# The True Story of the Vatican Council/Chapter 3

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CHAPTER III.
THE OPENING OF THE COUNCIL: AND FIRST CONSTITUTION OF FAITH.
The narrative of the Archbishop of Florence reaches to the date of the assembling of the Council. From this point we have, if possible, a still surer witness for the minute facts and dates which he has recorded. The Bishop of S. Pölten, in Austria, Monsignor Fessler, was appointed by Pius the Ninth to be Secretary to the Vatican Council. Through his hands every authoritative document passed; by him it was countersigned and distributed to the Council. He was necessarily present at every Public Session and every General Congregation. He was cognisant of the acts and decisions of the Cardinal Presidents. No one possessed such means of accurate and certain knowledge. There is a saying in S. Polten that no bishop lives in that see longer than ten years. Monsignor Fessler was no exception. He took possession of his see in 1865, four years before the Council, and in four years after the Council he died. He has, however, left behind a small book which may be called a diary of the Council. He has there minutely ​registered the number of votings, and the number of votes by which each decree was passed. We have therefore a guidance in these points which cannot fail.
1. Early in December 1869, six days before the opening of the Council, a Preliminary Congregation was held in the Sistine Chapel in presence of Pius the Ninth. He expressed his joy at seeing so great a number of bishops gathered at his call from all parts of the world. He bade them, in entering the Council, to pray especially for charity, patience, and perseverance. After the allocution, the names of the Cardinal Presidents of the Council were announced, and those also of the other officials. The Constitution for the regulation of the Council was then distributed to the bishops.
On the 8th of December, the Feast of the Immaculate Conception, the first Public Session was held in the hall of the Council—that is, in the transept on the right hand of the Basilica of St Peter, or the Gospel side of the high altar, and close to the Confession of the Apostle.
After the Veni Creator had been sung, the Session opened with High Mass, at the end of which the Secretary of the Council placed upon the altar the Book of the Gospels, which always remained open throughout the Session. A sermon was then addressed to the Council, and the Synodal prayers ​were intoned by the Holy Father, followed by the Litany of the Saints. After the Gospel had been sung, the Pope made an allocution to this effect:—
You are now met, venerable brethren, in the name of Jesus Christ, to bear witness with us to the Word of God; to declare with us to all men the truth, which is the way that leads to God; and to condemn with us, under the guidance of the Holy Ghost, the doctrines of false science. God is present in His holy place; He is with our deliberations and our efforts; He has chosen us to be His servants and fellow-workers in this great work of His salvation. Therefore, knowing well our own weakness, and filled with mistrust of ourselves, we lift up our eyes and our prayers to Thee, O Holy Ghost—to Thee, the source of true light and wisdom.
After the Veni Creator had been again sung, the Bishop of Fabriano from the Ambo read the decree of the opening of the Council, the substance of which was as follows:—
Is it the pleasure of the fathers that the Œcumenical Council of the Vatican should be opened, and should be declared open for the glory of the most Holy Trinity, the custody and declaration of the faith and of the Catholic religion; for the condemnation of errors which are widely spreading, and for the moral correction of clergy and people?
The Council unanimously answered Placet. The Pope then declared the Council to be opened, and fixed the second Public Session for the Feast of the Epiphany, January 6, 1870. The Session closed with the Te Deum and the Pontifical benediction.
​This detailed account is given because, with little variation, it describes all the Public Sessions which followed afterwards.
2. On the 10th of December the first General Congregation for business was held under the direction of the Cardinal Presidents. Cardinal de Luca held the first place in the stead of Cardinal de Reisach, who had before been named as the First President. He was at that time in Savoy in his last illness, which ended on Christmas-day. He was a man of great and varied learning, of a large and refined culture of mind, fitted in a special way to understand the diversities of thought which met in the Vatican Council. His loss to the Holy See, great as it would have been at any time, was still more seriously felt at the meeting of the Council, in preparing for which he had borne a chief part. Cardinal de Reisach was not only one of the foremost members of the Sacred College in the public service of the Church, but in private life he was greatly and deservedly loved for his genial and sympathetic character.
After the usual prayer at the commencement of the sitting, the list of names of the Commission of Postulates or Propositions, appointed by the Pope, was published. It was composed of cardinals who had had experience both as residents in Rome, and formerly as Nuncios in foreign courts, together with ​archbishops and bishops selected from each of the chief nations in the Council.
The list was as follows:—
Twelve cardinals—Patrizi, Antonelli, di Pietro, de Angelis, Barili, and Monaco; Cardinals Corsi, Archbishop of Pisa; Riario Sforza, Archbishop of Naples; Rauscher, Archbishop of Vienna; de Bonnechose, Archbishop of Rouen; Cullen, Archbishop of Dublin; Moreno, Archbishop of Valladolid.
Two patriarchs—Antioch and Jerusalem.
Ten Archbishops—Thessalonica, Sardis, Turin, Sorrento, Tours, Westminster, Valencia, Malines, Santiago in Chili, and Baltimore.
Two Bishops—Paderborn and Messina.
The other commissions were to be elected by the universal suffrage of the Council.
The commission of Faith, which consisted of twenty-five, was elected in the third General Congregation on the 20th of December, as follows:—The Archbishop of Edessa (Roman), Archbishop of Modena, the Bishop of Treviso and Calvi (Italian), the Archbishop Primate of Gran (Hungarian), the Bishop of Brixen Austrian), the Bishops of Ratisbon and Paderborn (German), Archbishop of Cambrai and Bishop of Poitiers (French), Archbishop of Saragossa and Bishop of Jaen (Spanish), Archbishops of Westminster (English), of Cashel (Irish), of Utrecht ​(Dutch), of Malines (Belgian), of Gnesen and Posen (Polish), the Bishop of Sion (Swiss), the Armenian Patriarch of Cilicia, and the Archbishop of Bostra (Asiatic), of Baltimore and San Francisco (North American), of Santiago in Chili, and Bishop of Rio Grande (South American). The Pope named Cardinal Bilio President of the Commission.
The Commission of Discipline was composed of twenty-four members, likewise selected from all nations—the Bishop of Birmingham representing England.
The Commission on Religious Orders was in like manner chosen—England being represented by the Bishop of Clifton.
The election of the other commissions was postponed.
3. The second Public Session was held on the Feast of the Epiphany. On that day was made the profession of faith by all members of the Council, according to the tradition of the Church. In the second Council of Constantinople, a.d. 381, the fathers repeated the Creed of the Council of Nicæa; at Chalcedon, a.d. 451, was recited the Creed of Nicæa, with the addition of the Council of Constantinople. So again in the subsequent Councils of Constantinople and the Second of Nicæa. In like manner also at Trent was recited the creed ​of the former Councils; and in the Council of the Vatican the same was recited with the articles or definitions of the Council of Trent, which are called the Creed of Pius the Fourth. First the Pope rose and recited the profession of faith in a loud voice. After that the Bishop of Fabriano read it from the Ambo. Then for two whole hours the cardinals, patriarchs, primates, archbishops, bishops, and other fathers of the Council made their adhesion to the same by kissing the Gospel at the throne of the head of the Church. Seven hundred bishops of the Church from all the world, the representatives of more than thirty nations and of two hundred millions of Christians, made profession with one heart of the same faith in the same form of words. If any one can believe this intellectual unity of faith, which has endured for eighteen hundred years unchanged through all changes, in all the minuteness of the definitions of Nicæa, Constantinople, and Trent, to be a simply human and natural fact, his credulity must be great. They who looked on, still more they who shared in that world-wide profession of the baptismal creed of the Christian world, will never forget it. Never at any time has such a witness been borne to the universality and unity of the Catholic faith.
