# Left-Wing Communism: an Infantile Disorder/Chapter 7

CHAPTER VII.
SHOULD WE PARTICIPATE IN BOURGEOIS PARLIAMENTS?
The German Left Communists with the greatest contempt—and the greatest lightmindedness—reply to this question in the negative. Their arguments. In the quotation cited above we saw:—"to refuse most decisively any return to the historically and politically worn-out forms of struggle of parliamentarism."
This is said with absurd pretentiousness, and is obviously incorrect. "Return" to parliamentarism! Does that mean that the Soviet Republic already exists in Germany? It does not look as though such were the case. How is it possible, then, to speak of "returning"? Is not this an empty phrase?
Historically, "Parliament has become worn-out"; this is correct as regards propaganda. But everyone knows that it still very far from being threadbare when the practical question of eliminating Parliament is under consideration. Capitalism could, and very rightly, have been described as "historically worn-out" many decades ago, but this in no way removes the necessity of a very long and very hard struggle against capitalism at the present day. Parliamentarism is "historically worn-out" in a world-historical sense; that is to say, the epoch of bourgeois parliaments has come to-an end, the epoch of the proletarian dictatorship has begun. This is incontestably true. But the scale of the world's history is reckoned by decades. Ten or twenty years sooner or later—this from the point of view of the world-historical scale makes no difference, from the point of view of world-history it is a trifle, which cannot be even approximately reckoned. But this is just why it is a crying theoretical mistake to refer, in questions of practical politics, to the world-historical scale.
​Parliament is "politically worn-out?" This is quite another matter. If this were true, the position of the "Left" would be strong. Whether it is actually true must be proved by the most searching analysis; the "Left" do not even know how to tackle the problem. In the "theses on Parliamentarism," published in No. 1 of the Bulletin of the Provisional Amsterdam Bureau of the Communist International, February, 1920, which obviously expresses Dutch-Left (or Left-Dutch) views, we shall see that the analysis, too, is very poor.
In the first place, the German "Left," as is known, considered parliamentarism "politically worn-out" as far back as January, 1919, contrary to the opinion of such eminent political leaders as Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht. It has now been seen that the "Left" made a mistake. This alone radically destroys the proposition that "parliamentarism is politically worn-out." It is incumbent upon the "Left" to prove that their mistake at that time has now ceased to be a mistake. They do not, and cannot, give even the shadow of a proof of their proposition. The attitude of a political party towards its own mistakes is one of the most important and surest criteria of the seriousness of the party, and of how it fulfils in practice its obligations towards its class and towards the laboring masses. To admit a mistake openly, to disclose its reasons, to analyse the surroundings which created it, to study attentively the means of correcting it—these are the signs of a serious party; this means the performance of its duties; this means educating and training the class, and, subsequently, the masses. By neglecting this, by failing to proceed with the utmost care, attention and prudence to investigate their self-evident mistake, the "Left" in Germany (and some in Holland) proved themselves thereby to be not a class party, but a circle, not a party of the masses, but a group of intellectuals, and a handful of workers who imitate the worst characteristics of the intellectuals.
Secondly, in the same pamphlet of the Frankfurt group of "Left Wingers," from which we have already cited in detail, we read: "Millions of workmen, still following the policy of the center" (the Catholic "Center" Party) "are ​counter-revolutionary. The village proletarians produce legions of counter-revolutionary troops." (p. 3).
Everything shows that this is said in much too off-hand and exaggerated a manner. But the fact here stated is fundamentally correct, and its acknowledgement by the "Left" goes to prove their mistake with particular clearness. How is it possible to say that "parliamentarism is politically worn-out" when "millions" and "legions" of proletarians not only stand up for parliamentarism generally, but are directly counter-revolutionary? It is clear, then, that parliamentarism in Germany is not worn-out politically as yet. It is evident that the "Left" in Germany have mistaken their desire, their ideopolitical attitude, for objective reality. This is the most dangerous error which can be made by revolutionaries. In Russia, where the fierce and savage yoke of Tsarism, extending over a long period, had created an extraordinarily great variety of revolutionaries of every creed, remarkable for their wonderful devotion, enthusiasm, strength of mind, and heroism, we watched this mistake particularly closely; and it is because we studied it with particular attention that this mistake is especially familiar to us, and especially apparent to our eyes when revolutionaries in other countries fall into it. For the Communists in Germany parliamentarism is, of course, "politically out-worn"; but—and this is the whole point—we must not deem that that which is outworn for us is necessarily outworn for the class, the masses. Here, again, we see that the "Left" do not know how to argue, do not know how to behave as a class, as a party of the masses. True, it is our duty not to sink to the level of the masses, to the level of the backward strata of the class. This is incontestable. It is our duty to tell them the bitter truth. It is our duty to call their bourgeois democratic and parliamentary prejudices by their right name. But, at the same time, it is our duty to watch soberly the actual state of consciousness and preparedness of the whole class, and not of the Communist vanguard alone; of the whole laboring mass, and not merely of its foremost men.
