# A memoir of Granville Sharp/Law of passive obedience

Layout 2
THE LAW
OF
PASSIVE OBEDIENCE;
OR
CHRISTIAN SUBMISSION TO PERSONAL INJURIES:
WHEREIN IS SHOWN, THAT THE SEVERAL TEXTS OF SCRIPTURE, WHICH COMMAND THE ENTIRE SUBMISSION OF SERVANTS OR SLAVES TO THEIR MASTERS, CANNOT AUTHORIZE THE LATTER TO EXACT AN INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE, NOR, IN THE LEAST DEGREE, JUSTIFY THE CLAIMS OF MODERN SLAVEHOLDERS.
BY GRANVILLE SHARP
"Servants, obey in all things (your) masters, according to the flesh; not with eye service, as men pleasers, but in singleness of heart, fearing God;" &c.—Coloss. iii. 22.
PUBLISHED IN LONDON IN THE YEAR 1776.
THE
LAW OF PASSIVE OBEDIENCE.
The illegality of slavery among Christians is a point which I have long laboured to demonstrate, as being destructive of morality, and consequently dangerous both to body and soul. There are nevertheless some particular texts in the New Testament, which, in the opinion of several well meaning and disinterested persons, seem to afford some proof of the toleration of slavery among the primitive Christians; and, from thence, they are induced to conceive, that Christianity doth not oblige its professors to renounce the practice of slaveholding.
A learned and reverend correspondent of mine seems to have adopted this notion, and has signified his opinion nearly to the same effect, in a private letter to me on this subject, to which I have not yet ventured to send him a reply, though it is a considerable time since I received his letter; but, to say the truth, the question in which I had never before apprehended any difficulty, was rendered very serious and important, upon my hands, by my friend's declaration; and I thought myself bound to give it the strictest examination, because I conceived (as I do still) that the honour of the Holy Scriptures, which of all other things, I have most at heart, was concerned in the determination of the point in question; and yet I know, that my friend is full as zealous for the honour of the Scriptures as myself, and much more learned in them, being very eminent in that most essential branch of knowledge. ​I believe also that he is perfectly disinterested, and of undoubted Christian benevolence. The objection has therefore acquired an accumulated weight from the authority and worth of the person who made it; and consequently, it demanded more circumspection and reading, to answer it in any reasonable time, than my short broken intervals of leisure (the only time that I was then master of) would permit me to bestow upon it; and as so much time has already elapsed, the answer which I originally intended for my friend's private perusal, shall now be adressed to all well meaning persons in general, who may have had the same motives for admitting in any degree the legality of slavery; and that there are many such (even among those that are concerned in the practice of slaveholding) the example of my disinterested friend's opinion, and common charity, oblige me to suppose. I shall therefore consider my friend's opinion as the common excuse of our American and West Indian brethren for tolerating slavery among them.
"I do not think (says he) that Christianity released slaves from the obligation they were under according to the custom and law of the countries, where it was propagated."
This objection to my general doctrine is expressed in the most guarded terms;—so guarded, that it obliges me to acknowledge, that the observation is, in some respects, strictly true. My present attempt is not to confute, but rather to demonstrate wherein this truth consists, which will afterwards enable me to point out such a due limitation of the doctrine, as will render it entirely inconsistent with the hypothesis, which I have so long laboured to maintain, viz: the absolute illegality of slavery among Christians.
In conformity to my worthy friend's declaration I must first observe, that the disciples of Christ (whose kingdom he himself declared—"is not of this world." John xviii. 36,) had no express commission to alter the temporal condition of men, but only to prepare them for a better world by the general doctrine of faith, hope, charity, peace and ​good will, (or universal love and benevolence to all mankind) submission to injuries, dependence upon God, &c. which—though general doctrines—are amply and sufficiently efficacious indeed, for the particular reformation of all conditions of men, when sincerity is not wanting in the application of them; but the principal intention of the whole system is evidently to draw men from the cares and anxieties of this present life, to a better hope in the life to come, which is Christ's proper kingdom: Christian servants, therefore, were of course instructed to be patient, to be humble and submissive to their masters, "not only to the good and gentle, but also to the froward." So that even ill usage does not justify perverseness of behavior in Christian slaves.
The apostle Paul also frequently insists upon the absolute necessity of an unfeigned obedience in the behavior of Christian servants to their masters. "Let every man abide in the same calling wherein he was called." "Art thou called being a servant? care not for it;" &c. 1 Cor. vii. 21. And again, "Servants, be obedient to them that are your masters according to the flesh, with fear and trembling, in singleness of your heart as unto Christ; not with eye service, as men pleasers, but as servants of Christ, doing the will of God from the heart; with good will doing service, as to the Lord, and not to men: knowing that whatsoever good thing any man doeth, the same shall he receive of the Lord, whether he be bond or free," Ephes. vi. 5—8. Again, "Servants obey in all things your masters according to the flesh; not with eye service, as men pleasers, but in singleness of heart, fearing God: and whatever you do, do it heartily, as to the Lord, and not unto men." Colos. iii. 22, 23.—The same apostle instructs Timothy to recommend obedience to servants: "Let as many servants," says the apostle, 'as are under the yoke, count their own masters worthy of all honor, that the name of God and his doctrine be not blasphemed. And they that have believing masters, let them not despise them because they are brethren; but rather do them service, because they are faithful and beloved partakers of the benefit. ​These things teach and exhort. If any man teach otherwise, and consent not to wholesome words, even the words of our Lord Jesus Christ, and to the doctrine which is according to godliness, he is proud, knowing nothing, but doting about questions, and strifes of words, whereof cometh envy, strife, railings, evil-surmisings, perverse disputings of men of corrupt minds, and destitute of the truth, supposing that gain is godliness. From such withdraw thyself. But godliness with contentment is great gain. For we brought nothing into this world, and it is certain we can carry nothing out. And having food and raiment, let us be there, with content." 1 Tim. vi. 1—8. And again he insists on the same doctrine: "Exhort servants," says he, "to be obedient unto their own masters, and to please them well in all things, not answering again, not purloining, but showing all good fidelity; that they may adorn the doctrine of God our Saviour in all things." Titus ii. 9, 10.
These texts are amply sufficient to prove the truth of my learned friend's assertion, so far as it relates to the duty of the slaves themselves, but this absolute submission required of Christian servants, by no means implies the legality of slaveholding on the part of their masters, which he seems to apprehend.
The slave violates no precepts of the gospel by his abject condition, provided that the same is involuntary (for if he can be made free, he is expressly commanded by the apostle to use it rather.) But how the master who enforces that involuntary servitude, can be said to act consistently with the Christian profession, is a question of a very different nature, which I propose to examine with all possible care and impartiality, being no otherwise interested in it than as a Christian who esteems both masters and slaves as brethren, and consequently, while he pities the unhappy temporal condition of the latter, is extremely anxious for the eternal welfare of the former.
I have already admitted, that Christianity doth not release slaves "from the obligation they were under according to the custom and law of the countries where it was propagated," agreeable to my learned friend's assertion, in ​favor of which I have produced a variety of texts; but as "the reason of the law," (according to a maxim of the English law,) "is the life of the law," we cannot with justice draw any conclusion from thence, in favor of the master's claim, till we have examined the principles, on which the doctrine of submission, in these several texts, is founded; and we shall find, upon a general view of the whole, that the principal reason of enforcing the doctrine was not so much because the persons addressed were slaves, as because they were Christians, and were to overcome evil with good, to the glory of God and religion.
These principles are clearly expressed in several of these very texts, and implied in all of them, viz: "That the name of God and his doctrine be not blasphemed." 1 Tim. vi. 1. And again, "That they may adorn the doctrine of God our Savior in all things! Titus ii. 10. So that a zeal for the glory of God, and of his religion (the principles of the first great commandment) is the apparent ground and sole purpose of the Christian slave's submission, which was therefore to be "with singleness of heart as unto Christ; not with eye service, as men pleasers, but as the servants of Christ, doing the will of God from the heart; with good will doing service, as to the Lord, and not to men: knowing that whatsoever good thing any man doeth, the same shall he receive of the Lord, whether he be bond or free." Ephes. vi. 5—8. And again, the same apostle charges the servants among the Colossians, to obey "not as men pleasers, but in singleness of heart, fearing God: and whatsoever they do, to do it heartily as unto the Lord, and not unto men." Coloss. iii. 2.
