# The Czechoslovak Review/Volume 3/Beneš and Kramář Report to the Nation

Beneš and Kramář Report to the Nation
On September 30 Edward Beneš, minister of foreign affairs, and Karel Kramář, chief of the Czechoslovak peace delegation, made a report to the National Assembly of their work at the peace conference. Both speeches are of very great importance and intrinsic interest, presenting the work of the Paris conference from the point of view of one of the smaller and new nations. We quote extensively from both speeches. Dr. Beneš said:
After four years of work abroad I return to my own land to render an account as foreign minister of the Czechoslovak Republic, of our activities at the peace conference and to lay the results of it in the form of several treaties before the National Assembly for ratification. . .
It seems to me proper on this occasion to say a few words about the spirit of our revolutionary labors and to point out, why and by what means we have achieved victory.
We declared war officially on Austria-Hungary on November 15, 1915, by a solemn declaration, and immediately commenced journalistic work in Switzerland, Paris and London. The first official assistance extended to us by the French government dates from February 1916. During the whole year 1916 we organized the Paris center with various branches in other Allied states, and already we looked forward toward the formation of a national revolutionary army. By our press propaganda and personal contact we archieved the first important success in January 1917, when the Allies in their note to President Wilson made the liberation of the nations of Austria-Hungary one of their war aims. At that lime we started to organize our prisoners of war into a national army, and in the summer of 1917 negotiations went on both in Russia and in France about creating a distinct army. On December 16, 1917, the French government published a decree, constituting the Czechoslovak army. Since that time the results of our labor grew and multiplied, and we reached one success after another. Even before that the revolutionary changes in Russia made possible the formation of a strong Czechoslovak army; and through the influence of these two armies we received the consent of the Italian government in April 1918 to the formation of another army in Italy. When our Siberian army in the spring of 1918 carried out its remarkable anabasis to the East, we obtained from the Allies the first private acknowledgement of our national independence.
As early as April 1918 French premier Clemenceau pledged himself to recognize our National Council as a government and our whole movement as the national movement of an Allied nation. This pledge was embodied in a letter of minister Pichon, dated June 28, 1918, by which our right to independence was for the first time clearly, solemnly and decisively acknowledged. The acts of the Italian government, signed in April 1918, constituting the Czechoslovak army in Italy, implied this also. One of the most serious blows to the Austro-Hungarian monarchy was inflicted by the declaration of the British government, August 11, 1918, by which in a manner precluding all ambiguity we- were recognized as an Allied and free nation. The same meaning was contained in the declaration of the United States, dated September 2, 1918, by which the National Council of Paris was definitely recognized as a government. These changes of supreme importance culminated in the constitution of the first provisional Czechoslovak government in Paris, October 14, 1918, which took place under very interesting circumstances, because at that time the Allies were not yet certain, whether Austria was destroyed or not. The declaration of our government came out at a moment, when Austria asked for peace and when strong friends of Austria worked for its salvation. By the formation of our government which confronted the Allies with an accomplished fact this question was settled, and thus, when the Allies granted armistice to Austria-Hungary and Germany, the Czechoslovak state from the point of view of the international law was already in existence. As Czechoslovak delegate I signed armistice terms, imposed upon our former tyrant, the Hapsburg empire. . . By this we automatically entered into the rank of states that must be represented at the peace conference. We entered the conference as an existing state on the same plane as others. It is difficult to realize -what would have happened, if we had not possessed the right to participate in the peace conference from the beginning as a fully acknowledged state. . .
Of great service to our cause was especially the strong national consciousness of all the elements of the nation, readiness to sacrifice lives and fortunes, and the passionate, convincing, sometimes almost fanatical fight against lies, deceit and violence, represented by the Central Powers. We made people respect us. When we entered the conference, it was under the influence of Siberian events, under the influence of accounts of the organization of our French and Italian armies and their bravery, under the influence of reports about the brave struggle of our nation, imprisoned in Austrian cells. All that gained strong friends and sympathies for our claims.
Our situation was very good, far better than that of many nations long in existence, incomparably better than that of nations which also ​ Dr. Beneš Welcomed in Budějovice. struggled desperately during the war for their independence, like the Lithuanians, Armenians and others. Even the position of the Jugoslavs, who had sacrificed so much during the war, as we well know, was not clear from the point of view of international law. United Jugoslavia was only recognized by the peace of Versailles.
