# Protestant Exiles from France/Book Second - Chapter 3 - Section XIII

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Sec. 13. — What became of King Charles and Lord Peterborough.
We must go back a little as to time, in order to bring our readers into contact with Charles III. and Peterborough at Barcelona, the capital of Catalonia. The singularly successful campaign there had been crowned by the retreat of the French on the arrival of the English fleet.
The young king always chafed under the arrangement of the English government, according to which he was nominally in command of the army, while the real power was exercised by the generals. His affection for the Prince of Hesse had sweetened his submission to this arrangement. Hut the prince had died a soldier’s death, and had left Lord Peterborough to concentrate upon himself all the honour both of the plan and of the execution of the recent brilliant enterprise. Peterborough openly treated the king as a cypher, and exhibited before the populace his consciousness of his own pre-eminent greatness. As to Lord Galway, Brigadier Stanhope, and all his brother officers, Peterborough, when not himself in the field, spent most of his time in defaming and disparaging them. If the king was ​prejudiced against these faithful and capable men, it was through Peterborough’s misrepresentations. But his Majesty specially winced under the contempt for himself which this mighty man of valour cared not to conceal. And he is known to have expressed himself in words to this effect:— “I shall be told next that I owe Madrid to Lord Peterborough; if I could not have health without owing it to him, I would rather be without it.”
Paul Methuen, son of the Irish ex-chancellor and ambassador at Lisbon, wrote to his father from Barcelona, 26th May 1706, telling him how Lord Peterborough was fretting under King Charles’ retaliatory discouragements of him, and adding — “What vexes my Lord Peterborough most of all is the great probability of my Lord Galway getting to Madrid before him.” He was beginning to be possessed with an overmastering jealousy of Lord Galway. Still he must endeavour to overcome the king’s beginnings of a course of systematic obstruction of English commanders. At last he succeeded in prevailing upon Charles to come to some arrangement for an expedition to Madrid. And both took their departure from Barcelona according to the programme that the troops should be conveyed by sea under Peterborough’s charge — that Charles should travel by land, via Tortosa — and that both should rendezvous at Valencia. The Earl kept his word and took up his quarters at Valencia. But his boyish Majesty had run off to Saragossa. In a letter to the Duchess of Marlborough, dated July 1706, Peterborough says:—
“Your grace has, before this can come to your hands, heard of my Lord Galway’s being in Madrid, but will wonder when I tell you that we cannot prevail on the King of Spain to go thither. And his wise ministers have thought fit to defer it from the time it was possible at least two months, if some accident do not prevent it for ever.”
The Duke of Marlborough believed that Peterborough had treated the young king " with levity and petulance." The Duke wrote to Godolphin:—
“I believe the anger and aversion he has for Lord Peterborough is the greatest cause of his taking the resolution to go to Saragossa, which I am afraid will prove fatal."
And again, on August 5:—
“I send you back Lord Galway’s letter. You will have seen by my former letter the fears that I have that the Duke of Anjou, being joined by Monsieur Legale, may be in a condition to oblige Lord Galway and the Portuguese to retire from Madrid, which will make it very difficult for King Charles or Lord Peterborough to join them. I do with all my heart wish Lord Galway with King Charles, for it is certain, since the relief of Barcelona, he has done everything as the French ought to have wished. For had he made use of the time and marched to Madrid, everything must have gone well in that country. The cabinet council are certainly right in advising the Queen to give the command to Lord Galway.”
Although Lord Peterborough deluged the press with documents as to the immediately previous and the subsequent stages of his career, he withheld all information concerning this period; he allowed his admirers to be content with guesses as to himself, and to invent and discharge random censures at the heads of Lord Galway and every other general. His only important utterance was untrue, namely, a declaration that Lord Galway never communicated to him the fact of his arrival at Madrid. The truly religious and honourable Lord Galway assured the House of Lords that he had sent letters to Peterborough both from Madrid and from Guadalaxara. The only foundation for Peterborough’s fiction was that Colonel Dubourgay was the bearer of Galway’s letter for the king, who was at Saragossa, but had no letter for Peterborough, who was at Valencia. But the colonel, in order to avoid the enemy’s troops, had to come round by Valencia, and thus Peterborough got the news verbally, sooner than by letter. It was no offence that the king, who was both king and commander-in-chief, should have been addressed first. The truth was, that through the colonel’s unintentional detour Peterborough had the intelligence before his master.