​With this closed the second Public Session.
The first schema, or draft decree, 'On Catholic Faith, and on the errors springing from Rationalism,' containing eighteen chapters, was discussed by thirty-five bishops in the General Congregations between the 18th of December and the 10th of January. It was then sent back to the Commission on Faith to be entirely remodelled. The original schema was one of the grandest of theological documents, cast in the traditional form of conciliar decrees, taking its shape, as they did, from the errors which required condemnation. It was somewhat archaic perhaps in language, but worthy to rank with the decrees of the Councils of Toledo or of Lateran. It was referred to the Commission on Faith, and on the 14th of March it was again distributed to the Council in its new form, wholly recast, and was received with general approbation. The new document is of a distinct character, and ought not to be compared with its predecessor. Instead of eighteen chapters, it contained only an Introduction and four chapters, in which every sentence is full of condensed doctrine, and the whole has a singular beauty and splendour of divine truth impressed upon it. The commission was engaged on the task of recasting the schema until the end of February.
5. In order to show the sustained care and exact​ness with which the work of the Council was conducted, and to remove from truthful and fair minds the notion that the Council cared little for anything but one subject, it will be well to give an account of the way in which this new schema was elaborated and finally adopted. A full statement will be given hereafter of the contents of this first schema on Catholic faith in the form in which it was finally passed. For the present it is enough to say that its subject-matter was what may be called the first foundations of natural and revealed religion—namely, the existence and perfections of God, the creation of the world, the powers and office of the human reason, revelation, faith, the relation of reason to faith, and of faith to science. From these truths followed the condemnations of atheism, materialism, pantheism, naturalism, and rationalism. To enter into these topics here would break the thread of this narrative. But they will be treated hereafter.
The second discussion began in the General Congregation on the 18th of March by a report made by the Primate of Hungary. Nine bishops then spoke in the general discussion of the text. No one desiring to speak further upon it, the general discussion closed, and the particular discussion of the first chapter began. In this debate sixteen took part; on the second chapter twenty; on the third twenty-two; on the ​fourth twelve spoke—in all seventy-nine. This discussion occupied nine sessions, and when no one desired to speak further, it closed. The schema was again sent back to the commission, with the amendments of the bishops. These were printed and distributed. After they had been examined by the commission a full report was made in the General Congregation on the Introduction, and the amendments were put to the vote. This being finished, the text of the Introduction was referred again. The four chapters were then each one treated in the same manner. On the first chapter there were forty-seven amendments. They were printed and distributed. The commission then reported, and the amendments were put to the vote. After another revision the first chapter was adopted almost unanimously on the 1st of April.
The second chapter had sixty-two amendments: the same process of reference to the commission, revision, reporting, and voting followed, and the chapter was referred back for final amendment.
The third chapter had one hundred and twenty-two amendments. These again were referred, printed, distributed, reported on, accepted or rejected, and the text once more returned to the commission. This took two days.
The fourth chapter had fifty amendments, which were treated as before, and sent back to the commis​sion. This was on the 8th of April. On the same day the second chapter as amended was passed. The third and fourth were passed on the 12th of April the one unanimously, the other all but unanimously. The whole was then put to the vote. There was no Non placet, but there were eighty-three Placet juxta modum. All these amendments were then sent in as before and printed in a quarto volume of fifty-one pages. On the 19th of April the report was made, and the amended text was unanimously accepted. In passing this one schema the interval between the 14th of March and the 19th of April was consumed; seventy-nine members of the Council spoke; three hundred and sixty-four amendments were made, examined, and voted upon; six reports were made by the commission upon the text, which, after its first recasting, had been six times amended.
The decree was finally adopted unanimously by six hundred and sixty-seven votes in the third Public Session, on the Dominica in Albis or Low Sunday, April 24, and confirmed by the Pope, who spoke as follows: "The decrees and canons contained in the Constitution just read were accepted by all the fathers, no one dissenting; and we, the Sacred Council, approving, by our apostolical authority so define and confirm them." He then went on to address the Council: "You see, beloved brethren, how good and ​pleasant it is to walk in the house of God in unity and peace. As our Lord gave to his apostles, so I, his unworthy Vicar, in his Name give peace to you. That peace, as you know, casts out fear; that peace shuts the ear to unwise words; that peace, may it go with you in all the days of your life; may that peace be with you in death; may that peace be your everlasting joy in heaven."
This account is given in full that a true estimate may be made of the care and deliberation with which the decrees of the Council were elaborated.
6. After the third Public Session followed the discussion on discipline relating to bishops, which lasted through seven sittings, in which thirty-seven spoke.
This again was followed by another relating to the clergy, which likewise occupied seven sittings and thirty-eight speakers.
Then followed the schema on the Little Catechism, which took up six sittings; forty-one speakers joined in it.
These discussions were not closed until no one desired to speak.
From these facts it will be evident that the amplest time and latitude of discussion was permitted from the outset of the Council, and the same will be hereafter still more manifest at its close.
All the schemata hitherto mentioned were referred ​to the respective commissions for revision in accordance with the report of the speeches and the written amendments of the bishops.
The second schema on faith, relating to the Church, had been before distributed. It contained fifteen chapters and twenty-one canons. The first ten chapters related to the body of the Church; the eleventh and twelfth related to the primacy of the head of the Church; the last three treated of the relations of the Church to the civil powers. Ten days were given to study and to send in written observations on the schema. One hundred and twenty amendments in writing were sent in. Of these many were signed, not by the writer alone, but by a large number of names. For instance, one had twenty-nine signatures; a second, thirteen; a third, eleven; a fourth, eight; a fifth, seventeen; a sixth, ten; a seventh, twenty-four. Therefore these documents represented not less than two hundred members of the Council—that is, nearly a third of the whole number.
7. We have now come to a moment in the history of the Council to which we must devote a closer attention.
When it was found that the Schema de Ecclesiâ contained only two chapters on the head of the Church—that is, on the primacy and on the temporal power—a very large number of the bishops desired that the ​subject of the infallibility of the head of the Church should be added to complete the doctrine, which would otherwise remain in an unfinished state. We have already seen that the Commission of Direction, when it came to this point in preparing the schemata, suspended its work, and left the subject incomplete. The work, therefore, was to be begun over again, for no complete preparation existed.
The legitimate or constitutional course open, to the bishops who desired that the doctrine of the infallibility should be introduced, was to present a petition to the Commission of Postulates or Propositions, asking that a chapter on the subject of infallibility should be added to the schema. It was necessary, therefore, to frame such a petition and to obtain the signatures of any members of the Council who desired the addition to be made.
While these things were being done, the bishops who thought the discussion of the infallibility would be, as they said, inopportune, were not inactive. About a hundred bishops signed a petition asking that the subject of the infallibility should not be laid before the Council.
And here it is a duty of justice to those who signed either of these two petitions that we should review the reasons for which some thought it inopportune that any such definition should be made, ​and others that it was not only opportune, but necessary.
