# New Orleans Natational Banking Association v. Adams/Opinion of the Court

* Court Documents
* Case Syllabus
* Opinion of the Court
United States Supreme Court
109 U.S. 211
New Orleans Natational Banking Association v. Adams
It is conceded by counsel for complainant that the original mortgage made by Tucker Brothers, dated February 24, 1860, and the decree rendered thereon in favor of the Bank of New Orleans by the district court of the parish of La Fourche, in June, 1867, were both extinguished by the sale of the mortgaged premises to Cummings on September 7, 1867. But complainant insists that the agreement made by Cummings on the day last named, with the Bank of New Orleans and other parties entitled to the proceeds of the sale, constituted a mortgage, and that the same having, on September 12, 1867, been recorded in the office of the recorder of mortgages for the parish in which the lands were situate, secured them a lien and privilege on the premises from the date of said record. We are of opinion that this contention is not well founded. While it may be conceded that no precise form of words is necessary to constitute a mortgage, yet there must be a present purpose of the mortgagor to pledge his land for the payment of a sum of money, or the performance of some other act, or it cannot be construed to be a mortgage. Wilcox v. Morris, 1 Murph. 116; S.C.. 3 Amer. Dec. 678.
The agreement of September 7, 1867, does not, on its face or by its terms, profess to create a lien in favor of the Bank of New Orleans on the premises in question, but it recites that the parties thereto do not thereby impair, affect, or novate their existing claims; that the original mortgages and privileges remain in full force and are recognized as operating on said property 'to secure the debts stated as aforesaid with the rank above stated.' The agreement is not of doubtful meaning. Its purpose is to recognize the old mortgage made by Tucker Brothers in 1860, and to preserve its lien on the mortgaged premises from the date of its inscription. The contention of complainant is not that the agreement is a mortgage to secure the notes made by Tucker Brothers, but to secure from Cummings the price which he bid for the premises at the sale made to satisfy the mortgage executed by Tucker Brothers. The bill of complainant is framed upon this theory; but the fault of this theory is that the agreement does not profess, of its own force, to secure the money due from Cummings, but excludes the idea that such is its purpose by declaring that the original mortgages are recognized as operating on said property to secure the sums due from Cummings. It is perfectly clear, therefore, that the agreement of September 7, 1867, was not intended by the parties as a new mortgage to take effect at that date, but as a recognition of the old mortgage, and that its purpose was to keep it alive and to preserve its lien as of the date of its inscription. In other words, Cummings, by this agreement, undertakes to keep alive and in full force a mortgage made by another party after it had been foreclosed, the mortgaged property sold, and the mortgage and the decree rendered thereon extinguished. It was not in his power to do this. It follows that the effect of the agreement of Cummings of September 7, 1867, is simply as a contract to pay the parties entitled to it the purchase money of the premises bought by him, and creates no lien or privilege on the premises sold. In other words, it is not a mortgage. This view is supported by the decision of the supreme court of Louisiana in the case of Adams v. Daunis, 29 La. Ann. 315. This was the proceeding by Adams to cause to be erased the mortgages anterior to his purchase of the premises in question. The agreement of Cummings of September 7, 1867, was put in evidence in that case, and this court held it to be no mortgage.
It results from this view that the decree of the circuit court dismissing the bill of complaint was right, and must be affirmed.

## Notes

This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
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