ignorance the probability of throwing heads twice in succession is increased. Indeed this probability is that of throwing heads at the first throw multiplied by the probability ​that having thrown it at the first throw it will be thrown at the second; but its happening at the first throw is a reason for belief that the inequality of the coin favors it; the unknown inequality increases, then, the probability of throwing heads at the second throw; it consequently increases the product of these two probabilities. In order to submit this matter to calculus let us suppose that this inequality increases by a twentieth the probability of the simple event which it favors. If this event is heads, its probability will be 1/2 plus 1/20, or 11/20, and the probability of throwing it twice in succession will be the square of 11/20, or 121/400. If the favored event is tails, the probability of heads, will be 1/2 minus 1/20 or 9/20, and the probability of throwing it twice in succession will be 81/400. Since we have at first no reason for believing that the inequality favors one of these events rather than the other, it is clear that in order to have the probability of the compound event heads heads it is necessary to add the two preceding probabilities and take the half of their sum, which gives 101/400 for this probability, which exceeds by 1/4 or by the square of the favor 1/20 that the inequality adds to the possibilities of the event which it favors. The probability of throwing tails tails is similarly 101/400, but the probability of throwing heads tails or tails heads is each 99/400; for the sum of these four probabilities ought to equal certainty or unity. We find thus generally that the constant and unknown causes which favor simple events which are judged equally possible always increase the probability of the repetition of the same simple event.
In an even number of throws heads and tails ought ​both to happen either an even number of times or odd number of times. The probability of each of these cases is 1/2 if the possibilities of the two faces are equal; but if there is between them an unknown inequality, this inequality is always favorable to the first case.
Two players whose skill is supposed to be equal play on the conditions that at each throw that one who loses gives a counter to his adversary, and that the game continues until one of the players has no more counters. The calculation of the probabilities shows us that for the equality of the play the throws of the players ought to be an inverse ratio to their counters. But if there is between the players a small unknown inequality, it favors that one of the players who has the smallest number of counters. His probability of winning the game increases if the players agree to double or triple their counters; and it will be 1/2 or the same as the probability of the other player in the case where the number of their counters should become infinite, preserving always the same ratio.
One may correct the influence of these unknown inequalities by submitting them themselves to the chances of hazard. Thus at the play of heads and tails, if one has a second coin which is thrown each time with the first and one agrees to name constantly heads the face turned up by the second coin, the probability of throwing heads twice in succession with the first coin will approach much nearer 1/4 than in the case of a single coin. In this last case the difference is the square of the small increment of possibility that the unknown inequality gives to the face of the first coin which it favors; in the other case this difference is the ​quadruple product of this square by the corresponding square relative to the second coin.
Let there be thrown into an urn a hundred numbers from 1 to 100 in the order of numeration, and after having shaken the urn in order to mix the numbers one is drawn; it is clear that if the mixing has been well done the probabilities of the drawing of the numbers will be the same. But if we fear that there is among them small differences dependent upon the order according to which the numbers have been thrown into the urn, we shall diminish considerably these differences by throwing into a second urn the numbers according to the order of their drawing from the first urn, and by shaking then this second urn in order to mix the numbers. A third urn, a fourth urn, etc., would diminish more and more these differences already inappreciable in the second urn.