# The Finnish Revolution/Chapter 1

THE FINNISH REVOLUTION A SELF-CRITICISM.
I.
FEARS AND HESITATIONS IN FACE OF THE REVOLUTION.
Proletarian revolutions, as Marx says, are always their own critics. We who have taken part in them ought consciously to facilitate this self-criticism, without, for that matter, seeking to avoid the historical responsibilities for our previous action.
The Finnish Revolution began in January of this year. Its mistakes had already begun in the preceding year.
Just as the war took most of the Socialist parties in the great European countries by surprise, and showed how little they were conscious of their historic mission, so in the spring of 1917 the Russian Revolution surprised Finnish Social-Democracy. This spring-time liberty fell for us like a gift from the skies, and our party was overwhelmed by the intoxicating sap of March. The official watchword had been that of independent class-struggle, i.e., the same which German Social Democracy had put forward before the war. During the reactionary period it was easy enough to maintain this position; it was not exposed to any serious attack, and resistance on the part of the Socialists of the Right could not manage to make itself felt. In March the Party's proletarian virtue was exposed to temptation and to fall into sin; and in fact our Social-Democracy prostituted itself just as much with the bourgeoisie of Finland as with that of Russia (at ​the beginning). The Russian Mensheviki also came forward tempters. The Finnish Coalition Government was the offspring of this immoral union. At the time of its formation in March about hall the Party representatives were opposed to it, and it was joined only by the Eight Socialists. Nevertheless, the resistance of the others was of so passive a nature, that it did not hinder for a single moment our collaboration with those Socialists who were hobnobbing with Finnish and Russian landowners. And it was very characteristic that in our Party meeting, held in June—during which we, in passing, gave our adhesion to the Zimmerwald International—not a single voice wns raised to demand separation from the Government Socialists.
What above all led us astray was the vague phantom of Parliamentary Democracy. If we had not had a Diet composed of a single Chamber, Proportional Representation and a relatively wide suffrage, and if the elections of the summer of 1916 our Party had not obtained a majority in the Diet, it might perhaps have been easier to be on our guard against the spring temptation. But at this moment the path of Parliamentary Democracy seemed cleared to an extraordinary extent, and wide vistas opened themselves out before our working-class movement. Our bourgeoisie had no army, nor even a police force they could count upon; and, moreover, could not form one by any lawful means, seeing that they would have needed the authorisation of the Social-Democrats of the Diet. Therefore there seemed every reason to keep to the beaten track of Parliamentary legality, in which, so it appeared, Social Democracy could wrest one victory after another from the middle class.
For Parliamentary Democracy to burst into full bloom it was now only necessary to get rid of the feeble authority of the Russian Provisional Government; to which the Finnish bourgeoisie clung like a drowning man to a straw. The Social-Democrats wished to brush aside, or at least to curtail, its legal right to interfere, so that it could not trouble the "internal affairs" of the country; in other words to protect the interests of the bourgeoisie. In this way our patriotism and our struggle for the independence of Finland seemed to spring from the very highest motives; it was a direct fight for democratic liberty, an organic part of the proletarian class-war.
​The legislative results obtained the Diet during the summer played their part in lulling us in the illusions of Parliamentarianism.
The normal working day of eight hours, which the mass of the workers had already caused to he adopted in most trades, became law; scarcely a Parliament had a more advanced law on this question than that of Finland. For the democratisation of the Communal Administration there was noted also a reform which meant that the power which had been entirely monopolised by the capitalists was transferred to the platform of Universal Suffrage—and this which was a bigger step in advance than had been known to any previous legislation. We saw clearly that the adoption of these laws was by no means due to the Parliament itself, but that a tempestuous wind from without had helped them to cross the shoals of Parliamentarianism with greater facility than in more normal times. This tempest made itself felt in the form of a mass demonstration which accompanied a full session of the Diet, in which one was conscious of a spirit more violent than usual, thanks above all to the presence of some Russian soldier comrades. There was nothing new in this for us, for we had always explained that Parliamentarianism gives its best results when the people exert pressure from without.
