# Secret Diplomacy/Chapter 6

​== VI. ENTENTE DIPLOMACY ==
As the commitments of the British Government gradually became more and more known the ques- tion arose as to how deeply and extensively Great Britain had been involved in continental affairs. Lord Eosebery, who was uninformed, with the rest of Parliament and the public, as to the actual details, said in a speech at Glasgow in January, 1912:
"This we do know about our foreign policy, that, for good or for evil, we are now embraced in the midst of the Continental system. That I regard as perhaps the gravest fact in the later portion of my life. We are, for good or for evil, involved in a Continental sys- tem, the merits of which I do not pretend to judge, be- cause I do not know enough about it, but which, at any rate, may at any time bring us into conflict with armies numbering millions, and our own forces would hardly be counted in such a war as they stand at present."
Lord Rosebery realized perhaps more fully than most of the leaders of English public life the com- plications adherent to what had already become public knowledge at the time. ​
Meanwhile the government, in Parliament, con- fined itself to plain denials whenever the matter of international undertakings and obligations of a general nature was brought up. The denials could be justified from the point of view that the situation as stated by the uninformed questioner in Parliament, in each case did not exactly cor- respond to the facts. But the impression created by such denials that no serious obligations had been incurred was, as the result showed, entirely misleading.
On March 8, 1911, Mr. Jowett asked in the House of Commons whether any undertaking, promise or understanding had been given to France that in certain eventualities British troops would be sent to cooperate with the French army. The Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs replied: "The answer is in the negative." On December 6, 1911, the Prime Minister said:
' ' As has been stated, there were no secret engagements with France other than those that have now been pub- lished, and there are no secret engagements with any foreign Government that entail upon us any obligation to render military or naval assistance to any other Power."
Upon another occasion Mr. Yerburgh, M.P., in- quired : ​
"May I ask whether or not we are to understand that the Government arrived at no decision upon this par- ticular question? Is the right honorable gentleman not aware that this new definition of the two-Power stand- ard is a question of supreme importance, and that in arriving at our standard of naval strength previous Governments had regard to the power of the fleets of other countries?"
The Prime Minister replied only :
"I think this question shows the inconvenience of dealing with these matters by way of question and an- swer. ' '
In December, 1912, Lord Hugh Cecil made the fol- lowing inquiry:
"There is a very general belief that this country is under an obligation, not a treaty obligation, but an obligation arising out of an assurance given by the Min- istry in the course of diplomatic negotiations, to send a very large armed force out of this country to operate in Europe. That is the general belief. It would be very presumptuous of any one who has not access to all the facts in possession of the Government
The Prime Minister interrupted him with: "I ought to say that it is not true." Lord Cecil thereupon expressed his satisfaction for having elicited this explanation, "because," he stated, "it was certainly widely believed that the Gov​eminent has engaged in a military policy of an adventurous kind and that if such a policy had actually been contemplated by the Government it would involve a very serious consideration of the military resources of the country. ' ' As a matter of fact, the latter was a just conclusion from the actual situation as it really existed, notwithstand- ing the denial by the Prime Minister.
In March, 1913, when during the discussion of the Navy estimates, the Mediterranean situation came up, Lord Beresford suggested that Mr. Churchill (First Lord of the Admiralty) must be trusting to France the duty of guarding the Mediterranean. Mr. Churchill had said in the course of these discussions: "In conjunction with the Navy of France, our Mediterranean Fleet would make a combined force superior to all possible combinations." Sir C. Kinloch-Cooke referred to this as a remarkable statement, and one "somewhat difficult to reconcile with the re- cent pronouncement of the Prime Minister as to our understanding with France in the matter of armaments." He added: "In one case we have the Prime Minister repudiating an obligation on our side of any kind, and in the other we have the First Lord of the Admiralty relying for the safety of our Eastern Empire, our trade and our ​
food supply, upon the assistance which he pre- sumes will be ready at any moment to be given to us by France."
On March 24, 1913, Mr. Asquith, Prime Minis- ter, made a comprehensive answer to a question of Sir W. Byles in the following terms:
"As has been repeatedly stated, this country is not under any obligation, not public and known to Parlia- ment, which compels it to take part in a war. In other words, if war arises between European Powers, there are no unpublished agreements which will restrict or hamper the freedom of the Government or Parliament to decide whether or not Great Britain should partici- pate in a war."