In recalling these activities abroad, I cannot refrain from mentioning a few matters that possess a certain political significance.
The third day after the declaration of war I made preparations to secure a passport, in order to escape into the Allied states. During August 1914 I spent some time in the country and made occasional trips to Prague. In the country I considered what could be done, and at the end of August 1914 I decided to see Professor Masaryk. I met him on the Letná and began to bring forward all sorts of arguments, why it was necessary to attack Austria, to begin work at home and also abroad. Professor Masaryk listened with a certain reserve, almost with a smile. Then he said: “I have already started working; we can work together.”
The first care was to get money, to finance our activity. President Masaryk informed himself as to the situation at home, made a second trip to Holland, where he informed himself as to the situation abroad, and he also ascertained the situation in Vienna. On the basis of this we established the so-called “maffia” of which I acted as secretary, as long as Masaryk remained in Prague.
I cannot forget, how in those first days of organizing activity we worked hand in hand with Dr. Rašín. I recall these beginnings, because I want to stress one characteristic of our entire foreign labor: it was carried on with a clear, firm, definite program. We had a few ideas, these ideas were engraved in everyone’s heart, and we followed them devotedly. Thus it happened that our action at home and abroad was always harmonious. It was best expressed by our president, when he first met delegates from Prague in Paris after the October overthrow. He told me then: “We were separated by thousands of miles, but methods, aims, principles were such that not in a single case did our steps or political decisions or tactical measures collide.”
At this point it is most appropriate that I mention the name of our noble comrade Milan Štefanik. His immense accomplishment must not be forgotten. If we have peace and freedom, his is the lion’s share of the accomplishment.
The method of our movement at first consisted simply in calling on our few friends in France, England and America and telling them about our attitude; we submitted facts and gave information. I remember that when I came to Paris I settled down in a side street in a small room on the sixth floor, and my budget during the first year provided for my living expenses the sum of 160 francs a month. At the same time President Masaryk in a little room in a London suburb was commencing his immense work of information and organization.
From the very first we had an exact and clear plan. Our movement supplemented the plans of the Allies. We emphasized from the beginning that Pan-Germanism was the chief danger, because it placed at the disposition of Germany the resources of the oppressed nations of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, and that therefore it is necessary to destroy Austria-Hungary which bears an equal and even greater share of the blame for war than Germany. That we were right is confirmed by recent disclosures which demonstrate that the responsibility for the war belongs to Austrian Germans, Magyars and Poles, because their representatives conducted the aggressive tactics against Serbia and put into motion the expedition against Serbia in 1914. And we have also the satisfaction of seeing that our Gen. Pellé, ex-minister Vrbenský, Mrs. Beneš, Dr. Scheiner, Dr. Štěpánek, John Masaryk, Minister Franke, Minister Beneš. ​ Mayor of Veselí addresses Dr. Beneš. entire plan which we were the first to preach has been realized almost to the last detail.
Three things were necessary; give out a clear political and war program which culminated in the war cry: destroy Austria-Hungary; start an intensive and reliable work of information and propaganda, and finally organize an army. We realized that the world was fighting and that we must fight also; we realized that without an army we could not exist. And so from the first moment we planned its creation. Let me say again that without an army, without actual belligerency, we could not have achieved our independence. And without a strong, democratic, nationally conscious army we will not be able, as things are today in Europe, to preserve our independence.
It is only right to state gratefully that wherever we came, our own people, our democratic elements in foreign countries, especially the workingmen of both socialist parties, instinctively were already doing what we consciously and with a clear-cut program set for our aim. In France, England, America, Russia, everywhere, our colonies were engaged in political work and many men entered the armies, either as distinct units or as parts of the Allied armies; thus they did independently what our plans provided. It is necessary to add that our American brothers—both Czechs and Slovaks—contributed tremendously to our political success by giving us the necessary financial support from the very first.
Our work at the peace conference undoubtedly will be one of the finest moments of our national history. Questions that we had to meet at the peace conference concerned first of all our territorial demands.
