# Diplomacy and the War/Part 1/Chapter 2

CHAPTER II.
Who Perpetrated the War?
I will now turn my attention to the question, who wanted the world war: was it Germany, which strove for the supremacy of the world and thereby caused the war? Or was it England, which sought to destroy the German Navy that was being built up and which attempted to repress the development of her economic prowess out of envy against Germany? Was it England which incited France to revenge and fostered the traditional lust for expansion in Russia? Or did Russia desire and cause the war?
Frederick II, King of Prussia, inherited rich coffers and a powerful army. Silesia was a pleasant addition to his provinces, and the King felt that he was endowed with great qualities, and he sought after fame; consequently he attacked Austria.
The great Italian statesman Cavour came to the conclusion that he could only achieve the union of all tho Italians over the corpse of Austria, and he therefore sought an excuse for war, and won Napoleon III over to his projected idea of attack.
Bismarck knew that without repressing Austria it was impossible for Prussia to gain supremacy in ​Germany, and he therefore sought a pretext for allying himself with Austria.
Who has played the part of these men during the course of recent events? Grey or Bethmann-Hollweg? Poincaré or William II?
The Central Powers, Germany and Austria, did not want a European war, but we wanted to defeat Serbia. The zenith of the political aims of our Government was the preservation of what existed, and not conquest for the sake of which it would have been worth while to risk a world war. The only German idea which altered the existing relation of the powers was the development of her navy, and even this thought did not involve the destruction, or even the weakening, of the power of other states, but it was only the externalization of her own prowess. In fact, this very ambition of our ally would have retarded the war most successfully, because it is surely obvious that the development of her Navy could only reach maturity during times of peace. The outbreak of war, before Germany had passed through the danger zone of naval weakness, threatened certain destruction to the results she had achieved at the expense of great sacrifices.
Austria-Hungary, however, was determined to solve the Serbian question fundamentally, because she was convinced that, unless she received substantial guarantees after the murder of Serajevo, Serbia would never abandon her aggressive policy, the Monarchy would run the risk of becoming paralysed, and her future would be in danger of falling to pieces like a sheaf ​of wheat that is untied. In the circumstances there could be no hope that the situation in the Balkans would improve; it would be certain, rather, that the situation would deteriorate.
Germany felt that the members of the Entente had not taken Serbia under their protection because they considered the demands of Serbia justified in themselves, but because Germany realised that the Entente regarded Austria as the outer bulwarks of the advancing might of Germany. The Entente only supported Serbia in opposition to us because they intended to cut off Germany from the Near East. If we had collapsed under this pressure, Germany would have had to surrender herself to the coalition whose aggressive aims were so strongly resented by public opinion in Germany. Germany sought refuge wherever vital interests attempted to solve the problem by wresting the double-edged sword from Jugo-Slavia. It was for this reason that von Tschirschky, the Ambassador, as he told me personally, tried to persuade us to take up an energetic attitude, and he let us feel for the same reason that Austria-Hungary would lose her value as an ally for Berlin if she failed to solve this question. And it was also for this reason that the Kaiser and his Chancellor were of the opinion that immediate military action was most advantageous (June 7).
During the first Cabinet meeting which considered the consequences of the murder, all the Hungarian and Austrian Ministers, with the exception of Tisza, demanded the war and considered that immediate ​action which would surprise Serbia was the only means to the desired end. It was only Tisza who prevented the realization of this conviction. He was ready to be content with a diplomatic victory which should be the starting-point for a more active policy that was to improve our position.
However, this attitude did not finally dictate the policy of the Monarchy. When the ultimatum was drafted, and during subsequent events, the intention of forcing Serbia to war became paramount. Serbia gained an opportunity of avoiding war by the action of Tisza, but our subsequent procedure appeared to have had the intention of making it difficult for Serbia to make use of this opportunity without serious humiliation.
The data in the new Red-book make it quite clear that Vienna considered war with Serbia as the best solution. At the same time, these data show that the European War was not desired in Austria. In fact, is it necessary to prove this? Is it not obvious that the old Monarchy and its old ruler did not want a European war? Does not the fact that we took the initiative prove that we were concerned with more modest aims than the World War? Not a single Minister, be he German, Austrian or Hungarian, spoke of the necessity of seizing the opportunity to defeat Russia or the Entente, or of deciding once and for all the position between the two world alliances by force of arms. The World War was only spoken of as a possibility, which had to be risked only as it was ​inevitable anyhow. The whole of our diplomatic force was exhausted by the attempt to sever the European from the Serbian questions. We were prepared to sign an agreement with Russia with reference to the preservation of our interests. We were prepared, for the sake of Russia, to make favourable conditions of peace to Serbia, only we were determined to be armed while we demanded a reckoning from her. Tisza's suggestion, not to make territorial conquests at the expense of Serbia, was accepted unanimously by the Cabinet Ministers in the hope that the World War might thus be avoided.
