OpenLLM-France/wikimedia huggingface dataset:
# Anna Karenina (Dole)/Part Four/Chapter 11

CHAPTER XI
All took part in the general conversation except Kitty and Levin.
At first, when they were talking about the influence of one people over another, Levin recalled what he had to say on this subject; but his thoughts, which at one time had seemed to him very important, simply flashed through his mind like notions in a dream, and now had not the least interest for him; he even thought it strange that people could trouble themselves about such useless questions.
Kitty, for her part, ought to have been interested in what was said about women's rights and education. How many times had she pondered over these subjects as she remembered her friend Varenka, whose dependence was so hard to bear! How many times had she thought what she herself would do in case she should not marry! How often had she disputed with her sister on the subject! But now it did not interest her in the least.
She and Levin had their own talk, and yet it was not a conversation so much as it was a mysterious affinity, which brought them nearer and nearer to each other, and filled them with a joyful timidity before the unknown which they were about to enter.
At first Kitty asked how he happened to see her in the summer, and Levin told her that he was returning from the hay-fields by the highway after the mowing:—
​"Wasn't my hair in disorder?" thought Kitty, but seeing the enthusiastic smile that lighted up Levin's face, she felt that on the contrary the impression she had produced was good, and she replied, blushing and laughing merrily:—
"Truly, I don't remember."
"How heartily Turovtsuin laughs!" said Levin, looking at his moist eyes and his sides shaking with laughter.
"Have you known him long?" asked Kitty.
"Who doesn't know him?"
"And I see that you think that he is a bad man."
"Not bad; but he doesn't amount to much."
"That is unjust. I beg you not to think so any more," said Kitty. "I, too, once had a very poor opinion of him; but he is a sweet-tempered and wonderfully good man. His heart is gold."
"How can you know what kind of a heart he has?"
"We are great friends. I know him very well. Last winter, a short time after—after you were at our house," said she, rather guiltily, but with a confiding smile, "Dolly's children had the scarlatina, and one day Turovtsuin happened to call on my sister. Would you believe it?" she said, lowering her voice: "he was so sorry for her that he stayed to take care of the little invalids. For three weeks he played nurse to the children. .... I am telling Konstantin Dmitritch of Turovtsuin's kindness at the time of the scarlatina," said she, turning to her sister.
"Yes, it was remarkable; it was lovely!" replied Dolly, looking with a grateful smile at Turovtsuin, who was conscious that they were talking about him. Levin also looked at him, and was surprised that he had never understood him till then.
# Anna Karenina (Dole)/Part Four

* Chapter 1
* Chapter 2
* Chapter 3
* Chapter 4
* Chapter 5
* Chapter 6
* Chapter 7
* Chapter 8
* Chapter 9
* Chapter 10
* Chapter 11
* Chapter 12
* Chapter 13
* Chapter 14
* Chapter 15
* Chapter 16
* Chapter 17
* Chapter 18
* Chapter 19
* Chapter 20
* Chapter 21
* Chapter 22
* Chapter 23
# Ante-Nicene Fathers/Volume IV/Origen/Origen Against Celsus/Book VII/Chapter XV

