# History of the United States During the Administrations of Thomas Jefferson/Second/I:4
## Chapter 4: Between France and EnglandChapter 4: Between France and England

President Jefferson's decision, in October, 1805, to retrace his steps and reverse a policy which had been publicly and repeatedly proclaimed, was the turning-point of his second Administration. No one can say what might have happened if in August, 1805, Jefferson had ordered his troops to cross the Sabine and occupy Texas to the Rio Bravo, as Armstrong and Monroe advised. Such an act would probably have been supported, as the purchase of Louisiana had been approved, by the whole country, without regard to Constitutional theories; and indeed if Jefferson succeeded to the rights of Napoleon in Louisiana, such a step required no defence. Spain might then have declared war; but had Godoy taken this extreme measure, he could have had no other motive than to embarrass Napoleon by dragging France into a war with the United States, and had this policy succeeded, President Jefferson's difficulties would have vanished in an instant. He might then have seized Florida; his controversies with England about neutral trade, blockade, and impressment would have fallen to the ground; and had war with France continued two years, until Spain ​threw off the yoke of Napoleon and once more raised in Europe the standard of popular liberty, Jefferson might perhaps have effected some agreement with the Spanish patriots, and would then have stood at the head of the coming popular movement throughout the world,—the movement which he and his party were destined to resist. Godoy, Napoleon, Pitt, Monroe, Armstrong, John Randolph, and even the New England Federalists seemed combined to drag or drive him into this path. Its advantages were so plain, even at that early moment, as to overmaster for a whole summer his instinctive repugnance to acts of force.
After long hesitation, Jefferson shrank from the step, and fell back upon his old policy of conquering by peace; but such vacillations were costly. To Gallatin the decision was easy, for he had ever held that on the whole the nation could better afford a loss of dignity than a war; but even he allowed that loss of dignity would cost something, and he could not foretell what equivalent he must pay for escape from a Franco-Spanish war. Neither Jefferson nor Gallatin could expect to be wholly spared; but Madison's position was worse than theirs, for he had still to reckon with his personal enemies,—John Randolph, Yrujo, and Merry,—and to overawe a quasi friend more dangerous than an enemy,—the military diplomate, Turreau.
Turreau during this summer kept his eye fixed on the Secretary of State, and repeatedly hinted, in a ​manner extremely frank, that he meant to tolerate no evasions. He wrote to Talleyrand in a tone of cool confidence. July 9 he said that the Emperor's measures for the protection of Florida were sufficient:
    "The intervention of France in the negotiations with Spain has stopped everything. They have been affected by it here, but have not shown to me any discontent at it. 'Well,' said Mr. Jefferson to me lately, 'since the Emperor wishes it, the arrangement shall be adjourned to a more favorable time.'"
That Jefferson made this remark could be believed only by his enemies, for it contradicted the tenor of his letters to Madison; but although Turreau doubtless overstated the force of the words, he certainly gave to Talleyrand the impression that the President was reduced to obedience. The impression was enough; correct or not, it strengthened Napoleon's natural taste for command.
A few weeks afterward, Turreau wrote to Madison a note in regard to General Moreau's reception in the United States. In a tone excessively military he said:—
    "General Moreau ought not (ne doit point) to be, in a foreign country, the object of honors which the consideration of his services would formerly have drawn upon him; and it is proper (il convient) that his arrival and his residence in the United States should be marked by no demonstration which passes the bounds of hospitality." ​
Madison was indignant at this interference, and proposed to resent it. The President encouraged him to do so, on the express ground that they had not ventured to resent the conduct of France in regard to Monroe's negotiation:—
    "The style of that government in the Spanish business was calculated to excite indignation; but it was a case in which that might have done injury. But the present is a case which would justify some notice in order to let them understand we are not of those Powers who will receive and execute mandates."
