# The rise and fall of the Emperor Maximilian/Chapter VIII

CHAPTER VIII.
Disasters in the Empire—Dissensions between the Foreign Contingents and Mexican Troops—The Empress Charlotte's Opinion of the French Army—Difficulty in paying the Troops, and consequent Desertions—Maximilian's Project to subdue Yucatan—'Its Impolicy—The two Chances for the Empire—Poverty of the Mexican Troops—Pecuniary Help rendered by Marshal Bazaine—M. de Lacunza's Moving Appeal to Marshal Bazaine—Meeting at the Imperial Palace—Maximilian speaks out—Yankee Intrigues—American Dictation to France—Mr. Seward's Note—Maximilian secretly sacrificed.
WE are now entering upon the period of those disastrous events which gradually crushed down the Mexican empire. A just idea may, we hope, have been formed as to the errors which caused them. The following pages, describing step by step the long agony of an empire, will surprise by the recital of sudden events, of solemn promises trodden under foot, of strange and unexpected political changes, through which the policy of the French and Mexican courts (soon to be at variance) will finally shatter itself to pieces against the arrogant threats of the United States. The year 1866 began under sad auspices. In the early part of January, disaffection began to show itself on all sides in the very heart of the empire. The breath of rebellion had passed over all the high plateaus. Bands of guerilleros were devastating Tamaulipas, Nuevo Leon, and Zacatecas, the states bordering on the Union. Pachuca had risen at the very gates of the capital, and Michoacan had raised the standard of revolt. 'Long live the Northern Intervention!'—this was the insurgents' rallying cry; they claimed the ​assistance of the great republic, in order to drive the allies of that republic into the sea. The title of ally applied to the Austrians and Belgians as well as to the French. These foreign contingents were not only detested by the malcontents, but had also sown disunion round the throne. Serious disagreements had sprung up between them and the Mexicans, who refused to obey the European officers. Art. 5 of the treaty of Miramar had, in fact, stipulated 'that in case of expeditions with French and Mexican troops combined, the chief command of these troops shall belong to the French general' But the Belgians and Austrians had only been summoned to Mexico as troops in the pay of the Mexican treasury, and were consequently subject to the military institutions of the country they were about to serve, thus losing all character of distinctive nationality. In case, therefore, of any combination of troops, the Mexican officers were justified in only accepting orders from Austrians or Belgians of a rank superior to their own. On the other hand, the Belgians complained of having been deceived, and asserted that they had only come as armed colonists intended to cultivate and to defend the land, but not to act as regular soldiers; this misunderstanding had already promoted desertions from their ranks. These northerners, whatever might be their military qualities, were not adapted for a climate such as this, and their powers of action suffered from their temperament not being fit for a partisan war. Besides, the employment of mercenaries is always dangerous and impolitic. The following remark of the Empress Charlotte well describes the state of things:—'The Austrians and Belgians are all very well in quiet times; but when a storm comes, there is nothing like the red trowsers.' The unfortunate princess rendered a just homage to ​the French blood, to which she was akin through the Orleans family.
We must add that Maximilian received numerous complaints from his generals, asserting that their contingents were without horses and arms. Mejia stated that it was very difficult to keep soldiers to their duty who received no pay. The minister of war had informed the emperor (whose displeasure was great) that he had begged the French head-quarters to escort with one of their battalions the conducta from Monterey, intended to carry the means of payment for Mejia's division at Matamoros, and that the marshal had not thought fit to afford his co-operation. This accusation against the French commander, who was unceasing in his efforts for the good of the service, called forth genuine surprise. Maximilian was, however, able to convince himself that the matter in question had not been an escort for money intended for the Mexicans, but only as to a commercial convoy, the sending off of which had been delayed by military exigencies. Besides, the ships of the squadron, constantly sailing between Vera Cruz and Matamoros, offered every facility for maritime transport in less than sixty hours, whilst the journey by land would require some weeks, and a uselessly dangerous array of forces; the roads leading to Tamaulipas from Queretaro, San Luis, and Monterey, being infested by the guerillas commanded by Cortina and Carbajal, and helped by bands of Americans.
