# The rise and fall of the Emperor Maximilian/Chapter XIX

CHAPTER XIX.
Conference of Mexican Ministers—Seductive Plans of the Clerical Party—Meditated Campaigns by Marquez and Miramon—Maximilian announces his fresh Resolve—His Manifesto—M. Larès' Letter to the French Representatives—Dissatisfaction in the French Camp—Destruction of the French Schemes—Harsh Measures of the Emperor Napoleon—Recall of the Foreign Legion—Mr. Bigelow's Despatch—Irritation at the Tuileries—The lost Despatch—Hostile Feeling between the French and Mexican Governments—Maximilian returns to the Capital.
WHAT, then, were the events which had taken place during the last few days at Jalapilla? The ministers and the council of state, having come down from Mexico to Orizaba under a French escort and with Miramon as their leader, had entered upon a conference, and had remained in consultation for three days (from Saturday until Monday) at the imperial residence. M. Larès, appointed to speak for all the members of the commission, had supplicated the emperor not to leave the territory, asserting, in the name of the clerical party (for whom Abbé Fischer vouched), that his majesty might reckon upon four millions of piastres and an army ready to commence operations. Marquez and Miramon both accepted commands. The former of these generals was to occupy the capital and protect the valley of Mexico and the plateaus of Inahuac against the attempts of Porfirio Diaz; the second was to make his way to the north and give battle to Escobedo's troops. Victory could not be doubtful, especially with the co-operation of the brave Mejia in the interior, whose military fame was no less potent in the Sierra than in the state of Queretaro, which had ​been aforetime witness of his triumphs. If necessary, immediately after the bands in the north were put to rout, the victorious forces of the monarchy might turn round against the rebels of Oajaca, whom they would soon bring to reason. As to the millions which were necessary, the president of the council confined himself to saying that they would be provided: this was the secret of his party.
This plan looked very seductive upon paper, and Maximilian fully adopted it. In order to put an end to the state of uncertainty in which the country had now been for more than a month, the emperor completely altered his course of action, and issued a telegraphic despatch, which contradicted all the events which had taken place. The visit to Orizaba of Mr. Scarlett, the English diplomatist, then on his way to Europe, did not a little contribute to hurry the adoption of this sudden measure by the young emperor, whom he advised not to abandon the throne.
Our head-quarters authorities received immediate communication from the imperial cabinet of the telegraphic despatch which left Orizaba, November 20, 1866.
This was the emperor's reply to the American mission, which he knew was now off Tampico; in it he relies for the future on the collective note of November 7. At the same time he counteracts the manœuvres of the cabinet of the Tuileries, which he knew were being carried on, both at Washington and in the liberal camp. After the publication of this fresh coup d'état, there was no further hope, for the present, of the abdication of the prince. This despatch was soon followed by a more official and explicit document. On December 1 appeared the imperial manifesto, dated from Orizaba, which announced to the country the assembling of a national congress.
Manifesto of the Emperor.
Mexicans,—Important circumstances affecting the welfare of our country, which vanish in the presence of our domestic misfortunes, have called forth the conviction in my mind, that I ought to give back to you the power which you formerly conferred upon me.
Two days after, the president of the council announced in the emperor's name, to the French authorities, that Maximilian had resolved for the future to depend only on his own forces. Nevertheless, it was settled that the expeditionary corps was to continue its protection to the monarchy during its stay in Mexico, now limited to the spring of 1867, and that it should defend all the points which it occupied, without undertaking any distant expeditions.
To His Excellency the Minister of France at Mexico, His Excellency Marshal Bazaine, and General Castelnau.
Orizaba, December 3, 1866.
The undersigned being appointed by the Emperor Maximilian to settle the measures which are rendered necessary by the mission of General Castelnau, a mission which the latter states he is fulfilling in conjunction with the Minister Plenipotentiary Dano and Marshal Bazaine, we now have the honour of acquainting you that, having communicated to his majesty the note of the 7th of last month, which was signed by Marshal Bazaine and General Castelnau, in reply to that which we had the honour of sending them on the 4th of the same month, his majesty, after long and serious consideration, by the advice of his ministers and of his council of state, has decided that, relying upon the authority conferred upon him by the nation, he will prolong and maintain his government with the resources of the country only; since the Emperor of the French has declared that it is no longer possible for him to support the empire either with his troops or his money, and perseveres in the resolution which he formed to withdraw the former in the beginning of 1867. ​His majesty the emperor, in carrying out the execution of his designs, is employed in the measures necessary for the formation of the Mexican army, and in organising the forces which are to uphold the empire. He hopes that M. the Marshal Bazaine will be pleased to give orders, as far as it lies with him, to the French chief-commandants, that the Mexican troops, the military establishments and magazines, should now remain at the exclusive disposal of his majesty. His majesty also assumes that the French troops, so long as they stay in the country, will protect the authorities and inhabitants in the districts which they occupy, without undertaking any distant expeditions.
