# Transcribed Interview of Kashyap Pramod Patel, (December 9, 2021)/1:05pm

Layout 2
​[1:05 p.m.]
    BY :
Q Okay. Just let me make sure I'm clear with what you are saying. It is your memory that the President authorized to Secretary Miller, understanding the chain of command, 10,000 to 20,000 troops to be on standby? Available? What terminology would you use?
A So, legally—and I haven't talked to DOD General Counsel in some time, and 9 a lot of the notes that you provided, the DOD General Counsel exchanges, have been completely redacted. But it's not a standard; it's a legal issue that we have to follow.
If we were going to ever utilize the National Guard—and that's not just during that time; any time, any Secretary of Defense—the President has to authorize, step one. If he doesn't do so, the Governor of State X can ask for 5 or 5 million, and it doesn't matter how many times he asks, the law forbids—my understanding—the Department of Defense from mobilizing the National Guard.
Q So, under that analysis of the chain of command, what action did Acting Secretary Miller take upon hearing this?
A He knew, I believe—and, you know, you can ask Chris, but my take on that was, we had step one of the two-step legal process from the President to say, I am authorizing X if you need it.
So the Secretary of Defense then makes a decision on whether or not requests come in, and, if they are legally satisfied, talk to the DOD General Counsel, then they come in and work out the numbers.
And I think that's what—I believe that's what Acting Secretary Miller took away from that conversation.
​Q Let me just finish reading the rest of that paragraph. And I have the article here, but—
A Yeah, if you don't mind.
Q —it says—
A Could we get a copy?
Q Sure.
It states—let me read the full thing—Trump says: You're going to need 10,000 people.
Miller responds: Maybe, but, you know, someone is going to have to ask for it.
A Okay.
Q So correct me if I'm wrong, but, in that exchange, it sounds like that's not an order from the President to Acting Secretary Miller—
A Well, I think—
Q —if the response is, "Maybe, but, you know, someone is going to have to ask for it," meaning "You haven't asked for it, President Trump."
A So what I take away from that—
Q There's the article.
Mr. Sofer. We have it.
Oh, okay.
The Witness. What I take away from that is—I don't know about this issuing orders or not. And having known Acting Secretary Miller and worked for him, was that Acting Secretary Miller—and he'd be the best person to talk to—knew that he needed a Presidential authorization per our communication with DOD General Counsel and their communications with the White House Counsel, that unless the President said X number is authorized, then we could not mobilize any number.
​So I'm not sure the article is exactly accurate to its verbiage and quoting, but for purposes of this illustration, we'll say it is. And, based on that, I believe Acting Secretary Miller took away that he had one of the two steps satisfied lawfully to mobilize the National Guard if a request was then made by law enforcement or a Governor or a mayor.
. So—
The Witness. It's not a—I don't think it's an order, but that's my estimation.
. Okay. So your perception of this conversation wasn't that it was an order for 10,000—I'll let your attorney finish talking.
[Discussion off the record.]
The Witness. Yeah. As I said earlier, I don't believe that the verbiage in the Vanity Fair article is accurate word for word. But what you're asking, I believe—and tell me if I'm wrong—is whether or not any orders were issued on that day that I can recall.
I don't recall, from the best of my memory, not the article, any orders being issued. But what I recall is authorizations being made for the mobilization of Guard should it be deemed necessary by law enforcement and Governors.
    BY :
Q Okay. That's helpful.
Do you remember if the President mentioned anything that he may need these troops to protect the Trump people?
A I don't recall him ever saying that.
Q So, just to take what you said about this not being orders, so was there any action that was taken based upon this conversation as you remember it?
A As I remember of what happens when, anytime there's an authorization, as this was, for National Guard from the President of the United States, the chain of command is the Secretary of Defense to the Secretary of the Army. The National Guard ​reports to the Secretary of the Army, as does the commanding general of the National Guard.
That information was then, from my memory, taken and given to Secretary McCarthy, who was the Secretary of the Army, so that he would know that if—because that's where the two points meet. That's where the two authorizations meet. The Presidential authorization meets the authorization from the field. The Mayor, in this case, would call Secretary McCarthy and say, I need—and I'm making up numbers—1,000 guardsmen and -women for X, Y, and Z.
Secretary of the Army McCarthy would then know, I'm authorized up to 20,000; I can go ahead and mobilize that once I get the okay from the Secretary of Defense.
Q Got it.
Do you remember if General Milley was at this conversation?
A Sorry. Which one?
Q The January 5th, this conversation regarding the 10,000 troops.
A To the best of my memory, we usually were in those Oval Office meetings with a number of folks, so it was a—he could've been. I just don't recall.
Q Do you recall a request for 10,000 troops by President Trump ever being conveyed to Speaker Pelosi?
A Did I do it to Speaker Pelosi?
Q Did you or do you know if anyone—
A I don't believe I ever said that. But, from the best of my memory, there were calls on January 6 between leadership, which I was privy to, and the Speaker. It may have come up. We fielded a lot of calls that day from congressional leadership.
Q Uh-huh.
A It might—if it's mentioned in the timeline, that's what I would say is the best ​recollection. If it's not, there's documents underlying the timeline that the Department has that may have captured the details of those calls.
Q But do you remember ever a request from President Trump for 10,000 troops being conveyed to Speaker Pelosi?
A I wouldn't—
Q It wouldn't make sense given the chain of command that you described, but I'm just asking.
A It's possible that the Acting Secretary and the Chairman, Chairman Milley, informed the Speaker of the House that we were authorized up to X. That's certainly possible. And, having worked with those two individuals, they were prudent men and it seemed that they probably would have notified them. But you'd have to ask them.
# # # # # # # # nmmmm— — —. , do you have anything?
# # # # # # nmm— — —. Yeah.
The Witness. Do you mind if we take a bio break?
# # # # # # nmm— — —. Of course.
The Witness. Thanks.
[Recess.]