Thus it is plain that the service was to be performed "as to the Lord," and "not to men," and therefore it cannot be construed as an acknowledgment of any right, or property really vested in the master.—This will clearly appear upon a closer examination of some of these texts. In the first, for instance, though the apostle Peter enforces the necessity of the servants' submission to their masters, in the strongest manner, commanding them to be subject "not only to the good and gentle, but also to the froward," ​&c. (1 Pet. ii. 18,) yet he adds in the very next verse— "for this is thankworthy, if a man, for conscience towards God, endure grief, suffering WRONGFULLY;" so that, it is manifest, the apostle did not mean to justify the claim of the master, because he enjoined the same submission to the servants that suffered wrongfully, as to those who had good and gentle masters: and it would be highly injurious to the gospel of peace, to suppose it capable of authorizing wrongful sufferings, or of establishing a right or power in any rank of men whatever, to oppress others unjustly? And though the apostle Paul, also, so strongly exhorts servants to submit to their masters, and "to abide in the same calling wherein they were called," and "not care for it."— 1 Cor. vii. 20, 21. Yet at the same time he clearly instructs them, that it is their duty to prefer a state of freedom whenever they can fairly and honestly obtain it; "but if thou mayest be made free," says he, "use it rather!" (v. 21.) And the reason which he assigns for this command, is as plainly delivered, viz: the equality of servants with their masters in the sight of the Almighty, "For he that is called of the Lord, being a servant," says he, " is the Lord's freeman: likewise also he that is called being free, is Christ's servant," (verse 22.) Christ having purchased all men to be his peculiar servants, or rather freemen. —"Ye are bought with a price," says the apostle in the 23d verse, "be not ye the servants of man," which plainly implies, that it is inconsistent with the dignity of a Christian who is the servant or freeman of God, to be held in an unlimited subjection, as the bond servant or slave of a man; and, consequently, that a toleration of slavery, in places where Christianity is established by law, is entirely illegal.; for though the slave commits no crime by submitting to the involuntary service, (which has been already demonstrated,) yet the Christian master is guilty of a sort of sacrilege, by appropriating to himself, as an absolute property, that body, which peculiarly belongs to God by an inestimable purchase! For if God said of the Jews, even under the old law, (Levit. xxv. 52,) "They are my servants, which I brought forth out of the land of Egypt; ​they shall not be sold as bondmen."—How much more ought Christians to esteem their brethren, as the peculiar servants of God on account of their being freed from the more severe bondage of our spiritual enemy, (of which the Egyptian bondage was only a type) by the inestimable price of Christ's blood! and, surely, we may therefore say, " they are God's servants" whom Christ hath redeemed with his own blood, as much as the Jews of old, who were on that account expressly enfranchised from worldly bondage, "they are my servants, they shall not be sold as bondmen;" for this application of the text is entirely to the same effect as the apostle's expression to the Corinthians—"Ye are bought with a price, be ye not the servants of men." 1 Cor. vii. 23. Dr. Whitby, indeed supposes that the words "ye are bought with a price," refer only to a pecuniary price given by the primitive Christians, to buy their brethren out of slavery. But the authority of Justin Martyr and Tertullian, which he cites, by no means proves his interpretation of the text, though it may sufficiently prove the primitive practice of redeeming slaves; which also furnishes a new argument against the legality of slavery among Christians, so far as the example of the primitive Christians is concerned. But scripture is best interpreted by scripture, and therefore the most certain means of ascertaining the true meaning of the words τιμης ηγορασθητε "ye are bought with a price," is to have recourse to the very same expression (ηγορασθητε γαρ τιμης, the words being only transposed) in the preceding chapter 20th verse, where we shall find that it can refer to nothing less than the inestimable price of Christ's redemption: "What! know ye not," says the apostle, "that your body is the temple of the Holy Ghost, which is in you, which ye have of God, and ye are not your own? for ye are bought with a price: therefore glorify God in your body, and in your spirit, which are God's," (1 Cor. vi. 19, 20,) and, consequently, it is the duty of a Christian legislature to vindicate the Lord's freemen from slavery, as all mankind are included in the same inestimable purchase, for it is not only their souls but even ​their bodies, which are God's;" and therefore it is an abominable sacrilege, that those bodies which are capable of being the "temple of the Holy Ghost," should be esteemed the mere chattels and private property of mercenary planters and merchants, merely for the sake of a little worldly gain!
But slaveholders may perhaps allege that believing masters are mentioned as "faithful and beloved," in one of the texts which I have cited, arid are also expressly accounted as "partakers of the benefit," (see 1 Tim. vi. 2,) so that, from thence, they may perhaps infer, that slave keeping is not inconsistent with their Christian profession.
But these expressions are included in that part of the apostle's charge to Timothy, which relates merely to the instruction of servants, so that there is no room to suppose, that any reference was intended to the practice of the masters by way of justification.—The meaning therefore can amount to no more than this, viz:. that as it is the duty of servants to "count their own masters"—even those that are unbelievers—"worthy of all honor, that the name of God and his doctrine be not blasphemed," so the same reason obliges them, more especially, to count their believing masters "worthy of all lawful honor," because of their Christian profession, which renders them accepted of God. For common charity obliges us, as Christians, to suppose that all men, who believe and hold the same professions as ourselves, are "faithful and beloved," as well as "partakers of the benefit" of Christ's redemption, because belief is the true means of leading and disposing men to acquire such happiness; and though many other necessary Christian qualities may seem wanting in our believing brethren, yet we must not presume to condemn them; God alone being their judge: and, for this reason also, Christian servants must not condemn and despise their believing masters, (though they know themselves equal in dignity as brethren, and that it is, consequently, their masters duty to
I mention this text of St. Paul, as one of "doubtful interpretation," because commentators are divided concerning the application of the very words on which the imaginary justification of the slaveholder is supposed to be founded! Many learned men (and Dr. Hammond among the rest) have construed the words—"δτι πιςοι εισιν και αγαπητοι όι της ενεργεσιας αντιλαμβανομενοι," (1 Tim. vi. 2.) in a very different manner from the common version, and applied them to the servants, which entirely destroys the presumption in favor of the slaveholder.
Nevertheless I have contented myself with the common rendering, being convinced that no conclusions can fairly be drawn from this text in favor of slavery, even when the epithets "faithful and beloved," &c. are applied to the ​masters; because the signification of them must necessarily be restrained within the bounds of gospel doctrine; and, therefore, we cannot conceive that the apostle intended, by the application of these epithets, to justify any practices which are inconsistent with the benevolence enjoined in other parts of the New Testament; for this would, be liable to produce a contrary effect from that which the apostle expressly intended by his injunction, viz: that "the name of God and his doctrine be not blasphemed."
Thus it appears, I hope, that the principles, on which the doctrine of the servant's submission is founded, are clearly expressed; so that slaveholders can have no right to avail themselves of any of these texts to enforce an absolute submission; for though these several texts clearly justify the slave, yet they cannot justify the master, unless he "can show that the same principles, (or reason of the law) on which they are founded, hold good also on his side of the question. Can the slaveholders and African ​traders allege, for instance, that they shall "adorn the doctrine of God our Savior," (Titus ii. 10,) by persisting ​in their unnatural pretensions to an absolute property in their poor brethren? or that they "do the will of God
​from the heart," (Ephes. vi. v, &c. ) when they retain their neighbor in an involuntary, unrewarded servitude for ​life? If they can do this, I shall have reason to be silent. But if, on the contrary, it should evidently appear that a very different behavior is required of Christian masters, "that the name of God and his doctrine be not blasphemed," (1 Tim. vi. 1,) they must be obliged to allow ​that the "reason or life of the law" is against them; and, consequently, that none of these texts, relating to Christian servants, are capable of affording them the least excuse for their selfish pretensions. They will find also, upon a more careful examination of the scripture, that they themselves are as much bound by the gospel to bear personal injuries with patience and' humility, as their slaves. Because the benevolent principles of the gospel of peace require all men, freemen as well as slaves, to return good for evil." "Bless them that curse you," said our Lord, "and pray for them which despitefully use you. And unto him that smiteth thee on the one cheek, offer also the other; and him that taketh away thy cloak, forbid him not to take thy coat also," &c. Luke vi. 28, 29. But, though submission and placability are thus unquestionably enjoined to the sufferers in all the cases above recited in the text, yet surely no reasonable man will pretend to allege, from thence, that tyrants and oppressors have thereby obtained a legal right, under the gospel, to curse others, and use them despitefully; or that the unjust oppression of strikers and robbers is thereby authorized or justified! In the same light exactly must we view the slaveholders claim of private property in the persons of men, whenever an attempt is made to support it on the foundation of any such texts as I have quoted, wherein servants or slaves are exhorted to submit with passive obedience, &c. to their masters; because the right (as it is improperly called) or pretension of the master may with the greatest propriety be compared to the pretended right or authority of oppressing or robbing others, which is too often exercised by imperial tyrants and despotic princes, as well as by their brethren in iniquity of a lower class, viz: pirates, highwaymen, and extortioners of every degree! The gospel of peace cannot authorize the oppression of these lawless men, though it clearly enjoins patience, submission, and acquiescence, to the individuals that are injured, whether freemen or slaves! The placability and absolute submission, commanded by the last cited text, to Christians in general, are manifestly founded on the very same principles ​with that particular submission which the gospel requires of Christian slaves; and is further parallel to the latter, by being equally passive; so that the oppression of the slaveholder can no more be justified by any text of the New Testament, that I am able to find, than the oppression of the striker and robber.
