# The rise and fall of the Emperor Maximilian/Chapter X

CHAPTER X.
Establishment of Cazadores and Gendarmes—The Marshal's Plan for Evacuation favourable to Maximilian—Maximilian's wise Measures of Retrenchment—His Confidence, Energy, and Hopes—His Plans explained to Marshal Bazaine—Revolt of Chihuahua and Reoccupation by the French—Maximilian's Letter of Congratulation to Marshal Bazaine—His Disagreement with the Marshal—Mr. Bigelow's Despatch—Left no Hope for Maximilian.
THE only co-operation which the marshal was able to afford to the imperial government consisted in the proper management of the war; for article 6 of the treaty of Miramar formally prohibited his intervening in any branch of the Mexican administration. Maximilian reigned in full independence, and, whatever might be the condition of domestic affairs, the responsibility rested on the ministers of the crown, though it is true that they had already begun to release themselves of it.
The head-quarters authorities, whose duty it was to strive against these tendencies, and to keep strictly to their own functions, exerted themselves, at the appeal of the imperial family, to lay down the basis of a new military formation which would double the forces of the foreign legion and the Austro-Belgian brigade. The commander-in-chief took upon himself to demand from his government authority to form nine battalions of Mexican cazadores (chasseurs), and to introduce into them a French list of officers, as offering a further guarantee to the court of Mexico.
In a few months, nine battalions of cazadores, of ten companies each, making up an average of 400 effectives ​for each battalion, were installed in the principal towns, for the defence of which they were permanently assigned, so as to be able to keep up their numbers by a local recruitment. Being clothed, equipped, and paid by our treasury, their duty was to patrol their districts, and as partisan companies to lend assistance to the gardes rurales. Instructors and agents taken from our ranks were added to this new force, in which certainly the French element prevailed, being represented by 66 officers, 130 sub-officers, and 1,502 private soldiers who had been drawn from the expeditionary corps. The remainder was made up of Indians and Mexicans. Two legions of gendarmerie also were organised at Mexico and Guadalajara, the two capital cities of the empire. The gendarmes, who were principally recruited among the Belgians and Austrians, were distributed in small parties along the high-roads, where they were sheltered in fortified barracks. Their duty was to guard the great line of communication between Vera Cruz and the city of Mexico.
At the same time the marshal, in conformity with the instructions of Napoleon III., forwarded to Paris his plan for a gradual evacuation. Using the latitude which was allowed him by his government, and anxious as far as possible to act for the interests of the new monarchy, he proposed to divide the departure of the French forces into three periods, each coming at a fixed time; so that the withdrawal would be commenced in November 1866, and would be concluded during the autumn of 1867. He thus ensured to the empire twenty months more of French protection. He was fortunate enough to find that this new and important proposition was favourably received at the palace of the Tuileries; but the promises made at Paris were not to be long respected by the French cabinet. ​Without allowing his difficulties to dishearten him, Maximilian, in whom the dreams of poetry too often eclipsed the feelings of a sovereign, set courageously to work. His hopes being revived by the formation of the cazadores, the emperor made up his mind to cut into the very heart of the military question, by the dismissal of dangerous officers, and by the reduction of the national forces at all those points where they remained at the expense of the treasury, without being of any service to the country. The following letter, which he addressed to his minister of war, shows that now, being made wise by experience, and left to his own ideas, he endeavoured for a time to follow a path full of wisdom:—
Cuernavaca, May 11, 1866.
My dear Minister Garcia,—We return you the draft of the project which you sent us as to the new organisation of the army, the basis of which appears to be generally good.
Nevertheless, you will take care to communicate previously with Marshal Bazaine, so as to make sure that no corps is suppressed which plays any important part in the plan of his military operations.
With regard to the delicate business of suppressing a certain part of our organised forces, you will take all the necessary precautions so as not to discourage the officers at the first outset, and thereby cause them to go and swell the ranks of the malcontents.
