# History of Aurangzib/Volume 1/Chapter 14

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CHAPTER XIV.
Aurangzib advances from the Deccan, 1658.
From 4th October 1657, when Aurangzib retired from the war with Bijapur, to 25th January 1658, when he began his march towards Hindustan as a claimant to the Anxious time for Aurangzi before the war of succession.throne, he passed through a most anxious and critical time. Events which he could not possibly control were moving fast, and he was bound to move also if he was not to perish. And yet the future was so dark and the danger of every possible course of action so great, that a wise decision was extremely difficult to make. His present position was daily growing more untenable, while the future was ominous. But the difficulties, great and complex, which he overcame raise to the highest pitch our admiration for his coolness, sagacity, power of managing men, and diplomatic skill. If it be urged that these do not ​ completely account for his success and that he was also beholden to Fortune, then the impartial historian of the period must admit that Aurangzib had done everything to deserve Fortune's help.
Whichever way Aurangzib turned, he was faced with danger. The exulting Deccanis interpreted his retreat from Bidar as a confession of defeat. The Bijapuris boasted that they had rolled the tide of Mughal invasion back; their armies tried to hem the Imperialists round; and their local officers drove out isolated Mughal outposts. Even the Sultan of Golkonda seized the opportunity of the retirement of Mughal troops: he renewed his efforts to retain a hold on the Karnatak and tried to seize some villages near the frontier fort of Udgir.
Yet Aurangzib could not remain where he was. The news had got out that the Emperor had orderedHis critical position in the Deccan. peace to be made and recalled the additional troops sent to the Deccan. It was impossible for Aurangzib to punish the Bijapuris by arms, or to overawe them by a display of superior force. He could not even safely stay ​ in their territory. A cruel fate threatened to snatch away from his grasp the fruits of his long and costly war with Bijapur, just when he was about to taste them. True, Adil Shah had agreed by solemn treaty to pay a huge indemnity and to cede the fort of Parenda and a large tract of land. But how could he be held to his promise now? Concessions wrung by force could be maintained by force alone.
Aurangzib, therefore, determined to play a game of boldness in order to realise the terms of the treaty before the Bijapuris could recover from their recent defeats or learn of the full extent of the weakness and distraction of the Imperial Government. He at first gave it out that he would stay at Bidar in readiness to punish the Bijapuris if they broke their word. Later on he announced a wish to march in person to Ahmadnagar, and actually sent his army under his son there, in order to overawe the refractory qiladar of He is forced to choose between two evils: to lose the crown: Parenda, who was not yielding up his charge. In his letters to frequently invoked his father's authority in demanding the quick payment of the promised indemnity and theatened war in case of default. But this policy of facing round to Bijapur and ​making military demonstrations in the South had its drawbacks too. The affairs of Hindustan had necessarily to be neglected. The longer Aurangzib delayed in maturing his plans for contesting the throne, proclaiming himself a claimant, and marching on Hindustan, the greater was the time that would Dara gain for recalling the chief captains from the Deccan, winning over officers and men far and near, consolidating his own power, and effectually counter-acting Aurangzib's possible designs. Moreover, during this period of suspense all ambitious and selfish men were likely to go over to Dara in the belief that the timid and slow Aurangzib would never make himself Emperor.
If, on the other hand, Aurangzib concentrated his forces, made a public claimor to lose all the gains of the Bijapur war. to the throne, marched northwards and openly broke with the Imperial government by enlisting troops and forcibly detaining with himself the officers ordered back to the Court,—then he would, no doubt, check Dara in time, he would secure the adhesion of ambitious adventurers. But at the same time the helpless condition of Shah Jahan, the civil war among the princes, and the temporary collapse of the Imperial authority would become ​ patent to Bijapur, and all hope of getting Parenda or the promised indemnity would be gone. And at the same time his other enemies in the South would raise their heads: Golkonda would recover the reluctantly ceded and eagerly coveted province of Karnatak; Shivaji would raid the Junnar and Ahmadnagar districts. In short, the fruits of the last two years' warfare in the South would be totally lost to him.
The whole The policy he followed. history of Aurangzib's changing anxieties and hopes, plans and devices, and the variations of his policy with every fresh development during this eventful period, is clearly and fully unfolded in his numerous confidential letters to Mir Jumla preserved in the Adab-i-Alamgiri. Briefly put, his first plan was to realise the terms of the Bijapur treaty as quickly as possible and then, secure about the Deccan, to embark on the struggle for the throne. The success of this plan, depended on the Bijapuris promptly keeping their promises, before the secret of Shah Jahan's helpless illness leaked out. The letters tell the story of how the hope of a speedy settlement with Bijapur daily grew fainter ​ and fainter, how he tried diverse means to get the promised territory and money, how he conceded to Bijapur one by one the hard terms wrung out of it by the treaty,-till at last, in despair of getting anything from Bijapur, he gave up all thought of the South, and turned his undivided attention and resources to the pursuit of his schemes in Northern India.