A worse sign of the powerlessness of Parliamentary Democracy to obtain results, was its inability to stop he wastage in food supplies. This naturally led to the belie that the Parliamentary results mentioned above were after all only results on paper, for the law necessary to stop speculation in food supplies was drawn up and voted, although that was as far as it got. The Coalition Government in reality did nothing. It was like a lazy bull which the Socialists were pulling by the horns, whilst the bourgeois pulled it by the tail, so that it went neither backward nor forward. And so speculation could go on in peace.
The hungry working masses soon lost all confidence in the Coalition Government, and, when all is said, in the leaders of the Social-Democratic Party as well. At Helsingfors the enraged workers sought, on their own account, to take stock of and distribute the stores of butter, and in the autumn a general strike broke out quite automatically in the capital, ​and lasted two days until the organised proletariat ended it. The atmospheric pressure, increased in a most disturbing fashion for our Parliamentarianism. It was the realisation of Democracy; the free aggravation of the Class Struggle. But we Social-Democratic representatives failed to comprehend true Democracy, and only its fleeting image was before our eyes.
This phantasmagoria was shaken for the first time by the Provisional Government of Kerensky. In spite of a violent resistance on the part of the bourgeois minority, the Diet had passed a fundamental law relating to the internal democratic liberty of Finland and to the Diet's right of wielding supreme power in the country. This law had been drawn up in accordance with the decisions of the Congress of Representatives of the All-Russian Workers' and Soldiers' Councils. A semi-official deputation of Mensheviki (Tcheidze, Lieber, and Dan) came from Petrograd to prevent the passing of the so-called law of the "supreme power," but they were too late. Thereupon, at the end of July, the Russian Provisional Government dissolved the Diet and ordered new elections. On two occasions our Social-Democratic group attempted to hold a plenary session of the dissolved Diet. The first time hussars, sent by Kerensky, were found posted at the gates of the building. The second time we found nothing but "Kerensky's seals." The President of the Diet, Comrade Manner, had the doors opened, and the plenary session rook place, but it was only attended by members of the Social-Democratic group.
Our Party did not refuse to take part in the elections which were held at the beginning of October. By these elections, in spite of a marked increase in the number of Social-Democratic voters, we lost our majority in the Diet. The chief resource of the bourgeois parties in the elections was evidently sophistication. Immediately after the elections the Press gave out that in the constituencies where the bureau was made up solely of bourgeois, the bourgeois parties had obtained a number of votes greater than that of the sum-total by electors in the whole of the northern region. Later, during the revolution, there were discovered in the "cachettes" of presidents of electoral bureaux whole masses of Social-Democratic voting papers, regularly filled up. The bourgeois in addition gained several seats by means of ​electoral cartels. But, apart altogether from these causes, I am convinced that the nascent disgust at Parliamentarianism amongst the mass of the proletariat contributed to the election results. The Diet's powerlessness, and the uncertainty of the results of its work, its delays and lack of energy, the slackening of the political activity of Social-Democracy at the instance of the Coaliiton Government—with the result that electoral enthusiasm amongst the proletariat was in no wise so great as one had a right to expect, in view of the strong political tension then reigning. It became evident that the fine illusions of our Parliamentary Democracy and received this second shock not merely by reason of external causes, but partly as a result of our own mistakes and intrinsic feebleness.
From now onwards the torrent of history rushed with a furious rapidity towards its first place of foaming eddies. As might have been expected, the bourgeoisie sought to make use of the advantage they had gained by seizing dictatorial power and degrading the Diet into a mere mask covering the dictatorship. Tho working class, on the other hand, had lost all hope on immediate help on the part of the Diet, and was tending consciously or unconsciously towards revolution. The Coalition Government had already been dissolved before the elections. The bitterness of the class-struggle could prevent nothing.
Moreover, even in Finland it was felt that Russia was steering towards a new and more complete revolution, the explosion of which might he heard at any moment. Kerensky's Provisional Government was trembling like an aspen in a storm. The power of tho Bolsheviki was growing like a storm-cloud.
