# Mexico and its reconstruction/Chapter 20

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CHAPTER XX
THE TROUBLESOME BORDER
When one American speaks to another of "the border," there is no doubt what border is meant. When the frontier problem is under discussion, it is always the Mexican frontier. There is no Canadian border in the sense in which there is a Mexican border; on that side there is a boundary line, but it has no problems. As an artificial barrier to free passage of trade it is troublesome to individuals on both sides of the line and looked upon as a necessary nuisance. It is not an imaginary wall separating two clashing sets of national interests, a protection against the aggressions of a suspected neighbor before whose courts a man from beyond the boundary is not de facto equal before the law.
Why is it that our southern boundary has been and is a problem, a "frontier" with all the sinister connotations of the word, while our northern boundary is not? The answer touches many of the reasons for the lack of good understanding between America and its southern neighbor.
The ill-feeling along the frontier is partly explained by history; it is the survival of the hate aroused by the Mexican War, but this is, at most, only the capstone of a group of elements, the one that claims first attention and lives longest in the memory, without being the most fundamental. Educated Mexicans still avoid reference ​to "'49" or discuss it as a year, the events of which are a source of national grief and a warning of what may again be expected. The agents of Germany in the World War thought the feeling still of sufficient potency to justify holding out before Mexico the possibility of a revanche. It may be doubted whether this sentiment runs as deeply as some would have us believe. Mexico does remember that the United States was her enemy in the middle of the nineteenth century, more keenly than she remembers the service rendered her by the same nation some two decades later, but she would not do so if there were not other elements contributing to her regret for losing the little-settled and less-governed wilderness that she lost in her war with the United States.
The underlying causes of Mexican-American distrust fall into three overlapping groups—human, physical, and governmental. Of the first the most important is the contrast of race. The attitude of the people of the United States toward the less-developed races has never been a friendly one. It has lacked the tolerance which the British have developed for the peoples with whom they have come into contact.
The problem has been more difficult in America, because it has been a closer one. Except in the Philippines, the less-developed peoples with whom the United States has had to deal have been within its body politic or upon its edges. There has not been any clear-cut class distinction, recognized by both sides, such as has established the relation of "superior" and "inferior" in most of the cases where Anglo-Saxon populations have come into contact with non-Europeans outside of ​America. Those who have come into contact with Mexican civilization along the border, too, have been, to a large extent, that portion of the American people who have had closest contact with the negro population of the republic and regard them, and to hardly a less degree any colored or mixed blood people, as unquestionably inferior. To the Mexican this attitude is a constant irritation.
Contrast in language and civilization accentuates frontier problems. On our northern boundary there is neither. Immigrants pass in both directions hardly conscious that the boundary exists. The flowing into Canada of an agricultural population from the United States occurred without clash. A similar movement could not take place from the United States to Mexico. To be sure, there is a border belt in which there is a population to some degree bi-lingual and large numbers of Mexicans, especially since the revolution, have sought an opportunity for a more secure livelihood across the border. But the average Mexican in the United States remains a foreigner in habits of life. For him, on account of a combination of elements including race, lack of education, and lack of resources, it is hard to become a part of the life of the new community in which he finds himself. In many cases he does not wish to do so.
Americans of the border states of Mexico also seldom identify themselves with the local life. They keep their American citizenship; they may be engaged in the exploitation of mines, lumber, or other natural resources, but they are representative of a "foreign interest." Even though they become landowners, they continue to ​look upon themselves as foreigners and to be looked upon as foreigners by the native population.
It is common to hear Americans speak of the United States as the melting pot. They are proud of the adaptability of the American. They take a certain pride in the easy way in which the European populations have been blended into the body politic. They have not shown the same willingness or ability to absorb non-European stocks or to be absorbed by them.
The American people have declared by law that they will not allow an opportunity to arise under which Chinese may be absorbed, and the Japanese are excluded by law plus administrative regulation. They have refused to absorb the aboriginal Americans and alliance with the imported non-European stocks brings social ostracism. Mexicans in the United States hardly fare better. If they are of Spanish ancestry, that fact is emphasized and any prejudice against them disappears—they are then Europeans. If they are not, they suffer the same discrimination as other mixed blood or non-European peoples. The same unyielding prejudice follows the American settler in Mexico. He is proud to remain a foreigner, and he looks with disfavor on any alliance of his sons or daughters with any Mexican not of pure European ancestry.