8. A grave injustice has been done to the bishops who opposed the definition. The world outside the Church, not believing in infallibility, claimed them as its own. They were treated as if they denied the truth of the doctrine itself. Their opposition was not to the doctrine, but to the defining of it, and not even absolutely to the defining of it, but to the defining of it at this time. The chief and foremost of those who opposed the defining it in the Vatican Council had signed the Address of the Centenary, in which, as we have seen, were contained the acclamations of Chalcedon and of Constantinople. They were united in declaring that Peter spoke by Pius. How, then, could anyone so far wrong them as to say that they opposed the definition because they denied the doctrine to be true? They who were in the Council may be permitted to bear witness to what they heard and know. Not five bishops in the Council could be justly thought to have opposed the truth of the doctrine. This is the testimony of one who heard the whole discussion, and never heard an explicit denial of its truth. Arguments were indeed advanced which logically, if pushed to their conclusion, would seem to oppose the doctrine; and representations of history were made which could not be ​easily squared with the infallibility of the head of the Church. But these were heard in only two or three speeches made by bishops of the Council; and some of these had signed the Address of the Centenary, and one especially had taught the doctrine as a professor in a seminary.
But as the consistency of many has been involved in this question, it is right and just to treat it more fully.
Once for all let it be said in this place that the question whether the infallibility of the head of the Church be a true doctrine or not was never discussed in the Council nor even proposed to it. The only question was whether it was expedient, prudent, seasonable, and timely, regard being had to the condition of the world, of the nations of Europe, of the Christians in separation from the Church, to put this truth in the form of a definition. The infallibility of the Church had never been defined. Why then, it was asked, define it now? or, at least, why define the infallibility of its head?
Inasmuch as the arguments which were weighing in the minds of the bishops for and against the opportuneness of defining this doctrine were not—as controversialists, politicians, newspapers, and the religious adversaries of the Church would have men believe—arbitrary, factious, contentious, intriguing, servile, or unreasoning it may be well to recite here ​in full a summary of the reasons on both sides. Those against the opportuneness come from a very high and authentic source, and were drawn up by one of the 102 theologians who prepared the schemata of the Council. He was one who held the doctrine as a divine truth in its amplest sense.
They shall be given here in full because they truly and adequately represent the balancing of motives which at that time caused some to hesitate, but decided the great majority.
9. The reasons against the definition were stated by a very learned and able theologian as follows:—
II. For the determination of all controversies, and for the solution of all doubts, the decree of the Council of Florence respecting the supreme authority of the Roman Pontiff as universal doctor, together with the creed enjoined by Pius the Fourth after the Council of Trent, is sufficient.
III. In order to decide and to determine with exactness the question of the infallibility, it would not be enough simply to declare the Pope to be infallible. It would also be necessary to declare, and that by a decree, the form and the mode in which the infallibility of the Roman Pontiff is to be exercised and known; which would be a difficult question, and would involve the authority of the Holy See in many new and grave complications,
IV. The making of such a definition would be exposed to ​this grave difficulty. Suppose the bishops not to be unanimous, what course should then be taken? Suppose again that they were unanimous in declaring the infallibility of the Roman Pontiff to be a revealed doctrine, would they not, in the very act of defining the dogma, seem to profess that there is no authority in defining the faith inherent in the Episcopate?
V. Such a definition would not only be of doubtful utility. It would probably hinder the hope of reuniting the Eastern Churches to the Holy See, for the Greeks and Orientals recoil from every new word. It is well known what serious and endless controversies the single phrase "Filioque" has stirred up. For which reason, in the profession of faith enjoined by Gregory the Thirteenth for the Greeks, and by Urban the Eighth and Benedict the Fourteenth for the other Orientals, the very words of the Florentine decree, without any change or addition, were retained.
VI. Such a definition might retard also the return, which we so much desire, of Protestants to the unity of the Church, inasmuch as the new dogma would excite and increase in large numbers a prejudice against the Catholic Church, and especially against the Roman Pontiff, thereby rendering it more difficult for them to understand and to embrace the faith by raising a suspicion that the doctrine of the Pope's infallibility is a novelty unknown in earlier ages.
VII. This question might possibly raise divergencies among the bishops, who now are of one mind and heart in their reverence and obedience to the Holy See; a result which would be most disastrous.
VIII. The defining of the Pope's infallibility might also cause doubts, or, what is worse, dissensions among Catholics who are otherwise sound, and willingly submissive, from conviction, to the authority of the Church; and that because certain historical facts and documents are not as yet sufficiently explained, so that in many countries the minds of men are not yet prepared for such a definition.
IX. Such a new decree would be no remedy for the perversity of the few persons who reject the decisions of the Supreme ​Pontiff and appeal from them to a General Council, as to a higher judge of controversies, forasmuch as their error comes not from the intellect, but from perversity of will. There is a difference, also, between a definition of the infallibility of the Pope and that of any other Christian doctrine. In the latter case, the authority of the Church may be sufficient to overcome any doubt. In the former it is the authority itself, the principle of all certainty in faith, which is in question. Would it not, therefore, be more prudent to spare the weakness of those who are not yet able to bear this definition?
X. It may be feared also, lest, by a perversion of the true sense of such a decree, some may be induced to despise the authority given by our Lord to bishops, especially in the condemnation of rash and pernicious opinions in philosophy and theology.
XI. Again it may be feared lest bishops, whom for some years the Holy See has been calling into activity, by discouraging them from sending to Rome in the first instance all doubts about books and matters of which it is their office to judge, might by such a definition be rendered more slack and backward in exercising their episcopal office of judges of doctrine.
​These, then, were some of the reasons for believing that a definition of the infallibility of the Pope would not be opportune. They who held these opinions said:
Let that suffice which has been already declared and has been believed by all namely, that the Church, whether congregated in Council or dispersed throughout the world, is always infallible, and the Supreme Pontiff, according to the words of the Council of Florence, is "the teacher of the whole Church and of all Christians." But as to the mysterious gift of infallibility, which by God is bestowed upon the Episcopate united to the Pope, and at the same time is bestowed in a special manner on the Supreme Pontiff, it may be left as it is. The Church, as all Catholics believe, whether in an Œcumenical Council, or, by the Pope alone, without a Council, guards and explains the truths of revelation. It is not expedient or opportune to make further declarations unless a proved necessity demand it, which necessity at present does not appear to exist.
10. On the other hand, it was urged by those to whom these reasons appeared to be insufficient:
II. That the decree of the Council of Florence ought indeed to be sufficient, and would be so if it were not misinterpreted by those who deny the infallibility of the Supreme Pontiff speaking ex cathedra. The existence of this misinterpretation by Gallicans and by Anglicans shows that the decree is not sufficient.
III. That the doctrine of the infallibility of the Pope, held, as ​it is alleged, by all but a small number, may indeed be exposed now to the questions as to the form and mode of its exercise. These questions will not become less clear by being defined, that is, by being made more clear. The complications which now arise from want of a clear declaration would then be avoided. Erroneous or doubtful opinions give rise to complications; but truth excludes doubt and obscurity in proportion as it is precisely defined.
IV. That if the bishops were not unanimous as to the making of a definition, no doubt the Council would know in its prudence what course to take. The Council of Trent made no definition of the Immaculate Conception. It went to the very verge of defining it, but no further. If the bishops were unanimous in declaring the prerogatives of the head of the Church, they would not thereby abdicate or divest themselves of any privileges or endowments divinely conferred upon the Episcopate. The divine endowments of the Church are not at war with each other. The apostles did not cease to be infallible because their Head was so. The infallibility of the Church does not diminish the infallibility of Councils. The endowments of the body are the prerogatives of the head. Both have their proper sphere and their full and legitimate exercise. No bishop alone is infallible, nor is the whole Episcopate infallible without its head. Of what, then, could they divest themselves by declaring their head to be infallible?
