# Southern Historical Society Papers/Volume 40/The Campaign of Chancellorsville

THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE
By DAVID GREGG McINTOSH Colonel of Artillery, C. S. A.
The Chancellorsville campaign was altogether the most remarkable conducted by General Lee. While it occupied less than a week in point of time, it included a series of engagements, a number of which might be classed as battles. Some of these were fought independently by detached bodies, on fields widely separated, but all controlled and inspired by one master mind.
Gettysburg was simply a square stand up fight; a race, in the first place between two hostile forces, each bent on concentration before the other; then a clash, ending with a magnificent assault which failed. And so it was at Fredericksburg, a face to face fight, the Confederates entrenched, and the Federals making the assaults, with disastrous results. Fredericksburg was largely an artillery battle and so was Gettysburg, but Chancellorsville was distinctly a battle of small arms, fought in dense forests, where open spaces could rarely be found for artillery, and where it was impossible for infantry to preserve its alignment. Night attacks alternated with those by day, and were productive of panics and confusion. The odds appeared to be first on one side and then on the other, and again to be evenly balanced. The campaign presented on the whole a greater variety of situations, and more spectacular features than any in which the army of Northern Virginia was ever engaged.
The battle of Chancellorsville was probably the most difficult of all General Lee's battles, at the same time it was his greatest success. At no time if we except the closing chapter of the war, did he have to face such overwhelming odds. After the battle of Fredericksburg he was reluctantly compelled to detach Longstreet and two of his best divisions, and send them ​south of Richmond, beyond his reach. Having to protect a front of ever twenty miles he only learned that Hooker was moving, and was crossing the Rapidan, when he was already upon his flank. At the same time, Sedgwick, with two army corps and a third in reserve, was crossing the Rappahannock in his front. If he moved to meet Hooker, Sedgwick had the road open to Richmond and could destroy his communications. Stoneman, with a cavalry force three times as large as Stuart, was already on the way to destroy the railroads in his rear. The situation was full of peril and might well appall the stoutest heart. That General Lee was able to meet it successfully proved him to be a master in the art of war, and made it his greatest triumph. In the midst of his first success, when Hooker had been routed at Chancellorsville and Lee was preparing to follow him, Sedgwick suddenly appeared in his rear, and he found himself between the two. It was a stroke of genius to hold Hooker at bay and turn upon Sedgwick, while Early in turn took Sedgwick in rear, and the positions of the combatants became reversed. This unique situation is believed to be without a precedent, and is only approached by what occurred at Lodz in December, 1914, during the present war, where a Russian army was hemmed in between two German columns and a fourth column, this time Russian, appeared upon the German flank.
The unusual conditions which developed in this short campaign called for the exercise of all the best qualities which belong to a Captain in war. They afforded, as no other battlefield did, the opportunity for the display of Lee's masterfulness in grappling with new and unexpected emergencies, while they exhibited at the same time his wonderful poise, and his fighting tenacity, and his heroic courage. It has been said that General Lee won through the mistakes of his enemy, but it is only the wise Captain who can see and profit by the mistakes of an enemy, and it might be added perhaps with more truth, that General Lee won in spite of the mistakes of those under him.
While a great deal has been written about this battle, it is believed to be less generally understood than any battle of the Civil War. The official reports on both sides are full of ​incongruities. Official reports it may be said, as a rule, are unsatisfactory, and often fail to furnish the information which would prove most useful in fixing localities and estimating the effect of a given movement. It is a usual failing to exaggerate the effect of minor actions, and to minimize serious errors. It is only by comparisons of reports on both sides that an approximate estimate can be arrived at. But any account of so intricate a battle as that of Chancellorsville, covering so wide an area, and involving so many changes of position, with few land marks to determine them, can only be general and must necessarily be imperfect. Individual prowess is hidden in the fog of battle, and organized units lose their identity. It is said that Victor Hugo spent three months studying the battlefield of Waterloo; and the house is still shown which he occupied while writing up his account of that battle. But it may be doubted if with all this preparation, the brilliant author did not draw upon his imagination to supplement what he saw and what he heard.
Notwitstanding the writer was in Jackson's flanking column and participated in the battle of May 3d, the movements of the two armies from April 30th to May 5th, and the relative location of the different battlefields were always shrouded in more or less obscurity. A visit to these fields a few years since enabled him to realize more fully the trying situations which General Lee had to meet, as well as the immense difficulties which General Hooker overcame in his initial movement, and the opportunities which he afterwards threw away. The interest thus stimulated led him to again go over many of the official reports and war maps, and to read more or less of the literature published on the subject, including Colonel Henderson's graphic account, and the elaborate compilation of Captain Bigelow, and for his own satisfaction he has at leisure moments filled up the following sketch.
​When little more than a month after the disaster of Fredericksburg, Mr. Lincoln entrusted the command of the army to General Hooker, he was anxious that the advance should be resumed with the least possible delay. The hopes which he entertained from the time the Federal army was in sight of the capital of the Confederacy in June, 1862, had been continually frustrated; sentiment throughout the North was becoming exceedingly impatient; the time of enlistment of a portion of the troops in service was about to expire; desertions in the army were alarmingly frequent, and everything combined to make an early movement desirable. General Hooker was not a favorite of Halleck's, the Commander-in-Chief at Washington, but he was selected by Mr. Lincoln to head the army of the Potomac because of his energetic character and his fighting qualities. He had served creditably in the Mexican War, gone through the Peninsula campaign with McClellan as a division commander, and was in charge of one of the three grand divisions of the army under Burnside. Impetuous in disposition and outspoken by nature, he was wont to give expression to his opinion of his fellow officers including his superior in rank, and it was on this account that the very day preceding his appointment, General Burnside had prepared an order, subject to the approval of the President, dismissing him from the service. This, however, was diplomatically ignored by the two men when the transfer of the command was made: General Burnside in general orders, upon his taking leave asked the army, "to give to the brave and skillful General who has so long been identified with its organization, and who is now to command you, your full and cordial support, etc." While General Hooker in taking command says, he only "gives expression to the feeling of this army when he conveys to its late commanding General the most cordial good wishes for his future, etc." And adds, "in equipment, intelligence and valor, the enemy is our inferior, let us never hesitate to give him battle wherever we can find him."
​The army of the Potomac had been much disheartened by the disastrous repulse met with in the previous December, and its discipline suffered in several respects; among others, in the easy intercourse and familiarity which was established between the opposing pickets of the two armies.
General Hooker set himself energetically at work to repair the morale of the army and to plan at once an offensive campaign. While his proneness to criticism did not commend him to all his fellow officers, the touch of a strong hand was instantly felt, and renewed confidence was inspired throughout the ranks. General Sickles bears testimony to the fact that when General Hooker rode with him along the lines on the morning of the eventful second of May, he was cheered to the echo, and received everywhere by the troops with the greatest enthusiasm.
The improved discipline introduced by General Hooker, not only had an inspiring effect upon his own men, but it was soon manifested in curtailing the information which was in the habit of leaking through to the other side. Secretiveness became a prime characteristic of headquarters. Not even the staff were admitted to the full confidence of the General, and it is said that they, as well as the enemy, were often deceived as to the real character of projected movements. When General Hooker took command the army was disposed in the neighborhood of Falmouth on the Stafford Heights on the north side of the Rappahannock, and along the line of the railroad running to Aquia. On either side were infantry outposts, and beyond these a strong cordon of cavalry, and no communication was permitted outside these lines.
On the 18th of February, three weeks after Hooker assumed command, General Lee wrote Mr. Davis, that General Hooker appeared to be abandoning his present position between the Rappahannock and the Potomac, and a large portion of his army to be descending the Potomac, but whether its destination was beyond Hampton Roads to Suffolk, or into North Caroiina, he could not ascertain. Two days later he wrote, the enemy appeared still in his front in large numbers. While Lee was always of opinion that Hooker's effort would be to cross the ​river above Fredericksburg, the reports that reached him were confused and contradictory. Accordingly, early in February he directed a reconnoitering party of Wickham's cavalry to cross the Rappahannock at the United States ford; descend the left bank, and find out the enemy's position. The river was at swimming point, and when the party had proceeded a few miles the enemy was discovered in force, compelling them to return empty handed. Subsequently General Fitz Lee was ordered with his brigade from Culpepper Court House to break through the outposts and ascertain what lay behind. With his accustomed dash he penetrated the lines some miles beyond Hartwood Church, and after capturing a considerable number of prisoners, brought them off in the face of a large body of the enemy, and the Confederate commander was assured of the fact of Hooker's presence and how his army lay.
General Hooker also set about reorganizing his army, and among other changes discarded the formation of the infantry into three grand divisions, retaining the corps formation as the unit. The reason assigned by him for the change, was that the grand division was cumbrous and unwieldy to handle. The army was thus made to consist of seven corps, each under its corps commander. Whether the change was judicious has given rise to a diversity of opinion. In the following spring, it may be said General Grant reduced the number of army corps, and the army was consolidated into three corps, making a corps about equal to the old grand division.
General Hooker's first demonstration was against the Confederate cavalry at Culpepper Court House, which General Averill about the middle of March, with three thousand sabres, was directed to attack and disperse, by crossing the river at Kelly's ford. Averill was provided with four days' rations, but after a sharp fight with Fitz Lee half way between the river and Brandy Station he retired, to the great disgust arid disappointment of Hooker. What should ultimately be the real line of attack was with General Hooker a matter of great solicitude. Burnside had already made an attack in front, nnd the result of that effort was not such as to invite a repetition. The passage of the river at ​some point below Fredericksburg with the aid of gunboats, seizing Bowling Green and the railroad, and throwing General Lee off his direct communications with Richmond was much considered. Brigadier General Warren, chief topographical engineer, reported that to cross the river so as to gain the heights below Lee's entrenchments, required the secret movement of pontoon trains and artillery for more than twenty miles over roads which were impassable, and that the first available point below Skinker's Neck would require one thousand feet of bridging, which in his judgment made a movement by that flank impracticable. The same authority looked upon a crossing immediately above Fredericksburg as scarcely more promising. He described the river as narrowing at Beck's Island two miles and a half above Fredericksburg, the bluffs a hundred and fifty feet in heighth on either side, "coming in close to the river, with steep wooded slopes cut by ravines, and difficult of approach."
The first favorable conditions for approach which presented themselves to him were found at Banks' ford about six miles above by the road, though owing to a bend in the river only three miles from Fredericksburg on the south side. The river at the time of the report was not fordable, and he found it protected on the opposite side by several lines of intrenchments rising from the water's edge and constructed with traverses, as a protection against artillery fire. Being well guarded he considered its surprise impossible. The next point examined by Warren was the United States ford, seven miles above Banks' ford, where he reported finding long lines of infantry with battery epaulments, and an ample force in support and the river not fordable.
Just above the United States ford the river forks, the Northern branch retaining the name Rappahannock and the Southern branch being known as the Rapidan. The most considerable ford on the northern branch is called Kelly's, which is about four miles from Rappahannock Station, a point on the Orange & Alexandria Railroad, now called Remington. From Kelly's ford, roads ran westerly to Brandy Station and Culpepper, and southeasterly to Germanna and Ely's fords on the Rapidan, the latter passing through Richardsville direct to Chancellorsville, and the former intersecting the plank road from ​Orange Court House to Fredericksburg at the Wilderness Tavern, five miles west of Chancellorsville. After looking over all the ground, Warren, who was a most capable engineer, inclined to a move along the route just indicated, as least likely to attract attention. He thought, "that the passage of two streams, not fordable, and having a width of two to three hundred feet at such a long distance from our base by a flank movement with many pontoons and artillery trains, over roads almost impracticable, seemed so unlikely as to give the enemy no concern." Hooker took Warren's advice, and in a letter to Mr. Lincoln of April 11th, he communicated his purpose, adding "that he was apprehensive the enemy would retire the moment he should cross the river, and over the shortest line to Richmond, and thus escape being seriously crippled, etc."