Compelled to give up for the present the idea of further conquests from Bijapur, Aurangzib, on 28thMir Jumla sent to get Parenda Fort. September, sent Mir Jumla towards Parenda to take delivery of the Fort in terms of the treaty. Qazi Nizama, who accompanied the Mir, was soon afterwards deputed to Bijapur to realise the promised indemnity. But before the Mir's departure, Aurangzib had held long and secret consultations with him and taken his advice on every possible contingency in anticipation. Even after Mir Jumla had gone towards Parenda, Aurangzib wrote to him almost every day, and important oral messages were delivered and consultations held with him by means of confidential officers like Shaikh Mir and Abul Fath, who made repeated trips between the Prince and the minister. Not a step was taken without first seeking Mir Jumla's advice. "I ​have no friend or confidant but you," as Aurangzib told him.
The Prince set out on his return from Kaliani Aurangzib retreats from Kaliani.on 4th October and reached Bidar in five days. A Mughal garrison under Ali Beg was left to hold Kaliani. At Bidar, according to the Emperor's last orders, Aurangzib was to halt and keep hold of the conquered territory. But untoward events rendered his stay here useless and even dangerous. High officers like Mahabat Khan and Rao Chhatra Sal had left for Delhi at the Imperial summons. Another great general, Nasiri Khan, though entreated by Aurangzib to stay till he was relieved, had abandoned his post at Bir to return to his charge of Raisin in Malwa. The retreat of the army from Kaliani was taken to mean an abandonment of the new conquest. The Bijapuris grew bolder and attacked detached Mughal parties wherever they could find them. Their general Afzal Khan with a large army crossed the Binathora river and advanced to recover the Kaliani and Bidar districts. Worst of all, the Bijapuris intercepted near Naldrug Aurangzib's despatch to Mir Jumla together with the deciphered copy of a secret letter he had received from his agent at Delhi, and thus ​they learnt the truth about Shah Jahan's critical condition and the hostility between Dara and his brothers. Aurangzib himself was growing more and more anxious at having got no fresh letter from Delhi for several days past. Was his father dead? If so, he must make an attempt for the throne without further loss of time.
So, he provided for the future with his usual foresight and wisdom. Bidar Fort was repaired, the ravages of the late siege restored, its artillery properly arranged, and the necessary provisions and munitions stored. A garrison of 5,500 under Mir Jafar was left here. At this time Aurangzib wrote to Murad a letter which merely said, "You have not written to me for a long time past. . . . I shall soon return to Aurangabad. You must have heard the news about the Imperial Court." But his real message, proposing an offensive and defensive alliance between the two brothers against Dara, was orally entrusted to Allah Yar, the confidential messenger who carried the letter to Murad. He also wrote similar letters to Shuja in Bengal. A communication received from Delhi on the 17th, after a ​ long silence, only confirmed his suspicion that and Bidar to the old Mughal territory. Shah Jahan had lost his control and that affairs at Court had taken a new turn. Therefore, he made up his mind, and started from Bidar on 18th October, 1657.
Immediately there was the greatest rejoicing in the Deccani kingdoms. Here were the Mughals abandoning their late conquests as untenable! In vain did Aurangzib try to put a bold face on the matter; in vain did he write to Qutb Shah: "The retreat of my army was due to a wish to reassure the people of Bijapur who were frightened by its presence and had abandoned the cultivation of their lands, and also because I had got news that my Begam's illness had increased." The plea was too palpably false to be believed. While his vanquished enemies were raising their heads in the South, and a storm was brewing against him in the North, Aurangzib received one of the severest domestic shocks: the day after leaving Death of his wife Dilras Banu. Bidar he learnt that his principal wife ​ and the mother of three of his sons had died at Aurangabad on the 8th of the month.
Shah Jahan had ordered Aurangzib to stay at Bidar; but the prince now got a plausible excuse for marching to Aurangabad, viz., to console his children newly bereaved of their mother. For some weeks after leaving Bidar he did not write any letter to the Emperor, nor give any reason for his return to Aurangabad. But he corresponded frequently with Shuja and Murad, especially the latter, who was nearest to him, and thus built up an alliance against Dara. Murad's first letter, sent with a confidential servant named Muhammad Raza on 19th October, had crossed Aurangzib's letter to him (written about the 15th). And now, assured of his support, Aurangzib sent him the key to a cypher in which their future correspondence was to be conducted, as "prudence is needful, and writing in the ordinary alphabet is not proper."
On leaving Bidar, Aurangzib's plan at first was He waits in uncertainty for news of Shah Jahan's condition. to go to Pathri, some 120 miles north, where the road for Burhanpur and Hindustan branches off from that leading to Aurangabad. If he heard of Shah Jahan's death on the ​ way he would follow the former route and march into Northern India; otherwise he would set his face westwards and return to Aurangabad, the seat of his viceroyalty. But the period of uncertainty was only prolonged; no decisive information came from Delhi, and for weeks after leaving Bidar, Aurangzib passed his time in the greatest anxiety and vacillation.
On 18th October he learnt from a letter of his agent at Delhi that Shah Jahan had become helpless; on the 21st came another letter, saying that the Emperor's illness was decreasing. A third letter, received on the 22nd, brought news of an opposite tenour: Dara had become supreme at Court and was daily strengthening his position. A secret message from the Collector of Agra, evidently professing devotion, reached Aurangzib at this time. It only confirmed his worst suspicions: the very fact of such a letter being written meant that a demise of royalty had taken place or was very imminent; "one of these two alternatives must have happened,-Shah Jahan is either dead or a helpless invalid."
