# The rise and fall of the Emperor Maximilian/Chapter XI

CHAPTER XI.
Bad System of Enlistment followed—Energy of the Empress Charlotte —Destruction of Mejia's Division—The Emperor Napoleon's harsh Reply to M. Almonte's Mission—Its Effect on the Mexican Court— Maximilian's Project of Abdication stopped by the Empress—Her Expedition to Europe—Painful Incident—Fresh Imperial Disasters— Maximilian's Idea of Declaring a State of Siege—It is opposed by Marshal Bazaine.
AS we have seen, Maximilian set great value on the increase of the nine battalions of cazadores. He had a right to reckon on the good disposition of the French who had consented to join them, for the two sovereigns excited the ardent sympathies of our noble army. But the efforts of our head-quarters and the devotion of the French officers who had accepted the difficult task of commanding and forming these nine battalions would all be fruitless if the country itself, the imperial commissioners, and the great landed proprietors did not unreservedly help them by some substantial system of recruitment. The leva, a kind of military impressment, had been abolished in former days by the regency, obeying the noble suggestion of Marshal Forey. The empire had renewed the formal prohibition of resorting to this brutal and inhuman system of swelling the ranks of the Mexican army. But, nevertheless, the leva was still practised. Indians taken by force by the hacenderos, the dregs of the Mexican community discharged from the public prisons, —such were the miserable elements that the political prefects of the provinces persisted in placing at the ​disposal of the French commandants; and it may be easily understood what our volunteers, conscious of their own dignity, must have felt when they elbowed in their ranks comrades who had just exchanged the convict's chain for the musket. Yet our officers were not disheartened.
Depending upon the imperial orders which had directed the recruitment in the states of Mexico, Queretaro, and San Luis, they endeavoured to arouse the apathy of the political prefects, and, in some cases, to baffle their hostility. They personally visited all the haciendas; they appealed to the patriotism as well as to the self-interest of the great landed proprietors, whose safety could only be ensured by the legal enlistment of the labourers living on their property, or by the arrival of volunteers to serve under the flag. The whole population, if the imperial commissioners did not betray the crown, ought to furnish its contingent to the recruitment. And never had sacrifices of this sort been more called forth by pressing emergencies. General Mejia found in his front Escobedo and Cortina threatening to annihilate his division, the best disciplined amongst the Mexican troops, and composed of veteran bands well seasoned to the hardships of the sierras. Yet Maximilian did not lose heart. It should also be told that he felt his powers doubled by the energy of his devoted wife, who directed affairs at Mexico whilst he was traversing the country. From Cuernavaca, where he then was, and where the news of a great disaster had just come upon him without prostrating him, he demanded without delay from our head-quarters the means of retrieving the misfortune.
Cuernavaca, June 24, 1866.
A second and still more painful blow fell on the court of Mexico at the end of June. This was the Emperor Napoleon's reply to the embassy of M. Almonte, on which both Maximilian and the Empress Charlotte had built such fond hopes. Napoleon III. notified to his ally certain conditions which were harsher than any of those which had been hitherto drawn up. Although the form of the imperial message, which contained a statement of certain well-founded grievances, might be wounding to Maximilian's self-esteem, the resolutions it contained passed the sentence of death on the Mexican monarchy. Mr. Seward had triumphed!
Paris, May 31, 1866.
There is no need to go back to the origin of the French expedition; its justification is founded on our grievances. Compelled, as we were, to do ourselves justice, the experience of the past taught us for the future to seek for guarantees against the return of actions which had so often drawn down on this country (at the cost of burdensome expeditions) severe but always ineffective repressions. These guarantees were to result from the foundation of a regular government, strong enough to put an end to the traditions of disorder bequeathed by a succession of ephemeral powers. However desirable might be the establishment of such a government, we, least of all, could think of imposing it on others, and we have always loudly disavowed any such design. We have not, however, liked to believe that the elements of an indispensable political regeneration were altogether wanting in the Mexican community, and we resolved to further all the efforts which should be made by the country to rid itself of the anarchy which was destroying it. This enterprise was a grand one, and it allured the Emperor Maximilian. Being appealed to by the Mexican nation, without allowing himself to be deterred by the difficulties and dangers of the task, he courageously devoted himself to it. He, like the Emperor Napoleon, thought the great questions of conciliation and counteraction were connected with the independence of Mexico, and with the integrity of its territory when guaranteed by a stable and regenerative government; and he knew that he would not want for our help in aiding him to realise a work profitable to the whole world.
The duties of the Emperor towards France required him, however, to proportion the extent of the assistance that he could offer to Mexico to ensure the success of this enterprise to the importance of the French interests engaged. The treaty of Miramar was concluded to this effect.
