# Schlude v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue/Opinion of the Court

* Court Documents
* Case Syllabus
* Opinion of the Court
* Dissenting Opinion Stewart
United States Supreme Court
372 U.S. 128
Schlude v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
Argued: Dec. 10, 1962. --- Decided: Feb 18, 1963
This is still another chapter in the protracted problem of the time certain items are to be recognized as income for the purposes of the federal income tax. The commissioner of Internal Revenue increased the 1952, 1953 and 1954 ordinary income of the taxpayers by including in gross income for those years amounts received or receivable under contracts executed during those years despite the fact that the contracts obligated taxpayers to render performance in subsequent periods. These increases produced tax deficiencies which the taxpayers unsuccessfully challenged in the Tax Court on the ground that the amounts could be deferred under their accounting method. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit agreed with the taxpayers and reversed the Tax Court, 283 F.2d 234, the decision having been rendered prior to ours in American Automobile Ass'n v. United States, 367 U.S. 687, 81 S.Ct. 1727, 6 L.Ed.2d 1109. Following the American Automobile Association case, certiorari in this case was granted, the judgment of the lower court vacated, 367 U.S. 911, 81 S.Ct. 1915, 6 L.Ed.2d 1248, and the cause remanded for further consideration in light of American Automobile Association. 368 U.S. 873, 82 S.Ct. 25, 7 L.Ed.2d 72. In a per curiam opinion, the Court of Appeals held that in view of American Automobile Association, the taxpayers' accounting method 'does not, for income tax purposes, clearly reflect income' and affirmed the judgment for the Commissioner, 296 F.2d 721. We brought the case back once again to consider whether the lower court misapprehended the scope of American Automobile Association, 370 U.S. 902, 82 S.Ct. 1248, 8 L.Ed.2d 399.
Taxpayers, husband and wife, formed a partnership to operate ballroom dancing studios (collectively referred to as 'studio') pursuant to Arthur Murray, Inc., franchise agreements. Dancing lessons were offered under either of two basic contracts. The cash plan contract required the student to pay the entire down payment in cash at the time the contract was executed with the balance due in installments thereafter. The deferred payment contract required only a portion of the down payment to be paid in cash. The remainder of the down payment was due in stated installments and the balance of the contract price was to be paid as designated in a negotiable note signed at the time the contract was executed.
Both types of contracts provided that (1) the student should pay tuition for lessons in a certain amount, (2) the student should not be relieved of his obligation to pay the tuition, (3) no refunds would be made, and (4) the contract was noncancelable. The contracts prescribed a specific number of lesson hours ranging from five to 1,200 hours and some contracts provided lifetime courses entitling the student additionally to two hours of lessons permonth plus two parties a year for life. Although the contracts designated the period during which the lessons had to be taken, there was no schedule of specific dates, which were arranged from time to time as lessons were given.
Cash payments received directly from students and amounts received when the negotiable notes were discounted at the bank or fully paid were deposited in the studio's general bank account without segregation from its other funds. The franchise agreements required the studio to pay to Arthur Murray, Inc., on a weekly basis, 10% of these cash receipts as royalty and 5% of the receipts in escrow, the latter to continue until a $20,000 indemnity fund was accumulated. Similarly, sales commissions for lessons sold were paid at the time the sales receipts were deposited in the studio's general bank account.
The studio, since its inception in 1946, has kept its books and reported income for tax purposes on an accrual system of accounting. In addition to the books, individual student record cards were maintained showing the number of hours taught and the number still remaining under the contract. The system, in substance, operated as follows. When a contract was entered into, a 'deferred income' account was credited for the total contract price. At the close of each fiscal period, the student record cards were analyzed and the total number of taught hours was multiplied by the designated rate per hour of each contract. The resulting sum was deducted from the deferred income account and reported as earned income on the financial statements and the income tax return. In addition, if there had been no activity in a contract for over a year, or if a course were reduced in amount, an entry would be made canceling the untaught portion of the contract, removing that amount from the deferred income account, and recognizing gain to the extent that the deferred income exceeded the balance due on the contract, i.e., the amounts received in advance. The amounts representing lessons taught and the gains from cancellations constituted the chief sources of the partnership's gross income. The balance of the deferred income account would be carried forward into the next fiscal year to be increased or decreased in accordance with the number of new contracts, lessons taught and cancellations recognized.
