# The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787/Volume 1/Proceedings of Convention, June 2, 1787
## JournalJournal

Saturday June 2nd 1787.
The honorable William Samuel Johnson Esquire, a Deputy of the State of Connecticut, and the honorable Daniel of St Thomas Jenifer, a Deputy of the State of Maryland, and the honorable John Lansing junior a Deputy of the State of New-York attended and took their seats.
The following credentials were produced and read.
(here insert the credentials of the Deputies of the State of Maryland)
The Order of the day being read,
The House resolved itself into a Committee of the whole House to consider of the State of the American union.
Mr President left the Chair
Mr. Gorham took the Chair of the Committee.
Mr President resumed the Chair
Mr Gorham reported from the Committee that the Committee had made a further progress in the matter to them referred; and had directed him to move that they may have leave to sit again
Resolved that this House will on Monday again resolve itself into a Committee of the whole House to consider of the State of the american union.
And then the House adjourned till Monday next at 11 o’clock A.M.
In a Committee of the whole House
Saturday June 2nd 1787.
Mr Gorham in the Chair.
It was moved and seconded to postpone the farther ​consideration of the resolution, submitted by Mr Randolph, which respects the Executive—in order to take up the consideration of the resolution respecting the second branch of the Legislature.
And on the question to postpone
it passed in the negative
it was then moved and seconded to postpone the consideration of these words namely
“to be chosen by the Natl. Lege”
in order to take up the following resolution submitted by Mr Wilson. namely.
“Resolved that the Executive Magistracy shall be elected in manner following.
“That the States be divided into Districts—and that the persons, qualified to vote in each District, elect Members for their respective Districts to be electors of the Executive Magistracy
“That the electors of the Executive Magistracy meet and they or any … of them shall elect by ballot, but not out of their own Body, … Person in whom the Executive authority of the national government shall be vested.”
“and on the question to postpone
it passed in the negative [Ayes—2; noes—7; divided—1.]
It was then moved and seconded to agree to the words in the resolution, submitted by Mr. Randolph, so as to read
“To be chosen by the national legislature for the term of seven years”
And on the question to agree to these words.
it passed in the affirmative. [Ayes—8; noes—2]
It was then moved and seconded to postpone the consideration of that part of the resolution, as submitted by Mr Randolph, which respects the stipend of the Executive, in Order to introduce the following motion made by Dr Franklin namely
​“whose necessary expences shall be defrayed, but who shall receive no salary, stipend, Fee or reward whatsoever for their services.”
and on the question to postpone
it passed in the affirmative.
It was then moved and seconded to postpone the consideration of the said motion offered by Dr Franklin.
and on the question to postpone
it passed in the affirmative.
It was then moved by Mr Dickinson seconded by Mr Bedford to amend the resolution, before the Committee, by adding after the words “to be chosen by the national legislature for the term of seven years” the following words
“to be removable by the national legislature upon request by a majority of the legislatures of the individual States”
it was moved and seconded to strike out the words “upon request by a majority of the legislatures of the individual States”
On the question to strike out
it passed in the negative
The question being taken to agree to the amendment, offered by Mr Dickinson
it passed in the negative. [Ayes—1; noes—9.]
The question being then taken on the words contained in the resolution submitted by Mr Randolph, namely “to be ineligible a second time”
it passed in the affirmative. [Ayes—7; noes—2; divided—1.]
It was then moved by Mr. Williamson seconded by Mr Davie to add the following words to the last clause of the resolution respecting the executive namely “and to be removable on impeachment and conviction of mal-practice or neglect of duty”
​On the question to add the words
it passed in the affirmative.
It was then moved by Mr Rutledge seconded by Mr C Pinckney to fill up the blank after the words “executive to consist of—with the words “One person.”
It was then moved and seconded to postpone the consideration of the last motion.
and on the question to postpone.
it passed in the affirmative.
It was then moved and seconded that the Committee do now rise, report a further progress, and request leave to sit again
the Committee then rose.
Details of Ayes and Noes
| | 1 N.H. | 1 N.H. | 2 Massa: | 3 C: | 4 R.I. | 5 N.Y | 6 N.J: | 7 P: | 8 D: | 9 Mary: | 10 V. | 11 N.C. | 12 S.C. | 13 G. |
| [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15]  [16] | ayes 3 2 2 3 1 2  6 | noes 7 7 8 7 9 7  4 | no no aye no no aye  aye | no no aye aye no no  aye | Executive to be again ineligible | aye divided aye no no aye  aye | | aye aye no no no divided  no | no no aye no aye aye  no | aye aye no no no aye  no | no no aye no no aye  no | no no aye no no aye  aye | no no aye aye no aye  ay | no no aye aye no no  aye |

## MadisonMadison

Saturday June 2d. In Committee of whole.
