# History of Aurangzib/Volume 1/Chapter 11

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CHAPTER XI.
War with Bijapur, 1657.
The treaty of 1636 had turned the king of Bijapur into a friendly ally of the Emperor of Delhi, but left his sovereignty unimpaired. He had not become a vassal prince, nor bound himself to pay an annual tribute. On the other hand, he had been formally confirmed in the possession of a large portion of the territory of the extinct royal house of Ahmadnagar, the whole of which the Mughals had once claimed. Secure from his mighty neighbour Growth of Bijapur kingdom. on the north, the Bijapur Sultan began to extend his dominions westwards into the Konkan, southwards into Mysore, and eastwards into the Karnatak. The principality of Ikkeri (or Bednur, in N. W. Mysore), had been raided in 1635 at the invitation of a local faction, and a heavy fine of 30 lakhs of hun imposed on its ​Rajah, Virabhadra Nayak. Two years later the invasion was renewed and the Nayak deposed. Shortly afterwards, a vast Bijapuri army, numbering 40,000 and led by the famous general Randaulah Khan, took Sira, Bangalore, and the country north of the Kaveri (1639), and then, advancing eastwards into the Karnatak, went on capturing forts and cities for many years. In 1647, the entire Bijapur army under Mustafa Khan, the foremost noble of the State, repeated the invasion, but met with stubborn opposition at first. In a great battle fought east of Bangalore, the impetuous valour of an Abyssinian general, Malik Raihan, saved from destruction the lives of the Bijapur troops and the honour of their king: the famous Hindu general Vailuar was routed and his master's It conquers the Southern Karnatak. cause ruined. Finally starvation opened the impregnable fortress of Jinji to Bijapur arms (17th December 1649), and the whole Southern Karnatak lay open to the Muslims. The prize thus secured was most splendid; besides the ​vast rich and fertile territory annexed, the treasure captured was valued at four krores of hun. Westwards, a Bijapur force invaded the Portuguese territory of Goa and Salsette (August 1654) with some success. In short, in the reign of Muhammad Adil Shah (1626-56) the kingdom of Bijapur attained to its highest extent, power, and magnificence. His dominion stretched from the Arabian Sea to the Bay of Bengal, across the entire Indian Peninsula.
Ever since 1636, Muhammad Adil Shah had lived at peace with the Emperor of Delhi, and we read of friendly exchanges of presents between the two Courts. This Sultan's good Relations between the Delhi and Bijapur Courts. name for piety, love of justice, and care for his subjects,—which was heightened by a certain simplicity of understanding and ignorance of the world,—greatly pleased Shah Jahan. The Emperor recognised the merits of the king and the increased power of the kingdom by addressing him as Shah or King ​(1648),—whereas the former sovereigns of Delhi, in their pride of suzerainty, had styled Shah Jahan is displeased; why? the rulers of Bijapur as mere Khans or Lords. Some years afterwards, differences had arisen between the two. Adil Shah displeased Shah Jahan by departing from the practice of his ancestors in as much as he held Court in a lofty palace outside his citadel and witnessed elephant-combats in an open plain beyond the fort instead of within it, and lastly by conferring the title of Khan-i-khanan on his premier noble. These acts were taken to imply a presumptuous assumption of the prerogatives of the Emperor and rivalry with the Court of Delhi. Shah Jahan wrote him a letter of rebuke, sharply telling him to return to the ways of his forefathers, or a Delhi army would visit his dominion. The letter was discussed in full Court. The captains of Bijapur rattled their sabres and cried out, "Let them come on! We too are ready and eager for such a day. We shall be glad to measure our swords with the blades of ​Hindustan." A haughty reply was delivered to the Delhi envoy.
With the night came a change. A charming story is told, how the king was amusing himself with his chiefs and favourites on the lofty terraced roof of his palace, under the moonlit sky. Hours rolled on in delight. At midnight, when all other hearts were sunk in pleasure, the pensive king turned his ears to the City of Bijapur and heard only sounds of revelry coming from it on the night wind. "What does the City say, Afzal Khan Ji?" he asked of his favourite general. "It is only singing the praise of your Majesty's love of justice and care for your subjects and praying for your long life, so that the people may continue to enjoy the same peace, plenty and happiness." The pleased king asked again, "What will be the result if we encounter the forces of Delhi?" The reply was, "Only lamentation and grief will be heard in the place of these joyous sounds. Whichever side may win, every house will mourn some Adil Shah yields. deaths and the people will know no peace or happiness." The king brooded over the answer, preferred ease to honour, and next morning took his haughty ​reply back and sent in its stead a letter of apology and submission to Delhi. This long and prosperous reign of 30 years ended with his death at the age of 47 (on 4th Nov. 1656), and the danger he had successfully averted fell on his kingdom.
But before we can proceed to the troubled history of his successor, it is necessary to take up the thread of our narrative where we dropped it at the end of the last chapter.
When returning from the Golkonda expedition Mir Jumla at the Imperial Court, Aurangzib had sent Mir Jumla off to the Imperial Court (7th May), to fill the high post of prime minister. In the meantime he had completely won Mir Jumla over to his interests, and the Mir's arrival at Delhi (7th July, 1656) secured the triumph of Aurangzib's policy of aggression in the Emperor's council. Mir Jumla's presents, matchless diamonds, rubies and topazes, dazzled the eyes of the Emperor and brought about the downfall of the peace party under Dara Shukoh. The land whence these jewels came was worth annexing!
​The late wazir of Golkonda knew all the secrets of the Deccani Courts, the ins and outs of the land, and the exact prices of all the chief officers of Qutb Shah and Adil Shah. Therefore, as an authority on Deccan questions supports policy of aggression in the Deccan. he was unapproached by any other courtier of Shah Jahan. His expert knowledge was now utilised in intriguing at the Deccani Courts and seducing their officers. With Mir Jumla dominating the Emperor's counsels, Aurangzib confidently matured the plan of invading Bijapur on the expected death of its reigning king who was lingering on the bed of illness. The Mir, as one fully conversant with the country, was urged by Aurangzib to return to him as quickly as possible, "in order that this opportunity might not slip away."