When we recognized clearly that this object was unattainable, and that the Serbian war would cause a European conflagration, our policy changed its course. Russia mobilized her army against Austria-Hungary on July 29. We realized fully that France would support Russia's attitude. Grey gave Bethmann-Hollweg to understand quite clearly that he could not count on British neutrality, and that it was possible that England would decide rapidly on intervention.
The Kaiser, who was prepared to accept the Serbian reply as a basis of negotiations, was alarmed by the danger of European war, and advised acceptance urgently. Beihmann-Hollweg wrote an almost threatening note to Berchtold, and advised him to accept Grey's suggestion according to which we were to arrest the progress of our troops, retain Belgrade as a hostage, and accept the intervention of the Great Powers between us and Russia.
​A certain change of policy now became noticeable in our Government. We entered into a discussion with Russia concerning the Serbian ultimatum (July 30). Although Berchtold had refused to accept a similar proposal on July 28, made by Sasanow, we were also prepared to consider the conditions of negotiating à quatre which we had refused hitherto. We did not abandon the idea of defeating the Serbian Army, because the Minister for Foreign Affairs said that we had to anticipate another attack on the part of Serbia in two or three years, but he did not know whether the first attempt would not result in further measures to meet us.
The diplomats of the Entente began to hope again. Russia, however, proceeded to order a general mobilization, which suddenly put an end to the possibility of peace. Germany had already indicated that, in case Russia should mobilize against her, Germany would be forced to do the same, and that a general German mobilization meant war. When Russia mobilized, in spite of the knowledge of these circumstances, everybody felt in Berlin that Russia meant to go to war, and it is an unquestionable fact that Russia was aware that the result of her mobilization would be a European war. Sasanow transmitted a note on July 29 to Poincaré to the effect that his military measures made it necessary to reckon with the inevitability of war. Berlin regarded it as her first duty to increase her chances of victory by rapid entry into the war, and to exploit the advantages which lay in speedy action.
​Even after the Russian mobilization had cut short negotiations peace could still have been secured. The attempts at negotiation were not completed. They had not failed finally as yet. There was still a chance that Austria-Hungary would arrest the advance of her troops and enter into further negotiations. It was still possible that the Entente would allow the defeat of Serbia and be content to save Serbia after a military defeat by securing terms which would ensure the independence and the existence of this country.
It was the mobilization of the Russian Army which put an end to these possibilities. What motives led her to this mobilization? Did the Entente want the war? What do we know concerning the intentions of the members of the Entente? Are not they the criminals we have been looking for?
There is no doubt whatever that France had cause to enter the world war.
Alsace-Lorraine could only be returned to France as the result of a European war. The shame which France suffered during 1870 and 1871 could only be wiped off by German blood. Documents which have only recently seen the light of day prove that, ever since the formation of the Entente Cordiale and after the Moroccan crisis, France had felt the approach of an enormous contest, of an historic reckoning.
During the Moroccan crisis (1911) the French Ambassador in London, Cambon, who was a responsible individual, told the Serbian Ambassador in London that the opposition which existed then would ​probably be settled by a friendly arrangement, but such an agreement would not remove for any length of time the dangers which were threatened by the aggressive policy of Germany. The result of such an agreement would only mean the postponement of the war for three or four years. France was fully aware that in any case she would be forced into war. France, as well as her allies, was of the opinion that, even at the cost of great sacrifices, it was necessary to postpone the war for some time—that is to say, until 1914 or 1915.
While Poincaré was President in 1912, he told Iswolski: "The outlook of France is definitely peaceful, and she neither seeks nor desires a war. But Germany's attitude against Russia would change her point of view immediately," and he felt sure that in such an event Parliament and public opinion would approve unanimously the determination of the Government to support Russia with force of arms. At the same time he strengthened this statement by what he told the Russian Ambassador: in the course of conversation Poincare said to Tittoni that if the Austro-Serbian antagonism led to a general war, Russia could count with absolute certainty on the armed support of France.
