# Harisiades v. Shaughnessy & Mascitti/Dissent Douglas

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* Case Syllabus
* Opinion of the Court
* Concurring Opinion Frankfurter
* Dissenting Opinion Douglas
United States Supreme Court
342 U.S. 580
Harisiades v. Shaughnessy & Mascitti
Argued: Dec. 5, 1951. --- Decided: March 10, 1952
Mr. Justice DOUGLAS, with whom Mr. Justice BLACK concurs, dissenting.
There are two possible bases for sustaining this Act:
(1) A person who was once a Communist is tainted for all time and forever dangerous to our society; or
(2) Punishment through banishment from the country may be placed upon an alien not for what he did, but for what his political views once were.
Each of these is foreign to our philosophy. We repudiate our traditions of tolerance and our articles of faith based upon the Bill of Rights when we bow to them by sustaining an Act of Congress which has them as a foundation.
The view that the power of Congress to deport aliens is absolute and may be exercised for any reason which Congress deems appropriate rests on Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 13 S.Ct. 1016, 37 L.Ed. 905, decided in 1893 by a six-to-three vote. That decision seems to me to be inconsistent with the philosophy of constitutional law which we have developed for the protection of resident aliens. We have long held that a resident alien is a 'person' within the meaning of the Fifth and the Fourteenth Amendments. He therefore may not be deprived either by the National Government or by any state of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. Nor may he be denied the equal protection of the laws. A state was not allowed to exclude an alien from the laundry business because he was a Chinese, nor discharge him from employment because he was not a citizen, nor deprive him of the right to fish because he was a Japanese ineligible to citizenship. An alien's property (provided he is not an enemy alien), may not be taken without just compensation. He is entitled to habeas corpus to test the legality of his restraint, to the protection of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments in criminal trials, and to the right of free speech as guaranteed by the First Amendment.
An alien, who is assimilated in our society, is treated as a citizen so far as his property and his liberty are concerned. He can live and work here and raise a family, secure in the personal guarantees every resident has and safe from discriminations that might be leveled against him because he was born abroad. Those guarantees of liberty and livelihood are the essence of the freedom which this country from the beginning has offered the people of all lands. If those rights, great as they are, have constitutional protection, I think the more important one-the right to remain here-has a like dignity.
The power of Congress to exclude, admit, or deport aliens flows from sovereignty itself and from the power 'To establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization'. U.S.Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 4. The power of deportation is therefore an implied one. The right to life and liberty is an express one. Why this implied power should be given priority over the express guarantee of the Fifth Amendment has never been satisfactorily answered. Mr. Justice Brewer's dissent in Fong Yue Ting v. United States, supra, 149 U.S. at pages 737-738, 13 S.Ct. at page 1031, grows in power with the passing years: 'It is said that the power here asserted is inherent in sovereignty. This doctrine of powers inherent in sovereignty is one both indefinite and dangerous. Where are the limits to such powers to be found, and by whom are they to be pronounced? Is it within legislative capacity to declare the limits? If so, then the mere assertion of an inherent power creates it, and despotism exists. May the courts establish the boundaries? Whence do they obtain the authority for this? Shall they look to the practices of other nations of ascertain the limits? The governments of other nations have elastic powers. Ours are fixed and bounded by a written constitution. The expulsion of a race may be within the inherent powers of a despotism. History, before the adoption of this constitution, was not destitute of examples of the exercise of such a power; and its framers were familiar with history, and wisely, as it seems to me, they gave to this government no general power to banish. Banishment may be resorted to as punishment for crime; but among the powers reserved to the people, and not delegated to the government, is that of determining whether whole classes in our midst shall, for no crime but that of their race and birthplace, be driven from our territory.'
The right to be immune from arbitrary decrees of banishment certainly may be more important to 'liberty' than the civil rights which all aliens enjoy when they reside here. Unless they are free from arbitrary banishment, the 'liberty' they enjoy while they live here is indeed illusory. Banishment is punishment in the practical sense. It may deprive a man and his family of all that makes life worth while. Those who have their roots here have an important stake in this country. Their plans for themselves and their hopes for their children all depend on their right to stay. If they are uprooted and sent to lands no longer known to them, no longer hospitable, they become displaced, homeless people condemned to bitterness and despair.
This drastic step may at times be necessary in order to protect the national interest. There may be occasions when the continued presence of an alien, no matter how long he may have been here, would be hostile to the safety or welfare of the Nation due to the nature of his conduct. But unless such condition is shown, I would stay the hand of the Government and let those to whom we have extended our hospitality and who have become members of our communities remain here and enjoy the life and liberty which the Constitution guarantees.
Congress has not proceeded by that standard. It has ordered these aliens deported not for what they are but for what they once were. Perhaps a hearing would show that they continue to be people dangerous and hostile to us. But the principle of forgiveness and the doctrine of redemption are too deep in our philosophy to admit that there is no return for those who have once erred.

## Notes

* ↑ Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 6 S.Ct. 1064, 30 L.Ed. 220.
* ↑ Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 36 S.Ct. 7, 60 L.Ed. 131.
* ↑ Torao Takahashi v. Fish and Game Commission, 334 U.S. 410, 68 S.Ct. 1138, 92 L.Ed. 1478.
* ↑ Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United States, 282 U.S. 481, 51 S.Ct. 229, 75 L.Ed. 473.
* ↑ Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 660, 12 S.Ct. 336, 338, 35 L.Ed. 1146.
* ↑ Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 16 S.Ct. 977, 41 L.Ed. 140.
* ↑ Bridges v. State of California, 314 U.S. 252, 62 S.Ct. 190, 86 L.Ed. 192.
This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
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