# A History of Persia/Chapter 8

CHAPTER VIII.
FROM the perusal of the preceding chapter it will have been seen that so unsettled was the condition of Persia in the reign of Fetteh Ali Shah, that scarcely a single year elapsed without the occurrence, in one direction or another, of some outbreak in the kingdom or on the frontiers, which called for the armed interference of the king's representatives. Such was the normal state of things, but as these outbreaks for the most part soon subsided, and left Persia in the same condition in which they had found her, they were not looked upon by the Shah's government as being very serious calamities. If they had their darker aspect, they had also a brighter side on which they might be viewed. If they excited discontent amongst the people of the districts ravaged by the insurgents or invaders, they in turn afforded to an unpaid army the opportunity of enriching itself by ​plunder. There had been but one war in which Persia, since the accession of the Kajars, had been obliged to cede any territory, and the Shah was therefore only careful to avoid giving occasion for another struggle with the powerful neighbour whose might he had so sorely felt. But notwithstanding this sincere desire on the part of Fetteh Ali, perverse circumstances once more led to a serious and threatening misunderstanding between his Government and that of Russia. The treaty of Gulistan was not worded with sufficient accuracy as regarded some portions of the line of frontier which was thenceforth to separate the respective possessions of Russia and of Persia; and although many years had elapsed since its ratification, no definite arrangement had been concluded for the settlement of the points in dispute. When at length commissioners were nominated, and when they met on the ground under dispute, matters did not seem to have advanced at all towards a satisfactory settlement, for fresh discussions were created as the commissioners became personally acquainted with the localities they visited. The Russian agents, conscious of the power by which they were backed, determined to adhere to that view of the treaty of Gulistan which appeared to them to be most in accordance with the interests of their master, while the Persian commissioners, who perhaps knew more of the real meaning of the disputed article of the treaty, refused to give up any portion of the territory, which, according to their view, belonged to the Shah. There were three small portions of land which formed the chief subject of discussion, the principal one of which was the district of Gokcheh, which of right belonged to the Shah, and ​which lies to the left of the beautiful lake of the same name, and between it and Erivan. The other two districts in dispute were those of Guni and Balakloo. The lands of Kapan were also made a subject of contention.
Agents were sent from the Governor-General of the Caucasus to Tabreez, and from the Crown-Prince to Tiflis, and on two occasions the points in dispute seemed to be in the way of being satisfactorily settled. On the first, however, the provisional agreement entered into by the Russian chargé d'affaires at Tabreez was not ratified by General Yermeloff at Tiflis, and on the second, the engagement drawn up by the Persian agent at the latter city was not ratified by the Shah. With a view to obtain the royal consent to this treaty, the Russian chargé d'affaires, who by the King's wish resided at the Court of the Crown-Prince, visited the Shah's camp in the summer of 1825, and on his efforts for the above- mentioned end proving unsuccessful, the Government of Georgia occupied with a military force the district of Gokcheh.
This step is said to have convinced the court of Persia that Russia was determined to make use, in the settlement of the frontier question, of the convincing argument that might makes right, and the remonstrances which the Shah at once addressed at Tiflis against this seizure, were met by the reply that Gokcheh would be given up, provided that, on the other hand, the lands of Kapan, to which Russia advanced a claim, were given up by Persia. In the meantime, a very strong feeling against Russia had been arising throughout the Shah's dominions, which owed its origin to more than ​one cause. The people had had time to breathe since the last war between the two nations, and anger at the loss of so many rich provinces could not but rankle in the minds of the vain inhabitants of Iran. But what chiefly excited their hatred against their Northern neighbours, was the story that reached them of the contemptuous manner in which the Muscovites treated the Mahomedans who were subject to their sway. Indeed many of the inhabitants of the Moslem districts of Transcaucasia, and many also from amongst the Christians of that country, had made secret overtures of assistance to the Shah, in the event of his one day seeking to re-conquer the provinces which had been reft from his empire. The occupation of Gokcheh by Russia at once blew into a flame the embers of religious frenzy which were already alive throughout Persia. The priests, taking the lead in the movement, proclaimed aloud, from the pulpits of the mosques, the necessity of chastising the infidels who had dared to lower their religion; and so great was the pressure brought to bear upon the Shah, that he found himself under the necessity of engaging to go to war with Russia, unless she should agree to the evacuation of Gokcheh. The crown-prince, untaught by past experience, was anxious to measure himself once more in the field against the Russian commanders; and there were only two men, it seemed, in the whole kingdom, who supported the Shah in his wish to avoid a war, if a war might yet be avoided. These were his Minister for Foreign Affairs, who, having filled the post of ambassador to Russia, was acquainted with the vast resources of that power, and the Moëtemed-ed-Dowleh, of whose capacity the Shah had had abundant ​proof. The chief religious authority in Persia, too, the high priest of Ispahan, seems to have retained some slight remnant of prudence, after that quality was no longer discernible in the conduct and language of his professional brethren. He sent a confidential messenger to the king, to inquire whether or not it were the royal wish that the people should be excited to war, and following closely after his agent to Tehran, he there had an interview with the Shah. But the religious excitement had now attained to such a pitch, that it was useless to try to arrest its development, and Fetteh Ali had to allow himself to be carried along by the current. He started for his summer camp at Sultaneea.