​After the battle of Fredericksburg the proximity of his opponent required General Lee to maintain a defensive line about twenty-five miles in length. His army consisted of two corps, the first commanded by Longstreet, and the second by Jackson, each corps consisting of four divisions. Longstreet's corps occupied the range of hills back of Fredericksburg, extending from the river to what was known as Hamilton's Crossing, a station on the railroad about six miles from Fredericksburg, where the range of hills is broken. It also held Banks' and the United States' fords. Above the latter the crossings were watched by cavalry. Jackson's corps occupied a position extending down the river from Hamilton's crossing to Port Royal. His headquarters were at the Corbin House, Moss Neck; and when spring approached at the Yerby House in rear of Hamilton's crossing. General Lee's headquarters were about three miles south of Fredericksburg. The only material change in the organization of Lee's army was in the artillery, which was reorganized into battalions, consisting usually of four batteries each. Separate batteries were no longer attached to infantry brigades, but the battalion under field officers was attached to infantry divisions. The cavalry 6f the army commanded by Stuart, consisted of two small brigades, one under Fitz Lee at Culpepper Court House, where were Stuart's headquarters, and the other under W. H. F. Lee; Hampton having been sent to the rear to recruit his brigade.
In the latter part of January Pickett's division of Longstreet's corps was withdrawn from the front and moved to Salem Church, a point on the plank road about four miles from Fredericksburg, afterwards the scene of a fierce battle, and some intrenchments were thrown up designed to form a rallying point in case the troops on the river front should be compelled to abandon that line.
When the news reached Richmond that Burnside's corps had embarked for Fortress Monroe, it excited much apprehension, as being the forerunner of a movement against that place from the south side of James River. The apprehension was increased by reports of other similar movements, and it led finally to the ​detachment of two divisions, Hood's and Pickett's under Longstreet, to guard Richmond against an attack from that quarter. It does not appear from the official correspondence on the Federal side that any serious movement of that sort was in fact contemplated, but General Longstreet as well as the authorities in Richmond were obsessed with that idea.
It is evident from the correspondence of the period that General Lee parted with his two divisions with reluctance. On the 16th of February he wrote the President that he had received the dispatch of the Secretary of War, conveying his, the President's wishes, and that he had accordingly directed Hood to march to Hanover Junction, and that Longstreet was directed to move Pickett on to Richmond. The letter indicates that Lee was meditating an offensive himself as soon as conditions became favorable.
On the 16th of March General Lee wrote Longstreet, referring to the removal of Burnside's corps and its expected appearance south of James River; that from present appearances it was fair to presume he would be called on to engage the enemy first on the Rappahannock, and he wished him to be prepared to return the troops recently detached to that point when it became necessary. On the 17th, Longstreet replied, "I shall be ready to join you with Hood's division at any moment, and trust to your being able to hold the force in your front in check until I can join you." On the 19th, Longstreet wrote, "It seems to me a matter of prime necessity to keep the enemy out of North Carolina in order that we may draw all the supplies there, and if we give him ground at all, it would be better to do so from the Rappahannock. It is right as you say, to concentrate and crush him; but will it be better to concentrate on his grand army, than on his detachments, and then make a grand concentration on the grand army? If we draw off from the front of his grand army, we ought to be able to crush rapidly his detachments, and at the same time hold the grand army in check as far as South Anna at least, particularly while the roads are so very bad, then concentrate on the grand army and dispose of that." In pursuance of this idea he applied to Lee for another ​division of his corps, to which Lee replied, "If this army is further weakened, we must retire to the line of the Annas', and trust to a battle near Richmond for the defence of the capitol. * * * Unless therefore, a retrograde movement becomes necessary, I deem it advantageous to keep the enemy at a distance, and trust to striking him on his line of advance."
On April 27th General Lee writing Mr. Davis and thanking him for the steps taken to reinforce the cavalry and increase the army supplies, says, that he had written General Longstreet to expedite his operations in North Carolina, as he might be obliged to call him back at any moment.
On the 29th Mr. Davis addressing the Secretary of War and transmitting a dispatch from General Lee says, "The demand which was looked for has come and requires prompt attention. This (alluding to Lee's dispatch) of course involves rapid and immediate movement of troops and supplies, to enable General Lee to meet the enemy and sustain himself in whatever position it may be necessary to assume." When Longstreet was ordered to move he delayed doing so, on the ground that to move at once would lose the supplies and the transportation he had gathered. When the battle of Chancellorsville came off he was still south of Richmond.
​In the game of War which now went on between the opposing leaders, General Hooker was confused by contradictory reports as to the strength of Lee's army, and the size of the detachments which left it. On the other hand various reports came to Lee as to Hooker's designs, and these were sometimes supported by feints which had the appearance of being serious moves. On the 22d of April a second demonstration was made by Hooker below Fredericksburg, and a crossing effected from Port Conway in canvas boats, but after the capture of a wagon train and a few prisoners, the expedition came to an end amidst a deluge of rain. While the feints on the lower Rappahannock did not deceive General Lee, it appears that the movement projected by the cavalry under Stoneman did, for he wrote to Stuart on the 25th of April of his apprehensions that Stoneman would cross the Blue Ridge, in which event he, Stuart, was to plunge into the rear of the Federal army and cut their line of communication.
On the 25th of April after it had rained for ten days, the skies cleared, the mud began to dry, and the hour for Hooker's advance arrived. Orders were issued on the 26th, which directed with great precision how the respective movements should be made. The 11th and 12th corps under Howard and Slocum were directed to march from their encampments in the order named at sunrise on the 27th, and to reach Kelly's ford by 4 P. M. on the 28th, without discovering themselves to the enemy. Meade's corps by a different route was to reach the same vicinity at the same hour. Two divisions of the 2d corps under Couch were also to move to Bank's ford, excepting a brigade and battery which was to take position at the United States ford; the remainder being held in reserve. The troops were provided with eight days' rations, five of which were to be carried in the men's haversacks, and three in their knapsacks, a supply of beef for five days to be taken along on the hoof. In addition each man was to carry sixty rounds of ammunition, and eighty more were to be carried chiefly on pack mules. While this arrangement added to the mobility of the army, it may be doubted whether that advantage was not over-balanced by the fatigue endured by ​the men carrying a load estimated to weigh between forty-five and sixty pounds.
As soon as this movement was well under way, Sedgwick was directed to have the 1st and 6th corps in position to cross the river below Fredericksburg at 3:30 A. M. on the 29th. When the crossing was completed, Sedgwick was expected to secure the Telegraph road as the direct route to Richmond, and also the River road which ran for some miles parallel to the river, and turning south at Hamilton's Crossing led to Bowling Green. The 3rd corps under Sickles, after making a demonstration with Sedgwick, was to join the right wing under Hooker. Gibbon with a division was to remain at Falmouth. The cavalry under Stoneman in two columns with 7,600 sabres and 12 guns was directed to cross the Rappahannock at Kelly's ford, and proceeding, one column towards Gordonsville, and the other in the direction of Hanover Junction, to unite after destroying the Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac Railroad, and intercept the retreat of Lee's army. Pleasanton's division was to remain and move with the army. The plan was well conceived. As soon as Bank's ford was open the two wings of the army would be drawn near together, and Butterfield as Chief of Staff at Falmouth, with telegraphic communication, was to transmit orders quickly between the two wings.
Carrying out the program, at 3 A. M. on the 29th, Devin's cavalry brigade' crossed in the vicinity of Kelly's ford and made straight for Germanna and Ely's fords on the Rapidan, covering the right and left flanks of the infantry. The Confederate pickets at Kelly's ford were captured during the evening of the 28th, and at 10 P. M. canvas boats having arrived from Washington, the troops began crossing. Stuart, who was at Culpepper Court House, was at once apprised, but he was in ignorance of the extent of the movement, and sent forward a regiment of W. H. F. Lee's brigade from Brandy Station for observation. Early during the day of the 29th, he telegraphed General Lee that Howard had crossed at Kelly's ford with a division of about 14,000 men, six pieces of artillery, and some cavalry. The crossing of the three corps meantime proceeded steadily and ​was completed shortly after noon. The 11th and 12th corps took the road to Germanna ford, and the 5th corps that to Ely's ford. Germanna ford on the Rapidan is distant from Kelly's on the Rappahannock about nine miles, and Ely's is distant about fourteen miles. The only opposition encountered by the Federal troops was from the 15th Virginia cavalry on the way to Germanna ford. At that point a small Confederate force was engaged in the construction of a bridge over the river to facilitate communication between Stuart at Culpepper and the army. This detachment and the picket on outpost were cleverly captured, only a handful escaping to Wilderness Tavern. Stuart says in his report that the couriers sent by him to Ely's and Germanna fords to notify the forces there of the enemy's advance were captured and hence the surprise, but it seems the Federals were already in possession at Germanna before the couriers were dispatched. It was not until the afternoon that learning from his pickets of the large force about Madden, he assembled his two brigades and pierced the column, taking prisoners from the different Federal corps. The river at Germanna ford was between three and four feet in depth. The foremost of the troops to arrive waded across, hanging their cartridge boxes and haversacks on their fixed bayonets, but the bridge which was soon rebuilt furnished passage for the bulk of the two corps. The leading corps, the 12th, completed its passage by 11 P. M., and before midnight the 11th was well under way. After crossing the two corps went into camp on the south side of the river.
At Ely's ford the river was equally deep and running with a swift current. General Meade is said to have hesitated and sent to Slocum for instructions, and the latter replied, his men were fording through swift water breast deep, and that the 5th corps must cross without further delay. No serious opposition was encountered, and this corps also went into bivouac for the night on the south side.
General Meade's first object was to clear the ground in his front, and open communication with General Couch on the north side of the river, who with the 2d corps had been directed to march to the United States ford. The squadrons of cavalry sent ​out by him surrounded and captured in the early morning a Confederate outpost, and proceeded, one in the direction of Chancellorsville, the other towards the United States ford. The former met little resistance, but the latter reported that after driving the enemy several miles, they were found drawn up in line of battle, which caused General Meade to direct a division under Sykes to proceed to United States ford. Pausing on Hunting Run to learn the effect of Sykes' move, he received word from Devin that the road to Chancellorsville was open, and he resumed the march, reaching Chancellorsville at 11 A. M., April 30th, distant from Fredericksburg ten miles.
Chancellorsville appears to have been the Mecca of the Union army. It was undoubtedly so regarded by General Hooker. We made it our Mecca, when the writer with some friends on a certain day in the last of August, 1911, drew rein before the only house in sight, and asked permission to water our horses, and eat our luncheon under the shade in the yard. The house, which is of brick, must have been a pretentious one in its day for that locality.
We did not enter, as the ladies who came to the door reported members of the family sick with a low fever, but the building which had been injured by fire is now restored, and presents the same appearance as it did in 1863. We took our luncheon on the steps of the porch, just by the tall pillar against which General Hooker was leaning on the 3d of May when the pillar was struck by a shot and the General injured by the concussion; and as we drank the steaming hot tea prepared for us by the fair equestrienne of the party, we faced the plain and battlefield of Chancellorsville. The open plain in front just across the road looking south appears smaller than it did in 1863, and is more overgrown with bushes, but on all sides is fringed by the same woods. Far off to the South and beyond the range of vision is Wellford's or Catherine Furnace. A little to the west but not so far, although obscured by trees, is Hazel Grove, while around to the right and a short distance south of the road is Fairview where there was an old burying ground. The road immediately in our front is the old turnpike, but usually ​at this point called the Plank road. A hundred and fifty yards to the east of us and where the forest begins, the road forks, the turnpike keeping the straight course, and the Plank road bending to the south, the two coming together again at Tabernacle Church, about four and a half miles distant. Where they first diverge they are intersected by the road from Ely's ford on which the old corduroys laid by the army are still to be seen. A half mile back of us the Ely's ford road is intersected at Chandler's house by a road called the Mineral Spring road running northerly to the River road at a point below the United States ford. From Chandler's house a woods road also communicates with the Plank road west of Chancellor's house. These roads give Chancellorsville a strategic importance which otherwise it would not possess. Going west the Plank road diverges again to the south from the turnpike at Dowdall's Tavern about two miles distant, following the line of the watershed between the Rapidan and the Mattapony. On the north side of the turnpike beyond Dowdall's is a little chapel called Wilderness Church, and some miles beyond that is the Wilderness Tavern. The road from Germanna ford crosses the turnpike and runs to the Plank road, the two being a mile and a half apart at that point. Beyond the Germanna road running southerly from the turnpike to Todd's tavern is a well known road called the Brock road. Most interesting by far however, of all these localities is the sequestered spot about three-quarters of a mile westerly just beyond the ravine in front of Fairview, and a little to the north side of the road, where a modest pedestal and block of stone mark the spot where Jackson fell. Illustrious shade! No one can approach the spot without being awed by the consciousness that here the very genius of war fell a merciless victim to fate, and that the very passion which made him glorious and great proved his own destruction. All nature seems to stand by in mute reverence. Not a sound escapes through all the wide forest. Not the note of a bird, or the whisper of an insect; the very atmosphere itself seems laden with its heaviness, and the silence of death is all pervading.