The physical features of the border have contributed to the lack of good understanding between Mexico and the United States. They, of course, largely determined the settlement or the lack of settlement of the region. The broad dry strip of territory stretching northward from the Gulf of Mexico toward the mouth of the ​Colorado River seemed, until the coming of the railroads, to be the perfect boundary, which theorists have imagined for separating nations. It was almost a desert. It was not valuable land. A sparse population was all it could support where it could support any at all. Small land-ownership was unthinkable.
Mexican efforts to control this region had always been futile. They never had effective control over the region north of the Rio Grande before the war with the United States, and it was long after the middle of the last century before any true policing of the district south of it was attempted. Even up to the time of the present revolution the native tribes of her northwest disputed her authority with fair success.
Effective American control extended south west ward more rapidly than Mexican governmental authority came to meet it, but it would be easy to overemphasize the fact. At all times it is difficult to police a sparsely settled, arid country, such as the lands along the Mexican border were a generation ago. They continued up to our own day to be a region wherein things were done with impunity—on both sides—that neither government would approve, a territory in which each man was, to a large degree, a law unto himself. It was a place where individualism thrived, where self-help was at a premium, and where the strong one was too often the judge of the rights of the weak.
A region like the Mexican border produced and drew to itself from other regions a not too gentle population. The only life that could be lived there was one on which adventurous spirits thrived. Those who had ventured ​too much in the communities of their birth came to add their bit to keep life on the border from becoming dull. If they were "wanted back home," they had a tendency to step across the border, whence they might make themselves even more a subject of anxiety for their home governments.
Such a community, as it grew, developed a rough and ready character not inconsistent with respect for its own, but having little conscience about the rights of those across the border. The records of the foreign relations of the United States and Mexico for the '70s, '80s and '90s of the past century are interesting, if not always pleasant reading. They are by no means records of a civilization of which either Mexicans or Americans can be uniformly proud. Raids, violations of sovereignty, contraband trade, corruption of officials, murders, miscarriage of justice, stimulation of national antipathy by newspapers, which baited each other across the border—the record is full of evidence that the friction in Mexican-American relations was so great that a bursting forth into flame was a possibility for years and doubtless would have occurred frequently but for the efforts of the governments to calm the local discontent.
In the period before the Diaz régime a stream of complaints of lawlessness went from the border to Washington and Mexico. While the revolution was in progress the partisans of Lerdo de Tejada operated along the border and were popular in certain districts of Texas. At times they allowed United States troops freedom to operate on both sides of the river to put ​down raiders. At others the local authorities were completely out of hand and no attempt was made by the Mexicans to control them nor was a willingness evidenced to let the United States exercise effective measures to check wrongdoing. On the north side of the river the state authorities showed a disposition to act independently when the central government refused to give life and property protection from Mexican aggressions. In 1874, Governor Coke of Texas took affairs into his own hands and ordered the forces under his control to pursue cattle thieves "both on this side of the river and on the other," and when called to account by Secretary Fish, refused to modify his orders. There were several invasions by Texas troops in the following year.
During this period the offenses against order were doubtless more frequent from the Mexican than from the American side. Indeed, on May 20, 1875, Secretary of State Fish made the statement that during the four years previous there had been none from the United States and challenged proof to the contrary. The statement was handed to the Mexican minister of foreign affairs, who promised to examine the evidence in his office, but made no reply.
General Diaz came into power November 29, 1876. The United States refused to recognize his government, ​one reason being that there was "some doubt" whether his government "possessed the ability and the disposition to check the raids and depredations upon American property in the vicinity of the Rio Grande." In the first years of the Diaz régime the clashes continued frequent. Settlement was spreading into the southwest and the plunderable property was increasing in value, making the temptation to the lawless greater and the demand for redress more insistent. For several years conditions seemed to be growing steadily worse.
The border was a "free for all" region in these years. It is impossible to make distinction between American and Mexican outrages. They were frequent on both sides of the line, and it was often difficult to tell whether the guilty were Mexicans or Americans. The population of Texas exaggerated Mexican faults to emphasize their claims for damages and to induce the government to place more troops on the border, from the provisioning of which the local population might prosper. That this was true was admitted by the American Secretary of State. State and national control of the border later stiffened and wrongs committed against Mexicans north of the border decreased in number.
