# Diplomacy and the War/Part 4/Chapter 2

CHAPTER II.
The Bourgeois Republic.
The development of Hungary was subject to the dominating influence exercised by the surrender of arms since the October revolution. This influence was perhaps more derogatory than the famous order of the first Russian revolution, by which the disciplinary rights of the officers were removed, and which instituted the Soldiers' Councils. This influence was particularly evil because the first criminal demand that the Hungarian troops were to lay down their arms everywhere was followed by the unheard-of statement of the Minister for War, Linder, to the effect that he did not wish to see any more soldiers. In consequence of this treacherous proclamation the enemy could penetrate into our country from all sides with ridiculously small and disgracefully weak forces. If the Hungarian army, which was retreating but partially capable of action, had been held together through the energy of the Hungarian Government and thoroughly organized, instead of being artificially disbanded and demoralized, it would have been easy to defend our borders against the weak forces of our enemies until the conclusion of peace. This problem was considerably facilitated by ​the conditions of the armistice, which was concluded in Italy, because these conditions contemplated fixing the Hungarian frontier as the line of demarcation in the south-east.
In these circumstances the peace would have been more favourable. The demands of our neighbour were by no means detailed at that time, and they grew in proportion to their military success. The demands of the Great Powers also increased in proportion to these successes. The Entente would never have accepted the demands of their smaller allies if they had been obliged to enforce these demands by bloodshed, which they would undoubtedly have had to do but for the fatherly care of those who wielded power in Hungary, as our neighbours, with the exception of Serbia, did not possess armies capable of action.
The Entente would have had to fetch the chestnuts out of the fire for them. The disruption of our army poisoned the nationality question. As soon as our neighbours who had been considered weak, succeeded in making their armies cross our frontier, it was in vain that our Government made fair promises to our various nationalities. They disgraced in vain the whole of Hungary's history, and it was in vain that they declared that up to date all classes of the people and all nationalities had been suppressed and exploited. Among these nationalities the desire grew to secede in proportion as foreign armies invaded us. Those who had regarded autonomy as the summit of their desires now turned from the broken-down State which had ​surrendered all hope and naturally turned towards the powers in the ascendant, the allies of the victorious Entente. The tendency to secession was furthermore increased by the fact that we had destroyed the crown of St. Stefan, the tie which had hitherto held Hungarian society together and represented the unity of the State, and even the national councils, which exercised the highest power, could not arrogate to themselves more than to demand, according to Wilson's principles, the right of self-determination for the Hungarian race. We destroyed law and order, which was the basis of our national unity, even before our enemies would have done so.
The internal order also, as well as the whole of the economic and social life of the Hungarian States, became untenable by the disarming of the army. In order to protect peace and the security of life in the capital, the labour element had to be armed, by which process the real power slipped out of the hands of the State into the control of a class which, firstly, was in the minority, and, secondly, had been educated in the hatred against all other classes. And within this class those gained the upper hand who were determined to exploit the situation ruthlessly.
It is a natural tendency of all revolutionary upheavals that they develop a tendency towards exaggeration, and consequently untenable circumstances arise which prepare the reaction. It is always difficult to stop at the point at which the revolution really wishes to arrive. The success of one revolution prepares the way for ​others. As soon as might has become the source of right, there is no holding back any longer. As soon as it is given to the mob to exercise control, and as soon as a clever coup can place a man who is unknown and unimportant yesterday into the forefront of history and make a demi-god of him, others ask themselves the question why they should not attain to similar fortune. Ambition grows from day to day, and the wishes and desires of every one of the climbers grow into infinitude. More and more people are found who are prepared to stake themselves and others in order to secure everything at one stride for themselves or for the community. Anyone who thinks and who is cautious retires at such times. He realizes that the tendency of affairs is unfavourable to him. Only the bold and energetic gambler steps to the front. Success is attained only by a rapid decision and lightheartedness, and conscience is only ballast in this race for priority. The climber, the flatterer and the fanatic, all fall a prey to the cult of the exaggeration of the principle which has caused the revolution, for they feel that by this means they can outdo the previous leaders, or else they are driven onwards by their hot-bloodedness and by the excitement of public opinion until they collapse.