In situations where the French troops protected the northern frontier, the Americans still hesitated to violate the Mexican territory; but this state of things was a very awkward one, and any aggressive demonstration by our battalions on the Rio Grande or the Rio Bravo might have brought on an immediate ​conflict with the United States, which by the formal instructions of our government we were to avoid. Besides, the scattered state of the expeditionary force had not permitted any movement of this sort so far from the centre of Mexico. It was necessary in the first place to put down the insurrection in the departments close to the capital, and our commander had to hurry off reinforcements to pacify Michoacan.
These sad events tore down the veil by which, up to this time, the ministers had flattered themselves that they could hide the truth from Maximilian, in spite of the warnings given by the marshal.
Some days before, the commander-in-chief had been forced to draw the attention of the emperor to the frequent military pronunciamientos, which bid fair to threaten the very existence of the army.
The embellishment of the city of Mexico and of the imperial palace at Chapultepec absorbed considerable sums, although the financial position of the country should have claimed this money for more practical purposes. Nevertheless, at the note of alarm proceeding from our head-quarters, Maximilian trembled.
He had just felt the first shocks which were agitating his throne, and on January 6, 1866, he wrote the following lines, which well depict the state of his mind, and the commencement of his sufferings:—'I know that ​I have accepted a singularly difficult task, but my courage is equal to supporting the burden, and I will go on to the end.' What a painful contrast to the calmness of the following letter, which he wrote to the marshal only five weeks before:—
Mexico, December 2, 1865.
What! had a reign of eighteen months been completely wasted? The necessity of action had not made itself felt until now. The imperial correspondence is full of these strange contradictions. Whilst the departments were rising in revolt, and the want of troops was showing itself by great disasters in many parts of the territory, Maximilian again dreamt of another distant expedition, and stripped, as is proved by the following order, the province of Oajaca, where Porfirio Diaz was about to rekindle the civil war.
Maximilian cherished the idea of conquering a new province, at a time when the old ones were being wrested away from his crown. And Yucatan, a most unhealthy country, and the refuge of many rebel native tribes, had never been in proper subjection to the old presidential authority.
If eighteen months' experience and various harsh lessons had only inspired Maximilian with wisdom, he ought to have understood that he would be unable ​to unite under the imperial sceptre this scattered cluster of vast provinces, almost unknown one to the other, for want of ways of communication favourable to trade. History taught him that the sacrifices made by the states farthest from the centre and separated from the capital by vast deserts, had resulted only from a desire to defend their independence against foreigners, and from no real sympathy with Mexico or with Juarez, from whom they had but little favour or assistance to hope for. Every state capital had its own administration and its own individual interests. Since the war of independence, Mexico (not to speak of the reign of Iturbide, the first emperor, shot in 1823) had been more of a federation than a republic. Moreover, if the military efforts of the crown had failed when the troops were regularly paid, and when a civil war was rending the interior of the United States, what could be hoped for in the future, now that the national treasury, forced to provide for the defence of eighteen hundred leagues of territory, was avowedly exhausted, and the victorious Yankees no longer concealed the hostility of their sentiments? Only two chances of safety were left to the tottering monarchy: one would have been, instead of pretending to reign over an imaginary kingdom exposed on every side, to concentrate all his active forces in the richest and most populous central states, to carefully preserve his communications for export and import with both seas, and then to wait for better times before he tried to regain territory. The other plan would have been, to return to the constitution of 1857, and to proclaim the seventeen states free and independent under the aegis of a sovereign ruler. This federal organisation would have been the only measure to calm the easily offended susceptibilities of the American Union. ​In the early part of February 1866, the situation of the empire was most critical. The state treasury was completely exhausted, and the Mexican army was calling loudly for its pay. When the French officers remained two months under the walls of Puebla without touching any pay, and when our soldiers also have occasionally waited for the arrival of their money, their bivouac was none the less gay, thanks to our magnificent administrative organisation, which so fully provides for every necessity in a campaign.