〈William Saml. Johnson, from Connecticut, Daniel of St. Thomas Jennifer, from Maryld—& John Lansing Jr. from N. York, took their seats—〉
〈It was movd. & 2ded. to postpone ye Resol: of Mr. Randolph respecting the Executive in order to take up the 2d. branch of the Legislature; which being negatived by Mas: Con: Del: Virg: N. C. S. C. Geo: agst. N. Y. Pena. Maryd〉
​〈The〉 mode of appointg ye Executive 〈was〉 resumed.
Mr. Wilson made the following motion, 〈to be substituted for the mode proposed by Mr. Randolph’s resolution.〉
“that the Executive Magistracy shall be 〈elected〉 in the following manner: 〈That〉 the States be divided into districts: 〈& that〉 the persons qualified 〈to vote in each〉 district for members of the first branch of the national Legislature elect members for their respective districts to be electors of the Executive magistracy. that the said Electors of the Executive magistracy meet at and they or any of them so met shall proceed to elect by ballot, but not out of their own body person in whom the Executive authority of the national Government shall be vested.”
Mr. Wilson repeated his arguments in favor of an election without the intervention of the States. He supposed too that this mode would produce more confidence among the people in the first magistrate, than an election by the national Legislature.
Mr. Gerry, opposed the election by the national legislature. There would be a constant intrigue kept up for the appointment. The Legislature & the candidates wd. bargain & play into one another’s hands. votes would be given by the former under promises or expectations from the latter, of recompensing them by services to members of the Legislature or to their friends. He liked the principle of Mr. Wilson’s motion, but fears it would alarm & give a handle to the State partizans, as tending to supersede altogether the State authorities. He thought the Community not yet ripe for stripping the States of their powers, even such 〈as〉 might 〈not〉 be requisite for local purposes. He 〈was〉 for waiting till people 〈should〉 feel more the necessity of it. He seemed to prefer the taking the suffrages of the States instead of Electors, or letting the Legislatures nominate, and the electors appoint. 〈He was〉 not clear that the people ought to act directly even in 〈the〉 choice of electors, being too little informed of personal characters in large districts, and liable to deceptions.
​Mr Williamson could see no advantage in the introduction of Electors chosen by the people who who would stand in the same relation to them as the State Legislatures, whilst the expedient would be attended with great trouble and expence. On the question for agreeing to Mr. Wilson’s 〈substitute, it was negatived:〉 Massts. no. Cont. no. N. Y. no. Pa. ay. Del. no. Mard. ay. Virga. no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geoa. no. [Ayes—2; noes—8.]
On the question for electing the Executive by the national legislature, 〈for the term of seven years, it was agreed to〉 Massts. ay. Cont. ay. N. Y. ay. Pena. no. Del. ay. Maryd. no. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. [ayes—8; noes—2.]
〈Docr. Franklin moved that what related to the compensation for the services of the Executive be postponed, in order to substitute—“whose necessary expences shall be defrayed, but who shall receive no salary, stipend fee or reward whatsoever for their services”—He said that being very sensible of the effect of age on his memory, he had been unwilling to trust to that for the observations which seemed to support his motion, and had reduced them to writing, that he might with the permission of the Committee, read instead of speaking them. Mr. Wilson made an offer to read the paper, which was accepted—〉
〈The following is a literal copy of the paper.〉
Sir.
It is with reluctance that I rise to express a disapprobation of any one article of the plan for which we are so much obliged to the honorable gentleman who laid it before us. From its first reading I have borne a good will to it, and in general
* ↑ See Appendix A, ⅩⅩⅩⅢ.
* ↑ See Appendix B.
* ↑ Journal ascribes to this question Vote 10, Detail of Ayes and Noes.
* ↑ Vote 11, Detail of Ayes and Noes. Madison makes New York’s vote “no” instead of “divided”.
* ↑ Vote 12, Detail of Ayes and Noes, which is evidently mistaken in giving the summary of the vote.
* ↑ Journal ascribes to this question Vote 13, Detail of Ayes and Noes.
* ↑ Vote 14, Detail of Ayes and Noes.