It will likewise be proper that you should settle the mode to be adopted in carrying out this reduction, by fixing a date, at which each commandant of a corps, a battery, company, &c. should draw up, assisted by the nearest military authority, a list of the effective force under his command, of their clothing, arms, &c; and it will be also requisite to point out some one who is to take possession of everything that belongs both to embodied and disbanded forces.
Before making public the arrangement which will reduce our existing forces, you will carefully study as to what parts of the territory are occupied by troops whose withdrawal would expose the countries which they protect to the attacks of the enemy, in order to arrange immediately for the defence of these localities by fresh troops.
In a word, the great object of your attention will be to prevent the inconvenience which measures so important must bring with them.
In these instructions we find the decided and concise style, and the good sense, of the former admiral of the Austrian marine, who had prepared the laurels won for the glory of his country at Lissa. If he had been aided by his own party, and if he had not been fatally deserted by France in obedience to the voice of the United States, Maximilian would perhaps have triumphed over every obstacle. But our head-quarters were almost his only support. The latter hastened to grant to the emperor the help of any of our officers whom he desired to have as coadjutors. M. Friant, the commissary of stores, gave peculiar satisfaction to the court of Mexico, who thought highly of his services. The emperor planned to call him in to his assistance.
Cuernavaca, May 16, 1866.
Maximilian obtained without difficulty the concession that this high functionary should be placed at his disposal, although the latter was really necessary in the administration of our expeditionary corps.
One of the most striking features in Maximilian's reign is the confidence which he seemed to feel in his work. His energy seemed only to increase under the pressure of adversity. When he had once recovered from the shock which, after the mission of Baron Saillard, the news of the approaching evacuation had given him, he coolly confronted the position in which he was placed; and, though expecting some modification of the instructions given by his ally Napoleon III. in consequence of the efforts of M. Almonte, he looked to find in his adopted country all the necessary resources for bringing his undertaking to a favourable issue. He hoped much that time would shed a softening influence on conflicting passions, and felt persuaded that in the course of time the malcontents would be induced to return under his flag. Thus, as the following letter proves, he already accepted more readily the idea of the gradual departure of our troops, and was working actively to organise his national forces. The only thing was that he often nursed himself in fond illusions, and cherished ideas which, as he himself said, 'breathed the spirit of the middle ages.' Whilst drawing ​up his army on paper, he fancied he was dealing with German soldiers, and forgot that the chief need in Mexico was an iron hand, which could hold firmly all the threads of this complicated web, leaving nothing to chance or to the dangers resulting from want of discipline; he forgot, too, that for about fifty years the country had been trodden under foot by partisan bands. A scheme like his might have been practicable for the energetic Yankees, who often operated in this way during the war of secession; but in Mexico it would only have the effect of increasing the number of what the emperor himself called 'hordes,' which were nothing more than a destructive scourge.
Cuernavaca, May 17, 1866.
I also intend to call upon the Commandant Loysel to take a part in these meetings, in which all the principal points will be discussed both of the organisation generally and also of the expenditure and the persons to be employed; he will also draw up confidentially an official record of our proceedings, without which we shall not attain either the order or promptitude which are desirable. If the marshal should be of opinion that would likewise be useful to summon General Uraga to present at these meetings, as a representative of the active portion of the Mexican army, he will be kind enough to let me know.
At the present moment, it appears to me that the military question is to be looked at in three essential points of view.
The immediate organisation of 20,000 national troops, the firm consolidation of the mixed corps who are styled by you the cazadores of Mexico, who are in my opinion the principal basis for the future army and for the systematic pacification of the country.
As regards the first point, it appears to me that we must avail ourselves of the few honourable corps now existing, such as those of Mejia, Mendez, Garcia, &c., so as to form a national nucleus, and that we must immediately dismiss all those men that constitute nothing but a valueless body of soldiery. This measure, however, can only be considered as the beginning of the matter.