Unhappily for the Christian world, the duties of patience, submission, and placability, enjoined by the gospel to persons injured, are too commonly either misunderstood or rejected; though the temporal, as well as the eternal, happiness of mankind greatly depends upon a conscientious and proper observance of these duties: for even the most rigid obedience to the letter of the command would be far from being productive, either of the real evils to which the pernicious doctrine of a national passive obedience apparently tends, or of the imaginary inconveniences apprehended by the advocates for duelling, because the same benevolent principles, (viz: universal love and charity, founded on the great commandment, "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself,") which oblige the true Christian, most disinterestedly, to forgive all injuries, and pass over every affront offered to his own person, will necessarily engage him, on the other hand, as disinterestedly, to oppose every degree of oppression and injustice, which affects his brethren and neighbors, when he has a fair opportunity of assisting them; and from hence arises the zeal of good men for just and equitable laws, as being the most effectual means of preserving the peace and happiness of the community, by curbing the insolence and violence of wicked men. We have an eminent example of this loyal zeal in the behavior of the apostle Paul, who could not brook an infringement of the Roman liberty from any persons whatever in the administration of government, though he could endure personal injuries from men unconnected therewith, and the persecutions of the multitude, with all the Christian patience and meekness which the gospel requires. The scripture history of this great apostle affords many proofs of his extraordinary humility and patience under sufferings, so that his spirited opposition to ​the illegal proceedings of magistrates cannot be attributed to private resentment on his own account, but merely to his zeal for the public good, founded upon the great Christian principle of "loving his neighbor as himself," since the maintaining of good laws is, certainly, the most effectual means of promoting the welfare and happiness of society. His resolute and free censure of the magistrates at Philippi, in the message which he sent by their own Serjeants, his spirited remonstrance to the chief captain at Jerusalem and his severe rebuke to the high priest himself, even on the seat of judgment, are remarkable instances of this observation. ​In the last mentioned instance, indeed, the apostle was charged, by those "that stood by," with reviling God's high priest, which would have been a notorious breach of the law, had there not been circumstances of justification sufficient to vindicate the severity of the apostle's censure: these, however, were not urged by the apostle himself, who best knew how to behave towards those with whom he had to do. He readily allowed the principle, however, on which the censure of his accusers was founded, but he by no means retracted what he had so justly applied to the person of the unworthy magistrate who sat to judge him; neither did he even acknowledge him to be the high priest, though he was expressly questioned for a supposed misbehavior to that dignitary! His answer was cautiously worded. He did not say—I know not that this person, whom I have censured, was the high priest, but—ονκ ηδειν αδελφοι δτι εςιν αρχιερενς, &c. "I knew not, brethren, that there is a high priest." Which answer, though on the first hearsay it seems to bear some affinity to an excuse or apology for what had past, yet in reality, includes a still farther rebuke; for it plainly implies that the high priest, in whose presence the apostle then stood, was (in some respect or other) deficient or blameable in his deportment as chief magistrate, either that he did not duly support the dignity of that sacred and distinguishing public character, so that he did not seem to be high priest, and of course could not be known and honored as such; or else that his ​behavior had been so unjust and illegal that he did not deserve to be considered as a lawful magistrate, who had publicly demeaned himself as a tyrant, by commanding a prisoner to be beaten contrary to law, without hearing his defence! And, that this latter sense is most probable, we may learn by the following circumstance, viz: that the apostle chose to decline the dispute, and to waive the accusation about reviling the high priest, by acknowledging the principle of law on which it was manifestly founded, viz: "Thou shalt not speak evil of the ruler of thy people." But be pleased to observe, he neither acknowledged that he himself had broken the said precept by so severely censuring the unjust ruler, nor did he acknowledge the presence of a high priest in the person of Ananias; neither did he allow the bystanders time enough to criticise upon the true literal meaning of his reply, (whereby they would probably have been led to demand some express recantation of the personal censure which he had so amply bestowed upon the high priest,) but he prudently changed the subject in debate from the person of the high priest (who was a zealous overbearing Sadducee) to an avowed censure of his whole sect, charging the Sadducees in particular with the unjust persecution, then before the assembly, and openly appealing to the opposite party, the Pharisees, in order to divide his united enemies: " I am a Pharisee," said he, "the son of a Pharisee; of the hope and resurrection of the dead I am called in question." Such a manifest reflection against the whole body of Sadducees cannot by any means favor the supposition of an intended apology, or recantation in the preceding sentence, to soothe the enraged leader of that very party, whom he had publicly branded as a hypocrite, with the significant appellation of whited wall! Let it be also remembered that the supposed breach of the precept ("thou shalt not speak evil of the ruler of thy people") could not rest on the circumstance of knowing Ananias to be the high priest; for, whether the apostle did know, or did not know that Ananias was high priest, yet he certainly knew, before he censured him, that he was a ruler of the people, and that he then sat in ​the quality of a judge; (for this is declared in the very censure itself—"sittest thou to judge me after the law, and commandest me to be smitten contrary to law!") so that whether Ananias was really high priest, or not, he was manifestly censured in his official capacity as a ruler, or magistrate, and not as a private individual, through any inadvertency or mistake of the apostle, as some commentators have conceived. And, even when the apostle was informed by those "that stood by," that the magistrate whom he had censured was the high priest, ("revilest thou God's high priest ?") Yet his reply, (" I knew not, brethren, that there is a high priest,") when fairly compared with the preceding censure of Ananias, as an unjust dispenser of God's law, ("sittest thou to judge me according to law?" &c.) proves, as I before remarked, that the apostle neither acknowledged the dignity of a high priest, nor that of a legal ruler in the person of Ananias, though he knew him at the same time to be a ruler, and had censured him as such, for having notoriously prostituted the power and authority of a ruler, and violated the law, by commanding him to be stricken contrary to law, notwithstanding, that he sat to judge (as the apostle remarked) "according to the law;" in which case no epithet whatever could be so apt and expressive to mark the true character of the dignified hypocrite in power, as whited wall! This proves, that the apostle knew well enough with whom he had to do. The censure was too just, and his prophecy in the accomplishment too true, ("God shall smite thee, thou whited wall,") to be esteemed a mere unguarded sally of resentment! The latter supposition is, indeed, inconsistent with the remarkable sagacity, prudence, and readiness of mind, which always distinguished this apostle in bearing his testimony to the truth, on the most dangerous ​emergencies! The apostle's known character as a chosen vessel for Christ's service, and as an exemplary preacher of righteousness, will by no means permit us to conceive that he was either guilty of any mistake or inadvertency with respect to the person of the high priest on this occasion; or of any illegal or unbecoming behavior to him as a ruler or judge of the people! When these several circumstances are compared with the general bad character of Ananias, as a persecuting zealot of the most virulent and intolerant sect among the Jews, it must appear that the apostle accounted that person unworthy of any esteem as a magistrate, whom he had so publicly convicted of abusing and perverting the legal authority with which he had been entrusted; and, indeed, a notorious breach of the law, by any man in the capacity of a ruler, may reasonably be esteemed a temporary disqualification for such an honorable trust; for, a judge without justice and righteousness, who openly perverts judgment, does thereby unquestionably degrade himself from the dignity of his station, and render himself unworthy, for the time being, of that respect which is otherwise due to his rank in office. The same apostle, indeed, upon another occasion, commands us to give "honor to whom honor" is due; but what honor can be due to a convicted hypocrite—a "whited wall"—a "wolf in sheep's clothing"—to an "Ananias on the seat of judgment?" Such characters must expect such treatment, as Ananias met with, from all sensible and discerning men; if the latter are also equally loyal with the apostle, I mean in the strict and proper sense of the word loyal, (which is so frequently misapplied and perverted by sycophants,) that is, if they are equally zealous with that apostle for law, justice, and righteousness, ​for the general good of mankind! So that if we approve of the apostle's advice, in the beginning of the same sentence, viz: "Rendering, therefore, unto all their dues"—"tribute, unto whom tribute,—"custom to whom custom"—"fear to whom fear"—"honor to whom honor;" we must needs also allow, that the apostle's practice (even in his behaviour to Ananias) was strictly consistent with his own declared precepts, and that he most justly rendered to Ananias his due, when he so severely reprimanded his conduct as a judge! When all these circumstances are duly considered, the meaning of the apostle's reply, may, fairly enough, be paraphrased in the words of Lorinus, ​as I find him quoted by Cornelius a Lapide, viz: "I knew not that he was the high priest, because, from his furious manner of speaking, he did not seem to be a high priest, but a tyrant." This sense is strictly consonant to reason and natural right!
