# Glacier Northwest v. Teamsters

Note: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
GLACIER NORTHWEST, INC., DBA CALPORTLAND v. INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS LOCAL UNION NO. 174 CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF WASHINGTON No. 21–1449. Argued January 10, 2023—Decided June 1, 2023
Glacier Northwest delivers concrete to customers in Washington State using ready-mix trucks with rotating drums that prevent the concrete from hardening during transit. Concrete is highly perishable, and even concrete in a rotating drum will eventually harden, causing significant damage to the vehicle. Glacier’s truck drivers are members of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters Local Union No. 174. After a collective-bargaining agreement between Glacier and the Union expired, the Union called for a work stoppage on a morning it knew the company was in the midst of mixing substantial amounts of concrete, loading batches into ready-mix trucks, and making deliveries. The Union directed drivers to ignore Glacier’s instructions to finish deliveries in progress. At least 16 drivers who had already set out for deliveries returned with fully loaded trucks. By initiating emergency maneuvers to offload the concrete, Glacier prevented significant damage to its trucks, but all the concrete mixed that day hardened and became useless.
Held: The NLRA did not preempt Glacier’s tort claims alleging that the Union intentionally destroyed the company’s property during a labor dispute. Pp. 6–12.
(a) The parties agree that the NLRA protects the right to strike but that this right is not absolute. The National Labor Relations Board has long taken the position—which the parties accept—that the NLRA does not shield strikers who fail to take “reasonable precautions” to protect their employer’s property from foreseeable, aggravated, and imminent danger due to the sudden cessation of work. Bethany Medical Center, 328 N. L. R. B. 1094. Given this undisputed limitation on the right to strike, the Court concludes that the Union has not met its burden as the party asserting preemption to demonstrate that the NLRA arguably protects the drivers’ conduct. Longshoremen v. Davis, 476 U. S. 380, 395. Accepting the complaint’s allegations as true, the Union did not take reasonable precautions to protect Glacier’s property from imminent danger resulting from the drivers’ sudden cessation of work. The Union knew that concrete is highly perishable, that it can last for only a limited time in a delivery truck’s rotating drum, and that concrete left to harden in a truck’s drum causes significant damage to the truck. The Union nevertheless coordinated with truck drivers to initiate the strike when Glacier was in the midst of batching large quantities of concrete and delivering it to customers. The resulting risk of harm to Glacier’s equipment and destruction of its concrete were both foreseeable and serious. The Union thus failed to “take reasonable precautions to protect” against this foreseeable and imminent danger. Bethany Medical Center, 328 N. L. R. B., at 1094. Indeed, far from taking reasonable precautions, the Union executed the strike in a manner designed to achieve those results. Because such conduct is not arguably protected by the NLRA, the state court erred in dismissing Glacier’s tort claims as preempted. Pp. 6–8.
(b) The Union’s efforts to resist the conclusion that the NLRA does not arguably protect its conduct are unavailing. First, the Union emphasizes that the NLRA’s protection of the right to strike should be interpreted generously. But the protected right to strike is not absolute, thus the Court must analyze whether the strike exceeded the limits of conduct protected by the statute.
Second, the Union argues that workers do not forfeit the NLRA’s protections simply by commencing a work stoppage when the loss of perishable products is foreseeable, but this case involves much more than that. Given the lifespan of wet concrete, Glacier could not batch it until a truck was ready to take it. By reporting for duty and pretending as if they would deliver the concrete, the drivers prompted the creation of the perishable product. Then, they waited to walk off the job until the concrete was mixed and poured in the trucks. In so doing, they not only destroyed the concrete but also put Glacier’s trucks in harm’s way.
Third, the Court acknowledges that the Union’s decision to initiate the strike during the workday and failure to give Glacier specific notice do not themselves render the Union’s conduct unprotected. Still, these actions are relevant considerations in evaluating whether strikers took reasonable precautions, whether harm to property was imminent, and whether that danger was foreseeable. See International Protective Services, Inc., 339 N. L. R. B. 701, 702–703. Here, the Union’s choice to call a strike after its drivers had loaded a large amount of wet concrete into Glacier’s delivery trucks strongly suggests that it failed to take reasonable precautions to avoid foreseeable, aggravated, and imminent harm to Glacier’s property.
Finally, while the Union maintains that the drivers took some steps to protect the trucks, the Union concedes that the NLRA does not arguably protect its actions if those actions posed a material risk of harm to the trucks. Given that Glacier alleges that the Union took affirmative steps to endanger Glacier’s property rather than reasonable precautions to mitigate that risk, the NLRA does not arguably protect the Union’s conduct. Pp. 8–12.
198 Wash. 2d 768, 500 P. 3d 119, reversed and remanded.
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