The plain and explanatory facts, which I am now to present to my readers, are here printed for the first time from Admiral Sir John Leake’s Papers in the British Museum. Lord Peterborough, whose present displeasure with the king was partly hypocritical, corresponded with him and endeavoured to take advantage of his lukewarmness as to the expedition to Madrid, by proposing to take his troops into Savoy for the relief of Turin, then besieged by a French army. Charles’ reply is preserved, in which he gave him orders accordingly.
But immediately thereafter Colonel Dubourgay arrived at Saragossa from Madrid with despatches from Lord Galway, having occupied four days in the ride. From ​him Charles received the further information that the French had voluntarily raised the siege of Turin. The king accordingly wrote a distinct and elaborate letter to Lord Peterborough from Saragossa, 20th June o.s. 1706 positively ordering him to set all the troops in motion for Madrid without losing a moment. I translate the letter:—
“My Lord Earl, — After I had written the enclosed, an officer sent from my Lord Calhvay has arrived, who set out from the army of the allies, only four days ago. He has brought me the agreeable news that the said army has advanced as far as Guadalaxara, and is waiting with impatience for the reinforcements which it hopes to obtain from the corps d’armée which happens to be under your orders. The enemy is encamped in the direction of Atienza, and boasts of expected succours from France, which would put them in a condition to decide the destiny of Spain at a stroke by a single battle. For this reason I send you this Express with all diligence to give you the intelligence, and to demand of you that without losing a moment of time you will set in motion all your cavalry and the greater part of your infantry, to march towards the said army at Guadalaxara by the direct route, without waiting for any other advice from me, and without making the detour which in my former letter I marked with a line. My object was to cover the roads which I myself would take, but I am now uncertain as to taking the route by Tervel, and will perhaps take a different (because more direct) road to save both distance and time. In any case I will let you know of any changes as to my own progress, determined on while the troops are advancing, that you may thereupon adopt the most suitable measures.
“Further, it will not be necessary that your whole force should assemble in order to march all together, for the enemy being now at a distance from the road which these troops should take, you can make the cavalry advance regiment by regiment; the infantry to follow as soon as possible. According to the news which the said officer retails, the siege of Turin has been raised; therefore one need not now embarrass oneself in regard to the succours which the Duke of Savoy asked for. Even if it were not the case that the gallant admirals are unwilling to engage in the enterprise against the islands with the three or four battalions of your troops which had been destined for that service, it is contrary to the public interest to amuse oneself now with any operation on the coast. The public interest requires that these battalions should serve in the reinforcements (supposing them to be in a condition to march), in order to give better assurance of the great success which we should be able to obtain by advantageously giving tattle to the enemy, or by driving the French altogether from the continent of Spain, before they could be joined by succours from Italy.
“I have no doubt of the zeal and diligence with which you will take care to put in execution these directions and marches, so important to the common cause, and profitable for your own honour and glory, in which the friendship is interested which I profess for your person, praying God to preserve it in His holy keeping.”
Madrid was now Lord Peterborough’s post of duty for three reasons:—
First. The English Government, aware of his feeling of rivalry towards every brother officer, and towards Lord Galway specially, had given him a special post of honour. The Earl of Peterborough had been appointed ambassador-extraordinary at Madrid, with powers and instructions for treating of and adjusting all matters of state and traffic between the kingdoms of Great Britain and Spain. Brigadier Stanhope was the ambassador in attendance on the king’s person, and therefore Lord Peterborough ought to have hastened to Madrid in order to acquaint himself with the political situation. Secondly. He was generalissimo of the forces under the King of Spain, according to a commission granted by the king. He ought, therefore, to have obeyed the positive orders conveyed to him by letter. Thirdly. He was indebted to Lord Galway for the English regiments under his command. He should have regarded those regiments as having been lent to him in order to ensure his success at Barcelona, and as being now due to his brother officer in order to ensure his success at Madrid.
Notwithstanding these solid and solemn reasons, Lord Peterborough would not move until the king would come to the rendezvous at Valencia.
