# All the Works of Epictetus, Which Are Now Extant/Book 1/Chapter 18

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CHAPTER XVIII.
That we are not to be angry with the Errors of others.
§. 1.If what the Philosophers say be true, That all Mens Actions proceed from one Source: that, as they assent, from a Persuasion that a Thing is so, and dissent, from a Persuasion that it is not; and suspend their Judgment, from a Persuasion that it is uncertain; so, likewise, they exert their Pursuits, from a Persuasion that such a Thing is for their Advantage: and it is impossible to esteem one Thing advantageous, and desire another; to esteem one Thing a Duty, and pursue another: why, after all, should we be angry at the Multitude?
They are Thieves and Pilferers.
What do you mean by Thieves and Pilferers? They are in an Error concerning Good and Evil. ​Ought you, then, to be angry, or to pity them? Do but show them their Error, and you will see, that they will amend their Faults: but, if they do not see it, the Principles they form, are to them their supreme Rule.
What, then, ought not this Thief and this Adulterer to be destroyed?
By no means [ask that]: but say rather, "Ought not he to be destroyed, who errs and is deceived in Things of the greatest Importance; blinded, not in the Sight that distinguishes White from Black, but in the Judgment, that distinguishes Good from Evil?" By stating your Question thus, you see how inhuman it is; and just as if you would say, "Ought not this blind, or that deaf Man, to be destroyed?" For, if the greatest Hurt be a Deprivation of the most valuable Things, and the most valuable Thing to every one is a right Judgment of chusing; when any one is deprived of this, why, after all, are you angry? You ought not to be affected, Man, contrary to Nature, by the Ills of another, Pity him rather. Do not be angry; nor say, as many do, What! shall these execrable and odious Wretches dare to act thus! Whence have you so suddenly learnt Wisdom? Because we admire those Things which such People take from us. Do not admire your Clothes, and you will not be angry with the Thief. Do not admire the Beauty of your Wife, and you will not be angry with an Adulterer. Know, that a Thief and an Adulterer have no place in the Things that are properly your own: but in those that belong to ​others; and which are not in your Power. If you give up these Things, and look upon them as nothing, with whom will you any longer be angry? But, while you admire them, be angry with yourself, rather than with others. Consider only: You have a fine Suit of Clothes; your Neighbour has not. You have a Window; you want to air them. He knows not in what the Good of Man consists; but imagines it is in a fine Suit of Clothes: the very Thing which you imagine too. Must not he, then, of course, come and take them away? When you show a Cake to greedy People, and are devouring it all yourself; would not you have them snatch it from you? Do not provoke them. Do not have a Window. Do not air your Clothes. I, too, the other Day, had an Iron Lamp burning before my Houshold Deities. Hearing a Noise at the Window, I ran. I found my Lamp was stolen. I considered, that he who took it away, did nothing unaccountable. What then? To-morrow, says I, you shall find an Earthen one: for a Man loses only what he hath. I have lost my Coat. Ay: because you had a Coat. I have a Pain in my Head. Why, can you have a Pain in your Horns? Why, then, are you out of Humour? For Loss and Pain can be only of such Things as are possessed.
§. 2. But the Tyrant will chain——What?——A Leg——He will take away——What?——A Head.——What is there; then, that he can neither chain, nor take away?——The Will, and Choice. Hence the Advice of the Ancients——Know thyself.
What ought to be done, then?
​Exercise yourself, for Heaven's sake, in little Things; and thence proceed to greater. "I have a Pain in my Head."——Do not cry, alas!——"I have a Pain in my Ear"——Do not cry, alas! I do not say, you may not groan; but do not groan inwardly: or, if your Servant is a long while in bringing you something to bind your Head, do not bawl, and distort yourself; and say; "Every body hates me." For, who would not hate such a one?
§. 3. Relying for the future on these Principles, walk upright, and free; not trusting to Bulk of Body, like a Wrestler: for one should not be unconquerable in the Sense that an Ass is.
Who then is unconquerable? He whom nothing, independent on Choice, disconcerts. Then I run over every Circumstance, and consider [such a one in each. As they say] of an athletic Champion. He has been victorious in the first Encounter: What will he do in the Second? What, if the Heat should be excessive? What, if he were to appear at Olympia? So I say in this Case. What, if you throw Money in his Way? He will despise it. What, if a Girl? What, if in the dark? What, if he be tried by popular Fame, Calumny, Praise, Death? He is able to overcome them all. What, then, if he be placed in the Heat, or in the Rain? What, ​if he be hypochondriac, or asleep? [Just the same.] This is my unconquerable athletic Champion.
* ↑ The most ignorant Persons often practise what they know to be evil: and they, who voluntarily suffer; as many do, their Inclinations to blind their Judgment, are not justified by following it. The Doctrine of Epictetus, therefore, here, and elsewhere, on this Head, contradicts the Voice of Reason and Conscience: nor is it less pernicious, than ill grounded. It destroys all Guilt and Merit, all Punishment and Reward, all Blame of ourselves or others, all Sense of Misbehaviour towards our Fellow-creatures, or our Creator. No wonder that such Philosophers did not teach Repentance towards God.
* ↑ Several Words are wanting in different Places of some of the following Lines of the Greek; which are conjecturally supplied in the Translation from Mr. Upton's Version.
* ↑ See Gal. vi. 1. and many other Parts of the New Testament, in which all the Humanity and Tenderness prescribed by the Stoics are enjoined; and the dangerous Notions, on which they found them, are avoided.
* ↑ This alludes to a famous Quibble among the Stoics. What you have not lost, you have: but you have not lost a Pair of Horns; therefore you have a Pair of Horns. Upton.
* ↑ Mr. Upton observes, That Epictetus here applies to the wise Man, what he had just been saying of the athletic Champion: and he proposes a Change in one Word; by which, instead of the Heat, or the Rain, the Translation will be, in a Fever, or in Drink. For the Stoics held their wise Man to be a perfect Master of himself in all these Circumstances. The Passages which Mr. Upton produces from L. ii. c. 17. towards the End, and L. iii. c. 2. towards the Beginning, makes the Conjecture of οινωμενος for 'υομενος as probable as it is ingenious. But yet the τι ουν αν καυμα η one would imagine to have crept in by a Repetition of the Transcriber, from the Description, a few Lines before; as it is scarcely probable, that the same Word should be used by Epictetus in two different Senses, at so small a Distance, in the same Discourse