Meanwhile General Smith, who had not resented the repudiation of his niece by the Emperor, and to whom Madison showed the offensive letter, undertook to soothe the irritation. "He says," wrote Madison in his next letter to the President, "that Turreau speaks with the greatest respect, and even affection, toward the Administration; and such are the dispositions which it is certain he has uniformly manifested to me." Upon these assurances Madison toned down the severity he had intended.
Turreau had resided hardly six months in the United States before he announced to Talleyrand the conviction of all American politicians that any war would end in driving from office the party which
    "To such an extent is the actual Administration convinced of this fact, that it allows itself to be outraged every day by the English, and accepts all the humiliations they care to impose; and notwithstanding the contempt generally felt here for Spain, against whom a war was last year quite openly provoked, the members of the United States government have not dared to undertake it, although sure of beginning it with public opinion in their favor. And no one need think that this indisposition to war depends only on the personal character and the philanthropic principles of Mr. Jefferson, for it is shared by all the party leaders, even by those who have most pretensions and well-founded hopes to succeed the actual President,—such as Mr. Madison."
Turreau's sketch of American character and ambition was long and interesting, and suggested the vulnerable point where France should throw her strength against this new people. Neither as a military nor as a naval power did he think the United States formidable. Their government made no concealment of its weakness:—
    "They especially lack trained officers. The Americans are to-day the boldest and the most ignorant navigators in the universe. In brief, it seems to me that, considering the weakness of the military constitution, the Federal government, which makes no concealment of this weakness, will avoid every serious difference which might lead to aggression, and will constantly show itself an enemy to war. But does the system of encroachment which prevails here agree with a temper so pacific? Certainly not, at first sight; and yet unless circumstances change, the ​United States will succeed in reconciling the contradiction. To conquer without war is the first fact in their politics (Conquèrir sans guerre, voilà les premiers faits politiques.)"
These reflections were written early in July, 1805, before the President and his Cabinet had begun to discuss Monroe's failure and the policy of a Spanish war, and more than three months before the President wholly abandoned the thought of warlike measures. Turreau's vision was keen, but he had no excuse for short-sightedness. Madison made little effort to disguise his objects or methods.
    "I took occasion to express to Mr. Madison," wrote Turreau in the same despatch, "my astonishment that the schemes of aggrandizement which the United States government appeared to have, should be always directed toward the south, while there were still in the north important and convenient territories, such as Canada, Nova Scotia, etc. 'Doubtless!' replied the secretary, 'but the moment has not yet come! When the pear is ripe it will fall of itself.'"
Had Turreau asked why, then, Madison gave so violent a shaking to the Florida pear-tree, Madison must have answered, with the same candor, that he did so because he supposed the Florida pear to be ripe. The phrase was an admission and an invitation,—an admission that Florida would have been left alone if Spain had been as strong as England; and an invitation to Turreau to interpose with safety the sword of France. Turreau could not doubt the ​effect of his own blunt interference. So confident had the new French minister already become, in July, 1805, that he not only told Madison to stop these petty larcenies of Spanish property, but also urged Napoleon to take the Floridas and Cuba into his own hand solely to check American aggression. "I believe that France alone can arrest these American enterprises and baffle (déjouer) their plan."
Had Turreau's discipline stopped there, much might have been said in his favor; but in regard to still another matter he used expressions and made demands such as Madison never yet had heard from a diplomatic agent, although the secretary's experience was already considerable. Neither Yrujo nor Merry had succeeded in giving to their remonstrances or requests the abruptness of Napoleon's style.
The Federalist newspapers during Jefferson's first term had found so little reason for charging him with subservience to France, that this old and stale reproach had nearly lost its weight. Neither the New England merchants whom France had plundered, and whose claims Jefferson consented to withdraw, nor the British government or British newspapers had thought it worth their while to press the charge that Jefferson was led astray by love or fear of Napoleon or the Empire. Not until the winter of 1805-1806 did the doctrine of French influence recover a certain share of strength; but as John Randolph and his friends, who detested Madison, were outraged by the conduct of France in Spanish affairs, ​so Timothy Pickering and the whole body of Federalists, who hated the South and the power which rested on the dumb vote of slaves, were exasperated by the conduct of France in regard to their trade with St. Domingo. In both cases Madison was the victim.