At this time news reached Persia of the death of the Czar Alexander and the accession to empire of his brother Nicholas; this intelligence was quickly followed by the announcement that Prince Menchikoff was on his way to the court of Tehran. The Russian envoy was received with distinction, the Shah entertaining the hope that through his means the points in dispute between Persia and Russia, as to their frontier, might be satisfactorily arranged. But scarcely had the negotiations opened, when a long train of priests from the capital, headed by the Imam-i-Juma of Ispahan, arrived at the royal camp. Prince Menchikoff had no power to consent to the evacuation of the district of Gokcheh, and the Shah was therefore forced to break up the conferences and to give the prince his passports. He was, however, up the last, treated with the utmost distinction, and the king strove by the richness of the presents which he bestowed on this occasion, to lessen the chagrin which the Russian envoy might be expected to ​feel on receiving his dismissal from the Kajar court. The whole people of Persia seemed to be united in the determination to enter upon a religious war, and the king's last scruples were removed on his receiving intimation of the threat that if he should still decline to lead his people to battle, his subjects would find another leader for themselves. The nation was indeed roused to action as it never had been roused since the period when its energies had been directed by Nadir. From the Bakhtiari mountains and from the hills of Looristan; from the vales of Khorassan and the plains of Irak; troops in thousands came to join the standard of the crown-prince, to whom was assigned the task of conducting the war, which was now begun without recourse being had to the preliminary ceremony of a formal declaration.
The first blow struck in this war was given by the hereditary chief of Taleesh, who, with the object of rescuing his wife from the hands of the Russian authorities, attacked a detachment on its march to Lankoran. ​Being thus committed so seriously with the Muscovite government, the Khan lost no time in rousing the people of the province to take up arms against the inﬁdels, and at the same time he sent to ask the support of the Shah in an undertaking, the sole object of which, he declared, was to restore Taleesh to the Persian crown. A corps of ten thousand men was accordingly sent to his aid, with which body he was enabled to lay siege to the Russian station of Lankoran. That place was abandoned, and the garrison took refuge in the adjacent island of Sari, thus leaving the whole of the mainland of Taleesh in the hands of the Persians. A division of the Shah's troops, commanded by one of his sons, hastened in the meantime to cross the Araxes, and the crown-prince lost no time in bringing up the reinforcements under his orders. The Russians were found to be altogether unprepared for so sudden a beginning of war, and at ﬁrst the impetuous Persians carried all before them. The disputed districts of Gokcheh, Balaklu, and Guni were taken possession of in the name of the Shah, and Abbass Meerza made ready to advance on the important fortress of Sheeshah in Karabagh. He did not, however, march upon this place so rapidly as not to allow the Russian ofﬁcer who commanded there to have sufficient time to call in some detachments from the neighbourhood, and to put himself in a posture of defence.
It may here be remarked as strange that the Governor-General of the Caucasus should have taken no more effectual measures to guard against being surprised by the Persians at a time when the envoy of Russia was refusing to accede to the Shah's peremptory ​demand for the evacuation of the territory of Gokcheh. The language used by the representative of Russia should have been based upon a firmer state of preparation to resist the force of Persia. Taken as they were by surprise, the Russian officers, with the exception of the colonel commanding at Sheeshah, had no choice but to quit their posts and fall back upon places of safety. A Persian division marching into Karabagh under the command of the Shah's son, Ismail Meerza, encountered at Khunzerukh a Russian detachment which was making its way towards Sheeshah. The weather was extremely hot, and the Russians were parched with thirst, and to these circumstances their colonel afterwards attributed the fact of his regiment surrendering to the Persians. Four hundred soldiers were killed or wounded, and the rest of the battalion, as well as two guns, fell into the power of the prince, who sent his prisoners to the Shah's camp. There half of the private soldiers thus taken soon enlisted themselves in the Persian service. After this, the Russian general who commanded the district bordering on Erivan, retired to Lori, a strong position on the Tabeda river, from which Hassan Khan, the brother of the hereditary Sirdar of Erivan, found it impossible to dislodge him. The Persian troops, however, were for the present unopposed in the open field, and they carried terror and destruction up to the Russian outposts the Sirdar penetrating in one raid to the immediate vicinity of Tiflis. The Russian officer in command at Genja, having marched across country to the assistance of the general commanding at Lori, the Mahomedans of Genja rose upon, ​and massacred, the garrison that had been left in the place, and at the same time exterminated the Armenian inhabitants of the town. They then sent to entreat Abbass Meerza to advance to their support, and the prince responded to this appeal by despatching his eldest son, together with Ameer Khan, chief of the upper branch of the Kajar tribe, to the assistance of the men of Genja. His Highness at the same time sent forward the hereditary chief of the place, but he himself remained before the fortress of Sheeshah. The rising throughout the whole of the provinces inhabited by Mahomedans continued to spread. The hereditary chiefs of Sheerwan, of Sheki, and of Bakoo returned to their respective governments from their places of exile, and were soon employed actively in cooperating with the officer in command of the Shah's troops in Taleesh ; whilst at the same time the wild mountaineers of Daghestan did not lose the opportunity of adding to the confusion prevailing by descending to the plains, and plundering Russians and Persians with utter impartiality. In the course of three weeks, Russia had lost for the time nearly all the territory that had been ceded to her by the treaty of Gulistan. Sheerwan, Sheki, Taleesh, and Genja were evacuated, and the few remaining Russians to the east of Tiflis were forced to seek shelter in the forts of Bakoo, Derbend, and Kooba. The only advanced post which the troops of the Governor- General now held was the fortress of Sheeshah, which continued to defy the power of Abbass Meerza. The prince remained before that place for six weeks, the effect which his guns produced upon the walls being concealed from him by canvas stretched behind them.