The second point is completely in your hands, and your wisdom and your thorough knowledge of the country cannot fail to ensure a right solution.
As regards the third point, it appears to me that it would be very useful if we were to acquaint ourselves with all the reports and communications which have been lately furnished by the imperial commissioners and the generals commanding the territorial divisions, copies of which are to be found in my secretary s office. By this means, it would be easy to form a clear idea of the number of troops which would have to be set in movement, and the expenditure to which we should have to look forward.
If the execution of this is possible, we should have the advantage of implicating all the high functionaries who have furnished the reports, by showing them that we have complied with their desires, and that the responsibility of the ulterior state of things would therefore fall upon them.
As may be easily seen, the army was always in a state of transformation. These commissions absorbed precious hours, and too often in vain. Nevertheless, time pressed, and such serious alterations could not be made in a day. Besides, it kept up a state of uncertainty among the Mexican regiments, already too prone through their fickle nature and the traditions of former pronunciamientos to go over easily from one chief to another. Maximilian was much deceived when he thought that 'implicating his high functionaries' would give pledges of their future fidelity. This stratagem was hardly worthy of a sovereign, and, besides, he ought to have known that Mexicans would never ​consider themselves bound because they were implicated in any particular course of action. For the latter were accustomed, at each new revolutionary movement, to disappear so as to let the storm pass over, and then to rally round the victorious side until the propitious moment came for a fresh revolt. This contempt for all political faith formed Juarez's power; he was always certain of being well received by his countrymen, even when they had just taken an oath of allegiance to the empire. Thus, as will be recollected, our troops had rushed to the very extremity of the empire, to the city of Chihuahua, to expel from it the president of the republic. After some months' occupation, which had certainly restored calm to these distant districts, the French forces were compelled to deliver up this state capital to its own garrison, and left it in order to seek fresh dangers. Chihuahua immediately opened its gates to Juarez, who had returned from Paso del Norte at a time when Maximilian thought that his enemy had crossed the American frontier without intention of returning. The president's presence on Mexican territory deeply affected Maximilian, who imagined that the resistance of the malcontents was due to this cause only. In spite of the want of troops which was felt in the central states, the court of Mexico itself resolved on a second expedition against Chihuahua, and it signified its desire to the commander-in-chief in terms which clearly prove that the emperor reigned and governed in complete independence.
Chapultepec, May 28, 1866.
It is evident that it is as much to the interest of your glorious sovereign and my august ally, the Emperor Napoleon, as it is to mine that we should put an end to the pretensions of the Washington cabinet by expelling Juarez from the above capital. It is a matter, indeed, on which our honour depends.
I repeat that the foreign news which I have just received strongly shows the urgency of this measure, and, as chief of my army, you will have the goodness to immediately see to its execution.
I again urge the prompt formation of Franco-Mexican battalions, and the necessity of instantly appointing their French cadres, for time presses.
Thus the Mexican court ignored the whole conduct of the French cabinet, and still clung to the hope of putting an end to the claims of the Washington cabinet, nattering itself that it would be able to allure its ally into the same course. Two powerful reasons forbade our return to Chihuahua. First, the expenses which this long journey must involve would press heavily on the Mexican treasury, which was already sadly exhausted; and, besides, our head-quarters had orders from their government to avoid at all hazard the chance of an engagement on the northern frontier, especially on those parts where the Americans exercised any direct action. Moreover, an expedition like this was a mistake, for it was easy to foresee that an occupation at such a distance could not be a permanent one. It would uselessly fatigue our operating columns, which could be better employed elsewhere.
The imperial order was, however, carried out. Commandant Billot marched rapidly on Chihuahua, whence ​Juarez fled again towards Paso del Norte, followed by a few travelling companions only. The soldiers and the liberal officials were already scattered to the winds. For six weeks the French troops had worked at constructing a fort in the town, so that it might be defended from any further attack; and after the completion of this work, they gave up the place to the care of about twelve hundred imperialists, who were not long before they were attacked. Their generals, instead of keeping them in the fort, and thence defending the environs, undertook a sortie with their forces to a spot half a mile from the town. That night their overthrow was complete, and Chihuahua definitively welcomed the republic.