    BY :
Q So, Mr. Patel, let me just pick up where left off. And, just putting aside the Vanity Fair article, all the emails, tell us what you remember about that January 5th meeting, or thereabouts, the meeting that started with Iran and then ended up with some discussion of January 6th.
A Yeah. So, just to couch that—
Mr. Jensen. I apologize, I cannot hear.
# # # # # # nmm— — — Oh, sorry.
​# # # # # # # # nmmmm— — —. Sorry, Jeff, we had not unmuted. I'll restate.
Mr. Jensen. Thank you.
# # # # # # # # nmmmm— — —. We're back on the record.
    BY :
Q Yeah, Mr. Patel, I understand that there's been some reporting about this meeting, and you gave us some helpful information about it. I just want to set that aside and ask you what you recall, not about the Iran stuff, but anything that anyone, the President or others, said about January 6th during that meeting, whatever date it was.
A As best as I can recall, it's what I told co-counsel just before we broke. I don't think that I have any additional memory of that as I sit here, but I'm happy to look at anything you guys want me to.
Q We don't have anything else to show you. I just—whatever you recall.
There was some reference in the article, for instance, to 10,000 to 20,000 troops. What do you remember about how that came up, who said it, what was discussed?
A Yeah, and I will rely on what I told co-counsel, not to provide a duplicative record, but, basically, the sum and substance is, there was a conversation that there was an authorization by the President of the United States for 10,000 to 20,000. That's what I remember because it's the important step one of the authorization process.
Q Uh-huh. Yeah.
A Outside of that, it was—I will say this, without getting into details: It was an extensive classified conversation about a number of other topics.
Q I appreciate that.
A We were there for a while.
Q Yeah. Okay. So the topic of 10,000 to 20,000 troops being potentially on the streets the next day or a couple of days later, kind of a big deal, right?
​A So, just to clarify, it's 10,000 to 20,000 across America.
Q Okay.
A It was an authorization for anybody—
Q Yeah.
A —if there was civil unrest anywhere.
Q Yeah. So, again, was there more information as to why that number was appropriate or what might happen that would give rise to the need from anyone during that meeting?
A I don't—I don't remember. Maybe the Acting Secretary and the Chairman have a different—maybe.
A lot of times, in these meetings, just for an example, not talking subjects, there would be groups of individuals in the Oval and there would be side conversations sometimes, depending on the topic or depending on what was going on. So I can't pinpoint that one meeting, and I don't know if that happened or not in that meeting. But that's my recollection, is that was the authorization for 10,000 to 20,000.
Q Let's separate it from that meeting. What do you remember at any time the President saying about January 6th, expectations about what might happen in the days before January 6th?
A So, from my understanding and my memory—
[Discussion off the record.]
    BY :
Q Right. I understand you have a continuing privilege assertion but are nonetheless willing to talk about it.
A Yeah. So, just let me say, I'm prepared—so the question appears to implicate core executive privilege concerns. I'm prepared to answer it, but I want the ​record to reflect my serious concerns about congressional overreach.
Q Appreciate that.
A Thank you.
Q Yeah.
A And so I believe you asked, outside of Jan. 5, any other meetings—
Q Yeah.
A —that I have a recollection about anything Jan.-6-related, let's say, with the President.
Q Yeah.
A To the best of my memory, my interactions with the President in and about January 6th, around that time period, that I can recall was the authorization for 10,000 to 20,000.
As I best remember, he and I did not have substantive conversations about other things on January 26 that did not involve the Department of Defense's role—sorry, Jan. 6th, not the 26th.
Q Okay.
Separate from your direct communication with the President, what did you expect, in your role as chief of staff to the Acting Secretary of Defense, was the threat landscape or might happen on January 6th justifying the deployment of the National Guard?
A So, from my opinion, the advice that I would give would be based on the intelligence that was coming in. I haven't seen or looked at intelligence in a long time—
Q I'm just asking you what you remember.
A Yes.
Q What was coming that justified the deployment of National Guardsmen on ​the streets of Washington, D.C.?
A What was common?
Q Coming. What was expected to happen that would justify the deployment of National Guard troops?
A We had a request that I remember—we had a request from late December from the Mayor, so we knew that was coming.
Q Uh-huh.
A And the Department was aware that January 6th was the certification date. And what I remember generally is that law enforcement had said, there may—could be—a possibility of some unrest.
And so, in preparation, what I remember is the authorization for up to 10,000 to 20,000. That's not to say we were going to use that many.
Q Tell us more about the unrest. What did you hear about from any source about what that might be?
A I don't recall hearing anything personally about it. And, outside of the intelligence at the time that we were provided, which I can't recall now, I don't remember anything.
Q You have no recollection, as you sit here, of any of the intelligence that gave rise to the request for National Guard on January the 6th?
A Personally?
Q Yes.
A If you could show me, I'm happy to read it, but I don't have an independent memory, other than law enforcement saying there could be unrest. That's what I recall.
Q Just to be clear, that's all? You don't remember anything else about the specifics of what that unrest might entail—the numbers, the specific groups involved, ​anything like that?
A I don't have an independent memory of that, but—
Q Despite the fact that, the next day, people rioted at the United States Capitol, you have no recollection, sir, of—
Mr. Glabe. I think he's answered it, like, three times the same way.
# # # # # # nmm— — —. Let me just ask it again.
The Witness. Okay.
    BY :
Q You have no recollection of any of the intelligence, other than some generalized threat that there could be unrest, as you sit here today?
A How my memory operates, if you showed me the underlying intelligence, I could probably jog my memory. But, a year later, do I have an independent memory of anything outside of what I've stated? I do not remember at this time.
Q How about the summer of 2020? asked you some questions about the impact that the summer protests had on preparation. Right now, separate from any email, separate from any document, what do you remember about how what happened in the summer impacted preparations for January 6th?
[Discussion off the record.]
The Witness. So, at that time, in the summer of 2020, I was deputy assistant to the President and senior director for counterterrorism. So that was my focus.
    BY :
Q I understand.