Justice and righteousness are so inseparably connected with the proper character of a chief magistrate or ruler, that any notorious perversion of those necessary principles in the actual exercise of that official power with which a magistrate is entrusted for legal (and not for illegal) purposes, must unavoidably distinguish the contemptible hypocrite, the whited wall, from the honorable magistrate, and deprive the former of the respect which is due only to the latter! "Sittest thou to judge me according to the law, and commandedest me to be smitten contrary to law?" Thus the apostle clearly explained the fitness and propriety of the reproachful figure of speech (whited wall,) by which he had expressed the true character of the unworthy judge!
An appellation similar to this was given, even by our Lord himself, to the Scribes and Pharisees, who Were the teachere and magistrates of the people: "Wo unto you, Scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites; for ye are like unto whited sepulchres, which, indeed, appear beautiful outwardly, but are within full of dead men's bones, and of all uncleanness." Matt, xxiii. 27.—And, in the context, he calls them "blind guides," (v. 24,)—"hypocrites," (v. 25,) "full of hypocrisy and iniquity," (v. 28,)—"partakers in
​the blood of the prophets," (v. 30.—"serpents—"generation of vipers,"—"how can he escape the damnation of hell?" &c. (v. 33.) Nay, Herod himself, the tetrarch of Galilee, was not exempted from the severity of our Lord's censure, when there was a proper occasion to declare it; for, though our Lord lived, for the most part, under Herod's temporal jurisdiction, that is, in Galilee, yet he openly, characterised the crafty, base, and self-interested, disposition of the tetrarch, by expressly calling him a fox, ​"Go ye, and tell that fox," &c. Luke xiii. 32, and, though our Lord endured the most provoking indignities from the licentious soldiery and reviling multitude, in silence, answering not a word, agreeable to that striking character of a suffering Messiah, so minutely described, many ages before, by the prophet Isaiah, yet ye made an apparent distinction between the violence and injustice of these, as individuals, and the injustice of man in a public character, as a chief magistrate; for even in our Lord's state of extreme humiliation, when his hour of sufferings was come, he did not fail to rebuke the injustice of the high priest in his judicial capacity, because, instead of proceeding against him by the legal method of examination by witnesses, he had attempted to draw out matter of accusation from his own mouth, against himself, by interrogatories, according to the baneful method of arbitrary courts!
But our Lord soon put a stop to his imperitent questions, by referring him to the legal method of finding evidence by witnesses:—Why askest thou me? Ask them which heard me, what I have said unto them: behold, they know what I said." John xviii. 21. Upon which, a time
​serving, officer, who probably had not accustomed himself to distinguish the different degrees of respect that are due to good and bad magistrates, "gave Jesus a blow, or rap with a rod," (εωκε ραπισμα τω Ιησον) saying, "Answerest thou the high priest so?" (v. 22,) which open injustice, to a person uncondemned, (even while he stood in the presence of the magistrate, who ought to have protected him,) drew a farther remonstrance, even from the meekest and humblest man that ever was on earth, though the same divine person afterwards suffered much greater indignities in silence! For, "Jesus answered him,"—" If I have spoken evil," said he, "bear witness of the evil: but, if well, why smitest thou me?" (v. 23.)
This showed that the reprehension of magistrates and and their officers, for injustice and abuse of power, is not inconsistent with the strictest rules of Christian passive obedience; and, though the apostle Paul, in a similar case, used much harsher language, yet his censure was undoubtedly just and true, and the severity of his expressions was plainly justified (as I have already shown) by the event! i. e. by the fatal catastrophe of Ananias. The law, therefore, which forbids the speaking evil of the ruler of the people, is certainly to be understood with proper exceptions, so as not to exclude any just censure of rulers, when their abuse of office, and the cause of truth and justice, may render such censure expedient and seasonable. That the apostle Paul thus understood the text in question, is manifest from his manner of quoting it, when he was charged with reviling God's high priest, if the severity of his censure be compared with the indifference which he showed, immediately afterwards, towards the offended Sadducee, by openly professing himself to he of an opposite party, and by throwing an oblique charge against the whole body of Sadducees, as the principal authors of the unjust persecution against himself,—"I am a Pharisee," (said he,) "the son of a Phasieee; of the hope and resurrection of the dead am I called in question." (Acts xxiii. G. ) Thus he manifestly threw the whole blame upon the ​Sadducees, and thereby showed no inclination to apologize for the severity of his speech to their dignified chief!
I must further remark, that the apostle's behavior, in openly opposing the high priest, (who, as such, was also a chief magistrate and judge,) is by no means inconsistent with that excellent advice which the same apostle has laid down in the thirteenth chapter of his epistle to the Romans, though it is frequently cited by the advocates for arbitrary power, in order to justify their false notions concerning the necessity of absolute submission and entire passive obedience ?
To an inattentive reader, indeed, the apostle's expression may seem too much to favour such doctrines, if the sense and connextion of the whole context are not carefully weighed together: but though he said—" Let every soul be subject unto the higher powers. For there is no power but of God: the powers that be are ordained of God. Whosoever, therefore, resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God: and they, that resist, shall receive to themselves damnation." Yet he immediately afterwards signifies what kind of rulers he spoke of "that were not to be resisted." "For rulers" (says he, in the very next verse,) "are not a terror to good works, but to the evil. Wilt thou then not be afraid of the power? do that which is good, and thou shalt have praise of the same; for he is the minister of God to thee for good." (But Ananias, as a ruler, was certainly the very reverse of this description, so that the practice of the apostle with respect to him, was by no means opposite to this doctrine.) "But" (says he) "if thou do that which is evil, be afraid; for he beareth not the sword in vain: for he is the minister of God, a revenger to (execute) wrath upon him that doeth evil. Wherefore (ye) must needs be subject, not only for wrath, but also for conscience sake. For this cause pay ye tribute also: for they are God's ministers, attending continually upon this very thing. Render, therefore, to all their dues: tribute, to whom tribute (is due;) custom, to whom custom; fear to whom fear; honor to whom ​honor." (Romans xiii. 1 to 7.) Now, be pleased to remark, that the apostle has expressly and repeatedly assigned the reason why so much respect and obedience is due to the higher powers, or to the ruler, or magistrate; "for he is" (says the apostle) "the minister of God to thee for good" &c.; and again—"for he is the minister of God, a revenger to execute wrath upon him that doeth evil:" and again—"for they are God's ministers;" that is, they are God's ministers while they maintain justice and righteousness in the execution of their public charge, howsoever deficient their characters may be in other respects, as private individuals; but, on the other hand, such an unjust ruler as Ananias, for instance, who sat to judge according to law, and yet commanded a person to be beaten contrary to law, such a ruler, I say, cannot be esteemed a minister of God to us for good, or a minister of God in any respect whatsoever. A man, who "is notoriously guilty of perverting the laws, and of abusing the delegated power, with which he is entrusted, by acts of violence and injustice, is so far from being "the minister of God," that he is manifestly "the minister of the devil;" which is the express doctrine of the common law of this kingdom, according to the most approved and most ancient authorities; wherein we find it applied not merely to inferior rulers, but to the supreme magistrate, even to the king himself, if he rules contrary ​to law, by violating, corrupting, or perverting, in any respect, the powers of government! And that excellent constitutional lawyer, Lord Sommers, informs us, that St. Edward's law even goes further, viz: "That, unless the king performs his duly, and answers the end for which he was constituted, not so much as the name of a king shall remain in him." Now, when these constitutional principles of the English law are collated and duly compared with the precepts before cited from the apostle Paul, they are so far from being contradictory, that the full and clear meaning of them all may be maintained together without the least inconsistency or discrepance of doctrine; for we may surely say, with the apostle, "Render to all their dues," &c. without seeming to favour the pernicious and dangerous doctrine of an unlimited passive obedience! "Render, therefore, to all their dues; tribute, to whom tribute (is due); custom, to whom custom; fear, to whom fear; honor, to whom honor."—For, though custom, tribute, fear, and honor, are certainly due to him who is the minister of God to us for good, yet, surely, no honor is due, or ought to be rendered, to the minister of the devil, to the perjured violator of a public trust, who, in the eye of the English law, is not even worthy of " so much as the name of a king!"