St. Domingo was still in name and in international law a colony of France. Although Rochambeau surrendered himself and his few remaining troops as prisoners of war to the English in November, 1803; although the negroes in January, 1804, proclaimed their independence, and held undisputed control of the whole French colony, while their ports were open, and not an armed vessel bearing the flag of France pretended to maintain a blockade,—yet Napoleon claimed that the island belonged to him. General Ferrand still held points in the Spanish colony for France, and defeated an invasion attempted by Dessalines; nor did any government betray a disposition to recognize the black empire, or to establish relations with Dessalines or Christophe, or with a negro republic. On the other hand, the trade of Hayti, being profitable, was encouraged by every government in turn; but because it was, even more than other West Indian trade, unprotected by law, the vessels which carried it were usually armed, and sailed in company. In the winter of 1804-1805, soon after General Turreau's arrival at Washington, a flotilla armed with eighty cannon and carrying crews to the number of seven hundred men, set sail from New York with cargoes which included contraband of war ​of all kinds. Turreau remonstrated with Madison, who assured him that a law would soon be reported for correcting this abuse.
A Bill was accordingly reported; but it prohibited only the armed commerce and put the trade under heavy bonds for good behavior. To answer Turreau's object the trade must be prohibited altogether. Dr. Logan, one of the senators from Pennsylvania, who led the Northern democrats, with the "Aurora's" support, in hostility to the Haytian negroes, moved an amendment to the Bill when it came before the Senate. He proposed to prohibit every kind of commerce with St. Domingo; and the Senate was so closely divided as to require the casting vote of the Vice-President. Burr gave his voice against Dr. Logan's amendment, and the Bill accordingly passed, March 3, 1805, leaving the unarmed trade still open.
Turreau duly reported these matters to his Government. The facts were public, and were given needless notoriety by the merchants themselves. On the return of the Haytian flotilla to New York, they celebrated the event in a public dinner, and the company drank a health to the government of Hayti. Another expedition was reported to be preparing. General Ferrand issued severe proclamations against the trade, and Madison remonstrated strongly against Ferrand. One armed American vessel, ​which had carried three cargoes of powder to the Haytians, was taken by a British cruiser, sent into Halifax, and there condemned by the British court as good prize for carrying on an unlawful trade.
Early in August, 1805, after Monroe's return to London, and while Jefferson and Madison were discussing the problem of protecting themselves from French designs, the Emperor Napoleon, who had returned from Italy and gone to the camp at Boulogne, received Turreau's despatch, and immediately wrote in his own emphatic style to Talleyrand:—
    "The despatch from Washington has fixed my attention. I request you to send a note to the American minister accredited to me. You will join to it a copy of the judgment [at Halifax]; and you will declare to him that it is time for this thing to stop (que cela finisse); that it is shameful (indigne) in the Americans to provide supplies for brigands and to take part in a commerce so scandalous; that I "will declare good prize everything which shall enter or leave the ports of St. Domingo; and that I can no longer see with indifference the armaments evidently directed against France which the American government allows to be made in its ports."
In this outburst of temper Napoleon's ideas of law became confused. The American government did not dispute his right to seize American vessels trading with Hayti: the difficulty was that he did not or could not do so, and for this reason he made the ​demand that the American government should help him in doing what he was powerless to effect without its aid. Talleyrand immediately wrote to Armstrong a letter in which he tried to put the Emperor's commands into a shape more diplomatic, by treating the Haytians as enemies of the human race, against whom it was right that the United States should interpose with measures of hostility:—
    "As the seriousness of the facts which occasion this complaint obliges his Majesty to consider as good prize everything which shall enter into the part of St. Domingo occupied by the rebels, and everything coming out, he persuades himself that the government of the United States will take on its part, against this commerce at once illicit and contrary to all the principles of the law of nations, all the repressive and authoritative measures proper to put an end to it. This system of impunity and tolerance must last no longer (ne pourrait durer davantage)."
