# The rise and fall of the Emperor Maximilian/Chapter XIII

CHAPTER XIII.
Reactionary Influence of the new Ministry—Maximilian's injudicious Innovations—Fall of Tampico—Correspondence thereon—Marshal Bazaine's Explanations—Mutiny of the Belgian Contingent—Singular Loss of Belgian Despatches—Bad State of the National Army—Complaints made by the French Commandants of the Cazadores—Well-founded Appeal of General Guttierez—Clerical Interference with the Course of Justice.
IT was to be expected that the influence of the new ministry would soon begin to show itself; anxious as they were to take revenge for the liberal measures which were inaugurated before Maximilian's arrival at Mexico, when the commander-in-chief declared that the sales of mortmain property were valid, except in cases of fraudulent acquisition. Our head-quarters authorities felt displeased at having to be associated with a policy of so decidedly reactionary a character. It was not long before hostilities broke out between the crown, now alas! subjected to untoward influences, and the military representative of the French government. The marshal might now congratulate himself that he had been the means of sparing Mexico all the severities of a state of siege, which would indeed have been terrible in the hands of religious fanaticism.
The capture by the rebels of the port of Tampico,—so important for its customs' receipts—formed a pretext for an attack by the ministers, who had for a moment flattered themselves that our flag, being compromised by a sudden conflict with the United States, would become so committed to the war, that France, so far from being able to withdraw, would find herself ​compelled to send for fresh reinforcements. Maximilian, it must be confessed, had found out that the policy of the Tuileries spoke two languages; that the ministers contradicted the assurances of his ally, who had never ceased to promise his material assistance and moral support; and that at last the Emperor Napoleon had placed him in a cruel dilemma, by forcing him to sign the convention of July 30.
The Emperor of Mexico also had profited by these lessons of a political conduct now much in request in Europe. Thus he no longer hesitated in sowing the seeds of discord in the French camp, appealing to certain feelings of devotion in some, who, in consequence of their complete ignorance of the instructions sent by the cabinet of the Tuileries, deplored the severity of the measure of evacuation, although the latter had been modified by our head-quarters authorities. Forgetting that discipline is the first law of an army, Maximilian sought to create for himself partizans in our ranks, in the hope that their counteraction might find an echo in France which would be powerful enough to retard the movement of evacuation.
The constant innovations which were experienced by Maximilian's military household had often revealed a real want of experience on the part of the sovereign as well as a complete forgetfulness of the etiquette of government. Thus, the following letter from the imperial cabinet, was intended to compel a marshal of France, as well as all the ministers of the crown, to correspond with the emperor through the medium of a captain of the expeditionary corps.
Military Cabinet of the Emperor,
Mexico, March 7, 1866.
His majesty places Captain X——— at the head of the military section of this office.
For the future, the emperor desires to correspond with your excellency, the chief of the staff, and the various ministers, through the medium of this officer.
Maximilian now felt himself, and rightly so, relieved of all gratitude to the French government, and had only one aim with regard to them; namely, to derive all the advantage he could from our help, and to make use of our soldiers as long as he could, in order to save his crown. And he had a right to do this. Thus, he constantly expressed his wishes that the French should guard specially the northern frontier line, and the neighbouring ports of the United States. In this sphere of action there was a chance of their coming in collision with the Americans; but our authorities kept on their guard and obeyed the instructions which came from Paris, although at the same time they afforded complete co-operation to the crown of Mexico which they were still charged to defend, the convention of July 30 being now signed. Impressed by these hopes now deceived by our total abandonment of the northern frontier, Maximilian thus wrote to the Commander-in-Chief:—
Alcazar de Chapultepec, August 4, 1866.
My dear Marshal,—The capture of the city of Tampico by the rebels and the evacuation of Monterey apprise me that the result of the campaign in the north will be attended with the most serious consequences to my country.
This letter manifests considerable irritation, which was hardly uncalled for, on the part of the Prince, who was still feeling the blow inflicted by the imperial note of May 31, and saw that all his hopes were betrayed. If the commander-in-chief had been received at the palace, when he presented himself there before his departure for his northern tour of inspection, these questions might have received a more conciliatory solution. As this painful history goes on, we shall see that the sovereign's correspondence with the marshal, as far as regards all personal relations with him, never ceases to manifest feelings of cordial good-will. But as soon as the great military interests of the Mexican crown, now put in jeopardy by the anticipated withdrawal of our troops, again come into question, we shall find that Maximilian could only look upon the marshal as the representative of a government against which he had the most bitter cause of complaint; and consequently the relations on both sides will be as stiff as the situation itself was awkward, since the headquarters authorities, having already received several rebukes from Paris, could not do otherwise than conform to their instructions.
The commander-in-chief replied from his camp:—
Peotillos, August 12, 1866.
Sire,—I have this instant received your majesty's letter of August 4.
