OpenLLM-France/wikimedia huggingface dataset:
# Appletons' Cyclopædia of American Biography/Haynes, John

Edition of 1892.
​HAYNES, John, statesman, b. in Copford Hall, Essex, England; d. in Hartford, Conn., 1 March, 1654. He came to this country in 1633 with the Rev. Edward Hooker, and in 1634 was assistant, and in 1635 governor, of Massachusetts Bay colony. Removing to Connecticut in 1636, he became its first governor, and served every alternate year until his death. He was one of the five authors of the first constitution of Connecticut in 1638, which embodies the main points of all subsequent state constitutions and of the Federal constitution. He is described as of “large estate and larger affections; of heavenly mind and spotless life, sagacious, accurate, and dear to the people by his benevolent virtues and disinterested conduct.”—His son, Joseph, clergyman, b. in Hartford in 1638; d. there, 24 May, 1679, was graduated at Harvard in 1658, supplied the pulpit at Wethersfield. Conn., and was pastor of the 1st church in Hartford in 1664. He was ordained as a colleague of the Rev. John Whiting, who held Congregationalist doctrines, while Mr. Haynes represented the Presbyterian element. The disputes which ensued divided the Hartford church, Mr. Whiting refusing to hold communion with Mr. Haynes and his party. In February, 1670, Mr. Whiting, with thirty-one members, withdrew, and formed the 2d church of Hartford, leaving Mr. Haynes in possession.
# Ante-Nicene Fathers/Volume IV/Origen/Origen Against Celsus/Book IV/Chapter LXXXIV

Chapter LXXXIV.
And since he asserts that, “when ants die, the survivors set apart a special place (for their interment), and that their ancestral sepulchres such a place is,” we have to answer, that the greater the laudations which he heaps upon irrational animals, so much the more does he magnify (although against his will) the work of that reason which arranged all things in order, and points out the skill which exists among men, and which is capable of adorning by its reason even the gifts which are bestowed by nature on the irrational creation. But why do I say “irrational,” since Celsus is of opinion that these animals, which, agreeably to the common ideas of all men, are termed irrational, are not really so? Nor does he regard the ants as devoid of reason, who professed to speak of “universal nature,” and who boasted of his truthfulness in the inscription of his book. For, speaking of the ants conversing with one another, he uses the following language: “And when they meet one another they enter into conversation, for which reason they never mistake their way; consequently they possess a full endowment of reason, and some common ideas on certain general subjects, and a voice by which they express themselves regarding accidental things.” Now conversation between one man and another is carried on by means of a voice, which gives expression to the meaning intended, and which also gives utterances concerning what are called “accidental things;” but to say that this was the case with ants would be a most ridiculous assertion.
* ↑ ἐντρέχειαν.
* ↑ οὐκοῦν καὶ λόγου συμπλήρωσίς ἐστι παρ᾽ αὐτοῖς, καὶ κοιναὶ ἔννοιαι καθολικῶν τινων, καὶ φωνὴ, καὶ τυγχάνοντα σημαινόμενα.
# Ante-Nicene Fathers/Volume IV/Origen/Origen Against Celsus/Book IV/Chapter VI

Chapter VI.
But if you will have us to meet the most ridiculous among the charges of Celsus, listen to him when he says: “Now God, being unknown amongst men, and deeming himself on that account to have less than his due, would desire to make himself known, and to make trial both of those who believe upon him and of those who do not, like those of mankind who have recently come into the possession of riches, and who make a display of their wealth; and thus they testify to an excessive but very mortal ambition on the part of God.” We answer, then, that God, not being known by wicked men, would desire to make Himself known, not because He thinks that He meets with less than His due, but because the knowledge of Him will free the possessor from unhappiness. Nay, not even with the desire to try those who do or who do not believe upon Him, does He, by His unspeakable and divine power, Himself take up His abode in certain individuals, or send His Christ; but He does this in order to liberate from all their wretchedness those who do believe upon Him, and who accept His divinity, and that those who do not believe may no longer have this as a ground of excuse, viz., that their unbelief is the consequence of their not having heard the word of instruction. What argument, then, proves that it follows from our views that God, according to our representations, is “like those of mankind who have recently come into the possession of riches, and who make a display of their wealth?” For God makes no display towards us, from a desire that we should understand and consider His pre-eminence; but desiring that the blessedness which results from His being known by us should be implanted in our souls, He brings it to pass through Christ, and His ever-indwelling word, that we come to an intimate fellowship with Him. No mortal ambition, then, does the Christian doctrine testify as existing on the part of God.
* ↑ καὶ παρὰ τοῦτ᾽ ἔλαττον ἔχειν δοκῶν.
* ↑ καθάπερ οἱ νεόπλουτοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐπιδεικτιῶντες, πολλήν τινα καὶ πάνυ θνητὴν φιλοτμίαν τοῦ Θεοῦ καταμαρτυροῦσι.
* ↑ οἱκείωσιν.
# Ante-Nicene Fathers/Volume IV/Origen/Origen Against Celsus/Book IV/Chapter LXXXVIII