If, not "millions" and "legions," but merely a considerable minority of industrial workers follow the Catholic priests, and if a considerable minority of village workers follow the ​land-owners and rich peasants (grossbauern), it inevitably means that parliamentarism in Germany is not politically outworn as yet; hence participation in parliamentary elections and the struggle on the parliamentary platform is obligatory for the party of the revolutionary proletariat, just for the purpose of educating the backward masses of its own class, just in order to awaken and enlighten the undeveloped, down-trodden, ignorant masses. Just so long as you are unable to disperse the bourgeois parliament and other reactionary institutions, you are bound to work inside them, and for the very reason that there are still workmen within them made fools of by priests or by the remoteness of village life. Otherwise you run the risk of becoming mere babblers.
Thirdly, the “Left” Communists have a great deal to say in praise of us Bolsheviks. One sometimes feels like telling them that it were better to praise us less, and go more thoroughly into the tactics of the Bolsheviks, to get better acquainted with them. We participated in the elections to the Russian bourgeois parliament, the Constituent Assembly, in September-November, 1917. Were our tactics right or not? If not, this should be clearly stated and proved; this is essential for the working out of the right tactics for international Communism. If, on the other hand, we were right, certain inferences should be drawn. Of course, there can be no question of approximating Russian conditions to the conditions of Western Europe. But where the special question of the phrase “parliamentarism has become politically outworn” is concerned, it is necessary by all means to gauge our experience; since, without a proper estimate of concrete experiences, such conceptions too easily resolve themselves into empty phrases. Had not we Russian Bolsheviks, in September and November, 1917, more right than any Western Communist to consider that parliamentarism in Russia had become politically outworn? Undoubtedly we had, for the point is not whether bourgeois parliamentarism has existed for a long or a short period, but to what extent the laboring masses are prepared, spiritually, politically and practically to accept the Soviet regime and to disperse (or allow to be dispersed) the bourgeois democratic parliament. That in Russia, in ​September-November, 1917, the working classes of the towns, the soldiers and the peasants, were, owing to a series of special circumstances, exceptionally well prepared for the acceptance of the Soviet regime and the dispersal of the democratic bourgeois parliament, is a quite incontestable and fully-established historical fact. However, the Bolsheviks did not boycott the Constituent Assembly, but took part in the elections before, as well as after, the conquest of political power by the proletariat. That these elections gave very valuable (and for the proletariat highly beneficial, political results—this I hope to have proved in the above-mentioned article, which deals in detail with the data concerning the elections to the Constituent Assembly in Russia.
The inference which follows from this is quite clear; it has been proved that participation in bourgeois-democratic parliaments a few weeks before the victory of the Soviet Republic, and even after that victory, not only has not harmed the revolutionary proletariat, but has actually made it easier to prove to the backward masses why such parliaments should be dispersed, has made it easier to disperse them, and has facilitated the process whereby bourgeois parliaments are actually made “politically outworn.” To pretend to belong to the Communist International, which must work out its tactics internationally (not on narrow national lines), and not to reckon with this experience, is to commit a great blunder, and, while acknowledging internationalism in words, to draw back from it in deeds.
Let us have a look at the arguments of the “Dutch Left” in favor of non-participation in parliaments. Here is the most important of their theses, No. 4:—
   When the capitalist system of production is broken down and society is in a state of revolution, parliamentary activity gradually loses its significance as compared with the action of the masses themselves. When then under such conditions Parliament becomes the center and organ of counter-revolution, while on the other hand the working class creates the tools of its power in the shape of Soviets, it may even become necessary to decline all and any participation in parliamentary activity.