When General Mahone learned that his outposts at ​Germanna ford had been captured, and that those escaping were collected at Wilderness Tavern, he directed the latter to report to Chancellorsville, at which point Anderson was assembling his division. At 6 A. M., a few hours before the arrival of Meade, Anderson under orders retired two brigades, Wright's and Posey's by the Plank road, and Mahone by the turnpike, to the vicinity of Zion Church, where a defensive position was selected and the work of entrenching begun. Mahone's brigade was established north of the turnpike, Posey's between the turnpike and the Plank road, and Wright's between the Plank road and an unfinished railroad to the south. During this operation the Federal cavalry made a bold attack upon Mahone's rear guard upon reaching some open ground, but met with a decided repulse by the 12th Virginia infantry.
From Germanna ford Slocum with his two corps resumed the march on the morning of the 30th between 6 and 7 A. M. Colonel Owen with two squadrons of cavalry was directed by Fitz Lee at 3 A. M. to move forward from Locust Grove on the turnpike, get in front of and delay the enemy as far as possible, and report his information to General Lee. He moved to Wilderness Tavern and sent a scouting party towards Germanna and Ely's fords. Some of these bearing information back to Fitz Lee were captured, and some reported that they were unable to communicate with the Confederate infantry who were falling back, and the Federals were already at Chancellorsville. Owen moved first towards Chancellorsville, and finding a strong force in his front turned south towards Todd's tavern. The courier sent by him with dispatches to General Lee, escaping the Federal cavalry at Chancellorsville, and making a detour to the south, reached General Lee about noon, which was the first intelligence he had that day from the Rapidan.
Upon the appearance of Slocum in the vicinity of Wilderness tavern, the Federal cavalry covering the right of his leading division had a sharp brush with Stuart's cavalry, commanded by him in person, which required the support of Federal infantry; thereupon Stuart retired intending to swing around by Spottsylvania Court House and join General Lee. Slocum ​continued his march without further interruption, crossing the turnpike to the Plank road, and moving on that road easterly to the vinicity of Chancellorsville, the head of the 12th corps reaching that place about 2 P. M., while Howard, with the 11th corps, halted at Dowdall's tavern.
Hooker now had three army corps assembled at Chancellorsville, and another under Couch approaching by the United States ford road, while Sickles was ready to move and join him at a moment's notice. His plans had worked out well. His leading corps had marched near forty miles and occupied the coveted ground with scarcely a show of resistance. He was greatly elated, and had good reason to be proud of his success. When one considers how well the movement was guarded, the difficult character of the roads, and the passage of the two fords over the Rapidan, with the long tortuous hills on the southern side and the sticky red clay characteristic of Orange County, it must be admitted to have been a remarkable feat, and merited the verdict generally given at the time, that it was a brilliant success, and that he had clearly outmanouvered Lee. Having succeeded thus far Hooker believed he commanded the situation. It admitted of great possibilities, but if he saw them, he was not disposed to depart from his original program. He was now on the ground which Grant had to fight for in the succeeding year, with the difference that then Grant was east of Lee, and now Hooker was west of Lee. From Chancellorsville to Spottsylvania Court House is less than eight miles in an air line, with connecting roads either by Todd's tavern or by Aldrich and Piney Branch Church. From the Plank road where Slocum struck it to Todd's tavern over the Brock road is a little over four miles, and about the same distance from Todd's tavern to Spottsylvania Court House, which is a little east of south from Chancellorsville. As General Lee was in ignorance of how Hooker had disposed his forces, and so late as the afternoon of the 1st inquired of Stuart where the 11th and 12th corps were, stating that the prisoners taken were from Meade's corps only, it is difficult to see any good reason why Hooker should not have continued his movement and made Spottsylvania his objective instead of ​Chancellorsville. He would then have been out of the wilderness in the open country, and directly upon General Lee's communications, and the latter been between Sedgwick and Hooker. General Hooker however, was persuaded that the position of Chancellorsville commanded the situation, and from his headquarters at Falmouth at 2:15 P. M., he issued an order that no advance should be made from Chancellorsville until the 2d, 3d, 5th, 11th and 12th corps were all concentrated at that place. General Hooker said afterwards to the Committee on the Conduct of the War, "I knew I could not cross the river in the presence of Lee's army, if he was informed of my movement. The great difficulty I apprehended was in crossing the river. I apprehended no serious trouble after I had crossed."
Had Hooker accompanied his leading column, or arrived at Chancellorsville at the same time, he might have felt the enthusiasm of General Meade, when the latter is said to have exclaimed to Slocum, "Hurrah for old Joe; we are on Lee's flank, and he doesn't know it. You take the Plank road towards Fredericksburg, and I take the pike, or vice versa, and we will get out of this wilderness." Hooker was at Falmouth and joined the army during the afternoon. In general orders he announced to the army, his heartfelt satisfaction over the operations of the last three days, which he said "had determined that our enemy must either ingloriously fly, or come out from behind his entrenchments and give us battle on our own ground where certain destruction awaits him."
Two divisions of Couch's corps arrived during the night crossing at United States ford, and Sickles with his corps by 9 A. M. next morning.
The seven corps of General Hooker's army at this time according to the official reports embraced 133,868 officers and men as its effective strength present for duty. Deducting the provost guard, artillery reserve and absent cavalry under Stoneman, there was left about 122,000. Sedgwick had his own corps and Reynold's amounting to 40,575, and Gibbon's division estimated at 5,500 would give Sedgwick 46,000 men, and Hooker 76,000.
Let us now see what preparation General Lee was making, ​and whether he would ingloriously fly, or come out from behind his entrenchments and give battle. General Hooker thought he had him clearly beaten, and it appeared he had won the first point in the game. On the morning of the 29th General Lee received a message from General Jackson, through his Aide de Camp, Captain James Power Smith, that the enemy under cover of a heavy fog were discovered crossing the river below Deep Run. In communicating the fact to the authorities at Richmond, he said the force was large and appeared to be in earnest, and he wished all troops not required south of James River to be sent in his direction. Later in the morning, he heard through Stuart of the passage of the Rappahannock by Howard's corps at Kelly's ford. As if he were apprehensive of a move towards Gordonsville, he recommended Longstreet's division to be sent to him, and any other available troops to that point. Jackson's corps was at once moved to the left to occupy the space between the Massaponax River and Deep Run, connecting there with Anderson's division. General Jackson proposed to Lee to attack Sedgwick, and General Lee seems to have given his consent, provided Jackson thought he could do so successfully. The project however was abandoned. When it is remembered that the heavy guns on Stafford's Heights swept all the river plain back to the hills on the south side, of which Jackson had experience on the 13th of December, 1862, and that the same thing was then discussed, but given up, it is not likely the plan was very seriously considered.
Late in the afternoon of the 29th, Lee received through couriers the information that the Federal army was crossing the Rapidan at Germanna and Ely's fords. The Federal columns had apparently interrupted communication with Stuart, and General Lee up to this time was in doubt whether Howard's corps which he last heard from at Kelly's ford was not headed for Gordonsville.
Stuart after skirmishing with the Federal advance had retired to Todd's tavern, where his cavalry rested. He was proceeding with a small escort to communicate with General Lee by a road running in the direction of Spottsylvania Court House, when he fell in with the Sixth New York cavalry, which had ​advanced from Chancellorsville to that point, and a sharp skirmish ensued, in which Stuart was compelled to call up some of his reserve, and in which Colonel McVickar, of the Sixth New York, fell mortally wounded.
The situation was becoming tense. If the enemy desired battle, General Lee was ready to give it: but if they were moving on his communications it would then seem there was nothing to do but to retire. There was much discussion among Confederate officers as to Hooker's intentions. General Lee was convinced however, that Hooker would never uncover Washington, and no matter what his inclinations might be, if he were left to indulge them, he was not at liberty to hazard such a stake. He wisely divined therefore that Hooker's objective must be Chancellorsville, and he prepared to meet him on that ground.
Anderson's three brigades were now facing three full Federal army corps. To meet the situation, General Lee directed McLaws to leave a brigade of his division to hold the lines immediately in rear of Fredericksburg, and to move with his remaining three brigades to reinforce Anderson. General Jackson was directed to leave a division of his corps to hold the lines in Sedgwick's front, and with the remainder of the corps to join Anderson at Tabernacle Church and take command of all the forces at that point.
One of the cavalry brigades under Fitz Lee was directed to keep in touch with Hooker's army and supply information; the other under Stuart was to keep in touch with Lee's army, and cover its movements. Longstreet at the same time, was ordered to move to Richmond to effect a junction with Lee.
Having concenerated his five corps, Hooker on the morning of May 1st ordered an advance; Meade with two divisions Griffin's and Humphrey's on the river road, Sykes on the turnpike, and Slocum on the Plank road. It does not appear from the wording of the order whether it was intended as an attack upon any force it might encounter, or whether it was to take up a new defensive position.
At the same time he directed Sedgwick to advance in full force at one o'clock and threaten an attack, "making the ​demonstration as serious as can be without an actual attack." This indicated that Hooker was not aware of Lee's having already transferred the bulk of his army from Fredericksburg to the neighborhood of Chancellorsville. The demonstration was intended to prevent that very thing. As Hooker had surprised Lee by his concentration at Chancellorsville, so Lee now surprised Hooker by his concentration at Zion and Tabernacle Churches.
When Jackson ahead of his troops reached Tabernacle Church he ordered the intrenching to stop, and to prepare to advance. He was a thorough believer in the military principle which reckons the advantage on the side of the attacking party. As soon as the troops could be formed the movement began in two columns, McLaws with four brigades on the turnpike, followed by Wilcox with his brigade from Banks' ford, and Perry with his brigade from opposite Falmouth. On the Plank road, Rodes' and Hill's divisions, with the brigades of Wright and Posey, were led by Jackson in person. McLaws' skirmishers ran almost immediately into the 8th Pennsylvania cavalry, which was thrown back upon the head of Sykes' division, which in turn drove back the Confederate skirmishers, and advanced to a ridge with open ground in front, about two miles and a half from Chancellorsville, and about one mile from Zion Church. Sykes deployed his division across the turnpike at right angles to it, holding one brigade in reserve. McLaws deploying with greater front, overlapped Sykes on both flanks, and sent word to Jackson suggesting an attack on Sykes' right from the Plank road. Jackson directed him to hold his position. Meantime a sharp engagement ensued. Sykes had advanced more rapidly along the pike than had Meade upon his left or Slocum upon his right, and failing to get in touch with either he reported the situation to Hooker, when the latter sent him word to retire, sending also Couch with a division and some artillery to his support. Sykes however began retiring before the order reached him. Couch it seems was reluctant to abandon the movement, and delayed the execution of the order until he could report that he thought the advanced position a good one and should be held, but the ​peremptory order was then given to retire. Later in the afternoon Hooker sent word to Couch to hold the position until five o'clock, extend his skirmishers on either flank, and that Slocum would hold a position on the Plank road equally advanced, but Couch replied the order was too late as he was then in full retreat. During the afternoon McLaws was directed by Jackson to press on up the turnpike towards Chancellorsville. He with three brigades of Hill's division, moving across from the Plank road struck the turnpike half a mile in advance of McLaws and engaged Hancock who was covering Sykes' retirement, and pressed him back to within a short distance of Chancellorsville.
