# Philosophical Works of the Late James Frederick Ferrier/Institutes of Metaphysic (1875)/Section 3/Proposition 9

The Institutes of Metaphysic, Philosophical Works of the Late James Frederick Ferrier (1875 ed., Vol. 1). (E. L. Lushington, & A. Grant, Eds.) Edinburgh: William Blackwood and Sons. pp. 479-510.
PROPOSITION IX.
THE ORIGIN OF KNOWLEDGE.
DEMONSTRATION.
Matter is the particular part, or peculiar element of some of our cognitions—of those, viz., which we term perceptions (Prop. VII. Epistemology). But the part of a cognition cannot be the cause of a cognition. Therefore matter is not the cause of our perceptive cognitions; in other words, our knowledge of material things is not an effect proceeding from, and brought about by, material things.
OBSERVATIONS AND EXPLANATIONS.
1. It is at this place that the question as to the ​Question as to the origin of knowledge—has been erroneously treated.origin of our knowledge falls to be discussed, and that the opinions of philosophers respecting it come under review: for this question is ontological, just as the inquiry into the actual character and composition of our cognitions is epistemological. It is of the utmost importance that these inquiries should be kept distinct, and that the nature of our knowledge should be accurately ascertained, before any attempt is made to explain its origin. This order, however, has been reversed: philosophers have treated of the origin of knowledge before they had attained to any definite conception of its nature; they explored the causes of the fact, but the fact itself they left undetermined: and to this reversal of the right method of research are to be attributed all the perplexities and errors in which they got involved in the course of the controversy.
The assumption which vitiates the discussion.2. The fundamental assumption which has hitherto rendered abortive every attempt to settle this question, is the hypothesis that matter exists, not as an element of cognition, but in an absolute capacity, or irrespective of all intelligence. Whether this assumption be true or not, it was not a position to start from. It is an ontological offshoot from an uncritical and erroneous epistemology. To comprehend the salient points of the controversy respecting the origin of knowledge, and the ​perplexities by which it has been beset at every stage, we have but to trace this assumption into its consequences.
First consequence of the assumption. Ninth counter-proposition3. The attribution of absolute existence to material things leads at once to the inference, that matter operates as a cause in the production of our cognitions. And accordingly, when the question as to the origin of knowledge arose, this was the solution proposed—an explanation which finds expression in the following counter-proposition. Ninth Counter-proposition: "Matter is the cause of our perceptive cognitions; in other words, our knowledge of material things is an effect proceeding from, and brought about by, material things." This opinion is the first consequence which flows from the assumption referred to.
Second consequence. The doctrine of representationism.4. This consequence may seem harmless enough; the next is more serious. If our knowledge, or perception, of material things be an effect produced by material things, this knowledge (the effect) must be all that we truly apprehend: the material things themselves (the cause) must elude or transcend our observation. The position is, that matter is not itself our knowledge, or any part of our knowledge, but is merely the cause of our knowledge, the originator of our perceptions: hence the perceptions alone are the objects of the mind; their cause ​comes not within the pale of our cognition. And thus the second consequence of the assumption that material things have an absolute existence, is the inevitable conclusion that we have no knowledge of them, but only a knowledge of their effects. Thus arises, and thus arose, the doctrine of a representative perception—a doctrine which, substituting for the real material universe what Berkeley calls "a false imaginary glare," is alike unsatisfactory to the philosophical, and to the unphilosophical, mind.
The earliest form of representationism. Physical Influx.5. The earliest form of the representative hypothesis is that which is known in the history of philosophy under the name of Physical Influx (influxus physicus). The advocates of this scheme maintained that real things are the efficient causes of our perceptions, the word "efficient" being employed to signify that the things, by means of some positive power or inherent virtue which they possessed, were competent to transmit to the mind a knowledge of themselves. This theory held that man was cognisant, not of things themselves, but only of certain ideal copies, or intelligible transcripts of them; and that these were caused, first, or remotely, by the operation of material things on the senses, and secondly, or proximately, by the operation of the senses on the mind; so that the doctrine of physical influx was rather an hypothesis explanatory of the way in which the senses or ​nervous system affected the mind, than of the way in which external objects affected the nervous system. It attempted, by invoking the casual relation, to explain the intercourse which subsists between the body and the mind. External objects were supposed to operate on the nervous system by the transmission of some kind of influence—the nervous system was supposed to carry on the process by the transmission of certain images or representations—and thus our knowledge of external things was supposed to be brought about. The representations alone came before the mind; the things by which they were caused remained occult and unknown.