Our Social-Democracy, which ought in this crisis to have put forth the whole of its forces in preparing for revolution, sat and waited quite calmly for—the meeting of the Diet! At the beginning of November the union of the bourgeois groups voted a resolution entrusting the supreme power in internal affairs—formerly a prerogative of the monarch—to a triumvirate, but did not dare to put this decision into execution. At the same time they entered into negotiations with the Russian Provisional Government concerning the sharing of power. Nekrasoff, the Governor-General of ​Kerensky's Government, left for Petrograd, taking with him a draft of an agreement for signature.
But he did not return to Helsingfors. The Russian proletariat had, at that very time, under the leadership of the Bolshevik party, overthrown the bourgeoisie and their lackeys and bad itself taken the reins of power.
Amongst us, too, the genius of revolt passed over the country. We did not mount upon its wings, but bowed our heads and let it fly far above us. In this way, November was for us but a festival to commemorate our capitulation!
Would revolution at that time have given us the victory in Finland? That is not the same thing as asking if the revolution of the proletariat would have been able to get the victory directly as in Russia. At this distance the first seems probable. The second, on the other hand, improbable, just as it did at the time.
The chances of success were not on the whole bad. The enthusiasm and desire to fight on the part of tho proletariat were, on the whole, great. The bourgeoisie was relatively badly armed, in spite of the fact that it had begun to get arms from Germany. It is true that the proletariat was also without arms. We borrowed several hundreds of rifles from groups of Russian soldiers at Helsingfors, and that was, practically speaking, all that we had in the way of arms at that time. There is no doubt, however, that more could have been obtained, at need, from Russian comrades, at least up to a certain point. What was far more important, the Russian soldiers could have given much more direct military aid to the Finnish revolution than later during the winter, when the "débâcle" of the Russian army and navy was at its height. There were doubtless also in our country certain Russian forces whom one could reckon on as being more liable to obey the orders of their reactionary officers than the behests of proletarian solidarity; but it is not at all likely that these elements would have made any really important active resistance to the revolutionary tempest.
In face of these signs, we Social-Democrats, "united on the basis of the class war," swung first to one side and then to the other, leaning first of all strongly towards revolution, only to draw back again. The true Socialists of the Right, who were about half the Party, were divided into two groups, one distinctly opposing the revolution and the other desiring ​it. In the Social-Democratic group of the Diet, the majority was evidently so hostile to the revolutionary currents that it could be said to be with the bourgeoisie rather than with the proletariat. On the other hand the Right Socialist leaders in the territorial organisations wanted to have recourse to a sort of revolution, a kind of revolutionary general strike, to obtain the majority in the Government.
Acting in conjunction with them the Council of our Party (the Labour Commission) formed a Central Revolutionary Council which, especially after the S.-D. members of the Diet had given their adhesion—at first they were openly hostile to revolution—was good enough at making speeches on revolution, but impotent to carry out truly revolutionary policy. This Committee decided to begin by supporting the proclamation for a general strike. At a congress of representatives of the territorial organisation which bad just met, it was decided to call a general strike embracing the whole country. Was this strike to mean revolution, or simply a demonstration in support of the demands put forward in the strike manifesto? No decision was taken, for we were not at one on this point.
The general strike spread throughout. the country. Our "Central Revolutionary Council" discussed the question of going further. We, who without reason have been called "Marxists," did not wish to do so, and the "revolutionaries" of the territorial organisation did not wish to go forward without us.
In not desiring to go as far as revolution, we Social-Democrats of the Centre were, in a way, acting consistently with our point of view, imbued, as this had been for many years, with Socialist activity. We were in fact Social-Democrats and not Marxists. Our Social-Democratic point of view was: (1), Peaceful, continuous, but not revolutionary class-war, and at the same time (2), an independent class-war, seeking no alliance with the bourgeoisie. These two points of view decided our tactics.
(1). We did not believe in revolution; we did not trust it, nor did we call for it. This, when all is said, is characteristic of Social-Democracy.