​In the meantime a large force was being concentrated at Tiflis; and the foremost Russian division, consisting of 9,000 men of all arms, was pushed forward to Shamkar, a village in the vicinity of Genja. The young prince, Mahomed Meerza, who now commanded in that place, moved out at the head of about 10,000 men to engage the advancing Russians. A battle was fought on the banks of the Zezam, a small stream of which the contending armies occupied the opposite sides. The Russian force, about a third of which was cavalry, was drawn up in one line, its left resting on the stream, and the whole of the cavalry being placed on the right, and separated by the guns from the infantry. Half of the Persian force consisted of cavalry, which was placed behind the line in which the infantry was drawn up. The Persian horse moved to the flank, with the intention of attacking the Russian cavalry; but it was kept in check, and soon forced to retire, by the well-directed fire of the Russian artillery. Upon this the cavalry advanced and pursued the Persians along the whole line of their infantry and to the rear of that body. General Madadoff, the Russian commander, upon this ordered his infantry to advance, which had the effect of enclosing the Persians between two fires. They thereupon broke and retired in confusion, leaving their field-pieces in the hands of the enemy. Of the two Persian commanders, Ameer Khan was shot by a Cossack when in the act of endeavouring to rally his troops; and Mahomed Meerza, the future king of Persia, had actually fallen into the hands of the Cossacks, when he was rescued by a Shahsevend chief, who carried him off behind him on his horse. This was the turning-point ​of the war. From that day the Russians began to roll back the tide of victory upon their foes. General Madadoff now recovered Genja without a struggle, and connected the town and citadel with a strong line of communication. Fresh reinforcements were ordered up from Tiflis, and the command of the army in the field was conferred upon General Paskievitch, who advanced to a position some miles to the south of Genja, where he determined to await the approach of Abbass Meerza.
The crown-prince hastened to repair the disaster which had happened to his son, and on the 26th of September the hostile armies met each other. The force commanded by the prince now numbered about 30,000 men, and the siege of Sheeshah was carried on by another division. It cannot be doubted that it was a mistake on the part of the Persian commander-in-chief to risk a general engagement with the Russian troops. The latter would have been far more readily overcome had the Persians contented themselves with laying waste the country over which extended the route of the enemy. As it was, every advantage was voluntarily given by the prince to the Russian commander, who was allowed to choose his own fighting ground; and when the Persian troops came within a short distance of the enemy they were kept under arms during the succeeding night, in order to avoid the risk of a surprise. On the following morning the prince left his camp at an early hour, and, after a march of about ten miles, found the enemy drawn up in squares on the level plain to the east of the fort and suburb of Genja, which covered their rear. The Russian army consisted of about 10,000 or 12,000 infantry, a regiment of dragoons, about 2,000 Cossacks, 3,000 ​irregular troops of the Caucasus, and twenty pieces of cannon. The cavalry were placed on the flanks and the artillery in the centre. To oppose this force the Persian commander had under his orders about 30,000 men, of which 16,000 were infantry, and the remainder irregular cavalry, with some artillerymen. He had also twenty-two light field-pieces, directed by an Englishman in his service. The infantry regiments were drawn up in one long line, having fourteen guns to their right and eight to their left, while the cavalry covered the flanks and rear. The battle commenced by a cannonade from both sides; the Russian artillery being so ill-served that the shot for the most part went over the heads of the Persians, doing little or no execution; while the fire of some of the Persian guns was so well directed as to compel one of the Russian divisions to retire and abandon its cannon. Two battalions, composed of the men of Karadagh, charged the retiring square, and had the remaining Persian infantry made a corresponding movement in advance at that critical moment, it is probable that victory would have crowned their effort. The great body of the troops, however, remained stationary; and the two Karadagh battalions, being unable to maintain their position without support, fell back in confusion.
It is said that at this juncture Prince Abbass Meerza was so ill-advised as to send a message to his sons to withdraw themselves from the thick of the fight. The messenger either misunderstood the order which he was to convey, or he was himself misunderstood in the midst of the noise and confusion of the battle. The result was that the young princes conceived the notion that their father wished them to withdraw the troops under their com​mand, and accordingly the line gave way and a general rout ensued. The regiments of infantry, composed of men from Irak, broke without having fired a shot, and retired in the utmost confusion. The loss of the Persians upon this occasion would have been greater had not their retreat been covered by some artillery, which, assisted by the prince's guards, kept the pursuers in check. One battalion of Russian light infantry, together with the dragoons and the irregular horse, followed the Persians for about eight miles; but the pursuers were not able to effect much injury. Abbass Meerza endeavoured in vain to rally his broken army, and remained with his guns till the last shot had been fired. He then withdrew towards Ooslandooz, accompanied by a small body of infantry and nearly 5,000 horsemen. The remainder of the army dispersed in various directions, and made for the banks of the Araxes. At the beginning of the action the Russian cavalry had been charged by the Persian horse, and driven back amongst the trees and ruined suburbs of Genja; but this partial success was rendered unavailing by the defeat of the infantry, and the horsemen followed their retreating comrades. The actual loss of the Persians on this day did not exceed 1,500 men, but the survivors were dispirited, and all organization was for the time being gone. Only one piece of artillery was captured by the Russians, and its loss was owing to three of the horses attached to it having been killed.
But disastrous as was this day to Persia, it might have proved an useful one to that country, had her rulers been possessed of sufficient wisdom and energy to profit by the lessons it taught. The Persian army had at one time been on the point of driving the ​enemy from the field, and the temporary success was to be attributed to the disciplined courage of two regiments from Karadagh, and to the fire of the prince's artillery. These battalions, as well as the artillerymen, had been trained by competent and zealous foreign instructors, and had the whole army been equally well drilled, there can be no doubt that the fate which befell the Persians would that day have befallen their enemies. Could the Shah have convinced himself of the fact that in his hardy and obedient subjects he possessed the material for an army capable at any time of defending his dominions against invaders, provided that his troops should be properly drilled, the lesson would have been cheaply paid for by the disaster of Genja; but the rulers of Persia have not grown wiser by the experience of the past, and to this day the Shah's army is only half-drilled, and is in reality less effective, either for the purposes of defence or of offence, than if it were not drilled after the fashion of European armies at all.