Correction of this doctrine by Des Cartes. 6. The first important correction which this crude hypothesis sustained was at the hands of the French philosopher Des Cartes. The doctrine was, that things remotely, and the senses proximately, transmitted to the mind a knowledge of external objects. Des Cartes had an eye for the fallacy of that position. He saw that things and the senses could no more transmit cognitions to the mind than a man can transmit to a beggar a guinea which he has not got. Material things, including of course the organs of sense, have no knowledge to give to man; and therefore man cannot receive his knowledge from material things; in other words, matter cannot be the efficient cause of our perceptions. The explaining cause is not adequate to the ​production of the effect to be explained. To derive our perceptions of material things from material things, is to derive them from a source in which they are not contained, and which is therefore not competent to impart them. Such is the substance of the revolution effected by Des Cartes on this the standard opinion in the common schools of philosophy; and the downfall of the hypothesis of Physical Influx was the result.
Consequences of the Cartesian correction.7. The Cartesian reform was followed by important consequences. The question now arose—What, then, is the cause of our knowledge; from whence do we derive our cognitions of external objects? If material things and the organs of sense do not originate them,—what originates them? Their efficient cause, answers Des Cartes, their true source, is the power and will of the Deity, who, containing within Himself every perfection, is competent to produce and to impart to us perceptions, or whatever else he may be pleased to produce and to impart.
Scepticism and Idealism arise.8. This solution gave a new turn to the discussion. Now scepticism in regard to the existence of material things broke loose. Now the question emerged—What proof is there that matter exists at all? So long as material things were held to be the causes of our perceptions, a sufficient guarantee ​for their existence was obtained; for we can scarcely maintain that one thing is the cause of another, without conceding that the former thing exists. But now, when this doctrine is set aside as untenable—now, when it is held that material things are not, and cannot be, the causes of our perceptions, and when it is further maintained that these are to be attributed to an entirely different origin, the question may reasonably be put—What evidence is there in support of the existence of matter? The material universe is now superfluous and otiose. It has no part to play—no purpose to fulfil. Our perceptive cognitions are brought about without its aid. All goes on as well, or better, without it. It is a mere cumberer of the ground,
Ἀχρεῖον καὶ παράορον δέμας.
Why not say at once that it is a nonentity? Thus scepticism and idealism are the consequences, not very far removed, of the assumption that matter has an absolute existence. Commencing with the hypothesis that matter exists absolutely, philosophers have been led on, by the inevitable windings of the discussion, to doubt or to deny that it exists at all.
9. It might have been expected that these, perplexities would have thrown philosophers back upon a severer examination of the data on which ​The Cartesian salvo—hypothesis of "Occasional Causes." Its insufficiency.they were proceeding, and would have suspended their inquiry into the origin of our knowledge until the state of the fact as to its actual nature had been determined. But no such result ensued. Philosophers still busied themselves about its causes; and in order to salve the scepticism which his own reform had provoked, Des Cartes came to the rescue of the material universe armed with these two arguments: first, that matter, although not the cause, is nevertheless the occasion, of our perceptions. It affords the occasions on which the Deity (the efficient cause and true source of all our knowledge) calls up in our minds the appropriate presentations. This is the Cartesian doctrine of occasional, as distinguished from efficient, causes. And secondly, he argues that the Deity, from whom can proceed no fallacious beliefs, has implanted within us a conviction of the independent existence of material things. To which arguments the answer is, that if our perceptions are originated by the Divine Power, it is more probable that they are called into being directly, and not through the circuitous process alleged by the Cartesians, in which certain material existences, of which we know nothing, are supposed to serve as the occasions on which the Deity is pleased to bring about in our minds certain corresponding representations; and, secondly, that it is not true that any man really believes in the existence of material things out of all relation ​to an intelligent mind—for, however much we may deceive ourselves on this point, it is certain that we cannot believe in that which we cannot, by any possibility, think of—and it is certain that we can think of material things only in association with our own, or some other, intelligence.
