# United States v. Page

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United States Supreme Court
137 U.S. 673
United States v. Page
The findings of fact and conclusion of law of the court of claims were as follows:
'FINDINGS OF FACT.
'(1) On January 18, 1865, the claimant was mustered in as a second lieutenant in the veteran reserve corps of volunteers, and served as such till September 20, 1866, when he was honorably mustered out. October 3, 1866, he was appointed second lieutenant in the forty-fourth regiment of infantry, U.S. army, and accepted the appointment the same day. August 3, 1870, he was transferred to the tenth regiment of infantry. September 29, 1871, by order of the president, he was retired from active service, and placed on the retired list of the army, on account of wounds received in battle, i. e., the loss of his right arm. (2) April 29, 1874, a court-martial was convened at New York city, by virtue of special orders No. 73, dated April 7, 1874, head-quarters military division of the Atlantic, for the trial of Second Lieutenant Frank A. Page, (retired.) Before this court-martial Lieut. Page was arraigned and tried on the following charges and specifications. [Here follow three charges, there being one specification under charge 1, one specification under charge 2, and three specifications under charge 3. To these charges and specifications the accused pleaded not guilty. The court found him guilty of the specification under charge 1, excepting as to certain words, for which it substituted others, but not guilty of the charge; guilty of charge 2 and the specification; guilty of charge 3, and of the second and third specifications thereunder, and guilty of the first specification, excepting as to certain words, and as to those not guilty. The sentence was, 'to be dismissed the service of the United States.' The charges, specifications, findings, and sentence are set forth at length in finding 2 of the court of claims.] The proceedings, findings, and sentence were transmitted to the secretary of war, who wrote upon the record the following order, viz.: 'War Department, Washington City, May 27, 1874. In conformity with the 65th of the rules and articles of war, the proceedings of the general court-martial in the foregoing case have been forwarded to the secretary of war, and by him submitted to the president. The proceedings and the findings upon the second charge and specification, and upon the third charge under its second and third specifications, are approved. With regard to the other findings, the remarks noted by Major General Hancock, who convened the court, are concurred in as follows: 'The finding to the first specification is not approved. The sale of Lieutenant Page's pay accounts and right of pay to the Piedmont and Arlington Life Insurance Company is not sustained by the evidence. The transaction was unquestionably a pledge as collateral security; but, the court having found that it was a sale, it is difficult to account for the rest of the finding to this specification, which describes the subsequent presentation of a claim against the United States for the same pay as false and fraudulent, although it acquits Lieutenant Page of Knowing that it was such. In order to constitute fraud, there must be a knowledge that the property belongs to another, and a design to deprive him of it. If these are wanting, it is not fraud. So the word 'false,' used in this connection, implies an intent to cheat or defraud. Moreover, if the transaction with the Piedmont and Arlington Life Insurance Company was a sale, as the court found it to be, how could the accused, knowing that he had made such a sale, present a claim for the same pay without knowing that it was false and fraudulent? By its finding to the specification, the court convicts the accused of presenting a claim against the United States for his pay which was false and fraudulent, and yet acquits him of the charge of 'presenting for payment a false and fraudulent claim against the United States.' The finding to the first charge is therefore likwis e disapproved. Again, having, by its finding to the specification of the 1st charge, characterized the presenting of a claim for pay as false and fraudulent, the court, by its finding to the 1st specification of the 3d charge, say that he did not do it 'fraudulently and dishonorably,' nor 'knowing that he had no right or property in said claim or payment;' and this, notwithstanding that he is by the same finding found guilty of 'defrauding the United States.' The finding to this specification, however, convicts the accused of the facts upon which it is based.' The sentence is approved. Second Lieut. Frank A. Page (retired) accordingly ceases to be an officer of the army from the date of this order. WM. W. BELKNAP, Secretary of War.' The said secretary also issued, May 27, 1874, general court-martial order No. 42, announcing the sentence of the courtmartial, and that 'Second Lieut. Frank A. Page (retired) ceases to be an officer of the army from the date of this order.' From the date of this order the claimant's name has not been borne on the army register, and he has received no pay as an officer of the army since that time.
'CONCLUSION OF LAW.
'Upon the foregoing facts, the court determines that the claimant is entitled to recover the sum of $11,572.75; that amount being the sum due the decedent within the statute of limitation of six years before the commencement of the suit.'
Judgment was rendered in favor of the claimant accordingly, and the case brought to this court by appeal.
Sol. Gen. Taft, for appellant.
J. E. McDonald and J. C. Fay, for appellee.
Mr. Chief Justice FULLER, after stating the facts as above, delivered the opinion of the court.

## Notes

This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
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