# Intelligence and Security Committee Report: Extreme Right-Wing Terrorism/The Military and Police Insider Threat

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​THE MILITARY AND POLICE INSIDER THREAT
The military
94. Extreme Right-Wing Terrorists often display an interest in military culture, weaponry and the armed forces or law enforcement organisations—the Director General for MI5 noted that "many of these people are absolutely fixated with weaponry". This leads both to individuals seeking to join the military, and groups seeking to recruit within the military.
95. Internationally, Right-Wing Extremist recruitment within the armed forces has long been of particular concern in the US and Germany. As early as 2008, the US Department of Homeland Security identified the radicalisation of veterans by Right-Wing Extremist organisations as a key concern, recalling that the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995 had been carried out by three former soldiers who had first met while serving in the US Army. More recently, in 2019, the German authorities announced an investigation into 450 cases of suspected Right-Wing Extremism in their police and armed forces, after identifying dozens as members of the Reichsbürger, a neo-Nazi movement. (The international movement is covered further in the next chapter.)
96. In October 2019, the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC) assessed that military experience remained a source of legitimacy among ERWT groups, and that an individual with military experience, including potentially from the Armed Forces, would very likely be held in high regard in ERWT groups as a result of their perceived skill set. We note that the Armed Forces Reserves may also hold appeal for potential Extreme Right-Wing Terrorists, since it requires less time commitment and enables individuals to pursue other employment.
97. In September 2017, four soldiers were arrested for membership of National Action, which had encouraged its members to prepare for a "race war" by joining the army or developing links with serving personnel to enhance their military capabilities.
Case study: ERWT in the military
In April 2018, serving soldier Lance Corporal Mikko Vehvilainen of the Royal Anglian Regiment was jailed for possession of a banned CS gas canister. Police found dozens of weapons—including guns (for which he was licensed), knives and a crossbow—at two properties occupied by him in Powys, Wales. Vehvilainen was also found to be in possession of a copy of Anders Breivik's 'manifesto'. Another soldier serving in the Royal Anglians, Private Mark Barrett, was later acquitted of membership of National Action.
​98. In May 2019, BuzzFeed News reported that internal guidance issued by the British Army to help officers spot Right-Wing Extremists had been leaked online, and was being circulated on UK Far-Right news and conspiracy websites. The guidance, 'Extreme Indicators and Warnings', listed a range of behaviours—in addition to indicators such as individuals engaging in discussions on an "impending Race War", or endorsing the creation of 'white only' communities, officers are told to look out for individuals who "involve colleagues in closed social media groups" and "actively seek out impressionable individuals to indoctrinate or recruit".
99. In March 2020, it was reported that two Royal Navy sailors had been permitted to remain in the Royal Navy despite being named as members of Generation Identity:
   An undercover journalist said they were serving together at a naval base in Plymouth, where they believed fellow sailors held similar views. After his story was published in August, the Royal Navy promised an investigation but The Independent has learned they were not disciplined.
Nick Lowles of Hope Not Hate told the Committee that the organisation had been instrumental in identifying these two individuals:
   We [Hope Not Hate] had an issue a year ago with the Navy where we identified two very active Generation Identity people who were in the Navy, one of them who was on the Trident submarine. We raised with the authorities at the highest level via Ruth Smeeth, who was obviously then an MP, and, you know, one of them would boast online, as well as pushing out all this kind of, you know, stuff about the end of the west and everything like that would post stuff about how he was spreading stuff around his unit. The Navy didn't take any action at all, even though they publicly said that they would.
100. We subsequently asked Defence Intelligence (DI) if members of the Armed Forces are allowed to be members of extreme organisations that are not proscribed—and indeed if there are any restrictions on the type of organisations that the military are permitted to join - and were told:
   MOD policies do not explicitly state which organisations a Service person may be a member of, nor do they place limits on the nature of organisations that a Service person may join. However, any extremist ideology is completely at odds with the values of our Armed Forces and MOD works closely with police and security partners to ensure that any activity or membership of concern is thoroughly investigated. The MOD routinely works with the Home Office to implement the Prevent programme across the Armed Forces, including training personnel to ensure that they are aware of what to do if they believe an individual is showing signs of radicalisation. In addition, Regular Service personnel are prohibited from engaging in political activity and this may have a bearing on some cases . . .
​101. DI told the Committee that its Counter Intelligence (CI) unit had set up an Insider Threat team in 2018, which works to understand and counter the threats to Ministry of Defence (MoD) establishments and current or former MoD personnel:
   This includes insider threats from personnel who may engage in [E]RWT. The team conducts searches for indicators of insider activity, and cases where significant indicators of risk are detected will be referred for investigative action DI CI works continuously with Five Eyes partners to *** ***. DI CI also participates in joint training activities with ***, to refine techniques, tactics and procedures, and ensure working to common standards. MOD Prevent referrals for 2019 totalled 14, of which 13 were for [Extreme] right-wing concern. Referrals for 2020 to date total 7 of which 6 are for [Extreme] Right-Wing concern. The [Extreme] Right-Wing referrals relate to the views expressed by a small number of individuals, none of whom were members of proscribed right-wing organisations or involved in [E]RWT activity.
G. The fact that the Armed Forces do not provide clear direction to service personnel regarding membership of any organisation—let alone an extremist one—would appear to be something of an anomaly. It could be argued that this is a somewhat risky approach, given the sensitive roles of many service personnel.