In August, 1913, Lord Haldane made a state- ment to the effect that the very friendly relation- ships with France rendered the situation in the Mediterranean most satisfactory. On June 11, 1914, this same general matter was up again for discussion. Sir Edward Grey, in answering a question, referred back to the statement made by Mr. Asquith on March 24, 1913, and added: "It remains as true to-day as it was a year ago."
The nation was meanwhile left entirely in the dark with respect to the actual matter of the re- lationships which had developed between Great Britain and France, and it was only after the ​
Great War had broken out that Sir Edward Grey, in his speech of August 3, 1914, gave to Parlia- ment some account of what had actually hap- pened.
The first important step in the new interna- tional policy of Great Britain was taken immedi- ately after the Liberal Government had been formed on December 12, 1905. It appears that Sir Edward Grey consulted in this matter par- ticularly Mr. Asquith and Lord Haldane, inform- ing the Prime Minister, Sir Henry Campbell- Bannerman, but not his other Cabinet colleagues. The above three men were the leaders of the Lib- eral Imperialist faction, and it is not at all cer- tain that in an aggressive foreign policy they would have been at that moment readily followed by their whole party.
When in consequence of the attempted division of Morocco, relations between France and Ger- many became somewhat strained, Sir Edward Grey, Foreign Minister, made communications to the French Ambassador to the effect that, while no promises could be given to any Foreign Power, yet in Sir Edward Grey's opinion, if war was then forced upon France on the question of Morocco, public opinion in England would rally to the ma- terial support of France. Sir Edward ​Grey, as related in his own words, said : "I made no prom- ises and I used no threats, but I expressed that opinion." The accuracy of that opinion has been questioned, in view of the temper of the House of Commons elected at a time when resentment at the imperialist war in South Africa was powerful. On the basis of the statement made by Sir Ed- ward Grey, the French Government said to the British Foreign Minister, as reported by him:
"If you think it possible that the public opinion of Great Britain might, should a sudden crisis arise, jus- tify you in giving to France the armed support which you cannot promise in advance, you will not be able to give that support, even if you wish it when the time comes, unless some conversations have already taken place between naval and military experts."
Sir Edward Grey saw merit in this proposal and agreed to it. He authorized that conversations should take place, but with the distinct under- standing that nothing which would bind either Government should occur. However, the holding of conversations between two Powers concerning military cooperation is in itself a sufficiently seri- ous matter out of which expectations and rela- tionships are apt to arise that cannot be over- looked in future action. The Cabinet was not informed of the authorization given by Sir Ed​
ward Grey until later. He did not state how much later.
We know from official sources that Colonel Bar- nardiston proceeded to Belgium and had inter- views with the Chief of the Belgian General Staff concerning combined operations in the event ef a German attack directed against Antwerp. Colo- nel Barnardiston confided to the Belgian Chief of Staff that his Government intended to move the British base of supplies from the French coast to Antwerp as soon as the North Sea had been cleared of all German warships. When the Bel- gian documents were published in Germany, it was attempted by the press to represent these con- versations as an actual convention. These con- sultations occurred during the first quarter of 1906.
From an official source comes the statement that in July, 1911, the British Government informed the German, that on certain contingencies, Great Britain would support France (if Germany should demand the whole of French-Congo and Agadir as a naval base). What actually happened at this time has never been fully revealed.
In April, 1912, the British military attache at Brussels informed the Belgian General Jungbluth that Great Britain had 160,000 men availa ​ble for despatch to the continent, and added that the Brit- ish Government in certain contingencies during recent events would have immediately landed troops on Belgian territory.
About this time the Cabinet had a discussion of the whole situation and of the special relation- ship with France; and it was decided that there should be some definite expression in writing, of the latter. Accordingly, in November, 1912, an exchange of notes took place between Sir Edward Grey and the French Ambassador. The British Foreign Minister wrote the following letter:
Nov. 22nd (1912). MY DEAR AMBASSADOR:
"From time to time in recent years the French and British Naval and Military experts have consulted to- gether. It has always been understood that such con- sultation does not restrict the freedom of either Gov- ernment to decide at any future time whether or not to assist the other by armed force. We have agreed that consultation between experts is not and ought not to be regarded as an engagement that commits either Gov- ernment to action in a contingency that has not yet arisen and may never arise. The disposition, for in- stance, of the French and British fleets respectively at the present moment is not based upon an engagement to cooperate in war. You have, however, pointed out that if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power it might become essential to know whether it could in that event depend ​
upon the armed assistance of the other. I agree that if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, or something that threatened the general peace, it should immediately dis- cuss with the other whether both Governments should act together to prevent aggression and to preserve peace, and, if so, what measures they would be prepared to take in common. If these measures involved action, the plans of the General Staffs would at once be taken into consideration and the Governments would then decide what effect should be given to them."