* ↑ Vote 15, Detail of Ayes and Noes, which is evidently mistaken in giving the summary of the vote.
* ↑ Vote 16, Detail of Ayes and Noes, might be assigned to either of these last two questions.
* ↑ Taken from Journal.
* ↑ Revised from Journal.
* ↑ For further discussion of this subject see references under September 6 note 23.
* ↑ Taken from Journal.
* ↑ Madison’s original record was very similar to this revised form.
* ↑ See Appendix A, ⅭⅭⅭⅬⅩⅧ.
* ↑ Among the Franklin Papers is the original, or at least an earlier draft, of this paper. Madison’s copy differs only in the omission of the frequent capital letters affected by Franklin.
​wished it success. In this particular of salaries to the Executive branch I happen to differ; and as my opinion may appear new and chimerical, it is only from a persuasion that it is right, and from a sense of duty that I hazard it. The Committee will judge of my reasons when they have heard them, and their judgment may possibly change mine.—I think I see inconveniences in the appointment of salaries; I see none in refusing them, but on the contrary, great advantages.
Sir, there are two passions which have a powerful influence on the affairs of men. These are ambition and avarice; the love of power, and the love of money. Separately each of these has great force in prompting men to action; but when united in view of the same object, they have in many minds the most violent effects. place before the eyes of such men a post of honour that shall at the same time be a place of profit, and they will move heaven and earth to obtain it. The vast number of such places it is that renders the British Government so tempestuous. The struggles for them are the true sources of all those factions which are perpetually dividing the Nation, distracting its councils, hurrying sometimes into fruitless & mischievous wars, and often compelling a submission to dishonorable terms of peace.
And of what kind are the men that will strive for this profitable pre-eminence, through all the bustle of cabal, the heat of contention, the infinite mutual abuse of parties, tearing to pieces the best of characters? It will not be the wise and moderate, the lovers of peace and good order, the men fittest for the trust. It will be the bold and the violent, the men of strong passions and indefatigable activity in their selfish pursuits. These will thrust themselves into your Government and be your rulers. And these too will be mistaken in the expected happiness of their situation: For their vanquished competitors of the same spirit, and from the same motives will perpetually be endeavouring to distress their administration, thwart their measures, and render them odious to the people.
Besides these evils, Sir, tho’ we may set out in the beginning with moderate salaries, we shall find that such will not ​be of long continuance. Reasons will never be wanting for proposed augmentations. And there will always be a party for giving more to the rulers, that the rulers may be able in return to give more to them.—Hence as all history informs us, there has been in every State & Kingdom a constant kind of warfare between the Governing & Governed: the one striving to obtain more for its support, and the other to pay less. And this has alone occasioned great convulsions, actual civil wars, ending either in dethroning of the Princes or enslaving of the people. Generally indeed the ruling power carries its point, the revenues of princes constantly increasing, and we see that they are never satisfied, but always in want of more. The more the people are discontented with the oppression of taxes; the greater need the prince has of money to distribute among his partizans and pay the troops that are to suppress all resistance, and enable him to plunder at pleasure. There is scarce a king in a hundred who would not, if he could, follow the example of Pharoah, get first all the peoples money, then all their lands, and then make them and their children servants forever. It will be said, that we don’t propose to establish Kings. I know it. But there is a natural inclination in mankind to Kingly Government. It sometimes relieves them from Aristocratic domination. They had rather have one tyrant than five hundred. It gives more of the appearance of equality among Citizens, and that they like. I am apprehensive therefore, perhaps too apprehensive, that the Government of these States, may in future times, end in a Monarchy. But this Catastrophe I think may be long delayed, if in our proposed system we do not sow the seeds of contention, faction & tumult, by making our posts of honor, places of profit. If we do, I fear that tho’ we do employ at first a number, and not a single person, the number will in time be set aside, it will only nourish the fœtus of a King, as the honorable gentleman from Virginia very aptly expressed it, and a King will the sooner be set over us.