In view of these facts Aurangzib proposed to send his son Muhammad Sultan with an army to Burhanpur, to close the ferry over the Tapti river, ​ to detain in the Deccan nobles like Nasiri Khan then returning north at the Imperial summons, and also to assemble the local landholders in the Prince's service and enlist new troops. But to do so would have been to commit himself openly; it would have been an overt act of rebellion, which he could not have explained away if Shah Jahan recovered. Aurangzib, therefore, hesitated and asked Mir Jumla's opinion, who condemned the proposal and requested that Muhammad Sultan should be sent towards Parenda instead.
In fact, while days and weeks wore on without the expected event taking place Aurangzib despairs of getting Parenda Fort, at Delhi, Aurangzib and Mir Jumla were wistfully looking towards Parenda. Every letter of Aurangzib to the Mir contained an urgent order "to settle the affair of Parenda as quickly as possible, in order that the most important business of all may be undertaken before it is too late." The minister still flattered himself that the fort could be secured by threat or bribe, and both these means were employed in turn. But Aurangzib made a more correct estimate of the character of the Bijapuris and their future line of action than Mir Jumla did. He frankly wrote, "No trust in the words of the Bijapuris....They used to lie ​even in the life-time of Khan Muhammad (who was in our interest). There is no hope that the affair (of peace) will be accomplished. . . . No good waiting in vain near the fort of Parenda."
Mir Jumla, however, persisted in his own view. At his request Aurangzib sent while Mir Jumla is more hopeful and tries all sorts of means.him solemn written promises of high favours addressed to the qiladar of Parenda to induce him to give up the fort. But the attempt failed. Then Mir Jumla tried a show of force. To please him, Aurangzib reluctantly sent Muhammad Sultan with a part of the army from his side at Pathri (4th Nov.) to join the Mir near Parenda. The young prince was told to place himself under Mir Jumla's orders, and "to be guided entirely by his judgment."
Mir Jumla had hoped that the force accompanying Sultan would be exaggerated by popular report and this would cow down the Bijapuri qiladar. Aurangzib even made a public declaration that he was himself going to Ahmadnagar to coerce the Bijapuris, and ordered the palace there to be got ready for his use. But all these tricks failed. The news of Shah Jahan's ​ illness became public. The Bijapuris shrewdly guessed the situation. They knew that Aurangzib, with his depleted force and distraction about the succession, was not prepared to renew the war with them, and so they delayed yielding their forts and paying the promised indemnity. Mir Jumla, still hoping against hope, lingered near Parenda, trusting that his envoy at the Bijapur Court would influence the Sultan and his Ministers and secure the peaceful surrender of Parenda. Though every moment was precious for "the most important business of all" and Aurangzib was impatient to get Mir Jumla back at his side to make the necessary preparations for war with Dara, yet he permitted the Mir to continue in that quarter with M. Sultan for weeks longer, if by so doing he expected to get Parenda. About 6th December Sultan was recalled to his father's side and Prince Muazzam was sent in his place to Mir Jumla's camp near Bir.
But the hope of getting Parenda and the war-indemnity grew fainter and fainter, and, as the complexion of affairs at Delhi grew more and ​ more ominous, Aurangzib relaxed and finally abandoned all his claims onAfter three months Mir Jumla returns without success to Aurangabad. Bijapur and tried to make friends with Adil Shah in a fashion amusing to those who know not the crooked ways of diplomacy. As early as the end of October he had instructed Mir Jumla to terminate the affair of Bijapur by giving up all claims to Parenda and tribute, and remaining content with Adil Shah's promises and oaths to maintain peace on the withdrawal of the Mughal army. But evidently Mir Jumla still hoped to get the cessions, and so he did not then adopt the policy here recommended. He spent three months in the Bir district, within easy reach of Parenda, in the vain hope of inducing the Bijapuris to keep their promises. At last even he was undeceived; he confessed that there was no good in staying there any longer. His return to Aurangabad was hastened by a peremptory order of recall received from Shah Jahan about 22nd December. Leaving Bir about the 27th of the month, he reached Aurangabad about the first of January, 1658. ​ Aurangzib had arrived at Aurangabad on nth November, 1657, and set himself Aurangzib at Aurangabad: his preparations for the war of succession: to the task of preparing the way for his own succession to the throne. He had one eye turned on Mir Jumla at Bir and another on Shah Jahan at Agra. The idea of his marching to Ahmadnagar to overawe the Bijapuri officers was definitely abandoned. On 28th October he had taken a very necessary precaution by sending a force under Malik Husain to Handia to seize all the ferries of the Narmada and prevent correspondence between Dara and the Mughal officers in the Deccan. He also wrote friendly letters to the Gond Rajahs of Deogarh and Chanda, through whose territories his road to Agra lay. A few men in his camp who had tried to send news to Agra w^ere punished and carefully watched, and a secret courier was expelled. At the same time he urged his forms an alliance with Murad and Shuja. friends to collect news: "We should be on the watch to get news from all sides. His alliance with Murad was made strong and its terms clearly defined. Letters were frequently sent to Shuja, both by way of Agra—which route was unsafe, being in his enemy's hands,—and also through Orissa. But distance forbade any useful ​ league or concerted action between these two brothers. So, they were content to vow mutual friendship and a common hostility to Dara.
