# Mexico and its reconstruction/Chapter 4

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CHAPTER IV
THE GOVERNMENT OF MEXICO: ELECTIONS
Tracing the details of Mexican politics before the Diaz régime gives no picture of principles or system. Each triumph announced is followed at a short interval by what appears to be the overthrow of all the triumph stood for. Nor indeed did the government, which brought peace in the late '70s, mean triumph of principle. Of the principles for which it stood—no reelection and free suffrage—one was overthrown by the leader who proclaimed it and the other never was given a trial. There was established a system of government that brought peace, freedom from pillage in the name of the people, and at least a greater measure of freedom for the economic development of the country, but the political ideals of the revolution were brushed aside and ignored.
How Mexico came to the belief that peace at any price was the first need of the republic is the theme of a great part of its early history. In the generation following the revolution against Spain the contests had been between the Conservatives, or supporters of the church, and the Liberals. These were divisions on principle but ones in which the conflicts of opinion were settled, as a rule, by violence and not by appeal to the ballot. At the restoration of the republic in 1867, the French intervention having come to an end, the Liberal ​party was completely victorious. Its opponents have never recovered their prestige, nor indeed have they even attempted actively to enter political life. Juarez was elected President on the prestige of his leadership against the Conservatives and the European intervention. There was practically no opposition. A large minority of the people constituting the Conservative party had eliminated itself as a political factor.
At the next election the single group that was left divided into the supporters of President Juarez, Lerdo, and Diaz. The discord that had formerly existed between the parties invaded the organization of the Liberals. Even the general participation of the Liberal party in politics was soon to disappear. In the election Juarez was again declared President. Diaz appealed to arms in the so-called revolution of La Noria. With the revolution still in progress Juarez died. Lerdo, in accordance with the law, succeeded and later was elected without contest—and with very little popular participation. The Liberal party, so far as it had vitality, was breaking down.
In the election of 1876 Lerdo again declared himself a candidate. Diaz announced that an election would be a farce since Lerdo controlled the election machinery. His supporters took no part in the election but started the revolution of Tuxtepec on the platform "no reelection and free suffrage." The Lerdistas held their election in July, armed opposition being in full swing and the Conservatives not voting. The revolution headed by Diaz was successful and its leader ordered a new election for President and members of the supreme ​court early in 1877. In this only the Diaz men voted. The other branches of the Liberal party and the Conservatives abstained. The election of Congress the following year showed no more vitality.
The new system of Mexican politics had been ushered in. It was a brave show of popular government but one in which the people had no real part and took no real interest. It was not even a true contest among the upper class. It was a procession only, not, in fact, a struggle in which high aspirations were announced by rival candidates for the approval of the multitude but a sham display in which decisions already taken were confirmed. From 1877 to the end of the Diaz régime elections in Mexico were not functions reflecting national opinion but ceremonies consecrating the established order.
It is wrong to suppose that the succeeding elections in Mexico all rested on active general display of force. They did not, nor was comment in the press at an end. The criticisms of the government in the opposition papers were often lurid. Mexican journalism is nothing if not colorful. But active repressive measures were unnecessary as a rule because there was no active opposition. Peace had come, a peace that, laying its strong hand upon the people, took away from them the right of self-government, which they had used only to abuse it. Peace had come to bring to the country the longed for economic development that might make Mexico one of the leading countries of the New World. Pity that the peace that came to Mexico had not also within the folds of its garments that uplift for the Mexican people ​that would have made them capable of solving by peaceful methods the very problems that peace and material development left at their door!
The election of 1882 illustrates the conditions at the beginning of the new regime. There were no true party organizations, practically no public gatherings, and little discussion of candidates or issues in the press. There were no nominating conventions. The candidates were chosen in private juntas of very select character. High flown editorials appeared concerning the solemnity of the electoral function but even the date of the election passed almost unnoticed and the announcement of the result was not of sufficient public interest to receive more than casual mention. Even the solemn public show of compliance with constitutional formulas, which characterized the later "elections," was not observed. Mexican leaders seemed to have tired of factional struggles and were willing to let the government in power rule—if it could assure peace.