This military episode was reproduced on many points of the territory; and Maximilian, whom the French and foreign press has so often represented as constantly disagreeing with our head-quarters, desired nothing better than its concurrence in the means of defence for the empire. The prince could not make the marshal responsible for the acts of his government, and, in spite of all, was pleased with his exertions. Does the following letter testify to any hostile feeling on the part of the crown, or any dissatisfaction with the management of military operations, when, on the contrary, its aim is to concentrate absolute authority in the hands of the general-in-chief?
Mexico, June 3, 1866.
My dear Marshal,—Unity of action is the first requisite for finishing promptly the organisation of the army.
. . . All orders given by you, and sent to the minister for war, should express, 'by order of the emperor.'
Pengamillo, October 7, 1864.
My dear Marshal and Friend,—It is with the greatest pleasure that I have just heard of your promotion to the rank of marshal.
By distinguishing you with so high a mark of favour, the emperor fulfils the desire of all good Mexicans, to whom, in his name, you have brought liberty and peace, for which they will always be grateful to you. One thing alone could lessen the joy which this happy event causes us, it is in case it should result in your leaving our country. I trust that the Emperor Napoleon will not deprive Mexico of services which are so necessary to her well-being.
Was there not in these words something more than mere courtly language? The note of the Empress Charlotte, who was eager to be the first to apprise the commander-in-chief of the happy event, by sending him the Belgian newspapers, was redolent of the same goodwill. But at the commencement of 1866, a real misunderstanding interrupted for a short time the good understanding which existed between the throne and head-quarters. A French officer had, by order of the Emperor Napoleon, returned to Mexico after leave of absence. Maximilian, who at that time did not appreciate the services of this officer, addressed the following note to the general-in-chief:—
As we here see, Maximilian spoke with an air of authority; but, as it may be imagined, the marshal ​could not countenance any such control over the acts of his sovereign, who alone had the right of choosing officers to serve in Mexico. That same evening, in the saloons of the palace, in the presence of the corps diplomatique, and after the departure of the commander-in-chief, Maximilian thought it his duty to denounce this act in rather strong terms. The procedure of the marshal, when acquainted with this painful incident, was determined on by him; but the Emperor of Mexico, who had a noble heart, did not delay in being the first to efface every trace of this disagreement. Neither this sovereign nor the empress ever made the commander-in-chief acquainted, either directly or indirectly, with the grievances which they revealed to the court of the Tuileries; and, but for the indiscretion of the Empress Charlotte during her stay at the Grand Hotel in Paris, the marshal might have remained much longer in complete ignorance of them.
