# History of Aurangzib/Volume 1/Chapter 8

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CHAPTER VIII.
Second Siege of Qandahar, 1652.
The first siege of Qandahar had failed for Preparations for the second siege.want of heavy guns and material. The honour of the attempt to be Mughal arms required the repeated. The next three years were spent in preparations on a scale worthy of the grandeur of the task. Big guns were cast, provisions accumulated at convenient depots on the route, thousands of camels assembled for transport, the friendship of Baluch chiefs purchased along the line of communication from Multan, and money and munitions stored at the base at Kabul.
Aurangzib had been appointed to command the expedition. From his government of Multan he had sent men to explore the routes to Qandahar, and at last selected the Chacha-Chotiali-Pishin line as the shortest. For years his agents had visited the Baluch country and ​ contracted with the tribal chiefs for the supply of provisions to the Prince's army during the march and siege.
The force sent against Qandahar numbered between 50,000 and 60,000 men, of whom one-fifth were musketeers and artillery men.Strength of Aurangzib's army. The officers formed one-twentieth of the strength. The artillery consisted of eight big cannon, some of which carried 70 lb. shot, twenty of smaller calibre, each carrying 4 or 5 lb. shot, twenty swivels mounted on elephants and a hundred on camels. The transport was entrusted to ten choice elephants from the Emperor's own stables, besides many others owned by the generals, and three thousand camels. Two krores of rupees were set apart for the expenses. The Emperor himself stayed at Kabul with a reserve of 40 to 50 thousand men, to reinforce the besiegers if necessary, and to keep their communication with the north open.
The main army, led by the Prime Minister Sadullah Khan, entered Afghanistan by the Khaibar Pass and reached Qandahar by way of Kabul and Ghazni. Aurangzib with a smaller ​ body, containing many officers and some five thousand soldiers of his own contingent, started from Multan, followed the western route through Chotiali and Pishin, and debouched through the Panjmandrak (=Khojak ?) Pass. The two divisions met near Qandahar on 2nd May, 1652.
Dispositions of the besiegers. On that day the siege was begun. The divisional commanders occupied their appointed places round the fort and set themselves to run trenches and erect batteries. Aurangzib took post on the west of the fort, behind the hill of ​Lakah; his Chief of Artillery, Qasim Khan, south of the fort, with orders to drain the ditch dry; Sadullah's position was south-east; while in the extreme north-west, facing the Forty Steps, lay Rajah Rajrup with his Kangra hillmen. Four other generals, occupying the intervening spaces completed the investment.
The work of sapping necessarily took time. Meanwhile attempts were made to capture some of the outlying defences by sudden assault. Mahabat Khan and Rajah Rajrup, in charge of the northern line of attack, dragged two heavy guns to their trenches and bombarded the two towers on the Forty Steps, doing some damage to the works. But the position was impreg​ nable; the assault delivered here by Bhao Singh during the first siege had failed with heavy loss, and his son Rajrup now shrank from the hopeless task. He next proposed to surprise the peak of the ridge, behind the Forty Steps. Rajrup removed his men to a position facing the gate of Ali Qabi on this hill, and entrenched himself. Under him were many foot-musketeers of the Kangra district, expert in hill-climbing. His plan was to send them secretly up the hill after midnight and, when they had surprised the gate and entered the defences, to push up supports and storm the hill-top itself. Preparations were made for this object; materials were collected for building a stockade on the hill side, and the two chiefs of the army were warned to be ready to send help.