But when money was deficient, the Mexican troops would have died of hunger if they had not turned into bands of marauders. The commander-in-chief knew too well the military elements of the Mexican army not to fear that treason and confusion would immediately follow pillage; and he judged it to be his duty to take the best means he could to prevent it. For the sake of the imperial throne, which now seemed ready to break up, he assumed the responsibility of authorising the French paymaster-general to make an advance of five millions, which were required for the subsistence of the imperialists.
We have selected the following letter from the emperor, out of many others, as worthy of being quoted, because it exactly points out the nature of the relations existing at this period between our headquarters and the court of Mexico, now tried by misfortune:—
Palais de Mexico, February 5, 1866.
My dear Marshal,—I have just learnt the valuable service which you have rendered to my government, by coming to its help at the time of a difficult financial crisis.
The marshal, however, could not turn a deaf ear to the moving supplications of the Mexican government; for its last appeal was truly heartrending. M. de Lacunza, the president of the council, a man devoted to his country, and one of her most enlightened citizens, begged for the help of France, in a letter too appealing to be passed over without notice. This document, full of revelations as to the policy of the French cabinet, marks the epoch of one of the downward steps of the unhappy empire, which was called into being by our hand, and now tottered over the precipice dug away for it by our intervention.
To His Excellency Marshal Bazaine.
Mexico, April 28, 1866.
Most esteemed Marshal,—I had the honour yesterday of paying you a visit, and you are aware that its principal object was to point out to your excellency the indubitable necessity of your continuing the advances to the Mexican treasury which have been made these last few months. I now desire to reiterate to your excellency my most urgent entreaties on this subject, and also to make known to you the circumstances in which we now stand, and the result we must look forward to, if we do not at once get out of the difficulty.
The military state of things, in a financial point of view, is well known to your excellency. In the north, Mejia's division is scarcely able to live even by eating up the meagre resources of the place in which it is stationed, by making almost forced loans, and also by drawing considerable sums from Vera Cruz.
Also in the north, the troops commanded by Quiroga have no food of any consequence, and this chief is compelled to enforce the payment of taxes a whole year in advance, and also to exact loans, so that the citizens of the places where his troops are stationed are obliged to emigrate in order to avoid these molestations.
In the south, the troops which are under Franco's orders cannot leave Oajaca to meet the enemies which menace them because the daily pay of the soldiers is not secured, and also because there is no forage for the horses.
In the centre of the empire, Florentino Lopez has been compelled by like causes to lose much time before leaving San Luis.
The Austro-Belgian troops are owed more than half a million of piastres, and before your excellency caused them to be paid out of the French treasury, they had spent their last centime, and consumed all the available provisions in the towns they occupy.
It is useless to prolong this sad picture of the poverty of our resources in a military point of view; your excellency is well aware of it, and I have been compelled to reply to the sovereign, when I have been requested to help pecuniarily various Mexican corps, that there were not the means of doing it.
What is going on in the central pay-office at Mexico? Various bills have been drawn upon it amounting to about 300,000 piastres, which have not been paid, and for which there is no hope of payment; there are urgent requisitions to which we can pay no attention; there are, finally, the troops forming the garrison to whom their pay has been owing for nearly two months.
Your instructions express that you are not to make advances ​to Mexico. These instructions are in direct contradiction to the friendly intentions and the very policy of the emperor.
Is there any remedy for this state of things? Certainly, there is one, and it is not of my suggestion; it is M. Langlais who has mentioned it—he who possessed the full confidence of France, and most assuredly well deserved it.
What, then, is this remedy? It consists of a new financial system by which the expenses will be diminished and the revenue increased. The scheme of this system is already decided on, and is almost drawn up; it is also to some extent put in practice.
All the expenses have been reduced to the lowest possible figure, commencing with the emperor's civil list; his majesty is content with only a third of the amount assigned to the Emperor Iturbide, nearly half a century ago. As your excellency is well aware, we are arranging the new system which is to prevail with regard to the public revenue, from which system we expect a considerable augmentation of our resources, and we are preparing the new taxes, a portion of which is already put in force, as, for example, in the maritime customs.
But it is not in man's power either to delay or hasten the march of time, and this is a principal element in every kind of useful progress. If they are to produce their effect, the new plans, which I have every confidence will not delude our hopes, inevitably need a certain space of time for putting them in practice.
