# Muller v. Norton/Opinion of the Court

* Court Documents
* Case Syllabus
* Opinion of the Court
United States Supreme Court
132 U.S. 501
Muller v. Norton
The validity of the above deed, in view of matters apparent on its face, constitutes the only question for consideration. We think that question is determined by the principle laid down in Cunningham v. Norton, 125 U.S. 77, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 804, which reversed the judgment on the authority of which the one now under review was rendered by the court below. That case involved, as does this, the validity of an assignment under the Texas sta ute just referred to, which was sought to be set aside on account of a provision in the deed alleged to be not in conformity with that statute. The assignments in the two cases are very similar; the main difference being that the one in the Cunningham Case contains two provisions, neither of which occurs in the instrument under consideration. The first of these provisions reserves to the assignor the surplus of the property assigned after the payment of all the debts of the consenting creditors. The second expressly authorizes the assignee to sell such property on credit, according to his discretion. This last provision, however, was not called to the attention of the court in that case. The main contention was that the deed in controversy was rendered void by the clause directing the assignee to pay over to the assignor the surplus after paying in full all the creditors who should accede to the deed. This court decided that the said clause did not affect the validity of the assignment, but was itself alone invalidated by reason of its being in violation of the statute. The decision was based upon the general construction of the whole act, taken together, in view of the main object designed to be subserved by it, and of the decisions of the supreme court of Texas upon many of its express provisions, in which line of decisions the court indicated its full concurrence. That policy the court declares to have been the appropriation of the entire estate of an insolvent debtor to the payment of his debts, and, as a means thereto, to favor assignments, and to give them such construction that they may stand rather than fall; that its manifest purpose was to provide a mode by which an insolvent debtor, desiring to do so, may make an assignment simple and yet effective to pass all his property to an assignee for the benefit of such of his creditors as will accept a proportionate share of the said property, and discharge him from their claims; that it further manifests the intention to transfer to the assignee all the property of the debtor for distribution among all the creditors; that no act of the assignee or of the assignor after the assignment is made, or preceding it, but in contemplation of it, however fraudulent that act may be, shall divest the right of the creditors to have the trust administered for their benefit, in accordance with the spirit of the statute; and that, therefore, the provision reserving the surplus to the debtor after payment of the debts to the consenting creditors, even though conceded to be not in conformity with the requirements of the statute, and therefore itself void, does not vitiate the assignment, or prevent its execution for the benefit of the creditors, as provided in the statue. These principles apply with controlling force to the assignment in the case at bar. The ingenious argument of the counsel has failed to point out any distinguishing features in the two cases.
The first ground upon which this deed is assailed is the following clause therein: 'The said Fred. Muller and A. Jacobs are hereby authorized and directed to take possession at once of all the property above conveyed, and covert the same into cash as soon and upon the best terms possible for the best interest of our creditors,' which language the court below, and the counsel for the defendants, claim is an authority to the assignee to sell upon credit. We do not think that such is a correct or fair interpretation of the clause, taking the whole instrument together, and construing it with reference to the purpose manifest in all its other provisions. A positive direction to 'convert' the property assigned 'into cash as soon and upon the best terms possible for the best interest of our creditors' can hardly be construed into a discretionary authority to sell on credit, without doing violence to the well-established rule that the power to sell on credit will not be inferred from language susceptible of a different construction. Burrill, Assignm. § 224. But, even if we concede that he construction contended for be correct, and that the clause thus construed is in contravention of the statute, it will not, as this court has decided, operate to annul the assignment, in which all the creditors may have an interest. In Kellogg v Muller, 68 Tex. 182, 184, 4 S. W. Rep. 361, this very point we are now considering was presented and decided by the court in the following language: 'The first exception to the deed is that the deed authorized the assignee to sell the property assigned on a credit, and is therefore void. The provision to which we are cited in support of the exception is as follows. 'That, so soon as said inventory is complete, the said Frederick Muller, as such trustee aforesaid, shall thereafter, with all reasonable dispatch, proceed to sell and dispose of said goods, wares, and merchandise, and furniture, and collect said book-accounts and bills receivable, converting the same into cash, or its equivalent.' It may be doubted if this can be construed to empower the assignee to sell for anything but money. * * * But, however this may be, even if a badge of fraud, it is not sufficient to authorize the court in holding the deed void upon its face;' citing Baldwin v. Peet, 22 Tex. 708. In the assignment before us, all the property conveyed by it is in terms devoted to the payment of the creditors of the insolvent debtor. The judgment of the court below adjudging it to be void upon its face because it permitted a sale on credit was erroneous.
The second objection, that the deed was not made to one assignee, does not require any extended comment. Under the common law, an insolvent debtor was permitted to make an assignment to a single individual, or to several. Burrill, Assignm. § 91. It is true, the act of March 24, 1879, speaks only of an assignee; but the statutory rule of construction in force in Texas is: 'The singular and plural number shall each include the other, unless otherwise expressly provided.' Rev. St. Tex. (1879) art. 3138, § 4. Under this rule, and keeping in mind the policy of the statute of 1879 regulating assignments, we do not think the deed of assignment in this case void for the second reason assigned. For the reasons given, the decree of the court below is reversed, and the case remanded, with directions to take such further proceedings as shall not be inconsistent with this opinion.

## Notes

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