# Cicero And The Fall Of The Roman Republic/Chapter 11

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CHAPTER XI.
THE CIVIL WAR.
49-47 B.C.
HE first moves in this terrible game were highly successful for Cæsar. Though he had at the moment only a small force south of the Alps, it consisted of seasoned veterans, and he pushed it forward without intermission. "We still hold Cingulum," writes Cicero on the 18th of January, "we have lost Ancona; Labienus has deserted Cæsar. Are we speaking of an officer of the Roman People, or of Hannibal? Insensate and B.C. 49.unhappy man that he is! he has never had sight of so much as the shadow of true honour." Ariminum, Pisaurum, and Arretium also opened their gates to Cæsar. Pompey seems to have been taken by surprise. The city of Rome was manifestly untenable in any case, but it was deserted in such ​hurry and confusion that even the money in the Treasury was forgotten and left to fall into Cæsar's hands.
Pompey soon recovered himself and took the only course open to a prudent general under the circumstances. The young men of age to serve throughout Italy had already taken the oath of military allegiance to him, and he now ordered a general levy, and directed that the recruits should concentrate at Canusium and Luceria in Apulia, so that they could fallback on the port of Brundisium. He had full command of the sea, and had collected abundance of transports. His orders however were not obeyed. Domitius Ahenobarbus, who had charge of Picenum and Umbria, in spite of the most urgent commands to march south with every man whom he could raise, chose to believe that he couId make a stand against Cæsar at Corfinium. He had promised to start from thence on the 9th of February, and if he had done so all might have been well. Later on he changed his mind, and announced that he should remain. He seems to have thought that he would force Pompey's hand, and compel him to advance to his support. Pompey, of course, knew better than to expose his raw recruits to Cæsar's veterans. Cæsar cut off Domitius' army at Corfinium, and it surrendered on the 21st of February. Cæsar dismissed the officers, including Domitius and Lentulus Spinther, unharmed, and enlisted the soldiers under his own standard.
​In this signal act of clemency Cæsar acted both nobly and wisely. He had indeed every reason to be thankful to Domitius, who had done his best to give him the opportunity of finishing the war at a stroke, and who actually succeeded in disconcerting all Pompey's plans. In any modern army Domitius would have been shot by sentence of court-martial; but it is doubtful how far Pompey's power extended in matters of military discipline; and even if he had the power, after Cæsar had spared Domitius, Pompey could hardly help doing the same. In letting loose on him again so mutinous and incompetent a colleague, Cæsar was at once embarrassing his adversary, and gaining great credit for moderation himself. He had good cause to remark five weeks later in a letter to Cicero: "I am quite indifferent to the fact that those whom I released are said to have gone away to make war with me again. All my wish is, that I should act like myself, and they like what they are." Cæsar little knew that Domitius Ahenobarbus was destined to play the part of Banquo to his Macbeth. The great-grandson in direct male line of this Domitius married Agrippina the great-granddaughter of Augustus, and became the father of Nero, the last Emperor of Cæsar's House.
It is possible that, if Domitius had obeyed orders, Pompey might have been able with the sea open behind him at Brundisium to make a stand within lines erected there, just as he did a year later at Dyrachium. As it was, there was nothing for him but to evacuate Italy. Cæsar pressed close upon him ​and tried to block the harbour of Brundisium; but Pompey effected his escape with great skill, and crossed the Adriatic with the remainder of his force on the 10th of March. Cæsar was unable from want of ships to follow up the pursuit; and he resolved to transfer the war at once to Spain, which was held with a strong army by Pompey's lieutenants, Afranius and Petreius. Pompey might have availed himself of his command of the sea to reach Spain before Cæsar, and to face him again on this new battle-ground. Cæsar seems to have thought that this would have been his adversary's best move; "as it is," he said, "I shall go to Spain to fight an army without a general, and shall return to fight a general without an army." Pompey had however no reason to expect that Afranius and Petreius, who were esteemed competent officers, would be so completely out-generaled by Cæsar; and he hoped that the war in that quarter would at least be prolonged. He judged that he would be more usefully employed in using his great influence in the East to raise and train a fresh army, which might perhaps be able to restore his power in Italy, while Cæsar was occupied in Spain, and would at the worst form a second line of defence.