The police
102. There is a similar risk from the ‘insider threat’ in relation to the police. The risk of radicalisation in general (and not just by the Far Right) was highlighted in a 2020 report published by Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services on the contribution being made by the police to the Prevent programme. The report noted that "few staff we interviewed had considered the possibility that their staff could be vulnerable to radicalisation".
103. However, Counter Terrorism Policing (CTP) told the Committee during this Inquiry that the police are aware of the potential for those within policing to be exposed to, and influenced by, Right-Wing Extremist ideologies, and that this risk could stem from officers and staff being exposed to influencing factors in their routine lives, or from enhanced exposure to extremist content due to their specialist roles. CTP notes that there are a number of measures in place to address these potential vulnerabilities:
* Across policing there are mechanisms for officers and staff to discreetly report concerns about colleagues which would then be subject to further investigation;
* If employees become the subject of an ERWT investigation, it is expected that their employment would be identified through the course of the investigation. In such cases, CTP and MI5 would develop the intelligence, and where appropriate disrupt the threat; and ​
* Existing vetting processes for policing, including enhanced levels of vetting for sensitive posts, offer a further level of assurance to identify any vulnerability.
104. This issue was brought into sharp focus in April 2021, when the media reported that Metropolitan Police officer Ben Hannam had been convicted of membership of National Action. Hannam was jailed for four years and four months—the first serving British police officer to be convicted of a terrorism offence. It had emerged during his trial that there were indications of his beliefs whilst he was still at school (he had apparently joined National Action in early 2016 whilst studying for his A-levels, and just two days before he applied to join the force had appeared in a neo-Nazi propaganda video). A teacher told the trial she had been unable to mark one essay submitted by Hannam—the first time this had happened in 20 years of teaching—because of "concerning content" and his "intolerance towards Islam". He was also spoken to after students at his diverse school reacted to 'anti-immigration' views he espoused during a debate. A Prevent referral was not made at the time. However, the police had not sought a reference from the school when Hannam applied to join the police.
105. When we questioned the Head of CTP about this, we were told that Hannam had undergone the same checks as other recruits applying for the police, and that their "current vetting processes would not have picked up Hannam's membership and interest in National Action".
106. Hannam's extremist activity had eventually been picked up through a data leak from a closed forum called Iron March. CTP explained that for the police to have picked up Hannam, without having detected that leak, at the point of entering the police, they would have needed to complete an extensive search of his internet activity and IP searches. We were told that this has not, to date, been done routinely for individuals joining the police, on the grounds that the resource and privacy implications are "quite enormous". The police are now actively considering this additional measure, although the Head of CTP caveated that "reality being . . . people don't like the idea that their whole internet history is going to be looked at as part of their application for a particular job".
107. When we asked the Home Secretary whether she was comfortable with that level of risk when it came to the police, she was clear that as far as she was concerned it was imperative that the vetting process for those entering the police was sufficiently rigorous:
   my line of questioning now around vetting is very much case by case, step by step, you know, what are the processes, and there are other individuals as well, not in relation to this example but others where I'm asking some pretty detailed questions because one of the areas where I need assurance right now is that it's not just, you know, desk-based, paper-based tick-box but people are actually contacted and the right questions are being asked and they are asked consistently.
​H. There appears to be an issue around the current vetting processes for candidates applying to join the police—the lack of thorough background checks is a matter of concern. As the internet and the wider online sphere is the key driver of the Extreme Right-Wing Terrorism threat, it follows that online activity must be closely scrutinised when the police are assessing whether an individual is suitable to join its ranks.
* ↑ Oral evidence - MI5, 28 April 2021.
* ↑ 'Far Right and very wrong: why White Nationalist terrorism is a global threat', The Economist, 21 March 2019. While the Oklahoma City bombing was not a White Supremacist or Cultural Nationalist attack in a simple sense, the extreme anti-government conspiracy theories which motivated it were a major trope of the US Far Right at the time, and the perpetrators were known to have been directly influenced by White Supremacist groups and literature.
* ↑ 'Far Right and very wrong: why White Nationalist terrorism is a global threat', The Economist, 21 March 2019.
* ↑ JTAC paper, 3 October 2019.
* ↑ Europol, 'European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2018'.
* ↑ 'Soldier Mikko Vehvilainen jailed for CS gas canister', BBC News, 13 April 2018.
* ↑ The British Army's Guide for Spotting "Extreme Right-Wing" Soldiers Has Leaked Online', BuzzFeed News, 29 May 2019.
* ↑ 'Royal Navy allows members of white nationalist group to remain in service', The Independent, 15 March 2020.
* ↑ Oral evidence - Nick Lowles, Hope Not Hate, 16 December 2020.
* ↑ Written evidence - DI, 26 May 2021.
* ↑ The DI CI Insider Threat team works with MI5, SIS, GCHQ and the National Crime Agency.
* ↑ Written evidence – DI, 30 November 2020.
* ↑ Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services, Counter Terrorism Policing—An inspection of the police’s contribution to the government's Prevent programme, March 2020.
* ↑ Written evidence - CTP, 14 September 2020.
* ↑ 'Ben Hannam: the neo-Nazi who joined the Metropolitan Police', BBC News, 1 April 2021.
* ↑ Oral evidence - CTP, 28 April 2021.
* ↑ Iron March was a neo-Nazi website. It was launched in 2011 and ceased operating in 2017.
* ↑ Oral evidence - CTP, 28 April 2021.
* ↑ Oral evidence - Home Secretary, 20 May 2021.