And who is to defend authority, law and order after a successful revolution? The revolutionary of yesterday? Yes, if that which strengthens him yesterday would not weaken him to-day! If it was permissible yesterday to oppose violence to law, why should it be a crime to-day to direct violence against revolutionary ​force? Why is law, peace and public security sanctified to-day if they were not so yesterday? Because the revolutionary holds the rudder? Just as Mirabeau and Lafayette were supplanted by Danton, and just as the latter was taken from power by Robespierre and Marat, and just as Lwow and Miljukow were supplanted by Kerenski, and just as Kerenski was removed by Lenin and Trotzki—the sequence of events here had to be just the same.
The working classes were particularly susceptible to exaggeration owing to the revolutionary idea of Marxism with which they had grown up. The position of the socialists who are determined to create the longed-for revolution is far more advantageous than those who try to exercise a moderating influence upon it. It is in vain that they are in the right, they are unable to banish the spirits which they have called up.
If a social democrat who disapproved of the revolution pointed out that even according to the teaching of Marx the social-democratic ideal can only be established in a society whose riches are on the increase, and not in an impoverished state, as ours was, then this argument is refuted by the assertion that in such a case all hope would have to be abandoned, as it is particularly difficult to create a revolution in a society which is growing richer and richer. The completely opposite development of affairs also destroyed the belief that, according to the prophecy of Marx, the development of capitalism would cause the revolution automatically sooner or later, as the working classes would ​become poorer and poorer in an increasingly rich society, and wealth would be concentrated in fewer hands until the situation becomes untenable. The legality, the necessity of a gradual development by the aid of democracy, failed to exercise a moderating influence upon those who had imbibed the hope of the revolution which alone could bestow all blessings together with their mother's milk.
He who announced the revolution as principle, but who trembled at the psychological moment when the masses believed that the revolution alone could succeed, lost his influence very rapidly. The authority of Lenin and Trotzki, the first socialists who gained really great successes and who controlled the social revolution in a great State victoriouslv during a long period of time, is far more weighty than the authority of the revolutionary whose words are but printed wisdom and who preached moderation at the decisive moment. The doctrine of the Russian apostles is so simple that anyone can understand it. It is the same as the essence of any other Parliamentary battle. Ote toi que je m'v mette. Hitherto the bourgeoisie had exercised its tyranny. It had exploited the working classes and finally perpetrated the war. For this they had to be punished. Their power had to be broken. It was necessary to occupy their position and to rule in their stead. Even if it is impossible to obtain ideal circumstances in the midst of the ruins that the war had created, it would nevertheless be an enormous step towards the goal if labour could obtain control. If the ​opportunity is missed, when will it ever return again? When will the army be disbanded, when will the arms be in the hands of the working classes, when will the bourgeois deserve his punishment to such a degree as now, after the heaven-crying sins of the European War?
The dominion of the Romanoffs, the Habsburgs and the Hohenzollern, collapsed like a house of cards. Anyone who is not prepared to seize opportunity by the forelock and to forge the iron while it is hot is a coward and a traitor, and does not deserve the confidence of the proletariat. This method of argument was ably applied by the Russian rouble, which was placed at the disposal of propaganda purposes. The personal apostles of the great prophets, the Russian prisoners, spread the true word in great numbers.
And nobody can be found who is capable of setting a goal to this progress of disruption! The Government commands no respect. Their popularity buried Franchet d'Esperay in Belgrade. If the Entente does not come to their assistance, their position is untenable because the basis of their existence was the assumption that the Entente extended their sympathy to them.
No sooner had Karolyi failed to bring about a satisfactory peace, when the armistice conditions of Diaz were considerably increased in Belgrade, and he was once again without prestige and dependent upon his old allies, that is to say, upon that minority which was almost completely isolated from the rest of the nation. Nothing but success could have saved Karolyi. Instead ​of success, he met with one defeat after another. He heaped error upon error. His attempts to create a revolutionary diplomacy ended in unparalleled disgrace. Poor, wretched, vanquished Hungary wanted to create a new fashion: she thought to impose female ambassadors upon foreign Governments without their consent. This attempt, of course, failed, and its only result was that all contact between us and foreign countries ceased. While German and Austrian diplomacy were gaining ground, our new pledged and accepted diplomacy registered nothing but losses.
The complete uncertainty of the future heightened the general state of nervousness. The more the enemy penetrated into our country, the more was the disbandment of our army regarded in ever-increasing circles as a terrible crime. The Government clutched at every straw that offered, and began to contradict itself. The Government started with ultra-pacifist principles, and now it spoke once more of war and integrity; it disbanded the existing army, and now set about organizing a new one. The best possible peace was expected from this Government, and it became apparent that they were committing the nation to a hopeless war.