The Diaz administration, then striving to establish itself within the country and among the family of ​nations, did not consider of slight importance the crossing of the border by American troops and, while anxious to secure the friendship of the United States, was unwilling to do anything that seemed to cloud what was declared to be a principle of national sovereignty. In taking this position the government received the hearty support of the press. The administration insisted that in the later '70s raids were becoming less frequent. When an instance of violation of American territory by Mexicans was brought to his attention. President Diaz gave complete disavowal and promised prompt investigation, reparation, and punishment. He withdrew to the interior generals toward whom the United States had expressed distrust and whom it appears Diaz himself could not fully control. He sought a similar standard of action from the United States.
But, for the United States, evidences of the Mexican desire to relieve the tense situation on the border were not enough. The Mexican generals who were sent to replace those who had shown themselves in sympathy with border lawlessness were given a cool reception by the Mexican state and local officials and their authority was not recognized. Between October, 1876, and March, 1877, it was reported Indian marauders from Mexico killed 17 men and the arms and horses taken from the ​murdered men were openly offered for sale in Mexico. Large numbers of horses and cattle were driven from Texas into Mexico. In one instance a raiding party was followed over 150 miles into the country to their camp "where nearly 100 of the cattle had been slaughtered and beef was found drying." The marauders found a refuge in the Mexican towns when pursued and sold their plunder there. In some cases American troops crossed the border and punished the offenders. The United States military authorities declared "that the only way to check these atrocities is to follow the delinquents into Mexico and there attack them in their lairs. The Government of the United States was coming to feel that if the outrages were persisted in, it would adopt this policy with or without the consent or acquiescence of Mexico.
Matters came to a head on June 1, 1877, when the Secretary of War wrote General Sherman instructing him to notify General Ord, commanding the border forces, to ask the coöperation of the Mexicans in bringing an end to disorder and to inform them that while the President was anxious to avoid giving offense, "the invasion of our territory by armed and organized bodies of thieves and robbers" could "not be longer endured." General Ord was informed that if Mexico continued to neglect to suppress such bands, the duty to do so would rest upon the United States, and the duty would be performed "even if its performance should render ​necessary the occasional crossing of the border by our troops." General Ord was informed that he was "at liberty, in the use of his own discretion, when in pursuit of a band of marauders, and when his troops are either in sight of them or upon a fresh trail, to follow them across the Rio Grande, and to overtake and punish them, as well as retake stolen property. . . ."
This was the famous Ord order. It was hardly issued before the United States Government had to complain that Diaz troops had driven a band of Lerdists across the river into Texas, where they were attacked and dispersed. American officers asked whether they should cross to punish the offending forces. They were instructed not to cross, but a prompt disavowal was demanded.
The Ord order meanwhile created a widespread protest in Mexico, and under date of June 18, 1877, the Mexican government ordered its forces to resist any crossing and to "repel force by force, should the invasion take place. In August a band of Mexicans raided the county seat of Starr County, Texas. American forces followed them to the river and the Governor of Texas demanded the extradition of the criminals, a demand supported by the United States Government. Mexico now made a serious effort at reparation, but the border officials had little respect for the demand made upon them. Some of the raiders were arrested and surrendered, although the extradition treaty did not ​demand it. The local authorities refused to surrender the rest. An American force crossed the border in October in pursuit of marauding Indians, but, on the approach of Mexican troops, retired.
By this time the Ord order had been modified on assurance that Diaz recognized the gravity of the situation and would send to the border a prudent general with an adequate force. General Ord was instructed to cooperate with the Mexican general and to cross the border only in an aggravated case. The instruction did not stop the crossings. A proposal to allow reciprocal privilege met a non-committal answer from the Mexican commander. The officers had received commands not to attack the United States troops, but to "see" them cross the border. Later the objectionable Ord order was revoked to the great satisfaction of Mexico.