We demanded our national territory—Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia, Slovakia; we demanded Kladsko (Glatz), part of Upper Silesia, freedom for Lusatian Sorbs, rectification of frontier as against Austria, territorial connection with the Jugoslavs; there was the question of the Danube, the frontier as against the Magyars, and finally the problem of the Rusins of Hungary. Then we had to agree on peace terms in matters of finance, state economy, communications, the problem of the German and Magyar minorities, and finally our most serious problem, an agreement with the Poles and the struggle for Teschen; there were other less important episodes, like the war on Magyar bolshevism, attempted Hapsburg restoration in Budapest etc.
The contest for our territory at the peace conference was severe. After much discussion in various commissions, and after the exposition of our demands on March 5, 1919, the situation was this; we asked our historical frontiers with various rectifications against Prussia, Saxony, Bavaria and Austria; we asked a part of Kladsko, of Upper Silesia and Moravian Field (in Lower Austria.)
As to Slovakia we secured the recognition of the union of Slovakia in principle immediately after the coup of Karolyi. It was declared in a categorical manner that Slovakia is an integral part of the Czechoslovak Republic and that no discussion of this matter would be even admitted by us. The conference at once adopted this attitude and accepted the view that the foundation of Slovak boundaries must be the Danube.
The question of Bohemian boundaries was not solved fully to our satisfaction, but the manner in which this was done illustrates the work and method of the Paris conference. We were given opportunity a number of times to defend our position with reference to historical boundaries before a commission; this commission as a result of our explanations approved rectification of our boundaries on all sides, as well as the annexation of a part of Upper Silesia and Kladsko, to be compensated on our part by the cession of parts of Friedland, Šluknov and Asch. But when this proposal came before the Council of Four, it was decided to adhere to the historical boundaries, because it would be easier, simpler, not requiring special commissions, discussion with Germany etc.
At that time the struggle for Teschen was already going on, for in negotiations at the beginning of February the Allies imposed upon us their first attempt at the solution of this problem. But at that time the question of Teschen did not receive a solution, because the conference avoided all difficult problems and postponed them toward the end. Thus it happened that of all the rectifications of boundaries that we asked for we received in the end only a little territory in Prussian Silesia, which at first we were to receive absolutely, but which later was, as to one half of it, made subject to a plebiscite, when the Germans secured the concession of a plebiscite as against the Poles. As against Austria rectification of frontier were at first conceded to us by the commission to the full extent asked for, but when Austria received certain conces​sions, this territory was reduced, especially on the Moravian Field. But our main demands for the Vitoraz and Poštorná districts were saved.
The question of co-terminous boundaries with Jugoslavia was of extreme importance for us, and we did everything possible to gain this point. The Americans from the beginning adopted the ethnographical standpoint. The English pointed to the indefensibility of the so-called corridor from the military point of view, and the Italian delegation was opposed to any such ideas, believing it contrary to future Italian interests that we should be neighbors with the Jugoslavs. France alone adopted our attitude and supported us fully; French military circles realized the importance of our boundaries touching Jugoslav boundaries. But under the circumstances even in the commission the corridor was defeated, and although it was brought up again before the Supreme Council, it was rejected.
The problem of the Rusins of Hungary was solved at the peace conference easily and without a special struggle. The difficult position of the Rusins was evident to everyone; it was plain that their country could be given neither to Magyars, nor to Roumanians nor to Poles, and the population itself of its own accord asked for union with the Czechoslovak Republic. In that way we secured a considerable territorial increase; let me state that in peace conference circles our delegation was held to have been most successful from the point of view of territorial delimitation.
As far as the cause of our Lusatian brothers is concerned, we put before the conference strong demands on their behalf, but we did not achieve as much as we should have wished.
There remains the Teschen problem. The fight was very strenuous. Up to April the territorial commission adhered on three occasions to our views( leaving to the Poles only the district of Bílsko. But since April, after the intervention of the local Teschen commission, the situation turned against us. I want to say that during the whole course of negotiations about Teschen we acted with absolute loyalty, honesty and openness toward the Polish delegation. Unfortunately we did not get in return a single expression of reasonable concession. The Czechoslovak delegation can say with a good conscience that it did everything possible in the interest of friendship with Poland. But the manner in which Polish propaganda sometimes acted toward us was not very loyal or brotherly. Means used against us recalled former Austrian politics. The Poles went so far that they attempted to interfere in our internal affairs, especially in Slovakia. I declare that from our side nothing of the sort was ever done, that our attitude was absolutely correct and honest. I deeply regret that in this controversy we could not reach an agreement; their action is more likely to estrange than to bring together two states which are so vitally interested in living together as friends. The Polish question has been for a century and a half a sore on the body of Europe, and it still remains one of the most pressing European problems.