During the Balkan War (1913) the Russian Ambassador to London, Count Benckendorf, who was a competent and disinterested witness, reported to his Government: "De toutes les Puissances, c'est la France seule qui, pour ne pas dire qu'elle veut la ​guerre, la verrait sans grand regret. En tout cas rien ne m'a indiqué qu'elle coniribue activement à travailler dans le sens d'un compromis. Or, le compromis, c'est la paix, en dehors d'un compromis—c'est la guerre!" The Russian Ambassador wrote: "La situation, telle que j'ai pu l'observer, me parait être que toutes les Puissances travaillent en réalité à la paix. Mais de toutes, c'est la France qui accepterait la guerre avec le plus de philosophie. La France, comme il a été, c'est reprise. Elle a, à tort ou à raison, confiance complète en son armée; le vieux levain de rancune reparaît; elle pourrait bien juger les circonstances plus favorables aujourd'hui qu'elles ne le seraient plus tard."
A certain discussion seemed also to point to France's warlike aims. This conversation took place a few weeks before the perpetration of the murder in Serajevo, between Karolyi and the President of the Republic, Poincaré, the substance of which I learnt from Karolyi personally during the last weeks of the war. Poincaré tried to persuade Karolyi to induce Hungary to change her alliance, and to come in on the side of the Entente in the war which the President expected in 1915. If Hungary decided to desert the German-Alliance and Austria, Poincaré promised him complete independence. The President also pointed out that Germany could not be victorious in the war, as Italy would desert the Alliance.
The above shows that France had regarded the war as inevitable, and the catastrophe was dreaded less and ​less. The main object of French policy was to prepare for the war. No documents have been found which prove that France intended to provoke the war which she considered inevitable, either in the year 1914, or at any other definite moment. No agreement is known which would have forced France to such an action. All that is clear is that France was absolutely determined to enter into the war as soon as Germany and Russia should become actively hostile, and this had been known in Russia for some time, with the effect that Russia experienced a sense of great security and freedom of action, and finally it facilitated the outbreak of the war.
Russia also had a motive for a European war. Byzantium, which Russia loved so dearly and which was the gateway to the sea and the outlet for the richest portion of her country, could only be won by means of a European war. Moreover, Jugo-Slavia could only be created out of a pool of blood—a fact which was very well known in Petrograd.
In 1898, during the annexation crisis, the Russian Ambassador in Bucharest, Prince Urusoff, said to the Serbian Ambassador: "Nobody in his senses could have imagined that Austria-Hungary would surrender of her own free will the occupied provinces, and that they would fall to Serbia." This possibility can only "result in an unfortunate war for Austria-Hungary, or in a successful revolution in Bosnia." During the same critical time, the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Iswolski, said to the Serbian Ambassador that ​it was well known Austria would never cede Bosnia and Herzegovina without war to Turkey, and much less to Serbia. The Czar said the same thing.
"The Czar," said a Serbian diplomat, "gave expression to his great sympathy for Serbia, advised a peaceful attitude because our cause was just but our preparation was weak. The question of Bosnia and Herzegovina will only be decided at the point of the sword." Notwithstanding that Russia knew this, she did everything to support and strengthen Pan-Serbian ambitions. And the Czar continued: "Our advice is: agreement with Turkey, peaceful attitude, military preparation, and wait."
When Gutschkow informed Serbia, in 1909, during the Bosnian crisis, that Russia could not interfere in this question, he added with reference to the future: "As soon as our armaments are complete, we will settle up with Austria-Hungary. Do not begin a war now, for this would be suicide. Keep your intentions secret and prepare yourselves, for the days of your joy are about to come." The Serbian Ambassador reported that Bobrinski had told him: "There was no hatred against Austria, but the fact that Austria humiliated us has let loose a terrible wrath and hatred against her, for which she will pay dearly."
On another occasion Iswolski expressed the following opinion to the Serbian Ambassador: "Serbia will be condemned to a miserable life until the hour of the disruption of the Austro-Hungarian Empire has struck. The annexation has brought this moment nearer, and ​when the moment actually arrives, Russia will open the Serbian question and solve it. Iswolski realizes that the battle against the German nation is inevitable."
During the Balkan War the Serbian Ambassador reported concerning the new Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Sasanow: "He is inspired with confidence by our power after our great successes, and he believes that we will shake the foundations of Austria-Hungary. We are to content ourselves with what we will get and to regard it only as a stepping-stone, for the future belongs to us."