Fear, indeed, may too often be said to be due to such
​men when in power; but it is a very different sort of fear from that reverential fear which is due to him who "is the minister of God to us for good!" It is such a fear only as that, which men have of a wild beast that devours the flock! He is fierce and strong, say they, and, therefore, each individual, through fear of personal inconvenience to himself, is induced to wink at the ruinous depredations made upon his neighbors and brethren, so that, for want of a prudent and timely opposition, the voracious animal (which in a state is a many headed monster) becomes stronger and more dangerous to the community at large, till the unwary time-servers themselves perceive (when it is too late) that, by their own selfish connivance, respectively, as individuals, they have been accessaries to the general ruin ; and, as such, must one day be answerable to God for their shameful breach of that law of liberty, ("Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself,") in which we are assured all the law is fulfilled, and by which we are also assured, we shall be judged!
This heavenly principle is the true and proper ground for patriotism, and undoubtedly has always been the predominant motive of great and good men, (such as the disinterested and loyal apostle Paul, following his Lord's example,) in their opposition to the injustice of rulers and magistrates, though they passively submit to personal injuries from other hands! for, in this, as I have already remarked, consists the due distinction between the necessary Christian submission to personal injuries, and the doctrine of an unlimited passive obedience.
The subjection and obedience to magistrates, enjoined by the same apostle in his Epistle to Titus, (c. iii. 1,) must certainly be understood with the same necessary limitations,—"Put them in mind," says the apostle, " to be subject to principalities and powers, to obey magistrates," ​(πειζαρχειν, says he. but then he immediately subjoins,) "to be ready to every good work."—and no man can be esteemed "ready to every good work," if he is obedient to magistrates when their commands exceed the due limits of the law; or if (contrary to the example of the apostle himself) he neglects a fair opportunity of publicly discountenancing and censuring any notorious perversion of justice and right by a magistrate!
The same necessary limitation of the doctrine of obedience must also be understood when we read the exhor-tation of another apostle on this head, viz: "Submit yourselves to every ordinance of man for the Lord's sake: whether it be to the king, as supreme; or unto governors, as unto them that are sent by him for the punishment of evil doers, and for the praise of them that do well. " For so is the will of God, that with well-doing ye may put to silence the ignorance of foolish men: as free, and not using (your) liberty for a cloak of maliciousness, but as the servants of God !" (1 Peter ii. 13 — 16.) Governors are here declared to be sent for the punishment of evil doers, and for the praise of them that do well; to such,. therefore, as answer this description, the submission and honor enjoined in the context are undoubtedly due; but, whenever the governors themselves become the evil doers, and, like Ananias, instead of praising and encouraging "them to do well," do notoriously abuse, oppress, and murder them, as he did, it would be a manifest ​perversion of the text to suppose that we are required thereby to "submit ourselves to every ordinance of man," without admitting such just and necessary exceptions to
​the doctrine as I have already cited from the example of the apostle Paul, and even from that of our Lord himself.
And, therefore, though the apostle Peter adds,—"Honor all (men): love the brotherhood: fear God: honor "the king:" yet he must necessarily be understood to mean, with the apostle Paul, that we must render " honor to whom honor" is due, and not to honor such men and such kings as are unworthy of honor! ​But what men (it will be said) are to be esteemed the proper judges of desert in such cases, so as to determine with propriety when honor is or is not to be rendered? To which I answer—Every man is a judge of it if he be not an idiot or mad man! Every man of common sense can distinguish justice from injustice, right from wrong, honorable from dishonorable, whenever he happens to be an eye or ear witness of the proper circumstances of evidence for such a judgment! Every man, (except as above,) be he ever so poor and mean with respect lo his rank in this life, inherits the knowledge of good and evil, or reason, from the common parents of mankind, and is thereby rendered answerable to God for all his actions, and answerable to man for many of them!
In this hereditary knowledge, and in the proper use of it, (according to the different stations of life in which men subsist in this world,) consists the equality of all mankind in the sight of God, and also in the eye of the law, I mean the common law and rules of natural justice, which are formed upon the self-evident conclusions of human reason, and are the necessary result of the above mentioned hereditary knowledge in man. Every man knows, by what we call conscience, (which is only an effect of human reason upon the mind,) whether his own actions deserve the censure of the magistrate, who "bears not the sword in vain!" And the same principle of hereditary knowledge enables him to judge also concerning the outward actions of other men, whether they be just or unjust; whether they be praiseworthy or censurable!
But, if a man abuses his own natural reason, and suffers himself to be blinded by private interest, by passion, or unreasonable resentment, or by pride, envy, or personal partiality, and is thereby led to misconstrue the actions of his superiors, to behave unseemly towards them, and to censure them publicly without a just cause, the conscience of such an offender against reason will speedily
​inform him that he has cause to fear the magistrate, and that he is liable to suffer for his misbehavior "as an evil doer:" but, when the like faults are discoverable on the other side, that is, on the side of the superior or magistrate, (as it happened in the case of Ananias,) a just censure of the unjust magistrate, even though it comes from the poorest and meanest man that happens to be present, will have its due weight in the opinion of all unprejudiced and disinterested persons, and may occasion a considerable check to the progress of injustice; and, therefore, if any man neglects such an opportunity (when he has it in his power) of making a personal protest (as Paul did) against the public injustice of a wicked magistrate, he strengthens the hand of iniquity by his timidity and remissness, and becomes accessary to the public disgrace by refusing his endeavors, according to his abilities, (howsoever small,) to vindicate the laws of God, and maintain the common rights of his neighbors and brethren. Such an one unhappily demonstrates that he has more fear of man than of God, and much more love for himself than he has for his neighbor and country, and, consequently, in that awful day, when he "shall be judged by the law of liberty," must be liable, (unless a timely repentance should have previously restored him to a better use of that hereditary knowledge for which all men are accountable,) must be liable, I say, to be cast with the unprofitable servant into outer darkness: there shall be weeping and gnashing of teeth!" Matt xxv. 30.
All men, therefore, be they ever so rich, or ever so poor and mean, are required to vindicate the cause of truth, justice, and righteousness, whenever they have a favourable opportunity of doing so; they are required, I say, because they are enabled by their natural knowledge of good and evil to discern and judge concerning the fitness or unfitness of human actions, and of the justice or injustice of all measures and proceedings that happen to fall within the reach of their inspection and consequent observation. ​He, who denies this, is ignorant of the true dignity of human nature, and wants a teacher to point out to him not only the equality of mankind before God, but also the universal conditions of man's subsistence in the world! The hereditary knowledge of good and evil may, at least, be esteemed as the one talent for which all mankind are accountable to the universal Lord? And, therefore, if they wilfully abuse or bury this talent, they have surely nothing to expect but the condemnation above mentioned of the unprofitable servant!
Shall we blame the patriotic apostle, then, for his zeal in vindicating the natural rights of mankind against an unjust judge, when he had so fair an opportunity of protesting against his iniquity? God forbid! Let us, on the contrary, revere his example, which, in reality, affords no opposition to the doctrine laid down in the beginning of this tract concerning the necessity of "Christian submission to personal injuries." If he, sometimes, freely and courageously expressed his resentment for personal ill usage, it was always in vindication of the law, on which (next to the providence of God) the safety, liberty, and happiness, of the community depend; whereas, the hasty revenger of his own cause is so far from being a friend to the community, or a lover of liberty, that he himself is actually a tyrant; because he neglects the necessary doctrine of "Christian submission to personal injuries," and on every occasion is ready to revenge his own cause with his own hand, and to usurp all the distinct offices of judge, jury, and executioner! He is so far from vindicating the law, like the generous and patriotic apostle, for the sake of national liberty, that he manifestly sets himself up above the law, (which is the first characteristic of a tyrant,) and thereby renders himself in fact an open enemy to liberty, and consequently a disgrace to society!
