# More Concern for the Victims? - ACF Statement on the UTHR Report - 3rd April 2008

From http://www.peaceinsrilanka.org/peace2005/Insidepage/SCOPPDaily_Report/SCOPP_report030408_2.asp: The Official Website of the Secretariat for Coordinating the Peace Process (SCOPP)
The Peace Secretariat notes, with hopes that it will lead to greater regard in all respects for the victims, what seems to be a statement of Action Contre le Faim UK (which appears on Alertnet, attributed to Action Against Hunger – UK) on the most recent report issued by the Jaffna University Teachers for Human Rights about the killing of 17 aid worker in Mutur in August 2006. Their suggestion that material in the report should be used in investigation echoes a similar call by relevant agencies in government.
It is to be hoped that this appreciation of the efforts of UTHR will at least now lead also to a satisfactory investigation into the manner in which ACF sent these workers into danger. As early as 23rd August 2006, UTHR said in a report on the deaths that ‘Why the ACF sent a group of local workers by vehicle from Trincomalee without a French national accompanying them, suggests their ignorance of the ground situation.’
It also drew attention to the fact that ACF had kept the workers in danger despite advice to the contrary - ‘Very independently the following day, Thursday, in Mutur itself, a church official with the acting Divisional Secretary for Mutur, called on the ACF workers and strongly advised them in the interest of their safety to go to the Methodist or Roman Catholic churches where many Tamil refugees were staying. The ACF workers said that their head office had asked them to stay in the premises.’
Later, in their report on November 7th, UTHR elaborated on the irresponsibility of ACF - ‘Some ACF staff members were in Pulmoddai when the fighting extended to other parts of Trincomalee. The ACF (see Map of ACF Neighbourhood) reportedly asked them to remain. But people of the area strongly advised them to leave, and the group leader decided to return to Trincomalee. The group leader in Mutur reportedly lacked the same initiative and was more dependent on his superiors.’
UTHR also suggested that ACF had been less than transparent in its account of what happened – ‘The public position of the ACF has been that its last contacts with the ACF office in Mutur were between 6.00 and 7.00 AM on Friday 4th and following this their sets did not respond. Several among ACF family circles strongly believe that at least an indirect or informal contact was made later that morning.
One doubts that they would have confidently remained in Mutur if they had lost all contact with the Trinco ACF office. Around 10.00 AM was a crucial period when several of those quitting Mutur were advising them to leave and they were hard put to make a choice.
UTHR also had in that report a section specifically on ‘The Responsibility of International Agencies’. In that section it notes that ‘Soon after the tragedy, INGO representatives met in Colombo to decide what to do about it. Some of those present found the discussion wishy-washy and felt angry that if a foreigner had been killed, they would not simply be talking, they would already have done something. Behind the simple expression that aid workers were killed, a number of tensions remain unresolved. Among these are the different categories of staff, the pressures they face because of their national origins, the fear of saying no to instructions that carry unreasonable risk, and the fear of being accused of underperformance and losing a job that does not come easily to nationals of third world countries.
As for the ACF itself, we understand that they were operating on security level 3 after the troubles affecting Trincomalee last April….At security level 3, all decisions to send the staff away from base, Trincomalee town in this instance, to work in an outlying area, we learn, must be routed through the head office in Colombo. Whether this procedure was followed or the decision taken in Trincomalee itself with regard to the staff sent to Mutur during that fatal week is a question to which the answer is hazy.’
ACF in Trincomalee had three expatriate staff attached to the base and other expatriates from a central pool were sent to stations as required. Those at the base were the Head of Base (HB), Programme Manager for food security (FS) and Programme Manager for water and sanitation (WS). There had been a change of expatriate base staff in June. Owing to a delay in finding replacements, the newcomers did not have the benefit of a transition period where they would have worked with their predecessors. The new arrivals had no previous acquaintance with Sri Lanka and no preparation for the kind of problems they encountered in early August. All they had to prepare themselves with was written advice left behind by their predecessors. We understand that one piece of written advice left behind was for them to ask the local staff whether they felt comfortable about going somewhere before sending them.
Those sent to Mutur were normally sent in vehicles on Monday to stay over in Mutur until Friday when the vehicle would return. Those coming back in-between would use the ferry. Fighting between the LTTE and the Army was going on ten miles south of Mutur and there was fear that it could affect Mutur any time. The local staff members who were to go to Mutur on Monday 31st July did not want to go. We are told that two of them applied for leave and were turned down. About 5 food security workers were sent to Mutur on Monday. One supposes that instructions to go were routed through Colombo. Some who were sent expressed a wish that evening to get back.
There was also another reason for their anxiety:…ACF was the first to send back staff to stay overnight and this surprised other INGOs. Despite the improved situation the fighting at Mavil Aru worried them.
Meanwhile, early in the week beginning 31st July, there were warnings, from the Non-Violent Peace Force for one, that it was unsafe to send employees to Mutur. NVPF workers went to Mutur on Tuesday 1st August morning by ferry just to pack up and remove their equipment like computers, and returned by the 11.00 AM ferry. By 12.30 PM the shelling had started and the ferry service stopped. The ICRC too had pulled out leaving behind about two local staff in Mutur, who left with the people on the 4th.
As for ACF, we learn that WS had second thoughts about sending his staff to Mutur on 1st August, but was persuaded to send them by the fact that FS’s staff was already there the day before. ACF also had a coordinator, a local man, but he does not seem to have applied himself effectively in ensuring the security of the staff, or was it that those above him did not heed his advice?’
The Peace Secretariat has long been urging a full inquiry into the circumstances in which these workers were sent into danger. In his correspondence with the Secretariat on the subject, Sir John Holmes has sent the relevant regulations which make clear that ACF was in breach of its obligations in such situations. However, our request, and our statement that ACF is also culpable, is perverted into the suggestion that we believe ACF was responsible for the actual killings.
This distortion is of a piece with the fact that, perhaps after UTHR drew attention to the collateral responsibility of ACF for what happened, ACF, ignoring the opinions of the Sri Lankan embassy in Paris, allowed Gen Henricsson to repeat his false allegations against the Sri Lankan forces. It is known in Colombo that a journalist’s attempts to record the ACF contribution to the tragedy was stymied. Now that ACF has registered the importance of what UTHR has said when it concerns the purported Sri Lankan perpetrators, perhaps it will also acknowledge the importance of its criticisms of ACF in this regard with regard to the victims – and at last pay proper compensation, treating them not as mere local employees but as human beings equal to any foreigner.
Prof Rajiva Wijesinha
Secretary General
Secretariat for Coordinating the Peace Process