For the third time within six months Talleyrand used the word "must" to the President of the United States. Once the President had been told that he must abandon his Spanish claims; then that he must show no public respect for Moreau; finally he was told still more authoritatively that he must stop a trade which France was unable to stop, and which would continue in British hands if Congress should obey Napoleon's order. Talleyrand directed ​Turreau to repeat at Washington the Emperor's remonstrance, and Turreau accordingly echoed in Madison's ear the identical words, "must last no longer." His letter, to his indignation, received no answer or notice.
Thus at the moment when Congress was to meet, Dec. 2, 1805, serious problems awaited it. The conduct of Spain was hostile. At sea Spanish cruisers captured American property without regard to treaty-rights; on land Spanish armed forces made incursions from Florida and Texas at will. The conduct of France was equally menacing, for Napoleon not only sustained Spain, but also pressed abrupt demands of his own such as Jefferson could not hear without indignation. As though Congress had not enough difficulty in dealing with these two Powers, Great Britain also took an attitude which could be properly met by no resistance short of a declaration of war.
During the whole year the conduct of England changed steadily for the worse. The blockade of New York by the two frigates "Cambrian" and "Leander" became intolerable, exasperating even the mercantile class, who were naturally friendly to England, and who had most to dread from a quarrel. On board the "Leander" was a young midshipman named Basil Hall, who in later years described the mode of life he led in this service, and whose account of the blockade, coming from a British source, was ​less liable than any American authority to the charge of exaggeration.
    "Every morning at daybreak," according to his story, "we set about arresting the progress of all the vessels we saw, firing off guns to the right and left to make every ship that was running in heave to, or wait until we had leisure to send a boat on board to see, in our lingo, what she was made of. I have frequently known a dozen, and sometimes a couple of dozen, ships lying a league or two off the port, losing their fair wind, their tide, and worse than all their market, for many hours, sometimes the whole day, before our search was completed."
An informality in papers, a suspicion of French ownership, a chance expression in some private letter found and opened in the search, insured seizure, a voyage to Halifax, detention for months, heavy costs, indefinite damage to vessel and cargo, and at best release, with no small chance of re-seizure and condemnation under some new rule before the ship could reach port.
Such vexations were incident to a state of war. If the merchants of New York disliked them, the merchants might always ask Government to resent them; but in truth commerce found its interest in submission. These vexations secured neutral profits; and on the whole the British frigates and admiralty courts created comparatively little scandal by ​injustice, while they served as a protection from the piratical privateers of Spain and France. Madison, Gallatin, and the newspapers grumbled and complained; but the profits of neutrality soothed the offended merchant, and the blockade of New York was already a fixed practice. Had the British commanders been satisfied with a moderate exercise of their power, the United States would probably have allowed the habit of neutral blockade to grow into a belligerent right by prescription. Neither the mercantile class nor the government would have risked profit or popularity on such a stake; but fortunately the British officers steadily became more severe, and meanwhile in their practice of impressment roused extreme bitterness among the seafaring classes, who had nothing to gain by submission. In Basil Hall's words, the British officers took out of American vessels every seaman "whom they had reason, or supposed or said they had reason, to consider" a British subject, "or whose country they guessed from dialect or appearance." By these impressments American vessels were often left short-handed, and were sometimes cast away or foundered. In such cases the owners were greatly irritated; but commonly the exasperation was most deeply felt by the laboring class and among the families of seafaring men. The severity with which impressment was enforced in 1805 excited hatred toward England among people who had at best no reason to love her. More than twenty years afterward, when Basil Hall revisited ​New York, he was not surprised to find the name of his old ship, the "Leander," still held in detestation. Not only were the duties harsh, but, as he frankly admitted, they were harshly performed.
