# The Annual Register/1758/History of the Present War/Chapter 2

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CHAP. II.
State of the English ministry. The characters and designs of the several factions. A coalition. Oswego taken by the French. Calcutta taken by the Nabob. Angria reduced by Admiral Watson.
Whilst the King of Prussia passed the winter in the most vigorous preparations for carrying on the war, his ally Great Britain presented a very different face of things. The loss of Minorca plunged the people into the utmost grief, mixed with shame, for such a blot on the national honour, and with indignation not only against those who had acted weakly, but those who had provided insufficiently for the relief of that important possession. The public resentment, which at first seemed to have no other object than Byng, was soon turned against the ministry. The clamour in parliament was great; without doors it was excessive. Addresses, praying a strict enquiry into the cause of our misfortunes, were presented from all parts of the kingdom. The ministry, notwithstanding this general discontent, had a ​real strength; and they might have stood, had they agreed amongst themselves. The commons could not be brought to any angry votes; and the result of the enquiry into the loss of Minorca, was as favourable as they could have wished. But Mr. F——— thought it not adviseable to bear a large proportion of the odium caused by counsels, in which he had little share. Perhaps, he thought this embarrassment a situation not unfavourable to the arrangement he had always aimed at; he therefore suddenly threw up an employment, which he hoped to resume augmented with greater power.
On the removal of this principal prop, the whole structure of the ministry fell to pieces. The D. of N. the Ld. Ch. the first lord of the admiralty resigned; and the chiefs of the party by whose manoeuvres they were displaced, naturally succeeded to the management of affairs. Dec. 4. 1756. They who had resigned gave them no apparent opposition in parliament; but whether it was, that the new ministry were themselves too fresh from opposition, and some of them too full of the popular manners that introduced them to court, to be perfectly agreeable in the closet, or that they had made their bottom too narrow, after holding their employments for some months, to the great concern of the public, they in their turn were obliged to quit their posts. April 5. 1757. Thus was the helm of government a second time abandoned. The case of the King and the nation was at that juncture truly deplorable. We were without any ally who could do us the least service, engaged in a war, hitherto unsuccessful, with the most formidable power in Europe; we almost despaired of our military virtue; public spirit appeared utterly extinguished, whilst the rage of faction burned with the utmost violence; our operations were totally suspended; and having no ministry established, we had no plan to follow.
Three factions divided the ruling men of the nation, for the gross of the people seemed to have no further views than a redress of their grievances, by whatever means that could be brought about; the first of these factions was composed of those who had grown to place and power, or had formed their connections under the old ministry. They were some of the most respectable persons in the nation, and had undoubtedly the greatest parliamentary interest. They had at the same time another interest hardly less confiderable, that of the monied people; but in some points, and these material too, they were weak. They were not at all popular; a matter of great consideration in a government like ours: and they were supposed by the gross of the people not to be under the direction of great political abilities.
The second faction, though not suspected of the want of sufficient ability, was yet more unpopular than the former; they had not attempted to preserve even the appearances essential to popularity; and to them the more essential, as their parliamentary strength was, however respectable, much inferior to the first. If their influence at one court was able to balance that of the old ministry, by means of a then powerful connection, that very connection made them far worse at another court, and worse with the generality of the people, who entertained, or pretended at least to entertain, suspicions of a nature the more dangerous, as they were only drop​ped in hints and whispers, and never could come to a full and open explanation.
The third party had little parliamentary, and less court influence; but they had a prodigious popularity, which supplied every other defect. The abilities of their leader were of the most shining kind; his application equal to his abilities; his disinterestedness was confessed by his enemies; and tho' it would have shined in the days of heroism, was now the more valued, and set off to the greater advantage by the general selfishness which prevailed among the men of business. The nation reposed the moft perfect confidence in his integrity and love to his country. This party, conscious where its strength lay, cultivated with great care the popularity which was the basis of their power; even perhaps so as to impair, on some occasions the dignity of government.
These three factions differed from each other extremely with regard to power, the grand object of all factions. But in the general scheme of their politics, the two first were pretty much agreed. Looking on France as the moft constant and most dangerous enemy of Great Britain, they dreaded the increase of her power and influence among the neighbouring nations as the greatest of all evils. To prevent so dangerous an aggrandisement, they thought it absolutely necessary to preserve a constant attention to the balance of power, and to seek our particular safety and liberty in the general safety and liberty of Europe. A close connection was therefore to be kept up with the powers of the continent, not only by continual negotiations, but by large subsidies, and even by assisting them with our troops if the occasion should require such assistance. For this purpose, as well as to secure more effectually our present happy establishment, a considerable regular land force ought to be constantly maintained. Our navy, they thought, ought by no means to be neglected: but it was only to be cultivated and employed subserviently to the more comprehensive continental system. These parties were far from being friends to arbitrary power, or in any sort averse to parliaments; they loved the constitution; but they were for preserving the authority of government entire, and in its utmost lawful force. To make government more easy, knowing that many would disturb it, from disaffection, or disgust, or mistaken notions of liberty, they thought it just to rule men by their interests, if they could not by their virtues, and they had long been in the practice of procuring a majority in parliament, by the distribution of the numerous lucrative places and employments which our constitution leaves in the dispofal of the crown. Several believed that no other method was practicable, considering the nature of mankind, and our particular form of government.