The night of Sunday, 20th June, was chosen for the attempt. Sadullah A surprise of Qaitul hill attempted at night, Khan poured in men from the trenches on the right and left of Rajrup's and sent 1,000 picked troops of his own division, to form a body of supports at the Rajah's post. Every one took the position previously marked out for him by the Minister. ​ Early in the night the Rajah sent his own retainers up by a track which they had discovered for reaching the top. He himself followed them at some distance and piled up a shelter of stones in the hillside as his own station. The supports marched towards the Ali Qabi gate, while their leader, Baqi Khan, with 300 men from among Aurangzib's retainers, joined the Rajah. The success of this hazardous enterprise depended on silence and secrecy. But the Mughals bungled. Indian troops are not accustomed to silent work at night, especially in a hilly region. The supporting body was too large and too variously composed to be led on smoothly and noiselessly. There was some disagreement between Rajrup and an Imperial officer named Muzaffar Husain, and words were exchanged.mismanaged, This created a loud noise. The enemy got the alarm and stood on their defence. A surprise was no longer possible in the face of alert defenders, by men climbing up a narrow hill-track in single file. About three hours before daybreak the moon rose and took away the last chance of Mughal success. Soon afterwards, news came to the Rajah, who had been anxiously waiting so long in his stone shelter on the hillside, that his troops had found the defenders of the fort on the summit awake at one place ​ and were returning baffled. So he sent his supports back and stayed there for the return of his men. After a while a foolish servant told him that his men had reached the hill-top and entered the fort. The Rajah hastily believed the report, blew his trumpet, and beat his drums. At this signal the returning Imperial troops ran back to him. But the truth was soon discovered; the Sun rose and presented the straggling assailantsfails with heavy loss. on the hill-side as a clear target to the Persian marksmen. Many were slain and wounded on the Mughal side, but the main portion of the loss was undoubtedly borne by the Rajah's men who were nearest the enemy. For this error of judgment Rajrup was censured by his chief and sent back to his old trenches.
Thereafter the only hope of taking Qandahar Trenches run. was by carrying the sap nearer and breaching the walls. In both of these the Mughals failed. Aurangzib's trenches, west of the ridge, arrived within 22 yards of the wall, and Sadullah's (east of the fort) to a spot 10 yards from the ditch. But here their progress was arrested. "The trenches could not be carried any nearer in face of the severe fire showered from the fort-walls." "The work [of sapping] was hard, and many of Sadul​ lah's men were wounded and slain....The enemy issued on three sides, and from sunset to dawn fired their muskets incessantly from loop-holes opened in the fort-walls, so as to give no opportunity to Aurangzib's workmen [to make progress.]"
Bad gunnery of the Indians. In fact the Persian artillery was as excellent as the Mughal was inefficient. The Indian gunners were bad marksmen and their fire produced no effect on the fort-walls. Some of Aurangzib's men were so ignorant that they overcharged two of his big guns with powder, causing them to burst. Five large pieces of cannon now remained, which were insufficient to breach the wall in two places. In fact so notoriously bad were the Indians in handling artillery that the main reliance of their kings was on European gunners, who are praised in contemporary histories as masters of their craft, and were attracted to the Imperial service by high pay and large rewards, though they used to desert as soon as they could get a chance. In the third siege, Dara Shukoh took a body of them with him to Qandahar.
There were other difficulties, too. Within a ​ few weeks of the opening of the siege the work of draining the wet ditch and running mines had to be suspended for lack of materials. Aurangzib now realised that the fort could be taken only by storm. And the Emperor had ordered that no assault was to be delivered without making a breach.
Mughals fail to breach eastern wall. According to Sadullah's plan, all the big guns were assembled on the eastern side, opposite the Mashuri gate. Batteries were raised on the the right and left of Sadullah's trenches (17th and 22nd June.) The famous gun Fatih Lashkar and three other large pieces were mounted here with great labour. Every day ten rounds were fired from each gun, but the damage done to the screens and towers of the fort was always repaired at night. and the Persian artillery was not over-powered. The Mughal artillery was as weak in number as in efficiency. In the meantime Aurangzib set up four stockades in front of his trenches, holding 3,000 men in all, for making a feint against Fort Lakah when Sadul​ lah would breach the wall and deliver an assault on the Mashuri gate.