At Genja the command of the Persian troops was shared by the crown-prince with the Asef-ed-Dowleh a proud nobleman who occupied the post of prime minister to the Shah. The Asef-ed-Dowleh quitted the field at the first alarm of danger, and, accompanied by a slender retinue of well-mounted horsemen, pressed his flight with such unwearied diligence that he reached the Araxes, a distance of a hundred and fifty miles from Genja, on the night of the day after the action. On the following evening the crown-prince rejoined him, when mutual recriminations took place between them. Each accused the other of being the author of the catastrophe which had occurred, and they parted in hostility, each ​taking the route towards the camp of the Shah. The roads were now covered with fugitives proceeding to their homes, and many of those who were intercepted and brought into the royal camp, were found not to have tasted food for several days. After the battle of Genja, the Russian general lost no time in sending on reinforcements to the garrison of Sheeshah, the siege of which place was now discontinued. The Shah on his part proceeded to Tabreez, and took immediate steps for the assembling of a fresh army, the command of which was to be entrusted to the luckless crown-prince. Abbass Meerza was not deficient in courage, but he had not the qualities required by the leader of an army, and his self-possession invariably deserted him in the hour of battle. The prince, too, was on such bad terms with more than one of his brothers, that, even at the present critical juncture, they refused to serve under him. It was found necessary to give to Ismail Meerza a separate command; and Abdullah Meerza, the governor of Zinjan, in bringing up his contingent, stipulated with the Shah that he should not be called upon to act under the orders of his brother, the crown-prince. The Zinjan troops were accordingly sent to the Erivan frontier, to cooperate with those of the Sirdar of that city.
It had been the Shah's policy throughout his reign to humble the hereditary nobles of the country, and now at each chief city of the kingdom one of the numerous members of the royal family presided. With the exception of some of the princes and the Sirdar of Erivan and his brother, the Shah now possessed no general capable of handling troops in the field. The ablest soldier in Persia was undoubtedly Hassan Ali ​Meerza, the governor-general of Khorassan. That prince offered his services in the prosecution of the war against Russia; but it was considered by the government that at such a crisis it would be unsafe to remove the check which his presence in Khorassan imposed upon the turbulent chiefs of that province. Some of the Khorassan squadrons of cavalry were, however, directed to march to Azerbaeejan; and the prince of Kermanshah received orders to bring up the whole disposable force of his province and a body of horsemen from Looristan, making together a corps of twelve thousand men. The ruling weakness of Fetteh Ali Shah was an extreme unwillingness to part with money. This avariciousness increased with his years, and it was peculiarly disagreeable to him to be forced now by circumstances to disburse to his army one year's pay in advance, besides having to expend the sum of fifty thousand tomans in refurnishing the arsenal at Tabreez.
On the Russian side, General Sewadzamidzoff quitted his position at Lori, and marched by the route of Gumri upon the fortress of Erivan; but he was so much harassed by the troops of Hassan Khan, that, after having approached to within a short distance of the city, he was forced to retire with the loss of four hundred men and a portion of his baggage. The Russian force thus discomfited was composed of about five thousand men, and was scarcely inferior in point of numbers to that under the Sirdar of Erivan. But an occasional display of activity and bravery on the part of some of the Shah's troops was not sufficient to counteract the influence of the disciplined organization of the Russian army. Through the most shameful malversation on the part ​of some Persian officials at Tabreez, the arsenal at that place was quite unfit to supply the troops with the most necessary articles for carrying on a campaign. Not more than two thousand shot were to be found, and of these the half were either too large or too small for the calibres of the guns for which they had been cast; and the whole city of Tabreez could not supply lead for musket bullets, nor even paper for the construction of cartridges. The Shah declared that he was tired of drill, and he threatened to gather a body of a hundred thousand horsemen, and to overrun and lay waste the Caucasian provinces of Russia. But at the same time that he uttered this threat he was inwardly pining for the return of peace, and his ministers were instructed to discuss with each other, and with the representative of the Government of India, the terms upon which an end might honourably be put to the war.
The council of the king was divided into two factions, one of which was in favour of a continuance of war, while the other voted for concessions and peace. To the first party belonged the Asef-ed-Dowleh, who was the most powerful nobleman in the kingdom, and allied to the Shah by marriage, and he was seconded in his policy by the Kaim-Makam, a vizeer of great capacity. To the opposite party belonged the minister for foreign affairs, and the Moetemed-ed-Dowleh, who were backed by the personal influence of the Shah, and by that of his confidential Georgian eunuch. It was at length determined to send an envoy to Tifiis with instructions to endeavour to pave the way for the restoration of peace, and he was the bearer of letters from the Shah's minister to Count Nesselrode, expressive of the regret ​with which they would view a continuance of the war. This envoy, however, could not at first proceed further than Tabreez, in consequence of the vicinity of a Russian force to that city. The Governor-General of the Caucasus had been reinforced by the arrival of ten thousand men at Tiflis, while the division of Astrakan came up to Kooba and Derbend, and compelled the Shah's troops in that direction to retire. It seems then to have occurred to General Yermeloff to make immediate use of the additional force of which he was now master, and accordingly two Russian divisions moved into the enemy's country in the heart of winter. One of these bodies of men, consisting of infantry, cavalry, and artillery, crossed the Araxes at a point from which it might have marched either on Ardabeel or on Tabreez. Both of these cities were undefended, the Persian troops having been dismissed to their homes for the winter.