A So what I remember? I remember the media and the Lafayette Square incident. Of course, I remember the media's portrayal of it, and I remember the video and the walk-across. I don't recall having conversations with intel or DOD at that time, ​and—
Q That's not my question. My question is, in January, the first few days of January of 2021—
A Uh-huh.
Q —you're the chief of staff to the Secretary of Defense. Was there any discussion that you recall about what happened in the summer impacting preparations, DOD preparations, for what was coming on January 6th?
A So I believe I addressed that, so I'll refer back to that answer. But, to address your question again, I rely on what I previously stated. But do I recall conversations about the summer in early January?
Q Yes.
A I recall some conversations with leadership at the Department that it came up. The specifics I do not recall.
Q Okay. Again, as you sit here today, no recollection of any of the specifics of how the summer protest events impacted the Defense Department's preparation?
A I think as I stated earlier, what I do remember is that the senior leadership that was in place at the Department of Defense reminded senior leadership that was then in place of lessons learned. And whatever those lessons learned were documented by us in our recording—in our reportings, excuse me. And so, outside of that, I don't have any other independent memory of not using anything else.
Q What were the lessons learned?
A You'd have to ask the people that were there—
Q I'm asking you, Mr. Patel.
A Well, I wasn't there.
Q In your mind, what were the lessons learned from the summer that affected ​preparations for January 6th?
A The biggest lesson in my mind—
Q Yes.
A —is that the Members of Congress did not want an arms display, for lack of a better word, on National Guardsmen and -women ever. That's my recollection.
Q Okay.
A —looking back at the arc of this entire thing—
Q Great.
A Now, that's what the number one—I wouldn't call it number one—that was a lesson learned that I recall other folks saying, but that's about it.
Q And how did that relate to the summer of 2020?
A I'm not sure. What do you mean?
Q What do you recall—you said Members of Congress didn't want an armed display. How does that in some way—again, your recollection—reach back to what happened in the summer of 2020?
A I think it stems from, I believe, Chairman Milley at the time walked across Lafayette Square with a sidearm holstered on his military uniform. I believe that's what that reference was to. And Chairman Milley would have a better idea of those conversations because it impacted him directly.
Q I'm not asking you to look inside of Chairman Milley or anybody else's mind. I'm just asking you, in your role as a high-level official in the Department of Defense, how the summer events affected preparation for the riot at the Capitol.
A Look, I believe I've answered it. I mean, if you would like, we can again look at things that can help to jog my memory, but I believe I've answered your question.
Q You have no independent recollection beyond the stuff, the documents, that ​we've provided you—
Mr. Glabe. Respectfully, you've asked him the same question in slightly different ways five or six times. He's testified to what he remembers, his best recollection. He's talked about what he doesn't recall, but—and I understand that you may wish that he recalled more, but he's answered the question, like, five times.
    BY :
Q I'm just trying to pinpoint whether you have any independent recollection beyond the documents that you've been provided to review today.
A Beyond the documents that I've been directed to review, beyond whatever was provided, and beyond whatever I've already said, outside of that, I don't have an independent recollection.
Q Okay. I thought that's what you said. Thank you.
    BY :
Q Okay. Let's start on January 6th, on the day of.
A Uh-huh.
Q When did you first learn about the—any type of escalation of violence at the Capitol?
A I'm not sure. I think it's detailed in the timeline I provided you, so I would say whatever that timeline says is the appropriate answer.
    BY :
Q Well, the timeline's not just your memory, though, right? Without the timeline, do you remember when you first learned on that day that there was a breach at the Capitol?
A I believe late morning, early afternoon, from the best of my memory, is that on TV—and there's TVs on at the Department of Defense, and there was a showing by video cameras that people were marching towards the Capitol. So whenever that was, in and around that time is when we saw it.
Q "We" meaning who?
A Whoever was in the Office of the Secretary of Defense where the TVs were on.
Q And do you remember listening to President Trump's speech that day?
A I don't. I believe I was working on a number of other things.
Q Did you speak to anybody—after you saw the march up to the Capitol, what happened next, from your memory?
A As best as I can recall, there was a lot of phone call activity that started happening. We tried to divvy up the work as best we could to be responsive to Congress, to public affairs, to the White House.
So I don't have an independent memory of exactly everybody that I did talk to, but, as chief of staff of the Department of Defense, I know I reached out to the chief of staff of the White House at some point during that day.
Q Okay. Do you remember—Chief of Staff Mark Meadows, do you remember how many times you spoke to him?
A It was at least once, and it was, from my memory, maybe up to three times, ​but I'm not sure.
Q Can you describe the first time? Do you remember what time period that would've been, the first time you—did you reach out to him, or did he reach out to you?
A I don't remember. We had a line of communication that was open through cables in WHSR for lots of activity, so I don't—my best guess is that he reached out or I reached out right around the time we saw a crowd gathering around the House. I think that would be the timing.
Q And what was the substance of that conversation?
A I believe the Acting Secretary or someone had said, "Let's make sure we're in touch with the White House." And that was the sum and substance of it. And I probably, in my role, said, "Let me call Chief Meadows."
And I said, "Hello. Are you aware that this is going on? Please let us know if there's any information you'd like passed on to the Secretary and the Chairman." I believe that's what I would've done.
Q Was that from your personal cell phone to Mark Meadows, or was that from—
A We have a—so the whole Office of the Secretary of Defense is a giant SCIF, a secure compartmented information facility. And, in my office, fortunately, we had a system in place where you could directly call through DOD—what we call DOD cables—the White House Situation Room and/or to the chief of staff's office so that we could communicate directly.
So I'm guessing—my practice was to use that system. And, since it was a SCIF, there was no phone—cell phones allowed in the SCIF, personal cell phones of any kind in the SCIF.
Q So you said there was up to three calls. So that first call was when you said ​there was the crowd gathering. Was that had they breached at that point? What—
A I'm not sure.
Q When you look back, though, what would trigger that first call to Mark Meadows?