But the last expectation failed. On 19th June, before Sadullah's second battery Sorties. was complete, a large armour-clad force made a sortie from the fort and fell on his trenches. From the top of the fort and the side of the hill a shower of musketry fire was kept up. Though reinforcements drove the enemy out after an hour's severe fight, the Persians succeeded in killing and wounding many of the Mughals. On some other nights, too, sorties were made, some Mughal guns damaged, and many of the besiegers carried off as prisoners. The Persians could not be pursued, as they quickly went back within shelter of the fort-guns.
By the end of June it was recognised that the Mughal guns would never breach the wall on that side. So they were removed from the Mashuri gate to the western side. Two of the Surat cannon were sent to strengthen the artillery in Aurangzib's trenches. and two other big pieces, including Fatih Lashkar, to a new battery opposite the Ali Qabi gate, on his left hand. Here, too, the besiegers fared no better; besides, ​they got no more than a week's time to use their artillery before orders arrived to abandon the siege.
From the commencement of the leaguer two months had now passed away.Persian losses. An attempt to corrupt Utar, the commandant of the fort, had brought back the taunting reply, "When you have succeeded in weakening the fort or injuring the garrison in any way, it will be time for me to think of deserting to you!" About the middle of June two high Persian officers (including Mir Alam, their Chief of Artillery), were blown away by a 70 lb. shot from a Mughal gun. On 26th May, when a magazine was opened for distributing powder to the garrison, the store of sulphur caught fire from the hand of a careless servant who was preparing a pipe of tobacco for the Persian officers present. It soon spread to the powder and there was a terrible explosion. Many houses in the neighbourhood were overthrown, and men and horses wounded by the flying splinters of rock. About 150 sepoys and water-men perished in the fire, and the four ​officers who had opened the magazine were confined to bed by their burns.
But with all these disasters to the garrison,Emperor orders retreat. the Imperialists were no nearer success. Shah Jahan had strictly enjoined that there was to be no assault before breaching the wall, and a breach with their few guns and bad gunners was out of the question. Aurangzib therefore wrote to the Emperor on 3rd July, soliciting a distinct order to storm the walls which were still intact. It would have been madness to sanction such an enterprise. Shah Jahan had been already informed by Sadullah Khan that his guns could effect nothing, and that the munitions had run short, and on 1st July he had replied that the siege was to be abandoned. Aurangzib pleaded hard for a short delay; he offered to lead a desperate assault on the walls, for to leave Qandahar untaken after such grand preparations would destroy his reputation for ever. But the news that a retreat had been ordered spread through the camp, the scouts fell back on the army, and the trenches were deserted. When Shah Jahan at last grudgingly consented to ​ continue the siege for another month, it was found impossible to carry out the new order.
What had hastened the Emperor's resolve to raise the siege was a raidUzbak raid on the Mughal rear. by a body of ten thousand Uzbak horsemen, who had burst through the western hills into the district south of Ghazni, and threatened the Mughal line of communication between Kabul and Qandahar, (about 26th June). The danger was greatly exaggerated by the Court at Kabul, though Aurangzib assured the Emperor that from his experience in Balkh he was sure that a few thousand Mughal troops could expel the raiders. In fact, the Uzbaks fled on hearing of the approach of the Imperial army, and were cut off during their flight by the Afghans with the aid of the officer in command at Ghazni. The Delhi historian boasts that not a tenth of the raiders returned to Central Asia alive. The Mughal army, however, raised the siege and began its retreat from Qandahar on 9th July. A small party sent back to India by the Pishin-Chotiali-Multan road, which two centuries ​later Biddulph's division followed at the end of the Second Afghan War,—reported that the Baluch clans had already risen and rendered the road unsafe. So, Aurangzib withdrew his outposts from Pishin and Duki, and led the army back to Kabul, joining the Emperor on 7th August. The Van under Sadullah had arrived eight days earlier.