Notwithstanding this circumstance, it would have been an act of rashness on the part of the Russian officer who commanded the invaders to have attacked Tabreez with so slender a force as that which he had under his orders, but it was open to him to march upon the city of Ardabeel. Indeed it is difficult to conceive what object other than the hope of capturing this city could have induced the Russian military authorities to expose their troops to the dangers and privations of a winter campaign in a country so trying as that bordering on the river Araxes. The possession of Ardabeel by the Russians would have been a standing threat both to Tabreez and to Tehran, whilst from that commanding position the Russian leaders would have exercised a paramount influence over the warlike tribes of the vast plains ​of Moghan. But these considerations seem to have exercised no influence on the conduct of the Russian commander of the force which now invaded Persia; for, after having exposed his men to all the trials of a winter march through a hilly country destitute of roads and covered with snow, he retired as he had come, and allowed the Persians to recover from the consternation into which his approach had plunged them. The only fruit of his expedition was the seizure of some stores of wheat and rice, the property of Abbass Meerza. After the retreat of this predatory expedition, the Persian envoy found his opportunity of proceeding to Tiflis, and as a peace-offering, he took with him some hundred of Russian prisoners whom the Shah released without ransom. But at Tiflis he learned little which it would give satisfaction to the Shah to hear. The Russian authorities gave it to be understood that in order to secure peace, Persia must be prepared to relinquish the possession of the provinces of Erivan and Nakhtchivan, which lay between her former frontier and the Araxes, and further to defray the charges of the war. The envoy was then permitted to return to Tabreez with the assurance that the reply of Count Nesselrode to the letters from the Persian ministers, would be forwarded to Tehran. That reply, when received, was found to be couched in haughty terms, which showed that Russia did not as yet share the wishes of the Shah for the restoration of peace.
The Persian monarch at this juncture, which was one of the greatest importance as regarded the future destiny of his kingdom, did not act in such a manner ​as to show his subjects that he was worthy of being the absolute director of the policy of Persia. He wished for peace, but so great was his pride, that it had required all the efforts of the representative of the Indian Government to induce him to consent to the mission of an envoy to Tiflis; while, on the other hand, he could not be persuaded to devote a sufficient portion of his ample treasure for the purpose of equipping an army in such a manner as to enable his son to carry on the war with effect. His parsimonious disposition made it harder for him to part with his gold than to see his armies vanquished, and his territory invaded by the enemy. The following anecdote gives proof of the extent to which the unprincely vice of avarice had by this time gained possession of the mind of the Shah. Some boxes containing mirrors and lamps had been left in the royal camp by Prince Menchikoff, and Fetteh Ali caused them to be seized on the flimsy pretence that the Russian envoy had intimated that they were intended to be given as a present to the Persian monarch. It was feared by the peace party of his court, that if this act of spoliation should be repeated to the Russian authorities it would be likely to raise a personal feeling against the Shah, and so to retard the conclusion of peace. But the king fiercely refused to relinquish his prey, and at length Abbass Meerza had to purchase the mirrors and lamps from his father in order that they might be restored to Prince Menchikoff. In the same spirit the Shah insisted on throwing the expense and burden of the war upon the single province of Azerbaeejan, the revenues of which belonged to the crown-prince.
With the spring of the year 1827, both sides ​prepared to resume hostilities, and the regularly-drilled regiments of Abbass Meerza were employed in garrisoning the forts, and protecting the passes along the line of the Araxes, a duty which might have been equally well performed by irregular Persian troops, had the Shah placed such at the disposal of the prince. So shortsighted a line of conduct is altogether inexcusable on the part of the Persian king, who was at that moment master of an available force of eighty thousand men, exclusive of the contingents of Fars, Kerman, and Azerbaeejan. On the 25th of April, the Russian division, commanded by Prince Sewadzemizoff, broke up from its camp at Lori, and marched to the Armenian convent of Etchmiadzeen, twelve miles distant from Erivan, and from there reconnoitred the fortress of Sirdarabad; in performing which service it encountered opposition from the Persians, and met with some loss. In Karadagh, the Russian division under General Madadoff approached the Araxes near the bridge of KhodaAfereen. On the morning of the 4th of May, the engineers endeavoured to construct a floating bridge of rafts, but they were prevented from doing so by the Persians, who kept up a very heavy fire of musketry from behind the rocks that at that point stretch almost to the water's edge. Many of the Muscovite soldiers engaged in the work were killed, and some were forced to seek safety in the river, in the rapid currents of which, however, they only found a watery grave. Two Persian field-pieces, which had been brought up during the preceding night, now opened fire on the Russian camp near the stream, and the whole corps then retired with precipitation, leaving some tents on the ground, as well ​as the timber with which they had intended to construct the raft and repair the bridge. The troops who thus retreated, are said to have numbered ten thousand men, while the Persians were less numerous. The result of this action was to be attributed to the nature of the ground where it took place, in which the Russian artillery was of no service whatever. The position of Etchmiadzeen was well calculated as a base for further operations. From Tiflis the Russian general had brought with him Archbishop Narses, to act as patriarch of the Armenian church, and under such auspices it was easy to obtain the good wishes and active cooperation of the Christian inhabitants of that portion of Armenia. To the strongly-walled village of Etchmiadzeen the Russian commander brought up from Lori stores of all kinds, which were deposited in the ample rooms of the monastery. At this juncture General Yermaloff, who had arranged the plan of a summer campaign, was suddenly recalled from his government, in which he was succeeded by General Paskiewitch. The latter officer now took the field in person, to command a disposable force of about twenty thousand men. The object of the Russian Governor-General was to obtain possession of the important city and fortress of Erivan. It was attempted on the part of a Russian agent, to win over the Sirdar Hassan Khan; but that chief and his aged brother remained true to the interests of the Shah.
