# The rise and fall of the Emperor Maximilian/Chapter XIV

CHAPTER XIV.
French Officers in the Mexican Administration—Correspondence on this Subject—Marshal Bazaine's Acquiescence—Disavowed at Paris —Neglect of the Mexican Naval Department—Convention of July 30 —Sudden Alteration in the Views of the French Cabinet—The Mission of General Castelnau—Matters getting Worse in Mexico—Maximilian's Plans to ensure his safe Retreat—Marshal Bazaine receives fresh Orders from Paris—Mr. Seward's Despatch—Complaints of the Mexican Ministry rebutted by Marshal Bazaine—Mysterious Aim of General Castelnau's Mission—The Four-fold Drama—Maximilian's Protest.
Palace of Mexico, September 15, 1866.
My dear Marshal,—I think that advantage has been taken of your good faith in putting this ministerial modification before you as the commencement of an era of reaction which would be incompatible with the presence of two French generals amid their new colleagues.
My past actions, and my well known political tolerance are, I have a right to think, a sure pledge that the change will be one which events call for, and worthy both of my glorious allies and of myself.
Receive, my dear marshal, the assurance of my feelings of the sincere friendship with which I am your very affectionateMaximilian.
Mexico, September 16, 1866.
Sire,—In reply to the letter which your majesty sent me yesterday evening, I have the honour of acquainting you that I have called upon MM. Osmont and Friant to make their election between the duties which they are fulfilling in your majesty's service and those which have been assigned to them in the expeditionary corps; experience daily shows that their double functions are incompatible, and that annoyances are thereby caused such as the various services of the army have been too long suffering from.
It is not my province to express an opinion on the shade of political opinion which is represented by your majesty's new cabinet, and this is not the motive which has induced me to come to the above determination.
Immediately on my return to Mexico, I allowed MM. Osmont and Friant to remain in your majesty's service because the number of ministers was deficient; now that the cabinet is fully constituted, I thought that they might withdraw without inconvenience.
Nevertheless, I have the honour of repeating to your majesty, that I am quite disposed to afford to your government the co-operation of these officers, if they are willing to resign the functions they have to fill in the expeditionary corps.
With the most profound respect, sire, &c.Bazaine.
Mexico, September 16, 1866.
My dear Marshal,—I regret that you place MM. Osmont and Friant in a position which will leave them no alternative but to resign their portfolios. Both of these officers fulfilled their duties to my entire satisfaction. The former has managed to secure the good feeling of the Mexican army; the latter has just prepared a series of decrees calculated to increase our resources, but which he alone is able to carry into execution. If, therefore, it is true that the alliance between my own and the French government is to be considered as a reality, as I flatter myself that it is, it is my desire that these two officers should continue in their ministerial functions, for, I am pretty sure, it will not be impossible to replace them, at least temporarily, in the offices which they occupy in the expeditionary corps.
Your reply will at all events inform me as to which class of ideas I must now make up my mind to.—Your very affectionateMaximilian.
Mexico, September 17, 1866.
. . . Taking into serious consideration the desire which your majesty expressed in your letter of September 16, I have the honour of informing you that, until the arrival of fresh instructions from my government, the present positions of MM. Osmont and Friant will not be altered.
These two gentlemen will remain at your majesty's disposal, and the duties which belong to them in the expeditionary corps will, until further orders, be fulfilled by their respective assistants.
With the deepest respect, sire, &c. Bazaine.
Again, our head-quarters' authorities yielded to Maximilian's wishes. The reply of the French cabinet, dated August 26, was not long before it arrived. It was as the marshal had foreseen; 'it was of serious consequence to us,' they wrote, 'to keep aloof from the administration of the country. The Emperor ​Napoleon felt bound to send instructions directly. It was inadmissible in any case that a chief of the staff and a commissary of stores should simultaneously be ministers of the Mexican empire.' In the meantime, in the beginning of the month of September, a despatch arrived in Paris from the Marquis de Montholon, laying before the Cabinet of the Tuileries the following note from Mr. Seward:—
Mr. Seward to the Marquis de Montholon.
Washington, August 16, 1866.
Sir,—I have the honour of calling your attention to two orders or decrees which it is said were issued on the 26th of last July by the Prince Maximilian, who lays claim to being Emperor of Mexico. In these orders he states that he has made over the direction of the war department to Genera Osmont, chief of the staff in the French expeditionary corps, and that of the treasury department to M. Friant, chief commissary of stores to the same force.