Chapter XV.
After assuming that some things were foretold which are impossible in themselves, and inconsistent with the character of God, he says: “If these things were predicted of the Most High God, are we bound to believe them of God simply because they were predicted?” And thus he thinks he proves, that although the prophets may have foretold truly such things of the Son of God, yet it is impossible for us to believe in those prophecies declaring that He would do or suffer such things. To this our answer is that the supposition is absurd, for it combines two lines of reasoning which are opposed to each other, and therefore mutually destructive. This may be shown as follows. The one argument is: “If any true prophets of the Most High say that God will become a slave, or suffer sickness, or die, these things will come to God; for it is impossible that the prophets of the great God should utter lies.” The other is: “If even true prophets of the Most High God say that these same things shall come to pass, seeing that these things foretold are by the nature of things impossible, the prophecies are not true, and therefore those things which have been foretold will not happen to God.” When, then, we find two processes of reasoning in both of which the major premiss is the same, leading to two contradictory conclusions, we use the form of argument called “the theorem of two propositions,” to prove that the major premiss is false, which in the case before us is this, “that the prophets have foretold that the great God should become a slave, suffer sickness, or die.” We conclude, then, that the prophets never foretold such things; and the argument is formally expressed as follows: 1st, Of two things, if the first is true, the second is true; 2d, if the first is true, the second is not true, therefore the first is not true.  The concrete example which the Stoics give to illustrate this form of argument is the following: 1st, If you know that you are dead, you are dead; 2d, if you know that you are dead, you are not dead. And the conclusion is—“you do not know that you are dead.” These propositions are worked out as follows:  If you know that you are dead, that which you know is certain; therefore you are dead. Again, if you know that you are dead, your death is an object of knowledge; but as the dead know nothing, your knowing this proves that you are not dead. Accordingly, by joining the two arguments together, you arrive at the conclusion—“you do not know that you are dead.”  Now the hypothesis of Celsus which we have given above is much of the same kind.
* ↑ διὰ δύο τροπικῶν θεωρήμα.
* ↑ We follow Bouhéreau and Valesius, who expunge the negative particle in this clause.
# Ante-Nicene Fathers/Volume IV/Origen/Origen Against Celsus/Book VII/Chapter XLV

Chapter XLV.
But let us see further what the things are which he proposes to teach us, if indeed we can comprehend them, since he speaks of us as being “utterly wedded to the flesh;” although if we live well, and in accordance with the teaching of Jesus, we hear this said of us: “Ye are not in the flesh, but in the Spirit, if the Spirit of God dwelleth in you.” He says also that we look upon nothing that is pure, although our endeavour is to keep even our thoughts free from all defilement of sin, and although in prayer we say, “Create in me a clean heart, O God, and renew a right spirit within me,” so that we may behold Him with that “pure heart” to which alone is granted the privilege of seeing Him. This, then, is what he proposes for our instruction: “Things are either intelligible, which we call substance—being; or visible, which we call becoming: with the former is truth; from the latter arises error. Truth is the object of knowledge; truth and error form opinion. Intelligible objects are known by the reason, visible objects by the eyes; the action of the reason is called intelligent perception, that of the eyes vision. As, then, among visible things the sun is neither the eye nor vision, but that which enables the eye to see, and renders vision possible, and in consequence of it visible things are seen, all sensible things exist and itself is rendered visible; so among things intelligible, that which is neither reason, nor intelligent perception, nor knowledge, is yet the cause which enables the reason to know, which renders intelligent perception possible; and in consequence of it knowledge arises, all things intelligible, truth itself and substance have their existence; and itself, which is above all these things, becomes in some ineffable way intelligible. These things are offered to the consideration of the intelligent; and if even you can understand any of them, it is well. And if you think that a Divine Spirit has descended from God to announce divine things to men, it is doubtless this same Spirit that reveals these truths, and it was under the same influence that men of old made known many important truths. But if you cannot comprehend these things, then keep silence; do not expose your own ignorance, and do not accuse of blindness those who see, or of lameness those who run, while you yourselves are utterly lamed and mutilated in mind, and lead a merely animal life—the life of the body, which is the dead part of our nature.”
* ↑ Rom. viii. 9.
* ↑ Ps. li. 10.
* ↑ γένεσις. For the distinction between οὐσία and γένεσις, see Plato’s Sophista, p. 246.
# Ante-Nicene Fathers/Volume IV/Origen/Origen Against Celsus/Book VII/Chapter XVI