Deductions were also reported on the accrual basis except that the royalty payments and the sales commissions were deducted when paid irrespective of the period in which the related receipts were taken into income. Three certified public accountants testified that in their opinion the accounting system employed truly reflected net income in accordance with commercial accrual accounting standards.
The Commissioner included in gross income for the years in question not only advance payments received in cash but the full face amounts of notes and contracts executed during the respective years. The Tax Court and the Court of Appeals upheld the Commissioner, but the United States in this Court has retreated somewhat and does not now claim the includibility in gross income of future payments which were not evidenced by a note and which were neither due by the terms of the contract nor matured by performance of the related services. The question remaining for decision, then, is this: Was it proper for the Commissioner, exercising his discretion under § 41, 1939 Code, and § 446(b), 1954 Code, to reject the studio's accounting system as not clearly reflecting income and to include as income in a particular year advance payments by way of cash, negotiable notes and contract installments falling due but remaining unpaid during that year? We hold that it was since we believe the problem is squarely controlled by American Automobile Association, 367 U.S. 687, 81 S.Ct. 1727, 6 L.Ed.2d 1109.
The court there had occasion to consider the entire legislative background of the treatment of prepaid income. The retroactive repeal of § 452 of the 1954 Code, 'the only law incontestably permitting the practice upon which (the taxpayer) depends,' was regarded as reinstating long-standing administrative and lower court rulings that accounting systems deferring prepaid income could be rejected by the Commissioner.
'(T)he fact is that § 452 for the first time specifically declared petitioner's system of accounting to be acceptable for income tax purposes, and overruled the long-standing position of the Commissioner and courts to the contrary. And the repeal of the section the following year, upon insistence by the Treasury that the proposed endorsement of such tax accounting would have a disastrous impact on the Government's revenue, was just as clearly a mandate from the Congress that petitioner's system was not acceptable for tax purposes.' 367 U.S., at 695, 81 S.Ct. at 1731.
Confirming that view was the step-by-step approach of Congress in granting the deferral privilege to only limited groups of taxpayers while exploring more deeply the ramifications of the entire problem.
Plainly, the considerations expressed in American Automobile Association are apposite here. We need only add here that since the American Automobile Association decision, a specific provision extending the deferral practice to certain membership corporations was enacted, § 456, 1954 Code, added by § 1, Act of July 26, 1961, 75 Stat. 222, continuing, at least so far, the congressional policy of treating this problem by precise provisions of narrow applicability. Consequently, as in the American Automobile Association case, we invoke the 'longestablished policy of the Court in deferring, where possible, to congressional procedures in the tax field,' and, as in that case, we cannot say that the Commissioner's rejection of the studio's deferral system was unsound.
The American Automobile Association case rested upon an additional ground which is also controlling here. Relying upon Automobile Club of Michigan v. Commissioner, 353 U.S. 180, 77 S.Ct. 707, 1 L.Ed.2d 746, the Court rejected the taxpayer's system as artificial since the advance payments related to services which were to be performed only upon customers' demands without relation to fixed dates in the future. The system employed here suffers from that very same vice, for the studio sought to defer its cash receipts on the basis of contracts which did not provide for lessons on fixed dates after the taxable year, but left such dates to be arranged from time to time by the instructor and his student. Under the contracts, the student could arrange for some or all of the additional lessons or could simply allow their rights under the contracts to lapse. But even though the student did not demand the remaining lessons, the contracts permitted the studio to insist upon payment in accordance with the obligations undertaken and to retain whatever prepayments were made without restriction as to use and without obligation of refund. At the end of each period, while the number of lessons taught had been meticulously reflected, the studio was uncertain whether none, some or all of the remaining lessons would be rendered. Clearly, services were rendered solely on demand in the fashion of the American Automobile Association and Automobile Club of Michigan cases.