During this period of transition, what are we to depend upon? We cannot trust, for a time, to our own new resources, and it is necessary that France should provide what is immediately required. This also is a truth which was admitted and acted on by M. Langlais.
After his much regretted death, this material help was for a time interrupted, and the government had to submit to the dictation of the capitalists to whom it was compelled to apply. Your excellency is not ignorant of what took place; transactions which were ruinous in every way, made, as they were, under the pressure of necessity, put the government in possession of resources which lasted eight days, and discredited it for a much longer time, by obliging it to employ for ​repayment a portion of the customs-funds, with which the foreign loans ought to have been paid.
This is the result produced by the withdrawal of the French co-operation before the appointed time.
I will say a few words more as to these results. Your excellency will understand that a powerful argument is contained in the fact that a large portion of the Mexican nation accept the French intervention, and likewise accepted and is now supporting the empire, in spite of their republican principles, which are those they were brought up in; for with the idea the intervention and the empire was connected that of good faith, order, and impartiality of government, and, consequently, that of the independence of the Latin race in the New World. This, at least, has been the way in which the grand conception of the Emperor Napoleon has been understood here.
Up to the present time, the emperor and the intervention have played a satisfactory part. The disorder in the financial department (which we are now considering) had disappeared, the payments were punctual, the revenue was no longer exposed to the speculations of stock-jobbery, and the loans subscribed in Europe were contracted in due form. If, after having exhausted the resources produced by these loans (as is the case), the emperor finds himself unable any longer to meet expenses, and is compelled to enter upon the old path of disorder, all the good effected by the new system will be undone, and the hopes which had been founded on it will become at least problematical. The final result may be obtained, but the fresh sacrifices and expenses that it will require will be prolonged and multiplied to an extent that no one can now foresee.
The alternative for your excellency is: either to impose a slight burden on the French treasury, in order to accomplish a work undertaken by the Emperor Napoleon himself, which is a work both grand in idea and useful in itself; or, to refuse to do it, and, consequently, to throw upon this very same treasury the necessity of a far more profuse outlay and more costly sacrifices.
Two days after the receipt of this document, which well attests what Maximilian must have suffered, there was a council held at the imperial palace. The commander-in-chief, M. Dano, and M. de Maintenant (the inspector of finances delegated to Mexico by France) had been summoned to it. The emperor was surrounded by all his ministers. The scene was full of sadness. M. Lacunza demanded boldly a monthly advance of five millions from our treasury. The representatives of our government, in virtue of the formal instructions they had received, had urged that his demand should not be entertained. Then the emperor, breaking into the discussion, cried out:—
'Doing away with all detail, the question may be summed up in very few words—it is either the bankruptcy of the empire or the hope of saving it. If the personages who represent France at this meeting are not willing to take the responsibility of spending a few millions, they must take that of having allowed bankruptcy to intervene, which assuredly would not be the desire of the Emperor Napoleon, who has always shown himself to be the friend of the Mexican empire.'
The marshal conceded one-half of the advance requested by Maximilian. We have seen before what sort of reception awaited this step taken by the commander-in-chief. How was it that the Emperor Napoleon's letters to Maximilian, constantly containing direct promises of effective co-operation, were always preceded or followed by orders from the ministers forbidding the French agents to make any financial ​advances? How was it that the marshal's actions did not meet with approval? This last act of the French policy, publicly putting an end to the period of our financial sacrifices, produced a great effect, both in Mexico and also in the Old and New Worlds generally; for this refusal of subsidies was but the precursor of the withdrawal of our expeditionary corps. The government of Napoleon III. was beginning now to reap the fruits of its adventurous policy. Henceforth, the aim of the Washington cabinet was the humiliation of our national self-respect by the overthrow of the Mexican throne. The inmates of the White House had not forgotten that France had once granted belligerent rights to the Southern rebels, anxious as she was to inaugurate a military dictatorship, the future head of which, the celebrated Confederate general, had commenced negotiations with Mexico itself.