The disposition of Teschen was not settled definitely, but a plebiscite was determined upon. The situation is favorable to us. We have definite frontiers on all sides, except in Teschen. Peace terms of financial and economic character are on the whole advantageous to us; we are engaged in effective work for the consolidation of our internal conditions, creation of a new financial system, new economic life, building up of a firm administrative machine. Externally we are and will be in favor of a peace-lowing policy. We will not have any aggressive wars, we will only defend ourselves.
In the controversy over Teschen—and under the circumstances we claim the district in its entirety—all these questions will be taken into consideration, and the people of Teschen have the chance to compare and decide to which state they desire to be united and which they prefer.
At this point let me say a few words about a question which disturbed the peace conference a great deal and which resulted in the refusal of Roumania and Jugoslavia to sign the Austrian peace treaty. It is the special treaty dealing with the rights of minorities.
A few words about our Bohemian Germans and our national minorities in general. Our mixed Bohemian-German territory was not for a moment in danger. Even before the end of the war the French promised to oppose firmly any attempt to detach the nationally mixed territory from our state. The question came up at the conference and we had to defend our attitude. Let me say that the reports in Vienna and other German papers were absolutely false. The appeals of the so-called German-Bohemian government were not once discussed at the peace conference; nobody paid any attention to them, and the demands of Germans of Bohemia, as formulated by Vienna and the so-called German-Bohemian government, were never taken seriously
The position of Germans in the Czechoslovak Republic was discussed twice. First, when after our general exposition the commission took up the delimitation of Bohemia; secretary Lansing asked us directly, what territory and to what extent could be separated from Bohemia. We admitted that some of the projecting regions could be ceded as compensation for territory which we preferred; we wanted Kladsko and Upper Silesia in exchange for the district of Asch, Friedland and Šluknov. All the delegations were from the first and unconditionally of the opinion that the nationally mixed territory could not be torn away from the Republic. The question of Germans came up the second time, when ​the conference began to discuss the protection of minorities, to be guaranteed by treaty. On that occasion I was expressly asked by the proper commission, what legislation for the protection of national minorities, Germans and others, we would be ready to adopt. In connection with that we took up the problem of Rusins of Hungary and it was declared: The Czechoslovak state is a national state, containing ten million Czechoslovaks and somewhat over three million of other nationalities, national minorities. Rusin territory has a special character and must be specially regulated. On this occasion the Czechoslovak delegation presented to the conference with reference to the Rusins and to all national minorities in the Czechoslovak Republic such declarations that they were received by the peace conference with much gratitude; it was stated that they were extremely liberal, that more could not be asked; on the contrary, the general principles for the protection of minorities to be imposed upon states which arose on the ruins of Austria-Hungary could only provide for a minimum, and that certain declarations made by the Czechoslovak delegation were in excess of the proposed principles . . . The peace conference even agreed that clauses protecting the rights of Jews need not be inserted in the treaty with us, even though Poland and Roumania had to agree to them. Here also the conference manifested complete confidence in us, and I believe that in all nationalist questions our republic must so act as to deserve this confidence of the Great Powers and of the League of Nations. I again emphasize that the League of Nations and the Great Powers have confidence that we shall give to our minorities all that a civilized nation needs and is entitled to. We signed the special treaty as to minorities, and I am persuaded that the Czechoslovak Republic will keep its word fully . . .
It is my duty to declare what the president of the republic has already declared on another occasion that we owe all we have gained in this war and in the peace conference to a very large extent to our Allies, France, England, Italy and the United States, and the other countries that remained our friends even when as to a particular question they were of different views. . .