V. That all hope of reunion with the East is alone to be found in an explicit recognition of the divine prerogatives of the Church. Reunion on anything short of this, on any principle, obscure, ambiguous, or equivocal, could not endure for a day. The rent would be made worse. The decree of the Council of Florence, which is alleged to be sufficient, was not sufficient for the Greeks. They accepted it for a moment, but no sooner were they again at Constantinople than they threw it to the winds. Reunion is not to be gained or to be sought by reducing its conditions, like a bargain, to the minimum, but by an explicit and precise acceptance of the truth. Gregory the Thirteenth, Urban the Eighth, Benedict the Fourteenth, kept strictly to the ​Florentine decree, because no other existed then. No other exists at this day; and the question is, whether the events of the last three centuries do not demand a more precise declaration of the truth.
VI. That the return of Protestants also to the Church is more retarded now by the apparent contradiction among Catholics on the subject of infallibility, than it could be by the definition of the infallibility of the Pope. They now reject the infallibility of the Church altogether, because they believe that we are divided, if not about the infallibility of the Church, at least about the infallibility of its head. So long as the infallibility of the Pope is not authoritatively declared, they cover themselves under the shelter of those Catholics who deny it. And, to our shame, they borrow their belief that the opinion is a novelty from some among us. The Gallicans put weapons into their hands which they use against all infallibility whatsoever.
VII. That no divergence among the bishops is to be feared, the unanimity alleged above may assure us. But if it were to exist, would it be of greater moment than the want of unanimity on the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception at the Council of Trent? The prudence of the Council, both natural and supernatural, would know how to deal with such a contingency; and if divergence in anything should arise, no diminution of filial and cordial obedience to the Holy See could follow in those things where all are unanimous.
VIII. That, if the pastors of the Church be unanimous, there is no fear of dissensions or doubts among the faithful. Rather, the dissensions and doubts, if any now exist, arise from the allegation that the pastors are not unanimous as to the infallibility of the Vicar of Jesus Christ. It is of the highest moment to put an end to this false allegation, so boldly and plausibly made by non-Catholics of every name. For this reason alone the sooner the unanimity of the pastors of the Church can be manifested the better, both for the truth's sake and for the salvation of souls. The same reason holds as to the supposed historical difficulties. They have been examined and exposed over and over again; but they will be perpetually brought up ​again, and with increased confidence, so long as the infallibility of the Roman Pontiff shall be left undefined. Where the Church has spoken, the faithful are not open to seduction. While the Church is silent, the spirits of error are clamorous and plausible. A definition would silence all voices, the voice of the Church alone excepted.
IX. That any decree would satisfy those who, out of perversity, oppose the faith, by appealing from the Supreme Pontiff to a General Council, and excommunicate themselves, is not to be expected. But if there be a hope for them, it is to be found in rendering clear beyond all possibility of doubt the divine certainty of faith. But this is closely connected with the divine authority of the head of the Church. The example of our Lord in sparing the infirmities of the weak, who were as yet unable to bear mysteries not yet revealed, is no warrant for keeping back any revealed truth because men will not believe the revelation already made. This would tacitly assume that the infallibility of the head of the Church is not a revealed truth. If it be a revealed truth, our Lord's example is not in point; still less that of the apostles, who "kept back nothing," and declared to the faithful "all the counsel of God " (Acts xx. 20, 27).
X. That the perverse interpretation of a decree could only be partial, and could never be either widespread or permanent. Such perversion, therefore, can be no reason against the definition being made, if the proper reasons exist for making it.,The definition of the infallibility of the Roman Pontiff can in no way lessen the authority of bishops as judges of doctrine in their own flocks, but on the contrary it would give great support to all their legitimate acts. It does not appear how bishops should be more authoritative because their head is believed to be less so.
For these reasons it appeared to others that the objections to such a definition had no sufficient weight to dissuade the Council from making it.
11. But thus far we have only answered objections. It now may be well to state the positive reasons which decided the majority of the bishops to sign the petition by which they asked for the introduction of the subject of the infallibility, and in the end to define it.
By "opportune," then, in the mind of the objector, must be meant something politic or diplomatic, some calculations of local expediency in respect to nations and governments. This sense of opportunity is proper to legislatures and cabinets in deliberating on public utilities and opinions; but in the Church, and in the truths of revelation, it is always opportune to declare what God has willed that men should know. If the infallibility of the head of the Church be a doctrine of revelation, then "necessity is laid upon us, and woe unto us if we preach not the Gospel" (1 Cor. ix. 16). It may, however, be said that many revealed truths are not defined; and that it does not follow that any doctrine ought to be defined, only because it is true, or because it has been revealed.
II. This is indeed certainly true, and would be of weight if this revealed truth had never been denied. There are two reasons for which the Church from the beginning has defined the doctrines of faith: the one to make them clear, definite and precise; the other to defend them and to put them beyond doubt when they have been called in question. If the infallibility of the head of the visible Church had never been denied, it might not have been necessary to define it now. The true doctrine of justification was never defined till it was denied. The nature of inspiration has never yet been defined, but the denial which is now spreading may one day make it necessary to define it. In like manner the infallibility of the Roman Pontiff has been openly denied. Its definition, therefore, has become necessary. It was never indeed formally denied before the period of the ​Council of Constance; but this denial of the truth, modern as it is, renders its definition necessary. When this is said, objectors tell us that the denial is far more ancient and widespread. If that were true, it only makes the definition all the more necessary. They who, to make the doctrine appear doubtful, or to prove it to be false, represent the denial of it to be ancient and widespread, in that proportion increase the necessity of declaring it by an authoritative decree. Such a denial as emanated from the Assembly in 1682 would amply suffice to show that the definition would be more than opportune.
III. And further, the denial of the infallibility of the head of the Church has already suggested doubts as to the truth of the doctrine in minds that never doubted before. We are asked by non-Catholics, "If the doctrine be revealed, how is it that you allow it to be denied? If you are not doubtful about it, why not put it beyond doubt by declaring it to be true?" It is certain that not only Protestants believe the doctrine to be an open question among Catholics, but even among Catholics some are tempted to believe it to be doubtful, and therefore not revealed. They hear it said that it is irreconcileable with history, a modern exaggeration arising from the adulation of courtiers and the ambition of Popes. In France, to deny it has been thought a test of political independence. In England some Catholics are frightened by the pretensions of patristic learning and historical criticism of anonymous writers, so as to doubt or to shrink in false shame from believing a truth for which their fathers died. The admission of a doubt as to any revealed doctrine is fatal to faith in that doctrine.
IV. It would appear not only to be opportune that this doctrine should be placed beyond the reach of doubt by a definition, but that such a definition would be specially opportune at this time, because of the fact that the formal and systematic denial of the truth in question has arisen since the last General Council.