Cæsar returned from Brundisium to Rome, where he arrived about the end of March, and then set out for Spain. The Spanish campaign, after some weeks of much danger and anxiety for Cæsar, ended triumphantly in the month of August by the surrender of all the Pompeian forces. The failure of his ​
COIN OF CÆSAR.
(Cohen.)
NERO AND CLAUDIUS.
(Cohen.)
NERO AND AGRIPPINA.
(Cohen.)
Cicero's letters to Atticus enable us to trace, almost day by day, the fluctuations in the hopes, the wishes, and the opinions of the people of Italy during these eventful months. 49 B.C.The first news that Cæsar was actually in armed rebellion shocked and disgusted all moderate men. They were moved by the spectacle of the city left without Senate or magistrates, and of Pompey in flight—"the whole Jan. 18.aspect of opinion is changed; every one now thinks that no terms should be made with Cæsar." The Italians however showed themselves by no means ready to take arms in the quarrel, and the conscripts Jan. 23.came in slowly and unwillingly. A month later the feeling against Cæsar has considerably cooled down. Cicero reports from Capua—"there is no indignation of any class, nor even of individuals publicly expressed. There Feb. 19.is some feeling among loyal men, but it is blunted as usual; and (as I have clear evidence) the rabble and the lowest classes are keen on the other side, and many anxious for revolution."
​By the 1st of March the news of Cæsar's great success at Corfinium and of the generosity he showed to his prisoners has caused a 49 B.C.strong revulsion in his favour. "Just see what a man this is into whose power the commonwealth has fallen, how keen, how Mar. 1.watchful, how well prepared! I declare that if he puts no one to death and robs no one of his goods, he will become the object of affection to those who were most in dread of him. I have much conversation with men from the borough-towns and with the country people. They care for absolutely nothing except their farms, and their bits of houses and money." The threatening language reported from the Republican headquarters, and the determination which the Optimates expressed, to regard all neutrals as enemies, heightened by contrast the impression made by Cæsar's moderation. "The one, alas that it should be so, earns applause in the worst of causes; the other in the best of causes nothing but reproach." By the 4th of March we find this current of opinion in full flood. "The Mar. 4.country towns," writes Cicero, "hold Cæsar for a god; and there is no pretence about their feelings, as there was when they made vows for Pompey in his sickness. It comes to this; whatever mischief this Pisistratus refrains from committing, they are as grateful to him as if he had stopped ​some one else from committing it. They hope that he will be all that is kindly; whereas they dread Pompey in his anger."
Cæsar was particularly happy in allaying the fears of the monied men, who had expected a national bankruptcy as the result of his victory. He devised an excellent plan for tiding over the difficulties of the money market, while doing substantial justice both to debtors and creditors. He ordained that it should be open to debtors to discharge their obligations by the tender of land, which was to be received at a valuation, calculated on what it would have fetched before the Civil War broke out. This was a bitter disappointment to many of Cæsar's bankrupt supporters, who seem to have forgotten that Cæsar was now no longer the penniless prætor of thirteen years ago. Early in the next year Cælius Rufus, the most audacious of the malcontents, ventured to bring forward revolutionary proposals on his own account, and, when they failed, to attempt, along with the exile Milo, an insurrection in which both lost their lives. In a wild letter to Cicero, ​written immediately before his revolt, Cælius gave unconscious testimony to the sagacity with which Cæsar had discarded the bad traditions of his party; while declaring that every one at Rome is now for Pompey, he is obliged to add "except a few moneylenders." From this time onward the equestrian order may be counted as among Cæsar's partisans.