But the third and popular party, was influenced by different principles. They looked indeed on the power of France in the same light with the two former, and were of the same opinion concerning the necessity of setting bounds to it. In the means of attaining this end they differed. Our situation they thought dictated a narrower, but a more natural, a safer and a less expensive plan of politics, than that which had been adopted by the other party. We ought never to forget, said they, that we are an island: and that this circumstance, so favourable both to our political and to our civil liberty, pre​scribes to us a conduct very different from that of every other nation. Our natural strength is a maritime strength, as trade is our natural employment: these must always go hand in hand, and they mutually support each other. But, if turning our back to our real interests, and abandoning our natural element, we enter that inextricable labyrinth of continental politics; if we make ourselves parties in every controversy; if we exhaust our wealth in purchasing the useless and precarious friendship of every petty prince or state; if we waste the blood of our people in all the quarrels that may arise on the continent; so far from going in the right way to reduce France, that we attack her on the strong fide, and only destroy ourselves by our ill judged efforts against the enemy. That we can have nothing to fear from the superiority of France on the continent, whilst we preserve our superiority at sea; that we can always cut the sinews of the enemies strength by destroying their traffic; that to fear an invasion from a power weak in its marine, is the idlest of all fears; that in case an invasion were possible, a well-trained national militia, supplying by their zeal the defects of their discipline, would prove our best protection; that a standing army is in whatever shape dangerous to freedom; and that a government like ours, connected by its very essence with the liberty of the subject, can never be in want of the supports of despotic power. As little is parliamentary influence necessary. A government pleasing to the people, as every good government must be, can never be generally opposed: and men need no bribes to persuade them to their duty.
These notions, so opposite in their extremes, might be reconciled in a medium, and used to temper each other. For as on one hand, it would be very absurd to take no sort of advantage of our insular situation, but to engage in all the business of the continent without reserve, and to plunge ourselves into real evils out of dread of possible mischiefs; so on the other hand to think ourselves wholly unconcerned in the fortunes of our neighbours on the continent, or to think of aiding them in any case, only by the way of diversion with our fleets, would be a way of proceeding still more extravagant than the former. If such notions were reduced to practice, we might soon lose all these advantages derived from a situation which we abused.
The reasonableness of such a temperament, could not be perceived during the ferment of that time, in which these topics were bandied to and fro with infinite heat. The resignation or rather deprivation of the popular ministry, only increased their popularity, and the general discontent; the people could not believe that good measures could be pursued, when those in whom alone they confided, were not employed; almost all the corporations of the kingdom presented the deprived ministers with their freedom, and addressed them in the warmest manner, testifying the most entire approbation of their conduct, and the sincerest concern to see them out of employment.
This conflict between an old established interest, and the torrent of popularity continued for a long time, and the nation was almost ruined by it. It is not easy nor perhaps quite proper to attempt to trace the steps by which so happy a coalition, as we have seen take place, was brought about. But it was formed in ​such manner as held together with such solidity, and produced such excellent effects, as I believe the most sanguine could not have hoped for at that time. June 29, 1757. Mr. P. was again restored to the office of secretary of state, the D. of N. was placed at the head of the treasury, Mr. F. was appointed paymaster of the forces. This arrangement, which gave very general satisfaction, was however disliked by those whom their violent attachment to their party had inspired with a narrow and exclusive spirit. It was the best measure, because it was an healing measure; and it was little less than impossible for any particular party to carry on public business on its single bottom.
It was high time that our domestic dissensions should be composed at last. From every quarter of the world in which we had any concern, we heard of nothing but losses and calamities. Aug. 14, 1756. In America we lost the fort of Oswego. That fort, situated at the mouth of the Onondaga river, commanded a commodious harbour on the lake Ontario. It was built by General Shirley, and designed to cover the country of the Five nations; to secure the Indian trade; to interrupt the communication between the French northern and southern establishments; and to open a way to our arms to attack the forts of Frontenac and Niagara. For these purposes, some frigates had been fitted out for cruising, and a number of boats prepared for the transportation of troops, but they all fell to the enemy with the fort, where 100 pieces of cannon were, and a considerable quantity of provision. 1600 men were made prisoners of war. The place made but a trifling resistance, scarce holding out three days; the attempts to relieve it were too late. The French demolished the fort.
Our losses were not confined to America. The East India company received a blow, which would have shaken an establishment of less strength to its foundation. The news of the war between France and England had not yet reached India, but a new and very formidable enemy was raised up in that quarter. The Nabob of Bengal (the Nabobs are a species of viceroys to the Grand Mogul, grown almost independent in their several provinces) irritated at the protection given to one of his subjects in the English fort of Calcutta, and, as it is said, at the refusal of some duties to which he claimed a right, levied a great army, and laid siege to that place. The governor, terrified by the numbers of the enemy, abandoned the fort with several of the principal persons in the settlement, who saved themselves with their most valuable effects on board the ships.
Thus deserted, Mr. Hollwel the second in command, bravely held the place to the last extremity, with a few gallant friends, and the remains of a feeble garrison. A very noble defence was insufficient to keep an untenable place, or to affect an ungenerous enemy. June 26. The fort was taken, and the garrison being made prisoners, were thrust into a narrow dungeon. Hollwel, with a few others, came out alive, to paint a scene of the most cruel distress which perhaps human nature ever suffered. The East India company lost their principal settlement in Bengal, and a fort which secured to them the most valuable part of their trade.
In the space of this unfortunate year we were stripped of Minorca ​and Oswego; we apprehended an invasion of Great Britain itself; our councils were torn to pieces by factions, and our military fame was every where in contempt. Feb. 13. Amidst these losses, we considered as some advantage, the reduction of the principal fort of Angria, a piratical prince, who had been many years troublesome to the English trade in the East Indies. This service was performed by Admiral Watson in the beginning of the year.