By its organization the electoral system in force contributed to make it easy to impose the will of the party in power. It was so complicated that it obscured the ​result of any development of popular opinion. While a system in some respects similar has resulted in the United States in an approach to direct popular control through the creation of agencies which, while keeping the form of the constitutional provisions, changed their spirit, in Mexico the indirect system enabled the executive to destroy all popular control.
The various states were divided into electoral districts of 40,000 inhabitants. These in turn were divided into sections of 500 inhabitants. Every alternate June the people of a section chose an "elector." The electors assembled in July to vote for one Congressman for each district and two Senators for each state. Every fourth year they voted also for the President. The result of the voting of the electors was canvassed by the Congress in the case of the Congressmen and the President, and by the State legislatures in the case of the Senators.
The state elections, also based on popular vote, occurred simultaneously with the choice of the federal officers but aroused no more popular interest. The state officers were regularly supporters of the government who lived in the state capital, though representing, in the case of legislative officers, outlying districts in which they were often very little known. Often the members of the state legislature might also be executive officers.
Besides this practice of allowing an individual to hold ​executive and legislative positions at the same time, there grew up the custom of divorcing representation from even the requirement of a nominal residence in the district represented. This was true in both the state and central governments. The law required that members of Congress should be citizens and residents of the districts represented. Nevertheless it frequently happened that those elected were neither, and in some cases had never even been physically within the district from which they were "elected." Curious situations arose thus. In 1878 one of the prominent members of Congress was elected from a district in his native state but not that of his residence. He was also chosen from a district in another state. As he was at outs with the local governor he accepted the election in the second. At the next election he was chosen Senator from a still different state and seated.
These practices continued throughout the Diaz régime. In 1904 three states were represented in Congress by Senators and deputies none of whom had ever resided in their districts and only two or three of whom had ever been in the states they represented. Actual residence, even when claimed, was, in fact, often nominal since the real abode of many of the representatives was regularly the capital—the attractions of which made life in the provincial towns seem dull.
As the Diaz period progressed the elections became more important events in the national life. They were given greater publicity and attracted more popular attention. Nevertheless they did not represent a clash ​between two great political parties nor a free-for-all contest between a number of groups. There was no political organization such as is characteristic in Anglo-Saxon countries and in continental Europe.
The election of June, 1904, illustrated the smooth working of republican government of the type the Diaz administrations created. Election boards were chosen in strict accordance with the letter of the law and polling places were specified. In the campaign period there were "spontaneous demonstrations of the masses" announced by government papers. Small crowds gathered at political speeches to enjoy the music that was furnished and to be thrilled by oratorical appeals to general principles. On election day there was little real public interest evident. When the votes, which in most districts were few, were counted, the candidates who had been announced as having the support of the government were found elected. They had had little opposition, indeed they generally had no opponents.
The election over, the work of the various electoral colleges proceeded with all due ceremony. The following summary is based on the official proceedings of one such body as published in the official Gazette of the State:
By this time repression of public discussion in the spoken word or in the newspapers had almost disappeared. The dictator in the latter part of his régime is said to have welcomed criticism so long as it did not touch himself. Whether this was done from desire to promote the development of true parties, which might later become responsible agents for carrying on the government, or as a means to provide a safety valve for increasing public opinion is not clear. There was, however, no group of thinkers that announced a platform of real reform. The opposition press was no more constructive in policy than that which supported the ​government. The statements of the papers presented the most amazing contradictions. The work of the reporter and of the newspaper in the elections too often were interpreted not as involving a duty to report the facts but as an opportunity to damage the candidate opposed by misstatement and invective.
The degree to which popular government did not exist in Mexico in the old régime may be judged by the number of votes actually cast for the Presidential candidate. Going back before the Diaz régime we find the votes at the second election of Juarez to number 12,361 in a reported population of 8,836,000. Lerdo was chosen in 1872 by 10,465 votes with less than 1,000 in opposition. The control of the government in 1876 was determined by revolution. In 1880, 11,528 votes were cast for Gonzalez with a scattering opposition. Popular interest did not rise even with the establishment of peace. Throughout the Diaz régime there continued the apathy on the part of the general electorate which must be shaken off before Mexico can lay any claim to being a representative or popular government.