GRANVILLE SHARP.
"Glory to God in the highest! And on Earth—Peace, Good will towards men!"
* ↑ Apparently meaning, "all honor" which is not inconsistent with their duty to God.
* ↑ These words are translated by Dr. Hammond as follows:—"Because they who help to do good are faithful and beloved," and he uses several arguments to show that these epithets refer to the servants, rather than to the masters.
* ↑ This is apparently the case in the other "different relations of life, mentioned in these contexts," as in the relation between husbands and their wives, parents and their children, but is far otherwise in the relation between masters and their servants, (unless free hired servants are to be understood,) and therefore the objection of my learned friend, drawn from thence, cannot he just. He says, "If the connexion of persons in the two former respects be lawful, so that husbands had a right to the subjection of their wives, and wives a right to the love of their husbands; parents had a right to the honour and obedience of their children, and children a right to maintenance and instruction by their parents; unnatural (says he) is it to imagine the connection between master and slaves was looked upon by him as absolutely unlawful, so that the former had no right to rule the latter! Indeed, he very clearly signifies (says he) that the right of dominion remained, when he opposes doing wrong to obeying in all things their masters according to the flesh, &c. as he does. Coloss. iii. 25." "Ό δε αδικων κομιειται δ ηδικησεν." But my learned friend has entirely misunderstood the purport and intention of my arguments on these several texts relating to obedience and submission. I have not attempted to prove, by these particular expressions of the apostle, that "the connection between masters and slaves "was looked upon by him as absolutely unlawful, so that the former had no right to rule the latter;" for this I have demonstrated, I trust, by other authorities of scripture equally authentic, and much less liable to be misunderstood. My attempt to explain the texts in question extends no further than to show that they do not really justify the uncharitable claims of the modern slaveholders, though they are frequently cited for that purpose. An attempt to show that any particular doctrine is not necessarily implied in a certain text or texts of scripture, is a very different thing from an attempt to prove or authenticate an opposite doctrine by the same text of scripture! For instance, when my learned friend asserts, as above, that the apostle to the Colossians, iii. 25, "very clearly signifies that the right of dominion remained, when he opposes doing wrong to obeying in all things their masters." &c. I do not pretend to build au opposite doctrine upon the very same words, but shall only endeavour to show that this supposed "right of dominion" is not necessarily implied in the text which my friend has cited in support of it. The servants are indeed expressly and plainly exhorted to obedience and submission, as well in this as in all the other texts before recited, so that a contrary behavior in them might certainly be esteemed a "doing wrong" on their part, yet this by no means implies "a right of dominion" vested in the master; for that would prove too much; because the like submission is elsewhere equally enjoined to those who are expressly said to "endure grief, suffering wrongfully," (πασχωυ αδικως,) and we cannot suppose (as I have before observed) that the submission enjoined implies a right in masters to exercise such a dominion as that of oppressing others unjustly, or αδικως; for that could not possibly tend to promote the declared purposes of the apostle's exhortations, viz: "that the name of God and his doctrine be not blasphemed," (1 Tim. vi.) And again, "that they may adorn the doctrine of God in all things," (Titus ii. 9). These purposes, however, are fully answered in the advice given by the same apostle to all the other different relations of life mentioned by my worthy friend. Wives may "adorn the doctrine of God" by submission to their "own husbands, as it is fit in the Lord." (See Coloss, iii. 18.) And husbands by love to their wives: for they are expressly charged in the following verse "not to be bitter against them," that is, they must, by love and sincere affection, moderate and soften that supreme authority with which husbands are entrusted, (by the laws of God and man,) that they may rule rather by the gentle influence of an inviolable love and fidelity, as so good an example will seldom fail to produce due respect, and will certainly "adorn the doctrine" or profession of the Christian. Children "may adorn the doctrine of God" by obedience to their "parents in all things for this is well-pleasing," says the text, "unto the Lord." (v. 20.) And again, the reciprocal duty of fathers is plainly pointed out to be a prudent moderation of that paternal authority with which they are entrusted, for they are carefully warned against arbitrary severity. "Provoke not," says the apostle, "your children to anger, lest they be discouraged." Servants are in the very next verse (v. 22) commanded to "obey in all things their masters according to the flesh, not with eye-service, as men pleasers, but in singleness of heart, fearing God:" so that the submission of the servants was also to adorn the "doctrine of God," it being manifestly enjoined only for God's sake, and not on account of any supposed "right of dominion" invested in the masters, which the following verses (v. 23 and 24,) when applied to the servants, sufficiently demonstrat—"And whatsoever ye do, do it heartily as to the Lord, and not unto men: knowing, that of the Lord ye shall receive the reward of the inheritance: for ye serve the Lord Christ." And to the same eternal and unerring dispenser of rewards—and not to temporal masters—is attributed the power of punishing the "doing wrong," mentioned in the very next verse; which according to my learned friend's notion, is opposed to obeying in all things the masters—"he that doeth wrong," says the text, "shall receive for the wrong which he hath done; and there is no respect of persons." (v. 25.) Such strict impartiality in the administration of justice cannot always be attributed, with certainty, even to the best regulated human tribunal, and much less is it applicable to the decisions of uncontrolled will and pleasure, in punishing "wrong doing," under the absolute dominion of slaveholders! No earthly dominion whatever is conducted with such an equal distribution of rewards and punishments, as that it may always with truth be said, "there is no respect of persons," for this is the proper characteristic of the judgments and dominion of God and Christ alone. "For the Lord is judge, and with him is no respect of persons." Eccles. xxxv. 12. "For there is no respect of persons with God." Rom. ii. 11. And, therefore, we may fairly conclude that the punishment, not only of slaves, but that also of masters, that "do wrong," is to be understood in the text which my friend has cited to support his notion of a "right of dominion" vested in the masters; so that the said supposed right has, indeed, but a very "slippery" foundation! Agreeable to my last remark on this text, (Coloss. iii. 24,) the learned Dr. Whitby has commented upon it, as if he thought it exactly parallel to another declaration of the same apostle, (viz. Ephes. vi. 8 and 9,) wherein not only both masters and servants are unquestionably included, but also the dominion, or judgment, in which "there is no respect of persons," is expressly attributed to our "Master in heaven." "Christ, in judging men at the last day," says the Doctor, "will have no respect to the quality or external condition of any man's person; but, whether he be bond or free, he shall receive recompense for the good that he hath done, in obedience to him; whether he be master or servant, he shall be punished for the wrong that he doeth in those relations." If all these circumstances be duly considered, it will manifestly appear, I trust, the master's supposed "right of dominion"—which certainly is not expressed in the text—cannot even be implied in these contexts, nor in any of the parallel passages already recited! Can the master adorn the 'doctrine of God our Savior"—as in the other indissoluble relations of life—by continuing the unnatural connection of master and slave, and by exacting involuntary labor from his brethren without wages or reward, agreeable to my friend's notions of the supposed implied "right of dominion!" The reciprocal duty of the master is mentioned, indeed, in the next chapter, (Col iv. 1,) but it is of such a nature as must necessarily lead Christian masters to abhor any such supposed "right of dominion" as that which is tolerated in the British colonies, and which my friend seems desirous to defend! The masters are not directed by the apostle to claim as their own, by "right of dominion," the labor of their servants without wages, but, on the contrary, are expressly commanded to "give unto their servants that which is just and equal; which comprehends (as I have fully shown in the preceding tract) such a measure of generosity, recompense, and benevolence, on the part of the master as is totally inconsistent with the claims and views of modern slaveholders! and, if put in practice, would necessarily effect the entire abolition of slavery! The masters are likewise carefully reminded, in the last mentioned text, that they "also have a Master in heaven."—(Col. iv. 1.) A Master, by whose example they are bound to regulate their conduct, so that this consideration alone is a sufficient antidote against slavery; for the principal doctrine of that heavenly Master was Love, which cannot subsist with the contrary exaction of involuntary servitude! "This is my commandment," said that glorious and gracious Master, "That ye love one another as I have loved you." The nature of his love (which we are to imitate, that is, to love as he hath loved us) is then immediately described as exceeding all bounds of comparison: "Greater love," said he "hath no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends.—Ye are my friends, if ye do whatsoever I command you." "Henceforth I call you not servants." Here is an express enfranchisement of his servants for our example! The universal Lord and Master of all men delights in promoting the dignity of human nature; which cannot be said of the temporal slaveholder, who enforces an imaginary "right of dominion" by exacting an involuntary service, and that for no other purpose than for the sake of a little pecuniary gain, by depriving the laborer of his hire; which savors of no other love but self-love; whereas, our disinterested Lord and Master hath even laid down his life through love and compassion to his servants, and hath declared us free, as before recited. "Henceforth I call you not servants; for the servant," said he, "knoweth not what his Lord doeth; but I have called you friends; for all things that I have heard of my Father I have made known unto you." John xv. 12—15. And, in the 17th verse he again enforces his doctrine of love. "These things, I command you," said he "that ye love one another." The measure of this indispensable love is expressly declared in the Scriptures, "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself. "Love worketh no ill to his neighbor: therefore love is the fulfilling of the law." Rom. xiii. 9 and 10. Such love, therefore, is clearly incompatible with the arbitrary claims of the slaveholder, who can neither be said to love his neighbor as himself, nor to cherish that love which worketh no ill to his neighbor, whilst he strenuously contends for such "a right of dominion" as may enable him to exact not only the involuntary service of his neighbors and brethren, contrary to the law of nature, but also to rob them of the fruits of their own labors, "Giving them not for their work;" against which practices a severe denunciation of woe is expressly declared in the Scriptures; as I have fully demonstrated in my tract on "the Law of Retribution" as well as in the preceding tract: and, therefore, as it is necessary to construe difficult or dubious passages of Scripture consistently with the general tenor of Scripture evidence, it would be highly improper to admit this opposite doctrine of a supposed "right of dominion," especially as the same is not expressed in the text which my learned friend has cited for it, but is merely drawn forth by an imaginary implication!