After Pitt's return to power impressments increased until they averaged about a thousand a year. Among them were cases of intolerable outrage; but neither President, Congress, nor people, nor even the victims themselves, cared as a body to fight in defence of their rights and liberties. Where an American-born citizen had been seized who could prove his birth, Madison on receiving the documents sent them to Monroe, who transmitted them to the British Admiralty, which ordered an inquiry; and if the man had not been killed in action or died of disease and hard usage, he was likely, after a year or two of service, to obtain a release. The American-born citizen was admitted to be no subject for impressment, and the number of such persons actually taken was never so large as the number of British-born sailors who were daily impressed; but both the mercantile and the national marine of the United States were largely manned by British seamen, and could not dispense with them. According to Gallatin's calculation, American tonnage increased after 1803 at the rate of about seventy thousand tons a year; and of the four thousand two hundred men required to supply this annual increase, about two thousand five hundred were British. If the British marine lost two thousand five hundred men ​annually by desertion or engagement in the American service, even after recovering one thousand seamen a year by impressment, the British navy made good only a fraction of the loss. On the other hand, if the United States government went to war to protect British seamen, America would lose all her mercantile marine; and these same seamen for whom she was fighting must for the most part necessarily return to their old flag, because they would then have no other employer. The immediate result of war must strengthen the British marine by sending back to it ten thousand seamen whom America could no longer employ.
Nations rarely submit to injury without a motive. If Jefferson and the Republican party, if Timothy Pickering and George Cabot, the merchants of Boston and New York, and even the seamen themselves, rejected the idea of war, it was because they found a greater interest in maintaining peace. This interest consisted, as regarded England, in the large profits realized in neutral freights. So long as the British navy protected this source of American wealth, Americans said but little about impressments; but in the summer of 1805 Pitt thought proper to obstruct this source, and suddenly the whole American seaboard, from Machias to Norfolk, burst into excitement, and demanded that the President should do something,—they knew not what, but at moments they seemed to ask for war.
The news of Sir William Scott's decision in the ​case of the "Essex" reached America in the month of September, while the President and Madison were discussing an alliance with England to protect themselves against France and Spain. The announcement that Great Britain had suddenly begun to seize American ships by scores at the moment when Jefferson counted most confidently on her willingness to oblige, was a blow to the Administration so severe that a long time elapsed before either Jefferson or Madison realized its violence. Their minds were intent on the Spanish problem; and with the question of war pressing upon them from the south, they did not at once perceive that another war was actually declared against their commerce from the north. Jefferson disliked commercial disputes, and gladly shut his eyes to their meaning; Madison felt their importance, but was never quick to meet an emergency.
Merry was near Philadelphia during the autumn, when Mrs. Madison's illness obliged the secretary to remain in that city. Early in September Merry wrote to his Government that the complete failure of Monroe's Spanish mission was no secret, and that Madison expected some collision with Spain in West Florida, but would wait for the meeting of Congress before taking action. "Such a determination on the part of the President," continued Merry, "is so consonant with his usual caution and temporizing system (to which the opposition here give the character of timidity and irresolution), that I cannot but be ​disposed to give entire credit to the information." Shortly after the date of this despatch, news arrived that the British government had altered its rules in regard to the neutral carrying-trade, and that British cruisers were everywhere seizing American ships. Merry, who had not been forewarned by Lord Mulgrave, and who had no wish to see his own position made more uncomfortable than it already was, became uneasy. "The sensation and clamor," he wrote, "excited by this news from England (which has already caused the insurance on such cargoes to be raised to four times the usual premium) is rendered the greater by such events having been totally unexpected, and by the merchants here having, on the contrary, considered themselves as perfectly secured against them." Merry saw that his Government had in the midst of peace taken a measure which Madison could hardly fail to denounce as an act of war. Dreading a violent explosion, the British minister waited anxiously; but, to his surprise, nothing happened. "Although I have seen Mr. Madison twice since the attention of the public has been so much engaged with this object, he has not thought proper to mention it to me." At first Merry could not account for this silence; only by degrees was he taught to connect it with the Spanish quarrel, and to understand that Madison hoped to conciliate England in order to overawe France. In this play ​of cross-purposes Merry's account of Madison's conversation was not calculated to alarm the British government:—