Chapter XVI.
But besides, the prophecies which he introduces into his argument are very different from what the prophets actually foretold of Jesus Christ. For the prophecies do not foretell that God will be crucified, when they say of Him who should suffer, “We beheld Him, and He had no form or comeliness; but His form was dishonoured and marred more than the sons of men; He was a man of sorrows, and acquainted with grief.” Observe, then, how distinctly they say that it was a man who should endure these human sufferings. And Jesus Himself, who knew perfectly that one who was to die must be a man, said to His accusers: “But now ye seek to kill Me, a man that hath spoken unto you the truth which I heard of God.” And if in that man as He appeared among men there was something divine, namely the only-begotten Son of God, the first-born of all creation, one who said of Himself, “I am the truth,” “I am the life,” “I am the door,” “I am the way,” “I am the living bread which came down from heaven,” of this Being and His nature we must judge and reason in a way quite different from that in which we judge of the man who was seen in Jesus Christ. Accordingly, you will find no Christian, however simple he may be, and however little versed in critical studies, who would say that He who died was “the truth,” “the life,” “the way,” “the living bread which came down from heaven,” “the resurrection;” for it was He who appeared to us in the form of the man Jesus, who taught us, saying, “I am the resurrection.” There is no one amongst us, I say, so extravagant as to affirm “the Life died,” “the Resurrection died.” The supposition of Celsus would have some foundation if we were to say that it had been foretold by the prophets that death would befall God the Word, the Truth, the Life, the Resurrection, or any other name which is assumed by the Son of God.
* ↑ Isa. liii. 2, 3.
* ↑ John viii. 40.
# Ante-Nicene Fathers/Volume IV/Origen/Origen Against Celsus/Book VII/Chapter XLII

Chapter XLII.
Celsus next refers us to Plato as to a more effective teacher of theological truth, and quotes the following passage from the Timæus: “It is a hard matter to find out the Maker and Father of this universe; and after having found Him, it is impossible to make Him known to all.” To which he himself adds this remark: “You perceive, then, how divine men seek after the way of truth, and how well Plato knew that it was impossible for all men to walk in it. But as wise men have found it for the express purpose of being able to convey to us some notion of Him who is the first, the unspeakable Being,—a notion, namely; which may represent Him to us through the medium of other objects,—they endeavour either by synthesis, which is the combining of various qualities, or by analysis, which is the separation and setting aside of some qualities, or finally by analogy;—in these ways, I say, they endeavour to set before us that which it is impossible to express in words. I should therefore be surprised if you could follow in that course, since you are so completely wedded to the flesh as to be incapable of seeing ought but what is impure.” These words of Plato are noble and admirable; but see if Scripture does not give us an example of a regard for mankind still greater in God the Word, who was “in the beginning with God,” and “who was made flesh,” in order that He might reveal to all men truths which, according to Plato, it would be impossible to make known to all men, even after he had found them himself. Plato may say that “it is a hard thing to find out the Creator and Father of this universe;” by which language he implies that it is not wholly beyond the power of human nature to attain to such a knowledge as is either worthy of God, or if not, is far beyond that which is commonly attained (although if it were true that Plato or any other of the Greeks had found God, they would never have given homage and worship, or ascribed the name of God, to any other than to Him: they would have abandoned all others, and would not have associated with this great God objects which can have nothing in common with Him). For ourselves, we maintain that human nature is in no way able to seek after God, or to attain a clear knowledge of Him without the help of Him whom it seeks. He makes Himself known to those who, after doing all that their powers will allow, confess that they need help from Him, who discovers Himself to those whom He approves, in so far as it is possible for man and the soul still dwelling in the body to know God.
# Ante-Nicene Fathers/Volume IV/Origen/Origen Against Celsus/Book VII/Chapter XLIX

Chapter XLIX.
What I have now said, then, is offered not for the purpose of cavilling with any right opinions or sound doctrines held even by Greeks, but with the desire of showing that the same things, and indeed much better and diviner things than these, have been said by those divine men, the prophets of God and the apostles of Jesus.  These truths are fully investigated by all who wish to attain a perfect knowledge of Christianity, and who know that “the mouth of the righteous speaketh wisdom, and his tongue talketh of judgment; the law of his God is in his heart.” But even in regard to those who, either from deficiency or knowledge or want of inclination, or from not having Jesus to lead them to a rational view of religion, have not gone into these deep questions, we find that they believe in the Most High God, and in His Only-begotten Son, the Word and God, and that they often exhibit in their character a high degree of gravity, of purity, and integrity; while those who call themselves wise have despised these virtues, and have wallowed in the filth of sodomy, in lawless lust, “men with men working that which is unseemly.”
* ↑ Ps. xxxvii. 30, 31.
* ↑ Rom. i. 27.
# Ante-Nicene Fathers/Volume IV/Origen/Origen Against Celsus/Book VII/Chapter XLVIII