Chapter LXXXVIII.
And wishing to show at greater length that even the thoughts of God entertained by the human race are not superior to those of all other mortal creatures, but that certain of the irrational animals are capable of thinking about Him regarding whom opinions so discordant have existed among the most acute of mankind—Greeks and Barbarians—he continues: “If, because man has been able to grasp the idea of God, he is deemed superior to the other animals, let those who hold this opinion know that this capacity will be claimed by many of the other animals; and with good reason:  for what would any one maintain to be more divine than the power of foreknowing and predicting future events? Men accordingly acquire the art from the other animals, and especially from birds. And those who listen to the indications furnished by them, become possessed of the gift of prophecy. If, then, birds, and the other prophetic animals, which are enabled by the gift of God to foreknow events, instruct us by means of signs, so much the nearer do they seem to be to the society of God, and to be endowed with greater wisdom, and to be more beloved by Him. The more intelligent of men, moreover, say that the animals hold meetings which are more sacred than our assemblies, and that they know what is said at these meetings, and show that in reality they possess this knowledge, when, having previously stated that the birds have declared their intention of departing to some particular place, and of doing this thing or the other, the truth of their assertions is established by the departure of the birds to the place in question, and by their doing what was foretold. And no race of animals appears to be more observant of oaths than the elephants are, or to show greater devotion to divine things; and this, I presume, solely because they have some knowledge of God.”  See here now how he at once lays hold of, and brings forward as acknowledged facts, questions which are the subject of dispute among those philosophers, not only among the Greeks, but also among the Barbarians, who have either discovered or learned from certain demons some things about birds of augury and other animals, by which certain prophetic intimations are said to be made to men. For, in the first place, it has been disputed whether there is an art of augury, and, in general, a method of divination by animals, or not. And, in the second place, they who admit that there is an art of divination by birds, are not agreed about the manner of the divination; since some maintain that it is from certain demons or gods of divination that the animals receive their impulses to action—the birds to flights and sounds of different kinds, and the other animals to movements of one sort or another. Others, again, believe that their souls are more divine in their nature, and fitted to operations of that kind, which is a most incredible supposition.
# Ante-Nicene Fathers/Volume IV/Origen/Origen Against Celsus/Book IV/Chapter LXXXII

Chapter LXXXII.
Perhaps also the so-called wars among the bees convey instruction as to the manner in which wars, if ever there arise a necessity for them, should be waged in a just and orderly way among men. But the bees have no cities or suburbs; while their hives and hexagonal cells, and succession of labours, are for the sake of men, who require honey for many purposes, both for cure of disordered bodies, and as a pure article of food. Nor ought we to compare the proceedings taken by the bees against the drones with the judgments and punishments inflicted on the idle and wicked in cities. But, as I formerly said, we ought on the one hand in these things to admire the divine nature, and on the other to express our admiration of man, who is capable of considering and admiring all things (as co-operating with Providence), and who executes not merely the works which are determined by the providence of God, but also those which are the consequences of his own foresight.
# Ante-Nicene Fathers/Volume IV/Origen/Origen Against Celsus/Book IV/Chapter LXXXIX