    "Before I quitted the vicinity of Philadelphia to return to this place [Washington], I had an interview with Mr. Madison, who having then received accounts from Mr. Monroe respecting the detention by his Majesty's ships of several American vessels in consequence of their being loaded with the produce of the enemy's colonies, brought forward that subject to me, speaking upon it, however, with much more moderation than from his natural irritability, and the sensation which it had produced throughout this country, I could have expected on his part. It is unnecessary for me to trouble your Lordship by detailing to you the several observations which he made to me to endeavor to prove the impropriety of the principle upon which the detention of those vessels has taken place. . . . As I had the honor to observe in the former part of this letter, the American Secretary of State delivered his sentiments on this subject with great temper, and concluded by expressing only a wish that Mr. Monroe's remonstrances upon it might prove so far efficacious as at least to procure the liberation of the vessels and cargoes which were already detained, as well as of those which might be stopped before the new system adopted by his Majesty's government in regard to the trade in question should be generally known. Our conversation afterward turned upon some circumstances, the accounts of which had just been received, of the recent conduct of Spain toward this country, when Mr. Madison was much less reserved in expressing his sentiments than on former ​occasions, and gave me the detail of the perfidious and insolent proceedings of some of the Spanish officers who still remain at New Orleans, and of others who command in the disputed territory,—which, combined with information he had received of the departure of four hundred troops with a quantity of military stores from the Havana, supposed to be destined to reinforce the garrisons in East and West Florida, and with a report which prevailed at New Orleans of a considerable force advancing from Mexico toward Louisiana, could not, he observed, fail to render the differences subsisting between the two governments still more difficult of accommodation."
This conversation took place about the middle of October, before the President had decided to acquiesce in the acts of Spain and France. As a result of the high tone taken toward England in the winter of 1803-1804, the secretary's mildness might well surprise a British minister, who was not quick of comprehension, and required to be told in plain language the meaning of Madison's manœuvres. No sooner had Merry returned to Washington than "a confidential person" was sent to him to explain the mystery:—
    "On this subject it has been remarked to me by a person in a confidential situation here that the detention of the American vessels by his Majesty's ships has happened very unseasonably to divert the attention of the people of the United States and of the Government from a proper consideration of the grievances and injuries ​which they have experienced from Spain, and which the Government were disposed and had actually taken the measures to resent; and he conceived that when the state of the relations between the United States and other Powers should be laid by the President before Congress at their approaching meeting, the circumstance abovementioned, of what is considered to be so unfriendly a proceeding on the part of Great Britain, will have the same effect upon the resolutions of that body by blunting the feelings which would otherwise have been excited by the conduct of Spain, supported by France, against this country."
The "confidential person" usually employed by Jefferson and Madison on such errands was either Robert or Samuel Smith; partly because both these gentlemen were a little inclined to officiousness, partly because they were men of the world, or what Pichon called "hommes fort polis." In this instance the agent was probably the Secretary of the Navy. In telling the British minister that the President had already taken measures to resent the conduct of Spain, this agent was unwise, not so much because the assertion was incorrect, as because Merry knew better. In the same despatch, written Nov. 3, 1805, Merry informed his Government of the President's hopes of an agreement with Spain, founded on the war in Europe,—hopes which had been entertained only ten days, since October 23. He had the best reason to be well informed on this subject, for he drew his information directly from Jefferson himself.