A As I said, my best guess, my best estimate is probably I saw what was going down. I was with the Chairman and the Acting Secretary of Defense, amongst other people. And we were figuring out what DOD's responsibilities should be on that day and who should be in touch with who. So they probably said to me, "Let's make sure the White House"—and I have an open line of communication.
Q And what was the response from Mark Meadows?
A I believe it was, "Yeah, thanks for the call. Let us," the White House, "know if you need anything." And I said the same.
And I said, "We have a number of other calls to make," as calls began coming in from congressional leadership and other interagencies, so I don't believe it was an extensive phone call.
Q What was the the tone of that call?
A I'm sorry?
Q What was the tone of that call? When you see the crowd going towards the Capitol, whether the breach had happened or not, was there a sense of urgency in the call?
A I'm not sure. I don't recall anyone yelling, if that's what you're asking. I think we relayed the information, and he relayed it to me, and we moved on.
Q So you say to Mark Meadows, "Let us know if you need anything," and he says back, "Let us know if you need anything"? Sorry, I got a little confused there as to—
A My habit—because I don't have an independent memory of that phone ​call—my habit would've been—I'm with the Acting Secretary of Defense and the Chairman and others at DOD. We want to make sure we are giving the White House everything they need. And do you, the White House, have any questions for DOD?
That's usually how we did things outside of Jan. 6th or involving Jan. 6th to make sure we had a line to the chain of command.
Q Well, was there a request from the White House?
A I don't recall that there was any request from the White House specifically, other than to do what we discussed earlier, which was things related to the National Guard.
Q So how about in the subsequent calls? Was there ever any specific request from the White House?
A When you say "request," like, what do you mean? Like, are you working the National Guard? What's going on? What's the status of that? Or—
Q Well, you tell me. I don't know. When you say there wasn't a request, what was the context of the conversation?
A The context was, as best I can recall, was: Chief of Staff Meadows, we have the authorization from prior communication with the President from the day or so ago before. We have additional requests that came in throughout the day—I'm not sure of the timing—from the Mayor and other offices that we were fielding.
So I was keeping him up to date of that order of events as best as I could. It was not an extensive phone call. We had to focus on mobilizing, employing, and deploying the National Guard.
Q But was there ever a request made from Mark Meadows to move the National Guard to the Capitol?
A I don't believe so, because I don't know what I would've done with such a ​request. It's not up to—it's not up to him.
Q Okay. So, taking out—was there any urgency conveyed as to, "We're in the middle of a crisis here, and what are you guys doing?" meaning you, Kash Patel, as a high official at DOD?
A Yeah, I mean, I remember the chief just being like, "Do whatever you need to do. Respond to congressional requests. Get the National Guard where they need to be. Respond to the Mayor." "Thanks. Check. Let me go do it."
Q Are you saying, when you say "the chief," do you mean from the DOD side, or are you talking about Mark Meadows?
A Chief of Staff Meadows.
Q And that's what you remember from those calls?
A Yeah. They weren't—as I said, they weren't long. They were sort of updates and "get the job done."
Q Was there anyone else you spoke to at the White House?
Mr. Glabe. On January 6th?
    BY :
Q On January 6th.
A Maybe, but I don't remember. I probably fielded on that day at least 50 phone calls and up to 100, I'm guessing.
Q Well, did you speak to Keith Kellogg?
A General Kellogg was at the time the Vice President's National Security Advisor, and we served on the National Security Council together. So it's possible that General Kellogg called me or I called him. He was a representative of the Vice President. So it's definitely possible.
Q It's reported in the press that Meadows didn't understand what the delay ​with the National Guard is, so Keith Kellogg reached out to you—
A Uh-huh.
Q —and stated, "What the hell are you guys doing? Meadows is furious that the Guard is not moving."
Mr. Glabe. Sorry, is there a particular—
The Witness. Yeah.
# # # # # # # # nmmmmm— — —. This is from Peril. I don't have a page number.
The Witness. I don't know what that is.
    BY :
Q Do you have any recollection of that at all?
A No.
Q Did anyone convey to you that there was an urgency to move the National Guard, from the White House? From any of those calls from anybody at the White House, did anyone convey a concern about the timing of the National Guard?
A Not a concern. I think that the sum and substance of those conversations was: Employ, deploy, and mobilize the National Guard. Do it.
Q And when it did not happen over—and we'll go through the 2-1/2-hour period of time—
A Okay.
Q —was there an urgency that increased from those phone calls?
A There was a—I don't believe there was an urgency. We had what we needed from the White House to deploy and employ the National Guard. We were fielding requests from the field throughout the country for the National Guard. So we were putting that all together.
Q When you say "we," though, you're not fielding all the calls from across the ​country; you're fielding calls from the White House, as you said, correct?
A We were collectively fielding a lot of calls that day. There was a lot of joint calls. There was a lot of—a bunch of singular calls. So—
Q But you, Kash Patel, were receiving calls from Mark Meadows and from Keith Kellogg.
A I believe that's correct, yeah.
Q Well, that's what you just said.
A Yeah.
Q Was there anyone else from the White House that reached out to you?
A I don't—not that I can recall.
Q Did Tony Ornato ever reach out to you?
A Being the deputy chief of staff to Mark Meadows, he probably did. He—
Q On January 6th?
A Tony and I—Mr. Ornato and I have worked together for a long time, and so it's possible he also reached out.
I'm telling you, I can't remember every phone call I had. If there's something you can show me, like a call log, that says I talked to them, maybe I can narrow it down.
Q Did you talk to the President at all during January 6th?
A I don't believe that the President President Trump and I spoke on January 6th. That's my memory.
Q Do you not believe—wouldn't you remember if the President reached out to you on January 6th?
A Not necessarily. But I'm telling you, I don't remember him doing so, and I don't remember calling him on January 6th.
Q When you say "not necessarily," there's an attack on the Capitol, and he is ​the President of the United States.
A Okay.
Q You wouldn't remember if you talked to him on January 6th?
[Discussion off the record.]