In the year 1913, also during the Balkan difficulty, Sasanow repeated that Serbia must work for the future "when she will receive considerable land from Austria-Hungary." Sasanow informed the Russian Ambassador in Belgrade, Hartwig, in 1913: "Serbia has passed through the first stage of her historic course, and in order to achieve the end she will have to endure a terrible battle, which will involve risking her very existence. The promised land of Serbia lies within the territory of Austria-Hungary, and not where she is striving at present, and where the Bulgarians stand in her path. In the circumstances it is of vital interest to Serbia to preserve her alliance with Bulgaria on the one hand, and on the other hand to prepare herself with steady and patient labour to the degree that is necessary, so that she may be ready for the future battle which is inevitable. Time is working in favour of Serbia and towards the destruction of her enemies, who are already displaying certain signs of disruption. ​A breach between Bulgaria and Serbia would be a chance for Austria, and the agony of Serbia would only be prolonged for many years." Is it possible to be more explicit?
In the same year the Serbian Ambassador in Petrograd reported that an authoritative person had brought the following to his notice: "We are immediately faced by the danger of a general European War, and the reason that this war had been avoided at the expense of moral sacrifices, was to be traced, among other things, to the desire to give the allies in the Balkans opportunity for recovery, and to prepare themselves for possibilities which may come to be realized within the near future."
The chief representative of the Pan-Serbian idea, Pasics, wired to Belgrade in 1914 that the Czar had told him that he had "done his duty to the Slavs," by mobilizing during the Balkan War against Austria-Hungary. The Czar encouraged Pasics to induce Serbia to approach Roumania, because the Roumanians who were domiciled in Austria and Hungary were anxious to join up with Roumania. When the Serbian President boasted before the Czar that the Southern Slavs gravitated outwards, he noticed that the Czar was very pleased. Nicholas expressed the hope that the Russian banks would now take a greater interest in Slavonic countries than they had done heretofore. He said that Austria treated her Slav citizens very badly, and he emphasized that this procedure was sure to be avenged. The Czar expressed the greatest joy ​on hearing that Serbia possessed a powerful army. When Pasics gave vent to the project that there should be an alliance by marriage between the Serbian and the Russian dynasties, so that the Queen would be the Czarina of all the Southern Slavs, the Czar accepted this suggestion according to the report of the Serbian statesman "with visible joy." This characteristic interview ended with the statement of the mighty Czar that he would "do everything for Serbia."
All this proves that in 1908 and 1909 Russia did not want a war à propos of the Bosnian annexation, but only because she considered herself to be too weak; but, on the other hand, it shows that she had already approved of the Pan-Serbian idea. Russian diplomacy worked steadily in order to ensure that Serbia should not surrender her aggressive wishes, although she knew that the realization of these wishes could only be rendered possible after the war. In connection with the Balkan War, Russia did not yet desire an armed conflict, but again, only because her preparations were incomplete, at the same time, with incredible care, she fed the flame from which the present firebrand was lit. By encouraging Serbia to keep alive the Pan-Serbian ideal, she made sure that this was done at our expense and not at that of Bulgaria.
Russia's responsibility for the war is therefore not in question. Russia collected the materials for the European conflagration with conscious tenacity.
She had determined upon our destruction, whether by war or by revolution.
​The only question that remains is whether the Government of the Czar had decided upon the war for 1914. Positive proof is not forthcoming on this point. At any rate, the main obstacle to peace must be sought in the fact that after Russia had sent Serbia upon the evil errand which led to the catastrophe she could not allow Serbia to become the victim of our punishment.
Russia, moreover, did not wish to accept a solution which took the sword out of the hands of the Karagyorgyevics.
England had least cause to desire the world war. The German colonies were not sufficient to make it worth while. The price would not have been worth the gain. It would also have been unprofitable to attempt to destroy Germany's ability to compete in the economic race by means of the sword. To kill your own customer would be unwise. And the expenses of a world war would be so enormous that it could never be good business. The destruction of the German fleet would, of course, be a serious interest, but the threat which lurked in the German fleet was paralysed by the naval activity of England and the system of alliances, even without the risk of war. The result of this situation was that no recent communications exist which reveal in any single detail that England had belligerent intentions.
When England found that she was unable to come to an agreement with Germany, she gathered together an enormous camp against her rival. The attitude of Great Britain added poignancy to the situation. This ​procedure encouraged Germany's enemies so much that the idea of revenge became stronger in France and it facilitated the bloody game that Russia played with Serbia. But I am unaware of any statement made by a responsible British statesman which in any way indicates belligerent intentions.
In fact, one has to recognize that English policy took great pains to avoid the acceptance of any responsibility and as long as she did not risk the friendship of France, England acted in the interests of peace.