Couch was undoubtedly right in thinking the position gained by Sykes was a good one and should be held. Sykes had advanced about two miles and a half from Chancellorsville leaving the worst of the wilderness behind him, and reached a very considerable clearing extending across the pike in the direction of the river, with open ground mostly high, and admirably suited for the use of artillery and the deployment of large bodies of troops. But as so often happens, Hooker was not impressed with the value of time. His troops did not get under way until between ten and eleven o'clock, when Sykes might just as easily have occupied the ground three or four hours earlier, and had time to select his position, and throw out feelers for Humphreys and Griffin on his left, and Slocum on his right. Couch did not hesitate to express his indignation at being required to surrender the advantages of the advanced position and fight a defensive battle, in a "nest of thickets."
On the Confederate side Anderson, who was reinforced by Ramseur's brigade, succeeded in forcing back Slocum's line to a point beyond Aldrich's house, where an opportunity was presented for the use of artillery, and a brisk duel ensued between the opposing artillery. While this was in progress Slocum received orders to retire. On the retreat Slocum was vigorously pressed by Rodes' division and Posey's brigade, and his column was thrown into some disorder, but finally regained its original position without serious loss. Posey's advance was retarded by the Great Meadow Swamp forming the head of Mott's Run, but ​after passing through the swamp, he pressed forward until he was met by a number of Slocum's guns placed in position at the junction of the Plank road and the turnpike, just east of Chancellor's house, and disposed so as to command both approaches. The balance of Slocum's guns were placed on the heights of Fairview west of Chancellorsville and facing south.
Wright's brigade leaving the Plank road and bearing to the left, was directed to get upon the enemy's right flank and rear. Wright followed the line of an unfinished railroad, to the Furnace road, and the latter to the Furnace, which he reached at half past four P. M. Here he found Stuart who informed him the Federals occupied the woods to the north of the Furnace. Wright deployed two of his regiments and advanced through the forest until he came in contact with a portion of Williams' division, which he forced back to the farm house. Stuart sent to his support a section of horse artillery, but these drawing fire from a greater number at Fairview and at Hazel Grove, and night coming on, he withdrew. During the night Fitz Lee who with his brigade was a mile and a half further west on the Brock road, had a slight engagement with an infantry regiment sent out from Howard's corps a mile distant on the turnpike.
The 5th corps which moved on the river road reached a point within sight of Banks' ford when it received orders to turn back, which were executed without question or delay. Sedgwick's order to advance at one, was not received by him until after 4 P. M. He began a demonstration at six, Hooker in the meantime sending an order to countermand it.
Thus ended the operations of May 1st, with Hooker occupying the lines he held the night before. The prestige of his first success was gone. Up to the moment of his arrival at Chancellorsville, his movements were characterized by the greatest energy and dispatch, but from that time there was a manifest lack of character and decision. Whether his failure to follow up the movement which was so auspiciously begun, was owing to chagrin and disappointment in not hearing as he seems to have expected from Sedgwick, or whether his resolution became "sicklied o'er" by the memory of Mr. Lincoln's admonition against ​rashness, it would be hard to say. But his attitude of mind was quickly betrayed to the staff and corps commanders. At 2 P. M. he sent Butterfield the following telegram, "From character of information, have suspended attack. The enemy may attack me. * * * I will try it. Tell Sedgwick to keep a sharp lookout and attack if he can succeed." The most charitable construction to put on the message is, that Hooker was staggered by the unexpected resistance he encountered, and that he lost his nerve. When he testified before the Committee on the Conduct of the War he said, "As soon as Couch's division and Sickles' corps came up, I directed an advance for the purpose in the first instance, of drawing the enemy away from Bank's ford, which was six miles down the river, in order that we might be in closer communication with the left wing of the army." When asked by the Committee what action was taken on the first day, he replied, "I went out to attack the enemy." There is no doubt that General Hooker had firmly persuaded himself that there was but one thing left for Lee to do, and that was to get away. When he succeeded in getting Lee out of his entrenchments, he did not believe it possible that the latter would turn and fight. When he discovered upon ordering an advance that Lee was in heavy force in his front, and assuming the offensive, it completely upset him, and broke up all his calculations. It was in this frame of mind, that he "suspended the attack." He was still confident however, that Lee would not fight, as shown by the events of the subsequent day. He clung to the belief that his success in turning Lee's flank, left him no alternative but to retire, which would be impossible by reason of Stoneman's raid in his rear. He concluded therefore to "sit tight," and act on the defensive. At 4:20 P. M., he issued an order to his corps commanders to establish their commands on the lines assigned them, and put them in a condition of defense without a moment's delay.
During the afternoon and night Meade's corps was placed along the Mineral Spring road north of Chandler's house, and stretching to a bend in the river just above Scott's dam. This was a strong defensive position, the left of the line resting on ​the river, and a small creek running parallel with its front the entire distance. It was impossible to turn it, as General Lee readily discovered, and its approaches were such as to make it difficult to attack in front. From Chandler's house, Couch's corps occupied a line nearly at right angles to Meade's, and ran southerly across the turnpike a full quarter of a mile east of the Chancellor house bending westwardly to the Plank road, Slocum's corps connected with Couch's, and swung to the south and west in a half circle, the lines of the two corps having the shape of a huge bowl or kettle, with Meade's corps as the handle. The rim of this bowl touched the turnpike again about a mile west of the Chancellor house, and included all the open ground in its front, together with Fairview to the west. Fairview commanded Chancellor's and the open ground in its front, as well as the pike both east and west, and when Jackson made his attack on the afternoon of the 2d, as well as the following morning, it proved of great advantage to the Federal artillery. Birney's division of Sickles' corps formed a connecting link, between Slocum's and Howard's corps. Beginning at a point on Slocum's line which formed the most southerly part of the bowl, it ran with a wider curve northwardly to the neighborhood of Dowdall's tavern on the pike, a full mile from Slocum's right, and skirting the edge of Hazel Grove, which was destined to play a most important part in the coming battle. The balance of Sickles' corps was massed in the neighborhood of the Chandler house. Howard's corps extended westwardly from Dowdall's tavern along the turnpike by the Wilderness Church and by Talley's, a little upwards of a mile, the extreme right being refused at right angles to the pike, and its extremity covered by two field pieces placed in small redoubts looking west. Almost the entire front of the line was protected by earthworks, and covered by a thick growth of small scrubby oak and pine interspersed with vines.
In view of the surprise which the Federals suffered on the 2d, it must be said in justice to General Hooker, that on the afternoon of the 1st, he directed that the right of Slocum's line should fall back and rest at a saw mill on Hunting Run. ​Hunting Run was a stream heading near Dowdall's tavern and running due north, but it was alleged that the saw mill was not locatable. Slocum and Howard are both said to have protested vigorously against a further refusal of the right wing, holding that the forest was impenetrable to troops, except by the roads, and it was consequently decided not to change their positions, but to strengthen them with breastworks and abatis.
Had General Lee chosen to remain behind his works and await an attack, it is difficult to speculate as to what would have been the outcome. But Lee believed that this was one of the occasions, "when the best defense is to attack." The question was where and how. His first inclination was to assault Hooker's left, which as we have seen swung off to the river, and covered the United States ford. To have commanded that ford would have meant Hooker's destruction, and General Jackson had that in mind when he was making his attack upon the other flank. But an examination of the ground by Lee's engineers pronounced an attack upon Meade's front impracticable, and the alternative was an attack at some other point.
It must have been an anxious hour when Lee and Jackson consulted over the situation. The story is now familiar of Fitz Lee's announcement that Hooker's right was unprotected by cavalry, and that the extremity of Howard's line "hung in the air." It came as an illumination. Maps were sought for, and the subject of roads eagerly investigated. Happily it was discovered that from Welford's Furnace, where Wright had been engaged during the afternoon, a narrow woods road recently opened led through the forest by a circuitous route to the Brock road, which in turn communicated with the plank and turnpike roads at a point beyond and west of Howard's right. It was midnight when the plans of Lee and Jackson were concluded, and it was determined the latter should lead the flanking column, while Lee would hold the front. When Lee asked Jackson what force he would require, the latter is said to have replied, he must have all of his three divisions, and when Lee said, "What will that leave to me," Jackson replied by pointing to McLaws and Anderson, to which Lee generously assented. The three ​divisions of Jackson's present were Hill's, Rodes' and Colston's, Early having been left at Fredericksburg. Hill's division consisted of six brigades, Rodes' of five, and Colston's of four. The two divisions remaining with Lee, excepting Wilcox's brigade which had been returned to Bank's ford, and Barksdale's brigade which was left at Fredericksburg with Early, numbered a little less than 13,000 infantry. Jackson took with him 88 pieces of artillery of the 2d corps, and 14 of the 1st corps. General Lee retained with his force 24 pieces, which were probably all that could be brought into play, the remaining artillery being held in reserve.
As a preliminary move General Lee withdrew his right, and Wofford's brigade was shifted to the left. Wright's brigade was withdrawn from the Furnace, and it, and Posey's put in position across the Plank road. These operations consumed most of the night. The work of felling timber and constructing breastworks was actively prosecuted on both sides. The pickets of the opposing armies were within speaking distance of each other, and throughout the night the forest resounded with the noise of chopping axes and falling trees. This work upon Hooker's part must have been a secret satisfaction to Lee, as it gave assurance that Hooker would remain behind his works while Jackson was on his way.
The march was to have begun at 4 o'clock A. M., but it was half past five when Colquitt's brigade of Rodes' division moving up the Plank road from Aldrich's debouched on the Furnace road in rear of the Confederate line and took the lead. The 2d Virginia Cavalry preceded the infantry, while the 1st, 5th, and part of the 3d Virginia were disposed on the right flank and rear of the column. The horse artillery accompanying the cavalry amounted to ten pieces. Colston's division followed Rodes' and was succeeded by Hill's, each with its artillery contingent, ordinance trains, and ambulances. The main trains were directed to move by roads further to the south towards Todd's tavern. As soon as Jackson's move was under way, a strong line of skirmishers was sent out from McLaw's front, and an artillery fusilade was opened which had the effect of causing an ​immediate response, and assuring Lee of Hooker's continued presence.