On 4th November, 1656, Muhammad Adil Ali Adil Shah II succeeds. Shah, the seventh of the royal line of Bijapur, died. Through the efforts of his chief minister, Khan Muhammad, and the Queen, Bari Sahiba, ​a sister of the Golkonda king, the crown was placed on the head of Ali Adil Shah II, a youth of 18 years, and the only son of the late king. The news reached Aurangzib on 10th November, and he immediately wrote to Shah Jahan, urging an invasion on the plea that Ali was not really a son of the deceased Sultan, but a boy of obscure parentage whom Muhammad Adil Shah had brought up in the harem. In anticipation of the Emperor's orders, he massed his troops on the Bijapur frontier, and proposed to go himself to Ahmadnagar to be nearer to the point of attack.
The death of Muhammad Adil Shah was Rebellion and disorder in the kingdom. followed by disorder in the Karnatak he had conquered. The zamindars recovered much of their former lands, and the Bijapuri officers were driven to the shelter of the forts. Shahji Bhonsla disobeyed his new master, and set up for himself. At the capital things were even worse. Bijapuri nobles had never been kept under proper control by their king, and had been wont to regard themselves as their own masters. ​ They now quarrelled with one another and with the prime minister Khan Muhammad for the division of power. To aggravate the evil, Aurangzib intrigued with them, and succeeded in corrupting most of them. "I am trying my utmost," he writes to Mir Jumla, "to win the Bijapur army over, for then the chiefs of that country will join us of their own accord." Randaulah Khan's son and several other leading men of the Court promised their adhesion and prepared to desert to the Mughal territory with their troops. After they had reached him Aurangzib hoped to seduce the others withOfficers seduced by Aurangzib the aid of Mir Jumla. So, he sent Rs. 20,000 to Multafat Khan, the governor of Ahmadnagar, the nearest point on the Mughal frontier towards Bijapur, with instructions to distribute it among the deserters: every Bijapuri captain who brought a hundred men to the muster was to get Rs. 2,000 out of the local treasury, (evidently after the above sum had been spent). The governor was ordered to welcome and conciliate every arrival from Bijapur, even when he was not a captain of known position and importance. An envoy from Shivaji waited on Aurangzib proposing the ​terms on which the Maratha chieftain was willing to co-operate with the Mughals by making a diversion in the Bijapuri Konkan. He received in reply a letter of vague promises.
On 26th November Shah Jahan sanctioned the Shah Jahan sanctions invasion of Bijapur, invasion and gave Aurangzib a free hand to "settle the affair of Bijapur in any way he thought fit." At the same time orders were sent to Shaista Khan, the Governor of Malwa, to hasten to Aurangabad and hold it during Aurangzib's absence in the war. A force of 20,000 troopers, partly from the Court and partly from the jagirs, with a large staff of officers, was despatched to reinforce the army of the Deccan. Lastly Mir Jumla himself, with most of the officers and a portion of the troops ordered, was sent (1st December) to join Aurangzib.
The Emperor's instructions to his son were, first to march with Mir Jumla to the Bijapur frontier and conquer the whole of the kingdom, if possible; otherwise, to annex that portion of the old Ahmadnagar kingdom which had ​been ceded to Bijapur by the treaty of 1636, and to spare the territory of Bijapur proper on the payment of an indemnity of 1½ krores of rupees and the recognition of the Emperor's suzerainty,—viz., the issuing of coins in his name and the public reading of his titles from the pulpit at Bijapur. If the latter alternative was carried out, Aurangzib was to employ the vast army assembled under his banner in the conquest of Golkonda. The Prince, however, was keen upon conquering Bijapur first; "I want to put off the conquest of Golkonda, which can be seized at any time we like."
The war thus sanctioned was wholly unrighteous. an act of unjust aggression. Bijapur was not a vassal State, but an independent and equal ally of the Mughal Emperor, and the latter had no lawful right to confirm or question the succession at Bijapur. The true reason of the Mughal interference was the helplessness of its boy-king and the discord among his officers, which presented a fine "opportunity" for annexation, as Aurangzib expressed it.
​Aurangzib impatiently waited for Mir Jumla's coming and pressed him to hasten his movements. "Let not such an opportunity (viz., the revolt and dissension among the Bijapur officers) slip away. Come quickly, so that we may both start together." It was of no use waiting for the rest of the reinforcements ordered from Northern India. Several officers were slow to leave their jagirs, in spite of strong letters from the Emperor urging them on; and Aurangzib could not expect to get the whole additional force of 20,000 men before 19th February 1657.
Mir Jumla arrived at Aurangabad on 18th Mir Jumla join Aurangzib with reinforcements. War begun. January, and that very day at the auspicious hour chosen by the astrologers, the Prince set out with him to invade Bijapur. As he was encumbered with heavy artillery and siege materials, his movement was very slow; 240 miles were covered in 43 days. On 28th February, he reached the environs of Bidar, and laid siege to the fort on 2nd March.
A short distance south of the Mughal frontier fort of Udgir and across the Manjira river lies ​the city of Bidar. It is large and well peopled, and the remains of fine buildings speak of its ancient grandeur. Tradition connects it with Bidar. the father of Damayanti, the devoted wife of Rajah Nala, who flourished in the mythical age of the Mahabharat. Coming down to historic times, we find that Bidar was captured by Muhammad Tughlaq in the 14th century, and became successively the capital of the Bahmani Sultans and of the short-lived Barid Shahi dynasty, both of whom adorned it with fine palaces, tombs and mosques, as memorials of their greatness. The glory of the city is the magnificent college, built by Mahmud Gawan, the famous minister of the Bahmanis (1478). On the extinction of the Barid Shahi kings, Bidar passed into the hands of Bijapur.
