# Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the case of Al Zahri, Abd Al Rahman (21 November 2005)

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Transcribed from pages 39-42 of http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/detainees/csrt_arb/ARB_Round_1_Factors_000394-000494.pdf#39
UNCLASSIFIED
* Department of Defense
* Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants
* at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba
21 November 2005
| To: | Al Zahri, Abd Al Rahman |
| Subject: | Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the case of Al Zahri, Abd Al Rahman (21 November 2005) |
| 1. | An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary. |
| 2. | The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state or to a third state; (2) transfer you to your home state, or a third state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state, or the third state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control. |
| 3. | The following primary factors favor continued detention: |
| | a. Commitment After hearing stories about the fighters in Chechnya, the detainaa became inspired and decided to attend training to fight in Chechnya. The detainee purchased and watched a recruitment video about jihad in Chechnya. The detainee wanted to go join the fight against the Russians in Chechnya and many people instructed him to go to Afghanistan and get training. In March or April 2001, the detainee attended the Masjid al Shohada Mosque where he heard that jihad was a good and fun thing to do and that jihad is a duty of all Muslims. The detainee heard religious leaders from Saudi Arabia state it would be a great thing to join the war. The religious leaders issued a fatwa. The detainee consulted an Afghani fighter who suggested he go to Afghanistan for training. The detainee attended the al Khair Mosque in Sanaa, Yemen. While at the mosque, he met a Yemeni with whom he traveled to Afghanistan. The detainee stayed at the Al Nibras guesthouse in Kandahar, Afghanistan, before traveling to al Farouq. Al Nibras is known as a place for brothers coming to train for jihad. The detainee traveled to Belkh, Afghanistan, where he met an Taliban official. The detainee took one thousand dollars and his Yemeni passport to Afghanistan. The detainee's initial travel route is reported to be from Sanaa, Yemen to the al Farouq training camp via Dubai, [[United Arab Emirates; to Karachi, Pakistan; to Kandahar, Afghanistan. The detainee stayed at the residence of the former Saudi Arabian Ambassador in Kabul, Afghanistan, which has been reported as a Taliban safe house used by al Qaida and personnel from al Farouq. b. Training The detainee never served in the military but knew how to use weapons like the Kalashnikov handgun since he was a child. The detainee spent 57 days at the al Farouq training camp, Afghanistan. The detainee was able to provide details about his training at al Farouq. The detainee trained on AK-47's , pistols, M16's , Uzis, G-3's Kalaco rifles and rocket-propelled grenades. The detainee received specialized weapons training. The detainee possessed two training videos that he indicated he made about mines and minefields. c. Connections/Associations During the detainee's training at al Farouq, Usama bin Laden spoke about the need to stay and fight for jihad and not to return to their home country. The detainee sat with Usama bin Laden more than ten times. The detainee reportedly identified an individual who was in charge of maintaining an al Qaida computer database containing information indicating which trainee would attend special training courses. The detainee confirmed that part of his training allowed him to sit and talk with al Qaida leaders. The detainee's name was found on a computer seized during a raid against al Qaida associated safe houses in Rawalpindi and Karachi, Pakistan. d. Intent The detainee's mission was to collect information on our techniques and to waste our resources investigating his lies. The detainee and others were told they would go to Yemen and set up a base and that base would be "the base of the base". The detainee reported he might have been on a mission for Usama bin Laden when he was caught. e. Other Relevant Data The detainee claims he was arrested on a trip with a Taliban official to purchase antique books about Muhammad. The detainee was detained and accused of being a theif in Mazar-E-Sharif by the Taliban Intelligence Agency. The detainee claims he fabricated a story about his experiences with Usama bin Laden and al Qaida and he did this as a joke to law enforcement authorities. The detainee did well at al Farouq resulting in special treatment. The detainee heard about attackss being planned against the United States' interests in Kuwait, Japan, Qatar and Oman. The detainee admitted making fabricated stories such as Usama bin Laden visiting guest house in which the detainee stayed; that he took trips to Afghanistan to the front lines during training; and that he had knowledge of special training camps in Afghanistan. General Dostum's Forces captured the detainee who was in a truck that contained a bag on money and passports. The detainee was captured with 24,000 Pakistani rupees of his own money which is approximately $500 United States dollars given to him by someone he had met at a hospital. The detainee was identified in Konduz, Afghanistan and at the front lines in Afghanistan along with other Arabs from al Farouq. The detainee indicated he knew Usama bin Laden was preparing a big strike and several smaller strikes on the United States and that his sources of information were good. The detainee reported that he would be honored to be an al Qaida member. |
| 4. | The following primary factors favor release or transfer: |
| | a. The detainee claimed everything he had reported to this point was wrong. He denied receiving a fatwa and he left Yemen legally to purchase antiquities. b. The detainee denied being at al Farouq and he previously stated he was at al Farouq because this is what he thought others wanted to hear. c. The detainee denied he received specialized training. d. The detainee denied he attended advanced training. e. The detainee was asked to fight for the Taliban but refused. f. The detainee didn't train to fight the United States forces, but to fulfill his religious duty to protect himself and his honor with civil and physical defense. g. The detainee denied any previous travel to the United States. He denied any knowledge of the World Trade Center attacks; the bombing of the USS COle, the embassy bombings or any other terrorist attacks. h. The detainee claimed he was not part of al Qaida or the Taliban. i. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001 and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States. |
| 5. | You will be provided with a meaningful opportunity to be heard and present information to this Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter. |