After this almost menacing communication, the Moniteur of September 13 announced, without delay, that MM. Osmont and Friant were not authorised by the French government to accept their respective portfolios. The commander-in-chief was also informed in writing, alluding to the unexpected nomination of these officials, that he ought to have opposed it even after it had been carried out; and a formal disavowal was also sent him from the Tuileries of this interference in the public affairs of Mexico. Although the duty of our ​military commander became more and more difficult, what was Maximilian to think, who had just asked, 'If it was true that the alliance between his own and the French government was to be considered as a reality, as he flattered himself that it was?'
The attitude of the United States, full of a logic which was never inconsistent with its purpose, was at all events an attitude of open hostility. Just at this time President Johnson issued a proclamation, declaring null and void a decree of Maximilian, which ordered the blockade of certain ports in Mexico.
One cannot help wondering at the illusions of a prince who thought proper to order a blockade at the very doors, as it were, of the United States, and yet did not possess a single Mexican ship ready to enforce with its guns the will of the sovereign. Nevertheless, Mexico lies between two seas, and possesses an extensive line of coast. What had her naval department been doing for the last three years? Although it might not, perhaps, have been able to launch large ships, or to measure their strength with the American Monitors, surely they ought to have constructed gunboats and light vessels fitted to go up the rivers, and to protect the shores against duerilleros and smugglers. Certainly, France, as an ally of Maximilian, might, with her fleet, have maintained an effective blockade of Matamoros, and especially of Tampico, where, by the convention of July 30, she had powerful interests at stake. She preferred to abstain from doing this, and again gave way before the Americans.
It will be recollected that when the convention of July 30, so ruinous to the Mexican monarchy, was so dictatorially exacted, the Emperor Napoleon promised ​Maximilian that, if he accepted the new conditions laid before him, the French army should not all return at once, but in three portions, at fixed dates, up to November 1867. But the interview at St. Cloud had called forth certain resolutions as extreme as the conversation of the two sovereigns had been violent: the irritation had been equal on both sides. The court of the Tuileries, yielding to passion which should always be banished from politics, conceived the sudden resolution of recalling its troops, at a short notice, in one mass, thus treading under foot the promise it had first made. Nevertheless, it was well understood in Paris that a cancelling of plighted faith, although recommended by an excessive impatience to have done with this fatal expedition, was a matter of deep moment; but that its importance might be lessened, if Maximilian, either with or against his will, could be snatched from fresh hazards, and could be induced to abdicate. By this plan, whilst they restored to Europe an archduke somewhat disgraced, it is true, but still safe and sound, they would run the chance of constituting a new Mexican Republic, with which they would have to deal.
Such was to be the result of five years of grievous sacrifices! Time had been when Admiral Jurien de la Gravière could have negotiated successfully without firing a shot! In 1861, the rise of Maximilian was plotted; in 1866, they were plotting his fall, and were prepared, in case the unfortunate sovereign declined to lay down his crown, to hasten on the end, by entering into mysterious negotiations, through our diplomacy and through the medium of the United States, with the liberal chiefs in Mexico. In the first place, an attempt was to be made to procure Maximilian's abdication by means of persuasion. For this second ​and delicate mission, which was of rather a complex character, the French cabinet cast their eyes on General Castelnau, aide-de-camp to the emperor, who was then in attendance on his sovereign. His majesty's envoy was invested with full powers for every eventuality. This mission conferred on a mere general certain prerogatives superior to the authority of the commander-in-chief himself, and gave him a right of control over the acts of the latter, which right (although not avowed) was prejudicial to the dignity of a marshal of France. The French cabinet would certainly have been stopped in a course so contrary to military etiquette, if it had not taken advantage of Marshal Randon's temporary absence from Paris; but we cannot help thinking that the tried loyalty of the minister of war, who thoroughly understood the Mexican question —both the promises which had been made, and also the immense difficulties which our military commander had had to grapple with—would not have lent his aid to the almost forcible subversion of Maximilian.
General Castelnau set sail on September 17.
