# Swift Company v. United States (343 U.S. 373)/Dissent Reed

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* Opinion of the Court
* Dissenting Opinions Reed Frankfurter
United States Supreme Court
343 U.S. 373
Swift Company v. United States (343 U.S. 373)
Argued: March 6, 1952. --- Decided: May 5, 1952
Mr. Justice REED, with whom Mr. Justice DOUGLAS joins, dissenting.
I am not able to accept the conclusion of the majority that the Interstate Commerce Commission can on this record deny the appellant's prayer for joint through rates between the line-haul defendants and the terminal defendant, the Chicago Junction Railroad. It is admitted here that every manner of freight save livestock is delivered to private industrial sidings in the Chicago switching district under tariffs embracing joint through rates. When the Court concludes that it is not a 'discrimination against livestock as a commodity to impose a switching charge in addition to the line-haul rate for delivery of livestock to the same point,' it violates the statutory requirement of equality between commodities. To accord joint through rates for switching to private sidetracks to all commodities save livestock, constitutes such a preference to those commodities over livestock as is proscribed by 49 U.S.C. § 3(1), 49 U.S.C.A. § 3(1). See note 2 of the opinion of the Court.
It is the law under the Interstate Commerce Act, as set out in § 3(1), that the public interest is best served when common carriers accord equally reasonable treatment to all their patrons. To be sure, the law might be that the public interest is best served by avoiding congestion in order to pass the maximum amounts of traffic through a transportation bottleneck. But Congress has decided, both for the Commission and this Court, that the commonweal shall be served by guaranteeing that there shall not be discrimination between commodities by carriers. The difficulties of congestion, limitations on facilities or other shipping disadvantages are to be borne equally by all shippers, otherwise the Interstate Commerce Commission could unreasonably prefer commodities through transportation orders, and in effect would be authorized to prescribe the manner in which goods shall be marketed in the public interest. The inadequacy of transportation facilities may not, in my opinion, be cured by penalizing one commodity for the benefit of the others.
When, as here, the carriers while fixing joint through rates for commodities in general fail to furnish them to shippers of livestock, on application the Commission should fix such rate. That rate should be established, 49 U.S.C. § 15(3), 49 U.S.C.A. § 15(3), in the same manner as similar rates for other commodities, of course with proper consideration of the costs of handling the respective commodities. I consider it no answer on this record to say that the switching charge may be no more than the difference in cost of handling dead freight and livestock. The shipper is entitled to meet that problem when the Commission comes to determine the switching factor in the joint through rate. Joint through rates should be accorded to livestock shipments on Swift's siding. Then, and not until then, if the rate is attacked as unreasonable, may the Court properly rely on the fact, if supported by a finding of the Interstate Commerce Commission, that the 'more complex nature of the switching services required by livestock as compared with dead freight' makes justifiable the difference in the rates. See majority opinion, 72 S.Ct. 722. The reasonableness of any commission increase of livestock rates over other commodities should depend upon evidence and findings showing its necessity because of the extra cost of handling without regard to congestion.
I would reverse.

## Notes

This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
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