The capitulation of Matamoros, and the consequences which have resulted from it, are not my doing, and I have not yet been able to state my opinion on the subject. I had to meet the exigencies of a position which I found ready made to my hands, and I believe I have done my duty to the sovereign in placing before him all the documents annexed to my before-named letters, duplicates of which I have sent to my government.
With respect to the capture of the city of Tampico by the rebels, I must have the honour of respectfully reminding the emperor that, before undertaking what he is pleased to call my campaign in the north, at the time when the remains of General Mejia's troops were arriving at Vera Cruz, I asked that General Olvera, with the residue of his brigade, should be sent to Tampico. The urgency of General Mejia has, it appears, induced your majesty to modify your first decision, which was favourable to the contemplated movement. For Olvera's brigade has not gone to Tampico, and has indeed been sent on to Mexico contrary to the orders which I left, which were in harmony with a military combination, the foiling of which finds its material results in the state of Queretaro.
The want of a similar co-operation, which General de Thun refused to afford me, has not a little contributed to the disasters which have befallen Tamaulipas. General Mejia complained that his soldiers were exposed to the yellow fever at Tampico.
A small detachment of the contre-guerilla, which was all I had at my disposal to form a garrison at Tampico, was then embarked at Vera Cruz, without noticing the dangers of the climate, which cost us a whole battalion last year. I am not aware that this detachment has abandoned its post, or delivered up that which it was charged to defend.
Your majesty expresses a desire of being informed of the plan which I propose to follow in my operations.
​If your majesty had deigned to receive me when, on the eve of leaving the city of Mexico, I solicited the honour of taking leave of you, I should have explained my intentions, which simply were—to see with my own eyes the effect produced in the north by the events at Matamoros; to assure myself of the correctness of the reports which had been sent me as to the little confidence that could be placed in the principal officials, and as to the generally hostile feeling of the population of those districts.
After having ascertained all these facts, and relying on the reports of Generals Douay and Jeanningros, I saw the impossibility (at least for a time) of preserving these advanced points, which could be nothing else but a source of danger and continual expense. I formed the resolution, and stated it to your majesty, of directing the evacuation of Monterey and Saltillo, so as to establish in their rear a strong line, easy to defend and separated from the former places by a complete desert, where neither allies nor enemies could reckon on any resources. My opinion was, and still is, that it is preferable for you to develope your influence in the interior, by concentrating your powers on a limited extent of territory, instead of exhausting your energies at the extremities of the empire which are subject to the evil influence of the American frontier.
Your majesty calls forth these explanations; and I give them to you in good faith.
The absolute state of isolation in which the former ministers of the crown left General Mejia at Matamoros was the real cause of the capitulation of that place; the painful position in which General Montenegro has been placed at Acapulco—and this in spite of my numberless demands, and in spite of promises made but never kept—will lead, I doubt not, either to the early defection of this body of troops, which has really given proofs of self-denial and devotion, or to the capitulation of the place.
My letter of July 11 has set before your majesty the duties which fall upon me in connection with the approaching withdrawal of a considerable portion of the army under my command.
As a natural consequence of the apprehensions which I am justified in conceiving as to the part which the Mexican element plays in this country, I have the honour of acquainting your majesty that it will be impossible for me to leave any of my troops at Guaymas and at Mazatlan.
For a long time the Mexican government has been able, and ought, to have taken in hand the maintenance of the imperial power in these two places. I find myself compelled to leave La Sonora and Sinaloa to those resources alone which the government of your majesty has at its disposal, and I shall not delay in recalling the French troops who are occupying these far-off districts.
With regard to the officials who have given their support to your majesty's government, I take them to be too clever either to have compromised themselves fruitlessly, or to expose themselves to danger from events which they must have foreseen.
They have all of them understood hitherto, and I think will still understand, how to keep themselves clear from all danger.
Upon the whole, sire, I do not think that the evacuation of Monterey and Saltillo can produce the serious results for your country which you appear to dread.
In war, it is necessary to know how to make allowances for emergencies, and to be able to sacrifice a portion of territory in order to preserve the main part; and then, when the enemy is weakened by exhaustion or desertion, the offensive must again be resumed and victory established.
In order to arrive at this end, your majesty has and will continue to have at your disposal means (the Foreign Legion and the Austrian brigade) which will not leave you in embarrassment.
With the deepest respect, sire, &c.,
This letter—which, by the way, clearly shows the ​stiffness which had crept into official relations in consequence of the attitude of the French cabinet—proves that our army was still holding the most dangerous positions, which were avoided by the Mexican troops. Our French ports, which witnessed the return of the marine-infantry, can testify how their sons had been swept away by their stay in the Terres Chaudes, and especially at Tampico. The French contre-guerillas were, in their turn, sadly tried there, both by pestilence and by the fire of the enemy.
Yet Tampico fell into the power of the Liberals only through the treason of the Mexican soldiers, who caused a portion of our men to be slaughtered in the fort of Iturbide. The valorous defence by Captain Langlais can never be forgotten, who, in defiance of famine and la vomito, held out for weeks with only two hundred men of the contre-guerilla against two thousand Liberals under Pavon; when he surrendered the fort of Casa-Mata, he marched his troops out freely in front of the enemy, with their arms loaded and their flag proudly flying.