The intense energy of General Jackson's nature was never more in evidence than on this march. He knew well the hazardous character of the undertaking, and he felt the responsibility which the confidence of his chief had reposed in him. Usually at the head of the column, he passed it occasionally in review to see that the men were up and to urge it forward. Celerity and secrecy were the orders of the day. But he understood too well the limits of endurance to overtax his men, and as the day grew warm and the air close in the dense thickets through which the winding road ran, a halt of ten minutes was ordered every hour. Soon after the march began a serious situation developed near the Furnace, where the road turned south passing over an open space where the column could be seen from Hazel Grove. This drew fire from a couple of guns soon to be followed by others. The infantry were promptly shunted off to the left to go through the woods, and the guns hurried past without a thought of returning the fire. General Jackson was not to be diverted for a moment from the great object he had in view, and directing a regiment of Colquitt's brigade to be detached and guard the flank of the column, he ordered it to press forward. As the morning progressed the situation at the Furnace became more serious. Berdan's sharpshooters were ordered forward, followed by Hayman's brigade, and the Georgia regiment became seriously involved, and Anderson was compelled to send Posey's brigade to its support. Graham's Federal brigade was ordered up by Birney in support of Hayman, and Sickles ordered Whipple's division to be in supporting distance, while Wright's brigade was started to the support of Posey. So grave did the situation appear for a time that Archer's and Thomas' brigades were turned back for the protection of the trains. A sharp encounter took place between the 23d Georgia and Berdan's sharpshooters, in which about forty of the former were captured. While retiring the 23d Georgia was followed up by Hayman's and Graham's brigades, but these fell under a heavy fire from Posey's brigade and Brooke's battery, which effectually checked their advance until the last of the trains had gone by. ​It is astonishing to learn from the official reports, that the movement was perceived from its beginning; and known to Birney and to the three corps commanders on that front, as well as to General Hooker. As early as nine o'clock Birney informed Hooker by couriers that a column of the enemy with guns and trains and ambulances was moving across his front to the right. In consequence at 9:30 Hooker directed Howard to examine the ground upon his flank in case an attack should be made from that quarter, "and be prepared for him in whatever direction he advances." Howard was also directed to advance his pickets for the purpose of observation as far as was safe to obtain timely information of any approach; at the same time he sent word through Butterfield to Sedgwick to attack in his front if there was any reasonable expectation of success, leaving it to his discretion. About 11 A. M. Sickles received several reports from Birney that a column of the enemy was moving across his front, and with Hooker's approval he joined Birney at Hazel Grove. Sickles seems to have been impressed by the movement, and reporting it to Hooker, proposed to launch his whole corps against the column, inviting Howard and Slocum to join in the attack if Hooker approved. Hooker's reply was to advance cautiously with two divisions, Birney's and Whipple's, and harass the movement as much as possible. More remarkable still, at 10:50 A. M., Howard sent the following dispatch to Hooker from General Devens' headquarters at Talley's, "We can observe a column of infantry moving westward on a road parallel with this on the ridge about a mile and a half to two miles south of this. I am taking measures to resist an attack from the west." What these "measures" amounted to, does not appear, except that signal stations were established at Dowdall's tavern and on the extreme right, and some of the reserve artillery placed so as to face west. Later in the day Sickles again sent word to Hooker that he could break the enemy's column, but bearing in mind Hooker's warning to move cautiously he wished support from Slocum and Howard of what he proposed to do. Howard replied he had no troops to spare, and Slocum referred the matter to Hooker. About 4 P. M. Pleasanton's cavalry was ​ordered from Chancellorsville to co-operate with Sickles who had previously moved forward, and Howard was directed to send a brigade to Sickles' support.
While Jackson's movement was thus generally known to the other side, they were fully persuaded it meant a retreat, and the turning to the south at the Furnace gave the impression that the move was in the direction of Gordonsville. It is claimed that several recognizances were made by Devens in his front, and that these discovered a body of hostile skirmishers at the distance of a couple of miles, but their reports made no difference and were regarded as idle stories. In Hamlin's history of the battle of Chancellorsville, it is stated that the officer of the day reported to Devens and to Howard, that a large force of the enemy was passing to his rear, when he was rebuked for his statement and warned not to bring on a panic; that returning to the picket line and renewing his report, he was called a coward and ordered to his regiment. Major Rice of the 153d Pennsylvania in command of the picket line at 2:45, sent a dispatch to Von Gilsa, commanding a brigade on the extreme right, saying "a large body of the enemy is massing in my front. For God's sake make disposition to receive him." When this was taken to Howard, he treated it with scorn, and replied no force could penetrate the outlying thickets. So confident was Hooker that the enemy were now "ingloriously flying," that at 2:30 P. M., he sent out a circular to his corps commanders directing them to replenish supplies of forage, provisions and ammunition, so as to be ready to start in pursuit early in the morning, and at 4:10 he telegraphed Sedgwick through Butterfield to capture Fredericksburg and everything in it and vigorously pursue the enemy. "We know he is fleeing, trying to save his trains. Two of Sickles' divisions are among them." His amazement and dismay can scarcely be conceived, when at 6:30 an aide stepping into the road from the porch of the Chancellor house where they were sitting, and looking westward toward the sound of cannonading, called attention to the fugitives crowding the turnpike, and learned from them the story, that the whole Rebel army had broken loose upon the flank and rear of the Federal line. ​A letter written by General Lee to Mr. Davis during this time says that he was then swinging around to his left to come up in the enemy's rear and that he had no expectation that Longstreet would be in time to aid in the contest at that point. General Lee during the day was making demonstrations on his front, which were especially vigorous about three o'clock.
When the 2d Virginia cavalry leading the column emerged from the Brock road upon the Plank road, it turned to the right and moved along it about three-quarters of a mile to where it is intersected by the Germanna ford road. One squadron proceeding a little farther met with a cavalry picket, which it dislodged and pursued for a short distance. The officer returning reported that he had gotten a view of the right of the Federal line. Upon General Jackson's coming up, he and Fitz Lee proceeded to the high ground on Burton's farm to reconnoitre. A short distance to the north stretched along the turnpike could be seen the line of Federal intrenchments with abatis in front, arms stacked, and groups of soldiers scattered about in apparent abandon. Jackson's expectation had been to reach the enemy's rear by the Plank road, but he now saw that this would bring him obliquely across their front, and it was evident that to reach their rear he would have to extend his turning movement to the turnpike. He accordingly directed Rodes to resume his march to the pike and there wait orders. Fitz Lee was directed to engage the attention of a body of Federal cavalry in the neighborhood of the plank road, and the Stonewall brigade under Paxton with two batteries of Alexander's battalion was sent to Hickman's on the plank road to support him if necessary. When Jackson joined Rodes on the pike, the head of the column was turned to the right, and moved along the turnpike a short distance to the neighborhood of Luckett's, where preparations were made for attack. The formation was in three lines, perpendicular to the turnpike, extending about a mile on either side. Jackson must have anticipated finding the enemy some distance away from the pike, otherwise he would not have extended his flanks so far. Owing to the density of the woods and the extent of his front, the deployment consumed much time. The hour and ​a half lost at the start would now have been invaluable. Four brigades of Rodes' division, Colquitt's, Doles', O'Neill's and Iverson's running from right to left in the order named, constituted the first line, which was covered with sharpshooters deployed as skirmishers about 400 yards to the front. Colston's division except Paxton's brigade which had been detached, formed the second line, Ramseur's brigade of Rodes' division took the place of Paxton and formed in support of Colquitt, overlapping it by a regiment. On the left of the first and second lines, a regiment of Iverson's brigade was formed as flankers, with skirmishers on its left. Hill's division formed the third line. Three of his brigades were deployed, and the others followed in column of route. The 2d Virginia cavalry was on the left of the infantry, and was directed when the advance commenced to take and hold the road leading to Ely's ford. The artillery took the lead, but were shortly relieved by the artillery of Rodes' division. The force present with Jackson of all arms was estimated at 26,500 officers and men. Particular directions had been given for preserving quiet throughout the march, and every brigade was now directed how to act and move, always keeping the road as a guide. Jackson's purpose was, when he approached within reach of Chancellorsville to direct a part of his force upon Chandler's so as to take Chancellorsville and Fairview in rear, and cut off Hooker from the fords on the river, and doubtless that was the reason for his sweeping so far to the north.
It must have been near six o'clock, when the alignment being completed, Jackson inquired of Rodes if he was ready. Rodes replied he was, and giving the order to Major Blackford in command of the skirmishers, the latter moved forward and in a few minutes struck the Federal pickets. The latter like startled hares, broke for their reserves, who with a feeling of perfect security were about to get their evening meal. The surprise was complete. A bolt from the sky would not have startled Von Gilsa's men half so much as the musket shots in the thicket, and the sight of their flying comrades, followed by a straggling line of skirmishers, and then by a solid wall of gray, forcing ​their way through the timber and bearing down upon them like an irresistible avalanche. There was no stemming such a tide. The two guns fired a round or two, and efforts were made by the infantry here and there to form, and make some show for a fight. But the shock was too great; the sense of utter helplessness was too apparent. The resistance offered was speedily beaten down. There was nothing left but to lay down their arms and surrender, or flee. They threw them away, and fled. Arms, knapsacks, clothing, equipage, everything, was thrown aside and left behind. The camp was in wild confusion. Men lost their heads in terror, the road and the woods on both sides were filled with men, horses and cattle, in one mad flight. The rebel yells added terror to the situation, and the two guns moving abreast of the line of battle and firing alternately into the fleeing mass, completed the panic. Rodes' line swept forward driving the mass before it, but no line with so wide a front could advance rapidly through such a forest. The high ground at Talley's, five-eighths of a mile distant, which overlooked the neighborhood was the first vantage point which Jackson aimed at. This place was protected by redoubts and a battery of guns. But the panic which began with Von Gilsa's brigade had spread through the division, and the resistance offered at Talley's, was scarcely more than was encountered at the first onset. The battery was captured without its having fired a shot, and the infantry were swept along with the fleeing mass.
Beyond Talley's is a stretch of forest extending to the open space around Dowdall's tavern. The tavern is located on high ground just beyond the intersection of the plank road with the turnpike, and is surrounded by undulating fields which slope to the south and west to the margin of a small stream. These fields were occupied by Bushbeck's brigade, about 1,500 strong, of Steinwehr's division. The open space on the north side of the road had been occupied by Barlow's brigade of the same division, but had during the forenoon been ordered to the support of Sickles beyond Hazel Grove. A battery was posted on the high ground at the tavern, where Bushbeck's infantry ​occupied rifle pits looking south. Another line of rifle pits had been constructed at right angles to the latter running across the pike between the church and the woods to the east, and on these rifle pits facing west Bushbeck rallied his men to meet the coming storm. A number of guns constituting the reserve artillery were also in position on this line. Schurz's division was encamped on some ground north and northwest of Dowdall's called Hawkins' farm. Two regiments were thrown out still further to the west of the road leading to Ely's ford. The remainder of the division was located west of the church, and a battery of guns bore directly upon the intersection of the two roads. From where Rodes first struck Von Gilsa's brigade to Dowdall's is a mile and a quarter. On reaching the opening which revealed the latter position, Rodes paused a moment for his men to take breath and to straighten his lines. During the pause Colston's men in the second line pressed to the front and when the command was given, both lines dashed forward together, and with redoubled force threw themselves upon Schurz and Bushbeck. Although the resistance was stout the contest was too unequal to last long, and the victorious Confederates soon swept away everything in their path. Weidrich commanding the battery on the hill, says he was unable to use his guns with effect because his front was filled with their own men. Dilger's guns at the intersection of the roads was said by Schurz to have done good service. Bushbeck offered a determined resistance, his loss being 255 in killed and wounded, including three regimental commanders killed. When Schurz learned of the situation he made an effort to throw some of his regiments into line at right angles with the pike west of the Church. Failing to make good his position, he fell back on Bushbeck and attempted a rally of his men there. It soon became evident that the Federals were not only outnumbered but outflanked, and Schurz drew off such of his men as he could gather up by the Bullock road in the direction of Chandler's house. Bushbeck withdrew to the heights at Fairview. The accounts of the battle thus far by those engaged are naturally conflicting. Colonel Von Gilsa commanding the 1st Federal brigade, reports that when his skirmishers ​were driven in, his whole line was at once engaged furiously, but his brigade stood coolly and bravely, firing three times, until he was outflanked, when he fell back, expecting to rally behind the second line formed by the third division, but that he could not find the second line as it was abandoned before he reached it. General McLean, commanding the 2d brigade, says the two pieces of artillery with Von Gilsa's brigade fired but a few times, and then broke down the road in rear of the rifle pits: that the 75th Ohio was wheeled into column to the right and deployed, but the attack was so impetuous, the regiments in his front at once broke in great confusion, interfering with its deployment, but still it was able to form and deliver its fire until ordered to face about. General Devens commanding the division says that while it has been suggested that the 1st division was to some extent surprised, he felt it his duty to say, in riding down the entire line he found no officers or men out of their assigned positions, and all prepared to meet the attack: that the skirmishers along both brigade fronts behaved with great resolution, keeping the enemy back as long as could be expected, and that notwithstanding the confusion in which the division was forced to relinquish its first position, he thought a second line might have been formed within the lines of General Schurz had his division been able to maintain its position. Schurz in his report speaks of the difficulties of the position in changing fronts, and says he was hemmed in by a variety of obstacles in front and dense pine brush in rear, and the "command had hardly been given when almost the whole of McLean's brigade mixed up with a number of Von Gilsa's men came rushing down the road from General Devens' headquarters in wild confusion, and the battery of the 1st division broke in on his right at a full run: that the whole line deployed on the old turnpike facing south was rolled up and swept away in a moment." The panic which began with Devens' division and spread through Howard's corps carried demoralization into adjoining commands, and swept some of these into the general stampede. A small force of Confederate infantry running up against the Federal force in the neighborhood of Hazel Grove were repulshed by the guns ​stationed there, but not before they had carried off a mule train of ammunition, and thrown into disorder Berry's park of artillery which with fugitives from the 11th corps, rushed through Williams' division carrying part of that organization with it and adding to the general confusion. The chief of artillery of Berry's division describing it says, "As we passed General Hooker's headquarters a scene burst upon us which God grant may never be seen again in the Federal army of the United States. The 11th corps had been routed and were fleeing to the river like scared sheep. The men and artillery filled the roads, its sides and the skirts of the field; and it appeared that no two or one company could be found together. Aghast and terror stricken, heads bare, and panting for breath, they pleaded like infants at the mother's breast that we should let them pass to the rear unhindered." Berry who was near the Chandler house with two of his brigades when the fugitives from Howard's corps began surging in, was ordered by Hooker to cover the rear of the 11th corps, and he proceeded at double quick with Hayes' brigade of the 2d corps to endeavor to stem the tide and cover the retreat.