It remains to say a few words about the direction of our future foreign policy. The peace treaties determine first of all our relations to the Allied states. In addition to the treaties with Germany, Austria and Hungary by which indirectly our relations to our Allies are expressed, we sign a number of other treaties, partly political and commercial, partly conventions relating to certain financial, commercial and nationality issues which will contain the details of our relations to our Allies. If we recall further that the general direction of our policy toward the Allies is given by our relations toward them during the war and by our traditions which grew up and developed during the war and during the Paris negotiations, and if we remember also that sentimental relations between us and France, England, America and Italy have been largely strengthened and that we have also acquired new and frinedly ties with other nations, especially the Jugoslavs and Roumanians, we get thereby our future policy toward the Allies. Our foreign policy will act in harmony and friendship with those that have been heretofore our Allies. We shall remain faithful to the program and the aims and traditions of our revolutionary period. That does not mean that we shall be in tutelage or that we shall become the tool of someone of the great powers of the Entente. Our unity with the Entente rests above all in this that we are guided by the same democratic spirit, by the same principles of general policy by which these states were guided during the war, that ideas that we preached and they professed will remain with us and with them the ruling ideas. . . .
We have been loyal and faithful to our Allies, we shall be fair and honest even to those of our neighbors who have been our enemies. If any one menaces us, we shall defend ourselves with the utmost energy, as we have done in the revolutionary period.
Beside the great Allied block we see two others—German and Russian. To declare in detail our future policy toward these two blocks is impossible, because their future course is so uncertain. We can only declare more or less clearly our wishes and our tendencies.
Our relations to Germany constitute a' vital problem for our young republic, and we must therefore examine them with the utmost care. I have already indicated that the legal basis of these relations is given in the peace treaties. But besides this legal basis we have politics and diplomacy which partake of the nature of art. Germany as it is today, is unfinished; for several years it will be busy with internal crises, and while it will make attempts to play a foreign policy and participate in decisions on world questions, it will be unable to dictate to a neighbor, even though much weaker, as the Czechoslovak Republic. It is in our interest to act fairly and correctly toward Germany, but at the same time create at once a tradition for our foreign policy, namely that it shall never be a weapon in the hands of our neighbor, never lose freedom of action or political, military and financial strength by becoming dependent on our powerful neighbor. We need to be reserved in diplomatic relations and in all questions of foreign policy. That means seriousness, circumspectness in our relations to this big neighbor, guarded action that could be interpreted neither as provocation nor as fear. It is unnecessary to say that any attempt to renew the Pan-German policy will be fought by us with the utmost vigor.
​Our relations to Russia are equally vital. Conditions there will continue for a long time unsettled. Not only is it impossible to foresee clearly the early outcome of the campaigns of Kolchak and Denikin who are undoubtedly, though not very firmly, backed by the Entente, but it is impossible to tell, how soon and under what conditions an agreement will be reached between the various local de facto governments which arose on the ruins of old Russia, with the Ukrainians, White Russians and the Baltic and Caucasian nations. It is most probable that problems of internal reconstruction will for a long time disturb the Russian nation, and that Russia therefore will for some time take no strong part in foreign politics. That also requires a reserve on our part, and a responsible statesman cannot be swayed by partisan considerations or personal sympathies to favor this or that tendency; he must see the development to which the state as whole is tending, he must realize in what relation the policy of our state will stand in the near future toward the state form which will soon emerge there. Our foreign attitude must be dictated by this reserve and this view of the near future. Resides, as we have no desire as a state to interfere in Russian internal questions, it is the duty of all of us to maintain a reserve toward Russia and fairness to all sides. The whole world knows that we love Russia, the whole world knows that we desire a rapid reconstruction of the Russian nation and state, that we wish to collaborate in the building up of a great, democratic, confederated Russia which will conduct together with us a friendly, Slavic, democratic policy. We got into a fight with the Bolshevik government against our desires, for we followed the principle of not interfering in Russian quarrels. We wanted to get our army to France as soon as possible, to fight against the common enemy in the West. Conditions have changed, but our policy has not changed. We still endeavor to have our boys return home after five terrible years. And just before we left Paris, we received efficient assistance from the Allies which will make the rapid return of the army possible.
Besides these three cardinal problems of our foreign politics we must consider the relations to our immediate neighbors. We have often spoken of our extremely friendly feelings for the Jugoslavs. They must of course remain such, for the Jugoslav nation is indeed very near to us; not merely our interests, but our sentiments dictate closest friendship. It is self-evident that with Italy, too, we desire friendly and loyal relations of allies, such as we had during the war. We proved on many occasions that we mean this in earnest. That need not, however, militate against our excellent, friendly ties with the Jugoslavs; quite the contrary.