The Witness. Yeah, as I said, I don't remember having a phone call with the President on January 6th.
    BY :
Q So, Mr. Patel, just so I'm clear, that does not mean you did not have a call with the President on January 6th.
Because if you—you and I could agree that a call from the President of the United States during an attack on the Capitol would be memorable, no?
A To me?
Q To you.
A To me as chief of staff? It might be. I know this might be hard for you to believe, but I talked to the President a number of times. So, any time that the President called, it was a memorable moment. But I don't remember every single phone call I fielded, especially on a day when I fielded upwards of 100 phone calls.
Q So you have no recollection if the President called you or did not call you.
A I believe—as I said, I don't believe we spoke on January 6th.
Q But by saying "I don't believe"—and you've been an attorney, a trial attorney—it's not precluding that you did have a conversation with President Trump.
A And, as I've said, if you show me a call log that says—
Q I don't have to show you a call log for you to jog your memory if you talked to President Trump or not.
Mr. Glabe. Hold on just a second.
​You asked earlier if he spoke to the President on January 5th. You had a record, and he spoke in detail to the best of his recollection about the call—about the meeting on January 5th.
You asked him about January 6th, and he said, to the best of his recollection, he doesn't recall speaking to the President on that day. That's been his answer several times.
    BY :
Q Did Secretary Miller have any contact with President Trump that day?
A I'm not sure. I would imagine he did, but I'm not sure.
Q You're not certain if they—if he reached out to him?
A I'm not sure.
Q You've gone through the authorities, right? You've stated that you didn't need to talk to the President that day.
A Uh-huh. As far as the National Guard was concerned, sure. If we're talking about a different subject, then you'd probably have to talk to the President.
Q Secretary Miller has stated publicly that he did not speak to President Trump that day.
A Yeah.
Q He stated it outright, unlike you, who has not said that outright.
But did you think it was, as you sit here, unusual that the President did not reach out to Secretary Miller?
A I don't think it was unusual.
Q Why not?
A As far as the activities of January 6th are concerned, as I said before, we had our authorization for the deployment, employment, and mobilization of the National ​Guard. The Secretary of Defense, following the chain of command, had what he needed from the White House.
So, as it relates to January 6th, the authorization was there, and the Secretary of the Army was working the separate request from Mayor Bowser and company. So I think that our bulk and the Secretary's work were focused on fulfilling those requests.
Q I understand that he had the authority. But do you see any duty for the Commander in Chief, the President, to reach out to the Acting Secretary Miller during an attack on the seat of democracy?
A Well, I don't—I'm not going to presume what the Presidential duties were on any given day for any President. You can ask them.
Q Presidential duties—
A That's what you just asked me.
Q No, I'm asking you, as the President, when there is an attack on the Capitol, is it unusual for him not to reach out to the Secretary of Defense.
A I don't—
Q If you didn't find it unusual, that's fine. We can move on.
A What I'm telling you is that I don't recall that phone call occurring. You're asking me to characterize a phone call that I don't recall occurring. I can't do that.
Q I'm telling you no such phone call occurred. That's what I'm asking you. I'm telling—
A You're not allowed to testify for me. If you want the record to reflect you're going to answer for me, the record will reflect that.
I've answered your question to the best of my ability and the best of my memory. And I've said repeatedly, if there's something you can show me to jog my memory, I'm happy to look at them, but my answer is not going to change if you keep asking me the ​same question.
Q Let me rephrase my question, first with a statement. There was no call between President Trump and Secretary Miller on January 6th during the attack.
Separate question: Did you find that to be unusual?
A You are telling me that. I don't know that to be true. You said you read it from somewhere about this phone call or lack thereof. I'm telling you, I can't testify to the lack of a phone call that you're reading to me from some transcript or some news article. I don't know where that came from. If you showed me, I would look at it.
Q Were aware of President Trump's tweet at 3:13 during January 6th?
A I don't believe so. I wasn't following. I'm not on Twitter. I've never been on Twitter. I don't even know how to log on to Twitter. So probably not.
Q So I think the big question here is, did you see any role for the President to quell the violence that was going on on January 6th?
A Any role? What do you mean? What are you saying?
Q I mean, should there have been—
[Discussion off the record.]
The Witness. I'm sorry. Go ahead. Should there have been—
    BY :
Q Should he have done anything to quell the violence as your—go ahead.
A I don't know what the President should or shouldn't have done. I know what I was busy doing was mobilizing the National Guard to the various locations we were asked to do it as best as we could and as fast as we could.
Q Were you aware of anyone who attempted to encourage the President to put out a statement or issue a tweet to quell the violence?
A To the best of my memory, I don't know who would do that. So I don't ​recall anyone doing it.
Q Did you make any attempt?
A I don't believe I made any attempt to do that.
Q You don't believe or you didn't?
A I don't believe I made any attempt to do that.
. , do you have anything on that?
. No.
    BY :
Q Were you present for the 2:30 call with General Flynn, General Piatt, General Walker, Chief Contee, and Chief Sund? This is the 2:30 call that's on the DOD timeline in terms of the request for the D.C. National Guard from the Capitol Police.
A Do you know the location of where that call took place?
Q This is the call that—yeah, it's on the timeline, and then, soon after, there's a separate conversation between Secretary Miller, McCarthy, and Milley.
A So what I recall is that I, as chief of staff, was not on any calls with Mayor Bowser. That's my recollection. We left that engagement, and that relationship was under the purview of the Secretary of the Army. That's what I recall. I don't recall ever being on a phone call with Mayor Bowser.
Q Are you familiar with, kind of, the discussion about the call regarding optics between General Flynn, General Piatt, Chief Sund, and Chief Contee?
A I'm not familiar with that.
Q Okay.
You said you had talked to a number of Members of Congressional on January 6th?
A Yes, collectively.
​Q Who did you speak to, if you remember?