Chapter XLVIII.
But those who are despised for their ignorance, and set down as fools and abject slaves, no sooner commit themselves to God’s guidance by accepting the teaching of Jesus, than, so far from defiling themselves by licentious indulgence or the gratification of shameless passion, they in many cases, like perfect priests, for whom such pleasures have no charm, keep themselves in act and in thought in a state of virgin purity. The Athenians have one hierophant, who, not having confidence in his power to restrain his passions within the limits he prescribed for himself, determined to check them at their seat by the application of hemlock; and thus he was accounted pure, and fit for the celebration of religious worship among the Athenians. But among Christians may be found men who have no need of hemlock to fit them for the pure service of God, and for whom the Word in place of hemlock is able to drive all evil desires from their thoughts, so that they may present their prayers to the Divine Being. And attached to the other so-called gods are a select number of virgins, who are guarded by men, or it may be not guarded (for that is not the point in question at present), and who are supposed to live in purity for the honour of the god they serve.  But among Christians, those who maintain a perpetual virginity do so for no human honours, for no fee or reward, from no motive of vainglory; but “as they choose to retain God in their knowledge,” they are preserved by God in a spirit well-pleasing to Him, and in the discharge of every duty, being filled with all righteousness and goodness.
* ↑ [See Robertson’s History of the Church, vol. i. p. 145.  S.]
* ↑ Rom. i. 28.
# Ante-Nicene Fathers/Volume IV/Origen/Origen Against Celsus/Book VII/Chapter XLIV

Chapter XLIV.
Celsus supposes that we may arrive at a knowledge of God either by combining or separating certain things after the methods which mathematicians call synthesis and analysis, or again by analogy, which is employed by them also, and that in this way we may as it were gain admission to the chief good. But when the Word of God says, “No man knoweth the Father but the Son, and he to whomsoever the Son will reveal Him,” He declares that no one can know God but by the help of divine grace coming from above, with a certain divine inspiration. Indeed, it is reasonable to suppose that the knowledge of God is beyond the reach of human nature, and hence the many errors into which men have fallen in their views of God. It is, then, through the goodness and love of God to mankind, and by a marvellous exercise of divine grace to those whom He saw in His foreknowledge, and knew that they would walk worthy of Him who had made Himself known to them, and that they would never swerve from a faithful attachment to His service, although they were condemned to death or held up to ridicule by those who, in ignorance of what true religion is, give that name to what deserves to be called anything rather than religion. God doubtless saw the pride and arrogance of those who, with contempt for all others, boast of their knowledge of God, and of their profound acquaintance with divine things obtained from philosophy, but who still, not less even than the most ignorant, run after their images, and temples, and famous mysteries; and seeing this, He “has chosen the foolish things of this world”—the simplest of Christians, who lead, however, a life of greater moderation and purity than many philosophers—“to confound the wise,” who are not ashamed to address inanimate things as gods or images of the gods. For what reasonable man can refrain from smiling when he sees that one who has learned from philosophy such profound and noble sentiments about God or the gods, turns straightway to images and offers to them his prayers, or imagines that by gazing upon these material things he can ascend from the visible symbol to that which is spiritual and immaterial. But a Christian, even of the common people, is assured that every place forms part of the universe, and that the whole universe is God’s temple. In whatever part of the world he is, he prays; but he rises above the universe, “shutting the eyes of sense, and raising upwards the eyes of the soul.” And he stops not at the vault of heaven; but passing in thought beyond the heavens, under the guidance of the Spirit of God, and having thus as it were gone beyond the visible universe, he offers prayers to God. But he prays for no trivial blessings, for he has learnt from Jesus to seek for nothing small or mean, that is, sensible objects, but to ask only for what is great and truly divine; and these things God grants to us, to lead us to that blessedness which is found only with Him through His Son, the Word, who is God.
* ↑ Matt. xi. 27.
* ↑ 1 Cor. i. 27.
* ↑ [Vol. ii. p. 186, this series.]
# Ante-Nicene Fathers/Volume IV/Origen/Origen Against Celsus/Book VII/Chapter XLVII