In the meantime Minister Foster, on April 24, 1877, recommended that recognition be given Diaz by the United States, in the belief that this might strengthen the hands of the government. On March 23, 1878, though conditions in Mexico were still unsatisfactory, the President instructed the American Minister that the Diaz government was formally recognized. Later in the year Mexico was still unable to repress raids and the United States again declared it would not stand ​quietly by while the criminals were allowed to flee into Mexico, there to have refuge from just punishment. "When Mexico will pursue the marauders, the United States will be glad to stop doing so at its own boundary," but cases in which Mexican troops were fed with the cattle yielded by border raids, the commanding officer knowing of the theft, protecting the raiders, and furnishing them with arms, were unbearable. If Mexico could not, or would not, punish such acts, the United States, it was intimated, would have to, whatever happened to the theory of sovereignty in the meantime.
While these events were taking place, the governments were in negotiation to try to secure some basis for an agreement by which the threatening clash could be avoided. Finally, in 1881, a limited reciprocal right of crossing was arranged, but one, unfortunately, that it proved impossible to make permanent. Though the agreement did not satisfy either side, it helped to bridge over what proved to be the period of greatest danger. Both sides continued to report atrocious happenings, but there developed a greater willingness to admit that the problem was a mutual one in which the elimination of the cause was at least as important as the maintenance of the theoretic rights of sovereignty.
General Polk, commanding the Department of the Missouri in the early '80s, declared it beyond question "that bands of thieves infest the whole southwest and plunder citizens in both countries." "They. . . are sometimes occupied in smuggling, at others in ​stealing." A few years later a similar complaint was made by Mexico. Her minister of foreign affairs complained that American Indians crossed the border, committed depredations, and then fled across the protecting boundary. It was claimed by the Governor of Chihuahua that in less than one month more than 60 persons had been killed by savages in that state alone. "It is high time," concludes the Minister of Foreign Affairs, "for the honor of the age in which we live, for the honor of two powerful neighboring Republics, for the sake of the friendship that happily exists between them, . . . that a stop be put to [these] frightful scenes, . . ." As the Diaz government succeeded in establishing itself and as the settlement and better policing of the American side of the river progressed, the danger of a breach between the two governments lessened.
The source of complaint gradually shifted to the westward and, as exploitation of the resources of the border states progressed, especially after the railroads crossed the boundary, southward. The border problem broadened and became one involving the general protection of the life and property of foreigners. The violation of sovereignty by crossing the frontier in one direction or the other was less common and the rights of resident aliens came more frequently under discussion. Since the economic development of the country was spreading from north to south, it was natural that the disputes should more frequently involve the rights of United States citizens in Mexico than the reverse. ​The border itself was still a source of irritation, but a less insistent one. At times each government showed a disposition to blame the other or to explain its own shortcomings by reference to peculiar disadvantages under which its military forces worked. By 1892, though the military measures taken had "sufficed to make . . . lawless attempts very dangerous and unprofitable to the criminal," who might or might not operate under a political disguise, there was still enough marauding to keep the discussion warm. The Mexican Minister of Foreign Affairs and the American Secretary of State continued to complain to each other against raids by groups of bandits from across the border. The Mexican statesman asserted that when the bands crossed into Mexico they were beaten back toward the border across which they fled, taking refuge in the United States, whence they could again issue as soon as the vigilance of the Mexican troops relaxed or other favorable circumstances developed. Local sentiment along the border was still declared not to be against the bandits, as was shown by "culpable connivance or tolerance on the part of certain functionaries in Texas." More federal troops should be provided for keeping the peace. The American government replied that "the efforts of the United States Government to prevent these raids from its territory into Mexico seem to receive little cooperation . . . from the Mexican side. . . ." If Mexico would only keep a force on the south, such as the United States had on the north, all would be well, Mexico apparently found it inadvisable to attempt to maintain a force of such size as was suggested by her ​northern neighbor and the United States was indisposed to increase the number of its troops. It felt that the running down and punishment of the guilty was a better method of stamping out banditry than the adoption of extensive preventive measures.
On both sides the control of the marauders was rendered difficult by their methods of operation. A band might be collected in the United States, for example, with the intent of raiding Mexico, but it would cross the border casually at different points as individuals. Meeting at a rendezvous, the depredations would be committed, and the guilty would again disperse. The only time when the band could be met as a band, therefore, was when the wrongful acts were actually being committed.