This co-operation, the points of which are specified in the note of November 7, above quoted, is gratefully accepted by his majesty.
His majesty the emperor desires us also to state, that any question relative to the matters spoken of in this note, or which may be called forth by the resolution he has adopted, may be discussed with the president of the council of state, who, in this capacity, has signed his name first.
* Teodosio Larès
* President of the Council of Ministers.
* Luis de Arroyo,
* Minister of the Emperor's Household.
The rupture was now de facto consummated with the French government; and, from this day forward, Maximilian had no further direct communication with our head-quarters. The president of the council had the power of dealing with all questions, and of addressing himself to the three French representatives collectively. Maximilian well understood that the effects of the personal feeling of the commander-in-chief would disappear with his authority, and that the Mexican throne would henceforth have to treat with the aide-de-camp of Napoleon III. as if with the sovereign himself.
The sudden change in the political views of the ​Emperor of Mexico excited deep dissatisfaction in the French camp. The scheme of the Tuileries was utterly destroyed. Nevertheless, the illusion of its success had strongly prevailed in Paris, to judge only from the despatches of our government, dated October 31, which had just arrived from Europe. 'The minister Larès,' they wrote, 'has no chance of a continuance of power; the mission of General Castelnau could not be more opportune; and the emperor's desire is to see Maximilian quit Mexico.' Two of the representatives of France thought that an energetic note, telling the undisguised truth as to the impossibility of the enterprise which he was undertaking, might perhaps open Maximilian's eyes, and cause him to relinquish his design.
The marshal, in his feeling as a soldier, persisted in believing that, with the sure help of the foreign legion and the Austrians, and with the numerous well-fortified places to constitute his base of operations, Maximilian still retained those elements of a continuance of power which would permit him to retire at some future day with more honour and in full security. He was, however, compelled to embrace the opinion of General Castelnau and M. Dano.
To His Excellency M. Téodosio Larès, President of the Council of Ministers.
Mexico, December 8, 1866.
The undersigned have received the note, dated the 3rd instant, which MM. Larès and Arroyo did them the honour of sending them.
The president of the council being charged with the duty of dealing with the matters which formed the subject of this note, the undersigned have to acquaint him with their opinion as to the determination adopted by his majesty the Emperor Maximilian to retain the authority which the Mexican nation has conferred upon him, and to uphold his government with the resources of the country only.
The sacrifices which the government of the undersigned has made, and their own personal efforts to establish a monarchy in Mexico, need not be recalled. The agents of France deeply regret the arrival of a crisis which they would have desired to render impossible. However, after having maturely considered the position of things, they have come to the conviction that it is impossible that the imperial government should be upheld by its own resources alone.
However painful it may be for them, and without pretending at all to influence the final decision, they consider that it is their duty to make the above declaration; and they must add that, in the actual state of things, the high and generous resolution which the Emperor Maximilian appeared a month back anxious to decide on could be the only one to allow a solution of matters calculated to hold harmless every interest.
As to everything which bears upon the military question and all connected with it, replies have already been sent by competent French agents. Fresh explanations will be furnished by them if they become necessary.Bazaine.Alph. Dano.Castelnau
Circular
The French government had not, however, yet reached the limit of its disloyalty. The American frigate, after several days of useless waiting in the gulf, had put to sea to proceed to the United States, carrying back on board the two plenipotentiaries, who had not even landed. The news from Mexico and Orizaba had ruined the hopes of the ministers at the Tuileries, who now had no fear of unmasking before Maximilian's eyes the whole of their hostile policy, by again violating their promise given and recorded by treaty.
The Emperor to Castelnau.
Compiègne, December 13, 1866.
This despatch had the effect of depriving Maximilian of his last support, in defiance of Article 3 in the treaty of Miramar, which had been expressly reserved in the convention of July 30, and, as will be recollected, was to the following effect;—'The Foreign Legion in the ​service of France, composed of 8,000 men, shall remain six years in Mexico after all the other French forces have been recalled in conformity with Article 2. From this time the said legion is to pass into the service and pay of the Mexican government. The latter government reserves to itself the power of shortening the period of the employment in Mexico of this foreign corps.'