Bitter was Aurangzib's humiliation at the ill-success of the expedition.Bitter corres- pondence between Shah Jahan and Aurangzib on the failure. Shah Jahan wrote to him, "I greatly wonder how you could not capture the fort in spite of such vast preparations." Aurangzib protested that he had done his utmost, but the scantiness of siege materials and insufficiency of artillery had rendered the attempt hopeless, as Sadullah Khan himself had testified. But Shah Jahan angrily rejoined, "I am not going to give up Qandahar. I shall try every means to recover it." The Prince pleaded hard to be permitted to stay in Afghanistan or the Panjab and to take part, even as a subordinate, in the next attempt on Qandahar, in order to retrieve his character as a general. For this he was willing to forego the viceroyalty of the Deccan ​ which was now offered to him. But Shah Jahan was inexorable: he ordered Aurangzib to go to the Deccan at once, and brushed aside the Prince's excuses for his failure with the caustic remark, "If I had believed you to be capable of taking Qandahar, I should not have recalled your army...Every man can perform some work. It is a wise saying that men of experience need no instruction." Aurangzib replied by quoting the proverb, "Whosoever has a particle of sense can know his own good from his harm" and pointing out that he could not have purposely failed in his task, as he knew that it would involve his father's displeasure.
The Court ascribed the failure to the abandonment of Shah Jahan's plan of Causes of the failure. operations, which was that Aurangzib should invest the fort with half the force, while Sadullah should advance west with the other half and capture the forts of Bist and Zamin Dawar, when the garrison of Qandahar would see their communication with Persia cut off, lose heart and surrender to the Mughals. But Sadullah Khan opposed such division of the force and of the scanty supply of provisions and material, and the Emperor ​ himself, on being referred to, confirmed the change of plan.
In truth it is unjust to blame Aurangzib for the failure to take Qandahar. Throughout the siege he was really second in command.Aurangzib not the real commander. The Emperor from Kabul directed every movement through Sadullah Khan. His sanction had to be taken for every important step, such as the removal of guns from one battery to another, the disposition of troops, the date, hour and point of assault. Fast couriers brought his orders from Kabul to Qandahar in four days, and the Prince had merely to carry them out. Indeed so thoroughly subordinate was Aurangzib that during the first month of the siege only one despatch from him reached the Emperor, while Sadullah corresponded frequently and the Emperor's letters were often written to the Prime Minister, to be afterwards shown to the Prince.
Unjustly held responsible for the defeat, Aurangzib lost the favour and confidence of his father. WhatFailure of the third siege. added a keener edge to his mortifica​tion was that he had given occasion for laughter at his expense to his envious eldest brother and that brother's party at Court. But Dara's crowing did not last long; Aurangzib soon tasted the sweets of revenge. Dara led a still vaster army and a larger part of artillery against Qandahar and vowed to capture it in a week. His siege dragged on for five months and in the end Qandahar was not taken. The long history of Dara's doings there written by the courtly pen of Rashid Khan (Muhammad Badi) is remarkable only for the sickening flattery offered by his courtiers and the insane pride displayed by the Prince. It unconsciously but most effectively condemns Dara and by contrast places Aurangzib in an honourable light.
These failures left a lasting sting in the mind of Aurangzib. Half a century later, when he was a dying man, he heard that his son Shah Alam, then Governor of Kabul, was enlisting troops evidently to dispute the succession on the Emperor's expected death. Aurangzib tauntingly wrote to him, "I hear that inspite of your lack of ​ money you are engaging highly paid soldiers. Evidently you want to recover Oandahar. God assist you! Herein he recognised that the conquest of Qandahar was an impossible feat.
The three sieges of Qandahar cost the Indian treasury more than ten krores of Cost of the sieges. rupees. In addition to this sum, the new fortifications built by the Mughals on taking possession of it from Ali Mardan Khan and the treasure, arms, munitions, and provisions that fell into the hands of the Persians on its capture, must have cost more than a krore. Thus the Indian tax-payer poured into the sands of Afghanistan about 12 krores of rupees, and more than half the gross annual ​revenue of the entire empire, for absolutely no return.