The same circumstances surrounded raids from Mexico against the United States. In the latter country, at least, there was the added difficulty that the pursuit of the wrongdoers was a duty of the civil authorities of the government or of Texas and the troops could only aid the United States marshals as a part of their posse. Coöperation by allowing a reciprocal crossing of the boundary in pursuit of wrongdoers seemed an obviously desirable privilege and one that Mexico now seemed disposed to grant, while the United States held back. For both countries this was a curious reversal of position compared to the early '80s. The United States felt that the increase of settlement made the problems, which would arise under such conditions, more serious than formerly. The military authorities in charge of border affairs did not favor a renewal of the arrangement. It ​did prove possible, however, to arrange for cooperation in notifying the forces of each country of possible raids and to station the troops in such a way that the fords could be more effectively policed. In at least one case a reciprocal right of crossing was arranged.
Impartially considered, it is plain that in the border incidents the shortcomings did not lie wholly on one side. At times each country found itself drawn into defending persons because of their nationality who deserved no protection from any one. Sometimes the rules of international law, which were intended to promote good relations among nations, seemed to be the chief cause of entanglements. For example, it was not always easy to differentiate border raids from "revolutions" or either of these from the Indian depredations, which even down to our own day have continued to be a source of disturbance along the boundary. In the discussions of pursuit of wrongdoers across the border there has been a conspicuous lack of willingness to recognize the fact that under the conditions that have existed it would be better for both parties to place considerations of public order and justice above insistence upon scrupulous observance of the "rights of sovereignty."
Where settlement is sparse, policing on account of great distances is difficult, and the boundary' itself often hard to locate, opportunities for the lawless flourish and shuttling back and forth across an imaginary line is an easy way to defy the law. The local population on both sides of the border frequently looks upon the bandit ​as a semi-hero, if he confines his operations to the other side of the boundary. Evidence of guilt is hard to secure partly because of this sympathy and partly because of fear of retaliation by friends of the accused. Dissatisfaction is sure to result, especially when one country does not or cannot maintain as efficient a police patrol as does its neighbor. Add to these elements a roving population, one that gives only nominal respect to either sovereignty, such as the border Indian tribes were, and trouble is very likely to rise. If either side yields to the temptation to enlist these aborigines in its own military forces, either as guides or as soldiers, as both Mexico and the United States formerly did, clash is almost unavoidable. Looked at long after the event, it is not remarkable that there were such acrid interchanges between the two governments. It is to the credit of both that wiser counsels prevailed and that the many technical causes of war were kept in their proper perspective.
The meticulous insistence on respect for technical rights under international law, which some border incidents involved, makes the history of some of them amusing as well as illustrative of frontier conditions and psychology. One of these was the much-discussed case of Jesus García arising in 1896.
The incident arose in Nogales, a town located on both sides of the border, with a street running diagonally through it which crosses the boundary line. García was a powerful man described as "a low-down desperado," who was at the time of the incident "on a general drunk," "bulldozing the saloons." He and another Mexican came out of a saloon on the American side of the line ​and began to fight. An American officer ran toward them and arrested them on the American side of the boundary. García resisted. The officer called for assistance and another American ran from the Mexican side of the line and collided with García, who fell with his head and a small part of his body on Mexican territory. No blow was struck. García was then marched toward the jail and on again resisting was struck with a leather walking cane to quiet him. No blood was drawn.
As reported to the Mexican government and made the basis of diplomatic protest, this case had a decidedly different character. Two Americans, one an officer, crossed into Mexican territory to arrest García. The civilian knocked him down and the officer beat him while prostrate. They then dragged him across the line into Arizona, assisted by another American civilian. On the way to the prison the Mexican was again subjected to a cruel beating.
That such an affair should be raised to the dignity of an international incident would seem ridiculous and impossible if the high state of feeling and the willingness to twist evidence resulting therefrom were not realized. The affair was finally patched up through acceptance by the Mexican authorities of the statement that no invasion of Mexican territory was contemplated and the declaration that in the opinion of the United States none had occurred. ​The opening years of the nineteenth century, during which the Diaz régime was reaping the reward of its efforts to establish order and induce the economic development of the country, brought the period of most cordial relations between Mexico and the United States. The border problem was not at an end, but it was active only in Arizona and New Mexico and even there involved not so much raids across the boundary as the prevention of the purchase in the border towns of arms and ammunition, which were later used by the Indians against American citizens living south of the border. The attitude of the local authorities in the Mexican northwest toward American settlers also continued to be a matter of complaint. Both governments were anxious to do all in their power to remove the reasons for friction.