In the midst of a people thus drifting, how was Cicero to act? Honour and duty showed him his place in the Republican camp; but many accidents and many doubts delayed his arrival there. He had been nominated by Pompey to take charge of the Campanian coast; and partly owing to a misunderstanding he had not quitted his post to join his leader, when the disaster of Corfinium occurred. Cæsar advanced on the very day of 49 B.C.the surrender (21st of February) and Cicero's road to Brundisium was barred. In any case he would not have gone, for he was at the moment in the very depths of trouble and perplexity, and wanted time to recognise his duty and to steady his resolution. Meanwhile he had been constantly deluded by the hope that a peace might still be arranged. After crossing the Rubicon, Cæsar made fresh proposals through his cousin Lucius, which reached Pompey in Samnium on the 22d of January. By these, Cæsar offered to give up all the points at issue; he would surrender his provinces to the successors nominated by the Senate, and would come ​himself to Rome to sue personally for the consulship; Pompey was to retire to his Spanish province. The only condition attached was that the Republicans should dismiss their levies. The terms were accepted by Pompey and the consuls with the sole proviso that Cæsar should likewise withdraw from the posts he had occupied in Italy. But Cæsar, like Napoleon, made it his practice to push on his military operations all the more vigorously when he had begun to negotiate. He was advancing day by day; and when Lucius arrived at his camp, he rejected the condition that he should withdraw his garrisons. His offer certainly had not been sincere. It is probable, indeed, that at this time neither party trusted the other, and that each suspected that the adversary would take advantage of the preliminaries of peace only to strengthen his military position. Cicero, however, seems to have had no suspicion of this, and so late as the 3d of February he evidently believes that Cæsar will stand to his offer; "he is a lost man else." Cicero's intention during these days was to go with Pompey to Spain, that he might have no part in the coming iniquities of Cæsar as consul. Even when this negotiation had fallen through, Cæsar continued to amuse Cicero with hopes that a peace might still be arranged, and that he himself might act as mediator. Balbus and Oppius, Cæsar's ​confidential agents, were constantly urging Cicero to this course, and protesting that Cæsar would be only too happy to put an end to the war; they likewise enclose letters of Cæsar, appealing to the clemency he has shown as an evidence of his desire for reconciliation. Cicero wrote and published an elaborate letter to Cæsar which he hoped might pave the way for peace; and in the meantime he preserved, so far as might be, the neutral attitude proper to a possible mediator between the parties. "I have refused," he writes, "to be a leader in a civil war, so long as any negotiations for peace are afoot. . . . If there is war, as I think there will be, I shall not be found wanting in my duty."
These last words give a faithful presentation of Cicero's deliberate resolve, and his action never really swerves from the path thus marked out; but in his constant exchange of letters with Atticus, only consolation in this dreary time, we find his mind working over every possible topic of hesitation and anxiety. He criticises Pompey's strategy in a way which reveals his own plentiful ignorance of the art of war. Cicero seems to have thought that military movements could be conducted in obedience to sentimental considerations. He first urged Pompey not to abandon the city of Rome, "his country for which and in which it would have been a noble deed to die." Next he blames him bitterly for not going ​to the support of Domitius at Corfinium; and when it comes to Pompey's resolve to leave Italy, he is almost in despair. How can he join Pompey in bearing arms against his country? What does posterity think of Hippias and Tarquin and Coriolanus, who did the same? "Is not his cause then a good one? Nay, it is the best in the world; but it will be played for, mark my words, most foully." Pompey will starve out the Roman People; he will bring hosts of Thracians and Colchians and Armenians to invade Italy; he will ravage, burn, and rob. Again it occurs to him that he is staking too much on a single life, that Pompey is after all a man, that he is subject each year to grave sickness, that a thousand chances might cut him off, "but that our city and nation ought, so far as in us lies, to be preserved to eternity." The threatening language of the Optimates and the prospect of a victory, cruel as that of Sulla, likewise affect him painfully; and it is to be noticed that at this time he is inclined to include Pompey in the same condemnation with his followers on the score of cruelty. Nay, he sometimes writes as if he fancied that Pompey no less than Cæsar was aiming at a despotism, or that he might sacrifice the Republic and Cicero (as he had done at Luca) to Cæsar as the price of a private reconciliation. When all was over, and Cicero had ​gathered by personal intercourse fuller knowledge of the doings and intentions of his associates, he was careful to correct these hasty judgments; he acknowledges Pompey to have been "loyal and stainless and of faith unshaken," and he expressly exempts him from the charges of savagery which he records against the mass of his party. But for the moment, these doubts and suspicions added painfully to Cicero's embarrassments.