Chapter XLVII.
For Scripture testifies, in regard to those who have a knowledge of those things of which Celsus speaks, and who profess a philosophy founded on these principles, that they, “when they knew God, glorified Him not as God, neither were thankful, but became vain in their imaginations;” and notwithstanding the bright light of knowledge with which God had enlightened them, “their foolish heart” was carried away, and became “darkened.” Thus we may see how those who accounted themselves wise gave proofs of great folly, when, after such grand arguments delivered in the schools on God and on things apprehended by the reason, they “changed the glory of the incorruptible God into an image made like to corruptible man, and to birds, and four-footed beasts, and creeping things.” As, then, they lived in a way unworthy of the knowledge which they had received from God, His providence leaving them to themselves, they were given “up to uncleanness, through the lusts of their own hearts to dishonour their own bodies,” in shamelessness and licentiousness, because they “changed the truth of God into a lie, and worshipped and served the creature more than the Creator.”
* ↑ Rom. i. 21.
* ↑ Rom. i. 23.
* ↑ Rom. i. 24, 25.
# Ante-Nicene Fathers/Volume IV/Origen/Origen Against Celsus/Book VII/Chapter XLIII

Chapter XLIII.
Observe that when Plato says, that “after having found out the Creator and Father of the universe, it is impossible to make Him known to all men,” he does not speak of Him as unspeakable, and as incapable of being expressed in words.  On the contrary, he implies that He may be spoken of, and that there are a few to whom He may be made known. But Celsus, as if forgetting the language which he had just quoted from Plato, immediately gives God the name of “the unspeakable.”  He says: “since the wise men have found out this way, in order to be able to give us some idea of the First of Beings, who is unspeakable.” For ourselves, we hold that not God alone is unspeakable, but other things also which are inferior to Him.  Such are the things which Paul labours to express when he says, “I heard unspeakable words, which it is not lawful for a man to utter,” where the word “heard” is used in the sense of “understood;” as in the passage, “He who hath ears to hear, let him hear.” We also hold that it is a hard matter to see the Creator and Father of the universe; but it is possible to see Him in the way thus referred to, “Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God;” and not only so, but also in the sense of the words of Him “who is the image of the invisible God;” “He who hath seen Me hath seen the Father who sent Me.” No sensible person could suppose that these last words were spoken in reference to His bodily presence, which was open to the view of all; otherwise all those who said, “Crucify him, crucify him,” and Pilate, who had power over the humanity of Jesus, were among those who saw God the Father, which is absurd. Moreover, that these words, “He that hath seen Me, hath seen the Father who sent Me,” are not to be taken in their grosser sense, is plain from the answer which He gave to Philip, “Have I been so long time with you, and yet dost thou not know Me, Philip?” after Philip had asked, “Show us the Father, and it sufficeth us.” He, then, who perceives how these words, “The Word was made flesh,” are to be understood of the only-begotten Son of God, the first-born of all creation, will also understand how, in seeing the image of the invisible God, we see “the Creator and Father of the universe.”
* ↑ 2 Cor. xii. 4.
* ↑ Matt. v. 8.
* ↑ John xiv. 9.
# Arsène Lupin

* related portals: Mystery.
* sister projects: Wikipedia article, Commons category, Wikidata item.
Originally a 4-part play written by Maurice Leblanc and Francis de Croisset in 1908, it was subsequently novelized by Leblanc and published in 1909. First translated in English in 1909 by Edgar Jepson.
page
ARSÈNE LUPIN
BY
EDGAR JEPSON
AND MAURICE LEBLANC
From the Play by Maurice Leblanc
and Francis de Croisset
Illustrated by H. Richard Boehm
New York Doubleday, Page & Company 1909
page
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED, INCLUDING THAT OF TRANSLATION INTO FOREIGN LANGUAGES, INCLUDING THE SCANDINAVIAN
COPYRIGHT, 1909, BY CURTIS BROWN & MASSIE, NEW YORK PUBLISHED, OCTOBER, 1909
page
"'If it's for me, plenty of tea, very little cream, and three lumps of sugar,' he cried in a gay, ringing voice"
page
CONTENTS
CHAPTER PAGE
page
ILLUSTRATIONS
FACING PAGE
This work is a translation and has a separate copyright status to the applicable copyright protections of the original content.