General Rodes in his report says the movement was slightly delayed because the order to advance was not promptly extended to the skirmishers, but when put in motion, the line rushed forward sweeping everything before it, and pressing on to Talley's carried the works there, capturing five guns: that so complete was the success, and such the surprise of the enemy that scarcely any organized resistance was met with after the first volley was fired: that the enemy fled in the wildest confusion, leaving the field strewn with arms, accoutrements, clothing, caissons and field pieces in every direction.
When the works at Dowdall's had been taken, General Jackson directed the pursuit to be pressed. Beyond on all sides was the forest again, the ground descending gradually for some distance to a feeble stream, and then ascending to the heights of Fairview, with gulleys and ravines interspersed. At a point between Dowdall's and the stream on the Plank road, Slocum's right had rested before Williams' division had been called to ​the assistance of Sickles, and Williams had constructed substantial works of logs and earth across the road at this point facing westerly. Had these works been manned by Williams' troops, when Rodes reached them they would have formed the most formidable obstacle the Confederates had yet met with, but fortunately for them they were unoccupied.
Rodes had not pushed his way much, if any, beyond this point, when the increasing confusion of his long line now mixed up with that of Colston, and the approach of night caused him to order a halt and request Jackson to send forward Hill to take his place. This was immediately done, and Jackson with increasing eagerness urged the pursuit. Rodes had reported that he discovered nothing in the road in his front between him and Fairview, and everything promised complete success, up to that time, the forces at Fairview had consisted of but two brigades. But Williams' division had now been recalled and was seeking to occupy its old lines. Williams says on reaching the vicinity of Fairview he found it swarming with fugitives of the 11th corps, and moving Ruger's and Knipe's brigades by the flank, at a double quick along the line south of the Plank road, he faced them to the front and pushed forward into the woods, directing Knipe to reoccupy his original works. It was these troops which now presented an unexpected obstacle to Rodes' and Hill's continued advance. As they came to the front Lane's and Fender's brigades deployed on either side of the road, Lane on the right and Fender on the left. McGowan subsequently formed on Lane's right and Archer on Lane. While this was going on Colonel Crutchfield, Jackson's chief of artillery had two or three guns run forward on the road half a mile beyond Dowdall's and open fire on Fairview. This drew from the guns in position there a return fire which raked the Plank road and shelled the woods on either side. Hill's brigades not in the act of deploying were now moving along the road en route, the infantry on the left, the artillery on the right. The effect of this fire was for a few moments demoralizing to the artillery horses and drivers, and the infantry were compelled to dodge into the woods. Lane complained to Hill that the effect of the ​Confederate fire was interrupting the movement of his own troops, whereupon Hill had it stopped and that from the Federal guns died out also. By this time it was full dark. General Jackson however was determined to press on, and not for a moment did he think of allowing a halt with victory seemingly in his grasp. "Press on," was his command to Lane, and while the latter had his skirmishers out and his lines ready to advance, Jackson impatient of delay, rode forward in advance to satisfy himself of the exact situation. It was when returning to his lines with a small escort composed of some of his staff and a few couriers, that they were mistaken for the enemy and received a volley of musketry from their friends. The volley killed several of the group and wounded others, among them General Jackson, as it proved fatally. With much difficulty he was borne on a litter to the rear. General Hill who was nearby assumed command. Fearing the effect upon the troops, he directed that the news of the disaster should not be made known, but as the sad litter was borne along the road, the news quickly spread of the loss which had befallen the army. The nemesis of fate which now threw its shadow over the fortunes of the Confederacy was not content with one victim. Hill had scarcely taken command when a similar accident befell him. Bursts of musketry with occasional cannonading were now springing up in every direction. No one could tell friend from foe. The 18th North Carolina was beginning its advance on the north side of the road directed toward a battery in its front, when General Hill and staff to avoid the fire which at the moment was sweeping down the road, dashed into the woods in front of the regiment, and the latter mistaking them for Federal cavalry fired several rounds before the mistake was discovered. General Hill was disabled, and the command then devolved by right on Rodes. Rodes says that he received a message from Hill to that effect. A staff officer of Hill's rode in haste to Stuart who had joined Fitz Lee at Ely's ford, bearing an urgent message for him to come and take command, and Stuart says that Hill formally turned over the command to him. It was an awkward situation, and might have proved embarrassing, but Rodes was a true ​patriot as well as a good soldier, and he gracefully acquiesced. General Stuart was a great favorite with the army, and it was thought he could best restore the confidence suffered from Jackson's loss. Any further attack for the night was abandoned.
While General Jackson's movement and attack had been a great success in the way of surprise, and the rout of the 11th corps with the capture of a number of guns and prisoners had been complete, the result was on the whole disappointing. The heights at Fairview still frowned upon the Confederates and time was now given to reinforce and strengthen these. Another hour of daylight would undoubtedly have swept Jackson into Chancellorsville with as little resistance as he had encountered up to the time when night overtook him. When Lane drew back his right wing, Ruger reoccupied his old position, but Knipe in making an effort to do the same thing came in contact with Lane's left, and in the darkness this led to much confusion and several collisions. The 128th Pennsylvania regiment which blundered into his lines was made captive along with its Colonel. Williams finding he could not reoccupy his old works on the Plank road, now took up a new line through the woods in front of the ravine near Fairview connecting with the left of Berry's division of the 3d corps, and the night was passed in throwing up defences of logs and earth along the whole of the new line.
It was a bad night for both sides. Commands were groping in the dark to find the positions assigned them, and struggling groups were wandering around in search of their commands. Alarms were frequent. Intermittent flashes of musketry burst out and threw a glare over the forest, and the guns from Fairview opened at intervals. The unpleasantness of the situation was intensified by a midnight attack from the direction of Hazel Grove by Sickles with two brigades, designed to drive Lane from his position and occupy the Rank road. In making his attack Sickles formed Ward's and Hayman's brigades in echelon, one behind the other, each company marching in column of fours, at deploying intervals, with fixed bayonets, and under orders not to fire until the Plank road was reached. When the column was put in motion it penetrated the interval between the ​respective lines, and the right struck the centre of Williams' division while the left ran into the right of Lane's brigade. Receiving a cross fire from friend and foe, despite orders to the contrary, the advancing column opened fire, and dashed through the darkness at whatever might be in its front. Lane's left was not heavily engaged, but on his right he had difficulty in beating off two successive attacks. Slocum says that not being informed of Sickles' proposed attack, on hearing the firing he supposed the enemy was advancing on Williams' division, and he at once opened fire on them with his artillery, and Williams fired upon all lines that made their appearance in his front. The attack accomplished no results. Bigelow quotes from a private letter of General Williams written at the time this account of the night. "A tremendous roll of musketry fire, mingled with yellings and shoutings almost diabolical and infernal opened the conflict on the side of Sickles' division. For some time my infantry and artillery kept silent, and in the intervals of musketry, I could distinctly hear the oaths and imprecations of the rebel officers, evidently having hard work to keep their men from stampeding. In the meantime Sickles' artillery opened fire over the heads of the infantry, and the din of arms and inhuman yellings and curses redoubled. All at once Berry's division crossing the road on our right opened in heavy volleys, and Knipe commanding my right brigade next to the road on the south followed suit. Best began to thunder with his thirty odd pieces. In front and on the flank shell and shot and bullets were poured into the woods, which were evidently crowded with rebel masses preparing for the morning attack. Human language can give no idea of such a scene—such an infernal and yet sublime combination of sound and flame and smoke and dreadful yells of rage, of triumph or of defiance."
At 6 A. M., May 3d, Jackson's three divisions, now under command of Stuart, renewed the attack. The night had been spent by the Federals in strengthening the first line of works, which in front of Fairview stretched squarely across the road, and in erecting barricades behind these. The Federal centre was held by Williams' and Berry's divisions. Pender and Thomas ​north of the road stormed and carried two lines of works and assailed a third where a long and desperate struggle ensued. Being subjected to a severe artillery fire, they gave ground and fell back upon the captured works where they waited for reinforcements. One of Pender's regiments advancing beyond the brigade captured Brigadier General Hays and staff of the Union army. Lane and McGowan with a part of Heth's brigade under Brockenbrough, on the south of the road likewise charged the works in their front in the face of the fire from the 38 guns at Fairview, and after a determined fight were able to seize and hold the works for some time, until McGowan's right flank becoming exposed, they were compelled to retire. Archer on the extreme right in charging forward inclined to the right, which left a gap between McGowan and himself. Pressing on he struck the rear of Birney's division leaving Hazel Grove, and attacked Graham's brigade inflicting severe loss, capturing a number of prisoners and a battery and opening the way to Hazel Grove. Hazel Grove proved to be the key to the situation. It jutted out beyond the contour of the Federal line, and Sickles wanted to hold it: but Hooker on looking over the field at daylight decided it was untenable, and directed Sickles to move to Fairview and occupy a new line of intrenchments extending across the Plank road in rear of Fairview, the front line occupying the artillery breastworks. A similar experience fell to Sickles at Gettysburg when he was ordered by Meade to withdraw from the peach orchard because his right flank was too far in advance.
In the meantime Perry's brigade of Anderson's division which had remained with Lee, was put in motion before daylight to gain ground to its left, and if possible get in touch with Stuart. Posey's brigade which had spent the night in the neighborhood of the Furnace was directed to do likewise, and finding nothing in its way it proceeded in the direction of Hazel Grove. Mahone and Wright also endeavored to gain ground to the left and conform to these movements, but the character of the country made any alignment impossible, and none of the four brigades were in touch with each other. ​As Lane and McGowan advanced, they lost touch and moved without support on either flank. McGowan struck Hayman's brigade while the latter was changing position and threw it into greater disorder, after which it encountered Mott's and Ruger's brigades, and after a fierce fight was itself thrown back upon its starting point.
Lane supported by Brockenbrough, with Pender on his left attacked the centre of the Federal line at the Plank road, where the 3d Maryland was overwhelmed and a number of prisoners and a section of artillery captured while firing charges of canister. The 115th Pennsylvania was ordered to take the place of the Maryland regiment, but refused to budge from its tracks. The 5th and 8th New Jersey came to the rescue and a desperate fight ensued with great loss to both sides. There was charge and counter-charge. The ground was won and lost, and won again. Pender reinforced, attacked the left of Berry's division held by the 1st Massachusetts supported by the 11th New Jersey, and Berry regarding his position critical sent to Hooker for aid. Shortly afterward he was killed crossing the road, and Carr succeeded to the command. The two regiments were both badly shattered and compelled to fall back and reform in rear of the artillery at Fairview, while Franklin's brigade was rushed to the front in their stead. The remainder of Carr's line gave way from left to right as Pender and Thomas in succession fell upon its flank. French's division with some accessions from Hancock came to its rescue and formed obliquely to the Plank road. Lane's brigade which had suffered severely was compelled to retire and reform after the loss of one-third its strength. Mott's and Ruger's success, and French's advance made it a stand off fight, and Stuart ordered up his second line. Colston put in two brigades on either side of the road, but to meet a pressure on the right shifted Paxton to the south of the road, just in time to meet the Federal attack which was sweeping everything before it. Colston describes it as a critical moment. McGowan's and Pender's troops had exhausted their ammunition and were hugging their breastworks. One of the fiercest battles of the day followed. Paxton was killed, and also Garnett commanding ​Jones' brigade. For a time the tide of battle fluctuated. Colston's three brigades made several distinct charges with varying success, but finally held fast to the ground gained. On the north side of the road Nichols' Louisiana brigade became hotly engaged, and support had to be extended from the south side. Its ammunition was finally exhausted and it was being forced back, when Colquitt's brigade rendered timely assistance enabling it to hold its ground.