The moral loss was even greater than the material. The Emperor of Loss of Mughal prestige.Delhi might dazzle the eyes of foreign ambassadors and travellers by displaying his Peacock Throne and Kohi-noor, or the superb marble edifices with which he had adorned Agra and Delhi. But henceforth his military prestige was gone throughout the world. The Persian king could rightly boast that the rulers of Delhi knew how to steal a fort by means of gold, but not how to conquer it by strength of arm. Shah Abbas II. had conquered Qandahar in less than two months; but two Mughal princes in three long and costly campaigns could not recover it, though they were opposed by mere generals and not by any member of the royal blood of Persia. Naturally the military fame of Persia rose very high. The ​
* ↑ Adab-i-Alamgiri, 3a, 4a, 5a, 7a, 10a, 11a, 96b.
* ↑ Waris, 60a-61a. He says that about 56,000 troops were sent to Qandahar. Khafi Khan (i. 710) wrongly gives the number as 70,000.
* ↑ For the details of the marches, Waris 64a, and especially Adab-i-Alamgiri, 9a—11b, which gives Aurangzib's movements thus-Left Multan 16th February, but halted long outside it,—crossed the Chenab 20th March (sent his family back to Multan),—reached the Indus by four marches, and crossed it on 26th March—Lakia,—Chacha, 6th April,-Chotiali on 13th April, Duki on 14th, Tabaq-sar on 19th, Pishin (probably on 23rd, because the dates in the above two authorities conflict), the Panjmandrak Pass on 26th, reached Qandahar, 2nd May. The whole distance between Multan and Pishin is given as 124 kos. The route followed by the English travellers Richard Steel and John Crowther in 1615 was,—Multan—the Chenab—Patuali village (20 kos from the river—the Indus—Lacca (=Lakia),—enters the mountains 12 kos from Lacca,—Chatcza (Chacha),—Duki—Secotah (=seh kotah, three castles),—crosses a mountain pass,—Coasta-Abdun-Pesinga (=Pishin),—crosses a high mountain, and descends into the plain—Qandahar, 60 kos from Pesinga. (Kerr, ix. 210-212, quoting Purchas.) Pishin is spelt in the Persian MSS. as Fushanj or Qushanj or Qushakh. A map of Biddulph's route in 1879 is given in Shadbolt's Afghan Campaigns, and with Temple's article in the Royal Geographical Soc. Journal, 1880, pp. 190-319.
* ↑ Waris, 65a., Adab-i-Alamgiri, 12b. The following was the distribution of trenches, going from the west, by the north, to the east and south:— Opposite Lakah Fort—Aurangzib, Qalich Khan, Shah Nawaz Khan, Rajah Pahar Singh Bundela. Opposite the Ali Qabi Gate—Baqi Khan. ” the Forty Steps—Rajah Rajrup. ” the Baba Wali Gate—Mahabat Khan and Rajah Anurudh. ” the Waisqaran Gate—Najabat Khan. ” the Khwajah Khizir Gate to the Mashuri Gate $\scriptstyle {\left.{\begin{matrix}\ \\\\\ \ \end{matrix}}\right\}\,$ —Qasim Khan (Chief of Artillery). Sadullah, and Jai Singh. ” the Earthwork Bastion—Rustam Khan. The Adab-i-Alamgiri places Rustam Khan opposite the Mashuri Gate, but his real position was at the south-west corner of the fort. Qasim Khan's position was also shifted by Sadullah. This explains the slight differences between the two authorities quoted above.
* ↑ For the history of the night-attack, Waris, 65b, and Adab-i-Alamgiri, 16b and 17a. Life of Rajrup in Masir-ul-Umara, ii. 277-281, does not even mention the incident. Khafi Khan, i. 711-712.