There was only one way out of the morass into which we had fallen: hard, serious and untiring work; but the desire to work was completely lacking. The large majority had given up regular work during the war. They wanted to rest after the excitement and the weariness of the centuries. The apostles of the revolution had promised them comfort and even luxury, and the ​men expected it, but instead they found disorder everywhere, and they even had to suffer from the insufficiency of the necessities of life. The spirit of the revolution also reduced the desire for work, which was but faint anyhow. The masses wanted to acquire comfort, not by means of work but by means of the division of property. There was no discipline and no police. Robbery was easy and became general. The social doctrines of the day demanded communal property, but the Hungarian farmer wanted to know nothing of this; quite on the contrary, he did not only wish to retain his own soil, but he wanted to acquire the soil of others as well. In certain places this opposition led to encounters. The miners took possession by violence. It had often been proclaimed "the land for the people," and the people now wanted to take possession of the land instantly. They refused to wait any longer; their patience was exhausted. But how were they to take it without stealing? The bold spirits who had made these promises were now in power and were unable to keep their word. They had raised hope and expectation to the utmost limit, and were now unable to satisfy either. For this reason they lost the trust that had been placed in them, and the more they had promised, the more did they lose respect. The provinces, the open country, also fell a prey to anarchy. Political discussion, the convening of meetings, and the drawing up of political demands, engaged the time that should have been spent upon agriculture. The problem of unemployment exercised a depressing effect ​everywhere. Unemployment had either to be compensated in money, or the new régime would lose the support of the people and risk serious unrest.
The disgraceful murder of Stefan Tisza on the first day of the revolution, together with the fact that no search was made for the culprit, and that it was not even demanded, destroyed public safety. Who was sure of his life if such a deed remained unavenged? Power and influence, therefore, gradually fell into the hands of the Left party.
This tendency could only have been counteracted by great determination and energy. In Germany, where the revolution had formerly given the sole control to the Social Democratic Party, and where no agreement was reached between it and the bourgeois parties, the new elements that wielded power were yet able to preserve social order better than in Hungary. The majority of socialists in Germany saw that it would be wrong to abuse the possibility which the revolution offered, and that they must not base the future upon violence, but they must regard the nation as the source of their power, and that they must give the nation an opportunity immediately of making felt its opinion. After some hesitation they broke completely with those who planned the social revolution according to the Russian pattern, and they preserved their army carefully. Hindenburg continued to remain their leader. Moreover, the elections were treated seriously. The Social Democrats did not pretend to be the nation; they were determined to honour the result of the elections, ​even if they did not gain a majority. The hesitation they displayed at the beginning had to be paid for with the price of blood later on, but they nevertheless secured their success. The Sparticists were beaten, the election proceeded, and Germany was in a position to conclude peace. The party lost sole control, but secured for itself a permanent and justified influence, because that influence was founded upon the proper basis of the execution of their duty.
The revolution broke out here as well as in Germany because the leading strata of society had sustained a nervous shock and had dropped the sword. In Germany, however, this sword was picked up again by a powerful hand, whereas in our case it was left in the dust. In Germany they did not permit any experiments with the body of the nation. A disciplined power, full of political traditions, took over control and proved itself worthy of this tradition. This power disposed over a developed governmental mind, and had the courage also to be unpopular. In our case, however, a small faction without political tradition or experience gained the upper hand, whose governmental spirit was substituted by a spirit of anarchy. The competition for the applause of the extremists was continued. There was not sufficient courage to protect public interests. Extreme elements gained control whose purpose it was to retain the minority in power without the consent of the nation. The number of Social Democrats in the Government grew gradually, and their party gained strength throughout the country. ​Their members were drawn from the camp of numerous and able opportunists who never lent a helping hand during distress, but who created, at a time when fortune favoured them, a dangerous feeling of false power which is eagerly revenged.
The party leaders of the Socialists were blinded and intoxicated by their fictitious power, and lost their ability of judgment and their self-control. There was no serious determination among them to place the nation's fate into the nation's hands. This fact became obvious when, after considerable hesitation, the Government proclaimed the date of the next election, and the Social Democratic party was bold enough to say that they would not submit to the judgment of the people.