Mallebranche: His "Vision of all things in God.10. Mallebranche, following in the wake of Des Cartes, advocated similar opinions. He perceived, and avoided, the contradiction involved in the supposition that material things cause our cognitions. Our perceptions of extension, figure, and solidity (the primary qualities, as they are called), he attributed to the direct operation of the Deity. This is what he means by our "vision of all things in God," who, according to Mallebranche, is the "light of all our seeing." Our sensations of heat, colour, and so forth, he referred to certain laws of our own nature. Although material things are superfluous and otiose by the terms of this, no less than by the terms of the Cartesian hypothesis, still Mallebranche asserts their independent existence on the authority of revelation, as Des Cartes had attempted to vindicate it on the ground of natural belief—"In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth"—as if that statement was equivalent to the declaration that material things were invested with an absolute existence, and had a subsistency out of relation to all intelligence!
​Leibnitz: His "Pre-established Harmony.11. Leibnitz, also, studiously avoided all acknowledgment of matter as the transmitting cause of our cognitions. He supposed a double series of phenomena running on simultaneously in the mind and in the body, and coincident, although absolutely independent of each other. No influence of any kind passed from mind to body, or from body to mind; but the preconcerted arrangements of each brought about an entire concordance between the two series of changes—a concordance in which the mental representations were never at variance with the bodily impressions, although in no respect induced by them; nor the bodily movements ever at cross-purposes with the mental volitions, although in no degree dependent upon them—just as two clocks may keep time together, although no sort of influence is transmitted from the one to the other. This is the doctrine of Pre-established Harmony—a scheme which differs from that of "occasional causes" only in this respect, that by the former hypothesis the accordance of the mental and the bodily phenomena was supposed to be pre-arranged, once for all, by the Divine Power, while by the latter their harmony was supposed to be effected by His constant and ever-renewed interposition.
Character of these hypotheses.12. Extravagant as these hypotheses may seem, they are less so than the position which they controverted; the doctrine, namely, of physical influx, ​which asserted that our cognitions were caused or produced by material things operating upon our minds. They are commendable, as evidences of a reaction or struggle against that contradictory position. But they did not go to the root of the mischief: they involved no critical inquiry into the essential structure of all cognition; and hence they failed to reduce matter per se to the condition of a contradiction.
Locke's explanation.13. Locke's explanation of the origin of our knowledge differs from the opinions of his predecessors only by being more ambiguous and perfunctory. Material things exist, and give rise to our sensible ideas or perceptions, because they are fitted to do so by the Divine law and appointment. That sentence contains the substance of all that has been advanced by Locke on the subject now under consideration, and the doctrine which it expresses is obviously a mere jumble of the four hypotheses which have just been commented on. Like his predecessors, Locke was a staunch representationist. The philosopher next to be named was the first who distinctly promulgated a doctrine of intuitive perception, although he seldom gets credit for having done so.
14. Berkeley's merits and defects have been already touched upon (see Epistemology, Prop. ​Berkeley: His doctrine of intuitive perception.XXII. Obs. 14). His system, with all its imperfections, was an immense improvement upon those which had preceded it. It was an inquiry, not so much into the origin as into the nature of our knowledge. It was mainly a polemic against the doctrine of representationism in all its forms. Other systems had declared that our perceptions were representative of material realities—that the perceptions alone were known—that the realities themselves were occult. Looking merely to the actual structure, and not to the supposed origin, of our cognition; Berkeley brought the material reality itself into the immediate presence of the mind, by showing, not indeed that it was the object, but that it was part of the object of our cognition. The total and immediate object of the mind is, with Berkeley, the material thing itself (and no mere representation of it), with the addition, however, of some subjective and heterogeneous element. It is a synthesis of the objective and the subjective; the thing plus the sense (sight or touch, &c), a unit indivisible by us at least Berkeley thus accomplished the very task which, fifty or sixty years afterwards, Reid laboured at in vain. He taught a doctrine of intuitive, as distinguished from a doctrine of representative, perception; and he taught it on the only grounds on which such a doctrine can be maintained.