It may be imagined by some that this is an Utopian Idea, and that we can never find men to serve us in the Executive department, without paying them well for their services. I ​conceive this to be a mistake. Some existing facts present themselves to me, which incline me to a contrary opinion. The high Sheriff of a County in England is an honorable office, but it is not a profitable one. It is rather expensive and therefore not sought for. But yet, it is executed and well executed, and usually by some of the principal Gentlemen of the County. In France the office of Counsellor or Member of their Judiciary Parliaments is more honorable. It is therefore purchased at a high price: There are indeed fees on the law proceedings, which are divided among them, but these fees do not amount to more than three per Cent on the sum paid for the place. Therefore as legal interest is there at five per Ct. they in fact pay two per Ct. for being allowed to do the Judiciary business of the Nation, which is at the same time entirely exempt from the burden of paying them any salaries for their services. I do not however mean to recommend this as an eligible mode for our Judiciary department. I only bring the instance to shew that the pleasure of doing good & serving their Country and the respect such conduct entitles them to, are sufficient motives with some minds to give up a great portion of their time to the Public, without the mean inducement of pecuniary satisfaction.
Another instance is that of a respectable Society who have made the experiment, and practiced it with success more than an hundred years. I mean the Quakers. It is an established rule with them, that they are not to go to law; but in their controversies they must apply to their monthly, quarterly and yearly meetings. Committees of these sit with patience to hear the parties, and spend much time in composing their differences. In doing this they are supported by a sense of duty, and the respect paid to usefulness. It is honorable to be so employed, but it was never made profitable by salaries, fees, or perquisites. And indeed in all cases of public service the less the profit the greater the honor.
To bring the matter nearer home, have we not seen the great and most important of our officers, that of General of our armies executed for eight years together without the smallest salary, by a Patriot whom I will not now offend by ​any other praise; and this through fatigues and distresses in common with the other brave men his military friends & companions, and the constant anxieties peculiar to his station? And shall we doubt finding three or four men in all the U. States, with public spirit enough to bear sitting in peaceful Council for perhaps an equal term, merely to preside over our civil concerns, and see that our laws are duly executed. Sir, I have a better opinion of our country. I think we shall never be without a sufficient number of wise and good men to undertake and execute well and faithfully the Office in question.
Sir, The saving of the salaries that may at first be proposed is not an object with me. The subsequent mischiefs of proposing them are what I apprehend. And therefore it is that I move the amendment. If it is not seconded or accepted I must be contented with the satisfaction of having delivered my opinion frankly and done my duty.
The motion was seconded by Col. Hamilton with the view he said merely of bringing so respectable a proposition before the Committee, and which was besides enforced by arguments that had a certain degree of weight. No debate ensued, and the proposition was postponed for the consideration of the members. It was treated with great respect, but rather for the author of it, than from any apparent conviction of its expediency or practicability.
Mr. Dickenson moved “that the Executive be made removeable by the National Legislature on the request of a majority of the Legislatures of individual States”. It was necessary he said to place the power of removing somewhere. He did not like the plan of impeaching the Great Officers of State. He did not know how provision could be made for removal of them in a better mode than that which he had proposed. He had no idea of abolishing the State Governments as some gentlemen seemed inclined to do. The happiness of this Country in his opinion required considerable power to be left in the hands of the States.
Mr. Bedford seconded the motion.
Mr. Sherman contended that the National Legislature should have power to remove the Executive at pleasure.
​Mr. Mason. Some mode of displacing an unfit magistrate is rendered indispensable by the fallibility of those who choose, as well as by the corruptibility of the man chosen. He opposed decidedly the making the Executive the mere creature of the Legislature as a violation of the fundamental principle of good Government.
Mr. 〈Madison〉 & Mr. Wilson observed that it would leave an equality of agency in the small with the great States; that it would enable a minority of the people to prevent ye removal of an officer who had rendered himself justly criminal in the eyes of a majority; that it would open a door for intrigues agst. him in States where his administration tho’ just might be unpopular, and might tempt him to pay court to particular States whose leading partizans he might fear, or wish to engage as his partizens. They both thought it bad policy (to introduce such a mixture) of the State authorities, when their agency could be otherwise supplied.