Our relations to Roumania and Poland must be so shaped that the nation can feel absolutely secure, that from their side there is not merely no danger threatening us, but that we can count on their peaceful co-operation in the cultural, financial and economic field. It will take a certain amount of time, before a tradition of friendly Czecho-Polish relations will be formed. It would be useless to hasten things unduly; but it is well to emphasize that the Poles are so situated that they need good relations with us far more than we need them. Their existence will continue to be more endangered than ours. Polish public opinion and Polish parties are still too excited to appreciate their real international position. They lack an impartial view of themselves and are in error. We have today before us the question of plebiscite which is a certain form of struggle, to be decided legally and peacefully, but since it has been imposed upon us, we must fight it out energetically to the very end. But I have not ceased hoping that we shall reach an understanding. In the meanwhile we must act seriously and critically, with dignity and tact.
There remains the question of our relations to the Magyars and Austrians. We are still swayed by our feelings and lose sight of the fact that for centuries we have been in close contact with these two nations and that in the future these relations cannot be simply broken off. In a short time we shall have to consider carefully and sensibly the direction of our politics as regards Vienna and Budapest. The aims of our diplomacy in this respect must be clear, and I believe that we can trace their main out lines now. Prague will acquire its full importance as the capital of central Europe, if we are wise. That is at the bottom the significance of the struggle of Prague against Vienna and Budapest during the war, and in fact for the last few centuries. But let us remember that we must reckon with Vienna as a political factor, even though it is greatly weakened. When after the execution of Austrian peace our bills are settled, we can cultivate with Vienna loyal, sensible and amicable international relations. Economic interests that bind us to the Alpine provinces will strengthen this policy. But we have had lessons from history that we are not likely to forget.
The same thing is true of the Magyars. They will depend completely on their neighbors, they will have to seek allies, if they want to save at least their national existence. We shall be fair toward them, and it is in our interest to have close relations with them, if they act loyally toward us. One of the first tasks of Czechoslovak diplomacy will be to show the Magyars that we do not threaten their national existence. They will appreciate it, and that will make possible the formation of a new political system in Central Europe, based on an understanding between us, Jugoslavs, Roumanians and Poles.
To sum up, the immediate principles of our foreign policy will be: 1. To maintain our ​present cordial relations to the Allies, especially France which has done so much for us, for reasons of continental European policies and our situation in central Europe. 2. To endeavor to construct correct and loyal relations to our neigbors. That does not mean weakness. Europe is still unsettled and our internal and foreign politics must be prepared for all eventualities. Our love of peace and our loyalty must not be come to us a handicap. Therefore our foreign and domestic politics must go hand in hand, so that we could defend ourselves, if anybody tried to bear down on us. Here also we must construct a clear and exact program resting on internal strength. That is the categorical imperative of all our political life. That will be possible, if we build up an army, good diplomatic service and co-operation of the various ministries in all foreign affairs, commercial and economic. . .
Dr. Kramář then made a report on the economic and financial side of the long negotiation in Paris:
As chief of the peace delegation I will touch upon those things which Dr. Beneš omitted. Our economic life has been profoundly changed by the erection of the Czechoslovak Republic. We are in the centre of Europe and lack altogether access to the sea. It was therefore one of our chief problems at the peace conference to obtain the best possible substitute for a sea coast. And we have been successful. . .
Courtesy of the Czechoslovak Information Bureau.
Sokols escorting Dr. Kramář passing the Museum.
For that I have to render thanks to some of our Allies. As usual France was on our side. What ever demand we made—and we made no unreasonable ones—France was with us. Faithful to her pledge to our foreign minister in the time of war she championed our interests with such success that we owe her the majority of our successes. In the commission on communications we found a warm friend in the English representative. Our problems were new to international law: to have ports without sea coast, to have our own ocean-going ships, to sail them under our own flag. We secured all that, and after many consultations the commission voted an unheard of thing namely, that Prague shall be a port of registration for our merchant marine.