The Yaqui Indians, against whose acts the most numerous protests were made, are a Sonora tribe, about ​whose wrongs and wrongdoings much discussion has occurred in both Mexico and the United States. Part of the tribe were peaceful, but others were chronic troublemakers, who, as President Diaz once reminded the American Ambassador, were comparable to the Apaches with whom the United States had had so much difficulty. They were especially active against Americans. These, the most prominent foreigners engaged in exploitation of the country, they looked upon as disturbers of what they considered the immemorial privileges of the tribe. The Mexican government, at least the central government, did its best to punish the guilty, but it could not always rely upon the soldiers it sent to punish the Indian bands. It adopted the policy of taking arms and ammunition away from the Indians, thinking that would bring an end to the trouble. After 1903 the government deported to Yucatan and Quintana Roo many Indians who had taken part in marauding. Others were sent to colonization enterprises in Sinaloa and still others set to work in convict gangs in Sonora. To those who were disposed to settle down to a peaceful life the government supplied farming implements, farm animals, and poultry in Sinaloa. The Indians, however, continued to cross into Arizona towns "to work," where they replenished their ammunition supplies and then returned to Mexico to start trouble again. The local ​authorities were instructed to furnish escorts to Americans when they went outside the settled districts. It does not appear that such protection was always given, and in some cases when proffered it was declined by Americans, especially by mining prospectors, who did not want to have their movements observed.
In 1906 President Diaz asked whether the United States would not give its active coöperation to stop the Yaquis from getting supplies of arms in the way indicated. To do so would make it possible to assure order in the northwest states, promote their development, protect the lives of American citizens, and help to eliminate the claims for damages against the government of Mexico, The President, of the United States promised to do what he could to help. In the following year the Secretary of the Interior asked the Governor of Arizona to put into effect again precautionary measures to prevent smuggling of arms. This he did. Similar orders were issued by the Secretary of the Treasury to the Customs Collector at Nogales. In 1908 the United States government concentrated forces along the border to stop fleeing marauders from seeking refuge in American territory, thus assisting the Mexican troops to stamp out disorder.
In short, in the closing years of the Diaz régime there was cordial cooperation between the government of ​Mexico and the United States for the elimination of the border problem. Possibility of friction still existed for reasons of a nature that it will be difficult to remove, but the old suspicion and animosity shared by large numbers of both peoples, which made the border a source of constant irritation for both, was rapidly passing. The border problem was less a problem than it had ever been. American economic interests had spread southward far beyond the boundary, and Mexico realized and admitted her duty, under international law and the rules of comity, to give them full protection. Mexican interests had grown in the United States, not in the development of the economic resources of that country, for Mexico was still a non-industrial debtor nation and had no large amounts of capital seeking investment abroad, but through the realization that the two countries, which had such close geographical relations, had, in their foreign trade, an economic common interest that closely bound the fortunes of the one to the fortunes of the other.
The good feeling that existed between the two republics was illustrated by the expressions of appreciation that passed between them just before the close of the Diaz régime.
Secretary Elihu Root, the guest of honor at a banquet given by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, carried the statement further. He said:
Among the friendly declarations from the Mexican side that which touches best the old distrust and the new confidence between the two countries was perhaps that of Manuel Calero, President of the Chamber of Deputies, who said:
Two years later there occurred the first exchange of visits between the Presidents of the two republics and the first visit of an American President to Mexico. At that meeting, after President Diaz had spoken of the cultivation and maintenance of the cordial relations existing. President Taft in his reply took "occasion to pronounce the hearty sentiments of friendship and accord with which the American public regard the Mexican people." He declared, "The aims and ideals of ​our two nations are identical, their sympathy mutual and lasting, and the world has become assured of a vast neutral zone of peace, in which the controlling aspiration of either nation is individual human happiness."