Up to this time the Confederate artillery had been of little use, although several Napoleon guns posted by Jones on the Plank road were used with effect upon the works at Fairview. When Archer opened the way to Hazel Grove, Pegram was sent with his batteries to occupy that ground and was speedily joined by Huger with his batteries. These guns were brought to bear upon Geary's lines to the east, and upon Fairview and the Federal lines to the north. Carter's and McIntosh's battalions also took positions upon the high ground in the vicinity, and an effective and concentrated fire was kept up which contributed largely to determine the fortunes of the day.
The battle still hung fire and Rodes' division was called into action. O'Neill's and Iverson's brigades were put in on the north side of the road and Ramseur's and Doles' on the south, Colquitt had already been called to Nichols' assistance. Two of O'Neill's regiments advancing to the attack became separated from the brigade and obliquing to the right, met the enemy's fire from behind barricades on the south side of the road and not more than two hundred yards distant from the works at Fairview. Pender thereupon advanced a portion of his and Iverson's lines and the barricades were abandoned. Whereupon Hall leading the 5th and 26th Alabama regiments and the 23d North Carolina carried the heights and planted their colors on the works, Colonel Garvin falling on the inside. The colors were subsequently captured and again recaptured. The remainder of Rodes' line meeting with a repulse and failing to sustain Hall he was compelled to retreat. A second line of battle was then formed and another attack ordered moving parallel with the road, and the heights were gained a second time, and a second time given up because of a repulse on the left. ​Ramseur and Doles on the south side of the road passed over the first and second Confederate lines, and immediately became furiously engaged. Doles deflecting to the right passed up a ravine behind the graveyard, and came out upon the field nearly opposite the Chancellor house, driving the enemy out of his entrenchments and pressing him back upon the batteries at Fairview, capturing a number of prisoners and several guns which had been abandoned. During the movement Doles came in contact with Slocum's left who was changing position. Finding his flank and rear open to Slocum he withdrew. Ramseur after pushing to the front and repulsing several assaults, found himself exposed to an enfilade fire, and was forced to go back. The 30th North Carolina on his right in the meantime, struck Graham's brigade in flank and took several hundred prisoners.
The Federals still held their position in a ravine on Ramseur's right preventing his further advance, and his line was successfully retired by Colonels Grimes and Cox, the latter remaining on the field though wounded in five or six places.
While the Confederate lines at the Plank road were generally perpendicular to it, such was not always the case. Christie commanding the 23d North Carolina had his left swung forward almost parallel with the road, while Hall and the 5th Alabama on the south side had is right swung violently back. Confronting these were Berdan's sharpshooters and the 122d Pennsylvania.
At 9 A. M. the Federal lines had considerably shifted. In support of the centre two brigades under Franklin and Meagher had been drawn from Hancock. Geary found his line untenable after the occupation of Hazel Grove, and he formed a new line at right angles with the former, the right resting near the Chancellor house. In making the change he came in contact with Doles and Graham brought up against Ramseur. On the north side Iverson was in contact with French, and Col. I. M. Williams commanding Nichols' brigade with his left refused was confronted by Tyler's brigade. Sickles about this time retired to Chancellorsvi11e, forming in three lines on Hancock's right, with his batteries between Fairview and Chancellorsville. ​Both sides had now fought to a frazzle, and were thoroughly exhausted. Both had displayed with a few exceptions the most determined courage and obstinacy. No more desperate fighting was ever done over such a length of time. The ground was covered with the slain, and in some places the woods had taken fire, and the ground was hot to stand on. The Federal artillery after the Confederates got in position was badly smashed. Slocum mentions that two of his battery commanders were killed, sixty-three cannoneers killed or wounded, and eighty horses shot in harness.
But it was now becoming apparent that the Federals were playing a losing game. As their lines became contracted they were more exposed to the destructive fire of the Confederate artillery. Hooker gave orders to retire. Hancock described his situation as fighting in opposite directions, one line faced Fredericksburg, the other towards Gordonsville, the enemy's lines being half a mile apart, and projectiles from his artillery from front and rear passing over both his lines, while they were enfiladed by other pieces in different positions. The battery at the right of the Chancellor house had lost all its officers and cannoneers and horses, and had to be moved by hand by details from the infantry. Covering the retirement of Sickles and Slocum, Hancock left the field at 10 A. M. and moving half a mile to the rear, established a new line occupying the left of a salient toward the Chancellor house. Anderson who had been steadily pressing forward was now able to join hands with Stuart, and when that was effected a general advance was ordered. Wright's brigade was the first to emerge upon the plains of Chancellorsville, and he was quickly followed by the remainder of Anderson's and Stuart's troops, McLaws at the same time moving up along the Plank road.
When General Lee rode into the open to greet his victorious troops he received a tumultuous ovation which must have stirred his soul. The troops were wild with excitement and success. The past with its horrors was forgotten, and they knew only the delirium of victory. The welkin rang with shouts and cheers, and the war-worn veterans almost wept for joy.
​The victory was won at a fearful sacrifice. The list of killed and wounded in Jackson's three divisions was reported at 6,872: that in the 2d, 3d, 11th and 12th Federal army corps including the missing, at 11,168. The battle on either side was fought in a disjointed way. When success was achieved at one point, support was lacking to make it good, and there was a general want of concert. This was due in large measure to the character of the ground, and the difficulty of seeing and knowing how things were going. General Stuart was subjected to some criticism for the manner in which the troops were handled, which caused him to address General Lee on the subject, but the latter thought it did not require investigation. In his official report he says of Stuart, "He conducted the operations on the left with distinguished capacity and vigor, stimulating and cheering the troops by the example of his own coolness and daring."
General Hooker's new position was in the shape of an obtuse angle, each leg of which touched a bank of the river in rear. Couch and Howe were on the left leg, Meade and Reynolds on the right, with Sickles at the Salient, and Slocum in the rear.
General Lee immediately made disposition to renew the attack and formed his lines along the Plank road, Colston in the centre with Anderson and McLaws to his right, and Rodes and Heth to his left. Hooker's forces were estimated to be 75,000 men with 246 pieces of artillery, Lee's at 34,000 with 132 pieces of artillery. Notwithstanding the disparity of numbers, Lee's confidence in his troops now flushed with victory, was such that he determined on another attack.
When General Hooker appeared before a Committee on the Conduct of the War, describing the army of Northern Virginia, he paid it this tribute: "That army has by discipline alone acquired a character for steadiness and efficiency, unsurpassed in my judgment in ancient or modern times. We have not been able to rival it, nor has there been any near approximation to it in the other rebel armies."
It was at this juncture that General Lee received a message from Early that Sedgwick had captured Fredericksburg, and ​was approaching in his rear on the Plank road. He immediately directed McLaws to move with the brigades of Kershaw and Mahone to meet him. The three remaining brigades of McLaws' followed soon after. Meanwhile the attack on Hooker was suspended. Hooker received numerous dispatches during the day of Sedgwick's movement, and was informed at one P. M. that he was on the Plank road at Guest's house, but he preferred to sit tight.
Let us now turn to Sedgwick and Early. Early it will be remembered was holding the old line of entrenchments at Fredericksburg, from the river above the town to Hamilton's Crossing, a distance of 6 4/10 miles. Besides his own division, he had Barksdale's brigade in the town, and Wilcox's brigade at Bank's ford, making altogether about 11,500 men. During the forenoon of the 2d, Early was instructed by General Chilton of Lee's staff to move to Chancellorsville with all his force, except a small body left for observation, and except the reserve artillery, which was to be sent to the rear to Chesterfield. Early and Pendleton who was in charge of the artillery were much disconcerted, and suggested that such a move would invite an advance from the enemy, but Chilton insisted, and the orders were being carried out, when Early received a letter from General Lee, saying, he feared his wishes had been misunderstood, and leaving the matter to Early's discretion. The column was faced about and the old positions resumed by 11 P. M., with the exception of some artillery which had gotten too far to be recalled. During the night of May 2d, Sedgwick received orders to cross the river and join Hooker at Chancellorsville at daylight on the 3d. Sedgwick however was on the south side, and as a strict compliance with the order would have required him to cross twice, he wisely determined to march up the south side of the river. By 2 A. M. he had reached the outskirts of the town, and found the Confederates in their old position on Marye's Hill. Gibbon at Falmouth had been directed to cross the river and seize the town. The Massachusetts troops who undertook this, were the same who had done so in the previous December, and they were opposed by the same Mississippi troops.
​After some resistance the crossing was effected and Barksdale retired to the heights west of the town, consisting of Willis' and Marye's Hills and the famous stone wall which had proved such a deadly obstacle to Burnside. This stone wall, the remains of which still exist, ran at the base of the hill along the east side of the Telegraph road, where the same on leaving the town turns south. It was about three feet above the road-bed, and the ground in front fell away gradually to low land, through which flowed the tail race of a mill emptying into Hazel Run. The wall accommodated five or six hundred men, though in the previous battle the number was much larger. Behind the wall on the hill was a battery of four guns, and howitzers faced the Plank road and the pike. Barksdale's two remaining regiments and one of Hays' Louisiana were posted in the old entrenchments south of Hazel Run, and in front of Lee's Hill and the Howison house, covering a distance of about a mile. The balance of Hays' brigade occupied 1,000 yards of entrenchments to the north, and when Wilcox arrived, he was still further north at Stansbury's hill facing the canal. Connecting with Barksdale on the south and stretching to Hamilton's Crossing were the brigades of Hoke, Gordon and Smith. Early had on his whole line 42 guns, 28 of which were south of Hazel Run, and 14 north of that point. Sedgwick had 66 guns on the south side of the river and 40 on the north side, including a number of twenty pounder Parrotts, and 4 1-2 inch seige guns. Sedgwick wishing to avoid a direct attack upon Marye's Heights directed Howe with his division to make a turning move to the left, and Gibbons was directed to do the same thing on the right. Howe advanced, but found he would have to cross the ravine of Hazel Run, and expose his flank, which caused him to pause. Gibbon moving to the right found he would have to cross the canal to effect his object. Wilcox at Bank's ford, had been led to believe from indications in his front that the Federal force there was withdrawn, and he determined to move to Chancellorsville, leaving a guard at the ford. He was scarcely in motion when his pickets reported Gibbon's advance on the road between the canal and the river. Gathering up a handful of skirmishers he ​delayed the advance until Huger could bring up a section of artillery, which shelled the column forcing it to seek cover. The delay enabled Wilcox to destroy the bridge over the canal which Gibbon was aiming to cross. As the canal was both wide and deep, Gibbon reported the attempt as impracticable, and left Sedgwick no alternative but to attack in front.
The column of attack which began at 10:30 consisted of ten regiments drawn from Newton's and Burnham's divisions. Four of the regiments taking the Plank road, moved in column of fours, and two taking the turnpike, a continuation of the telegraph road where it entered the town, moved in like formation. On the left of these columns where the ground was open four regiments marched in line of battle. The artillery on Marye's Hill seems to have held their fire longer than was prudent, as the guns could not be sufficiently depressed to be effective at short range, but at the distance of three hundred yards the howitzers on the Plank road opened with canister and the column was literally swept away. On the other road the column approached within less than one hundred yards when it too was swept back by cannon and musketry. The columns were rallied and reformed, and a second time were broken and compelled to seek shelter, along with the lines to the left. During an interval which now took place a flag of truce was sent out from the Federal line asking permission to remove the dead, which was granted by the Colonel of the 18th Mississippi. The 17th Massachusetts which had retired for cover behind a board fence had the opportunity while this was going on to see how exceedingly few Confederates there were behind their lines, and when this information became known, another attack was ordered. This time the first line was to be followed by a second at the distance of thirty paces, and that by a third. Conscious of their strength and the weakness of their adversary, the Federal lines now dashed forward and swept over the works with scarcely a pause.