To have our own ships, sailing under the Czechoslovak flag, was not a simple matter. The problem was to get to the ports without dependence on Germany. That was accomplished by the internationalization of the Elbe and the Oder. International control is a guarantee that our ​trade will not be hampered by Germany through unfair dues. We can ask the international commission to compel Germany to deepen the Elbe channel so that thousand ton ships could go up to Prague. We shall also get a share of the river boats according to a favorable quota, namely export statistics of our cities. As the greatest export was from Ústí (Aussig), we get thus a considerable advantage. In Hamburg we shall have our own port, our own docks, equipment and employees so that the transfer of merchandise from ocean ships to river boats will be altogether in our hands.
Courtesy of the Czechoslovak Information Bureau.
Dr. Kramář accompanied by Premier Tusar.
We were equally successful in the Danube questions. The internationalization of the Danube is of great importance for us, because our commercial relations with the states south of us will be very strong. If we can manage to have the Danube navigable up to Komarno for two thousand ton boats, we can sail on the Black Sea. I agreed to have internationalization of the Morava River as far as the mouth of the Dyje, because we lost the right bank of the Morava. By its internationalization we get the same advantage as on the Danube; Austria will not be permitted to block the regulation of the channel. I consider it one of our foremost tasks to make Morava navigable for the sake of our commerce with the East, and the projected canal from Přerov to Pardubice has become a pressing question. But we do not only need water ways; we must take steps to secure ships. If we want raw materials from other parts of the world, we must not hesitate to invest money in ships; the expense may be staggering, but it will pay.
As far as the railroads are concerned, we have also gained our point. I regret that we have not been successful in securing the corridor connecting us with Jugoslavia. France alone favored it, but England helped us to get a substitute for it. We have gained the rights to build a secondary railroad from Bratislava to Great Kanizsa in Jugoslavia, a two track road that will give us connection with Belgrade and Trieste, with our own trains and our own railroad men. We have also gained special rights on Alpine railroads, over which we can send our own trains. Through the efforts of Lloyd George we were given the right to build a short connection from Náchod to Prussian Silesia in the interest of our coal imports. Beside that express trains, now going through Vienna, will pass through Prague. In a very short time a train de luxe will run from Strassburg to Warsaw via Prague. In short we ​got practically everything we asked for. At the last minute we secured a valuable concession, namely the right to our own telegraph and telephone lines across Austrian and Hungarian territory.
Easy comunication with foreign countries is but one of the conditions of our commercial and industrial prosperity. Our situation is difficult, for our economic life has grown up in connection with Austria-Hungary. Through the help of the French minister of commerce Clementel we have been permitted to make a customs treaty for three years with Austria and Hungary; during that time all customs may be suspended between us and these two nations, without affecting the most favored nation clause of other countries. We have agreed in general on a commercial treaty with France by which France will grant us the same privileges as to her allies of the Entente. This will have great importance for our future economic policy.
We also saw to it that too heavy financial burdens should not be imposed on our state, so as to handicap our industry and make it unable to compete in foreign trade. That was a difficult fight and we were obliged to accept certain sacrifices. We of course claimed that the Czechoslovaks, like the other nations, contributed toward victory. The Allies admitted it and France did not ask for any compensation from us. I will not speak about the various phases of this struggle. In the end we agreed to contribute the sum of 750 million francs.
Te second question was, how we were to share in the financial legacy of Austria. Together with Jugoslavs, Roumanians and Poles we declared emphatically that we would not pay any part of the Austrian war debts. We carried this point. As far as pre-war debt is concerned, the important question was the quota. After much altercation we, Jugoslavs, Roumanians and Poles agreed on two principles; Austrian debts to be divided on the basis of income tax in the years 1911—1913, Hungarian debts on the basis of all direct taxes. Another concession gained by us is that we can reclaim before an international commission objects of art taken from the Prague castle to Vienna.
Our economic environment is now very different, because we have to fight for our markets and compete not only with Entente products, but with German as well. That means that we must indulge in no experiments that would endanger our productivity. We must not go so far in social reforms as to hamper our exporting ability. We are an exporting state par excellence. We cannot live an easy-going life, as we did in the Austrian state; we must struggle and fight. But we who love the republic are not discouraged thereby. It will be a joy to employ our energy so as to show that the Czechoslovaks are worthy of the liberty which they conquered.
Such is the outlook into the future. I may say for the entire peace delegation that the economic conditions we have brought you may be approved by you without hesitation, and I trust that the National Assembly will promptly do so.
This work is in the public domain in the United States because it was published in 1918, before the cutoff of January 1, 1929.
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