15. Berkeley's system, however, was invalidated ​His fundamental defect.by a fundamental weakness, which was this, that it was rather an exposition of the contingent structure of our knowledge, than an exposition of the necessary structure of all knowledge. As has been stated elsewhere, he does not sufficiently distinguish the necessary from the contingent laws of cognition, or distinctly lay down the former as binding on intelligence universally. He saw that every object of our cognition must contain and present a subjective element. But he neither declared what that element was, nor did he dearly show that all intelligence was necessarily subject to the same law, and that every object of all cognition must involve a subjective or non-material ingredient. Hence he failed to reduce matter per se to the condition of a contradiction; because if matter can be known per se by any possible intelligence—if it can, in any circumstances, be apprehended without some subjective ingredient being apprehended along with it—we are not entitled to set it down as the contradictory in itself. To fix it as this, it must be fixed as the absolutely and necessarily and universally unknowable. Berkeley's system scarcely rises to this position. He has nowhere made out dearly that matter per se is the contradictory to all intelligence, although he may have shown with sufficient distinctness that it is the contradictory to our intelligence. But if matter per se is not the contradictory to all intelligence, it may possibly exist—exist ​with a true and absolute existence. But if matter per se can exist exclusively, Berkeley's ontology breaks down—for his conclusion is that the subject and the object together, the synthesis of mind and the universe, is what alone truly and absolutely exists, or can exist.
Reid: His misunderstanding of Berkeley.16. Reid mistook entirely the scope of the Berkeleian speculations. He actually supposed Berkeley to have been a representationist, and that the only difference between him and the ordinary disciples of this school, was, that while they admitted the existence of matter, he denied it, and was what is vulgarly termed an idealist. Berkeley is supposed by Reid to have agreed with the representationists in holding that mere ideas or perceptions were the immediate objects of the mind; but to have differed from them in throwing overboard the occult material realities which these ideas were supposed to represent. This interpretation of Berkeleianism is altogether erroneous. Instead of exploding the material reality, Berkeley, as has been said, brought it face to face with the mind, by showing that it was a part, although never the whole, of the object of our cognition; and this, it is submitted, is the only tenable or intelligible ground on which the doctrine of intuitive perception can be placed. This position, however, was totally misconceived by Dr Reid; and hence he ​has done very gross, although unintentional, injustice to the philosophical opinions of his predecessor.
Reid failed to establish a doctrine of intuitive perception.17. In regard to Dr Reid's own doctrine of intuitive perception and his supposed refutation of representationism, it must not be disguised that both of them are complete failures. His ultimate object was to vindicate the absolute existence of the material universe, which, having been rendered problematical by the Cartesian speculations, had been denied on much better grounds by the dialectic of Berkeley—these grounds being, that we could only know it cum alio, and therefore could neither conceive nor believe in it per se. To accomplish this end, Reid set on foot a doctrine of intuitive perception, in which he endeavoured to show that material realities stand face to face with the mind, without anything more standing there along with them. This at least must be understood to have been his implied, if not his express, position; for what kind of logic would there be in the argument—material things are known to exist, not by themselves, but only in connection with something else, therefore they exist by themselves, or out of connection with everything else. Unless, then, we are to charge Dr Reid with this monstrous paralogism, we must suppose him to have held that we apprehend material things without apprehending anything else at ​the same time. If that position could be made good, it would at once establish both the independent existence of matter, and a doctrine of intuitive perception. But the position is one which runs counter to every law of human knowledge, both contingent and necessary. Whenever we know material things, we are cognisant of our own senses (sight or touch, &c.) as well: it thus runs counter to the contingent laws. Again, whenever we know material things, we know ourselves as well: it thus runs counter to the necessary laws. This doctrine of intuitive perception, therefore, is a theory which sets at defiance every law of intelligence, and which consequently fails to overtake either of the aims which its author had in view.