Social-Democracy is in principle a working-class movement, which organises and moulds the workers for the class-struggle (legal, bourgeois and parliamentary). It is true that ​Socialism finds a place in its programme as the goal to be aimed at, and that, in a certain measure, it is a factor in the general trend of the true or "immediate" programme of Social-Democracy. But on the whole it is only a Utopian ornament, seeing that it is impossible even to imagine Socialism as realisable within the bourgeois society, in the framework of which the practical action of Social-Democracy is nevertheless enclosed. The road historically unavoidable for passing from the bourgeois into the socialist society, the road of revolution and of the dictatorship of the armed proletariat is quite outside the conscious, practical field of operation of Social-Democracy; it begins only where the action of Social-Democracy ends.
The relations of a consistent Social-Democracy with revolution are just as passive as those of a tolerant historian with respect to the revolutionaries of past times. "The Revolution is born, not made." is the favourite expression of Social-Democracy, for it considers that it is not its sphere to work in support of revolution. It has on the contrary a natural tendency to delay the revolutionary explosion. This is easy enough to understand from the view-point of the true practical object of Social-Democracy: the revolutionary movement distrusts its action and threatens to interrupt it. Now as one cannot, when it is a question of revolution, decide with absolute certainty whether it will lead at the first essay to victory or to defeat, it always, in tho event of revolution, seems possible that a danger threatens the gains of Social-Democracy's work of organisation, of its political conquests, its organisations, houses, libraries, newspapers, reforming laws, democratic institutions, acquired rights, etc. The whole practical action of Social-Democracy is founded on these benefits. They have become in part the intrinsic aim of its life; they are for the most port necessary to its future revolution and to its existence on the field of bourgeois legalism. That is why Social-Democracy strives by all means in its power to protect and conserve its conquests, even if danger threatens them from the side of the proletarian revolution.
Doubtless the doctrines of Social-Democracy, leaning in so doing on Marx, regard the conquests of organisation, their growth and conservation, as necessary in the very first place for the proletarian revolution. And evidently they are finally ​useful to this revolution. Yet the latter takes place not at all by reason of Social-Democracy but in spite of it. (In the same way the military organisation of the bourgeois State will assuredly prove useful to the proletarian revolution, although the latter is against the object—military organisation.) If Social-Democracy could always direct the will of the labouring masses, the working class with its organisations would hardly over plunge into no enterprise so risky as a revolution, and would thus never reach the final goal of Socialism, unless of course the bourgeoisie were itself to provoke the workers to revolution. In this case alone, then, is Social-Democracy consistent with itself—a thing, however, when it enters into a revolutionary struggle to protect its future and its legal bourgeois conquests—as we did in January.
In November, however, we determined to avoid the revolutionary struggle, partly in order to protect our democratic conquests, partly because we hoped to be able to weather the storm by Parliamentary means, perhaps also with the fatalistic idea in our minds, that "if the revolution comes now or later, it will come in spite of our resistance, and will show its power to the full."
What was the result of this historical error? Could we avoid an armed conflict? No! It was only postponed till a time when the bourgeoisie would be better prepared for it than they were in November. The bourgeoisie always bring about a conflict with the workers when they desire it. In the fight put up by the working class there was but one danger, namely, that the bourgeoisie might determine the moment for the outbreak of the revolution. When the workers begin the revolution, the bourgeois are not always ready at every point, and may thus be partially taken by surprise, especially if a reactionary Government has for a considerable time been arousing feelings of hatred amongst the masses. In that case, a revolution set in motion by the workers may carry with it the discontented middle classes, or at least it may disunite and discourage the partisans of the Government.
Seeing that a Government, even after some delay, has always at its disposal the means of disarming the masses, can arrest the protagonists of the revolution, can methodically place "safe" troops for attack and defence against "the internal enemy," and can in general concentrate the whole of ​its forces tor an active or passive resistance to the revolution. Moreover it may be taken for granted that at the moment when the class-war breaks out, the Government will know how to arrange the external situation as favourably as possible according to its needs, will, if possible, have sought help from outside, or in any case will have made ready in the rear against any attack coming from inside the frontier. In November the bourgeois class of Finland would have had more trouble in obtaining help from the German Government than they subsequently had in winter, when the German troops had beau withdrawn from the Russian from—but it was difficult for us to foresee this in November, or for that matter in January as well.