Chapter LXXXIX.
Celsus, however, seeing he wished to prove by the foregoing statements that the irrational animals are more divine and intelligent than human beings, ought to have established at greater length the actual existence of such an art of divination, and in the next place have energetically undertaken its defence, and effectually refuted the arguments of those who would annihilate such arts of divination, and have overturned in a convincing manner also the arguments of those who say that it is from demons or from gods that animals receive the movements which lead them to divination, and to have proved in the next place that the soul of irrational animals is more divine than that of man. For, had he done so, and manifested a philosophical spirit in dealing with such things, we should to the best of our power have met his confident assertions, refuting in the first place the allegation that irrational animals are wiser than men, and showing the falsity of the statement that they have ideas of God more sacred than ours, and that they hold among themselves certain sacred assemblies. But now, on the contrary, he who accuses us because we believe in the Supreme God, requires us to believe that the souls of birds entertain ideas of God more divine and distinct than those of men. Yet if this is true, the birds have clearer ideas of God than Celsus himself; and it is not matter of surprise that it should be so with him, who so greatly depreciates human beings. Nay, so far as Celsus can make it appear, the birds possess grander and more divine ideas than, I do not say we Christians do, or than the Jews, who use the same Scriptures with ourselves, but even than are possessed by the theologians among the Greeks, for they were only human beings. According to Celsus, indeed, the tribe of birds that practise divination, forsooth, understand the nature of the Divine Being better than Pherecydes, and Pythagoras, and Socrates and Plato! We ought then to go to the birds as our teachers, in order that as, according to the view of Celsus, they instruct us by their power of divination in the knowledge of future events, so also they may free men from doubts regarding the Divine Being, by imparting to them the clear ideas which they have obtained respecting Him! It follows, accordingly, that Celsus, who regards birds as superior to men, ought to employ them as his instructors, and not one of the Greek philosophers.
# Ante-Nicene Fathers/Volume IV/Origen/Origen Against Celsus/Book IV/Chapter LXXXVI

Chapter LXXXVI.
Immediately after this, as if doing his utmost to reduce the human race to a still lower position, and to bring them to the level of the irrational animals, and desiring to omit not a single circumstance related of the latter which manifests their greatness, he declares that “in certain individuals among the irrational creation there exists the power of sorcery;” so that even in this particular men cannot specially pride themselves, nor wish to arrogate a superiority over irrational creatures. And the following are his words: “If, however, men entertain lofty notions because of their possessing the power of sorcery, yet even in that respect are serpents and eagles their superiors in wisdom; for they are acquainted with many prophylactics against persons and diseases, and also with the virtues of certain stones which help to preserve their young. If men, however, fall in with these, they think that they have gained a wonderful possession.” Now, in the first place, I know not why he should designate as sorcery the knowledge of natural prophylactics displayed by animals,—whether that knowledge be the result of experience, or of some natural power of apprehension; for the term “sorcery” has by usage been assigned to something else. Perhaps, indeed, he wishes quietly, as an Epicurean, to censure the entire use of such arts, as resting only on the professions of sorcerers. However, let it be granted him that men do pride themselves greatly upon the knowledge of such arts, whether they are sorcerers or not: how can serpents be in this respect wiser than men, when they make use of the well-known fennel to sharpen their power of vision and to produce rapidity of movement, having obtained this natural power not from the exercise of reflection, but from the constitution of their body, while men do not, like serpents, arrive at such knowledge merely by nature, but partly by experiment, partly by reason, and sometimes by reflection and knowledge? So, if eagles, too, in order to preserve their young in the nest, carry thither the eagle-stone when they have discovered it, how does it appear that they are wise, and more intelligent than men, who find out by the exercise of their reflective powers and of their understanding what has been bestowed by nature upon eagles as a gift?
* ↑ φυσικήν τινα κατάληψιν.
* ↑ τῷ μαράθρῳ.
* ↑ ἀλλ᾽ ἐκ κατασκευῆς.
* ↑ [The ἀετίτης. See Pliny, N. H., x. 4.]
# Ante-Nicene Fathers/Volume IV/Origen/Origen Against Celsus/Book IV/Chapter LXXXVII