It is estimated that 7,500 Federal troops participated in the assault, and that they outnumbered the Confederates between seven and eight to one. The 18th and part of the 21st Mississippi regiments, and a company of the Washington artillery with ​their guns were captured, the loss on the Federal side in killed and wounded being estimated at between one and two thousand. Barksdale realizing his weakness had sent to Hays and Wilcox for assistance, and five regiments were on their way when it was found they were too late. General Newton is quoted as saying, "If there had been 100 more men on Marye's Hill we could not have taken it."
The capture of Marye's Heights split the Confederate force and left the way open to Sedgwick to pursue Early by the Telegraph road running south near Spottsylvania Court House, or to turn west and follow the Plank road. Newton's division was directed on the Plank road, and Brook's was directed to follow. Gibbon returned to Fredericksburg to take possession of the town, and Howe followed Early on the Telegraph road. Barksdale attempted a rally at Lee's Hill, but was compelled to give way. Early hastened to check the pursuit, and when Hays' regiments came round from the Plank road, with these and Gordon's brigade, he established a line at Cox's house 1 3/4 miles further south. Cox's and a little group of dwellings is situate where a road coming from the direction of Salem Church intersects the Telegraph road, and the denizens of the little borough retain a lively tradition of what they regard as one of the battles of the war. Howe could not have considered the pursuit serious as he does not mention it in his report. Wilcox in the meantime when he found that assistance was too late for Barksdale, with admirable judgment moved his command to Salem Church on the Plank road, and anticipating Sedgwick's advance selected a position at the toll house where he determined to make a stand. The battle of Salem Church is regarded as one of the most brilliant engagements of the war. The old brick church with its walls scarred by bullets and shells, and with its gallery and double row of windows, stands a little removed from the road on the south side, in the midst of a clump of trees, and the schoolhouse a few paces beyond. McLaws did not accept Wilcox's position at the toll house, but threw his lines across the road about sixty yards in rear of the Church, with two brigades on either side, and an interval between to be filled by ​Wilcox when he retired. When that was done Wilcox posted a company in the Church and one in the schoolhouse with directions to fire from the windows, and one of his regiments he held in reserve. As the Federals advanced from the toll house the ground ascended slightly with open fields on either side until they reached within about two hundred and fifty yards of the Church, where there was a thick wood on the south side extending nearly to the Church. A slight halt was made here and then with three cheers the lines dashed forward. The Confederates held their fire until the line had gotten within about eighty yards, when a terrific volley was discharged causing the line to waver and give way. Bartlett with the second brigade rushed forward with a new line, surrounded the schoolhouse and captured the company in it. Pressing on and striking the 10th Alabama, that was broken and forced back, and victory seemed to be in the grasp of the Federals. But Wilcox quickly hurled his 9th Alabama in reserve upon Bartlett, and a hand to hand fight ensued. Bartlett was unable to hold his ground, and amid yells and confusion was driven back and the schoolhouse recaptured, the captors themselves becoming captives. The pursuit was kept up to the toll house, and a number of prisoners taken. In Semmes' front the battle was fought with equal obstinacy. A number of assaults were repulsed, the 10th and 51st Georgia charging the enemy in support of Wilcox and driving him back to his reserves, a mile distant. Two handsome marble monuments have been erected near the Church by the New Jersey troops engaged in the battle to commemorate the valor of their comrades who fell on the field, and upon the face of one of these is an inscription to the brave Alabamians who opposed them. An instance of generosity and appreciation, as rare as it is noble. McLaws made no effort to hold the ground gained. Had he succeeded in doing so, with the front which he occupied at Salem Church, he could at the toll gate have rested his right on Hazel Run and his left would have reached the river road, with his front covered by a small stream between him and Newton. This would have greatly embarrassed Sedgwick in making his final escape. When General Lee sent McLaws to ​the Plank road he informed Early of what he had done, directing him to communicate with McLaws and to move upon Sedgwick's left flank, expressing the hope they would unite and be able to crush him. Early, at the Cox house on the Telegraph road was only about three miles distant from McLaws' right, with a good road running westerly to McLaws' rear, and it was entirely feasible for Early to have carried out this instruction. It would seem he must have heard McLaws' and Sedgwick's guns which engaged in an artillery duel before the fight began in earnest. But General Early was doubtless chagrined over the defeat of the morning, and was anxious to recapture Fredericksburg and Marye's Hill. From the Cox house to Fredericksburg was further than to McLaws, and Fredericksburg itself was of no consequence, except as the high ground upon the west might be of use in shutting Sedgwick off from Bank's ford, and General Early may have had that in his mind, but at any rate he obtained permission from General Lee during the night to move in that direction and retake Fredericksburg. Early accordingly having sent word to McLaws of his intention to attack Marye's Hill the next morning (May 4th) and that he would extend his left so as to connect with him, he threw Hoke's and Hays' brigades across Hazel Run leaving a space of nearly two miles between them and McLaws' right. Gordon, followed by Smith and Barksdale advanced on Marye's Hill which Gordon seized without serious resistance, and a line was formed facing west, Smith on the right on Cemetery Hill, Barksdale on Marye's and Willis' hills to look after the rear, and Gordon along the Plank road, on a line with Hays facing westerly and almost at right angles with Smith. This also put Gordon's back to Barksdale.
Early says he then waited to hear from McLaws and hearing no sound and finding artillery in his front he sent word to McLaws to move. McLaws says he agreed to advance provided Early would first attack, and that he did advance his right, and finding his force insufficient for a front attack withdrew.
It would be uncharitable at this day to impute to McLaws any feeling of pique because of Early's failure to carry out his ​first instructions. But his conduct is inconsistent with the fine reputation he bore in the army of Northern Virginia as one of its most tried and experienced division commanders. While this see-sawing was going on McLaws had applied to General Lee for assistance. Lee generously dispatched Anderson's division, leaving himself only Stuart's battered divisions to face at least 75,000 men. In looking at the relative strength of the opposing forces, it is amazing that Hooker did not assume the offensive, and attempt a counter-stroke. Reynold's corps and the larger part of Meade's corps had not been engaged. Howard's corps had had a day to recuperate, and Averill joined him that morning with 4,000 cavalry. Had Hooker any conception of the thinness of Lee's lines, his failure to attack would have been criminal. But then he had not recovered from the injury on the day previous, and he is described as having the appearance of a man in a stupor. It was asserted at the time and afterwards that he was under the influence of liquor, but there does not appear to be any foundation for this charge, and if there had been, there was not wanting among those high in authority and none too friendly sufficient hostility to have made it good.
Anderson under instructions from Lee was engaged in feeling Hooker's left when on the morning of the 4th, he was ordered to proceed with his three remaining regiments and report to McLaws on the Plank road. He arrived at 11 A. M., and at 12 M. was in position between McLaws and Early.
General Lee was not aware up to this time that Reynolds had been transferred from Sedgwick to Hooker, and was under the impression that Sedgwick had two corps with him. Sedgwick on the other hand believed that Early had been reinforced by the arrival of 15,000 fresh troops from Richmond. Sedgwick's lines covered three sides of a rectangle with the open side to the north. Newton's line ran south from a point on the River road east of Bank's ford to a point south of the toll house on the Plank road facing McLaws. Brooks' line ran just south of the Plank road from the toll house to a point beyond Guest's house facing Anderson, and Howe faced Early to the ​south and east. General Lee had followed Anderson, and his plan seems to have been that Early should attack Howe's left driving it towards McLaws, while McLaws and Anderson would close in and shut off Sedgwick's escape.
Lee had left Hooker penned up at Chancellorsville with his back to the river at the United States ford. He now had Sedgwick penned up with his only outlet at Bank's ford, and what had never happened before he was superior in numbers. If Sedgwick were pressed he was bound to be crumpled up like the shell of an egg. He was fully alive to the weakness of his position. He looked forward to the coming of night and every hour that passed gave him increased hope. In the meantime the Confederates dallied. From 12 M. to 6 P. M., nothing was done except some minor changes of position. When the advance began no serious resistance was met with except by Gordon and Hays, but there as elsewhere night intervened and the pursuit was abandoned. It must have been a cruel disappointment to General Lee. A report was current at the time in the army that upon his arrival on the ground and during the afternoon he was much disturbed over the failure of his plans, and that he expressed his displeasure in words which bore no uncertain sound.
Newton and Brooks fell back rapidly on Bank's ford where they took position, on the heights and in rifle pits, and Howe soon followed. At 11:50 P. M. Sedgwick, unwilling to cross the river without Hooker's permission wrote him, that his army was hemmed in, covered by the guns on the north side of Bank's ford, and asking if he should jeopardize its safety by retaining it on the south side. At one A. M., Butterfield replied, to withdraw. At 1:20 Hooker sent an order countermanding the authority to withdraw. When Butterfield's dispatch was received Sedgwick began crossing immediately, and when that from Hooker was received, he replied at 2:30 that nearly all his command was over.
At a council of war held at Hooker's headquarters at midnight of May 4th-5th, all the corps commanders being present except Slocum and Sedgwick, the question was presented whether the army should withdraw or attack. Meade, Reynolds ​and Howard voted to attack, Sickles and Couch to withdraw. General Hooker then announced that he would take upon himself the responsibility of withdrawing. Warren was directed to prepare a new and short line of defence, and to secure the army against any attempt to interrupt its passage of the river, and the 5th corps was designated as rear guard. On the morning of the 5th, leaving Early and Barksdale as before at Fredericksburg, General Lee ordered McLaws and Anderson's divisions back to Chancellorsville. Unwilling to be baffled of his prey, and his fighting blood rising to the occasion, he resolved to attack Hooker on both flanks. Anderson and McLaws were put in position on Hooker's left and Stuart on his right, and preparations were made for a daylight attack on the 6th. As the order for attack was about to be given, Fender galloped up to General Lee's headquarters then at Fairview, and announced that his skirmishers on advancing had just discovered that Hooker was gone. Those who were present report that General Lee manifested much disappointment at the announcement, but as he had neither pontoons nor transportation any thought of pursuit was out of the question. The crossing of the river was attended with much difficulty. At midnight the river rose suddenly over the bridges, and one of them had to be taken up to piece out the other. The night was dark and it rained in torrents. General Hunt in charge of the artillery did not think his guns could all be gotten over, and proposed that the movement be suspended for a day, but Hooker refused. The rain served to conceal the movement from the Confederate pickets, and Hooker's refusal to suspend probably saved part of the army from destruction. As a final adieu a lively artillery duel sprung up after daylight between some of the Federal and Confederate artillery, in which each side claimed to have put the other out of commission.
Thus ended the campaign, with the exception of Stoneman, who destroyed some property, and caused a good deal of alarm at Richmond, but whose raid was without material effect upon General Lee's communications, and contributed nothing to the campaign. To the absence of the greater part of the Federal cavalry may be attributed the surprise and destruction of the ​11th corps, and as it turned out, its presence would have been more important to Hooker, even than Stuart's to Lee at Gettysburg. The news that Hooker and his army had recrossed the Rappahannock was received at the north with incredulity and consternation, second only to what occurred after the battle of Bull Run. Horace Greely, Editor of the New York Tribune, rushed into his office with the latest telegram in his hand, exclaiming "My God! it is horrible! horrible! Think of it. 130,000 magnificent soldiers cut to pieces by less than 60,000 half starved ragamuffins." These "ragamuffins" were described by a correspondent of the London Times who witnessed the return of Anderson's division on the Plank road on May 5th as, "splashing through the mud, in wild, tumultuous spirits, singing, shouting, jesting, heedless of soaking rags, drenched to the skin, and burning again to mingle in the mad revelry of battle."
DAVID GREGG McINTOSH, Col. of Artilley, C. S. A.
February 23, 1915.