The city stands on a high plateau, 2330 feet Its impregnable fort. above sea-level. A wall with a dry ditch and glacis surrounds the city itself, and bastions rising at various points of the wall add to its defensive power. The fort or citadel, finished in 1432 and occupying the eastern face of the city, ​is of immense strength. Its wall is 4500 yards in circuit and 12 yards in height. Three separate ditches each 25 yards wide and 15 yards deep, cut in the solid rock, surround the citadel, which contains many palaces, mosques, Turkish baths, a mint, arsenal, magazine, and other public edifices built of trap but now in ruin. The only entrance is a zigzag passage from the southwest, protected by three gateways. On the bastions stood several guns, one of them being 23 feet long with a 19 inch bore. In the age before modern artillery, Bidar was rightly held to be impregnable to assault.
Aurangzib's opponent at the siege was Siddi Siege of Bidar. Marjan, an Abyssinian who had held the fort for Bijapur for thirty years, and had collected abundance of materials of defence and a garrison of 1000 horse, and 4000 foot, including musketeers, gunners, and rocket-men. Inspite of a fierce fire from the fort walls, the Mughal sappers worked hard in the inspiring presence of their chief, and in two days carried the trenches to the edge of the moat. Then they began to fill up the ditch. Siddi Marjan offered a stout defence: he made several sorties, and falling on the trenches tried to arrest ​the progress of the siege. But the superior numbers of the Mughals told in the end, and Mir Jumla's fine train of artillery did great damage to the fort walls; two towers were demolished, and the battlements of the lower-most wall as well as the outer breast-works were levelled to the ground.
The ditch having been filled up, the assault The assault. was delivered on 29th March. Muhammad Murad, at the head of a select party, sallied out of his trenches, rushed to the foot of the tower opposite Mir Jumla's post, and planting ladders scaled the wall. An accident favoured the assailants. Siddi Marjan, with his sons and troops, was standing close to the tower ready to repel the attack. But a spark from a rocket thrown by the Mughals fell into a chamber of gunpowder and grenades behind the tower. There was a terrific explosion. Marjan was mortally wounded with two of his sons and many of his followers. The garrison, appalled by the disaster, carried their dying chief to the citadel, while the exulting Mughals swarmed out of all their trenches and rushed into the city, driving the remnant of the defenders back wfth fearful slaughter. Behind them came Aurangzib himself, with his banners waving and his drums beating a victorious note, ​and took possession of the city. The Mughals Bidar captured. closely followed the retreating garrison and took possession of the gate of the citadel. But the fall of their leader had taken the heart out of the defenders. In response to the Mughal call to surrender and promise of quarter, Siddi Marjan from his deathbed sent his seven sons to Aurangzib with the keys of the fort.
Thus, the stronghold of Bidar, hitherto reputed The spoils of victory. impregnable throughout India, fell into the hands of Aurangzib after a siege of 27 days only. Among the spoils of victory were 12 lakhs of rupees in cash, 8 lakhs worth of powder, shot, grain and other stores, besides 230 pieces of cannon. Well might Aurangzib exult over such a victory. Well might he boast to Shivaji, "The fort of Bidar, which was accounted impregnable, and which is the key to the conquest of the Deccan and Karnatak, has been captured by me in one day, both fort and town, which was scarcely to have been expected without one year's fighting."
​On Wednesday, 1st April, Siddi Marjan succumbed to his burns. Aurangzib again visited the city and fort, and had the Emperor's titles publicly read out from the pulpit of the grand mosque built by the Bahmani Sultans two centuries earlier.
Meanwhile the Bijapuris had made some feeble Mahabat Khan sent to ravage Bijapur territory. attempts to relieve Bidar. A force under Khan Muhammad, their prime minister, had been advancing towards it during the siege; but it had evidently retreated without striking a blow. After the fall of the fort, Aurangzib learnt that a large Bijapuri army was being mobilised near Kulbarga. Their light troopers arrived within six miles of the Mughal camp and carried off some of the transport oxen that were grazing there. So, Aurangzib sent a force of 15,000 well mounted and experienced troopers under Mahabat Khan, to punish the assembled enemy and ravage the Bijapur territory up to Kaliani in the west and Kulbarga in the south, "leaving no vestige of cultivation in that tract." In his march southwards from Kaliani, the Mughal general encountered the enemy on 12th April. The Bijapuris, numbering some 20,000, under their famous ​chiefs Khan Muhammad, Afzal Khan, and the Battle of 12th April. sons of Randaulah and Raihan, began the attack. Mahabat Khan, leaving his baggage and camp behind, advanced with the Van. The fiercest onslaught was delivered on the Mughal Right under Dilir Khan. The Bijapuris kept up a hot fire of rockets and muskets from all sides, but, as was their wont, did not engage at close quarters. A counter-charge on the enemy's Centre produced no lasting effect on the illusive Deccanis. Mahabat Khan like a good general kept his men well in hand, amidst the ring of his enemies and their distracting mode of attack. Finding his Right Wing hard pressed, he charged the enemy with his own followers; the Bijapuris fled without standing the shock, and the Mughal general chased them for four miles; but evidently he found his position insecure, as on the 14th he fell back on Bhalki, without waiting for the reinforcements sent under Najabat Khan.
​Forty miles west of Bidar, on the old road from the holy shrine of Tuljapur to Golkonda, stands the city of Kaliani, the ancient capital of the Chalukya kings and of the Kanarese country. With the fall of the Kalachuris in the twelfth century, it ceased to be a capital, and afterwards passed into the hands of the Deccani Muslim powers as a mere dependency of Bidar. But the large mounds surrounding the town indicate its greater extent in days of yore.