On the 6th of May the siege of Erivan was commenced, and two days later the investment of that place was complete. Hassan Khan attempted to annoy the besiegers from without, but his horsemen were driven off, and the city continued for several weeks to be beleaguered. ​On the morning of the 8th of June, a Russian column, consisting of two thousand infantry, and an equal number of cavalry, with six pieces of artillery, crossed the Araxes, near which stream the guns and infantry were posted, whilst the cavalry advanced to attack Hassan Khan, who, with a similar number of irregular horseman, and two regiments of infantry, had taken up his position on the slope of a hill, called Koh-i-zoor. Some Polish lancers charged the Persians, and broke through their ranks; but Hassan Khan, taking the supporting Cossacks in flank, drove them before him, and forced them to make the circuit of the plain in order to rejoin their reserve. An officer of the Affshar horse, fancying that he recognized in the colonel of one of the regiments of Cossacks the same person who in a previous affair had slain his brother, was fired with an ungovernable desire to perform what to a Persian is the sacred duty of avenging a relative's blood. Singling out his adversary, he followed him throughout the circuitous pursuit, and having cut him down between two Russian guns, succeeded in effecting his own escape. In the meantime the siege of Erivan was still prosecuted. On the arrival before that place of General Paskiewitch on or about the 25th of June, the garrison was called upon to surrender, with the offer of being allowed to retire with the honours of war. But Hassan Khan replied that it would ill become him to close his long life by an act of treachery to his king, and the Russian approaches were thereupon pushed onwards near to the city. New batteries poured for four or five successive days a heavy but fruitless fire into the place, and not a single man suffered from its effects. At length, on the 1st of July, after the investment of the fortress had ​lasted for eight weeks, the Imperial army broke up from before Erivan, and General Paskiewitch, leaving that stronghold behind him, marched on Nakhtchivan, after having sent his sick and wounded men to the Monastery of Etchmiadzeen. Thus for the third time the troops of the Czar failed in their efforts to take the fortress of Erivan.
On the 12th of July the Russian moveable force, consisting of 18,000 men and thirty pieces of ordnance, marched from Nakhtchivan to Abbassabad, a fortress on the northern bank of the Araxes, a little lower on the stream. This place was held by 3,000 men and was well supplied with provisions. Abbassabad had been fortified by a French engineer and was capable of presenting considerable obstacles to the besieging army. But treachery lurked within its battlements, over which the Russian eagles were destined soon to wave their wings. The chief of the tribe of Kangerloo had been won over to the cause of the Russians, and he only awaited a fitting opportunity for delivering up the place into their hands. On the night of the 14th of July an attempt was made to carry Abbassabad by escalade, but the assailants were repulsed with heavy loss. The fort was then closely invested by the Russians, who were in turn watched by the troops of Abbass Meerza; by those of Hassan Khan; and by those of the Asef-ed-Dowleh; the last-mentioned person being put to flight in an affair which took place on the 16th of July. On that occasion Hassan Khan crossed the Araxes with his cavalry and attacked the Russian outposts, but he was driven back by the infantry and pursued by the cavalry and by a number of foot-soldiers who were conveyed over the stream at the backs of their mounted comrades, each ​horse carrying two men. The Persian guns opened on this body so soon as it had formed on the right bank of the Araxes. The Russians thereupon, finding the ford impassable, threw ropes from one bank to the other higher up the stream, in order to prevent their men from being swept away by the current, and by these means they transported three thousand infantry to the right bank. Hassan Khan was unable to interrupt this movement, and as his men and their horses were exhausted with fatigue, he sent a message to Abbass Meerza requesting that the Asef-ed-Dowleh might be ordered to attack with his cavalry the half-formed battalions of the enemy. This suggestion was not complied with, but on the other hand the Russians turned their guns upon the Persian horse, as they stood crowded together in a ravine, and drove them in confusion from the field. The troops under the immediate command of the crown-prince were withdrawn in good order, and those of Hassan Khan held their ground, whilst the Russians recrossed to the left bank of the Araxes. But the flight of the troops of the Asef-ed-Dowleh afforded to the base chief of the tribe of Kangerloo the opportunity which he waited for, of delivering up Abbassabad to the foe. The garrison for the most part made terms with General Paskiewitch, with the exception of a regiment of Bakhtiari that crossed to the right of the stream before the fall of the fort. But no sufficient attempt was made to follow up this success, and the Russian commander-in-chief, after having left a suitable force in Abbassabad, retired by Nakhtchivan to the frontier with the intention of allowing to his troops some time for repose. It may have been necessary for General Paskiewitch to spare his ​army, but by so doing he lost a precious opportunity of following up the advantage he had gained at Abbassabad. Had he crossed the river and marched towards Khoi, where the Shah was then encamped, he would have thrown his majesty into the utmost state of consternation, and might have wrung from his fears an advantageous peace.
The Prince Abbass Meerza was now most desirous that a term should be put to the war, and he accordingly sent a confidential agent to Tiflis who was charged with a letter from the representative of the Indian Government to the Russian commander-in-chief on the subject of a negotiation for peace. In consequence of this step, M. Grebaiodoff, a gentleman whose subsequent melancholy fate made his name to be remembered, was deputed by General Paskiewitch to the Persian camp for the purpose of offering the following conditions of accommodation: namely, that there should be an armistice for five weeks; that Persia should cede to the Emperor in perpetuity all the countries now belonging to her to the south of the Araxes; and that the Shah should pay the sum of 700,000 tomans in compensation for the expenses of the war and the ravages committed by the Persian troops. The prince would not accede to these terms, and, as General Paskiewitch would not grant an armistice on any other basis, the negotiations were broken off, and Abbass Meerza, with the Sirdar Hassan Khan, marched towards Aberan, whilst the other Persian commanders were so placed as best to protect the extensive frontier from Karabagh to Taleesh. The prince and the sirdar now determined to attack the monastery of Etchmiadzeen; but in the neighbourhood of that place ​they encountered a Russian force which had been brought up from Aberan by General Karkoffski on his hearing a cannonade in the direction of the three churches. The Persians here numbered about five thousand infantry, and as many cavalry, with twenty-eight guns, while the Russians had the same number of infantry, but only one thousand cavalry and twelve guns. At evening, General Karkoffski arrived at Asterick, a village about six miles distant from Etchmiadzeen, and having rested there for the night, he resumed his march on the following morning. At a short distance from the village he passed a division of the Persian army, which was posted on some heights near the road, and a little further on he came abreast of a second column, under the command of the Sirdar of Erivan. Here the action commenced with a fire from the Persian artillery, so destructive that the Russians could not proceed, but were forced to endeavour to fall back upon Asterick. Their retreat was intercepted by the advance of a division led by Prince Abbass Meerza, and from that moment the battle became general throughout the line. The repeated charges of the Persian infantry, who, anxious to wipe off the disgrace of Genja, advanced in excellent order and with great intrepidity on the Russian squares, succeeded in throwing the latter into disorder. The fire of the prince's guns had the effect of preventing the Russian soldiers from reforming, and changed the well-organized battalions into a tumultuous throng. The Muscovite general was borne away from the field wounded; his brother, a lieutenant- colonel, was killed; and most of the officers of the division received wounds or death, after having made brave but fruitless efforts to rally their men. Some of ​them fell alive into the hands of the Persians, and these gentlemen, while estimating the loss on their side at nearly three thousand men, affirmed that, had their opponents evinced more moderation and less barbarity in the moment of victory, not one of the Russians would have escaped. The eagerness of the Persians to cut off the heads of their slain or wounded enemies gave time for many hard-pressed men to effect their escape; and many who had thrown aside their arms with the intention of surrendering, took courage on viewing the fate of their comrades, and fought with desperation their way towards the friendly walls of Etchmiadzeen. It is but just to the memory of Abbass Meerza to state that he did his best to discourage amongst his soldiers the practice of decapitating their slain enemies: he gave no reward for the heads which were brought to him after the battle of Asterick, but the sum of eleven tomans for each living prisoner. About one thousand of the Persians were killed or wounded in this action, in which it was fairly proved that the battalions of Azerbaeejan, which had been disciplined by a Major Hart and other English officers, were a match in the open field for nearly a similar number of Russian infantry.