A So the conversations were coming in. It would be, generally speaking, myself, the Acting Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
We wanted to make sure we spoke to the Gang of Eight. So, from the best of my memory, we spoke to Senator Schumer, Speaker Pelosi, Senator McConnell, Majority Leader McCarthy, Chairman Schiff, and I know I'm forgetting one or two. But I believe the instructions were to make contact with the Gang of Eight. And, also, they were making contact with us, amongst other Members of Congress as well, heads of the Armed Services Committees and whatnot.
Q And that was set up through DOD to have those conversations, correct, with the Speaker in particular?
A Either we called them or they called us. There were multiple calls happening. So, yeah, it was set up through DOD cables, congressional cables, WHSR, what have you, whoever and however we could get those.
Q Did any Members reach out to you specifically from your past relationships, in terms of calling you at DOD during the crisis?
A I don't remember a conversation where it was just me—just a Member calling me. I don't recall that.
Q I recall speaking to Leader McConnell's—or Senator McConnell's, I think, chief of staff or national security advisor for a brief period of time on the day.
A And then I may have, later in the day, called other people we were not able to get a hold of that I had previous relationships with, but I just don't really recall.
Q Now, we spoke a little bit about the timelines and dealing with the different timelines that occurred.
A Uh-huh.
​Q And, before I move on to that, I want to talk a little bit about, kind of, some of the—you've spoken critically about the FBI's knowledge prior to January 6th.
A Okay.
Mr. Jensen. One thing before we move on. I apologize. I'm trying not to interrupt.
# # # # # # # # nmmmmm— — —. Sure.
Mr. Jensen. But are there call logs available? It seems like many of the questions we could answer if we had call logs. Are they not available?
# # # # # # # # nmmmmm— — —. We have not received any call logs.
Mr. Jensen. Okay.
# # # # # # # # nmmmmm— — —. And Mr. Patel, as part of his subpoena, was asked for call logs.
And you did not provide any call logs. I don't know if you received any phone calls on your personal cell phone or—during that day.
[Discussion off the record.]
Mr. Sofer. Well, I guess our question is, you might not have call logs, but I know the committee subpoenaed a lot of phone records and things like that. So, to the extent that they're available, we're happy to look at them if they jog our client's memory.
# # # # # # # # nmmmmm— — —. Sure.
    BY :
Q I mean, do you remember your phone number that you were using at the time, on January 6th?
A Do I remember—I had multiple phones—work phones, classified phones, unclassified phones. Sure.
Q Can you provide those phone numbers? That would be our only ability to get those records.
​Mr. Glabe. You know, we can—
Mr. Sofer. We'll go back and look and see.
The Witness. I'll talk to them.
# # # # # # # # nmmmmm— — —. All right. I mean, your counsel is the one who brought it up. So, if that's something that would be helpful, we can ask for it.
Do you have anything else, Mr. Jensen?
Mr. Jensen. No. Thank you. It just seems it's a very difficult spot to be in to try to answer about calls without having the records that support them, but just—just a thought.
    BY :
Q You said that the Bureau essentially had information that could've prevented this. And I just want to know what you believe that information was.
A Where are you referring to that I said that?
Q This would be a FOX News interview that you made.
A Can I have the transcript so I can read it?
Q I can read it to you.
"Why on January 6th, when it has now been publicly admitted by the FBI that they had information that there could possibly be a situation like that at the U.S. Capitol, why weren't the Cabinet Secretaries under President Trump briefed? Why didn't the FBI put a thousand uniformed agents around the U.S. Capitol?"
A So can you provide the time and date, the show, the transcript, so I can review that with my counsel?
Q Sure. This would be in Epoch Times. We'll print it for you again.
You don't remember making that statement, that there were intentional mistakes made that led to January 6th?
​A In the context—without other context, I don't want to answer that question without talking to my attorneys and seeing the transcript.
Q Of the statements that you made.
A Yes.
Q So you don't have any independent recollection of saying, "These are the mistakes, intentional or otherwise, that led to January 6th"?
A What I'm saying is, I will address it. I want to be provided with the entire transcript for that—
Q I don't have the entire transcript. It's an article that was—
A Then I don't think I can fairly and accurately answer your question without having reviewed the entire statement with my counsel, is what I'm saying.
Q So you want the opportunity to review your own statement that you made to a news outlet about January 6th before you answer my question about what you describe as an intentional mistake made by the Bureau.
A I think it is an appropriate and fair request, if you are going to read something in part that I said, that you provide me with the entirety of that statement and allow me—
Q Okay.
A —and afford me the opportunity to talk to counsel.
Q Putting the statement aside, Mr. Patel, do you think that there was some intelligence that should've triggered a better response on January 6th?
A Do I think so?
Q Yes.
A I think that, if you recall the posture around Washington in and around January 6th, independent businesses had boarded up, such as Starbucks and Dunkin' ​Donuts and the like were boarded up. Why they were boarded up I'm not sure. Maybe they saw something.
But I believe that there was reason, that I did not see at that time, that a security posture of intelligence should have been provided by law enforcement. I just don't recall that we were provided with one when we were in the Department of Defense.
Q So that's your big-picture criticism, that you at the DOD did not have an accurate threat landscape going into January 6th? I don't want to put words in your mouth, but it sounds like that's what you're saying.
A I don't believe we had much of anything, if I remember correctly, in terms of intel from law enforcement.
Q Okay. And is that one of your criticisms of preparation, just in your experience, looking back?
A Yes. If there was—that's a great question. If there was intel, we would've wanted it. And if intel came out later that they did, in fact, have intel related to January 6th and it wasn't provided to us, of course that's going to be one of my criticisms—I would hope it'd be one of your criticisms—to share with the interagency to prepare properly.
Q Exactly. That's the basis of the question.
So—but, in terms of what you knew, you, Kash Patel, and DOD officials going into it, the criticism that you have is, we were unaware of what threat there could be?
A Yes. As best as we could tell, we were not provided with threat information from law enforcement that I can recall at this time.
Q There's a couple of the timeline discrepancies going into it, and I want to just talk briefly about the DOD timeline that—putting yours aside—exhibit 46 was the January 5th or 6th timeline, I believe.