The increase of the Radical elements paralysed the determination of those who were more conservatively minded, and they believed that the time for the world revolution had come, and that it was in Hungary's interests. The idea gained popularity that peace with the Entente could not be concluded by those men who had initiated the negotiations, but by the Social Democrats. The general nervousness and the lack of energy of the protectors of law and order, which had placed Karolyi at the head of affairs, now favoured the Kunfis and the Kuns.
If the Government, however, has not got the courage to enter into the battle against the destructive elements, then the Government cannot be replaced by anything or by anyone in this matter. No matter how weak the ​Government may be, it can only be turned out by a new revolution. There is no electoral body which can control or defeat the Government by a vote. Furthermore, it was quite impossible to organize an opposition. There was no freedom of the press because the press was partially paralysed by the violence of the actual printers, and partially by the violence of the Government. Moreover, the liberty to call meetings had ceased to exist also. The bourgeosie had no weapons. No free political expression of opinion was possible in view of the fact that houses were searched, arrests made, and terrorism reigned supreme. It was regarded as a crime of the first order for a body to express its distrust in the Government, although this body was undoubtedly entitled to do so and had always exercised this right, and they had often done so at the instigation of those parties who now regarded such action as counter-revolutionary. The only energy that was displayed was directed against the bourgeosie. Any sign of life on their part was regarded as counter-revolution. The Communists, on the other hand, continued their evil work without impediment. Apart from the Social Democratic workmen, only the Communists possessed arms. Greater political activity and a wider organization were only possible within the Social Democratic party. The power of the Government was only limited by the Soldiers and Workmen's Councils and by the armed Communists. As soon as a Minister for War made an attempt to re-establish discipline (Bartha Sestetich) and to organize an army which was ​to obey the Government and not the party, the soldiers revolted, the Minister for War was made to resign, or, rather, he was chased from his office. The army organized itself on a social democratic basis, and only members of the party were accepted into the service. Militarism took its most dangerous form because the army directed our policy, formed Governments and defeated them, and used grenades and bayonets in place of arguments and discussion. By this method the dictatorship of the proletariat was prepared, whose first condition, according to the theory of Lenin, is the disarming of the bourgeoisie and the arming of the workmen.
From this moment on the catastrophe was inevitable. The country was unable to help itself. The only help that could serve any purpose would have been for the mission of the Entente, for their own protection, to concentrate so powerful a military force in Budapest as would be in a position to protect the National Assembly against the terrorism of the mob as well as to preserve law and order. I tried to do everything imaginable to point to the truth of this fact in Paris. In vain! Independent Hungary within its own narrow borders, which had been set up for it, was of little interest to the statesmen of the Entente, who were occupied with the great world problems. The first mutiny that was instigated in the interests of the Soviet caused the downfall of the Government. Forty-two leaders were arrested, but this victory was unable to arrest the process of disruption. Even in Russia, ​Kerenski gained the victory over Lenin before the latter could gain the upper hand. The weak attitude of the victor soon furnished proof that the vanquished represented a great power, and that circumstances were in his favour. The Government hastened to inform those who were arrested that they would not be treated as criminals but as counter-revolutionaries. People who had instigated murder, theft and robbery, were to be treated in the same way as those who attempted to form an opposition during an election for the restitution of law and order, from which it was obvious that the first-named were regarded with fear and trembling. The prisoners were allowed to have intercourse in prison with their partisans.
Such was the position when the Government, under pressure of the passive resistance of society and the pressure of the Entente, recognized its position to be untenable. The French military plenipotentiary, Vix, desired to lay down a line of demarcation that was unfavourable to us. The Government did not dare to shoulder the responsibility either of accepting or refusing these conditions, and wanted to give way to a purely social democratic government, whose ostensible purpose was the refusal of the demands of the Entente and the preparation of armed resistance. The decision of the Government was logical to the extent that the power was already de facto exclusively in the hands of the Social Democrats, and that there was no real power behind the bourgeois elements of the Cabinet of Karolyi. When these bourgeois elements ​left the Government, nothing but the appearance was changed, and those who were actually in possession of power should have taken over the responsibility completely. The new Government could have counted upon support with greater certainty, as it was completely composed of members of the predominant party. The idea of armed resistance, however, was not logical and wrong. It was impossible to shake off the consequences of the sins that had been perpetrated already. Those who did not want to see any more Hungarian soldiers had, therefore, to see all the more Serbian, Roumanian and Bohemian ones.