Now that the Yankees had triumphed over the Secessionists, they were resolved to make our country as well as Maximilian pay dearly for the part they had taken in the intervention in the neighbouring republic. It must be confessed that the time selected by Mr. Seward, the obstinate secretary of state at Washington, was not ill chosen. Public opinion in France, which had been led away for a time by the pompous statements of our ministers, bound to allure subscribers to the two Mexican loans, had gradually become enlightened as to the real state of matters, both military and political, in the new empire. Although every transatlantic courier brought to Saint-Nazaire the news of ​fresh successes won by our arms, it was also known through private correspondence that the Juarists, countenanced by the privity of the United States, and by the approach of threatening complications in Europe, were not discouraged by the reverses inflicted upon them by our soldiers, and were reconquering without difficulty those portions of the territory which were entrusted for defence to the imperial forces alone.
On the other hand, our government, who were now uneasy as to the eventualities of the German conflict, felt unwilling to be deprived of the help of 30,000 seasoned men, now engaged on the other side of the ocean; a force which it had the intention (we are justified in believing) to maintain in Mexico for an indeterminate period. Besides, it was annoyed in domestic matters by the utterances from the tribune and the notices of the press, which incessantly demanded that an end should be put to this fruitless enterprise. Then it was that the United States, through the medium of Mr. Seward, spoke out dictatorially to the cabinet of the Tuileries. In 1864, this minister had confined himself to asserting to M. Drouyn de Lhuys 'that the unanimous feeling of the American people was opposed to the recognition of a monarchy in Mexico.' Now, become bolder, he challenges directly the French intervention itself, and gives France to understand that the prolongation of an armed occupation might become pregnant with danger.
On December 6, 1865, a note emanating from the state department at Washington had been sent to the Marquis de Montholon, the French minister; it explained, à propos of Mexico, the political views of the United States with regard to the American continent. This note, when communicated to the palace of the Tuileries, and there considered, caused considerable ​sensation. On January 9, 1866, our ministry of foreign affairs sent to its representative a reply to Mr. Seward's communication. The French government announced 'that it was disposed to hasten as much as possible the recall of its troops from Mexico.' Seven days afterwards, the packet conveyed to Mexico M. le Baron Saillard, furnished with confidential instructions.
Not content with this first victory, President Johnson directed that another and still more pressing diplomatic note should be sent to the French legation; it was dated February 12. After having assumed as settled that the recall of our troops was laid down as a principle, it demanded the fixture of an exact date, which would quiet the susceptibilities of his fellow-citizens. Maximilian was, as we see, abruptly sacrificed, and found himself henceforth at the mercy of the United States, which now ruled the French policy on the continent of America. This second diplomatic document, in fifteen pages of which Mr. Seward discussed with inexorable logic all M. Drouyn de Lhuys' dilatory arguments, left no room either for intentional or unintentional delays; and the purport as well as the form of it are so curious a study, if read in the light of the events about to be detailed, that we must here quote some instructive passages of it. The light that will be reflected from them will illumine the whole scene of action.
Note from Mr. Seward to the Marquis de Montholon, the French Minister.
Washington, February 12, 1866.
Sir,—I had the honour, on December 6, of addressing to you, for the information of the emperor, a written communication on the subject of Mexican affairs, so far as they are affected by the presence of the French armed force in that country.
​. . . M. Drouyn de Lhuys assures us that the French government is disposed to hasten, as soon as possible, the recall of its troops from Mexico. We welcome this notification as a promise that our government shall be henceforth spared the apprehensions and anxieties which I dwelt upon in the communication which M. Drouyn de Lhuys has had under his consideration.
. . . It is my duty, however, to maintain that, whatever may have been the intentions, the aim, and the motives of France, the means adopted by a certain class of Mexicans for overturning the republican government of their country, and for availing themselves of the French intervention to establish an imperial monarchy on the ruins of the above government, have been, in the eyes of the United States, without any authorisation on the part of the Mexican people, and have been carried out contrary to its will and its opinion.