His character as a philsopher18. But Dr Reid, honest man, must not be dealt with too severely. With vastly good intentions, and very excellent abilities for everything except philosophy, he had no speculative genius whatever—positively an anti-speculative turn of mind, which, with a mixture of shrewdness and naïveté altogether incomparable, he was pleased to term "common sense;" thereby proposing as arbiter in the controversies in which he was engaged, an authority which the learned could not well decline, and which the vulgar would very readily defer to. There was good policy in this appeal. The standard of the exact reason did not quite suit him, neither was ​he willing to be immortalised as the advocate of mere vulgar prejudices; so that he caught adroitly at this middle term, whereby he was enabled, when reason failed him, to take shelter under popular opinion; and when popular opinion went against him, to appeal to the higher evidence of reason. Without renouncing scientific precision when it could be attained, he made friends of the mammon of unphilosophy. What chance had a writer like David Hume, with only one string to his bow, against a man who thus avowed his determination to avail himself, as occasion might require, of the plausibilities of uncritical thinking, and of the refinements of logical reflection? This amphibious method, however, had its disadvantages. At home in the submarine abysses of popular opinion, Dr Reid, in the higher regions of philosophy, was as helpless as a whale in a field of clover. He was out of his proper element. He blamed the atmosphere: the fault lay in his own lungs. Through the gills of ordinary thinking he expected to transpire the pure ether of speculation, and it nearly choked him. His fate ought to be a warning to all men, that in philosophy we cannot serve two mistresses. Our ordinary moods, our habitual opinions, our natural prejudices, are not compatible with the verdicts of our speculative reason.
19. The truth is, that Dr Reid mistook, or rather ​He mistook the vocation of philosophy. reversed, the vocation of philosophy. He supposed that the business of this discipline was, not to correct, but to confirm the contradictory inadvertencies of natural thinking. Accordingly the main tendency of his labours was to organise the irrational, and to make error systematic. But even in this attempt he has only partially succeeded. His opinions are even more confused than they are fallacious, more incoherent than they are erroneous; and no amount of expositorial ingenuity has ever succeeded in conferring on his doctrines even the lowest degree of scientific intelligibility. His claim to take rank par excellence, as the champion of common sense, is preposterous, if by common sense anything more be meant than vulgar opinion. When the cause of philosophy is fairly and fully pled at the bar of genuine common sense, it is conceived that a decision will be given by that tribunal in favour of the necessary truths of reason, and not in favour of the antagonist verdicts of the popular and unreflective understanding which Dr Reid took under his protection. Oh, Catholic Reason of mankind, surely thou art not the real, but only the reputed, mother of this anti-philosophical philosophy: thy children, I take it, are rather Plato's Demigods and Spinoza's Titans.
20. At this place, and in special reference to the philosopher (Kant) whose opinions have next to be ​Kant. "Inate ideas." considered, it will be necessary to introduce a short account of the doctrine of "innate ideas," viewed both in itself and in its history. This theory has been generally, if not universally, misunderstood; and, as has usually happened in philosophical controversies, its supporters and its impugners have been both equally at fault. Before commenting on the false, it will be proper to give the true, version of this celebrated opinion—and before showing in what sense it is wrong and untenable, to show in what sense it is tenable and right.
Right interpretation of this doctrine. 21. Rightly understood, the doctrine of innate ideas is merely another form of expression for the initial principle (Prop. 1.) of these Institutes. From an accurate observation of the fact in regard to knowledge, we learn that every cognition, or perception, or idea, consists, and must consist, of two heterogeneous parts, elements, or factors,—one of which is contributed from within—belongs to the mind itself and hence is said to be innate; the other of which is contributed from without, and hence may be said to be extranate (if such a word may be used), or of foreign extraction. To render this somewhat abstract statement perfectly intelligible and convincing, all that we have to do is to translate it into the concrete; and to affirm, that whenever a man apprehends an external thing (this is the foreign, the extranate ingredient in the total ​cognition), he must apprehend himself also (this is the innate, or home ingredient in the total cognition); and conversely, that whenever a man apprehends himself (the innate element), he must always apprehend something else, be it a thing or a thought, or a feeling (the foreign element) as well. So that every cognition, or idea, or perception, necessarily consists of two parts, the one of which is native to the mind, and is often denominated a priori—to indicate that it is the essential or grounding element; and the other of which is extraneous to the mind, and is frequently termed a posteriori, to signify that it is the changeable, or accidental, or accruing element It is thus obvious that the doctrine of innate ideas, when properly understood, is merely another form of the doctrine advanced in the first proposition of the epistemology; and, further, that it is merely another phasis of the doctrine of "the universal and the particular" propounded in the sixth proposition of that same section. The me is the innate, or a priori, or universal, part of every cognition, perception, or idea: things, or thoughts, or states of mind whatsoever, (the not-me) are the extranate, a posteriori, or particular part of every cognition, perception, or idea.