Since the passing of the old régime no issue has been presented to the people under conditions that would encourage a free expression of popular opinion. The private instructions sent out for the Huerta election in 1913, which was the veriest farce, showed on their face the desire to preserve an apparent respect for popular will and to assure that it should be defeated.
Political parties and citizens were to be "given full freedom in the polls which may operate, allowing them ​to make all kinds of protests, providing they refer to votes in favor of any of the candidates appearing before the people" and those who were chosen to manage the polls were to be persons who would "inspire absolute confidence" and who were "well versed in the electoral law."
The private instructions sent out provided, it is reported, that the persons in charge of the polls were to be "absolutely reliable, so that they may follow the instructions given to them." It was planned to prevent, where possible, the election in two-thirds plus one of the polls in each district, to make the choice void. In all the polls that did operate blank tickets were to "be made use of in order that the absolute majority of the votes may be cast in favor of General Huerta. . ." and if these means failed the returning officers were to falsify the result.
The government recognized in the election of 1917 that the executive influence exercised in the elections of the old régime did not square with true democratic standards and announced its intention to have the voting unaffected by official pressure. First Chief Carranza announced that the reports that some of the candidates for governorships were official candidates were unfounded. He declared "the Constitutional government, which I have the honor to represent, will not sustain or protect any popular candidate whatsoever. . . . In virtue of this in some of the States, where the provisional ​governors have placed their influence in favor of certain candidates, they have been removed, so that the will of the people shall not be trampled upon." Whether the election was free in fact is disputed. The opponents of the government alleged that the announcement that the election was free was made only to strengthen the government in the opinion of foreign nations.
It seems clear that in some sections at least the election of 1917 did awaken a greater interest in public affairs, and resulted in more voluntary voting. In some cities activity in the election appears to have produced spirited contests, but these seem to have been generally the result of enthusiasm in support of rival candidates within the same party and not of a true inter-party clash. In Mexico City there were over 600 candidates for the 24 positions to be filled—a fact which in itself shows scattered enthusiasm rather than good political organization. The official Congressional canvass showed 797,305 votes cast for Carranza, 11,615 for Gonzalez, 4,000 for Obregón, and a number of scattering ballots for other candidates. On the evidence available it appears clear that the election of 1917 was ​less affected by official influence than those of the old régime. There was greater popular enthusiasm and the largest vote in the history of the republic was cast.
On the other hand, the circumstances surrounding the election were so exceptional that the returns cannot properly be taken as indicative of what may be expected in the average case. The choice occurred shortly after a successful revolution, when a widespread opposition could hardly be expected. This was the first election in which the Mexican people voted under the new constitution providing for a direct vote for the President, a change which in itself would encourage a heavier poll. The desire of the administration to make a good showing naturally made its supporters anxious to get the voters to the polls. The opposition did not vote. Many of its leaders were in exile. The government could have made the vote larger doubtless if it had wished, just as the Diaz government could have increased or decreased the polling if it had been felt worth while. The lack of secrecy of the ballot, especially among a population so largely illiterate, is another factor that makes the result doubtful as a reflection of the popular will.
Events after the election of 1917 have not been encouraging for those who hope for the early development of popular elections in Mexico. The violent death of President Carranza followed, after the provisional Presidency of de la Huerta, by the unopposed election of Obregón in August, 1920, does not show that a new era in Mexican politics is at hand.
The most unsatisfactory feature of these elections is ​their unanimity. No nation of 15,000,000 people voting under normal conditions shows such community of opinion. There was not before the revolution and there is not now in Mexico a vigorous party organization that brings a clear-cut clash on candidates and policies. The test of the Mexican people as a voting body lies not in the elections of 1917 and 1920 but in the elections to come, when the personal ambitions and differences of opinion of the various leaders have free play. There may then arise the old personalism that has been the fatal element in Mexican politics. The mutterings of discontent already beginning to be heard may make applicable again the lament of a member of the Supreme Court who, over a generation ago, declared:
One cannot study the political history of Mexico without reaching the conviction that the political leaders have not faced the facts with which they have had to deal. There has never been a determined and united effort to raise the people to that status in which true enthusiasm and ability for self-government is born. The better educated have made sporadic efforts to do so but those efforts have broken down almost as soon as made. Great advance has occurred in economic lines through the cooperation of the foreigner. Mexicans have not had cooperation from outside the country in political affairs and have indicated their unwillingness to accept it. If Mexico is to work out her own political salvation, as all her friends hope she may, a great responsibility rests on that small class which, by its wealth, social position, and education, is free from the limitations that surround the electorate as a whole. Orderly government has heretofore meant one-man rule in Mexico. That basis must be broadened, to include de jure and de facto at least those who, by education and experience, have the intellectual equipment for self-government.