A reply from the French Ambassador accepted this understanding.
Side by side with the Anglo-French military and naval collaboration, there went the making of joint plans by France and Russia which culmi- nated in the Franco-Russian military convention of August, 1912. At the same time Russia had pressed upon France the need of increasing her army by raising the term of service to three years. Concerning the new disposal of the French fleet, according to the desires of Russia, President Poincare stated to Ambassador Isvol- sky in November, 1912 :
"This decision has been made in agreement with Eng- land, and forms the further development and completion of arrangements already made previously between the French and English staffs." ​Thus the chain of coöperation was completed, and England was effectively tied up with the situation in the Balkans, in which only Russia had a primary interest.
Meanwhile, the repeated denials previously set forth kept the British Parliament and public from all knowledge of the exceedingly important rela- tionships which were growing up between the Naval and Military establishments of Great Brit- ain and France.
How these relationships, though only partially known and suspected, were looked upon by out- siders is shown from expressions in the reports of Belgian diplomats. Count de Lalaing wrote from London in 1907: "England is quietly pursuing a policy opposed to Germany and aimed at her isolation." Baron Greindl wrote from Ber- lin in 1908: "Call it alliance or what you will, the grouping constitutes, none the less, a diminu- tion of Germany's security." Baron Guillaume wrote, in 1911, from Paris: "I have less faith in the desire of Great Britain for peace. She would not be sorry to see the others eat one another up." These expressions are not, of course, evidences of British policy, but simply of the impression which whatever leaked out concerning that pol- icy, made upon outside diplomats. ​
In his clear and convincing analysis of the situ- ation created by the gradual formation in secret, of these relationships, Lord Loreburn brings out the following points : Through the communica- tions with the French Ambassador and military and naval conversations concerning plans for joint action, France was encouraged more and more to expect that Great Britain would stand by her in arms if she were attacked by Germany. Such a policy of a defensive understanding with France, no matter how right in itself, was obvi- ously a new departure of tremendous importance. Its execution and effectiveness could be assured only if understood by Parliament as a national policy, with all the risks involved, so that proper preparations could be made. Parliament was, however, never warned of the danger England stood of being thrown suddenly into a European war. Had Germany been told in July, 1914, that Great Britain would support France and Russia, the war would undoubtedly have been prevented; but while the ministers had in fact incurred moral obligations over against France, they had not as- sured themselves of the necessary Parliamentary support and could therefore not make a statement involving such risk as the above declaration to Germany would have created. ​
Of Sir Edward Grey's speech of the 3rd of August, 1914, Lord Loreburn says:
"This remarkable speech began with an elaborate ef- fort to prove that the House of Commons was perfectly free to determine either for peace or war. It ended with a passionate declaration that this country would be dis- graced if we did not declare war, and the reasoning of the speech proved that Sir Edward Grey had committed himself irretrievably. It left the House of Commons convinced that it had in honor no choice but to join France in arms. It is an epitome of the reasoning by which Sir Edward Grey had been brought to believe that he could say and do what he said and did without limit- ing his freedom of action. But if this is legitimate we ought not to keep up the pretense that we are a self- governing nation in foreign affairs."
Thus a minister, to whom national intrigue and duplicity were essentially foreign, who was trusted by his country and who wanted peace, was brought by the methods of secret diplomacy into a position where he had actually incurred the moral obligation to assist another country with- out having the power for peace which the ability to avow that relationship openly, to take the re- sponsibility, and to confront Germany therewith, would have given him.
As early as November, 1911, Lord Lansdowne, one of the founders of the Entente, in speaking of the secret agreement of 1904 concerning Mo​rocco, which had then just become known to the public, had admitted that in such a case the prom- ise of purely diplomatic support might easily bring on the obligation to assist in other ways; that an entente cordiale creates close relation- ships between two countries; and that, should one of them get into difficulties without its guilt, it would expect to receive support.