The king’s delay was inexcusable. He wished time for marshalling a royal equipage and retinue which would dazzle the admiring eyes of the Castilians. He set out by the province of Arragon, which, along with Castile, had formally submitted to him. His German favourites advocated his plan, saying, “It would not be advisable for his Majesty to go to Madrid in a hurry, without his equipage and retinue.” To this Stanhope replied, “William of Orange, when he made his descent upon England, went to London in a hackney, attended by a few dragoons, otherwise he had lost the crown.” The young king wasted thirty days in pageantry and easy marches, and at length rejoined Peterborough at Valencia.
During this weary time Lord Galway at Guadalaxara, and the people of Madrid, are kept in a state of blank astonishment or stupor. Here is an army, professedly ​a part of a king’s escort, and yet no king is visible to receive the allegiance of his subjects. No message is forthcoming to give assurance of a royal anxiety to be in his capital and among his people. The Spaniards can hardly believe in the existence of a prince styled His Catholic Majesty, heralded by a Calvinistic commander-in-chief. Some humourists design and strike and circulate a medal describing Charles III. as “king by favour of the heretics.” While some people jest as if the invisible Pretender must be non-existent, others seriously give up all expectation of his coming. Two priests go about declaring he is dead. One of them is arrested by order of Lord Galway, who cannot punish him, because he cannot infallibly contradict the report. The report is believed. Day after day French troops arrive from Italy. At length our allied army is hopelessly outnumbered; at least it cannot prevent the enemy from entering and occupying Madrid on the 4th of August (25th July, old style).
On the 6th of August (27th July, o.s.), King Charles and Lord Peterborough appear — the former with a kingly retinue — but too late. If the very late lord had brought his troops with him, a battle might still have been fought. But he had played a trick well known to jealous confederate generals, and had dispersed the bulk of his army in garrisons. He brought only two regiments of Spanish dragoons and a part of a regiment of English dragoons, and left behind him thirteen battalions of English foot and two regiment of dragoons. What, then, could be done, but to retreat?
In extenuation of Charles’ delay, it must be said that he could not have foreseen that Peterborough would have disobeyed his positive orders. During three-fourths of the time, if his better judgment reproached him for his neglect of duty, he may have consoled himself by thinking that all the forces had long ago combined at Madrid and beat the enemy, as they could then have done. In that case the people would have felt it consistent with prudence and safety to have done immediate homage to a victorious monarch. The circumstance, that he ultimately came to the rendezvous at Valencia, only showed that he yielded to Lord Peterborough’s obstinacy.
All these transactions were shrouded in mystery and unknown to the world. The Duke of Berwick wondered at (what he called) the forty days’ halt, and condemned it as a fatal mistake. In aftertimes, Lord Peterborough being put upon his defence, led people to believe that it was Galway who was thus fatally criticized. The fact is that Berwick meant to criticize Peterborough, Stanhope, Das Minas, and all the generals, and not Galway only.
Trusting to the ignorance of people at home, Peterborough insinuated a theory, which seemed to say that Lord Galway knew reinforcements could not come up for forty days, and that he ought therefore to have entrenched his army and enrolled regiments of Spanish volunteers. As to the latter suggestion, no Spaniard could serve the allies until they had fought a decisive battle with Philip and the French. Regular troops under Peterborough’s command ought to have hurried to the scene. Lord Galway expected the king in eight days (or ten days at the most). Colonel Dubourgay’s roundabout journey to Saragossa had occupied four days only. Immediately the king had ordered Peterborough to march to Madrid, in a letter which apparently copied Lord Galway’s statement of the urgent object of such a rapid march. After the lapse of eight days, Galway was in hourly expectation of the arrival of Peterborough’s vanguard. Every military precaution was taken to keep the roads open for the English hero and his royal master. Convoys of provisions were sent to meet them — provisions which mouldered during Lord Peterborough’s delay — a delay prompted by the most unheroic jealousy and by senseless displeasure at the thought that in the presence of his more venerable comrade he would be a junior officer. The imputation to Lord Galway of the blame of a forty days’ halt at Madrid proves only that Galway had the honour (or misfortune) of arriving at Madrid forty days before another general, whose vaingloriousness overpowered his sense of duty, and who himself wasted and lost those forty days, to the injury of his country and of her confederates.