The blacker the fortunes of the Republicans look, the more Cicero is determined to throw in his lot with them. When Cæsar is swooping down on Brundisium, and Pompey's life seems in danger, he breaks out in the bitter self-reproach of Achilles: "Let me die at once, since it was not mine to help my friend in death; far from his fatherland he fell, and found not me beside him to ward off woe." A few days later he writes: "I seem March 11.to myself to have lost my wits from the first; and one thing torments me, that I did not follow Pompey, when he was falling or rather rushing headlong to ruin, like any private soldier in the ranks. Now my affection for him re-awakens, now I cannot bear the loss of him, now neither books nor letters nor philosophy give me any relief. Day and night, like the caged bird, I look towards ​the sea and long to fly away." The climax is reached on the 20th, when a false report arrives March 20.that Cæsar has succeeded in blocking up the harbour of Brundisium, and that Pompey is cut off and surrounded. "Now I lament, now I am tormented, when some think me prudent and others think me lucky in not having gone along with him. It is just the other way; I never wished to share his victory, but would that I were the partner of his disaster."
The memory of those dreadful days served to steady Cicero's purpose, and he came to see clearly that there was no place for him in Italy; the only question now was whether he should retire to some remote spot, to Malta for instance, or whether he should join Pompey in Epirus. But to leave Italy at all was no longer easy; he would not be allowed to cross over to the east coast; and to escape by sea from a western port he must wait till the winter was over, and in the meantime must conceal his intentions.
Cæsar was strong in all the material elements of success; "all the rascals in Italy" writes Cicero, "seem to have flocked to him;" and these were useful, no doubt, in their way to a fighting chief. None the less, Cæsar seems to have felt keenly the weak ​point in his own position. All men of character and standing were at heart loyal Republicans: taking a broad view of the matter, they could not but be enemies to Cæsar's cause. Cæsar did his best to remedy this weakness. In the first place he showed scrupulous moderation in all his words and even in all his deeds, so far as these did not interfere with the main military issues. His chivalrous temper always inclined him to spare a fallen enemy, and his cool head and brave heart made it clear to him that his clemency could do him no harm. "I will follow your advice," Cæsar writes to Balbus and Oppius, "and the more willingly as I had already resolved to act as leniently as possible, and to do my best to effect a reconciliation with Pompey. Let us exert ourselves to recover by such means, if it be possible, the good-will of all men, and so secure a lasting victory; our predecessors did not escape the hatred which their cruelty aroused; none of them could permanently hold his ground, excepting only Sulla, and him I will never imitate. Let us conquer on a new plan, and fortify ourselves with mercy and kindliness." We have already seen how successful this policy was with the rank and file of the Italians.
Secondly, Cæsar was unremitting in his efforts to draw or to keep to his side any of the distinguished citizens who had not yet finally committed themselves against him. His chief success was with the two consulars Volcatius Tullus and Servius ​Sulpicius Rufus. Servius was the first lawyer in Rome, but in politics he showed himself wanting in insight and decision. He allowed his son to accompany Cæsar to Brundisium, to take part in peace negotiations, as he hoped, really to assist in attacking and blockading Pompey. He was next obliged himself to appear in Cæsar's Senate at Rome. His despair and disgust at the situation were overwhelming, and he expressed his sorrows freely in an interview just before Cicero's departure. "He shed so many tears, that I wondered that the fountain of them had not been dried up with his continued affliction." But his timidity prevented his accompanying his friend in his flight from Italy. He had committed himself too far, and he had to count, sorely against his will, as a Cæsarian.