It may at first sight appear that this statement is at variance with the common assertion that the denial of the infallibility of the Roman Pontiff had its rise in the period and events of the ​Council of Constance. It is true that an erroneous opinion lingered on from the time of the Council of Constance, in what De Marca calls the "Old Sorbonne," to distinguish it from the Sorbonne of his own day. But it is certain, then, that before the Council of Trent this opinion had not assumed the definite and elaborate form given to it by the Assembly of 1682, and by those who for two centuries have defended the Four Articles. This modern and dogmatic form of the denial of the Pope's infallibility, ex cathedrâ, was completed in the seventeenth century that is, since the last General Council and gave rise to a widespread and mischievous controversy.
V. It was therefore evident that if an Œcumenical Council should meet and separate without taking notice of this denial, one of two inferences would be drawn. It would be said either that Gallicanism had obtained its place among tolerated opinions; or, at least, that it might be held with impunity. It does not readily appear what answers could be made to this argument. It would be hardly enough to say that it was not thought opportune to meet so open a denial of a doctrine universally believed and taught everywhere out of France, or that it was inopportune to renew the acts of three Pontiffs who had authoritatively censured it. History would have said of the Vatican Council: "Qui tacet, consentire videtur."
VI. It could not be said that the denial of the infallibility of the Roman Pontiff is an obscure and inert error. It is notorious and active. To find or invent a division among Catholics is the chief hope of antagonists. To foment the least divergence among Catholics into a conflict is their chief policy. There can be no doubt that this controversy afforded them their most advantageous attack. Catholics are visibly united on all doctrines of faith, but on the infallibility of the head, as distinct from the infallibility of the Church, a divergence existed which adversaries think or pretend to be a contradiction in faith. The combined action of a certain school within the Church, and of Protestants without it, has given to this erroneous opinion a great notoriety in the last two centuries, and this takes it out of the category of innocuous errors which may be left to evaporate ​or to die out of themselves. It had forced itself into the history of the Church, and would live on until, by the Church, it should be finally condemned.
VII. Prudence would require the condemnation of any notorious error which, even if innocuous at first, might hereafter produce ill effects; but the denial of infallibility in the head of the Church had already produced ill effects. Nevertheless, so long as no final condemnation was stamped upon the error, it would always pass for a tolerated opinion. Men will never believe that it is wrong to do that which they see done with impunity every day. Where there is no law there is no transgression.
VIII. But the true and ultimate reason which determined the majority of the bishops to define the infallibility of the head of the Church was to protect from denial or doubt the divine certainty on which the revelation of Christianity comes down to us. We believe in revelation because God is its author. We know what he has revealed because the Church by divine assistance guards it. He might have ordained other ways for the custody and declaration of His truth. But the way he has actually ordained is a visible body of witnesses in perpetual succession with a special assistance of His presence and guidance. All Catholics believe that the Church, by the assistance of the Holy Ghost, is infallible, and therefore that all doctrines proposed by it for our belief are divine, and for that reason certainly true. But if the head of the Church may err in his teaching, doctrines may be proposed by him that may not be divine, and would therefore be doubtful. But if the teaching of the head of the Church cannot exclude doubt, for that reason it cannot form a foundation of faith. Where faith is, doubt cannot be; and where doubt is faith ceases to be. If therefore it be left in doubt whether the teaching of the head of the Church be certainly true, those who believe that he may err can always contradict his teaching. A fallible head to an infallible body is a doctrine which would soon give way before the logic of common sense, and the denial of the infallibility of the head of the Christian Church is the first position of vantage to assail ​the infallibility of the Church as a whole, and therefore to assail the divine certainty of Christianity altogether.
12. Such were the reasons which finally determined 450 fathers of the Council to send up to the Commission of Postulates a petition that the doctrine of the infallibility of the head of the Church should be discussed in the Council.
The steps taken to prepare and to obtain signatures to this petition were as follows:—
A number of bishops of all nations met to agree upon the wording of the petition. After one or two revisions it was finally adopted in these words:
The undersigned fathers humbly and earnestly beg the holy Œcumenical Council of the Vatican to define clearly, and in words that cannot be mistaken, that the authority of the Roman Pontiff is supreme, and therefore exempt from error, when, in matters of faith and morals, he declares and defines what is to be believed and held, and what is to be rejected and condemned, by all the faithful.
​This was then printed for distribution.
It was decided that this petition should be sent with a circular letter to all the bishops, omitting only those whose known opposition made it a duty of delicacy and of respect not even to seem to obtrude upon them. It was afterwards decided to add to this brief petition, in an appendix, a series of reasons and of authorities from Provincial Councils in support of the petition. The whole was therefore printed a second time. And this perhaps has given rise to the mistake that there were two such petitions, of which the first failed, the second succeeded. There never was but one—the general petition here given—twice printed, indeed, but one and the same from first to last.
The whole of this action, which has been represented as conspiracy, cabal, intrigue, done in the dark, with suddenness and surprise, was done in open day. The petition was at once printed and given to all who wished for it. No sooner was it in print than an archbishop known to be of the opposition came and asked for a copy. He at once received three, and by the end of the week the petition came back to Rome in the Augsburg Gazette translated into German. It appeared at once in the journals of France, Switzerland, Italy, and England. So much for its clandestinity. Its authors wished it to be ​spread far and wide, and were thankful not only to friends but to adversaries who helped to make it more extensively known.
13. The text of the reasons and appendix added to the petition was as follows:—
Reasons for which this Definition is thought Opportune and Necessary.
The Sacred Scriptures plainly teach the primacy of jurisdiction of the Roman Pontiff, the successor of St Peter, over the whole Church of Christ, and, therefore, also his primacy of supreme teaching authority.
The universal and constant tradition of the Church, as seen both in facts and in the teaching of the fathers, as well as in the manner of acting and speaking adopted by many Councils, some of which were Œcumenical, teaches us that the judgments of the Roman Pontiff in matters of faith and morals are irreformable.
In the Second Council of Lyons, with the consent of both Greeks and Latins, a profession of faith was agreed upon, which declares: "When controversies in matters of faith arise, they must be settled by the decision of the Roman Pontiff." Moreover, in the Œcumenical Synod of Florence, it was defined that "the Roman Pontiff is Christ's true Vicar, the head of the whole Church, and father and teacher of all Christians; and that to him, in blessed Peter, was given by Jesus Christ the plenitude of power to rule and govern the Universal Church." Sound reason, too, teaches us that no one can remain in communion of faith with the Catholic Church who is not of one mind with its head, since the Church cannot be separated from its head even in thought.
Yet some have been found, and are even now to be found, who, boasting of the name of Catholic, and using that name to the ruin of those weak in faith, are bold enough to teach that sufficient submission is yielded to the authority of the Roman ​Pontiff, if we receive his decrees in matters of faith and morals with an obsequious silence, as it is termed, without yielding internal assent, or, at most, with a provisional assent, until the approval or disapproval of the Church has been made known. Anyone can see that by this perverse doctrine the authority of the Roman Pontiff is overturned, all unity of faith dissolved, a wide field open to errors, and time afforded for spreading them far and wide.
Wherefore the bishops, the guardians and protectors of Catholic truth, have endeavoured, especially now-a-days, to defend in their synodal decrees, and by their united testimony, the supreme authority of the Apostolic See.
But the more clearly Catholic truth has been declared, the more vehemently has it been attacked both in books and in, newspapers, for the purpose of exciting Catholics against sound doctrine, and preventing the Council of the Vatican from defining it.