Abbass Meerza, however, sensible that unless he should be supported by the whole power of Persia, he would not be able long to cope with the resources of Russia, addressed to his father a note setting forth the unvarnished truth, on the receipt of which the Shah fell into so ungovernable a fit of rage, that he sentenced the Vizeer who delivered the note, to pay a fine of six hundred tomans, and could not be approached for hours afterwards. On coming to his senses, after having ​consigned his son a hundred times to perdition, the king determined to send his Vizeer of Foreign Affairs to London, to press the British ministers to use their influence with Russia for the reestablishment of an honourable peace; but the mission of the Vizeer was postponed, pending the reply to some communications which had been already addressed to his Britannic Majesty's Ministers. General Paskiewitch, in the meantime, relieved the garrison of Etchmiadzeen, and the Persian commander retired to the south of the Araxes.
Towards the close of the September, the fort of Sirdarabad, near Mount Ararat, was deserted by its garrison, and fell into the hands of the Russians, and as General Paskiewitch was strengthened by the arrival of five thousand fresh troops, as well as by that of a siege-train, he now once more undertook the siege of Erivan. By the fall of Abbassabad and Sirdarabad, Erivan was now isolated, and it was the only post wanting to secure to the Russians the possession of the portion of Persia which lay to the south of the river Araxes. Up to this point of the campaign, the Russian commanders had owed their successes more to the supineness of the Shah and to the discontent of some of his subjects, than to any military talent or any remarkable energy displayed by themselves. But for the treachery of the garrisons of the above-mentioned two fortresses, it is probable that the campaign of 1827 would have left the belligerents in the same position relatively to each other in which it had found them at its opening. But fortune favoured General Paskiewitch, and the utterly infatuated conduct of the Shah rendered it only needful for the Imperial officers to come and see and conquer. When the heats ​of summer had subsided, Fetteh All Shah retired to Tehran, having positively refused to dole out any more money for the purpose of enabling his son to carry on the war. The resources of Tabreez were now exhausted, and the prince, therefore, with much reluctance dismissed the greater part of his troops to their homes for the winter, thus leaving the capital of Azerbaeejan undefended. Of this state of things General Paskiewitch was early made aware through the Armenians who corresponded with Archbishop Narses, and a corps of his army was accordingly pushed forward to Marend on the south of the Araxes, a town forty miles distant from Tabreez. The gloomy aspect of affairs seems at length to have broken the firmness of Hassan Khan, for we read that only eight days after the opening of the trenches before his city for the last time by the Russians, the hero of a hundred fights surrendered himself, and his brother's fortress, to General Paskiewitch, who thus earned the title of Count of Erivan.
A greater calamity was in reserve to punish the avarice and supineness of the Shah. Sensible when too late of the terrible consequences that were likely to follow the dismissal of his forces for the winter, the crown-prince made many fruitless attempts to reassemble his soldiers, and was on his way from Khoi to Tabreez with the few troops remaining to him, when, at the distance of one day's march from the place, he learned to his horror that its gates had been thrown open to Prince Aristoff, who with a force of 5,000 men had advanced from Marend. The dismay of the prince on receiving this intelligence may be more easily conceived than described. His wives and children had been left in Tabreez, and ​that city contained his palace, his artillery, and his military stores. He dismounted from his horse, and at once entreated Sir John Macdonald, the British envoy, to send one of his officers to arrange for an interview between his Royal Highness and General Paskiewitch. At the same time, as he was seated disconsolate under the shade of a willow-tree, he implored the envoy to lend him 3,000 tomans, to defray his current expenses. The British officer forthwith ordered that the sum specified should be handed over to the prince. But the Russian commander was not so courteous towards the royal personage in distress. Probably possessed by a feeling of secret satisfaction at being able to humble so exalted a personage, General Paskiewitch declined for the present the interview proffered by his Royal Highness. The prince had no resource but to brook this insult, and he retreated with the Sirdar Hussein Khan to Salmas, to await the pleasure of the conqueror.
