# The rise and fall of the Emperor Maximilian/Chapter IX

CHAPTER IX.
Arrival of Baron Saillard—Despatches from M. Drouyn de Lhuys— Proposals for French Evacuation—French Hypocrisy—Position of Maximilian—M. Almonte sent to the Court of the Tuileries—Proposal for Concentration of the Foreign Contingents—Thwarted by Maximilian's Advisers—Fruitless Bungling.
AT the time when Mr. Seward delivered his long diplomatic note to the French minister, the Baron Saillard, sent on a mission to Mexico by the French cabinet, was landing at Vera Cruz. The same courier brought two despatches from M. Drouyn de Lhuys to M. Dano, one dated January 14, the other January 15, 1866. In the first, he set forth 'that our present situation in Mexico could not be prolonged, and that circumstances compel us to take a decided step in this respect, which the emperor desires me to communicate to his representative.' Our minister of foreign affairs limited himself to affirming e that the court of Mexico, in spite of the rectitude of its intentions, avowedly found it impossible to fulfil the conditions of the treaty of Miramar.' By putting it in these terms, the entire responsibility of our evacuation was unfairly thrown upon Maximilian, who was left in ignorance of the fact that the Mexican question had now become an American one. M. Drouyn de Lhuys ended his first despatch as follows:—
To M. Dano, French Minister at Mexico.
Paris, January 14, 1866.
The second despatch, of a more intimate character aimed to establish that our government intended to get quit of the obligations it contracted in the treaty of Miramar, taking advantage of the power afforded it by the non-execution by Mexico of a reciprocal convention, since the treasury of the latter was empty, and it was no longer able to pay the troops maintained in its territory. The French cabinet added that these difficulties were nothing new, and that we had endeavoured to meet them on various occasions by facilitating loans which had placed considerable sums at the disposal of Mexico. This was carrying a forgetfulness of the facts rather too far, as these enormous loans had only placed in Maximilian's hand the comparatively small sum of about forty millions, without reckoning the eight millions which the new sovereign had personally received on taking possession of his throne. With, as it were, bitter irony, this despatch, so strange in its contradictions, while arguing from the inability of the Mexican crown to meet its engagements, seemed to take a pleasure in asserting that the sympathies and hopes of ​the population were in favour of Maximilian. In conclusion, our government tried even to colour the withdrawal of its troops with a desire of being better able to serve the interests of that throne which it was about to leave to ruin, or, rather, the fall of which it was, as we shall soon prove, about to precipitate.
To M. Dano, French Minister at Paris.
Paris, January 15, 1866.
. . . This state of things leads me to ask if the interests of the Emperor Maximilian, when thoroughly understood, do not entirely chime in with the necessities to which we are bound to yield. Among all the reproaches which are thrown out by domestic malcontents and foreign enemies, the most dangerous for a government which is in course of establishment is certainly that of being maintained only by a foreign power. No doubt, the suffrage of the Mexicans has given a reply to this imputation; but nevertheless it exists, and it is easily to be understood that it might prove useful to the cause of the empire to deprive its adversaries of this weapon.
Can it be pretended that M. Rouher was ignorant of the truth when, from the elevation of the tribune in our Corps Législatif, he drew those pleasant pictures of the Mexican landscape which had been already so ​brilliantly sketched out by M. Corta? The French cabinet were surely very late in perceiving 'that the most dangerous reproach for a government which is in a course of establishment is that of being maintained only by a foreign power.' Did not the history of France itself contain all the precepts necessary on this point?
The mission of Baron Saillard, so completely unexpected, brought unutterable trouble into the imperial palace. Maximilian, without realising whence the blow came, had to face the disastrous consequences of this sudden abandonment on the part of France. When he had obtained a complete mastery over his just resentment, which he did not disguise, he distinctly repudiated the propositions which had been laid before him in the name of Napoleon III. Scarcely a month elapsed before fresh and more precise instructions, worded again under American dictation, were sent out to M. Dano. Could it then be supposed at Paris that the Emperor Maximilian, whom they had not even cared to sound on the subject, would passively consent to tear up the treaty of Miramar, or rather, had the government made up their minds to come in direct collision with all the opposition of the prince? The latter idea seems to us the more likely. They had hastened doggedly to cast aside all the modifying measures which so violent a question seemed to require. The despatch of February 16 sufficiently testifies to the sentiments of the court of the Tuileries, impatient to cut the Gordian knot which connected it with the New World.
To M. Dano, French Minister at Paris.
Paris, February 16, 1866.
I cannot here enter into the various considerations which must weigh in the conduct of this operation; some of them, of a purely military and technical character, are essentially cognisable only by the marshal commanding in chief; others, of a more political kind, must be left to your mutual consideration, enlightened by the perfect knowledge which you possess of local circumstances and the necessities which they impose.