. . . The United States have not seen any satisfactory proof that the people of Mexico have had a voice in the matter, or that they have established or accepted the self-styled empire which is asserted to have been established in their capital. As I have remarked on former occasions, the United States are of opinion that no popular assent can be either freely obtained or legitimately accepted at any time, in the presence of the French army of invasion. The withdrawal of the French forces appears to them a necessary measure to allow Mexico to resort to a manifestation of this nature. Doubtless the Emperor of the French is authorised to define the point of view under which it is his duty to pledge this country to a certain state of things. That under which I present it is, however, that which the Union has adopted. The Union, therefore, only recognises, and can only continue to recognise, the former republic in Mexico, and cannot, under any circumstances, consent to enter into any arrangement which would directly or indirectly imply relations with the prince installed at Mexico, or a recognition of him.
States and France. The United States content themselves with explaining to France the exigencies of a situation so embarrassing to Mexico, and with expressing the hope that some means will be discovered compatible both with the interests and dignity of France, and also with the principles and interests of the United States, of putting an end to this state of things without injurious delay.
We adhere to our assertion that the war in question has become a political war between France and the Mexican republic, injurious and dangerous both to the United States and to the republican cause, and looking at it under this aspect and in this character only, we demand that it should come an end.
We look upon the emperor as having announced to us his immediate intention of putting an end to the service of his army in Mexico, and of keeping faithfully, without any stipulation or condition on our part, to the principle of non-intervention, as to which he is henceforth agreed with the United States.
. . . To these explanations, I will only add that, in the opinion of the president, France has no reason whatever for delaying for an instant the promised withdrawal of her military forces from Mexico.
The rudeness of this message was at least strange; but it was the inevitable consequence of our policy of intervention. Our respective characters were for the future inverted: the Union now gave orders. Before, France had spoken boldly, in April 1864, saying through M. Drouyn de Lhuys to Mr. Dayton, the American representative at Paris—'Do you bring us ​peace or war?'—in reply to the resolution of Congress unanimously voting against the establishment of a monarchy in Mexico.
The series of humiliations was now begun, and at the end of 1865 Maximilian was secretly sacrificed. This prince, whose imprudent ambition had impelled him to the shores of Vera Cruz, was about to fall a victim to the weakness of our Government in allowing its conduct to be dictated by American arrogance. Indeed, before rushing into such perilous contingencies, might not this attitude of the United States have been easily foreseen? Our statesmen needed no such rare perspicuity to have discovered the dark shadow of the Northern Republic looming up on the horizon over the Rio Bravo frontier, and only biding its time to make its appearance on the scene. If they were about so resignedly to adopt the resolution of giving way, a resolution which prudence certainly would dictate in a business so far from the mother-country, was it acting generously to lead on the archduke to his certain ruin? On the other hand, a too sudden withdrawal would wound the national pride of our own troops; for it could hardly be expected that our regiments could evacuate in succession, almost sword in hand, the towns which they had occupied, without their looking forward with emotion to the reprisals which the inhabitants would have to undergo from the victorious Liberals; and without groaning over their retreat before the American bravado. This was, we shall say boldly, the way to introduce our soldiers to a bad warlike school, in which the spirit of discussing the acts of their commander, compelled as he was to yield to an humiliating policy, must infallibly have weakened the discipline of our army, so prompt to be roused by anything which seems to them ambiguous. ​It may, therefore, be well understood what a difficult part to play had now fallen on our commander-in-chief, having to decide between accomplishing the orders of his sovereign—in which a soldier cannot fail without forfeiting his honour—and witnessing the sad spectacle of the ruin of a throne through the sudden and frightened change in French policy, now hurrying on the destruction of its own handiwork. The marshal did not conceal from himself that he was about to tread a path bristling with obstacles and full of sadness, in which a feeling of duty and the security of the expeditionary corps (justly discontented at its passive attitude) had to be reconciled with all the consideration due to a prince borne down by great misfortune and embittered by our sudden desertion.
* ↑ The Corps Législatif sanctioned this payment.
* ↑ The general who died at Matehuala.
* ↑ It will not be without interest to point out here that, notwithstanding these loans were warmly recommended in Mexico, not a family, nor a commercial house in that country, would subscribe to them: in a word, not a single bond could be placed in Mexico, even among the imperial party. The Mexicans were 'wiser in their generation' than our too credulous countrymen.