* ↑ "And, when it was day, the magistrates sent the Serjeants, saying, Let those men go. And the keeper of the prison told this, saying to Paul, The magistrates have sent to let you go: now therefore depart, and go in peace. But Paul said unto them, They have beaten us openly uncondemned, being Romans, and have cast (us) into prison: and now do they thrust us out privily! nay verily; but let them come themselves and fetch us out. And the Serjeants told these words unto the magistrates: and they feared when they heard that they were Romans. And they came and besought them, and brought them out, and desired them to depart out of the city." Acts xvi. 35 — 39.
* ↑ "The chief captain commanded him to be brought into the castle, and bade that he should be examined by scourging; that he might know wherefore they cried so against him.—And, as they bound him with thongs, Paul said unto the centurion that stood by, Is it lawful for you to scourge a man that is a Roman, and uncondemned? When the centurion heard (that) he went and told the chief captain, saying, Take heed what thou doest: for this man is a Roman. Then the chief captain came, and said unto him, Tell me, art thou a Roman? He said, Yea. And the chief captain answered, With a great sum obtained I this freedom. And Paul said, But I was free born. Then straightway they departed from him which should have examined him: and the chief captain was also afraid after he knew that he was a Roman, and because he had bound him. On the morrow, because he would have known the certainty wherefore he was accused of the Jews, he loosed him from (his) bands, and commanded the chief priests and all their council to appear, and brought Paul down and set him before them." Acts xxii. 24—30.
* ↑ "And Paul earnestly beholding the council, said, Men and brethren, I have lived in all good conscience before God until this day. And the high priest Ananias commanded them that stood by him to smite him on the mouth. Then Paul said unto him, God shall smite thee, (thou) whited wall; for, sittest thou to judge me after the law, and commandest me to be smitten contrary to the law? And they that stood by said, Revilest thou God's high priest ? Then said Paul, I wist not, brethren, that he was the high priest, for it is written, Thou shalt not speak evil of the ruler of thy people. Acts xxiii. 1—5.
* ↑ The learned Hugh Broughton has construed the text as follows—"I knew not, brethren, that there was a high priest;" but the words ονκ ηδειν αδελφοι δτι εςιν αρχιερενς, are more literally rendered above. Castalio reads it—"Nesciebam, fratres, esse pontificem. And Heinsius—" Summum esse sacerdotem ignorabam."
* ↑ This denunciation of God's vengeance against Ananias was fully justified by the event; for, Josephus (as the learned Monsieur Martin remarks) reports that he was killed in Jerusalem with his brother Ezechias. "Josephe rapporte," liv. 2. de la guerre des Juifs, qu'il fut massacre dans Jerusalem avec son frere Ezechias."
* ↑ This "malicious Sadducee very soon afterwards gave so flagrant a proof of his injustice and cruelty towards the Christians, that even the Jewish historian, Josephus, has recorded it as an event which gave offence to all good and loyal men at that time in Jerusalem; I mean the murder of the apostle James, bishop of Jerusalem, whom Josephus stiles the brother of Jesus, who was called Christ.
* ↑ "Nesciebam eum esse pontificem, quia, ex modo, loquendi furioso, non videtur esse pontifex, sed tyrannus." Many of the most learned and celebrated commentators have considered the apostle's censure nearly in the same light. In the learned commentary, commonly called Assembly's Annotations, the same sense is applied to the apostle's reply to the charge of having reviled God's high priest, viz: " I know him not to be a lawful high priest, who thus violateth the law; and, indeed," (says the Commentary,) "he was but an usurper." For proof of which they refer us to "Josephus, Ant. I. 20. c. 3. 5. Chr. Helvic. Theat. Hist. Anno Christi, 46." The learned Mathias Flacius Francowitz remarks that the famous Augustine, bishop of Hippo, thought this reply of the apostle ironical. "and truly," says he, "it borders upon irony; for when he saw him (Ananias) sit in the chief place among the priests, to judge according to the law, he necessarily knew him to be the high priest: for even the little children knew that by his mere pomp and attendants; and much less could a man, so watchful and diligent as Paul, be ignorant of it; the sense, therefore, is," says the learned Francowitz, "I do not acknowledge, in this man, the high priest of God, but a hypocrite, a deceiver, and a persecutor of the truth. Otherwise, I well know that a ruler is not to be spoken against or reviled." To the same effect, also, the learned Monsieur Martin—"As St. Paul," says he, "was not ignorant, nor could be ignorant that this was the high priest, especially as he saw him at the head of the sanhedrin, it is better to translate the term of the original, by I did not think, &c. as in Mark ix. 5. and so to understand this reply of St. Paul as a grave and strong irony, by which he would make those understand, by whom he was accused of want of respect for the high priest, that this person was a man unworthy of that character, and that he did not believe, that a vicious and wicked man, such as Ananias, who had usurped the pontificate by purchasing it of the Romans, could deserve to be esteemed as the high priest of God!" It would be tedious to quote all the authorities that may be found to this purpose; the evidence, however, of the learned Dr. Whitby, as it includes more authorities than his own, is worthy of the reader's notice. "Dr. Lightfoot and Grotius," says he, " think as I do, that St. Paul does not go about to excuse his mistake, but rather saith, I know well enough that God's high priest is not to be reviled, but that this Ananias is a high priest, I know not, i. e. I do not own him as such who hath procured this title by bribery; our celebrated Rabbins having declared that such an one is neither a judge, nor to be honored as such," &c.
* ↑ "The message, our Lord here sends to Herod," (says a sensible and learned commentator, the Rev. Mr. Francis Fox, in his edition of the New Testament, with references set under the text in words at length,) "is no breach of that command which forbids the speaking evil of the ruler of the people, and consequently is no blemish (says he) in our Lord's example. For our Lord here acts as a prophet, as one who had received an extraordinary commission from God: and those, who were truly prophets, were, in the execution of their commission, above the greatest men and most powerful princes, whom they were not to spare when God sent them to reprove for sin." All this is certainly true with respect to the real authority of Christ to censure Herod, and that his applying so harsh and severe an expression to the tetrarch "is no blemish in our Lord's example:" but yet this is not, I apprehend, the proper method of reconciling the seeming difficulty, which arises from this example, of our Lord's applying a severe and reproachful epithet to a chief ruler, (in calling Herod a fox,) when it is compared with that precept of the law, which forbids the speaking evil of the ruler of the people; for, though our Lord had ample superiority and authority to reprove whomsoever he pleased, even the greatest ruler upon earth, yet, with respect to his own personal behaviour, as a man among men, he claimed no authority to dispense with the positive precepts of the Mosaic law, on account of his own real dignity, or superiority over the rest of mankind, but strictly obeyed the law in all things, and publicly declared his strict conformity thereto. "Think not," (said he,) "that I come to destroy the law or the prophets: I am not come to destroy, but to fulfill." Matth. v. 17. "By the law and the prophets" (says the same ingenious commentator above cited) "are meant the great rules of life, delivered in the writings of Moses and the prophets, or in the Old Testament, more especially the duties of the moral or natural law;" (from whence those, respecting our behavior to rulers, cannot with propriety be excluded ;) "These, our Lord assures us, he did not come to destroy or dissolve: It was not his design to free men from the obligation they were under to practise the moral laws of God, but to fulfil and perfect them. This our Lord did, by living up to those laws himself," (which totally excludes the idea of his dispensing, on account of his own real superiority, with that moral law respecting behaviour to rulers,) "and becoming thereby an example to us, by freeing them from the corrupt glosses, which the teachers among the Jews put upon them, and by expounding them in their fullest sense, and according to their just latitude, shewing that they command not only an outward obedience, but the obedience even of the mind and thoughts, as appears in what our Lord delivers in the following verses:—These laws have their foundation in the reason and nature of things, and therefore their obligations will never cease."