Mahabat Khan having cleared the road of hovering bands of the enemy, Siege of Kaliani.Aurangzib on 27th April set out with light kit and arrived before Kaliani in a week's time. The place was immediately invested, and through Mir Jumla's exertions and supervision the siege trenches were pushed on to the edge of the ditch by nth May. Day and night the garrison kept up a ceaseless fire from the walls; they made fierce onslaughts on Mir Jumla's trenches, but to no purpose. The bands of the enemy roving outside gave greater trouble and retarded the siege. They established ​ themselves four miles from the besiegers' camp and molested them at night by the discharge of rockets, the favourite fire-arm of the Deccanis and especially of the Marathas. Expert in partisan warfare, they effectually closed the path for the coming of provisions and couriers. The Mughal army could not be fed unless its food supply was sent under strong escort. Once Mahabat Khan himself on escort duty was hemmed round by the enemy at a place 10 miles north-east of Kaliani. The Mahabat Khan's battle with the Bijapuris: small Mughal detachment of 2,000 was outnumbered as ten to one, but stood its ground heroically. The battle raged long and fiercely. "The field was obscured by the smoke of artillery and muskets, and the dust raised by horses' hoofs. Fathers could not look after their sons," as the Mughal annalist writes. The brunt of the battle fell on the Rajputs. The horsemen of Khan Muhammad burst in vain upon the granite wall of Rao Chhatra Sal and his Hada clansmen. Rajah Rai Singh Sisodia, assaulted by the sons of Bahlol Khan of Bijapur, was wounded and unhorsed in the press of the enemy. Sivaram, the captain of the Maharana's contingent, was slain with many followers of Rai Singh. Barhamdeo and others, as is the wont of Rajputs in desperate straits, dismounted, drew ​ their swords, and flung themselves in reckless fury on the enemy, vowed to slay and be slain. Just then relief arrived a charge by Mahabat Khan broke the enemy's ranks and they fled. Sujan Singh Sisodia and others of his party, though severely wounded, had not quitted the field. Ikhlas Khan, the leader of the Mughal Van,Mughal victory; loss of heavy Rajputs. had been wounded during the onset, but inspite of it he had held his ground and even driven back Afzal Khan's division which was opposed to him. The obstinate struggle raged till an hour after nightfall, when the enemy withdrew, and the hard-pressed Mughals at last got the respite they sorely needed.
Aurangzib concentrated his efforts on pressing the siege hard and capturing Kaliani as quickly as he had done Bidar. He, therefore, at first paid no attention to the Bijapuri army assembled only four miles from his camp. This emboldened them to acts of greater audacity. A force of 30,000 enemies posted only an hour's journey from his camp_could no longer be neglected. So, he cunningly announced that his army would proceed to Bhalki in the north-east to bring in provisions; but on 28th May, leav​ ing a screen of tents round the fort, he marched with the main body of his troops upon the enemy's position.
The sons of Bahlol Khan attacked the Mughal Van under Mir Jumla and Dilir Khan and fought with valour and obstinacy for some time. Battle of 28th May: Dilir Khan received some sword-cuts, but his armour saved him from harm. The battle soon became general. All divisions of the two armies were engaged with their respective opponents. The fight raged for six hours. The Deccanis kept up a running fight, in their customary manner: four times in succession were they broken and as often did they form again and face the advancing Mughals, regardless of their thinned ranks. But at last the repeated charges of the northern horse prevailed in the close fight; the Mughal army crowded upon them from left and right, and scattered them finally: their whole army fled in confusion; the Imperialists pursued them pell-mell to their camp, slaying and capturing all that they could. Everything found in the Bijapuri camp,—Imperial victory; Bijapuri camp looted. arms, slave-girls, horses, transport-cattle, and all kinds of property, was plundered; and the tents were burnt down. In the evening Aurangzib returned ​ to his trenches before Kaliani, his brows adorned with victory.
The siege was pressed with vigour, but the defence by the Abyssinian Dilawwar was equally heroic. Progress of the siege. The sap had reached the moat on 11th May, and by the 23rd of the month three-fourths of the ditch had been filled up, under the guidance of Mir Jumla, with thorny plants. The garrison, by hurling down lighted gunpowder and burning naphtha and grass, reduced these plants to ashes; the work of bridging the ditch had to be begun anew; the assault was delayed. Stones and earth were now thrown into the ditch, but progress in this task was necessarily slow. During this period of enforced idleness detachments from the besieging army were usefully employed in capturing the forts of Nilanga and Chincholy.—
Since their defeat in the great battle of 28th May, the Bijapuris had not interfered with the siege for nearly two months. At the end of ​this interval, Mughal detachment ravages the country to Kulbarga.having repaired their losses they began to assemble in order to oppose the Mughals. So, on 22nd July, Aurangzib sent a large division under his eldest son and Mir Jumla to break up their forces before they could gain formidable strength. This Mughal corps advanced forty-eight miles, and then, sighting the enemy's camp at a distance, charged and broke their formation, and pursued them for four miles. The victors proceeded, laying the Bijapuri villages waste with fire and sword, and leaving no vestige of habitation or tillage in their path. They reached the unprotected hamlet near the fort of Kulbarga, the old Bahmani capital, where they reverently spared the tomb of Syed Gisu Daraz, a famous saint of Southern India.
At last the end of the siege came in sight;Kaliani taken by assault. the ditch was filled up with stone and mud, the parapets demolished by artillery fire, and on 29th July the Imperialists scaled a were ​ tower on the other side of the moat. But the garrison had built a wall across this tower, and under shelter of it fought the Mughals hard with rockets, bows, and matchlocks. The struggle here was most obstinate. While the Mughals were checked by the unexpected obstacle of the wall and had to demolish it, the Bijapuris flung on their heads lighted bombs, blazing sheets steeped in naphtha, and bundles of burning grass. But regardless of all these, the assailants swarmed into the fort and held this portion of the defences. Two days afterwards, the commandant Dilawwar offered to capitulate on condition of a free passage out for the garrison and their families. Aurangzib readily consented to grant them quarter, as the place sheltered many Muhammadans. especially Syeds. On 1st August the keys of the fort were delivered to him by Dilawwar, who was given a robe of honour with permission to go to Bijapur.