At this time the Mexican horizon was getting darker and darker. The rebels were forcing their way to the very heart of the empire. The French alone made any head against the progress of the insurrection. The battalions of cazadores were rapidly melting away, and the Austrians themselves gave unequivocal signs of a feeling of discouragement which can easily be accounted for, when we consider that Maximilian was compelled against his will to neglect his countrymen. This apparent unconcern on the part of the sovereign had a bad effect on the Austrian legion; the wounded men of this corps had not yet received any alleviation of their lot from the Mexican government. At the end of September, 1866, the officers of this force found ​themselves compelled to give up generously a portion of their pay to assist their mutilated comrades. It must, however, be stated, in justification of the court of Mexico, that the civil list itself, which at first took away every morning 27,500 francs in gold from the daily receipts of the capital, was now much diminished owing to the financial crisis, which was afflicting the whole empire, so that the court was often powerless to render assistance, although actuated by the most generous intentions. As to the regular and auxiliary Mexican army, of which the ministry had the sole management, it was dwindling away to nothing. Maximilian now learnt, through the medium of the United States, the failure of the interview at St. Cloud: he kept this news secret until he heard the result of the empress's negotiation with the Holy See, whose moral support might, he thought, counterbalance the gradual withdrawal of our troops. But from this moment he quietly began to make his preparations for departure; and to make sure beforehand of an escort, he sent the following letter to the commander-in-chief, who had just arrived at Puebla, having marched to the assistance of an Austrian column which was in serious danger:—
Palais de Mexico, September 26, 1866.
My dear Marshal,—I send you annexed some documents as to the invasion of Llanos de Apam by the rebels; and you will have the kindness to adopt the necessary measures with all the haste that the state of things requires, so as to prevent the rebels from taking complete possession of these points so rich and so important.
After having executed these orders, the marshal hurried on his march along the road to Jalapa. In spite of his advice and the objections he made, the minister of war, who was operating without the marshal's privity, had undertaken the pacification of the sierra of Tulancingo, and the Austrian troops had been put in motion. This difficult and troublesome mountain warfare, now also especially inopportune, looking at the general disturbed state of the country, must have been fatal to these foreign soldiers, who were put to rout and closely blockaded in the town of Perote. Scarcely had the commander-in-chief got within reach, with the intention of extricating them, when an officer of the French cavalry came at full speed from Mexico to his bivouac; he was the bearer of the following imperial message:—
Chapultepec, October 11, 1866.
My dear Marshal,—The arrival of the empress is likely to take place between the 20th and the end of the present month. As I wish to receive her in person at the port of disembarkation, I propose to quit the capital in the early part of next week. Consequently, as I am desirous to leave the tranquillity of Mexico well assured, and as I also wish to discuss with you certain important points, it is indispensable that we should meet, and I should be glad to have an interview with you next Sunday.
Alcazar de Chapultepec, October 19, 1866.
The emperor was well aware that the Empress Charlotte could not yet be en route, even supposing that she had achieved a rapid success at the Vatican; for the accession of King Leopold had made it necessary for the Empress of Mexico to stay some time at Brussels. But the expressions in this letter had a double aim; first, not to reveal his projects to the rebels in case the letter should have fallen into their hands; and next, to get a cordon of troops placed along the line of road from Vera Cruz to Mexico, so as to ensure Maximilian's safety in his descent from the high plateaus. All the military arrangements ​pointed out were made as far as the Terres Chaudes. On the Sunday, the commander-in-chief went to the palace to meet the emperor. The grand chamberlain, who received the marshal, begged him from Maximilian to defer the intended interview until the next day, and to wait for fresh notice from his majesty. The sovereign's fickleness of mind was such that he did not yet dare to take any decisive course, and the important interests which he had declared to be so urgent seemed no longer in question.
On his return to Mexico, the marshal heard of the landing of General Castelnau; he also received the following urgent instructions, dated at Paris, September 12:—'As matters get worse and worse every day, and as the capture of Tampico has disappointed us of the customs' receipts, Napoleon III. has decided to recall the troops en masse, and to push forward their complete evacuation in the approaching spring.' It was, however, thought necessary to retain the regiments which were just upon the point of sailing, and it was added:—'Protect our flag against every insult, and assert, if necessary, the power and the preponderance of our arms.'
Despatch from Mr. Seward to Mr. Bigelow on the subject of the French troops leaving Mexico, dated October 8, 1866.
Sir,—The question which you submit to me in your last despatch—namely, 'What our government would think of the recall of the whole body of the French troops in the course of next year, instead of their retiring in three detachments during the space of eighteen months?' has never been directly laid before me.
What I have to say on the subject is this: The arrangement proposed by the emperor for the recall of his troops in three divisions, the first of which would leave in November, was likely to be forgotten (in the midst of the political agitation which has accompanied every Mexican question), even before the execution of the above arrangement had commenced.
The frequent and varied incidents mentioned by the press both in France and Mexico, and represented as manifesting a disposition on the part of the emperor not to fulfil this engagement, have had the inevitable effect of creating and spreading doubts even as to the sincerity of the emperor in entering into the engagement, and on his fidelity in carrying it out.
