# Duckworth v. Arkansas

Cite as: Duckworth v. Arkansas, 314 U.S. 390 (1941).
Supreme Court of the United States
314 U.S. 390
DUCKWORTH v. ARKANSAS
Appeal from the Supreme Court of Arkansas
No. 43 Argued: Nov. 17, 18, 1941 --- Decided: Dec. 15, 1941

## Concurring Opinion

    Jackson
A statute of Arkansas, requiring a permit for the transportation of intoxicating liquor through the State, which may be obtained upon application, for a nominal fee—the object of the regulation being merely to identify those who engage in such transportation, their routes and points of destination, thus enabling local officials to insure transportation without diversion, in conformity with the permit—is not violative of the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution. P. 396.
201 Ark. 1123, 148 S.W.2d 656, affirmed.
APPEAL from a judgment affirming a conviction and sentence for transportation of liquor without a permit in violation of a State law.
Mr. Harold R. Ratcliff, with whom Mr. Cecil B. Nance was on the brief, for appellant.
The Acts of Congress dealing with interstate commerce in intoxicating liquors do not confer upon the State any power whatsoever to regulate a shipment of intoxicants which is merely passing through the State. These Acts use the word "into" as distinguished from "through," and there is no basis for a regulation such as that here involved.
Each State has power to prohibit the manufacture of liquors within its borders and to prohibit or condition their export from the State, Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves, 308 U.S. 132; also the power to condition or absolutely prohibit the importation into it of all intoxicants. Const., 21st Amendment; State Board of Equalization v. Young's Market Co., 299 U.S. 59. But there is nothing in the Federal Constitution or statutes, nor in the decisions of this Court, which sanctions the Arkansas regulation.
If the State may demand a permit from one class of transporter, it may demand it from all. Every auto- [p391] mobile, truck, train, wagon, or boat, and indeed every person, is subject to search and possible arrest upon entering the State. This is what Art. I, § 8, Cl. 3, of the Constitution was designed to prevent.
Messrs. Jno. P. Streepey, Assistant Attorney General of Arkansas, and Leffel Gentry argued the cause, and Mr. Jack Holt, Attorney General, was with Mr. Streepey on the brief, for appellee.
Arkansas has built through roads across the State and has provided for police protection, inspection, etc., thereon. The statute requires persons transporting liquor into the State and across it, on these through roads, to take out a permit from the State Commissioner of Revenues. One of the purposes in requiring such a permit is to enable the State to check up on bootleggers using the highways, to see that they do not dump their stocks into the State. When a permit is obtained, a state policeman can be assigned to each shipment of liquor as it comes into and across the State, and there is no chance for anything to go wrong. It is otherwise if those transporting liquor may cross the State without supervision.
The regulation applies to interstate and intrastate traffic without discrimination. Congress has not acted in this particular matter; therefore, the State had the right to do so, even though interstate commerce was burdened to some extent.
This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
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