# Theologico-Political Treatise 1862/Appendix

APPENDIX.
The Editor cannot, resist the desire he feels to make the reader acquainted with the following appropriate and characteristic letter of Spinoza, in answer to a hostile criticism of this work, which had been sent him by a mutual friend of the critic and himself. The translation is made free, to enhance the pleasure the Editor himself has experienced in turning it into English, and for the sake of the reader; but there is no form of expression he believes which Spinoza's views do not warrant, and which he would not have suffered to pass. The original is the Epist. 49, of the Op. Posth.
_________________________
"Learned Sir,
"You are doubtless surprised that I have made you wait so long for an acknowledgment of your last letter, but, in truth, it is with difficulty I have brought myself to notice the libellous epistle you enclosed, and, indeed, I only write now to make good my promise to answer it. That I may do as little violence as possible to my proper sentiments, I shall be brief, contenting myself with showing how your correspondent falsifies both my views and my intentions, — whether of set purpose and from malevolence, or through ignorance, I cannot so readily tell. But to the matter.
"Your correspondent in the beginning of his letter says, 'That it is of no consequence to know to what people I belong, or what manner of life I lead.' Had he been duly informed on both of these heads he would not so lightly have taken up the idea that I inculcate atheism. Atheists, for the most part, are wordlings, and seek eagerly after wealth and distinction, but these, all who know me are aware, I have ever held in the very slenderest estimation. He is then pleased to say that 'I must be a man of no mediocre ability,' for the purpose, apparently, of giving point to his next assertion, that 'I have at best skilfully, craftily, and with the worst intentions, advocated the radically bad and pernicious cause of the Deists.' This of itself were enough to show that the writer has not understood my arguments; for who could possibly be of so crafty and hypocritical a temper as to array a host of the most cogent and convincing reasons in favour of a conclusion which he himself believed to be false? Of whom would your correspondent believe that truth and sincerity guided the pen, if he thought that falsehood in disguise could be enforced with the same straightforwardness of purpose as truth itself? But, indeed, I ought not to express surprise here, for even thus was Descartes traduced by Voet; even thus are the best men in the world wont to be met by their opponents.
"The writer next proceeds to say, 'It seems as though, to escape suspicion of superstition, I had thought it requisite to divest myself of all religion.' I do not pretend to divine what he understands by religion and what by superstition here, but I ask, Does he cast off religion who rests all he has to say on the subject, on the ground that God is to be acknowledged as the Supreme Good, that He is with entire singleness of soul to be loved as such; and that in loving God consists our highest bliss, our best privilege, our most perfect freedom? Further, that the reward of virtue is virtue, and the penalty of incapacity and baseness is ignorance and abjectness of spirit? Still further, that every one is bound to love his neighbour as himself, and to obey the laws of the land in which, and the authority under which, he lives? Now all this I have not only insisted on as impressively as I could in words, but I have further adduced the most cogent reasons that presented themselves to me in support of my conclusions.
"But I think I can see whence the hostility of my critic arises. This person finds nothing in virtuous life and right reason in themselves which satisfy or delight him; it seems as though he would rather live under the empire of his passions, yield to his appetites and lusts, were it not that this one consideration withheld him — the fear of punishment. He must keep himself from doing amiss as a slave; he cannot observe the divine commandments of his own free-will, but crouches before them with a perplexed and unsatisfied soul; he strikes a bargain with the Almighty, and for good conduct looks for much more ample reward, and of a much more sensible kind, than he expects to find in the divine love, — ay, recompense ever the greater as inwardly he feels more averse to good, as reluctantly and perforce he compels himself to effect what good he does. This is the ground of his belief, that all who are not restrained by fear of the kind he feels himself, must live without a curb upon their lusts, and cast out religion from their hearts. But I quit this ungrateful topic, and proceed to the inferences of my censor, and to this one in especial, that 'I with glozing and crafty arguments inculcate Atheism.'
"The grounds of this conclusion appear to be that he thinks I take from God all freedom, that I subject the Supreme to fate. This is utterly false; I do nothing of the sort; on the contrary, I maintain that everything follows by inevitable necessity from the very nature of God. It is universally admitted that God by his nature knows himself, and that this knowledge follows necessarily from the divine nature; but I presume no one thinks that God is therefore controlled by fate. On the contrary, all reasonable men believe that God knows himself freely and necessarily at once; that freedom and necessity, in fact, are terms synonymous when the nature of Deity is in question: God, as author of all, is himself fate, freedom and necessity. In this I can see nothing which every one may not understand, nothing which any one can find fault with; but if my critic nevertheless believes that what I say is said with an evil intention, what, I would ask, must he think of his Descartes, who maintains that nothing happens through our agency which God has not already pre-ordained; yea, that in every moment of our lives we are as it were created anew by God, but that we do not the less act freely according to the power that is given us? a state of things which, as Descartes himself admits, is altogether incomprehensible.