Before those to whom Mexico has given advantages lies this opportunity for patriotic service and upon them rests the responsibility of learning the lesson of cooperation—cooperation with those of like and of unlike political faiths. They must lead their country and must ​govern it, they must prepare the common people of Mexico to discharge the duties of self-government, which a century of experience has shown they do not yet possess.
The failing of Mexican statesmen in the past has been the one that has beset Latin American countries generally from the day of their independence. They have not realized that true ability for self-government on the part of the people at large comes with the slow growth of national ideals and the gradual adjustment to more advanced standards of political thinking and action. The constitution makers have placed their faith in forms of government. They have overlooked the fact that high sounding phrases cannot at a stroke endow a people who have never enjoyed self-government, and who are without experience, therefore, in its exercise and without the critical public opinion on which it must rest, with the ability to cast off the past like a cloak and start anew.
This is the fundamental truth that makes all the detailed comparisons of the old and new constitutions carried on in and out of Mexico futile. The old constitution did not fit the facts. The new constitution does not do so. The people of Mexico will never truly rule themselves until the day when by evolution through education, industry, and habits of political association they fit themselves to do so. Unfortunately the ​adoption of no constitution alone will give them that endowment. Till this slow development is under way political power will rest in the hands of some new Diaz or in the hands of a small but widening group, which, with or without foreign aid, will undertake to prepare the people for responsibilities of self-government.
* ↑ A good description of political conditions during the election of 1882 is found in the Nation, vol. 34, p. 399, May 11, 1882, and the Nation, vol. 35, p. 198, September 7, 1882. These articles discuss the conditions under Gonzalez. The conditions surrounding earlier elections are described in Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1878, p. 567 et seq. Later elections are described in Alfred Bishop Mason, "The Cause of Revolution in Mexico," Unpopular Review, vol. 3, April, 1915, and Henry Lane Wilson, "Madero's Failure," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciencce, vol. 54, p. 148 et seq, July, 1914, discussing the government control of elections under Madero.
* ↑ Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1878, p. 567 et seq.
* ↑ Various amendments were introduced before the end of the Diaz régime, but the general character of indirect choice was not affected thereby.
* ↑ Nation, vol. 79, p. 194, September 8, 1904.
* ↑ The facts concerning the elections of 1904 are taken from the Nation, vol. 79, p. 194, September 8, 1904.
* ↑ The control over the casting and counting of votes, however, was not lessened and extreme measures were taken when an election threatened to become more than a formality. See an interesting discussion of widespread arrests and other corrupt practices employed to control the Diaz-Madero election, in Dolores Butterfield, "The Situation in Mexico," North American Review, vol. 196 p. 649, November, 1913.
* ↑ Figures cited in the Nation, vol. 34, p. 399, May 11, 1882.
* ↑ This interesting set of directions, dated October 22, 1913, is published in the Congressional Record, vol. 51 part 9, p. 8517, May, 1914.
* ↑ Mexican Review, vol. 1, No. 9, Washington, June, 1917. The announcement was dated at the National Palace, Mexico, April 7, 1917.
* ↑ A description of this election is found in the semi-official Mexican Review, Washington, vol. 1, No. 8, May, 1917. See also Arthur Ruhl, "Mexico's First Real Election," Collier's, vol. 48, No. 7, p. 19, November 4, 1911.
* ↑ Mexican Review, vol 1, No. 9, Washington, June, 1917, p. 5. A table is included showing the votes by states. See also Bulletins of the Mexican News Bureau, June 19 and 21, 1917.
* ↑ I. M. Vigil in Monitor Republicano, August 7, 1878, article quoted in Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1878, p. 571.
* ↑ The political organization considered practical by the advanced revolutionary leaders is discussed by V. Carranza in his "Report to Constitutional Congress at Querétaro," December 1, 1916, New York, Latin American News Association (pamphlet).