. . . Now, in the contract which established our rights and our obligations, France has fully discharged the duties which she accepted, and she has but very incompletely received the ​equivalent compensations which were promised her. This is a fact which we are bound to assert, since it no longer rests with us to keep silence as to its consequences. We are far from not comprehending the obstacles and difficulties of every kind against which his majesty the Emperor Maximilian has had to strive. Although we have often deplored that his loyal intentions were not better appreciated, we have always applauded his active solicitude and his generous purposes.
. . . . The results did not answer our hopes in spite of the skilful and energetic management of the marshal and the devotion of an army which nothing wearies. . . . The French government facilitated the negotiation of loans which relieved the embarrassments of the Mexican treasury, and yet our claims were compensated only by fallacious settlements. Friendly advice has been given, but the councillors of his majesty manifested a systematic resistance in everything which concerned the interests of France. Must we recall what exertions it cost the French Legation to obtain only an insufficient reparation for the injuries suffered by our countrymen, when the English claims were settled without question; when resources were found to discharge without delay and with ready money doubtful and perhaps illegal debts? We found the very principle of the French demands contested,—those demands which had been recognised by the treaty of Miramar as the determinative cause of our expedition; which, too, in default of any stipulation, should have constituted an undoubted and indisputable debt of honour.
After having, in all circumstances, pointed out to the Mexican government the necessity of itself individually providing for its own conservation, and after having many a time stated that the assistance which we were affording it could only be maintained in proportion as the corresponding obligations due to us should be strictly fulfilled, we have acquainted it with the stringent considerations which forbid us any longer to demand fresh sacrifices from France, which also decided us to recall our troops.
Nevertheless, whist adopting this resolution, we have directed that, in its execution, those delays and precautions should be employed which are necessary for avoiding the dangers of too sudden a change. We have been compelled, at ​the same time, to substitute for the now valueless stipulations of the treaty of Miramar other arrangements intended to ensure the security of our claims. The emperor's minister at Mexico has consequently received instructions to conclude a new convention for this purpose.
These instructions, like all the acts of the Emperor Napoleon, are inspired by the natural sentiments which attach him to the Emperor of Mexico, and by a sincere desire to reconcile interests that he does not wish to see separated. He has duly appreciated the reasons which have led his representatives not to press for the immediate conclusion of the arrangements which had been prescribed; but he has regretted to see that the Mexican cabinet has profited by their compliance to remove to Paris the scene of a negotiation which can only be usefully carried on at Mexico.
The Emperor Napoleon has especially regretted to find included in the draft of a treaty submitted to his government by General Almonte certain propositions which have already been laid before them, and have been necessarily declined for the most powerful reasons every time that they have been brought forward. The stay of the troops (it is said) must be prolonged beyond the assigned periods; fresh advances are demanded of us, in the anticipation of a deficiency in the resources of the Mexican treasury, and the repayment of these advances is put off to undetermined dates; no pledge is offered, no guarantee is given for the security of our claims. After the frank, loyal, and full explanations of the French government, it is difficult to account for the persistency of illusion which must have guided the conception of this scheme.
It is impossible to accept the propositions brought by General Almonte, or even to authorise their discussion. It will be necessary to consent to a new convention.
If the combinations which will be proposed to him are accepted by his majesty the Emperor Maximilian, the times fixed for the gradual departure of the French troops will be maintained; and Marshal Bazaine, in conjunction with his majesty, will settle the measures necessary, in order that the evacuation of the Mexican territory may be carried out in the mode most favourable to the maintenance of order and the consolidation of the imperial power.
The court of Mexico was stupified, and even showed openly all its grief at the conduct of the Tuileries, feeling it all the more strongly as the Mexican treasury had been emptied to meet its engagements to France. At the time when this message arrived from Napoleon III., it is an undoubted fact that Maximilian, with the exception of 400,000 francs, owed nothing; for some time he had been devoting all his care and all his efforts to satisfy the conditions of the treaty of Miramar, which was henceforth to be trodden under ​foot; and now a fresh convention was to be exacted from him, which would take away his last available resources—the customs' duties at Tampico and Vera Cruz, the half of which he was to consent to assign to France. If this convention was not accepted by him, the marshal had orders to fall back at once and abandon Maximilian to his own resources. The imperial family gave vent to their feelings in bitter complaints, some of which transpired beyond the precincts of the palace. The revelations of the future will justify the following words which, we assert, were pronounced by Maximilian in the hearing of those around him: 'I am tricked: there was a formal convention entered into between the Emperor Napoleon and myself, which guaranteed me absolutely the assistance of the French troops until the end of the year 1868; without this I never would have accepted the throne.' As a matter of fact, which was not unknown in London, this secret treaty existed.