There was no doubt that the dissolution of this legion would entail the withdrawal of the Austro-Belgian legion, which by itself would be incapable of upholding the monarchy, even for a time. Besides this, the defection of the French volunteers engaged in the ranks of the Mexican army must also surely follow; for they reckoned, beyond everything, on having this almost French element always near them. This contempt for plighted faith on the part of our government affords the greater cause for surprise, because, in a conversation with Mr. Bigelow (November 7, 1866), the Emperor Napoleon had stated to the American minister, that if Maximilian asserted that he could maintain his authority alone, France would not withdraw its troops sooner than M. Drouyn de Lhuys had stipulated for, if such should be the desire of the young sovereign. This was saying clearly that the expeditionary corps should be brought home in three separate divisions, and consequently that the French protection should be secured to Mexico for another year. The day that Mr. Bigelow received this assurance at Saint Cloud from the imperial lips, General Castelnau, in Mexico, was doing the very contrary; for we have seen that the joint note of the three French representatives announced to Maximilian that the Emperor Napoleon had resolved to withdraw his troops en bloc in the early part of 1867. What change, therefore, had taken place in the state ​of things as admitted by our government?—absolutely nothing. But Maximilian, declaring that he was able to maintain his power with his own resources alone, intimidation was tried as a last resource, which, through his decisive refusal to abandon the throne, necessarily changed into reality, for General Castelnau could no longer retract. The Emperor Napoleon, who had fancied this stratagem would be infallible, and was convinced that the abdication of Maximilian would solve everything to his satisfaction, doubtless thought it preferable to make this last threat, which he hoped would soon be shrouded under the veil of oblivion. We shall see directly what menacing language this silence called forth on the part of Mr. Seward. It is nevertheless the case that General Castelnau withdrew from Maximilian the troops which the emperor said were to be left him. This will be seen if we refer to the language of the interview at St. Cloud, reported by the American minister himself, the principal passages of which it will be best to quote:—
Despatch from Mr. Bigelow to Mr. Seward as to the Withdrawal en bloc of the Expeditionary Troops from Mexico during the next Spring.
Paris, November 8, 1866.
Sir,—The minister of foreign affairs informed me last Thursday, in reply to a question which certain rumours in the newspapers had led me to put to him, that the emperor contemplated withdrawing his troops from Mexico in the spring, but that he would not recall any corps before that time.
I expressed my surprise and my regret at this determination, so clearly contrary to the assurances given by his excellency's predecessor, both to you through the medium of the Marquis de Montholon, and also to me personally.
The minister fell back upon considerations of a purely military character, not desiring to see, or not estimating at its ​value, as it seemed to me, the important effect which this change-might perhaps have on the relations of France with the United States.
My first impulse was to send him a note the following day, asking for a formal statement of the emperor's motives for having paid no regard to the stipulations made by his minister for foreign affairs relative to the recall of a detachment of his army from Mexico in the course of the month of November.
I came, however, to the conclusion, that it would be more satisfactory to the president if I saw the emperor himself on this subject.
To-day, therefore, I waited on his majesty at St. Cloud. I repeated to him all that the Marquis de Moustier had told me, and expressed to him my desire to know if I could do anything to anticipate and prevent the dissatisfaction which I was persuaded the people of my country would feel if this news was received without any explanation.
I alluded to the approaching meeting of Congress, a time when any change in our relations, either with France or with Mexico, would probably be the subject of discussion. I also expressed my fear that his majesty's reasons for delaying the withdrawal of the first detachment of his troops would be imputed to motives that our people would be inclined to resent.
The emperor told me that it was true that he had resolved to delay any recall of troops till the spring, but that in acting thus he had been influenced by military interests exclusively. . . .This despatch, added his majesty, has not been sent in cipher, in order that no secret should be made of its tenour to the United States.
I asked the emperor if the president of the United States had been informed of all this; and if anything had been done to prepare his mind for this alteration in his majesty's policy.
He replied that he knew nothing about it; that M. Moustier ought to have done it. . . . There is but one feeling here as to the determination of France to wash its hands of Mexico as soon as possible. I doubt not that the emperor is acting in good faith towards us; but I was not sure that the change in his plans which I have commented upon would receive an equally favourable interpretation in the United States.
In consequence of the late successes of the imperialists in Mexico, and the rather disturbed state of our domestic political affairs, I fear lest the conduct of the emperor should awaken suspicions in the United States which might be seriously prejudicial to the friendly relations of the two countries.
To prevent, if possible, a calamity of this kind, I thought it my duty to take the precautions of which I have just informed you. The emperor having admitted in this conversation that he had advised Maximilian to abdicate, I have been prepared every day to receive the news of this event; for advice to one in the dependent position of Maximilian is almost equivalent to an order.
The emperor said that he hoped to hear the final result of the mission of General Castelnau about the end of this month.
General Castelnau, however, was less harsh towards Maximilian than the Court of the Tuileries itself; for the former did no more than notify the recall of the troops at once, but Napoleon III., doubly severe, gave the order to send home the Foreign Legion as well. This attitude on the part of the Tuileries can only be ​explained by the deep irritation which was felt there: first, on account of the non-abdication of Maximilian, which kept our policy, our flag, and above all our responsibility in regard to the young sovereign, still entangled in regard to Mexican affairs; secondly, on account of the check given to Sherman's mission which, if it had succeeded, would have smothered, by the restoration of the Mexican republic, the seeds of misunderstanding with the United States; and finally, on account of a despatch from Mr. Seward (recently communicated to the Emperor Napoleon, although disavowed by our government), which called forth from the Moniteur in its bulletin of December 24, the following remarks:—'The American press sends us very incomplete extracts of the diplomatic correspondence which has just been submitted to congress.'