Chapter LXXXVII.
Let it be granted, however, that there are other prophylactics against poisons known to animals: what does that avail to prove that it is not nature, but reason, which leads to the discovery of such things among them? For if reason were the discoverer, this one thing (or, if you will, one or two more things) would not be (exclusive of all others) the sole discovery made by serpents, and some other thing the sole discovery of the eagle, and so on with the rest of the animals; but as many discoveries would have been made amongst them as among men. But now it is manifest from the determinate inclination of the nature of each animal towards certain kinds of help, that they possess neither wisdom nor reason, but a natural constitutional tendency implanted by the Logos towards such things in order to ensure the preservation of the animal. And, indeed, if I wished to join issue with Celsus in these matters, I might quote the words of Solomon from the book of Proverbs, which run thus: “There be four things which are little upon the earth, but these are wiser than the wise: The ants are a people not strong, yet they prepare their meat in the summer; the conies are but a feeble folk, yet make they their houses in the rocks; the locusts have no king, yet go they forth in order at one command; and the spotted lizard, though leaning upon its hands, and being easily captured, dwelleth in kings’ fortresses.” I do not quote these words, however, as taking them in their literal signification, but, agreeably to the title of the book (for it is inscribed “Proverbs”), I investigate them as containing a secret meaning. For it is the custom of these writers (of Scripture) to distribute into many classes those writings which express one sense when taken literally, but which convey a different signification as their hidden meaning; and one of these kinds of writing is “Proverbs.” And for this reason, in our Gospels too, is our Saviour described as saying:  “These things have I spoken to you in proverbs, but the time cometh when I shall no more speak unto you in proverbs.” It is not, then, the visible ants which are “wiser even than the wise,” but they who are indicated as such under the “proverbial” style of expression. And such must be our conclusion regarding the rest of the animal creation, although Celsus regards the books of the Jews and Christians as exceedingly simple and commonplace, and imagines that those who give them an allegorical interpretation do violence to the meaning of the writers. By what we have said, then, let it appear that Celsus calumniates us in vain, and let his assertions that serpents and eagles are wiser than men also receive their refutation.
* ↑ αποτεταγμένως.
* ↑ ὑπὸ τοῦ Λόγου γεγενημένη.
* ↑ χοιρογρύλλιοι.  Heb. סינִּפַשְׁ.
* ↑ ἀσκαλαβώτης.
* ↑ Cf. Prov. xxx. 24–28.
* ↑ αὐτόθεν.
* ↑ John xvi. 25.
* ↑ ιδιωτικά.
# Ante-Nicene Fathers/Volume IV/Origen/Origen Against Celsus/Book IV/Chapter V

Chapter V.
The illustrious Celsus, taking occasion I know not from what, next raises an additional objection against us, as if we asserted that “God Himself will come down to men.” He imagines also that it follows from this, that “He has left His own abode;” for he does not know the power of God, and that “the Spirit of the Lord filleth the world, and that which upholdeth all things hath knowledge of the voice.” Nor is he able to understand the words, “Do I not fill heaven and earth? saith the Lord.” Nor does he see that, according to the doctrine of Christianity, we all “in Him live, and move, and have our being,” as Paul also taught in his address to the Athenians; and therefore, although the God of the universe should through His own power descend with Jesus into the life of men, and although the Word which was in the beginning with God, which is also God Himself, should come to us, He does not give His place or vacate His own seat, so that one place should be empty of Him, and another which did not formerly contain Him be filled. But the power and divinity of God comes through him whom God chooses, and resides in him in whom it finds a place, not changing its situation, nor leaving its own place empty and filling another: for, in speaking of His quitting one place and occupying another, we do not mean such expressions to be taken topically; but we say that the soul of the bad man, and of him who is overwhelmed in wickedness, is abandoned by God, while we mean that the soul of him who wishes to live virtuously, or of him who is making progress (in a virtuous life), or who is already living conformably thereto, is filled with or becomes a partaker of the Divine Spirit. It is not necessary, then, for the descent of Christ, or for the coming of God to men, that He should abandon a greater seat, and that things on earth should be changed, as Celsus imagines when he says, “If you were to change a single one, even the least, of things on earth, all things would be overturned and disappear.” And if we must speak of a change in any one by the appearing of the power of God, and by the entrance of the word among men, we shall not be reluctant to speak of changing from a wicked to a virtuous, from a dissolute to a temperate, and from a superstitious to a religious life, the person who has allowed the word of God to find entrance into his soul.
* ↑ γενναιότατος.
* ↑ Wisd. Solom. i. 7, καὶ τὸ συνέχον τὰ πάντα γνῶσιν ἔχει φωνῆς.
* ↑ Cf. Jer. xxiii. 24.
* ↑ Cf. Acts xvii. 28.
# Ante-Nicene Fathers/Volume IV/Origen/Origen Against Celsus/Book IV/Chapter LXXXV

