# Secretary Kissinger's Talks in China, November 1974/2nd Report to the President Nov 27

​MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON
INFORMATION November 28, 1974 SECRET/SENSITIVE
| MEMORANDUM FOR: | THE PRESIDENT |
| FROM: | BRENT SCOWCROFT |
The Secretary asked that I pass you the following report of his Wednesday afternoon meeting:
"I held another meeting with Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-P'ing at the Great Hall of the People Wednesday afternoon which lasted for two and a quarter hours. He outlined various Chinese positions in a general tour d'horizon of international issues. He demonstrated across the board continuity on Chinese international policies, with the central theme once again being Soviet hegemony and ways to counter it. The difference from our talks with Chou lay in the manner of presentation, with Teng staying within carefully framed positions and reluctant to engage in extensive philosophic excursions or to get into uncharted areas. The Vice Premier did liven up considerably and presented the Chinese position competently and sometimes humorously but he has none of Chou's elegance, flair, breadth or subtlety -- though admittedly Chou represents a very high standard. He quoted Chairman Mao with great frequency as have all Chinese interlocutors during the past year. There has been only very occasional reference to Chou during this trip.
"Teng began by stressing the importance of good relations among the US, Europe and Japan, just as Chairman Mao did a year ago. He said that we need these allies to deal effectively with the Russian 'power bear.' I agreed with him that we had to work together on a basis of equal partnership, underlining the improvement of our allied relations during the past year and said that your forthcoming meeting with Schmidt and Giscard should make further progress. I told him China's emphasizing to European leaders the need for allied unity has been very helpful. Like Mao and Chou before him, Teng showed contempt for the left in European politics, saying that China preferred conservatives. I pointed out the danger of Moscow controlled communist parties gaining power in Europe, but we agreed that even if this were to happen, it would only be a short term phenomenon. I said that the MBFR negotiations were ​the best vehicle for maintaining substantial forces in Europe by defusing Congressional pressures for reductions and said that any agreement on these negotiations would only amount to about a ten percent cut.
"On Japan, Teng said that Japan's relations with us were the first priority, and its relations with China came second. I said that your visit to Japan had put our relations on a steady course.
"Teng called the Middle East the most sensitive area and suggested that the Russians were making a comeback against our earlier inroads. He said it was important for us to help the Arabs as well as Israel. China in turn must support the Arab/Palestinian cause, but at the same time wishes to see erosion of Soviet influence. I responded that we were continuing to make progress, though in less dramatic fashion, and that I expected further movement by February, which should once again give us momentum vis-a-vis Moscow. I explained that we have to follow a step-by-step approach in order to handle our domestic situation and promised him a further rundown on our assistance to various Arab countries in a more restricted session tomorrow. I emphasized three main principles: (1) The US will not yield to pressure in the Middle East, especially Soviet pressure; (2) No diplomatic progress is possible without us and therefore sooner or later everyone, including the Palestinians, would have to come to us; (3) We were determined to bring about diplomatic progress and we would succeed though there will be temporary ups and downs.
"The Vice Premier approved of our bettering relations with India, in order to counter Soviet influence. I explained that this was the purpose of my trip and that we plan to help Pakistan in the wake of Bhutto's visit early next year. We agreed on India's essentially expansionist impulses, though he stressed China's lack of concern about any direct Indian military threat.
"Teng repeated familiar Chinese position on Cambodia, suggesting once again that we leave the field.
"I emphasized that we had nothing particular to gain in Cambodia but that we could not simply abandon our friends. I stated that we had nothing against Sihanouk but thought he should lead a balance of forces and not be a figurehead completely dependent on forces controlled by ​Hanoi. I said that it was not in China's interest to have Indochina dominated by one power. I said that we were prepared to see a conference on Cambodia out of which might emerge a new government with an important role for Sihanouk. Teng claimed that the Khmer communists are essentially free of Hanoi's influence. I said that we might exchange views with Peking further on this question after the UN vote.
"With respect to the oil crisis, Teng said that inflation and worsening economic problems preceded the hike in oil prices and were due largely to price increases in other commodities. He said that China supports the use of oil as a weapon but hoped that a solution could be found through dialogue rather than confrontation between producers and consumers. I replied that while we understood China's ideological support of the third world, at some point this ran up against China's real concerns about security. (I meant this as a general point, given China's policy of hitting us in international forums on behalf of the third world, while simultaneously dealing with us as a counter-weight to the Soviet Union.) If the oil prices demoralized Europe and Japan and weakened their defenses, this would surely not be in China's interest. Nor should these countries be dependent on forces outside their control. I explained the strategy of developing consumer cooperation and stressed that our objective was to have a constructive outcome with the producers rather than confrontation. I suggested very lightly that the Chinese might want to be helpful on this question, but I did not press this because I doubt that their ideological imperatives will permit it.
"With respect to developments on food, we both agreed that the solution to the world's problem is to develop production in the deficit countries. It would not do for these countries to be dependent on a few exporters and the gap could not be made up in this way in any event.
"The Vice Premier closed the meeting with the issue of normalization. He repeated and seemed to slightly harden their basic principles on this question, while at the same time making it clear that they were in no hurry if we did not feel the time was ripe to move on this problem. He said that this did not imply their lack of desire in solving the issue, but China is willing to wait. We agreed that there would be no breakthrough on this trip.
"Teng hosted a dinner in a local restaurant featuring a Mongolian hot pot wherein you cook very tender lamb yourself. The mood at both the meeting and the dinner was very friendly. I will meet one more time with Teng Thursday afternoon to go into a little more detail on the communique with the Foreign Minister. I am giving a return banquet Thursday night and we are off for Soochow sightseeing Friday morning."
SECRET/SENSITIVE