# Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the case of Al Yazidi, Rida (2006)

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From pages 66-68 of http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/detainees/csrt_arb/ARB_Round_2_Factors_1-99.pdf#66
* Department of Defense
* Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants
* at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba
10 August 2006
| To: | Al Yazidi, Rida |
| Subject: | Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the case of Al Yazidi, Rida |
| 1. | An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary. |
| 2. | The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state or to a third state; (2) transfer you to your home state, or a third state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state, or the third state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control. |
| 3. | The following primary factors favor continued detention: |
| | a. Commitment The detainee attended the Islamic Cultural Institute in Milan, Italy. One of the leaders of the mosque spoke frequently of the jihad ongoing in Bosnia. The leader went on jihad to Bosnia and was killed. The Italian Islamic Cultural Institued, referred to as ICI, was shut down by Italian authorities for housing the Sami Essid Ben Khemais network, which is the core for the Tunisian Combat Group in Italy. The detainee decided to join the Jihad in Afghanistan in 1996. Two people at the mosque influenced him in his decision. Once he made this decision, the detainee began saving money and intensifying his religious studies. In May 1999, the detainee traveled for training to Islamabad, Pakistan using a fake passport. He then traveled to Khaldan Camp in Afghanistan. A recruiter provided him a letter, which essentially admitted him into training. b. Training The detainee was trained at Khaldan Camp in small arms, Kalishnikov and other assault rifles and machine guns, mortars, rocket propelled grenade launchers, small artillery, SPG-9, explosives, C-3, C-4, dynamite, electronic detonators, Yaesu walkie talkie radios and had mountain and urban warfare tactics training. The detainee stated he received additional explosives training in Jalalabad, Afghanistan. He was taught how to manufacture explosives using fertilizer and ammonium, and this training lasted approximately 20 days. c. Connections/Associations A foreign government reports the detainee participated in terrorist activities in Bosnia in 1995 alongside members of the Algerian Armed Islamic Group, GIA. The detainee states he was imprisoned for 27 days for terrorism. He explained the Italian authorities arrested him before the 1998 World Cup Soccer tournament, which was held in France. He indicated the Italian police accused him of being a member of the Algerian terrorist group, Armed Islamic Group. The detainee was among 30 individuals arrested in Italy in 1997 and 1998 as members of the Armed Islamic Group. The Armed Islamic Group, GIA, is an Islamic extremist group. The GIA aims to overthrow the secular Algerian regime and replace it with an Islamic state. They are connected to frequent attacks against civilians and government workers. Since 1992, the GIA has conducted a terrorist campaign of civilian massacres, sometimes wiping out entire villages in its area of operation. The group uses assassinations and bombings, including car bombs, and it is known to favor kidnapping victims and slitting their throats. A foreign government reports the detainee was a known associate of the Sami Essid network in Milan, Italy, and later joined up with the Tunisian Combatant Group in Afghanistan in 1998. The Essid Network is active particularly in the falsification of travel documents, the counterfeiting of money, stolen vehicles, and the illicit trafficking of narcotics in coordination with the mafia, to ensure financial support to the terrorist groups. In addition, the network recruits among youth with limited education and sends them to training camps in Afghanistan sponsored by Usama bin Laden. The Tunisian Combatant Group, TCG, also known as the Jama'a Combattante Tunisienne, reportedly is seeking to establish an Islamic regime in Tunisia and targets United States and Western interests. Tunisians associated with the TCG are part of the support network of the broader international jihadists movement. According to European press reports, TCG members or affiliates in the past have engaged in trafficking falsified documents and recruiting for terror training camps in Afghanistan. Some TCG associates are suspect of planning an attack against the United States, Algerian and Tunisian diplomatic missions in Rome in January 2001. Some members reportedly maintain ties to the Algerian Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat, GSPC. A foreign government reports the detainee is known to have been in the company of Usama bin Laden adherents and later took explosives training in Afghanistan in 1999 with operatives from the Afghan Taliban Movement. The detainee was captured among 30 individuals known as the Dirty 30. All thirty of these individuals were caught together in Pakistan and a number of them are suspect of being bodyguards for Usama bin Laden. d. Other Relevant Data In 1988, the detainee began to use and sell heroin, cocaine, and hashish on the street in Milan, Italy. As a result, the Italian authorities arrested him and thereafter deported him. Sometime after that he returned to Italy. The detainee advised he continued his lifestyle using and selling drugs in Milan, Italy until 1991. In 1995, Italian immigration authorities again departed the detainee. On 10 June 1998, as a result of continuing investigation, the detainee was charged with criminal activity finalized in terrorism, distribution of counterfeit banknotes, preparation of false documents, use of falsified Italian and foreign seals and visas, recycling of documents and stolen automobiles. Reportedly, the detainee was seen in the Geyer Region of Tora Bora with a group of Tunisian Mujahadden fighters. In February 2002, the detainee was sentenced by a foreign government to 20 years in prison for being a member of a terrorist organization operating abroad. The detainee stayed at an al Qaida guesthouse in Khandahar, Afghanistan during Spring 2000 for approximately 2 weeks. |
| 4. | The following primary factors favor release or transfer: |
| | The detainee states he is not a member of the Armed Islamic Group, GIA. |
| 5. | You will be provided with a meaningful opportunity to be heard and present information to this Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter. |