Though, then, hitherto many might have doubted the opportuneness of declaring this doctrine in the present Œcumenical Council, it would seem now to be absolutely necessary to define it. For Catholic doctrine is now once more assailed by those same arguments which men, condemned by their own conscience, used against it in old times; arguments which, if carried to their ultimate consequences, would bring to the ground the very primacy of the Roman Pontiff and the infallibility of the Church itself; and to which, also, is frequently added the most violent abuse of the Apostolic See. Nay, more;, the most bitter assailants of Catholic doctrine, though calling themselves Catholics, are not ashamed to assert that the Synod of Florence, which so clearly declares the supreme authority of the Roman Pontiff, was not Œcumenical.
If then the Council of the Vatican, being thus challenged,. were to be silent, and omit to give testimony to the Catholic doctrine on this point, then Catholics would, in fact, begin to doubt the true doctrine, and the lovers of novelty would triumphantly assert that the Council had been silenced by the arguments brought forward by them. They would, moreover, ​abuse this silence on every occasion, and openly deny the obedience due to the judgments and decrees of the Apostolic See in matters of faith and morals, under pretext that the judgment of the Roman Pontiff is fallible on such points.
Wherefore the public good of Christianity seems to require that the holy Council of the Vatican, professing once again, and explaining more fully, the Florentine decree, should define clearly, and in words that can admit of no doubt, that the authority of the Roman Pontiff is supreme, and therefore exempt from error, when in matters of faith and morals he decrees and ordains what is to be believed and held by all the faithful of Christ, and what to be rejected and condemned by them.
There are, indeed, some who think that this Catholic truth should not be denned, lest schismatics and heretics should be repelled yet further from the Church. But, above all other considerations, Catholics have a right to be taught by the Œcumenical Council what they are to believe in so weighty a matter, and one which has been of late so iniquitously attacked, lest this pernicious error should in the end infect simple minds and the masses of people unawares. Hence it was that the fathers of Lyons and of Trent deemed themselves bound to establish the doctrine of the truth, notwithstanding the offence that might be taken by schismatics and heretics. For if these seek the truth in sincerity, they will not be repelled, but, on the contrary, drawn towards us, when they see on what foundations the unity and strength of the Catholic Church chiefly repose. But should any leave the Church in consequence of the true doctrine being defined by the Œcumenical Council, these will be few in number, and such as have already suffered shipwreck in the faith; such as are only seeking a pretext to abandon that Church by an overt act, which they plainly show they have deserted already in heart. These are they who have never shrunk from disturbing our Catholic people; and from the snares of such men the Council of the Vatican ought to protect the faithful children of the Church. For all true Catholics, taught and accustomed to render the fullest obedience both of thought ​and word to the Apostolic decrees of the Roman Pontiff, will receive with joyful and devoted hearts the definition of the Council of the Vatican concerning his supreme and infallible authority.
APPENDIX.
Decisions of Provincial Synods recently held, showing the Common Opinion of Bishops Concerning the Supreme and Infallible Authority of the Roman Pontiff in matters of Faith and Morals.
1. The Provincial Council held at Cologne in 1860, to which, in addition to his Eminence Cardinal Geissel, Archbishop of Cologne, five bishops subscribed, expressly declares: 'He (the Roman Pontiff) is the father and teacher of all Christians, whose judgment in questions of faith is "per se" unalterable.'
2. The bishops assembled in the Provincial Council, held at Utrecht in 1865, most openly assert: 'We unhesitatingly hold, that the judgment of the Roman Pontiff in matters which refer to faith and morals is infallible.'
3. The Provincial Council of Prague in 1860, to which his Eminence Cardinal Archbishop Frederic de Schwarzenberg and four other bishops subscribed, under the heading, 'On the Primacy of the Roman Pontiff,' decreed as follows: 'We reject, moreover, the error of those who pretend that the Church can exist anywhere without being joined in bonds of union with the Church of Rome, in which the tradition which has been handed down by the apostles has been preserved by those who are in every part.'
'We know that no one who is not joined to the head can be considered as a member of the body of the Church which Christ founded on Peter, and established on His authority. Let all them prefer to confess with us and with the multitude of orthodox believers spread over the whole world, the headship, ​of the Roman Church and the primacy of the Roman Pontiff; let them, as is fitting, with us, reverence and honour with dutiful affection our Most Holy Father, Pius the Ninth, by God's Providence Pope, the lawful successor of the Prince of the Apostles, the Vicar of Christ on earth, the chief teacher of faith, and pilot of the ship of Christ, to whom the most exact obedience and internal assent is due from all who wish to belong to the fold of Christ. We declare and teach, that this authority of the Roman Pontiff comes from Christ our Lord, and that consequently it is dependent upon no power or favour of men, and remains unimpaired in all times, even in the most bitter persecutions which the Church of Rome has suffered, as was the case during the imprisonment and martyrdom of blessed Peter.'
4. The Provincial Council of Kalocza, held in 1860, declared: 'That as Peter was … the irrefutable teacher of the doctrines of faith, for whom the Lord Himself prayed that his faith might not fail, so his legitimate successors seated aloft on the Chair of Rome … preserve the deposit of faith with supreme and irrefutable powers of declaring the truth … Wherefore we also reject, proscribe, and forbid all the faithful of this province to read or maintain, and much more to teach, the propositions published by the Gallican clergy, in 1682, which have already been censured this same year by the Archbishop of Gran, of pious memory, and by the other bishops of Hungary.
5. The Plenary Council of Baltimore, which met in 1866, and to which 44 archbishops and bishops subscribed, says: 'The living and infallible authority flourishes in that Church alone which was built by Christ upon Peter, who is the head, leader, and pastor of the whole Church, whose faith Christ promised should never fail; which ever had legitimate Pontiffs, dating their origin in unbroken line from Peter himself, being seated in his Chair, and being the inheritors and defenders of the like doctrine, dignity, office, and power. And because, where Peter is, there also is the Church, and because Peter speaks in the person of the Roman Pontiff, ever lives in his ​successors, passes judgment and makes known the truths of faith to those who seek them, therefore are the Divine declarations to be received in that sense in which they have been and are held by this Roman See of blessed Peter, that mother and teacher of all Churches, which has ever preserved whole and entire the teaching delivered by Christ, and which has taught it to the faithful, showing to all men the paths of salvation and the doctrine of everlasting truth.
6. The first Provincial Council of Westminster, held in 1852, states: 'When our Blessed Lord exhorts us, saying, "Look to the rock whence you are hewn; look to Abraham your father," it is fitting that we who have received our faith, our priesthood, and the true religion, directly from the Apostolic See, should more than others be attached to it by the bonds of love and fidelity. Therefore do we maintain that foundation of truth and orthodoxy which Jesus Christ willed should be maintained unshaken; namely, the See of Peter, the teacher and mother of the whole world, the Holy Roman Church. Whatever is once defined by it, for that very reason alone we consider to be fixed and certain; and when we look at its traditions, rites, pious customs, discipline, and all its Apostolic Constitutions, we follow and cherish them with all the affection of our hearts. In fine, we of set purpose publicly declare our obedience and respect for the Pope as Christ's Vicar, and we remain united to him in the closest bonds of Catholic unity.'
The bishops of Italy and the Order of S. Francis sent in petitions of their own to the same effect.
14. On the 9th of February the Pontifical Commission of Postulates was summoned to decide whether this petition should be laid before the Pope. With hardly any dissent the decision was affirmative; and on the 7th of March an additional chapter was distributed to the Council, entitled: 'Chapter to be added to the Decree on the Primacy of the Roman Pontiff: That the Roman Pontiff, in defining matters of faith and morals, cannot err.'