That Merry should have been exceedingly perplexed ​was no wonder. Two years had elapsed since his first arrival in Washington, when he had been harshly treated without sufficient reason, by President, Cabinet, and Congress; and on returning to the same place in this autumn of 1805, immediately after his Government had made war on United States commerce, he found himself received with surprising cordiality. Immediately on his return, about October 20, he called at the White House. Instead of finding the President in a passion, denouncing Pitt and the British nation, as he might reasonably have expected, Merry was delighted to find Jefferson in his most genial humor. Not a word was said about British outrages; his conversation assumed the existence of a close concert and alliance between England and the United States:—
    "Upon my seeing the President on my return to this place a fortnight ago, he spoke to me with great frankness respecting the state of affairs between this country and Spain; saying that it was possible that the accumulation of the injuries which they had sustained might produce a resolution on the part of the Congress to resent them. With a view to the hostile situation of affairs, he lamented that unfortunately [notwithstanding] the superiority of his Majesty's naval force and the vigilance of his officers, it had not been possible to prevent the enemy's fleet from crossing the Atlantic. He said that this experience would render it necessary for the United States to proceed with great caution and to gain time, in order to put their principal seaports in a state of defence, ​for which he had already given directions. In the event of hostilities he considered that East and West Florida, and successively the Island of Cuba, the possession of which was necessary for the defence of Louisiana and Florida, as being the key to the Gulf of Mexico, would, in the manner in which that island might and would be attacked, be an easy conquest to them. He, however, expressed that his individual voice would constantly be for the preservation of peace with every Power, till it could no longer be kept without absolute dishonor."
Such speculations were not so practical as to affect Merry's antipathy to the American government, but he reported them to Lord Mulgrave without comment, as intended to express the President's plan in case of a Spanish war. Meanwhile the Secretary of State was engaged in composing a pamphlet, or book, to prove that the new rule adopted by Great Britain was an act of bad faith, in violation of international law. The task was not difficult.
Such was the diplomatic situation at Washington, Nov. 12, 1805, when the Cabinet adopted Jefferson's plan of reopening negotiations for the purchase of Florida on the line so persistently recommended by the irresponsible creatures of Talleyrand, and so steadily rejected to that moment by Madison and Monroe. Congress was to meet in three weeks, and within that time the diplomatic chaos must be reduced to order.
* ↑ Turreau to Madison, 26 Thermidor, An xiii. (Aug. 14, 1805); MSS. State Department Archives.
* ↑ Jefferson to Madison, Aug. 25, 1805; Works, iv. 584.
* ↑ Madison to Jefferson, Sept. 1, 1805; Jefferson MSS.
* ↑ Turreau to Talleyrand, 20 Messidor, An xiii. (July 9, 1805); Archives des Aff. Étr., MSS.
* ↑ Turreau to Talleyrand, 30 Germinal, An xiii. (April 20, 1805); Archives des Aff. Étr., MSS.
* ↑ State Papers, ii. 728.
* ↑ Napoleon to Talleyrand, 22 Thermidor, An xiii. (Aug. 10, 1805); Correspondance, xi. 73.
* ↑ Talleyrand to Armstrong, 29 Thermidor, An xiii. (Aug. 16, 1805); State Papers, ii. 726.
* ↑ Turreau to Madison, Jan. 3, 1806; State Papers, ii. 726.
* ↑ State Papers, ii. 682-695.
* ↑ Fragments of Voyages and Travels, by Captain Basil Hall, R. N., F. R. S., London, 1856.
* ↑ Gallatin to Jefferson, April 16, 1807; Works, i. 335.
* ↑ Merry to Mulgrave, Sept. 2, 1805; MSS. British Archives.
* ↑ Merry to Mulgrave, Sept. 30, 1805; MSS. British Archives.
* ↑ Ibid.
* ↑ Merry to Mulgrave, Nov. 3, 1805; MSS. British Archives.
* ↑ Merry to Mulgrave, Nov. 3, 1805; MSS. British Archives.
* ↑ Merry to Mulgrave, Nov. 3, 1805; MSS. British Archives.