Mr. Dickenson considered the business as so important that no man ought to be silent or reserved. He went into a discourse of some length, the sum of which was, that the Legislative, Executive, & Judiciary departments ought to be made as independt. as possible; but that such an Executive as some seemed to have in contemplation was not consistant with a republic; that a firm Executive could only exist in a limited monarchy. In the British Govt. itself the weight of the Executive arises from the attachments which the Crown draws to itself, & not merely from the force of its prerogatives. In place of these attachments we must look out for something else. One source of stability is the double branch of the Legislature. The division of the Country into distinct States formed the other principal source of stability. This division ought therefore to be maintained, and considerable powers to be left with the States. This was the ground of his consolation for the future fate of his Country. Without this, and in case of a consolidation of the States into one great Republic we might read its fate in the history of smaller ones. A limited ​Monarchy he considered as one of the best Governments in the world. It was not certain that the same blessings were derivable from any other form. It was certain that equal blessings had never yet been derived from any of the republican form. A limited monarchy however was out of the question. The spirit of the times—the state of our affairs, forbade the experiment, if it were desireable. Was it possible moreover in the nature of things to introduce it even if these obstacles were less insuperable. A House of Nobles was essential to such a Govt. Could these be created by a breath, or by a a stroke of the pen? No. They were the growth of ages, and could only arise under a complication of circumstances none of which existed in this Country. But though a form the most perfect perhaps in itself be unattainable. we must not despair. If antient republics have been found to flourish for a moment only & then vanish forever, it only proves that they were badly constituted; and that we ought to seek for every remedy for their diseases. One of these remedies he conceived to be the accidental lucky division of this country into distinct States; a division which some seemed desirous to abolish altogether.
As to the point of representation in the national legislature as it might affect States of different sizes, he said it must probably end in mutual concession. He hoped that each State would retain an equal voice at least in one branch of the National Legislature, and supposed the sums paid within each state would form a better ratio for the other branch than either the number of inhabitants or the quantum of property.
〈A motion, being made to strike out “on request by a majority of the Legislatures of the individual States” and rejected, Connecticut. S. Carol: & Geo. being ay. the rest no: the question was taken—〉
On Mr. Dickenson’s motion for making Executive removeable by Natl. Legislature at request of majority of State Legislatures (was also rejected) all the States (being in the negative) except Delaware which (gave an) affirmative vote.
​The Question for making ye. Executive ineligible after seven years, 〈was next next taken, and agreed to:〉
Massts. ay. Cont. no. N Y—ay Pa. divd. Del. ay. Maryd. ay. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. no: [Ayes—7; noes—2; divided—1.]
〈Mr. Williamson 2ded. by Mr. Davie moved to add to the last Clause, the words—“and to be removeable on impeachment & conviction of mal-practice or neglect of duty”—which was agreed to.〉
〈Mr. Rutlidge &〉 Mr. C. Pinkney moved that the blank for the no. of persons in the Executive be filled with the words “one person”. He supposed the reasons to be so obvious & conclusive in favor of one that no member would oppose the motion.
Mr. Randolph opposed it with great earnestness, declaring that he should not do justice to the Country which sent him if he were silently to suffer the establishment. of a Unity in the Executive department. He felt an opposition to it which he believed he should continue to feel as long as he lived. He urged 1. that the permanent temper of the people was adverse to the very semblance of Monarchy. 2. that a unity was unnecessary a plurality being equally competent to all the objects of the department. 3. that the necessary confidence would never be reposed in a single Magistrate. 4. that the appointments would generally be in favor of some inhabitant near the center of the Community, and consequently the remote parts would not be on an equal footing. 〈He was in favor of three members of the Executive to be drawn from different portions of the Country.〉
Mr. Butler contended strongly for a single magistrate as most likely to answer the purpose of the remote parts. If one man should be appointed he would be responsible to the whole, and would be impartial to its interests. If three or
* ↑ Crossed out “nation”.
* ↑ Taken from Journal.
* ↑ Taken from Journal.
* ↑ Probably taken from Yates, possibly from Pierce.
​more should be taken from as many districts, there would be a constant struggle for local advantages. In Military matters this would be particularly mischievous. He said his opinion on this point had been formed under the opportunity he had had of seeing the manner in which a plurality of military heads distracted Holland when threatened with invasion by the imperial troops. One man was for directing the force to the defence of this part, another to that part of the Country, just as he happened to be swayed by prejudice or interest.
〈The motion was then 〉 postpd. 〈the Committee rose 〉 & the House Adjd.

## YatesYates

Saturday, June 2d, 1787.
Met pursuant to adjournment. Present 11 states.
Mr. Pinkney called for the order of the day.
The convention went into committee of the whole.
Mr. Wilson moved that the states should be divided into districts, consisting of one or more states, and each district to elect a number of senators to form the second branch of the national legislature—The senators to be elected, and a certain proportion to be annually dismissed—avowedly on the plan of the New-York senate.—Question put—rejected.
In the 7th resolve, the words to be chosen by the national legislature, were agreed to.
President Franklin moved, that the consideration of that part of the 7th resolve, which had in object the making provision for a compensation for the service of the executive, be postponed for the purpose of considering a motion, that the executive should receive no salary, stipend or emolument for the devotion of his time to the public services, but that his expenses should be paid.