During the last conflict in Morocco, Grey adopted an attitude which did not calm the anxiety of the French President, Caillaux, sufficiently for him to dare to count with certainty upon the military support of England, and he therefore became very cautious.
During the period of the Balkan War, Poincaré was of the opinion that England would support Russia in case of war by diplomatic means, which, Poincaré added, did not necessarily preclude the possibility that England would go a step further. In the report which has been mentioned previously concerning the French readiness for action. Count Benckendorf emphasized the fact that the French Ambassador, Cambon, relied upon the assistance of England and trusted that feelings of honour or the consciousness of her national pride would press the sword into the hand of Great Britain. At the same time he laid stress on the fact that the British Government and public opinion wanted peace and were trying to effect a compromise. Although he was of opinion that England might well appear upon ​the scene as the protector of France, it cannot be denied that British policy was rather a harbinger of caution than the herald of war.
Even during the last crisis, England appears to have pursued a careful policy, as she succeeded in avoiding any obligation up to the last moment which forced her to give active support to France, without losing the confidence of her allies.
The Russian Ambassador wired, on July 27, that the confidence which Berlin and Vienna had reposed in England's neutrality was justified no longer. At the same time he does not appear to have counted positively upon England's assistance. On the 30th, that is to say on the day before the French Ambassador, Cambon, was told by Sir Edward Grey that he was not in a position to promise that England would participate in the campaign, Cambon said to Benckendorf that he believed the position in Parliament was not sufficiently defined for Grey to speak openly at present. This was known to mean that the Government was not yet able to state with certainty that it would support Russia and France. The Russian Ambassador said on the 30th: "Grey sees the position clearly," and knows "that caution is necessary." Public opinion regarded the whole of the Serbian affair as purely a Slav question, and the Government could not participate as long as public opinion was not behind it. Only if France became endangered could the question be decided in England. "The affair with Serbia" had no weight in public opinion. "In the ​North of England the financial, commercial and industrial interests were against the war." In such circumstances, said the Russian Ambassador, the "hopes which had been placed upon England might turn out to be deceptive." And it was possible that the expression of Russia's confidence in England might paralyse Grey's action.
The decision to enter into the war was brought about by the breach of Luxemburg and Belgian neutrality. For this reason Iswolski considered the breach (August 2) as "advantageous" for France.
These dates place a greater responsibility upon Sir Edward Grey as an individual than official communications have revealed. These communications reveal that Russia knew earlier than we could possibly know that Grey intended to interfere against us, a fact which reduced the chances of peace, although nobody could know, either in Petrograd or in Paris, whether Grey's policy would remain supreme. Grey did not wish to bring about the European conflagration on any account. When he had the choice of offending France and Russia, with the possibility of losing them as allies for the future, or of risking the war in favourable circumstances, he chose the latter modus operandi.
I am not aware of an agreement or of any action or any statement made by any responsible person which could make it seem even probable that England had planned a war of aggression either for 1914 or for any subsequent date. If this had been the intention of Asquith's cabinet, the Irish question would not have ​been forced and the possibility of war would have been prepared for more efficiently. I am therefore unable to see in "perfidious Albion" the breaker of the peace who was ready for and knew everything.
Frederick II., Cavour, and Bismarck could approximately gauge the consequences of their undertaking. The relation of the measurable Powers which fought against each other in the European War could, however, not be ascertained so easily. The suffering and the risk which are involved in war are of such fantastic dimensions that it is scarcely credible that anybody wanted to bring about the European War unless he was convinced that it was inevitable anyhow.
Accordingly, I would not care to level the accusation of having brought about the war intentionally against anybody. My personal impression is that not one of the statesmen who were in responsible positions wanted the war at that moment.
During the crisis, all Governments appeared to seek an agreement.
Even Russia does not seem to have wanted to force the war at any price.
From all this I deduce that the World War is rather the result of mistakes, hatred, corruption and distrust, than the outcome of political strategy. I do not know of a single political action which does not appear justified by the assertion that the party in question was convinced that her opponent was determined upon war. Even the general mobilization of the Russian Army may conceivably be traced to the fear of the Russian ​Military Command that we intended to attack them, and that they believed that, unless they accelerated matters, the rapidity of action on the part of Austria might be decidedly detrimental to Russia. For who could deny that there was much in our attitude which led others to believe that we wanted the European War?