All Cæsar's efforts were directed to inducing Cicero to acquiesce in the situation as Sulpicius had done. The presence of Cicero would have soothed the minds of many, and would have given weight and dignity to the remnant of the Senate which could still be assembled in Rome. Urgent letters, couched in the most flattering language from Cæsar himself and from his friends pressed Cicero to return, and the hope that he might thus aid the cause of peace was always dangled before him. On this point, however, Cicero was no longer to be deceived, and he stood firm in spite of the ordeal (which he would fain have avoided) of a personal interview with the "master of ​so many legions." This interview took place at Formiæ. "We were much mistaken, March 25.when we supposed that Cæsar would be easy to deal with; I never saw any one less so. He would be discredited, he said, by my refusal, and the others would be more unwilling to speak if I did not come. I said their case was different. At length, 'Come,' says he, 'and speak for peace.' 'Am I to say what I please on the subject?' 'Do you suppose,' says he, 'that I claim to dictate what you shall say?' 'Then I shall move that the Senate disapproves of any expedition to Spain, or of any transport of troops to Greece; and I shall express many regrets about Pompey.' 'I should object,' says he, 'to a speech of that sort.' 'So I supposed, and that is my reason for not wishing to go to Rome; I must either utter, what I have told you, and much more about which I could not hold my tongue, if I were on the spot, or else I must stay away.' The end was that, to put a stop to the discussion, he begged me to think the matter over. This of course I could not refuse, and so we parted. I imagine that he is much displeased with me; but I am pleased with myself, a feeling that I have not had for this long time. . . . Now, if ever, I must call for your advice. This makes a fresh departure. I almost forgot to mention an ugly remark with which he clenched his argument—'that if he were not to have the benefit of my counsel he must follow the advice of those who would give it, and stick at nothing.'"
Cicero's mind was now made up, and he only ​looked for an opportunity of flight. His daughter indeed urged him to await the issue of the Spanish campaign, which was now commencing; but this idea he entirely discarded, holding that it would be even more his duty to shake himself loose from Cæsar, if he were victorious than if he were beaten. There were difficulties in the way of escape. Antony, who was left in command in Italy, informed Cicero that he could let no one go without Cæsar's permission. He pretended acquiescence, and took precautions to elude the vigilance of Antony's spies, even dropping during the last fortnight his correspondence with Atticus for fear that the letters might fall into wrong hands. Meanwhile he secretly prepared a vessel at Caieta, as soon "as the first swallow appeared," and 49 B.C.from thence he set sail on the 3d of June (really 19th of April) for Pompey's headquarters.
The year 48 B.C. saw the conflict between the two great commanders in person. The strategy was admirable on both sides, full of daring and genius on the part of Caesar, and of skill and prudence on the part of Pompey. The campaign in Epirus after many vicissitudes ended favourably for Pompey, who beat Cæsar out of the lines in which he had attempted to enclose him at Dyrrachium. Cæsar was as great in defeat as in victory; he succeeded in extricating his army from the pursuit, and marched right across the peninsula, thereby transferring the war to fresh ground on the eastern coasts of Greece. Pompey, who had command of the great northern road passed ​by a parallel route into Macedonia, and the two were again face to face. Pompey knew that he ought still to play a waiting game; but he lacked firmness to resist the urgency of his associates, who were elated with the victory which had been gained, and thought themselves now in a position to crush Cæsar at once. Pompey had indeed performed wonders in raising and training in a single year an army which had held its own, so far, with credit. But his success came to an end, as soon as he allowed his own judgment to be overborne by the clamours of the ignorant Nobles. His troops required every advantage which consummate generalship could give them; they were not fit for a soldier's battle on fair ground with the veteran legions of Gaul, and the day of Pharsalia ended Aug., 48 B.C.in their utter overthrow. Pompey fled to Egypt where he was immediately murdered by order of the ministers of the boy-king who had succeeded his father "the Piper."