​The first sentence is obviously wrong, since the action of the masses—a big strike for instance—is more important always than parliamentary activity, and not merely during a revolution or in a revolutionary situation. This obviously meaningless argument, historically and politically incorrect, only shows, with particular clearness, that the authors absolutely ignore both the general European experience (the French experience before the revolutions of 1848 and 1870; the German from 1878 to 1890, etc.), and the Russian, cited above, with regard to the importance of unifying legal and illegal forms of the struggle. This question has immense significance generally as well as specially. In all civilized and advanced countries, the time is coming speedily—it may, in fact, be said already to have come—when such unification becomes more and more—and, to an extent, has already become—obligatory for the party of the revolutionary proletariat. It is necessitated by the development and approach of the civil war between the proletariat and the bourgeoise, by the furious persecution of Communists by republican and all bourgeois governments generally, breaking the law in innumerable ways (the American example alone is invaluable). This most important question has not been at all understood by these Dutch "Left Communists" or by the "Left" generally.
The second phrase of the thesis is, in the first place, historically untrue. We bolsheviks took part in the most counter-revolutionary Parliaments. Experience showed that such participation was not only useful, but necessary to the party of the revolutionary proletariat, directly after the first bourgeois revolution in Russia (in 1905), to prepare the way for the second bourgeois revolution (February, 1917), and then for the Socialist revolution (November, 1917). In the second place, this phrase is strikingly illogical. If Parliament becomes an organ and a "center" (by the way it never has been in reality, and never can be, a "center") of counter-revolution, and the workmen create the tools of their power in the form of Soviets, it follows that the workers must prepare themselves—ideologically, politically, technically—for the struggle of the Soviets against parliament, for the dispersion of parliament by the Soviets. But it does not at all follow that such a dispersion ​is made more difficult, or is not facilitated, by the presence of a Soviet opposition within the counter-revolutionary parliament. In the course of our victorious fight against Denikin and Koltchak, it never occurred to us that the existence in their rear of a Soviet, proletarian opposition, was immaterial to our victories. We know perfectly well that the dispersion of the Constituent Assembly on January 5, 1918, was not made more difficult, but was facilitated by the fact that, within the dispersed counter-revolutionary Constituent Assembly, there was a consistent Bolshevik, as well as an inconsistent Left-Social Revolutionary, Soviet opposition. The authors of the theses got into a muddle; they forgot the experience of many, if not all, revolutions, which proved how particularly useful during a revolution is the co-ordination of mass action outside a reactionary parliament with an opposition inside the parliament which sympathizes with—or better still, directly supports—revolution.
These Dutchmen (and the “Left” in general) altogether argue here as doctrinaires of revolution, who never took part in a real one, or never deeply reflected on the history of the revolution, or naively mistake the subjective “denial” of a certain reactionary institution for its destruction in reality by the united forces of a whole series of objective factors. The surest way of discrediting a new political (and not only political) idea, and to cause it harm, is, under pretext of defending it, to reduce it to an absurdity. For every truth, as Dietzgen senior said, if it be “carried to excess,” if it be exaggerated, if it be carried beyond the limits of actual application, can be reduced to an absurdity; and, under the conditions mentioned, is even bound to fall into an absurdity. In their very zeal to help, the Dutch and German “Left” did unwitting harm to the new idea of the superiority of Soviet power over bourgeois-democratic parliaments. Of course, anyone who should say, in the old sweeping way, that refusal to particpate in bourgeois parliaments can under no circumstances be permissible, would be wrong. I cannot attempt here to formulate the conditions under which a boycott is useful, for the scope of my article is more limited; here I only want to estimate all the possibilities of Russian experience in connection with ​certain burning questions of the day, questions of international Communist tactics. Russian experience has given us one successful and correct application of the boycott (1905), and one incorrect application of it, by the Bolsheviks. In the first case we see that we succeeded in preventing the convocation of a reactionary parliament by a reactionary government, under conditions in which revolutionary mass action (strikes in particular) outside parliament was growing with exceptional rapidity. At that time not a single element of the proletariat or the peasantry gave any support to the reactionary government; the proletariat secured for itself influence over the backward masses by means of strike and agrarian movements. It is quite evident that this experience is not applicable to present-day European conditions. It is also quite evident, on the strength of the foregoing arguments, that even a conditional defense of the refusal to participate in parliament, on the part of the Dutch and the “Left,” is thoroughly wrong and harmful to the cause of the revolutionary proletariat.