Maximilian felt that he had but one step to take,—that of abdication. On July 7, he took pen in hand to sign the fall of the monarchy; the Empress of Mexico stayed his hand. Then it was that the Empress Charlotte, moved by a generous but ill-considered feeling, crossed the seas, braving all the fatigues of the voyage and the fevers of the Terres Chaudes. She hoped that at Paris and Rome she should be able to gain her cause; that is, that she would be able to settle favourably the three questions which must decide the fate of the monarchy—the maintenance and increase of the corps of occupation, some financial assistance, and the acquisition of an ecclesiastical concordat. If her undertaking was not crowned with success, the emperor, after having placed his authority at the disposal of the nation, was to rejoin his courageous ​and admirable helpmate in Europe. The court of Mexico still blinded itself as to the real state of things; but certain intimate confidants, who could not make up their minds to abandon their high positions, urged the empress to embark. As to General Count De Thün, he had already returned to Austria. On July 8, the official journal of Mexico announced that the empress was leaving for Europe, where she was about to enter into negotiations as to the affairs of Mexico, and to settle various international matters. Allusion was made to the approaching visit to Rome, to reassure both the clergy and the holders of ecclesiastical property. To provide for the expenses of the august traveller it was necessary, as the treasury was exhausted, to have recourse to the funds of the 'inundation tax' to provide a sum of 30,000 piastres.
An incident, painful in every respect, marked the visit of her majesty to the port of Vera Cruz. The department of the Mexican marine, for which the marshal had spontaneously opened a credit of 500,000 francs to form a coast-guard service to cope with the smugglers who interfered with the customs' receipts, did not possess a barge, and had not thought of preparing one for the use of their empress. The Empress Charlotte, on arriving at the quay, found nothing but a French boat at her command. She declined distinctly to embark under the shadow of our flag to go on board the vessel which was lying in the roadstead. The unequivocal signs of dissatisfaction which her majesty manifested whilst waiting on the quay, showed clearly enough that she quitted the Mexican soil with a heart thoroughly embittered against the French government. ​Her departure, which was considered as the last effort of the monarchical régime, was the signal of important Juarist demonstrations. Symptoms of dissolution openly showed themselves in the imperial army; and the Belgian legion, already weakened by desertions, began to mutiny just at the time that the northern frontier was lighted up with all the fires of revolt. General Douay announced that the whole country was cut up by the republican cavalry. General Olvera allowed a convoy to be taken from him, defended by 250 Austrians and 1,500 Mexicans, and a portion of the latter went over to the victorious Escobedo. General Mejia had given way, losing definitively the port of Matamoros, and was compelled to return to Vera Cruz by sea almost alone. In the south, Parras' troops had deserted and gone over to the enemy. Colonel Medina had betrayed the empire by raising into rebellion the central town of Tula, and the empty coffers of the state having failed to furnish pay for the troops of Lopez and Quiroga, they had disbanded. Moreover, the French treasury had received orders not to give another piastre to the battalions of cazadores, which the commander-in-chief had hitherto taken the responsibility of paying. On hearing of all these disasters, the marshal thought it prudent to proceed personally to the northern frontier, where the storm was principally gathering. He immediately formed a light column which, in conjunction with the French contra-guerillas, were commissioned to operate across the zones of the revolt. Before quitting Mexico, the commander-in-chief had presented himself at the palace in the hope of taking his orders from the emperor, but he was not received.
With what kind of feelings was it possible for Maximilian to look at the representative of France? ​Besides, the emperor had not yet made up his mind as to the fresh convention, and he preferred to keep his own counsel. On July 20, on arriving at San Luis, the marshal sent a summary of the state of the country to the palace of Mexico, and announced 'that the Belgian legion could no longer be left alone in the town of Monterey, for it was not to be depended upon. The want of discipline had assumed such proportions that General Douay had not ventured to execute the orders which he had received to disband his forces, fearing to provoke an armed revolt.' In concluding this letter, the marshal, obeying the formal instructions of the Emperor Napoleon, said to Maximilian, 'I cannot undertake anything before I know the decision of his majesty as to the note he has just received from France, the latter portion of which directs the immediate concentration of the French troops, in case the emperor should not acquiesce in the substitution of a fresh convention instead of that of Miramar.'
Fifteen days after a courier arrived from Maximilian at Peotillos, where our head-quarters were fixed, and handed to the marshal a letter more fatal even than the unhappy decree of October 3, which must have been extorted from the weakness of the sovereign by a minister infatuated by fear at the report of the insurrection which was now reaching the very heart of the empire. It must, besides, be stated, that if urgent persuasion had not been used, the emperor would not even have consulted the commander-in-chief, and would have immediately placed the whole empire in a state of siege.