The immediate cause of the fall of Tabreez may be stated to have been the disaffection of the chiefs of Marend, whose father had been put to death by Abbass Meerza, for having in the previous year deserted his post at the fortress of Genja. These young men, intent on revenge, were made aware of the discontent with which the people of the city endured the rule of the Asef-ed-Dowleh; and they accordingly assured Prince Aristoff that he would meet with no opposition in marching on the capital of Azerbaeejan. Nevertheless, the Asef-ed-Dowleh discharged with his own hand some shots pointed on the advancing Russian columns, and thus caused Prince Aristoff to suspect the truthfulness of the chiefs ​of Marend. But at the close of that day the high-priest of Tabreez, backed by many of the chief citizens, took the keys of the city from the gate-keepers, whom the party threw down from the top of the city wall. They then proceeded to the Russian camp, and invited the general to take possession of the place. On the receipt of this intelligence, General Paskiewitch brought up the bulk of his army, and on his arrival he omitted no means of soothing the inhabitants of Tabreez.
The standard of revolt was now raised by several of the discontented chiefs of Azerbaeejan, who, deprived by the policy of the Shah of much of their hereditary influence, thought to regain it under the sway of the Czar. Amongst these were the lords of Maragha, who liberated the Russian prisoners confided to their care, and proffered their own allegiance to the Emperor. Another insurgent was Jehangeer Khan, chief of the great tribe of Shekaki, and the son of the celebrated Sadek Khan, who had disputed the possession of the Persian throne with Fetteh Ali Shah, and who had perished so miserably at Tehran. This chieftain was now appointed to be governor of Ardabeel, in the name and on the behalf of the Emperor of Russia. Two of the best regiments in the Shah's service belonged to the tribe of Shekaki, and at the word of their chief they at once dispersed, and carried to their homes their arms and accoutrements. In short, the parsimoniousness and neglect of the Shah had brought about a state of things when his empire was fast crumbling to pieces; and, to crown all, the Russian commander-in-chief declared his intention of marching on Tehran, unless his demands should be instantly complied with. There existed indeed but one obstacle, namely, the pass of the Kaflankoh, to ​the advance of a force from Tabreez to Tehran; but to have pushed forward the small body of troops at his disposal 400 miles further from his base of operations, would have been a proceeding of so hazardous a nature, that nothing but the assurance of his being unopposed by the Persians could have justified it in the eyes of European tacticians. But in the same way the advance by Prince Aristoff on Tabreez a city of 200,000 warlike inhabitants with only 4,000 men, may be characterized as rash. Rashness is sometimes the most prudent course in war with irresolute Oriental enemies; and it is probable that had General Paskiewitch carried into execution his threat of marching on into the interior of the country, he would have obtained possession of the Persian capital.
The demands of the Russian plenipotentiaries at the conferences which now took place between them and Abbass Meerza at Dehraghan were that, in addition to Erivan and Nakhtchivan, the district of Makoo, on the south of the Araxes, and the province of Taleesh, should be given up to the Czar, together with the enormous sum of fifteen crores of tomans, or nearly 4,000,000£. sterling. The negotiations were protracted from the middle of November, 1827, until the end of the month of February of the following year, owing to the almost insuperable reluctance of the Shah to part with a portion of the treasure which it had been the task of a long reign to amass. Judging of European faith by his experience of the absence of truthfulness in the Persian character, Fetteh Ali Shah did not scruple ​to express his apprehensions lest General Paskiewitch should accept the Persian gold and then expend it in the prosecution of the war. It was fortunate that there yet remained one person to whose word the Shah expressed himself willing to trust. This was Sir John Macdonald, the British envoy; and Fetteh Ali positively refused to pay any portion of the sum asked by Russia unless the English representative would guarantee that General Paskiewitch would fulfil the conditions of the contract. This pledge, at the request of the Russian general, was readily given by Sir John Macdonald, and the negotiations were accordingly proceeded with. But it required the utmost pressure to induce the aged Shah to agree to the sum to which the Russian plenipotentiaries consented to reduce their demand, and it was to the personal influence exerted over his majesty by Mr. McNeill, of the British Mission, that the conclusion of peace was in a great measure to be ascribed. A treaty was at length agreed to on the 21st of February, 1828, by the plenipotentiaries assembled at Turkomanchai, a village a few miles to the west of the pass of Kaflankoh. The Shah's consent had not been given too soon, for the rebellious chiefs of Azerbaeejan had offered to the Russian general the assistance of 15,000 horsemen in the march to Tehran; and his Excellency, tired of delay and mistrustful of the honesty of the Shah, was preparing to move on the capital.
* ↑ Rauzat-es-Sefa.
* ↑ Blackwood's Magazine, vol. xxi.
* ↑ It is interesting to compare the manner in which European ambassadors in modern times are received at the Persian court with the treatment they met with in the time of the Sefaveean Shahs. The following extract from Chardin's Travels describes the reception of a Russian envoy at Ispahan (vol. iii. p. 177). "Celui de Moscovie parut un quart-d'heure après. Il entra du même côté, amené fur les chevaux du Roi par l'Introdućteur des Ambassadeurs;...L'introducteur mit pied à terre à cent cinquante pas du palais, et dit à l'ambassadeur de descendre aussi de cheval. Je ne sais si le Moscovite avait été informé que l'ambassadeur Lesqui n'avait descendu de cheval que beaucoup plus proche de l'entrée, ou que, par grandeur et pour l'honneur de son maître, il voulût passer et aller plus avant, tant y a qu'il fit résistance, et donnant ses talons à son cheval il le fit avancer trois ou quatre pas malgré l'opposition des valets de pied de l'introducteur, qui avait mit la main à la bride de son cheval pour le retenir. On l'arrêta alors tout à fait... Le roi ne leur dit [aux ambassadeurs] point une parole, et ne les regarda pas seulement."
* ↑ A.D.1826.
* ↑ Colonel Réut.
* ↑ September, 1826.
* ↑ He was afterwards Shah of Persia.
* ↑ AD. 1827.
* ↑ The Russian force at this time in Tabreez amounted to 15,000 infantry and cavalry with fifty guns.