Through this very fact, this department has continually found itself under the evident necessity of protesting against acts which were calculated to weaken the confidence of the people in hopes which were as just as they were well defined.
The government, however, most confidently hopes that the emperor's engagement will be fulfilled at least to the letter; and it has even expected that, going beyond the mere letter, this promise would be kept with a sincerity of intention which would have hastened, instead of retarding, the departure of the French forces from Mexico. But, at the present time, we have not yet seen even the beginning of the evacuation. When this operation is completed, the government will willingly listen to any suggestions wherever they may come from, which tend to ensure the re-establishment of tranquillity, peace and a native constitutional government in Mexico.
But, until we are permitted to verify the commencement of this evacuation, any attempt at negotiation would only have the result of misleading public opinion in the United States, ​and of rendering the position of things in Mexico still more complicated.
I scarcely need inform you that the surmises which have been made by a portion of the press on the subject of certain relations existing between this department and General Santa Anna, have no foundation in fact.W. H. Seward.
Despatch of Mr. Bigelow to Mr. Seward reporting his first interview with the Marquis de Moustier, the new Minister of Foreign Affairs, dated Paris, October 12, 1866.
Sir,—The Marquis de Moustier received the corps diplomatique for the first time yesterday.
He asked me if it was true, as the newspapers reported, that our official relations were soon to cease. He expressed his regret to learn that this was the case, and the desire which he should have felt to co-operate with me in cultivating very friendly relations between our two respective countries.
In reply to a question I put to him, he stated that the policy of his government towards the United States and Mexico would undergo no alteration through his accession to the ministry.
His excellency added that he was devoting all his leisure time to studying the different American questions with which he had not yet had an opportunity of becoming familiar, and that as soon as he was prepared, he should be glad to converse at greater length either with me or my successor. Nevertheless, he wished to inform me, and begged me to apprise you of the fact, that he had seen the emperor at Biarritz; that his majesty had expressed his desire and intention of withdrawing his troops from Mexico as soon as it could be done, and without taking cognizance of the convention entered into with Maximilian. His excellency added that, according to the last reports, the malcontents were gaining territory, but that it was not the emperor's intention to undertake any fresh or distinct expeditions for the purpose of subduing them; that there had been an idea of recapturing Tampico, but that nothing had transpired at Paris on the subject.
To this I merely replied in general terms, that I had no reason to doubt that the future relations between the United States and France would be marked by the same friendly considerations which had hitherto characterised them.
I did not ask what kind of aid from the United States he meant, presuming that he reckoned on forbearance rather than on any active co-operation.
I may also mention on this subject that I returned yesterday from Biarritz, where 1 was informed by M. Pereire, the proprietor of the Franco-Mexican line of packet-boats, that his agent had finally signed the contract with the minister of war for bringing home the whole French army during next March.
From these two documents it is easy to see, what was thought of French policy on the other side of the ocean. And it was nothing but justice. Whatever might be the cause, our head-quarters still remained in complete ignorance of these diplomatic manœuvres. As to General Castelnau's mission, its almost threatening character was not long in transpiring. The public feeling spread as far as Mexico, and M. Larès, the president of the council, undertook to express the general impression to our head-quarters authorities. The reply only reaffirmed the principle, which its powers and personal conviction fully confirmed, that ​the expeditionary corps had but one duty, that of protecting the empire. At the same time, the marshal honestly pointed out to the Mexican cabinet the mistakes which had been made, and met the pretended complaints which were brought forward against the expeditionary corps.
Mexico, October 16, 1866.
Monsieur le Ministre de la Justice,—In reply to your excellency's letter of October 9, I have the honour to inform you that, in consequence of the arrival of General Castelnau, aide-de-camp to his majesty the Emperor Napoleon, who certainly is the bearer of instructions from my august sovereign which I have not yet seen, I am not in a position to inform you of the future disposition of the French troops. In the meantime they remain in their positions, continuing to render assistance wherever necessity arises, both to the authorities and to the people of the empire.
With regard to the national and auxiliary troops, your excellency, having been away from the government, is doubtless not aware that, since the arrangement of military divisions, these troops have been completely at the disposal of the Mexican generals commanding these divisions, and consequently under the orders of the government which directs their movements, either through the medium of the minister of war, or of the imperial commissioners.
Since this took place, my duty has been confined to giving advice which has scarcely ever been followed, or to lending the assistance of my troops in recovering the warlike stores, or repairing the fortifications in the most important places; in short, in helping as far as I possibly could in the reorganisation of the national army. This army comprises, at the present time, twenty-two battalions of infantry, including the Mexican cazadores, ten regiments of cavalry, four companies of gendarmerie, with artillery and engineers to correspond, the whole forming an effective force of 17,254 men.