22. The circumstance, then, above all others, to be attended to in coming to a right comprehension ​The circumstance to be particularly attended to in considering this doctrine. of this theory is, that the word "innate" is never to be understood in reference to ideas, but only in reference to a part of every idea, and that neither is the word "foreign, or acquired, or extraneous," ever to be understood in reference to ideas, but only in reference to a part of every idea. There are thus no innate ideas, and no extranate ideas; but every idea or cognition has an element which is innate, and an element which is not so—every cognition, in short, is both innate and extranate—is a synthesis constituted by an a priori part and an a posteriori part. This consideration, of course, fixes these elements (when considered apart from each other), as necessarily unknowable and contradictory.
The misconception to be particularly guarded against. 23. Hence the misconception, above all others to be avoided, if we would form a correct notion—indeed, any notion at all of this theory—is the supposition that some (one class) of our cognitions or ideas are innate; and that others (another class) are originated from without; in other words, the blunder most particularly to be guarded against, is the opinion that the two factors (original and derivative) of our cognitions are themselves cognitions, or can be themselves whole ideas. If this were the theory it would indeed be a portentous, purposeless, and unintelligible chimera.
24. Strange to say, no philosopher that can be ​This misconception has never been guarded against by any philosopher.named has avoided this error. They have agreed, to a man, in thinking that the word "innate" referred to a particular class of our ideas—and not to a part of each of our ideas; and that the word "foreign" or "derived" or "extraneous," referred to another class of our ideas, and not to a part of each of them. In short, they have fallen into the mistake already explained at considerable length under the Sixth Proposition of the Epistemology, Obs. 13-17. The advocates, equally with the opponents of the theory, have misapprehended the nature of the analysis on which it proceeded. They have mistaken elements for kinds. Those who maintained the doctrine, supposed that one kind or class of our ideas had its origin from within the mind, and that another kind or class of our ideas had its origin from without; while their opponents, never doubting that this was the point properly at issue, denied that any of our ideas were innate, and attributed the whole of them to an extraneous origin. Accordingly, the controversy concerning innate ideas has been one in which neither of the parties engaged had any conception of the question properly under litigation.
Hence the ineptitude of the controversy.25. This fundamental mistake has beset the controversy during every period of its history. Des Cartes, Mallebranche, and Leibnitz were of opinion that some of our ideas came to us from without, and ​that others were generated from within; that one class of our cognition was innate, or original; that another class was factitious, or acquired. Over the theory thus irrationally propounded, Locke obtained an easy victory. Had the controversy been put upon the right footing—had the true question been raised, Is there an innate part and an extraneous part in every one of our cognitions?—and had Locke answered in the negative, and maintained that each of our cognitions embraced only one element—namely, the extraneous, or sensible part,—in that case his position would have been untenable, because it would have been equivalent to the assertion that both factors (inner and outer) were not essential to the formation of all knowledge, and that an idea could subsist with one of its necessary constituents withdrawn. But, as against Des Cartes, Mallebranche, and Leibnitz, who held that some of our ideas are from without, and others from within, his refutation was triumphant. If any one cognition has its origin wholly from without, we may safely generalise that fact, and assert that the whole of our knowledge is due to an external source. The postulation of an internal element is permissible only because the external element by itself (the mere objective) is no cognition at all, but is pure nonsense, just as the postulation of an external element is permissible only because the internal element by itself (the mere subjective, the ​indeterminate me) is no cognition at all, but is pure nonsense. This, however, was not the acceptation in which the doctrine of innate ideas was understood at the time when Locke wrote, and therefore he is less to be blamed for having impugned, than his opponents are for having advanced, so inept and irrelevant an hypothesis.