In spite of great military talents and in spite of honest but clumsy efforts to do his duty, Pompey's life had been a failure, because he aspired to guide the politics of his country without any political principles to carry into effect and without any party to which to be loyal. The errors of the statesman entailed the ruin of the soldier, and fate denied him even a soldier's grave. It was given to one of the petty Eastern Courts, so long the creatures of Pompey's will, to extinguish a personality which ever since the death of Sulla had occupied the ​foremost place on the great stage of the Roman world—
"Sunt lacrimæ rerum, et mentem mortalia tangunt."
Cicero had remained in Epirus along with Cato and Varro, and the news of Pharsalia reached them at Dyrrachium. Cato resolved to fight to the last, and took refuge with the more obstinate of his adherents in Africa, where the Cæsarian governor Curio had been overwhelmed and slain the year before by the help of Juba, King of Numidia. Cicero and Varro considered that the issue of the conflict must be held to have been decided by the defeat of Pompey. Cicero returned once more to Italy, landing at Brundisium about the end of October in the year 48 B.C.
It was doubtful at first whether he would be allowed to remain. Antony, who held Italy as Master of the Horse (for Cæsar had been proclaimed Dictator immediately after the battle of Pharsalia), had received orders that no Pompeians were to return to Italy without leave. Cicero, however, was able to show that Dolabella had written to him by Cæsar's direction, requesting him to return at once. This caused an exception to be made for him in the general edict of prohibition. He remained, Nov., 48 - Sept., 47. B.C.therefore, at Brundisium for the next ten months in a miserable condition of mind and body. The climate affected his health, and his nerves seem to have completely broken down under the doubts and difficulties of the ​situation. His complaints are consistent only so far as they are always directed against what he esteems his own blindness and folly. Sometimes he blames himself for having taken arms at all; more often he is afraid that he has disgraced himself by not following the fortunes of his party to the last in Africa. Cæsar is detained in Egypt and in Asia, so that he cannot come to speech with him, and he fears that this will prevent a reconciliation. He hears that his brother and nephew have turned against him, and mean to make their own peace by accusing him to Cæsar. This does not prevent his writing to the Dictator on behalf of March, 47 B.C.Quintus, protesting that the responsibility of the flight from Italy was all his own, and that his brother had only borne him company.
At the same time some action of his wife, as to which we have only obscure hints, caused him much displeasure. His beloved daughter was in distress on account of the neglect and infidelities of her husband, and Dolabella's conduct in public matters was also most painful to his father-in-law. He took advantage of Cæsar's absence to dabble in socialistic and revolutionary legislation, much as Cælius had done a year before. This led to riots which Antony put down by military force; eight hundred persons are said to have been killed in these disturbances. Dolabella, however, stopped short of the extravagances of Cælius, and Cæsar checked and forgave him. In the meantime his actions appear to Cicero ​only a foretaste of the general reign of rascality which is to be expected from the victory of such a crew. This adds to Cicero's despair. "I see no chance of peace," he writes, "and the July, 47 B.C.party now in power will, I think, bring itself to ruin, even if there be no adversary to oppose it."
Cæsar was occupied with war and pleasure in Egypt during the first half of the year 47, and trustworthy news from him was wanting. When he did write, Cicero doubted whether the letter was really Cæsar's. Thus the comfort to be derived from the Dictator's intentions regarding him was delayed. Cæsar, when he had time to attend to the matter, behaved as generously as possible. He pardoned Quintus at a word, "would not even allow himself to be entreated," and expressed himself so kindly about Marcus Cicero that his brother wrote heartily in congratulation. Cæsar likewise sent word to Cicero to keep his laurelled fasces, thus ignoring the part he had taken in the Civil War, and indicating that he looked on him merely as the pro-consul on his way home from Cilicia and claiming the honour of a triumph.