Eighteen days were given to the bishops to study this schema, and to send in their amendments in writing before it would be proposed for discussion.
15. And here we will for a time leave the subject of the infallibility, and go back to examine the first Constitution on Catholic Faith, which, as we have seen, was unanimously passed by six hundred and sixty-seven fathers of the Council in the third Public Session. Thus far we have followed the historical narrative of events. We must now shortly examine the subject-matter of the first Constitution or Decree.
The following statement is a brief paraphrase of the first Constitution on Catholic Faith:—
It begins in its preface or introduction by enumerating ​the evils which, since the Council of Trent, have sprung up in the world, and by infection have threatened also the peace of the Church. The first cause of all these evils the Council affirms to be the rejection of the divine, and therefore infallible, authority of the Church. The inevitable consequence of this rejection was to leave all matters of religion to be decided by the judgment of individuals; from this again has followed the multiplication of sects conflicting with each other, whereby the faith of many in Christianity has been wrecked. The Holy Scriptures were asserted three hundred years ago to be the sole fountain of Christian faith; but the Holy Scriptures are now rejected by many as myths. From this abandonment of divine authority and of revealed truth two main principles of error come: the one, Rationalism, which makes the human reason to be the test, the measure, or the source of all truth to itself; the other, Naturalism, which denies altogether the existence of a supernatural order of grace and truth. The legitimate offspring of Rationalism and of Naturalism are Pantheism, Atheism,, and Materialism. These, in the order of the human mind, destroy even natural theism—that is, the belief of the existence of God and of the soul—and in the order of politics have brought in the lawless spirit of revolution, which is now undermining the foundations of human society. Such is the description given in the ​schema of the intellectual aberrations of the world outside the Church. But it goes on to say that many Catholics also, by contact with these errors, have lost, if not faith, at least piety and the Catholic instinct which is the legitimate antagonist of indifferentism. From which cause erroneous interpretations of the doctrines of the Church have been introduced, and the orders of nature and of grace, of human science and of divine faith, have been mixed and confounded together. The Constitution then proceeds to treat in four chapters—(1) of God, the Creator of all things; (2) of revelation; (3) of faith; (4) of the relation of faith and reason.
16. It may be asked why, in the nineteenth century of the Christian world, need an Œcumenical Council be convened to define these things? The answer is: Because these things are divine and vital truths, and because they have been denied. For three centuries these foundations of all truth have been undermined by systematic negations, which have now issued in a formal and widespread rejection of all faith. They who ask the question can have little knowledge of the intellectual history or the intellectual state of the so-called Christian world. They are not likely indeed to have much knowledge of the acts of Pius the Ninth, who, through the whole of his pontificate, has been striving to rectify the intellectual aberrations of these ​later days. Every age has hitherto had its heresy. It may be said that the nineteenth century has no heresy, or rather that it has all heresies, because it is the century of unbelief. The intellect of man for three hundred years has broken loose from faith, and the heresy of the day is a heresy against the order of even natural truth; it is the assertion that reason is sufficient to itself. We, as compared with the men of the sixteenth century, have a great advantage. We see the whole intellectual movement which then began fully worked out to its legitimate conclusion. They saw only the first deviation from the path, which then was hardly appreciable. The reason of man either is, or is not, sufficient to itself. If it be, then Rationalism is its perfection. If it be not sufficient to itself, then somewhat higher than reason is needed. Or, in other words, reason is either its own teacher, or it needs a teacher higher than itself. The Christian world till the sixteenth century believed that the teacher of the reason of man is God, that the teaching of God is perpetual by the world and in the world, and that the reason of man is thereby related to Him as a disciple to a guide. The movement of the sixteenth century in its last analysis is the assertion that the reason of man is the critic and the measure of all truth to itself. The Reformation in all its diversities of national and personal character—German, Swiss, French, English, ​Scottish—is all one in its principle. It consisted in an appeal from the living authority of the Church to the inspired Scriptures, or to the Scriptures with the written records of Christianity, tested and interpreted by reason. All particular controversies against particular Catholic doctrines or practices were no more than accessories and accidents to the main debate. The essence of the Reformation consisted in the rejection of the doctrinal authority of the Church. The Reformers denied it to be divine, and therefore unerring; and certain. The history of the Reformed religion in Germany abundantly proves the truth of this assertion. It has had three periods. The first was a period of dogmatic rigour. The Lutheran doctrine was imposed and believed as the word of God. Men believed the Lutheran religion as they had before believed the Catholic, less only the principle. They had believed the Catholic doctrine to be the word of God; they now believed the Lutheran to be the word of God. They had believed the voice of the Church before; they believed the voice of the Bible now. It belonged to no individual to say what is the voice of the Church. But it was left for each to say what is the voice of the Bible. This period could not last long. Its own incompleteness suggested doubts. The contentions and contradictions of the Reformers shook the authority of the Reformation. Men of consecu​tive minds then began to give up dogma, and to withdraw into a personal piety. The second period was one of pietism, with a diminishing definiteness of Christian doctrines. But pietism, unsustained by the positive objects of faith, could have no duration in itself. It is like the seed which, having no root, withers away. It soon passed into the third period, which was one of Rationalism. Pietism hid its eyes from doctrines which it was tempted to doubt; but Rationalism looked them steadily in the face, and searched beyond them into the reasons, evidences, and authorities on which they rested. The search was soon over. It terminated in a book, and the book rested upon human history. Book after book of the Holy Scriptures was tried by Rationalistic criticism, and rejected until the whole Bible was banished to the realm of myths, and the Lutheran Reformation was ruined at its base. The Rationalists of to-day in Germany are the legitimate sons of the Lutherans of three hundred years ago.
17. What has happened in religion has happened also in philosophy. Three hundred years ago the intellectual system of the world was represented by the philosophy of the Christian schools. Philosophy was the intellectual prelude or avenue to the scholastic theology, and beyond all doubt this philosophy is the most solid and subtil system which the human in​tellect has ever elaborated by its own unaided force. The Reformation revolted against both the scholastic theology and the scholastic philosophy. Precisely the same development of doubt, ending in scepticism, pantheism, atheism, and naturalism, has been the result. The line of philosophy from Leibnitz, Wolff, Kant, to Schleiermacher, Hegel, Fichte, Schelling, and Strauss, exhibits the same steady advance to the rejection of all that is above the level of reason or of nature. And yet the later German philosophy regarded itself as a theology. But it taught that reason cannot prove the existence of God—that the argument from design will yield to us, not God, but only a being great enough to make the universe. It teaches also that God is the world, and the world God; that all things are manifestations or emanations of God, and that God by a necessity creates or manifests Himself for His own justification; that He cannot reveal Himself to men by outward revelation or through the senses; that all materials of reason are derived only through the external world; that religious belief and (religious feeling are one and the same; that faith is founded in the feeling of the reality of the ideal; that nothing is to be believed, nor can be required of man to believe, which is not capable of demonstration. These propositions were textually before the minds of those who elaborated the first Constitution on Catholic ​Faith, for these and the like aberrations in philosophy had been spreading for generations through the German people. It is true that they were the offspring of Lutheranism, and existed formally in the non-Catholic schools; but it is to be remembered that in the mixed universities the Catholic and Protestant populations were confounded together, and that the government appointed Protestant professors, at whose lectures Catholics attended. Infection cannot be circumscribed, nor diseases kept within a ring-fence. The same habits of mind are found to pervade men of the same nation, and among Catholic philosophers unsound theories had begun to appear. Pius the Ninth, during his pontificate, has been compelled to condemn three or four philosophies which were being" taught by Catholic professors.
