# Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Anderson

In general, a tortfeasor's responsibility to compensate for all harm that he or she causes is not confined to the net loss that the injured party receives. In other words, payments made to the victim, or benefits received by the victim, from collateral sources are not credited against the tortfeasor's liability. This is the "collateral source" rule.
In Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Anderson, 334 Ark. 561 (1998), the Arkansas Supreme Court held that discounted or free medical treatment is a collateral source under this rule.
Supreme Court of Arkansas
334 Ark. 561
MONTGOMERY WARD & CO., Inc. v. G.W. ANDERSON and Shirley Anderson
Appeal from Stone Circuit Court
No. 97-1456.---Opinion delivered: October 22, 1998.
* Court Documents
* Opinion of the Court
* NEW TRIAL—GRANT OR DENIAL—TRIAL COURT'S DISCRETION.—The decision to grant or deny a new trial under Ark. R. Civ. P. 59(a)(8) is within the discretion of the trial court and is not reversed absent a manifest abuse of discretion, that is, discretion exercised thoughtlessly and without due consideration.
* EVIDENCE—ADMISSION OR EXCLUSION—TRIAL COURT'S DISCRETION.—A trial court's ruling on the admission or exclusion of evidence will not be reversed absent abuse of discretion.
* DAMAGES—COLLATERAL-SOURCE RULE—RELEVANCE EXCEPTION.—The collateral-source rule applies unless the evidence of the benefits from the collateral source is relevant for a purpose other than the mitigation of damages.
* DAMAGES—COLLATERAL-SOURCE RULE—OPERATION OF.—Under the collateral-source rule, a trial court must exclude evidence of payments received by an injured party from sources collateral to the wrongdoer, such as private insurance or government benefits; recoveries from collateral sources do not redound to the benefit of a tortfeasor, even though double recovery for the same damage by the injured party may result.
* DAMAGES—COLLATERAL-SOURCE RULE—RATIONALE.—The rationale of the collateral-source rule is that a claimant should benefit from a collateral-source recovery rather than the tortfeasor because the claimant has usually paid an insurance premium or lost sick leave, whereas the tortfeasor would receive a total windfall.
* DAMAGES—COLLATERAL-SOURCE RULE—DISCOUNTED AND GRATUITOUS MEDICAL SERVICES INCLUDED—RATIONALE FAVORED APPELLEE.—The policy supporting the collateral-source rule and Arkansas case law favor including discounted and gratuitous medical services within the shelter of the collateral-source rule; where there was no evidence that appellant had anything to do with procuring the discount of appellee's medical-services bill, the rationale of the rule favored appellee. ​
* DAMAGES—COLLATERAL-SOURCE RULE—EXCEPTIONS DID NOT APPLY.—The collateral-source rule does not apply in cases in which a collateral source of recovery may be introduced (1) to rebut the plaintiffs testimony that he or she was compelled by financial necessity to return to work prematurely or to forego additional med.ical care; (2) to show that the plaintiff had attributed his condition to some other cause, such as sickness; (3) to impeach the plaintiffs tes.timony that he or she had paid his medical expenses himself; and (4) to show that the plaintiff had actually continued to work instead of being out of work, as claimed; evidence of collateral sources is also allowed when the plaintiff opens the door to his or her financial condition; the trial court correctly ruled that none of the exceptions applied to the facts at hand.
* DAMAGES—COLLATERAL-SOURCE RULE—TORTFEASOR'S RESPONSIBILITY.—The general rule concerning collateral-source recovery is that payments made to or benefits conferred on the injured party from other sources are not credited against the tortfeasor's liability, although they cover all or a part of the harm for which the tortfeasor is liable; another way to state the rule is to say that it is the tortfeasor's responsibility to compensate for all harm that he or she causes, not confined to the net loss that the injured party receives.
* DAMAGES—COLLATERAL-SOURCE RULE—GRATUITOUS OR DISCOUNTED MEDICAL SERVICES ARE NOT TO BE CONSIDERED IN ASSESSING PERSONAL-INJURY PLAINTIFF'S DAMAGES—TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN EXCLUDING EVIDENCE OF MEDICAL-SERVICES DISCOUNT.—The supreme court adopted the rule that gratuitous or discounted medical services are a collateral source not to be considered in assessing the damages due a personal-injury plaintiff, noting that the rule is consistent with the policy of allowing the innocent plaintiff, instead of the tortfeasor defendant, to receive any windfall associated with the cause of action; the court held that the trial court did not err by excluding evidence of the medical-services discount as a collateral source.
Appeal from Stone Circuit Court; John Dan Kemp, Judge; affirmed.
Wright, Lindsey & Jennings LLP, by: Jay Moody, for appellant.
Hively & Ketz, by: Vickie A. Warner, for appellees.
[Opinion of the court by Justice DAVID NEWBERN.]
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