The real cause of the World War was not conscious political determination, but the instinct of distrust and self-preservation. This statement is rendered plausible by the fact that the war was not declared because political determination and political aims failed to arrive at a compromise, and because all negotiations were utterly and finally futile; the war was brought about because, in the course of the negotiations, the feeling of distrust and the instinct for self-preservation led to military measures which were diametrically opposed to the instincts of self-preservation and distrust of all the other States.
A most instructive book could be written about those speeches which were the result and also the cause of mass-suggestions which called forth the belligerent atmosphere during the last decade, and which succeeded in frustrating the peaceful intentions of most of the States.
The unpremeditated and frequent outbursts of hatred on the part of the French strengthened Germany in the belief that it was impossible to live peaceably with France. Her people were convinced that France would seize the first opportunity to eradicate the bitter memory ​of Sedan. The utterances of many statesmen who led public opinion, the press and also persons outside the public arena, testify to the fact that France would never forget or forgive Germany for Sedan and Alsace-Lorraine.
The speeches of the Serbian Nationalists and the Serbian press, as well as the contempt that was poured upon our ruler, Francis Joseph, deepened the conviction that the Serbian question could only be solved by a resort to arms. The feeling between the two peoples was poisoned, not by any single political action but by thousands upon thousands of revelations of public sentiment.
Nothing corrupted the Austro-Italian friendship more than the irresponsible press which clung to the old reminiscences of political demagogy, the distrust and antipathy which was rife in the Nationalistic sections of the public and which were revealed so frequently in insults and street brawls. The atmosphere of mutual antipathy and mutual distrust made it all the more difficult to uphold the friendship between us and Italy and, at the same time, made it all the more easy to create a quarrel. When Field-Marshal Conrad relies upon the fact that events in regard to Italy have justified him, the question must be asked: did he not heighten the antagonistic feeling of our ally immeasurably, by allowing his intention of attacking Italy to become known publicly, and by conducting a press campaign against Italy?
The relation between England and Germany was also ​poisoned chiefly by threatening words. It was not so much that the respective interests were really so fundamentally opposed; nor was it the action of the States in question which led to the great catastrophe, but rather public feeling which had been excited by the irresponsible press. I will illustrate with a few examples the process which resulted in the enmity between these two great nations. To begin with, I will cast a glimpse into the English press.
The Saturday Review wrote in 1895: "In case of a war with Germany we can only win and lose nothing." In 1897 the same paper wrote: "England and Germany have become rivals everywhere. These many small oppositions are the greatest casus belli which has ever existed." "If Germany collapses to-morrow, there will be no Englishman who will not be rich the day after."
In 1902 we read in the National Review: "Germany is the enemy. The leadership of the world belongs to the Anglo-Saxon and the Slav elements."
When England and Germany pursued a common policy with a view to protecting common interests in Venezuela, the English press interfered for this reason and voiced the suspicion that Germany was harbouring plans for conquest.
The Army and Navy Gazette published the following in 1904: "The moment has arrived for us to have a reckoning with the German fleet."
The Daily Chronicle wrote in 1905: "If we had destroyed the German fleet last year, the peace ​of Europe would have been secured for sixty years."
The passionate anti-German propaganda which had been carried on for many years was created by Lord Northcliffe, than whom there is no statesman more responsible for the outbreak of the war. The revelations which came to light as a consequence of party quarrels, and the accusations made at the time of the Morocco Crisis in 1911, caused the impression among public opinion in Germany that England wanted to catch the German fleet unawares and to destroy it.
Chamberlain's speech and Bülow's answer at the time of the Boer War in connection with military atrocities, together with the threat made by the Secretary for War, Lee, that the British Fleet could annihilate the enemy squadrons before the public was aware that war had been declared, all tended to incite the two nations against each other. These statements were, however, rather the result of distrust of the one nation for the other, and the attempt to express the feeling of the country rather than the expression of belligerent intentions. The fault, however, does not lie on one side only. Germany also supplied ample material for suspicion. Even the words of the Kaiser, who was peaceful and Anglophile at first, did much towards the creation of British antipathy. The Kaiser knew how to express his thoughts with so much pregnant force and in such winged words, that everything he said was remembered, and often appeared to disclose intentions which the Kaiser never cherished. ​How much ill-feeling was caused against the person of the Kaiser because he once said that he expected his soldiers to shoot their fathers and their brothers if he ordered them to do so! And again, the reported statement that German soldiers were to give no quarter to the Boxers during the Chinese Expedition. The first statement was only made for the purpose of emphasizing the absolute necessity of discipline; the second was merely the result of a momentary passion and corresponded in no way to the real inner life of the Kaiser, but did him immense harm. The famous telegram addressed to Kruger and the statement that Germany's future lay on the sea had an especially unfortunate effect in England. The attitude of the German press also did incredible damage in England during the Boer War. Moreover, the fierce words of the Crown Prince created the impression that the peaceful policy of Germany would not last for a long time.
