# Maynard v. Durham and Southern Railway Company/Dissent Whittaker

* Court Documents
* Case Syllabus
* Opinion of the Court
* Dissenting Opinions Frankfurter Whittaker
United States Supreme Court
365 U.S. 160
Maynard v. Durham and Southern Railway Company
Argued: Jan. 12, 1961. --- Decided: Feb 20, 1961
Mr. Justice WHITTAKER, with whom Mr. Justice HARLAN joins, dissenting.
Petitioner was employed by respondent as a 'section' worker at Apex, North Carolina. He normally worked five eight-hour days per week, and was compensated for hours worked at a rate aggregating about $290 per month. The record is not entirely clear on the point, but it would appear that he had received the wages he had earned through Friday, August 19, 1955. On Monday, August 22, he was injured in the course of his work, but he worked the remainder of the day and also the next, Tuesday, August 23. He was then off work for a total of 19 days, 13 of which were working days, returning to work on Mondays, September 12, and working through Friday, September 16, of that week. On Saturday, September 17, he signed a 'Release' of all claims against his employer on account of his injury and delivered the same to his employer in exchange for its check to his order in the amount of $144.60-which, it appears, is the exact amount he would have earned had he worked each working day through the period he was off.
At the conclusion of the trial of his action, brought under the Federal Employers' Liability Act against his employer, the trial court rejected his contentions that the 'Release' was (1) obtained by fraud and (2) was not supported by any consideration, held the 'Release' to be a valid bar of his claim for damages, and dismissed the suit. On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed, 251 N.C. 783, 112 S.E.2d 249, and we granted certiorari. 363 U.S. 839, 80 S.Ct. 1634, 4 L.Ed.2d 1725.
The only question here is whether that judgment was justified by the record. With all respect, I think it was.
I agree with the Court that the evidence wholly failed to sustain the claim of fraud. In fact, as the Court's opinion shows, petitioner's testimony affirmatively discloses that there was none. He testified that respondent's officer, with whom he dealt in respect of the 'Release,' 'didn't make me any false representations. * * * He didn't make any deceitful suggestions to me. He didn't make any fraudulent suggestions to me.'
But I am equally unable to find in the record any evidence to show that the 'Release' was given without consideration. Petitioner admits that he was required to sign the 'Release' before respondent would pay him the $144.60 which he received in exchange for it. Of course, I agree with the Court's statement of the law that "A release is not supported by sufficient consideration unless something of value is received to which the (releasor) had no previous right.' If, in other words, an employee receives wages to which he had an absolute right, the fact that the amount is called consideration for a release does not make the release valid.'
Here, however, there is no evidence that the $144.60 which petitioner received in exchange for the release had been earned by, or was due, him. It is true that that amount was exactly the sum he would have earned in the relevant period had he worked. But he did not work in that period. He admits that he was off work from Wednesday morning, August 23, to Monday morning, September 12 a total of 19 days, 13 of which were working days. Of course, he could have had a contract with his employer obligating it to pay him normal wages while disabled by injury or sickness. But he has not shown that any such contract existed.
As I read and understand them, these undisputed facts fail to show that the amount paid by respondent to petitioner for the Release was his own money-money that he had earned as wages, or that was otherwise owing to him. As I see it, then, petitioner has wholly failed to produce any evidence to show that the Release was made without consideration.
Whether petitioner may have had a solid basis to rescind the Release-upon the ground of mutual mistake of fact, i.e., that he was more seriously injured than either he or respondent believed at the time the Release was made, of which there is considerable indication in the record-would present a question of more substance. But that question is not before us, as petitioner has not proceeded on that theory.
On the record as it stands, I think the North Carolina Courts were right, and that their judgment should be affirmed.

## Notes

This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
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