* ↑ Waris, 65a and b, Adab-i-Alamgiri, 16a and 15b.
* ↑ Waris, 65b, Khafi Khan, i. 713; Lataif-ul-Akhbar, 9a. Storia do Mogor, i. 95, 226, 232, 259.
* ↑ Adab-i-Alamgiri, 17b.
* ↑ Adab-i-Alamgiri, 14a, 15b, 17b, 18a, 15a.
* ↑ From these stockades to the fort-wall there was a fire-swept zone with no shelter except a few boulders, while the soil was too stony to permit sapping. (Adab-i-Alamgiri, 16a.)
* ↑ Adab-i-Alamgiri, 16b, Waris, 65b, Khafi Khan, i. 712,
* ↑ Called in the Adab-i-Alamgiri, "Mir Alam, surnamed Mir Kalan Sani, the Bishak Bashi and superintendent of the New Bastion and Earthen Bastion," and by Waris, "Mahammad Beg, Topchi Bashi."
* ↑ Waris 65b, Adab-i-Alamgiri, 13b, 14b, 15a.
* ↑ Aurangzib's letters, (repeating at their commencement the contents of Shah Jahan's letters which are being replied to), are given in the Adab-i-Alamgiri, 18a & b, 19a.
* ↑ Waris, 64b & 66a, Adab-i-Alamgiri, 18b, 19a.
* ↑ Adab-i-Alamgiri, 18b, Waris, 66b, Zubdat-ut-Tawa-rikh, 44a & b, (very meagre).
* ↑ Adab-i-Alamgiri, 19a—20b.
* ↑ Waris, 656, Adab-i-Alamgiri, 12a and b, 20b. The plan, even if carried out, would have availed little. In the next siege, a detachment from Dara's army did capture Bist and Girishk, but Qandahar held out for five months all the same, and was not taken at the end.
* ↑ Adab-i-Alamgiri, 13b, 17b, 18b, and elsewhere.
* ↑ Dara sat down before Qandahar from 28th April to 27th September, 1653, with an army of 70,000 men. Two of his heavy guns carried 112 lb. and 96 lb. shot. He was supplied with 30,000 cannon balls, 5,000 maunds of powder, 1,500 maunds of lead, and 14,000 rockets. (Waris, 70a et seq.) Khafi Khan, i. 717—728.
* ↑ Lataif-ul-Akhbar.
* ↑ Letter No. 4 in the Hthographed Ruqat-i-Alamgiri.
* ↑ We have the following data for calculating the cost of the Qandahar wars. For the second siege 2 krores of rupees were brought from Delhi and Agra, out of which one krore was spent on the soldiers and officers in one month. (Waris, 61a). The third siege occupied 5 months (against 2 months in the case of the second) and Dara's army was probably 70,000, as against the 50,000 men who accompanied Aurangzib. Hence the third siege must have cost about seven krores. The presents to Dara on the eve of the expedition amounted to 20 lakhs, and one krore was sent with him (Waris 70a and 71a). When starting for the first siege, the officers were paid a bounty of Rs. 100 for each trooper placed in the field, and as the force was 50,000 strong, this alone absorbed 50 lakhs (Waris, 23a). Before the Persians arrived, 5 lakhs had been sent to the fort from Kabul. In 1638, when Qandahar was betrayed to Shah Jahan, 20 lakhs were sent with Shuja to meet the cost of the expedition for driving away the Persians, and 5 lakhs more were spent on the fortifications. (Abd. Ham., ii. 40, Waris 21a and 26a).
* ↑ The Revenue of the Mughal empire in 1648 was 22 krores of rupees. (Abdul Hamid, ii. 710.)
* ↑ For his exultation at the capture and retention of Qandahar, see Ruqat-i-Shah Abbas Sani, 106—120, (his exact words are different).
* ↑ Masir-i-Alamgiri, 56—58, Alamgirnamah, 974, Anecdotes of Aurangzib, §§ 50, 51, and 52.