# Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Frank Varela/Dissent Sotomayor

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 17–988
LAMPS PLUS, INC., ET AL., PETITIONERS v. FRANK VARELA ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT [April 24, 2019]
Justice Sotomayor, dissenting. I join Justice Ginsburg’s dissent in full and Part II. of Justice Kagan’s dissent. This Court went wrong years ago in concluding that a “shift from bilateral arbitration to class-action arbitration” imposes such “fundamental changes,” Stolt-Nielsen S. A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U. S. 662, 686 (2010), that class-action arbitration “is not arbitration as envisioned by the” Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U. S. 333, 351 (2011). See, e. g., id., at 362–365 (Breyer, J., dissenting). A class action is simply “a procedural device” that allows multiple plaintiffs to aggregate their claims, 1 W. Rubenstein, Newberg on Class Actions §1:1 (5th ed. 2011), “[f]or convenience… and to prevent a failure of justice,” Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U. S. 356, 363 (1921). Where, as here, an employment agreement provides for arbitration as a forum for all disputes relating to a person’s employment and the rules of that forum allow for class actions, an employee who signs an ​arbitration agreement should not be expected to realize that she is giving up access to that procedural device.
In any event, as Justice Kagan explains, the employment contract that Frank Varela signed went further. It states that “‘any and all disputes, claims or controversies arising out of or relating to the employment relationship between the parties shall be resolved by final and binding arbitration.’” Post, at 2 (quoting App. to Pet. for Cert. 24a). It adds that Varela and Lamps Plus “consent to the resolution by arbitration of all claims that may hereafter arise in connection with [Varela’s] employment.” Id., at 24a–25a. And it provides for arbitration “‘in accordance with’” the rules of the arbitral forum, which in turn allow for class arbitration. Post, at 3 (opinion of Kagan, J.) (citing App. to Pet. for Cert. 25a–26a). That is enough to persuade me that the contract was at least ambiguous as to whether Varela in fact agreed that no class-action procedures would be available in arbitration if he and his co-workers all suffered the same harm “relating to” and “in connection with” their “employment.” See id., at 24a–25a. And the court below was correct to turn to state law to resolve the ambiguity.
The Court today reads the FAA to pre-empt the neutral principle of state contract law on which the court below relied. I cannot agree. I also note that the majority reaches its holding without actually agreeing that the contract is ambiguous. See ante, at 5 (“[W]e defer to the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation and application of state law”). The concurrence, meanwhile, offers reasons to conclude that the contract unambiguously precludes class arbitration, see ante, at 1–2, and n. (opinion of Thomas, J.), which would avoid the need to displace state law at all. This Court normally acts with great solicitude when ​ it comes to the possible pre-emption of state law, see, e. g., Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U. S. 470, 485 (1996), but the majority today invades California contract law without pausing to address whether its incursion is necessary. Such haste is as ill advised as the new federal common law of arbitration contracts it has begotten.
* ↑ I am not persuaded at this point that the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction over this case, and for that reason I do not join Justice Breyer’s dissenting opinion. Nevertheless, I believe that Justice Breyer’s opinion raises weighty issues that are worthy of further consideration if raised in the appropriate circumstances in the lower federal courts.
* ↑ The majority notes that I criticize it for not checking for such an off-ramp while being unable to take one myself. See ante, at 6, n. 3. But the majority never suggests that it shares my rationale as to why the contract is ambiguous. In other words, the reasons that I reach the issue that the majority decides say nothing about whether the majority would get there itself, short of deferring to the lower federal court.