# Wilwording v. Swenson/Opinion of the Court

* Court Documents
* Case Syllabus
* Per Curiam Opinion of the Court
* Concurring Opinion Blackmun
* Dissenting Opinion Burger
United States Supreme Court
404 U.S. 249
Wilwording v. Swenson
On the ground that they challenged only their living conditions and disciplinary measures while confined in maximum security at Missouri State Penitentiary, and did not seek their release, petitioners' state habeas corpus petitions were dismissed. The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed. Petitioners then sought federal habeas corpus in the District Court for the Western District of Missouri. The District Court dismissed the petitions, 331 F.Supp. 1188, and the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed, 439 F.2d 1331. Although petitioners had exhausted state habeas relief the Court of Appeals agreed with the District Court that the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2254 had not been satisfied because petitioners had not invoked any of a number of possible alternatives to state habeas including 'a suit for injunction, a writ of prohibition, or mandamus or a declaratory judgment in the state courts,' or perhaps other relief under the State Administrative Procedure Act. Id., at 1336.
* Section 2254 does not erect insuperable or successive barriers to the invocation of federal habeas corpus. The exhaustion requirement is merely an accommodation of our federal system designed to give the State an initial 'opportunity to pass upon and correct' alleged violations of its prisoners' federal rights. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 438, 83 S.Ct. 822, 848, 9 L.Ed.2d 837 (1963). Petitioners are not required to file 'repetitious applications' in the state courts. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 449 n. 3, 73 S.Ct. 397, 403, 97 L.Ed. 469 (1953). Nor does the mere possibility of success in additional proceedings bar federal relief. Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U.S. 40, 42-43, 88 S.Ct. 194, 196-197, 19 L.Ed.2d 41 (1967); Coleman v. Maxwell, 351 F.2d 285, 286 (CA6 1965). Whether the State would have heard petitioner's claims in any of the suggested alternative proceedings is a matter of conjecture; certainly no available procedure was indicated by the State Supreme Court in earlier cases. See McMichaels v. Hancock, 428 F.2d 1222, 1223 (CA1 1970). Furthermore, we are not referred to a single instance, regardless of the remedy invoked, in which the Missouri courts have granted a hearing to state prisoners on the conditions of their confinement. In these circumstances § 2254 did not require petitioners to pursue the suggested alternatives as a prerequisite to taking their claims to federal court. As Mr. Justice Rutledge stated in his concurrence in Marino v. Ragen, 332 U.S. 561, 568, 68 S.Ct. 240, 244, 92 L.Ed. 170 (1947):
'The exhaustion-of-state-remedies rule should not be stretched to the absurdity of requiring the exhaustion of * * * separate remedies when at the outset a petitioner cannot intelligently select the proper way, and in conclusion he may find only that none of the (alternatives) is appropriate or effective.'
Moreover, although cognizable in federal habeas corpus, see Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 89 S.Ct. 747, 21 L.Ed.2d 718 (1969), petitioners' pleading may also be read to plead causes of action under the Civil Rights Acts, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1343(3) and 1343(4), for deprivation of constitutional rights by prison officials. As to like actions, in an exhaustive opinion in Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571 (CA8 1968), Mr. Justice (then Judge) Blackmun stated:
'These actions were instituted in 1966 by handwritten petitions employing varying titles (including 'habeas corpus'). Each plaintiff asked for the appointment of counsel and permission to proceed in forma pauperis. Those requests were granted. Appointed counsel then filed amended complaints which have been treated by all concerned as petitions for injunctive relief under the civil rights statutes, 42 US.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) and (4). We are satisfied as to jurisdiction. We are also satisfied, as were the district judges, that the cases are appropriately to be regarded as class actions within the scope and reach of Rule 23, Fed.R.Civ.P.' Id., at 572-573.
Petitioners were therefore entitled to have their actions treated as claims for relief under the Civil Rights Acts, not subject, on the basis of their allegations, to exhaustion requirements. The remedy provided by these Acts 'is supplementary to the state remedy, and the latter need not be first sought and refused before the federal one is invoked.' Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183, 81 S.Ct. 473, 482, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961); McNeese v. Board of Education, 373 U.S. 668, 83 S.Ct. 1433, 10 L.Ed.2d 622 (1963); Damico v. California, 389 U.S. 416, 88 S.Ct. 526, 19 L.Ed.2d 647 (1967). State prisoners are not held to any stricter standard of exhaustion than other civil rights plaintiffs. Houghton v. Shafer, 392 U.S. 639, 88 S.Ct. 2119, 20 L.Ed.2d 1319 (1968). There an inmate's challenge to the confiscation of his legal materials without first seeking administrative redress was sustained. Although the probable futility of such administrative appeals was noted, we held that in 'any event, resort to these remedies is unnecessary.' Id., at 640, 88 S.Ct., at 2120. Accordingly, the motions to proceed in forma pauperis and the petition for certiorari are granted, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Reversed and remanded with directions.

## Notes

This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
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