(2). We Centre Social-Democrats did not wish to form a "bloc" with the bourgeois "Liberals," although the Right S.-D.'s, those who were for, equally with those who were against tho revolution, looked upon it as desirable. With some sort of "entente" it is desirable. With some sort of "entente" of this kind, it was scarcely to he hoped that the aim which was floating before the eyes of the "Centrist" S.-D.'s could be realised, i.e., the formation of a Liberal Government whose members should be in great part Socialists, and whose programme should be the alleviation of tho food famine and tho adoption of a hundred different reforms through Parliamentary methods. That several Agrarians might be included as a sort of reinforcement in a "Red" Senate constituted by "revolutionary means" was looked upon favourably by the Right S.-D.'s. With this in view, the S.-D. group of the Diet, during the week of the general strike, held several conferences with the Agrarian Party, and probably also with certain other Liberal groups, and "Comrade" Tokoi made inquiries as to whether the Senate officials would remain at their posts under a "Red Senate." Thus the object of the "revolutionary" S.-D.'s was in reality to reform the spring Coalition Senate in a more thorough way than before, i. e., with a S.-D. majority, and leaving eventually the worst reactionaries out of account altogether.
Viewing the matter in the most favourable light, this result might well have been obtained by the revolution in November. Nothing more. Finnish Social-Democracy could have gained nothing else. One section of the workers would ​certainly have demanded more extreme measures, but the majority of our working class party, which was contented with so little, would then have been able ta stifle the real revolutionary voice of the proletariat, for having obtained satisfaction on this point, it would have opposed the revolutionary demands for a dictatorship. It would then have attained its object, or very nearly so. At this distance it now seems even more probable than it did then. In any case the Finnish bourgeois class would probably have given any for the time being before the revolutionary movement, in order the better to protect its own chief interests, which were in no way threatened by the Right S.-D.'s. The Finnish revolution in November would then most probably have become a bourgeois revolution with liberal tendencies. There would then have been a split on the ranks of the organised workers: the Right Wing would have drawn nearer to the Conservative Front with the bourgeoisie, the Left would have been the standard-bearer of Revolutionary Socialism or Communism, and would have continued to attack the bourgeois State with its partisans and powers.
It was in some such way, although not so clearly, that we "Marxists" in the Party Council had figured to ourselves the results of a revolution already continued during the week of the November general strike. But for that very reason we had two very weighty reasons for opposing the revolution: (1) We did not want to help in uniting the Right Socialists with the bourgeoisie, and (2) we wished to avoid splitting the S.-D.'s into two opposite camps. So that from this standpoint also our thought was moving in channels characteristic, not of Marxism, but of Social-Democracy.
In fact we curbed the historic evolution of things by preventing a split in the working class movement, although the beginnings of such a division were already a necessary condition if the working class movement were to advance towards a consciously revolutionary goal.
And now artifically patched up and with sections in opposition to one another, the movement was absolutely incapable of action. A division, it is true, might have been damaging to Social-Democratic action, i.e., to the success of Parliamentary and Trade Union work. Hopes of a success at the polls might have been lessened by it. But for the real progress of the working class movement, and for the ​strengthening of the class-war, this internal rupture could not but have been of service. It would have meant the withdrawal from the working class front of harmful and doubtful elements, which, ranged on the side of the bourgeoisie, would have done less damage to the revolutionary class struggle than in the ranks of the workers themselves.
Doubtless, in spite of the most intense effort, we should in all probability have been unable to dictate the revolution's immediate conquests. History itself would have done that. But we ought to have made the attempt, we ought to have fought and attacked, so as to help in the progress of events as much as possible. History itself cannot work with empty gloves—it needs fighting hands. And even if the great break up of the ice had not come in the history of the class-struggle in Finland, but had confined itself to disintegrating the bourgeois "bloc," this break-up would have been one step in advance. The force of resistance of the ice-block would have been weakened; the pressure of the torrent would not have been broken against a compact roof, and would have been able to bring all its strength and weight to bear against the opposing obstacle until it smashed it. This is, indeed, the most rapid and natural method to use in ice-breaking. It is just what came about in Russia. By this method a good beginning may most easily be made. The resistant power of the bourgeois. State is thus largely put out of working order at the decisive moment. On the other hand the break-up may hang out for weeks beyond the prescribed time, if the ice crust is of equal thickness right up to the last moment; if there are not formed here and there cracks and eddies before the final rupture.