In this controversy Kant is as much at fault as his predecessors.26. Locke's refutation of the doctrine, as it was at that time understood, was so complete, that little or nothing was heard of "innate ideas" for many years afterwards. This speculation lay dormant during the ascendancy of sensualism, or the scheme which derives all our knowledge from without, until towards the close of the eighteenth century, when it was again revived under the auspices of the German philosopher Kant. And on what footing does Kant place the resuscitated opinion? Precisely on the same footing as before. He understands, or rather misunderstands the doctrine, just as its former upholders had misunderstood it. He mistakes elements for kinds. In explaining the origin of our knowledge, he does not refer one part of each of our cognitions to the mind itself, and another part of each of our cognitions to some foreign source; but he refers some of our cognitions entirely to the one source, and some of them entirely to the other. It is true that Kant is ambiguous; and appears at times as if he had got hold of the right doctrine—namely, ​that the words a priori, or native, on the one hand, and a posteriori, or empirical, on the other, apply only to the elements of our ideas, and not to our ideas themselves. But he more frequently repeats the old error, characterising some of our cognitions as a priori, or original, and others as empirical or acquired. At any rate, his misconception of the true doctrine is proved by the consideration that he nowhere proclaims that the empirical element of cognition (that supplied by the senses) is nonsensical and contradictory, when divorced from the element which is supplied by the mind; and conversely, that the latter element is nonsensical and contradictory, unless when associated with some empirical or extraneous ingredient. Not having made this announcement Kant must be held to have missed the true theory, and to have taught a doctrine of innate ideas fully as untenable and inept as any propounded by his predecessors. He regards matter per se as the cause of our sensible cognitions; and altogether he cannot be complimented on having thrown any new light on the origin of knowledge, or on having extricated the controversy from the confusion into which it had run.
27. The errors and perplexities which have been passed under review might have been avoided, had philosophers addressed themselves assiduously to ​How this system of Institutes avoids these errors.the consideration of knowledge as it actually is, and eschewed at the outset all inquiry into its origin. This is the method which these Institutes have endeavoured uniformly to pursue throughout the first section of the science; and to its observance is to be attributed any credit which they may obtain for having steered clear of the shoals and whirlpools which have shipwrecked all previous systems. The following recapitulation may serve as a memorandum of some of the leading points of the system.
First: it starts from no hypothesis.28. First, and generally, this system obtains a great advantage in starting from no hypothesis, either affirmative or negative, in regard to the absolute existence of the material universe. The affirmative assumption has disconcerted every attempt which has hitherto been made to propound a reasoned theory of knowing; and the negative assumption is, of course, equally unwarrantable. The system, therefore, indulges; at the outset, in no opinion in regard to independent material existence either pro or con; it leaves that point to be determined by the result of the inquiry into the actual character and constitution of knowledge. To this inquiry it adheres closely until it has exhausted all its details, and, tracking the knowable through all the disguises and transformations which it can assume, has found that, under all its metamorphoses, it is, at ​bottom and in the last resort, essentially the same—the same knowable in all essential respects, susceptible though it be of infinite varieties in all its accidental features.
Secondly: it finds that all cognition consists of two elements. 29. Secondly, a rigorous inquisition into the structure of the known and knowable, shows us that oneself must always be a part of everything that is known or knowable. The two constituents, therefore, of every cognition which any intelligence can entertain, are itself and—whatever else the other element may be; for this element being indefinite and inexhaustible, cannot be more specially condescended upon.
Thirdly: it finds that each element is no cognition, but only half or part-cognition. 30. Thirdly, this analysis necessarily reduces to a mere part of cognition everything which is known along with that definite part called self; because, if this definite element must be known (as it must) along with whatever is known, that which is known along with it cannot be a known or knowable whole; but only a known and knowable part. Thus many things—indeed, everything—which we heretofore regarded as the objects of cognition, turn out, on examination, to be only part-objects of cognition.
31. Fourthly. This analysis further reduces the material universe, whether considered in the ​aggregate Fourthly: it finds that matter is only half cognition.or in detail, to a mere part or element of cognition. It can be known only along with the other element. The cognition is always the material universe (or a portion of it), plus the mind or person contemplating it. This synthesis is not merely the only known, but the only knowable.
Fifthly: it establishes "intuitive," and overthrows "representative," perception.32. Fifthly. Now, a doctrine of intuitive perception can be established on reasonable grounds; now the downfall of representationism is insured. A doctrine of intuitive perception arises, indeed, of its own accord, out of the data which have been laid down. Matter, or the external thing, is just as much the immediate object of a man's mind as he himself is the immediate object of his mind, because it is part and parcel of the total presentation which is before him. Thus the material universe is neither representative of something else, nor is it represented by anything else. It is representative of nothing except itself; and we apprehend it intuitively—the consideration being borne in mind that we always do and must apprehend ourselves along with it.