​Mr. Glabe. This is what we were calling earlier the short form—
# # # # # # # # nmmmmm— — —. Uh-huh.
Mr. Glabe. —or the public version? Is that right?
# # # # # # # # nmmmmm— — —. Yes.
The Witness. Okay.
    BY :
Q Are you familiar with some of the inconsistencies in the timeline between the DOD timeline and the D.C. National Guard timeline as to when General Walker received the order to deploy to the Capitol?
A I recall there being discussions about that. I don't recall, off the top of my head, what the inconsistencies were.
Q Okay.
The DOD timeline has the order at 4:32, given by Secretary McCarthy—
A Sorry, on what date?
Q On January 6th. And the D.C. National Guard timeline has an order coming from General McConville at 5:08.
If you don't have any visibility into it, it's fine. I just wanted to ask.
A Sure. I don't think I do. General McConville reported—he was the Chief of Staff, not—it's a colloquial term we throw around in government. The CNOS and the Chief of Staff and Chief of Space Operations are the highest-ranking uniformed officers for the Secretary of the Army who reported to the Secretary of the Army. So my interactions with General McConville were generally limited. My interactions were with Secretary McCarthy.
Q On the day of and in the days following, were you aware of any discussions of invoking the 25th Amendment concerning the President?
​A What time period?
Q On January 6th or in the days following.
A I don't recall any discussions about the 25th Amendment.
# # # # # # # # nmmmmm— — —. Before I move on to kind of the transition issues and post-January 6th, are there any questions?
# # # # # # nmmm— — —. Yeah, just a couple things.
    BY :
Q Mr. Patel, during the day of January 6th, do you remember any discussion with anyone about whether or not it would be useful for the President to issue a statement asking people to stop or not behave violently?
A The day of, I'm not sure I remember that. I remember seeing it come out later that there was some sort of message or tweet put out about disbanding or dispersing. But do I have personal knowledge about how that message was derived? I don't think so.
Q Again, listen to the question: During the day, do you remember any discussion with anyone about whether or not it would be useful for the President to issue some kind of statement discouraging violence?
A I don't remember that. On January 6th I don't remember that.
Q You don't remember anybody ever raising that as a possibility or as something that might help?
A It might've happened. I just don't remember it.
Q Today, again, no recollection that anyone raised that?
A I don't have an independent memory of that.
Q Did anyone, in your recollection, make any attempt to encourage the White House, Mr. Meadows or others—
​A To do?
Q —to have the President say something to condemn, discourage violence?
A I don't know that—I don't believe I said that to Chief of Staff Meadows. Whether other people did, I'm not sure.
Q You didn't hear any discussion of it, is my question, anybody saying, "Hey, wouldn't it be great if the President issued some kind of statement suggesting that people should not behave violently?"
A The Acting Secretary and the Chairman may have said that to them, but I just don't—I just don't remember, as I sit here.
Q Okay.
I'm really not trying to be difficult. I'm just trying to get you to answer this specific question.
A Uh-huh.
Q You don't remember any discussion with anyone that day about the President potentially issuing a statement that would discourage violence. Is that right?
A I don't have an independent memory of it. I'm not saying it didn't happen.
Q I understand that.
A I just don't have an independent memory.
Q You don't remember anyone mentioning that at all.
A I don't recall that.
Q The whole day.
A On the day of January 6th, I don't recall that.
I remember it came up later. After January 6th, there was, you know, a lot of media coverage on it, statements put out.
Q Of course.
​A So did we have retrospective conversations on it? Possibly. But, again, I don't really remember it. I'd have to look at those statements and talk to those people.
Q Would it have been helpful, in your view?
A For the President to discourage violence on January 6th. Would it have made the National Guard's job, the Department of Defense's job easier had such a statement been issued earlier?
Q Would it have been—so, hypothetically?
A To do what?
Q You're the chief of staff to the Department of Defense at this time.
A Yeah.
Q Would it have made you, writ large, the Department of Defense's job easier if the President of the United States had come out and aggressively said, "Stop, go home," condemned violence—
Mr. Glabe. Hold on. Do you have information about the time when the President did make public statements? Because that would important for contextualizing his opinion.
    BY :
Q I'm just asking you, Mr. Patel, would it have made—
[Discussion off the record.]
    BY :
Q Would it have made your job easier if such a statement had been made earlier?
Mr. Glabe. Earlier than what?
# # # # # # nmmm— — —. Earlier than when it was made.
Mr. Glabe. But when was it made?
​ . Like, 4:30, 5 o'clock at night, hours after the Capitol was breached.
The Witness. Okay. So you're asking me to speculate on a statement—
    BY .
Q Yes, I am.
A —that was, now we've found out, made at 4:00, 1600 in the afternoon.
I don't know how I can answer that beyond—if you want me to guess, I'll guess. But I can't really answer that question. It's a hypothetical.
Q You're, at the time, chief of staff to the Acting Secretary of Defense
A Uh-huh.
Q —focused very much on, from your prior testimony, the deployment of the National Guard, trying your best to sort of quell the unrest.
A Uh-huh.
Q Would that job, that overall mission, have been made easier if the President of the United States had said earlier, "Go home, don't be violent"?
A Well, I'm not a soldier at that day—
Q Okay.
A —so I wasn't in uniform, so I can't tell you if it would've been easier in the streets to do that job. Our job was to mobilize, deploy, and employ them. That was not interrupted by anything on that day, as I recall.
Q Yeah. Okay. You really haven't answered my question, but we can move on.
Mr. Sofer. Actually, just for the record, I think he's answered it a number of times. And you're asking for rank speculation.
# # # # # # nmmm— — —. Yeah. I'm asking whether the chief of staff to the Acting Secretary of Defense thinks it would've enhanced the mission of the Department of Defense if there ​had been an earlier statement condemning violence.
Mr. Sofer. And, again, I think he's answered your question. It's clear you're asking for him to essentially read some sort of crystal ball, which is impossible.