Postponed.
Mr. Dickinson moved that in the seventh resolution, the ​words, and removable on impeachment and conviction for malconduct or neglect in the execution of his office, should be inserted after the words ineligible a second time. Agreed to. The remainder postponed.
Mr. Butler moved to fill the number of which the executive should consist.
Mr. Randolph.—The sentiments of the people ought to be consulted—they will not hear of the semblance of monarchy—He preferred three divisions of the states, and an executive to be taken from each. If a single executive, those remote from him would be neglected—local views would be attributed to him, frequently well founded, often without reason. This would excite disaffection. He was therefore for an executive of three.
Mr. Butler.—Delays, divisions and dissentions arise from an executive consisting of many. Instanced Holland’s distracted state, occasioned by her many counsellors. Further consideration postponed.
Mr. C. Pinkney gave notice for the re-consideration of the mode of election of the first branch.
Adjourned till Monday next.

## KingKing

Saturday
2 June
Dickinson
A vigs. executive with checks &c can not be republican, it is peculiar to monarchy—
The monarchl. Ex is vigour—not alone from power but attachment or respect—
The Repub. plan may have an equivalent to the attachmt. that is the 3d Br. of the Legis:
We cannot have a limited monarchy instanter—our situation will not allow it—Repubs. are for a while industrious but finally destroy ymselves—they were badly constituted—
I dread a Consolidation of the States
​I hope for a good national Govt. from the present Division of the State—
With a feeble executive—We are to have a Legis: of 2 Br. or 2 Legislatures the Sovereign of the nation. This will bring a Change unless you have the Judicial to aid and correct the Executive—The first Br: will be on another plan, but the 2d. may be on the present plan—1st. Br. to be formed by the Quotas pd. into ye. Genl Treasury—2d B.
The Ex to be removed on the, petition of 7. Sts by the national Legislature—

## PiercePierce

Mr. Charles Pinckney was of opinion that the election of the Executive ought to be by the national Legislature, that then respect will be paid to that character best qualified to fill the Executive department of Government.
Mr. Wilson proposed that the U. States should be divided into districts, each of which should elect a certain number of persons, who should have the appointment of the Executive.
Mr. Gerry observed that if the appointment of the Executive should be made by the national Legislature, it would be done in such a way as to prevent intrigue. If the States are divided into districts, there will be too much inconvenience in nominating the Electors.
Mr. Wm’son observed that if the Electors were to chuse the Executive it would be attended with considerable expence and trouble; whereas the appointment made by the Legislature would be easy, and in his opinion, the least liable to objection.
On the subject of salary to the Executive Dr. Franklin arose and produced a written Speech. It was, on account of his age, read by Mr. Wilson, in which was advanced an opinion that no salaries should be allowed the public Officers, but that their necessary expences should be defrayed. This would make Men, he said, more desirous of obtaining the Esteem of ​their Countrymen,—than avaricious or eager, in the pursuit of wealth.
Mr. Dickinson moved that the Executive should be removed at the request of a majority of the State Legislatures.
No Government can produce such good consequences as a limited monarchy, especially such as the English Constitution.
The application of the several Legislatures brings with it no force to the national Legislature.
Mr. Maddison said it was far from being his wish that every executive Officer should remain in Office, without being amenable to some Body for his conduct.
Mr. Randolph was for appointing three Persons, from three districts of the Union, to compose the Executive. A single Person may be considered the foetus of a Monarchy.
Mr. Butler was of opinion that a unity of the Executive would be necessary in order to promote dispatch;—that a plurality of Persons would never do. When he was in Holland the States general were obliged to give up their power to a French Man to direct their military operations.
* ↑ See further Appendix A, ⅩⅩⅩⅣ.
* ↑ Yates evidently misunderstood Wilson’s proposal, which was a plan for the election of the executive and not for the composition of the senate.
* ↑ Compare Genet’s version of this in Appendix A, ⅭⅭⅭⅩ.
* ↑ [Endorsed:] 2 June | Dickinson | Extive Power
* ↑ This speech of Pinckney’s may belong to records of June 1. See June 1 note 16.
​* ↑  〈N. Y. in the printed Journal—‘divided’.〉
​**↑ 〈In printed Journal Geo: ay.〉
* ↑ Simply a copyist’s mistake in Journal. Detail of Ayes and Noes, Vote 15, gives Georgia’s vote as “no”.