But what line of action was Aurangzib to adopt now? His followers were Conflicting news from Delhi. looking up to him to declare his policy. A prompt decision w^as required from him; but a decision at this stage was most difficult to make, and beset with dangers. The news from the Imperial Court was conflicting. The first intimation of Shah Jahan's illness was followed by a long silence; from about 8th October to the 18th he received no tidings of his father's condition. Then (on 18th October) he learnt from his agent at Delhi that Shah Jahan had lost all control and that the state of affairs at the capital had taken a new character. Three days afterwards came a letter (written on the 5th) saying that Shah Jahan's illness was decreasing and that he was conducting business without difficulty. The next day brought another letter (dated the loth) from his agent at Court, which stated that Dara had virtually usurped the government and was doing everything at his own will,—changing officers, taking away jagirs, and collecting men and money, though the orders were issued in Shah ​Jahan's name. Other communications from Agra only increased his distraction and uncertainty about Shah Jahan's real condition.
His followers were equally distracted. As he wrote to Mir Jumla, "The army of this province, after a year's Aurangzib's distraction:hard campaigning, has lost heart on hearing of the Emperor's illness, and has been unsettled in various ways. They are in greater trouble than can be described. Many (of my) officers want to return to the Emperor." How harassing Aurangzib's anxieties were and how open to objection every possible line of action before him was, will be seen from the following letter which he wrote to Mir Jumla in cypher:
If in such circumstances, I delay in equipping my army and publishing my claim (to the throne), in what hope will men consent to keep my company? If the officers here, seeing my negligence and indifference, return to the Court, and Dara becomes aware of my condition, it will be impossible ​for me to attract other worldlings and seekers of rank. So, I have determined on this:—if we can quickly conclude the affair of Bijapur, it will be good, because then I can reach Burhanpur before the screen is withdrawn, Shaista Khan recalled to Court, somebody else appointed in his place (as Governor of Malwa), and Dara wins over the zamindars (of that province) and seizes the forts of Raisin, Mandu, etc. The fort of Raisin, which is under Nasiri Khan, can be got (by us) now without effort, and the army of this province can be led by hope to accompany me, and fresh troops may be carefully enlisted.
When, in the 4th week of December, Mir Jumla received a strict order of recall from Shah Jahan, Aurangzib's depression reached its lowest point. He wrote to his confidant: "Friend, God assist you! What shall I write about my own troubled state or describe how the days pass over me? I have no remedy save patience."
Murad, too, was urging him in letter after letter, to be immediately up and Aurangzib wishes to wait and watch.doing, and not to give Dara further time to strengthen his own position and cripple his brothers' power beyond repair. But Aurangzib refused to raise the banner of rebellion before knowing for certain that Shah Jahan was dead. His own army was ​ small, and he was making desperate efforts to collect the sinews of war by securing the payment of at least one portion of the Bijapur indemnity. Possibly also, he waited to let Dara show his hand and divide his strength by attacking one of the brothers first.
But the quick march of events forced Aurangzib's hand. He learnt by 24th November that Dara had decided to send an Imperial army against Shuja who was advancing from Bengal. Shah Jahan's policy (he inferred) was clearly this: 'So long as a few days of his life remain and out of regard for him no unfilial movement is undertaken from any quarter, he will make such arrangements that after (his death) no injury may be done by any (of the other three princes) to Dara.'
Dara's plan with regard to the South was now fully unfolded. He wanted toDana's hostile plans unfolded. weaken each of his two brothers there and set one against the other. For this he made the helpless Shah Jahan transfer Berar from Aurangzib to Murad and remove the latter from the viceroyalty of Guzerat. But Murad had discussed with Aurangzib and pre​ pared himself beforehand for such a contingency; he refused either to take Berar or to give up Guzerat. Dara then sent two Imperial armies under Jaswant Singh and Qasim Khan, the governors-designate of Malwa and Guzerat, to bar the path of Aurangzib and expel Murad from Guzerat. These two forces left Agra on 18th and 26th December. Murad's jagirs in Malwa were taken away, and Shaista Khan removed from that province as friendly to Aurangzib. In December, Murad crowned himself and took Surat Fort by force; and such overt rebellion could not be left unpunished by the Imperial government. Lastly, Mir Jumla received a formal Imperial letter of recall which it would have been flat rebellion to disregard. Similar letters reached Aurangzib's officers.
The time for action had at last arrived. Further inactivity under these circumstances was impossible if Aurangzib hoped ever to be king or even to live in freedom. His mind was made up. He sent a most flattering letter to Mir Jumla, highly extolling his wisdom, thank​ing him for his entire devotion to his interests, and placing him above all his other followers:—
"I know you are faithful to your word. Your intention in going to Hindustan was and is no Aurangzifa invites Mir Jumla to his side to help in preparing for war.other than to increase my power and grandeur and to make me succeed in my heart's desire. You have often said within my hearing, 'I wish for life only that I may see the master of mankind (=Aurangzib) on the throne; and in realising this aim I value not my life or property.' Now is the time to display your devotion. I do not need others in making the necessary equipment for this business, while you are alive. I care not for those (officers) who have been estranged from me by reason of my partiality to you. Come to me, so that with your advice I may engage in preparations for the work of gaining the crown."