The list of the sins of the Government was increased by the fact that this armed resistance fell to that portion of social democracy which was attempting to get into touch with the Internationale and with Russia. The disarmed State could not quarrel with the armed Entente, and the Social Democratic Party could do this least of all in the interests of the nation of Hungary. Social democracy could, at most, enter the fight on behalf of the programme of the Internationale against the bourgeoisie of Europe on the grounds of fundamental principles, but they could not do so for the integrity of the Hungarian soil. Even during imprisonment (March 11) the Social Democrats agreed with the Communists that they would cease to pursue the so-called policy of integrity.
It was settled, however, that the Hungarian people had to endure all sufferings. Hungary, which bled from a thousand wounds, had to enter a new fight and ​receive new wounds, but not for the protection of her own existence, but in the interests of an idea of which the enormous majority of the nation wanted to hear nothing, and whose victory would have buried for ever the independence and the State of Hungary. Hungary had to bleed for a mortal excrescence of the world's catastrophe: Bolshevism.
Social Democracy was cautious enough to deny itself the pleasure of accepting this heroic part. Oppressed on the one hand by the Communists, and on the other by the bourgeois party, without an army and without money, they did not wish to shoulder the responsibility which even the Government of Karolyi had refused to accept. The Social Democrats were afraid that the lot of Kerenski might also fall to them: for Kerenski had failed because he was forced, in opposition to his own pacifist principles, to enter into a war when he was called upon to do so by the Communists. The Social Democratic Party was only too anxious not to deny this problem to the Communist Kunfi, and the Social Democratic candidate for the Presidency released Bela Kun, and handed over the Government to him, together with the enforced blessing of Karolyi, on March 22. He really had nothing to lose. Anyone who gained power from prison cannot afford to be particular with regard to the moment of his election.
The bourgeois members of Berinky's Cabinet were convinced that a Social Democratic Cabinet would succeed him. And they all agreed to this, including the leaders of the Social Democrats. After the last Cabinet meeting, one of the bourgeois ministers, the ​Minister for Agriculture, was stopped by soldiers and ejected from his motor. The minister protested in vain, and it was in vain that he referred to his position. The Red soldiers referred him to the command of the Soviet Government which had been constituted in the meantime, and removed the minister without further ado from his car. Hy this means the minister was informed that the revolution, which was inevitable, had entered upon its last and destructive phase, because nothing had been done to arrest it, and everything had been done to further it.
The Social Democratic Party and the Communists, who had hitherto fought each other for power, now joined hands and formed the Soviet Government together. It is to be assumed that the non-Communistic Social Democrats thought that they would exercise a moderating influence. Their assumption, however, was totally erroneous. The same thing had to happen as occurred when Karolyi controlled the Government and Karolyi and his people had to swim with the general stream. It was they who took over the part of Karolyi and his followers, and it was they who served as the protection for the most violent extremists. They lost their respect and their political position because they did not dare to go their own way.
The October revolution, which was a manifestation of hysteria, brought men with diseased minds to the forefront. The second revolution, however, produced lunatics and criminals.
Once more I directed my importunate request to the Entente that they should interfere and prevent other​wise inevitable bloodshed, and prevent furthermore the destruction of property and values whose consequences they would have to bear as well as ourselves. However, I strove in vain once more. Nevertheless, it would have been easy to frustrate the constitution of a Soviet Government. A small military force would have been sufficient to frighten the Communist leaders. The French troops in Southern Hungary did not cost the Entente a penny less than they would have done in Budapest. The danger of infection was greater round about the origin of the revolution in consequence of their inaction, than the danger for the troops of the Entente would have been on the ruins of the revolution itself, on account of the fact that their military duties would have employed them. If we had been satisfied at that time that the nation would obtain bearable conditions of peace, almost the whole of Hungary would have been solidly behind the Entente. Instead of this, the Entente only assisted in making the Soviet régime more secure. For the first time they sent a leading statesman to Budapest. The South African politician, Smuts, recognized at once that it was impossible to come to an agreement with Kun and his followers, because Kun understood by "peace" the freedom to continue his revolutionary propaganda. Even then it would have been easy to deduce the consequences of experience and to occupy Budapest.
The Entente, however, did not move a finger. The Soviet Republic became established, and we were faced by new tortures in the future.