But the marshal was gravely wrong, in a way, too, which increased every day in the eyes of Maximilian and his august spouse. This offence was his desire, above all things, of remaining true to his own country. The instructions of the French cabinet, dated January 6, 1866, and incessantly repeated since that time, prohibited the head-quarters from exercising any influence, except with great reserve. 'Notwithstanding the complaints of Maximilian,' they wrote, 'we will not grant another soldier.' At the end of the same month, they wrote to the marshal from Paris:—'You have acted wisely in concentrating your troops between San Luis, Aguas Calientes, and Matehuala. Let our share in military operations gradually die out.' At the latter end of the month of May 1866, the French government 'was even then hoping for some definite resolutions on the part of Maximilian,' weighed down as he was by ​the poverty of the treasury, and appealing to the devotion of the commander-in-chief that he would not yet return to Europe, as he was preparing to do with the first troops going home, but that he would undertake the charge of the evacuation until its completion. Maximilian had himself testified to the commander of the expeditionary corps his entire satisfaction with such a measure. But in spite of all this, the Mexican court allowed itself to be persuaded into begging that a much larger French force should be sent, and that large credits should be opened; and on account of the resistance from head-quarters to these projects, it was convinced that the marshal was the only obstacle to fresh sacrifices being made by our country, which would, in its opinion, ensure triumph to the cause. This court had unfortunately entertained the idea that France was still quite inclined to come to their help. But the marshal, who since the end of 1865 had been thoroughly enlightened, both as to the intentions of the cabinet of the Tuileries, and also as to the course public opinion was taking in France and in the United States, would in no way ask for an augmentation of forces, which would have been certainly refused. His personal opinion was that we had wasted enough, both of men and money; and, as he never failed to represent to Maximilian himself, he had been too much struck by the weakness of the Mexican element to consent to plunge his country into fresh dangers. The Mexican sovereign was right in seeking for further resources for his country, and the marshal would have been proud of commanding a more imposing army; but would not France have cried out if one of her generals had led away some thousands of men more? What a fatal story would there have been to tell to-day! Some believed, and will continue to believe, that an increase ​of the effective force at its disposal would have been sufficient to decide the triumph of the monarchy; but these persons have never witnessed the intrigues and disloyalties of a court, and have never scanned the distressing picture of financial difficulties springing up again and again. They could hardly have been aware of the French instructions directing that the towns should be evacuated in the beginning of 1866; and they had not had to deal with the premeditated sluggishness of the very highest officials, acting as a dead weight on nearly all the imperial territory. Maximilian was to be pitied; but it is not the commander-in-chief who must be blamed.
To be better convinced of this, one need only glance at the despatch which, at this very time, Mr. Bigelow, the American minister at Paris, addressed to his government, which had enjoined him to demand explanations from the cabinet of the Tuileries as to the asserted movements of troops intended for Mexico.
To Mr. Seward, Under Secretary of State at Washington.
Paris, June 4, 1866.
Sir,—I called on his excellency the minister of foreign affairs, last Sunday, to confer with him on the subject indicated in your instructions marked 'confidential.' As he had already been informed of the contents of this despatch by the French minister resident at Washington, I had not to explain it to him afresh.
. . . I then told him that the object of your instructions, as I understood them, is simply to obtain an explanation which would certainly be required of you in reference to the embarkation in France of large bodies of troops for Mexico, after the intention of withdrawing the whole army had been officially announced.
These soldiers had been waiting for some time in France and in Algeria for means of transport to rejoin their regiments. No enlistments have taken place for the foreign legion since the emperor announced his intention of withdrawing his flag from Mexico, and there is no idea, as far as he knows, of making fresh enlistments.
Regarding the embarkation of troops recruited in Austria, his excellency told me that this is a matter entirely between the Austrian government and the Mexicans, and that France had nothing to do with it. Since I pointed out the fact to him, he has confirmed his own convictions on the subject, by a correspondence with the ministers of war and marine, and he has satisfied himself that there has been no kind of engagement entered into, either for the enlistment or for the transport of Austrian troops into Mexico.
He then stated that the intention of his government is to withdraw the whole of their army from Mexico at latest within the time specified in the despatch which he sent you, and even sooner, if the climate and other considerations permit it; also, that it is not their intention to replace this army by other troops from any source whatsoever.
In concluding this long conversation, with the important result of which I have acquainted you, I expressed to the minister the satisfaction which his explanations gave me, and the pleasure I should have in communicating them to my government.
After reading this despatch, could any hopes be ​entertained of reinforcements of troops for Maximilian? Thus, then, the United States followed step by step the actions of French policy, counting, nearly to a man, the detachments which were necessary to keeping up the number of our effective force. Even the recruiting of Austrians was forbidden. The government of France had not for a long time been subject to dictation so tyrannical as this! The only source of military recruitment left to Maximilian consisted for the future in re-enlisting those discharged soldiers of the French force who, instead of re-embarking for Europe, consented to enter his service amongst the cazadores.