Mir Jumla returned to Aurangabad about 1st January, 1658, avowing that he was going to Agra to wait on the Emperor. But a plot had been already contrived between him and Aurangzib, and a little play was acted to save the Mir's family at the capital from Dara's vengeance. Mir Jumla feigned fear of Aurangzib's intentions and refused to see him, saying, "As I have been ordered by the Emperor to go to him, I have no choice but to He arrests Mir Jumla by collusion, on a false charge of treason.obey. Aurangzib sent him a friendly message through his son Muhammad Sultan, "to drive all suspicion out of his mind" and to ​ persuade him to visit the Prince in order to receive an important oral message for the Emperor. As soon as Mir Jumla entered the chamber of Aurangzib, he was arrested at a preconcerted signal, and all his property and artillery seized by Aurangzib in the name of the State. But the mask had not yet been thrown off, and so Aurangzib gave an ostensible reason for this act: he publicly announced that Mir Jumla was thus punished because he had not sufficiently exerted himself against Bijapur and was in secret collusion with the two Deccani sultans! But his real motive comes out in the letter which he wrote to the Mir after defeating Dara, when he set him free and said, "You insisted on going back to the Court at an inconvenient time in spite of my urging you to the contrary." The captive wazir was lodged in the prison-fort of Daulatabad, to be released, restored to his property, and promoted to the highest rank of the nobility with the honoured titles of Premier ​Peer (Khan-i-khanan) and Faithful Friend (Yar-i-wafadar), as soon as Aurangzib made himself Emperor.
Even at this stage Aurangzib was not prepared to break openly with the Imperial Court by taking an irrevocable step. He urged Murad to abate his ardour and practise subterfuge. For himself he announced that his loving heart had been distracted by hearing sad rumours about Shah Jahan, and that like a dutiful son he was going to Agra to see his father in his illness, release him from Dara's control, and thereby save the empire from alarm, confusion and tumult. As his pious journey to his father was likely to be resisted by Dara's creatures, he was taking his army with himself; but his mission was entirely pacific. So he wrote to Shah Jahan and the new wazir Jafar Khan.
In the meantime, from the beginning of January he had been pushing his military preparations most vigorously on. First, he wanted to settle the problems of the Deccan and secure the sinews of war. Letters were written to Qutb Shah press​ing him to pay up the balance of his indemnity. Since his return from HaidarabadHistory of his dealings with Golkonda. Aurangzib's tone towards the Golkonda king had been harsh and chiding. He was particularly displeased at Abdullah having intrigued with Dara and poisoned the Emperor's ears against him. He frequently duns him for the arrears of tribute and the balance of the promised indemnity, urges him to banish from his mind the vain dream of keeping hold of the Karnatak, and warns him to withdraw from that province his officers (especially Abdul Jabbar), who were obstructing Mir Jumla's agents there. Further the Golkonda king is commanded to restore the relays of postmen established by Mir Jumla from Mughal Deccan to the Karnatak across the Golkonda territory. When Qutb Shah prayed for the remission of a part of his indemnity, Aurangzib tauntingly replied, "What can I do? You better appeal to Jahanara and Dara, and through their mediation submit a petition to the Emperor." And again, "You do not keep your promises but are listening to wicked and ruinous advice. I cannot save you!"
During the invasion of Bijapur, Qutb Shah is asked to send a contingent of auxiliaries. "You ​ have kept 32,000 horsemen inspite of your (pretended) poverty. Send me 5,000 of them quickly, as you promised. Do not delay in providing the arrears of tribute. Recall your men from Mir Jumla's estates in the Karnatak." A harsh and rude officer, Mir Ahmad Said, was sent as Mughal envoy to Golkonda to hustle the defaulting king and exact the arrears of tribute. "When Aurangzib retreated from Bidar, he thus rebuked Qutb Shah: "I learn that on hearing of the march of the Imperial army from Bidar and the circulation of some false rumours (about Shah Jahan's death) among the vulgar, you have changed your attitude of fidelity, and your silly ministers have given you improper counsels,—so that you are making delay in sending escort and despatching the collected arrears of tribute; you are trusting to a fox-like policy and are passing your time idly under a false hope Relying on false news, you have ceased to keep your former promises!"
But soon afterwards his own needs forced Aurangzib to assume a gentler whose king is at last conciliated. tone. First, he instructed Mir Ahmad not to pain the king's mind in realising the tribute due. Later on, the objectionable envoy was recalled and one more acceptable to the king was sent in his place, with ​ instructions to behave gently to him. When his Vanguard was being sent to Burhanpur, Aurangzib urged Qutb Shah thus; "Now is the time for you to show your friendship and exert yourself that nothing unfriendly may be done." A little later, when Aurangzib himself marched northwards to contest the throne, he sent a most conciliatory letter to Qutb Shah, urging him to guard the frontiers of Mughal Karnatak from mischievous persons and not to encroach on the Imperial territory.
Aurangzib also sent friendly epistles and presents to the Queen Mother of His dealings with Bijapurf Bijapur, urging her to expedite the payment of the indemnity, and next despatched a secret oral message to her. Just before marching to Burhanpur he wrote again to her: "I hope the Deccani sultans will remain quiet (during my absence) and you will keep your promise (about sending the indemnity money), so that I may reward you when I have become Emperor."