The 'Yellow Book' is not, as we see, uninteresting to refer to. Maximilian was, therefore, placed in a perfect cul-de-sac. It must be understood that article 2 of the treaty of Miramar,—worded as follows, 'The French troops shall evacuate Mexico in proportion as his majesty the Emperor of Mexico shall be able to organise troops to replace them'—would confer on France the strict right of diminishing its forces, inasmuch as Maximilian had had for eighteen months both the time and the means for organising a part of his army, if he had not been hindered by his generals and officials. But although it might be desirable as a salutary measure to leave the Mexican nation to rely gradually on its own powers, it did not follow that the evacuation, commenced in autumn, should be completed with such fatal precipitation. The point that especially rendered, and at first sight must render, the discussion an irritating, ​one was the fact that the cabinet of the Tuileries made use of the treaty of Miramar so far as suited its own purpose, and at the same time determined to get rid of the obligations which it had accepted through this convention, which bound the two parties to it. At the end of February, the Baron Saillard, without finishing his mission, set sail for Europe.
By the renewed urgency of our diplomatists, the court of Mexico was not long in perceiving that its cause was being seriously compromised at Paris. It thought that sending an ambassador devoted to the cause, who could explain freely to its august ally all its hopes and fears, would be the means of doing away with, or at least modifying, the resolutions which had been arrived at. M. Almonte, the former regent, received the order to be bearer of an imperial missive to the palace of the Tuileries. Whilst he was awaiting the result of these negotiations, the sovereign of Mexico turned all his attention towards the foreign legion and the Austro-Belgian brigade, the only European elements which would be left after the evacuation to form the buttresses of the imperial edifice. The proper organisation of these forces became of the highest importance for the future, and even for the safety of the crown.
The convention of Miramar, by article 3, had stipulated 'that the foreign legion in the service of France, composed of 8,000 men, should remain for six years in Mexico after all the other French troops had been recalled' (in conformity with article 2). 'After this time, the said legion was to pass into the service and the pay of the Mexican government. The latter government reserved to itself the power of abridging the duration of the employment in Mexico of this foreign corps.' ​Looking forward to the future, our head-quarters in 1865 had busied themselves in the special formation of this force, and had taken the greatest care in the choice of the military elements which were to compose it. The legion was not long before it became formidable, and, at the beginning of the year 1866, it already reckoned six battalions, two squadrons, two batteries of artillery, and a company of engineers. It formed a new and firm support for Maximilian in addition to his army, the effective force of which, as we have seen, reached a total of 36,000 men, and about 12,000 horses.
The Austro-Belgian brigade was managed in a similar way to the foreign legion; its cost, however, was almost double that of the French corps. Nevertheless, as its existence was important and its dismissal for want of pay would have been the signal for a general disbanding of the Mexican army, the French government thought it right that our treasury should provide for the expenses of the Belgians and the Austrians. For the sake of the better management of these two contingents which our commissariat had to maintain and control, it was proposed to Maximilian to unite the foreign legion and the Austro-Belgian brigade in one division, both corps being called upon to follow the same fortunes under the same flag. This division was to be commanded by a French general. A combination of this sort was a happy one: it put a stop to any cause for a conflict of authority between the foreign and native officers. Moreover, these European elements, become consolidated by close companionship, would acquire a cohesive force which, in difficult times, would have enabled Maximilian to march victoriously throughout all Mexico. The French general was selected; our acquired rights did not ​permit us to place our legion under the orders of Austrians who were themselves bound to obey the Mexican officers.
To this double proposition, so favourable to the interests of the crown, Maximilian replied to the commander-in-chief as follows:—
Mexico, April 3, 1866
My dear Marshal,—I reply as under to your kind letter of the 30th ultimo. It is very pleasing to me to know that, during the temporary duration of the present financial state of the country, the French treasury undertakes to supply the wants of my Austro-Belgian legion. I see in this a fresh proof of the sympathy of the government for the Mexican cause.
As regards the union of the French foreign legion and the Austro-Belgian brigade in one division, under the orders of a French general, I consent to the measure so far as the legal grounds and the special national circumstances of these two corps will permit, and provided that their total effective force is not less than 15,000 men. I am anxious therefore to see negotiations opened on the subject.
This reply of the emperor, who thus again allowed another element of power for his throne to escape him, was nothing but a disguised refusal of the military combination submitted to his consideration. The premeditated expressions, 'as far as the legal grounds and special national circumstances of these two corps' opened a wide field for interpretations and ambiguities. Nevertheless, a general of our army, distinguished by his energetic qualities, was placed at the disposal of the court of Mexico. The commission often met, but its deliberations soon manifested those influences which had already hampered the imperial resolutions. The ​Belgian and Austrian commissioners demanded for their soldiers an independent discipline, and the right of command for that one of the chiefs who had the largest effective force under his orders. In a word, the effect was to get rid of all French superintendence, and thus to expose them, as events proved, to serious disasters. The end of the matter was that the Austrian general, de Thûn, who, disgusted with having to deal with the Mexican army, had resigned his powers, was called to command these foreign troops, and Maximilian again requested our head-quarters to assume the chief direction of his army. How much time was lost in fruitless bungling!