Bidar and Kaliani, the guardian fortresses of Adil Shah's north-eastern frontier, had fallen, and the way now seemed open for an advance on Bijapur itself. But a cruel disappointment was in store for Aurangzib; his victorious career was to be suddenly checked. The Bijapur agents had intrigued hard at Court; Dara's ​jealousy was rising in proportion to the success of his younger brother, and he at last persuadedShah Jahan orders peace. the Emperor to put an end to the war. Even in the midst of the siege of Kaliani Shah Jahan had repeatedly written to the Prince to patch up a peace with Bijapur as soon as possible, because the rainy season was approaching when the Mughal army must retire to cantonments at Bidar, and Shaista Khan, who had been guarding Aurangabad during the Prince's absence, must return to his own charge of Malwa without further delay. Aurangzib knew that to raise the siege of Kaliani and retire to Bidar, would only embolden the Bijapuris and take away from them their only motive for offering terms of peace. So, he had sat down before Kaliani a month longer,Terms of peace with Bijapur. and brought the siege to a successful issue. Negotiations for peace were now opened. The Bijapur envoy, Ibrahim Bichittar Khan, agreed to pay an indemnity of 1½ krores of rupees and to cede not only Bidar and Kaliani, but also the fort of Parenda with its dependent ​ territory, all the forts in the Nizam Shahi Konkan, and the district of Wangi. The king of Bijapur accepted these terms and sent letters to his officers to deliver the forts in question to the Mughals. Shah Jahan ratified the treaty, remitting half a krore from the indemnity, and sending a gracious letter to Adil Shah. He at the same time ordered Aurangzib to return with his army to Bidar; the officers and men sent to the Deccan from Malwa and Hindustan were recalled to their former posts. Mir Jumla was directed to take possession of the newly ceded forts in the west and then return to the Imperial Court.
War abruptly ended, without ensuring conquest. Thus Aurangzib received a sharp check in the hour of his triumph. He had gained only the northern fringe of the vast Bijapur kingdom when his father cried halt to him. Small as his acquisitions by the treaty were, he had no power to hold the Bijapur king to his promises. At the Imperial order dictating peace, the Mughal officers slackened their efforts and many of them set out for the Court ​ in spite of Aurangzib's entreaty to stay a little longer. The Bijapuris profited by his distraction and weakened power, and delayed fulfilling the terms of a peace that had no armed strength behind it. Their commandants refused to surrender the forts ceded by the treaty.
To complete the misfortunes of the Mughal Illness of Shah Jahan. Mughal retreat. cause in the Deccan, Shah Jahan fell ill on 6th September and for one week lay at death's door. Rumours of his death spread through the Empire, and gave rise to confusion and disorder in every province. Aurangzib, harassed by anxiety and distracted by conflicting plans, at last decided to be content with what could be easily secured from Bijapur. On 30th September he sent Mir Jumla towards Parenda to take delivery of it, and on 4th October he himself began his retreat from Kaliani to the Imperial dominion.
Only one episode of the war still remains to be recorded. While Aurangzib was busy conquering the north-eastern angle of the Bijapur kingdom, stirring events were occurring in its north-western corner, where the boundary of the Mughal district of Ahmadnagar adjoined the Northern Konkan. Here a young and obscure ​ local chief of very small means and no high family influence, was just beginning to peep above the horizon of history and to start or that career of greatness whose noontide splendour was destined to dazzle the Indian world and to leave his name a byword for posterity. Shivaji, the son of Shahji Bhonsla,Shivaji's negotiations with the Mughals; a Maratha captain in Bijapur service, had taken forcible possession of his father's western jagirs and seized hill-fort after hill-fort in the Ghats from the agents of Bijapur. When the Mughals were about to invade Adil Shah's territory, he had sent an envoy to Aurangzib's deputy at Ahmadnagar, offering to co-operate on condition of being guaranteed by the Mughals in the possession of the Adil Shahi Konkan. He had received in return vague promises of favour and protection. Even a less astute man than he must have known that such promises would amount to nothing in practice when the need of the Imperialists would be over.raids the Imperial dominion. So, on the outbreak of the war, he seized his opportunity, and in concert with the Bijapuri officers in the neigbourhood, he raided the Mughal territory from the west. One ​ night he silently scaled the walls of Junnar with rope-ladders, and after slaughtering the defenders carried off 11,000 hun, 200 horses, and much costly clothing and jewels. Bands of Maratha light horsemen spread in all directions, cutting off provision trains and foraging parties, plundering the smaller towns and flourishing villages, rendering the roads unsafe, and carrying devastation and alarm to the very gates of Ahmadnagar, the seat of the Mughal administration in that region. An attack on the town (pettah) which nestled under shelter of the fort of Ahmadnagar was frustrated by a timely sortie of the garrison. But so great was the alarm it caused that the Mughal governor made the citizens remove their property to within the fort as a precaution. Two other Marathas, Minaji Bhonsla and Kashi, where notably successful in their raids.
Aurangzib orders reprisals against Shivaji, Aurangzib learnt of these disturbances and hurried reinforcements up to Ahmadnagar, with strict orders to punish Shiva. He chastised with his pen those officers who were slow in marching to the scene. His letters to his officers ​ breathe fury and revenge: the Mughal captains must beat the raiders back from the Imperial dominions and make reprisals by entering Shiva's land from all sides, “wasting the villages, slaying the people without pity, and plundering them to the extreme";—Shivaji's possessions, Poona and Chakna, must be utterly ruined and not the least remissness shown in slaying and enslaving the people;—the village headmen and peasants of the Imperial territory who had secretly abetted the enemy, must be slain without compunction.