The agitation of the German Navy League gave rise to the idea that the Navy was being built against England, just as Lord Roberts' agitation for the increase of the standing army was regarded in Germany as a preparation for an attack against the German Emperor.
The chances of peace were frustrated most successfully by the pan-Germans by their articles and speeches, which expressed their fundamental idea that the German nation was the first in the world and destined to command everywhere. The pan-German idea was celebrated with terrible orgies, especially during the Centenary of the Battle of Leipzig (1913).
​During the Moroccan crisis, it was not so much the nature of the German attitude, but the way in which it was expressed, that offended British vanity. The personal appearance of the Kaiser in the harbour and the despatch of a man-of-war to Agadir, reacted upon public opinion in England like an insult.
If I now summarize now investigation up to date, after all that I have said, I arrive at the following conclusions:
The tension, the danger of war and the distrust were so enormous and so constant in Europe, that Russia pursued the dangerous policy of associating herself with pan-Serbian ideas and fostering them secretly—a procedure which was suffered consciously by the Great Powers of the West.
The passionate feeling which had thus been created then became uncontrollable and culminated in the atrocity of Serajevo.
This tragedy forced us to settle with the Serbian danger, and we were met by a Russian attitude which condemned the murder and was consequently prepared to permit the humiliation of Serbia to a certain extent, but which refused to allow a weakening of Serbian aggressive power, which alone could have assured internal and external security. Russia also needed the alliance and the strength of Serbia for the future. France supported Russia, and England supported France, which was the natural consequence of the general policy of these States and the result of the fear of German supremacy.
​No power wanted the World War, possibly not even Russia. Up to the last moment attempts were made to find a peaceable solution. The difficulties of the situation, however, were more powerful than the determination of the statesmen. Before the attempt at negotiations had failed finally, the general distrust and the fear of being attacked unprepared and the conviction that the European War, which had been expected so often, was inevitable after all, resulted in a military situation which could not be arrested in its progress. The mobilization of Russia brought the final decision with it.
If a compromise had been found for the Serbian question, it would have been possible to postpone but not to prevent the war. Real peace could only have been attained by a change of the previous policy of the Great Powers.
The heaviest burden of responsibility must be borne by Russia, because she positively fostered Serbian aggression and she took the last and decisive step prior to the outbreak of war.
The fundamental causes of the European conflagration were, firstly: the general hatred and the general conviction that the war would break out sooner or later. This attitude caused the pursuance of policies which were bound to bring their own revenge in their wake, for they were prepared to sacrifice the future of the greater Powers. The second main cause of the Great War was the Anglo-German rivalry.
The question could be put whether I do not really ​agree, by virtue of what I have said above, with the assertion of social democracy that the World War was a natural and inevitable consequence of the capitalist system, and that therefore anyone who wanted to preserve peace must help to bring about the supremacy of social democracy.
I believe the answer is in the negative. At the same time it must be admitted that the seeds of the World War grew upon the soil of Imperialism, and upon the soil of that Imperialism which competes in the interests of enormous industrial production for colonies. The nature of this Imperialism was to guard its territories by protective tariffs, whose competition was carried on during a time of complete international anarchy. There can be no question that only modern industrialism and capitalism rendered the war technically possible, and that the insane competition of imperialism weakened the feeling of human solidarity and raised the sentiment of nationality above the clouds. The foregoing, however, does not prove that the World War was a necessary consequence of capitalism and bourgeois society. The wars of to-day are as detrimental to capitalism and bourgeois society as to humanity in general. The colossal cost of war, the loss of human material, and the political excitement which goes hand in hand with war, are of the utmost danger to production and internal order. They involve, moreover, such a collapse of civilization that the war is as little in the interests of the capitalistic world as the world of labour. The wars which we had known ​hitherto were means and milestones in the development of imperialism. The war which we have now experienced would, however, dig the grave of imperialism if it were repeated again. But the enormity of its size and its technical means combined to make war such an immeasurable misfortune that no single country and no economic system can gain any advantage from it. No party but the anarchists could possibly desire such a calamity. Anyone who wishes to preserve the existing social order can be nothing but a friend of peace. The attempt of social democracy to strive after international solidarity and solution is certainly a factor of great importance for future peace. Nevertheless, it is an attempt which could only secure peace if it did not deny the essence of peace itself by making class hatred and class trouble one of its principles, which have since led to the destruction and the wars of the Bolsheviks. Social democracy could only achieve a lasting peace if it had discovered the secret of settling the divergent interests and sentiments which are based upon territorial and national possessions, and even social democracy is incapable of achieving this end. The wish to achieve it is not sufficient.