The moral responsibilities in which the For- eign Minister had involved the British Govern- ment were not simple, nor did they exist against France alone. Because of the Franco-Russian alliance the relationship established between Great Britain and France virtually involved shar- ing in the defense of France against the conse- quences of her alliance with Russia, as the subse- quent events showed; any serious situation aris- ing in the Balkans and affecting Russian interests would thereafter involve France, and through her, Great Britain. Accordingly, the effect of this policy was to make the peace of Great Britain depend upon, and to involve it with, the complex struggle for influence in the Balkans.
After Sir Edward Grey's speech of August 3rd, Mr. T. Edmund Harvey, M.P., said: "I am convinced that this war for the great masses of the countries of Europe is no peoples' war. It ​
is a war that has been made by men in high places, by diplomatists working in secret, by bureaucrats out of touch with the people, by men who are a remnant of an older evil civilization."
Lord Loreburn sums up his indictment of se- cret diplomacy in the following language: "Se- cret diplomacy has undergone its 'acid test' in this country. It had every chance. The voice of party was silent. The Foreign Minister was an English gentleman whom the country trusted and admired, who was wholly free from personal en- mities of every kind, and who wanted peace. And secret diplomacy utterly failed. It pre- vented us from finding some alternative for war, and it prevented us from being prepared for war, because secret diplomacy means diplomacy aloof from Parliament." The issue is here quite clearly stated. Those who see in the methods and spirit of the old diplomacy the chief cause of war, do not hold, on the one hand, that secret diplo- macy involves at all times and in all cases un- scrupulous plotting. But they believe that the method of dealing with foreign affairs as a mys- terious matter, fit to be handled only by the se- lect, and the reliance on a policy of bargains and compensations, with the aim thus artificially to maintain a balance of power, may be blamed for ​
this great catastrophe; for they stood in the way of dealing with great public affairs in a sounder manner, that is, with more regard of the actual public interest and of the underlying racial and popular factors.
Those British critics who have attacked this method as practised in their own country before and during the war, do not thereby mean to im- pute to British statesmen a major share in the responsibility for the war. The high-mindedness and public spirit of the responsible statesmen is recognized by all fair critics, and most of them imply that Great Britain has far less to fear from this system than have nations with less responsi- ble governments and a less sound tradition of statesmanship. They attack the system as a whole as it exists throughout European diplo- macy, and as it has been used by the British Gov- ernment.
From the point of view of historic evidence, and of strict reasoning from cause to effect, a great deal of doubt still remains as to how far secret diplomacy in itself, that is, the failure to publish to parliament and the people, details of the situation as it developed, could properly be considered the specific cause of the war; no mat- ter how definite may be our judgment ​and belief that the secrecy and tortuousness of foreign pol- icy are bound to generate an air of uncertainty and suspicion which will so greatly favor mili- tarist intrigues and influence as to render the making of wars far more easy than they would otherwise be, were time and opportunity given to the public to consider the details of a critical situation. Yet it might be difficult to prove by historic evidence, the specific proposition that the war of 1914 was directly due to the fact that the development of international affairs was quite generally kept from the knowledge of the public. Nevertheless, unquestionably the atmosphere of secret diplomacy is a medium exactly suited to the most baneful influences.
Viscount Haldane has made a strong defense of the policy of Sir Edward Grey. He asserts that "the failure of those who had to make the effort to keep the peace, does not show that they would have done better had they discussed delicate de- tails in public." He continues: " There are top- ics and conjunctures in the almost daily changing relations between Governments as to which si- lence is golden. For however proper it may be in point of broad principle that the people should be fully informed of what concerns them vitally, the most important thing is that those to whom ​
they have confided their concerns should be given the best chance of success in averting danger to their interests. To have said more in Parliament and on the platform in the years in question, or to have said it otherwise, would have been to run grave risks of more than one sort." This de- fense, however, also makes certain assumptions, particularly the underlying one that the war was not to be avoided by any method. It is based on the traditional concept of foreign affairs which considers that it is best to leave them at the dis- cretion of a few initiated and responsible offi- cials. There can be no question that from the highest plane conceivable under the older ideas and norms of diplomacy, the conduct of foreign relations by Sir Edward Grey must be consid- ered as a model of sagacity and caution. But when Lord Cromer describes the secret, arrange- ments concerning Morocco as "a wise measure of preventive diplomacy," it is not easy to fol- low him.