* ↑ "He was oppressed, and he was afflicted, yet he opened not his mouth: he is brought as a lamb to the slaughter; and, as a sheep before her shearers is dumb, so he opened not his mouth. He was taken from prison, and from judgement : and who shall declare his generation? for he was cut off out of the land of the living: for the transgression of my people was he stricken! Isaiah liii. 7, 8,
* ↑ The celebrated and learned Henry de Bracton says,—"that a king can do nothing else upon earth, as he is the minister and vicar of God, but that only which by law he may do," &c. And, a little further, he adds,—"His power, therefore," (says he) " is of right, (or law,) and not of wrong, (or injury,) &c."—"That a king ought, therefore, to exercise the power of right, (or law,) as the vicar and minister of God on earth, because that power is of God alone; but the power of wrong (or injury) is of the devil, and not of God, and the work of which soever of these the king shall do, of him he is the minister whose work he shall do. While, therefore, he does justice, he is the vicar (or minister) of the eternal king; but he is the minister of the devil while he turns aside to injustice, for he is called king (rex) from well ruling, and not from reigning; because he is king while he rules well, but a tyrant while he oppresses the people committed to his charge with violent (or oppressive) government." "Nihil enim aliad potest rex in terris, cum sit Dei minister et vicarius, nisi id solum quod de jure potest, &c. Potestas itaque sua juris est, et non injuriæ, &c. Exercere igitur debet rex potestatem juris, ficut Dei vicarius et minister in terra, quia ilia potestas solius Dei est, potestas autem injuriae diaboli, non Dei; et cujus horum opera fecerit rex, ejus minister erit, cujus opera fecerit. Igitur duni facit justitiam, vicarius est regis æterni; minister autem diaboli, dum declinet ad injuriam. Dicitur enim rex a bene regendo et non a regnando, quia rex est dum bene regit, tyrannus dum populum sibi creditum violenta opprimit dominatione." Henrici de Bracton de Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliæ lib. iii. c. ix. And nearly the same doctrine in substance is laid down in Fleta, lib. i. c. 17.
* ↑ The judgment of whole kingdoms and nations, concerning the rights, power, and prerogative, of kings, and the rights, privileges, and properties, of the people, &c. See the 51st paragraph.
* ↑ See my tract on the Law of Liberty.
* ↑ " For all the law is fulfilled in one word, even in this; thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself." Galatians, v. 14.
* ↑ "So speak ye, and so do, as they that shall be judged by the law of liberty." James ii. 12.
* ↑ The apostle Paul was so far from retracting any part of his severe censure and remonstrance against Ananias, that he afterwards (before Felix; defied Ananias and the rest of his accusers to show that he had been guilty of any the least misdemeanor ever since his last arrival at Jerusalem, and more particularly while "he stood before the council," (meaning the time when he foretold that God should smite that whited wall, Ananias,) "or else" (said he to Felix) "let these same here say," (meaning the high priest Ananias, the elders, and their orator, Tertullus, mentioned in the first verse of the chapter,) "if they have found any evil doing in me while I stood before the council, except it be for this one voice," (now he once more provokes the malicious Sadducee,) " that I cried, standing among them, Touching the resurrection of the dead I am called in question by you this day." (Acts xxiv. 20.) This is a manifest declaration that there was nothing reprehensible either in his behavior or words on that day "before the council," because his declaration concerning the resurrection of the dead was the only one voice (or expression) which he supposed these Sadducees could call in question and lay to his charge!
* ↑ The apostles and disciples of Christ were so far "from submiting themselves to every ordinance of man," that they boldly rejected the unjust commands even of the high priest and the whole national council of the Jewish state! The great council, called Sanhedrim, i. e. συνεδριον, (the commands of which they rejected,) included at that time all persons of their nation that bore any public authority or dignity among them, for the text expressly informs us that "their rulers, and elders, and scribes, and Annas, the high priest," (and the high priests since the time of the Maccabees were generally considered as a sort of princes,) "and Caiaphas, and John, and Alexander, and as many as were of the kindred of the high priest, were gathered together at Jerusalem." No power, therefore, amongst the Jews, could be more respectable (in regard to temporal authority) than this great national council: and the apostle Peter accordingly acknowledged their legal authority at first, by respectfully addressing them, saying,—"Ye rulers of the people and elders of Israel," &c. Yet, notwitstanding the temporal authority of this awful assembly of rulers and elders, (or senators,) they were publicly disregarded and contradicted by the apostles even in their presence, upon the very first proposal of an unreasonable and unlawful ordinance; for "they called them," (the apostles,) "and commanded them not to speak at all, nor teach in the name of Jesus."—But "Peter and John answered and said unto them, whether it be right in the sight of God to hearken unto you more than unto God, judge ye. For we cannot but speak the things we have seen and heard." (Acts iv. 19 and 20.) And afterwards, when they were brought a second time before the said great council to answer for their breach of this "ordinance of man," "the high priest asked them, saying, did not, we straightly command you that you should not teach in this name, and behold ye have filled Jerusalem with your doctrine, and intend to bring this man's blood upon us. Then Peter and the other Apostle answered and said,—We ought to obey God rather than men," &c. This sentence, in effect, holds good with respect also to the rejection of every public ordinance that is contrary to reason, justice, or natural equity, as well as those that are contrary to the written word of God! This I have shown more at large in my declaration of the people's right.
* ↑ To the example of the patriotic apostle, Paul, upon this point, I must now add that of another chosen vessel of Christ, the protomartyr Stephen: this excellent man, "full of the Holy Ghost and wisdom," (Acts vi. 3,) "full of faith and power," (v. 8,) "and whose wisdom and spirit none were able to resist:" (v. 10,)—This excellent man, I say, has left us by his own example an unquestionable precedent on record to demonstrate that honour is not due to the highest temporal authority on earth, not even to a great national council of rulers and elders, while they exercise their authority in unjust prosecutions, and abuse their power by enacting unreasonable and tyrannical ordinances. The great council of the Jewish state had been "straightly commanded" the apostles and disciples of Christ (as I have already remarked in a preceding note) "not to speak at all, nor teach in the name of Jesus;" which command, it seems, was given lest their preaching should " bring this man's blood" (said the high priest, meaning the blood of our Lord Jesus; "upon us:" but Stephen paid so little regard either to the unlawful command itself, or to the reason of it, that he afterwards publicly upbraided the whole council, with the high priest at the head of it, (in the most stimulating and unreserved terms,) as the betrayers and murderers of the just One!—"Ye stiff-necked, and uncircumcised in heart and ears," said he to their faces in the public assembly,) "ye do always resist the Holy Ghost: as your fathers (did,) so (do) ye. "Which of the prophets have not your fathers persecuted? And they have slain them which showed before of the coming of the just One, of whom ye have been now the betrayers and murderers," &c. (Acts vii. 51 and 52.) Words could not well be sharper than these, which is manifest from their effect; for the text testifies that "when they heard these things they were cut to the heart, and they gnashed on him with (their) teeth." (v. 54.) Thus it clearly appears that the holy, innocent and meek Stephen did not think himself bound (like our undistinguishing passive-obedience men) to "submit to every ordinance of man," &c. nor to "honor all men," without making reasonable and due exceptions! Nay, so far from honoring man "merely on account of their temporal dignity, it is manifest that he treated the whole body of rulers with the utmost sevrity and contempt, while he thought them unworthy of honor,
* ↑ James ii. 12. See also my tract on the law of liberty.
This work was published before January 1, 1929, and is in the public domain worldwide because the author died at least 100 years ago.
Public domainPublic domainfalsefalse