Aurangzib's new dispositions for guarding this tract showed excellent combination and effectually protects Mughal territory. and judgment. Kartalab Khan was posted near Junnar, Abdul Munim at Garh Namuna, Hushdar Khan at Chamargunda and Raisin, and Nasiri Khan and some others at Bir and Dharur. These officers stood facing the frontier and barring every path of the enemy's advance, so that the Imperial ryots behind them might enjoy peace and safety. The officers were further bidden to make a dash forward across the frontier, whenever they got an opportunity, ravage as much of the enemy's territory in front of them as they could, and then quickly return to the defence of their respective posts. At last ​ in May, 1657, Nasiri Khan, so often rebuked for his slow movements and failureShivaji defeated, to catch Shivaji up, made a forced march, for once, to the neighbourhood of Ahmadnagar and fell upon Shiva, who escaped with heavy loss. Orders were sent to the victor to pursue Shiva into his own territory and wrest all his lands which had been given up to the Mughals by the Bijapur king in the new treaty. But a campaign in the Tal Konkan in the rainy season was impossible, and Poona escaped an invasion. When his liege-lord, the king of Bijapur, made peace, Shivaji found it useless and even ruinous to himself to continue the war with the Mughal empire single-handed. He must try to save his patrimony. So, he sent an agent, named Raghunath Panth, to Nasirimakes peace with Aurangzib. Khan, with a letter offering submission and promising loyal behaviour in future. To this a conciliatory reply was given. Then Shiva despatched another ambassador, Krishnaji Bhaskar, to Aurangzib himself, begging forgiveness for his raids and offering to send a contingent of 500 horse to the Prince's assistance. ​Aurangzib was then about to leave the Deccan to contest the throne of Delhi. He received Shivaji's submission with outward pleasure; but his mind was not really composed about the Konkan; he omitted no precaution to maintain peace in that quarter by force, for he felt convinced that the young Maratha chief was a raider whose daring was only equalled by his cunning, and an ambitious adventurer who would place self-interest above fidelity to his plighted word or gratitude for favours received.
The invasion of Bijapur now ends, and the great War of Mughal Succession begins.
APPENDICES.
II.—Parentage of Ali II.
​The boy's birth, initiation into Islam, and commencement of education, were all celebrated with the pomp and ceremony worthy of a prince of the blood, and he publicly rode through the capital in the style of the heir to the throne. His right to ascend the throne was apparently not questioned by the Bijapur nobility and officers of the army, though they soon afterwards began to quarrel about the division of power and influence. But such internal discords were the usual case at Bijapur and in every other country where the king is weak and his officers strong and selfish. Against Aurangzib's theory that Ali was a lowborn lad smuggled into the harem, stands the fact that at the time of his birth (August 1638), Muhammad Adil Shah was only 29 years old. Are we to believe that at this early age he and his queen had given up all hope of having any issue, and had contrived the fraud of proclaiming a stranger's child as their son? Some scandalous tale about the private life of Muhammad Adil Shah was told after his death by a Bijapur officer who had deserted to Aurangzib, (Adab 91a), but we do not know of its precise nature. Aurangzib himself utters a pious cry of disbelief in it! Who Ali's mother was is not explicitly stated in the Bijapur history. In the record of an event a few years after his accession, the chief Dowager Queen, Bari Sahiba, is spoken of as his walida, but the term may mean nothing mor than adoptive mother, because in the account of Ali's birth even this lady is never once described as his mother. Possibly he was the son of a slave-girl of the harem. But under Islamic law children of such birth are not debarred from inheritance.
[The history of Ali Adil Shah II from his birth to accession is given in the Basatin-i-salatin, 345-347. Tavernier, i. 183, repeats the prevalent story that Ali was merely an adopted child. Also Bernier, 197.]
III.—Corruption of the Bijapur Wazir by Aurangzib.
The Bijapur history asserts that the prime minister, Khan Muhammad, surnamed Khan-i-khanan, was corrupted by Aurangzib, and gives the following account of his treachery and its punishment:—
"Adil Shah had appointed Khan Muhammad, with a large army to guard the kingdom. He took post on the frontier. Spies brought him news that the Delhi army was crossing a pass only two or three days' march off. Khan Muhamamad by a forced march at night barred the road. Famine ​raged in the Mughal camp, but the troops had no way open for escape. Aurangzib then wrote to the prime minister: 'If you let me off now, there will be perpetual friendship between the Bijapuris and us, and so long as you or your descendants hold the wazirship of the country, we shall never covet any of its territory.' The letter reached Khan Muhammad when he was sitting down with some learned men after his evening prayer, and, he remarked, 'This letter will be the death of me.' After long reflection, he replied on the back of the epistle, 'Early next morning, getting your men ready as for a night-attack, make a forced march and escape.' Aurangzib with his men fell on the Khan's troops who left a path open for them, and so he escaped. At the news of the night-attack Khan Muhammad's officers hastened to him, found Aurangzib already fled, and urged him to chase the Mughals as there was yet time. The Khan replied, 'We shall thus secure peace. But if we slay Aurangzib an ocean of troubles will surge up and [Mughal] armies will drown the Deccan land. Good, that he has escaped.' So, he forbade pursuit. Afzal Khan after using hot words left with his troops, went to Bijapur, and reported the matter to the Sultan, . . . . . . . . . . who recalled Khan Muhammad and his army to the capital. The Khan, knowing that his death was certain marched very slowly, with frequent halts. On the day he entered the city, two Mughals, armed with many sharp weapons, stood on the two sides of the Mecca gate. As the Khan's palki entered, they fell on him and despatched him with blows. The date was the year 1068 A. H. [early in November, 1657 A. D.] . . . It is said that Aurangzib ordered that the annual tribute from Bijapur to the Emperor should not that year be paid to him, but spent in building a tomb for Khan Muhammad." (Basatin-i-salatin, 349-351).
Now, this story of Khan Muhammad having caught Aurangzib in a trap in a mountain pass near the frontier, is clearly false. The detailed official history of the Mughals and Aurangzib's letters show that he only marched from his own frontier to Bidar (a short distance), and then from Bidar to Kaliani, and lastly (28 May) he made a four miles' advance from Kaliani in order to disperse the enemy assembled in the neighbourhood. There is no formidable mountain-pass in this route, and at every one of these steps Aurangzib had a strong base close behind him, viz., the Mughal fort of Udgir when he first marched to Bidar, the ​conquered fort of Bidar when he proceeded to Kaliani, and lastly the part of his army left to invest Kaliani when he advanced four miles from that fort. Further more, the road between Bidar and Kaliani had been cleared of the enemy by Mahabat Khan, before Aurangzib traversed it.
