# The Unpopular History of the United States by Uncle Sam Himself/Chapter 14

XIV
THE PRAIRIE FIRE PANIC
Hull’s inglorious finish riled the Americans. They got their dander up, especially some high-tempered mountaineers in Tennessee and Kentucky, where General Hopkins raised 4,000 mounted militia. They treated America to the spectacle of a genuine rush—the real thing—a rush which measured up to every optimistic prediction of those who placed their faith in militia—4,000 fiery ​cavaliers, “smart and active woodsmen,” eager for revenge, sniffing the battle from afar—4,000 mounted frontiersmen rode, furiously, upon what developed into the wittiest campaign of any war—if brevity be the soul of wit. Their whirlwind campaign lasted five days. Once on the march the ardor of the troops began to cool, and the leaven of mutiny wrought disintegration. On the fourth day a prairie fire was mistaken for some cunning ruse of the enemy. Panic-stricken and totally ignoring the authority of their officers, the disorderly rabble abandoned their journey. Incredible as it may sound, it is yet the sober truth, that 4,000 hardy pioneers scurried back again to their mountains, hysterically frightened by an anonymous and serenely innocent prairie fire. Their officers ordered and pleaded and raved and swore; nothing could stop such an unreasoning and undisciplined rabble.
Every fellow for himself, and the devil take the hindmost, they scattered to their homes, each with a gory and imaginative tale to tell. ​This is just another illustration of individual initiative—working backwards.
It is perfectly possible to take a thousand individuals, each of whom is individually fearless, form them hastily into a regiment, and collectively they will not stand fire. A thousand individual heroes may easily make one collective regimental coward. Such is the incomprehensible psychology of the mob.
But the point to be emphasized is this: Nobody seemed to learn anything from these staggering stampedes. Even General William Henry Harrison, who had sense enough to become President of the United States some years later, tried his hand at the same game. He selected another army for the express, sworn, and heralded purpose of wiping out the stain of Hull’s surrender. Again it was militia—frontiersmen—from Kentucky, Virginia, Tennessee, Pennsylvania. Volunteers surged forward with the greatest enthusiasm, and offered themselves in such numbers that General Harrison could only take a chosen few, and leave the disappointed ​many. These were not old men and weaklings and substitutes; they were Indian-fighting sons of the border—stout bodies and brave souls, but undisciplined.
The militia of Kentucky and Tennessee assembled at Louisville and Newport; those from Virginia mobilized at Urbana; and the Pennsylvania crowd gathered at Erie. They were to march in three columns with a supposed total of not less than ten thousand men. Think of it! Ten thousand Daniel Boones, Simon Kentons, and Buffalo Bills! What glory a school boy would expect from such an expedition, which trailed through the forest, registering oaths against the savage redskins, and swearing to make the British sweat for their capture of Detroit.
It ended as was foreordained, in the same old, sad old way. No sooner had the several columns began to move than they began to strike the truly American stumbling blocks of mutiny and disobedience. Raw militia stand hard work with no better grace than they will stand a steady hammering. The left ​column from Kentucky, when only a few days out, had to be argued and pleaded with, remaining only in response to the personal entreaties of General Harrison. The middle column, from Urbana, after a slight skirmish with Indians, flatly refused to obey orders for a further pursuit, and returned to their camp. This ended the autumn campaign, and represented the total accomplishments of ten thousand men, frontiersmen at that, engaged in the very kind of warfare for which they were supposed to be peculiarly adapted. Once again they demonstrated the undependableness of men who were not trained to control and obedience, no matter what may be their patriotism and courage. Nothing, absolutely nothing, was done until January 22, 1813, when a forward movement under General Winchester was defeated and captured at Frenchtown with a loss of 397 killed, 27 wounded, and 526 prisoners. The British force was the same that had, under General Brock, captured Detroit, and were now commanded by Proctor who terrorized the ​northwest. The American loss at Frenchtown was a natural sequence of Hull’s surrender, and a further installment of the price that we were continually paying for the insubordination of our militia.
But, my son, let me impress upon you, let me tell you over and over again, the shame of it is that these same militiamen who run away, mutiny, and surrender, represent A No. 1 military material which we lose for lack of training, discipline, and organization.
For a moment now turn back to the beginning of the war. You will remember that President Madison had an argument with various governors and lawyers as to whether the state militia could be employed outside of the United States. That powwow raged in the capitol and continued in the camp, to this distressing outcome: On October 12, 1812, General Van Rensselaer, commanding 900 regulars and 2,270 militia, held Fort Niagara; 225 American regulars crossed the river into Canada and by a brilliant assault captured the British heights at Queenstown. General ​Brock, the British commander who had taken Detroit, at once saw the importance of dislodging these troops, and was killed while leading an unsuccessful assault. In the meantime most of the militia detachment which was to have taken part of the original movement, as well as the remainder of the regulars, had crossed the Niagara to help defend the heights. But the rest of the militia on our side of the river, although ordered and implored by their commander, absolutely refused to pass beyond the borders of the United States. Stubborn as mules, they balked within plain sight and watched their comrades being slaughtered, while they debated a high point of law—whereas, viz, to wit: whether or not under the Constitution of the United States duly adopted in May, 1787, they as militiamen of the sovereign States, temporarily in the service of the National Government, could be called out for any service other than to resist invasion. Manifestly this was not resisting an invasion, they were safely on their own side of the river, within ​the United States while their friends and kinsmen beyond the river were dying in foreign territory. The militia won their argument, while every solitary American who had already crossed the river was either killed or forced to surrender—250 killed and wounded, and 700 prisoners. The British lost 16 killed and 69 wounded. The total British force was estimated at 600 regulars with 500 militia and Indians. The Americans had 900 regulars and 2,270 militia.
A little later Gen. Proctor, who apparently succeeded Gen. Brock in command of the British, had penned up Gen. Harrison in Fort Meigs on the east bank of the Miami River. Proctor’s 983 regulars and militia with twelve hundred Indians, occupied both banks of the river. Twelve hundred Kentucky militia under Gen. Clay were moving down the Miami to Harrison’s support. Harrison sent orders for Clay to land eight hundred men on the west bank, spike the enemy’s cannon, and return to their boats—which eight hundred Americans easily accomplished. But instead ​of returning to their boats, they stormed the British camp—result: 45 killed, 605 prisoners, 150 escaped. The other detachment, thanks to a vigorous sortie by the regulars, succeeded in entering the fort. One-half the command had been lost by disobedience and individual initiative.
One bright spot showed in the whole campaign. Fort Stephenson was garrisoned by 160 American regulars, under command of Major Croghan, a lad of less than twenty-one. Through his successes Proctor had grown audacious. He assaulted the fort with 391 British regulars, losing 96. The garrison casualties were 1 killed and 7 slightly wounded. Why the difference? Easy to answer. Major Croghan’s Americans were regulars, and knew how to obey.
There is no sense in piling up instances. The War of 1812 bristled with calamities caused by our unmanageable, disorganized, and inefficient militia. Throughout that war the British regulars held Canada with probably 5,000 men. Against them we sent ​expedition after expedition, losing 5,614 in killed and wounded—614 more, possibly a thousand more—than the entire British force, and we never budged them. They continued to hold Canada. Undisciplined courage hurled itself in vain against their organized and immovable ranks.