We have seen how as early as October Aurangzib had proposed to Mir Jumla a friendly settlement with Bijapur by abandoning all claims to the territory and indemnity promised by that ​ State in the recent treaty. This policy, held in reserve at that time, was now put in practice. Adil Shah was informed by the Prince, "At Mir Jumla's wicked advice I had attacked your kingdom as well as Golkonda. Guard your people well. Let there be peace and happiness. Remain loyal and keep your promises....! agree that (1) the fort of Parenda and Large concessions promised to Adil Shah in return for his friendship. its dependent territory, the Konkan, and the mahal of Wangi, which have been annexed to the empire, together with that portion of the Karnatak which had been granted to the late Adil Shah,—should be left to you as before, and (2) out of your promised indemnity of one krore of rupees, thirty lakhs are remitted.
Protect this country; improve its administration. Expel Shiva who has sneaked into possession of some forts of the land. If you wish to entertain his services, give him Jagirs in the Karnatak, far from the Imperial dominions, so that he may not disturb them. Send the reduced indemnity. Be loyal, and you will be amply rewarded.—I am going to Hindustan with my army. Now is the time to show your loyalty and friendliness. The late Adil Shah had promised to send a contingent to me, should an ​ occasion for it arise. Do you send me at least 10,000 cavalry. I shall grant you the territory up to the bank of the Banganga. I promise not to accept the offer of Shahji or of the sons of Bahlol and other officers of yours to enter my service. So long as you remain faithful, no officer of this Court will molest your dominion. Should any one come from Hindustan to invade your country, I shall defend it."
The concessions here made were ample beyond Adil Shah's fondest dreams, and he knew that they would be withdrawn as soon as Aurangzib's need was over. Indeed the above offer contained conditions liable to great latitude of interpretation; and afterwards, in his hour of victory over his rivals, Aurangzib seized this loophole to repudiate his promises and to demand more than all that Bijapur had agreed to yield by the treaty of August, 1657.
But some money realised from the Deccani sultans now fell into Aurangzib's hands and helped to equip him for the arduous struggle for the throne. Mir Jumla's wealth and excellent ​ park of artillery, served by European gunners, were of inestimable use to Aurangzib, who had attached them early in January. These "supplied the much-needed means of Aurangzib's progress towards his object, at this critical time," as the historian Aqil Khan Razi points out.
All this time Aurangzib was intriguing actively but in secret with the Aurangzib intrigues with the nobles at Court and the generals. courtiers at the capital and the high officers in the provinces (especially Malwa). Some anecdotes have come down to us which prove that Aurangzib was regarded by the ministers and even by Shah Jahan himself, as the ablest of the princes. I find it impossibe to reject them entirely as prophecies made after the event. Of all the four sons of Shah Jahan he had the best reputation for capacity and experience; the known record of his actual performances was most varied and distinguished. Evidently all self-seeking nobles and officers recognised ​him as the coming man, and hastened to secure their future by doing him friendly turns or at least by sending him secret assurances of their support. As Dara reported to Shah Jahan, "Aurangzib is winning over the nobles and the pillars of the State. He is doing his work by means of secret epistles."
The enlisting of new soldiers had been going on apace. A bounty of one His military preparations completed.month's pay was advanced to all recruits. Muhammad Beg in Khandesh was ordered to select and engage as many Bundela infantry and Buxari artillery-men of reputation as he could get. Two officers were sent to bring 2,000 maunds of saltpetre from Balapur and to buy sulphur and arsenic at Surat and convey these materials to Burhanpur for manufacturing gunpowder. Lead for making shot in sufficient quantity was stored at Burhanpur and Handia. A quantity of gun-powder and fuses, evidently taken from the Deccan forts, accompanied the Vanguard led by Muhammad Sultan. A thousand soldiers were enlisted by Sultan Beg in the sarkar of Bijaygarh. Many Maratha chiefs also joined Aurangzib with their contingents. In this way ​his army was swollen to 30,000 picked troopers, besides Mir Jumla's excellent train of cannon served by English and French gunners.
Aurangzib was even stronger in officers than in men and material. During his rule His band of able officers. of the Deccan he had gathered round himself a band of very able servants, all attached to him by gratitude and some by personal affection. They did him signal service during the contest for the throne, often giving up their lives in stemming the enemy's onset in the hard fights of the War of Succession. Those who survived naturally rose to the highest offices, and were at once the pillars of his throne and ornaments of his Court during the early years of his reign. Such were Murshid Quli Khan the diwan, Shaikh Mir the warrior and confidential adviser, Aqil Khan Razi the equery and personal attendant, Qabil Khan the facile and trusty secretary, Khan-i-Zaman the energetic Inspector of Ordnance, Muhammad Tahir, a veteran captain raised to the peerage as Wazir Khan, the faithful envoy Isa Beg (created Mukhlis Khan), the highborn and experienced Shamsuddin Mukhtar Khan, ​and above all that jewel of a servant, Mir Jumla, great in war, greater still in counsel. Of the Imperial officers who had served in the Deccan, besides Multafat Khan, his able son Hushdar Khan, Najabat Khan, Qazi Nizama and some others, Aurangzib secured the adhesion of Nasiri Khan, recently transferred from the Deccan to Malwa. Lastly, he released from prison and took with himself Rajah Indradyumna of Dhamdhera, a valiant Rajput of Malwa. Two other of the most devoted Hindu followers of Aurangzib were Rao Karan the Rajah of Bikanir and Subh-Karan the Bundela chieftain of Datia and father of the more renowned general Dalpat Rao.