The great questions whether the social order based upon the principle of private ownership should continue or whether communism should be established, and the question as to what part both principles are to play in the political economy of all nations, must in my opinion be settled in accordance with the demand of local circumstances, human nature, economics, and the ​laws pertaining to them, but not from the point of view of war or peace.
One of the lessons of the war has been that every order of society must foster the interests of peace equally. We have learnt that every effort must be made to achieve one aim, the aim which removes the obstacles between class and state interests and which furthers the safety of humanitv, in order to regulate armaments automatically and to bring peace under the protection of new institutions and to remove international anarchy. Capitalism, the régime of the bourgeoisie, and patriotism, cannot support a repetition of the present world war any more than social democracy. A war of such dimensions ceases to be a rational weapon of imperialism. The enormity of modern war is also the bankruptcy of imperialism, for the victors themselves are unable to draw any serious advantages from it. Moreover, the destructive power of such a war will increase from year to year in proportion to the advance of modern science.
During the war, many people thought that they could trace the cause of the war to the spheres of culture. Either side glorified its own culture, and considered it incompatible with that of the other party. This theory, however, is the product of the diseased mental atmosphere of the war, and is entirely untenable. When some time ago a German book with this tendency came into my hands—for instance, the work of H. Chamberlain—concerning the superiority of the German genius and German culture, for which it is ​claimed that it is the only way to salvation, the thought suddenly flashed through my mind as to whether by chance we were not fighting unconsciously under the influence of German suggestion for a mental tyranny which justified the greed of a certain type. However, I very soon sought and found similar writings emanating from the Entente which calmed my anxiety. The Entente has a complete literature which traces the war to German mentality and which emphasizes the one-sidedness of German culture, and the political immorality of Frederick II, Nietsche, and Treitschke. These works have taught that the culture, love of freedom and democracy of the more cultured West are destined to fulfil their function by suppressing German barbarism in the interests of humanity.
In opposition to the above, I am of opinion that mankind must utilize all these various cultures equally. Mankind is as much in need of the German genius as of the genius of France, England and Italy; and I believe, further, that the mental independence of the small nations forms a factor that must be counted as an asset to the world. The main characteristic of the advance of modern times and its superiority to Roman culture lies in its versatility. It is not my intention to draw a comparison between these cultures and to distinguish between them, for everyone contains, notwithstanding their possible weaknesses, an immeasurable value, and every one of them contains much that is noble and useful and beautiful, and we certainly have need of them all. He who wishes to repress any ​individual and fundamental development robs mankind. The rivalry between various forms of culture has nothing in common with armed warfare. The era has passed when Arabian and Christian cultures meant to attack each other by force of arms, and when the Catholic faith made war upon Protestantism. If any culture had strayed into wrong paths, the weapon of the mind must be brought to bear upon it and not bombs and aeroplanes.
There is no point of view which is more unjust or more one-sided than the political cynicism which regards political selfishness as a German monopoly. It is true, however, that there were several German writers who emphasized and justified political egoism; at the same time, it was by no means only German writers who did so. Machiavelli alone proves that, in the domain of political theory, the palm of cynicism cannot be awarded to the Germans. In the realm of practical politics there is also no nation which has the right to sit in judgment upon another, because the history of every people relates countless selfish actions. If we wish to condemn the unquestionably cynical remarks and the unscrupulous actions of Frederick II of Prussia, we must not forget the enormous services which he rendered and the tremendous love which he brought to his people, and we must not forget that Louis XIV or Napoleon I shed at least as much blood for the sake of ambition, and that they have broken their word at least as often as Frederick the Great.
​When we consider the question of the war, we must preclude the question of the value of various forms of culture. Peace will never become a permanent peace until all the races cease to indulge in chauvinistic exaggeration which leads to mutual contempt. They must realize that they must learn from each other and that they depend upon each other. They must learn that Frenchmen, Englishmen and Americans would not be where they are at present if they had been unable to benefit by the great achievements of German culture. The same argument also applies to the other camp. All the world over, mankind must return to labour shoulder to shoulder, and establish a solid foundation for humanity.