'Amongst it we notice a despatch dated November 23, sent by Mr. Seward to Mr. Bigelow.
'This document the French government have never had any knowledge of.
'The United States newspapers confirm, however, the good understanding which exists between the Federal government and that of the emperor.'
Looking at the fresh document of a threatening character which now follows, our patriotism finds a difficulty in realising this 'good understanding,' the assertion of which indicates really too much complacency on the part of the official journal.
Despatch from Mr. Seward to Mr. Bigelow, as to the Return of the French Troops from Mexico, dated November 23, 1866.
Sir,—Your despatch of November 8 (No. 384) relative to Mexico has been received. Your conduct in your interview both with M. de Moustier and with the emperor is entirely approved of. ​Tell M. de Moustier that our government is astonished and distressed at the announcement now made for the first time,— that the promised withdrawal of a detachment of French troops from Mexico, which ought to have taken place in November, has been put off by the emperor. The embarrassment resulting from this is considerably increased by the circumstance that this resolution was adopted by the emperor without having conferred with the United States about it, or even advising them on the point. Our government has in no way sent reinforcements to the Mexicans, as the emperor seems to presume; and it knew nothing at all about his counter-order to Marshal Bazaine of which the emperor speaks.
We consult the official communications only, when we want to know the aims and resolutions of France, just as we communicate our own intentions and resolutions in this way when France is in question. I am not in a position to say, and, for the present it would be unnecessary to enter on the question, whether the President would have been able or not to acquiesce in the delay intended by the emperor, supposing that he had been consulted at a fitting time, and that this proposition had been based as now on purely military considerations, and that it had been characterised by ordinary manifestations of deference to the interests and feelings of the United States.
But the decision arrived at by the emperor of modifying the present arrangement without any previous understanding with the United States, and of leaving, for the present, the whole of the French army in Mexico, instead of withdrawing a detachment in November as promised, appears at the present time to be in every respect to be regretted.
As a part of these measures, Mr. Campbell, our newly-nominated minister, accompanied by Lieutenant-General Sherman, was sent to Mexico in order to confer with President Juarez, on questions which are of the highest interest to the United States, and of vital importance to Mexico. Our policy and measures, thus adopted in the firm conviction that the evacuation of Mexico was about to commence, have been brought to the knowledge of the French legation here, and you have doubtless fulfilled your instructions by communicating them to the emperor's government at Paris.
The emperor will see that we cannot now recall Mr. Campbell, or modify the instructions in conformity to which it was expected he would treat, and according to which he may indeed have treated with the republican government of Mexico; viz., that this government certainly very warmly desires and confidently hopes that it will see the foreign occupation immediately and definitively cease.
You will therefore inform the emperor's government that the president desires and sincerely hopes that the evacuation of Mexico will be accomplished in conformity with the existing arrangement, so far as the inopportune complication necessitating this despatch will permit. On this point Mr. Campbell will receive instructions. Instructions will also be sent to the military forces of the United States, which are placed in a post of observation, and are waiting the special orders of the president. And that this will be done with the confidence that the telegraph or the courier will bring us intelligence of a satisfactory resolution on the part of the emperor in reply to this note. You will assure the French government that the United States, in wishing to free Mexico, have nothing so much at heart as preserving peace and friendship with France.
On the other hand, it can be thoroughly understood that after this increase of harsh measures on the part of the French emperor, the Mexican government assumed a more hostile attitude. After he quitted La Jalapilla, the young emperor went up by easy stages to Puebla; he travelled slowly, for, under the influence of the prejudicial regimen he was following, his health had become still more impaired. The sad news received from Paris and Miramar brought no relief to his sorrow. On the other hand, until the evacuation was quite decided upon, he was not very anxious to meet the French authorities at Mexico. He stopped at the country-house of the Archbishop of Puebla, situated at the edge of the valley leading down from Amozoc. General Castelnau and the French minister, without informing the marshal, came from Mexico and obtained an interview with the sovereign. The conversation which took place was curious enough to induce the Emperor of Mexico to express in writing that he purposed to publish an account of it in Europe; but it had the effect of only strengthening the resolutions of the crown. Maximilian returned to Mexico; ​but giving up the palace of Chapultepec, he took up his quarters in a modest hacienda adjacent to the capital, called La Teja; it was the spot where our squadrons of the Chasseurs d'Afrique had encamped the day the French entered Mexico.