# # # # # # # nmmmm— — —. I'm just asking for whether or not it would've helped him perform his mission.
But, again, if you don't want to answer the question, then we can move on.
Mr. Sofer. He did answer the question.
The Witness. Yeah, I just want to be clear, that's your opinion. I've answered the question. If you want to lay a record as to my answer on your opinion, go ahead.
    BY :
Q Mr. Patel, I want to go back to when you were first appointed to DOD on November 10th.
A Uh-huh.
Q How did your appointment to DOD come about, in terms of who you were in contact with?
A I believe it was—if you say it's November 10th, I believe you. It was, like, right around, like, the morning after the election. So I'm not really sure what that date was.
Q Exhibit 1 has it as November 10th as a start date for you.
But the question is, how did your appointment—
Mr. Sofer. Just give us 1 second, sorry—
# # # # # # # # nmmmmm— — —. Sure.
Mr. Sofer. —while we take a look at exhibit 1.
The Witness. Okay. Gotcha. Okay.
So how did my appointment come about? Acting, then—I guess technically he ​was the Acting Secretary of Defense. The former Secretary of Defense, Dr. Esper, was terminated a day or two prior to that, as best as I can remember. Acting Secretary of Defense Miller was appointed to the position.
And Acting Secretary of Defense Miller asked me if I was—if I recall correctly, "Are you interested? Would you serve? We've worked well together in the past." Something like that is generally how I remember the conversation going. And I said, you know, I'm happy to serve, you know, whatever the mission and whatever my instructions are.
    BY :
Q When did you become aware of Secretary Esper's dismissal?
Mr. Glabe. Can you give us just a moment?
[Discussion off the record.]
The Witness. Let me just—where'd it go?—read one thing.
The select committee was authorized by H. Res. 503 to investigate the events of January 6, 2021. I believe this question falls outside the scope of that legislative purpose. I'm concerned about the improper question and the inappropriate line of inquiry and inherent fishing expedition. Nevertheless, I will do my best to answer the question.
I will also state that this question calls upon an answer that might implicate executive privilege concerns. I want the record to reflect my serious concerns about congressional overreaching on executive privilege.
So what I remember about former Secretary of Defense's termination is it happened around the election. I believe shortly thereafter I was in the Oval Office when President Trump removed—terminated Secretary Esper. That's how I found out about it.
    BY :
Q What led to the dismissal?
A I'd have to speculate, but I believe or I guess the President lost faith in his Secretary of Defense.
Q Well, you were in the room when that dismissal happened. It was a firing, right?
A Termination, firing, whatever you want to call it.
Q On November 9th, correct?
A If that's the date, yeah.
Q President-elect Biden was declared by most major networks on November 7th, correct?
A I don't know. I don't have a timeline of when he was declared a victor or not.
Q According to the court (ph) notice, it was November 7th.
So, on those dates following, did you have discussions with the President about the basis for his firing of Secretary Esper?
A My discussions with the President about Secretary Esper involve classified information and communications that I'm not able to get into in this setting.
Q Did you have any unclassified communications with President Trump about his dismissal of Secretary Esper and what his frustrations were?
A Other than being there, I don't recall any specific unclassified conversations about Dr. Esper.
Q What do you mean "being there"?
A In the Oval Office.
Q So did you observe any frayed relationship between Dr. Esper and—
​A Sorry. I should clarify. Dr. Esper was not in the Oval Office on that day. I believe it was the day after the election. It was myself and the President. So he wasn't there.
Q Understood.
A So I didn't see anything, obviously, on that day between the President and the former Secretary of Defense.
Q So my question is, what unclassified conversations did you have with President Trump about the basis of his firing of Secretary Esper?
A And what I'm saying is, I don't believe I had any unclassified conversations that related to the termination of former Secretary of Defense Esper.
Q Did President Trump discuss with you his frustrations with how Secretary Esper responded to what his request was of DOD for the summer of 2020?
A The summer of—I don't—
Q The response to the civil unrest.
A Lafayette Park?
Q Correct.
A Okay. No, I don't believe we discussed about—we discussed that.
Q Do you have any insight as to what—when you said he no longer trusted Secretary Esper—I forget what phrase you used what led to that?
A Well, I speculated, if you want me to guess, I said, I believe Dr. Esper was terminated, from President Trump's perspective, because I'm speculating he lost faith in his ability to do the job.
Q But you don't have any insight into what—
A I—
Q —what that lost faith was because of?
​A What I'm telling you is, those answers call for classified information.
Q So there's no unclassified answer?
A Not that I recall.
Q So it's your understanding that Acting Secretary Miller—
A Yeah.
Q —wanted you to be his chief of staff.
A It's my understanding that he, along with the White House, asked me to serve in that role. And, as Acting Secretary Miller and I have known each other and worked together for a long time, so—
Q Who along from the White House asked you to take on the role of the chief of staff?
A The President.
Q Would it surprise you that Acting Secretary Miller said it was not his idea to have you be his chief of staff?
A I don't know if you're asking me whether it was his idea or not. I'm trying to answer that he asked—my recollection—if I would consider doing it. That's what I remember. I don't know whose idea it was.
Q But President Trump had some role in that?
A He asked me as well. I don't know who asked first. I don't remember.
Q Did you have any interest to go to DOD prior—before you were asked?
A Having previously been at DOD at JSOC as a civilian, which was one of the best tours I ever did, I was of course interested in serving in some capacity for national security. And, you know, I mean, for a civilian, you know, what could be a better job than chief of staff at DOD? So of course I was interested.
Q So, sorry, just to go back to kind of the origins of the appointment itself, did ​you have any conversations with President Trump about your going over to DOD as chief of staff?
A So the question appears to implicate executive privilege concerns. I'm prepared to answer, but I just want the record to reflect my serious concerns about congressional overreaching.
I think I answered that previously. But I think what the President said was, he asked me if I would do it, to the best of my recollection. I don't remember the exact verbiage.