We prevented the formation of these eddies by countermanding the general strike at the end of a week and by referring back a decision as to revolution to the Party Congress. This caused discontent and even exasperation amongst the working masses. The discontent did not reach the stage of revolt against the Party leaders, but it acted in a manner which was if anything still more dangerous for the future class struggles of the workers: confidence in the party leaders was to a great extent lost.
The leaders who had need, as one would have thought, of well-stoked fires in order to get up full speed against the enemy, now gaining strength, wasted their time in blowing ​upon and rekindling the ashes of distrust. The awakened mistrust and hostility made themselves felt in the sequel as a nightmare during the whole course of the Revolution. In this way there was sown in November the seed of the April débâcle. The Party Congress, which met a few weeks after the general strike, felt that already the crest of the revolutionary wave was beginning to fall under the influence of various cross winds. The delegates present at the conference had been elected during the spring, when conditions were quite different. About half of these delegates seemed to be more or less favourable to Revolution; the other half was opposed to it. We Centrists wanted, above everything, to keep the party together, and we "succeeded." In the joint resolution there was no statement either for or against Revolution, but in its place the spirit of the old class struggle manifested itself; also a whole crowd of unmeaning reforms were demanded by the bourgeoisie, and an appeal to arms was made to the workers, not, however, for a revolutionary offensive, but for the defence that had become necessary.
For the moment the necessity for defence had become the most important question, as the bourgeoisie, seeing that for the time being it had escaped the danger of revolution, was now consciously preparing for the attack. The bourgeois newspapers openly conducted a fierce campaign against Social-Democracy, and with more secrecy the bourgeoisie got ready for war, procured arms, drilled and put the bourgeois army, on a footing, and despatehed agents abroad on urgent missions. The workers' guard also drilled, and the party council even co-operated in this work. But the work went on lazily, without the necessary intensity and energy. Little revolutions were threatening here and there with their anarchic influences: at Abo a revolution of this kind broke out.
The work of Parliament was not, and could not be, anything than harmful to the working-class movement. All that it did was to bind together in a useless way all our forces which were necessary for the revolutionary struggle. It only served to deceive the masses and helped to mask what was coming, to close their eyes to bourgeois preparations, such preparations as the workers themselves ought to have made. When the Revolution had threatened to break out in ​November, we had been successful in getting a decision from the Democratic majority of the Diet, according to which the Diet itself, and not merely a Government "bloc," would have wielded the supreme power in the country. This seemed a real step, small enough it is true, towards pure democracy. In the Constituent Commission we were already tracing the fundamental lines of this régime, so fine in perspective, and decided to institute a competition for the best design tor a flag for the Finnish Democratic State.
It was then that we heard from the lips of M. Svinhufoud the constitution ef the Capitalist State. It contained but one paragraph:—" A strong police force."
It was an ignoble and sanguinary constitution. But it was bound to the historic reality of the class-war, and the repression of the masses at a time when more than one Social-Democrat was still dreaming of a Democratic Constitution springing from victories gained at the polls.
II.
FOR DEMOCRACY.
During the revolution which swept over Finland last winter, the Finnish Social-Democracy did not follow its tendency beyond the régime of general popular representation. On the contrary it sought as much as possible to create a régime which should be democratic in the highest degree. In the same order of ideas was the plan for setting up a "popular commissariat," a plan which seemed from time to time on the point of being adopted by referendum during the spring. By this project, the Diet elected on a democratic basis was to exercise the supreme power; the Government was only to be its executive committee; the president was not to have the right of independent action, and was to be subject to regular and direct control from the Diet; the people's power of initiative was to be very wide; officials were to be nominated for a certain length of time, and high officials were to be nominated by the Diet.
Of course this form of Government was not the final aim of the people's commissariat, but simply an instrument whose object was to realise social and economic aspirations. By this means it was hoped to create conditions favourable to evolu