Before leaving the Deccan he took steps to His arrangements for keeping hold of the Deccan during his absence. maintain his hold on the country during his absence. Shah Beg Khan was recalled from the Karnatak with his detachment, and ordered to guard the province. Prince Muazzam was left at Aurangabad with two high officers and a strong force to carry on the government and to prevent the public peace from being broken by Shivaji. Aurangzib did not lose his fear lest that "son of a dog," as he called the youthful Maratha leader, should ​seize the opportunity of his absence. His newborn son Muhammad Akbar was left in Fort Daulatabad with his harem, but two other sons, Muhammad Sultan and Muhammad Azam, accompanied him to the war. Some forts were also repaired and a wall of defence built round the suburb of Karan-pura, as the absence of the main army in Northern India might tempt spoilers. The officers were ordered to engage houses at Aurangabad and Burhanpur and leave their families there. Money was given to them in aid of these necessary arrangements.
On hearing of Murad Bakhsh's coronation and He openly marches north-wards to contest the throne. Mir Jumla's arrest, Shah Jahan sent letters of reprimand to his two sons, ordering them to return to the path of obedience and duty. But they pretended to see only Dara's hand in these Imperial letters, and insisted on going to the capital to pay their respects to the Emperor in person. At last, his preparations being well advanced, Aurangzib considered further delay useless, especially as Jaswant Singh and Qasim Khan on reaching Malwa were sure to strengthen Dara's interest there and organise the local zamindars to bar the road from the ​South. So, after giving to Murad the impatiently expected notice to start, he sent his eldest son with the Van towards Burhanpur (25th January, 1658) and himself left Aurangabad with the rest of his army eleven days afterwards (5th Feb.). He now began to exercise royal prerogatives, bestowing titles, posts, and promotions of mansab (rank). Muazzam was created Viceroy of the Deccan and Wazir Khan that of Khandesh.
Burhanpur was reached on 18th February, and At Burhanpur he halts one month. here the organisation of the army and the preparations for the march were completed. A month's halt was made in this town. Aurangzib had written a letter to Shah Jahan inquiring about his health and hoping that the Emperor would soon completely recover, look after the administration himself, and put an end to Dara's usurpation of the supreme authority. But day by day only alarming news of the Court reached him. His agent Isa Beg, too, arrived from Agra and fully unfolded the state of affairs there, saying how after his illness Shah Jahan doted on Dara to an extreme and that Prince had made himself Emperor in all but the name. Isa Beg was the bearer of secret messages from ​many nobles, professing devotion to Aurangzib and asking him to push on to the capital, without fearing the largeness of the Imperial army, as it was at heart hostile to Dara.
Encouraged by these promises of support and unwilling to let Jaswant Singh have more time to consolidate his power in Malwa or close the northern road effectually, Aurangzib set out from Burhanpur on 20th March. From Mandwah he Imprisons Shah Nawaz Khan, sent his eldest son back to arrest and imprison Shah Nawaz Khan, who was unwilling to accompany Aurangzib in his open rebellion, and had lingered behind at Burhanpur under false pretexts. This high officer, though he was the father-in-law of Aurangzib and descended from the royal blood of Persia, had to sacrifice liberty to loyalty, (26th March). By Aurangzib's order, he was kept a prisoner in the fort of Burhanpur for seven months.
At Mandwah there is a parting of the roads crosses the Narmada, to Hindustan. One path running north-eastwards crosses the Narmada at Handia. But Aurangzib took the other route, turned to the ​north-west, and in seven marches reached Akbarpur on the bank of the Narmada, the stream that has divided Southern India from Northern since time immemorial. Here he forded the river without the least opposition (3rd April) and then marched due north towards Ujjain, through the pass overlooked by the hill-fort of Mandu.
On 13th April he reached the environs of and joins Murad. Dipalpur and learnt that Murad had arrived some miles west of him. A messenger was sent to invite the younger Prince to join him without delay. Next day, both the armies began their march, and on the way, near the lake of Dipalpur, the brothers met together; their armies were united; and with redoubled strength and confidence they pushed on towards Ujjain to encounter Jaswant, who was only one day's march in front. In the evening Aurangzib encamped at the village of Dharmat, on the western bank of the Gambhira (an affluent of the Chambal), and decided to fight the enemy next day.
* ↑ The Bijapur historian asserts that Aurangzib escaped with his army from the Bijapur territory only by bribing the wazir Khan Muhammad (Basatin-i-salatin. 349.) Adab, 70b, 197a.
* ↑ Adab, 94a.
* ↑ Adab, 92a—95a (Aurangzib to Mir Jumla), 197a—206a (Qabil Khan, by order of Aurangzib, to Mir Jumla), 1786 (Qabil Khan to Aurangzib).