After settling the affairs of Egypt and Asia Cæsar returned in the month of September, and Cicero met him somewhere in southern Italy. When he ​perceived Cicero advancing to meet him, Cæsar dismounted from his horse and came forward to salute him, and the two walked together conversing alone far a1ong the road. The reconciliation was complete, and Cicero was free to return to his home and his family.
* ↑ Ad Att., vii., 11, 1.
* ↑ Ad Att., viii., 12, A, B and C.
* ↑ Ad Att., viii., 11, A.
* ↑ Ad Att., ix., 16, A.
* ↑ Seutonius, Jul., 34.
* ↑ Ad Att., vii., 11, 4.
* ↑ Ad Att., vii., 13, 2.
* ↑ Ad Att., viii., 3, 4.
* ↑ Ad Att., viii., 13.
* ↑ Ad Att., viii., 9, 3.
* ↑ Ad Att., viii., 16.
* ↑ Cicero, writing after Cæsar's death, blames his law of debt as impairing the sanctity of contracts (De Off., ii., 24). This has generally been explained by the statement of Suetonius (Jul., 42), that all interest hitherto paid was to be deducted from the principal. If, however, Cæsar's law really contained such a clause, his silence about it in his own account of the law (Bell. Civ., iii., 1) and his severe comments on Cælius' schemes of repudiation (Bell. Civ., iii., 20) are dittleult to interpret. I am inclined to think that Suetonius has been misinformed, and that Cicero's criticisms apply to the measure as Cæsar himself describes it.
* ↑ Ad Fam., viii., 17.
* ↑ Ad Att., viii., 12, 3.
* ↑ Ad Att., vii., 14, 1.
* ↑ Ad Fam., xvi., 12, 3.
* ↑ Ad Att., vii., 18, 1. It is to be noticed that next day he received by enclosure from Atticus letter written by Curio to Furnius (presumably a few days earlier) in which Curio, with a frankness, for which Cæsar would not have thanked him, openly scoffed at the mission of Lucius. (Ad Att., vii., 19.)
* ↑ Ad Att., viii., 15, A and ix., 7, A.
* ↑ Ad Att., ix., 11, A. Compare viii., 9.
* ↑ Ad Att., vii., 26, 2.
* ↑ Ad Att., viii., 2, 2.
* ↑ Ad Att., ix., 10, 3.
* ↑ Ad Att., ix., 7, 4.
* ↑ Ad Att., viii., 2, 3.
* ↑ Ad Att., ix., 10, 3.
* ↑ Ad Att., viii., 11, 2.
* ↑ Ad Att., x., 8, 5.
* ↑ Ad Att., xi., 6, 5.
* ↑ Ad Fam., vii., 3, 2.
* ↑ Ad Att., ix., 5, 3.
* ↑ Homer, Illiad, xviii., 98 (Purves' translation).
* ↑ Ad Att., ix., 10, 2.
* ↑ Ad Att., ix., 12, 4.
* ↑ The confusion of the Calendar must always be borne in mind. The 10th of March, when Pompey crossed the Adriatic, was really the 18th of January, that is to say, it was just twenty-eight days after the winter solstice.
* ↑ Ad Att., ix., 19, 1.
* ↑ Ad Att., ix., 7, c. 1.
* ↑ Ad Att., ix., 19, 2, and x., 1, 4.
* ↑ Ad Att., x., 14 1.
* ↑ Ad Att., ix., 18.
* ↑ Ad Att., x., 8, 2.
* ↑ Plutarch, Pomp., 67.
* ↑ De Div., i., 32, 68, and ii., 55, 114.
* ↑ Ad Att., xi., 7, 2.
* ↑ See above, p. 79.
* ↑ Ad Att., xi., 12, 2.
* ↑ Ad Att., xi., 25, 3.
* ↑ Ad Att., xi., 16, 1.
* ↑ Ad Att., xi., 22, 1.
* ↑ Ad Att., xi., 23, 2.
* ↑ Pro Lig., 3, 7.
* ↑ Plutarch, Cicero, 39.