18. With this short paraphrase of the Introduction, we will go on to the chapters of the Constitution de Fide Catholica, endeavouring to reduce to the narrowest compass the matter contained in it.
The Vatican Council in this Constitution has defined truths which have never been treated by any Council before.
In the first chapter it affirms that the creation of all things came from the free will of God, in exclusion and condemnation of the philosophies of emanation, manifestation, and pantheistic identity ​of God and the world, philosophic aberrations not yet extinct.
In the second chapter it affirms that the existence of God can certainly be known by the works of the visible creation. He has given us evidence enough, and reason to collect that evidence. This certainty of our natural reason may be called the infallibility of the natural order. God has so manifested Himself in creation that the reason in a normal state may come to know His existence, His power and divinity. This infallible certainty is the foundation of the moral life of man. St. Paul says that they who know not God by the things which are made are inexcusable. But they would not be inexcusable if God could not be known by the light of reason. And if in this knowledge the reason could be deceived—that is, if it were not certain—then there could be no moral obligation upon the conscience to believe. The atheist, pantheist, and sceptic, would all be excused for their doubt and unbelief. But if the existence and moral character of God be doubtful, the basis of all morals is doubtful too. Lex dubia non obligat. No Council of the Church has hitherto ever been compelled to make such a definition as this, for no age of the Christian world has yet so far departed from the theism which, from the beginning of the world under all perversions and corruptions, has pervaded mankind. It may be ​that in England surprise may be felt at such a decree; but nobody who knows Germany and France and the philosophies of this century will fail to understand the reasons of it, and to see its absolute need. It is here to be noted that the Council does not affirm that men must come, or ordinarily do come, to the knowledge, of God by the process of their own reason. It is certain, as a fact, that they receive this knowledge, from their earliest consciousness, by the instructions of others and by the doctrine of faith. The decree affirms two things—the one that the works of creation afford a sufficient evidence of the existence of God; the other that the reason has an intrinsic power of discernment by which that evidence may be collected into a logical proof. In this assertion two errors are excluded the one which denies that the visible world presents an adequate evidence of the existence of God; the other that denies to the reason a power to read that evidence without the tradition and proposition of the truth. The second chapter, after vindicating these truths of the natural order, goes on to affirm the possibility and the fact of revelation; it affirms also that revelation is necessary to two things—first, that man may attain to the knowledge of truths above and beyond the order of nature, and, secondly, that by such revelation man may be raised to a higher order of knowledge and perfection. ​It thereby denies that man can attain to such elevation and perfection of and by his own natural powers.
The third chapter opens with these words: "Forasmuch as man depends altogether on God, his Maker and Lord, and the created reason is wholly subject to the uncreated truth, we are bound to render to God in his revelation the full obedience of the intellect and of the will by faith." By this, again, the first axioms of Rationalism are denied. They cannot be better stated than in the words of the second and third propositions condemned in the Syllabus: "All action of God upon man and upon the world is to be denied." This would exclude revelation, grace, providence, and the dependence of the reason of man upon God by faith.
Again: "The reason of man, without any regard to God, is the sole judge of truth and falsehood, of good and evil; it is a law to itself, and is sufficient by its own natural powers to provide for the welfare of man and of nations."
The axioms of Rationalism may be thus stated: 1. Reason is the sole judge of truth, so that whatsoever it critically rejects is incredible. 2. Reason is the measure of truth, so that whatsoever exceeds its comprehension is incredible. 3. Reason is the sole fountain of truth, so that whatsoever is not found within its consciousness, nor can be elicited from it, is ​incredible. But if these axioms, or any one of them, be true, the reason of man is not dependent on God, and God cannot lay upon man the obligation of believing—that is, of faith.
From this it would follow that all revelation is needless, and that there is no truth except within the order of nature. But this denies all revelation, and therefore all supernatural truths such as the redemption, the Redeemer, the supernatural order of grace. There is no alternative but between Rationalism and faith. The human reason is either a critic or a disciple, and to determine this issue the first necessary truth to be proved is the existence of God. If the world be God, or if God be the world, or if the world be all, or if there be no personal Creator distinct from it, or if we cannot know Him to exist, then the reason of man is the critic of all that remains. All nature is under his feet, and though he cannot create a grain of sand or a corn of wheat he bears himself as if he were the lord and judge of all. Such is the ethical character of complete or absolute Rationalism.
But there is another form of Rationalism which is inconsistent and transitional. Many who would shrink from affirming that reason is the sole fountain of truth to itself, and that nothing is true which cannot be found in the human consciousness or ​elicited from it, nevertheless maintain that reason is the measure of truth, and that nothing which is incomprehensible is credible. The teachers of this school tell us that although without revelation many truths would not have been known to man, yet when once revealed they may be adequately comprehended and proved by reason, so that they become objects not only of faith, but of science. They therefore undertook to demonstrate the doctrines of the Holy Trinity and of the incarnation, which, when they had been reduced to the measure of reason, ceased to be the doctrines of revelation. This, especially in the last century, was the first momentum which carried many into unbelief of revelation altogether.
But if the truths of faith are not at the same time truths of science that is, adequately measured by the reason and resolved into their first and self-evident principles—then there is an essential distinction between faith and science. Both are operations of the reason, and both are strictly rational, but they are distinguished by their subject-matter, and are therefore distinct in their principles. Faith is the obedience of the created intellect in dependence upon the uncreated intelligence of God. But faith is not a blind or irrational act. The motives and preludes of faith are processes of reason. Reason weighs the evidences which show that it is reasonable and ​rational to believe what the uncreated intelligence of God reveals to man. Faith comprehends, therefore, the reasons why it is a rational act to believe what it is beyond reason to discover. Science is the certain knowledge of truth in its principles. But this is possible to man only in the natural order.
In the fourth chapter the Council treats of the relation of faith and reason. It defines that there are two orders of knowledge, distinguished by their principle and their object—by their principle because the one proceeds by natural reason, the other by divine faith; by their object because the one is in the order of nature, the other in the order of supernatural truths. It then declares that between faith and reason there can be no conflict. They move on different planes, and truth can never be opposed to truth, nor can truth contradict itself; wherefore, if at any time there shall seem to be opposition between the doctrines of faith and the conclusions of reason, the conflict can only be apparent and transient, and while it seems to exist we are bound even by reason, which assures us of the certainty of faith, to believe the conflict to be not real, but only apparent.
The Constitution then further declares that faith and reason are mutually helpful:—
It further says that the doctrine of faith is not a philosophical discovery, but a divine deposit to be faithfully guarded and infallibly declared by the Church.
If the Vatican Council had met and parted without any act beyond this one decree, it would have applied a direct and searching remedy to the intellectual aberrations of the nineteenth century. The proof of this may be seen in the outcry of unbelief against the Council. If it had not touched the quick, the outcry would not have been heard.
* ↑ The Definitions of the Vatican Council are now in like manner added to those of the Council of Trent.
* ↑ S. Irenæus, Adv. Her. 1. 3, c. 3, n. 2.