* ↑ Kambu, 6b. Adab, 197a, 203a, 149b, 157b. Aqil Khan, i6. Naldrug, 27 miles N. E, of Sholapur (Ind. At. 57).
* ↑ Adab 92b, 169a and b, 199a. Kambu, 6b.
* ↑ Adab, 71a.
* ↑ Adab, 198a, asserts that Aurangzib learnt the news on 19th October one march out of Bidar, but 190a states that the news reached Aurangzib's Court at Bidar in the night preceding the 18th.
* ↑ Adab, 198a and b.
* ↑ Aurangzib to Murad (Adab, 169a-170a), to Shuja (Adab, 170a—171a). Murad to Aurangzib (Faiyaz, 413—435).
* ↑ Adab, 198a.
* ↑ Adab 199a-200b, 169b.
* ↑ Adab, 200a, 201b.
* ↑ Adab, 200b, 93a and b.
* ↑ Adab 201b, 203a and b.
* ↑ Adab, 71a, 150b.
* ↑ Adab, 93b-94a, 94b.
* ↑ Adab, 202b, 94b.
* ↑ Adab, 93a, 201b, 170b, 203a.
* ↑ Adab, 93b.
* ↑ Adab, 94a.
* ↑ Adah, 95a.
* ↑ Anecdotes of Aurangzib, § 6. Adah, 205a.
* ↑ Adab, 205b.
* ↑ Faiyaz, 413-414.
* ↑ Adab, 94b, 202b. Kambu, 10a.
* ↑ Adab, 205b, (a report of Aurangzib's words that Qabil Khan wrote to Mir Jumla).
* ↑ Kambu, 10b. Aqil Khan 20. Alamgirnamah, 83 and 84.
* ↑ Aqil Khan, 20. Adab, 67b, 95a (Aurangzib writes, "That I imprisoned you was not due to any disloyalty on your part. Only you showed remissness in exertion and insisted on going back, &c.") Khafi Khan writes "Aurangzib imprisoned Mir Jumla at Daulatabad as a stroke of policy to prevent his ill repute." (ii. 9). The official history, Alamgirnamah also admits that Mir Jumla was arrested "for political reasons" (84).
* ↑ Adab, 96a. Alamgirnamah 191, 563.
* ↑ Alamgirnamah, 41. Kambu 11a. A. S. B. MS. F. 56, pp. 54—57. Masum 44a-45a (incorrect paraphrase.) Adab, 123a, (after the battle of Dharmat). Faiyaz 466-467 (Murad to Jafar Khan).
* ↑ Adab, 59a—63b, 69a-70a (Aurangzib to Qutb Shah).
* ↑ Adah, 69a, 70a-71a.
* ↑ Adah, 64, 71b, 65a and b, 72a.
* ↑ Adab, 51b-52b.
* ↑ Adah, 202a and b.
* ↑ Adah, 162a-163b.
* ↑ Adah, 167b.
* ↑ The public money in the Deccan just before the invasion of Bijapur was 64 lakhs of rupees,—viz., Reserves of 20 lakhs at Daulatabad and Asir, and of 30 lakhs in the other public treasuries, Golkonda indemnity of 2 lakhs of hun (=10 lakhs of rupees) realised by Ahmad Said about Dec. 1656 {Adab, 1956, Waris, 121b.), Bijapur present of four lakhs of rupees in cash and kind brought to Aurangabad by Abul Hasan, in the 3rd quarter of 1656 {Adah, 191a). From this total must be deducted the cost of the war with Bijapur and bribes to Bijapuri deserters, against which the 12 lakhs worth of booty taken at Bidar was a partial set off. What wealth, if any, Aurangzib and Muhammad Sultan secretly took from Qutb Shah we know not; but popular report greatly magnified it.
* ↑ Ruqat-i-Alamgivi, Nos. 54 and 5, India Office Pers. MS. 370, f. 81a, Kambu, 86, 10a, Aqil Khan, 23.
* ↑ Adab, 93b, 168b-169a, Isar-das (16a) and Aqil Khan (25) both estimate Aurangzib's army at 30,000 strong. Also Kambu, 11b. A. N. 42.
* ↑ Adab, 99, M. U. ii. 265.
* ↑ Adab 2010, 168b, 92a, 123a; A. N. 43-46; Dilkasha, 18-21.
* ↑ A. N., 42-46. Aqil Khan, 24-26. Kambu, 10b. Masum, 42b-45a
* ↑ A. N. 46-53, 209, Anecdotes of Aurangzib, § 6, Kambu, 10b, Aqil Khan, 23-24. Mandwa is a station on the G. I. P. Railway, 10 miles N. N. E. of Burhanpur, (Ind. Atlas, Sheet 54).
* ↑ Akbarpur, 22°9 N. 75°32 E. on the Narmada, 13 miles west of Mandlesar (Ind. At. Sh. 37 N. E.) The hill-fort of Mandu is 14 miles north of Akbarpur. Dipalpur, 22°50 N. 75°36 E. (Sh. 36 S. E.) Dharmat, 23 N. 75°43 E. is 12 miles north of Dipalpur, 2 miles S. W. of the Fatehabad Railway Station, and 14 miles S. S. W. of Ujjain. (Sh. 36 N. E.) A. N. 53-56. Aqil Khan, 26. Isar das, 17.