Chapter LXXXV.
He is not ashamed, moreover, to say, in addition to these statements (that the unseemly character of his opinions may be manifest to those who will live after him): “Come now, if one were to look down from heaven upon earth, in what respect would our actions appear to differ from those of ants and bees?” Now does he who, according to his own supposition, looks from heaven upon the proceedings of men and ants, look upon their bodies alone, and not rather have regard to the controlling reason which is called into action by reflection; while, on the other hand, the guiding principle of the latter is irrational, and set in motion irrationally by impulse and fancy, in conjunction with a certain natural apparatus? But it is absurd to suppose that he who looks from heaven upon earthly things would desire to look from such a distance upon the bodies of men and ants, and would not rather consider the nature of the guiding principles, and the source of impulses, whether that be rational or irrational. And if he once look upon the source of all impulses, it is manifest that he would behold also the difference which exists, and the superiority of man, not only over ants, but even over elephants. For he who looks from heaven will see among irrational creatures, however large their bodies, no other principle than, so to speak, irrationality; while amongst rational beings he will discover reason, the common possession of men, and of divine and heavenly beings, and perhaps of the Supreme God Himself, on account of which man is said to have been created in the image of God, for the image of the Supreme God is his reason.
* ↑ ἀσχημοσύνην.
* ↑ οὐ κατανοεῖ δὲ τὸ λογικὸν ἡγεμονικὸν καὶ λογισμῷ κινούμενον;
* ↑ μετά τινος φυσικῆς ὑποκατασκευῆς;
* ↑ ἀρχήν.
* ↑ τὴν ἀλογίαν.
* ↑ λόγος.
# Ante-Nicene Fathers/Volume V/Cyprian/The Epistles of Cyprian
## Contents

* Part 1
* Part 2
* Part 3
* Part 4
* Part 5
* Part 6
* Part 7
* Part 8
* Part 9
* Part 10
* Part 11
* Part 12
* Part 13
* Part 14
* Part 15
* Part 16
* Part 17
* Part 18
* Part 19
* Part 20
* Part 21
* Part 22
* Part 23
* Part 24
* Part 25
* Part 26
* Part 27
* Part 28
* Part 29
* Part 30
* Part 31
* Part 32
* Part 33
* Part 34
* Part 35
* Part 36
* Part 37
* Part 38
* Part 39
* Part 40
* Part 41
* Part 42
* Part 43
* Part 44
* Part 45
* Part 46
* Part 47
* Part 48
* Part 49
* Part 50
* Part 51
* Part 52
* Part 53
* Part 54
* Part 55
* Part 56
* Part 57
* Part 58
* Part 59
* Part 60
* Part 61
* Part 62
* Part 63
* Part 64
* Part 65
* Part 66
* Part 67
* Part 68
* Part 69
* Part 70
* Part 71
* Part 72
* Part 73
* Part 74
* Part 75
* Part 76
* Part 77
* Part 78
* Part 79
* Part 80
* Part 81
* Part 82
* Part 83
# Ante-Nicene Fathers/Volume V/Cyprian

See also: Cyprian

## Contents

* Title Page
* Introductory Notice to Cyprian
* The Life and Passion of Cyprian, Bishop and Martyr. By Pontius the Deacon
* The Epistles of Cyprian
* The Treatises of Cyprian
* The Seventh Council of Carthage under Cyprian
* Treatises Attributed to Cyprian on Questionable Authority