Khan Muhammad might possibly have hemmed round some small Mughal detachment escorting provisions, or even Mahabat Khan's division in its march towards Kulbarga, (12th April) but then Aurangzib himself was too far off to write to the Bijapur wazir the letter of temptation described above. I think it most likely that the charge on which he was condemned of treason and murdered was that, having been already corrupted by Aurangzib, he had made a sham fight in the battle of 28th May, when he might have easily annihilated Aurangzib's force.
From the description in the Basatin-i-salatin it appears that Khan Muhammad had an opportunity of crushing Aurangzib during the latter's retreat from Kaliani or Bidar. This theory receives some support from Aqil Khan Razi, who writes (p. 17), "Aurangzib's army was distracted, but he remained firm, without being at all shaken by the departure of such high officers [as Mahabat Khan and Rao Chhatra Sal.] With boldness and prudence he returned, unhurt and without loss, from the place, through that ring of enemies."
In a letter written a few days after 8th October, Secretary Qabil Khan reports a rumour that Afzal Khan with the Bijapuri army had crossed the Benathora with a view to invade the mahals on "this side", evidently meaning the newly annexed districts of Bidar and Kaliani (Adab, 197a). We read (Adab, 64b), that the Bijapuri territory north of the river had been previously occupied and administered by Aurangzib's officers. Therefore, his return march from Kaliani to Bidar, 4th—9th October, could not have been molested by Khan Muhammad.
Did the Bijapur prime minister, then, get and throw away, with fatal consequences to himself, the chance of capturing the Prince, during his retreat from Bidar to the Mughal frontier? The idea is plausible. The Bijapuris were certainly emboldened by the distraction of the Mughals; Aurangzib's army was weakened by the deputation of Mir Jumla and the departure of several other officers for Delhi; and the report of his intended retreat to the Mughal frontier had totally destroyed the Imperial prestige in that region, ​the Bijapuris were openly insulting isolated Mughal detachments and officers. But against this theory must be urged that (1) Bidar was only 28 miles by road from the Mughal frontier (viz., the ferry over the Manjira river); (2) Kaliani and Bidar were both held by Mughal garrisons, which might have assisted Aurangzib by falling on the rear of any Bijapuri army surrounding him; (3) Aurangzib left Bidar on 18th October, and Khan Muhammad was murdered early in November, as the news of his death reached Aurangzib at Aurangabad in the middle of the month. (Adab, 92b.) There was not sufficient interval between these two events for the return of Afzal Khan to Bijapur, the summoning of Khan Muhammad by Adil Shah, and the minister's slow march from Bidar to Bijapur, as described in the Basatin-i-salatin.
However, from Aurangzib's letters it is clear that Khan Muhammad was friendly to the Mughals, and advocated a policy of peace with them, while Mulla Ahmad was at that time bitterly hostile to them. (During the war Khan Muhammad openly sent an agent to Shah Jahan, evidently to propose terms on behalf of his master. Adab, 125a.) But this need not have meant that Khan Muhammad had been bribed to advocate the peace policy or that he shirked his duty in the field of battle. Before Aurangzib's invasion Mulla Ahmad himself had visited the Mughal ambassador at Bijapur and professed friendliness, though Aurangzib distrusted him. (Adab, 91b).
Aurangzib's own remarks on hearing of Khan Muhammad's murder are given in a letter from Secretary Qabil Khan to Mir Jumla, written in November, 1657. The Prince only says that Khan Muhammad fell a victim to the treacherous intrigue of his false friend, Mulla [Ahmad] Natia, and that he almost threw away his life by neglecting to take proper steps to counteract his rival's designs, though repeatedly cautioned by Aurangzib. (Adab, 92b, 204b). The other references to his death are in Adab, 93b and 179a. "Khan Muhammad" is a most unusual name; "Jan Muhammad" is more likely.
* ↑ Chapter III.
* ↑ Basatin-i-salatin, (Major B. D. Vasu's MS.), 302-305. S. K. Aiyangar's Ancient India, 293-294. Sewell, 37, names the Nayak Bhadrappa.
* ↑ In the Persian manuscripts of the Basatin-i-salatin, the place of this encounter is indistinctly written like "Antur, between Bangalore and Masti." There is a Wantur, n. e. of Bangalore. Both Attur and Vellore are too far off.
* ↑ Basatin-i-salatin, 305-308, 311.
* ↑ D'Anvers's Portuguese in India, ii. 308 and 309.
* ↑ Abdul Hamid. Waris, 90 a, 98b, 101a, 113b, 117b, (in these passages the word peshkash is used, but evidently in the sense of 'present' and not in that of 'tribute).
* ↑ Basatin-i-salatin, 324 and 325. Aurangzib refers to the granting of this title in a letter written to Shah Jahan in September 1654 (Adab, 44a.)
* ↑ In October 1652, also, Shah Jahan was angry with the Bijapur king for some reason unknown to us. (Adab, 22a.)
* ↑ Basatin-i-salatin, 324-326. For another quarrel connected with the Imperial dignity, Adab, 40b.
* ↑ The glories of the reign are described in detail in the Basatin-i-salatin, 304-345, especially 329–331.
* ↑ Waris, 113a (Mir Jumla took leave of Aurangzib at Indur on 3 May, and left that place for Delhi four days afterwards), 114 a. Adab, 83a, 205b. Storia, i. 239.
* ↑ Adab, 49b.
* ↑ Adab, 88a and b, 91a and b, 191a (Aurangzib thanks Mir Jumla for having supported him against Dara). (Aurangzib planned the invasion of Bijapur even before the death of its king, Adab, 88a). Aqil Khan, 15, and Manucci (i. 239) assert that Mir Jumla induced Shah Jahan to sanction the invasion of Bijapur.