In Western Europe and America, parliament has become an object of special aversion to the advanced revolutionaries of the working class. This is self-evident, and is quite comprehensible, for it is difficult to imagine anything more abominable, base, and treacherous than the behavior of the overwhelming majority of Socialist and Social-Democratic deputies in Parliament, during and after the period of the war. But it would be, not only unreasonable, but obviously criminal to yield to such a frame of mind when solving the question of how to struggle against this generally admitted evil. In many countries of Western Europe the revolutionary mood is, we might say, a “novelty,” a “rarity,” which has been too long expected, vainly and impatiently it may be; and it may be because of this that people more easily yield to their frame of mind. Of course, without a revolutionary disposition on the part of the masses, and without conditions tending to enhance this disposition, revolutionary tactics will never materialize in action. But we in Russia have convinced ourselves, by long, painful, and bloody experience, of the truth that it is impossible to build up revolutionary tactics solely on revolutionary dispositions and moods.
​Tactics should be constructed on a sober and strictly objective consideration of the forces of a given country (and of the countries surrounding it, and of all countries, on a world scale), as well as on an evaluation of the experience of other revolutionary movements. To manifest one's revolutionism solely by dint of swearing at parliamentary opportunism, by rejecting participation in parliaments, is very easy: but, just because it is too easy, it is not the solution of a difficult, a most difficult, problem. In most European states, the creation of a really revolutionary parliamentary group is much more difficult than it was in Russia. Of course. But this is only one aspect of the general truth that it was easy for Russia, in the concrete, historically quite unique, situation of 1917, to begin a social revolution; whereas to continue it and complete it will be more difficult for Russia than for other European countries.
Already at the beginning of 1918 I had occasion to point out this circumstance, and since then an experience of two years entirely corroborates this point of view. Certain specific conditions existed in Russia which do not at present exist in Western Europe, and a repetition of such conditions in another country is not very probable. These specific conditions were (1) the possibility of connecting the Soviet Revolution with the conclusion, thanks to it, of the imperialist war which had exhausted the workers and peasants to an incredible extent; (2) the possibility of making use, for a certain time, of the deadly struggle of two world-powerful groups of imperialist plunderers, who were unable to unite against their Soviet enemy; (3) the possibility of withstanding a comparatively lengthy civil war, partly because of the gigantic dimensions of the country and the bad means of communication; (4) the existence of such a profound bourgeois-revolutionary movement amongst the peasantry that the proletarian party included in its program the revolutionary demands of the peasant party (the Socialist Revolutionaries, a party sharply hostile to Bolshevism), and at once realized these demands through the proletarian conquest of political power.
The absence of these specific conditions—not to mention various minor ones—accounts for the greater difficulty which Western Europe must experience in beginning the social ​revolution. To attempt to "circumvent" this difficulty, by "jumping over" the hard task of utilizing reactionary parliaments for revolutionary purposes, is absolute childishness. You wish to create a new society? And yet you fear the difficulties entailed in forming, in a reactionary Parliament, a sound group composed of convinced, devoted, heroic Communists! Is not this childishness? Karl Liebknecht in Germany and Z. Hoglund in Sweden succeeded, even without the support of the masses from below, in giving examples of a truly revolutionary utilization of reactionary parliaments. Why, then, should a rapidly-growing revolutionary mass party, under conditions of post-war disappointment and exasperation of the masses, be unable to hammer-out for itself a Communist faction in the worst of parliaments? It is just because, in Western Europe, the backward masses of the workers and the smaller peasantry are much more strongly imbued with bourgeois-democratic and parliamentary prejudices than they are in Russia, that it is only in the midst of such institutions as bourgeois parliaments that Communists can and should carry on their long and stubborn struggle to expose, disperse, and overcome these prejudices, stopping at nothing.
The German "Left" complain of bad "leaders" in their party and give way to despair, going to the length of a laughable "repudiation" of the said "leaders." But when conditions are such that it is often necessary to hide the "leaders" underground, the preparation of good, reliable, experienced and authoritative "leaders" is an especially hard task, and these difficulties cannot be successfully overcome without co-ordinating legal with illegal work, without testing the "leaders" in the parliamentary arena, among others. The most merciless, cutting, uncompromising criticism must be directed, not against parliamentarism or parliamentary action, but against those leaders who are unable—and still more against those who do not wish—to utilize parliamentary elections and the parliamentary platform as revolutionaries and Communists should. Only such criticism—added, of course, to the expulsion of worthless leaders and their replacement by capable ones—will constitute useful and fruitful revolutionary work. Thus will both the leaders themselves ​be trained to become worthy of the working-class and the toiling masses, and the masses learn correctly to understand the political situation, and to understand the often very complicated and intricate problems that originate from such situations.
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