With respect to Monterey, which was left to the safe keeping of the Belgian Legion, Maximilian's letter, which we quote here, shows sufficiently what kind of support was to be expected from the cabinet of Brussels and the Belgian corps, which had recently mutinied. The unhappy prince did not derive any more benefit from the help of the foreigners whom he had been so unwise as to call in for the defence of his throne.
Chapultepec, August 30, 1866.
It must be stated here, that Maximilian only subsequently learned that the King of the Belgians had authorised his officers to prolong their stay in Mexico until the month of April 1867. But, unfortunately, the despatch from Brussels, dated July 30, 1866, and addressed to the Belgian chargé d'affaires at Mexico, was lost for six weeks, and did not reach this diplomatist, as he asserted, until October 21, at a time when all the Belgian officers but five had set sail for Europe.
Following the example of this foreign contingent, the national army was in a state of complete dissolution. In consequence of the poverty of the treasury, the imperial edifice was giving way on all sides. The cazadores themselves, this last resource for evil days, who had hitherto rendered important services, whose French commanders, too, did not hesitate to risk their lives, were threatened with extinction for want of money and recruits. Thanks to the course of action which the new ministry adopted, the public officials, the imperial prefects, and the great landed proprietors, who all took their watchword from Mexico, refused to provide soldiers. The clerical party, who wanted to have Maximilian delivered up to them bound hand and foot, employed all the means in their power to shake ​off the yoke of the French intervention, and to free themselves from French military administration. Disgust and weariness took possession of our officers, who asked to be recalled in all the provinces in which the cazadores were acting. At Queretaro, at Mazatlan,— in fact everywhere—the same complaints were raised, accompanied with tenders of resignation. The two documents which follow, which have been selected out of many others written in the same spirit, will relate the existing state of things more clearly than a mere recital:—
September 15, 1866.
Monsieur le Maréchal,—When you did me the honour of placing me in command of the. . battalion of cazadores, I thought I might be able to undertake this difficult, but not impossible, task. Certain advantages and guarantees were promised to the military men of these battalions, and it was likely that a large number of French soldiers would come forward on the faith of these promises. The system of voluntary enlistment was an element of strength; confidence was felt in the certainty that the cazadores would be treated like the foreign legion, with which they were connected; that they would be dependent on the commander and administration of the expeditionary corps, receiving their pay from French paymasters, their food from the French commissariat, and their stores from the state magazines and from the camp; finally, that they would be cared for in the hospitals of the expeditionary corps. This confidence was increased by the certainty of remaining for at least eighteen months along with the French army, the aid of which was to facilitate and further the organisation, the instruction, and the solidity of these battalions.
I therefore profess myself incapable of commanding a corps which is subject to this sort of recruitment, and it is my duty, monsieur le maréchal, to state this to you, and to beg you to withdraw me from the command of the. . battalion of cazadores.The Commandant. .
September 23, 1866.
Monsieur le Maréchal,—. . . All the Mexican coffers are empty. The imperial commissary has just laid upon us a most iniquitous ordinance, the decree of which I send you. Many a person will be reduced to poverty, and everyone is complaining. The various consuls have protested, but nothing has come of it. The most painful part of it is, that it is imagined here that this notorious decree has been issued under the protection of the French bayonets, as we are compelled to repress all the disorders which this unhappy decision has called forth.
The following deposition of the Mexican general commanding at Guadalajara, the second city of the empire, is not less curious. This high functionary, placed at the head of the fourth military division, which was one of the most important, wrote to the emperor to complain of a want of co-operation on the part of, the civil authorities:—
Head-Quarters, Guadalajara.
The revolutionary movements, which are to be observed in various parts of this military division, the indefatigable activity of the agents of disorder, and the apathy and indolence which the greater part of the political authorities in these departments manifest in the execution of their duties, render my task more and more difficult every day.
I shall always insist on the obligation incumbent on the civil authorities to assist our military operations in every possible way. My work is condemned beforehand to failure, if I am to continue as now to contend with the unwillingness of certain prefects.
Such were the fruits of the new policy! When the establishment of French courts-martial was asked for, the marshal replied officially, that he could not concur ​in the appointment of such tribunals, because it was altogether contrary both to his instructions and his intentions.
The administration, too, sought to get off any culprits in whom the clergy were interested. No other proofs of this are needed than the following telegraphic despatch from a general of the expeditionary corps. 'A telegram from the imperial secretary directs that the sentence on Rosada should be reprieved. The bishop is interested in him. It is wished that he should make his escape. In spite of all I have written, in spite of a refusal by the emperor, Rosada will escape well-deserved punishment. I am distressed to see numbers of poor wretches shot, and the greatest culprits get off. This sort of thing produces a very bad effect for the imperial cause.' Thus it was that the emperor found himself disobeyed in the provinces in which Father Fischer was beginning to make his influence directly felt.