Mexico, August 7, 1866.
On this subject, I must inform you that several members of my ministry solicit me to declare a state of siege over the whole empire. They assert that the only means of tranquillising the country, and also of obtaining some degree of order in the administration and finances, is to place the power in the hands of the chief military commanders, who should be chosen, wherever it is possible, among the French officers. This measure can only be legal through the departments being declared in a state of siege.
The question is a highly important one; it affects the most serious interests, and I did not wish to decide upon it before knowing your opinion. You have just traversed a large portion of the empire; you have observed closely the state of things in various departments, and you better than anyone are in a position to enlighten me with the information you have obtained, and the observations you have made.
The marshal, to whom some have so complacently attributed certain dreams of personal ambition, which would certainly have accepted the offer of a military dictatorship like this at a time so critical for the crown, replied to the emperor from his bivouac as follows:—
Peotillos, August 10, 1866.
As your majesty remarks, the question is a very important one, and affects the most serious interests.
A state of siege is in fact a transitory state in which all the powers are combined in the hands of the military authority; a state which extraordinarily modifies the administrative and judicial machinery, and places the citizens in an abnormal and unnatural position.
It is likewise only in the public interests and at some great unforeseen crisis, that the sovereign authority should resort to these extreme means to point out that force is the only argument which is left for it to employ.
Is it necessary at the present time to apply this measure to the Mexican empire? I do not think so; and I ask the emperor's permission to prove to him that this measure is a useless one.
The normal state, so to speak, of this country for the last fifty years, has been a state of war, which will not be altered for a long time yet. Does not this afford all the facilities which could be wished for obtaining by force that which neither persuasion nor the efforts of a regular administration have been able to effect?
The substitution of one sole authority, and of one sole power instead of all those which before ruled the community, could only give more unity to the proceedings of government, so far as the authorities temporarily suspended (for, as I repeat, the state of siege can only be transitory), may be simultaneously and everywhere replaced by others on whose valour and good faith dependence may be placed.
Does it not seem more natural to act than to issue edicts? and, in the unquestionable state of war in which the country now is, is not the gradual transition to a state of siege both simple and easy? There are generals and chief commandants close to all the points where their actions would be indispensable.
Courts-martial are now at work over the whole extent of the empire. Would a state of siege give more force, more ​activity, more prestige to the military authority? No, sire; it would simply have the effect of putting a stop to any direct action on the part of the civil authorities.
The same end may be arrived at without frightening anybody: by remaining in a state of war without deviating from strict legality, and by remodelling the administrative, judicial, and financial staff.
As a corollary to the feeling which urges me to oppose a state of siege, except in urgent cases and exceptional localities, allow me now to add to the general considerations which I have had the honour of submitting to your majesty, some other considerations founded on the peculiar position of the French army in Mexico, now that it has for the last two years restored to the Mexican authorities all the powers which it exercised before the arrival of the sovereign.
Whatever might be my desire of placing at your majesty's disposal all the officers whom you might require, there are limits which I cannot pass.
At a time when a portion of the French army is preparing to quit Mexican soil, I could not, in fact, disorganise its ranks and deprive it of its superior officers, the only ones who possess a sufficient authority for exercising the functions of chief-commandants in the departments in a state of siege.
Still less can I think of removing the superior officers belonging to the corps destined to remain in Mexico.
And, finally, would it be prudent, when two officials of the French army already fill two of the most important positions in the Mexican government—would it be prudent, may I venture to say to your majesty, to augment the share of responsibility which already falls upon us, by allowing us to absorb all the powers in the country, and by thus annihilating all the national elements on which your majesty has hitherto relied, which also may still be made useful?
The means which, as I think, ought to be first tried, are as follows:—You must oblige the prefects and the sub-prefects to send to the generals and chief-commandants (whatever may be their nationality) political reports as to the state of the country and its requirements. You must deprive them of the right to dispose of any troops without the assent of the military authority, to whom they must address a requisition in writing. And, finally, you must actively push forward the organisation of a good gendarmerie, and must endeavour to bring about a solidarité between the military and civil powers, instead of setting them in opposition one to the other.
If it had not been for this language, so worthy of the French people, the severities incumbent on a state of siege would have desolated the whole of Mexico; and the Americans, now ready to cross for a second time the frontier of the Rio Bravo, would have hurled defiance at the tri-coloured flag, which our army, less patient than our policy, would certainly never have allowed to be humbled.
* ↑ A fund which was raised by taxes levied for the works intended to preserve Mexico from inundations.
* ↑ The American negroes had already some months before taken possession of Bagdad, then occupied by the Imperialists, and had evacuated it after having plundered it. Bagdad was immediately reoccupied by the French.