Few were they who realized upon what an insecure foundation the Diaz régime rested. Order had been so long established that even the majority of those well acquainted with local conditions had come to consider it as a matter of course and, in her foreign affairs, Mexico had come to enjoy a position of greater prestige than any other Latin-American state. Capital was flowing from abroad to develop her industries, interest on public obligations was being promptly met, there was a surplus in the public treasury that could be devoted to the improvement of the conditions of the country. There was no cloud on the international horizon. Relations with all foreign nations were friendly and with the United States, the country with which the republic is of necessity most closely associated in foreign affairs, relations were cordial. The two countries had greater confidence in each other than ever before. The wounds of the conflict of two generations before were healing, the irritations of border conflicts were at a minimum. Everything seemed to justify the hope that there had been created in North America an area within which peace internal and external was secure.
* ↑ Shafter to the Assistant Attorney General, May 10, 1877, House Document 13, 45th Congress, 1st Session, p. 147.
* ↑ In a memorandum left by Mariscal with Evarts June 7, 1877, published in ibid., p. 61.
* ↑ Foster to Evarts, June 28, 1877, in ibid., p. 30.
* ↑ A gloomy review by Minister J. W. Foster of the condition of Americans in Mexico and of border relations covering a period of more than five years is found in Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1879, p. 755 et seq.
* ↑ House Document 13, 45th Congress, 1st Session, Foster to Evarts, July 24, 1877, in a Memorandum of the Mexican Minister of Foreign Affairs, p. 88.
* ↑ See collection of newspaper comments in ibid., p. 21 et seq.
* ↑ Memorandum by Mexican Minister of Foreign Affairs forwarded to Secretary Evarts by Minister Foster, July 24, 1877, in ibid., p. 40.
* ↑ Foster to Evarts, July 9, 1877, ibid., p. 34.
* ↑ Foster to Fish, March 3, 1877, ibid., p. 8.
* ↑ Evarts to Foster, ibid., p. 4, citing a report of P. H. Sheridan which refers to an opinion of Colonel Shafter.
* ↑ Secretary of War to General Sherman, June 1, 1877, ibid., p. 14.
* ↑ Ibid., p. 18 et seq.
* ↑ Under date of June 9, 1877, ibid., p. 101.
* ↑ Ibid., pp. 45-240, passim.
* ↑ Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1880-1, p. 735.
* ↑ Foster to Evarts, April 24, 1877, op. cit., p. 6.
* ↑ Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1878, pp. 543 and 573.
* ↑ Ibid., p. 612.
* ↑ Ibid., 1881, p. 756.
* ↑ Ibid., 1883-4, p. 680 et seq.
* ↑ These facts are summarized from ibid., 1893, vol. 1, pp. 429-55.
* ↑ Ibid., 1896, p. 438.
* ↑ Ibid., 1893, vol. 1, p. 457, also ibid., 1896, pp. 439, 448, 449, 454.
* ↑ A review of the various incidents which kept feeling aroused along the border is obtainable in Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States. Some of the more important disputes illustrating phases of the border problem are found at the following points: 1878, p. 679, illustrating "revolutionary" activity; 1888, vol. 2, p. 1176, illustrating border kidnapping; 1893, vol. 1, p. 468, illustrating difficulty of securing evidence as to raiders; 1895, pp. 997-1013, illustrating position of refugees guilty of embezzlement; 1897, pp. 372 and 405, illustrating claims for damages caused by disturbance of public order. What is a political act?, also ibid., 1898, pp. 491-510; 1899, p. 499, illustrating unwillingness to surrender citizens to justice of another country; 1904, pp. 462-72, illustrating the prejudices of lower Mexican courts, and ibid., pp. 473-81, illustrating attitude of Texas authorities toward Mexican delinquents.
* ↑ Correspondence illustrating both phases of the problem is found in ibid., 1905, p. 639 et seq.
* ↑ Ibid., 1906, p. 1142.
* ↑ Accounts of transfer of parties of such Indians are found in ibid., p. 1134 et seq. The policy of the government toward the Yaquis, as described by Diaz, is outlined at p. 1141.
* ↑ Ibid., 1905, p. 648.
* ↑ A number of incidents illustrating these conditions are described in ibid., p. 639 et seq.
* ↑ Ibid., 1906, p. 1149; see also ibid., 1907, p. 846 et seq.
* ↑ Ibid., 1908, p. 604, quoting the Mexican Herald of September 17, 1908.
* ↑ Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1907, p. 859.
* ↑ Ibid., p. 867.
* ↑ Ibid., p. 855.
* ↑ Ibid., 1909, pp. 425-8.