* ↑ Adab, 88b, 60b, 145a, 132b. (Aurangzib writes to Khwajah Abdul Ghaffar that he invaded Bijapur for the good of the people, as the late king had left no heir!) Basatin-i-salatin, 326, 347. Waris, 118a. There was even a talk of Shah Jahan going to the Deccan to direct the operations. (Adab, 89b).
* ↑ Adab, 89b, 91a.
* ↑ Adab, 91a, 145a & b, 146b.
* ↑ Adab, 144b (about July 1656), 146a (about February or March 1657).
* ↑ Waris, 118a, Adab, 90a.
* ↑ Waris, 118a and b, (list of officers sent to the Deccan.) Adab, 118a (Mir Jumla takes leave of the Emperor on 26th November, but actually starts from Delhi on 1st December).
* ↑ Adab, 90a, 196b.
* ↑ Adab, 88a, 91b. Grant Duff, i. 155. The Bijapur historian thus points out the wickedness of the Mughals, "After the death of Muhammad Adil Shah, Aurangzib invaded Bijapur, in violation of the treaty and solemn agreement between the Mughals and Bijapur, and though Shah Jahan [the maker of the treaty] was alive." Basatin-i-salatin, 348.
* ↑ Adab, 90b-92a, 1956.
* ↑ Adab, 92a, 109b, 145b, 118a, 196b. Kambu, 2b.
* ↑ Kambu, 2b, (both MSS. wrongly give 14 days instead of one month and 14 days, as the time taken by the march.) Adab, 109b, 146a, 118b.
* ↑ This account of Bidar is based on Kambu, 2b and 3a, Adab, 146a, Dilkasha, 14, Burgess's Bidar and Aurangabad Districts, 42-44, and Imp. Gaz. viii. 170.
* ↑ For the history of the siege, Kambu, 2b-3a, Dilkasha, 15, Adab, 109b-110a, 119b, 122a, 127a, 146a.
* ↑ Quoted in Grant Duff, i. 157n. This passage is referred to in a letter of Shivaji to the Mughal officers in 1665 (Khatut-i-Shivaji, 2). There is a similar boast in Aurangzib's letters to Nasiri Khan and Abdul Ghaffar, (Adab, 132b, 130b).
* ↑ Adab, 146a.
* ↑ Kambu, 3a and b, (for the battle of 12th April).Adab, 125a and b, (Aurangzib's instructions of 13th April to Mahabat Khan), 120a (Najabat Khan sent on 5th April to reinforce Mahabat). Najabat Khan's force is given as 10,000 on 125a and as 2,000 on 120a; the latter is more likely. Aurangzib's instruction was that the two generals should unite south of Kaliani and advance to attack Chidgupa. But on Mahabat Khan's retreating northwards to Bhalki, he ordered them to meet near fort Nilanga and try to capture it by corrupting the qiladar through his brother Mamaji (or Nanaji) Deshmukh, who had made overtures to the Mughals. The attempt failed. (Adab, 125b, 126b-127a).
* ↑ Burgess, 23, 37, 38.
* ↑ For the siege of Kaliani, Kambu, 36—5a. Adab (very meagre, no detail) 113a, 139a, 149b, 156b.
* ↑ Kambu, 4a.
* ↑ For the battle of 28th May, Kambu, 4b, Adab, 112a, 147b, 154b. In his letters Aurangzib speaks of the Bijapuris generally as Zangis or Negroes. The context shows that the term is merely used by way of abuse, and does not mean any Negro corps in the service of Bijapur.
* ↑ Kambu, 5a.
* ↑ Kambu, 5a. Aqil Khan states that after taking Kaliani, Aurangzib himself besieged Kulbarga (pp. 16, 38). Grant Duff (i. 157) makes him besiege Bijapur! But neither the official history of Kambu nor Aurangzib's letters support the assertion. Aurangzib did not advance further south than Kaliani and his son, who had penetrated to Kulbarga, did not besiege that fort.
* ↑ Kambu, 5a.
* ↑ Adab, 177a (Aurangzib complains of Dara corresponding with Bijapur behind his back, but two years before this time). Aqil Khan, 16. Kambu, 10a (probably two months later). Alamgirnamah, 29, 83.
* ↑ Adab, 112b (dated early in July).
* ↑ Kambu, 56, (rewards for the capture of Kaliani, and settlement of peace). Adab, 113a, 157a. Aurangzib was commanded to return to Bidar (according to Adab, 112b, 198b), or to Aurangabad (on the authority of Kambu, 5b),
* ↑ Adab, 197a, 149b, 157b, Alamgirnamah, 29. Aqil Khan, 16. Kambu, 6a.
* ↑ Kambu, 6b. Adab, 157a, 169a.
* ↑ Grant Duff, i. 161-162. Adab, 144b (Shiva sends agent, July 1656), 146a (Shiva sends agent, February 1657).
* ↑ The history of the contest with Shiva is given in Grant Duff, i. 162—164, Kambu 3b, and Adab, 110b—112a (Aurangzib's letters to Shaista Khan), 147a—149a (to Multafat Khan), 153a—157a (to Nasiri Khan).
* ↑ Adab, 153a and b, 154b (rebuke for slowness), 156a (news of defeat of Shiva, in May, 1657), Kambu, 4b.
* ↑ Adab, 156b-157a. Grant Duff, i. 163-164.
* ↑ Adab, 157a, 163a. "Take care of Ahmadnagar. Keep your troops ready, lest when Nasiri Khan goes away to Hindustan, Shiva, finding the field vacant, should begin to plunder" (To Multafat Khan. Adab, 149b). "Don't leave your charge at the call of Shah Jahan, lest Shiva should sally out." (To Nasiri Khan, Adab, 157b). "At Nasiri Khan's departure that district has been left vacant. Attend to it, as the son of a dog is waiting for an opportunity" (To Mir Jumla, Adab, 92a). Dilkasha, 20 and 21.