Moreover, percentage royalties and sales commissions for lessons sold, which were paid as cash was received from students or from its note transactions with the bank, were deducted in the year paid even though the related items of income had been deferred, at least in part, to later periods. In view of all these circumstances, we hold the studio's accrual system vulnerable under § 41 and § 446(b) with respect to its deferral of prepaid income. Consequently, the Commissioner was fully justified in including payments in cash or by negotiable note in gross income for the year in which such payments were received. If these payments are includible in the year of receipt because their allocation to a later year does not clearly reflect income, the contract installments are likewise includible in gross income, as the United States now claims, in the year they become due and payable. For an accrual basis taxpayer 'it is the right to receive and not the actual receipt that determines the inclusion of the amount in gross income,' Spring City Foundry Co. v. Commissioner, 292 U.S. 182, 184, 54 S.Ct. 644, 645, 78 L.Ed. 1200; Commissioner v. Hansen, 360 U.S. 446, 79 S.Ct. 1270, 3 L.Ed.2d 1360, and here the right to receive these installments had become fixed at least at the time they were due and payable.
We affirm the Court of Appeals insofar as that court held includible the amounts representing cash receipts, notes received and contract installments due and payable. Because of the Commissioner's concession, we reverse that part of the judgment which included amounts for which services had not yet been performed and which were not due and payable during the respective periods and we remand the case with directions to return the case to the Tax Court for a redetermination of the proper income tax deficiencies now due in light of this opinion. It is so ordered.
Affirmed in part and reversed in part and case remanded with directions.
Mr. Justice STEWART, with whom Mr. Justice DOUGLAS, Mr. Justice HARLAN, and Mr. Justice GOLDBERG join, dissenting.

## Notes

* ↑ The controversy turns upon the accounting method employed by a partnership in which the taxpayers were equal partners. Since a partnership is not a taxable entity, the partners being liable in their individual capacities for their distributive share of partnership income, § 181, Int.Rev.Code of 1939; § 701, Int.Rev.Code of 1954, the proper statement of the partnership's income affects only the tax liabilities of the partners individually. However, as there is no other dispute in the case, for convenience the discussion will center upon the partnership's accounting method without further mention of its effect upon the respective tax liabilities of the partners.
* ↑ Although the contracts stated they were noncancelable, the studio frequently rewrote contracts reducing the number of lessons for a smaller sum of money. Also, despite the fact that the contracts provided that no refunds would be made, and despite the fact that the studio discouraged refunds, occasionally a refund would be made on a canceled contract.
* ↑ Notes taken from the students were ordinarily transferred, with full recourse, to a local bank which would deduct the interest charges and credit the studio with approximately 50% of the face amount. The remaining 50% was held in a reserve account, unavailable to the studio, until the note was fully paid, at which time the reserved amount was transferred to the studio's general bank account.
* ↑ Though the studio is not a taxable entity, it is still required to prepare and file an information return showing, inter alia, items of gross income and allowable deductions. § 187, 1939 Code; § 6031, 1954 Code.
* ↑ The following schedule reflects ordinary net income on the studio's books and returns:
* ↑ 'Upon reconsideration, however, we concede the error of accruing future payments which are neither due as a matter of contract, nor matured by performance of the related services. Indeed, the Studio's right to collect the installment on its due date depends on its continuing ability and willingness to perform. Until that time, its right to receive payment has not fully ripened.' Brief for the United States, p. 67.
* ↑ '§ 41. General rule
* ↑ '§ 446. General rule for methods of accounting
* ↑ The treatment of 'gains from cancellations' underlines this aspect of the case. These gains, representing amounts paid or promised in advance of lessons given, were recognized in those periods in which the taxpayers arbitrarily decided the contracts were to be deemed canceled. The studio made no attempt to report estimated cancellations in the year of receipt, choosing instead to defer these gains to periods bearing no economic relationship to the income recognized. Cf. Continental Tie & Lumber Co. v. United States, 286 U.S. 290, 52 S.Ct. 529, 76 L.Ed. 1111.
* ↑ Negotiable notes are regarded as the equivalent of cash receipts, to the extent of their fair market value, for the purposes of recognition of income. § 39.22(a)-4, Treas.Reg. 118, 1939 Code; § 1.61-2(d)(4), Treas.Reg., 1954 Code; Mertens, Federal Income Taxation (1961), § 11.07. See Pinellas Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Commissioner, 287 U.S. 462, 53 S.Ct. 257, 77 L.Ed. 428.
This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
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