By adding to this the 6,811 men of the Austro-Belgian legion, and the auxiliary or permanent guards who still exist, it amounts to a total of about 28,000 men. On the 28th of last ​January, this effective force reached 43,520 men. The artillery and engineer services have been made over since last year to Mexican officers nominated by the minister of war, and the inventory which was then made out was placed in their possession.
Owing to the trouble taken by the Austrian staff, there exists at Puebla a powder-mill and a percussion-cap manufactory, as well as workshops for iron, wood, and leather, which would provide for all the wants of the national army; all these appliances are at the sole disposal of the minister of war.
The imperial government has, therefore, all these elements under its control, with regard to which, however, I have never exercised any direct action. It also has the artillery, which exists in the fortified places, and 46,000 muskets and other arms, which have been distributed during the last three years to the Mexican army and to the population generally. A commander-in-chief's duty, as it is usually understood, is not to interfere with the discipline, advancement, and administration of the troops, but only to put them in operation, so that there may be unity of action.
I am sorry to have to say that this has not been the case, notwithstanding my reiterated observations; the generals commanding have more frequently acted according to their own caprice, or in consequence of orders proceeding directly from the minister of war.
Nothing prevents this course being continued, and the question as to the national troops being placed at the disposition of the government, is already solved as you wish it.
But it is necessary that generals nominated to divisional commands should proceed to their posts, as, for example, Generals Chacon and Severo Castillo, the one to the 8th, and the other to the 9th, military division.
Your excellency labours under another error, due doubtless to your absence from state business, which, however, I hasten to rectify. It is that you attribute the evacuation of the towns to the French troops. The latter did not evacuate them, but gave them over to the Mexican troops, who, for some cause or other, have not defended them; this is the truth, and it is right for your excellency to know it.
The liberal camp of Porfirio Diaz was better informed than our head-quarters authorities as to the proceedings of our government. Just at the time when the envoy of Napoleon was ascending, the high plateaus, the republican newspaper thus expressed itself:—'The packet from St. Nazaire has just brought over General Castelnau and the Marquis of Galliffet, both of them aides-de-camp of Napoleon III. . .' '. . . Castelnau makes no mystery of his important mission; he says that he has brought the order to make Maximilian abdicate. It is asserted that, after the fall of the Austrian prince, a convention will make its appearance, which has been concluded beforehand between the cabinets of Washington and the Tuileries as to the French debt. It will be understood that Maximilian's abdication is inevitable, either voluntary or forced; the proceedings of France are well comprehended; and the sun of the new year will see the triumphant arms of the republic glittering all over the Mexican territory.'
Our troops continued to concentrate on the centre of the country. After the last orders were received ​from Paris their retrograde movement was about to be hastened, and our head-quarters authorities brought these military arrangements to the knowledge of Maximilian, leaving to Napoleon's envoy the task of dealing with the political side of the mission, with which he alone was charged, and of which he alone knew the full import. What a complicated drama was this, the exciting scenes of which were now being acted at Paris, Rome, Washington, and Mexico! The whole weight of it fell upon two persons,—Maximilian and the Marshal. The Emperor of Mexico began to feel his energies giving way, but ere he gave up the contest he issued this final protest against the actions of our policy.
Mexico, October 18, 1866.
My dear Marshal,—I have learnt with the deepest regret from your esteemed letter of yesterday's date, that we are threatened with the immediate abandonment of Matehuala, which is a strategetical point of great importance as regards the rebels.
I have at once given orders that the necessary funds should be provided to pay the troops in full. I am firmly persuaded that one vigorous attack would be sufficient to put to flight the undisciplined forces of the rebels; whilst, if the Franco-Mexican forces retire, not only will the number of the enemy be increased, but the communications between Tamaulipas and San Luis will be cut off, and we shall be deprived of the resources of this territory. It will also be the means of giving to the rebellion a fictitious importance, to which, up to the present time, it has never attained.
Maximilian still dreamt of appealing to the treaty of Miramar, which had been revoked three months before, when, too, the Emperor Napoleon had declared to Mr. Bigelow, that he would undertake no further expeditions to subdue the rebels.
* ↑ It had not even made use of the credit opened by the marshal for this very purpose.
* ↑ The alteration in the first contract with this line of packets, which was made with an idea of withdrawing the troops in three divisions, was a great loss to the French treasury.