"The necessity of things which I contend for abrogates neither divine nor human laws; the moral precepts, whether they have the shape of commandments from God or not, are still divine and salutary; and the good that flows from virtue and godly love, whether it be derived from God as a ruler and lawgiver, or proceed from the constitution, that is, the necessity, of the Divine Nature, is not on this account the less desirable. On the other hand, the evils that arise from wickedness, are not the less to be dreaded and deplored because they necessarily follow the actions done; and, finally, whether we act with freedom or from necessity we are still accompanied in all we do by hope or fear. My censor, therefore, says falsely that I put the question of morals and religion on such a footing that neither command nor prescription are any longer to be recognized, or, as he has it, 'That there can be no expectation of reward, no fear of punishment, if everything be held subject to fate, or follow of necessity from the nature of God.'
"Here I will not pause to ask whether it be one and the same, or not a very different thing, to maintain that all happens necessarily from the nature of God, and to hold that the Universe is God? but I beg you to observe how the critic odiously and unjustifiably adds that 'I am minded men should lead virtuous lives, not because of the precepts and commands of God, or moved by the hope of reward or fear of punishment, but,' &c. In the whole of my Tractate I aver that you will find no word to this effect. On the contrary, I declare expressly (vide Chap. IV.) that the sum of the divine law, the law that is written on our hearts and minds by the hand of God (vide Chap. II.), consists in this especially, — that we love God as our supreme good, not through fear of punishment, for love knows nothing of fear and cannot flow from fear, not even from love of aught else that we might wish to enjoy, but wholly and solely from devotion to the Supreme; for were this not the rule, we should then love God less than the thing desired. I have further shown in the same place that this is the very law which God revealed to the prophets; and if I now maintain that this law receives its character of commandment from God, or if I comprehend it in the way I comprehend the other decrees of God as involving an eternal truth, an eternal necessity in itself, it still remains an ordinance of the Almighty, and is doctrine wholesome to mankind. Even so, whether I love God of my own free will or by the necessity of the divine decree. I still love the Creator and am blessed. I might therefore with reason maintain that this person belongs to that class of men of whom I speak at the end of my preface, and say, that I would much rather they left my book unread, than by perverse interpretations of its views, whilst deriving no benefit from its perusal themselves, they proved hindrances in the way of others who might profit by its contents.
"Although I believe that I have already said enough in the way of explanation of my views, and in answer to my censor, I still think it worth while to make a few further observations. I say, then, that he is mistaken when he imagines that I had in my eye that axiom of theological writers, which draws a distinction between the dogmatic doctrine and the simple narrative discourse of a prophet. If he really understands what I say in my 15th chapter, when quoting the Rabbi Judah Alpakhar, how could he believe that I agreed with the Rabbi, when I was all the while engaged in pointing out the erroneousness of his conclusions? If my critic intended any other axiom than the one I refer to, then I avow that I am not myself acquainted with it, and could not therefore in any way have had it in my eye.
"Further, I cannot see how my censor should say I believed that 'all would agree with me in my views who deny that reason and philosophy are the proper interpreters of Scripture,' seeing that I have pointedly rejected the conclusions as well of those who scout reason, as of Maimonides [who would reconcile Scripture with reason by arbitrarily torturing its text into the shape he desires].
"It were long to recite everything advanced by my critic in which I can see that he does not come to his task of censor with an entirely assured spirit; I therefore proceed at once to the passage where he says, that 'I have no grounds for my opinion that Mahomet was not a true prophet.' This singular conclusion of his he as strangely seeks to make good from the general statements and opinions I propound, in spite of the fact that from all I say of Mahomet I plainly show that I regard him as an impostor, inasmuch as he denies throughout the Koran that liberty which the universal religion, the religion which is revealed by natural as well as by prophetic light, allows — the right to worship God in spirit and in truth, a right which I have maintained must under all circumstances be conceded to mankind. And had I happened not to have done so, I should ask whether I were really bound to show that every one who has spoken oracularly was a false prophet? The prophets of the Old Testament were held on their parts, to prove that they were true prophets [and this, not by signs only, but by the excellence of their doctrine also]. If after all I am met by the reply that Mahomet taught divine precepts and gave sure signs of his mission, then would my critic himself have no grounds for refusing to Mahomet the character of a true prophet.
"As regards the Turks and other nations not included in the pale of Christianity, I am free to confess that I believe if they worship God in love and truth and do justly by their neighbour they have within them that which is equivalent to the Spirit of Christ, and that their salvation is assured, whatever notions they in their ignorance may entertain of Mahomet and his revelations.
"You see, therefore, my dear friend, that my critic fails greatly of the truth; but I do not the less perceive that he does me far less injustice than he does himself, when he ventures to assert that 'with covert wiles and glozing arguments I inculcate Atheism.'
"In conclusion, I venture to hope that in what precedes you will not find anything said too severely, and that is not well merited by my censor. Should you however meet with anything of the sort, I beg you to strike it out, or to soften and amend it as may seem best to you. It is not my wish to vex or irritate him, whoever he may be; neither is it my purpose, in my desire to stand well with you, to make myself a single enemy abroad; indeed, as such adverse criticisms are common enough, I should scarcely have brought myself to reply to this particular one, as I say at the beginning of my letter, had I not pledged you my word that I should. Farewell! I commit this letter to your prudence, and beg you to believe that I am yours, &c,
"B. de Spinoza."

## Notes

* ↑ Isaac Orobio, M.D., a Jewish physician of Amsterdam.