Sixthly: it steers clear of materialism.33. Sixthly. This system steers clear of materialism, or the doctrine which holds that matter has an absolute existence—is an independent and completed entity. The same stroke which reduces matter to a mere element of cognition, reduces matter per se (that is, matter dissociated from the other ​element of cognition) to the predicament of a contradiction. But the contradictory can have no true or absolute existence; and thus materialism is annihilated. Its whole strength is founded on the assumption that material objects are completed objects of cognition; in other words, that they can be known without anything else being known along with them. This assumption has been found to be false. The materialist is asked where is the matter per se of which you speak? There it is, said Dr Johnson, kicking against a stone. But, good Doctor, that is not matter per se—that is matter cum alio; and this, we need scarcely say, is what no man ever doubted or denied the existence of.
Seventhly: it steers clear of spurious idealism.34. Seventhly. This system steers clear of spurious idealism, or the doctrine which holds that matter, in the supposed withdrawal of all intelligence, is a nonentity. Matter is an element, or half-object of cognition. The withdrawal therefore of the other element or half-object (the ego), cannot have the effect of reducing matter to a nonentity; first, because the whole object of cognition is matter-plus-me, and only half of it has been supposed to be withdrawn; and, secondly, because there are no nonentities any more than there are entities out of relation to some me or mind. Knowable nonentity is always nonentity plus me, just as much as knowable entity is always entity plus me. So ​that to suppose matter to become a nonentity in the supposed withdrawal or annihilation of (every) me, would be to suppose it still in connection with the very factor which we profess to have withdrawn. Accordingly the conclusion is, first, if we can suppose all intelligence at an end, matter, although it would cease to be an entity, would not become a nonentity. It would become the contradictory—it would be neither nothing nor anything. And secondly, we can not conceive all intelligence at an end, because we must conceive, under any circumstances, either that something exists or that nothing exists. But neither the existence nor the non-existence of things is conceivable out of relation to an intelligence—and therefore the highest and most binding law of all reason is, that in no circumstances can a supreme mind be conceived to be abstracted from the universe. The system which inculcates these truths may be termed a philosophy of real-idealism. It loses hold of nothing which the unreflective mind considers to be real; but seizing on the material universe, and combining it inseparably with an additional element it absorbs it in a new product, which it gives out as the only true and substantial universe—the only universe which any ​intellect can think of without running into a contradiction.
Eighthly: it is under no oligation to explain the origin of knowledge, because knowledge itself the Beginning.35. Eighthly. By these considerations this system is absolved from all obligation to point out the causes or origin of cognition. The truths which it has reached render that question absurd. It is unanswerable, because it is unaskable. The question is, What are the conceivable causes in existence which generate knowledge? And the answer is, That no existence at all can be conceived by any intelligence anterior to, and aloof from, knowledge. Knowledge of existence—the apprehension of oneself and other things—is alone true existence. This is itself the First, the Bottom, the Origin—and this is what all intelligence is prevented by the laws of all reason from ever getting beyond or below. To inquire what this proceeds from, is as inept as to ask what is the Beginning of the Beginning. All the explanations which can be proposed can find their data only by presupposing the very knowledge whose genesis they are professing to explain. In thinking of things as antecedent to all knowledge, some me or mind must always be thought of along with them; and in thinking of some me or mind as antecedent to all knowledge, some things or determinations must always be thought of along with it. But the conception of this synthesis is itself the conception of knowledge; so that we are compelled to ​assume as the ground of our explanation, the very thing (knowledge) which that ground had been brought forward to explain.
The synthesis of ego and non-ego is original, and not factitious or secondary.36. And finally, it must be borne in mind that although all cognition has been characterised by this system as a fusion or synthesis of two contradictories (the ego and non-ego)—that is, of two elements which, out of relation to each other, are necessarily unknowable—this does not mean that the synthesis is brought about by the union of two elements, which existed in a state of separation previous to the formation of the synthesis. The synthesis is the primary or original; the analysis is the secondary or posterior. The contradictory elements are found by an analysis of the synthesis, but the synthesis is not generated by putting together the parts obtained by the analysis, because these parts can be conceived only in relation to each other, or as already put together.